ciass JBJLajL Bnolr . ) OojpghtN?. COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY, 5^T COMPRISING LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY OR GENERAL METAPHYSICS. JiS. BY Rev. W. H. HILL, S. J., Professor of Philosophy in the St. Louis University. BALTIMORE: 4 Published by John Murphy & Company, No. 182 Baltimore Street. London: R. Washburne, i 8 Paternoster Row. 1873- Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by John Murphy, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington PREFACE. The following elementary work, though primarily intended for learners, will, it is believed, be found by the general reader of philosophy to contain things which are new, as regards works of the kind published in the English language. In order to render the Logic more easy and more practical, First, the author has omitted the perplexed, undiscussed and in- determinate Greek derivatives, which give vagueness or obscu- rity to the matter contained in many popular text books on Logic ; and he has aimed to use in their stead the most plain and simple terminology. This perpetual multiplication of in- definite and unintelligible technicalities, which are devised as if to embody new forms of thought, helps much to render the study of Logic and Philosophy discouraging, and their very names repulsive, even to the most ambitious and the most in- telligent young minds that attempt to master the established elementary principles of these all-important branches of a good education. The introduction of a new term into a book on Philosophy, does not necessarily imply the actual discovery of a new truth. It is a significant fact that, while eccentric iii IV PREFACE. thought and novel phraseology possess a peculiar charm for ill-educated, rambling and superficial minds ; yet, the lan- guage which remains in prevailing use, is the embodiment of deep and true philosophy ; and the words as well as the con- clusions, which convey what is absurd or preposterous, it must necessarily repudiate, by the general law of human thought. Second: It was judged best, also, for the interests of learn- ers in general, to omit the discussion of the modes and figures of the syllogism; for, in practice they are not attended to, even by those who actually argue in form, the simple rules of demonstration sufficing for all practical purposes, and being all that is even really useful in the strictest argumentation. On the other hand, it was deemed expedient to introduce some matters that pertain to branches of Philosophy, whose full treatment is appropriate to another volume; e. g., certain sub- jects which strictly belong to Psychology, Cosmology and Natural Theology. The author derived much help from notes taken in private study years ago, but which were prepared with no thought of ever employing them for any other purpose than his own in- struction. It is hoped that the acknowledgment of having made a free use of what was then obtained from the best works within his reach, will excuse the omission of more fre- quent reference to them in the margin. In disposing the matter, the method employed in the most approved text books used in the schools of Philosophy is generally followed. In such works the definitions of terms, PREFACE. -V many important propositions of Logic and Metaphysics, even with the chief arguments for them, are treated as com- mon property; as happens, for example, with certain defini- tions and theorems of geometry, originally from Euclid, but which are now the recognized property of all geometricians. In order to secure brevity, after having indicated succinctly, but, as he trusts, clearly and comprehensively, the theories and the salient points of the matters treated, he has been com- pelled, in many instances, to leave their development to the instructor, or to the reader for himself. The writer flatters himself that the treatises on certainty, and its motives and principles; on sensible and intellectual cog- nition ; the objective reality of ideas ; the principle of causa- tion ;. will, perhaps, be found to possess special value, more particularly for those who are not familiar with the language of the schools. It was deemed expedient to insert on the margin, here and there, some suggestive axioms, brief distinctions and explana- tions, taken from the Latin authors, among whom they pass for established doctrine, and are usually enunciated nearly in the same terms. The Latin of the schools, besides being brief, is also peculiarly capable of expressing precisely, clearly, and com- prehensively, matters which it is difficult to utter through the less accurate vernacular, in terms that are neither obscure nor ambiguous. Though they are not essential to the text of the work, yet, for the convenience of the reader who is not familiar with the Latin language, the translation is subjoined to these VI PREFACE. citations. It was, however, found no easy task, in some in- stances, to reproduce them with fidelity in English phraseology, as the classic scholar will readily see from the result, and know how to judge benignantly. If the offering which is herewith respectfully made to the cause of education meet with public favor, it is designed to complete the philosophical course by adding to the present work treatises on Cosmology, Psychology, Theodicea, and Ethics or Moral Philosophy. Whether this part of the under- taking be well or ill done — and, doubtless, many errors and imperfections have escaped notice — it may, nevertheless, fairly be taken as a specimen of what the whole is likely to be ; and, even if it prove to possess but indifferent merit, still it is the fruit of much toil, and the result of the writer's best possible effort, done, as it was, during intervals between various daily duties. With this candid statement, the work is sent forth with the hope that kind suggestions and ingenuous criticism may contribute to improve, and perfect it for the object in- tended; i. e., an aid for the study of Philosophy. St. Louis Univeksity, February 10th, 1873. INTRODUCTION. PHILOSOPHY; ITS OBJECT. The word Philosophy, according to the sense in which Pytha- goras applied it to his school, means the love, desire and pur- suit of wisdom. Philosophy, as a science, is the knowledge of things in their highest and most universal causes, so far as such knowledge is attainable by the light of natural reason. Its object, therefore, includes the world or universe, man, God, in their most essential relations to each other.* It is not without propriety, then, that Philosophy, when compared to the whole collection of human sciences, is pro- nounced to be, " as the sun in the planetary system, the light of all." Without some adequate acquaintance, at least with the body of its established doctrine, even a liberal education is incomplete or partial, if, indeed, it be not superficial or un- sound. The knowledge of a thing, even when it is scientific, stops with the immediate or proximate causes of that thing; but wisdom, which is philosophical knowledge, refers the same thing * ' ' Rerum divinarum atque humanarum causarumque quibus continentur cognitio. ' ' The knowledge of human and divine things, and of the causes by which they are related to each other. vii VIII INTRODUCTION. to its still higher and more universal causes; that is, it seeks to understand and explain it in its essence as it absolutely is, and must be. Other science acquaints us with things as they are directly and extrinsically known through the senses, or other powers of cognition; but philosophy, by means of higher scientific knowledge, proceeds further, and explains the intri?isic nature of those things, and their relation to still more universal truths. For example: Physiology, as a science, ex- plains the whole economy of the living human body, its organism, the functions of its tissues, the relations and con- nexions of its members, and the like ; and that science is wholly limited to this positive object, to this view of organic beings. Philosophy proceeds much farther; it explains the fiature of man as a rational animal, or as consisting of an or- ganized body and a living soul in union by composition ; and it answers the questions, " what is life ? what is the nature of the soul? what essentially constitutes the union of the soul and body ? can material organs, by any possibility, elicit acts of intelligence?" etc. It is manifest, therefore, that Philosophy is superior in its aim and objects to all other human sciences. It treats of its matter on metaphysical principles; that is, it explains objects in their essence, employing for that purpose necessary, immutable and absolute truths; which preserve the understanding from error, not only in these elevated matters, but also in the study of facts, no less than the conclusions from those facts. The subjects that are now usually treated in a course of INTRODUCTION. IX Philosophy, are Logic, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, Natural Theology, and Moral Philosophy or Ethics. Logic explains the laws of right reasoning ; it is, when con- sidered under different respects, both a natural gift, and the result of art. Artificial Logic derives its value from the natu- ral, whose principles it aims to express in a few clear and inva- riable formulae. Logic, considered as practically directing the mind in reasoning, is an art; but inasmuch as it explains and proves the precepts of correct argument by their reasons, fur- nishes the means and the criteria of certainty, or propounds the truth of cognition, it is a science. Ontology, or General Metaphysics, has for its object the essential predicates of all things ; and it, therefore, deals with truths which are strictly absolute and universal. It is the most completely generalized system of knowledge which it is possi- ble for the human intellect to form by its highest power of analysis. Cosmology treats of the visible world; its origin by creation, the nature of the material substance of which it is made, of what constitutes the essence of inorganic, organic, and living forms of material substance. Psychology has for its end to explain the human soul, con- sidered both as the vital principle in the human compound, and as a spiritual substance capable of existing per se, or separ- ate from the body, together with its nature, operations, its essen- tial immateriality, and indestructibility. Natural Theology treats of God as the first and unproduced X INTRODUCTION. cause of all that exists out of him ; his nature, attributes or perfections, so far as they can be known by mere reason. Moral Philosophy or Ethics has for its object moral good; and man as a moral being, his relation to the natural law of right and wrong, the ultimate end of his being, what consti- tutes his chief good, summum bonu?n. When limited rigor- ously to its sphere, Moral Philosophy prescinds from Revela- tion ; or, in other words, it presents its subject matter only in a philosophical light. But, because there can be no disagree- ment between natural and supernatural truth, God being the author of both ;* and, also, since the light of revelation perfects even the knowledge which is acquired by the light of natural reason, it is not wonderful that much of the matter which is usually contained in works on Moral Philosophy should really be derived, directly or indirectly, from revelation ; for, indeed, all human science has been benefited, in one respect or an- other, by supernatural truth. * ' ' Principiorum naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus indita est, cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostras naturae. Quidquid igitur principiis hujusmodi contrariura est, divinae sapientise contrarium est, non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cog- nitioni esse contraria." (Div. Th., contr. gent. lib. I. c. 7.) The knowledge of principles known naturally is divinely put into us, since God himself is the author of our nature. "Whatever, therefore, is contrary to these principles, is contrary to the Divine wisdom, and on that account cannot be from God. Those things, therefore, from Divine revelation, which are held by faith, cannot be contrary to natural knowledge. CONTENTS. LOGIC: FIEST PAKT. CHAPTER I. PAGE. Article I : Simple Apprehension 16 Article 2 : Definition of Terms ; Comprehension and Extension 18 Article 3 : Ideas or Concepts ; Their Objects 19 Article 4: Genus, Species, Difference, Attribute, Accident.. -. 22 Article 5 : Division; Rules of 26 Article 6: Definition; Rules of. 28 CHAPTER II. Article 1 : Judgment 30 Article 2: Propositions 31 Article 3 : Opposition. 33 CHAPTER III. Article 1: Reasoning; Specific Act of 35 Article 2 : The Syllogism ; Its Canons Explained 36 Article 3: Hypothetical Syllogisms ; Rule of 43 Article 4 : Other Forms of Argument ; The Dilemma 45 CHAPTER IV. Article I : Scientific Method ; Analysis and Synthesis in their Rela- tion both to Particular Scientific Cognitions, and to Systems of such Cognitions 48 Article 2 : Demonstration; Kinds of 50 Article 3: Induction; Essentially Syllogistic 52 Article 4 : Probable Argument 53 Article 5 : Fallacies or Sophisms 55 LOGIC: SECOND PAET; OE, LOGIC APPLIED. CHAPTER I. Article 1 : Truth, Error, Falsehood 61 Article 2 : States of the Mind in Relation to Truth 65 Article 3: Certainty; Evidence 67 Article 4 : Criterion of Certainty 78 Article 5 : Primitive Truths not Demonstrable 80 xi XII CONTENTS. CHAPTER II. MEANS OR SOURCES OF CERTAINTY. PAGE. Article I : Consciousness 82 Article 2 : The Senses, Internal and External ; Their Objects ; Brute Soul Material; Human Soul Immaterial; Imagination an Organic Power 85 Article 3: Apprehension, Judgment, Reasoning; Connatural Object of Intellect 103 Article 4 : Objective Reality of Ideas 112 Article 5: Universals; Their Objects 1 15 Article 6 : Memory, Organic and Intellectual ; When it Affords Cer- tainty 125 Article 7 : Testimony Affords Certainty 129 Article 8: Scientific Knowledge ; In What it Specifically Consists 132 APPENDIX. Disputation, or Practical Exercise in Reasoning ; The Fonn or Man- ner of Conducting it ; Its Advantages 141 ONTOLOGY; OE, GENEKAL METAPHYSICS. Introduction 149 CHAPTER I , Article 1 : Notion of Being ; What it Includes 151 Article 2 : Truth, Metaphysical Truth 164 Article 3 : Good and Evil 165 Article 4 : Beauty ; In What it consists 1 73 CHAPTER II. Article I : Substance and Accident Defined 1 78 Article 2: Quantity, Quality, Habit ; Relation 184 CHAPTER III. Article I : Principle of Causation 199 Article 2 : Different Kinds of Causes ; Efficient, Final 200 Article 3 : Material Cause ; Formal Cause Explained 206 Article 4: Perfection of Beings ; The Finite and Infinite ; The Knowl- edge of the Infinite is Logically Derived from that of the Finite.. 212 Article 5 : The Necessary ; The Contingent ; Order 222 LOGIC: FIRST PART OR DIALECTICS. ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. THEORETICAL AND APPLIED. CHAPTER I. As the end of Logic is to direct the mind in reasoning, it has for its object : ist. To explain the operations of the mind so far as they are directly related to that end; 2d. The rules and precepts that govern these operations. Some of its principles prevent error in the process of reason- ing, that is, in the form of argument ; others guard against deception in the subject jnatter, that is, in the truths or facts that are compared. Hence, Logic may be conveniently divided into two parts: into Theoretical Logic or Dialectics, and Applied Logic. In the first, the operations of the mind in right reasoning are described, and the rules are given which direct it in the form of reasoning. In the second part of Logic, those principles are considered in their practical application to the objects of rea- soning, that is, to the matter or the logical truth of propositions. Observe, then, that Logic is not limited in its scope or gen- eral aim to the mere form of arguments ; for this is, in fact, only a part of its proper object. It teaches also the means of attaining truth of cognition, since it lays down principles that preserve the mind from error in judging and assenting to the motives of certainty. By explaining and prescribing the rules of definition, division and ratiocination, it gives light and method to all the sciences; and, because its true and proper end is to expound and direct the acts of reason, it is itself correctly styled by philosophers the science of reason. 16 LOGIC : FIRST PART. ARTICLE I. SIMPLE APPREHENSION. There are three acts or operations of the mind which are to be treated in the first part of Logic, namely, simple apprehen- sion, judgment, and reasoning. Apprehension, from the Latin word, apprehendere, to take hold of, as with the hand, in its widest sense, includes all those acts of cognition which precede judgment. Hence, even the senses may be said to apprehend their objects; the fancy appre- hends by means of its images ; the intellect apprehends the intelligible essence, after the concrete or singular realities of the objects which are presented by the sensible organs are dropped. The intellect expresses what it thus apprehe?ids or conceives in the verbum mentis, or concept, or by these acts it forms its idea of the object. All these acts of simple knowledge are included under the general name, simple apprehension. We may regard the idea, or concept, as the term of all these apprehensive acts, since it is their last immediate result. It is manifest that the object conceived or apprehended may be either complex or incomplex; v. g., "learned man, man," "stone house, stone;" but so long as there is no judgment affirmed by the mind, the acts all pertain to apprehensive knowledge, or they are acts of simple apprehensio7i. When the mind actually compounds or divides two concepts, as predicate and subject, it judges or form- ally and explicitly affirms truth, and this judgment or explicit affirmation, being enunciated or expressed in language, is a proposition. The truth contained in this judgment is iniplicitly contained in the acts of simple apprehension, but it is explicitly in the judgment alone, for, as is manifest, it is only judgment that can properly be said to affirm truth. Simple apprehension, in the more special sense in which the expression is generally used, is an act of the intellect, by which it takes notice of an object and acquires some knowledge of it, but without any judgment or explicit affirmation; or, in other words, by this act it merely perceives or sees the object, with- out proceeding to form a judgment LOGIC : FIKST PAET. 17 The object of the apprehension may be either a singular and individual thing, or a relation between two or more things. The knowledge or cognition acquired by this act is called, indiscriminately, a co7icept or an idea, and it is the result or fruit of the simple apprehension. Take care not to confound idea, which is mental, with the image or phantasma in the imagination, which is organic, and which we have in common with the brute. The thing apprehended, as it is in itself, with its qualities and attributes, is the material object ; the object, with its constituent marks or properties as expressed in the mind, is the formal object of the apprehension; this formal object is also called the mental term of the apprehension, and verbum mentis, or mental word. The oral term is the word which is employed in language to express orally the name of the me?ital term, concept, or idea. The formal concept,* is the actual mental word by which the intellect formally , i. e., actually, perceives or sees the thing known, or it is the intrinsic or formal term of mental concep- tion. The concept is so called on account of its being, as it were, the offspring of the intellect. The objective concept is the thing, whatever it be, which is known or represented by means of the formal concept ;t v. g., when we mentally con- ceive " man," the act in the intellect by which we do this is the formal concept, but "man," as known and represented in that act, is the objective concept. The formal concept is always a singular and individual thing, because it is an act in the intellect ; but the objective concept may be a universal, a confused object, a common or general thing; as animal, sub- stance ; or, what is the most universal of all objective concepts, being. *Vide Suarez's Metaphysics, Disp. 2, Sect. 2. t * ' Objectum est determinans ; intellectus, determinable ad concipiendum. ' ' The object is that which determines; and the intellect is that which can be determined to conceive an object. 18 LOGIC : FIRST PART. ARTICLE II. terms; comprehension and extension of terms; defini- tion OF other terms. Oral terms are the names in language for ideas or concepts, and, therefore, represent them, or stand for them. A term may be considered in connexion with the constituent marks or properties contained in its object; v. g., man, as ex- pressing intelligence, mortality, stature, complexion, etc.; in this case the comprehension of the term man is attended to. The comprehension of a term, therefore, expresses all the marks or constituent properties of the object for which that term stands. If we consider the number of individuals to which' the term may be applied, we then regard the extension of that term ; v. g., intelligence, extends to more individuals than the term man, for it belongs, also, to angels Hence, the extension of a term expresses the greater or less number of individuals to which it applies. The comprehejision of a term decreases as its extension in- creases ; and, vice versa, the comprehension increases as the ex- tension decreases; v. g., the term substance expresses but one mark or attribute of beings, for its comprehension; but its ex- tension is very great. Now, if another property or mark be added to it its comprehension is increased, but its extension is diminished; v. g., corporeal substance has greater comprehension, but less extension, than substance without any mark or property added to it. Atle?itio?i is an act of the mind by which it is directed to some object or objects, to which it adheres, for a time. This act is either voluntary or spontaneous. There is some degree of spo?itaneous atte?ition in every act of cognition which the understanding elicits. Voluntary attention may last for a greater or a less time, and may consist of one or more acts. Abstraction is a species of Attention by which the mind separates (withdraws) one thing from others with which it is connected, and contemplates that, to the exclusion of the LOGIC : FIRST PART. 19 others ; v. g., to think of the eye without attending to the other parts of man.* Reflexion is also an exercise of attention, by which the mind contemplates its own acts, or considers its concepts or ideas of objects. ARTICLE III. THE OBJECTS OF IDEAS OR CONCEPTS; DEFINITION OF OTHER TERMS. Ill reference to their objects, ideas are divided into concrete and abstract^ universal and particular, etc. Concrete ideas are those whose objects are conceived as actually or physically existing ; as Peter, those books, etc. The abstract idea has for its object a form or quality separated from its subject; as white- ness, roundness, wisdom, etc. A univervsal idea is one whose object is a mark or property which is common to a whole class of objects and can be affirmed of each one; as "man, animal," etc. The objects included under it are called its subjects or inferiors. A particular idea has for its object only a part of the objects to which a universal is applicable, or it is a com- mon or universal limited to a part only of its extension; as "a soldier, some men, some trees," etc. A term is singular when it applies to but one concrete and actual individual; as "Caesar, this apple," etc. A term is com- mon when it may be applied to many ; as " father, substance, just," etc. * ' ' Abstrahentium non est menclacium. ' ' Abstraction is not falsehood. "Id cognoscitur abstractive quod non cognoscitur praesens; intuitive, quando cognoscitur praesens. Seu cognitio abstractiva est cognitio rei in alio tanquam in medio prius cognito ut quod seu in quo: e. gr. Videre partem in toto; parie- tem in domo, objectum representation in speculo, causam in effectu, etc. Cog- nitio intuitiva est cognitio immediata seu a tali medio independens . " That is known abstractly which is not known as present ; it is known intuitively when known as present ; or, abstract knowledge is the knowledge of one thing in an- other as in a medium previously known; v. g. , to see a part in the whole, a wall in the house, an object imaged in the mirror, cause in the effect, etc. Intuitive knowledge is immediate knowledge, or it is independent of such medium. 