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 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 
 
 ?/ 
 
THE DIPLOMACY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 WAR OF 1914 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 
 
 BY 
 
 ELLERY C. STOWELL 
 
 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 COLUMBIA UNIVEESITY 
 
 Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
 ^6e RibetiSitie J^te?? Cambridge 
 
 1915 
 

 COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY ELLERY C. STOWELL 
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 Puhlished June iqij 
 
 M 28 1915 
 
 ©G|,.A4ni53 4 
 
 __ . V _ 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In this brief account of the causes of the War of 1914, 
 it has been possible to touch upon only the more impor- 
 tant points. After the war is over, the results of patient 
 research may make clear the truth of accusations and 
 counter-accusations. I have, however, made an effort to 
 present the questions from a really impartial and neutral 
 point of view, even though the result may not find ap- 
 proval from the partisans of either side. After all, man 
 as a rational being is most deeply concerned in the ra- 
 tional efforts of mankind to avoid the ills the political 
 body is heir to, and in the end will turn from the din of 
 battle to that preliminary conflict of brains and policies 
 as portrayed in the dispatches of the diplomats. 
 
 The importance of the official documents issued by the 
 beUigerent Governments has been questioned, and it is 
 well to remember that they are specially prepared for 
 publication, and further, that the diplomats, when report- 
 ing to their Governments, do not lose from sight the ad- 
 vantage of having their dispatches in a form suitable for 
 publication at short notice. The most secret and delicate 
 negotiations may occasionally be effected through the 
 intermediary of a special and confidential messenger or 
 by means of the telephone. Nevertheless, the basis and 
 permanent structure of the British diplomacy is doubtless 
 to be found in the papers laid before the Houses of Par- 
 hament and in the discussions and explanations given in 
 Parliament. If any doubt as to the value of these public 
 documents has existed, it must have been dispelled by the 
 recent publication of the Austrian Red Book, which con- 
 firms in a most remarkable manner almost every impor- 
 tant statement of the British White Paper. ^ 
 
 1 Some of the official publications relating to negotiations preceding 
 the war give evidence of having been prepared with great haste. No. 141 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 Documents do not, however, give adequate information 
 of the personal factor which is so important in all matters 
 of diplomacy. The documents are, as it were, the skeleton 
 which needs to be built up with the Uving flesh of the per- 
 sonal characteristics of the actors; but any attempt to ac- 
 comphsh this successfully must await the results of long 
 and careful investigations. It was only years afterwards, 
 through the publication of letters and memoirs, that the 
 world learned the truth in regard to Bismarck's diplomacy 
 during the formative period of the German Empire. 
 
 I shall not attempt in this book to do anything more 
 
 of the French Yellow Book speaks of the time limit of the German ultima- 
 tum to Belgium as seven hours; the Belgian Gray Paper shows (no. 38) 
 that it was twelve hours. Again, the French Yellow Book (no. 18) speaks 
 of the Russian Ambassador as being about to leave for the country {pour 
 la campagne), whereas he was really leaving for his own country, as is 
 shown by no. 55. 
 
 In another case it is interesting to note how the same incident, M. 
 Sazonof's proposal of the conditions for a peaceful settlement between 
 Austria and Russia, is treated in the dispatches of three different countries. 
 According to the French Yellow Book (no. 103), M. Sazonof said to the 
 German Ambassador: "The Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent 
 war that I am going to make a new proposal to you in his name"; the 
 Russian Orange Paper (no. 60) gives M. Sazonof's own statement that the 
 German Ambassador asked him if he could not indicate upon what con- 
 ditions Russia might yet agree to arrest her military preparations; in the 
 British White Paper (no. 97) the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg re- 
 ports: "German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing 
 that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some sug- 
 gestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. 
 M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a 
 formula in French of which following is a translation: . . ." The English 
 account, though fuller, coincides with the Russian, while the French con- 
 veys a different impression. 
 
 In the course of the narrative of events I have referred to some other 
 instances. No. 5 of the French Yellow Book, which was so severely criti- 
 cized by Drs. Dernburg and Helfferich {post, p. 155), is not, as the criticism 
 might lead us to think, a document containing material received July 30, 
 1913, but a statement drawn up at the French Foreign Office summarizing 
 the correspondence received during the preceding two years in regard to 
 opinion in Germany. An examination of the document in question will suf- 
 fice to make this clear. (See Sun, February 2, 1915.) Another case of 
 error is found in the case of enclosure 3 in no. 105 of the British White 
 Paper {post, p. 285). 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 than draw attention to the more salient traits of the im- 
 portant personages, as disclosed in the documents them- 
 selves; and for the sake of clearness shall bring certain of 
 the statesmen and diplomatists before the reader by their 
 official titles only. 
 
 In the analysis of the documents, it has seemed better 
 to bring out each successive link of the chain forged to 
 involve the unhappy powers of Eiu-ope in this war. Some 
 repetition has been necessary for the sake of clearness, 
 and at times I have been 'o'bUged to sacrifice the chrono- 
 logical order so as to adhere to a logical exposition in the 
 unfolding of the events of the opening scenes in the great- 
 est drama of human history. 
 
 I have reduced as much as possible the extracts from 
 the various official papers published by Great Britain, 
 France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Austria- Hungary, and 
 Servia. It is my belief that the piecing together of the 
 documentary evidence under logically arranged headings 
 will be of value to all those with an interest in international 
 affairs, since the perusal of the documents themselves 
 to get at the gist of the material requires a considerable 
 expenditure of time on the part of even an experienced dip- 
 lomatist. Then, too, almost every one of the original docu- 
 ments treats of a number of different matters or negotia- 
 tions which by their interrelation confuse the reader. No 
 system of paraphrase and excerpt can, however, replace 
 the use of the original documents. To facilitate comparison 
 with the original source, in each case the reference has 
 been placed in parentheses immediately after the extract, 
 so as to save constant and irritating interruption through 
 the use of footnotes. I must warn the reader that citations 
 not referring to direct or ''modified" quotations do not 
 necessarily confirm the statements which they follow, as 
 their purpose is rather to direct him to the documents 
 which bear upon the matter under discussion. 
 
 In the ''modified extracts" from the British White 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 Paper, the German White Book, the Russian Orange Pa- 
 per, the Belgian Gray Paper, the French Yellow Book, the 
 Austrian Red Book, and the Servian Blue Book, the exact 
 sense has been preserved as nearly as possible, although 
 it has often been necessary to transpose or modify the 
 quotation. When an extract has been so treated or modi- 
 fied, the fact is indicated by the marks (")> — tliat is, one 
 quotation mark at the beginning and one at the end, — 
 and in addition the source is given in parentheses im- 
 mediately after, with the words, "modified quotation." 
 When the words of the documents are quoted verbatim, 
 as in direct quotation, it has been shown by the ordinary 
 quotation marks (" "), even when within a modified quo- 
 tation. In the case of a quotation within a quotation, the 
 usual system has been followed. 
 
 These extracts were made from the original documents, 
 except in the case of the Servian Blue Book. I have made 
 use of the official, authorized English translation of the 
 German White Book except where the English was either 
 too uncouth or else not clear, when I have retranslated the 
 original German. In the same way I have used the various 
 translations of the London Times, the New York Times, 
 the official translation of the Austrian Red Book, and 
 the translations published by the British Government as 
 White Papers, attempting, where I have found the trans- 
 lation faulty, to make corrections or to substitute a better. 
 The admirable enterprise of the New York Times in plac- 
 ing the important official documents before the general 
 public has been of immense educational value to the 
 whole country, and incidentally has rendered it unneces- 
 sary to encumber the appendix of this book by adding 
 reprints of these pubhcations.^ 
 
 ^ The American Association for International Conciliation has also 
 reprinted many of the most important publications, and has generously 
 distributed them widely and free of cost. The American Journal of Inter' 
 national Law prints the official publications in its Supplement, vol. 8, no. 
 4 (October, 1914); vol. 9, no. 1 (January, 1915). An official translation of 
 the Austrian Red Book has been placed on sale. 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 Various other documents of general interest, bearing on 
 the causes of the war, have been included in this volume. 
 
 I do not attempt to mention all those who have helped 
 in the preparation of this material. I cannot, however, 
 pass over without acknowledgment the assistance I have 
 received from Professors Munroe Smith and John Bassett 
 Moore, of Columbia University, to whom I owe more than 
 one important suggestion, while Professor James T. Shot- 
 well also has given me the benefit of his valued criticism 
 of the subject-matter and the arrangement of the ma- 
 terial. Mr. Henry F. Munro has been kind enough to go 
 over the proof, and Miss Isadore G. Mudge, of the Colum- 
 bia University Library, has greatly facilitated my search 
 for material and examination of sources. 
 
 E. C. S. 
 
 Columbia University, 
 May, 1915. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART I: INTRODUCTORY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 
 
 1. The European Concert 3 
 
 2. Belgian neutrality 4 
 
 3. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente 7 -^ 
 
 4. Crises 9 
 
 5. Fashoda 10 
 
 6. The Algeciras Conference 12 
 
 7. The Casablanca affair .18 
 
 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 19 
 
 9. Agadir 22 
 
 10. The Turco-Italian War 24 / 
 
 11. The Balkan Wars 26 
 
 12. The situation just before the War of 1914 34 
 
 PART II: ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE AUSTRO-SERB CONFLICT 
 
 1. The terms of the Austrian note 41 
 
 2. Efforts of the powers to secure an extension of the time limit . . 59 
 
 3. The powers influence Servia to make a conciliatory reply ... 62 
 
 4. Servia's reply 64 
 
 5. Austria rejects Servia's reply . . .78 
 
 6. The powers urge Austria to delay military operations and accept 
 
 the Servian reply as a basis for discussion 81 
 
 7. Austrian assurances 84 
 
 8. Austria declares war on Servia 85 
 
 9. Austria explains the purpose of her action 89 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN DISCUSSIONS 
 
 1. Russia's interest in the Austro-Servian conflict 96 
 
 2. Russia beUeves Austria's action is directed against herself . . . 105 
 
xii CONTENTS 
 
 3. Russia considers immediate action necessary 108 
 
 4. Russia partially mobilizes against Austria 109 
 
 5. The Tsar asks the Kaiser to try his mediation 112 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 GERMANY'S SITUATION 
 
 1. Germany's interest in the dispute 117 
 
 2. Germany declares that the Austrian note was not communicated to 
 
 her beforehand 119 
 
 3. Germany pledged to support Austria 123 
 
 4. Germany insists upon the "localization" of the Austro-Servian 
 
 conflict 126 
 
 5. The responsibility Russia will incur by supporting Servia . . 131 
 
 6. The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute , . 133 
 
 7. Germany delivers an ultimatum to Russia 142 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 FRANCE SUPPORTS RUSSIA 
 
 1. Germany asks France to use her influence with Russia . . . 147 
 
 2. France believes Germany intends to precipitate a war . . . 155 
 
 3. France supports her ally 163 
 
 4. Military preparations in Germany and France 166 
 
 5. The German ultimatum to France 174 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 MOBILIZATION 
 
 1. The meaning of mobihzation 178 
 
 2. The issuance of the order for general mobihzation .... 181 
 
 3. Intermediate military preparations 183 
 
 4. The fatal succession of mobiUzations 184 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CONCERT 
 
 1. European diplomacy in the Balkans 195 
 
 2. Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers . . . 197 
 
 3. Germany makes objection to mediation 205 
 
 4. Russia proposes to Austria to enter upon "conversations" . . 213 
 
 5. The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and St. Peters- 
 
 burg 227 
 
CONTENTS xiii 
 
 6. Efforts to discover a formula for mediation 229 
 
 7. Germany asked to "press the button" 231 
 
 8. The San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Servia's uncondi- 
 
 tional acceptance of the ultimatum 234 
 
 9. The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's occupation 
 
 of Belgrade 236 
 
 10. The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty of the powers . . 239 
 
 11. Germany asks Russia to propose a formula 242 
 
 12. Austria agrees to mediation 252 
 
 13. The failure to reach a compromise 264 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 SIR EDWARD GREY AND THE ENGLISH DIPLOMACY 
 
 1. The important role of England 268 
 
 2. Efforts to prevent war 270 
 
 3. Efforts to organize mediation 270 
 
 4. England refuses to take sides 273 
 
 5. The Anglo-French Entente 282 
 
 6. England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan question . 293 
 
 7. England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if France is 
 
 involved 295 
 
 8. Germany's bid for English neutrality 297 
 
 9. Divergence of opinion in England 303 
 
 10. England's vital interests 311 
 
 11. England's inquiry relative to Belgium's neutrality . . . .316 
 
 12. England asked to guarantee the neutraUty of France . . . 328 
 
 13. Germany's detention of English vessels 336 
 
 14. Germany invades Luxemburg 337 
 
 15. England agrees to protect the French coast 339 
 
 16. The British ultimatum 352 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 
 
 1. The history of Belgian neutraUty 
 
 2. The obligation to respect the treaty of April 19, 1839 
 
 3. The obligation to make good the guaranty of neutrality 
 
 4. The right to make war and the equality of states 
 
 5. Anglo-Belgian conversations 
 
 6. Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany 
 
 7. Alleged violations of Belgian neutrality .... 
 
 8. The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg 
 
 9. Some considerations concerning Belgium's right to resist 
 
 371 
 376 
 387 
 391 
 395 
 411 
 415 
 422 
 431 
 
xiv CONTENTS 
 
 10. Gennany accuses England of misrepresentations in regard to 
 
 Belgium 441 
 
 11. Germany's plea of necessity 445 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 ITALY REMAINS NEUTRAL 
 
 1. Italy desirous for peace 457 
 
 2. San Giuliano's helpful suggestions 462 
 
 3. Italian cooperation with England 465 
 
 4. Italy declares she will remain neutral . 467 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 1. The interest of the United States in the war 474 
 
 2. Suggested and alleged causes of the war 475 
 
 3. Displacement of the balance of power 476 
 
 4. The immediate causes of the war 479 
 
 5. The determining causes of the war 491 
 
 6. The world's answer 495 
 
 7. Formation of a Super-Empire 496 
 
 8. The "Peace power" 500 
 
 9. Germany's nationalistic conception 502 
 
 10. Nationalism and internationalism 508 
 
 11. The results 514 
 
 PART III: DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 Questions and answers 519 
 
 Questions without answers 528 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 DOCUMENTS 
 
 POLITICAL AIMS OF THE POWERS 
 
 Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796. (Extract.) . . 530 
 Bismarck's Speech in the Reichstag, February 6, 1888. (Extract.) . 533 
 Apocryphal Will of Peter the Great (the Sokolnicki Text) . . .537 
 The Declaration of the American Delegation at the First Hague Con- 
 ference 539 
 
 / 
 
CONTENTS XV 
 
 THE ALLIANCES 
 
 Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Germany, October 7, 1879 . 540 
 
 Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, July 13, 1911 . 541 
 
 Anglo-American cooperation in regard to American affairs. (Extract 
 from speech of the Queen on the opening of Parliament, 1896.) . 542 
 
 Anglo-American Arbitration. (Extract from speech of the Queen on the 
 opening of Parliament, 1897.) 543 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine. (Extract from American Diplomacy, by John 
 Bassett Moore.) 543 
 
 Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt 
 and Morocco, April 8, 1904 544 
 
 Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the interests 
 of their states on the continent of Asia, August 31, 1907 .... 546 
 
 Treaty between Japan and Russia guaranteeing the present territory of 
 each, the integrity of China, and the principle of the "open door" 
 in that empire, August 14, 1907 550 
 
 Convention between Russia and Japan concerning Manchuria, July 4, 
 1910 551 
 
 The Formation of the Triple Entente. (Diplomatic Correspondence pub- 
 lished by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 1914.) . . . .551 
 
 ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 
 A German Historian predicts War with England. (Extract from an 
 
 article by Hans Delbruck, 1912.) 560 
 
 The Price of a German-EngUsh Entente. (Extracts from an article by 
 
 Hans Delbruck, 1911.) 561 
 
 References to the Anglo-German secret treaty of 1898 relative to the 
 
 eventual dismemberment of the Portuguese colonies .... 562 
 Anglo-German Agreement in regard to the African possessions of Por- 
 tugal, 1913 562 
 
 Portugal won't sell yet; division of her East African Colonies when she 
 
 does. (New York Times, January 1, 1914.) 563 
 
 Interview of October 28, 1908, with Emperor William II. (London 
 
 Telegraph) 563 
 
 Colonial Development and Removal of Conflicting Interests, by Sir 
 
 Harry Johnston 566 
 
 Commercial and Economic Competition, by Karl Rathgen . . . 567 
 Speech of the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in 
 
 the Reichstag, December 2, 1914 568 
 
 Cardiff Speech of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, October 2, 
 
 1914 569 
 
 THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN DISPUTE 
 
 Article 25 of the Treaty of BerUn, July 13, 1878 572 
 
xvi CONTENTS 
 
 Secret Appendix to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the 
 Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Servia, February 29, 1912 572 
 
 Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government, July 23, 1914 574 
 
 Servia's reply to the Austrian note, July 25, 1914 576 
 
 Negotiations of the Spanish and American Governments following the 
 destruction of the Maine 579 
 
 Comparison between the action of the United States in 1898 and Aus- 
 tria in 1914 583 
 
 The Case of Servia. (Extract from a speech by Lloyd George, Sep- 
 tember 21, 1914.) 586 
 
 The Austro-Servian Conflict. (Extract from an article by Constantin 
 Theodor Dumba, 1914.) 587 
 
 Criticism of Servia. (Article by Count Albert Apponyi, 1914.) . . 588 
 
 BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 
 
 Richelieu rejects a proposal for the partition of Belgium and suggests 
 another plan 595 
 
 The Barrier Treaty between Great Britain and Holland, October 29, 
 1709 596 
 
 Belgium and the Balance of Power 597 
 
 The Barrier Treaty Vindicated, by Francis Hare, 1712. (Extract.) . 598 
 
 The Neutralization of Belgium by the Treaty of April 19, 1839; inter- 
 national treaties regulating the neutrality of Belgium .... 600 
 
 Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia relative to the independence 
 and neutrality of Belgium, August 9, 1870 603 
 
 Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the 
 Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia relative to the Grand Duchy of 
 Luxemburg and the Duchy of Limburg, May 11, 1867 .... 603 
 
 Declarations made by France and Prussia to respect the neutrality of 
 Luxemburg, July 17, 1870 . 605 
 
 Extracts from Parliamentary Debates regarding the neutrality of Lux- 
 emburg and Belgium, 1867; 1870 606 
 
 Belgian Neutrality. (Gladstone's letter to Bright, August, 1870). . . 624 
 
 Anglo-Belgian Military Preparations. Documents made public by the 
 German Government after taking possession of the Brussels Archives: 
 
 (1) Report of General Ducarme to the Belgian Minister of War; 
 
 (2) Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to his Gov- 
 ernment 626 
 
 Remarks introductory to the Secret Documents, by Bernhard Dernburg 631 
 Violation of Belgian neutrality by England and Belgium. (Semi- 
 official view expressed in the North German Gazette.) .... 634 
 Statement relative to the publication of the Belgian Documents, from 
 , M. Havenith, Belgian Minister at Washington 635 
 
CONTENTS xvii 
 
 The Nature of Neutrality, etc. (Extracts from World Organization as 
 affected by the Nature of the Modern State, by David Jayne Hill.) . . 638 
 
 The Alleged Inherent Right of Self -Preservation (extract), by John 
 Westlake 640 
 
 The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens 642 
 
 Thucydides: The Melians' Defense of their Neutrality against the 
 Athenians 645 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 The Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the settlement of interna- 
 tional disputes, Article iii 651 
 
 The Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the opening of hostilities . 651 
 The Larger Meanings of the War. (Extracts from an article by 
 
 Franklin H. Giddings.) 652 
 
 Appeal to the Universities of America, signed by Rudolf Eucken and 
 
 Ernst Haeckel 653 
 
 America and the Issues of the European War, by Charles W. Eliot . 655 
 Germany's Treaty Record: a letter by Bernhard Demburg answering 
 Dr. Eliot 661 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 Chronologt 667 
 
 List of Citations 686 
 
 Index 693 
 
THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATORS ^ 
 
 AT LONDON 
 
 Mr. Asquith, British Prime Minister. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador. 
 
 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador. 
 
 AT BERLIN 
 Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg, German Chancellor. 
 Herr von Jagow, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
 Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador. 
 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador. 
 
 AT ST. PETERSBURG 
 
 M. Sazonof, Riissian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador. 
 Count Pourtales, German Ambassador. 
 Count Szapary, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. 
 
 AT VIENNA 
 
 Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 Herr von Tchirsky, German Ambassador. 
 
 AT PARIS 
 M. Poincar6, President of France. 
 
 M. Viviani, Premier of France, and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador. 
 
 AT ROME 
 Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 AT BELGRADE 
 M. Pashitch, Servian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 ' In this list are included only the most important names which it may be expected that 
 the reader will remember. A complete listing, under both name and office, of all actors in 
 the negotiations, including those here mentioned, will be found with page references in the 
 index. 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 The abbreviations used to denote the various ofiicial publications are the 
 following: ^ 
 
 (1) B. W. P. (British White Paper, no. 6, Miscellaneous, 1914.) 
 
 (2) G. W. B. (German White Book, authorized translation.) 
 
 (3) R. O. P. (Russian Orange Paper.) 
 
 (4) B. G. P. (Belgian Gray Paper.) 
 
 (5) F. Y. B. (French Yellow Book.) 
 
 (6) A. R. B. (Austrian Red Book.) 
 
 (7) S. B. B. (Servian Blue Book.) 
 
 ' The British White Paper was also published as a small blue book and the Russian, 
 Belgian and French publications have been issued in a convenient form as British White 
 Papers. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 
 
 PART I 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
THE DIPLOMACY OF THE 
 WAR OF 1914 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 
 
 The European Concert — Belgian neutrality — The Triple Alliance and 
 The Triple Entente — Crises: Fashoda (1896); Algeciras (1906); the 
 Casablanca afifair (1908); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908); Agadir (1911); 
 theTurco-Italian War (1911-12); the Balkan Wars (1912-13) — The situa- 
 tion just before the War of 1914. 
 
 1. The European Concert 
 
 It is impossible to understand the causes of the outbreak 
 of the present war without some knowledge of the sahent 
 features of history which led to the aUgnment of the great 
 powers into two camps known as the Triple AlUance and 
 the Triple Entente. The questions of the present moment, 
 such as that of the neutrality of Belgium, have their roots 
 deep in the past, and their elucidation must be sought in 
 the history of the relations of the European states. 
 
 Modern Europe, as we know it to-day, was patched 
 together at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The principal 
 independent states of Europe, which took part in that 
 settlement, formed the European Concert. They had been 
 drawn together by the common danger of French domina- 
 tion and had succeeded at last in overwhelming Napoleon. 
 During the Congress of Vienna, it looked as if the jealousies 
 over the spoils stripped from France would divide the vic- 
 tors into two camps, and start another war. Russia, wish- 
 ing to acquire all of Poland, offered to compensate Prussia 
 with territory taken from Saxony. This gave Talleyrand 
 his opportunity, and France, Austria, and England agreed 
 to make common cause, by force of arms if necessary, to 
 
4 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 prevent this dangerous aggrandizement of Russia and 
 Prussia. But the powers had had enough of war, and so 
 found a way to settle their differences by a ruthless carv- 
 ing-up of territories in disregard of the principle of nation- 
 ahty, and even that of ''legitimacy," a term which served 
 the same purpose of a shibboleth that the ''observance of 
 treaties" now fulfills. The able diplomacy of Talleyrand 
 took advantage of this disagreement to reestabhsh the 
 diplomatic equality of France, and the five powers, — 
 England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, — working 
 together as the Concert of Europe, dictated to all the other 
 states and completed the territorial transformations and 
 adjustments which suited their counterbalancing interests 
 and jealousies. Proceeding with stumbhng and halting 
 gait, constantly in danger of faUing, the European Concert 
 continued to be, up to the outbreak of the War of 1914, 
 Europe's supreme hope and only protection against the 
 occurrence of a general war. Although acting as a sort of 
 shock-absorber to break the force of the territorial trans- 
 formations found necessary and inevitable in the course of 
 years, the European Concert has neither maintained the 
 status quo nor perfected the balance of power, but by com- 
 promising between the two has managed to keep the peace. 
 Throughout this long period, the principal concern of the 
 Eiu-opean Concert has been to watch over Balkan affairs 
 in order to prevent the starting of a conflagration in the 
 Near East. 
 
 2. Belgian neutrality 
 The Congress of Vienna, which stripped France of the 
 immense possessions she had acquired since 1792, divided 
 them up so as to meet the desires and secure the agreement 
 of the coalition which had overthrown Napoleon. Prussia, 
 Austria, and Russia received their parts on the Continent, 
 but England did not desire to place hostages there, and 
 made no demands for territory, seeking her compensation 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 5 
 
 elsewhere. It was natural that she should keep the colonial 
 possessions captured from France by her fleets. The others 
 could not refuse her what she already held. She wished 
 also to retain certain of the Dutch possessions, as the Cape 
 Colony, which she had seized when Holland was incor- 
 porated into the French Empire; at Vienna it was proposed 
 to give the Belgic provinces to Holland as compensation. 
 Austria gladly exchanged her provinces for territories 
 nearer Vienna.^ But this union of Belgium and Holland 
 under the same king was contrary to the sentiments of the 
 Belgian people, and fifteen years later they revolted. 
 
 France was very anxious to take them over, and there 
 was some Belgian sentiment favorable to this plan; but 
 this would not have satisfied one of England's fundamental 
 principles of poUcy, which for centuries had been to keep 
 the Belgic provinces out of the control of France. Through 
 these provinces and Holland flowed some of the principal 
 rivers of Europe. They possessed besides great importance 
 as industrial centers. Their union with any great power 
 would inconvenience England, because of the facility of 
 attack afforded by the proximity of Belgian and Dutch 
 harbors to her shores, and also because her commerce 
 might thus be excluded from these rich territories drained 
 by their rivers. Lord Palmerston, therefore, in 1831, 
 true to England's traditional poUcy, strove to give to Bel- 
 gium an independent position. But it was evident that 
 a small, rich country with a magnificent strategic position 
 would be coveted by her powerful neighbors, France and 
 Prussia; in the course of future campaigns conducted 
 across her territory, she might, at the settlement of peace, 
 fall to one or the other. The interest of England seemed 
 best served, therefore, by making her perpetually neutral; 
 
 ^ At the time, Prussia was even more anxious to have a strong "buffer" 
 or "stopper" state to prevent France from invading her territory, and the 
 general distrust of France made all the powers ready to fall in with the 
 proposal. 
 
6 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the other powers had to acquiesce in this project or ac- 
 knowledge ambitions of aggrandizement, which might lead 
 England to make a coaUtion against them until she ob- 
 tained assurances that such designs had been abandoned. 
 Accordingly, it was agreed that Belgium should be per- 
 petually neutral, and the principal powers — England, 
 France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia — joined in guaran- 
 teeing her independence and perpetual neutrahty. 
 
 It is no secret that France still pursued the main purpose 
 of her diplomacy and mihtary exertions since the time of 
 Richeheu — that is, to annex the neighboring provinces of 
 Belgium and to secure her natural outlet toward the north, 
 thus regaining control of her own fluvial arteries of com- 
 merce. Under the great Napoleon she had accompUshed 
 the union of Belgium with France and had given the bene- 
 fits of her reformed judicial system to a country which was 
 already united to her by many ties, such as language and 
 rehgion. But England came and put asunder these two 
 peoples whom the evolution of history had united. 
 
 In the course of years, another Napoleon upon the throne 
 of France had hoped again to incorporate Belgium into 
 France, as was done at the epoch of the Revolution, and 
 the French Ambassador, Benedetti, proposed to Bismarck 
 a partition of Belgium, just as Russia had proposed and 
 successfully brought about the partition of Poland in the 
 latter part of the eighteenth century. Bismarck prevailed 
 upon Benedetti to write out this proposal in his own hand, 
 which he took for reference to the King of Prussia, and on 
 the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War exhibited it to 
 the diplomatic corps at Berlin. The inevitable result was 
 still further to prejudice England against the brilliant ad- 
 venturer upon the throne of France. Negotiations were 
 entered into with each of the belligerents, and a separate 
 treaty signed with each to make common cause against the 
 other in case of a violation of Belgian neutrality. During 
 the Franco-Prussian War, the perpetual neutrality of Bel- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 7 
 
 gium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, the only perpetually 
 neutralized states of Europe, was faithfully respected by 
 all parties. In the course of generations, Europe has be- 
 come accustomed to this artificial situation and has taken 
 for granted that it would persist. 
 
 The general pubhc has not appreciated the difference 
 between ordinary neutrahty and perpetual neutrality. In 
 the present war the United States is a neutral in the ordi- 
 nary sense, but may terminate that condition at any mo- 
 ment by declaring war and becoming a belligerent; or any 
 other power may declare war upon the United States with 
 the same effect. So also in the case of Holland, Germany 
 or England may terminate Dutch neutrahty by declaring 
 war against her. Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, 
 on the contrary, are placed under a special regime based 
 on international agreements signed by the powers inter- 
 ested, according to the terms of which their territories must 
 remain perpetually neutral, and this condition may not 
 be modified to suit the convenience of any belligerent or of 
 the perpetually neutral country itself. Such a condition is 
 often spoken of as neutraUzation. 
 
 3. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente 
 The Franco-German War was the most important event 
 of European history until overshadowed by the outbreak of 
 the present war. Prussia emerged from it at the head of 
 a united German nation. There was a serious dislocation 
 of the old political relations which it took several years to 
 adjust. England, for a time at least, needed not to fear 
 the rivalry of France and devoted her attention to check- 
 ing the ambitions of Russia. Bismarck made the center of 
 his political conception a firm alliance with Austria. When 
 Prussia defeated her in 1866, Bismarck held back the 
 Prussians from making a triumphal entry into Vienna and 
 was most considerate of Austrian susceptibilities. Later, 
 at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, he succeeded in obtaining 
 
8 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 for Austria the occupation, administration, and control of 
 the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria 
 had also to recognize that German support would protect 
 her from the extreme demands and nationaUstic aspira- 
 tions of the heterogeneous elements embraced in her terri- 
 tories. So she constructed her empire on the double basis 
 of the German and the strongest non-German element, the 
 Magyars, and looked for support to the German alhance 
 to maintain the bond and the balance between these two; 
 Germans and Magyars of Austria, united and backed by 
 the support of Germany, could maintain German suprem- 
 acy over the numerically superior Slav elements of the 
 Austrian Empire. 
 
 The Dual Alliance between Austria and Germany, estab- 
 lished in 1879, was joined by Italy in 1883, as a result of 
 Italian pique at France's acquisition of Tunis. The Ital- 
 ians there much outnumbered the French, and Italy had 
 been hoping for its acquisition. It appears that the per- 
 mission to occupy Tunis was the price Bismarck paid 
 France to make the Congress of BerHn a success by her 
 participation. He probably reaHzed that the jealousy of 
 France it would arouse on the part of Italy and England 
 would strengthen Germany's position. 
 
 The effect of the formation of the Triple Alliance was to 
 draw France and Russia together.^ It is in the nature of 
 things for any two states, separated by a third sufficiently 
 strong to resist conquest and partition, to combine against 
 the medial state, but this natural bond between France 
 and Russia had been weakened by the mistrust of the 
 Emperor Nicholas I of the radical governments of France.^ 
 
 ^ The text of the Dual Alliance between Austria and Germany was first 
 published in 1888 to check Russia from any attempt at aggression. See 
 Encyclopcedia Britannica, 11th ed., vol. ii, p. 889. For text see Documents, 
 post, chap. XIII. 
 
 2 Another ground of difference resulted from France's adhering to her 
 traditionally sympathetic attitude toward Polish independence, while Bis- 
 marck joined hands with Russia in stamping out Polish insurrections on 
 either side the border by an exchange of Polish political refugees. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 9 
 
 The Franco-Russian alliance was not merely political, but 
 was further strengthened by financial ties between the 
 parties. Russia found a market in which she could borrow 
 to greater advantage and the thrifty French were glad of 
 the opportunity of securing for their savings a high rate of 
 interest from investments approved and supported by the 
 Repubhc. It is estimated that as early as 1906, France 
 had become Russia's creditor to the extent of some twelve 
 billions of francs.^ The alUance was signed August, 1891, 
 but it was not avowed till some time later, and its terms 
 have never been disclosed. 
 
 4- Crises ; 
 
 The formation of the Dual AlUance at once reestablished 
 some semblance of a balance of power, based upon a 
 bipartite division of continental Europe, in place of the 
 older association of the relatively equal principal powers, 
 which had formed the Concert of Powers since the Congress 
 of Vienna. How perfect a balance existed could only be 
 ascertained after testing it by diplomacy and the power of 
 arms.^ 
 
 Although England had always been included in the 
 Concert of European Powers, she had held somewhat 
 aloof, and avoided in any way limiting her freedom of 
 action. Her unique geographical position and unchallenged 
 control of the sea gave her a peculiarly potent influence on 
 the Continent whenever she chose to exert it. When Ger- 
 many, Austria, France, and Russia, the four powers 
 originally forming the European Concert, together with 
 
 ^ Tardieu, France and the Alliance, p. 1.0. 
 
 2 Von Biilow says of the Triple Alliance : "The three mid-European States 
 are bound to each other by the firm resolve to maintain the existing balance 
 of power in Europe, and should a forcible change be attempted, to prevent 
 it if need be by force. The united strength of Middle Europe stands in the 
 path of any revolution — any European policy which might elect to follow 
 the courses pursued by Louis XIV or Napoleon I. This alliance is like a 
 mighty fortification dividing the Continent in two." (Imperial Germany, 
 p. 67, New York, 1914.) 
 
10 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Italy, admitted later on in recognition of her intervention 
 in the Crimean conflict, grouped themselves in the manner 
 indicated, it left England detached and enjoying still the 
 same advantages she had possessed at the time of the for- 
 mation of the European Concert. Even if the Dual Alli- 
 ance of France and Russia, on the one hand, and the 
 Triplice, on the other, effected a rough approximation to a 
 balance of power, England, by throwing her weight to 
 either side, could easily disturb it. She did not, however, 
 immediately pursue such a course, but contented herself 
 with her traditional policy of defending the smaller conti- 
 nental states from the aggression of their more powerful 
 neighbors, and checking the free development of any state 
 she feared might become so powerful as to dictate on the 
 Continent. 
 
 Englishmen of that epoch predicted and prepared for a 
 conflict with Russia. Russia, they said, was reaching out 
 toward India. Russia it was who had never given up her 
 ambition to secure Constantinople, — who had waited an 
 opportunity to seize Persia and acquire an outlet on the 
 Persian Gulf, — who was ever lying in wait for an oppor- 
 tunity to reach out an arm across Norway and Sweden to 
 an ice-free port north of England, bathed by the warm 
 Gulf Stream. 
 
 But trouble arose in another quarter, for shortly after 
 the establishment of the new system of alliances, Europe 
 passed though a series of violent crises. 
 
 5. Fashoda 
 The first of these crises nearly involved Great Britain 
 and France in war. France had been vanquished repeatedly 
 in her contest with Great Britain for control of the sea, 
 and in 1815, it seemed that the century-long duel between 
 the countries had been definitely concluded at the down- 
 fall of Napoleon, when France was crushed and suffered, 
 together with a great loss of prestige, a curtailment like- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 11 
 
 wise of her European and colonial territory. But France's 
 imagination had not been destroyed and French diplomacy 
 remained as effective as ever. In the course of a few years 
 she had acquired Algiers, and decade after decade she kept 
 pace with Great Britain in the scramble for colonial pos- 
 sessions. France made one mistake in not joining Eng- 
 land when in 1882 it was found necessary to intervene in 
 Eg3TDtian affairs. England soon acquired control of the 
 Khedive's dominions and directed a joint Anglo-Egyptian 
 expedition to subdue the troublesome tribes infesting the 
 Upper Nile. As rapidly as possible, England pushed for- 
 ward to secure the strategically important head-waters of 
 the Nile. There had been indications that France hoped 
 to stake out a claim on the Upper Nile by extending her 
 explorations east from the Congo to Abyssinia. By so doing, 
 France thought she might secure a land route across equa- 
 torial Africa, and so arrest England's expansion southward 
 to connect the British possessions and prepare the way for 
 the Cape to Cairo route. Such an intercepting cross-road 
 of Africa in the hands of the French would also give them 
 a land and sea route to India almost free from English 
 control. 
 
 September 19, 1898, the English forces under General 
 Kitchener, pushing their way up the Nile, found the French 
 flag waving over the island of Fashoda, where a French 
 exploration party under Captain Marchand had estab- 
 lished itself. Long years of colonial rivalry had at last 
 brought the two states into direct collision. The only pos- 
 sibility of avoiding the conflict was that one or the other 
 should back down. War hung in the balance and prepara- 
 tions for war were rushed in both countries. France, how- 
 ever, preferred to yield rather than to risk the annihilation 
 of her colonial empire in a one-sided conflict with Great 
 Britain, and accordingly withdrew from Fashoda. 
 
12 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 6. The Algeciras Conference 
 As Russia extended farther eastward, she aroused the 
 fears of England regarding Tibet and the control of China. 
 She also came in conflict with Japan. The Mikado's 
 Empire had learned from bitter experience at the conclu- 
 sion of the Chino-Japanese War how impotent it was to 
 withstand a European coalition, when Port Arthur and 
 the Liao-tung peninsula had to be given back at the de- 
 mand of Russia, France, and Germany. Hence Japan was 
 desirous of reaching some agreement with Russia with 
 regard to the extreme East and the control of Korea, for 
 which she had just fought a successful war with China. 
 But Russia thought to continue her triumphal advance 
 and disdained the Japanese offers. The Japanese Embassy, 
 headed by Marquis Ito, which had been sent to St. Peters- 
 burg, then proceeded to London, hoping to find there in 
 their common fear of Russia a bond of union. On January 
 30, 1902, an aUiance was signed, according to the terms of 
 which Japan agreed to come to the assistance of England, if 
 she were attacked by more than one power, in the defense 
 of her Eastern possessions and interests.^ England's sub- 
 scription to an identical obligation insured Japan against 
 a European coalition similar to that from which she 
 had suffered at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War. 
 -^England now felt less uneasy about Russian aggression, 
 and met halfway the concihatory advances of Delcasse, the 
 French Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose diplomacy was 
 directed toward removing the vestiges of bitterness left 
 in France by the Fashoda humiliation, and securing a 
 working agreement with England for harmonious action 
 throughout the world. In this he was assisted by Edward 
 VII, whose ready tact and real Hking for the French 
 
 ^ See Documents, post, chap, xiii, for the terms of the alliance entered 
 into in 1911. With some modifications this reproduces the terms of the 
 alliance of 1902, renewed first after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 13 
 
 enabled him to further the plans of the statesmen in both 
 countries working toward an Anglo-French accord. But 
 French public opinion was decidedly cool, and whatever 
 bonds of sympathy there were did not embrace any great 
 number of persons in either country. Nevertheless, on 
 April 8, 1904, France and England entered upon an agree- 
 ment settling certain of their disputes, as a result of which 
 the century-old conflict in regard to the Newfoundland 
 fisheries, a constant source of irritation, was ended by a 
 compromise. Certain other understandings were reached 
 as to the divisions between the French and English pos- 
 sessions in Africa, and most important of all, France gave 
 assurances that she would abandon the policy of checking 
 the development of English control in Egypt, where she 
 had hitherto been able to prevent English reorganization 
 of the finances and economic conditions of the country 
 through her recognized treaty right to veto any action 
 which might affect the security of the French investments. 
 In return it was understood that England would support 
 France in her designs to develop Morocco. 
 
 Germany, of course, perceived the danger of the situa- 
 tion. Having fully outgrown Bismarck's distrust of a 
 policy of settlement colonies, she had been picking up such 
 waste places, still unappropriated, as she could lay hands 
 upon, and probably hoped for some favorable occasion 
 when she might secure control of Morocco. In any event, 
 she had the same interests in maintaining the open door 
 in Morocco as we have in China. Besides this, she realized 
 the danger to her general interests of an agreement be- 
 tween France and England. Hitherto, in spite of some 
 minor disagreements, Germany had made it her policy 
 to remain on good terms with England. She feared lest 
 France, allied to Russia, should become the close friend of 
 England, and German prestige and poHtical influence be 
 diminished, or occasion found, even, by which France 
 might bring about the war of revenge to recover her lost 
 
14 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 provinces. Bismarck, instead of following the usual pat- 
 tern of German constitutional government, and either 
 including the conquered provinces in some one of the 
 states of the German Union or endowing them with a 
 separate constitutional government within the German 
 Federation, designated the territory taken from France 
 as "Reichsland" or ''imperial territory."^ Since then the 
 prevaihng opinion in Germany has been that France 
 would tear up the Treaty of Frankfort as soon as she felt 
 strong enough. As long as Germany held Alsace and 
 Lorraine, every German felt he must keep bright his sword 
 to defend this possession. Germany's conquest of Alsace- 
 Lorraine has been up to the present time a constant irri- 
 tant in the body politic of Europe. France looked forward 
 to recovering the lost provinces, and Germany felt she 
 must protect herself by keeping France weak. Pursuing 
 this poHcy, the German strategists were anxious to pounce 
 on France in 1875, but even if Bismarck had been will- 
 ing to desert his precepts and enter upon a campaign of 
 aggression, it would not have been possible, as in 1870, to 
 secure from the other powers of Europe permission to pro- 
 ceed.2 The formation of the Dual AUiance tended to 
 
 1 It would have aroused the jealousies of the other German states if 
 Prussia had appropriated Alsace-Lorraine, and she did not care to lessen 
 her superiority by turning the provinces over to any other. To have made 
 a new state would also have diminished Prussia's relative position and made 
 possible in future a stronger combination in opposition to her control of the 
 affairs of the Empire. So the solution adopted was inevitable and resulted 
 in giving Prussia, through her preponderating position in the Empire, a 
 consequent control of the acquired provinces. 
 
 2 Bismarck always made it a cardinal principle of his policy to avoid any 
 appearance of aggression. "According to Bismarck, the military plan of 
 seizing the first favorable opportunity of crushing France was not aban- 
 doned in 1875. 'Later also,' he says, this plan was advocated; but he re- 
 mained convinced that it was impossible to say that any war was inevitable. 
 No one, he said, 'can look into the cards held by Providence.' (Memoirs, p. 
 442; translation, vol. ii, p. 103.) And, as was his wont, he summed up his 
 views in a single pregnant phrase, declaring that offensive war to anticipate 
 a possible attack was, ' in a sense, suicide in apprehension of death.' " (Mun- 
 roe Smith, " Military Strategy versus Diplomacy." Political Science Quar- 
 terly, vol. XXX [1915], p. 63.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 15 
 
 reestablish the balance of power and prevent any further 
 ''bleeding" of France. France for her part seems really to 
 have given up any active intention of pursuing a pohcy of 
 revenge to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The gradual centrah- 
 zation of pohtical control in the hands of the Radicals and 
 Sociahsts, especially those of southern France, directed 
 attention toward social reform and colonial expansion and 
 development. She readily accepted as a condition of the 
 alliance with Russia the understanding that the latter's 
 support was not to be counted upon to further a war of 
 revenge. No doubt there were many Frenchmen who, in 
 the words of Gambetta, kept silent about Alsace-Lorraine 
 but thought of it always; yet in any event the Triple and 
 Dual Alhances seemed to be too nearly balanced to hold 
 out any certainty of success in a war of aggression or 
 revenge. England, too, in her splendid isolation might be 
 counted upon to prevent either Russia or Germany from 
 gaining any additional influence in the control of European 
 affairs. From this time on, until the present war, Europe's 
 peace rested upon the balance between the two alhances, 
 and upon England's isolation and intention to check the 
 too great development of any one continental power. 
 
 As soon, therefore, as Germany perceived from the trend 
 of affairs in Morocco, after the agreement of 1904, that 
 France had not only received permission to extend her 
 pohtical influence in northern Africa, but at the same time 
 was reaching a better understanding with England, she 
 had to consider her own safety as seriously threatened. 
 Nevertheless, Germany did not think it opportune just 
 then to enter a protest against the Moroccan arrangement. 
 In the German Reichstag, in answer to a question from 
 Count Reventlow why the Government did not take 
 action to protect Germany's interests, the Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs asked whether the interpellator 
 thought the Government should make war for this purpose. 
 So Germany allowed the matter to he without protest, and 
 
16 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 France and England thought that they had successfully 
 carried through and definitely disposed of the Moroccan 
 deal. The fact that this important step did not give rise 
 to an acute crisis would indicate either that the balance 
 in Europe was thought to be very nearly true at that 
 moment or that the combination against Germany was 
 too powerful to be resisted. 
 
 Meantime, the Russo-Japanese War, which had broken 
 out the February preceding (1904), began in the winter of 
 1904-05 pitilessly to reveal Russia's military weakness 
 and inefficiency. Europe was surprised, even startled, to 
 hear of Japan's conspicuous success. The value of Russia's 
 pohtical support to France as an ally was much diminished, 
 and there were indications that Russia's dislike of the 
 socialistic and radical governments in control of France, 
 and of the French criticism of Russia's severity in dealing 
 with political agitation, had considerably weakened the 
 bonds between them and undermined the Dual Alhance.^ 
 This seemed to the German Government a good occasion 
 to make a move in regard to Morocco. Accordingly, the 
 German Emperor disembarked at Tangier March 31, 1905, 
 on his way east, and, after making a speech and remaining 
 a few hours, continued his voyage on to Constantinople. 
 The attention of the world was at once focused upon the 
 Moroccan dispute, and France rushed forward military 
 preparations to defend her eastern frontier against an 
 anticipated attack from Germany. 
 
 ' England let it be understood that Germany's action 
 in attempting to block France in Morocco would be 
 looked upon as interference with England also, since 
 France, acting in accordance with-'' an understanding 
 reached between the two countries, had a right to count 
 
 1 The ex-Chancellor of the German Empire says: "After the Russo- 
 Japanese War there was a slight coolness in Franco-Russian relations, 
 whereas there was an increase of warmth in those between Russia and 
 Germany." (Vou Billow, Imperial Germany, p. 81. New York, 1914.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 17 
 
 upon EngUsh support in Morocco.^ The whole question 
 was referred to a diplomatic conference at Algeciras in 
 which, it is interesting to note, the United States took 
 part. Thanks to the support of England and the defec- 
 tion of Germany's ally, Italy, France emerged from the 
 combat of wits with a diplomatic victory to her credit. 
 Far from separating France and England, Germany's ac- 
 tion only drew them closer together and disastrously af- 
 fected German prestige, by demonstrating at Algeciras 
 that France had succeeded in forming an entente cordiale, 
 or cordial understanding, with England without in any 
 way weakening the Dual Alhance with Russia. Little 
 comfort could be got from the humiliation of France in 
 compelling the resignation of Delcasse, whose foresight 
 and unflagging efforts had brought the foreign pohcy of 
 France to such a successful culmination. Germany had 
 insisted officially upon interpreting the purpose of his 
 diplomacy as an attack against herself, and had secured 
 his dismissal by a threat of immediate recourse to arms. 
 France was again grievously humiliated, but her experi- 
 ence this time differed from that at Fashoda, for she re- 
 tained in her grip material solace in her position in Mo- 
 rocco, now made more secure, so as to offer an opportunity 
 for the extension of French influence and control.^ 
 
 Gradually, England had come to the realization that 
 Germany was the most powerful nation on the Continent, 
 and her most active rival for the world's commerce. The 
 great development of Germany's merchant marine and her 
 unprecedented eftorts to launch a navy commensurate 
 with this commerce and suflficient to defend it, had aroused 
 British jealousy and had influenced England to appreciate 
 still more highly the friendship with France. 
 
 In 1907, a few months after the Algeciras Conference, 
 England entered into a convention with Russia which, Hke 
 her entente with France, eUminated some of their long- 
 1 Cf. B. W. P. no. 87. See post, chap, viii, § 5. 
 
18 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 standing grounds of difference. Northern Persia was 
 allotted to Russia as being within her sphere of influence, 
 while the southern part fell to Engliind. This practically 
 amounted to a partition of this small weak state just on the 
 point of instituting veritable reforms. A small central por- 
 tion, it is true, was still left to Persia to constitute a buffer 
 state between Russia and England, and to serve, perhaps, 
 as a sop to English conceptions of international morality. 
 As a result of all these efforts, the Triple Alliance found 
 itself confronted by the gradually forming Triple Entente 
 in which France was Unked by an alliance with Russia and 
 a friendly understanding with England. Germany felt 
 herself hemmed in on every side. 
 
 7. The Casablanca affair 
 After the agreement reached at Algeciras, it was natural 
 that there should be a certain animus between the French 
 and Germans in Morocco, and in 1908, in the course of the 
 military operations which the French were conducting, 
 six of the members of the French Foreign Legion at 
 Casablanca fled to the German Consulate and were there 
 given protection by virtue of the privilege of extraterri- 
 torial jurisdiction which the consuls of the different powers 
 enjoyed in Morocco. The German Consul had intended 
 to extend his protection only to German nationals, but in 
 point of fact three of the deserters were non-German. The 
 consul, not realizing this, signed a safe-conduct for all six 
 to be embarked upon a German ship. While on the way to 
 the ship under the protection of German agents, they were 
 arrested by French officials in spite of the protests of the 
 German Consul, and in the melee which resulted, the 
 Chancellor of the German Consulate and one of its 
 Moroccan guards were roughly handled. This led to an 
 energetic protest from the German Government and the 
 demand that the deserters be restored to the German 
 authorities. For a while the situation was most threaten- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 19 
 
 ing. Germany contended that the rights of her consuls to 
 exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over German subjects 
 in Morocco had been violated by the French officials. 
 France, admitting the validity of such extraterritorial 
 jurisdiction, considered, nevertheless, that the right of an 
 armed force to control its members took precedence over 
 the ordinary right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
 France refused to yield to the German demands, but was 
 willing to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal. The 
 award which it rendered in effect sustained the French 
 position, though the language in which it was couched was 
 evidently intended to avoid giving offense to German sus- 
 ceptibihties and to reach a verbal compromise. The de- 
 cision was accepted by both parties. 
 
 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 When the German Emperor decided to cultivate close 
 relations with the Turk, a great transformation was 
 brought about in the situation of Europe. This policy was 
 really determined by Austria's opposition to Russia's 
 ambitions in the Balkans. Since Russia was known to 
 covet the possession of Constantinople and the control of 
 the Slav states of the peninsula, Austria's easiest method 
 of defense was to support the Sublime Porte; Germany, 
 who hkewise feared Russian aggression along her unpro- 
 tected frontier, was led by this common fear to form the 
 closest of alliances with the Dual Monarchy. Thence- 
 forth, Austria's policy toward Turkey became her own. 
 Gradually England relinquished her role of protector of 
 the Turk, to be replaced by Germany. The secondary 
 consequences of this change of policy were important. 
 Germany prevented Greece from acquiring Crete, and 
 shielded the Sultan from the diplomatic intervention of the 
 powers to protect the Christians in Macedonia. Turkish 
 mihtary prestige was high after her defeat of Greece in 
 1896, and German officers, under the great strategist. Von 
 
20 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 der Goltz, trained her forces. Germany in return for this 
 assistance was able to count Turkey as almost an integral 
 part of the Triple Alliance, and to secure concessions in the 
 rich territory of Asia Minor, where she pushed the con- 
 struction of the Baghdad Railway to hnk Constantinople 
 with the Persian Gulf. 
 
 Suddenly all Germany's plans were upset by the revolu- 
 tion of July 24, 1908, which brought the Young Turks into 
 power. Imbued with liberal doctrines, they turned to 
 England, and the British Ambassador was greeted with 
 cheers wherever he went. In this emergency Baron Mar- 
 schall von Bieberstein, Germany's astute Ambassador, 
 was worth a whole army to her, for he soon was able to 
 regain for Germany the position which she had before 
 held. 
 
 The Young Turks did not show political wisdom in the 
 conduct of the foreign affairs of the Empire. They had 
 irritated Bulgaria into seizing the Roumelian section of 
 the Oriental Railway controlled by the Turks ;^ and when 
 Austria found that delegates from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 were preparing to send representatives to sit in the Turk- 
 ish Chamber of Deputies, she considered it necessary to 
 reaffirm her virtual sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzego- 
 vina by proclaiming their annexation, October 7, 1908. 
 Austria had been playing second fiddle to Germany so 
 long that her prestige as a great power had suffered, and 
 Aerenthal, backed by the energetic Archduke Franz Ferdi- 
 nand, thought the occasion opportune for showing Europe 
 that Austria still counted. Germany supported her ally 
 loyally. This action was well timed to make the Young 
 Turks, at the moment they were turning their back on 
 Germany and German influence, feel the folly of their 
 course; at the same time it was a unique opportunity to 
 
 ^ S. p. Duggan, "The Balkan Problem," Political Science Quarterly, 
 March, 1913, p. 104. This article gives an admirable summary of recent 
 events in the Balkans. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 21 
 
 allow Austria to make an advantageous readjustment 
 without laying Germany open to the accusation of playing 
 Turkey false. 
 
 Italy was irritated by the annexation, for she had always 
 feared to see Austria grow too strong in the Balkans and 
 extend her power along the eastern shore of the Adriatic; 
 but Servia most of all was injuriously affected. As long as 
 Bosnia remained nominally under Turkish sovereignty, 
 she had hoped a favorable opportunity might permit her 
 to incorporate its large Serb population into a Greater 
 Servia. Russia obviously would come to the assistance of 
 Servia, or any other state opposed to Austria, and there 
 was a possibility of her attacking Austria. England did 
 not wish to be drawn into any dispute over a Balkan mat- 
 ter, but was disturbed by what she considered Austria's 
 disregard of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. 
 
 Russia protested against this violation of the twenty- 
 fifth article of the Treaty of Berlin and declared that the 
 question of Bosnia and Herzegovina interested all Europe 
 and could not be settled without the assent of the powers 
 signatory to the treaty.^ Sir Edward Grey supported 
 Russia and pointed out that Austria was also violating 
 the Treaty of London of 1871, the terms of which declare 
 it to be ''an essential principle of the law of nations that 
 no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a 
 treaty or modify the stipulations thereof unless with the 
 consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable 
 arrangement."^ 
 
 Diplomatic wrangling was ended when, on March 22, 
 1909, Germany announced that unless Russia consented 
 to the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, 
 Austria would invade Servia, to put an end to her prepara- 
 tions for an attack upon Austria. Russia was unprepared 
 
 ^ For the terms of Article 25, see Documents, 'post, chap. xiii. 
 2 S. P. Duggan, "The Balkan Problem," Political Science Quarterly, 
 March, 1913, p. 105. 
 
22 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 for war and had to submit, especially since England and 
 France were not ready to be dragged into a war over a 
 Balkan question. 
 
 If England and France had been in quest of an oppor- 
 tunity to strike Germany and Austria, they could not have 
 found a better; but both were animated by peaceful inten- 
 tions, and in Russia there was still a vivid recollection of 
 the recent campaign in the Far East. So Russia yielded to 
 the calming influence of France and England. The idea of 
 a conference was abandoned. Austria's fait accompli was 
 accepted, and Servia was even compelled (on March 31, 
 1909) to make a formal declaration that she would accept 
 the situation, desist from her hostile preparations against 
 Austria, and arrest her propaganda looking to the acquisi- 
 tion of Bosnia. A few months after this, Marschall von 
 Bieberstein succeeded in reestablishing German influence 
 in Constantinople. For a while a calmer tone prevailed in 
 European affairs, until the corruption in the blood of 
 European politics came to a head again at Agadir. 
 
 9. Agadir 
 The convention adopted by the Algeciras Conference to 
 regulate the situation in Morocco has generally been con- 
 sidered as a defeat of German pretensions. Germany 
 found it necessary at that particular moment to accept 
 its terms, but she reserved the right to interpret them as 
 best she might in her own interest; and just as France 
 had formerly spent every effort to block the develop- 
 ment of British control in Egypt, Germany now em- 
 ployed every means to thwart the extension of French 
 influence in Morocco. She had seized upon the Casablanca 
 incident, which gave her some reasonable ground of com- 
 plaint, to cover demands for a modification of French 
 poUcy in Morocco; France, by offering to submit the 
 question to arbitration and letting it be perceived that she 
 v/ould resist any attempts at intimidation, succeeded in 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 23 
 
 restricting the question to its juridical limits and eluding 
 the inconvenient poUtical demands of Germany.^ 
 
 Germany's only resource, then, was to continue a policy 
 of diplomatic obstruction and to attempt to work through 
 Spain, who, because of her proximity, was naturally anx- 
 ious to retain what she considered her legitimate rights to 
 a reasonable influence in Moroccan affairs. France con- 
 tinued to push her policy of extending French influence and 
 control, which necessitated campaigns to overcome the 
 native resistance. As France secured a firmer control, Ger- 
 many complained that she was ignoring the principle of 
 the open door, and interfering with the rights assured to 
 German citizens. July 1,1911, the German cruiser Panther 
 appeared off Agadir just as France was pushing a campaign 
 in the interior of Morocco. Germany claimed that it was 
 necessary to send the warship to protect German interests 
 because of the unrest in Morocco, but all Europe recognized 
 that she was putting forth a claim to a greater interest in 
 the Shereefian Empire. 
 
 The Panther was soon replaced by a larger German war- 
 ship, and both England and France sent ships to Agadir. 
 Lloyd George's speech of July 22 made it clear that Eng- 
 la-nd would support France against German aggression. 
 For some weeks the situation was most tense, but in the 
 end an acceptable compromise was reached, November 4, 
 1911, the effect of which was to settle the Moroccan 
 
 ^ Germany's interest in the fate of Morocco was more than commercial. 
 To quote from Von Biilow: "In November, 1898, the Emperor Wilham II 
 had said in Damascus: 'The three hundred milhon Mahommedans who hve 
 scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor 
 will be their friend at all times.' In Tangier the Emperor had declared 
 emphatically in favour of the integrity of Morocco. We should have com- 
 pletely destroyed om- credit in the Mahommedan world, if so soon after 
 these declarations we had sold Morocco to the French. Our Ambassador in 
 Constantinople, Freiherr von Marschall, said to me at the time: 'If we 
 sacrifice Morocco in spite of Damascus and Tangier, we shall at one fell 
 swoop lose our position in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and 
 prospects that we have painfully acquired by the labor of many years.'" 
 {Imperial Germany, pp. 100, 101. New York, 1914.) 
 
24 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 question once for all on the understanding that Germany 
 should recognize it as a French protectorate and no longer 
 oppose French designs. In return Germany received a 
 cession of part of the French Congo — Ubangi, bordering 
 on her possessions of the Kamerun. The solution was a big 
 disappointment to both countries; Germany had hoped 
 at least to acquire an important port on the Moroccan 
 coast which would have been most valuable to her as a 
 way-station on the commercial routes to South America 
 and South Africa. In France there was a feehng that Ger- 
 many, by threatening resort to force, had obhged France 
 to give up part of her possessions for a mere recognition 
 of what she already was entitled to. This agreement, how- 
 ever, laid the Morrocan specter. 
 
 It had taken three crises threatening the peace of 
 Europe before this satisfactory result was reached; but 
 Europe, reheved of her anxiety in this quarter, had good 
 reason to turn her attention to the Near East, whence have 
 emanated so many baleful international disagreements. 
 
 10. The Turco-Italian War 
 
 We have already noted how France's seizure of Tunis 
 drove Italy to join the Dual AlHance of Austria and Ger- 
 many, which thus became the Triple Alliance or TripHce. 
 It was in vain that France intimated that Italy might con- 
 sole herself by taking Tripoli. Italy shut her eyes to the 
 obvious fact that England and France would never allow 
 her to cut the Mediterranean in two and, by controUing 
 the passage between Sicily and the coast of Tunis, to 
 estabUsh a second Gibraltar. Italy went farther afield by 
 attempting a luckless pohcy of expansion. Her prestige 
 was lowered by a defeat at the hands of Abyssinia, and 
 when the great powers were taking possession of choice 
 morsels of Chinese territory and she cried, ''Me too," 
 China faced about and by an emphatic refusal put a 
 quietus on her demands. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 25 
 
 Italy had been more successful in building up internally 
 the strength of her country and began to consider favor- 
 ably the plan to take over Tripoli. In 1900, at the time 
 when France was feehng about for support, Italy came to 
 an understanding with her in regard to the occupation of 
 TripoU; and now that Germany seemed likely to inherit 
 the land of the Turk, England was not loath to have a 
 power less formidable, like Italy, secure a good parcel. 
 Still Italy seemed in no hurry to make the move until the 
 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908 
 spurred her on. Thenceforth Italy pushed the pacific pene- 
 tration into Tripoli with constantly increasing intolerance 
 of Turkish opposition, and shortly after the subsidence of 
 the acute phase of the Moroccan crisis, she took definite 
 action. At 2.30 p.m. on September 28, 1911, the Italian 
 Government demanded that Turkey, in order to terminate 
 the disorders due to her neglect in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, 
 should, within twenty-four hours, consent to Italy's occu- 
 pying those provinces. Upon Turkey's refusal, Italy de- 
 clared war at 3 p.m. September 29, and after a long and 
 difficult campaign occupied Tripoli and Cyrenaica. It was 
 hardly to be expected that Germany would rehsh this 
 onslaught on her Turkish proteg^, but she was powerless 
 to object, because she feared that Italy's flirtation with the 
 Entente might become really serious and amount to a 
 desertion of her partners in the Triple AlHance; but un- 
 official criticism of what was called Italy's unprincipled 
 and greedy action was not lacking in the Austrian and 
 German press. The nearest approach to an objection was 
 Austria's seeking and obtaining an assurance that the war 
 would not extend to European Turkey. After several 
 months of hostihties, the Turkish and Italian plenipoten- 
 tiaries met in Switzerland, in July, 1912, to arrange the 
 terms of peace; Turkey, following her usual tactics, at- 
 tempted to drag out the negotiations. Meantime the 
 exposure of Turkish weakness had whetted the appetite 
 
26 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of the Balkan States, and they were preparing an aUiance 
 against the Sultan. Italy, taking advantage of this situa- 
 tion, presented a demand that the Porte accept her con- 
 ditions or resume the war. In the face of an impending 
 struggle with her Balkan neighbors, Turkey could do 
 nothing but yield, and agreed, by the Treaty of Lausanne 
 of October 18, 1912, to cede TripoH and C3T:-enaica, while 
 Italy was to return the ^gean Islands upon the under- 
 standing that certain reforms should be instituted for the 
 benefit of the Christian inhabitants. 
 
 So skillfully had Italy applied her diplomatic anaesthesia 
 to the Triple Alliance, that it did not struggle during the 
 whole operation. Nevertheless, it felt the effects of the 
 shock, for at the same time that Italy showed up the weak- 
 ness of Turkey, she indicated how loosely she was bound 
 to the Triple Alliance and how free she still felt to direct 
 her foreign policy in patent opposition to Germany's 
 wishes. 
 
 11. The Balkan Wars 
 Before Turkey had settled her conflict with Italy, Bul- 
 garia, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro accomplished what 
 had always been considered an impossible feat : an alliance 
 against the Porte. A long experience with the evils of 
 Turkish rule, and the still greater evils of their own mutual 
 antagonisms, had done much for their political education. 
 The Balkan States no longer looked to a benevolent Europe 
 to protect them from the tyranny of the Turk and be- 
 gan to see the folly of their own ceaseless and bloody 
 struggles among themselves. They realized at last the 
 necessity and the feasibility of a combination, of a coali- 
 tion to rescue their brothers in Macedonia from their in- 
 tolerable situation. They realized that they might never 
 again find the Turk so weakened as after the Turko-Ital- 
 ian War; they might wait in vain for another occasion 
 such as then presented itself, when jealousies between the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 27 
 
 two groups of great powers and the bitter memories of the 
 recent Agadir incident made it difficult for them to present 
 a united front against the alUes' attack upon Turkey. 
 
 In truth the powers were quick to reaUze the danger to 
 European peace which a break-up of the Turkish Empire 
 might entail, and on October 8, 1912, they agreed upon a 
 collective note which they presented to the Balkan allies, 
 stating that in event of war they would permit of no modi- 
 fication of the status quo. 
 
 But the allies, wise in their generation, estimated these 
 representations of the great powers at their true value, and 
 prosecuted their campaign against Turkey. The glorious 
 successes, first of Bulgaria and then of Servia and Greece, 
 made the disastrous rout of Turkey complete. This unex- 
 pected result was too much for the feeble Concert to han- 
 dle. The Triple Alliance could not prevail upon all the 
 members of the Triple Entente to force the Balkan States 
 to restore to the Turkish Empire its lost possessions. We 
 have not here to follow the interesting course of events 
 leading up to the Treaty of London, when the representa- 
 tives of Turkey and of the allies met to discuss terms of 
 peace, while at Sir Edward Grey's suggestion a conference 
 of the ambassadors of the great powers carried on a con- 
 current exchange of views. Turkey wished to settle with 
 each one of the allies separately, but they decided to make 
 their terms with her first, and later on to divide amongst 
 themselves the ceded territory. Turkey had to give up all 
 of Macedonia and most of her territory in Europe, except a 
 small strip about Constantinople, and leave to the decision 
 of the great powers the disposition of the iEgean Islands. ^ 
 
 1 " The introduction of our last Army Bill, which had its origin in the 
 change of situation effected by the Balkan War, shows that Turkey's col- 
 lapse was a blow to us. I never had any illusions about the limits of Turkish 
 ability to act with effect. For that very reason I strove, for many years 
 successfully, to prevent any serious conflict in the Near East. In 1897, 
 during the Cretan affair, in 1908-09, during the crisis caused by the annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia, and in all phases of the Macedonian question, there was 
 great danger that serious trouble in the Balkan Peninsula would have more 
 
28 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 When it came to the division of the spoils, the political 
 sagacity of the Balkan alhes broke down under the strain. 
 One of the principal difficulties arose from the inconvenient 
 determination of the great powers to estabhsh an inde- 
 pendent Albania on the Adriatic coast, south of Monte- 
 negro, thus cutting Servia off from her outlet on the 
 Adriatic, and robbing Montenegro of her long-cherished 
 hope of securing Scutari. Both Italy and Austria had no 
 desire to complicate their political situation by the advent 
 of a new power on the Adriatic littoral, so they seized 
 upon the convenient excuse of Albanian nationality to es- 
 tablish under the collective protection of the great powers 
 the independent state of Albania. Servia was promised the 
 right of transit and commercial use of port facilities on the 
 Adriatic, but she recognized that the tenure of such a privir 
 lege was of necessity precarious, and she felt that she had 
 been robbed of the hope of reaHzing her legitimate aspira- 
 tion for an outlet on the sea. For her disappointment she 
 hoped to find some compensation elsewhere, but Bulgaria 
 ungenerously refused to modify the terms of the agreement 
 for the division of conquered territory entered into previ- 
 ously to the war. Greece, for her part, wished to retain 
 territory which Bulgaria considered should fall to her. 
 Bulgaria was supported by Austria, while Servia and 
 Montenegro relied on the support of Russia. Not content 
 with making enemies of her two allies, Bulgaria further 
 antagonized Rumania by refusing to give any satisfactory 
 assurance as to a compensatory rectification of their com- 
 mon frontier. Rumania, although she had taken no part in 
 the contest, thought that she should receive some accession 
 of territory to retain her relative position in the Balkans, 
 alleging that she might have thrown her army against the 
 
 unfavourable than favourable results for us, as well as for Austro-Hungary, 
 and would not make the European situation any easier for us to deal with. 
 For many a year Turkey was a useful and important link in the chain of our 
 political relations." (Von Billow, Imperial Germany, pp. 74, 75. New York, 
 1914.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 29 
 
 allies, and so have prevented the success of their campaign. 
 Turkey also joined in the attack upon Bulgaria, and Ru- 
 mania mobilized her forces. Bulgaria's pride was quickly 
 humbled; she appealed to the Rumanian King to intercede 
 with Greece and Servia, and by the terms of the Treaty of 
 Bukharest of August 6, 1913, she was forced to yield up to 
 Servia and Greece larger portions of the conquered terri- 
 tories than they had at first demanded, at the same time 
 that she acknowledged Rumania's claim to a strip of terri- 
 tory of small extent but of great importance from a strate- 
 gic point of view. Turkey, too, succeeded in regaining 
 Adrianople. 
 
 Russia and Austria all but came to blows over the 
 Albanian question, but France and England were unwill- 
 ing to be drawn into a war over this Balkan question, and 
 considered that Servia should be satisfied with her large 
 accessions of territory even though Austria and Italy had 
 succeeded in thwarting the claims of Servia and Monte- 
 negro to the Albanian coast. ^ Europe felt a sense of relief 
 that the map of the Balkans had been made over without 
 the outbreak of war between any of the great powers. 
 
 Austria with Italy's support had checked Servia's aspira- 
 tions for an outlet on the Adriatic, either through union 
 with Montenegro or by the acquisition of part of the Alba- 
 nian coast, but she could not prevent the extension of 
 Servia's territories, which brought with it greater prestige 
 and made her more dangerous as the champion of the Pan- 
 Serb propaganda, with the avowed purpose of incorporat- 
 ing into a united Servia all Serbs under the Austrian Em- 
 pire. In other words, Austria could no longer dictate to 
 Servia, but had to contend with a neighbor of no mean 
 strength, who was, besides, backed by Russia. Austria was 
 bitterly disappointed to find her dreams of an outlet on the 
 
 ^ Any attempt to support Servia would have been particularly ill-advised, 
 since it would have united Italy strongly in support of Germany and Austria 
 and probably brought on a European war under conditions very unfavor- 
 able to the Triple Entente. 
 
\ 
 
 30 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 JEgean through Salonika thwarted by the results of the war 
 and the throwing of a stronger Servia across her path. 
 Prior to the assassination of King Alexander and Queen 
 Draga, Servia had been as much a sateUite of the Austrian 
 system as is Portugal now of the British. Afterwards, even 
 though the Government of the regicides was recognized as 
 the pliant tool of Russia, the knife of the assassin could not 
 remove the effect of Austrian proximity and the Dual 
 Monarchy might still entertain a reasonable hope of unit- 
 ing all the Serbs in one autonomous group like Hungary, 
 while pohtical security would be insured by union with 
 other groups for certain common purposes, such as foreign 
 affairs, war, and the needs of imperial finance. But Ser- 
 vian successes against Turkey and Bulgaria had destroyed 
 this possibihty of cooperation. The new Servia considered 
 herself free from Austrian tutelage and dreamed of rees- 
 tabhshing the glories of the ancient Serb Empire. 
 
 Even before the Balkan conflict she had nursed this 
 hope, and had attempted in 1906 to escape from Austrian 
 dictation by drawing nearer to France and Russia, and by 
 concluding a convention with Bulgaria, which facilitated 
 the export of Servian goods through the Bulgarian ports on 
 the Black Sea.^ Austria retaliated by making certain re- 
 strictions and discriminatory tariff regulations and held up 
 her exports. This action, which has been known as the 
 "Pig War," quickly whipped Servia back into the Austrian 
 political fold. 
 
 Again in 1908, when Austria proclaimed the annexation 
 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Servia was aroused, for she 
 feared that the tightening of Austria's grip on these prov- 
 inces would put a definite quietus on the political aspira- 
 tions nearest her heart — that is to say, the incorporation 
 of the Serbs of Bosnia into the Servian Kingdom. Austria 
 also realized that it made more difficult the effecting of a 
 closer union with Montenegro, which should give to Servia 
 
 1 See Encyclopoedia Brilannica, 11th ed., vol. xxiv, p. 695. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 31 
 
 an outlet on the sea, and to the kindred kingdoms, through 
 their united action, the exercise of a much greater pohtical 
 influence. So Servia manifested signs of restlessness as if 
 preparing to open up the whole Balkan question by- 
 recourse to arms. 
 
 The political situation in 1908 seemed very favorable to 
 Servia's plans, for England was irritated and alarmed at 
 what she considered Austria's disregard of the article of 
 the Berlin Treaty regulating the position of the Turkish 
 provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, too, was 
 vitally interested in everything relating to the balance of 
 power in the Balkans and might have been expected to 
 give Servia her diplomatic and miUtary support. But 
 Russia had recently tasted of the rigors of war and was not 
 eager to begin again; not, at any rate, until she had reor- 
 ganized her mihtary system in the hght of her recent 
 experience in the Far East. England, for her part, was not 
 ready to be drawn into a general war because of this rela- 
 tively trivial Balkan question. Both Russia and England 
 must have realized that Austria's proclamation of the 
 annexation had not really materially changed the situa- 
 tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since it was well under- 
 stood that Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, which gave 
 to Austria the occupation and administration of the 
 provinces, had been intended to make her a permanent 
 cession of the territory, yet in such a form as to appear 
 to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Unless 
 the powers had been looking for a pretext, the annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina could hardly have af- 
 forded an excuse for launching a general European war. 
 So the Concert of Powers applied themselves to soothing 
 and restraining Servia, and prevailed upon her to agree 
 not to carry on an active propaganda to detach the prov- 
 inces from Austria.^ 
 
 * This promise of Servia was made in a note of March 31, 1909, communi- 
 cated to the powers. See post, p. 52. 
 
32 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 The powers were not so naive as to expect that these 
 promises would be effective in restraining Servia, and no 
 doubt whatever efficacy they may have had was impaired, 
 if not swept away, by the Balkan War. The Minister sent 
 by Russia to represent her at Belgrade became the center 
 of an active propaganda to extend Slav, that is Russian, 
 influence. Another cause of anxiety for Austria was that if 
 Italy should once secure control of the important Albanian 
 port of Avlona, she would make the Adriatic an Italian 
 sea, control the commerce of Trieste, and deprive the Aus- 
 trian base at Pola of its strategic value. Italy, being 
 nearer at hand, was much better situated for bringing 
 Albania under her influence. Austria had other causes for 
 chagrin, since she had lost prestige and direct influence by 
 backing the losing power in each of the two preceding 
 wars.^ No sooner had the Turk been worsted than she 
 hoped to find in Bulgaria a counterpoise to Russian influ- 
 ence in the Balkans, but her support of Bulgaria's preten- 
 sions and urging her to take an unconciliatory attitude 
 had only been the latter's undoing. Embittered by succes- 
 sive disappointments, Austria was in no mood to bear with 
 patience any further interference with the development of 
 her policy in the Balkans. She felt that her prestige as a 
 great power required that she pursue with success some 
 constructive policy to reestablish her weakened position. ^ 
 
 In Franz Ferdinand, the Dual Monarchy had fortu- 
 nately what had been lacking for generations — a leader 
 
 1 S. p. Duggan, "The Balkan Adjustment," Political Science Quarterly, 
 December 1913, p. 627. 
 
 ^ This attitude on Austria's part is indicated by Count Berchtold's 
 remark to the British Ambassador at Vienna that, " though he had been 
 glad to cooperate towards bringing about the settlement, which had resulted 
 from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he 
 had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which 
 was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests 
 which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent." 
 (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) These remarks should be consid- 
 ered in the light of ex-Premier Giolitti's recent disclosure regarding Aus- 
 tria's intention of making war upon Servia in August, 1913. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 33 
 
 capable of taking up the direction of the Empire's pohti- 
 cal affairs. Had he not recently successfully put through 
 the Bosnia-Herzegovina coup which had done so much to 
 enhance Austrian prestige? There had been indications 
 that, realizing the hopelessness of maintaining the Ger- 
 man-Magyar foundation of the Empire, he was ready to 
 broaden the basis of the Government and give to the 
 principal groups the national independence at present 
 enjoyed by the German and Magyar alone. This would 
 have still further weakened German influence, and would 
 have lessened the racial-political tie with Germany, but it 
 might have made possible the organization in the Balkans 
 of a great federated empire with Constantinople as its 
 seat of government, and united by the overshadowing 
 fear of Russian domination.^ 
 
 As a result of the Balkan w^ars, Turkey and Bulgaria 
 had been too much weakened to offer any effective support 
 against Russian aggression or the spread of Russian influ- 
 ence in the peninsula. The Government of the Tsar could 
 continue to rely upon the loyalty of the new Servia, 
 strengthened and filled with enthusiasm by two successful 
 campaigns in which she had doubled her territory and 
 acquired Uskub, the ancient capital of the Serb Empire. 
 In Bosnia, there was disaffection toward Austria and an 
 ardent desire for union with Servia. As Austria would not 
 tolerate any open expression of this desire, so natural on 
 the part of the Serb and Serbo-Croat portion of the popu- 
 lation in the provinces bordering on the Servian frontier, 
 it was inevitable that secret organizations and conspira- 
 cies should spring up. It was easy for the agitators to cross 
 over the Servian frontier and perfect their organization and 
 plans undisturbed by the ubiquitous Austrian police offi- 
 cers and spies. Furthermore, Servia did nothing to restrain 
 
 1 See "The War in Europe," The Round Table, September, 1914. A 
 remarkably interesting and suggestive article written with a strong anti- 
 Magyar bias. 
 
34 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 her citizens from aiding these conspirators, nor did she 
 interfere to prevent Servian citizens from organizing and 
 carrying on an active propaganda for the union of Bosnia 
 with Servia. On her side, Austria redoubled her efforts to 
 prevent any outbreak in Bosnia. 
 
 12. The situation just before the War of 1914 
 Such was the condition when Franz Ferdinand and his 
 morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, decided to 
 make a journey to Serajevo. The Servian Government, 
 hearing of his intentions, warned him of the danger of 
 which no doubt he was himself fully aware, but, as it might 
 be considered to Servia's interest to prevent his journey, no 
 significance seems to have been attached to the warning. 
 After the failure of the first attempt on his life, the Arch- 
 duke made an impassioned speech, in which he notified the 
 authorities that they would be held responsible for his 
 safety. The second attempt was successful, and on June 
 28, 1914, the fateful shot of Gavrilo Princip shattered the 
 dearest hopes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The news 
 of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir 
 to the Empire of the Hapsburgs, and his wife, at the hand of 
 pohtical conspirators of Servian nationality or sympathy, 
 was flashed over the wires to all parts of the world, and 
 every intelligent individual reahzed that the removal of 
 Franz Joseph's energetic heir would have some effect upon 
 future events, but there was no general appreciation of the 
 serious consequences threatened as a result of this assassin- 
 ation. Yet, from the moment the Young Turk party came 
 into power in 1908 up to the assassination at Serajevo, 
 there had been one continuous state of crisis in which no 
 one could tell what the next month might bring forth. The 
 chancelleries of Europe had realized aheady the gravity of 
 the general European situation, and after the assassination 
 they prepared with apprehension to watch attentively the 
 course of events. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 35 
 
 Since the outbreak of the war, GioHtti, ex-Premier of 
 Italy, has made public that Austria, in August of 1913, 
 notified the Italian Government that she intended to 
 declare war on Servia with Germany's consent. This indi- 
 cates how profoundly she had been affected by the changes 
 in the Balkans. But what Austria and Germany designated 
 as a defensive measure Italy considered aggression, and 
 refused to make common cause with her allies. Whether 
 Austria after waiting so long would have commenced a 
 war against Servia without the additional friction result- 
 ing from the crime of Serajevo, it is impossible to tell. As 
 Von Billow himself has said, the collapse of Turkey was a 
 blow to Germany and made necessary the introduction of 
 a new Army Bill. The German- Austrian Empires were 
 making every effort to regain the lost ground. But the 
 other powers were naturally not willing to lose their advan- 
 tage, and France replied to Germany's extraordinary war 
 taxes to increase her armament, by lengthening the period 
 of military service from two to three years, at the same 
 time that she lent Russia her financial aid to reorganize 
 her army, to build her fleet, and to lay down strategic rail- 
 ways along the German frontier. The German strategists 
 may well have feared that England also would turn her 
 attention toward her army. Germany at the zenith of her 
 military effectiveness was obHged to contemplate the rapid 
 increase of armament in Russia, possibly, too, in England. 
 Another very important factor in the European situation 
 was the bitterness so general in Germany after Agadir. 
 
 The French military attach^ at Berlin writes: ''We dis- 
 cover every day how deep and how lasting are the senti- 
 ments of wounded pride and rancor against us, provoked 
 by the events of last year. The treaty of November 4, 
 1911, is a profound disappointment. 
 
 "The resentment felt in every part of the country is the 
 same. All Germans, even the Sociahsts, resent our having 
 taken their share in Morocco." (F. Y. B. no. 1, Annex 1.) 
 
36 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 It is a curious circumstance, not without influence on 
 the events we are considering, that each of the Entente 
 Powers was, during July, in the throes of serious internal 
 difficulties. Great Britain was admitted on every hand to 
 be on the verge of a civil war; St. Petersburg was in the 
 midst of a great strike, especially dangerous in a country 
 which represses all expression of poHtical opinion; in 
 France, perhaps, the situation was most serious of all. The 
 attempt to constitute a ministry in sympathy with the 
 plans to strengthen the national defense had failed and the 
 direction of affairs had passed into the hands of the Social- 
 ist and more radical groups. The Caillaux affair was dis- 
 astrously affecting the prestige if not the very security of 
 the Government, and the Minister of War chose the occa- 
 sion to confess that the army was in a deplorable state of 
 unpreparedness. 
 
 Such was the situation in Europe between the assassina- 
 tion, on June 28, and the presentation of the Austrian 
 ultimatum, July 23. If Germany and Austria felt war was 
 inevitable, it must be confessed that another opportunity 
 equally favorable could hardly be expected. Nevertheless, 
 the best-informed opinion could not believe in the reality 
 of a great European war.^ 
 
 For a few days following the crime, there was a calm 
 such as often precedes a terrific tempest. The tone of the 
 press might have caused alarm, but the accusations made 
 in the Austrian and Servian newspapers were looked upon 
 as a natural consequence of the emotion aroused by the 
 tragedy of Serajevo. It was hoped these ebullitions might 
 
 1 After the event is the day of the scaremongers who proudly point to 
 their prophecies, but if we turned back a few months we should find coimt- 
 less other prophecies unfulfilled. The same is true of the interesting mihtary 
 reports in the French Yellow Book. There must be many such reports in 
 every Foreign Office of especial advantage to spur on the legislators to vote 
 the supplies for increased armaments. Their significance depends upon the 
 extent to which they are borne out by information from other sources. The 
 critic ought also to be able to compare them with similar reports received 
 in previous years. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 37 
 
 afford a harmless outlet for pent-up feelings and allow the 
 excitement to subside. In any event, it was thought no 
 action would be taken until the results of the investigation 
 of the outrage had been concluded and the findings made 
 public. But less than a month after the assassination, 
 Austria startled the world by addressing an ultimatum to 
 Servia without any previous warning. It was the opening 
 scene of the most tragic drama of human history. 
 
PART II 
 ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE AUSTRO-SERB CONFLICT 
 
 The terms of the Austrian note — Efforts of the powers to secure an exten- 
 sion of the time Umit — The powers influence Servia to make a concihatory 
 reply — Servia's reply — Austria rejects Servia's reply — The powers urge 
 Austria to delay military operations and accept the Servian reply as a basis 
 for discussion — Austrian assm-ances — Austria declares war on Servia — 
 Austria explains the purpose of her action. 
 
 1 . The terms of the Austrian note ^ 
 Although European diplomatists were alive to the 
 danger of possible complications between Austria and 
 Servia as a consequence of the assassination of the Arch- 
 duke, there was no suspicion of any immediate cause for 
 worry. It was expected, perhaps, that Austria would pre- 
 sent an angry protest to Servia and that negotiations 
 would be continued at the ordinary halting gait. Europe 
 looked with anxious gaze farther south, where Austria and 
 Italy were engaged in a diplomatic duel to secure control 
 of the newly constituted state of Albania with its magnifi- 
 cent harbor of Avlona (Vallona) commanding the entrance 
 to the Adriatic. Even in Albania it seemed that the very 
 difficulty of the situation would make the rivals cautious, 
 since England and France could be counted upon to 
 throw their influence for peace, and Germany would not 
 allow either of her allies to seize Avlona, which lay like an 
 apple of discord between them ; for a move on the part of 
 either to gain possession would have meant the disruption 
 of the Triple Alliance. So the diplomats took their usual 
 vacations. Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, 
 was absent from Berlin. The Russian Ambassador to 
 Berhn had turned over his office to a charge. The Kaiser 
 
 ^ For the text of the Austrian note and Servia's answer, see Documents, 
 post, chap. XIII. 
 
42 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 himself was on his annual cruise to Norway, while Presi- 
 dent Poincare and Premier Viviani, who was also Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, were on an official visit to the Tsar at 
 St. Petersburg.^ 
 
 Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at 
 Vienna, in his dispatch of September 1, giving an account 
 of the events preceding the war, says in substance:^ 'The 
 presentation of the note, on July 23, was preceded by a 
 period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz (Austrian For- 
 eign Office), and with the exception of the German Ambas- 
 sador, Von Tchirsky, who must have been aware of the 
 tenor, if not of the actual words, of the note, none of his 
 colleagues was allowed to see through the veil.^ On the 22d 
 
 1 B. W. p. no. 6. 
 
 2 As has been explained in the Preface, a single quotation is used at the 
 beginning and at the end of the extracts which are somewhat modified so as 
 to make it possible to include them in a running narrative of the events. In 
 other instances the modification has been made so as to separate out from a 
 docmnent the part relating to the question under discussion in the text. The 
 words "modified quotation" in parenthesis with the exact reference are 
 placed at the end of all such quotations to enable the reader to ascertain, by 
 refeiTing to the source, how faithfully the original has been adhered to. 
 Where the ordinary double quotations are employed, the original is strictly 
 followed. The word "extract" is placed in the parenthesis after a direct 
 quotation when a part only of the document is quoted. 
 
 ^ M. Jovanovitch, Servian Minister at Vienna, stated in a report drawn 
 up after the outbreak of hostilities: "In spite of all, it was known that a note 
 was being framed to the Minister which should contain the grievances and 
 claims of Austria-Hungary against Servia. This work was entrusted to 
 Count Forgach, formerly Minister from Austria-Hungary to Servia. It 
 was generally believed that, of the representatives of foreign countries, only 
 the German Ambassador, Herr von Tchirsky, had been kept informed of 
 the progress of this work, and I have reason to believe that he even collab- 
 orated in drawing up the note. Representatives of states favorable to us 
 also agreed with me in thinking that, drafted by these two authors, the 
 note would contain very hard conditions for Servia, and not such as she could 
 accept. When the text of the note was made public, they were all taken by 
 surprise, not to say dismayed." (Extract, August 16, S. B. B. no. 52.) 
 
 As early as July 15 M. Jovanovitch telegraphed to Belgrade: "From 
 now on, one thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will make diplomatic rep- 
 resentations (demarches) at Belgrade as soon as the Serajevo investigation 
 has been completed and the case presented to the tribunal." (Extract, 
 July 15, S. B. B. no. 23.) 
 
 In another telegram of the same date the Servian Minister furnishes his 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 43 
 
 and 23d of July, M. Dumaine, the French Ambassador, 
 had long interviews with Baron Macehio, one of the Under- 
 
 Government with a prophetic analysis of the plans of the Austrian Govern- 
 ment : — 
 
 "What steps will be taken? In what form? What demands is Austria- 
 Hungary about to make on Servia? I do not believe that even at Ballplatz 
 clear and concise replies could be given to these questions. I think that all 
 this is being worked out at the present time/and that Count Forgach has 
 become the principal factor in the matter. 
 
 "In one of my previous reports, I mentioned that Austria-Hungary had 
 to choose between two courses: that of considering the outrage at Serajevo 
 an internal affair and inviting us to aid her in discovering and punishing the 
 guilty; or, on the other hand, that of turning the tragedy of Serajevo into 
 a case against Servians and Servia and even against the Southern-Slav 
 movement (jougo-Slave). Judging from all that is being projected and all 
 that is being done, it seems to me that Austria-Hungary will choose this 
 second course. She will choose it, convinced that she will receive the ap- 
 probation of Europe ; why not profit by it to humiliate us and, up to a certain 
 point, justify the Friedjung trial and that of Agram? Besides, she would 
 justify to her own people and to Europe the severe reactionary measures 
 she intends to take in the country in repressing the Pan-Servian propaganda 
 and the Southern-Slav (jougo-Slave) idea. Finally, this Government believes 
 that it will be doing something also for its own prestige, convinced that this 
 will increase the esteem in which it is held both abroad and in the interior 
 of the Monarchy. 
 
 "I think that the Austro-Hungarian Government will draw up a memo- 
 randum, or rather an indictment of Servia. In this document will be set 
 forth all that has been gathered against us from April, 1909, to to-day, and 
 I believe that it will be sufficiently long. This indictment the Government 
 will send to the Cabinets of the European powers, adding that the facts 
 therein set forth give Austria the right to make certain diplomatic repre- 
 sentations at Belgrade, and to demand that Servia fulfill in the future all 
 the obligations of a loyal neighbor. At the same time the Government of 
 Vienna will send a note to us also, in which will be rehearsed all that the 
 Dual Monarchy desires us, without question, to perform." (July 15, S. B. B. 
 no. 25.) 
 
 Even before this, on July 7, M. Jovanovitch, had sent a report of a similar 
 tenor: "In this matter Austria-Hungary will have to choose between two 
 solutions: either to regard the crime of Serajevo as a national misfortune 
 and a criminal act which must be adjudged according to established proof, 
 the assistance of Servia being sought in this task, that the guilty may in no 
 way escape the severest punishment; or else to make of the outrage at 
 Serajevo a Pan-Servian, Southern-Slav {jougo-Slave), Pan-Slav conspiracy, 
 with every manifestation of hate on the part of Austria-Hungary toward 
 everything Slav, — hate which up to this time has been dissembled. There 
 are several indications that those competent to act in the matter are being 
 pressed toward this second solution, and it is for that reason that it is neces- 
 sary to be prepared for defense. In case the first solution should be adopted, 
 we ought to rally to it completely." (Extract, July 7, S. B. B. no. 17.) 
 
44 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was 
 left under the impression that the words of warning he had 
 been instructed to speak to the Austrian Government had 
 not been unavaiUng and that the note which was being 
 drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a 
 self-respecting state need hesitate to comply. At the sec- 
 ond of these interviews he was not even informed that the 
 Austrian note (ultimatum) was at that very moment being 
 presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in 
 Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the 
 other Under-Secretary of State, had, indeed. Sir Maurice 
 says, confided to him the true character of the note, and 
 the fact of its presentation about the time they were 
 speaking.^ 
 
 1 This hardly seems in agreement with the following consular report, 
 which the French Ambassador at Vienna stated (July 19) was "drawn from 
 a source which commands consideration" (F. Y. B. no. 13): — 
 
 Vienna, July 20, 1914. 
 
 "I hear from a personage, who is specially well informed with regard to 
 official news, that the French Government would be wrong in heeding the 
 optimism-mongers. Much will be demanded of Servia. The dissolution of 
 several societies engaged in national propaganda will be forced upon her. 
 She will be called upon to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in collab- 
 oration with Austrian commissaries, to police her schools with reference to 
 anti-Austrian feeling, and it is really difficult for a Government to agree to 
 act as policeman for a foreign Government. The shifts by which Servia will 
 no doubt wish to delay a direct and clear reply have been taken into account, 
 and that is why a brief delay will be fixed for her to notify her acceptance or 
 refusal. The tenor of the note and its imperative air make it almost certain 
 that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will follow. 
 
 "There is here, as in Berlin, a clan which accepts the idea of a conflict on 
 a general scale — in other words, a conflagration. The governing idea prob- 
 ably is that it is necessary to start before Russia can have finished the great 
 improvement of her army and of her railways, and before France has over- 
 hauled her military organization. 
 
 "But here there is not agreement in high circles. Count Berchtold and the 
 diplomats want at most a localized operation against Servia, but everything 
 has to be considered possible — everything. I have been struck by a curious 
 fact. Generally, the official telegraph agency, in its summaries of the views 
 of the foreign press, disregards all but the official newspapers and the more 
 important organs; it omits aU quotations and all mention of the others. This 
 is a rule and a tradition. For the last ten days the official agency has daily 
 supplied to the press of Austria-Hungary a complete review of the whole 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 45 
 
 ' So little had the Russian Ambassador to Vienna been 
 made aware of what was preparing, that he actually left 
 Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th of 
 July. He had only been absent a few days when events 
 compelled him to return. It might have been supposed 
 that Due Avarna, Ambassador of the allied ItaUan King- 
 dom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh 
 
 Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest and 
 most insignificant newspapers, who, owing to their very insignificance, use 
 language which is freer, more daring, more aggressive, and frequently insult- 
 ing. The object of this work of the official agency is evidently to arouse 
 opinion, to create an opinion favorable to war. The fact is significant." 
 (F. Y. B. no. 14.) 
 
 On July 14, M. Pashitch, Prime Minister of Servia, sent a telegram to the 
 Servian legations explaining this activity of the Austrian Correspondence 
 Bureau, in stirring up animosity against Servia, by the dissemination of 
 reports of articles published in the Servian press. The dispatch closes 
 with the remark: "No one in Europe would know anything of what our 
 own newspapers print, if the Correspondence Bureau of Vienna did not give 
 it wide circulation for the purpose of injuring Servia." (Extract, July 14, 
 S. B. B. no. 20.) 
 
 Only two days after the assassination, M. Jovanovitch, Servian Minister 
 at Vienna, had sent the following warning to the Servian Government: 
 "More and more evident is the tendency in Vienna to give Europe the 
 impression that the outrage committed against the hereditary Archduke of 
 Austria-Hungary is the outcome of a conspiracy hatched in Servia. It is 
 their intention to use it as a political means against us. It is necessary, 
 therefore, to guard with the greatest care the language of our newspapers 
 about the affair at Serajevo." (June 30, S. B. B. no. 2.) 
 
 As early as July 11, the French Consul at Budapest informed his Govern- 
 ment : — 
 
 "Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of the public 
 believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason 
 to have confidence have told me that they know that every day guns and 
 ammunition have been sent in large quantities to the frontier. True or not 
 true, this rumor has been reported to me from various quarters with corrobo- 
 rative details. It shows, at any rate, the nature of the general preoccupa- 
 tions. The Government, whether it be seriously desirous of peace or whether 
 it be preparing a coup, is now doing everything it can to allay this anxiety. 
 That is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered first 
 by one note and then by two, until now it has become almost optimistic. 
 But the Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the alarm. 
 Their optimism to order is really without an echo. The nervousness of the 
 Bourse, a barometer one cannot neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, 
 without exception, have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian 
 4 per cent was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never been quoted 
 since the first issue." (F. Y. B. no. 11; cf. S. B. B. no. 22.) 
 
46 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully 
 into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical 
 time. In point of fact His Excellency was left completely 
 in the dark.^ As for Sir Maurice de Bunsen himself, no. 
 indication was given him by Count Berchtold of the im- 
 pending storm, and it was from a private source that he 
 received on the 15th of July the forecast of what was about 
 to happen, which he telegraphed to his Government the 
 following day. 2 It is true that during all this time the Neue 
 Freie Presse and other leading Viennese newspapers were 
 using language which pointed unmistakably to war with 
 Servia.^ The official Fremdenhlatt, however, was more 
 
 1 Cf. B. W. P. no. 38. 
 
 2 It is to be regretted that no mention of this dispatch of the 16th is found 
 in the British White Paper. It would be interesting to know what warning 
 Sir Maurice gave his Government. The omission of the dispatch leaves the 
 reader with the impression that Downing Street (British Foreign Office) had 
 received no information of the forthcoming note to Servia. 
 
 3 The London Times of July 23 published a dispatch of July 22 from their 
 Vienna correspondent, that 'contrary to expectation, Count Tisza, Hun- 
 garian Prime Minister, did not answer that evening Count Andrassy's inter- 
 pellation on the Austro-Servian situation, stating, before the interpellation 
 was brought, he was unable for the time being to reply to it, not considering 
 it in the interests of the country that the matter should be ventilated at that 
 moment. Count Tisza's declaration, which was completely unexpected, was 
 stated to have occasioned great surprise in parliamentary circles in Buda- 
 pest. The day before, the Austrian funds fell below 791, the lowest that 
 Government stock had ever touched.' (Modified quotation.) 
 
 The Times coiTespondent further gave an account of two important articles 
 which appeared in the Vienna newspapers that day, July 22: 'The first, 
 which appeared in the Neues Wiener Tageblatt, read as though it were in- 
 tended to prepare Servia for what the Austro-Hungarian note woiild demand 
 of her. This journal, often in close touch with the Ballplatz, advised com- 
 petent quarters in Belgrade to take steps that the points at issue between 
 Austria and Servia might be placed in a proper light before the Servian 
 people, since the "clarification of the relations of the two countries is abso- 
 lutely necessary, and we admit that the process will not be a pleasure for 
 Servia; for it will natm-ally entail a large sacrifice of amour propre and cannot 
 fail to wound the exalted vanity of the adherents of the Greater Servia idea." 
 Servia, the article continued, was possessed by an "incomprehensible megalo- 
 mania," which made her strive to take rank with the great powers. She must, 
 however, make up her mind, in spite of all her politicians and generals, "to 
 remain a middle state." Empty promises, Servia was warned, would not 
 suffice this time, and the article concluded: "The demands which om- Gov- 
 ernment will make are not as yet known, but when they are presented, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 47 
 
 cautious, and, till the note was published, the prevailing 
 opinion among the members of the diplomatic corps was 
 that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve 
 her in grave European comphcations.' (Modified quotation, 
 September 1, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) 
 
 We learn from the report which the Servian Minister 
 at Vienna sent to his Government on July 20, that he 
 was expecting a war. He stated : — 
 
 ''It is very difficult, ahnost impossible, to get hold of 
 anything definite here in regard to the real intentions of 
 Austria-Hungary. The watchword in regard to every- 
 thing that is going on is absolute secrecy. To judge from 
 what our newspapers write, Belgrade is optimistic in re- 
 gard to our relations with Austria-Hungary. But it is not 
 possible to be optimistic. There is no doubt that Austria- 
 Hungary meditates something serious. What is most to 
 be feared and what is very likely is that she meditates war 
 against Servia. The general conviction here is that for 
 Austria-Hungary once again to take no action against 
 Servia would be equivalent to suicide. Moreover, the idea 
 that Servia, after two wars, is completely exhausted, and 
 that a war undertaken against her would be nothing more 
 than an expedition ending in prompt occupation, has taken 
 still deeper root. It is beheved also that such a war would 
 be over before Europe could intervene. 
 
 Servia will certainly feel that it is not her fate to become a great power at 
 our expense, and that she has aheady reached the utmost limits of her 
 growth. ... We are very desirous that the necessary discussion which is 
 impending may find pubhc opinion in Servia in a state of mind to understand 
 all this." 
 
 'The other article was pubUshed in the Reichspost, and was of mterest 
 inasmuch as it summed up some of the arguments adduced in quarters which 
 demanded the adoption by the Monarchy of a very energetic attitude in 
 Belgrade. These were briefly that "the acceptance of anything short of an 
 unconditional guarantee for the maintenance of orderon the southern frontier 
 of the Monarchy" would be regarded as a sign of weakness, not only by 
 Servia, but also by the adversaries and the friends of Austria-Hungary in 
 Europe. In other words, this opportunity must be taken to demonstrate to 
 the world the strength of Austria-Hungary as a great power.' (Modified 
 quotation, London Times, July 23, 1914.) 
 
48 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 "Military preparations, which are being made especially 
 on the Servian frontier, are a proof that the intentions of 
 Austria are serious." (July 20, S. B. B. no. 31.) 
 
 On July 23, the very day on which the Austrian note was 
 presented, the Austrian Ambassador at London gave Sir 
 Edward Grey to understand that he would give him next 
 day a paper which would ' include proof of the complicity 
 of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Arch- 
 duke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands conse- 
 quently made by Austria on Servia.' ^ 
 
 To this Sir Edward rephed that he would not 'make any 
 comment until he had an official communication, and it 
 seemed to him probably a matter on which he should not 
 be able to make any comment on first sight.' But when the 
 Ambassador added that 'he supposed there would be some- 
 thing in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin 
 to an ultimatum, Sir Edward regretted it very much. To 
 begin with, because a time limit might inflame opinion in 
 Russia, it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give 
 more time even if after a few days it should appear that, by 
 giving more time, there would be a prospect of securing a 
 peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from 
 Servia. Sir Edward admitted that, if there were no time 
 limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but he 
 urged that a time limit could always be introduced after- 
 ward; and if the demands were made without a time limit 
 in the first instance, Russian pubhc opinion might be less 
 excited. After a week it might have cooled down, and if the 
 Austrian case was very strong, it might be found that the 
 Russian Government would be disposed to use its influence 
 in favor of securing a satisfactory reply from Servia. A 
 time limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last 
 resort, after other means had been tried and failed. 
 
 'The Austrian Ambassador rephed that if Servia, in the 
 
 ^ Cf. F. Y. B. no. 74, enclosure. This material, with several important 
 annexes, is given in the Austrian Red Book, no. 19. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 49 
 
 interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Arch- 
 duke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own 
 territory, all this comphcation might have been avoided.^ 
 
 1 The Austrian Councilor of Legation at Belgrade, on the second day 
 (June 30) following the tragedy, 'directed to the General Secretary of the 
 Servian Foreign Office, M. Gruic, the very pertinent mquiry as to what 
 measures the Servian poUce had taken or contemplated takmg m order to 
 follow the threads of the assassination, which notoriously led over mto 
 
 'M. Gruic's reply was that the Servian police had, as a matter of fact, 
 given the matter no consideration.' (Modified quotation, June 30, A. R. 
 
 In his'dispatch of July 23, Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Am- 
 bassador at London to point out to Sir Edward Grey when he communi- 
 cated the Austrian Circular Note on the 24th instant that "Servia would 
 have had it in her power to ward off the vigorous action which we must have 
 been expected to take if she had spontaneously on her own account taken the 
 necessary steps to establish an investigation on Servian territory against 
 the Servian participants in the assassination of June 28, and to investigate 
 the clews which, in connection with the assassination, have been proved to 
 lead from Belgrade to Serajevo. 
 
 "The Servian Government has till to-day, despite the fact that a number 
 of notoriously familiar indications point toward Belgrade, not only under- 
 taken nothing in this matter, but it has rather sought to wipe out the traces 
 
 "Thus it can be gathered from a telegraphic report of our [the Austrian] 
 Embassy at Belgrade that the Servian State official Ciganovic, who has 
 been compromised by the common testimony of the assassins, still so- 
 journed in Belgrade on the day of the assassination, but that three days 
 thereafter, when his name was mentioned in the newspapers, he had already 
 quitted the city. It is well known, too, that the Servian Chief of the Press 
 has already declared that Ciganovitch is utterly unknown in Belgrade." 
 (Extract, June 23, A. R. B. no. 9.) ,.,,„. .u 
 
 M. Pashitch, the Servian Prime Minister, in a telegram of July 19, to the 
 Servian Missions abroad, stated: — • 
 
 "From the beginning the Servian Government has declared itself ready 
 to bring before the courts of justice every Servian subject shown to have 
 taken part in the outrage of Serajevo. Furthermore, the Government has 
 declared that it had prepared a bill to render more efficacious the measures 
 already taken against any misuse of ex-plosives. This bill had aheady 
 been submitted to the Council of State, but could not be presented to the 
 Skoupchtina, that body having been dissolved. Finally, the Servian Gov- 
 ernment has declared that it is ready, in the future as in the past, to fulfill 
 all those neighborlv duties devolving upon it as a European state. 
 
 " Since the outrage was committed, the Austro-Hungarian Government 
 has at no time addressed itself to the Servian Government for the purpose 
 of secuj-ing its concurrent action in regard to the matter of the outrage. It 
 has not demanded that one of the accomplices be subjected to a prelinunary 
 
50 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live 
 on terms of good neighborhood with Austria; but she had 
 never kept her promise. She had stirred up agitation, the 
 object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and had made 
 it absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself. 
 
 ' Sir Edward Grey said that he would not comment upon 
 or criticize what the Austrian Ambassador had told him 
 that afternoon, but he could not help dwelling upon the 
 awful consequences involved in the situation. Great appre- 
 hension had been expressed to him, not only by the French 
 and Russian Ambassadors, but also by others, as to what 
 might happen, and it had been represented to him that it 
 would be very desirable that those who had influence in 
 St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and mod- 
 eration.^ ^He had repUed that the amount of influence that 
 could be used in this sense would depend upon how rea- 
 sonable were the Austrian demands, and how strong the 
 
 examination or be brought to trial. Once only it asked for particulars in 
 regard to the present address of some students who had been expelled from 
 the primary normal school of Pakrac and who had come to Servia to con- 
 tinue their studies. All the information on this subject which could be 
 gathered was forwarded to the Austrian Government. 
 
 "Nevertheless, the campaign against Servia is continued in the Austro- 
 Hungarian press and public opinion against Servia is being excited in 
 Austria-Hungary and in Europe. . . . We shall welcome the claims of Aus- 
 tria-Hungary in case she may demand that certain accomplices in Servia 
 — should any such be found — be brought before our own independent 
 courts to receive judgment." (Extract, July 19, S. B. B. no. 30.) 
 
 Servia's action in not instituting any investigation was, under the circum- 
 stances, not merely discourteous to Austria, but really insulting. When, on 
 July 4, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris transmitted to M. Poincar^ the 
 thanks of his Government for his sympathy at the tragic bereavement of 
 the imperial house, the president of the Republic had ' expressed the convic- 
 tion that the Servian Government would come to meet Austria with the 
 greatest possible degree of conciliation in respect to the judicial investiga- 
 tion and prosecution of those found to be accomplices. No state could, he 
 said, evade such a duty.' (Modified quotation, July 4, A. R. B. no. 4.) 
 
 ^ It may perhaps seem somewhat far-fetched to remark that the words of 
 the French and Russian Ambassadors, being members of the Triple Entente, 
 would not, of course, have seemed to the Austrian representative so signifi- 
 cant as this veiled hint at apprehension on the part of the German Ambassa- 
 dor, who is easily understood as included among "others." (See B.W. P. 
 no. 11.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 51 
 
 justification that Austria might have discovered for mak- 
 ing her demands. The possible consequences of the present 
 situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of 
 Europe, say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany, were 
 engaged in war, it seemed to him that it must involve the 
 expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an inter- 
 ference with trade that a war would be accompanied or 
 followed by a complete collapse of European credit and 
 industry. In these days, in great industrial states, this 
 would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, 
 irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things 
 might be completely swept away. 
 
 'The Austrian Ambassador did not demur to this state- 
 ment of the possible consequences of the present situation, 
 but said that all would depend upon Russia. 
 
 ' Sir Edward made the remark that, in a time of difficul- 
 ties such as the present, it was just as true to say that it 
 required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, 
 that it took two to make a quarrel. He hoped very much 
 that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be 
 able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each 
 other. 
 
 'The Austrian Ambassador said that he hoped this 
 would be possible, but he was under the impression that 
 the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favorable 
 recently.' (Modified quotations, July 23, B. W. P. no. 3.) 
 
 The next day, July 24, the Austrian Government com- 
 municated the contents of their note and the reasons for 
 its presentation.^ 
 
 ' The note was also published in the Vienna newspapers 
 the same day, and by common consent it was at once 
 styled an ultimatum.'^ (Modified quotation, B. W. P., 
 
 * The texts of the Austrian note of July 23, and the Servian reply of July 
 25, will be found among the Documents; see post, chap. xiii. 
 
 ' The effect of an ultimatum is to put an end to discussion by the offering 
 of final terms to be accepted or rejected. 
 
52 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) The Austrian note to Ser- 
 via began as follows: ''On the 31st of March, 1909, the 
 Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the 
 Servian Government, made the following declaration to 
 the Imperial and Royal Government : — 
 
 '''Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding 
 Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she 
 will conform to the decisions that the powers may take in 
 conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In 
 deference to the advice of the great powers Servia under- 
 takes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest 
 and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the 
 annexation since last Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, 
 to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria- 
 Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms 
 with the latter.' " (Extract, July 24, B. W. P. no. 4; cf. A. 
 R. B. no. 8.) 
 
 In diplomatic parlance this statement, referred to at the 
 beginning of the Austrian note, was equivalent to an agree- 
 ment to abandon any active support of the Pan-Serb prop- 
 aganda, and not to permit the Servian territory to be made 
 use of for any such purpose; but this engagement was 
 taken before the Balkan War had added so materially to 
 the strength of the Servian state and before the hearts of 
 her people had been embittered by Austria and Italy's 
 blocking their access to the sea by way of the Albanian 
 coast. Russia objected that this agreement by Servia was 
 made ''in deference to the advice of the great powers" and 
 was not given to Austria alone. Consequently, its enforce- 
 ment should likewise have been considered a concern of 
 all the powers. There is much truth in this remark. Be- 
 sides, every Balkan question has always been looked upon 
 as of general concern. 
 
 The Austrian note or ultimatum then went on to com- 
 plain that Servia had not carried out this undertaking 
 formally entered into, and had made it necessary for 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 53 
 
 Austria to put an end to the intrigues which menaced her 
 tranquiUity by demanding a formal assurance from Servia. 
 To this effect the Austro-Hungarian Government insisted 
 upon imposing the terms in which Servia should make an 
 official and most pubhc condemnation of the propaganda 
 complained of, and express regret at its ghastly conse- 
 quences. In addition the note formulated ten demands. 
 Servia was required to answer by six o'clock of Saturday 
 evening, July 25, only two days after its presentation. To 
 the note was attached a memorandum deahng with the 
 results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo in as far as it 
 related to the comphcity of the Servian officials mentioned 
 in the demands. 
 
 The memorandum explaining the comphcity of the 
 Servian officials seems to have been a mere statement of 
 what the Austrian ofiicials considered to be the facts 
 which, if adequately supported by copies of depositions, 
 etc., would have borne out the statements of the note. In 
 other words, it added nothing to the say-so of the Austrian 
 Government, which was submitted in writing to the Serv- 
 ian Government to be accepted as true and acted upon 
 within forty-eight hours, without its being furnished with 
 anything worthy of the name of proof in the broadest sense 
 of the word.^ 
 
 In communicating this note to the powers, Austria 
 accompanied it with explanations of the nature of the 
 
 1 When M. Sazonof asked the Austrian Ambassador to explain whether 
 or not it had been proved that the series of outrages he mentioned originated 
 in Belgrade, the latter emphasized the fact that they were the result of 
 Servian instigation. (A. R. B. no. 14.) 
 
 In a note of July 1, sent to all the Servian representatives, the Servian 
 Prime Minister, M. Pashitch had defended his Government from such an 
 imputation: "At the moment when Servia was making every eifort to bring 
 about better and more friendly relations with her neighbor, the Monarchy, 
 it would be absurd to think that, either directly or indirectly, she could have 
 inspired such acts. On the contrary, it was to the vital interest of Servia 
 herself that this crime should not have taken place. Unfortunately that 
 was a matter beyond her power, the two authors of the outrage being Aus- 
 trian subjects." (Extract, July 1, S. B. B. no. 8.) 
 
54 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Servian propaganda of which she complained. It was 
 stated that ' the Servian Government had failed in the duty- 
 imposed on it by the solemn declaration of March 31, 1909, 
 and had acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the 
 undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. The British Gov- 
 ernment was informed that the Austrian Government held 
 at its disposal a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues 
 and the connection between these intrigues and the murder 
 of the 28th of June.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. 
 no. 4. Of. F. Y. B. no. 75, Annex; A. R. B. no. 19.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey remarked to the Austrian Ambassador 
 that it seemed a matter for great regret that a time limit, 
 and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this 
 stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and 
 some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the 
 note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, 
 but at the same time he had never before seen one state 
 address to another independent state a document of so 
 formidable a character. Demand number 5 would be 
 hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's inde- 
 pendent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that 
 it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a 
 right to appoint officials who would have authority within 
 the frontiers of Servia. 'Sir Edward added that he felt 
 great apprehension, and that he would concern himself 
 with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of 
 the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute betweei 
 Austria and Servia were not, he said, the concern of tht 
 British Government, and such comments as he had previ- 
 ously made had not been made in order to discuss those 
 merits. 
 
 'He ended by saying that doubtless the British Govern- 
 ment would enter into an exchange of views with other 
 powers, and that he must await their views as to what 
 could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. 
 (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 5.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 55 
 
 In the absence of the Russian Ambassador the Russian 
 Charge at Vienna called upon Count Berchtold the morn- 
 ing after the note was presented, before there had been 
 time for instructions from St. Petersburg to arrive, and told 
 him 'as his own personal view, that the Austrian note was 
 drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as 
 it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in 
 its terms.' ^ (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 7; 
 cf. B. W. P. nos. 17, 32.) 
 
 The Servian Government informed the British repre- 
 sentative that Hhey considered the Austrian demands 
 absolutely unacceptable.' (Modified quotation, July 24, 
 B. W. P. no. 8; cf. S. B. B. no. 35; R. 0. P. nos. 1, 6.) 
 
 The experienced diplomat, M. Paul Cambon, thought 
 'the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian de- 
 mand.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10; cf. 
 B. W. P. no. 16.) 
 
 ' In a long conversation with the Austrian Ambassador 
 on July 26, M. Sazonof pointed out how some of the de- 
 mands were absolutely inexecutable, even in case the 
 Servian Government should declare its willingness to ac- 
 
 1 "Until Austrian diplomacy emerged into publicity with the ultimatum 
 to Servia on July 23, the Dual Monarchy appeared to have strong claims on 
 neutral sympathy. Continued hostile agitation in Servia; alleged intrigues 
 in Austria's Slav provinces; pledges of more neighborly behavior repeatedly 
 broken; finally, the murder of the successor to the throne, through a con- 
 spiracy asserted to have been framed in the Servian capital and to have been 
 abetted by Servian officials — these were indeed grievances. Neutral sym- 
 pathy was sensibly lessened by the far-reaching demands formulated in the 
 Austrian ultimatum, and even more by the unusual and peremptory tone of 
 this undiplomatic communication. From the diplomatic point of view, the 
 Russian Minister of Foreign Aflfairs was quite justified in saying that its form 
 was 'scarcely clever' (peu habile). (Russian Orange Paper, no. 25.) Even 
 the German Secretary of State confessed that 'the note left much to be 
 desired as a diplomatic document.' (British Blue Book, no. 18.) Neutral 
 sympathy began to shift to the other side in consequence of Servia's unex- 
 pectedly conciliatory reply and Austria's refusal to recognize Servia's con- 
 cessions as a possible basis for negotiation or mediation. Instead of turmng 
 away wrath, Servia's soft answer elicited a declaration of war." (Munroe 
 Smith, "Military Strategy wrsus Diplomacy," PoKiicoI Science Quarterly, 
 vol. XXX, [1915] no. 1, pp. 55-56.) 
 
56 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 cept them.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. 0. P. no. 25; 
 cf. B. W. P. no. 44.) 
 
 The Russian Ambassador, after his return to Vienna, 
 told Count Berchtold that Hhey were absolutely inac- 
 ceptable by any independent state, no matter how small.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 27, R. 0. P. no. 41; R. O. P. no. 
 77.) Even the German Secretary of State 'admitted that 
 the Servian Government could not swallow certain of the 
 Austro-Hungarian demands.' (Modified quotation, July 
 25, B. W. P. no. 18.) In fact the Secretary 'confessed pri- 
 vately he thought the note left much to be desired as a 
 diplomatic document and he repeated very earnestly that, 
 though he had been accused of knowing all about the con- 
 tents of the note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18; see also 
 B. W. P. no. 25.) 
 
 Russia's official protest, dated the 24th, was directed 
 'against the note's leaving a period to the powers quite 
 insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might 
 help to smooth away the difficulties that had arisen. A 
 refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would, the 
 Russian Government said, render nugatory the proposals 
 made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, 
 and would be in contradiction to the very bases of inter- 
 national relations.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. 
 no. 13;cf. R. 0. P. no. 4.) 
 
 Previously to the presentation of the note the Austrian 
 Ambassador at London had, as was said above, admitted 
 that the Austrian note ' would have something in the nature 
 of a time limit which was in effect akin to an ultimatum.' 
 (Cf. B. W. P. no. 3.) But two days later 'he was authorized 
 to explain to Sir Edward Grey that the step taken at 
 Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a 
 time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not 
 complied with within the time limit, the Austro-Hunga- 
 rian Government would break off diplomatic relations and 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 57 
 
 begin military preparations, not operations.'^ Sir Edward 
 Grey, with evident satisfaction at this characterization of 
 the note, instructed the British representatives at Paris 
 and St. Petersburg, ' in case the Austrian Government had 
 not there given the same information, to inform the Minis- 
 ter for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; as it made the 
 immediate situation rather less acute.' (Modified quota- 
 tions, July 25, B. W. P. no. 14; cf. B. W. P. nos. 25, 26; 
 F. Y. B. no. 36; R. O. P. no. 16.) That same day the report 
 came back from Paris that the 'French Government had 
 not yet received such an explanation from the Austrian 
 Government, while at the Russian capital M. Sazonof told 
 the British Ambassador the explanations of the Austrian 
 Government did not quite correspond with the informa- 
 tion which had reached him from German quarters.' ^ 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. nos. 15, 17.) 
 
 1 According to the Austrian Red Book this information was given to Sir 
 Edward Grey in confidence. This would look as though the Austrians ex- 
 pected England to remain quiet while they derived the full benefit of their 
 unjustifiable coup. Such a course on England's part would not have been 
 loyal. Count Berchtold's instructions to the Austrian Ambassador at Lon- 
 don, in his telegram of July 24, were: — 
 
 " Try to make it clear at once to Sir Edward Grey that our dimarche of 
 yesterday in Belgrade is not to be regarded as a formal ultimatum, but that 
 it is a matter of a demarche with a term of grace (delay), which, as Your Ex- 
 cellency will communicate in strictest confidence to Sir Edward Grey, — in 
 case the term of grace expires without result, — will be followed for the 
 time being only by a severance of diplomatic relations and by the beginning 
 of necessary military preparations, since we are absolutely determined to 
 carry out our justified demands. 
 
 "Your Excellency is authorized to add that certainly if Servia, after the 
 expiration of the term of grace, will yield only under pressure of our military 
 preparation, we must hold it to account for the costs that have accrued 
 to us. As is well known, we were twice [1908 and 1912] obliged to mobilize 
 on account of Servia." (July 24, A. R. B. no. 17.) 
 
 2 When the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asked the German 
 Ambassador "whether the Austrian note bore the character of a mere mise 
 en dcjneure for allowing of discussion or of an ultimatum, the latter replied 
 that he had no personal view on this point." (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. 
 no. 28; cf. R. O. P. no. 18.) All this discussion as to whether the Austrian 
 note was a demarche (that is, a simple presentation of views with a re- 
 quest added for an answer) with a time limit, or an ultimatum, is of real 
 importance because it indicates that the Austrian Government was either 
 
58 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 What are we to think of this discrepancy? Was Austria 
 trying to deceive England for the purpose of arresting her 
 efforts toward diplomatic intervention, or did she wish to 
 offer to Sir Edward Grey an explanation which might assist 
 the British Government to quiet public opinion and resist 
 being drawn in? In any event, in the light of subsequent 
 events, it would seem to show either an inefficient system 
 of diplomacy and double currents in the Government, or 
 an attempt to steal a march on the other powers and 
 put them face to face with a fait accompli — a policy she 
 had so successfully engineered in the case of the Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina cowp. 
 
 On the other hand, refreshingly frank is the statement 
 of the German Secretary of State, Von Jagow, that ' he did 
 not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, 
 but he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that 
 they meant to take military action.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.) 
 
 ' The general opinion in diplomatic circles at Vienna was 
 
 undecided what its action would be or was trying to convey a different im- 
 pression of its action at London than at the other capitals. 
 
 On July 11, several days before the Austrian note was presented, the 
 French Consul-General at Budapest sent the following report to his Gov- 
 ernment : — 
 
 "Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian ques- 
 tion, M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait 
 for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment 
 to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full ap- 
 proval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions 
 taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indica- 
 tion whether the project of a demarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers 
 of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented 
 without hesitation. 
 
 "With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has been given to 
 minimize its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evap- 
 orated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in 
 advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press 
 especially would desire that for the word 'demarche/ with its appearance of 
 a threat, there should be substituted the expression 'pourparlers,' which 
 appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the 
 moment all is for peace." (Extract, July 11, F. Y. B. no. 11.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 59 
 
 that the Austro-Hungarian Government were determined 
 on war, and that the Austro-Hungarian note had been so 
 drawn up as to make war inevitable.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 27, B. W. P. nos. 40 and 41.) 
 
 2. Efforts of the powers to secure an extension of the time limit 
 The powers did not, however, lose much time in futile 
 protests against the terms of the Austrian note, but em- 
 ployed all the means at their disposal toward preventing 
 the actual outbreak of hostilities between Austria and 
 Servia. For they felt, as M. Paul Cambon, French Ambas- 
 sador to London, said to Sir Edward Grey, that 'Russia 
 would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as 
 soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the 
 Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any 
 mediation.' (Modified quotation, B. W. P. no. 10.) 
 
 As soon as the terms of the Austrian ultimatum were 
 known, England, Russia, and France made every effort to 
 secure an extension of the period of forty-eight hours which 
 Austria had imposed as the time limit for the receipt of the 
 Servian answer. While evincing a certain sympathy with 
 Austria's difficulties, the powers besought her to extend 
 the time limit. At St. Petersburg, the British Ambassador 
 expressed to M. Sazonof the opinion 'that the important 
 point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and 
 that the first thing to do was to bring influence to bear on 
 Austria with that end in view.' His colleague, the French 
 Ambassador, did not agree with this, saying, 'either Aus- 
 tria had made up her mind to act at once or she was bluff- 
 ing. Whichever it might be, he considered the only chance 
 of averting war was to adopt a firm and united attitude. 
 There was not, he thought, time to carry out the British 
 Ambassador's suggestion.' (Modified quotation, July 24, 
 B. W. P. no. 6.) 
 
 On the same date, probably just after that conversation, 
 M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian Charge at Vienna 
 
60 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 instructions to present the following vigorous protest : ' The 
 communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to 
 the powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum 
 to Belgrade leaves to the powers a delay entirely insuffi- 
 cient to undertake any useful steps whatever for the 
 straightening out of the compHcations that have arisen. 
 To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disas- 
 trous for all the powers, which may result from the action 
 of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us 
 above all indispensable that the delay allowed Servia to 
 reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, in declaring 
 herself disposed to inform the powers of the results of the 
 inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government 
 bases its accusations, should at least give them the time to 
 consider them. If after such consideration the powers 
 should be convinced that certain of the Austrian demands 
 were well founded, they would be in a position to advise 
 the Servian Government accordingly. A refusal to extend 
 the period of the ultimatum would render worthless the 
 step taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government in regard 
 to the powers and would be contrary to the basic principles 
 governing international relations.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 13; July 24, R. 0. P. no. 4; cf. A. R. 
 B. no. 21.) In communicating this protest to the powers, 
 Russia expressed the hope that similar instructions might 
 be given their representatives at Vienna. 
 
 The Russian note sets forth plainly that such an insuffi- 
 cient interval allowed no time for the powers to consider 
 the reasonableness of the Austrian complaint, and so was 
 nugatory of the very purpose of the explanations offered, 
 and contrary to the basic principles of international rela- 
 tions. 
 
 Von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, upon receipt, at 10 o'clock in the morning of July 
 25, of a telegram from the German Ambassador at London, 
 'immediately instructed the German Ambassador at Vi- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 61 
 
 enna to ' ' pass on " to the Austrian Government Sir Edward 
 Grey's suggestion to secure an extension of the time Umit/ 
 but, due to the unfortunate absence of Count Berchtold at 
 Ischl, 'there would, he thought, be delay and difficulty in 
 getting the time limit extended.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 18; R. 0. P. no. 14.) 
 
 The Russian Charge at Vienna, ' seeing the impossibility 
 of arriving at Ischl in time, telegraphed the proposal to 
 extend the delay of the ultimatum' (modified quotation, 
 July 25, R. 0. P. no. 11) and received from the Austrian 
 Government an answer refusing to do so.^ (July 25, R. 0. 
 P. no. 12.) 
 
 The Italian Ambassador had been given instructions to 
 support the Russian request, but they arrived too late. 
 (July 27, B. W. P. no. 40.) The French Ambassador 
 received similar instructions, so that both at Vienna and 
 at Berlin every effort of diplomacy was made without 
 avail to secure an extension. 
 
 After the failure of this effort, the Russian Ambassador 
 at Vienna thought it was useless to press further for an 
 extension of the time limit.^ (July 26, B. W. P. no. 40.) 
 
 1 'Count Berchtold telegraphed Baron von Macchio, the Department 
 Chief of the Austrian Foreign Office, instructions to answer the Russian 
 Charg6 d'AfTaires in his name that Austria could not agree to an extension of 
 the time limit. Baron von Macchio was further directed to add that Servia 
 could reach a peaceful solution, even after the breaking-off of diplomatic 
 relations, by unreservedly accepting the Austrian demands, but that the 
 Austrian Government would be constrained in such case to demand from 
 Servia indemnification for all the expenses and damages forced upon them 
 through the undertaking of military measures.' (Modified quotation, July 
 25, A. R. B. no. 20; cf. A. R. B. no. 17.) 
 
 * An explanation of the attitude of the Austrian Government is found in 
 Count Berchtold's dispatch of July 25 to Covmt Szapary, Austrian Ambassa- 
 dor at St. Petersburg: — 
 
 "For Your Excellency's information and for the regulation of your 
 remarks. 
 
 "The Russian Charg6 d' Affaires appeared this morning before the First 
 Department Chief in order to express in the name of his Government the 
 wish that the time limit set in our note to Servia be extended. 
 
 "This request was made because it was said that the powers had been 
 surprised by our step and that the Russian Government would consider it a 
 
62 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 3. The powers influence Servia to make a conciliatory reply 
 
 The powers could hardly have had much hope of the 
 success of their request for an extension of the time limit, 
 and as soon as it was certain that Austria would refuse, 
 another effort was made to prevail upon Austria to delay 
 recourse to hostilities after the expiration of the time limit, 
 and the receipt of Servians reply. (B. W. P. nos. 10 and 11.) 
 It was evident, however, that Austrian action would de- 
 pend in great measure upon the nature of the Servian re- 
 ply. Baron Giesl von Gieshngen, the Austrian Minister at 
 Belgrade, when he handed the ultimatum to the Servian 
 Minister, had 'added verbally that in case the note should 
 not be accepted in its entirety within a delay of forty-eight 
 hours, he had orders to leave Belgrade with the staff of 
 the Legation.' (Modified quotation, July 23, R. 0. P. 
 no. 1.) 
 
 The Itahan Secretary-General thought ' Austria would 
 only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance of her 
 note by the Servian Government.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 19.) 
 
 The only chance appeared, then, 'to lie in avoiding an 
 absolute refusal, and prevailing upon Servia to reply favor- 
 ably to as many points as the time Umit allowed.' (Modi- 
 natural token of consideration from the Vienna Cabinet toward the other 
 Cabinets if the latter should be given an opportunity to study the grounds 
 of our announcement to the powers and our dossier on the subject. 
 
 "The First Department Chief replied to the Charg^ d' Affaires that he 
 would bring his statements immediately to my knowledge, but could tell 
 him even then that there was no hope of the granting of a longer time on our 
 part. As for the reasons stated by the Russian Government for its request, 
 he said that they apparently were based on mistaken assumptions. Our note 
 to the powers was not intended to invite them to make known their objec- 
 tive conception of it, but partook merely of the nature of an announcement 
 which we had considered a duty imposed on us by international courtesy. 
 Moreover, we looked upon our action as a matter concerning only ourselves 
 and Servia, to which we had been forced, in spite of the patience and for- 
 bearance evinced by us for years, by the development of the situation which 
 necessitated our defending our most vital interests much against our will." 
 (July 25, A. R. B. no. 21.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 63 
 
 fied quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 12.) Accordingly, the 
 British and French representatives at Belgrade were in- 
 structed to use their influence with the Servian Govern- 
 ment to work for such a result. (B. W. P. nos. 12 and 15; 
 of. A. R. B. no. 13. ) Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambas- 
 sador at London, had declared that ' Austria might be ex- 
 pected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia 
 could give an unconditional acceptance of Austrian de- 
 mands in toto. Speaking privately, he had suggested that a 
 negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia; he 
 counseled that a reply favorable on some points be sent at 
 once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be 
 afforded to Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. 
 P. no. 11.) 
 
 It is of interest to learn, in Sir Edward Grey's instruc- 
 tions to the British representative at Belgrade, his opinion 
 that 'Servia ought to promise that, if it was proved that 
 Servian officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in 
 the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she would give 
 Austria the fullest satisfaction and that she certainly ought 
 to express concern and regret. Although the Servian Min- 
 ister at London had begged the British Government to 
 express their views, Sir Edward was not willing to incur the 
 responsibility of saying more and did not like to say even 
 that, without knowing what was being said at Belgrade by 
 the French and Russian Governments. Accordingly, he 
 directed the British representative to consult his French 
 and Russian colleagues as to repeating what his views were, 
 as expressed above, to the Servian Government.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 12.) 
 
 The same day, July 24, the British Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg, in a conference with M. Sazonof and the 
 French Ambassador, said that 'it seemed desirable to 
 know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the 
 demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof 
 replied that he must first consult his colleagues on that 
 
64 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands 
 could be accepted by Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 
 24, B. W. P. no. 6.) 
 
 The situation was difficult, for it was probable that a 
 revolution would have broken out in Servia if the ' Govern- 
 ment were to accept the Austrian demands in their en- 
 tirety.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 16.) 
 The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had truly re- 
 marked that ' no independent state could be expected to 
 accept the political demands which had been put forward.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 
 The attitude of Servia was most tractable; the Prince 
 Regent telegraphed the Tsar : ' ' We are ready to accept the 
 Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with 
 the situation of an independent state, as well as those the 
 acceptance of which may be advised by Your Majesty." 
 (Extract, July 24, R. 0. P. no. 6.) 
 
 4. Servia' s re-ply ^ 
 
 Saturday afternoon, July 25, at 5.58 p.m., only two 
 minutes before the expiration of the time limit (cf . A. R. B. 
 no. 24), the Servian Government handed to the Austrian 
 Minister at Belgrade their answer to the harsh terms of 
 the Austrian ultimatum. The Servian reply accepted the 
 greater part of what Austria demanded, and offered, 'in 
 case the Austrian Government should not be satisfied with 
 their answer, to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal 
 or to the mediation of the great powers that had taken part 
 in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian 
 
 ^ To bring the emphasis in the right place, to economize space, and spare 
 the reader unnecessary effort, the terms of the Austrian ultunatimi, the 
 Servian reply, and the Austrian rejoinder or comment have been combined 
 under this heading. The text of the Austrian note and Servian reply will be 
 fovmd among the Documents; see -post, chap. xiii. No. 84 of the publications 
 of the Association for International Conciliation gives a very interesting 
 comparison of the original texts of the Austrian note and the Servian reply 
 arranged in parallel columns with annotations. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 65 
 
 Government March 31, 1909.' ^ (Modified quotation, July 
 27, B. W. P. no. 39.) 
 
 In spite of the conciliatory nature of the Servian reply, 
 the Austrian Government, nevertheless, considered it un- 
 satisfactory and the Austrian Minister, accompanied by 
 his staff, withdrew from Belgrade. (Cf. A. R. B. nos. 22, 
 24; S. B. B. no. 40.) 
 
 "As soon as it was known later that evening that the 
 Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had 
 broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy 
 of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing 
 patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning." (B. W. 
 P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) To justify their stand, 
 the Austrian Government published a detailed criticism of 
 the Servian reply to show that it was insincere and only 
 *'a play for time." 
 
 The Servian Government in their reply began by stating 
 that they were not conscious that any protests, such as 
 were made in the national assembly and by the responsible 
 representatives of the Government until cut short by the 
 declaration of the Servian Government of March 31, 1909, 
 had since been made against Austria's annexation of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina and against their continuance 
 under the actual political and legal conditions which the 
 annexation had created. They further pointed out that the 
 Austrian Government had made no representations, except 
 one concerning a school-book, which was explained to the 
 satisfaction of the Austrian Government. 
 
 The Servian Government did not consider that they 
 could be held responsible for the opinions expressed by pri- 
 
 1 When the Servian Minister appealed to the French Foreign OflBce for 
 advice, it was suggested that Servia might seek "to escape from the direct 
 clutch of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of 
 Europe." (F. Y. B. no. 26.) The Russian Charg^ at Paris reported that 
 'when the Director of Political Affairs of the French Foreign Office com- 
 municated to the Austrian Ambassador the contents of the Servian reply, 
 the latter did not conceal his astonishment that it had not satisfied the Aus- 
 trian Minister at Belgrade.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 27.) 
 
66 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 vate individuals, such as articles appearing in the press and 
 in the ordinary peaceful proceedings and activities of socie- 
 ties, similar to what take place in nearly every country and 
 which are not, as a general rule, subjected to official control. 
 
 The Servian Government further expressed pain and 
 surprise at the assertion that citizens of Servia were con- 
 cerned in the perpetration of the Serajevo outrage. They 
 declared that they had expected to cooperate in the inves- 
 tigation of the crime and that they were ready to proceed 
 against all persons about whom communications might be 
 addressed to them. In accordance with the wishes of the 
 Austrian Government, the Servian Government expressed 
 a willingness to turn over to the judicial authorities any 
 individual, without regard to official position or rank, 
 against whom any proof of complicity in the Serajevo out- 
 rage should be adduced. As for the official publication of 
 the demanded apology, the Servian Government agreed to 
 make, on the first page of their official publication, a state- 
 ment including the following: — 
 
 ''The Royal Servian Government condemns the propa- 
 ganda directed against Austria-Hungary; that is to say, 
 all efforts designed ultimately to sever from the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy any territory of which it is consti- 
 tuted, and sincerely regrets the sad consequences which 
 have resulted from such criminal machinations." (B. W. P. 
 no. 39; G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 25; R. 0. P. no. 13.) 
 
 The Austrian Government declared, in an official re- 
 joinder to the Servian reply published in the German 
 White Book, that no objection in regard to the action of 
 the Servian Government or Servian officials had been 
 raised by Austria, but that Servia had been charged with 
 disregarding the above-mentioned promise, in that she had 
 not suppressed the unofficial agitation directed against the 
 territorial integrity of Austria. Servia was, according to 
 the view of the Austrian Government, under an obligation 
 to change her attitude and the entire trend of her policies 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 67 
 
 by entering into friendly and neighborly relations with 
 Austria-Hungary — merely to refrain from interfering 
 with Austrian control of Bosnia was not enough. 
 
 As for the activity of the Servian press and patriotic 
 societies, the Austrian Government considered that the 
 Government of Servia and other states exercised a certain 
 control over the press and provided for the supervision of 
 the organizations of individuals. The Servian Govern- 
 ment were to blame for omitting altogether to exercise this 
 supervision in so far as the action of the press and organi- 
 zations disclosed a purpose hostile to the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy. 
 
 As to the complicity of certain individuals in the Sera- 
 jevo conspiracy, the Austrian Government declared that 
 Servia's assertion was not correct, since the Government 
 at Belgrade had been accurately informed of the suspicion 
 attaching to certain specified individuals, so that it was 
 not only able, but under an obligation under their own 
 laws, voluntarily to institute an investigation, yet the 
 Servian Government had taken no such action. 
 
 And as for the expression of regret to be officially pub- 
 lished in the Official Journal and pubhcly announced as 
 the order of the day to the army, the Austrian Govern- 
 ment objected that the Servian formula lacked in sincerity 
 and had altered the words of the Austrian note in such a 
 manner as to imply that a propaganda directed against 
 Austria-Hungary did not really exist, so that later the 
 Servian Government might use this as a subterfuge by 
 saying that they had not condemned the existing propa- 
 ganda or acknowledged it to be hostile to Austria. This 
 would amount to a contention on the part of the Govern- 
 ment that they were under no obligation to suppress in 
 future any propaganda similar to that being carried on at 
 present. 
 
 When we come to consider Austria's criticism of the 
 Servian replies to the ten specific demands contained in 
 
68 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the Austrian ultimatum, we find similar quibbling on Aus- 
 tria's part. 
 
 First demand. Servia agreed to pass laws prohibiting the 
 publication in the press of articles inciting to hatred of the 
 Dual Monarchy or directed against the territorial integrity 
 of Austria. Servia also agreed to amend her constitution so 
 as to permit the enactment of the legislation necessary for 
 the suppression of such publications. (Cf. R. O. P. no. 25; 
 S. B. B. no. 30.) 
 
 Austria replied that she had demanded the suppression 
 of every publication which incited to hatred and contempt 
 for the Dual Monarchy, and which was intended to influ- 
 ence the taking of action directed against the territorial 
 integrity of the Monarchy. Austria had asked the Servian 
 Government to agree to enforce such provisions, whereas 
 Servia only offered to pass legislation with this end in view. 
 The reply did not even indicate when such legislation 
 would be passed, and a failure to do so would leave every- 
 thing as it was, especially in the event of the resignation of 
 the Government. 
 
 Second demand. The Servian Goverrunent declared they 
 had no proof, nor did the Austrian note furnish any, that 
 the members of the Narodna Odbrana and other similar 
 societies had been guilty of carrying on a propaganda 
 against the Dual Monarchy, but the Servian Government 
 agreed, nevertheless, to dissolve the society and any other 
 which might direct its action against Austria. (Cf. S. B. B. 
 no. 16.) 
 
 The comment of the Austrian Government on this was 
 that it was impossible to accept Servia's statement that 
 she was imaware of the hostile propaganda of the Narodna 
 Odbrana and affiliated societies against Austria, since it 
 permeated the entire political life of Servia. Furthermore, 
 what the Austrian Government had asked for was not only 
 the dissolution of the societies mentioned, but also the 
 confiscation of their means of propaganda, and the pre- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 69 
 
 vention of the reorganization of the societies under other 
 names to continue their activity.^ 
 
 Third demand. The Servian Government agreed, as soon 
 as the proofs should be furnished by the Austrian Govern- 
 ment, to ehminate without delay from the pubhc insti-uc- 
 tion in the schools any passages in the textbooks which 
 might be considered as likely to foment the propaganda 
 against Austria. 
 
