Class iJ :' '\ Book_^ :a COPYRIGOT DEPOSIT G 7 OUR 110 DAYS* FIGHTING OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING BY ARTHUR W. PAGE With Many Maps in Text {And Two Large Maps at the Back) Garden City New York DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 1920 1> / "9 V COPYRIGHT, I919, 1920, BY DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN MAR 18 1920 iGl,A565239_ TO MY FATHER WHO SACRIFICED HIS LIFE TO THE END THAT AMERICA SHOULD DO ITS PART IN THE DEFENSE OF CIVILIZATION FOREWORD THE Americaa people realize in a general way what wonderful work was done by the Ameri- can Expeditionary Forces in the great war. They scarcely realize, however, to any extent, that this work was done in the face of difficulties all but in- surmountable, or that General Pershing and those under him accomplished miracles in overcoming adverse conditions that sprang from many causes, most of them going back to our lack of preparation for war, some of them inseparable from war, and, therefore, unavoidable. The country may well be proud of the fact, in spite of our general lack of preparation for war, that in the great Meuse-Argonne battle — which proved the decisive battle of 191 8, and which lasted from September 26th to November nth — the quality of our leadership and plans were such that our par- tially trained troops were able to drive back the picked troops of the German Army from Verdun to Sedan. In the course of these operations, three strongly prepared defensive lines, in a terrain which in itself afforded great natural obstacles, were captured from the enemy, in spite of the effort of the enemy to hold these lines at all cost to prevent the ruin of his armies on the Western Front. viii FOREWORD They can further be proud of the fact that our leadership, plans, and the devotion of our men were such that this great victory was won with a total loss on our side of approximately 9,000 less than that inflicted on the enemy. What the American Expeditionary Forces accom- plished in France forms a grand picture that com- pels the admiration of the patriotic American. The small-souled critic may pick up a magnifying glass and apply it to the picture in an endeavour to bring out prominently small flaws that, in the distorted view of the glass, may appear great, but when seen in correct perspective and relation to the remainder of the picture, do not affect in any way its grandeur. Those of us who were called upon to hold more or less responsible positions in the American Expe- ditionary Forces in France, and who are, therefore, acquainted with the facts, feel that Mr. Page in his book, "Our no Days' Fighting," has rendered a distinct public service in giving a splendid vista of the organization of the American Armies in France, and of the period of fighting that began with Cantigny and ended with Sedan. Apart from the official reports, which are to come out later, nothing can appear that will have greater immediate interest than Mr. Page's book. It forms a brief, readable, and concise account of the part the American troops played in Europe. In this necessarily brief record we get only a glimpse of the principal difficulties that confronted General FOREWORD ix Pershing and his staff in France. It would take hundreds of volumes to recite them all, little and great, and in the detail necessary to a clear under- standing of their importance to all our operations. The soldiers, whose devotion to duty has set a new standard in our army, and their leaders from General Pershing down, including the staffs who directed operations in the American Expeditionary Forces; who spent days and nights of heart-breaking anxiety and labour in struggling with untoward con- ditions; whose motto was, "GET RESULTS," under any and all circumstances, and who finally presented to their country a victorious army — are satisfied to rest their case with the Nation, feeling sure of a just verdict. J. W. McAndrew, Major General U. S. Army. Chief of Staff, A. E. F., May 6, 191 8, to May 26, 1919. CONTENTS Foreword by Major General McAndrew PAGB I. Our Training and Our Plan of Campaign 3 II. A Little Battle That Proved a Great Point and Made 100,000 Men ... 20 III. Our Sixty Days Under the French . . 31 IV. The Triumph and Humour of St. Mihiei 62 V. The Campaign of the Argonne-Meuse . 83 VI. With the AUies 142 Statistics of the First Army .... 267 LIST OF MAPS PAGE The American Army's Supply System ... 7 ^ Seicheprey and the Fixed Trench System . . 12 *^ Artillery Plan for the Cantigny Attack . . 22 " The Plan of the First American Attack . . 23 '^ Cantigny and the Trenches of the War of Move- ment 27 Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood ... 35 -^ Ludendorff's First Effort to Widen the Marne Salient 39 Ludendorff's Second Effort to Widen the Marne Salient 41 Where the Tide of War Changed .... 48 America's Part in Clearing the Marne Salient 55 The Topography of the St. Mihiel Salient . 63 The Official Plan of the St. Mihiel Attack . . 67 The Lane of the 42nd's Advance at St. Mihiel 69 The Allied Advance . 77 The Woods of the Argonne-Meuse Battlefield 92 The Roads of the Argonne-Meuse .... 95 The Official Plan of the Argonne-Meuse Attack 98 Xlll xiv LIST OF MAPS PAGE Looking from the American Positions, Septem- ber 26th 106 Relief Map of Montfaucon Area .... 107 The German Defence Lines . . . . . . 115 The Verdun Hills and the Woevre Plain . . 134 The Last Battle 136 Where We Cut the German Communications . 137 Two Detail Maps of the Argonne-Meuse. Supplement OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING Our 110 Days' Fighting CHAPTER I OUR TRAINING AND OUR PLAN OF CAMPAIGN THE first independent offensive action by the American Army in Europe, the taking of Can- tigny, took place only five and a half months before the war ended. The first American division to take over an active sector of line did so only in April, six months before the war ended. And the American First Army, formed on the 20th of July, had its first action at St. Mihiel, September 1 2th, just two months before the war came to an end. The active fighting of any large bodies of American troops was confined to two main periods — from Chateau-Thierry to the Vesle, some sixty days, in which eight of our divisions took part; and the Argonne-Meuse battle, forty-seven days, in which twenty-two divisions took part. There were two or three days' fighting at St. Mihiel in between these two times. There were also several other notable actions, as those of the 27th and 30th divisions with the British, but none involving more than two divisions. 4 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING In other words, our army just barely got in at the finish, and to do that it had to fight before either its training or equipment was ready. But if it had not gone in, ready or unready, and had not paid the price when it did, the war would not have ended on November nth. The war ended then because the Germans were beaten — defeated in the military sense. Let there be no mistake about that. And the Ameri- can Army in its hundred-odd days of fighting pro- vided one of the vital elements of this defeat. If the Marines of the 2nd Division at Belleau Wood, and the 3rd Division machine gunners at Chateau-Thierry, provided a dramatic entrance of our army into the main struggle, the moral decisions that placed them there were no less dramatic. If the six green divisions that went over the top in the Argonne-Meuse battle on September 26th performed heroic deeds, the moral courage to set them at such a task was no less remarkable, and far back of that, the moral courage to train them for open warfare was worth a great victory in Itself. Most battles are lost or won before the first shot is fired. With this in mind it is worth stud5dng the American Army's action In France, for It is full of brave, human en- deavour, of moral