20 LOGIC : FIRST PART. Transcendental ideas are those whose objects transcend all classification of genus and species, being the common attributes of all things; as "being, essence, one, true, good." The idea, considered as expressing its object, is either ade- quate or inadequate j the adequate includes not only all that is of the essence, but all accidents and relations of its object; it is inadequate when it does not include all, absolutely, that is true of its object. Terms, considered in respect to their objects, are real and logical ; of the first and second i?itentio?i ; absolute and conno- tative. The object of the real term actually exists outside of the mind ; it is a real or actual object, or, at least, really possible; as " this horse, a star, a planet." The logical term has for its object a concept or idea, which, though founded upon real objects, does not itself express anything really existing out of the mind; v. g., the terms genus, species, and all universals. Terms of the first and second intention have the same ob- jects, respectively, as real and logical terms; a term of the first intention expresses the object as seen by the first and direct act of the mind, in which act the object is affirmed by its real predicates. A term of the seco?id intention stands for another concept which the mind forms by a secofid and reflex act, in which second act logical or universal predicates are attributed ; v. g., the terms genus, species, transcendentals, are terms of the second intetition, because their objects are not real\ but logical only. A term is absolute when there is not directly implied in the idea of its object any dependence on, or relation to, another object; e. g., such substantives as gold, apples, etc.; also, adjec- tives used absolutely; as the good, the true, etc. The connotative term stands for an object, in the very idea of which is directly implied an adjacent object on which it depends or to which it is related; as white, heavy, living, rapid, and all adjectives and adjunctives, as also such substantives as professor, musician, artist, etc. Signs are either natural, as sighs, groans, laughter ; or sup- LOGIC : FIRST PART. 21 positive, as articulate sounds forming words or terms, which are conventional signs for things. Supposition here means merely the conventional use of a term or sign for a thing. Aris- totle observes (Elench. lib. i., c. i.), that since we cannot have all objects physically in our presence when arguing, we employ in their stead names as signs for them. In the well known saying, "words are the counters of wise men; they are the money of fools," it is meant that words suppose or stand for different objects with two classes of men. Terms are univocal or equivocal ; a term is univocal which, being applied to different objects, has the same signification or expresses the same quality or essence; thus, animal \s univocal when applied to man and brute, because, in each case, its meaning is the same. A term is equivocal when, being applied to different objects, it does not express the same quality or essence in each ; thus "light is the opposite of darkness; feathers are light." Equiv- ocal terms often subserve the designs of sophistry; they are also frequently employed for comparison and metaphor, giving to style one of its chief ornaments. A term is used in a material sense, or the supposition is material, when the word is used merely as a word; as "Cicero is a word of three syllables." It has a formal supposition, or is used in its formal sense, when it is employed to express the object for which it stands, as "Cicero was an orator." Analogy is a certain agreement or remote relation that one object bears to another. Analogy is either that of attribution, or that of proportion. In the analogy of attribution a predicate that belongs pri- marily and properly to one object is attributed to another, owing to some relation between them or aptitude of one for the other; thus healthy is primarily and properly a predicate of the animal body ; but we say healthy food, healthy complexion, healthy cli- mate, from the relation which these things have to health in its primary meaning. Analogy of proportion is founded on a resemblance of pro- portion which is in the substance or in a quality of objects that 22 LOGIC : FIRST PART. are of a different species. It imports a certain agreement in the effects produced by causes which are otherwise quite dis- similar, or it is a certain agreement in the manner in which objects are related to or referred to other objects. Owing to this agreement, the term that expresses the relation in one set of objects is applied to the other related objects; v. g., "bread is the staff of life ;" " the Scipios were thunderbolts of war." The terms "staff" and "thunderbolts" here have an a?ialogical sense; they are not used either in a imivocal or an equivocal sense, but in a sense that is between them as extremes. This analogy of proportion is the basis of tropes and metaphors ; " Cicero was a pillar of the state ; " " voice of the waters ; " " music of the spheres," etc. Analogy must not be confounded with parity or equality of ratios in proporiio?ij v. g., "a mile is the third part of a league," " four months are the third part of a year;" in real parity of the kind the terms expressing it are used univocally ; " third part " is univocal in the examples given. ARTICLE IV. GENUS, SPECIES, DIFFERENCE, ATTRIBUTE, ACCIDENT. Species includes all that is necessary to constitute the essence* of many individuals, and the essence includes all that is neces- sary for a thing to exist or without which it cannot be conceived * ' ' Est essentia in ordine ad esse ; natura, prout principium operationis. ' ' What we term essence in respect to existence is called nature, when it is regarded as operative. 1 ' Species immediate subjicitur generi, individuum, mediante specie; genus de specie immediate praedicatur, et ea mediante de individuo. ' ' Species is imme- diately subject to genus; the individual is subject to genus through the medium of species; genus is predicated immediately of species, and mediately through species of the individual. 1 ' Est differentia per quam species excedit suum genus. Plus continetur actu in specie quam in genere; plus autem continetur potentia in genere quam in specie, quia genus poten tia omnem continet inferiorem difterentiam." Differ- ence is that by which the species exceeds its genus ; more is actually contained in species than in genus; but more is potentially in genus than in species, for genus potentially contains every inferior difference in its extension. LOGIC : FIRST PART. 23 by the mind. Now. that cannot be conceived by the mind which is absolutely false, absurd, or impossible, and the mind can really and properly conceive nothing but truth, or that which is, and it can form some concept of any real object that is presented to it. Therefore, that which cannot be conceived by the mind is, more strictly, nothing. Hence, essence is all that, without which a thing cannot exist, cannot be the object of a co?icept* or is nothing. The species is the answer to the question, " what is it ? " " what is man ? " " Man is a rational animal ; " this is an answer which assigns the species of man by its essential constituents. Genus expresses an attribute or essential property which is common to many species; v. g., material, animal, which are common to many species of bodies and living things. Genus does not express determinately the whole essence of its inferiors ; while species does express the whole essence of its individuals. Difference is an attribute or essential property which, when added to the genus, along with it constitutes a species ; v. g., rational, being added to animal, constitutes the species ?nan. It is here properly called differefice, because animal in general, and man in particular, differ by the essential constituent, rational. The extension of an idea increases as we ascend from indi- viduals to their species, or from species to its genus ; while the comprehension decreases; but the comprehension increases as we pass from genus to species, or species to individuals; while the extefision decreases. A genus has more extension than any of its species, but the species have more comprehension; that is, more essential properties. In respect to genera, the species may be treated as individ- uals; and similarly genera for still higher genera. Aristotle's ten categories, or ten highest genera, that include all real things, are "substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion (action received), place, time, posture, habiliment (cov- *Do not confound concept in the understanding with image in the imagination; there are many concepts in the intellect of whose objects no real images can be formed by the fancy. 24 LOGIC : FIRST PART. ering or clothing, ornament, armor, etc.)" The categories are the classification into genera and species of all things, accord- ing to their mode of existence; "sunt modi existendi."* The five universals or predicables, genus, difference, species, property or attribute, and accident, are capable of being affirmed, or predicated, of individual inferiors, in all those supreme genera. The following table, figured as the Porphyrian Tree, exhibits to the eye, genus, species and individuals, as they are respect- ively related to each other. THE PORPHYRIAN TREE. . *'.' Categoriae seu praedicamenta sunt ordo seu series generum, specierum et indiyiduorum." "Res praedicamentales seu praedicamenta considerantur a Logico, prout secundis intentionibus subjacent; spectantur a Metaphvsico auatenua reales. species and individuals. The things in those categories are considered brS Logician as subject to the second intention: *— **■- ■*■-—*— The categories or predicaments are the order or series" of thVgenera, e categories are considered by the by the Metaphysician they are re- garded as real. (Vid. p. 20.) LOGIC I FIRST PART. 25 In like manner, each of the ten genera may be resolved into its subjects by adding the respective specific differe?ices ; v. g., QUANTITY. DISCRETE CONTINUOUS. CONTINUOUS. SURFACE LINE. SURFACE. CURVED PLANE. ETC. Attributes or properties, and accidents, are found in all the species which are formed out of the genera ; and hence, since the five universals are pre 'die -able 'S of all the categories, they are properly denominated universals j and, as there is no other predicable that applies to all the categories, they are the only universals. Supreme, or ultwiate genera, are those which are the highest, and, therefore, cannot be made the species of other genera ; v. g., substance, which has no superior genus. Being (ens) is a transcoidental; it is not a genus, but it is common to every genus, species, and difference; it is, therefore, a common predicate of all things, and for that reason can have no sub- species, for it is not univocally predicated of its inferiors, as is required for genus or species. As above indicated, the ultiniate genera are usually called the categories, or predicaments. The proximate, or lowest genus, is that which contains species whose subjects or inferiors are individuals/ v. g., animal in respect to man, for man is one species, whose subjects or in- feriors are individual men. Attribute* is a property that necessarily results from the essence of the object to which it belongs; as "the power of rational speech, laughter;" or, what is still more intrinsic, "intel- ligence, liberty," etc. * " Proprium est quod prsedicatur de pluribus in quale quid sen in quale necessario. ' ' Property is that which is predicated of many in what is essential. " Proprium sen attributum est quod convenit speciei omni, soli et semper. '-' Property or attribute is what pertains always and exclusively to the inferiors ol the whole species. 26 LOGIC : FIRST PART. Essential attributes, or such as necessarily and always follow the essence of every individual belonging to the species of objects, are absolutely inseparable from the objects to whose essence they belong. All other properties or qualities, though they may be necessary in different degrees for the integrity or perfection of the objects in which they inhere or to which they pertain, are absolutely separable from them, as will be explained in another part of this work. Accident* is anything whose presence in the object, or absence from it, does not destroy, or even change the essence of the object; as learning in man, roundness in marble: the essence of man is not intrinsically changed by the possession or the want of learning, nor that of marble by any particular shape of it. ARTICLE V. DIVISION. Division t and Definition are employed to facilitate clear- ness of matter and distinctness of thought, by preventing all confusion arising from multiplicity in the objects of thought and ambiguity in the use of terms. Division is the separation of a whole into its component parts ; a whole is that which is one, and yet is capable of this resolu- tion into parts. A whole is either actual or logical; in the first, the parts are physical or real; as " man's soul and body; " in the second, they are metaphysical; v. g., the species and difference of objects are only metaphysically distinct. Again, parts are essential; as body and soul in man; or integral; as hands and feet in man. All universals, in respect *' 'Accrdtms est quod praedicatur de pluribus in quale contingeuter . Quod adest et abest sine interitu subjecti. ' ' Accident is that which is predicated of many in what is contingent ; it is what may be present or absent without destroying its subject. f'Bene docet qui bene distinguit." He teaches well, who distinguishes well. ' ' Per id res constituitur per quod et distinguitur. ' ' That which constitutes a thing, is that by which it is also distinguished. LOGIC : FIRST PART. 27 to their extension, may be regarded as logical wholes; as also genus in respect to the species, which it includes ; and species in respect to its individuals. Hence, division is also either physical or metaphysical. Logical divisions are, first, of genus into its species; as animal into rational and irrational; second, species into its individuals; as Peter, John, Greeks, Romans, etc.; third, of substance into essential constituents, attributes, accidents; or into essential properties, and qualities which are not essential. An attribute, as already observed, is a property or power that flows immediately from the essence of a thing ; as, intelli- gence in man, freedom, risibility; an accident is that which may or may not exist in the subject, and whose presence or absence does not change the essence of its subject, as this color, size, etc. RULES OF DIVISION. First — The division must be adequate, that is, the sum of the members or parts must be equal to the whole. This rule may be violated by excess, or by defect; by excess, as, v. g., when the ancient philosophers divided souls into " rational, irrational and vegetable;" by defect, v. g., if we divide the motives of human action into " love of glory and love of money." Second — No member of a division must equal the whole ; still less must it exceed the whole ; for example, to divide ani- mals into " those endowed with reason, and those endowed with senses," is a violation of this rule ; and still more faulty would be a division of trees into " fruit-bearing, and those that are not fruit-bearing, and trees that vegetate." Third — One member of the division must not include an- other ; as, to divide animals into " rational, irrational and mor- tal," which is also a violation of the preceding rule. Fourth — Division should be made, first, into the proximate or immediate members ; then, if necessary, into others by sub- division; as in the "porphyrian tree," viz., substance into cor- poreal and incorporeal ; then corporeal into organic and inor- ganic ; organic into vegetable and animal, etc. Any other method would produce confusion rather than clearness. 28 LOGIC : FIRST PART. ARTICLE VI. DEFINITION. Division gives the extension of an idea ; definition its com- prehension. Definition, then, is a true and complete notion of a thing expressed in words. But definition is twofold — first, nominal, that is, of a word ; second, real, that is, of a thing. Definition of a word is either by its synonym, or by its deri- vatives or components, or by a periphrasis of its import. Gen- eral usage determines the signification of- words ; but when they are equivocal a distinct meaning may be attributed to them arbitrarily. A definition is real, first, when it is essential, that is, when it expresses the essence or nature of the thing defined ; this is done by enumerating the attributes or essential properties of the thing. The essential parts of a thing are either physical or metaphysical; v. g., man may be defined by his physical essence " a being composed of a rational soul and an organized body; " and, again, he may be defined by his essence, metaphysically considered, to be a rational animal. A logical definition is one in which the proximate or nearest genus and the specific difference are given ; v. g,, a brute is a?i irrational animal. Here brute is the thing defined ; animal is the proximate or immediate genus; and irrational 'is the specific difference. A descriptive definition is one in which no genus or species is assigned, but only some accidental circumstances with a gene- ral term as a quasi genus; this is resorted to when the object defined transcends all the genera or categories; v. g., being, goodness, unity, etc. A genetic definitio?i is one in which an effect is explained by its cause; v. g., "a lunar eclipse is an occultation of the moon, which is caused by the earth directly intervening between the moon and the sun ; " '•' brass is a metal produced by the fusion of copper and zinc together." RULES OF A GOOD DEFINITION.* First — It must not be more nor less extensive than the thing * c ' Una unius definitio est. ' ' — Of one thing there is Imt one definition. LOGIC I FIRST PART. 29 defined; v. g., if man be defined, "an intelligent being;" the definition is too general, for it includes angel ; if he be defined, " a rational being who knows how to read," the definition is faulty, for it is applicable to some men only. Second — The definition must be clearer than the thing defined ; hence, the definition must contain no vague, obscure or equivocal words; v. g., "logwood is a species of wood; life is vitality," are offences against this rule. Third — A definition must not be negative; for in such a case the definition would not declare what the thing defined is, but only what it is not; v. g., " a bird is a creature that is not rational." But if two contraries, between which there is no medium, are to be defined, when one is positively defined the other may be given as its negative or opposite; v. g., " a compound is that which consists of parts ; a simple substance is that which does not consist of parts." Fourth — A substance must be defined in itself; accidents may be defined by the substance in which they adhere ; v. g., " man is a rational animal ; motion is change of place by a body." Fifth — Habits and powers must be defined by their acts, or by the objects of those acts; v. g., "Meekness is the virtue by which we restrain the motions of anger; the will is the power of choosing between things that are judged to be good ; sight, the power of distinguishing objects by figure and color." CHAPTER II. ARTICLE I . JUDGMENT. Judgment is an act of the mind, by which it affirms the agreement or disagreement of two concepts or ideas. When they are affirmed to agree, the judgment is affirmative; when they are affirmed to disagree, the judgment is ?iegative; v. g., " The soul is a spirit ; God is not a creature." These two judgments by which *he mind affirms the identity or diversity of two ideas by conjoming or separating them are termed respectively composition and division in respect to the ideas, which are the matter or elements ; and they are also affirmation or negation, in respect to the identity or diversity of the things compared. When the identity or diversity of the ideas is self-evident, or one is seen to be necessarily included in the other, it is a judg- ment a priori; v. g., " the sum of the parts is equal to the whole ; a part is not equal to the whole." Such judgments are also often termed necessary, metaphysical, pure or analytical judgments. But when the identity or diversity in the objects of those ideas is learned solely by experience, then it is a judgment a posteriori; v. g., "fire gives pain when it burns." These judgments are also termed contingent, physical, empyrical or synthetical. Judgments, both a priori and a posteriori, are sometimes 7nediate, sometimes immediate, according as they are formed with or without the medium of reasoning. A priori judgments suppose a necessary identity or diversity in the objects com- pared; a posteriori judgments suppose a mere contingent rela- tion or connexion, learned only by expedience. 