MAY, 1832. 
 
 SPEECH, 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 AND 
 
 FREE TRABE ASSOCIATIOIV, 
 
 AT 
 
 THEIR REGULAR MEETING, APRIL 1, 1832, 
 
 EXPLAINING AND IINFORCING 
 
 THE REMEDY OF NULLIFICATION. 
 
 .f^-^ 
 
 my"^: 
 
 c 
 
 '^ Ammis Opibusque ParatV%^ 
 
 fyjsr.isHEO Br the state rights and free tradx AitociAJi^ei, 
 CHARLESTON: 
 
 PRIflXED By E. J. VAN BR05T, 
 
 JS'o. 121 East-Bay. 
 
 ' It. 
 
 WZ^. 
 
t-^' 
 
 
 jubip^e harper s speech. 
 
 AfT£R some remarks en the state of opinions at Washington, so 
 iar as be iiad been able to observe them, on the subject of (he 
 Protective Policy, Judge Harpkk proceeded to say, that the 
 remedy of State interference, or Nullification, i)roposed in South- 
 Carolina, began now to engage the attention of tiie people of the 
 rest of the IJniled States. Many individuals, even in the ►dilates 
 most devoted to the Tariff policy, rejoice to apprehend that there 
 
 ^ may be a remedy for the usurpation of power, short of secession or 
 civil strife; that there is a medium between disunion and consoli- 
 dation ; and that Nullification is not intended to make, but lo 
 prevent, a revolution. Tiiere are some, particularly in the wiest- 
 ern portion of the Union, who agree with us respecting the liiglits 
 of the States, though they differ from us as to the protecting sys- 
 tem; who would not see all the grounds of liberty destroyed, and 
 an absolute, consolidated government established, even for the 
 sake of a policy to which they are favourably disposed. Our 
 friends of the otiier Southern States encourage us lo proceed. It 
 is true they say to us — " the people of our States are less informed 
 and less excited than in South Carolina, where these lo|)ics have 
 been so long agitated. They are all devoted lo Free Trade and" 
 to the Rights of the States. But with respect to the. particular 
 measures of resistance to be adopted, they are reluctant to exju'e^ 
 opinions on matters which they have tiot fully- considered, and un 
 which they are not fully informed, atid you would in vain attempt 
 to concert such measures with the^m. Such an at(em[)l would 
 call forth a thousand various projects and opinions; wonbl lead to 
 interminable discussions and negotiations; and be more likely 
 than any thing else to retard or defeat any effectual resistance 
 No! South-Carolina, who has been hitherto in advance, must vin- 
 dicate her right to the post, which she has assumed to herselt. Let 
 her act, and let a i)ractical queslion be put to the people of the 
 other Southern Slates, »n which it is necessary to decide one way 
 or the other; let h'h^ jjroposed to tiiem to make common cause 
 with South-Caroliiia..*;;? to aid in putting her down by violence; 
 and there cannot he a doubt of their decision. They cannot 
 sacrifice their dearest interests, renounce their long cherished 
 principles, and forge chains for their own limbs and those of their 
 posterity." 
 
 Let us examine a little the nature of this check of State interpo- 
 .sition, or Nullification. All we ask.is, that the arguments in its 
 favour-shall be Examined with the strictest scrutiny. All we com- 
 
 J plain of is, that it is denounced without examination. Men ap- 
 pear unwilling to understand us. The very simplicity and obvioufl 
 
character of some truths seem to render them utterly incompre- 
 hensible. It is, perhaps, natural to tliink that a very simple truth, 
 "vvhich'has long lain in the way of observation, must, if it w ere in- 
 deed a truth, have been discovered before ; and if discovered, 
 mjst have engaged the attention of reflectingmen. But yet we know 
 that this does not always happen, and that the most obvious and im- 
 portant truths have long escaped observation. It is now, however, 
 no longer doubtful (hat the tr'uih for which we contend was known 
 to one emineiit individual, who better than any one else under- 
 stood the true character of our institutions, It is no longer dis- ^ 
 puted that Mr. Jefkkrsom was the advocate of our doctrine, and 
 the au'thor of the term "Nullification." We hope that this will 
 •abate the distrust and aversion whicii have been entertained to- 
 wards it. 
 
