K E Y I E AV 
 
 McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGNS, 
 
 AS COMMANDER OF 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 PRESS OF THE DAILY COURIER, 
 
 1863. 
 
 tS^ 
 
RE VI EW 
 
 McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGNS, 
 
 AS COJIMAXDEK OF 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Lu.>^'lr tre 
 
 or~p e^ 
 
 BOSTON: 
 
 PRESS OF THE DAILY COURIER 
 
 1863. 
 

 West. Kes. Hist. Boo. 
 
REVIEW. 
 
 To THE Editor of the Boston Courier: 
 
 The dismissal of Major-General George B. McClellau from the com- 
 mand of the Army of the Potomac, on the seventh day of Xovember, 
 1862, closed a very important chapter in the history of the present war. 
 
 The future historian, only, will be enabled to gather up all the facts 
 of this remarkable period ; but the logic of events — the brief, yet 
 impressive lessons from experience — the testimony of General McClel- 
 lan, recently given before the McDowell Court-Martial — the letters 
 and orders made public in the investigation — the statement of Prince 
 de Joinville, and evidences from various other sources, carefully exam- 
 ined and compared, will throw much light upon matters which have not 
 been fully understood by the people, and relieve many mistakes of 
 judgment regarding the character, acts, and militaiy ability of the late 
 Commander of the Army of the Potomac. The first period in this his- 
 tory is the season of inactivity, as it has been called, covering 
 
 THE FALL AND WINTER OF 1861 AND 1802. 
 
 General McClellan, upon the recommendation of General Scott, was 
 called by the President to the command of the Army of the Department 
 of Washington, July 25th, 1861, four days after the battle of Bull 
 Run ; and, upon the withdrawal of General Scott from active service on 
 the first day of November, he was appointed Commander of the Armies 
 of the United States. From the time he took command of the Army 
 of the Department of Washington until March, no important movement 
 was made by that portion of the army, which after his appointment, was 
 designated the Army of the Potomac. During this period a movemen 
 was inaugurated by the radical men of the country, sustained by lead 
 
ing papers, having for its object the diversion of the management of the 
 army to party purposes, and in pursuance of it bills of emancipation 
 and confiscation were pressed upon and passed by Congress, which were 
 with hesitation afterwards signed by the President. General McClellan 
 was known to be a man who would have no sympathy with such a move- 
 ment, and it was determined by them that he should be displaced, if 
 it could be effected without the real object of the movement being known 
 to the loyal masses and the army. 
 
 The suspension of movements during this period, with the prudent 
 and studiously maintained silence of the Commanding General, gave 
 them an opportunity to make considerable progress in their designs. 
 The cry was started by them that he was " too slow" — that he was an 
 excellent engineer, a good organizer, but not the man to lead the army 
 or direct its movements in the field. This cry was responded to by a 
 considerable portion of the people, who were impatient for success, and 
 who, wanting in experience, then believed that it was only necessary 
 that our men should be led against the enemy to insure victory and to 
 put down the rebellion. 
 
 The people are now able to see the error into which they were led, 
 and to judge more correctly upon the conduct of the Commander-in- 
 Chief during this period. 
 
 When General McClellan assumed command of the Federal forces, 
 the enemy were flushed with victory, and had a large and comparatively 
 well disciplined army. The Federal army consisted mostly of three 
 months' men, whose term of service was about to expire. The remain- 
 der were two and three years' troops, which had been in the field but a 
 very short period. Massachusetts had at the time but three three 
 years' regiments in the field, and they had been in the service but a few 
 weeks. 
 
 The exigencies of the time were such that, during the months of 
 August and September, fears were very generally entertained for the 
 safety of the National Capital. By October, a sufficient number of 
 troops had been furnished to relieve this apprehension, and by the first 
 of December nearly all of the three years' troops had arrived at the seat 
 of war. 
 
 Up to this period, December 1st, no reasonable man deemed it pru- 
 dent that any oftensive movement should be attempted. About this 
 time, unmindful of past experience, the radical cry for an advance upon 
 
Eichmond was renewed with redoubled vigor. To this General McClel- 
 lan did not respond. He placed the army in winter quarters, and made 
 no advance movement for the three winter months. For this he was 
 blamed. Partizans and party presses commenced upon him, and kept 
 up a terrible fire. He was accused of slowness and incapacity, and 
 even of cowardice and disloyalty. But he made no reply, and waited 
 until in his judgment the time for active operations should arrive. 
 
 Was this delay, during the three months of winter, necessary ? His- 
 tory and our own experience, particularly at the Battle of Bull Run, 
 prove the necessity of discipline in the troops to insure success. In- 
 stances are frequent of regiments who have fought well, with but little 
 discipline. But the general fact will be everywhere admitted that a 
 large body of undisciplined men cannot be relied upon to properly 
 co-operate, through the contingencies of a severe battle. They have 
 not learned that subordination which is indispensable to be observed, 
 that they may be trusted in the changes of circumstances and position 
 which are liable to occur. Hence the danger of confusion and panic, 
 and consequent defeat and disaster. 
 
