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AN EXAMINATION 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNKNOWABLE 
 
 AS EXPOUNDED BY 
 
 HERBERT SPENCER, 
 
 i> 
 
 BY 
 
 / 
 
 WILLIAM .\f. LACY. 
 
 
 PHILADELPKl \: 
 l; I .N.I A M I N I . LACY, l-'i 8. SEVENTH ST, 
 
 I--::. 
 

 [the library 
 
 lot CONGRESS 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1883, by 
 
 WILLIAM M. LACY, 
 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at AVashington. 
 
/ 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Issue. 
 Introductory 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 A Fundamental Fallacy. 
 The Impossibility of Establishing Unknowableness. ... 5 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Inductive Argument. 
 Origin of the Universe; Causation 27 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Inductive Argument Continued. 
 Space, Time, Matter, Motion, Force 47 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Tin: Imhctive Argument Continued. 
 
 Self- knowledge ': Extent of Conxeiousne.ss end Merited 
 Substance 70 
 
IV CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 The Inductive Argument Concluded. 
 Transfigured Realism Confronted by the Problems of 
 
 Realism 75 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Deductive Arguments. 
 The Process of Comprehension. . 102 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Deductive Arguments Continued. 
 The Unconditioned. 113 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Deductive Arguments Continued. 
 The Nature of Life . 145 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Deductive Arguments Concluded. 
 The Power of Thought to Transcend Consciousness. . 158 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The Final Argument. 
 The Reconciliation Between Science and Religion. . . 209 
 
/♦* 
 
 AN EXAMINATION 
 
 OF 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNKNOWABLE 
 
 AS EXPOUNDED BY 
 
 HERBERT SPENCER, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Issue. 
 
 Introductory Remarks. 
 
 §. 1. Citations to be hereafter made will show that Mr. 
 Spencer holds, and has endeavored to prove, that we can know 
 nothing of the External World, save its bare existence; nothing 
 of Mental Substance, save its bare existence; and noTEing of the 
 Intrinsic Nature of mental modes, except that something of 
 the kind exists. Otherwise stated, I conceive the theory to be, 
 that, of reality external to consciousness, nothing but the exist- 
 ence can be known. As stated in still a third form, the doctrine 
 seems to consist in the belief that all* without the sphere of 
 consciousness Is, in respect of its nature, — that is, the sum of 
 its attributes minus its existence, — absolutely unknowable. 
 Some realization of the equivalence of these three modes of 
 expression is essential to an appreciation of the discussions 
 which are to follow. 
 
 To the scheme of nescience, substantially as above set forth, 
 I oppose the doctrine that we are capable of realizing something 
 of the nature of things occupying the region outside of con- 
 sciousness. It is not meant by this that immediate knowledge 
 of anything ooi present in consciousness is possible. X.> <me i> 
 more firmly convinced than myself that there can I"' no con- 
 sciousness, strictly so-called, of what fa beyond consciousness. 
 
2 THE ISSUE. 
 
 But that there can be genuine thought of something not within 
 consciousness, is an independent proposition, and the one here 
 urged as true. 
 
 It will be perceived, by those who have read thus far, that, 
 as regards the question in dispute, Mr. Spencer is at great dis- 
 advantage of position. To the disadvantage necessarily accru- 
 ing to one who undertakes to establish a contested proposition, 
 there is added, in Mr. Spencer's case, the greater disadvantage 
 inherent in the effort to establish a rule as absolutely without 
 exception. His task is far less arduous whose success is attain- 
 able by breaking a single link in a chain of reasoning, or 
 forcing recognition of a single exception to a rule. While, how- 
 ever, it is obligatory upon any one to avail himself, in discussion, 
 of every advantage which he can, in moderate self-gratu- 
 lation, attribute to the greater justness of the views he has 
 adopted, he should scorn to avail himself of any mere contro- 
 versial formality. Ours is not the age of quibblings over the 
 "the affirmative" and "the negative;" and no such quibblings 
 shall the reader find. Wherever he finds denial, he shall find 
 affirmation; wherever he finds attempted refutation of an im- 
 portant doctrine, he shall find an endeavor to establish another 
 doctrine in its stead. In this connection it is also well to men- 
 tion that the dry and rigid epitome, above presented, gives no 
 adequate idea of the entertaining variety of important topics 
 which Mr. Spencer subordinated to his main design. All these 
 are to be drawn into the discussion. To the reader may be 
 promised, therefore, something more substantial than mere log- 
 ical statement of the issue would lead him to anticipate. 
 
 § 2. The issue is not between Mr. Spencer, on the one hand, 
 and a single opponent, on the other; nor is it of recent advent. 
 "The question of an external world," said Mr. Mill, "is the 
 great battle-ground of metaphysics." Says an eminent con- 
 temporary metaphysician: "In this border country there has 
 been a war for ages in the past, and there is likely to be a war 
 for ages in the future." Over all external to consciousness, let 
 us add, the conflict extends, engaging about as many factions as 
 
THE ISSUE. 3 
 
 there are philosophers. Whoever enlists in it will find that the 
 greatest are his allies and the greatest his opponents. 
 
 This is, therefore, no attack upon Mr. Spencer personally. 
 He is the most dangerous of adversaries, and one of the most 
 worthy of men. But, as the latest authoritative exponent of a 
 certain philosophic tendency, there is no proper alternative be- 
 tween attacking his reasonings or refraining from the attack. 
 Again, the sentiments here upheld are not peculiar to myself. 
 They are those of a numerous class of enquirers, and are even 
 entertained by mankind at large. It can scarcely be presumpt- 
 uous to side with so many, although to do so is to decide against 
 the rest. One thing that may seem presumptuous is to risk the 
 defeat which has been repeatedly visited upon the strong. But 
 if the contest is to be continued, and its antiquity and present 
 unsettled state imply that it is, there must be a continual coming 
 of recruits. He who thinks he has novel tactics to try should 
 come forward and give them trial. 
 
 § 3. To the issue, the Doctrine of Evolution is not a party. 
 There is, it is true, a connection between what I have called 
 the "Philosophy of the Unknowable " and the Philosophy of 
 Evolution ; but it is' not that of foundation and superstructure. 
 
 Mr. Spencer has, indeed, prefaced the exposition of his 
 System of Philosophy by a systematic treatise on "The Un- 
 knowable;" and he does, moreover, return to the subject again 
 and again throughout his writings, to give his views 1 hereon 
 further expression, elucidation, and confirmation. His theory of 
 knowledge he considers, not a doctrine of metaphysics only, but 
 a biological, psychological, and even a sociological doctrine as 
 well. Under the title of "Transfigured Realism," too, he gives 
 it consideration not otherwise bestowed. 
 
 Yet it is not indispensable to the Philosophy of Evolution, 
 I >i 1 1 is rather a complication from which thai philosophy should 
 be glad to extricate itself. Thai evolution is only a law of ap- 
 pearances, not a law of things, ifl a thought fraught with dis- 
 heartenment and burdened by a weight of complex subtilties. 
 No evolutionist should harbor Bentimenl repugnant to the t<'n< t 
 
4 THE ISSUE. 
 
 that realities are the subject-matter of the process of evolution 
 and of the Evolution Philosophy. But if he must entertain a 
 prejudice, let it not lead him into suspicion that he hears a voice 
 from the hostile camp. In my own case, at least, I find the 
 fullest acceptance of criticisms to be propounded not incompat- 
 ible with estimation of the "Synthetic Philosophy " as perhaps 
 the noblest speculative product of a single mind. 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 , 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 A Fundamental Fallacy. 
 
 The Impossibility of Establishing Unknowableness. 
 
 § 4. On slightest acquaintance with Mr. Spencer's agnostic 
 conclusions, there is enough to raise the question, How is it 
 possible to establish the proposition that something is unknow- 
 able? Accordingly with this question the examination shall 
 begin. Incidentally to the search for an answer, the reader 
 shall be introduced to the whole line of argument which it is 
 my intention to investigate. 
 
 The following is an epitome of the treatise on "The Un- 
 knowable:" " Common Sense asserts the existence of a reality; 
 Objective Science proves that this reality cannot be what we 
 think it; Subjective Science shows why we cannot think of it 
 as it K and yet are compelled to think of it as exMng; and in 
 this assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature, Religion 
 finds an assertion essentially coinciding with her own." (First 
 Prin., § 27.) 
 
 I 5. (J ran ting that "Common Sense asserts the existence of 
 a reality," which -hull be provisionally called "The Unknow- 
 able," we will first enquire in what manner Objective Science 
 i- supposed to aid in proving that this reality i- bo far from 
 being what we think it, that it is "utterly inscrutable in nature." 
 
 To deduce unknowableness from knowledge of "The Unknow- 
 able," would have been absurd, so what doubtless appeared t<> 
 be an alternative method was adopted. It seemed t<» Mi-. 
 Spencer that if successful in showing that every idea, vulgarly 
 supposed to be representative of the nature of "The Unknow- 
 able," conflicts witli itself, lie would have the testimony of 
 Objective Science in Buppoii of his position. Pursuant bo such 
 
6 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 view, he makes an attack upon all possible conceptions of the 
 Origin of the Universe. These, if he commits no error, are 
 demonstrated self-conflicting. Next, he grapples with the 
 mental representation of Causation, and brings it before us, de- 
 nuded of obscurity, that Mansel may point out its self-opposing 
 tendencies. This disposition of " Ultimate Religious Ideas" 
 being made, " Ultimate Scientific Ideas " are treated in a similar 
 manner. The notions expressed by the terms, " Space, " " Time," 
 "Matter," " Motion," "Force," "Extent of Consciousness," and 
 "Mental Substance," are severally examined for the purpose of 
 showing that each, when expanded, combats itself. 
 
 We can aiford to be very generous with Mr. Spencer. Let 
 it, for experiment, be conceded that he has been entirely success- 
 ful in showing, that what we have heretofore deemed knowledge 
 of " The Unknowable," the knowledge that it exists excepted, 
 "proves on examination to be utterly irreconcilable with itself." 
 (First Prin., § 22.) Nevertheless a gap effectually separates 
 the premise from the conclusion. A certain portion of the 
 universe was to be proved unknowable. Our ideas of it are, 
 with one exception, shown to be utterly incongruous. The con- 
 clusion is, that there is a total non-resemblance between these 
 ideas and the part of the universe in question. But what shall 
 be said to the polemic who will argue that this, the so-called 
 "Unknowable," may, in exact correspondence with what have 
 been esteemed its representatives in the world of mind, sustain 
 necessary conflicts among its parts? Worse than hopeless 
 would it be to rely upon the declaration that it is impossible to 
 pronounce this assertion true or false ; for, if its falsity is not 
 known, none can deny its truth; and if true, "The Unknow- 
 able" is known. Of one defence, and one only, can Mr. 
 Spencer avail himself. He must maintain that "The Un- 
 knowable" is free from the conflicts which overwhelm the ideas 
 commonly thought to represent it — that the notion of its self- 
 consistency is as legitimate as the notion of its existence. The 
 defence, that existence involves self-consistency, is not open to 
 him; because he denies this in the case of the contested ideas. 
 Such an inconsistency as the ideas have, may realities be sup- 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 7 
 
 posed to have, unless the contrary be shown. Understand that 
 if the proposition missing from Mr. Spencer's argument is im- 
 plied, he has not only affirmed of "The Unknowable" a gen- 
 eral and abstract consistency, but also denied that it possesses 
 any of a multitude of special and concrete inconsistencies. 
 Every time he showed, or tried to show, us an imperfection in 
 the ideas which he impugned, he said, by implication, "The 
 Unknowable is not subject to an imperfection answering to 
 this one." Justice will be done if he be permitted to speak his 
 own accusation. " In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us 
 the truth, that we are not permitted to know — nay are not even 
 permitted to conceive — that Reality which is behind the veil 
 of Appearance; and yet it is said to be our duty to believe (and 
 in so far to conceive) that this Reality exists in a certain de- 
 fined manner." (First Prin., § 31.) The "certain defined 
 manner," in the case before us, is the possession of congruity 
 and the freedom from certain incongruities. 
 
 Thus it appears that the first proof that something is un- 
 knowable, rests on the supposition that more of it than its ex- 
 istence is known. Of course all would more willingly hear 
 "The Unknowable" called congruous than incongruous. It is 
 not this description, but the name and something said to justify 
 its application, to which objection is made. That the objection 
 lias been sustained by criticism, that there has been discovered, 
 in the reasoning of Mr. Spencer, a difficulty from which he can- 
 not extricate himself, they who still doubt may satisfy them- 
 selves by considering what answers he can offer to the question, 
 Is the unknowable portion of the universe a chaos correspond- 
 ing to that mental chaos which you tell US OUT thoughts of 
 something beyond the knowable compose? Refusing to an- 
 swer, he would abandon his argument. Should he say "yes," 
 he would deny his conclusion. Should he say "no," he would 
 
 be thereby debarred it- affirmation, lie musl answer t<» avoid 
 
 a surrender; yet any answer will defeat his cause. 
 
 § ('). Although Objective Science has jusi taught us, by its 
 example, to think of the inscrutable reality as congruous, we 
 
8 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 are now to learn how " Subjective Science shows why we cannot 
 think of it as it is." Reduced to syllogistic form, the argument 
 to be next investigated seems, a minor premise being supplied, 
 to stand thus: 
 
 There can be no knowledge of what is unconditioned; 
 "The Unknowable" is unconditioned; 
 .'.There can be no knowledge of "The Unknowable." 
 
 To which, one objection is that the minor premise destroys the 
 conclusion. Asserting that "The Unknowable" is uncon- 
 ditioned, carries the implication that it is known to be uncon- 
 ditioned. Lest it be thought unfair to present so briefly an 
 elaborate argument, and particularly unfair to summarily sup- 
 ply a minor premise, it will be well to go further into detail. 
 First, however, it must be premised that the author has, because 
 of supposed appropriateness, given to "The Unknowable" 
 several titles, not yet mentioned, each of which is significant of 
 a part of what is imported by "unconditioned," — significant 
 of the absence of certain particular conditions. 
 
 Assisted by Hamilton and Mansel, Mr. Spencer, in the 
 chapter entitled " The Relativity of All Knowledge," puts forth 
 considerable effort to convince us that "a thought involves rela- 
 tion, difference, likeness." (First Prin., § 24.) By this is meant 
 that every thought involves a relation of subject and object; 
 also a difference and a likeness between the object and something 
 else. So much being granted, it would follow that whatever 
 cannot exist in relation to the thinking mind, and be known as 
 different from something else, and as like something else, cannot 
 be thought of at all. Because seeming not to fulfill the 
 specified conditions of the thinkable, "the Real, as distinguished 
 from the Phenomenal;" "the First Cause;" "the Infinite;" 
 "the Absolute," or non-relative; "the creating;" "the un- 
 caused;" "the Actual," as opposed to the "Apparent" — in 
 short, "the Unconditioned" — is pronounced unthinkable, and 
 the conclusion that "The Unknowable" can never be an object 
 of thought is treated as too obvious to need definite expression. 
 
 From his own words we may best learn how Mr. Spencer 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 9 
 
 passes to the ultimate conclusion from the law of relativity. 
 After quoting largely to show that "the Unconditioned" has 
 been put to the first and second tests and found unthink- 
 able, he proceeds ( First Prin., § 24 ) to apply the third axiom 
 — what can be known can be classed. "A cognition of the 
 Real, as distinguished from the Phenomenal, must, if it exists, 
 conform to this law of cognition in general. The First Cause, 
 the Infinite, the Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. 
 To be positively thought of, it must be thought of as such or 
 such — as of this or that kind. Can it be like in kind to any- 
 thing of which we have sensible experience? Obviously not. 
 Between the creating and the created, there must be a distinction 
 transcending any of the distinctions existing between different 
 divisions of the created. That which is uncaused cannot be 
 assimilated to that which is caused: the two being, in the very 
 naming antithetically opposed. The Infinite cannot be grouped 
 along with something that is finite; since, in being so grouped, 
 it in ust be regarded as not-infinite. It is impossible to put the 
 Absolute in the same category with anything relative, so long 
 as the Absolute is defined as that of which no necessary relation 
 can be predicated. Is it then that the Actual, though unthink- 
 able by classification with the Apparent, is thinkable by classifi- 
 cation with itself? This supposition is equally absurd with the 
 other. It implies the plurality of the First Cause, the Infinite, 
 the Absolute; and this implication is self-contradictory. There 
 cannot be more than one First Cause; seeing that the ex- 
 istence of more than one would involve the existence <>f 
 something necessitating more than one, which something would 
 he the true First ( ause. How self-destructive is the assumption 
 of two or more infinities, i> manifest <>n remembering that such 
 Infinities, by limiting each other, would become finite. And 
 similarly, an Absolute which existed imt alone but along with 
 
 other absolutes, would do Longer be an absolute hut a relative. 
 
 The Unconditioned therefore, a- claSSlble neither with any form 
 of the conditioned nor with any other Unconditioned, cannot 
 
 he classed at all. And to admit that it cannot he known ;i- of 
 such or such kind, is to admit that it IS unkuowahli/' A few 
 
10 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 words more, and the entire argument is thus summarized and 
 ended: "a thought involves relation, difference, likeness. 
 Whatever does not present each of these does not admit of cog- 
 nition. And hence we may say that the Unconditioned, as 
 presenting none of them is trebly unthinkable." 
 
 What, if we assent to all this, does it establish in regard to 
 " The Unknowable?" A multiplicity of names, signifying the 
 possession of certain characteristics, has been given to it; and 
 these characteristics have, it is thought, been proved incogni- 
 zable. Does "The Unknowable" possess these characteristics? 
 is now the all-important question. To profess ignorance, is to 
 yield the argument. To deny, is to leave a gap in the argu- 
 ment and violate the conclusion. To affirm, is to complete the 
 argument by violating the conclusion. Mr. Spencer has indi- 
 cated a willingness to seize the last horn of the trilemma. By 
 indulging in reasoning which postulates such knowledge, he 
 has asserted that " The Unknowable " is real ( not phenomenal ), 
 a first cause, infinite, absolute (non-relative), creating, uncaused, 
 actual (not apparent): in brief, unconditioned. Surely this is 
 an amount of information which we do not possess concerning 
 many things that are called knowable. ISTot yet, however, have 
 the limits been reached. All that has been affirmed of that 
 possessing its alleged attributes, has been affirmed of "The 
 Unknowable." It is, we are to understand, of such a nature 
 that it cannot exist in relation to the knowing mind. In other 
 words, we know "The Unknowable" as so conditioned that it 
 is incapable of that relative existence without which any knowl- 
 edge of it is impossible. Add to the intelligence already ac- 
 cumulated the knowledge that "The Unknowable" is neither 
 like nor unlike anything else existing ; and consider the number- 
 less implications which might be developed and added to the sum. 
 Should not "The Unknowable" be called by another name? 
 Mr. Spencer must answer affirmatively or disavow many beliefs 
 essentially implied in his mode of proof; but in the latter case 
 he has proved nothing in regard to " The Unknowable." What 
 matters it, as far as the question before us is concerned, whether 
 a long list of attributes is conceivable or inconceivable, if they 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY.. 11 
 
 are not known to belong to a The Unknowable?" Admit that 
 "The Unknowable" is not known to be unconditioned, and 
 we care not if "the Unconditioned" is unthinkable. Concede 
 it impossible to say knowingly that "The Unknowable" has 
 peculiarities which must forever prevent its existing relative 
 to something knowing it, and in relations of likeness and un- 
 likeness, and it will be necessary to consider all that has been so 
 far said about the relativity of knowledge utterly irrelevant. 
 Ineffective from end to end is the argument, unless the thought 
 that "The Unknowable" is unconditioned, is as legitimate as 
 the thought that it exists. 
 
 § 7. Notwithstanding the premise, above implied, and 
 elsewhere repeatedly expressed, that "The Unknowable" 
 transcends all relation, we are now to be shown how it is related 
 to the mind; and the purpose is to farther convince us that 
 "we cannot think of it as it is." From a point of view widely 
 separated from that which he lately occupied, Mr. Spencer, in 
 additional support of his theory of the unknowableness of 
 something which exists, directs our attention (First Prin., § 25) 
 to what purports to be the relativity of knowledge presenting 
 another aspect. " Life," he says, " is definable as the continuous 
 adjustment of internal relations to external relations." "If 
 then," he argues, "Life, in all its manifestations, inclusive of 
 Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous 
 adjustment of internal relations to external relations, the 
 necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes obvious." 
 11 If every act of knowing is the formation of a relation in 
 consciousness parallel to a relation in the environment, then 
 the relativity of knowledge is self-evident — becomes indeed a 
 truism." Judging from what ha- been cited, one mighl be led to 
 suppose that the relat ivity spoken of consists of relation- be- 
 tween phenomena, relations between noumena, relations between 
 phenomena and noumena, and relation- between phenomenal 
 and noumena] relation-. Taking, however, all that is said into 
 consideration, the meaning seems to be, that only phenomenal 
 relation-, or relation- in consciousness, can ever come "withini 
 
12 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 the reach of intelligence;" and that the impossiblity of trans- 
 cending these relations proves noumena and their relations un- 
 knowable. Witness the following: "The knowledge within 
 our reach, is the only knowledge that can be of service to us. 
 This maintenance of a correspondence between internal actions 
 and external actions, which both constitutes our life at each 
 moment and is the means whereby life is continued through 
 subsequent moments, merely requires that the agencies acting 
 upon us shall be known in their co-existences and sequences, 
 and not that they shall be known in themselves." Remarks 
 immediately following show this to mean that the necessities of 
 life require a knowledge, not of noumena, but merely of the co- 
 existences and sequences of the effects which noumena produce in 
 consciousness. " If x and y are two uniformly connected proj:>erties 
 in some outer object, while a and b are the effects they produce 
 in our consciousness; and if while the property x produces in 
 us the indifferent mental state a, the property y produces in us 
 the painful mental state b (answering to a physical injury); 
 then, all that is requisite for our guidance, is, that x being the 
 uniform accompaniment of y externally, a shall be the uniform 
 accompaniment of b internally; so that when, by the presence 
 of x, a is produced in consciousness, b, or rather the idea of 6, 
 shall follow it, and excite the motions by which the effect of y 
 may be escaped. The sole need is that a and b and the relation 
 between them, shall always answer to x and y and the relation 
 between them. It matters nothing to us if a and b are like x 
 and y or not. Could they be exactly identical with them, we 
 should not be one whit the better off; and their total dissimi- 
 larity is no disadvantage to us." Immediately after comes ^he 
 conclusion of the argument. "Deep down then in the very 
 nature of Life, the relativity of our knowledge is discernible. 
 The analysis of vital actions in general, leads not only to the 
 conclusion that things in themselves cannot be known to us ; 
 but also to the conclusion that knowledge of them, were it 
 possible, would be useless." 
 
 What has all this to do with " The Unknowable ? " Are we to 
 understand that it is believed to comprise "things in them- 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 13 
 
 selves " which are known to be so constituted and connected 
 with consciousness that a knowledge of their nature would not 
 enable us to better procure the desirable and avoid the unde- 
 sirable effects which they may produce upon us ? Silence on Mr. 
 Spencer's part means death to the argument ; negation, abortion ; 
 affirmation, self-destruction. Implicitly he affirms. "In the 
 very definition of Life," he tells us, "when reduced to its most 
 abstract shape," the "ultimate implication becomes visible." 
 According to this definition, Life is "the continuous adjustment 
 of internal relations to external relations." Because in this 
 view of life is involved the belief that "every act of knowing 
 is the formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a re- 
 lation in the environment," it is deemed beyond dispute that the 
 mind can and need contemplate relations in consciousness only, and 
 that therefore the environment is unknowable. But stop: it 
 is impossible to realize that life is "the continuous adjustment 
 of internal relations to external relations," or that "every act 
 of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness par- 
 allel to a relation in the environment," without forming a rela- 
 tion in consciousness that is not parallel to a relation in the en- 
 vironment, but representative of a relation between the environ- 
 ment and the environed mind. Now, as in the author's words, 
 "tin- consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both 
 the related members" (First Prin., § 26), the knowledge of a 
 relation between them proclaims the mind and its environment 
 knowable and known. " In the very definition of life," then, 
 as in everything which we have found Mr, Spencer employing 
 for the same purpose, "this ultimate implication becomes vis- 
 ible" — the nature of "The Unknowable" is partly known. 
 Besides being known as one of the terms of a certain kind of 
 relation, it is, according to implication- of remarks concerning 
 the necessities of life, minutely understood. Knowing that 
 promotion of life "merely requires thai the agencies : i « - 1 1 1 1 ir 
 upon n- shall he known in their co-existences and sequences, 
 and imt that they shall l>c knowD in themselves" — thai the 
 record of past manifestations of "The Unknowable" will just 
 as well enable us to regulate the character of future manifesta- 
 
14 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 tions, as would a perfect understanding of "The Unknowable" 
 and all the relations which it may possibly bear to us — 
 is impossible unless "The Unknowable" is exceedingly well 
 known. Repeatedly we discover the one unlawful implication. 
 Again Mr. Spencer has thwarted his own design. 
 
 § 8. With the assertion that we cannot think of "The Un- 
 knowable " as it is, fresh in our memory, we are called upon to 
 listen to an argument, supplementary of those preceding, yet 
 based on the supposition that we may rightly think of it as a 
 cause. 
 
 An entire chapter ( First Prin., Part I., Chap. I.) is devoted 
 principally to establishment of the doctrine that "there must be 
 a fundamental harmony" between Science and Religion; and 
 another (First Prin., Part I., Chap. V.) to showing that this 
 fundamental harmony is to be found in the conclusion that 
 u the reality underlying appearances is totally and for ever incon- 
 ceivable by us." The former chapter is almost unobjectionable; 
 the latter is open to destructive criticism. In it we are told 
 that in the " assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature, 
 Religion finds an assertion essentially coinciding with her own ; " 
 and this is what we question. How Science, represented by 
 Mr. Spencer, proves the conclusion which is to end the Avar 
 between Scientists and Religionists, by contradicting it, — how 
 she uncovers something, to show it to be totally and eternally 
 hidden from our view, has been observed. Forgetting this, as 
 best we may, let us suppose that Science supports the conclusion 
 that promises to harmonize her and her great antagonist. Will 
 religious thought tend to the acceptance of the same belief? 
 
 Religion is represented as having been forced to abandon 
 position after position, retreating before advancing Science, 
 until the impregnable point, the ultimate conclusion, was 
 reached. "Leaving out the accompanying moral code, which 
 is in all cases a supplementary growth, a religious creed is de- 
 finable as a theory of original causation." (First Prin., § 14.) 
 As religions developed, existing theories of causation gave way 
 to others. " Each higher religious creed, rejecting those deli- 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 15 
 
 nite and simple interpretations of nature previously given, has 
 become more religious by doing this. As the quite concrete 
 and conceivable agencies alleged as the causes of things, have 
 been replaced by agencies less concrete and conceivable, the 
 element of mystery has of necessity become more predominant." 
 (First Prim, § 28.) "And now observe that all along, the 
 agent which has effected the purification has been Science." 
 (First Prin., § 29.) Here we must pause to consider of what 
 the alleged development consists. It is asserted that Religion, 
 d by Science, has, from time to time, abandoned causes 
 relatively conceivable and assumed causes less conceivable. 
 Note that Religion is not shown to have ever given up the hy- 
 pothesis of causation. That the contrary is true, we are fre- 
 quently reminded. Defining religious creeds as theories of 
 original causation, is the same as affirming that they Avill be 
 something else than religious creeds when they exclude belief 
 in a cause. What says the author? " Be it in the primitive 
 Ghost-theory which assumes a human personality behind each 
 unusual phenomenon; be it in Polytheism, in which these per- 
 sonalities are partially generalized; be it in Monotheism, 
 in which they are wholly generalized; or be it in Pantheism, 
 in which the generalized personality becomes one with the 
 phenomena; we equally find an hypothesis which is supposed 
 to render the universe comprehensible. Nay, even that which 
 is commonly regarded as the negation of all Religion — even 
 positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for it, too, in 
 asserting the Self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion, which 
 
 irdfl as adequate causo of every appearance, propounds an 
 
 a priori theory from which it holds the facts to be deducihle." 
 
 (Firsl Prin., § 14.) Elsewhere, as well as here, the assertion 
 is withheld, that Religion has consented, or will consent, to dis- 
 pense with all causes. No more is said than thai "instead of 
 die specific comprehensible agency before assigned, (here is sub- 
 stituted a less specific and Less comprehensible agency." (First 
 Prin., ^ 29.) Could any doubl in regard to Mi-. Spencer's 
 meaning remain, it would l>e dispelled by the words of the 
 alleged ultimate religious conclusion. To this we now pass. 
 
16 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifesta- 
 tion of some Power by which we are acted upon ; though Om- 
 nipresence is unthinkable, yet, as experience discloses no bounds 
 to the diffusion of phenomena, we are unable to think of limits 
 to the presence of this Power; while the criticisms of Science 
 teach us that this Power is Incomprehensible. And this con- 
 sciousness of an Incomprehensible Power, called Omnipresent 
 from inability to assign its limits, is just that consciousness on 
 which Religion dwells." (First Prin., § 27.) 
 
 Science proves that there is "a Reality utterly inscrutable in 
 nature." Religion teaches us to believe that there is an agency 
 producing all the phenomena we know, the cause of all known 
 effects, a never-absent power. Mr. Spencer informs us that 
 here is an agreement between Science and Religion: which 
 means that "The Unknowable" of Science and the Cosmical 
 Cause of Religion are identical. In the "assertion of a Reality 
 utterly inscrutable in nature, Religion finds an assertion essen- 
 tially coinciding with her own." Once more we learn much 
 about "The Unknowable." It is an ever-present power, a 
 universal cause, an all-working agency. Admit this, and it is 
 possible to partially describe a nature called wholly indescrib- 
 able, to conceive a nature said to be wholly inconceivable, and 
 to know a nature deemed absolutely unknowable; deny it, and 
 Religion does not contribute to the belief in something unknow- 
 able. Even supposing that both Science and Religion were, as 
 alleged, moving towards this belief, the fact is useless for the 
 purposes of the argument unless a certain correspondence be- 
 tween the general tendency of thought and " The Unknowable " 
 be assumed ; but, again, to so assume, is to assume knowledge 
 which the assumption is to prove impossible. 
 
 § 9. Every leading argument by which Mr. Spencer attempts 
 to enforce acceptance of the conclusion, " that we cannot know the 
 ultimate nature of that which is manifested to us" ( First Prin., 
 § 35) has now been considered. Examining the conclusion 
 itself, none can fail to notice the fatal implication — we do know 
 something of the ultimate nature of that which is manifested 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 17 
 
 to us. Strike out everything descriptive of the ultimate nature 
 of "The Unknowable," and, having substituted something 
 which will (as nearly as is possible ) convey the idea of existence 
 only, observe what is left of the conclusion. We must drop 
 the words, " that which is manifested to us ; " for by describing 
 "The Unknowable" thus, we imply that it is properly con- 
 ceived, not merely as something capable of producing phe- 
 nomena, but also as something that actually causes certain well 
 known effects. Xeither can "the ultimate nature" of "The 
 Unknowable" be spoken of: the possession of a noumenal 
 nature, by an object, is something belonging to its noumenal 
 nature; without doubt, then, Ave cannot speak of anything's 
 noumenal nature without implying some knowledge of the same. 
 Supplying the proposed substitute for what criticism compels 
 us to exclude, the conclusion stands — "We cannot know some- 
 thing which exists." Still it is suicidaL Denial that we can 
 know something, is both a denial that it can exist in a certain 
 relation to the mind and an affirmation that it must bear to the 
 mind an opposite relation; therefore the phrase, "we cannot 
 know," must be stricken out. There is left, not a conclusion, 
 but what may be called by the more general name, "conception " 
 — the conception of something existing. Such is the only 
 thought that can be entertained of what is "utterly inscrutable 
 in nature;" and it is a thought which does not express un- 
 knowableness, but consists with the reverse. Some such modi- 
 fications a- those which have been dropped are essential to Mr. 
 Spencer's conclusion; yet any, however vague, would render 
 that conclusion self-contradicting. Without them, there is no 
 Conclusion; with them, there is worse than none 
 
 § 10. "Have we not," Mr. Spencer confidently asks | First 
 Prin., $ 31), "seen how utterly incompetent our minds are to 
 form even an approach to a conception of thai which underlies 
 
 all phenomena?" It seems not. An attempt to translate the 
 
 conclusion into thought has confirmed as in the observation 
 
 that, "after it has been shown that every supposition respecting 
 
 nesis of tin- Universe commits us to alternative impossi- 
 
 2 
 
18 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 bilities of thought — after it has been shown that each attempt 
 to conceive real existence ends in an intellectual suicide — after 
 it has been shown why, by the very constitution of our minds, 
 we are eternally debarred from thinking of the Absolute; it is 
 still asserted that we ought to think of the Absolute thus 
 and thus." (First Prin., § 31.) Throughout we have found 
 reason for believing that Mr. Spencer's Science of Nescience, 
 as he says of the religion which is, he thinks, ultimately to 
 support it, "has all along professed to have some knowledge of 
 that which transcends knowledge; and has so contradicted its 
 own teachings. While with one breath it has asserted that the 
 Cause of all things passes understanding, it has, with the next 
 breath, asserted that the Cause of all things possesses such or 
 such attributes — can be in so far understood." ( First Prin., § 28.) 
 Yes, it will even, as was seen before, consent to call that which 
 transcends knowledge "the Cause of all things;" not realizing 
 that power to cause, acts of causing, and the bearing of relations 
 of universal cause to numberless effects, are attributes. The 
 philosophical dissertation which we have casually surveyed, 
 while seeming with loud voice to banish "The Unknowable" 
 from the realm of speculation, silently acknowledges its title to 
 a place in philosophy. The abstract truth that we cannot rea- 
 son about that of which we know nothing, it seems, occurred to 
 Mr. Spencer ; but it appears that he took no pains to determine 
 just what knowledge was required to prove his particular 
 proposition. He would have us observe, "that every one of the 
 arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demon- 
 strated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something 
 beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, 
 is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the 
 very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there 
 lies hidden the assumption that it is." (First Prin., § 26.) But 
 care has been taken to show that the ultimate proposition con- 
 cerning "The Unknowable" is without meaning and without 
 support, unless we know, not only that something besides the 
 knowable is, but also, to some extent, what it is. It is admitted 
 that we are compelled to form representations of " The Un- 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 19 
 
 knowable" which are not representative of its existence only; 
 but asserted that all such conceptions must be treated as entirely 
 illusive. "Very likely there will ever remain a need to give 
 shape to that indefinite sense of an Ultimate Existence, which 
 forms the basis of our intelligence. We shall always be under 
 the necessity of contemplating it as some mode of being; that 
 is — of representing it to ourselves in some form of thought, 
 however vague. And we shall not err in doing this so long as we 
 treat every notion we thus frame as merely a symbol utterly without 
 resemblance to that for which it stands. Perhaps the constant 
 formation of such symbols and constant rejection of them as 
 inadequate, may be hereafter, as it has hitherto been, a means 
 of discipline. Perpetually to construct ideas requiring the 
 utmost stretch of our faculties, and perpetually to find that 
 such ideas mast be abandoned as futile imaginations, may realize 
 to us more fully than any other course, the greatness of that 
 which we vainly strive to grasp." (First Prin.. § 31.) Treat 
 every notion of "The Unknowable" which has been found in 
 Mr. Spencer's speculations, as "a symbol utterly without resem- 
 blance to that for which it stands," and you will be obliged to 
 consider his exposition of the Philosophy of The Unknowable 
 as among the most remarkable of intellectual suicides. Having 
 formed illegitimate symbols, they may with advantage, it is true, 
 be sometimes permitted to enter into our reasonings; but when 
 the intellectual gymnastic is completed by their rejection, all 
 that depends apOD them for it- acceptance most he rejected too. 
 
 A- yet, we have had no proof that a certain portion of the 
 universe is unknowable; for, if all our ideas of it "musl he 
 abandoned a- futile imaginations," then must Mr. Spencer's 
 nescience theory hi- abandoned a- improved and unthinkable. 
 
 > 1 1. Many flaws in Mr. Spencer's reasoning have been 
 ignored in order to bring out more clearly an ever-recurring 
 
 error, which, of itself, is sufficient to render ougatory his entire 
 contribution to the doctrine of nescience. The establishment 
 of a broader truth than any yet reached was also contem- 
 plated. What we have learned ifl of more value to phil- 
 
20 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 osophy than it has heretofore seemed to be, if it has prepared 
 us for the apprehension of the fact that failure must be the re- 
 sult of every attempt to prove that something is unknowable 
 — can be known only to exist. Two considerations, each of 
 which is alone adequate, combine to force this conclusion upon 
 us: (1.) It is impossible to construct an argument which shall, 
 without disabling itself, lead to the required conclusion ; and 
 ( 2.) It is impossible to realize the conclusion in thought. Tak- 
 ing these propositions in their order, we will turn our attention 
 to their substantiation. 
 
 Nothing can be shown in justification of a belief, except that 
 it is agreeable, or that an opposing belief is repugnant, to 
 something which is held to be true. A conclusion, then, which 
 denies, in its own case, the validity of such justification, makes 
 every argument in its own support self-destructive. Such is 
 the conclusion that something is unknowable. If we know 
 nothing of " The Unknowable " but that it exists, we are not 
 entitled to the postulate that there is congruity among its parts 
 and between it and its opposite, the knowable. Precluded the 
 assertion of this congruity, we cannot say that our legitimate 
 thoughts of "The Unknowable" should harmonize with each 
 other or with our thoughts of the knowable. That the propo- 
 sition, expressing what we are permitted to think of " The Un- 
 knowable," is consistent and agrees with truth in general is, 
 therefore, no reason for believing it true. Can its truth be 
 proved by showing that a contradictory proposition is inconsist- 
 ent, and otherwise does violence to truth ? No ; because this last 
 proposition declares something of "The Unknowable," and 
 therefore, may be in so far true, no matter how great the incon- 
 sistency which its acceptance would occasion. Anything may 
 with impunity be declared of "The Unknowable." Were it 
 even possible to show the belief in something unknowable to be 
 intuitive, it would be useless to do so: "The Unknowable" 
 cannot be known to be in harmony with the intuitive powers. 
 
 The first obstacle lost sight of, another arises before us. Ex- 
 pressed or implied, an inference must be drawn from premises. 
 Our conclusion asserts that something is unknowable. As we 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 21 
 
 cannot argue that the something is unknowable because it is 
 unknowable, we must declare of it something, not unknowable- 
 ness, which is a sign of unknowableness. Only one declaration 
 besides that of unknowableness will our conclusion permit us 
 to make; that is, that the something exists. Thus we have as 
 a premise, " The something exists." This, which we see is a 
 minor premise, will aid in finding the major. Unless the ma- 
 jor premise predicates something of whatever exists, the minor 
 is irrelevant; and if anything other than unknowableness is 
 predicated, the conclusion does not follow. The only possible 
 major premise then is, " Whatever exists is unknowable." The 
 minor is, "The something exists." And the conclusion is 
 " The sometiiing is unknowable." Now, one of two results must 
 appear: either the major premise is wrong, and we have proved 
 nothing; or it is right, and everything is unknowable, one 
 thing no more than another. The existence of something is 
 the datum from which its unknowableness is to be deduced. 
 Some addition may be made to the datum; but not without 
 professing more knowledge of the something than its existence, 
 and thus assuming premises which the conclusion will destroy. 
 Without such addition, the datum is insufficient, unless what- 
 ever exists is unknowable; but if existence is a sign of unknow- 
 ableness, many things unknowable are known, and the particular 
 something may be one of them. 
 
 Before the attempt was made, we might have known the im- 
 possibility of reasoning about that of which no notion can be 
 formed. Our reasoning was, by supposition, concerning some- 
 thing; and we called it the something to distinguish ii from 
 Other things. This we had DO right to do; since, until the 
 conclusion was reached, we were not permitted to know that it 
 differed from anything else existing. If, therefore, we really 
 reasoned about something, it may have been anything — it may 
 have been, e, </., an appearance. The nearest approach to a 
 notion of that of which the conclusion makes a declaration, 
 that may be consistently formed, is a notion of its existence. 
 Not a notion of Us existence, however, for this again implies a 
 distinction; but a notion of unqualified existence. Hut ii" the 
 
22 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 notion contain nothing besides existence, our reasoning will 
 apply to all existence, and our conclusion will be in regard to 
 existence, and not something, not existence, which we wish to 
 prove unknowable. All that can be done to complete the 
 notion the conclusion will undo. 
 
 Already the unthinkableness of something unknowable be- 
 gins to emerge. "The Unknowable" is that of which nothing 
 but the existence can be known. How any existence can be 
 known separate from something to which it belongs, need not 
 be asked. It is sufficient that if we contemplate existence 
 wholly apart from other attributes, we cannot say to what it 
 belongs, and have no reason to say that it does not belong to 
 this or that which we know. 
 
 Although it is that of which nothing but the existence can 
 be known, "The Unknowable" is that of which everything: 
 besides the existence is known to be not, in any measure, know- 
 able. Notwithstanding the great discrepancy between these 
 definitions, the latter is deducible from the former, and they 
 contain the same element of incongruity. Unknowableness is 
 an attribute which no one will identify with existence. When 
 unknowableness is ascribed to an object, therefore, something 
 more than existence is affirmed of it. To do this is improper 
 if the object is really unknowable to such an extent as is 
 alleged. Nor is unknowableness entirely a negative attribute. 
 Volumes might be filled with an elaboration of the knowledge 
 of an object which is inferable from its unknowableness. We 
 might compare the object with all imaginable things, one by 
 one, and each time say, " It is unlike this" It is throughout 
 uniform and unchangeable in respect of its unknowableness. So 
 strangely is it constituted that whatever there is of it besides its 
 existence can never be presented to us, or be in the least degree 
 represented by any conception we are able to form. The num- 
 ber of such deductions is limitless; one would work destruction 
 to the conception of " The Unknowable." 
 
 Definitions of "The Unknowable" imply that it is divisible 
 into two parts — the part known, or its existence; and the part 
 absolutely unknowable, or what belongs to it besides existence. 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 23 
 
 The whole is called unknowable, because so little of it can be 
 known ; the existence is called the known part, because it is the 
 only part known; that to which the existence belongs is called 
 the absolutely unknowable part, because of it nothing whatever 
 can be known. Yet it is contradictory to say that there is 
 something of which we know absolutely nothing ; for the asser- 
 tion implies a knowledge of this something's existence. Though 
 the conclusion that what was called " the absolutely unknowable 
 part" is not quite absolutely unknown, is thus forced upon us, 
 it will be found as objectionable as the opposite conclusion 
 would be. We now know the existence of " The Unknowable," 
 and also the existence of one of its parts. Can the existence 
 of the whole and the existence of the part be distinguished, one 
 from the other? If they can, we are capable of observing 
 differences between the whole and parts of " The Unknowable." 
 If they cannot, we are unable to tell whether it is the existence 
 of the whole or the existence of the part which we know : if it 
 be the existence of the part, the existence of " The Unknow- 
 able " is unknown, and, on the same principles, the existence of 
 the part, or of a part's part, ad infinitum, is unknown ; if it be 
 the existence of the whole which alone is known, we have re- 
 turned to an absolutely unknowable part, which is the absurdity 
 with which we set out. 
 
 Again; "The Unknowable" embraces existence and some- 
 thing else. This time we will leave out of consideration the 
 incongruity of saying that we do or do not know the existence 
 of the something else. Without doubt, the something else 
 musl \>c distinguished from the existence which we know; and 
 if so, we know more than such existence. If we do not know 
 more than the existence, if we do not know that there is some- 
 thing joined to the existence, which we distinguish from it; we 
 do not know that "The Unknowable" contains anything besides 
 existence, we do not know that there is anything belonging to 
 it which is not known. 
 
 A very formidable trilemma confronts all who proclaim that 
 there is something unknowable. Excepting a very few 
 propositions, they can affirm of it nothing, tiny can deny of it 
 
24 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 nothing ; but they cannot refuse to either affirm or deny any prop- 
 osition concerning it. "Is it like this?" (which we know), we 
 ask them. They cannot say '"yes," without asserting a like- 
 ness, or "no," without asserting an unlikeness, between "The 
 Unknowable" and something known; yet if they say that they 
 do not know how to answer, they confess that " The Unknow- 
 able" may be in nature like something known — that it may be 
 in so far knowable. 
 
 Aside from the inconceivableness of an unknowable, the 
 conclusion that there is such a thing is unlawful. He will 
 make the best use of an illegitimate conception, who shall as- 
 sert that if there is anything unknowable, the fact itself can 
 never be discovered. This averment may be explained and 
 justified by saying that what is unknowable is, its existence ex- 
 cepted, ex hyphothesi, entirely unknown; but if so unknown, 
 it is impossible to ascertain whether it is unknowable or merely 
 unknown. 
 
 § 12. The considerations which men put forth for the con- 
 viction of others are commonly not those upon which they, for 
 their own conviction, principally rely. So it may have been 
 in the present instance. The unquestionable legitimacy of the 
 thought that something is unknown may have been deemed to 
 bespeak the legitimacy of the thought that something is un- 
 knowable. Knowing beyond knowledge seems to be involved 
 in both until we enter into particulars, when the apparent 
 analogy fades away. In the case of the unknown we do not think 
 more than our conclusion permits us to conceive. Thinking 
 that the exterior appearance of my friend's house is unknown 
 to me, I both conceive that appearance and conceive it as un- 
 known. The conception I form is vacillating, and because of 
 this I affirm ignorance. A variety of conceptions float through my 
 mind ; yet I cannot pronounce the reality like this, or this, or this. 
 Contemplating one representation, I can conceive that the real- 
 ity is, in each particular, like this or unlike it; contemplating 
 more than one representation, I can conceive that the reality 
 is, in each particular, most like this, or most like that. My 
 
A FUNDAMENTAL, FALLACY. 25 
 
 inability to decide which, is my ignorance of something that I 
 conceive. When I see the house, my conception will become 
 constant: then I will conceive affirmatively what I now con- 
 ceive in the alternative : then I will know as real what I now 
 represent as doubtful, as unknown. If I find that I have repre- 
 sented very little, the implication will be, not that I knew as 
 unknown more than I could represent, but that I knew very 
 little as unknown. "The Unknowable" has no similar means 
 of finding representation. A vacillating conception cannot 
 exhibit its relation to cognition; not alone because it cannot be 
 viewed in relation, but also because no element in conception 
 can, even provisionally, for an instant represent it. The ina- 
 bility applies to anything essentially beyond knowledge, whether 
 it extend throughout only a part of externality, instead of the 
 whole ; whether it consist of an attribute of an attribute, instead 
 of all attributes but one. 
 
 Deprived of an essentially unknowable, its worshipers will have 
 at least an unknowable which is necessarily such. Regretfully, 
 but with confidence, they will accept this as their cry : " Informa- 
 tion, however extensive it may become, can never satisfy inquiry. 
 Positive knowledge does not, and never can, fill the whole region 
 oi* possible thought At the uttermost reach of discovery there 
 . and must ever rise, the question — What lies beyond? 
 A- it is impossible to think of a limit to space so as to ex. hide 
 the idea of space lying outside that limit; so we cannot con- 
 ceive any explanation profound enough to exclude the question 
 — What is the explanation of that explanation? Regarding 
 Science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may say thai every 
 addition to its surface does hut bring it into wider contact with 
 surrounding nescience." (Firsi Prin., § L) There is no longer, 
 to the Realist, terror in the cry. The nescience which we musi 
 ever recognize is not <>f the quality which Mr. Spencer seeks to 
 
 prove. Out beyond the known we See the unknown; but it is 
 
 net a hare existence to as. slowly and with trembling thought, 
 we magnifiy and multiply its attributions. No part of it do we 
 
 know as absolutely unknown; to no particular part Can we 
 
 point and Bay, "that never will he better known." 
 
26 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 
 
 Many of Mr. Spencer's admirers believe that he has taught them 
 what can be known and what cannot. The arbitrary line which 
 he attempted to draw between possible knowledge and necessary 
 nescience, they did not see him cross. Yet he did cross it, and 
 was compelled to cross it, to obtain data to support the belief 
 that it is impossible to be crossed. Encouraged by his example, 
 others may attempt to cross at the same and other points, in the 
 prosecution of other aims. His reasoning was general ; having, 
 it was supposed, equal applicability to the whole line which 
 forms the circumference of consciousness. Till he has shown 
 us that the points where he breaks through are weaker than 
 others, we may doubt the strength of all; and could we be 
 repulsed at other points, where he has passed through we 
 would assert our right to follow. 
 
 § 13. Seeing that the conclusion, lately in discussion, is 
 unthinkable, and that it vitiates every argument from which it 
 can be supposed to derive support, we are prepared to go a step 
 further. Whenever a logically constructed argument leads to 
 an illegitimate conclusion, it is competent to foretell that the 
 premises will prove faulty. Who thus predict in Mr. Spencer's 
 case will realize their expectation. 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 27 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 The Inductive Argument. 
 
 Origin of the Universe; Causation. 
 
 § 14. The reader will remember Mr. Spencer's first argu- 
 ment : it purports to deal with all ideas of " The Unknow- 
 able," and to prove, by experimenting with them, that they 
 are wholly spurious. 
 
 Were defences scarce, I would dwell at length upon the fact 
 that most of such ideas have been left entirely out of mind. 
 The conceptions, and the only ones, from experiment with 
 which Mr. Spencer has drawn his induction, are those of the 
 Origin of the Universe, Causation, Space, Time, Matter, Mo- 
 tion, Force, Extent of Consciousness, and Mental Substance. 
 That these do not comprehend all thoughts of things outside 
 of consciousness, may be very readily shown by calling atten- 
 tion to some such thoughts. We think we recognize, in exter- 
 nalities, homogeneity and heterogeneity; and a surrender of 
 this belief would not necessarily accompany a surrender of the 
 ideas above enumerated; for likeness and unlikeness of parts 
 is an abstraction which we could easily attach to "Unknowable 
 Existence." So also, be it observed, are the abstractions, sub- 
 stance and attribute, number and figure, whole and part. Of 
 some attributes, after saying so much, we may say much more 
 — we may add that they have been transferred to "The Un- 
 knowable" by Mr. Spencer. He implies that it possesses 
 quantity, when he calls it " infinite M or " unlimited;" he attrib- 
 utes to it mobility , when he describes it as acting upon us; and 
 
 allows it COngruity, in a manner before remarked. Now 
 
 we may profitably enquire into the distinction between what 
 Mr. Spencer attempted and whal he improperly ignored. He 
 dealt with externalities in the particular, rather than in the 
 
28 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT. 
 
 general ; in the concrete, rather than in the abstract. The Origin 
 of the Universe, Extent of Consciousness, and Mental Sub- 
 stance are obviously very particular, very concrete. Causation, 
 Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force are truly abstractions ; 
 but they do not compare in degree of abstractness with other 
 notions mentioned; indeed some of them, and to some degree 
 all of them, may be, and are, considered things. Compare the 
 assailed conceptions with the notions, of homogeneity, hetero- 
 geneity, whole, part, quantity, congruity, and the like: these 
 represent attributes common to them all and are therefore ab- 
 stractions higher than them all. The importance of 
 the distinction lies in the fact that the abstraction is more gen- 
 eral than the particulars from which it is taken — involves a 
 greater number of experiences. Abstractions formed by the sift- 
 ing and combining of many experiences are doubtless more reliable 
 than those formed by the sifting and combining of a few. 
 Thus we reach the conclusion that the most general conceptions 
 of externalities may not be proved illusive by proving the illu- 
 siveness of the less general notions from which they have, to a 
 considerable extent, been drawn. Besides difference 
 in respect of generality, there is another difference, above sug- 
 gested, which if analyzed will lead us to the same conclusion. 
 To conceive the Origin of the Universe, or Space, or Mental 
 Substance, for instance, it is necessary to represent a definite 
 combination of various attributes; whereas such a conception 
 as that of conditionality is both extremely simple and unre- 
 stricted to any very particular form. Considering the immense 
 difference in the conditions they should fulfill, it is evident that 
 the one class of conceptions may be almost entirely spurious 
 while the other is almost entirely true. The replies 
 which it may be supposed Mr. Spencer could make to the fore- 
 going may be met by the observation, that we shall find him 
 employing the distinctions here drawn, and in a like manner, 
 for a like purpose. We shall find him arguing that the exist- 
 ence of "The Unknowable" is of the utmost certainty because 
 it is an abstraction derived from all thoughts and experiences 
 of externalities — thoughts and experiences which are, except 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 29 
 
 as respects existence, totally delusive. And we shall find him 
 arguing that, although definite conceptions of "The Un- 
 knowable" must be renounced, we are nevertheless obliged 
 to treat the unformed sense of its existence as completely reli- 
 able. TTe have merely applied the same line of argument to 
 abstractions intermediate between the notion of existence, which 
 is of the highest abstractness, and certain abstractions, dealt 
 with by Mr. Spencer, which are, as abstractions, relatively low. 
 Not that there are no abstractions, (for relationship is one), 
 that are as high as existence; but the intermediate abstractions 
 are so much more numerous as to preponderate in importance. 
 To all these the induction should have extended : inasmuch as 
 it ignores them, it ls deficient. 
 
 Were defences scarce, I would also enter into a detailed 
 criticism, intended to show that besides not drawing his induc- 
 tion from experiments with all ideas of "The Unknowable," 
 he has not, even if his attacks cannot be repelled, shown, by 
 experiment, the entire illusiveness of one. It is often inad- 
 vertently assumed by Agnostics, and inadvertently cc needed by 
 Realists, that the partial reliability and partial delusiveness of 
 ideas is in some way inconsistent with Realism. An application 
 of the principles of evolution would drive from speculation a 
 supposition so manifestly repugnant to them. From a realistic 
 stand-point it is supposable, nay, almost certain, that idea- may 
 be Legitimate for some purposes, but not for others. They may 
 in part represent, and in part misrepresent realities; or they 
 may represent realities, when they are vague and connote little, 
 and misrepresent the same realities, when, expanded into defi- 
 niteness, they connote much. The attributes best represented 
 are probably, on the whole, those which, being mosl genera] 
 within the range of our faculties, are oftenesl experienced. 
 Another supposition consistent with Realism, is thai ideas may 
 be fitted for dealing with things in some relations, but not in 
 other relations — that is, they may be Like things in .-Mine rela- 
 tions, and Less Like them, or unlike them, in oilier relations. 
 As was said of idea-, bo it musl be said of their relations, that 
 
 those best realized are probably the ones which mosl affect us. 
 
30 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 
 
 Again ; it is supposable by the Realist, that ideas may serve for 
 approximate explanation, and yet not serve, or not serve so 
 well, for final explanation. It will be noticed that, as in the 
 earliest steps of explanation we deal with ordinary ideas and 
 ordinary relations, while in ultimate explanation we deal with 
 extraordinary ideas and extraordinary relations, the third sup- 
 position leads us to the point to which we have been led by the 
 preceding two. This, observe, is the point at which we arrived 
 in the foregoing paragraph. There is much reason, then, to con- 
 clude that representative consciousness is reliable in proportion 
 to the quantity of experience by which it has been developed. 
 Just as we before distinguished between ideas wrought by com- 
 paratively few experiences and ideas wrought by comparatively 
 many, we here distinguish between the components of thoughts 
 produced by less and the components produced by more experi- 
 ence. Just as we before complained because Mr. Spencer's in- 
 duction had not been extended to the most trustworthy ideas, 
 we now charge that it has not been extended to the elements 
 of even the conceptions with which it dealt, presumably the 
 most reliable, — those within the range of every-day experience. 
 In other words, though he experimented with final, he ignored 
 approximate, comprehension of things external. 
 