 No answer has ever been attempted to the common argument — 
 that if individuals fcnter into a compart, and have no arbiter, or 
 superior authority, to interpret it for them, each must decide on 
 its interpretation, so far as respects the government of his own 
 conduct; that if independent and sover'eign States form a com- 
 pact, each, not only may, but must of necessity determine the 
 true meaning of the compact, so far as it rs to be carried into ettect 
 vby itself, or within. its own territory.— And it is plainly impossible 
 that any answer should be given. The argument in favour ot the 
 Constitution having provided such an umpire in the Supreme 
 Court, rests upon (his, viz:— It is taken for granted that by the 25th 
 section of the Act of 1789, /he appeal from the State Cour'ts in the 
 last resort, in cases involving any question arising under the laws 
 cf.d Constitution of the United States, is rightfully allowed to the 
 Supreme Court; then, although the Suprenie Court be not a 
 ' oiitical tribunal (as it has itself determined) birt its only function 
 I ing to decide the rights of individuals, yet. in the ordinary working 
 : the Government, it will happen, that in deciding the rights of 
 dividual-:, as they are affected by the conflicting Slate and Fede- 
 ial laws, this tribunal will determine how far either laws shall 
 have operation and effect, and consequently what are the relative 
 '^hts and powers of the Federal and State Governments ; and 
 ;i3 ordinary working of the Government can only be interrupted 
 y some extra-copstitutional or revolutionary movement. 
 I appf'al to you whether this be not the whole of the argument; 
 id fairly stated. I appeal to the advocates of the power of the 
 -iip.reme Court, whether any thing^ can be added to it. And yet 
 what sort, of jargon is this .? We have been accused of refined 
 «<! eculation — poliiical metaphysi^-.s, it has been called — and often 
 . v "men so long accustomed to verbal refinement as to have lost 
 ;iie faculty of distinguishing plain truth and direct argument when 
 they are ofTered to them. But how is it that a tribunal professing 
 to have no political power, shall exercise all political power ? — 
 that a constituent department of one government, certainly a 
 weaker, and in some respects subordinate department, shall be the 
 exclusive and final arbiter of the powers of that whole govern- 
 ment ? as well as of the powers of States acknowledged to be, (ov 
 some purposes at least, sovereign and independent ? 
 
 The truth is, however, that even in the ordinary loorking of the 
 ■ '}verorji°ut; thcS tSuprem'.i Couii is rrot the authority ofthclrsl: 
 
resort. There is a power beyond that, in the Senate of the tjnileii 
 States sitting as a Court of Im[)e;ichment. A Judge may be tried 
 for a wilful violation of the Constitution, and the Senate jnay not 
 only judge of him and his motives, but interpret the Constitution 
 too, arid that in the very last resort. Though a particular decision 
 cannot be reversed, yet a rule of conduct will be furnished, to 
 which the Court will in future be compelled to conform. Will, 
 you then say that the Senate is the supreme arbiter of the consti- 
 tutional powers of the Federal and Siate Governments ? 
 
 If the Constitution, (as it might very well have done) had not 
 provided for the establishment of Courts by the Federal Govern- 
 ment, but authoi'izini^ it to act on the persons and property of 
 individuals, had loft its laws to be carried into effect by means of 
 the State tribunals, would you sa^-- that those Courts — the creatures 
 •fa State — v;hose rule of conduct migljt be prescribed by it — 
 whose constitution might be modified by it at plensure— whose 
 very existence might be abolished at its will — were the supreme 
 arbiters of the powers of their creator. The absurdity would 
 strike every one ; yet tliis is, to all intents and purposes, the argu- 
 ment of these who suppose such an arbiter to be found in ihc 
 Supreme Court. Would not ihf relative powers of the State and 
 Federal Government have been the same under that Constitution 
 as under the present ? The authority of the Supreme Court in 
 relation to this matter, is precisely of the same charac'er with tljat 
 of every other functionary of both St<itc and Federal Governments, 
 whether legislative, ex(^ciulivc, or judicial ; all must, in the dis- 
 charge of their proper functions, incidentr»4l3', and in the first in' 
 stance, interpret the Constitution. To none of them is this inter- 
 pretation committed as a substantive and ultimate power. 
 