 The sad result of the previous summer left us in such a position that 
 no offensive movement, without very strong probability of success, could 
 be justified. General McClellan could not have been justified in incur- 
 ring the risk incident to the advance of a large and undisciplined army 
 against the enemy. Even if the enemy were under no better discipline, 
 the uncertainty of the result would have been much too great. This 
 General McClellan knew and felt, and he also knew that three months 
 was the shortest time in which any troops could be drilled, to be made 
 reliable. 
 
 The winter also largely increased the difficulties and dangers of an 
 advance movement. Beside the sickness and loss of men from exposure 
 upon the march, without tents or other shelter, the roads are liable at 
 any time to be in such a condition from rain and thaw as to be entirely 
 impassable to artillery and supplies. No winter campaign can be car- 
 ried on in such a climate as that of Virginia, without immense suffer- 
 ings and danger. 
 
 There were other and weightier reasons for delay. Having been so 
 long on a peace footing, we were sadly deficient in artillery and other 
 supplies for a large army, and it was also of the greatest importance 
 
6 
 
 that the defences about Washington be perfected before an advance 
 movement should be made. 
 
 General llcClellan proceeded to the performance of the stupendous 
 labor before him with a zeal and energy which knew no limit He 
 organized and disciplined his army. Eveiy available foundry in the 
 country was employed in casting ordnance, and he prepared and col- 
 lected avast supply of the best artillery and material for his army 
 The heights about Washington were covered with fortifications, that the 
 Isationa Capital could be defended with a comparatively small force 
 m the absence of the main portion of the army. He had quietly ma- 
 tured his plans. The time for their execution was approaching The 
 preliminary movements on the sea-coast and at the West had been made 
 with triumphant success, and he was now prepared to strike the death- 
 blow to armed rebellion, by a movement which the enemy little antici- 
 pated. Much depended upon concealing his plans from the rebels It 
 was important for him that they should continue to occupy Manassas 
 and Centre^ulle m force, until be was ready to move. He knew their 
 position and numbers, even of their « Quaker guns," Ion. before the 
 evacuation. 
 
 But the conspiracy that had been organized against him began to be 
 telt. Its object was to strike him before victory in the field should 
 place him beyond their reach. The prejudice created by his apparent 
 inactivity, without explanation, favored the conspirators. In the graphic 
 language of the Prince de Joinville, — 
 
 which the President gave him, he could no longer stand up against the 
 storm precipitated upon his head. A council of war of all the generals 
 of divisions was held, and a plan of the campaign, which was not that 
 of the Commander-in-Chief, was proposed and discussed. General 
 McClellan had then to explain his projects, and the next day they were 
 known to the enemy- informed, without doubt, by one of those thou- 
 sands of female agents who did the work of espionage for him even in 
 the most intimate places. The chief of the rebel army evacuated 
 Manassas. His manoeuvre was skilful. Unable to assume the defen- 
 sive ; menaced with attack either at Centreville, where his defence 
 would serve for nothing, or at Richmond, the loss of which would be a 
 great check ; unable besides to cover both of these positions at once he 
 
could do nothing better than fall back, with all his forces, upon Rich- 
 mond. For the Army of the Potomac this evacuation was unfortunate. 
 Its movement was unmasked before it was ready ; the transport vessels 
 were not collected; even a part of them were still ice-bound in the 
 Hudson. In that situation, should he persevere in executing as rapidly 
 as possible the movement by water towards the Virginia peninsula, or 
 should he rather march by land to Richmond ? Such was the grave 
 decision which the young General of the Army of the Potomac, laid up 
 sick in a miserable chamber of a deserted house in Fairfax, had to 
 make within twenty-four hours." 
 
 In addition to this General McClellan was deprived of his authority 
 as Commander-in-Chief of the armies, and the Army of the Potomac 
 was divided into four grand corps, each under the command of separate 
 Generals, taken according to rank. General McClellan did not com- 
 plain. He proceeded to the performance of his duty to his country 
 under the new order of things. The condition of the roads at this 
 season of the year, and the fact that all the bridges on the route had 
 been destroyed by the rebel army in their retreat from Manassas, ren- 
 dered a march by land difficult if not impossible, and a plan for a 
 
 PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 
 
 was determined upon. General McClellan immediately commenced upon 
 the labors necessary for the movement. The proceedings of the authori- 
 ties at Washington embarrassed him in his operations. His plans were 
 fully divulged to the enemy, and they were making preparations to meet 
 him on his proposed field of operations. In addition to this, there was 
 an unexpected delay of some weeks in collecting and getting ready the 
 transports. Thus delayed, he commenced the embarkation of his troops 
 March 17th. 
 
 This was the commencement of the movement of the Peninsula, upon 
 the success of which so much depended to the country. For a proper 
 understanding of the merits of this campaign, and the responsibility 
 which attaches to General McClellan, it is necessary that his plans of 
 the proposed movement should be considered. What his plans were 
 there seems to be, upon the evidence, no contradiction. 
 