3° LOGIC : FIRST PART. 31 ARTICLE II. PROPOSITIONS. A proposition is a judgment expressed in words; v. g., "man is mortal; prudence is a virtue." A proposition consists of three parts : the subject, copula, and predicate or attribute. The subject is that of which something is affirmed ; the predicate is that which is affirmed ; and the copula is the term that con- nects or couples the subject and predicate. For example, in the proposition, "diligence is praiseworthy" the subject'^ "diligence-" the copula is the verb "is" and the predicate is "praiseworthy." . Logic recognizes but one verb, and but one mood and tense, viz. : the verb to be in the indicative mood and in the present tense. The reason of this is, the affirmation is always indica- tive and present; v. g., "Caesar conquered; James writes," are equivalent to the affirmation ; that which is expressed by " co?iquered" is predicated of Caesar, etc. All that is not ex- pressed by this verb belongs to the predicate, for it is attributed to the subject. Propositions may be considered in respect to their quality and their quantity or extension. The two concepts com- pared to each other are the -matter; the perceivi?ig of their agreement or disagreement is the form of the proposition ; since the copula either affirms or denies agreement, the quality and form of a proposition are indeed the same. Propositions as to their form or quality are either affirmative or negative. In an affirmative proposition the predicate is declared to agree with the subject. In the negative proposition the pre- dicate is denied or declared not to agree with the subject. In an affirmative proposition the predicate is taken accord- ing to the whole of its comprehension ; but not according to the whole of its extension. In the proposition, "air is a body" the predicate " body " is taken according to the whole of its comprehefision ; that is, all the attributes or essential properties included in body, as such, are predicated of air, or said to be verified in air; but, as there are many objects besides air which are body, the predicate, body, is not taken in its whole 32 LOGIC : FIKST PART. extension; and it is, therefore, said to be particular in affirma- tive propositions. In such propositions as this, " man is a rational animal," the predicate is commensurate in comprehension with the subject; not, however, in virtue of the form, but by accidental coin- cidence. Good definitions are thus convertible and true. In a negative proposition the predicate is taken according to the whole of its extension; v. g., "matter is not intelligent;" that is, matter is not one of those objects of which intelligence can ever be predicated. When any term is thus taken, according to the whole of its extension, or universally, it is said to be distributed. Therefore, in a negative proposition the predicate is always distributed ; that is, is taken as universal, or in all its extent. In an affirmative proposition, the predicate is particular, as already observed. The subject of a proposition is distributed if taken as a universal ; as " every man is mortal ; " " no metal has sensation." Quantity or extension of propositions : quantity or exten- sion regards the extent of the propositions; that is, as being universal or particular ; when universal, the subject of the proposition is taken according to its entire extension; v. g., "all men are mortal." It is particular when the subject is taken according to a part only of its extension; v. g., "some men are learned." Universality, in reference to the matter of the proposition, may be, first, metaphysical, as when the proposition expresses a judgment a priori; v. g., "a part is less than the whole;" second, it may he physical, as when it is according to the laws of nature, which, however, are contingent; v. g., "the dead do not return to life ; " third, it may be a moral universality, that is, when it is taken according to the ordinary action of moral causes; v. g., "a mother loves her child." In respect to the last two, exception is not absolutely impossible. A proposition is either categorical or hypothetical. It is cate* gorical when it positively and unconditionally affirms the agree- ment or disagreement of the predicate with the subject. LOGIC : FIRST PART. 33 A hypothetical proposition affirms conditionally ; v. g., "if you are virtuous, you will be rewarded." This species of enunciation implies an argument/ and under that respect it may be regarded as pertaining to the third operation of the intellect; i. e., to reasoning. It consists of two propositions ; the first, or ante- cedent, which affirms the condition; the second is the conse- que?it, whose truth depends on the verification of the a?itecedent. A hypothetical proposition is true, if the connexion between the antecedent and consequent be true. It is sometimes disjunc- tive in form; "every body is either in motion, or at rest." Such a disjunctive is not true when there is a medium; v, g., "John must either write or come to see me." It is possible that he may do neither. A term, or a proposition, is taken reduplicatively, or by reduplication, when any particles or clauses are annexed to it which have the effect of doubling or repeating it, in order that the sense in which it is used may be rigorously defined; v. g., "all substance as substance, is good;" "a being, so far forth as it is free, is necessarily intelligent;" "water, as such, is composed of eight parts of oxygen with one part of hydrogen." When a term is used reduplicatively, it is restricted to a precise signification; the limiting words and phrases are, as such, as, so far forth, precisely take?i, and the like. ARTICLE III. OPPOSITION. For opposition* between two propositions, first, they must have the same subject; secondly, they must have the same predicate; thirdly, one must, in some sense of the terms, affirm what the other denies. Hence, opposition is a mutual repug- nance between two propositions, arising from the affirmation and negation of the same thing in the same respect. * ' • Oppositio est affirmatio et negatio ejusdem de eodem. ' ' Opposition is the affirmation and negation of the same thing in regard to the same object. 3 34 LOGIC I FIKST PAET. This opposition is twofold, first, of contradiction; second, of contrariety ; in contradictory propositions, one simply denies the other; v. g., "all souls are substance;" the contradictory, "not all souls are substance." A negative prefixed to any affirmative proposition forms its contradictory, because any particular and negative proposition is the contradictory of the opposite universal proposition. Contrary* propositions are both of them extreme; that is, what one of them affirms as universal, the other denies with equal universality; v. g., "no miser is happy;" the contrary, "all misers are happy." Hence, a contradictory merely denies its opposite, while the contrary goes further, and affirms its equally general opposite. Of two contradictories, one is necessarily true and the other false; two contraries cannot, at the same time, be true; but both of them may be false; v. g., "all good men are prosper- ous in this world; no good man is prosperous in this world;" these propositions are both false. Subcontrary propositions are both particular \ and they differ in quality; that is, one is affirmative and the other negative ; as, " some men are honored ; " " some men are not honored." Subcontraries may both be true, but they cannot both be false ; for, if both were false, they would make two contradictories to be both false, which cannot be ; v. g., " some men are learned ; " " some men are not learned." It is evident that both of these propositions cannot be false. * " Contraria jlixta se posita magis luoescunt." When contraries are put near to each other they become clearer. ' ' Contraria versantur circa idem. ' ' Contraries regard the same thing. CHAPTER III. ARTICLE I. REASONING. The power in the soul by which it perceives, judges, reasons. is termed the understanding, the judgme?it, the reason, accord- ing to the act which it performs ; yet, it is one and the same power that understands, judges and reasons. All the powers of the soul that are concerned in the acts of knowing, when taken collectively, constitute the mind; hence, the soul is the spiritual substance with its perfections ; the mind is the aggre- gate of its powers or faculties, the understanding, conscious- ness, will and memory ; but mind, more particularly, stands for the power in the soul of knowing. Every process of reasoning is reducible to an act of the mind by which it determines the agreement or disagreement, the identity or diversity of two things, by comparing them to a third; v. g., " that which is designed is the work of an intelli- gent cause ; the world shows design ; therefore, the world is the work of an intelligent cause." The two things here com- pared to a third, are the "world" and "the work of an intelli- gent cause ; " and the third thing to which they are compared is that which is " designed" with which they both agree, and, therefore, they agree with each other. All reasoning or argument rests on this self-evident princi pie : " when two things are each equal to a third thing, they are equal to each other ; " " when one of two things is equal, and the other unequal to a third thing, they are unequal to each other." Take care to observe, however, that when the two things are both unequal to a third, it does not follow that they are either equal or unequal to each other. 36 LOGIC I FIRST PART. The truth of this agreement or disagreement of two things, following from their relation to a third, is termed the conse- quence or sequence; and the proposition which expresses that agreement or disagreement, as following from the comparison, is called the conclusioji or consequent. Hence, an act of reasoning, or an argument expressed in full, consists of three judgments or propositions ; the first two are a comparison ; and the third, or conclusion, affirms the consequent which follows from this comparison ; v. g., "All virtue is commendable ; Diligence is a virtue; Therefore, diligence is commendable." Here "diligence" and "commendable" are both compared to "virtue," and judged to agree with it; the agreement of "dili- gence " and " commendable " is perceived to follow from their agreement with "virtue"; and the truth of that agreement thus following, is the sequence or consequence which is declared in the third proposition or conclusion, " diligence is commend- able." Sequence, therefore, expresses the dependence of the conclusion on the premises; and is truly there when the con- clusion or consequent really follows from the premises. ARTICLE II. THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS LAWS. An argument expressed in the preceding form is termed a syllogism; hence, a syllogism is defined to be " an argument consisting of three propositions so related to each other that, the first two being granted, the third necessarily follows from them." The first two propositions are sometimes termed the antecedent; also, the pre?nises; and the conclusion is sometimes termed the consequent; which, however, must not be con- founded with consequence or sequence. The peculiar and specific act of reason, by which its nature LOGIC : FIRST PART. 37 / is defined, is, the knowing of one thing front another; i. e., reason is the power of deriving the knowledge of one thing from the knowledge of another by means of the relation be- tween the two. ( Vide rule fifth for a good definition.) The syllogism is the formula for the act of deriving the knowledge of one thing from that of another by means of their relation to each other. There is no other mode of learn- ing truth proper to reason as such ; tor, it belongs only to in- telligence to perceive truth directly in itself, and not by means of its relation to other truth. To reject the syllogism, there- fore, as a mode of acquiring truth, is to reject reason itself. Nor, in fact, is it possible to state an argument against the syllogism without virtually employing that very form itself; for the argument itself would be an exercise of reason, inas- much as it would be a formal effort to derive the knowledge of one thing from that of another to which it was assumed to be related. When the propositions of a syllogism are categorical, the syllogism is categorical; and when they are hypothetical, it also is hypothetical. A syllogism consists of three propositions, each containing two terms, and each one of these terms is named twice in the syllogism : these terms are the subjects and predicates of the propositions. The subject and predicate of the conclusion are the ex- tremes, the former being the minor extreme or ter?n, and the latter the major extreme or term. The major premise is strictly the one which contains the major extreme; and the ??ii?ior premise the one which contains the minor extreme. But in practice, the premise which comes first is generally termed the ?najor, and the other the minor premise. The term twice named in the premises to which the extremes are compared is called the middle term; in the preceding syllo- gism "diligence" is the minor extreme, because it is the sub- ject of the conclusion; "commendable" is the major extreme, because it is the predicate of the conclusion ; and " virtue " is 38 LOGIC : FIRST PART. the middle term, because it is the one to which the two others are compared. The rectitude of the conclusion, as already observed, de- pends on its sequence; that is, on its following from the pre- mises ; its truth depends on the nature of the 7natter. Observe, that in the following syllogism — "Every virtue is hateful; Patience is a virtue; Therefore, patience is hateful ; " There is rectitude of conclusion, but it has not truth, because one premise is false in matter. The conclusion may express truth, and yet not follow from the premises; v. g., "All virtue is good; Health is not a virtue; Therefore, health is good." Here there is truth of matter, but not rectitude or sequence of conclusion. The requisites of a correct, simple or categorical syllogism are expressed in the following rules or canons : Rule First: The syllogism must contain three, and only three, terms. Rule Second: No term can have greater extension in the conclusion than it had in the premises. Rule Third : The conclusion must never contain the middle term. Rule Fourth : The middle term must be, at least once, dis- tributed ; that is, it must be, at least once, taken according to the whole of its extension. Rule Fifth : A negative conclusion cannot follow from two affirmative premises. Rule Sixth : No conclusion follows from two negative pre- mises. Rule Seventh : The conclusion follows the less worthy pre- mise. Rule Eighth.- No conclusion follows from two particular premises. LOGIC : FIRST PART. 39 First Rule: The reason of this rule is obvious, if we reflect that a syllogism is founded on a comparison of two terms with a third ; and, hence, if there were four terms, it would not be a syllogism, but several comparisons from which there could follow no certain conclusion ; since the terms might agree in pairs, or disagree, without any relation to a third term. There may be four terms explicitly or implicitly; v. g., "Diligence is commendable; But anger is not a virtue ; Therefore, anger is not commendable." This syllogism contains four terms explicitly. But when four terms are used, it is generally done by employing the middle term in two senses: 1 Ccesar is a word of two syllables ; But Bi-utus killed Coesar; Therefore, Brutus killed a word of two syllables." In this syllogism Ccesar is used in two senses — as a word and for a person-, hence, when the middle term is ambiguous, it is equivalent to two terms. Second Rule : If a term have greater extent in the con- clusion than it had in the premises, there would then be in- ferred from the premises what is not contained in them ; but the conclusion, from its nature, is that which follows from the premises; v. g., "Every animal is a substance; No tree is an animal ; Therefore, a tree is not a substance." In this syllogism "substance" is a particular term in the pre- mises, while it is universal in the conclusion ; that is, in the premises " substance " is compared to the middle term only as to a part of its extent; while in the conclusion it is denied of " tree," according to its whole extension. Hence the conclusion, as such, can have no greater exten- sion than its premises. The fact that we frequently derive the knowledge of that which is greater from the knowledge of that which is less, as, for example, when from their relation we infer a cause from an 40 LOGIC : FIRST PART. effect, which, as such, is inferior to it, is not adverse to this rule when rightly understood. The conclusion must not have greater extension than the premises; but it may have more comprehension; nay, its terms, in some sense, must have greater comprehension ; for the conclusion is the synthesis of a subject and predicate which is not made in the premises.* Third Rule : If the middle term be used in the conclu- sion, nothing would be inferred; since the conclusion in that case would be but a repetition, in some shape, of one premise, and, therefore, it would not^express a sequence; v. g., ' 'AH virtue is commendable ; Kindness is a virtue ; Therefore, virtue is commendable." Fourth Rule : If the middle term be not, at least once, distributed ; that is, be not at least once a universal, it would be equivalent to two terms ; for it might be taken, according to one part of its extent, in one premise, and according to an- other part in the other; whence the major and minor terms would be compared to two things instead of one; v. g., " Every man is an animal; Every bird is an animal; Therefore, every man is a bird." In this syllogism "man" is compared to "animal," taken ac- cording to one part of its extension, and " bird," according to another part; whence, as the two extremes are not compared to the same term, no conclusion legitimately follows. The subject of every universal proposition is distributed, and it is not distributed in any other than a universal proposition; the predicate of every negative proposition is distributed, and it is not distributed in any but a negative proposition. Fifth Rule : A negative conclusion cannot follow from two affirmative premises; for, when they affirm the agreement of the major and minor terms with the middle, the conclusion must affirm the consequent agreement of the major and minor; v. g., "a substance whose action, or mode of operation, exceeds * "Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu."— Div. Th. 1, 2, p. q. 66, a. 1. The cause is always superior, in some respect, to its effect. LOGIC : FIRST PART. 41 the powers of matter, is above matter; the actions of the human soul transcend the powers of matter; therefore, the human soul is a substance which is superior to matter," is a correct syllog- ism by this rule. Sixth Rule : When the premises deny the agreement of both the major and minor, terms with the middle term, then nothing is affirmed as to the identity or diversity of the major and minor; it is only declared that they do not agree with the middle term; hence, when both extremes disagree with the middle term, they may either agree or disagree with each other; v. g., " A reptile is not a bird; A snake is not a bird ; Therefore, a snake is not a reptile." This conclusion, though false in matter, derives neither truth nor falsehood from the premises. " A bird is not a reptile ; A tree is not a reptile ; Therefore, a tree is not a bird." This conclusion is true in matter, but it does not follow from the premises. Seventh Rule : The unworthy premise is that which is negative, in respect to that which is affirmative; and that which is particular, in respect to that which is universal. The reason of the rule will become obvious if it be observed that when one premise affirms the agreement of its extreme term with the middle term, and the agreement of the other term with the middle is denied in the remaining premise, it follows that the extremes disagree with each other; v. g., " If A is equal to B, And C is not equal to B ; Then C is not equal to A." Or " Xone but organized, living, corporeal beings are mortal; Angels are not corporeal beings ; Therefore, angels are not mortal." Again, if a term which is particular in the premises, be made universal in the conclusion, in such case, an agreement will be 42 LOGIC : FIKST PART. affirmed in the conclusion which is not implied in the premises; v. g., " All virtue is commendable; Some parsimony is a virtue ; Therefore, all parsimony is commendable." Here the conclusion affirms that all parsimony agrees with " commendable," though in the premises it is only said that some parsimony agrees with " virtue," the middle term. Hence, this is, at the same time, a fault against the second rule. Eighth Rule : When both premises are particular, neither term is distributed ; and hence the extremes may be actually compared to different parts of the same extension ; v. g., " Some Cretans were liars; Some Romans were liars ; Therefore, some Cretans were Romans." This is a vicious syllogism ; for the major and minor terms agree with " liars " in different parts of its extension ; therefore, since they are not compared to the same thing, it does not follow from the premises either that they agree or that they disagree with each other. This syllogism is wrong by rule the fourth also, since the middle term is not distributed. Yet, even when the terms are all singular, the conclusion may be valid; v. g., " Romulus was the founder of Rome; The first king of Rome was Romulus Therefore, the first king of Rome was the founder of Rome." Here the conclusion is really consequent, lor the middle term, " Romulus," may be considered as virtually a common term taken according to its whole extent and including "founder of Rome," and "first king of Rome;" this is termed by the old philosophers, an expository syllogism. It is an apparent excep- tion to the eighth rule. When the three terms are really singular, they may be identical as to their object; and then it is not a real argument, but a sort of definition, by synonyms; v. g., ' ' Man is a rational animal ; Man consists of soul and body; Therefore, a rational animal consists of soul and body. This also is an expository syllogism. LOGIC I FIRST PART. 43 ARTICLE III. HYPOTHETICAL OR CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS ; THE DIS- JUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM. A hypothetical syllogism is one in which a categorical con- clusion is deduced from a hypothetical premise. In a hypo- thetical proposition, the conclusion or consequent is verified Avhen the condition is verified; hence, when the major propo- sition is conditional, i. e., has a condition which is expressed by " if," or its equivalent, in the minor the truth of the condi- tion is affirmed as a categorical proposition, from which the truth of the conclusion follows; or the truth of the co?isequent is denied; whence the falsity of the condition will result; v. g., " If Brutus killed Caesar, then Caesar is dead; But Brutus did kill Caesar ; Therefore, Caesar is dead." In such syllogisms, then, the minor premise may either affirm the truth of the condition, or deny the truth of the conclusion; in the first case, the consequent will be the conclusion of the syllogism; v. g., " Caesar is dead;" in the second, the denial of the condition will be the conclusion of the syllogism; v. g., " Brutus did not kill Caesar ; " and in both cases, the argument will be hi form, that is, consequejit. But, as regards the matter, it does not follow that if the con- dition be false, the consequent is therefore false ; for it may be true for some other reason; v. g., even if Brutus did not kill Caesar, still Caesar may be dead from some other cause. Again, it does not follow that if the consequent be true the condition is therefore true, for the consequent might be verified by a different condition ; v. g., though it may be granted that Caesar is dead, it does not therefore follow that he was killed. In such hypothetical enunciations as the following, "if man is a mineral, he does not feel;" the consequent has not real, but only suppositive truth, for the antecedent is merely an arbitrary supposition. Hence, when, in a conditional proposition, the truth of the 44 LOGIC : FIRST PART. affirmative consequent is really dependent on that of the affirm- ative antecedent; or, also, when the antecedent is so included in the consequent, that the denial of the conseque?it necessarily implies the denial of the antecedent, we have for the conditional argument the following Rule : First, In the affirmative conditional, the minor pre- mise muse affirm the antecedent, and the conclusion must affirm the consequent ; v. g., "if the soul reasons, it is a simple sub- stance; but the soul does reason; therefore the soul is a simple substance." Second, In the negative conditio?ial, the minor premise must deny the consequent, and the conclusion must deny the antecedent, observing that two negatives in English are equivalent to an affirmative; v. g., "if the soul perishes when the body dies, then the soul is not a spiritual substance; but the soul is (is not not) a spiritual substance ; therefore, the soul does not perish when the body dies." As