 The Austrian Government objected that Servia was well 
 aware that the textbooks used in the schools contained 
 objectionable matter. The reply also ignored the essential 
 demand for the dismissal of those teachers engaged in 
 carrying on the propaganda complained of, a large pro- 
 portion of the teachers, according to Austria's statement, 
 being found in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and 
 affiliated societies. 
 
 Fourth demand. The Austrian Government had de- 
 manded that Servia dismiss from her army and the govern- 
 mental employ in general all officers and officials found to 
 be guilty of taking part in the propaganda, the Austrian 
 Government communicating their names and the evidence 
 relating to such complicity. 
 
 The Servian Government agreed to do so in the case of 
 those officers and officials whose guilt should be established 
 
 1 See extract from article in the Outlook, by Theodor Constantin Dumba, 
 Ambassador of Austria-Hungary to the United States, August 29, 1914, is 
 which he explains how this very thing had occurred in his own experience 
 when Minister at Belgrade. 
 
 The Austrian memorandum (A. R. B. no. 19; F. Y. B. no. 75, Annex; see 
 post, chap. XIII ; cf. B. W. P. no. 9) to the powers contains a very interesting 
 and specific account of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana which seems 
 to show clearly the insincerity of the Servian answer on this head. Never- 
 theless, can any instance be found where one Government has answered the 
 ultimatum of another by confessing its fault? However much we may sym- 
 pathize with Austria in her efforts to resist dissolution, we cannot blame the 
 Serbs for carrying on an active propaganda to incorporate their brothers in a 
 Greater Servia. When M. Sazonof was discussing the Austrian demands 
 with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, he "spoke with utmost 
 \ngor against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana which Servia would 
 never undertake." (July 24, A. R. B. no. 14.) 
 
70 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 as a result of a judicial investigation, assisted by Austria's 
 communication of the names of the officers and officials 
 and the evidence against them. 
 
 But again the Austrian Government objected that Ser- 
 via agreed to dismiss only those officers found guilty by 
 judicial procedure, which would limit the application to 
 those cases where a statutory crime was charged, whereas 
 the propaganda complained of was not punishable under 
 Servian law. Austria might also have objected that Servia 
 had ignored that part of the fourth demand in which the 
 Austrian Government communicated to the Servian Gov- 
 ernment the names of the officers and officials who were 
 to be dismissed. To accept this demand would have been 
 equivalent to agreeing that Austria herself should have the 
 right to specify the names of the Servian officers and offi- 
 cials to be dismissed as objectionable to Austria. Of course, 
 Servia could not have allowed that. The acceptance and 
 putting into effect of such a demand would make the ten- 
 ure of every position under the Government, whether civil 
 or military, dependent upon Austrian favor. It would have 
 resulted in placing the political control of Servia in Aus- 
 trian hands and Servia would have become henceforth a 
 political dependency of the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian 
 reply — can it be from shame? — passes over the failure to 
 comply with this part of its original demand.^ 
 
 Fifth demand. Austria's fifth demand was that Servia 
 accept in Servia the collaboration of agents {des organes) 
 of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression 
 of the subversive movement directed against the territorial 
 integrity of the Dual Monarchy. 
 
 Servia replied that she did not understand exactly the 
 meaning of the terms employed, but that she was ready to 
 accept such collaboration as should conform to the princi- 
 
 1 M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, made this de- 
 mand one of the grounds for his objection to the Austrian note. (Cf. A. R. 
 B. no. 31.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 71 
 
 pies of international law and criminal procedure, and help 
 to promote good neighborly relations. 
 
 The Austrian rejoinder declared that the question in no 
 way concerned international law and criminal procedure, 
 but related purely to the exercise of the police powers of 
 the state and might properly be settled by special agree- 
 ment.^ 
 
 Sixth demand. The sixth demand was to take judicial 
 proceedings {enquete judiciaire) against the accessories to 
 the conspiracy of June 28, found on Servian territory, 
 and to permit representatives (des organes delegues) of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government to take part in the investi- 
 gation (recherches) relating thereto. 
 
 ' 'Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador, admitted to Sir Edward 
 Grey that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but 
 the Sers^ians had, he said, refused the one thing — the cooperation of Aus- 
 trian officials and police — which would be a real guaranty that in practice 
 the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 48.) It is probably in reference to 
 this same demand that the German memorandum says: "... The Servian 
 Government made a reply which, though complying in some points with the 
 conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor, 
 through procrastination and new negotiations, to escape from the just 
 demands of the Monarchy, . . ." (G. W. B. p. 5.) Sir Edward Grey's 
 opinion of the fifth demand has been given already. M. Jules Cambon, 
 French Ambassador at Berlin, said to the German Secretary of State: 
 "... If Peter I [of Servia] humiliates himself, Servia will probably be given 
 over to internal troubles." (July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30.) M. Sazonof told the 
 Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that ' the putting into effect of the 
 fourth and fifth demands might result disastrously and lead even to the 
 attempted assassination of members of the royal family and the Premier, 
 M. Pashitch.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 25; cf. A. R. B. 
 nos. 10, 11.) 
 
 Count Berchtold's telegram of July 25, to the Austrian Ambassador cov- 
 ers this point: "Since Point 5 of our demands, concerning the participation 
 of Austro-Himgarian officials in stamping out the subversive movement in 
 Servia, has aroused special objections from M. Sazonof, will Yoxir Excel- 
 lency express yourself confidentially in strong terms on this point to the 
 effect that the inclusion of this point was due solely to practical considera- 
 tions and in no way owing to any contemplated impairment of the sover- 
 eignty of Servia. In Point 5 we had in mind a ' collaboration ' in the estab- 
 lishment of a secret bureau de surete at Belgrade, to work along the lines 
 of the similar Russian organizations in Paris, and cooperate with the Servian 
 poUce and administration oflacials." (July 25, A. R. B. no. 27.) 
 
72 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 In reply, Servia declared that she considered it her duty 
 to take proceedings against all those who were involved in 
 the conspiracy of June 28, but that she could not permit 
 the participation of Austrian agents or officials specially 
 delegated by the Austrian Government; as it would be a 
 violation of her constitution, and of her legislation relative 
 to criminal procedure. Servia considered, however, that in 
 certain cases the results of the investigation might be com- 
 municated to the agents of the Austrian Government. 
 
 Austria thereupon explained that her demands, clear 
 and unmistakable, had been : — 
 
 1. That Servia institute criminal proceedings against 
 those concerned in the outrage; 
 
 2. That she allow the participation of Austrian officials 
 in the preliminary examinations (recherche) and not 
 in the judicial investigation (enquete judiciaire), it 
 never having entered the mind of the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government that its officials would partici- 
 pate in the proceedings before the Servian tribunal. 
 Their cooperation was intended to be limited to the 
 preliminary examination for the purpose of discover- 
 ing and preparing the material for the investigation. 
 
 The Austrian rejoinder accused the Servian Govern- 
 ment of having deliberately misunderstood the Austrian 
 demand, and of having ignored the clear distinction be- 
 tween court proceedings in the nature of a trial (enquete 
 judiciaire) and a simple preliminary examination con- 
 ducted by the police. The rejoinder considered that the 
 purpose of this insincerity on Servia's part was to grasp 
 the only plausible excuse that she could find for refusing 
 the cooperation of the Austrian officials,^ in order to get 
 rid of any check upon the honesty of the investigation, 
 
 ^ The Austrian comment states, "precedents for such poHce intervention 
 exist in great number." Cf. the statement of Vice-Consul Fischerauer, note, 
 p. 76, and the case of the Maine. See post, chap. xin. See also Ernest 
 Ludwig, Austria-Hungary and the War, pp. 64-71. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 73 
 
 which would, if properly pursued, have led to disclosures 
 that the Servian Government was most anxious to avoid. 
 To the impartial observer, however, it does not seem 
 surprising, in view of Austria's third, fourth, and fifth 
 demands, that Servia should misunderstand Austria's 
 intent in asking permission to participate in the action 
 taken against the accessories to the assassination. The 
 participation which the Servian answer understood, though 
 denied in the Austrian rejoinder as that intended, would 
 seem to interfere less with the independence of Servia than 
 did the third demand relating to the dismissal of Servian 
 teachers in the schools. For the investigation of the con- 
 spiracy in question was but a single incident which might 
 soon be settled, whereas Austria, if the third and fourth 
 demands were agreed to, might have renewed whenever 
 she chose her demands for the dismissal of any official she 
 objected to, until the entire Servian army and bureau- 
 cracy came under her control.^ This is the significance of 
 the statement made by the Servian Minister at London 
 on the day the ultimatum was presented, that the Servian 
 Govermnent ' was perfectly ready to meet any reasonable 
 demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands 
 were kept on the terrain juridique.^ If the results of the 
 inquiry at Serajevo — an inquiry conducted with so much 
 mystery and secrecy — should disclose the fact that there 
 were any individuals conspiring or organizing plots on 
 Servian territory, the Servian Government would, he said, 
 be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satis- 
 faction; but if Austria transported the question on to the 
 political ground, and said that Servian policy, being incon- 
 venient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that 
 Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no inde- 
 pendent state would, or could, submit to such dictation.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 30.) 
 
 1 Lloyd George emphasized this in the extract from his speech placed 
 among the Documents; see post, chap. xiii. 
 
 * That is, confined to considerations of a judicial nature. 
 
74 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Seventh demand. The seventh demand related to the 
 arrest of the commander Tankositch and one Cigano- 
 vitch, in the employ of the Servian Government, and the 
 Austrian rejoinder accused Servia of bad faith in shielding 
 Ciganovitch by allowing him to escape, and then announc- 
 ing that 'it had as yet been impossible to locate him.'^ 
 
 Eighth demand. The eighth demand related to the smug- 
 ghng of arms and explosives across the Servian frontier, 
 and the punishment of the officials who had aided the con- 
 spirators by permitting them to cross the frontier. Servia's 
 reply, giving ample promises, seems to have been approved 
 and is passed over without comment. 
 
 Ninth demand. The ninth demand i§ for explanations as 
 to unwarranted expressions of hostility toward Austria on 
 the part of certain high Servian officials since the Serajevo 
 assassination. 
 
 The Servian Government expressed itself as ready to 
 give the desired explanations in regard to any such remarks 
 as should be brought to its attention by the Austrian 
 Government, with proof of their having proceeded from 
 Servian officials. The Servian Government on its own 
 behalf promised to collect proof and press the conviction 
 of any such officials. 
 
 Again the Austrian Government declared the Servian 
 response to be insincere, since it was futile for the Servian 
 Government to pretend it was not aware of the remarks in 
 question. The requiring of proof by Austria was taken as 
 indicating an intention not to comply with the demand. ^ 
 
 ^ Cf. the statement of the Servian Minister at London (B. W. P. no. 30). 
 
 2 The London Times of July 20 pubHshes under the heading " GREATER 
 SERVIA SCARE," the following from their Vienna correspondent: — 
 
 "The Press on both sides of the frontier is taking pains not to allow public 
 interest in Austro-Servian relations to flag. 
 
 "To-day, considerable exception was taken by the newspapers of the 
 Monarchy to various recent utterances from Servian official sources. These 
 consist, on the one hand, of statements represented to have been made by 
 M. Pashitch to a correspondent of the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten and 
 hitherto not denied by the Servian Prime Minister, and, on the other hand, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 75 
 
 Tenth demand. The tenth and last demand required 
 Servia to notify the Austrian Government without delay 
 of the execution of the preceding demands, and, in as far 
 as they were not already covered by her answer, the Ser- 
 vian Government agreed to notify the Austrian Govern- 
 ment of the putting into effect of the measures in question 
 as soon as accomplished. 
 
 The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'speaking of 
 Austria's long official explanation of the grounds on which 
 the Servian reply had been considered inadequate, told the 
 British Ambassador he thought many points besides the 
 explanation — such as a slight verbal difference in the sen- 
 tence regarding the renunciation of the propaganda — 
 quite childish.' ^ (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. 
 no. 64.) 
 
 of two articles dealing with the 'Greater Servian' idea and the Serajevo 
 crime which have appeared in the Servian Government organ Samouprava. 
 Among other statements, M. Pashitch is represented to have said that 
 Servians are so accustomed to see their compatriots in Hungary oppressed 
 and treated in an unfriendly manner that they no longer grow excited about 
 it. ' We do not participate in conspiracies, but we know that time is working 
 for us.' Servia wanted to be left alone, and, he added, she would not stand 
 isolated if a Great Power attacked her. 
 
 ''The Samouprava counters Austro-Hungarian complaints of a 'Greater 
 Servian' propaganda by declaring that complaints of this kind would be 
 much more justified if made by Servia who finds herself perpetually face to 
 face with a ' Greater Austrian ' propaganda. A second article in the same 
 journal afiirmed that the origin of the Serajevo crime is to be found in the 
 Monarchy itself, and denies that Belgrade is a fountain-head of assassina- 
 tions. 
 
 "These utterances have called forth replies the tone of which is in some 
 cases somewhat minatory. Thus the Neue Freie Presse declares that, as the 
 remarks attributed to M. Pashitch are not denied, the Austro-Hungarian 
 Minister at Belgrade will have to ask for their exact text in order that 
 proper steps may be taken to prevent the Minister from approving conspira- 
 cies directed against the Monarchy by saying that time is working for the 
 attainment of aims for which the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was mur- 
 dered. 
 
 "The Reich-post brands the utterances of the Samouprava as rank ingrati- 
 tude for the present of the Sanjak made to Servia by the Monarchy, and 
 concludes its article by asking, ' Do oiu" statesmen not yet reahze what the 
 position is, and what they have to do?'" 
 
 * Among the documents at the end of this volume will be found an Eng- 
 
76 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 It is true that Servia did not accept word for word the 
 demands of the Austrian note, but she did go as far as was 
 
 lish view of the Austrian demands and the Servian reply, taken from the 
 speech of Lloyd George of September 21. The Austrian view of Servia's 
 reply has been further explained in an extract of an article by the Austro- 
 Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, also to be found among the 
 documents at the end of this volume. 
 
 The New York Sun of October 8, 1914, quotes Dr. Fritz Fischerauer, 
 Austrian Vice-Consul, as saying: — 
 
 " By 1909, the two provinces [Bosnia and Herzegovina] had reached a 
 level of culture and development which could not be dupUcated on the 
 Servian side of the frontier. Then came unexpected events in the wake of 
 the Ottoman declaration of a constitutional order, which, as every one 
 knows now, was but another name for a military dictatorship. Relying upon 
 its nominal sovereignty rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Young Turk 
 organization started a movement to recover the garden which Austria had 
 made out of the former Tmrkish wilderness, 
 
 "For its own interests and those of civiUzation, Austria had to meet thia 
 movement with energetic action. This action took the form of annexation. 
 But even in this apparently aggressive act the Dual Monarchy acted 
 strictly on the defensive. 
 
 "The tragic climax to the Servian campaign of violence was reached on 
 June 28 last, when the hand of a young Serb who had been led to believe he 
 was performing a patriotic duty laid low the Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
 and his consort in Serajevo. The event convinced the Austrian Government 
 that it must act with energy, and act at once, to check a subversive move- 
 ment carried on from without its borders, which had degenerated into a 
 campaign of assassination. It demanded that Servia put an immediate stop 
 to the agitation of the Narodna Odbrana, that it place the stamp of its 
 formal disapproval upon the crime of Serajevo, and that it punish the auth- 
 ors of that revolting offense against civilization and comity. 
 
 "Austria did not impose any terms in its ultimatum which could be 
 regarded as a blow at Servian sovereignty. There is even a parallel in history 
 in which the roles were reversed; when in 1861 Milos Obrenovic, then the 
 reigning Prince of Servia, was assassinated in the Park of Topschider near 
 Belgrade by the adherents of the present reigning family of Karageorgevich, 
 the trail of the plot was traced to Hungary. The Hungai-ian Government 
 at the time invited the Servian authorities for a cooperation of the Servian 
 police in the investigation, and this cooperation actually took place in the 
 poUce investigation on Hungarian territory, 
 
 "Another parallel is fiu-nished by the case of William S. Benton, the 
 Englishman who was murdered in Mexico last year. The British and 
 the United States Governments demanded to be permitted to cooperate 
 in the investigation in Mexico of that murder. 
 
 "Servia assented to all the other terms of the ultimatum, but in every 
 instance evaded the basic admission of the charge that a crime had been 
 committed against a neighboring state, and that it had been committed by 
 a Servian nationalist organization having its central body in Belgrade, Aus- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 77 
 
 possible for the government of any independent state, and 
 evinced a most conciliatory spirit. Even admitting that 
 she knew of the hostile remarks against Austria, and the 
 anti-Austrian propaganda, she could hardly confess to 
 them publicly in her answer to Austria, and make it possi- 
 ble for Austria both to disdain her reply and use the con- 
 fession as an excuse for aggression. Such a confession, at 
 most, concerned their past relations; what was important 
 to the security of Austria was that Servia should punish 
 the conspirators and restrain in future any hostile propa- 
 ganda of whatever nature or designation. 
 
 Every statesman in Europe would have admitted that 
 Austria was justified in taking some action to protect her- 
 self against Servia, whose Government was unwilling or 
 unable to restrain a widespread and dangerous propa- 
 ganda openly directed against the integrity of the Dual 
 Monarchy. Such action is nothing but the exercise of the 
 right of a state to protect itself against potential aggression. 
 At the same time every state owes it to the general inter- 
 ests of all the other states not to have recourse to force 
 until every reasonable effort has been made to secure the 
 desired result by peaceful means. ^ Austria referred to 
 Servians violation of her promise of March 31, 1909, as 
 indicating that her promises could not be relied upon, but 
 
 trian participation in the inquiry, Servia denied by evasion. Now this clause 
 in the ultimatum was a vital part of it. The Austrian authorities recalled 
 that one of the men chiefly implicated in the assassination of Archduke 
 Francis Ferdinand and his consort had been quietly warned out of Servia by 
 the Servian police after the Austrians had requested his arrest." 
 
 ^ In the absence of any organized machinery for determining what con- 
 stitutes international law and enforcing a respect therefor, it is of the utmost 
 importance that the forms, ceremonies, and even courtesies of international 
 intercourse be strictly observed. In the early history of legal development 
 within each state, the necessity of an unswerving respect for legal forms was 
 well understood. At the present time in the affairs of nations, the greatest 
 protection against the abuse of force and disastrously precipitate action is a 
 strict observance of the forms of procedure. Baron von Macchio, the Aus- 
 trian General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was not correct 
 in saying: "Interest was sometimes an excuse for not being courteous." 
 (F. Y. B. no. 45.) 
 
78 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 19U 
 
 in the five years that had elapsed since Servia had been 
 obUged to make that promise, the whole Balkan situation 
 had been completely changed as a result of the Balkan 
 War. Since the national aims of Servia and Austria's pol- 
 icy to preserve the pohtical integrity of the Dual Mon- 
 archy were in conflict, it was necessary, for the maintenance 
 of peace, either that the Servian Government should 
 restrain the people, or that they should be arrested by the 
 fear of Austria. Servia's Government was powerless in the 
 face of an all-pervading national enthusiasm for the Pan- 
 Serb propaganda, and the fear of Austria was, to a certain 
 degree, paralyzed by the rehance placed upon Russian 
 support. If Austria would not rely on Servia's promises, 
 the only remaining possibility of preserving the peace lay 
 in the calming influence of other powers. It may be said 
 that the hope of Europe lay in the mediation of the less 
 interested powers. The course of the subsequent events 
 shows how Austria ignored this situation, and, trading on 
 the sympathy of the world for whatever real grounds of 
 complaint she might have, attempted to subjugate^ her 
 weaker neighbor under the guise of exacting satisfaction. 
 It is quite possible that Servia, advised, that is to say, 
 directed, by the powers, might have been ready to give 
 and live up to assurances adequate to satisfy the reason- 
 able demands of Austria. If Austria, because of her pecu- 
 Uarly perilous situation, considered it impossible to discuss 
 the question and to examine whether the proposed guaran- 
 ties would not be adequate, we must conclude her action 
 to be a confession that she was herself unable to live up to 
 her international obligations. 
 
 5. Austria rejects Servians reply 
 
 Influenced by Russia (B. W. P. nos. 22 and 46), Servia 
 
 had met the advice of the powers more than halfway 
 
 (B. W. P. nos. 21 and 30), and the powers of the Entente 
 
 had been justified in feehng satisfied with their efforts and 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 79 
 
 in hoping that a reply so concihatory would prove accept- 
 able to Austria (cf. R. O. P. no. 33). 'Servia's attitude had 
 been such as to produce the best impression in Europe.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 27.) Sir Edward 
 Grey said that ' the Servian reply went further than could 
 have been expected to meet the Austrian demands.' (Mod- 
 ified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46; cf. R. O. P. no. 
 42.) Yet Von Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at 
 Vienna, did not blush when he asked his British colleague 
 'whether he had been informed that a pretense of giving 
 way at the last moment had been made by the Servian 
 Government. The Servian concessions he considered all a 
 sham, and Servia proved that she well knew that they were 
 insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria- 
 Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had 
 ordered mobilization and the retirement of the Govern- 
 ment from Belgrade.' (Modified quotation, July 26, 
 B. W. P. no. 32.) From St. Petersburg it was learned that 
 the German Ambassador there also 'considered the Ser- 
 vian reply insufficient.' (Modified quotation, July 28, 
 B. W. P. no. 54.) 
 
 Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Ambassador at 
 London to make clear to Sir Edward Grey that 'Servia's 
 complaisance was only apparent and was calculated to 
 deceive Europe without giving any guaranty as to the 
 future. Since the Servian Government knew that only an 
 unqualified acceptance of the demands could satisfy Aus- 
 tria, Servian tactics could be easily understood: Servia in 
 order to influence the public opinion of Europe, was to 
 accept some of the demands with all sorts of reservations, 
 trusting that she would never be called upon to fulfill her 
 agreements. The Ambassador was asked, in his conversa- 
 tion with Sir Edward Grey, to lay stress on the fact that 
 the full mobilization of the Servian army was ordered for 
 July 25 at 3 p.m., whereas the answer to the Austrian note 
 was only handed in just before the expiration of the time 
 
80 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 limit; i.e., a few minutes before 6. Before that, the Aus- 
 trian Government had made no miUtary preparations, but 
 were forced to make them by Servia's mobiUzation.' ^ 
 (Modified quotation, July 28, A. R. B. no. 39; cf. A. R. B. 
 no. 40.) 
 
 July 28, the Russian Government learned from their 
 charge at Berlin that * the Wolff Press Agency had not pub- 
 lished the text of the Servian reply which had been com- 
 municated to it, and that up to the time of sending the 
 dispatch the note had not appeared in extenso in any of the 
 local newspapers, which evidently did not wish to print it 
 because they realized what a calming effect its publication 
 would have upon the German pubhc' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 28, R. 0. P. no. 46.) This attitude on the part of 
 the 'German Government was most alarming' (modified 
 quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 54) in view of the extremely 
 conciliatory nature of the Servian reply. For it began to 
 look as though it lacked the will to preserve the peace of 
 which Sir Edward Grey had spoken when he remarked to 
 the Austrian Ambassador that 'in times of difficulty like 
 the present, it was just as true to say that it required two 
 to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took 
 two to make a quarrel.' (Modified quotation, July 23, 
 B. W. P. no. 3.) 
 
 The powers must have foreseen that Austria, having 
 refused to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, would 
 probably refuse to accept the Servian reply, concihatory 
 as it was, and they tried to prevail upon Austria to refrain 
 from having immediate recourse to force while they tried 
 to find a satisfactory solution to the difficulty. July 24, 
 Sir Edward Grey 'urged upon the German Ambassador 
 that Austria should not precipitate military action.* 
 (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 12.) 'When the 
 Austrian Ambassador, the day following, was authorized 
 
 * Aocording to the Servian Blue Book this mobilization did not occur till 
 later. (S. B. B. no. 41.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 81 
 
 to inform Sir Edward that the Austrian method of proce- 
 dm-e upon the expiration of the time limit would be to 
 break off diplomatic relations and commence military prep- 
 arations, but not military operations/ it was natural that 
 the British Secretary should say, ' in informing the German 
 Ambassador, that in accordance with what he had urged 
 the day before, it interposed a stage of mobilization before 
 the frontier was actually crossed.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 25.) To the Ambassador at Vienna 
 Sir Edward telegraphed: ''Since the telegram to the 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a re- 
 lief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government 
 were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rup- 
 ture of relations and to military preparations, and not 
 operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government consider it too late to prolong the time 
 Hmit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for 
 the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretriev- 
 able steps." (Extract, July 25, B. W. P. no. 26; cf. R. 0. P. 
 no. 16; F. Y. B. no. 40.) The telegram referred to is that 
 from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, asking for 
 an extension of the time limit. (R. 0. P. no. 4.) 
 
 6. The powers urge Austria to delay military operations and accept 
 the Servian reply as a basis for discussion 
 
 In the mean time the negotiations at St. Petersburg be- 
 tween M. Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador gave 
 some reason to hope for a pacific solution. The Russian 
 Ambassador at Vienna said that ' in fact they had prac- 
 tically reached an understanding as to the guaranties which 
 Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hun- 
 gary for her future good behavior.' ^ (Modified quotation, 
 July 27, B. W. P. no. 56.) So that even though Austria 
 should refuse to accept the reply, it was hoped that 'it 
 
 * This optimistic statement of Russia's optimistic representative does not 
 find any corroboration in the published correspondence. 
 
82 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 might' constitute a fair basis of discussion during which 
 warhke operations might remain in abeyance.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 62.) 
 
 In the mean time, the British representative at Belgrade 
 had been urging the 'greatest moderation pending efforts 
 being made toward a peaceful solution.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 28, B. W. P. no. 65.) Russia had been pursuing 
 a similar course. In the Tsar's telegram to Prince Alex- 
 ander, he said, "I have no doubt that Your Highness and 
 the Royal Government wish to facilitate this task by neg- 
 lecting nothing to arrive at a solution which would pre- 
 vent the horrors of a new war while at the same time safe- 
 guarding the dignity of Servia. So long as there is the least 
 hope of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must tend 
 toward this object. If, despite our most sincere desire, we 
 do not succeed. Your Highness may be assured that in no 
 case will Russia be unconcerned regarding the fate of Ser- 
 via." (Extract, July 27, R. O. P. no. 40.) Also the Russian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs assured the British Ambassador 
 that ' he would use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the 
 Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satis- 
 faction to Austria, but that her territorial integrity must 
 be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign state respected, 
 so that she should not become Austria's vassal.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 55.) A similar assurance 
 was given at Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador said 
 ' he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pend- 
 ing any discussions that might yet take place,' and he 
 assured the British Ambassador that ' he would advise his 
 Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid 
 any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an 
 Austrian advance. Time so gained should, it was hoped, 
 suflSce to enable a settlement to be reached.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 56.) 
 
 The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, perhaps better 
 informed as Austria's ally than the members of the Entente, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 83 
 
 *saw no possibility of Austria's receding from any point 
 laid down in her note to Servia, but believed that, if Servia 
 would even then accept it, Austria would be satisfied, and 
 if she had reason to think that such would be the advice of 
 the powers to Servia, Austria might defer action. Servia, 
 he thought, might be induced to accept the note in its 
 entirety on the advice of the four powers invited to the 
 conference and this would enable her to say that she had 
 yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 57.) 
 
 When the British Government had learned, July 25 
 (B. W. P. no. 21), how conciliatory the Servian reply 
 would be, it tried to use every means available to prevail 
 upon Austria to accept it. The forecast of the reply was 
 communicated to the German Ambassador, and Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey said that, 'if the Servian reply when received 
 at Vienna corresponded to the forecast, he hoped the Ger- 
 man Government would feel able to take a favorable view 
 of it.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 27.) 
 This conversation was communicated to the British repre- 
 sentatives at Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburg, so that 
 they might exert themselves to secure action along the 
 same line. As soon as the substance of Sir Edward Grey's 
 remarks had been communicated to Italy, July 28, the 
 Marquis di San Giuliano immediately telegraphed the 
 Italian representatives at Berlin and Vienna ' in precisely 
 similar terms.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. 
 no. 63.) Sir Edward Grey probably expressed the opinion 
 of the Entente Powers, and Italy as well, when he told the 
 German Ambassador that, 'if Austria put the Servian 
 reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into 
 Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia 
 at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might 
 be involved. The Servian reply should, he said, at least 
 be treated as a basis for discussion and pause.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46.) 
 
84 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 7. Austrian assurances 
 
 But 'Austria refused to accept any discussion on the 
 basis of the Servian note' (modified quotation, July 29, 
 B. W. P. no. 81 ; cf . B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914, 
 p. 2), and to all the efforts of the powers to induce her to 
 postpone hostilities, she replied by defending the justness 
 and necessity of her action, and by giving repeated assur- 
 ances as to her designs. (Cf. G. W. B. exhibits 5; 10; A. 
 R. B. no. 30.) 
 
 Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 told the Russian Charg^ at Vienna, on July 24, that ' the 
 Dual Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest of 
 Servia. Austria would not, he said, claim Servian territory, 
 but insisted merely that the action taken was meant to 
 check effectively Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of cir- 
 cumstances, Austria must have a guaranty for the con- 
 tinuation of amicable relations with Servia. It was far 
 from his purpose to bring about a change in the balance of 
 power in the Balkans.' (Modified quotation, G. W. B. 
 exhibit 3; cf. A. R. B. no. 18.) 
 
 The statements of the German representatives at the 
 different capitals to the same effect had the double purpose 
 of guaranteeing the Austrian promises and of indicating 
 Germany's firm intention to back up her ally. At St. 
 Petersburg the German Ambassador stated under instruc- 
 tions that Germany would be 'all the more able to sup- 
 port Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the Servian 
 Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria herself 
 did not call this integrity into question.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 26, G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 7.) July 27, the 
 German Ambassador at Paris, Baron von Schoen, con- 
 firmed in writing his declaration of the day before, namely, 
 * that Austria had declared to Russia that she did not seek 
 acquisitions and was not attacking the integrity of Servia.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 27, R. 0. P. no. 35; cf. A. R. 
 
 i 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 85 
 
 B. no. 32.) July 28, he stated that 'Austria would respect 
 the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her in- 
 dependence also would be respected, he gave no assur- 
 ance.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 59.) 
 
 8. Austria declares war on Servia 
 In answer to all these efforts to persuade Austria directly 
 and through Berlin, the Austrian Government replied, 
 July 27, 'As peaceable means had been exhausted, the 
 Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They 
 had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their 
 action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not 
 be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defense. 
 Also they thought that they would serve a European inter- 
 est if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an ele- 
 ment of general unrest, such as she had been for the last 
 ten years.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 48; 
 cf. R. 0. P. no. 37.) July 28, Count Berchtold told the 
 Russian Ambassador that ' the crisis had become so acute, 
 and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excite- 
 ment, that the Government, even if they wished it, could 
 no longer recede or enter into any discussion about the 
 terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 28, B. W. P. no. 93; cf. B. W. P. no. 61.) 
 
 In a telegram to St. Petersburg Count Berchtold re- 
 lated how, ' in reply to the statement of the Russian Am- 
 bassador to the effect that Austria would not decrease, 
 but rather increase, the undeniably hostile attitude of 
 Servia by having recourse to warlike measures, he had 
 given him some light on those relations existing between 
 Austria and Servia which had made it inevitable for the 
 former state to declare to her restless neighbor with the 
 requisite emphasis, that, quite against her will and with- 
 out any selfish motives, she was no longer willing to toler- 
 ate the continuance of a movement directed against her- 
 self and acquiesced in by the Servian Government. The 
 
86 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Austrian Minister added, moreover, that the behavior of 
 Servia after receiving the Austrian note was not calcu- 
 lated to bring about a peaceful solution, since Servia, 
 even before handing the Austrian Government her un- 
 satisfactory answer, had ordered complete mobilization 
 and had thus committed a hostile act against that Govern- 
 ment; but that Austria, nevertheless, had waited three 
 days. The Austrian Minister further remarked that the 
 Servians had the day before opened hostilities against 
 Austria on the Hungarian border, thereby making it 
 impossible for Austria to continue her patient course with 
 Servia, or bring about any thorough yet peaceable set- 
 tlement of her difficulties with that country, — Austria 
 could not, therefore, do otherwise than meet the Servian 
 challenge in a manner befitting the dignity of the Mon- 
 archy.' (Modified quotation, July 28, A. R. B. no. 40.) 
 
 Previously, July 26, Austria had declared that the with- 
 drawal of her Minister from Belgrade did not imply a 
 declaration of war. (B. W. P. no. 35.) 
 
 But the German White Book (p. 6) states that, from the 
 moment Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Servia, 
 a state of war actually existed. It is perhaps more correct 
 to say that at the expiration of the time limit of the ulti- 
 matum, and after the formal breaking-off of all negotia- 
 tions, Austria might have considered herself at liberty to 
 commence hostilities without further notice.^ There could 
 have been no doubt as to this, had it not been for Austria's 
 assurances 'that her note to Servia was not an ultima- 
 tum, but only a demarche ^ (inquiry) with a time limit at- 
 
 1 A London cable of July 26, published in the New York Sun of July 27, 
 1914, declared that General Pulnik, Servian Chief-of-Staff, was arrested in 
 Hungary, July 25. He was traveling with his daughter in his private 
 capacity on their return from a vacation. 
 
 ^ A demarche in diplomatic parlance is a word very difficult to translate. 
 It may mean an inquiry or a request for an explanation or answer in regard 
 to a certain matter; it may likewise include a representation or mild protest 
 made to any other Government. Sometimes it denotes simply action taken, 
 i.e., proceedings or even procedure. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 87 
 
 tached.' (B. W. P. no. 14.) It would appear that actual 
 hostilities did follow the rupture of diplomatic relations. 
 For the British Government publish in the AVhite Paper 
 a telegram, dated July 28, from their representative at 
 Belgrade that 'two Servian steamers had been fired on 
 and damaged and two Servian merchant vessels captured 
 by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 28, B. W. P. no. 65.) 
 
 To avoid any doubt as to their compliance with the 
 terms of Article I of the Hague Convention of October 18, 
 1907, Relative to the Opening of HostiUties,^ Austria de- 
 livered, on July 28, the following formal declaration of war 
 against Servia, giving her reasons, as required by the 
 Hague Convention : " In order to bring to an end the sub- 
 versive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at 
 the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy, the Imperial and Royal Government delivered to 
 the Royal Servian Government a note in which a series of 
 demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a 
 delay of forty-eight hours was allowed the Royal Govern- 
 ment. The Royal Servian Government not having an- 
 swered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and 
 Royal Government are obliged themselves to see to the 
 safeguarding of their rights and interests, and for this pur- 
 pose to have recourse to force of arms." (July 28, B. W. P. 
 no. 50; cf. A. R. B. no. 37; S. B. B. no. 45.) Austria may 
 also have intended by this course to pursue her favorite 
 fait-accompli policy and to make still clearer to the powers 
 that she would brook no mediation in her dispute with 
 Servia. 
 
 The same day, the British Ambassador at Vienna re- 
 ported to his Government that 'Austria-Hungary had ad- 
 dressed to Servia a formal declaration, according to Article 
 I of the Convention of 18th of October, 1907, Relative to 
 the Opening of Hostilities, and considered herself from 
 • See Documents, post, chap. xin. 
 
88 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 then on in a state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary 
 would conform, provided Servia did so, to the stipulations 
 of Hague Conventions of 18th of October, 1907, and to the 
 Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 73.) 
 
 It is not quite clear why Austria should have referred to 
 the London Declaration in her note, for Servia, having no 
 navy, would be obliged to submit to any system of dealing 
 with neutral commerce which Austria might apply. Per- 
 haps Austria hoped, by giving official support to the 
 Declaration, to help to secure its general adoption. She 
 may have been preparing for the general war about to 
 occur, and thought the immunity of trade in conditional 
 contraband shipped to belligerents through neutral ports 
 would be an inducement for England to keep out of the 
 war. 
 
 'The demeanor of the people at Vienna, and, as the 
 British Ambassador was informed, in many other prin- 
 cipal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popu- 
 larity of the idea of war with Servia, and there could be no 
 doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian 
 statesmen by whom the momentous step was adopted, 
 gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the 
 determination of the people, except, presumably, in por- 
 tions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races.' ^ 
 (Modified quotation, B.W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) 
 
 ^ The depth of the hostile feeling toward Servia is well illustrated by the 
 following incident as recounted by the Servian Minister at Vienna: "Yes- 
 terday, the day when the remains of the Archduke Francois-Ferdinand and 
 his wife were taken from Serajevo, I caused to be raised and placed at half- 
 mast on my residence the national flag. This gave rise to protests last 
 evening from the doorkeeper, the tenants, the manager, and even the 
 owner of the property, all of whom demanded that the flag be removed. 
 Explanations serving no purpose, recourse was had to the police, who asked, 
 though not oSicially, the removal of the flag in order to prevent disorder. 
 The flag was kept flying, and this circumstance provoked violent demon- 
 strations in front of the legation last night. The police were active and no 
 damage was done either to the building or to the flag. Toward two o'clock 
 in the morning those who had been engaged in this manifestation were 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 89 
 
 After Austria's declaration of war and the publication 
 next morning of the Emperor's appeal to his people, the 
 British Ambassador at Vienna agreed with his French and 
 Italian colleagues in thinking there was ' at present no step 
 they could take to stop war with Servia.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 79.) 
 
 9. Austria explains the purpose of her action 
 The Austrian Ambassador at London, speaking on his 
 own account, really expressed the view of his Government 
 when he said that 'as long as Servia was confronted with 
 Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because 
 of her adherence to the policy of the free development of 
 the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her ter- 
 ritory and population without any Austrian interference, 
 the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter 
 of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 48.) 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador told Sir Edward Grey that 
 'the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not con- 
 tinue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and 
 again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She 
 had no idea of territorial aggrandizement, and all she 
 wished was to make sure that her interests were safe- 
 guarded.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 91; 
 of. A. R. B. no. 18.) 
 
 The same day that the Austrian Ambassador at London 
 told the British Government of the views and intentions 
 of Austria, the German Chancellor informed the British 
 Ambassador at Berlin that ' the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment, to whom he had at once communicated Sir Edward 
 Grey's opinion, had answered that events had marched too 
 
 driven away from my residence. The papers to-day, especially those of a 
 clerical-popular tendency, have published articles under the caption * Pro- 
 vocative Acts of the Servian Minister,' misrepresenting the whole affau:." 
 (Extract, July 3, S. B. B. no. 11.) 
 
90 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon Sir 
 Edward's suggestion that the Servian reply might form the 
 basis of discussion. He had, he said, on receiving their 
 reply, dispatched a message to Vienna, in which he had 
 said that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, 
 been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of 
 Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure 
 guaranties that Servia would carry out in their entirety the 
 demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment could not rest satisfied in view of their past experi- 
 ence. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which 
 were about to be undertaken against Servia had presum- 
 ably the exclusive object of securing such guaranties, see- 
 ing that the Austrian Govermnent had already assured the 
 Russian Government that they had no territorial designs. 
 He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should 
 this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The 
 holding of such language would, he hoped, eUminate all 
 possible misunderstandings.' (Modified quotation, July 
 29, B. W. P. no. 75. Of. A. R. B. no. 44.) 
 
 If this important communication had been made to the 
 Austrian Government earher and had been followed up, it 
 might have influenced the Dual Monarchy to accept in 
 time Servia's conciliatory reply, and Austria would un- 
 doubtedly have secured guaranties which, while preserving 
 Servian independence, would have checked her Pan-Serb 
 propaganda. This would have constituted a diplomatic 
 victory for Austria, have rendered her Empire more 
 secure, and have added to the prestige of the Triple Alli- 
 ance. It would also have been useful as a precedent to 
 determine the Hmits within which one state may allow a 
 political agitation directed against its neighbor to be 
 carried on. 
 
 But every one knows that promises made at a time of 
 crisis are not always observed after successful military 
 operations, and the high-handed manner in which Austria 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 91 
 
 had proceeded did not indicate that she was prepared to 
 give much heed to the wishes or views of the powers. The 
 British representative at Constantinople was so mistrust- 
 ful of Austria's real intentions as to telegraph Sir Edward 
 Grey: "I understand that the designs of Austria may ex- 
 tend considerably beyond the Sanjak^ and a punitive 
 occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a 
 remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who 
 spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonika 
 under Greek administration and of the assistance on 
 which the Austrian army could count from the Mussul- 
 man population discontented with Servian rule." (July 29, 
 B. W. P. no. 82; cf. B. W. P. no. 19; cf. A. R. B. no. 31.) 
 At the time the Austrian ultimatum was presented, the 
 view was expressed at the Italian Foreign Office that ' the 
 gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary 
 for their prestige, after many disillusions which the turn 
 of events in the Balkans had occasioned, to score a definite 
 success.'^ (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 38; 
 cf. B. W. P. no. 61; S. B. B. no. 25.) This is supported by 
 the statement of the British Ambassador at Vienna, re- 
 ferring to popular feeling, in which he said that 'there 
 had been much disappointment in many quarters at the 
 avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation 
 crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent 
 
 * By the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Austria-Hungary was empowered to 
 garrison certain towns in the Sanjak (Turkish province) of Novibazar, 
 though Turkey kept the entire civil administration. The following extract 
 from the Encyclopccdia Brilannica (Uth ed., 1911 vol. xix, p. 840) makes 
 clear the situation of the Sanjak, as it is called, in the political geography of 
 the Balkans: "The Sanjak is of great strategic importance, for it is the N.W. 
 part of the Tm-kish Empire, on the direct route between Bosnia and Sa- 
 lonika, and forms a wedge of Turkish territory between Servia and Monte- 
 negro. The union of these powers, combined with the annexation of Novi- 
 bazar, would have impeded the extension of Austrian influence towards 
 Salonika." As a result of the Balkan Wars, Servia received this important 
 territory, three fourths of the inhabitants of which are Christian Serbs. 
 
 • See post, p. 107. 
 
92 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Balkan War. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met 
 with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood- 
 gates were opened, and the entire people and press clam- 
 ored impatiently for immediate and condign punishment 
 of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed 
 that it had before it only the alternative of subduing 
 Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her 
 hands. . . . So just was the cause of Austria held to be, 
 that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any coun- 
 try should place itself in her path, or that questions of 
 mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as 
 superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact sum- 
 mary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo.' (Modified 
 quotation, September 1, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 
 1914.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at London said that 'the view 
 of the German Government was that Austria could not 
 by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position 
 as a great power.' Sir Edward Grey rephed that 'he en- 
 tirely agreed, but it was not a question of humihating 
 Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to 
 push the humihation of others. There must, of course, be 
 some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things 
 so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.' When 
 the German Ambassador remarked that 'Austria would 
 not take Servian territory,' Sir Edward 'observed that, 
 without taking territory and while leaving nominal Ser- 
 vian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically 
 into a vassal state, and this would affect the whole position 
 of Russia in the Balkans.' (Modified quotation, July 29, 
 B. W. P. no. 90.) At Berlin the French Ambassador made 
 suggestions as to the possibiHty of securing guaranties satis- 
 factory to Austria without impairing the independence of 
 Servia. (July 29, F. Y. B. no. 92.) Sir Edward Grey re- 
 peated to the Austrian Ambassador his statement to the 
 German Ambassador 'that it would be quite possible, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 93 
 
 without nominally interfering with the independence of 
 Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into 
 a sort of vassal state.' This the Ambassador deprecated, 
 and 'in reply to some further remarks of Sir Edward's as 
 to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the 
 Russian position in the Balkans, said that, before the 
 Balkan War, Servia had always been regarded as being in 
 the Austrian sphere of influence.' ^ (Modified quotation, 
 July 29, B. W. P. no. 91.) 
 
 This last remark touches the very crux of the question. 
 Servia, as a consequence of the Balkan War, had escaped 
 from the position of a political vassal of Austria, and, from 
 the Austrian point of view, it was perfectly natural that 
 every effort should be made to reestablish over her Aus- 
 trian influence and political dictation. So, when the Ger- 
 man Ambassador at St. Petersburg said that the German 
 Government was 'willing to guarantee that Servian in- 
 tegrity would be respected by Austria,' M. Sazonbf replied 
 that 'this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would be- 
 come an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstance, 
 Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a 
 revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of 
 affairs.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 97.) 
 
 The German Memorandum, issued when war with 
 Russia was certain, gives a frank explanation of Austria's 
 motives and states that "Russia, soon after the events 
 brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endea- 
 vored to form under Russian patronage a union of the 
 Balkan States directed against Turkish integrity. This 
 union, which succeeded in 1911 in depriving Turkey of a 
 greater part of her European possessions, came to grief 
 over the question of the distribution of spoils. Russia was 
 
 ^ "The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, 
 with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make 
 Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance." 
 (Extract, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 65.) 
 
94 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 not dismayed by this failure of her policies. The Russian 
 statesmen adopted the plan of forming a new Balkan 
 union under Russian patronage, directed no longer against 
 Turkey, now crowded out of the Balkans, but against the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It was intended that Ser- 
 via, in return for Bosnia and Herzegovina, acquired at the 
 expense of the Dual Monarchy, should make over to Bul- 
 garia the parts of Macedonia which she had acquired in 
 the last Balkan War. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this 
 plan she was to be isolated, Rumania was to be attached 
 to Russia by means of a French propaganda, and Servia 
 was to be promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 
 
 "Under these circumstances Austria could not consider 
 it compatible with her dignity and the preservation of her 
 national security longer to view supinely the working-out 
 of this plan across the border." (G. W. B., Memoran- 
 dum, p. 4.) 
 
 The Marquis di San Giuliano, as soon as he learned that 
 the Russian Government had announced at Berlin her 
 partial mobilization, thought the time was 'past for any 
 further discussions on the basis of the Servian note.' The 
 utmost he hoped for was that Germany might 'use her 
 influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further 
 demands on Servia' (modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. 
 no. 86), which meant that she might influence Austria not 
 to make any further demands or take any action which 
 would interfere with the maintenance of Servia's independ- 
 ence, thereby affecting the balance of power in the Balkans, 
 and making a general war inevitable. 
 
 Meantime, the question of Austria's mobilization became 
 so important as to overshadow that of the Austro-Servian 
 relations, but as the question of the military preparations 
 involves the relations of all the powers, it will be best to 
 lay it aside until we take up the consideration of Russia's 
 reply to Austria's attack upon Servia. 
 
 To the impartial observer who has followed the course 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 95 
 
 of Austria's action to this point, it may seem inexplicable, 
 even in the face of a most serious grievance against her 
 weaker neighbor, that a civilized state should wish to pro- 
 ceed so far in the abuse of force before there had been any 
 opportunity for an unbiased investigation. It will, per- 
 haps, help to understand the national psychology to com- 
 pare our own conduct, not so very many years ago, in 
 circumstances somewhat analogous, when the American 
 nation was stirred by the loss of the Maine. ^ 
 
 * Among the documents at the end of this volume has been placed a 
 r^sum^ of the negotiations between Spain and the United States follow- 
 ing the destruction of the Maine and a comparison between the action of the 
 United States in 1898 and that of Austria-Hungary in 1914. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN DISCUSSIONS 
 
 Russia's interest in the Austro-Servian conflict — Russia believes Aus- 
 tria's action is directed against herself — Russia considers immediate 
 action necessary — Russia partially mobilizes against Austria — The Tsar 
 asks the Kaiser to try his mediation. 
 
 1. RtLssia's interest in the Austro-Servian conflict 
 
 From the date of the presentation of the Austrian ulti- 
 matum, the efforts which the powers had directed toward 
 settUng the Austro-Servian controversy had, of course, the 
 object of preventing Russia's entry upon the scene. It was 
 an A B C of European poUtics that Russia was deeply 
 interested in the fate of the Slav states of the Balkan 
 Peninsula. 
 
 Before taking his departure on leave of absence, the 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna assured his British col- 
 league that 'any action taken by Austria to humiliate 
 Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 7.) 
 
 Count Berchtold received Prince Kudachef, the Rus- 
 sian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna, the morning after the 
 presentation of the ultimatum and ' assured him that he 
 laid special weight upon notifjang him as soon as possible 
 of the steps they had taken in Belgrade and making clear 
 to him their point of view in this connection. 
 
 ' Prince Kudachef, in thanking Count Berchtold for this 
 attention, did not conceal from the Austrian Minister his 
 uneasiness about Austria's categorical procedure toward 
 Servia, remarking in this connection that they had been 
 continuously preoccupied at St. Petersburg in considering 
 whether the Austrian demarche would take the form of a 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 97 
 
 humiliation for Servia, which could not take place with- 
 out affecting Russia. 
 
 'Count Berchtold took occasion to calm the Russian 
 Charge in this respect. Their goal, he told him, was to 
 clear up the untenable attitude of Servia toward the Mon- 
 archy and for this purpose to influence the Government 
 there, on the one hand, publicly to disavow the currents 
 directed against the present stability of the Monarchy and 
 to suppress them by administrative measures, and, on the 
 other hand, to offer the Austrian Government the pos- 
 sibihty of assuring itself of the conscientious execution of 
 these measiu-es. He furthermore dwelt upon the danger 
 which a further tolerance of the Greater Servian propa- 
 ganda would entail, not only for the integrity of the Mon- 
 archy, but also for the balance of power and the peace of 
 Europe, and how much all dynasties, and not least of 
 them the Russian, seemed to be threatened by a popular 
 adoption of this view that a movement which made use of 
 murder as a nationalist means of battle could remain un- 
 punished. 
 
 'Finally, Count Berchtold pointed out that they did 
 not seek for an acquisition of territory, but merely for the 
 conservation of that which existed, a point of view which, 
 he considered, should be understood by the Russian Gov- 
 ernment.' (Modified quotation, July 24, A. R. B. no. 18.) 
 
 As early as July 24, the British Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg had sounded M. Sazonof as to the course 
 Russia would pursue, supposing Austria, even though the 
 powers 'joined in making a communication to the effect 
 that her active intervention in the internal affairs of Servia 
 could not be tolerated, should nevertheless, in spite of 
 their representations, proceed to embark on military 
 measures against Servia. The Russian Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs replied that he thought that Russian mobiliza- 
 tion would at any rate have to be carried out, but that a 
 Council of Ministers was being held that afternoon to con- 
 
98 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 sider the whole question, and that a further council would 
 be held, probably on the morrow, at which the Tsar would 
 preside, and that then a decision would be reached.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.) 
 
 M. Sazonof, according to the report of the German 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 'made wild complaints 
 against Austria-Hungary and was much excited. Wliat he 
 said most definitely was this: that Russia could not pos- 
 sibly permit the Austro-Servian dispute to be confined to 
 the parties concerned.' (Modified quotation, July 24, 
 G. W. B. exhibit 24.) 
 
 In the Austrian Red Book, Count Szapary, Austrian 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg, gives the following account 
 of this interview of July 24, with M. Sazonof: ''The Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs received me, telling me that he 
 knew what led me to him and that he would declare to me 
 at the outset that he would take no attitude toward my 
 demarche. I began with the reading of my instructions. 
 The Minister interrupted me the first time upon the men- 
 tion of the series of outrages and asked me to explain 
 whether or not it had been proved that all these originated 
 in Belgrade. I emphasized the fact that they were the 
 result of Servian instigation. In the further course of the 
 reading he said that he knew what was at issue; we wanted 
 to make war upon Servia, and this was to be the pretext. 
 I replied that our attitude in recent years afforded ample 
 proof that we neither sought nor needed pretexts in 
 Servia's case." (Extract, July 24, A. R. B. no. 14.) 
 
 The Russian Government, in a communique of July 25, 
 stated that it was ' carefully following the evolution of the 
 Austro-Servian conflict to which it could not remain in- 
 different.' (Modified quotation, July 25, R. O. P. no. 10.) 
 
 Several days later, July 31, M. Sazonof said that 'during 
 the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian 
 Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow 
 an attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 99 
 
 of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the depend- 
 ence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great 
 Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of hfe 
 and death.' ^ (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 
 139.) 
 
 When the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg urged 
 upon M. Sazonof the danger of precipitating a German 
 attack if Russia should mobilize, he 'replied that Russia 
 could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the 
 predominant power in the Balkans.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 
 On July 27, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, having 
 just returned from St. Petersburg, and being 'well ac- 
 quainted with the views of the Russian Government and 
 the state of Russian public opinion,' assured the Austrian 
 Government 'that if actual war broke out with Servia it 
 would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not pre- 
 pared to give way again, as she had done on previous oc- 
 casions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 
 1909.' (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 56.) 
 No wonder Sazonof complained to the Austrian Govern- 
 ment that its action had caused in his country a feeling of 
 'profound surprise and general reprobation.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 27, R. 0. P. no. 41.) 
 
 That Servia was well aware of Russia's interest is indi- 
 cated by Prince Alexander's telegraphing an appeal for 
 aid to the Tsar. (July 24, R. O. P. no. 6.) In another tele- 
 gram to the Tsar, Prince Alexander of Servia says: "These 
 painful moments can only strengthen the bonds of the 
 deep attachment which unites Servia to Holy Slav Russia, 
 and the sentiments of eternal gratitude for the aid and 
 protection of Your Majesty will be piously preserved in 
 
 * "From the political point of view, it is not by annexation alone that the 
 balance of power is affected. If, as a result of war, Servia became politically 
 dependent on Austria, or France were seriously weakened, the balance of 
 power would be disturbed." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus 
 Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, pp. 75-76.) 
 
100 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the souls of all Servians." (Extract, July 29, R. 0. P. no. 
 56; cf. S. B. B. no. 44.) The Tsar, in answer to this appeal 
 telegraphed : '' So long as there is the least hope of avoiding 
 bloodshed, all our efforts must tend toward this object. 
 If, despite our most sincere desire, we do not succeed. Your 
 Highness may be assured that in no case will Russia be 
 unconcerned regarding the fate of Servia." (Extract, July 
 27, R. O. P. no. 40.) 
 
 In a telegram of July 28, the Servian Minister at St. 
 Petersburg informed his Government of the manner in 
 which he had informed M. Sazonof of the Austrian declara- 
 tion of war against Servia: — 
 
 ^'I have the honor of informing you that I have just 
 received from M. M. Pashitch, President of the Council, 
 the following urgent telegram sent from Nish to-day at 
 2.10 p.m.: — 
 
 'The Government of Austria-Hungary declared 
 war to-day at noon in an open [en clair] telegram 
 addressed to the Servian Government.' 
 
 'Pashitch.' 
 
 "In bringing to your attention this act which a great 
 power unhappily has had the courage to commit upon 
 a little Slav country just now barely emerging from a 
 long series of struggles as heroic as they have been exhaust- 
 ing, I take the liberty, in circumstances so serious to my 
 country, of expressing the hope that this act, which shat- 
 ters the peace of Europe and shocks its conscience, will be 
 disapproved by the whole civilized world and severely 
 punished by Russia, protector of Servia. 
 
 "I pray Your Excellency be pleased to bear to the throne 
 of His Majesty this prayer of the whole Servian people, 
 and to accept the assurance of my devotion and respect." 
 (July 28, S. B. B. no. 47.) 
 
 When the Russian Charge at Belgrade communicated 
 to M. Pashitch the Tsar's promise of protection, the 
 Servian Minister exclaimed: ''Seigneur, the Tsar is great 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 101 
 
 and clement" (extract, July 29, R. 0. P. no. 57), and, 
 unable to restrain his emotion, embraced the Charge. 
 
 Count Berchtold showed that he realized how vitally 
 Russia was concerned by summoning the Russian Charg^, 
 the day after the presentation of the ultimatum, 'in order 
 to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the posi- 
 tion of Austria regarding Servia. After going over the his- 
 torical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on 
 the statement that the Monarchy entertained no thought 
 of conquest of Servia. He said that Austria-Hungary 
 would demand no territory; that the step was merely a 
 definitive measure against Servian intrigue; that Austria- 
 Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guaranties for the 
 future friendly behavior of Servia toward the Monarchy; 
 that it was far from his intention to bring about a change 
 in the balance of power in the Balkans. The Charg6 
 d' Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Peters- 
 burg, took the explanations of the Minister ad referendum, 
 promising to transmit them immediately to M. Sazonof/ 
 (Modified quotation, July 24, G. W. B. exhibit 3; cf. A. 
 R. B. no. 18.) 
 
 Herr von Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, 
 'doubted if Russia, who had no right to assume a protec- 
 torate over Servia, would act as if she made any such 
 claim.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 32.) 
 To the British Ambassador he expressed his confident 
 belief that 'Russia, having received assurances that no 
 Servian territory would be annexed by Austria-Hungary, 
 would keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia, which 
 Austria-Hungary was resolved to inflict.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 32; cf. B. W. P., Miscellane- 
 ous, no. 10, 1914.) When asked 'whether the Russian 
 Government might not be compelled by public opinion to 
 intervene on behalf of a kindred nationality, he said that 
 everything depended on the personality of the Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he 
 
102 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out 
 that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, 
 and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs would not, he thought, be so im- 
 prudent as to take a step which would probably result in 
 many frontier questions in whiph Russia was interested, 
 such as the Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Rumanian, and 
 Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. 
 France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 32.) 
 
 Similarly, the German Under-Secretary of State, learn- 
 ing from St. Petersburg that Russia would not remain 
 indifferent 'if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory,' 
 drew the conclusion ' that Russia would not act if Austria 
 did not annex territory.' (Modified quotation, July 26, 
 B. W. P. no. 33.) 
 
 The German Memorandum admits, however, that 
 'Germany was fully aware in this connection that warlike 
 moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia 
 would bring Russia into the question and might draw Ger- 
 many into a war in accordance with her duty as Austria's 
 ally.' (Modified quotation, G. W. B. p. 4.) 
 
 The Marquis di San Giuliano had previously, in a con- 
 versation with the French representative at Rome, said 
 that 'unfortunately in this whole affair it had been and 
 still was the conviction of Austria and Germany that 
 Russia would not move. In this connection he read a dis- 
 patch from the Italian representative at Berlin reporting 
 an interview he had had that day with the German Secre- 
 tary for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter again repeated 
 that he did not believe Russia would move, basing his be- 
 lief on the fact that the Russian Government had only just 
 sent an agent to Berlin to arrange about certain financial 
 matters. Furthermore, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin 
 had told his English colleague that he did not believe in a 
 general war, Russia being in neither a mood nor a condition 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 103 
 
 to make war. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs did 
 not share this opinion, but considered that if Austria con- 
 fined her action to humiUating Servia and to exacting in 
 addition to the acceptance of the note, certain material 
 advantages not affecting Servia's territorial integrity, 
 Russia would still be able to find ground for a settlement 
 with her. If, however, Austria wished either to dismember 
 Servia or destroy her position as an independent state, he 
 thought it impossible for Russia not to intervene with 
 armed force.' (Modified quotation, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 
 96.) 
 
 Public opinion in Austria well understood Russia's atti- 
 tude, for during the orderly patriotic demonstrations which 
 followed the news of the rejection of the Servian reply, ' one 
 or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the 
 Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of 
 police which held the approaches to the principal embassies 
 during those days' (modified quotation, B. W. P., Miscel- 
 laneous, no. 10, 1914), and in Berlin 'after the reception of 
 the news of the mobilization of the Austrian army against 
 Servia, a large crowd, composed, according to the newspa- 
 pers, partly of Austrians, indulged in a series of noisy man- 
 ifestations in favor of Austria. At a late hour in the even- 
 ing the demonstrators gathered several times in front of 
 the Russian Embassy, uttering cries against Russia. The 
 police were practically absent and took no steps.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 26, R. 0. P. no. 30.) 
 
 'At St. Petersburg, M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, begged the German Ambassador to point out the 
 danger of the situation to his Government. He refrained, 
 however, from alluding to the step which Russia would 
 doubtless be led to take if the independence or territorial 
 integrity of Servia should be threatened. The evasive 
 replies and recriminations of the German Ambassador 
 made an unfavorable impression upon M. Sazonof, who 
 nevertheless gave evidence of his moderation when he re- 
 
104 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 marked to the French Ambassador that they must avoid 
 everything which might precipitate the crisis, and that, 
 even if the Austro-Hungarian Government should pro- 
 ceed to action against Servia, they ought not to break 
 off negotiations.' (Modified quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. 
 no. 38.) 
 
 July 27, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg in- 
 formed his Government: ''M. Sazonof has used concilia- 
 tory language to all my colleagues. In spite of public feel- 
 ing the Russian Government is endeavoring with success to 
 restrain the press. Great moderation in particular has been 
 recommended toward Germany." (Extract, July 27, F. Y. 
 B. no. 64.) 
 
 The Russian Ambassador at Vienna was instructed to 
 point out to Count Berchtold 'how desirable it would be 
 to find a solution which, while consolidating the good rela- 
 tions between Austria-Hungary and Russia, should give to 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious guaranties for 
 its future relations with Servia.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 28, R. 0. P. no. 45; cf. F. Y. B. no. 18.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported 
 that M. Sazonof in a previous interview (July 26) with 
 the Austrian Ambassador had been visibly calmed by the 
 latter's assurance that 'Austria Hungary was planning 
 no conquests, and simply wished to secure peace at last 
 on her frontiers.' (Modified quotation, July 26, G. W. B. 
 exhibit 5.) 
 
 These extracts show that Russia was ready to acquiesce 
 in some plan by which Austria might be relieved of the 
 constant menace to her security resulting from the Pan- 
 Serb propaganda. But when the Austrian Government 
 was unwilling to discuss with the other powers the condi- 
 tions of the settlement of her difference with Servia, M. 
 Sazonof felt that Russia must prepare to insist that she be 
 heard. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 105 
 
 2. Russia believes Austria's action is directed against herself 
 
 Russia employed all her efforts to obtain a pacific issue 
 which would be acceptable to Austria, and satisfy her 
 amour-propre as a great power. (August 2, R. 0. P. no. 77.) 
 
 St. Petersburg considered that 'Austria's action was in 
 reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrow- 
 ing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing 
 her own hegemony there.' (Modified quotation, July 25, 
 B. W. P. no. 17; cf. F. Y. B. no. 65; B. W. P. nos. 90, 91; 
 R. 0. P. no. 75.) Russia seemed to be justified in this 
 view by the terms of the ultimatum and Austria's refusal 
 to modify them, as well as by the hostile demonstrations 
 before the Russian Embassies in Vienna and Berlin. ^ 
 (July 26, R. 0. P. no. 25.) Austrian and German expres- 
 sions of opinion that ' Russia neither wanted nor was in a 
 position to make war' (modified quotation, July 29, B. W. 
 P. no. 71; cf. F. Y. B. no. 96) confirm this impression. 
 
 The attitude of the Russian Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs is indicated in the following report which Count 
 Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, sent 
 to Count Berchtold on July 27: "Have just had a long 
 interview with M. Sazonof. I told the Minister that I had 
 received the impression that there was misunderstanding 
 in Russia regarding the nature of our action, that we were 
 accused of wishing to undertake an advance in the Bal- 
 
 ^ This is indicated by the following extract from a cable dispatch of 
 July 25 from Berlin to the New York Sun, July 26: " ' Down with Russia,' 
 resounds to-night in Unter den Linden, where vast throngs of excited thou- 
 sands are moving from the Imperial Palace down past the Brandenburger 
 Gate to the famous Avenue of Victory, around the column of Victory, which 
 is largely composed of French cannon captured in 1870. This is faced by 
 huge statues of Prince Bismarck, Field Marshal von Moltke, and Field 
 Marshal von Roon. The immense crowds are singing the 'Watch on the 
 Rhine,' 'Deutschland Ueber Alles,' and the German and Austrian national 
 hymns. In front of the Russian Embassy on Unter den Linden there are 
 constant shouts of 'Down with Russia!' while across the street and almost 
 opposite there are jeers at the French Embassy. The police are trying to 
 keep the crowds constantly moving." 
 
106 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 kans, and a march to Saloniki or even Constantinople. 
 Others, I added, went so far as to see in our action the 
 beginning of a preventive war against Russia. I said all 
 this was a mistake, nay, absurd in part ; that the purpose 
 of our action was self-preservation and self-defense against 
 a hostile propaganda of words, writings, and deeds which 
 was threatening our national integrity. I said that no- 
 body in Austria-Hungary thought of threatening Russian 
 interests or even of picking quarrels with Russia, but 
 that we were absolutely resolved to achieve the goal 
 which we had set ourselves and that the road we had 
 chosen seemed to us the best. I added that as it was a mat- 
 ter of self-defense, however, I would not attempt to con- 
 ceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be 
 turned aside by any consideration of the consequences, 
 no matter what they might be. M. Sazonof agreed with 
 me. He considered that our purpose, such as I had ex- 
 plained it to him, was perfectly legitimate, but it was his 
 opinion that the way we had chosen to achieve it was 
 not the safest; that the note which we had sent was not 
 happy in its form. He said that he had studied it mean- 
 while, and that if I had time he wished to go through it 
 again v^^ith me. I remarked that I was at his disposal, but 
 was not authorized either to discuss the text of the note 
 with him nor to interpret it; that, however, his remarks 
 would be naturally of interest. The Minister then' took 
 up all the points of the note, and found to-day that seven 
 out of the ten might be accepted without great difficulty 
 and that only the two points dealing with the partici- 
 pation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servia and that 
 which dealt with the dismissal of officers and officials to be 
 named by us were unacceptable in their present form. 
 As to the first two points, I was in a position to give an 
 authentic interpretation of them, in the light of Your 
 Excellency's telegram of the 25th inst. ; as to the third, I 
 expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand; 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 107 
 
 moreover, I said that matters were taking their course; 
 that the Servians had already mobihzed yesterday; and 
 that I was unaware of what might have happened since." 
 (July 27, A. R. B. no. 31.) 
 
 To Russia's proposal for collaboration in finding a 
 solution acceptable to Russia and Austria, Count Berch- 
 told had replied that 'the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
 which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic 
 measures which it had taken against Servia, could now 
 neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the 
 terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 28, R. 0. P. no. 45.) 'The prestige of the Dual 
 Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could prevent a 
 conflict.' 1 (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 
 61; cf. A. R. B. no. 44.) In an interview of July 29, M. 
 Sazonof, referring to the Austrian demands, told the 
 Austrian Ambassador, Count Szapary, that, ''so far as 
 acquisition of territory was concerned, he had allowed him- 
 self to be convinced ; but, as to sovereignty, he was obliged 
 to keep to the viewpoint that the imposition of our de- 
 mands would put Servia in the position of our vassal. He 
 added that this would imperil the balance of power in the 
 Balkans, which constituted the Russian interests in ques- 
 
 ^ "It is an interesting and possibly significant fact thait the one European 
 power whose ' prestige ' seems to have been in question was Austria. In the 
 entire diplomatic correspondence published by the different Governments 
 we find the word used only in reference to tliis power. It was employed to 
 explain the Austrian attitude, not only by Italian, French, and Russian 
 diplomatists (British Blue Book, nos. 38, 76, and Russian Orange Paper, 
 no. 14), but by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, who told 
 the British ambassador at Vienna, July 28, that the 'prestige of the Dual 
 Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict' with 
 Servia (British Blue Book, no. 61). Without using the word 'prestige,' the 
 German Foreign Office indicated the existence at Vienna of a degree of 
 touchiness closely related to the soldier's and duelist's sense of honor: 
 Germany hesitated to urge Austria to moderation, because 'any idea that 
 they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate mat- 
 ters.' (British Blue Book, nos. 76, 107, and Russian Orange Paper, no. 51.) " 
 (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy rersns Diplomacy," Political Science 
 Quarterly, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, p. 70. Cf. also S. B. B. no. 25.) 
 
108 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tion. He then returned to the discussion of the note, the 
 action of Sir E. Grey, etc., and wished to tell me again 
 that, though he recognized our legitimate interests and 
 wished to satisfy us thoroughly, our demands should be 
 clothed in a form possible of acceptance by Servia. I said 
 that this was not a matter concerning Russia, but Servia, 
 upon which M. Sazonof stated that Russian interests in 
 this matter were identical with Servia's, so that I put an 
 end to the vicious circle {circulus vitiosus) by changing to 
 another subject." (Extract, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47; cf. 
 F. Y. B. nos. 52, 96.) Thus Austria not only insisted upon 
 taking drastic action against Servia, but refused to allow 
 Russia or the powers to consider the question. 
 
 3. Russia considers immediate action necessary 
 The British Ambassador expressed the hope that Russia 
 would not ' do anything to precipitate a conflict and would 
 defer the mobihzation ukase as long as possible.' In reply 
 the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that 'until 
 the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward 
 mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government would profit by delay in order to complete 
 her mihtary preparations, if it were deferred too long.' 
 (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 44.) 
 
 Russia felt that mediation between Austria and Servia 
 was urgently necessary, and that meantime 'the military 
 action of Austria against Servia should be immediately 
 suspended, otherwise mediation would only serve as a pre- 
 text to delay inordinately the solution of the question, and 
 give Austria an opportunity of crushing Servia completely 
 and securing a dominant situation in the Balkans.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 28, R. 0. P. nos. 48; 53.) M. Sazonof 
 declared to the British Ambassador that 'if Servia were 
 attacked, Russia would not be satisfied with any engage- 
 ment which Austria might take in respect to Servia's integ- 
 rity and independence, and that the order for mobilization 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 109 
 
 against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria 
 crossed the Servian frontier.' (Modified quotation, July 
 28, B. W. P. no. 72.) Russia received notice of Austrian 
 mobilization from her consular and diplomatic representa- 
 tives in different parts of the Austrian Empire. The Rus- 
 sian Consul-General at Fiume telegraphed his Government 
 'that a ''state of siege" had been proclaimed in Slavonia, 
 in Croatia, and at Fiume, and at the same time the reserv- 
 ists of all classes had been mobilized.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 28, R. O. P. no. 44.) From Vienna the Russian 
 Ambassador had telegraphed his Government that 'the 
 decree of general mobilization had been signed.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 28, R. 0. P. no. 47.) 
 
 The effect of these measures and Austria's declaration of 
 war against Servia on opinion in Russia was great. (Cf. 
 G. W. B., exhibit 21.) The view of Russia's ally is ex- 
 pressed by the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 in a short resume of the situation communicated to the 
 French representatives in which he declares that 'in the 
 Austrian capital they wish to keep St. Petersburg amused 
 by the illusion that an understanding might result from 
 direct conversations while they in the mean time are tak- 
 ing action against Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 29, 
 F. Y. B. no. 85; cf. R. O. P. no. 53.) 
 
 4. Russia partially mobilizes against Austria 
 On July 29, Russia, as had been expected and feared, 
 replied to the Austrian mobilization by partial mobiliza- 
 tion. (July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) M. Sazonof told the 
 British Ambassador that 'had not Russia by mobilizing 
 shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded 
 on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that 
 she could go to any lengths,' but at the same time gave 
 him to understand that ' Russia would not precipitate war 
 by crossing the frontier immediately, and a week or more 
 would, in any case, elapse before the mobilization was 
 
no THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous 
 situation he considered it necessary that in the interim 
 they should all work together.' (Modified quotations, 
 July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) When the British Ambassador 
 referred to Germany's fear of being "taken by surprise" 
 (July 27, B. W. P. no. 43), M. Sazonof explained that 'the 
 mobilization would be directed against Austria only.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) At Vienna 
 the Russian Ambassador 'expressed the hope that Russian 
 mobilization would be regarded by Austria as what it was, 
 namely, a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted 
 regarding the fate of Servia, but he did not know how the 
 Austrian Government were taking it. He said that Russia 
 must have an assurance that Servia would not be crushed, 
 but she would understand that Austria-Hungary was com- 
 pelled to exact from Servia measures which would secure 
 her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propa- 
 ganda from Servian territory.' (Modified quotation, July 
 30, B. W. P. no. 95.) 
 
 Turning to the German point of view, we find that, as 
 early as July 25, the German Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg had telegraphed his Government his opinion that 
 'all preparations had been made for mobilization against 
 Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 
 6.) ' July 26, the German military attache reported mobili- 
 zation at Kieff and Odessa as certain, while at Warsaw 
 and Moscow he considered it doubtful, and elsewhere re- 
 ported it had probably not been ordered.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 26, G. W. B. exhibit 7.) 
 
 The next day, July 27, the Minister of War, acting at 
 the request of M. Sazonof, explained the situation to the 
 German miUtary attache, and ' gave his word of honor that 
 as yet no mobilization order had gone forth; that for the 
 time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, 
 but that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single 
 horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 111 
 
 the Servian frontier, the miUtary districts in the direction 
 of Austria — ICieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan — would be 
 mobihzed, but that those on the side of Germany — War- 
 saw, Vilna, St. Petersburg — would not be under any 
 circumstances.' The attach^ told the Minister that his 
 Government appreciated Russia's friendly attitude to- 
 ward them, but must 'look upon mobilization against 
 Austria alone as very menacing.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 11.) That same day the German 
 Consul in the district telegraphed, "State of war declared 
 in Kovno." (July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 8.) In an interview 
 which he had, on July 29, with the Austrian Ambassador, 
 M. Sazonof concluded by informing the Ambassador, 
 'that a ukase would be issued that day ordering a some- 
 what extended mobilization, but that he could assure him 
 absolutely officially that these troops were not destined 
 to attack Austria, but would only be held armed and ready 
 in case Russia's interests in the Balkans should be imperiled. 
 He added that an explanatory note would announce this, 
 since what was contemplated was only a precautionary 
 measure which the Tsar had considered to be justified, 
 not only because Austria had the advantage of being able 
 to mobilize more quickly, but also because she already 
 had so long a start. The Austrian Ambassador called 
 M. Sazonof's attention earnestly to the impression which 
 such a step would make in his country, remarking that 
 he could but doubt whether the explanatory note would 
 soften this impression; whereupon the minister once more 
 gave assurances of the harmlessness (!) of the measure.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47.) The Rus- 
 sian Ambassador, returning to Berlin on July 29, informed 
 the German Government that ' Russia was mobilizing in 
 the four southern districts.' (Modified quotation, July 29, 
 B. W. P. no. 76.) 
 
112 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 5. The Tsar asks the Kaiser to try his mediation 
 
 While this mobiHzation had been going on, the Tsar 
 telegraphed the Kaiser: ''I am glad that you are back in 
 Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to 
 help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak 
 nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is im- 
 mense in Russia. I fear that soon I shall no longer be able 
 to withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear 
 upon me, and that I shall be forced to take measures which 
 will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a 
 European war would be, I ask you in the name of our old 
 friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from 
 going too far." (July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 21.) The Ger- 
 man Emperor responded to this appeal and made efforts 
 at mediation between Austria and Russia. (R. 0. P. no. 
 49; G. W. B. exhibit 23.) 
 
 On July 29, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
 assured M. Sazonof that 'up to that morning there had 
 been no news that the Austrian army had crossed the 
 Servian frontier.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. 
 no. 93 (2); July 29, R. 0. P. no. 49.) 
 
 To prevent Russia's further mobilization, the sincerity 
 of Austria's assurances in regard to her designs on Servia 
 were emphasized, and it was pointed out that 'Austria- 
 Hungary had mobilized only against Servia, and at that 
 she had mobilized a part only of her army.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 23; cf A. R. B. no. 50.) 
 M. Sazonof, 'informing the German Ambassador of the 
 military measures taken by Russia, said that none of them 
 were directed against Germany, and added that they did 
 not indicate aggressive intentions against Austria-Hun- 
 gary, since they were to be explained by the mobilization 
 of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 49.) 
 
 That same day, Wednesday, July 29, the German mill- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 113 
 
 tary attach^ at St. Petersburg reported that the 'Chief of 
 the General Staff of the Russian army had told him that 
 he had just come from the Tsar, and had been requested by 
 the Minister of War to reiterate once more that every- 
 thing had remained in the same state as the Minister had 
 informed him two days ago. The Chief of the General Staff 
 offered him a written confirmation and gave him his word 
 of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had 
 begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse 
 had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the after- 
 noon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, 
 but could declare most emphatically that no mobilization 
 was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching on 
 the German frontier. But as the attache had received 
 many items of news concerning the caUing out of the re- 
 serves in different parts of the country, including Warsaw 
 and Vilna, he told the General that his statements were 
 a riddle to him. On his honor as an officer, the General 
 replied that the information received by the attach^ was 
 incorrect, though possibly here and there a false alarm 
 might have been given.' (Modified quotation, July 29, 
 G. W. B., Memorandum, pp. 10-11.) The attache, inform- 
 ing his Government, commented that 'in view of the 
 abundant and positive information which reached him 
 about the calling out of reserves, he considered this con- 
 versation as an attempt to mislead the German Govern- 
 ment as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, G. W. B. p. 11.) 
 
 It would be interesting to know how far this report of 
 the German military attach^ was responsible for Germany's 
 preparations and accusations against Russia. There is as 
 yet no available evidence to determine what justification 
 the attach^ had for these statements. He might well be 
 expected to emphasize the mihtary preparations, and if, 
 like many of the militarists, he was really anxious to bring 
 on a war, his inchnation would have been very likely to 
 
114 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 influence his judgment, however sincere his intention. He 
 would have been held responsible if Russia had really got 
 a start toward mobilization without Germany's knowledge. 
 Before such a crushing load of responsibility it would take 
 a man of iron nerves not to pass on for fact what might 
 upon closer investigation have been found to be mere 
 rumors, or exaggerations at least. Perhaps the very effi- 
 ciency of the Governments in keeping secret their military 
 preparations or arrangements gave rise to baneful rumors, 
 and these, believed and serving as ground for counter- 
 preparations, quickly complicated the situation. 
 
 Even as late as July 31, the British Ambassador at Paris 
 informed Sir Edward Grey that ' the Russian Ambassador 
 was not aware that any general mobilization of the Rus- 
 sian forces had taken place.' (Modified quotation, July 
 31, B. W. P. no. 117.) 
 
 But in a dispatch to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, 
 M. Sazonof said: ''Since we cannot accede to the desire 
 of Germany [in regard to arresting miUtary preparation] it 
 only remains for us to accelerate our own armament, and 
 to take measures for the probable inevitability of war." 
 (July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.) 
 
 July 31, Sir Edward Grey learned from the British Am- 
 bassador at St. Petersburg that 'it had been decided to 
 issue orders for general mobiUzation. This decision was 
 taken in consequence of a report received from the Russian 
 Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria was deter- 
 mined not to accept the intervention of the powers, and 
 that she was moving troops against Russia as well as 
 against Servia. Russia had also reason, he said, to believe 
 that Germany was making active preparations, and could 
 not afford to let her get a start.' (Modified quotation, July 
 31, B. W. P. no. 113.) 
 
 \- July 31, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward 
 Grey that 'the Chancellor had informed him that his 
 efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna had been 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 115 
 
 seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against 
 Austria. He had done everything possible to attain his 
 object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was alto- 
 gether palatable at the Ballplatz (Austrian Foreign Office). 
 He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while 
 time was being utilized by other powers; and if, as he had 
 learned was the case, military measures were being taken 
 by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible 
 for him to remain quiet. The Chancellor said he wished to 
 tell him that it was quite possible that in a very short time, 
 that same day, perhaps, the German Government would 
 take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the 
 point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. 
 The Chancellor added that the news of the active prepara- 
 tions on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just 
 when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name 
 of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the 
 Emperor was actually conforming to that request.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 108.) 
 
 In reply to the Kaiser's telegram pointing out 'the 
 threatening character of the Russian mobilization,' the 
 Tsar answered, July 31, that it was 'a technical impossi- 
 bility for Russia to halt her military preparations which 
 had been rendered necessary through Austria's mobiliza- 
 tion; that Russia was far from desirous of war. So long as 
 the negotiations continued with Austria concerning Servia, 
 his troops would not undertake any challenging action. To 
 that he solemnly pledged his word.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 31, G. W. B. p. 12.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador 
 that, 'as regards military preparations, he did not see how 
 Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit 
 were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into 
 Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 110.) 
 At the same time he suggested that ' if the Russian Govern- 
 ment objected to the Austrians' mobilizing eight army 
 
116 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 corps, it might be pointed out that this was not too great a 
 number against 400,000 Servians.' (Modified quotation, 
 JulySl, B. W. P.no. 110.) 
 
 But on August 1, the British Ambassador reported the 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna as saying that 'the so- 
 called mobiUzation of Russia amounted to nothing more 
 than that Russia had taken mihtary measures correspond- 
 ing to those taken by Austria, and that Russia would even 
 now be satisfied with assurance respecting Servian integ- 
 rity and independence, and had no intention of attacking 
 Austria.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 
 141.) 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 GERMANY'S SITUATION 
 
 Germany's interest in the dispute — Germany declares that the Austrian 
 note was not communicated to her beforehand — Germany pledged to sup- 
 port Austria — Germany insists upon the "localization" of the Austro- 
 Servian conflict — The responsibility Russia will incur by supporting Servia 
 — The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute — Germany 
 delivers an ultimatum to Russia. 
 
 1 . Germany's interest in the dispute 
 After the Austro-Servian dispute had widened into an 
 Austro-Russian conflict, the next consequence was the 
 entanglement of Germany because of her aUiance with 
 Austria. 
 
 Defining its views, the German Government declared in 
 a confidential communication to the states of the German 
 Empire: ''The attitude of the Imperial Government in 
 this question is clearly indicated. The agitation carried 
 on by the Pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal 
 the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which 
 carries with it the shattering or weakening of the Triple 
 Alliance and, in consequence, the complete isolation of the 
 German Empire. Our nearest interests, therefore, summon 
 us to the support of Austria-Hungary." (Extract, July 28, 
 G. W. B. exhibit 2.) 
 
 The German Memorandum says: ''If the Serbs con- 
 tinued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the 
 existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Aus- 
 tria and the subjection of all the Slavs under the scepter 
 of Russia would be the consequence, thus making unten- 
 able the position of the Teutonic race in central Europe. 
 A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian 
 Pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could 
 
118 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 count and in whom we could have confidence, such as we 
 must have, in view of the increasingly menacing attitude 
 of our neighbors on the east and on the west." (Extract, 
 G. W. B. memorandum, p. 5.) 
 
 The attitude of Austria toward Servia and the intense 
 popular feeling which had been aroused by the assassina- 
 tion of the Archduke were well understood by all the 
 statesmen of Europe. The uncertain factor of the situation 
 was the attitude which Germany would take. In breath- 
 less anticipation Europe waited to see to what extent Ger- 
 many was prepared to support and assume responsibility 
 for the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. It 
 was generally believed, and the opinion was openly ex- 
 pressed in many quarters, that Germany had urged 
 Austria to precipitate a crisis by presenting demands 
 against Servia which she would find it impossible to accept. 
 However little foundation there may have been for such 
 belief, it was generally considered that Austria could not 
 have taken so decisive a step without coming to a previ- 
 ous understanding with her mighty ally. The Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs said that 'Austria's conduct 
 was both provocative and immoral, and that she would 
 never have taken such action unless Germany had been 
 first consulted.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. 
 no. 6.) 
 
 The statesmen of Europe accordingly waited with 
 anxiety to see whether Germany would back up Austria, 
 as she had at the time of the annexation of Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina, or whether she would discuss the question 
 from the point of view of the European powers, as she 
 had done in the more recent Balkan settlement of 1913, 
 when the Albanian question so seriously threatened the 
 peace of Europe. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 119 
 
 2. Germany declares that the Austrian note was not communicated 
 to her beforehand 
 
 The German Government was fully aware that the other 
 powers would consider that she had had a hand in the 
 preparation of the Austrian note, and she hastened to 
 enter a complete denial. The German Ambassador read 
 Sir Edward Grey a telegram from his Government saying 
 that 'they had not known beforehand, and had had no 
 more than the other powers to do with the stifT terms of the 
 Austrian note to Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 25, 
 B. W. P. no. 25; cf. R. 0. P. no. 19.) 
 
 At Paris the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, 
 informed a number of reporters, and called at the Foreign 
 Office to say, that ' there had been no agreement between 
 Austria and Germany over the Austrian note, of which the 
 German Government had been ignorant ; although subse- 
 quently it had approved it, on receiving communication of 
 it at the same time as the other powers.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 36.) 
 
 On July 24, the day after the presentation of the Aus- 
 trian ultimatum, M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassa- 
 dor at Berhn, sent his Government the following report of 
 an interview which he had had with the German Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs: — 
 
 ''I to-day asked the Secretary of State in an interview 
 I had with him if it was true, as was stated in the news- 
 papers, that Austria had sent a note to the powers dealing 
 with her differences with Servia; if he had received it, and 
 what he thought of it. 
 
 "Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the 
 note was forceful, and that he approved it, the Servian 
 Government having long since exhausted Austria's pa- 
 tience. He considers, moreover, that the question relates 
 to the internal affairs of Austria, and hopes that it will be 
 localized. I continued by saying that, not having received 
 
120 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 any instructions, I only wished to have with him an en- 
 tirely personal exchange of views. I then asked him if the 
 Berlin Cabinet had really been in complete ignorance of 
 the Austrian demands before they were communicated to 
 Belgrade, and, as he replied that this was so, I expressed 
 my surprise that he should thus undertake to support 
 pretensions, of the limits and nature of which he was 
 ignorant. 
 
 '''It is only,' said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, 
 'because we are having a personal talk together that I al- 
 low you to say that to me.'" (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. 
 no. 30; cf. F. Y. B. no. 15; B. W. P. no. 18.) 
 
 On July 23 the French Minister at Munich reported to 
 his Government that the Bavarian Government were 
 acquainted with the terms of the Austrian note.^ (F. Y. B. 
 no. 21.) 
 
 On July 30, the British Ambassador at Vienna informed 
 Sir Edward Grey that, 'although he was unable to verify it, 
 he had private information that the German Ambassador 
 knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum before it was dis- 
 patched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 95.) 
 
 According to the remarks of the Italian Ambassador at 
 Berlin to the Belgian Minister, 'the Italian Government 
 was surprised, to say the least, not to have been consulted 
 in regard to the whole affair by her two allies.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 35; cf. B. W. P., Miscel- 
 laneous, no. 10, p. 1.) 
 
 On July 27, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured M. Barrere, the 
 French Ambassador, that 'he had not had any previous 
 knowledge of the note. Although he knew that the note 
 would be strong and forceful, he had no idea it would take 
 
 ^ Cf. statement in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung relative to the 
 denial made by the Bavarian Government. (Translation, War-Chronicle, 
 December, 1914, p. 19. Published by M. Berg, Beriin.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 121 
 
 such a form.' ^ (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. 
 no. 72;cf. F. Y. B. no. 56.) 
 
 On July 25, the Belgian Minister at Berlin told the 
 French Ambassador that 'he did not believe in the pre- 
 tended ignorance of the German Government on the sub- 
 ject of Austria's demarche.' (Modified quotation, July 25, 
 F. Y. B. no. 35.) 
 
 This solicitude on the part of Germany to explain her 
 ignorance of the Austrian note seems out of proportion to 
 its significance. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 137.) As M. Jules 
 Cambon remarked — ''It is not less striking to note the 
 care which Herr von Jagow and all the other officials under 
 him take to tell every one that they were ignorant of the 
 nature of the Austrian note delivered to Servia." (Extract, 
 July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30.) 
 
 The motive was, undoubtedly, to give to Germany's 
 support of Austria a more disinterested aspect than it 
 would have appeared to have had she herself taken part in 
 planning a note couched in such terms. The powers, realiz- 
 ing the intimate relations between the two allies, would be 
 much less disturbed by German support of a note, the 
 terms of which she did not approve, than they would have 
 been if Germany herself had taken part in drawing it up. 
 If Germany had admitted her complicity, it might have 
 been more difficult for Austria to maintain that the ques- 
 tion was a matter entirely between herself and Servia. 
 
 There seems to be no reason why we should not accept 
 the statements of the officials of the German Government 
 that they had not received a previous communication of 
 
 ^ July 23, the British Ambassador at Rome 'gathered that the ItaHan 
 Government had been made cognizant of the terms of the communication 
 which would be addressed to Servia,' (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. 
 P. no. 38.) Probably the information of the Italian Government only 
 extended to a general and accurate appreciation of the situation and 
 the probable terms of the note, such as was indicated in the report from 
 the French Consul at Budapest. (July 11, F. Y. B. no. 11.) Because 
 of the previous negotiations, recently disclosed by Giolitti, Italy could ac- 
 curately gauge Austria's intentions. 
 
122 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the contents of the Servian note. They make this state- 
 ment without quahfication. We learn from the statement 
 of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, 
 that the contents of the note were communicated to him 
 at about the time of its presentation at Belgrade. (Cf. 
 B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, p. 1.) It seems likely, how- 
 ever, that the note was shown to Von Tchirsky, German 
 Ambassador at Vienna, in his private if not in his official 
 capacity. It will doubtless be a matter of particular inter- 
 est to ascertain what is the ground for the statement of 
 Sir Maurice de Bunsen that Von Tchirsky, disregarding 
 the procedure of responsible Governments, telegraphed 
 the contents of the note directly to the Kaiser. If there 
 should prove to be any truth in this allegation, it would 
 have an important bearing upon the responsibility of the 
 Kaiser, and show that Germany was afflicted with a secret 
 or irresponsible diplomacy similar to that which was the 
 curse of the old regime in France. 
 
 In any event, accepting the statements of the German 
 officials at their full face value, and having due regard for 
 the care which they took to emphasize their ignorance, we 
 are led to the conclusion that the German Government 
 took particular pains to be in a position where it could pro- 
 claim its innocence of the terms of the Austrian note. One 
 explanation would be that the German Government con- 
 sidered that it would then be in a better position to say to 
 the other powers, ''We have kept out of this affair because 
 it is a matter between Austria and Servia, and we expect 
 the other powers to assume the same attitude." This stand 
 on the part of Germany would be less dictatorial than if she 
 had had a previous acquaintance with the note, and had 
 then insisted upon holding off the powers from any inter- 
 vention. In such a case she would seem to be a party with 
 Austria in the chastisement of Servia. Such an attitude 
 would have aroused still more the resentment of Russia, 
 and precipitated a conflict. Yet this very precipitancy 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 123 
 
 was the thing above all others which Germany needed if 
 she were really planning a war. True, it may be said that 
 the German Government had to take care not to proceed 
 in such a way as to lose the confidence of the German 
 people, in seeming to force a war by its aggressive action. 
 It does not seem Hkely, however — if those who actually 
 controlled the destinies of Germany were determined to 
 have a war at that particular moment — that they would 
 have been at such pains to avoid the appearance of an ac- 
 tion which would have helped to force the issue and bring 
 on the conflict. 
 
 Germany's soUcitude to avoid too great an appearance 
 of aggression may have been with an eye to securing Brit- 
 ish neutrahty. It seems most probable that Germany did 
 not really wish to force a war, and that her real purpose 
 was to secure a diplomatic triumph and force the Entente 
 Powers to recognize the paramount influence of Austria 
 in Servia. If Germany had been successful in carrying 
 through this programme, German prestige would have 
 been greatly enhanced in the Balkans, at the expense of 
 Russia. By accepting her dictation in this matter, the 
 Entente Powers would have practically opened the way 
 for Austria to expand her influence toward the iEgean, 
 and have permitted the German Empire to develop its 
 great project of expansion in Asia Minor along the Hne 
 of the Bagdad Railway. 
 
 3. Germany pledged to support Austria 
 The German Memorandum, setting forth the circum- 
 stances under which Germany promised Austria her sup- 
 port, goes on to relate how '' Russian policy soon after the 
 events following the Turkish revolution of 1908 was di- 
 rected towards bringing about, under her patronage, a 
 coalition of the Balkan States armed against the integrity 
 of Turkey. This coahtion, which succeeded in 1911 in 
 driving Turkey from the greater part of her European 
 
124 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 possessions, came to grief over the question of distributing 
 the spoils. Russia was not discouraged by this failure of 
 her plans. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen, 
 a new Balkan league under Russian patronage should be 
 brought about, directed no longer against Turkey, now 
 dislodged from the Balkans, but against the integrity of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It was proposed that 
 Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia 
 which she had received during the last Balkan War, in 
 exchange for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were to be 
 taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this 
 plan, she was to be isolated; Rumania was to be attached 
 to Russia through the aid of a French propaganda, and 
 Servia was promised Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 " Under these circumstances it was clear that Austria 
 had to recognize that she could, with due regard for the 
 dignity and preservation of the Monarchy, no longer view 
 with unconcern this agitation across the border. The 
 Austro-Hungarian Government imparted their views to 
 the German Government, and asked for our opinion. 
 We were able to agree most heartily with our ally's esti- 
 mate of the situation, and assure her that any action she 
 considered necessary to put an end to the movement in 
 Servia directed against the integrity of the Monarchy 
 would meet with our approval. 
 
 " We were perfectly aware that the event of any warlike 
 preparations by Austria-Hungary against Servia might 
 bring Russia into the field, and that it might therefore 
 involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. 
 Recognizing, however, that Austria's vital interests were 
 at stake, we could not advise our ally to yield in a manner 
 incompatible with her dignity, or deny her our assistance 
 at this trying time. We were still less able to do so since 
 our own interests were most seriously threatened by the 
 continuation of the Serb agitation. We therefore left 
 Austria an absolutely free hand in dealing with Servia, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 125 
 
 and we took "no part in her preparations." (G. W. B., Mem- 
 orandum, pp. 4-6.) 
 
 On July 24, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at 
 Berlin, in a dispatch to his Government said: — 
 
 "Herr von Jagow asked me if I really considered the 
 situation serious. 'Assuredly,' I replied, 'for, if what is 
 going on has been pondered over, I do not understand why 
 people have cut their bridges behind them.' 
 
 ''Everything shows that Germany is prepared to sup- 
 port in a thoroughly energetic manner the attitude of 
 Austria. The weakness displayed for some years past by 
 the Austro-Hungarian ally has undermined the confidence 
 placed in her here. She was found heavy to move. The 
 foolish trials, such as the Agram and Friedjung affairs, 
 made her police odious by covering it with ridicule. All 
 that was asked of her was that she should be strong, but 
 it is now thought sufficient that she should be brutal. 
 
 "An article which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger re- 
 veals a state of mind in the German Chancellery, to which 
 we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay enough atten- 
 tion. I refer to the feeling of monarchical solidarity. I am 
 convinced that this point of view must be largely taken 
 into account, in appreciating the attitude of the Emperor 
 Wilham, whose impressionable nature must have felt the 
 murder of a Prince who had received him a few days ear- 
 lier." (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30. Cf. G. W. B. 
 Exhibit 20; A. R. B. nos. 13, 18.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at Paris declared at the 
 French Foreign Office that 'Austria had presented her 
 note without any previous understanding with Berlin, 
 but nevertheless Germany approved of Austria's views 
 and that certainly "the arrow once flown," to use the 
 Ambassador's own words, Germany would have to be 
 guided in her action by the consideration only of her duties 
 as an ally.' (Modified quotation, July 24, R. O. P. no. 19; 
 cf. B. W. P. no. 25.) 
 
126 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Von Tchirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, de- 
 clared to his British colleague that 'Germany knew very 
 well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in 
 the matter.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 32.) 
 
 4. Germany insists upon the ^^ localization^^ of the Austro-Servian 
 conflict 
 
 The German Government did not hmit its support of 
 Austria to a declaration in general terms, but even before 
 the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum the views of 
 the Government were understood by the diplomats and 
 could be discerned through semi-official or inspired articles 
 in the press.i (Cf. July 4, F. Y. B. no. 9; July 21, F. Y. B. 
 no. 16.) 
 
 This attitude that Austria was entitled to take measures 
 to protect herself found a sympathetic echo in England, 
 where the London Times, in its editorial columns, argued 
 that the Austro-Servian dispute was no concern of Eng- 
 land's and should be left to the parties immediately con- 
 cerned ; the article did conclude, however, with a warning 
 to Austria against any attempt to use force. ^ 
 
 ^ The London Times of July 20 published a dispatch of July 19 from their 
 Berhn correspondent under the heading " PEACE OF EUROPE PARA- 
 MOUNT":— 
 
 " The North-German Gazette observes that the European Press is recogniz- 
 ing more and more that Austria-Hungary's demand for a 'clarification' of 
 her relations with Servia is warranted, and proceeds: 'We associate ourselves 
 with the hope expressed in more than one quarter that a serious crisis will 
 be averted by the Servian Government's giving way in good time. In any 
 case, the interests of Europe as a whole, which have asserted themselves 
 hitherto throughout the long Balkan crisis in the maintenance of peace 
 among the great powers, make it appear desirable and necessary that any 
 discussion which may ensue between Austria-Hungary and Servia should 
 remain localized.' On the Bourse, the impression seems to be gaining ground 
 that the Austrian demarche at Belgrade will be such as to cause, at the least, 
 severe tension, and nervousness is aggravated by uncertainty as to Russia's 
 attitude." 
 
 These remarks are significant, since the North-German Gazette is generally 
 recognized as a semi-official organ of the Government. 
 
 2 London Times, July 16, 1914. 
 
 A pamphlet issued by the Austro-Hungarian Consulate-General, New 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 127 
 
 On July 23, the day of the presentation of the Aus- 
 trian ultimatum, the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann- 
 Hollweg, sent the following instructions to the German 
 Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg : — 
 
 "The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment concerning the circumstances under which the assas- 
 sination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his 
 consort took place, disclose clearly the aims of the Pan- 
 Serb propaganda and the means which it employs for their 
 reahzation. After the publication of the facts, the last 
 doubt must disappear that the efforts for the separation of 
 the Southern Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy and their union with Servia are directed from 
 Belgrade, with the connivance, to say the least, of Govern- 
 ment officials and officers of the army. 
 
 ''The Servian intrigues date back several years, but 
 Pan-Serb chauvinism manifested itself in an accentuated 
 form during the Bosnian crisis. Thanks to the perfect self- 
 restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment and the intervention of the powers, the provocations 
 to which Austria-Hungary was at that time subjected on 
 the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assur- 
 ances of future good behavior, which the Servian Govern- 
 ment gave at that time, have not been kept. Under the 
 very eyes, and with the tacit permission, at least, of Ser- 
 vian officials, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile in- 
 creased in scope and intensity; at its door must be laid the 
 
 York, entitled "Austria-Hungary and the War," (p. 32) states: "The 
 aggressiveness of Servia toward her neighbors was condemned, shortly 
 before the outbreak of the present crisis, by Sir Edward Grey, who said 
 in a conversation with a foreign statesman: 'Servia is a perpetual danger to 
 European peace; its groundless aspirations continually threaten the tran- 
 quillity of the world. The present dynasty must have external success to 
 remain in power.' On the eve of the crisis the British Ambassador in 
 Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, observed to the editor of the Freie Presse ' that the 
 entire English nation condemns the crime of Serajevo. No single English- 
 man has any sympathy left for Servia. We are thoroughly weary of being 
 thrown into disquietude by this little country, and there is no Englishman 
 who does not wish heartily that Servia receive a rough, sound lesson.' " 
 
128 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 blame for the latest crime, the traces of which lead to Bel- 
 grade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither 
 with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy longer to view supinely the 
 doings across the border which constitute a constant men- 
 ace to the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy. In 
 such a state of affairs, the action and the demands of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government can only be considered as 
 justifiable. Nevertheless, the expressions of opinion in 
 Servia and the attitude of the Government give rise to 
 apprehension that the Servian Government may decline 
 to accede to these demands and allow itself to be carried 
 away into assuming a provocative attitude toward Austria- 
 Hungary. In such an event the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment, unless prepared forever to renounce its position as a 
 great power, would have no choice but to press its demands 
 upon the Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce 
 them by the employment of military measures, the nature 
 of which must be left for its decision. 
 
 ''I have the honor to request you to express yourself in 
 the sense indicated above [to the present representative 
 of M. Viviani, Sir Edward Grey, M. Sazonof], and there- 
 with give special emphasis to the view that this question 
 relates to matters which should be settled solely between 
 Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that it must be the 
 earnest endeavor of the powers to insure that it be so re- 
 stricted. We anxiously desire the locaUzation of the con- 
 flict because any intervention on the part of another power 
 would, because of the various treaty stipulations of alli- 
 ance, lead to inconceivable consequences. 
 
 ''I shall await with interest a telegraphic report of the 
 result of your interview." (July 23, G. W. B., exhibit 16; 
 cf. Memorandum, p. 6.) 
 
 In communicating this note, a copy of which he was not 
 willing to leave, to the French Government, the German 
 Ambassador dwelt with particular emphasis on the last 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 129 
 
 paragraphs, to the effect that the question was a matter to 
 be settled between Austria and Servia alone, and that the 
 German Government ardently desired that the conflict be 
 locahzed, as any intervention by a third power would be 
 of a nature to entail incalculable consequences.^ (Of. 
 F. Y. B. no. 28.) In accordance with the instructions of the 
 Chancellor a similar communication was made at London 
 (cf. B. W. P. no. 9) and at St. Petersburg (cf. R. 0. P. no. 
 18). 
 
 Throughout the period of crisis the German Govern- 
 ment continued to insist upon the ''localization" of the 
 conflict. (Cf. B. W. P. nos. 2, 9, 40, 43, 48, 55, 62; R. 0. P. 
 nos. 8, 18, 28, 34, 41; G. W. B., Memorandum, pp. 6, 10, 
 exhibits 1, 2, 10.) 
 
 Germany justified her action not only on the ground of 
 her obligation as Austria's ally, but from the general point 
 of view that Austria's action was taken in defense of her 
 very existence. (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10 [1914], 
 p. 2; B. W. P. nos. 7, 48, 61; 91; G. W. B., Memorandum, 
 p. 6, exhibit 1; F. Y. B. no. 93.) German representatives 
 asserted that if Servia did not yield to Austria's just de- 
 mands, she would have against her European public opin- 
 ion and would be condemned by the judgment of the whole 
 civihzed world. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 9.) 
 
 ' The attitude of the German Government is well illustrated in the 
 interview, between Dr. Spalaikovitch, Servian Minister at St. Petersburg, 
 and the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalds, as reported by the former 
 in hia dispatch to Belgrade July 24 : — 
 
 "On leaving the office of M. Sazanof whom I acquainted with the text 
 of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Ambassador. He 
 appeared to be in very good humor. In the conversation which ensued on 
 the subject of the step which Austria-Hungary had taken, I asked Count 
 Pourtales to indicate to me a way out of the situation created by the Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian ultimatum. The ambassador answered that it all depended 
 on Servia, since it was a question which ought to be settled by Austria 
 and Servia alone, and in which no one else could interfere. I replied to 
 Count de Pourtales that he was mistaken and that before long he would 
 be convinced that it was not a question merely between Servia and Aus- 
 tria, but a European question." (July 24, S. B. B. no. 36.) 
 
130 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 In a confidential communication to the Governments 
 of the German states the Chancellor stated: "In view of 
 the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has 
 published in its note to the Servian Government, the last 
 doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro- 
 Hungarian successor to the throne and his wife have 
 fallen victims was prepared in Servia, with the connivance, 
 to say the least, of members of the Servian Government 
 and army. It is a product of the Pan-Serb intrigues which 
 for a series of years have become a source of permanent 
 disturbance to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the 
 whole of Europe." (July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 2.) 
 
 The German view is summed up in their Memorandum: 
 ''From the beginning of the conflict we took the stand 
 that the question was one which concerned Austria, and it 
 would have to be left for her to settle alone with Servia. 
 Accordingly, we devoted our efforts to securing the local- 
 ization of the war and convincing the other powers that 
 Austria-Hungary had, through the force of circumstances, 
 been obliged to decide upon an appeal to arms in legitimate 
 self-defense." (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 7.) 
 
 In response to the declaration that they desired and 
 aimed at the ''locaUzation" of the conflict, the German 
 Memorandum states that the French and English Govern- 
 ments promised action in the same direction.^ (G. W. B., 
 Memorandum, p. 6; cf. B. W. P. nos. 5, 25.) 
 
 The Russian Ambassador at Vienna summed up the 
 
 1 Sir Edward Grey declared that he was not concerned in a Balkan ques- 
 tion. I do not find any such statement made by the French. On the con- 
 trary, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, advised Sir 
 Edward Grey that it was necessary to intervene between Austria and 
 Servia. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 10.) 
 
 The German Chancellor has stated: " From the first moment of the Aus- 
 trian conflict we strove and labored that this conflict might be confined to 
 Austria-Hungary and Servia. All the Cabinets, notably the English Cab- 
 inet, took the same ground, only Russia insisted that she would have to say 
 a word." (Extract from Chancellor von Bethmann-HoUweg's speech in the 
 Reichstag, August 4, 1914. From What Germany Wants, by Edmund von 
 Mach, p. 147. See also International Conciliation Pamphlet, no. 84.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 131 
 
 situation when he said that it was not, according to his 
 opinion, a question of '^ocahzing" the conflict, but of 
 preventing it. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 83.) 
 
 5. The responsibility Russia will incur hy supporting Servia 
 The German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
 when refusing to discuss the Servian note with the British 
 Ambassador, said that 'Austria's standpoint, with which 
 he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely 
 Austrian concern, with which Russia had nothing to do.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 71.) This did 
 not, of course, mean that the German Government was 
 ignorant of the importance to Russia of the maintenance of 
 their prestige in the Balkans. In fact the German Govern- 
 ment said: ''We are perfectly aware that the possibility of 
 warlike operations on the part of Austria-Hungary toward 
 Servia may bring Russia into the field, and that we may, 
 therefore, in accordance with our duty as allies, become 
 involved in the war." (Extract, G. W. B., Memorandum, 
 p. 5.) 
 
 To quote from the Chancellor's instructions to the 
 German representatives: "Some exponents of Russian 
 opinion regard it as a self-evident right and as the task of 
 Russia to take action in support of Servia in the conflict 
 between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European 
 conflagration which would result from such a step by 
 Russia, the Novoe Vremja believes itself justified in hold- 
 ing Germany responsible in so far as she does not induce 
 Austria-Hungary to yield. In this the Russian press re- 
 verses the situation. It is not Austria-Hungary that has 
 evoked the conflict with Servia, but it was Servia that, 
 through an unscrupulous fostering of Pan-Serb aspirations, 
 even in the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
 has threatened her very existence and created conditions, 
 which eventually found expression in the criminal act at 
 Serajevo. If Russia believes that she must champion the 
 
132 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 cause of Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a perfect 
 right to do so. However, she must realize that by so do- 
 ing she accepts the Servian activities for the undermining 
 of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as her 
 own, and that she alone becomes responsible, if out of the 
 Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers de- 
 sire to localize, there should arise a European war. This 
 responsibility of Russia's is perfectly evident and weighs 
 all the heavier since Count Berchtold has officially declared 
 to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention of ac- 
 quiring Servian territory or of assailing the stability of 
 the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace through the 
 cessation of the Servian intrigues which threaten her exist- 
 ence. 
 
 ''The attitude of the Imperial Government in this ques- 
 tion is clearly marked out in advance. The agitation con- 
 ducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has for 
 its goal, through the destruction of the Monarchy of the 
 Danube, the sundering or weakening of the Triple Alliance 
 and in consequence the complete isolation of the German 
 Empire. Our own nearest interest therefore calls us to the 
 side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, likewise, of keeping 
 Europe from a universal war, if at all possible, points to 
 our supporting those endeavors which aim at the localiza- 
 tion of the conflict, faithful to the policies which we have 
 carried out successfully for forty-four years in the interest 
 of the preservation of the peace of Europe. 
 
 ''If, however, contrary to what we hope, the fire should 
 be spread, through Russia's intervention, as faithful allies, 
 we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with 
 all the power of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall 
 we grasp the sword, but when we do, it will be with a clear 
 consciousness that we are not to blame for the calamity 
 which war must bring upon the peoples of Europe." (Ex- 
 tract, July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 2.) 
 
 Russia's answer to these arguments of Germany is ex- 
 
 I 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 133 
 
 pressed in the objection which she opposed to Austria's 
 action in regard to Servia as has been ah-eady discussed.^ 
 
 6. The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute 
 
 The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, as early as 
 July 25, ' said all he could to impress prudence on the Min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia 
 mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mo- 
 bilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would 
 probably declare war at once.' (Modified quotation, July 
 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) This situation was perfectly well 
 understood by all the powers. In studying the events and 
 negotiations preceding the war, it must always be borne in 
 mind that, whether justified or not, a general mobilization 
 on Russia's part would bring on war at once. 
 
 On July 26, the German Chancellor telegraphed the 
 German Ambassador at London: 'According to reports 
 reaching here, Russia is about to summon several bodies 
 of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to 
 mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we 
 shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet 
 it.' (Modified quotation, July 26, G. W. B. exhibit 10.) 
 The next day (July 27) Von Jagow, German Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs, told the British Ambassador that 
 'if Russia mobilized against Germany she would have to 
 follow suit.' Sir Edward Goschen asked him what he 
 meant by "mobilization against Germany." He replied 
 that 'if Russia only mobilized in the south, Germany 
 would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Ger- 
 many would have to do so too, and the Russian system of 
 mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult 
 exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would there- 
 fore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.' 
 (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 43.) 
 
 On July 27, when the Russian Minister of War had ex- 
 
 * See ante, chap, iii, sees. 1 and 2. 
 
134 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 plained to the German military attache that the mihtary 
 preparations did not constitute mobilization, which would 
 under no circumstances be undertaken on the German 
 frontier, the latter had remarked that 'though Germany 
 appreciated Russia's friendly intentions toward her, they 
 must consider mobilization against Austria even as very 
 menacing.' (Modified quotation, July 27, G. W. B. 
 exhibit 11.) Germany heard of preparations on her fron- 
 tier; beside the declaration of a state of war in Kovno 
 (July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 11), it was reported that the 
 Warsaw garrison had departed, and that the garrison at 
 Alexandrovo had been strengthened. (G. W. B. p. 8.) 
 
 When the Austrian Government learned that Russia 
 would mobilize in the districts bordering on Austria, as 
 a counter-measure if Austrian troops crossed the Servian 
 frontier. Count Berchtold, on July 28, telegraphed the 
 Austrian Ambassador at Berlin to go at once to the Im- 
 perial Chancellor or Secretary of State and inform him 
 of the preparations Russia was making. 
 
 ''Under these circumstances," Count Berchtold further 
 said, "I wish urgently to request the Berlin Cabinet to 
 consider whether it should not be intimated to Russia in 
 a friendly manner that the mobilization of the districts 
 above referred to would constitute a threat against Austria- 
 Hungary and, should it actually occur, must therefore 
 be answered, on the part of the Monarchy and her ally, 
 the German Empire, by the most extensive military coun- 
 ter-measures. 
 
 "In order to make it easier for Russia to acquiesce, it 
 seems to us better that such a step should first be under- 
 taken by Germany alone, though, of course, we would be 
 willing to take part in it with her. 
 
 "It seems to me that at this moment plain language 
 would be the most efficacious means for bringing to Rus- 
 sia's attention the consequences of assuming a threaten- 
 ing attitude." (Extract, July 28, A. R. B. no. 42.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 135 
 
 On July 29, M. Sazonof informed the German Ambassa- 
 dor of ' the military measures made necessary by the mobili- 
 zation of the greatest part of the Austrian army, and ex- 
 plained that none of them were directed against Germany.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 49.) 
 
 On July 29, M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian Ambas- 
 sador at Paris that ' the German Ambassador had commu- 
 nicated to him the resolution taken by his Government to 
 mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations, 
 which M. Sazonof declared Russia only took in conse- 
 quence of the mobiUzation Austria had already proceeded 
 with, and in view of the evident absence on Austria's part 
 of any desire to find some method of effecting a pacific 
 solution of her conflict with Servia. Since Russia was un- 
 able to accede to Germany's wishes, the only remaining 
 course was to accelerate the Russian armament and to 
 make preparations for a war which was probably inevita- 
 ble.' 1 (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.) 
 
 On that same day (July 29) Count Berchtold sent the 
 following telegram to the Austrian Ambassador at Ber- 
 Hn: — 
 
 ''I have just been informed by Herr von Tchirsky that 
 the Russian Ambassador communicated to him that he had 
 been told by his Government that the military districts 
 of Kief, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan had been mobilized, 
 
 * It is interesting to compare the course pursued by the German gov- 
 ernment with what Bismarck said regarding the course to be pursued in 
 1888: — 
 
 " You will ask: ' If that is so, what is the use of this expensive allocation 
 of the Russian troops? ' That is one of the questions for which one hardly 
 can expect an answer from a ministry of foreign affairs, itself vitally in- 
 terested. If we should begin to ask for explanations, we might receive 
 forced replies, and our surrejoinders would also have to be forced. That 
 is a dangerous path which I do not like to tread. Allocations of troops 
 are things for which one does not take the other coimtry to task, asking 
 for categorical explanations, but against which one takes counter-precau- 
 tions with equal reserve and circumspection." (Speech of Bismarck, 
 February 6, 1888; from What Germany Wants, by Edmund von Mach, 
 p. 84.) 
 
136 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 that Russia's honor as a great power had been impugned, 
 and that she had been forced to take the requisite steps. 
 The Russian mobihzation is confirmed by the command- 
 ers of our Gahcian corps, and, following a report from the 
 Austro-Hungarian military attaches, it was also not denied 
 to-day by M. Sazonof to the German Ambassador. 
 
 ''I request Your Excellency to bring the above imme- 
 diately to the attention of the German Government and 
 to emphasize in this connection that if the Russian mo- 
 bilization measures are not immediately stopped our 
 general mobilization will be made necessary at once for 
 mihtary reasons. 
 
 "As a last resort, to prevent European war, I considered 
 it desirable that our representative and the German re- 
 presentative in St. Petersburg, and possibly in Paris, be 
 at once instructed to inform those Governments in a 
 friendly manner that the continuation of Russian mobiliza- 
 tion would occasion counter-measures in Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary, which must necessarily lead to serious 
 consequences. 
 
 ''Your Excellency will please add that it is self-evident 
 that we naturally will not allow ourselves to be deflected 
 in our hostile attitude toward Servia. 
 
 ''The Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in St. Peters- 
 burg and Paris are being instructed to make a similar 
 statement as soon as their German colleague receives like 
 instructions." (July 29, A. R. B. no. 48 ; cf . A. R. B. no. 46.) 
 
 The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reporting 
 the interview referred to above, between Count Pourtales 
 and M. Sazonof on July 29, said that 'the German Am- 
 bassador stated that if Russia did not stop her military 
 preparations, the German army would receive the order 
 to mobilize. M. Sazonof replied that the Russian prepara- 
 tions had been due, on the one hand, to the persistently 
 uncompromising attitude of Austria; and, on the other 
 hand, to the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 137 
 
 were already mobilized. The tone with which Count de 
 Pourtales performed this task had decided the Russian 
 Government to order that very evening the mobilization 
 of the thirteen corps destined to operate against Austria.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 100; cf. R. O. P. 
 nos. 49, 58; G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 10.) 
 
 On July 30, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin tele- 
 graphed his Government that ' the decree of mobilization 
 of the German army and fleet had just been promulgated.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 30, R. O. P. no. 61.) But he 
 immediately afterwards informed his Government that 
 Hhe Minister for Foreign Affairs had just telephoned him 
 to communicate to him that the news just given of the 
 mobilization of the German army and fleet was false ; that 
 the newspapers' slips were printed in advance in view of all 
 eventualities and put on sale at mid-day, but that now 
 they had been confiscated.' (Modified quotation, July 30, 
 R. 0. P. no. 62.) 
 
 It would be interesting to learn whether this was merely 
 a typical example of journalistic enterprise, or an effort to 
 stir up an irresistible war spirit so as to hasten the declara- 
 tion of war. When the Berliner Tagehlatt similarly dis- 
 tributed extras with the unauthorized statement that 
 England had declared war against Germany, Von Jagow, 
 apologizing to the British Ambassador, said it was the 
 fault of the ''pestilential TagehlatV (B. W. P., Miscella- 
 neous, no. 8, 1914.) 
 
 The British Ambassador at Paris telegraphed Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey: 'President of the Republic tells me that the 
 Russian Government have been informed by the German 
 Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilization 
 Germany would mobilize. But a further report, since re- 
 ceived from St. Petersburg, states that the German com- 
 munication had been modified, and is now a request to be 
 informed on what conditions Russia would consent to de- 
 mobiUzation. The answer given was that she agreed to do 
 
138 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 so on condition that Austria-Hungary gave an assurance 
 that she would respect the sovereignty of Servia and sub- 
 mit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which 
 Servia had not accepted, to an international discussion. 
 The President thinks that these conditions will not be ac- 
 cepted by Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. 
 no. 99.) 
 
 On July 31, the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann- 
 Hollweg, telegraphed the German Ambassador at St. Pe- 
 tersburg: "In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, 
 and although we ourselves have up to the present moment 
 taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized 
 her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized 
 against us also. By these Russian measures we have been 
 obliged, for the safeguarding of the Empire, to announce 
 that ' danger of war ' threatens us, which does not yet mean 
 mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless 
 Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures 
 against us and Austria-Hungary, and gives us definite 
 assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to 
 M. Sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him." 
 (July 31, G. W. B. exhibit 24.) 
 
 That same day, the British Ambassador, Sir Edward 
 Goschen 'spent an hour with Von Jagow, the German 
 Secretary of State, urging him to accept Sir Edward Grey's 
 proposal for mediation of the four disinterested powers (cf . 
 B. W. P. no. Ill); but Von Jagow, though he expressed 
 himself as sympathizing with Sir Edward's proposal and 
 appreciating his continued efforts to maintain peace, said 
 it was impossible for the German Government to consider 
 any proposal until they had received an answer from Rus- 
 sia to their communication made that day. Sir Edward 
 Goschen asked the Secretary why the German demand had 
 been made even more difficult for Russia to accept by ask- 
 ing her to demobilize in the south as well, and was told that 
 it was to prevent Russia from saying that all her mobiliza- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 139 
 
 tion was directed only against Austria.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 31, B. W. P. no. 121.) 
 
 When the German military attache at St. Petersburg 
 learned through Prince Troubetzkoy that ' Russia felt she 
 could not forego her mobilization, he told him the blame 
 for the terrible consequences must be laid to the premature 
 mobilization against Austria, engaged after all in a merely 
 local war with Servia. Germany's situation was clear, and 
 the responsibility rested upon Russia for disregarding 
 Austria's assurances that she had no territorial ambitions 
 in Servia. Austria, he said, had mobilized against Servia 
 and not against Russia, and there was no cause for immedi- 
 ate action on Russia's part. He further added that after 
 the hoiTible crime of Serajevo, it was impossible for Ger- 
 many to understand Russia's declaration that she could 
 not desert her brethren in Servia; and finally he told the 
 Prince he need not be surprised if Germany's army were to 
 be mobiUzed.' (Modified quotation, July 30, G. W. B. 
 exhibit 18; cf. A. R. B. no. 50.) 
 
 'That evening, July 30, the German Ambassador came 
 again and urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical 
 terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, 
 and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial 
 integrity of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 30, F. Y. B. 
 no. 103.) 
 
 On July 30, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at 
 Berlin, reports his interview with the German Secretary 
 of State. Herr von Jagow said that " he feared that Austria 
 might mobilize completely in consequence of the partial 
 mobilization of Russia, which might bring about the an- 
 swering blow of total Russian mobilization, and, in con- 
 sequence, that of Germany. 
 
 '^I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he himself 
 had said to me that Germany would not consider herself 
 forced to mobilize unless Russia mobilized upon the Ger- 
 man frontier, and that such was not the case. He replied 
 
140 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 that that was true, but that the heads of the army insisted 
 that all delay was a loss of strength to the German army, 
 and that 'the words I recalled did not constitute a firm 
 engagement on his side.' This interview gave me the im- 
 pression that the chances of peace were still further dimin- 
 ished." 1 (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 109.) 
 
 July 30, M. Sazonof told the French and British Am- 
 bassadors that the Russian Government had absolute 
 proof that Germany was making military and naval pre- 
 parations against Russia — more particularly in the direc- 
 tion of the Gulf of Finland. The Minister said that if 
 Austria rejected the proposal he had submitted at Ger- 
 many's request, 'preparations for general mobilization 
 would be proceeded with, and the inevitable result would 
 be a European war. Public opinion in Russia was stirred 
 to such a pitch that if Austria refused to make a conces- 
 sion, Russia could not hold back, and now that she knew 
 Germany was arming, she could, for strategical reasons, 
 hardly postpone converting partial into general mobiliza- 
 tion.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 97.) 
 
 'The news of the bombardment of Belgrade during the 
 night and morning of the 30th provoked very deep feeling 
 in Russia. The French Ambassador found it hard to un- 
 
 ' At first appearance this change of attitude on the part of Herr von 
 Jagow lays him open to the charge of insincerity. It has been suggested 
 by Professor Munroe Smith that this dispatch shows that the German 
 Secretary was overborne by the strategists and prevented from adhering 
 to the plans worked out by the diplomatists. (See " Military Strategy 
 versus Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, pp. 71- 
 72.) There seems to have been some sinister influence at work which over- 
 balanced the sincere, though hesitating and awkward, efforts of Von 
 Bethmann-HoUweg toward peace. Perhaps history will show the existence 
 of a court camarilla of military authorities, seconded by Von Tchirsky at 
 Vienna, and working to precipitate a war. This will explain the most ex- 
 traordinary admission of the German Under-Secretary of State that 'the 
 Foreign Office regretted the sudden return of the Emperor, acting on his own 
 initiative, for fear his sudden return might cause speculation and excite- 
 ment.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 33.) May not the 
 German Foreign Office have feared that they could no longer control undis- 
 turbed the negotiations in progress? 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 141 
 
 derstand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations, from 
 the beginning of the crisis, had followed without fail Rus- 
 sia's efforts at conciliation, and the satisfactory conver- 
 sations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 113.) 
 
 Germany for her part felt that she must reply to Russian 
 mobiHzation (cf. B. W. P. no. 98). Von Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg told Sir Edward Goschen that 'he could not leave his 
 country defenseless while time was being utilized by other 
 powers; and that if military measures were being taken 
 by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible 
 for him to remain quiet. He said that it was quite possible 
 that in a very short time, perhaps to-day, the German 
 Government would take some very serious step, and that 
 he was just on the point of going to have an audience with 
 the Emperor. The Chancellor added that the news of the 
 active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had 
 reached him just when the Tsar had appealed to the Em- 
 peror, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at 
 Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming 
 to that request.'^ (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. 
 no. 108.) 
 
 Later on in the same day the German Chancellor, Von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, told Sir Edward Goschen that they 
 were informed by their Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 
 ' the Russian army and fleet were being mobilized, and that 
 Germany would at once proclaim Kriegsgefahr (danger 
 of war), since the Russian general mobilization could be 
 directed only against Germany. The Chancellor explained 
 that Kriegsgefahr signified the taking of certain pre- 
 cautionary measures consequent upon strained relations 
 with a foreign country.' (Modified quotation, July 31, 
 B. W. P. no. 112; cf. A. R. B. no. 52.) 
 
 Von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign 
 
 * The telegrams exchanged between the two Emperors and King George 
 are discussed further on. 
 
142 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Affaii's, told the Russian Ambassador that ' the 'pourparlers 
 [negotiations] between the two countries, which had been 
 difficult enough in consequence of the mobilization against 
 Austria, became increasingly so in the presence of the seri- 
 ous military measures Russia was taking against Germany; 
 news regarding these, according to the Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs, had been received in Germany from 
 every side, and must inevitably provoke analogous meas- 
 ures on the part of Germany.' (Modified quotation, July 
 31, R. O. P. no. 68.) 'If the German Government had 
 failed to meet the imminent peril confronting them, as a 
 result of Russia's mobilizing her entire land and naval 
 forces, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the 
 existence of Germany.' (Modified quotation, August 1, 
 G. W. B. exhibit 26.) 
 
 7. Germany delivers an ultimatum to Russia 
 On August 1, M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian repre- 
 sentatives abroad: — ''At midnight the German Ambas- 
 sador, acting upon the instructions of his Government, 
 declared to me, that if within twelve hours, that is by 
 mid-day of Saturday, we had not begun to demobilize, not 
 only against Germany, but also against Austria, the Ger- 
 man Government would be forced to give the order for 
 mobilization. To my inquiry whether this meant war, 
 the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that 
 we were very near it." (August 1, R. 0. P. no. 70; cf. 
 F. Y. B. no. 120.) 
 
 After the presentation of Germany's ultimatum to 
 Russia, M. Sazonof declared to the British Ambassador 
 that ' the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and 
 the German preparations had forced the Russian Govern- 
 ment to order mobilization. He said he had forwarded to 
 Vienna his telegram modified in an attempt to meet the 
 suggestion of the British Government, and that he would 
 adhere to it if Sir Edward Grey could obtain its acceptance 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 143 
 
 before the frontier was crossed by German troops, and 
 that in no case would Russia first begin hostiUties. The 
 British Ambassador informed Sir Edward that he now saw 
 no possibiUty of a general war being avoided unless the 
 agreement of France and Germany could be obtained to 
 keep their armies mobilized on their own sides of the fron- 
 tier, as Russia had expressed her readiness to do, pending 
 a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.' 
 (Modified quotation, B. W. P. no. 139.) 
 
 The Ambassador must have known such a course could 
 have little possibiUty of fulfillment under the circum- 
 stances, unless Germany should suddenly decide to change 
 her course upon finding that England was likely to sup- 
 port the Entente Powers. 
 
 This same day Sir Edward Goschen tried to convince 
 the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs that since Aus- 
 tria and Russia were, 'as was evident, ready to discuss 
 matters, and since Germany did not desire war on her own 
 account, it seemed to him only logical that Germany should 
 hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settle- 
 ment. Herr von Jagow replied that Austria's readiness 
 to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, 
 and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would 
 have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answer- 
 ing Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had 
 caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that 
 her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that 
 she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months with- 
 out making war. This was not the case with Germany. 
 She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the 
 safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should 
 allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all 
 parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, 
 though the Imperial Government had allowed her sev- 
 eral hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no 
 answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, 
 
144 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 and the German representative at St. Petersburg had 
 been instructed within a certain time to inform the Rus- 
 sian Government that the Imperial Government must 
 regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.' 
 (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 138.) 
 
 The German Chancellor accordingly sent the following 
 telegram, dated ''August 1, 5 p.m., Urgent," to the German 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg: — 
 
 ' In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory- 
 answer to our demand. Your Excellency will please trans- 
 mit at 5 o'clock this afternoon (Central European time) 
 the following statement : — 
 
 'The Imperial Government has endeavored from the 
 beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. 
 In accordance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty 
 the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Ger- 
 many, in cooperation with England, took upon himself 
 the role of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg; but Russia, without awaiting the out- 
 come, proceeded to mobiUze her entire land and naval 
 forces. 
 
 'As a consequence of this threatening measure, occa- 
 sioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, 
 the German Empire found itself confronted by a serious 
 and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had 
 failed to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the 
 safety and even the existence of Germany. Consequently, 
 the German Government was obliged to address the Gov- 
 ernment of the Emperor of all the Russias and insist upon 
 the cessation of all these military measures. Russia having 
 refused to accede to (not having thought it should reply 
 to) ^ this demand, and having manifested by this refusal 
 (this attitude) that her acts were directed against Ger- 
 
 ^ The Russian Orange Paper states: "The words between parentheses 
 are in the original. It is to be supposed that two variations had been pre- 
 pared in advance and that by error they were both inserted in the note." 
 
 4 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 145 
 
 many, I have the honor, by order of my Government to 
 make known to Your Excellency the following conamuni- 
 cation: — 
 
 'His Majesty the Emperor, my august sovereign, in the 
 name of the Empire, takes up the defiance and considers 
 himself in a state of war against Russia. 
 
 'I urgently ask you to wire the hour, according to 
 Russian time, of arrival of these instructions, and of their 
 carrying out. 
 
 'Kindly ask for your passports and hand over the pro- 
 tection of German interests to the American Embassy.' 
 (Modified quotations, G. W. B. exhibit 26; R. O. P. no. 
 76.) 
 
 The German orders ' for the general mobilization of the 
 navy and army, issued August 1, made August 2 the first 
 day of mobilization.' (Modified quotation, August 1, 
 B. W. P. no. 142.) 
 
 August 2, Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at 
 Berlin, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey: 'Secretary of State ^ 
 has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops 
 having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in 
 
 * Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, in his speech 
 to the Reichstag on August 4, described the events leading up to the rup- 
 ture of peace as follows : — 
 
 "As soon as the first definite information about military preparations in 
 Russia reached us, we informed St. Petersburg in a friendly but pressing 
 manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side of 
 our ally and that military preparations against ourselves would oblige us to 
 take counter-measures. But mobilization would be close to actual war. 
 
 " Russia formally assured us of her desire for peace and declared that she 
 was making no military preparations against us. 
 
 " In the mean time, England, warmly assisted by us, tried to mediate 
 between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
 
 " On the 28th of July, the Emperor, by telegram, asked the Tsar to con- 
 sider that Austria-Hungary had the duty and the right to defend herself 
 against the Pan-Serb agitation which undermined her existence. The Em- 
 peror called the Tsar's attention to the fact that the interests of all mon- 
 archs must be identical in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked him to 
 personally assist him and to smooth over the divergence between Vienna 
 and St. Petersburg. About the same time and before receipt of this tele- 
 gram, the Tsar asked the Emperor to help him and to induce Vienna to 
 moderate her demands. 
 
146 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 a state of war.' (Modified quotation, August 2, B. W. P. 
 no. 144; cf. A. R. B. no. 57.) 
 
 " The Emperor accepted the role of a mediator. 
 
 " But scarcely had the action begun, according to his orders, when Rus- 
 sia mobiUzed all her forces directed against Austria, while Austria-Hun- 
 gary only had mobilized those of her corps which were directed against 
 Servia. To the north she had mobilized only two of her corps, far from the 
 Russian frontier. 
 
 " The Emperor immediately informed the Tsar that this mobilization of 
 the Russian forces against Austria rendered the role of a mediator, which 
 he had accepted upon the Tsar's request, difficult, if not impossible. 
 
 " Still we continued to mediate in Vienna, a mediation which in its form 
 went as far as would appear permissible, even for an ally. 
 
 " During this time Russia of her own accord renewed her assurances that 
 she was making no military preparations against us. 
 
 " The 31st of July has come. The decision is to fall in Vienna. We have 
 already learned, thanks to our representations, that Vienna again has 
 started the direct conversation with St. Petersburg which had already suf- 
 fered an interruption. But before the final decision is taken in Vienna, the 
 news arrives that Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, therefore 
 also against us ! The Russian Government, which knew from our repeated 
 statements what mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of 
 this mobilization nor did it even vouchsafe any explanation. Only in the 
 afternoon of July 31, a telegram of the Tsar to the Emperor arrived in 
 which he guaranteed that his army would take no provocative attitude 
 toward us. But the mobilization on our frontiers was in full swing since the 
 night from the 30th to the 31st of July. 
 
 " While we are mediating in Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, 
 the Russian host arises all along our extended and open frontier, and France, 
 though not mobilizing, must admit that she makes military preparations. 
 
 "We had ourselves, up to then, not called in a single man, for the sake of 
 the peace of Europe. Were we now to patiently wait until the nations, be- 
 tween which our country is situated, selected the moment for their attack? 
 It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, 
 on the 31st of July, we demanded demobilization from Russia as the only 
 means to still preserve the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in 
 St. Petersburg was besides instructed to inform the Russian Government 
 that in case of our demand meeting with a refusal, we would have to con- 
 sider the state of war as existent. 
 
 "The Imperial Ambassador followed these instructions. What Russia 
 answered to our demand of demobilization, we have not learned up to this day. 
 Telegraphic reports on this question have not reached us even though the 
 wire still transmitted much less important information. 
 
 "Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the Emperor saw 
 himself obliged to mobihze our forces on the 1st of August, at 5 p.m." (Inter- 
 national Conciliation Pamphlet, no. 84.) 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 FRANCE SUPPORTS RUSSIA 
 
 Germany asks France to use her influence with Russia — France be- 
 lieves Germany intends to precipitate a war — France supports her ally — 
 Military preparations in Germany and France — The German ultimatum to 
 France. 
 
 1 . Germany asks France to use her influence with Russia 
 At the present time France no longer plays such an im- 
 portant role as formerly in Balkan affairs. As in the case of 
 England, the necessity of looking after more immediately 
 important questions has lessened her relative interest in 
 Near-Eastern affairs. As long as the protection of the 
 large French financial interests in this region is secured, 
 France is not immediately concerned with the settlement 
 of the intricate political questions which arise in the Near 
 East. Like England, she has been content to leave Balkan 
 questions to the bi-partisan control of Austria and Russia. 
 If the other powers had left Austria and Russia to settle 
 Balkan questions without their support or interference, 
 Russia's superior strength would have placed Austria at 
 a disadvantage in conducting negotiations and made it 
 possible for Russia to secure the paramount position in 
 the Balkans. 
 
 The important event modifying this situation in favor of 
 Russia was the assassination of King Alexander and Queen 
 Draga of Servia. Thenceforth the policy of Servia was 
 frankly Russophile. Although the proximity of Austria 
 kept Servia still in the condition of economic dependency 
 upon Austria, she partially escaped as a result of a tariff 
 war which opened up new outlets for her commerce through 
 Bulgaria. This condition of hostility between Austria 
 and Servia smouldered until Austria's annexation of 
 
148 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina stirred up the little kingdom, 
 and public opinion clamored for a war against Austria 
 to effect what the Servians considered would be the lib- 
 eration of their fellow-nationals and their incorporation 
 into the Servian Kingdom. They counted upon the aid 
 of Russia, where public opinion accorded them enthusi- 
 astic support. 
 
 England, though she resented what she considered 
 Austria's violation of the Treaty of Berlin, probably had 
 to acknowledge to herself that Austria's action had not in 
 reality changed the situation in the Balkans, and she was 
 not willing to become involved in a contest, the purpose of 
 which was clearly to dismember the Austrian Empire in 
 Servia's favor. 
 
 France very properly gave Russia to understand that, 
 loyal as she was to her alliance and the support of Russia's 
 vital interests, public opinion would not justify her in 
 participating in a war, the immediate purpose of which 
 was the dislocation of the status quo. Unfortunately for 
 Russia, her desire to protect her sister state and to foster 
 the expansion of Slav and Russian influence in the Bal- 
 kans appeared to the impartial observer as a campaign 
 for prestige not warranted by any attack upon her vital 
 interests. 
 
 England and France might grumble at Austria's action 
 and extend to Russia an expression of their sincere sym- 
 pathy, but in their hearts they had to recognize that 
 Germany was justified in standing ''in shining armor" 
 beside her ally to protect her from aggression by Servia 
 supported by Russia. Russia was bitterly disappointed, 
 but could not, so soon after her defeat by Japan, undertake 
 a new war against Austria and Germany combined; so she 
 had to yield. 
 
 The advantage however which Austria derived from 
 her diplomatic success was short-hved. The kaleidoscopic 
 changes of the successive Balkan Wars from 1912 to 1913 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 149 
 
 brought to Servia a great accession of territory, while Aus- 
 tria, for her part, had been unsuccessful in saving Turkey 
 from dismemberment and was again disappointed in her 
 efforts at estabhshing a Greater Bulgaria as a "stopper" 
 state to the extension of Russian influence in the Bal- 
 kans. All her plans had miscarried, and she found herself 
 hemmed in from any advance in the Balkans by Servians 
 recent accession of territory. Austria then tried to obtain a 
 modification of the Treaty of Bukharest, which had estab- 
 lished these territorial modifications in the Balkans; but 
 Germany would only support her diplomatically, and was 
 not willing to encourage her to undertake a war to effect 
 her purpose. 
 
 Throughout this crisis resulting from the Balkan set- 
 tlements, the less interested powers, Italy, Germany, 
 France, and England, cooperated in a common aim to 
 preserve the peace, and although Austria was discontented 
 with the result, Russia also had to swallow her pill when 
 the conference disappointed the hopes of Servia and Mon- 
 tenegro and established an independent Albania under the 
 collective control of the great powers. We may well believe 
 that in the succeeding months Austria availed herself 
 of every argument to prevail upon Germany to give her 
 better support in regard to Balkan affairs. Russia no 
 doubt was making a similar plea to France and England. 
 
 We are too close to the event to know what interesting 
 conversations may have passed in regard to the settlement 
 of the rivalries in the Near East. We can only form our 
 opinions of the understandings reached from the attitude 
 assumed by the powers in the negotiations during the 
 recent crisis; from the very start we find Germany em- 
 phasizing her intention to support Austria in the localiza- 
 tion of the Austro-Servian dispute, and requesting France 
 to help her by exerting her influence on Russia. 
 
 On July 24, acting upon his instructions. Baron von 
 Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, informed M. 
 
150 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Bienvenu-Martin, the French Acting Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, of the German position, and laid particular em- 
 phasis upon the German view that the matter concerned 
 only Austria and Servia, and that the effort of the great 
 powers should be to endeavor to restrict it to them, for 
 any interference of another power would lead to incal- 
 culable consequences. (July 24, F. Y. B. no. 28.) 
 
 The next day the German Ambassador called again at 
 the Foreign Office, greatly concerned at an article in the 
 Echo de Paris which had designated his procedure of the 
 day before as a German threat. Baron von Schoen denied 
 that there was any thought of a threat, and declared that 
 ' the German Government had merely indicated that they 
 thought it desirable to localize the dispute, and that there 
 was risk of aggravating it should other powers intervene.' 
 M. Berthelot, Acting Pohtical Director, remarked that, 
 'as no confidential communication had been made to any 
 representative of the press, the Echo de Paris alone was 
 responsible for the publication referred to, and that the 
 fact of publication merely indicated that the action taken 
 by Germany appeared to have been known outside of the 
 officials of the Foreign Office. Baron von Schoen made no 
 reply to this allusion.' ^ (Modified quotations, July 25, 
 F. Y. B. no. 36.) 
 
 1 The intimation of M. Berthelot is evidently that the German Ambas- 
 sador had tried to use the press to influence French public opinion in favor 
 of interference at St. Petersburg. Dr. Karl Helfferich, German Secretary 
 of the Treasury, in a most important and interesting commentary on the 
 official publications relating to the war (New York Times, March 14, 1915), 
 says: "When, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum 
 to Servia, the German Ambassador in Paris gave to the French Govern- 
 ment the correct and faithful explanation that the German Government 
 regarded the matter as one that should be settled exclusively between 
 Austria-Hungary and Servia, and desired urgently the localization of the 
 conflict, since every intervention of another power might, by the natural 
 play of the existing alliances, bring on incalculable consequences, the echo 
 of this communication was an article in the Echo de Paris, the intimate 
 relations of which to the Quai d'Orsay are well known. In this article, the 
 step of the German Ambassador was branded as a menace 
 (F. Y. B. no. 36.) " 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 151 
 
 The next day, July 26, the German Chancellor tele- 
 graphed Baron von Schoen as follows : — 
 
 ''Austria-Hungary having declared officially to Russia 
 that she purposed no acquisition of territory, and did not 
 mean to affect the integrity of the kingdom, the decision 
 whether a European war shall break out rests only with 
 Russia, who must accept the whole responsibility. We 
 rely upon France, with whom we know ourselves to be one 
 in the wish for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, 
 to bring to bear her calming [in beruhigendem sinne] influ- 
 ence at St. Petersburg." (G. W. B. exhibit 10a.) 
 