 •General McClellan was to have under his control and disposal certain 
 troops, including those under Generals Blenker, McDowell, and Wool, 
 with the condition that he should leave sufficient force for the protection 
 
 \ 
 
8 
 
 of Washington, in the event of any attack being made upon it in the 
 absence of the main portion of the Army of the Potomac. The force 
 necessary for this purpose was variously estimated by different Generals 
 The highest estimate was that of General McDowell, 50,000 General 
 McClellan made his plans for the campaign, which were at the time 
 fully known to the authorities at Washington, leaving some 70,000 men 
 and one hundred and nine pieces of light artillery for the defence of 
 Washington and its approaches. These numbers are not disputed It 
 IS only claimed that a certain portion of these troops were so located as 
 not to be immediately available in the event of a sudden attack upon 
 Washington. Of this, more hereafter. It is only necessary for the 
 present to state the facts as affecting General McClellan in determining 
 upon his plans for the campaign. He deemed he had amply complied 
 with the conditions relating to the protection of Washington ; and having 
 done that, his plan was to embark with his entire remaining force, ex* 
 cept that of General McDowell, for Fortress Monroe, and from thence 
 proceed in the direction of Yorktown, as he subsequently did. His 
 plan, further, was for the transports to return and take the corps of Gen- 
 eral McDowell, as a unit, to Fortress Monroe. From thence. General 
 McDowell was to proceed up the Severn and take Gloucester. This 
 being accomplished, the gunboats could pass up York Eiver, and then 
 he was to advance beyond in the direction of West Point. This was 
 proposed to obviate the delays of a siege. For, with the forces of Gen- 
 eral McDowell in the rear of the enemy, they would have been compelled 
 to at once evacuate or run the risk of capture, their position bein- 
 turned. No one now has reasonable doubts but that, if these plans had 
 not been interfered with at Washington, they would have resulted 
 successfully, and Richmond, probably, have been soon taken. 
 
 But General McClellan was not permitted to carry out his plan. He 
 was obliged, at the moment of embarkation, to consent to the retention 
 of Blcnker's command at Washington, which, as the President states 
 he did " reluctantly." Further, after he had arrived on the Peninsula,' 
 and whilst the array was under fire before Yorktown, he was informed 
 for the first time that General McDowell and corps, 35,000 strong, had 
 been detained at Washington for another destination. The effect of this 
 intelligence is stated by the Prince de Joinville : 
 
 " The news was received by the army with astonishment, although the 
 majority could not then foresee the deplorable consequences of an act 
 
 
9 
 
 performed it must be supposed, with no evil intention, but with incon- 
 ceivable recklessness. Fifteen days earlier this measure, although it 
 would always have been injurious, would not have had so bad an effect ; 
 for new arrangements might have been made. Now, it was the main- 
 spring removed from a great work already begun. It deranged every- 
 thing." 
 
 About the same time he was notified that the forces at Fortress Monroe, 
 under General Wool, were detached from his command. 
 
 He afterwards received Franklin's Division, 11,000 men, but it was 
 not a sufficient force with which to carry out his original plan. Not- 
 withstanding these extraordinary proceedings. General McClellan deter- 
 mined to do the best he could under the circumstances, and commenced, 
 which was the only thing to be done, the siege of Yorktown. 
 
 The main body of his forces arrived at Fortress Monroe, April 6th. 
 The landing and placing of the batteries commenced April 1 1th, and by 
 May 3d, in the short space of twenty-two days, the batteries, consisting 
 of seventy-one heavy guns and mortars, were placed in position to open 
 upon the enemy's works. In the night of May 3d and 4th, Yorktown was 
 evacuated by the enemy. As soon as known, gunboats and a consider- 
 able force in transports were sent to West Point, with a view to intercept 
 the enemy on their retreat, and the remainder of the army was pushed 
 forward in pursuit of the enemy, who were overtaken at Williamsburg, 
 and the battle of that place was fought May 5th. Our forces were not 
 sufficient to render the movement to West Point successful. From these 
 points the army moved forward toward Eichmond, and arrived at White 
 House May 16 th. 
 
 Thus were concluded the events connected with the siege of York- 
 town ; and, as a different state of facts influenced the subsequent 
 movements on the Peninsula, it may be well to pause and examine into 
 the reasons given by the President for his disastrous interference with 
 the plans formed by General McClellan at Washington. 
 
 The reason given by the President for his course, in which he was 
 sustained by two Generals at Washington, one of whom, General Hitch- 
 cock, has since shown the most unfriendly disposition toward General 
 McClellan, was the fear that Washington was not left sufiiciently pro- 
 tected. That the President may have been prevailed upon by deter- 
 mined and artful conspirators against General McClellan to commit a 
 grave error, the fatal effect of which he could not foresee, upon an honest 
 
10 
 
 but exaggerated apprehension for the .safety of the National Capital is 
 probable. But that his action in thus summarilj and recklessly inter- 
 fering with important plans, upon which so much depended, can be 
 upon the facts justified, seems hardly possible. 
 