 Our idea is the plainest in the world, if those who differ from ns 
 would deii^n to comprehefsd it. It is that ours is a confederacy, 
 and nothing but a confederacy. The notinn of a Government 
 partly consolidated and partly federative; of Slate Governments 
 partly sovereign and partly subordinate; is incongruous and irp- 
 possible. Twenty-four distinct and in dependent toverei2;ns have 
 agreed, by the constitutional compact, for certair» specific purposes 
 of common interest, to exercise their powers joiiitiy. For this 
 purf)ose they have provided, as other confederacies have dfKv^ 
 fcr the appointment nf a central council and authorities suborn 
 ate to it, called a Fedenl Government. It dues not detract from 
 its character as a Confederated /lovernmenf, that they have pro- 
 vided (what has not been so usual among confederacies) that the 
 central government, instead of making requisitions on the several 
 contrac'ing sovereigns, and carryirfg its regulations into eli'ect 
 solely by menns of thf ir authoiity, has power to make requisitions 
 on individuals in the first instance, and to affect their persons and 
 property. In thus acting upon Individ lals, however, it ficts solely 
 by the permission and under the authority, (as expressed by the 
 •ompact of coof'^deration.) of the soverei;<ti in whose territory the 
 jurisdiction is exercised. Thuti sovereign may,, therefore, inhibit 
 any exercise of the power, rightfully'and in good faith, if the joint 
 authorities have exceeded the powers granted in the compact. 
 
 Let us suppose that in former ;inies, when theological affairs 
 engaged more of the attention of the world than they do at pr*^ 
 
ieat, lialf a dozen of the sovereigns of Christendom had entereii 
 into a compact for (he appointment, from their respective domin- 
 ion?, of am ecclesiasJical council to regulate matters of religious 
 faith and pradice. Suj^^ose them furtiier to have stipulated that 
 the council might appoint ecclesiastical tribunals to exercise juris- 
 diction wiUiiu the dominions of each, that the regulations of thfe 
 council, when within the scopa of »heir authority, should be para 
 mount to tlie temporal laws with which they shimld come in col- 
 lision, orsupreiue, and, if you please, tiiat ihere should be an ap- 
 peal from the Usy to the ecclesiastical tribunals, in cases involving 
 any (luestion of religious faith or practice. Would this ecclesias- 
 tici establishm-enl have been any thirig else than a part of the 
 machinery of each of the contracting sovereigns for the govern- 
 ment of his own dominjons ? This might have been dangerous 
 power to grant, and have opened the way to the usurpation of powers 
 not granted ; bui would any one have dreamed that by such com- 
 pact, the council in qnestion was constituted the righful sovereign 
 ot ail the dominions of the contracting j)arlies.'' — that any sover- 
 eign might not rightfully control tho=;e tribunals when he per- 
 ceived them to exceed their proper authority ? — or that he was 
 restrained by anything but the faitii of the compact from suppress- 
 ing them akogeiher, or banishing them his dominions. 
 
 This is not similar, but identical. The iStates, before the forma- 
 tion of the C(/ns\i!ntion, were sovereign : they exercised, uncon- 
 trolled, all the powers of government. This is not matter of 
 argument, but of historical fact, and established by evidence per- 
 fectly indis[)ntable They entered into a compact providing for 
 the estallshment of a common council, for the regulation of cer- 
 tain afi'airs of common interest, and provided that it should appoint 
 otScers arid tribunals to exec me its powers in the most effectual 
 manner Certainly the States diil not stipulate to become consol- 
 idated fiT every purpose; to abandon altogether their sovereign 
 character, and to become corporations. Yet, unless they have 
 done this, i will prove, so that no one shall question it. that they 
 must retain every right of sovereignty and have rightful power to 
 control every tribunal and function within their respective ter- 
 ritories. 
 
 What is sovereignty ?— there is no. mystery in this — sovereign — 
 supreme — the highest apd uhimate authority in a State. Such an 
 authority there must, of necessity, lie in every State. Can there 
 be any doubt ot thi? ? It may not reside in a single individual, or 
 a single department ; as in the instance of the Brilish Parliament 
 of King, Lords and Commons, but when sovereignty is thhs dis- 
 tributed the concurrence of all the departments is required to ren- 
 der any act effectual. If under our American constitutions, there 
 ■were no provision for an appeal lo the people in Convention, it 
 might be said that sovereignty resided in the legislature, the execu- 
 tive and the judiciary, since there would be no nllenor authority 
 to control any act in which they concurred. But the sovereignty 
 •would, in effect, reside in the legi^lrtture, which might organize 
 and modify the other ccfjartments at its pleasure. It\vnuldbe 
 vain to talk of an abstract sovereignty residing; in tiie people. A 
 sovereignty which can never be called into action is a nonentity. 
 V, under such a Constitution, the people should ^assemble and 
 
 1* 
 
ajodiiy the i'orin oi governraent, this would be revohiiion 3r>u 
 force. VVhfiii we speak of soveieigiily, we mean the highest Ugai 
 power, exercised acci>rdijig to the forms ot'lhe '"'ofisiitufiou. ^t 
 means this, or il means iioihing. Is it .possible to conceive oT a 
 Rtfiip iii whidi ti.ertr is not suth an authority ' 
 