 Wlien, on the afternoon of the 26th, the German Ambas- 
 sador called at the French Foreign Office to communicate 
 the views of his Government as indicated in the preceding 
 telegram, he added that ' the prevention of war depended 
 upon the decision of Russia, and that Germany felt that 
 she was at one with France in the ardent desire that peace 
 might be maintained, and did not doubt that France would 
 use her influence for peace at St. Petersburg.' ^ (Modified 
 quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 62.) 
 
 ' To this ''suggestion," M. Bienvenu-Martin, the French 
 
 1 The exact language employed by the German Ambassador in convey- 
 ing this message of his Government, as well as the intonations of his voice, 
 would be of the very greatest importance as indicating whether Germany 
 intended to ask for a friendly cooperation toward the maintenance of peace, 
 or to threaten France with the consequences of war if she did not restrain 
 her ally. As we have no information on these points, it seems important, 
 in lieu of more detailed information, to repeat here the terms of the Ger- 
 man communication in the exact words of the dispatch in which the French 
 Acting Minister for Foreign AfTairs informed M. Viviani of the interview: 
 " En ce moment, la decision, si une guerre europeenne doit ^clater, depend 
 uniquement de la Russie. Le Gouvernement AUemand a la ferme confiance 
 que le Gouvernement Frangais, avec lequel il se sait solidaire dans I'ar- 
 dent desir que la paix europeene puisse §tre maintenue, usera de toute son 
 influence dans un esprit apaisant aupres du Cabinet de Petersbourg." 
 (F. Y. B. no. 62.) 
 
 The Russian Charg6 at Paris in a telegram to his Government gave the 
 ambassador's words as follows: "L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la 
 France dans le d6sir ardent de conserver la paix et espere fermement que 
 la France usera de son influence h Petersbourg dans un sens moderateur." 
 (R. O. P. no. 28.) 
 
152 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Minister, replied that Russia was moderate, that she had 
 taken no step such as to cause any doubt of her modera- 
 tion, and that the French Government were in accord with 
 her in attempting to urge a peaceful solution of the dis- 
 pute. M. Bienvenu-Martin said that it appeared to them 
 that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where 
 her action would certainly be effective, with a view to pre- 
 venting military operations looking toward the occupation 
 of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 56.) 
 
 While the German Government, through its ambas- 
 sadors at Paris and Vienna, was urging France and Great 
 Britain to influence Russia, M. Paul Cambon, French 
 Ambassador at London, said to Sir Edward Grey that ' if 
 there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he 
 had no doubt his Government would be glad to join in it, 
 but he pointed out that England and France could not 
 say anything at St. Petersburg until Russia had expressed 
 some opinion or taken some action.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.) 
 
 Just what M. Cambon meant by this is not clear, but 
 apparently he was anxious to forestall the making of any 
 formal representations to Russia. For if this should be 
 done, the conciliatory attitude on the part of Russia would 
 be misunderstood and thought to be imposed by the diplo- 
 matic intervention of England and France. It was very 
 natural that France should not wish to weaken the in- 
 fluence of her ally in such an important question by taking 
 action before Russia had had a chance to indicate what 
 were her views in regard to a matter recognized as one 
 which primarily concerned her. There was, however, no 
 reason why France and England should not in an informal 
 and confidential manner make any suggestion to Russia 
 which they thought likely to be of use. The powers had 
 just been making similar informal suggestions to Austria, 
 hoping to influence her against adopting too drastic a 
 course with Servia. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 153 
 
 The Russian Charg6 at Paris reported to his Govern- 
 ment (July 26) that ' the Director of Political Affairs had 
 declared that it was his personal opinion that Germany's 
 course of procedure at Paris was intended to intimidate 
 France and bring about her intervention at St. Petersburg.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 29.) 
 
 The next day, July 27, the Russian Ambassador, M. 
 Isvolsky, immediately after his return to Paris, had an 
 interview with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at 
 which M. Berthelot, Acting Director of Political Affairs, 
 was also present. Both of them confirmed the information 
 respecting the action taken by Baron von Schoen, the Ger- 
 man Ambassador, which the Russian Charge had already 
 reported to his Government. That morning the German 
 Ambassador confirmed in writing his declaration of the 
 day before: — 
 
 '1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks 
 no territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs 
 against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure 
 her own peace and quiet. 
 
 ' 2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. 
 
 '3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their 
 ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their mod- 
 erating influence upon Russia. 
 
 ' Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expres- 
 sion of solidarity of Germany and France. The Acting 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Bienvenu-Martin, was 
 convinced,' so M. Isvolsky reported to his Government, 
 that 'these steps on the part of Germany were taken for 
 the evident purpose of alienating Russia and France, of 
 inducing the French Government to make representa- 
 tions at St. Petersburg, and of thus affecting Russia's 
 confidence in her ally; ^ and finally, in the event of war, 
 of throwing the responsibility, not on Germany, who was, 
 to believe her own statements, making every effort to 
 * " Compromettre ainsi notre alli6 k nos yeux." 
 
154 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 maintain peace, but on Russia and France.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 27, R. 0. P. no. 35; cf. F. Y. B. no. 62; 
 also F. Y. B. no. 61.) 
 
 The Russian Ambassador at Paris transmitted to his 
 Government, on July 29, a short summing-up of the situa- 
 tion which the French Acting Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs had prepared for President Poincare upon his arrival : 
 "Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the 
 assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt 
 to obtain guaranties, which may assume the form of an 
 occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian terri- 
 tory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation 
 of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at 
 issue must be 'locahzed' between Austria and Servia; that 
 is to say, the question concerns the punishment of Servia 
 for her previous policy and the obtaining of guaranties for 
 the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderat- 
 ing influence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This 
 sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. 
 In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavored to induce 
 France to agree to undertake joint action with Germany 
 to influence Russia for the preservation of peace. The 
 same attempts were made in London. In both capitals 
 the answer was given that it was at Vienna that action 
 should be taken, since it was Austria's excessive de- 
 mands, her refusal to discuss Servia's few reservations, 
 and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a 
 general war. France and England cannot exert any pres- 
 sure upon Russia to cause her to moderate her action, 
 for so far she has shown the greatest moderation, more 
 particularly in her advice to Servia to accept as much as 
 possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has 
 now given up the idea of bringing pressure to bear upon 
 Russia only, and inclines toward mediatory action both 
 at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time 
 both Germany and Austria are endeavoring to have the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 155 
 
 question drag along. Germany is opposing the conference 
 without suggesting any other practical course of action. 
 Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, mani- 
 festly with the object of procrastinating. At the same time 
 she is taking action, and if permitted to continue, her 
 claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable 
 that Russia should give entire support to the proposal 
 for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. Other- 
 wise, Austria, under the guise of 'guaranties,' will be 
 able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern 
 Europe." (July 29, R. O. P. no. 53. Of. F. Y. B. no. 85.) 
 
 2. France believes Germany intends to precipitate a war 
 The first few dispatches in the French Yellow Book 
 indicate that for several months preceding the Serajevo 
 assassination, many of the French officials had considered 
 that Germany was preparing for a proximate war,^ and 
 this opinion was strengthened after the assassination of 
 Franz Ferdinand (June 28). 
 
 On July 2, the French Ambassador at Vienna reported 
 that 'the investigation of the origin of the crime which 
 it was the desire of the Austrian Government to exact 
 from Servia under conditions impossible for her to submit 
 to with dignity, would, it was said, in case of a refusal, 
 furnish the grounds to justify a recourse to military meas- 
 ures.' (Modified quotation, July 2, F. Y. B. no. 8.) 
 
 * In the noteworthy article, referred to above, by Dr. Karl Helfferich, 
 German Secretary of the Treasury, published in the New York Times, 
 Sunday, March 14, 1915, he says: "... in the case of the French Yellow 
 Book the proof can be regarded as furnished that certain documents there 
 republished were belated fabrications." In a note he gives the following: 
 "Thus the Yellow Book, in its first chapter, entitled 'Avertissements,' 
 contains a series of documents which, beginning from March, 1913, are 
 intended to prove a growing war sentiment in Germany. Among them, 
 designated as no. 5, dated July 30, 1913, is a note of the French Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, in which is said : — 
 
 " * M. von Kiderlen fut I'homme le plus hai de I'Allemagne, I'hiver dernier. 
 Cependant il commence k n'^tre plus que ddconsid6r6, car il laisse entendre 
 qu'il prendra sa ravanche.' (Herr von Kiderlen was last winter the best- 
 
156 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 A consular report of July 20, which the French Am- 
 bassador forwarded from Vienna, contains the following 
 account of the situation shortly before the presentation of 
 the Austrian note: ''There is here, and at Berhn as well, a 
 group in favor of a conflict of wide extent, in other words, 
 a conflagration. The controlling motive is probably the 
 necessity of taking action before Russia has completed the 
 extensive improvements of her army and her system of 
 railways, and before France has perfected her military 
 organization. But here [at Vienna] there is no general 
 agreement in high circles : Count Berchtold and the diplo- 
 matists do not wish anything more than local operations 
 against Servia, but anything may be considered as possible. 
 A singular fact is pointed out. Ordinarily the official tele- 
 graph agency in its summaries and reviews of the foreign 
 press pays attention only to the semi-official newspapers 
 and most important publications. It omits all quotations 
 and all mention of the others. This is a traditional rule; 
 but during the last ten days the official agency has fur- 
 nished each day to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete 
 review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place 
 to the smallest and most insignificant newspapers which 
 for that very reason express themselves more aggressively 
 and often more insultingly. This work is undertaken by 
 the official agency with the obvious intention of stirring up 
 public feeling and creating a sentiment favorable to war. 
 The fact is significant." (Extract, July 20, F. Y. B. no. 14; 
 cf. S. B. B. no. 20.) 
 
 From its Ambassador at Berlin the French Govern- 
 ment learned, July 21, the extreme weakness of the Berlin 
 
 hated man in Germany. At present he is beginning to be only disliked 
 [instead of hated], for he allows it to be understood that he will take his 
 revenge [for Morocco].) 
 
 "Secretary of State von Kiderlen, who, according to this, began to medi- 
 tate vengeance in July, 1913, had already died in December, 1912, a fact 
 which was manifestly not realized by that oflBcial of the Quai d'Orsay 
 who belatedly fabricated this Yellow Book document." (See above, Preface, 
 p. vi, note.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 157 
 
 Bourse the day before. This M. Cambon attributed to the 
 anxiety in regard to the Servian question. The ambassador 
 reported that 'he had very good reason to beheve that, 
 when Austria made the communication at Belgrade which 
 she considered necessary in consequence of the Serajevo 
 assassination, Germany would stand back of her with the 
 weight of her influence, without seeking to play the part of 
 mediator.' (Modified quotation, July 21, F. Y. B. no. 16.) 
 
 This impression of the seriousness of the situation was 
 deepened when the French Government learned the terms 
 of the Austrian note and the vigorous support it received 
 from the German Government. In the absence of many of 
 the ambassadors from Berlin the charges came to see jNI. 
 Jules Cambon the morning after the presentation of the 
 Austrian note. The Russian Charg4 remarked with bit- 
 terness that ' Austria had chosen a moment to deliver her 
 note when the President of France and M. Viviani had left 
 St. Petersburg. He thought that public opinion in Ger- 
 many, in great part, favored war and wished to take ad- 
 vantage of this opportunity when Austria would no doubt 
 be found more united than in the past, and when the Ger- 
 man Emperor would be less inclined, because of his feeling 
 of common monarchical interest and horror at the assassi- 
 nation, to show a conciliatory disposition.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 29.) 
 
 This last observation relative to monarchical solidar- 
 ity seems to have impressed the French Ambassador, 
 for in another dispatch sent that same day (July 24) to 
 his Government, M. Jules Cambon states: ''An article 
 which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger this evening shows 
 also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of 
 mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay 
 sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies 
 must stand together {sentiment de la solidarite monarchique) . 
 I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this 
 point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the 
 
158 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have 
 been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest 
 he had been a few days previously." (Extract, July 24, 
 F. Y. B. no. 30; cf. A. R. B. no. 18.) 
 
 On July 24, also, the French Government received a 
 report from M. Paul Cambon at London, that 'Count 
 Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, told him how 
 Prince Lichnowsky, on his return from Berlin about a 
 month ago, had expressed pessimistic views in regard to the 
 relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. The Prince 
 had remarked the uneasiness caused at the German capital 
 by the rumors of a naval agreement between Russia and 
 England, by the visit of the Tsar to Bukharest, and by the 
 strengthening of the Russian army. From this the Rus- 
 sian Ambassador had concluded that Germany would not 
 be averse to a war with Russia. The British Under-Secre- 
 tary of State had been struck, as were they all,' M. Cambon 
 remarked, ' by Prince Lichnowsky's air of anxiety since his 
 return from Berlin. The Under-Secretary considered that 
 Germany, if she had wished, could have prevented the 
 delivery of the ultimatum. In view of these considerations, 
 the French Ambassador considered the situation very seri- 
 ous, and informed his Government that they ^ saw no 
 means of arresting the course of events.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 32.) 
 
 The French Government considered that one of the 
 most alarming indications of Germany's aggressive inten- 
 tions lay in her refusal to join with the other less directly 
 interested powers in a consideration of the means by 
 which the difficulty might be settled. Although the Ger- 
 man Government had refused to take part in any media- 
 tion in regard to the Austro-Servian dispute, they declared, 
 in a telegram to Prince Lichnowsky, that Hhey accepted 
 
 ^ When M. Cambon speaks of "they" [" we"] here, he evidently refers 
 to the efforts of Sir Edward Grey, in consultation with the Ambassadors of 
 France and Russia, to find some means of avoiding the conflict. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 159 
 
 the distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an 
 Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict. They 
 insisted that the question be locaUzed, by virtue of all 
 the powers refraining from intervention, and they were 
 prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, 
 
 — reserving their duty as an ally, — to join the other pow- 
 ers in undertaking mediation between Russia and Austria.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 13; cf. 
 B. W. P. no. 25.) 
 
 That same day the German Secretary of State informed 
 the British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin that 'if the rela- 
 tions between Austria and Russia became threatening, he 
 was quite ready to fall in with Sir Edward Grey's sug- 
 gestion as to the four powers working in favor of modera- 
 tion at Vienna and St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.) 
 
 The French Ambassador at Berlin reported that 'this 
 formula, — i.e., "mediation between Austria and Russia," 
 
 — to which it seemed that Germany might agree, had the 
 disadvantage of admitting that there was a conflict be- 
 tween the two countries, which up to that time did not 
 exist.' (Modified quotation, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 83.) 
 
 The French and Russian Governments considered that 
 Germany and Austria were trying to prolong discussions so 
 as to permit Austria to accomplish her purpose of crush- 
 ing Servia before the other powers could intervene. (Cf. 
 R. 0. P. nos. 48, 53.) The French Yellow Book and the 
 Russian Orange Paper do not make clear exactly what 
 advantage it could be to Germany and Austria to prolong 
 negotiations rather than secure the great advantage which 
 would be theirs from an immediate recourse to arms. At 
 first appearance this statement seems somewhat incon- 
 sistent with the accusation that Germany wished to force 
 the war. If, on the other hand, it was meant that Germany 
 and Austria intended to secure a complete diplomatic 
 triumph, or failing that, to have recourse to arms, the 
 
160 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 inconsistency might disappear; for Austria, under the 
 pretext of engaging in punitive measures against Servia, 
 might complete her mobilization, while Germany, with 
 all the influence she could bring to bear at St. Petersburg, 
 restrained Russia from any corresponding preparations. 
 Russia was perhaps afraid that if Austria were allowed to 
 complete her mobilization and commence her attack upon 
 Servia, the powers might decide to make the best of the 
 situation and bring influence to bear at St. Petersburg in 
 an attempt to get the Government of the Tsar to remain 
 passive while Austria subjugated Servia. 
 
 The views of the French Government are set forth by 
 the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in a dispatch which 
 he sent on July 27 to M. Viviani and the French Ambas- 
 sadors : — 
 
 "The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at 
 Paris seem characteristic: On Friday he reads a note in 
 which the German Government categorically place them- 
 selves between Austria and the powers, approving the 
 Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding that ' Germany 
 warmly desires that the dispute should remain localized, 
 since any intervention of another party is bound, because 
 of its alliances, to provoke incalculable consequences ' ; — 
 the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, 
 and the powers having, on account of the surprise, the 
 shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of a general war, 
 advised Servia to yield, Herr von Schoen returns to mini- 
 mize this step, pretending to be astonished at the impres- 
 sion produced, and protests that intentions are attributed 
 to Germany which she does not harbor, 'since,' he says, 
 ' there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards ' ; 
 — the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, 
 since Servia has yielded, one might almost say, to all the 
 Austrian demands, the German Ambassador reappears 
 on two occasions, to lay stress on Germany's peaceful 
 intentions, and on her warm desire to cooperate in the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 161 
 
 maintenance of peace, after having secured the Austrian 
 success which closes the first phase of the crisis. 
 
 ''The situation at the moment of writing continues 
 to cause anxiety, because of Austria's incomprehensible 
 refusal to accept Servia's submission, and further be- 
 cause of Austrian mobihzation operations, and her threats 
 to invade Servia. The attitude which the Austrian Gov- 
 ernment has assumed from the beginning, with German 
 support, and her refusal to enter into any conversation 
 with the powers, practically prevents them from effec- 
 tively intervening at Vienna, except through Germany 
 as an intermediary. But time presses, for if the Austrian 
 army crosses the frontier, it will be very difficult to set 
 limits to the crisis, as it does not appear possible that 
 Russia should tolerate the occupation of Servia, after the 
 latter has in reahty accepted the Austrian note, and given 
 every satisfaction and guaranty. Germany, from the 
 very fact of her taking the stand she has, is in a position 
 to intervene effectively at Vienna and to gain a hearing; 
 if she does not do this, she will have justified all the 
 suspicions [which have been aroused] and will take upon 
 herself the responsibility for the war." (Extract, July 29, 
 F. Y. B. no. 61.) 
 
 The German Government must have realized perfectly 
 what views France entertained in regard to Germany's in- 
 tentions. As an assurance of this we have only to recall how 
 M. Berthelot, of the French Foreign Office, speaking, with 
 the permission of the German Ambassador, unofficially 
 and as man to man, said to him that ' to any simple mind 
 Germany's attitude was inexplicable unless she aimed to 
 bring about a war.' (Modified quotation, July 26, F. Y. B. 
 no. 57.) Similarly M. Jules Cambon, speaking to the Ger- 
 man Secretary of State, asked him ''whether Germany 
 wished for war." (July 27, F. Y. B. no. 74.) 
 
 The French Ambassador at Vienna, in his dispatch 
 of July 28, remarked apropos of Austria's declaration of 
 
162 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 war against Servia: ''Among the suspicions aroused by- 
 Austria's sudden and violent decision, the most disquiet- 
 ing is that Germany has urged her on to take aggressive 
 action against Servia in order to enable Germany herself 
 to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances 
 which she supposes ought to be most favorable to herself 
 and under conditions which have been thoroughly con- 
 sidered." (Extract, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 83.) 
 
 From their Ambassador at Berlin the French Govern- 
 ment received a dispatch of the same date betraying a 
 similar mistrust of Germany. In it M. Jules Cambon 
 suggests that 'in consequence of the repugnance shown 
 by Herr von Jagow toward the making of any demarche 
 Sit Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma, 
 by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic 
 action by the powers for the purpose of avoiding war could 
 be brought about.' (Modified quotation, July 28, F. Y. B. 
 no. 81.) 
 
 Two days later (July 30) Herr von Jagow, the German 
 Secretary of State, said to M. Jules Cambon that 'in re- 
 sponse to Sir Edward Grey's request that Germany draw 
 up a formula for the intervention of the disinterested 
 powers, he had, "to save time," asked Austria directly to 
 state the manner in which the conversations with her 
 might be entered into. M. Cambon considered that this 
 was a pretext for eliminating England, France, and Italy, 
 and entrusting the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a 
 concihatory attitude to the German Ambassador at Vi- 
 enna, Herr von Tchirsky, whose Pan-Germanist and Russo- 
 phobe sentiments were well known.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 109.) 
 
 M. Viviani's dispatch of July 31 to the French Am- 
 bassadors contains a severe arraignment of the German 
 Government: "When we consider what has been the con- 
 stant attitude of Germany, and how, since the beginning 
 of the conflict, though she never ceased to affirm to each 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 163 
 
 one of the powers her ^peaceful intentions, she has act- 
 ually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the fail- 
 ure of all attempts at agreement; when we know how she 
 has not ceased, through her Ambassador, to encourage 
 Vienna to maintain an uncompromising attitude; when 
 we perceive how the German military preparations were 
 begun on the 25th of July and have been continued 
 subsequently without cessation; and when we remember 
 Germany's immediate objection to the Russian formula, 
 which Berlin declared unacceptable to Austria even before 
 that power had been consulted, we cannot escape the con- 
 viction, driven home by all the impressions derived from 
 Berlin that Germany has sought to humihate Russia, to 
 disrupt the Triple Entente, and that she was prepared if 
 she could not effect her purpose, to make war." ^ (Extract, 
 July 31, F. Y. B. no. 114.) 
 
 8. France supports her ally 
 If the German diplomats really did entertain the hope 
 of separating France and Russia, they made a signal fail- 
 ure. From the very first the French Government strength- 
 ened Russia's hand by its unswerving support.^ 
 
 ^ This translation had to be somewhat free, because of the peculiar con- 
 struction of the original. 
 
 * On July 28, the Russian Ambassador at London communicated to Sir 
 Edward Grey the contents of a telegram of July 27 from M. Sazonof, in the 
 closing paragraph of which the Russian Foreign Minister said: "I wish, 
 however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which 
 might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to 
 the German Ambassador regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the 
 Imperial Cabinet." (Extract, July 27, B. W. P. no. 53.) Strange to say, the 
 Russian Orange Paper, no. 32, reproduces the first three paragraphs of this 
 note, but omits this concluding statement. I do not understand to what 
 M. Sazonof refers unless it is to M. Bienvenu-Martin's remark about the 
 conditions of France's making representations at St. Petersburg. (See F. 
 Y. B. nos. 56, 62; cf. R. O. P. no. 28.) Perhaps M. Sazonof wished to head 
 off any such possibility, for fear Russia might be forced to yield as she had 
 been in 1908. This may explain why Russia preferred direct conversations 
 with Austria to the mediation of the four less interested powers. (See chap. 
 VII, § 4.) In the Austrian Red Book just published we find M. Bienvenu- 
 Martin telling the German Ambassador that ' the French Government was 
 
164 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 When the German Secretary of State said, by way of 
 excuse for not taking part in the proposed mediation, 
 that Germany had engagements with Austria, the French 
 Ambassador rephed that the relations of Germany with 
 Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia. 
 (See July 27, F. Y. B. no. 74.) 
 
 On July 29, the Russian Ambassador in France tele- 
 graphed to M. Sazonof : ''Viviani has just assured me of 
 the firm determination of the French Government to act 
 in accord with us. This decision finds the most general 
 support in all circles and all parties, including the Radical 
 Socialists, who have just made him a declaration express- 
 ing the absolute confidence and the patriotic dispositions 
 of the group. Upon his arrival in Paris, Viviani rushed 
 through a telegram to London, saying that, in view of the 
 cessation of direct pourparlers between St. Petersburg 
 and Vienna, it was necessary that the London Cabinet 
 should renew as soon as possible, in one form or another, 
 its proposal for the mediation of the powers. Before see- 
 ing me to-day, Viviani received the German Ambassador, 
 who renewed the assurance of Germany's pacific inten- 
 tions. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany de- 
 sired peace, she should hasten to adhere to the British 
 proposal for mediation. Baron von Schoen replied that 
 the words 'conference' or 'arbitration' frightened Aus- 
 tria. Viviani answered him that it was not a question of 
 words, and that it would be easy to find another form of 
 mediation. According to Baron von Schoen, in order that 
 the negotiations between the powers might succeed, it 
 would be necessary to ascertain what Austria was going 
 to demand from Servia. Viviani replied that the Berlin 
 Cabinet might very easily inquire about this from Aus- 
 
 of the opinion that the Austro-Servian controversy concerned only Belgrade 
 and Vienna, and that it was hoped at Paris that the question might find a 
 direct and peaceful solution.' (Modified quotation, July 24, A. R. B. no. 13; 
 cf. A. R. B. no. 11. See contra, E. Durkheim and E. Denia, Who Wanted 
 War? Colin, Paris, 1915, p. 15.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 165 
 
 tria, but that in the mean time the Servian note of reply 
 might serve as a basis of discussion; he added that France 
 was sincerely desirous of peace, but that she was at the 
 same time determined to act in full harmony with her 
 allies and friends, and that he (Baron von Schoen) must 
 have convinced himself that this decision would meet with 
 the heartiest approval of the country." (July 29, R. 0. P. 
 no. 55.) 
 
 That same day M. Sazonof 'instructed the Russian 
 Ambassador to the French Government to express to the 
 French Government Russia's sincere gratitude for the 
 declaration the Ambassador of France had made him in its 
 name to the effect that Russia could count with assurance 
 upon the assistance of her ally, France. ^ In the present 
 
 1 This assurance of support, which France gave to Russia on July 29, 
 is of the utmost significance. The Russian Government had every reason 
 to beheve that France would stand behind her ally, but a sudden explosion 
 of anti-war sentiment would have embarrassed the French Government. 
 The purpose of the latter was to strengthen the hand of Russia without 
 encouraging her to take aggressive action; in pursuing this policy public 
 opinion in France and the attitude of the English Government had to be 
 considered. Although France was perfectly justified in supporting the Rus- 
 sian Government to the extent to which she did, it seems that she was so 
 convinced of Germany's insincerity and intention to provoke a war that 
 she failed to make Russia realize the imperative need of keeping always 
 one step behind Germany in her defensive measures. Russia's mobiliza- 
 tion in the south was a justifiable counter-move. We cannot, however, 
 make the same statement in regard to Russia's order for a general mobili- 
 zation on July 31 — before she had received the German ultimatum. 
 
 Dr. Karl Helfferich states his reasons for thinking this assurance of France 
 to support Russia was given only after France was convinced that England 
 would support the Entente : — 
 
 "From no document of the French Yellow Book, and as little from the 
 Russian Orange Book and the English Blue Book, does it appear that 
 France at any stage ventured to give the Russian Government an earnest 
 counsel in a pacific sense, unless it be considered that the expression of the 
 wish that Russia might avoid measures which could give Germany a pretext 
 for mobilization (Yellow Book, no. 102) be regarded as a sincere mediation 
 for peace, while as a matter of fact such wishes are more properly to be re- 
 garded as tactical hints to detain Germany until the assurance of armed help 
 from England, toward which France was at that time working with all 
 means at its disposal, should be attained. 
 
 "The unconditional safeguarding of the English alliance, not any media- 
 tory activity whatsoever, was in those critical days the goal of the labors of 
 
166 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 circumstances, M. Sazonof said, this declaration was par- 
 ticularly precious to Russia.' (Modified quotation, July 
 29, R. 0. P. no. 58; cf. F. Y. B. no. 101.) 
 
 4. Military preparations in Germany and France 
 Two days before the presentation of the Austrian ulti- 
 matum, M. Jules Cambon reported from Berlin that ' he 
 had been assured that the preliminary notices for mobili- 
 zation, the object of which was to place Germany in an 
 attitude of "attention," as it were, in times of tension, had 
 been sent out to those classes of reservists which would re- 
 ceive them in such circumstances. This was a measure to 
 which, on account of the conditions existing in Germany, 
 the Government could have recourse without giving away 
 its intentions and without exciting the people. The meas- 
 ure was not of a sensational nature, nor was it, as had 
 been shown, necessarily followed by actual mobilization. 
 Nevertheless, it was, as the Ambassador remarked, signifi- 
 cant.' 1 (Modified quotation, July 21, F. Y. B. no. 15.) 
 
 ' On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by 
 France arrived in Germany. The Fourteenth Corps dis- 
 continued its maneuvers and returned to garrison duty.' 
 
 French diplomats; and as long as this goal was not attained, the decisive 
 word to Russia was also not uttered. No matter if the impression is given 
 a hundred times in the French Yellow Book that French assistance of 
 Russia was axiomatic, so axiomatic that a special declaration on this point 
 to Russia — which one seeks in vain in the French Yellow Book — was not 
 at all necessary — the Russian Orange Book knows better. In this there 
 is contained a telegraphic statement of Sazonof to Isvolsky, printed as of 
 July 29 (Orange Book, no. 58), and that, too, as the last of the ten docu- 
 ments dated July 29, so that we may assume that this telegram was dis- 
 patched only late in the evening of July 29. 
 
 "From this [citations from R. O. P. no. 58] it appears that France, on the 
 evening of July 29, not earlier and not later, gave to Russia expressly and 
 without conditions its declaration of armed assistance. 
 
 "Why not earlier? And why did France on July 29 find the ability to 
 make up its mind to this decisive step? 
 
 "The key lies with ENGLAND." (New York Times, March 14, 1915.) 
 
 ' For other reports of German military preparations see F. Y. B. nos. 
 59, 60, 88, 89. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 167 
 
 (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.) While these preparations 
 were in progress, the German Memorandum recounts how 
 the German Government continued its mediatory action 
 between Austria and Russia (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 
 9, and exhibit 23), though it does not appear that any real 
 steps toward mobilization were undertaken until France 
 considered that Germany's action rendered it necessary; 
 for President Poincare told the British Ambassador, July 
 30, that 'France was pacific, that she did not desire war, 
 and that all she had done up to the present was to make 
 preparations for mobilization so as not to be taken un- 
 awares.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 99.) 
 On the previous day (July 29), the German Chancellor 
 sent the following instructions to Baron von Schoen, Ger- 
 man Ambassador at Paris: ''News received here regardmg 
 French preparations of war grows from hour to hour. I re- 
 quest that you call the attention of the French Government 
 to this and accentuate the fact that such measures would 
 call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have 
 to proclaim threatening state of war [drohende Kriegsge- 
 fahr], and while this would not mean a call for the reserves 
 or mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We 
 continue to hope for the preservation of peace." (Extract, 
 July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 17; cf. A. R. B. no. 45; F. Y. B. 
 no. 101.) 
 
 When the situation became threatenmg, M. Paul Cam- 
 bon, French Ambassador at London, told Sir Edward 
 Grey, on July 29, that 'he anticipated a demand from Ger- 
 many that France should be neutral while Germany at- 
 tacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not 
 give, being bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 87.) 
 
 On July 30, Von Jagow, the German Secretary of State, 
 speaking of the ' Russian mobiUzation and French military 
 measures which he heard were being taken in France, said 
 that when they mobiUzed they would have to mobilize on 
 
168 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 three sides at once. He said he regretted this, as he knew 
 France did not desire war, but it would be a miUtary neces- 
 sity.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 98.) 
 
 That same day, July 30, M. Jules Cambon, French 
 Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed his Government : — 
 
 "Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the 
 news of the German mobilization which had spread an 
 hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this 
 without delay; the Imperial Government is confiscating 
 the extra editions of the papers which announced it. But 
 neither this communication nor these steps diminish my 
 apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany. 
 
 *'It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council, held 
 yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authori- 
 ties under the presidency of the Emperor, decided on mob- 
 ilization, and this explains the preparation of the special 
 edition of the Lokal Anzeiger, but that from various causes 
 (the declaration of England that she reserved her entire 
 liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between the 
 Tsar and William II), the serious measures which had been 
 decided upon were suspended. 
 
 ''One of the ambassadors with whom I have very close 
 relations saw Herr von Zimmerman at 2 o'clock. Accord- 
 ing to the Under-Secretary of State, the military authorities 
 are very anxious that mobilization should be ordered, be- 
 cause every delay makes Germany lose some of her advan- 
 tages. Nevertheless, up to the present, the haste of the 
 General Staff, which sees war in mobilization, has been 
 successfully restrained. In any case mobilization may be 
 decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has is- 
 sued in the Lokal Anzeiger, — a paper which is usually 
 semi-official, — premature news calculated to cause excite- 
 ment in France. 
 
 ''Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that 
 all the measures for mobilization which can be taken before 
 the pubhcation of the general order of mobiUzation have 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 169 
 
 already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to 
 make us publish our mobilization first in order to attribute 
 the responsibiUty to us." (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 
 105.) 
 
 Still another dispatch of that same day which M. Vivi- 
 ani sent to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at Lon- 
 don, instructed him to inform Sir Edward Grey of the 
 situation relative to the French and German military prep- 
 arations, so that England might see that, although France 
 was prepared to defend herself {est resolue), it was not she 
 who was undertaking aggressive action. The telegram 
 continued : — ■ 
 
 "You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the 
 decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; 
 although Germany has made her covering dispositions 
 a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole 
 front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported 
 her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept 
 our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden 
 them to approach nearer. 
 
 ''Our plan, though based upon the idea of attack, pro- 
 vided, nevertheless, that the fighting positions of our cover- 
 ing troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By 
 leaving a strip of territory undefended against the sudden 
 aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic 
 hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than 
 Russia, the responsibility for the attack. 
 
 " In order to be convinced of this, it is sufficient to com- 
 pare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in 
 France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until 
 we were certain that Germany had done so five days before. 
 
 "In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of 
 Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been 
 reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons in 
 the interior such as Treves or Cologne; nothing of this 
 nature has been done in France. 
 
170 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ' ' The making ready of the positions on the frontier (clear- 
 ing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batter- 
 ies, and protection of railway junctions) was begun in Ger- 
 many on Saturday, the 25th; in France we are going to 
 begin it, for we can no longer refrain from taking similar 
 measures. 
 
 ''The railway stations were occupied by the military in 
 Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, 
 the 28th. 
 
 ''Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands 
 have been recalled by individual summons, those living 
 abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the 
 officers of reserve have been summoned ; in the interior the 
 roads are closed, motor-cars circulate only with permits. 
 These measures constitute the last stage before mobiUza- 
 tion. None of them has been taken in France. 
 
 "The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on 
 two occasions yesterday ^ German patrols penetrated our 
 territory. The whole 16th Army Corps from Metz, rein- 
 forced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occu- 
 pies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th Army 
 Corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier. 
 
 "Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the an- 
 nexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the 
 frontier." (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 106.) 
 
 On July 31, Herr von Jagow, the German Secretary for 
 Foreign Affairs, sent for the French Ambassador and told 
 him he was very sorry to inform him that ' in the face of the 
 total mobilization of the Russian army, Germany, in the 
 interests of the security of the Empire, would have to take 
 serious precautionary measures; that what was called 
 Kriegsgefahrzustand (state of danger of war) allowed the 
 authorities, if they deemed it expedient, to proclaim a state 
 of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close 
 the frontier. At the same time he informed the ambassa- 
 
 ^ For a discussion of the date of these occurrences see the Preface, and 
 post, p. 285. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 171 
 
 dor that a demand was being made at St. Petersburg that 
 Russia should demobilize on the Austrian as well as on the 
 German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to 
 mobilize also. Herr von Jagow said that instructions had 
 been sent to Baron von Schoen to inform the French Gov- 
 ernment of the decision of the Berlin Cabinet, and to ask 
 them what attitude they intended to adopt.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 116.) 
 
 On the afternoon of August 1, the French Minister of 
 War informed the British Military Attach^ at Paris that 
 'orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilization of 
 the French army. This became necessary, the minister 
 said, because he knew that under the system of Kriegs- 
 gefahrzustand the Germans had called up six classes. 
 Three classes were sufficient to bring their covering troops 
 up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. 
 This he said, being tantamount to mobilization, was mo- 
 bilization under another name. The French forces on the 
 frontier had opposed to them eight army corps on a war 
 footing and an attack was expected at any moment. It was, 
 therefore, of the utmost importance to guard against this. 
 A zone of ten kilometres had, he said, been left between 
 the French troops and the German frontier. The French 
 troops would not attack, and the Minister of War was 
 anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobili- 
 zation was one for purely defensive purposes.' (Modified 
 quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 136; cf. B. W. P. no. 
 140.) 
 
 In his speech before the French Chamber of Deputies on 
 August 4, M. Viviani, President of the Council, speaking 
 of the situation at this time when Russia had in part mo- 
 bilized, ^ and Germany was maintaining a negative attitude 
 
 * M. Viviani says that the German ultimatum was addressed to Russia 
 on July 31, " on the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobiliza- 
 tion." (August 4, F. Y. B. no. 159.) The " pretext" seems to have been a 
 reahty. 
 
172 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 toward the suggestions brought forward with the hope of 
 reaching a peaceful solution, said: ''This was a disquieting 
 situation which made it probable that there existed at Ber- 
 lin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours 
 afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become 
 a certainty. In fact Germany's negative attitude gave 
 place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were 
 truly alarming. On the 31st July, Germany, by proclaim- 
 ing ' a state of war,' cut the communications between herself 
 and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete 
 freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy mili- 
 tary preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could 
 justify. For some days past, and in circumstances difficult 
 to explain, Germajiy had been preparing for the transition 
 of her army from a peace footing to a war footing." 
 
 Farther along in the same speech he enumerated the 
 following acts of hostility committed by Germany against 
 France on the same day (July 31) she delivered her ultima- 
 tum to Russia: "The rupture of communications by road, 
 railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French 
 locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of 
 machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which 
 had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this fron- 
 tier. From this moment we were no longer justified in be- 
 lieving in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the 
 German representative continued to shower upon us. We 
 knew that Germany was mobilizing under the shelter of 
 the 'state of danger of war.' We learned that six classes of 
 reservists had been called up, and that transport was being 
 collected even for those army corps which were stationed a 
 considerable distance from the frontier. As these events 
 succeeded one another, the Government, watchful and 
 vigilant, took from day to day, or rather from hour to 
 hour, the precautions which the situation required; the 
 general mobilization of our forces on land and sea was 
 ordered." (Extracts, August 4, F. Y. B. no. 159.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 173 
 
 The German Chancellor gives a different account of the 
 violation of French territory: "Concerning the one excep- 
 tion I mentioned, I have received the following report 
 from the General Staff: 'As regards the French complaints 
 of our crossing their frontier, only one case we have to 
 acknowledge. Contrary to express orders a patrol of the 
 14th Army Corps, led, it would seem, by an officer, crossed 
 the frontier on August 2. It appears that all were shot 
 except one man, who returned. But long before this iso- 
 lated instance of crossing the frontier occurred, French 
 aviators had dropped bombs on our railway tracks far 
 into southern Germany, and near the Schluchtpass French 
 troops had made an attack upon our frontier guards. Our 
 troops have obeyed orders and merely defended them- 
 selves.' Such is the report of the General Staff." ^ (Extract 
 
 1 M. Jules Cambon, in a dispatch which was sent from Copenhagen 
 August 6, when the ambassador was returning to France, gives the French 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs the following account of an interview with the 
 German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, relative to this incident: 
 " On the morning of Monday, the 3d of August, after I had, in accordance 
 with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the 
 acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the 
 Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts 
 of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially 
 at Nuremberg and Coblenz by French aviators, who according to his state- 
 ment 'had come from Belgium.' I answered that I had not the slightest 
 information as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and 
 the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part I asked him 
 if he had read the note which I had addressed to him with regard to the 
 invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Sec- 
 retary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its con- 
 tents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer com- 
 manding one of the detachments who had advanced to the French village 
 of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the 
 brains of a French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my 
 opinion of this act I added: 'You will admit that under no circumstances 
 could there be any comparison between this and the flight of an aeroplane 
 over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit 
 of daring for which aviators are conspicuous. 
 
 "'An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbor by 
 detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an import- 
 ance of quite a different nature.' [See also F. Y. B. nos. 136, 139, 148.] 
 
 "Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the 
 facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was difficult 
 
174 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 from Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech in the 
 Reichstag, August 4, 1914.) 
 
 5. The German ultimatum to France 
 On July 31, M. Viviani telegraphed the French Ambas- 
 sador at St. Petersburg: "The German Government de- 
 cided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by 
 the condition known as the 'state of danger of war.' In 
 communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this even- 
 ing, Baron von Schoen added that the Government was 
 at the same time requiring that Russia demobilize. If the 
 Russian Government does not give a satisfactory reply 
 within twelve hours, Germany in her turn will mobilize. I 
 replied to the German Ambassador that I had no informa- 
 tion at all about an alleged total mobilization of the Rus- 
 sian army and navy which the German Government in- 
 voked as the reason for the new military measures which 
 they are taking to-day. Baron von Schoen finally asked 
 me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of 
 France would be in case of war between Germany and 
 Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to- 
 morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock. I have no intention of 
 making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall 
 confine myself to telling him that France will consider her 
 interests.^ The Government of the Republic is, indeed, 
 
 for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the 
 feelings which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either 
 side of the frontier." (Extract, August 6, F. Y. B. no. 155.) 
 
 ^ An editorial in the Journal des Debats, Paris, contains the remarks: 
 "Under the pretext of being at war with Russia, Germany called on France 
 either to proclaim her neutrality or declare war on Germany. But when we 
 replied that we would remain faithful to our alliance with Russia, Germany 
 did not officially follow up these demands. This reply of ours disconcerted 
 her. She wished us, in pursuance of our alliance with Russia, to declare war 
 on Germany, so that she might say to her own people and to the Italian 
 Government that France had been the aggressor. She wished at one stroke 
 to rouse public opinion in Germany, which seems much less enthusiastic, 
 and to make operative the casus foederis of the Italian-German Alliance." 
 (August 4, 1914, Journal des Debats, "La ru6e germanique et le devoir des 
 nations.") 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 175 
 
 under no obligation to give an account of its intentions to 
 any one except its ally. I request you to inform M. Sazonof 
 of this inunediately. As I have already told you, I have no 
 doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest inter- 
 ests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid any- 
 thing that might render a crisis inevitable or precipitate 
 it." (July 31, F. Y. B. no. 117.) 
 
 The German Chancellor's instructions to the German 
 Ambassador at Paris to make the anticipated demand were 
 as follows: 'Kindly ask the French Government whether 
 it will remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Answer 
 must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that 
 inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 31, G. W. B. exhibit 25.) 
 
 The Director of Political Affairs at the French Foreign 
 Office, speaking the next day of the German demand, told 
 the British Ambassador at Paris that, ' although there were 
 no differences at issue between France and Germany, the 
 German Ambassador had made a menacing communica- 
 tion to the French Government and had requested an 
 answer the next day, intimating that he would have to 
 break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not 
 satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the 
 French Government considered this an extraordinary pro- 
 ceeding. The German Ambassador, who was to see the 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs again that evening, had said 
 nothing about demanding his passports, but stated that he 
 had packed up.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. 
 no. 126.) While it is true that a menacing tone for the 
 German communication was unnecessary, its general tenor 
 could hardly have occasioned any real surprise, especially 
 in the light of what M. Jules Cambon had said. So that 
 this part of the dispatch seems meant more for publication 
 than to convey any important information. 
 
 To the repeated inquiry of the German Ambassador as 
 to whether France in case of a Russo-German war would 
 
176 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1911 
 
 remain neutral, the French Premier Viviani made the non- 
 committal reply that ' France would take such action as her 
 interests might require.' (Modified quotation, August 1, 
 G. W. B. exhibit 27.) 
 
 On August 1, M. Viviani, in a telegram to the French 
 Ambassadors, said: ''The attitude of Germany proves that 
 she wishes for war. And she wishes for war against France. 
 Yesterday when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Or- 
 say to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case 
 of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, al- 
 though there has been no direct dispute between France 
 and Germany, and although from the beginning of the 
 crisis we have employed all our efforts for a peaceful solu- 
 tion and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked 
 me to present his respects and thanks to the President of 
 the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough 
 to make arrangements for him personally {des dispositions 
 pour sa propre personne) ; we know also that he has already 
 provided for the safety of the archives of the Embassy. 
 These indications of his intention to break off diplomatic 
 relations without any direct dispute, and even though he 
 has not received any definitely negative answer, are in keep- 
 ing with Germany's determination to make war against 
 France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protesta- 
 tions is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon 
 Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed to begin 
 negotiations with Russia." (Extract, August 1, F. Y. B. 
 no. 120.) 
 
 In spite of what seemed the beginning of a rupture of 
 peaceful negotiations, the German Ambassador remained 
 at Paris some time longer. On August 3, he asked for 
 his passports. (F. Y. B. no. 148.) Germany in taking this 
 anomalous course ^ was probably influenced by the hope of 
 
 ^ It is, indeed, hard to explain the reason why so many ambassadors re- 
 mained at capitals of states with which their own states or their allies were 
 at war. (Cf. Bunsen's Report, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10 [1914].) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 177 
 
 placing her action in a more favorable light, especially in 
 regard to Italy. Undoubtedly any indignity offered to 
 the German Ambassador in Paris would have greatly 
 strengthened Germany's position with Italy. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 MOBILIZATION 
 
 The meaning of mobilization — The issuance of the order for general 
 mobilization — Intermediate military preparations — The fatal succession 
 of mobilizations. 
 
 1. The meaning of mobilization 
 
 Mobilization is a system by which a country is enabled 
 to pass from its ordinary condition of peace into a state of 
 full preparation for war. The speed and order with which 
 this operation can be effected are the first considerations. 
 The rapidity of mobilization is a prime factor of the mili- 
 tary strength of a country, for whether the preparation be 
 for aggression or defense, the country which can mobilize 
 most rapidly will be able to strike its adversary while it is in 
 the peculiarly disorganized condition incident upon mobil- 
 ization. The tremendous transformation which occurs in a 
 state passing from a peace to a war footing is one of the 
 most complex and rapid in human society. It is like some 
 of those marvelous, almost instantaneous, metamorphoses 
 of the insect world. The plans have been previously 
 worked out in every detail, and each individual has re- 
 ceived the requisite drill and an individual copy of the 
 written instructions informing him of the part he is to 
 play. When the order is given by the head of the state, 
 every prospective soldier, wherever he may be, knows 
 where to go. The system depends upon every individual's 
 performing his part faithfully and expeditiously. 
 
 What each state desires is to escape all unnecessary mili- 
 tary burdens by reducing the number of effectives as far 
 as possible in time of peace. The more rapid and more 
 efficient the mobihzation, the less extensive, under normal 
 conditions, need be the military preparations and burdens. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 179 
 
 Rapidity of mobilization, however, is not easy to obtain, 
 for with every gain in time goes a disproportionate in- 
 crease in expense, not to speak of additional burdens put 
 upon the organizing faculty of the Government. It would 
 be disastrous to have the system of mobihzation break 
 down and leave the country at the mercy of a neighbor 
 able to complete his own mobilization in an orderly even 
 though less rapid manner. 
 
 The political situation of each state determines in gen- 
 eral the military economy which it will adopt. Between 
 the two great neighboring countries, Russia and Germany, 
 the contrast is most striking. Russia has none of the faciU- 
 ties for rapid mobilization. She lacks railways and mih- 
 tary stores, and above all, she has no bureaucratic organi- 
 zation sufficiently perfected to mobilize great masses of 
 men with rapidity. To offset these disadvantages, Russia 
 has unlimited resources in good fighting men whom she can 
 place in the field without disorganizing the economic life 
 of the nation, and if Germany or Austria should, through 
 their rapidity in mobilization or any other cause, gain an 
 initial advantage, Russia could retire toward the interior 
 and oblige her adversaries to attempt what Napoleon 
 failed to accomplish — an invasion and conquest of Russia. 
 Even if successful, the invader could keep the country in 
 subjugation only by an immense army of occupation. Just 
 as some of the less highly developed forms of life recover 
 from mutilation and continue their normal life, Russia, 
 when the invader had tired of his efforts permanently to 
 subjugate the country, would resume her customary na- 
 tional life. As a consequence of these conditions, Russia 
 has less reason to dread the advent of war, for she risks 
 less than the other powers. 
 
 In Germany we find the exact antithesis of the condi- 
 tions just described. Mihtary organization and prepara- 
 tion have been carried to the highest point of perfection, 
 and the best thought and effort of an efficient bureaucracy 
 
180 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 are utilized to mobilize and maintain the military strength 
 of the country. Germany has a network of strategic rail- 
 ways along her frontiers and has worked out every minute 
 detail of the plans for passing, in the shortest possible time, 
 from a peace footing to complete armament. 
 
 Since the formation of the Dual Alliance and the 
 strengthening of the bonds of the Triple Entente, Germany 
 has considered that her security against a combination 
 overwhelming in numbers lay in her ability to complete 
 her mobilization and strike her adversaries while they 
 were still in the disorganized state which necessarily 
 accompanies the transformation from a peace footing to 
 that of war. The French system, though slower than that 
 of Germany, lags behind by a few days only, so that Ger- 
 many in case of war must lose no time and strike her at 
 once with irresistible force, otherwise she would lose the 
 advantage of her rapidity of mobihzation. When France 
 should have been crushed, Germany considered that she 
 would still have time to transfer her forces to her eastern 
 frontier and strike Russia before she had completed her 
 military preparations. 
 
 The danger of this situation was not lost on France, and 
 she well recognized that Germany intended to make her 
 bear the brunt of any conflict which should occur — make 
 her the ' ' hostage ' ' for Russia's good behavior. France might 
 have attempted to meet Germany on her own ground 
 by developing plans for a mobilization equally rapid, and 
 to this result she would have been helped by the great 
 advantage she possesses in having only one extent of 
 frontier open to attack, and that relatively short. Except 
 for the Franco-German boundary she is indeed secure from 
 attack. The Pyrenees and the Alps cover all but two 
 vulnerable localities bordering on Belgium and on Switzer- 
 land, and the perpetual neutralization of those states con- 
 stituted a barrier between herself and her powerful neigh- 
 bor. Even if this neutraUzation should be disregarded, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 181 
 
 France might count on several days before the German 
 forces could break through to her frontier. Such a poHcy, 
 however, would have imposed burdens which the French 
 taxpayers were unwilling to bear. Having no desire to 
 launch upon an aggressive policy of revenge, they felt that 
 the Dual Alliance with Russia would make Germany hesi- 
 tate before commencing an attack. Everything considered, 
 the nation preferred to compromise and to maintain their 
 military organization on such a basis as to afford an effec- 
 tive and vigorous resistance to Germany, without attempt- 
 ing to develop a mobilization and a power of attack to 
 equal Germany's. They trusted to the skillfully con- 
 structed fortifications on their border to delay the German 
 onslaught until the French forces behind this barrier 
 should have completed their mobilization. Of course, mil- 
 itary authorities had to take into consideration the possi- 
 bility that Germany would not respect the neutrahty of 
 Belgium or Switzerland ; but in that event, it was evident 
 that France would almost certainly be able to secure the 
 assistance of England. These various considerations were 
 responsible for the situation in which we find France upon 
 the outbreak of the war. The military experts on neither 
 side of the frontier seem to have realized how easy it would 
 be for the perfected German artillery to break down any 
 existing system of fortifications. When war became inev- 
 itable, Germany's problem was then to find some way, 
 before France had mobilized, of crushing her with sufficient 
 celerity to allow time to turn against Russia, before the 
 latter could collect her forces. The solution which Ger- 
 many adopted is bound up with the question of Belgian 
 neutrality, under which we shall consider it more at length. 
 
 2. The issuance of the order for general mohiUzation 
 The plans of mobilization adopted in the different coun- 
 tries are, thanks to an extensive system of espionage, 
 known to the general staffs of all the European powers. 
 
182 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 The respective Governments are able, therefore, to gauge 
 the time at which a full or partial mobilization begins. 
 It is also perfectly well understood that, unless Germany 
 is willing to forego the advantage which she derives from 
 her superior speed, she must undertake her own mobiliza- 
 tion the moment either of her neighbors begins. But, as 
 soon as general mobilization has started, it is not practi- 
 cable to arrest it before completion, since all the individ- 
 uals withdrawn from their normal activity would have to 
 retrace their steps. While this return to a peace footing 
 was going on, and until the country had resumed its former 
 situation, it could not begin to mobilize again and com- 
 plete its preparations according to the plans devised, until 
 sufficient time had elapsed to return to the peace footing. 
 Consequently, in the interval elapsing between the mo- 
 ment of arresting mobihzation and the complete return to 
 the normal peace footing, the country would be in a most 
 vulnerable condition, which would have disastrous conse- 
 quences, should it be the object of attack. When, there- 
 fore, the mobilization decree had once been issued and 
 the preparations had begun to run their course, Germany 
 could no longer delay, but would have to strike at France 
 before the latter had finished her mobilization. In other 
 words, from the moment France or Germany issues a de- 
 cree for general mobilization, it might be regarded that 
 war was almost as certain as though a formal declaration 
 had been made ;^ and when Germany felt that she was 
 confronted by the danger of a Franco-Russian coalition 
 against her, she considered that her only feasible plan of 
 campaign consisted, as we have pointed out, in attempt- 
 ing to crush France before Russia should have completed 
 her mobihzation. 2 
 
 1 Cf. F. Y. B. no. 50. 
 
 "^ In this discussion I am explaining the military situation and basing 
 conclusions on strategic considerations alone. There are other practical 
 considerations of great weight which might have deterred Germany from 
 threatening France even if France would not agree to remain neutral. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 183 
 
 This situation makes it necessary, from the moment 
 that a conflict with Russia is inevitable, that Germany 
 should have an assurance from France that she will re- 
 main neutral, faihng which Germany must without delay 
 declare war against her. This is a very inconvenient situa- 
 tion for Germany, for it forces upon her the appearance 
 of being the aggressor against France whenever her own 
 mobilization is necessitated by Russia's military prepara- 
 tions. 
 
 It is evident from this review of the military situation of 
 the Continental powers that the decree for general mobil- 
 ization on the part of any one of them must, because of the 
 system of alliances, make almost certain a general Euro- 
 pean conflict. This important fact gives us the explanation 
 why the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of 
 the present war are so intimately related with the question 
 of mobilization. 
 
 3. Intermediate military preparations 
 The country which was able to make the most extensive 
 preparations without the conspicuously hostile act of issu- 
 ing a decree of general mobilization would gain a consider- 
 able advantage from this priority of its military prepara- 
 tions. The operations of mobilization being so extensive 
 and so interrelated with every activity of the community, 
 it is naturally very difficult to specify just where the 
 maintenance of the normal military strength ceases and 
 immediate preparation for war begins. For instance, the 
 purchase of supplies and draft animals is a very important 
 factor in putting a country on a war footing, yet, unaccom- 
 panied by mobilization of troops, it in no way constitutes 
 a menace for a neighboring state. In a time of tension, the 
 various efforts made to strengthen the mihtary, financial, 
 and economic condition of the country are apt to be inter- 
 preted as indicating an intention to have recourse to arms, 
 and these suspicions stimulate similar military prepara- 
 
184 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tions on the other side. Worst of all, this distrust is 
 magnified by the efforts of each Government to conceal 
 whatever preparations it thinks expedient to undertake. 
 It is very possible that the difficulty of gauging exactly 
 what was occurring in Russia caused Germany to use such 
 vigorous language at St. Petersburg, and the Russian Gov- 
 ernment might well consider the threatening tone of the 
 German remonstrance as an indication of a hostile atti- 
 tude. The distrust between France and Germany reached 
 its culmination when Germany declared Kriegsgefahrzu- 
 stand. Although the German Chancellor was careful to 
 explain that this did not constitute mobilization, the 
 French Premier declared that it made it possible to effect 
 important military preparations which appertained to 
 mobilization. The French Premier, M. Viviani, said in his 
 speech to the Chamber of Deputies on August 4: ''We 
 knew that Germany was mobilizing under cover of the 
 'state of danger of war' [Kriegsgefahrzustand]. We learned 
 that six classes of reservists had been called up and that 
 transport was being collected even for those army corps 
 which were stationed a considerable distance from the 
 frontier." (Extract, August 4, F. Y. B. no. 159.) On the 
 other hand, these assertions were contradicted by the Ger- 
 man authorities. No doubt it was impossible for Germany 
 to place herself on a war footing before the issuance of the 
 mobiUzation decree, though she could mass the troops 
 already under arms wherever she considered it advanta- 
 geous. 
 
 4. The fatal succession of mobilizations 
 We can now sum up and apply what has been said about 
 mobilization to the situation just prior to the outbreak of 
 the present war. As a result of actual, suspected, and an- 
 ticipated mobihzations, Germany and Russia had been 
 brought to the brink of war. The hope of preserving peace 
 was gone. The contagion of "mobihtis" had overspread 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 185 
 
 all Europe and threatened to traverse the EngUsh Channel 
 as well. 
 
 To understand this situation, the first and fundamental 
 consideration to keep in view is that Germany, having, as 
 the German Secretary later told the British Ambassador, 
 the speed, would not be likely to allow this advantage to 
 escape her. Even if the German Government sincerely 
 desired peace, the principal hope of success, as soon as 
 war appeared likely or inevitable, lay in taking advantage 
 of her wonderfully perfected plans for mobilization, and 
 striking before her adversaries should be ready. (B. W. P. 
 no. 138.) 
 
 It is evident that this facility of striking before there had 
 been time to organize resistance might be as important for 
 German success as it would be to double the reserves upon 
 which she could draw. Germany has always looked upon 
 this speed in mobilizing as her greatest military asset, 
 and has never felt that she could allow it to be taken from 
 her. Hence, — and mark it well, — the moment she per- 
 ceives mobilization has been begun by either of her neigh- 
 bors, Russia or France, she may be expected to insist that 
 it be arrested, and if her demand is not immediately ac- 
 quiesced in, she is almost certain to declare war with all 
 dispatch. Otherwise every hour's delay will put her more 
 and more at a disadvantage. To allow either Russia or 
 France to commence, continue, and complete mobilization 
 would have bereft Germany of half her strength. 
 
 The second important consideration to bear in mind is 
 that Germany, when confronted with a war against Rus- 
 sia and France combined, could count upon three to five 
 weeks before Russia could complete her mobilization, 
 which would leave Germany ample time to strike France 
 before Russia could complete her preparations, and if suc- 
 cessful in crushing her, transport the German troops to the 
 eastern frontier to attack Russia.^ All the diplomats at the 
 
 ^ It seems from the reports received that Russia succeeded in mobilizing 
 
186 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 various capitals thoroughly understood this situation, for 
 it had been obvious to Europe for years. Therefore Russia 
 was perfectly aware that her mobihzation against Austria 
 might bring on a general European war.^ On the other 
 hand, assuming that Russia did not have such a purpose, if 
 she remained quiescent, she feared that Austria would take 
 advantage of the situation to settle affairs with Servia to 
 the satisfaction of the Dual Monarchy by imposing condi- 
 tions entirely unacceptable to St. Petersburg. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey had recognized the course which Rus- 
 sia must pursue when he declared, on July 25, that 'the 
 sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Aus- 
 trian demand made it almost inevitable that in a very 
 short time both Russia and Austria would have mobilized 
 against each other.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. 
 no. 24.) But this did not prevent the British Ambassador 
 at St. Petersburg from expressing to M. Sazonof the hope 
 that 'the Russian Government would defer the mobihza- 
 tion ukase as long as possible, and not allow troops to 
 cross the frontier even when it was issued.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 44.) 
 
 In the dilemma in which Russia found herself, she tried 
 first to avoid the necessity of mobilizing at all by making 
 it perfectly clear that she would mobilize as soon as Aus- 
 tria attacked Servia. The powers could not consider this 
 anything more than justifiable action to maintain her 
 right to be consulted in the settlement of all Balkan affairs. 
 As was expected, the powers did their best to restrain 
 Austria, even Germany acquiescing to a certain degree in 
 the representations made at Vienna. When, nevertheless, 
 on July 28, Austria partially mobilized (R. O. P. no. 47), 
 as she declared, for an attack upon Servia, Russia con- 
 sidered the mobilization as directed against herself and 
 
 more quickly than was expected. See Professor Hans Delbnick: "Ger- 
 many's Answer," Atlantic Monthly, February, 1915. 
 1 Cf. F. Y. B. nos. 67, 101. 
 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 187 
 
 felt that she must take action. In the hope of not alarming 
 Germany and causing her to make a counter-move, Russia 
 announced, July 29, that she would mobilize her four 
 southern districts lying in the direction of the Austrian 
 frontier. (G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 9; R. O. P. no. 49.) 
 Thereupon Germany, instigated by Austria (A. R. B. nos. 
 42, 48), declared Russia's action unjustifiable, since Aus- 
 tria's mobilization was itself undertaken only in reply to 
 Servian mobilization (R. O. P. no. 51). Von Jagow, German 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had told Sir Edward Gos- 
 chen, two days before, that ' if Russia mobilized only in the 
 south, Germany would not mobilize, but he added that 
 the Russian system of mobilization was so complicated 
 that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization, 
 and that Germany would therefore have to be very careful 
 not to be taken by surprise.' (Modified quotation, July 
 27, B. W. P. no. 43.) When Germany, however, learned of 
 Russia's mobilization in the south against Austria, she 
 notified Russia of her intention to mobilize if Russia did 
 not arrest her military preparation. This threat, instead 
 of deterring Russia, only made her the more anxious to 
 hasten her preparation to complete her armament. (July 
 29, R. 0. P. no. 58.) 
 
 Meantime each Government had been lajdng at the door 
 of another the blame for its own preparations. Russia 
 blamed Austria (R. O. P. no. 51) ; Austria blamed Servia 
 (R. 0. P. no. 51) ; and Germany blamed Russia and France 
 (July 30, B. W. P. nos. 96 and 98). Each in turn explained 
 or denied the truth of the accusations in regard to its own 
 preparations, but was unshaken in assertions regarding 
 the mobilization of its neighbors. Out of this confusion of 
 accusation and counter-accusation one fact was clear, that 
 whoever might be at fault, Europe on a slippery incline was 
 quickly sliding into war, and yet who wanted war? Vienna, 
 perhaps, was enthusiastic for a campaign against Servia, 
 and at Berlin, too, ''Geht's los?" was asked on all sides 
 
188 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 amid suppressed excitement, when the relations with 
 Russia became strained. But all through Germany the 
 people were praying for peace. ^ A vote of the whole Aus- 
 trian people would almost certainly have been overwhelm- 
 ingly against war. Even the German officials admitted 
 that France did not want war. England was doing every- 
 thing to prevent it. And all the time Europe was sUding 
 down the incUne faster and faster, to be engulfed in war. 
 To her statesmen and diplomats alone she looked to save 
 her. First they had tried to prevent the counter-mobihza- 
 tions by restraining Servia, but in the face of Austria's 
 note and her openly avowed intention to chastise Servia, it 
 was impossible to forbid Servia's doing what she could to 
 defend herself, and when she mobilized, the diplomats 
 could not, without the aid of Germany, interfere to re- 
 strain Austria. The eight army corps which she mobihzed 
 were not, as Sir Edward Grey remarked, excessive against 
 400,000 Servians. (B. W. P. no. 110.) 
 
 Once Austria had mobilized these eight army corps, the 
 next move was Russia's. Would she reply in such a way 
 as to bring in Germany? Europe was in suspense. In 1908, 
 Servia had been left unassisted, and had had to agree to I 
 the declaration of March 31, 1909, for Russia had re- 1 
 ceived no encouragement from France or England, while 
 her recent experience in the Far East in the war against , 
 Japan had made her cautious. Now, however, she de- I 
 clared that she would not submit to Austrian dictation 
 again as meekly as she had then done. Had she again been 
 as complaisant, the bipartisan Austro-Russian direction of 
 Balkan affairs would have been replaced by an Austrian 
 hegemony, and Russia's prestige as a great power would 
 have suffered. So France and England, anxious as they 
 
 ^ When we say Germany wanted war or Germany wanted peace, we 
 have" to define what we mean by " Germany" and what we mean by 
 " wanted." Every one wants peace if he can have peace on his own terms. 
 Nine tenths of the people might want peace, yet in a time of crisis it is the 
 great cities that are taken as the interpreters of public opinion. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 189 
 
 were to preserve the peace of Europe, could not advise 
 Russia to remain quiescent while Austria worked her will 
 upon Servia. As Sir Edward Grey told the Austrian Am- 
 bassador at London, on July 23, 'the amount of influence 
 that could be used at St. Petersburg on behalf of patience 
 and moderation would depend upon how reasonable were 
 the Austrian demands and how strong the justification 
 that Austria might have discovered for making her de- 
 mands.' (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 3.) 
 When, however, the astonished diplomats learned the 
 nature of Austria's demands, which she presented without 
 having allowed them to examine the evidence in support 
 of her assertions, Sir Edward Grey expressed the general 
 opinion of the less interested powers, in the remarks he said 
 he purposed to make to the German Ambassador, that 'he 
 felt that, if Russia took the view of the ultimatum which it 
 seemed to him that any power interested in Servia would 
 take, he should be quite powerless, in the face of the terms 
 of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence at 
 St. Petersburg in accordance with Prince Lichnowsky's 
 request made privately some days before.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.) From St. Peters- 
 burg the British Ambassador reported that 'France and 
 Russia were determined to make a strong stand.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.) Nevertheless, the 
 British Ambassador did express to M. Sazonof the earnest 
 hope that ' Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing 
 until Sir Edward had had time to use his influence in favor 
 of peace.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 If Russia had really wanted war, she found it obhgingly 
 thrust upon her in accordance with the famous recipe of 
 Bismarck.^ That she did not, however, want war, we have 
 
 ^ "I liave always opposed the theory which says 'Yes'; not only at the 
 Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty years, in the con- 
 viction that even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced 
 upon one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead 
 
190 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 as evidence the expressed opinion of high German offi- 
 cials ^ and the consensus of pubHc opinion throughout 
 the world; but whether she wished for war or hoped to 
 avoid it, her move in reply to Austria seemed forced upon 
 her. She felt that she must make evident the sincerity of 
 her intentions to protect her vital interests in the Balkans 
 by mobilizing (July 29) her four southern districts in reply 
 to Austria. (G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 9; R. 0. P. no. 
 49.) This move put an end to Austria's hope of being 
 
 to anticipate historical development according to one's own calculation. It 
 is natural that in the staff of the army not only younger active officers, but 
 likewise experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to account 
 the efficiency of the troops led by them, and their own capacity to lead, and 
 of making them prominent in history. It would be a matter of regret if this 
 effect of the military spirit did not exist in the army; the task of keeping its 
 results within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justly claim is the 
 duty of the political, not the military, heads of the state. That at the time 
 of the Luxemburg question, during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchak- 
 o£f and France, and even down to the most recent times, the staff and its 
 leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to endanger peace, lies 
 in the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forego. It only be- 
 comes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion 
 and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences." 
 (Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; being the Reflections and Reminis- 
 cences of Otto Prince von Bismarck, Written and Dictated by Himself after his 
 Retirement from Office. Translated by A. J. Butler. Vol. ii, pp. 101 and 102. 
 London, 1898.) 
 
 Cf. also what Bismarck said in 1888: — 
 
 "This was in 1866, and in 1867 the Luxemburg problem arose, when only 
 a somewhat firmer reply was needed to bring about the great French war 
 in that year, — and we might have given it, if we had been so strong that 
 we could have counted on success. From then on, during 1868, 1869, and 
 up to 1870 we were living in constant apprehension of war, and of the agree- 
 ments which in the time of Mr. von Beust were being made in Salzbiirg and 
 other places between France, Italy, and Austria, and which, we feared, 
 were directed against us. The apprehension of war was so great at that 
 time that I received calls — I was the president of the Cabinet — from 
 merchants and manufacturers, who said : * The uncertainty is unbearable. 
 Why don't you strike the first blow? War is preferable to this continued 
 damper on all business! ' We waited quietly until we were struck, and I be- 
 lieve we did well to arrange matters so that we were the nation which was 
 assailed and were not ourselves the assailants." (Extract from Speech of 
 Bismarck, February 6, 1888, from What Germany Wants, by Edmund von 
 Mach, pp. 92, 93. See also Bismarck's Speech, chap, xlil.) 
 
 * At the beginning of the period of crisis, Germany expressed this opinion. 
 Cf. also F. Y. B. nos. 50, 96. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 191 
 
 permitted to deal with Servia without interference, and 
 made the situation at once most critical. 
 
 As soon as Russia had mobilized, and Austria had re- 
 plied by extending her mobilization to GaUcia it was Ger- 
 many's turn to move. Von Jagow, the German Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs, had declared on July 27, that 
 Germany would not mobilize so long as Russia mobilized 
 only against Austria; that is to say, only in the south (B. 
 W. P. no. 43). It must be observed that if Germany had 
 wanted a general war from the start, she would never have 
 allowed Russia to begin even partial mobilization, even 
 against Austria alone. The statement of Von Jagow above 
 referred to is one of the strongest proofs that the German 
 Foreign Office hoped to avoid war. If she had insisted that 
 no move toward mobiHzation should be made by either 
 Russia or France as long as Germany herself took no action, 
 she would have forced at once the issue of war, or an agree- 
 ment to allow Austria to deal directly with Servia. Pos- 
 sibly she was restrained from taking this stand by the fear 
 that such action would seem so unreasonable as to make 
 it appear that Germany was claiming the right to dictate 
 to Europe. Germany would realize that such a pretense to 
 a Teutonic hegemony of Europe would rally England to 
 the support of the Triple Entente and the maintenance of 
 the balance of power. Whatever the reason, Germany, 
 though she blamed Russia for her unwarranted move and 
 denied that Austria had furnished any motive, did not at 
 first make Russia's mobilization in the south a casus belli. 
 Germany had previously warned Russia that the German 
 Government would have to be very careful not to be taken 
 by surprise. 
 
 On July 29, Germany notified Russia of her intention of 
 mobilizing if Russia did not stop her military preparation. 
 (July 29, R. 0. P. no. 58.) Again it was Russia's move. 
 She might, perhaps, have made a conciliatory reply to 
 Germany. Consider, however, that if Russia had not been 
 
192 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 making the preparations Germany accused her of, she 
 doubtless would think Germany, in making this unfounded 
 charge, was looking for a pretext to declare war, and must 
 have considered it necessary to redouble her efforts to 
 prepare for the conflict. As M. Sazonof said in his an- 
 nouncement respecting the events leading up to the war: 
 ''The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to 
 extend the scope of our precautionary measures." (Ex- 
 tract, August 2, R. 0. P. no. 77.) Almost immediately 
 after this, Germany began to complain that Russia was 
 also mobilizing along the German frontier, and she was 
 troubled by the reports received from France and Russia. 
 Even if the sincerity of these reports should be questioned 
 and later found unsubstantiated, the important point to 
 note was their great significance as indicating on Ger- 
 many's part either a belief that war was inevitable or an 
 intention to make it so. 
 
 According to the dispatch of the Belgian Minister at 
 St. Petersburg, dated July 30, and published in the Ger- 
 man White Book (German Edition, exhibit 28) there had 
 been a difference of opinion in the meeting of the Minis- 
 terial Council which took place at an early hour July 29, 
 and this difference had caused the postponement of mobil- 
 ization. Since then, however, there had been a change of 
 sentiment due to the behef that England would certainly 
 support France. This conviction that England could be 
 relied upon to support the Entente had, according to the 
 Belgian Minister, given the war party the upper hand, and 
 early July 30 (4 a.m.) the general mobihzation of the Rus- 
 sian forces was announced.^ 
 
 ^ M. p. Price in The Diplomatic History of the War (Scribner^s : 1914, 
 p. 103), sums up the results of his very careful and impartial examination 
 of the documents and other sources of information relative to Russia's 
 Mobilization as follows: — 
 
 "Stated concisely, the decision of Russia to mobilize partially was taken 
 on the 24th, directly after the Austrian note to Servia. This was confirmed 
 on the 25th, and during the week-end all military preparations except the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 193 
 
 The next day, July 31, Germany declared Kriegsge- 
 fahrzustand, demanded of France what she intended to 
 do, and delivered her ultimatum to Russia. On August 1, 
 Germany and Russia were in a state of war. 
 
 If Russia, prior to the issuance of her mobilization order, 
 really made the preparations against which Germany pro- 
 tested, the reason must have been either that Russia 
 wanted war or else that she was convinced that Germany 
 was preparing to force the issue. In a situation like that, 
 if either Russia or Germany wanted war, it would have 
 been most difficult to have avoided it. If, on the other hand, 
 neither really wanted to precipitate the conflict, there 
 was room for the mediation of a friend of both parties. 
 England and Italy, though deeply interested and to a 
 certain degree partisan, were nevertheless the only great 
 powers that were not immediately involved. Hence they 
 alone were able to offer some assistance. Even though 
 Russia or Germany, one or both of them, were intent upon 
 war, a possible way out might have been found if Italy and 
 England had been willing to conunit themselves either 
 singly or conjointly by saying at this last moment to Rus- 
 sia: ''Demobilize or at least arrest your preparations, and 
 we will guarantee an adequate consideration for your 
 interests and for the protection of the independence of 
 
 calling up of reservists were made, and partial mobilization orders signed 
 but not issued. In spite of rumors there is no direct evidence that reser- 
 vists were on the move on Monday the 27th. On the 28th several corres- 
 pondents agree that mobilization was in progress, but that it was partial, 
 and one definite statement comes from Renter that a partial mobilization 
 order was issued on the night of the 28th. On the 29th it was officially 
 announced, and all through this day proceeded steadily. Rumors grew 
 that the districts on the German frontier were being affected, but we have 
 only one definite statement to this effect from the Temps on the 29th, and 
 two other less definite ones. On the 30th, late, a general mobilization order 
 was issued, thus bringing officially the whole military machinery of the 
 Empire into action. It may, therefore, be said that Russia began to put 
 her army from a peace to a war footing early in the week that preceded the 
 outbreak of the general European war, gradually extending the operations 
 till by the 31st the whole machinery was in progress." 
 
194 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Servia in any settlement which may result. Otherwise we 
 will join Germany against you. We insist that Germany 
 also arrest her preparations and come into a conference 
 to settle the Austro-Servian question, unless Russia and 
 Austria can settle their differences by direct negotiations 
 according to the usual method!" 
 
 Looking back, we can see that a firm stand taken by 
 England and Italy at this eleventh hour might possibly 
 have avoided the conflict, but independent countries are 
 not willing to involve themselves to such a degree and make 
 it very Ukely that they will be drawn into a war, the pri- 
 mary cause of which did not in the shghtest interest them. 
 WTiat could Sir Edward Grey have said to the British 
 Cabinet, and the Cabinet to Parliament, if by acting with 
 sufficient promptness he had thus involved England in 
 a war? It is just possible that the country might have 
 disavowed him and refused to follow such an adventur- 
 ous policy ; and when Germany had firmly declared that 
 Austria must be left to settle the Austro-Servian dispute 
 without interference, would she have backed down before 
 a threat? And if she had consented, while Russia refused, 
 we should have been treated to the anomalous spectacle of 
 Germany and England combined against France and Rus- 
 sia to humble them after they had made every reasonable 
 effort to preserve the peace threatened by the uncompro- 
 mising stand of Austria, backed by Germany. We may, 
 then, I think, conclude that at this last moment nothing 
 could have been done to intervene between Germany 
 and Russia to break the fateful chain of mobilizations ; and 
 so, uninterrupted, the mobilizations and the futile nego- 
 tiations accompanying them must needs proceed to their 
 termination. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CONCERT 
 
 European diplomacy in the Balkans — Sir Edward Grey proposes a con- 
 ference of the powers — Germany makes objection to mediation — Russia 
 proposes to Austria to enter upon "conversations" — The powers employ 
 their good offices at Vienna and St. Petersburg — Efforts to discover a 
 formula for mediation — Germany asked to "press the button" — The 
 San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Servia's unconditional accept- 
 ance of the ultimatum — The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Aus- 
 tria's occupation of Belgrade — The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty 
 of the powers — Germany asks Russia to propose a formula — Austria 
 agrees to mediation — The failure to reach a compromise. 
 
 1. European diplomacy in the Balkans 
 The ordinary course of procedure, when a diplomatic 
 difficulty has arisen in Europe, has been to submit it form- 
 ally or informally to a conference of the powers. This has 
 been the usual method followed since the establishment of 
 the Concert of Em-ope after the overthrow of Napoleon. 
 In the course of the last hundred years, the powers have 
 taken counsel together from time to time to avoid recourse 
 to arms; and this method of procedure has been consid- 
 ered as peculiarly appropriate whenever affairs of the Near 
 East were concerned. Up to very recent years, the rivalry 
 of England and Russia was focused in the Balkans, and all 
 the threads of European politics were gathered at Constan- 
 tinople ; but Russia was weakened as a result of her war with 
 Japan, and Turkey's affiliation with the Triple Alhance 
 enabled her to check any Muscovite designs upon her capi- 
 tal. These modifications in the political situation relieved 
 England of the burden of checking Russian advance on Con- 
 stantinople. British statesmen could likewise count upon 
 the Balkan States and Russia to thwart any designs Ger- 
 many's ally, Austria, might have on Turkish territory, more 
 particularly on Salonika. England felt sure, in the presence 
 
196 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of the balanced rivalries and immediately conflicting inter- 
 ests of Austria and Russia, that the balance in the Balkans 
 would be maintained. Her diplomatic intervention could 
 always be counted upon to prevent either Austria or Rus- 
 sia from acquiring too great an advantage, but England 
 could be expected to keep her hands ofT unless the influence 
 of either seemed likely to become predominant. This trans- 
 formation and substitution of a bipartisan Austro-Russian 
 supervision of Balkan afTairs, in place of the time-honored 
 Concert of European Powers, explains in part why the last 
 Balkan War was undertaken in open defiance of the pow- 
 ers. The Balkan States found it possible to get between 
 Austria and Russia.^ England made an attempt, it is true, 
 to prevent that conflict, fearing that it might cause a gen- 
 eral Emopean war, but when it resulted in the disruption 
 of Tiu-key by the other Balkan powers, the new situation 
 must have fallen in marvelously with her plans, for the out- 
 come of it was the creation of stronger Balkan States able 
 to offer some resistance to either Russia or Austria and to 
 prevent a possible Austro-Russian partition of the pen- 
 insula. Besides, the weakening of Turkey had left her less 
 valuable as an ally to Germany. Thenceforth the strength- 
 ening of the international control and protection of Con- 
 stantinople would be more necessary than ever to the Turk 
 to resist the ambitious designs of his neighbors. Hence, 
 England, wishing to maintain this condition, was not will- 
 ing to take part in a collective effort to force the Balkan 
 States to disgorge. As a result of these changes, England, 
 having no longer the same immediate concern in Balkan 
 questions, preferred to economize her efforts by leaving 
 them to the obviously inefficient bipartisan control of 
 Austria and Russia. The recognition of this system as part 
 of the Em'opean political situation explains the lack of in- 
 
 ^ In reality Russia sympathized with the Allies, though she continued to 
 cooperate with the other great powers. This explains why the Balkan 
 States were not interfered with. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 197 
 
 terest that England took in the events preceding the pre- 
 sentation of the Austrian ultimatum.^ Even as early as 
 the first week in July, it was recognized by the pubhc in 
 Austria-Hungary, and conceded in government circles 
 elsewhere, that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand must 
 inevitably result in some action against Servia. The unex- 
 pected harshness of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum 
 at once made it evident that Austria intended to break 
 with the policy of bipartisan control of Balkan questions, 
 at least as far as Servia was concerned. The danger of a 
 general war at once loomed up threateningly. 
 
 In their efforts to preserve peace, the corps of diplomats, 
 like an army, took up the simultaneous defense of their 
 strongest points, and as one after another fell before the 
 advance of war, they transferred their forces to the re- 
 doubts still remaining. When they had failed to secure 
 an extension of the time limit, they tried to prevent the 
 outbreak of hostihties between Austria and Servia, and to 
 prevail upon Austria to make the Servian reply the basis 
 of negotiations between herself and Russia. WTien these 
 attempts had ended in failure, they returned to the sug- 
 gestion made at the very first : to refer the dispute to the 
 mediation of the powers less directly interested in the 
 Balkan question, in the hope of preventing an immediate 
 clash between Austria and Russia. It will be of interest to 
 trace these successive steps. 
 
 2. Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers 
 In a conversation with the Austrian Ambassador at 
 London, following his communication of the Austrian ulti- 
 matum, and the reasons leading up to it. Sir Edward Grey 
 
 ^ This is a real weakness in England's Balkan policy — of trying to 
 shelve responsibility so as to avoid l)eing drawn into some future altercation 
 over a Balkan question. In point of fact, this action left it to Russia to take 
 up the care of British interests, and, as there is not the same confidence in 
 Russia as in England, it made the diplomacy of the Balkans still more difiB- 
 cult and perilous, as the result showed. 
 
198 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ended by saying that 'doubtless they should enter into 
 an exchange of views with other powers, and that they 
 must await their views as to what could be done to miti- 
 gate the difficulties of the situation.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 24, B. W. P. no. 5.) 
 
 That same day (July 24) Sir Edward Grey told the 
 French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, that 'during the 
 afternoon he was to see the German Ambassador, who 
 some days ago had asked him privately to exercise a mod- 
 erating influence in St. Petersburg; and his intention was 
 to say to him that, of course, if the presentation of the ulti- 
 matum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria 
 and Russia, the British Government need not concern it- 
 self therein; but that if Russia took the view of the Aus- 
 trian ultimatum, which it seemed to him that any power 
 interested in Servia would take, he would be quite power- 
 less, in the face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise 
 any moderating influence. He would say that he thought 
 the only chance of any mediating or moderating influ- 
 ence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and 
 Great Britain, who had no direct interests in Servia, should 
 act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously, in Vi- 
 enna and St. Petersburg. 
 
 ' M. Cambon repUed that, if there was a chance of medi- 
 ation by the four powers, he had no doubt his Government 
 would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that they 
 could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had 
 expressed some opinion or taken some action. But when 
 two days had gone by, Austria would march into Servia, 
 for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian de- 
 mand ; and Russia would be compelled by her public opin- 
 ion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia; 
 therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would 
 be too late for any mediation. 
 
 'Sir Edward Grey said that he had not contemplated 
 anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was 
 
,THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 199 
 
 clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Rus- 
 sia. His thought was that if Austria did move into Servia, 
 and Russia then mobihzed, it would be possible for the four 
 powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia 
 also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be es- 
 sential, for such a step to have any chance of success, that 
 Germany should participate in it. 
 
 'M. Cambon considered that it would be too late after 
 Austria had once moved against Servia. The important 
 thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best 
 chance of this being accepted would be that Germany 
 should propose it to the other powers. 
 
 'Sir Edward Grey understood M. Cambon to mean a 
 mediation between Austria and Servia.^ 
 
 'M. Cambon repHed that that had been his mean- 
 ing. 
 
 ' And Sir Edward Grey said that he would talk to the 
 German Ambassador that afternoon on the subject.' (Mod- 
 ified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.) 
 
 This extract from the British WTiite Paper gives, like an 
 overture to a tragedy, a presage of the subsequent events. 
 We note how England is not concerned unless the presen- 
 tation of the note leads to trouble with Russia, yet Sir 
 Edward Grey could not consider it as in conformity with 
 due respect for Russia's legitimate and vital interests to 
 exercise diplomatic pressure and ''moderating influence" 
 to restrain her freedom of action in the face of such a note. 
 Sir Edward considered that the only hope of peace was 
 
 ' It would seem that the first idea of France and Russia was to suggest 
 that England mediate between Austria and Servia. This is borne out by M. 
 Bienvenu-Martin's telegram, in which he states that Sazonof had advised 
 the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Govern- 
 ment, and instructs the French Charg6 to urge the British Government to 
 accept. (July 26, F. Y. B. no. 53; cf. F. Y. B. no. 50.) It appears, however, 
 that Servia was disposed to appeal to the powers, and that when Sir Edward 
 Grey learned of this from St. Petersburg, he adopted the idea and proposed 
 a conference of the four powers. (July 27, F. Y. B. no. 68; cf. F. Y. B. no. 
 69; S. B. B. no. 35.) 
 
200 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 mediation of the four less interested powers simultaneously 
 at Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
 
 M. Cambon agreed to the idea of mediation, but thought 
 it would savor of pohtical dictation to interfere at St. 
 Petersburg before Russia had given some sign; yet before 
 she had had time to do so and the powers to offer their 
 mediation, the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum would 
 have expired, and since the Servians could not accept the 
 Austrian terms, Austria would force Russia to take action. J 
 It would then be too late for mediation. * 
 
 Sir Edward Grey foresaw this, but hoped that the medi- 
 ation of the four powers might prevail on Austria and 
 Russia to arrest their advance; but he recognized that Ger- 
 many's cooperation was essential to the success of the plan. 
 
 M. Cambon feared, and the event proved the truth of 
 his fear, that it would be too late for successful mediation 
 once Austria had attacked Servia. The mediation between 
 Austria and Servia seemed to him to offer the best chance 
 of success, especially if proposed by Germany, and Sir 
 Edward promised to talk the matter over with the German 
 Ambassador. 
 
 Assuming that France and her ambassador were sin- 
 cerely desirous of avoiding war, it is difficult to understand 
 why M. Cambon thought that Germany would be willing 
 to make such a proposal to Austria, when the very terms of 
 the ultimatum seemed to indicate that every precaution 
 had been taken to forestall any attempt at mediation be- 
 tween Austria and Servia. As for Germany's making the 
 proposal, what was meant evidently was that Germany 
 should be invited to invite the powers to invite Austria and 
 Servia to accept their mediation. In this way, Austria 
 would have the guaranty of Germany that she would re- 
 ceive an equitable treatment, and the fact of Germany's 
 making the suggestion would avoid any appearance of 
 compulsion on Austria with consequent loss of prestige. 
 
 That same day, Sir Edward Grey accordingly repeated 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 201 
 
 to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, 
 almost the same views in almost the identical words that 
 had just passed between him and M. Cambon; and Lich- 
 nowsky on his part urged the necessity of securing as 
 favorable a reply as possible from Servia. (July 24, B. W. 
 P. no. 11.) 
 
 M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 thought that 'in event of the Austrians attacking Servia, 
 the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and 
 withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at 
 the same time appeal to the powers to help them. He was 
 in favor of their making this appeal, and would like to see 
 the question placed on an international footing, as the 
 obligations taken by Servia in 1909, to which reference 
 was made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to 
 Austria, but to the powers. 
 
 'If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be 
 quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the 
 hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was 
 possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to sub- 
 mit the question to arbitration.' (Modified quotation, July 
 25, B. W. P. no. 17 ; cf . F. Y. B. no. 26.) These words of the 
 Russian Minister forecast the Servian reply and show how 
 earnestly Russia was working for peace. 
 
 When the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg 'ex- 
 pressed his earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate 
 war by mobilizing until Sir Edward Grey had time to use 
 his influence in favor of peace, M. Sazonof assured him 
 that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and that she 
 would take no action until it was forced upon her, though 
 Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She 
 aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Bal- 
 kans and estabUshing her own hegemony there. He did not 
 beheve Germany really wanted war, but her attitude would 
 be decided by that of England.' (Modified quotation, July 
 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 
202 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador at London was authorized to 
 inform Sir Edward Grey that 'the Austrian method of 
 procedure on expiration of the time Umit would be to break 
 off diplomatic relations and conunence military prepara- 
 tions, but not military operations.' Sir Edward Grey, in- 
 forming the German Ambassador, ' said this interposed, as 
 he had urged, a state of mobilization before the frontier 
 was actually crossed.' Assured of this. Sir Edward 'felt 
 that he had no title to intervene between Austria and 
 Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between 
 Austria and Russia the peace of Europe was affected, in 
 which case all the powers must take a hand.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 25.) In other words, Eng- 
 land could resume her former position that she was not 
 concerned in a dispute confined to the Balkans, and could \ 
 employ all her diplomatic efforts directly to eliminating j 
 any cause of dispute between Russia and Austria, with the , 
 object of preventing an outbreak between them. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey impressed upon the German Ambasss 
 dor at London that ' in the event of Russian and Austriai 
 mobilization, the participation of Germany would be es-| 
 sential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone, Englanc 
 could do nothing. The French Government were traveling 
 at the moment, and he had had no time to consult them,] 
 and could not, therefore, be sure of their views, but he we 
 prepared, if the German Government agreed with his sug- 
 gestion, to tell the French Government that he thought it 
 the right thing to act upon.' (Modified quotation, July 25,| 
 B. W. P. no. 25; see also R. O. P. no. 22.) In so doing, Sii 
 Edward Grey practically offered to make himself suretj 
 that France would accept the proposed mediation by the 
 four powers if Germany would agree. It is to be remem^ 
 bered that this offer came when there might have beer 
 some fear of Russia's also throwing obstacles in the way of 
 settling the Russo-Austrian difference through mediation^ 
 England was asking the closest friend and ally of each of 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 203 
 
 the principals in dispute to agree to mediation, naturally 
 expecting each one to use its influence to bring the princi- 
 pals to accept this method of procedure. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, in a telegram (July 25) informing the 
 British Ambassador at St. Petersburg of the view he took 
 of the situation, said: ''The sudden, brusque, and peremp- 
 tory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost 
 inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Aus- 
 tria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, 
 the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other 
 four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian 
 Goverimients not to cross the frontier, and to give time for 
 the four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try 
 and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I 
 feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. 
 Italy would no doubt gladly cooperate. No diplomatic 
 interv^ention or mediation would be tolerated by either 
 Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and in- 
 cluded the allies or friends of both. The cooperation of 
 Germany would, therefore, be essential." (Extract, July 
 25, B. W. P. no. 24; cf. F. Y. B. no. 50.) 
 
 July 26, Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambas- 
 sadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs whether 'he would be disposed that his 
 ambassador at London join with the representatives of 
 England and the other powers for the purpose of discover- 
 ing an issue which would prevent comphcations. If the 
 minister consented to do so, it was suggested that the rep- 
 resentatives of these powers should, at the same time that 
 they notified the Governments at Belgrade, Vienna, and 
 St. Petersburg, be authorized to request that all active 
 military operations be suspended pending the results of the 
 conference.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 
 36.) 
 
 France agreed to this proposal of Sir Edward Grey's, and 
 sent instructions 'to the French Ambassador at Berlin to 
 
204 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 concert with his British colleague as to the advisabihty of 
 their speaking jointly to the German Government. The 
 French Government remarked, however, that until it was 
 known that the Germans had spoken at Vienna with some 
 success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry for Foreign 
 Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Italian,^ and British 
 Ambassadors to do so.' (Modified quotation, July 27, 
 B. W. P. nos. 42, 51.) 
 
 In confirmation, the French Embassy at London com- 
 municated on the day following a note declaring: ''The 
 Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's 
 proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, 
 France, Germany, and Italy, with a view to avoiding ac- 
 tive miUtary operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, 
 and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to 
 take part in the deliberations of the four representatives 
 at the meeting which is to be held in London." ^ (Extract, 
 July 28, B. W. P. no. 52.) 
 
 Italy likewise agreed, and the ' Marquis di San GiuUano 
 was ready to recommend warmly to the German Govern- 
 ment the suggestion of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia 
 to suspend military operations pending the results of the 
 conference' (modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 49), 
 and telegraphed an acceptance of Sir Edward Grey's pro- 
 posal.3 (July 26, B. W. P. no. 35.) 
 
 * The British White Paper has "Russian," perhaps meaning "Italian." 
 2 The French note calls the action intervention, but if Germany con- 
 sented, it could hardly have been anything but mediation. 
 
 * Sir Edward Grey, in a dispatch of July 28, to the British Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg, stated: "I am ready to put forward any practical proposal 
 that would facilitate this [direct exchange of views], but I am not quite 
 clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the 
 Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange 
 of views with Austria his willingness to cooperate in some such scheme? 
 It might then take more concrete shape." (Extract July 28, B. W. P. no. 
 69.) This suggestion is referred to in B. W. P. no. 78, where M. Sazonof 
 says he thinks the proposal "was one of secondary importance." This may 
 have some relation to M. Jules Cambon's remarks about collective action 
 in Servia. (F. Y. B. no. 92.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 205 
 
 S. Germany makes objection to mediation 
 In the case of a serious difference between two states it 
 has been generally acknowledged that it falls to the part of 
 third states to try to help the states at variance to come to 
 some agreement which will be acceptable to both sides and 
 preserve the peace. The first step is for a friendly power or 
 powers to employ its good offices, which simply means to 
 take whatever informal and friendly diplomatic means it 
 considers will be helpful. When a third state is on most 
 cordial footing with both states it may perhaps make in- 
 formal suggestions, or the parties may decide to entrust the 
 question to the mediation of the third state. Such media- 
 tion, if agreed to, only means that the parties are prepared 
 to consider carefully and in conciliatory spirit any sugges- 
 tion which their common friend may put forward as a basis 
 of agreement or compromise. Neither party is bound to 
 accept the proposal ; but consideration for the friendly ac- 
 tion of the mediator does exercise a certain moral pres- 
 sure upon the parties, so that in certain instances a state 
 may prefer to retain its entire liberty of action by refus- 
 ing to accept offers of mediation. Under the guise of media- 
 tion, one or more third states may really dictate a solution, 
 but whenever there is any exercise of pressure, mediation 
 ceases and intervention takes place. ^ The facility with 
 which intervention is disguised under a cloak of mediation 
 is another reason why states are very cautious in accepting 
 it when proffered. 
 
 Recourse to mediation in the case of a conflict such as 
 that between Austria and Servia would ordinarily have 
 followed the rupture of negotiations, and when the Aus- 
 trian Minister withdrew from Belgrade, Servia did ap- 
 peal to the mediation of the powers; but Austria had let 
 it be known for weeks preceding the presentation of her 
 
 ^ If the pressure goes no further than diplomatic pressure, it is called 
 diplomatic intervention. 
 
206 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ultimatum that she intended to settle her difference with 
 Servia alone. ^ There was, however, another basis of medi- 
 ation, which was to prevent an Austro-Russian conflict 
 resulting from Austria's enforcing of her demands against 
 Servia. Whether the mediation was between Austria and 
 Servia, or between Austria and Russia, it was evident that 
 it had no chance of success without the cooperation of 
 Germany (B. W. P. no. 25), for even though Italy was 
 Austria's ally, they had such serious grounds of differ- 
 ence as to make impossible any real sympathy between 
 them. Accordingly, Sir Edward Grey, confident that he 
 could rely upon the support of the other powers, Russia 
 included, launched his proposal for an ambassadorial con- 
 ference at London. The invitation as issued had not 
 stated whether the mediatory action was to be between 
 Austria and Servia, or between Austria and Russia. Sir 
 Edward had simply asked the representatives of the less 
 interested powers to meet at London in a conference 
 ''for the purpose of discovering an issue which would 
 prevent compUcations " (July 26, B. W. P. no. 36); but 
 that mediation was to include all three of the states imme- 
 diately concerned is indicated by the suggestion that the 
 powers accepting should 'authorize their representatives 
 at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to request that all 
 active military preparations should be suspended pending 
 the result of the conference.' (Modified quotation, July 
 26, B. W. P. no. 36; cf. F. Y. B. no. 76.) 
 
 M. Viviani, French Premier and Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, returning from Russia on the France, had learned 
 from telegrams received at Copenhagen and a wireless dis- 
 patch from the Eiffel Tower of the "twofold English pro- 
 posal," received July 28. He telegraphed in reply: "I 
 entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir Edward 
 
 1 The publication of the French Yellow Book shows the pains the Entente 
 Powers took to impress upon Austria directly and through Germany that 
 she ought not to have recourse to force, and that she should show modera- 
 tion in dealing with Servia. (Cf. F. Y. B., nos. 10, 15, 17.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 207 
 
 Grey, and I am asking M. Paul Cambon directly to ac- 
 quaint him with this fact." (Extract, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 
 76.) 
 
 The Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs, informed the British Ambassador at Rome 
 that he ' greatly doubted whether Germany would be will- 
 ing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending 
 the conference, but he had hopes that military action 
 might be practically deferred by the fact of the conference 
 meeting at once.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. 
 no. 57.) 
 
 In reply to Sir Edward Grey's statement to the German 
 Ambassador at London, Prince Lichnowsky, on July 24, 
 that ' if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to 
 trouble between Austria and Russia he had no concern with 
 it' (modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 11), the Ger- 
 man Chancellor (in a telegram to Prince Lichnowsky) 
 agreed that ' the distinction made by Sir Edward Grey be- 
 tween the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict was 
 quite correct. Germany wished as little as England to mix 
 in an Austro-Servian dispute; and first and last, took the 
 ground that this question must be localized by the absten- 
 tion of all the powers from intervention in it. It was, there- 
 fore, their earnest hope that Russia would refrain from any 
 active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of 
 the seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dis- 
 pute should arise, they were ready, with the reservation of 
 their known duties as aUies, to cooperate with the other 
 great powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 13.) Sim- 
 ilarly Von Jagow told the British Charg^ at Berlin that ' if 
 the relations between Austria and Russia became threat- 
 ening, he was quite ready to fall in with Sir Edward's sug- 
 gestion as to the four powers working in favor of modera- 
 tion at Vienna and St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.) 
 
208 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 On July 27, — that is, the day after Sir Edward Grey 
 instructed the British representatives to extend to the 
 powers the invitation to the ambassadorial conference, — 
 the German Chancellor telegraphed Lichnowsky, the Ger- 
 man Ambassador at London: ''Nothing is known here as 
 yet concerning a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey to hold a 
 quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to 
 drag our ally before a European court for the settlement of 
 her difference with Servia. Our mediatory activity must 
 be confined to the danger of a Russo-Austrian conflict."^ 
 (July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 12; cf. A. R. B. no. 35.) 
 
 Later that same day, when the proposal was officially 
 presented, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Af- 
 fairs, Von Jagow, declined it, saying that 'a conference 
 such as Sir Edward Grey suggested would practically 
 amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opin- 
 ion, be called together except at the request of Austria and 
 Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with Sir Edward's 
 suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the 
 maintenance of peace. Sir Edward Goschen said that he 
 was sure that Sir Edward Grey's idea had nothing to do 
 with arbitration, but meant that the representatives of the 
 four nations not directly interested should discuss and sug- 
 gest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. Von Jagow 
 maintained, however, that such a conference as Sir Edward 
 Grey proposed was not practicable, and added that news he 
 had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was 
 an intention on the part of M. Sazonof to exchange views 
 with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of 
 procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it 
 would be best, before doing anything else, to await the out- 
 
 ^ The French Charg^ at London informed his Government: "It would 
 be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, 
 Austria, and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir 
 A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who 
 has shown himself favorable to it." (Extract, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 68; cf. 
 F. Y. B. no. 69.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 209 
 
 come of the exchange of views between the Austrian and 
 Russian Governments.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. 
 W. P. no. 43; cf. B. W. P. no. 67; F. Y. B. no. 73; B. G. P. 
 no. 6.) 
 
 The same day the French Ambassador at Berlin argued 
 forcibly to prevail upon Germany to agree to the quad- 
 ruple mediation and tactfully proposed 'that the powers 
 advise Vienna ''to abstain from any act which might ag- 
 gravate the situation at the present hour," as this veiled 
 formula obviated the need of mentioning the necessity of 
 refraining from invading Servia; but Von Jagow returned a 
 categorical refusal to the proposal, in spite of the insistence 
 of the French Ambassador, who pointed out the advantage 
 of this suggestion in that the powers would be so grouped 
 as to avoid the opposing of the Alliance by the Entente, of 
 which Von Jagow himself had so often complained.' (Mod- 
 ified quotation, July 27, R. 0. P. no. 39; cf. F. Y. B. no. 74; 
 R. 0. P. no. 34.) 
 
 In reference to the English proposal, M. Jules Cambon, 
 French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to his Government, 
 on July 28 : — 
 
 "I to-day supported the step of my British colleague 
 with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as 
 he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that he could not possibly 
 accept the idea of a sort of conference in London between 
 the ambassadors of four powers, and that another form 
 would have to be given to the British suggestion if it were 
 to be realizable. I pointed out the danger of a delay which 
 might lead to war, and asked him if he wanted war. He 
 protested, and added that direct conversations between 
 Vienna and St. Petersburg were begun, and that from now 
 on he expected a favorable result. The British and Italian 
 Ambassadors came together to see me this morning, in 
 order to discuss with me the conversations they had yes- 
 terday with Herr Von Jagow on the subject of Sir Edward 
 Grey's proposal. The Secretary of State said, on the whole. 
 
210 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 pretty much what he said to me; he accepted the prin- 
 ciple of joining in a demarche common to Italy, England, 
 and ourselves, but rejected all idea of a conference. We 
 are of opinion, my colleagues and I, that there is in this 
 nothing but a question of form, and the British Ambas- 
 sador is going to suggest to his Government that it should 
 give another label to its proposal, which might take the 
 character of a diplomatic demarche in Vienna and in St. 
 Petersburg." (Extract, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 81.) 
 
 The German Chancellor sent word to Sir Edward Grey 
 that 'he had not been able to accept his proposal for a 
 conference of representatives of the great powers because 
 he did not think that it would be effective, and because 
 such a conference would in his opinion have had the ap- 
 pearance of an "Areopagus," consisting of two powers of 
 each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining 
 powers.' ^ (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 71; 
 cf. G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 8.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey attempted to remove the German 
 objection to the proposed mediation by declaring that 'it 
 would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal 
 discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for 
 a settlement. No suggestion would, it was declared, be 
 put forward that had not previously been ascertained to 
 be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the medi- 
 ating powers could easily keep in touch through their 
 respective allies.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. 
 no. 67; cf. B. W. P. no. 43.) 
 
 After the first breakdown of direct conversations between 
 Austria and Russia the German Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg reported to his Government that 'when the Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs tried to persuade him that he 
 should urge his Government to participate in a quadruple 
 conference for the purpose of finding means to induce Aus- 
 tria to forego those demands which affected Servian sover- 
 
 * See statement in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, September 25, 1914. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 211 
 
 eignty, he had pointed out how Russia was asking Ger- 
 many to take in regard to Austria the very action which 
 the latter was blamed for taking against Servia, i.e., a vio- 
 lation of her sovereignty.' ^ (Modified quotation, G. W. 
 B. Memorandum, pp. 9-10.) 
 
 In view of this attitude on the part of the German 
 Government, it is hard to understand what Prince Lich- 
 nowsky meant when he informed Sir Edward Grey (July 
 27) that 'the German Government accepted in principle 
 mediation between Austria and Russia by the four powers. 
 At the same time, he urged Sir Edward to use his influence 
 at St. Petersburg to localize the war and keep the peace of 
 Europe. To which the British Secretary replied that if 
 Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing 
 and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined 
 to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the conse- 
 quences that might be involved. The Servian reply should 
 at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. Sir 
 Edward said that the German Government should urge 
 this at Vienna. Continuing, he recalled what the German 
 Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if 
 the war could not be localized, and observed that if Ger- 
 many assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, 
 without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Ger- 
 many could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so, 
 other issues might be raised that would supersede the dis- 
 pute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other 
 powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; 
 but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace, Sir 
 Edward said he would keep closely in touch. He repeated 
 that after the Servian reply, it was at Vienna that some 
 moderation must be urged.' (Modified quotation, July 27, 
 B. W. P. no. 46; cf. F. Y. B. no. 66.) The emphatic, almost 
 threatening, manner in which Sir Edward Grey spoke 
 
 1 For M. Sazonof's account of this interview see R. 0. P. no. 49; B. W. P. 
 
 no. 93 (2). 
 
212 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 seems to have borne fruit, for the German Ambassador was 
 not long in informing him that ' the German Government 
 had taken action in the sense of their conversation.' (Mod- 
 ified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 67.) 
 
 In reply. Count Berchtold requested the German Am- 
 bassador at Vienna, Von Tchirsky, to express to Von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg his thanks for the communication of 
 the English proposal of mediation on the basis of the 
 Servian note, but he added that, ' after the commencement 
 of hostilities by Servia and Austria's subsequent declara- 
 tion of war, the step appeared belated.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 16; cf. B. W. P. no. 76; 
 A. R. B. nos. 43, 44.) 
 
 That same day, July 28, 'the Enghsh Ambassador at 
 Vienna, in a most tactful manner and avoiding the word 
 mediation, spoke directly to the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs of Sir Edward Grey's hopes that conversations in 
 London between the four less interested powers might 
 yet lead to an arrangement which the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government could accept as satisfactory and as rendering 
 actual hostilities unnecessary. He also said that Sir Ed- 
 ward regarded the Servian reply as having gone far to 
 meet Austria's just demands and that he thought it con- 
 stituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike 
 operations might remain in abeyance. Count Berchtold 
 replied that no discussion would be accepted on the basis 
 of the Servian note, that war would have to be declared, 
 and that it was a matter that must be settled directly be- 
 tween the parties immediately concerned.' ^ (Modified quo- 
 tation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 62.) 
 
 ^ Count Berchtold, according to the Austrian Red Book (no. 41), said 
 in part: "Sir Edward Grey's suggestions concerning the possibility of prei 
 venting an outbreak of hostilities are somewhat belated, since, as early ; 
 yesterday, the Servians opened fire on our frontier-guards, and also 
 cause we declared war upon Servia to-day. Referring to the idea of an ex- 
 change of views on the basis of the Servian response, I have to decline the 
 suggestion. We demanded an unqualified acceptance. Servia has endeavored 
 to extricate herself from an embarrassing situation by means of quibbles. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 213 
 
 In fine, Germany took the stand that she could not 
 bring pressure to bear to induce Austria to accept the 
 mediation of the powers, since Austria had been obUged 
 to take action in consequence of the unjustifiable conduct 
 of Servia. After Austria had declared that the settlement 
 of the dispute must be left to the parties concerned, — that 
 is to say to Austria and Servia, — Germany felt that the 
 prestige of her ally would suffer should she yield on that 
 point. 'Besides, Germany felt that she had to be very 
 careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that she 
 was being pressed would be likely to cause her to pre- 
 cipitate matters and place them in the presence of a fait 
 accompli. The German Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs was not sure, he said, that his communication 
 to Austria of Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that the Serv- 
 ian reply should serve as a basis for discussion had not had 
 such a result in hastening the declaration of war.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 76; cf. F. Y. B. no. 
 11; R. 0. P. no. 51; B. W. P. no. 107.) 
 
 4. Russia proposes to Austria to enter upon '^ conversations^^ 
 
 While Sir Edward Grey had been making the effort to 
 constitute a mediatory conference, the Russian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs had been attempting to reach a solu- 
 tion by direct negotiations with Austria. 
 
 On July 26, the day following Austria's rupture of dip- 
 lomatic relations with Servia, the French Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg sent the following report of M. Sazonof's 
 efforts at conciliation : — 
 
 "The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praise- 
 worthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peace- 
 ful solution. ' I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to 
 the last instant,' he said to me. 
 
 ''It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szapary 
 
 With such tactics we are only too familiar." (Extract, July 28, A. R. B. 
 no. 41.) 
 
214 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 [Austrian Ambassador] to come and see him for a ' frank 
 and loyal explanation.' In his presence M. Sazonof dis- 
 cussed the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by arti- 
 cle, showing clearly the insulting character of the different 
 clauses. 'The intention which inspired this document,' he 
 said, 'is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the 
 protection of your territory against the agitation of Serv- 
 ian anarchists, but the step to which you have had re- 
 course is not defensible.' He concluded, 'Take back your 
 ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee the re- 
 sult.' 
 
 "The Austrian Ambassador appeared to be touched by 
 his language, but pending instructions he reserved the 
 opinion of his Government. M. Sazonof, without being 
 discouraged, has decided to suggest this evening to Count 
 Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between 
 Vienna and St. Petersburg with regard to the changes to 
 be made in the ultimatum. This friendly and semi-official 
 interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has 
 the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore think it 
 preferable to any other procedure, and I think it is likely 
 to succeed." (July 26, F. Y. B. no. 54.) 
 
 July 26, M. Sazonof, informing the Russian Ambas- 
 sador at Vienna of this same conversation which he had 
 had with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, said 
 that 'in the interest of the preservation of peace, which, 
 according to the Ambassador's statements, was precious 
 to Austria in the same degree as to all the powers, it would 
 be necessary to put a stop as soon as possible to the 
 strained situation of the moment. With this object in 
 view, it seemed very desirable that the Ambassador of 
 Austria-Hungary should be authorized to enter into an 
 exchange of private views with him, with the object of 
 making in common an alteration (remaniemeni) of some 
 of the clauses of the Austrian note. This proceeding would, 
 the Russian Minister thought, perhaps permit of finding a 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 215 
 
 formula acceptable for Servia while at the same time giving 
 satisfaction to Austria as to the basis of her demands. Ac- 
 cordingly he instructed the Russian Ambassador to enter 
 into prudent and friendly explanation with Count Berch- 
 told in conformity with these views.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 26, R. O. P. no. 25; cf. R. 0. P. no. 26; B. W. P. 
 no. 56.) 
 
 As soon as the Russian Ambassador at London learned 
 of M. Sazonof's proposal, he telegraphed the Minister: — 
 
 "Pray telegraph me if in your opinion your direct pour- 
 parlers with the Cabinet of Vienna are in hne with Grey's 
 proposal concerning the mediation of the four Govern- 
 ments. Having learned from the Ambassador of England 
 at St. Petersburg that you were disposed to accept this 
 combination, Grey decided to give it the form of an official 
 proposal, which he made last night to Berlin, Paris, and 
 Rome." (Extract, July 27, R. 0. P. no. 31.) 
 
 The British White Paper does not appear to contain any 
 record of Russia's having given her assent to the British 
 mediation proposal before it was officially presented, but 
 M. Sazonof had said to the British Ambassador, July 25 : 
 "If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be 
 quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the 
 hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy." (Extract, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) Sir Edward Grey had also that 
 same day, July 25, sent to Sir George Buchanan, the Brit- 
 ish Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the telegram express- 
 ing his view, as we have seen, to the effect that 'the sud- 
 den, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian 
 demarche made it almost inevitable that in a very short 
 time both Russia and Austria would have mobihzed 
 against each other. In that event, the only chance of 
 peace, in Sir Edward's opinion, was for the other four 
 powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Govern- 
 ments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the 
 four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try to 
 
216 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 arrange matters. If Germany would adopt that view, he 
 felt strongly that France and England should act upon it. 
 Italy would no doubt gladly cooperate. No diplomatic 
 intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either 
 Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and in- 
 cluded the allies or friends of both. The cooperation of 
 Germany would, therefore, be essential.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 24.) 
 
 July 27, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador 
 at St. Petersbiu-g, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that M. 
 Sazonof ' said that he did not know whether Austria would 
 accept the friendly exchange of views which he had pro- 
 posed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact 
 with the other powers throughout the conversations that 
 would ensue. He again referred to the fact that the obhga- 
 tions undertaken by Servia in 1909,^ alluded to in the 
 Austrian ultimatum, were given to the powers. The Am- 
 bassador then asked him if he had heard of Sir Edward 
 Grey's proposal with regard to a conference of the four 
 powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, Sir George 
 told him confidentially of Sir Edward's instructions to 
 him, and inquired whether instead of such a conference 
 he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had 
 proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom Sir George 
 had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that 
 a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to 
 Austria-Hungary. 
 
 *M. Sazonof replied that he was perfectly ready to 
 stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a con- 
 ference, but he trusted that Sir Edward Grey would keep 
 in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its 
 taking place.^ (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. 
 no. 55.) 
 
 I The text of the British White Paper has 1908. 
 
 * The Russian Minister lost valuable time in not at once throwing his 
 whole influence on the side of Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 217 
 
 The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the 
 Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris of this inter- 
 view with the British Ambassador in the following 
 terms : — 
 
 ''The Ambassador of England called to ascertain if we 
 thought it useful that England should take the initiative 
 in convoking at London a conference of the representatives 
 of England, France, Germany, and Italy, in order to study 
 a solution of the present situation. 
 
 "I repHed to the Ambassador that I had opened pour- 
 parlers with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under 
 conditions that I hope are favorable. However, I have not 
 yet received a reply to the proposal I made for a revision 
 of the note between the two Cabinets. 
 
 " If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna prove 
 impracticable, I am ready to accept the Enghsh proposal 
 or any other calculated to bring about a favorable solu- 
 tion of the conflict." (July 27, R. 0. P. no. 32.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey showed a total absence of pique that 
 his formal proposal should be set aside ^ and telegraphed 
 the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg: — 
 
 but, no doubt, he felt that Austria's ignoring of recognized Russian inter- 
 ests in the Balkans would, if allowed to pass unopposed, affect Russia's 
 prestige. Even though the united influence of the powers in conclave should 
 prevent a war, it would appear that they, and not Russia, were the pro- 
 tectors of the small states of the Balkans against Austrian aggression. M. 
 Sazonof's last remark about "keeping in touch" shows some apprehension 
 lest the quadruple intervention might impose a solution objectionable 
 to Russia. It may have been an appeal to England to protect Russia's 
 interests in case of mediation. 
 
 1 On July 27, Sir Edward Grey made a statement in the House of Com- 
 mons in regard to the European situation and the steps the British Govern- 
 ment was taking to preserve the peace. He concluded as follows: — 
 
 " The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to 
 take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of 
 trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters 
 are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that is 
 unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, 
 assuming that the text of the Servian reply as published this morning in 
 the press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a 
 basis on which a friendly and impartial group of powers, including powers 
 
218 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 "It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct 
 exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Gov- 
 ernments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th of July. 
 
 "I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that 
 would facihtate this, but I am not quite clear as to what 
 the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the 
 Ministers at Belgrade ^ should do. Could he not first men- 
 tion in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to 
 cooperate in some such scheme? It might then take more 
 concrete shape." (July 28, B. W. P. nos. 69, 78.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey also informed Sir Edward Goschen 
 at Berlin of his agreement with the views expressed by the 
 German Government ' that a direct exchange of views be- 
 tween Austria and Russia was the most preferable method 
 of all, and as long as there was any prospect of such an 
 exchange, he said he would suspend every other sugges- 
 tion.' 2 (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 67; cf. 
 B. W. P. no. 68.) 
 
 As early as July 23, before he knew the terms of the 
 Austrian note. Sir Edward Grey had said to the Austrian 
 Ambassador at London that he 'hoped very much that, 
 if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able 
 in the first instance to discuss them directly with each 
 other'; and the Austrian Ambassador had replied that 'he 
 
 who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should 
 be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable. 
 
 "It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that 
 the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and 
 Servia and becomes one in which another great power is involved, it can 
 but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of 
 Europe at one blow; no one can say what would be the limit of the issues 
 that might be raised by such a conflict; the consequences of it, direct and 
 indirect, would be incalculable." (London Times, July 28, 1914.) 
 
 1 This seems to refer to some proposal of collective intervention or media- 
 tion at Belgrade. See above p. 204, note 3. 
 
 2 The German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, is quoted as hav- 
 ing made the statement: " By dropping her idea of a conference England 
 made it appear that she wished Austria-Hungary, through Germany's 
 mediation, to yield." (The New York Times, January 15, 1915, p. 3.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 219 
 
 hoped it would be possible, but he was under the impres- 
 sion that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very 
 favorable recently.' (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. 
 P. no. 3.) 
 
 At Berlin the Russian Charg^ 'urged the German Sec- 
 retary for Foreign Affairs to support the Russian proposal. 
 Von Jagow repUed that he shared the opinion of the Ger- 
 man Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that since Count 
 Szapar^^ the Austrian Ambassador, had begun this con- 
 versation he might very well continue it.^ He said he 
 would telegraph the German Ambassador at Vienna to 
 this effect; but when the Russian Charg^ begged him to 
 urge Vienna with more insistence to adopt this conciHatory 
 procedure. Von Jagow answered that he could not advise 
 Vienna to yield.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. 0. P. 
 no. 38.) 
 
 'July 28, in the afternoon, M. Sazonof received the 
 German and Austrian Ambassadors. The impression he 
 received from his double interview was bad. " Decidedly," 
 he said to the French Ambassador, "Austria does not wish 
 to talk." As a result of a conversation that the latter had 
 with his two colleagues, he received the same pessimistic 
 impression.' (Modified quotation, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 
 82; cf. R. 0. P. no. 43.) 
 
 When, on July 28, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, 
 'acting upon M. Sazonof 's instructions, brought to the 
 notice of Count Berchtold how desirable it was to find a 
 solution which, while consolidating good relations be- 
 tween Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guaranties for its 
 future relations with Servia, the Austrian Minister re- 
 plied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation, 
 and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the 
 
 * Ordinarily the Government which makes the proposal would entrust 
 the whole negotiations to its representative at the capital where the pro- 
 posal was made. 
 
220 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 St. Petersburg Cabinet, but that, on the other hand, the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government, having decided, much 
 against their will, on the energetic measures which they had 
 taken against Servia, could no longer recede or enter into 
 any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian 
 note.' 1 (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 93 (1); 
 R. O. P. no. 45.) 
 
 When the Russian Government learned of Austria's 
 declaration of war against Servia, M. Sazonof telegraphed 
 the Russian Ambassador at London: "On the outbreak 
 of hostiUties between Austria and Servia, it is necessary 
 for England without delay to try her mediation. At the 
 same time Austrian military operations against Servia 
 should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation 
 would only serve as a pretext to drag out the settlement of 
 the question, and afford Austria in the mean time a pos- 
 sibility of crushing Servia completely and acquiring a 
 predominating position in the Balkans." (July 28, R. 0. P. 
 no. 48; cf. B. W. P. nos. 70 (2), 74.) 
 
 1 The Austrian Red Book gives the following account of this interview: 
 "The Imperial Russian Ambassador waited on me to-day to announce 
 to me his return from a short leave of absence in Russia and at the same 
 time to carry out instructions sent to him by M. Sazonof by telegraph. 
 He said that he later had informed him that he had had a long, friendly 
 interview with Your Excellency (Your Excellency's telegram of July 27), 
 during which Your Excellency had with great willingness discussed the 
 various points of the Servian reply. He said that M . Sazonof thought that 
 Servia had met our wishes to a great extent, but that certain demands 
 seemed to him quite unacceptable and that he had not concealed this be- 
 lief from you. Under the circumstances, he said, it seemed to him that the 
 Servian reply was suitable for being made the basis for an understanding, 
 toward which the Russian Government would willingly cooperate. There- 
 fore, he said, M. Sazonof wished to propose to me that his exchanges of views 
 with Your Excellency might continue and that Your Excellency might 
 for this purpose be provided with instructions. 
 
 *' In reply I said emphatically that I could not agree to such a suggestion. 
 No one here would understand or tolerate that we should enter into dis- 
 cussions regarding the wording of a reply already designated by us as un- 
 satisfactory; that such a course was all the more impossible since public 
 opinion was already deeply stirred, as the ambassador knew, and that, more- 
 over, we had declared war against Servia to-day." (Extract, July 28, 
 A. R. B. no. 40.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 221 
 
 On July 29, before M. Sazonof had heard of the Austrian 
 Minister's rejection of his proposal, he sent off a telegram 
 informing the Russian Charge at Berlin of a conversation 
 with the German Ambassador in which he had said that he 
 was ' in favor of the direct explanation between Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg, provided the conciliatory counsel from 
 Berlin to which he referred met with a response from 
 Vienna. At the same time M. Sazonof indicated that Rus- 
 sia was prepared to accept the proposed conference of the 
 four powers, which Germany, it seemed, did not entirely 
 approve. The Minister further said that in his opinion the 
 best way to take advantage of every opportunity to effect 
 a peaceful solution would be to parallel the direct nego- 
 tiations between Austria and Russia by the pourparlers of 
 the four powers, Germany, France, England, and Italy, 
 united in a conference, similarly to what was done at the 
 most critical moment of last year's crisis.' ^ (Modified 
 quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 49; cf. R. 0. P. no. 50; 
 B. W. P. no. 93 (2).) 
 
 As soon, however, as the Russian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs had received the telegram from Vienna, telling of 
 Count Berchtold's refusal of the Russian proposal, he sent 
 a second telegram to Berhn explaining that ' at the time of 
 his conversation with the German Ambassador, referred 
 to in his last telegram (R. O. P. no. 49), he had not re- 
 ceived word from Vienna of the refusal of the Austrian 
 Government to enter upon a direct exchange of views with 
 
 1 I find it difficult to reconcile R. O. P. no. 50 with B. W. P. no. 70 (2), 
 (R. O. P. no. 48), which is dated July 28. According to B. W. P. no. 70 (2), 
 Sazonof on July 28 took the same stand that direct negotiations were at an 
 end, as R. O. P. no. 50 indicates he took only after he heard that his offer 
 for direct conversations had been refused by Austria. Perhaps the ex- 
 planation of this discrepancy maybe that when Sazonof heard of Austria's 
 declaration of war against Servia he sent the telegram (R. O. P. no. 48) to 
 London, making it emphatic to impress Sir Edward Grey, and after that 
 (July 29) he had an interview with the German Ambassador which made 
 him hopeful of continuing negotiations with Austria, until he learned of 
 Berchtold's refusal. (R. O. P. no. 45.) 
 
222 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the Russian Government. After that the only course left 
 open to the Russian Government was, M. Sazonof said, to 
 leave to the initiative of the English Government the 
 undertaking of such action as it should consider advisable.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, R. 0. P. no. 50; cf. B. W. P. 
 nos. 93 (3), 74.) Yet that same day (July 29) the German 
 Ambassador at London was instructed to inform Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey that ' Austria and Russia seemed to be in con- 
 stant touch, and that the German Chancellor was endeav- 
 oring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. 
 Petersburg the scope and extent of the Austrian proceed- 
 ings in Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 
 84; cf. G. W. B. exhibit 22.) This amounted to saying that 
 Austria was willing to continue to negotiate with Russia ; 
 but that she was not willing to discuss the terms of her 
 note to Servia, which she persisted in considering as a 
 question purely between herself and Servia. (Cf. B. W. P. 
 no. 62.) 
 
 In a dispatch of July 29 to Count Berchtold, Count 
 Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, states: — 
 
 *' On information received from the German Ambassador 
 that M. Sazonof appeared greatly disturbed by your 
 apparent unwillingness to continue discussions with Russia 
 and by the Austro-Hungarian order of mobiHzation, which 
 appears to him to exceed the necessary scope and therefore 
 is believed to be directed against Russia, I called upon the 
 Minister in an attempt to clear up misconceptions which 
 seemed to exist. 
 
 **The Minister asserted that Austria-Hungary had re- 
 fused point-blank to discuss matters any further. In ac- 
 cordance with your telegram of the 28th instant, I ex- 
 plained that in view of recent events, you certainly had 
 refused to discuss any further the wording of the notes and 
 our conflict with Servia in general ; that, on the other hand, 
 I had to state that I was in a position to open a much wider 
 field for discussion by declaring that we do not wish to in- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 223 
 
 terfere with any Russian interests and that we do not in- 
 tend to take any Servian territory; provided, always, that 
 the conflict be locaHzed between Austria-Hungary and 
 Servia; that, moreover, we did not intend to violate 
 Servians sovereignty. I expressed my firm conviction that 
 you would always be willing to keep in touch with St. 
 Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian 
 interests." (Extract, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47.) 
 
 The German Memorandum states: "Inasmuch as the 
 Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries 
 regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several 
 times alluded to the circumstance that Austria-Hungary 
 had not yet begun any conversations in St. Petersburg, the 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our request, was di- 
 rected on July 29 to begin the conversations with M. Saz- 
 onof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to 
 the Russian Minister the contents of the note to Servia 
 which has been, as it were, overtaken by the declaration of 
 war, and to receive any suggestions that might still come 
 from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with M. Sazonof 
 all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian 
 relations." (Extract, G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 11; cf. 
 A. R. B. no. 49.) 
 
 Between the 28th and 30th, Austria undoubtedly as- 
 sumed a much more conciliatory attitude, for on the latter 
 date Count Berchtold ' again received the Russian Ambas- 
 sador in a perfectly friendly manner and gave his consent 
 to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg.' 
 (Modified quotation, B. W. P. Miscellaneous, no. 10 
 [1914];cf. B. W. P. no. 110.) 
 
 On July 30 the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann- 
 Hollweg, sent the following instructions to Herr von 
 Tchirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna: — 
 
 "The report of Count Pourtales does not harmonize 
 with the account which Your Excellency has given of the 
 attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. Appar- 
 
224 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ently there is a misunderstanding, which I beg you to clear 
 up. We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with 
 Servia, with which she is in a state of war. The refusal, 
 however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be 
 a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty. 
 As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a 
 world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respect- 
 ing our advice. Your Excellency will express this to Count 
 Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness." ^ 
 
 On July 30, Count Berchtold sent the following telegram 
 to Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg: "In reply to Your Excellency's telegram of July 29: 
 
 1 This telegram was published in the Westminster Gazette August 1. See 
 also M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, p. 251. Mr. Price (pp. 
 6-7) gives the following summary of Germany's mediatory efforts at Vienna: 
 
 "On the other hand, there is evidence to the effect that during the nego- 
 tiations after the Austrian Note to Servia, Germany, however stupidly and 
 supinely she handled the Austro-Servian dispute, was fully alive to the 
 danger to Europe of a Russo-Austrian conflict. Thus the telegrams passing 
 between the London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Paris Foreign Offices show 
 that although Germany refused Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of a Four 
 Power Ambassadorial Conference in London, nevertheless she supported 
 the mediation of Four Powers not immediately concerned at Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg, with a view to inducing Austria and Russia to come to terms 
 with each other. Indeed, Germany was on more than one occasion the 
 means of conveying to Austria proposals concerning the need of moderation 
 in Vienna and about the guarantees which Servia could reasonably be ex- 
 pected to give. (B. W. P. nos. 18, 95, 98.) The pressure brought to bear on 
 Austria by Germany during the last few days of negotiations is also seen in 
 the German Denkschrift and in the Westminster Gazette correspondent's 
 telegram of August 1st. In addition to these, numerous British Press cor- 
 respondents in Berlin and St. Petersburg, between July 25th and 30th, 
 show that Germany, so far from being an instigator, was doing all she could, 
 having regard to the difficult position in which she was placed, to make her 
 ally com.e to terms with Russia. 
 
 " Germany's great initial blunder was that she refused to regard the Austro- 
 Servian dispute as one that concerned any other but those two countries, 
 and would not recognize the claim of Russia to be consulted about the fate 
 of Servia. Hence her interpretation of Four Power mediation was not the 
 same as Russia's. She wanted mediation to aim at securing for Austria a 
 'free hand.' Russia wanted mediation which would give her a chance of 
 settling the Servian question according to her ideas." 
 
 Sir Valentine Chirol has attacked the authenticity of this communication. 
 See Price: The Diplomacy of the War, p. 51. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 225 
 
 I am naturally ready now, as I was before, to allow 
 Your Excellency to elucidate to M. Sazonof the various 
 points of the note addressed by us to Servia, though it has 
 been superseded by later events. In this connection I 
 would also make a point of discussing in a frank and 
 friendly way the questions directly concerning our rela- 
 tions with Russia, in accordance with the suggestion trans- 
 mitted to me by M. Schebeko, which might bring about 
 a clearing up of the doubtful points and a safeguarding of 
 the peaceful development that is so desirable in our neigh- 
 borly relations." (July 30, A. R. B. no. 49.) 
 
 Count Berchtold sent another telegram of the same date 
 (July 30) for Count Szapary's information: ''I have ex- 
 plained to M. Schebeko to-day, that it had been reported 
 to me that M. Sazonof was painfully impressed by my flat 
 rejection of his suggestion of a conference between you and 
 himself, and also because no exchange of views had taken 
 place between myself and M. Schebeko. With regard to 
 the first proposal, I had already instructed you by tele- 
 graph to give M. Sazonof any explanation he might re- 
 quire concerning our note, although recent events have su- 
 perseded that note. Such explanation, however, could not 
 go further than a belated elucidation, since we had never in- 
 tended to abate any point in the note. I also stated that I 
 had authorized you to make our relations with Russia the 
 subject of an amicable exchange of views with M. Sazonof. 
 The complaint that there had been no conference between 
 myself and Schebeko must be based on a misunderstand- 
 ing, as we — Schebeko and I — discussed the pending 
 questions only two days ago. The Ambassador confirmed 
 this and said that he had sent a full report of our interview 
 to M. Sazonof." (Extract, July 30, A. R. B. no. 50.) 
 
 On July 30, also, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at 
 Vienna, reported to his Government: ''With regard to the 
 settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute, it has been 
 agreed that the pourparlers shall be resumed in St. Peters- 
 
226 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 burg between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. Their 
 interruption was due to a misunderstanding, Count Bereh- 
 told believing that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 demanded that his interlocutor should be given powers en- 
 abling him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. 
 Count Szapary will only be authorized to discuss what 
 arrangement would be compatible with the dignity and 
 prestige of the two empires, which are to both of them an 
 object of equal care. For the moment, therefore, it will be 
 in this direct form, confined to the two most interested 
 parties, that the examination of the situation will take 
 place which Sir Edward Grey proposed should be under- 
 taken by the four not directly interested powers. Sir M. de 
 Bunsen, who was with me, at once told M. Schebeko that 
 the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new 
 procedure. Repeating the expose he made at the Ballplatz, 
 the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government 
 would pay much more regard to the demands of the Mon- 
 archy than was supposed. M. Schebeko neglected nothing 
 to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's 
 desire to reach an understanding acceptable to the two 
 empires. The interview was conducted in a very friendly 
 tone, and gave rise to the belief that all hope of localizing 
 the conflict was not lost, and then the news of the German 
 mobilization reached Vienna." (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. 
 no. 104; cf. B. W. P. nos. 96, 110.) 
 
 On July 31, 'Count Berchtold begged the Russian Am- 
 bassador to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous 
 impression in St. Petersburg that the ''door had been 
 banged" by Austria on all further conversations.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 137.) 
 
 The day following, — that is, the day Germany de- 
 clared war against Russia, — Sir Edward Grey, encour- 
 aged by this friendly attitude of Austria, telegraphed the 
 British Ambassador at Berlin that ' he still believed that it 
 might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 227 
 
 time could be gained before any great power began war. 
 The Russian Government had communicated to him the 
 readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia, and the readi- 
 ness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which was 
 not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula 
 which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not, he 
 thought, to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia were 
 ready to converse, and he hoped that the German Govern- 
 ment might be able to make use of the Russian communi- 
 cations referred to above, in order to avoid tension.' 
 (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 131.) 
 
 5. The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg 
 
 While these conversations were going on at St. Peters- 
 burg and Vienna, between M. Sazonof and the Austrian 
 Ambassador, and between Count Berchtold and the Rus- 
 sian Ambassador, the less interested powers were trying to 
 use their good offices ^ at the two capitals to facilitate the 
 course of the conversations or direct negotiations and to 
 prevail upon Austria and Russia to agree to some method 
 to settle their difference, which threatened to involve all 
 Europe. 
 
 Although Germany supported Austria in insisting upon 
 the ''localization" of her dispute with Servia, the German 
 Government did nevertheless 'instruct Von Tchirsky on 
 July 26 to "pass on" to the Austrian Government Sir 
 Edward Grey's hopes that they might take a favorable 
 view of the Servian reply if it corresponded to the forecast 
 contained in the telegram of July 25 from the British rep- 
 resentative at Belgrade.^ The German Government con- 
 
 ^ "Good offices" merely means the ordinary friendly diplomatic activity 
 which a power carries on with one or both of the powers in disagreement. 
 Such action consists in offering suggestions or giving explanations and 
 friendly counsel, which may lessen the tension or induce the Governments 
 concerned to come to an agreement directly, or to entrust to one or more 
 third powers the more formal office of mediator. 
 
 * B. W. P. no. 20. 
 
228 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 sidered that the very fact of their making this communi- 
 cation to the Austrian Government impHed that they 
 associated themselves, to a certain extent, with the hope 
 expressed by Sir Edward. The German Government could 
 not see their way of going beyond that.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 26, B. W. P. no. 34.) 
 
 Two days later Von Bethmann-HoUweg told the British 
 Ambassador at Berlin that 'Sir Edward Grey could be 
 assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and 
 at St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss 
 the situation with each other and in a friendly way.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 71 ; cf . G. W. B. 
 exhibits 14, 15, 22; R. 0. P. nos. 38, 51.) When the Aus- 
 trian Government replied with a polite refusal, the Chan- 
 cellor 'advised them to speak openly to assure Russia 
 regarding the object of the hostilities about to be under- 
 taken against Servia. After going so far in giving advice 
 at Vienna, the Chancellor expressed the hope that Sir 
 Edward would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his 
 power to prevent the danger of European complications.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 75.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey replied appreciatively of these efforts 
 on the part of the Chancellor, and said that 'if he could 
 induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going 
 so far as to come into collision with her, they should all 
 join in deep gratitude to him for having saved the peace of 
 Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 77.) 
 Sir Edward Grey, in reply to a suggestion from the Marquis 
 di San Giuliano as to a possibly acceptable basis for media- 
 tion, said that 'he could do nothing in the face of Austria's 
 refusal to accept any form of mediation as between Aus- 
 tria and Servia, but that he should be glad if a favorable 
 reception were given to any suggestion he could make 
 there.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 81; cf. 
 B. W. P. nos. 64, 90.) England, France, and Italy realized 
 that Germany, and Germany alone, could speak at Vienna 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 229 
 
 with any chance of being listened to. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 
 111.) Accordingly, while they had been urging upon the 
 German Government the imperative necessity of exercis- 
 ing its influence in favor of moderation at Vienna if it was 
 hoped to avoid an Austro-Russian conflict (cf . R. 0. P. no. 
 42), they had kept begging the Russian Government not 
 to precipitate a crisis by mobilizing. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 104; 
 F.Y.B. 101.) 
 
 6. Efforts to discover a formula for mediation 
 The powers continued to exercise at Vienna and St. 
 Petersburg the same restraining influence that they had 
 from the first brought to bear at Belgrade to induce Servia 
 to return a conciliatory reply to the Austrian note, but 
 they realized how much more effective would be their 
 restraining action if they could succeed in giving whatever 
 counsel was offered the united support of the four less 
 interested powers. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 11.) 
 
 Even in the face of Germany's refusal of Sir Edward 
 Grey's proposal for an ambassadorial conference at Lon- 
 don, Italy, France, and Russia continued to urge Germany 
 to reconsider her decision. Present in the minds of the 
 diplomats was the success of the same plan when adopted 
 during the Balkan crisis the year preceding. At that time 
 the delicate question of Albania and the Servian frontier 
 had been peacefully settled by means of direct negotia- 
 tions between the two great powers most immediately 
 interested, Austria and Russia, while at London an ambas- 
 sadorial conference of the less interested powers had col- 
 laborated to reach an acceptable compromise. The happy 
 result of those negotiations made the diplomatists hope to 
 employ again that parallel system consisting of direct con- 
 versations between Austria and Russia, advised and re- 
 strained by the collective counsel of the ambassadorial con- 
 ference. (R. 0. P. nos. 50, 69; B. W. P. nos. 93 (2), 80, 81, 
 120, 139; F. Y. B. no. 84.) The advice of the powers was 
 
230 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 all the more difficult for Austria and Russia to reject in 
 1913, because it was the resultant of the views of powers 
 possessing different interests and divided sympathies, and 
 was therefore a compromise between the views of the two 
 powers immediately interested in the fate of Servia. But, 
 as Count Berchtold remarked, Austria considered the solu- 
 tion then adopted as "highly artificial," which means that 
 the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs considered it 
 unsatisfactory to Austria. Entertaining such a view, he 
 wished, as we understand, to avoid a repetition of the pro- 
 cedure which had forced Austria to acquiesce in the solu- 
 tion adopted in 1913. (B. W. P. Miscellaneous, no. 10, 
 1914 ; F. Y. B. no. 70.) In 1913, Germany had been willing 
 to join the other powers in carrying through the parallel 
 procedure of an advisory ambassadorial conference at Lon- 
 don, but in 1914 she announced that she could not drag 
 her ally before a "European Areopagus " in which the pow- 
 ers should sit in judgment on Austria, and in which the 
 judges opposed to her would outvote those interested in 
 securing the protection of her interests. 
 
 When Germany was pressed, she said that she would 
 join the other powers in exercising a mediatory influence 
 between Austria and Russia (B. W. P. no. 18), but she con- 
 tinued emphatically to refuse to participate in a conference 
 to bring pressure to bear on Austria to induce her to recon- 
 sider and modify the terms of her note to Servia. (R. O. P. 
 no. 53; G. W. B. exhibit 13, Memorandum, p. 9; F. Y. B. 
 no. 81.) 
 
 In the face of this firm stand of Germany, the other pow- 
 ers sought to replace the proposed ambassadorial confer- 
 ence at London by another method of mediation which 
 might be effective in helping Austria and Russia to find 
 some acceptable compromise (F. Y. B. no. 81); what the 
 diplomats designated as the finding of a "form.ula." 
 
 For a moment, when it was thought that Austria had 
 refused to continue the direct "conversations" with Rus- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 231 
 
 sia regarding the settlement of the Servian question, the 
 exercise of the mediatory or moderating influence of the 
 powers seemed the only hope of peace, — though a slender 
 one. (R. O. P. no. 50; B. W. P. nos. 93 (3), 74, 78; R. 0. P. 
 no. 54.) But it was quickly explained that Austria had not 
 "banged the door," and the "conversations " ot pourparlers 
 were renewed. (B. W. P. no. 137; A. R. B. no. 53.) 
 
 7. Germany asked to *' press the button" 
 Finding it impossible to bring forward any suggestion 
 acceptable to Germany, on July 28, Sir Edward Grey had 
 telegraphed the British Ambassador at Berlin: "German 
 Government having accepted principle of mediation be- 
 tween Austria and Russia by the four powers, if necessary 
 I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State 
 should suggest the lines on which this principle should be 
 applied.^ I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we 
 
 * The following extract from a dispatch of July 27, sent by M. Bien- 
 venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French represen- 
 tatives, shows the feeling of the French Government : — 
 
 "The powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their 
 urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield; and thus have done their part; 
 it is now for Germany, who alone is in a situation to obtain a speedy hear- 
 ing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and 
 cannot be permitted, for the sake of a matter of detail easy to adjust, to 
 bring about a general war. 
 