 The President knew, or had the means of knowing and ought to have 
 known, before General McClellan embarked, the exact number and 
 position of the troops to be left for the protection of the Capital If he 
 had any doubts about their sufficiency then was the time for him to 
 have expressed them, and to have heard the explanations of the Com- 
 manding General, and, if necessary, to have modified the plans of the 
 campaign. _ There was no excuse afterwards, except upon an unanti- 
 cipated exigency, and none such is pretended to ha^e arisen. There is 
 nothing to indicate that the President at that time had any doubts He 
 extorted from General McClellan at the last moment the division of 
 General Blenker, as he says under a "pressure," which General Mc- 
 Cle an knew, not with any view that it was necessary for the protection 
 of ^\ashington, but that with it and troops from another department 
 he might organize the Mountain Department, to be commanded by 
 Major-General Fremont. What the object or mission of that depart- 
 ment was, or what was the object of the "pressure," no one outside of 
 Washington and the reticent General McClellan, as yet understands 
 One thing is certain, - that it was located with no view to the imme- 
 diate protection of the Capital. 
 
 In regard to the retention of General McDowell and his corps the 
 President wrote General McClellan, April 9th, that he ascertained after 
 he left that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field 
 battery, were all that were designed to be left for the defence of Wa«h 
 ington and Manassas Junction, &c. It is probable that the President 
 received his information from the reports of Generals Hitchcock and 
 Thomas of April 2d. That report shows that there were in the fortifi- 
 cations under General Wadsworth, 20,-i77 men, of whom 19 0^2 were 
 eflFective, and that General McClellan designed that 7,780 troops should 
 beleftatWarrenton. 10,859 at Manassas, 1,350 on the Lower Poto- 
 mac, and 35,4G7 under General Banks; but that several regiments 
 designed for these localities had been removed. This made in all over 
 70,000 men. The corps commanders under General McClellan had 
 estimated 15,000 men as a sufficient number for the fortifications about 
 Washington, and 25,000 as a sufficient covering force in front -in all 
 
11 
 
 4:0,000 men. The report of the two Generals further states, that wheth- 
 er General Banks's force "should be regarded as a part of the force 
 available for the protection of the immediate front of "Washington, the 
 undersigned express no opinion." They expressed no opinion, but it 
 seems very probable if they entertained an opinion that it should not 
 be so regarded, their modesty would not have prevented an expression 
 of it. General Banks's force was certainly available to defend the ap- 
 proaches to Washington ; and even without that force, there were nearly 
 40,000 men of whose position for "the protection of the immediate 
 front of Washington " they intimate no doubt, and this force would be 
 increased by the new regiments as they should arrive at Washington. 
 In addition, there was left for the protection of AVashington, as appears 
 by the repoi'ts of Chiefs of Ordnance, 109 pieces of light artillery. 
 
 The result to which any impartial and intelligent mind must arrive, 
 upon a consideration of the facts that have been made public, is, that 
 the total derangement of the plans of General McClellan for operating 
 upon the Peninsula was occasioned by the unwarranted interference of 
 the authorities at Washington, whose orders it was his duty to obey. 
 
 The second chapter of the Peninsula Campaign embraces the time 
 covered by his 
 
 OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 
 
 The corps of General McDowell, after it was detached from the com- 
 mand of General McClellan, was sent forward in the direction of Fred- 
 ericksburg to form a new department, to be designated the Department 
 of the Kappahannock, and upon May 17th, the day after the arrival of 
 General McClellan at White House, the Secretary of War sent let- 
 ters to Generals McClellan and McDowell, with instructions in regard 
 to their co-operating for the capture of Eichmond. 
 
 The letter of instruction to General McClellan acknowledges that his 
 dispatch to the President, asking for reinforcements, had been received 
 and carefully considered. That in order to increase the strength of the 
 attack upon Eichmond at the earliest moment. General McDowell had 
 been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route, so to operate 
 as to put his left wing in communication with General McClellan's 
 right. He further writes : " Tou (General McClellan) are instructed io 
 co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by 
 extending your right wing to the north of Richmond" and further, that 
 
12 
 
 General McDowell retains command of tte Department of the Rappa- 
 hannock and forces with which he moves forward 
 
 Accordingly, General McClellan advanced to Hanover Court House, 
 where he engaged and defeated the enemy May 26th and immediately 
 after took and held the place, which is north of Richmond, and on the 
 direct line from that city to Fredericksburg. 
 