 But the ideas attacked have separate defences, and to these 
 we turn. 
 
 § 15. In the following manner conceptions of the genealogy 
 of the universe are disposed of. (First Prin., § 11.) 
 
 " Respecting the origin of the Universe three verbally intelli- 
 gible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self- 
 existent; or that it is self-created; or that it is created by an 
 external agency." Self-existence is inconceivable, because "to 
 form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of 
 existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort can 
 we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past time, 
 implies a conception of infinite past time, which is an impossi- 
 bility." Self-creation is unthinkable, since " really to conceive 
 self-creation, is to conceive potential existence passing into 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 31 
 
 actual existence by some inherent necessity; which we cannot 
 do. We cannot form any idea of a potential existence of the 
 universe as distinguished from its actual existence/' and 
 "we have no state of consciousness answering to the words — 
 an inherent necessity by which potential existence became 
 actual existence." Besides, potential existence "would just as 
 much require accounting for as actual existence; and just the 
 same difficulties would meet us." "Creation by external 
 agency," is unimaginable; for the production of matter out of 
 nothing is not realizable in thought. Moreover, " if space was 
 created, it must have been previously non-existent. The non- 
 existence of space cannot, however, by any mental effort be 
 imagined." "Lastly, even supposing that the genesis of the 
 Universe could really be represented in thought as the result of 
 an external agency, the mystery would be as great as ever; for 
 there would still arise the question — how came there to be an 
 external agency? To account for this, only the same three 
 hypotheses are possible — self-existence, self-creation, and crea- 
 tion by external agency;" and all of these "turn out, when 
 critically examined, to be literally unthinkable." 
 
 J la- Mr. Spencer forgotten that there is generally "a soul of 
 truth in things erroneous"? And shall he, when he finds his 
 views antagonized, be permitted to dispense with his rule for 
 finding such soul of truth? "This method is to compare all 
 opinion- of the ^inw genus; to set aside as more or Less dis- 
 crediting one another those various special and concrete elements 
 in which such opinion- disagree; to observe what remains alter 
 the discordant constituents have been eliminated." | First Prin., 
 § 2.) This principle must be applied to the three hypotheses 
 before considered. Much as they disagree in other respects, 
 there is one in which there is absolute agreement among them 
 — each postulates the Belf-existenoe of something, and thereby 
 asserts its conceivability. Atheism asserts the Belf-existenoe of 
 the essentials of the Actual Universe; Pantheism, of a Poten- 
 tial Universe; Theism, of a Creator. Anomalous as it is, 
 "Transfigured Realism" must <1«» Likewise. It allow-, knowl- 
 edge of the existence of something more thai phenomena; the 
 
32 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 
 
 problem of such existence therefore confronts it. How came 
 "The Unknowable" to exist? On the supposition that we 
 know no more about it than that it exists, there is no possible 
 way of answering : we know nothing contrary to the conclusion 
 that it was created by an agency external to itself, or that it is 
 the product of something potentially what it now is, or that it 
 is self-existent. Strangely, however, we must recognize in it, 
 or back of it, self-existence. Something cannot have sprung 
 from nothing; therefore there must have always been, within 
 or back of "The Unknowable," a persistence of something — 
 some kind of self-existence, if it is only the eternal persistence 
 of the chain of causation. This is an important implication; 
 but Mr. Spencer goes beyond it. He must have decided that 
 "The Unknowable" is self-existent; for he calls it "The Un- 
 caused" and "an unconditioned reality without beginning or 
 end." Without beginning and without cause, is self-existent. 
 Atheist, Pantheist, Theist, and the Promulgator of "Trans- 
 figured Realism," rely upon the conception of self-existence: 
 when such bitter antagonists agree, there is strong presumption 
 that their bond is truth. 
 
 Thus enforced by the reasonings of Mr. Spencer, his objec- 
 tions must be met and overcome. The immense difference in 
 point of conclusiveness, between the argument which he used 
 against the theory of self-existence, and those which he opposed 
 respectively to each of the other hypotheses, first presents itself 
 for consideration. The hypothesis of self-creation, and that of 
 creation by external agency, were intimated to possess, among 
 other evil qualities, a remarkable proneness to self-contradiction; 
 for he brings them to the point where they must affirm what they 
 began by denying — namely, self-existence. But the postulate of 
 self-existence is not even implicitly charged with suicidal pro- 
 clivities. If our conception of self-existence is not self-contra- 
 dictory, what can be said against it ? Does it involve absurdities ? 
 Mr. Spencer has not preferred this charge against it It may, 
 in perfect harmony with his remarks about it, be consistent and, 
 so far as it goes, self-supporting; but he thinks it is not suffi- 
 ciently comprehensive. That it is possible to think of exist- 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 33 
 
 ence a? not derived from anything but previous existence dur- 
 ing a finite portion of time, he seems to £.dmit. The alleged 
 impossibility is the conception of self-existence during more 
 than a finite portion of time. Our conception of self-existence, 
 then, is no conception, because we are unable to comprehend 
 its relation to infinite time. Again we must summon our dis- 
 tinguished adversary to do battle with himself. Sensations he 
 has classed among the perceivable and conceivable, yet are they 
 considered by him "absolutely incomprehensible." (First Prin., 
 § 194.1 Why incomprehensible? Because their relations to 
 "The Unknowable" are unknown. How knowable? In as 
 far as a knowledge of them does not involve a knowledge of 
 these relations. On Mr. Spencer's principles, therefore, the 
 idea of self-existence may be no more fallacious than the notion 
 of a seusation. Each may be a truthful representation of but 
 a portion of a fact, though neither a representation nor a mis- 
 representation of the remainder. A similar analogy also avails 
 as. As "'The Unknowable" is considered a fact which can be 
 Been but not circu inspected, so might self-existence be deemed 
 a fact which is apprehensible though not delineable. 
 
 We have been allowing Mr. Spencer benefit of the generally 
 received supposition that a conception of infinity is impossible; 
 it is dow time to withdraw the favor. To show, as he could 
 not omit to do, that the conception of infinite past time is an 
 impossibility, he was under obligation to entertain every con- 
 ception thought to represent infinite past time, and render mani- 
 fest it- unmitigated illusiveness. Instead of attempting this, 
 however, b<- assailed but a single symbol, and one which do one 
 supposed could be formed, and pronounced it impossible. Y< t 
 there is a conception of infinite past time which is as far as it 
 can be from being impossible; it is actual. Not only occasion- 
 ally, when our mind- are free from the prejudices of this dis- 
 cussion, but also in every act of thinking of the inability to 
 travel in thought through infinite past time, does it li;i\ 
 istence. The bare sound of the phrase, "infinite past time," 
 calls up a corresponding representative mental state. Mr. 
 Spencer has assumed the burden of showing that it is ool re- 
 ft 
 
34 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 
 
 preservative of a reality. This he cannot do by proving the 
 conception inharmonious with other thoughts of infinite past 
 time, since he does not admit the legitimacy of any such thoughts. 
 Without employing other thoughts of what it purports to re- 
 present, he cannot discover the conception in question to be in- 
 complete. He must prove it self-destructive, or otherwise in 
 conflict with undoubted truth; and that he can do neither, a 
 short inspection of the conception spoken of will render probable. 
 In conceiving infinite past time, I form a conception of some- 
 thing, which conception excludes conception of a beginning of 
 that something; therefore I consider infinite past time to be 
 something of such a nature as is incompatible with a beginning. 
 I do not try to let my thoughts run back through past time to 
 an unlimited extent; for it is unnecessary to do this. The 
 infinity of time is not conceived, as it is not discovered, by 
 traversing time exhaustively; though we cannot conceive time 
 without, to some extent, mentally traversing it. By conception 
 of the nature, not the quantity of time, is its infinity discovered 
 and represented. To bring into clearer view the distinction 
 here indicated, let it be observed that there are two ways in 
 which we might be supposed to form a conception of past time 
 without limit — extensively and intensively. The former is to 
 let the mental eye run back along the whole extent of past time ; 
 scanning part after part, in their order, until all the parts have 
 been exhausted; in vain searching for a beginning. Mr. 
 Spencer and others are right in believing this impossible. The 
 latter is to call into view a portion of time ending with the 
 present and extending indefinitely back ; and perceive that it is 
 of such nature that, no matter how much it may be added to by 
 retrospection, its beginning must be in contact with the ending 
 of another part. In this process, the extension of the portion 
 with which we start, considered in regard to its essential quali- 
 ties, is made the representative of extensions in general ; and 
 entitles us to affirm that no extension can be brought to a 
 termination by the beginning of a first portion of time. In 
 the manner described there is formed a conception of time as 
 having at no place a starting point; and this conception is quite 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 35 
 
 as legitimate as the conception of all possible thoughts of " The 
 Unknowable " as containing no truth ; since, even if their num- 
 ber were finite, which it is not, it would be impossible to gather 
 up all such thoughts and examine every one of them. 
 
 Infinite past time is, then, conceived as something having no 
 limit but the present, no place of beginning. Some will be 
 curious to know if it really is what we conceive it to be. Let 
 them neutralize their doubts by the assurance that we cannot 
 know, or believe, or even imagine it to be something else. I 
 am well aware that my words will not produce a lasting effect 
 on these self-devouring minds. They will re-read skeptical ar- 
 guments and return to their unwholesome feast, intoxicated by 
 the superstition that they think infinite past time to be some- 
 thing very different from what their finite faculties compel 
 them to think it to be. " We cannot," they will say, " picture, 
 either serially or simultaneously, all past time, and so are un- 
 able to take an imaginary trip through it; but if it were con- 
 ceivable, this would not be the case." That men are prone so 
 to reason, only proves that the mind is confused by two concep- 
 tions of the same thing — one conspicuous and imperfect, which 
 is put to the test of legitimacy; and one obscure but reliable, 
 by which the other is tested. The aberration would be avoided, 
 were it as obvious as it is true, that only by employing what I 
 hive described as the actual conception of infinite past time, 
 i- ir possible to discover that we cannot picture all past time, 
 and in fancy journey through it. A picture of some past time 
 is easily formed and readily explored from end to cud: how 
 do we know that it is not a perfect picture of all pasl time? 
 Certainly by comparing it with that conception of infinite past 
 time which is always recognized as being more than a mental 
 
 picture of a Unite portion of tiim the picture of the illimit- 
 able nature of prior duration. This representation relieves 
 itself of tin- suspicion of disclosing it- own inadequacy, by en- 
 abling n- to perceive that an infinite cannot he an all, be 
 
 u all" smuggles in the limits which "infinite" excludes; and 
 
 that, "through the infinite" is a contradiction in term-, because 
 
 "through" asserts a beginning and an end. There i- hut one 
 
36 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 
 
 charge more which is likely to be brought against the concep- 
 tion which I have undertaken to defend — it may be called 
 negative. The obvious answer is that in some respects it is 
 positive, and that its negative qualities are believed to corre- 
 spond to the negative qualities of what it represents, which is 
 negative in that it is not limited. Is it not strange that thinkers 
 should want the conception of the infinite to exactly re- 
 semble the conception of the finite? They can picture all the 
 finite, and consequently seek to picture all the infinite ; but the 
 infinite refuses to be comprehended in the limits of an all. 
 They may explore all the parts of the finite, from the first to 
 the last, and desire to do the same with the infinite; but there 
 is no last part for them to reach. The finite seems positive, 
 and they complain because they cannot represent the mfinite as*, 
 in the same degree, positive also. 
 
 We return to the problem of self-existence, to enquire whether 
 the conception of infinite past time, which Mr. Spencer 
 ignored, will enable us to advance our cause. No difficulty is 
 experienced in thinking of self-existence during a portion of 
 time : as having during that time no creation and no beginning : 
 as having from the beginning to the end of that section of time 
 been derived from nothing but previous existence: as at any 
 particular moment the effect of preceding existence and the 
 cause of existence about to succeed. Have I described a com- 
 plete conception of self-existence? Mr. Spencer would be among 
 the first to answer, "no;" arid his answer could not knowingly 
 be offered, without an antecedent recognition of the unlikeness 
 of the given conception to one yet to be described. The latter 
 represents self-existence as infinite in preceding duration. It 
 is the conception of beginningless time filled in with the symbol 
 of existence. Contemplating something in a portion of time 
 past, and perceiving that its nature excludes a creation there, 
 we involuntarily extend the time only to perceive the same 
 in regard to the addition : thus, through the essentials of the 
 one, we perceive that no addition of periods can bring us to a 
 creative point, a place in time where the nature of the entity 
 in question was compatible with the process of creation. The 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 37 
 
 conception is negative as compared with the one which it is 
 generally thought we should have; but it expresses as much as 
 Ave know of self-existence, and, very likely, all that there is to 
 know. The other, according to description, would express too 
 much ; being a picture of all past existence, when there is no 
 such thing. The assertion of infinity is the denial of aggrega- 
 tion. It is the very want of an extreme that characterizes a 
 thing, whether in thought or reality, infinite. 
 
 Somewhat inconsistently, Mr. Spencer has asserted (First 
 Prin., § 11), " that even were self-existence conceivable, it would 
 not in any sense be an explanation of the Universe." It would 
 trouble him to inform us how he became possessed of this in- 
 formation. The truth is, he relied upon a conception of self- 
 existence, as his words will show. "No one," he states (First 
 Prin., § 11), "will say that the existence of an object at the 
 present moment is made easier to understand by the discovery 
 that it existed an hour ago, or a day ago, or a year ago; and if its 
 existence now is not made in the least degree more comprehen- 
 sible,' by its existence during some previous finite period of time, 
 then no accumulation of such finite periods, even could we ex- 
 tend them to an infinite period, would make it more comprehen- 
 sible." Xot only must we protest against Mr. Spencer's attempt 
 to describe as actual a conception which he has called impossible, 
 but we must also persistently refuse to consider infinite time as 
 an "accumulation of" "finite periods," "an infinite period." 
 Self-existence does not pretend to be an explanation of the 
 universe, but an essential part of that explanation. It does 
 ooi explain the origin of the existence of aU things; it merely 
 explains away the supposed origin of whatever cannot be 
 believed to have come from non-existence into existence. Though 
 it is true the knowledge that an object existed at some particular 
 point, or during some particular portion of time past, will not 
 much assist us in comprehending ii ; y<t it is also true that the 
 genesis of whatever is self-existent is not so much a mystery, 
 when it is thought that the present existence of the self-existent 
 is derived from immediately preceding existence, tlii- 
 from existence immediately preceding it, and soon without limit. 
 
38 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 
 
 The Atheist, the Pantheist, and the Theist, may start with 
 the self-existent, and attempt to derive all that is existent from 
 it. The first may begin with Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and 
 whatever else he thinks fundamental, and try to show how from 
 them the present state of the universe was evolved. The 
 second may commence with such a Potential Universe as he 
 thinks most reasonable. He must take care that he does not 
 leave out of his Potential Universe something self-existent, or 
 include something not self-existent; and that the " inherent 
 necessity by which potential existence became actual existence " be 
 not such as will baffle conception. And he must understand, more- 
 over, that potential existence is nothing else than actual exist- 
 ence considered as the potency of what it has subsequently become. 
 The third, to begin, may assume the existence of a Creator. 
 He must conceive the Creator as, more or less, self-existent; 
 and if anything else cannot have been created, he must consider 
 it as self-existent also. The Creator must not be considered 
 the Creator of anything self-existent, but as the moulder of the 
 same, while the author of all or much that is not self-exist- 
 ent. At the start, then, the advocate of Atheism, Pantheism, 
 or Theism, will have nothing to fear from the logic of Mr. 
 Spencer. In fact, they may compel him to join their order; 
 for he must recognize in "The Unknowable Cause" the pro- 
 cedure of the ephemeral from the self-existent. Did he look 
 upon "The Unknowable" as entirely self-existent, he could 
 allow in it no change, no occurring of what did not exist before, 
 no activity by which it affects us, now thus, and now so. Yet 
 if he could brin^ himself to assert that that " The Unknowable" 
 is entirely changeless, he would still occupy essentially the same 
 position ; for, by considering " The Unknowable " as the change- 
 less cause of what we know, he would make it the self-exist cut 
 cause of effects not self-existent. With the rest, lie must assume 
 a fundamental something, and a product thereof, which is not 
 fundamental. Only in regard to details, do they disagree with 
 each other, or he with them. 
 
 § 16 The method by which Mr. Spencer attempts to expand 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 39 
 
 the idea of causation into afelo de se is next in order. This is 
 it. (First Prin., §§ 12,13.) 
 
 " When we inquire what is the meaning of the various effects 
 produced upon our senses — when we ask how there come to be 
 in our consciousness impressions of sounds, of colors, of tastes, 
 and of those various attributes which we ascribe to bodies ; we 
 are compelled to regard them as the effects of some cause." 
 This cause may be variously described. "But be the cause we 
 assign what it may, we are obliged to suppose some cause. And 
 we are not only obliged to suppose some cause, but also a first 
 cause." If what we assume to be the cause of the sensation 
 be the first cause, "the conclusion is reached. If it is not the 
 first cause, then by implication there must be a cause behind it; 
 which thus becomes the real cause of the effect." "We cannot 
 think at all about the impressions which the external world 
 produces on us, without thinking of them as caused; and we 
 cannot carry out an inquiry concerning their causation, without 
 inevitably committing ourselves to the hypothesis of a First 
 Cause." Going a step farther, we are driven to the 
 
 conclusion that the First Cause is infinite. "To think of the 
 First Cause as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of 
 it as limited, necessarily implies a conception of something be- 
 yond its limits: it is absolutely impossible to conceive a thing 
 88 bounded without conceiving a region surrounding its bounda- 
 "If the First Cause is limited, and there consequently 
 imething outside of it, this something must have no First 
 Caua — must be uncaused. J>ut if we admit that there can be 
 something uncaused ' * * we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of 
 causation altogether. Thus it is impossible to consider the 
 First ( Sause as finite. And if it cannot be finite, it must be in- 
 finite." A third "inference concerning the First 
 Cause is equally unavoidable/' It must be absolute; that is, 
 independent. "If" it is dependent it cannot be the First Cause; 
 
 for that must be the First Cause OH which it depend-/' "But 
 
 to think of the First Cause as totally independent, is to think 
 
 of it as that which exists in the absence of all other existence; 
 
 seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, 
 
40 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT. 
 
 it must be partially dependent an that other existence, and so 
 cannot be the First Cause. Not only however must the First 
 Cause be a form of being which has no necessary relation to any 
 other form of being, but it can have no necessary relation with- 
 in itself. There can be nothing in it which determines change, 
 and yet nothing which prevents change. For if it contains some- 
 thing which imposes such necessities or restraints, this something 
 must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is ab- 
 surd." Thus "in our search for a cause, we discover 
 no resting place until we arrive at the hypothesis of a First 
 Cause; and we have no alternative but to regard this First 
 Cause as Infinite and Absolute. These are inferences forced 
 upon us by arguments from which there appears no escape. 
 It is hardly needful however to show those who have followed 
 thus far, how illusive are these reasonings and their re- 
 sults. " Having led us to the conclusion that there is 
 a first cause, and that it is infinite and absolute, Mr. Spencer 
 delivers us into the charge of Mansel ; who shows " the fallacy 
 of these conclusions, by disclosing their mutual contradictions." 
 
 If, as I suspect, and the words of Mr. Spencer imply, Mr. 
 Mansel has done no more, or little more, than disclose the 
 "mutual contradictions" of the three conclusions, — if he has 
 not succeeded in showing, in regard to every one of them, that 
 it annihilates every vestige of itself, — there may be one of these 
 conclusions which is true, or partly true; and the self-contra- 
 diction and mutual hostility of the others, joined to their con- 
 flict with it, may serve only to furnish it support. However 
 this may be, as I have no interest in defending the First Cause, 
 the Infinite, and the Absolute, as Mr. Spencer describes them, 
 I will not enquire into their conceivability, jointly or separately. 
 
 It is enough to know that if Mansel has succeeded in proving 
 them in no manner or degree conceivable, his criticism will be 
 useless for the purposes of Mr. Spencer. A known fact cannot 
 evidence to us a fact which is inconceivable (any farther than 
 it is conceivable). What is inconceivable cannot be an object 
 of thought; no relation which it bears can be an object of 
 thought. If, therefore, the conclusion, that there is an infinite 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 41 
 
 and absolute first cause be inconceivable, it is not forced upon 
 us; and Mr. Spencer must have somewhere failed in his 
 proof that the thought of sensations as effects leads to incon- 
 oeivables. He has not even shown that this thought 
 
 leads to absurdities. When a train of thought ends in absurd- 
 ities, the notion with which it began is not therefore known to 
 be logically faulty, unless the operation is known to be logically 
 fruitless; and Mr. Spencer has granted that the reasonings 
 which he employed are illusive as well as their results. He 
 began with the notion of sensation as the effect of something 
 external; reasoned, as he admits, illusively; and, because he 
 reached nonsensical conclusions, thought he had proved the 
 original notion illegitimate. Perhaps it will be 
 
 thought that he could save himself by substituting a psycho- 
 logical for a logical point of view — by explaining that if the 
 mind is affected with a sensation, or the idea of a sensation, 
 together with an idea of a cause thereof, its state invariably 
 determines an operation ending in the vain endeavor to assume 
 another representative state. Such was indeed the case with 
 Mi-. Spencer; but not necessarily so, as logical analysis has 
 already shown. The assumption is otherwise inefficient. It 
 proves too little- for it does not decide whether the original 
 state or the operation following is to blame. It can be so used 
 as t<» prove too much. Impressions are produced on us, and, as 
 Mr. Spencer says, "we are compelled to think of these in re- 
 lation to a positive cause. " Now, if the thought of the rela- 
 tion of* effed and cause, between sensations and external causes, 
 is proved wholly illusive by the fad thai we are compelled bo 
 pass from it to absurdities \ then are sensations wholly illusive, 
 since we must puss from them to the misleading causal relation. 
 Of no avail i- it to reply thai sensations are delusive only in so 
 
 far as they must be thought of afl caused; for there is no part 
 
 of a sensation that may be thoughl of as iincaused. Equally 
 useless will it be to say thai we can think of a Bensation with- 
 out thinking of it as caused— thai the thoughl of a Bensation 
 need nol be developed until it be made to involve an idea of a 
 
 Cause; lor in Like manner, can we defend any link in the chain 
 
42 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT. 
 
 of causation, by averring that we can ignore those which pre- 
 cede it. The assumption in question is incapable of proof; 
 since if the mind is essentially so constituted that it must frame 
 false thoughts, necessity of thought is not a reliable test of truth. 
 It may be disproved, as what follows will show. 
 
 Whenever we have reasoned from what we deem the truth to 
 absurdities, we think that perhaps the process of reasoning, and 
 not that with which it began is responsible; and cannot suppress 
 the suspicion that there may be another process which will be 
 productive of better results. To find this process, we begin 
 again, determined to avoid errors. Fault cannot be found with 
 the assertion, that, " when we inquire what is the meaning of the 
 various effects produced on ourselves," "we are compelled to 
 regard them as the effects of some cause." When again, "we 
 inquire what is the meaning" of this cause, we are obliged to 
 suppose a cause for it; and, again, a cause for this cause; and 
 thus repeat the process, until thought, wearied, turns from the 
 pursuit. Are we obliged to suppose & first cause? Experience 
 answers in the negative; for if at any place we say, "the next 
 must be a first cause," we are unable to give a reason. Shall 
 we suppose a first cause? Criticism will tell us that we cannot. 
 A first cause would be one that precedes and produces all others ; 
 but no cause can fulfill these conditions. It is a matter of fact, 
 that there is, in the sequence of causation, change and something 
 which changes. No one is likely to consider the change as the 
 first cause, since it could not exist before that which sustains 
 change, and could not, for that reason if for no other, have 
 produced the latter. There is, however, a tendency to credit 
 that which changes with being the first cause. Yet this sup- 
 position is no better than the other. That which changes can- 
 not have existed before change, which, as it can have sprung 
 from nothing but change, is eternally persistent; nor can it 
 have produced change, for the additional reason that the change- 
 less cannot have spontaneously begun to change. Is it, then, 
 some particular mode of permanence and change combined, 
 which is the first cause? This cannot be: for the eternal 
 persistence of this mode would imply the eternal persistence of 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 43 
 
 all its effects; and if it has not been eternally persistent, that 
 is a prior cause upon which its last state is consequent. And 
 so on to infinity. 
 
 It is observable that we went along smoothly until we tried 
 to postulate a first cause, and that we then became overwhelmed 
 with difficulties. We will, therefore, abandon the hypothesis 
 of a first cause. Being unable to find a beginning to the chain 
 of causation, we know that retrogression cannot bring us to a 
 cause preceding and producing all other causes. This is a con- 
 ceivable conclusion ; and, contrary to the supposition of its fals- 
 ity, it is least resistible when viewed in the concrete. 
 
 Sensations are felt, and causes are looked for. Xo matter 
 what the sensation, the cause is always found to be substance 
 acting. The activity may be on the part of the body, or extra- 
 organic matter, or both; and in such cases, it is undoubtedly the 
 activity of material substance. Sometimes the mind itself is 
 looked upon as the chief factor; but analysis leads us to believe 
 that the mind is but an activity of something which we call 
 mental substance. Again, when it is said that all things else 
 are to be attributed to the agency of a spiritual substance, the 
 same generalization is exemplified. The cause of sensations 
 may, then, be assumed to be substance in activity, and of course 
 whatever this implies, as relation and change of relation, space 
 and time. To the question — what is the cause of this cause? 
 and of the next? and the next? and so on without end, — we 
 have the answer — Substance in action back in the past without 
 beginning. Analyzing this cause, the questions may arise, 
 whence the substance? and whence its activity? To both these 
 interrogatories, satisfactory answers are at hand. Substance is 
 conceived as self-existent. The conviction is unavoidable that 
 at do point in past time was its existence derived from, or, we 
 may say, caused by anything but it- previous existence. It- 
 self-existence is thought of as infinite in past temporal extent. 
 Activity doc- not hold so strong a title to the attribute of self- 
 existence; for, while it is evident that substance can bethought 
 to exist in the absence of activity, activity cannot be thought 
 to exist in the absence of substance capable of action. Vet in 
 
44 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 
 
 some respects does activity fulfill the conditions of self-exist- 
 ence : inactive substance cannot be conceived as starting spon- 
 taneously into activity. Activity, then, must be believed to 
 have been at no time derived from anything but preceding 
 activity of substance. 
 
 We have been led to belief in a cause which may be con- 
 sidered as at any moment the effect of what it was in an im- 
 mediately preceding state, and the cause of what it will be in 
 an immediately succeeding state. Such doctrine is novel, but 
 necessary to a reconciliation between the abstract and the 
 concrete view of causation; for as in the first we can discover 
 no beginning to the chain, so in the second we must not think 
 we discover something with which the chain began. By look- 
 ing upon that which constantly persists as ever consequent 
 upon its prior being, we bring our thoughts of causation into 
 even verbal congruity. Yet it may not be always expedient 
 that verbal congruity should be scrupulously maintained. The 
 self-existent may be called the Uncaused, if it is borne in mind 
 that the meaning is that it is uncaused by anything other than 
 its previous self. It may also be called the First Cause, mean- 
 ing that it existed prior to any passing phase discoverable, no 
 matter how far back we look ; but suppressing the thought that 
 it brought about a beginning. Far better, however, would it 
 be to call it the Eternal Cause ; for eternality, not beginning, 
 is its distinguishing attribute. 
 
 Is this cause infinite or finite? In some respects, one; in 
 some, the other; not infinite in all. Mr. Spencer reasons to 
 the contrary. "To think of the First Cause as finite, is to think 
 of it as limited. To think of it as limited, necessarily implies 
 a conception of something beyond its limits : it is absolutely 
 impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving a 
 region surrounding its boundaries." The argument is appli- 
 cable to the temporal extent of the First Cause, and to little else. 
 The First Cause cannot, for example, be infinitely harmonious: 
 it can be absolutely (completely) harmonious, and no more. 
 To think of harmony as complete, does not imply a conception 
 of greater completeness. But supposing we can imagine some- 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 45 
 
 thing more, it does not follow that the First Cause should ern- 
 es / 
 
 brace the something more ; for much that we can picture we 
 know not to exist. For instance, we limit its homogeneity in 
 thought, as it is limited in realitv, when we think that it 
 might have had this quality in a higher degree. Nevertheless 
 we do not think of the lacking degrees, supplied by the imagina- 
 tion, as existing external to the cause and encroaching on its 
 sphere. It should also be remarked, that the existence of the 
 finite marks limitations to the infinite. While, then, the First 
 Cause is infinite in temporal extent, it is in many respects 
 limited. The Infinite which Mr. Spencer submits to Mansel's 
 criticism is, by supposition, infinite in every particular. Ours, 
 being free from its pretensions, will escape its fate. 
 
 Is our First Cause absolute, in the sense of being out of 
 relation ? It certainly bears relations, and necessarily so. While 
 it doc- not depend for its being upon any relation to something 
 else, it could not exist without bearing relations within itself. 
 These relations are not something more fundamental than that 
 which sustains them; for they depend upon it as much as it 
 upon them. In fact so far as relation is immutable, and only 
 thus far is it accessary, it is a component of the First Cause. 
 Neither is the principle of necessity which determines what 
 relations shall obtain in the constitution or conduct of the First 
 Cause "a higher cause, or the true First Cause." This prin- 
 ciple is not self-dependent. It is but a part of the First ( !ause 
 which could not exist without the other part-. The compo- 
 nents of the First Cause reciprocally sustain each other. To- 
 gether they form a unit; divided, they are not at all. Our 
 First Cause, being comparatively independent, may be called 
 absolute. It does not pretend to be free from all relation; and 
 bo does not call down upon itself the logical chastisement which 
 Man-el inflicts upon its more pretentious rival. 
 
 Vehement condemnation of the idea of causation docs not 
 prevent Mr. Spencer from employing thai very idea when it 
 seem- favorable to his cause. Once did we find him reasoning 
 from the postulate that "The Unknowable" is the can 
 Bensations (supra, i 7)j and once, from the postulate that it is 
 
46 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMEXT. 
 
 the cause of all things (supra, § 8). Often, too, throughout his 
 writings, does he speak of it as a cause, and far more often does 
 he imply as much. I submit that if causation is unthinkable, 
 causation by "The Unknowable" is pre-eminently so; and 
 that if we cannot think of "The Unknowable" as causing, we 
 cannot assert that it does cause, much less make this a postulate 
 in our reasoning. Mr. Spencer's example shows that the con- 
 ception of causation is so persistent that it cannot be repressed. 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 47 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 The Inductive Argument Continued. 
 
 Space, Time, Hatter, Motion, Force. 
 
 § 17. Mr. Spencer next directs his critical powers to expo- 
 sure of the entire fallacy of the various conceptions of Space and 
 Time. Of such conceptions, those which represent Space 
 and Time as realities, being the only ones the writer deems de- 
 fensible, shall be the only ones defended. What then has Mr. 
 Spencer said against conceiving Space and Time as realities? 
 
 This is his first argument. "But while, on the hypothesis 
 of their objectivity, Space and Time must be classed as things, 
 we find, on experiment, that to represent them in thought as 
 things is impossible. To be conceived at all, a thing must be 
 conceived as having attributes. We can distinguish something 
 from nothing, only by the power which the something has to 
 act on our consciousness; the several affections it produces on 
 our consciousness (or else the hypothetical causes of them), we 
 attribute to it, and call its attributes; and the absence of these 
 attribute- is the absence of the terms in which the something 
 is conceived, and involves the absence of a conception. What 
 now are the attributes of Space? The only one which it is 
 possible for a moment to think of as belonging to it, is thai 
 of extension; and to credit it with this implies a confusion of 
 thought. For extension and Space are convertible terms: by 
 extension, as we ascribe it to surrounding objects, we mean 
 occupancy of Space; and thus to say that Space is extended is 
 to say that Space occupies Space. How we are similarly 
 unable to assign any attribute to Time, scarcely needs point- 
 in- out." ( First Prin., J L5.) 
 
 But is it true that "extension/ 5 i meaning the quality ), and 
 "Space" are convertible term-"/ There needs no vocabulary to 
 
48 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 tell us that they are not. We never speak of matter as having 
 Space; we never speak of matter as occupying the quality ex- 
 tension. By extension, as we ascribe it to surrounding objects, 
 we do not mean occupancy of Space; although these two qual- 
 ities are almost always found together. The idea of extension 
 is, indeed, involved in the idea of the occupancy of Space ; but 
 it is not all that is contained therein. Besides being extensive, 
 an object occupying Space is known as being co-extensive — co- 
 extensive with the Space which it occupies. Another element, 
 moreover, is noticeable in occupancy of Space, which is not 
 only lacking to bare extension, but repugnant to it. To occupy, 
 as its etymology discloses, signifies to keep something "so that 
 it cannot be held by others." This an object occupying Space 
 is believed to do, and is what we have in view when we say 
 that no two portions of matter can occupy the same portion of 
 Space at the same instant of time. Occupancy of Space thus 
 proving to be far more than extension, it becomes evident that 
 we can attribute extension to Space without ascribing to the 
 same occupancy of itself. Consequently extension may be 
 claimed as one of the attributes of Space. 
 
 In the case of Time, there is an analogous justification for an 
 analogous claim. This truth cannot be realized without ani- 
 madverting to a striking dissimilarity between the affections 
 which Space and Time respectively produce on our conscious- 
 ness; that is, by Mr. Spencer's admission, a striking dissimi- 
 larity of attributes. While Space is occupied by things, Time 
 is occupied by events. Space is extended in all directions; 
 Time in only two. The extension of Space is spoken of liter- 
 ally ; that of Time, more or less metaphorically ; as is observed 
 when we reflect that a line extended in Space is that by which 
 we commonly symbolize the extent of Time. Differences like 
 these must have forced themselves upon Mr. Spencer when he 
 said (First Prin., § 15) that a to deny that Space and Time are 
 things, and so by implication to call them nothings, involves 
 the absurdity that there are two kinds of nothing." They are 
 also perceived to differ from other things, no less than from 
 each other. A child shows no more liability than Mr. Spencer 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 49 
 
 to confound Space and Time with Matter, Motion, or Force. 
 We have been looking upon attributes of Space and Time while 
 contemplating their contrast, both mutual and with other ob- 
 jects. Some of these attributes have names, and some have 
 not ; but we must not conclude that therefore the latter are less 
 deserving to be treated as attributes. 
 
 While it seemed more thorough to thus point out how many 
 of the contested attributes are to be discovered, there was no 
 imperative necessity to do so, as numbers of these attributes 
 are already much remarked. To Time belong mutability, ob- 
 jectivity and subjectivity; to Space, immobility, objectivity, 
 penetrability. Common to both are the attributes — self-exist- 
 ence, conditionally, limitedness in many respects, relativeness, the 
 quality of being inclusive of other things, likeness and unlikeness 
 of parts, continuity, divisibility, inseparability, and others. 
 That infinity, too, is of their number will, it is hoped, soon 
 appeal-, notwithstanding the second and last argument which 
 Mr. Spencer has directed against the belief that Space and 
 Time are entities. 
 
 '* Nor," he says, "are Time and Space unthinkable as entities 
 only from the absence of attributes; there is another peculiarity, 
 familiar to readers of metaphysics, which equally excludes them 
 from the category. All entities which we actually know a- such 
 are limited; and even if we suppose ourselves either to know 
 or to 1"' able to conceive some unlimited entity, we of necessity 
 in so classing it positively separate it from the class of Limited 
 
 [ties. But of Space and Time we cannot assert either limitation 
 or the absence of limitation. We find ourselves totally unable to 
 form any mental image of unbounded Space; and y< t totally 
 unable to imagine bound- beyond which there is do Spice. 
 Similarly at the other extreme: it is impossible to think of a 
 limit t<> the divisibility of Space; yet equally impossible to 
 think of its infinite divisibility. And, without stating them, 
 it will he seen that we labor under like impotencies in respect 
 
 to time." i First Prim, § 15.) 
 
 Concerning the doctrine, that a thing to he known must he 
 classed, something critical -hall be said when we enter upon a eon- 
 
 i 
 
50 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 sideration of the deductive arguments. Here it will be sufficient 
 to remark, that if Space and Time were the only infinities they 
 could be classed together; but that, in fact, they may be classed 
 with anything else we know as extended ; for the latter is an 
 infinity, inasmuch as it has an infinite number of parts. 
 
 Concerning the other difficulty, — the difficulty of picturing 
 infinity, — enough was said before (§ 15), could it be easily 
 remembered and applied. Briefly let us recapitulate. Time 
 was the example before; now the example shall be Space. 
 All Space is inconceivable, because there is nothing answering 
 the description. The assertion of an all is the denial of infin- 
 ity. The infinity of Space is represented by means of the 
 quality not the quantity of the Space we picture, though we 
 cannot have quality without some quantity. The same mode 
 of representation is employed when we think of all thought as 
 essentially relative; for we cannot picture all thought in bulk. 
 And now take in mind that these remarks will apply whether 
 we have in view the absence of limit to extent or the absence 
 of limit to divisibility. 
 
 § 18. Immediately after the discussion of Space and Time, 
 the author proceeds (First Prin., § 16) with an attempt to dis- 
 close to his readers the self-destructibility of the idea of Matter. 
 
 "Matter," he says, "is either infinitely divisible or it is not." 
 We cannot think that it is not, as no part can be thought indi- 
 visible. We cannot think that it is ; for really to conceive the 
 infinite divisibility of matter, "is mentally to follow out the 
 divisions to infinity." 
 
 Here is an infinity which may be classed with the other in- 
 finities whose conceivability has been explained. To conceive 
 the infinite divisibility of Matter is but to realize that Matter 
 and indivisibility cannot exist together as substance and attri- 
 bute; which is done when one division is perceived to be essen- 
 tially like any other division, in that it must leave parts capable 
 of division. Conception of the infinite divisibility of Matter 
 owes its appearance of impossibility largely to being confounded 
 with the conception of Matter infinitely divided. The two 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTIjSUED. 51 
 
 conceptions are so repugnant in nature as to be exclusive of 
 each other. Matter infinitely divided would admit of no 
 farther division; would thus present a limit to divisibility. In- 
 finite divisibility, on the other hand, precludes infinite division; 
 precludes us from following out the division to infinity, — that 
 is, until all divisions have been traced in thought. 
 
 The next charge is that absurdities are involved in the 
 thought of Matter as at any place in contact with Matter. 
 
 " Were Matter thus absolutely solid, it would be, what it is 
 not — absolutely incompressible; since compressibility, imply- 
 ing the nearer approach of constituent parts, is not thinkable 
 unless there is unoccupied space between the parts. Nor is 
 this all. It is an established mechanical truth, that if a body, 
 moving at a given velocity, strikes an equal body at rest in 
 such wise that the two move on together, their joint velocity 
 will be but half that of the striking body. Now it is a law of 
 which the negation is inconceivable, that in passing from any 
 one degree of magnitude to any other, all intermediate degrees 
 mint be passed through. Or, in the case before us, a body 
 moving at velocity 4, cannot by collision, be reduced to velocity 
 2, without passing through all velocities between 4 and 2. 
 lint were Matter truly solid — were its units absolutclv incom- 
 pressible and in absolute contact — this Maw of continuity' as it 
 is called, would be broken in every case of collision. For 
 when, of two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes 
 another at rest, the striking unit must have its velocity 1 In- 
 stantaneously reduced to velocity 2; must pass from velocity 
 •1 to velocity '1 without any lapse of time and without passing 
 through intermediate velocities; must be moving with velocities 
 1 and '1 at the same instant, which is impossible. 
 
 "The supposition that Matter is absolutely solid being unten- 
 able, there presents itself the Newtonian supposition, thai if COU- 
 siste of solid atoms not in contact hut acting on each other by 
 attractive and repulsive force-;, varying with the distances, To 
 a— nine this, however, merely A\\\'\< the difficulty: fhe problem 
 is simply transferred from the aggregated masses "I* matter t<» 
 these hypothetical atoms, ■ * • Exactly the same inquiries may 
 
52 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 be made respecting the parts of which each atom consists; 
 while exactly the same difficulties stand in the way of every 
 answer." 
 
 Two ways of reconciling the compressibility of a sensible 
 portion of Matter with its contiguity of parts are likely to 
 occur to any one contemplating the problem. One is to suppose 
 that a quantity of Matter escaped in the so-considered act of 
 compression; the other is to assume that within the portion of 
 Matter compressed there were spaces unoccupied. Either 
 theory may be accepted alone, or they may be blended, with- 
 out adopting Newton's hypothesis that atoms act upon each 
 other through such a medium as unfilled space. Eemark, 
 moreover, that when we have to deal with the ultra-micro- 
 scopic portions of Matter, we shall not be troubled by the phe- 
 nomenon of compression. But we shall be confronted by the 
 above-quoted appeal to the law of continuity, which, if con- 
 sidering perceptible aggregates of matter, the assumption of 
 empty spaces within would empower us to withstand. 
 
 If at any place Matter touches Matter, we can carve out 
 imaginatively, and the proper influences might carve out 
 physically, a portion in which there shall be no point where 
 there is an absence of contact. We may consider this block 
 of any size, but for our purposes it will be convenient to give 
 it the name of atom. Now, supposing, as Mr. Spencer sug- 
 gests, that one such atom in motion should strike another such 
 atom at rest, what would take place? Were each of these 
 atoms, as visible Matter is supposed to be, composed of many 
 minute particles, not in unbroken contact, though not every- 
 where apart, we might imagine that, as one atom strikes the 
 other, the components of each at the place of contact are forced 
 back upon their next neighbors, these in turn upon those still 
 more remote, and so on throughout. Thus would we avoid 
 the implication that a body can go from one velocity to another 
 without passing through intermediate velocities. For as the 
 bodies come from no contact into the closest contact they attain, 
 resistance is gradually exerted upon the striking body, and, 
 therefore, its velocity gradually reduced ; while motion is grad- 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 53 
 
 ually imparted to the body struck, and, therefore, its velocity 
 gradually initiated and increased. But the experiment is to be 
 with absolutely solid atoms. How shall it be shown that, under 
 the given circumstances, they will not violate the law of con- 
 tinuity as Mr. Spencer understands it? 
 
 Shall it be by explaining that, after the contact begins by 
 the atoms becoming so close that they cannot longer be said to 
 be apart, an interim, during which they draw still nearer, in- 
 tervenes before they can be said to touch? Unsatisfactory as 
 thi- explanation certainly is, it may yet be so used as to dis- 
 concert Mr. Spencer. If the contact cannot be conceived as 
 continuous, but must be conceived as instantaneous, as in fact it 
 is, we conceive an essential breach of continuity, — something as 
 having widely contrasted states in contiguous points of time. 
 Mr. Spencer dare not admit that change from the state of ab- 
 solute separation to the state of absolute union is thinkable as 
 an entirely gradual change, because he would thereby deny the 
 sity of imagining an immediate imparting of motion. 
 On the other hand, if he would maintain that gradual touch- 
 ing is inconceivable, he is bound to establish such proposition; 
 and this can be done only by pointing out that we cannot avoid 
 conceiving the change from no contact to some contact as in- 
 stantaneous. 
 
 After it has been granted that change from separation to 
 slightest contact cannot be conceived except as being suddenly 
 ended by the production of some contact, we are prepared to 
 bring forward stronger instances of like implication — instances 
 which manifest mosl clearly that it i< not "inconceivable that 
 in passing from any one degree of magnitude to any other, all 
 intermediate degrees musl be passed through." Between no 
 contact of cubes and contact extending throughout their adja- 
 cent side-, many quantities of contact might intervene; a- it' 
 
 they should be brought precisely face to lace by touching the 
 
 Corner of the one t<> the corner of the other and gradually 
 
 bringing them more and more together, by sliding the first 
 upon the second. Mr. Spencer would not hesitate to allow that 
 by clashing them together we could produce the greatest quan- 
 
54 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 tity of contact at a point in time, and without producing a 
 plurality of degrees. And again: consider that the objects 
 are of different sizes; that the smaller is a unit, and the larger 
 an aggregate of matter; and that when they come together they 
 will form a larger aggregate. Evidently, if they can be con- 
 ceived to unite, as the portions of time in which their different 
 relations severally endure unite, the aggregate may be con- 
 ceived as passing from one magnitude to another many degrees 
 greater without ever having any of the magnitudes that poten- 
 tially lie between. 
 
 In all the instances given, we have seen our ability to con- 
 ceive what Mr. Spencer said we could not conceive. Is it so 
 in the case in question? Introspection discloses that it is. 
 Nothing is more definitely representable than motion as in- 
 stantly lost and instantly acquired. No one ever doubted the 
 fact except those who, like Mr. Spencer, looking at it in the 
 abstract, thought it implied an exception to a rule which they 
 deemed invariable. By comparison with the concrete, the ab- 
 straction has been corrected. The difficulty of conceiving an in- 
 stantaneous transition from one state to another, so unlike that 
 we symbolically picture them as in the distance, has been shown 
 not to be universal. While this is so, there has been no denial 
 that the difficulty is very general. No such denial was neces- 
 sary. Mr. Spencer has been completely answered, if it now 
 appears that velocity can be thought to be acquired and lost, 
 as a man may acquire a dollar or lose his hat — all at once. 
 
 Supposing himself successful in exposing the self-contra- 
 diction of other conceptions of Matter, Mr. Spencer takes in 
 hand that of Boscovich ; which is, " that the constituents of 
 Matter are centres of force — points without dimensions, which 
 attract and repel each other in suchwise as to be kept at specific 
 distances apart." Over this absurdity, Mr. Spencer gains a 
 speedy victory ; but one not as extensive as he seems to think it. 
 "A disciple of Boscovich," he argues, "may reply that his 
 master's theory is involved in that of Newton; and cannot in- 
 deed be escaped. ' What/ he may ask, ' is it that holds together 
 the parts of these ultimate atoms V 'A cohesive force/ his 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 55 
 
 opponent must answer. 'And what/ he may continue, 'is it 
 that holds together the parts of any fragments into which, by 
 sufficient force, an ultimate atom might be broken V Again 
 the answer must be — a cohesive force. 'And what/ he may 
 still ask, i if the ultimate atom were, as we can imagine it to 
 be, reduced to parts as small in proportion to it, as it is in pro- 
 portion to a tangible mass of matter — what must give each 
 part the ability to sustain itself, and to occupy space 'V Still 
 there is no answer but — a cohesive force. Carry the process 
 in thought as far as we may, * * * and we can find no limit 
 until we arrive at the conception of centres of force without 
 any extension." (First Prim, § 16.) 
 
 To the acceptance of centres of force without any exten- 
 sion, there is, for those who follow Xewton, an alternative; 
 namely, to accept an infinite series. If a cohesive force sus- 
 tains an atom, there is no reason for not saying that it sustains 
 half an atom, quarter of an atom, any part of an atom, though 
 we divide forever. 
 
 § 19. After Matter, Motion is put upon the rack. ('First 
 Prim, § 17.) 
 
 "Here, for instance," says the author, "is a ship which, for 
 simplicity's sake, we will suppose to be anchored at the equator 
 with her head to the AVest. AVhen the captain walks from 
 stem to stern, in what direction does he move? East is the 
 obvious answer — an answer which for the moment may pass 
 without criticism. But now the anchor is heaved, and the vessel 
 sails to the West with a velocity equal to that at which the 
 captain walks. In what direction does he UOW move when he 
 
 ■Min stem to .-tern? Von cannot say East, for the vessel 
 is carrying him as fast toward- the WeBi a- he walks to the 
 East; and you cannot say West for the converse reason. In 
 respect t<> surrounding space he is stationary; though to all on 
 
 board the -hip he seem- to he moving. But now are we quite 
 
 sure of this conclusion? — Is he really stationary?" The 
 author answers this question by showing us that we have n<»t 
 
 allowed lor the earth's rotary and orbital motions, or for the 
 
1)6 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 motion of the whole solar system, or for the possible motion of 
 our whole sidereal system ; and that when we do this we must 
 confess that " that which seems moving proves to be stationary ; 
 that which seems stationary proves to be moving; while that 
 which we conclude to be going rapidly in one direction, turns 
 out to be going much more rapidly in the opposite direction." 
 
 We have, in the above example, a very good specimen of 
 false inference from partial premises. The captain is first per- 
 ceived to move with respect to the ship, and secondly perceived 
 not to move with respect to the water. To the untaught child 
 he would be thought motionless in respect to space. How do 
 we know that he is not motionless? Not by finding that there 
 is something in the perception which vitiates it; not by being 
 led by the perception into conceptions which prove self-destruc- 
 tive ; but by considering that the earth is moving variously, and 
 that the captain is moving with it. The error of the child, then, 
 arises from a mere mistake of fact. Explain the mistake, and 
 the child will follow you in thought until you reach a combina- 
 tion of facts too complicated for its faculties. At some point it 
 would, of course, stop bewildered; and so would Mr. Spencer, 
 if he should attempt to follow out, in all their complications, 
 the phenomena of evolution. Now, if nothing has been shown 
 to prevent our conceiving Motion, except its complications and 
 our ignorance of what they are, it does not yet appear that we 
 may not form of Motion, as we do of other facts, a conception 
 always corresponding with what might be, and always coming 
 more and more into correspondence with what is. It is probably 
 owing to a sense of the inefficiency of the argument before us 
 that it was supplemented by the following. 
 
 " We take for granted that there are fixed points in space 
 with respect to which all motions are absolute ; and we find it 
 impossible to rid ourselves of this idea. Nevertheless, absolute 
 motion cannot even be imagined, much less known. Motion 
 as taking place apart from those limitations of space which we 
 habitually associate with it is totally unthinkable. For motion 
 is change of place; but in unlimited space, change of place is 
 inconceivable, because place itself is inconceivable. Place can 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 57 
 
 be conceived only by reference to other places; and in the 
 absence of objects dispersed through space, a place could be 
 conceived only in relation to the limits of space; whence it 
 follows that in unlimited space, place cannot be conceived — all 
 places must be equidistant from boundaries that do not exist." 
 Try the experiment of imagining a body moving from point 
 to point in space. You do not meet the least suggestion of a 
 difficulty. Tin's is, as far as it goes, good evidence, and raises 
 a favorable presumption. Moreover you have not contemplated 
 Motion as a change of relation with respect to the limits of 
 space, but with respect to points. Were it not so, however, 
 you would not be involved in perplexities; for the limitations 
 which we habitually associate with extensive Motion are them- 
 selves real. They are nothing but the outskirts of that district 
 of space which for the moment chiefly engages the mind. The 
 district is an actuality, and so are its confines. The latter, it is 
 true, appear to recede, when the mind, with a fresh impulse, 
 seeks to pierce with its vision a region still more remote; but 
 observation shows that the limits to the first region fade 
 out of contemplation as those of the second become distinct. 
 They are not thought of as going out of existence, or as chang- 
 ing place. You know, then, of some realities which, in the 
 absence of matter, would enable you to conceive place. Had 
 tli'-'' escaped you, you would still have been able to find others 
 which would do as well; for instance, the spacial point of view 
 we occupy. Nothing illusive has so far appeared in the habit- 
 ual conception of Motion. But Mr. Spencer would say that 
 tin- concept ion is not of absolute Motion, because nothing 
 u fixed" can be pointed out. Think, if you can, of anything 
 appertaining to void space that is not fixed. Think of a point 
 moving, of a line shifting it- direction, of a spherical portion 
 of space flying through an Infinite vacuum, and revolving as 
 it goes. Here is an object, and here the place it occupies. 
 Think of the objed Leaving it- place. Now think of the 
 place leaving the object Von at once perceive a difference, 
 The place i- immovable. The relations which it bears to other 
 place- are necessary and eternal. We do not seem to he 
 
58 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 deprived of the means of location. Everything within the 
 universe may be located by reference to any point, line, figure, 
 place, or object holding place. We may start with any one of 
 these; knowing that in relation to it every object has absolute 
 situation, and all motion is absolute. 
 
 "Another insuperable difficulty," our author continues, "pre- 
 sents itself when we contemplate the transfer of Motion. • • • 
 In what respect does a body after impact differ from itself before 
 impact? What is this added to it which does not sensibly 
 affect any of its properties and yet enables it to traverse space? 
 Here is an object at rest and here is the same object moving. 
 In one state it has no tendency to change its place; but in the 
 other it is obliged at each instant to assume a new position. 
 What is it which will forever go on producing this effect with- 
 out being exhausted? and how does it dwell in the object? The 
 motion, you say, has been communicated. But how? — What 
 has been communicated? The striking body has not trans- 
 ferred a thing to the body struck ; and it is equally out of the 
 question to say that it has transferred an attribute. What then 
 has it transferred?" 
 
 I will suggest what seems to me to be the explanation of the 
 phenomenon. A boy wields a bat, and striking a ball sends it 
 flying through the air. What has taken place? The activity 
 called willing has set free and given direction to certain nervous 
 energies, which in turn have produced a co-ordination of muscu- 
 lar movements. By these movements, the bat was impelled and 
 the ball struck. It being impossible for the ball to share with 
 the bat any portion of the space it occupied, it was under the 
 necessity of stopping the bat or being pushed along by it. 
 Both effects were in a measure produced. But lo ! in a moment 
 more the ball left the bat and flew onward. While we per- 
 ceived an urging we did not marvel ; but when this ceased to 
 be perceived the mystery began. The solution, like the problem 
 itself, is not given in perception. It is the answer to the 
 query — what took place that was not perceived? As usual, 
 no account has yet been taken of the atmospheric or ethereal 
 mediums. May not the initial moving of the ball have given 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 59 
 
 direction to and increased their activities, thus inducing a con- 
 tinuance of the propulsion which the bat began? May not 
 the ball, also, have been given an internal activity, which, by 
 acting upon surrounding mediums, promotes motion? There 
 is no other conceivable hypothesis; which is the best reason 
 that could be had for accepting either one or both of these. 
 In respect to details we are liable to err, but concerning the 
 abstract proposition there can be no mistake. Motion, in the 
 absence of propulsion is unthinkable. Propulsion must con- 
 sist in the action of the object on something in contact with it, 
 or in the action of the latter upon the object, or in both; and 
 this is the essence of our conclusion. In its most abstract form 
 it is as readily realized as was that concerning the mental, ner- 
 vous, and muscular antecedents of the ball's motion. What- 
 ever is said to render it more definite, must be understood to 
 be advanced as a provisional elaboration. 
 
 According to a law which seems to be exemplified by all 
 orders of phenomena, anything affected by motion — as an ob- 
 ject made to move and a medium around about it — would tend 
 to acquire the combination of state and activity most consistent 
 with the affecting motion; and this would be a combination 
 eventually promotive of such motion. This proposition, like 
 the other, is not to be prejudiced by what follows it. AV r ith 
 this caution, we shall leave the more for the less abstract, the 
 general lor the particular. 
 