and physical courage at many times and places that are still little known. The short period In which our forces were actually engaged has tended to obscure somewhat the fact that when the war ended General Pershing com- manded the largest force in American history, which had fought and won one of the great battles of all OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 5 times — the Argonne-Meuse battle, which lasted forty- seven days and used more American troops than there ever were in an American army before. This extraordinary result came suddenly. The work, how- ever, that produced it was slow. When General Pershing first landed in France, he determined to create a purely American force of quality and size large enough to bring victory to the Allied armies, for even before the German offensive of the spring of 191 8 it was clear that the maximum British and French forces were not sufficient to defeat the Germans, then reinforced by their troops from Russia. General Pershing's intention was to train divisions until there were enough for an army corps, and occupy a sepa- rate American sector with that. As more divisions were trained and as the number of corps increased he planned to form an American army, and as the troops further increased more armies, until there were American groups such as existed in the armies of the French, British, and Germans. This was to be strictly an American organization, just as the British Army was entirely British, and the French all French. It would, of course, be under the supreme Com- mander-in-Chief, as all others were; even before he reached France, General Pershing was a believer in a unified command. The divisions which were to make up this American force were to be trained principally for open warfare, a war of movement, with less attention paid to trench warfare, although they were to spend a certain time 6 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING in quiet sectors of the front-line trenches as part of their training. It is worth while for every American who takes pride in what the army accomplished to contem- plate carefully this conception of training — two thirds for open warfare, one third for trench warfare. This conception was decided upon in the summer of 1 91 7, when there had been no war of movement on the Western Front for nearly three years. As prosaic as it looks on paper, this decision was more important than most battles, for it made our part in the final battle possible. It had this significance : Continued trench fighting almost inevitably meant a stalemate. A war of movement meant a decision one way or the other. The American Army was built for offensive, for victory. It is probably fair to say that the bulk of military opinion on the Allied side did not agree with General Pershing, and his decision was, therefore, a very bold one. But seldom has sound thinking and courage been better rewarded. A good many thousand American soldiers are alive now who would have died had his decision been the reverse. He expected to vindicate his belief in open warfare in the spring of 19 19. It was vindi- cated, most opportunely, six months earlier. The position on the front, ultimately to be taken by the group of American armies being planned, was practically fixed by the only possible remaining line of supply. The British had all the northern ports, and their lines covered everything from the battle area to the sea, as far south as Havre. The French THE AMERICAN ARMY's SUPPLY SYSTEM This map shows in general the area occupied by British and French supply systems into which we could not go without confusion, and the lines of the supply we organized for our army. This only available line of supply chiefly dictated our position on the front. 8 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING supply lines took in all the Paris area and a broad belt running eastward from the capital. A supply system south of the French belt, from the sea to the battle line, between Verdun and Belfort, was about all that was left. Therefore Chaumont became head- quarters, and the neighbourhood of Neufchateau and Saint-Dizier became our main advanced base. The first place selected by the American staff for attack was the St. Mihiel salient, and the staff was working on this project many months before there was any American force ready even for a minor engagement, not to mention the taking of this position. To make a purely American army, trained for open warfare, with the first attack to be made at St. Mihiel — such were the plans. By March, 19 17, there were four American divi- sions which had finished their training and were theoretically ready for battle. Still, they had never been seriously engaged and no one knew how they would compare with first-class veteran troops in the ordeal of battle. The first division which arrived after General Pershing in the spring of 19 17 went into the trenches for training for the first time in October of that year. Three other divisions had followed it, the 2nd made up of two regiments of regulars (mostly recruits), the 9th and 23rd, and two regiments of Marines; the 26th Division, made up of the New England Na- tional Guard; and the 42nd, the Rainbow Division, made up of guard units from many states. But none of these divisions had yet been tested under fire. They OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 9 had had trench practice in quiet sectors, some patrol work, and had been subjected to a few German raids. Until March, 191 8, no American unit had ever made a raid itself. The first one planned was to take place at one o'clock on the morning of March 4th. It was to be carried out by a detachment of 150 men from the ist Division then in line on the southern side of the St. Mihiel sector. There was a good deal of suppressed excitement over this first offensive action, even if it was a small one. The whole division would have volunteered for the duty. The Commander-in-Chief himself was present. Nearly everyone stayed up, so as not to miss any- thing. The plan was for the engineers to crawl out over No Man's Land, and put Bengalore torpedoes under the German wire, so arranged that they could be set off from a safe distance. At the appointed time the wire was to be blown up, the box barrage was to sur- round entirely the point to be attacked, and the raiders were to rush across, capture as many of the enemy as possible, and come back before the Ger- mans could retaliate. The infantry, artillery, and engineer watches had been exactly synchronized, so that everything should work in harmony. To the second, on the appointed time, a wonderfully precise and accurate barrage surrounded the point of attack. The hundred and fifty raiders hurried out of their trenches. But the German wire remained intact. The attacking party was ordered back again. And then, about this time, the missing engineers turned 10 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING up. They had not been out preparing to blow up the German wire. They had been lost! The miscarriage of this plan killed no one on this occasion, as such miscarriages often do. To train an army, especially a very new one, so that every- thing Wxli happen correctly, and on time, is a task which is very difficult, and hard even to conceive in its true proportions. And if any one is disposed to laugh at the engineers for getting lost, let him take a map and go forth in the trenches in that sector in broad daylight, with no enemy to bother him, and see how rapidly he can get to any given point. Trenches are very crooked, puzzling, and slow and slippery lanes of travel. The largest action in which American troops ap- peared before Cantigny was the so-called "battle of Seicheprey." It, too, occurred on the southern side of the St. Mihiel salient, and it, too, was unfortunate, if judged by immediate results. This "battle" of Seicheprey