regards the form of the hypothetical or conditional argu- ment the preceding rule is absolute, or it admits no exception. But it may happen by accident, or in virtue of the matter, that the conclusion is true, even w r hen these rules are inverted; as, for example, when the antecedent is the sufficient reason of the consequent; if the antecedent is denied* the conseque?it may also be denied; v. g., " if the sun is at the meridian, it is noon ; but the sun is not at the meridian; therefore, it is not noon" This conclusion is true, not in virtue of the fonn, but on account of the ??iatter; in other words, it is not logically consequent, though it is materially true. Also, when the condition and conseque?it are in matter iden- tical and co-extensive, by accident, and not in virtue of the form, the falsity of the condition infers the falsity of the conclu- sion; v. g., "if Apollo was not a man, then he was not a rational animal; but he was a man; therefore, he was a rational animal" : "if man is immortal, he will not die; but he is not immortal ; therefore, he will die." As the condition and con- ditionate are identical, the falsity of one always infers, neces- sarily, the falsity of the other, on account cf that ide7itity. This species of argument, for its brevity, is used in practice ; and LOGIC I FIRST PART. 45 when the matter is true, the proof of the condition is the proof, also, of the condiiionate; or vice versa. The same thing which is misunderstood or denied under one form of expression, may be seen and admitted under another; hence, this mode of proof is legitimate, and may be useful in some cases. A syllogism is disjunctive when it proceeds from a disjunc- tive proposition. The disjunction of the antecedent and con- sequent is perfect when they divide the whole matter so as to admit no medium; v. g., "man is either mortal, or not mortal;" in man there can be no medium between mortality and immor- tality. The truth or rectitude of the disjunction is determined by the matter. In the completely disjunctive syllogism, the admission of one member of the disjunction requires the denial of the other; v. g., "either man is mortal, or he is immortal; but he is mortal ; therefore, he is not immortal ; " " the honor of first discovering America belongs either to Americus or to Columbus ; it belongs to Columbus ; therefore, it does not belong to Americus." When one member of a disjunctive premise is merely the contradictory of the other, if the affirm- ative one be granted, the negative one has a double negation, which is really an affirmative; v. g., " either it rains, or it does not rain ; it does rain ; therefore, it does ?iot not rain ; " i. e., it does rain. ARTICLE IV. OTHER FORMS OF ARGUMENT WHICH MAY BE REDUCED TO THE SYLLOGISTIC FORM. The ejiihymeme is a syllogism, one of whose premises is not expressed; v. g., "the poor are men; therefore, they are not to be contemned." The sorites is a series of propositions in which the predicate of the first is the subject of the second, the predicate of the second is the subject of the third, and so on till the last or conclusion, in which the predicate of the last proposition is conjoined to the subject of the first proposition ; 46 LOGIC : FIRST PART. v. g.. " he who does not restrain his passions, has many violent desires; he that has many violent desires, is unquiet; he that is unquiet, is miserable ; therefore, he that does not restrain his passions is miserable." Both these forms of argument consist of abridged syllogisms. The epycherema is a syllogism in which one or both of the premises are proved, each by its reason ; or it has its reason annexed to it in the syllogism; v. g., "every spiritual substance is incorruptible, since it neither has parts nor depends on matter; but the human soul is a spiritual substance, since it is intel- ligent; therefore, the human soul is incorruptible." The dilemma is a compound argument which consists of two members proposed disjunctively, and so related that the legiti- mate conclusion from either member, or horn, is a refutation of the adversary; v. g., "the skeptic's denial of all certainty is either true or false ; if true, then that is certain ; if false, still more is there certainty ; therefore, in either supposition, scep- ticism is false." This argument is called a dilem??ia, because it consists of but two members. The trile?nma and quadrilemma are too compli- cated to be ordinarily useful in reasoning. A dilemma is faulty; ist, If the division of the matter made by the disjunctive be not coniplete; in other words, if there be a medium of escape from it. The dilemma put into the mouth of Socrates when dying, has this fault: " Death is either a sweet sleep, or it is a transition to the happy companionship of Orpheus and Ulysses; in either case, therefore, it is good to die." Between " sleep " and the "society of Ulysses," there is a wide medium. But when the early Christians said to the Roman tyrant, " either we are innocent, or we are guilty; if innocent, why condemn us ? if guilty, why refuse us a lawful trial?" between men's innoce7ice and guilt, and also between the corresponding provisions of the law, there is no medium. 2d, The conclusion derived from one, or each member of the dilemma, may not be legitimate; in this case, it not only proves nothing, but it may be retorted; v. g., it was said to a judge, who was about to enter into office, " you will administer the LOGIC : FIRST PART. 47 laws either well or ill; if well, you will displease the people; if ill, you will displease the gods;" he retorted, "I will administer the laws justly or unjustly; if justly, I shall not displease the gods; if unjustly, I shall not displease the people." Another example of the dilemma which may be retorted: Protagoras bargained to educate Euathlus for the law, half of the money to be paid when his studies were finished, the rest when Euathlus gained his first suit; after some time Prota- goras sued Euathlus, and this was the first case for Euathlus. Protagoras thus argued : " Either Euathlus will lose or gain this case ; if he lose it, then the money is to be paid me by the decision of the court; if he gain it, then he must pay me by our contract." Euathlus retorted : " If the decision is in my favor, then I will pay nothing by the sentence of the court; if against me, I will pay nothing according to the contract, since I will not have gained my first case" The fallacy really arises from Protagoras having, by the contract, no right to bring the suit, as he was to wait till Euathlus gained his first case; hence, the disjunction did not include the whole matter. Euathlus' dilemma was at fault, because he assumed that the judge's decision would annul the contract, or exempt him from paying, if he gained the suit ; and Protagoras was wrong for assuming the canceling of the contract, in case the decision of the judge was adverse to his disciple. A sophist argued : " You say that you lie; and if you speak the truth, then you do lie; if you say falsely that you lie, then also you lie; therefore, whether you speak truly or falsely, you lie." He does "lie" in each case, but not about the same thing, and under the same respect. CHAPTER IV. ARTICLE I. SCIENTIFIC METHOD : ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS, IN THEIR RELATION BOTH TO PARTICULAR SCIENTIFIC COGNITIONS, AND TO SYSTEMS OF SUCH COGNITIONS. There are two methods which the mind follows in acquiring or imparting knowledge by reasoning; namely, Analysis and Synthesis. In analysis the mind proceeds from the compound to its simple components, from the particular object to the general truth ; but in synthesis this order is inverted, and the mind proceeds from the simple to the compound, from the general to the particular. The particular, as this man, this rose, is compound, or has many component marks or properties, while the universal has but o?ie jnark; hence, the process of going from a particular object or truth to the general or universal, is analysis. When we say that the particular is compound, we regard the compre- hensioji of the term. The more general the term is, the greater its exte?ision, but the less its comprehension; v. g., the term man includes many marks, as, " substance," " animal," " rational " ; the term being includes but one mark, but, as to its extension, it is applicable to all things. When by argument we proceed from a subject to a predicate, the method of reasoning is analytical; when the reasoning is from the predicate to the subject, the method is synthetical. A simple syllogism is synthetical; a sorites may combine in it both synthesis and analysis. But analysis and synthesis may also regard the general method by which a series of cognitions, a particular system of knowledge or a particular science is ac- quired or taught ; however, they are always distinguished from 48 LOGIC : FIKST PAET. 49 each other in the same manner. By analysis we resolve what is complex into its simple constituents ; by synthesis we form one whole out of many constituents. By analysis we find the extension of terms, ideas or propositions ; by synthesis we find their comprehension* In all lengthy trains of reasoning both synthesis and analysis may occur, whether the general method be conducted according to the one or the other. Induction, as a method of acquiring science, is analysis; regarded as a syllogism, it is synthesis/ for, as a general method of scientific reasoning, it deduces univer- sal principles from particular facts, and this is analysis. When its conclusions are finally established, it is by one argument concerning the whole class in which a law or property is pre- dicated of them ; this is synthesis, and yet it pertains to the in- duction. When a property is deduced from a substance; when algebraic formulae are resolved by transformation into more general formulas ; the process in each case is analysis ; for, in these instances, the universal is deduced from the par- ticular. When we predicate the effect of the cause, or pass from the general truth to the particular object, the process is synthesis. Analysis is called, also, the method of invention; synthesis the method of discipline, or instruction. Observe, however, that in education, considered as to its general scope and progress, knowledge advances by analysis; for the progress of the mind in education thus generally un- derstood, is from the particular to the universal ; from what is less universal to what is more universal; but yet the particular steps or acts of cognition by which the mind proceeds, are, as already remarked, both those of synthesis and those of analysis. This will be easily understood if it be kept in mind that to deduce a general property from its subject is analysis; to predi- cate is synthesis. The mind, by the law of its nature, begins with the knowledge of physical and sensible objects, reasons to their general properties ; it passes from quantity to its gene- ral properties, and finally attains to strictly metaphysical truth; * " Multa ex uno analysis, unum ex multis efficit synthesis." Analysis makes many out of one; synthesis makes one out of many. 50 LOGIC : FIRST PART. i. ternal senses, etc.; for all these powers, taken together, con- stitute our only natural means of knowing; and it is as legiti- mate and reasonable to deny or doubt the truth of one natural faculty or power in respect to its own proper objects as that of another. From consciousness, which is purely subjective, to the ob- jective, is not a valid illation, since no power or faculty can transcend its own order of objects, and pass without a medium, to a class specifically different, or really separated from it. But sound philosophy must begin with, as admitted, because undeniable, the truths or principles that are known to reason, without argument, of themselves, and which need no proof, and admit none, and require no other reason for an assent, than **' Propositio perse nota est, quando ea est comiexio praedicati cum subjecto, ut penetrari subjectum nequeat, quin ea comiexio deprehendatur in ipsa ratione subjecti. Seu propositio per se nota dicitur cujus Veritas per se et sine medio a se distincto imiotescit: sic lux dicitur per se visibilis, quia eaipsa et non per medium magis lucidum videtur . ' ' A proposition is per se known, or is self-evi- dent, when the connexion of the predicate with the subject is such, that the subject cannot be understood, without the connexion being perceived in the very nature of the subject. Or, a proposition is said to be per se known, or self-evi- dent, whose truth is known in itself and without any medium which is distinct from it: thus light is per se visible, for it is seen in itself, and not by means of another medium more distinct than itself. logic: second pakt. 81 their own self-evidence. With regard to empirical knowledge, or that acquired by experience, we must also admit, without other proof, the evident perceptions of the mind, through the senses and ccnsciousness ; since these, too, are direct cogni- tions of evident truth : nature, of itself, cannot err.* Nor do we thereby assume truth on faith i?i natural law. No ; we assent to it, because it is evident ; and it is evident because it is truth, or that which is, and we know it to be stfch as we see it to be. Hence, then, our own existence, our perceptions of external objects, the acts of consciousness, truths known /w w, as, "it cannot be that the same thing exists, and does not exist, at the same time;" and the like, are truths that are admitted as abso- lutely certain, and incapable of logical proof; since that alone is capable of proof which can be made more evident by another truth still more evident, from which it is evidently deduced. Therefore, genuine philosophy begins, not with doubt or negation; but with certain first truth, immediately evident without demonstrative proof, and the affirmation of it. This question, as to primitive truths, should not be con- founded with the question, as to the origin of ideas; this latter subject pertains to psychology, or the philosophy of the mind, but yet it will be briefly treated in a subsequent part of this work. The importance of the foregoing doctrine will be appreciated if it be remembered that, as said by an illustrious author (D. Th. de veritate, a. i). "the certainty of knowledge comes from the certainty of its principles ; for, the certainty of infer- ences or conclusions is known only when they are resolved into their principles." Observe, also, that inferences or conclusions, as such, partake in some mode of the nature of their premises; for they are caused by them. Hence, principles or premises that are evi- dent and absolute, furnish conclusions which are necessary and evident in virtue of those premises. *"Xatura non deficit in necessariis." Nature is not deficient in -\vhat is necessary. CHAPTER II. MEANS OF ATTAINING TRUTH WITH CERTAINTY. The means of attaining truth may be classified under the following heads, viz. : ist, the faculty of consciousness ; 2d, the internal senses and the external senses ; 3d, the ideas which the mind has acquired, and which it compares among themselves, or, simple Apprehension, Judgment and Reason- ing; 4th, Testimony or Authority, which exacts rational assent. ARTICLE I. THE POWER OF CONSCIOUSNESS. The word consciousness is here used to signify the power or faculty of the mind to reflect on its own modifications or oper- ations, together with the act of thus reflexively seeing what is within itself. In this sense it corresponds to the Latin phrases, sensus intimus, conscientia reflexa, and is, therefore, not only the power, but includes the act of the mind by which it sees and recognizes what happens within itself, as its own. Hence, it has for its immediate object internal facts; i. e., ist, the modifications of the mind alone, as ideas, judgments, acts of volition; 2d, modifications of the human compound, as grief, gladness, cold, hunger. The act or modification of the mind is not anything really distinct from the mind itself ; it is the mind acting within itself as subject and object. In an act of consciousness two things are always seen, at least con- fusedly, viz., the impression, and the subject of it ; for the im- 82 logic: second part. 83 pression is always perceived in concrete, as it is ; therefore, it is seen not as abstract or separate from the mind, but in the mind itself. For the mind knows itself as a living principle of action, by its own operations ; i. e., it knows its acts, as its own. The faculty or power of consciousness does not attain physi- cally and immediately to external objects; but it becomes cog- nizant of them only as they are presented through the action of the senses, the imagination, and as seen through the ideas or concepts in the intellect, but without directly perceiving the internal medium. (Vide page 62, note.) Without this power of the mind we could have no reflex knowledge of anything; even evidence itself can only become a motive of philosophical certainty when it is an object of consciousness; or is reflexively seen as such. The action of consciousness is implied in all judgments; for it is the directing and controlling influence in all the mind's completely rational action. Consciousness, therefore, affords an unerring motive of cer- tainty, as to the truth of its objects; that is, both of our ex- istence and the mind's own modifications. This proposition cannot be logically demonstrated, since the formal argument would explicitly assume what is in question ; but, on the other hand, we cannot conceive or declare a doubt of it, except on its own testimony. All demonstration presup- poses some truths that are known per se, that is, evident in themselves without proof; or, such as are known through our cognoscive powers by their own objective evidence, as facts which neither require nor admit any demonstration ; what we know by the direct and immediate act of consciousness is an evident fact of this kind. It neither admits nor requires demonstration ; for, the understanding clearly perceives the truth in the objects of its own acts, as self-evident; and it is absurd either to doubt or to attempt the a priori proof of what is self-evident. To deny the absolute certainty of its testi- mony is to reject all certainty, and the right use of reason, and logic itself; which would be either intellectual blindness or moral perversity. The fact that persons who are delirious, or dream, do not 84 LOGIC : SECOND PART. have normal action of consciousness, and do not thereby either perceive or acquire truth, does not militate against the thesis, that consciousness affords an infallible motive of cer- tainty as to its own objects. In such conditions the mind per- ceives and judges by the phantoms of a disturbed imagination. This organ, in those states, has none but disordered action ; for, when diseased or disturbed, the imagination cannot coop- erate in rational thought, as will be more fully explained in an- other place. As disturbed water reflects images in distorted fragments ; so, when the fancy is in an abnormal state, its action is morbid and disorderly, and its imagery is in undistinguisha- ble confusion. When this organ is so diseased or disordered as not to have normal action, the intellect is thereby more or less completely shut off, according to the extent and nature of the affection, from the entire world of realities, with which the fancy, as will be again remarked in the next article, is its essential medium of communication; and, in this state of seclusion, it is either wholly or partially unable to distinguish what is merely of the sickly fancy, from what is objectively real. In such case, this organ either forms no image at all of objects acting on the external senses, or those images are distorted and confused. Even in dreams, the action of the external senses being sus- pended, and those senses thereby ceasing to present real ob- jects to the imagination, it is not then a medium of rational communication for the soul with real or actual objects; which strikingly shows how entirely dependent the intellect is on the imagination, for all the objects of its action. By the power of consciousness it is sometimes difficult to distinguish in impressions that are even but recently past, whether they were acts of the will, or acts of the soul as not free ; especially since the acts and affections of the will are, by their nature, more obscure than are the acts of direct per- ception or judgment. But even in this and analogous cases, in which truth may be difficult of attainment, close observa- tion of what actually occurs in the mind, with careful reflec- logic: second part. 85 tion, secures the judgment from error, especially if the mind merely affirms what it perceives, and as it perceives it. Abnormal action of the faculties proceeds from a disturbed condition of the bodily organs, and is an exceptional case, that properly has nothing to do with the thesis; for it has reference to the operations of the mind only in its sound condition. The causes of diseased mental action properly pertain to another science for their analysis. ARTICLE II. THE SENSES; THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF ORGANIC POWERS. The senses, sensation, the nature of organic action, also the nature and specific objects of intellectual action, are explained somewhat diffusely in this article and the succeeding one; be- cause a clear distinction between organic action and intellectual action is of the utmost importance, even for the very beginning of philosophic study. That distinction is ignored in some popular works on philosophy, and is directly denied in others, either because their authors had made no careful and con- siderate examination of the subject, or because it was their pleasure to teach an hypothesis which identifies matter and intellect. The old philosophers classified the senses as internal and external. The i?iternal senses are, imagination; sensile 7nem- ory; potentia cesti/naliva, or power of estimating material things, as good or evil for sensible appetite; sensns commimis, "com- mon sense," an organic power, by which the impressions made on the external senses are sensibly distinguished from each other. A sensible organ, or an organic power, is a member of the living animal compound, i. e. ; compound of a substantial vital principle, and matter; it is capable of vital action in respect to its proper objects, and is ordained by its nature to sustain and perfect the living organism to which it pertains. Hence, or- 86 logic: second part. ganic power essentially belongs to animal nature, and is, there- fore, living, and corporeal or material. Imagination, and fancy, are two names for the same organic power, or internal sense, and are used in this work indiscrimi- nately; the former word is derived from the Latin language; the latter, from the Greek. Imagination is the power of form- ing and reproducing sensible images made out of the impres- sions received by the senses from external objects. Sensile* memory is the organic power by which these impressions are retained, and recognized when they are reproduced ; or, more explicitly, sensile memory, which is an organic power, is the faculty of retaining the quasi concepts or intentions of those im- pressions and images in the fancy, and sensibly recognizing them when they are reproduced. If the reproduction of the past impression be understood to include the recalling of it, then, the reproduction of an impres- sion may be referred, under different respects, both to the imagination and the memory. The intellectual memory is not an organic power, but is a faculty of the soul itself, having no more direct dependence on the organs of the body than the understanding or will has. THE CONNEXION OF THE INTERNAL SENSES, AND THEIR DEPENDENCE ON EACH OTHER. The polenlia cesti.mativa is the power of duly estimating, i. e., sensibly appreciating the fitness or unfitness of an object to satisfy the wants of animal nature, or, as good or harmful for it. The sensus communis, which is analogous to the potentia cestimativa, is the basis of all the external senses, and is thus commo7i to them, somewhat as the sense of touch, under an- other respect, may be regarded as the basis of all the senses ;t but it moreover distinguishes the impressions made on the five external senses from one another. It was argued thus : even *It is manifest that sensile is here a more proper term than sensible, sensitive or sentient, any one of which would be equivocal in this connexion. t ' ' Omnes alii sensus fundantur supra tactum. ' ' (Div. Th. , 1 p. , qu. 76, a. 5.) All the other senses are founded on that of touch. LOGIC : SECOND PART. 87 the brute animal feels that it sees, feels that it hears, feels that it smells, etc. ; but the eye cannot distinguish between color and sound, the ear cannot distinguish between sound and smell, etc.; there-fore, there must be an organic power which receives, feels, and distinguishes all these impressions made upon the external organs. To do this, is the function of the se?isus com- munis, or " common sense," so called, because, as already ob- served, it is the common basis and principle of unity for all the five external senses. The imagination, which is also an internal sense, forms its images or p/iantasmata from the impressions made through the external senses on the sensus communis/ the potentia cestimativa, i. e., the power of estimating or valuing objects as good or hurtful for appetite, makes its appreciation or estimate of its objects as presented to it by i/nages in the fancy; and in this act the potentia cestimativa forms for itself quasi concepts expressing the uses, "intentions" of sensible objects, and these quasi concepts are retained by the sensile memory. All these powers are purely organic, and are situated in the brain. They are possessed by all the perfect animals :. i. e., ail animals that hawtfive external senses. They discriminate, in certain instances, between the prop- erties of objects presented to them through the external senses; not, however, by way of a formal judgment; but by a true, though sensible, appreciation of them.