 "These are the circumstances in which the proposal made by the London 
 Cabinet has been brought forward: M. Sazonof having said to the British 
 Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the powers, 
 Russia would agree to stand aside. Sir Edward Grey has formulated the fol- 
 lowing suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome: the French, 
 German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek 
 with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being 
 understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria, and Servia would 
 abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson [of the British 
 Foreign Office] has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, 
 who showed himself favorable to it; it will be equally well received in Paris, 
 and also, according to all probability, at Rome. Here again it is Germany's 
 turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her good-will by other 
 means than words. 
 
 "I would ask you to come to an understanding with your English col- 
 league, and to support his proposal with the German Government in what- 
 ever form appears to you opportune." (Extract, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 61.) 
 
232 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 see how the conversations between Austria and Russia 
 progress." (July 28, B. W. P. no. 68; cf. B. W. P. nos. 43, 
 46, 60.) 
 
 On July 29, the British Ambassador at Rome pointed 
 out the inconsistency between Sir Edward Grey's telegram 
 to Sir Edward Goschen of July 27, in which he relates that 
 'the German Government accepted mediation in princi- 
 ple' (modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46), and Sir 
 Edward Goschen's dispatch of the same date to Sir Edward 
 Grey, to the effect that 'Germany could not accept the 
 suggestion which the Secretary of State considered would 
 amount to a court of arbitration.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 27, B. W. P. no. 43.) 
 
 At Rome the Italian Government, he reported, had 
 received information that ' what created the difficulty was, 
 so the Marquis di San Giuliano thought, the "conference," 
 rather than the principle, and the Marquis was going to 
 urge, in a telegram which he was sending to Berlin that 
 night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in 
 London. He suggested that the German Secretary of State 
 might propose a formula acceptable to his Government.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 80.) 
 
 July 29, Sir Edward Grey urged upon Prince Lichnow- 
 sky that 'the German Government should suggest any 
 method by which the influence of the four powers could be 
 used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. 
 France agreed. Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation 
 or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation 
 by any method that Germany thought possible, if only 
 Germany would "press the button" in the interests of 
 peace.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 84; 
 cf. B. W. P. nos. 92, 100; R. O. P. nos. 53, 54.) 
 
 July 30, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward 
 Grey from Berlin that ' he did not know whether the Ger- 
 man Government had made any reply to Sir Edward's 
 proposal asking whether they could not suggest any 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 233 
 
 method bj^ which the four powers could use their mediating 
 influence between Russia and Austria. He was informed 
 the night before that the German Government had not 
 had time to send an answer yet. The same day, July 30, 
 in reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to 
 whether the Imperial German Government had proposed 
 any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he 
 felt that time would be saved by communicating with 
 Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hunga- 
 rian Government what would satisfy them. No answer 
 had, however, been returned yet. 
 
 ' The Chancellor had told him, the night before, that he 
 was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he 
 was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging 
 moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated 
 rather than otherwise.' (Modified quotation, July 30, 
 B. W. P. no. 107.) 
 
 On July 30, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg gave the but- 
 ton a good push by instructing the German Ambassador 
 at Vienna ' to impress upon Count Berchtold with great 
 seriousness that Germany would have to refuse to be 
 drawn into a general war resulting from Austria's disregard 
 of Germany's counsel.' (See above, p. 224.) 
 
 On the morning of July 31, the last day of European 
 peace. Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador, 
 Prince Lichnowsky, that 'if Germany could get any rea- 
 sonable proposal put forward which made it clear that 
 Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European 
 peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable 
 if they rejected it, he would support it at St. Petersburg 
 and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and 
 France would not accept it, the British Government would 
 have nothing more to do with the consequences ; otherwise, 
 he told the German Ambassador that if France became 
 involved, they should be drawn in.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 31, B. W. P. no. Ill ; cf. R. 0. P. no. 42.) It is much to 
 
234 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 be regretted that Germany was unable to reply to this bid 
 for her cooperation in maintaining the peace by suggesting 
 some feasible plan. 
 
 8. The San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Servians 
 unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum 
 
 July 28, Sir Edward Grey received a telegram from the 
 British Ambassador at Rome to the effect that ' the Mar- 
 quis di San Giuliano, as at present informed, saw no pos- 
 sibility of Austria's receding from any point laid down in 
 her note to Servia, but he believed that if Servia would 
 even then accept it, Austria would be satisfied, and that if 
 she had reason to think that such would be the advice ofj 
 the powers, Austria might defer action. Servia might be' 
 induced to accept the note in its entirety on the advice of 
 the four powers invited to the conference, and this wouldJ 
 enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not] 
 to Austria-Hungary alone.' ^ (Modified quotation, Julyj 
 27, B. W. P. no. 57; cf. B. W. P. no. 64; F. Y. B. no. 72.)| 
 Even this proposal, worthy of the astute and tactful Ital- 
 ian, does not seem to have found favor with Germany oi 
 Austria. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, when showing the German Ambass 
 dor at London the telegrams exchanged about the Sanl 
 Giuliano suggestion, remarked that 'he had begun toj 
 doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian] 
 demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria, but that! 
 there appeared, from what the Marquis di San GiulianoJ 
 
 ^ The attitude of the Austrian Government is shown by the following! 
 telegram which Baron von Macchio, of the Austrian Foreign Office, receivedl 
 from Count Berchtold: "Russian Charge d' Affaires telegraphs me that hej 
 has been urgently instructed by his Government to ask an extension of timel 
 on the ultimatum to Servia. I ask Your Excellency, therefore, to answer! 
 him, in my name, that we cannot agree to an extension of the time. Yourj 
 Excellency will please add that Servia can reach a peaceful solution, evenj 
 after the breaking off of diplomatic relations, by unreservedly accepting! 
 our demands, but that we should be constrained in such case to demand! 
 from Servia indemnization for all the expenses and damages incurred bj 
 reason of our military measures." (July 25, A. R. B. no. 20.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 235 
 
 had said, to be a method by which, if the powers were al- 
 lowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring 
 about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter 
 would give them an opportunity. Sir Edward said he could, 
 however, make no proposal, and could only give what the 
 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German 
 Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood 
 that Austria would accept no discussion with the powers 
 over her dispute with Servia.^ As to mediation between 
 Austria and Russia, Sir Edward said it could not take 
 the form simply of urging Russia to stand aside while 
 Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. 
 That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting 
 pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 90.) 
 
 The German Ambassador, according to the dispatch of 
 the British Secretary, did not comment on the San Giu- 
 liano proposal, but after expressing his views as to Aus- 
 tria's situation, in conclusion 'said emphatically that some 
 means must be found to preserve the peace of Europe.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 90.) 
 
 M. Sazonof, when 'asked if he would raise objections if 
 the Italian suggestion were carried out, replied that he 
 would agree to anything arranged by the four powers, pro- 
 vided it was acceptable to Servia ; as he could not be more 
 Servian than Servia. He thought, however, that some sup- 
 plementary statement or explanations would have to be 
 made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultima- 
 tum.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) 
 
 * German critics have impugned the sincerity of Sir Edward Grey'a 
 efforts toward peace because he was not more ready, at this stage, to urge 
 mediation. (See above, p. 218, note 2.) Having formally invited thepowers to 
 a conference at London, only to have the proposal refused by Germany and 
 Austria, Sir Edward very properly felt he could not make a new proposal un- 
 less there was some chance of its being accepted. 
 
236 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 9. The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's 
 occupation of Belgrade 
 
 On July 29, the French Ambassador at Berhn suggested 
 anew to the German Under-Secretary of State that 'it 
 seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and 
 so satisfied her miUtary prestige, the moment might then 
 be favorable for the four disinterested powers to discuss 
 the situation and come forward with suggestions for pre- 
 venting graver compHcations. The Under-Secretary of 
 State seemed to think the idea worthy of consideration, 
 as he replied that that would be a different matter from 
 the conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 76.) 
 
 That same day, whether or not in consequence of the 
 Cambon suggestion, Sir Edward Grey proposed to the 
 German Ambassador at London that, since it was 'too 
 late for all military operations against Servia to be sus- 
 pended, it might be possible to bring some mediation into 
 existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the 
 occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from 
 Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending 
 an effort of the powers to mediate between her and Rus- 
 sia.'i (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 88; cf. 
 B. W. P. no 100.) As soon as Von Jagow, German Secre- 
 tary of State, learned of Sir Edward Grey's proposal, he 
 asked the Austro-Hungarian Government whether they 
 would be willing to accept mediation on the basis of the 
 occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other 
 point, and issue their conditions from there. After expres- 
 sing fears that Russia's mobihzation might make it diffi- 
 
 1 Mediation or intervention on the basis of the occupation of Belgrade 
 was indicated by M. Sazonof's remark as early as July 25, when he expressed 
 the thought that the Servian Government might retire from Belgrade and 
 appeal to the powers. (B. W. P. no. 17.) I have called it the Cambon sug- 
 gestion so as to distinguish it, and because it was put forward by M. Jules 
 Cambon. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 237 
 
 cult for Austria, who had 'as yet mobihzed only against 
 Servia, but would probably find it necessary also against 
 Russia/ the Secretary said that if Sir Edward could 'suc- 
 ceed in getting Russia to agree to the above basis for an 
 arrangement and in persuading her in the mean time to 
 take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggres- 
 sion against Austria, he still saw some chance that Euro- 
 pean peace might be preserved.' (Modified quotations, 
 July 30, B. W. P. no. 98.) 
 
 According to the German Memorandum, the German 
 Government, thinking Russia would agree, forwarded to 
 Vienna as a basis of negotiation the proposal brought for- 
 ward by England that Austria should dictate her condi- 
 tions from Servia, i.e., after having marched into Servia. 
 (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 11.) 
 
 That same day, July 30, the German Ambassador in- 
 formed Sir Edward Grey that "the German Government 
 would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Bel- 
 grade and Servian territory in region of the frontier, to 
 promise not to advance farther, while the powers en- 
 deavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction 
 sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of 
 course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied." (Ex- 
 tract, July 30, B. W. P. no. 103.) 
 
 After this interview Sir Edward Grey, following up this 
 plan of mediation between Austria and Servia on the basis 
 of Austria's occupation of Belgrade, and the cessation of 
 further aggression, telegraphed the British Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg in an effort to secure Russia's consent to 
 this arrangement and acquiescence in an agreement to 
 'suspend further military preparations on all sides.' Re- 
 ferring to the Russian offer of terms at the request of the 
 German Ambassador as a last effort toward peace, Sir 
 Edward hoped, in spite of the Russian Ambassador's be- 
 lief that the terms could not be modified, that 'if the Aus- 
 trian advance were stopped after the occupation of Bel- 
 
238 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 grade, the Russian [Sazonof] formula ^ might be changed 
 to read, that the powers would examine how Servia could 
 fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian rights or 
 independence.' ^ (Modified quotations, July 30, B. W. P. 
 no. 103.) 
 
 M. Viviani, in accordance with Sir Edward Grey's 
 request, agreed to the English suggestion (Cambon's 
 suggestion),^ and instructed the French Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg as follows : — 
 
 ''Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion 
 of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for 
 conversation between the powers, who are equally desirous 
 of working for an honorable arrangement of the Austro- 
 Servian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers 
 which threaten general peace. 
 
 "The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for For- 
 eign Affairs, by stopping the advance of the Austrian 
 army and by entrusting to the powers the duty of examin- 
 ing how Servia could give full satisfaction to Austria with- 
 out endangering the sovereign rights and the independence 
 of the kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of sus- 
 pending all military preparations, while the other powers 
 are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give 
 satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for 
 Servia an acceptable means of issue from the present 
 difficulty. 
 
 '* I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing 
 considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his 
 
 ' The Russian formula here referred to is that first offered by M. Sazonof 
 at the request of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. (See post, 
 §11.) 
 
 2 As Mr. Price very truly remarks: "The difference between this and the 
 first [Russian] formula is that the powers are specially mentioned as arbi- 
 trators to decide upon those points concerning the sovereignty and in- 
 dependence of Servia." (C. M. Price: The Diplomatic History of the War, 
 p. 57.) 
 
 ' That M. Viviani refers here to the Cambon suggestion and not to the 
 Grey suggestion appears from F. Y. B. no. 104; of. F. Y. B. no. 103. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 239 
 
 adherence without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of 
 which he will have been himself informed." (Extract, 
 July 31, F. Y. B. no. 112; cf. B. W. P. no. 104.) 
 
 This mediation, on the basis of the occupation of Bel- 
 grade, may have been suggested by what M. Sazonof 
 remarked to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
 July 25, that he 'thought from a conversation which he 
 had had with the Servian Minister the day before, that in 
 the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian 
 Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their 
 forces into the interior, while they made, at the same time, 
 an appeal to the powers to help them. The Russian Min- 
 ister declared that he was in favor of their making that 
 appeal.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 The day before the proposal was brought forward by the 
 British Ambassador at Berlin, Von Tchirsky, German 
 Ambassador at Vienna, ' told his British colleague that he 
 thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from 
 making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be in- 
 duced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon 
 as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 100.) 
 
 10. The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty of the powers 
 During the two days preceding Germany's declaration of 
 war against Russia, the diplomatic activity of the powers 
 in their efforts to avoid war seems to have been redoubled 
 and the overlapping of the various proposals made and 
 supported by the different powers makes it very difficult to 
 unravel the web. We have already seen how, on July 30, 
 Austria agreed to renew direct conversations with Russia, 
 while England, with the support of France, brought for- 
 ward the suggestion originally made by M. Jules Cambon 
 at Berlin. 
 
 On July 30, the Marquis di San Giuliano told the British 
 Ambassador at Rome that he was 'telegraphing to the 
 
240 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Govern- 
 ment to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views 
 between the four powers should be resumed in any form 
 which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to 
 him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly 
 the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a 
 guaranty that she would neither deprive her of independ- 
 ence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for 
 anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultima- 
 tum, and Germany would support no proposal that did 
 not imply success for Austria. It might, on the other hand, 
 be ascertained from Russia what she would accept, and 
 once they knew the standpoints of these two countries, 
 discussions could be commenced at once. There was still 
 time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any 
 case was in favor of continuing an exchange of views with 
 the English Government, if the idea of discussions between 
 the four powers was impossible.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 30, B. W. P. no. 106; cf. B. W. P. no. 79.) 
 
 In line with this suggestion Sir Edward Grey tele- 
 graphed, July 31, to Sir Edward Goschen: ''I hope that 
 the conversations which are now proceeding between 
 Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The 
 stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of 
 Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of Austrian 
 intentions with regard to the independence and integrity 
 of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this 
 mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would 
 undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be 
 possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Aus- 
 tria that they would undertake to see that she obtained 
 full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that 
 they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity 
 of Servian territory. As Your Excellency is aware, Aus- 
 tria has already declared her willingness to respect them. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 241 
 
 Russia might be informed by the four powers that they 
 would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the 
 length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All 
 powers would, of course, suspend further military opera- 
 tions or preparations. You may sound the Secretary of 
 State about this proposal." 
 
 The dispatch goes on to recount the previously men- 
 tioned offer to collaborate with Germany,^ and to with- 
 draw from the conflict unless France and Russia were 
 ready to accept any reasonable proposal put forward, and 
 concludes: ''You can add this when sounding Chancel- 
 lor or Secretary of State as to proposal above." (July 31, 
 B. W. P. no. 111.) 
 
 The British Ambassador at Berlin reported the result 
 of this commission as follows : — 
 
 ''I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him 
 most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another 
 effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war. 
 
 ''He expressed himself very sympathetically toward 
 your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to 
 maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial 
 Government to consider any proposal until they had re- 
 ceived an answer from Russia to their communication of 
 to-day (July 31); this communication, which he admitted 
 had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia 
 could inform the Imperial Government within twelve 
 hours that she would immediately countermand her mo- 
 bilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would 
 be obliged on her side to mobilize at once. 
 
 "I asked His Excellency why they had made their de- 
 mand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking 
 them to demobilize in south as well. He replied that it was 
 in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization 
 was only directed against Austria. 
 
 "His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia 
 
 1 See ante, p. 233; (B. W. P. 111.) 
 
242 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal 
 merited favorable consideration, and in any case he would 
 lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated 
 that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Govern- 
 ment had sent in their answer to the German demand. 
 
 *'He again assured me that both the Emperor William, 
 at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German 
 Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Aus- 
 tria to show willingness to continue discussions — and tele- 
 graphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had 
 been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobilization 
 had spoiled everything." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 121.) 
 
 What form of collective guaranty the powers had in 
 mind is perhaps indicated in the conversation which M. 
 Jules Cambon had with Herr Von Jagow, July 29: ''The 
 Secretary then remarked that with Eastern peoples one 
 could never have enough guaranties, and that Austria 
 wished to have, over the execution of the promises made 
 to her, a control which Servia refused to give. This, in 
 the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the capital point. I 
 rephed to Herr von Jagow that if Servia desired to remain 
 independent, she was bound to reject the control of a single 
 power, but that an international commission would not 
 present the same character. There was more than one in 
 the Balkan States, beginning with the financial commission 
 in Athens. One might, for example, I said, imagine among 
 other combinations a provisional international commission 
 entrusted with the duty of controlling the police inquiry 
 demanded by Austria. It was clear from this example that 
 the Servian reply opened the door to conversations, and 
 did not justify a rupture." (Extract, July 29, F. Y. B. 
 no. 92.) 
 
 11. Germany asks Russia to propose a formula 
 When M. Sazonof, on July 29, had received from the 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna information which he con- 
 
: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 243 
 
 sidered as indicating Austria's definite refusal to discuss 
 with Russia the terms of the Austrian note (B. W. P. no. 
 93), he had told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
 that 'he purposed, when informing the German Ambas- 
 sador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return 
 should be made to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a con- 
 ference of four ambassadors, or at all events for an ex- 
 change of views between the three ambassadors less 
 directly interested. Sir Edward, and also the Austrian Am- 
 bassador if Sir Edward thought it advisable. Any arrange- 
 ment approved by France and England would, he said, be 
 acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such 
 conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only 
 way to avert war was for Sir Edward Grey to succeed in 
 arriving, by means of conversations with ambassadors, 
 either collectively or individually, at some formula which 
 Austria could be induced to accept.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 29, B. W. P. no. 78; cf. R. 0. P. no. 48.) 
 
 Accordingly, when, shortly after, ^ the Russian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs had a conversation with the German 
 Ambassador, he urged him to agree to an ambassadorial 
 conference in London for the purpose of exercising a media- 
 tory influence, at the same time that direct negotiations 
 were being carried on between Austria and Russia; but 
 the German Ambassador objected that the mobilization 
 
 ^ There seems to be a confusion in regard to this matter. In B. W. P. 
 no. 93 (2), identical with R. O. P. no. 49, both dated July 29, M. Sazonof 
 proposed to the German Ambassador that direct conversations with Aus- 
 tria should be paralleled by discussions of the four powers. In B. W. P. 
 no. 93 (3), which is identical with R. O. P. no. 50, M. Sazonof says that at 
 the time he made that suggestion he had not learned from M. Schebeko 
 of Austria's refusal to agree to a direct exchange of views (B. W. P. no. 93 
 (1), identical with R. O. P. no. 45). Yet no. 48 of the Russian Orange Book, 
 sent on July 28, seems to indicate that the Russian Government had al- 
 ready heard of Austria's military action against Servia. From B. W. P. 
 no. 78, dated July 29, we learn that M. Sazonof had heard of the Austrian 
 refusal to agree to direct conversations, and that he told the British Am- 
 bassador that he intended, when informing the German Ambassador of 
 this refusal, to urge upon him a return to Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a 
 conference of the four powers. 
 
244 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Russia had undertaken would render this very difficult, 
 and remarked that Russia was asking Germany to take in 
 regard to Austria the very step which she blamed Austria 
 for taking in regard to Servia. Nevertheless he agreed to 
 transmit the conversation. (B. W. P. no. 93 (2) ; R. O. P. 
 no. 49; G. W. B. Memorandum, pp. 9-10.) 
 
 The same day, July 29, Von Tchirsky, the German Am- 
 bassador at Vienna, said, as has been noted above, that 
 "if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect 
 of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought 
 that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert 
 with the three other powers." (Extract, July 29, B. W. P. 
 no. 94.) 
 
 This effort to maintain direct negotiation, paralleled by 
 mediation or diplomatic intervention^ through an ambas- 
 sadorial conference, was wrecked by Austria's refusal, 
 July 28, to continue any discussion with Russia relative to 
 the modifications of the terms laid down in her note, and 
 by her bombardment of Belgrade. As soon as M. Sazonof 
 learned (July 29) of Austria's refusal, he considered that 
 England alone could preserve the peace by exercising her 
 mediatory action. It was under these circumstances that 
 the German Ambassador on July 30 ^ had a second inter- 
 view with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs at two 
 o'clock in the morning. When the Ambassador perceived 
 that war was inevitable, he broke down completely and 
 
 ^ If Austria had really acquiesced, it would have been mediation. If Ger- 
 many had joined the other powers and forced her to yield, the ambassado- 
 rial conference would have constituted diplomatic intervention. The term 
 "diplomatic intervention" is often used for any diplomatic suggestion re- 
 garding the relations of other states. It is sometimes hard to distinguish 
 from "good offices," except that diplomatic intervention supposes the pos- 
 sibility that suggestions made may be supported by force. 
 
 * According to R. O. P. no. 63, it would seem that this conversation must 
 have taken place on July 29, but R. O. P. no. 60 confirms July 30 as the 
 correct date. As the interview took place at 2 a.m. and was sent immediately 
 (d'urgence) to Berlin, the dispatch may have reached the Russian Ambas- 
 sador at Berlin at the same time as one sent July 29. This may account 
 for the confusion. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 245 
 
 appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which 
 he could telegraph to the German Government as a last 
 hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to the 
 German Ambassador a formula in French, of which the 
 following is a translation: — 
 
 "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia 
 has assumed the character of a question of European 
 mterest, declares herself ready to ehminate from her 
 ultimatum points which violate the principle of sover- 
 eignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military 
 preparations." 
 The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in trans- 
 mitting this formula, informed Sir Edward Grey that 
 'preparations for general mobilization would be pro- 
 ceeded with, if this proposal was rejected by Austria, and 
 the inevitable result would be a European war. The excite- 
 ment at St. Petersburg had, the Ambassador said, reached 
 such a pitch that, if Austria refused to make a concession, 
 Russia could not hold back, and now that she knew that 
 Germany was arming, she could hardly postpone, for 
 strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobil- 
 ization.' (Modified quotation, and extract, July 30, 
 B. W. P. no. 97.) 
 
 In the telegram which was immediately dispatched to 
 the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to inform him of this 
 formula suggested by M. Sazonof at the request of the 
 German Ambassador, M. Sazonof instructs the Ambas- 
 sador 'to telegraph him at once the attitude of the Ger- 
 man Government after this new proof of the desire of the 
 Russian Government to do everything possible to reach a 
 peaceful solution of the question, for, says the Minister, we 
 cannot permit negotiations such as these to serve only the 
 purpose of affording Germany and Austria time to make 
 their military preparations.' (Modified quotation, July 
 30, R. O. P. no. 60.) 
 
 In other words, this formula was something in the 
 
246 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 nature of a last word or ultimatum from Russia. It is 
 most important to note that according to the documents 
 (R. O. P. nos. 49; 50), this change of tone occurred at or 
 after the interview of the German Ambassador with M. 
 Sazonof on July 29. The Russian Foreign Minister seems 
 to have taken umbrage at the tone employed by the Am- 
 bassador upon that occasion, for he said, speaking of the 
 interview, that 'he feared that the German Ambassador 
 would not help to smooth matters over if he used to his 
 own Government the same language he had when speaking 
 to him.i (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78; 
 cf . F. Y. B. no. 100.) In a telegram sent that day, July 29, 
 to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, he also said, 'since 
 they [Russia] could not arrest their mihtary preparations 
 as Germany desired, it only remained for them to accel- 
 erate their armament and to take measures for the prob- 
 able inevitability of war.' (Modified quotation, July 29, 
 R. O. P. no. 58.) 
 
 Although M. Sazonof was not unwilling to continue at 
 this time his efforts toward conciliation and cooperation 
 with the other powers in an attempt to reach a peaceful so- 
 lution (cf. R. O. P. no. 49), it appears beyond doubt that 
 the war party was gaining headway. ^ Then came word of 
 Austria's refusal to continue discussions (R. 0. P. no. 50), 
 and M. Sazonof informed Sir Edward Grey that the only 
 hope for peace lay in England's initiative. (B. W. P. 
 no. 93.) 
 
 The German point of view is that Russia's change of 
 
 * On July 28, Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Ambassador at 
 Berlin to urge the German Government to threaten Russia with a counter- 
 mobilization if she persisted in mobilizing the four southern districts against 
 Austria. In closing, Count Berchtold remarks: "It seems to me that at this 
 moment plain language would be the most efficacious means to make 
 Russia realize all the consequences of assuming a threatening attitude." 
 (Extract, July 28, A. R. B. no. 42; cf. A. R. B. no. 48.) The plain language 
 to which the Austrian Minister refers does not seem to have been taken in 
 good part by M. Sazonof when delivered the next day (July 29). 
 
 8 Cf. Report of the Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg, ante, p. 192. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 247 
 
 attitude was due to the conviction that England would 
 back her up.^ Doubtless this belief may have stiffened her 
 attitude, but that is not the question, as long as this stiff- 
 ening went no further than a proper respect for her dignity 
 and interests, and did not constitute a withdrawal of her 
 cooperation with less interested powers in reaching a 
 peaceful solution. 
 
 This change of attitude on England's part is indicated 
 by the telegram of the Russian Ambassador at London, 
 July 30, giving an account of his interview with Sir 
 Edward Grey: — 
 
 "Have communicated the contents of your telegrams of 
 the 29th and 30th July to Grey, who considers the situa- 
 tion very serious, but desires to continue the pourparlers. 
 I observed to Grey that, since you had proposed to him to 
 accept anything he might propose in favor of the main- 
 tenance of peace, provided that Austria would not profit 
 by the delays to crush Servia, the situation in which you 
 found yourself was apparently modified. At that period 
 our relations with Germany were not compromised. After 
 the declaration of the German Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg concerning the German mobilization,^ these relations 
 had changed, and her demand had received from you the 
 only reply which a great power could give. When the 
 Ambassador of Germany returned to you and asked for 
 your conditions, you formulated them in altogether special 
 circumstances. I at the same time again insisted with 
 Grey on the necessity of taking into consideration the new 
 situation created by the fault of Germany in consequence 
 
 » See above, p. 192. 
 
 * The motive of this action of the German Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg is explained in the Austrian Red Book (no. 42), which shows that 
 Austria urged Germany to threaten Russia with a counter-mobilization 
 if she mobilized even partially and only against Austria. The paramount 
 interest of the peace of Europe required that M. Sazonof should, like 
 Bismarck, remember that it was a case in which "Le plus sage c6de" (the 
 wiser yields), and not allow German threats to hasten or increase Russia's 
 preparations. 
 
248 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of the action of the German Ambassador. Grey replied 
 that he understood it, and that he would take these argu- 
 ments into consideration." (July 30, R. O. P. no. 64.) 
 
 When the Ambassador said to Sir Edward Grey that the 
 Russian conditions had been formulated under exceptional 
 circumstances, it was equivalent, in diplomatic language, 
 to saying that it was tantamount to an ultimatum. It was 
 at least a '* near "-ultimatum, even if not as "near" as was 
 the Austrian note to Servia. The conditions laid down by 
 Russia are seen to be that Austria should agree to allow 
 the powers to discuss and modify the terms of her note to 
 Servia. To have agreed to this would have humbled Aus- 
 tria in the eyes of the world. The Russian Minister cannot 
 for one moment have thought that Austria would accept 
 such a formula. President Poincar^ expressed to the Brit- 
 ish Ambassador his opinion that the ' conditions laid down 
 by Russia would not be accepted.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 30, B. W. P. no. 99.) The German Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs did not hesitate to declare that he con- 
 sidered the Russian (Sazonof) formula unacceptable for 
 Austria. (July 30, R. O. P. no. 63.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, speaking of the Sazonof formula in a 
 dispatch to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, said 
 that the Russian Ambassador feared that the conditions 
 laid down could not be modified, but Sir Edward's opinion 
 was that ' if the Austrian advances were stopped after the 
 occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the powers 
 would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria 
 without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independ- 
 ence. 
 
 'If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring 
 Servian territory, declared herself ready, in the interest of 
 European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how 
 a complete settlement could be arrived at, he hoped that 
 Russia would also consent to a discussion and suspension 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 249 
 
 of further military preparations, provided that the other 
 powers did the same. 
 
 *It was a slender chance of preserving peace, but the 
 only one he could suggest if _the Russian Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs could come to no agreement at Berlin.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 103.) 
 
 Upon receipt of Sir Edward Grey's request, M. Sazonof 
 'sent for the British and French Ambassadors and asked 
 them to telegraph to their respective governments the fol- 
 lowing formula, as best calculated to amalgamate the pro- 
 posal made by Sir Edward Grey in his telegram of July 30 
 (B. W. P. no. 103) with the formula the Russian Minister 
 had previously offered: ''If Austria will agree to check 
 the advance of her troops on Servian territory ; if, recogniz- 
 ing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has as- 
 sumed a character of European interest, she will allow the 
 great powers to look into the matter and determine 
 whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
 ernment without impairing her rights as a sovereign state 
 or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her 
 waiting attitude." ' ^ (Modified quotation and extract, 
 July 31, B. W. P. no. 120; R. 0. P. no. 67.) 
 
 August 1, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the modified 
 Russian proposal to Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin, and it 
 was communicated to the other powers. (B. W. P. no. 
 132.) 
 
 It must be remarked that this revised formula substi- 
 tutes for Russia's original offer ^'to stop all military opera- 
 tions" a promise "to maintain her waiting attitude." This 
 significant modification may have been due to the previ- 
 
 ^ The original French text is as follows: "Si I'Autriche consent h arrdter 
 la marche de ses armies sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le 
 conflit austro-serbe a assum^ le caract^re d'un question d'int^rfit europ6en, 
 elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la 
 Serbie pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser 
 porter atteinte b. ses droits d'Etat souverain et k son ind^pendance, — la 
 Russie s'engage k conserver son attitude expectante." (July 31, R. 0. P. 
 no. 67.) 
 
250 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ous issuance of an order for the general mobilization of the 
 Russian forces,^ which would have made it impracticable 
 to arrest the measures when once begun. The Russian 
 Government may also have felt more confident of Eng- 
 lish support and been unwilling to make a real concession 
 for the sake of peace. Those who sympathize with Russia 
 will consider M. Sazonof's action in modifying what was 
 virtually an ultimatum as a most conciliatory action on his 
 part, while the Russophobes will declare this action was 
 only taken to secure England's support, and that its in- 
 sincerity was shown by Russia's making no effort to arrest 
 her mobilization. The impartial critic must remember 
 that Germany could not possibly allow Russia to under- 
 take a general mobilization, so that Russia's promise not 
 to commence the war or commit any act of aggression has 
 the appearance more of an attempt to deceive the ignorant 
 than of an effort to calm the apprehensions of Germany. 
 At the very commencement of the crisis, Sir Edward Grey 
 had warned the Russian Government that Germany, to 
 avoid a surprise, must attack Russia if Russia mobilized, 
 and Von Jagow merely repeated what all intelligent ob- 
 servers knew, when he said to M. Jules Cambon that ' the 
 heads of the army were insisting on mobilization, for every 
 delay was a loss of strength for the German Army.' (Mod- 
 ified quotation, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 109; cf. F. Y. B. no. 
 105.) 
 
 Opinions may differ as to whether Germany and Aus- 
 tria had given Russia cause for her action, but I beheve an 
 examination of the events and the documents must lead to 
 the conclusion — 
 
 (1) That Russia, up to the 29th of July, did everything 
 that could reasonably be expected of her to satisfy Austria, 
 and preserve the peace. It is not going too far to say that 
 the first responsibility of allowing the difference to come to 
 a rupture must be laid at the door of Germany and Austria. 
 
 1 See above, chap, iv, § 7; chap, vi, § 4. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 251 
 
 (2) That when, between July 29 and 31, Germany 
 might perhaps have been ready to agree to the proposal 
 for mediation on the basis of Austria's occupation of Bel- 
 grade, Russia by undertaking more extensive military 
 preparations, practically forced Germany's retaliatory dec- 
 laration of war. 
 
 I know that it will be urged that Germany might still 
 have made some proposal to avert the rupture instead 
 of embittering the relations between the two countries 
 tlirough the accusations of her Ambassador and the insinu- 
 ations of her military attach^. If Germany on the one 
 hand had accepted at the last minute the English proposal 
 for mediation on the basis of Austria's occupation of Bel- 
 grade, she might very possibly have prevented war. Rus- 
 sia on the other hand was in a position to refrain from 
 mobilizing until she was actually attacked, especially since 
 the very condition of her slowness in mobihzing made it 
 relatively of small importance whether or not she gained 
 a start of a few hours more or less on her adversary. 
 
 In one other respect we must criticize the Russian state- 
 ments; that is, when they accuse the Germans of wishing 
 to drag matters out until they had completed military 
 preparations. This charge might have had some slight 
 foundation in regard to Austria's invasion of Servia, for un- 
 doubtedly, if Austria could have crushed Servia before she 
 had to cope with Russia, it would have been a very con- 
 siderable advantage; but the Servians, by retiring to the 
 mountains, would have made it impossible to vanquish 
 them quickly, and anyway, if Russia had taken more 
 pains to make it clear that she would restrict her mobiliza- 
 tion to the Austrian frontier, she could have blocked this 
 move of Austria's. As regards Germany, it does seem 
 unreasonable that she should be accused of delaying mat- 
 ters for the purpose of strengthening her position, when 
 it is an almost self-evident fact that every hour of delay 
 would cost her dear. No; we can only explain what Russia 
 
252 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 would designate as German temporization, on the ground 
 either that Germany thought it possible that an accept- 
 able solution might be found without recourse to arms, or 
 else that she feared to have her action appear so aggres- 
 sive as to alienate a large part of her people. It hardly 
 seems that the latter reason had much force, and we must 
 conclude that up to the date of Russia's more extensive 
 mobilization Germany believed in the possibility of main- 
 taining peace. 
 
 12. Austria agrees to mediation 
 We have seen how Russia, acting on the suggestion of 
 Germany, first proposed direct conversations in place of 
 the mediation conference at London to which Sir Edward 
 Grey had invited the powers, and how Sir Edward held 
 his proposal in abeyance to await the result of the direct 
 negotiations, while the powers continued at the same time 
 to exert their influence for peace and moderation at 
 Vienna and St. Petersburg. Austria, however, was deter- 
 mined to prevent any mediation for the purpose of dis- 
 cussing and modifying her note to Servia; accordingly she 
 refused to accept the idea of the conference first suggested 
 by Sir Edward Grey, and rejected Russia's proposal for 
 direct conversations. Then from the powers came various 
 formulas or suggestions as bases for mediation, and Ger- 
 many at the same time continued her efforts to prevail 
 upon Austria to accept direct negotiations; ^ but just when 
 
 * The German White Book gives a series of telegrams exchanged between 
 the Kaiser and the Tsar. On July 28 at 10.45 p.m., the Kaiser sent a telegram 
 informing the Tsar of his efforts to induce Austria to "come to a frank and 
 satisfactory understanding with Russia." (G. W. B. exhibit 20.) The 
 Kaiser emphasized their common interest in repressing regicide and ap- 
 pealed to the Tsar to cooperate with him. This telegram seems to have 
 crossed with one the Tsar sent the Kaiser next day (July 29) at 1 p.m., in 
 which he expressed great indignation at Austria's action in declaring war on 
 Servia, and asked the Kaiser to help him ' in the name of their old friend- 
 ship to do everything in his power to prevent his ally from going too far.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 21.) To this the German 
 Emperor replied that same afternoon (July 29) at 6.30 p.m., defending 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 253 
 
 this had been accompUshed/ Russia's attitude, so extraor- 
 dinarily conciUatory hitherto, changed, and in reply to the 
 
 Austria's action and declaring his opinion that Russia might remain an 
 onlooker while the Austro-Servian War continued. He further warned the 
 Tsar that military preparations, which might be construed as a menace to 
 Austria, would be apt to precipitate a crisis and undermine the Kaiser's 
 mediatory action, which the Kaiser said he had willingly undertaken upon 
 the Tsar's appeal to his friendship for assistance. (July 29, G. W. B. ex- 
 hibit 22.) This was followed a few hours later (July 30, 1 a.m.) by another 
 telegram in which the Kaiser, having received notice of the Russian mobili- 
 zation against Austria, warned the Tsar that such action on Russia's part 
 might make his position as mediator impossible. The Kaiser ended by de- 
 claring that the responsibility of deciding for war or peace lay with the 
 Tsar. (July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 23.) On this same day (July 30, at 1.20 
 P.M.) the Tsar sent another telegram. (This was evidently dispatched by the 
 Tsar before he had received the Kaiser's telegram of July 30, since Nich- 
 olas thanked the Kaiser for his quick reply which must refer to the Kaiser's 
 telegram of July 29.) Therein the Tsar explained that the measures taking 
 place had been decided upon five days ago and were necessary in response 
 to Austria's preparations. He expressed the hope that the Kaiser would 
 not let them affect his mediatory action, which Russia appreciated very 
 highly (July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 23a). On the next day (July 31), the 
 Kaiser and Tsar each sent telegrams at 2 p.m., which therefore crossed. 
 The Tsar declared that it was impossible to arrest the mobilization, but 
 that his troops would not undertake any provocative action (G. W. B. 
 memorandum, p. 8.) The Kaiser accused Russia of making serious prepa- 
 rations for war on his eastern frontier, thus forcing Germany to have re- 
 course to counter-measures of defense. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.) 
 It is possible that the menacing tone of the Kaiser's last telegram influ- 
 enced the Russian Government to take the premature and ever-to-be- 
 regretted step of ordering a general mobilization. 
 
 The Russian Government did not apprise France or England of the issu- 
 ance of her order for general mobilization, but telegrams were exchanged 
 between Prince Henry of Prussia and King George, on July 30, and on the 
 next day the Kaiser telegraphed King George that Russia had ordered the 
 mobilization of her entire fleet and army. (See pp. 28-29 of the Authorized 
 American Edition of the German White Book published by the Fatherland.) 
 August 1, at 1.30 in the morning, Mr. Asquith was received by King George 
 (London Times, Aug. 3), and two hours later (3.30 a.m.) Sir Edward Grey 
 telegraphed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to apply at once 
 for an audience with the Tsar and to convey to him the following personal 
 message from the King: — 
 
 " My Government has received the following statement from the German 
 Government : — 
 
 " ' On July 29, the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by 
 telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immedi- 
 ately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor 
 
 ^ See above, § 4. 
 
254 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 menacing words of Count Pourtales, the German Ambassa- 
 dor, relative to Russia's mobilization, she stated, almost in 
 
 of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without 
 waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilized against Austria. By 
 telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that 
 hereby his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor 
 further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations 
 against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the Ger- 
 man Government continued its mediation in Vienna. In this matter the Ger- 
 man Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested 
 to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by 
 the German Government in Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines 
 suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended 
 them in Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into 
 consideration in Vienna this morning. Diu-ing the deliberations of the 
 (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were concluded, the German Am- 
 bassador in St. Petersburg reported the mobilization of the entire Russian 
 army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia, the Austrian 
 answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under con- 
 sideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed 
 against Germany — that is to say, the power whose mediation had been 
 invoked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious 
 counter-measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, 
 unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our country. We are un- 
 able to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilization on our frontier. 
 We have therefore informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to sus- 
 pend within twelve hours the warlike measures against Germany and Aus- 
 tria, we should be obliged to mobilize, and this would mean war. We have 
 asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.' 
 
 "I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this 
 deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the 
 terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore 
 make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel 
 must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and pos- 
 sible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important 
 purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the inter- 
 rupted conversations between the powers concerned. I feel confident that 
 you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure 
 the peace of the world." 
 
 To this the Tsar replied: — 
 
 " I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambas- 
 sador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. 
 Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted 
 all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Aus- 
 tria's action. Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a 
 vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power 
 in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, 
 including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, 
 and it was only when favorable moment for bringing pressure to bear on 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 255 
 
 the form of an ultimatum to Austria, what would be her 
 conditions. According to the terms of these, Austria must 
 agree to the mediation of the powers for the purpose of 
 modifying the Austrian note. From the beginning Austria 
 had refused all such proposals and there was Uttle likeli- 
 hood that she would accept the first Sazonof formula; the 
 modified Sazonof formula, however, was less humihating 
 for her. 
 
 On July 30, Count Berchtold told the Russian Ambassa- 
 dor at Vienna that ''he had no objection to the Russian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador 
 at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although 
 he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of 
 the Servian reply." (Extract, July 30, B. W. P. no. 96; 
 cf. F. Y. B. no. 104.) 
 
 Count Berchtold sent instructions that same day (July 
 30) to Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassadorjat St. 
 Petersburg, to ''elucidate to M. Sazonof the various 
 points of the note addressed to Servia, though it has been 
 superseded by later events." (Extract, July 30, A. R. B. 
 no. 49.) 
 
 On July 31, M. Sazonof instructed the Russian Ambas- 
 sador at London that 'he thought it was only at London 
 
 Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. 
 Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declara- 
 tion of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilization, though, in 
 view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a 
 general mobilization owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilize 
 in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this coiu"se 
 in consequence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the bombardment of 
 Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret mili- 
 tary preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing 
 BO is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite un- 
 e.xpected by me, as I had given most categorical assurances to the Emperor 
 William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations 
 continued. 
 
 "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done 
 all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust 
 your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and 
 protect you." (London Times, August 5, 1914.) 
 
256 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 that the pourparlers would still have some chance of suc- 
 cess by facilitating Austria's acquiescence in a necessary 
 compromise.' (Modified quotation, July 31, R. 0. P. no. 
 69; cf. A. R. B. no. 56.) 
 
 We have seen how the German Government, yielding 
 to the representations of Sir Edward Grey, had asked 
 Vienna, on July 30, what would satisfy them.^ (B. W. P. 
 no. 107.) 
 
 In reply Count Berchtold sent next day (July 31), the 
 following dispatch to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin: 
 
 " I request Yoiu* Excellency to thank the Secretary of 
 State most deeply for the information transmitted to us 
 through Herr von Tchirsky and to tell him that we, in 
 spite of the change in the situation occasioned by Russia's] 
 mobilization, would be willing to cooperate with Sir E.i 
 Grey in his proposal to mediate between ourselves and 
 Servia. 
 
 "Our acceptance would naturally be upon the condi- 
 tions that our military operations against Servia shall] 
 meanwhile take their course, and that the English Cabinet] 
 prevail upon the Russian Government to arrest the Rus- 
 sian mobilization against us, in which case we would natu-] 
 rally at once countermand in Galicia the defensive militai 
 measures forced upon us by Russia's mobilization." ^] 
 (Extract, July 31, A. R. B. no. 51.) 
 
 On July 31, Sir Edward Grey learned from the German] 
 Ambassador at London that, 'as a result of suggestions 
 by the German Government, a conversation had taken] 
 place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign] 
 Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Am- 
 bassador at St. Petersburg had also been instructed that] 
 he might converse with the Russian Minister for ForeignJ 
 
 1 See above, p. 233. 
 
 2 The French Ambassador questions the sincerity of Austria's acceptance! 
 of mediation. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 121. See above, p. 260.) This same viewl 
 is suggested as probable by Durkheim and Denis, Who Wanted War?\ 
 Colin, Paris, 1915, p. 55, note 1. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 257 
 
 Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the 
 Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions 
 and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian rela- 
 tions/ (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 110. 
 Cf. A. R. B. nos. 49, 50.) 
 
 On this same date (July 31), Sir Edward received a tele- 
 gram, dispatched that day from the British Ambassador 
 at St. Petersburg, stating: — 
 
 "It has been decided to issue orders for general mobil- 
 ization. 
 
 "This decision was taken in consequence of report 
 received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the ef- 
 fect that Austria is determined not to yield to interven- 
 tion of powers, and that she is moving troops against 
 Russia as well as against Servia. 
 
 "Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is 
 making active military preparations, and she cannot afford 
 to let her get a start." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 113.) 
 
 On August 1, the following telegram from M. Sazonof, 
 dated July 31, was communicated to Sir Edward Grey 
 and the Governments of the other powers : — 
 
 "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readi- 
 ness of his Government to discuss the substance of the 
 Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by ex- 
 pressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the 
 discussions should take place in London with the partici- 
 pation of the great powers. 
 
 "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would 
 assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of 
 Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very im- 
 portant that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provi- 
 sionally to her mihtary action on Servian territory." 
 (August 1, B. W. P. no. 133.) 
 
 On August 1, the same day that M. Sazonof 's telegram 
 of July 31 was communicated to Sir Edward Grey, he tele- 
 graphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg: — 
 
258 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ''Information reaches me from a most reliable source 
 that Austrian Government have informed German Gov- 
 ernment that, though the situation has been changed by 
 the mobilization of Russia, they would in full appreciation 
 of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be 
 ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation 
 between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this 
 acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military 
 action against Servia would continue for the present, and 
 that the British Government would urge upon Russian 
 Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed 
 against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally 
 cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Gali- 
 cia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian 
 mobilization. 
 
 '^You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
 say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of medi- 
 ation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, 
 it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Pre- 
 sumably the matter should be discussed with German 
 Government, also by Russian Government." (August 1, 
 B. W. P. no. 135.) 
 
 The following dispatch, dated August 1, sent by M. 
 Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs and respon- 
 sible head of the Government, to the French representa- 
 tives abroad, gives an account of the Austrian action: — 
 
 ''Two steps were taken yesterday evening by the Aus- 
 trian Ambassadors : one rather vague at Paris, and the 
 other at St. Petersburg definite and conciliatory. 
 
 "Count Szecsen called upon me and declared that the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed 
 Russia that it entertained no territorial ambition and 
 would not touch the sovereignty of the State of Servia; 
 that it also repudiated all intention of occupying the 
 Sandjak; but that these declarations of disinterestedness 
 would only preserve their value if the war remained local- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 259 
 
 ized to Austria and to Servia, a European war opening up 
 eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The 
 Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these declara- 
 tions, let it be understood that although his Government 
 could not reply to the questions of the powers speaking 
 in their own names, it could doubtless reply to Servia 
 or to a power which asked its conditions on behalf of Ser- 
 via. He added that here there might perhaps still be a 
 possibility. 
 
 ''In St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on 
 M. Sazonof and communicated to him the consent of his 
 Government to enter upon a discussion as to the basis of 
 the ultimatum addressed to Servia. The Russian Minister 
 declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and pro- 
 posed that the conversations should take place in London 
 with the participation of the powers. M. Sazonof had 
 doubtless asked the British Government to take over the 
 direction of the negotiations. He pointed out that it 
 would be very important that Austria should cease her 
 operations in Servia. 
 
 "These facts show that Austria at last says that she 
 is inclined to an arrangement, just as the Russian Gov- 
 ernment is also ready to enter into negotiations on the 
 basis of the English proposal.^ 
 
 "Unfortunately these dispositions, which might justify 
 hope in a pacific solution, appear in fact bound to be an- 
 nulled by Germany's attitude. This power has, indeed, 
 delivered an ultimatum giving the Russian Government 
 twelve hours in which to agree to demobilization not only 
 on the German frontier, but also on the Austrian frontier. 
 This period expires at noon. The ultknatum is not justi- 
 fied, since Russia has accepted the English proposal, which 
 implies a suspension of military preparations by all the 
 powers." 2 (Extract, August 1, F. Y. B. no. 120.) 
 
 ^ The Cambon suggestion. See § 9, ante. 
 
 * It is not clear to what acceptance M. Viviani refers; Russia had given 
 
260 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, in his 
 dispatch of August 1, says: — 
 
 ''My Russian colleague yesterday evening received two 
 telegrams from M, Sazonof advising him that the Austrian 
 Ambassador in St. Petersburg stated that the Austrian 
 Government was ready to discuss with the Russian Gov- 
 ernment the basis even of the note to Servia. M. Sazonof 
 replied that in his opinion these conversations should take 
 place in London. 
 
 "The ultimatum to Russia can but lessen the last 
 chances of peace which seem to be held out by these con- 
 versations. It may be asked if in such circumstances 
 Austria's acceptance was serious, and if its aim were not 
 to make the responsibility for the struggle fall upon 
 Russia. 
 
 ''To-night my British colleague has made a pressing 
 appeal to Herr von Jagow's sentiments of humanity. 
 The latter repHed that the question was too involved, 
 and that the Russian reply to the German ultimatum must 
 be awaited. Moreover, he said to Sir E. Goschen that 
 the ultimatum demanded the withdrawal of Russian 
 mobilization not only against Germany, but also against 
 Austria. My British colleague showed himself more than 
 surprised, and told him that this last point appeared to be 
 unacceptable to Russia. 
 
 "The ultimatum of Germany, intervening just at the 
 exact time at which agreement appeared on the point of 
 being estabhshed between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is 
 significant of her bellicose policy. 
 
 a qualified acceptance of "anything arranged by the foiu: powers, provided 
 it was acceptable to Servia" (B.W. P. no. 78) ; but Russia had not agreed to 
 arrest her mobilization. Furthermore this assertion that Russia had 
 accepted the English proposal does not correspond with the statement a few 
 lines above that the Russian Government was ready to negotiate on the 
 basis of the English proposal. (Cf. also the German Chancellor's note of 
 December 24, 1914, to the German representatives, New York Times, 
 January 15, 1915; and Dr. Karl Helfferich's article in the New York Times, 
 March 14, 1915.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 261 
 
 ''The dispute existed only between Russia and Austria, 
 Germany having to intervene only as the ally of Austria. 
 In these conditions the two powers chiefly interested 
 being ready to talk, if Germany did not want war on her 
 own account, it would be incomprehensible that she should 
 send an ultimatum to Russia, instead of continuing to 
 work like all the other powers for a peaceful solution." 
 (August 1, F. Y. B. no. 121.) 
 
 According to the report of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Brit- 
 ish Ambassador at Vienna, after July 30, when Count 
 Berchtold 'gave his consent to the continuation of the 
 conversations at St. Petersburg, the tension between 
 Russia and Germany was much greater than between 
 Russia and Austria. As between the latter, the Ambassa- 
 dor stated, an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and 
 on the 1st of August, he was informed by the Russian 
 Ambassador that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg had at last conceded the main point at issue, by 
 announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to 
 submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which 
 seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian 
 independence. The Russian Ambassador stated that M. 
 Sazonof had accepted this proposal on condition that Aus- 
 tria would refrain from actual invasion of Servia. Austria, 
 in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at 
 this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the 
 communication made to Sir Edward Grey on the 1st of 
 August by the Austrian Ambassador at London, to the 
 effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on 
 compromise nor cut off the conversations. The Russian 
 Ambassador to the end worked hard for peace. He em- 
 ployed the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, 
 and he informed Sir Maurice that Count Berchtold as well 
 as Count Forgach, the Austrian Under-Secretary, had 
 responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much 
 for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her 
 
262 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 armies; but this matter could probably have been settled 
 by negotiation, and the Russian Ambassador repeatedly 
 told Sir Maurice that he was prepared to accept any rea- 
 sonable compromise. 
 
 'Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg 
 and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute 
 to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between 
 Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st of 
 July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg 
 and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only 
 one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on 
 Russia on the 1st, and on France on the 3d of August. 
 A few days' delay might in all probability have saved 
 Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.' 
 (Modified quotation, September 1, B. W. P., Miscellane- 
 ous, no. 10, p. 3.) 
 
 It is important to compare these statements with the 
 reports which the Austrian Ambassador sent from St. 
 Petersburg. On July 31, Count Szapary telegraphed Count 
 Berchtold: ''Your Excellency will have learned from my 
 telegram of the 29th that I, without awaiting instructions, 
 had resumed conversations with Sazonof practically on 
 the basis now suggested by you, without coming notice- 
 ably closer to an understanding." (Extract, July 31, 
 A. R. B. no. 55.) The next day, August 1, he sent the 
 following report : — 
 
 "On my visit to M. Sazonof to-day, I declared that I 
 had received certain instructions, but that I was not aware 
 of the situation created in Vienna by the Russian general 
 mobilization. 
 
 "Therefore, in carrying out the instructions which had 
 been dispatched to me before that event, I could not take 
 into account the newly created situation. I said that the 
 two points of your instructions dealt with the misun- 
 derstanding arising out of our refusal to discuss mat- 
 ters any further with Russia. As I had said, even before 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 263 
 
 I was authorized to do so, this conception was erroneous. 
 I pointed out that you were not only wiUing to enter into 
 negotiations with Russia on a most comprehensive basis, 
 but even to discuss the wording of our note, inasmuch as it 
 was only a question of interpretation. 
 
 "I emphasized the point that your instructions once 
 more bore out your good intentions; that I was still ignor- 
 ant of the effect produced in Vienna by the Russian general 
 mobilization, and that I could but hope that events might 
 not yet have carried us too far. In any case I considered 
 it my duty at the present momentous juncture to furnish 
 another proof of the good-will of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government. 
 
 ''M. Sazonof, in reply, expressed his satisfaction at this 
 evidence of our good intentions, but observed that for 
 obvious reasons the neutral ground of London would 
 promise better success for the proposed negotiations than 
 St. Petersburg. I replied that you desired to be in direct 
 touch with St. Petersburg, and that I was consequently 
 unable to give an opinion on the suggestion, but would not 
 fail to convey it to you." (August 1, A. R. B., no. 56.) 
 
 These dispatches do not bear out the statements of MM. 
 Viviani, Cambon, and de Bunsen, that Austria and Russia 
 were on the point of a settlement when the German ulti- 
 matum to Russia intervened. Austria was willing to give 
 assurances to Russia that she would not impinge upon 
 either the territorial integrity or the sovereignty of Servia. 
 She would not, however, agree to any modification of the 
 terms of the ultimatum, and insisted upon pursuing her 
 military operations until the ultimatum had been accepted 
 without condition by Servia. Austria had announced that 
 it would not be enough for Servia to accept the terms of the 
 original ultimatum after war had been declared, but that 
 she would have to give, beside, security to indemnify 
 Austria for the expense incurred in mobilizing. (Of. 
 A. R. B. no. 17.) 
 
264 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 At the last moment, July 31 (see A. R. B. no. 51), 
 Austria agreed to consider the Servian answer as a basis 
 for negotiation, on condition (1) that she continue her 
 military operations against Servia, and (2) that Russia 
 demobilize. On her side Austria would then arrest her 
 preparations in Galicia. It does not appear whether 
 Austria also would have agreed to arrest her advance after 
 she had taken Belgrade. If Russia had demobiUzed, 
 Austria might have found some new excuse for continuing 
 her conquest, and Russia would then have been in no 
 position to make her protest heard. 
 
 Under the circumstances, the Russian Government could 
 not have demobilized against Austria, and it would have 
 been very difficult for it to remain passive while Austria 
 invaded Servia. It is possible that the fear which Russia 
 may have had that the other powers would ask her to make 
 that sacrifice for the cause of peace hastened the issuance 
 of the general mobilization order after the German Am- 
 bassador had threatened a counter-mobilization. At that 
 point both Austria and Russia were playing for the support 
 of the other powers. When Germany, instigated by Aus- 
 tria, threatened Russia, July 29, Russia replied by draw- 
 ing the attention of England and France to the undiplo- 
 matic course pursued by the German Ambassador and, 
 on the 31st, issued the order for a general mobilization.^ 
 
 13. The failure to reach a compromise 
 The principal efforts of the diplomatists had been di- 
 rected towards securing some solution in regard to the 
 Servian question which would satisfy both Austria and 
 Russia. The powers were able neither to find an acceptable 
 compromise nor to reach any agreement as to the method 
 of procedure for continuing the search further. Media- 
 tion had been suggested and refused. Direct conversations 
 
 ^ French authorities argue that Austria mobilized before Russia. See 
 Durkheim and Denis, Who Wanted War? p. 40, note 2. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 265 
 
 had been accepted by Austria and Russia and then termi- 
 nated because Austria was unwilling to discuss any modi- 
 fication of her terms as laid down to Servia. Meanwhile 
 the various military preparations had increased the ten- 
 sion and diminished the chance of reaching a peaceful solu- 
 tion, while at the same time stimulating the diplomats 
 in their final efforts to find some acceptable compromise. 
 Various formulas were suggested, but in the confusion of 
 the last two or three days it is not possible to decide with 
 any definiteness how far they might have been acceptable 
 if further time for peaceful discussion could have been 
 found. 1 On July 30, Austria, at the soUcitation of Ger- 
 many, explained to Russia that she was ready to elucidate 
 the terms of her note to Servia and to continue direct nego- 
 tiations with Russia, and Russia on this same day modified 
 the conditions she had laid down in her first formula, but 
 no longer agreed to arrest her military preparations. This 
 Sazonof formula, as we have seen, required Austria to 
 accept the mediation of the powers and eliminate from 
 her ultimatum those conditions which were incompatible 
 with the maintenance of Servian independence and in- 
 tegrity. The next day (July 31), just after Germany had 
 launched her ultimatum requiring Russia to demobilize, Sir 
 Edward Grey brought forward his final proposal, which 
 was that Austria and Russia should arrest their military 
 preparations, on the understanding that the powers would 
 
 * The situation was characterized by the Paris Journal des Debats a8 
 follows: "All these formulae of the old Chancelleries have had their day. 
 Let us consider facts only. The Triple Alliance has challenged the Triple 
 Entente. The German Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg 
 have just supported the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, declaring that the 
 Governments to which they were accredited must, under penalty of incal- 
 culable consequences, allow Austria to enslave Servia. The Cabinets at St. 
 Petersburg, Paris, and London have replied in courteous terms that they 
 would not allow this crime to be consummated. It has gone as far as that. 
 All the formulae in the world will not change the situation. Austria-Ger- 
 many must effectively renounce the execution of her plan or the two forces 
 will come face to face." (Extract, July 31, 1914, Journal des Debats, Paris, 
 "Le Dessein Austro-Allemand,") 
 
266 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 work to find some solution satisfactory alike to Austria 
 and Russia. According to these terms Austria would 
 receive adequate guaranty against the continuance of 
 the hostile Servian propaganda and unfriendly action of 
 Servia, of which she justly complained. With due regard 
 to the rights of Servia and the prestige of her mighty pro- 
 tector, nothing would be accepted which should infringe 
 upon Servia' s rights as a sovereign state. It was Sir Ed- 
 ward's thought that Germany might support this pro- 
 posal at Vienna while the other powers entered into a 
 friendly discussion at London, but although the German 
 Government expressed a favorable opinion of this proposal, 
 the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Von Jagow, refused to 
 cooperate at Vienna until an answer to the German ulti- 
 matum should be received from Russia. This dashed all 
 hopes, since it was hardly likely that Russia would make 
 a conciliatory reply to an ultimatum couched in such 
 terms. 
 
 It is hard to overestimate the place which compromise 
 plays in the affairs of nations. But for the system of 
 mutual "give and take," all international intercourse were 
 well-nigh impossible, and except where there is an inten- 
 tion to force an issue, in all disputes the governments con- 
 cerned are ready to concede something of their extreme 
 claims for the sake of reaching a half-way and peaceful 
 result.^ It is the work of the diplomatist to trace this line, 
 
 * Cf . R. O. P. no. 51, where Von Jagow told the Russian Ambassador at 
 Berlin that he learned that M. Sazonof was "more inclined than previously 
 to find a compromise acceptable to all parties." M. Sazonof had said to 
 the German Ambassador that, "after the concessions which had been made 
 by Servia, it should not be very diflBcult to find a compromise to settle the 
 other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed 
 some good-will and that all the powers used their entire influence in the 
 direction of conciliation." (Extract, July 29, B. W. P. no. 92 (2).) 
 
 Such evidently was not the frame of mind of Baron von Giesl, the Aus- 
 trian Minister at Belgrade, when two days before the presentation of the 
 Austrian ultimatum he wrote to Vienna: "Half measures, demands, end- 
 less debating, and finally a foul compromise, would be the hardest blow to 
 Austria-Hungary's prestige in Servia and her standing as a great power 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 267 
 
 and for such negotiations a certain length of time is neces- 
 sary. The more complex and delicate the situation, the 
 longer must be the period allowed. In the present in- 
 stance the diplomats reaUzed from the very first that in 
 place of weeks, a few days would have to suffice to effect 
 the work of peace. The task would have been difficult 
 enough in an atmosphere of general confidence and good 
 will, but was rendered impossible by the mutual rivalries 
 and distrust of the powers. In his speech in the House 
 of Commons, August 3, Sir Edward Grey said : — 
 
 ''In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure 
 the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, 
 and there has been a disposition — at any rate in some 
 quarters on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly 
 to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as 
 we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace, 
 as far as the great powers (generally) are concerned, is in 
 danger. ..." 
 
 in Europe." (Extract, July 21, A. R. B. no. 6.) The Austrian Government 
 seem to have taken these words to heart. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 SIR EDWARD GREY AND THE ENGLISH DIPLOMACY 
 
 The important r61e of England — Efforts to prevent war — Efforts to 
 organize mediation — England refuses to take sides — The Anglo-French 
 Entente — England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan ques- 
 tion — England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if France is 
 mvolved — Germany's bid for English neutrality — Divergence of opinion 
 In England — England's vital interests — England's inquiry relative to 
 Belgium's neutrality — England asked to guarantee the neutrality of France 
 
 — Germany's detention of English vessels — Germany invades Luxembm-g 
 
 — England agrees to protect the French coasts — The British ultimatum. 
 
 1 . The important rdle of England 
 In the midst of all these preparations, mobilizations and 
 counter-mobilizations, England with her First Fleet assem- 
 bled at Portsmouth was the key to the whole European 
 situation. The fears of Austria and Germany and the 
 hopes of France and Russia centered about the probable 
 course of England. No other state was so free from entan- 
 gling alliances, none was so secure from invasion, and in 
 case of war, no state as a neutral would have had such an 
 opportunity for commercial expansion. But England, hav- 
 ing built up an imimense empire, required security above 
 everything ; so her first desire was to prevent the outbreak 
 of any war between the powers, and if this should not be 
 possible, she still hoped to keep out of it herself. 
 
 At this critical juncture the control of England's foreign 
 affairs was in the experienced hands of the broad-minded 
 and large-framed statesman — Sir Edward Grey.^ In the 
 short period between the presentation of the Austrian note 
 at Belgrade and the British ultimatum at Berlin, Sir 
 
 1 Sir Edward Grey, third baronet, was born April 25, 1862. He was edu- 
 cated at Balliol College, Oxford, and has been a member of the Liberal party 
 in Parliament since 1885. In 1892 he became Under-Secretary for Foreign 
 Affairs, holding office three years. Since 1905 he has held the office of Secre- 
 tary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 i 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 269 
 
 Edward is shown by the British White Paper to have had 
 a constant succession of interviews, and to have sent nearly 
 sixty dispatches to the British representatives at the cap- 
 itals of the great powers. Together with this great tax on 
 his time and energy went the heaviest responsibility which 
 has ever fallen to any single man. Under ordinary circum- 
 stances the responsibility of the British Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs is heavy enough, when he can refer to 
 his colleagues and gauge the trend of opinion in his party 
 or throughout the country as a whole; but when events 
 move with such rapidity as they did just preceding the 
 outbreak of the present war, he has to make almost instan- 
 taneous decisions on very important questions, where any 
 misstep may destroy confidence in his party or even in- 
 volve his country in war. He has to decide what the coun- 
 try wishes and what the country needs, and act upon it 
 forthwith. It is easily understood that Sir Edward Grey's 
 first object must have been to prevent the outbreak of war, 
 but he had at the same time to be working to keep Eng- 
 land out of the war should it prove inevitable. His great 
 responsibility lay in deciding which plans or methods to 
 follow. He had to be sure that he took no step without the 
 support of a Cabinet which was torn by conflicting views; 
 he had further to feel certain that the policy adopted would 
 secure a large non-partisan majority in Parliament and be 
 enthusiastically acclaimed by the press and the whole 
 country. Not a very easy problem in statecraft, as we 
 shall see when we come to examine the intricacies of the 
 political situation and the sudden transformations during 
 the fortnight preceding the declaration of war against 
 Germany. 
 
 In the critical week following the presentation of the 
 Austrian ultimatum, the diplomats tried one plan after 
 another, and one plan in conjunction with another, and 
 always it was Sir Edward Grey to whom they turned from 
 all sides. 
 
270 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 2. Efforts to prevent war 
 Sir Edward turned his attention from the very first to 
 preventing war between any of the principal powers. As 
 he observed to the German Ambassador at London, 
 "When there was danger of a Em-opean conflict, it was 
 impossible to say who would not be drawn into it." (B. 
 W. P. no. 90.) He made suggestions, he fathered the pro- 
 posals of others, he was ceaseless in his efforts for peace. 
 He first advised Austria against an ultimatum, explaining 
 how it would be likely to inflame public opinion in Russia, 
 and could, he said, be introduced later if Servian pro- 
 crastination made it necessary. When he learned that the 
 time limit of the ultimatum was only forty-eight hours, he 
 had recourse to the telegraph, and worked with France, 
 Russia, and Italy in an attempt to prevail upon Austria, 
 either directly or through the mediation of her ally, Ger- 
 many, to extend the delay long enough to permit of find- 
 ing some way out of the threatening compHcations. When 
 Germany refused to join in making the representations 
 at Vienna, and Austria refused the requested extension. 
 Sir Edward instructed the British representative at Bel- 
 grade to bend his efforts toward securing a conciliatory 
 reply from Servia. So successful was the combined influ- 
 ence of Russia, England, and France that for a moment 
 it seemed as if Austria must accept Servia's reply, and 
 forego the war for which her people were clamoring; but 
 in spite of all the persuasion lavished upon her, Austria 
 pronounced the reply unacceptable.^ 
 
 3. Efforts to organize mediation 
 While all this was taking place. Sir Edward Grey had 
 been striving to set up a mediatory conference at London, 
 
 ^ Some of the indications of England's disposition to exercise a pacific 
 and restraining influence at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg will be 
 found in the following dispatches: B. W. P. nos. 5, 6, 11, 17, 18, 30, 44, 46, 
 65, 72, 104, 110, 111; A. R. B. no. 38. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 271 
 
 and as soon as he found that several of the powers ap- 
 proved the project, he issued the formal invitation and 
 asked the accepting Governments to urge upon Belgrade, 
 Vienna, and St. Petersburg to refrain from all aggressive 
 action until the conference should be able to arrive at 
 some solution. Germany agreed to mediation in principle, 
 and declared that she was ready to cooperate in media- 
 tion if necessary to keep the peace between Austria and 
 Russia, but said emphatically that Austria and Servia must 
 be allowed to settle their difference without interference 
 from other powers. In place of the British proposal, the 
 German Government suggested to Russia that the Austro- 
 Russian disagreement over the Servian question be made 
 the object of direct conversations. Russia accepted with 
 alacrity, and Sir Edward Grey held his mediation proposal 
 in abeyance in the hope that the direct negotiation might 
 succeed. These conversations were suddenly interrupted 
 when Austria, as if fearing that the negotiations might be 
 successful in robbing her of an excuse for war against Ser- 
 via, declared that she could not discuss any modification of 
 the terms of the Servian reply, and put Em-ope face to face 
 with a fait accompli by declaring war against Servia. Rus- 
 sia refused to be satisfied by Austria's assurances that she 
 would not impair Servia's independence, and now again 
 Russia, France, and Italy turned to Sir Edward Grey, 
 imploring him to renew his proposal for conferences at 
 London as the only hope of averting war. But Germany 
 again raised objections — she felt that she could not drag 
 her ally before a European tribunal, which would sit in 
 judgment on matters interesting only Austria and Servia. 
 The British Foreign Minister hastened to explain that the 
 conference would not be of so formal a nature, and that 
 nothing would be proposed which had not first been sub- 
 mitted to both Austria and Russia for their approval. In 
 the vain effort to find some basis of mediation acceptable 
 to Austria, it was even suggested that Austria might save 
 
272 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 her face by occup5dng Belgrade, and that she might there 
 agree to a discussion of the terms of settlement. 
 
 The natural consequence of Germany's objections and 
 Austria's aggression on Servia had been to call forth a 
 partial mobilization from Russia. When the German 
 Chancellor had previously appealed to Sir Edward Grey 
 to put pressure upon Russia, he had replied in no uncertain 
 terms, warning Germany of her responsibility for backing 
 Austria in her uncompromising attitude, and pointing out 
 that Vienna was the place where a restraining influence 
 was needed. (Of. R. O. P. no. 42.) Germany seems to 
 have felt the justice or at least the seriousness of these 
 remarks, and to have spoken at Vienna. Whether as a 
 consequence of this influence from Berlin, or because she 
 perceived too late that England was likely to be drawn 
 into the war, the Austrian Government assumed a much 
 more conciliatory attitude, and renewed direct negotia- 
 tions with Russia. The powers had now faint hope of suc- 
 cess from these conversations, and made every effort to 
 bring Germany into a conference at London. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey asked Germany herself, since she had 
 agreed to mediation "in principle," to suggest the form it 
 should take, to "press the button," as the British Minister 
 expressed it. When this offer evoked no response from 
 Berlin, except that the Chancellor to save time had passed 
 it on directly to Austria, Sir Edward came forward with 
 the Marquis di San Giuliano's plan that Servia should 
 accept Austria's demands in their entirety, Austria giving 
 to the powers certain explanations as to their meaning and 
 effects.^ When this fell flat, Sir Edward Grey was ready 
 to ask that Austria should herself suggest an acceptable 
 formula, which would have given the conference more the 
 appearance of an Austrian commission, working to help 
 Austria solve her difficulties, than an Areopagus sitting 
 
 ^ See above, chap, vii, § 10, pp. 240-242, where Sir Edward Grey's offer 
 and the Chancellor's reply are given. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 273 
 
 in judgment over the prostrate Dual Monarchy. Sir Ed- 
 ward went so far as to say to the German Ambassador at 
 London that 'if Germany could get any reasonable pro- 
 posal put forward which made it clear that Germany and 
 Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and 
 that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they re- 
 jected it, he would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, 
 and go the length of saying that if Russia and France 
 would not accept it, the British Government would have 
 nothing more to do with the consequences.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 111.) 
 
 4. England refuses to take sides 
 From the very beginning, France and Russia had been 
 urging England to stand with them, on the ground that it 
 would deter Germany from entering upon a war. The day 
 that he learned the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, 
 M. Sazonof joined the French Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg 'in pressing the British representative for a declara- 
 tion of complete solidarity of his Government with the 
 French and Russian Governments. The Ambassador 
 replied that it seemed to him possible that Sir Edward 
 Grey might perhaps be willing to make strong representa- 
 tions to both the German and Austrian Governments, and 
 to impress upon them that an attack upon Servia by 
 Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Per- 
 haps he might see his way to saying to them that such 
 action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian 
 intervention, which would involve France and Germany, 
 and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out 
 if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered 
 that England would sooner or later be dragged into war 
 if it did break out ; and that England would have rendered 
 war more likely if she did not from the outset make com- 
 mon cause with his country and with France; at any rate, 
 he hoped the British Government would express strong 
 
274 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 reprobation of the action taken by Austria.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6; cf. B. W. P. no. 24.) 
 
 The next day (July 25), M. Sazonof further said to the 
 British Ambassador that 'he did not believe that Germany 
 really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by Eng- 
 land's. If she took her stand firmly with France and 
 Russia, there would be no war. If she failed them now, 
 rivers of blood would flow and England would in the end 
 be dragged into war. The Ambassador replied that Eng- 
 land could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna 
 to better purpose as a friend, who, if her counsels of mod- 
 eration were disregarded, might one day be converted into 
 an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at 
 once. M. Sazonof said that, unfortunately, Germany was 
 convinced that she could count upon England's neutrahty.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17; cf. F. Y. B. 
 nos. 31, 47, 92.) 
 
 A couple of days later (July 27) the Russian Ambassador 
 at London told Sir Edward Grey that 'in German and 
 Austrian circles the impression prevailed that in any event 
 England would stand aside. He deplored the effect that 
 such an impression must produce.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 27, B. W. P. no. 47.) 
 
 The President of France also was ' convinced that peace 
 between the powers was in the hands of England. He 
 thought that if the British Government announced that 
 England would come to the aid of France in the event of a 
 conflict between France and Germany as a result of the 
 present difference between Austria and Servia, there would 
 be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.* 
 
 * George Bernard Shaw, in various articles appearing in the press, has 
 presented this view to the pubHc with all his literary skill. We have, how- 
 ever, to remember that, though such may have been the sincere conviction 
 of France, Russia, and Italy, it was also the dearest hope of France and 
 Russia. Under the circumstances the most effective way for the Dual Alli- 
 ance to bring England to stand with them was to express this view with as 
 much force as possible. Then, in case war did residt, France and Russia 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 275 
 
 When the British Ambassador explained how difficult it 
 would be for the British Government to make such an 
 announcement, M. Poincar6 still said that he must main- 
 tain that it would be in the interests of peace. If there were 
 a general war on the Continent, it would inevitably draw 
 England into it for the protection of her vital interests. 
 A declaration at that time of England's intention to sup- 
 port France would almost certainly prevent Germany from 
 going to war.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 
 99.) 
 
 In a final effort to obtain a declaration of support of 
 France, President Poincar^ sent the King of England an 
 autograph letter ^ dated July 31. M. Paul Cambon, 
 
 could maintain with all appearance of reason that the war could have been 
 avoided if England had followed their advice; as a consequence their moral 
 claim on England's assistance would have been very strong. From the Ger- 
 man side Sir Edward Grey has been made responsible for the war, on the 
 ground that by standing back of France he encouraged France to promise 
 Russia support, with the result that the latter by ordering a general mobili- 
 zation precipitated the war. (See Bernhard Dernburg, Search-Lights on the 
 War, pp. 28-29; cf. the German Chancellor's speech of December 2, 1915, 
 in the Reichstag.) 
 
 Whatever the truth of these conflicting assertions, it is open to doubt 
 whether Germany showed as conciliatory a disposition after July 29 as be- 
 fore. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 92.) 
 
 Professor Hans Delbriick writes: "... Grey's fault is not that he gave 
 them a promise of help, but that he failed to declare that England would 
 not be on their side. That, and that alone, would have conserved the peace." 
 ("Germany's Answer," Atlantic Monthly, February, 1915, p. 240.) 
 
 ^ President Poincar6's letter of July 31, and King George's reply, dated 
 August 1, were published in the London Times, February 20, 1915: — 
 
 Paris, July 31, 1914. 
 Dear and great Friend, — 
 
 In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound 
 to convey to Your Majesty the information which the Government 
 of the Republic have received from Germany. The mihtary prepara- 
 tions which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, espe- 
 cially in the immediate neighborhood of the French frontier, are being 
 pushed forward every day with fresh vigor and speed. France, re- 
 solved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power 
 to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the 
 most indispensable precautionary measiu-es. But it does not appear 
 that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; 
 indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the modera- 
 
276 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 French Ambassador at London, in a telegram dispatched 
 on that same date (July 31) informs his Government: 
 
 tion of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, 
 on the eve of the most terrible events. 
 
 From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war 
 would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Gov- 
 ernment would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be 
 engaged; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the en- 
 tente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of 
 taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that 
 peace would remain unbroken. 
 
 It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete 
 liberty to Your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters ex- 
 changed in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, 
 Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual 
 agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and 
 to examine in concert whether common action were advisable. 
 
 But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given 
 in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France, the 
 confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work 
 for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of S3Tnpathy which Your 
 Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite 
 frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the 
 Republic and of all France. 
 
 It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Gov- 
 ernment that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement 
 depend. 
 
 We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined 
 upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not 
 swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in con- 
 formity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act 
 on the same lines. 
 
 But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Ger- 
 many and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, 
 Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between 
 her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that 
 at the present moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can 
 give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, 
 the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace. 
 
 I beg that Your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by 
 the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed. 
 
 Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments. 
 
 R. POINCARE. 
 
 Buckingham Palace, August 1, 1914. 
 Dear and great Friend, — 
 
 I most highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write 
 to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for 
 having stated your views so fully and frankly. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 277 
 
 ''According to your instructions, I have taken the neces- 
 sary steps to secure that the autograph letter which the 
 President of the Repubhc has addressed to His Majesty 
 the King of England should be given to the King this even- 
 ing. This step, which will certainly be communicated to 
 the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be 
 taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet." ^ 
 (Extract, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 110.) 
 
 Even Italy joined in urging England to declare herself 
 on the side of France and Russia. The Marquis di San 
 Giuliano said that 'as Germany was really anxious for 
 good relations with England, if she beheved that the Brit- 
 ish Government would act with Russia and France, he 
 thought it would have a great effect.' (Modified quota- 
 tion, July 29, B. W. P. no. 80; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 72, 96.) 
 The following evening, July 30, the Italian Foreign Minis- 
 
 You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been 
 the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to 
 think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together 
 in endeavoring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue. 
 
 It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts 
 were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the ter- 
 rible events which seem so near may be averted. 
 
 I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercis- 
 ing in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier 
 and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted 
 as a provocative one. 
 
 I am personally using my best endeavors with the Emperors of Rus- 
 sia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual 
 military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus 
 given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute 
 these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an 
 amicable settlement. 
 
 As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that 
 it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured 
 that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any 
 point which might arise of interest to oiir two nations with M. Cambon. 
 
 Believe me, 
 
 M. le President, 
 
 (Signed) George R. I. 
 
 * From the London Times of August 3, we learn that Mr. Asquith was 
 received on August 1 , at 1 .30 a.m., by the King, who had been visited shortly 
 before midnight by M. Paul Cambon. 
 
278 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ter told the British Ambassador at Rome that 'he had 
 reason to beUeve that Germany was now disposed to give 
 more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed con- 
 vinced that England would act with France and Russia, 
 and was most anxious to avoid an issue with her.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 106.) 
 
 When, on the other side, Germany and Austria ap- 
 pealed to England to prevent a European war by declar- 
 ing that the English Government would not permit the 
 peace of Europe to be disturbed by a Balkan question and 
 that Austria should be allowed to settle her difference with 
 Servia undisturbed, Sir Edward Grey refused.^ Before the 
 
 ^ Cf. above, p. 274, note. An editorial in the London Times (December 
 5, 1914), entitled "The German Premise," makes answer: "There was one 
 minor point in Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg's speech in the Reichstag 
 which deserves noting, not because it needs to be denied, but because it 
 throws light on the German state of mind. The responsibility for the war, 
 he said, falls on the British Government, because it could have made war 
 impossible if it had, without ambiguity, declared at Petrograd that Great 
 Britain would not allow a Continental war to develop from the Austro- 
 Serbian conflict. That, unlike some other statements in the speech, is prob- 
 ably quite true. But if the British Government had made this declaration 
 to the Russians, it would have meant simply that England declared for 
 Germany and Austria against Russia. But, according to that argument, 
 all of the great powers at war are equally responsible because they did not 
 do something different from what they did do. France, for instance, could 
 have prevented the war if she had declined to support Russia; Russia could 
 have prevented it if she had taken no interest in the fate of Serbia; and, 
 finally, Germany could have prevented it if she had refused to support Aus- 
 tria; while as for Austria, she could have prevented it if she had never pre- 
 sented her ultimatum. But the Chancellor's argument, poor as it may seem 
 to the rest of the world, will satisfy the Germans, because for them the 
 Austro-German resolve was something as fi.xed and unalterable as a force 
 of nature. According to their notion, the problem for France, Russia, and 
 England was not to achieve some compromise, but to adapt themselves to 
 that resolve as best they could. If Russia would not submit to it, it was the 
 duty of France to desert her; and if France preferred to be faithful to her 
 alliance, it was our duty to prevent war by threatening to throw all our 
 power in on the side of Germany and Austria. And since we failed to do 
 that, we are responsible for the war that followed. Given the German prem- 
 ises, we are; but on that condition any power that went to war with Ger- 
 many in any possible circumstances would be responsible. Even Belgium is 
 responsible because she did not allow her neutrality to be violated. In fact, 
 if another nation exists and Germany prefers that it should not exist, that 
 nation is responsible for any efforts which Germany may make to bring its 
 existence to an end." (Extract.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 279 
 
 presentation of the ultimatum he had made it clear to 
 Austria that the amount of influence he could use with 
 Russia would depend upon the reasonableness of the de- 
 mands which Austria made upon Servia. As soon as he was 
 cognizant of the terms of the note, he foresaw — what 
 was, indeed, plain to every one — that Servia could not 
 accept it unconditionally, and that, in consequence of 
 Austria's probable intention of having recourse to mili- 
 tary measures against Servia, Russia would mobilize. 
 When all this came to pass and Germany persistently 
 urged Sir Edward Grey to influence Russia to arrest her 
 military operations, he replied by renewing his suggestions 
 for quadruple mediation or intervention, but did not con- 
 sider that he could bring pressure to bear at St. Peters- 
 burg alone, since that would not be mediation but inter- 
 vention in favor of Austria. 
 
 At first sight, as one reads the documents, it seems most 
 probable that had Sir Edward Grey announced that Eng- 
 land would support France and Russia, he might have 
 prevented the war. I admit frankly that such was my own 
 opinion until I had made a thorough and critical study of 
 the documents and the situation of the respective powers. 
 As a result of this examination I am convinced that Sir 
 Edward would not have been justified in taking any other 
 course than that which he actually pursued. For if he had 
 let it be known that England would stand with France and 
 Russia, his course would have been attended with two 
 dangers. In the first place, if Germany was in her heart of 
 hearts determined to have war unless she could impose on 
 Eiu-ope her own solution of the Servian and Balkan ques- 
 tion, England's declaration would have made it evident 
 that Germany must strike at once to secure the whole 
 benefit of her speed in mobilization, and this would have 
 been the easier to accomplish, since the popular imagina- 
 tion in Germany would have been instantly fired with 
 hatred of England for her interference. Whereas, by hold- 
 
280 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ing off, Sir Edward forced Germany, even if it were ad- 
 mitted that she was set on war, to weigh the relative 
 advantages of striking at once, thereby drawing Eng- 
 land in, or of making a show of negotiation to furnish 
 England with some good excuse for remaining neutral. 
 By holding aloof and prevailing upon the other powers to 
 show a conciliatory spirit, Sir Edward would force even 
 a power bent upon war to lose time ^ and to fence for a 
 position justifying it in the eyes of its own people in 
 commencing the war. 
 
 If, on the other hand, Germany had been sincerely and 
 out and out for peace, England by joining France and 
 Russia might have put Germany in the position where she 
 could only yield with loss of prestige, a situation to which 
 there would be no alternative but war. Nor is it certain 
 that France and Russia would not have thought it too 
 good an opportunity to lose and have found some means of 
 bringing on the conflict. I admit that this seems a wild 
 hypothesis in view of all the efforts made by France and 
 Russia to keep the peace, but we do not know what at- 
 tempts might not have been made to stampede a war if 
 English support was certain. In any event, France and 
 Russia must have been still more anxious for peace, when 
 they were uncertain as to England's stand, than they 
 would have been had they counted upon her support. 
 
 There is still another aspect of the affair which we are 
 likely now to forget. It is that England and Germany had 
 been making sincere, if unfruitful, efforts to reach some 
 agreement to eliminate their rivalry, to their own great 
 benefit and for the good of the world's peace. ^ Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey having, I believe, a right to expect that peace 
 could be maintained, and that the reasonable prospects of 
 maintaining peace outweighed the probability of war up to 
 
 1 Belgium took advantage of this delay to mobilize, July 31; see Charles 
 Sarolea, How Belgium Saved Europe, pp. 73-74, 1915. 
 * See Documents: "Anglo-German Relations," post, chap. xiii. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 281 
 
 the time of Germany's presentation of her ultimatum to 
 Russia, would not have been justified in destroying the 
 growing confidence between England and Germany. A 
 reciprocal desire upon the part of Germany is indicated by 
 Von Bethmann-Hollweg's remark that 'ever since he had 
 been Chancellor, his policy had been, as Sir Edward was 
 aware, to bring about an understanding with England.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 85.) We can 
 sympathize with Sir Edward in trying to emphasize and 
 appeal to this common desire for cooperation when he 
 instructed Sir Edward Goschen, when refusing Germany's 
 offer to secure England's neutrality, to say most earnestly 
 to the Chancellor, as from him, that ' the one way of main- 
 taining good relations between England and Germany was 
 that they should continue to work together to preserve 
 the peace of Europe; if they succeeded in this object, 
 the mutual relations of Germany and England would, 
 he believed, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. 
 For that object, adds Sir Edward, the British Govern- 
 ment would work in that way with all sincerity and good- 
 will.' 
 
 Sir Edward added further : ' If the peace of Europe could 
 be preserved, and the present crisis safdy passed, his own 
 endeavor would be to promote some arrangement to which 
 Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured 
 that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued 
 against her or her allies by France, Russia, and England, 
 jointly or separately. He had desired this and worked for 
 it, as far as he could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, 
 Germany having a corresponding object, their relations 
 sensibly improved. The idea had hitherto been too Uto- 
 pian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this 
 present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe 
 had gone through for generations, be safely passed, he was 
 hopeful that the relief and reaction which would follow 
 might make possible some more definite rapprochement 
 
282 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 between the powers than had been possible hitherto.'^ 
 (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 101.) 
 
 As the Russian Ambassador at London expressed it, 
 *the English Government was sincerely disposed to col- 
 laborate with the German Government in an effort to 
 preserve the peace.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. 0. 
 P. no. 42.) 
 
 By taking the stand he did, Sir Edward Grey encour- 
 aged, even forced, Germany along the road of peaceful 
 concession, and when she balked herself or blocked the 
 route for others, all the world could judge of the real re- 
 sponsibility for the failure of the negotiations. 
 
 5. The Anglo-French Entente 
 England's refusal to take sides involved the delicate 
 question of what were her obligations toward France and 
 Russia by reason of the intangible Entente. With what 
 admirable aplomb the French Ambassador handled this 
 most difficult discussion! He tactfully pressed Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey to stand with France, and asked for informa- 
 tion as to what England's course would be, without ever 
 attempting to tell the British Government what its duty 
 
 1 Following is an extract from some observations upon the report of an 
 interview with the German Chancellor after the outbreak of the war. The 
 publication of the observations was authorized by the British Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs: "The German Chancellor spoke to the American 
 correspondent of his 'efforts for years to bring about an understanding be- 
 tween England and Germany,' an understanding, he added, which would 
 have 'absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe.' He omitted to mention, 
 what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff, that Germany re- 
 quired, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional pledge of Eng- 
 land's neutrality. The British Government were ready to bind themselves 
 not to be parties to any aggression against Germany; they were not pre- 
 pared to pledge their neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. An 
 Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have meant an 
 absolute guaranty for the peace of Europe; but it would have meant an 
 absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was concerned, for 
 Germany to break the peace of Europe." (London Times, January 27, 
 1915. Cf . Von Bethmann-HoUweg's speech of December 2.) 
 
 What Mr. Asquith said in his Cardiff Speech of October 2 is given in the 
 Documents, post, chap. xin. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 283 
 
 was. In an interview, on July 30, M. Paul Cambon re- 
 minded Sir Edward of a letter written him two years pre- 
 viously which read as follows : — 
 
 Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 
 My dear Ambassador: — 
 
 From time to time in recent years, the French and 
 British naval and military experts have consulted to- 
 gether. It has always been understood that such con- 
 sultation does not restrict the freedom of either Gov- 
 ernment to decide at any future time whether or not 
 to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed 
 that consultation between experts is not, and ought 
 not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits 
 either Government to action in a contingency that 
 has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, 
 for instance, of the French and British fleets respec- 
 tively at the present moment is not based upon an 
 engagement to cooperate in war. 
 
 You have, however, pointed out that, if either 
 Government had grave reason to expect an unpro- 
 voked attack by a third power, it might become es- 
 sential to know whether it could in that event depend 
 upon the armed assistance of the other. 
 
 I agree that, if either Government had grave rea- 
 son to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, 
 or something that threatened the general peace, it 
 should immediately discuss with the other whether 
 both Governments should act together to prevent 
 aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what 
 measures they would be prepared to take in common. 
 If these measures involved action, the plans of the 
 General Staffs would at once be taken into considera- 
 tion, and the Governments would then decide what 
 effect should be given to them. Yours, etc. 
 
 E. Grey.i 
 
 » B. W. P. no. 105; end. 1. 
 
284 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 M. Cambon's translated reply was: — 
 
 French Embassy, London, November 23, 1912. 
 Dear Sir Edward : — 
 
 You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d 
 November, that during the last few years the mili- 
 tary and naval authorities of France and Great Brit- 
 ain had consulted with each other from time to 
 time; that it had always been understood that these 
 consultations should not restrict the liberty of either 
 Government to decide in the future whether they 
 should lend each other the support of their armed 
 forces; that, on either side, these consultations be- 
 tween experts were not and should not be considered 
 as engagements binding our Governments to take 
 action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had 
 remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Gov- 
 ernments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked 
 attack on the part of a third power, it would become 
 essential to know whether it could count on the 
 armed support of the other. 
 
 Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized 
 to state that, in the event of one of our two Govern- 
 ments having grave reasons to fear either an attack 
 from a third power, or some event threatening the 
 general peace, that Government would immediately] 
 examine with the other the question whether both] 
 Governments should act together in order to prevent] 
 aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Govern- 
 ments would deliberate as to the measures which theyl 
 would be prepared to take in common. If those meas- 
 ures involved action, the two Governments would 
 take into immediate consideration the plans of their 
 General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect] 
 to be given to those plans. Yours, &c., 
 
 Paul Cambon.^ 
 
 » B. W. P. no. 105, end. 2. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 285 
 
 Having thus recalled to Sir Edward's mind the exact 
 nature of the Anglo-French Entente, M. Cambon went on 
 to say that ' the peace of Europe was never more seriously 
 threatened than it was then. He did not wish to ask Sir 
 Edward Grey to say directly that Great Britain would 
 intervene, but he was desirous of having him say what 
 Great Britain would do if certain circumstances arose. 
 The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggres- 
 sion by Germany on France.' (Modified quotation, July 
 30, B. W. P. no. 105.) The Ambassador handed Sir Ed- 
 ward a paper indicating the extent to which Germany had 
 pushed her preparations for an attack upon France and 
 the efforts the latter was making to preserve peace. ^ Sir 
 
 1 The War Chronicle, December, 1914, pp. 20-24, gives an English trans- 
 lation of an article which appeared in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
 (no. 321, December 23, 1914,) attacking the veracity of the documents in 
 the British White Paper on the ground of the inconsistencies contained in 
 no. 105. This criticism, however, was made without reference to the docu- 
 ments in the French Yellow Book. 
 
 In making a comparison of the original in no. 106 of the French Yellow 
 Book with the French original of enclosure 3 in no. 105 of the British White 
 Paper, we find that they are almost identical. With the exception of one or 
 two sentences they can be pieced out word for word. This shows beyond 
 question that they are the same dispatch. But the French Yellow Book no. 
 106 is dated July 30, whereas the first edition of the British White Paper 
 gave the date of its enclosed document as July 31. Directly after the 
 "hier" of the French Yellow Book, no. 106, the British White Paper has 
 "vendredi" in parentheses. This does not occur in the original French 
 Yellow Book, no. 106, since hier — that is, July 29 — would have been 
 Wednesday. Apparently noticing this mistake, the later editions drop out 
 the "vendredi." 
 
 Another mistake of a similar nature was made in an attempt to explain 
 the "Saturday" mentioned in the second paragraph of enclosure 3 by the 
 addition of "le jourmeme de la remise de la note autrichienne." If Saturday 
 the 25th was referred to, it was the day that the Servian reply was handed 
 in, and not the Austrian note. F. Y. B. no. 106 has simply " Saturday, the 
 25th." This discrepancy is explained in the Blue Book edition of the docu- 
 ment by the addition of a note: "Sic in original." 
 
 In the later editions of the British White Paper the date of enclosure 3 in 
 B. W. P. no. 105 is omitted. 
 
 If F. Y. B. no. 106 and B. W. P. no. 105 are both correctly dated July 30, 
 it must mean that the French dispatch left Paris and reached the French 
 Ambassador at London in time for him to present it to Sir Edward Grey 
 and have him include it in his dispatch of that same date to the Briti.sh Am- 
 
286 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Edward replied that Hhere would be a meeting of the 
 Cabinet next day, in the morning, and that he would see 
 M. Cambon in the afternoon.' (Modified quotation, July 
 30, B. W. P. no. 105.) 
 
 When M. Cambon, in the interview after the Cabinet 
 meeting, referred to a remark of the French Ambassador 
 at Berhn that 'it was the uncertainty with regard to 
 whether England would intervene which was the encour- 
 aging element in Berlin, and that, if England would declare 
 definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would de- 
 cide the German attitude in favor of peace, Sir Edward 
 said that it was quite wrong to suppose that they had left 
 Germany under the impression that they would not inter- 
 
 bassador at Paris. Furtbennore, it does not seem that the dispatch (F. Y. 
 B. no. 106) could have been sent by cipher, otherwise the words, when re- 
 translated, would not have been identical. 
 
 If we examine F. Y. B. no. 106 closely, we shall notice the statement in the 
 next to the last paragraph: " Par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes 
 ont penetre sur notre territoire." Enclosure 3 of B. W. P. no. 105 has identi- 
 cally the same words, except that the "hier" is thrown into the previous 
 sentence. We do not find that the French Government made any protest 
 against this violation of the frontier, but when we come to August 2, we 
 find the telegram from M. Viviani to M. Jules Cambon (F. Y. B. no. 139), 
 directing him to protest against various violations of the frontier. In this 
 M . Viviani says :"Au nord de Delle, deux patrouilles allemandes du 5^ chasseurs 
 A cheval ontfranchi lafrontiere dans la matinee d'aujourd'hui. . . ." (F. Y. B. 
 no. 155 recounts the interview in which M. Jules Cambon presented the 
 protest as instructed.) The next day the French Prime Minister indig- 
 nantly challenged the accuracy of the German Ambassador's statement in 
 regard to French violations of the frontier, and reminded him that he had 
 yesterday sent him a note protesting against the violations of the French 
 frontier committed during the last two days by detachments of German 
 troops. (F. Y. B. no. 148.) In the German Chancellor's speech of August 2, 
 he quotes a report of the General Stafi" as follows: "Against express orders 
 a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the 
 frontier on August 2." 
 
 That there should have been some isolated violations of the frontier is 
 easily understood when we read in the telegram that Emperor William sent 
 to King George V, on August 1 : "The troops on my frontier at this moment 
 have received orders by telegraph and by telephone to arrest their advance 
 across the French frontier." (F. Y. B., p. 188.) 
 
 It ia hard to explain these discrepancies, which are patently the result of 
 carelessness and hasty editing, since no falsification would have been ut- 
 tered with such obvious inconsistencies. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 287 
 
 vene, and that he had refused overtures to promise that 
 they should remain neutral. He had not only definitely 
 declined to say that they would remain neutral; he had 
 even gone so far that morning as to say to the German 
 Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved 
 in war, England would be drawn into it. That, of course, 
 was not the same thing as entering into an engagement to 
 France, and he told M. Cambon of it only to show that 
 they had not left Germany under the impression that they 
 would stand aside. 
 
 'M. Cambon then asked Sir Edward for his reply to 
 what he had said the day before. Sir Edward said that 
 they had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet that day 
 that they could not give any pledge at the present time; 
 that though they should have to put their policy before 
 Parliament, they could not pledge Parliament in advance. 
 Up to that moment they did not feel, and public opinion 
 did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of England 
 were involved.^ Further developments might alter this 
 situation and cause the Government and Parliament to 
 take the view that intervention was justified. The preser- 
 vation of Belgian neutrality might be, Sir Edward would 
 not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining 
 their attitude. Whether they proposed to Parliament to 
 intervene or not to intervene in a war. Parliament would 
 j wish to know how they stood with regard to the neutrality 
 i of Belgium, and it might be that Sir Edward would ask 
 I both France and Germany whether each was prepared to 
 undertake an engagement that she would not be the first 
 to violate the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 'M. Cambon repeated his question whether England 
 would help France if Germany made an attack on her. 
 
 'Sir Edward replied that he could only adhere to the 
 answer that, as far as things had gone then, they could not 
 enter into any engagement. 
 
 » Cf. B. W. P. no. 87; F. Y. B. nos. 32, 110. 
 
I 
 
 288 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ' M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the begin- 
 ning rejected proposals that might have made for peace; 
 that it could not be to England's interest that France 
 should be crushed by Germany; that they would then be 
 in a very diminished position with regard to Germany; 
 that in 1870, the EngUsh had made a great mistake in 
 allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and 
 that they would now be repeating the mistake. M. Cam- 
 bon asked Sir Edward whether he could not submit his 
 question to the Cabinet again. 
 
 ^Sir Edward said that the Cabinet would certainly be ■ 
 summoned as soon as there was some new development, 
 but at that moment, the only answer he could give was 
 that they could not undertake any definite engagement.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 119; cf. B. W. P. 
 no. 116.) 
 
 On August 3, at the end of three days crowded with 
 momentous happenings, Sir Edward Grey, as a prelimin- 
 ary to consulting the House of Commons on the course the 
 Government should take, gave an authoritative account of 
 the formation of the entente with France : — 
 
 "I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. 
 I have assured the House — and the Prime Minister has 
 assured the House more than once — that if any crisis 
 such as this arose, we should come before the House of 
 Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free 
 to decide what the British attitude should be, that we 
 would have no secret engagement which we should spring 
 upon the House, and tell the House that because we had 
 entered into that engagement there was an obligation of 
 honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to 
 clear the ground first. 
 
 "There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the 
 Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple 
 Entente, for some years past. The Triple Entente was not 
 an alliance — it was a diplomatic group. The House will 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 289 
 
 remember that in 1908 there was a crisis, also a Balkan 
 crisis, originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to 
 London, or happened to come to London, because his visit 
 was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him defi- 
 nitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I 
 did not consider that public opinion in this country would 
 justify us in promising to give anything more than diplo- 
 matic support. More was never asked from us, more was 
 never given, and more was never promised. 
 
 "In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also 
 given no promise of anything more than diplomatic sup- 
 port. Now I must make this question of obligation clear 
 to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 
 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and 
 it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's 
 Government, when a general election was in progress, 
 and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — 
 spending three days a week in my constituency and three 
 days at the Foreign Office — was asked the question 
 whether, if that crisis developed into war between France 
 and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then 
 that I could promise nothing to any foreign power unless 
 it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support 
 of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my 
 opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the ques- 
 tion of Morocco — a question which had just been the 
 subject of agreement between this country and France, 
 an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if 
 out of that agreement war was forced on France at that 
 time, in my view public opinion in this country would have 
 ralUed to the material support of France. 
 
 "I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during 
 the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words, 
 to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador 
 at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; 
 
290 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted 
 by the French Government, but they said to me at the 
 time — and I think very reasonably — ' If you think it 
 possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, 
 should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France 
 the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, 
 you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish 
 to give it, when the time comes, unless some "conversa- 
 tions have already taken place between naval and miUtary 
 experts.'" There was force in that. I agreed to it, and 
 authorized those conversations to take place, but on the 
 distinct understanding that nothing which passed between 
 military or naval experts should bind either Government 
 or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as 
 to whether or not they would give that support when the 
 time arose. 
 
 "As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general 
 election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibihty 
 of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be sum- 
 moned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry 
 Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I 
 remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of 
 State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was 
 then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I 
 could do, and they authorized that on the distinct under- 
 standing that it left the hands of the Government free 
 whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations be- 
 tween military and naval experts took place was later on 
 — I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and 
 the thing ceased to be of importance — but later on it was 
 brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. 
 
 "The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — 
 and throughout that I took precisely the same Hne that 
 had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after 
 discussion and consideration in the Cabinet it was decided 
 that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 291 
 
 which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, 
 that these conversations which took place were not bind- 
 ing upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 
 22nd of November, 1912, 1 wrote to the French Ambassa- 
 dor the letter which I will now read to the House, and I 
 received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The 
 letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will 
 be known to the pubUc now as the record that, whatever 
 took place between military and naval experts, they were 
 not binding engagements upon the Government. [Sir 
 Edward then read his letter to M. Cambon of November 
 22, 1912. See above pp. 283-84.] 
 
 ". . . That is the starting-point for the Government with 
 regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that 
 what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Com- 
 mons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our free- 
 dom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether 
 we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the 
 Government remained perfectly free and, a fortiori, the 
 House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to 
 clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I 
 think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of 
 Commons that I should give that full information to the 
 House now, and say what I think is obvious from the 
 letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything 
 which has previously taken place in our diplomatic rela- 
 tions with other powers in this matter as restricting the 
 freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they 
 should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of 
 Commons to decide what their attitude should be. 
 
 ''Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The 
 situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as 
 it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question 
 it was primarily a dispute which concerned France — a 
 dispute which concerned France and France primarily — 
 a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of an 
 
292 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 agreement subsisting between us and France, and pub- 
 lished to the whole world, in which we engaged to give 
 France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged 
 to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any 
 rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with 
 France diplomatically in that question. 
 
 "The present crisis has originated differently. It has 
 not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not origin- 
 ated as regards anything with which we had a special agree- 
 ment with France; it has not originated with anything 
 which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a 
 dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with 
 the most absolute confidence — no Government and no 
 country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute 
 with Austria and Servia than the Government and the 
 country of France. They are involved in it because of their 
 obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. 
 Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation 
 of honor cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not 
 parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even 
 know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, 
 faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard 
 to the question of obligation." ^ 
 
 ^ At the same time that the relations of France and England are under 
 discussion, it will be of interest to consider what was the situation between 
 England and Russia. Some very interesting documents bearing upon the 
 negotiations of England with France and Russia have been published in the 
 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. These appeared in Germany, October 16, 
 and were republished by the New York Times, November 8, and on account 
 of their length have been placed among the documents at the end of this 
 volume. {Post, chap, xiii.) It is necessary to read them carefully to reach 
 an understanding of the peculiar nature of the hazy entente, which " with 
 subtle ingenuity is worded in such a manner that it suits the peculiar Eng- 
 lish mentality." To the German editorial writer it looks like an attempt to 
 play a double game, but it is in reality something deeper than an ordinary 
 treaty between two bureaucratic governments; just as between individuals 
 the ties of a sincere friendship are deeper and sometimes better observed 
 than a more formal and legally binding partnership agreement. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 293 
 
 6. England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan 
 
 question 
 
 Sir Edward Grey had been paralleling his efforts to pre- 
 vent a war by a second series of efforts to prevent his 
 country from being engulfed, should war prove inevitable. 
 
 From the very start he had made the same declaration, 
 contained in his speech of August 3, that England was not 
 concerned in a Balkan question (R. O. P. no. 20; B. W. P. 
 no. 5), and that as long as Austria could settle her affairs 
 with Servia so as not to involve Russia, he had nothing to 
 say. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg told M. 
 Sazonof , that ' direct British interests in Servia were nil, and 
 a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned 
 by British public opinion.' (Modified quotation, July 24, 
 B. W. P. no. 6; cf. B. W. P. no. 24.) 
 
 In conformity with this stand. Sir Edward Grey refused 
 to go into the merits of the Austro-Servian dispute (B. W. 
 P. no. 91), but said that he 'should concern himself with 
 the matter solely and simply from the point of view of the 
 peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. 
 no. 5.) British opinion sympathized with Austria's be- 
 reavement, and could easily believe that a government 
 founded upon regicide and favoring regicides merited the 
 natural suspicions which attached to its evil reputation. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador at Lon- 
 don that 'of course, if the presentation of the Austrian 
 ultimatum did not lead to trouble between Austria and 
 Russia, they need not concern themselves about it.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.) 
 
 Sir Edward, well knowing that France had announced 
 from the start that she would stand back of Russia and 
 that Germany would not allow Russia to crush Austria, 
 realized that an Austro-Russian conflict was almost cer- 
 tain to widen out to include Germany and France, and 
 that when this occurred it would be difficult for England 
 
294 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 to keep out of the struggle. (Cf. B. W. P. nos. 6, 24, 25.) 
 As Sir Edward remarked, 'when there was a danger of a 
 European conflict, it was impossible to say who would not 
 be drawn into it; even the Netherlands apparently were 
 taking precautions.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. 
 P. no. 90.) 
 
 Intending to reserve his independence of action up to 
 the last. Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon (July 
 29) that he meant to tell the German Ambassador that 
 day that he 'must not be misled by the friendly tone of 
 their conversations into any sense of false security that 
 they should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the 
 peace, which they were then making in common with Ger- 
 many, failed. But he went on to say to M. Cambon that 
 he thought it necessary to tell him also that public opin- 
 ion in England approached the present difficulty from a 
 quite different point of view from that taken during the 
 difficulty as to Morocco a few years before. In the case of 
 Morocco the dispute was one in which France was prima- 
 rily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in 
 an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on 
 France on a question that was the subject of a special 
 agreement between France and England. In the present 
 case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in 
 which she felt called to take a hand. Even if the question 
 became one between Austria and Russia, England would 
 not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be 
 a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a strug- 
 gle for supremacy in the Balkans; and their idea had al- 
 ways been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan 
 question. If Germany became involved and France be- 
 came involved, they had not made up their minds what 
 they should do; it was a case that they would have to con- 
 sider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel 
 which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, 
 her honor and interest obHged her to engage. England 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 295 
 
 was free from engagements, and would have to decide 
 what British interests required her to do. Sir Edward 
 thought it necessary to say this, because, as M. Cambon 
 knew, they were taking all precautions with regard to their 
 fleet, and he was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to 
 count on their standing aside, but it would not be fair 
 that he should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing 
 that this meant that they had decided what to do in a 
 contingency that he still hoped might not arise.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 87.) 
 
 7. England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if 
 France is involved 
 
 As early as July 27, Sir Arthur Nicolson, English Under- 
 Secretary of State, told the French Charge at London, in 
 reference to ' the German and Austrian Ambassadors giv- 
 ing it to be understood that England would remain neutral, 
 that Prince Lichnowsky could not, after the conversation 
 he had had with him that day, preserve any doubt as to the 
 liberty of intervention which the British Government in- 
 tended to keep, should it deem intervention necessary.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 63.) 
 
 In Sir Edward Grey's dispatch of July 29, to Sir Ed- 
 ward Goschen at Berlin, we learn that he told the German 
 Ambassador at London that ' after speaking to him about 
 the European situation, he wished to say to him, in a quite 
 private and friendly way, something that was on his mind. 
 The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to 
 the issues at present actually involved, England had no 
 thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became in- 
 volved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great 
 that it would involve all European interests; and he did 
 not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of their con- 
 versation — which he hoped would continue — into think- 
 ing that they would stand aside. 
 
 ' Prince Lichnowsky said that he quite understood this, 
 
296 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 but he asked whether Sir Edward meant that England 
 would under certain circumstances intervene. Sir Edward 
 replied that he did not wish to say that, or to use anything 
 that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by 
 saying that, if things became worse, the British Govern- 
 ment would intervene. There would be no question of 
 their intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if 
 France was not involved. But the British Government 
 knew very well that if the issue did become such that they 
 thought British interests required them to intervene, they 
 must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be 
 very rapid, just as the decisions of other powers had to be. 
 He hoped that the friendly tone of their conversations 
 would continue as at present, and that he would be able to 
 keep as closely in touch with the German Government in 
 working for peace. But if they failed in their efforts to 
 keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved 
 practically every European interest, he did not wish to be 
 open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all 
 their conversations had misled him or his Government 
 into supposing that they would not take action, and to the 
 reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course 
 of things might have been different.^ 
 
 'The German Ambassador took no exception to what 
 Sir Edward said; indeed, he told him that it accorded with 
 what he had already given in Berlin as his own view of the 
 situation.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 
 89; cf. F. Y. B. no. 98.) 
 
 1 We have seen above (p. 294) that Sir Edward Grey had already told 
 the French Ambassador of his intention to give the German Ambassador 
 this warning (cf. B. W. P. no. 87). German partisans have criticized Sir 
 Edward Grey severely for thus taking M. Cambon into his confidence. Dr. 
 Karl Helfferich cites various documents (R. O. P. no. 58; B. W. P. no. 17) 
 in support of his contention that this act, by assuring France of England's 
 support, decided the French Government to promise its support to Russia, 
 (New York Times, March 14, 1915; see also Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, 
 Search-IAghls on the War, The Fatherland Corporation, New York, 1915.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 297 
 
 8. Germany's hid for English neutrality 
 At the very time (July 29) when the British Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs was explaining to the German 
 Ambassador at London that England would not neces- 
 sarily come in or stay out, but must, in case of a general 
 European war, decide — and that very rapidly — what her 
 interests dictated, the German Chancellor, just returned to 
 Berlin from Potsdam, was making an offer to the British 
 Ambassador at Berlin to secure England's neutrality. He 
 said that ' should Austria be attacked by Russia, a Euro- 
 pean conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, 
 owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite 
 of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then pro- 
 ceeded, as Sir Edward Goschen said, to make the following 
 strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, 
 so far as he was able to judge the main principle which 
 governed British policy, that Great Britain would never 
 stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict 
 there might be. That, however, was not the object at 
 which Germany aimed. Provided that the neutrality of 
 Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be 
 given to the British Government that the Imperial Ger- 
 man Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at 
 the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any 
 war that might ensue. 
 
 ' When questioned about the French colonies, the Chan- 
 cellor said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking 
 in that respect. As regards Holland, however, he said that, 
 so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity 
 and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready 
 to give the British Government an assurance that she 
 would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France 
 what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon 
 in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity 
 would be respected, if she had not sided against Germany. 
 
298 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ' He ended by saying that ever since he had been Chan- 
 cellor, the object of his poHcy had been, as Sir Edward 
 Grey was aware, to bring about an understanding with 
 England; he trusted that these assurances might form the 
 basis of that understanding which he so much desired. 
 He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between 
 England and Germany, though it was of course at the 
 present moment too early to discuss details, and an as- 
 surance of British neutrality, in the conflict which the 
 present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him 
 to look forward to the realization of his desire. In reply to 
 an inquiry how he thought this request would appeal to 
 Sir Edward Grey, Sir Edward Goschen said that he did 
 not think it probable that at this stage of events Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey would care to bind himself to any course of 
 action and that he was of opinion that Sir Edward Grey 
 would desire to retain full hberty.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 29, B. W. P. no. 85.) 
 
 To this, Sir Edward Grey replied (July 30) in a telegram 
 to the British Ambassador at Berlin : — 
 
 ''His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment en- 
 tertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind 
 themselves to neutrality on such terms. 
 
 "What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
 French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long 
 as Germany does not take French territory as distinct 
 from the colonies. 
 
 ''From the material point of view such a proposal is 
 unacceptable, for France, without further territory in 
 Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose 
 her position as a great power, and become subordinate to 
 German policy. 
 
 "Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for 
 us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of 
 France, a disgrace from which the good name of this coun- 
 try would never recover. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 299 
 
 "The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away 
 whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the 
 neutraUty of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain 
 either. 
 
 "Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine 
 whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agree- 
 ment between England and Germany offered positive ad- 
 vantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands 
 now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circum- 
 stances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable 
 and regrettable development of the present crisis as the 
 Chancellor contemplates." (Extract, July 30, B. W. P. 
 no. 101; cf. F. Y. B. no. 126.) 
 
 Then Sir Edward Grey, in the words referred to above 
 (see above, pp. 281, 282), directed the Ambassador to speak 
 of the need of cooperation between England and Germany 
 and of Sir Edward's hopes that, if they succeeded in pre- 
 serving the peace, their relations would be improved, and 
 to say that he would work for some arrangement to assure 
 Germany against aggression from any European power. 
 
 When the British Ambassador at Berlin read to Von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg Sir Edward Grey's 'answer to his 
 appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, the Chan- 
 cellor was so taken up with the news of the Russian meas- 
 ures along the frontier that he received the communica- 
 tion without comment. He asked the Ambassador to let 
 him have the message just read to him as a memorandum, 
 as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, 
 and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could 
 not be certain of remembering all its points. Sir Edward 
 Goschen, therefore, handed to him the text of the message 
 on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as 
 a record of conversation, and not as an official document. 
 To this the Chancellor agreed.' (Modified quotation, July 
 31, B. W. P. no. 109.) 
 
 Before Sir Edward Goschen had communicated this 
 
300 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 message from Sir Edward Grey, the German Secretary of 
 State learned of England's attitude in a telegram from 
 Prince Lichnowsky a propos of which Herr Von Jagow 
 said that it 'contained matter which he had heard with 
 regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he 
 thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with 
 which Sir Edward Grey had spoken. He also told the 
 British Ambassador that this telegram had only reached 
 Berlin very late the night before; had it been received 
 earlier the Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken 
 to him in the way he had done.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 30, B. W. P. no. 98.) 
 
 While this exchange was going on, the situation had been 
 growing rapidly worse between Russia and Germany, and 
 on July 31, the German Chancellor informed Sir Edward 
 Goschen that 'if, as he learned was the case, military 
 measures were then being taken by Russia against Ger- 
 many also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. 
 He wished to tell the Ambassador, he said, that it was 
 quite possible that in a very short time, that day, perhaps, 
 the German Government would have to take some very 
 serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to 
 have an audience with the Emperor.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 31, B. W. P. no. 108.) 
 
 On August 1, the day Germany declared war against 
 Russia, Sir Edward Grey had an important interview 
 with the German Ambassador at London, in which he told 
 Prince Lichnowsky that ' the reply of the German Govern- 
 ment with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a mat- 
 ter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium 
 affected feeling in the country. If Germany could see her 
 way to give the same assurance as that which had been 
 given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve 
 anxiety and tension. On the other hand, if there were a 
 violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant 
 while the other respected it, it would be extremely diflScult 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 301 
 
 to restrain public feeling in England. Sir Edward said 
 that they had been discussing this question at a Cabinet 
 meeting, and as he was authorized to tell this to Prince 
 Lichnowsky, he gave him a memorandum of it. 
 
 'Prince Lichnowsky asked Sir Edward whether, if Ger- 
 many gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, 
 England would engage to remain neutral. 
 
 'Sir Edward replied that he could not say that; their 
 hands were still free, and they were considering what their 
 attitude should be. All he could say was that their attitude 
 would be determined largely by public opinion in Eng- 
 land, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal 
 very strongly to public opinion. He did not think that 
 they could give a promise of neutrality on that condition 
 alone. 
 
 ' The Ambassador pressed Sir Edward as to whether he 
 could not formulate conditions on which he would remain 
 neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France 
 and her colonies might be guaranteed. 
 
 ' Sir Edward said that he felt obliged to refuse definitely 
 any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and he 
 could only say that they must keep their hands free.' 
 (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 123.) 
 
 This second *'bid" for England's neutrality shows how 
 far Germany was ready to go to obtain a pledge from Eng- 
 land that she would stand aside. It seems likely that Ger- 
 many would have agreed to respect the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium and to guarantee the restoration of French territory, 
 colonial as well as European, and also that Germany might 
 have agreed not to attack the northern and western coasts 
 of France. But England could not agree to stay out of the 
 war, much as she hoped to be able to, unless she could be 
 certain that her vital interests would not suffer.^ 
 
 * Sir Edward Grey has stated that this offer of Prince Lichnowsky was 
 his personal offer and not that of the German Government. If Sir Edward 
 had wished to consider it, the German Ambassador could have learned in a 
 
302 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Again, on August 3, 'just as Sir Edward Grey was leav- 
 ing for the Cabinet meeting, Prince Lichnowsky called to 
 
 few hours whether his Government would confirm it or not. Sir Edward 
 Grey has been attacked by J. Ramsay MacDonald (New York Evening 
 Post, September 8, 1914) and others because he did not communicate this 
 offer to Parhament and because he did not make any effort to formulate 
 conditions upon which England could remain neutral. According to the 
 report in the London Times, Sir Edward Grey answered Mr. Hardie as fol- 
 lows in the House of Commons on August 27: — 
 
 "Mr. Keir Hardie (MerthjT Tydvil, Lab.) asked the Secretary for For- 
 eign Affairs whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by the 
 German Ambassador (White Paper, p. 66, no. 123), together with his invi- 
 tation to the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own which 
 would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and con- 
 sidered by the Cabinet, and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reach- 
 ing possibilities were thus rejected. 
 
 "Sir E. Grey (Northumberland, Berwick) — These were personal sug- 
 gestions made by the Ambassador on August 1, and without authority to 
 alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor 
 in no. 85 in the White Paper — Miscellaneous, no. 6, [1914]. 
 
 "The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning — 
 that is, Sunday, August 2 — the conditions on which we could remain neu- 
 tral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium 
 must be one of these conditions. [Hear, hear!] The German Chancellor had 
 already been told on July 30 that we could not bargain that way. 
 
 "On Monday, August 3, I made a statement in the House accordingly. 
 I had seen the German Ambassador again at his own request on Monday, 
 and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the 
 plans of the German miUtary authorities, not to make the neutrality of 
 Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of 
 great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no 
 time to record the conversation, and therefore it does not appear in the 
 White Paper; but it was impossible to withdraw that condition [loud cheers] 
 without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the treaty, and 
 subsequently to a German attack on Belgium. 
 
 "After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the 
 communication described in no. 153 in the White Paper about the neutral- 
 ity of Belgium. Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that commu- 
 nication had not been received when the White Paper was printed and laid. 
 It will be laid before Parliament to complete the White Paper. 
 
 " I have been asked why I did not refer to no. 123 in the White Paper 
 when I spoke in the House on August 3. If I had referred to suggestions to 
 us as to conditions of neutrality I must have referred to no. 85, the propo- 
 sals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but oflBcially by the German 
 Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently, 
 and this would have made the case against the German Government much 
 stronger than I did make it in my speech. [Hear, hear!] I deliberately re- 
 frained from doing that then. 
 . "Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Am- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 303 
 
 urge him to say that the neutrality of England did not 
 depend upon respect for Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward 
 refused to discuss the matter, and the German Ambassa- 
 dor, according to the report of M. Cambon, gave out to 
 the press a communique ^ stating that if England remained 
 neutral, Germany would forego all naval operation and 
 would not use the Belgian coasts as a supporting base. 
 The French Ambassador informed his Government that 
 he was replying that respect for coasts was not respect for 
 the neutrality of territory, and that the German ultima- 
 tum was in itself a violation of neutrality.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 144; cf. F. Y. B. no. 126.) 
 
 9. Divergence of opinion in England 
 Up to this point we have been examining certain aspects 
 of the attitude assumed by England when first brought 
 face to face with the European crisis. Sir Edward Grey 
 could be sure of the unanimous support of the country in 
 pursuing a policy which offered some chance of averting 
 a war at the same time that it left open the question of the 
 conditions which might necessitate armed intervention on 
 
 bassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Govern- 
 ment. He worked for peace; but real authority at Berlin did not rest with 
 him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace 
 failed. [Loud cheers.] 
 
 "Mr. Keir Hardie — May I ask whether any attempt was made to 
 open up negotiations with Germany on the basis of suggestions here set 
 forth by the German Ambassador ? 
 
 "Sir E. Grey — The German Ambassador did not make any basis of 
 suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of sugges- 
 tions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative 
 and without authority, asked whether we would formulate conditions on 
 which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and those condi- 
 tions were stated to the House and made known to the German Ambas- 
 sador. 
 
 "Mr. Keir Hardie [who was received with cries of 'Oh!' from all parts 
 of the House] — May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin 
 repudiated the suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether 
 any effort at all [renewed cries of 'Oh!' and 'Order! '] was made to find out 
 how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put 
 before them by their own Ambassador? " (London Times, August 28, 1914.) 
 
 1 See vost, p. 360. 
 
304 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the part of Great Britain. From the very start it was 
 evident that the Austro-German and the Franco-Russian 
 groups were each acting in the closest accord, and that 
 neither Germany nor France was inclined to exert any 
 pressure upon its ally. In this situation Sir Edward Grey 
 had to use the whole strength of his position to influence 
 and stimulate the peaceful efforts of each group ; he was the 
 better able to do this because of England's long-estab- 
 lished cordial understanding with France and her rela- 
 tions with Germany, which had gradually been becoming 
 more friendly as a result of the collaboration of the two 
 Governments at the recent conference in London, when 
 they had succeeded in avoiding a Balkan war.^ 
 
 Even before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, 
 Sir Edward Grey had been in discussion with the German 
 Ambassador, pointing out to him that the influence the 
 English Government could exert in Russia would depend 
 upon the nature of the Austrian demands on Servia. No 
 sooner had the Austrian note been presented than the 
 principal diplomatic effort of all the great powers was 
 directed upon Sir Edward Grey to win his support for one 
 side or the other. He held his ground steadfastly, en- 
 couraging now one, now the other. In view of Russia's as- 
 suming a most correct and conciUatory attitude and in- 
 ducing Servia to astonish the world by the extent of her 
 concessions to the intentionally insulting Austrian de- 
 mands, he refused to acquiesce in the German Ambassa- 
 dor's attempt to put off on Russia the responsibility for 
 the outcome. In no uncertain terms he imparted to 
 Prince Lichnowsky his characterization of Austria's action 
 in case she should put the Servian reply aside as worthless 
 and march into Servia, reckless of the consequences. In 
 this same interview Sir Edward Grey promised, as long as 
 
 1 This close sympathy and cooperation was clearly indicated by the 
 Anglo-German discussions relative to an eventual partition of the Portu- 
 guese colonial possessions. (See Documents: Anglo-German Relations, post, 
 chap. XIII.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 305 
 
 Germany would work for peace, to keep in close touch. 
 (B. W. P. no. 46.) Lest, however, Austria and Germany 
 might believe — as the Russian Ambassador asserted they 
 did — that England would stand aside in any event, Sir 
 Edward rewarded Russia and Servia for their conciliatory 
 action by publishing the news that the First Fleet had 
 not been dispersed. (July 27, B. W. P. no. 47; July 27, F. 
 Y. B. no. 66.) 
 
 Yet Sir Edward did not encourage Russia to relax her 
 efforts to reach a peaceful solution through a feeling that 
 she was certain of England's support; at the same time 
 that he showed his appreciation of Russia's action by in- 
 forming the Russian Ambassador of the retention of the 
 fleet, he added significantly that his reference to the fleet 
 must not be understood as promising anything more than 
 diplomatic action. (B. W. P. no. 47.) 
 
 While Sir Edward continued to declare that England 
 was not concerned in a Balkan question, he proposed vari- 
 ous bases for the mediation of the four less interested 
 powers to avoid an Austro-Russian conflict. When Ger- 
 many refused to participate in a mediation conference, he 
 emphatically declared that if Germany intervened in an 
 Austro-Russian conflict, brought on by the unjustifiable 
 aggression of Austria against Servia, it would be because 
 Germany, without any reference to the merits of the dis- 
 pute, could not afford to see Austria crushed.^ Just so he 
 hinted that other issues might be raised which would 
 supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia and 
 would bring other powers in. (B. W. P. no. 46.) This was 
 equivalent to an intimation that, when France came to the 
 support of Russia by reason of her obligation under the 
 Dual Alliance, England might consider that she was under 
 a certain moral obligation to support her partner in the 
 Entente against Germany, whose aggressive action would 
 
 ^ That is to say, Germany's action would not be based upon the casus 
 foederis of a defensive alliance, but would be a matter of policy. 
 
306 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 have dragged her unwiUingly into a conflict. Besides, it 
 was clear that England's vital interests might be affected 
 in such a way as to make it very difficult for her to keep out. 
 On the other hand, when Sir Edward Grey informed the 
 French Ambassador of his intention to warn ^ the German 
 Ambassador of the consequences which might result in 
 case Germany supported Austria in her unjustifiably ag- 
 gressive action, he distinctly told M. Paul Cambon that it 
 would not be fair to let him be ''misled into supposing that 
 this meant that they had decided what to do in a contin- 
 gency that he still hoped might not arise." ^ (July 29, B. 
 W. P. no. 87.) Against this statement M. Cambon could 
 urge nothing except his understanding of English inter- 
 ests which, he said, required her intervention. England 
 was, indeed, absolutely free to remain out or not as she 
 
 ^ The difference between a warning and a threat is, that in a warning, 
 the actual condition of affairs is set forth in an objective manner by one 
 speaking with expert knowledge. Such an exposition makes plain the inev- 
 itable consequences of a certain course of action. A threat implies an inten- 
 tionally retaliatory action, and is a conditional declaration of hostility which 
 often has an injurious effect upon relations hitherto friendly. 
 
 2 It has been ably argued by Dr. Karl Helfferich (New York Times, 
 March 14, 1915) that this declaration decided France to promise her sup- 
 port to Russia (see above chap, v), and that Sir Edward Grey's attempt to 
 play the role of an independent mediator was doomed to failure because 
 England was bound by the Entente to help France. Yet elsewhere in the 
 same article Dr. Helfferich points out how anxious France was about Eng- 
 land's attitude up to August 2, and he concurs with the German Chancellor's 
 opinion that England should have informed Russia that she would not al- 
 low a European war to result from the Austro-Servian dispute. (See Chan- 
 cellor's speech in the Reichstag, December 2, 1914, 'post, chap, xiii.) This 
 would hardly be consistent with England's recognition of an obligation to 
 support France. By notifying France that she might not support her (B. 
 W. P. no. 87), Sir Edward Grey plainly intimated that England was not 
 bound. Before reaching any conclusion about this question, one has to con- 
 sider the effect of Germany's attitude in regard to Belgium. The whole 
 situation is made clear by Sir Edward Grey's offers of July 31 to desert 
 France and Russia if they refused to cooperate in any reasonable peace pro- 
 posal put forward by Germany. (B. W. P. no. 111.) To admit that Eng- 
 land was bound to support France would have meant that she was pledged 
 to protect Russia from aggression to the same extent as France. It is hard j 
 to believe that England would have obligated herself to such an extent with- 
 out some quid pro quo. 
 
 I 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 307 
 
 should deem best for the protection of her interests.^ To 
 deny this is to assert that England was obligated to defend 
 Russia from attack whenever the Franco-Russian Alli- 
 ance forced France to intervene in favor of her ally. 
 
 That same day, July 29, arrived the German Chancel- 
 lor's ''strong bid for British neutrality" — another at- 
 tempt to induce the English Government to depart from 
 its role of neutral mediation, and to support Germany by 
 a binding agreement not to intervene in favor of the Dual 
 Alliance in the event of war. Sir Edward Grey refused this 
 offer the following day and declared that ' the one way of 
 maintaining good relations between England and Germany 
 was that they should continue to work together to pre- 
 serve the peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 
 30, B. W. P. no. 101.) 
 
 By Thursday, July 30, the European situation had 
 grown most serious. We have seen how Sir Edward Grey, 
 up to this date, had avoided taking sides, but when M. 
 Paul Cambon reminded him of their understanding that if 
 the peace of Europe was threatened, they would discuss 
 what they were prepared to do, the English Secretary rec- 
 ognized that his Government must give the French as 
 frank a statement as possible, and so Sir Edward told M. 
 Cambon that he would bring the question up in the Cabi- 
 net meeting next day, and tell him of the result in the 
 afternoon. 
 ; Hitherto we have considered the foreign relations side of 
 ! the negotiations, without reference to the internal situa- 
 tion, which was, notwithstanding, a factor of the utmost 
 importance. It is impossible to understand what hap- 
 i pened in the three days, July 31 to August 2, apart from 
 i a consideration of the political situation in England. 
 I The morning of Friday, July 31, 1914, will, I believe, be 
 
 * The obligation to protect the French coast, which resulted from the 
 concentration of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, is considered, post, 
 §15. 
 
308 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 considered the most fateful day of the century, and Sir 
 Edward Grey the principal actor. That day was the cul- 
 mination of several important movements. Only a few 
 hours before (July 30), Mr. Asquith, in the interest of 
 national harmony, had announced in the House of Com- 
 mons the decision of the Government to adjourn the sec- 
 ond reading of the Amending Bill.^ This action made pos- 
 sible the union of all parties to support the Government 
 in the adoption of a firm national foreign policy. 
 
 A few days before, July 21, the King had summoned the 
 leaders of both parties to a conference at Buckingham 
 Palace, in an effort to reach some compromise to avoid 
 civil war. 2 The royal intervention was ineffectual, and on 
 the Sunday following these unusual conferences, just when 
 the country was learning of Austria's peremptory rejec- 
 tion of the Servian note, the whole nation was stirred by 
 the news of the fighting at Dublin, where three men were 
 killed and thirty- two wounded. 
 
 The agitation of the public during this period is shown 
 by the fact that, since the presentation of the Austrian 
 note on the 23d of July, consols had begun to fall, until 
 the extraordinarily low price of 69 was reached on the 31st 
 — the last day before the Stock Exchange closed. As was 
 to be expected, the Bank of England tried to inspire confi- 
 dence by retaining its rate at 3 per cent, but on the 30th it 
 was raised to 4 per cent, and on the 31st this was doubled. 
 
 During the preceding week, while the powers had been 
 engaged in their great diplomatic struggle, the necessity 
 of quickly coming to a decision in regard to the foreign 
 policy had subjected the governmental political machinery 
 of the different states to a severe test.^ 
 
 ^ Amending the Home Rule Bill. 
 
 2 This action on the part of the King gave rise to bitter discussion, in 
 which George V was openly accused of being a Conservative partisan. 
 
 ' On the 30th, in Russia, the war party seems to have gained control, 
 and on the 31st, in France, the agitation is shown by the assassination of 
 Jaurfes, July 31. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 309 
 
 In England the political situation was most complex 
 and difficult, not only because the country was on the 
 verge of war, but also because the Government was in 
 control of the Liberal Party, whose ultra-pacifist proclivi- 
 ties made it willing to try almost any expedient which 
 might be considered as offering a chance of maintaining an 
 honorable peace. They had been working to reach some 
 agreement with Germany and were not ready to believe 
 that war with her was unavoidable.^ It was the Conserva- 
 tives who were most strongly inclined toward taking a 
 firm stand in support of the Entente. Under the English 
 system, the Foreign Office has never been given over to 
 partisan conception. Whatever the changes in internal 
 politics, in foreign affairs the country has continued to 
 pursue the same general course. 
 
 ^ Up to the very day of the presentation of the English ultimatum to 
 Germany the Manchester Guardian inveighed against intervention. 
 
 The New York Evening Post, August 14, 1914, printed the following 
 editorial: " Why England went to War": 
 
 " What chiefly surprises one who reads the English newspapers, now at 
 hand, published during the week ending August 5, is the extent and inten- 
 sity of the feeling against going to war with Germany. There was, of course, 
 an active war party. In the press it was led by the London Times and Daily 
 Mail. And naval men, it is evident, were hot for striking now that the hour 
 for which they had been watching had come. But there was a powerful anti- 
 war party. Its moderate exponent was the Westminster Gazette, a newspaper 
 which has long shown that it stands closer to the Liberal Government than 
 any other. It was all for caution and restraint, and, till the last moment, 
 anxious to keep England out of the war and to find some means of coming to 
 terms with Germany. But the impassioned champion of peace, through all 
 the time when the issues hung in the balance, was the Manchester Guardian. 
 This able newspaper — thought by many to be the most influential in Eng- 
 land ; outside London it certainly is — made a most gallant fight against the 
 war. Day after day it made powerful appeals, arguing that neither Eng- 
 lish interest nor Enghsh honor required the nation to fling itself into the 
 gulf of a European war. 
 
 " And this opinion found very wide support throughout the country. A 
 Neutrality League was formed. It at once gained numerous adherents. It 
 spread its protests broadside. And a host of enlightened Englishmen has- 
 tened to array themselves against the war party. Among them was the 
 editor of the Economist, still the chief financial guide of England, with 
 clergymen, professors, philanthropists, and honorable women not a few." 
 (Extract.) 
 
310 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 On July 31, the Cabinet met, and, in spite of the urgent 
 appeals from France, decided that England could not 
 agree to support her.^ Sir Edward Grey impai-ted this 
 decision to M. Cambon and refused to commit himself 
 further, except to intimate that the Government were 
 considering asking France and Germany whether they 
 were prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium so long as no other power violated it. (B. W. P. no. 
 114; F. Y. B. no. 110.) Sir Edward further promised to 
 bring up the question of their cooperation with France as 
 
 * The situation, on that morning, July 31, when the Cabinet met and 
 considered what course to adopt, is well summarized in a Times editorial 
 which appeared the following day: — 
 
 "Europe was rapidly arming last night, as was foreshadowed by the ex- 
 ceedingly grave disclosures made yesterday by the Prime Minister. He said 
 that the Government had just heard — not from St. Petersburg, but from 
 Germany — that Russia had proclaimed a general mobilization of her army 
 and fleet, and that in consequence martial law was to be proclaimed in 
 Germany. It was understood, he added, that mobilization would follow in 
 Germany if the Russian mobilization continued. We may amplify the 
 Prime Minister's statement by saying that even yesterday morning there 
 still seemed to be a ray of hope. It was announced in London, in authorita- 
 tive quarters, that the Russian Foreign Minister and the Austro-Hungarian 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg were discussing the possibility of settling the 
 Servian question. Even last night 'conversations' were reported to be 
 continuing at Vienna. 
 
 "Then came the disquieting news of the Russian general mobilization, 
 which meant that four million Russians were being placed upon a war foot- 
 ing. Germany, who had already proclaimed martial law, declared that un- 
 less the Russian movement was suspended within twelve hours the German 
 forces would be mobilized also. As a matter of fact, we believe that large 
 bodies of German troops are already massed on the French frontier. Sub- 
 stantial rumors from Paris indicate that there will probably be a general 
 mobilization in France to-day. The Queen of Holland has already signed 
 an urgent decree ordering the general mobilization of the Dutch forces. 
 Belgium has also decided to mobilize. The trend of German thoughts is 
 illustrated by the retention at Hamburg of the great Atlantic liner, the 
 Imperator, which was to have sailed yesterday morning for Southampton 
 on her way to New York. Simultaneously the sister ship, the Vaterland, 
 was ordered to stay in shelter at New York, where she now is. These and 
 many other indications unfortunately point to the extreme probability that, 
 within a time which may now be measured by hours rather than by days, 
 we may see the beginning of that unprecedented struggle of which Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey has said that 'it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has 
 ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow.'" (Extract, London 
 Times, editorial, "Europe in Arms," August 1, 1914.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 311 
 
 soon as any modification of the situation should occur. To 
 the German Ambassador Sir Edward Grey had that morn- 
 ing made the promise that, ' if France and Russia should 
 refuse to cooperate in any reasonable peace proposal sug- 
 gested by Germany, England would have nothing more to 
 do with the consequences; but otherwise, Sir Edward told 
 Prince Lichnowsky that, if France became involved, Eng- 
 land would be drawn in.' (Modified quotation, July 31, 
 B. W. P. no. 111.) 
 
 In spite of the divergence of opinion among the members 
 of the Cabinet, which threatened to split them into two 
 factions, the dire need of the nation kept them together. 
 During this crisis Sir Edward Grey continued to work to 
 present the British foreign policy in such a way as to unite 
 the Cabinet and the country in the furtherance of Eng- 
 land's vital interests.^ 
 
 10. England's vital interests. 
 Although the Cabinet at its meeting on Friday morning, 
 July 31, had decided not to guarantee England's inter- 
 vention in favor of France, the probability of war made it 
 necessary for the Government to consider what policy they 
 must adopt to protect England's vital interests. The dif- 
 ficulty in this situation was to find the method of action 
 which was, under the circumstances, best suited to this 
 end. The first desideratum was the preservation of peace 
 without such a loss of prestige or honor as to weaken the 
 Triple Entente for the benefit of the Triple Alliance.^ Eng- 
 
 * The Cabinet crisis is related in the London Times. See post, p. 340, 
 note 1. 
 
 * It is a mistake to consider that England and France would not have 
 been ready to yield a matter of mere empty prestige to save the peace of 
 Europe, but they reasoned that to yield at the dictation of Germany, when 
 Austria's aggressive and unyielding attitude was itself excused on the ground 
 of the necessity of protecting her prestige, would only encourage Germany 
 and Austria to take a similarly uncompromising stand on some other ques- 
 tion, when England would find the Triple Entente weakened, for Russia 
 would be likely to desert the Entente and draw nearer to Germany, in disgust 
 at finding that its only purpose was to permit Austria to disregard Russia's 
 
312 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 land's next most urgent desire was to keep out of the con- 
 flict, provided she could do so without too great a sacrifice.^ 
 When the Cabinet met on Friday, it seemed improbable 
 that European peace could be maintained, even with Sir 
 Edward Grey's skillful putting-up at a peace-auction the 
 determination whether England should intervene or re- 
 main neutral. Up to the actual outbreak of war between 
 Germany and Russia, he allured Germany and Austria 
 with the hope of English neutrality, and Russia and France 
 with that of intervention as the reward to the side which 
 should make the sincerest efforts to preserve the peace. 
 
 England might consider the arguments in favor of inter- 
 vention as coming under three heads: First, on the groimd 
 
 vital interests in the Balkans. Germany offered England the choice of pre- 
 serving the peace or the Entente, and England was not willing to sacrifice the 
 Entente without some security that she would not, next time, find herself in 
 the dilemma of having to choose between peace with the sacrifice of import- 
 ant interests, or war without any allies against Germany and Austria, and 
 possibly with Italy, too, — nay, she might have had to encounter a coalition 
 similar to that which the German Emperor has stated that he prevented 
 during the Anglo-Boer War. (See Documents: Interview of October 28, 
 1908.) 
 
 Dr. Karl Helflferich admits: " On the other hand, it is equally true that, 
 had France and England stood aloof, no matter how such a step may have 
 been formally authorized by treaties and agreements, the triple understand^ 
 ing would have been destroyed, and a new direction given to the policy of all 
 Europe, which necessarily would have led, not to the hegemony of a single 
 nation, but far more to a state of affairs in which every power could have 
 had its due. Confronted with the choice of preserving the Entente or pre- 
 serving the peace of the world, the statesmen at the helm in Great Britain 
 and France, who had by their own acts and words in reaUty lost their free- 
 dom and become entangled, sacrificed the peace of the world to the Entente, 
 under pressure from the cliques desiring war, and swept in their wake by far 
 the greater part of the public in their countries by appealing to the sanctity 
 of written and unwritten treaties." (New York Times, March 14, 1915.) 
 