was in reality a large raid. The Germans intended to cross the two American trenches between their lines and the village, clean it up, and then withdraw to the Sibille trench immediately north of the town. If they were not too heavily attacked, they meant to hold this position. And, in a general way, they carried out this mission successfully. In the early morning of April 20th there were no Americans in the foremost trench. The second, the Sibille trench, was occupied by three companies of the 102nd Infantry, each minus one platoon. OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 11 They had orders to hold this trench if attacked. They also had been instructed by the French to have no outposts more than ten meters in front of the trench. Behind these trenches in the village was one platoon and the battalion headquarters. About four o'clock in the morning of the 20th the German artillery became active. Later it quieted down, and then again, at about a quarter past five, it fell heavily on the village of Seicheprey and on parts of the Sibille trench in front. The American major in command, in the village, asked for a return artillery fire, which was given; but he got no word of any kind from his troops in the trenches, until about six o'clock a few of them retreated into the town with the Germans close behind them. With these men and the platoon that made up the town's garrison the major retreated to the southern edge of the village. The Germans cleaned up most of the town, destroyed the dugouts, kitchen, and first-aid station, captured the battalion headquarters and all its papers, and on an appointed signal withdrew to the cemetery that they held as a kind of advanced post in front of the Sibille trench, which they now organized for defence. It was discovered later that the Germans had come in three parties from the northeast, north, and northwest of Seicheprey, all arriving at the town at about the same time, and all having overcome the resistance of the Ameri- cans in the trenches. Most of our 400 or 500 losses in killed, missing, wounded, and prisoners occurred in the fighting in the Sibille trench. But the Ger- SEICHEPREY AND THE FIXED TRENCH SYSTEM The heavier black lines show the Franco-American trenches. The lighter black lines the German trenches. The lines of xxxx indicate wire. The Germans who attacked Seicheprey came from the direction of Richecourt, from Lahayville, and through the Bois de Remieres. OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 13 mans did not escape easily, for we buried forty-one of their men, and they left other indications of having met a very stiff resistance. Our men probably had little real chance to make a successful defence, be- cause of having no patrols to warn them and not being able to see on account of a heavy fog. The Germans, following their barrage very closely, were on them before they were aware. The Germans held the Sibille trench all day, with the small American force lying in front of them in the village, while back on the next hill preparations for a counter attack were in progress. But the day passed with no reaction on our part, except artillery fire, and a little before the counter attack was ordered an American patrol discovered that the Germans had abandoned the Sibille trench and returned to their own lines. Seicheprey was a very successful performance for the Germans, who endeavoured to use it to dampen our morale, sending out reports by their wireless and printing in their paper, the Gazette des Ardennes^ a list of the prisoners, with the comment that, as General Pershing was very new at the game, he might like to know what had become of his men. But while such misadventures were annoying, they were part of the process of education. And this proc- ess was not an orderly procession of perfect achieve- ments. No one can appreciate the real accom- plishments of the army who does not realize how unskilled it was to begin with, and how dangerous it was to be unskilled in the presence of a keen and 14 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING practised enemy. Even our successes In the train- ing period were sometimes rather high priced. A part of the 5th Division in August, 19 18, under French orders attacked and captured the town of Frapelle in the Vosges near St. Die. The account of this in one of the New York papers was as follows : The brilliant work of the American troops on Saturday in low ground bordering the little River Fave, east of St. Die, In the Vosges, has scarcely, perhaps, received the attention it deserves. It may be taken for granted that the affair must have been pretty serious for the enemy, otherwise Ludendorff would not have allowed himself in an official report to state that the Germans advanced posts had "yielded to an enemy local thrust." What Ludendorff omitted to add was that very few of the defenders of these advanced posts succeeded in falling back, as nearly the whole lot were killed or made prisoner. The American attack, according to accounts which reached here to- day, was carried out with extraordinary dash. Charging with the bayonet on the village of Frapelle from two sides, the Americans carried the machine gun nests with a single rush, cleaning out the trenches and shelters with grenades as they went. The German garrison was practically wiped out. There is nothing so far to indicate whether Saturday's affair may be regarded as the precursor of other operations on that part of the front, which has been for many months regarded by both sides as exceptionally quiet. Frapelle, however, is the first stage on the very important road from St. Die to Strass- burg, via the Col de Saales. It lies in a river bottom, between five and six miles from the Col de Saales, from the crest of which the run down into Alsace is rapid and easy. This was all true. But it was also true that the garrison consisted of four men, one an idiot, and that, OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 15 while it cost us nothing to take the town, the German artillery caused us a good many casualties before we withdrew from the village again. Seicheprey and Frapelle and various other raids and minor activities taught us much. After Sei- cheprey battalion headquarters were not again put where the Germans were likely to get the papers. The men at Frapelle learned the cost of holding bad positions. Our artillery became surer of itself. We were not so likely to carry on a night battle be- tween two parts of our own trenches if they happened to be very crooked. We were getting on in our train- ing. And in recounting these instances, it is not intended to imply that we were not getting on very well. We were. But merely to give the bright side of the picture, which was all that came to the papers at the time, does not give a fair estimate of the situation. Without the less victorious side the record takes on an air of precision and assurance which the actual progress of events often lacked. Suddenly, in March, our army was forced to give up its orderly plan of training and growth. In a sense. General Pershing was a sufferer from his own principal theory. The German General Staff also believed that the only way to win the war was to get out of the trenches and start a war of movement. The Germans had evolved a theory for accomplish- ing this end, and General Von Hutier practised it on the Russians near Riga. From this it became known as the Riga attack, or the Von Hutier method. In- stead of concentrating troops on a front some days 16 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING before an attack, which usually resulted in detection by the enemy, they brought them up from many directions and had them arrive practically at the time of offence. The numbers and effect of surprise due to this system enabled them to break through the trench lines. They provided their infantry