 General McDowell's advance posts at that time were near Bowling 
 Green, fifteen miles from Hanover Court House. They were m such a 
 position that, in the language of the Prince de Jomville, "it was only 
 necessary that it should be desired, and the two armies might form a 
 iunction, in which case the possession of Richmond was assured 
 ' Z it was not permitted. On the 24th of May, General McDowell 
 received a letter of instructions from the President, which, with the 
 reply and rejoinder, is as follows : — 
 
 " Washington, 3fay 24. 
 " T^Iajor-Genekal McDowell, Fredericksburg : 
 
 u General Fremont has been ordered by telegraph to move from Frankhn 
 on pSdsonburg, to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson s 
 
 ^"^n:it^:ucted, .y.^ as^e tbr the present ^^^0^-^;^^^ 
 
 r;^;;nirr:r:^r^t:ro?t::M^r^^^^ 
 
 yo" Ob ect w^^^^^^^^ to capture the forces of Jackson and E.ell, either in co- 
 Iperat oTw tl General Fremont, or in case a want of supplies or transporta^ 
 tiontte fires with his movement, it is believed that the force .vith which you 
 Tvew 1 be sufficient to accomplish the object alone. The information thus 
 Tc ivl here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively a n.^^ 
 Banks you will not be able to count upon much assistance from lin , but naj 
 fven have to release him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is 
 fighting with Ewell eight miles ^-m Wim^^ster. ^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^, 
 
 "DePVKTMENT of the RAl'PAnANNOCK, 
 
 <' May 24, 1862. 
 "To E M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 
 
 ..The President's order has been received, and it is in process of execution. 
 
 This is a crusliing blow to us. . 
 
 ^'"'' ^ (Signed) .-iHWiN McDowell, J/«> GV)i. 
 
13 
 
 "War Department, 
 " Washington-, May 2-t, 18G2. 
 " To Major-General McDowell : 
 
 " I am highly gratiticd by your ah\crity in obeying my orders. Tlie change 
 was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or any one else. Everything 
 now dej)ends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement. 
 
 (Signed) *' A. Lincoln." 
 
 " Head-quarters Department of Rappahannock, 
 " Opposite Fredericksburg, May 24, 1862. 
 
 " To HIS Excellency the President : 
 
 " I obey your order immediately, for it was positive and urgent ; and per- 
 haps, as a subordinate, there I ought to stop ; but I trust I may be allowed to 
 say something in relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark 
 that everything now depends upon celerity and vigor of movement. 
 
 " I beg to say that co-operation between General Eremont and myself to 
 cut off" Jackson or Ewell is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a prac- 
 tical impossibility. Next, that I am entirely beyond helping distance of Gen- 
 eral Banks, and no celerity or vigor will avail so far as he is concerned. Next, 
 that by a glance at the map will be seen that the line of retreat of the enemy's 
 forces up the valley is shorter than mine to go against him. It will take a 
 week or ten days for my force to get to the valley by this route, which will 
 give it good forage, and by that time the enemy will have retreated. I shall 
 gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here. It is therefore 
 not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but that 
 I feel it throws us all l)ack, and from Richmond north we shall have all our 
 large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accom- 
 plished. 
 
 "I have ordered General Shields to commence a movement by to-morrow 
 morning. A second division will follow in the afternoon. 
 
 "Did I understand you aright that you wished me to accompany this 
 
 expedition ? 
 
 "Very respectfully, Iravin McDowell."' 
 
 The President again played the General, and Eichmond, almost 
 within our grasp, was lost. McDowell felt it was " a crushing blow," 
 but he obeyed his instructions with "a heavy heart." If anything is 
 needed to show the worse than folly of a man deficient in military 
 knowledge undertaking to direct military movements, this instance 
 affords the plainest and saddest proof. The President, with a dash of 
 his pen, crushes the movement on Eichmond, by instructions which 
 
14 
 
 General McDowell, as a man of military knowledge and experience, at 
 once knew could not be successfully carried out. He saw that with his 
 hand on the Confederate Capital, he must turn to other and what he 
 knew must be, and what results proved to be, entirely fruitless missions. 
 General McDowell turned his face from Richmond, marched up into the 
 north of Virginia, and then marched back again, reproached by his 
 troops and by the people ; but General McDowell was in no way respon- 
 sible for the movement. His military reputation was under a dark 
 cloud until the facts were shown before the court-martial. General 
 McDowell there stated that in his opinion it was safe and proper for 
 him to proceed to co-operate with General McClellan against Eichmond, 
 and that he only yielded his purpose so to do in obedience to higher 
 orders. General McClellan fully concurred in this opinion. These are 
 the facts in regard to the movement on Eichmond, and no intelligent 
 man can have a doubt where the responsibility for its failure belongs. 
 
 General McClellan was then left to struggle alone in his further 
 attempts against the Confederate Capital. On May 31st and June 1st, 
 he fought the Battle of Fair Oaks, and then proceeded industriously to 
 build bridges and roads on which to make his advance. Toward the 
 latter part of June he had finished his preparations. In the mean 
 time General Beauregard, with a considerable force, had reached Eich- 
 mond from the West ; and, as General McClellan was about to recom- 
 mence active operations, Jackson, defeating or eluding the different 
 detached corps under Generals Banks, Shields, Fremont, and McDow- 
 ell, in all nearly one hundred thousand men, was back again to Eich- 
 mond, and his advance guards could be seen from Hanover Court 
 House. Under these circumstances, General McClellan saw but one 
 course for him to pursue. It was to retreat upon the James Eiver. 
 This he effected, saving all his guns but one, and most of his supplies. 
 