 1 No doubt France and Russia would have resented England's remaining 
 neutral, however good an excuse she had, but at the end of a desperate war 
 with Germany, their incapacity to retaliate would have made their hostility 
 less formidable; in any event, it would have been counterbalanced by a 
 better understanding with Germany. What England had most to fear was 
 the disruption of the Entente, as the result of a diplomatic triumph on the 
 part of the Imperial Allies, which would have left France and Russia un- 
 shorn of their strength and smarting with resentment against England as 
 the "perfidious" cause of their humiliation. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 313 
 
 of obligation to France resulting from the Entente. It has 
 been shown most clearly from Sir Edward Grey's own 
 arguments that England was not bound to make common 
 cause with France when involved in a war through the 
 Russian alliance. In consequence of the Anglo-French 
 cooperative division of naval forces, England was bound to 
 protect the coasts of France, — perhaps even French com- 
 merce in the Atlantic, — but Germany would almost cer- 
 tainly have raised no objection to this qualified partici- 
 pation in the war if she had felt that it would extend 
 no further. The second consideration was the balance of 
 power for which England had been employing her diplo- 
 macy and her arms since the time of Wolsey. The develop- 
 ment of larger views of world interests and the unity of 
 aim of civilized nations had weakened the support of this 
 principle. Some of the most powerful organs ^ of the press 
 openly raised their voices against the idea of continuing 
 longer to bow down before this fetish which had been re- 
 sponsible for the long duel with France. On this question 
 the country was divided, without any prospect of being 
 able to agree. 2 There remained the question of Belgian 
 neutrality — a diplomatic jewel for the Foreign Office 
 which sparkled light from its m&ny facettes. There was the 
 obligation to make good the guaranty, which was of a na- 
 ture to rally the support of that very group of advanced 
 Liberals who refused to be drawn into a war for the main- 
 tenance of the balance of power. The need of defending a 
 small state against aggression would also influence them. 
 The partisans of a vigorous foreign policy, the supporters 
 of the Entente, and the Germanophobes all realized that 
 insistence upon the respect of Belgian territory would lend 
 material strength to the support of their cherished policies 
 or convictions. If Germany agreed to respect Belgian neu- 
 
 ^ Notably the Manchester Guardian; see editorial of August 3, 1915. 
 2 See "Changes in the Cabinet," London Tmes, August 5, 1914, pos<, 
 p. 340, note. Cf. also above, p. 311. 
 
314 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 trality, a great step toward the maintenance of the bal-a 
 anee of power would have been assured, and it would have 
 been easier for England to intervene later on if German 
 success should endanger the balance of power; and France, 
 secured from attack through Belgium, would be much bet- 
 ter able to resist attack. The respecting of the neutrality 
 of Belgium might thus have left Germany and Austria to 
 fight on fairly even terms against Russia and France. Had 
 Germany agreed to respect Belgian neutrality, the bal- 
 ance of power and the integrity of France might have been 
 maintained by this diplomatic intervention on the part 
 of Great Britain. Germany's refusal would tend to unite 
 all parties in support of British intervention. The only 
 danger — and that a slight one — was that France and 
 Russia might suddenly give in to Germany, through fear 
 that they could not resist, and then nurse their resentment 
 against England.^ It was, therefore, most important to 
 
 1 The effect of placing the whole question of England's intervention on 
 the broad basis of respect for Belgian neutrality is strikingly shown by the 
 following remark of Henry James, who has lived so long in England as to be 
 classed as an Englishman: "Personally I feel so strongly on everything that 
 the war has brought into question for the Anglo-Saxon peoples that humor- 
 ous detachment or any other thinness or tepidity of mind on the subject 
 affects me as vulgar impiety, not to say as rank blasphemy; our whole race 
 tension became for me a sublimely conscious thing from the moment Ger- 
 many flung at us all her explanation of her pounce upon Belgium for mas- 
 sacre and ravage in the form of the most insolent 'Because I choose to, 
 damn you all!' recorded in history." (New York Times, Magazine Sec- 
 tion, p. 4, March 21, 1915.) 
 
 Mr. Clifford Allen, a well-known leader of the Labor Party, bears un- 
 intentional testimony to the eflScacy of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy in 
 placing England's intervention on the Belgian basis: — 
 
 "What happened, then, when the danger of war loomed ahead? The 
 Prime Minister had told us, and the Foreign Secretary had confirmed his 
 statement, that we were under no secret alliance with any nation, yet, when 
 it came to the point, it became perfectly clear that we considered ourselves 
 under an honorable obligation to France far more binding than Italy's share 
 in the Triple Alliance. Over and over again this has been emphasized since 
 the outbreak of war. We could not leave our neighbor, France, in the lurch, 
 having put her fleet in the lurch long before Belgium was violated. We 
 eventually give her an undertaking to protect her coasts. 
 
 "Now, let us be perfectly definite about this business. The question of 
 Belgian neutrality has been raised, with all the ingenuity of the capitalist, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 315 
 
 know at once what would be Germany's attitude. Ac- 
 cordingly, Sir Edward Grey decided to ask France and 
 Germany to declare their intentions in respect to Bel- 
 gium.^ The making of this inquiry at that time had the 
 further advantage, in case Germany should refuse, of 
 showing plainly to the English people the true nature of 
 German designs. Public opinion would have time to form 
 and unite in support of intervention, so that when war 
 was declared, the whole country, to a man, would respond. 
 It now appears clearly how perfect was the British diplo- 
 macy in taking advantage of the Belgian question on that 
 critical Friday morning, July 31. At one stroke Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey showed up Germany's designs, secured an 
 opportunity to urge upon Belgium a timely resistance, 
 united the Cabinet and the country against Germany, in- 
 tervened in good season for the defense of the balance of 
 power, and came to the aid of the Entente soon enough 
 to be siu"e of the gratitude of Russia and France; yet he 
 had also succeeded in holding off both sides long enough 
 to try the effect of every inducement for peace he could 
 bring forward. It is also probable that the delay robbed 
 Germany of a great part of the advantage she would have 
 had if she could have struck several days earlier. 
 
 With a full realization of the importance of Sir Edward 
 Grey's Belgian policy, we can return to an examination of 
 the manner in which it was carried out and the futile 
 efforts of Germany to prevent Sir Edward Grey from tak- 
 
 as the great and honorable pretext for our participation in this war. Had 
 that been the only reason, it could have been discussed upon its merits, and 
 upon those merits it could certainly claim a far higher place than any other 
 pretext. But let us make no mistake about it. Belgian neutrality or no 
 Belgian neutrality, Britain would have been involved in this war. Why? 
 Accepting our foreign policy and our view of the balance of power, it was to 
 our interest to join in." (Extracts from Clifford Allen, Is Germany Right 
 and Britain Wrong? Second edition, 1914.) 
 
 ^ Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon that "Germany's reply to this 
 communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilization of four 
 army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us [them] to realize the 
 intentions of the German Government." (Extract, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 98.) 
 
316 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ing the steps which brought about the mental and moral 
 mobilization of the country to present against Germany 
 the united strength of the whole people.^ 
 
 11. England's inquiry relative to Belgium's neutrality 
 The vital importance to England of maintaining Bel- 
 gium free from all control of a Continental power is recog- 
 nized as the principal reason why the regime of neutrali- 
 zation was imposed upon Belgium when she broke away 
 from Holland. Because of the very great importance of 
 Belgian independence to England, ^ it is natural that Sir 
 Edward Grey should have told the German Ambassador 
 at London that, though England could not agree to stay 
 out of the conflict in any event, even if Belgium's neutral- 
 ity was respected, they would nevertheless consider it a 
 very important factor. It was because of this attitude on 
 the part of the British Government that Sir Edward Grey 
 had on July 31 telegraphed the British Ambassador at 
 Berlin: — 
 
 ''I still trust the situation is not irretrievable, but in 
 view of the prospect of mobilization in Germany, it be- 
 comes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of 
 existing treaties, to ask whether the German Government 
 is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium, so 
 
 1 For a fuller consideration of the question of Belgian Neutrality, see 
 chapter ix. 
 
 2 See "The Barrier Treaty Vindicated," Documents, post, chap. xiii. 
 Grotius wrote in 1632: "The King of England will give up everything 
 before he allows France to receive the p>orts of Flanders." (Dollot, Les 
 Origines de la Neutralite de la Belgique, p. 58.) Cf. also post, chap, ix, §§1, 
 10. "... With characteristic nawete and insular selfishness some jingoes 
 imagine that if only the naval armaments of Germany could be stopped, all 
 danger to England would be averted. But surely the greatest danger to 
 England is not the invasion of England; it is the invasion of France and Bel- 
 gium. For in the case of an invasion of England, even the Germans admit 
 that the probabilities of success would all be against Germany; whilst in the 
 case of an invasion of France, the Germans claim that the probabilities are 
 all in their favor. It is therefore in France and Belgium that the vulnerable 
 point lies, the Achilles heel of the British Empire." (Charles Sarolea, The 
 Anglo-German Problem, p. 43. London and New York, 1912.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 317 
 
 long as no other power violates it. A similar request is 
 being addressed to the French Government. It is impor- 
 tant to have an early answer." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 114.) 
 
 To this Sir Edward Goschen replied : — 
 
 "I have seen the Secretary of State, who informs me 
 that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor 
 before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what 
 he said that he thought any reply they might give could 
 not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of cam- 
 paign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore 
 very doubtful whether they would return any answer at 
 all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your re- 
 quest. 
 
 ** It appears from what he said that the German Govern- 
 ment consider that certain hostile acts have already been 
 committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged 
 that a consignment of com for Germany had been placed 
 under an embargo ^ already. 
 
 ''I hope to see His Excellency to-morrow again to dis- 
 cuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a 
 definite answer seems to me remote. 
 
 ''In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear 
 that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply 
 returned to you by the French Government." (Extract, 
 July 31, B. W. P. no. 122.) 
 
 The desire of the German Chancellor to know what reply 
 was returned by France, before giving Germany's answer, 
 may have been explained on the ground that there was 
 some sincere belief in Germany that France intended to 
 violate Belgium's neutrality. In the latter case it does not 
 do much credit to German political acumen or to her se- 
 cret service, which has been credited with such a high de- 
 
 ' As regards the embargo to which Von Jagow refers, documents in the 
 Belgian Gray Paper explain that a provisional prohibition was placed by the 
 Government on certain articles, but this was not intended to apply to arti- 
 cles in transit, and the German Legation was informed, August 3, that the 
 exportation of the grain had been authorized on August 1. (B. G. P. no. 79.) 
 
318 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 gree of efficiency. It may, on the other hand, have been a 
 mere play to hold off British action or to avoid an abrupt 
 refusal. 
 
 The British Ambassador at Paris reported to Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey in regard to Belgian neutrahty : ''On the receipt 
 at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon, I sent 
 a message to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting 
 to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, 
 where a Cabinet council was being held. He took a note 
 of the inquiry as to the respecting by France of the neu- 
 trality of Belgium which you instructed me to make." 
 (July 31, B. W. P. no. 124.) 
 
 In a telegram immediately following he added: "Politi- 
 cal Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of 
 Belgium. It is as follows: The French Government are 
 resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would 
 only be in the event of some other power violating that 
 neutrality that France might find herself under the neces- 
 sity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act 
 otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. 
 The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of 
 the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has 
 spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs to-day." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 
 125; cf. F. Y. B. no. 119.) 
 
 On July 31, Sir Edward Grey instructed the British 
 representative at Brussels: — 
 
 ''In view of existing treaties you should inform the Min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possi- 
 bihty of a European war, I have asked the French and 
 German Governments whether each is prepared to respect 
 the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no 
 other power. 
 
 "You should say that I assume that the Belgian Govern- 
 ment will maintain to the utmost of her power her neu- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 319 
 
 trality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold 
 and observe. 
 
 ''You should inform the Belgian Government that an 
 early reply is desired." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 115.) 
 
 He received the following reply (August 1) : — 
 
 ''The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yes- 
 terday (see B. W. P. no. 115) have been acted upon. 
 
 "Belgium expects and desires that other powers will 
 observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to 
 maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, 
 the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of 
 the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they be- 
 lieved that they were in a position to defend themselves 
 against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her 
 neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to sus- 
 pect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, 
 to be prepared against emergencies." (August 1, B. W. P. 
 no. 128.) 
 
 When Sir Edward Grey said, "I assume that the Bel- 
 gian Government will maintain to the utmost her neutral- 
 ity, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and 
 observe," he gave Belgium official notice that England 
 would support her in her defense of her neutrality. The 
 evident intention was to stiffen her resistance to German 
 aggression by promise of support. The language used 
 might possibly cover a threat as well. Yet this is hard to 
 reconcile with the attitude of the British Minister at Brus- 
 sels (July 31), who, after informing the Belgian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs that France and Germany had been 
 asked whether they would respect Belgian neutrality, 
 evinced in the course of the conversation which followed 
 'some surprise at the rapidity with which the Belgian 
 Government had resolved upon the mobilization of their 
 army. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that 
 the Netherlands had taken an identical resolution before 
 they had, and that, on the other hand, the recent date of 
 
320 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the putting into effect of their new military regime and the 
 measures made necessary by this transformation imposed 
 urgent and comprehensive measures upon them. Their 
 neighbors, the guarantor powers, ought to view this action 
 as an evidence of their wish to manifest their profound de- 
 sire to maintain of themselves their own neutrality. The 
 British Minister appeared satisfied with his reply, and 
 said the British Government awaited this reply and assur- 
 ance of Belgium's intention to defend her neutrahty in 
 order to continue negotiations with France and Germany, 
 the conclusion of which negotiations would, he said, be 
 communicated to the Belgian Government.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 31, B. G. P. no. 11; cf. B. W. P. nos. 115, 
 128.) 
 
 'On the morning of July 31, in the course of a conversa- 
 tion which Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General of the 
 Belgian Department of Foreign Affairs, had with Herr von 
 Below, he explained to the German Minister the trend of 
 the military measures which Belgium had taken and told 
 him they were a consequence of Belgium's decision to 
 carry out her international obligations, and that they in no 
 way implied an attitude of defiance toward her neighbors. 
 
 ' The Secretary-General subsequently asked Von Below 
 whether he had knowledge of the conversation which he 
 had had with the German Minister, his predecessor, Herr 
 von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancel- 
 lor had instructed the latter to make to him. 
 
 'In the course of the discussion aroused in 1911 by the 
 consideration of the Dutch scheme regarding the Flush- 
 ing fortifications, certain newspapers asserted that in the 
 event of a Franco-German war, Belgium's neutrality 
 would be violated by Germany. 
 
 'The Department of Foreign Affairs suggested that a 
 declaration made in the German Parliament on the occa- 
 sion of a discussion of foreign policy would be calculated 
 to appease public opinion and to calm the suspicions, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 321 
 
 which are so much to be regretted because of their influ- 
 ence on the relations of the two countries. 
 
 'Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg made the reply that he 
 was most appreciative of the motives which had caused 
 Belgium to make this request. He declared that Germany 
 had no intention of violating Belgium's neutrality, but 
 said he considered that by making a declaration publicly, 
 Germany would weaken her military position in respect 
 to France, who, being reassured as to her northern fron- 
 tier, would direct all her efforts to the east. 
 
 'Baron van der Elst, continuing the discussion with 
 Von Below, went on to say that he perfectly understood 
 the objections which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg raised 
 to the suggested public declaration, and he pointed out 
 that subsequently in 1913 Herr von Jagow had given to 
 the Budget Committee of the Reichstag reassuring declara- 
 tions with reference to the respect of Belgian neutrality.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 31, B. G. P. no. 12.) 
 
 As an enclosure in the same dispatch is given a letter of 
 May 2, 1913, from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, which 
 gives an account of Von Jagow' s assurance in the following 
 words : — 
 
 ''I have the honor of informing you, according to the 
 semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, of the de- 
 clarations made in the course of the sitting of the 29th of 
 April of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag by the 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of 
 War with reference to Belgian neutrality. 
 
 *'A member of the Social Democratic Party said: 'In 
 Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed 
 with apprehension, because it is feared that Germany will 
 not respect Belgian neutrality.' 
 
 ''Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 replied : ' The neutrality of Belgium is determined by inter- 
 national conventions, and Germany is resolved to respect 
 these conventions.' 
 
322 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 "This declaration did not satisfy another member of the 
 Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow observed that 
 he had nothing to add to the clear statement which he had 
 uttered with reference to the relations between Germany 
 and Belgium. 
 
 "In reply to further interrogations from a member of 
 the Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, Minis- 
 ter of War, stated : ' Belgium does not play any part in the 
 justification of the German scheme of military reorgan- 
 ization; the scheme is justified by the position of matters in 
 the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Bel- 
 gian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.' 
 
 "A member of the Progressive Party having again re- 
 ferred to Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that 
 his declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently clear." 
 (Extract, May 2, 1913; enclosure in B. G. P. no. 12.) 
 
 It is hard to understand just what the Secretary-General 
 of the Belgian Foreign Office meant when he said that he 
 understood the objections to making a public declaration. 
 On its face it would look as though Belgium recognized 
 that Germany was justified in trading upon the possibility 
 that she might violate her agreement to respect Belgian 
 neutrality so as to hamper France. Such an attitude, if 
 really entertained by Belgium, would be contrary to the 
 principles of neutrality, and would constitute the nearest 
 approach to a departure from a neutral attitude on Bel- 
 gium's part which has been adduced. The departure from 
 this attitude of neutrality is probably more apparent than 
 real, and merely intended not to offend a powerful neigh- 
 bor. In this connection it is interesting to note Belgium's 
 attitude at the Second Hague Conference, when her dele- 
 gation was generally to be found supporting Germany. 
 Belgium's support of a general treaty of arbitration would 
 have been very valuable then, but she preferred to follow 
 the lead of German opposition. Again it is to be remarked 
 that Belgium showed no disposition to facilitate France's 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 323 
 
 policy in Morocco, but held back her approval of the aboli- 
 tion of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of her consuls. 
 Such an attitude savors of political support of Germany, 
 and as such does not indicate subserviency to French or 
 English dictation. The determining factor in this action 
 was undoubtedly the fear that France might seize the Bel- 
 gian Congo, and did not indicate the slightest intention of 
 failing to observe the duties of her position as a perpetually 
 neutral state. 
 
 On August 1, the French Minister at Brussels made the 
 following verbal communication to the Belgian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs: ''I am authorized to declare that in 
 the event of an international conflict the Government of 
 the Republic will, as it has always declared, respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not 
 being respected by another power, the French Government, 
 in order to insure its own defense, might be led to modify 
 its attitude." (August 1, B. G. P. no. 15.) 
 
 The next day, August 2, at 7 p.m.. Von Below, notwith- 
 standing his assurances given two days before, handed the 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs Germany's ultima- 
 tum: — 
 
 ''The German Government has received reliable infor- 
 mation according to which the French forces intend to 
 march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This 
 information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France 
 marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The 
 Imperial German Government cannot avoid the fear that 
 Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to 
 repulse such a largely developed French march without 
 aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat 
 directed against Germany. 
 
 "It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Ger- 
 many to forestall this attack of the enemy. 
 
 ''The German Government would feel keen regret if 
 Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against her- 
 
324 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 self the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany- 
 oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory. 
 
 "In order to dissipate any misunderstanding, the Ger- 
 man Government declares as follows: — 
 
 ''1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostil- 
 ity against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about 
 to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality 
 toward Germany, the German Government on its part 
 undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the 
 kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent. 
 
 *'2. Germany undertakes under the condition laid down 
 to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is con- 
 cluded. 
 
 "3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany 
 is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Bel- 
 gian Government, to buy against cash all that is required 
 by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages 
 caused in Belgium. 
 
 "4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the 
 German troops, and in particular raises difficulties against 
 their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the 
 Meuse, or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other 
 engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider 
 Belgium as an enemy. 
 
 "In this case Germany will take no engagements toward 
 Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations 
 of the two States toward one another to the decision of 
 arms. The German Government has a justified hope that 
 this contingency will not arise, and that the Belgian Gov- 
 ernment will know how to take suitable measures to hinder 
 its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which 
 unite the two neighboring states will become closer and 
 more lasting." (August 2, B. G. P. no. 20; see also B. W. 
 P. no. 153.) 
 
 A few hours later, August 3, at half -past one in the morn- 
 ing, the German Minister asked for an interview with the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 325 
 
 Belgian Foreign Minister, and made the extraordinary 
 statement that ' he was instructed by his Government to 
 inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles 
 had thrown bombs, and that a patrol of French cavalry, 
 violating international law, seeing that war was not de- 
 clared, had crossed the frontier. ^ 
 
 'When asked where these events had taken place, Herr 
 von Below answered, in Germany. The Secretary-Gen- 
 eral observed that in that case he could not understand 
 the object of his communication. Herr von Below replied 
 that these acts, contrary to international law, were of a 
 nature to make one expect that other acts contrary to 
 international law would be perpetrated by France.' (Mod- 
 ified quotation, August 3, B. G. P. no. 21.) 
 
 1 In reference to these alleged violations of German territory, seeF. Y. B. 
 nos. 146, 147, 148, 149, 155. A pamphlet by two distinguished French pro- 
 fessors has the following note: — . 
 
 " As we wished to ascertain whether the German newspapers had given a 
 more detailed account of these occurrences, we consulted five of the principal 
 newspapers {Vorwaerls, Arbeiter Zeitung, of Vienna, Frankfurter Zeitung, 
 Koehiische Zeitung, Munchner Neueste Nachrichten) from the end of July to 
 the 5th of August. First of all we noticed that the aviator who is said to have 
 flown over Karlsruhe is not mentioned. As for the others, the account of 
 them is as vague as it is in the official note. These incidents, given as the 
 cause determining war, take up one line, two or three at the most. Tfw 
 bombs never left any trace. One of these aeroplanes, that at Wesel, is said to 
 have been brought down; nothing is said of the aviator and what became of 
 him nor is there anything about the aeroplane itself. In a word, the Ger- 
 mans took care to draw attention to their arrival in Germany and then never 
 spoke of them again. They were never seen to return to their starting-point. 
 "But we have still more convincing evidence. We have been able to pro- 
 cure a Nuremberg newspaper, the Frankischer Kurrier. On the 2d of August, 
 the day the bombs are supposed to have been thrown, not a word is said 
 about the incident. Nuremberg received the news on the 3d by a telegram 
 from Berlin identical to that published by the other newspapers. Again, the 
 Koelnische Zeitung of the 3d, in its morning edition, published a telegram 
 from Munich which read as follows : ' The Bavarian Minister of War is doubt- 
 ful as to the exactness of the news announcing that aviators had been seen 
 above the lines Nuremberg-Kitzingen and Nuremberg-Ansbach and that 
 they had thrown bombs on the railway.' 
 
 "We have been greatly helped in these researches by our colleague J. 
 Hadamard and M. Edg. Milhaud, professor at the University of Geneva, to 
 whom we tender our sincere thanks." (E. Durkheim and E. Denis, Who 
 Wanted War ? p. 50, note 1. Paris, 1915.) 
 
326 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Apparently the German Government wished to put their 
 action in Belgium in the light of a reprisal or violation of 
 international law in answer to that of France. 
 
 At the hour of the expiration of the German ultimatum, 
 Monday morning, August 3, the Belgian Government 
 handed Von Below its answer : — 
 
 *By their note of the 2d of August, 1914, the German 
 Government has made known that according to certain 
 intelligence the French forces intend to march on the 
 Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite 
 of her good intentions, would not be able without help to 
 beat off an advance of the French troops. 
 
 ' The German Government felt it to be its duty to fore- 
 stall this attack, and to violate Belgian territory. Under 
 these conditions Germany proposes to the Belgian Gov- 
 ernment to take up a friendly attitude, and undertakes 
 when peace is established to guarantee the integrity of the 
 Belgian Kingdom and of its possessions in their entirety. 
 The note adds that if Belgium raises difficulties about the 
 advance of the German troops, Germany will be compelled 
 to consider her as an enemy and to leave to the decision of 
 arms settlement of the later relations of the two states 
 toward one another. 
 
 'This note caused profound and painful surprise to the 
 Belgian Government. 
 
 'The intentions which it attributed to France are in 
 contradiction with the express declarations which were 
 made to us on the 1st of August, in the name of the Govern- 
 ment of the Republic. 
 
 'Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation 
 of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, 
 Belgium would fulfill all her international duties, and her 
 army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the in- 
 vader. 
 
 'The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, 
 establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 327 
 
 under the guaranty of the powers, and particularly of the 
 Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia. 
 
 'Belgium has always been faithful to her international 
 obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal 
 impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her 
 neutrality or to make it respected. 
 
 ' The attempt against her independence with which the 
 German Government threatens her would constitute a 
 flagrant violation of international law. No strategic in- 
 terest justifies the violation of that law. 
 
 'The Belgian Government would, by accepting the 
 propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor 
 of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties 
 toward Europe. 
 
 'Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more 
 than eighty years in the civilization of the world, she re- 
 fuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be 
 preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neu- 
 trality. 
 
 ' If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government 
 has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power 
 any attack upon her rights.' (Modified quotation, August 
 3, B. G. P. no. 22.) 
 
 The Council of Ministers having decided that ' there was 
 not for the moment reason to appeal to the guaranteeing 
 powers,' (B. G. P. no. 24), the French Minister to Belgium 
 said: 'Without being instructed to make a declaration 
 by his Government, he believed, however, judging by its 
 known intentions, that he could say that if the Royal 
 Government should appeal to the French Government, as 
 a power guaranteeing her neutrality, the French Govern- 
 ment would immediately respond to her appeal; if this 
 appeal was not made, it is probable, unless of course the 
 anxiety about their own defense should lead them to take 
 exceptional measures, that the French Government would 
 wait before intervening until Belgium had performed an 
 
328 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 act of effective resistance.' (Modified quotation, August 
 3, B. G. P. no. 24.) 
 
 Probably the heroic Uttle people wished first to make a 
 stand for their rights. By this action, in not calling imme- 
 diately upon the guaranteeing powers, they made it im- 
 possible for Germany to claim that Belgium had violated 
 her obligations as a neutral; for if French troops had been 
 rushed to the frontier, it would have been hard to tell just 
 when they had entered Belgian territory. 
 
 12. England asked to guarantee the neutrality of France 
 It will be remembered how Sir Edward Grey in a con- 
 versation with Prince Lichnowsky on July 29 had said 
 that there would be no question of England's intervening 
 if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not 
 involved. (B. W. P. no. 89.) Three days after this declara- 
 tion an important exchange of telegrams took place re- 
 garding the neutrality of France. August 1 is the date of 
 Lichnowsky 's dispatch informing his Government that 
 'Sir Edward had just asked him by telephone whether he 
 believed he could declare the German Government would 
 not attack France in case of war between Germany and 
 Russia, provided France remained neutral. To which the 
 Ambassador replied that he believed he could enter into 
 such an agreement.' (Modified quotation, August 1, G. W. 
 B. exhibit 33.) 
 
 This brought in response that same day two telegrams, 
 one from the Kaiser : — 
 
 "I have just received the communication from your 
 Government offering French neutrality under guarantee of 
 Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether 
 under these conditions Germany would refrain from at- 
 tacking France. On technical grounds my mobilization, 
 which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must 
 proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this 
 cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, your tele- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 329 
 
 gram came so late. But if France offers me neutrality 
 which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, 
 I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ 
 my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become 
 nervous. The troops on my frontier are in the act of being 
 stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into 
 France." (August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 32.) 
 
 Von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed : — 
 
 "Germany is ready to accept British proposal in case 
 England guarantees with all her forces absolute neutrality 
 of France in Russo-German conflict. German mobilization 
 has been ordered to-day on account of Russian challenge 
 before English proposal was known here. It is, therefore, 
 now impossible to make any change in strategical distribu- 
 tion of troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guar- 
 antee that our troops will not cross the French frontier be- 
 fore 7 P.M. on Monday the 3rd inst. in case England will 
 pledge herself meanwhile." (August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 34.) 
 
 In reply to this response, King George telegraphed the 
 same day : — 
 
 ''In answer to your telegram just received, I think there 
 must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that 
 passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnow- 
 sky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were 
 discussing how actual fighting between German and 
 French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance 
 of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early 
 to-morrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misun- 
 derstanding on his part." (August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 35.) 
 
 This direct exchange of telegrams between the heads of 
 the states was brought about by Prince Henry's telegram 
 of July 30 to King George, informing him of the efforts the 
 Kaiser was making to 'fulfill Nicky's ^ appeal to him to 
 
 ^ The authorized Enghsh version of the German White Book puts 
 "Nicky" for Nicholas, but the German edition has "Nikolaus." 
 
330 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 work for the maintenance of peace '; and urging the King, 
 'if he really and earnestly wished to prevent the terrible 
 disaster, to use his influence on France and Russia to keep 
 them neutral/ (Modified quotation, July 30, G. W. B. 
 exhibit 29.) King George in his reply of the same date 
 'expressed pleasure at learning of the Kaiser's efforts, 
 and explained the exertions the British Government were 
 making, by suggesting to Russia and France to suspend 
 further military preparations, if Austria would agree to 
 content herself with the occupation of Belgrade and sur- 
 rounding territory as a hostage for the satisfactory settle- 
 ment of her demands, the other countries agreeing mean- 
 while to suspend their preparations for war.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 30.) 
 
 The foregoing telegrams were published in the North- 
 German Gazette, August 20, 1914. A few days later, when 
 Lord Robert Cecil, in the House of Commons, asked the 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether his attention had 
 been called to the publication by the German Government 
 of certain proposals which were alleged to have been made 
 to secure French and English neutrality during the war, 
 and whether the publication was complete and accurate, 
 Sir Edward Grey replied : — 
 
 "I have seen an incomplete publication. The circum- 
 stances were as follows: It was reported to me one day 
 that the German Ambassador had suggested that Ger- 
 many might remain neutral in a war between Russia and 
 Austria and also engage not to attack France if we would 
 remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said 
 at once that if the German Government thought such an 
 arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it. 
 
 "It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador 
 meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France 
 if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite 
 a different proposal, and as I supposed it in all proba- 
 bility to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 331 
 
 Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to 
 secure it. 
 
 "Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private sec- 
 retary and told him that as soon as the misunderstanding 
 was cleared up he had sent a second telegram to Berlin to 
 cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had 
 sent on the subject. The first telegram has been pubUshed. 
 This second telegram does not seem to have been pub- 
 lished." 1 
 
 ^ From the report of the ParHamentary debates in the London Times of 
 August 29. An article in the London Times commenting on the pubUcation 
 of the letters in the North-German Gazette gave the text of the omitted letter, 
 which would indicate that Lichnowsky commvmicated a copy of his ex- 
 planation to Sir Edward Grey. Perhaps he felt he was to blame for the mis- 
 understanding, and took this straightforward means of setting his blunder 
 right with Sir Edward. 
 
 Shortly after this, the German Government issued from the Government 
 Printing Office in BerUn an oflficial English translation of these letters, 
 among which was included Lichnowsky's telegram of August 2. (See New 
 York Times, September 11, 1914.) 
 
 The Appendix of the Authorized American Edition of the German White 
 Book (pp. 31-32) contains the following official communique in reference to 
 this disputed question : — 
 
 "The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of September 5, 1914, contains the 
 following official statement : — 
 
 "According to news received in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey, in the House 
 of Commons, had made a statement to the effect that the exchange of tele- 
 grams between Germany and England, prior to the war, as published by the 
 German Government, was incomplete. 
 
 "The Secretary alleged that Prince Lichnowsky had cancelled his report 
 anent the well-known telephonic conversation, immediately afterwards, by 
 telegraph, after he had been enlightened that there was a misunderstanding. 
 This telegram, however, had not been published. 
 
 "Moreover, the Times, apparently on information from official quarters, 
 had made an identical statement, with the comment that the German Gov- 
 ernment had suppressed the telegram in question, in order to be able to ac- 
 cuse England of perfidy, and to prove Germany's pacific intentions. 
 
 "In contradiction to these statements, we hereby aflirm that a telegram 
 of the alleged contents does not exist ! 
 
 "Besides the telegram already published, which was dispatched from 
 London on August 1,11 a.m.. Prince Lichnowsky sent on the same day, the 
 following telegrams to Berlin: — 
 
 "(1) At 1.15 p.m. 
 
 "'The Private Secretary of Sir Edward Grey just called to inform me: 
 The Minister wished to make propositions to me for the neutrality of Eng- 
 land, even in the event of our going to war with Russia, as well as with 
 
332 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 The explanatory telegram of the German Ambassador, 
 dated August 2, was: — 
 
 ''Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire 
 to make it possible for England to keep permanent neu- 
 trality, but as they were not based on a previous under- 
 
 France. I shall see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will at once re- 
 port.' 
 
 " (2) At 5.30 P.M. 
 
 " ' Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration which 
 had been unanimously applied {sic) by the Cabinet : — 
 
 " ' "The reply of the German Government with regard to the neu- 
 trahty of Belgium is a matter of very great regret because the neutral- 
 ity of Belgium does aflfect feeling in this country. If Germany could 
 see her way to give the same positive reply, as that which has been 
 given by France, it would materially contribute to reheve anxiety and 
 tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the 
 neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, 
 it would be extremely difficult to restrain public opinion in this coun- 
 try." 
 " 'To my question, whether he could give me a definite guaranty as to the 
 neutraUty of England in case we respected the neutrality of Belgium, the 
 Minister responded that he was unable to do so. However, this question 
 would have an important bearing upon English public opinion. If, in a war 
 against France, we should violate the neutrality of Belgium, it would surely 
 cause a change in public opinion which would make it very difficult for the 
 British Government to maintain an amicable neutrality. So far, there was 
 not the slightest intention to take hostile measures against us. The desire 
 prevailed of refraining from such measures, as far as possible. Yet one could 
 hardly draw a line up to which we might safely proceed, without calling 
 forth British intervention. He repeatedly recurred to the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium, and said that this question would, at all events, play a great role. He 
 said that he had already thought it over whether it would be possible that 
 we and France would, in the event of a Russian war, remain in a state of 
 armed opposition, without attacking each other. I asked him whether he 
 was in a position to declare that France would be prepared to enter such a 
 pact. Since we had no intention of either annihilating France, nor of an- 
 nexing parts of her territory, I was inchned to think that we might be open 
 for such an agreement which would secure for us the neutrality of Great 
 Britain. The Minister said that he would make inquiries, adding that he 
 did not under-rate the diflSculties of maintaining military inactivity on 
 both sides.' 
 
 "(3) At 8.30 P.M. 
 
 " * My report of this morning is cancelled by my report of to-night. Since 
 positive English proposals are not forthcoming, further steps in the direction 
 indicated in (Yoiu: Excellency's) instructions are useless.' 
 
 " Obviously the above telegrams contain no hint whatsoever that there 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 333 
 
 standing with France and made without knowledge of our 
 mobilization, they have been abandoned as absolutely- 
 hopeless." (August 2, G. W. B. exhibit 36.) 
 
 At first view one might be inclined to think that the 
 German Ambassador, whose sincerity seems never to have 
 been questioned, could not have made such a mistake 
 unless Sir Edward Grey had made some such proposal, 
 perhaps only tentative. Entirely aside from the reliance 
 which I think may be placed upon Sir Edward Grey's 
 word, it is most improbable that England would have 
 agreed to stand aside and let Germany and Austria unite 
 in an attempt to crush Russia, while England restrained 
 France. France had let it appear clearly that she wanted 
 peace, but that she would, nevertheless, support her ally if 
 attacked by Germany, and England, if she had guaranteed 
 the neutrality of France, would have placed the latter in a 
 dependent and humiliated position. The result of a policy 
 so fatuous might have been to allow Germany to crush 
 Russia, perhaps, and then turn later against England. 
 Again, if we were to question the sincerity of Germany's 
 Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, we might discover a plot 
 to pretend a conversation which had not occurred, and by 
 answering it to put on record material apt to create in 
 Russia suspicions of France and England, and in France 
 distrust of England, so as to break up the cordial coopera- 
 tion of the members of the Entente. But in that case. Sir 
 Edward Grey would not have known anything of Prince 
 
 had been a misunderstanding, nor anything about the removal of the al- 
 leged misunderstanding, as affirmed by the English statesman." 
 
 The same publication contains the following remarks about this ex- 
 change of correspondence : — 
 
 "... It will be perceived from these documents that Germany was pre- 
 pared to spare France in case England should remain neutral and would 
 guarantee the neutrality of France. 
 
 "The essence of Germany's declarations is contained in Emperor Wil- 
 liam's telegram to the King of England of August Ist, 1914. Even if there 
 existed a misunderstanding as to an English proposal, the Kaiser's offer 
 furnished England the opportunity to prove her pacific disposition and to 
 prevent the Franco-German War." 
 
334 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Lichnowsky's letter to his Government, explaining his 
 mistake. In reality, it seems then that Prince Lichnow- 
 sky must have misunderstood. Sir Edward Grey may per- 
 haps have asked whether, if he prevailed upon France to 
 remain neutral, Germany would hold aloof. Some such 
 remark Lichnowsky may possibly have understood as an 
 offer to secure the neutrality of France ; but to believe this 
 makes it impossible to place a very high estimate on the 
 German Ambassador's intelligence. With the best inten- 
 tions, he was unable to handle the situation as his predeces- 
 sor Von Bieberstein would have done.^ 
 
 1 The London Times of August 27 (p. 5), giving the important parts of 
 the letters published in the Gazette, and Lichnowsky's supposed telegram 
 of explanation, comments: — 
 
 "PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S BLUNDER 
 "Prince Lichnowsky's telegram of August 1 was based upon a com- 
 plete misunderstanding of the subject of a conversation. It was in fact 
 a serious professional blunder of which the only explanation can be 
 that Prince Lichnowsky, who was himself working sincerely and 
 seriously for an Austro-Russian settlement, was not equal to the strain 
 imposed upon him. There was no question of French neutrality in the 
 event of ' a Russo-German war.' Sir Edward Grey was merely making 
 one last desperate effort to see whether Germany could be induced to 
 remain neutral if England secured the neutrality of France. 
 
 "We understand that immediately after the telephone conversa- 
 tion, which took place at 11.30 in the morning of August 1, there was 
 an official conversation with Prince Lichnowsky in which it was plainly 
 pointed out that what would be a casus foederis for Germany must 
 imply a casus foederis for France — that if Germany fought, France 
 must fight also. Prince Lichnowsky at once said that he had been 
 under a misapprehension, and telegraphed to Berlin a correction of his 
 previous telegram. His second telegram has simply been suppressed, 
 and the German Government actually publishes the German Ambas- 
 sador's inaccurate dispatch in order to give a fresh proof of British 
 perfidy and of Germany's eagerness to accept any proposal making for 
 peace. 
 
 "Meanwhile we may at any rate be grateful for the publication of 
 the extraordinary telegram sent by the Emperor William when he was 
 given to beheve that England was offering to look after France while 
 Germany attacked Russia. So far from remaining quiet herself, Ger- 
 many was to move her troops from the French frontier in order to 
 employ them 'elsewhere.' There was, moreover, to be no shadow of 
 doubt about France keeping quiet, for England was not merely to 
 procure a declaration of French neutrality — in fact, the destruction 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 335 
 
 The English Government must have felt justly incensed 
 to learn, on July 31, ''not from St. Petersburg, but from 
 Germany, that Russia had proclaimed a general mobiliza- 
 tion of her army and fleet." ^ And it is very possible that 
 
 of the Franco-Russian Alliance — but was to guarantee French neu- 
 trality with the whole strength of the British Army and Navy." 
 Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, in an article in the New York Sun of Sunday, 
 October 11, implies that the British Government left out of the White 
 Paper the so-called "Willy," "Georgie," and "Nicky" correspondence for 
 fear it might prejudice their case. The following Sunday the well-known 
 historian, George Louis Beer, in a vigorous defense of the British Govern- 
 ment publication, says of this omission: — 
 
 "The explanation is quite simple to one versed in British constitu- 
 tional practice, but is naturally not so plain to the citizen of a country 
 whose monarch claims to be the direct agent of God. As a result of 
 prolonged struggles the House of Commons ultimately established its 
 predominance in the British Commonwealth, and while leaving most 
 of the powers of the Crown intact, it successfully insisted upon the 
 exercise of those functions by Ministers responsible to it. Hence the 
 essential negotiations prior to the outbreak of war were conducted 
 by the Foreign Secretary. This does not, however, imply that the 
 King's personal influence is not at times used by the Ministry in a 
 delicate diplomatic situation. 
 
 "But unquestionably all letters and telegrams from the King to the 
 Kaiser and Prince Henry of Prussia were either drafted by Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey or submitted to him for approval. This is a necessary con- 
 sequence of the system of a responsible government. Thus Queen Vic- 
 toria under similar circumstances was at times obliged in her own 
 handwriting to express opinions far other than those she really held. 
 But why, it may be asked, was this ancillary correspondence not 
 published? Here again one runs across some peculiar features of the 
 British Constitution resulting from the adaptation of mediaeval forms 
 to democratic conditions. According to British practice a Minister is 
 responsible for every executive act, and the King's name must not be 
 brought into the political discussions either within or without Parlia- 
 ment. It is obvious that if this personal correspondence of the King 
 were laid before Parliament there would be a violation of this funda- 
 mental principle, without which the system of responsible government 
 cannot work smoothly. Moreover, these documents were naturally in 
 complete accord with those submitted, and were in no way essential to 
 the formation of a correct judgment by Parliament. Had there been 
 any divergence Dr. Dernburg's query would have some point." 
 1 Statement of Mr. Asquith, July 31; see London Times, August 1, 1914. 
 The date of the Austrian general mobilization is in dispute. (Cf . F. Y. B. 
 no. 115.) M. Viviani stated: "But while these negotiations were going on, 
 and while Russia in the negotiations showed a good-will which cannot be 
 disputed, Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilization." 
 (Extract, F. Y. B. no. 127.) Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence indi- 
 
336 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Sir Edward Grey was negotiating with Prince Lichnowsky 
 in an attempt to find some way of allowing France and Eng- 
 land to keep out of the fray, so that Russia might be left to 
 pay the penalty of her ill-timed and precipitate mobiliza- 
 tion.^ In any event, the attitude of the German Govern- 
 ment in regard to Belgium and the determination of 
 France to support Russia under all circumstances would 
 have rendered such efforts of no avail. 
 
 , 13. Germany's detention of English vessels 
 
 On August 1, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Sir Edward 
 
 Goschen in reference to the detention of British vessels : — 
 ''We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have 
 
 forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central 
 
 Company and other British merchant ships. 
 
 "I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of 
 
 British ships has been ordered. 
 
 cates that Russia was the first to order a genera! mobilization. M. Auguste 
 Gauvin, in his article, on Les origines de la guerre Europ^nne, states: "The 
 posting up of orders completing the bulletins which announced partial mo- 
 bihzation took place only the 1st of August in part of the monarchy." 
 (Translated from La Revue de Paris, December 15, 1914, p. 414, note 1.) 
 
 Professors Durkheim and Denis take a different view. (Durkheim and 
 Denis: Who Wanted War f p. 40, note 2. Paris, 1915.) 
 
 1 In this connection the remark in the London Times of August 27 (see 
 above, p. 334), that Prince Lichnowsky was guilty of a "serious professional 
 blunder," seems to convey the idea that some very confidential matters were 
 under discussion. The Oxford professors make the following statement: 
 "One more effort to preserve peace in western Europe seems to have been 
 made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky 
 whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attack 
 her. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was an offer 
 to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, and the Ger- 
 man Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of the relief His 
 Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relations between the 
 two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for such hopes, France 
 had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever any idea of 
 coercing France into neutrality, and even the original proposal had to be 
 abandoned on consideration as unpractical." (Extract from Why We are 
 at War, by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History, p. 87. Clar- 
 endon Press, 1914.) 
 
 The authors of these remarks must have had exceptional facihties for 
 ascertaining what actually took place. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 337 
 
 "You should request German Government to send im- 
 mediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed 
 without delay. The effect on pubhc opinion here will be 
 deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, 
 on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an 
 aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I 
 hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would 
 make the situation between us impossible." (August 1, 
 B. W. P. no. 130.) 
 
 The German Secretary of State 'expressed the greatest 
 surprise and annoyance and promised to send orders at 
 once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 143.) The Secretary 
 said that ' this must be regarded as a special favor to His 
 Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have 
 been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines 
 were being laid and other precautions being taken.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, August 2, B. W. P. no. 145.) 
 
 The next day, August 2, Sir Edward Grey lodged pro- 
 test against unloading and holding of British cargoes of 
 sugar (B. W. P. no. 150); but the British Ambassador re- 
 ported ''no information available." (Extract, August 3, 
 B. W. P. no. 150.) 
 
 14. Germany invades Luxemburg 
 
 On August 2, Sir Edward Grey received the following 
 dispatch from the Minister of State of Luxemburg : — 
 
 "I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency's notice 
 the following facts: — 
 
 "On Sunday, the 2d of August, very early, the German 
 troops, according to the information which has up to now 
 reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into 
 Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and 
 Remich, and proceeded particularly toward the south and 
 in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand 
 Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops 
 
338 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 and ammunition have been sent along the railway line 
 from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is ex- 
 pected. These occurrences constitute acts which are mani- 
 festly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as 
 guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxem- 
 burg Government have not failed to address an energetic 
 protest against this aggression to the representatives of 
 His Majesty, the German Emperor, at Luxemburg. An 
 identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin." (August 2, B. W. P. 
 no. 147.) 
 
 Sir Edward received a second dispatch the same day: — 
 
 ''The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received 
 through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, 
 a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military meas- 
 ures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act 
 against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against 
 a possible attack of a French Army. Full compensation 
 will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by 
 using the railways, which are leased to the Empire." 
 (August 2, B. W. P. no. 129.) 
 
 When M. Paul Cambon 'asked Sir Edward about the 
 violation of Luxemburg, he stated to him the doctrine on 
 that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon 
 in 1867, but when the Ambassador asked what the British 
 Government would say about the violation of the neutral- 
 ity of Belgium, the British Minister replied that that was a 
 much more important matter and that they were consider- 
 ing what statement they should make in Parliament next 
 day — in effect, whether they should declare the violation 
 of Belgian neutrality a casus hellV (Modified quotation, 
 August 2, B. W. P. no. 148.) 
 
 In reporting this interview, M. Cambon says that ' the 
 Secretary of State reminded me that the convention of 
 1867 relative to Luxemburg differed from the treaty rela- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 339 
 
 tive to Belgium in this sense, that England was bound to 
 uphold this latter agreement without the support of the 
 other guaranteeing powers, while, for Luxemburg, all the 
 guaranteeing powers must act in concert.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, August 2, F. Y. B. no. 137.) 
 
 It seems to have been lost sight of that this violation by 
 Germany of the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg was 
 contrary to her solemn treaty obligations, and hence a con- 
 spicuous violation of international law; for the German 
 Empire had inherited the obligation of Prussia to respect 
 and guarantee the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg, 
 undertaken by the Treaty of London. The principle of the 
 perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg was "placed under the 
 sanction of the collective guarantee of the powers,"^ and 
 England has expressly stated that she did not understand 
 the treaty of guaranty to compel her to make war against a 
 guarantor to secure its respect. This is a weakness in the 
 logic of England's stand, for why should she from a legal 
 point of view be any more bound in the case of Belgium? 
 Only because in the latter case her political interests and 
 her obligations under international law coincide. It is to be 
 remarked, however, that it is one thing for a nation to re- 
 fuse to make war to uphold the neutrality of Luxemburg, 
 and another to be guilty itself of violating it. The viola- 
 tion of the neutrality of Luxemburg will be more fully dis- 
 cussed in the following chapter. ^ 
 
 15. England agrees to protect the French coast 
 On August 1, Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon 
 that, when informing the Cabinet that German}^ had de- 
 clared ''herself not in a position to reply," regarding Bel- 
 gian neutrality, he would 'ask for authority to tell the 
 House of Commons on Monday [August 3] that the Brit- 
 ish Government would not permit a \dolation of Belgian 
 neutrality. In the second place, Sir Edward said that he 
 
 1 Wicker, Neutralization, p. 30. 1911. * Chap, ix, § 8. 
 
340 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 would propose to his colleagues that they should declare 
 that the fleet, the squadrons of which were mobilized, would 
 oppose the passage of the German squadrons through the 
 Straits; or, if they passed the Straits, that they would op- 
 pose any attack upon the French coasts. M. Cambon 
 pointed out to the Secretary that if between then and 
 Monday, when the Cabinet would discuss these questions, 
 any serious incident should occur, it would not do to be 
 taken by surprise and that it would be well to consider 
 intervening in time.' (Modified quotation, August 1, 
 F. Y. B. no. 126.) 
 
 The morning of August 2, after the meeting of the Cabi- 
 net, Sir Edward Grey gave M. Cambon the following 
 memoranda : — 
 
 ''I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the Ger- 
 man fleet comes into the Channel or through the North 
 Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts 
 or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in 
 its power. 
 
 " This assurance is, of course, subject to the poHcy of His 
 Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parlia- 
 ment, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's 
 Government to take any action until the above contin- 
 gency of action by the German fleet takes place." ^ (August 
 2, B. W. P. no. 148.) 
 
 1 An editorial in the London Times, August 3, gives a r€sum6 of the situa- 
 tion and sets forth its understanding of England's vital interests: "The 
 whole situation has been revolutionized by the events of yesterday. The 
 doubts which many of us tried hard to cherish as to Germany's real inten- 
 tions have been dispelled by her high-handed contempt for public law. The 
 Government and the nation now realize that she has been bent on a Euro- 
 pean war — a European war to be waged in the first instance against France, 
 and through at least one of those neutral States whose safety we have bound 
 ourselves to defend because it is indispensable to our own. The Cabinet, 
 which has been sitting almost uninterruptedly since Saturday morning, 
 reached a decision at an early hour yesterday, which shows that they know 
 what is before us. They have called up the Naval Reserves. They would 
 not have taken this step had they not felt that in this quarrel our interests 
 are now directly at stake. . . . Here at home and in the far-off dominions 
 the sure instinct of our peoples teaches them that the ruin of France or of 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 341 
 
 'Sir Edward Grey pointed out that Great Britain had 
 very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, 
 and that the Government felt that they could not neces- 
 sarily bind themselves to declare war upon Germany if war 
 broke out between France and Germany the next day, but 
 it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had 
 long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how 
 to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely 
 undefended. Great Britain, therefore, thought it necessary 
 to give them this assurance. It did not bind her to go to 
 war with Germany, unless the German fleet took the ac- 
 tion indicated, but it did give a security to France that 
 would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Med- 
 iterranean fleet.' (Modified quotation, August 2, B. W. P. 
 no. 148.) 
 
 The British Cabinet, in spite of the dissension among its 
 members,^ could on August 2 feel more secure in giving the 
 
 the Low Countries would be the prelude to our own. We can no more toler- 
 ate a German hegenaony in Europe than we can tolerate the hegemony of 
 any other power. Aa our fathers fought Spain and France in the days of 
 their greatest strength to defeat their pretense to Continental supremacy, 
 and their menace to the narrow seas, which are the bulwark of our independ- 
 ence, so shall we be ready, with the same unanimity and the same stubborn 
 tenacity of purpose, to fight any other nation which shows by her acts that 
 she is advancing a like claim and confronting us with a like threat. If any 
 individual member of the Cabinet dissents from this view, the sooner he 
 quits the Government the better. Mr. Asquith may find it no disadvantage 
 to take fresh blood into his Administration, as M. Viviani has undoubtedly 
 strengthened the French Government by the admission of M. Delcass6 and 
 M. Clemenceau. The controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia, 
 and that between Austria-Hungary and Russia, have passed away from the 
 eyes of the nation. These are fixed on the German attack upon the French 
 Republic and upon Luxemburg. In that conflict the nation know their duty. 
 With the blessing of Heaven they will do it to the uttermost." (Extract.) 
 
 1 The acute Cabinet crisis which paralleled the European crisis is dis- 
 closed in the London Times: — 
 
 "CHANGES IN THE CABINET 
 
 " We understand that Lord Morley, Lord President of the Council, and 
 Mr. Burns, President of the Board of Trade, have resigned oflSce. At a late 
 hour last night efforts were still being made to induce Mr. Bums to with- 
 draw his resignation, but Lord Morley's is final. 
 
 "The resignation of these Ministers is the result, of course, of a f undamen- 
 
S42 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 above assurance, since on that date Mr. Asquith received 
 the following important letter from the leader of the Parlia- 
 mentary opposition: — 
 
 tal difference of opinion with their colleagues over the national policy, as set 
 forth on Monday by Sir Edward Grey, and of a strong desire that at this 
 time of crisis Mr. Asquith should have the support of an absolutely united 
 Cabinet. 
 
 "THE INNER HISTORY 
 
 " Now that it has reached this point no harm is done by revealing some of 
 the stages leading up to yesterday's decision. It is already a tolerably open 
 secret, indeed, that throughout last week — while Germany's intentions 
 were still undeclared and Sir Edward Grey was laboring for the peace of 
 Europe — divergent views were held inside the Cabinet as to the duties and 
 interests of this country in certain — still non-existent — circumstances. 
 There were well-founded rumors of possible resignations — first on one side, 
 then on the other side, of the cleavage. But the Prime Minister — feeling, 
 no doubt, that a change of Government under present conditions was im- 
 possible — successfully exerted all his powers to keep his colleagues together; 
 and by Sunday the scale had been turned decisively by the news of Ger- 
 many's action in the matter of Luxemburg and Belgium. On the same after- 
 noon the country was definitely conamitted to the support of France by Sir 
 Edward Grey's note to M. Cambon, and Monday's speech announced the 
 decision to the world. 
 
 "By that time the dissentient element in the Cabinet had been reduced 
 by the logic of events to very small proportions. Four Ministers out of 
 twenty-one were still unconvinced; but there is reason to believe — if only 
 from their continued attendance at yesterday's meeting — that two of them 
 have now found it possible to remain in office. The decision of Mr. Burns 
 and Lord Morley was deeper rooted. They had taken it independently and 
 at different stages in the controversy — an important fact which completely 
 dispels the notion that there has been anything like an organized secession. 
 In both cases it is satisfactory to know that one of the strongest motives for 
 resignation was the conviction that any rift in the Cabinet must hamper its 
 freedom of action in a great emergency. 
 
 "FILLING THE GAPS 
 
 " No steps have yet been taken to fill their places. The project of a Coali- 
 tion Government, which has been discussed in certain quarters, has no 
 present foundation in fact; and indeed it is open to many of the objections 
 which prevent a general 'swopping of horses in mid-stream.' There were 
 renewed rumors yesterday that Lord Haldane was to return to the War 
 Office, but there is reason to believe that they were are least premature. 
 The arguments against such a change, which we set forth elsewhere, are 
 absolutely overwhelming in the circumstances, and the mere thought of it 
 produced a storm of protest in London. On the other hand, the suggestion 
 of the Times that Lord Kitchener's services should be invoked for this pur- 
 pose was the subject of universal and approving comment in many quarters. 
 No official inspiration attaches to it, but there is reason to believe that, from 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 343 
 
 2d August, 1914. 
 Dear Mr. Asquith, — Lord Lansdowne and I feel 
 it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well 
 as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been 
 able to consult, it would be fatal to the honor and 
 security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in sup- 
 porting France and Russia at the present juncture; 
 and we offer our unhesitating support to the Govern- 
 ment in any measures they may consider necessary for 
 that object. — Yours very truly, 
 
 A. BoNAR Law.^ 
 
 As soon as M. Viviani, French Premier and Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, learned of this assurance, he instructed M. 
 Paul Cambon that ' in communicating this announcement 
 
 members of the Government downwards, the appointment, if it were made, 
 would be received with profound satisfaction and confidence." (London 
 Times, August 5, 1914, p. 6.) 
 
 1 This letter was made public at a meeting of the Unionist chairmen held 
 at the Hotel Cecil, December 14, in the coiu-se of an address by Mr. Bonar 
 Law. His introductory remarks referring to this letter were as follows: — 
 
 " Before the war, as you well know, party differences were as acute as they 
 have ever been in this country; party passions were inflamed to such an 
 extent that I saw no possible outlet which would not be disastrous to the 
 country. In a moment the whole situation was changed. The war cloud 
 which had been gathering over Europe, which for years we had looked upon 
 with growing anxiety, suddenly biu-st, and we realized that we were face 
 to face with the gravest danger which, as a nation, we have ever encoun- 
 tered. We realized also, that that danger could only be overcome if na- 
 tional resources were utilized to the utmost, and we could act as a united 
 nation. Though the Opposition plays a recognized part in our form of gov- 
 ernment, it has no official position. We recognized, however, that we repre- 
 sent a large proportion of the members of the House of Commons, and in 
 the days of suspense, especially in the days between the time when war had 
 actually broken out and the position of this country became clear, we came 
 to the conclusion that we were bound to state plainly what oiu- views were, 
 and what action we were prepared to take. 
 
 "On the eventful Sunday, the 2d of August, when the decision of the 
 Government was still in doubt, a letter was sent to the Prime Minister on 
 the joint authority of Lord Lansdowne and myself, in which we declared 
 that in our belief it was the duty of this country to join her Allies, and in 
 which we promised, in that case, to support the Government. There can be 
 no harm in publishing this letter, and 1 think it might interest you to hear 
 its exact wording. It was in these terms. (London Times, December 15, 
 1914.) 
 
344 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 to the French Chambers, he purposed to indicate that the 
 assistance which Great Britain had the intention of giving 
 France, with the view of protecting the French coasts or 
 the French mercantile marine, would be so exerted as to 
 afford equal support to the French navy by the English 
 fleet, in case of a Franco-German conflict, in the Atlantic 
 as well as in the North Sea and in the English Channel. 
 He said, moreover, that he would mention that English 
 ports could not be used as points for the revictualing of 
 the German fleet.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. W. B. 
 no. 138.) 
 
 M. Cambon repUed: — 
 
 ''Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to tell you that 
 you may inform Parliament that to-day he made declara- 
 tions in the Commons as to the present attitude of the 
 British Government, and that the chief of these declara- 
 tions was as follows : * If the German fleet cross the Straits, 
 or go north in the North Sea in order to double the British 
 Isles, with a view to attacking the French coasts or the 
 French Navy, or to disturbing the French mercantile 
 marine, the British fleet will intervene in order to give the 
 French marine entire protection, so that from that moment 
 on England and Germany would be in a state of war.' 
 
 " Sir E. Grey pointed out that the mention of operations 
 through the North Sea implied protection against a dem- 
 onstration in the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
 ''The declaration with regard to the intervention of the 
 British fleet, of which I gave you the text in my telegram 
 of August 2, is to be regarded as binding the British Gov- 
 ernment. Sir Edward Grey assured me of this, and added, 
 that the French Government was therefore in a position to 
 bring it to the knowledge of the Chambers. 
 
 "On my return to the Embassy, I learned from your 
 telephonic communication of the German ultimatum ad- 
 dressed to Belgium. I immediately informed Sir E. Grey 
 of it." (Extract, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 143.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 345 
 
 In his speech in the House of Commons (August 3), Sir 
 Edward Grey, after tracing the history and explaining the 
 nature of the Entente ^ with France, said : — 
 
 ''I now come to what we think the situation requires of 
 us. For many years we have had a long-standing friend- 
 ship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House 
 — and my own feeling — for I spoke on the subject, I think, 
 when the late Government made their agreement with 
 France — the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the 
 fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differ- 
 ences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I re- 
 member saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some 
 benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial 
 atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that 
 friendship entails obligation — it has been a friendship 
 between the nations and ratified by the nations — how 
 far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his 
 own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent 
 of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel 
 it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than 
 their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the 
 obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may 
 judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have 
 given the House my own feeling in the matter. 
 
 "The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the 
 northern and western coasts of France are absolutely un- 
 defended. The French fleet being concentrated in the 
 Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what 
 it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up 
 between the two countries has given them a sense of se- 
 curity that there was nothing to be feared from us. The 
 French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French 
 fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been 
 concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and 
 friendship which has existed between the two countries. 
 1 See above, pp. 288-292. 
 
346 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war 
 which France had not sought, and in which she had not 
 been the aggressor, came down the Enghsh Channel and 
 bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, 
 we could not stand aside and see this going on practically 
 within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on 
 dispassionately, doing nothing! ^ I believe that would be 
 the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels 
 that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a 
 feeling which would spread with irresistible force through- 
 out the land. 
 
 "But I also want to look at the matter without senti- 
 ment, and from the point of view of British interests, and 
 it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am 
 presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at 
 this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the 
 Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement 
 from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and 
 western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a 
 German fleet coming down the Channel, to do as it pleases 
 in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If 
 we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is with- 
 drawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of 
 a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the 
 consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that 
 to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying 
 * No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party 
 in this conflict.' Let us suppose the French fleet is with- 
 drawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the 
 consequences — which are already tremendous in what 
 has happened in Europe even to countries which are at 
 peace — in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or 
 at war — let us assiune that out of that come consequences 
 
 1 Sir Edward Grey here acknowledges England's moral obligation to 
 support France against a German attack upon her coasts, but this was only 
 because France "had not been the aggressor." 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 347 
 
 unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment 
 that, in defense of vital British interests, we should go to 
 war : and let us assume — which is quite possible — that 
 Italy, who is now neutral, because, as I understand, she 
 considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple 
 Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not 
 arise — let us assume that consequences which are not 
 yet foreseen — and which perfectly legitimately consult- 
 ing her own interests — make Italy depart from her atti- 
 tude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense 
 of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will 
 be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at 
 some critical moment those consequences would be forced 
 upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean 
 might be vital to this country. 
 
 "Nobody can say that in the course of the next few 
 weeks there is any particular trade route the keeping open 
 of which may not be vital to this country. What will be 
 our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Medi- 
 terranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combina- 
 tion of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the 
 very moment when we could not detach more ships to the 
 Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country 
 from our negative attitude at the present moment to the 
 most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of 
 British interests. We feel strongly that France was en- 
 titled to know — and to know at once! — whether or not 
 in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and 
 western coasts she could depend upon British support. In 
 that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, 
 yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the 
 following statement : — 
 
 "'I am authorized to give an assurance that if the 
 German fleet comes into the Channel or through the 
 North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the 
 French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give 
 
348 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of 
 course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment receiving the support of Parliament, and must 
 not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to 
 take any action until the above contingency of action 
 by the German fleet takes place.' 
 "I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war 
 on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action 
 on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action 
 should that contingency arise. Things move very hur- 
 riedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I can- 
 not give this in any very formal way; but I understand 
 that the German Government would be prepared, if we 
 would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its 
 fleet would not attack the nothern coast of France. I have 
 only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it 
 is far too narrow an engagement for us. 
 
 "There is but one way in which the Government could 
 make certain at the present moment of keeping outside 
 this war, and that would be that it should immediately 
 issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We can- 
 not do that. We have made the commitment to France, 
 that I have read to the House, which prevents us from 
 doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium 
 which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, 
 and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and sat- 
 isfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to 
 the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that 
 line by saying, 'We will have nothing whatever to do with 
 this matter ' under no conditions — the Belgian Treaty 
 obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, 
 with damage to British interests, and what may happen 
 to France from our failure to support France — if we were 
 to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as 
 nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I be- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS^ OF THE WAR 349 
 
 lieve, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation 
 before the world and should not escape the most serious 
 and grave economic consequences. 
 
 "My object has been to explain the view of the Gov- 
 ernment, and to place before the House the issue and the 
 choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have 
 said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I 
 have given to the House with regard to Belgium,^ that we 
 must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the conse- 
 quences of having to use all the strength we have at any 
 moment — we know not how soon — to defend ourselves 
 and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have 
 stated them, though I have announced no intending ag- 
 gressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to 
 force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the 
 case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as 
 the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I 
 believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the 
 First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that 
 the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never 
 at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there 
 a time when confidence was more justified in the power of 
 the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our 
 shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and 
 misery entailed from which no country in Europe will 
 escape and from which no abdication or neutrality will 
 save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an 
 enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the 
 amount of harm that must be done by the economic con- 
 dition that is caused on the Continent. 
 
 "The most awful responsibility is resting upon the 
 Government in deciding what to advise the House of Com- 
 mons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of 
 Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information 
 which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that 
 ^ See post, Documents, chap, xiii; also p. 353. 
 
350 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it 
 develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We 
 worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the 
 last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how ear- 
 nestly we strove for peace last week, the House will see from 
 the Papers that will be before it. 
 
 ''But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is con- 
 cerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all 
 the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We 
 believe we shall have the support of the House at large in 
 proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and 
 whatever measures may be forced upon us by the develop- 
 ment of facts or action taken by others. I believe the coun- 
 try, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has 
 not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still think- 
 ing of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the 
 complications of this matter which have grown out of the 
 quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany 
 we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that 
 Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at 
 war with Russia.^ We know that a good deal has been hap- 
 pening on the French frontier. We do not know that the 
 German Ambassador has left Paris. ^ 
 
 ''The situation has developed so rapidly that techni- 
 cally, as regards the condition of the war, it is most dif- 
 ficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to 
 bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own 
 conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I 
 have put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems 
 not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take 
 our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the 
 country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, 
 the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of 
 
 * Austria declared war against Russia on August 5. (See A. R. B. no. 59.) 
 ^ The German Ambassador left Paris the evening of August 3. (See F. 
 Y. B. nos. 147, 148, 157.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 351 
 
 Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, 
 we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House 
 of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the 
 courage, and the endurance of the whole country." 
 
 The formal assurance which the British Government 
 gave France that her fleets would protect the French coast 
 against a German attack may be looked upon as a condi- 
 tional declaration of war against Germany, and amounted 
 to England's entry into the war between Germany and 
 France. By the announcement that England made, she 
 intervened just as really as she would have by the sending 
 of troops to defend the French frontiers. Yet if Germany 
 had not invaded Belgium, the war between France and 
 Germany might possibly have been fought out under this 
 condition of English restraint of the German fleet without 
 the exchange of a shot between Germany and England. 
 It is hardly just, therefore, to say that England came into 
 the war because of Germany's violation of Belgium's neu- 
 trality. A more accurate statement is that when Germany 
 violated Belgium's neutrality, England decided to change 
 from partial and specially restricted intervention in the 
 war to a general engagement of all her forces against Ger- 
 many. This is no fine-spun theory, but a statement of fact 
 which might have had the most important consequences. 
 For when the British Government, by Sir Edward Grey's 
 speech in Parliament, had notified the German Govern- 
 ment of the fact of the assurance it had given to France, 
 Germany, in the course of a war against France, would 
 have been justified in falling upon the British fleet or 
 British commerce, without further warning, at any mo- 
 ment she might choose. That this situation did not escape 
 the advisers of the British Foreign Office is clearly shown 
 by Sir Edward's remarks, and had the general or full 
 war not broken out, Sir Edward Grey must either have 
 required a formal acceptance by Germany of the condition 
 upon which England refrained from active operations, or 
 
352 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 else have continued to hold the British fleet constantly 
 prepared for a sudden attack, which could not have been 
 designated as treacherous.^ 
 
 16. The British ultimatum 
 In the dispatch which M. Paul Cambon, French Am- 
 bassador at London, sent to his Government on Sunday, 
 
 1 At the time when Sir Edward Grey, in his speech before the House of 
 Commons (August 3), made public the assurance given to France, he did 
 not know whether Germany had yet declared war on France. The effect of 
 the promise made to France was that when war broke out, England would 
 remain on the watch to prevent the German fleet from making an attack on 
 the French coasts or French shipping. That is to say, upon the outbreak of 
 the war between France and Germany, England was actively involved to 
 the extent of a conditional intervention in case a certain contingency should 
 arise. France, Germany, and England were obligated by their ratification 
 of the Hague Convention "Relative to the Opening of Hostilities" to give a 
 formal notice before attacking, but Germany, when engaged in war with 
 France, was under no obligation to notify England of her intentions in re- 
 gard to sending her fleet through the Channel or the North Sea to attack 
 France; yet when she attempted to do so, it was certain that she would be 
 attacked by the British fleet. It follows that Germany was free to take any 
 hostile action she thought advisable against England to prevent this inter- 
 ference. In other words, England had made a conditional declaration of war 
 which absolved Germany from the obligation of giving any further notice 
 of an intention to attack England. 
 
 Sir Edward Cook says: "This was not a declaration of war, but a contin- 
 gent obligation to make war." (Why Britain is at War, p. 18. Macmillan, 
 & Co., London, 1914.) 
 
 The German Secretary of the Treasury, Dr. Karl Helfferich, has recently 
 stated: — 
 
 " Therefore, if during the time between August 2 and 4 German warships 
 had passed through the Strait of Calais or the North Sea, a state of war 
 would immediately have arisen between Germany and England, since such 
 an operation would have been immediately taken by the English to mean 
 that the French coast or fleet was to be attacked or, at least, the French 
 merchant marine to be alarmed ; and this would have occurred solely because 
 of the obligations which the English Cabinet felt to be imposed upon it by 
 the entente with France, which, on its face, bound England to nothing: all 
 this, moreover, quite irrespective of Germany's attitude toward Belgian 
 neutrality. 
 
 " One must now deplore that in those days the German fleet did not come 
 out and cause hostile action on the part of the English fleet. Then the fairy- 
 tale that England was forced to enter the war solely by the violation of Bel- 
 gian neutrality at the hands of Germany could never have come up." (New 
 York Times, March 14, 1915.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 353 
 
 August 2, to announce the important decision of the Eng- 
 lish Government to give France the assurance that the 
 English fleet would protect the French coasts from a Ger- 
 man attack, he sagaciously added that ' the preservation 
 of Belgian neutrality was considered so important there 
 that England would look upon its violation by Germany as 
 a casus belli. This was, he said, a peculiarly English in- 
 terest, and one could not doubt that the British Govern- 
 ment, faithful to the traditions of its poHcy, would make 
 it prevail, even if the business world, where German in- 
 fluence makes tenacious efforts, tried to exert pressure to 
 hinder the Government from engaging itself against Ger- 
 many.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. Y. B. no. 137.) 
 
 In his speech in the House of Commons next day (that 
 is, Monday, August 3), Sir Edward Grey, after consider- 
 ing the nature of England's obUgation to assist France, 
 turned to the question of the neutrality of Belgium. Be- 
 ginning with the Treaty of 1839, he outlined the history 
 of the question, including a review of the negotiations in 
 course (see post, Documents, chap, xiii), and concluded: — 
 
 ''It now appears, from the news I have received to-day, 
 — which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite 
 sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form,* — 
 that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, 
 the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations 
 with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the 
 passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, 
 until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the 
 last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say 
 if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, 
 and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded 
 in the course of last week as to whether, if a guaranty were 
 given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be pre- 
 
 1 August 3, M. Paul Cambon reported to his Government: " On my 
 return to the Embassy I learned from your telephonic communication of 
 the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately informed 
 Sir E. Grey of it." (Extract, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 143.) 
 
354 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 served, that would content us. We replied that we could 
 not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had 
 in Belgian neutrality.^ 
 
 1 Sir Edward Grey has been accused of being responsible for the war: — 
 
 (1) Because he did not inform Russia and France that England would not 
 allow a European war to develop out of the Austro-Servian dispute. Sir 
 Edward Grey could not have done this without disrupting the Entente. He 
 could not have guaranteed that his country would intervene to make good 
 his threat, and it is very possible that France and Russia would have made 
 war together against Austria and Germany rather than permit Austria to 
 overthrow the status quo in the Balkans. The disastrous results to Eng- 
 land might have been still greater if the war had been thus avoided as a re- 
 sult of England's veto, for Russia and France would have resented Eng- 
 land's desertion of them and awaited an opportunity to join Germany in 
 accomplishing her ruin. 
 
 (2) Because he did not tell Germany that England would stand by France 
 and Russia. An influential friend and intimate of the Kaiser, Herr Balhn, 
 has recently joined the ranks of those who criticize Sir Edward Grey on this 
 ground. He has said: — 
 
 " We all feel that this war has been brought about by England. We hon- 
 estly believe that Sir Edward Grey could have stopped it. 
 
 " If, on the first day, he had declared, 'England refuses to go to war be- 
 cause of the internal questions between Servia and Austria,' then Russia and 
 France would have found a way to compromise with Austria. 
 
 "If, on the other hand, Sir Edward Grey had said England was ready to 
 go to war, then, for the sake of Germany, probably Austria might have been 
 more ready to compromise. 
 
 " But, by leaving his attitude uncertain and letting us understand that he 
 was not bound to go to war. Sir Edward Grey certainly brought about the 
 war. If he had decided at once, one way or the other. Sir Edward Grey 
 could have avoided this terrible thing." (London Times, April 15, 1915, 
 extract from New York World, April 16, 1915.) 
 
 The London Spectator (August 8, 1914, p. 193) adopts this view in an 
 article on " The Revelations of the Blue Book." " But we do say that if we 
 had stated firmly and boldly to Germany from the first that we should un- 
 doubtedly stand by our friends, — it was always obvious to people of the 
 least penetration that we must do so in the end, — we should have been 
 saved this appalling war." 
 
 The French and Russian diplomatists began to harp on this theme from 
 the moment they learned of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum. I 
 believe it has been shown that the course Sir Edward Grey pursued was 
 much wiser, since he stimulated both sides to make concessions for a peace- 
 ful settlement. As soon as it was believed in Russia that England would be 
 upon her side, those in favor of war seem to have acquired a greater influ- 
 ence. (See Renter dispatch; Price, Diplomatic History of the War, p. 338.) 
 There are certain indications that at about this period, July 29, when 
 France and Russia felt confident that England might be upon their side, 
 Germany and Austria hesitated to force the issue. Nevertheless, we do not 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 355 
 
 "Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that 
 the following telegram had been received from the King 
 
 find that either Austria or Germany put forward a single suggestion which 
 might have served as a possible compromise. In addition to the reasons just 
 given, Sir Edward Grey could not have made such a declaration, because he 
 could not have been sure that the Government and the country would back 
 him up. Even after several days had elapsed, in which the British public 
 might have convinced itself that Austria and Germany were forcing the 
 issue, and that France and Russia were giving every indication of a concilia- 
 tory spirit, there was, nevertheless, a strong British sentiment in favor of 
 remaining neutral. There was a serious split in the Cabinet, and it is ru- 
 mored that Sir Edward Grey himself considered resigning. Not until Ger- 
 many refused to respect Belgian neutrality was it possible to unite the Gov- 
 ernment and the country in the firm support of Russia and France against 
 German aggression. Sir Edward Grey must have felt that England would be 
 dishonored if she did not support France against German aggression. He 
 must have known that his country would come to a realization of her mis- 
 take as soon as Germany had crushed France, but that it might then be too 
 late to succor France or wash away England's dishonor. 
 
 (3) Because he worked to involve England in a war against Germany. 
 The main argument in support of this contention is that he would not 
 respond to Prince Lichnowsky's request to state the conditions upon which 
 England would remain neutral. In point of fact, he did lay down the condi- 
 tions upon which England would remain neutral, when, on July 31, he said 
 that if Germany brought forward any reasonable proposal which France and 
 Russia would not agree to, he would have nothing further to do with the 
 consequences. The failure to meet this proposal of Sir Edward Grey showed 
 that Germany was making no efi'orts at cooperation and made plainer than 
 ever her aggressive purpose. In the face of German aggression upon France, 
 England was bound to come to her support both on the ground of the 
 Entente and on the ground of her general interests to resist the attempt of 
 any nation to acquire dominion on the Continent by conquest of arms. 
 The vast majority of those who were won over by Sir Edward's maneuvers 
 of springing the Belgian question at an opportune moment must have been 
 very thankful to him for making clear Germany's real designs and saving 
 them from making a colossal blunder. I doubt if the British people will ever 
 consider that Sir Edward Grey deceived them. By focusing attention upon 
 the Belgian question he united the whole country for immediate action. As 
 soon as there was time for reflection, it was seen that Belgium was only one 
 of several reasons for joining France and Russia against Germany. 
 
 In any event, Sir Edward Grey did tell Prince Lichnowsky, July 29, that 
 he must not be misled into thinking that England would stand aside (B. W. 
 P. nos. 87, 89). Prince Lichnowsky replied that he had already reported to 
 his Government that such was his estimate of the situation (B. W. P. no. 89), 
 and Herr von Jagow told Sir Edward Goschen that he heard the answer of 
 the British Government to the German proposal (B. W. P. no. 85) not ex- 
 actly with surprise (B. W. P. no. 98). Neither Sir Edward Grey nor any one 
 else could tell with certainty what would be the attitude of the British Gov- 
 
356 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of the Belgians by our King — King George: 'Remem- 
 bering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's friendship 
 
 ernment. George Bernard Shaw has given the following picturesque de- 
 scription of the situation : — 
 
 " The Lion broods and broods, and deep in his subconsciousness there 
 stirs the knowledge that Germany will never fight unless — unless — unless 
 — the Lion does not quite know what, does not want to know what, but dis- 
 interested observers complete the sentence thus: Unless Germany can be 
 persuaded that the Lion is taking a fancy to Germany and is becoming a bit 
 of a pacifist and will not fight. Then the luck that has so seldom failed the 
 Lion sent Prince Lichnowsky as German Ambassador to London. There 
 was nothing wrong in being very friendly to the Prince, a charming man 
 with a very charming wife; there was our Sir Edward Grey, also a charming 
 man, always ready to talk peace quite sincerely at tea parties with all 
 Europe if necessary. 
 
 " The Lion knew in his heart that Sir Edward Grey knew nothing of the 
 ways of lions, and would not approve of them if he did, for Sir Edward had 
 ideas instead of the one idea, and Prince Lichnowsky knew so much less of 
 the ways of lions than Sir Edward that he actually thought Sir Edward was 
 the Lion. The Lion said: 'This is not my doing. England's destiny has 
 provided Grey, and provided Lichnowsky; England's star is still in the ze- 
 nith.' Lichnowsky thought Grey every day a greater statesman and a more 
 charming man, and became every day more persuaded that the lion's heart 
 had changed and that he was becoming friendly, and Grey thought Lichnow- 
 sky, perhaps, rather a fool, but was none the less nice to him. 
 
 "Then there was Mr. Asquith, the lucid lawyer, the man who could 
 neither remember the past nor foresee the future, yet was always a Yorkshire- 
 man with [an] ancient English depths behind his mirrorlike lucidity, in which 
 something of the lioncraft could lodge without troubling the surface of the 
 mirror. Mr. Asquith suddenly found in himself an unaccountable but 
 wholly irresistible impulse to hide and deny those arrangements with the 
 French commanders which had frightened Germany. He said to Sir Edward 
 Grey: 'You must go to the French and say that we are not bound to any- 
 thing.' Sir Edward Grey, the amiable lover of peace, was delighted. He 
 went, and the French, with imperturbable politeness, made note of it, and 
 then Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward, with good conscience, foimd themselves 
 busily persuading the world that the Lion was not bound to help France and 
 Russia when the great day of Armageddon came. They persuaded the na- 
 tion, they persuaded the House of Commons, they persuaded their own 
 Cabinet, and at last — at last, they persuaded Germany. And the Lion 
 crouched. 
 
 "Almost before he was ready the devil's own luck struck down the Arch- 
 duke by the hand of the assassin, and Austria saw Servia in her grasp. At 
 last she flew at Servia, Russia flew at Austria, Germany flew at France, and 
 the Lion, with a mighty roar, sprang at last, and in a flash had his teeth and 
 claws in the rival of England and will now not let her go for all the pacifists 
 or Socialists in the world until he is either killed or back on his Waterloo 
 pedestal again." (New York Times, December 13, 1914.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey accomplished his task of uniting the Cabinet and secur- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 357 
 
 and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of 
 England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just 
 
 ing the united support of Parliament and the country for his poHcy at the 
 same time that he retained the respect of France and Russia. Furthermore, 
 his unofficial mediatory action for peace delayed the recourse to hostilities 
 long enough to give time for Belgium to mobilize and save France, while he 
 showed up, beyond all question of doubt, Germany's aggressive action, so 
 that Italy was amply justified in her own eyes and before the neutral world 
 in refusing to support her allies in their aggressive campaign. Had Sir 
 Edward Grey declared that England would be on the side of France and 
 Russia, it is very possible that Italy might have become involved on the side 
 of Austria and Germany. 
 
 Recently a distinguished British scholar, Dr. F. C. Conybeare, has en- 
 tered the lists and declared Russia responsible for the war, placing upon Sir 
 Edward Grey the responsibility for not taking action which would have 
 given Russia pause. He says in part : — 
 
 "Meanwhile Grey had great difficulty with the Cabinet, a majority of 
 whom flatly refused to go to war with Germany over Servia and preferred 
 to throw over Grey's naval and other agreements with France (which on 
 July 30 Cambon urged Grey to execute without delay; see White Paper, 
 no. 105). Grey threatened to resign, but on July 31 agreed to stay on until 
 it was known if Germany would respect or not Belgian neutrality, as to 
 which, on July 29 (White Paper, no. 85), the German Chancellor had 
 spoken ambiguously. If he really feared that France would violate it he 
 should have demanded of us an assurance that we would defend it vi et armis 
 against France. We could not have refused such an assurance. But Belgian 
 neutrality was the only thing the majority in our Cabinet really cared about, 
 and unless it — a small country — was violated by Germany — a big one — 
 the English people could not be reHed upon to join in any war. Nothing else 
 appealed to them in the least, and not a soul had any idea that Germany 
 had already offered to respect Belgium. Accordingly on the afternoon of 
 July 31 Goschen sounded Von Jagow about Belgium, and he could not 
 answer without consulting the Kaiser and the Chancellor. The Kaiser, ever 
 anxious to keep us out (and probably aware also that Russia would retire 
 across the golden bridge he had built as soon as ever she learned that we 
 were going to be neutral and not help her in her designs), ordered Lichnow- 
 sky to offer to respect Belgium and also to guarantee integrity of France and 
 of French colonies, to offer, in short, any conditions in order to keep us out. 
 Our Cabinet, in its turn anxious only to get from Germany a favorable 
 answer about Belgium and to be able to keep the peace with Germany, met 
 early on August 1 and drew up a memorandum about it, which Grey was to 
 submit to Lichnowsky. 
 
 "There was perhaps some one in the Cabinet who pointed out that to 
 challenge Germany to respect Belgium, after signifying our intention of 
 supporting France anyhow, was a work of supererogation. It was in effect 
 to say: 'I am going to war anyhow with you,' and at the same time, 'I will 
 go to war with you if you touch Belgium.' The Germans would probably 
 answer: ' We may as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb, and if we are, 
 anyhow, to fight you, why should we forego the military advantages of 
 going through Belgium? ' 
 
S58 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic 
 intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard 
 the integrity of Belgium.' 
 
 " In our White Paper, no. 123, may be read Grey's own abstract of his 
 conversation with Lichnowsky. At about 1.30, on August 1, Lichnowsky 
 freely offered to respect Belgium and also to guarantee the integrity of 
 France and of her colonies, although France (who really needed a strait- 
 waistcoat to keep her out of a quarrel which was not hers) could not com- 
 plain, if she was beaten, of Germany helping herself to some of her colonies. 
 Grey might have said to Lichnowsky that he could not barter our neutrality 
 against an undertaking by Germany to respect Belgium, seeing that it was 
 anyhow Germany's duty to respect Belgium. However, our Cabinet was in 
 a bartering mood, and they only wanted an excuse for not going to war with 
 Germany. Lichnowsky therefore adopted the bartering tone, and so did 
 Grey. Grey evidently expected Lichnowsky to offer no sort of terms, and 
 when Lichnowsky made the proposals as he did, and furthermore besought 
 him to formulate any conditions on which England would consent to be 
 neutral. Grey refused all on the pretext of keeping his hands free (see no. 
 123). Lichnowsky must have gone away with the conviction that Grey 
 anyhow wanted war. 
 
 " Now, our Cabinet plainly expected Grey to report to them at once any 
 disposition to yield, if Germany showed signs of it. He knew that if he re- 
 ported Lichnowsky's proposals, the Cabinet would jump at them, and then 
 he would be unable to execute his secret bond to France and Russia. What 
 did he do? He told none of his colleagues of them on August 1, and when the 
 Cabinet met next morning, August 2, he concealed them from the entire 
 Cabinet, as he did from the House of Commons next day, August 3. By do- 
 ing so he precipitated us into this war. I say he tricked us into war; us, a 
 generous people (who — except for a few rabid chauvinists on the Tory side 
 — were averse to war with Germany with whom we were for the first time 
 since Agadir on cordial terms) into war with you. Take my word for it, 
 Grey wUl, in good time, be running for his life over this sinister business. 
 Bismarck in 1870 modified a telegram in order to provoke that owl, Louis 
 Napoleon, into a declaration of war; Grey deliberately concealed from his 
 colleagues and from Parliament overtures made by Lichnowsky, which 
 would have been accepted at once; but for Grey's action Belgium would not 
 have been turned into a shambles, and in all probability Russia would have 
 professed her satisfaction that Austria had accepted her terms (dictated by 
 Sazonof to Pourtales at 2 a.m. on July 30) and have shut up. I consider that 
 Grey acted more criminally than Bismarck ever did. 
 
 " Mark the sequel. War ensued over Belgium, and weeks of it ensued 
 before any one knew of the interview given in White Paper, no. 123. As 
 soon, however, as Parliament met on August 27, Keir Hardie, who spotted 
 it, asked Grey whether he had submitted Lichnowsky's proposals to the 
 Cabinet and why they had not been made the basis of peace with Germany. 
 Grey in his answer acknowledged that he had disclosed it to no one at the 
 time and excused himself on the ground that Lichnowsky in no. 123 was 
 speaking de suo and without authority from Berlin. He acknowledged that 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 359 
 
 ''Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our 
 part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have 
 great and vital interests in the independence — and in- 
 tegrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is com- 
 pelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of 
 
 Lichnowsky was actuated in making these proposals by a sincere desire for 
 peace with us, but declared that Berlin in the background was as sincerely 
 working for war. And yet he must have been well aware that Lichnowsky 
 was acting on instructions from Berhn, as Lichnowsky's three dispatches 
 sent to Berlin about that interview at 1.15 p.m., 5.30 p.m., and 8.30 p.m. on 
 August 1 sufficiently prove. Moreover, had Grey not known that Lichnow- 
 sky's proposals were authoritative and bound the German Government, 
 he would never have wired them at once to Goschen lest the latter should 
 get at cross-purposes with our Foreign Office in the matter. All Grey'a 
 answers to Keir Hardie on August 27 are thus a model of hard lying, sup- 
 pressio veri and suggestio falsi. Naturally the House of Commons, having 
 been utterly hoodwinked by him, applauded. Presently they will send him 
 to the gallows. I doubt if even Asquith knew of this crime, for on August 
 6 he based his whole argument on White Paper, no. 85, but if he really was 
 Grey's accomplice, he will swing too. I fancy Lloyd George — a plastic 
 tool in Grey's hands — begins to smell a rat, for he is going about the 
 country now protesting loudly that he and the English democracy could 
 and would never have been induced to go to war except by the aggres- 
 sion on Belgium." {The Vital Issue, April 17, 1915, vol. ii, no. 16.) 
 
 If the facts are as stated, and Sir Edward Grey "deliberately concealed 
 from his colleagues and from Parliament overtures made by Lichnowsky, 
 which would have been accepted at once," he certainly took a very heavy 
 responsibility, — probably greater than any man should be allowed to 
 accept under a free government. In point of fact, however, the very men 
 from whom he is alleged to have concealed the offer probably now realize 
 the reasons for his action. Some of those reasons might have been that: (1) 
 Until Germany met his ofifer of July 31 and proposed some practical method 
 of procedure to reach a compromise, there was no use in offering terms which 
 would have temporarily tied Great Britain's hands. (2) If Sir Edward Grey 
 had offered his conditions and Germany had chosen to let them be known, 
 Russia might possibly have retreated (as Mr. Conybeare suggests), but the 
 Entente would have been sacrificed at German dictation to buy peace for 
 Europe, — not a permanent, but probably only a temporary, peace. (3) 
 British public opinion would have been so confused with the complicated 
 issues as to make it impossible to take united action until it was too late to 
 come to the effective support of Belgium and France, and to preserve the 
 good name of England. It is my opinion that, instead of heaping blame upon 
 Sir Edward Grey, we should accord him the Nobel Peace Prize for his active 
 and intelligent work to preserve peace. He performed the Herculean task of 
 putting off the actual outbreak of hostilities for several days at least. It was 
 not his fault if his great plans could not be carried to a successful culmina- 
 tion. He preserved his country's vital interests, he saved her good name, 
 and he did everything that was possible to preserve peace. 
 
360 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she 
 admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she 
 could only do so under duress. The smaller states in that 
 region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is 
 that they should be left alone and independent. The one 
 thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity 
 but that their independence should be interfered with. If 
 in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of 
 those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the com- 
 batants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to 
 resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may 
 be, the independence will be gone." 
 
 M. Paul Cambon informed his Government: 'In view of 
 events, Sir Edward Grey rendered more precise the de- 
 clarations he intended to make on the subject of Belgian 
 neutrality. The reading of a letter from King Albert ask- 
 ing for the support of England made a deep impression on 
 the House. The House would that evening vote credits 
 asked for; from then on its support was acquired to the 
 poUcy of the Government, which, following public opinion, 
 was growing more and more in their favor.' (Modified 
 quotation, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 145.) 
 
 That same day (August 3) Baron Kuhlmann, Councillor 
 of the German Embassy in London, gave to the press the 
 communique previously referred to : — 
 
 "The maintenance of British neutrality would in no 
 way injure France. On the contrary, it might be argued 
 that by remaining neutral Great Britain could give France 
 exactly as much strategic assistance and a good deal more 
 effective diplomatic help. 
 
 ''As, according to all reliable information, there is no 
 intention of sending British troops to the Continent, and 
 as a few British divisions, considering the enormous num- 
 bers engaged, could hardly alter the balance of power, all 
 England can do for France is to protect her North Sea 
 coast from invasion and to prevent the neutral ports of 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 361 
 
 Belgium and Holland being used as bases of armed aggres- 
 sion against France. 
 
 "Germany would be disposed to give an undertaking 
 that she will not attack France by sea in the north, or 
 make any warlike use of the seacoast of Belgium or Hol- 
 land, if it appeared that Great Britain would make this 
 undertaking a condition of her neutrality for the time 
 being. 
 
 ''Thus, England, without going to war herself, could 
 render to France the maximum of assistance she could 
 give by going to war. That England, as a neutral power, 
 maintaining an armed neutrality, would diplomatically 
 be a greater asset for France for the termination of hostil- 
 ities at an early moment than if herself involved in war, 
 is self-evident." ^ 
 
 The next day, August 4, Sir Edward Grey transmitted 
 to the British Ambassador at Berlin the text of the Belgian 
 appeal to England for diplomatic intervention, and further 
 stated that the British Government were also informed 
 that 'the German Government had delivered to the Bel- 
 gian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality en- 
 tailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promis- 
 ing to maintain the independence and integrity of the 
 kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, 
 threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an 
 enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. 
 They also understood that Belgium had categorically re- 
 fused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. The 
 British Government were bound to protest against this 
 violation of a treaty to which Germany was a party in com- 
 mon with themselves, and requested an assurance that the 
 demand made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with, 
 and that her neutrality would be respected by Germany. 
 Sir Edward instructed the British Ambassador at Berlin to 
 
 ^ Manchester Guardian, Tuesday, August 4, 1914. Statement first 
 printed in evening papers, August 3, 1914. 
 
362 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ask for an immediate reply.' (Modified quotations, Au- 
 gust 4, B. W. P. no. 153; cf. B. G. P. no. 25.) 
 
 On August 4, the German Secretary of State telegraphed 
 Prince Lichnowsky : — 
 
 "Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part 
 of the British Government with regard to our intentions, 
 by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even 
 in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, 
 under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. The 
 sincerity of this declaration is borne out by the fact that 
 we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to re- 
 spect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not pro- 
 fitably annex Belgian territory without making at the 
 same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Hol- 
 land. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German 
 army could not be exposed to French attack across Bel- 
 gium, which was planned according to absolutely unim- 
 peachable information. Germany had consequently to dis- 
 regard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of 
 life or death to prevent the French advance." (August 
 4, B. W. P. no. 157.) 
 
 On August 4, the British Government learned that 'Ger- 
 man troops had entered Belgian territory, and that Liege 
 had been summoned to surrender by a small party of Ger- 
 mans, who, however, were repulsed.' (Modified quotation, 
 August 4, B. W. P. no. 158.) 
 
 That same day Sir Edward Grey instructed the British 
 Ambassador at Berlin: — 
 
 ''We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Bel- 
 gian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the German 
 Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, 
 by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. 
 
 "We are also informed that Belgian territory has been 
 violated at Gemmenich. 
 
 "In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that 
 Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 363 
 
 Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request 
 made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat 
 that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and 
 to my telegram of this morning (see B. W. P. no. 153) be 
 received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are in- 
 structed to ask for your passports, and to say that His 
 Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their 
 power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the obser- 
 vance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as 
 ourselves." (August 4, B. W. P. no. 159.) 
 
 Sir Edward Goschen relates in the following words how 
 he called upon the German Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs on the afternoon of August 4, and inquired in the 
 name of the British Government whether the German 
 Government would refrain from violating Belgian neu- 
 trality:^ — 
 
 ^'Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to 
 say that his answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the 
 German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, 
 Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von 
 Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Gov- 
 ernment had been obliged to take this step, namely, that 
 they had to advance into France by the quickest and 
 easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their 
 operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as 
 early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, 
 as if they had gone by the more southern route they could 
 not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the 
 strength of the fortresses, to have got through without 
 formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This 
 loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians 
 for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rap- 
 idity of action was the great German asset, while that of 
 Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed 
 
 1 This dispatch, drawn up on August 8, after Sir Edward Goschen re- 
 turned to London, supplements the record of the British White Paper. 
 
364 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the viola- 
 tion of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily 
 understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked 
 him whether there was not still time to draw back and 
 avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would 
 deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, 
 it was now impossible for them to draw back. 
 
 "During the afternoon I received your further telegram 
 of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions 
 therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial For- 
 eign Oflfice and informed the Secretary of State that unless 
 the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 
 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further 
 with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their 
 advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports 
 and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's 
 Government would have to take all steps in their power to 
 uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a 
 treaty to which Germany was as much a party as them- 
 
 "Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he 
 could give no other answer than that which he had given 
 me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Em- 
 pire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial 
 troops should advance through Belgium. I gave His Ex- 
 cellency a written summary of your telegram and, point- 
 ing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when 
 His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, 
 asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences 
 which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even 
 at the last moment that their answer should be reconsid- 
 ered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty- 
 four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said 
 that in that case I should have to demand my passports. 
 This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short 
 conversation which ensued, Herr von Jagow expressed his 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 365 
 
 poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and 
 that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends 
 with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get 
 closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work 
 in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and dis- 
 appointment, but that he must understand that under the 
 circumstances and in view of our engagements. His Majes- 
 ty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise 
 than they had done. 
 
 ''I then said that I should like to go and see the Chan- 
 cellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have 
 an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I 
 found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once 
 began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. 
 He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government 
 was terrible to a degree; just for a word — 'neutrality,' a 
 word which in war time had so often been disregarded — 
 just for a scrap of paper, ^ Great Britain was going to make 
 war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than 
 to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had 
 been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the 
 policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since 
 his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of 
 cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like 
 striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his 
 life against two assailants. He held Great Britain respon- 
 sible for all the terrible events that might happen. I pro- 
 tested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the 
 same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to under- 
 stand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life 
 and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and 
 violate the latter' s neutrality, so I would wish him to 
 understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of ' life and 
 
 1 The Chancellor, in an interview with the correspondent of the Associ- 
 ated Press, has explained what he meant by the phrase "a scrap of paper." 
 His explanation and Sir Edward Grey's rejoinder are considered in the 
 following chapter. 
 
366 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep 
 her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgi- 
 um's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply- 
 had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in 
 engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The 
 Chancellor said, ' But at what price will that compact have 
 been kept? Has the British Government thought of that? ' 
 I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of 
 consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for 
 breaking solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so 
 excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, 
 and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from 
 adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was 
 leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining 
 Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to 
 the last moment he and his Government had been working 
 with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace be- 
 tween Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the 
 tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the 
 moment when the relations between them had been more 
 friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfor- 
 tunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace 
 between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had 
 brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to 
 our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which 
 unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow- 
 workers. He would readily understand that no one re- 
 gretted this more than I. 
 
 "After this somewhat painful interview I returned to 
 the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had 
 passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Tele- 
 graph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that 
 office, but apparently never dispatched.^ 
 
 ''At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under- 
 Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his 
 
 ^ This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 367 
 
 deep regret that the very friendly official and personal 
 relations between us were about to cease, he asked me 
 casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent 
 to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on 
 international law as he was known to be must know as well 
 or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added 
 that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had 
 been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; 
 but that in this case he would have seen from my instruc- 
 tions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written sum- 
 mary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer 
 to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in 
 default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to 
 take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zim- 
 mermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, 
 as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the 
 assurance required either that night or any other night. 
 
 ''In the mean time, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a 
 flying sheet, issued by the Berliner Tagehlatt, was circu- 
 lated stating that Great Britain had declared war against 
 Germany. The immediate result of this news was the as- 
 semblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before 
 His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which 
 had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, 
 and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We 
 took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was con- 
 fined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing 
 of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all 
 sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleas- 
 ant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what 
 was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the 
 Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, 
 sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. 
 From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more 
 direct unpleasantness occurred. 
 
 "After order had been restored, Herr von Jagow came 
 
368 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what 
 had occurred. He said that the behavior of his country- 
 men had made him feel more ashamed than he had words 
 to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of 
 Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the 
 streets had not been authorized by the Government; in 
 fact the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether 
 he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he 
 had replied, 'Certainly not, until the morning.' It was in 
 consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small 
 force of police had been sent to the neighborhood of the 
 embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large 
 force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead 
 to disturbances. It was the 'pestilential TageblatV which 
 had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his 
 calculations. He had heard rumors that the mob had been 
 excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown 
 from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true 
 (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no 
 foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse 
 for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared 
 that I would take home with me a sorry impression of 
 Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no 
 apology could have been more full and complete. 
 
 "On the following morning, the 5th August, the Em- 
 peror sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with 
 the following message: — 
 
 '"The Emperor has charged me to express to Your 
 Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, 
 but to tell you at the same time that you will gather 
 from these occurrences an idea of the feelings of his 
 people respecting the action of Great Britain in join- 
 ing with other nations against her old allies of Water- 
 loo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King 
 that he has been proud of the titles of British Field- 
 Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 369 
 
 of what has occurred he must now at once divest him- 
 self of those titles.' 
 
 ''I would add that the above message lost none of its 
 acerbity by the manner of its delivery. 
 
 ''On the other hand, I should like to state that I re- 
 ceived all through this trying time nothing but courtesy 
 at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the 
 Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same 
 morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — which 
 I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told 
 me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to 
 the route which I should follow for my return to England. 
 He said that he had understood that I preferred the route 
 via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had 
 therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, 
 only I should have to wait till the following morning. I 
 agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured 
 that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes 
 of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. 
 He added that they were doing all in their power to have a 
 restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a 
 difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter 
 from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. 
 The day was passed in packing up such articles as time 
 allowed. 
 
 "The night passed quietly without any incident. In the 
 morning a strong force of police was posted along the 
 usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was 
 smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. 
 We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided 
 the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and 
 French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to 
 say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that 
 all the arrangements ordered for oiu* comfort had been 
 properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards ac- 
 companied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was ex- 
 
370 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds 
 which thronged the platforms at every station where we 
 stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of pa- 
 triotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had 
 really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey 
 to the Dutch frontier. 
 
 ''Before closing this long account of our last days in 
 Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your 
 notice the quite admirable behavior of my staff under the 
 most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they 
 worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot 
 praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, 
 naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the two 
 young attaches buckled to their work and kept their nerve 
 with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of 
 British subjects clamoring for advice and assistance. I 
 was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most 
 grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and sup- 
 port, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, 
 which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me. 
 
 ''I should also like to mention the great assistance ren- 
 dered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and 
 his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which 
 he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving 
 the embassy, His Excellency came repeatedly to see me to 
 ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the 
 safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of 
 these from extremely difficult situations at some personal 
 risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his 
 firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full 
 assurance that the protection of British subjects and in- 
 terests could not have been left in more efficient and able 
 hands." (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 8 [1914].) 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 
 
 The history of Belgian neutrality — The obligation to respect the treaty 
 of April 19, 1839 — The obligation to make good the guaranty of neutrality 
 — The right to make war and the equality of states — Anglo-Belgian con- 
 versations — Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany — Alleged 
 violations of Belgian neutrality — The violation of the neutrality of Lux- 
 emburg — Some considerations concerning Belgium's right to resist — 
 Germany accuses England of misrepresentation in regard to Belgium — Ger- 
 many's plea of necessity. 
 
 1. The history of Belgian neutrality 
 The origins of Belgian neutrality may be traced back 
 for centuries. The subject is a most important one, and 
 round it have centered the intense rivalries of the European 
 states. Ever since the Treaty of Verdun, when the grand- 
 sons of Charlemagne divided his inheritance into three 
 strips, there has been an incessant conflict between the 
 western division which fell to Charles the Bold, and 
 the eastern which Louis the German received, to divide 
 the intermediate inheritance of Lothair, whose name in 
 the form of Lorraine is still applied to part of the terri- 
 tory which is now the scene of an armed conflict. 
 
 France early gained the advantage through her achieve- 
 ment of a strong national state, while Germany remained 
 split up into a lot of independent and semi-independent 
 states under the nominal suzerainty of emperors chosen, as 
 a rule, from the Austrian reigning house. Spain and Eng- 
 land played an important part in checking the ambitions 
 of France, and when Spain fell into decadence, the Eng- 
 lish and the Dutch strove to maintain the balance of power 
 on the Continent. France, by playing upon the fears and 
 jealousies of the minor German states, was able to para- 
 lyze the political and military action of the German Em- 
 pire. England alone was able to persist in her resistance, 
 
372 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 and prevented the French from advancing to their goal of 
 occupying the Netherlands. 
 
 In the course of generations France had acquired a con- 
 siderable portion of the middle strip of the inheritance of 
 Lothair, but until the French Revolution she was never 
 able to acquire those provinces on her northeastern frontier 
 which were successively known as Burgundy, the Spanish 
 Netherlands, the Austrian Netherlands, the Belgic Prov- 
 inces, and Belgium. 
 
 As early as 1609 the great Cardinal Richelieu perceived 
 the futility of any immediate efforts of conquest, and pro- 
 posed that France and the United Provinces of Holland 
 should enter into a treaty with these provinces, according 
 to the terms of which this middle state, made into an in- 
 dependent Catholic republic, should join in a perpetual 
 alliance with its two neighbors to maintain its independ- 
 ence.^ The great statesman considered such a solution 
 superior to any attempt at partition of these provinces by 
 France and Holland, for the following reasons: (1) It 
 would prevent the maintenance of an expensive system of 
 fortifications between France and the growing Dutch Re- 
 public, which Richelieu foresaw would soon acquire a 
 position of great strength. (2) It would do much to re- 
 move the causes of war, so difficult to avoid between two 
 powerful coterminous states. (3) It would prevent a coali- 
 tion of England and Spain to check France. This danger 
 the Cardinal appreciated fully, because he realized the 
 fundamental motives which governed England's policy 
 better than did the English statesmen of the period. 
 (4) An independent republic placed between France and 
 the Dutch Republic would be a factor in preserving peace, 
 because this medial state would understand that the great- 
 est menace to its existence would arise from a conflict 
 between its neighbors. 
 
 By insisting that the state so established should be 
 
 1 See Documents, chap. xiii. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 373 
 
 Catholic, the Cardinal would have made it extremely dif- 
 ficult for the Dutch to incorporate it in their own terri- 
 tory. But the advantages of this plan of the far-seeing 
 Cardinal were not sufficiently appreciated by his con- 
 temporaries, and it had to be abandoned in favor of a less 
 perfect scheme.^ 
 
 The purpose of the Dutch was to acquire a sufficient 
 strip of this territory bordering on France to serve as a 
 barrier for the protection of their own province. In pur- 
 suit of this policy, they acquired a strip called the Gen- 
 erality or Common Lands, and succeeded in closing the 
 Scheldt, so that Amsterdam and the Dutch cities might be 
 favored over Antwerp. Unable to secure the establish- 
 ment of a neutralized state, they decided to adopt the 
 system of a '^ buffer" state, which was then called a bar- 
 riere.- But in the course of time this plan was modified, 
 and took the form of a system of barrier fortresses, located 
 in these provinces and garrisoned by the Dutch and Eng- 
 lish. At the conclusion of the Wars of the Spanish Suc- 
 cession these provinces passed to Austria. Even before 
 this the Dutch had attempted to establish a similar sys- 
 tem of outposts along the Rhine, by holding Ravestein 
 and Rhineburg in defiance of the rights of their lawful 
 possessors, with the object of protecting their frontier on 
 the German side. The negotiations in regard to these bar- 
 rier posts may be considered as the very crux of the diplo- 
 macy between France, England, and Holland. England 
 was generally to be found helping the adversaries of 
 France, so as to maintain the balance of power on the 
 Continent. 
 
 1 Dollot, Neutralite de la Belgique, pp. 56-57. Paris, 1902. 
 
 2 "In order to prevent France from encroaching upon Flanders, since 
 otherwise she would be more to be dreaded than Spain, and to this effect 
 just as the Princes of Christendom secured the equality of the balance on 
 the side of Spain by assisting us, let the same procedure be undertaken 
 against*France, and Flanders always kept as a dividing wall." (Extract from 
 the minutes of the Session of the States General of April 19, 1647. See 
 Dollot, op. cit, p. 99.) 
 
374 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 The system of barrier treaties, as organized in 1709 and 
 continued by the treaties of 1713 and 1715, provided for 
 the Dutch control of the Scheldt and the shutting-off, in 
 favor of Amsterdam, of the competition of the more favor- 
 ably located Antwerp; the right to garrison certain of the 
 strong places along the frontier; and the placing upon the 
 Austrian Netherlands of the maintenance of this heavy 
 military burden. 
 
 The essential idea of this barrier system was to place 
 upon Belgium the cost of maintaining a foreign garrison 
 intended principally for the protection of the Dutch, 
 though incidentally for Belgium's own security against an 
 invasion from France. The adoption of this system was 
 made possible only through the agreement between Eng- 
 land and Holland. It amounted to the imposition of a 
 military servitude on these territories in favor of Holland 
 and England. 
 
 England had insisted upon treaty recognition of the ap- 
 plication of a similar military servitude applied directly 
 to French territory, and had succeeded in securing it ; the 
 Treaty of Utrecht, Article 9, required that the fortifica- 
 tions at Dunkirk should be destroyed and not rebuilt. 
 
 As the power of Austria and Holland waned, they were 
 quick to recognize that they could place upon England 
 the principal burden of preserving the independence of 
 the Austrian Netherlands. When England became in- 
 volved in difficulties, she could no longer sustain the bur- 
 den of this mihtary establishment, and on April 18, 1782, 
 the last of the Scotch regiments left Namur. The system 
 of the barrier had come to an end, as was tacitly admitted 
 by the Treaty of Fontainebleau of November 19, 1785, 
 which omits all mention of it.^ 
 
 When in 1789 Belgium revolted because of the attempt 
 of Emperor Joseph II to introduce certain religious and 
 administrative reforms, Prussia feared that the modifica- 
 
 1 Dollot, op. cit., p. 440. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 375 
 
 tion introduced might strengthen Austria's position and 
 affect her poUtical influence. Accordingly, Frederick Wil- 
 liam favored the project of establishing Belgium as an 
 independent republic; but England, although the scheme 
 was in general harmony with her policy, was not willing 
 to give Prussia her support, not wishing to antagonize 
 Austria.^ The Belgian revolt was quickly suppressed, only 
 to be succeeded shortly after by another uprising. The 
 efforts of the Provinces to break away from Austria found 
 enthusiastic support in France, and in 1792 the French 
 invaded Belgium to free her, as they considered, from the 
 Austrian yoke. Maurier, French Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, realized, however, that England would not place 
 much confidence in the French protestations of disin- 
 terestedness. England was aroused, but offered no resist- 
 ance to the French, who acquired control of the country. 
 The French Convention was so lacking in all appreciation 
 of the political situation as to remove the restrictions on 
 the navigation of the Scheldt and thus to goad England on 
 to declare war. This French occupation of Belgium and 
 Holland undoubtedly was a vigorous spur toward urging 
 England on to accomplish the fall of Napoleon. Even dur- 
 ing the great conflict which ensued, we trace the formation 
 of the idea of the regime to be applied to Belgium. On 
 January 9, 1805, Pitt remarked to the Russian Ambas- 
 sador to England: "Belgium can never exist as a separate 
 and independent state." ^ This thought of Pitt's was put 
 into effect when Holland and Belgium were united for the 
 purpose of forming a ''stopper" state against French ad- 
 vance. Certain of the old Dutch barrier forts, which had 
 been destroyed by Napoleon in 1803, were rebuilt, and the 
 old system of the barriere was thereby reestablished against 
 
 1 DoUot, op. cit., pp. 452-53. 
 
 2 Ihid., p. 515. In an article on " The Neutrality of Belgium," by Th. 
 Baty, The Quarterly Review, January, 1915, p. 216, is the following note: 
 " Pitt's original plan was to give Belgium to Prussia. Castlereagh preferred 
 to strengthen Holland (Hansard, Nov. 2, 1830, col. 40).". 
 
376 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR QF 1914 
 
 France, though in a more perfected form, and placed 
 under the general guaranty of the powers. This arrange- 
 ment was intended to be not merely for the advantage of 
 the English and the Dutch, but to serve as a rampart for 
 all Europe against another revolutionary outbreak on the 
 part of France. 
 
 Without repeating what has been said already ^ about 
 the separation of Belgium from Holland in 1830, we need 
 only recall how the Treaty of November 15, 1831, guar- 
 anteeing the neutrality and independence of Belgium, was 
 replaced eight years later by the treaties signed April 19, 
 1839, after Holland had agreed at last to recognize Belgian 
 independence. 
 
 2. The obligation to respect the Treaty of April 19, 1839 
 The obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium may 
 be considered to rest upon the obligation to respect the 
 Treaty of April 19, 1839, which sets forth this obligation 
 in express terms. To understand the question of observ- 
 ance we must, however, examine the nature of this treaty 
 and of treaties in general. Although there is no good classi- 
 fication of treaties, some of the divisions into which they 
 fall are: (1) political treaties; (2) commercial treaties; (3) 
 treaties of settlement; (4) treaties to take effect in the 
 event of war; and (5) law-making treaties. We cannot here 
 enter into a discussion of the nature of the different kinds 
 of treaties except in so far as it is germane to the question 
 of Belgium. 
 
 The treaty of neutralization of Belgium is certainly 
 either a political treaty or a treaty made for the event of 
 war. It may, in fact, belong to both categories.^ This dual 
 characteristic of the neutralization treaty is one of the 
 
 ^ See chap. i. 
 
 ^ Many authorities regard the stipulations establishing the neutrality of 
 Belgium as a lawmaking treaty. See Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 
 I, §§ 555, 558, 18, 492 (2d edition. New York, 1912); and Westlake, Inter- 
 national Law, part i, pp. 29-30, Cambridge, 1910. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 377 
 
 reasons why there is so much discussion as to the require- 
 ments in regard to its observance. Let us examine the 
 treaty first from the political aspect in an attempt to de- 
 termine the conditions under which it may come to an 
 end. 
 
 Undoubtedly, this result may be reached by an agree- 
 ment of all the parties. Any signatory of a political treaty 
 of indefinite extent may by its simple declaration put an 
 end, as far as it is concerned, to the continuance of the 
 treaty. If by so doing it arouse the anger of the other 
 party or parties, the settlement of the question is one of 
 politics like the treaty to which it relates. Let us take, as 
 an example of a political treaty, the alliance existing be- 
 tween Italy and her partners in the Triplice. It is for 
 Italy to interpret her obligation, and if Austria and Ger- 
 many should be dissatisfied, they could only apply such 
 measures of persuasion or of force as they might judge 
 expedient. 
 
 The termination of a treaty may be brought about 
 tacitly by its gradually falling into desuetude. Whether 
 a treaty be terminated by an express declaration or 
 whether it gradually wastes away until it is generally rec- 
 ognized to have lost all binding force, every state is re- 
 quired by the fundamental principles of international law 
 to observe good faith in regard to its conventional agree- 
 ments, as well as in regard to all other relations with its 
 sister states. Treaties would be of no value unless it were 
 generally recognized that every self-respecting state might 
 be counted upon to observe its obligations in those cases 
 in which it had solemnly given its most sacred word of 
 honor. 
 
 Governments are not sufficiently wise to foresee all 
 events, and may with the best of faith enter into an agree- 
 ment, the observance of which would mean the jeopardiz- 
 ing of the existence of the nation. Whatever we might like 
 to urge in theory, the practice of all those states which 
 
378 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 now survive and make up the family of nations has then 
 been to prefer their national existence to the scrupulous 
 observance of their plighted troth. ^ It might well be ques- 
 tioned whether the present crude machinery of govern- 
 ment is a sufficiently authorized agent of the whole people 
 of the state to engage the responsibility of all the state to 
 the observance of such a treaty. If the Government did 
 not hasten to repudiate its obligation, the nation would 
 cast it out and place the control of its public affairs in other 
 hands. 
 
 The determination of the dividing line, where the obliga- 
 tion to observe a treaty ends and the necessity of guarding 
 the national existence begins, cannot be decided with any 
 degree of certainty. The evolutionary process of the ages, 
 working to select the states best fitted to survive in the 
 family of nations, will favor those which have had a gov- 
 ernment sufficiently intelligent or fortunate to have been 
 caught most rarely by this dilemma. For every time that 
 a state finds it necessary to modify or avoid the obliga- 
 tions to which it has subscribed, its credit will be adversely 
 affected, and the burden of its ill-repute will weigh it 
 down, as compared with the states which have found it 
 possible to survive and adhere more faithfully to their 
 agreements. A certain latitude must be allowed for every 
 state to reconcile the scrupulous observance of its obliga- 
 tions with a necessary regard for its own vital interests. 
 
 In another respect treaties are sometimes considered to 
 lapse, when conditions have so essentially altered as to 
 render their stipulations no longer applicable. Any politi- 
 cal agreement entered into by two governments must be 
 tacitly understood as intended to apply to conditions 
 similar to those which existed at the time the treaty was 
 entered into. Where there is a gradual modification of 
 conditions, and a continued indication on the part of both 
 
 ^ Cf. the remarks of Bismarck in reference to the observance of treaties; 
 speech of February 6, 1888; yost, chap. xiii. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 379 
 
 the parties to the treaty of an intention to observe its 
 terms, it may be said that the original obligation is con- 
 tinued by a tacit prolongation. In the absence of such con- 
 tinuation, an essential modification of the conditions to 
 which the treaty was expected to apply would give rise to 
 a doubt, at least, as to whether it continued to apply. At 
 the present time, for the most part, political agreements 
 are entered into for a short term of years, which in itself 
 may be looked upon as a tacit waiving in great measure 
 of the condition just stated, often spoken of as the rule of 
 rebus sic stantibus. 
 
 With these exceptions, a treaty entered into must be 
 faithfully observed by all the parties as long as it continues 
 in existence. The exceptions pointed out presuppose that 
 the states will endeavor under all circumstances to avoid 
 any action which may take their co-signatory by surprise. 
 This implies that a state which considers a treaty defunct 
 and no longer binding must refrain from any action which 
 might be misinterpreted by the other party as an expres- 
 sion of an intention to continue to observe the obligation. 
 It would be contrary to a due regard for the proper con- 
 duct of international relations to allow such a misunder- 
 standing to arise or persist. 
 
 In deciding to what class any particular treaty applies, 
 the safest method will be to inquire what purpose it was 
 intended to serve. Applying this test to the Neutraliza- 
 tion Treaty of June 26, 1831, and to its successor of April 
 19, 1839, we may consider the purpose as twofold: (1) To 
 find, in place of Holland, the large state with which the 
 powers of Europe had hoped in 1815 to block any further 
 danger of French expansion into the rich Belgian terri- 
 tory, another check in the form of a neutralized Belgium 
 whose independence should be guaranteed by all the 
 powers.^ This purpose is evidently political in its nature. 
 
 ^ Perhaps England was the only power really desirous to secure the adop- 
 tion of this plan in 1831. With all the others it was probably a choice of 
 
380 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 (2) The second purpose of the treaty resulting from the 
 neutralization of Belgian territory was intended to pro- 
 tect Belgium from invasion, and make it impossible for 
 France or any other country to use its plains as a highway 
 for military operations. England was, of course, partic- 
 ularly interested, not wishing, as a result of the invasion 
 of Belgium, to have military forces massed so near her own 
 shores. The neutralization of Belgium amounted to the 
 placing upon her territory of a military servitude. As this 
 provision was intended to have its full effect only in the 
 event of war, the treaty must upon this ground be classed 
 as one made in the anticipation of war.^ 
 
 Now, treaties made for the event of war are peculiar 
 in their nature, for, just when all normal relations be- 
 tween nations cease, a treaty made in anticipation of war 
 would come into full vigor. ^ War automatically puts 
 an end to all political treaties, and brings into full effect 
 those made in anticipation of war. What, then, will be 
 the effect of war upon this treaty which seems to be 
 partly political and partly contingent upon the event of 
 war? 
 
 Before we answer this, let us examine further the na- 
 
 evils. France preferred an independent Belgium to the former arrangement; 
 besides, she did not wish to have the powers undertake joint intervention to 
 regulate Belgian affairs, for fear Nicholas I and Metternich might attempt 
 to interfere with what they considered the revolutionary government of 
 France. 
 
 ' Baron Kuhlmann in his communique to the press was careful to explain 
 that Germany would not make any warlike use of the seacoast of Belgium 
 or Holland. (See above, p. 361.) This view of the nature of the treaty of 
 1839 is maintained by Dr. Th. Niemeyer, "International Law in War": 
 Michigan Law Review, Jan. 1915, p. 178. 
 
 ^ CrandaU quotes with approval Vattel's remark in reference to the an- 
 nulling of treaties: " ' Yet here we must except those treaties by which cer- 
 tain things are stipulated in case of a rupture — as, for instance, the length 
 of time to be allowed on each side for the subjects of the other nation to quit 
 the country — the neutrality of a town or province insured by mutual con- 
 sent, etc. Since, by treaties of this nature, we mean to provide for what shall 
 be observed in case of a rupture, we renounce the right of cancelling them 
 by a declaration of war.' " (S. B. CrandaU, Treaties, Their Making and En- 
 forcement, New York, 1904, p. 244.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 381 
 
 ture of treaties made in anticipation of war. It would be 
 futile, of course, to attempt to incorporate political pro- 
 visions in a treaty of this kind, since the very object of a 
 war would generally be to modify the political relations of 
 the signatories. What stipulations, then, may we rea- 
 sonably expect to find in such a treaty? Clearly, only such 
 provisions as both the parties consider it to their common 
 advantage to secure in the event of military operations. 
 For example, both parties might agree not to employ aero- 
 planes or submarines, or might stipulate that each would 
 permit the citizens of the other to continue their uninter- 
 rupted residence in its territories upon the outbreak of 
 war. Any provision made in anticipation of war must be 
 entirely voluntary on the part of both the signatories, and 
 free from any taint of duress.^ This is a point of capital 
 importance, for in the case of all other treaties, the pres- 
 sure which compels the signatory government to agree in 
 no wise affects the validity of the agreement. ^ 
 
 The truth of what was said above, that any treaty made 
 to take effect in the event of war must be free from all 
 taint of compulsion, is made evident when we consider 
 that otherwise, by menace or force, one state could make 
 another sign agreements restricting its liberty of action in 
 the event of war. If such a principle were to be admitted, 
 the oppressed state, having recourse to war to rid itself of 
 
 1 Westlake says: " Conspicuous among treaties doomed by their nature 
 to obsolescence are those by which a state defeated in war is obhged to ab- 
 stain from fortifying or otherwise making free use of some part of its terri- 
 tory, when the restriction is not imposed as forming part of a system of 
 permanent neutraUty." (John Westlake, International Law, part i, p. 296. 
 Cambridge, 1910.) 
 
 2 Much confusion results from the drawing of false comparisons between 
 international treaties and ordinary contracts between individuals. In the 
 case of the former, the fact that one of the parties has been more or less 
 under the dominance of force and compelled to subscribe to the stipulations 
 is not necessarily a ground for denying its validity. In a treaty of peace, for 
 instance, the vanquished is under the necessity of accepting the terms which 
 the victor imposes. If he is not willing loyally to accept the conditions, he 
 must prolong the contest as best he may. 
 
382 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the obnoxious pressure, might find its liberty to wage war 
 restricted by these previous agreements imposed upon it 
 with this very purpose in view. Had it happened, in the 
 year 1913, that the states as now existing in Europe had 
 never signed an agreement relating to the neutrahzation 
 of Belgium, and the Entente Powers, feeling their strength 
 sufficient to attack, should have imposed upon the Triple 
 Alliance the acceptance of the neutralization of Belgium 
 and Switzerland, Germany might have found herself in a 
 situation entirely unprepared for war and have had to 
 subscribe to these conditions. When war broke out, how- 
 ever, she would have been perfectly justified in reasserting 
 her full liberty of action. But such is not the actual situa- 
 tion of Belgium. The neutralization of Belgium was de- 
 sired by Prussia in 1839. She has never since given any 
 official indication that she would not consider herself 
 bound by the terms of the neutralization treaty in the 
 event of war, although she might easily have done so. 
 During the eighty-four years which have intervened since 
 Belgium was first neutralized, she has been universally 
 recognized as enjoying this peculiar status of neutraliza- 
 tion, and up to the outbreak of this war had fulfilled 
 her obligations to the apparent satisfaction of the other 
 states. 
 
 The Treaty of April 19, 1839, had come to be looked 
 upon as such a fundamental part of the public law of 
 Europe that it no longer bore the political imprint of its 
 origin. As Dr. David Jayne Hill declared, in a book pub- 
 lished shortly after his return from Berlin where he had 
 represented the United States: "While this arrangement 
 prevents making their territories the scene of hostilities, 
 it does not deprive these States of the right of self-defense. 
 On the contrary, it imposes upon them the duty of defend- 
 ing their neutrality to the best of their ability; but, as 
 they enjoy the guaranty of the powers that they will aid 
 them in this respect, it is improbable that their neutrality 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 383 
 
 will ever be violated." * From such a source these re- 
 marks are most significant, for no doubt former Ambassa- 
 dor Hill had an opportunity to fraternize with the mem- 
 bers of the diplomatic corps at Berlin and to study at first 
 hand the various political views of the powers in regard 
 to the situation of Belgium. In his previous post at The 
 Hague, Dr. Hill had another excellent opportunity to 
 study the question of neutralization. 
 
 It has been stated that the Treaty of April 19, 1839, ac- 
 cording to the terms of which the principal powers were 
 obligated to defend the neutrality of Belgium, was no 
 longer in effect : — 
 
 (1) Because it had been superseded by the Treaties of 
 1870, which had also lapsed. 
 
 (2) Because the present German Empire was not a 
 party to the Treaty of 1839. 
 
 (3) Because Gladstone had admitted that England, and 
 hence the other powers, could not be expected to 
 carry out its provisions. 
 
 (4) Because the conditions in Belgium had so altered as 
 to make the treaty of neutrality no longer applic- 
 able. 
 
 (1) As far as regards the effect of the Treaties of 1870 
 on the Treaty of 1839, one has only to read the Parlia- 
 mentary debates to perceive that the British Government 
 had no thought of superseding the Treaty of 1839 as a 
 result of entering into treaties with France and Germany 
 in 1870.2 The fact that England found it necessary to 
 enter into separate treaties with France and Germany at 
 that time did not affect the Treaty of 1839, but only made 
 clear, whatever care the British Ministers took to disguise 
 it, that the guaranty, being every power's duty, might fail 
 
 1 See Documents, post, chap, xni, where an extensive extract from David 
 Jayne Hill's World Organization as affected by the Nature of the Modern State 
 is given. 
 
 2 Consult Extracts from the Parliamentary Debates, post, chap. xiii. 
 
384 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of execution by any.^ Austria and Russia had probably 
 never expected to take a very active part in making good 
 the guaranty, so that England must have realized that she 
 alone would have to watch over Belgium's neutrality dur- 
 ing the war between Prussia and France. The situation 
 was particularly difficult because one of the belligerents 
 might discover that it might be to his advantage to vio- 
 late Belgian neutrality, and by doing so he might secure a 
 strong position from which it might be difficult to dislodge 
 him before England could gather her forces together to 
 offer any resistance. The effect of the separate Treaties 
 of 1870 was, that in the event of the violation of Belgian 
 neutrality by one of the belligerents, the other could rely 
 upon England as an ally in defense of the Treaty of 1839. 
 By their own express terms (Article III) the Treaties of 
 1870 expired one year from the date of the conclusion of 
 peace. ^ Their introduction shows that the treaties were in 
 no wise at variance with the Treaty of 1839, but supple- 
 mentary to it, hence the obligations to respect and guar- 
 antee the neutrality of Belgium remained after the ex- 
 piration of the Treaties of 1870, and even during their 
 
 1 In 1855 Palmerston in the course of a discussion about the Danubian 
 Principalities expressed some doubt as to the efficacy of neutrahzation : 
 " The right honorable Gentleman has thrown out certain suggestions, some 
 of which, no doubt, are deserving of consideration, with respect to the ar- 
 rangements for the future protection of Turkey, and one of those sugges- 
 tions was that the Principahties should be declared neutral. There cer- 
 tainly are instances in Europe of such propositions, and it has been agreed 
 by treaty that Belgium and Switzerland should be declared neutral; but I 
 am not disposed to attach very much importance to such engagements, for 
 the history of the world shows that when a quarrel arises, and a nation 
 makes war, and thinks it advantageous to traverse with its army such neu- 
 tral territory, the declarations of neutrality are not apt to be very reli- 
 giously respected. But if these Principahties continue to form a part of the 
 Turkish Empire, as I think it is essential they should — for, if separated, 
 they might follow the fate of Poland, and be partitioned to some neighbor- 
 ing State — for their neutrahty would be disregarded the moment Russia 
 went to war, that, I think, would be the best guaranty for the safety of the 
 whole." (Extract, June 8, 1855, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. 
 cxxxviii, pp. 1747-48.) 
 
 ^ For the terms of the treaties, see post, chap. xiii. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 385 
 
 existence, upon the same footing as before their signature. 
 Furthermore, Austria and Russia were not parties to these 
 other treaties. Strictly speaking, any action on the part 
 of England, France, and Prussia, could not without the 
 consent of the other signatories terminate the perpetual 
 Treaty of 1839. 
 
 (2) It is true that the present German Empire was not 
 a signatory to the Treaty of 1839. Prussia, however, 
 signed it, and the German Empire has in general suc- 
 ceeded to the obligations of its component states. In 
 many instances the German Government has claimed the 
 benefit of treaty rights previously enjoyed by the sepa- 
 rate states of the Empire. ^ 
 
 The difficult question as to what treaties survive, when 
 one state is succeeded by another, cannot be answered off- 
 hand. As a general rule, it may be said that the continu- 
 ance of those treaties which might be denounced, depends 
 upon the intentions of the parties, and that each case is 
 decided more or less upon its merits. As soon as either of 
 the parties avails itself of the provisions of the treaty, it 
 
 ^ "Where no new treaty has been negotiated with the Empire, the trea- 
 ties with the various States which have preserved a separate existence have 
 been resorted to. 
 
 "The question of the existence of the extradition treaty with Bavaria 
 was presented to the United States District Court, on the apphcation of a 
 person, accused of forgery committed in Bavaria, to be discharged on ha- 
 beas corpus, who was in custody after the issue of a mandate, at the request 
 of the Minister of Germany. The court held that the treaty was admitted 
 by both Governments to be in existence. 
 
 "Such a question is, after all, purely a political one." (Opinion of Chief 
 Justice Fuller, in Terlinden v. Ames [1901], U.S. Reports, vol. 184, p. 287, 
 quoting with approval the remarks of Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis contained 
 in his notes to the State Department's compilation of Treaties and Con- 
 ventions between the United States and other Powers, pubhshed in 1889.) 
 
 Crandall says: "The Italian government considered the treaties between 
 foreign countries and the two Sicilies terminated, at least for most pur- 
 poses, on the consolidation of the latter with the Kingdom of Sardinia in 
 1860, but treaties existing with Sardinia, the nucleus of the Kingdom, it 
 regarded as still binding and applicable to the whole kingdom." (Samuel 
 B. Crandall, Treaties, their Making and Enforcement, p. 234. New York, 
 1904.) 
 
386 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 would be considered as evidence of the survival of the 
 treaty. The party availing itself of the treaty or recog- 
 nizing its efficacy, might be considered as estopped from 
 denying its validity imtil the other signatories had re- 
 fused to recognize it.^ In the case of Belgian neutrality, 
 all the signatories and their successors continued to treat 
 Belgium as a neutralized state, and there can be no doubt 
 as to the continuance of the treaty in force. 
 
 (3) What Gladstone said in 1870 in no wise admitted 
 that the Treaty of 1839 was not binding upon all the sig- 
 natories. His language is somewhat obscure, with the 
 haziness so dear to the practical English statesmen, con- 
 scious of their great responsibility and the danger of def- 
 inition. In this particular instance it seems clear enough 
 that Gladstone was considering the possibility that Eng- 
 land alone might be called upon to make good her obliga- 
 tions to guarantee Belgium's neutrality. No one would 
 take so extreme a view as to consider that England was 
 obliged to risk her existence in a combat with all the other 
 powers, should they insist upon a concerted violation of 
 Belgian neutrality. Gladstone admitted the obligations of 
 England to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and would 
 undoubtedly have recognized the duty of taking reason- 
 able action to maintain her inviolability. To that extent 
 he would have been ready to make good England's obliga- 
 tion to guarantee the neutrality. 
 
 (4) It has been said that Belgium has so developed in 
 population and influence, through the organization of her 
 
 1 "None of the arguments advanced by Germany's apologists to show 
 that the treaties of 1839, neutralizing Belgium, were no longer binding on 
 Prussia (either because Prussia has become a part of the German Empire, 
 or because provisional agreements, reinforcing these treaties, were made in 
 1870), has any basis in international theory or practice. Moreover, the in- 
 tention of Germany to respect these treaties was asserted by the present 
 Imperial Chancellor in 191 1 and by the present Imperial Secretary of State 
 in 1913. Cf. Belgian Gray Paper, no. 12, and enclosures." (Munroe Smith, 
 "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
 XXX, March, 1915, no. 1, p. 57.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 387 
 
 army and the acquisition of the Belgian Congo, that the 
 system of neutralization could no longer be applied to her 
 territory. Far from being a reason for a discontinuance of 
 the former neutralization applied to Belgium, any in- 
 crease in strength should be regarded as a justification of 
 the stipulation allowing Belgium to take part in defending 
 her own neutrality. It is doubtful, however, if the relative 
 military strength of Belgium as compared with that of her 
 neighbors has been greatly changed through the course of 
 years. The acquisition of colonies could in no wise affect 
 her neutrality, provided, of course, her colonies were not 
 obtained at the expense of any of the powers. 
 
 After due consideration of all these arguments, I have 
 no hesitation in saying that the Treaty of April 19, 1839, 
 in spite of its violation by two of the signatories, is to-day 
 legally binding. It remains to be seen what modification, 
 if any, may be made by the treaty of peace which will 
 terminate the present conflict. 
 
 3. The obligation to make good the guaranty of neutrality 
 When the great powers signed the treaty by which they 
 agreed to respect Belgian neutrality and to guarantee its 
 observance, they took an engagement in express terms to 
 exert what strength they could to protect Belgian territory 
 from invasion. If, as practical students of politics, we try 
 to examine the situation at the time the Treaty of Nov- 
 ember 15, 1831, was signed, we should recognize that the 
 interests of the signatory powers were varied. To a cer- 
 tain degree the old fear of France still prevailed, and it was 
 the general intention to maintain a "stopper" state to 
 prevent her expansion. The need of this policy became 
 apparent later on when Napoleon III became the most 
 powerful and most feared monarch of Europe. 
 
 The main reason why France was led to agree to the 
 neutralization of Belgium was that she preferred a small 
 independent Belgium to the larger border state which it 
 
388 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 replaced. France was glad also to avoid complications with 
 Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The French Monarchy, 
 brought in by the revolution of July (1830), was regarded 
 with considerable distrust and apprehension by the reac- 
 tionary courts of Europe. Louis Philippe was in a difl5cult 
 situation because French public opinion would not have 
 permitted the Government to acquiesce, much less take 
 part in any collective intervention on the part of the great 
 powers to compel Belgium to continue in the union with 
 Holland. Prussia in 1831 was doubtless glad to have an 
 obstacle to French advance or possible aggression against 
 her. Austria and Russia, obliged to concur in the ar- 
 rangement, had probably no intention of wasting any 
 strength in maintaining Belgian neutrality, except in so 
 far as should be necessary to prevent a too great aggran- 
 dizement on the part of France or England, or any other 
 rival who happened at the moment to arouse their fears. 
 
 The views of each of the signatories of the Treaty of 
 November 15, 1831, may be summed up as follows: Eng- 
 land intended to keep Belgium really neutral and out of 
 the control of any great Continental power. France 
 agreed to the neutralization because she knew she would 
 not be permitted to absorb Belgium. Prussia looked upon 
 the neutralization as a measure to check France and by 
 means of a buffer state prevent an inconvenient attack 
 upon herself. Austria and Russia considered the regime 
 as a check upon French expansion, even though they re- 
 gretted the necessity of legalizing a government which had 
 made a revolutionary break in the work of the Congress of 
 Vienna.^ 
 
 The only power that may be considered to have en- 
 tertained the intention to make good the guaranty was 
 Great Britain. The guaranteeing action of the other states 
 could be counted upon only in special circumstances. 
 
 ^ See Th. Baty, " The Neutrality of Belgium," The Quarterly Review, 
 January, 1915, p. 214. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 389 
 
 France and Prussia could each be relied upon to oppose an 
 invasion of Belgium by the other, though they might not 
 have been averse to partition at an appropriate oppor- 
 tunity. Austria and Russia might reasonably expect the 
 whole burden of the obligation to fall on the three nearest 
 powers. As for Holland, she was naturally chagrined at 
 losing half of her territory, and refused to sign the treaty; 
 but long before her stubborn king could be made to accept 
 the inevitable and agree to the separation, the Dutch peo- 
 ple were ready to acquiesce. They only awaited the as- 
 sent of their king to agree to the neutralization of Bel- 
 gium in accordance with the policy pursued since the time 
 when they secured their independence from Spain. ^ Eng- 
 land, then, was the only power which, in 1831, might be 
 considered to have accepted in its full significance the ob- 
 Ugation to maintain the neutrality of Belgium against any 
 violator. By April 19, 1839, the powers had come to look 
 upon the neutralization of Belgium with much greater 
 favor. The treaty signed that day, reproducing the articles 
 and stipulations relating to the neutraUzation of Belgium, 
 may be considered as purged of any insincerity that may 
 have attended the acceptance of its predecessor. 
 
 In reference to the guaranty of the Treaty of 1839 it is 
 most important to note what Gladstone said in the House 
 of Commons, August 10, 1870: ''But I am not able to 
 subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this 
 House, what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the 
 simple fact of the existence of a guaranty is binding on 
 every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular 
 position in which it may find itself at the time when the 
 occasion for acting on the guaranty arises. The great 
 authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accus- 
 tomed to listen — such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palm- 
 erston — never, to my knowledge, took that rigid and, 
 
 ^ The Dutch did not jom in the guaranty of the neutrality of Belgium in 
 1839. 
 
390 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of a 
 guaranty." ^ 
 
 What Gladstone undoubtedly meant by this was that 
 the English statesmen perceived that the whole brunt of 
 maintaining the Belgian neutrality rested upon their 
 shoulders, and that though they intended to take every 
 means to make good the engagement into which they had 
 entered, they did not feel that England was in honor bound, 
 where the odds were too great against her, to stake her 
 national existence in the defense of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 Gladstone has been criticized for this frank expression, 
 and in truth his speech seems to present a confusion of 
 ideas which lays him open to criticism. In reality, how- 
 ever, his stand was perfectly justified, for otherwise, in 
 agreeing to the neutrality of Belgium, England would have 
 been digging a pit into which she herself might later have 
 fallen. Gladstone could not have meant that England 
 would ever shirk her obligation to participate in any rea- 
 sonable measures to make good the guaranty. England's 
 vital interests would surely recommend such a course; 
 but it would have been an impracticable view of the obli- 
 gation which would have sent England to her doom in the 
 face of a great Continental combination intent upon vio- 
 lating the obligation imposed by the Treaty of 1839. 
 
 At the present time, then, I believe it to be beyond all 
 reasonable doubt that all the signatory states of the Treaty 
 of 1839 were bound not only to respect the neutrality of 
 Belgium, but to collaborate in the undertaking of rea- 
 sonable measures to guarantee this neutrality. It was a 
 duty which all the states of the world owed to international 
 law to take every reasonable and practical means to pre- 
 vent Germany from effecting such a gross violation of the 
 rights of a weak state as has resulted from her invasion. 
 
 As this latter duty is part of the general obligation on 
 
 ^ See post, chap, xiii, where the rest of Gladstone's remarks and other 
 extensive extracts are quoted from the Parliamentary Debates. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 391 
 
 all nations to cooperate toward securing a proper respect 
 for the principles of international law, it may be said to 
 enjoin similar action on the United States.^ The obliga- 
 tion, though equally binding upon us, cannot require us to 
 act with the same energy and promptness as the powers 
 nearer at hand and more vitally interested. International 
 law, as now in operation, lays upon the states most di- 
 rectly concerned the burden of taking the requisite action 
 to secure respect for its rules. 
 
 4. The right to make war and the equality of states 
 International law, as at present applied to the relations 
 between states, is based on the fundamental principle of 
 equality of the separate states before this law of nations. 
 As Pascal said of custom, this principle owes its greatest 
 force, perhaps, to the fact that it is accepted. For ac- 
 cepted it is, with a concurrence of opinion almost reaching 
 unanimity. If an objection to the validity of the principle 
 be raised, we must refer to the authorities and marshal the 
 arguments in its favor. 
 