* But the potentia cestimativa, as it is in man, is far more per- fect than it is in irrational animals. In man it is not limited in its action to merely appreciating a sensible object as useful or hurtful for appetite ; but it can compare particular and sin- gular objects of the kind among themselves, in a manner not unlike to that in which the intellect co?npares universals, and it * "Opinio passionem facit in appetitu, non autem imaginatio ; si enim prae- cise imaginemur hostes, non statim timemus aut lugimus; secus vi-ro si opine- mur prassentes. Ratio est, quod sola apprehensio qualis est in phantasm, non movet appetitum nisi accedat aestimativae operatro." — Musaenra Philos. de Anima. Opinion produces passion in the appetite, imagination does not ; if we merely imagine enemies, we do not at once flee away or fear; it is otherwise though, if we have the opinion that they are present. The reason is , that the sole apprehension as it is in the fancy cannot move appetite, unless there accede to it the operation of the potentia cestimativa, which reputes the object to be real. 88 LOGIC: SECOND PART. thus approaches to a nearer resemblance of intellectual action. Hence, this power in man, was termed vis co^itativa, or cogita- tive power; or, also, ratio particularism ox particular reason; and it was described by the old philosophers as the connecting link in man between sense and reason. It is, therefore, under differ- ent respects, both the highest power of sense, and, in some manner, the lowest power or act of reason : yet this power is, in itself, merely organic. The human soul, by the power of consciousness, can reflect on its own acts and what affects it, and see these operations as its own; but no sense or organic power, whether internal or external, can reflect on itself or its own act ; this power of reflex action pertains to simple intellectual substance only. It is, perhaps, not too much to affirm that no other theory as yet proposed by philosophers, so consistently or so satis- factorily explains the phenomena of what may be termed by analogy, the brute mind, or which accounts equally well for all that which is merely sensible or organic operation, in man also. THIS THEORY FOR THE EXPLANATION OF SENSE COGNITION, ACCOUNTS CONSISTENTLY FOR ALL ITS PHENOMENA. In order that the limits of purely sensible knowledge may be more distinctly traced, and be more clearly seen, it will be useful to consider this truth, namely, that the doctrine of in- ternal sense, or internal organs of sensible cognition, is in itself not repugnant to the nature of organic power. For since the fact is undeniable that the senses have many virtues or perfec- tions of various species and degrees, we can easily conceive internal ones capable, without at all transcending the specific nature of organic power, of receiving and acting on the impres- sions conveyed to them by the external senses, as their conna- tural objects; analogously to the manner in which the external senses receive and act on impressions from their objects. Since the sense has no reflex action, the impression which is actually in it must be immediately produced by the object and the organ, and as the object is singular, concrete and material, the impression as in the organ, though vitally received by it, logic: second paet. 89 must be a material effect. Both the organ, and the object are material \ therefore, the effect of their combined action is material. The material nature or character of the impression in the external sense, is all that is per se or necessarily required to constitute it the connatural object of another organic power that is superior to the external sense. That the fancy is an internal organic power of this kind, i. e., that its proper or connatural object is an impression furnished by the external sense, will be rendered more manifest by what is to be shown a little further on. They who deny or fail to recognize the existence of internal senses, attribute all sensible 'operation, whose principle is not obvious, or which cannot be explained by the action of exter- nal sense alone, either to instinct or to intellect. Instinct, in such theory, is a vague and indeterminate power which is made to account for all cognoscive operation which transcends the capacity of external sense. But this is to evade the diffi- culty, n°t to explain it. Instinct,* more precisely and accu- rately understood, is a natural impulse and positive tendency to some vital action which is useful or necessary for the indi- vidual agent or its species, that utility of the action not being apprehended or known by it as an end to be attained. Thus we explain some actions of beavers, ants, migratory birds, etc. They apprehend certain sensible objects, and are moved by them to action ; but the design or intention of the end in their action, we ascribe, through the law of their nature, to the Author of their being. Considered in itself, instinct appears to be a virtue or prin- ciple of action superadded to nature as operative, over and above appetite and cognition ; subserved by them, and direc- tive of them and the subject to which they belong, in certain matters in which those powers are not sufficient for the end to be attained. In order not to confound merely organic action with intel- lectual action, we must not lose sight of the truth that their •Div. Th. 1, 2. p. qu. 40, a. 3. 90 logic: second part. objects are essentially distinct ;* the formal, proper, connatural object of organic power or sense, is the singular, or concrete and material reality ; that of the intellect, is the abstract, uni- versal or intelligible, which is, of its nature, absolutely super- sensible, and is therefore immaterial. THE BRUTE SOUL, ANIMA BELLUINA, IS MATERIAL. Brutes evidently have those cognitions that are perfected in sense alone ; though they show no signs whatever that they possess intellect or free will. Their action is physically neces- sary and uniform, quid determinatum ad unum, "what is deter- mined to one mode of action." An agent which is thus limited to that action which is physically necessary has, of course, no rational empire over its own operation, and, therefore, has no intelligent principle of action. It cannot be legitimately denied that an agent which depends on matter in all its action, also depends on matter in existing, according to the metaphysical principle, "modus agendi sequi- tur modum essendi," "action is according to the essence of the agent:" or, that which is material in its action is also material in its essence ; and hence, knowing the action, we may justly conclude a posteriori to the esse?ice or nature of the agent that puts it. This axiom holds true, whether the agent is the urn- vocal, or the equivocal cause of the effect produced by means of its act. The argument may be stated more strictly in form, thus: all organic action is material action, because both the organ is material, and its object is per se material ; the brute mind has none but organic action, and, therefore, it has none but mate- rial action.t But that which wholly depends on matter in its *"Sentire, et consequentes operationes animae sensitive, accidunt cum ali- qua corporis immutatione . . intelligere exercetur sine organo corporeo. " (Vide Div. Thorn. Sum., 1 p., qu. 75, a. 3.) To feel sensibly, and the conse- quent operations of the sensitive soul, happen •with some change in the body . . . to understand, is exercised without a bodily organ. f ' ' Cum animae brutorum animalium non per se operentur, non sunt subsis- tentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem. ' ' (Div. Th. 1 p. qu. 78, a 3.) Since the souls of brute animals do not operate per se, they do not subsist, (or exist alone or apart from matter) , for every thing exists and acts in a similar manner. logic: second part. 91 action, also depends wholly on matter in existing; now, the brute soul is affixed to matter and limited to matter in all its action ; it is, therefore, similarly dependent on matter in exist- ing; i. e., it can not exist per se, or alone and apart from matter, but only dependency on it. The force of this reasoning will be still more clearly perceived, if it be borne in mind that we not only know an agent by its action, and know it only by its action ; but its action is, in some proper sense of the words, the measure of its essence ; "unumquodque agit in quantum est actu, i. e., in quantum forma actuatum ; " " every thing has action, in proportion as it has actual essence.'" THE HUMAN SOUL A SPIRITUAL OR IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE. By similar reasoning it follows that since the acts of the human soul, intellection and volition, are wholly inorganic, for their objects are wholly immaterial, and the intellect and will elicit their acts alone, i. e., without any other second cause as a concurrent principle, the soul is therefore immaterial; or, since the human soul operates per se, or without direct depend- ence on matter, it also can exist per se, or is an immaterial substance. The intellect knows material or sensible things by their intel- ligible essence;* i. e., by real intellectual types or similitudes of them expressed in concepts of their essence ; hence, it knows material things in an immaterial manner, which it is not possi- ble for organic power to do. The human soul, when existing separate from the body, is said to subsist i?icompletely j because, by its very nature, it is ordained to substantial union with the body. But, considered as a substance, it can be said to exist completely when in that state, because it exists per sey i. e., it, as it were, stands alone, or exists without leaning or depending on a?iother thing, by in- hering in it. ♦"Essentia rerum materialium sunt in intellectu hominis, vel angeli, ut intellectum est in intelligente, et non secundum suum esse reale. ' ' (Sum. , 1 P. , Qu. 57, Art. 1, Ad. 2.) The essences of material things are in the intellect of man, or the angel, as that which is understood is in that which understands, and not as to their real existence. ^ 92 logic: second part. It would seem necessarily to follow from what is said above that the brute soul, anima bellui?ia, is a substantial and living principle, or, as expressed by the old philosophers, forma sub- stantialis et principium vivefis; and, in fact, such it evidently must be. Yet, its total dependence on matter in operating proves that it is totally of matter also in existing ; it can exist only in union by composition with matter, and it is, therefore, only incomplete, and, at the same time, partial substance. Besides, even if we conceived it absolutely possible for the brute soul to exist separate from matter, to which it must naturally be affixed in existing, as shown above ; then it could have no sensible action, for it would be destitute of an organ ; it could have no spiritual action, for it would have no intellect; therefore, its state would be that of mere potentiality, or exist- ence without action ; i. e., the supposition is absurd. IS THE IMAGINATION AN ORGANIC POWER; OR, IS THE SUBJECT IN WHICH IT RESIDES, THE SOUL; I. E., THE SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE AS ESSENTIALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM MATTER ? The imagination or fancy is organic ; or, its subject is the living compound, and not the soul or spiritual substance alone; its peculiar function in man is to serve the intellect, or to pre- sent objects to it by means of true images of those objects.* It is an organic power, for the brute animal possesses no higher principle of action than that of sense or organic power, as already seen ; but the brute has imagination, and even sen- sible memory also; for the arguments which prove the exist- ence of fancy in them, at the same time conclusively show them to possess organic or sensible memory. For the perfect animal, imagination is physically necessary, since it must know sensible things not only as present and acting on its external organs ; but it must know them when they are absent so that it may tend to such objects as are necessary for sustenance, *' 'Anima rationalis, licet quamdiu corpus informat, supponat operationem phantasise quae per organum operatur, tamen organo non elicit suana intellec- tionem." (Irenaeus Carmelit, et philosophi passim.) The rational soul, though so long as it informs the body it suppose the operation of fancy which acts through an organ, does not elicit its intellection by an organ. logic: second part. 93 preservation, etc. But to form and preserve the images of sensible things, to reproduce and recognize them, are respect- ively the functions of fancy and sensible memory. Since brutes have no intellect, this power must be merely organic in them ; it follows, therefore, that the faculty, imagination, is, at least, not per se, or necessarily intellectual. But even in man this power can form the image of no ob- ject except one that is either sensible in itself, or which it can represent as invested with sensible forms or qualities. Now, a power that can have no object of action but that which is sensible, and, therefore, material, must itself be material; for the nature of a power is known by the specific objects of its action, since action follows the nature, or agrees with the nature of the agent. The imagination in man is, therefore, an organic power, or its subject is the living compound of soul and body. Or, in fewer words, the imagination is not an intellectual prin- ciple, because its connatural object is only the sensible or material ; and, hence, it is per se, or esse?itially material or organic. The imagination in man is sometimes termed " the medium between the senses and the intellect ; " " fantasia est media inter sensum et intellectum." Hence, without the action of the external senses, the fancy could form no images of sensible objects; without the action of the fancy, the intellect could not naturally have any communication whatever with any real object, or any sensible power of cognition, and hence it would be totally insulated from all the proper objects of its action. The fancy, therefore, is for the intellect the essential medium of comviunication with the entire order of reality. As we are now constituted, the intellect cannot contemplate or even per- ceive any object, except as in some manner e?nbodied and reflected in that minor* The fancy can form no image every real component of which was not originally acquired by the actual observation •"Corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sedratione objecti." (Div. Th. 1 p, qu. 75, a. 2, ad. 3.) "The body is required for the action of the intellect, not as an organ by which such action is exercised, but on account of the object. 94 LOGIC : SECOND PAET. of sensible things : a man blind from his birth can have in his fancy no real image of color ; " quibus deficit unus sensus, deficit una scientia; " "they who never possessed any one sense, are destitute of one species of cognition." WHAT, IN REGARD TO MENTAL THOUGHT, IS THE SPECIAL FUNCTION OR ACT OF THE IMAGINATION, WHOSE CONNA- TURAL OBJECT, AS ALREADY SHOWN, IS PER SE MATERIAL. Imagination is generically the same in man and brute ; in man it forms and presents images to the intellect, which the intellect contemplates, and by abstraction forms from them its intel- ligible concepts or ideas of things.* In the brute its images serve as objects for the faculty of sense, termed potentia cesti- mativa, or power of sensibly discerning objects as good or noxious for the animal : t called by what name soever, unde- niable facts prove that brute animals possess this faculty of distinguishing such uses or intentions of sensible objects, no less than facts also prove demonstratively that they have no intellectual act. That no brute faculty can apprehend the abstract or universal, or can judge, is strictly demonstrated by induction only ; but this induction, it cannot be questioned, has long since actually been made by mankind, logically, over and over again, and in the most general manner; and each one's daily observation verifies the conclusion which is known, as a fact, to have been reached by mankind. Whence it logically suffices here merely to affirm the impossibility of any duly attested law or fact of brute action being adduced, which cannot be fully accounted for, by the operation of sensible or organic powers, as they are above described. ♦With strange confusion, both of thought and of language, this action of the intellect is, by certain writers, called imagination. Wherefore, since this volume contains no treatise on the science of Psychology, it was judged advisable to explain more fully and explicitly in this place the specific and distinguishing acts of fancy and intellect, than is strictly pertinent to a work on Logic and General Metaphysics. t "Ad apprehendendum intentiones qua? per sensumnon accipiuntur ordinatur vis aestimativa." (Div. Th., 1 p., qu. 78, a. 4.) The vis cestimativa, or power of sensibly appreciating, is ordained for apprehending the uses or intentions Which are not received through the external sense. logic: second part. 95 THE NATURE AND THE CONNATURAL OBJECT OF THE EXTER- NAL SENSES ; THEY DO NOT ERR PER SE, I. E., THEY CAN- NOT PHYSICALLY CAUSE ERROR. The external senses are the five organs through which the mind becomes cognizant of various exterior* objects, by- means of the properties of those objects. The organs are in themselves capable of being acted on, and of conveying to the mind the impressions received, but are indifferent as to their particular object; their action is determined in species by the connatural and singular object, which is duly present to them. The external senses are, sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell. Sensef is an organic power of the soul, and is cognoscive only of those things that are singular and ??iaterial; i. e., ist, it is an active principle, whose subject is man, or the compound of soul and body, and not a part only of man, as is the case with the intellect, whose subject is the spiritual substance of the soul alone, not the compound; 2d, sense is termed organic, be- cause it is affixed to an organ, which, as already observed, is a compound of soul and matter ; and hence, under this respect, sense could also be denominated a power of the body, or a cor- poreal power; 3d, it perceives or apprehends only the singu- lar; L.e., the concrete, determinate individual; while the in- tellect, on the contrary, has for its object the universal; 4th, it cannot attain in its action to every species of singular thing; v. g., it cannot perceive an angel, but its object is only the sin- gular which is at the same time material^ The sensible, there- fore, or the object of sense, may be defined to be "any material, * • ' Sensus 11011 apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum; similiter neque imaginatio . " (Div. Thorn. 1 P., Qu. 57, Art. 1, ad. 2.) Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only exterior accidents; like- wise, the imagination does not apprehend the essences of things. t " Sensus est facultas animse organica, singularium materialium cognosci- tiva." Sense is an organic power of the soul, capable of knowing singular material objects. X ' ' Omne sensibile est materiale. JJ Whatever is sensible is material. ■ 96 logic: second part. extended, and singular object or being, which is perfective of "sense or organic power, by intimate conjunction with it."* An object is sensible, either per se,\ or per accidens; an object is sensible per se or of itself, which has, of its own nature, the power of perceptibly affecting, or producing an impression on the sense; v. g., light has of itself, and by its own nature, the power of physically producing such impression on the eye; heat, on the touch, etc. An object is said to be sensible per accidens, when, without having any power in itself to act on the sense, yet it has con- joined with it some property or accident by means of which it does become known as present. In this case, while it does not itself physically act on the sense, yet it becomes known to the sense in some manner, by means of another thing in con- junction with it that does thus act; v. g., Socrates has com- plexion, animal heat, etc.; the color can be seen per se, the heat can be felt per se; but it is not Socrates the person that thus acts per se on the senses, for sense is immediately acted on, not by substance, but by accidents only; hence, Socrates is an object that is sensible per accidens; or, more generally, substance, as such, is sensible only per accidens ; i. e., substance, as such, is not properly a sensible object at all. For an object to become sensible per accidens, the following conditions must be fulfilled ; ist, it must be susceptible of a property or accident which is perse, or of itself, capable of acting . on the sense, and also actually have such property or accident; 2d, it must be an object which can be known per se or in itself, either by the intellect, or by some sense or organic power; v. g , the senses perceive or know material substance per acci- dens, the intellect alone can know it per se; i. e., as its proper object; a colored object may be known per accidens by the touch, but it is known per se, or as its proper object only by *■' Sensibile est ens materiale extensum, singulare, perfectivum sensus per intimam cum eo conjunctionem." The sensible is a material being, extended, singula!