 Thnre is a^cMise in whiC i a suvcreign may be said to bo subor- 
 dinate or (lependafit A weaker sovereign has been subordinate 
 to a ujore j)!««'i'rful ofie, fr(.ni t'e diead of superior lorce.. But 
 we speak ii levctl power. The prucess of the superior sovereign 
 does pot run intt) the domiiiinns of the infeiior. He does not 
 control according to the forms of law. If he du^s, the inferior is 
 no longftr sovereign in aiiv sense. He is but a functionary of the 
 superior, governing pow 
 
 A State p^rily soverei ... ......: ,,ar)ly\subordiiiate ; a government 
 
 partly consolidated and partly jede»'ative, currently as this lan- 
 guage has been repeated Ijy those who ha\e been contented to use 
 words without ideas annexed to th^m* is a monster, inconceivable 
 as the ChiiUiTera If, as seme hav^e sngjresled, sovereignly were 
 distributed betvveeiithe Eeder^l and Stale authorities, then the, 
 concurrence of both v\ ould be necessary to render any act effec- 
 tual. But is this the case.'' If tiie State doe.s nnt possess the 
 right of Nullifi aiiof!, is its concarrei:ce required to give efi'ect to 
 any act of the Federal Government? Is there any act of the State 
 which may not be arrested on ih*; ground of cejugnance to the 
 laws or Canslitntion of the (Jniteil States 7 The argument in favor 
 of the pHrtial soveriignty tif the Slates stands thus: — Th« Stales 
 may regulate all their internal concerns; they may legi^late on all 
 subjects, but those on wliich they have surrendered their powers 
 to the Federal Government ; their lav\s have full operation and 
 eff'ct, and are the hiijiiest authoity on the matier.s which they 
 regulate — unless, indeed, the States tran.seend their rightful p<jwert% 
 and their laws come into collision with the Constiiijpion or laws of 
 the E'cderal Goveriuneill ; th.en, to be sure, their opeiration is liable 
 to be arretted ; and the qu sti'm, whether the States have trans- 
 cended their powers, is to be judged of by the Supreme Court — a 
 tribun.il appoi:ited by the Fedeial Gove'nment. Aie, those who 
 ^ argue thus aware that they have e,iven us the very flefiniiion of the 
 powers of a corporation ?— that the peitiest town council — the 
 associated i^roeers' compuny — is sovereign in the very !^ense they 
 have supposed the States to be sovereign? Think — lellect — the 
 laws ot a corporation are binding on its members; they have full 
 operation and effect, and are the iiighest authority on the matters 
 which they regulate ; unless the corporation transcends its powers, 
 and its regnhuions come in collision with those of the superior 
 government; then, indeed, their operation is to be restrained, and 
 the question, wliether the corporaiion has transcended its powers, 
 is to be judged 'f l)y a liibunal appointed by the sHperior govern- 
 ^ ment There can be no question of sovereignty (>r supremacy, but 
 ** in the case ot a colision (^f autlnn-itieS, and the very ic^t ofsover- 
 •ianty or subordination is, which shall judge of the validity of the 
 other's act And iiractically, is it not evident that a majority of 
 the people of the United States, which elects the Congress and 
 President, and indirectly appoints the Judges, may, if there ,be no 
 right of Stale iDterposition, assume any power they may think 
 
HJvan'ageous, and restrain ihe exerciie oTany power by the SiaitS 
 that it ihiriks peops-r t ) *'xereise. If this h-r; =t!. v hat is the sover 
 eigniy to the Slates ? 
 