 If, for the purpose of this argument, we accept the prin- 
 ciple, it follows necessarily that this equality between the 
 states would have no meaning if the stronger could refuse 
 
 ^ The United States is required only to make every reasonable effort to 
 secure respect for Belgium's rights, which are the rights of all humanity: 
 necessarily the rights of Germany, too, if she could but perceive it. It has 
 been argued that we should intervene as signatories of the Hague Conven- 
 tion of October 18, 1907, respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers 
 and persons in case of war on land. Article I of this convention reads: " The 
 territory of neutral powers is inviolable." This article would apply to a neu- 
 tralized state like Belgium as well as to a state neutral in the ordinary sense 
 like Holland or Italy in the present war. In the case of Belgium the invio- 
 lability is sufficiently covered by the Treaty of April 19, 1839. Germany's 
 ratification of this Hague Convention might, however, be taken as another 
 indication that she expected to recognize the inviolability of Belgian terri- 
 tory. For that matter the convention is for the most part a restating of the 
 recognized rules of international law, but since this treaty was not ratified 
 by all the belligerents, it would not under its terms be applicable. The 
 concern of the United States in the protection of Belgium's rights must 
 therefore rest upon the general principles of international law. 
 
392 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 to respect the recognized right of the weaker, or if the 
 stronger could use his might to work his will in violation 
 of the right of the weaker. It follows that no state is justi- 
 fied in making war except in the vindication of its rights. 
 Such is, in truth, the principle recognized and observed by 
 civilized states. What if the strong does, notwithstanding, 
 appeal to arms and disregard the right of a weaker state? 
 Has international law any means to check the violator? 
 Yes; a means less direct and less immediate than in the 
 case of violations of national law, though none the less 
 sure in its effect. Public opinion throughout the world will 
 work against the culprit, and in favor of the oppressed, 
 until perhaps some combination of states is found to in- 
 tervene and check the aggression. At times it is not easy 
 to discover which side is right, so that other states are 
 cautious lest they make a mistake and lest their interven- 
 tion be considered a cloak to hide political designs. Un- 
 fortunately, in the past the political element in interven- 
 tion has often been predominant. Each state is eager to 
 protect the policies which lie closest to the hearts of the 
 people, as being the expression of views peculiarly their 
 own; that is, the views which they think right and wish to 
 have adopted. To maintain the law pertaining to all the 
 states and accepted by them does not require the same 
 effort. 
 
 When a state has recourse to force, it is not possible to 
 know at once the real motive, and to judge how far the 
 action is justified. It results from this situation that 
 when a state takes the law into its own hands and at- 
 tacks another, there is no effective way of determining on 
 the instant whether the action is a proper vindication of 
 its rights or a more or less disguised violation of interna- 
 tional law. This inability to discern the rights of the 
 question and the consequences which will result from 
 the prevalence of either of the opposing views led to the 
 development of the condition of neutrality. Where two 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 393 
 
 political views are opposed to each other, it is natural that 
 superior force should have its effect. It is only in the 
 realm of law that the equality of weak and strong is 
 reasonable.^ 
 
 In the presence of a conflict between two opposing 
 political views, interest and expediency alone determine 
 whether a given state will throw its support to one side or 
 the other. When in doubt, neutrality would be by far the 
 safest course. Since the greater number of international 
 disputes have related to political questions, neutrality has 
 proved a useful institution, and has developed into a sys- 
 tem recognized as part of the law of nations. This system 
 of neutrality could never be meant to justify the nations in 
 standing aside and in letting the strong crush the weak by 
 violating clearly recognized principles of international law. 
 If that were true, neutrality might serve in practice to 
 authorize or make possible any violation of the law of na- 
 tions. In the face of such a contradiction the whole system 
 of the law of nations would fall to pieces. 
 
 The old conception of international law recognized this 
 obligation of the nations, in the event of war, to take up 
 arms against the unjust. In the case of political disputes, 
 which were most frequently the cause of conflict, this 
 principle could not be satisfactorily applied, and the idea 
 of neutrality gradually ceased to be held in disrepute, un- 
 til to-day it has become the rule for third states to adopt 
 this status upon the outbreak of a war. By a natural con- 
 fusion of ideas, the general practice of neutrality has been 
 mistaken as a license for any state to have recourse to war 
 at will. This would constitute a right to make war irre- 
 
 1 The great jurist Westlake remarks d propos of the action of States in 
 adopting new rules of international law: "Therefore, from time to time new 
 rules have to be proposed on reasonable grounds, acted on provisionally, 
 and ultimately adopted or rejected as may be determined by experience, 
 including the eflfect, not less important in international than in national 
 affairs, of interest coupled with preponderating power." (John Westlake, 
 Intematio7ial Law, part i, p. 15. Cambridge, 1910.) 
 
394 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 spective of the cause. There could be no graver error, since 
 the recognition of such a right would vitiate the highest 
 law of humanity. It would make impossible the con- 
 tinued survival of small states, to the great detriment of 
 mankind. 
 
 When we come to the question of settling conflicting 
 views of rights, we find at once a difficulty in that the 
 stronger state always finds some advantage in its strength 
 to secure a better recognition of what it calls its right, 
 sometimes to the total disregard of the superior right of a 
 weaker state. The defect is not in the substantive law of 
 nations, which is sufficiently well defined and discernible 
 to indicate the right. It is due to the fact that when the 
 interests, prejudices, and passions of a strong country 
 cause it to take a view at variance with that held by an- 
 other state, if this other be weaker, there is no direct means 
 by which it can make good its rights. Its only champion is 
 the opinion of other governments and the public opinion 
 of the world, which may directly or indirectly compel some 
 action in support of the weaker's right. At the present 
 time, when the stronger comes into conflict with the 
 weaker, if its view be not accepted, it often finds it possi- 
 ble to have recourse to war to enforce its views. 
 
 As we have seen, international law does not authorize 
 the strong state thus to make use of its force to the dis- 
 paragement of the right of the weaker. With no means of 
 control for enforcing its rules, except the general pubhc 
 opinion which we have considered, international law has 
 often to leave the conflict to run its course. This situation 
 is to blame for that serious error of those who believe that 
 international law allows the strong to have recoiu-se to war 
 to impose his will; in other words, that it constitutes a 
 right to make war. The only rightful use of force is to 
 establish right. Out of respect to this underlying princi- 
 ple there have slowly been developed certain methods of 
 procedure. No state may rightly have recourse to force 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 395 
 
 until every peaceful means, reasonably possible of appli- 
 cation, has been tried to settle the dispute. 
 
 5. Anglo-Belgian conversations 
 
 A pamphlet called ''The Case of Belgium," containing 
 facsimiles of documents found in the Belgian archives after 
 the occupation of Brussels, has been widely circulated, with 
 an introduction by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, and a transla- 
 tion of an article in the North-German Gazette commenting 
 upon them. A similar translation has been given out to the 
 press, and may be considered as the inspired or semi-official 
 defense of the German Government. 
 
 For the sake of convenience I reproduce here the trans- 
 lation, given in the pamphlet referred to above, of docu- 
 ment 2 containing the minutes of a conference between 
 the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General Jungbluth, 
 and the British Military Attach^, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Bridges:^ — 
 
 1 The other document (1) and the extract of another (3) are given among 
 the Documents (see post, chap, xiii). Document 2 is reproduced here be- 
 cause it seems to be the briefest and most important of the three and con- 
 tains the evidence upon which the charge against Belgium and England is 
 rested. In the following summary adjoined to the documents, the most 
 disputed assertions are contained in the italicized portion and one other 
 sentence which I have underlined : — 
 
 "SUMMARY OF THE SECRET DOCUMENTS 
 "I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General 
 Staflf, Major-General Ducarme, to the Minister of War, reporting a series 
 of conversations which he had had with the Military Attach^ of the British 
 Legation, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, in Brussels. It discloses that, 
 as early as January, 1906, the Belgian Government was in consultation with 
 the British Government over steps to be taken by Belgium, Great Britain 
 and France against Germany. A plan had been fully elaborated for the 
 landing of two British army corps in French ports to be transferred to the 
 point in Belgium necessary for operations against the Germans. Through- 
 out the conversation the British and Belgian forces were spoken of as "al- 
 lied armies"; the British Military Attach^ insisted on discussing the ques- 
 tion of the chief command; and he urged the establishment, in the mean 
 time, of a Belgian spy system in Germany. 
 
 "II. WTien in the year 1912 Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had been 
 succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges as British Military Attach^ in 
 
396 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 '' Confidential 
 
 "The British Military Attach^ asked to see Gen- 
 eral Jungbluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23d. 
 
 ''Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that 
 England had at her disposal an army which could be 
 sent to the Continent, composed of six divisions of 
 infantry and eight brigades of cavalry — together 
 160,000 troops. She has also everything which is 
 necessary for her to defend her insular territory. 
 Everything is ready. 
 
 ''At the time of the recent events, the British Gov- 
 ernment would have immediately effected a disem- 
 barkment in Belgium {chez nous), even if we had not 
 asked for assistance. 
 
 "The General objected that for that our consent 
 was necessary. 
 
 Brussels, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Du- 
 carme, had been succeeded by General Jungbluth as Chief of the Belgian 
 General Staff, the conversations proceeded between the two latter officials. 
 That is to say, these were not casual conversations between individuals, but 
 a series of official conversations between representatives of their respective 
 governments, in pursuance of a well-considered policy on the part of both 
 governments. 
 
 "III. The above documents are given additional significance by a report 
 made in 1911 by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which it appears that this representative 
 of the Belgian Government in Beriia was familiar with the plans above set 
 forth and protested against them, asking why like preparations had not 
 been made with Germany to repel invasion by the French and English. 
 
 "Taken together, these documents show that the British Government had 
 the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, of sending troops into Belgium 
 immediately, that is, of doing the very thing which, done by Germany, was 
 used by England as a pretext for declaring war on Germany. 
 
 "They show also that the Belgian Government took, in agreement with 
 the English General Staff, military precautions against a hypothetical Ger- 
 man invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government 
 never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German 
 Government, military precautions against an Anglo-French invasion of 
 Belgium, though fully informed that it was the purpose of the British Gov- 
 ernment to land and dispatch, across French territory into Belgium, 160,000 
 troops, without asking Belgium's permission, on the first outbreak of the 
 European war. This clearly demonstrates that the Belgian Government was 
 determined from the outset to join Germany's > 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 397 
 
 "The Military Attach^ answered that he knew this, 
 but that — since we were not able to prevent the 
 Germans from passing through our country — Eng- 
 land would have landed her troops in Belgium under 
 all circumstances (en tout etat de cause). 
 
 ''As for the place of landing, the Military Attache 
 did not make a precise statement; he said that the 
 coast was rather long, but the General knows that 
 Mr. Bridges, during Easter, has paid daily visits to 
 Zeebrugge from Ostende. 
 
 ''The General added that we were, besides, per- 
 fectly able to prevent the Germans from passing 
 through." ^ 
 A confidential report dated December 23, 1911, and 
 probably therefore anterior to document 2, was received at 
 Brussels from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin. 
 The Minister warns his Government of the danger which 
 threatened Belgium from the French side, not only in the 
 south of Luxemburg, but along the entire length of the 
 Belgian frontier, remarking that this assertion was not 
 based upon conjectures, but that the Belgian Government 
 had positive evidence of it. Baron Greindl then proceeds 
 to the reasons for his anxiety in the following terms : — 
 
 "Evidently the project of an outflanking movement 
 from the north forms part of the scheme of the Entente 
 Cordiale. If that were not the case, then the plan of forti- 
 fying Flushing would not have called forth such an out- 
 burst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished 
 that the Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly con- 
 
 1 Document 2 was published with the following explanatory note: 
 "Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, British Military Attache in Brussels, 
 was succeeded in his office by Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. Likewise, 
 General Ducarme was succeeded, as Chief of the Belgian Staff, by General 
 Jungbluth. A conversation between Colonel Bridges and General Jung- 
 bluth was committed to writing, and that writing was also found at the 
 Belgian Foreign Office. The document, which is dated April 23d and is 
 presumed to belong to the year 1912, is marked ' confidentielle' in the 
 handwriting of Graf. v. d. Straaten, the Belgian Foreign Secretary." 
 
398 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 cealed by them. Their aim was to be able to transport an 
 English garrison, unhindered, to Antwerp, which means to 
 establish in our country a basis of operation [sic] for an 
 offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and West- 
 phalia, and then to make us throw our lot in with them, 
 which would not be difficult, for, after the surrender of our 
 national center of refuge, we would, through our own fault, 
 renounce every possibility of opposing the demands of our 
 doubtful protectors after having been so unwise as to per- 
 mit their entrance into our country. Colonel Barnardiston's 
 announcements at the time of the conclusion of the En- 
 tente Cordiale, which were just as perfidious as they were 
 naive, have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. 
 When it became evident that we would not allow ourselves 
 to be frightened by the pretended danger of the closing of 
 the Scheldt, the plan was not entirely abandoned, but 
 modified in so far as the British army was not to land on 
 the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors. 
 
 ''The revelations of Captain Faber, which were denied 
 as little as the newspaper reports by which they were con- 
 firmed or completed in several respects, also testify to 
 this. This British army, at Calais and Dunkirk, would by 
 no means march along our frontier to Longwy in order to 
 reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from 
 the northwest. That would give it the advantage of being 
 able to begin operations immediately, to encounter the 
 Belgian army in a region where we could not depend on 
 any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, 
 that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich 
 in all kinds of resources, and, at any rate, to prevent our 
 mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally 
 pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the ex- 
 clusive advantage of England and her aUies. 
 
 "It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle 
 for the Belgian army also for that possibility. This is 
 necessary in the interest of our military defense, as w^ell 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 399 
 
 as for the sake of the direction of our foreign policy, in 
 case of war between Germany and France.'^ ^ 
 
 This extract from this remarkable report of Baron 
 Greindl is clear and easy to comprehend, and leaves the 
 impression that England and France were in fact prepar- 
 ing to invade Belgium immediately on the outbreak of war 
 for the purpose of attacking Germany. The Belgian Min- 
 ister was undoubtedly of the opinion that the powers of the 
 Entente intended to frustrate any attempt on the part of 
 Belgium to live up to her obligations dnd defend her neu- 
 trality, by preventing her mobilization unless she agreed 
 to violate her sacred obligations by joining in an attack 
 on Germany. 
 
 The Baron's report contradicts by implication any idea 
 of an agreement between Belgium and the Entente Powers. 
 The Belgian Minister does not, in any event, seem to have 
 the slightest suspicion of such an agreement, though the 
 extract of his report refers to Colonel Barnardiston's plans 
 in regard to the landing of English troops at French ports. 
 
 The Belgian Government made answer to the publica- 
 tion of this report through the columns of the London 
 Times .^ 
 
 1 This document, in so far as made public, is given in the Documents. 
 (See post, chap, xiii.) 
 
 2 The London Ti7nes of Friday, October 23, 1914, in answer to the pub- 
 Hcation of these documents in the North-German Gazette, pubhshed a reply 
 from the Belgian Government of which this is an extract: — 
 
 "We have only one regret to express on the subject of the disclosure of 
 these documents, and that is that the publication of our military documents 
 should be mangled and arranged in such a way as to give the reader the 
 impression of duplicity on the part of England and adhesion by Belgium, 
 in violation of her duties as a neutral State, to the policy of the Triple 
 Entente. We ask the North-German Gazette to publish in full the result of 
 its search among our secret documents. Therein will be found fresh and 
 striking proof of the loyalty, correctness, and impartiality with which Bel- 
 gium for eighty-four years has discharged her international obligations. 
 
 "It was stated that Colonel Barnardiston, the military representative at 
 Brussels of a power guaranteeing the neutrahty of Belgium, at the time of 
 the Algeciras crisis questioned the Chief of the Belgian General Staff as to 
 the measures which he had taken to prevent any violation of that neutrality. 
 The Chief of the General Staff, at that time Lieutenant-General Ducarme, 
 
400 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 When the Greindl report and the minutes of the two 
 Anglo-Belgian military conversations were distributed in 
 this country, with a prefatory explanation by Dr. Bern- 
 hard Dernburg, the Belgian Minister to the United States 
 gave out a statement in which he said: "The Belgian 
 Minister does not know whether or not these pubUshed 
 documents are authentic; but, far from discussing their 
 authenticity, he declares that if he had them in his pos- 
 session he would have published them long ago, as they 
 constitute the strongest proof of the innocence of the Bel- 
 gian Government." ^ 
 
 replied that Belgium was ready to repel any invader. Did the conversation 
 extend beyond these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in an interview 
 of a private and confidential nature, disclose to General Ducarme the plan 
 of campaign which the British General Staflf would have desired to follow if 
 that neutrality were violated? We doubt it, but in any case we can solemnly 
 assert, and it will be impossible to prove the contrary, that never has the 
 King or his Government been invited, either directly or indirectly, to join 
 the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German war. By their words 
 and by their acts they have always shown such a firm attitude that any 
 supposition that they could have departed from the strictest neutrality is 
 eliminated a priori. 
 
 "As for Baron Greindl's dispatch of December 23, 1911, it dealt with a 
 plan for the defense of Luxemburg, due to the personal initiative of the 
 Chief of the First Section of the War Ministry. This plan was of an abso- 
 lutely private character and had not been approved by the Minister of 
 War. If this plan contemplated above all an attack by Germany, there is 
 no cause for surprise, since the great German military writers, in particular 
 T. Bemhardi, V. Schlivfeboch, and Von der Goltz, spoke openly in their 
 treatises on the coming war of the violation of Belgian territory by the Ger- 
 man armies. 
 
 "At the outbreak of hostilities the Imperial Government, through the 
 mouth of the Chancellor and of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, did not 
 search for vain pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the 
 victim. They justified it on the plea of military interests. Since then, in 
 face of the universal reprobation which this odious action has excited, they 
 have attempted to deceive public opinion by representing Belgium as 
 boimd already before the war to the Triple Entente. These intrigues will 
 deceive nobody. They will recoil on the head of Germany. History will 
 record that this power, after binding itself by treaty to defend the neutrality 
 of Belgium, took the initiative in violating it, without even finding a pretext 
 with which to justify itself." 
 
 ^ The full statement of the Minister, as it appeared in the New York 
 Times of December 22, 1914, is given in chapter xiii, together with the 
 Dernburg charges and explanations to which it refers. See also Emile 
 Waxweiler, La Belgique neutre et loyale, Part iv. Lausanne, 1915. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 401 
 
 The British Foreign Office gave out Sir Edward Grey's 
 report of his conversation with the Belgian Minister con- 
 tained in his dispatch of April 7, 1913, to Sir F. Villiers, 
 British Minister at Brussels, which was as follows : ^ — 
 
 Foreign Office, 
 
 April 7, 1913. 
 
 Sir: 
 
 In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, 
 speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my 
 knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium 
 lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutral- 
 ity. I did not think that this apprehension could have 
 come from a British source. 
 
 The Belgian Minister informed me that there had 
 been talk, in a British source which he could not 
 name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great 
 Britain, in order to anticipate a possible dispatch of 
 German troops through Belgium to France. 
 
 I said I was sure that this Government would not 
 be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I 
 did not believe that any British Government would 
 be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here 
 ever approve of it.^ What we had to consider, and it 
 was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it 
 would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the 
 guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian 
 neutrality was violated by any power. For us to be 
 the first to violate it and to send troops in to Belgium 
 would be to give Germany, for instance, justification 
 for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired 
 in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral 
 countries, was that their neutrality should be re- 
 
 1 Printed in part in the New York Times of December 7, 1914. 
 
 * Dr. Edmund von Mach puts a peculiar interpretation on this statement. 
 (See post, p. 403, note 1. Cf. Bethmann-Hollweg's statement, post, p. 455, 
 note.) 
 
402 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 spected, and as long as it was not violated by any 
 other power we should certainly not send troops our- 
 selves into their territory. 
 
 I am, etc., 
 
 E. Grey. 
 
 As nearly as I can sum up the assertions made by the 
 defenders of Germany's action in regard to Belgium, they 
 may be set down as follows : — 
 
 1. That England intended to violate Belgian neutrality 
 by landing troops in Belgium for the purpose of at- 
 tacking Germany. 
 
 2. That there was an Anglo-Belgian agreement in con- 
 travention of Belgian neutrality to make common 
 cause against Germany. 
 
 3. That there was a similar agreement between France 
 and Belgium. 
 
 4. That England also intended to violate the neutrality 
 of Holland. 
 
 6. That the documents discovered at Brussels show that 
 Belgium had violated her neutral obligations, so that 
 Germany could not be expected to observe them, and 
 hence was not at fault in invading Belgian territory. 
 Beginning with the first of these assertions: In docu- 
 ment 1, it is clearly stated that "the entry of the English 
 into Belgium would take place only after the violation of 
 our [Belgian] neutrality by Germany." This is admitted, 
 but in document 2, supposed to be of the year 1912, the 
 British Military Attache at Brussels declares that *'at the 
 time of the recent events, the British Government would 
 have immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium, 
 even if we [the Belgians] had not asked for assistance" ; 
 and when 'Hhe General [Jungbluth] objected that for that 
 our consent was necessary, the military attache answered 
 that he knew this, but that — since we were not able to 
 prevent the Germans from passing through our country — 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 403 
 
 England would have landed her troops in Belgium under 
 all circumstances (en tout etat de cause). ^' 
 
 An examination of the previously quoted extract from 
 document 3 shows plainly that the Belgian Minister at 
 Berlin could not conceal his fear that it might be the insidi- 
 ous design of France and England to make use of Belgian 
 territory in the furtherance of their attack upon Germany, 
 without regard to Belgium's wishes in the matter.^ 
 
 A mere superficial perusal of the documents might 
 lead to the conclusion that England did contemplate an 
 attack upon Germany without regard to whether Belgium 
 called for her assistance or not. Such a conclusion seems 
 reasonable after examining the documents, especially the 
 contents of General Jungbluth's report in document 2; 
 and this opinion is strengthened by the evident appre- 
 hension of Belgium as to England's intention. If the Bel- 
 gian Government did not have real cause for anxiety, why, 
 it will be asked, should it have been necessary for Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey to assure the Belgian Minister, in an interview 
 which took place in 1913, that England would not be the 
 first to send troops into Belgium? 
 
 To this, doubtless, England will reply that the Belgian 
 Government really could have had no serious grounds for 
 apprehension, but wished to be in a position to demon- 
 strate to Germany how careful and how impartial it had 
 been in providing against the violation of its territory. In 
 the same way that the British Government had been asked 
 
 1 Dr. Edmund von Mach, writing in the Boston Evening Transcript of 
 January 6, 1915, declares: "It was exactly the same with the Treaty of 
 1839. She [England] had been unwilling to declare it either valid or invalid. 
 For years military experts in Europe, both French and German, have talked 
 of the necessity of striking a blow through Belgium, and England never 
 raised her voice in protest nor pointed to an existing treaty. When Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey was charged by the Belgian Government in 1913 that England 
 intended to be the first to invade Belgium, Sir Edward in his reply, pub- 
 lished by himself, made no reference to an existing treaty, but contented 
 himself wdth pointing out that such an action would be unwise." (Of. Sir 
 Edward Grey's statement above, p. 401.) 
 
404 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 to give this formal expression of its intention to respect 
 Belgian neutrality in 1913, the German Chancellor had 
 been approached in 1911 with a request that he make a 
 formal statement of the German attitude toward Belgian 
 neutrality. He replied that Germany had no intention of 
 violating Belgian neutrality, but that it might weaken 
 Germany's military position if he were to make a public 
 declaration to that effect. In other words, he wished to 
 imply that the Belgians would have to rely as best they 
 might on Germany's observance of their neutrality, with- 
 out any public declaration on his part, because he wished 
 the situation to remain uncertain, so that the French 
 would have to expend part of their resources in fortifying 
 the Franco-Belgian frontier against a possible German 
 invasion.^ The only other reasonable explanation of his 
 reply that I can perceive is that Germany wished to keep 
 open the possibility of making a successful attack through 
 Belgium. 
 
 The British military authorities may have felt so sure 
 that Germany would disregard Belgian neutrality as to 
 be themselves impatient of any further thought of re- 
 specting it. This is not by any means to say that the Brit- 
 ish Foreign Office or British Cabinet would have been will- 
 ing to violate Belgian neutrality before Germany had done 
 so. If, however, for any reason, Belgium should have de- 
 cided to cast her lot with Germany, and allowed Germany 
 free transit through her territory, England would then, 
 of course, have been perfectly justified in landing troops 
 in Belgium and forcing Belgium to assist her in resisting 
 the German aggression. 
 
 In case Belgium was defending her own neutrality 
 against Germany, and had not made appeal to England or 
 France, the question as to whether England and France 
 would have a right, uninvited, to come to the assistance 
 of Belgium is more open to question; since England and 
 1 Cf. B. G. P. no. 12; see above p. 317, 321. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 405 
 
 France were guarantors of the Treaty of April 19, 1839, 
 it would seem that they might be expected to take what- 
 ever measures were necessary to ward off an attack upon 
 Belgium's neutrality.^ 
 
 The next assertion relates to an Anglo-Belgian agree- 
 ment to make common cause against Germany. ^ This 
 assertion seems to be entirely without foundation. The 
 alleged agreement between the British Military Attach^ 
 and General Jungbluth could not have been binding upon 
 either Government without the concurrence of the re- 
 sponsible authorities. 3 Furthermore, there does not seem 
 actually to have been any agreement; otherwise why 
 should it have been necessary for Sir Edward Grey to have 
 assured the Belgian Government that England would not 
 
 1 After such an ultimatum as that delivered by Germany, the other 
 guarantors had a right to take all necessary measures to prevent the con- 
 summation of the announced or threatened violation of the neutrality of 
 Belgium. They would have been justified even in invading Belgium, pro- 
 vided Belgium was unable to make an effective resistance. 
 
 2 "For this reason, Belgium, in 1906, as has now become known, closed 
 with France and England an eventual convention concerning military aid. 
 Belgium did not close such a convention with Germany. This might be 
 explained if Belgium — in spite of the memory of the French plans in 1870 
 — had been absolutely sm-e that this neighbor (on the south) at no time and 
 under no circumstances would violate her neutrality. If this had been the 
 reason. Sir Edward Grey would have told the German Ambassador, and 
 would have been obliged to tell him, that France would not violate the 
 neutrality of Belgium and that England was ready to guarantee that 
 France would keep this obligation. Sir Edward did not give such a pledge 
 to the German Ambassador." (Professor Hans Delbruck: "Germany's 
 Answer." Atlantic Monthly, February, 1915, p. 239.) 
 
 3 "When in 1912 (or 1911: the date seems to be uncertain), the British 
 MUitary Attach^ in Brussels told the Belgian general with whom he was 
 conferring that, in case of necessity, the British Government would land 
 troops in Belgium without waiting for any invitation from that country, he 
 neither committed the Belgian Government to any such arrangement, 
 since the Belgian general protested that Belgian consent was necessary, nor 
 did he commit his own Government, because, fortunately, he had no power 
 to do so. He gave, however, a typical illustration of the incapacity of the 
 military man to appreciate the importance of keeping one 's country in a 
 correct attitude on the face of the record." [The Case of Belgium, p. 12.] 
 (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," Political Science 
 Quarterly, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, p. 80.) See also Sir Edward Grey's remark 
 about the Anglo-French military conversations (above, p. 290). 
 
d06 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 violate Belgian neutrality? ^ Baron Greindl's report of 
 December 23, 1911, complaining of the danger of an at- 
 tack from England and France, would seem to indicate that 
 his Government had not entered into any agreement with 
 the Entente Powers. At least it must have been kept so 
 secret as not to have been known by the most important 
 diplomatic officers of the Belgian Government. Although 
 the report of General Jungbluth would seem to be sub- 
 sequent to Baron Greindl's statement, it does not refer 
 to any change of situation between Belgium and England 
 from that disclosed by document 1, containing the report 
 of a conversation between Colonel Barnardiston and Gen- 
 eral Ducarme. Even if we were to make the very most of 
 the German arguments and accept the documents brought 
 forward by Germany as genuine, exhaustive, complete, 
 and uncontroverted by other documents which might have 
 been suppressed or withheld, and if we accept for true — 
 what I must consider as a forced interpretation — that 
 they indicate a firm engagement according to the terms 
 of which England and Belgium are to make common cause 
 against Germany, there would still be every reason to be- 
 lieve that this agreement was conditional in nature, and 
 would only come into effect after Germany had violated 
 Belgium's neutrality.^ 
 
 1 Cf. Statement of Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Minister April 7, 
 1913. (See ante, p. 401.) 
 
 2 A statement in answer to a published interview with the German 
 Chancellor given out with Sir Edward Grey's authorization, contains the 
 following : — 
 
 "If the Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on mih- 
 tary subjects between British and Belgian officers, he may find one reason 
 in a fact well known to him: namely, that Germany was establishing an 
 elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the 
 Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract. The railways 
 were deUberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium 
 such as was carried out in August last. 
 
 "This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Bel- 
 gium and the other powers on the footing that there would be no violation 
 of Belgian neutrality, unless it was previously violated by another power. 
 On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such communications. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 407 
 
 The New York World recently published an interview 
 the King of Belgium fgave its correspondent in which he 
 declared that he had the German Mihtary Attache at 
 Brussels informed that these conversations were taking 
 place, ^ I sought a confirmation of this important state- 
 ment from the Belgian Minister at Washington, who re- 
 phed : — 
 
 ''Concerning the matter referred to in your letter of 
 March 25, I wish to let you know that I am just now in 
 receipt of instructions from my Government to the effect 
 that I am authorized, in reply to your letter, to make the 
 statement herewith enclosed." 
 
 [The following is the authorized statement of the Belgian 
 Government enclosed in Minister Havenith's letter.] 
 
 "In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium as hav- 
 ing thereby ' abandoned and forfeited ' her neutrality, and he implies that he 
 would not have spoken of the German invasion as a 'wrong' had he then 
 known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911. 
 
 "It would seem to follow that according to Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg's code wrong becomes right if the party which is to be the subject of the 
 wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist it." (New 
 York Times, January 27, 1915.) 
 
 1 King Albert of Belgium, according to the interview in the New York 
 World, printed on March 22, 1915, made the following statement regarding 
 the Anglo-Belgian conversations: — 
 
 "No honest man could have acted otherwise than I did. Belgium never 
 departed for an instant nor in the slightest degree from the strictest neu- 
 trality, and Belgium was always the loyal friend of each and every one of the 
 powers that guaranteed her neutrality. At first, Germany openly admitted 
 that in violating the neutrality of Belgium she was doing a wrong, but now, 
 for the purposes of a campaign of propaganda in neutral countries, an at- 
 tempt is being made to cast a slur upon Belgium and hold her up to scorn 
 as having perfidiously departed from her neutrality in connection with the 
 so-called Anglo-Belgian convention of which so much is being made. 
 
 "I can say this: No one in Belgium ever gave the name of Anglo-Belgian 
 conventions to the letter of General Ducarme to the Minister of War detail- 
 ing the entirely informal conversations with the British Military Attach^, 
 but I was so desirous of avoiding even the semblance of anything that might 
 be construed as un-neutral that I had the matters of which it is now sought 
 to make so much communicated to the German Military Attach6 in Brus- 
 sels. When the Germans went through our archives, they knew exactly 
 what they would find, and all their present surprise and indignation is 
 assiuned." (Extract.) 
 
408 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ''With the King's assent, and in several conversa- 
 tions, the German Minister in Brussels was placed on 
 his guard against the attitude of military attaches who 
 were holding conversations of which the Belgian Gov- 
 ernment had never been apprised by the only author- 
 ized representative of their country. 
 
 ''A more official communication was impossible, as 
 it would have infringed the rules of diplomacy and 
 lent to these conversations an importance which the 
 Belgian Government could not attribute and never 
 did attribute to them. 
 
 ''The fact that the military attache of a power 
 guaranteeing the integrity of Belgium should converse 
 with other military men about military matters, in 
 case of the violation of Belgian neutrality was in no 
 way abnormal. All the representatives of the guaran- 
 teeing powers have at all times render [ed] justice to 
 the absolute correctness of Belgium in its interna- 
 tional relations. By placing Germany on its guard, 
 Belgium was carrying her loyalty to the most scrupu- 
 lous extreme." 
 It has been asserted that a neutral state has no right to 
 enter into an agreement for its defense. This is true in so 
 far as it means that such a state has no right to join forces 
 with any other state for the purpose of providing against 
 the contingency of a violation of its neutrality. If, how- 
 ever, the preparations to defend its neutrality should be 
 put off until its neutrality had been actually violated, it 
 might then be too late to enter into an agreement with 
 any of the guarantors for combined action against the 
 violator. There is no good reason why, when Belgium or 
 any other neutralized state, obligated to provide for the 
 maintenance of its own neutrality, has reason to antici- 
 pate an attack, it should not enter into a conditional 
 agreement by the terms of which it would, in case of an 
 attack, receive immediate assistance, according to pre- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 409 
 
 viously specified and elaborated plans. ^ This would be 
 nothing more than common-sense provision for the main- 
 tenance of its neutrality. It would be a very different 
 matter, should the neutralized state hand over to its pros- 
 pective ally complete information in regard to its system 
 of national defense.^ 
 
 Objection has been made that Germany, knowing that 
 such a plan for concerted action against her existed, could 
 not be expected to come to the assistance of Belgium, had 
 England invaded her territory uninvited. If Germany's 
 action made such preparations for joining forces against 
 her necessary, she would not be relieved from her obliga- 
 tions, though doubtless she would be less disposed to ful- 
 fill them. At most, this argument might justify Germany 
 in not going to the assistance of Belgium against England, 
 in case of the latter' s invasion of Belgian territory, but 
 would by no means justify her in attacking Belgium unless 
 it was made certain beyond the shadow of a doubt that 
 Belgium was planning to engage with some other power for 
 a concerted and unprovoked attack upon Germany. 
 
 The various official documents published seem to indi- 
 cate that, though Belgium realized that her principal 
 danger of attack lay with Germany, she did not wish to 
 become so dependent on England's protection in case of 
 this attack as to lose her independent position. This atti- 
 tude is reflected in the policy adopted by the Belgian Gov- 
 ernment. At the Second Hague Conference of 1907 it was 
 very striking to remark how the Belgian delegates sup- 
 ported Germany in preventing the adoption of a general 
 treaty of obligatory arbitration which England, France, 
 
 ^ Cyrus French Wicker, Neutralization, p. 59. Oxford, 1911. Wicker 
 also cites Rivier and Arendt. 
 
 2 Some other alleged proofs of Belgium's secret and unneutral agreement 
 with England have been adduced; see Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung, 
 December 2, 1914, and December is, 1914; printed in Der Kriegsverlaufy 
 November, 1914, pp. 323-31; December, 1914, pp. 427-28; E. Waxweiler, 
 La Belgique neutre et loT/ale, p. 186; " British Aviator's Secret Data," New 
 York Times, February 28, 1915. 
 
410 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 and the United States favored.^ In Morocco, too, Belgium 
 did not evince any desire to favor France at the expense of 
 Germany, for she delayed signing the agreement relin- 
 quishing the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by her 
 consuls. In fact she was, I believe, among the last of the 
 powers to relinquish this privilege. 
 
 It is asserted that England intended to violate the neu- 
 trality of Holland, because she proposed to use Antwerp 
 as her base after sweeping the German ships from the 
 North Sea. 2 England would be amply justified in such a 
 
 1 ' ' The time when the Norddeutsche A llgemeine Zeitung supposes an Anglo- 
 Belgian agreement to have been effected is ill-chosen. It is a well-known 
 fact that, toward 1906, the traditional relations of sympathy between Eng- 
 land and Belgium were becoming cool. Occurrences during the Boer War, 
 the stupid outrage committed by a youth at Brussels against the Prince of 
 Wales, who a little later was to become Edward VII, and the Morel cam- 
 paign against the regime in the Congo, had all conspired to bring about ill- 
 feeling between the two countries. 
 
 " It is also a well-known fact that, since the beginning of the twentieth 
 century, all the activities of Belgian diplomacy have centered about the 
 Congo Free State. If Germany will but think, she will remember that as- 
 suredly it was not German interests which, in the course of those critical 
 years, were sacrificed to English interests in the Belgian Congo, and that it 
 was not in England that companies organized by King Leopold II sought 
 the protection of the laws. 
 
 "But why continue? 
 
 " Need I say that on the 28th of July last, when the international situation 
 was coming to a head, the instructions given the Belgian Administration in 
 the Congo were aimed to guard against a possible blockade of the river by 
 France and England, as well as against a violation of the frontiers of the 
 colony by Germany? It was not until after the break with Germany that 
 orders were given to concentrate all forces on one side. 
 
 " Need I say further, — merely to add to the sheaf of testimony, — that, 
 at the outbreak of war, the Belgian royal family had not yet paid its visit 
 to the royal family of England, although it had already been to Berlin and 
 Vienna? 
 
 "Finally, there are the facts making all discussion useless: In August, 
 1914, Germany violated Belgian neutrality for the sake of strategic advant- 
 age, and the march of her armies conformed exactly to plans which were 
 known. In August, 1914, England awaited an overt act before announcing 
 her intervention, and her troops did not enter Belgium until eighteen days 
 later." (Emile Waxweiler, La Belgique neutre et loyale, pp. 190-191. Lau- 
 sanne, 1915.) 
 
 ^ Baron Greindl considers the outbreak in London and Paris against the 
 fortification of Flushing as an indication of these sinister designs. It would 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 411 
 
 course, provided always that she took no action until Ger- 
 many had been guilty of a violation of Belgian neutrality. 
 As soon as this violation had occurred, Holland, as one of 
 the signatory states of the Treaty of 1839, would be ex- 
 pected to put no obstacle in the way of the other powers in 
 repelling German aggression and making good their guar- 
 anty. ^ If, however, for reasons of policy, Holland decided 
 to remain neutral, she could have no serious ground for 
 complaint against England for using the Scheldt to main- 
 tain her connection with Antwerp. In the present war 
 England has been careful to respect the neutrality of the 
 Scheldt, which in reality constitutes part of the neutralized 
 system of Belgium. She knows that if she were to disre- 
 gard it she would arouse Holland against her, or if Hol- 
 land were to acquiesce, Germany would probably show 
 her resentment by invading Holland. 
 
 The peculiar position which has placed Belgium's prin- 
 cipal outlet from Antwerp in the military control of the 
 Dutch is due to historical reasons connected with the 
 whole evolution of Belgian neutrality. It may be main- 
 tained with reason that the disregard of the neutrality of 
 Belgium would be a justification for a like disregard of this 
 peculiar provision which restricts the exercise of Belgium's 
 military action. 
 
 6. Effect of Belgium^ s preparations against Germany 
 
 Aside from the question of conventional agreements on 
 
 the part of Belgium, France, and England, the German 
 
 partisans have expressed the view that Belgian military 
 
 preparations for the defense of her neutrality, instead of 
 
 more probably simply indicate apprehension on the part of England at the 
 strengthening of Germany's position on the Continent, since those ports 
 would be most advantageous to Germany if she should overcome the resist- 
 ance of Holland and Belgium. Germany might conceivably have been able, 
 as the result of possible political transformations, to prevail upon Holland 
 and Belgium to join her in a conflict against the powers of the Entente. 
 
 ^ It must be remembered that Holland did not sign the article of guar- 
 anty. 
 
412 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 being impartially directed against the possibility of attack 
 from any of the powers, were made entirely against Ger- 
 many. This, it is alleged, makes it justifiable to consider 
 the Belgian preparations in the nature of a political cooper- 
 ation with France and England against Germany, and re- 
 moves from them entirely the character of an attempt on 
 Belgium's part to live up to her obligations by defending 
 her neutraUty.^ 
 
 Given the obligation of Belgium herself to provide in 
 the first instance for the maintenance of her own neutral- 
 ity, it must be admitted that she should have taken care 
 to dispose her means of defense on all sides impartially, so 
 as to protect herself against the possibility of attack from 
 every direction. By so doing she would have indicated the 
 perfect impartiality of her policy, and have prevented any 
 inference that a possibility of attack and consequent vio- 
 lation of the solemn treaty obligation on the part of one 
 nation was more probable than from another. She would 
 thus have silenced the assertion that her neutrality was 
 being weakened because of political affiliation with certain 
 of the guarantor powers in opposition to others. 
 
 It is not, however, fair to say that Belgium was fortified 
 toward Germany only, since, as the Belgian Minister has 
 pointed out, the fortress of Namur is directed against 
 France and commands the entrance by Chimay, consid- 
 ered a particularly vulnerable spot in the French frontier.^ 
 
 ^ It is sometimes alleged by German writers that Belgium forfeited her 
 position as a perpetually neutral state by her construction of fortifications; 
 and in support of this view reference is made to Article III of the Treaty of 
 London of May 11, 1867, establishing the neutrality of Luxemburg, accord- 
 ing to the terms of which article the fortresses of Luxembm-g were declared 
 to be 'without object because of Luxemburg's neutrahzation, and that 
 hence they will be destroyed.' In point of fact, this provision received 
 unanimous acceptance by the plenipotentiaries at the London Conference 
 only because of the annexed protocol, containing a declaration of the Belgian 
 plenipotentiary, that this article could not be considered in any way to 
 limit the right of another neutral [neutralized state] to construct fortifica- 
 tions and make other provision for its defense. (See Annex to protocol iv, 
 British White Paper. Luxemburg, 1867.) 
 
 ' See statement of the Belgian Minister, post, chap. xiii. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 413 
 
 It will be remembered that Talleyrand attempted at the 
 Conference of London to acquire a strip of Belgian terri- 
 tory to strengthen France's frontier at this point. ^ Just as 
 Liege has been compared to the neck of a bottle from which 
 the railway lines sweep out, Namur is the neck of another 
 such bottle, so that it would be of the utmost importance 
 for France to capture Namur as soon as possible, even if it 
 were merely to prevent an invasion of her territory. 
 
 England would, of course, find it difficult to effect a 
 landing in the face of opposition, and Belgium may be ex- 
 cused for not devoting any great part of her resources to 
 defending her coast. She took great pains to make Ant- 
 werp as impregnable as possible, and this would have been 
 a protection against aggression on the part of England, 
 Germany, or Holland. In addition, she might reasonably 
 count somewhat upon the Dutch fortifications of the 
 Scheldt to repel any attempt on the part of the English to 
 force a passage through the Scheldt to violate at one and 
 the same time Dutch neutrality and Belgian neutraliza- 
 
 1 "... The vulnerable part of the French northern frontier is between 
 the Sambre and the Meuse. Three main hnes of railway cross it from north 
 to south — one down the valley of the Sambre, one through the famous 
 trouee of Chimay, and one down the Meuse Valley. It was by the irouee of 
 Chimay that a combined Russian-Prussian force under Winzingerode 
 advanced on Paris in 1814, and gave a timely hand to Blticher after his 
 thrashing by Napoleon. Formerly closed by the fortress towns of Philippe- 
 ville and Marienbourg, the trou6e of Chimay is now an open gap. The 
 frontier drawn in 1815 makes a great loop south on purpose to give Phil- 
 ippeville and Marienbourg to Belgium, just as the northern loop of the 
 Swiss frontier gives Schaffhausen to Switzerland. Chimay is, in fact, the 
 Schaffhausen of Belgium. 
 
 "The French, however, unlike the Germans at Schaffhausen, are fully 
 alive to the weakness of this part of their northern frontier, and have re- 
 cently constructed a powerful fort with outworks at Hirson, in order to 
 command the Chimay-Laon railway. Thirty-five miles farther on, the in- 
 vaders marching on Paris would encounter, in the second line of the French 
 defenses, the new entrenched camps of La Fere and Laon ; and as all the 
 roads and railways from this part of the Belgian frontier converge on these 
 camps, their reduction would be indispensable before an advance on Paris 
 could be made." ("Belgian Neutrality" [extract], in Fortnightly Review, 
 ccLxxiii, New Series, September 1, 1889, p. 302; vol. xlvi, July 1 to De- 
 cember 1, 1889.) 
 
414 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tion. Nevertheless it is patent that Belgium has directed 
 her attention principally to fortifying her territory against 
 Germany. In this practical world we can hardly blame 
 Belgium if she spent what money she could afford in 
 strengthening the points at which she was most immedi- 
 ately threatened. Even if we were to consider the Eng- 
 lish as ready to violate any and every principle of interna- 
 tional law, unrestrained by any considerations for the 
 rights of others, we certainly must believe that out of con- 
 sideration for their own interests they would not be the first 
 to violate the neutrality which they made such efforts to 
 incorporate into the pubUc law of Europe and to place 
 upon a juridical foundation. It seems hardly reasonable 
 to expect that they would have contemplated operations 
 through Belgium unless they were convinced that Ger- 
 many would in all probability violate Belgian neutrality. 
 In any event, the onesidedness of Belgian defense could at 
 most have constituted but a ground of complaint on the 
 part of Germany. 
 
 A study of the events at the commencement of the pre- 
 sent war leads me to conclude that from the point of view 
 of the theoretical working of the institution of neutrality, 
 Belgium's action was unjustifiable, and yet, as a practi- 
 cal matter, the need of devoting all her resources to pre- 
 paration against a German invasion has been clearly dem- 
 onstrated. Germany, it seems to me, after giving grounds 
 for legitimate apprehension that she might violate Bel- 
 gian neutrality, has declared that the inevitable Belgian 
 counter-preparations, to which Germany's action gave 
 rise, constituted a perfect justification for the German 
 Government's disregarding Belgian neutrality. In other 
 words, they take as an excuse for the carrying into effect 
 of the unjustifiable German acts which they had previ- 
 ously planned, the perfectly practical and legitimate at- 
 tempts on the part of the Belgians to defend themselves 
 against this anticipated German violation. It was evident 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 415 
 
 that Germany was planning such a violation — at least, 
 her expectation of undertaking military operations in Bel- 
 gium was made perfectly evident. Germany may reply 
 that these preparations were to anticipate a French vio- 
 lation of Belgian territory. The impartial critic will have 
 to form his opinion in part from antecedent probability, 
 and in part from the consideration of the evidence such 
 as that which has been given in the preceding pages. ^ 
 
 7. Alleged violations of Belgian neutrality 
 Germany has declared that her invasion of Belgium was 
 undertaken only in response to violations of Belgian neu- 
 trality on the part of France. The German Government has 
 asserted that the evidences of French preparations to march 
 through Belgium constituted such proof of their intention 
 as to justify an invasion of Belgium on Germany's part.^ 
 
 ^ "The German Government asserts that Belgium had ceased to be 
 neutral and was virtually in alliance with France and Great Britain. [The 
 Case of Belgium, in the Light of Official Reports found in the Archives of the 
 Belgian Government, with an introduction by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg. 
 n. d.] If this assertion could be proved, the strongest prejudice which Ger- 
 many's conduct of the war has aroused in neutral countries would tend to 
 disappear. In America, at least, few people care whether the Treaties of 
 1839 were or were not in force and binding upon Prussia. Even if Belgium 
 was no longer a neutralized country, it was apparently a neutral country, 
 and it has been ravaged with fire and steel because so the German armies 
 could reach France most quickly. What, however, has Germany been able 
 to prove? Only that British military attaches had concerted with Belgian 
 military authorities plans of joint action against a German invasion. If, as 
 is insisted, no consultations were held with German military attaches to 
 provide for the defense of Belgian neutrality against a French or British 
 invasion, what does that prove? Only that the Belgians knew well or 
 guessed rightly on which side their neutrahty was menaced." (Munroe 
 Smith, " Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, 
 vol. XXX [1915], p. 59.) 
 
 2 "If we had waited longer before taking the offensive, we should not 
 have needed to violate the neutrality of Belgium, nor should we have been 
 able to do it, for by that time the French and English would have been on 
 the way through Belgium; they would have invaded the Rhine country, 
 occupied Aix-la-Chapelle and Treves, and then, with the strong Belgian 
 strongholds of Liege and Namur as bases, would have been able to push their 
 offensive operations further into the Rhine provinces." (Professor Hans 
 Delbriick, " Germany's Answer," Atlantic Monthly, February, 1915, p. 239.) 
 
416 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 In his speech delivered in the Reichstag on August 4, 
 the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
 made the statement: "France has, it is true, declared at 
 Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of 
 Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary.^ 
 But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. 
 France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon 
 our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been 
 fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride rough-shod 
 over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxem- 
 burg and Belgium." (Cf. B. G. P. no. 35.) 
 
 We find here no reference to any overt act by France 
 violating Belgian neutrality. The sole argument upon 
 which the Chancellor relies to justify Germany's action is 
 her necessity arising from this certitude of France's inten- 
 tion. The head of the German Government was perfectly 
 aware that French intentions could not justify German 
 acts.- Germany's justification must then depend upon the 
 validity of the plea of necessity, which we shall discuss 
 farther on.^ 
 
 1 The French Minister at Brussels made the following declaration to the 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on July 31: "I am authorized to de- 
 clare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in 
 accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected 
 by another power, the French Government, to secure their own defense, 
 might find it necessary to modify their attitude." (Extract, B. G. P. no. 
 15; cf. B. G. P. no. 9.) 
 
 "^ Proof sufficient to convince a government that another intended to 
 have recourse to treachery would justify another government in taking 
 any measures necessary to protect itself against the commission of such 
 acts, but could never justify it in disregarding the rights of a third innocent 
 state. It cannot be presumed that a higlily civilized state, with a reputation 
 for observing its international obligations in good faith, will be guilty of 
 treachery. In the face of the solemn declaration of the French Government 
 that it would respect Belgium's neutrality, Germany must be expected to 
 Bhow the clearest proof of the alleged perfidy of France. 
 
 ^ In his remarks introductory to the secret documents (see yost, chap, 
 xiii) Dr. Dernburg states: "The Imperial Chancellor has declared that 
 there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Bel- 
 gium her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 417 
 
 In any event, France would hardly antagonize England 
 by invading Belgium unless England gave her consent. 
 This consent might be given, but it is not likely that Eng- 
 land, if neutral, would be willing to run the risk that one or 
 both of the belligerents might remain in permanent occu- 
 pation of the Belgian ports. 
 
 If France and England were united against Germany, 
 there is a possibility that Germany might have been at- 
 tacked by the immediate transit of an Anglo-French force 
 through Belgium. If, however, France had contemplated 
 such a possibility, she would have taken care to be in a 
 better state of preparation to send her troops into Belgium 
 than was disclosed at the beginning of this war. 
 
 Another important consideration is the difference of 
 view in regard to neutrality and the force of treaties in 
 Germany and France. German authorities have gone the 
 farthest in permitting the freest action to military force 
 when necessary to attain the ends in view.^ 
 
 In the present war there were other and stronger rea- 
 sons why France was unlikely to be the first to invade 
 Belgium. 
 
 1. She had just recently given her solemn word that she 
 would not be the first to violate Belgian neutrality, while 
 Germany refused to make a similar agreement. 
 
 2. When Germany begged England not to make the 
 respect for Belgian neutrality a condition of her neutrality, 
 it showed that Germany contemplated a violation of it. 
 
 3. Germany admitted that France could wait without 
 attacking. In other words, to make her position clear and 
 secure as much neutral sympathy as possible, it was the 
 policy of France to force Germany to attack. France, by 
 remaining within the Franco-Belgian frontier, could force 
 
 strongest character. So the Chancellor was right in appealing to the law 
 of necessity, although he had to regret that it violated international 
 law." 
 
 1 See Oppenheim, International Law, vol. ii, War and Neutrality, pp. 
 83-85, §69, 2d ed. 
 
418 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Germany to violate Belgian neutrality or else to undertake 
 the relatively slow operations necessary to reduce the 
 French fortifications along the Franco-German frontier. 
 This would have lost Germany so much time that she 
 would not have had any great chance of crushing France 
 and turning against Russia before Russia had completed 
 her mobilization. If Germany was not willing to lose this 
 advantage, because a treaty of neutralization stood in the 
 way, she had to accept the onerous responsibility of violat- 
 ing Belgian neutrality. If France believed Germany would 
 take this coiu-se, it was to her advantage to allow the Bel- 
 gians to bear the brunt of the first German onslaught, while 
 she made her preparations and hastened to the assistance 
 of the defenders. The success of the German attack was 
 such that Liege and Namur were taken before the French 
 and English were able to organize any effective resistance 
 to the German advance. This fact itself is one of the best 
 arguments that the French were not, at the time of the 
 Chancellor's speech, in a situation to take advantage of an 
 invasion of Belgium in violation of their treaty obligations 
 with the purpose of attacking the Rhenish provinces. 
 
 On August 3, at 6.45 p.m.. Baron von Schoen, German 
 Ambassador at Paris, in a farewell audience handed a letter 
 to M. Viviani, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 asking for his passports on the ground that French acts of 
 aggression forced the German Empire to consider itself in a 
 state of war with France. The letter contained the follow- 
 ing reference to a French violation of Belgian neutrality: 
 *'The German administrative and military authorities 
 have remarked a certain number of definitely hostile acts 
 committed on German territory by French military air- 
 men. Several of these latter have manifestly violated the 
 neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that 
 country." (Extract, F. Y. B. no. 147.) 
 
 After receiving this communication, M. Viviani sent a 
 dispatch that same day (August 3) instructing M. Jules 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 419 
 
 Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to ask for his 
 passports and to protest against Germany's action in vio- 
 lating the neutrality of Luxemburg, in delivering her 
 ultimatum to Belgium, and in making a ' false allegation of 
 an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by 
 French armies, by which it had been attempted to justify 
 the existence of a state of war between Germany and 
 France.' (Modified quotation, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 149.) 
 
 Germany here makes the accusation that France was 
 responsible for prior violations of Belgian neutrality. This, 
 if substantiated, would be a reasonable justification for 
 Germany's invasion of Belgium. Unfortunately for Ger- 
 many's defense on this ground, absolutely no evidence 
 worthy of the name has been forthcoming. 
 
 The German Chancellor, in his speech of August 4 in the 
 Reichstag, refers to French violations of international law 
 by the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, but makes no mention 
 of any acts contrary to Belgian neutrality. If there had 
 been any serious violation of Belgian neutrality, and the 
 Belgian Government had been delinquent in its preven- 
 tion, Germany would have been amply justified in disre- 
 garding the Treaty of 1839, as well as Belgium's rights as a 
 neutral state. Under such circumstances the Chancellor 
 need not have confessed: "This [Germany's invasion of 
 Belgium] is contrary to international law." 
 
 In its ultimatum delivered at Brussels, August 2, the 
 German Government made no reference to the previous 
 violation of Belgian neutrality by France, and declared: — 
 
 "Reliable information has been received by the German 
 Government to the effect that French forces intend to 
 march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This 
 information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France 
 to march through Belgian territory against Germany. 
 
 "The German Government cannot but fear that Bel- 
 gium, in spite of the utmost good- will, will be unable, with- 
 out assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion 
 
420 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate 
 guaranty against danger to Germany. The German Gov- 
 ernment would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium 
 regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that 
 the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for 
 her own protection, to enter Belgian territory." (Extract, 
 August 2, B. G. P. no. 20.) 
 
 This ultimatum was presented at the Belgian Foreign 
 Office on the afternoon of August 2. A few hours later — 
 that is, in the early morning hours of August 3, before a 
 reply to the ultimatum had been received — the German 
 Minister returned to inform the Belgian Government that 
 'he had been instructed by his Government to inform the 
 Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown 
 bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the 
 frontier in violation of international law, since war had not 
 been declared. The Belgian Secretary-General asked the 
 German Minister where these incidents had occurred, and 
 was told that it was in Germany. The Secretary-General 
 then observed that in that case he could not understand 
 the object of this communication. The German Minister 
 stated that these acts, which were contrary to international 
 law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that France 
 would commit other acts contrary to international law.' 
 (Modified quotation, August 2, B. G. P. no. 21.) 
 
 On August 9, at Montjoie, Von Bulow, General Com- 
 mander in Chief of the German Second Army, issued a 
 proclamation which said in part: ''To the Belgian Nation 
 — We have been obliged to enter into Belgian territory in 
 order to safeguard the interests of our national defense. 
 We are fighting the Belgian army solely in order to force a 
 passage into France, which your Government wrongly re- 
 fused us, although it tolerated a French military recon- 
 naissance, a fact of which your newspapers have kept you 
 in ignorance." ^ 
 
 1 Boston Evening Transcript, December 26, 1915. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 421 
 
 Dr. Dernburg asks: ^ " ... What would American read- 
 ers say if they knew that as early as July 30 French guns 
 were in Liege where they have been captured alongside of 
 French officers and soldiers? Such is stated in a letter writ- 
 ten to Mr. Lehman, house superintendent of the Beecher 
 Memorial Building, from his brother in Germany, who has 
 been on the ground. What would they think if it was 
 proved, as it is recited in the semi-official Government 
 journal, that two wounded Frenchmen had been found in 
 Namur, who said that their regiment, the Forty-fifth, was 
 brought to Namur as early as July 30? In the Evening 
 Post of to-day a lady from Boston relates on good author- 
 ity the landing of British marines in Ostend on the 30th 
 of July." 
 
 Professor Harnack and other well-known Germans have 
 stated that Great Britain stored great quantities of am- 
 munition at the French fortress of Maubeuge before the out- 
 break of the war. This they consider as evidence that Eng- 
 land intended to violate the neutrality of Belgium. The 
 official Press Bureau at London denies that there is any 
 authority for these statements. ^ Even if the Harnack 
 statement had been true, it might well be considered evi- 
 dence of justifiable preparations in the event of Germany's 
 disregard of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 In the preceding chapter we discussed the charge made 
 by the German Government that Belgium had departed 
 from a neutral attitude by holding up shipments of grain 
 for Germany.^ 
 
 We must leave this discussion for the present, I think, 
 
 » The New York Sun of October 11, 1914. 
 
 * The New York Times of October 7, 1914, gives an extract from this 
 statement: "No decision to send British forces abroad was taken till after 
 Germany had violated Belgian neutrality and Belgium had appealed for 
 assistance. No British ammunition or stores had been placed at Maubeuge 
 before these events. Any British ammunition or stores found at Maubeuge 
 was sent there after, and not before, the outbreak of the war and the viola- 
 tion of Belgian neutrality by Germany." 
 
 ' See ante, chap, viii, § 11. 
 
422 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 until Germany has brought forward some evidence sub- 
 stantiating some of these various alleged violations of 
 Belgian neutrality previous to Germany's attack. We 
 must bear in mind, however, that from the moment Ger- 
 many invaded Luxemburg and disregarded her solemn 
 treaty obligations to respect the latter's neutrality, France 
 would have been perfectly justified, as far as her obliga- 
 tion toward Germany went, in disregarding Belgian neu- 
 trality. Nevertheless, as between France and Belgium and 
 as between France and the other guaranteeing powers, a 
 retaliatory violation of Belgian neutrality would not have 
 been justified; nor is there any indication that France 
 proposed to violate Belgian territory in return for Ger- 
 many's violation of Luxemburg's neutralization on August 
 2. In any event, the German Government has as yet pro- 
 duced no evidence of this. 
 
 8. The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg 
 
 At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Luxemburg had been 
 given to the King of the Netherlands,^ and it continued to 
 form a part of the German Confederation until the dissolu- 
 tion of the Confederation in 1866. At that date it was ap- 
 parent that, upon the death of the King of Holland, the 
 effect of the Luxembm-g law governing the succession to 
 the Grand Duchy would bring to an end the personal 
 union of Holland and Luxemburg under one ruler. The 
 London Conference which met in 1867 was successful in 
 reaching an agreement in regard to the settlement of the 
 Luxemburg question. By the terms of the Treaty of Lon- 
 
 1 ". . . This [Luxemburg] had been granted in 1815 to the King of the 
 Netherlands in compensation for his hereditary territories of Orange- 
 Nassau ceded to Prussia. It formed part of the German Confederation, and, 
 as its duke, King WilHam had a vote in the Diet of Frankfort. The city of 
 Luxemburg itself was, moreover, a strong fortress, and commanded the 
 approaches to Lower Germany. The Belgians, however, while consenting 
 to reserve the rights of the German Confederation, claimed Luxemburg as 
 an integral part of their country, and deputies from it took their seats in the 
 Congress at Brussels." (Phillips, Modem Europe, p. 192. London, 1902.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 423 
 
 don of May 11, 1867, Luxemburg was constituted into an 
 independent neutral state placed under the "collective 
 guaranty" of the powers. '^ 
 
 Since Luxembiu-g was too weak to provide for her own 
 defense, and since neither France nor Prussia would allow 
 the other to garrison her fortresses, it only remained to de- 
 molish them. Had they been left standing, in times of ten- 
 sion either France or Prussia, mistrusting the other's in- 
 tentions, might have been tempted to seize them.^ 
 
 The question of the guaranty of the perpetual neutrality 
 of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is one of the most in- 
 teresting that has arisen in international law. According 
 to the terms of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, Luxemburg, 
 as I have said, was placed under the ''collective guaranty" 
 of the powers. This treaty was signed by the five great 
 powers signatory to the treaties guaranteeing the neutrali- 
 zation of Belgium, with the addition of Italy, who there- 
 upon took her place as the sixth great power in the Euro- 
 pean Concert. Belgium also signed this treaty, with an ex- 
 press reservation in regard to the neutralization guaranty, 
 the subscription to which was very properly considered 
 as incompatible with her own situation as a neutralized 
 state. 
 
 The interest which the British public took in the work 
 of the London Conference was evidenced by the questions 
 which the members of Parliament addressed to the Gov- 
 ernment, as to the natiu-e of the obligations incurred by 
 Great Britain's agreeing to the collective guaranty of the 
 neutrahzation of Luxemburg. In Chapter XIII we have 
 given full extracts of the most important portions of this 
 most interesting debate, from which it appears that the 
 responsible ministers of the British Government took the 
 ground that Great Britain was not obligated to make good 
 her guaranty unless all the other signatories should also 
 
 ^ See for terms of the treaty, Documents, post, chap. xiii. 
 
 * See Article III of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, post, chap. xin. 
 
424 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 join in collective action for this purpose. As it would be 
 hard to conceive of a violation of the neutrality of Luxem- 
 burg on the part of any power other than the signatories 
 of the treaty of guaranty, this interpretation of the British 
 Government of the obligation would make the treaty the 
 most veritable scrap of paper and the greatest trumpery of 
 diplomacy. 
 
 This peculiar quirk in British policy, this twisting of the 
 clear intention of the treaty stipulation as generally inter- 
 preted by impartial observers, ^ is only comprehensible in 
 the light of the diplomatic situation which led to the con- 
 elusion of the Treaty of May 11, 1867. Napoleon III, 
 making Prussia's increase in territory after the defeat of 
 Austria an excuse, sought compensation in order to main- 
 tain the relative position of France. The dissolution of the 
 Germanic Confederation caused uncertainty in regard to 
 the situation of Luxemburg, which was further increased 
 by the fact that in the death of the King of Holland the 
 personal union with that country would disappear, because 
 the Luxemburg law of inheritance did not recognize the 
 succession of females except in default of male heirs. Na- 
 poleon III found the King of Holland ready to acquiesce 
 
 1 See Milovanovitch, Les Traitis de Garantie au XIX« Sibcle, pp. 287-88. 
 (Translation.) "We have seen how, taking their stand on this difference in 
 terms, consisting only in the qualification ' collective ' given to the guaranty 
 applying to Luxemburg, the English Ministers, Lord Stanley and Lord 
 Derby, built up a theory on the distinction between a collective guaranty 
 and a number of individual guaranties. We shall not repeat here our reasons 
 for finding this distinction without foundation. We will only point out that 
 the terms establishing the guaranty of the neutrality of Luxemburg were 
 retained exactly as the Prussian plenipotentiary had proposed them. Now, 
 this plenipotentiary formally declared, while making his amendment, that 
 he desired to have the neutrality of Luxemburg placed under the same 
 guaranty as that given to Belgian neutrality. It would be strange, there- 
 fore, to give to the terms in which he formulated his proposal a real 
 difference as regards the efficacy of the two kinds of guaranties. Assuredly, 
 neither the Prussian plenipotentiary in making his proposal, nor any of the 
 plenipotentiaries who adopted it, suspected that it was possible to attribute 
 to the term 'Collective Guaranty' the meaning given to it in the EngUsh 
 Parliament."' 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 425 
 
 in his project to secure Luxemburg, but unwilling to keep 
 the negotiations secret from Prussia. Bismarck, however, 
 showed a complaisant disposition and seemed willing to 
 allow France to secure Luxemburg in return for her neu- 
 trality during Prussia's war with Austria. At an opportune 
 moment Bismarck proceeded to make public the negotia- 
 tions in regard to the cession of Luxemburg and to take 
 advantage of the popular outburst of indignation against 
 France to form defensive alliances with the several German 
 states against the eventuality of a French attack. Sup- 
 ported by a strong public sentiment, Bismarck refused to 
 withdraw the Prussian garrison from Luxemburg,^ and a 
 Franco-Prussian war seemed on the point of breaking out. 
 The other powers did what they could to prevent the con- 
 flict, and at Russia's suggestion a conference was called at 
 London to settle the Luxemburg question on the basis of 
 the neutralization of the territory and the destruction of 
 its fortresses. 
 
 Prussia made her participation in this conference con- 
 ditional upon the adoption of a provision establishing the 
 perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg under a collective guar- 
 anty of the powers. The British Government were not at 
 all disposed to shoulder the responsibility of this guaranty. 
 The fate of Luxemburg did not present a vital question 
 like that of Belgium, and it was reasonable for England to 
 strive to keep her treaty obligations and her vital interests 
 coextensive. For the purpose of avoiding the war which 
 tln-eatened. Great Britain accepted Bismarck's terms. As 
 soon as the conference began its work, however, Lord 
 Stanley introduced a draft of a treaty which omitted the 
 provision of the collective guaranty. The British Govern- 
 ment perhaps hoped that in the interval the acute feeling 
 in regard to Luxemburg might have sufficiently cooled to 
 make it possible to find some adjustment without accept- 
 
 ^ Prussia had been authorized by the Treaty of February 17, 1856, to 
 garrison the forts of Luxemburg. 
 
426 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ing the objectionable clause. The Prussian delegate was 
 not to be put off in this manner, and his objections were 
 sustained by the other delegates to the conference. Great 
 Britain thus had to accept in express terms the provision 
 for a collective guaranty to prevent France and Prussia 
 from deciding their dispute by an appeal to arms. Con- 
 strained to take this attitude, the British Government lost 
 no time in attempting to minimize the extent of their obli- 
 gations. This explains the peculiar language used in the 
 Parliamentary debates on Luxemburg neutrality. Well 
 might Lord Russell say, ''. . . We know that the explana- 
 tions given by the noble Lord, reported as they have been 
 in the newspapers and otherwise, have created a very un- 
 pleasant feeling in Prussia, and that it is commonly said 
 there that it is no use to sign a treaty with England, be- 
 cause England will find a means of escaping from the 
 obligations imposed on her by it." ^ Whatever the official 
 utterances of the British Government, the truth of the 
 situation was, as Lord Derby said, "Whatever the inter- 
 pretation which I may put on particular words of the 
 treaty, or whatever the interpretation which Her Ma- 
 jesty's Government may put on it, such interpretation 
 cannot affect the International Law by which the terms 
 of all treaties are construed." ^ It cannot be denied that 
 the Prussian Government might very naturally have ac- 
 cepted the official utterances of the British Ministers as 
 indicating the probable interpretation which England 
 would put upon its obligations when called upon to make 
 them good. The oflScial British utterances might have 
 served as an excuse to Prussia for violating the treaty, 
 since she could claim that the quid pro quo for which she 
 agreed to refer the whole question to the London Con- 
 ference had been rendered illusory by the interpretation 
 
 * Extract from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. clxxxviii, House 
 of Lords, July 4, on the neutrality of Luxemburg. (See post, chap, xiii.) 
 
 * Ibid. (See post, chap, xiii.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 427 
 
 that the British Government had put upon it, in clear con- 
 tradiction to the express terms of the treaty.^ 
 
 The British Government does not seem to have receded 
 from this view that it was not bound to make good its 
 guaranty to Luxemburg unless all the powers joining in 
 
 * The London Times, in its editorial of December 3, 1914, seems to over- 
 look this when it says: — 
 
 "LUXEMBURG — ANOTHER BROKEN TREATY 
 
 "The new attempt of the Germans to explain away their acts of aggres- 
 sion to neutral peoples comes as a reminder that the whole case against 
 them has still to be stated. In particular, the brutal treatment of Belgium, 
 the greatest international crime of modern times, has somewhat distracted 
 attention from the perfidy of Germany toward Luxemburg. Yet there are 
 circumstances connected with the violation of the neutrality of the latter 
 which are scarcely to be surpassed in cynical bad faith. Let us recall the 
 facts. The Duchy of Luxemburg was, by the Treaty of 1839, joined by a 
 personal tie to the Sovereign of Holland. In 1866 and 1867 the political 
 position of Luxemburg was the subject of diplomatic correspondence which 
 threatened to precipitate war between France and Prussia, a war which 
 Bismarck at that time desired to postpone. The former wished to purchase 
 the rights of the King of Holland, and he at one time consented to part with 
 them. But, Prussia strongly objecting to the transaction, he withdrew his 
 consent. France pressed Prussia to withdraw her garrison from Luxemburg, 
 which Bismarck met with a refusal. At the instance of Lord Stanley, then 
 Foreign Secretary, a conference was held in London in 1867, and was at- 
 tended by representatives of all the great powers. Count von Bernstorff, 
 the representative of Prussia, announced at the outset that the invitation 
 had been accepted by her only upon the assumption that a European guar- 
 anty of the neutrality of Luxemburg would be given. Lord Stanley at first 
 demurred: the guaranty given by the Treaty of 1839 was, in his view, 
 sufficient, and he was reluctant, as he explained to the House of Commons, 
 to ex-tend the liability of this country. But Count von Bernstorff did not 
 agree with him, and insisted upon the insertion of the words to be found in 
 Article II of the treaty — viz., that Luxemburg was to form henceforth a 
 state perpetually neutral 'under the sanction of the collective guaranty 
 of the signatories to the present treaty.' It matters not whether these 
 words substantially differed from those in the Treaty of 1839; Bismarck 
 thought that they did, and insisted upon their insertion as giving an ampler 
 guaranty. What is to be said of diplomacy which deliberately breaks a 
 promise expressed in words of its own choosing in preference to other words 
 conceived to be less binding? The contention of Prussia in 1867 was, ' We 
 are so anxious about the maintenance of the neutrality of the Duchy that 
 we must have it secured by the strongest possible obligation.' Could her 
 most dUigent historians discover an example of bad faith comparable with 
 her violation in 1914 of the promise which in 1867 she gave, and which she 
 insisted upon the other powers also giving?" 
 
428 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the collective guaranty should take part in the collective 
 action to this effect. This would have limited her obUga- 
 tion to one of mere respect for the treaty, not much of a 
 burden, since it was hardly likely that she would ever con- 
 template the acquisition of Luxemburg territory or its vio- 
 lation. On the other hand, she has interpreted the Belgian 
 guaranty as requiring her to make every reasonable sacri- 
 fice in enforcing upon other powers its respect. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, in a conversation with the French Am- 
 bassador just prior to the outbreak of the present war, re- 
 ferred to the distinction between the guaranty of Luxem- 
 burg and that of Belgium as explained in the speeches of 
 Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in the Parliamentary de- 
 bates in 1867, thus reaflarming the untenable view of 
 Great Britain's obligation. ^ (Cf. B. W. P. no. 148.) The 
 truth of the situation would seem to be that a collective 
 guaranty was intended to be much stronger than an ordin- 
 ary guaranty, in that all the powers would be obligated to 
 take action against the violator, whereas in the case of an 
 ordinary guaranty like that of Belgium, the less interested 
 powers might expect to place upon the shoulders of those 
 more directly interested the particular charge of maintain- 
 ing the inviolability of the neutrality. The English inter- 
 pretation is the exact reverse of this. If my interpretation 
 be correct, Germany's invasion of Luxemburg was as great 
 a violation of formal international law as was her action 
 in the case of Belgium. The maxim, de minimis non curat 
 lex (the law does not take account of trifles), is equally ap- 
 plicable in international law, so that it is reasonable that a 
 question of the violation of Luxemburg should not be con- 
 sidered of the same concern as would be the more serious 
 interference with the neutralization of Belgium. Never- 
 theless, the views of the British Government in interpret- 
 ing its obhgations under the Treaty of May 11, 1867, form 
 a curious commentary on the provisions of the protocol, 
 » See above, p. 338. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 429 
 
 which, as the result of the efforts of the British Govern- 
 ment, was signed at London by the representatives of the 
 powers on January 17, 1871. It reads: "The plenipoten- 
 tiaries of North Germany, of Austria-Hungary, of Great 
 Britain, of Italy, of Russia, and of Turkey, assembled to- 
 day in conference, recognize that it is an essential principle 
 of the law of nations that no power can hberate itself from 
 the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations 
 thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers 
 by means of an amicable arrangement." ^ 
 
 When the situation became tense, after the presentation 
 of the Austrian note to Servia, M. Eyschen, Minister of 
 State of Luxemburg, asked the French Minister on July 31, 
 'for an official declaration to the effect that France, in case 
 of war, would respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When 
 the French Minister asked him if he had received a similar 
 declaration from the German Government, M. Eyschen 
 answered that he was going to the German Minister to 
 ask for it. Upon his return, M. Eyschen informed the 
 French Minister that the German Minister had replied, 
 "That is a matter of course, but the French Government 
 must make the same promise."' (Modified quotation, 
 July 31, F. Y. B. no. 111.) 
 
 The next day M. Eyschen asked both Governments to 
 give Luxemburg an assurance of neutrality. (Of. F. Y. B. 
 no. 128.) To this, M. Viviani, responsible head of the 
 French Government, replied : — 
 
 "Be good enough to state to the President of the Coun- 
 cil that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867, 
 the Government of the Republic intends to respect the 
 neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they 
 have shown by their attitude. 
 
 "The violation of this attitude by Germany would, how- 
 ever, compel France from that time to be guided in her ac- 
 
 * Translation as laid before Parliament. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by 
 Treaty, vol. iii, p. 1904. London, 1875. 
 
430 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tion by the necessity of caring for her defense and her in- 
 terests." (August 1, F. Y. B. no. 129.) 
 
 The next day, August 2, M. Eyschen telegraphed the 
 French Government of the German invasion of Luxemburg 
 as follows: ''I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency's 
 notice the following facts: On Sunday, the 2d August, 
 very early, German troops, according to the information 
 which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Govern- 
 ment, penetrated into Luxemburg territory especially to- 
 ward the south and in the direction of Luxembiu*g, the 
 capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored 
 trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along 
 the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where 
 their arrival is immediately expected. These occurrences 
 constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neu- 
 traUty of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty 
 of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not 
 failed to address an energetic protest against this aggres- 
 sion to the representatives of His Majesty the German 
 Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent 
 by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
 at Berlin." (August 2, F. Y. B. no. 131.) 
 
 Likewise, on August 2, Baron von Schoen, German Am- 
 bassador at Paris, delivered the following note from his 
 Government: "The German Ambassador has just been 
 instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, that the military measiu-es taken by Germany in 
 the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act 
 of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive 
 measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, 
 under the treaties between Germany and the Grand 
 Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administra- 
 tion." (August 2, F. Y. B. no. 133.) 
 
 That same day, August 2, the French Ambassador at 
 London informed his Government that ' Sir Edward Grey, 
 in speaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 431 
 
 had reminded him that the Convention of 1867, relative to 
 the Grand Duchy [Luxemburg], differed from the treaty 
 concerning Belgium, in that England was bound to re- 
 quire the observance of this latter convention without 
 necessarily having the concurrence [concours] of the other 
 guaranteeing powers, whereas in the case of Luxemburg 
 all the guaranteeing powers were to act in concert.' (Modi- 
 fied quotation, August 2, F. Y. B. no. 137; cf. B. W. P. 
 no. 148.) 
 
 9. Some considerations concerning Belgium's right to resist 
 According to the Treaties of April 19, 1839, between 
 Belgium and the six other powers, Belgium is obligated to 
 preserve a strictly neutral attitude toward all the powers, 
 and to take no action contrary to the spirit of this neutral- 
 ity. She was not expressly required to defend her o^vn 
 neutrality. Belgium's own interests would, however, im- 
 pel her to take as active a part as possible in resisting any 
 attempt to violate her territory.^ 
 
 Belgium is thus in the situation in which the great Car- 
 dinal Richelieu desired to see her, when he thought that 
 a friendly medial state between France and Holland would 
 be ever ready to resist any encroachment upon her inde- 
 pendence by either neighbor, and to throw her support 
 wherever it would best help her to maintain her independ- 
 ent position. Besides, this buffer state would exert all its 
 influence to keep the countries which it separated on good 
 terms, since at the outbreak of any conflict between them 
 its own territory would be in great danger of invasion. The 
 great powers, on the other hand, by guaranteeing Belgium's 
 
 1 The treaty signed at London December 14, 1831, by Belgium and the 
 great powers excepting France, placed upon Belgium the obligation to main- 
 tain constantly in good order the fortresses which were not demolished. 
 (Article IV; Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 883.) Bel- 
 gium was furthermore recognized as an independent state, except for the 
 obligation to respect her neutralization. (Treaty of November 15, 1831, 
 Article VII; Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 863.) 
 
432 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 neutrality, agreed to render assistance in maintaining her 
 independence and the inviolabiUty of her territory. 
 
 It may be said that all the difficulties which have arisen 
 in regard to Belgium are primarily due to this freedom left 
 to her to provide for her own defense. Such a situation is 
 open to criticism from two points of view. In the first 
 place, as Wicker in his extremely enlightening monograph 
 on neutralization has so well pointed out, the greatest 
 danger that the regime of neutralization may fail is to be 
 found in the provision which makes the continuance of the 
 neutralized condition dependent upon the conduct of the 
 Government of the territory neutralized.^ The example of 
 Cracow well illustrates how the powers are quick to seize 
 upon the action of the Government of the neutralized ter- 
 ritory to make it an excuse for disregarding the obligations 
 to respect its neutrality. Another example of this is af- 
 forded by the German arguments against the manner in 
 which Belgium has lived up to her obligations. The sys- 
 tem of neutralization, as applied to Belgium, instead of 
 proving an advantage has proved a great calamity to the 
 people. If Belgium had been relieved from all responsibil- 
 ity of providing for the defense of her own neutrality, 
 in case of French or German aggression, Belgium would 
 simply have allowed the occupation of her territory until 
 the conclusion of the conflict between the great powers; 
 and we should not have had to endure the heartrending 
 spectacle of Belgium's suffering which has resulted from 
 her heroic but unavailing efforts to live up to her obliga- 
 tions to prevent the violation of her territory. 
 
 Doubtless, if Germany had realized what this resistance 
 would have amounted to, and had appreciated the terrible 
 consequences of her act, she might have hesitated to allow 
 her generals to ''hack their way through." ^ Perhaps Ger- 
 
 ^ Cyrus French Wicker, Neutralization, p. 23. Oxford, 1911. 
 
 2 "It is obvious that Belgian resistance has enabled the invaders to use 
 not only the territory, but all the resources of this country in the prosecu- 
 tion of the war, and has opened the way for its annexation in case of final 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 433 
 
 many's adversaries hoped that this consideration might 
 check German action and help to win for them the support 
 of the world in case Germany should, nevertheless, disre- 
 gard it. WTiatever the reasons for the adoption and con- 
 tinuation of such a system as that applied to Belgium, it 
 was hardly fair to expect a small state to support such a 
 burden. 
 
 The acclamations of admiration for Belgian conduct 
 which have gone up throughout the whole world may cheer 
 the hearts of the refugees, but who can be sure that Bel- 
 gium will ever recover from the effects of the struggle to 
 which she has so nobly sacrificed everything in the vain de- 
 fense of her home, though in the successful protection of 
 her honor? Even in the midst of our enthusiastic admira- 
 tion we may be permitted to pause and ask ourselves 
 whether this little nation was called upon to make such a 
 sacrifice for the maintenance of a regime which had the 
 effect of putting upon her a burden so disproportionate to 
 her strength. I believe that if those responsible for Bel- 
 gium's welfare could have known with certainty what 
 would have been the result of Belgium's resistance, the 
 Government at Brussels might have considered that the 
 burden of maintaining the inviolability of Belgian terri- 
 tory should fall to the guaranteeing powers. 
 
 There were reasons, however, which militated in the past 
 against the adoption of such a policy on the part of Bel- 
 gium. The first and foremost was that England would 
 certainly have considered it a violation of Belgium's obli- 
 gations in favor of Germany. The consequence would 
 have been to force England to increase her army for the 
 purpose of being able to resist, from the very beginning, a 
 
 German victory; but to infer that, in view of these immediate and prospec- 
 tive advantages, the German Government not only reckoned with but 
 hoped for resistance would be to attribute to that Government intentions 
 which it has not avowed and with which it should not be charged without 
 direct evidence." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," 
 Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, pp. 77-78.) 
 
434 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 German invasion of Belgium. England in all probability 
 would have tried to find some means of reaching an agree- 
 ment to avoid this difficulty and the burdens it would have 
 imposed. In doing so she might not have had any tender- 
 ness for Belgium, whose action would have placed her in 
 that quandary. There is still another aspect of the ques- 
 tion, perhaps of more importance, and that is the aspiration 
 of the Belgian people to play as virile a role in the affairs of 
 the nations as their numbers and situation could reason- 
 ably entitle them to. This ambition of theirs prevented 
 them from taking advantage of their neutralized position. 
 The Belgian Government, without in any way violating 
 its obligations, continued to assert that it possessed the 
 entire freedom of an independent state, except in so far as 
 limited by the obligations immediately resulting from its 
 neutralized position. Had Belgium, instead of attempting 
 to acquire a prominent position as a political power, 
 thrown her whole efforts into making the most of her neu- 
 tralized position, she would then have limited her political 
 activity to the minimum. Such a policy would have done 
 much to save her the dangers consequent upon her geo- 
 graphical position. 
 
 A factor in the situation which has not been sufficiently 
 appreciated is the belief that Belgian fortifications when 
 manfully defended could successfully resist the German 
 onslaught, long enough, at least, to permit reinforcements 
 from England and France to arrive. Belgium must have 
 quickly discovered her mistake, but once having decided 
 to resist, it was not in her nature to stop to weigh the con- 
 sequences. If the Belgians had foreseen how futile would 
 have been their resistance, I believe that they would have 
 left the responsibility of defending their territory to the 
 powers to settle as best they might, and have limited their 
 action to a negative observance of a strictly neutral atti- 
 tude. The world is certainly richer by their action, for if 
 they had foreseen these consequences and been influenced 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 435 
 
 by them, as I think any reasonable people would, we 
 should not have witnessed the noblest example of resist- 
 ance in recorded history. 
 
 It must be remembered that Sir Edward Grey, on Au- 
 gust 4, telegraphed to the British Minister at Brussels: 
 "You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure 
 is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart 
 from neutrality. His Majesty's Government expect that 
 they will resist by any means in their power, and that His 
 Majesty's Government will support them in offering such 
 resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this 
 event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in 
 offering to the Belgian Government at once common ac- 
 tion for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany 
 against them, and a guaranty to maintain their independ- 
 ence and integrity in future years." (August 4, B. W. P. no. 
 155; cf. B. G. P. no. 28.) The Belgian Government must 
 have noticed the "expect " and the mentioning of the main- 
 tenance of Belgian "independence and integrity in future 
 years." Any one familiar with diplomatic language might 
 consider this significant. It cannot be called a threat, but 
 it might be taken as a spur to resistance, lest the great 
 power lose interest in maintaining Belgium's independ- 
 ence.^ 
 
 ^ The following extract from the New York Times of October 1, 1914, 
 gives a semi-official defense from England: "In an interview granted to 
 the correspondent of a Copenhagen paper, Francis Dyke Acland, Parlia- 
 mentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Afifairs, contradicts certain statements 
 made by the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, in an interview 
 recently issued at Berlin. One assertion was that 'England has provoked 
 poor Belgium to make resistance.' 'This leaves it to be inferred,' said Mr. 
 Acland, 'that Belgium, if not provoked, would have allowed herself to be 
 trampled upon. It might have been thought that the nature of the resist- 
 ance offered by Belgium would be enough to prevent such a libel on a gallant 
 foe. An official statement issued this week by the Belgian Government con- 
 clusively proves that no provocation from England or anybody else was 
 needed to make Belgium maintain her rights. The Belgian Government at 
 the time of the Agadir crisis did not hesitate to warn the foreign ambassa- 
 dors in terms which could not be misunderstood of its intention to compel 
 respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal.' " 
 
436 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 To be just, we must confess that England and France 
 were in a desperate situation ; and they probably believed 
 that they would be able to come to Belgium's assistance 
 before Liege could be taken. They perhaps considered that 
 the risk of a devastating invasion that Belgium was made 
 to run was only a fair return for the guaranty of the powers. 
 
 Belgium gave every indication that she would have de- 
 fended her neutrality irrespective of any prodding from 
 abroad. The Belgian Government even delayed calling 
 upon the assistance of the guaranteeing powers {see Au- 
 gust 3, B. G. P. no. 24). This may have been for the pur- 
 pose of demonstrating to the world that Germany alone 
 had been guilty of violating her neutrality. 
 
 The attitude of Belgium was clearly indicated in Emile 
 Waxweiler's account of the interview which the Belgian 
 Minister at Berlin had with Herr von Jagow: — 
 
 "This indeed was just what the German Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, declared to 
 Baron Beyens, the Belgian minister at Berlin, on the fol- 
 lowing morning (Monday, August 3), at the beginning 
 of a conversation in which things were said which deter- 
 mined the whole subsequent course of events. It is at 
 Baron Beyens's wish that I record this conversation, the 
 spirited march of which I shall do my best to render. 
 
 ''Early that Monday morning, the Belgian Minister 
 asked by telephone to be received by the Secretary of 
 State; the interview was immediately granted. 
 
 "The Belgian Minister had scarcely pronounced his 
 greetings when Herr von Jagow exclaimed: 'Believe me, 
 it is with anguish in her heart that Germany has resolved 
 to violate Belgian neutraUty; and personally I feel the 
 most poignant regret. But what else is possible? It is a 
 question of life or death for the Empire. If the German 
 armies would avoid being caught between hammer and 
 anvil, they must strike a vigorous blow upon the side of 
 France so as to be able to turn then upon Russia,' 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 437 
 
 "'But,' said Baron Beyens, 'the French frontier is of 
 such an extent as to make passage through Belgium avoid- 
 able.' 
 
 '''But that frontier is too well fortified. Besides, what 
 is it we ask of you? Simply to permit us a free passage and 
 not to destroy your railways or your tunnels, and to allow 
 us to occupy the fortified places which we need.' 
 
 '"There is,' immediately rejoined the Belgian Minister, 
 ' a very easy way of formulating the only reply admissible 
 to such a demand. It is this: suppose France had pre- 
 ferred the selfsame request and we had yielded. Would 
 not Germany have said that we had basely betrayed 
 her?' 
 
 "The Secretary of State allowing this clear-cut inter- 
 rogation to pass without answer, Baron Beyens completed 
 his thought. 
 
 "'Have you,' he asked, 'the least thing with which to 
 reproach us? Have we not always, for three quarters of 
 a century, fulfilled toward Germany, as well as to all the 
 great powers guarantors [of the neutrality of Belgium], all 
 our duties of neutrality? Have we not given Germany 
 proof of our loyal friendship? With what coin does Ger- 
 many repay all this? With making Belgium the battle- 
 field of Europe, and we know what devastation, what 
 calamity modern warfare brings in its train.' 
 
 "'Germany has nothing with which she can reproach 
 Belgium; the attitude of Belgium has always been beyond 
 reproach (d'une correction parfaite.) ' 
 
 " ' You will admit,' replied Baron Beyens, 'that Belgium 
 can make no other reply than that which she has already 
 given, without the loss of honor. It is with nations as it 
 is with individuals; there is not a different kind of honor 
 for a people than for one's self. You must admit,' urged 
 Baron Beyens, 'our reply had to be what it is.' 
 
 " ' I grant you that as a private individual, but as Secre- 
 tary of State I have no opinion to express.' 
 
438 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ''The interview was at an end. Nevertheless, the Bel- 
 gian Minister added that in his opinion Germany was 
 deceiving herself: she was going into a war with England, 
 and besides, German troops would not pass Li^ge as easily, 
 perhaps, as they imagined. And, when the Minister made 
 him understand that there was no doubt of his asking for 
 his passports, Herr von Jagow protested, 'Do not leave; 
 perhaps we shall still have occasion to converse.' 'What 
 is about to take place,' replied Baron Beyens, 'is not a 
 matter within our control; from now on it is for the Bel- 
 gian' Government to decide upon the action it will take.' " ^ 
 
 The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a dispatch 
 of August 4 to the Belgian representatives abroad, re- 
 lates: 
 
 "The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3. As at 
 10 o'clock no act of war had been conmiitted, the Belgian 
 Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment 
 to appeal to the guaranteeing powers. 
 
 "Toward midday the French Minister questioned me 
 upon this point, and said: 'Although in view of the rapid 
 march of events I have as yet received no instructions to 
 make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, 
 in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the 
 Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Govern- 
 ment as one of the powers guaranteeing their neutrality, 
 the French Government would at once respond to Bel- 
 gium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is prob- 
 able that — unless, of course, exceptional measures were 
 rendered necessary in self-defense — the French Govern- 
 ment would not intervene until Belgium had taken some 
 effective measure of resistance.' 
 
 "I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support 
 which the French Government had been good enough to 
 offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Bel- 
 
 ^ Emile Waxweiler, La Belgique neutre et loyale, pp. 65-67. Lausanne, 
 1915. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 439 
 
 gian Government were making no appeal at present to the 
 guaranty of the powers, and that they would decide later 
 what ought to be done. 
 
 "Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4, the German Minister 
 made the following communication to me : ' In accordance 
 with my instructions, I have the honor to inform Your 
 Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Bel- 
 gian Government to entertain the well-intentioned pro- 
 posals made to them by the German Government, the lat- 
 ter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to 
 take — if necessary by force of arms — those measures of 
 defense already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of 
 the menace of France.' 
 
 "The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on 
 the question of an appeal to the powers guaranteeing our 
 neutrahty." (August 4, B. G. P. no. 38.) 
 
 The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered that 
 same day to the representatives of England, France, and 
 Russia, the following note : — 
 
 "The Belgian Government regret to have to announce 
 to Your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of 
 Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty 
 engagements. 
 
 "The Belgian Government are firmly determined to re- 
 sist by all the means in their power. 
 
 "Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia 
 to cooperate as guaranteeing powers in the defense of her 
 territory. 
 
 "There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose 
 the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, 
 and, at the same time, to guarantee the future mainten- 
 ance of the independence and integrity of Belgium. 
 
 "Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will 
 undertake the defense of her fortified places." (August 4, 
 B. G. P. no. 40.) 
 
 On August 5, the Belgian Government conamunicated 
 
440 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 its views to the members of the diplomatic corps in the 
 following note: — 
 
 ''By the Treaty of April 18th [sic], 1839, Prussia, France, 
 Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves 
 guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day be- 
 tween His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Ma- 
 jesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: 
 'Belgium shall form a state independent and perpetually 
 neutral.' Belgium has fulfilled all her international obli- 
 gations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal 
 impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her 
 neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected. 
 
 "In these circumstances the Belgian Government have 
 learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, 
 a power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered 
 Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken 
 by treaty. 
 
 "It is our duty to protest with indignation against an 
 outrage against international law provoked by no act of 
 ours. 
 
 "The Belgian Government are firmly determined to re- 
 pel by all the means in their power the attack thus made 
 upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in vir- 
 tue of Article 10 of the Hague Convention of 1907 respect- 
 ing the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in 
 the case of war by land, if a neutral power repels, even by 
 force, attacks on her neutrality, such action cannot be con- 
 sidered as a hostile act. 
 
 "I have to request that you will ask at once for an audi- 
 ence with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this 
 dispatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the 
 interview cannot be granted at once you should make the 
 communication in question in writing." (August 5, 
 B. G. P. no. 44.) 
 
 The strong are apt to consider as unjustifiable all resist- 
 ance to their advance, and the Germans have gone so far 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 441 
 
 as to blame the Belgians for their resistance. We find in 
 Germany many indications of a widely prevailing idea that 
 the Belgians merit the severity of their suffering because of 
 the futility of their resistance. They make somewhat the 
 same distinction that we should make between one who 
 should unfortunately, through no fault of his own, meet 
 with a mishap, and another who deliberately sets himself in 
 front of an advancing, irresistible force. Here again they 
 leave out of account the obligations which Belgium had 
 assumed to maintain her inviolability. Once we admit the 
 validity of these obligations, there can be no reasonable 
 ground for declaring that the Belgians were at fault be- 
 cause they did not weigh the consequences. Quite the con- 
 trary : their preeminent gloiy depends upon this very fact, 
 and makes every sincere admirer and lover of Germany 
 hang his head for shame at this sad page of her history. 
 
 10. Germany accuses England of misrepresentations in regard 
 to Belgium 
 
 In Germany and in England also the British Govern- 
 ment have been attacked because they gave as the reason 
 for England's intervention Germany's invasion of Belgium. 
 
 The British Government have never, so far as I have 
 noted, made the statement that England entered the war 
 solely to defend Belgium and to make good the guaranty 
 under the Treaty of April 19, 1839. In many instances, 
 however, this reason has been emphasized while the others 
 have been slighted. This is nothing more than the ordinaiy 
 procedure of every government in time of war. An attempt 
 is made to present 'its action in such a way as to move the 
 country to come to its support.^ The mass of men cannot 
 
 1 " That Great Britain had other grounds for declaring war is not dis- 
 puted. They are indicated in the correspondence published by the British 
 Government {cf. British Blue Book, especially nos. 89, 101, 111), and they 
 were frankly stated — and put first — by Sir Edward Grey in his speech in 
 the House of Commons, August 3. (Ibid., pp. 89-96.) If among its various 
 grounds for declaring war, the British Government finally selected that 
 which was formally the beet and which would appeal most strongly to pub- 
 
442 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 grasp complicated details; consequently, every govern- 
 ment presents for popular consumption only one or two 
 main ideas. No doubt England's chief reasons for going 
 into the war were, first, to protect her vital interests, and, 
 second, her good name in observing her treaty obligations. 
 Germany's invasion of Belgium would, however, have 
 stirred all England irrespective of vital interests and treaty 
 obligations, as it has stirred, the world over, every lover 
 of justice who was not already a German partisan. 
 
 It is much to the credit of the British people that they 
 are moved by the disregard of Belgium's rights rather than 
 by their more immediate selfish interests. Any one who 
 will read the British White Paper will find that England 
 does not conceal the fact that Belgian neutrality was for 
 her a vital question. One vital question may be enough to 
 justify a war of defense.^ That England has other reasons 
 
 lie sentiment in Great Britain and in other countries, it is not chargeable 
 with insincerity or with hypocrisy. Any other course would have been unin- 
 telligent. As far as the appeal to public sentiment is concerned, Austria and 
 Germany acted in the same way; the former in the stress it laid upon the 
 crime of Serajevo, the latter in charging the Russian Emperor with 'per- 
 fidy' because his armies were mobilizing while the German Emperor was 
 conducting direct personal negotiations with him. (This was the casus belli 
 emphasized in all the CJerman newspapers in the early days of August.)" 
 (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," Political Science 
 Quarterly, vol. xxx, [1915], no. 1, p. 58.) 
 
 1 "When we read the official and unofficial explanations of Great Brit- 
 ain's intervention which have been advanced on the part of Germany since 
 the outbreak of the war, and which aim to show that Great Britain had 
 quite other reasons for intervening than Germany's breach of Belgian neu- 
 trality, our perplexity increases. When, for example, we are reminded that 
 for centuries it has been Great Britain's policy to promote and support Con- 
 tinental coalitions against any Continental state which threatened to ob- 
 tain a dominating position, especially if such a state was developing sea 
 power, we wonder why this fact was not taken into account by the German 
 Government before the outbreak of the present war. And when we are told 
 that to Great Britain itself — to take the German Chancellor's most recent 
 explanation of his famous phrase — the Treaty of 1839 was only ' a scrap of 
 paper,' we wonder why, in a country justly renowned for the promotion of 
 historical research, it should be forgotten that the neutralizing of Belgium 
 in 1839, like the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, was 
 chiefly promoted by Great Britain, for the quite intelligible purpose of pre- 
 venting this part of the European coast line from being used as a base for 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 443 
 
 is no ground for accusing her of hypocrisy in proclaiming 
 loudest the one that stirs her deepest, or the one that she 
 thinks best calculated to awaken neutral sympathy. 
 Many of the German defenders make the mistake of con- 
 fusing the question of the violation of Belgian neutraHty 
 and the guilt attaching to it with the cause for England's 
 joining in the war. They are two entirely distinct ques- 
 tions.^ 
 
 In his speech before the Reichstag on December 2, the 
 German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said: 
 "The Belgian neutrality, which England pretended she 
 was bound to shield, is but a mask. On the 2d of August, 
 7 P.M., we informed Brussels that France's plan of cam- 
 paign w^as known to us and that it compelled us, for rea- 
 
 military operations against its own territory." (Munroe Smith, "Military 
 Strategy versus Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxx [1915], 
 pp. 74-75.) 
 
 1 Mr. Jacob H. Schiff in a published interview makes the distinction: — 
 
 "I am not defending the violation of Belgian neutrality. This, undeni- 
 ably was a most unjustifiable action, in spite of German claims that she was 
 forced into it by the necessities of the situation. But I am explaining that, 
 even had it not occurred, still England would have gone to war. 
 
 "That was the situation. 
 
 "Germany is now fighting for her very existence and I, who am not with- 
 out knowledge of German conditions, am convinced that never has there 
 been a war more wholly that of a whole people than is this present conflict, 
 as far as Germany is concerned." (New York Times, November 22, 1914. 
 Interview with Jacob H. Schiff.) 
 
 The former Ambassador of Austria to the United States, Baron L. 
 Hengelmuller, writes in a letter to Colonel Roosevelt, published in the New 
 York Times of November 8, 1914: — 
 
 "But why has England plunged into this war? OflScially and to the world 
 at large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of Belgian 
 neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was solemnly declared 
 that England could not stand by and passively tolerate such a breach of 
 international obligations. 
 
 "No Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful 
 smile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of 
 standing and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they 
 would equally have declared war on France if that violation of neutrality 
 had first come from her side. In face of this question having remained un- 
 answered, and in face of what has come to light since about French prepara- 
 tions in Belgium, there is no need to expatiate on this subject." 
 
 This extract illustrates the confusion referred to above. 
 
444 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 sons of self-preservation, to march through Belgium; but 
 as early as the afternoon of the same day, August 2, that is 
 to say, before anything was known and could be known 
 of this step, the British Government promised uncondi- 
 tional aid to France in case the German navy attacked the 
 French coast line. Not a word was said of Belgian neu- 
 trality. This fact is established by the declaration made by 
 Sir Edward Grey in the House of Conmions on the 3d of 
 August. The declaration was communicated to me on 
 August 4, but not in full, because of the difficulties experi- 
 enced at that time in the transmission of telegrams. Be- 
 sides, the very Blue Book issued by the British Govern- 
 ment confirms that fact. How, then, can England allege 
 that she drew the sword because we violated Belgian 
 neutrality? How could British statesmen, who accurately 
 knew the past, talk at all of Belgian neutrality? When on 
 the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we were 
 doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known 
 for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour 
 of need would not decide after all to spare the country and 
 to retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, 
 after the occupation of Liege, at the request of our army 
 leaders, I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. 
 For military reasons it was absolutely imperative that at 
 the time, about the 4th of August, the possibility for such 
 a development was being kept open. Even then the guilt 
 of the Belgian Government was apparent from many a 
 sign, although I had not yet any positive documentary 
 proofs at my disposal. But the English statesmen were 
 perfectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which 
 in the meantime have been found in Brussels, and which 
 have been given publicity by me, prove and establish in 
 what way and to what degree Belgium has sm-rendered her 
 neutrality to England. The whole world is now acquainted 
 with two outstanding facts: (1) In the night from the 3d to 
 the 4th of August, when our troops entered Belgian terri- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 445 
 
 tory, they were not on neutral soil, but on the soil of a state 
 that had long abandoned its neutrality. (2) England has 
 declared war on us, not for the sake of Belgian neutrality, 
 which she herself had helped to undermine, but because 
 she believed that she could overcome and master us with 
 the help of two great military powers on the Continent." ^ 
 
 11. Germany's -plea of necessity 
 
 The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag, 
 August 4, said : — 
 
 ''Gentlemen, we are now acting in self-defense. Neces- 
 sity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg 
 and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil. 
 
 ''Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. 
 
 "The French Government has notified Brussels that it 
 would respect Belgian neutrality as long as the adversary 
 respected it. But we know that France stood ready for an 
 invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French in- 
 vasion on our flank and the lower Rhine might have been 
 disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful pro- 
 tests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The 
 injustice — I speak openly — the injustice we thereby 
 commit we will try to make good as soon as our military 
 aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are 
 and is fighting for his All, can only consider the one and 
 best way to strike." ^ 
 
 1 [Extract.] — Translation from Pamphlet no. 86 of the American Asso- 
 ciation for International Conciliation. 
 
 2 This translation is taken from Pamphlet no. 84, p. 7 of the American 
 Association for International Conciliation. The London Times of August 
 11, 1914, gave the following translation: "Gentlemen, we are now in a state 
 of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
 burg, and perhaps [as a matter of fact the speaker knew that Belgium had 
 been invaded that morning] are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that 
 is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French 
 Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, how- 
 ever, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we 
 could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine 
 
446 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Various other pleas in justification of the invasion of Bel- 
 gium were later brought forward. The arguments in their 
 support have not appealed to impartial minds with the 
 same force as the Chancellor's original pleas of necessity, 
 either because the evidence to substantiate the assertions 
 upon which they rested was trivial and far from the point, 
 or else because the plea of necessity has really struck a 
 responsive chord. ^ 
 
 might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just pro- 
 test of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong — I speak 
 openly — that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as 
 our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are 
 threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one 
 thought — how he is to hack his way through {wie er sich durchhaut)\" 
 The version of this part of the Chancellor's speech in the New York Times 
 Current History of the War, vol. i, no. 2, pp. 219-22, follows closely that of 
 the London Times, but the last sentence reads: "Who, like we, are fighting 
 for the highest, must only consider how victory can be gained." 
 
 1 The following extracts may serve as an illustration of this as well as of the 
 confusion above referred to regarding the motive of England's intervention. 
 
 A Dutch professor wrote to the Koelnische Zeitung: — 
 
 "When Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium I was very indig- 
 nant. But I was partially conciliated when the Imperial Chancellor said 
 frankly : ' We are doing the wrong thing, but for military reasons we cannot 
 help but do it.' Necessity is, at any rate, a strong excuse. 
 
 "But that's where the thing should have stopped. Distinct antipathy 
 is provoked when afterward all kinds of little things are dug up to show 
 that Germany had the right to act as she did." (New York Sun, December 
 
 27, 1914.) 
 
 Professor George W. Kirchwey, of Columbia University, in a letter to 
 the New York Times, Thursday, December 24, 1914, says: — 
 
 "The pity of it is that Germany really has a case which is obscured and 
 betrayed by arguments such as this. The argmnent from military necessity 
 urged by the Imperial Chancellor in his address to the Reichstag (immoral 
 though it be) has at least the merit of a certain nobility, and there are not 
 wanting those in this country to whom it makes its appeal. We, too, have 
 our admirers of the strong man or nation that takes what he or she needs, 
 that hews his or her way through every obstacle to success, that lets no 
 trumpery considerations of public morality or humanity stand in the way 
 of the pursuit of his or her ends. But even our Bernhardis can have only 
 contempt for a cause which seeks to justify its grandiose violation of inter- 
 national law and public right by seeking, tlirough the distortion and mis- 
 representation of facts, to shift the responsibility upon the victim of its 
 high-handed proceedings." 
 
 Professor John W. Burgess in a letter to the New York Times (October 
 
 28, 1914) says: — 
 
 "I find in the British 'White Paper,' itself, no. 123, not only ample justi- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 447 
 
 In his speech of December 2, ^ before the Reichstag the 
 Chancellor no longer relies on the necessity plea pure and 
 simple, but adds as a justification of Germany's course the 
 charge that Belgium herself was guilty of violating her 
 obligations. We have seen what foundation there was for 
 this serious charge. It is noteworthy that Professor Hans 
 Delbriick, in a recent article in the Atlantic Monthly ("Ger- 
 many's Answer," February, 1915, p. 233), ignores, except 
 for a passing allusion, these efforts to excuse Germany's in- 
 vasion on the ground of Belgium's guilt, and reverts to the 
 Chancellor's first position, when he says: — 
 
 fication, but absolute necessity, from a military point of view, for a German 
 army advancing against France, not only to pass through Belgium but to 
 occupy Belgium. This number of the 'White Paper' is a communication 
 dated August 1 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, British Am- 
 bassador in Berlin. In it Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Edward Goschen 
 that the German Ambassador in London asked him 'whether, if Germany 
 gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we. Great Britain, would 
 remain neutral,' and that he [Grey] replied that he 'could not say that,' that 
 he did not think Great Britain ' could give a promise of neutrality on that 
 condition alone'; further, Sir Edward Grey says: ' The Ambassador pressed 
 me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would re- 
 main neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her col- 
 onies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any 
 promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we 
 must keep our hands free.'" 
 
 Count Apponyi, the distinguished Hungarian statesman, in an article 
 in the New York Times (January 17, 1915), writes: — 
 
 "I should like to say one word concerning Belgium. Many are hypno- 
 tized by the case of Belgium, and I certainly agree with them so far as to de- 
 plore the ruin inflicted on a highly civilized, prosperous country, and the 
 setting aside of international treaties. But if the question of right and wrong 
 is to be decided, you cannot isolate this peculiar fact from the situation in 
 which it originates, and you cannot speak in fairness of Germany as having 
 invaded Belgium in a spirit of wanton aggression and premeditated disre- 
 gard of international obligations." 
 
 Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania, in an 
 article published in The Fatherland allows by implication some force to the 
 necessity plea: — 
 
 "Germany's breach of neutrality with Belgium, which I do not justify 
 and which Germany herself acknowledges was wrong, but prompted by ab- 
 solute necessity, could not have been the real, or let us say the only, motive 
 inducing Sir Edward Grey to range England on the side of France and 
 Russia." 
 
 ^ See above § 10, pp. 443-45. 
 
448 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ''From Sir Edward Grey's refusal to answer the neu- 
 trality question, Germany saw clearly that just as soon as 
 the Russians were near enough, the French, perhaps aided 
 by the English and Belgians, would attack Germany on 
 that flank. Germany, therefore, had to consider which 
 was the lesser of the two evils. 
 
 "If she proceeded against Belgium, there was the pros- 
 pect of gaining large advantages before the Russians en- 
 tered the conflict — a hope that has only in small measure 
 been realized. On the other hand, there was the disadvan- 
 tage in this move, that abroad, particularly in neutral coun- 
 tries, Germany would appear in the Ught of peace-breaker. 
 
 '' If, on the contrary, Germany had waited until the en- 
 emy had violated Belgium's neutrality, she would have 
 had the moral advantage of appearing in the light of the 
 defender of the right, but at the same time would have lost 
 almost all hope of victory against the stupendous odds. 
 Under these conditions Germany chose the odium of ap- 
 pearing to the world as the treaty-breaker, sure that she 
 was so only in appearance, because the treaty had already 
 been broken in fact from the other side." 
 
 Delbriick and Von Bethmann-HoUweg both allege that 
 Germany's necessity arose from the fact that France in- 
 tended, by waiting, to take advantage of Germany when 
 she was obliged to divide her forces to repel the Russian 
 advance, and then to invade Belgian territory to strike 
 Germany on the flank. If France had actually attempted 
 to do this, Germany would have been justified in advanc- 
 ing across Belgian soil to meet her treacherous attack, but 
 the clearest and most absolute proof of the mere intention 
 of France to do so would not serve as a justification, though 
 it might afford some excuse. I have examined this question 
 without finding any evidence that France intended any 
 such perfidy — nay, I find every indication that France 
 would have refrained from any violation of Belgian neu- 
 trality. She had made an express declaration to the Bel- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 449 
 
 gian Government that she would observe the latter's neu- 
 trality provided Germany followed a like course, and I 
 know of no case where a formal engagement of this kind 
 has been violated by a civilized state. In the last analysis, 
 then, we must fall back on the only German argument 
 which has any strength — that of necessity pure and 
 simple. 
 
 Before we take up the main argument, it may be ob- 
 served that the excuse of necessity can serve as a justifi- 
 cation only when there actually is a necessity. It will not 
 suffice that the one who disregards the ordinary rules sup- 
 posed such a necessity to exist. In this present war there 
 was really no necessity for violating the neutrahty of Bel- 
 gium, since Germany had another perfectly feasible plan of 
 campaign. She might have confined her offensive opera- 
 tions to the eastern frontier and remained on the defensive 
 on the West, forcing France to adopt the role of the aggres- 
 sor. 
 
 For the sake of argument, however, we will admit that 
 Germany could discover no other way to preserve her 
 national independence and integrity except by forcing her 
 way through Belgium to crush France. On this assumption 
 we must examine whether Germany can make out a case 
 to justify her action before the really impartial public opin- 
 ion of the world. Speaking generally, is there any restric- 
 tion upon the liberty of one individual to injure another 
 for his own preservation? 
 
 By restriction of the liberty to injure another for self- 
 preservation, we mean, of course, a self-imposed restric- 
 tion — that is, one which will affect the will in such a way 
 as to deter an individual from using strength to the de- 
 triment of another person, even though it be for the pur- 
 pose of preserving existence. The only limit which can be 
 self-imposed on this liberty to injure another must result 
 from respect for principles which are intended either for 
 the direct benefit of the individual himself, or for the pro- 
 
450 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tection of what he considers still more important. For ex- 
 ample, except when acting instinctively, an individual 
 would hardly take any action, whether involving injury to 
 another or not, when he felt absolutely convinced that his 
 own existence after the commission of the act would be an 
 intolerable burden for him. We are all brought up with the 
 idea that it is better to die than to live on as a miserable 
 creature despised by all. Pushing this idea still further, we 
 reach the stage when life seems intolerable unless we can 
 preserve and remain true to certain ideals. Suicide is the 
 ordinary outlet when an individual finds this impossible. 
 Consequently, individuals will sacrifice life and property 
 to defend a person or an ideal when a failure to do so would 
 result in making life unbearable. The refusal to injure an- 
 other, in order to preserve life, would not differ essentially 
 from the case just considered. 
 
 So by a projection of his personality into the future, an 
 individual is ready to sacrifice himself rather than retain 
 life upon conditions that he is not willing to accept. This 
 attitude toward the maintenance of certain ideals, becom- 
 ing widespread and generalized, brings it about that the 
 protection of certain principles or ideals is considered by 
 the better individuals as more important than life itself. 
 In any comjuunity those unwilling to put this ideal into 
 practice may, when those who believe in the ideal and ad- 
 here to it are sufficiently strong, be punished so severely in 
 one way or another as to act on the public imagination or 
 conscience and to enforce upon individuals the sacrifice 
 of certain primary or brute instincts for the good of all as 
 expressed in the ideal. In other words the community 
 will find a way to make life unbearable to those who do not 
 observe the ideal. 
 
 Deeper down than this superstructure of social and 
 ethical ideals, however, is the primary, fundamental love 
 of life, which like any other passion may be so strong in 
 many individuals as to defy the ideals of the enveloping 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 451 
 
 society. This primary instinct to live and the socially 
 evolved ideal, will be in constant conflict, and if the organ- 
 ized society is once well in the control of those who believe 
 in the enforcement of the ideal, the individual who gives 
 any indications of breaking away will be eliminated from 
 the society, with the result that the ideal becomes better 
 and better observed. We have a good example of this 
 willingness to sacrifice life for an ideal in the patriotic 
 spirit which makes a whole people rush to the defense of 
 the nation without regard to self-preservation. 
 
 Now, individuals, in addition to being members of inde- 
 pendent states, are also part of humanity, and the inde- 
 pendent governments to which they belong merely carry 
 on the principal relations of humanity, each acting as trus- 
 tees for that part of humanity embraced within the terri- 
 tories it controls. Each government must, in the long run, 
 give expression to the views which prevail and control the 
 action of the individuals composing it. Just as in each 
 such state certain principles will be found to be more ap- 
 preciated than life, so in the realm of world society, or 
 humanity, individuals may look upon certain ideals as 
 more important than their national life. When this stage 
 is reached, the individuals composing the state will prevent 
 their government from overriding the international or hu- 
 manitarian ideal even for the preservation of the nation's 
 life. Should the individuals composing a state allow their 
 government to trample upon such humanitarian ideals, 
 the people of other states, acting unitedly and individually 
 through the agency of their governments, will be found 
 discriminating against that people and punishing it so se- 
 verely as to deter any other state from a similar violation 
 in future. Should mistaken ideals prevail, and attempts be 
 made to exact respect for principles the maintenance of 
 which would not be for the general good, governments at- 
 tempting to disregard these principles for immediately 
 selfish ends will be successful, and in consequence the un- 
 
452 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 workable theory will be discarded. Ideals which have to 
 be discarded as impractical for our present stage of devel- 
 opment may be resurrected again when a higher general 
 level of civilization shall have been reached. 
 
 In our municipal law we have long left behind the brutal 
 idea that one individual may sacrifice an innocent neighbor 
 to save himself. 1 Our laws do not permit any one to 
 sacrifice another innocent individual to save himself. In 
 the words of the judge who condemned to death for mur- 
 der two men who had killed and eaten a boy to save 
 themselves: '*To preserve one's life is generally speak- 
 ing a duty, but it may be the plainest and highest duty 
 to sacrifice it." ^ 
 
 The biological test, in my belief, will favor those states 
 which observe most perfectly in their relations with their 
 weaker neighbors this same principle. An occasional in- 
 stance may doubtless occiu-, in the course of generations, 
 where the observance of this rule will result in the de- 
 struction of the state which is true to the ideal. On the 
 other hand, the ill-repute arising from the sacrifice of a 
 weaker neighbor may be too heavy a burden for the trans- 
 gressor to bear. 
 
 The invasion of Belgium has been compared to the case 
 of a man who is guilty of a trespass in crossing his neigh- 
 bor's premises to escape from a fire. The purpose of this 
 comparison is to indicate that a lesser right should give 
 way before a greater. This idea of the relativity of rights 
 seems to me perfectly sound, even though the formal rules 
 of our legal system do not accord it the consideration it 
 merits. In the case of Belgium, however, the benefit of this 
 principle of the relativity of rights might be thought to 
 
 1 The eminent jurist, the late Professor John Westlake, of Cambridge 
 University, has stated this so clearly that I will not confuse what he has said 
 by the addition of a single word, but refer the reader to Westlake's own 
 lucid remarks. See post, chap. xiii. 
 
 2 Extracts from this remarkable case. Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 
 will be found among the Documents, chap. xiii. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 453 
 
 incline more to the support of the action of Belgium than 
 to that of Germany ; for Belgian independence would have 
 been a mere word if she had accepted the terms of the 
 German ultimatum. In such a case, were the Allies to win, 
 they would consider Belgian independence as a trap, which 
 they would remove so that they might not be caught in it 
 again. If, on the other hand, Germany were victorious, 
 Belgium would become a German protectorate. 
 
 It would be fairer then, if instead of comparing Ger- 
 many's action to that of a man who trespasses to save his 
 life, we should compare the invasion of Belgium to the case 
 of a man who does not wait to meet his adversary in a fair 
 fight, but tries to reach him by shooting through the walls 
 of an intervening house without regard to the lives of the 
 helpless inmates. 
 
 It may be asked whether the test of time will not favor 
 those little states which hold the defense of their honor 
 higher than the preservation of material existence, and 
 disparage those other states which would sacrifice another 
 for their own preservation. 
 
 If the society of nations is to make any further progress, 
 it must be recognized that the good of all the states is more 
 important than the good of any individual state. This 
 principle can have no force unless it means that there are 
 certain fundamental rights, the respect of which all must 
 place before every other consideration. Three of the most 
 fundamental principles of international law I believe to be : 
 
 (1) Good faith in the observance of treaties.^ 
 
 ^ It is worth while to compare the statement of the present German 
 Chancellor in reference to Belgian neutrality (see above, chap, viii, § 16), 
 with the words of one of his predecessors; On May 2, 1871, Bismarck de- 
 clared before the Reichstag: — 
 
 " ' There could be no thought,' said Bismarck at that time, 'of our making 
 Alsace and Lorraine into a neutral country, like Belgium and Switzerland, 
 for that would have constituted a barrier which would have prevented our 
 ever attacking France; we are accustomed to respect treaties and neu- 
 tralities.'" (EmileWaxweiler, La Belgiqueneutreetloyale, p. 72. Lausanne, 
 1915.) Cf. Les Discours de Bismarck, vol. in, p. 419. Berlin, 1886. 
 
 In explanation of his remark that England was making war on Germany, 
 
454 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 (2) The equality of all the states before the law.^ 
 
 (3) The observance by each state of all reasonably pos- 
 sible formalities and delays before having recourse 
 to force to make good its rights or to impose its 
 views. 
 
 It must be left to the impartial observer to answer in 
 
 "just for a scrap of paper," Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said in an inter- 
 view which he gave, on January 25, 1915, to the correspondent of the Asso- 
 ciated Press: — 
 
 "I am surprised to learn that my phrase, 'a scrap of paper,' which I 
 used in my last conversation with the British Ambassador in reference to 
 the Belgian neutrality treaty should have caused such an unfavorable 
 impression in the United States. The expression was used in quite another 
 connection and meaning from that implied in Sir Edward Goschen's report, 
 and the turn given to it in the biased comment of our enemies is undoubt- 
 edly responsible for this impression. 
 
 "My conversation with Sir Edward Goschen," said the Chancellor, "oc- 
 curred on the 4th August. I had just declared in the Reichstag that only 
 dire necessity, only the struggle for existence, compelled Germany to 
 march through Belgium, but that Germany was ready to make compen- 
 sation for the wrong committed. When I spoke I already had certain indica- 
 tions, but no absolute proof, on which to base a public accusation that 
 Belgium had long before abandoned its neutraUty in its relations with 
 England. Nevertheless, I took Germany's responsibilities toward neutral 
 States so seriously that I spoke frankly on the wrong committed by Ger- 
 many. What was the British attitude on the same question? " said the Chan- 
 cellor. "The day before my conversation with the British Ambassador, 
 Sir Edward Grey had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament, 
 wherein, while he did not state expressly that England would take part in 
 the war, he left the matter in little doubt. One needs only to read this 
 speech through carefully to learn the reason of England's intervention in the 
 war. Amid all his beautiful phrases about England's honor and England's 
 obligations we find it over and over again expressed that England's inter- 
 ests — its own interests — called for participation in war, for it was not 
 in England's interests that a victorious, and therefore stronger, Germany 
 should emerge from the war. This old principle of England's policy — to 
 take as the sole criterion of its actions its private interests regardless of right, 
 reason, or considerations of humanity — is expressed in that speech of 
 Gladstone's in 1870 on Belgian neutrality from which Sir Edward quoted. 
 Mr. Gladstone then declared that he was unable to subscribe to the doctrine 
 that the simple fact of the existence of a guaranty is binding upon every 
 party thereto, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it 
 may find itself at the time when the occasion for action on the guaranty 
 
 ^ This equality refers only to questions of law. In all political questions 
 it is inevitable that the more powerful states should be more generally able 
 to secure the acceptance of tlieir views. See above, p. 393, note 1. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 455 
 
 how far Germany has observed these three rules. It must 
 be remembered also that the law of nations is a practical 
 system which has weathered the worst storms of national 
 
 arrives, and he referred to such English statesmen as Aberdeen and Palmers- 
 ton as supporters of his views. 
 
 "England drew the sword," continued the Chancellor, "only because 
 she beheved her own interests demanded it. Just for Belgian neutrality 
 she would never have entered the war. That is what I meant when I told 
 Sir Edward Goschen, in that last interview when we sat down to talk the 
 matter over privately man to man, that among the reasons which had 
 impelled England into war the Belgian neutrahty treaty had for her only 
 the value of a scrap of paper. I may have been a bit excited and aroused," 
 said the Chancellor. "Who would not have been at seeing the hopes and 
 work of the whole period of my Chancellorship going for naught? I recalled 
 to the Ambassador my efforts for years to bring about an understanding 
 between England and Germany, an understanding which, I reminded 
 him, would have made a general European war impossible, and have ab- 
 solutely guaranteed the peace of Europe. Such understanding," the Chan- 
 cellor interjected parenthetically, "would have formed the basis on which 
 we could have approached the United States as a third partner. But Eng- 
 land had not taken up this plan, and through its entry into the war had 
 destroyed forever the hope of its fulfilment. In comparison with such 
 momentous consequences, was the treaty not a scrap of paper? 
 
 "England ought really to cease harping on this theme of Belgian neu- 
 trality," said the Chancellor. "Documents on the Anglo-Belgian mihtary 
 agreement, which we have found in the mean time, show plainly enough 
 how England regarded this neutrality. As you know, we found in the 
 archives of the Belgian Foreign Office papers which showed that England 
 in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent 
 of the Belgian Government if war had then broken out. In other words, 
 do exactly the same thing for which, with all the pathos of virtuous in- 
 dignation, she now reproaches Germany. In some later dispatch Grey, I 
 believe, informed Belgium that he did not believe England would take such 
 a step, because he did not think English public opinion would justify such 
 action, and still people in the United States wonder that I characterized 
 as a scrap of paper a ti-eaty whose observance, according to responsible 
 British statesmen, should be dependent upon the pleasure of British public 
 opinion, a treaty which England herself had long since undermined by 
 military agreements with Belgium. Remember, too, that Sir Edward 
 Grey expressly refused to assure us of England's neutrality even in the 
 eventuality that Germany respected Belgian neutrality. I can under- 
 stand, therefore, English displeasure at my characterization of the Treaty 
 of 1839 as a scrap of paper, for this scrap of paper was for England ex- 
 tremely valuable, as furnishing an excuse before the world for embarking 
 in the war. I hope, therefore, that in the United States you will think clearly 
 enough and realize that England in this matter, too, acted solely on the 
 principle, 'Right or wrong, my interests.'" (Extract.) Space does not 
 permit the addition of Grey's authorized reply; see statement in press, 
 January 27, 1915. 
 
456 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 passions and hatred and yet continues on its sublime 
 course. Its true and fundamental rules can no more be 
 disregarded without punishment than can the laws of 
 hygiene. If I am wrong in my criticism of Germany's 
 action, on the ground that she has violated international 
 law, time will disclose the truth and indicate the right 
 path to follow. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 ITALY REMAINS NEUTRAL 
 
 Italy desirous for peace — San Giuliano's helpful suggestions — Italian 
 cooperation with England — Italy declares that she will remain neutral. 
 
 1 . Italy desirous for peace 
 
 The position of Italy is one of the most interesting fea- 
 tures of the present war. By its very nature, the Triple 
 Alliance contained within itself the seeds of its own disso- 
 lution. For the first interest of Italy, since she obtained 
 her national unity, has been to acquire the neighboring 
 Italian-speaking provinces of Trieste and the Trentino, 
 which she would lay claim to on the basis of the principle 
 of nationality. This aspiration of Italy for what is called 
 ''Itaha Irredenta" — that is to say, the remnant of Italy 
 unredeemed from Austrian sway — has been a constant 
 source of irritation between the two countries, and it has 
 required all the efforts of Germany to keep the peace. As 
 Count Nigra said to Von Biilow, '^ Austria and Italy can 
 only be either allies or enemies. " ^ 
 
 The first serious blow to the Triple Alliance was struck 
 when Italy threw her influence against her ally at the Al- 
 gecirag Conference. A still ruder shock was the Austrian 
 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The consolidation 
 of Austrian strength in those provinces of Bosnia and Her- 
 zegovina was most irritating to Italy; but she prepared a 
 subtle diplomatic coup, and shortly after, in 1911, launched 
 a war against Turkey, a state which had come to be con- 
 sidered as a component part of the Triple Alliance group. 
 It would have taken the diplomacy of a Bismarck to have 
 extricated Germany from this precarious and involved situ- 
 ation; for any interference on the part of Austria or Ger- 
 
 ^ Von Biilow, Imperial Germany. New York, 1914, p. 69. 
 
458 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 many would have thrown Italy into the arms of England 
 and France and made of her an integral part of the Triple 
 Entente. So Germany had to stand by and see her Otto- 
 man protege stripped of her possessions, and her weakness 
 shown up to the world. Perhaps a later and careful study 
 of the diplomacy of this epoch will show that Germany 
 made a great mistake in not insisting upon arresting this 
 conflict; but had she been successful, she would probably 
 have had to prepare in quick succession for an attack from 
 France and Russia, assisted by Italy smarting under her 
 check. So Germany considered that she must stand by, 
 and tolerate Italy's undermining of the Triple Alliance by 
 the dismembering of Turkey. 
 
 Still another cause of discord, and consequent weakening 
 of the Triple Alliance, resulted from the settlement of the 
 Balkan conflict. Austria and Italy had checked Servia's 
 aspiration for control of Albania and had set up an in- 
 dependent state under international supervision, which 
 meant that Austria and Italy would commence a diplo- 
 matic duel to secure control. This ground of difference 
 with Austria, added to the ever-present popular aspira- 
 tions toward ''Italia Irredenta," increased the difficulty of 
 maintaining the peace of the Adriatic. Even had the War 
 of 1914 not broken out, a conflict between Austria and 
 Italy seemed imminent, or at most a question of a few 
 years — perhaps months. Such was the situation at the 
 outbreak of the war.^ 
 
 In the light of conditions we have just outlined, Italy 
 might well consider that the success of the Triple Alliance 
 would mean dictation by Germany and Austria, an in- 
 crease of Austrian and German power in the Balkans, and 
 consequently Austrian control of Albania and the length- 
 
 1 The recent disclosures of ex-Premier Giolitti have shown how Italy 
 blocked Austria's plans for a war against Servia in August, 1913, just after 
 Servia had been so successful in foiling Austrian plans and had emerged 
 from the Treaty of Bukharest with her territory almost doubled. (See post, 
 p. 471.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 459 
 
 ening and strengthening of Austria's grip on the Adriatic 
 coast Hne opposite Italy. From this point of view, Italy's 
 immediate interest would point to her making common 
 cause with the Triple Entente; and she had another reason 
 perhaps of more immediate compeUing force, in that her 
 extensive coast line offered an easy target to the fleets of 
 France in control of the Mediterranean. Now that Italy 
 had acquired TripoU, she had given a hostage to the powers 
 in control of the Mediterranean. Italy understands that it 
 is a first consideration of self-preservation for her never to 
 be engaged in conflict with a power in control of the Med- 
 iterranean. 
 
 Italy's position was further complicated by her inclu- 
 sion in the Triple Alliance, according to the terms of which 
 Italy is in certain circumstances obligated to come to the 
 assistance of her two alUes. It has been much argued 
 whether the present conflict constitutes a casus foederis 
 under the terms of the alliance. To discuss this intelli- 
 gently, we should have to know what obligations Italy had 
 undertaken toward Germany and Austria.^ We only know 
 that Italy has considered that Austria and Germany were 
 the aggressors and that she was not obligated to come to 
 their assistance. This is the gist of the whole question, and 
 has been much obscured by the efforts of all parties to 
 avoid any aggressive action, for the very high purpose of 
 influencing Italy's action and at the same time bidding for 
 the support of international opinion. 
 
 The fact remains, after all is said and done, that it is 
 very difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy 
 which party is the aggressor in any conflict. If Russia, for 
 example, should mobilize, out of a clear sky, along the 
 German frontier, Germany would certainly have to de- 
 clare war and put herself technically in the position of the 
 
 1 The terms of the Triple Alliance have not been published, but Bismarck 
 published in 1888 the terms of the Dual Alliance between Germany and 
 Austria, which is supposed to be the basis of the triplice formed by including 
 Italy. 
 
460 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 aggressor, but the causal act and incipient aggression 
 would have been entirely Russian. A political, defensive 
 alliance, if it has any real vigor, has always of necessity 
 a tendency to become something more than insm-ance 
 against attack, and as each member in turn gains from the 
 diplomatic support of its co-allies, the alliance comes in 
 time to be looked upon as forming a new, ill-defined po- 
 litical group. The impartial critic could not deny that, 
 even in the absence of aggression, there would be a certain 
 political obligation upon Italy to support her allies. On 
 the other hand, the actual situation of a country, and the 
 diplomatic premonitions which have been given of the 
 action it intends to adhere to, must always be considered 
 when discussing any question as to the good faith of a 
 nation. The good faith of the Italian Government in ob- 
 serving her treaties has always with reason stood very 
 high.^ In our own history we had a similar crisis, when we 
 refused to live up to the terms of our alliance with France 
 and join the French Revolutionists against England. 
 
 Looked at superficially, Italy, it might be thought, 
 would make common cause with her allies in the event of 
 war. But if Italy supported Germany and Austria, the re- 
 sults of a war, whether victory or defeat, might be disas- 
 trous to her. In case of victory, Austria would become 
 dangerously powerful, and the control of the Balkans — 
 and possibly of the mouth of the Adriatic — would tighten 
 her grasp on the Italian portions of her empire. If de- 
 feated, Italy would be bereft of Tripoh. On the other hand, 
 Italy's political conscience would not allow her to turn 
 against her allies; and even if she did so she might suffer 
 terribly from the invasion of her northern provinces. Italy, 
 therefore, had more than general objections to the rupture 
 of peace. The Marquis di San Giuliano made every effort 
 to preserve peace, and we need only read the telegrams 
 
 * The Giolitti disclosures reported in the press indicate that Italy did not 
 leave Austria in doubt as to her intentions. See post, p. 471. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 461 
 
 from Italy to make clear the quarter from which blew the 
 wind endangering it. (Cf. F. Y. B. nos. 17, 19, 27, 72; B. W. 
 P. no. 80). 
 
 On July 17, M. Michailovitch, Servian Minister at 
 Rome, telegraphed M. Pashitch: " I have reliable informer 
 tion that the Marquis di San Giuliano has declared to the 
 Austrian Ambassador that a demarche directed against 
 Servia, which did not treat Servia with the respect due from 
 one nation to another, would be condemned by public 
 opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government was 
 interested in the maintenance of the complete independ- 
 ence of Servia." ^ (July 17, S. B. B. no. 28.) 
 
 On July 25, ' the Italian Ambassador cordially approved 
 of what Sir Edward Grey had said to the German Am- 
 bassador, and made no secret of the fact that Italy was 
 most desirous to see war avoided.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 25, B. W. P. no 29.) 
 
 Italy thus showed a general desire to cooperate with 
 Great Britain in her efforts to preserve peace. (See B. W. P. 
 nos. 57, 86, 90.) From the first the Marquis di San Giuli- 
 ano supported Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a confer- 
 ence of the four powers at London. (B. W. P. nos. 35, 63.) 
 
 The importance of Italy's influence for peace is also dis- 
 closed by M. Sazonof 's telegram to the Russian Ambassa- 
 dor in Italy : ' Italy might play a role of first importance in 
 helping to maintain peace, by exercising the necessary in- 
 fluence upon Austria and by adopting an attitude clearly 
 in opposition to the conflict, for it cannot be localized. It 
 is desirable that you express the conviction that it is im- 
 
 * Mr. Price, referring to Sazonof 's proposal to the " eflFect that France and 
 Germany should fall out of the mediation scheme, and that the good offices 
 of two powers only, England and Italy, should be used," writes: "This 
 seems to mean that Russia was attempting to detach Italy from the Triple 
 Alliance, and then use her as a mediator with England." (M. P. Price, 
 The Diplomatic History of the War, p. 31 .) The above dispatch of the Servian 
 Minister shows that Servia and hence Russia also were well aware of Italy's 
 attitude and that she had so little sympathy with Austria's projects as to 
 warn her against the course she was about to take. 
 
462 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 possible for Russia not to come to the aid of Servia.' (Mod- 
 ified quotation, July 26, R. 0. P. no. 23.) 
 
 2. San Giuliano's helpful suggestions 
 On July 27, the Marquis di San Giuliano returned to 
 Rome, and in a conversation which he had immediately 
 after his arrival, with M. Barrere, the French Ambassador 
 to Italy, 'he spoke to him of the contents of the Austrian 
 note, and formally assured him that he had not had any 
 previous knowledge of it. He knew, indeed, that this note 
 was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had 
 not suspected that it could take such a form. The Am- 
 bassador asked him if it was true that he had given at 
 Vienna, as certain papers alleged, an approval of the Aus- 
 trian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfill her 
 duties as an ally toward Austria. ''In no way," the Min- 
 ister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; 
 it was not for us then to make any such communication to 
 Vienna." The Marquis di San Giuliano thought that 
 Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted 
 the note in its entirety; that day he still thought that that 
 would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Aus- 
 tria would not withdraw any of her claims, and would 
 maintain them even at the risk of bringing about a general 
 conflagration; he doubted whether Germany was disposed 
 to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserted, 
 however, that Germany at that moment attached great 
 importance to her relations with London, and believed 
 that if any power could determine Berlin in favor of peace- 
 ful action, it was England. As for Italy, she would con- 
 tinue to make every effort in favor of peace. It was with 
 that end in view that he had adhered without hesitation 
 to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of 
 the ambassadors of those powers which were not directly 
 interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 72.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 463 
 
 On July 28, as a result of his conversation with the Ser- 
 vian Charge d'Affaires at Rome, the Marquis di San Giu- 
 liano told the British Ambassador that 'he thought that 
 if some explanations were given regarding the manner in 
 which the Austrian agents would require to intervene 
 under Articles V and VI, Servia might still accept the 
 whole Austrian note. As it was not to be anticipated that 
 Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they 
 might be given to the powers engaged in- discussions, who 
 might then advise Servia to accept without conditions. In 
 the Austrian official explanation of the grounds on which 
 the Servian reply was considered inadequate, the Marquis 
 considered many points besides explanation — such as 
 slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation 
 of propaganda — quite childish, but there was a passage 
 which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as 
 was considered practicable by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. 
 It was stated that cooperation of Austrian agents in Servia 
 was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or adminis- 
 trative measures. Servia was said to have willfully misin- 
 terpreted this. He thought, therefore, that the ground 
 might be cleared here. He impressed upon the Ambassador, 
 above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of dis- 
 cussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every 
 point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement 
 with England and Germany had, he said, been given to 
 the Italian Ambassador.' (Modified quotation, July 28, 
 B. W. P. no. 64.) 
 
 On July 29, the British Ambassador at Rome learned of 
 'information received by the Italian Government that 
 Germany was really opposed to a conference, in spite of the 
 statement of Prince Lichnowsky about Germany's accept- 
 ance of it in ''principle." The ItaUan Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs informed the ambassadors that he was telegraph- 
 ing to Berlin to urge adherence to the idea of an exchange 
 of views in London, and suggested that the German Secre- 
 
464 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his 
 Government. He was of the opinion that this exchange of 
 views would keep the door open if the direct communica- 
 tions between Vienna and St. Petersburg failed to have 
 any result. He thought that this exchange of views might 
 be concomitant with such direct conamunications. He also 
 said that he was informing the German Government that 
 the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public 
 opinion in Italy unless they had taken every possible step 
 to avoid war. He was urging that the German Govern- 
 ment must lend their cooperation in this. There seemed to 
 be a difficulty in making Germany beheve that Russia was 
 in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for 
 good relations with Great Britain, if she believed that 
 Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he 
 thought it would have a great effect. Even should it prove 
 impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still 
 advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one 
 group, should continue to exchange views.' (Modified 
 quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 80.) 
 On July 29, 'the Marquis di San GiuHano^ suggested 
 
 ^ The London Times of December 5, 1914, prints a Reuter dispatch, 
 an extract from which sums up tersely San Giuliano's direction of Italian 
 diplomacy just preceding the war: — 
 
 "Since the beginning of July, when, after the murder at Serajevo, the re- 
 lations between Austria and Serbia became most strained, the Marquis di 
 San Giuliano, the Itahan Foreign Minister, thought it his duty to advise 
 Vienna to use moderation and to avoid the intervention of Russia in support 
 of Belgrade. Austria answered that she did not believe that Russia was suf- 
 ficiently prepared after the Japanese War to undertake military action in 
 favour of Serbia, bringing forward as an example the attitude of Russia dur- 
 ing the whole Conference of London after the Balkan War, when she was 
 unable to make her supremacy in the Balkans felt. 
 
 "The Marquis di San Giuliano replied that, according to his information, 
 the situation was changed, and Russia would not tolerate any attempt to 
 limit the independence and sovereignty of Serbia or any diminution of her 
 territory. Austria retorted that in such a case the intervention of Russia 
 would be answered by the participation of Germany in the war. The Italian 
 Foreign Minister pointed out the enormous gravity of this plan, as the ac- 
 tion of Germany would inevitably mean the intervention of Great Britain. 
 
 "Both Vienna and Berlin replied that they were convinced that at the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 465 
 
 that the German objections to the mediation of the four 
 powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, 
 might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.' 
 (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 92.) July 30, 
 'when the Marquis learned that Austria had refused to 
 continue the direct exchange of views, and believing that 
 Germany was then ready to give Austria more concilia- 
 tory advice, he suggested that an exchange of views be- 
 tween the four powers should be resumed in any form 
 which Austria would consider acceptable.' (Modified quo- 
 tation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 106.) 
 
 3. Italian cooperation with England 
 In a conversation, on July 26, with M. Barrere, the 
 French Ambassador at Rome, Signor Salandra said in re- 
 gard to the attitude the Italian Government would take: 
 ''We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent the rupture 
 of peace : our situation is somewhat similar to that of Eng- 
 land. It is possible that we might be able to take some 
 action with England toward maintaining the peace." (Ex- 
 tract, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 51.) The advantage of such a 
 collaboration on the part of the two powers least directly 
 involved in the Austro-Servian controversy is evident, be- 
 cause, even after Germany might have become involved in 
 reply to Russian mobilization and have raUied to the sup- 
 port of her ally, these two powers, one from each group, 
 Entente and Alliance, could still continue their united 
 efforts in the cause of peace. 
 