 Little sua is known of the action of air and the ethereal sub- 
 stance under an influence which, in the important particular, 
 transcends observation, and novel as is the thought of them 
 ;i- continuers of motion, no violence is done to the current un- 
 derstanding of their nature by imagining tlieni as in the act of 
 urging forward an object enveloped in them. The object can- 
 not be made to move without causing much that is before it to 
 move in the same direction, and much also to be dissipated 
 laterally. Thus, by opening a path, is resistance Lessened. The 
 lessening of resistance obviously affects the ease with which the 
 motion of the object may he continued after the initiatory im- 
 pulse. Now consider what musi simultaneously take place in 
 
60 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 the rear. A space must be vacated by the object, and as 
 quickly filled by an in-rushing from all directions except that 
 of the object. To the confluence of forces so formed there is 
 no outlet except in the direction of the object; consequently this 
 direction they take, impelling the object forward. Thus far 
 the explanation postulates no other external activity than that 
 derived from propulsion of the object itself; for the filling iu 
 behind might be attributed to the forcing out from the path be- 
 fore — to alternative compression here and expansion there. 
 Important agencies there are, however, which, existing inde- 
 pendent of the object's motion, powerfully aid in its prolongation. 
 One of these is gravity. Supposing a vacuum to be formed, 
 gravity would cause it to be filled to overflowing. The momen- 
 tum acquired by an in-rushing medium would be expended in 
 the direction in which resistance is already overcome. Other 
 activities besides those of gravity would be similarly diverted 
 in the same direction. Minute perturbations of the atmos- 
 phere or of the less stable substance which is supposed to per- 
 vade it — and there must be many of them besides heat and 
 light — would, taking the line of least resistance, ultimately 
 make their contribution too. It needs but a statement to carry 
 conviction that such a concatenation of activities as that de- 
 scribed must, when once established, repeat itself until by 
 resistance overcome. Internal activities we cannot so 
 
 exhaustively conceive. In the case of a ball, we may imagine 
 a compression, caused by resistance on one side and propulsion 
 on the other, alternated by an expansion which inclines from the 
 propulsive toward the less powerful resistant force. The action 
 of compression and expansion may be realized by pressing an 
 elastic ball down upon the floor and then gradually taking the 
 hand away. This shows how expansion in the line of least 
 resistance may change the relation of an object to space. In 
 the case of an arrow we may superadd the notion of a shiver 
 or of a lateral expansion running from end to end, or of such 
 undulations as an eel makes in moving through the water. In 
 the case of a clot of mud, on the contrary, we cannot go far 
 towards imagining any internal activities whatever. Examples, 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 61 
 
 however, we have which enable us to conceive very definitely 
 how an object may aid in propelling itself. 
 
 Is not the explanation arrived at more in harmony with ob- 
 servation than that which is universally accepted? Xo answer 
 can be based on the supposition that an object once started in an 
 infinity of unoccupied space would journey on alone forever. 
 Bach a fact has never been, and can never be, observed ; and 
 Mr. Spencer's argument rests on its inconceivability. It is 
 pleasing to have such good authority for the proposition that 
 we are unable to realize that there can be something dwelling 
 in an object, which, in the absence of anything else, impels it 
 onward; since if there is no such entity or property our con- 
 clusion is necessitated. Mr. Spencer's last resort appears to be 
 the paradox, that, although nothing can be imagined as continu- 
 ing motion in vacuo, nothing can be imagined as bringing it to 
 an end. The problem at once disappears when it is observed, 
 that motion of matter, not in contact with other matter, cannot 
 be thought of as beginning; and that therefore questions in re- 
 gard to its termination are idle. Should we suppose an object 
 to be poshed into a region of space absolutely void, we could 
 not suppose it to break contact with that which pushes it, upon* 
 the stoppage of the latter. If it be asked what there is to 
 hinder it from going on, the answer is, — nothing but the want 
 of something to make it move. It could not acquire an inher- 
 ent tendency to move under such conditions, and would there- 
 fore be -topped by the withdrawal of external influence, inde- 
 pendent of any inherent tendency to come to rest. 
 
 With renewed confidence, we may proceed with the comparison 
 of fad and theory from which we have digressed. It is an 
 observed law of Motion that, other conditions being the same, 
 the greater the extent of surface which an object in motion 
 presents in the direction of resistance, the sooner it will be 
 
 brought to rest. One might think that, as the same amount of 
 
 surface must be presented in the direction of the propulsive 
 force, an exact compensation would be made. This would be 
 approximately true in respect to the Less stable medium, but 
 far from true in respect to the more stable medium, The 
 
62 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 larger the surfaces in question, and the faster the rate of speed, 
 the more resistance the atmosphere would oppose in front, and, 
 after reaching a certain maximum, the less assistance it would 
 afford behind. Where the speed is great, its action may be 
 compared to that of water stoutly resisting and slowly filling 
 in behind a moving oar. Of the ethereal fluid the same is 
 doubtless true, only in a different degree; that is, its maximum 
 of propulsion is greater. 
 
 That a heavy object is, other things being equal, more diffi- 
 cult to stop than a light one, is a rule which, though possibly 
 not without exception, must not be ignored. The prevalent 
 notion of inertia will not explain it. No one can answer why, 
 on the old hypothesis, there should be found a stronger tend- 
 ency to continue motion in a heavy object than in a light one. 
 To think that that which has the most power to refrain from 
 motion must have the most power to resist stoppage, is but to 
 formulate the reverse of an explanation ; for that which at first 
 chiefly hinders the object's motion — gravity — continues all 
 along to act. Inertia is an internal passive proclivity. Why 
 should a moving object have a greater internal passive pro- 
 clivity to fly onwards whenever there exists a greater external 
 tendency to bring it to rest? Why should the surplus of tend- 
 ency to move, over resistance to motion, be small where the 
 resistance is small, and great where the resistance is great? 
 What is this secret, inactive, yet acting, perversity? Is an in- 
 ternal, passive proclivity to act, is inertia even thinkable? Any 
 conceivable explanation would be preferable to the old one. It 
 may be to offer but a vague solution, but it is certainly to offer 
 what is, to some extent, a solution, to say that a body's suscep- 
 tibility to aerial and ethereal impulses must depend, in a great 
 degree, upon its internal structure — for instance, upon its den- 
 sity. And it will as surely carry this solution further to remark 
 that a body's ability to promote its own motion must depend 
 largely upon the same condition — for example, upon vibratory 
 peculiarities. In the last remark we have an explanation of 
 what the inherent tendency, which we find it almost impossible 
 to banish from our thoughts, really is. 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 63 
 
 The next question is, — Why is a moving object more diffi- 
 cult to stop in proportion as its speed is great? We totally 
 fail to comprehend how a stronger inactive tendency to change 
 place can be stored up inside an object by starting it rapidly, 
 than by starting it slowly; but we are far from being unable 
 to realize how, by starting motion with a more rapid impulse, a 
 greater quantity of both external and internal activity is in- 
 duced to act in a given time. 
 
 On the theory of Motion here advanced, some would expect 
 to feel a rush of air and ether following every moving object. 
 They must be reminded that the older theory involves the same 
 filling-in, and with about the same force and rapidity. Con- 
 cerning its imperceptibility, the same explanation must be 
 given, whichever theory we adopt. In the first place, the phe- 
 nomenon is frequently noticeable; and in the second place, it is 
 more often too slow or too inextensive to be perceived. 
 
 Experience and theory seem in perfect harmony; and if so, 
 our conclusion is unassailable. 
 
 One more puzzle connected with motion confronts us. We 
 cannot, Mr. Spencer assures us, represent the transition from 
 resl to motion, and from motion to rest. 
 
 "Truly to represent these transitions in thought, we find im- 
 possihle. For a breach of the law of continuity seems neces- 
 sarily involved ; and yet no breach of it is conceivable. A body 
 traveling at a given velocity cannot be brought to a state of 
 rest, or no velocity, without passing through all intermediate 
 velocities. At first sight, nothing seems easier than to imagine 
 it doing this. It is quite possible t<> think of its .Motion as 
 diminishing insensibly until it becomes infinitesmal; and many 
 will think equally possible to pass in thought from [nfinitesmal 
 
 motion to no motion. lint this is an error. Mentally follow 
 
 out the decreasing velocity as long a- yon please, and there still 
 remain- some velocity. Halve and again halve the rate of 
 movement forever, yet movement still exists. • • ■ 
 
 Whoever admit-, as Mr Spencer has, the possibility of con- 
 ceiving a loss of the first half of the velocity, can allege no 
 obstacle to conceiving a loss of the second. If in the one case 
 
64 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 the alternative is between passing in thought over an infinite 
 series and thinking of the sudden loss of a quantity of motion, 
 so is it in the other. Waiving this tacit admission, 
 
 there are grounds for believing either alternative conceivable. 
 Some pages back it was shown that to the rule, that in passing 
 from one degree of magnitude to another all intermediate de- 
 grees must be passed through, there are exceptions, and that 
 the transition between velocities is of their number. That an 
 infinite number of degrees potentially lie between some velocity 
 and no velocity, and between any two velocities, must be 
 granted by all who believe infinite divisibility thinkable; but 
 that each must be actually passed through whenever there is a 
 transition between states of which it is a conceivable mean, is 
 as untrue as that three apples cannot at once be taken from a 
 lot of five. The other alternative is likewise con- 
 
 ceivable. The infinity, of which unlike velocities are the ex- 
 tremes, is not an infinity in respect of extent but in respect of 
 divisibility. Now it is the extent which the mind is supposed 
 to glance over, and not the possible divisions thereof. An in- 
 finitude of parts is indeed traversed, but without contemplation 
 as such. In thought itself, however, there is a corresponding 
 infinitude. Change from one mental state to another, if it be 
 gradual, is infinitely divisible. So we find subjective infinity 
 representative of objective infinity; and this is what Mr. 
 Spencer thought could not be. 
 
 § 20. The conception of Force was the next to be assailed. 
 (First Prin., § 18.) 
 
 " On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to 
 that antagonistic force called the weight of the chair; and we 
 cannot think of these as equal without thinking of them as like 
 in kind; since equality is conceivable only between things that 
 are connatural." "Yet, contrariwise, it is incredible that the 
 force as existing in the chair really resembles the force as present 
 to our minds." "So that it is absurd to think of Force as in 
 itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of 
 it if we realize it in consciousness at all." 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 65 
 
 To avoid the imputation of accepting a very questionable 
 proposition, it mast be said that it is not the force known in 
 consciousness that is thought to be equal to the force by which 
 the chair is drawn downwards. The effort of volition nee 
 to the lifting of the chair, probably acts by directing into cer- 
 tain channels forces that are not present in consciousness. But 
 after this correction has been made, the fact remains that we 
 are compelled to attribute to volitional and extra-yolitional force 
 a certain likeness of nature. On this fact, howeyer, the refuta- 
 tion may be made to rest. A resemblance of causes is inferred 
 because there is observed a likeness of their effects. Such in- 
 e Is legitimate. What matters it that one agency is an 
 ingredient of consciousness and the other not? Their difference 
 in -nine respects is not repugnant to their similarity in others. 
 Mr.Spencer , s unexpressed major premise is, that things which are 
 equal in any particular are like in all. lie would shrink from 
 relying on this premise; and if he does not rely on it, his 
 lusion fails. 
 
 J j! it Mr. Spencer does not permit the preceding argument to 
 go forth alone. The next is, that when we contemplate cither 
 attraction between objects separaf&b! or the transmission of light 
 and heat from the Sun to the Earth, "we are obliged to conclude 
 that matter ■ ' ■ acts upon matter through absolutely vacant 
 : and yet this conclusion is positively unthinkable." i tf 
 con:-' it was impossible to justify such a position without dis- 
 posing of the hypothesis of an intervening fluid. This is what 
 s of it. " Remembering that this ether is imponderable, 
 we are obliged to conclude that the ratio between the Interspaces 
 of these atoms" (those of ether) "and the atom- themselves, 
 is [ncommensurably greater than the like ratio in ponderable 
 matter; else the densities could not be incommensurable. In- 
 stead then of a direct action by the Sun upon the Earth with- 
 out anything intervening, we have to conceive tie- Bun's action 
 propagated through a medium whose molecules arc probably as 
 small relatively to their interspaces as are the Sun and the 
 Earth compared with the space between them : we have to con- 
 ceive these infinitesmal molecule- acting on each other through 
 
66 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 absolutely vacant spaces which are immense in comparison with 
 their own dimensions/ 7 
 
 Strange the thought that ethereal units are made to convey force 
 by projecting them upon each other through the spaces interven- 
 ing should have escaped one who was bound to show its incon- 
 ceivability. What has been here neglected, let an admission 
 supply. The real key to the problem is the fact that there is 
 no necessity of concluding that the ethereal fluid is less dense 
 than the hardest metal. If it is only sufficiently less coherent 
 than other fluids, it will consist with all that we actually know 
 about it. That it is imponderable proves nothing. A sub- 
 stance which permeates all other substances is necessarily 
 incapable of being weighed. But that it has no weight is a very 
 different proposition, and one not admitting of the ordinary 
 proof nor easy to believe. 
 
 How delusive is our supposed knowledge of the nature of 
 the force of gravitation, Mr. Spencer, in the next paragraph, 
 proceeds to show. 
 
 "That the gravitation of one particle of matter towards 
 another, and towards all others, should be absolutely the same 
 whether the intervening space is filled with matter or not, is 
 incomprehensible. I lift from the ground, and continue to 
 hold, a pound weight. Now, into the vacancy between it and 
 the ground, is introduced a mass of matter of any kind what- 
 ever, in any state whatever — hot or cold, liquid or solid, trans- 
 parent or opaque, light or dense; and the gravitation of the 
 weight is entirely unaffected. The whole Earth, as well as 
 each individual of the infinity of particles composing the Earth, 
 acts on the pound in absolutely the same way, whatever inter- 
 venes, or if nothing intervenes. Through eight thousand miles 
 of the Earth's substance, each molecule at the antipodes affects 
 each molecule of the weight I hold, in utter indifference to the 
 fullness or emptiness of the space between them. So that each 
 portion of matter, in its dealings with remote portions, treats 
 all intervening portions as though they did not exist; and yet, 
 at the same time it recognizes their existence with scrupulous 
 exactness in its direct dealings with them." 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 67 
 
 If we dismiss, as manifestly gratuitous, the assertion that 
 objects attract each other where nothing intervenes, our first 
 defence may be a demurrer — a provisional admission of the 
 facts alleged, coupled with a denial that they make out a 
 case of essential incomprehensibility. The truth to be ascer- 
 tained is, not what we know, but what we are capable of know- 
 ing. It is lawful for us to admit that gravitation is, as yet, 
 nothing to us but a fact, and to nevertheless believe that its 
 cause will some time be known. The only way in which the 
 facts asserted could be effectively used to deprive us of this 
 belief is by showing every possible conception of the nature 
 of gravity to be inconsistent with them. This has not been 
 attempted. In the popular understanding of attraction, — in the 
 thought of the exercise of force upon distant things independ- 
 ent of anything intervening, — absurd as it is, there is nothing 
 to imply that it should make any difference whether there be 
 or be not a substance intervening, or whether an intervening 
 substance be "hot or cold, liquid or solid, transparent or opaque, 
 light or dense." Indeed consistency demands the contrary in- 
 ference. The theory that a fluid which permeates everything 
 else is the medium of attraction has also little to fear from Mr. 
 Spencer's criticism. Such fluid could not be intercepted in its 
 work of communication by grosser forms of matter. This 
 theory may be elaborated into greater strength. If the ulti- 
 mate form of all matter is the very fluid in question, then no 
 difference what is inserted between two objects the Bpace be- 
 tween them is filled, and solely (illed,by the medium of attrac- 
 tion. I have in mind another theory which is similarly capable 
 of defence; namely, that the intervening object, attracting and 
 attracted by both objects which it intercepts, forms a Link in the 
 chain of attraction equivalent to the one or one- supplanted by 
 it. Many theories being consistent with them, we may con- 
 clude that, granting Mr. Spencer's Tact-, bis case proves prima 
 
 fade incomplete. 
 
 Were it not so, we could still -how that he is estopped from 
 
 siting the facte on which he relic-. For this purpose, the 
 following is quoted. "Throughout the investigations Leading 
 
68 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 the chemist to the conclusion that of the carbon which has dis- 
 appeared during combustion, no portion has been lost, what is 
 his repeatedly assigned proof? That afforded by the scales. 
 In what terms is the verdict of the scales given? In grains 
 — in units of weight — in units of gravitative force. And 
 what is the total content of the verdict? That as many units of 
 gravitative force as the carbon exhibited at first it exhibits still. 
 The validity of the inference, then, depends entirely upon the 
 constancy of the units of force. * ■ * Everything turns on the 
 truth of the assumption that the gravitation of the weights is 
 persistent, and of this no proof is assigned, or can be assigned.'''' 
 (First Prin., § 61.) Without accepting this to its full extent, 
 it is competent to say that the difficulties which are here held to 
 preclude the demonstration that the weight of a body of matter 
 is unchanged by combustion, will, as far as they are real, similarly 
 prevent us from satisfying ourselves that the body's weight 
 is unaffected by interposing heat, for instance, between it and 
 the earth. In the latter case, moreover, there is the additional 
 feature that the change of condition is likely to modify the 
 scales and the weights. But dropping these considerations, 
 there may, nay, there must be differences of weight, infinitely im- 
 portant, which the finest scales, though unaffected by change of 
 surroundings and used in combination with unchanging weights, 
 cannot indicate. 
 
 The allegations in question are refutable. It is not known 
 that attraction between separated objects is the same "whatever 
 intervenes, or if nothing intervenes." The latter condition is 
 never, to our knowledge, fulfilled : something always intervenes. 
 With this in view, we must conclude that what intervenes is a 
 matter of great moment. Where much extent of matter inter- 
 venes between objects, their attraction is small. It is therefore 
 untrue "that each portion of matter in its dealings with remote 
 portions, treats all intervening portions as though they did not 
 exist." Exactly the reverse is true: portions of matter which 
 arc near are dealt with to the partial exclusion of portions 
 which are remote. And again: were Mr. Spencer 
 
 right in saying that attraction is not affected by what intervenes 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ABGUMEN1 CONTINUED. 69 
 
 between attracting objects, he would be compelled to deny that 
 such attraction may be added to by substituting for the interven- 
 ing matter, matter of greater density. Air at first intervening 
 between the pound weight and the earth, their attraction 
 towards each other should be increased by inserting between 
 them a mass of solid metal. Undoubtedly Mr. Spencer 
 
 would assent to both these corrections. He no doubt holds 
 that the gravity of a pound weight is increased by inserting 
 between it and the earth matter of greater density ; and would 
 explain that the difference is too slight to be detected. On the 
 other hand, it is equally probable he would concede that the 
 gravity of the weight would be lessened by bringing between 
 it and the earth matter of greater extent. To thus correct 
 himself, however, would be to allow that attraction is af- 
 fected by the character of that through which the line of 
 attraction runs.* 
 
 * Until the preceding had been electrotyped, I thought to reserve 
 entire for future elaboration, but will here in part disclose, a theory of 
 gravitation to which I have been led, or rather helped, by my theory 
 Of motion above expounded. I regard that tendency to move which 
 we call gravity, as well as the motion resulting from it and all other 
 perceptible motion, as due (principally) to ethereal UfPUISES. The 
 fact that substances are susceptible to the force of gravitation just in 
 proportion as they are susceptible to a tendency to move imparted to 
 them by other agencies, is what Led metosusped that one explanation 
 might serve to account for the two phenomena, in the cae 
 gravity, the theory is that the motion or tendency to move is due to 
 Listing and continuous perturbations of the Inter-stellar medium, 
 urging what it envelops and permeates towards centres of attraction, 
 or repulsion, or, more properly, propulsion. Thai the lines of attraction 
 converge, elucidates the increase of gravity towards the centres. Such 
 lines may be straight or spiral Bodies doubtless take an active pari 
 
 in their own gravitation, as they do in other motion ; which is « pari 
 
 of tin- explanation of why gravitation is increased by gravitating. 
 Constituted subject to the influence of gravity, perhaps constituted 
 mainly by it, nil bodies must be of nature consistent u Ith, and suscep- 
 tible to its tendencies. Probably those eptible to it pass its 
 Influence most readily on: if bo .Mr. Spencer's attack and my d< 
 
 stand much B6 they Stood before; for then the chain of attraction mUSl 
 
 be strongest u here its links are most \\ eighty and compact 
 
70 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 CHAPTEK V. 
 The Inductive Argument Continued. 
 
 Self-knowledge: Extent of Consciousness and Mental Substance. 
 
 § 21. Before proceeding, a short explanation must be inter- 
 polated. Hitherto the contest has been over ideas of what we 
 call the " External World." That upon which we are about to 
 enter, will concern ideas of the Substance of Mind and the 
 Intrinsic Nature of its modes. In other words, Mr. Spencer 
 maintains that we can have no legitimate ideas of Mental 
 Substance or even of the Noumenal Nature of states of conscious- 
 ness; and it is a defence of ideas purporting to be such that is 
 next to engage us. Mr. Spencer's object, it is hardly necessary 
 to remind the reader, is to show States of Mind to be partly, 
 and Substance of Mind wholly, unknowable — components of 
 "The Unknowable." 
 
 His method, it must be observed, is not as thorough as was 
 that employed to prove the External World unknowable; for, 
 whereas he aimed to dispose of every possible idea of it, he 
 has not sought to experiment with more than a partial concep- 
 tion of the Real Nature of conscious states, or with more than 
 a partial conception of the underlying Substance. Almost all 
 thoughts of the Intrinsic Nature of the Mental World are left 
 in oblivion, and therefore in integrity. The reader will observe 
 how few are noticed. 
 
 § 22. What has Mr. Spencer to say ( First Prim, § 19) about 
 the unthinkableness of the Intrinsic Nature of mental affections? 
 Notwithstanding that the inconceivability of an infinite series 
 prevents us from thinking of the chain of consciousness as in- 
 finite, he argues, we are as conclusively prevented from thinking 
 it finite. " Go back in memory as far as we may, we are wholly 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 71 
 
 unable to identify our first states of consciousness: the per- 
 spective of our thoughts vanishes in a dim obscurity where we 
 can make out nothing. Similarly at the other extreme. We 
 have do immediate knowledge of a termination to the series at 
 a future time; and we cannot really lay hold of that temporary 
 termination of the series reached at the present moment. For 
 the state of consciousness recognized by us as our last, is not 
 truly our last. That any mental affection may be contemplated 
 as one of the series, it must be remembered — represented in 
 thought, not presented. The truly last state of consciousness 
 is that which is passing in the very act of contemplating a state 
 just passed — that in which we are thinking of the one before 
 the last. So that the proximate end of the chain eludes 
 us as well as the remote end." 
 
 \ - Mr. Spencer has not attempted to show that a first state 
 of consciousness is unthinkable, and as we have seen that in- 
 finite continuance is thinkable, we might, in the face of his 
 argument, take the position that consciousness had a beginning 
 but will have no end. To those who choose to do this, it will 
 not matter whether a last state is or is not conceivable. Or 
 we might assert that a last state will occur without beino; con- 
 templated, just as he maintains that a state, temporarily the last, 
 occur- without being contemplated. But this supposition, that 
 a state of consciousness occurs before it is perceived — that it 
 cannot be contemplated until it is represented — is the central 
 fallacy in the author's reasoning. There exists in the mind a 
 conception of a series of feelings, while there arises a feeling to 
 take its place as one of the Beries. Can it be denied thai rela- 
 tions between present feeling and feelings present by represen- 
 tation may establish themselves simultaneously with it- estab- 
 lishment? As it cannot, we are convinced of* our ability to 
 
 lay hold of the temporary termination of the series a- com- 
 pletely as we should expect to lav hold of a point in continuous 
 
 change. Having this power, we can a- easily conceive a future 
 termination as we can a past beginning, There remain- no 
 assigned reason why we cannot conceive a future termination, 
 after dispelling tin- delusion that a mental affection and its 
 
72 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 recognition cannot co-exist; for this delusion is all that gives 
 the following extension of the argument the air of plausibility. 
 
 " i But/ it may be said, i though we cannot directly know 
 consciousness to be finite in duration, because neither of its 
 limits can be actually reached; yet we can very well conceive it 
 to be so. ? No : not even this is true. In the first place, we 
 cannot conceive the terminations of that consciousness which 
 alone we really know — our own — any more than we can per- 
 ceive its terminations. For in truth the two acts are here one. 
 In either case such terminations must be, as above said, not 
 presented in thought, but represented ; and they must be repre- 
 sented as in the act of occurring. Now to represent the termi- 
 nation of consciousness as occurring in ourselves, is to think of 
 ourselves as contemplating the cessation of the last state of con- 
 sciousness; and this implies a supposed continuance of con- 
 sciousness after its last state, which is absurd. In the second 
 place, if we regard the matter objectively — if we study the 
 phenomena as occurring in others, or in the abstract, we are 
 equally foiled. Consciousness implies perpetual change and 
 the perpetual establishment of relations between its successive 
 phases. To be known at all, any mental affection must be 
 known as such or such — as like these foregoing ones or unlike 
 those: if it is not thought of in connection with others — not 
 distinguished or identified by comparison with others, it is not 
 recognized — is not a state of consciousness at all. A last state 
 of consciousness, then, like any other, can exist only through a 
 perception of its relations to previous states. But such per- 
 ception of its relations must constitute a state later than the 
 last, which is a contradiction." 
 
 They who hold that a state of consciousness cannot be per- 
 ceived while it exists, must face this difficulty. It is theirs ex- 
 clusively. They may, if they prefer, avoid it by embracing 
 the belief that consciousness is unending, or that a last state 
 may occur unperceived. But they are recommended to the 
 doctrine that the perception of a state of consciousness is not 
 subsequent to, but contemporaneous with, the state perceived. 
 It is m I easy to discover how any can object to this view, 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 73 
 
 seeing that to have consciousness and to know that we have it 
 form not distinct acts, but one indivisible aet. 
 
 The supposed difficulty is put in still another form. " If 
 ceaseless change of state is the condition on which alone con- 
 sciousness exists, then when the supposed last state has been 
 reached by the completion of the preceding change, change has 
 ceased; therefore consciousness has ceased; therefore the sup- 
 posed last state is not a state of consciousness at all; there- 
 fore there can be no last state of consciousness." 
 
 Either of two replies may be made, accordingly as the person 
 replying holds one or the other of two alternative positions. If 
 he thinks that consciousness follows after change in Mental 
 Substance, he can say consistently that consciousness may exist 
 after such change has ceased. If, on the other hand, he thinks 
 that consciousness consists in, and is simultaneous with, chance 
 of substance, he need only suggest that when the last change 
 is completed, the last state is completed and at an end. Neither 
 opinion obliges the holder to think of consciousness as persisting 
 after the termination of its conditions. 
 
 § 2-*]. Confident of having demonstrated that any notion of 
 the extent of consciousness is essentially incongruous, Mr. 
 Spencer next ostensibly takes in hand the notion of Mental 
 ••Nor do we meet," he says, "with any greater 
 success when, instead of the extent of consciousness, we eon- 
 • its substance." According to his usual practice, he devotes 
 a paragraph to showing that, "belief in the reality of self, is, 
 indeed, a belief which no hypothesis enables us to escape/' and 
 and then concludes with the following argument. 
 
 "But now, unavoidable as is this belief — established though 
 it is not only by the assent of mankind at large, endorsed by 
 divers philosophers, but by the suicide of the Boeptical argu- 
 ment — it is vet a belief admitting of no justification by reason: 
 nay, indeed, it is a belief which reason, when pressed for a 
 distinct answer, rejects. ■ ■ ■ The fundamental condition to all 
 consciousness, emphatically insisted upon by Mr. Mansel in com- 
 mon with Sir William Hamilton and others, is the antithi sisof 
 
74 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
 
 subject and object. And on this ' primitive dualism of conscious- 
 ness/ ( from which the explanations of philosophy must take their 
 start/ Mr. Mansel founds his refutation of the German abso- 
 lutists. But now, what is the corollary from this doctrine, as 
 bearing on the consciousness of self? The mental act in which 
 self is known implies, like every other mental act, a perceiving 
 subject and a perceived object. If, then, the object perceived 
 is self, what is the subject that perceives? or if it is the true 
 self which thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of? 
 Clearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which the 
 knowing and the known are one — in which subject and object 
 are identified; and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the 
 annihilation of both." 
 
 A mistaken application of the foregoing argument has re- 
 sulted from the confounding of self with the Substance of Mind. 
 This substance is truly a part of self; but it is not all of self; 
 nor is it that part in regard to which the difficulty arises. It 
 is inferred from the fact of consciousness. Only that part of 
 self which is immediately known in what is called " self-con- 
 sciousness" is involved in the perplexity. The question is, how 
 can this present at once the contrast between the subject and 
 object of cognition? Obviously it is not sufficient to say that 
 in self-consciousness we contemplate two sides of the same 
 fact; for, in this case, the subject and object present absolutely 
 the same appearance. The mind, looking upon itself, sees but one 
 thing — the mind thus looking upon itself. One other propo- 
 sition is available; namely, that what is known in self-con- 
 sciousness is the same thing under two sets of relations; and 
 this is the theory which analysis justifies. In the first place, 
 self is classed with other objects of thought. It is perceived 
 to differ with them in other respects, but to resemble them in 
 being an object. In the second place, self as knowing self is 
 classed with, although at the same time, distinguished from, 
 self as knowing other objects. By the process postulated, the 
 same aggregate of consciousness is made to present at once the 
 contrast between the subject aud the object of thought. 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 75 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The Inductive Argument Concluded. 
 
 Transfigured Realism Confronted by the Problems of Realism. 
 
 § 24. The preceding three chapters were confined to a con- 
 futation of certain reasons given by Mr. Spencer for "having 
 repudiated as impossible the Philosophy which professes to 
 formulate Being as distinguished from Appearance." (First 
 Prim, § 35.) In the present one it is to be shown that these 
 reasons, if adequate for the purpose to which they were directed, 
 are similarly adequate to prove impossible a Philosophy which 
 professes to formulate Appearances. Upon a theory of the 
 function of Philosophy, which none can gainsay, and which 
 Mr. Spencer asserts, I ground the charge. " Besides," he says 
 ( First Prim, § 41 ), "seeing that the unified knowledge consti- 
 fcuting a completed Philosophy, is a knowledge composed of parts 
 that are universally congruous; and besides seeing that it is the 
 business of Philosophy to establish their universal congruiiy; 
 we also see that every act of the process by which this universal 
 congruity is to be established, down even to the components of 
 every inference and every observation, consists in the establish- 
 ment of cnnLiTiiity." Could there be a complete congruity 
 among phenomena while Mr. Spencer's puzzles remain un- 
 solved? To thi- question we shall now address ourselves. 
 
 § 2o. When we arc self-conscious, we arc conscious of noth- 
 ing not phenomenal. If we are conscious of more, if we are 
 conscious of the Substance of Mind, then must Philosophy 
 take this "component of observation " in hand and find it a 
 place in the universal congruity. Bui Mr. Spencer is ool one 
 who will assert that Mental Substance is immediately known 
 in self-consciousness, [nhis "Principles of Psychology" (§59) 
 
76 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 he employs several arguments to confirm the contrary. How, 
 then, could he excuse the philosophy, which is to establish 
 congruity among phenomena, from showing the congruity 
 among the phenomena composing self-consciousness? Not, 
 certainly, by distinguishing between the apparent and intrinsic 
 natures of mental affections, and saying that the latter are the 
 authors of the difficulty: if they are, they are given in con- 
 sciousness, and therefore necessitate a philosophy of more than 
 appearances; or they are not given in consciousness, and from 
 this we know that there is no incongruity in self-consciousness. 
 Accepting this latter conclusion, would be equivalent to admit- 
 ting the entire congruity of a state of consciousness, in which 
 subject and object are completely identified. By refusing to 
 make this admission, he would assert an incompatibility of ap- 
 pearances. Escape would be possible if the doctrine that there 
 can be no identification of subject and object were peculiar to 
 Ontology. That Ontology, as we have seen, is in a position to 
 reject such a doctrine, is scarcely less to be doubted than that 
 the prevailing Phenomenal Philosophy accepts it. Mr. Spen- 
 cer would no more affirm that the same phenomena can be at 
 once the subject and object of cognition, than he would deny 
 that in the act of self-consciousness they seem to be the same. 
 He must therefore acknowledge the paradox to be, until ex- 
 plained away, an obstacle to the establishment of phenomenal 
 congruity. 
 
 The stumbling-block, which he has placed in the path of 
 those who search for an understanding of Mental Substance, 
 constantly rises in his own path as an impassable barrier. 
 
 Having seen that a mental state aware of itself is a mystery 
 similar to a mental substance aware of itself, we are prepared 
 to appreciate the remark, that there is an element in conscious- 
 ness which Mr. Spencer will consent to call metaphorically the 
 Substance of Mind. Meaning this, he will allow (Prin. of 
 Psy., § 58) that "we do know something about the substance 
 of Mind, and may eventually know more." This element is 
 the primordial element of consciousness — the unit of feeling, 
 whose various combinations constitute those states of mind 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 77 
 
 which to introspection seem indecomposable. He is desirous of 
 showing that the ultimate unit of phenomena is a feeling akin 
 to a nervous shock. "It is possible, then — " he says (Prin. 
 Psy., § 60), "may we not even say probable — that something 
 of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the 
 ultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the unlikenesses 
 among our feelings result from unlike modes of integration of 
 this ultimate unit." Undoubtedly; but if so, we have a 
 mental substance which is more closely involved than any other 
 is supposed to be with the perplexities of self-consciousness. 
 Mr. Spencer is as much under necessity of explaining self-con- 
 sciousness as they who assert that we can be conscious. of the 
 noumenal Substance of Mind. He is far more under such 
 necessity than one who deals with this Mental Substance as 
 lying wholly out of consciousness. 
 
 In a very different instance, we shall find Mr. Spencer con- 
 fronted by the problem of self-consciousness. The hypothesis 
 that like units of feeling, differently combined, form a phe- 
 nomenal substratum of states of consciousness, is supported 
 (Prin. of Psy., § 60) by pointing out "the complete congruity 
 between this view and the known character of nerve action." 
 Be explains that "if each wave of molecular motion brought 
 by a nerve fibre to a nerve-centre, has for its correlative a shock 
 or pulse of feeling; then we can comprehend how distinguish- 
 able differences of feeling may arise from differences in the 
 rati- of recurrence of* the waves, and we can frame a general 
 
 idea of the way in which, by the arrival through other fibres, 
 of waves recurring al other rates, compound wave- of molec- 
 ular motion may he formed, and give rise to units of compound 
 feelings: which process of compounding of waves and produc- 
 tion of correspondingly-compounded feelings, we may imagine 
 to be carried on without limit, and to produce any amount <.i* 
 heterogeneity of feelings." Of course Mr. Spencer is careful 
 to explain thai he baa not been guilty of here striving 
 to comprehend the ooumena] something which underlies 
 mind — that Qerve-substanoe and nerve-action are nothing but 
 phenomena. For present purposes, the camion is immaterial. 
 
78 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 save as it tends to modify our language. It merely tells of two 
 substrata under consciousness, instead of one. In the above 
 example, as in multitudes that might have been chosen, Mr. 
 Spencer is found endeavoring to explain the phenomena of 
 mind through the phenomena of matter. What is noteworthy 
 is that he attempts this, leaving self-cognition unexplained. 
 His objective elucidation of consciousness can never, he is com- 
 pelled to admit, explain self-consciousness. He is therefore in 
 a position analogous to that of one who, being unable to offer 
 an explanation of self-consciousness, yet holds the belief in a 
 substance of mind which does much to render consciousness 
 in general comprehensible. The incompleteness of the one 
 explanation is equivalent to the incompleteness of the other. 
 
 Let us turn, from what may be thought more or less adven- 
 titious, back to essentials of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Phe- 
 nomena distinguished as external are no less real than phenomena 
 distinguished as internal. Moreover, the phenomenon of the 
 externality of the former is no more readily suppressed than 
 the phenomenon of the internality of the latter. Mr. Spencer 
 speaks (Prin. of Psy., § 62) of the "distinction of Subject and 
 Object" as "the consciousness of a difference transcending all 
 other differences." Now, if Philosophy can neither banish 
 from its realm external manifestations, nor resolve them into 
 internal manifestations, by banishing so much of them as 
 characterizes them external, she must entertain the question — 
 Can internal manifestations be resolved into external manifes- 
 tations? Having shown our warrant for propounding this 
 question, we are entitled to an answer. Whether it be "yes" 
 or "no," we need not accept it unless it be justified. In either 
 case, the justification must be that a comparison of internal and 
 external phenomena was made, and that the answer given is 
 authorized by the result. In either case, however, we can inter- 
 pose the objection, that, as tliere can be no comparison between 
 something inscrutable and something else, the conclusion that 
 self-consciousness is, or the conclusion that it is not, identical 
 with objective manifestations, can never be justified. Thus is 
 Mr. Spencer's philosophy brought face to face with a question 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 79 
 
 which it cannot answer. The charge is, the reader must ob- 
 serve, not that there is a question to which his philosophy has 
 not found an answer, but that any answer which can be found 
 is, in its mouth, illegitimate. It will clarify our ideas somewhat 
 to learn how Mr. Spencer actually deals with the question raised. 
 "Let it be granted," he says ( Prin. of Psy., § 62), "that all 
 existence distinguished as objective, may be resolved into the 
 existence of units of one kind. Let it be granted that every 
 species of objective activity, may be understood as due to the 
 rhythmical motions of such ultimate units, and that among 
 the objective activities so understood, are the waves of molecular 
 motion propagated through nerves and nerve-centres. And let 
 it further be granted that all existence distinguished as sub- 
 jective, is resolvable into units of consciousness similar in nature 
 to those which we know as nervous shocks; each of which is 
 the correlative of a rhythmical motion of a material unit or 
 group <>1" such unit-. Can we then think of the subjective and 
 objective activities as the same? Can the oscillation of a 
 molecule be represented in consciousness side by side with a 
 nervous Bhock, and the two be recognized as one? No effort 
 enables as to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has noth- 
 ing in common with a unit of motion, becomes more than ever 
 manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition.''' Mr. 
 Spencer can hardly consider this a solution of the question. 
 "When we recall the fact that molecules are never at rest, and 
 that by carrying their individual rhythmical motions into the 
 Compound molecule- formed of them, they produce compound 
 
 rhythm- — when we recoiled the extreme complexity of the 
 molecules of nervous matter, and imagine how various and in- 
 volved must be the rhythms <>f which they are the seats — 
 when, further, we infer the countless modifications <>f rhythms 
 that must under Buch condition- become possible" ( Prin, of 
 <;i i; we shall doubt whether Mi-. Spencer really made 
 a serious endeavor to compare a unit of feeling with each dis- 
 tinct phase of aeura] modes. WTien also we reflect that he is 
 
 ever pointing out similarities between nerVOUS and mental phe- 
 nomena; when we add to this that we have recently found him 
 
80 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 giving a material explanation of mental heterogeneity, and 
 think of his theory that all explanation is assimilation; we 
 shall be inclined to doubt his complete acceptance of his own 
 conclusion. If he had seriously attempted to make the com- 
 parison, he would have discovered an obstacle of his own cre- 
 ation. The feeling, called a nervous shock, involves self-con- 
 sciousness. Concerning their relations to each other, two sup- 
 positions may be made, either of which will answer our purpose. 
 If we argue that, as to have a feeling and to know that we 
 have it constitute but one feeling, the self-consciousness in which 
 a unit of feeling is known, is that feeling or a considerable part 
 of it, we assert a mental mode which cannot, if self-conscious- 
 ness is beyond our grasp, be compared with material phenomena. 
 If, on the contrary, we assert a distinction between a unit of 
 feeling and the self-consciousness which accompanies it, we 
 nevertheless allow a kind of consciousness similarly incapable 
 of comparison. In fine: in whatever way we strive to reduce 
 consciousness, subjectively considered, into its elements, there 
 must always remain at least one element, of which Mr. Spencer 
 can affirm neither materiality nor immateriality. 
 
 After the answer that the phenomena of consciousness are 
 not contained in the phenomena of matter, surprise must be 
 called forth by the declaration that Mr. Spencer deals with 
 mental phenomena as entirely included in those that are phys- 
 ical. Yet the declaration must be made. Evolution, as Mr. 
 Spencer sets it forth, purports to include every knowable activ- 
 ity. What is Evolution ? Here is his definition. " Evolution 
 is an integration of matter, and concomitant dissipation of 
 motion) during which the matter passes from an indefinite, in- 
 coherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and 
 during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel trans- 
 formation." (First Prin., § 145.) This process includes all 
 phenomenal activity; includes the activity, consciousness; in- 
 cludes the evolving of consciousness; includes the production 
 and maintenance of every element in consciousness. Again is 
 Mr. Spencer met by self-consciousness. Is this produced by, 
 and does it consist in, the above-described activity of matter? 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 81 
 
 is a question to which he, not being cognizant of self-conscious- 
 ness, can give no answer. 
 
 The collateral importance of some of the foregoing criticisms 
 must not cause us to lose sight of the main issue. An impeach- 
 ment, which had been brought against the Noumenal Philos- 
 ophy, we have found it possible to reiterate in many ways 
 against the Phenomenal Philosophy. Confining ourselves to 
 internal phenomena, we observed that self-consciousness never- 
 theless demanded explanation. From the same point of view, 
 we saw Mr. Spencer occupying a position as objectionable, as 
 far as self-consciousness is concerned, as that of those who assert 
 consciousness of Mental Substance. Assuming next an objec- 
 tive stand-point, we learned that Mr. Spencer's attempts to ex- 
 plain mental affections through material manifestations were as 
 much restricted by the difficulties of self-consciousness as is 
 the attempt to accomplish the explanation by means of Mental 
 Substance. Next it was shown that the question of identity or 
 non-identity of subjective with certain objective phenomena 
 was a question for the Phenomenal Philosophy; and that there 
 are but two answers, neither of which, on Mr. Spencer's prin- 
 ciple, it can advance. Lastly we find that Mr. Spencer has 
 given both answers, but that he had no right to give either; the 
 problem of self-consciousness not being, in his opinion, soluble. 
 
 § 26. The Extent of Consciousness will not require as much 
 discussion as was given to Mental Substance. "Difficult as 
 We find it distinctly to Separate and individualize them, it is 
 nevertheless beyond question that our states of consciousness 
 ocmr in succession." ( Kirst Prin., § 19.) Feeling justified by 
 the deliverance of consciousness in making this statement, Mr. 
 Spencer is obligated, if any one is, to ascertain whether the 
 succession of* consciousness is of finite or infinite extent Here 
 i- the fact that the phenomena of consciousness occur in HJ ,._ 
 eeasion. Here is the belief, itself a phenomenon, that in the 
 succession tli<T<- musl have been a state or no state which all 
 others follow, and necessarily will be a state or no state which 
 all others precede. And here are the imagined absurdities to 
 
82 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 which any of these suppositions leads. How is Mr. Spencer to 
 establish congruity? He is both powerless and unwilling to 
 dispute the fact of succession. The belief in extremes or no 
 extremes he has not ability to suppress. It may be called 
 speculative, but still it will remain as a phenomenon which will 
 persist in repugnance until reconciliation. Moreover it is a 
 speculative difficulty which arises on the contemplation of phe- 
 nomena solely, and has no necessary reference to their intrinsic 
 nature. There remains no course but to establish congruity be- 
 tween the fact and the belief. In doing this, Mr. Spencer will 
 be met by the precise difficulties which he presented to us, and 
 will be compelled to adopt precisely the same means of over- 
 coming them. If he cannot believe the series infinite, he must 
 believe it finite. He can have no experience of a beginning or 
 a termination. Of a temporary termination he cannot be con- 
 scious, as such, unless relations between states and the states 
 themselves can exist together. When he tries to conceive a 
 future ending of his own consciousness, he is confronted by the 
 same difficulty : he must conceive an affection and perception 
 of it as simultaneous, or the perception as intercepted and pre- 
 vented from occurring. Upon consciousness presented objec- 
 tively and in the abstract he cannot refuse to look. When we 
 think of consciousness as depending for all its modes upon 
 something out of consciousness, (though it be a The Unknow- 
 able"), we view it objectively. When we think of conscious- 
 ness as characterized by changes, and class these changes with 
 other changes, we view it objectively. When we think of con- 
 sciousness as always manifesting changes, without regard to 
 any particular change, we view it in the abstract. Since these 
 views are necessitated, Mr. Spencer cannot but entertain them; 
 and when he does, he will find for himself the problems which 
 he found for us, and be obliged to resort to our solutions. 
 
 As unworthy of notice, Mr. Spencer treats the incongruities 
 of extended consciousness when they tend to circumscribe his 
 speculations. He has virtually decided, and from an objective 
 and abstract point of view, that the extent of consciousness is 
 finite. Somewhere in the process of evolution, he must recog- 
 
THE nTDUCTIYE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 83 
 
 nize for it a beginning, and in the state of stable equilibrium, 
 which he predicts, he must recognize for it an end. 
 
 § 27. By considering Force as a mere shadow thrown from 
 beyond upon the screen of consciousness, Mr. Spencer expects 
 to eliminate the problems which it otherwise presents. We 
 shall see that the expectation is not to be realized. 
 
 On lifting a chair, two phenomena present themselves: one 
 objective, the other subjective; one an effort of volition, the 
 other a downward pulling of the chair. Contemplating the 
 two phenomena as such, we wonder whether, if realized more 
 fully (as phenomena may be), they would or would not present 
 similarity. As they exhibit some equivalence, we should incline 
 to think they would, had not Mr. Spencer told us that so to think 
 is impossible. Here, again, unless a former explanation be 
 applicable, we have a phenomenal incongruity — an inclination to 
 think phenomena like, opposed by inability to conceive the same. 
 
 "When it comes his turn to explain this equivalence, he duly 
 adopts our explanation. According to him, mental forces are 
 nothing but transformed physical forces, capable of being re- 
 fransformed. I quote his words. "Various classes of facts 
 th as unite to prove that the law of metamorphosis, which holds 
 among the physical forces, holds equally between them and 
 the mental forces. Those modes of the Unknowable which 
 we call motion, heat, light, chemical affinity, &c, are alike 
 transformable into each other, and into those modes of the 
 Unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, 
 thought: these, in their turns, being directly or indirectly re- 
 ftransformable into the original shapes. That no idea or 
 feeling arises, save as a result of some physical force expended 
 in producing it, is fast becoming a common place of science j 
 
 and whoever duly weighs the evidence will see, that DOthing 
 
 but an overwhelming bias, in favor of a preconceived theory, 
 can explain it- Qon-acceptanca How this metamorphosis takes 
 
 place how a force existing a- motion, heat, or light, can he- 
 come a mode of consciousness — how it is possible lor aerial 
 vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or for the 
 
84 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 forces liberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to 
 emotion — these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. 
 But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformations 
 of the physical forces into each other." (First Prin., § 71.) 
 Judging from this, Mr. Spencer must be understood to assert 
 a conceivable likeness between mental and material forces; and 
 this whether the force we know is like anything in the nou- 
 menal w^orld or not. 
 
 Presence of the Sun, and sensations of heat and light, are co- 
 existent phenomena. The latter two seem consequent upon the 
 the first ; yet we cannot trace out the connection of dependence. 
 Perhaps, we think, if the phenomena were on a very much 
 larger scale, or if our perception of them were more minute, we 
 could do this. But the fact is, the phenomena are not contigu- 
 ous, and there can be no connection in the absence of contiguity. 
 We must, therefore, submit to the perplexity, or set about 
 supplying, by means of the imagination, the intervening phe- 
 nomena. We must surrender to incongruity, or think that if 
 the shadows upon the screen could only be intensified (as with 
 other phenomena often is the case), something now unper- 
 ceived would be perceptible, and would connect the phenomena 
 in perception as they are now connected in thought. The phe- 
 nomena to be supplied, can be nothing but what we call the 
 activities of a medium; and it is as necessary to make them 
 contiguous as it was to complete the contiguity of the original 
 phenomena. 
 
 Which does Mr. Spencer prefer : incongruity of thought, or 
 the conception which brings about congruity? This implies 
 his answer : " the elevation of water to the height whence it 
 fell, is due to solar heat, as is also the genesis of those aerial 
 currents which drift it about when evaporated, and agitate its 
 surface when condensed. That is to say the molecular motion of 
 the ethereal medium is transformed into the motion of gases," &c. 
 ( First Prin., § 139.) Shortly after this he speaks of " molecular 
 movements propagated by the Sun to the Earth." The hypoth- 
 esis of an ethereal medium, notwithstanding the phenomenon of 
 imponderability, seems both conceivable and acceptable to him. 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 85 
 
 In the fact of gravitation there is a latent problem for even 
 those who think with Mr. Spencer. Call the fact an appear- 
 ance, if you please, and consider it as taking place entirely 
 within the mind. You cannot by this means eradicate the 
 thought of another appearance which, were our faculties (as 
 they are ever becoming) more acute, would be found con- 
 nected with this one, and would render it comprehensible. 
 The possibility of another appearance is as persistent as the 
 actuality of the one we know. We should conceive the pos- 
 sible appearance to be some so-called activity of the ethereal 
 medium, but then we would be met by other actual appear- 
 ances, which Mr. Spencer has pronounced conflicting with it. 
 What should we do? Mr. Spencer shall decide. 
 
 He explains (First Prin., § 57) that gravity "is probably a 
 resultant of actions pervading the ethereal medium." This is 
 the conclusion we once found it necessary to defend against his 
 charges. He justifies us by professing it. 
 
 § 28. Motion as a phenomenon, is no more readily brought 
 into philosophical congruity than Motion as a noumenon. 
 
 Owing to vast and unknown complications, "that which 
 seems moving proves to be stationary ; that which seems station- 
 ary proves to be moving; while that which we conclude to be 
 going rapidly in one direction, turns out to be going much more 
 rapidly in the opposite direction." All this appears upon 
 comparison of phenomena. To realize the confusion, and to 
 resolve it into consistency, it is necessary to imagine absolute 
 direction ; that is, direction through positions that are fixed. If, 
 as Mr. Spencer claim-, to do this is impossible, the phenomena 
 of Motion must ever remain a mas- of incongruities. 
 
 "Motions, visible and invisible, of masses and of molecules, " 
 says In- I Pirsi Prim, g 55), "form the larger hall" of the phe- 
 nomena to be interpreted. * • • " It is, therefore, of great 
 moment to know whether Motion, as a phenomenon, can be 
 congruously conceived. What the conception involves, Mr. 
 Spencer explains. kk A something that moves; a series of 
 positions occupied in Bnccessionj and a </roup of eo-existerU 
 
86 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 positions united in thought with the successive ones — these are 
 the constituents of the idea." (First Prin., § 49.) It is not to 
 be pretended that Mr. Spencer conceives, or thinks he con- 
 ceives, positions as not fixedly related to other positions; whence 
 it follows that he conceives motion as absolute. To see that he 
 invariably does this, nothing more is necessary than a reference 
 to his chapter on "The Direction of Motion," (First Prin., 
 Part II., Chap. IX.), where he will be found conceiving direction 
 as fixed and as congruous with other manifestations. 
 
 To the ball which I hold in my hand I can very readily im- 
 part motion. What continues the motion of the ball? we ask; 
 meaning what new phenomena would be presented, if the phe- 
 nomenon before us were (as phenomena often are) expanded? 
 The question is one which we cannot suppress. It is impossible 
 to conceive that under the conditions described no new phenom- 
 ena would appear; and Mr. Spencer thinks, equally impossible to 
 conceive such phenomena. It is for him to reconcile the conflict. 
 
 The reconciliation could be brought about only by an expla- 
 nation essentially like the one called for and given when the 
 supposition was that we contemplated noumena. Phenomena 
 involved in that phenomenon, the ball, or phenomena external 
 and contiguous with it, or both, must be imagined. Mr. Spencer 
 advances no explanation ; but does what is less allowable. He 
 accepts (^First Prin., § 49) "the necessity which the moving 
 body is under to go on changing its position" as the "funda- 
 mental element" of the idea of motion, regardless of the per- 
 plexities to which the acceptance leads. This is only another 
 instance in which he does what he insists we have no right to do. 
 
 " We daily witness the gradual retardation and final stoppage 
 of things projected from the hand or otherwise impelled. * * " 
 (First Prin., § 17.) Can we construe the phenomenon in 
 thought without conceiving a breach of continuity? We will 
 argue that the phenomenon of motion cannot change into the 
 phenomenon of rest without taking the forms of each of the nu- 
 merous phenomena that potentially intervene, and that to follow 
 out the transmutation is impossible, because there must always 
 remain some intermediate phenomenon which might be 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 87 
 
 presented. What escape is there for Mr. Spencer? Is he not 
 committal, if ever we were, to a choice between a breach of 
 graduality and an infinite series? 
 
 What his explanation would be is problematical, since he has 
 given none. Perhaps, as his philosophy is the one threatened, 
 he would explain that, in the case presented, continuity does 
 not mean graduality; and that the second choice is not to follow 
 out infinite divisibility, but to pass over something capable of 
 unending division. Whatever the answer, it would be no de- 
 nial of the late assertion that "we daily witness the gradual 
 retardation and final stoppage" of moving things. The per- 
 ception occurring daily, the conception must be possible. One, 
 no less than the other, is a subjective thing infinitely divisible. 
 It would be far better for Mr. Spencer to accept some explana- 
 tion suggested than to proceed, as he has been doing, in utter 
 disregard af a supposed phenomenal incongruity. 
 
 § 29. The conclusion that what we contemplate when per- 
 ceiving Matter is nothing but an aggregate of manifestations, will 
 not dispel the mysteries of its infinite divisibility and ultimate 
 constitution. 
 
 N<»t only any phenomenon called a portion of matter, but 
 any phenomenon whatever, objective or subjective, having ex- 
 tent, is either infinitely divisible or not infinitely divisible. The 
 manifestation Matter can be conceived as dividing into two 
 such manifestations; either partial manifestation may be con- 
 ceived to similarly divide; and so on. When parts too small 
 to be distinguished have been reached, we can imagine them 
 magnified into perceptibility (as phenomena sometimes are), 
 and proceed with the division. The query Is, can we, or rather 
 could we if eternity were given us, reach parts which, having 
 
 no extent, cannot be divided? We cannot think so, and Mr. 
 
 Spencer insists thai we cannot think the contrary ; jrel one or 
 
 the oth.r we imiM think, if we think congruously. 
 
 Which maintain- in Mr. Spencer's thoughts? I quote from 
 him. " We are obliged to conceive every portion of matter as 
 
 containing more than one resistant position — that is,aSOOCUpy- 
 
88 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 ing Space. Hence the necessity we are under of representing 
 to ourselves the ultimate elements of Matter as being at once 
 extended and resistant: this being the universal form of our 
 experiences of Matter, becomes the form which our conception 
 of it cannot transcend, however minute the fragments which 
 imaginary subdivisions produce." (First Prin., § 48.) The 
 preference here indicated is for an infinite series of conceptions, 
 rather than a terminal conception of an indivisible part. The 
 thought of such infinite series contains all that was considered 
 objectionable in the thought of infinite divisibility. 
 
 If Mr. Spencer imagined that he either could or would refrain 
 from all inquiry into the ultimate constitution of Matter, he 
 was guilty of considerable inadvertence. We cannot but think 
 that accompanying that mode of "The Unknowable" which 
 produces in us the appearance Matter, there are other modes 
 which, were our faculties more susceptible, would prove in the 
 manifestation Matter the quality of unbroken or broken con- 
 tinuity. If we conclude that unbroken continuity would ap- 
 pear, we cannot imagine how the manifestation can be made to 
 contract its limits. To the same conclusion another fact is 
 repugnant. It is an established mechanical truth that when a 
 material aggregate of manifestations, to which is joined the 
 manifestation motion, is brought into a certain dynamical rela- 
 tion with an equal material aggregate of manifestations, to 
 which a manifestation of motion is not joined, the two aggregates 
 divide the manifestation of motion equally between them. This 
 division cannot be gradual unless the parts of the aggregates 
 ( supposing the whole phenomenon to be, as phenomena may be, 
 expanded) are capable of closer approximation; and if the 
 division is not gradual, it contravenes the law of continuity, as 
 Mr. Spencer understands it. Confining ourselves now to a part, 
 we see that we have the same reason for believing that, imagin- 
 ing it magnified, its parts cannot be in unbroken contact; and 
 so we may proceed unendingly. Is this result satisfactory to 
 Mr. Spencer? Will he consent to reject the atomic hypothesis, 
 because solid atoms will not observe the law of continuity? 
 