 The most hazardous and laborious portion of the labor on the retreat 
 was performed by that gallant and patriotic soldier, Fitz-John Porter, 
 to whom more than to any other man, excepting the Commander-in- 
 Chief, is due the success of this movement. A grateful country will 
 remember and appreciate his services. 
 
 Secure in his position on the James Eiver, General McClellan asked 
 for reinforcements, that he might renew the attempt on Eichmond, but 
 the authorities at Washington could not or would not furnish what was 
 required, and he was ordered to evacuate the Peninsula. This he did 
 
15 
 
 successfully, and upon his arrival at Alexandria, was deposed from his 
 command, and even refused the privilege of inspiring by his presence 
 the troops, who were falling back under General Pope. 
 
 Thus ended the campaign on the Peninsula, and the partizan conspir- 
 ators were jubilant over the fact that they had, by the removal of Gen- 
 eral McClellan, paved the way to a partizan control of the army. Their 
 rejoicing was short. The disorganized forces under General Pope, flee- 
 ing before the rebels, sought safety in the intrenchments about Wash- 
 ington, which General McClellan' s prudence and skill had provided. 
 The President, at the White House, trembled for the safety of the 
 Capital, and it was evident that a portion of the rebel army contem- 
 plated the invasion of Maryland and perhaps of Pennsylvania. An 
 [emergency was upon him. The safety of the country absolutely re- 
 quired the most decisive and vigorous action, and that the ablest Gen- 
 eral should be placed in command of the troops. With this " pressure" 
 lupon him, the President could not, did not hesitate. He called upon 
 I General McClellan to take command of the army. Ever ready to serve 
 [his country, in any capacity in which he might be needed, he nobly 
 V3sponded to the call. With his staff, he visited the disheartened 
 /T troops. His presence, and the announcement to the army that he was 
 *' again to lead them to the field, at once aroused an enthusiasm which 
 knew no bounds. As if by magic, confused masses of men formed into 
 regiments and brigades, and within five days from the time he resumed 
 command, he marched from Washington to Kockville, at the head of 
 more than fifty thousand noble veterans, who made the air resound with 
 plaudits for their noble chieftain. He commenced 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND. 
 
 On the fourteenth day of September, seven days after leaving Wash- 
 ington, he fought and nobly won the fierce battle of South ]\lountain, 
 driving, after a determined fight, the enemy from their strongholds. 
 
 Three days after, on September 17th, he fought the memorable battle 
 of Antietam, against superior forces of the enemy, and defeated them 
 after a terrible struggle. It was emphatically the great battle of the 
 war. Unaided by gunboats, which had played an important part in 
 most of our important battles — opposed by an enemy elated by pre- 
 vious successes, and led by the most skilful rebel generals, he came out 
 victorious. But it was a deadly struggle, and it left his army exhausted 
 
IS 
 
 and much broken. A council of all the Generals was called in the 
 evening. General McClellan knowing the anxiety of the Government 
 and the people for complete success over the enemy, and satisfied that 
 the army of the enemy were at least as exhausted and broken as his 
 own, favored a renewal of the conflict in the morning. But every other 
 General in the council was opposed to it, and he wisely yielded to their 
 unanimous judgment. The next day was occupied in burying the dead. 
 On the second day the enemy retreated into Virginia. Ten days after, 
 September 29th, General McClellan crossed the Potomac. He ad- 
 vanced in the direction of Culpepper, guarding the gaps in the moun- 
 tains on his right as he proceeded. His army was not in a condition to 
 engage the enemy. He needed important supplies, which were not for- 
 warded, and be was pushed by the authorities at Washington to 
 advance, and finally received " peremptory orders " to attack the enemy. 
 General McClellan wrote the President, giving him an exact account 
 of the condition of the army, saying, nevertheless, that if the Pres- 
 ident should say he must go forward, he would. The reply was, 
 that he could not be expected to effect impossibilities, Upon this 
 he acted, until ready to move. At the earliest practicable moment he 
 commenced his advance, and whilst the whole army was in motion 
 against the enemy, with an expectation that within five days a decisive 
 blow would be stnack, he, on the seventh of November, received notice 
 of his dismissal and the appointment of General Burnside in his place. 
 This closed the connection of General McClellan with the Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION. 
 
 No one can read the history of the campaigns of General McClellan, 
 without being satisfied that the charges against him for slowness, hes- 
 itation, and want of energy in his operations, are all untrue. 
 
 His enemies admit that he is prudent, a superior engineer, and an excel- 
 lent organizer of troops. These are three great qualifications for a Com- 
 manding General. He exhibited these qualities in a most remarkable 
 manner in his labors during the three winter months of 1861 and 1862. 
 He decided upon all the plans for the varied operations of our difterent 
 armies. He exhibited the greatest engineering skill in the location and 
 erection of the splendid fortifications about Washington. In that brief 
 period he organized and disciplined the noble army of the Potomac, so 
 
17 
 
 that in the spring it was prepared to take the field with the effectiveness 
 of veteran troops. He prepared an ample supply of the best artillery, 
 which in more than one instance was the salvation of the army. He 
 prepared and collected vast amounts of munitions and supplies, and in 
 the mean time, by his intercourse with his army and the exhibition to 
 them of his great qualities he gained their confidence, which is of the 
 utmost importance for success, particularly with an American army. 
 