 At St. Petersburg, on July 26, when M. Sazonof pointed 
 out to the Austrian Ambassador why he considered the 
 Austrian note unacceptable, he remarked that 'it would be 
 
 last moment Great Britain would not take upon herself the risk of enter- 
 ing a European war. The Marquis reiterated that such a view was erron- 
 eous, having sufficient foundation for the opinion that the exact opposite 
 would occur, but his warning was in vain. Events were precipitated by 
 the ultimatum to Serbia, which was sent without Italy's either being con- 
 sulted or notified." 
 
466 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, 
 in view of the fact that she was the object of such sus- 
 picion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the 
 present tension, he thought that England and Italy might 
 be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Am- 
 bassador undertook to communicate the Minister's re- 
 marks to his Government.' (Modified quotation, July 27, 
 B. W. P. no. 44.) A couple of days later, the Marquis di San 
 Giuliano made the various suggestions indicated above; 
 more particularly he hinted that it would have a most salu- 
 tary effect if England would act with France and Russia; 
 but in case that proved impossible he declared that *'he 
 would still advocate that England and Italy, each as repre- 
 senting one group, should continue to exchange views." 
 (July 29, B. W. P. no. 80.) Again, on July 30, the resource- 
 ful Minister made still other suggestions to the British Am- 
 bassador, and concluded by repeating what he had said the 
 day before that ' he in any case was in favor of continuing 
 an exchange of views with the British Government, if the 
 idea of direct discussions between the four powers was im- 
 possible.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B.W.P. no 106.) 
 M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a 
 conversation with the British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg, August 1, said that he had refused no suggestion held 
 out to him, and enumerated those he had accepted, among 
 them the proposal for mediation by Great Britain and 
 Italy. (Cf. August 1, B. W. P. no. 139.) 
 ' Elsewhere in the British White Paper I find no refer- 
 ence to this proposal for the joint mediation of Great Brit- 
 ain and Italy, and am unable to discover whether Italy 
 went any further than merely to make the suggestion. 
 This plan of Anglo-Italian mediation perhaps offered the 
 method best calculated to preserve the peace, and if it 
 could have been possible for these two less directly involved 
 states to declare that they would make common cause 
 against the aggressor, neither Austria, Russia, Germany, 
 
 I 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 467 
 
 nor France would have dared to traverse their frontiers 
 with hostile intent. But either the time was too short, or 
 the obhgations of the alliance too encumbering, to permit 
 of the putting into effect of Anglo-Italian intervention in 
 favor of peace. 
 
 4. Italy declares that she will remain neutral 
 
 Austria and Germany had had occasion to sound Italy 
 in regard to her action in the event of a European war re- 
 sulting from an attack upon Servia, and although the re- 
 cent tragedy had strengthened Austria's position in the 
 eyes of Europe, the nature of the Austro-Servian disagree- 
 ment remained the same. 
 
 The Entente Powers must, on the other hand, have felt 
 considerable anxiety as to the course Italy would pursue. 
 From the very first days of the crisis, this solicitude is in- 
 dicated in the reports made by the ambassadors of the 
 Entente Powers to their Governments, especially as to 
 whether Italy had been consulted in regard to the demarche 
 at Belgrade. 
 
 On July 24, — that is, the day after the presentation of 
 the Austrian ultimatum, — the Acting Foreign Minister in 
 France, in a telegram sent to Stockholm to reach M. Vivi- 
 ani and President Poincar^, then on their return journey 
 on board the France, said: ''It appears from the informa- 
 tion we obtain that not until to-day was the Austrian note 
 communicated to Italy, and that she was neither con- 
 sulted nor even informed about it." (Extract, July 24, 
 F. Y. B. no. 26.) July 25, the French Ambassador at Berlin 
 learned through the Belgian Minister that 'the Italian 
 Ambassador, who had just cut short his leave to return to 
 his post, said that Italy was surprised, to say the least, at 
 having been kept in the dark regarding the whole affair by 
 her two allies.' (Modified quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 
 35.) 
 
 Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, 
 
468 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 in his report written after his return to London, says: 
 "It might have been supposed that the Due Avarna, 
 Ambassador of the alUed Itahan Kingdom, which was 
 bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in 
 the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confi- 
 dence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In 
 point of fact. His Excellency was left completely in the 
 dark." (Extract, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10 [1914], 
 
 p.l.) 
 
 In a telegram sent July 26, transmitted to M. Viviani 
 and the French representatives abroad, the French Acting 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the Italian Govern- 
 ment, ' ' to whom the Austrian note had been communicated 
 on Friday, ^ without any request for support or even advice, 
 could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, 
 who does not return until Tuesday [July 28], make any reply 
 to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing 
 to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears 
 from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambas- 
 sador to M. Pal^ologue [French Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg] that at Vienna people still nurse the illusion that 
 Russia 'will not hold fast.' It must not be forgotten that 
 Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Al- 
 Hance if she has been consulted beforehand." (Extract, 
 July 26, F. Y. B. no. 50.) 
 
 A dispatch, however, of the same date (July 26) from M. 
 Barrere, the French Ambassador at Rome, shows that the 
 Acting French Foreign Minister was mistaken, for Signor 
 Salandra stated to him that * the Austrian note had been 
 communicated to Rome at the last moment. M. Barrere 
 carried away from his conversation with the President of 
 the Council the impression, gathered from the general 
 drift of his remarks, that the Italian Government would be 
 willing in case of war to keep out of it and maintain an at- 
 
 1 That is July 24, the day after the presentation of the Ultimatum to 
 Servia. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 469 
 
 titude of observation.' (Modified quotation, July 26, 
 F. Y. B. no 51.) 
 
 Yet, when, upon his return to Rome on the evening of 
 July 27, the Marquis di San Giuliano saw the French Am- 
 bassador, he spoke to him of the contents of the Austrian 
 note and formally assured him that he had had no previous 
 knowledge of it.^ 'He knew, indeed, that this note was to 
 have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not 
 suspected that it could take such a form. The Ambassador 
 asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as 
 certain papers alleged, an approval of the Austrian action 
 and an assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as an 
 ally toward Austria. ''In no way," the Minister replied: 
 "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not 
 for us then to make any such conamunication to Vienna.'" 
 (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 72.) 
 
 We have the statement of the French Ambassador at 
 Rome that 'Italian public opinion was hostile to Austria 
 in the serious situation of affairs.' (Modified quotation, 
 July 26, F. Y. B. no. 52.) 
 
 On August 1, the French Ambassador at Rome sent the 
 following dispatch to his Government : — 
 
 "I went to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning 
 at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from 
 him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative 
 acts of Germany and the results which they may have. 
 
 "The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had 
 seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr 
 von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested 
 the Russian Government to suspend mobilization, and the 
 French Government to inform them as to their intentions; 
 Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours 
 and Russia a time limit of twelve hours. 
 
 » Probably the Minister only meant that he had not known about the 
 note before its presentation. It seems, however, from Signor Salandra's 
 statement, that it was communicated to Rome shortly before it was pre- 
 sented at Belgrade. 
 
470 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ' "Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication 
 asked what were the intentions of the ItaUan Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 ''The Marquis di San GiuHano answered that as the war 
 undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall 
 within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, 
 particularly in view of the consequences which might re- 
 sult from it according to the declaration of the German 
 Ambassador, Italy would not be able to take part in the 
 war." (August 1, F. Y. B. no. 124.) 
 
 On August 1, the French Ambassador at London made 
 the following communication : — 
 
 "In reply to the German Government's intimation of 
 the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France 
 and Russia, and to the question as to what were the inten- 
 tions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied : ' The 
 war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which 
 might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador 
 himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in con- 
 flict with the purely defensive character of the Triple 
 Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain 
 neutral.' 
 
 ''In making this communication, M. Cambon was in- 
 structed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the 
 present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, 
 and that, for this reason the casus fcederis under the terms 
 of the Triple Alliance did not arise." (August 3, B. W. P. 
 no. 152.) 
 
 Any suspicion that Italy had not been frank with her 
 allies is disproved by the declaration which Signor Gio- 
 vanni Giolitti, the former Premier, made in the Italian 
 Chamber of Deputies, December 5, when announcing his 
 approval of the Government's policy of neutrality: — 
 
 "I feel it my duty to recall a precedent showing how cor- 
 rect was the interpretation of the alliance by the Govern- 
 ment when the conflict began. During the Balkan War, on 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 471 
 
 August 9, 1913, being absent from Rome, I received the 
 following telegram from the late Marquis di San Giuliano : ^ 
 '''Austria has communicated to us and Germany that it 
 has been the intention to act against Servia, defining such 
 action as defensive and hoping for an application of a casus 
 fcederis by the Triple Alliance, which I consider inappli- 
 cable. I am trying to agree with Germany concerning 
 efforts to prevent Austrian action, but it may be necessary 
 to say clearly that we do not consider such eventual ac- 
 tion as defensive, and, therefore, do not think that there 
 exists a casus foederis. Please send a telegram saying 
 whether you approve.' 
 
 ''I answered Marquis di San Giuhano thus: 'If Austria 
 goes against Servia, a casus foederis evidently does not ex- 
 ist. It is an action she accomplishes on her own account. 
 It is not defensive, because nobody thinks of attacking 
 her. It is necessary to declare this to Austria in the most 
 formal manner, hoping that Germany will act to dissuade 
 Austria from a very dangerous adventure.' 
 
 ''This was done, and our interpretation of the treaty was 
 accepted by our allies, our friendly relations not being in 
 the least disturbed. Thus the declaration of neutrality, 
 made at the beginning of this conflict, is according to the 
 spirit and letter of the treaties. I recall this incident, wish- 
 ing to demonstrate the complete loyalty of Italy before the 
 eyes of Europe." ^ 
 
 Not only have Germany and Austria refrained from crit- 
 icizing Italy for her stand, but Germany's ex-Chancellor, 
 Prince von Biilow, made the following statement in his 
 book published just before the outbreak of the war : "Sup- 
 posing Italy were not able in every conceivable circum- 
 stance to go to all lengths with Austria and us, and if we 
 and Austria likewise were not able to support Italy in all 
 
 1 The late Marquis di San Giuliano was, at the time referred to, Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of which Signor Giolitti was Premier. 
 
 2 From the New York Times, December 7, 1914. 
 
472 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 complications of international politics, even then each one 
 of the three powers would, by virtue of the existing alli- 
 ance, be prevented from assisting the enemy. That is 
 what Prince Bismarck meant when he once remarked that 
 it was sufficient for him that an Italian corporal with the 
 Italian flag and a drummer beside him should array them- 
 selves against the West, i.e., France, and not against the 
 East, i.e., Austria." ^ 
 
 Let me conclude this discussion of Italy's attitude up to 
 the outbreak of the war by an extract from a recent ar- 
 ticle by William Roscoe Thayer: ^ 
 
 "Too little has been said about Italy's refusal to join 
 Germany and Austria in their war for world power. Dur- 
 ing the past five months we have heard German apologists 
 offer the most contradictory arguments to prove, first, that 
 Russia, next, that France and Belgium, and, finally, that 
 England began the struggle. The Kaiser himself, with 
 that disdain of fact which is the privilege of autocrats, de- 
 clared that the sword was forced into his hands. And all 
 the while the mere abstention of Italy from supporting 
 Germany and Austria gave the lie to the Germanic pro- 
 testations and excuses. 
 
 *'By the terms of the Triple Alliance every member of 
 it is bound to communicate at once to the other members 
 all international diplomatic transactions which concern 
 the alliance. Germany and Austria failed to do this during 
 the earlier stages in July, when they were preparing for 
 war. Only after they had laid their train so surely that 
 an explosion was almost inevitable did they communicate 
 the documents to Italy and call upon her to take her place 
 in the field with them. But Italy refused; because, after 
 examining the evidence, she concluded that Germany and 
 Austria were the aggressors. Now, the terms of the Triple 
 
 1 Imperial Germany, pp. 72-73. New York, 1914. 
 
 2 This valuable discussion of Italy's relation to the war appeared in the 
 New York Tim^s, Sunday edition, January 17, 1915. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 473 
 
 Alliance bind its members to stand by each other only in 
 case of attack. 
 
 "Italy's verdict, therefore, threw the guilt of the war on 
 Germany and Austria. She had testimony before her 
 which does not appear even in the 'White Papers' and 
 other official diplomatic correspondence; and all the efforts 
 of German zealots and casuists have not subtracted one 
 iota from the meaning of her abstention. Germany and 
 Austria were the aggressors — that is the Italian verdict, 
 which history will confirm. 
 
 ''But a still further consideration influenced her. It was 
 understood that, if the war in which Germany and Austria 
 engaged should involve England as an enemy, Italy's 
 obligation to support the Triple AUiance would cease. 
 Since it would be suicidal for Italy to accept the liability 
 of a casus foederis which should expose her to attack by the 
 English and French navies, her participation in the Triple 
 Alliance always carried the proviso that it did not bind her 
 to fight England." 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The interest of the United States in the war — Suggested and alleged 
 causes of the war — Displacement of the balance of power — The immedi- 
 ate causes of the war — The determining causes of the war — The world's 
 answer — Formation of a Super-Empire — The "Peace power" — Ger- 
 many's nationalistic conception — Nationalism and internationalism. — 
 The results. 
 
 1 . The interest of the United States in the war 
 The United States is more than an interested spectator 
 — it is vitally affected by the war. In the early part of 
 July, 1914, hardly any one on this side of the Atlantic real- 
 ized that trouble was brewing, and when, in the last week 
 of the month, we heard of one threatening move after an- 
 other, it seemed too terrible to believe. As I look back, the 
 strongest impression I recall of the days just preceding the 
 war is that the renewal of negotiations between Austria 
 and Russia, as reported on July 29 and 30, seemed to point 
 to the probability of a peaceful solution, and the continued 
 sailing of the great German liners gave indication that all 
 hope was not lost. The whole country was horrified at the 
 prospect of such a war, and many, up to the very last, re- 
 fused to believe it possible. 
 
 It was inevitable that war on such a scale should seri- 
 ously affect our economic interests. Not only were our 
 markets and sources of supplies disorganized by the mili- 
 tary operations, but almost all our sea-borne commerce 
 was in the hands of one or the other belligerent, so that we 
 could not depend upon adequate shipping facilities. In 
 fact, many of the ships flying a belligerent flag were Am- 
 erican-owned, and their seizure would be a loss to Ameri- 
 can capital. It is not, however, the serious monetary losses 
 of this country by reason of the war which explain our pe- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 475 
 
 culiar interest. More significant still is the fact that, of the 
 population of the United States, more than ten millions 
 were born within the territory of the belligerents.^ The in- 
 fluence, direct and indirect, of these millions permeates this 
 whole country, and deepens our concern in what is taking 
 place beyond the seas. The American people is thoroughly 
 imbued with the idea that any avoidable war is a crime 
 against humanity, and before we blame any of the con- 
 tending powers, we must make every effort to ascertain 
 what were the causes of the outbreak of the War of 1914. 
 
 2. Suggested and alleged causes of the war 
 
 The interest of the belligerents in the consideration of 
 the causes of the conflict is much obscured by the all-per- 
 vading event itself. It is desirable to consider the causes 
 of the war, if only to help avoid a repetition of the catas- 
 trophe. In the United States we are particularly well situ- 
 ated to make this the object of our study. Among the sug- 
 gested causes of the war are — the monarchical form of 
 government; exaggerated armaments; territorial ambi- 
 tion; England's repression of Germany and Germany's 
 consequent jealousy; capitalistic organization of the state; 
 seizure of private property at sea; tariff barriers; nervous 
 tension resulting from successive alarms; poHtical ignor- 
 ance and mistrust; unequal speed of mobilization; division 
 of Europe into two groups of alliances ; displacement of the 
 balance of power; secret diplomacy; Germany's refusal to 
 join in mediation; Russia's premature mobilization against 
 Germany; national hatred; patriotism; mystic conception 
 of the state; deification of force; England's hesitation in 
 siding with Russia and France. 
 
 All these reasons and many another have been adduced. 
 If many English sympathizers declare that Germany in her 
 
 1 This does not include a million and a half of Italians and many millions 
 more of our citizens who have one or both parents from a belligerent coun- 
 try. (United States Census Report, on "Foreigners in the United States in 
 1910.") 
 
476 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 lust for empire intended to wage a war for the domination 
 of the Continent, the Germans answer that EngUsh jeal- 
 ousy, selfishness, and imperialistic designs threatened to 
 strangle her rival's development. The pacifist blames the 
 competition in armament, while the strategist gives an ex- 
 planation diametrically opposed, to the effect that the un- 
 preparedness of the Entente Powers invited attack, and 
 that the inability of Russia to mobilize with speed forced 
 the issue as soon as she made a move to prepare for her de- 
 fense. For others, the cause is the inanity of the diploma- 
 tists. Many a casual student of pohtics will take upon 
 himself to give an offhand explanation of how certain states- 
 men or diplomatists might have acted so as to save the 
 peace of the world. 
 
 The really significant thing about all these causes, main- 
 tained with such sincerity, is their variety, their independ- 
 ence one of another, one might say even their mutual ex- 
 clusion. It shows that we are in the presence of a great 
 tidal movement in the affairs of men which we find it diffi- 
 cult to appreciate because of the very fact that we are in it 
 and part of it. Under the circumstances, it is very natural 
 for each individual to fasten the blame upon the side with 
 which he has least sympathy, and to select his particular 
 phobia as the basic cause of the conflict. 
 
 3. Displacement of the balance of power 
 When everything is considered, it may perhaps be said 
 that one of the most important contributory causes of the 
 outbreak was the distm-bance of the balance of power be- 
 tween the two groups, the Triple Entente and the Triple 
 AlUance. Ever since the Congress of Vienna, Europe has 
 been slowly working out its political evolution from the 
 necessarily unstable condition of a number of nearly equal 
 powers toward a division of these powers into two great 
 groups. 
 Great Britain at first held aloof in '^splendid isolation." 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 477 
 
 Later she found that even the two opposed groups on the 
 Continent were gradually becoming conscious of the ad- 
 vantage which would result from sinking their immediate 
 grounds of difference and forming a union to oppose any 
 further extension of British power. The danger of this situ- 
 ation could not fail to impress Great Britain and make her 
 all the quicker to perceive the community of interest 
 which she had with France. Then came the growing rivalry 
 with Germany to hasten the formation of the Entente. 
 Without joining in a formal alliance, Great Britain was 
 still true to her traditional policy in throwing her weight 
 against the more powerful continental group, which in- 
 cluded her most immediate rival, Germany. Great Bri- 
 tain's association with France was soon followed by an 
 understanding with Russia to form the Triple Entente. 
 This policy, taken in conjunction with England's friendly 
 relations with the United States and her alliance with 
 Japan, made it possible for her to turn her principal at- 
 tention to the settlement of her outstanding differences 
 with Germany. England and France, both rich, conserva- 
 tive powers, wanted to keep what they already had and to 
 get rid of the intolerable burdens of increasing armaments. 
 Germany, on the other hand, considered that disarma- 
 ment would put an end to her imperialistic aspirations 
 and leave her industrial development at the mercy of Eng- 
 land and Russia — Russia with tremendous advantages 
 in her millions of population, and England enjoying her 
 superb geographical situation and her unparalleled finan- 
 cial strength. If Germany had had a Bismarck, she would 
 have talked disarmament with the others, but deferred its 
 actual execution until a satisfactory pohtical adjustment 
 should have been reached. As it was, Germany's refusal, 
 in no uncertain tones, to entertain the thought of any limi- 
 tation of armament, left to Europe as her only hope of 
 peace the continuance of her system of balancing the 
 Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance. 
 
478 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 In spite of Germany's tremendous efforts toward the co- 
 ordination and organization of her national strength, the 
 Triple Entente was able to exert throughout the world an 
 influence entirely overbalancing that of Germany and 
 Austria. The strengthening of the bonds of union between 
 the members of the Entente, the cooperaton of the French 
 and English fleets, and the reorganization of the Russian 
 navy, made it clear that time was working against the 
 Triple Alliance, and that the balance would incline more 
 and more to the side of the Triple Entente. The prospect 
 of such a dislocation of the balance of power would have 
 been enough in itself to threaten the peace of Europe, but 
 the equilibrium was further disturbed by Italy's attack 
 upon Turkey and her entering into an agreement with 
 France and England in regard to Mediterranean waters.^ 
 One more blow was dealt to the tottering edifice when the 
 Balkan allies carved up the Turkish territory in Europe. 
 This was the situation when the crime of Serajevo came as 
 the final jolt. Germany and Austria felt that they were 
 face to face with a dilemma : either they had to accept the 
 status quo at what they considered the dictation of the 
 Triple Entente and resign themselves to the increase of 
 Russian influence in the Balkans, thus endangering the 
 existence of the Austrian Empire, or they had to strike at 
 once before Russia became too powerful.^ There were 
 
 1 Italy held a position of balance between the different groups. Germany 
 had not been willing to make the Triple Alliance cover the Mediterranean, so 
 that Italy had to look for other support in that region. This necessity under 
 which she lay of coming to an agreement with France and England made it 
 possible for her to coquet with France without losing the advantage she de- 
 rived from her alliance. This difficult role of balancing between opposing 
 groups she has played with great skill. At Algeciras she deserted Germany, 
 who could hardly complain at Italy's making use of her liberty of action in 
 Mediterranean affairs, since it was Germany herself who had been unwilling 
 to extend the Triplice to include them. 
 
 2 Prince von Billow says of the Triple Alliance: "The three mid-Euro- 
 pean States are bound to each other by the firm resolve to maintain the 
 existing balance of power in Europe, and should a forcible change be at- 
 tempted, to prevent it if need be by force. The united strength of Middle 
 Europe stands in the path of any revolution — any European policy which 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 479 
 
 many reasons why the situation in Russia, France, and 
 England must have made Germany feel it a good time to 
 strike. So good an excuse for war might not soon again be 
 found, for Germany well knew that a Balkan question 
 was not a vital matter for either France or England, and 
 that England would not willingly be drawn into conflict 
 for such a cause. The German Government seems to have 
 had some hope that England would really hold aloof from 
 the conflict, and that seems to have been the general pub- 
 lic opinion throughout Germany. If England had remained 
 neutral, Germany might have been able to increase the 
 strength of the Triple Alliance at the expense of the Dual 
 Alliance between Russia and France. 
 
 4. The immediate causes of the war 
 It is easy to recognize as a cause of the war the distur- 
 bance of the balance of power between the two European 
 groups. What it really caused was not the war, but a con- 
 dition of uneasiness and tension which made Germany ap- 
 prehensive lest she be overpowered by the growing strength 
 of the Triple Entente and thwarted in her plans looking to 
 territorial and commercial expansion throughout the world, 
 and, at the moment, through the Balkans into Asia Minor. 
 This state of mind is, then, more truly a cause of the war 
 than is the upsetting of the balance of power. Even so, we 
 must still inquire what were the reasons why the conflict 
 broke out at the particular time and in the particular way 
 it did. In other words, what were the immediate causes of 
 the war. 
 
 When we speak of causes, we mean ordinarily the causes 
 resulting from voluntary action. That is what interests us, 
 because by discovering and demonstrating wherein this 
 voluntary action was irrational, we shall make it impossi- 
 
 might elect to follow the courses pursued by Louis XIV or Napoleon I. 
 This alliance is like a mightj' fortification dividing the Continent in two." 
 ilmperial Germany, p. 67. New York, 1914.) 
 
480 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 ble of repetition for rational beings. Whatever lies beyond 
 this sphere of voluntary action is also beyond any possibil- 
 ity of blame or responsibility. It is like the play of natural 
 forces. 
 
 We have seen how the separate links were forged in the 
 chain of mihtary preparation which involved the powers 
 in quick succession in the coils of war. We find that the 
 condition of Balkan affairs caused aggressive action of the 
 Dual Monarchy toward its weaker neighbor; in the rivalry 
 of Austria and Russia for the maintenance or extension of 
 their influence in the Balkans, we discover the most cogent 
 immediate cause for the break between these two states; 
 while Germany was involved because she could not allow 
 Austria to become engaged in an unequal struggle with 
 Russia and Servia which would have weakened the Triple 
 Alliance and her own influence. Because of the Dual Al- 
 liance and the similar need of maintaining the existing 
 balance of power, France could not hold aloof. And Ger- 
 many ought to have been sufficiently well informed to 
 realize that England could not be relied upon to stand by 
 and allow her partners in the Entente to be crushed, as 
 Germany knew they would be if unsupported by England. 
 She should, therefore, have realized that England would 
 probably either come in at the start to protect France, or 
 intervene later to prevent Germany from reaping the bene- 
 fits of victory. Germany seems indeed to have understood 
 that she could not count upon British neutrality without a 
 definite engagement to that effect, for she made a "strong 
 bid" to secure it, and no doubt she would have doubled or 
 trebled this. England was not to be caught, however, and 
 Germany had to reckon upon English intervention as one 
 of the factors of the situation. With this great potential 
 coalition staring her in the face, the necessity of getting in 
 a telling blow before the Entente could collect its forces 
 was of prime importance; and when we take into account 
 the German point of view, philosophy of life, and espe- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF. THE WAR 481 
 
 cially the large influence of the mihtary class, we see that 
 it was inevitable that respect for Belgium's rights and 
 Germany's own treaty obligations should be brushed aside 
 in order that she lose no time in crushing France. 
 
 The consequence of England's refusal to enter into a 
 binding agreement that she would remain neutral was the 
 invasion of Belgium; and the invasion of Belgium, or rather 
 Germany's refusal to give her promise that she would keep 
 out, was again one of the principal causes of England's 
 immediate rally to the support of the Entente.'^ 
 
 If the logic of each of these steps be true, so that each 
 made the succeeding inevitable, the first move would be 
 the cause of all the others. By cause we mean, as has been 
 said, the responsible cause; that is, the action which we 
 look upon as having been voluntarily taken. If, therefore, 
 we wish to get at the cause or causes of this conflict, we 
 must, I repeat, examine in this successive widening of the 
 area of conflict each step to see where there was any op- 
 portunity for a rational choice of action. 
 
 Looking at it from this point of view, we must conclude 
 that Servia and her Government could do nothing. The 
 widespread hatred of Austria, and the bitter disappoint- 
 ment in Servia at being checked by her from securing an 
 outlet on the Adriatic, made it impossible for the Servian 
 Government to hold in check the hostile propaganda di- 
 rected against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire. The Servian Government might, however, have 
 instituted its own coiu-t of investigation of the Serajevo 
 assassination, and this would have made it more difficult 
 for Austria to present an ultimatum drawn in terms so ex- 
 traordinarily harsh. I doubt, however, if this would have 
 
 * Since England's action depended upon what Germany promised, and 
 Germany's action depended upon what England promised, it is evident that 
 the real cause of German aggression against Belgium was the belief that 
 England might intervene even if Gennany kept out of Belgium, and the 
 cause of the English intervention of August 2 in favor of France was the 
 distrust of Germany and fear that she intended to invade Belgium. 
 
482 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 had any real effect. In the first place, it would not have 
 been possible to secure an unbiased and fair conduct of 
 such an investigation on Servian soil, and even if the au 
 horities at Belgrade had accomplished this impossibl 
 task Austrian hatred and ambitions would have caused 
 her criticize the manner in which it was conducted, and 
 would have accounted this an additional ground of com- 
 plaint. However little sympathy we may have for the 
 conTr'^ f ""^"f '° '"^ ^* '^'^ ''«°^ *e cause of the 
 people the course adopted by the Servian Government 
 admLble " °^ '^"^ ''"' ^''^'*^' ^'''^''^- ^^^ 
 
 cnnl w"' "' ^"'^ r?* ''y '^"^ '''=*'°" have obvfated 
 contributmg causes of the conflict. Russia and Austria had 
 each been intriguing by every possible means to increase its 
 own mfluence m the Balkans at the expense of the other's. 
 Ihe last moves had all been in Russia's favor, and Austria 
 was smartmg at her loss of prestige and fearful for the 
 preservation of the integrity of her empire. Even Russia 
 took into account the difficulty of Austria's position, and! 
 mfluenced by the £«tente Powers a^d the broad vision o 
 her Minister for Foreign Affaii^, was led to cooperate in 
 wT™ t • *l" V"""^ ^"-l *° P'"**"' Austria's vital interests 
 rtht? A ri'T ^th Austria's integrity and sovereign 
 rights. A difficulty, perhaps, was that Austria probably 
 considered that her vital interest required that she should 
 be free to extend through the Sanjak of Novibazar toward 
 Salomka. The death of M. Hartwig, the Russian Minister 
 to Servia, seemed to remove one of the principal obstacles 
 
 Rusi" n^'Tr'^A' °^^«'^«™^ between Austria and 
 Russia. Doubtless Austria was sincere when she said she 
 would not ajinex any Servian territory, but Russia knew 
 
 !^, /« J "™' T" ""^^"""^ *° domineer over Servia, she 
 could find some disguised way of continuing her advajice 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 483 
 
 on Salonika without disturbing the nominal integrity of 
 the Servian Kingdom. ^ We are, therefore, in the presence 
 of a conflict in the policies of expansion. Servia's propa- 
 ganda directed against Austria's integrity, if it would not 
 have justified a campaign of conquest against the Serbs, 
 would have excused any measures of force which Austria 
 found necessary to employ in order to establish a modus 
 Vivendi with her neighbor. If Russia chose to interfere, it 
 would have been merely a case of one ambition in conflict 
 with another. But the point where Austria is to blame — 
 and I would emphasize it most strongly — is in the deliber- 
 ate manner in which she concealed her intentions and tried 
 to lull to rest the suspicions of the powers, while she pre- 
 pared an ultimatum which she knew could not possibly be 
 accepted. In this course of action she disregarded the well- 
 recognized forms of diplomatic procedure, according to 
 which one state, before it has recourse to measm-es of force 
 against another, should state its grievance and give an op- 
 portunity for explanation and the voluntary elimination 
 of the cause of complaint. It will be said that this is not a 
 requirement of international procedure specifically set 
 forth, but it will not be denied that it is the course ad- 
 hered to by civilized states in their dealings with one 
 another, and that, wherever there has been a departure 
 from this method of procedure, it has met with the general 
 condemnation of the society of states. Here, then, in first 
 instance, we must place the blame for the whole war in 
 which Europe is engaged. 
 
 Continuing, let us examine w^hether even after this 
 blameworthy action, which it was the purpose of the con- 
 ciliatory efforts of the powers to counteract, there were not 
 other acts open to criticism. As soon as Austria presented 
 her ultimatum, it was patent to all that Russia, unless re- 
 strained by fear, would hasten to protect her prestige in the 
 
 1 For example, England has been the virtual sovereign of Egypt for years 
 without disturbing the noniinal sovereignty of the Porte. 
 
484 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Balkans and save her sister state from annihilation by the 
 Dual Monarchy; and that this would bring in Germany, 
 then France, and possibly England. Germany maintained 
 that Russia by such action would be responsible for the 
 subsequent widening of the conflict. But before blaming 
 Russia for coming to the support of Servia, we have to 
 ascertain whether any other course lay open to her. Again 
 I believe that it will generally be recognized that Russia 
 could only have kept out of the conflict if some way had 
 been found to prevent the subjugation of Servia by Austria. 
 In all Balkan disputes the recognized method of proced- 
 ure during the last few years has been either to leave the 
 question to be adjusted by mutual agreement of Austria 
 and Russia, or else, in case the problem proved too difficult, 
 to confide it to a conference of the powers. In the present 
 case Austria departed from this procedure and insisted on 
 settling this Balkan question directly with Servia, without 
 the interference of any other powers, thus contributing an- 
 other cause for the conflict. In this stand she was abetted 
 by Germany, who, up to the time of the presentation of her 
 ultimatum to Russia, insisted that the settlement of the 
 Austro-Servian question be left to Austria alone. Further- 
 more, Germany refused to take part in a conference to dis- 
 cuss the question with the hope of reaching some solution. 
 Mr. Asquith was certainly right in saying that if Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey's proposal for a mediatory conference of the 
 four powers who were not directly concerned — Germany, 
 France, Italy, and England — "had been accepted, the ac- 
 tual controversy would have been settled with honor to 
 everybody, and the whole of this terrible welter would 
 have been avoided." ^ Germany did declare that she was 
 willing to enter into a conference to consider a difference 
 between Austria and Russia, but by refusing to consider 
 that Russia could have any interest in the Austro-Servian 
 dispute, she practically refused to enter into a mediatory 
 » Guildhall speech, September 4. (London Times, September 5, 1914.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR .485 
 
 conference in regard to the only acute ground of difference 
 which could be considered as existing between Austria and 
 Russia. In taking a stand so opposed to what had been 
 the practice in regard to the settlement of Balkan ques- 
 tions, Germany, it might have been supposed, would make 
 every effort to suggest some equally effective means of pre- 
 venting actual recourse to arms. Instead, she limited her 
 conciliatory action to urging her ally to continue direct 
 negotiation with Russia, and passing on to her the various 
 suggestions advanced m the vain hope of preventing a 
 war. In adopting this course, she assumed a very great re- 
 sponsibility, and because of the superior development and 
 civilization of the German Empire as compared with the 
 Austrian state, we must apportion to her for this mistake 
 a still larger share of the blame for the terrible conse- 
 quences. 
 
 I do not wish to be misunderstood as thinking that Ger- 
 many really wished for war; but by her conduct she gave 
 evidence that she intended to back up her ally to secure a 
 diplomatic triumph and the subjugation of her neighbor, 
 which would greatly have strengthened Teutonic influence 
 in the Balkans.^ She risked the peace of Europe in a cam- 
 paign after prestige. 
 
 Germany accused Russia of making war inevitable by 
 her mobilization just at the moment when, cooperating 
 
 1 Bismarck said: "The Oriental crisis is undoubtedly the most likely to 
 occur, and in this our interests are only secondary. When it happens, we 
 are in a position to watch whether the powers, who are primarily interested 
 in the Mediterranean and the Levant, will make their decisions and come to 
 terms, if they choose, or go to war with Russia about them. We are not im- 
 mediately called upon to do either. Every great power which is trying to 
 influence or to restrain the policies of other countries in matters which are 
 beyond the sphere of its interests is playing politics beyond the bounds 
 which God has assigned to it. Its policy is one of force and not of vital in- 
 terests. It is working for prestige. We shall not do this. If Oriental crises 
 happen, we shall wait before taking our position until the powers, who have 
 greater interests at stake than we, have declared themselves." (Speech of 
 Bismarck, February 6, 1888, quoted from translation in What Germany 
 Wants, by Edmund von Mach, pp. 86, 87. See ante, p. 107.) 
 
486 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 with Sir Edward Grey, Germany had prevailed upon Aus- 
 tria to renew direct negotiations with Russia, and was pre- 
 pared by way of concession to allow a conference of the 
 powers to consider how a satisfactory arrangement with 
 Servia might be effected. The German Government es- 
 pecially blamed Russia for ordering mobihzation while 
 the Kaiser, at the request of the Tsar, was trying to use his 
 mediatory influence between Austria and Russia. By this 
 premature mobilization Russia did, I believe, throw away 
 the last remaining chance of peace. The question is, how- 
 ever, the most difficult of all the many knotty problems in- 
 volved in the negotiations preceding the war. If Russia 
 had continued to the last the extraordinarily conciliatory 
 attitude which was hers up to the 28th or 29th of July, 
 there might possibly — provided, of course, that Germany 
 did not really intend to force a war — have been some way 
 of maintaining peace. Since this precipitate military prep- 
 aration on Russia's part could have been avoided, we must 
 consider this also a rational cause of the war, and blame 
 Russia accordingly. Yet never did country have greater 
 provocation. After Russia's display of a most unusually 
 conciliatory disposition, and after her declaration that 
 Austria's invasion of Servia would be considered a casus 
 belli, Austria was responsible for one high-handed act after 
 another, while she refused every conciliatory suggestion. 
 When at last Russia, in response to Austria's aggression 
 against Servia, partially mobilized on her Austrian fron- 
 tier, as she had previously declared she would do, Ger- 
 many took umbrage. At first Germany had said that she 
 would not consider partial mobilization against Austria a 
 cause for war, but now she performed a volte face and in 
 menacing tone declared that mobilization even against 
 Austria rendered the situation very difficult. This action 
 on the part of Germany, taken with Austria's refusal to 
 continue direct negotiations and with her bombardment of 
 Belgrade, not to forget the Austrian threat of a general mob- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 487 
 
 ilization,^ had no doubt worn out the patience of the Rus- 
 sian Minister and aroused feehng in Russia. In England, 
 the natural consequence of the attitude assumed by Ger- 
 many and Austria was to awaken indignation against the 
 latter and sympathy with Russia. After Austria declared 
 war against Servia, Sir Edward Grey spoke emphatically 
 to Germany of the responsibility which she would incur by 
 supporting Austria in her course of action. According to 
 the statements expressed by the French and Italian diplo- 
 mats, the effect of Sir Edward's warning on Germany was 
 to influence her to a more conciliatory attitude, while in 
 Germany it is believed that the result of the British Secre- 
 tary's action was to convince Russia that she could count 
 upon England's support, with the result that she became 
 eager to enter upon the war. If this should prove to be the 
 case, which I think is open to question, it would still have to 
 be considered as the natural result of Germany's unjusti- 
 fiable action in preventing recourse to the ordinary diplo- 
 matic procedure for the settlement of Balkan diflSculties. 
 
 The last and more difficult question — that of England's 
 intervention — has already been thoroughly discussed. 
 It is unthinkable that she should have consented to tie her 
 hands and remain out of the conflict no matter what the 
 result ; and, failing such an agreement, Germany was not 
 willing to forego the advantage which she hoped to derive 
 by invading Belgium. If England had wished to keep out 
 of the war, this violation of Belgian neutrality was certain 
 to make her come in, for the reasons previously discussed. 
 Here again Germany is rationally to blame. If she had 
 been willing to agree to remain out of Belgium and prose- 
 cute the war upon that condition, it is possible that Eng- 
 land would have held aloof, except as regards her condi- 
 
 1 Even if Austria did not issue the order for a mobilization until after 
 Russia had done so, the Austrian threat to reply to Russia's partial mobihza- 
 tion by a general mobilization might be expected to hasten Russia's general 
 mobilization. The effect of Austria's threat would be all the greater because 
 of the difficulty in learning what was really taking place. 
 
488 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tional intervention in regard to her protection of the French 
 coasts and shipping.^ 
 
 This plan of the German strategists to make France the 
 hostage for Russia was well understood in France and Eng- 
 land, and made it possible for France to remain on the de- 
 fensive until attacked. Germany had to crush her without 
 delay, and considered the route through Belgium the only 
 feasible way. The objection to this plan was that it forced 
 Germany to take upon herself the responsibility of aggres- 
 sion against France and the violation of Belgian neutrality. ^ 
 
 1 It is said on all sides that a conflict between England and Germany was 
 inevitable. I doubt it. It used to be said that a conflict between England 
 and Russia was inevitable. Now that England is the ally of France and 
 Russia, it is very natural for all three Governments to emphasize whatever 
 tends to show that England would have joined with France and Russia in 
 any event. The deep feeling of sympathy for an ally makes it difiicult for 
 Englishmen now to believe that they would have stayed out under any con- 
 ditions. 
 
 2 Professor Hans Delbriick makes this clear in an article in the Atlantic 
 Monthly, February, 1915 (p. 238), in which he writes: — 
 
 "One very important advantage for Germany, at the outbreak of the war, 
 lay in the fact that it could hardly be expected that Russia and France 
 would be able to open hostilities simultaneously: the Russians, with their 
 cumbersome mobilization, the enormous extent of their empire, and the 
 thinly distributed network of their railways, would not be able to take the 
 field until several weeks later than their allies. 
 
 "It was to be anticipated, therefore, that the French would first advance 
 up to the Franco-German frontier (two hundred kilometres in length, and 
 thickly invested by forts and fortresses), and would wait there, without as- 
 suming the offensive, until the Russians, arriving from the east, had obliged 
 the Germans to divide their forces. Then, however, as the Germans have 
 amply fortified their French frontiers with fortresses at Strassburg, Metz, 
 and other places, the attack would have followed through Belgium, on the 
 much more exposed lower Rhine. 
 
 "Of course, the German General Staff knew that, since they possessed 
 the great mortars which subdued Li^ge, Namur, Antwerp, and the French 
 northern fortresses, the French fortresses along the Vosges must fall also; 
 but with these places protected by the whole French army, this would take 
 so long that the Russians would have time to arrive. The only possibility of 
 averting from Germany this hazardous double conflict was to break into 
 France, across her much longer and less protected northern frontier through 
 Belgium, and thereby gain such an advantage that a part of the army could 
 be dispensed with and sent against the Russians. Although finally Ger- 
 many did declare war on Russia because the latter was mobilizing in threat- 
 ening force on the Austro-German frontier, this danger was in reality much 
 greater than Germany imagined." 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 489 
 
 Had Germany withdrawn twenty kilometres from her 
 western frontier, and entrenched herself behind her de- 
 fenses, she could have employed the greater part of her 
 troops against Russia. In these conditions it is most likely 
 that she could have relied on dividing English sympathy, 
 and could, perhaps, have counted, with reasonable assur- 
 ance, on the neutrahty of England. England might have 
 exerted some influence, not to say pressure, upon France 
 to prevent her attacking Germany. Had France, never- 
 theless, gone to the assistance of her ally, the sympathy of 
 the world would have been divided. Germany could have 
 stood on the defensive, and could have gradually retreated, 
 if necessary, until she had dealt with Russia. 
 
 The idea that England should guarantee the neutrality 
 of France was fantastic, but this other plan would have 
 worked advantageously for Germany. It may be answered 
 that Germany could not be sure of her tremendous military 
 superiority over other nations, and that she did not know 
 how effectively entrenched troops could arrest the advance 
 of greatly superior forces. The consequences of Germany's 
 attack upon Belgium and France show the truth of what 
 Bismarck said when he opposed a policy of aggression, 
 that it was his " conviction that even victorious wars can- 
 not be justified unless they are forced upon us, and that we 
 cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to 
 anticipate historical development according to our own 
 calculations." ^ 
 
 It is very possible that the French and English states- 
 men might have hit upon some plan to prevent the out- 
 break of the war, but my thorough examination of the doc- 
 uments and my study of European politics has not made it 
 possible for' me to discover wherein that possibility lay. 
 We must remember that the French and English states- 
 men, when they were confronted by Austria's demarche 
 and Germany's subsequent stand, must have feared that 
 
 1 Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii, p. 101. London, 1898. 
 
490 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 what Germany really intended was to precipitate a war. 
 Certainly the manner of the Austrian procedure and the 
 uncompromising stand which Germany took lent force to 
 this view. It is evident from the French Yellow Book that 
 the best-informed French diplomats were convinced that 
 Germany intended war from the very start, and it is very 
 possible that we may later learn that the English diplomat- 
 ists were of a similar opinion. Under the circumstances, 
 then, whether or not the French and English statesmen 
 were persuaded that Germany intended to precipitate a 
 war, they had so to lay their course that no suggestion 
 could be seized upon by Germany to force an issue. The 
 French and Russians urged Sir Edward Grey to make 
 common cause with them so as to influence Germany for 
 peace. The result might, and very probably would, have 
 been immediately to bring on war, and this would have 
 been playing into Germany's hands if she intended war, 
 and would have given her an immense advantage if she 
 could have forced the issue at once without wasting several 
 days in diplomatic negotiation. 
 
 There might have been one possibility: if Italy and 
 England had declared that they would make war against 
 the aggressor, and had insisted that the difference must be 
 submitted to mediation, I believe that Germany must 
 have yielded. There are indications in the dispatches that 
 Italy was disposed to enter into some kind of diplomatic 
 intervention in conjunction with England. A combina- 
 tion to fight for peace may, perhaps, under the circum- 
 stances, have been beyond the realm of possibility. Italy 
 was the ally of Germany and might not have been willing 
 to risk German resentment by taking such a stand, ^ and 
 England, too, perhaps, did not wish to negotiate in such a 
 
 1 Such an agreement between England and Italy could not, however, be 
 considered contrary to the terms of a defensive alliance, to which the Tri- 
 plice was limited; but it has generally been considered that if the ally did 
 not recognize the casus foederis, she would, at least, remain neutral unless her 
 own vital interests were directly attacked. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 491 
 
 way that the aftermath would mean a continuation of bit- 
 ter relations with Germany. Everything considered, there- 
 fore, it does not seem that we are in a position to say that 
 Sir Edward Grey might so have acted as to avoid the 
 war. It was his duty to conduct the affairs of England 
 on the safest basis and according to what was best on gen- 
 eral principles. He could not take some desperate chance 
 which, in the light of after events, and looking backward, 
 we may consider offered a possible means of avoiding the 
 conflict. 
 
 5. The determining causes of the war 
 Since our consideration of the immediate causes, in so 
 far as they were based on rational, as opposed to involun- 
 tary, action, leads to the conclusion that the countries re- 
 sponsible for the outbreak of the war were first, Austria, 
 second, Germany, and to some slight degree, Russia, it 
 becomes of interest to analyze what considerations or sen- 
 timents were decisive in determining these countries to 
 pursue the courses they did. In other words, What was the 
 situation or what were the conditions in each country which 
 determined it to take the action upon which we place the 
 responsibility for the war? 
 
 It will not be unjust, I think, to lay at the door of Ger- 
 many the causes of whatever action was taken on the part 
 of Russia and Austria to bring on the war, for Austria, being 
 a less civilized and less highly developed state than Ger- 
 many, is less responsible before the bar of public opinion 
 for her unjustifiable violation of international procedure 
 and disregard of the ordinary recognized method for the 
 settlement of Balkan differences; and her ally, Germany, 
 in standing between her and the diplomatic intervention 
 of the other powers, assumed before civilization the full re- 
 sponsibility for Austria's action. By the same token, Ger- 
 many must shoulder part of the responsibility for Russia's 
 response of counter-miUtary preparations in answer to Aus- 
 
492 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tria's aggression upon Servia. She incurred further respon- 
 sibiUty when she changed her ground, and, instead of al- 
 lowing Russia to effect a reasonable counter-mobilization 
 against Austria, intimated in a threatening manner that she 
 would consider such mobilization as endangering the rela- 
 tions with herself.^ In the third place, her stand influenced 
 England to support France, against what appeared to be un- 
 justifiable browbeating on Germany's part. It follows, if my 
 analysis has not been unfair to Germany on these various 
 grounds, that she stands primarily responsible for the out- 
 break of the war, and it becomes of the greatest interest to 
 understand who decided upon the various steps which de- 
 termined her action. This question is much more difficult 
 to answer than the preceding, because when we come to 
 internal affairs we have a whole world in itself, with the 
 resultant interplay of politics and intrigue between the dif- 
 ferent forces controlling the action of the state; whereas 
 in international relations the resultant of these different 
 forces finds expression through the recognized diplomatic 
 organs of the Government, and we hold the Government 
 responsible for the action of these agents. To find out who 
 is responsible for any particular line of action is, as has 
 been remarked, most difficult. However, we may discover 
 the influence of certain factors, such as that of the mili- 
 tary oligarchy. 
 
 There may have been certain men, like the German 
 Ambassador at Vienna, whose uncompromising attitude 
 helped to bring on the crisis and did nothing to appease it, 
 but the search for any personal responsibility for the war 
 will, I believe, prove unavailing. The causes are too com- 
 plex, the responsibility too divided and widespread. In 
 answer to our inquiry, we shall learn that the real cause of 
 
 1 It seems probable that Russia was to blame for her hasty and excessive 
 mobilization, but Germany's manner of conducting her negotiations was 
 unjustifiably brusque. The recent publication of the Austrian Red Book 
 discloses that Austria urged Germany to assume this menacing attitude to- 
 ward Russia. (July 28, A.R.B. no. 42.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 493 
 
 the action of the German Government was a result of the 
 state of mind of the nation. As a whole, the German na- 
 tion thought and still thinks in a manner distinct from the 
 rest of Europe. Because of Germany's geographical posi- 
 tion, she suffered for centuries before she could constitute 
 a German state; finally, in the course of European evolu- 
 tion, a period was reached when it was almost inevitable 
 that a strong German state should be constituted, and 
 again the weakness of Germany's geographical position 
 made it necessary, as Sarolea has said, for her to have a 
 strong army and a strong bureaucracy, both of which Prus- 
 sia gave her.^ Prussia herself was nothing but the survival 
 of the state fittest to survive the pecuUarly disadvantage- 
 ous conditions of Central Germany. As leader of the Em- 
 pire, she supplied the German states with the valuable 
 results of her own political experience, and guided them, 
 organized into a confederation, safely through the maze of 
 European politics. Unfortunately for Germany, the states- 
 man who successfully accomplished this great achieve- 
 ment trampled upon the constitutional privileges of his 
 state. If he had not succeeded, he would have paid with 
 exile or death; but when by " blood and iron" he had had 
 his first great success in vanquishing Austria, enthusiastic 
 delegates gave him a vote of confidence. No voice was 
 longer raised to condemn his illegal acts. 
 
 The effects of these immoral acts upon the Staatspolitik 
 and on the Weltanschauung of Germany have been, in my 
 belief, very far reaching. It is an open question whether 
 our entire moral system is not empirical in its nature, and 
 this does but coincide with the doctrines of the pragmatists 
 so widely accepted at the present time. It is not, therefore, 
 to be wondered at that this magnificent success of Bis- 
 marck should have impressed the imaginations of the peo- 
 
 1 "Two things above all were required to make Germany into a powerful 
 state — a strong army and a well-ordered administration. Prussia has 
 given us both." (Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, p. 91.) These 
 words are put into the mouth of a German outside of Prussia. 
 
494 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 pie of Germany — we may say, of the whole world. After 
 Prussia under Bismarck had crushed Austria, there fol- 
 lowed several years during which he guided the affairs of 
 the Kingdom and of the German Empire. He was in the 
 main outspoken, straightforward, and honest, as might be 
 expected of a man of his intelligence and force of character; 
 but occasionally he stooped to deceit, so subtly executed 
 that it was not discovered by his victims. In the course of 
 years, however, various bits of evidence were pieced to- 
 gether, and his own pride in achievement led him to disclose 
 the methods he had pursued to confound his adversaries. 
 We can well understand the influence of his example on 
 every German youth. Instead of having held up before 
 him the example of a Lincoln, or that other hero who could 
 not tell a lie, the German youth was taught to admire the 
 man who had trampled on the express provisions of the 
 constitution, and the statesman who knew how to suppress 
 a part of the truth, ^ in order to entrap an unprincipled sov- 
 ereign into an aggressive war. Such an example must have 
 exercised a potent influence in building up a RealpoUtik — 
 that is to say, a policy of dealing with concrete conditions 
 as they are, as opposed to the following of ideals. But in 
 the minds of many it means the justification of whatever 
 succeeds. Since Bismarck ''succeeded" in trampling the 
 constitution under foot, the German people have naturally 
 come to feel that the same procedure might apply to the 
 law binding the nations in their relations to one another. 
 Any statesman might, they think, violate any provision, 
 however sacred, provided he could carry it through. We 
 do not need to point out the application to the present 
 war. 
 
 Still other factors have entered into the formation of 
 this point of view. The necessity under which Germany 
 
 1 I refer, of course, to the editing of the Ems dispatch. The unbiased 
 sympathy of the world must be with Prussia at that crisis; France deserved 
 little sympathy, but this does not change the moral effect upon the nation 
 of Bismarck's action. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 495 
 
 labors of maintaining a very large army has brought it 
 about that war and the use of armed force is regarded with 
 much higher favor than in other states of equal civiliza- 
 tion. Added to this, it is generally conceded that since the 
 accession of the present Kaiser there has been no real 
 chancellor like Bismarck to hold the strategists in check; 
 and although the Emperor has been a sincere worker for 
 peace, which he preserved unbroken up to 1914, the pre- 
 dominant role which he plays as military leader of the na- 
 tion makes it inevitable that the General Staff should 
 exercise a great influence in determining his counsels. 
 
 These are some of the conditions which were responsible 
 for a state of mind in Germany, in July, 1914, such as to 
 influence her Government to assume its extremely uncom- 
 promising attitude. This refusal to cooperate with her sis- 
 ter states, among whom was her ally, Italy, must, I be- 
 lieve, place upon Germany the first and by far the heaviest 
 responsibility for the war. 
 
 6. The world's answer 
 
 While every one is attempting to discover the causes of 
 the war, the answer to the riddle is daily being indicated 
 by the movement on all sides toward certain reforms de- 
 signed to obviate the recurrence of a similar disaster. 
 Everywhere we find in progress the substitution of inter- 
 national ideas, that is, world ideas, in place of the narrow 
 national policy which has hitherto prevailed. Everywhere 
 we hear talk of founding a world organization capable of 
 eliminating the national differences responsible for this 
 conflict. The idea has gained the support of statesmen and 
 well-poised men of affairs. 
 
 Up to the present we have been living in an age of na- 
 tional states. The slow evolution of the national state, 
 which began centuries ago in Europe, has reached its cul- 
 mination in the examples we have before our eyes; but the 
 idea of a national state is exclusive, when pushed to ex- 
 
496 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tremes, of the broader ideals of humanitarian cooperation. 
 This idea of the organization of a national state, which was 
 a crutch to help the development of humanity through one 
 stage, has become a hindrance in the present stage of de- 
 velopment. During the last decades the development of 
 internationalism has gone on at a tremendous pace. This 
 development has had to be carried on, one might almost 
 say, in spite of the national states. The governments of 
 the great national states have been intensely jealous of 
 any interference with their sovereign rights, which, when 
 pushed to an extreme, are destructive of the rights of other 
 states. Of necessity they have had to agree to a certain 
 amount of combination for uniform action; but they have 
 resisted all the nobler, broader tendencies which threat- 
 ened their own lower ideal of national perfection as op- 
 posed to the general interests of humanity. 
 
 In the Middle Ages, when the serf or laborer in each com- 
 munity had hardly any thought beyond the confines of his 
 town, we find in certain respects a broader intemationahsm 
 than at the present time. The ideal of chivalry was uni- 
 versal. The conception of the Catholic Church was more 
 widespread than now and more nearly universal. The legal 
 system of the Middle Ages transcended national or feudal 
 divisions. It is only in modem times that the talents of 
 the community have been timied to strengthening national 
 development at the expense of the general interests of hu- 
 manity. 
 
 7. Formation of a Super-Empire 
 Progressing along a course parallel with that of the na- 
 tional states, we find great empire states in which the na- 
 tional state has controlled the destinies of less powerful 
 or less developed communities. These separate, national 
 state empires have become the great politically independ- 
 ent groups of our day. The competition between national 
 states has been transformed into a competition of these 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 497 
 
 larger units under the name of what is termed Weltpolitik. 
 Among these we have Great Britain, France, the United 
 States, Germany, Russia, and Japan; all extending their 
 empires or political control widely over the habitable globe. 
 
 The means by which this extension has been accom- 
 plished are (1) seizure or acquisition of territory; (2) the 
 throwing of a protectorate over a region, forming what is 
 known as a protected state, which becomes part of the po- 
 litical system of the empire; and (3) the rendering of a 
 country dependent on the financial and military support 
 of the empire state. These different classes of territories 
 might be designated as ''owned," ''protected," and "in- 
 fluenced." If we trace the evolution of the British Empire 
 in this way, we find that Great Britain actually owns a 
 great part of the globe, and protects another large portion, 
 while many countries reckoned as independent are directly 
 dependent upon her for the support which guarantees their 
 political existence. A similar development may be traced 
 with regard to the expansion of the other empires. 
 
 At the same time that this great imperial development 
 has been slowly progressing, the great capitalistic and im- 
 perialistic states have come to realize more and more that, 
 since the territory of the earth was pretty well preempted, 
 the great desiderata of widely extended and capitalistic 
 empires like those of England and France must be abso- 
 lute security, to insure constant returns on their capital 
 and to preserve uninterrupted the communications of the 
 empire states with their dependencies, as well as the in- 
 terrelations of the political groups of the empires among 
 themselves. In other words, they have realized that their 
 aims were one and the same, and the desire to get the 
 biggest return for their effort has made them ready to co- 
 operate in supporting one another, rather than to push 
 their competition to the verge of a great conflict of arms. 
 Great Britain has in consequence decided frankly to ac- 
 cept the Monroe Doctrine, — part of our own imperial- 
 
498 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 istic concept, — and to leave the policing and protection 
 of her own interests on this continent mainly to the United 
 States. Her adoption of this policy liberated a consider- 
 able portion of her oversea fleet just when Germany began 
 to push her naval construction, and allowed Great Britain 
 to increase her own fleet for immediate maritime competi- 
 tion in Europe without undertaking the tremendous outlay 
 necessary to keep up the old two-power standard of British 
 naval strength. 
 
 The next step for Great Britain was the result of the 
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Japan and England 
 found desirable a defensive alliance for mutual protection 
 against the possible designs of Russia on India and the 
 Far East. In reality this defensive alliance went further 
 than the mere terms of its articles would indicate. The 
 understanding upon which it was based allowed Great 
 Britain to leave to Japan to a great extent the policing of 
 her interests in China and the Pacific in the same way that 
 she had previously decided to entrust the protection of her 
 interests in the American continent to the United States. 
 
 Aiter almost coming to war with France at Fashoda in 
 1898, Great Britain turned round in 1904 and formed with 
 her the Entente Cordiale. Shortly after this she withdrew 
 a large portion of her Mediterranean fleet, leaving to 
 France in great part the protection of her interests in the 
 Mediterranean, and allowing France in return to with- 
 draw her fleets from the Channel and the Atlantic. 
 
 The next stage, brought about through France, was an 
 agreement of Great Britain with Russia to lay their strife 
 in Persia by an apportionment of their spheres of influ- 
 ence, leaving to Persia a buffer strip in the middle. 
 
 We find, therefore, at the period of the outbreak of the 
 war, that the American, Japanese, French, and Russian 
 Empires had joined in a cooperative division of spheres 
 of influence with the British Empire, so that there is, in 
 fact, a super-empire composed of all this great organiza- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 499 
 
 tion. The basic idea of this empire is that the interests of 
 all in every part of the world shall be cared for by the rep- 
 resentative able to act on the spot in the most effective 
 manner — all for the pm-pose of securing a reasonable ob- 
 servance of the rules of international intercourse. This is 
 an organization for cooperation and the enforcement of 
 international law in the interest of the general prosperity 
 and the greater security of these military and financial 
 empires. This combination allows each empire to restrict 
 its armament to the minimum required for the defense and 
 development of the interests to be protected in its immedi- 
 ate sphere, and has made it possible to avoid the increasing 
 of naval armament at the same rate as the increase of in- 
 ternational relations and international commerce. 
 
 While this movement has been going on, it has been im- 
 possible to lose sight of the possibility of a great war in 
 which one or more of the empires in this super-empire 
 might be involved. The danger of this war was well known 
 to lie in the rivalry between the Triple Entente, or the 
 European part of the super-empire, and the Triple Alliance, 
 which includes the only remaining great empire^ and the 
 only one which has not seen her way to join in this co- 
 operative action and division of the police work of the 
 world. Germany has considered that she could not be con- 
 tent with her position relatively to the other empires, and 
 this discontent with her lot has revealed itself in a pushing 
 of her armament to the greatest extent that her economic 
 resources would bear. Having acquired her national unity 
 later than the others, Germany has been inclined to over- 
 
 ^ We cannot call the Triple Alliance a second super-empire because Ger- 
 many is the only state in the group which is an empire in the same sense aa 
 are the other empires, i.e., that has interests in all parts of the world. Italy 
 is rapidly acquiring such a position, and, in so far as she has done so, she has 
 come to an understanding with France and England in regard to her oversea 
 possessions. As for Turkey and Austria, they may be considered as coming 
 within the sphere of German influence and constituting to this extent a part 
 of the German Empire. The Chinese Empire is momentarily in some dan- 
 ger of disintegration. 
 
500 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 value this achievement. Her success in reaching results 
 through her efficiency in armament, and her need of a 
 stout defense, owing to her unfavorable geographic posi- 
 tion, have led Germany to force the pace of armaments. 
 
 She has preferred to turn the cold shoulder to the invita- 
 tions to join in the development of this great super-empire, 
 which would thus have been rounded out to the long- 
 dreamt-of world state, — this super-empire composed of 
 six great empires: Britain, America, France, Germany, 
 Russia, and Japan, united in a bond as loose and elastic as 
 that of the Triple Entente, yet strong through its efficiency 
 to perform the work of humanity as a whole. 
 
 8. The '^ peace power" 
 The gradual apportionment of the earth to the spheres 
 of influence of certain empires requires as a corollary that 
 in its sphere each empire should protect the rights of all the 
 others according to the recognized principles of interna- 
 tional law. When, in the face of unjustifiable conduct upon 
 the part of a wayward or less civilized government, the 
 overlord or responsible empire makes an appeal to force, 
 this action can be no longer designated as war, but should 
 be considered as an act of international police — an exer- 
 cise of what we might call the "peace power." ^ For interna- 
 tional peace must be based upon respect for the principles 
 of international law. A great majority of the reasonable 
 pacifists to-day recognize this distinction, and approve the 
 use of force where force is applied to compel respect for 
 international law.^ The greatest weakness in this system of 
 
 1 This designation of "peace power" was suggested to me as better 
 than the term "police power" ordinarily employed. I think there are evi- 
 dent reasons for the use of "peace power" instead of "police power," which 
 is also employed in municipal aflfairs. We might then speak of recourse to 
 force for political purposes as "war power." 
 
 * There is much loose reasoning in regard to the use of force in interna- 
 tional relations. One party of extremists, headed by the great Tolstoi, has 
 advocated the doctrine of non-resistance, confident that through its inher- 
 ent truth an idea will persist and conquer; whereas recourse to force will 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 501 
 
 applying force is the facility with which a government may 
 make use of it as an excuse to cloak some extra-juridical, 
 and hence purely political, design. This difficulty has led 
 governments of good intention to call upon other govern- 
 ments to join with them in substituting joint intervention 
 in place of their own independent action, because joint 
 action is less lil<:ely to be for the purpose of abuse. 
 
 In the regulation of recent international difficulties there 
 have been numerous instances of this collective action, as 
 for example the action of the powers in China, 1901. 
 
 In the Austro-Servian dispute it was the peace power 
 which Austria claimed the right to exercise in regard to Ser- 
 via; but as her situation made it seem veiy probable that 
 
 stir up opposition and confirm the ignorant and the transgressors in their 
 evil course. As a result of the war now in progress, the most rational sup- 
 porters of this policy have modified their opinion, without giving up their 
 belief in the necessity of an active propaganda for the peaceful settlement 
 of international difficulties and the avoidance of all causes of strife. Many 
 of these pacifists now believe that international peace can be secured only 
 through the establishment of an international court backed up by an 
 armed force supplied by the independent states. The advocates of this 
 view fall into other errors almost as serious as those of the former non-re- 
 sistance pacifists whom they replace. The organization of such an inter- 
 national force in the form generally proposed is entirely impracticable. 
 
 In the first place, it could hardly be made sufficiently powerful to impose 
 its will without opposition upon the strongest states. A country like the 
 United States would not, in the case of a fundamental question where its 
 conscience was thoroughly aroused, yield to any organized force, though it 
 were the combined armament of three great European powers. The mere 
 anticipation that force will be applied stirs up passions which will yield only 
 before an irresistible force, and such an irresistible force as exists in muni- 
 cipal affairs cannot at present be considered as a practical basis for the po- 
 lice force of an international organization. The states would fear that it 
 might become a veritable international Prsetorian guard. Even if we admit 
 that such a force might be constituted, of sufficient strength to impose the 
 decisions of the permanent international court upon all the world, interna- 
 tional politics would center round the securing of the appointment of offi- 
 cers who, in the employment of the force under their control, would show a 
 partiality for the partisans of certain opinions. For the present, the safest 
 course to pursue is to establish a permanent international court, and leave 
 the enforcing of its decrees to the public opinion of the world. In the last 
 analysis, public opinion is always the force which exacts compliance with 
 the decrees of every tribunal. (See John Bassett Moore: Opening Address 
 at the 21st Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, 1915.) 
 
502 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 her action would not be strictly limited to this function, 
 but would cover a political purpose as well, the less inter- 
 ested powers came forward with various proposals, hoping 
 to set in motion collective action for the proper application 
 to Servia of the peace power. Austria and Germany, how- 
 ever, denied the right of the other states to interest them- 
 selves in the dispute. They thought that, since the other 
 powers recognized that Servia was at fault, Austria should 
 be allowed a perfectly free hand to impose upon Servia 
 conditions which would guarantee for the future due 
 respect for the rights of the Dual Monarchy. This stand 
 would have been logical if Servia had been within the 
 Austrian sphere of influence, as Austria seemed to believe 
 should be the case. 
 
 9. Germany's nationalistic conception 
 While the cooperating empires were elaborating this vast 
 machine of international control to protect the interests of 
 civilization and maintain the peace of the world, Germany, 
 having lately achieved her national unity, looked to the 
 national state as the be-all and end-all of political achieve- 
 ment. This arrested conception of political philosophy has 
 had important practical effects. It has made the Germans 
 feel very bitter because all of the great German emigration 
 of the past became absorbed in other political units and 
 was lost as a factor in their national influence. Another 
 serious consequence has been that, while the rest of the 
 world is thinking in terms of international cooperation, ^ 
 Germany is actuated by ideals of national aggrandizement. 
 The American mind can hardly understand how a German 
 can look upon it as a benefit that heroic little Belgium 
 should be destroyed, even though the German Empire 
 prosper thereby. , From the international point of view 
 they are both useful administrative divisions or agents of 
 
 1 Cf . the arguments of the Athenians in their discussion with the Melians, 
 Documents, post, chap. xiii. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 503 
 
 humanity. On the other hand, if Germany had absorbed 
 Turkey, enUghtened opinion in England and elsewhere 
 would quickly have agreed that she was merely taking up 
 the administrative burden of the world and acting for the 
 general good. 
 
 The political ideals of Germany and those which we have 
 traced in the formation of the super-empire, being opposed, 
 soon came into conflict. The rest of the world was not 
 willing to turn back the hand of progress and return to the 
 old ideas which they had left behind. Were the growing 
 pains of the Venezuela Message, of the Fashoda incident, 
 of the Dogger Bank to be so soon forgotten? They could 
 not, if they would, have stenmied the onward march of a 
 more perfect political organization on the basis of the 
 supremacy of international over national laws. 
 
 Germany was at a parting of the ways, and had to 
 choose between two courses. Either she could bend her 
 policy toward the conservation of her resources, frankly 
 recognizing the inevitable consequences of her geographical 
 situation, which handicapped her in the role of a world 
 state, or she could branch out into a policy of search after 
 prestige, with the consequent modification of her situation. 
 If she decided upon the first course, the corollaries would 
 have been to attempt to reach some agreement with 
 France to heal the still open wound of Alsace-Lorraine, 
 and, instead of resisting their expansion, to support Eng- 
 land and France in all action tending to affirm and solidify 
 their established control over their extensive dominions. 
 To this end she would have stood with England for a most 
 rigid adlierence to the binding force of treaties, and she 
 would have cooperated with England, France, and the 
 United States in the gradual and reasonable extension of 
 obligatory arbitration and the rapid improvement of the 
 procedm-e of international relations. She would have 
 reverted to that ancient treaty negotiated by her King 
 Frederick the Great and the philosopher Franklin to make 
 
504 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 inviolate private property at sea. The strengthening of 
 the ties between the great empires would have made it 
 possible for Germany to bring to bear a strong influence 
 for the ''open door" and the lowering of tariffs throughout 
 the world. 
 
 However, Germany gave her decision for the opposite 
 course, and determined to create for herself a larger "place 
 in the sun." Especially she aspired to acquire part of the 
 colonies preempted by the empires earlier on the field. 
 With such aims it was natural that she should oppose 
 every tendency which strengthened the status quo. She 
 went as far as possible in denying the binding force of inter- 
 national law in general.^ She was unwilling to see inter- 
 national obligatory arbitration embrace the relations of all 
 the states, and she did everything to enhance the respect 
 for might as the foundation of right to hold. She pushed 
 her armaments, and commenced building a great navy, to 
 protect her world-wide commerce. By refusing to work 
 for the adoption of a rule establishing the inviolability of 
 private property at sea, the German Government accepted 
 the responsibility for leaving the vast German merchant 
 fleets at the mercy of the chance of war. The only object 
 was to stimulate enthusiasm for an extensive naval equip- 
 ment and to make it possible to strike England's weakest 
 
 ^ Of course the diplomatic representatives of Germany have not stultified 
 themselves by proclaiming such a theory, but in Germany we find much sup- 
 port for the thoroughly untenable and elsewhere discredited theory of Kriegs- 
 raison, according to which the laws of war may be set aside in the case of 
 military necessity. A recent illustration of this peculiar nationalistic myopia 
 is found in an article by the distinguished German professor of international 
 law, Dr. Niemeyer, of Kiel University, whose article is translated in the 
 Michigan Law Review for January, 1915. He maintains that the 1839 treaty 
 for the neutralization of Belgium must yield before this Kriegsraison. 
 
 Germany admits the existence of rules of international law, but has in 
 general resisted the development of institutions for their effective enforce- 
 ment. The result of this policy would be to leave the international law 
 rights of the weak at the mercy of the strong, and to make the strong judge 
 in his own case. We should have, as a consequence of this system, as many 
 different systems of international law as there were powerful states, which 
 shows the reductio ad absurdum of the German contention. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 505 
 
 spot. Germany hoped to be able in case of war to threaten 
 England's communications and food supply. 
 
 In this pursuit of prestige and national expansion, Ger- 
 many was anxious to acquire new territories, but as she 
 came late into the field, there was very little left for her to 
 glean. Wherever she turned she found some European 
 power well established ; and since she had no thought of 
 being barred by this preemption of the face of the earth, she 
 had to consider where best she could secure the land she 
 coveted. There were several possibilities. She would have 
 preferred, of course, to avoid a conflict with England, and 
 at first turned her thoughts in other directions. There was 
 the great basin of the Congo; but England and France pre- 
 ferred that the King of Belgium should retain its control, 
 rather than have Germany thrust in between them. To 
 have seized the Dutch possessions would again have in- 
 volved England. From all of South America Germany was 
 shut out by the Monroe Doctrine unless she would do 
 battle with the United States. Accordingly, she directed 
 her attention toward the possessions of the Sublime Porte, 
 and with the help of her able ambassador at Constanti- 
 nople, the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, was able 
 to acquire and maintain an ascendancy over the Turk. It 
 is much to be regretted that the opposition which the other 
 powers were able to exercise at Constantinople was suc- 
 cessful in thwarting the development of her plans. This 
 caused Germany to look toward Morocco. Thence she had 
 to withdraw before the combined opposition of England 
 and France. These various checks to -Germany's diplo- 
 matic policy embittered her citizens and produced a state 
 of mind largely instrumental in influencing her Govern- 
 ment to take the uncompromising attitude which was the 
 immediate cause of the war. 
 
 Germany, like the vigorous organism that she is, felt 
 the life throb in her veins, a consciousness of strength to 
 do. Her superabundant vitality was evident through her 
 
506 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 rapidly growing population, which was due in part to the 
 continued maintenance of a birth-rate high as compared 
 with other equally developed and civiHzed countries, and 
 in part to the lowering of the death-rate as a result of the 
 efficient paternalism of the German Government. 
 
 This great increase in population made it necessary for 
 Germany to consider the policy she would adopt. Could 
 she continue her phenomenal industrial development so 
 as to find employment for her increasing millions, and so 
 as to be able to continue her programme for the progres- 
 sive uplifting of her masses? Certain signs made her doubt 
 the possibility of maintaining the same rate of increase 
 of industrial development which had hitherto made it 
 possible to absorb the increase of population. In this pre- 
 dicament, three courses of action lay open to the German 
 people. 
 
 First, — the simplest and most natural, — was the 
 traditional solution of allowing the surplus population to 
 emigrate. But the German people have resented the loss 
 of their good German stock in the past through emigra- 
 tion. They have remarked that in all parts of the world 
 the German has become a good citizen of his adopted 
 country and has been lost to the Fatherland. It has become 
 a conscious part of German policy to find some means of 
 keeping the whole German population within German 
 governmental control. If Germany had good colonies, the 
 solution would be simple. 
 
 The second solution was that which has been adopted 
 in other highly civilized communities, — commonly known 
 as race-suicide, — which means, of course, the restricting 
 of the number of children so as to maintain for the off- 
 spring the same or a better standard of hving than that 
 enjoyed by the parents. France is the classical example 
 of this system. The idea is revolting to the German con- 
 sciousness. The Germans are willing to restrict the num- 
 ber of children in the interest of the best development of 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 507 
 
 the whole German people. They do not advocate that the 
 family should be so large as to make a drudge of the mother 
 with her poverty-stricken horde of children; but they do 
 believe that the family should be large enough to give the 
 fullest enjoyment of motherhood and fatherhood, and to 
 supply every German child with the beautiful compan- 
 ionship of brothers and sisters. And so Germany is not 
 willing to follow in the path of France and our own New 
 England. If she had accepted the status quo and bound 
 herself to take no aggressive action, the increase of her 
 population must have been arrested or it would have 
 worked disaster in the Fatherland through the cut-throat 
 competition it would have engendered. 
 
 In the face of this alternative, Germany preferred the 
 larger, fuller national life to the quiescent acceptance of 
 the status in which she found herself. She preferred the 
 third solution, which was to make an appeal to her teem- 
 ing millions to hack their way to a larger place in the 
 world. She was not deterred by the fact that she must 
 rend the prize from the grasp of another state, whose 
 philosophy of race-suicide she considered merited such a 
 fate. 
 
 Having decided for this fuller life, even at the cost of 
 the world-condemnation which would follow her aggressive 
 attempts to seize the territory of others, she attempted to 
 secure the results through threats of force without its ac- 
 tual employment. She played for a diplomatic victory 
 over Servia and so on beyond the Balkans into Asia 
 Minor. 
 
 If England and France could have been sure that once 
 Germany had expanded over these regions she would sub- 
 scribe to their own philosophy of the status quo and not 
 take advantage of this increase in strength to make it a 
 fulcrum for a further advance, they could, doubtless, have 
 reached some agreement with her, but each side mistrust- 
 ing the other's purpose, it was most difficult to reach any 
 
508 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 compromise. Germany, impatient and apprehensive of 
 delay, said, ''I will expand, even at the cost of aggression. 
 If need be I will seek my 'place in the sun' at the point of 
 the sword." To this the Anglo-French super-empire, de- 
 fending the status quo, repUed, ''Thou shalt not expand 
 until thou puttest aggression behind thee." The issue is 
 being fought out. 
 
 10. Nationalism and internationalism 
 Under the old conception of independent and rival 
 national states, we had groups of men swayed by antago- 
 nisms to one another, traceable to opposition of interests; 
 in the course of time, other conditions being equal, one 
 such group would be eliminated, which is another way of 
 saying that there is a tendency in the long run for the 
 action of a group of individuals to be based upon their 
 material interests. Where action necessary to the protec- 
 tion of such interests is opposed to the action necessary for 
 the protection of other interests, we may in general predi- 
 cate a conflict of the groups supporting the opposed inter- 
 ests. When we consider what is the direct motive of the 
 antagonism, we find that it is not so much the interest as 
 a different way of thinking, though in the long run this 
 difference of thinking will arise from the conscious or sub- 
 conscious appreciation of difference of interests, — which 
 restates our previous remark that antagonisms have a 
 tendency to be the expression of differences of interests. 
 Since, as we have seen in the preceding section, Germany's 
 interest was to secure more territory, and since this could 
 only be accomplished by aggression, her interests sup- 
 ported aggression, — which means that she would oppose 
 all rules of international law tending to confirm rights of 
 possession. This she did through the doctrine of national 
 necessity, — that is to say, whatever is necessary for na- 
 tional salvation as interpreted by the state is permissible, 
 — and so we find that the German theory of the superi- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 509 
 
 ority of national needs over international rules conforms 
 with her understanding of her interests.^ 
 
 We must not, however, confuse that difference of interest 
 which may be the fundamental or underlying cause with 
 the immediate ground of difference, which is psychological. 
 Individuals and groups of individuals differ because they 
 have different ways of thinking, and this it will be found is 
 the real reason for the great human conflicts. Religious 
 wars have been most bitter because the difference of 
 opinion touched upon the most vital questions of human 
 thought. One reason for the peculiarly dreadful nature of 
 civil conflicts is that the disagreement in point of view 
 between the two factions has been more thoroughly 
 brought out and emphasized by the associations and inter- 
 relations of the opposed factions. 
 
 The great states of to-day are composed of individuals 
 of all degrees and kinds of opinions, so that an individual 
 will often find closer relations between himself and certain 
 other individuals in a neighboring nation, in regard to the 
 questions which he holds most important, than he will 
 among the generality of citizens of the state to which he 
 belongs. This interrelation of ideas binding the world 
 together by a philosophical network is the only real foun- 
 
 ^ Germany, being a highly developed, civilized state, had to observe the 
 rules of international law in her intercourse with her sister states. She found 
 a workable system to obviate the inconveniences of her philosophy by 
 strictly observing the rules of international law, making a reservation only 
 in those exceptional cases when it should be necessary to consummate her 
 national aims. Up to the outbreak of the war, jurists of other countries 
 refused to believe that Germany meant her theory of state necessity seri- 
 ously. They thought it a half-baked theory due to a lack of critical appre- 
 ciation and understanding of the true meaning of international law. They 
 realize now the sincerity of the views expressed by German writers on inter- 
 national law and their general acceptance by German men of affairs. Had 
 the world appreciated sooner the true significance of these views and the 
 firm determination of the German Government to apply them, it would 
 have retahated against her. It would not have continued international 
 relations with her on the same basis as with the other states which accept 
 a common system based upon the supremacy of international law over the 
 needs and policies of any separate state. 
 
510 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 dation for considering humanity as a unit. But when a 
 war intervenes, we witness a mental mobilization analogous 
 to the wonderful military transformation previously dis- 
 cussed. The individual oppositions and diversities of 
 opinion for the most part disappear, and in the peculiar 
 psychological condition which prevails, the individuals of 
 the highest mental endowment accept without question 
 the views which are in part the officially promulgated views 
 of their government. These must of necessity in such 
 instances either be in harmony with the prevailing senti- 
 ments of the community, or based upon them. To analyze 
 the causes of this peculiar mobilization would carry us too 
 far afield, but if we apply the ever-ready explanation of 
 the evolutionist, we may consider that the communities 
 which lack this power of war-thought could not present 
 an undivided front to the enemy, so that, in the course of 
 countless generations, the surviving representatives of 
 those states possessing the fittest conditions for survival 
 in this world possess this marvelous faculty of united war- 
 thought. The rapidity and the thoroughness with which 
 this mental mobilization can be effected will depend upon 
 many conditions, which it would be interesting to analyze, 
 if space allowed. One of the most important is doubtless 
 the degree of the general realization of the danger with 
 which the community is threatened. 
 
 In the present war, Germany has given the most wonder- 
 ful example of this mental mobilization, for the whole 
 German people have united themselves in support of the 
 fundamental ideas which lie at the basis of Germany's 
 political action — that is, a worship of the national exis- 
 tence expressed in an almost mystical adoration for the 
 state. The rest of the world, perhaps because it has passed 
 through the national stage of development and takes a 
 broader outlook, thinks differently from Germany. Since 
 this difference of thought had gradually been uniting the 
 greater part of the civilized world — with the exception of 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 511 
 
 Germany — into a company for collaboration on the basis 
 of the unity of mankind, sometimes spoken of as inter- 
 nationalism or international cooperation, this great differ- 
 ence of opinion has become the fmidamental basis of sepa- 
 ration between the two great masses of men now fighting 
 by land and sea. This difference of point of view explains 
 why Germany's intense national feeling made her oppose 
 every attempt to restrict the freedom of individual state 
 action. Her mystical conception of the divine position of 
 the state prevented Germany from joining with the other 
 powers to hasten the advance of international cooperation. 
 With remarkable consistency Germany remained true to 
 this religion and opposed the various efforts of the other 
 nations to strengthen the actual situation, known as the 
 status quo. The Germans saw no reason why they should 
 voluntarily limit the freedom of development of the Ger- 
 man state so as to cooperate with England and France in 
 reaffirming this status quo.^ Since they had to recognize 
 
 1 Germany maintains that England's policy was directed toward main- 
 taining the balance of power on the Continent while she remained supreme 
 on the seas. If Germany means that England's policy was to protect the 
 weaker states on the Continent against armed aggression and conquest, no 
 doubt this was true. In his speech of December 2 before the German Reichs- 
 tag, Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg said: "The whole situation was as follows: 
 England was willing to come to an understanding with us in individual 
 questions, but the first principle always was that Germany's free develop- 
 ment of strength must be checked by the balance of power." 
 
 Mr. Asquith has explained that in 1912 England offered the German 
 Chancellor an understanding neither to make nor join in any aggression 
 upon Germany; but the Chancellor asked for a pledge that England would 
 remain neutral whenever Germany went to war. (London Times, January 
 27, 1915.) This shows that England no longer wanted to maintain her old 
 traditional policy of aggressive intervention to impose a balance of power on 
 the Continent, but merely sought to insure herself and France against any 
 attempt on the part of Germany to take from any state its possessions by 
 force. The field of fair commercial competition, in which Germany was suc- 
 ceeding so marvelously, lay open to her. 
 
 In his Guildhall speech Mr. Asquith said: "Let me now turn to the actual 
 situation in Europe. How do we stand? For the last ten years, by what I 
 believe to be happy and well-considered diplomatic arrangements, we have 
 established friendly and increasingly intimate relations with two powers — 
 France and Russia — with whom in days gone by we have had in various 
 
512 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 that in the affairs of nations the international point of view 
 was necessarily paramount to the national, it was their 
 policy to minimize, in every way, the place of international 
 law. Instead they would set up a right of the strong to 
 control, not, as many think, with brutal excesses, but 
 restrained by a mystic realization of responsibility for the 
 proper application of this force; but what the German 
 mind would not admit was that any control should be 
 placed on the exercise of this force by the voice of any 
 majority. The strong individual, whether man or nation, 
 was to hold a larger freedom in his action because of his 
 superior qualities. The opponent of this point of view con- 
 siders that its danger lies in the fact that there exists no 
 guaranty that the physical force will be combined with the 
 high moral qualities requisite for the effective control of 
 its employment ; since the possessor of physical power might 
 not, perhaps, recognize or admit his own imperfections, but 
 proceed to employ the force at his own will, society would 
 be in imminent peril. To have met this very need has been 
 the culminating triumph of efforts toward the establishing 
 and perfecting of constitutional government. Germany, 
 however, does not appreciate the results of all this human 
 experience, and has refused to allow the society of nations 
 to transfer into the domain of international law those 
 
 parts of the world occasions for friction, and now and again for possible con- 
 flict. These new and better relations, based in the first instance upon busi- 
 ness principles of give and take, matured into a settled temper of confidence 
 and good-will. They were never in any sense or at any time, as I have 
 frequently said in this hall, directed against other powers." (London Times, 
 September 5, 1914.) 
 
 In spite of this difference of aim the British and German Governments 
 had made real progress toward settling their differences and might have 
 discovered the basis for a long peace if they could have passed this latest 
 and most acute Balkan crisis. When Germany began building her great 
 fleet in the late nineties, it was evident that England would strike very 
 quickly if she intended aggression for a preventative war. Similarly, Ger- 
 many had to strike in 1914 before Russia and France should become still 
 stronger, or resign herself to accept cooperative action on the basis of the 
 status quo. That would have meant the renunciation of all hopes of ex- 
 pansion by force of arms or threat of arms. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 513 
 
 restrictions upon the exercise of the national will which, in 
 municipal affairs, have grown up within the modern con- 
 stitutional states. And so, at the Second Hague Confer- 
 ence, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein opposed the adop- 
 tion of a general convention of obligatory arbitration, 
 much to the disappointment of the great majority of the 
 delegates there assembled. Furthermore, Germany refused 
 to consider the possibility of limiting her armament by 
 land or sea. Regarding the obligation to respect treaties, 
 Germany has compromised; she has realized full well that 
 any intercourse with her sister states was impossible on 
 any other basis than the respect for treaties, so that, if we 
 except the violation of Belgian neutrality, she has stood 
 high in the faith with which she has observed her obliga- 
 tions. Nevertheless, the general tendency of Germany's 
 action and the opinions expressed by German jurists has 
 been to place the observance upon the grounds of more 
 immediate interest; that is, policy, rather than upon the 
 idea of a sacred obligation. The German system is being 
 put to its own test of effectiveness on the high seas and on 
 the plains of Europe. To me the German view seems an 
 anachronism, and, taking into consideration all the aspects 
 of the subject, the greatest error of mankind; nevertheless, 
 I must admit as a general principle that, where great 
 masses of men have been willing to lay down their lives for 
 an ideal, the results have demonstrated that they were not 
 wholly wrong. 
 
 If, as I say, there may be truth on either side, this great 
 country of ours, with its many millions of German citizens 
 and sympathizers, will not fail to have it fully presented; 
 nor, when we remember the hold that liberal democratic 
 doctrines have upon this country, and the part we have 
 taken in international cooperation, the great development 
 of internationalism among our citizens, and the aid our 
 Government has given in maintenance of the principles of 
 international law, will there be any danger that we shall 
 
514 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 be led to give an undue place to the narrowing doctrine of 
 nationalism as opposed to internationalism. 
 
 11. The results 
 
 Germany has clearly violated international law, and, if 
 she does not succeed, even for the moment, in escaping 
 punishment, the lesson will be as salutary as the example 
 of Bismarck was deleterious. Meantime, the manner in 
 which she has held the rest of Europe in check compels the 
 admiration of all beholders. If Europe learns to realize 
 the necessity of finding some means to organize an efficient 
 bureaucracy without destroying the freedom of individual 
 initiative, while Germany learns to take a more cosmopoli- 
 tan and less nationally narrow point of view, the world 
 may enter upon a new era of efficient government. 
 
 Should Germany be successful in carrying out the theo- 
 ries of her Government, and her people, after the war 
 enthusiasm is past, continue to support the Government, 
 which has put through its projects in disregard of its treaty 
 obligations and of the peaceful existence of the individuals 
 composing another nation, the student of events, seeking 
 with impartial view, will have to admit that we are not 
 yet ready for any great step forward; that it is too early to 
 recognize the practical existence of the society of humanity 
 as such, including all peoples. He will perceive that the 
 high-water mark of achievement possible under present 
 conditions is the perfected national state after the type of 
 Germany, where the whole nation to a man unites with 
 absolute devotion and training which indicates science and 
 character. He may regret that the other states which have 
 earlier achieved this national union and passed on, looking 
 toward the next stage, have been doomed to disappoint- 
 ment. Just as for centuries the Germans who dreamed of 
 a great national German state had to be content with a 
 political grouping into smaller and less national units and 
 endure all the inconveniences of such a condition, so must 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 515 
 
 we sink with despair to that lower level. He will, perhaps, 
 discover, in such an event, that we rushed on with too 
 much hope and idealism, and without a just sense of pro- 
 portion. 
 
 The world will adjust itself to all the miseries of a patch- 
 work of jealous and independent states and wait for the 
 next step, until a broadened experience and a more uni- 
 form advance in civiUzation throughout the world have 
 made it possible to build, on a firmer, saner foundation, a 
 nobler edifice of human government. 
 
 But before we yield up our cherished ideals, we will 
 strive, by force of arms if necessary, to meet the force 
 which that marvelously perfected national state has 
 thrown against the foundation of our international order. 
 We will help to overthrow the projects of such a govern- 
 ment and recognize none that will not live within the same 
 community of common international ideals. 
 
 In the mean time, we are in the midst of a contest be- 
 tween the two great rival systems of thought — national 
 and international — which will be settled in a treaty of 
 peace which is a compromise, as every treaty of peace has 
 always been. In any great conflict neither side has all of 
 the truth, and this new compromise may well be a nearer 
 approximation to the facts of actual conditions, and con- 
 stitute a better working basis of agreement, in accordance 
 with which the nations of the world may dwell in more per- 
 fect peace. 
 
 Let us not forget that every ounce of strength that is 
 put forth to defend and maintain the views we believe in 
 will weigh in the balance when the discussion of the terms 
 of peace shall come. 
 
PART III 
 DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
 
 Question: — Did Austria intend to precipitate the war? 
 
 Answer: — If by intent to precipitate the war is meant to bring on a war 
 in any event, we must answer, no. But if we mean, Did Austria take action 
 so as to necessitate a war unless Servia consented to abase herself, as no in- 
 dependent state could do and yet retain its claims to the respect of the other 
 states? — we must answer that Austria did intend to precipitate a war. 
 Austria, besides imposing humiliating conditions, demanded that Servia 
 would immediately cease a propaganda which it was practically impossible 
 for her Government to prevent. Thus Austria made it necessary for Servia 
 to accept her dictation and to become a vassal state if she would avoid a war. 
 
 Question: — Was Austria's ultimatum to Servia intended to be accepted? 
 
 Answer: — The form in which the Austrian ultimatum was drawn up, 
 the short delay accorded, and the subsequent action of Austria, make clear 
 that the Austrian ultimatum was intended to be unacceptable to Servia. 
 
 Question: — Was Austria's action toward Servia reasonable? 
 
 Answer: — Austria's action was unreasonable in that she attempted to 
 deal with Servia, an independent sovereign state, almost as though she were 
 an Austrian province in rebellion. Her action was unreasonable because 
 for many years past it had been recognized that any change in the Balkan 
 affairs was the concern of Europe in general and of Austria and Russia in 
 particular. The assassination of the heir to the Dual Monarchy gave Aus- 
 tria serious ground of complaint against Servia, but by no means justified 
 her recourse to such extreme measures. Almost any other state would have 
 departed from a conduct strictly reasonable under a similar provocation, 
 and in the face of a similar danger. The manner of Austria's action was at 
 fault rather than the nature. 
 
 Question: — Did France first cross the Franco-German frontier? 
 
 Answer: — The German Government, in its oflScial correspondence, 
 claims that France first crossed her frontier and was guilty of other acts 
 contrary to international law, making her the aggressor in the Franco- 
 German conflict. As yet it has been impossible to obtain any evidence 
 substantiating this charge, while France has made out by far the best prima 
 facie case, because the diplomatic correspondence contains the statement 
 of her Government that she had withdrawn all her troops ten kilometres 
 from the frontier so as to avoid any possibility of conflict with Germany. 
 
 Question: — Did France do her whole duty in restraining Russia from 
 endangering the continuance of peace by mobilization? 
 Answer: — The French Government apparently was so convinced that 
 
520 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Austria's action was intended as an attack on Russia's position in the Bal- 
 kans, and that Germany would back up Austria, that from the start she 
 made clear to Germany her intention of supporting her ally. Even Germany 
 herself recognized that France did not wish for war. The best evidence of 
 France's peaceful intentions is derived from her action in 1909, when she 
 threw her influence against war, although there was a strong feeling on the 
 part of the Entente Powers that Austria, in her annexation of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, had been guilty of unjustifiable procedure affecting the vital 
 interests of all European powers. Similarly, in 1913, France used her influ- 
 ence for peace in the Balkans. Nevertheless, France does not seem to have 
 been as active in working for peace during this crisis as England and Italy. 
 The reasons for her attitude are made clear in the French Yellow Book. She 
 believed the only hope for peace was for the Entente Powers to make a firm 
 resistance to the Austro-German demands. This attitude prevented France 
 from exercising a wholesome restraint upon Russia in regard to a premature 
 mobilization. 
 
 Question: — Did France violate, or intend to violate, Belgium's neutral- 
 ity? 
 
 Answer: — Germany has declared that she had proof that France intended 
 to violate Belgium's neutrality. She alleged that French aviators flew over 
 Belgian territory and that France intended to attack Germany by tra- 
 versing Belgium. Germany has not, as yet, adduced any evidence worthy 
 of the name in support of these claims. Even when the German minister 
 aroused the Belgium Foreign Ofl5ce in the dead of night dm-ing the period 
 that the twelve hours of the German ultimatum to Belgium were running, 
 because he wished to notify them of the violations of international law of 
 which France was guilty, he did not assert that those violations had occurred 
 on Belgian territory. It is conceivable that France may have prepared 
 elaborate plans for traversing Belgium to attack Germany, to be used only 
 in case Germany should be guilty of an unmistakable and serious violation 
 of Belgium's neutrality. Germany's allegations against France have been 
 so frivolous as to create a prejudice throughout the world. The world has 
 had more respect for the straightforward declaration of the Chancellor that 
 Germany's action was based upon "necessity, which knows no law." The 
 best answer to these claims of Germany is the fact that even after Germany 
 had entered Belgium's territory, it was several weeks before the French 
 troops could come up to render assistance. 
 
 4 Question: — Did the German Government know the contents of the 
 Austrian note to Servia before it was presented? 
 
 Answer: — I am convinced that the German Government spoke the 
 truth, and that the note was not previously communicated. From an ex- 
 amination it would seem probable that this ignorance was prearranged. 
 Cf. the Documents, post, chap. xiii. 
 
 Question: — Did Germany do everything reasonably possible to avoid 
 war? 
 
 Answer: — Germany certainly did make serious efforts to avoid war, 
 but they seem, though sincere, to have been misdirected; for example, her 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 521 
 
 desperate eflfort at the last moment to mediate between Austria and Russia. 
 But Germany refused to employ the most natural and effective means of 
 avoiding war by referring the question in dispute to a general conference, 
 and, whatever her reasons, she backed her ally in persisting in a course 
 contrary to the generally recognized canons of international procedure. 
 Such conduct was very likely to force a war. 
 
 Question: — Was Germany the first to cross the French frontier? 
 
 Answer: — The evidence seems to indicate that Germany certainly was 
 the first to cross the French frontier, especially in view of the French Gov- 
 ernment's declaration that it had withdrawn all its troops ten kilometres from 
 the international frontier. In any event, Germany's entry into Luxemburg, 
 on August 2, was an act of aggression as dangerous to France as a viola- 
 tion of her territory. If France had immediately replied by crossing the in- 
 ternational frontier, she could not have been considered the aggressor. 
 
 Question: — Was the German Emperor personally responsible for the 
 war? 
 
 Answer: — The German Emperor undoubtedly made great efforts to pre- 
 serve the peace of Europe. For forty-four years, the German Empire has 
 not known a war. As a result of this policy, the Emperor has been severely 
 criticized by the Fan-Germanist party and has been dubbed "William the 
 Poltroon." It is even probable that the Emperor delayed Germany's at- 
 tack in the present war. But if he may not be held directly responsible for 
 the war, indirectly a large share of the blame falls to him, because he has 
 been so unwise as to wish to retain in his own hands the direction of Ger- 
 many's foreign affairs. Since he dismissed Bismarck, he has had no real 
 Chancellor of the Empire, but only under-secretaries. William I could listen 
 to the arguments of the military group, headed by Von Moltke and Von 
 Roon, and balance against them what Bismarck had to say. The present 
 Kaiser, being his own Commander-in-Chief and his own Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs, has lost the advantageous position of umpire. Weak as has 
 been German diplomacy, it is inconceivable that those oflScially in charge of 
 her foreign policy could have allowed her to enter this war at such a disad- 
 vantage, from a diplomatic point of view, if they had been able to exercise 
 any real influence upon the German Government. For the great aim of 
 diplomacy is first to avoid war, and, secondly, when war is inevitable, to 
 prepare favorable alliances or relations with the other powers so that war 
 may be entered upon at an opportune moment, and incidentally, to force 
 the adversary to take the position of the aggressor in appearance if not in 
 fact. 
 
 Question: — Was Germany back of the Austrian ultimatum? 
 
 Answer: — The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared 
 that he did not know the terms of the ultimatum before it was presented, 
 but he probably had some inkling of its general tenor. The British Ambas- 
 sador at Vienna believed that his German colleague was closely in touch with 
 Austria's preparations for taking drastic action against Servia. It may have 
 been thought better that Germany should have no official knowledge of the 
 contents of the Austrian note so that she might be in a better position to 
 
522 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 support her ally. Another explanation may also have been that the Ger- 
 man Ambassador at Vienna, who was known to be intensely hostile to 
 Russia and to the continuance of Russian influence in the Balkans, was 
 intriguing, through the help of the military party, to bring on a conflict 
 between Germany and Russia. It is hardly possible that Germany would 
 have allowed such a clumsily worded note to be presented if she had known 
 the terms in which it was drawn up. If she had not previously given Aus- 
 tria carte blanche, it is not likely that Germany would have approved the 
 note which Von Jagow said "left much to be desired." So we are led to 
 conclude that she was so unwise as to allow her ally a free hand. 
 
 Question: — Did Germany believe England would remain neutral? 
 
 Answer: — No doubt a large part of the German and Austrian popula- 
 tion thought England would keep out of the war, as she would almost cer- 
 tainly have done if France had not become involved. But the German 
 statesmen and men of affairs must have realized that, although England 
 would not interfere in the Balkans, she could not allow Germany to become 
 paramount on the Continent. If there had been any real hope of England's 
 remaining neutral throughout the war, Germany would not have been so 
 insensate as to provoke her by invading Belgium. Germany feared that 
 England would step in at a moment opportune for England and inopportune 
 for Germany, and preferred to secure what immediate advantage she could 
 by violating Belgium's neutrality. 
 
 Question: — Was it necessary for Germany to hack her way through 
 Belgium ? 
 
 Ansiver: — Although that was the only way by which she could have any 
 hope of rapidly crushing France and vanquishing her enemies in a quick 
 campaign, a better plan for Germany te have pursued would have been to 
 remain on the defensive against France and, in cooperation with Austria, 
 to direct her attack against Russia. If Germany had followed this plan, the 
 Belgian question would not have arisen, and England might have remained 
 neutral. The invasion of Belgium was not necessary, therefore, to the 
 preservation of the German nation. 
 
 Question: — Did Russia make every reasonable effort to avoid war? 
 
 Answer: — In view of conflicting reports, it is very difficult to arrive at 
 any conclusion. There is, however, no question but that Russia preserved 
 a perfectly correct diplomatic attitude, evincing her willingness to partici- 
 pate in and give her adhesion to any plan which seemed to present the 
 slightest possibility of a peaceful solution. Furthermore, she made sugges- 
 tions herself. The only ground upon which Russia is at all open to criticism 
 ia that she was unnecessarily hasty in mobilizing. Russia's view was that, 
 if she merely protested and took no action, Austria would take advantage 
 of her supineness, thinking Russia was ready to submit to anything to 
 avoid war, and though she was most peacefully inclined, she was not willing 
 to back down again, as she had done when Germany threatened war if she 
 did not acquiesce in what she considered Austria's violation of Article 25 
 of the Berlin Treaty by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. So Russia 
 proceeded to mobilize on her southern frontier bordering on Austria. 
 
 In view of the uncompromising attitude of Germany and Austria, we 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 523 
 
 cannot blame Russia for thinking it necessary to show that she was in ear- 
 nest, but we must regret that she did not longer delay her mobilization. 
 When, however, we consider that Russia was by no means assured of Eng- 
 lish support in case of a conflict, — in fact, England was making heroic 
 efforts to keep out of any conflict arising from a Balkan question, — we 
 must realize that Russia was in great peril from a German attack. Russia 
 believed that Germany was intent upon war — Austrian and German action 
 making such an assumption seem very probable — and feared to let Austria 
 complete her mobilization while she herself made no preparation. 
 
 On the other hand, Russia must have known that Germany would con- 
 sider it absolutely essential to strike before her neighbors had completed 
 their mobilization and would look upon even Russia's partial mobilization 
 as necessitating war. Mobilization once begun it was not to be expected that 
 Germany would long delay a declaration of war. On the whole, then, we 
 may say that Russia's mobilization on the Austrian frontier made it im- 
 possible for the powers to continue at greater length the diplomatic discus- 
 sions and negotiations which might possibly have resulted in a solution 
 acceptable to all. On the other hand, we cannot say that Russia's action 
 was unreasonable. 
 
 The last two or three days before the war, it appears that the war party 
 in St. Petersburg may have felt that England was sure to support Russia 
 and so have been anxious to precipitate a conflict. It is just possible, if 
 England had intimated to Russia from the very start that she would stand 
 with her in case of German aggression, provided Russia did everything to 
 faciUtate negotiations toward peace, that Russia might have been willing 
 to defer her mobilization on the southern frontier; because in case of an 
 actual outbreak of war, she would then have been hnked with her ally, 
 France, and also with England, against Austria and Germany, joined 
 possibly by Italy. With such support Russia might have felt more secure 
 of the ultimate result, and have entertained less apprehension of German 
 aggression. 
 
 Germany reiterates her charge that the whole conflict was brought on by 
 Russia's mobilization, when she was in the act of mediating in response to 
 the appeal of the Tsar. On the other hand, to this Russia answers that the 
 mobilization which she undertook was a result of a decision made the mo- 
 ment she learned of the terms of the Austrian note. This mobilization in 
 her southern districts would, Russia declared, be undertaken in case of 
 Austrian aggression against Servia. 
 
 Once the order given for this mobilization, necessitated by Austria's 
 action, it was, as all military experts know, impossible to arrest it in the 
 middle. Russia assured Germany that the measures were not directed 
 against her, but when Germany began to assume a threatening attitude and 
 to insist that Russia should arrest her preparations, Sazonof became con- 
 vinced that Germany intended a war, and hastened his preparations. The 
 German Ambassador requested Sazonof to make a suggestion of a formula 
 to Servia as a basis for mediation. This the Russian Ambassador not only 
 did in the special circumstances of the case, which made it amount almost 
 to an ultimatum; but when Sir Edward Grey requested him to change the 
 form so as to make it easier for Austria to accept, and so as not to seem in 
 any way to force Austria and Germany to back down, he did not hesitate to 
 
524 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 do so. Then, just as there was some prospect of peace as a result of Austria's 
 suddenly assuming a conciliatory attitude, Russia dashed all hopes by order- 
 ing a general mobilization. This gave Germany reasonable ground to launch 
 her ultimatum, after which, of course, there could be but one answer. 
 
 The impartial observer cannot get at the truth of this difficult question 
 until he knows more of the facts of the military preparations undertaken by 
 Germany and Russia. An examination of the action of the two Govern- 
 ments is prejudicial in favor of Russia, because of the extremely concilia- 
 tory attitude of her diplomacy from the start. Russia did, nevertheless, lose 
 the benefit of this favorable consideration when she became responsible for 
 precipitating the war by ordering a general mobihzation. 
 
 Question: — Was the protection of Servia of vital interest to Russia? 
 
 Answer: — It is hard to define a vital interest with any degree of accuracy, 
 but from the material side, it may reasonably be made to include those 
 economic interests of a country of sufficient importance to affect its whole 
 industrial and commercial development. From the sentimental or immate- 
 rial side, it would embrace all those ties of sympathy which are supported 
 by a general consensus of opinion within the country and which a large 
 body of the individuals are willing to help their Government maintain, even 
 to the extent of sacrificing their lives. From a material point of view, it is 
 essential for Russia to secm-e good port facilities on ice-free seas, and above 
 all to protect her commerce through the Dardanelles. Hence she must 
 consider Austrian supremacy in the Balkans as a menace to her vital inter- 
 ests, and must be prepared to block, at its inception, any move which may 
 lead to such a result. In the Austro-Servian conflict it was evident that 
 Austria, whatever her immediate design might be, intended ultimately to 
 secure control of the Balkans. Even though she should leave Constantinople 
 in Turkish hands or under the collective control of the powers, by securing 
 Salonika she could at will intercept Russia's grain fleets and cruisers as 
 they issued from the Dardanelles. 
 
 But strong as is Russia's material interest in the Balkan situation, the 
 real impelling force with the Russian people is sympathy for their Slav 
 brethren. Whenever Russia has made war, the great mass of the Russian 
 people has always believed that it was undertaken solely for the pur- 
 pose of protecting Christians and upholding Christianity. Russians are 
 especially ready to assist the Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans. The Russo- 
 Tiu-kish War of 1877 was, from the Russian point of view, entered upon to 
 protect the Christian states in the Balkans. The war with Japan, it was pop- 
 ularly believed in Russia, was merely a campaign against the infidel. Con- 
 sequently it would be very difficult, almost impossible, for the Russian 
 Government to resist the popular pressure to come to the aid of the Servians, 
 Bulgarians, or Montenegrins when threatened by Austria. We may con- 
 clude that the protection of Servia was a vital interest for Russia, though 
 this does not mean that the Russian Government could not have stemmed 
 the clamor for intervention if it had felt that there were sufficiently weighty 
 reasons to justify such action. 
 
 Question: — Should Russia have been satisfied with Austria's assurances 
 that she would not interfere with Servian integrity or independence? 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 525 
 
 Answer: — Austria, in the assurances she gave to Russia and to the other 
 powers concerning her intentions toward Servia, especially emphasized 
 that she would under no circumstances seize Servian territory, that is, 
 interfere with Servia's integrity; but she was much less specific concerning 
 Servia's independence, though she might perhaps have been willing to enter 
 into a binding agreement not to interfere with Servia's independence. But 
 the demands of the ultimatum, if complied with, would actually have been 
 such an interference, for according to their tenor, Austria v/ould be permitted 
 to name the Servian officials who she considered ought to be dismissed, and 
 there was no guaranty that this procediu-e, once agreed to, might not be 
 repeated on other occasions until Servia's officials would look to Austria's 
 favor for the security of their positions. But even if these matters could 
 have been arranged satisfactorily and Austria allowed to continue her cam- 
 paign against Servia, as soon as she had vanquished her weaker neighbor, 
 she might have interpreted her promises in such a way as to render them 
 null and void. The low standard of international integrity and sense of 
 obligation to respect a solemn promise makes it, alas, impossible to place 
 perfect reliance upon them. 
 
 Question: — Did Russia mobilize in such a fashion as to threaten Ger- 
 many and necessitate action by Germany? 
 
 Answer: — The answer to this question will be found in the discussion of 
 a previous question regarding Russia's efforts to avoid war. 
 
 Question: — Did Russia cross the Russo-German frontier before the dec- 
 laration of war? 
 
 Ansiver: — With the present lack of information, it seems impossible to 
 ascertain whether this accusation of the German Government is well 
 founded or not, but in a time of such unusual tension isolated instances of 
 violations of territory by a few troops are hard to prevent. Even in time 
 of peace they sometimes occur, and are of trivial importance when under- 
 taken. They should not be magnified and permitted to bring about a gen- 
 eral engagement. Russia had every reason to avoid such acts, since she 
 needed all the time that she could get to complete her mobilization before 
 Germany should strike. 
 
 Question: — Did Great Britain enter the war against Germany in order 
 to protect Belgium's neutrality? 
 
 Ansiuer: — Great Britain did not enter the war solely to protect Bel- 
 gium's neutrality, and Sir Edward Grey has been careful in his ofiicial 
 utterances to say that this was one of the reasons why Great Britain en- 
 tered the conflict. An approximately correct statement of Great Britain's 
 position may perhaps be made as follows: Great Britain would have found 
 it most difficult, under any circumstances, to have tied her hands not to 
 intervene in the war. In any event, when it came to agreeing upon the 
 conditions of peace, she would have intervened diplomatically to prevent 
 any terms that she considered dangerous to her interests. Even if she had 
 agreed to remain absolutely neutral, the understanding would always have 
 been that Germany must not expect to make any settlement of European 
 affairs violating too flagrantly Great Britain's permanent and vital interests. 
 
 The conditions under which Great Britain would have tied her hands 
 
526 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 and remained out were so difficult to define and so little likely to have been 
 acceptable to Germany that Sir Edward Grey probably thought it was not 
 worth while to enter into a discussion of them when the German Ambassa- 
 dor asked him upon what terms Great Britain would agree to remain neu- 
 tral. For this action he was severely criticized by a Labor Member of 
 Parliament who accused him of striving to involve the country in a con- 
 flict with Germany. The only attitude that Great Britain could take was 
 that she hoped to keep out of the conflict and that she would make the 
 neutrality of Belgium an important factor. If Germany refused to respect 
 Belgium's neutrality, she intended to enter the conflict at once, and at the 
 same time that she assisted Belgium, she would oppose Germany in the 
 accomplishment of designs which must necessarily conflict with British 
 interests. 
 
 It is, then, not entirely correct to say that Great Britain entered the war 
 to protect Belgium's neutrality, for she entered the war to protect her own 
 vital interests. Though the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium was 
 of the greatest importance to her vital interests, she would have gone into 
 the war likewise if it had been a question of Germany's invading Holland. 
 The fact that Great Britain was not obligated by treaty to defend Holland's 
 neutrality would not have entered into consideration, for in the case of an 
 invasion of Holland, England's vital interests would be endangered. The 
 occupation of Belgium, even if it had not involved the violation of a solemn 
 treaty, could not be tolerated by England. England has never considered 
 that she could permit any great Continental power to hold any of the Chan- 
 nel ports. It is more correct, therefore, to say that England went into the 
 war because it was a vital interest for her that no great power should con- 
 trol Belgium. At the same time, it is possible that she might have gone 
 into the war simply because of Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality. 
 The great majority of the English people, however, really believe that the 
 war was undertaken in great measure to protect Belgium. The Germans 
 consider such an attitude as hypocrisy, but they do not realize that they 
 afford an example of a still greater popular error — that their invasion of 
 Belgium was undertaken because the German Government had conclusive 
 proof of the actual and intended violation of Belgian neutrality by France 
 or England. 
 
 Question: — Was Belgium neutrality violated by France or England or 
 by Belgium herself in such manner as to justify Germany's disregard of the 
 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality? 
 
 Answer: — The answer to this question is to be found in the chapter on 
 Belgium where an examination of the evidence has been made. The con- 
 clusion is that not one bit of evidence worthy of the name has been brought 
 forward by Germany to justify any of these serious charges. So many of 
 the German allegations have been found, upon fuller investigation, to be 
 unsubstantiated, as to raise a reasonable presumption of doubt regarding 
 all the others. 
 
 Question: — Was England free to remain out of the war up to the time 
 of her ultimatum to Germany, and was Sir Edward Grey correct in saying 
 that Great Britain was in no wise committed? 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 527 
 
 Answer: — England was committed to the extent of a conditional partici- 
 pation in the war because of the relations of the Entente and the agreement 
 with France. According to the arrangement carried into effect by France 
 and England, the English fleet was withdrawn from the Mediterranean and 
 the policing of English interests left to France, while the French fleets were 
 concentrated in the Mediterranean for this purpose. Tliis placed upon Great 
 Britain an obligation which she was in honor bound to observe of protecting 
 the French coasts from aggression. Hence she was to that extent a condi- 
 tional ally of France. Sir Edward Grey's remarks in ParUament, and his 
 efforts as shown in the diplomatic documents to make it clear that the Brit- 
 ish Cabinet could in no wise agree to enter the war even to this extent unless 
 they should receive the support of Parhament, hardly alter the situation, for 
 the British Cabinet is the agent of Parliament, and it would be almost un- 
 heard of for Parliament to repudiate the action of its Cabinet in such a crisis. 
 The cooperative division of the fleets was intended only for defensive pur- 
 poses. If France had been guilty of any aggression or even if she had felt 
 that she must support Russia when the latter was responsible for any act 
 of aggression, England might reasonably have considered that she was no 
 longer bound to help France. Sir Edward Grey first gave Germany what 
 almost amounted to an assurance that Russia and France would join in any 
 reasonable plan to prevent a rupture of peace, and just before the outbreak 
 of war he again offered to leave Russia and France to their fate if they should 
 refuse any reasonable suggestion Germany put forward. Germany did not 
 avail herself of this offer. Under the circumstances Sir Edward Grey was 
 justified in considering Russia's action, upon the whole, as defensive. Hence 
 England was bound to protect the French coasts. 
 
 The claim that England was involved in any other way seems to have no 
 serious foundation. No doubt she was tending toward a closer entente with 
 Russia, but the whole course of the diplomatic correspondence up to the 
 last three or four days does not indicate that England was in any way bound 
 to Russia. If Russia could have been assured of British support, it is doubt- 
 ful whether she would have made such great efforts toward peace and have 
 urged Servia to return an answer so extraordinarily conciliatory. When, 
 however, we come to Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 in Parliament, 
 the foreign policy of Great Britain had become clearly defined because of 
 Germany's attitude respecting Belgium, and the Government was com- 
 mitted to a conditional participation in the war, unless Parliament had been 
 ready to repudiate its Government on the eve of the most serious crisis the 
 nation had ever faced. Hence, Sir Edward's statement that the country was 
 not committed to enter the war, may be considered mere Parliamentary 
 courtesy or persiflage. There was no deception since the actual facts of the 
 situation spoke for themselves. 
 
 Question: — Was England responsible for the result? 
 
 Answer: — There can be no question that England was most anxious 
 to avoid a war, and yet Germany would lay at her door the principal re- 
 sponsibility. When we read the diplomatic correspondence, we find the 
 French and Russian diplomats predicting that war will result, unless Eng- 
 land announces that she will make common cause with them. And at the 
 end, Sir Edward Grey did not escape censure from a member of Great 
 
528 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Britain's own Parliament, who made the accusation that he was to blame 
 for the rupture of peace between Great Britain and Germany. No intelli- 
 gent observer, with all the advantage of after-thought and after-sight, has 
 been able to point out how Great Britain might sm-ely have avoided the war. 
 If Sir Edward Grey had followed the suggestions of France and Russia and 
 had announced to Germany that England would support the Dual Alliance 
 in resisting what was patently aggressive action on the part of the two mem- 
 bers of the Triple Alliance, she would have played directly into the hands 
 of Germany, provided Germany wanted war, because, by refusing to agree 
 and by making counter-demands, Germany could have precipitated an im- 
 mediate conflict, giving her the advantage of striking quickly and without 
 delay. This would probably have made war inevitable. But even if Ger- 
 many, with her backing of the arrogant Austrian demands, had sincerely 
 desired to maintain the peace, France and Russia might have thought it was 
 too good an opportunity to let slip. They might, by undercurrents of re- 
 sistance, have nettled Germany and have made inevitable the conflict which 
 Great Britain wished to avoid. Sir Edward's refusal to commit the British 
 Government may have had a great deal to do with the remarkably concilia- 
 tory attitude of Russia. England's refusal to continue the discussion with 
 Germany of the conditions upon which she might consent to remain neutral 
 has been considered under a previous question. 
 
 As was previously noted, there is just a possibility that Sir Edward might 
 have been successful if he had attempted to play more directly the media- 
 tory role between Germany and Russia, and had said to Germany that if 
 she would agree to come into a conference upon certain terms, he would 
 secure Russia's consent to demobilize. If England had taken this stand the 
 moment there was danger of Russian mobilization, there might have been, 
 provided always that Germany was not determined upon a war, a reason- 
 able chance of maintaining peace. But such mediation would have been 
 most hazardous, and might have involved England in a war from which 
 she could otherwise have held aloof. There is another consideration, which 
 is that a great power cannot afford to risk its prestige by having its pro- 
 posals refused too often. Otherwise, when it made a suggestion it would not 
 secure that consideration which is so important a factor in strengthening a 
 state's political action. So it was reasonable that Sir Edward should pre- 
 fer not to commit England until the last moment. We may then answer 
 that England cannot be considered directly responsible for the result. On 
 the whole, I believe, unsuccessful as the event proved, Sir Edward Grey's 
 diplomacy, as portrayed by the British White Papers, will stand forth as 
 one of England's glories and as a pattern for generations to come. 
 
 QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS 
 
 Question: — If Germany wanted to avoid war, why did she insist upon 
 disregarding the usual method of procedure for the settlement of European 
 difficulties? 
 
 Question : — If Germany wanted war, why did she lose valuable time in 
 prolonging discussions? 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 529 
 
 Question : — Did Von Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, 
 telegraph the contents of the Austrian note to the Kaiser (cf. B. W. P. no. 
 95) before it was presented to Servia? 
 
 Question: — If Germany considered that Russia was responsible for 
 bringing on the crisis by mobilizing, why could not the German Govern- 
 ment have agreed to Sir Edward Grey's last proposal (see chap. VII) on 
 condition that England would guarantee the cessation of further military 
 preparations? 
 
 Question: — What did Germany mean by saying that her entry into 
 Luxemburg was not a hostile act? 
 
 Question: — Why did Germany invade Belgium? 
 
 Question: — As Russia was so much slower to mobilize, why could Ger- 
 many not have rested on the defensive against France and have appealed 
 to England to prevent war by joining her against Russia unless Russia de- 
 mobilized? 
 
 Question : — Had England been guilty of any commercial oppression of 
 Germany or interference with the expansion of her international trade? 
 
 Question : — Why did Sir Edward Grey not find some means of effective 
 collaboration with Italy, so that the two powers might have exercised 
 joint intervention in favor of the maintenance of peace? 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 DOCUMENTS 
 
 POLITICAL AIMS OF THE POWERS 
 
 WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS, SEPT. 17, 1796. ^ 
 
 . . . Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace 
 and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. And 
 can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of 
 a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation to give to man- 
 kind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided 
 by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course 
 of time and things the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any tempo- 
 rary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it 
 be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation 
 with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every senti- 
 ment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its 
 vices? 
 
 In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that per- 
 manent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate 
 attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just 
 and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The nation which 
 indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in 
 some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either 
 of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipa- 
 thy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult 
 and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and 
 intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. 
 
 Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. 
 The nation prompted by ill will and resentment sometimes impels to war 
 the government contrary to the best calculations of policy. The govern- 
 ment sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through 
 passion what reason would reject. At other times it makes the animosity of 
 the nation subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition, 
 and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes 
 perhaps the liberty, of nations has been the victim. 
 
 So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces 
 a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion 
 of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest 
 exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former 
 into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate 
 inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite na- 
 
 i Extract from Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, pp. 221-24. 
 Washington, 1896. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 531 
 
 tion of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation 
 making the concessions by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have 
 been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retali- 
 ate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives 
 to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the 
 favorite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own 
 country without odium, sometimes even with popularity, gilding with the 
 appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for 
 public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good the base or foolish com- 
 pliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. 
 
 As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments 
 are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. 
 How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, 
 to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or 
 awe the public councils ! Such an attachment of a small or weak toward a 
 great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter. 
 Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, 
 fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, 
 since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most 
 baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, 
 must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to 
 be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one for- 
 eign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom they actu- 
 ate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the 
 arts of influence on the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues 
 of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and 
 dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their 
 interests. 
 
 The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extend- 
 ing our commercial relations to have with them as little political connec- 
 tion as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be 
 fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 
 
 Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very 
 remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the 
 causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, 
 it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordi- 
 nary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions 
 of her friendships or enmities. 
 
 Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue 
 a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, 
 the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external 
 annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality 
 we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when bel- 
 ligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, 
 will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose 
 peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. 
 
 Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our 
 own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with 
 that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of 
 European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? '- 
 
532 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion 
 of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for 
 let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing en- 
 gagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private 
 affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those 
 engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is 
 unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. 
 
 Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a 
 respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances 
 for extraordinary emergencies. 
 
 Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, 
 humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an 
 equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or 
 preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversify- 
 ing by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; estab- 
 lishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to de- 
 fine the rights of our merchants, and to enable the Government to support 
 them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances 
 and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary and liable to be from time to 
 time abandoned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; con- 
 stantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested 
 favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence 
 for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance it 
 may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal 
 favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. 
 There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors 
 from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which 
 a just pride ought to discard. 
 
 In offering to you, my coimtrymen, these counsels of an old and affec- 
 tionate friend I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impres- 
 sion I could wish — that they will control the usual current of the passions 
 or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked 
 the destiny of nations. But if I may even flatter myself that they may be 
 productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good — that they may 
 now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against 
 the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pre- 
 tended patriotism — this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude 
 for your welfare by which they have been dictated. 
 
 How far in the discharge of my official duties I have been guided by the 
 principles which have been delineated the public records and other evi- 
 dences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, 
 the assurance of my own conscience is that I have at least believed myself 
 to be guided by them. 
 
 In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe my proclamation of the 
 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your approving 
 voice and by that of your representatives in both Houses of Congress, the 
 spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any 
 attempts to deter or divert me from it. 
 
 After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, 
 I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 533 
 
 case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, 
 a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined as far as should depend 
 upon me to maintain it with moderation, perseverance, and firmness. 
 
 The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct it is not 
 necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that, according to 
 my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by 
 any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all. 
 
 The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything 
 more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every 
 nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations 
 of peace and amity toward other nations. 
 
 The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be re- 
 ferred to your own reflections and experience. With me a predominant mo- 
 tive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature 
 its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree 
 of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speak- 
 ing, the command of its own fortunes. . . . 
 
 BISMARCK'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG, FEB. 6, 1888* 
 
 When I say that it is our duty to endeavor to be ready at all times and 
 for all emergencies, I imply that we must make greater exertions than other 
 people for the same purpose, because of our geographical position. We are 
 situated in the heart of Europe, and have at least three fronts open to an at- 
 tack. France has only her eastern, and Russia only her western, frontier 
 where they may be attacked. We are also more exposed to the dangers of a 
 coalition than any other nation, as is proved by the whole development of 
 history, by our geographical position, and the lesser degree of cohesiveness, 
 which until now has characterized the German nation in comparison with 
 others. God has placed us where we are prevented, thanks to our neighbors, 
 from growing lazy and dull. He has placed by our side the most warlike and 
 restless of all nations, the French, and He has permitted warlike inclina- 
 tions to grow strong in Russia, where formerly they existed to a lesser degree. 
 Thus we are given the spur, so to speak, from both sides, and are compelled 
 to exertions which we should perhaps not be making otherwise. The pikes 
 in the European carp-pond are keeping us from being carps by making us 
 feel their teeth on both sides. They also are forcing us to an exertion which 
 without them we might not make, and to a union among us Germans, which 
 is abhorrent to us at heart. By nature we are rather tending away, the one 
 from the other. But the Franco-Russian vise within which we are squeezed 
 compels us to hold together, and by pressure our cohesive force is greatly 
 increased. This will bring us to that state of being inseparable which all other 
 nations possess, while we do not yet enjoy it. But we must respond to the 
 intentions of Providence by making ourselves so strong that the pikes can 
 do nothing but encourage us. 
 
 What, then, was my surprise and natural disappointment, when gradu- 
 ally a sort of newspaper campaign began in St. Petersburg, attacking the 
 
 1 These extracts, from an English translation, have been taken from The German Classics, 
 vol. X, pp. 257-72. I have, however, made one or two slight changes. ^ 
 
534 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 German policy, and casting suspicion on my personal intentions. These 
 attacks increased in the following year to the strong request, in 1879, for 
 pressure to be exerted by us on Austria in matters where we could not attack 
 the Austrian rights as such. I could not consent, for, if we should have been 
 estranged from Austria, we should necessarily have fallen into a dependence 
 on Russia, unless we were satisfied with standing entirely alone in Europe. 
 Would such a dependence have been bearable? Formerly I had believed it 
 might be, when I had said to myself: " We have no conflicting interests at 
 all. There is no reason why Russia should ever cancel her friendship." 
 At least I had never contradicted my Russian colleagues when they ex- 
 pounded such theories to me. The Russian behavior as regards the Con- 
 gress disappointed me and showed me that we could not be sure of not being 
 drawn into a conflict with Russia against our wishes, even if we placed oiu* 
 policy (for a time) completely at her disposal. The disagreement concerning 
 instructions which we had given or had not given to our representatives in 
 the south [Constantinople] grew, until threats resulted, threats of war from 
 the most authoritative quarters. 
 
 This is the origin of our Austrian Treaty. By these threats we were com- 
 pelled to choose between our two former friends, a decision which I had 
 avoided through several decades. At that time I negotiated in Gastein and 
 in Vienna the treaty, published the day before yesterday, which is in force 
 between us to-day. 
 
 The publication has been partly misunderstood, from what I read in the 
 newspapers of yesterday and the day before. It has been variously inter- 
 preted as an ultimatum, a warning, and a threat. A threat could not pos- 
 sibly be contained in it, since the text of the treaty has been known to 
 Russia for a long while, — not since November of last year only. We con- 
 sidered it due to the sincerity of so loyal a monarch as the Emperor of Rus- 
 sia not to leave a doubt concerning the actual state of affairs. 
 
 Personally I do not see how we could have done otherwise than conclude 
 this treaty. If we had not done it, we should have to do it now. It possesses 
 the finest quality to be found in an international treaty, in that it is the 
 expression of the lasting interests of both parties, of Austria as well as 
 ourselves. No great power can for any length of time cling to the wording 
 of a treaty against the interests of its own people; it will at last be forced 
 to declare openly: "Times have changed; we can no longer do this"; and 
 will have to defend its action as best it can before its own people and the 
 other contracting party. For no power will approve a course which leads 
 its own people to destruction, for the sake of the letter of a treaty signed 
 under different conditions. Nothing of this kind, however, is contained in 
 these treaties. The treaty concluded with Austria, as well as similar treaties 
 existing between us and other powers, notably the agreements into which 
 we have entered with Italy, is the expression of common interests in mutual 
 aspirations and dangers. Italy, like ourselves, has been obliged to fight 
 against Austria for her right to establish her national union. At present 
 both of us are living in peace with Austria, sharing with her the wish to 
 ward oflf the dangers which are threatening all alike. Together we wish to 
 preserve the peace, which is as dear to one as to the other, and to protect 
 our internal development to which all of us are determined to devote our- 
 selves. These aims and our mutual confidence that the treaties will be kept, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 535 
 
 and that no nation will be inconvenienced by them further than its own 
 interests permit, make these treaties firm, durable, and permanent. 
 
 The extent to which our treaty with Austria is the expression of our 
 mutual interests was shown at Nikolsburg, and in 1870. Already during the 
 negotiations of Nikolsburg we were of the opinion that we could not do for 
 any length of time without Austria in Europe — a strong and vigorous Aus- 
 tria. In 1870, when the war between ourselves and France broke out, many 
 sensitive Austrians whom we had hurt were naturally tempted to make use 
 of this opportunity to take revenge for 1866. The thoughtful and far- 
 seeing diplomats of the Austrian Cabinet, however, had to ask themselves: 
 " What will be the result? What will be our position, if to-day we assist 
 the French, and help them to beat Prussia, or even Germany?" What 
 would have been the result if France with the help of Austria had been 
 victorious over us? If Austria had followed such a policy, she could have 
 had no other aim than to resume her former position in Germany, for this 
 was really the only thing she had given up in 1866. There had been no other 
 important stipulations, and the pecuniary conditions were insignificant. 
 Well, then, what would have been the position of Austria as the presiding 
 power in the German Union, if she had to confess that in alliance with 
 France she had taken from Germany the left bank of the Rhine, that she 
 had reduced the South German States to a renewed dependence on France 
 in the shape of a Rhenish Federation, and had condemned Prussia to an 
 irrevocable dependence on Russia, subject in future to Russian policies? 
 Such a position was unacceptable to all Austrian statesmen not completely 
 blinded with wrath and vengeance. 
 
 The same is also true with us in Germany. Imagine Austria struck from 
 the map of Europe. Then we and Italy would be isolated on the continent, 
 hemmed in between Russia and France, the two strongest military powers 
 next to Germany, either continually one against two — and this would be 
 most probable — or alternately dependent on one or the other. But this 
 will not be the case. It is impossible to imagine Austria removed, for a 
 state like Austria does not disappear. She may be estranged if jilted, as 
 was proposed in the Villafranca negotiations, and inclined to offer her hand 
 to that nation which for its own part is the opponent of an unreliable 
 friend. 
 
 In short, if we wish to avoid being isolated, which is especially danger- 
 ous for Germany in our assailable position, we must have a reliable friend. 
 Thanks to the similarities of our interests, and this treaty before you, we 
 have two such friends. It is not love which makes them reliable, for nations 
 may make war one upon the other because of hate, but it has never yet 
 happened that one nation has sacrificed itself for another for mere love. 
 Nor do they always fight when they hate each other, for, if this were the 
 case, France would have to be fighting incessantly, not only with us, but also 
 with England and Italy. She hates all her neighbors. I believe, however, 
 that the Russian hatred of us, which has been artificially fanned, will not 
 last. We are united with our allies in the love of peace, not only by inclina- 
 tion and friendship, but also by the most cogent interests of a European 
 equilibrium and of our own future. 
 
 Then there is another advantage if this bill is passed. The very strength 
 
536 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 at which we are aiming necessarily renders us pacific. This sounds like a 
 paradox, but it is not. 
 
 With the powerful engine into which we are transforming the German 
 army one does not make an attack. If I were to come before you to-day 
 on the assumption that conditions were different from what I believe they 
 are, and should say, "We are considerably menaced by France and Russia; 
 we shall probably be attacked, and as a diplomat, believing my miUtary 
 information in these matters to be correct, I am convinced that it is better 
 for us to have our defense consist of a bold attack, and to strike the first 
 blow now "; and if I should add: "We can more easily wage an aggressive 
 war, and I, therefore, am asking the Reichstag for an appropriation of a 
 milliard, or half a milliard, marks to engage in a war against our two neigh- 
 bors," — then I do not know, gentlemen, whether you would have enough 
 confidence in me to grant my request, but I hope you would not have it. 
 
 But, if you had, it would not satisfy me. If we Germans wish to wage 
 a war with the full effect of our national strength, it must be a war which 
 is approved by all who take part in it, all who sacrifice anything for it; in 
 short, the whole nation. It must be a national war, a war carried on with the 
 enthusiasm of 1870, when we were foully attacked. I still remember the ear- 
 splitting, joyful shouts in the station at Cologne. It was the same all the 
 way from Berlin to Cologne, in Berlin itself. Waves of popular approval 
 bore us into the war, whether we wished it or not. That is the way it must 
 be, if popular force like ours is to show what it can do. It will, however, 
 be very difficult to prove to the provinces and states of the Empire and 
 their inhabitants that the war is unavoidable, and has to be. People will 
 ask: "Are you so sure? Who can tell?" In short, when we make an attack, 
 the whole weight of all imponderables, which weigh far heavier than material 
 weights, will be on the side of our opponents whom we have attacked. France 
 will be bristling with arms away down to the Pyrenees. The same will take 
 place everywhere. A war into which we are not borne by the will of the 
 people will be waged, to be sure, if it has been declared by the constituted 
 authorities who deemed it necessary; it will even be waged pluckily, and 
 possibly victoriously, after we have once smelled fire and tasted blood, but 
 it will lack from the beginning the nerve and enthusiasm of a war in which 
 we are attacked. In such a one the whole of Germany from Memel to the 
 Alpine Lakes will flare up like a powder mine; it will be bristling with guns, 
 and no enemy will dare to engage this furor teutonicus which develops when 
 we are attacked. We cannot afford to lose this factor of preeminence even 
 if many military men — not only ours but others as well — believe that 
 to-day we are superior to our future opponents. Our own officers believe 
 this to a man, naturally. Every soldier believes this. He would almost cease 
 to be a useful soldier if he did not wish for war, and did not believe that we 
 should be victorious in it. If our opponents by any chance are thinking that 
 we are pacific because we are afraid of how the war may end, they are might- 
 ily mistaken. We believe as firmly in our victory in a just cause as any 
 foreign lieutenant in his garrison, after his third glass of champagne, can 
 believe in his, and we probably do so with greater certainty. It is not fear, 
 therefore, which makes us pacific, but the consciousness of our strength. 
 We are strong enough to protect ourselves, even if we should be attacked 
 at a less favorable moment, and we are in a position to let divine Providence 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 537 
 
 determine whether a war in the mean while may not become unnecessary 
 after all. 
 
 I am, therefore, not in favor of any kind of aggressive war, and if war 
 could result only from an attack" — somebody must kindle a fire — we shall 
 not kindle it. Neither the consciousness of our strength, which I have 
 described, nor our confidence in our treaties, will prevent us from continuing 
 our former endeavors to preserve peace. In this we do not permit ourselves 
 to be influenced by annoyances or dislikes. The threats and insults and 
 challenges which have been made have, no doubt, excited amongst us also 
 a feeling of irritation, which does not easily occur in the case of Germans, 
 for they are less prone to national hatred than any other nation. We are 
 trying to calm our countrymen, however, and we shall work for peace with 
 our neighbors, especially with Russia, in the future as we have in the past. 
 When I say, 'especially with Russia,' I express the opinion that France offers 
 us no assurances of success in our endeavors. I will not, however, say that 
 these endeavors are of no use. We shall never pick a quarrel, nor ever 
 attack France; and in the many little incidents which the proclivity of our 
 neighbors for spying and bribing has occasioned, we have always brought 
 about a very courteous and amicable settlement. I should consider it crimi- 
 nal if we were to inflame a great national war for such bagatelles. These 
 are instances when one should say: "The cleverer of the two will yield." 
 
 THE APOCRYPHAL WILL OF PETER THE GREAT 
 (THE SOKOLNICKI TEXT) i 
 
 1. Neglect nothing to give the Russian nation European forms and cus- 
 toms; with this purpose engage the different courts and the learned of Eu- 
 rope in particular, whether by interested motives or by the philanthropic 
 principles of philosophy, or any other motive, to contribute to this end. 
 
 2. Maintain in the state a system of continuous warfare in order to 
 
 1 The ghost of Peter the Great, which has long stalked through Europe in the shape of a 
 BO-called "will," setting forth his designs for Russian aggrandizement, can at last be laid to 
 rest, at least in its current versions. Whether Peter did or did not leave behind him some sort 
 of a poUtical testament, we do not attempt to decide, but the source of the document which 
 has masqueraded under his name has been traced beyond cavil, the original having been 
 brought to light from the Public Archives at Berlin, with the name of its utterer, one Sokol- 
 nicki. The motive of its fabrication is not far to seek. This Sokolnicki was a Polish officer, 
 a refugee in Paris in 1797, at the time of the Directory, and for the purpose of inciting the 
 French, then posing as the saviors of oppressed peoples, to come to the rescue of his native 
 land, he composed the articles of this instrument, ingeniously contrived to reveal to the 
 French Government the menace of Russian intrigue. 
 
 In this brief note it is impossible to go into the picturesque details that attended the birth 
 of the forgery. For them the reader is referred to the authorities given below. It may be 
 well to add that Waliszewski, in his history of Peter the Great, arrives at the same conclusion 
 as to the spuriousness of the will, though he does not seem to be cognizant of the real author 
 of the deception. Yet in a sense the will is genuine, for it merely lends the glamour of pre- 
 tended prophecy to historical events as they have actually occurred, and in gi^ang expres- 
 sion to the political aims of Russia it states simply what was natural to an empire situated 
 as hers hae been, though these aims were immeasurably beyond any dreams of Peter and the 
 Muscovy of his day. I have, therefore, notwithstanding the apocrj-phal character of the 
 will, given a translation of it in its primitive form, the two later versions (Lesur, 1812, and 
 Gaillardet, 1836) being derivatives, with such variations and embroideries as were conven- 
 ient at the date of their appearance. See Harry Bresslau, Das Testament Peter's des Orossen, 
 in Sybel's Historiscke Zeitachri/t, vol. 41, p. 385 et aeg. (1879), and K. Waliszewski, Peter the 
 Great, English translation (New York, 1900), pp. 548-51. 
 
538 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 harden the soldiery and to keep the nation always in training and ready to 
 march at the first signal. 
 
 3. Extend by every possible means towards the north along the Baltic, 
 and towards the south. And with this end in view — 
 
 4. Arouse the jealousy of England, Denmark, and Brandenburg against 
 Sweden; as a result of which these powers will shut theu- eyes to the encroach- 
 ments that may be made on that country, and in the end it will be sub- 
 jugated. 
 
 5. Interest the House of Austria in driving the Turk from Europe, and 
 under this pretext maintain a standing army and establish dockyards on 
 the shores of the Black Sea, and by continually advancing reach out to Con- 
 stantinople. 
 
 6. Keep Poland in a state of anarchy, influence its Diets, and especially 
 the elections of its kings; get a morsel of it at every opportunity, and end 
 by subduing it completely. 
 
 7. Contract a close alliance with England, and keep up direct relations 
 with her by means of a commercial treaty; even permit her to exercise a 
 kind of monopoly in the interior; which will lead imperceptibly to an inter- 
 mingling of our nationals with English merchants and sailors, who will pro- 
 vide all the means for perfecting and enlarging the Russian navy, by the 
 help of which it should soon be our aim to secure the mastery of the Baltic 
 and the Black Sea. . . . This is a point of capital importance upon which 
 depend the rapid execution and success of the plan. 
 
 8. At any cost mix in the quarrels of Europe, either by force or by stealth, 
 — especially those relating to Germany. And to this end — 
 
 9. Always appear to be the ally of Austria, profiting by the smallest 
 ascendancy that you can get over her to drag her into ruinous wars in order 
 to enfeeble her by degrees ; sometimes even succor her, and do not cease to 
 make enemies for her secretly in the interior of the Empire by arousing 
 against her the jealousy of the princes. . . . Nota. This article will be all 
 the more easy to carry out since the House of Austria has not ceased up to 
 this time to delude itself with the project of acquiring universal dominion, 
 or at least of reestablishing the Western Empire, and for that purpose she 
 must before everything begin by subduing Germany. 
 
 10. Always choose wives for Russian princes among the princesses of 
 Germany, and thus multiply alliances by the relations of families, interest 
 and influence everywhere in that Empire. 
 
 11. Make use of religious ascendancy among the Greek separatists and 
 schismatics who are distributed through Hungary, Turkey, and the south- 
 ern parts of Poland, bind them to you by every insidious method, get your- 
 selves called their protectors and acquire a title to the sacerdotal supremacy; 
 under this pretext and with their assistance, with Turkey subjugated and 
 Poland encroached upon, the conquest of Hungary will be but a trifle; prom- 
 ising to Austria in the mean while indemnifications in Germany, while the 
 rest of Poland, no longer able to sustain itself either by its own strength, or 
 by political connections, will of its own accord come under the yoke. 
 