 What he says on the subject (First Prin., § 48) is very 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 89 
 
 satisfactory. " "We may therefore deliver ourselves over with- 
 out hesitation, to those terms of thought which experience has 
 organized in us. We need not in our physical, chemical, or other 
 researches, refrain from dealing with Matter as made up of 
 extended and resistant atoms; for this conception, necessarily 
 resulting from our experiences of Matter, is not less legitimate 
 than the conception of aggregate masses as extended and resist- 
 ant. The atomic hypothesis, as well as the kindred hypothesis 
 of an all-pervading ether, consisting of molecules, is simply a 
 necessary development of those universal forms which the 
 actions of the Unknowable have wrought in us. The conclu- 
 sions, logically worked out by the aid of these hypotheses, are 
 sure to be in harmony with all others which these same forms 
 involve, and will have a relative truth that is equally complete." 
 Considering Mr. Spencer's strenuous, and it may be said suc- 
 
 sful, endeavor to convince us that one of "the conclusions 
 logically worked out" from the atomic hypothesis is that, in 
 the transfer of motion, matter violates his notion of continuity, 
 a pleasurable surprise is awakened by the assertion that such 
 conclusions "are sure to be in harmony with all others which 
 tli ae same forms involve." 
 
 Banish nonmena from the sphere of legitimate inquiry, and 
 the problem of the coherence and incomprcssibility of Matter 
 will remain. In contemplation there is a phenomenon which 
 will not be, like some other-, metamorphosed into a less exten- 
 sive phenomenon, or into two or more. The conviction is 
 strong within us that, could the noumenal mode which pro- 
 duces this phenomenon affed as more deeply, — or more properly, 
 were the phenomenon (as phenomena may be) magnified, — 
 we should be able to distinguish what makes it impossible to 
 compressor rend. Thai which we think would be disclosed is 
 some force manifestation; and we imagine that this would be 
 found to pervade any part of the materia] phenomenon, any 
 part's part, and so on eternally; unless we could eventually 
 reach parts which are centres of force without extension, shall 
 we say that part- of matter ad infinitwm are extended, and thus 
 accept an infinite series; or .-hall we say that the ultimate 
 
90 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 components of matter are extensionless centres of force? 
 This is the author's solution of the problem. " Centres of force 
 attracting and repelling each other in all directions, are simply 
 insensible portions of matter having the endowments common 
 to sensible portions of matter — endowments of which we can- 
 not, by any mental effort, divest theni." (First Prin., § 74.) 
 So it appears that no matter how far the division of the mani- 
 festation Matter be pursued, we can never arrive at parts which 
 are the phenomena known as extensionless centres of force — 
 that insensible portions of the manifestation Matter have the 
 endowments common to its sensible portions, though divided 
 for ever and ever. This is essentially like a conviction which 
 Mr. Spencer once sought to prove absurd. We have escaped 
 no difficulty by considering Matter a phenomenon, nor have Ave 
 found any explanation other than the ones we had before. 
 
 § 30. Between Space manifestations and Time manifestations, 
 a distinction must be drawn. All of the former are thought to 
 be objective; while many of the latter are considered subjective. 
 Time being given in subjective manifestations, does not depend 
 for its recognition on objective manifestations. Neither, there- 
 fore, does the question concerning the character of its attributes, 
 the quantity of its extent, and its infinite divisibility. These 
 questions will obviously arise, even if we exclude from the 
 mind thought of anything beyond its limits. 
 
 What, for instance, are the attributes of Space manifestations? 
 What, in other words, are their peculiar manners of aifecting 
 that which contemplates them? Shall the answer be, that 
 Space manifestations present the attribute extension? Such 
 answer will not be sufficient; for to give an object but one attri- 
 bute is to identify it with that attribute. We must say what 
 there is in Space besides extension, or we must say what are the 
 attributes of extension. Finding their attributes difficult to 
 name, must we conclude that Space and Time manifestations 
 have no peculiar ways of appearing in consciousness — are not 
 distinguishable from each other and from other manifestations? 
 What does Mr. Spencer do? 
 
THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONCLUDED. 91 
 
 His writings abound with proof that he does not do this. 
 " The abstract of all sequences is Time. The abstract of all 
 co-existences is Space." (First Prin., § 47.) The chapter in 
 which this occurs sets forth the antithesis between the manifes- 
 tations called Space and Time; and between these respectively 
 and those called Matter, Motion, and Force. Yet the Realist 
 was denied the means of an antithesis. 
 
 Supposing self to travel out into Space is but imagining a 
 certain sequence of experiences. Might such sequence, as far 
 as it depends upon Space experiences, be prolonged forever? 
 We cannot believe that the sequence could be terminated by the 
 want of a Space experience. There is, then, no limit to the 
 manifestation, Space. Conceive this and you conceive the 
 infinite. " Similarly at the other extreme." Dividing a portion 
 of Space is but dividing an appearance, and dividing an appear- 
 ance is but causing or imagining one appearance to take (as 
 they readily will) the form of several. The division always 
 leaves more appearances than it found, and so long as there is 
 an appearance left, it may continue or be imagined to continue. 
 Conceive this, and you again conceive infinity. Now if infin- 
 iteness of extent and divisibility are unthinkable, we are in- 
 evitably committed to the unthinkable by contemplation of the 
 appearance Space and, let us add, the appearance Time; from 
 which the inference is that these appearances are delusive. 
 
 Mr. Spencer does not treat either as delusive. Throughout 
 his endeavor to establish universal congruity, he makes frequent 
 Use of them, never hesitating, because to expand them is to in- 
 duce perplexities. The problem of their infinite divisibility, 
 I believe, be entirely ignores; the question of their infinity of 
 extent he has dared to pronounce upon. In a recent article 
 
 in tin- Popular Science Monthly (Oct., 1882) he declares thai 
 "The Unknowable " is "without limit in space, and without 
 beginning or end in time." This means thai Space and Time 
 manifestations of w The Unknowable" are potentially without 
 limit, lint the potentially limitless is no more readily conceived 
 
 than that which is actually Limitless. IT the one conception 
 is possible, 80 is the other. 
 
92 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 § 31. At this point we are brought back to the difficulties 
 dealt with in the third chapter. It is to be shown that they, 
 like the rest, are not born to Realism only. 
 
 It is not possible for Mr. Spencer to suppose that when a 
 sensation has been attributed to the agency of " The Unknow- 
 able," all inquiry concerning its antecedents is at an end. Feel- 
 ing a tap on his shoulder, he would look around to ascertain, 
 as he must explain, what knowable antecedent occasioned the 
 sensation felt. Seeing a friend, he would cease to wonder ; or, 
 if surprised to find his friend so near, a disclosure of remoter 
 antecedents would afford solution. All this without a single 
 thought of " The Unknowable : " illustrating that even if a sen- 
 sation has unknowable antecedents, it nevertheless has a chain 
 of antecedents that are knowable. Is this chain infinite or 
 finite? Apprehending that some real or imaginary knowable 
 antecedent of any effect upon the mind must precede such effect, 
 we should prefer to call the chain infinite. Mr. Spencer repu- 
 diates an infinite series; consequently he must accept the alter- 
 native, which is a First Cause, that is, a first knowable antece- 
 dent of an effect upon any mind. His own arguments should 
 be sufficient to convince him that his phenomenal First Cause 
 is Infinite in backward extent, and Absolute in the sense of 
 being independent of other phenomena. 
 
 In his favor it must be said that he does not seek to avoid the 
 question. "Be it in a single object or the whole universe, any 
 account which begins with it in a concrete form, or leaves off 
 with it in a concrete form, is incomplete; since there remains 
 an era of its knowable existence undescribed and unexplained. 
 Admitting, or rather asserting, that knowledge is limited to the 
 phenomenal, we have, by implication, asserted that the sphere 
 of knowledge is co-extensive with the phenomenal — co-exten- 
 sive with all modes of the Unknowable that can affect con- 
 sciousness. • * ' These preceding and succeeding existences 
 under sensible forms, are possible subjects of knowledge and 
 knowledge has obviously not reached its limits until it has 
 united the past, present, and future histories into a whole." 
 (First Prin., § 93.) Thus are the past, present, and future 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 93 
 
 histories united into a whole : "if, as we have seen reason to 
 think, there is an alternation of Evolution and Dissolution in 
 the totality of things — if, as we are obliged to infer from the 
 Persistence of Force, the arrival at either limit of this vast 
 rhythm brings about the conditions under which a counter- 
 movement commences — if we are hence compelled to entertain 
 the conception of Evolutions that have filled an immeasurable 
 past, and Evolutions that will fill an immeasurable future; we 
 can no longer contemplate the visible creation as having a definite 
 beginning or end, or being isolated. It becomes unified with 
 all existence before and after; and the Force which the Universe 
 presents, falls into the same category with its Space and Time, 
 as admitting of no limitation in thought." (First Prin., § 190.) 
 Here is another passage to the same effect. "Apparently, the 
 universally-co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion, which, 
 M we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes through- 
 out the Universe, also necessitate rhythm in the totality of its 
 changes — produce now an immeasurable period during which 
 the attractive forces predominating, cause universal concent ra- 
 tion, and then an immeasurable period during which the repulsive 
 forces predominating, cause universal diffusion — alternate eras 
 of Evolution and Dissolution. And thus there is suggested 
 the conception of a past, during which there have been successive 
 Evolutions analogous to that which is now going on; and a 
 future during which successive other such Evolutions may go 
 on — ever the same in principle, but never the same in concrete 
 
 result." (First Prin., $ 183.) Ever the same fundamentally 
 but otherwise ever in change — this was our history of the past 
 and prophecy for the future. 
 
 \ 32, The last <>!' our analogies Is one of peculiar interesi and 
 supreme importance. It has been supposed by both the adherents 
 and opponents of Mr. Spencer, thai by considering thai through 
 which ;ill thin'.:- exisl as unknowable, it is possible to preclude the 
 old question of self-existence or creation. We have seen th.it 
 this question ariseswith regard t<» "The Unknowable;" we 
 have vci to Bee that, in regard t<> appearances, it w ill qo< subside, 
 
94 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 In addition to sequence of the knowable from "The Un- 
 knowable," and of "The Unknowable" from "The Unknow- 
 able," ad finem or ad infinitum, there is a sequence of the 
 knowable from the knowable, with or without limit. This 
 stupendous mass of partly constant, partly variable manifes- 
 tations, known as the universe, must have had a beginning or 
 no beginning. Absence of a beginning implies infinity, and 
 infinity cannot be detailed in thought. Moreover want of a 
 beginning is not a complete history of any manifestation ; par- 
 ticularly such as have had a beginning. Turn now to the 
 hypothesis of creation. The phenomenon of a beginning im- 
 plies a phenomenon from which the beginning is a consequent. 
 Try to think, for example, of the phenomenon of nebular dif- 
 fusion as the first phenomenon, and learn how signally you will 
 fail. There arises in consciousness a vague conception of a 
 manifestation back of this one, and essential to its occur- 
 rence. To think congruously that any phenomenon is the first 
 belonging to the universe, we must think of it as due to some 
 prior phenomenon not belonging to the universe. Such prior 
 phenomenon may be deemed as either external to the universe 
 or as not actual. First suppose it to have been primarily 
 potentially actual, and to have contained some element which 
 caused it to develop actuality. In making such a supposition, 
 we trifle with words. Potential actuality, if it be thinkable, 
 is nothing but actuality. The element which is said to cause 
 the transmutation from non-existence into existence is as 
 unthinkable as the transmutation itself. Besides potential actu- 
 ality, whatever its nature, must have had antecedents, and an 
 inquiry into them would bring us around again into the same 
 difficulties which it is the object of the hypothesis to avoid. 
 Next we will suppose the first manifestation belonging to the 
 universe to have been the sequence of some manifestation not 
 included in the manifestations of the universe. That we may 
 deal, as much as possible, in familiar thoughts, let us imagine 
 that at the inauguration of the universe there were present 
 manifestations to which, when viewed collectively, we can attri- 
 bute personality, just as we attribute personality to those collec- 
 
THE INDUCTIVE AKGTJMENT CONCLUDED. 95 
 
 tions of manifestations called our fellows. And let us imagine 
 also that one of the manifestations belonging to this personality 
 was the act of creation — a manifestation from which followed 
 the initiatory manifestation of the universe. You are asked to 
 frame a thought that will baffle your powers. There are some 
 manifestations, belonging to the universe, which can have had 
 no creation — which are sequences from nothing but their former 
 selves. No first material manifestation can be imagined. 
 Matter in its remotest known form, is always thought of as the 
 product of Matter in some unknown form. The same is true 
 of Motion. If the phenomenon, Space, was brought about by 
 some preceding phenomena, it must have been sometime absent. 
 A time when Space was absent, however, is inconceivable. 
 Indeed the phenomenon of creation is always imagined as tak- 
 ing place somewhere in Space. Time calls for the same com- 
 ments as Space. One more difficulty, inherent in the last hy- 
 pothesis, remains. Turning to pre-universal phenomena, we 
 cannot but entertain the question of derivation; yet if we do, 
 we find the difficulties we struggle to escape again confronting us. 
 Who shall lead us out of this maze? Perhaps the author. 
 Let us see what solution he has to offer. "All the apparent proofs 
 thai something can come out of nothing, a wider knowledge 
 has one 1 >y one cancelled. The comet that is suddenly discovered 
 in the heavens and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a 
 newly created body, but a body that was until lately beyond 
 the range of vision. The cloud which in the course of a few 
 minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just 
 begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more 
 diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or 
 precipitate in relation to the fluid depositing it. Conversely, 
 eming annihilations of .Matter turn out, on closer observa- 
 tion, to be only changes of state." ( First Prin., > 52.) "The 
 annihilation of Matter is unthinkable for the same reason 
 thai the creation of Matter is unthinkable." | Firei Prin., §53.) 
 "Could it he shown, oi* could it with any rationality be even sup- 
 posed, th;it Mattel-, either in it- aggregates Or in itfi unit-, ever 
 
 became non-existent, there would he Deed either to ascertain 
 
96 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 under what conditions it became non-existent, or else to confess 
 that Science and Philosophy are impossible." (First Prin., § 52. ) 
 Of Motion he speaks similarly. " Motions, visible and invis- 
 ible, of masses and of molecules, form the larger half of the phe- 
 nomena to be interpreted; and if such motions might either 
 proceed from nothing or lapse into nothing, there could be no 
 scientific interpretation of them." (First Prin., § 55.) In 
 another place (First Prin., 53) he explains that "it is impos- 
 sible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same 
 reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming some- 
 thing. * * * ", The eternal persistence, or self-existence, of 
 manifestations of Matter and Motion is, then, firmly believed in 
 by Mr. Spencer. He manifests no repugnance to the infinite 
 series involved, which is something of which he warned us to 
 beware. How near he comes to occupying our former position 
 may be best known from the following comprehensive state- 
 ment of the universal retrospect and prospect. " This rhythm 
 of evolution and dissolution, completing itself during short 
 periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates distributed 
 through space completing itself in periods which are immeasur- 
 able by human thought, is, so far as we can see, universal and 
 eternal. • • • " (Pop. Sci. Monthly, Oct., 1882.) Thus Mr. 
 Spencer professes belief that the Universal Manifestation is a 
 rhythmical activity of substance pervading all Space and per- 
 sisting throughout beginningless and unending Time. 
 
 § 33. It appears, then, that all the perplexities which were 
 pointed out as resulting from the attempt to formulate Being, 
 are similarly consequent upon the endeavor to formulate 
 Appearances. And, which is more remarkable, it appears that 
 Mr. Spencer has been detected in disregarding every one of 
 them. In consistency, therefore, he could not have complained 
 if we had chosen to do the same. But the fact is, that the 
 choice was to attempt the very opposite, and we see we have 
 happened upon a justification for so doing. Every philosophy 
 aims at the establishment of congruity. No philosophy can 
 attain congruity while these perplexities remain ; consequently, 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 97 
 
 if any philosophy is to reach its goal, they are explicable. On 
 the supposition that they are explicable, unless other explana- 
 tions are to be had, those given must be received. 
 
 Further important results are to be gathered. Perhaps we 
 have been tracing an analogy applicable to more than the in- 
 stances that have come before us. Perhaps we have reached a 
 generalization which, if duly realized, would put an end to the 
 kind of argument we have been reviewing. We will inquire 
 if the likeness of the mysteries, which confront respectively 
 the Noumenal and the Phenomenal Philosophies, does not 
 result from some likeness between these two Philosophies. In 
 this they may be said to agree : that we perceive nothing but 
 appearances. Without noting a disagreement, the concurrence 
 is inappreciable. The one holds that we look upon things in 
 a measure appearing as they are; the other that the appearances 
 which we look upon are not in any measure components or 
 semblances of things. The one persists in partly identifying 
 the appearance with the reality outside of consciousness, while 
 the other wholly " transfers the appearance into consciousness 
 and leaves the reality outside." ( First Prin., § 46. ) 
 
 Unknown appearances are a necessary and legitimate subject 
 of inquiry for each. This truth is much obscured by its com- 
 plexity. It is sufficiently obvious that if appearances are modes 
 of things, we can philosophize about appearances absent in space, 
 and appearances absent in time; appearances too great for our 
 faculties, and appearances which cannot be presented to us 
 because they are too minute. But it is far from sufficiently 
 obvious that if appearances are only modes which tilings pro- 
 duce within the mind, a purely inferential appearance is not 
 an absurdity. Consequently this last truth must be elucidated* 
 
 ll is well known that neither Mr. Spencer nor any Other 
 
 agnostic philosopher confines his speculations within the Limits 
 
 Of perception. It is readily realized that to do SO would he to 
 preclude the possibility of a philosophy. On what theory, 
 
 then, do these philosophers proceed? Their theory I shall now 
 attempt to sel forth. 
 
 lie-ides the appearance- wrought in us directly through our 
 
 7 
 
98 THE nroiTCTTVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 senses, there are appearances wrought in us indirectly through 
 other appearances. Thus, when the appearance hardness is 
 perceived in total darkness, it carries with it the appearance 
 color. Though we cannot say that the mode of the External 
 Cause which wrought the hardness, wrought also the color con- 
 templated ; we can say that the External Cause, considered as a 
 whole, wrought both effects, because, by previous uniformity, it 
 caused one to be produced upon production of the other. Be-. 
 sides this simple example, others might be given in which, 
 througluappearairces "indirectly produced, others are similarly 
 produced ; in which the inference made is not the only one that 
 could be made; and in which the appearances inferred are not such 
 as have ever been directly produced. In addition, it might be 
 shown how, from the constant verification of inferred appear- 
 ances, we learn to place implicit reliance on inferred appearances 
 which can never be verified. But it is the meaning of reliance 
 on inferred appearances which alone needs much explanation. 
 It means that the mental mode present in the act of conception 
 is regarded as no less the obverse of some extra-mental mode 
 than the mental affection present in the act of perception. It 
 may mean belief that the inferred appearance would be directly 
 produced if certain other appearances were directly produced ; 
 or it may not mean so much. It may mean no more than con- 
 fidence that the inferred appearance is, in the world of thought, 
 the equivalent of some mode in the world beyond. Thus much, 
 at least, it always means. Now we know why we were so well 
 able to turn the questions addressed to us, back upon the 
 questioner. Now we have an explanation of that irresistible 
 tendency to seek appearances answering (as they say) to even 
 those modes of things which do not, and never can, affect the 
 senses. They are constituents of the world of thought; and 
 thought can never be' completely organized while the least of 
 them is lacking. By means of them, we reason from experience 
 to experience, separated by a gap which experience could never 
 fill. By means of them, we pass beyond the circumference of 
 all possible experience. Constructed by analogy with direct 
 impressions, they bear the same relation to insensible external 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 99 
 
 modes, as direct impressions bear to the external modes which 
 make them. They are the obverse of whatever is external and 
 insensible; and as such, must be sought for until none remain 
 unknown, but not finally accepted until they are reduced to 
 complete congruity. 
 
 "We may now proceed with our analogy. However our 
 theories of knowledge may differ, we contemplate precisely the 
 same direct appearances. Though we may differ as to which 
 of such appearances are real, yet, were the truth known, the 
 same would be pronounced real by all. Exactly the same is 
 true of our inferred appearances. While we differ as to which 
 are properly inferred, the difference is due to some one's inad- 
 vertence. There is not one set of appearances with which the 
 Noumenal Philosophy must start, and one set of inferences 
 which it must make; and another set of appearances with 
 which the Phenomenal Philosophy may start, and another set 
 of inferences which it may make; but they must, from the 
 same direct appearances, obtain the same inferred appearances. 
 Should there, then, occur, in the synthesis of appearances, an 
 incongruity or an omission which is necessitated by irrepressible 
 direct appearances and unavoidable inferences from them, it 
 would be equally preclusive of the two Philosophies. Neither 
 can obtain the advantage by arbitrarily limiting its sphere to 
 certain kinds of appearances, because the same appearances are 
 thrust upon the cognizance of both. Neither can do otherwise 
 than synthetize all persistent appearances into a complete and 
 harmonious whole, or confess it- own incompleteness. 
 
 There is another, perhaps a better, method of presenting the 
 
 fundamental analogy now in view. Realism and Transfigured 
 Realism may concur in calling all ideas of things external t«> 
 consciousness symbols. They disagree, of course, concerning 
 
 tin- natures of these symbols and what they empower as to do. 
 
 Realism hold- that the symbols, being in many respects like 
 things, are, in many respects, substitutes of things for purposes 
 of contemplation. Transfigured Realism holds that the symbols 
 resemble coumena in reaped of existence only, and therefore 
 enable us to contemplate nothing noumenal besides exist 
 
100 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 
 
 Notwithstanding so great a variance, there is concurrence in 
 that the symbols of thought must form a complete set and 
 admit of congruous combination. Whenever a symbol is 
 wholly or partly wanting, the deficiency must be supplied; 
 whenever one is found incongruous internally or with the pre- 
 ponderance of the rest, it must be rejected as illegitimate. For 
 one Philosophy to ask the other to reject a number of symbols 
 because there is a vacancy or an incompatibility among them, 
 is to acknowledge its own obligation to reject them. If it will 
 not reject them, it cannot compel its antagonist to do so. A 
 number of persistent symbols presenting irremediable deficiency 
 and conflict, would be an everlasting obstruction to the comple- 
 tion of even an idealistic philosophy. 
 
 § 34. Conformably to necessity, Mr. Spencer elects to retain 
 the symbols which he denies to the Realist. As we have seen, 
 he endeavors, in a manner which Realism approves, to develop 
 them into harmonious completeness. It must be added that he 
 encounters one problem which Realism escapes, and leaves it 
 unsolved. 
 
 Choose any symbol of reality beyond consciousness, and ask 
 yourself — How does the mode of "The Unknowable" which 
 this symbolizes differ from it? To answer this, you must form 
 another symbol, in regard to which the same question arises; 
 and so on ad infinitum, unless 1 you can sometime reach a symbol 
 which is like the thing for which it stands. Suppose you try 
 to evade this infinite series of problems by employing the same 
 symbol as often as the question is put — suppose you say with 
 Mr. Spencer, that, the consciousness of Force being the ultimate 
 symbol, all modes of "The Unknowable " must be symbolized 
 by Force. Then when we ask you how you symbolize the 
 non-resemblance of "The Unknowable" to its symbol, you 
 must answer — by Force. Force, then, is the symbol of the 
 contrast with itself. This is very absurd ; but it does not reach 
 the climax of absurdity. When you are asked how you 
 symbolize the consciousness of Force you must, unless you will 
 allege that a state of consciousness is symbolized by something 
 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 101 
 
 unlike itself in the very respect in which it is symbolized, 
 answer — by Force. Force is, then, the symbol of itself and 
 the symbol of "The Unknowable": hence Force and "The 
 Unknowable," the symbol and the thing, are like. Thus there 
 proves no alternative for Transfigured Realism but to proceed 
 with its infinite series of problems, giving a different answer 
 every time. It cannot make any symbol of externality the 
 secoud time the symbol of the mode for which it stands; it 
 cannot make any permanent symbol of externality the symbol 
 of the symbol. Always there will be a question ahead and a 
 necessity to answer it. Realism encounters no such difficulties ; 
 since, in as far as the symbol is likened to the thing, the 
 question of how to symbolize the thing anew is erased from 
 thought. Assert an Unknowable and you encounter all the 
 problems of Realism and more. 
 
102 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Deductive Arguments. 
 The Process of Comprehension. 
 
 § 35. We pass now to the author's deductive considerations. 
 The following ( First Prin., § 23 ) is the first of this class. 
 
 " If, when walking through the fields some day in September, 
 you hear a rustle a few yards in advance, and on observing the 
 ditch-side where it occurs, see the herbage agitated, you will 
 probably turn towards the spot to learn by what this sound and 
 motion are produced. As you approach there flutters into the 
 ditch, a partridge; on seeing which your curiosity is satisfied — 
 you have what you call an explanation of the appearances. 
 The explanation, mark, amounts to this; that, whereas through- 
 out life you have had countless experiences of disturbances 
 among small stationary bodies, accompanying the movement of 
 other bodies among them, and have generalized the relation 
 between such disturbances and such movements, you consider 
 this particular disturbance explained on finding it to present 
 aa instance of the like relation. Suppose you catch the par- 
 tridge ; and, wishing to ascertain why it did not escape, examine 
 it, and find at one spot, a slight trace of blood upon its feathers. 
 You now understand, as you say, what has disabled the par- 
 tridge. It has been wounded by a sportsman — adds another 
 case to the many cases already seen by you, of birds being 
 killed or injured by the shot discharged at them from fowling- 
 pieces. And in assimilating this case to other such cases con- 
 sists your understanding of it." In like manner, Mr. Spencer 
 carries the reader through several further steps of investigation, to 
 illustrate a generalization which we shall permit him to disclose. 
 
 " Observe now what we have been doing. Turning to the 
 general question, let us note where these successive interpreta- 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 103 
 
 tions have carried us. We began with quite special and con- 
 crete facts. In explaining each, and afterwards explaining 
 the more general facts of which they are instances, we have 
 got down to certain highly general facts. * * * The particular 
 phenomena with which we set out, have been merged in larger 
 and larger groups of phenomena; and as they have been so 
 merged, we have arrived at solutions that we consider profound 
 in proportion as this process has been carried far. Still deeper 
 explanations are simply further steps in the same direction." 
 From the induction thus set forth, Mr. Spencer proceeds to 
 deduce the unknowableness of noumena. 
 
 * Is this process limited or unlimited '? Can we goon for ever 
 explaining classes of facts by including them in larger classes; or 
 must we eventually come to a largest class? The supposition 
 that the process is unlimited, were any one absurd enough to 
 espouse it, would still imply that an ultimate explanation could 
 not be reached; since infinite time would be required to reach 
 it. While the unavoidable conclusion that it is limited ( proved 
 not only by the finite sphere of observation open to us, but 
 also by the diminution in the number of generalizations that 
 necessarily accompanies increase of their breadth) equally im- 
 plies that the ultimate fact cannot be understood. For if the 
 successively deeper interpretations of nature which constitute 
 advancing knowledge, are merely successive inclusions of special 
 truths in general truths, and of general truths in truths still 
 more general; it obviously follows that the most general truth, 
 not admitting of inclusion in any other, does not admit of 
 interpretation. Manifestly, as the most general cognition al 
 which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one, it 
 cannot be understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation 
 must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The 
 
 deepest truth which we can get at, musl be unacconntahle. 
 
 Comprehension must be something other than comprehension 
 before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." 
 
 Muse awhile upon the dogma to which we have been intro- 
 duced. Can the author mean to tell us that a fad is to be 
 explained only by likening it to the Less intelligible? Can he 
 
104 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 
 
 mean to say that the first step towards the comprehension of a 
 fact consists in assimilating it to facts not so capable of com- 
 prehension? that further steps of the process are but further 
 inclusions of the fact with obscurer facts? and that the clearest 
 understanding is attained upon categorizing the fact with the ab- 
 solutely inscrutable ? He can mean nothing else. Strange, then, 
 and numerous are his oversights. A moment's reflection, had 
 he thought it necessary, would have suggested to him that a 
 fact cannot become comprehensible in proportion as it ceases to 
 be comprehensible. Classification, making one fact comprehen- 
 sible, should, by the same magic, make its fellow members 
 comprehensible also. Consequently the largest class should be 
 the best understood ; or, to vary the expression, the most gen- 
 eral truth should (it having no existence apart from the facts 
 which are its exemplifications) be the one most completely 
 realized. Out of the implications of the argument may we 
 thus weave its refutation. 
 
 It may be disposed of by reduetio ad absurdum. At every 
 step in the direction of more extensive classification of facts, 
 some of their individual elements must be dropped. Extension 
 and intension accompany each other in inverse proportion. 
 The consequence of this principle is, that when the maximum 
 of classification, and consequently of comprehension, has been 
 reached, there will be retained a minimum of elements. Such 
 minimum of elements must be a single element; for if it were 
 a plurality of elements, the cognition of them would be a cog- 
 nition of facts not to be assimilated to each other or to other 
 facts — not to be assimilated at all. As each other element has 
 already been cast aside as unclassible, each has proved incom- 
 prehensible. The universal element must, then, be the only 
 element of a fact that the mind can graap, ! >ut neither, on the 
 other hand, can it be known ; for it can be classed with nothing. 
 Nothing, therefore, can be known. The same result, in its 
 
 concrete form, may be arrived at by another process. There is no 
 attribute which Mr. Spencer will assert to be possessed by all 
 things actual except existence. Similarity in this respect is, he 
 would say, the only one by which they can be bound together 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 105 
 
 in a universal class. From this it is inferable that the most 
 thorough comprehension of facts consists in contemplating 
 their existence only. Existence seems, indeed, to be all that 
 we can comprehend about them. In the process of constructing 
 the most general class, all other attributes have been rejected as 
 unclassible. Though we have classed facts together because 
 of their common possession of some of these attributes, yet we 
 have at the end of such classifications been compelled to reject 
 them as of no aid to comprehension. In as far as the facts 
 grouped together were unlike, there was, by admission, no 
 comprehension ; and in as far as they were alike, they consisted 
 of an element which, being unique, could not be comprehended. 
 We have the same grounds, however, for pronouncing the 
 universal element incomprehensible. Existence cannot be 
 identified with what is not existence; and if it could, we would 
 obtain an unclassible something by the fusion. If existence or 
 what is not existence cannot be comprehended, nothing can. 
 Surely the conclusions to which the argument leads proclaim 
 its great absurdity. 
 
 We may meet it by a direct denial. Comprehension of a 
 fact does not necessarily consist in merging it "in larger and 
 larger groups of phenomena." Wishing to illustrate this truth, 
 I shall employ the instances cited by Mr. Spencer. On hear- 
 ing a rustle and seeing the herbage agitated, you seek an expla- 
 nation. When you have learned that the disturbance was due 
 to the movements of the bird, you consider the explanation 
 found. What, in this case, is the explanatory act? It is 
 the reduction of an instance of disturbances in general to an 
 instance of disturbance caused by a partridge. You have 
 ceased to contemplate the fact as one of the vast and indefinite 
 class of disturbances, and Learned to contemplate it as one of the 
 less general, but more definite, class of a particular kind of 
 disturbance. "Suppose yon catch the partridge; and, wishing 
 to ascertain why it did not escape, examine it, and find al one 
 spot, a Blighi trace of blood npon its feathers. Yon now wnder- 
 
 stand, as you say, what has disabled tin* partridge. It has 
 
 been wounded lw a sport-man. • * * ' At lirM you did not 
 
106 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 
 
 understand the bird's disability, because you could not abstract 
 it from the large class of disabilities. But now you have a 
 better understanding of it, having found it to belong to the 
 comparatively restricted class of wounds on the wing. What 
 caused the wound? This you do not understand while the 
 cause is thought of only as one of the very extensive class of 
 probable causes. The understanding comes when the cause is 
 recognized as belonging to a much less extensive class — the 
 class composed exclusively of discharges from fowling-pieces 
 in the hands of sportsmen. In these instances, comprehension 
 is forwarded by merging the fact to be explained in a less 
 numerous group of facts than that to which it was first recog- 
 nized as belonging. Enough has been elicited to put us 
 upon inquiry. Classification seems to be an aid to compre- 
 hension; but not in proportion to its generality. Other things 
 being equal, there would doubtless be a direct correspondence 
 between the degree in which a truth is known and the number 
 of truths to which it is perceived, to bear a resemblance. But, 
 then, these other things, which are usually very unequal, are of 
 preponderating importance. It is very sure that one analogous 
 truth, clearly and firmly grasped, will afford more aid than a 
 thousand vaguely apprehended. No one expects to solve a mys- 
 tery by determining that it is one of a class of mysteries. The 
 reason that the observation of analogy so often facilitates the 
 understanding of a truth is because it is an assimilation of that 
 which we strive to understand to that which is, in a further de- 
 gree, understood. Again, there is an aid to comprehension 
 which, besides being complementary to classification, is exclusive 
 of it. This aid is distinction. Before long we shall find Mr.. 
 Spencer arguing that nothing can be known except what presents 
 contrast with everything else. On adherence to such doctrine I 
 here insist. The complete assimilation of all truths would leave 
 no truth known. As long as a single truth is indistinguishable 
 from all others, we cannot be said to have a cognition of it. 
 The moment it becomes distinguishable in any degree, a smaller 
 class only will include all that is distinguishable in it. Its 
 peculiarities are not embraced in the largest class because all 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 107 
 
 things have not the same peculiarities. Likewise it is evident 
 that what is indistinguishable from the other members of a 
 very large class cannot be very thoroughly understood. It may 
 be better understood by bringing to view its contrasts with 
 fellow members; but if this be done, there will be observed 
 peculiarities about it which are common to only the members 
 of a still smaller class. Every step towards more complete 
 distinction is a step from universal assimilation. Some attribute 
 appears at even- stage which will not merge in the class last 
 contemplated. The more completely a fact is distinguished, 
 the more completely it is brought within the mental grasp. 
 The difficulty of understanding the cause of the wound, for 
 instance, was due to its indistinguishability from other suppos- 
 able causes. By relegating it to a sub-class, it was made to 
 manifest the distinctions common to that class, and so became 
 better known. In this way is classification often employed as 
 an auxiliary of distinction; but usually when it is, it will be 
 found to be less general classification. Proceeding with the 
 process of distinction, whether aided or not aided by classifica- 
 tion, a point must be reached at which further assimilation is 
 impossible, but past which, distinction must and does advance. 
 While even two facts are indistinguishable, neither is known; 
 since when we think we know one we may be really nearer 
 knowing the other, and vice versa. As a matter of fact, too, 
 that which is spoken of as known is distinguished ma only 
 from something else, but from all things else. Even that, 
 which i- in the Least degree known, is so distinguished. The 
 can-.- of the wound was set apart in the imagination before as 
 .well as after recognition. It was known to be, inter (ilia, what 
 no other cause could be, the cause of the particular effect in 
 contemplation. Something distinguishes any fact which can he 
 named from everything else in the universe which has been 
 observed or can be imagined. We, in every case, realize this 
 something hut cannot classify it. It i- no answer t<> say that 
 qualities which excludes Cad from one class admit it t<> some 
 
 other, and so all that is known of it ifi classed. Admitting the 
 verity of fchifl proposition is an allowance that all things known 
 
108 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 
 
 are classed; but not that all distinction may be eliminated. 
 By no means, however, is it to be admitted. The same attri- 
 bute is not absolutely the same in two objects. The existence 
 of this is not the existence of that. Stronger vindication is 
 forthcoming. Calling, as we may do, the combination of attri- 
 butes belonging to anything, an attribute, we are able to recog- 
 nize in any fact an attribute of which there is no counterpart 
 among all that is. Attributes of this attribute need not be 
 dwelt upon; for they too are involved in the last remark. 
 After all similarities have been cancelled, something must re- 
 main. Whatever remains is known independent of assimil- 
 ation. Nor is it insignificant: it belongs not only to every in- 
 dividual object of cognition, but to every class; it is found not 
 only in every whole, but in every part. Knowledge of the 
 unlike is more extensive than knowledge of the like. Sum- 
 ming up what has been said regarding distinction, by the 
 observation that truth, being heterogeneous, cannot be reduced 
 to homogeneity, let us note that there are relations, heretofore 
 left out of consideration, of which comprehension is not entirely 
 independent. The relations of cause and effect, whole and 
 part are such. It is probable Mr. Spencer would include them 
 in relations of unlikeness. In them, nevertheless, may be dis- 
 covered more than mere unlikeness. Sufficient for the argument, 
 is it that they are not relations of likeness. No longer 
 
 need we hesitate to repudiate the exorbitant claims made on 
 behalf of classification. As it depends upon them, the argu- 
 ment is null. 
 
 It may be nullified by citing Mr. Spencer to the contrary. 
 Something over a hundred pages after the argument in hand, 
 the reader's curiosity to know what the most general truth is 
 supposed to be, is gratified. Says Mr. Spencer: "As before 
 shown (§ 23), we cannot go on merging derivative truths in 
 those wider and wider truths from which they are derived, 
 without reaching at last a widest truth which can be merged in 
 no other, or derived from no other. And whoever contemplates 
 the relation in which it stands to the truths of science in gen- 
 eral, will see that this truth transcending demonstration, is the 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 109 
 
 Persistence of Force." (First Prin., § 61.) On the next page 
 he discloses what he means by the "Persistence of Force." 
 "By the Persistence of Force, we really mean the persistence 
 of some Cause which transcends our knowledge and conception." 
 To avoid the suspicion of having asserted of the Ultimate 
 Cause more than existence, he explains (First Prin., §60) the 
 meaning of "persistence." "The assertion of an existence 
 beyond consciousness, is itself an assertion that there is some- 
 thing beyond consciousness which persists; for persistence is noth- 
 ing more than continued existence, and existence cannot be 
 thought of as other than continued." This is not what we had a 
 right to expect. The continued existence of an unknowable 
 cause is not the denomination to which all truth belongs. We 
 have not been made acquainted with a universal class. The 
 cause is not to be assimilated to the effect. Mr. Spencer must 
 have given up the relation of likeness as the fundamental aid 
 to comprehension. In its stead he must have adopted the rela- 
 tion of cause and effect. All effects are to be explained by the 
 continued existence of the cause. A very meagre basis of ex- 
 planation it would seem, on reflecting that we are denied a 
 knowledge of the kind of existence which is continued. But 
 it is something other than the sufficiency of the explanation 
 which is to be here arraigned. The variance between what 
 Mr. Spencer demanded and what he has produced is the subject 
 of present animadversion. Formerly the highest degree of 
 comprehension of facts was to be attained by classing them with 
 the incomprehensible j latterly it is to be attained by attributing 
 them to the incomprehensible. Mark, also, that they are to be 
 made understandable by attributing them to that attribute of 
 "The Unknowable" which is the only one known — its con- 
 tinued existence. Through a known cause, not through 
 Unknown doubles, are things to be understood. 
 
 1 have no wish to hold Mr. Spencer to his professed theory 
 of the process of comprehension. If he will, let him cling to 
 the one implied. When we are called upon to oppose the 
 proposition that all knowledge is through the relation of cau- 
 sality, we -hall have no difficulty in meeting it. In the first 
 
110 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 
 
 place, we may put in the claims of many other relations. Sec- 
 ondly, we may show how little is really known through this 
 relation. Thirdly, we may maintain that only a known cause 
 will explain its effects. And fourthly, we may argue that the 
 uncaused can sometimes (as indeed the caused may) be known 
 through its effects; and that, as it exists independent of a cause, 
 there is nothing in its nature which it requires a cause to ex- 
 plain. A more abstract proposition — one that will 
 apply to any and all relations — is more likely to be urged 
 against us. Not many would think it absurd to insist that 
 truth can be known only through other truth, and that, there- 
 fore, the most important truth cannot be known. The present 
 is a good occasion for disposing of an entire class of arguments 
 which, alone and together, are fitted to annoy us. It is a priori 
 absurd that a known truth should be derived from that which 
 is unknown. The mutuality of relation suggests a better sup- 
 position. A's being known through its relation to B, does not 
 preclude B's being known through its relation to A. Distinction 
 is a relation that illuminates both its terms. So do all others. 
 Needless, then, is it to find a fact underlying all other facts. 
 If, however, any seek it, they should expect to learn that it 
 needs no explanation. That through which all else is realized, 
 be it one truth or many, must itself be fitted for independent 
 realization. 
 
 § 36. Special applications of the doctrine that a thing can 
 be known only in so far as it is classed, must be duly examined. 
 Of these there are two: one relating to the Substance of Mind, 
 and one relating to " The Unknowable " in general. The latter 
 will be discussed in the succeeding chapter; the former shall be 
 considered here. 
 
 Attempts to disprove an immediate knowledge of Mental 
 Substance I pass over as, although questionable in method, at 
 least laudable in aim. On denial of the conceivability of 
 Mental Substance, however, I join issue. What is now to be 
 cited opposes alike the perceptibility which I deny and the 
 conceivability which I affirm. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. Ill 
 
 u Again, to know anything is to distinguish it as such or such 
 — to class it as of this or that order. An object is said to be 
 but little known, when it is alien to objects of which we have 
 had experience; and it is said to be well known, when there is 
 great community of attributes between it and objects of which 
 we have had experience. Hence, by implication, an object is 
 completely known when this recognized community is complete; 
 and completely unknown when there is no recognized commu- 
 nity at all. Manifestly, then, the smallest conceivable degree 
 of knowledge implies at least two things between which some 
 community is recognized. But if so, how can we know the 
 substance of Mind ? To know the substance of Mind is to be con- 
 scion- of some community between it and some other substance. 
 If, with the Idealist, we say that there exists no other substance; 
 then, necessarily, as there is nothing with which the substance 
 of Mind can be even compared, much less assimilated, it remains 
 unknown. While, if we hold with the Realist that Being is 
 fundamentally divisible into that which is present to as as 
 Mind, and that which, lying outside of it, is not Mind; then. 
 as the proposition itself asserts a difference and not a likeness, 
 anally clear that Mind remains unclassible, and therefore 
 unknowable." ( Prin. of Pbv., § 59.) * 
 
 As opposed to the Realist, the argument is that, since Sub- 
 Btance of Mind must be contrasted with everything else, it is 
 unknowable. For the same reason — lor the reason that there 
 i< nothing else with which to class it — it follows that what is 
 not Substance of .Mind i- unknowable, that nothing i< knowable. 
 Sufficient a- this reduction to absurdity is, we do not depend 
 on it alone. We have Been that everything we do know is 
 contrasted with all and everything else within our know! 
 We have .-ecu also that contrast is one of the greatest aids 
 which struggling comprehension finds. We are not now to !«• 
 persuaded that Substance of Mind i- unthinkable merely l>« <-;iu-<- 
 it is unlike something, in that the latter is externa] to it- sphere. 
 
 To these considerations may be added others not previously 
 advanced. Mr. Spencer was bound to prove Mental Substance 
 totally inconceivable. Granting hi- mode of reasoning sound, 
 
112 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 
 
 it was not sufficient to point out a slight contrast : an absolute 
 unlikeness was called for. But an absolute unlikeness was not 
 to be shown. Mental Substance is supposed to be the sub- 
 stratum of states of Mind, sustaining them in a manner at least 
 analogous to that in which matter sustains very complicated 
 systems of motion. Some go so far as to think that Substance 
 of Mind is a kind of matter, and that consciousness is a kind 
 of motion. Either view is exempt from Mr. Spencer's strict- 
 ure, since either asserts the required resemblance. From his 
 point of view, as well as our own, we may point out to him 
 further analogy. As other substance is external to Mental 
 Substance and internal to its own realm, so is Mental Substance 
 external to other substance and internal to its own realm. 
 Both present quantity, whole and part. Both present quality 
 and relation. Both present change and permanence ; for each 
 is substance. 
 
 Though the argument proves bad in both premises, — though 
 no ignorance of Mental Substance has been demonstrated, we 
 should be ever ready to confess it in a comparative degree. 
 While the Mind is wonderfully familiar with what lies beyond, 
 it is wofully ignorant of its own constitution. Nevertheless, 
 we must persist in retaining and employing the conception of 
 Mental Substance which has grown up within us. Vague it 
 is, but not void; lacking form, but not formless. Inchoate 
 it may be, but promising great development. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 113 
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 The Deductive Arguments Continued. 
 The Unconditioned. 
 
 § 37. Tag next specimen of agnostic argumentation is rather 
 three than one. But its components are so well co-ordinated 
 that it shall be considered, what its propounder considered it, 
 one composed of three parts. The last of these was, in the 
 preceding chapter, partly disposed of. What familiarity with it 
 wo have acquired will be of service when we meet it again. 
 
 In stating the three-fold argument with which we are about 
 to come face to face, Mr. Spencer has availed himself of con- 
 siderable quotation from Hamilton and Mansel. This a courtesy 
 to them, which is no kindness to the reader. To the reviewer, 
 the circumstance is still less propitious. He must sift out for 
 discussion only what is of the essence of the argument, reject- 
 it only what Mr. Spencer afterwards expressly repudiates, 
 but all that he is at liberty to repudiate. As he has summar- 
 ized the argument, we have the advantage of knowing what he 
 intended it- general character to be. With this recapitulation, 
 he brings it to an end: "A thought involve.- rdati noe, 
 
 Ukeness. Whatever does not present each of these doc- imt 
 admit of cognition. And hence we may say that the Uncon- 
 ditioned, a- presenting none of them, is trebly unthinkable." 
 ( First Prin., § 24.) 
 
 3. First of difference. What on this subject is quoted 
 
 from Sir William Hamilton is the following: "all that we 
 
 know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is 
 
 only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of 
 
 the different^ of the modified, of the phenomenal." (First 
 Prin., § 24.) 
 
 b 
 
114 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 Erase the word "phenomenal/' or use it in a certain sense, 
 and we shall have no reason for denying this. It certainly im- 
 plies that "The Unconditioned" is unthinkable; but this is 
 rather favorable to our view that nothing is unconditioned. In 
 both the material and mental worlds, we expect to find partic- 
 ularity, plurality, heterogeneity, and the quality of being modi- 
 fied. They who hold a contrary opinion of the nature of 
 realities are the only ones whom the above-quoted dictum 
 does not favor. 
 
 Let us hear what Mr. Mansel has to say for Mr. Spencer 
 on the subject of difference. 
 
 "The very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it 
 may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one 
 object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of 
 something; and that something can only be known, as that 
 which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not. 
 But distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to 
 be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of 
 existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some 
 form which the other has. But it is obvious the Infinite cannot 
 be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by the absence of 
 any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence would 
 be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence 
 of an attribute which the Finite has not; for, as no finite part 
 can be a constituent of an infinite whole, this differential char- 
 acteristic must itself be infinite; and must at the same time 
 have nothing in common with the finite. We are thus thrown 
 back upon our former impossibility ; for this second infinite will 
 be distinguished from the finite by the absence of qualities 
 which the latter possesses. A consciousness of the Infinite as 
 such thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction; for it im- 
 plies the recognition, by limitation and difference, of that 
 which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent." ( First 
 Prim, §24.) 
 
 The application of these remarks will be known when it is 
 said that one of the supposed peculiarities of " The Uncon- 
 ditioned," is infiniteness in respect of every attribute of every 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 115 
 
 thing. Willingly will we predicate of it infiniteness in the 
 number and degree of its absurdities. Unhesitatingly will we 
 carry further Mr. Mansel's criticism. That is infinitely removed 
 from possibility, which has contradictory attributes in an infi- 
 nite number and degree. Stranger yet does it seem, when we 
 reflect that this, which must have so many attributes, can have 
 only one. Had it more, each would limit the other and limit 
 the whole. Xor can it have both substance and attribute; for 
 each, and their sum, would be limited by the other; yet not 
 either can exist alone. Consciousness, too, has a word to say. 
 We have immediate knowledge of finite things; and the existence 
 of these implies the non-existence of the Infinitely Infinite. 
 
 But the Infinite which thus proves to be unlimitedly ridic- 
 ulous, is not identical with those external things of which we 
 assert infiniteness. Space, we say, is infinite; meaning, not that 
 it is infinite in every quality imaginable, nor even that it is in- 
 finite in every quality belonging to itself, but that it is infinite 
 in extent. Mr. Spencer, when in quest of evidence that infi- 
 nite space is inconceivable, did not think it pertinent to suggest 
 that we cannot conceive space as infinitely righteous, infinitely 
 active, or infinitely hot. If, however, that which is infinitely 
 something must be infinitely everything, such reasoning would 
 be conclusive. It is as inconclusive as could well be, for the 
 reason that there is no tendency to attribute to anything infi- 
 niteness in respect of more than a very limited number of qual- 
 ities. To Divinity even are ascribed but a few qualities unlim- 
 ited in degree. The majority of attributes are not ascribed to 
 Divinity at all. We conceive anything infinite to be in some 
 way limited. This is true of the whole External Universe. 
 Call it infinite, hut keep in view in what respects it is, and in 
 
 what it is not infinite. Do not from infiniteness in spaouil or 
 
 temporal extent drift to the conclusion that it is incongruous 
 
 with the limitednesfi which contrast indicates. 
 
 The part of the argument which relates to difference we 
 
 have found to .-how the absurdities of something which we 
 
 deem both unthinkable and Don-existent j hut t<> leave unaf- 
 fected all that we consider existent and known. 
 
116 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 § 39. Next of Relation — the relation between subject and 
 object. This is the way Sir William Hamilton reasons from it. 
 "Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only 
 possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, 
 known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other." 
 (First Prin., § 24.) 
 
 By this, it is supposed, the Infinite is proved incognizable. 
 As above it was contended that other objects limited it, so it is 
 here contended that it is limited by the subject. The answer 
 before given is efficient here. The Infinite in every respect 
 cannot exist at all; the infinite in some respects can co-exist 
 with other things. The subject is not exclusive of it. 
 
 By the considerations last cited, the Absolute also is supposed 
 to be proved incognizable. The reason of the attempt to estab- 
 lish the incognoscibility of the Absolute is that it, like the 
 Infinite, is presumed to be comprehended in "The Uncondi- 
 tioned." Since an object of thought is "known only in corre- 
 lation" with the subject, it is argued that the " Unrelated" or 
 Absolute cannot be an object of thought. The argument would 
 be relevant if we believed in the existence of something unre- 
 lated; but we do not, and cannot. Everything we believe 
 existent, we believe to be related to every other thing; though 
 we consider some things not to be dependent upon the relation 
 in which we find them, and for this reason call them absolute. 
 Thought does not create its object, but the object exists before, 
 after, and independent of the thought. Correlated, but inde- 
 pendent of the correlation, is what we predicate of the Absolute. 
 
 Further discussion of the Absolute will be necessary after we 
 have listened to Mr. Mansel on the subject of relation. 
 
 " A second characteristic of Consciousness is that it is only 
 possible in the form of a relation. There must be a Subject, or 
 person conscious, and an Object, or thing of which he is con- 
 scious. There can be no consciousness without the union of 
 these two factors; aud in that union each exists only as it is 
 related to the other. The subject is a subject, only in so far as 
 it is conscious of an object: the object is an object, only in so 
 far as it is apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 117 
 
 either is a destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus mani- 
 fest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contra- 
 dictory with that of the Infinite. To be conscious of the 
 Absolute as such, we must know that an object, which is given 
 in relation to our consciousness, is identical with one which 
 exists in its own nature, out of all relation to consciousness. 
 But to know T this identity, we must be able to compare the two 
 together; and such a comparison is itself a contradiction. We 
 are in fact required to compare that of which we are conscious 
 with that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself 
 being an act of consciousness, and only possible through the 
 consciousness of both its objects. It is thus manifest that, even 
 if we could be conscious of the absolute, we could not possibly 
 know that it is the absolute : and, as we can be conscious of an 
 object as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is 
 equivalent to an admission that we cannot be conscious of the 
 absolute at all. As an object of consciousness, everything is 
 necessarily relative; and what a thing may be out of conscious- 
 ness, no mode of consciousness can tell us." "An object of 
 thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker; 
 while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation." 
 (First Prim, § 24.) 
 
 What is the substance of that said about the Absolute? It 
 has not been described, we must first observe, as that which is 
 out of all relation, but merely as that which is ''independent 
 of all relation." Being independent of relation, Mr. Manse] 
 think- it cannot be known as it is. Assuredly it cannot be 
 known out of relation to consciousness. Neither, reason- Air. 
 Mansel, can it be known in BUCh relation; for "the object ifl an 
 
 object, only in so far as it is apprehended by ;i subject;" "an 
 object of thought exists, a- such, in and through its relation to 
 a thinker. 1 ' Sere the fallacy emerges. How would those of 
 Mi-. MansePe persuasion content themselves with the conclusion 
 that an object of thought, as such, presents no attribute except 
 
 that of Immimj: an object of thought? Not at all; yet tin- is 
 
 the conclusion to which bis reasoning leads. In and through 
 
 its relation to thought, an object of thought is an object oi 
 
118 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 thought and nothing more. But it is more; therefore, it is 
 something independent of this relation. Did objects of thought 
 present nothing but objectivity, nothing that is objective, they 
 would be all alike: that they are unlike shows that they do 
 present something besides objectivity. May not this some- 
 thing be, in some cases, not dependent upon anything else? 
 Undoubtedly, unless we imagine that what depends upon other 
 things for one attribute depends upon them for all. This we 
 cannot do. Though the Absolute depend upon a thinker for 
 its being an object of thought, it does not depend upon a 
 thinker, as such, for its being whatever it is more than this. 
 So much of it is independent that we call it absolute. As the 
 Absolute is further known than as a mere object of thought, 
 there is no incongruity in saying that it is known as absolute. 
 But is not a knowledge of its absoluteness a knowledge of it 
 out of relation to the mind? By no means: while in such 
 relation we can perceive that cognition depends upon its 
 being, not its being upon cognition. To the objection that 
 from this may be deduced the conclusion that it would exist 
 even if it were not known, the reply is that this conclusion is 
 legitimate. We can think of an object's co-existing with our 
 utter ignorance of it. If I had not found a pretty pebble on 
 the beach, I would never have given it a thought; yet it would 
 have continued to exist as it existed before I found it. This 
 is no difficult thought. The relation in which the object was 
 once known seems, on contemplation, not to be the occasion of 
 the object's existence. " Still," it may be said, " the object is even 
 now in a relation fundamentally like the one contemplated." 
 So much the better: the relation contemplated being essentially 
 like the relation of contemplation, and in fact like all other 
 relations of cognition, stands for them all. The object exist- 
 ing independent of it, independent of its essence, exists inde- 
 pendent of anything essentially like it. The conclusion is 
 one which we cannot resist, and one which we can congruously 
 conceive. Two ways of knowing that an object of thought is 
 independent of cognition have been found. The knowledge is 
 given immediately, in perception, and mediately, by conception. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 119 
 
 Not even by defining the Absolute as that which cannot exist 
 in relation, can Mr. Mansel's argument be made effective. We 
 have the best evidence which the nature of the case permits, 
 that there exists nothing answering the description. It is a 
 strange absolute that depends upon the absence of relation for 
 the possibility of its existence. If the Absolute is independent, 
 it can exist in relation ; and if it is not independent, it may as 
 well depend upon relation as the want of it. Very much better, 
 we may say, considering that it must exist in relation or not at 
 all. Everything existing must be related in many ways to 
 everything else. Relation does not conflict with independence. 
 Space is independent of matter, though related to it. Within 
 itself, too, it has, and must have, relations; but it is not in the 
 ordinary sense dependent on them, nor they on it. The relation 
 which the Absolute transcends is that of effect to cause. When- 
 ever we find something which is not related to anything else as 
 an effect to its cause, however it may be otherwise related, 
 we may call it absolute. 
 