 T" say thai ;he States aic sovert'i;: , * terms, ii:.; >- 
 
 ri^ht of Nullification. Unqnestionrihly-^»i the lerai soviM-eijrniy 
 has the only nipaniiig that c.ui bp atir buted'to it, ami signifies ihe 
 authfrity ill the last leSfMi. 1 am avvarp that m-ifiy who concede 
 the sovereignty of the ^Slates, have done so uithout thinking it 
 necessary to annex a meahiiig to tlie ttrm. and that all, even oik- 
 opponents, are willing to admit the Stales to be sovereign, in sncli 
 sort, that they shall be snljorditiale for any purpose tliat it may 
 suit the views of the governing majority to render iheni subordin- 
 ate. Out I have never been able to conceive how those who con- -^ 
 ( ede and contend for the right of a State to secede from tlie 
 Union, can deny the ri^ht to nulli y. The right of secession is 
 founded on the sovereignty of the State, in the sense in which I 
 have u^^ the word. It depends on this.^that when the Slate has 
 ^^_ Ted the separation, the Federal auihorities are bound to yiebl 
 obedience and forbear the exercise of their functions. If a countv 
 or parisli siiould think proper to declare a secession from the State, 
 the pielention would be laughed at. The Slate authorities would 
 be bound still to go on to execute I'.ie laws vvilliir. tiie seceding ^ 
 district. And why is this ? — because the county or parish js'not 
 sovereign. If it were, the State auihorities would be bcund to 
 yield obedience. Those who contend for the Siatp rigiit of seces- 
 sion, cannot m<'«n the right of rebellion or revolt. Iflliey did, tl)e 
 ^'ederal autiiori'ies would not only have the rigiit, but would bu 
 
 und io go on to execute the Federal faws, notw ithstandif.g the 
 .'t of-secession. They must mean a legal right — the exercise of ' 
 ! authority to which all are bound to submit. But it is not easy 
 ;<., cojnprehe;nd how the Federal authorities can be bound to syb- 
 niiYivvheu th.ey are comta-nded to forbear the exercise o^ all (heir 
 ^uncrions arid to suspend the execnlion of all Federal ifiWs, yvhen 
 ;bey would liOt be bound, if couimarided, to forbear the execution 
 ni 3 pariicular o!)noxi'U9 law, or how the State can be sovf reign 
 tor one of these purposes and not tor Ihe other. The greater in- 
 volves the less. Csn it tie. that a sovereign party must either ac- 
 qtjirsce in having an attemped violntion of thf> comfiact carried 
 into e tie ct within his own territory, or declar: .ipact at an 
 
 end altogether.'' , * * '"" 
 
 Such are our views of our confederated system. Tiie Stales » 
 constituted a confederacy before the formation of the Consiitu* 
 tioi: ; they forma confederacy sliJl: they were sovereign before, 
 and are S(t still. They have not, by adofiting the ('onstilution, 
 abandon e<i their separate and independent character and formed a 
 eonsolidated empire. The people of each State, in their sovereign 
 character, delegated powers for some purposes to the Federal, for 
 other purposes to the. State authorities; but wiihin its territorial 
 jurisdietion there is but one sovereign, and both Federal and State 
 authorities, which are co-ordinate to each other, o-.ve it obedience, 
 snd are subject to its con rol. The a[)peal to (he people in theii- 
 sovereii'n ctiaracfer is vvithio the forms of the Coiistitutijm ; it is 
 provided for !)y the Ci.nstitution itself, and tomes wiihin Ihe 
 rirdinary working of the governiufint. It is not revolutionafy ; that 
 
53, a revoiution by which the obligation ot /aw is thrown off. a!i« 
 the forms of the Conjtilufion vinlated. The sovereignty of the 
 people is not an unmeatiing ahslraciion, but the living and activ« 
 principle of our institutions. Th.xjgf^. in its character v( s'<)vereign, 
 ihe Stale has the le^al right to S;.c>Mie from the. cornoact, even 
 vvillioiit allegiiig any violn'ion of it on the part of the othe.' con- 
 tracting parties, and both FedtM'al and. State aiiiliorities would be 
 legally bound to submit if it should ds) so, yet it lias not the moral 
 right. Its faith is bound to adhere to the conripacf, so lon^ as it- 
 remains unviolaled on the othe: j)art. So its failh is bound to 
 submit to atjy alteration of ti.e compact that may be made witli the 
 concuirence of three-fourlhs of the members of the confederacy. 
 We do not attribute to the three-fourths, as has been, supposed by 
 some, any constitutional power of consl/uing tlic Constitution. 
 They have the power of amendment, however — of making it what 
 they please; and tl:is, in effect, will amount to the same tiling. 
 
 Confusion has oftc^n been occnsioned by using the same word 
 with different meaniiigs attached to it, and such has arisen from the 
 use of the word rig/iMn different senses. Thus we speak of the 
 right of resista;n:e. ftlan has a natural and moral right to resist 
 oppression. But this is not a legal right. He is bound to obey 
 the laws, and the government has the legal right to punish him, if 
 bio rfesi?tant;e should prove ineffectual. These senses have been 
 confoujided t)y many who sp-'ak of the riglil of a Stale to secede 
 from the Union. If tiiis be a legal, a cotJSiilnii.oiml right, then f^ll 
 constituted authorities. Federnl and of the State, are bound to 
 yield to it. !t involves, a fortiori, the right of Nullification. It" it 
 he no?, then it is no more than the right of rebeilion, und the Fede- 
 ral aiitliorities are bound to gi> on and execute the Federal law?, 
 ijotu itbstanditi-^ the act of secesson, and to punish those who resist 
 tbem. 
 