with light artillery, which it could take along in the ad- vance, and which gave the troops power to keep up their progress even after they had left behind their field guns and heavy artillery, whose range had hitherto set the limit for any continuing attack. Using this system, the Germans broke through the British Fifth Army, and in five days had gone twenty- five miles to within artillery range of Amiens and the main lateral railway behind the British lines. In the face of this crisis. General Pershing imme- diately gave up (for the time) the plans on which he had been working so hard for a separate American force. The Secretary of War was in France. At a con- ference in Paris, General Pershing and Mr. Baker decided that we should turn over our forces to General Foch. The President approved by cable. On the 28th of March, General Pershing attended a meeting of the Allied commanders. As he came into the room he walked straight up to General Foch and said in French: " I have come to tell you that the American people would consider it a great honour for our troops to be engaged in the present battle; I ask you for this in their name and my own. OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 17 "Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have, is yours; use it as you wish. More will come, in num- bers equal to requirements. " I have come especially to tell you that the Ameri- can people will be proud to take part in the greatest and finest battle of history." At that time there were four trained American divisions in France — a few more than 100,000 com- batant troops, enough to make the first corps the first step in General Pershing's original hopes. General Foch accepted the offer. The ist Division was sent to the line opposite Montdidier — a still active sector. The 26th went in the line at St. Mihiel. We had entered the war on the firing line. The four divisions which were to have constituted the first American corps to take over the first Amer- ican sector were scattered across France. The American plan had been surrendered in the face of the Allied crisis. In the meanwhile, aff^airs had proceeded from bad to worse. On the 9th of April, the Germans broke through the Portuguese at Armentieres, and pushed their advantage until another great wedge was driven into the British line and the channel ports were threatened. The difficulties of transporta- tion, caused by the Amiens line being under fire, made it very hard to get French reinforcements as far north as the fighting at Kemmel Hill in time to be of assistance. On April 12th Sir Douglas Haig had issued his famous communique in which he said: 18 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment. With the help of French reinforcements the front held. The Belgian army repulsed a German drive north of Ypres — an important contribution to the whole situation of which little has been said. By the middle of May, the lines were again stabilized. When the storm had broken on the Allied lines in March, the High Commissioners of Great Britain and France had gone to the American Government in Washing- ton and asked that we send every available man to France, no matter how much training he had or how much he lacked. The British cut down communications with their colonies and again cut down the imports into England, combed their merchant marine for ships, and gave us the tonnage to bring our men in a hurry. Ten of our divisions were to go into their area to be ready to help stem another German attack there. The others were to go into various French armies to build up their reserves. In actuality, there had not been much to Foch's famous strategic reserve army, and what there had been was exhausted. Nor, as history will show, did the Generalissimo have the power with which the public was wont to credit him. He was faced with a somewhat desperate situation. On May 1st the Germans could count on 1,600,000 rifles on the Western Front against the 1,343,000 rifles OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 19 of the Allies. If America was coming at all, it was time to start. In April and May the men began to pour into France. American divisions were ar- riving back of the British lines, some via England and some via the French ports, and other American divisions were coming into a training area behind the French armies. In the ten months prior to April we had sent 283,511 men to France. In April, 117,212 troops of all kinds embarked. In May, the numbers rose to 244,345. The papers were full of the great troop movements, but, although we had been at war for more than a year, and our ist Division had been in France for most of that year, American troops had engaged in no real fighting. Yet American help was the main feature of any pro- gramme of bettering the Allied fortunes. By the middle of May there was no fear that great num- bers would not arrive, but how would they fight.? They were brave enough, admittedly, but 28,000 brave men might be a mob and not a division of fighting troops. The officers were of good character and intelligence, but these qualities do not necessarily imply military knowledge and leadership. The divi- sions manoeuvred well in training, but what would they do in battle? That was a vital question to America, to the Allies, and to Germany, in May, 1918. The German press belittled the possibility of our fighting well. Our press and the Allied press took success for granted. Neither side was quite sure. The stage was set for the trial. CHAPTER II CANTIGNY A LITTLE BATTLE THAT PROVED A GREAT POINT AND MADE 100,000 MEN THE trial was at Cantigny. It was, naturally, planned some time in advance, but in the march of events a thing happened the day before the Can- tigny attack which more than ever made the demon- stration of American fighting ability necessary. Our attack was to begin on the morning of May 28th. On the morning of May 27th, a great mass of Ger- man troops suddenly pushed across the Ailette, up over the strong position of the Chemin des Dames, and before the day was over the French lines were completely broken, and the Germans had crossed the Vesle on their way south to the Marne. The com- muniques that reached Paris on the night of the 28th told of the rapid and continuous German progress. But there came also that night another piece of news. The American Army had at last actively entered the war. The ist Division shed a bright little ray of light on the otherwise dismal picture. And this ray of light was of great significance, for if the Americans could successfully meet the Germans, the Allies were assured an eff^ective force big enough to win the war — the Americans were then arriving at the rate of 250,000 a month. If the Americans could OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 21 not successfully meet the Germans, then, well, the situation was very bad indeed. To the Allied High Command Cantigny had an importance much beyond its intrinsic value as an action. In General Pershing's report to the Secre- tary of War the following occurs : On April 26th, a month before, the ist Division had gone into line in the Montdidier salient on the Picardy battle front. Tactics had been suddenly revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the results of their training, were eager for the test. The first time one of our divisions went into line as a unit it met just the conditions for which it had been trained, and from that time to the end of the war the American troops were engaged in open warfare. The town of Cantigny was the centre of a little salient projecting into the Allied line west of Mont- didier. It was a very active part of the line, and the German artillery continually took a toll of forty or fifty casualties a day. The men were particu- larly eager, therefore, to get revenge. The task set the 28th Infantry, a part of the ist Division, was