 That part of the argument which concerns relation, is very 
 conclusive, as opposed to what we deny; but very inefficient, 
 as opposed to what we affirm. 
 
 § 40. Lastly of Likeness. On this subject, Mr. Spencer is 
 the one who speaks. His theory of comprehension is presented 
 in the conclusion, "that a thing is perfectly known only when 
 it is in all respects like certain tilings previously observed ; that 
 in proportion to the number of respects in which it is unlike 
 
 them, ifl the extent to which it is unknown; and that hence 
 
 when it has absolutely no attribute in common with anything 
 else, it musl be absolutely beyond the hounds of knowledge.' 1 
 Following this is the application. 
 
 "Observe the corollary which here concerns as. A cogni- 
 tion of the Real, as distinguished from the Phenomenal, must, 
 if it exists, conform to this law of cognition in general. The 
 Firei Cause, the In Unite, the Absolute, t<> l><- known at all, musl 
 be clas>ed. To he positively thought of, it huh he thought of 
 as such or such — as of this or that hind, ("an it he like in 
 
120 THE DEDUCTIVE AKGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 kind to anything of which we have had sensible experience? 
 Obviously not. Between the creating and the created, there 
 must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions exist- 
 ing between different divisions of the created. That which is 
 uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is caused : the two 
 being, in the very naming, antithetically opposed. The Infi- 
 nite cannot be grouped along with something that is finite; 
 since, in being so grouped, it must be regarded as not-infinite. 
 It is impossible to put the Absolute in the same category with 
 anything relative, so long as the Absolute is defined as that of 
 which no necessary relation can be predicated. Is it then that 
 the Actual, though unthinkable by classification with the Ap- 
 parent, is thinkable by classification with itself? This suppo- 
 sition is equally absurd with the other. It implies the plurality 
 of the First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute; and this impli- 
 cation is self-contradictory. There cannot be more than one 
 First Cause; seeing that the existence of more than one would 
 involve the existence of something necessitating more than one, 
 which something would be the true First Cause. How self- 
 destructive is the assumption of two or more Infinites, is 
 manifest on remembering that such Infinites, by limiting each 
 other would become finite. And similarly, an Absolute which 
 existed not alone but along with other Absolutes, would no 
 longer be an absolute but a relative. The Unconditioned, 
 therefore, as classible neither with any form of the conditioned 
 nor with any other Unconditioned, cannot be classed at all. 
 And to admit that it cannot be known as of such or such kind, 
 is to admit that it is unknowable." (First Prin., § 24.) 
 
 The above calls for nothing in the nature of explanation 
 except, perhaps, the remark that "The Unconditioned" is con- 
 sidered to be the First Cause, " the Heal as distinguished from 
 the Phenomenal," the Actual as contrasted with the Apparent, 
 as well as the Infinite and the Absolute. Some distance back, 
 we were given to understand that "The Unconditioned" can 
 bear no relations of difference. Now comes out the implica- 
 tion that it is not without them. "Between the creating and 
 the created, there must be a distinction transcending any of the 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 121 
 
 distinctions existing between different divisions of the created. 
 That which is uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is 
 caused; the two being, in the very naming, antithetically 
 opposed. The Infinite cannot be grouped along with something 
 that is finite; since, in being so grouped, it must be regarded as 
 not-infinite. It is imjjossible to put the Absolute in the same 
 category with anything relative, so long as the Absolute is 
 defined as that of which no necessaiy relation can be predi- 
 cated." Why, then, the endeavor to show that a d^tingiiishable 
 unconditioned is an absurdity? If "The Unconditioned" 
 really is, to the extent which Mr Spencer claims, distinct from 
 the Conditioned, to think of it as distinguished, is to think of 
 it as it is. One of the two arguments must devour the other: 
 if "The Unconditioned" transcends likeness, it is all distinction; 
 if it transcends distinction, it is all likeness. Regard for Mr. 
 Spencer would compel us to construe the arguments into an 
 attempt to show the folly of trying to believe in the existence 
 of an unconditioned, were it not that he actually believes that 
 there is something without conditions, and believes that it is dis- 
 tinguished from the Conditioned to the extent which he implies. 
 Tin- argument from the necessity of distinguishing objects of 
 thought is, therefore, the one which fails. Into the independent 
 conclusiveness of the other we shall proceed to inrjuire. 
 
 The premise that a thing is comprehended in direct propor- 
 tion t«> the generality, and in inverse proportion to the particu- 
 larity, of the class to which it is thought of as belonging, 
 warrant- the oonclusiou that "The Unconditioned " is compre- 
 hended. The First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, the 
 Xoiimcnal, belong to the most genera] class; which, remember, 
 includes whatever has existence. Even their distinctions belong 
 to thifl class. To it all classes, Including itself, belong. Every 
 thin- real belongstoit In it "The Unconditioned " is ■•! 
 with the Conditioned. According, then, to Mr. Spencer** 
 nothing is better known than "The Unconditioned." The 
 
 above premise also warrant- the conclusion that the t londitioned 
 cannot he known, and then-lore nothing can be known. The 
 Conditioned, as much as "The Unconditioned," presents abso- 
 
122 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 lute particularity. It canuot be classed with any other Con- 
 ditioned, because there is none; nor with any part, for between 
 whole and part there must be an insuppressible distinction. 
 For no portion, even, may an exact counterpart be found. 
 There is nothing which is like everything else; nothing which 
 is not unlike everything else. Point out all the resemblances 
 you can find, and there will remain something which nothing 
 resembles. Likeness upon likeness will not exhaust the un- 
 likeness. Go back and examine any attribute which you have 
 laid aside as matched. It cannot be completely likened to that 
 which most resembles it. After all its similarities to other 
 things have been noted, there will always remain a dissimilarity 
 which can never be resolved into similarity. Begin again with 
 any subdivision you may select, but you will end where you 
 did before. There is no absolute similarity, and relative simi- 
 larity proves to be only a less degree of dissimilarity. Analysis 
 shows every thing and every attribute to be absolutely, though 
 often not conspicuously, unique. That the mind cannot grasp 
 the unique, means that it can grasp nothing. Besides 
 
 reductiones ad absurdum, we have found a direct refutation 
 possible. So far is distinction from being an impediment to 
 comprehension, that it is to comprehension a most propitious 
 circumstance. Were that which Mr. Spencer has called uncon- 
 ditioned, without distinction it would baffle even our apprehen- 
 sion. We should then be under the constant liability of 
 confounding it with anything and everything, or we would take 
 no cognizance of it at all. Fortunate for us that it is dis- 
 
 o 
 
 tinguishable. 
 
 Mr. Spencer should have shown, but did not show, that 
 "The Unconditioned" is entirely unclassible. Does "The Un- 
 conditioned " consist of the peculiarities he has told us of, and 
 nothing else? Unless we know it all, there is something more 
 belonging to it. This, then, notwithstanding all said, may be 
 capable of being classed. Giving Mr. Spencer's words the 
 greatest weight Avhich he could think of claiming for them, 
 they do not carry conviction that "The Unconditioned" is 
 entirely unclassible. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 123 
 
 To other charges, may be added that of the argument's 
 irrelevancy. It is not difficult to show that existences beyond 
 consciousness may, without violating our conception of them, 
 be classed with regard to the very attributes which have called 
 forth so much discussion. The First Cause, we will con- 
 
 cede, cannot be classed with any other. Why this concession? 
 Because all things self-existent and productive of effects, are 
 (in abstract speculation) grouped together and called "the 
 First Cause;" leaving, of course, no like group. In the same 
 way, phenomena may be grouped together and called " the Phe- 
 nomenal World." In the first case, no less than in the. second, 
 the problem is given ready solved. If the First Cause is a 
 group, its components are already classed. Let us view this in 
 the concrete. Time and Space are uncaused, or, if we prefer, 
 perpetually self-caused. Either description gives us what we 
 seek — the means of grouping components of the First Cause. 
 Both Time and Space may be considered creating; since, besides 
 perpetuating themselves, they are factors in the continual change 
 of temporal and spacial relations: so we find a second attribute 
 bv which components of the First Cause are grouped. But 
 the strongest position accessible to us has not yet been reached. 
 In addition to classing component with component, we may 
 class the whole with its components. Its description is, that 
 which is self-existent and creating; and this is the description 
 of every part. There cannot, we must also concede be two 
 
 things infinite in every regard; because, as Mr. Spencer says, 
 "such Infinites, by limiting each other, would become finite." 
 The concession is but a yielding of what we are anxious to 
 repudiate Such infinites as we think we discern in the realm 
 of realities, are no( supposed to have uo limitations of nature. 
 The point is gained if infinite Time and Space are qoI exclusive 
 of each other, and may be classed together as limitless, A class 
 of absolutes may also be asserted. This remark is not supposed 
 to be 'true of absolutes which cannot exist in relation. It is 
 true bo long as the Absolute i- defined a- thai which depends on 
 no relation to any other thing for its existence. There is no 
 relation to any thing else from which Space or Substance derive 
 
124 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 their existence ; and in view of this likeness they may be classed 
 together as absolutes. Already it is shown that there are 
 
 various groupings of the Actual or Beal, as distinguished 
 from the Phenomenal or Apparent ; for they include self-existent 
 causes, infinites, and absolutes. Instances of other groupings 
 of things believed to lie out of consciousness, are so numerous 
 that the mention of one might suggest a thousand. While 
 Horse may be classed with Dog, Mr. Spencer should not flatter 
 himself that he has proved that there can be no assimilation of 
 things in themselves. It is remarkable that his argument 
 treats of those outward realites which are in the extreme 
 minority. To mankind at large, the External Universe pre- 
 sents little more than effects which are finite and relative : un- 
 caused causes, infinites, and absolutes are in a high degree 
 exceptional. 
 
 Instead of the fallacious reasoning which he employed, Mr. 
 Spencer might have premised that " The Unconditioned " must 
 be like everything else even to its parts, because distinction is 
 condition; and then pointed out that the First Cause, the Infi- 
 nite, and the Absolute, components of "The Unconditioned," 
 do present distinction. Thus, might the unthinkability of 
 "The Unconditioned" have been demonstrated. But we 
 require no demonstration. The want of distinction is, as well 
 as distinction, a condition. Nothing, we believe, can transcend 
 either; nothing, we are sure, can transcend both. "The Un- 
 conditioned " is to us a non-existence, and we welcome anything 
 which tends to banish it from thought. 
 
 That part of the general argument which deals with likeness 
 proves to be as inefficient as the rest. It may be so reformed as 
 to oppose what we deny ; but it cannot be made to dispute what 
 we proclaim. 
 
 § 41. And now let us take a glance at the argument as a 
 whole. Besides objections peculiar to certain portions, there is 
 one which is applicable to each of its three divisions, and con- 
 sequently to it all. Admitting that it proves a conception of 
 "The Unconditioned" self-destructive, the objection is never- 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 125 
 
 theless sustainable that it does not attach to a certain realistic 
 conception of the universe. Before we will admit that it proves 
 something that exists unknowable, we must be satisfied that 
 there exists an Unconditioned. And before admitting that it 
 proves the Xoumenal World unknowable, it must appear that 
 "The Unconditioned" and the world outside of consciousness 
 are co-extensive and identical. How much Mr. Spencer does 
 towards filling up these gaps in his argument, will be the next 
 subject of investigation. 
 
 § 42. He will not agree with Hamilton that "the absolute 
 is conceived merely by a negation of eonceivability," nor with 
 Man>el that "the Absolute and the Infinite" are, "like the In- 
 conceivable and the Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object 
 of thought or consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the 
 conditions under which consciousness is possible." What are 
 his reasons? "Observe in the first place, that every one of the 
 arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demon- 
 strated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something 
 beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, 
 is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute." (First 
 Prim, § 26.) How so? Surely it will not be contended that 
 proof of the impossibility of a certain conception, amounts to 
 proof that there is something answering to such conception. 
 To point out the contradictions involved in the thought of ;i 
 round square, is not to assert, by implication, that there is a 
 
 round Bquare. One very important proposition, of which we 
 
 remarked the want of proof, is that there exists an absolute 
 answering Mr. Spencer's description. The use which he made 
 of certain arguments, assuredly assumed the existence of such 
 an absolute; bul i- it not a justification of the assumption of 
 which we are even now in search? We have interrupted 
 
 the author in the middle of a paragraph, and must read further. 
 "Tin' Noumenon, everywhere named a- the antithesis of tin 1 
 Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of a- an actu- 
 ality. It i- rigorously impossible to conceive thai our knowledge 
 is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time 
 
126 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances ; for appear- 
 ance without reality is unthinkable." Again we must be 
 guilty of interruption. We cannot suffer Mr. Spencer to omit 
 proof that "The Unconditioned" and the Noumenal are the 
 same. That they are, is the second proposition which we 
 observed he had yet to establish. While they may be supposed 
 to differ, belief in the reality of the last will not be accepted as 
 equivalent to belief in the reality of the first. Now we 
 
 will hear Mr. Spencer out. " Strike out from the argument the 
 terms Unconditioned, Infinite, Absolute, with their equivalents, 
 and in place of them write, i negation of conceivability/ or 
 ( absence of the conditions under which consciousness is pos- 
 sible/ and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. 
 Truly to realize in thought any one of the propositions of 
 which the argument consists, the Unconditioned must be repre- 
 sented as positive and not negative. • • • Clearly, then, the 
 very demonstration that a definite consciousness of the Absolute 
 is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite con- 
 sciousness of it." Suppose that, with intent to demonstrate our 
 inability to conceive intersecting parallel lines, we argue that 
 the intersection of parallel lines is a contradiction in terms — 
 that their intersection conflicts with their parallelism; their 
 parallelism, with their intersection. If Mr. Spencer's prin- 
 ciples are to be relied on, we have proved the reality of parallel 
 lines which intersect. Strike out everything that stands for 
 the subject of discussion; in its place write "an unreality;" and 
 see if the argument does not lose its intelligibility. By like 
 reasoning, every proof that something is inconceivable is a 
 proof that it exists. The indefinite consciousness which Mr. 
 Spencer remarks is not consciousness of that of which the con- 
 ceivability is denied ; but the construing of several predicates 
 without the power of affirming them of a single subject. In- 
 somuch as there is a certain bond of union among them, they 
 may be dealt with as an integer; in as much as they exclude 
 each other, the union is incomplete. The denial of conceiv- 
 ability does not exclude all predicates from the mind, but 
 merely the co-affirmation of some of them. While they dis- 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 127 
 
 place one another, there persists a sense of their kinship, and 
 thus is formed the indefinite consciousness in question. This 
 vague and protean mode may be contemplated in one relation 
 and another, in this aspect and in that; but it cannot be said to 
 represent any reality, since it is marked by absence of the very 
 peculiarity essential to the supposed reality, — that is, the union 
 of certain attributes. The indefinite consciousness which arises 
 on mention of the name " Unconditioned," is no more the con- 
 sciousness of a reality than that which responds to the mention 
 of equidistant-crossing lines, or any other absurdity. 
 
 § 43. A second attempt to show that we have some conscious- 
 ness of "The Unconditioned," follows the one just examined. 
 
 "It is a doctrine called in question by none," premises the 
 author, " that such antinomies of thought as "Whole and Part, 
 Equal and Unequal, Singular and Plural, are necessarily con- 
 ceived as correlatives: the conception of a part is impossible 
 without the conception of a whole; there can be no idea of 
 equality without one of inequality. And it is admitted that 
 in the same manner, the Relative is itself conceivable as such, 
 only by opposition to the Irrelative or Absolute." (First Prin., 
 § 26.) To carry on the argument to its conclusion, it was 
 necessary to refute a doctrine expressed by Sir William I Iamilton 
 as follows. "Correlatives' certainly suggest each other, but 
 correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. In 
 thought contradictories necessarily imply each other, for the 
 knowledge of contradictories is one. But the reality of one 
 contradictory, so for from guaranteeing the reality of the other, 
 is nothing else (nan its negation." Accordingly Mr. Spencer 
 attempts the refutation. "In such correlatives as Equal and 
 I Fnequal, it is obvious enough thai the negative concept contains 
 something besides the negation of the positive one; for the 
 things oi* which equality is denied are not abolished from 
 consciousness by the denial. And the fed overlooked by Sir 
 
 William I Iamilton, is, that the like holds even with those cor- 
 relatives of which the negative is inconceivable, in the strid 
 sense of the word. Take for example the Limited and the 
 
128 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 Unlimited. Our notion of the Limited is composed, firstly of a 
 consciousness of some kind of being, and secondly of a conscious- 
 ness of the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical 
 notion of the Unlimited, the consciousness of limits is abolished • 
 but not the consciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true 
 that in the absence of conceived limits, this consciousness ceases to 
 be a concept properly so called; but it is none the less true that 
 it remains as a mode of consciousness. If, in such cases, the 
 negative contradictory were, as alleged 'nothing else 7 than the 
 negation of the other, and therefore a mere nonentity, then 
 it would clearly follow that negative contradictories could be 
 used interchangeably : the Unlimited might be thought of as 
 antithetical to the Divisible; and the Indivisible as antithetical 
 to the Limited. While the fact that they cannot be so used, 
 proves that in consciousness the Unlimited and the Indivisible 
 are qualitatively distinct, and therefore positive or real; since 
 distinction cannot exist between nothings. The error, (very 
 naturally fallen into by philosophers intent on demonstrating 
 the limits and conditions of consciousness,) consists in assuming 
 that consciousness contains nothing but limits and conditions; to 
 the entire neglect of that which is limited and conditioned. It 
 is forgotten that there is something which alike forms the raw 
 material of definite thought and remains after the definiteness 
 which thinking gave to it has been destroyed. Now all this 
 applies by change of terms to the last and highest of these 
 antinomies — that between the Relative and the Non-Relative*' 
 I think, nevertheless, that there are unanswerable reasons for 
 siding with Sir William Hamilton. Contradictories may, or may 
 not be equally real and positive. In the instances which Mr. 
 Spencer has cited, they are; in an infinite majority of instances 
 which might be cited, they are not. For our examples we shall 
 take such antinomies as Extent which is infinitely divisible, 
 and Extent which is not infinitely divisible; Motion which is 
 communicated gradually, and Motion which is communicated 
 suddenly; Force, operating through a medium, and Force oper- 
 ating through no medium. Or if these are not sufficient, we 
 will mention Mental Effects which are caused, and Mental 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 129 
 
 Effects which are uncaused; Phenomena of which we are con- 
 scious, and Phenomena of which we are unconscious; Appear- 
 ances known as internal to consciousness, and Appearances 
 known as external to consciousness. AVill Mr. Spencer admit 
 that both terms of each of these contradictions are true ? Nay, 
 is he ready to embrace the conclusion that the consciousness of 
 every possibility, to which there is a correlative impossibility, 
 carries with it a consciousness of the latter which proves its 
 reality? Absurd though it is, he comes near expressly affirm- 
 ing this very conclusion. Speaking of the correlatives Equal 
 and Unequal, he says tiiat "the things of which equality is 
 denied arc not abolished from consciousness by the denial ; " and 
 follow- this remark with the assertion that "the like holds 
 even with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceiv- 
 able, in the strict sense of the word." If Mr. Spencer will 
 say that it holds with all of them, and that therefore their con- 
 traries are as real as they, it will be unnecessary to make 
 further comment. He would say nothing so self-evidcntly 
 ridiculous; hence we may argue that "The Unconditioned V 
 being a correlative does not imply a consciousness of it. AYe 
 demand some other (latum. 
 
 It has been given. The Unlimited cannot be thought of as 
 antithetical to the Divisible; whence it is inferred that there is 
 a mode of consciousness answering to something unlimited. 
 We should have been pleased to have .Mr. Spencer tell as this 
 when tin- subject was unlimited Space and unlimited Time. 
 Though they are not interchangeable, he struggled hard to con- 
 vince ih that our thoughts of them in no manner correspond 
 to realities. We -hall not be a- inconsistent a- he, — we will Dot 
 one word to prove that there is no positive consciousm — of 
 the Unlimited. That we can prove there is such consciousm 
 by a method satisfactory to Mr. Spencer, is a matter of con- 
 gratulation. Our present concern i- with that which exists 
 out ol* relation. This, we maintain, we are not conscious of. 
 The argument opposed to as is substantially this: the I rrelativeis 
 antithetical to the Relative, and to no other correlative; but if* it 
 were not positively thought of, it would be ;i~ much antithetical 
 
 9 
 
130 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 to one thing as to another; therefore there is consciousness 
 of the Irrelative. An analogous case will furnish complete 
 refutation. To portions of matter which are not co-extensive, 
 there is the verbally intelligible correlative, — portions of 
 matter which are co-extensive. Try to make this correlative 
 seem the antithetical correlative of two twos which do not 
 make five. The effort must be unavailing, because portions of 
 matter occupying the same space and two twos which make five 
 are more to consciousness than zeros; proving a genuine con- 
 sciousness of them both, or proving Mr. Spencer's mode of 
 reasoning unreliable. 
 
 His aberration is undoubtedly attributable to a misunder- 
 standing of the indefinite consciousness which is, so to speak, the 
 symbol of the inconceivable. If he had reflected that in different 
 cases it consists of different groups of incompatible affirmations, 
 he would not have thought that if it has various forms, it 
 must, in each of them be a consciousness of a reality. The 
 same reflection might have saved him from a gross inconsistency. 
 He describes consciousness of the Absolute as "something which 
 alike forms the raw material of definite thought and remains 
 after the definiteness which thinking gave to it has been de- 
 stroyed ; " and, further on, speaks of the impossibility of giving 
 "to this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative expression 
 whatever." This can scarcely be thought to consist with the 
 argument that consciousness of the Absolute and consciousness 
 of other correlatives "are qualitatively distinct, and therefore 
 positive or real." Being distinguishable, they are qualified; 
 or being unqualified, they are indistinguishable, and therefore 
 interchangeable. The former position is preferable. In sup- 
 port of it, we have Mr. Spencer's proof that inconceivable 
 correlatives are distinct from one another. In further support 
 of it, we have the fact that the "raw material" of thought 
 would not support the antithesis which exists between the Ab- 
 solute and the Relative. What has no qualities cannot support 
 the antithesis issuing from the quality of being out of relation. 
 There is no escape from the conclusion, once urged by Mr. 
 Spencer, that the indefinite consciousness which is antithetical 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 131 
 
 to consciousness of the Related, is more than unmodified material 
 of definite thought. As before explained, it is a collection of 
 definite materials, but incapable of proper combination. The 
 impossibility of constructing from its components a congruous 
 idea, is its mark of spuriousness. It will not avail Mr. Spencer 
 to reject this explanation ; for consciousness of the Unrelated, 
 being distinguished from other consciousness, is not uncondi- 
 tioned consciousness — is much less consciousness of "The 
 Unconditioned." 
 
 § 44. A third endeavor to prove that we have consciousness 
 of "The Unconditioned" remains. 
 
 "Still more manifest will this truth become when it is ob- 
 served that our conception of the Relative itself disappears, if 
 our conception of the Absolute is a pure negation. It is 
 admitted, or rather it is contended, by the writers I have quoted 
 above, that contradictories can be known only in relation to 
 each other — that Equality, for instance, is unthinkable apart 
 from its correlative, Inequality; and that thus the Relative can 
 itself be conceived only by opposition to the Non-relative. It 
 is also admitted, or rather contended, that the consciousness of 
 a relation implies a consciousness of both the related members," 
 "If the Non -relative or Absolute, is present in thought only 
 as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative 
 becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation 
 IS absent from consciousness. And if this relation is unthink- 
 able, then i- the Relative itself unthinkable, for want of its 
 antithesis: whence results the disappearance of all thought 
 whatever." (First Prin., § 2G.) 
 
 Before us is an attack upon consciousness of the Belated 
 
 which, it is supposed, may he repelled only by asserting <■<)])- 
 
 sciousness of the Unrelated. Many other way.-- of accomplish- 
 ing the defence are available. 
 
 Were nothing necessary to make the Relative thinkable, Ian 
 
 to find it an antithesis, there- would be no occasion to call in the 
 
 Absolute. To something related, anything differently related 
 
 is antithetical. That which exists in certain relations ifi 
 
132 THE DEDUCTIVE AKGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 sufficiently contrasted with that which exists out of these 
 relations, though it exist in others. For the sum of things 
 related there is a similar antithesis. It is related differently 
 from its components, and they from it. But Mr. Spencer's 
 demands are not to be so easily appeased. He must have the 
 strongest antithesis verbally expressible. Nothing but absolute 
 contradiction is enough for him. As the Relative is a sphere 
 of reality sustaining relations, he will not grant that anything 
 is so strongly contrasted with it as to exhibit its relationship, 
 except a sphere of reality sustaining no relation. 
 
 With equal propriety, might we claim that Extended Space 
 is inconceivable apart from the consciousness of Unextended 
 Space. With equal propriety, indeed, might we claim that 
 nothing having a contradictory can be known unless in connec- 
 tion with consciousness of the latter. What knowledge is there 
 that would not be swept away by the requirement? Grant 
 
 us a license to use his mode of reasoning, and we will sub- 
 stantiate a set of conclusions still less agreeable to Mr. Spencer. 
 How easy, for instance, to prove that the External Universe is 
 self-existent. Other things are knowm as not self-existent ; but 
 that which is not self-existent cannot be known independent of 
 a consciousness of that which is self-existent; therefore we are 
 conscious of something self-existent. How easy to prove, in 
 the next breath, that the External Universe is self-created. 
 This last proposition manifestly conflicts with its predecessor. 
 It also conflicts with the doctrine that the External Universe is 
 unrelated; for, as self-creation can only be in time, the self- 
 created must sustain temporal relations. Causal relations are 
 likewise to be predicated of it. Sufficiently refuted is the 
 argument by its reduction to absurdity. Next comes the ex- 
 posure of an inconsistency. 
 
 While the subject of the relations of the Unrelated is before 
 us, let it be noted, that the passage last quoted proclaims that 
 the Absolute is related, and known as related. Something 
 having no relation, bears a relation of contrariety to something 
 that has relations. Mr. Spencer argues that the something 
 which is related, cannot be known out of relation to the some- 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 133 
 
 thing which is not related ; and that their relation is unthinkable 
 unless both its terms are present in thought. Both terms being 
 present in thought, the Unrelated is known as a term of a 
 relation. The explanation that the Irrelative is present merely 
 as raw material of thought, is entirely unsatisfactory. How- 
 ever symbolized, the Irrelative is symbolized as related, so far 
 as it is symbolized at all. By Mr. Spencer's admission, the raw 
 material and its relations, stand for the Irrelative and its rela- 
 tions. Could anything be more remarkable than the position, 
 that "The Unconditioned" is known, and is, so far as it is 
 known, known as conditioned? If the imagined correlative of 
 the Related, is itself related, what is there antithetical to the 
 quality of relativcness? 
 
 Towards finding the required antithesis, we can do more 
 than Mr. Spencer. Here again must be introduced the correc- 
 tion, that the thought corresponding to the word " Unrelated" 
 is far more than unmodified thought. The predications which 
 it contains, although incapable of complete union, present much 
 that is positive. Their union itself, far as it must stop Bnort of 
 completion, is not entirely negative. Such being the case, it is 
 legitimate for us to claim that the thought of the Unrelated, 
 spurious though it is, is more strongly antithetical than any 
 Other mental mode, to the thought of the Belated. Something 
 very aearly meeting Mr. Spencer's requirement may, it seems, 
 thus l»e pointed out without prejudice to ourselves. Hence 
 tiny may, who choose, speak of the antithesis between the 
 Relative and the 1 rrelativr, with immunity from the chai 
 asserting the latter'- existence. 
 
 Finding an antithesis for the Relative i-> t«> some extent a 
 work of supererogation. I think that philosophers are prone to 
 too much prominence t<> certain relations. Being con- 
 ditions of the object, these relations are mistaken for conditions 
 of the subject, because they modify cognition. Being general, 
 they are deemed universal. Being auxiliary t<> comprehension, 
 they are regarded a- essential t<> it. That "contradictories can 
 be known only in relation t<> each other/ 1 is doI a deduction 
 from any knowledge in our possession, and multiplicity of facts 
 
134 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 prevents its being anything like a complete induction. Nor is 
 it unopposed by facts. Experience is rarely, very rarely, 
 appealed to in order to decide the point in dispute, because, 
 among other reasons, of the difficulty of obtaining and inter- 
 preting the answer. Whenever an appeal is made, instances 
 are chosen which are most favorable to the appellant. Thus it 
 is that the majority of instances are never subjected to the 
 slightest examination. Those selected are, moreover, seldom, 
 if ever, examined to ascertain whether the things which occur 
 together are dependent or merely concomitant. Contraries, 
 instead of being simultaneously recognized usually only suggest 
 each other. Some do not even do this. When we read of the 
 quiet path, the green grass, the running brook, we find some- 
 thing which the mind would ordinarily grasp without a thought 
 of contradiction. 
 
 The conception which has been defended is of the Relative 
 as such. Perhaps it may be better to describe it as still less 
 comprehensive. It is of the Relative in the extreme sense in 
 which the latter is said to be the correlative of the Unrelated. 
 It might consequently have been given up without parting 
 with any attribute of the Relative, but its contrast with the 
 Irrelative. The Related as the antithesis of the Unrelated, in 
 the latter's absence from the universe, we do not need to know. 
 
 § 45. Mr. Spencer has more to say about consciousness of 
 "The Unconditioned," but by way of description rather than 
 substantiation. What he sometimes considers the character of 
 such consciousness to be, may be gathered from the following. 
 
 "One of the arguments used to prove the relativity of our 
 knowledge, is that we cannot conceive Space or Time as either 
 limited or unlimited. It is pointed out that when we imagine a 
 limit, there simultaneously arises the consciousness of a space or 
 time existing beyond the limit. This remoter space or time, 
 though not contemplated as definite, is yet contemplated as real. 
 Though we do not form of it a conception proper, since wo do 
 not bring it within bounds, there is yet in our minds the un- 
 shaped material of a conception. Similarly with our conscious- 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 135 
 
 ness of Cause. We are no more able to form a circumscribed 
 idea of Cause than of Space or Time; and we are consequently 
 obliged to think of the Cause which transcends the limits of 
 our thought as positive though indefinite. Just in the same 
 manner that on conceiving any bounded space, there ari 
 nascent consciousness of a space outside the bounds; so when 
 we think of any definite cause, there arises a nascent conscious- 
 - >f a cause behind it: and in the one case as in the other, 
 this nascent consciousness is in substance like that which 
 3ts it, though without form. The momentum of thought 
 inevitably carries us beyond conditioned existence to uncondi- 
 tioned existence; and this ever persists in us as the body of a 
 thought to which we can give no shape." (First Prin., § 26.) 
 The analogy which Mr. Spencer uses is one exceedingly 
 hostile to his purpose. From the very peculiarities of the 
 conceptions of Space and Time which renders them analogous 
 to the conception of Causation, was drawn support for the 
 conclusion that they do not represent anything outside of con- 
 sciousness. Suppose the same rule be applied to the conception 
 ibed as consciousness of the External Cause. It will then 
 result, if the rule be valid, that this conception correspond- to 
 n<> reality — is no consciousness of "The Unconditioned." An 
 alternative stricture will suit US better. Conception of tlie 
 Can-- being held to answer, as far as it goes, to reality, the 
 author i> unable to resist the conviction that the same is true 
 
 of the conceptions of Space and Time. 
 
 It i- granted that there [g a conception which Mi - . Spencer 
 very wel] describes. Bui he describes it a.- more than raw 
 material of thought, which i- what he has told as consciousness 
 of "The Unconditioned" is. Consciousness of a can 
 Mich, i- not unmodified consciousness. Again; he has told us 
 that we are conscious of "The Unconditioned" a- antith 
 to the Relative in being Non-relative. What n<>w does be 
 mean by saying that we are conscious of "The Unconditioned" 
 as a cause? — that i-, a- bearing relations of causation? 
 
 According t«> the author's last account, the consciou 
 of an unconditioned cause follows from the con.-cimi.-ne.— of 
 
136 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 conditioned causes. Does he contemplate these causes as phe- 
 nomena? If he does, his argument is that if we retrace their 
 lineage we shall arrive at unconditioned phenomena. This is 
 evidently not what he wishes to establish. An unconditioned 
 noumenon is to be the ultimate object of contemplation. Con- 
 sciousness of "The Unconditioned," not merely unconditioned 
 consciousness, is to be the ultimatum. To direct Mr. Spencer's 
 argument against his opponents and not against himself, it is 
 necessary to understand the proximate "definite cause/' of 
 which he speaks, to be something external to consciousness. 
 Yet by doing this we do not help him. If the supposed con- 
 sciousness of the first definite cause is a pseudo-consciousness, 
 the consciousness derived from it — the consciousness of "The 
 Unconditioned" — is probably the same. Supposing, on the 
 other hand, the latter consciousness genuine, is an implied con- 
 cession that it is possible to conceive the proximate end of 
 the chain of noumenal causation. Effects wrought on con- 
 sciousness are, then, not all that we know. We know causes; 
 even causes external to consciousness. "The Unconditioned" 
 is not all beyond consciousness: only a remote portion of it. 
 There are many Realists who hold this view. 
 
 As Mr. Spencer observes, the conception of a definite cause 
 raises a "nascent consciousness of a cause beyond it." His 
 mistake is in supposing that the remote cause is as unshapen as 
 our conception of it. The constant observation of causes 
 becoming more definitely known, should be sufficient to teach 
 that the modifications of consciousness are usually less numerous 
 and less marked than its object. Though equally absurd, there 
 is a vast difference between unconditioned consciousness and 
 consciousness of something unconditioned. Conceptions Hke 
 the one in question are so common that we need not look far 
 for an analogy. One thinking of the line of his ancestors, 
 can picture definitely his father's appearance. His grand- 
 father's appearance he is unable to represent with so much 
 definiteness. Of his great-grandfather, and an endless line of 
 predecessors, he can probably call to mind neither form nor 
 feature. Shall he then say that he can trace his pedigree back 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 137 
 
 to ancestors devoid of form and featnre ? To do so, is no more 
 preposterous than to declare that tracing back the chain of 
 causation brings us to a cause without form, because its repre- 
 sentation is so far from completely formed. 
 
 " When we think of any definite cause there arises a nascent 
 consciousness of a cause behind it," says Mr. Spencer. This 
 is true of those causes which are most likely to come to mind 
 on mention of the name; but is far from being universally 
 true. Space is a cause; yet we think of no cause, other than 
 its former self, back of it. The same is true of Time and of 
 the essence of both Substance and Activity. For nothing, but 
 evanescent modes of Substance and Activity, and evanescent 
 spacial and temporal relations, do we seek causes that are not 
 quite as definitely conceived as their effects, being identical with 
 them. The External Cause, we see, does not appear half so 
 indefinite when we cease to contemplate exclusively its indefinite 
 modes. Its vaguest forms, we may add, are presented with 
 some definiteness. Very remote causes, which Mr. Spencer 
 thinks must be regarded without any definiteness whatever, 
 may be, and in fact are, looked upon as some Activity of Sub- 
 stance taking place somewhere in Space and Time. The; 
 "momentum of thought" can never carry us into the presence 
 of what is less than this. 
 
 § 4G. Still another description of consciousness of "The 
 Unconditioned" is given by the author. Very pertinently he 
 asks: "How can there possibly be constituted a consciousness 
 of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, con- 
 sciousness is possible only under forms and limits? If every 
 consciousness of existence is a consciousness of existence as 
 conditioned, then how, after the negation of conditions, can there 
 
 be any residuum?" And he answers — 
 
 "Such consciousness is not, and cannot be, constituted by any 
 single mental act; but is the product of many mental acts. In 
 each concept there is an element which persists. Ii i< alike 
 impossible for tin- element t<> be absent from consciousness, and 
 
 lor it to he present in consciousness alone: either alternative 
 
138 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 involves unconsciousness — the one from the want of the sub- 
 stance; the other from the want of the form. But the per- 
 sistence of this element under successive conditions, necessitates 
 a sense of it as distinguished from the conditions, and 
 independent of them. The sense of a something that is 
 conditioned in every thought, cannot be got rid of, because 
 the something cannot be got rid of. How then must the 
 sense of this something be constituted? Evidently by com- 
 bining successive concepts deprived of their limits and condi- 
 tions. • * * By fusing a series of states of consciousness, in 
 each of which, as it arises the limitations and conditions are 
 abolished, there is produced a consciousness of something un- 
 conditioned. To speak more rigorously: — this con- 
 sciousness is not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, 
 ideas or conceptions ; but it is the abstract of all thoughts, ideas 
 or conceptions. That which is common to them all, and can- 
 not be got rid of, is what we predicate by the word existence. 
 Dissociated as this becomes from each of its modes by the perpetual 
 change of those modes, it remains as an indefinite consciousness 
 of something constant under all modes — of being apart from its 
 appearances." "Our consciousness of the unconditioned being 
 literally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of 
 thought to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows 
 that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of 
 our intelligence. As we can in successive mental acts get rid 
 of all particular conditions, and replace them by others, but 
 cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of conscious- 
 ness which is conditioned anew in every thought; there ever 
 remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and 
 independently of conditions." (First Prin., § 26.) 
 
 Mr. Spencer has the power of bestowing on error a force of 
 expression which few men can give to the truth. "Raw 
 material of thought" would be an admirable phrase, were there 
 anything answering to it; but there is not, at least in Mr. 
 Spencer's sense. There is no consciousness, or material of con- 
 sciousness, without form, any more than there is raw material 
 of any thing else, without form. Consciousness devoid of 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 139 
 
 form, would be consciousness of nothing. Marvelous is it that 
 a sense of existence should be mistaken for unconditioned con- 
 sciousness. Existence has its modifications, its attributes. It 
 has the attribute of being; it is distinguishable from what is 
 not existence; it is some particular existence; it is known in 
 the cognitive relation. Demonstrably, then, consciousness of 
 existence is, after all, consciousness of the Conditioned, and not 
 consciousness of "The Unconditioned." 
 
 Although Mr. Spencer calls consciousness of "The Uncon- 
 ditioned"' a "sense of real existence," he, in another place, 
 calls it "a sense of that which exists persistently and indepen- 
 dently of conditions." By what right he treats these descriptions 
 as equivalent la not disclosed. They are so far from equivalent 
 Bfi to be conflicting. The latter is more comprehensive than the 
 former. Which will he retain? Consideration reveals little 
 preference. Recently it has appeared that a sense of existence 
 is not consciousness of anything unconditioned. The same 
 remark will apply, even more extensively, to a sense of that 
 which exists thus and bo. The existence of "that which exists" 
 as described, is conditioned; and, moreover, so is whatever is 
 presented besides existence. This last is conditioned in being 
 related to the subject, in being joined to existence, in differing 
 from existence, in differing from other things existing. Strive 
 a- we may, we can be conscious of the ( Sonditioned only. Both 
 descriptions of consciousness of "The Unconditioned," represent 
 it as consciousness of something conditioned. In respect 
 
 of their other absurdities tiny are about equal. A Bense of 
 existence merely (supposing it possible) is a sense of the 
 existence of nothing in particular. There is no possibility of 
 determining to what the existence belongs — po way of knowing 
 it to If the existence, not of this or thai which is conditioned, 
 but <»f something else which i- unconditioned. Unless it- 
 existence' he all there is of "The Unconditioned," we have, 
 then, no consciousness of anything unconditioned. If it be, 
 however, all of "The Unconditioned" is within the grasp of 
 thought. Sincerely as he would repudiate it, this very absurd 
 proposition, that "The Unconditioned" comprises oothing luit 
 
140 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 existence, seems implied in the author's reasoning. He calls 
 " The Unconditioned " " the unformed ; " thereby implying that 
 it is an existence having no attribute except existence. Indeed 
 he is obliged to think it unformed, if he would believe it un- 
 conditioned; for that which has modifications is conditioned. 
 Thus it appears that he is driven to the admission, that in 
 knowing " The Unconditioned " as a pure existence, we know it 
 all. We shall find an equivalent objection to the 
 
 description of consciousness of "The Unconditioned" as "a 
 sense of that which exists persistently and independently of 
 conditions." This affirms something besides existence, it is true ; 
 but it affirms as well a knowledge of the something additional. 
 Such affirmation is a direct denial of the author's doctrine, that 
 nothing noumenal but existence is knowable. There is a way 
 of avoiding this difficulty. It is by returning to the preceding 
 one. Mr. Spencer might explain, that in speaking of "that 
 which exists persistently and independently of conditions," he 
 had reference to something which is unmodified existence. 
 Existence may, of course, be alluded to as something which 
 exists. Using this explanation is a return to the position, that 
 the entire "Unconditioned" is within our knowledge. 
 
 AY hatever attributes it may enable us to contemplate, con- 
 sciousness of "The Unconditioned" is said to be an abstraction. 
 "In each concept there is an element which persists," and 
 " the persistence of this element under successive conditions, 
 necessitates a sense of it as distinguished from the conditions, 
 and independent of them." Has not Mr. Spencer fallen into 
 the error of supposing that because elements can be separately 
 named, and separately contemplated, they can be disconnected 
 in fact? The notion of hardness in the abstract is not con- 
 stituted by a single mental act. By attending to the hardness 
 of a number of objects of various shapes, there is formed a 
 notion of hardness as distinguished from shape, and independ- 
 ent of any particular shape. Following the example set us, 
 we might assert a consciousness of something hard but shape- 
 less. To do this would be absurd. So also is it to say that 
 because an element is uniform under all conditions, it is hide- 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 141 
 
 pendent of condition. One important peculiarity of the uni- 
 versal element is that in the concrete it is invariably subject to 
 some conditions. In the abstraction, therefore, this peculiarity 
 should find expression. Mr. Spencer takes into his abstraction 
 an element (existence) fitted for his use, but leaves out an 
 equally persistent element (conditionally | which will not con- 
 form to his necessity. When this element has found due 
 recognition, it will be perceived that the sense of general exist- 
 ence is a sense of it as conditioned. Now another 
 consideration is equally important. Having formed the notion 
 of existence, it is obligatory upon us to consider how far the 
 notion corresponds to reality, reality to the notion. In other 
 
 . we do not imagine that there is an entity answering to 
 the concept. The most that we do imagine is that there are 
 attributes which the concept connotes. A proposal to consider 
 
 attributes as composing a separate existence, instead of 
 belonging to the concrete things from which they were theoret- 
 ically taken, would in other cases be disposed of by a summary 
 exercise of the prerogative to smile. Mr. Spei 
 
 anomaly of abstraction will be only prejudiced by further illu- 
 mination. What we contemplate in perceptions and conceptions 
 are, he thinks, phenomena. The element, then, which is recog- 
 nized as common to them all must, we should think, be phe- 
 nomenal. But according to hi- account, we abstract its existence 
 from each, and, when we have fused the abstractions, we have a 
 notion of the existence of something lying back of all, back of 
 even their existence. 
 
 § 47. All advanced in proof that there exists something 
 unconditioned has been noticed, and its inadequacy, it i- hoped, 
 made sufficiently manifest. That it may not be thought tint 
 the arguments examined are remediable or capable of efficient 
 substitution, a lew word- more are uecessaiy. 
 
 Mi-. Spencer's method of proving the existence of "The 
 Unconditioned" i- t<> prove consciousness of it. Such oon- 
 sciousness as he alleged, observe, is not in strictni rious- 
 
 ness of the object; but is no more, though it may be less, than an 
 
142 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 idea of the object. Proof of immediate knowledge of a thing 
 is proof that it exists; but proof that an idea of it exists does 
 not remove all doubt of its existence. It is not enough that 
 the idea is necessarily formed, unless the necessity is of a 
 peculiar kind. The necessity of forming an abstraction does 
 not, as we have lately seen, bespeak an abstract entity, but 
 rather favors the reverse. The necessity of forming vague 
 ideas of remote causes does not vouch for the existence of 
 causes that are as vague as their symbols. Inability to think 
 of a conceived existence without thinking of its correlative, 
 does not, if real, evidence the actuality, but only the think- 
 ability, of this correlative. If it be true that arguments to 
 prove the inconceivability of an alleged existence become mean- 
 iugless if all thought of this existence be suppressed, it may 
 nevertheless be true that to the thought there is nothing corre- 
 sponding. There are many ideas which we cannot but form, 
 but upon which we cannot rely. We demand, besides proof 
 that we are obliged to conceive an unconditioned, proof that we 
 are compelled to believe that it exists. Neither has been given. 
 
 Some reliance on a very strange method of proving a con- 
 sciousness of "The Unconditioned" is evinced by Mr. Spencer. 
 It is by proving an unconditioned consciousness. One objection 
 is, that unconditioned consciousness cannot disclose that there is 
 something beyond consciousness of which it is the consciousness. 
 Known merely as a state of mind, it cannot be known as a 
 representative state. To know vicariously that it is consciousness 
 of something, is to have some other consciousness of that some- 
 thing. Another objection is, that there is no consciousness 
 which is unconditioned: in no state of mind is there recognized 
 an unmodified element. It could be distinguished only by its 
 peculiarities; and peculiarities are peculiar modifications. 
 
 Apropos of the present criticism, are a few words which 
 appear in one of the author's quotations from Mansel: "we 
 can be conscious of an object, as such, only by knowing it to 
 be what it is." Mr. Spencer would have us conscious of "The 
 Unconditioned," as unconditioned; and yet not conscious of the 
 quality of being unconditioned, but only of the quality of 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 143 
 
 existence. Either we*are not conscious of " The Unconditioned " 
 as such (and if we are not, we have no knowledge of its being 
 unconditioned); or we are conscious of the very attribute which 
 is the only one said to be beyond the bounds of knowledge. 
 No matter that the consciousness is called indefinite: if it is so 
 indefinite as not to be a realization of the quality of being un- 
 conditioned, it is not the consciousness in question. Xo matter 
 that there persists in us a sense of something more than we 
 deliuitely know: unless it is a sense of something as being 
 unconditioned, it is not sufficient. The consciousness is spurious, 
 if it is not consciousness of "The Unconditioned" as it is. 
 
 Because he attempted the impossible, Mr. Spencer failed. 
 To reason about anything, \< to bring it into relation. To 
 reason about //, is to give it distinction. To reason about it, 
 is to view it in more than one relation, and therefore to give it 
 likeness. The product of Mr. Spencer's speculations is as bad 
 as the process. It is the conclusion that we know something 
 unconditioned. Yet, by implication, this something is related 
 to tie- subject; and at the same time assimilated to, and cou- 
 ■d with, other things which are objects. 
 
 Would it not be well tor philosophers to refrain from the 
 attempt to prove that there exists an unconditioned? Nayj 
 would it not be well lor all to repudiate belief in such an 
 entity? The answer has been given and confirmed. Acqui- 
 escing in reductions to absurdity of all pretended knowledge 
 of "The Unconditioned," the effort was to carry them -till 
 farther, it would be easy to protraci the criticism but t<> no 
 purpose; for, to those who can adopt a myriad of absurdities, 
 absurdity i- a recommendation. Whoever decides in accordance 
 with the best evidence procurable, will decide againsl the 
 existence of anything unconditioned. I think that even Mr. 
 Spencer would deny that External Reality is any such thin-, i.' 
 bis reasonings in regard t<> it would permit. They will not, 
 however. If a thing is not in every particular infinite, the 
 ity of contemplating it as not in every particular infinite, 
 does not preclude knowing it a- it i-. If it is not entirely 
 lacking in relativity, knowing it a- related, i- uol necessarily 
 
144 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 knowing it as it is not. If it is not absolutely unmodified, the 
 conditions under which it is presented, or some of them, may 
 belong to itself. Mr. Spencer must maintain belief in some- 
 thing which is in itself unconditioned, accepting its absurdities, 
 or abandon the argument. The alleged incongruities of 
 ultimate religious and ultimate scientific ideas were thought to 
 show the non-existence of objects corresponding. Let the 
 same rule be applied to the belief in " The Unconditioned." 
 
 § 48. Had the existence of "The Unconditioned" been 
 established, Mr. Spencer's argument would still be wanting. 
 No more than assertion has been advanced to show that all 
 outside of consciousness is unconditioned. Consciousness of 
 "The Unconditioned" has not been described as consciousness 
 of " The Unconditioned " as all external to consciousness. It 
 was not considered as consciousness of so much. So much, 
 however, it must be shown to be, in order to complete the 
 argument. The requirement is impossible to meet. Exter- 
 nality is a condition. Aside from this, it is impossible, Avhile 
 ignorant of things, to know that all are this or all are that. 
 The consequence is that the Theistic Realist may affirm con- 
 sciousness of an unconditioned God, together with a conscious- 
 ness of certain of his conditioned works; believing both to be 
 external to the mind. A further consequence is that an Athe- 
 istic Realist may imagine that he discerns in the external world 
 both qualified material things and an unqualified substratum. 
 Both might affirm with Mr. Spencer the existence of an Un- 
 conditioned, and nevertheless maintain, without conflict with 
 his argument, that some noumena are conditioned. In as 
 much as the argument fails to establish that all noumena are 
 unconditioned, it fails to establish that all are unknowable. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 145 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 The Deductive Arguments Continued. 
 
 The Nature of Life. 
 
 § 49. There is an important deductive argument yet to be 
 investigated. From his conception of Life, Mr. Spencer de- 
 duces, as follows, the unknowableness of things outside of 
 consciousness. 
 
 "Divesting this conception of all superfluities, and reducing 
 it to its most abstract shape, we see that Life is definable as the 
 continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations. 
 And when we so define it, we discover that the physical and 
 the psychical life are equally comprehended by the definition. 
 We perceive that this which we call Intelligence, shows itself 
 when the external relations to which the internal ones are 
 adjusted, begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time 
 or space; that every advance in Intelligence essentially consists 
 in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more 
 involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements 
 of science are resolvable into mental relations of co-existence 
 and sequence, so co-ordinated as exactly to tally with certain 
 relation- of co-existence and sequence that occur externally, 
 A caterpillar, wandering at random and at Length finding its 
 way on to a plant having a certain odor, begins to cat — has 
 inside of it an organic relation between a particular impression 
 and a particular set of actions, answering to the relation outside 
 of it, between scent and nutriment The sparrow, guided by 
 the more complex correlation of impression which the color, 
 form, and movement- of the caterpillar gave it; and guided 
 also by other correlations which measure the position and dis- 
 tance of the caterpillar; adjusts certain correlated muscular 
 movement- in such way as to Beize the caterpillar. ' • • And 
 
 10 
 
146 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 lastly, let it be noted that what we call truth, guiding us to 
 successful action and the consequent maintenance of life, is 
 simply the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective 
 relations ; while error, leading to failure, and therefore towards 
 death, is the absence of such accurate correspondence. 
 
 " If, then, Life, in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelli- 
 gence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment 
 of internal relations to external relations, the necessarily rela- 
 tive character of our knowledge becomes obvious. The 
 simplest cognition being the establishment of some connection 
 between subjective states, answering to some connection between 
 objective agencies; and each successively more complex cog- 
 nition being the establishment of some more involved connection 
 of such states, answering to some more involved connection of 
 such agencies ; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it 
 be carried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence 
 either the states themselves or the agencies themselves. Ascer- 
 taining which things occur along with which, and what things 
 follow what, supposing it to be pursued exhaustively, must still 
 leave us with co-existences aud sequences only. If every act 
 of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness par- 
 allel to a relation in the environment, then the relativity of 
 knowledge is self-evident — becomes indeed a truism. Think- 
 ing being relationing, no thought can ever express more than 
 relations. 
 
 " And here let us not omit to mark how that to which our 
 intelligence is confined, is that with which alone our intelli- 
 gence is concerned. The knowledge within our reach, is the 
 only knowledge that can be of service to us. This maintenance 
 of a correspondence between internal actions and external 
 actions, which both constitutes our life at each moment and is 
 the means whereby life is continued through subsequent mo- 
 ments, merely requires that the agencies acting upon us shall 
 be known in their co-existences and sequences, and not that 
 they shall be known in themselves. If x and y are two uni- 
 formly connected properties in some outer object, while a and b 
 are the effects they produce in our consciousness; and if while 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 147 
 
 the property x produces in us the indifferent mental state a, the 
 property y produces in us the painful mental state b (answering 
 to a physical injury); then, all that is requisite for our guidance, 
 is, that x being the uniform accompaniment of y externally, 
 a shall be the uniform accompaniment of b internally; so 
 that when by the presence of x, a is produced in conscious- 
 lies.-, b, or rather the idea of b, shall follow it and excite the 
 motions by which the effect of y may be escaped. The sole 
 need is that a and b and the relation between them, shall always 
 answer to x and y and the relation between them. It matters 
 nothing to us if a and b are like x and y or not. Could they 
 be exactly identical with them, w T e should not be one whit the 
 better off; and their total dissimilarity is no disadvantage to us. 
 "Deep down in the very nature of Life, the relativity of our 
 knowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital actions in 
 general, leads not only to the conclusion that things in them- 
 selves cannot be known to us; but also to the conclusion that 
 knowledge of them, were it possible, would be useless." (First 
 Prin., §25.) 
 