 I think vre ra»y fairly assume that the dispute is reduced to Ibis — 
 whether this be a consolidated gi>vernment, in uhich the States are 
 jneie «;orporalioris, or a coniederrition in wiiich the Slates are 
 sovereign — that there is no middle ground betweefi Nidlificalion 
 and consfdidation. Those who supjiose the government consoli- 
 dated, and the Constitution a mockery, are, howevf r slavisli, at 
 least consistent in (heir opinions. But it is impossible to compre- 
 hend those wJK) speak of the rights of a State which aie in direct 
 conflict with other lights of the Federal Governtncnt ; of lei;al or 
 icoustitutional ri;i;hls. which there are no means of b^g. !ly </r con- 
 »titutioiially enforcing; of the right of a State, by secediiij;, to 
 arrest and restrain all the laws and trii'unals of the Fedeiol Gov- 
 ernment; on the ground ofanallpged infraction of the constitu- 
 tional compact, and not to arrest tiie operation of that very act 
 whicl: conslilues the infraction ; of sovereignties which are not 
 sovereign. 
 
 Ours is merely a confederacy ; but the Cons'itution has gn-^rded 
 it against (he dangers which have' proved fatal to confedf racies 
 heretofore. It is authorized to make its reqfiisilions on individuals, 
 and is not left dep<^ndant on the caprice, the indolence, or the 
 selfishuess of the contracting sovereigrjs to cany its regulations 
 into effect. True, the parties may inteifere to arrest its operations, 
 bnt this interference is effected with infinite difficulty. It is not 
 

 
 '<3 if sovereign monarchs were the contracting pai'ties, and the 
 caprice or rashness of a single individual could in a single moment 
 destroy the whole system. The sovereignty is made up of hun- 
 dreds of thousands of individuals, whoac ignorance you must en- 
 lighten, whose understanding you must convince, whose selfish- 
 ness you must overcome, whose sluggishness you must stimulate, 
 before you can induce their interference. They must act accord- 
 ing to prescribed forms. It is impossible they should act hastily, 
 and time will beafforded to correct misconceptions. 
 
 The negative or nullifying power in a State is the (rue, the otily 
 principle of free governmejit, and, without understanding it as a 
 principle, every government that has pretended to freedom, has 
 acted upon it instinctively. The principie is, that when there are 
 great, distinct and coufliciing interests in the Stale, each must 
 have the means of protecting itself. The negative power is one of 
 defence, and can never be turned to purpose's of asgrevsiot?. The 
 Patriciaas and Plebeians of liorae were distinct and hostile races — 
 these were the confiicting interests. Rome was weak and en- 
 slaved, until the nullifying power was granted to the Plebeians ; 
 then sh.e Vftse to greatness and ciory ; which only began to de- 
 cline, when this anomaly in her Constitution was removed by the 
 rower of the emperors. The Constitutio/i of Eugland is founded, 
 in theory, upon this — that society naturally X^nd^ to divide ilselt 
 into a minority of those who possess weaitb or other distinctions, 
 and a majority of those who do not possess these advantage^, and 
 that each of these classes-, as represented in their t.vo houses of 
 legislature, is entitled to a negative orj the acts of the other; the 
 monarch holding the balance between them. The Constitution 
 of the States of Holland was founded on the territorial check. 
 I'his confederac)' s<;enied far weaiier and more distracted than 
 even our old confederacy; yet it did so happen that under this 
 distracted Constitution, I'oliand rose to unpreijer'ented greatness 
 and prosperity, until pressed by the arms of Louis XIV, she re- 
 formed this peculiarity of horgfivernment, b.y recalling the House ot 
 Orange; and whether it he regard'^d as coincidence or conse- 
 quence, from thai lime began the .decline > f Dutch power and 
 prosperity. In Lliis country, we have no distinction if rank, or 
 clr.sses ; we have liltle distinction of wcalih; our to.fl.cting and 
 discordant interests arise out of the geugraphiCal position oftho 
 flifterent pcrtiofis of the country ; if there be oppiession, it must 
 be the oppression of a ge;.>grap'iica! m^'jority, and if we wouKl 
 have frf-e government, we must have a geographical check iu 
 the minority tu oppose to it. 
 