to take the village of Cantigny and to straighten the line. The attack was to be made on a front of two kilometers (1.2 miles). The line having been here for some time, the industrious Germans had made for themselves some trenches and a good system of strong points, although there were no trench systems like those on the old fronts. The village itself was ROLLING BARRAGE end its immediate protection ARTILLERY PLAN FOR THE CANTIGNY ATTACK The lines marked H-5 to H, etc., show the position of the barrage from five minutes before the H hour, the moment of attack, until 42 minutes after the H hour. This movement of the barrage was calculated to synchronize with the speed of the attack. PLAN OF OPERATION AGAINST CANTIGNY legend 2ones of action • Objectives Olijective line on wtiicli Bn. C *ill establish itself after cleaning up Hie tiead of tlie hollow (19.25) (if the 9 th A.C. does not attacli on our left.) line of change of rate of advance o1 Barrage, limit behneen 6ns. limit between Companies x» THE PLAN OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ATTACK The first positions of the companies of the three battalions of the 28th Regi- ment (ist Division) are shown by squares marked A^ A^, A^, A* for the com- panies of one battalion and so forth. Their advance is shown by dotted lines. The advance was actually made exactly "according to plan." 23 24 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING particularly well defended by machine guns. Back of it, in various woods, were the German reserves and artillery. The American infantry, which was to take the town, was to be supported by three French tank battalions containing ten tanks. There were also a French platoon of flame throwers and 150 men of the 1st Engineers. A day or two before the ist Division prepared two trenches in front of its position, which would appear on any airplane photograph as a strong de- fensive system. One of these trenches was a fake. The other was to act as a jumping-off place for our attack. After an hour*s artillery preparation, the infantry started at 6:45 a.m. The barrage started at five minutes to the zero hour of 6:45, and from the zero hour moved forward 100 meters every two minutes for the first 300 meters (327.9 yards). Then it held its fire for four minutes to give the infantry time to get up, if it had fallen behind, and then it rolled for- ward again; then another stop occurred, and so on, until it finally covered its allotted task. The bar- rage covered two kilometers in forty-two minutes. The infantry reached its destination right behind it — forty minutes after the zero hour, so the report of the battle stated. This meant that they passed all obstacles, overcame the German defences, captured or killed the defenders, and proceeded 2,000 meters (2,186 yards) at about the rate a person would stroll over the ground now with nothing to bother him. But as the troops went forward on May 28th, the OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 25 French tanks lumbered alongside, the bursting shells of the barrage fell in front of them, beyond which the heavy artillery concentration burst on the woods, where otherwise assistance might come to the help of the town's defenders. The commander of the French tanks, in reporting his own operations, gives a picture of the soldiers of the 28th in action which is good evidence that all doubts of the skill and courage of the American Army to meet successfully the Germans could be safely discarded. One paragraph of his report read: Aside from the evidence of spirit and courage which aroused admiration on the part of all members of Tank Battalion No. 5 the American infantry showed a remarkable knowledge of how to use tank assistance, following them closely without allowing themselves to be held up by them, and sticking close to their barrage. The tanks destroyed, or helped to destroy, fifteen or twenty machine guns in the village, and north and east of it. With their help and the barrage, the town was taken without a great deal of loss, and, at the end of forty minutes, the troops had reached their objectives and were even pressing on. Two hun- dred and fifty prisoners also had been picked up. Five minutes later came the first German reaction. A small counter attack was launched against Fon- taine Wood, south of where the 28th had advanced. It failed. Following this came intermittent heavy artillery fire on this part of the line. Toward noon. 26 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING enemy planes came over, and, very shortly after, Cantigny and the lines that our men had established in front of it were violently shelled. At about this time the French corps artillery, which was to do the counter battery work on the German guns, was taken out and sent south to the Marne battle. This left the German artillery with a free hand. At ten minutes past five a heavy counter attack came against the western edge of Framecourt Woods. This was broken up by American artillery. At 6:45 another attack in waves came from due east toward Cantigny. Rifle and machine gun fire broke up the first wave, and the artillery attended to the rest. All the next day the Germans kept up their attempts to regain the town, but, as they lost many men and got nothing, at the end of the second night they ceased. The American casualties were 350 men and twenty- five ofllicers of the 28th Regiment, and twenty-five men of the ist Engineers. Including the loss from artillery and the counter attacks on the second day, the losses were probably 600. The French tank battalion lost two officers and one man. The German casualties in the actual taking of the position were estimated at 350 men besides the 250 prisoners. In their counter attack they suffered many more. 1. The American soldiers had shown bravery and energy — that had been pretty well taken for granted. 2. They showed trained intelligence in using the help of the tanks in following the barrage, and in establishing defensive positions after their attack CANTIGNY AND THE TRENCHES OF THE WAR OF MOVEMENT The American (regular line with points) and the German (irregular line) trenches after our taking of Cantigny, a great contrast to the foui^year-old systems around Seicheprey. These two maps are copies of the G. 2 maps made from airplane photographs and all other sources of information and keot up to date by frequent new editions. 27 28 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING had succeeded — this was the real test of their train- ing. They were not only brave men but brave and intelligent soldiers. This information was worth much to the Allied command. Our soldiers were, however, not skilled veterans. They showed this in an unnecessary and somewhat costly contempt for danger. After taking Cantigny, some of them walked round in the streets, as if they were invisible and invulnerable, although they were neither. This caused General Bullard, then in command of the division, to say in his telegraphic report: "The losses sustained, caused in part by lack of experience, will be a lesson which only per- sonal experience could have given.'