 § 50. Let us be careful to understand the author. Does he 
 mean to say that intellection is the establishment of relation- in 
 the mind parallel to relations in "The Unknowable?" lie 
 cannot mean this. Throughout those chapters in his Biology 
 
 and Psychology which exhibit Life as correspondence, there is 
 
 no intimation that the environment, SO often mentioned, is 
 other than phenomenal. Indeed his view- will not permit 
 BUch an intimation. Wen; he to grant that light, heat, air, 
 earth, water, and Other element- of a plant'.- environment 
 
 are aoumena, he could not conceive them save at the expense of 
 his theory of knowledge, should he concede thai any of the 
 multitudinous objects, properties, activities, relations, to which, 
 as he shows us, animal life corresponds, is an extra-mental 
 
 reality, he would thereby concede to ug a knowledge of auch a 
 reality. If lie will maintain the impossibility of knowing 
 
 things beyond the mind, he musl consider the mind'- environ- 
 ment, including the bodily organism, a.- lying wholly within the 
 
148 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 mind's circumference. What, then, is the portent of his defi- 
 nition of intelligence? It must be that every act of intellec- 
 tion is the establishment of relations in one (the subjective ) 
 order of mental states, so as to correspond with relations which 
 establish themselves in another (the objective) order of mental 
 states. Such being its interpretation, the definition will not 
 support the deduction Mr. Spencer would make, without an 
 identification which he would not make — an identification of 
 "The Unknowable" with objective appearances. For what is 
 it that cannot be transcended but relations among states belong- 
 ing to the subjective order of mental affections? This brings 
 the objective order into that- relation to the subjective order 
 which " The Unknowable " was to be proved to bear. To re- 
 tain the objective order as objects of cognition — and, as they 
 are said to lie within consciousness, they must be so retained — it 
 must be admitted that relations among states of the subjective 
 order are transcended by thought. But this again, leaves room 
 for the supposition that "The Unknowable" may be an object 
 of thought. The argument from the nature of life, as we have 
 interpreted it, means nothing, unless objective appearances are 
 (as far as they go) to be identified with "The Unknowable." 
 It seems that unless we adopt the interpretation which at 
 first we rejected, Mr. Spencer's reasoning must appear unintelli- 
 gible. We will do so. We will suppose that he means to 
 define intellectual life as the establishment of mental relations 
 correspondent to the relations of things in themselves. The 
 definition before us is not the one which he has in so many 
 places taken so much pains to establish. Declaring, arguing, 
 reiterating, again and again, that life, including mind, is 
 correspondence, he has not advanced one word to prove that 
 mental activity corresponds to more than mental affectability. 
 Wisely so, it would seem on inquiring what could be said to 
 the purpose. Induction can bear no testimony while experience 
 of things in themselves is denied. Deduction is equally mute, 
 unless the nature of things out of consciousness be drawn into 
 the reasoning process. What brings us intelligence that " The 
 Unknowable" is not an entirely homogeneous and inert entity, 
 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 149 
 
 by acting upon which in various ways, the mind induces, as 
 reactions, what are called "The Unknowable's" effects? If 
 unmodified, external reality is homogeneous. If homogeneous, 
 it is inert; for activity, being different from its substance, is 
 inconsistent with absolute homogeneity. To illustrate: when 
 percipient of hardness, none can readily decide whether he 
 perceives the force of something external acting upon the mind, 
 or the mind's activity reflected back upon itself. We have 
 readied a conception of mental activity which, besides not 
 being fitted for Mr. Spencer's deduction, supports, as we shall 
 see, an opposite one. The mind being all that is modified or 
 active; "The Unknowable" being homogeneous and inert; 
 there are no forms or activities belonging to " The Unknowable." 
 One attribute is all there is to know about it: this attribute we 
 know: there is no other to which our activities correspond, but 
 which we do not know. If Mr. Spencer's argument is to be 
 revived, this conception of "The Unknowable" must be 
 abolished, and another established in its stead. Primarily it 
 must be rendered evident that "The Unknowable" is the 
 environment of the mind. This cannot be done without 
 assimilating "The Unknowable" to that mass of appcaran< 
 the External World. Here we must take away something of 
 which we have long suffered Mr. Spencer to hold unlawful 
 possession. He has no right to conceive "The Unknowable" 
 a- surrounding the mind in the same way that objective things 
 seem to surround it, or, in fact, as surrounding it at all. lie 
 has no righl to make use of Spacial externality, fur lie denies of 
 it more than apparent existence; QOT "I' temporal externality, 
 for he all< ws no time to noumena. There is a kind of ex- 
 ternality which he may better employ. Love IS external 1 
 hate; pain, to pleasure; belief, to disbelief : lei him think that 
 in something like the same manner, "The Unknowable n is 
 externa] to the mind. Bui it' he does this, his conception of 
 correspondence will lade from thought. No: he must, as he 
 doe-, give to "The Unknowable" spacia] and temporal exter- 
 nality. This assimilation of the reality beyond conscdousn 
 to objective appearances, musl necessarily !><• carried much 
 
150 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 further. The alleged correspondence remains to be manifested. 
 It is a correspondence of internal to external activities. But 
 the outward activities cannot be conceived except as activities 
 of some substance, nor except as taking place in space and time. 
 Mr. Spencer's definition of intelligence, then, is realized bv 
 picturing, inter alia, extra-mental substance acting in time and 
 space. What is this but the abstract of all appearances? The 
 second interpretation, as well as the first, makes Mr. Spencer's 
 argument concern appearances, but nothing else. Any attempt 
 to make it concern something else must be futile so long as the 
 something else is beyond our ken; and, to complete the circle, 
 success would be an assimilation of "The Unknowable " to the 
 known — an identification of "The Unknowable" with objec- 
 tive appearances. 
 
 Which of the two interpretations Mr. Spencer would have 
 us put upon his definition, we care not. In his own mind, I 
 think it not unjust to say, there was a confusion of both. He 
 evidently did not remark that it makes a vast difference 
 whether we assert Intelligence to be a mental correspondence 
 with mental affections, or with modifications of the reality 
 outside. Putting phenomena only into the premises, he cer- 
 tainly expected to obtain only noumena in the conclusion. The 
 reason that he and others fail to observe how sophistical is the 
 argument, appears to be that when following it in thought they 
 identify external appearances with the reality which is to be 
 proved unknowable. That doing this should not be perceived 
 to conflict with the conclusion, I cannot explain. 
 
 § 51. For the purpose of further testing Mr. Spencer's 
 reasoning, let us lose sight of the distinction which he has not 
 observed, while we entertain the reflections which are to follow. 
 
 Cognizance of things in themselves is, in many eases at 
 least, resolvable into relations in consciousness parallel to rela- 
 tions in the environment. If this is so, Mr. Spencer's definition 
 is as agreeable to our views as to his own. And is it not so? 
 The correspondence asserted between internal and external 
 relations is merely such an adaptation of internal modes to 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 151 
 
 external influences as is promotive of life. When internal 
 relations are such that external relations preventive of life are 
 counterbalanced, and external relations promotive of life are 
 taken advantage of, the correspondence is said to exist. An 
 internal relation through which an external relation is properly 
 met, either co-operatively or adversely, by internal activity, 
 corresponds to such external relation. Now, the knowledge 
 that a harmless must be followed by a harmful external mode, 
 contains a relation that will prompt an avoidance of the first to 
 escape the baneful effect of the second. The relation between 
 the ideas of the two modes corresponds to the relation between 
 the mode-. And this can be none the less true if the ideas are 
 genuine representations. Knowledge of things certainly should 
 lead as t<> respond to their relations as intelligently as knowl- 
 edge of merely their effects. AVe have reason to consider 
 cognitions of things in themselves to be the most valuable 
 links in that chain of internal causation which best answers 
 to the chain of external causation. 
 
 Mr. Spencer has -aid nothing antagonistic to this except that, 
 a knowledge of externalities would be no more useful than an 
 acquaintance with nothing more than the co-existences and 
 Bequences of their internal correlatives. lie does not deny the 
 former kind of comprehension to be at least as useful a- the 
 latter; which is a fact of some significance. To the assertion 
 that, given the knowledge which he allows, there i- no need 
 for the knowledge which he denies, the first reply i-, that a 
 converse assertion would put him to proof that possession of 
 absolute knowledge would not obviate the necessity for a large 
 quantity of relative knowledge otherwise Invaluable, The 
 second reply is that nature d<.<^ not usually choose a Bingle 
 course; that among her ways and means there are many super- 
 numeraries. Co-existences and sequences of mental effects are 
 doubtless at one stage of it- development all, or nearly all, the 
 data intelligence ha- by which to guide it- conduct in relation 
 to the nniverse beyond; but this is evidence that Evolution. 
 which is a universal advancement, has brought us into possession 
 of a better guide. 
 
152 THE DEDUCTIVE AKGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer has advanced the dogma that an under- 
 standing of the nature of things is not a better guide. Proof 
 before assertion is in order. What proof is possible? None, 
 so long as things in themselves are inscrutable. While, how- 
 ever, no proof is possible, much is demandable. It must be 
 shown that internal to "The Unknowable" the same anteced- 
 ents are followed by the same consequents, and that the same 
 agencies outside of consciousness always work the same effects 
 within. This is not necessarily true, if "The Unknowable" 
 be unconditioned, or if it be absolutely unrestricted in potenti- 
 ality. With proof in regard to externalities, there 
 must come proof in regard to internalities. It must be shown 
 that conceptions built of co-existences and sequences form as 
 good symbols as would true ideas of things. I think this can- 
 not be shown because the contrary is true. The representation 
 of a thing as it is, would enable us to lay aside many of its 
 relations to other things; whereas, in as far as ideas deviate 
 from genuineness, they are involved with relations which, being 
 numerous, are cumbersome. Qualities of things are relatively 
 simple in comparison with their important co-existences and 
 sequences. Symbols which are easiest to frame, which can co- 
 exist in the mind in the greatest number and diversity, which 
 are most readily separated and combined, are the best. They 
 render truth obtainable by shortest process, and they bring 
 within our reach truth which, but for their perfection, would 
 be inaccessible. But waiving the question of superiority, sym- 
 bols resembling things are, if we have the capacity for con- 
 structing them, capable of being developed by fewer experiences 
 than symbols not resembling things. The difference is between 
 a mere construction, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
 preparing the materials and doing the work. How well is 
 this exemplified in the case of our fellow beings. If I had no 
 true realization of another's emotions, but depended upon their 
 sensible manifestations for my knowledge of how to act in relation 
 to them, more experience than I could ever have would be 
 required to keep me out of errors which I constantly avoid. 
 That a word should produce a blow, would be an inexplicable 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 153 
 
 mystery to me. Experiences sufficient, to teach me so little as 
 an understanding of what words are likely to call forth blows, 
 would be so multitudinous as to overwhelm any mind with 
 confusion. It cannot be improbable that in other cases simi- 
 larities, and capabilities of similarity, between internalities and 
 externalities, greatly advance the development of symbols. 
 Improbable or not, likeness of thoughts to tilings would 
 be a blessing; its impossibility, a curse: and this is the 
 reverse of what Mr. Spencer is secondarily called upon to 
 prove. To proof he must add disproof. Some 
 
 troublesome facts are for him to explain away. Pie should 
 not be unmindful that mankind is, and long has been, 
 Struggling to comprehend the great Noumenon. In the effort 
 we recognize a kind of life. This should correspond with 
 Life's conditions, and, if to be ultimately successful, certainly 
 does so. Success would make an end of unsuccessful effort; 
 which is the benefit Mr. Spencer is striving to confer. It 
 would do far more. Though fruitless effort may develop, 
 fruitful effort develops most. Perpetual defeat would drive 
 noble minds disheartened from the field of speculation; slight 
 success would encourage them to try new conquests. There is 
 exultation in propitious search for truth; and, could it ever 
 exhaust reality, it would leave us with a valuable acquisition. 
 "Man shall not live by bread alone." Mental food exhilarates 
 the mind, prolonging life. Truth is a possession in which 
 [. is a perpetual delight independent of its usefulness, being 
 in strictness a most useful product. It does seem, therefore, that 
 a comprehension of things beyond the ego would answer 
 urgenl requirements of life. 
 
 Were absolute knowledge incapable of being brought under 
 
 Mi*. Spencer's definition of life, and were it entirely a super- 
 fluity, it might -till be classed with a kind of life to which the 
 
 definition does not extend. Life varies from COITespondi D 
 
 far ;i- to he in Borne cases absolute Don-correspondence, No 
 one can deny this who recognizee an effort to grasp the «-\t« rnal, 
 and endeavors to dissuade us from it. Numerous other illus- 
 trations might be mentioned. The struggles of one assailed, to 
 
154 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 evade the assassin's steel, are no more a part of life than are 
 the movements by which a suicide severs his j ugular vein. Since, 
 therefore, life presents all degrees from correspondence to non- 
 correspondence, it was not imperative to show that absolute 
 knowledge comes within Mr. Spencer's 'definition of life, or is 
 fitted to respond to life's necessities. Though it be unquestion- 
 able that the correspondence promotive of life could be as well, 
 or even better, carried on without absolute knowledge, such 
 knowledge may nevertheless be a kind of intellectual life. 
 
 § 52. Here must be entered an important complaint against 
 the definition of life advanced by the author. The definition 
 is, at best, only proximate. For many purposes it is very 
 available; for our purposes, far too narrow. In Kfe we find 
 correspondence of internal to external relations; but this very 
 assertion implies that we find more. Correspondence of in- 
 ternal relations to relations that are external, involves also an 
 internal correspondence to the connections between these two 
 sets of relations — that is, with the relations between externalities 
 and internalities. A correspondence more important 
 
 than this kind has been slighted. I mean the correspondence 
 of internal relations to internal relations. Is not consciousness 
 itself to be considered when the problem is what will best conduce 
 to its own welfare? Does not correspondence with the same 
 external objects vary according to the nature of the life for 
 whose benefit the correspondence exists? Does not the mind 
 often banish thoughts which tend to disturb it; and otherwise 
 perform operations which have no relevancy to things outside, 
 or, at least, have preponderating relevancy to things within? 
 Supposing that these questions carry satisfactory answers, we 
 pass to a third defect in the definition. The correspon- 
 
 dence which life exhibits, is not merely between relations, but 
 between things. Relations must have terms. If these terms, 
 in some instances, be themselves relations, they still imply ulti- 
 mate terms which are not relations. All relations take every 
 vestige of their natures from the natures of these ultimate 
 terms. A correspondence, therefore, of relations to relations, 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 155 
 
 is fundamentally a correspondence of things to things. Xo 
 doubt can be entertained that Mr. Spencer conceives life to be 
 in reality a correspondence of the latter kind ; but he does not 
 always reason in conformity with such view. He admits 
 (Prin. of Biology, § 30) that to say that his definition includes 
 "those structural arrangements which enable the organism to 
 adapt its actions to actions in the environment, may perhaps be 
 going too far;" and he must admit that it is going too far to 
 say that the definition includes those forms of consciousness 
 which compose the structure and sustain the relations of 
 thought. There is a way of avoiding the three faults 
 
 noticed; namely, by saying that life manifests an effort to 
 correspond with the conditions to which it is subject. Then, 
 besides external relations, we include those of which one term 
 is internal, and those of which both terms are internal. Then, 
 besides relations, we include things. 
 
 To what purpose the correction is made, will be appreciated 
 if the reader will once more reflect that absolute knowledge of 
 anything would constitute a link in the chain of correspondence 
 to it. Knowledge of connections between external and internal 
 conditions, would facilitate correspondence to such connections; 
 and the like may be said with regard to conditions purely in- 
 ternal. In short: a knowledge of all the conditions, both 
 without and within, to which we are Subject, would i'all under 
 a proper description of the correspondence of life. Absolute 
 
 knowledge of the subject proves to be, as well as absolute 
 
 knowledge of the object, a kind of correspondence well fitted 
 for life's requirements. 
 
 To what purpose the correction IS made, may he better 
 
 appreciated by bringing it to bear upon the assertion, that 
 "thinking being relationing, no thought can ever express more 
 than relation-." The sounder doctrine i- that thinking being 
 relationing of things, expresses things as well a- th< ir relations 
 — expresses, besides co-existences and sequences, the things 
 which co-exist with and follow one another. States <>f mind are 
 known in consciousness. If this is nut too obvious t.» require 
 proof, it can be established by adverting to the truism, sometimes 
 
156 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 
 
 employed by the author, that consciousness of relation implies 
 consciousness of both its terms. But states are things, not rela- 
 tions: if expressed in consciousness, more than relations are 
 there expressed. Suppose the internal things expressed tell us 
 of external things: then external things are expressed in thought. 
 Knowledge of things, as well as knowledge of relations, would 
 fall properly under a description of life's correspondences. 
 
 § 53. Once more we shall turn to Mr. Spencer's definition 
 to find fault with it. After the corrections which were found 
 necessary, life would be defined as the correspondence of internal 
 conditions to conditions both external and internal. But 
 the definition still calls up a very erroneous conception of life. 
 When we view life, its correspondences are very conspicuous; 
 but we cannot repress the feeling that life essentially consists of 
 more than correspondence. The end of the correspondence is 
 to perpetuate life. Plow differently it sounds to say that the 
 end of the correspondence is to perpetuate the correspondence. 
 It is not the correspondence which is to be perpetuated. That 
 which is to be perpetuated is some form, some activity, which 
 struggles to persist; the correspondence is only ancillary. What 
 the essence of life is, what in every case distinguishes that mode 
 of existence which forms the beneficiary term of the corre- 
 spondence, I shall not surmise; but I will remark that among 
 its manifestations are considerable self-preservation, a repug- 
 nance to loss of identity by deterioration, a tendency to attain 
 higher forms. In these interests correspondence is employed ; to 
 these interests it is subservient. In as far as knowledge of things 
 is not resolvable into correspondence, it may be one of those 
 higher modes of life which it is the function of correspondence 
 to produce and to prolong. As all life is not correspondence, 
 something not correspondence may be a mode of life. 
 
 § 54. So many ways of depriving Mr. Spencer of his de- 
 duction have been discovered tliat a recapitulation will not be 
 amiss. From a definition which expresses nothing but phe- 
 nomena, the deduction cannot be drawn, because it is to concern 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 157 
 
 noumena. It cannot be drawn from the natures of noumena. 
 
 because they are professedly inscrutable. Aside from this 
 fundamental difficulty, are considerations equally conclusive. 
 Absolute knowledge may be brought under the definition 
 supposed to preclude it. Instead of being superfluous, it is 
 Indispensable. Had we found it as unlike correspondence as 
 non-correspondence is, there would have been no difficulty in 
 finding modes of life with which to class it. Upon unavoidable 
 correction, we learned that the definition extends to absolute 
 knowledge of the subject as well as the object; and that it 
 covers a knowledge of things no less than relations. Lastly, 
 it appeared that correspondence is not life, but for life — that 
 there is something in life worth preserving besides correspond- 
 ence; and it was intimated that absolute knowledge might be 
 claimed to fall to some extent under this description. 
 
158 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Deductive Arguments Concluded. 
 
 The Power of Thought to Transcend Consciousness. 
 
 § 55. How can the mind have cognizance of what lies 
 beyond its confines? is a question which has doubtless at many 
 points presented itself to the reader, awakening in him a sus- 
 picion that Mr. Spencer's conclusion must be valid, though his 
 arguments be void. The difficulty of imagining the process 
 by which thought can deal with objects outside of consciousness, 
 often has been, and often will be, the potent reason for rejecting 
 Realism. Of this difficulty Mr. Spencer does not fail to take 
 advantage. The advantage, though indirect, is great. It is 
 advantage issuing from constant suggestion of the difficulty. 
 The difficulty is suggested by mere expression of the nescience 
 theory, and by all the arguments in its behalf; particularly by 
 the deductive arguments, and most particularly by the deduc- 
 tive argument last under consideration. Independent of its 
 suggestiveness, there is little power of conviction in such an 
 argument as the following. " If every act of knowing is the 
 formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in 
 the environment, then the relativity of knowledge is self-evi- 
 dent — becomes indeed a truism." When this is understood to 
 mean that "thinking; being; relationing, no thought can ever 
 express more than relations," it is easy to refute by pointing 
 out that, as relations imply terms, terms, no less than relations, 
 are expressed in thought. But there is difficulty in dis- 
 abusing the mind of the impression which the argument 
 raises, that thought taking place wholly within consciousness, 
 cannot, for this reason, transcend consciousness. To prove this 
 a false impression — to show the possibility of realizing the 
 external, is the object of the present chapter. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 159 
 
 § 56. The mystery seems to be that the thought should ex- 
 press more thau the thought contaius. By those who propound 
 it as destructive of Realism, it is overlooked that a like mystery 
 is presented in every act of memory or anticipation. What I 
 experienced yesterday, and what I will experience to-morrow, 
 are present in thought, though absent in reality. It is the same 
 with all imagination ; it is the same with all conception. Concede 
 that a thought may express more than itself, or believe nothing 
 that you do not find in present consciousness; for only when 
 conscious of a thing, are the thing and the thought the same. 
 
 No better than the Realist, can Mr. Spencer escape the 
 problem of how thought can transcend consciousness. He 
 divides -tares of consciousness into two orders — the subjective 
 order, and the objective order; the latter being what the Realist 
 is said to mistake for things beyond the mind. But observe 
 the implication: knowledge of the objective order, both pre- 
 sentative and representative, belongs to the subjective order — ■ 
 lie- outside, we might say this side, of the order distinguished 
 as objective, Thought, then, does transcend the consciou>ne>s 
 of which it consists, and the question remains — How? 
 
 The concession which, in view of these considerations, all 
 must make, amounts to this: that no <i priori improbability 
 that a fact can be construed in thought, arises from the circum- 
 stance that it is external to thought. 
 
 § 57. Catholicity of a belief is much in its favor. It is doI 
 everything; it may not always be sufficient \ it may sometimes 
 be overcome by contravening circumstances ; yd it is much, very 
 much. Our author .-ays that "the convictions entertained by 
 
 many mind- in eonmion are the mo.-t Likely t<> have BOme 
 
 foundation." (Firsl IVin., ^ 1.) What belief is nearer uni- 
 versal than that things external to the mind are cognizable by it '.' 
 All persons during a considerable portion of life, raoel through- 
 out Life, never think of rejecting it; and, from the actions of 
 inferior animals, it is evident thai they possess it t<>". 
 
 Spontaneity, no Less than catholicity, is significant With 
 metaphysicians Mr. Spencer finds great fault, because they rely 
 
160 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 more on long chains of reasoning than upon a single link. 
 Very justly he charges them with employing extended ratiocina- 
 tion to abolish intuition. Would that he had avoided their 
 error. Belief in knowledge of things extra-mental is assuredly 
 an intuition. How inferior would have been its claims, if it 
 had been the tardy product of reasoning as elaborate as that 
 which is expected to drive it from our minds. Had it been 
 such, we would have been reminded that the farther a belief 
 varies from a pure intuition the less reliance should be placed 
 upon it. I cannot insist on this as an invariable rule, but 
 only on its applicability to the particular case in which we 
 are now interested. Did Mr. Spencer's reasoning contain con- 
 tiguous intuitions, it would, as a whole, be no weaker than the 
 weakest; and might, because of convergence, be much stronger. 
 But there is a presumption to the contrary difficult to rebut. 
 In the very extended process of reasoning in question, error 
 may have crept in through misinterpretation of intuitions, 
 through the suppression of intuitions, through the introduction 
 of something not intuitional. Where there were the most 
 errors to be avoided, there is the greatest likelihood that some 
 have been committed. We have witnessed many indications 
 that a host of aberrations would be driven from philosophy, if 
 each of the many judgments forming the basis of Agnosticism 
 should be subjected to as severe a test as that which Mr. Spen- 
 cer has applied to the single judgment which forms the basis of 
 Realism. A general deficiency must be particularly remarked. 
 What, in his arguments, Mr. Spencer would claim as intuitions, 
 are in many instances exceedingly lacking in spontaneity. It 
 requires an effort of the mind to produce them, instead (as in 
 the case of the conviction they are supposed to exclude) of an 
 unavailing effort to suppress. So much more likely is it that 
 some of them are not intuitions ; so much more likely is it that 
 error accompanies them if they are. The product of the pro- 
 cess is more lacking in spontaneity than any step of the process 
 itself. Mr. Spencer's arguments, where they produce conviction, 
 do not leave such a powerful belief as the one they are intended 
 to remove. The conditions of the latter being presented, it 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 161 
 
 wells up in consciousness with a power that is irresistible The 
 conditions of the former — that is, the fullest realization of 
 Mr. Spencer's arguments — being presented, it conies, when it 
 does come, the ghost of a belief which the mere crowimr of a 
 cock will dispel like other phantoms. I will not say that 
 Mr. Spencer even endeavored to raise his peculiar nescience 
 doctrine to the status of an intuition. All that I dwell upon 
 i- the probability that he ha- not done so. But if he ha-, he 
 has done no more for his cause than nature had already done 
 for ours. 
 
 These arguments from catholicity and spontaneity are very 
 important. If they were not so clearly and firmly grasped by 
 the mind as to find concise statement, they would receive more 
 consfderation than has been, or is likely to be, devoted to them. 
 Their very strength is the cause of their usual argumentative 
 inefficiency. Mr. Spencer has not given to them that attention 
 which their importance calls for. By drawing a distinction, he 
 thinks to dispose of them. The existence of an external reality 
 he admit- we know; more of it than it> existence he contends 
 we do not know. The intuition of something external i- to be 
 relied on as far a- it i- an intuition of existence, and no 
 farther. VThere is the justification of the distinction? It is 
 not to be found in any want of persistence in the rejected 
 elements of the intuition. As strenuously as "common 
 asserts the existence of a reality," i\<n- it a— en other attributes 
 of tin- reality — its spaciaJ extension, for instance. It i- a- 
 easy to banish the reality from the mind, a- n<>t t<> think of 
 it a- spacially extended. We can go further towards con- 
 ceiving impressions as produced within the subject by the 
 subject, than towards conceiving the subject a- not surrounded 
 by space. The verdict, or rather the testimony, of common 
 sense is not in favor of Mr. Spencer's views. It derides that 
 something exists, and partially how it i 
 the weight of its authority, so great is it- opposition n> Trans- 
 figured Realism. Every portion of the verdict is spontaneous 
 and catholic This consideration i- urged, i:"t a- one that i- 
 
 decisive, but as one that i- vr\ 
 
 ii 
 
162 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 § 58. That there is some kind of process by which the 
 mind can take cognizance of more than itself, is clearly asserted 
 by declaring that the existence of something absolutely exter- 
 nal is cognizable. When once it is conceded that the mind can 
 look out beyond itself and discern existence, the cry that it is 
 impossible for intelligence to contemplate other qualities, merely 
 because they are external to it, must be hushed. " Thinking 
 being relationing, no thought can ever express more than rela- 
 tions/ 7 says the author. How is it with the thought of external 
 existence? If this expresses no more than relation, why call 
 the thought of qualities other than existence illusive, even if it 
 does express no more than relation? The fact, however, is 
 that the thought of noumenal existence expresses more than 
 this ; for existence is neither a relation nor an aggregate of rela- 
 tions. There is, therefore, no absurdity in the belief that thought 
 expresses other external things which are not resolvable into re- 
 lations. When Mr. Spencer professed to know that " The Un- 
 knowable" exists, he destroyed the argument from its externality. 
 
 In light of these remarks, the implications commented on in 
 Chapter II. are seen to have an importance which did not there 
 appear. The whole inductive argument is based on the sup- 
 position that things in themselves are congruous. By what 
 power of thought is extra-mental congruity ascertained and 
 realized? Whatever the power it matters not: it is of the kind 
 whose possibility is here contended for. Looking out beyond 
 itself, intelligence sees, besides existence, congruity; and con- 
 gruity of the external can be realized only by means of some 
 modification of thought which expresses more than the in- 
 ternal. One deductive argument rests on the postulate 
 that "The Unknowable" is unconditioned. The use of this 
 argument is an assertion in still another form that there is a 
 process by which intelligence brings externalities within its 
 ken; that there is a mode of thought that expresses reality 
 beyond. The mind's ability to look out beyond itself and 
 perceive unconditionally, is, if real, the power of thought to 
 transcend consciousness. In the attempted deduction 
 from the nature of life, the same intellectual feat is affirmed. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 163 
 
 An evidence that "The Unknowable" is unknowable, was 
 thought to be that it is the mind's environment. Looking out- 
 ward, the mind observes that something lies outside around 
 about it. The process by which it sees so much, is one truly 
 analogous to seeing; one by which intellectual sight is brought 
 to bear upon external things. That external reality is 
 
 a universal cause, is a proposition, on the truth of which an 
 important argument depends. The amount of knowledge of 
 the external which this implies is very considerable. Looking 
 beyond the mind, something is perceived to be the cause of all 
 that is external, and of all impressions of externality. Look- 
 ing back of the mind, the same thing is seen to underlie and 
 support all states of consciousness. Truly, then, the mind is 
 believed to by some process obtain, and by some mode express, 
 more fact than is contained within itself. Even the 
 
 belief that noumena are unknowable, is an assertion that mind 
 can contemplate more than mental affections. Viewed in one 
 Light, onknowableness is the inability of something to assume 
 Buch a character that our faculties for knowing can be brought 
 to bear upon it. If we know this of noumena, we know what 
 is not in consciousness. , After what has been said, all 
 
 of Mr. Spencer's persuasion must allow- that intelligence i- of 
 such a nature that it can transcend relation- in eonscioufi 
 fbr the knowledge which their theory assumes i- not confined 
 to such relation-. Farewell, then, t<> the deduction from the 
 nature of life; farewell to any argument from externality. 
 
 We must not overlook the most conspicuous and Important In- 
 stance in which the intellect is believed by all n» grasp more than 
 the internal. Any one who agrees or disagrees with my views 
 concerning knowledge, does bo on tin' supposition that, in what 
 is to him the environment, are mind- essentially like big ,,\ Vr ,. 
 It' the Gad is otherwise, he may indeed trace the limit- of his 
 own intellectual capabilities; but in no case can he, without 
 penetrating his environment, set a limit t<> the capabiliti 
 other intelligence. It i- not n> be supposed, however, thai any 
 one will be perverse enough to deny that hi- environment eon- 
 tains mind- similar to hi- own. Mr. Spencer in part ieular 
 
164 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 cannot deny it; for his theory of nescience is a theory 
 concerning all minds, and was published for the instruction of 
 human minds that they might learn their essential impotence. 
 "With what credibility, then, comes the assertion that no mind 
 can perform the operation of intellection with respect to aught 
 beyond relations within itself. With less than none; since the 
 assertion implies that the operation has already been performed. 
 
 Glad to extend this confutation to all forms of anti-Realism, 
 and not unwilling to give further evidence of Mr. Spencer's 
 conviction that to transcend consciousness is to some extent pos- 
 sible, I cite the following. " Among the many contradictions 
 which anti-Realistic hypotheses involve, is the contradiction 
 between the assertion that consciousness cannot be transcended 
 and the assertion that there exists nothing beyond consciousness. 
 For if we can in no way be aware of anything beyond con- 
 sciousness, what can suggest either the affirmation or the denial 
 of it? and how can even denial of it be framed in thought? 
 The very proposition that consciousness cannot be transcended 
 admits of being put together only by representing a limit, and 
 consequently implies some kind of consciousness of something 
 beyond the limit." (Prin. of Psy., § 442.) 
 
 From all orders of philosophers, it seems, may be wrung the 
 admission, implied when not expressed, that cognizance of ex- 
 ternality in some shape or manner is a fact. Whoever makes 
 the admission thereby deprives himself of the argument that 
 there is or may be something which cannot be known, because 
 to know it would be to transcend consciousness. 
 
 § 59. Several separate arguments, ranging from strong to irre- 
 sistible, converge in the doctrine that knowledge of the mind's 
 environment is not a psychological impossibility. How the 
 mind can, as we say, grasp that which is not contained within 
 itself is still a mystery; but that it does so has been shown to be 
 ad mitted. By Mr. Spencer the mystery is accepted as a fact, with- 
 out an explanation. An explanation of the mystery he cannot, 
 therefore, require of us. As, however, it would greatly 
 strengthen Realism, a solution shall be attempted. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 165 
 
 § 60. The Philosophy of The Unknowable presents many 
 aspects. Some are but slightly intimated here and then 
 Mr. Spencer, and some can scarcely be said to be intimated at 
 all. Each aspect has implications peculiar to itself, which, if 
 definitely wrought out, would terminate in a vindication of 
 Realism. One such aspect is to be here applied to our pui 
 Mr. Spencer is favorable to the doctrine, "that it is alike our 
 highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through 
 which all things exist as Tin* Unknowable." (First Prim. ^ 31. ) 
 By Buch expressions, often repeated, he trie- to impress on us 
 the propriety of contemplating "The Unknowable" a- "the 
 Cause of all things." Suppose we follow his direction. The 
 Cause of all things produced mint}. Plow are we t<» conceive 
 this? Undoubtedly as Mr. Spencer in fact conceives it: pre- 
 viously there existed an active substance, which occupied -pace 
 and consumed time; from certain activities of this substance, 
 resulted certain modes called states of mind. The conception 
 is fundamentally like that of Materialism, and that of extreme 
 Spiritualism. Each of the three theories postulates a funda- 
 mental something, and regards states of mind as among its 
 modes. From this point there is divergence. These evolved 
 modes Mr. Spencer proposes to consider t<> be, excepting in 
 respect of the quality of existence, absolutely unlike any other 
 modes of that of which they are mud.-. There never was a 
 arranted presumption. At hand there is Che means <»t" 
 driving him from it. Not enlarging upon the probabilities «•<" 
 
 accidental similarity, it ifl certain that that which is a mode i^ 
 
 essentially like anything else whicb is a mode. The hi 
 
 must be still greater where the compared modes are i I< - of 
 
 the same thing. There are, therefore, Mr. Spencer being wit- 
 ness, similarities between mind and not-mind. 
 
 Bui this conclusion, from which there is for Mr. Spencer do 
 complete escapei is one thai be will oo4 accept In hi- work 
 on Psychology (§§77—95) he devotes two chapters to the 
 prop- .-it i<-n that feelings and the relations between feelings are 
 qualitatively and quantitatively absolutely unlike thin- I 
 relations between things. Tu<> considerations operate in 
 
166 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 of a brief attempt at refutation: one, that unlikeness of 
 thoughts to things is not to the majority the equivalent of the 
 latter's unknowableness ; the other, that the dissertations to be 
 refuted consist (not improperly) in manifold repetition of the 
 same thing. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's proof consists principally in an enumeration 
 of cases in which the same cause produces various effects in 
 consciousness. For example: "The quality and the quantity 
 of the sensation produced by a given amount of a given ex- 
 terual force, vary not only with the structure of the organism, 
 specific and individual, as well as the structure of the part 
 affected, but also with the age, the constitutional state, the state 
 of the part as modified by temperature, circulation, and pre- 
 vious use, and even with the relative motion of subject and 
 object." (Prin. of Psy., § 86.) 
 
 The fundamental fallacy of this kind of reasoning is, of course, 
 that it posits knowledge of that of which all knowledge is denied. 
 But in this particular case, the knowledge presupposed is that 
 the unknown cause is unlike its effects; which is the proposition 
 to be established, and which cannot be realized unless it be 
 untrue. The unlikeness which is presupposed is 
 
 the antithesis between constancy and variability. It is assumed 
 that the cause is constant while the effect varies with subjective 
 conditions; whence it is inferred that the cause and the effect are 
 absolutely unlike. How, it must be asked, may it be ascer- 
 tained that the cause is the same while the effect is different? 
 In no way, it must be answered, unless there is some manner 
 of learning the constancy of the cause. That he assumes 1 the 
 constancy of the cause, Mr. Spencer admits: "the validity 
 of the argument depends wholly on the existence of the com- 
 mon antecedent as something that has remained unchanged 
 while consciousness has been changing." ( Prin. of Psy., § 88. ) 
 He can allege no warrant for such assumption ; since contin- 
 uance of existence (all that he professes to know of noumena) 
 is continuance of existence only — not continuance of any par- 
 ticular state. Persistence of the cause does not amount to 
 persistence of any one of its possible modes. He admits that 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 167 
 
 the cause is capable of activity: "the inference is valid onlv 
 supposing the activity to which these different sensations are 
 referred, is an activity out of ourselves which has not been mod- 
 ified by our own activities." (Prill. Psy., § 88.) Capable of 
 activity, the cause may be supposed to vary with the variations in 
 the effect, unless we know it far enough to be able to decide that it 
 does not. To know so much is as essential as it is fatal to the 
 conclusion sought. What, besides a suicidal begging of the 
 question docs it involve? It will not take us long to 
 
 learn that it involves abolition of the conclusion. The most 
 general, as well as one of the most persistent, of internal effects of 
 an external cause is the idea of such cause. Our warrant for, 
 and our means of, thinking that the cause is constant is the 
 constancy of an idea. This brings us to a dilemma. If we 
 say that the idea and the thing are similar in respect of con- 
 stancy, we must reject the conclusion that there is no resemblance 
 between ideas and things. On the other hand, if we say that 
 the idea and the thing bear no resemblance in respect of con- 
 Btancy; then, since the idea of external being is constant, 
 external being is not constant; which deprives us of the 
 ground- on which the conclusion is founded. Were the con- 
 stancy in question persistence of existence, instead of persistence 
 of mod.-, this consequence mighl be escaped; but in such < 
 th<- conclusion could not be established, since it depends <>n 
 constancy of state in tin- cause answering to inconstancy of 
 state in the effect. Tim- we are led back n> the starting 
 
 point. The argument presupposes knowledge that the cause 
 i- constant in corresponding respects, and in the same degree, as 
 its effects are inconstant. And when we try to think of the 
 cause as thus proved to be unlike it- effects in thought, we find 
 we are proceeding on the assumption thai it i- like one of the 
 mosl important of them; that is, our idea of it. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's failure t<> observe that the idea of a cause 
 must be constant in such wise as we think of the cause as con- 
 stant, introduces t«> as a second order ->!" fallacies. In do 
 instance which has been cited, or could have been cited, i- th< 
 any means <>i' determining that the cause ha- not varied, exo pt 
 
168 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 the fact that its effects present some degree, and a considerable 
 degree, of invariability. Take this example: "when the Sun 
 is seen in the midst of the sky, with none but great angular 
 spaces between it and the horizon, it looks very much less than 
 it does when close to the horizon, where the angular space it 
 subtends is comparable side by side with small angular spaces." 
 (Prin. of Psy., § 90.) Nevertheless we decide that the same 
 cause affects us, merely because there is, on the ivhole, a persist- 
 ence of the same effects. The sun sinks below the horizon and 
 the moon appears : now we may say a different cause affects us, 
 for no other reason than because a set of effects has, on the 
 whole, been altered. It is only by persistence of some effects, 
 of the most important effects, of a cause, that we ascertain the 
 variability of its other effects. Where the effects are entirely 
 different, we assert an entirely different cause. But 
 
 it is not of relatively uniform effects only that invariability is 
 to be predicated. It is to be in some degree predicated of 
 effects liable to great variations. To run through the whole 
 scale of variations relative to its size, the sun must present 
 successively all sizes, and no size. In so far as it is incapable 
 of so great variation it is constant in size. For purposes of 
 present criticism, Mr. Spencer has named instances perhaps 
 better than the last. " Months to the old man appear no longer 
 than weeks to the young man. " (Prin. Psy., § 91. ) "Distances 
 which seemed great to the boy seem moderate to the man ; and 
 buildings once thought to be imposing in height and mass, 
 dwindle into insignificance." (Prin. Psy., § 90.) But do 
 months and weeks appear to the aged without distinction of 
 length? and have they usurped in thought each other's places? 
 Does the distance from earth to some remote celestial orb, so 
 marvelously great to the boy, seem but a step to the man ? Do 
 houses, by acquaintance with larger, lose their height and mass? 
 If these questions are not to be answered affirmatively, and 
 they evidently are not, we find constancy in elements that are 
 variable. A third consideration must be joined to 
 
 the last two. It cannot be denied, as a matter of fact, that 
 effects, liable to variation do not always vary, and that when 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 169 
 
 they do vary they do not always vary as extensively as they 
 mi^ht. In other words, sensations which sometimes change arc 
 sometimes relatively permanent. In this, then, they resemble 
 their causes, — that is, if Mr. Spencer is to be credited. He 
 has, in a very brief and dubious manner, recognized the impli- 
 cation. "Only while all the conditions remain constant," he 
 ventures to say, "is there something like a constant ratio be- 
 tween the physical antecedent and the psychical consequent." 
 (Prin. of Psy., § 78.) Sometimes, then, according to the im- 
 plied admission, there is Likeness between the physical antecedent 
 and the psychical consequent We are glad of the admission, 
 though it has not been consistently acted upon. Like other 
 thinkers, although perhaps least so, Mr. Spencer sometimes 
 considers the mention of a difficulty as a License lor thereafter 
 ignoring it. He, of all, should have the most vivid realization 
 that the very basis of Evolution, and in fact of all scien 
 the persistence of not only the existence, but the quantities and 
 qualities of phenomena. It is a grave question which really 
 preponderates — the dynamics or the statics of the uni- 
 verse. By way of summary, it must now be Baid 
 that in effects which arc almost absolutely constant, in effects 
 which arc not absolutely without constancy, and in effects which 
 mporarily constant, we discern in consciousness the p<— i- 
 bility of a representative correspondence with what \\c believe 
 
 to be without. 
 
 That Mr. Spencer is possessed of a remarkable powei 
 heaping before the mind instances favorable to himself, to the 
 entire concealment of all others, is a remark justified by what 
 has just preceded, and well exemplified by what is now to 
 follow. Mosl of his examples are like the following. "8 
 dons which to others seem strongly contrasted, as red and 
 seem" to some the same. "Vibrations exceeding thirty thou- 
 sand per second, are inaudible through certain ears; while 
 through other em-- thai are, as we may suppose, of somewhat 
 unlike structure, these rapid vibrations are known as an • 
 sively acute sound." "The Bushman is impressible by ch 
 in the held df view which do not impress the European*" 
 
170 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 (Prin. of Psy.,^ 80.) "A whiff of ammonia coming in contact 
 with the eyes, produces a smart; getting into the nostrils, excites 
 the consciousness we describe as an intolerably strong odor; 
 being condensed on the tongue, generates an acrid taste; while 
 ammonia applied in solution to a tender part of the skin makes 
 it burn, as Ave say." "The Sun's rays falling on the hand 
 cause a sensation of heat, but no sensation of light; and falling 
 on the retina cause a sensation of light but no sensation of heat/' 
 "When drinking a liquid the heat of which is quite bearable 
 by that part of the upper lip usually immersed, it may be 
 observed that if the lip is accidentally dipped deeper, so as to 
 immerse a little of the outer skin, a sensation of scalding 
 results." (Prin. of Psy., § 82.) 
 
 Instances like these, following each other in great numbers, 
 are very impressive in fact, while intrinsically they are of little 
 worth. We do not need to be told that Pain and Pleasure are 
 about as unlike their external stimuli as it is possible for any- 
 thing to be. It would have been more in accord with logical 
 requirement to say less about the sensations of Light and Heat; 
 for they are not supposed to be other than very unlike the 
 agencies by which they are wrought upon the mind. That 
 Color, Odor, Taste, and Sound are respectively less like their 
 causes than they are like each other, all are ready to admit. 
 No one thinks of asserting that for every object, and every 
 distinction of objects, outside of consciousness, there must be a 
 representative phase of consciousness: so variations of sensi- 
 bility to things and their distinctions is rather irrelevant. The 
 senses of Touch, Taste, Smell and Hearing, being, for purposes 
 of perception, less used and less perfected than Sight, have 
 furnished by far the more examples; whereas, for the same 
 reason, they should have been by far the less discussed. Simi- 
 larly, secondary qualities have been contemplated almost 
 exclusively; whereas primary qualities are the ones of the most 
 importance. What is the meaning of Mr. Spencer's 
 
 bias of selection? Is it not evidence that primary qualities — 
 the qualities with which we have the most frequent communion, 
 are the best construed in thought? We have already seen that 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 171 
 
 extension is a quality of which he finds it difficult to dispose. 
 Is not his impropriety of choice also evidence that the higher 
 the development of a sense, the more it can reveal of the cause 
 of a sensation? He not only deals with Sight less than the 
 other senses, but, as we have seen, less satisfactorily to him- 
 self. Here must be said, what was not observed before, 
 that while sensations have been the chief objects of consider- 
 ation, ideas and perceptions more than they, and thoughts more 
 than all these are the subjects of contention. The sensation 
 is the nucleus of the idea, and the idea is the nucleus of 
 an indefinite bodv of thought which clusters about it. Taking: 
 the least advantageous examples, we may argue that although a 
 sensation of touch, an odor, a taste, a sound, a color, is dissimilar 
 to its cause, yet the perception of which it is a part is to some ex- 
 tent a genuine representation of externality. In illustration, we 
 may say that the constant reference of color to an extended object 
 seems to point to an association in consciousness arising from 
 some association in fact. The argument we may cany further, 
 by maintaining that this, which is true of perception, is, in a 
 greater degree, true of thought in general. The place which 
 color occupies in the universe of thought, must have some 
 general correspondence with the place its cause occupies in the 
 universe of reality. Again criticism leads us to the conviction 
 that there must be some likeness between the internal and the 
 externa] worlds. 
 
 After the discussion of the List two paragraphs, we arc well 
 prepared to advert to a second fallacy lying at the very base of 
 .Mr. Spencer's reasoning. Of certain relations he says: "as 
 we cannol fix on any one of these relations in obnsciousn 
 rather than any other, a- like the reality beyond consciousness, 
 we must infer that there is no likeness between any one of them 
 
 and the reality beyond consciousness." | I'rin. of Pay, § '.'L'. ) 
 
 This mode of reasoning is not confined to relations. Though 
 nut throughout expressed, it is throughout i : 1 1 ( » ! i < •« 1 , thai becaue • 
 we cannol fix upon any of a set of subjective effects a- like 
 their common cause, we may he assured thai do one of th< 
 
 is like it. Because we do not know which object in a room is 
 
172 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 most like that which wrought them, no one is most like it, no 
 one is more like it, no one is at all like it. The weakness of 
 such an argument is too great to excuse further comment. 
 
 We must return to an assumption which was passed without 
 notice. It is not true that we cannot fix upon one mental im- 
 pression as more than another like that which makes them. 
 Differences in degrees of persistence in thought signify like 
 differences of degrees of correspondence. Primary qualities 
 are more persistent in thought than secondary ones; impres- 
 sions through higher sense, more persistent than impressions 
 through lower sense. Notions are more persistent than the 
 experiences which evolve them ; and propositions, more persist- 
 ent than the notions which converge to form them. That 
 which, as a representation, has the most persistence, is doubtless 
 the best representation. We must then presume that if non- 
 persistent representations are unlike things, persistent represen- 
 tations are less so. Besides this distinction between 
 the least and the most variable modes of representative con- 
 sciousness, we have to note a distinction between the different 
 states of the latter — of the most variable modes. If these are 
 continually vacillating between wide extremes, they are likely 
 to represent more truly the nearer they approach the mean. 
 Being in the extreme states unlike the represented reality, they 
 should, in the mean state, be less unlike it. This is the state 
 which they are constantly drawn towards; which is merely 
 saying that it is the most persistent. 
 
 The force of some of Mr. Spencer's examples is capable of 
 being explained away. This for instance. "Take two objects 
 sufficiently far apart to give standing room between them. 
 Having contemplated their relation of position from a distance, 
 contemplate it afresh, after having so placed the body that one 
 of them is in front and one of them is behind. It will be found 
 that what is conceived as a single relation in the one case cannot 
 be so conceived in the other." (Prin. Psy., § 90.) The change 
 in the contemplation is so very slight that, without much 
 detriment, all that it can be held to imply might be conceded: 
 a fact well illustrating the constancy of visual ideas. But the 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 173 
 
 concession, if made, would be a pure gratuity. It should not, 
 as it is likely to, be forgotten that, whereas before the objects 
 were the extremes of a simple relation, now they are, as they 
 seem to be, the extremes of a relation whose menu is self. 
 Change in the effect seems, in this case, to answer to change in 
 the cause. Take another. " The facts that the co- 
 
 existent positions forming a circle become to perception an 
 ellipse when viewed obliquely, and a straight line when viewed 
 edgeways, illustrate the truth that compound relations of Co- 
 existence undergo a species of qualitative variation as the place 
 of the percipient varies." (Prin. Psy., § 90.) Suppose the 
 facts otherwise. Suppose the hoop, which a child is rolling 
 past, did not appear as it recedes first an ellipse, and at last very 
 like a line, but still continued circular. In such case we should 
 be compelled to decide that what we seem to see is not what we 
 really see: the phenomenon would be a splendid exemplification 
 of Mr. Spencer's views. What is the explanation of the contra- 
 diction that has so unexpectedly arisen? In the first place the 
 hoop does not, as Mr. Spencer thinks, "become to perception" 
 anything different from what it was at first: a fact showing how 
 much more stable perceptions are than sensations. Moreover 
 when looking upon a circle obliquely, it is usually perceived to he 
 circular: usually an effort of the mind is required to make it look 
 like an ellipse. Perception makes allowance for deviations of 
 sensation. But the real explanation is that the circle has many 
 aspects. That which affects us when we see the circle i- nol 
 that which affects us when we see the line. It i< for this reason 
 that if it should seem to present a circle when the circular -Me 
 is turned away, we should be deluded. The growing, and at 
 la- 1 complete, coincidence of certain lines, drawn in imagination 
 from the extremities of the object to the point of sensation, is 
 a- real as it is apparent. There may be in the phenomenon a 
 liability to delusiveness, jusi as a stump i- Liable t<» be mistaken 
 for a highwayman j bul it isnoi essentially, nor even commonly, 
 delusive. All in all, the example is far more repugnant, than 
 favorable, to the views of .Mr. Spencer. They who 
 
 mos1 accord consequence t«> relativity to self, are continually 
 
174 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 acting on the supposition that it is not a fact but a delusion. 
 We have lately found Mr. Spencer reasoning as though an 
 object should remain absolutely the same to cognition, while 
 its relation thereto undergoes great change. Here is the same , 
 error in another form. "Animals having great locomotive 
 powers are not likely to have the same conceptions of given 
 spaces as animals whose locomotive powers are very small. To 
 a creature so constructed that its experiences of the larger spaces 
 around have been gained by long and quick bounds, distances can 
 scarcely present the aspects they do to a creature which traverses 
 them by slow and many steps." (Prin. of Psy., § 90.) In 
 common speech the propriety of this discrepancy of estimation 
 is recognized by such sayings as that a distance which is short 
 to an antelope is long to a snail. It is a fact, as well as an 
 impression, that, though the distance, abstractly viewed, does 
 not vary, its relations to different things are various. A short 
 distance bears very much the same relation to the snail, as a 
 long distance does to the antelope. If a foot should seem 
 longer than a yard to the one, and a yard should seem shorter 
 than a foot to the other, both would be deluded ; but as it is, 
 neither is in error. With this example may be 
 
 classed another. "A grain and half-a-grain are hardly dis- 
 tinguishable by their pressures on the finger; but if successively 
 borne by an animal not more than a grain in weight, a difference 
 divisible into many degrees would doubtless be perceptible be- 
 tween them. Conversely a man cannot perceive the contrast 
 in weight between a ton and half-a-ton, for he fails to put forth 
 a force sufficient to lift either; but it can scarcely be questioned 
 that in the consciousness of an elephant, now loaded with one 
 and now with the other, the feelings produced would have an 
 unlikeness that might be graduated." ( Prin. Psy., § 92. ) The 
 explanation is in both cases very simple. Relatively to their 
 strength, there is to a tiny animal more difference between sus- 
 taining a grain and half-a-grain than there is to a human 
 creature. It is absolutely true that one puts forth more effort 
 than the other. Similarly, and more obviously, to the unavail- 
 ing effort of the man, the ton and the half-ton which he tries 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CCOs'CLLDED. 175 
 
 to lift bear the same relation, while they bear different relations 
 to the exertions of the elephant. In neither of the cases is the 
 variance a delusion. Criticism has been necessary to 
 
 turn the foregoing illustrations against the author; but there 
 are some so manifestly adverse to him that it is difficult to 
 understand how he mistook their tendency. This is one. "A 
 greater chill is felt by those who, instead of standing still, are 
 exposed in a carriage to the 'wind of their own speed.'" | Prin. 
 of 1\\\, $ 84.) I do not know whether it is or is not necessary 
 to point to the fact that, in this instance, the intensity of the 
 effect varies in exact proportion to the varying intensity of 
 the cause. Again we find, as Ave have so frequently found before, 
 evidence of likeness between extra-mental things and their 
 mental representatives. 
 
 It may have occurred to the reader, that Mr. Spencer's error 
 is that of one who adopts an extreme position. Certain it is 
 that had he contented himself with the thesis, that there is a 
 great, instead of an absolute, unlikeness of nature between mind 
 and not-mind, he would not be amenable to mosl of the 
 criticisms made and to be made. But such moderation of view 
 was not congenial to him; and the consequence is thai lie has 
 carried his reasonings to an extremity that is surprising. If 
 hifl obligation to do so had occurred to him, he would probably 
 have tried t<» show thai there is beyond consciousness nothing 
 answering to the abstractions, "things" and "attributes." My 
 
 reason for thinking this is th;it he has attempted to do a- much 
 
 in the case of relations. The relations with which he concerns 
 himself are relations of co-existence, relations of sequence, and 
 relations of difference. ( )f these he questions as follow -. " lint 
 now what are we to say about the pure relations of' tence, 
 
 of Sequence, and of Difference; considered apart from amounts 
 of Space, of Time, and of Contrast? ('an we say that the 
 relation of Co-existence, conceived Bimply a- implying two 
 terms that exist at the same time, but are doI specified in their 
 relative positions, ha- anything answering t<» it beyond con- 
 sciousness? Can we say that oul of ourselves there is such a 
 thing a- Succession, corresponding \<> the conception we have 
 
176 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 of one thing coming after another, without reference to the time 
 between them? And can we say that what we know as Differ- 
 ence, apart from any particular degree of it, has objective un- 
 likeness as its cause ?" In answer to these questions, he says: 
 "The reply is that we cannot frame ideas of Co-existence, of 
 Sequence, and of Difference, without there entering into them 
 ideas of quantity. • • • • Co-existence cannot be thought of 
 without some amount of space. Sequence cannot be thought 
 of without some interval of time. Difference cannot be 
 thought of without some degree of contrast. Hence what has 
 been said above respecting these relations in their definitely- 
 compound forms, applies to them under those forms which by 
 a fiction, we regard as simple." ( Prin. of Psy., § 93. ) This allu- 
 sion, to "what has been said above," has reference to the 
 examples of the variability of the appearances, Space, Time, 
 and Contrast; of which the most important have been ex- 
 amined, with result contrary to what Mr. Spencer is here 
 making the basis of his argument. Space, Time, and Contrast 
 in the concrete are not delusive; but if they were it would not 
 follow that in the abstract they would not be less so. Abstrac- 
 tion, being an exclusion of inconstant elements, and an intensi- 
 fication of those that are constant, should operate as a process 
 of purification. Mr. Spencer felt the necessity of giving further 
 proof of his "apparently-incredible proposition." By a 
 
 more than questionable process, he comes to the conclusion that 
 "the whole question of the relativity of relations among 
 feelings is reducible to the question of the relativity of the 
 relation of Difference." Then he explains that "the relation 
 of Difference, as present in consciousness, is nothing more than 
 a change in consciousness;" and proceeds thus: "How, then, 
 can it resemble, or be in any way akin to, its source beyond 
 consciousness? Here are two colors which we call unlike. As 
 they exist objectively, the two colors are quite independent — 
 there is nothing between them answering to the change which 
 results in us from contemplating first one and then the other. 
 Apart from our consciousness they are not linked as arc the two 
 feelings they produce in us. Their relation as we think it. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 177 
 
 being nothing else than a change of our state, cannot possibly be 
 parallel to anything between them, when they have both re- 
 mained unchanged." (Prin. of Psy., § 93.) So patent is 
 it here, that we can not fail to note an assumption which at once 
 begs the question for our opponent, but decides it in our favor. 
 That "as they exist objectively, the two colors are quite inde- 
 pendent;" that "there is nothing between them answering to 
 the change which results in us from contemplating first one and 
 then the other," is an entirely gratuitous assumption. That 
 "apart from our consciousness they are not linked as are the 
 two feelings they produce in us," is the very proposition to be 
 proved. But proved or assumed, Mr. Spencer has uo right 
 to any such proposition : it cannot be construed unless connections 
 out of consciousness can be known through unlike relations in 
 consciousness, or there are in consciou inectiona like 
 those beyond. .Moreover, what can Mr. Spencer claim to know 
 about things "as they exist objectively" — as they exist "apart 
 from our consciousness"? Unless he will give up the con- 
 tent, nothing! To him, the two colors can be no more than 
 effects in consciousness. When thus considered, the fact 
 which ha- so impressed him, that they are not connected by trans- 
 ition, abolishes bis first premise. Here we have a difference in 
 consciousness which doe- not consist in transition. It may be 
 that primordially it did involve transition, and that the element 
 of transition has not been, and never will be, completely 
 elided; but to the fact that it is not transition, we have Mi'. 
 Spencer's testimony. From our point of view, there is no 
 difficulty in explaining the representation of difference by 
 change. Admitting tint consciousness is made up of cha 
 would not be an acknowledgment that there are no such things 
 as states of consciousness. What we call a state of oonscious- 
 fu>88 may consist of infinite minute ch ingty without 
 persistence, yet, as a body, persistent, [f this !><• true, a state 
 of consciousness is as much a state as an activity, and may thus 
 represent a Btate, And if there are in consciousm 38 boi 
 neousstates, may there not !>•• heterogeneous Btates, states in 
 which difference is statical? It' bo, but not otherwise, we have 
 
178 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 an explanation of the fact that the contrast of contiguous colors 
 does not seem to involve a conscious change. But suppose 
 
 this explanation wanting. There is, we will say, between the 
 two colors, a spacial difference, and this difference is represented 
 by the change in consciousness which takes place when we pass 
 from the contemplation of the one to the contemplation of the 
 other. Who can fail to see that there is a likeness between the 
 thing and the representation? Does not the change intervene 
 between subjective states as the space does between objective 
 things ? Is not the extent of the change determined by the spacial 
 distance for which it stands ? Leaving the reader to answer 
 
 these questions and such others like them as may arise, I must, 
 in this connection, make one other charge. As is usual, Mr. 
 Spencer has chosen one of the most favorable examples he could 
 find. Why did he not choose a case in which the objective 
 difference accompanies change of one thing from state to state? 
 An apple falling to the ground changes its state ; and by follow- 
 ing out the change in thought, we realize the difference. This 
 leads to a more general remark. If we had been driven to the 
 conclusion that there can be in consciousness nothing resembling 
 the difference of objective states which are not connected by 
 change, we could have set up the counter proposition that in 
 consciousness are resemblances to difference of objective states 
 which are connected by change. 
 