 T'« borrow the idea of a disti-iguisijed statesman to v,fhom I atn 
 indeiilfd for many ideas on this subject, the necessity for this nega- 
 tive power is foundf;d on the selfish |)rinci(»le in man ; a man loves 
 himself better t':an his n«-igh'l)';ur. Hence the necessity of gosern- 
 meiit; without it, the ?!rong \inuld nrrogate to themselves all ad- 
 vantage?, at the expense of the we^k If power iie oommili«'d to 
 one or a few, t! ey will gratify their f^mbitioii. Wwh a\arice or tiieir 
 sensnaliiy. at the expejise of the many Hence (he nercssity of 
 represenli.tive goveriui'enl. \' hich gives the power, in eftVc', U) tiie 
 whole society, or to a majority of it. But thus far government i."5 
 avideutiy imperfect, because a porlioti of Ibe society— the major- 
 
 V 
 
lu 
 
 i'y—mny practice oppression upon anolher portion. Majoriiv and 
 ^ mmon.y are the conflictihg Interests, and if you would have a 
 government tree, you must give to each (he power of self-nrotec- 
 t.on Every society, even the smallest, has a tendency to divide 
 itselt .nto parties geograi;hicai:y separated. This may easily be 
 vermed oy regarding onr State Governments. But in a represent- 
 ative government established over a very e.xtensive coun ry, it is 
 absulu oly mipcssible that there should not be a geographical 
 majority and minority. This is the inherent vice of such govern- 
 rner^t. against which you n^ust guard if you hope to perpetuate it. 
 
 « ?>'7,< ^^ ^ ^^'-^^ ''^' ^^'^ ''^^^ '" '^'^ede or to resist, is not to 
 say that the government is free. Turkish sultans have und2reone 
 the bou' sfrmg. and a Pa,'i! of Russia has been strangled, but their 
 goTernme.Mts are not on ihat account more free. The ri<^ht of 
 
 •yi secess.on-whatisthat, but to say there is no means of resJstino- 
 usurpa^.on, but fo dUsoWe the government. And can any onesa? 
 that this u,|| be a safer mode of redress? Will the mnjorily be 
 more ,,ke!y to recTogniza this right than (hat of Nulliiication P 
 U 111 thev not have greater temptation to enforce their power ? If 
 ^ wenu!lity merely, they may hope to have the disputed power 
 granted by three-fourths of the States. The objectionable mea- 
 sures of the government will still be matter for discussion and com 
 promise. But let the example of secession be once set, and th- 
 advantages which they derive from an union with us are .<rone (n 
 ever! Let (he Sonuiern States once taste (he advantages, so far 
 as wTalth IS concerned, of a separate existence, and they are not 
 iikely to seek the Union again. If we have no right but that of 
 ^ resistance the hopes of the Union are over. When resistance is 
 threatened, the gover.'iment must either yield to it or attempt to 
 suppress It by force. If they attempt (he latter course, then the 
 cjvtl Strife whicli men now apprehend is sure to follow, and the 
 gover??ment is scattered to the winds ofheavnn. Or is the gov- 
 ernment always to yield? Wliat a weak and degraded «»overP 
 rner.t \^ilI that be ? There is neither weakness nor de'^-adHtion i.; 
 '^ 5ubmitting to an authority uhich is recognised as alawful one. 
 l-ut It IS impossible tlnU that should answer (lie purposes of a gov. 
 ^rnmentwhich is to yield to every threat of force. We may inc-^ 
 nsk in^ the course we now propose to pursue ; it may be that \h'. 
 anflinrify we claim for the State will not he recognized, and th'- 
 force W.I be resorted to. {Jut ceriainlv we have better hope-s 
 now, while there is stiil a feeling in everv portkin of the Union that 
 vre belong (a a commr.n countiy. than vve can have in future whe- 
 there .-^hall be wider alienation and deeper hostility. On the o(he 
 
 ^ .5iLe-- without the check we contend for- there is no m;t--there is 
 the absolute cerlainty of a!i th^ evils and dangers which are threat- 
 ened <o onr present course. ' 
 
 1 rannot sf.y ih^t our principle, if it were generally recognized, 
 would render our Union pe.-petnal ; but I can say, what it seems 
 to me evfiy reflecting person mn?t perceive, that without it, its 
 perpetuation is impossibU. With' it. I cannot see the chance c; 
 dissolniion. I havo heard it objectec* by some who (bought the 
 continuance 01 the Union, on anv terms, incompatible with \\\c 
 interests ot the Southern States, that such a power wonid render 
 h* Union too indestructible. Tbe argument might be addressed 
 