* General Debeny, commanding the French First Army, reported that the operation was well prepared and vigorously executed, "which will serve to give the Americans, and others, a realization of the offensive valour of our Allies." A realization of the offensive valour of the American troops amounted to adding four large divisions to the Allied forces. The ist, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd had finished their training and were ready for battle, and, as the ist Division had just shown, when ready for battle on paper they were also prepared in fact. The 32nd, 3rd, and 5th were also on hand, but not so far advanced. Behind the British front, training under British tutelage, were ten newly arrived di- visions, the 35th, 82nd, 33rd, 27th, 4th, 28th, 80th, 30th, 77th, and 78th. In the supply area was the 41st, already being broken up for replacements. OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 29 When General Pershing arrived, followed by the 1st Division, in 1917, the French staff knew that the American Army, even after it reached Europe, would have to be trained. The French public, however, did not realize this so well. Month after month had elapsed, and, although the American help was much talked of — for it was the Allies' trump card — the American soldier did not appear in the fighting. Then came the terrible blows against the British. Still the Americans were not in the line. Then, on May 27th, the Germans succeeded in the unbeliev- able project of taking the Chemin des Dames, and seemingly doing it with ease. If the Americans were going to appear at all, it was time. Whatever had been the plans, whether their training was com- pleted or not, the current of events called for them in the fighting. Everyone in France, England, and America wanted to look at the trump card that had been talked of so long. Cantigny showed it just a little, and it looked very good. American stock rose immediately. It was a small fight of great importance. As General Per- shing said, in his report of November 20th, "Al- though local, this brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions." As the report of the fight reached French officers, it was easy to see the great importance they attached to it. Within a week afterward two American divi- sions were defending the road to Paris and the cross- ing of the Marne. Perhaps necessity would have 30 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING driven the French to call on them if Cantigny had not occurred. But without Cantigny, they could not have called on them with the same confidence. It is fair to say that Cantigny added 100,000 men, or about the equivalent of eight French divisions, at one of the most critical moments of the war. CHAPTER III OUR SIXTY DAYS UNDER THE FRENCH THE actual fighting of the American Army in France can be divided into two main periods: The first period included chiefly the battle of Cantigny, the fighting in the Chateau-Thierry area and on the Marne, and the Marne-Vesle campaign — some sixty days' fighting under French command. During this period we had nine divisions engaged. This does not include the operations of the 27th and 30th divisions which performed all their very remarkable service with the British Army. This first period is the period of French command. The second period, under American command, includes the battle of St. Mihiel beginning on Sep- tember 1 2th, and the forty-seven days of the Argonne- Meuse battle, from September 26th to November nth — about fifty days' fighting in which all of our com- bat troops were engaged. The 2nd, 36th, 27th, 30th, 37th, and 91st served either all or part of this period with either the French, British, or Belgians. But the second period is essentially the period of American command. To get a fair picture of what happened during the first period one must turn his mind back to the conditions at the end of May, 1918. The Germans 31 32 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING had just broken the French Hne on the Chemin des Dames, as they had previously broken the British Hues at St. Quentin. They were rapidly advancing toward the Marne. In all men's minds were two questions: Can this advance be stopped now? And if it is, is there any way to stop the Germans from succeeding in a third drive as they have already in two? There was no army of manoeuvre and not enough for either French or British reserves. Such was the situation on May 29th. There were, how- ever, considerable reserves of Americans in various stages of training, and two days previously one regi- ment of the American ist Division had demon- strated its skill and ability in taking the town of Cantigny. On the morning of May 29th, the Chief-of-StaflF, Major-General McAndrew, had a visit from General Ragueneau, then chief of the French mission to our headquarters at Chaumont. He told General Mc- Andrew of the desperate condition of the French forces north of the Marne, and the possibility of German cavalry getting through and raiding south of the river. General Pershing was at Cantigny and in his absence General McAndrew promised that the 3rd Division would be ready to move by 6 o'clock that evening. In consequence General Dickman, then command- ing the 3rd Division, received a sudden change in orders. He was on a tour, inspecting a quiet sector of the line to which he was to take his division for Its first trench training. He was overtaken by orders OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 33 to hurry back to his command and put them in mo- tion with all speed for Chateau-Thierry. The 2nd Division had a similar experience. French officers are among the least excitable people in the world, and having been in the war a long time they did not allow it to disturb their comforts any more than was absolutely necessary. Consequently the arrival of a French officer at five in the morning (May 30th) at the headquarters of the American 2nd Division was a sure proof that something unusual was afoot. The 2nd Division was then under orders to move up to the Beauvais district for further train- ing. The orders which this early-morning caller from French Headquarters gave to General Bundy were to put his whole division on trucks and move with all speed to Meaux. This meant that the training period was over and that the 2nd was going into battle ! These orders to the 3rd and 2nd divisions marked a vital decision in the conduct of the war. From five o'clock in the morning of May 30th to the end of the war American troops were always headed toward the fighting front. The little battle of Cantigny had proved that the Americans could be used without further test, and the German successes made it clear that they would have to be used without further de- lay. So the 3rd and 2nd received their historic orders and started for the battle. The first American unit to meet the German offen- sive was the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division. It was a motorized unit and rolled off to Conde-en-Brie to join the French, and then 34 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING on to Chateau-Thierry. The men rode up prac- tically to the battle line and immediately went into action. After being more than twenty-four hours on the road, two companies reached Chateau-Thierry on the afternoon of May 31st. They helped the French Colonials, who were there to stop a fierce effort of the Germans to cross the river, and from that time until the Germans retreated, more than a month later, there were machine gunners of the 3rd Division holding the crossing at Chateau-Thierry. The rest of the division came up little by little. Its transportation had been disarranged in the con- fusion caused by the German advance, and part of the troops had to march the thirty-five miles from Provins to the Marne. As they came in they were scattered amongst the French troops on the south side of the river. The conduct of this division is particularly interesting because it had not had its trench training, had never been under any kind of fire, and had not even been together as a unit since it left America until some days after it went into action, when its artillery came up. Its first troops went into action on May 31st. It was relieved on the Ourcq on July 29th. The 2nd Division came into the battle area in somewhat the same hurried way but it had time to get together before it was actually engaged. Motor transport to Meaux and an all-night march brought its leading troops, early on the ist of June, into a support position covering the Paris road at Le Thiolet. By that night the whole division was in 35 36 