 When the hour for active movements in the field had come, he ex- 
 hibited an energy and decision never surpassed. Although his plans 
 were thwarted, and he was obliged to change his entire system*of oper- 
 ations, he, in the short space of twenty-two days, perfected his works, and 
 placed his heavy guns in position for the siege of Yorktown. Upon its 
 evacuation he pursued the enemy with the utmost vigor, defeating them 
 at Williamsburg and West Point. The same month he fought the bat- 
 tles of Hanover Court House and Fair Oaks. 
 
 Upon receiving intelligence that he was not to be supported by 
 General McDowell, as before promised, he proceeded to make most 
 laborious preparations for an advance on the Confederate Capital with 
 the troops under his immediate command. Before he had finished the 
 necessary preparations the forces of the enemy were so greatly increased 
 that it was necessary for him to fall back on the James River. He 
 undertook this movement in the face of the enemy, who were vastly 
 superior in numbers, and exhibited in the memorable seven days' fights 
 the most consummate energy and military skill. In every battle on the 
 Peninsula he showed all the qualities of a great and prudent General. 
 The great object of his mission was not accomplished, but the blame 
 does not rest on him. 
 
 If his original plan had not been interfered with Eichmond would 
 inevitably have fallen, and if McDowell had afterwards been permitted 
 to co-operate with him from Fredericksburg, as promised, no one now 
 doubts what would have been the result. When again he was called to 
 the command of the army, after its defeat under General Pope, he 
 proved, in the most wonderful degree, his transcendent abilities. He 
 took command of a discomfited and demoralized army. Within fifteen 
 days from the date of his appointment he led that army against the 
 rebel host, before which they had so recently fled, and fought and won 
 two great battles. It would seem that this should forever after have 
 silenced the enemy in his rear. But this was not the result. Radical- 
 2 
 
18 
 
 ism was triumphant. During the past few months it had made gigantic 
 strides to power. It had at last taken the President an unwilling cap- 
 tive. Its batteries were no longer masked. It reared its hydra head 
 at noonday. General McClellan was in the way of its progress, and he 
 must be struck down, no matter what the cost. The standard of party 
 was raised a,bove the banner of the country. The Administration, 
 which could not, to insure the capture of Eichmond, furnish General 
 McClellan thirty-five thousand additional troops, could raise a new 
 army q^ six hundred thousand men for the new order of things. The 
 object of the conspirators was being accomplished. The war had been 
 protracted, and they had obtained their proclamation for emancipation. 
 Secresy was no longer necessary. Senator Chandler and others struck 
 the key-note in Congress, and Senator Trumbull, of Illinois, expressed 
 their purposes in a speech in Michigan, in October, in which he said to 
 the people : 
 
 " I thank God that the Federal arms were defeated at Bull Eun, and 
 on the Peninsula, and under Pope, for without such defeats we should 
 not have had the emancipation proclamation. Had we won at Bull 
 Eun, or taken Eichmond, the backbone of the rebellion would have been 
 broken, and the Union would have been restored with slavery remain- 
 ing in it." 
 
 GENERAL McCLELLAN'S ORDER OF AUGUST NINTH. 
 
 There are few productions of the last two years which exhibit a more 
 
 thorough knowledge of the principle which should govern not only the 
 
 army but the government and the people in the conduct of the present 
 
 war, than the subjoined order of Gen. McClellan of August 9. It is 
 
 equally worthy the pen of a profound statesman and of a commander of 
 
 armies. 
 
 " General Orders — No. 154. 
 
 " Head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac, 
 
 " Camp near Harrisons Landing, Va., August 9, 1862. 
 
 " The Major-General Commanding directs the attention of the officers 
 and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac to the following executive order 
 of the President, which has been officially published : — 
 
 * War Department, Washington, July 22, 1862. 
 ' First. Ordered : That military commanders within the States of Virginia, 
 South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, 
 
19 
 
 and Arkansas, in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real and per- 
 sonal, which may he necessary or convenient for their several commands for 
 supplies, or for other military purposes ; and that, while property may be de- 
 stroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness and 
 malice. 
 
 * Second. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, 
 within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be 
 advantageously used for military or naval pnrposes, giving them reasonable 
 wages for their labor. 
 
 ' Third. That as to both property and persons of African descent, accounts 
 shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail, to show quantities and 
 amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, 
 as a basis upon which compensation shall be made in proper cases ; and 
 the several departments of this government shall attend to and perform their 
 appropriate parts towards the execution of these orders. 
 ' By order of the President. 
 
 ' Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.' 
 
 " No official copy of this order has been received at these head-quar- 
 ters, and the General Commanding has, for this reason, delayed the 
 issuing of a general order to carry into effect the views and directions of 
 the President. Some recent occurrences in this army have, however, 
 shown that it has become necessary to do so, to prevent this executive 
 order being made a pretext for military license. 
 