 It remains to be shown that Mr. Spencer is not entirely 
 satisfied with his proof that there are no objective relations 
 answering to relations within the subject, and that he does not 
 long adhere to this conclusion. He manifests a weakening of 
 conviction by saying, that " Concerning compound relations of 
 Sequence, as concerning compound relations of Co-existence, 
 we must say that probably they are not qualitatively like the 
 connections to which they answer. • • •" (Prin. of Psy., § 91.) 
 A further step in the same direction is the recognition of "the 
 assumption made throughout, and inevitably made in all 
 reasoning used to prove the relativity of relations, that there 
 exists beyond consciousness, conditions of objective manifesta- 
 tion, which are symbolized by relations as we conceive them." 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 179 
 
 (Prin. of Psy., § 95.) The "conditions" which belong to "The 
 Unconditioned" must be things, attributes, relations, or a com- 
 pound thereof; and, since of plurality, must present difference. 
 The implication comes out more concretely in the following: 
 "The very proposition that what we know as a relation is qual- 
 itatively and quantitatively determined by our own nature, and 
 does not resemble any order or nexus beyond consciousness, 
 implies that there exists some such order or nexus beyond con- 
 sciousness; and every step in every argument by which this 
 proposition is established, distinctly posits this order or nexus, 
 and cannot be taken on any other condition." (Prin. of 
 Psy., § 95.) This use of the phrase, "order or nexus/' is 
 nothing else than a recalling under one name what had been 
 banished under another. If "order or nexus" means anything, 
 it implies some kind of co-existence or sequence. Any linger- 
 ing doubt of this will be removed by the following: "There 
 is some ontological order whence arises the phenomenal order 
 we know as Space; there is some ontoUxjical order, whence arises 
 the phenomenal order we know as Time; and there i< some 
 ontological nexus whence arises the phenomena] relation we 
 know as Difference." (Prin. of Psy., § 95.) This seems to be 
 an admission that, beyond consciousness, there are two orders 
 of something called for ambiguity's sake, a "nexus." Ajb 
 "nexus" may mean anything from a substance to a mere rela- 
 tion, it is impossible to say what it Implies, except that it Implies 
 as much, at least, as a relation; but "order" is fraught willi 
 meaning. Unless, which is not supposable, Mr. Spencer will 
 name a third kind of order a- poss ibly existing out of con- 
 sciousness, the orders which he has recognized in the objective 
 world must be those of co-existence and sequence. However 
 tlii- may be, the assertion of two objective orders is the assertion 
 
 of some objective difference. That Mr. Spencer does assert 
 
 both unlike objective orders and their necessary concomitant 
 objective difference, is evidenced by the admission that his 
 "argument assumes, and is obliged t<> assume, fundamental 
 differences of objective order which are symbolized l>v funds 
 mental differences of subjective order." | Prin, of l'-\. 
 
180 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 This, after the conclusion that there is nothing objective answer- 
 ing to our conception of pure order or pure difference, is 
 astounding. It may be well to say that no quibbling over the 
 meaning of "order" and "difference," as he uses them, would, 
 even if Mr. Spencer were capable of it, extricate him from 
 difficulty. They mean more than continued existence; for 
 continued existence would not produce the spacial and temporal 
 orders and their differences. Aside from this, continued ex- 
 istence is sequence, and sequence implies difference; so we are 
 not, in any case, to be deprived of the "pure relations" of 
 sequence and difference. More than this, objective activity is 
 admitted; activity implies sequence, and it implies a difference 
 additional to that which sequence implies : again we see that 
 sequence and difference in consciousness have counterparts out- 
 side. If, according to Mr. Spencer's rule, difference of time or 
 sequence implies its correlative, likeness of time or co-exist- 
 ence, we may claim the latter too. 
 
 There is a kind of argument which, in justice to Mr. Spencer, 
 must be duly noticed'. In addition to the arguments considered, 
 he propounds the following. 
 
 "A nerve is a thread of unstable nitrogenous substance 
 running from periphery to centre or from centre to periphery, 
 along which, when one of its ends is disturbed, there runs a 
 wave of molecular change to the other. The wave of change 
 set up by a peripheral disturbance is not like the action which 
 causes it; and the waves of change set up in different nerves by 
 different peripheral disturbances have no such unlikeness as 
 have the disturbances themselves. Hence being obliged to 
 concede that the kind of feeling depends either on the character 
 of the nerve-centre, or on the way in which the molecular dis- 
 turbance is brought to the nerve-centre, or both; it becomes 
 inconceivable that any resemblance exists between the subjective 
 effect and the objective cause which arouses it through the inter- 
 mediation of changes resembling neither." ( Prin. of Psy. § 87.) 
 
 " Indeed it needs but to think for an instant of a brain as a 
 seat of nervous discharges, intermediate between actions in the 
 outer world and actions in the world of thought, to be impressed 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 181 
 
 with the absurdity of supposing that the connections anions 
 outer actions, after being transferred through the medium of 
 nervous discharges, can re-appear in the world of thought in 
 the forms they originally had." (Prin. of Psy., § 94.) 
 
 AYhen will those who deny knowledge of noumena, cease fco 
 employ the supposition that they can contemplate things in 
 themselves? To Transfigured Realism, external agents, nerve- 
 fibres, and nerve-centres are phenomena; and if they are but 
 phenomena, the underlying noumena are not revealed. How, 
 on this theory, is it possible to know that the effect known 
 subjectively is not like the cause which appears objectively? 
 To know this, it is necessary to know more than mere manifes- 
 tations; and more than manifestations, therefore, Mr. Spencer 
 professes to know. The Realist is not at all perplexed 
 
 by the implication that a psychical effect is in a considerable 
 degree like its physical cause. He is .not at all abashed by the 
 appearance of dissimilarity between external agencies and 
 nerve-activities. Considering that these activities are extremely 
 minute, numerous, and capable of infinite combinations, he 
 deems them very good material for representations. Finding 
 that he has the vaguest and most mobile conception of what 
 they really are on their objective side, he is not surprised at 
 anything they may appear to be on their subjective side. Tie' 
 production of likeness through nerve-fibres is no more incon- 
 ceivable than is the transmission of sounds and pictures through a 
 wire. Analogies are. plenty. Take an example which has been 
 hackneyed by repeated use forpurposesof Agnosticism, [mar- 
 ine a blind man poking objects with the end of hi- walking-stick. 
 He touches one and then another, and two effects are produced 
 upon his hand. Now the -tick is pushed againsl a resisting 
 surface, now againsl a yielding surface; and upon the hand are 
 exerted successively greater and less resistance. Somethii 
 pulls the -tick, and the stick pulls the hand. The stick I" 
 held against a stationary object, the hand Is stationary ; the stick 
 being held againsl a moving object, the hand i- made f<- move. 
 Sensible vibration- might he communicated from the remote to 
 die near end; ;i.- might heat, if the stick were of metallic sub- 
 
182 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 stance. In all these cases, the correspondence of degree is too 
 obvious to require more than mention. But we need not resort 
 to analogy. In communication through nerve-fibers there is 
 undoubted equivalence of intensity; and, as is exemplified 
 by temporal distinctions, equivalence of kind. If we were not 
 so profoundly ignorant of the details of neural action and 
 mental action, we should probably be overwhelmed by exem- 
 plifications. The reader's attention must now be called 
 to what Mr. Spencer is trying to prove. He is laboring with 
 all his might to prove that nothing like what we call the objec- 
 tive world can be produced in consciousness. Pointing out the 
 great unlikeness between the external world and nerve-struct- 
 ures and functions within, he thinks we should be convinced 
 that the former cannot be in the least resembled by any phase 
 of consciousness. But we must ask him to hold to his belief 
 that the external world, as we know it, lies completely in con- 
 sciousness. He points to something and says, this cannot be 
 represented in consciousness; whereas he should have pointed 
 to it as a representation, and then shown us that there is nothing 
 which it truly represents. All that he said about the organ of 
 mind or its medium of communication with the external is 
 irrelevant. Mind he holds to be not unlike the external world 
 but in part identical with it : the external world is to him but 
 a mass of phenomena. No matter then what mind, objectively 
 considered, may appear to be, it is furnished with the represen- 
 tations which he has been trying to show it cannot frame. 
 Thus is the Realist relieved of the burden of showing that 
 ideas of external things are possible. Mr. Spencer admits the 
 possession of just such ideas: all he denies is that there are 
 corresponding things. We hold firmly to the admission that 
 the disputed elements are within the mind, since it destroys ail 
 arguments from our impotencies of conception. 
 
 We come now to an error at which all the group of argu- 
 ments above discussed converge; it is the reductla ad absurd am 
 of them all. Says the author : " subjective consciousness deter- 
 mined as it is wholly by subjective mature, date, and circumstances, 
 is no measure of objective existence." (Prim of Psy., § 86.) 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 183 
 
 The proposition, that consciousness is determined "wholly by- 
 subjective nature, state, and circumstances," is what he has, with 
 such poor success, been endeavoring to establish. If the effect 
 is not entirely determined by the nature of the affected, the 
 cause may determine some of its ingredients, which will be 
 unlike those determined by the affected. Yet if Mr. Spencer 
 has proved as much as he desires, he has proved something more 
 than he believes, and very much more than we can believe. 
 What does he mean by saying that "every argument proving 
 that our conceptions of Time are relative, falls to pieces on 
 withdrawing the assumption that there exists some form of 
 Things from which Time, as a form of Thought, is derived"? 
 What did he mean by previously saying something similar to 
 this concerning Space, phenomenal and noumenal? And what 
 did lie mean by adding that "the assumption of an objective 
 source for the subjective relation of Difference, is implied in the 
 last two assumptions"? (Prin. of Psy., § 95.) He meant some- 
 thing implying that modifications of consciousness are not 
 wholly determined a by subjective nature, state, and circum- 
 stances." Known to furnish some of the ingredients of con- 
 sciousness, external being may be supposed to furnish many of 
 them. Leaving Mr. Spencer's admissions, and passing to con- 
 siderations of a more positive character, we shall find that 
 externa] agency is the controlling factor in the production of 
 that order of affections called by Mr. Spencer objective. Their 
 chief peculiarity is that their "conditions are often not present, 
 but lie somewhere outside of the series." (First Prin., § 13.) 
 The thought that the characters of these are entirely controlled 
 by the subject is not to be entertained. We cannot think that the 
 
 same external cause lies back of an ant-hill and a VolcSUOj or 
 
 that the difference between the experiences of lying upon a bed 
 of sickness, and Eying pasl landscapes at an exhilarating rate of 
 speed, is determined wholly by subjective change. To imagine 
 Buch absurdities would be to supposititiously introduce into the 
 subject a mass of complicated mid cumbersome machinery, and 
 to reduce the object to entire and Impotenl homogeneity. This 
 ban implication repugnant to Mr. Spencer's views, 
 
184 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 Before changing the point of view, I must call to the reader's 
 attention that each criticism upon what Mr. Spencer has said 
 contrary to the existence of similarities between mind and not- 
 nrind, has led us more or less directly to the conclusion that 
 there probably are such similarities. 
 
 § 61. Without qualification, it would seem that too much 
 stress has been laid upon primordial likeness between the in- 
 ternal and the external. Knowledge of things wrought out of 
 contrast, is a very large share of all knowledge. What the 
 reader is particularly desired to realize is that the greatest 
 fundamental dissimilarity between the mental and the extra- 
 mental would not preclude an original and increasing likeness 
 between them. This is true if the only attribute common to 
 an external and an internal mode is that they both differ from 
 some other internal mode. Let their manner of difference be 
 as contrasted as you please, still one mode resembles the other 
 in differing from a third. As the number of modes with 
 which they differ increase, so will their mutual likeness in- 
 crease. What is true of single modes, is true of sets. If one 
 set of internal modes becomes transcendently distinguished 
 from another set of internal modes (as the subjective and 
 objective sets have done), one set or the other will probably be 
 extremely like external modes. And this, which holds of 
 general contrasts, holds more completely of intenser special 
 contrasts. Primordial unlikeness, as well as primordial likeness, 
 between mind and not-mind, forms, therefore, a good basis for 
 knowledge of external things. 
 
 Without qualification, it would seem that too much stress 
 has been laid upon ultimate likeness between ideas and their 
 outward correlatives. The positive advantage of unlikeness 
 must be insisted upon. It is commonly supposed that it is 
 desirable to have conceptions as nearly like things as possible. 
 This is true after other purposes are subserved; but untrue 
 in so far as it ignores their claims. Regard must be had to 
 the nature of mind. Some modes the mind sustains with ease; 
 some, with difficulty ; and some, scarcely at all. Ideas should 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 185 
 
 be produced without effort, and prolonged without fatigue. 
 They should be definite, yet easily modified. Such requisites 
 are cheap at the expense of slight similarity. Regard should 
 also be had to the natures of things. Their demands for 
 exact representation are not equally urgent. It is possible 
 that representative accuracy may be most judiciously distributed 
 while the greatest quantity thereof is not attained. Again; 
 regard should be had to the nature of ideas themselves. They 
 are symbols ; and symbols are often valuable in proportion as 
 they vary in certain respects from what they symbolize. For 
 purposes of felicitous separation and combination, thev may be 
 suffered to lack properties by which separation and combination 
 would be unduly antagonized. The numerals furnish an apt 
 illustration. Their only conspicuous resemblance to things is 
 their difference from each other. This bein^ maintained, other 
 characters, if as easily handled, would do as well. Substituting 
 one for another will not affect their completeness. One class 
 of things they represent as accurately as another. Notwith- 
 standing the extreme unlikeness which all this implies, to 
 increase their resemblance to things would, in a progressing 
 ratio, decrease their usefulness. Now let us turn to the resem- 
 blance of numerals to things, and observe how it produces in 
 the end a greater quantity of similarity than a more complete 
 primary resemblance could produce. The fundamental idea 
 underlying mathematics is that of equality and inequality — 
 that is, likeness and unlikeness in respect of quantity. Num- 
 bers, in their various combinations, arc capable of exhibiting 
 various likenesses and iinlikenesses to cadi other. So far, and 
 not much farther, do they resemble the things for which they 
 stand. Wonderfully much, nevertheless, may they express. 
 Beginning with a few marks on a surface and adding to their 
 number^ according to rules of combination, I at lasl produce 
 two numerals, or sets of numerals, as near alike as my hand 
 can make them, and kn<»w from this that two celestial events 
 will coincide. Or I produce unlike scratches, and read that 
 the coincidence will not take place; and, from the < ; 
 of numerical unlikeness, know how much the variance from 
 
186 THE DEDUCTIVE AEGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 coincidence will be. It is evident that in this case the produc- 
 tion of the ultimate representative correspondence is contingent 
 upon the employment of symbols extremely unlike the symbol- 
 ized realities. How circumscribed Avould be mathematical 
 calculations if we should employ symbols very much resembling 
 the objects which the calculations concern, is readily appreciable. 
 We should have more similarity in the first instance, but far 
 less in the end. To apply the analogy, ideas must not be too 
 much like things. If we put overmuch resemblance into the 
 process of thought, the latter will be clogged, and we shall 
 obtain so much less resemblance in the shape of products. To 
 resemble much, is to simulate seldom, and to simulate the most 
 important things never at all. Still less than before, therefore, 
 does it appear that mind is so unlike not-mind as to have no 
 realization of its nature. 
 
 § 62. Mere resemblances between modes within consciousness 
 and modes without, would not amount to knowledge of the 
 latter. But they would form the basis of such knowledge. 
 Given internal counterparts of external modes, and that con- 
 sciousness can figure to itself exterior reality, is no transcendent 
 mystery. Its only perplexity is that the symbol should not be 
 contrasted with the thing. The reason that we do not seem 
 to look through the symbol is obvious enough : ideas are but 
 affections of the mind; and as such are not distinguishable, as 
 they are not distinct, from the act of cognizing them. But 
 when we come to the fact that the idea is not distinguishable 
 from its external counterpart, we arrive at a real perplexity. 
 While from the certainty that the sun, for instance, is beyond con- 
 sciousness, we infer that knowledge of it must be representative, 
 we marvel that in perception the representation should not stand 
 opposed to what it represents. Some have indeed thought that 
 contemplation of externality does involve a duality of objects, — 
 the representation present to consciousness, and the thing 
 brought before consciousness by reference; but their supposition, 
 extremely unscientific in method, is negatived by both con- 
 sciousness and reflection. The reference, of which many so 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 187 
 
 glibly speak, is but a name for concrete ignorance; a verbal 
 substitute for rational explanation. In neither memory, im- 
 agination, nor perception, is there recognition that what is before 
 the mind is a mere representation of something else. All that 
 we contemplate we seem to look upon directly. The contem- 
 plation is not consciousness of something, plus a reference to a 
 second something beyond. We are aware of no such reference; 
 and if it did exist, it would be consciousness of the kind to 
 which it is supposed to be auxiliary, even to the requiring of a 
 reference auxiliary to itself. To escape the difficulties which 
 are thus started, many adopt belief in consciousness of. exter- 
 nalities; by doing which, they rush into a denser maze. Ob- 
 jective considerations necessitate the separation of outside things 
 from the sphere of consciousness. Introspection does the same; 
 for objects do not seem to be within consciousness, as subjective 
 things are, but to be beyond consciousness while affecting it. 
 There is no avoidance of the paradox, that we seem to be im- 
 mediately aware of the thing as something out of consciousness, 
 Question the least philosophical, and you will learn that he 
 believes himself conscious of externalities. Question him from 
 another point of view, and you will learn that lie believes them 
 to be distant from the mind, and therefore out of consciousness. 
 In consecutive breaths he will say virtually, that the mind is 
 the environment of the things contemplated, and that the things 
 are the environment of the mind. Is there a possible recon- 
 ciliation? Unwilling to question the veracity of consciousness, 
 we are unable to believe that we are conscious of the thing as 
 not in consciousness, nor even in contact with consciousness, 
 To decide that we are conscious of the thing only as an exist- 
 ence, is to convict consciousness of a lie, without cancelling the 
 present suspicion of an inconsistency. For consciousness pro- 
 claims its communion with more external than existence, and if 
 it so far falsifies, it is under the additional imputation of testify- 
 ing that it grasps existence which is beyond its sphere. Thus we 
 are forced back upon the problem with which we set out [fwe 
 will not give the lie to consciousness, we dolus! find congruity in 
 the circumstance that the symbol is uol contrasted with the thing. 
 
188 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 Though two things cannot be absolutely the same, they can 
 be relatively, that is, approximately the same. When we con- 
 sider that intrinsically a state of consciousness is but a portion 
 of a mode — when we consider that in the exclusions and pre- 
 sentations of consciousness, essentials are divided from essen- 
 tials; it will not seem impossible, or even incredible, that highly 
 evolved ideas should present only that aspect in which they are 
 one with the objective things they represent. If they do this, 
 observe, consciousness would err if it should discriminate be- 
 tween the mode presented and the mode represented: by the 
 hypothesis, as far as the former is presented, it is not in reality 
 contrasted with the latter; and as far as the latter is represented, 
 it is not in reality contrasted with the former. Consciousness 
 may, therefore, be entirely right in not contrasting the symbol 
 with the object symbolized. Mark that the supposition is not 
 that consciousness pronounces judgment that the symbol is like 
 the thing, to do which, would require other symbols ; but that 
 consciousness fails to observe distinction between the symbol 
 and the thing — compares them no farther than they are alike, 
 which is not to distinguish them at all. The manner in which 
 consciousness became possessed of the happy bias towards iden- 
 tification, to the exclusion of distinction, will be subsequently 
 considered. What is before us now is the legitimacy of ignor- 
 ing the distinction ; and we have found that in as far as the 
 idea is presented, or the thing truly represented, there is no 
 basis of distinction, because no difference. But while we are 
 thus able to justify consciousness in its negative deliverance, 
 we think strange that it does not disclose the whole truth by a 
 complemental positive deliverauce. Though not distinguish- 
 able in perception, we know that upon reflection the idea and the 
 thing are made to differentiate into a duality of things, — alike, 
 it may be true, so far as one stands for the other, yet in other par- 
 ticulars very unlike. It is the duality which perplexes us. 
 
 Perhaps the sense in which consciousness should be largely 
 understood is analogous to the one employed when I say that the 
 considerations before us should extend the acceptance of Realism. 
 I do not mean the modes of consciousness which obtain in any 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 189 
 
 mind while it entertains the considerations; because the con- 
 siderations do nor change identity upon traveling from mind to 
 mind, and are even capable of being present to two or more 
 minds simultaneously. So may consciousness be understood to 
 decide that a form presented is the form to which a sens 
 is attributable. In so far as ideas are mere forms of being, 
 and in so far as a form here and a form there are identical, 
 consciousness is justified in positively identifying present and 
 absent things. Still, as we cannot suppress distinction be- 
 external being and the consciousness by which it is 
 known, we are puzzled by the fact that a unity should appear 
 where a duality exists. 
 
 Suppose instead of viewing the likeness of nature between 
 the idea and the thing, we turn to their nearness <»f relation. 
 Some thinkers have considered the thing to be the objective 
 correlate of the idea; and the idea, the objective correlate of 
 th<- state in which it is contemplated. Other.-, recognizing that 
 tin- idea and it- contemplation are identical, have considered 
 the thing as the objective correlate of the contemplation. The 
 implication i-, that one party has mi-taken the relation which 
 the object bears to the contemplation, for that borne by the 
 idea; or the other party has mistaken the relation which the 
 idea bears to the contemplation, for that borne by the object. 
 In other word-, some have | not in perception, but in objective 
 speculation) put the idea in the place belonging to the object, 
 or other- have put the object in the place belonging t<> the idea. 
 Going a step tart her, it will appear thai neither party is entirely 
 
 wrong. It is maniie-t that the object is not the sole correlate 
 
 of the contemplation; because, a- the contemplation is con- 
 sciousness, something known in consciousness must be it- 
 corn late. But it is equally manifest that the contemplation i- 
 oot alone it- own correlative; for, ii it were, it would ooi be a 
 thought of something other than itself. The thing ami the 
 idea bear the same kind of relation to the contemplation; the 
 idea and the contemplation are •; the thing and the contem- 
 plation bear the same kind of relation to the latter. Here 
 again, we seem to have found only an analogy, not an identity. 
 
190 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 Our several efforts to identify ideas with things, though only 
 relatively successful, have taught us how surprisingly near they 
 may approach towards a community of nature. The necessity 
 of stopping here, were it obvious, would not preclude the claim 
 of having proved consciousness to be practically reliable, if not 
 theoretically so. But it is easy, with the insight attained, to do 
 much more by way of justification. Consciousness does not tes- 
 tify that Ave are conscious of outside objects; its testimony, even in 
 perceiving such, is that the mind is construing to itself objects 
 extra-mental. So far our endeavor has mainly been to identify 
 ideas with things as objects of consciousness; let us now try to 
 identify them as objects of contemplation. Very likely an 
 analogy will aid us. Instances of things standing for each other 
 as objects of contemplation are numerous, though little liable to 
 be observed. Take one appropriate by reason of its simplicity. 
 I imagine myself to be viewing a landscape through the win- 
 dow ; but you draw me nearer to the window, and show me 
 that the landscape is exactly pictured on the pane. Neverthe- 
 less I was contemplating the landscape, because I thought I 
 was — the thought being part of the contemplation. If to- 
 morrow, the window being raised, I look upon the landscape, 
 thinking it to be the picture; the picture, more than the land- 
 scape, will be the object of my contemplation. The case is one 
 in which faith is the determining circumstance. The fact which 
 it is its function to illustrate, is that the relation which an object 
 shall bear to thought may be determined by the thought. We 
 do not realize the extensive faculty of control we have. By 
 the slightest movement of the body, can we change the relation 
 which everything in the universe bears to it. The tiniest ani- 
 malcule has some power of influencing all that is. Carry the 
 impressions which these reflections make, to the consideration 
 of the act called thinking. It needs only an operation of the 
 mind to make anything the correlative of a thought. If in 
 the thought two objects are identified, they are thereby made 
 alike correlative of that thought. Which is the more inti- 
 mately related to the thinker in other respects is a matter of 
 utter indifference: we are considering them as objects of thought; 
 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 191 
 
 and as such, one is the correlative just as the other is. Though 
 one be present to, and the other absent from, consciousness; 
 this does not matter if the internality of the former is suppi 
 from the contemplation. Though the contemplation of one be 
 consciousness thereof; this is of no moment if we discard from 
 our consideration every element of the act in excess of mere 
 contemplation. As far as the act of thinking of two objects is 
 one, they bear one relation to it. We have found more than an 
 analogy. While it is true that the thing and its representation 
 are not identical, we perceive that they exist in the same relation 
 to the thought. Each is the correlative of the contemplation — 
 each its object. This is true of the whole, SO far as they are 
 similar; and true of any part, down to the limits of similarity : 
 as far as there is dissimilarity, the outer correlative is wanting: and 
 the mind deceived. Theoneness of relation has been represented 
 as depending on the act of unification, because if the object- were 
 separately thought of they would be correlative- of separate 
 thoughts, and if only one were contemplated it alene would be 
 tli • object of contemplation. When thought identifies objects, 
 it gives them not like relations, but the same relation, one 
 relation, to itself. It will be observed that the idea, a- well as 
 the thing, is represented a- correlative to the contemplation. 
 The reason of this is that we undoubtedly look upon the idea 
 
 when we look upon tin; thing; for otherwise the idea would be 
 
 a mode of consciousness of which we are unconscious. Though 
 in respect of its peculiarity of being within consciousness, the 
 idea is not employed as a representation; yet there is ever a 
 consciousness of something, and this consciousness is so inti- 
 mately involved with all we contemplate that it i- sometimes 
 
 construed into consciousness of the thing. The doctrine which 
 
 both reason and intuition sanction is, that we are conscious of 
 
 the idea only; but contemplate in one concrete BCt both the 
 
 idea and the thing | the thing, however, more than the idea |. 
 That this is the explanation of our cognizance of exterior 
 existence, Mr. Spencer would probably admit; and if the ad- 
 mission be made in the case of existence, it Cannot "ii any <i 
 
 priori grounds be denied in the case of other attributes. 
 
192 THE DEDUCTIVE AEGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 § 63. The knowledge which criticism and analysis have shown 
 to be probable, synthesis will show to be inevitable. On the 
 part of Mr. Spencer, it is admitted that Evolution has made 
 the mind aware of an outward cause of its own modifications. 
 For the convincing of others only, is it necessary to discuss 
 the process so far as it relates to existence of the cause. 
 
 In the dawnings of consciousness, we should look in vain for 
 more than the germs of present ideas. If we find these we 
 shall find enough. The first hint at causation probably pre- 
 sents itself in the shape of invariability. In the sequenee of 
 primitive states of consciousness, variability is in many in- 
 stances broken by constancy. Somp. sequences are more or less 
 invariable; some are absolutely so. Moreover, there is con- 
 spicuous persistence and recurrence of the same states. Expe- 
 riences of uniformity, continued throughout ages, would leave, 
 as a cumulative product, a mental habit expressive of more 
 than concrete uniformity. This incipient abstract of uniformity, 
 employed to construe each concrete uniformity, would be the 
 germinal appreciation of causation. 
 
 Here be it said, once for all, that kindred ideas do not appear 
 in absolute lineal succession; but that whole families are brought 
 forth in one generation, and developed concurrently. As soon 
 as the slightest appreciation of a concrete uniformity has appeared, 
 the way is open for the advent of another constituent of the 
 idea of causation. Uniformities lead to anticipations. Antici- 
 pation at first amounts to the feeling that something will be; and 
 this contains the faintest sensibility that something must be. 
 
 The transition from fact to necessity can be, however, only 
 initiatory until other ingredients of the idea of causation have 
 been obtained. Sequences, originally mere successions of 
 occurrences, repeatedly exhibit instances of something more. 
 Soon the least variable and least remote of them are dis- 
 tinguished as antecedent and consequent. While a is always 
 immediately followed by b, it is never immediately followed by 
 e: therefore a and 6 gradually become cemented in a relation 
 closer than exists between a and e. The class of antecedents 
 and consequents, once germinated, is rapidly increased, until 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 193 
 
 perhaps a rudimentary abstraction is formed. Dissociation, as 
 well as association, plays an important part. Seldom, and then 
 only distantly and at random, dees b follow c, d, or e. Its 
 not being sequent from them is, after many experiences, ap- 
 preciated, and the appreciation strengthens its association with a. 
 In this way is the mind prepared for in a measure realizing 
 the dependence of the consequent upon the happening of the 
 antecedent, A nearly allied appreciation probably carries for- 
 ward the suggestion of dependence A, B, and C, occur 
 independently of the happening of a and its consequents, and 
 build up an impression of so doing; b, c, d, e, etc., never do, and 
 so build up, with regard to themselves, a contrary impression. 
 From infinite repetition the respective abstracts follow, heighten- 
 ich other. The dependence recognized as yet, i- not 
 that of effect upon its cause. It is only the want of dis- 
 connection. 
 
 Experience of one thing influencing another is most likely 
 a prerequisite to a further grasp of causation. The experience 
 is proximately had in consciousness of mental affections inducing, 
 modifying, abolishing each other. A sensation awakens a 
 
 :id sensation changes it to another fear, a third lessens, and 
 a fourth dispels it. Emotion, being the cumulative incident of 
 experiences, give- a very strong impression of being ar 
 and sustained by every experience which excites it. 
 
 Influence is one -hade Less than power. The power <>f an 
 edent to produce its consequent derives at once a further 
 and a complete realization from a certain oft-recurring and 
 comparatively definite experience. In volitioD is expert* I 
 both Bides of the exercise of power. The exertion of p 
 by the antecedent i- fit in the consciousness of effort In the 
 direct product of volition, a- far ;i- it lies within consciousness, 
 and in the sense of resistance to it- efforts, is experienced the 
 production of the consequent by antecedent power. Together, 
 I* " two kind- of experience constitute an experience of causa- 
 tion. The antecedents of volition, in connection therewith, 
 are, we must add. experiences uext in importance to volition 
 itself. Willing was uot formerly what it is at present; but bo 
 
 l:; 
 
194 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 much the better: it exhibited relatively much less of intelli- 
 gence, prompting and directive, and much more of exertion, 
 causing and affected. Whether volition alone would have been 
 sufficiently suggestive of causation, is of no particular moment; 
 since it appears not to have been unaided. Other experiences, 
 such as those named, were valuable as developing forms to be 
 subsequently employed; and especially valuable as bringing 
 under the category of causation internal changes which volition 
 does not control. While to volition we are indebted for 
 strengthening and integrating these experiences; to them we 
 must accord the merit of having strengthened and extended 
 the implications of volition. 
 
 All the elements of a vague realization of causation being 
 supplied and integrated, there would rapidly develop a certain 
 mental formula in which each experience would immediately 
 upon production be enveloped. In some instances the formula 
 would be filled by a reproduced experience ; in others, the com- 
 plemental experience not being reproducible, there would be 
 left in the formula a blank to which the mind could not be 
 completely oblivious. The blank — the unfilled locus of a 
 cause — there would be an effort to fill up with an appropriate 
 reproduction. Experiences being so much more readily and 
 completely realized by means of the formula, there would be a 
 growing tendency to employ it in the case of every experience. 
 Such tendency would be greatly augmented by the experience of 
 new cases in which the formula is presented filled, and of cases 
 in which the void at first appearing is afterwards occupied. 
 The progressing recognition of the invariability of the connec- 
 tion between effect and cause would produce a feeling of the 
 universality of this connection. The mind would ultimately 
 exhibit a groping for the cause of every affection. Made 
 sensible, by instance upon instance, that when sensations are 
 contemplated there is a blank in the formula, and that when 
 other modes are contemplated there is at best a partial blank,, 
 which no re-presentation of its experiences can fill; it is 
 gradually guided to the formation of a representation of some- 
 thing not among its experiences. 
 
 
 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 195 
 
 We have been moving too hastily, and must now turn back 
 to the beginnings of a parallel development. The apprehen- 
 sion of something external is not likely to appear until 
 externality has become to some extent familiar to the mind. 
 For this to take place, is more than possible. Qualitative ex- 
 ternality is continually present to consciousness. Pain 
 external to pleasure; one pain or pleasure, to another. In 
 short, every contrast is a double instance of externality. Ex- 
 ternality is also presented as appertaining to quantity; as when 
 a loud sound or a severe pain seems ideally divisible into like 
 portions not co-incident. The notion of quantitative divisi- 
 bility probably result* from experience of sounds, pains and 
 the like, in various degrees of intensity. Increase and decre 
 of intensity would itself have the same tendency; and would 
 even directly suggest externality appertaining to quantity as 
 such. Temporal externality has something in common with 
 the others, but much peculiar to itself. Mental affections are 
 observed to occupy different sections of time, lying external to 
 each other in an indefinite series. It may well be, that th 
 is something in mental experiences still more nearly approach- 
 ing to local externality. Those which are simultaneous are not 
 looked upon as coinciding, but as laterally dispersed. The 
 accumulation of memory is doubtless the mosl important -tore 
 from which are drawn material- for a conception of externality. 
 On the one hand, memory discloses that mode- now present 
 were once not within consciousness; on the other, that modes 
 once present are within consciousness no Longer. Anticipation, 
 too, is belief that modes now absent will hereafter be present, 
 From the apprehension of modes a- not internal, the transition 
 i- short to the apprehension of modes a- external Especially 
 is this so because former and future modes are pictured as 
 ternal to present consciousness. There being no dearth of 
 materials out of which to construct the symbol of a new kind 
 of externality, we clearly understand how it fa that when the 
 mind seeks to lill up a partly blank form of causation, it is 
 enabled to provide a representation of somethu 
 to itself 
 
196 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 The materials being furnished by experience, what induces 
 the construction? We have seen why the mind struggles to 
 conceive a proper cause; but have not yet learned how it is 
 determined to conceive a cause which is external. Conceiving 
 at random, it might sometime form the right conception, which 
 would be approved as soon as formed ; or it might by random 
 conception obtain only a hint, which would be a guide to subse- 
 quent trials, each resulting in a further hint, and so on to 
 ultimate success. Such process has doubtless been an aid 
 throughout the whole progress of the development under view. 
 I am not disposed, however, to name chance as the chief factor 
 in production of the conception of externality. Examining 
 the mind, I find a more efficient in necessity. The mental 
 modification to be accounted for is, after all, not very elaborate. 
 A cause is necessarily conceived as next to completely external 
 to the mind. There has been no experience of coincidence of 
 cause and effect: in all instances each has been external to the 
 other. In almost all experience, when an effect was contem- 
 plated the cause has seemed to be external to present con- 
 sciousness. In almost all experience, the cause has also seemed 
 to be in a manner external to preceding consciousness; for, 
 being external to all modes contemporaneous with itself, is 
 being so far external to the mind. As so far external, im- 
 agination would immediately picture the hidden cause. Then 
 must begin a process of exclusion. Memory, which would be 
 more than at any subsequent stage relied on, would testify that 
 the cause occupied no place in preceding consciousness. Yet in 
 preceding consciousness uniform experience would indicate the 
 cause to be. Present consciousness would enforce experience by 
 excluding the cause from its own limits. Here is a direct con- 
 flict of tendencies: imagination endeavoring to locate the cause 
 in prior consciousness; memory excluding it therefrom. There 
 could have been but one resultant. Observe that memory does 
 not exclude the cause from all parts of immediately past con- 
 sciousness with equal power and effect. Lateral to the phases 
 which are remembered most vividly and persistently, arc other 
 phases the memory of which is indefinite and unstable. The 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 197 
 
 first effort of imagination would be to locate the cause at the 
 most vivid point in preceding consciousness. This being the 
 point of greatest resistance, the attempt would be deflected to 
 points of less and less resistance' until a point would be reached 
 where, both memory and resistance being absent, the proper 
 location would be found. To the past, but not to past con- 
 sciousness, the cause must at last be relegated. 
 
 It is not thought that the process just described is, or has been, 
 carried on from beginning to consummation in single individuals; 
 much less that it involve- but a single experience. It has 
 probably been transmitted from parent to offspring throughout 
 many generations, as an hereditary mental bias absorbing 
 growth from each sensation. Neither is it supposed that the 
 first cognizance of external cause is more than a vague and 
 momentary suggestion. Nay: only by slow accretion- could it 
 become bo much. If the breaking in upon placid consciousness 
 by a violent nervous -hock, faintly implies the operation of an 
 antecedent not in consciousness, it is only by virtue of the 
 same thing having been partly suggested numberless times 
 before. Infinitely -lower than language can depict is the 
 process, and less tangible the product 
 
 Before tracing the process of further development, let as dwell 
 awhile on the evolving product. That which we are obliged t<> 
 treat a- tic earliest idea of external cause is, strictly speaking, a 
 feeling rather than an idea; sensibility largely predominating 
 over sensibility to definite forma Still, the feeling must have 
 some representative qualities; else it is a feeling of nothing bat 
 
 itself. Afi the mind inclines to old forms, it i- likely that the 
 
 first representation of an externality is substantially some old 
 
 form, located out of vivid consciousness. The mode which 
 
 serves as a representation, doubtless varies with the individual 
 
 and the occasion, and i- while [| lasts but a series of pro- 
 visional substitutions. While we thus admit the inadequa! 
 of the representative mode, we most observe that it is not as 
 inadequate a- high abstraction makes it appear. There are 
 qualities besides externality which it always portrays. All 
 
 experience- of CaUSatiOD within COnSClOUSneSS, have prea Qted 
 
198 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 the cause as exercising power; that is, as acting on something: 
 any conception of causation by the external must do the same. 
 Necessarily the cause will be, from the start represented as in a 
 state of action. Another characteristic of the cause to 
 
 which the earliest portrayal must extend, is temporal relation- 
 ship. Familiarity with time is long anterior to acquaintance 
 with causation. Time has been given in every sequence. In 
 relations of sequence every experience of internal causation 
 has been presented. To leave time out of a representation of 
 causation by the external, would not be natural, nor, we may 
 add, possible. The representative mode would of necessity be 
 temporally qualified. Of necessity, the represented activity of 
 the cause would be activity in .time. Experience and 
 
 necessity unite in determining that the first representation of 
 external cause shall portray it as something acting in time. 
 Eventually the conception becomes a representation of substance 
 acting in space and time. Before inquiring into the trans- 
 formation, let us remark how like the last is the first conception. 
 A something acting in time, if we but add occupancy of space, 
 becomes a substance acting in time and space. Our problem, 
 then, is how to account for the representation of space-occupancy 
 by external cause. 
 
 A review of the materials at hand will go far towards the 
 required solution. Direction is within the sphere of experi- 
 ence. Prospection acquaints the mind with one direction; 
 memory, with one extremely opposite; and every approach to ex- 
 ternal location, with a third. Extension in two directions 
 and occupancy thereof is given among subjective experiences. 
 In present consciousness-, modes are arranged laterally, and in 
 the field of past consciousness they are arranged both laterally 
 and lineally. They seem, when viewed in mass, to fill up 
 extension of two dimensions. As bearing upon the 
 question of what things consciousness may symbolize, we shall 
 consider some of the things by which consciousness is symbol- 
 ized. Consciousness is for many purposes symbolized by a line. 
 Though such symbolization is posterior to, and dependent upon, 
 some acquaintance with spacial extension; nevertheless, that 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 199 
 
 it is ever available, proves something in conseiousness bearing 
 resemblance to a line. In this instance the likeness consists in 
 a series of modes. Yet it is only by very high abstraction 
 that we can speak of the line of consciousness. It would be 
 nearer the truth to look upon consciousness as a field stretched 
 out before the mental view. Accordingly, for many purposes 
 we do this, and with good effect; proving that consciousness 
 does bear some resemblance to a plane. The resemblance, in 
 this instance, consists in a series of co-existences. Still 
 there is too much abstraction to answer many purposes. With 
 great advantage, and therefore with great propriety, conscious- 
 ness is figured as a current flowing past relatively per- 
 manent modes of mind, and gradually wearing them away. It 
 is also, with good result, represented as like a flow in present- 
 ing depth as well as length and breadth. The semblance to 
 depth is recognized in the impression of' closer proximity of 
 modes than would be allowed by superficial arrangement. 
 Severally they seem to have depth as much as they seem to 
 have length or breadth; and collectively they seem to roll, and 
 tumble, and wind about each other almost indiscriminately. A 
 further approach to concrcteness brings us to the very useful 
 conception of consciousness as an ambiguous compromise be- 
 tween a point and a sphere — as an expanding, contracting 
 sphere, irregular in outline and heterogeneous in composition. 
 This conception results from, and is justified by, the fad that 
 co-existenl states an- huddled together in the mind, it never 
 
 knows how; while those that preceded have I' It the record of 
 
 having occupied the same general locality. Axe we authorized 
 lo assert that consciousness presente the three Bpacial dimensions 
 because a Line, a plane, a flow and a sphere correctly symbolize 
 it? I think we can go no farther than to affirm that there are 
 in consciousness elements bo much resembling the Bpacial dimen- 
 sions that either Bel may be used a- Bjmbols Of the Other. 
 
 Material being shown, the process of adding Bpacial qualifi- 
 cations to the primitive conception of external agency da 
 seem so mysterious. Of the same effed will !>'• tic disclosure 
 that something of such qualifications i- connate with tic con- 
 
200 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 ception itself. The moment a cause is located as lateral to past 
 consciousness, it presents more than temporal externality, 
 though less than spacial externality. To apprehend this 
 clearly, it is necessary to advert again to the process of location. 
 The region in which the mind first seeks to locate an unknown 
 cause, is that where all known causes of past and present mod- 
 ifications are located; that is, the field of retrospection. But 
 memory resists location in this field ; completely along the line 
 directly before the view, and with decreasing completeness 
 towards the lateral limits. The effort must be continued; and, 
 as it necessarily follows the line of least resistance, a point is 
 at last found where there is no resistance. The outness which 
 is at this stage recognized is a little more than temporal. It is 
 an outness that existed w T hen, a moment ago, the cause and then- 
 existing consciousness were temporally coincident. It is spacial 
 outness in one direction. Simultaneously outness in many 
 directions is recognized : for a single outward cause cannot find 
 complete location until many have been almost located. In its 
 efforts to locate the hidden causes which conspicuous experiences 
 suggest, the mind does not reiterate its efforts against the same- 
 points, nor even in the same general direction. Now a cause is 
 almost placed on one side of consciousness, now a cause, often 
 the same cause, is almost placed on the opposite side — develop- 
 ing, simultaneously with the complete location of causes out of 
 consciousness, the idea of a system of causes bounding con- 
 sciousness on every side. As the language here used is very 
 figurative, a word must be said about direction. The only 
 direction which is usually remarked as being presented in 
 consciousness is temporal. Less obvious, but of no less present 
 importance, is a kind of direction common to both time and 
 space; namely, that which is involved in lateral connections of 
 co-existent modes. This is introduced by time, but afterwards 
 almost exclusively appropriated to space. Now as to the 
 application. The cause which is first located out of conscious- 
 ness is necessarily given something like direction as related to 
 consciousness. Such relation is overwhelmingly temporal ; but 
 it is noticeable that in as far as the direction is lateral it is both 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 201 
 
 spacial and temporal, and that in as far as it exceeds lateral 
 direction in consciousness it is spacial. The same conclusion 
 may be reached by shorter process: outness from conscionsD 
 whatever else it may be, is spacial outness, and spacial outa 
 can only be in some direction. But then, at first the direction 
 is in no case fixed and determinate. By a colligation of ex- 
 periences, however, are permanent distinctions of outward 
 direction obtained. While spacial externality is closely in- 
 volved with temporal externality, one cause is located here, 
 another there, around the flow of consciousness, according to 
 vacillation- in the point of least resistance. This experience of 
 course develops a tendency to give each can-" a separate 
 location. A tendency so acquired is not, it must he remarked, 
 the only, nor even the important, factor in the case. The can 
 which environ consciousness are looked apon a- modes very 
 much resembling certain remembered modes. In particular, 
 they are conceived to he laterally arranged, Bince not in oon- 
 osness, around about it. Such arrangement is according t.» 
 the experienc • of consciousness that mode- are exclusive of each 
 other, filling up extension. Whether to these mod 
 anything like depth, need not he determined, a- it i- <>!»\ ;<>n- 
 that other modes are, as experiences accumulate, necessarily 
 imagined back of them. The necessity which compels the 
 conception of modes just outside of consciousness, likewi 
 compels the conception of modes still farther outside. ( 
 ceptual reproduction of a cause is almost a- much in requisirj 
 in the case of external modes a- in the case of modes not 
 
 external; and every increase of familiarity with external:' 
 augments the necessity. Sometimes theai ight ap- 
 
 pears to have- been an internal mode; :i- where a volition, by 
 changing tin- circumstances of the organism, reflects ne^ sensa- 
 tional Impressions upon the mind. In other instano -. because 
 of prior uniformities of sequence, tin me t«» have 
 
 been some external mode which previously affected « -< »i »-. f. »i 1 ~- 
 ness. In the majority of instances, however, the antecedent i- 
 not discoverable among internal modes, nor y. t among ill 
 externa] modes that immediately affect consciousness, and i- 
 
202 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 therefore relegated to a region outlying both consciousness and 
 its immediate surroundings. As causes seem to lie back of 
 sensations, so do other causes seem to lie back of these. 
 
 We have traced the notion of external cause from the begin- 
 ning of its evolution to the point where it represents external 
 substance acting in space and time, upon the mind and upon 
 itself. Both material for the construction and the construction 
 itself have been accounted for. To the very critical, there may 
 seem to be a great difference between the raw materials fur- 
 nished by experience and the elements of which the structure 
 is ultimately composed. Indeed it may be remarked that there 
 are elements in the complete idea which experience, in its nar- 
 row sense, did not provide. We have seen, I think, how all 
 the elements are wrought into ultimate shape by the mind's 
 operation upon itself. If the mind has contributed some ma- 
 terial, it has done no more than it always does when, out of 
 primary forms, it constructs derivative ones. To the 
 
 very critical, it may also occur that all the factors of the process 
 of construction have not been named. The truth of the objec- 
 tion is very favorable to the views above promulgated. Great 
 advantage might have been derived from a more exhaustive 
 exposition. I shall illustrate. When dealing with the earliest 
 representation of an externality, we noticed how it was bettered 
 by adding to it modifications which it lacked at first ; but did 
 not remark how it was perfected by depriving it of modifica- 
 tions which at first it had. Thus we are chargeable with 
 omission. Externality being first represented by a mode very 
 unlike anything external, misrepresentation would be rapidly 
 eliminated. Every recognition that something internal is not 
 the external cause represented, would remove a resemblance of 
 the representation to this thing internal. The exclusion of 
 qualifications from the representation would be both a sub- 
 traction of error and an addition of truth. This process of 
 exclusion, however, although continuous throughout the evolu- 
 tion of ideas, is too subtle for detail, and is not sufficiently 
 prominent to require it. The concurrent process of direct 
 inclusion very properly received our entire attention. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 203 
 
 To protract our review much further is needless. Likeness 
 after likeness, between the world of phenomena and the world 
 of nournena, has been incidentally disclosed in exhibiting the 
 synthesis of symbols, which was the subject of investigation. 
 Pages back it would have been competent to stop and claim a 
 sufficient positive refutation of Mr. Spencer's doctrine, that 
 between mind and not-mind there is an absolute dissimilarity 
 of nature. Yet, lest it be not obvious that consciousness can 
 symbolically simulate something more definite than the abstrac- 
 tion, "substance acting in space and time," it is advisable not 
 to omit a few suggestions illustrative of the fact. That 
 
 Figure is portrayed as belonging to outside agencies should not 
 be perplexing after the foregoing explanation-. Form is given 
 in every state of consciousness. This is true of both form- of 
 being and forms of activity. Difference, Likeness, and Iden- 
 tity, which things outside of consciousness present, have coun- 
 terparts inside. As to Number, Homogeneity and Heteroge- 
 neity, Whole and Part, any reader may be trusted to make 
 appropriate reflections. Size is relative extension. This is 
 constantly presented in consciousness; as are also Separability, 
 Inseparability, and Ideal Divisibility. Of Mobility and Immo- 
 bility we may say the same. In the abstract, [ncompressibility 
 is an exclusion, and Coherence, a cohesion of mode-; and when 
 so regarded, consciousness is remarked to present numberless 
 instances of each. Rich in materials, it isnol surprising 
 
 if' the mind i- felicitous in construction. The process beyond 
 the point to which it has been carried must be left to the reader's 
 imagination, aided by the last exhibition of materials. .My aim 
 wastoaocount for the idea of Bubstance acting in space and time. 
 
 I wish to preclade a probable criticism by observing, tint 
 ideas pre-logically developed are ;»t leasl as reliable a- ideas 
 Logically developed. It may be said that I have been arguing 
 on the supposition that the disputed attributes are poss — d by 
 that which is called "The Unknowable Cau .'" [f 1 had 
 done this, I could claim to have shown the Belf-consisten 
 Realism; but I claim to have done much more. Empl 
 only necessary mental modes, the effort was to show how these 
 
204 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 are constructed into ideas of noumena. If this has been done, 
 such ideas of noumena as have been accounted for, guarantee 
 the existence of noumena possessing the qualities which these 
 ideas represent; for the ideas, being necessitated by facts within 
 the mind, must, even to their aspect of identity with noumena, 
 be consistent with facts without the mind. But if it 
 
 were necessary to rely upon logical process, we should not be 
 without rational support. For instance, when b follows a in 
 consciousness, we may conclude by a logical process that the 
 immediate cause of b did not precede the immediate cause of a 
 outside. Given the present affections of consciousness, and we 
 can logically justify the preponderance of our beliefs in regard 
 to noumena. To them the rules of logic apply with good effect. 
 Logical, as well as pre-logical, conclusions, then, evidence a com- 
 munity of nature between the outside world and our ideas of it. 
 
 § 64. A congruity, greater than might have been anticipated, 
 remains to be pointed out. Before attempting to explain how 
 thought can transcend consciousness, it was said, " that a like mys- 
 tery is presented in every act of memory and anticipation." To 
 have found that one explanation is sufficient to clear up the several 
 varieties of the mystery, would have been a significant coinci- 
 dence; but to have found that cognizance of the external in space 
 is actually evolved from cognizance of the external in time, brings 
 our detached speculations into remarkably complete congruity. 
 
 The symbol of a remembered cause is, to a certain extent, a 
 reproduction thereof — is a reproduction of the cause to the 
 exact extent to which the cause is before the mind. The 
 reproduction is not only like the cause, but, in a degree, is the 
 cause. Just as the posture which the body assumes to-day 
 may be identical with one which it has had before; so may a 
 form of mind be, more or less, no other than a form before 
 obtaining The periods may be two, while the form is one. 
 A wntclTdoes not change its identity by being taken apart and 
 put toother again; nor by the substitution of a few old parts 
 bv new ones. It is obvious, then, why the state employed in 
 the act of memory is identified with the state remembered. 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. L' 1 >fi 
 
 The habit of identifying the symbol and the tiling is Dot 
 laid aside when the mind arises to the contemplation of thi 
 never within experience, because there is nothing in the 
 distinction between temporal and spacial externality requiring 
 that it should be. The first impression of an externality is that it 
 was some prior state of mind — some state again existing through 
 reproduction. While it is gradually excluded from actual 
 experience, the impression is not lost that it was a state now 
 within experience. The region of unconsciousness is not at first 
 recognized as differing from consciousness in anything except 
 that it is not within the field of memory. There was no mani- 
 fest incongruity in identifying a state of mind with a state 
 not rememberable. Xor was there manifest incongruity in 
 identifying something within experience with something be- 
 fore not within experience. Necessarily there would be a 
 confirmed habit of identifying the internal with the ex- 
 terna] long before the development of adequate ideas of 
 externality. 
 
 Thus it would result that the idea must ever be identified 
 with the external object, unless something should intervene to 
 differentiate perception of the one from perception of the other. 
 But there could Ik.' no such differentiation; for the only means 
 of apprehending the object is to identify it with it- representa- 
 tion. To distinguish the object from the idea, a new idea must 
 be introduced, which, in turn, culls for identification or a third 
 idea a- objectionable as itself. Moreover, there is no experience 
 demanding the differentiation. The mode produced may l'" 
 found not to consist with experiences; l»iit in such cases the im- 
 pression i-, not thai an interna] mode has been mistaken for a 
 mode external, hut that an imaginary external mode has been 
 mistaken for a real one Even speculation does no! demand 
 that the differentiation should take place. When it divides the 
 symbol from it- object, it is obliged t<» confess that it contem- 
 plates the object by identification with a duplicate Bymbol. It 
 is bound to find, and it does find, propriety in the identification 
 of the sign with the signified. The differentiation would require 
 judgment that the thing within and the thin- without differ in 
 
206 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 this, and this, and this; whereas, in as far as the thing is before 
 the mind, they do not differ, but are the same. The differentia- 
 tion would require judgment that the form within the mind is 
 not the form without; whereas identity of form is largely in 
 excess of substantial diversity. The differentiation would 
 require the complicating of perception with the distinction 
 between the thing and the idea as the correlatives of an impres- 
 sion; whereas their likeness in this respect is of all-absorbing 
 importance. The differentiation would require judgment that 
 the thing contemplated in perception and conception is not the 
 cause of the sensation; whereas it is the cause of the sensation 
 which the mind has chiefly in contemplation, whatever else 
 may be identified with it — the contemplation itself, not specu- 
 lation about it, determining its correlative. There is, we see, 
 neither possibility nor necessity of contrasting ( except in specu- 
 lation ) the things of which we are conscious with the things of 
 which we think. They bear the same relation to the act which 
 identifies them. Besides other points of identity, they are one 
 as related to the act (or part-act) of contemplating them as one. 
 