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING position behind the French troops on a twelve-mile front. The confidence born of the appearance of this help stiffened the resistance of the French troops holding this part of the line and they maintained themselves with the help of small American rein- forcements until the night of the 3rd of June. Dur- ing this night the 2nd Division relieved them, and on the morning of the 4th the 2nd Division was face to face with the Germans on a twelve-mile front. The Germans opposite them held a position includ- ing Belleau Wood and Boureseches village, which gave them protection and cover either for defence or concentration for another attack. The Ameri- cans set to work to push them out of the woods. The tactical and strategic reasons for advancing our line there at that time were of little consequence in comparison with the moral reason. Cantigny had, after all, been but a small experiment. A bigger dem- onstration was needed to establish the proper con- fidence in our army and in the minds of our Allies, and to explode the myth which the German com- manders circulated among their troops that even if Americans got to France they would not be trained enough to fight. The Germans sent two picked divisions for the particular purpose of inflicting a defeat on our troops that would seriously discount the effect of all American military aid. As American military aid was the greatest hope of the Allies and the greatest fear of the Germans, its test was a matter of supreme significance to each side. OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 37 The battle of Belleau Wood, which followed, has probably been described more than almost any other American engagement. It was a splendid test of American against German in open warfare with machine guns, rifles, and artillery, and with all the advantage of position with the enemy. The Ger- man defence consisted of hidden machine guns so placed as to cover all approaches, and with other machine guns covering these, so that taking one nest would not break their line. Theoretically, it was im- passable. Practically, it was impassable also for any troops that at all hesitated in their attacks. Our men produced a heavy and accurate rifle fire — a special part of their training — against these nests, and when they rushed them they shed all im- pediments, and went in at a terrible speed and regard- less of loss. The combination was just good enough. It was the vigour of our attack there that prompted the German intelligence officer*s comment, captured later by the French, which said : The American 2nd Division may be considered a very good division, perhaps even an assault division. The various at- tacks of the two regiments upon Belleau Wood were executed with dash and intrepidity. The moral effect of our fire was not able seriously to check the advance of the infantry. The nerves of the Americans are not yet worn out. This is an extraordinary tribute to a division in its first battle. This German practically says that to stop the Americans they had to be hit. The last line of his comment is also a grim comment on the 38 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING slowing down which long service causes in the best troops, and the great value of the freshness of our forces. From the 4th of June until the end of the month, the Marine brigade, with minor reliefs, worked its way through the woods. At the end it held Belleau (now Marine) Wood and the other brigade (regulars) of the division, which had been doing its part also, topped off the proceedings on July ist by brilliantly taking the village of Vaux with 500 prisoners. This action also marked the first appearance of the American Air Service in an active sector. The ist Observation and ist Pursuit Groups had been trans- ferred to this area on June 28th and the Pursuit Groups' task on July ist was to keep enemy air- planes from crossing the lines between daylight and eight P.M., which was successfully accomplished. The fighting of the 2nd Division and the scattered units of the 3rd Division on the south bank of the Marne confirmed the Cantigny verdict that there was no discount on our troops. On the Allied side the question ceased to be how much more training they needed, but how fast they could be moved into the line. With the Germans the question was: What could be accomplished before large numbers of Americans got into action? The necessity for a quick decision more than ever pressed upon the German High Command, and with amazing rapidity and persistence they continued their attacks. When they finally decided that the road to Paris via Chateau-Thierry was barred, they planned 39 40 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING a great offensive to widen their Marne salient on the western side. This offensive is best explained by the accompanying map. Its ultimate object was to join the Montdidier and Marne salients thereby not only threatening Paris, but the communications be- tween the British and French armies as well. On the 9th of June the attack began. It made some progress, and heavy fighting continued for several weeks. But strategically it was a failure. When it was over the Marne salient was still dangerously nar- row between Soissons and Rheims, and the Germans had derived no advantage from their operations. Having failed on this side of the salient, they deter- mined upon a similar operation on the other side. This, as planned, would cut the lines at Chalons and Epernay and threaten the French communications. The main second attack was to be against General Gouraud's army in the Champagne. But the cen- tral idea behind both these attacks was the destruc- tion of the French army. By various means. Gen- eral Gouraud discovered not only that this second attack was to be launched against him, but exactly the day, hour, and minute on which it would start, and he made his plans accordingly. The Germans counted upon massing both men and artillery in secret, and launching their infantry at- tack where they would have a great preponderance of both. These advantages, coupled with the effect of surprise, were to give them a third such victory as those of March 2ist and May 27th. But Gou- raud, knowing their plans, prepared his men and his VJ» i J \ 77 i. / ■'.;..;. ^"^i^ ?t , y o<39 i-..' 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The attacking waves, poorly protected by their own artillery, were ter- ribly lacerated by the French. Besides the ordinary kinds of shelling they were even subjected- to the point-blank fire from batteries of 75 's especially arranged to meet their attack. These guns were with the French infantry, which had been with- drawn from the front lines so that the Germans would have to pass a wide and withering zone of fire before reaching any one to fight. When they did reach the French lines they were met first with all the kinds of small arms fire and then with the bayo- net. July 15, 191 8, was probably the worst single day the Germans ever had. This last desperate attack in the Champagne was a terrible catastrophe for them. It took their last "offensive" reserve. They never attacked again. The 42nd, the Rainbow Division, had the honour of holding a small part of Gouraud's front line on that momentous day. Two battalions of the 165th Infantry (the old 'Tighting" 69th, New York) were in the line near Somme-Py, and the rest of the division was disposed in the rear to handle any Ger- mans that might break through. There was no break through, but the two battalions in the line handled themselves in a way to receive the praise and con-^ OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 43 gratulations of General Gouraud. In France this is taken to mean that the reward was fully merited. While this was going on, the Germans started their corollary attack across the Marne