 " The order of the President accords so substantially with the course 
 uniformly pursued by this army on this peninsula, under the orders and 
 instructions of the General Commanding, that no material change in any 
 respect is required thereby in its conduct and government. 
 
 " Personal property necessary or convenient for supplies or other mili- 
 tary purposes of this army will be, as heretofore, seized and used by the 
 proper quarter-master or subsistence officers, upon the orders of com- 
 manders of army corps ; or, in case of troops employed on detached 
 service, where army corps commanders are not accessible, by order of 
 the officer in command of such detached force. 
 
 " In all cases the officers thus making the seizures shall take an account 
 showing the kind and quantities of property seized, and by whose com- 
 mand ; the amounts of its estimated value, and the names of the persons 
 from whom the same shall have come. Whenever circumstances admit 
 of so doing, receipts will be given to the owners or their agents, specify- 
 ing simply the particulars above mentioned. Copies of all such accounts 
 
20 
 
 and receipts will be transmitted in the usual manner, by the officers 
 making them, to these head-quarters. 
 
 "All officers and soldiers of tJds army are enjoined and ordered to 
 abstain from all seizures of private property, except in the mode above pre- 
 scribed ; all other appropriations loill be regarded and punished as pil- 
 lage. The idea that private property may he plundered with impunity 
 is, perhaps, the very worst that can pervade an army. Marauding 
 degrades as men and demoralizes as soldiers all who engage in it, and 
 returns them to their homes unfitted for the pursuits of honest industry. 
 This army is composed mostly of young men, and the General Command- 
 ing, to whose care they are entrusted, owes it to the parents who have sent 
 their sons, and to the communities who have sent the flower of their youth 
 into the military service of their country, to warn and restrain them from 
 an evil so pernicious. 
 
 " The order of the President requires the application of a similar rule 
 in the use of real property. This, however, does not apply to such uses 
 as are inseparable from military operations — to wit, marches, camps, 
 pasturage, hospitals, depots, quarters, and damages occasioned by ac- 
 tive hostilities; but no use should be made or injury done to real 
 property beyond what is actually necessary or convenient for military 
 purposes. 
 
 " The destruction of any species of property in wantonness or malice 
 is expressly prohibited by the President's order, as well as by the Arti- 
 cles of War and the usages of all civilized nations. All commanding 
 officers are earnestly enjoined to exercise the utmost vigilance on this 
 subject. Straggling and trespassing are the invariable indications of a 
 tendency to this description of crime. 
 
 " Inhabitants, especially women and children, remaining peaceably at 
 their homes, must not be molested ; and wherever commanding officers 
 find families peculiarly exposed in their persons or property to maraud- 
 ing from this army, they will as heretofore, so far as they can do so 
 with safety and without detriment to the service, post guards for their 
 protection. 
 
 " In protecting private property, no reference is intended to persons 
 held to service or labor by reason of African descent. Such persons will 
 be regarded by this army as they heretofore have been, as occupying simply 
 a peculiar kgal status under state laws, which condition the military 
 authorities of the United States are not required to i-egard ut all in dis- 
 
21 
 
 tricts tohere military operations are made necessary by the rebellious action 
 of the state governments. 
 
 "Persons subject to suspicion of hostile purposes, residing or being 
 near our forces, will be, as heretofore, subject to arrest and detention, 
 until the cause of necessity is removed. All such arrested parties will 
 be sent, as usual, to the Provost Marshal General, with a statement of 
 the facts in each case. 
 
 " The General Commanding takes this occasion to remind the officers 
 and soldiers of this army that we are engaged in supporting the Constitu- 
 tion and Laws of the United States, and in suppressing rebellion against 
 their authority ; that loe are not engaged in a war of rapine, revenge, or 
 subjugation; that this is not a contest against popidations, but against 
 armed forces and political organizations ; that it is a struggle carried on 
 within the United States, and shoidd be conducted by us upon the highest 
 principles hnoxvn to Christian civilization. 
 
 " Since this army commenced active operations, persons of African 
 descent, including those held to service or labor under state laws, have 
 always been received, protected, and employed as laborers, at wages. 
 Hereafter it shall be the duty of the Provost Marshal General to cause 
 lists to be made of all persons of African descent, employed in the army 
 as laborers for military purposes, such lists being made sufficiently 
 accurate* and in detail, to show from whom such persons shall have 
 come. 
 
 " Persons so subject and so employed have always understood that 
 after being received into the military service of the United States, in 
 any capacity, they could never be reclaimed by their former holders. 
 Except upon such understanding on their part the order of the Presi- 
 dent, as to this class of persons, would be inoperative. The General 
 Commanding therefore feels authorized to declare to all such employees, 
 that they will receive permanent military protection against any compul- 
 sory return to a condition of servitude. 
 
 " By command of Major-General McClellan. 
 
 " S. Williams, Assistant AdJ?ttant- General." 
 
013 706 615 4