 § 65. As with the world outside, so is consciousness acquainted 
 with more of mind than consciousness contains. This we all 
 spontaneously believe. This Mr. Spencer admits so far as exist- 
 ence is concerned. This is probable in view of the sameness of 
 nature which must exist between modes underlying consciousness 
 and modes therein; and is rendered more probable by the 
 lately discussed power of communion with the external world. 
 It may be otherwise enforced. 
 
 Mr. Spencer argues that cognition, being "the establishment 
 of some connection between subjective states, answering to some 
 connection between objective agencies," "it is clear that the 
 process, no matter how far it be carried, can never bring within 
 the reach of Intelligence • • •• the states themselves." What 
 being within the reach of intelligence means, should have been 
 explained. It seems to be a tenet of Agnosticism, that if we 
 should come into possession of all knowledge, we should be 
 compelled to reject as illusive all that appears in consciousness. 
 
 
THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 207 
 
 That a state of mind can be and not be real, when being and 
 reality mean the same, is an assertion not congenial for anv one 
 to make; yet it is implied in the denial of our power to know 
 anything in itself. If a mental state is a real phenomenon, it is 
 therefore a real noumenon: inasmuch as we know it, we know 
 a noumenon. I insist upon this because it is of positive 
 advantage to Realism; and not because Mr. Spencer denies it; 
 for I do not understand that he does. Being known in con- 
 sciousness, is, in his view, to be known so far, but to be known 
 no farther. 
 
 From the knowledge of the subject which he admits, may 
 be obtained the knowledge which he denies. Beyond the rela- 
 tions of co-existence and sequence which mental affections bear 
 to each other, something of their natures is presented in con- 
 sciousness. It needs only to contrast love and hate, to bring 
 an instance before us. Of so much of the natures of mental 
 states as we can know in consciousness, we can unquestionably 
 
 form true ideas — ideas resembling the realities for which the 
 
 stand. These ideas we can divide in a way in which their 
 correlatives are in fact never divided. With these ideas and 
 their elements we can form combinations BUch as fcheir correla- 
 tives never form. Thus we can, probably by logical pr 
 certainly by a process of psychological development, arise to 
 truths concerning subjective modifications, which are, Btrictly 
 speaking, never presented in consciousness. It is by this pro- 
 cess that such abstractions as joy, hope, fear, regret, are obtained. 
 Probably to this process we are largely indebted for the r< cog- 
 nition of our own personality. 
 
 I must support the above by saying thai Mr. Spencer never 
 thinks of denying thai reproduced modifications of mind are 
 formed into combinations expressive of more than consciousness 
 directly reveals. Without the power of in Borne manner tran- 
 scending the presentations of consciousness there could be no 
 understanding of* Evolution. Withoul this power, it would 
 be impossible to think that mind, as we know it, may be 
 reduced to co-existences and sequences of states; this th 
 being an alluvium of the flow of consciousD 
 
208 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 
 
 Once across the line which divides mind as presented, from 
 mind as only represented, there seems no necessary limit to our 
 progress. If conception can give us a more thorough compre- 
 hension of mind than perception, why call any part of its 
 nature unknowable because it cannot be perceived? 
 
 What are the arguments with which this and the preceding 
 three chapters deal? They are confessedly arguments "from 
 the very nature of our intelligence." (First Prin., § 27.) 
 From the nature of intelligence as given in perception? By 
 no means : they are deductions from the intrinsic nature of in- 
 telligence, known only by symbolization. The inconsistency 
 is an inevitable one. Were the deduction from appearances 
 only, it would have no conclusiveness; for, notwithstanding 
 appearances to the contrary, we could imagine an acquaintance 
 of mind with its environment and with itself. Again: as no 
 essential inability to comprehend is perceivable, it can be known 
 only by conception; but if we truly represent more of a thing 
 than is perceptible, we so far represent its intrinsic nature. 
 To deduce unknowableness from the nature of mind, is neces- 
 sarily to rely upon symbols of more of its nature than 
 consciousness presents. 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 209 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Tin: Final Argument. 
 
 The Reconciliation Between Science and Religion, 
 
 § GG. There remains for our consideration a leading argu- 
 ment to which all those so far examined are Bupposed to be 
 subsidiary. With the preliminaries of this argument, the 
 treatise on "The Unknowable" begins, and with its culmination 
 that treatise is brought to a conclusion; while intervening dis- 
 cussions are thought to converge at the point to which it leads. 
 Valued by the rule- of logical estimation, it will be found n<»t 
 to merit the prominence, or to demand the degree of elaboration, 
 in which it has been presented: it falls toofarshorl of d 
 stration to be conclusive, and is too simple to require much detail. 
 But valued with regard to its practical efficiency, it will 
 prove not to have been overestimated; for its deviation from 
 logical rigidity insures it an extensive audience, and its relation 
 to the dearest interests of mankind carries it to the hearts of 
 all. The exact bearing of these remark- may be besl mani- 
 fested by making known the character of the argument which 
 they concern. Seizing upon the obvious necessity for a i 
 ciliation between Science and Religion, Mr. Spencer turned it 
 to his purpose, by arguing thai the basis of reconciliation musl 
 be the doctrine thai nothing in itself is knowable. This is 
 substantially bis presentation of the argument. 
 
 "Of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the 
 mosl profound and the tnoel important, is thai ben:— □ Religion 
 and Science." | Firsl Prin., § 3.) Religion is too deeply rooted 
 in our nature, Science too obviously grounded on fact, to be 
 discarded. "On both rides of this greal conta then, 
 
 truth musl exist.. ' ' ' And if both have b.i-. - in the reality 
 
 of things, then between them there musl be a fundamental 
 
 11 
 
210 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 harmony." (First Prin., § 6.) This being so, "we have to 
 discover some fundamental verity which Religion will assert, 
 with all possible emphasis, in the absence of Science; and which 
 Science, with all possible emphasis, will assert in the absence of 
 Religion — some fundamental verity in the defence of which 
 each will find the other its ally." ( First Prin., § 6.) As a belief 
 common to all religions must be highly abstract; and as 
 "Religion can take no cognizance of special scientific doctrines," 
 nor Science take cognizance of special religious doctrines; "the 
 most abstract truth contained in Religion and the most abstract 
 truth contained in Science must be the one in which the two 
 coalesce. The largest fact to be found within our mental range 
 must be the one of which we are in search. Uniting these 
 positive and negative poles of human thought, it must be the ulti- 
 mate fact in our intelligence." (First Prin., § 7.) "Religions 
 diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are yet perfectly at 
 one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world with 
 all it contains and all which surrounds it is a mystery ever 
 pressing for interpretation. On this point, if on no other, there 
 is entire unanimity." (First Prin., § 14.) Every theory of 
 creation " tacitly asserts two things : firstly, that there is some- 
 thing to be explained; secondly, that such and such is the 
 explanation." (First Prin., § 14.) But "analysis of every 
 possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is 
 sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus 
 the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far 
 more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect — not 
 a relative, but an absolute mystery. 
 
 "Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest 
 possible certainty — a truth in which religions in general are 
 at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to 
 their special dogmas. * * * If Religion and Science are to be 
 reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, 
 and most certain of all facts — that the Power which the Uni- 
 verse manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." (FirstPrin., § 14.) 
 
 An outline of the whole argument will be before us when we 
 have added the following. 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 211 
 
 "The consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to 
 us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and 
 must eventually be freed from its imperfections. The certainty 
 that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other 
 hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, 
 is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first 
 been progressing. To this conclusion Science inevitably arrives 
 as it reaches its confines; while to this conclusion Religion is 
 irresistibly driven by criticism." (First Prin., § 31.) 
 
 As intimated before, it cannot be denied that this argument 
 ha- much practical efficiency. It consists of reasoning bo far 
 from close as to be apprehended by the many, and is embodied 
 in propositions so general that its force may be felt by those 
 who do not clearly apprehend it. Moreover, its spirit is con- 
 genial to multitudes in both the religious and the scientific 
 camps who are wasted and wearied by the perennial conflict 
 between the two great systems of belief. Having -aid so much 
 regarding it- practical strength, let us address ourselves to die 
 question of its logical stability. 
 
 Instead of following it step by step, I prefer to attack it at 
 the point where all its parts converge. That intellectual evolu- 
 tion is bringing us to the recognition of an absolute and eternal 
 nescience, is the sum and substance of it all. This proposition 
 is divisible into two: that scientific progress is a spontaneous 
 advance, and religious progress a forced retreat, towards the 
 point where things in themselves are seen to be unknowable. 
 Of these divisions in their order. 
 
 § 67. Ajs author of the dissertation on "The Unknowable," 
 Mr. Spencer considered himself the oracle of thai department 
 of Science distinguished a- Metaphysics. To do this waa im- 
 proper onlyon the supposition thai his reasonings were al fault 
 Were they at fault? or does Metaphysical Science support the 
 conclusion he proclaimed? Foregoing criticism providi 
 
 with an answer. 
 
 Both induction and deduction have forced upon as < hap. 1 1. 
 
 the truth, that every argument \\-*-<\, or which can be used, in 
 
212 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 proof of unknowableness, is based on the knowledge it purports 
 to prove impossible. A number of problems, considered 
 insoluble and supposed to be peculiar to Ontology, were found 
 in the first place ( Chaps. III., IV., & V.) capable of solution, 
 and in the second place (Chap. VI.) presenting themselves for 
 solution to Phenomenology. Deductions from the nature of 
 intelligence were investigated with consonant result. The first 
 we found to be drawn from a gross misconception of the 
 process of comprehension; and learned that the actual nature 
 thereof does not exclude realities from its sphere. ( Chap. VII.) 
 In the second instance it was ascertained ( Chap. VIII.) that the 
 unknowableness deduced was the unknowableness of something 
 neither in existence nor capable of existence. The next 
 deduction we learned ( Chap. IX.) to be at best meaningless ; to 
 be drawn from an erroneous definition of life; and not to 
 follow from either this or a proper definition. Taking then 
 in hand an implied deduction, it was shown in opposition thereto, 
 (Chap. X.) by testimony of consciousness and admission of 
 opponents, that absolute knowledge is probable ; by criticism and 
 analysis, that it is possible; and by synthesis, that it is easily 
 accounted for. In conclusion of the same chapter it was made 
 manifest that the deductive arguments are essentially suicidal. 
 Now the last argument is before us; and the summary here 
 ended indicates a weakness in that argument too. The Science 
 of Metaphysics is, then, repugnant to Mr. Spencer's views. 
 We must next inquire if it is not so with Science in general. 
 
 After citing an illustration to which we shall afterwards 
 advert, the author proceeds to say: "Thus it is with Science in 
 general. Its progress in grouping particular relations of phe- 
 nomena under laws, and these special laws under laws more 
 and more general, is of necessity a progress to causes that are 
 more and more abstract. And causes more and more abstract, 
 are of necessity causes less and less conceivable; since the 
 formation of an abstract conception involves the dropping of 
 certain concrete elements of thought. Hence the most abstract 
 conception, to which Science is ever slowly approaching, is one 
 that merges into the inconceivable or unthinkable, by the 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 213 
 
 dropping of all concrete elements of thought." ( First Prin.. 
 In the next section we find the following: "The better inter- 
 pretation of each phenomenon has been, on the one hand, the 
 rejection of a cause that was relatively conceivable in its nature 
 but unknown in the order of its actions, and, on the other 
 hand, the adoption of a cause that was known in the order of 
 its actions but relatively inconceivable in its nature." 
 
 The a priori absurdity of the proposition, that the bettor inter- 
 pretation of each phenomenon has been the rejection ofa more and 
 the adoption of a less conceivable cause, is so great a- to amount 
 toasufficient refutation. It is beyond dispute that the consequent 
 is best explained through the antecedent, when the latter La m<»~t 
 intelligible. So unbelievable is it that nescience is the light of 
 knowledge, that I am in favor of finding Mr. Spencer guilty 
 of a lapsus of expression. His meaning probably is not that 
 better interpretation has been the substitution of definite by 
 vague causes, but that such substitution is the concomitant of 
 better interpretation. The latter rendering best harmonizes 
 with the declaration, that the progress of Science "in grouping 
 particular relations of phenomena under laws, and these special 
 laws under laws more and more general, is of necessity a on 
 to causes that are more and more abstract." We have, then, 
 to deal with a very different argument from the one which at 
 firs! seemed to have been presented. It is, let me say, a much 
 more rational argument. The progn I 
 
 collectively, certainly doea furnish much seeming justific 
 of the inference that the scientific conception of causal ag 
 is becoming more and more abstract The ever pr 
 ever widening assimilation of fad to fact, and consequent 
 attribution to like antecedents, is an assimilation of antecedent to 
 antecedent, and a consequent dropping from to 
 peculiarities. Will the process in time remove from th< 
 ception of causation all it- concrete elements, leaving us t<> 
 attribute all things to :i mere existence? 
 
 It i< difficult to discover any grounds for thinking - 
 change towards an extreme implies that the extreme most - 
 time be reached, there is no end t<» the anomalies which 
 
214 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 universal change implies. In particular, if the extreme must 
 in this case be reached, we should prepare to abolish, as some 
 propose to do, the hypothesis of noumenal causation altogether, 
 and look for the conditions of every fact in antecedent phe- 
 nomena. On the supposition that the comprehension of 
 phenomena, consists, and wholly consists, in assimilation to other 
 phenomena, this is the culmination to be expected. Mr. 
 Spencer is settled in the belief, however, that when the cause 
 has been deprived of all attributes but existence, the process of 
 subtraction must cease. But what is the evidence that the con- 
 ception of causal agency is to become as attenuated as is 
 compatible w r ith its persistence in thought? The only evi- 
 dence left for us to consider is that it is moving towards a 
 state of so great attenuation. To reasons for saying that 
 
 it might move past Mr. Spencer's culminating point, may be 
 added reasons for thinking that it w 7 ill not move so far. When 
 ,the cause has come to be conceived as substance acting in space 
 and time, the increase in the vagueness of its representation 
 must give place to a counter-change. As support for this ex- 
 pression of my views, I will name the fact, upon which we can 
 scarcely place too much emphasis, that "The Unknowable" is 
 not, and cannot be, conceived as unqualified being; but is, and 
 must be, represented as some kind of substance acting somehow 
 in space and time. Tell us that space, for instance, is but an 
 impression wrought by external being upon consciousness, and 
 immediately we picture the cause you name as spacially external, 
 spacially extended, and changing its spacial and temporal rela- 
 tions in the production of the appearance of space. Back of 
 space, time, substance, and activity, when viewed as phenomena, 
 we place that organism of things, of which, on the realistic 
 hypothesis, each is a member, and which all compose. 
 
 Supporting this consideration is a fact which Mr. Spencer 
 strangely overlooks. As in assimilation of causes attributes 
 are necessarily dropped, so in assimilation of effects is there a 
 necessary progress towards abstractness. " Progress in grouping 
 particular relations of phenomena under laws, and these special 
 laws under laws more and more general, is of necessity a 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 215 
 
 progress to causes that are more and more abstract;" but it is 
 similarly a progress to phenomena that arc mure and more ab- 
 stract. For the same reason that the Universal Cause is Less 
 definitely conceived than the cause of but one effect, the Uni- 
 versal Effect is less definitely conceived than is a particular 
 effect. Science is ever adding to the denotations of the word 
 "effect/ 7 and detracting from its connotations: will it therefore 
 eventually mean no more than "caused existence?" There i> 
 the same reason for thinking so, that there is for thinking that 
 the ultimate signification of "cause" will be "causing exist- 
 ence." Observe now, which will add something to the 
 last consideration, that the assimilation of can-.'- is represented 
 as resulting from assimilation of effects. The assimilation of 
 two effects brings about the assimilation of their two causes; 
 three causes assimilated, signifies three effect- previously assimi- 
 lated. The grouping or unification of all causes, therefore, 
 depends upon the prior grouping or unification of all effects. 
 Effects are to vanish before their causes from the realm of con- 
 templation! In both cases, tin- truth is, there will be 
 the same deliverance: effects, no more than causes, can be 
 reduced to anything less definite than substantia] activity. 
 
 A second fact, of like bearing, which Mr. Spencer baa 
 overlooked, is that scientific progress does oot entirely consist in 
 likening one thing to another. If it did, the grand fin 
 Science would be the disappearance from it- sphere of all fact-; 
 for in no respect do all phenomena agree, except that in which 
 they agree with "The Unknowable." In tie' universe, differ- 
 ence, if not preponderant over similarity, i- no more capable of 
 elimination. Each phenomenon presents something peculiar to 
 itself — something thai will not classify; and this element p r- 
 vades all others. Co-extensive, if not more than co-ext naive, 
 with recognition of likeness, must therefore ignition of 
 
 unlikeness. No fact ia thoroughly underet I until it i- not 
 
 only completely likened to tie' like, but also compli I 
 
 trasted with the unlike. Should we. how* 7i r, 
 
 Science as solely occupied in reducing facts I 
 and therefore to greater coherence and h< I 
 
216 THE FINAL AKGUMENT. 
 
 should be guilty of an aberration similar to that of Mr. Spencer 
 when he represents Science as solely occupied in reducing facts 
 to greater indefiniteness, and therefore (although he Avould be 
 loath to accept this consequence) to greater incoherence and 
 homogeneity. Science does neither solely. The decomposition 
 of facts and assortment of their like elements into general notions, 
 should be understood to be but a mean to the better understanding 
 of the objective synthesis, in which they are presented, and in 
 which they are to be ultimately construed. Now another 
 
 qualification must be subjoined. Neither through unlikeness 
 alone, nor through likeness alone, nor yet through a combination 
 of the two, may things obtain a final comprehension. The 
 relation of cause and effect is a circumstance very available in 
 reducing facts to their most comprehensible form. Causes 
 that best explain their effects are those most definitely con- 
 ceived. I shall attempt to illustrate so as to meet all Mr. 
 Spencer's arguments to the contrary. The child who hears 
 "hard times" attributed to a providential visitation, remains in 
 about as much perplexity as before. It is not because the 
 agency named, or rather its mode of operation, is not classified 
 or not distinguished : on the contrary, the instance of causation 
 to be understood is assimilated to the one, and distinguished 
 from the other, moiety of all familiar instances of causation. 
 The difficulty is that the relation of antecedent and consequent 
 is not definitely delineable. For if we make it still less defi- 
 nite, by telling the child that an unconditioned cause was that 
 which occasioned the fact to be explained, we advance an 
 explanation less efficient than the one previously advanced. 
 Suppose we try the opposite experiment of naming a very 
 definite cause — suppose we attribute the mysterious effect to 
 the prevalence of dark spots upon the sun. "Here," we may 
 suppose Mr. Spencer to interpose, "you have named a very 
 definite cause, but the child is as far from comprehension as 
 before." True; but not to the point. Comprehension through 
 the relation of cause and effect requires not merely a definite 
 cause; but requires nothing less than definite causation. Wait 
 until we have made the causation in question definitely con- 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 217 
 
 ceivable, by explaining to the child that the sun spots, by 
 affecting crops, affected the general prosperity, and you will find 
 that a flood of light will break upon his understanding. 
 "But," we may suppose Mr. Spencer to object, "you must, if 
 you wish the child to understand the truth, ultimately supplant 
 the definite solution just given by another Less definite; a- you 
 will perceive when you reflect that the real cause of 'hard 
 times' was the failure of a single business house, which, by 
 destroying mutual confidence, disturbed condition- of unstable 
 equilibrium, and hence brought about a crash." Very true, 
 and equally inconclusive. It would be useless folly to deny 
 that the right solution is frequently less definite than the wrong 
 solution. Nor is this tact dm- in every case to accident: neces- 
 sarily an explanation which has long had possession of tin- field 
 ha- come to be definitely conceived; and an explanation just 
 arising to supplant it is necessarily vague. But no sooner does 
 a new solution take the place of an old one than it begins :<> 
 develop definiteness. Having given to die child the last solu- 
 tion, how do you better it, but by going further into details? 
 The initial failure is sufficiently intelligible to the child; but it' 
 it were not, we would explain that SO much was due \\> 
 much owing there, and that the embarrassment consequent upon 
 the disproportion increased the same, ultimately bringing about 
 suspension and exposure. Disturbances of unstable equilib- 
 rium, and the following of failure from failure, we might 
 plain by the familiar and exceedingly definite illustration of a 
 structure of cards falling into utter ruin upon the withdrawal 
 of one. Throughout our illustration, it has been uniformly 
 manifested that the light which causation throw- upon the 
 mystery of it- effect, i- proportionate t" the definiteness with 
 which it is itself conceived. When t" this we add 
 
 the conclusion, previously '. that phenomena ai 
 
 incapable of complete assimilation as they are of unf. 
 distinction, we shall apprehend no approach t" the conception 
 of the 1 Fniversal Cause as an indefinite existent 
 
 A teleologies! argument may b 
 who occasionally resorts to argument* of the kind. I 
 
218 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 deprived of explanation through causation would be a sore 
 affliction. We are not to be consoled by telling us that dis- 
 tinction and assimilation are powerful aids to comprehension. 
 Are they alone as efficient as they and a realization, an extensive 
 realization, of causation would be? We must answer that they 
 are not. Mr. Spencer himself has spoken a confirmation of 
 our misgivings. I do not refer to his belief that all facts 
 are deducible, and have been by him in a manner deduced, from 
 the continued existence of "The Unknowable." (First Prin., 
 Part II., Chap. VI.) What I refer to is this: "were self- 
 existence conceivable, it would not in any sense be an explana- 
 tion of the Universe. No one will say that the existence of an 
 object at the present moment is made easier to understand by 
 the discovery that it existed an hour ago, a day ago, or a year 
 ago. • * * The assertion that the Universe is self-existent does 
 not really carry us a step beyond the cognition of its present 
 existence; and so leaves us with a mere re-statement of the 
 mystery." (First Prin., § 11.) After this we read with dissent, 
 that " whoever contemplates the relation in which it stands to 
 the truths of science in general, will see that" the truth which 
 is "the basis of science" is "the Persistence of Force" (First 
 Prin., § 61.); and that "by the Persistence of Force, we really 
 mean the persistence of some Cause which transcends our 
 knowledge and conception." (First Prin., § 62.) We must 
 incline to the prior persuasion, that continued existence (for 
 so he defines " persistence " ) is a very shadowy basis of solution ; 
 that it explains present existence, but little more. It is 
 probable, as we found it to be desirable, that the Cause which 
 Science is ever investigating will always present greater 
 definiteness than that of an unconditioned existence. 
 
 The illustration of Mr. Spencer's views concerning the 
 progress of Science, to which it was said we should return, is 
 the following. 
 
 " Of old the Sun was regarded as the chariot of a god, drawn 
 by horses. * * * When, many centuries after, Kepler discovered 
 that the planets moved round the Sun in ellipses and described 
 equal areas in equal times, he concluded that in each planet 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 219 
 
 there must exist a spirit to guide its movements. * ' ■ When. 
 finally, it was proved that these planetary revolutions with all 
 their variations and disturbances, conformed to one universal 
 law — when the presiding spirits which Kepler conceived were 
 set aside, and the force of gravitation put in their place; the 
 change was really the abolition of an imaginable agency, and 
 the substitution of an unimaginable one. For though the law 
 of gravitation is within our mental grasp, it is impossible to 
 realize in thought the force of gravitation." (First Prin., § 29.) 
 
 I consider this example as about the most favorable to him- 
 self that Mr. Spencer could have chosen. Here are some that 
 do not favor him. The cause of the sensation of color, and of 
 its various modifications, has been made more definitely conceiv- 
 able by the more definite understanding of the nature of Light 
 The sensations of heat and light are more completely accounted 
 for than they would be if we had not ceased to attribute them 
 to fluid substances which are so unlike fluids as to pass thr 
 dense objects, such as glass or metal, much better than they 
 pass through porous objects, such as wood. The cause of sound 
 is much more clearly conceived by the instructor who gives the 
 explanation, than by the scholar who Deeds it. A farm-boy 
 has a very indefinite notion of the antecedents which terminate 
 in the visible and conspicuous result of incubation; to the 
 biologist its antecedents are far from vague. Tip' operation of 
 tic machinery covered by his -kin is known to the Bavageonly 
 through its external manifestations; while a definite a 
 standing of its hidden nature i> at one- the aim ami the pride of 
 an important department of Science. These examples, an. I they 
 might If indefinitely multiplied, show that scientific pro 
 is frequently towards a more detailed comprehension of can 
 
 My choice of illustrations has been both guided and circum- 
 scribed by a fact unfortunately not noticed by Sir, S 
 Mysteries which are conspicuous and striking are the ones that 
 present themselves as such to primitive man, and an- th 
 therefore to which he seeks t>» find solutions, Hi- solutions 
 being as definite a- hi- sense of gen iral congruity will p rrait, 
 are very definite indeed, and must be subsequently 
 
220 THE FINAL AKGUMENT. 
 
 by others less definite. So that if I should choose a conspicuous 
 mystery as the basis of illustration, I should be met by the fact 
 that the first inquirers have given it a definite solution, early 
 scientists have given it a less definite solution, and later 
 scientists have given it a solution the least definite of all. The 
 examples given are not, therefore, as striking as the one of which 
 Mr. Spencer has availed himself and others available to him. 
 
 As has been already noticed, the general remarks just ended 
 have a very important present application. On a priori grounds 
 one ignorant of the fact might satisfy himself that the apparent 
 motion of the sun must find a solution before the dawn of 
 Science; that the first solution must be as definite as contempo- 
 raneous knowledge would allow it to be; and that Science must 
 sometime advance a less definite solution, perhaps falling into a 
 similar error to be afterwards similarly corrected. Such indeed 
 is part of the history of Science; but it is not all. Science 
 often prefers a vague solution to one less vague; but when it 
 has chosen between solutions, it wishes the one chosen to be, 
 and proceeds to make it, as definite as it can be made. 
 
 If this is not so, what means the hypothesis of influences 
 projected from object to object through an intervening medium? 
 Would not Science advance materially, if some one should ex- 
 plain clearly what the force of gravitation is? This is a test 
 question. If a solution of gravitation as definite, for instance, 
 as a child can have of the mysteries of a watch, would in the 
 least advance Science, the progress of Science is not essentially 
 towards vaguer representations of causation. 
 
 We have found nothing favoring, but very much opposing, 
 the conclusion that a settled nescience is to be an outcome of 
 scientific progress. That an examination of Religious evolution 
 will show the same result, is, therefore, highly probable. 
 
 § 68. With a mere reference to the foregoing exposition, we 
 may dismiss the claim that Science is, or ever has been, forcing 
 Religion to a realm of nescience. If Religion will not spon- 
 taneously accept an "Unknowable Cause" as the object of its 
 contemplation, there is nothing to force it into doing so. What 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 221 
 
 is the author's theory of the germination and development of 
 Religion? The following is an abstract of the account which 
 he gives in the first part of his work on Sociology. 
 
 Primitive man shows no native tendency towards super- 
 natural interpretation. Only after he has been " betrayed i nt< i an 
 initial error" (§ 205) — only after certain experiences have 
 suo-o-ested to him the existence of spirits, does he begin to think 
 of them as agencies. He "regards a dream as a series of actual 
 adventures: he did the things, went to the places, saw the per- 
 sons dreampt of." (§ 206.) While he was conscious of his 
 absence from his couch, others were conscious of his presence. 
 "Untroubled bv incongruities, he accepts the fact- as they stand; 
 and, in proportion as he thinks about them, he is Led to conceive 
 a double which goes away during sleep and cornea back." 
 (§205.) The unconsciousness of sleep being first explained 
 by the absence of the other-self, all kinds of unconsciousness 
 are eventually explained in the same way. The explanation is 
 little by little extended to the insensibility of swoon, apo- 
 plexy, catalepsy, ecstasy, coma, wounds, and finally death. 
 Other kinds of unconsciousness being terminated by renewal 
 of animation, the earliest inference of the savage is that death 
 is so terminated. "He witnesses insensibilities various in 
 their lengths and various in their degrees. Alter the im- 
 k majority of them there come animations — daily after 
 sleep, frequently after swoon, occasionally after coma, now and 
 then after wounds or blows. What aboul this oth 
 insensibility? — will nol reanimation follow this also? 3 
 Among other experiences, reanimation after supposed death 
 "helps to convince him thai the insensibility of death is like 
 all other insensibilities— only temporary." I S B2.) From the 
 not i on of an after-life terminated by return of the soul to the 
 body, "the notion of an enduring after-life is reached tl 
 Btages." ( § 100.) "The idea of death' differentiates dowry 
 from the ideaof temporary insensibility. At ii: 
 is looked for in a few ho,.,-, or in a few days, or in a I 
 and gradually, as death becomes more definitely 
 reanimation is not looked for till the end of all tl 
 
222 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 "The doubles of dead men, at first assumed to have but 
 temporary second lives, do not, in that case, tend to form in 
 popular belief an accumulating host; but they necessarily tend 
 to form such a host when permanent second lives are ascribed 
 to them. Swarming everywhere, capable of appearing and 
 disappearing at will, and working in ways that cannot be fore- 
 seen, they are thought of as the causes of all things which are 
 strange, unexpected, inexplicable. Every deviation from the 
 ordinary is ascribed to their agency; and their agency is alleged 
 even where what we call natural causation seems obvious." (§ 206.) 
 "With the development of the doctrine of ghosts, there grows 
 up an easy solution of all those changes which the heavens and 
 earth are hourly exhibiting. Clouds that gather and presently 
 vanish, shooting stars that appear and disappear, sudden 
 darkenings of the water's surface by a breeze, animal-meta- 
 morphoses, transmutations of substance, storms, earthquakes, 
 eruptions — all of them become explicable. These beings, to 
 whom is ascribed the power of making themselves now visible 
 and now invisible, and to whose other powers no limits are 
 known, are omnipresent. Accounting as they seem to do for 
 all unexpected changes, their own existence becomes further 
 verified." (§ 118.) The "machinery of causation which 
 primitive mau is inevitably led to frame for himself, fills his 
 mind to the exclusion of any other machinery. Fully to under- 
 stand the development of human thought under all its aspects, 
 we must carefully observe that this hypothesis of ghost-agency 
 gains a settled occupation of the field, long before there is either 
 the power or the opportunity of gathering together and 
 organizing the experiences which yield the hypothesis of 
 physical causation." (§ 120.) "Thus it becomes manifest that 
 setting out with the wandering double which the dream suggests; 
 passing to the double that goes away at death; advancing from 
 this ghost, at first supposed to have but a transitory second life, 
 to ghosts which exist permanently and therefore accumulate; 
 the primitive man is led gradually to people surrounding space 
 with supernatural beings which inevitably become in his mind 
 causal agents for everything unfamiliar." (§ 206.) "Further, 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 the hypothesis to which the ghost-theory leads, at first limited t<> 
 anomalous occurrences, extends itself to all phenomena; bo that 
 the properties and actions of surrounding things, as well as the 
 thoughts and feelingsof men, are ascribed to unseen beings, who 
 thus constitute a combined mechanism of causation.'' _ 7. 
 While supernatural interpretation is extended, ideas of the 
 other world and of its inhabitants undergo development. " The 
 habitat of the dead, originally conceived as coinciding with that 
 of the living, gradually diverges — here to the adjacent 
 forest, there to the remoter forest, and elsewhere to distant hills 
 and mountains." In the imagination of the savage, "the «>tli<r- 
 life, which at first repeated this exactly, becomes more and more 
 unlike it; and its place, from a completely known adjacent 
 spot, passes to a somewhere unknown and unimagined." 
 (§ 115.) A similar change occurs in the conception 
 
 of supernatural beings. "The second-self ascribed to each 
 man, at first differs in nothing from it- original. It is figured 
 as equally visible, equally material; and no Less suffers hunger, 
 thirst, fatigue, pain. Indistinguishable from the person himself, 
 capable of being slain, drowned, or otherwise destro 
 second time, the original ghost, soul, or spirit, differentiates 
 slowly in supposed nature. Aiming to reconcile conclusions, 
 progressing thought ascribe- a Less and less gross materiality; 
 and while the ghost, having at the outset but a temporary 
 second life, gradually acquires a permanent one, it deviates 
 more and more in substance from the body: becoming ai I 
 etherealized." I § 206.) "The second-self, originally con© 
 as equally substantial with the first, grows step by step Less 
 substantial: now it i- semi-solid, dow it is aeriform, now it i- 
 ethereal. " Bya parallel progression, differ 
 
 of caste among the population of the spirit-world aria 
 stantially similar a- ghosts are at first conceived to be, they 
 become unlike as fast as the tribe grows, complicates, and b 
 to have a history : the ghost-fauna, almost h it the 
 
 outset, differential "< >ut of the tm mbl 
 
 ghosts, some evolve into deities, who retain their anthropomorphic 
 characters. As the divine and the superior are, in the 
 
224 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 primitive mind, equivalent ideas — as the living man and re- 
 appearing ghost are at first confounded in his beliefs — as ghost 
 and god are originally convertible terms; we may understand how 
 the deity develops out of the powerful man, and the ghost of the 
 powerful man, by small steps. Within the tribe the chief, the 
 magician, or the man otherwise skilled, held in awe during his 
 life as showing powers of unknown origin and extent, is feared in 
 a higher degree when, after death, he gains the further powers pos- 
 sessed by all ghosts; and still more the stranger bringing new arts, 
 as well as the conqueror of superior race, is treated as a super- 
 human being during life, and afterwards worshiped as a yet greater 
 superhuman being. Remembering that the most marvelous ver- 
 sion of any story habitually obtains the greatest currency, and that 
 so, from generation to generation, the deeds of such traditional 
 persons must grow by unchecked exaggerations eagerly listened to; 
 we may see that in time any amount of expansion and idealization 
 can be reached." (§ 206.) The apotheosis of the distinguished 
 dead is perfected by lapse of time. Remote ancestors are deified 
 before recent ones. "Along with worship of recent and 
 local ancestors, there goes worship of ancestors who died 
 at earlier dates, and who, remembered by their power or 
 position, have acquired in the general mind a supremacy." (§149.) 
 Another factor aids in giving to supernatural beings differences 
 of rank. "When social ranks are established, there follow 
 contrasts of rank and accompanying potency among supernatural 
 beings; which, as legends expand, grow more and more marked. 
 Eventually there is formed in this way a hierarchy of partially- 
 deified ancestors, demigods, great gods, and among the great 
 gods one that is supreme; while there is simultaneously formed 
 a hierarchy of diabolical powers." ( § 207.) 
 
 "The theory of the Cosmos, beginning with fitful ghost- 
 agency, and ending with the orderly action of a universal 
 Unknown Power, exemplifies once more the law fulfilled by 
 all ascending transformations." ( § 207.) 
 
 From gods and demons, Mr. Spencer's narrative passes 
 abruptly to "The Unknowable," and abruptly stops. As the 
 transition has by no means yet been made, his assumption of its 
 
THE PEBTAIi ARGUMENT. 225 
 
 actuality amounts to no more than the prediction that it will be 
 made; and the grounds of the prediction are those of which 
 we are now in consideration. A new assertion must not be 
 mistaken for additional proof. Equally gratuitous is 
 
 the assumption, that attenuation of spirit-cause will cease when 
 nothing is left to it but existence. If attribute after attribute 
 of supernatural agency fades from thought as thought pro- 
 gresses, analogy suggests that all its attributes will be excluded 
 from thought the most completely evolved. AVe shall 
 
 now see that the last transition being inadequately dealt with 
 Mr. Spencer's account of the genesis of Religion contains little, 
 if anything, in support of his nescience doctrini 
 
 For Religion Mr. Spencer makes this claim: "In its earliest and 
 crudest forms it manifested, however vaguely and inconsistently, 
 an intuition forming the germ of this highest belief in which all 
 philosophies finally unite." "It has everywhere established 
 and propagated one or other modification of the doctrine that 
 all things are manifestations of a Power that transcends our 
 knowledge." (First Prim, § 28.) 
 
 Clothed in a discreet ambiguity, this claim may seem to have 
 a substantial significance. Deprived of its ambiguousness, it 
 will stand forth in naked frailty. The "intuition forming the 
 germ of" the "highest belief," is not a vague conscdousi] 
 a power transcending knowledge. It is no more than the 
 thought, that this circle of wind and dust, or that strange 
 mocking sound, is due to some agency. Such belief may 
 "modification of the doctrine that all things are manifestations 
 of a Power that transcends our knowledge;" but it is a modi- 
 fication exclusive of the contested elements. The cause which 
 primitive religion contemplates, is nol the Cause of all thin.:--, 
 but of this or that which seems mysterious; it is Dot a cause 
 transcending all conception! but many causes definitely con- 
 ceived. The basal intuition i- that there ifl a cause, not that the 
 cause is of indefinable nature. If there be an Unknowable, if 
 is not this which early Religion contemplates. I am happy to 
 be able to quote the author to thi- effect "< '.in 90 many and 
 such varied similarities [as those between worship of deities and 
 
 10 
 
226 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 worship of the dead] have arisen in the absence of genetic 
 relationship? Suppose the two sets of phenomena uncon- 
 nected — suppose primitive men had, as some think [ the emphasis 
 is mine], the consciousness of a Universal Power whence 
 they and all other things proceeded. What probability would 
 there be that towards such a Power they would spontaneously 
 perform an act like that performed by them to the dead 
 body of a fellow savage? And if one such community would 
 not be probable, what would be the probability of two such 
 acts in common? what the probability of four? what of 
 the score communities above specified? In the absence of 
 causal relation the probability against such a correspondence 
 would be almost infinity to one." (Prin. of Sociology, § 145.) 
 This passage is of importance as a concession that the agency, 
 of which primitive Religion is now and then conscious, is not 
 "The Unknowable" — that the intuition said to form the germ 
 of the so-called highest belief has as much in common with a 
 contrary belief — that the first belief propagated by Religion 
 is no more a " modification of the doctrine that all things are 
 manifestations of a Power that transcends our knowledge," 
 than it is a modification of the doctrine that all things are 
 manifestations of a Power within our knowledge. Nay, it may 
 in strictness be held, that primitive Religion contains the germ 
 of belief in the cognoscibility of causal agency in general. 
 Here is our author's confession and avoidance of this allegation. 
 " Every religion, setting out though it does with the tacit asser- 
 tion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution of 
 this mystery; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing 
 human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions 
 they severally propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid." 
 (First Prin., § 14.) If, as may reasonably be assumed, the 
 force of this concluding qualification has been dissipated — if it 
 has been shown (Chap. III.) that religious solutions of uni- 
 versal existence are not essentially at fault; we may note the 
 admission, that not only primitive religions, but all religions, 
 embody a so-far insuperable faith that the mysteries which they 
 contemplate are not insoluble. Truly there is meaning in Mr. 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 227 
 
 Spencer's complaint that Religion "has all along pr 
 have some knowledge of that which transcends knowle 
 that, after assertion to the contrary it has, " with the next ! 
 asserted that the Cause of all things possesses such or 
 attributes — can be in so for understood." (First Prin., 
 Assuredly there is an important admission in the charge that, 
 when face to face with Science, " Religion shows a - r that 
 
 all things may some day be explained; and thus itself betrays a 
 lurking doubt whether that Incomprehensible Cause of which 
 it is conscious is really incomprehensible." (First Prin.. 
 We have now before us the means of justly estimating the 
 claim, that the kernel of Religion is the germ of Agnosticism. 
 With greater propriety may it be called the germ <>1' a 
 quite contrary belief. Dismissing, then, the argument from 
 germination as satisfactorily refuted, we shall next consider the 
 argument from development. 
 
 In what kind of change does the evolution of relig 
 belief consist? The admission must be made, that it has 
 consisted largely in change from contemplation of many definite 
 caii-- of numerous particular phenomena, to contemplation of 
 one comparatively indefinite cause of thing ml. ]< 
 
 this change to be throughout the future a mere proloi 
 what it has been in the past, until the » of nihiltv has 
 
 been reached ? We have Mr. Speno [on to the contrary. 
 
 His grounds are far from satisfactory: they arc that we cannot 
 BUppi £S i sense of something unconditioned — a doctrine which 
 we found (§§ M - 18 I to be untenable, and, so Long as the I 
 may be supposed to have conditions, irrelevant Bui tfa 
 the reason fails, the fad of admitting thai evolution may Btop for 
 ever short of extremity, remains available to as, The implica- 
 tion is that uniform p up to a certain | 
 insure like progress pas( thai point. If Mr. 8 may 
 believe ihat the excluding process will 
 only is left, we may believe that it will cease whil ittri- 
 butes remain. The obligation of bIiop this 
 Latter belief, as Mr. Sp raght to Bhow ground 
 former, of course rests on them who hold it. In brief, our 
 
228 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 grounds may be said to be that the circumstances which tend 
 to bring about attenuation of the causal conception, will, before 
 the degree of attenuation predicted by Mr. Spencer has been 
 reached, cease to operate upon it. This proposition needs 
 some expansion. 
 
 Religious advancement is partly spontaneous, partly forced. 
 In the absence of Science, so-thought spiritual manifestations 
 would have been from time to time assimilated ; and the cause 
 of several would have been conceived more vaguely than the 
 cause of one. From the nature of the circumstances it was 
 inevitable that the most powerful spirits should be the oftenest 
 suggested, and that the oftenest suggested should make the 
 greatest acquisitions of power ; and it was similarly inevitable that 
 these should survive the rest in tradition, gaining credit for their 
 acts and powers, and thus losing specialties of nature. Add to 
 which, that, in itself, the lapse of time would have been sufficient 
 to greatly obliterate the definiteness and extend the power of 
 permanently-existing gods. Without external coercion, Religion 
 must necessarily have attributed the existence of all things to 
 spirit-agency ; for habitual solutions are most readily suggested 
 and most willingly applied. Science, then, is not entitled to the 
 credit of having caused Religion to embrace the doctrine of a 
 Supreme Power. It is far more probable that Religion has 
 introduced this doctrine into Science. Yet there is much 
 
 in religious development that is due to the coercion of Science. 
 It is due to the coercion of Science that Religion has withdrawn 
 its solution from mystery after mystery to which it had been 
 erroneously applied. From this it followed that Religion has 
 continually narrowed the application of its solution to more 
 and more general, more and more abstract, and more and more 
 recondite mysteries; until it has almost limited this solution to 
 the most general, most abstract, and most recondite mystery — 
 the mystery of mysteries. Possibly Religion would never have 
 spontaneously contemplated the Supreme Power as the only 
 power proper for its contemplation. It would have been more 
 likely to retain in its creed belief in many minor powers. The 
 Supreme Power would have occasionally encroached on demesnes 
 
THE FIXAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 at first assigned to others, and would have occasionally crowded 
 others out of theology; but it is doubtful whether it wool 
 have become to Religion the sole worker of the wonders which 
 Religion contemplates. If Science had not forced a substitute 
 in the place of every subordinate agency postulated by Reli 
 it is probable that Religion would now contemplate, as Science 
 does, not only Cause in the general and abstract, but also i 
 in the particular and concrete. There needed something more 
 than is internal to Religion to dispossess it of concrete interpre- 
 tation. Xor would Religion, without compulsion, have modi- 
 fied sufficiently its gross representations of Supreme Power. 
 Abstract Science from the inheritance of the age, and misrepre- 
 sentations of the Highest Cause will grow daily more definite. 
 But having changed its nature, Religion must change the 
 course of its development. Old factors can no Ion-, r operate, 
 because they no longer exist. When Religion ha- been induced 
 to contemplate the Great Cause as substance acting in space 
 and time, she has relieved herself of the influences which I' 
 wrought constant increase in vagueness of conception. The' 
 Cause is not to be made less definitely conceivable by 
 of time; because lapse of time cannot cause any of the attributes 
 essential to substance acting in space and time to fade from 
 memory. It cannot be made less definitely conceivable by 
 attributing to it a wider, and therefore less '1 finite, <•! 
 effects; because we have already attributed to it the widest and 
 mos< Indefinii • of all classes of effects; and becaue . 
 we ascribe to it no effect less definite than su . activity, 
 
 . or time, we ascribe to ii nothing which causes as b 
 it more vaguely. It cannot be made leas definitely conceivable 
 by blending it- nature with other causes lacking it- peculiari 
 because we can conceive no other can-.- lacking the peculiarities 
 of substance, activity, space, and time; and because, m< 
 is the final product which we have already obtained byeliminat- 
 as far as may be) the unlike peculiarities of dissimilar 
 can- When 1 \<-\\>i\* m ha- learned to describe the 
 
 Cause of all thin-- a- Bubstanoe acting in Space and time. 
 
 Science can deprive her "i' no concrete infc 
 
230 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 so long as she confines herself to this description, she can have 
 no concrete interpretations. Nor can Science compel her to 
 modify essentially this conception of the Cause; since this is 
 just the conception which Science is compelled to entertain. 
 
 In a high, but not an empty, abstraction Religion and Science 
 find a common creed. 
 
 § 69. The abstraction, in adoption of which Religion and 
 Science may find agreement, is not proposed as more than 
 the germ of a complete and final reconciliation between them. 
 It is about as abstract as Mr. Spencer predicted the basis of 
 unanimity would be; it is far more abstract than progressing 
 intelligence will permit it to remain. The complement of 
 advance to that vagueness which eliminates concrete errors, is a 
 subsequent advance to that definiteness consisting of concrete 
 truths. Describe a cause as indefinitely as language will per- 
 mit—define it as an undefined existence — and it will become 
 more definitely conceivable in proportion as its manifestations 
 are more definitely conceived : so even Mr. Spencer's proposed 
 reconciliation would be no more than temporary. There is no 
 reason for concluding, as he did, that neither Science nor Re- 
 ligion can take cognizance of special doctrines of the other; 
 except that these doctrines are irrelevant or unsound, which all 
 are not. Concurrence on a special doctrine, it is true, is not 
 likely to initiate coalescence; but, on the other hand, there 
 can be no complete concurrence while any special doctrine is 
 respectively asserted and denied. Even more than this may 
 be said. If either Science or Religion holds, or shall hereafter 
 come into possession of, any truth concerning that which both 
 contemplate, it will be able to force assent from the other. We 
 may predict, therefore, that when Science and Religion awaken 
 to the truth that there is a fundamental sameness between them, 
 they will operate together in the work of making their common 
 conception more definite ; and we may also predict that through- 
 out the process each will be prejudiced in favor of what it 
 desires to contribute, and against that sought to be contributed 
 by the other; and lastly we may predict that a complete 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 231 
 
 reconciliation will be attained when each rejects its own errors 
 and accepts the other's truths. The reconciliation does ad 
 demand that everything should be explained; but only that there 
 shall not be two sets of explanations. 
 
 The reconciliation proposed by Mr. Spencer would be do 
 reconciliation at all. No sooner would it become the accepted 
 doctrine that the Cause of all things is unknowable, than each 
 thinker would frame a conception of it to suit himself. The 
 Materialist would conceive it as material; the Spiritualist would 
 conceive it as spiritual; the Realist, of whatever denomination, 
 would conceive it as he conceived it before: for, if nothing 
 be knowingly affirmed of "The Unknowable/ 7 of it nothing 
 can be knowingly denied. I am not speculating entirely on 
 probabilities. "Is it not just possible," asks the author, reflect- 
 ing on the nature of the inscrutable, "that there is a mode of 
 being as much transcending Intelligence and Will, 
 transcend mechanical motion. It is true that we are totally 
 unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. But this 
 is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the 
 reverse." (First Prim, § 31.) Following this example, any 
 one might argue that the outer world is just what he thought it 
 was before he read a word of Mr. Spencer's wiir i 
 
 by an external agency," for example ); because if the impossibility 
 of conceiving Buch a thing has been demonstrated, "this i- qoI a 
 reason for questioning its existence," but u is rather the re\ 
 It is not probable that many would choose to justify them* 
 by such reasonings; Bince Mr. Spencer's doctrine them 
 
 free to rely, for justification of their beliefs concerning external 
 
 things, on the inclination to believe and the i 1 1 1 j ►« »~ - i ) » i 1 : 
 
 refutation. Besides the question of the consti- 
 
 tution of noumena in a Btab rpetuaJ agitation, 
 
 Spencer's proposed reconciliation would leave unsettled the 
 question of th< "I' phenomena. The Religionist would 
 
 still hold that the first phenomenon was the man 
 
 which he call- God; the Scientist would -till hold thai the 
 
 group of manifestations which he calls the Phj 
 
 was never derived from any manifestation other than w ha! 
 
232 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 in all essentials, its prior self. Thus would the old dispute 
 arise anew. Then there would be need for a reconciliation; 
 and this would probably be brought about by adoption, 
 on the part of both Science and Religion, of some high abstrac- 
 tion, and subsequent reduction to consistent definiteness. They 
 would probably be compelled, each by the other, to adopt 
 the belief that substance, activity, space, and time, compose an 
 eternal and universal phenomenon from which ever have pro- 
 ceeded, and ever will proceed, all phenomena. And having 
 found concurrence in this high abstraction, they would probably 
 proceed to make joint inquiry regarding the kind or kinds of 
 substance and activity, and the when and where. In the 
 
 double inadequacy of the reconciliation proposed by Mr, Spencer; 
 and in the probability that in so far as it might be rectified, it 
 would be supplemented by essentially the same reconciliation 
 that we propose; there is vindication of the latter. 
 
 It will be seen that what is here predicted is not a differen- 
 tiation which shall further increase the unlikeness between 
 Science and Religion, but an integration which shall make 
 them one. Integration is no less a part of evolution than 
 differentiation ; in fact integration is represented by Mr. Spencer 
 as the change from which follows increase of definiteness, co- 
 herence, and heterogeneity. Nor, in the case of Science and 
 Religion, would integration fail to bring about increased differ- 
 entiation; for the differences cancelled would be more than 
 compensated for by the possibility of a higher evolution in the 
 world of thought than speculative differences and supposed 
 speculative imbecility now permit. Mr. Spencer's reconciliation 
 is to be reached by a progress towards indefiniteness of concep- 
 tion, is to set a limit to the integration and coherence of 
 scientific and religious thought, and is to bring the differentia- 
 tion of Religion to a stand. The alternative reconciliation, 
 being an integration of separate bodies of thought, promising 
 rapid increase of definiteness, coherence, and heterogeneity, 
 seems very much more conformable to the formula of evolution. 
 
 If we seek to discover in the author's reasoning the underly- 
 ing error, we will find it to consist in drawing too boldly the 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 233 
 
 line of demarcation between Science and Religion. Tin i 
 contrast between them, but it is a contrast of non-essentials. 
 The peculiarity of Religion is that it has a solution for which 
 it has sought to retain a mystery; the peculiarity of Science is 
 that it has many mysteries for which it Beeks to find solution.-. 
 Yet the contrast does not hold in respect to detail.-. It was 
 when alert for the solution of many ni\ < -un- 
 
 recognized, that the hypotb my was first 
 
 adopted; and religious advancement has throughout con* 
 very extensively in better adapting it- solutions i" the problems 
 to be solved. As it has advanced, moreover, Religion has 
 absorbed more and more of the scientific method; until in our 
 day scarcely any theologian dares to wantonly distort 1 
 dogmas, but dares rather to modify d -nit facts. On to- 
 
 other hand also, the history of religious growth has been, on a 
 small scale, repeated over ami over in the histo 
 AVhen a scientific hypothesis has been once adopted, its adher- 
 ents transfer to it the allegiance they owe to truth: tiny will 
 unreflectingly extend it to additional facts; they will urge it in 
 almost open opposition to fact; and, when obliged to abandon it 
 as the solution of one mystery, they will find lor it another. 
 The conduct of men of Science, a- well as that of their oppo- 
 
 - in the religious camp, reminds us of the wit who 
 that, having thought of a splendid answer to a conundrum, all 
 he wanted was the other part A- is the case with R 
 some scientific doctrines are gradually forced into a nam 
 range of application, and in the same r i. by 
 
 other scientific doctrines aethus threatend with complete 
 
 extinction shade gradually into entire validity. Th 
 between Science and IJ<li.L r ion is, th< ially liki 
 
 between constituents of cadi. They differ, not in i 
 elements, but in respect of extraneous circumstano -. II I 
 ace which had gone astray, groping to attain th.' 
 Science is Religion, now turned back t<» procure tip 
 which at fir-: it <li<l not feel the need. 5 
 hypothesis, neither is all oba rvation: in each th.' two methods 
 are united ; in both, when joined, there will be :i similar u 
 
I 
 
 234 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 How like each other are Science and Religion, may be better 
 exhibited by a still deeper analysis. In both we recognize an 
 intellectual element. Both seek truth, and both employ fact 
 and speculation as the means to its attainment. If Religion 
 should attain its highest wish, the Universal Cause would be so 
 well apprehended as to explain all things; if Science should 
 attain as much as it desires, all things would be attributed to 
 an origin which will explain them : what either fails to realize 
 the other loses. Verification of Mr. Spencer's prediction would 
 take from Religion its intellectual element, consigning it to 
 blind contemplation of what it cannot know. Besides 
 
 the intellectual element, there is in both Science and Religion 
 an emotional element. If there is anything external calling 
 for such or such emotions, it is the duty of Science to produce 
 and to sustain them, and of Religion to do the same. Should 
 Mr. Spencer's prediction be verified, Religion would be de- 
 prived of all but the minutest remnant of its emotional 
 element; for there can be no fixed sentiment towards that 
 which may be anything — anything from god to demon, from 
 substance to possibility of sensation, from an active to a passive 
 entity, from an infinite environment to a mere shell of con- 
 sciousness. The emotion left to Religion might well be one of 
 philosophical contempt. But besides their intellectual 
 
 and emotional elements, there is a moral element in both Science 
 and Religion. Belief and the emotions which it calls forth 
 determine our estimate o^ conduct as right or wrong. So long 
 as there are two sets of beliefs and sentiments, there will be 
 two ethical codes. Religion cannot properly prescribe conduct 
 without absorbing all Science; Science cannot rule our morals 
 while Religion is the sole possessor of- a single truth, or the 
 sole entertainer of a single proper sentiment. To say that each 
 will fully recognize the claims which the other has to urge, is 
 but to say that each will become the other. This of course is not 
 what Mr. Spencer holds. He would take its moral element 
 from Religion, and accord to Science the entire supervision of 
 human conduct. Contemplation of "The Unknowable," 
 
 devoid of thought, productive of no worthy emotion, and 
 
 
THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 leading to no ethical consequences, is assigned to Religion; 
 
 while to Science is assigned knowledge of the true, the g L 
 
 the beautiful, — sustaining all just emotion, and revealing to as 
 what is good or bad in conduct. This is the reconciliation 
 issuing from extinction of one of the contending pnw 
 
 It is safer to predict, that, as they struggle to perform the 
 same function, they will eventually integrate. ( )r taking a [/ 
 
 broader view, and allowing for the development which must 
 follow fast upon advancing coalescence, we may predict that 
 the Science and the Religion of to-day shall pass into soi 
 thing more worthy than either, which shall take their pin 
 It shall be composed of all the elements into which we have 
 seen each of them may be resolved; but there shall be an 
 absence of logical conflict between thought and thought 
 tween emotion and emotion, and between act and act. It shall 
 investigate both the ego and the non^ego; and shall reveal 
 something of all that was, or is, or is to be. It shall teach 
 what to love, what to admire, what to emulate, what to ob 
 It -hall address itself at once to the understanding and the 
 sentiment of man; proclaiming duty with persuasive voi 
 
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