 
 ■) llio people of cveiy State, who complained of the acts of the 
 ederai Governineiit — is not the redress in your own hands' I 
 Hve atleni[;ted on a former occasion to ahew that the exercisR of 
 'is power by a State can never seriously embarrass the operations 
 I (he General Government, unless wxiCn applied to a law laying 
 niposts and dulics. Even in t!:e case of w-n- if one or several 
 tdtes sliould fail to contribute to the ^enerpi farce, this would not 
 ■aterially weaken the rest, who must have calculaiyd Lheir strength 
 cfore hand I have heard it said triumphanliy— will you give to 
 len the power of exempting tiiemsehts from taxation? — will you 
 ilow Uie people of a ijtpJe tu judge in a matter where their inler- 
 3ts are so din ctly concerned ? And why not? Our Anylo Saxon 
 ncestors held it the very touchstone of liberty, that the people 
 thouid have the power of granting their own money. Why is it 
 that :he people within a Slate, u here their power in the matter is 
 luiUnjited, do not e'^empt ttiemselves from taxation? If a si gle 
 .idividual in a Slate could exempt liimself from taxation, while all 
 he rest should continue to cont.ibule, aud the gi)v::rnraent go or 
 is usual, you might find many individuals willing to avail themselves 
 of this privilege. If the consequence of a single individ".al. thus 
 exempting himse!f, were to be that all the-rest of the society should 
 do so too, and the government shonld be dis'^olved, yoii might 
 still find, here and there, a reckless individual who v/ould avail 
 himself of the privilege even on these tersns — but you would not 
 Hnd one in a hundred. Men are not unwilling to support govern- 
 ment. The people hitherto have been attached to their Federal 
 no Tess than their State Government. They will confinue to be 
 so, if you will allow ihem to consider it their own government, 
 and not an extrinsic and antagonist pov.'cr. To dissolve the govern- 
 ment by withholding the necessary supplies, you must gain over, not 
 one reckless individual in a hundred, but a majority, and more than 
 .1 majority, of the whole jjeople of the State. The fear is I'antas- _^ 
 ;ical that the people of a State will arrest a law of taxation, unless 
 they aie satisfied of its inequality and injustice. The da;!ger of 
 their acting hastily, under ignorance or misconception of iho true 
 character of the law, is i^uarded a,><ai>ist, so f<»l: as any danger in 
 ;overnment can be guarded against, by tiio numijers that must con- 
 cur, the discussion that must lake place, the time that niust be con- 
 .umed, the forms that must be gone tiirough, before they can be 
 brought to set. This danger is as nothing, when coin|)aved to the y' 
 (^pposi;!^, appal'ing danger of giving ti» an in'erestejd and^irfesponsi- 
 bie majority ttie unlimited power of exaction. 
 . Great as the stalce is, which the Southern Siates have in the pre- 
 sent protecting policy of the government: though theiivprospeiify 
 certainly — nertiaps their existence as States, may dep';nd upon it- 
 yet I regard this as a ttifle, compared with the establishment of the 
 greal principle in gover:iment for which we contend — the- power v 
 of the weaker interest in the body politic to protect itself. It ia^ 
 satuiaiy that weakness sho'uld be able to say to power, "thus far 
 shalt thou go, and no farther." The United States have set to the 
 world the example of popular, rt^presentative gove'-nraer.t. The 
 spirit of reform is abroad, and our exam;'!'? is fol!:>..ed. It is in- 
 cumbent nil us to cnrry out the lesson we have tiught, and, (what 
 has not beau doae^here!ofore,) to show that such govern meat may 
 
1 Arf 
 
 )-e prncdc.nble, safe, and free. It is for want of '^ph n principle, 
 flial lUft abuses ot government in tiie ohi world have been vindi- 
 f*\:cd Monarchies and aiistncracics have been suSiniitted to, to 
 ?ave men from the more foi'raiilable tyrant of numbers. They 
 have been taught that it is belter to yield to one tyrant tb'in to a 
 million of lyranis, Tliarks to the conservative pp)ot,ip'e whJch lias 
 been infused into our Conslitti1ior> — whether by tH'fe dosign tf wise 
 «nd patriotic men, or the care of a protecting providence— we may 
 ?:ope to obtain nJI the good which has resulted from m6hai*chtt'»» 
 !»v;d aristccractfcs vilhoiit any naislure oi tlic evil. 
 
 V, 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 01 1 896 338 6