*, and perfective of sense by intimate conjunction with it. t ' ' Sensus externus non fertur in praeteritum nee futurum. ' ' External sense does not attain to that which is past, or future. LOGIC : SECOND PART. 97 the sight. If both the foregoing conditions be not verified, an object cannot, indeed, be known by the senses at all. The sensible per se is either proper, or common; the proper* sensible is what can be perceived by one sense and only by one sense; v. g., color, as such, is the proper object of sight only, and therefore it cannot be perceived, as such, by any other sense. The commo?i sensible, \ is what can be perceived by more senses than one, and it is on that account said to be common to them, or their common object. Under the name, common sensible, five classes of sensible objects are enumerated as in- cluding all things to which the term is applicable; viz.: " motion, rest, number, figure and size." These are all objects both of sight and touch, and they may, also, in certain cases, fall under the other senses, as a little reflection will show. All the qual- ities or accidents of material objects which can be perceived by more senses than one, can be reduced to one or other of the preceding five genera of conwnon sensibles. Size, as per- ceived by the eye, is modified and corrected when perceived by the touch ; and vice versa. Distance seen by the eye, and distance attested by the touch, serve to correct and perfect the judgment of it in the mind. It may be said, then; ist, that the common sensible modifies the proper; 2d, that the se?isible per accidens is known only by means of the proper, but it does not in any manner modify the action of the proper sensible % on its own particular organ; 3d, * t CHAPTER II. ARTICLE I. substance; accidents; substance as opposed to accident. Substance is a being that exists /y action which is analogous to that by which an agent produces effects upon substantial sub- ject matter. A created agent cannot produce f new being, or cause a real * ' ' Motum et movens sunt simul . ' ' That which moves , and the agent moving it, are, as such, simultaneous. " Agens et patiens sunt immediata, i. e., immediatione vel suppositi vel vir- tutis." That which acts, and that which receives the action, are immediate, either substantially or virtually. t ' ' Deus solus causat gradum essendi ; quia primus omnium effectus est esse quod supponitur a ceteris tanquam fundamentnm : sed Deus solus producit esse; sen illud esse quod diffusum est per omnes omnino perfectiones debet procedere ab altiori principle quam creatura. Agens particulare facit hoc ex non hoc, sed non facit ens a non-ente." (Div. Thorn., Summ. 1 p., qu. 105, art. 5.) God alone causes a degree of being ; for the first of all effects is being, AYhich is pre- supposed as the foundation of all else: God alone produces being; or, that being which is diffused throughout all perfections whatever, must proceed from a higher principle than a creature. A dependent agent can make this out of non this; (or transform one thing into another) ; but it cannot produce being from non-being. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 203 grade or degree of essence ; for this is, in its strict sense, crea- tion, which is pure efficiency, or the action of the first cause, i. e., God. Second causes, i. e., created causes, being dependent, are not purely efficient; they can only change or transform sub- ject matter; in other words, they require an object which actually determines and specifies their acts or efficiency. The various manners in which the efficient cause acts will be readily and clearly understood if they be contrasted; for this purpose consider the following opposite modes in which it may operate : ist, as principal, and as instrumental cause, which acts in virtue of its principal; 2d, as necessary and Jree ; 3d, physical and ?noral; 4th, remote and proximate; 5th, total and partial; 6th, adequate and inadequate; 7th, first* and second; 8th, univocal; i. e., whose effect is of its own species, as father and son; equivocal, i. e., whose effect differs from it in species, as architect and the house which he builds; 9th, cause per se, i. e., which directly, and of its own real action, produces its effect; v. g., "a vocalist sings;" *'a penman writes;" accidejital cause, or cause per accidens ; as w r hen a vocalist paints ; he does not directly as vocalist paint, for vocalist is only accidental to one as painting, and has no influence at all on the effect. The cause per se,\ which really influences in the production of an effect is one; but the cause per accidens or accidental cause, which does not really i?ifluence the effect, is said to be infinite; the meaning of which will be readily understood by an example of it : if one should go from home for the purpose of buying something in the market, and on his way be attacked by robbers, his intention of buying could not be considered as the one, cause per se, of his falling into the ha?ids of i-obbers; for, any number * " Cansaprima, quae nulli subordinatur; secunda, qvueprirrue subordinatur." The first cause is subordinate to no cause; a second cause is subordinate to the first. t " Causa per se est una, etproprie dicta causa; causa per accidens nee est una, sed infinita, sed nee proprie dicta causa, sed secundum quid, sen per accidens : non est proprie dicta causa, quia effectus per accidens non habet esse proprie dic- tum." (Philos. passim.) The cause per se is one, and is properly termed a cause; the cause per accidens is not one, but infinite, nor is it properly called a cause, but is such only under some respect, or by accident ; it is not properly termed a cause, for the accidental effect has not any existence properly so-called. 204 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. of reasons could have induced him to go to the market at that time; i. e., the cause per aecidens of his being then attacked by robbers is not limited to this or that motive for his going from home. It is in this sense that an occasion is sometimes rightly called an accidental cause* But it not unfrequently happens that an occasion or opportunity approaches more nearly to the nature of a cause per se, yet, however, without actually becoming a complete cause ; in this case it is said to be an imperfect cause, since it induces, or persuades to action ; but it is not a perfect cause, for it does not produce the effect. (D. Th., 2. 2., qu. 43, a. 1, ad. 3.) The only reason why cause per aecidens is denominated cause at all is that, whenever it occurs, it is in such case always conjoined with the thing which is really and properly the cause, and is then not separable from it. But neither the cause per aecidens, as such, nor the effect per aecidens, as such, has any real entity; f it is more correctly a certain respect only, of that which has reality and is a cause properly so-called. The final cause, or end intended.^, which is objective good, ap- prehended as such, acts first as a cause on "the will, or rational appetite ; for the end is an object of appetition, on account of its goodness, or it is a good which is desired and sought for, when it becomes an object of cognition. § The e?id intended for irrational or necessary agents, must be referred to the author * " Omne quod est per se, habet causam ; quod autem est per aecidens, non habet causam, quia nou est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam habet, similiter et musicum; album musicum non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum." (Div. Thorn., I p., qu. 115, art. 6.) What- ever truly is, has a cause; what is, only as accidental, has no cause, for it is not truly being, since it is not truly one. White, has a cause, and music has a cause; but white music has no cause, for it is neither truly being, nor truly one. • t " Eflectus per aecidens proprie non generantur, nee corrumpinitur, nee sunt simpliciter, sed secundum quid. ' ' Effects per aecidens, are not, properly speak- ing, produced, nor destroyed, nor do they simply exist, but only under a certain respect. J "Finis est potissimum in unoquoque; i. e., llnis est id quod principaliter intenditur in unoquoque." The end is chief in every thing; i. e., the end is what is principally intended in every thing. § '.' Nihil volitum nisi prsecoguitum. ' ' Nothing is wished, unless first known. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 205 of their nature, by whom it is determined for them. The end or the final cause is the first of the four to act, and it causes the others to concur and to execute, the e^cient cause being the second to operate. The end is the first* in the intention; but it is the last in the execution ; i. e., it is the effect intended, and the effect intended is the end which is last attained, and in which all rest. The end, when considered as to the different relations it may- have to the intention, is proximate or remote; mediate or imme- diate; and ultimate or not ultimate. These opposite relations will be easily understood, if it be borne in mind, that an end may be desired either for its ow?i sake ; or, on account of some- thing else, that is desired; in the first case, it is strictly and properly an end ; in the second, it is really a means to an end. As the will by its own spontaneous natural action can wish good only, since good, as such, is its essential object ; it is not free to wish evil, as such ; or, in other words, by its nature it is necessarily determined to desire good; and, as regards the de- sire of this good in general, it is not free, but obeys the neces- sary law of its nature.f Hence, it is evident that this good as absolute, or good in general, is strictly an ultimate end, which is presupposed to all other ends, which can be intended or desired by the will. These truths being understood, it will be easy to perceive the consequent truth, that there can be no choice or election as to this ultimate end, since the will is pre- determined to it by the necessary law of its nature as a power of appetitio:i. The will is physically unable to love evil for itself or as evil; it can love evil only when apprehended and presented to it, as good, under some respect. In respect to this ultimate end, all other ends are mediate, or have the nature of means in reference to it. In regard to certain intermediate ends, the will can deliberate, suspend or change. Hence, man's responsibility for his actions depends upon the use he makes * "Primum in iutentione, est ultimnm in executione." What is first in the intention, is last in the execution. f ' ' Minus malum, est aliquod bonum. ' ' Less evil, is some good. ' Malum sub ratione boui, potest fieri objectum volitionis." Evil, under the respect of good, can be the object of volition, 206 GENEKAL METAPHYSICS. of his power freely to choose the means of good; and he becomes morally good, or bad, accordirg as there is, or is not, real rectitude in his intention as regards those means which he employs for the attainment of this good. Hence, the obligation arises also for him to know what is good, and what is evil, in all the objects thus subject to election or choice. Distinguish between the end of the act or work, and the end inte?ided, or the good to be gained by the work. Distinguish, also, between the end which necessitates action in the will, and the end which it can freely elect or choose. It is good which causes, as an end ; but its apprehension is an in- dispensable condition* ARTICLE III. MATERIAL CAUSE; FORMAL CATTSE. As the terms, matter and form, material cause and formal cause, are much used in philosophy, law and ethics, for the most subtle, as well as for the most important distinctions, it is necessary that they should be clearly understood. For this object, it is deemed useful briefly to state in this place the philosophical theory that gives origin and meaning to these terms. According to the Aristotelian or peripatetic philosophy, which has had much to do in moulding both the thought and the higher language of all civilized nations, material substance, of which the earth is made, consists essentially of two principles, niatter and form. Matter, without the form, could have no determinate existence at all; it would be a mere potentiality for actual existence ; but could not, as such, really exist. The form, which is the principle of activity, and of all specific nature or essence, unites by composition with matter, and actu- ates it into real existence ; and, at the same time, gives to it * " Bonum ut apprehensum est objectura appetitus." Good as apprehended is the object of appetition. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 207 its determined and specific essence; i. e., makes, by union with it, material substance.* At the beginning of the world matter and form were con- created; i. e., passed from their causes into existence at the same time. Taken separately, they are both incomplete being; they are for each other, and, when they have the essential conditions for actual existence, they necessarily unite ; and, being united, they remain in union, unless separated by force. Some forms are more deeply radicated in matter than others are. Matter, as such, therefore, has no species ; it is the form that determines species, and constitutes it such. Hence, since there exist many species of material substance, there must be many species of forms, that are actually existing. To under- stand this, it must be observed that, when the world was first created, material substance was diversified with many species or forms, and made to possess within itself at the same time many other forms potentially ,f which may be educed from it by a competent efficient cause. Matter, therefore, is the subject in which are contained poten- tially^ like an effect is precon tamed in its actually existing cause, many substantial forms, which may be educed from it by an efficient cause; and these forms that are educed from the mat- ter, where they existed potentially, take the place of, or displace actual forms ; which actual forms are not thereby simply anni- hilated, but are re-immersed in the matter, or they revert to the state of potential being, in matter. The vital principle in organic beings, is a substantial form; v. g., the vegetative princ'ple in plants, the brute soul, anima ♦"Materia, quatenus est priraum subjectum, est una et eadam in omnibus rebus." (Suarez Metaph.) Matter as the first subject in material substance, is one and the same in all things . t ' ' Materia est infinita in potentia ad formas. ' ' (Summ. I p. , qu. 7, art. 2.) Matter is infinitely capable of receiving its forms. % ' ' Esse in potentia, hie non est ea mera possibilitas, quae est potentia objectiva ; sed esse in potentia involvit subjectum aliquod reale, cujus sinu res sit contenta, quae dicitur esse in potentia." To exist potentially, is not that mere possibility, which is only objective, (exists only in the concept of it) ; but to be potentially, involves a real subject, in which it is actually contained. 208 GENERAL METAPHYSICS* belluina in brutes, or animals of every species, man excepted, are substantial forms educed from n'tatter; as also the principle that gives to crystals their specific nature, is substantial form. They return to matter, or are re-immersed in it, when dissolu- tion, or death takes place. This eduction of new forms from matter, and the re-immersion of old ones into it, always sup- pose the agency of an efficierit cause. Since the operations of the brute soul, anima belluina, are purely organic* brute actions do not transcend the power of purely viaterial substance ; and, therefore, they are entirely from matter, and wholly for matter; and hence, brute souls cannot exist separate from matter. But the actions of intel- ligence and volition in the human soul, are from a principle that is not organic; they are inorganic or entirely super-sensiblej in their species, or transcend the powers of material nature; and, therefore, the substance that possesses intellect and will, is essentially and specifically immaterial Hence, though the human soul does inform or actuate matter by entering into composition with it, yet it is not educed from matter, and at death by dissolution, it is not re-immersed into matter ; but it is a substantial form that can and does exist separate from matter, or, then exists per se; or, to use the term by which this mode of existing is expressed, it subsists ; it is not said, how- ever, in that state of existence, to be a person, because it does not completely subsist, being by its nature ordained to union with the body. The human soul is by its nature fitted and ordained to unite in composition with matter ; but yet it does not, like inferior substantial forms, completely depend for its existence on matter. It follows, therefore, that there are forms which are complete, * ' ' Natura uniuscujusque rei ex ejus operatione ostenditur. ' ' (Phil, passim.) The nature of a thing is known by its action. t" Anima humana non est forma in materia immersa, vel ab ea totaliter comprehensa, propter suam perfectionem. Icleo nihil prohibet aliquant ejus virlutem non esse corporis actum. ' ' (Div. Thorn. , 1 part, qu. 76, art 1, ad. 4.) The human soul is not a form that is immersed in matter, or that is totally com- prehended by it, on account of its perfection. Therefore, nothing prevents some of its virtue from being no act of the body; i.e., some of its action is not action of the body, or the body has no share in it. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 2C9 and subsist, but do not inform matter, and, therefore, have no relation to, or dependence on, matter; as, angels. For, if there are incomplete farms, a fortiori, complete ones should actually exist ; and there are forms that are incomplete, and yet can sub- sist, but they inform matter, and are by their nature or essence ordained for union with matter; as, the human soul; it can exist separate from matter, but its only connatural and normal state is that of union with matter. All accidents whose presence in, or absence from, material substance does not change the species of their subject, are accidental forms; as, quality, greater or less extension, figure, features, etc. From this brief and incomplete outline of the peripatetic theory of material substance, it must appear evident that matter, as a cause* is receptive, and passively retentive; or it sustains, as a subject; and \\\2Xform,\ causes by giving determinate exist- ence, nature and action to the compound which it constitutes by union with matter; and thence it is, that all specific nature, and all action, are attributed to the form. Hence, the material cause, is the subject upon which the efficient cause acts, to produce its intended effect. '['he formal cause, is that reality, of whatever kind it may be, which the efficient cause by its action induces, or brings into actual being in that subject matter. The change produced in the subject by the efficient cause, may be either substantial or accidental, i. e., the form induced, may be either substantial or accidental. By analogy, other objects, as metaphysical and logical truth, * " Quemadmodum materia est in toto (composito) principium patiendi; itaet forma est principium agendi ; seu totum, ratione materke, patitur, et ratione forma? agit, seu totum agit ut quod, forma ut quo. Est totum quod existit, est, subsistit. etc. ' ' As matter is the principle that receives action, in the compound; so, the form is the principle of action; or, the whole object, acts, in virtue of the foim, suffers action in virtue of its matter; or the whole is that which acts, the form that by which it acts; the Avhole is what exists, subsists, etc. t " Omnis ratio boni. pulchri, ordinis, perfectique a forma venit; quia eo ipso quod est actus substantialis luec omnia ipsi conceduntur. ' ' (Div. Thorn. , 1 p. , qu. 7(5, art. 1.) The whole nature of the good, beautiful, order, perfection, comes from the form; for, since it is the substantial act, these are all attributed to it. 14 210 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. genus, species, etc., are termed matter, and, therefore, are con- ceived as susceptible of form; v. g., "rational animal," may be regarded, as having animal as matter, and rational as form; since " rational " constitutes with animal as quasi matter, man. Hence, matter and form are regarded by analogy as likewise having causal influence in objects of the intelligible order. These terms, therefore, have extensive application; but the mode in which the matter and form cause, is always the same; i. e., by composing the effect; the form giving its denomination or specific name to the effect, and the matter receiving and sustaining the form. An example will illustrate the analogical use of these terms : a man, who is uni?itentio?ially unjust to another person, does material injustice, but wot formal injustice; for, it is the inten- tion, as right or wrong, that gives to actions their specific moral or formal nature. From the preceding observations, it is manifest that the definition of cause has its most proper application to the efficient cause. It was, perhaps, on this account that the ancient stoics contended that the efficient cause is the only one which is truly and properly a cause at all. But it is undeniable that, as already shown, there are more causes than one, truly distinct from each other, and which have, in their mode and degree, real influence in producing many effects. There cannot be an actual effect* which is produced by only one cause ; for there can be no efficient cause, without the final cause ; and vice versa, there can be no final cause without the efficie?it to which it is presupposed, as the first of all causes ; and hence, for the production of an actual effect, both must concur. The cause, by its nature, is prior to its effect ;t but as to the * ' ' Nullus est effectus in rerura natura qui unicam tantitm habet causam, for- maliter loquendo." (Suarez Met. disp. 26, sect. 3, no. 3.) There is no effect which strictly has but one cause. t " Causa est prior effectu prioritate a quo, seu ratione dependentiae." The cause is prior to the effect, in the relation of dependence. • • Causa in actu, et effectus actu, sunt simul. ' ' The cause aud effect as actual, are simultaneous. ' ' Posito f undamento et termino , consurgit relatio . ' ' When the basis and term are put, the relation simultaneously regards them. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 211 relation actually existing between them, they are simultaneous ; or they begin to exist formally as such at the same time ; for, when the basis and term of a relation are put, it simultaneously relates the two to each other ; or, it arises at the same time for both the actual cause and its actual effect. Every effect has within it some degree of perfection, which gives to it a certain similitude to its cause ; but the resemblance may be only that of analogy, as when the cause is equivocal; v. g., the architect and the house which he builds with its design; the perfection which is in the house, resembles the intel- ligent mind) by analogy only. The effect is either virtually or formally precontained in its cause ; and, therefore, it is really from the cause. In the first case, the cause is equivocal, i. e., of a different species from the effect ; in the second case, the cause is univocal* i. e., of the same species as the effect. An effect that has the material cause, requires the three others also. But we may actually know one or two causes, and yet be ignorant of the remaining ones. Since no being can act at a distance, "nihil agit in distans," it is an essential condition, or a conditio sine qua non, that the agent and object acted on, be either ??iediately or immediately connected. But, take care to observe that a condition, how essential soever it may be for the action of a cause, has not itself any real causality; and, there- fore, it is an error to confound a condition with the cause that depends on it ; or to attribute to it any real agency in produc- ing the effect. The exemplary cause, or the ideal or type in the mind, by which an intelligent efficient cause is directed in producing an effect, may be referred, under different respects, to the efficient * " Causa univoca, sequalis est effectui in essendo, nobilior ratione dependen- tise; causa osquivoca, est vel principalis, vel instrumentalist principalis superat effectnm in essendo; instrument alis superstar ab effectu, nisi suraatur ut condi- visa principali, tune enim influit per virtutera inferioris ordinis. ' ' (Suarez Met. Disp. 17, sec. 2, no. 19.) The univocal cause is equal to its effect in essence, but more noble as regards dependence; the equivocal cause is either principal, or instrumental; the principal, exceeds its effect in essence; the instrumental is inferior to its effect, unless as precisely distinguished from the principal, for, thus taken, it influences by virtue of an inferior order, and is a partial cause only. It is more noble than its own .proper effect. 212 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. and to the formal cause ; namely, either as perfecting the agent for action ; or as, in some manner, extrinsically forming the effect* ARTICLE IV. PERFECTION OF BEINGS; THE FINITE AND INFINITE; THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INFINITE IS LOGICALLY DERIVED FROM THAT OF THE FINITE. A thing is perfect, when nothing is wanting to complete it in fulfilling the proper endt of its being; due respect being had as to whether that end be temporary, i. e., by way of transition to another ; or, fixed, and unchangeable, as a state. The per- feclion, and the goodness of a thing, are really the same ; yet, in the concept, or logically, the perfect is presupposed to the good ; for, in thought, we found the idea of a thing as being good, upon its perfection. Perfection is absolute or relative; absolute perfection includes all realities that can enter into the concept of infinite perfec- tion; relative perfection includes all those realities that are re- quired to constitute any particular species of complete finite perfection. Simple perfection is that, from the very concept of which is excluded all positive imperfection; as "justice," "intelli- gence," etc. The ??iixed perfection includes in its essential con- cept the idea of perfection which is mixed with imperfection; as, v. g., reasoning, which implies the absence of simple intel- ligence. Hence, reasoning is, under different respects both a perfection and an imperfection. Reason can come to the evident knowledge of truth, not known as self-evident, only by demonstration, or by discourse of reasoft; simple intelligence per- ceives the same truth intuitively, i. e., without the less perfect * tl Dispositio concurrit in genere causas materialis: subjectum facit magis receptivum. ' ' Disposition concurs by Avay of the material cause : it makes the subject more receptive. f " Ultima perfectio rei est in consecutione finis." The ultimate perfection of a thing, is in the attainment of its end, or reaching its destined end. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 213 process of reasoning* to it ; by the simple apprehension of an essence it acquires a knowledge of all that can be affirmed, or denied, by way of real property, in respect to the object. In other words, simple intelligence does not know truth by com- position and division, as reason does ; or, what is the same, by synthesis and analysis, for it does not know predicate and subject first as separate, but sees the one in the other. Distinguish, therefore, between knowing a thing after another, in another, and from another; the first is common to finite intelligence and reason ; the second, pertains to simple intelligence ; the third, is the peculiar and distinctive operatw?i of reason. The finite is what has limits; the infinite, is what has no limits. The infinite is either actual, or it is potential infinite. The actual infinite actually has all perfection without limit. This is possible only in one God. The i?ifi?iite potentially , is actually finite, but can be increased without limit. The infinite actually, cannot be increased, and cannot be subjected to measure, or number. Finite added to finite cannot produce infinite ; and, therefore, the actual infinite does not consist of extension or multitude. No finite being can be conceived so great, but that a greater one may be conceived as possible. Creation actually infinite is impossible: ist, because that which begins cannot become infinite; 2d, because potential in- finite cannot become actual infinite; or, neither that which can be finished, nor that which cannot ho. finished, can become infinite. * ' 'Ad discursum intellectualem pi*oprium, et formalem, requiritur quodunum cognoscatur ex alio; id est, quod ex alio prius noto deveniatur iu cognitionem alter iusposterius noti quod erat prius ignotum; sicque quod una prior eognitio sit causa posterioris, sive quod ex priori unius coguitione pariatur eognitio alte- rius, prascedatque prior eognitio posteriorem, si non in tempore, saltern natura et eausalitate." (Billuart de Angelis, Tract. 3, art. 3, sect. 3.) For discourse cf reason, properly and formally such, it is required that one thing should be known from another; i. e., from one thing previously known we comj to the knowledge of another thing afterwards known, but "which was previously un- known; and thus that a prior cognition is the cause of an after one, or that from the prior knowledge of one thing is born the knowledge of another, and that the prior cognition precede the posterior one, if not in time, at least by nature and causality. 214 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. The philosophers, who teach that the human mind has natu- rally a more or less immediate intuition of God, deny the possi- bility of knowing the infinite through the finite. The chief reason a priori which they allege for this impossi- bility of concluding the infinite from the finite, is that " the conclusion cannot be greater than the premises from which it follows as a consequent." But their proof of the hypothesis that the human mind natu- rally has an immediate intuition of God, seems to rest mainly on two erroneous arguments : ist. the misapplication of a canon of logic; 2d, a misconception of the fact of actual experience. They argue, that since the idea of an infinite being cannot be derived a posteriori, for the conclusion cannot exceed the pre- mises, therefore, because as a fact, we have that notion, we must have it as an a priori intuition. But the canon of logic referred to, forbids a greater exten- sion as to quantity in the conclusion than was in the premises ; but not greater comprehension. If the prohibition held true of both, then there could be no reasoning at all from truth known, to truth unknown. Since the conclusion attributes to a subject a predicate which is not attributed in the premises, the subject of the conclusion has greater comprehension in the conclusion, than it had in the premises, especially when the predicate affirms perfection, or denies imperfection. Also, when we reason a posteriori, or from effect to cause, the effect may have been either virtually, or formally precon- tained in the cause ; in the case in which we reason from an effect to its equivocal, or super-eminent cause, we pass from what is inferior in species, to what is eminently superior in species ; v. g., when we reason from the house to the architect, from the painting to the artist, which is legitimate reasoning, we always conclude from an inferior to a superior species of being. Hence, conclusion from the finite to the infinite, as its super- eminent cause, gives a conclusion of greater comprehension, though of less logical extension, than the premises explicitly and directly expressed, but yet, it is both consequent and legitimate illation. It is to be assumed that no sane philosopher denies that the GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 215 human mind, as a fact, does reason a posteriori, or from effect to cause, by means of the real relation between cause and effect. There is no object of cognition which the mind perceives with more facility, or which is more connatural to human in- tellect, than the real relation ot cause and effect. Evidences of dependence lead us daily to refer numberless effects to their causes, and this we have done from the earliest exercise of reason. In the same manner, the mind can see evidences in the visible world around us, of its dependent and contingent existence ; and, as the idea of limitation or finiteness is most simple, its object being so immediate and so obvious to the mind, it is clearly within the powers of human reason, to prove to itself the finiteness of the visible world, in the same manner in which it proves any object to be limited or finite. Hence, the mind of man, by its native power of reasoning, and without any intuition of God, can argue from what it knows and sees for itself: "There is no effect* which is not produced by sufficient cause; the visible world is an effect, and, therefore, the visible world is produced by an adequate cause." The intellect, then, is naturally competent to perceive by its own light, both that the visible world \z> finite, and that it is an effect ; for it is mutable, therefore, contingent, and, conse- quently, may lose or acquire being, which are distinctive marks of the finite. It may ask itself, what is a "sufficient cause" for such an effect. Reason would lead the mind to attribute to that " sufficient cause " t perfections pre-eminently superior to those of the * " Xon datur effectus sine causa: nihil est quod rationem sufficientem cur sit non habeat ; haec axiomata non coufnudeuda sunt. Juxta prirnum, nihil effici- tur sine causa; juxta secundum, nihil est, seuexistitsineratione sufficiente: pri- mum non pertinet ad Deum, cum Deus non habeat causam; secundum pertinet ad Deum, cum sit ratio sutliciens cur debeat admitti quod Deus existit." There is not given an effect without a cause; there is nothing which has not a sufficient reason why it exists ; these axioms should not be confounded. By the first, no- thing is effected without a cause; by the second, nothing is, or exists without a a sufficient reason: the first does not apply to God, since God has no cause; the second does pertain to God, since there must be a sufficient reason why it ought to be admitted that God exists. f " Si objiciatur, 'effectus flnitos, quales sunt creaturje, non exigere causam infinitam;' id conceditur deeorum causa secundaria, sed non de causa primaria, 216 GENEKAL METAPHYSICS. effect argued from; v. g., priority to all other causes, therefore, existence a se, and the infinite perfections of ail kinds, which flow logically from admitting a, first cause that is independent or absolute. The very words, infinite, immense, and all the names of God which are negative in form, indicate the natural process by which the human mind forms its concept of absolute perfec- tion, as expressed in the very structure of language ; for, the negative names of God, show that the positive, out of which they are formed, was presupposed as affirming the finite prem- ises of which they express the conclusion. Suarez* observes the fact that, " in all things pertaining to God, it is more difficult to know the manner in which they are in him, than it is to know the manner in which they cannot be in him; " i. e., it is easier to know what God is not, than it is to know what he is. This is the reason why it not unfrequently happens that negative terms are employed to enunciate the divine perfections. The accepted significance of these negative names, shows also, that the concepts for which they stand, were formed in the mind by the removing of imperfection, and the consequent addition of perfection. This concept of infinite perfection in God, as the first cause, we actually make more and more com- prehensive by study, reflexion, and meditation, as we grow in years. As a matter of experience, we have not that primitive intui- tion of the infinite, or immediate intuition of God. Had the human mind naturally any such intuition of ens creans existentias, as the first great thought, which is the foun- dation of all other thoughts, it should have, it would seem, its own proper name in every language, which would be known to quae sit omnium causa a nulla causata ; hanc enim esse infinitamnecesse est." Distinguish the effects in visible nature as proceeding/ro7?i second causes, from that respect of them which exacts for them, moreover, a Jirst and unproduced cause. No effect absolutely depends on a second cause, for the second cause is itself dependent on the first cause. *"In omnibus divinis rebus, difficilius est cognoscere quomodo sint, quam quomodo non sint. " (Suarez, 2 opuscul, lib. 1, cap. 8.) GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 217 all, and understood by all; for it would necessarily and most distinctly be seen as constituting the basis of all human thought, of perception, judgment and reasoning. But, as a fact, it has no such name, commonly recognized as pertaining to it, in languages, and it fulfills no such function in human thought ; on the contrary, the terms employed to enunciate it, which are not agreed upon, even in philosophy, offer to us an hypothesis which is obscure and difficult to be comprehended, because not only it does not declare, but it even contradicts, the facts of experience. Whatever may be the best philosophical explanation, the fact of experience is, thaf the progress of the mind is from the singular and co7icrete objects that through the senses determine its action, to the intelligible, expressed to it by the idea or con- cept; from the indeterminate idea of essence* and being in ge?ieral to the indefinitely great ; and, by renwtion of all limit, and the addition of all positive perfection, to the infinite, or to absolute being, as the only sufficient cause of all else. Hence, to affirm that the human mind cannot naturally infer the infinite from the finite, is not logically correct; and to affirm that the human mind has naturally and originally the im??iediate intuition of God, or, of absolute being, or, ens creans existenlias, is not true as a matter of fact. In the conclusion of a syllogism, the terms may have more comprehension, or their concepts include more essential perfec- tion, than they expressed in the premises. The infinite, as a conclusion from the finite, expresses less logical extension, but more comprehension, or perfection, than is explicitly in the prem- ises; for, whether the predicate attribute something positive, or deny some imperfection, the conclusion is the synthesis of a subject and predicate not made in the premises ; and its sub- * ' ' Intellectus noster ; dam de potentia in actum reducitor, pertingit prius ad coguitionem universalem et confusam de rebus quam ad propriam et specialera rerum coguitionem: sed perfectus modus cognoscendi, non prius attingit uni- versalem quam specialem coguitionem. ' ' (Vide Div. Thorn. , 1 p. , qu. 14, art. 6.) Our intellect, when it goes into action, attains to a universal and confused knowledge of things before it does to proper and special knowledge; but the perfect method of knowing does not first attain to universal, and then to special cognition 218 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. ject is thereby increased in comprehension. The absolute infinite is not such by extension; i. e., by continuous or discrete or logical quantity ; but it is such by comprehension of all per- fection. A desire to effect a unification of knowledge, or a coordina- tion of all cognitions, by a simple principle, has led many to adopt a theory that identifies the ontological and the psycho- logical orders; but, as a fact, they are not identical in the actual nature of things; i. e., the order of our cognitions is not from the first Being, to the works of that being ; but it is naturally just in the reverse order ; that is, it proceeds from his works to Him. The argument by which the existence of absolutely perfect and real being, entis realissi?ni, is claimed to be validly deduced from the idea of such a being, involves a double middle term; v. g., "he that has a true idea of absolutely perfect and real being, thereby knows that being to exist ; but there is in every mind, which comprehends the expression, absolutely perfect and real being, the true idea of such a being; therefore, from the very idea of such a being, it follows that the mind may and does know it as really existing." The phrase, "true idea," is here ambiguous; and, in fact, it has two objects in the premises ;* in the first, or in one mind, the idea, it must be supposed, formally connotes its object as actual or real ; in the second, or in the other mind, it legiti- mately expresses only the concept of a?i intelligible object, in which actual existence is neither affirmed nor denied; i. e., it exists in the second mind only objectively, as it is termed; or, for one mind, the existence is real ; in the other, it is ideal only : it needs not to be said that, if the existence of the ob- ject were merely ideal in both minds, then the argument would be simply nugatory. * ' ' Ex hoc (ex idea Entis quo majus et melius cogitari nequit) , non sequitur quod intelligat, id quod significatur per hoc noraen, esse in rerum natvra, seu, ut dicunt, existere in actu exercito; sed existere dumtaxat in apprehensione intel- lects, seu, ut dicunt, in actu signato." (Billuart, lp., qu. 1, art. 1.) From this idea it does not follow that the intellect perceives its object as real, or as actually existing; hut it exists only in the apprehension of the intellect, or only in its sign, the concept. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 23 9 Since the conclusion must follow the weaker part of the argument, it can affirm nothing more, in this case, than the concept of an intelligible object, whose objective truth, or esse in rerum natura, actual being, remains to be proved. Illation from the purely ideal, as such, to the real, is not valid; if it were, then any absurdity could be logically demonstrated a priori, or from the idea of it, to be truth. An object in the mind is purely ideal, when the notion of it which the mind has is merely a concept of what is not known by it as real; the mind acquires this idea by simply appre- hending the term or terms by which the object is expressed in. language, and its idea is, therefore, not derived from the object, as it is in itself really and extrinsically to the intellect, whether by means of evidence or testimony. If, in the syllogism given above, we suppose the idea to con- note the object as in actu exercito, or realm each mind, then, considered as reasoning, the argument is still more absurd; for, it is a vicious circle in which the same thing, though assumed to be self-evident, is proved by itself as reason, idem per idem, and it would be equivalent to this : " He that knows God to exist, knows God to exist; but Peter knows God to exist, therefore, Peter knows God to exist." In fact, truth which is intuitively evident, neither requires nor admits proof; nor, therefore, can it be directly subject to rational discussion. " But," it is further said, "he that has the idea of absolutely perfect being, in which the existence, in actu exercito, actual existence, of such a being, is not affirmed, but it is included only, in actu signato, i. e., only ideally, has a false idea; and thus the mind would err per se." The idea in the case supposed, would be false by privation, or negatively; but it would not be false positively; therefore, the mind would not err per se; for, it would simply be ignorant of a truth which is not yet mani- fested to it by the evidence of that truth ; this would be igno- rance, but not error. From this it would merely follow that the existence of God is not, as regards us, per se known, or self-evident, but requires proof. The old philosophers acutely and precisely enunciate the 220 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. distinction between that necessity of actual existence, as it is in absolutely perfect being, in ente realissimo, i. e., in God ; and as it actually is in relation to our intellects or our cognition of it, in the following terms: "propositio, Dens est, per se nota est quoad se, sed non quoad nos; "* the proposition, God exists, is per se known, as regards itself, but not as regards us. A proposition is per se known as regards itself, but not per se known as regards us, when it has no medium of proof a priori, nor is its truth directly and immediately evident to us on first apprehending the terms. Such proposition is also said to be immediate, in the sense that its predicate is i?n?nediately of the subject, or there is no medium between it and the subject, through which it agrees with the subject; but the predicate is included in the very nature of the subject, as its definition, or as a part of its definition. In case, however, that it is not self- evident to us, or per se known as regards us, the essence or quiddity of the subject does not become known to us, by the mere first apprehension of the terms that enunciate it; but it must be demonstrated to us by means something extrinsic to it, which is better known to us. // evide?ices itself, though our minds are not capable of immediately and directly receiving that evidence, but it must be conveyed to them through a medium which is extrinsic and a posteriori by which this evi- dence is. in some respect, reflected upon our minds. That which is per se known, as regards us, or is self-evident * " Propositio, Deus est, est per senota quoad se, sed nonguoad nos: ilia pro- positio non est per se nota quoad nos, in qua quidditas subjecti ex prima et cora- muni apprehensione terminorum nobis non innotescit, sed indiget discursu ut nobis innotescat, quia tunc non potest statim nobis innotescere an prsedicatum conveniat subjecto ; atqui quidditas Dei nobis nonnotescit nisi per discursum. ' ' (Billuart 1 p, qu. 1, art. I; vide page 139.) ' ' Cum ergo propositio per se nota et immediata idem sint, dubitari non potest quin multa sint per se nota in se, quse non sunt per se nota nobis. . . Sunt quaedam veritates in se immediatae; i. e., sine ullo medio inter praedicatum et subjectum, quas non nisi per aliquod medium (extrinsecum) intelligere vale- mus: v. g., quantitas est entitas accidentalis." (Suarez Met. Disp. 29, set. 3, no. 32.) Since a proposition which is per se known, and a proposition which is immediate, are the same thing, it cannot be doubted that there are many things per se known, as regards themselves, but which are not per se known as regards us; there are certain truths which are immediate in themselves, i. e., without any medium between the subject and the predicate, Avhich we are not able to understand unless through some medium; v. g. , quantity is accidental entity. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 221 to us, is seen and assented to by our minds, on first appre- hending the terms, and without any reasoning, whether a priori or a posteriori) v. g., "A whole is greater than its part." But while the proposition which is per se known as regards itself but not as regards us, possesses, in itself, the most perfect of all objective evidence, and the most absolutely necessary truth, in itself; yet, our imperfect intellects do not attain to it imme- diately, but do so only by reflex knowledge from other things, which are connected with it logically. Of this kind is the pro- position, "God exists;" and of this kind, also, are many of the highest and most universal truths, as remarked in respect to the proper object of wisdom or philosophy, on page 139. Hence, to sum up what was said in regard to the argument by which the existence of God is claimed to be proved from the mere idea of absolutely perfect being, entis realissimi; either this idea connotes its object as actually existing, in actu exercito, or it does not ; if it does, the argument in proof of it is useless, and is nothing more than a vicious circle. If the idea does not thus connote the object in both minds, then either it thus connotes the object in neither, or in one mind only ; in the first case, the argument is simply nugatory ; in the second, it is merely an equivocation, as is every argument which concludes from the ideal, as such, to the real. The existejiu of absolutely perfecl being, or of the infinite, must be learned otherwise than from the mere idea of it, or by the equally preposterous argument from the possibility of such a being; and, in fact, it is strictly demonstrable only a posteriori, or by reasoning from effect to cause.* The existence of absolutely perfect, necessary or infinite being, cannot be demon- strated a priori-, for, there is no principle prior to such being from which it comes, it being the first of all principles. All the demonstrative proofs of God's existence by natural reason are a posteriori -* and they are all reducible to the argu- * " Deura esse est demonstrabile non a priori, seu per causas, sed a posteriori seu per effectus : prima demonstratio dicitur propter quid; secunda, demonstratio quia. (Philos. passim.) The existence of God is not demonstrable a priori, or through causes, but a posteriori, or by effects; the first, is called demonstration propter quid; the second, demonstration quia. 222 G-ENERAL METAPHYSICS. ment for the necessity of a first and independent cause. The proof derived from motion, the argument for. the necessity of unproduced being, for absolute being, etc., are, in reality, but dif- ferent modes of showing the necessity of a first cause that ex- ists a se. ARTICLE V. NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT BEING; OF ORDER; IT CAN BE INTENDED BY NONE BUT AN INTELLIGENT BEING. A thing is absolutely necessary* whose non-existence is in- trinsically impossible; a thing is contingent, whose non-exist- ence is possible. God alone is absolutely necessary, in the strictest sense of the words; all other necessary being or truth, the eternal essences of things, metaphysical truth, as, v. g., "a part is less than the whole," etc., must be conceived as, in some manner, deriving their necessity, or depending for it on a presupposed Being whose necessity is still more strictly abso- lute, as it is under all respects underived and independent ; and, therefore, their necessity, immutability, etc., are less strictly absolute. The necessity which is predicated of them is by some appropriately styled, metaphysical necessity. Hence, metaphysical necessity belongs to objects, which, in their very nature, could not be otherwise than they are ; v. g., the triangle; the circle; or necessary truths in general. It is an- tecedently and absolutely required that, if they really exist, they be conformable to their essential concept; but their actual ex- istence as real things, "in rerum natura/' is contingent \ i. e., depends on a free cause. Physical ?iecessity, is that which is consequent upon physical law ; and is, therefore, contingent also, in some respect ; v. g., * ' • Necessarium est quod ita existit ut deficere non possit. Contingens est quod potest esse et non esse. " A thing is necessary, which so exists that it can- not cease to exist. A thing is contingent, which so exists that it can cease to exist. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 223 it is physically necessary that fire burn, that the sun rise to- morrow, if the stability of their physical laws be not suspended by Divine intervention. It is a physical fact that the sun rose yesterday morning ; and, as it now has consequent necessity, and is no longer actually contingent being, the truth of that fact is really metaphysical, under this respect of it. Absolutely necessary being, can neither have a beginning nor an end. For, what begins to exist, depends upon some condi- tion for its existence ; and, therefore, its being was not abso- lutely necessary^ and also, if it cease to exist, its being is not absolutely necessary either; for, what comes to an end, could have only conditional or dependent being. Hence, being that is absolutely necessary, cannot be conceived as actually in a state of possibility, and it is, therefore, eternal. But all contin- gent being was in a state of possibility before it began to exist. Necessity is either antecede?it or consequent \ v. g., it is antece- dent necessity for every circle to be round; every rectilinear tri- angle to have three angles, whose sum is equal to the sum of two right angles ; it is consequent necessity that the sun rose this morning, and, under another respect, it is also necessary that it will rise to-morrow; the necessity, in the latter case, is conse- quent upon the hypothesis that the law of the world's motion will not be changed before that time. The circle and triangle are continge?it, in respect to their actually existing, as real beings. No contingent being can exist, unless brought into existence by some cause, i. e., some being distinct from itself. The effi- cient cause of its beginning to exist, must be extrinsic to itself; for, if the sufficient reason of its existence were within itself, or intrinsic to it, then its existence would not be coniinge?it, but absolutely necessary ; or, in other words, the supposition can be made only of unproduced being. A thing may be produced 'in two ways : ist, by creation from nothing;* 2d, by being formed or made out of something else. * * ■ Creatio est rei produetio ex nibilo sui , et subjecti.' ' Creation is the pro- duction of a thing from nothing absolutely; i. e., from nothing that is presup- posed as subject matter out of which it is formed, or educed. 224 GEKEKAL METAPHYSICS. A being is made or produced out of something else, when it is made by the efficient cause, out of some subject matter which is extrinsic to the cause; v. g., an oak produces another oak ; an architect builds a house, etc. A being may be destroyed also in two ways : ist, by annihi- lation or absolute reduction to nothing; and 2d, by dissolution into the elements out of which it is made, by which the whole, as such, perishes. Simple substance, or a being that does not consist of parts, and that exists per se, i. e., alone, or not as inhering, cannot be produced out of pre-existing substance. For, by reason of its simple essence, it cannot be formed out of pre-existing parts, since parts are incompatible with its simple nature; it cannot be produced from material substance ; for that would not be its production, since its existence per se in that substance must be presupposed to its eduction from it ; and in which, not being an accident, it did not i?iher€ ; and on which, not being a constituent part, it did not depend for being. Finally, it can- not be educed from another simple substance; for since a simple substance is not compounded, it cannot separate a substantial part from itself. Hence, simple substance that exists per se, can begin to exist only by creation from nothing. Order* is a perfection, by which multitude is reduced to complete unity; it so disposes of its like and unlike constit- uents, that each has its appropriate place in respect both to the parts and to the whole. When the proportion of relations, on which order is founded, is perfect, according to the specific nature of the object thereby formed; then that object is, under different respects, perfect, good, or beautiful in its own species. Order is referable to the relations of time, place, material substance; to things moral, social, and intelligible; and, in general, to any object in which we conceive relations of parts among themselves, and to the whole. *"Ordo parium dispariumque, sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio." (S. August.) Order is the disposition of like and unlike things, giving to each its proper place. " Compositio rerum aptis et determinatis locis." (Cicero.) Order is the arrangement of things in apt and determinate places. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 225 Any order in action, proves the author of it to be intelligent; because the intention and production of it require the exercise ot judgment. By the order in men's actions and conversation we perceive daily the evidences of judgment exercised by them ; of ends deliberately intended, and of means compared, selected, and coordinated for their accomplishment. To intend, is properly an act of the will ; it is an efficacious desire of an end, which is, therefore, formally sought for by appropriate means ; or, it is an act by which the mind tends to an end wished for. The selection and arrangement of the means to that end, require practical judgment. The ape can warm himself at the fire which is made for him ; the dog can mount upon the chair that is already near the window, and thence jump to the window ; but neither can the one select means to keep the fire alive ; nor can the other combine separated and absent objects, so as to put them in the relation to each other of stiles s ; for both acts would require a comparison of abstract and concrete relations; i. e., judgment. Instinct deals with certain actually established and concrete relations of things, and when those relations cease to exist, or are essentially changed, it is powerless to devise entirely differ- ent means from its determined ones, or to combine and employ a new species of means. To select and combine means, to establish new relations, to devise means to an end which were not employed before, are acts of judgment that are proper only to rational natures. Hence, order or design gives complete evidence that its proper cause was an intelligent agent. There is order also in the works of the beaver, the bee, etc.; but they give no evidence whatever of intending it, which is an act of intelligence ; or that they exercise judgment in the selec- tion and use of the means. Cognition which is purely of sense, or organic, and limited to singular objects, and concrete relations ; action, which, in respect to the production of order, as such, is merely mechan- ical; fully explain their causality, and are all that can be attri- buted to them as agents. The intelligence and judgment, J 5 226 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. clearly discernible in their work, we must refer, through the law of their nature, to the author of that nature. They can accomplish an end determined for them, by deter)7iined means;* but they cannot substitute means of different species ; or, as their action is determined to one thing by natural law, they can- not select another end, or other means, equally good, or better, but must, circumstances being the same, always do the same thing, in the same specific manner and degree, and by the same means; for they can know only the singular, and can appre- hend and retain only concrete relations ; they are not capable of transmitting improvement as a species, are not perfectible, either in their knowledge, or their mode of action. " Determinating ad unum" means limited or determified to one mode of acting, without any real choice or rational empire over the agent's own action ; when the object is actually pre- sented, it cannot remain really indifferent as to action or non- action, or be free to choose the object, or choose the contrary, but is necessitated by the object to do what it does. There is, indeed, order in the action of all natural agents; * " Coguitio et appetitio animce rationalis, sunt illimitatae ; dum, e contra, materia determinata est ad unum; anima autem belluina est materialis." Ra- tional cognition and appetite, are unlimited; but matter is determined to one thing; its capacity to receive and contain, is determinate and limited; of such is the brute soul, which is material. t ' ' Natnra determinata est ad unum ; sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam, quasdam enim sunt naturaliter, qusedam voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius voluntati qua? est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Semper naturae respondet unum, proportionatum naturae: naturae enim in genere respondet aliquid unum in genere, et naturae in specie acceptas respondet unum in specie; naturae autem individuatae respondet aliquid unum individuale. Eorum igitur voluntas principium est, quae possunt sic, vel aliter esse. Eorum autem quae non possunt nisi sic esse, principium natura est." (Div. Th., 1 p., qu. 12, a. 1, et 1, 2 p., qu. 10, a. 1, ad. 3.) Nature is determined to one thing; the will is capable of opposites. The will is the opposite of nature, as one cause is the opposite of another, for, some things are natural, some things are voluntary. There is also one mode of causing, proper to the will as supreme over its act; a different one agrees with nature which is determined to one thing. There is always one object corresponding to nature, proportioned to nature: to nature in general, corresponds some one thing in general; to nature taken as a species, answers a species of object; to individual nature, corresponds an individual thing. The will, therefore, is the principle of those things that can be either one way, or another; nature is the principle of those things that can be only one way. GENERAL METAPHYSICS. 227 the intention of it, however, is not referable to them, but to an intelligent cause which is above them, and anterior to them.* Order and unity, attained by appropriate means, are manifest in the crystal, the mineral, the vegetable, the brute animal, in all objects around us; but the true cause and design of it, we cannot ascribe to those objects. For order, as such, can be intended and formally effected only by an intelligent cause; and the concurrence of irrational agents in producing it, is only instrumental and mechanical. Hence, none but an intelligent cause can per se produce order; for order essentially implies judgment; man, by the exercise of reason, produces order in thought, word, and work ; but the order that is in his physical nature as a sub- stance, is from God: "Oido recta? rationis est ab homine, ordo naturae est a Deo." To investigate this order with the design which it evinces, as manifested in the works of creation, in the means appor- tioned and directed to ends which are discernible in * all of them, constitutes what is termed the study of final causes. As before remarked, the final cause is the highest and the most noble of the causes ; for, it bespeaks the intelligent principle that gives motion, direction and efficacy to all the other causes, since they are subordinate and subject to it, and are, there- fore, dependent on it in operating. Hence, its objects fur- nish the mind congenial and elevated knowledge, since they acquaint it with the ends for which the different works of cre- ation are destined, as shown by their action ; and, by conse- quence, no study depending on the mere light of reason, can give us more perfect views of the author of their existence. When Bacon and others say that the study of final causes, according to the manner in which they are discernible in the nature of things around us, is arrogant, and tends to atheism, their fear and warning come, perhaps, from misguided reverence * • ' Ovis fug-it lupum ex quodam arbitrio quo existimat eum sibi noxium ; sed hoc judicium non est sibi liberum sed a natura inditum." (Div. Thorn. 1 p., qu. 59, art. 3.) The sheep flees from the wolf by a certain choice in which it esteems the wolf hurtful; but this judgment is not free, but is implanted in it by nature. 228 GENERAL METAPHYSICS. to God ; " semulationem Dei habent, sed non secundum scien- tiam."* All things are parts of the volume which creation forms, and it is open before us that we may read, and learn to know the existence and the perfections of its Author, as shown in his works. As the bees of Mount Hybla sip honey from the very flowers that give to reptiles deadly venom, so, that which teaches wisdom to the well meaning, may be turned to evil aims by the ill-disposed. In the operations of natural law, there is never mere acci- dent, or purely fortuitous event ; for, irrational agents have no action except in obedience to the law of their nature, imposed on them by the author of their being. Their action, though various, is orderly; their mechanism, though complex, has unity, and nature never fails either in the coordination of her means or in the attainment of her ends; "natura nunquam deficit in necessariis." Hence, such study of the creatures around us not only tends to knowledge that is true, and high, and wise, but at the same time gives us conclusions that are infallibly certain. * ' ' They have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. ' • (Rom. x.) See page 56. END OF ONTOLOGY, OR GENERAL METAPHYSICS. ALPHABETICAL INDEX. PAGE. Absolute 20 Abstract and Concrete 18, 19 Accident 26, 182 Accident, Proper and Common . . r 181 Accident, Fallacy of 56 Accident, Separable from Subject 180, 183, 196 Accidental Cause 204 Act, the Pure 124 Action, Immanent, Transient 187 Actio in Distans 2ir Acts Specified by Objects 71, 154 sEstimativa Potentia 86 Analogy 21, 162 Analogy Can Found Demonstration 54, 137, 162 Analogy not Parity 22 Analysis 48 Appetite, Appetition 166 Appodictic Demonstration no Apprehension 16, 64, 108 A se, Per se {note) 178 Assent, Consent 72 Attention 18, 126 Attribute or Property 25 Authority of Learned Men 132 Being, Notion of 151 Being, Degree or Grade of 202 Beauty 173 Begging the Question . . 57 229 230 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. PAGE. Brute Soul 90 Categories, the Ten 23 Causation, Principle of . . .' 199 Cause, Kinds of. 200 Cause, Efficient, Final 200 Cause, Material, Formal 206 Cause per se, per accidens 204 Cause, Exemplary 211 Cause, Univocal, Equivocal 211 Certainty (et seqq.) 67 Certainty, Criterion of 78 Circle, the Vicious 58 Comprehension of Terms 18 Comprehension in Conclusion of Syllogism 40, 214 Composition and Division 56 Conceived, What Cannot be is Nothing 22 Concept 16 Conclusion of Syllogism a Synthesis 40, 217 Concrete 19 Condition, not a Cause 211 Connotative 20 Consciousness 82 Consequence, Consequent, Sequence 36 Contingent 52, 75, 222 Contrary, Contradictory 34 Conversion, Mutation 155 Creation, Act of 158 Definition 28, 135 Demonstration 50 Determinatum Ad Umim 226 Difference, the Specific 24 Dilemma, the 4-6 Disposition 189, 212 Disputation 14 1 Distinction of Reason 1 63 Divisibility, How Infinite 185 Division, Rules of . . . 2 7 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 231 PAGE. Double Middle Term 54, 59 Doubt 66 Election, End not Subject to 187, 205 Elicited Acts 166 End 204 Enthymeme, the ...,-. 45 Ens Rationis 1 64 Equivocal 21 Equivocal, Univocal Cause 211 Error .' 63 Essence, Nature 22, 153, 158 Evidence 69 Evidence, in Civil Courts (note ) 129 Evil 165, 172 Existence 158 Extension of Terms 18 Extension, Definitive and Circumscriptive 184 Faith, .belief. 70, 74 Fallacy 55 Fancy, Same as Imagination 86 False, Falsehood 63 Figure 186, 195 Final Causes, Study of 227 Finite 213 Finite Founds Knowledge of the Infinite 213 Form and Matter, Theory of 206 Genus 24 Good 165, 171 Habit 189 Hypothesis, only Probable 54 Hypothetical Argument 43 Hypothetical Proposition., 33 Idea, not Image of the Fancy 17 Ideal to Real, not Valid Illation 219 Ideas, Objective Reality of. 112 Ideas, Universal, Founded on Objects 115 Identity .54, 161 232 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. PAGE. Ignorance 64, 66 Imagination, an Organic Power 92 Imagination, How it is Essential for the Intellect 84, 101 Immanent Acts, Transient Acts 187 Impossibility 160 Induction 52 Infinite (et seqq.) .' 213 Infinite, Known from the Finite 214 Infinite in Fotentia, cannot become Actual Infinite 185 Instinct 89, 225 Instrumental Cause 211 Intellect, not an Organic Power 103 Intellect, Adequate or Connatural Object of 104 Intelligence a Virtue or Perfection of the Intellect. .138, 190 Intend, Intention 225 Intensity, Greater or Less, Objects Capable of 193, 195 Intention, First and Second, Terms of. 20 Intuition of the Absolute, not Natural 214 Judgment 30, 109 Known Per se, What it Signifies 220 Life 187, 188 Material Cause 206 Matter and Form 206 Meditation, What Constitutes it 127 Memory, Sensile, Intellectual 125 Mental Term, Verbu?n Me?itis 16 Metaphysical, the 149 Metaphysical Truth 61, 164 Method, Scientific 48 Mind, Powers of 35 Mixed Perfection 212 Motion, of Self, is Life 187 Mutation *55 Natural Agent , 1 68 Nature, Essence 22, 153 Necessary, Necessity 222 Nominalists, Realists 115 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 233 PAGE. Objects, how they Specify Acts 71 Ontological, Psychological 51 Opinion * 54, 66 Opposition 33 Order 224 Organ, Organic Power 85, 95 Parity 22 Particular and Universal 19 Passion Specified 72 Perfection, Simple and Mixed 212 Per se, has Different Meanings {note) 178 Per se Known, or Self-Evident 220 Philosophical Knowledge 138, 140 Possibility 160 Potential Existence 207 Powers Pertain to Essential Quality 154, 186 Premises, of Argument 37 Probability , . 53 Probability, in Cognition only 53 Probability Essentially different from Certainty 53, 67 Property or Attribute 25, 181 Property an Accident 181 Proportion, Analogy of 21, 162 Proportion Essential to Beauty 174 Proposition 31 Psychological, Ontological 51 Quality, as a Category 186 Quality Follows the Form, Quantity the Matter 184 Quantity 184 Reasoning, Specific Act of {note) 35, in, 132 Reduplication, Reduplicative, Effect of. 3^ 153 Realists 115 Reflexion 19 Reflex Act, Organic Power Incapable of. 88 Relation 197 Science, Scientific Knowledge 132, 140 Senses, Internal and External .85, 95 234 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. PAGE. Sensible, the 95 Sequence i 36 Similarity 162 Singular 19 Soul, Immaterial 91 Species 22 Species, "Genesis of" 122, 195 Spontaneous Act, Spontaneity 168 Subcontrary 34 Sublime 179 Subsist 208 Substance 178 Substance, Complete, Incomplete 179, 208 Supposition of Terms 21 Suspicion 66 Syllogism, Canons of 36 Syllogism, Expository the 42 Synthesis 48 Testimony of Witnesses 129 Transcendentals 20, 119 Transubstantiation 157 Truth, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral 61, 164 Truths, the Primitive 80 Unity, One 161 Univocal 21 Universal I 9 Universal Ideas, How Less Perfect 12 t Will, the Rational Appetite 166 Will is Free 166 Will not Free to Wish Evil, as such 167, 205 Will, its Act Less Evident than that of Intellect 84, 194 Wisdom i3 8 Witness I2 9 J) Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Ox.de Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 PreservationTechnologies ^orTdueader.n PAPER PRESTON 111 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township. PA 16066 (724)779-2111