intending to push south and east. South of Dormans the attack caught some companies of the 28th Division — the Pennsylvania Guard. They were not enough to hold, and had their nerves been worn out, or perhaps, if their experience had been longer, they would have retired to the main force. As it was, they stopped the advance until most of them were killed or woun- ded. A few only trickled back. A little farther west, the German attack ran into the same spirit, backed by somewhat larger numbers. The 3rd Division held the south bank of the Marne from Chateau-Thierry, where their machine guns had come on May 31st, to Mezy, five miles (eight kilo- meters) eastward. East of Mezy the Germans were across the river, so that the right flank of the 3rd Divi- sion, the 38th Regiment, was already under fire when the battle commenced. The German artillery turned a stream of shells on, Mezy to drive the 38th into its dugouts, and then, under cover of a smoke screen, the German troops started to cross the river in boats. It is a little stream, and if the German fire had kept the Americans underground, the passage would have been quickly achieved. The 38th real- ized this as well as the Germans, and taking the barrage as it came, they remained in the open, and with rifle fire and machine guns fired through the smoke screen at the German boats. Our artillery 44 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING also, although this was its first action, got the range of the Germans waiting to cross and those crossing. In a few minutes broken boats and dead Germans were floating down the river. One boat got across, but there was a sergeant hiding in the bushes waiting for it. As it touched the shore he told the Germans with the particular vigour and implications of army language that they were the people he had been waiting for and simultaneously threw a hand gren- ade in the boat. There was no landing there. But east of the village, where a point of land jutted out, the German cross fire kept the defenders from pre- venting a landing. However, after they had crossed the river the Germans were little better off. They were met by the same machine gun and rifle fire — and General Pershing had made a specialty of marksmanship in the A.E.F. As they pressed on, they came into contact with bombs and bayonets. In the defence one platoon of the 38th Infantry was annihilated. A second was nearly so, but the third came in and continued the fight. As the fourth finally came into action, the Germans surrendered. With veritable devils in front of them, and the river behind, 400 men of the 6th Grenadiers gave them- selves up to about half their number. And while all this was going on the 38th had been subjected to fire from every possible direction, for they were sur- rounded on three sides. This is why General Pershing called this action *'one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals." By this time the 2nd, 3rd, and parts of OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 45 the 42nd and 28th divisions had met the enemy and verified the verdict of the ist at Cantigny. General Pershing was one of those who, imme- diately after the Germans reached the Marne, coun- selled attacking them at the base of their salient. Strategically, it was the normal thing to do if there was an available force to do it. On June 22nd, when Marshal Foch and Premier Clemenceau visited American Headquarters, General Pershing urged it again, saying that the American Army could furnish several first-class divisions, and several others which, if then not fully trained, would certainly fight. And the less advanced American divisions could relieve first-class French divisions and permit them to be used for attack. But the German preparations kept the initiative in their hands a little longer. On the 15th of July the French were still fighting where and when the Germans chose; three days later the exact reverse was the case. The terrible defeat Gouraud inflicted on the Ger- mans in the Champagne ended the German offensive. The plan to hit back by an attack on the base of the Marne salient had been made some time previous. The psychological moment was to strike when the German Army was in the confusion and discourage- ment of its great defeat, and before it could reor- ganize itself and initiate anything more. But the decision to put the Allied attack into effect neces- sarily rested on the availability of men to do the attacking. The French were terribly used up, as 46 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING well as the Germans. The available American troops were also in need of rest. There was a great danger that temporary stalemate might give the Germans time to recover. Instead, Foch had the moral courage to call on his tired forces, French and Ameri- can, to renew the struggle; and Americans can take pride in the fact that Pershing urged it, insisting that the Americans, tired and depleted as they were, could and should be used. There is a line in the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" that carries the spirit of the Franco- American attack of July i8th, for certainly on that day ''Hhere sounded forth the trumpet that never called retreat." The year 1918 had seen no Allied ad- vance of any size before July i8th. From that time to the end of the war there were nothing but Allied advances. The orders to start for this historic battle caught the 1st Division on the road to its rest area. They caught the 2nd Division resting after its month's fighting at Vaux and Belleau Wood. Both were ordered to make all speed, for once the decision had been made, no time was to be lost, lest the psycho- logical moment should slip away. Accordingly, the ist Division received orders to join the French XX Corps, Tenth Army — General Mangin — southwest of Soissons. The infantry, en- gineers, and even the field artillery of the ist Division were taken by truck to their area, and by the night of the 17th, by hard marching and long hours, the ist was in position for attack the next morning, although the artillery had to spend all night getting up ammunition. OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 47 The 2nd Division likewise had a difficult time. The plan of its attack was made on the night of the i6th. By superhuman efforts the infantry of the division was gotten to the line in time to make the attack al- though part of the 23rd Infantry and the 5th Marines had to double-time to get there. The machine guns, however, did not get into the fight until about 10 o'clock, some five hours after the battle opened. The object of the attack was to push forward due east and capture the heights south of Soissons, and cut the road from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry which was one of the vital supply lines to the Ger- mans in the Marne salient. From north to south the attack was to be delivered by the French 153rd Infantry Division, the ist American, the ist Mo- roccan, and the 2nd American. At 4:35 on the i8th the battle opened. There was no previous artillery preparation to warn the enemy. The infantry started with the first roll of the barrage. Except for the fact that the men were very tired from hard travel, and that the French tanks moving into action had cut all the ground telephone wires to division headquarters, the ist went into the fight in shape. The 2nd, likewise tired, was without its machine guns. But even if the at- tack occurred before some of our units were ready, the situation was even worse for the Germans. It caught them by surprise. One German officer was caught still in his pajamas. Their artillery was ac- cordingly weak at first. By six o'clock prisoners were coming in, and all reports from the front were good. >v O O U 5^H O < K u Pi < o M Q H .2 & -c-c HO j= o' O 5 1-i *j CO rt P 'S N ft u ei 0) u (9 +j 4-» CO 2>< IS ^ :i^?> s ;^^ w w H O IZi ill