 12. From then on every moment is precious. Make ready in secret the 
 batteries for the decisive blow and have them put into action with an order, 
 foresight, and rapidity that will give Europe no time to pull herself together. 
 One should begin by proposing separately, very secretly, and with the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 539 
 
 greatest circumspection, first to the Court of Versailles and then to that 
 of Vienna, a division of the sovereignty of the universe; calling their atten- 
 tion to this point: that Russia, being in fact the sovereign of the entire East, 
 and having nothing further to gain but the title, can in no wise be open to 
 their suspicion in advancing this proposition. Without doubt this project, 
 on the contrary, cannot fail to flatter them and to enkindle between them 
 a war to the death ; a war which will soon become general owing to the con- 
 nections and the relations extending from these two courts (rivals and 
 natural enemies), and also because of the interest which all the other powers 
 will of necessity take in this quarrel. 
 
 13. In the midst of this general turmoil Russia will arrange to be asked 
 for assistance, sometimes by the one, sometimes by the other of the bel- 
 ligerent powers, and after having long hesitated in order to give them time 
 to exhaust themselves and herself to assemble her forces, she will seem finally 
 to decide for the House of Austria, and while she advances her regular 
 troops to the Rhine, she will have them followed immediately by a swarm 
 of her Asiatic hordes; and in proportion as these last advance into Germany, 
 two considerable fleets will set out, the one from the Sea of Azof, the other 
 from the harbor of Archangel, laden with bands of these same hordes, imder 
 convoy of the armed fleets of the Black Sea and the Baltic; the fleets will 
 appear unexpectedly in the Mediterranean and on the ocean and will pour 
 forth all these nomad peoples, fierce and greedy for booty, to inundate Italy, 
 Spain, and France, one part of whose inhabitants they will plunder, another 
 part lead off into slavery to repeople with them the deserts of abandoned 
 Siberia; and the rest they will render helpless to shake off the yoke. 
 
 THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION 
 AT THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE 
 
 "On July 25, 1899, the American delegation at the Peace Conference at 
 The Hague, referring to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of 
 international differences, which was then pending before the conference, 
 made in full session the following declaration: 
 
 "'Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to re- 
 quire the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of 
 not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political 
 questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall 
 anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relin- 
 quishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude 
 toward purely American questions.' 
 
 "It was under this reserve that the American delegates signed the 
 convention on July 29, 1899." (Report of the United States Commission, 
 July 31, 1899, HoUs's Peace Conference at The Hague, 477, 531. See John 
 Bassett Moore: A Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 694.) 
 
540 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 THE ALLIANCES 
 
 TREATY OF ALLIANCE OF OCTOBER 7, 1879, BETWEEN 
 AUSTRIA AND GERMANY i 
 
 Considering that their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of 
 Hungary and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, must esteem 
 it to be their unavoidable duty as sovereigns to watch under all circum- 
 stances over the safety of their Empires and the tranquillity of their 
 peoples; 
 
 Considering that the two Monarchs will be able, by a solid alliance of the 
 two Empires, in the kind of that which previously existed, more easily to 
 accomplish this duty, as also more efficaciously; 
 
 Considering, in fine, that an intimate agreement between Austro-Hun- 
 gary and Germany can threaten no one, but is rather calculated to consoli- 
 date European peace as created by the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin; 
 
 Their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and the 
 Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, promising each other solemnly 
 never to give any aggressive tendency whatsoever to their purely defensive 
 agreement, have resolved to conclude a reciprocal alliance of peace and pro- 
 tection; 
 
 In this aim, their Majesties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: — 
 
 For his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, his real 
 Privy Councillor, the Minister of the Imperial House, as also for Foreign 
 Affairs, Lieutenant Julius, Count Andrassy, etc. ; 
 
 For his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, his Ambassador and pleni- 
 potentiary extraordinary, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII of Reuss, 
 etc.; 
 
 Who have both entered into relations with each other to-day in Vienna, 
 and, after showing each other their powers duly recognized as good and 
 sufficient, have settled what follows : — 
 
 Article I. If, contrarily to what may be hoped and contrarily to the 
 sincere wishes of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires 
 were to be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound 
 to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their imperial military 
 power, and, subsequently, to conclude no peace except conjointly and in 
 agreement. 
 
 Article II. If one of the two high contracting parties were to be at- 
 tacked by another Power, the other high contracting party binds itself, 
 by the present act, not only not to uphold the aggressor against its high 
 Ally, but at the least, to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the 
 contracting party aforesaid. 
 
 If, however, in the case previously mentioned, the Power attacking were 
 to be upheld by Russia, whether by way of active cooperation or by military 
 measures that should threaten the Power attacked, then the obligation 
 of reciprocal assistance with entire military forces — obligation stipulated 
 in Article I of this treaty — would immediately become executory, and the 
 > Tardieu. France and the Alliances, pp. 128-29. New York, 1908. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 541 
 
 military operations of the two high contracting parties would also, in such 
 circumstances, be conducted jointly until the conclusion of peace. 
 
 Article III. This Treaty, in conformity with its pacific character and 
 to avoid all false interpretation, will be held secret by all the high contract- 
 ing parties. 
 
 It may only be communicated to a Third Power with the knowledge of 
 the two parties and after a special agreement between them. 
 
 Considering the intentions expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the 
 Alexandrowo interview, the two contracting parties nourish the hope that 
 Russia's preparations will not, in reality, become threatening to them; 
 for this reason, there is at present no motive for communication. 
 
 But, if, against all expectation, this hope should be rendered vain, the 
 two contracting parties would recognize that it was a duty of loyalty to 
 inform the Emperor Alexander, at least confidentially, that they must 
 deem any attack directed against one of them as being directed against 
 both. 
 
 To testify which, the plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty with their 
 own hand and have afiixed their seals thereto. 
 
 Made at Vienna, on the 7th of October, 1879. 
 Signed: Andrassy. 
 
 Prince Henry VII op Reuss. 
 
 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
 JAPAN 1 
 
 Signed at London, July IS, 1911 
 
 Preamble 
 
 The Goverment of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having 
 in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since 
 the conclusion of the Anglo- Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 
 1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such 
 changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon 
 the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such 
 stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely: — 
 
 (a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions 
 of Eastern Asia and of India; 
 
 (6) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by 
 insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the 
 principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all na- 
 tions in China; 
 
 (c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting 
 Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their 
 special interests in the said regions: — 
 
 Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great 
 Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble 
 
 * British State Papers, vol. cm. London, 1911. The original alliance between the two 
 Btates was entered into January 30, 1902. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, 
 p. 514; American Journal of International Law, vol. i, 1907, Supplement, p. 14. A new agree- 
 ment was substituted for that of 1902, August 12, 1905. Foreign Relations of the United 
 States, 1905, p. 4S8; American Journal of International Law, vol. I, 1907, Supplement, p. 15. 
 
542 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate 
 with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the meas- 
 ures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests. 
 
 Article II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, 
 wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Con- 
 tracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights 
 or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other 
 High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and 
 will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. 
 
 Article III. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them 
 will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with 
 another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of 
 this Agreement. 
 
 Article IV. Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty 
 of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this 
 Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to 
 war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force. 
 
 Article V. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be af- 
 forded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the 
 present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made 
 available, wiU be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the 
 High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another 
 fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest. 
 
 Article VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately 
 after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that 
 date. 
 
 In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified 
 twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of 
 terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from 
 the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have de- 
 nounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally 
 ia actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace 
 is concluded. 
 
 In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective 
 Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their 
 Seals. 
 
 Done in duphcate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911. 
 
 ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN REGARD TO 
 AMERICAN AFFAIRS 
 
 The Government of the United States have expressed a wish to cooper- 
 ate in terminating differences which have existed for many years between 
 my Government and the Republic of Venezuela upon the boundary be- 
 tween that country and my Colony of British Guiana. I have expressed my 
 sympathy with the desire to come to an equitable arrangement, and trust 
 that further negotiation will lead to a satisfactory settlement.^ 
 
 ' Extract from the Speech of the Queen, on the Opening of the British Parliament, West- 
 minster, February 11. 1896. British and Foreign State Papers, 1895-96, vol. 88, p. 1. London, 
 1900. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 543 
 
 ANGLO-AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
 
 My Government have discussed with the United States, acting as the 
 friend of Venezuela, the terms imder which the pending questions of dis- 
 puted frontier between that RepubHc and my Colony of British Guiana 
 may be equitably submitted to arbitration. An arrangement has been ar- 
 rived at with that Government which will, I trust, effect the adjustment of 
 existing controversies without exposing to risk the interests of any colonists 
 who have established rights in the disputed territory. 
 
 It is with much gratification that I have concluded a Treaty for General 
 Arbitration with the President of the United States, by which I trust that 
 all differences that may arise between us will be peacefxilly adjusted. I hope 
 that this arrangement may have a further value in commending to other 
 Powers the consideration of a principle by which the danger of war may be 
 notably abated.' 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE 2 
 
 It must, however, be conceded that the most important political result of 
 the Venezuelan incident was not the decision upon the territorial question, 
 but the official adoption of the Monroe Doctrine by the Congress of the 
 United States, and its explicit acceptance by the principal maritime power 
 of Europe. 
 
 An official exposition of the Monroe Doctrine was given by President 
 Roosevelt in his annual message of Decembers, 1901, in which he said: — 
 
 "The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial 
 aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any Ameri- 
 can power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any na- 
 tion in the Old World. . . . This doctrine has nothing to do with the com- 
 mercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each 
 of them to form such as it desires. . . . We do not guarantee any state 
 against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does 
 not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American 
 power." 
 
 An occasion for the practical application of this definition soon arose. On 
 December 11, 1901, the German Ambassador at Washington left at the 
 Department of State a memorandum in which it was stated that the Ger- 
 man Government proposed to take certain coercive measures against Ven- 
 ezuela for the satisfaction of claims, based partly on breaches of contract 
 and partly on violent wrongs, which it had been found to be impracticable 
 otherwise to bring to a settlement. At the same time the memorandum 
 declared that "under no circumstances" would the German Government 
 consider in its proceedings ' ' the acquisition or the permanent occupation of 
 Venezuelan territory." In acknowledging the receipt of this memorandum, 
 on December 16, Mr. Hay adverted to the fact that the German Ambassa- 
 dor, on his then recent return from Berlin, had conveyed personally to the 
 President, and had afterwards repeated to himself, the assurance of the Ger- 
 
 » Extract from Speech of the Queen, on the Opening of the British Parliament, West- 
 minster, January 19, 1897. British and Foreign State Papers, 1896-97, vol. 89, p. I, London, 
 1901. This arbitration treaty failed to receive the assent of the Senate. 
 
 ' Extract from John Bassett Moore, American Diplomacy, pp. 157-59. New York, 1905. 
 
544 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 man Emperor that the Imperial Government had no purpose or intention to 
 make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South American con- 
 tinent or the adjacent islands; and in view of this circumstance, and of the 
 further assurance given in the memorandum, Mr. Hay declared that the 
 President, while "appreciating the courtesy of the German Government in 
 making him acquainted with the state of affairs referred to," did not regard 
 himself " as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in ques- 
 tion." The coercive measures contemplated by the German Government 
 were postponed for a year, and were then taken in conjunction with the 
 British Government, which also made to the United States, on November 
 13, 1902, a frank communication of its purposes. To this communication 
 Mr. Hay replied that the Government of the United States, although it 
 "regretted that European powers should use force against Central and 
 South American governments, could not object to their taking steps to 
 obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no 
 acquisition of territory was contemplated." In the hostilities with Ven- 
 ezuela that ensued, the assurances of the powers were honorably kept, but 
 peaceful relations were eventually restored through the frank exercise of the 
 friendly offices of the United States. 
 
 DECLARATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
 FRANCE RESPECTING EGYPT AND MOROCCO » 
 
 Dated April 8, 1904 
 
 Article I. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have 
 no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. 
 
 The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that 
 they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by ask- 
 ing that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other 
 manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivial Decree an- 
 nexed to the present Arrangement, containing the guarantees considered 
 necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, 
 on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any 
 way without the consent of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of 
 London of 1885. 
 
 It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt 
 shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French savant. 
 
 The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty 
 as in the past. 
 
 Article II. The Government of the French Republic declare that they 
 have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. 
 
 His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that it 
 appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are 
 conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order 
 in that coimtry, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all adminis- 
 trative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require. 
 
 > See Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Treaties Series, 1905, no. 6; American Journal 
 of International Law, Supplement, vol. i (1907), pp. 6-8. Upon the same day as this treaty, 
 another was signed settling outstanding differences between the two powers in regard to the 
 Newfoimdland fisheries and the boundary lines between their possessions in Africa. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 545 
 
 They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for 
 this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which 
 Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in 
 Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Mo- 
 rocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901. 
 
 Article III. His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will 
 respect the rights which France, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and 
 usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between 
 Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels. 
 
 Article IV. The two Governments, being equally attached to the prin- 
 ciple of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they 
 will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the impo- 
 sition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges. 
 
 The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the 
 same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in 
 Africa. An Agreement between the two Governments shall settle the con- 
 ditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry. 
 
 This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. 
 Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, 
 the period shall be extended for five years at a time. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to them- 
 selves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to 
 themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, rail- 
 ways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain 
 intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public 
 interest. 
 
 Article V. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will 
 use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian 
 service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those 
 applying to the British officials in the same service. 
 
 The Government of the French Repubhc, for their part, would make no 
 objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now 
 in the Moorish service. 
 
 Article VI. In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His 
 Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipula- 
 tions of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their 
 being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, 
 the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 
 of Article VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance. 
 
 Article VII. In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gib- 
 raltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any forti- 
 fications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco com- 
 prised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which conamand 
 the right bank of the River Sebou. 
 
 This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the 
 occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. 
 
 Article VIII. The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sin- 
 cere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which 
 that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial 
 possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these 
 
546 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 mterests the French Government will come to an understanding with the 
 Spanish Government. 
 
 The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and 
 Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government. 
 
 Article IX. The two Governments agree to afford to one another 
 their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses 
 of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco. 
 
 In witness whereof His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic 
 at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
 Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor 
 of India, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 duly authorized for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and 
 have affixed thereto their seals. 
 
 Done at London, in dupHcate, the 8th day of April, 1904. 
 
 (L.S.) Lansdowne. 
 (L.S.) Paul Cambon. 
 
 CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA 
 
 CONCERNING THE INTERESTS OF THEIR STATES 
 
 ON THE CONTINENT OF ASIA i 
 
 Signed August SI, 1907 
 
 His Majesty the King of the United Kjngdom of Great Britain and 
 Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, 
 and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere de- 
 sire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the inter- 
 ests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude 
 Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between 
 Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have 
 nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit : — 
 
 His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, 
 the Right Honorable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Ex- 
 traordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the 
 Russias; 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court 
 Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
 
 Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good 
 and due form, have agreed on the following : — 
 
 Arrangement concerning Persia 
 
 The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged 
 to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring 
 the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful develop- 
 ment, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the 
 trade and industry of all other nations ; 
 
 Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, 
 a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces 
 
 » Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, part i, pp. 549-53. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 547 
 
 of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the 
 one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other 
 hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their re- 
 spective interests in the above-mentioned Provinces of Persia; 
 Have agreed on the following terms : — 
 
 I 
 Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor 
 of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any Conces- 
 sions of a political or commercial nature — such as Concessions for railways, 
 banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc. — beyond a line start- 
 ing from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending 
 at a point on the Persian frontier, at the intersection of the Russian and 
 Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for 
 similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian 
 Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are in- 
 cluded in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Conces- 
 sions referred to. 
 
 II 
 
 Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in 
 favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of subjects of third Powers, any 
 Concessions of a political or commercial nature — such as Concessions for 
 railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc. — beyond a 
 line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and 
 ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands 
 for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British 
 Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are in- 
 cluded in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions 
 referred to. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement 
 with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British sub- 
 jects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in 
 Articles I and II. 
 
 Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of 
 Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia. 
 
 All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I 
 and II are maintained. 
 
 IV 
 
 It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the 
 exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guarantee- 
 ing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Govern- 
 ment of the Shah with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse" up 
 to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted 
 to the same purpose as in the past. 
 
 It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of 
 Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the 
 Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs, 
 
548 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the 
 Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date 
 of the signature of the present Arrangement. 
 
 V 
 
 In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment 
 of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the " Ban que d'Escompte 
 et des Prets de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date 
 of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity 
 arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guarantee- 
 ing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, 
 and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present Arrange- 
 ment, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue 
 guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second- 
 named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present 
 Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter 
 beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in 
 agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid 
 all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles govern- 
 ing the present Arrangement. 
 
 Convention concerning Afghanistan 
 
 The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on their 
 respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid 
 and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention : — 
 
 Article I. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have 
 no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan. 
 
 His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their 
 influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves 
 take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia. 
 
 The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize 
 Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage 
 that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through 
 the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further 
 engage not to send any Agents into Afghanistan. 
 
 Article II. The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared 
 in the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March, 1905, that they recognize 
 the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Ameer Abdur 
 Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal gov- 
 ernment of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to 
 occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to 
 interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the 
 Ameer fulfils the engagements already contracted by him towards His 
 Britannic Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty. 
 
 Article III. The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially designated 
 for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish 
 direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a 
 non-political character. 
 
 Article IV. His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian 
 Government afl^rm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 549 
 
 opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facihties which may 
 have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian 
 trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. 
 Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, 
 the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due 
 regard, of course, being had to the Ameer's sovereign rights. 
 
 Article V. The present Arrangements will only come into force when 
 His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian 
 Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms stipulated above. 
 
 Arrangement concerning Thibet 
 
 The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain 
 rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by 
 reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance 
 of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following 
 Arrangement : — 
 
 Article I. The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the ter- 
 ritorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal 
 administration. 
 
 Article II. In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty 
 of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into 
 negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese 
 Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations be- 
 tween British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided 
 for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 
 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great 
 Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906; nor does it modify the engage- 
 ments entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said 
 Convention of 1906. 
 
 It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of 
 Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the 
 Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the 
 Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are con- 
 cerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present 
 arrangement. 
 
 Article III. The British and Russian Governments, respectively, 
 engage not to send representatives to Lhassa. 
 
 Article IV. The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek 
 nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for 
 railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet. 
 
 Article V. The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of 
 Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great 
 Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects. 
 
 Annex to the arrangement between Great Britain and Russia concerning Thibet 
 Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by His Excellency the 
 Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of 
 the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation 
 of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of 
 three annual installments of the indemnity of 25,000,000 rupees, provided 
 
550 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been 
 effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan 
 authorities have faithfully compUed in all respects with the terms of the said 
 Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the 
 Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated 
 at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian 
 Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject. 
 
 The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged 
 at St. Petersburg as soon as possible. 
 
 In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the 
 present Convention and affixed thereto their seals. 
 
 Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th (31st) August, 1907. 
 
 (L.S.) A. NicoLSON. 
 
 (L.S.) ISWOLSKT. 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA, GUARANTEEING 
 
 THE PRESENT TERRITORY OF EACH, THE INTEGRITY 
 
 OF CHINA, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE "OPEN 
 
 DOOR" IN THAT EMPIRE i 
 
 Memorandum from the Japanese Embassy ^ 
 
 Imperial Japanese Embassy, Washington, 
 August 14, 1907. 
 
 The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the Govern- 
 ment of His Majesty of all the Russias, being desirous to consolidate rela- 
 tions of peace and good neighborhood which have happily been restored 
 between Japan and Russia, and wishing to remove for the future all causes 
 of misunderstanding in the relations of the two empires, have agreed upon 
 following stipulations: — 
 
 Article I. Each of the high contracting parties engages to respect the 
 actual territorial integrity of the other, and all rights due now both parties 
 by virtue of treaties, conventions, and contracts now in force between them 
 and China, copies of which have been exchanged between the contracting 
 parties (so far as those rights are not incompatible with the principle of 
 equal opportunity) as well as by virtue of the treaty signed at Portsmouth 
 on August 23/ September 5, 1905, and the special conventions concluded 
 between Japan and Russia. 
 
 Article II. The two high contracting parties recognize the independence 
 and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal 
 opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire and 
 engage to uphold and support the maintenance of status quo and the 
 respect for the said principle by all pacific means at their disposal. 
 
 The undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have 
 signed this convention and have aflSxed thereto their seals. 
 
 Done at St. Petersburg this day July 17/30, 1907. 
 
 (Signed) I. Motono. 
 (Signed) A. Iswolsky. 
 
 > Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, part il, p. 765. 
 
 ' Same, mutatis miUandis, handed to the Secretary of State by the Russian Ambassador, 
 August 14, 1907. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 551 
 
 CONVENTION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN 
 CONCERNING MANCHURIA i 
 
 Signed at St. Petersburg, July 4, 1910 
 
 The Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan, being sincerely attached 
 to the principles established by the convention concluded between them on 
 July 30, 1907, and being desirous of developing the effects of this convention 
 with a view to the consohdation of peace in the Far East, have agreed to 
 complete the said arrangement in the following manner : — 
 
 1. With the object of facilitating communications and developing the 
 commerce of the nations, the two high contracting parties agree to extend 
 to one another their friendly cooperation with a view to the improvement of 
 their respective railway hnes in Manchuria and the perfecting of the con- 
 necting services of the said lines, and to abstain from all competition preju- 
 dicial to the reahzation of this object. 
 
 2. Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to maintain and 
 respect the status quo in Manchuria resulting from all the treaties, conven- 
 tions, and other arrangements concluded up to this date, either between 
 Russia and Japan or between those two powers and China. Copies of the 
 said arrangements have been exchanged between Russia and Japan. 
 
 3. In the event of anything arising of a nature to threaten the status quo 
 mentioned above the two high contracting parties shall enter each time into 
 communication with each other with a view to coming to an understanding 
 as to the measures they may think it necessary to take for the maintenance 
 of the said status quo. 
 
 THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE ^ 
 
 The semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of October 16 pub- 
 lished correspondence bearing upon the events leading up to the war, with 
 particular reference to what it regards as the long-meditated transformation 
 of the Triple Entente into a hard-and-fast alliance. 
 
 In view of the efforts of our adversaries, it says, to put the blame for the 
 present war on a German "military party" and German militarism, we 
 publish herewith a number of dispatches of German diplomatic representa- 
 tives abroad which have for their subject the political and military relations 
 between the powers of the Triple Entente before the outbreak of the war. 
 For obvious reasons the exact dates of the dispatches and the offices from 
 which they were sent are not indicated here. The documents speak for 
 themselves. 
 
 I 
 England "the tool of France" 
 
 March — , 1913. Tighter and tighter are growing the meshes of the net 
 in which French diplomacy is succeeding in entangling England. It is 
 well known that in the early phases of the Morocco conflict England had 
 made certain promises of a military nature to France which have since 
 grown into positive agreements. Concerning their arrangements with 
 
 ' American Journal of International Law, Supplement, vol. 4 (1910), p. 279. 
 » From the New York Times, November 8, 1914. This is not the title of the article as it 
 appeared in the Times. 
 
552 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 regard to naval cooperation, I learn the following from a generally weU- 
 informed source; — 
 
 The British fleet undertakes the guarding of the North Sea, the Channel, 
 and the Atlantic Ocean in order to make it possible for France to concen- 
 trate her naval forces in the western basin of the Mediterranean, for which 
 operation Malta is placed at her disposal for a naval base. Detailed ar- 
 rangements have been made with regard to the use of French torpedo craft 
 and submarines in the Channel, and relative to the British Mediterranean 
 squadron, which will be placed under the command of a French Admiral at 
 the outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 Meanwhile the attitude of the British Government during the Morocco 
 crisis of 1911 — during which it proved the non-reasoning and obedient tool 
 of French politics and by Mr. Lloyd-George's speech encouraged French 
 chauvinism and inspired it with new hope — offered an opening to the 
 French Government to drive another nail into the cofiin in which Eng- 
 land's policy of ententes has already put to rest her freedom of deciding her 
 own course. 
 
 Through a trustworthy source I have obtained knowledge of an exchange 
 of notes which took place between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador 
 Cambon last autumn, which I have the honor of transmitting herewith, 
 with the request that it be treated as strictly confidential. In these notes, 
 the British and the French Governments agree that, in the event of a threat- 
 ening attack by a third power, they will at once enter into an exchange of 
 opinions about the question whether common action for preventing the 
 attack is advisable, and, if this should be found to be the case, whether and 
 to what extent the existing military arrangements should be carried out. 
 
 With subtle ingenuity the agreement is worded in such a manner that it 
 suits the peculiar English mentality. Formally, England enters into no obli- 
 gation whatsoever to give armed assistance ; according to the letter, she re- 
 tains full freedom to do whatever her own interests may demand. However, 
 that, in point of fact, England has by this agreement and the existing mili- 
 tary arrangements already given herself up beyond salvation to the French 
 revanche idea, requires no lengthy explanation. 
 
 The British Government plays a dangerous game. By its attitude in the 
 Bosnian and in the Moroccan questions it has twice created a crisis which 
 each time brought Europe to the verge of war. The encouragement which, 
 directly and indirectly, it grants to French chauvinism may on some future 
 day bring forth a catastrophe in which English and French soldiers may 
 have to pay by their blood, on French battlefields, for England's poUcy 
 of isolation. 
 
 King Edward's seed is germinatingl 
 
 II 
 
 Grey's Letter to Camhon 
 Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon: — 
 
 Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 
 My dear Ambassador: — 
 
 From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and 
 military experts have consulted together. It has always been imderstood 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 553 
 
 that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government 
 to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed 
 force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought 
 not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to 
 action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The dis- 
 position, for instance, of the French and British fleets, respectively, at the 
 present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. 
 
 You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave 
 reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become 
 essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed as- 
 sistance of the other. 
 
 I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unpro- 
 voked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general 
 peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Govern- 
 ments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, 
 and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If 
 these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at 
 once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide 
 what effect should be given to them. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Plan for Franco-British action 
 The French Ambassador Cambon to Sir Edward Grey: — 
 
 London, November 23, 1912. 
 In yoiu" letter of yesterday (November 22) you remind me that in recent 
 years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain have 
 consulted together from time to time; that it has always been understood 
 that these conversations did not restrict the liberty of each Government to 
 decide in the futiu-e whether they should lend each other the support of 
 their arms; that on both sides these conversations between specialists were 
 not, and ought not to be, considered as agreements obliging our Governments 
 to act in certain cases; that, moreover, I observed to you that if either 
 Government had serious reasons for fearing an unprovoked attack on the 
 part of a third power, it would become necessary to know whether it could 
 count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers this obser- 
 vation, and I am authorized to declare to you that, in case one of oiu- Gov- 
 ernments should have serious cause for fear, whether the aggression of a 
 third power or some event threatening the general peace, this Government 
 would instantly ascertain whether both Governments ought to act in con- 
 cert, with a view to anticipate the aggression or to preserve peace. In this 
 case, both Governments would deliberate on the measures they would be 
 disposed to take in common; if these measures warranted action, both Gov- 
 ernments would immediately examine the plans of their General Staffs 
 and then decide how these plans should be executed. 
 
 IV 
 
 King George's visit to Paris 
 May — , 1914. With regard to the political results of King George's 
 visit to Paris I learn that a number of political questions have been discussed 
 
554 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue. Moreover, it has been 
 suggested on the French side to complete the special military arrangements 
 existing between France and England by an analogous arrangement be- 
 tween England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey has received this suggestion 
 in a sympathetic manner. He has, however, pointed out that he is unable to 
 bind himself without a previous consultation with the Cabinet. It is said 
 that the Minister has been much impressed by the reception accorded to 
 the English guests by the French Government and the French population. 
 It is to be feared that the English statesman, who has made an official visit 
 abroad for the first time, and, as it is affirmed, even left England's soil for 
 the first time on this occasion, may in future succumb to French influence 
 in an even higher degree than he has done heretofore. 
 
 New Triple Alliance predicted 
 Jvme — , 1914. The news that, on the occasion of King George's visit 
 to Paris, the suggestion was made to conclude a military arrangement 
 between England and Russia, has been confirmed to me. From a reliable 
 source I learn that M. Iswolsky is responsible for that suggestion. His has 
 been the idea of using the expected high spirits of the days of Paris for 
 transforming the Triple Entente into an alliance of the type of the Triple 
 Alliance. If, in the end, Paris and St. Petersburg had to be satisfied with 
 a little less, this has, evidently, been done out of consideration of the fact that 
 in England a large part of pubhc opinion is positively unfavorable to the 
 conclusion of formal alliances with foreign powers. In view of this fact, 
 despite the numerous proofs of British diplomacy's entire lack of power to 
 resist the influence of the Entente, — I refer to the servility with which, 
 quite recently, England supported Russia, in the question of the German 
 military mission to Turkey, — it has evidently not seemed advisable to 
 let the cat out of the bag at once. It has rather been decided to advance 
 gradually, by slow steps. In a meeting of the Cabinet Sir Edward Grey 
 has warmly recommended the Franco-Russian suggestion, and the Cabinet 
 has accepted his views. It has been resolved to prepare a naval agreement 
 the negotiations for which are to be conducted in London between the 
 Admiralty and the Russian naval attache. 
 
 Great is the satisfaction among the Russian and French diplomatists. 
 They consider the conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance only a question 
 of time. To accelerate this result, St. Petersburg would even be ready to 
 make certain sham concessions to England in Persia. The differences of 
 opinion in this regard which have recently occurred between the two powers 
 have so far not been settled. As for England's apprehensions with regard 
 to the future of India which have made themselves felt again recently, Russia 
 follows the policy of giving appeasing assurances for the time being. 
 
 VI 
 
 Disclaimers of the new alliance 
 Jime — , 1914. The French indiscretions with regard to the Anglo- 
 Ruflsian naval convention cause a great deal of uneasiness in St. Peters- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 555 
 
 burg and London. Sir Edward Grey is afraid that the matter will cause 
 a question in Parliament. The naval attach^, Captain Wolkov, who has 
 spent several days in St. Petersburg with the obvious intention of getting 
 his instructions for the parliamentary debate, has returned to London. 
 Parliament has already opened. 
 
 VII 
 
 June — , 1914. In the House of Commons the Ministerial side addressed 
 an interpellation to the Government as to whether Great Britain and 
 Russia had recently concluded a naval convention, and whether negotia- 
 tions with a view of concluding such a convention had recently taken place 
 between the two countries or were going on at present. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey in his answer referred to similar questions addressed 
 to the Government in the preceding year. The Premier had at that time, 
 Sir Edward Grey went on to say, replied there were no unpublished agree- 
 ments with European powers apt to restrain or hem in the free decision of 
 the Government or Parliament as to whether Great Britain was to partici- 
 pate in a war or not. This answer held good to-day, just as it did a year 
 ago. No negotiations with any power had since been concluded which 
 would detract from the truth of the declaration in question; no such nego- 
 tiations were in progress, nor was it likely, as far as he could judge, that 
 such would be entered upon. In case, however, that an agreement was to 
 be concluded which might necessitate a retraction or alteration of the above- 
 mentioned declaration of the Prime Minister of last year, such an agree- 
 ment, in his opinion, would have to be and, he felt sure, consequently would 
 be, submitted to Parliament. 
 
 The great majority of the English press withholds all comment on this 
 declaration of the Minister. 
 
 Only the two radical papers, the Daily News and the Manchester Guardian, 
 have short editorial articles. The first mentioned expresses satisfaction 
 at Sir Edward Grey's words, saying that they are clear enough to dispel 
 all doubts. England, it says, is not in tow of any other country. She is not 
 a vassal of Russia's, not the ally of France, and not the enemy of Germany. 
 The declaration, it continues, is a salutary lecture to those English jour- 
 nalists who would give currency to the belief that there is a Triple Entente 
 of the same nature as the Triple Alliance. 
 
 The Manchester Guardian, on the contrary, is not satisfied with the 
 declaration of the Minister. The paper finds fault with its tortuous word- 
 ing, and tries to prove that it admits of interpretations which would not 
 entirely exclude the existence of certain, perhaps conditional, agreements of 
 the rumored kind. 
 
 The declarations of Sir Edward Grey correspond with a confidential ut- 
 terance to the following effect of a person of the Minister's immediate 
 entourage: He was in a position to assert most emphatically and decisively 
 that there were no agreements of any military or naval nature whatever 
 between England and France, although the wish for such had been repeat- 
 edly expressed on the French side. What the British Cabinet had refused 
 to France it was not likely to concede to Russia. No naval agreement 
 had been concluded with Russia, nor was any going to be concluded. 
 
556 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 VIII 
 
 June — , 1914. It would seem that Sir Edward Grey felt a need at once 
 categorically to repudiate the remarks of the Manchester Guardian in 
 response to his answer to the interpellation made concerning the rumored 
 Anglo-Russian naval entente. The Westminster Gazette prints in a prom- 
 inent place, from the pen of Mr. Spender, who is well known to be one of 
 Sir Edward Grey's most intimate political friends, a dementi which leaves 
 nothing to be desired as regards emphasis. Therein it is said: That no 
 naval agreement exists, and no negotiations are pending about a naval 
 agreement between England and Russia, and that nobody who knew the 
 character and the methods of Sir Edward Grey could think for a moment 
 that the declaration which he made was intended to veil the truth. 
 
 IX 
 
 The disclaimers disbelieved 
 June — , 1914. The fact that Sir Edward Grey's declaration in the House 
 of Commons concerning the Russo-English naval conventions was so read- 
 ily accepted by public opinion in England has caused great relief here and 
 in St. Petersburg. The wire-pullers in this action had feared that the beau- 
 tiful dream of the new Triple Alliance had come to an end. By the way, 
 I find it hard to believe that it should have been reserved exclusively for 
 the Manchester Guardian to see through the trick which Sir Edward Grey 
 was playing in not answering the questions whether negotiations were 
 pending or in progress about a naval agreement with Russia, and denying 
 the question (which had not been put at all) whether England had entered 
 into binding obligations relative to her participation in a European war. 
 I am, on the contrary, inclined to believe that the English press in this case 
 gave a new proof of its well-known discipline in the treatment of questions 
 of foreign policy, and that it kept silence either in response to a " mot 
 d'ordre," or from political instinct. What criticising and fault-finding would 
 the Imperial Government not have been subjected to on the part of the Ger- 
 man popular representatives and the German press; what a clamor would 
 not be raised about our foreign policy and our diplomats, if a similar declara- 
 tion should be made in the Reichstag! In Parliamentary England every- 
 body remains silent when a Minister tries in such an evident manner to 
 mislead his own party, the representatives of the people and public opinion. 
 What is there that England does not sacrifice to her Germanophobia? 
 
 X 
 
 Anglo-Russian agreement 
 June — , 1914. From a source which has preserved its old sympathies for 
 Germany, the accompanying notes have been sent to me with a request for 
 strictest secrecy, concerning a conference which took place on the 26th of 
 May of the present year, at which the Chief of the Russian Naval Staff pre- 
 sided, and in which the basic principles were fixed for the negotiations about 
 the Russo-EngUsh naval convention. My informant knew nothing as yet 
 about the result to which the negotiations have led until now, but he ex- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 557 
 
 pressed grave fears with regard to the promotion which the cause of Russian 
 nationalism would experience if the convention should really materialize. 
 The moment they were sure of England's participation, the well-known Pan- 
 Slavic agitators would not hesitate to seize the first opportunity to bring 
 about a war. Also, M. Sazonof was visibly drifting into the wake of the 
 Russian war party. 
 
 (Indosure) 
 
 St. Petersburg, May 13 (26), 1914. 
 
 Led by the considerations that an agreement was desirable between 
 Russia and England, with regard to the cooperation of their naval forces 
 in the case of military operations conducted by Russia and England with 
 the participation of France, the conference arrived at the following con- 
 clusions : — 
 
 As the contemplated naval convention is to regulate the relations in 
 all their details between the Russian and English maritime forces, an agree- 
 ment must be reached concerning signals and special ciphers, radio-tele- 
 grams and the mode of communication between the Russian and EngUsh 
 Naval Staffs. Besides this, the two Naval Staffs are to inform each other 
 regularly about the fleets of third powers and about their own navies, in 
 particular about technical data and newly introduced machines and 
 inventions. 
 
 Following the example of the Franco-Russian naval convention, a cur- 
 rent exchange of opinion is to take place between the Russian and the Eng- 
 lish Naval Staff in order to examine questions which are of interest to the 
 Naval Minister of both states. 
 
 The Russian naval agreement with England, like the Franco-Russian 
 agreement, is to make provision for actions of the Russian and English 
 navies, which, previously agreed upon, are to be fought separately. In 
 respect of the strategic aims, distinction is to be made between naval op)er- 
 ations in the Black Sea and the North Sea on the one side, and the expected 
 naval warfare in the Mediterranean on the other. In both spheres Russia 
 must endeavor to get compensation from England for deflecting a part of 
 the German navy upon the Russian fleet. 
 
 In the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, temporary activities of Russia 
 are to be considered as strategic operations in case of a war. 
 
 Russian interests in the Baltic Sea demand that England shall keep the 
 largest possible part of the German fleet in the North Sea. That would do 
 away with the overpowering superiority of the German fleet as against the 
 Russian, and might make it possible for the Russians to land in Pome- 
 rania. In this the British Government could be of essential assistance by 
 dispatching a great number of merchantmen to the Baltic ports before the 
 beginning of warlike operations, so as to make up for the lack of Russian 
 transport vessels. 
 
 As regards the situation in the Mediterranean, it is of prime importance 
 to Russia to have an unquestionable superiority of the forces of the Entente 
 over the Austro-Itahan fleets established. For in case the Austro-Italian 
 forces command the Mediterranean, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the 
 Black Sea would be possible, a contingency which would mean a dangerous 
 blow to Russia. It must be assumed that the Austro-Italian forces are 
 
558 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 superior to the French. England would, therefore, have to secure the 
 preponderance of the fighting forces of the Entente Powers in the Mediter- 
 ranean, at least for so long a time as the development of the Russian navy 
 has not made such progress as to be able to imdertake this task itself. Rus- 
 sian men-of-war must, through England's consent, be allowed to use the 
 English ports in the eastern Mediterranean as a base, just as the French 
 naval agreement permits the Russian fleet to base itself upon French ports 
 in the western Mediterranean. 
 
 XI 
 
 Poincare's visit to Russia 
 July — , 1914. During the course of my conversation to-day with M. 
 Sazonof, the talk also turned to the visit of M. Poincar^. The Minister laid 
 emphasis upon the pacific tone of the toasts exchanged. I could not refrain 
 from drawing M. Sazonof 's attention to the fact that not the toasts that 
 were exchanged at such visits were wont to give material for uneasiness, but 
 the comments made by the press in connection with them. Such press com- 
 ments had been made this time also, even spreading the news of a reported 
 conclusion of an Anglo-Russian naval convention. M. Sazonof, seizing upon 
 this remark, said, in a vexed manner, that such a naval convention existed 
 only " in the mind of the Berliner Tageblait and in the moon." 
 
 XII 
 
 July — , 1914. I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency herewith 
 the inclosed copy of a letter, dated the 25th inst. at St. Petersburg, sent to a 
 Russian Grand Duke, who is sojourning here for the present, by his adju- 
 tant, and about the gist of which I have already made telegraphic report. 
 The letter, which came to my knowledge in a confidential way, is proof, to 
 my mind, that as early as the 24th inst. people in Russia were determined to 
 go to war. 
 
 (Inclosure) 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914. 
 
 In St. Petersburg we have had great disorder among the laborers, which 
 strangely coincided with the presence here of the French and with the Aus- 
 trian ultimatum to Servia. Yesterday I heard from the French military 
 agent, General de la Guiche, that he had been told Austria was not innocent 
 of these labor disturbances. But now everything is quickly reverting to 
 normal conditions, and it seems that, encouraged by the French, our Gov- 
 ernment has ceased to tremble with fear of the Germans. It was about time! 
 It is better once to speak one's mind clearly to the other party than to hide 
 continually behind the professional lies of the diplomats. Austria's ultima- 
 tum is of an unheard-of insolence, as all papers here say unanimously. 
 
 I have just read the evening papers. Yesterday there was a meeting of the 
 Ministerial Council. The Minister of War spoke very strongly; he con- 
 firmed the statement that Russia is ready for war, and the other Ministers 
 agreed. In accordance with this spirit, a report to His Majesty was made 
 up, and this report was acknowledged the same night. To-day a preliminary 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 559 
 
 communique of the Government was published in the Russky Invalid to the 
 effect that " the Government is very anxious in consequence of the events 
 that have taken place and the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Ser- 
 via. The Government is following carefully the development of the Servo- 
 Austrian conflict, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent." This com- 
 muniquS was printed by all papers with very favorable comment. 
 
 We are all convinced that this time there will be no Rasputins to prevent 
 Russia from doing her duty. Germany, which is pushing Austria forward, 
 is determined to measure her strength against ours before we build up our 
 fleet, and the Balkan States have not yet recovered from the war. We also 
 must look danger bravely in the face, instead of hiding our heads as during 
 the Balkan War, when Kokovtzoff had no other thoughts than of the purse. 
 At that time war would have been easier, as the Balkan League was fully 
 armed. But in Russia the street demonstrations which were directed against 
 that detestable Austria were dispersed by the police. Now, however, such 
 demonstrations would be gladly welcomed. 
 
 Altogether we will hope that the reign of the poltroons and of certain 
 bawlers and mystics is a thing of the past. War is like a thunderstorm. 
 Even though catastrophes should come, it would be better than to endure 
 this sultriness longer. From experience I know to a certainty that for my- 
 self the quietest place is at the front, where I can see the danger in its natural 
 proportions, and that is not so terrible. The worst is in the realm where an 
 atmosphere of cowardice prevails, where improbable rumors are abroad, and 
 panics develop. And in the future war the Russian interior will be the rear 
 guard. 
 
560 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 
 
 A GERMAN HISTORIAN PREDICTS WAR WITH 
 ENGLAND i 
 
 . . . Professor Delbruck begins his statement by a candid avowal of 
 the " highly inflammable state of feeling" now rampant in Germany against 
 England. He asks, " Can an Anglo-German war be averted? " and replies: — 
 
 " I begin to think it cannot. We know now that England deliberately 
 planned to fall upon us without formal declaration of war last sumnier. We 
 know now how near we were to the realization of a British admiral's grim 
 prophecy that ' the Germans would wake up some morning to find that they 
 had once had a fleet.' The nation is so outraged over that revelation that 
 the next Reichstag may be asked to pass a law permitting us to treat as 
 pirates the prisoners of any enemy who begins hostilities under those wanton 
 circumstances — to shoot or hang them at sight ! I doubt very much if our 
 Government will be able for long to resist the pressure for more powerful 
 armaments, which are demanded in all patriotic German circles. Morocco 
 proved to the hilt, if further proof were necessary, that England is our 
 inveterate enemy. In the face of such a peril there is only one alternative — 
 more dreadnoughts ! We realize that a heavy or sudden increase of our fleet 
 might — probably would — be considered a casus belli by England. But 
 people think we must risk that. We cannot and will not ever again tolerate 
 such malicious interference with legitimate German aspirations as Britain's 
 intervention in our negotiations with France over Morocco. 
 
 "Our point is that the British Government has stubbornly and con- 
 sistently declined to negotiate with us, with a view either to cooperation or 
 avoidance of an eventual menace to British interests. Your standpoint is 
 simply blind unyielding opposition — the dog-in-the-manger attitude in ita 
 most virulent form. You refuse to associate yourselves with us in financing 
 the project [of the Bagdad Railway], as we invited you to do ten years ago. 
 Then, not satisfied with blocking our progress in that direction, you lose no 
 opportunity to unite Russian and Frenchman against us. Then you seek to 
 undermine us with the Turk, whose only friend is Germany, because we are 
 the only European power which has not despoiled him of territory in the 
 past and has no intention of doing so in the future. 
 
 " Let me summarize what I have said: The abandonment of unworthy 
 suspicions; the acknowledgment of our right to grow and to participate in 
 shaping the world's destinies; the expression of an honest desire to reach an 
 understanding; formal diplomatic steps in that direction; simultaneous 
 withdrawal of arbitrary opposition to legitimate German pohtical aspira- 
 tions — those are the things we mean by an exhibition of British friendship. 
 ... If you have no inclination to meet us on that ground, if your interests 
 rather point to a perpetuation of the anything-to-beat-Germany policy, so 
 let it be. The Armageddon which must then, some day, ensue will not be of 
 our making." 
 
 1 Extract from an article in the Literary Digest, 1912, vol. xliv, p. 201. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 561 
 
 THE PRICE OF A GERMAN-ENGLISH ENTENTE » 
 
 ... So soon as Germany perceives that the other powers are no longer 
 making it their object to exclude her from the politics of the world, she will 
 have attained the purpose of her shipbuilding; and she will rejoice to be rid 
 of the necessity of increasing her burden (p. 133). 
 
 ... So soon as they know that Germany is at one with England, all notion 
 of revolt must vanish. In spite of all differences among the great nations, 
 it is never to be forgotten that they also constitute a vast unity and have 
 common interests. Germany has a large and growing share in the trade of 
 India, and especially of Egypt. A rising in India or Egypt that should fling 
 back these lands into anarchy and barbarism would, therefore, be also an 
 acute injury to German interests. So soon as Germany stands in healthy 
 political relations with England, she has the keenest interest in the preser- 
 vation of England's rule, which represents civilization, in adjacent countries. 
 President Roosevelt was right in saying that Germany on the Euphrates 
 represented not a weakening, but a strengthening, of England's position on 
 the Ganges and the Nile (p. 134), 
 
 ... A war between Germany and England can only take one course, viz., 
 that the English vessels blockade the German harbors, and the German 
 ships by force or cunning break through the blockade and endeavor to inflict 
 widespread damage on English merchantmen and harbors. If other powers 
 come into play, Germany might, perhaps, in combination with the Turks, 
 attack the English in Egypt, and the English could strengthen with their 
 land forces an enemy of Germany — the French or the Russians. The land- 
 ing of English troops in Denmark or Holland could scarcely accomplish 
 much, since the German Empire has at its disposal more than four to five 
 million soldiers, and would therefore be speedily in a position to attack and 
 annihilate any such English army with overwhelmingly superior forces. We 
 could desire nothing better for ourselves than such an isolated landing of 
 English troops. If the English desire to support the French against us, they 
 must allow their army to land in France and unite directly with the French 
 army. A landing elsewhere would be a division of forces which would enable 
 the German army to overcome each in succession (pp. 135-36). 
 
 The field, wherein the understanding between England and Germany is 
 to be sought, is that of colonial policy and the Turkish Orient. Germany 
 recognizes that the greatest part of the world is allotted, and there are no 
 longer important colonies to be gained by her; but compensation for this 
 can be obtained m the preservation of the principle of the " open door," 
 where this still exists, and close relations to the rejuvenated Turkey, where 
 Germany may look for no sovereignty, but for influence and commercial 
 activity. If England, instead of placing obstacle after obstacle in the way of 
 the attainment of our purpose, in the fashion sufficiently described by Sir 
 Harry Johnston, will accord her friendly support, every motive for hostile 
 feeling on our part will have vanished and the rivalry of armaments will 
 diminish. 
 
 1 Extracts from an article by Hans DelbrQek, in the Contemporary Review, 1911, vol. 
 xcix, p. 138. 
 
562 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 REFERENCES TO THE ANGLO-GERMAN SECRET TREATY OF 
 
 1898 RELATIVE TO THE EVENTUAL DISMEMBERMENT 
 
 OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES 
 
 Even the Emperor William's telegram to Mr. Kruger provoked only a 
 temporary storm, and did not hinder the conclusion of a secret treaty which, 
 in 1898, in conditions but little known, disposed of the future of the Portu- 
 guese colonies. 1 
 
 England should afford Germany certain opportunities for working off her 
 surplus energy, her sm-plus production in Asia, but should avoid any ar- 
 rangement permitting her to become a greater rival than she already is 
 along the Atlantic trade routes. Thus, instead of confirming the Treaty of 
 1898 relative to the eventual dismemberment of the Portuguese colonies, 
 she should seek for a fresh arrangement undoing that dangerous and incom- 
 prehensible pact.^ 
 
 ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT IN REGARD TO THE 
 AFRICAN POSSESSIONS OF PORTUGAL ^ 
 
 London, December 30. (Special Cable to the New York Times.) The 
 New York Times is in a position to state that Great Britain and Germany 
 have concluded an important arrangement with regard to the African pos- 
 sessions of Portugal, that is, Angola and Portuguese East Africa. 
 
 By this arrangement Angola will become a German protectorate. It is a 
 vast tract of territory, 312,000 square miles in extent, with a native popula- 
 tion of 2,000,000, lying north of German Southwest Africa. Its proximity to 
 the German colony is, of course, the factor which made the German claims 
 to it so strong. 
 
 With reference to the Portuguese possessions on the other side of the con- 
 tinent, Mozambique in the north and Gazaland in the south, territory ex- 
 tending from the eleventh to the twenty-sixth parallels, the northern part 
 adjacent to German East Africa will pass under German control, and the 
 southern part, regarded as a natural seaboard for the Transvaal, will become 
 British, The boundary will be either the Zambesi River or in its vicinity. 
 
 Advices have been received in London from Lisbon to the effect that not 
 only has an agreement been completed, but that the purchase money has 
 already been paid by the two powers to Portugal. It is stated that this 
 amounts to something over $100,000,000. 
 
 The Portuguese Government refrains for political reasons from making 
 public details of the deal. It is felt that any such announcement would 
 endanger the existence of the present Government, which awaits a more 
 favorable time to inform the public of the bargain. 
 
 The position of Portugal toward the territories will be much the same 
 under the agreement as that of Turkey with regard to Egypt — suzerainty 
 more in name than anything else. 
 
 > Andr6 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, p. 47. New York, 1908. 
 
 » William Morton Fullerton, Problems of Power, p. 264. New York, 1913. 
 
 • From the New York Times, December 31, 1913. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 563 
 
 There can be no doubt that the discussions which led up to the agreement 
 had an excellent effect in clearing the air between England and Germany. 
 They were, of course, rendered easier by the fact that some time before the 
 Boer War a similar agreement was come to. It was then not carried out, as 
 the war increased the commercial competition between the two countries, 
 and the German naval policy combined to decrease the cordiality of their 
 relations. 
 
 PORTUGAL WON'T SELL YET: DIVISION OF HER EAST 
 AFRICAN COLONIES WHEN SHE DOES ^ 
 
 Berlin, December 31. The Foreign OfBce says of the report of an Anglo- 
 German agreement to acquire Angola and Mozambique from Portugal, that 
 should such an arrangement be reached, it would be contingent on Portu- 
 gal deciding to dispose of her colonies and would concern only the Anglo- 
 German rights of preemption. 
 
 Portugal, however, it is said, does not dream of selling her colonies. 
 
 London, December 31. The Foreign OflSce says there is no truth in the 
 report that Germany and England have agreed to the division of the 
 Portuguese colonies in Africa. It is pointed out that Portugal has not ex- 
 pressed a desire to sell the colonies. Should the Portuguese possessions 
 ever come into the market, the two countries may endeavor to obtain 
 possession of them. 
 
 INTERVIEW OF OCTOBER 28, 1908, WITH 
 EMPEROR WILLIAM II 
 
 [This interview, which the Kaiser gave to a " representative Englishman," 
 appeared in the London Telegraph, October 28, 1908, and is reprinted in 
 the New York Times Current History of the European War, vol. i, no. 2, p. 
 213. It was corroborated by the German Foreign Office, with the comment 
 that it was " intended as a message to the English people." In consequence 
 of the outcry in Germany, . . . and the representations of Chancellor von 
 Billow, the Kaiser had to declare that his principal imperial task was to " in- 
 sure the stability of the policies of the Empire, under the guardianship of 
 constitutional responsibility. . . ."] 
 
 " You English are as mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come 
 over you that you are completely given over to suspicions that are quite 
 unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I 
 declared with all the emphasis at my command in my speech at the Guild- 
 hall that my heart was set upon peace and that it was one of my dearest 
 wishes to live on the best terms with England. Have I ever been false to 
 my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions 
 ought to speak for themselves, but you will not listen to them, but to those 
 who misinterpret and distort them. 
 
 "This is a personal insult which I resent; to be forever misjudged, to 
 have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, 
 mistrustful eyes taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time 
 that I am a friend of England, and your press, or at least a considerable 
 
 1 New York Times, January 1, 1914. 
 
564 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 section of it, bids the people of England to refuse my proffered hand and 
 insinuates that the other hand holds a dagger. How can I convince a na- 
 tion against its will?" 
 
 Complaining again of the difficulty imposed on him by English distrust. 
 His Majesty said: "The prevailing sentiment of large sections of the middle 
 and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England, I am, there- 
 fore, so to speak, in the minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the 
 best element, just as it is in England respecting Germany." 
 
 The Englishman reminded the Kaiser that not only England, but the 
 whole of Europe, viewed with disapproval the recent sending of the German 
 Consul at Algiers to Fez and forestalling France and Spain by suggesting 
 the recognition of Sultan Mulai Hafid. The Kaiser made an impatient ges- 
 ture and exclaimed: "Yes, that is an excellent example of the way German 
 actions are misrepresented." And with vivid directness he defended the 
 aforesaid incident, as the German Government has already done. 
 
 The interviewer reminded the Kaiser that an important and influential 
 section of the German newspapers interpreted these acts very differently, 
 and effusively approved of them because they indicated that Germany was 
 bent upon shaping events in Morocco. 
 
 "There are mischief-makers," replied the Emperor, "in both countries. 
 I will not attempt to weigh their relative capacity for misrepresentation, but 
 the facts are as I have stated. There has been nothing in Germany's recent 
 action in regard to Morocco contrary to the explicit declaration of my love 
 of peace made both at the Guildhall and in my latest speech at Strassburg." 
 
 Reverting to his efforts to show his friendship for England, the Kaiser 
 said they had not been confined to words. It was commonly believed that 
 Germany was hostile to England throughout the Boer War. Undoubtedly 
 the newspapers were hostile and public opinion was hostile. "But what," 
 he asked, "of official Germany? What brought to a sudden stop, indeed, 
 to an absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were 
 striving to obtain European intervention? 
 
 "They were feted in Holland. France gave them a rapturous welcome. 
 They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have 
 crowned them with flowers, but when they asked me to receive them I 
 refused. The agitation immediately died away and the delegates returned 
 empty handed. Was that the action of a secret enemy? 
 
 "Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German Government was 
 invited by France and Russia to join them in calling upon England to end 
 the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer re- 
 publics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. "VVTiat was my reply? I 
 said so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to 
 bring pressure against England and bring about her downfall Germany would 
 always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications 
 with a sea power like England. 
 
 "Posterity will one day read the exact terms of a telegram, now in the 
 archives of Windsor Castle, in which I informed the sovereign of England 
 of the answer I returned to the powers which then sought to compass her 
 fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what 
 my actions were in the hour of their adversity. 
 
 "Nor was that all. During your black week in December, 1899, when 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 565 
 
 disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from 
 Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction 
 and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her 
 mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. I did more. I 
 bade one of my officers to procure as exact an account as he could obtain 
 of the number of combatants on both sides and the actual positions of the 
 opposing forces. 
 
 " With the figures before me I worked out what I considered the best plan 
 of campaign in the circumstances and submitted it to my General Staff for 
 criticism. Then I dispatched it to England. That document likewise is 
 among the State papers at Windsor awaiting the serenely impartial verdict 
 of history. 
 
 "Let me add as a curious coincidence that the plan which I formulated 
 ran very much on the same lines as that actually adopted by General 
 Roberts and carried by him into successful operation. Was that the act of 
 one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say." 
 
 Touching then upon the English conviction that Germany is increasing 
 her navy for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, the Kaiser reiterated 
 the explanation that Chancellor von Biilow and other Ministers have made 
 familiar, dwelling upon Germany's worldwide commerce, her manifold 
 interests in distant seas, and the necessity for being prepared to protect 
 them. He said: — 
 
 " Patriotic Germans refuse to assign any bounds to their legitimate com- 
 mercial ambitions. They expect their interests to go on growing. They 
 must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Ger- 
 many looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared for 
 any eventualities in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take place 
 in the Pacific in the days to come, days not so distant as some believe, but 
 days, at any rate, for which all European powers with Far Eastern inter- 
 est sought to steadily prepare? 
 
 "Look at the accomplished rise of Japan. Think of a possible national 
 awakening in China, and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. 
 Only those powers which have great navies will be listened to with respect 
 when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved, and if for that reason only 
 Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that England herself 
 will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak together in the great 
 debates of the future." 
 
 The interviewer concludes : — 
 
 "The Emperor spoke with all that earnestness which marks his man- 
 ner when speaking on deeply pondered subjects. I ask my fellow-countrymen 
 who value the cause of peace, to weigh what I have written and revise, if 
 necessary, their estimate of the Kaiser and his friendship for England by 
 his Majesty's own words. If they had enjoyed the privilege of hearing 
 them spoken they would no longer doubt either his Majesty's firm desire to 
 live on the best of terms with England or his growing impatience at the per- 
 sistent mistrust with which his offer of friendship is too often received." 
 
566 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND REMOVAL OF 
 
 CONFLICTING INTERESTS ^ 
 
 By Sir Harry Johnston 
 
 One thing, at any rate, that the recent German colonization of England 
 has done, has been to build up a remarkable degree of commerce between 
 the British and the German Empires; and a fact which is too often over- 
 looked by British politicians is the value of Anglo-German commerce at the 
 present day. We do a bigger trade with Germany than with all the British 
 Empire over the seas, and similarly German commerce flourishes in all that 
 part of the British Empire governed from London more than it does in the 
 colonial dominions of any other power. An Anglo-German war would be the 
 most dreadful disaster which could possibly happen to either Germany or 
 Britain. It would bankrupt both empires and only profit the United States 
 and Russia. 
 
 . . . We have overlooked the fact that it is only because hitherto trade has 
 been so splendidly free and fair to all the world throughout all the British 
 possessions that the rest of the world has permitted without undue grum- 
 bling a population of some forty millions only in northwest Europe to arro- 
 gate to itself the control of the best parts of Africa, Asia, Australasia, and 
 America. But a reversal of this policy would, in my opinion, eventually 
 unite all the other great commercial powers of the world in league against 
 us. 
 
 Germany wants, will have, and must have some day — and is morally 
 entitled to — an outlet towards the Mediterranean and a port on that sea. 
 That outlet can only be, if the balance of power is to remain undisturbed, 
 Trieste. In making such a sacrifice for the benefit of her ally, Austria would 
 require a territorial compensation farther east, and in the course of events 
 must of necessity become a great Slav empire rather than an eastern Ger- 
 many. These are matters which only concern Great Britain in so far that 
 we might hinder their solution by any stupid, short-sighted interference 
 in the affairs of the Nearest East. Far more important to us, in my hum- 
 ble opinion, than the fate and future history of the Balkan Peninsula, is a 
 good understanding with Germany. It is Germany and Austria together 
 who should be allowed by Britain, France, and Russia to determine the 
 settlement of southeastern Europe north of the Greek frontier. Similarly, 
 nothing should be done by us to block the way of Germany or Austria in 
 any steps they may take which are right and fair and which do not lead 
 to any policy of protection, for the regeneration of Turkey in Asia, providing 
 that due regard is given to the peculiar circumstances of Syria, the neces- 
 sity for a neutralized Arabia, and British interests in Egypt and the Persian 
 Gulf. 
 
 On the other hand, among the British interests of the greatest magnitude 
 are the independence and neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg and the 
 invulnerability of France within her present limits. Any unprovoked attack 
 by Germany on France, and any further encroachment of German power 
 westward in that direction would be a casus belli, even — I should imagine 
 — with the Labor and the Irish parties in Great Britain. 
 
 > Extract from the Report of Proceedings of the Anglo-German Understanding Conference, 
 pp. 116-18. London, 1912. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 567 
 
 COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION ^ 
 By Professor Karl Rathgen 
 
 As I said before, with the rest of the world Germany's foreign trade was 
 stagnant for twenty years from the middle of the seventies to the middle of 
 the nineties. From that time until now an enormous wave of increase of the 
 volume and the value of foreign trade has gone all over the world. It has 
 swelled statistical numbers in England as well as in Germany, but with one 
 difference. The wave began to rise in Germany several years earlier than in 
 England. In these first years of the great wave of increasing exports the 
 start which England had over Germany has been somewhat diminished. 
 About 1889-90 British exports were ahead of German exports by about 
 £100,000,000. Ten years later the difference was only £50,000,000 to 
 £65,000,000. But since that time, during the last fifteen years, the distance 
 has remained the same. Excepting that year of unusual prices, 1907, the 
 value of EngUsh ex-ports has been ahead of German exports between 
 £45,000,000 and £65,000,000. In other words, the absolute increase of the 
 value of exports has been the same in the United Kingdom and in Germany 
 between the years of prosperity, 1900, 1911, an increase of £170,000,000 for 
 Germany, £165,000,000 for the United Kingdom, increases both of them 
 much larger than those of any other country in the world. Even in the 
 United States it was only £115,000,000. The comparison of England and 
 Germany appears in less favorable light for the latter, if we compute the 
 proportion of exports per head of the population, because the German popu- 
 lation has increased by larger numbers than that of Great Britain. From 
 1890 to 1911 German exports increased per head by £2, 15s., British exports 
 by £3. 
 
 To give an analysis of this increase of exports would take up too much 
 time. But one point you will allow me to illustrate, which is of paramount 
 importance for our object. The direction of these foreign exports has de- 
 veloped in quite a different way for both countries. I have compared for 
 each commercial country of the world the years 1890 and 1910, two years 
 of good business, whether during this period German or British imports 
 show the greater increase. The result is very curious. For no European 
 country excepting Rumania and Greece have imports from Great Britain 
 decreased. But in every European country excepting Portugal, German 
 imports have increased faster than British imports. Here you have the in- 
 fluence of the central continental position of Germany, situated in the heart 
 of Europe, surrounded by other continental countries. Germany has the 
 advantage of its geographical position in Europe. This is confirmed by the 
 fact that about the year 1910 British imports were ahead of German im- 
 ports in France, in Spain, in Portugal, in Turkey, in Greece; in all the other 
 countries Germany is ahead, and that the more so the closer the continental 
 connection is. We get the inverse impression from the statistics of imports, 
 1890 and 1910, in countries out of Europe. In each of these countries the 
 imports from Great Britain have increased by a larger sum than those from 
 Germany. An exception is found, besides in the German colonies, only in 
 
 " Extract from the Report of Proceedings of the Anglo-Oertnan Vnderstarvding Conference, 
 pp. 19-21. London, 1912. 
 
568 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 some states of Central America, Mexico, Guatemala, San Domingo; in the 
 Argentine Republic the progress of both countries is nearly equal. Of the 
 increase in the buying power of the non-European countries Britain has 
 profited more than Germany. 
 
 Excepting certain parts of Central America and tropical Africa, British 
 exports are far ahead of German exports everywhere out of Europe. 
 
 Who would be foolish enough to think that the natural advantage of 
 Germany in Europe, of Britain beyond the seas, might be changed by a war! 
 
 If the economic conditions and necessities of England and Germany are 
 more and more similar, does that only mean increasing competition? Does 
 it not mean at the same time similarity and community of interests? The 
 great commercial nations have the same interest, that the whole world 
 should be opened up to civilization and to industrial and commercial enter- 
 prises. It has been England which has given the example of opening up new 
 areas to the commerce of all comers in fair competition. It has been the first 
 colonizing power which admitted merchants and goods from other countries, 
 and many are the German merchants who recognize this spirit of fairness 
 and economic wisdom. England has been the principal power to open up 
 the Near and the Far East to European enterprise. Germany has, as soon 
 as the Empire created the possibility of such action, always worked in the 
 same spirit, as shown in eastern Asia and in the opening up of Africa. It has 
 had an essential share in securing fair and equal treatment for all trading 
 nations, from the Congo Act down to the recent Morocco Treaty, where 
 England has left to Germany the privilege of protecting these principles. 
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to make special proposals for coopera- 
 tion; but how much work is to be done, how much capital is required to 
 civilize the vast expanse of countries beyond the sea and their hundreds of 
 millions of inhabitants! To mention one point only: have we not the same 
 interest to increase the production of other materials of industry like cotton? 
 In the same way as Germany has profited by the action of England, Ger- 
 many's action profits to England. Small as the volume of commerce with 
 our new colonies is as yet, they afford a market for Great Britain and its 
 possessions which is bound to increase in the future. 
 
 SPEECH OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR, HERR VON 
 
 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, IN THE REICHSTAG, 
 
 DECEMBER 2, 1914 1 
 
 Freer than France and Russia was England. I have already reminded 
 you how British statesmen in Parliament, again and again, proudly aSirmed 
 Great Britain's absolutely unrestricted right to steer her own course. The 
 attempt to come to an understanding, which would have safeguarded the 
 peace of the world, was easiest to make with England. 
 
 On these lines I had to act and I did act. I well knew that it was a narrow 
 road, not easy to tread. In the course of centuries, the English insular way 
 of thinking had evolved the political maxim that England had a right to an 
 arbitrium mundi, which she could only uphold by an unrivaled supremacy on 
 
 » Extract from the translation published in the International Conciliation Pamphlet, 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 569 
 
 sea and by the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent. I 
 never had any hopes that my persuasion could break that old English 
 maxim. What I did hope and thought possible was that the growth of 
 German power and the increase of the risks of a war might open England's 
 eyes to the fact that her old-fashioned maxim had become untenable and 
 impracticable, and that an amicable settlement with Germany was prefer- 
 able. But that old doctrine of hers more than once stood in the way of a 
 peaceful imderstanding. The crisis of 1911 gave a new impetus to the nego- 
 tiations. The English people suddenly realized that they had stood at the 
 brink of a European war. Popular sentiment forced the British Government 
 to a rapprochement with Germany. After long and arduous negotiations we 
 finally arrived at an understanding on various disputed questions of an eco- 
 nomic character, regarding Africa and Asia Minor. This understanding was 
 to lessen every possible pohtical friction. The world is wide. There is room 
 enough for both nations to measure their strength in peaceful rivalry as long 
 as our national strength is allowed free scope for development. German 
 policy always stood up for that principle. But during the negotiations Eng- 
 land was indefatigable in her endeavors to enter into ever closer relations 
 with France and Russia. The decisive point was that beyond the political 
 sphere of action one military agreement after the other was made in view of 
 a possible Continental war. England kept these negotiations as secret as 
 possible. When something about them would percolate, it was declared, 
 both in the press and in Parliament, to be perfectly harmless. But things 
 could not be concealed, as you know from the official papers that were pub- 
 lished by me. The general situation was this: England was indeed ready 
 to come to an understanding on single items, but the first and foremost 
 principle of her policy was the " balance of power" as a means of checking 
 German strength in its free development. 
 
 CARDIFF SPEECH OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, 
 MR. ASQUITH, OCTOBER 2, 1914 » 
 
 I WILL not repeat, and I certainly cannot improve upon it, and indeed I 
 am not here to-night to argue out propositions which British citizens in 
 every part of the world to-day regard as beyond the reach of controversy. I 
 do not suppose that in the history of mankind there has ever been, in such 
 a vast and diverse community, agreement so unanimous in purpose, so 
 concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear, so convinced, cooperation so 
 spontaneous, so ardent, and so resolute. Just consider what it means, here 
 in this United Kingdom — England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales — to 
 hear one plain, harmonious, united voice, while over the seas from our great 
 Dominions Canada, AustraUa, South Africa, New Zealand, our Crown 
 Colonies, swell the chorus. 
 
 In India, — where whatever we won by the sword we hold and we retain 
 by the more splendid title of just and disinterested rule, by the authority, 
 not of a despot, but of a trustee, — the response to our common appeal has 
 moved all our feelings to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to 
 shiver and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our enemies. That 
 is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle. 
 
 » Extract from "The War," a pamphlet published by Methuen & Co., London, 1914. 
 
570 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the conscience, enlisted 
 the manhood, welded into one compact and irresistible force the energies and 
 the will of the greatest Imperial structure that the world has ever known? 
 That is a question which, for a moment, it is well worth asking and answer- 
 ing. Let me say, then, first negatively, that we are not impelled, any of us, 
 by some of the motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the 
 past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and aggression play 
 no part. What do we want? What do we aim at? What have we to gain? 
 
 We are a great, world-wide, peace-loving partnership. By the wisdom 
 and the courage of our forefathers, by great deeds of heroism and adventure 
 on land and sea, by the insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested 
 experience of many generations, we have built up a dominion which is 
 buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law. We are not vain enough or 
 foolish enough to think that in the course of a long process there have not 
 been blunders, or worse than blunders, and that to-day our Dominion does 
 not fall short of what in our ideals it might and it ought and, we believe, it is 
 destined to be. But such as we have received it, and such as we hope to leave 
 it, with it we are content. 
 
 We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our 
 rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us. All that 
 we wished for, all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to con- 
 solidate our own resources, to raise within the Empire the level of common 
 opportunity, to draw closer the bond of affection and confidence between its 
 parts, and to make it everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of 
 British liberty. Does it not follow from that, that nowhere in the world is 
 there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war and to seek and en- 
 sue peace? Why, then, are the British people throughout the length and 
 breadth of our Empire everywhere turning their ploughshares into swords? 
 Why are the best of our able-bodied men leaving the fields and the factory 
 and the counting-house for the recruiting-office and the training-camp? 
 
 If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our Imperial burdens, either 
 in area or in responsibility, it is equally true that in entering this war we had 
 no ill-will to gratify, nor wrongs of our own to avenge. In regard to Ger- 
 many in particular, our policy — repeatedly stated in Pariiament, resolutely 
 pursued year after year both in London and in Berlin — our pohcy has been 
 to remove one by one the outstanding causes of possible friction, and so to 
 establish a firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come. 
 
 We have said from the first — I have said it over and over again, and so 
 has Sir Edward Grey — we have said from the first that our friendships with 
 certain powers, with France, with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be 
 construed as implying cold feelings, and still less hostile purposes, against 
 any other power. But at the same time we have always made it clear, to 
 quote words used by Sir Edward Grey as far back as November, 1911, — I 
 quote his exact words, — "One does not make new friendships worth having 
 by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us have, but not at 
 the expense of the ones we have." That has been, and I trust will always 
 be, the attitude of those whom the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation 
 describes as the "treacherous English." 
 
 We laid down — and I wish to call not only your attention, but the atten- 
 tion of the whole world to this, when so many false legends are now being 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 571 
 
 invented and circulated — in the following year — in the year 1912 we laid 
 down in terms carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually 
 quote, what ourjelations with Germany ought in our view to be. We said, 
 and we commimicated this to the German Government, "Britain declares 
 that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Ger- 
 many. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of 
 any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, 
 nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." There is 
 nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. 
 
 But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to 
 go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutraUty in 
 the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time 
 when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and her de- 
 fensive resources, especially upon the sea. They asked us, to put it quite 
 plainly, for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the 
 opportimity to overbear, to dominate the European world. 
 
 To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the answer 
 we gave. None the less we have continued during the whole of the last two 
 years, and never more energetically and more successfully than during the 
 Balkan crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe but for 
 the creation of a better international atmosphere and a more cordial coop- 
 eration between all the powers. From both points of view, that of our do- 
 mestic interests as a kingdom and an empire, and that of our settled attitude 
 and poUcy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, which injures the 
 one and frustrates the other, was and could only be regarded as among the 
 worst of catastrophes — among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst. 
 
572 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN DISPUTE 
 
 EXTRACT FROM TREATY OF BERLIN ^ 
 
 Signed July 13, 1878 
 
 Article XXV. The Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be oc- 
 cupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. The Government of Aus- 
 tria-Hungary, not desiring to imdertake the administration of the Sandjak 
 of Novi-Bazar, which extends between Servia and Montenegro in a south- 
 easterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, the Ottoman Adminis- 
 tration will continue to exercise its functions there. Nevertheless, in order 
 to assure the maintenance of the new political state of affairs, as well as 
 freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the 
 right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in 
 the whole of this part of the ancient Vilayet of Bosnia. To this end the 
 Governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves to come 
 to an understanding on the details. 
 
 SECRET APPENDIX TO THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND 
 
 ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BULGARIA 
 
 AND THE KINGDOM OF SERVIA 2 
 
 Signed at Sofia, February 29, 1912 
 
 Article I. In case internal disorders arise in Turkey, of such a char- 
 acter as to endanger the national or state interests of the contracting par- 
 ties, or of one of them, as for instance in case Turkey should find itself 
 beset by internal or external diflBculties which might involve the mainte- 
 nance of the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula, the first of the contracting 
 parties to arrive at the conviction that military action should be taken on 
 this account, shall make a statement, giving the reasons therefor, to the 
 other party which shall be bound to enter immediately upon an exchange 
 of views, and if the latter party does not agree with its ally, shall give to 
 the ally an answer stating the reasons. 
 
 If an agreement is arrived at, this agreement shall be communicated to 
 Russia, and in case that Power does not oppose it, the action shall be under- 
 taken in accordance with the agreement which has been reached, and in 
 accordance with the sentiments of unity and community of interests. In 
 the contrary case, — if an agreement is not reached, — the two states shall 
 appeal to the opinion of Russia, which opinion shall, so far as Russia shall 
 pronounce the same, be binding upon the two parties. 
 
 In case Russia does not give its opinion and an agreement between the 
 two contracting parties cannot, even after that, be reached, and in case the 
 party which is in favor of action decides to pursue such action alone and 
 at its own risk, the other party shall be obliged to observe a friendly neu- 
 trality towards its ally, to proceed at once to mobilize its troops within the 
 
 » Foreign Relations of United Stales, 1878, p. 901. 
 
 ' American Journal of International Law, Supplement, vol. 8 (1914), pp. 3-5l 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 573 
 
 limits provided by the military convention, and to go to the assistance of 
 its ally with all its power, if a third state takes the part of Turkey. 
 
 Article II. All territorial additions which may be secured by common 
 action as provided in articles one and two of the treaty and article one 
 of this secret appendix thereto, shall be under the common dominion 
 {condominium) of the allied states. The division thereof shall be made 
 without delay within the maximum period of three months after the re- 
 establishment of peace and upon the following bases : — 
 
 Servia recognizes the right of Bulgaria to territories to the east of the 
 Rhodopes and the Struma River; Bulgaria recognizes the rights of Servia 
 to those situated to the north and west of Char-Planina. 
 
 As regards territories situated between the Char, Rhodopes, the ^gian 
 Sea, and Ochrida Lake, if the two parties reach the conclusion that it is 
 impossible because of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Servian 
 nations, or for other reasons of domestic'or foreign affairs, to organize these 
 territories as a separate autonomous province, they shall be disposed of ac- 
 cording to the following provisions: — 
 
 Servia agrees not to lay any claim to the territory situated beyond the 
 line traced upon the annexed map, starting from the Turkish-Bulgarian 
 frontier at Mt. Golem (to the north of Kr. Palanka) and following a gen- 
 erally southwesterly direction to Ochrida Lake, passing Mt. Kitka, between 
 the villages of Metejeve and Podarji-kon, by the summit to the east of the 
 village of Nerav, and following the watershed to the peak of 1,000, north of 
 the village of Bascht^vo, between the villages of Liubentzi and Petarlitza, 
 by the peak Ostrich 1,000 (Lissetz-Planina), the peak 1,050 between the 
 villages of Dratch and Opila, by the villages of Talichmantzi and Jivalevo, 
 the peak 1,050, the peak 1,000, the village Kichali, the principal line of the 
 Gradicht^-Planina watershed to the peak Goritcht^, to the peak 1,023, fol- 
 lowing then the watershed between the villages of Ivankovtzi and Lo- 
 ghintzi, through Vetersko and Sopot on the Vardar. Crossing the Vardar, 
 it follows the ridges toward the peak 2,550 and as far as Mt. Petropole, 
 along the watershed of this mountain between the villages of Krapa and 
 Barbaras to the peak 1,200, between the villages of Yakryenovo and Dre- 
 novo, to Mt. Tchesma (1,254), along the watershed of the mountains Baba- 
 Planina and Krouchka-Tepessi, between the villages of Salp and Tzerske, 
 to the summit of Protoyska-Planina, to the east of the village of Belitza, 
 through Br^jani to the peak 1,200 (Hinska-Planina), along the line of the 
 watershed passing the peak 1,330 to the peak 1,217 and between the vil- 
 lages of Livoichta and Gorentzi to Lake ^chrida near the monastery of 
 Gabovtzi. 
 
 Bxilgaria agrees to accept this frontier if His Majesty the Emperor of 
 Russia, who shall be asked to be the final arbitrator of this question, decides 
 in favor of this line. 
 
 It is imderstood that the two contracting parties agree to accept as the 
 final frontier the line which His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, within the 
 above indicated limits, may find to correspond the closest to the rights and 
 interests of the two parties. 
 
 Article III. A copy of the treaty and of this secret appendix thereto 
 shall be communicated together to the Imperial Government of Russia, 
 which shall be asked at the same time to take note thereof, as a proof of 
 
574 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the good intentions of the parties thereto in connection with the purposes 
 sought by them, and with the request that His Majesty the Emperor of 
 Russia deign to accept and approve the powers attributed to himself and 
 his government in the provisions of these two documents. 
 
 Article IV. Every difference which shall arise concerning the inter- 
 pretation and execution of any of the provisions of the treaty, of this secret 
 appendix, and of the military convention, shall be submitted to Russia for 
 final decision, as soon as one of the two parties shall have declared that it 
 believes it impossible to reach an agreement by direct negotiations. 
 
 Article V. None of the provisions of this secret appendix shall be pub- 
 lished or communicated to another Power without a prior agreement 
 thereon by the two parties hereto and the consent of Russia. 
 
 Done at Sofia, February 29, 1912. 
 
 NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE SERVIAN GOVERNMENT 
 
 BY THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT 
 
 ON JULY 23, 19141 
 
 (Translation) 
 
 On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the in- 
 structions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to 
 the Imperial and Royal Government: — 
 
 " Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected 
 her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Pow- 
 ers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of BerUn. In 
 deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce 
 from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has 
 adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, 
 moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria- 
 Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." 
 
 The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 
 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with 
 the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from 
 the Monarchy. The movement which had its birth under the eye of the 
 Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both 
 sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series 
 of outrages and murders. 
 
 Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declara- 
 tion of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done 
 nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machina- 
 tions of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, 
 and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glori- 
 fication of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and 
 functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome 
 propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifesta- 
 tions of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy 
 and contempt of its institutions. 
 
 > B. W. P. no. 4. In the French Yellow Book, no. 75, will be found the memorandum of 
 the Austro-Hungaxian Government giving the reason for its action. See also Auatro-Hua- 
 garian Red Book, no. 19. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 575 
 
 This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased 
 at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal conse- 
 quences to the whole world. 
 
 It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetra- 
 tors of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were 
 planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers 
 were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries 
 belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into 
 Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the 
 chiefs of the Servian frontier service. 
 
 The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not per- 
 mit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of 
 expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the 
 machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories 
 of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of 
 putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tran- 
 quillity of the Monarchy. 
 
 I To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves 
 compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assur- 
 ance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; 
 in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is 
 to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they 
 undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propa- 
 ganda. 
 
 In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian 
 Government shall publish on the front page of their Official Journal of the 
 13/26 July the following declaration: — 
 
 " The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed 
 against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim 
 is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to 
 it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal 
 proceedings. 
 
 "The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries 
 participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised 
 the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government were sol- 
 emnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909. 
 
 "The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of inter- 
 fering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any 
 part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to 
 warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, 
 that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons 
 who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts 
 to anticipate and suppress." 
 
 This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal 
 Army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published 
 in the Official Bulletin of the Army. 
 
 The Royal Servian Government further undertake : — 
 
 1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is 
 directed against its territorial integrity; 
 
576 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 2. To dissolve immediately the society styled "Narodna Odbrana," to 
 confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner 
 against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propa- 
 ganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government 
 shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from 
 continuing their activity xmder another name and form; 
 
 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as 
 regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, 
 everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against 
 Austria-Hungary; 
 
 4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in 
 general, all oflBcers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal 
 Government; 
 
 5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement 
 directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; 
 
 6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th 
 June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto; 
 
 7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and 
 of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employee, who 
 have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sera- 
 jevo; 
 
 8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the Servian author- 
 ities in the illicit traflBc in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss 
 and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and 
 Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by 
 facilitating their passage across the frontier; 
 
 9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations 
 regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia 
 and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated 
 since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms 
 of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally, 
 
 10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the 
 execution of the measures comprised vmder the preceding heads. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal 
 Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July. 
 
 SERVIA'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE, JULY 25, 1914 » 
 
 (Translation) 
 
 The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the 
 Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that 
 their reply will remove any misimderstanding which may threaten to im- 
 pair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 and the Kingdom of Servia. 
 
 Conscious of the fact that the protests, which were made both from the 
 
 » B. W. P. no. 39. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR' 577 
 
 tribune of the National Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of 
 the responsible representatives of the State, — protests which were cut 
 short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th 
 [31st] March, 1909, — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards 
 the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since 
 that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, 
 to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this con- 
 nection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation 
 except one concerning a school-book, and that on that occasion the Imperial 
 and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Ser- 
 via has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during 
 the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has 
 made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been 
 preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for mani- 
 festations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peace- 
 able work of societies — manifestations which take place in nearly all coun- 
 tries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape 
 official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view 
 of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose 
 between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to 
 oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the 
 advantage of the two neighboring countries. 
 
 For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised 
 at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia 
 are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime com- 
 mitted at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collab- 
 orate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, 
 in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures 
 against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. 
 Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, 
 they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard 
 to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs 
 are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be pub- 
 lished on the first page of the Journal offidel, on the date of the 13th [26th] 
 July, the following declaration: — 
 
 "The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may 
 be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as 
 aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy terri- 
 tories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful conse- 
 quences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, 
 according to the commimication from the Imperial and Royal Government, 
 certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above- 
 mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighborly rela- 
 tions to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the 
 declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and 
 repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabi- 
 tants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their 
 duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the 
 kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all 
 
578 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they 
 will use their utmost endeavor." 
 
 This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in 
 an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal 
 Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next 
 official army bulletin. 
 
 The Royal Government further undertake: — 
 
 1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a 
 provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of 
 incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
 for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is 
 directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Govern- 
 ment engage at; the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an 
 amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a 
 nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present 
 impo8sible'"under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution. 
 
 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial 
 and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Od- 
 brana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any 
 criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. 
 Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial 
 and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society 
 and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria- 
 Hungary. 
 
 3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay 
 from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or 
 could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the 
 Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this 
 propaganda. 
 
 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all 
 such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts 
 directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to com- 
 municate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers 
 and officials for the pm-poses of the proceedings which are to be taken 
 against them. 
 
 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp 
 the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal 
 Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the 
 organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they 
 declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle 
 of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly 
 relations. 
 
 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their 
 duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may 
 be, implicated in the plot of the 15th [28th] June, and who happen to be 
 within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this 
 inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this pur- 
 pose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government can- 
 not accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Consti- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 579 
 
 tution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases 
 communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be 
 given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 
 
 7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery 
 of the note, to arrest Commandant Voija Tankositch. As regards Milan 
 Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who 
 up to the 15th [28th] June was employed (on probation) by the directorate 
 of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to 
 supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence 
 of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up 
 to the present, at the inquiry at Serajevo for the pxirposes of the later 
 inquiry. 
 
 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures 
 which have been taken for preventing the illicit traflBc of arms and explo- 
 sives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately 
 order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Scha- 
 batz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of 
 the crime of Serajevo to pass. 
 
 9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks 
 made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the 
 crime, which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment, were hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal 
 Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these 
 remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually 
 made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take 
 steps to collect evidence and proofs. 
 
 10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in 
 so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each 
 measure has been ordered and carried out. 
 
 K- If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, 
 the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest 
 to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a 
 pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the 
 International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the great powers which took 
 part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government 
 on the 18th [31st] March, 1909. 
 Belgrade, July 12 [25], 1914. 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN 
 GOVERNMENTS FOLLOWING THE DESTRUCTION 
 OF THE MAINE 1 
 
 On February 15, 1898, the United States battleship Maine was blown up 
 in Havana Harbor. 
 , February 19, the United States undertook an independent investigation 
 
 1 This comparison between the recent action of the Austrian Government and our own in 
 1898 was suggested to me last September by Professor Munroe Smith, of Columbia Uni- 
 versity, who was in Italy at the time of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, and 
 
580 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914' 
 
 conducted by American naval oflBcers, and on the same date the Depart- 
 ment of State informed Mr. Lee, Consul-General of the United States at 
 Havana, that "This Government will afford every facility it can to the 
 Spanish authorities in whatever investigation they may see fit to make upon 
 their part." {Senate Doc. no. 230, p. 89, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 1897-98, 
 vol. 21.) 
 
 February 21, without consulting the wishes of the Spanish Government, 
 our Government instituted an independent court of inquiry on board the 
 Mangrove in Havana Harbor. {Senate Doc. no. 207, p. 9, 55th Congress, 
 2d Session, 1897-98, vol. 21.) 
 
 February 25, General Blanco, Governor-General of Cuba, suggested that 
 American divers, in making the investigation under the authority of the 
 Spanish Government, should accompany the Spanish divers in making their 
 investigation of the cause of the disaster to the Maine. To this Consul- 
 General Lee replied to the effect that the American examination ought to be 
 made independently, but in harmony with that conducted by the Spanish 
 authorities. {Senate Doc. no. 230, pp. 90-91, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 
 1897-98, vol. 21.) 
 
 February 28, three days later, Consul-General Lee cabled to the Depart- 
 ment of State at Washington: "Arrangements made both Governments 
 conduct independently investigation Maine disaster." {Senate Doc. no. 
 230, p. 90, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 1897-98, vol. 21.) 
 
 March 19, Mr. Woodford, the American Minister at Madrid, cabled to 
 the President : "Unless report on Maine requires immediate action, I suggest 
 that nothing be decided or done until after the receipt of my personal letters 
 43, 44, and 46. I also suggest that you authorize me to tell , . . that you 
 wish final agreement made before April 15th. If you will acquaint me fully 
 with"general settlement desired, I believe Spanish Government will offer, 
 without compulsion and upon its own motion, such terms of settlement as 
 may be satisfactory to both nations. Large liberty as to details should be 
 conceded to Spain, but ... I now believe it will be a pleasure to the Spanish 
 Government to propose what will probably be satisfactory_to you." {Foreign 
 Relations of the United States, 1898, p. 692.) 
 
 March 20, the acting Secretary of State replied: "The President is at a 
 loss '^to know just what your telegram of the 19th covers, whether loss of 
 Maine or whole situation. Confidential report shows naval board will make 
 unanimous report that Maine was blown up by submarine mine. This report 
 must go to Congress soon. Feeling in the United States very acute. . . . 
 President has no doubt Congress will act wisely and an immediate crisis 
 may be avoided, particularly if there be certainty of prompt restoration of 
 peace in Cuba. Maine loss may be peacefully settled if full reparation is 
 
 reached Austria early in July. He had occasion to converse with several men prominent in 
 the pohtics of the Dual Empire; and after the Serajevo assassination he was assured that a 
 war between Austria and Germany, on the one hand, and Russia and France, on the other, 
 was probably inevitable, but that it was not expected that either England or Italy would 
 become involved. 
 
 The material of the comparison was prepared by Mr. Henry F. Munro from Foreiffn 
 Relations of the United States, 1898, and Senate Documents, nos. 207, 230, 65th Congress, 2d 
 Session, 1897-98, vol. 21. 
 
 Striking as are the points of similarity between the Austro-Servian and Hispano-Amer- 
 ican controversies, the differences are equally well marked and too apparent to require 
 notice. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 581 
 
 promptly made, such as the most civilized nation would offer," (Foreign 
 Relations, 1898, p. 692.) 
 
 March 21, the American inquiry was finished. (Foreign Relations, 1898, 
 p. 1036.) 
 
 March 25, the American Minister at Madrid made to the Spanish Gov- 
 ernment the following statement: "I ought, at the beginning of our inter- 
 view, to say to you that the report on the Maine is in the hands of the Presi- 
 dent. I am not to-day authorized to disclose its character or conclusions. 
 But I am authorized to say to you that, beyond and above the destruction 
 of the Maine, unless some satisfactory agreement is reached within a very 
 few days which will assure immediate and honorable peace in Cuba, the 
 President must at once submit the whole question of the relations between 
 the United States and Spain, including the matter of the Maine, to the deci- 
 sion of Congress. I will telegraph immediately to the President any sugges- 
 tions that Spain^may make, and I hope to receive within a very few days 
 some definite proposition that shall mean immediate peace in Cuba." 
 (Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 698.) 
 
 March 25, the Spanish Memorandum of the same date stated: "It now 
 appears that the captain of the United States cruiser Maine has asked leave 
 to destroy with dynamite the wreck of his ship, thus annihilating the only 
 proofs which, in case of doubt or disagreement, could be again examined in 
 order to determine, if necessary, the cause and natvu-e of a catastrophe in 
 the midst of which Spanish sailors and officials displayed the greatest 
 abnegation and oblivion of all personal risks and a generous wish to circum- 
 scribe or diminish the dreadful calamity which befell the crew of the Ameri- 
 can vessel." The Memorandum then goes on to protest against the proce- 
 dure of the American Government in submitting its report to Congress 
 before the receipt of the report of the Spanish Commission, and ends: "The 
 most elementary sense of justice makes it in these cases a duty previously to 
 examine and discuss in an atmosphere of absolute calmness two different 
 inquiries tending to one common end. Only in the supposition of an irrecon- 
 cilable discrepancy or complete opposition between one and the other would 
 it be proper to submit them as equity demands to evidence less prone to 
 prejudice, and if necessary, to fresh investigations and different judges." 
 (Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 711; see also p. 702.) 
 
 March 26, the United States report was published, and declared that the 
 catastrophe was due to the explosion of a submarine mine, but did not fix 
 the responsibility on any person. Secretary of State Sherman telegraphed 
 the American Minister at Madrid: "Upon the facts as disclosed, a grave re- 
 sponsibility appears to rest upon the Spanish Government, . . . which, as 
 the sovereign of the place, was bound to render protection to persons and 
 property there, and especially to the public ship and the sailors of a friendly 
 power." Regret was expressed that " circumstances of the case . . . are such 
 as to require of the Spanish Government such action as is due when the 
 sovereign rights of one friendly nation have been assailed within the juris- 
 diction of another. The President does not permit himself to doubt that the 
 sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action sug- 
 gested by the friendly relations of the Governments." (Foreign Relations, 
 1898, pp. 1036-37.) 
 
 That same day the Department of State cabled the American Minister at 
 
582 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 Madrid: "For your own guidance the President suggests that if Spain will 
 revoke concentration orders and maintain the people until they can support 
 themselves and offer to the Cubans full self-government, with reasonable 
 indemnity, the President will gladly assist in its consummation. If Spain 
 should invite the United States to mediate for peace, and the insurgents 
 would make like request, the President might undertake such office of 
 friendship." {Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 704.) 
 
 March 27, it was explained to the Spanish Government that Captain 
 Sigsbee's request to blow up the Maine, to which Spain took such exception, 
 was intended for the purpose of getting "at the bodies and guns. But find- 
 ing his request misunderstood and opposed, he withdrew it under instruc- 
 tions from the Secretary of the Navy." {Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1040.) 
 
 March 28, President McKinley's message, transmitting the report on the 
 Maine, was read in both houses of Congress. 
 
 The Spanish "report states that the peculiar nature of the procedure fol- 
 lowed and the thorough observance of the principle of the extraterritoriality 
 of the Maine have prevented the making such investigations in the interior 
 of the vessel as would furnish the means of deciding, at least hypothetically, 
 the internal cause of the disaster; and this inability was increased by the 
 unfortunate refusal which prevented the establishment of the necessary and 
 appropriate cooperation between the Spanish Commission on the one side, 
 and the commander and crew of the Maine, the American officials com- 
 missioned to investigate the causes of the event, and those subsequently 
 charged with the recovery {salvamento) on the other side." The report con- 
 cluded that a further examination would show the explosion to have been 
 produced by an internal cause. {Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1040 and 
 1044-45.) 
 
 March 31, Spain offered to submit the dispute regarding the Maine to 
 arbitration. {Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 758.) 
 
 April 10, the Spanish Minister communicated to the Government at 
 Washington that his Government had decreed an armistice in Cuba, 
 though he took care to avoid any acknowledgment that this was done in 
 response to American representations. He complained of the "manifest 
 injustice with which a portion of the public opinion of this country claims 
 to discover responsibilities on the part of Spain for the horrible catastrophe 
 which took place on the calamitous night of the 15th of February last." 
 And further stating the attitude of his Government, declared: "As for the 
 question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between the 
 reports of the Spanish and American boards, the Government of Her Maj- 
 esty, although not yet possessed of the official text of the two reports, has 
 hastened to declare itself ready to submit to the judgment of impartial and 
 disinterested experts, accepting in advance the decision of the arbitrators 
 named by the two parties, which is obvious proof of the frankness and good 
 faith which marks the course of Spain on this as on all occasions." The 
 American Government did not reply to this offer. {Foreign Relations, 1898, 
 pp. 747-49.) 
 
 April 19, Congress passed a joint resolution: — 
 
 "Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than 
 three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the 
 moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to civil- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 583 
 
 ization, culminating as they have in the destruction of a United States 
 battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on 
 a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as 
 has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to 
 Congress of April 11th, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the 
 action of Congress was invited: Therefore, 
 
 "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
 States of America in Congress assembled, 
 
 "First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to 
 be, free and independent. 
 
 "Second, That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the 
 Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Govern- 
 ment of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the 
 island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and 
 Cuban waters. 
 
 "Third, That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, 
 directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the 
 United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the 
 militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry 
 these resolutions into effect. 
 
 " Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
 intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, 
 except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that 
 is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its 
 people." 1 {Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 763.) 
 
 April 20, the Secretary of State instructed the American Minister at 
 Madrid to deliver an ultimatum to Spain to " at once relinquish its authority 
 and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval 
 forces from Cuban waters. ... If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 
 23d day of April, instant, there be not communicated to this Government 
 by that of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolu- 
 tion, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will 
 proceed without further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and 
 conferred upon him by the said joint resolution to such extent as may be 
 necessary to carry the same into effect." {Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 762- 
 63.) But before this ultimatum could be presented, the Spanish Govern- 
 ment notified our Minister of the rupture of friendly relations. {Foreign 
 Relations, 1898, p. 766.) 
 
 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ACTION OF THE UNITED 
 STATES IN 1898 AND AUSTRIA IN 1914 
 
 Although the Austro-Servian dispute bears little resemblance to our own 
 difference with Spain occasioned by the situation in Cuba and the destruc- 
 tion of the Maine, the incidents of the negotiations present many striking 
 points of similarity. To facilitate the comparison an arrangement in parallel 
 columns has been employed. ^ 
 
 » Approved April 20, 1898. 
 
 ' There are an equal number of points of difference between Austro-Servian and Spanish- 
 American cases, so evident as to need no explanation. For instance, the intervention of the 
 United States was really for the purpose of protecting the weak, and in favor of self-govern- 
 ment. "% - 
 
584 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 The Spanish-American 
 
 DiSAGEEEMENT (1898) 
 
 The Austro-Servian 
 Dispute (1914) 
 
 Responsibility for the occurrence 
 
 Public opinion was inflamed as a 
 consequence of the catastrophe of 
 the Maine, and although the Spanish 
 Government was not held to be di- 
 rectly responsible, it was neverthe- 
 less considered criminally negligent 
 in not having taken adequate meas- 
 ures for the protection of the Maine, 
 moored in her harbor. 
 
 In July preceding the presenta- 
 tion of the Austrian ultimatum, 
 public opinion was much inflamed 
 against Servia, and there was much 
 enthusiasm for war. The terms of 
 the Austrian and German corre- 
 spondence make clear that the Ser- 
 vian Government was held respon- 
 sible on the ground that it made no 
 effort to prevent the assassination, 
 but allowed the conspirators to 
 perfect their plans within the Ser- 
 vian frontiers. 
 
 Disregard of territorial jurisdiction 
 
 The American Government after 
 the destruction of the Maine, dis- 
 regarding the wishes of Spain, arro- 
 gated to itself the right to hold, on 
 board the U.S.S. Mangrove in Ha- 
 vana Harbor, and therefore within 
 the territorial jurisdiction of Spain, 
 an independent official investigation 
 of the causes of the catastrophe. Nor 
 were the Spanish authorities in their 
 own port allowed to examine the in- 
 terior of the wreck, but were com- 
 pelled to base their findings on a 
 superficial inspection of the exterior 
 of the hull. 
 
 Offers to 
 The Spanish Government, on 
 March 31, suggested referring the 
 questions in dispute to arbitration. 
 April 10, a further offer was made 
 to submit the whole question to an 
 impartial tribunal of experts, the 
 Spanish Government agreeing in 
 advance to accept its conclusions. 
 To this offer the United States gave 
 no reply. 
 
 Austria's demand on Servia was 
 that she should permit Austrian 
 officials to collaborate on Servian 
 territory in the proceedings under- 
 taken to suppress the subversive 
 propaganda directed against the 
 territorial integrity of Austria, and 
 that Servia should likewise take ju- 
 dicial proceedings against the acces- 
 sories to the crime of June 28, and 
 permit delegates of the Austrian 
 Government to participate. (See De- 
 mands 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note.) 
 
 arbitrate 
 
 At the end of Servia's reply to the 
 Austrian ultimatum, she offered, 
 should Austria not find her accept- 
 ance of the terms of her note en- 
 tirely satisfactory, to submit to ar- 
 bitration, or to the mediation of the 
 European powers, any of the remain- 
 ing questions in dispute. But Austria 
 took no official notice of this offer, 
 and let it be known to the represen- 
 tatives of other states that she con- 
 sidered the reply but a play for time, 
 and that Servian promises could not 
 be relied upon. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 
 
 585 
 
 Presentation of 
 April 20, the American Govern- 
 ment instructed its Minister by tele- 
 graph to present to the Spanish 
 Government an ultimatum requiring 
 Spain to withdraw from Cuba by 
 noon of April 23. The Spanish 
 Government, however, frustrated 
 this intention by breaking off friendly 
 relations with the United States. 
 
 an ultimatum 
 
 The ultimatum presented to the 
 Servian Government was, like that 
 intended to be presented by the 
 American Government, humiliat- 
 ing to the Government to wliich it 
 was addressed, and obviously not 
 intended to be accepted, the German 
 Secretary of State admitting that, 
 as a diplomatic document, it left 
 much to be desired. 
 
 Effect of the explosion in Havana Harbor and of the assassination at Serajevo 
 in hastening armed intervention 
 
 The destruction of the Maine 
 exercised an important influence 
 upon ovu* action in Cuba, and led to 
 intervention and war with Spain. If 
 the destruction of the Maine had 
 not occurred, Cuban autonomy 
 might perhaps have been accom- 
 plished without bringing the two 
 countries to war. 
 
 The assassination of Franz Ferdi- 
 nand led the Austrian Government 
 to force the immediate settlement 
 of their long-standing dispute with 
 Servia. Without the Serajevo as- 
 sassination, Austria might have con- 
 tinued to get along with her trouble- 
 some neighbor until Austro-Servian 
 difficulties were obscured or swal- 
 lowed up by some larger issue. 
 
 Assurances by the United States and Austria that their intervention did not 
 
 cloak any designs of territorial aggression, and was not intended to interfere 
 I with the independence respectively of Cuba and Servia 
 
 The joint resolution of Congress 
 of AprH 20 declares: "That the 
 United States hereby disclaims any 
 disposition or intention to exercise 
 sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control 
 over said island, except for the pacif- 
 ication thereof, and asserts its deter- 
 mination, when that is accomplished, 
 to leave the government and con- 
 trol of the island to its people." 
 
 Austria and Germany repeatedly 
 assured the powers of the Entente 
 that Austria had no intention of 
 interfering with Servian independ- 
 ence. 
 
 Effect on public opinion 
 
 There can be no question that 
 American public opinion, aroused 
 by the Maine disaster, considered 
 that our intervention in Cuba was 
 based upon humanitarian considera- 
 tions for the purpose of putting a 
 stop to the continued horrors of 
 chronic revolution and Weyler's 
 repressive measures, such as recon- 
 centrado camps. But at the same 
 
 Public opinion in Germany and 
 Austria considered the action against 
 Servia as a just punishment upon a 
 Government of regicides, which had 
 been protecting bands of conspirators 
 against the safety of a neighboring 
 state. In one point public opinion 
 in Austria differed from that in the 
 United States regarding Cuba. The 
 Austrians realized the full significance 
 
586 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 time there was behind this movement of the political motives of their 
 the support of certain financial Government, and that it was of vital 
 interests, for American capital had importance for Austria to prevent 
 invested deeply in the Cuban sugar Servia from continuing her propa- 
 plantations. Our action was also ganda for the dismemberment of 
 influenced in some degree by politi- the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But 
 cal considerations as to the per ma- just as there was no general apprecia- 
 nent interests of the United States, tion in the United States of the 
 Admiral Mahan has pointed out strategic and financial advantages 
 very clearly the tremendous strate- to be derived from our action in 
 gic importance to the United States Cuba, so Austrian and.German public 
 of the control of Cuba. opinion did not, perhaps, fully real- 
 
 ize the use which the Austrian and 
 German Governments hoped to 
 make of this incident to reestablish 
 the prestige of the Triple Alliance. , 
 
 THE CASE OF SERVIA i 
 
 But Belgium was not the only little nation that has been attacked in this 
 war, and I make no excuse for referring to the case of the other little nation 
 — the case of Servia. The history of Servia is not unblotted. What history 
 in the category of nations is imblotted? The first nation that is without sin, 
 let her cast a stone at Servia — a nation trained in a horrible school. But 
 she won her freedom with her tenacious valor, and she has maintained it by 
 the same courage. If any Servians were mixed up in the assassination of the 
 Grand Duke, they ought to be pvmished. Servia admits that. The Servian 
 Government had nothing to do with it. Not even Austria claimed that. 
 The Servian Prime Minister is one of the most capable and honored men in 
 Europe. Servia was willing to punish any one of her subjects who had been 
 proved to have any complicity in that assassination. What more could you 
 expect? 
 
 What were the Austrian demands? She sympathized with her fellow- 
 countrymen in Bosnia. That was one of her crimes. She must do so no 
 more. Her newspapers were saying nasty things about Austria. They must 
 do so no longer. That is the Austrian spirit. You had it in Zabern. How 
 dare you criticize a Prussian official? And if you laugh, it is a capital offense. 
 The colonel threatened to shoot them if they repeated it. Servian news- 
 papers must not criticize Austria. I wonder what would have happened had 
 we taken up the same line about German newspapers. Servia said : "Very 
 well, we will give orders to the newspapers that they must not criticize 
 Austria in future, neither Austria, nor Hungary, nor anything that ia 
 theirs." (Laughter.) Who can doubt the valor of Servia, when she under- 
 took to tackle her newspaper editors? (Laughter.) She promised not to 
 sympathize with Bosnia, promised to write no critical articles about Aus- 
 tria. She would have no public meetings at which anything unkind was 
 said about Austria. That was not enough. She must dismiss from her army 
 ofiicers whom Austria should subsequently name. But these officers had just 
 emerged from a war where they were adding luster to the Servian arms — 
 > Extract from speech of Lloyd George, printed in the London Times, September 21, 1914. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 587 
 
 gallant, brave, efficient. (Cheers.) I wonder whether it was their guilt or 
 their efficiency that prompted Austria's action. Servia was to undertake in 
 advance to dismiss them from the army — the names to be sent in subse- 
 quently. Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that? 
 Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to this 
 country. (Laughter.) " You must dismiss from your army and from your 
 navy all those officers whom we shall subsequently name." Well, I think I 
 could name them now. Lord Kitchener (cheers) would go. Sir John French 
 (cheers) would be sent about his business. General Smith-Dorrien (cheers) 
 would be no more, and I am sure that Sir John Jellicoe (cheers) would go. 
 (Laughter.) And there is another gallant old warrior who would go — Lord 
 Roberts. (Cheers.) 
 
 It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made 
 upon her by a great military power who could put five or six men in the 
 field for every one she could; and that power supported by the greatest mili- 
 tary power in the world. How did Servia behave? It is not what happens to 
 you in life that matters; it is the way in which you face it. (Cheers.) And 
 Servia faced the situation with dignity. (Loud cheers.) She said to Austria: 
 
 — " If any officers of mine have been guilty and are proved to be guilty, I 
 will dismiss them." Austria said, " That is not good enough for me." It 
 was not guilt she was after, but capacity. (Laughter.) 
 
 Then came Russia's turn. Russia has a special regard for Servia. She has 
 a special interest in Servia. Russians have shed their blood for Servian 
 independence many a time. Servia is a member of her family and she cannot 
 see Servia maltreated. Austria knew that. Germany knew that, and Ger- 
 many turned round to Russia and said: — "I insist that you shall stand by 
 with your arms folded whilst Austria is strangling your little brother to 
 death." (Laughter.) What answer did the Russian Slav give? He gave the 
 only answer that becomes a man. (Cheers.) He turned to Austria and said : 
 
 — " You lay bands on that little fellow and I will tear your ramshackle 
 empire limb from limb." (Prolonged cheers.) And he is doing it. (Renewed 
 cheers.) 
 
 THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN CONFLICT I 
 
 . . . The reply, although apparently conciliatory was far from satisfactory 
 in several essential respects. The promise to suppress the agitation was 
 made conditional upon the proof of its existence, when the affirmation of its 
 existence was the basis of the ultimatum. Then, again, the promise to 
 restrain the license of the press in its mendacious attacks upon Austria- 
 Hungary took the form of a vague concession or reform in the law governing 
 the press, but did not contain any pledge to put a stop to the virulently 
 provocative references to the Dual Monarchy. 
 
 The Servian Government, on the face of its reply, also undertook the 
 suppression of the Narodna Obrana, with its country-wide network of 
 affiliated organizations — only on condition, however, of conclusive proof 
 of its subversive activities. Inasmuch as the affirmation of the existence of 
 these subversive activities formed the sum and substance of the ultimatum, 
 
 • Extract from an article by Constantin Theodor Dumba, Ambassador of Austria-Hun- 
 gary to the United States, published in the Outlook, New York, August 29, 1914. 
 
588 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 such a reply to this phase of its just demands was regarded by Austria as the 
 flimsiest sort of evasion on the part of the Servian Government. 
 
 Another point that indicated the insincerity of Servia's apparent compli- 
 ance with the terms of Austria's ultimatum was the failure to accept the 
 Austrian suggestion of cooperation between the Austrian and the Servian 
 police in a joint inquiry into the origin and consummation of the crime of 
 Serajevo, to serve as the basis for the judicial proceedings in Servia. As to 
 the judicial phase of the inquiry, Austria never made any suggestion of 
 participating. The cooperation of the Austrian police was essential to a 
 successful and final solution of the problem. The shifty attitude of the 
 Servian police on the entire issue raised by the crime of Serajevo can best be 
 understood when it is remembered that the principal instigator of that of- 
 fense against the laws of civilization could not be brought to justice because 
 he had been warned out of Belgrade by a Servian prefect of police. 
 
 The duplicity characteristic of Servian diplomacy came under my per- 
 sonal observation when I was Minister to Servia in the last year of the reign 
 of King Alexander and the beginning of the rule of the present Karageorge- 
 vitch dynasty. At my request, after a peculiarly offensive outbreak of anti- 
 Austrian agitation carried on in Belgrade, the Government suppressed the 
 society responsible for endangering the good relations between Austria- 
 Hungary and Servia by a campaign of criminal mendacity. Two weeks 
 later, however, the same organization, under another name and with a new 
 secretary, but with the same membership and the same provocative aims, 
 was in full operation in the same assault upon the peace and security of a 
 neighboring friendly state. Such instances of evasion are so frequent in the 
 history of Servian promises to Austria- Hungary that in this case the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government was determined to exact complete and infallible 
 guaranties for the performance of the required pledges. It was all the more 
 necessary to act with final firmness because the Servian conscience, after the 
 butchery of King Alexander and Queen Draga, of which all the authors, well 
 known to every man of any account in Belgrade, were promoted in army 
 rank, was not especially sensitive to the murder of royal personages. 
 
 Besides, the Austrian Government had to be determined to obtain a clear 
 and final solution of the problem, because of its knowledge that Servia's 
 recalcitrant attitude was the result of encouragement from the great north- 
 ern power whose shadow was darkening over the Austrian frontier. Never- 
 theless, with the certainty that Russia was the actual instigator of Servia's 
 defiant policy, the Austro-Hungarian Government regarded the issue in- 
 volved as so vital that it did not hesitate to submit it to the final test of war. 
 
 CRITICISM OF SERVIA' 
 
 I CONSIDER it as highly important that the case for Austria-Hungary in the 
 present conflict of nations should be stated before American public opinion 
 with minute precision. We are all agreed in abhorring war and in deploring 
 the outbreak of a catastrophe the like of which history has never witnessed. 
 Those who are responsible for it will forever remain branded with a stigma 
 of infamy which no amount of military or political success can wipe off their 
 
 » Article by Count Albert Apponyi published in the Continental Times, Berlin, October 9, 
 1914, and reprinted in the New York Times, January 17, 1916. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 689 
 
 brows. Feeling as strongly as I do on that point, devoted as I am to the 
 peace ideal, I consider myself qualified to proclaim before the whole world 
 that my country is free from guilt in the horrible contest which has been 
 forced upon her and that she can face it with all the moral power of a pure 
 conscience. 
 
 This is what everybody feels in Austria-Hungary and in Germany; this 
 is why not a single soul can be found in those countries who grumbles at the 
 horrible sacrifice laid on his shoulders; this is why in Austria-Hungary up to 
 1,000,000 and in Germany up to 1,300,000 men more offered their services 
 at the first call to arms than are bidden by law to do it; this is why our men- 
 tality is one of absolute self-possession and quiet but unflinching resolve; 
 this is why the strife of races, on which om- enemies built such hopes, the 
 division of creeds, the conflict of party and faction, everything that engen- 
 ders division, is clean swept away, why millions feel of one mind in absolute 
 devotion to the great aim of freeing themselves once for all from the gang of 
 perfidious assailants who for the last years have worked in the dark for 
 our destruction, and whose infamy went so far as to organize assassination 
 besides political conspiracy. 
 
 If we can do that work of lawful self-protection thoroughly, humanity 
 will enjoy an almost limitless epoch of peace and tranquillity; if we cannot, 
 the world will remain under constant menace of war, unless it submits to the 
 dictates of Muscovite tyranny and to all the misery therein implied. Our 
 cause, so we feel, is the cause of humanity, of liberty, of peace, of progress, 
 of everything that men deserving the name of man value more than their 
 lives. 
 
 Now, I am perfectly aware that foreigners cannot be expected to accept 
 our feelings as a base for their judgment, that they want facts and reasons 
 to lean upon. That is what I am going to provide them with presently. But 
 I may put down the perfect imity of feeling, suddenly arisen in countries 
 generally torn by dissension, as one of the facts to be considered. There is at 
 least a strong presumption in favor of a cause which works so powerfully on 
 the psychology of the nations concerned and uplifts their minds above all 
 that is petty and discordant 
 
 But the crucial question, the one which decides the verdict, is the ques- 
 tion how and by whose fault the conflict originated and spread. This I have 
 to elucidate by imexceptionable evidence. 
 
 The direct cause of the outbreak is Servia's insane ambition to extend her 
 dominion over those southern parts of Austria-Hungary, Bosnia, and Herze- 
 govina to begin with, Croatia and the Slovene countries to follow, where 
 South Slavs live in great numbers. Never could a small country like Servia 
 nourish such designs against a great power, unless it felt sure of being sup- 
 ported by some other great power. Recent developments have shown that 
 Servia had good reasons to expect such support. On behalf of the mad am- 
 bitions not warranted even by the claims of racial kinship (since the Roman 
 Catholic Croatians generally abhor Servia), a constant agitation was or- 
 ganized in the aforementioned parts of Austria and Himgary. The origin 
 of this agitation can be traced as far back as the accession of the Karageor- 
 gevich dynasty to the Servian throne. 
 
 Under the Obrenovich rule Servia cultivated relations of good neighbor- 
 hood with Austria-Hungary, to whom she was largely indebted for the recog- 
 
590 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 nition of her independence by the Berlin Treaty of 1878. Things took differ- 
 ent shape when the last Obrenovich king and his wife were murdered by 
 military conspirators and the present king, Peter Karageorgevich, unhesita- 
 tingly accepted the crown from the blood-stained hands of murderers. For 
 a short time the conscience of Europe seemed to wake, or at least a feeling of 
 nausea prevailed among the civilized nations. King Peter found it difficult 
 to enter into diplomatic relations with the Governments of Europe. Russia 
 alone did not scruple to take him for granted. The other powers had to fol- 
 low; last of all England. Finally recognition became universal. 
 
 From that time Servia has been the seat of a permanent conspiracy against 
 Austria-Hungary. Associations were formed for the "liberation of the South 
 Slavonic brethren" in Austria-Hungary; agents were sent to undermine 
 among our fellow-citizens of South Slavonic race the feelings of allegiance to 
 their country; wherever a traitor could be found among them, his services 
 were enlisted; Bosnia and Herzegovina were almost openly claimed. 
 
 These two Turkish provinces had been trusted to Austria-Hungary's care 
 by the Berlin Treaty of 1878, because only the impartial rule of a western 
 power could secure peace and liberty in a country inhabited by Moham- 
 medans, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholic Christians. As a matter 
 of fact, they throve and developed under the enlightened government of 
 Austria- Hungary to a degree of welfare unknown in any other part of the 
 Balkanic Peninsula. Nevertheless, Servia took hardly any pains to hide 
 covetousness concerning these provinces, where under her riile two thirds 
 of the population would be submitted to the same tyranny of racial and 
 religious intolerance which the unhappy Bulgarians of Macedonia are expe- 
 riencing at her hands. It was this covetousness which brought us to the 
 verge of war in 1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina became formally an- 
 nexed to Austria-Hungary. That was done precisely to shut the door 
 against intrigues feeding on their ambiguous juridical situation, a situation 
 which maintained the Sultan's nominal sovereignty over them, while the 
 whole power and the responsibilities of sovereignty belonged to Austria- 
 Hungary. From the standpoint of international law the annexation was 
 certainly not unexceptionable. Turkey, whose nominal rights were set 
 aside, had a right to protest, and so had the signatory powers of the Berlin 
 Treaty; but Servia had absolutely no voice in the matter. No right of hers 
 was invaded, no legitimate interest of hers damaged; only mad pretensions 
 were thwarted and unfair opportunities lessened; still, it was Servia whose 
 outcries, echoed by Russia, endangered the peace of Europe. 
 
 Everybody knows how that first outbreak ended. Russia, Servia's patron 
 and inspirer, recoUed at that time from the conflict with Germany, which 
 aggression against Austria-Hungary would have implied ; so Servia had to 
 declare herself disinterested in the arrangements concerning Bosnia and 
 willing properly to fulfill toward Austria-Hungary the duties of good neigh- 
 bors. It was largely due to the exertions of the Hungarian Government, to 
 which I belonged at that time, that Austria- Hungary accepted these verbal 
 apologies and pledges, and that peace, or rather the semblance of peace, 
 was preserved for some years more — I almost regret this our decision. 
 Should Servia's impudent behavior have been chastised then, as it deserved 
 to be, the present general conflict might have been averted. On the other 
 hand, Austria-Hungary would not have shown that almost superhuman for- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 591 
 
 bearance, in which lies her clearest vindication. Anyhow it is important to 
 bear in mind that Servia's pretensions and designs brought matters to a 
 crisis six years ago, and that she escaped punishment only through a sol- 
 emn promise of correct behavior. 
 
 How was that promise kept? By doing worse from year to year, by devel- 
 oping with more energy still the propaganda of high treason among Aus- 
 tria's and Hungary's South Slavonic citizens; and, since the results of such 
 merely political work ripened too slowly, the pace was mended by setting up 
 an additional organization of political assassination, headed by military and 
 non-military officials of the Servian kingdom. The thing would seem almost 
 incredible but for the fact that the present Servian King's rule is based on 
 murder and that murderers are or were among his chief advisers. A Govern- 
 ment boasting of an origin like this must be expected to take a lenient view 
 of political assassination. 
 
 The matter was brought to light by Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassi- 
 nation. This dreadful crime, as has been established by the judicial inquiry, 
 was not the work of a single fanatic's craze; it was the carefully prepared 
 result of a widespread conspiracy, centered in a great Servian national 
 organization, the Narodna Obrana, whose chairman is a general in active 
 service, and whose rules, besides an almost open confession of criminal 
 propagandism among the neighboring power's citizens, contains a para- 
 graph of dark meaning, bidding young men to prepare for some "big deed 
 on behalf of the national cause." Well, Archduke Franz Ferdinand's mur- 
 derers, all of them affiliated with the aforesaid organization, were prepared 
 for the "big deed," and they also achieved it successfully. All the imple- 
 ments of their mm-derous deed came from Servian army stores; bombs of 
 the same origin were found hidden in many places; not a single accomplice 
 of the crime could be laid hands upon on Servian ground; they found pro- 
 tection there instead of prosecution. 
 
 If circumstantial evidence has any meaning, the case against official 
 Servia seems to be made out by these facts. But what is more, the lamented 
 Archduke's assassination was not the first, but, within two years, the fourth 
 attempt organized by the same gang of murderers against the lives of faith- 
 ful public servants in the southern parts of Austria and Hungary. Now, in 
 the name of all that is human and just and fair, for how many years more 
 should we have submitted to this? How many more assassinations should 
 we have left unprevented, unpunished? What nation, big or small, can 
 tolerate the setting up in her neighborhood of a whole machinery of treason 
 and destruction, the organization of a permanent conspiracy against her 
 moral cohesion, with murder lurking at every street's corner, threatening 
 the individual safety of her most valued citizens? Austria-Hungary has 
 tolerated it long enough to feel her strength shaken, to see her power dis- 
 believed, her destruction discounted, and her future ruler murdered. 
 
 A little more of this and our fellow-citizens of South Slavonic race would 
 have learned to doubt the Monarchy's capacity for defending the loyal and 
 punishing the traitors, for making herself respected, even by small neigh- 
 bors. In the face of such weakness on one side and such unscrupulous dar- 
 ing on the other, they might have wavered in their allegiance to a state 
 unable to protect them. It was high time to drag our treacherous assail- 
 ants from the dark recesses of conspiracy into the broad daylight of plain 
 
592 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 speaking and open doing. We had to exact from official Servia, whose moral 
 complicity was established beyond doubt, efficient pledges, not words 
 which in the case of confirmed liars are valueless — but measures, guar- 
 anteeing our tranquillity as a nation and the individual safety of our 
 faithful public servants. 
 
 Such pledges Servia would not give; she evaded the summons in her habit- 
 ual maimer of double-dealing, granting a profusion of words, professions, 
 and promises, the mendacity of which is warranted by experience, but re- 
 coiling from every measure really efficient. She was clearly resolved to go 
 on with her work of sneaking aggression and to cultivate further on her well- 
 tried methods of conspiracy. Austria-Hungary would have been the laugh- 
 ing-stock not of her enemies only, but of her own citizens, should she have 
 feigned to believe where bad faith was manifest. There was no help for it; 
 we had to set aside our extreme unwillingness to adopt violent measures. 
 We had to strike or to resign our right to live. 
 
 The case was not arbitrable, nor fit to be submitted to an international 
 inquiry. Before giving my support in any warlike step I examined with the 
 utmost care this side of the question, and, devoted though I am to the 
 international peace institutions and to a constant expansion of their activ- 
 ity, I had to own that they were no use in the present case. Their applica- 
 bility supposes good faith and a wish to do the right thing on both sides; 
 failing this honesty plays the part of a dupe. 
 
 What could have been the result of international proceedings against 
 Servia? A verdict establishing her malpractices and bidding her to desist 
 from them. Servia, of course, would have professed to submit, just as she 
 professed to be a good neighbor after the crisis of 1908. In fact, she would 
 have persisted in her dark work, somewhat cautiously, perhaps, at the be- 
 ginning, more daringly afterward. And in a couple of years, maybe after 
 another series of attempted and successful assassinations, matters would 
 again have ripened to a crisis. Should we then again have begun that par- 
 ody of an international procedure, which settles nothing, because the ad- 
 verse party hypocritically accepts and bare-facedly evades every decision 
 running against it? Should we have gone on rotting all the while and hast- 
 ening toward dissolution? Really, we could not do that; international in- 
 stitutions must not be converted into traps where honesty is caught and dis- 
 honesty enjoys good fun; they are meant to insure justice, not to further the 
 designs of cheats. In the face of God and man do I proclaim: if ever there 
 was a case of lawful self-defense here you have it. 
 
 But what about the universal war which grew out of a local conflict? 
 Who is responsible for its horrors, for its calamities? The answer to this 
 question is perfectly clear. Since Austria-Hungary was in a state of law- 
 ful self-defense against Servian aggression, those are responsible for the 
 greater evil who espoused the cause of that aggression. And this is what 
 Russia did. She is the great culprit. Her policy is the main fountain whence 
 torrents of blood and of tears will flow. Her allies have been drawn by her 
 into the concern. 
 
 Not that I wish to attenuate the guilt and the disgrace of highly cultured 
 nations like France and England, who became in some way the patrons and 
 the associates of a gang of murderers. But on Russia rests the chief respon- 
 sibility; on her head falls the great sin against humanity implied in this 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 593 
 
 war. From her face the mask has fallen, unveiling the lust of power and 
 expansion which inspires her policy and which is the real source of every 
 unrest in Europe. 
 
 In her war manifesto Russia tries to personate the chivalrous defender 
 of a weak country against a strong one. That may appeal to the ignorant; 
 in truth it is bare-faced humbugging. When Austria-Hungary had to coerce 
 Servia, she solemnly declared that her only aim was to win those guaranties 
 of her own tranquillity which Servia would not grant, but that neither Ser- 
 via's territory, nor Servia's independence would suffer any permanent mu- 
 tilation. After that solemn declaration, made in the most binding form by 
 a power whose word is as good as any deed, there remained not the smallest 
 pretext for honest interference. 
 
 Still Russia did interfere. On whose behalf? On Servia's? After the pledges 
 freely given by Austria-Hungary Servia as a nation needed no protection; 
 Austria-Hungary's coercive action was not directed against Servia, but 
 only against the system of treacherous conspiracies and murderous at- 
 tempts fostered by her present rulers. It is these dark forces alone that wei-e 
 threatened by our action in Servia. 
 
 It is therefore on behalf of these, not of the weaker nation, which was per- 
 fectly safe, that Russia interfered. Russia does not wish Servia to become 
 a decent coimtry and a loyal neighbor; Russia draws her sword to make it 
 possible that the conspiracies against Austria-Hungary's safety and the 
 plots of mm-der implied in them should go on imdistm-bed; Russia stands 
 behind that dark work with all her might and power; it is part of her policy. 
 Through it should Austria-Hungary be kept in a state of constant unrest, 
 economic difficulties and moral decomposition, till she became ripe for re- 
 ceiving the final blow? Because Austria-Hungary must disappear, to make 
 room for the programme now openly proclaimed by the Tsar: the union 
 of all Slavs under Russian rule. 
 
 So the mask has fallen, Servia is a simple outpost; behind her stands the 
 policy of Russia, supporting those treacherous and abominable acts which 
 compelled unwilling Austria-Hungary to make a stand for her dignity and 
 safety. Before the tribunal of human conscience stands Muscovitism unveiled 
 as responsible for the horrors of universal war and for the permanent unrest 
 that consumes Europe's forces. The power of Muscovitism must be broken 
 before peace can be enjoyed with any amount of safety, before peace insti- 
 tutions can work with any degree of efficiency. 
 
 Well, since Providence puts its bvu-den on our shoulders, that work will 
 be done with God's help thoroughly. The greatness of the task is felt by 
 every soul throughout Germany and Austria-Himgary, and absolute con- 
 fidence reigns everywhere that our joined forces are able to fulfill it. Even 
 in Germany there is no peculiar animosity against France. There is more 
 of it against England, whose intervention is considered as a piece of revolt- 
 ing cynicism; but the object of popular resentment is Russia, wliich only 
 shows the unerring instinct of the masses. And what I hear at home from 
 simple-minded but honest and straightforward people like the day laborers 
 on my own estate, is a passionate desire to have it out once for all with 
 Russia. 
 
 It is clear not from facts only, but from the Tsar's e.xplicit confession, that 
 the policy of Russia pursues aims which can be obtained only through uni- 
 
594 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 versal war. The union of all Slavs under Russian dominion can be effected 
 only after the disintegration of existing political bodies, Austria-Hungary 
 to begin with, and by subjecting the non-Slav races encompassed between 
 Slavs, such as the Hungarians and the Rumanians. Does n't that mean war, 
 horrible war, universal war, since neither the political bodies concerned will 
 submit to destruction, without making a desperate stand, nor the threat- 
 ened races to subjection, without fighting to the last? And does n't it imply 
 another confession of complicity with Servia's conspiracies and crimes, 
 which now appear quite distinctly for what they are — pioneer work on 
 behalf of Russia? 
 
 But what would Russia's dominion over the whole mass of Slavs, the 
 so-called Pan-Slavist ideals, mean from the standpoint of the great prin- 
 ciples and ideals of progressive humanity? What would it mean to the Slavs 
 themselves? It would mean, if a bad pun is to be allowed here, their trans- 
 formation into slaves; it would mean to those among them who are now 
 enjoying the bliss of civilized western government and liberty a rolling 
 down into the abyss of darkest tyranny, religious oppression to all those 
 who do not conform to the Orthodox creed ; a wiping-out of racial differences 
 as wide as the difference between German and Dutch, Italian and Spaniard; 
 loss of every guaranty of individual and political liberty; arbitrary police 
 rule, which makes every man and woman liable to be arrested and trans- 
 ported without a trial, without a judicial verdict. 
 
 These and other similar blessings does Muscovitism offer to those who 
 are so happy as to fall into its loving embrace. And to all mankind the 
 grouping of the forces of Slavism under Russia's despotic power would mean 
 the most horrible menace to enlightenment, progress, liberty, and democ- 
 racy; a peril of retrogression of several centuries, a moral and social catas- 
 trophe. 
 
 It is to be expected that Germany's and Austria-Hungary's joint forces 
 will save our kind from the peril of falling so low, notwithstanding the 
 damnable support which Muscovitism gets from two blindfolded western 
 powers, one of whom does not even scruple to draw the yellow race into a 
 conflict of Europeans. We have not the smallest doubt concerning the su- 
 perior value of our armies, even when outnumbered. And we feel able to 
 lay our cause before God, the just, the omniscient. We are conscious of 
 having stood for peace as long as there was the smallest chance of preserv- 
 ing it with honor. We are fighting now the battle of righteous self-defense 
 on the strongest compulsion ever undergone by any nation. We fight the 
 battle of mankind's highest ideals and we fight the battle of peace, which 
 our victory will make secxu-e for generations to come. 
 
 So we look forward to whatever is in store for us, with the serene forti- 
 tude of men who feel strong in the purity of their conscience. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 595 
 
 BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 
 
 RICHELIEU REJECTS A PROPOSAL FOR THE PARTITION 
 OF BELGIUM AND SUGGESTS ANOTHER PLAN i 
 
 Cardinal Richelieu was not at all inclined to the acquisition of the 
 Netherlands; he was deterred from it by political considerations of a prac- 
 tical nature, which have since prevented France from taking or keeping 
 them. It was upon this double difficulty of taking and holding the provinces 
 that in June, 1634, the Cardinal based his objection to a partition proposed 
 by the United Provinces. " Even if," said he, " we should with much time, 
 trouble, and expense succeed, in it, the preservation of what we had ac- 
 quired could not be effected except with very large garrisons such as would 
 render us intensely odious to the inhabitants and expose us for this reason 
 to serious uprisings and perpetual wars. And, even if France should be 
 so fortunate as to keep the provinces which had fallen to her share in volun- 
 tary dependence upon her control, it might soon happen that, having no 
 longer a barrier between us and the Dutch, we should be involved in the 
 same quarrel in which they and the Spaniards are now engaged, instead of 
 being as at present in good relations; [which is due] as much to the separa- 
 tion existing between our states as to the fact that we have a common enemy 
 who keeps us occupied, — seeing that we are equally interested in his abase- 
 ment." 
 
 He gave still other reasons drawn from the difficulties and uncertainties 
 of war, the fickleness of the French character, and the interests of Cathol- 
 icism. He added: " Thus it is that all these reasons lead Cardinal Richelieu 
 to say to the King that the proposal conveyed by the Sieur de Charnac6 
 could not in his opinion be entertained in any form, and that a war for the 
 purpose of conquering Flanders must absolutely not be undertaken." The 
 plan that he proposed was to form an independent Catholic Republic which 
 would offer to the French and to the Dutch the great advantage of getting 
 rid of the Spaniards, without exposing them [the French and Dutch] to 
 the risk of becoming enemies as a consequence of finding themselves out- 
 and-out neighbors. He said, therefore: " That if it should be necessary to 
 attack Flanders, it must be done under the most plausible conditions and 
 those best adapted to facilitate the design which would be entertained, in 
 that case, of expelling the Spaniards. That France and Holland should re- 
 solve not to lay claim to anything in all the provinces which are under 
 the sovereignty of the King of Spain except two or three places each (the 
 Dutch, Br6da, Gueldre, and other neighboring places which could be agreed 
 upon) as pledges, and as a bond of the union and of the peace which was 
 going to exist hereafter between the three states. That they would gain 
 enough if they should deliver the provinces from subjection to Spain, and 
 give to them the means of forming a free corporate body, powerful, and 
 capable of establishing a good alliance with them. That a public declara- 
 tion must be made in the form of a manifesto, which should assure the Cath- 
 
 ' Translated from F. A. Mignet, NSgociations relatives d la Succession d'Espagne, 
 pp. 174-76. Paris, 1835. 
 
596 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 olic religion and the liberty of these peoples in the best form that they 
 could desire, in order to give grounds to the nobles, the cities, and the 
 communities to rise up more boldly. . . ." 
 
 He said, moreover: " That if the plan proposed by the Dutch of a com- 
 plete conquest could succeed in twenty years, it was evident that this other 
 could be carried out in one year, if God granted even his slightest blessing 
 to the undertaking; and, besides, in case of success, so far from finding them- 
 selves charged with the garrisoning, as in the first project, and in fear of a 
 war between France and the Dutch (there being no longer a barrier between 
 them) it would even be the means of arresting the perpetual schemes of the 
 Spanish to regain what they had lost. 
 
 " That, on the contrary, the garrisons of France could be diminished, be- 
 cause we should not have neighbors as powerful and as evil disposed as the 
 Spaniards. 
 
 " That the Catholic provinces, which would then make a body corporate 
 depending solely on itself, would have too much interest in keeping France 
 and the Dutch in union for a quarrel to arise between them. 
 
 " And that the power and the forces of Spain, being then no longer next 
 to France, as they are now, need not be feared either. 
 
 " Moreover, this new body of Catholic states would be watchful to guar- 
 antee us from their evil designs, inasmuch as we should be indispensably 
 necessary to them for preserving their liberty, which was acquired by our 
 means." 
 
 He said further that, "being three bodies united together, it would be 
 easy for us to resist weak and distant enemies, and to live in the future in 
 peace and quiet delivered from those by whose mischievous ambition we 
 have been deprived of it hitherto." 
 
 "THE BARRIER-TREATY" OF OCTOBER 29, 1709, 
 BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HOLLAND i 
 
 V. And whereas, according to the ninth Article of the said Alliance, it 
 is to be agreed, amongst other matters, how and in what manner the States 
 shall be made safe by means of this Barrier, the Queen of Great Britain 
 will use her Endeavours to procure, that in the Treaty of Peace it may be 
 agreed, that all the Spanish Low-Countries, and what else may be found 
 necessary, whether conquer'd or unconquer'd Places, shall serve as a Bar- 
 rier to the States. 
 
 VI. That to this end their High Mightinesses shall have the Liberty to 
 put and keep Garrison, to change, augment and diminish it as they shall judge 
 proper, in the Places following: namely, Newport, Furnes, with the Fort of 
 Knocke, Ipres, Menin, the Town and Citadel of Lisle, Tournay and its Cita- 
 del, Conde, Valenciennes; and the Places which shall from henceforward be 
 conquer'd from France; Maubeuge, Charleroy, Namur and its Citadel, 
 Liere, Hale to fortify, the Forts of Perle, Philippe, Dam^ne, the Castle of 
 Gand, and Dendermonde: The Fort of St. Donas being join'd to the Forti- 
 fications of the Sluice, and being entirely incorporated with it, shall remain 
 and be yielded in Property to the States. The Fca-t of Rodenhuysen, on this 
 side Gand, shall be demolish'd. 
 
 > A General Collection of Treaties (English), vol. 2, p. 482. London, 1732. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 597 
 
 VII. The said States-General may, in case of an apparent Attack, or 
 War, put as many Troops as they shall think necessary in all the Towns, 
 Places and Forts in the Spanish Low-Countries, where the Reason of War 
 shall require. 
 
 BELGIUM AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS 
 
 The peculiar strategical geography of northern Europe the Germans also 
 hold responsible for England's power. The land on either side of the mouth 
 of the Rhine is the key to northern Europe. Belgium controls the shortest 
 route to Paris; Holland is the only point of departure from which an inva- 
 sion of England is hkely to be successful; both countries hold between them 
 the door of the Rhine Valley, the gateway to the heart of Germany. Their 
 possession by any one of the three nations nearest them would give her im- 
 mediately a most deadly offensive weapon against the other two. To pos- 
 sess them has been the dream of all; to secure them half the wars in Euro- 
 pean history have been fought. Those two tiny states are now independent 
 because England, France, and Germany cannot permit each other to control 
 them. To the east lies the gateway between France and Germany, Alsace- 
 Lorraine, through whose fair fields pass the roads to Cologne and BerUn, to 
 Frankfort, Leipzig, and Dresden, to Basel, Switzerland, and Italy, to the 
 Danube Valley and Vienna. Its possession permits France to enter the 
 heart of Germany; its possession puts Germany at the very doors of France; 
 it is a potent weapon of offense or defense and enables its holder to begin a 
 war with tremendous advantages. For its possession,France and Germany 
 have struggled for fifteen hundred years. The existence of these strategic 
 points has made England important. If France assailed the Rhine from 
 Lorraine, Germany would ally with England, who could assail Paris from 
 the north through Belgium. If Germany threatened France from the east, 
 the Enghsh might be induced to invade Germany from the Netherlands. 
 Should either country obtain the cooperation of England against the other, 
 the most disastrous results were probable. These conditions made England 
 a factor in politics during the Middle Ages, out of all proportion to her 
 actual strength as compared with France or Germany. She was in a position 
 to deliver a deadly flank attack on either; the Channel effectually prevented 
 retahation; she could have consummated the djoiastic ambitions of either; 
 she preferred to thwart the aims of both. When the Netherlands fell into 
 Spanish hands in the sixteenth century and the power of the Hapsburgs 
 threatened to absorb all Europe, the cooperation of the islanders, who con- 
 trolled the stormy Channel and who could so easily invade the Netherlands, 
 was seen by every one to be the controlling factor in a complex situation. 
 Their assistance would almost certainly decide the war in favor of France or 
 Spain. Not England's strength, but the fact that her position made her 
 valuable to stronger nations, gave her a voice in the days of Henry VIII and 
 Elizabeth. Not her strength, but the evenness of the balance of power in 
 Europe, the rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg, their fear of each other, gave 
 her the casting vote. 
 
 1 Extract from Roland G. Usher, Pan-Germanism, pp. 22-25. 
 
598 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 THE BARRIER TREATY VINDICATED i 
 
 1. As for the first proposition, the former part of it, that it is in itself, and 
 apart from all other considerations, the true interest of England, that there 
 should be a good and suflficient barrier against France on the side of the 
 Netherlands, is a point so evident in itself, and hath been so constantly 
 received as the known and avowed sense of the nation; that I am ashamed 
 to think there should be any number amongst us who want to have that 
 proved to them now, which hath hitherto been always allowed as a standing 
 maxim of our Government, and is now become our interest more than ever. 
 To have a good barrier against France in the Netherlands is as necessary 
 for us as it is to preserve a balance of power on the Continent, and to pre- 
 vent all Europe's being enslaved by France. For the situation of the Nether- 
 lands is such, with respect to Holland and the Empire, and even to Britain 
 itself, that if France be once suffered to get possession of them, it will not 
 be in the power of all Europe to set any bounds to the progress of her arms. 
 The United Provinces must in that case unavoidably fall a prey to her; as 
 every one must be fully convinced, who will but reflect upon the extremi- 
 ties to which they were reduced by the French king's seizing the Spanish 
 Low-Coimtries at the death of the late king of Spain. The Empire having 
 by that means lost the assistance of the States, and being cut off from all 
 communication with England, would soon follow the same fate; being, as 
 we see by long experience, hardly able to make head against a handful of 
 French troops, while the main strength of France is diverted and employed 
 on the wars in Spain, Italy, and Flanders; much less can it be thought in 
 any condition to defend itself when it is without allies, and France having 
 rid her hands of other wars is at liberty to pour in her whole force upon it. 
 So that if France could finish her long-laid design upon the Netherlands, 
 she might without opposition carry her conquests as far as she pleased into 
 Germany. Let us next consider the fatal consequences that will attend 
 the loss of the Netherlands with respect to Britain in particular. If France 
 be once mistress of those Provinces, she will from that moment have the 
 command of the narrow seas; so that our trade will neither be able to go out 
 nor to return with any tolerable safety. We see of what consequence it is 
 thought to England that Dunkirk should be taken out of the hands of the 
 French, or at least that the harbor of it should be ruined; and thence we 
 may judge how fatal it would be to this nation to let them get possession of 
 the other Flemish ports, with such an increase of naval strength as that 
 acquisition would give them. Our coasts and river would then be exposed 
 to perpetual insults, and our trade would be in so much danger in the nar- 
 row seas that we should soon be obliged to give it over. But this is not all : 
 should France be suffered to be mistress of the Netherlands, it is not to be 
 thought the United Provinces could maintain their independency. They 
 must either become directly the subjects of France, or live in an absolute 
 dependence on that crown; and the unavoidable consequence of that would 
 be that the great naval force of the Dutch, which hath hitherto acted in con- 
 junction with us, would then be turned against us; and such a vast accession 
 
 ' Extract from The Barrier Treaty Vindicated. By Francis Hare. London, 1712, pp. 22-28. 
 Halkett and Lang's Dictionary of Anonymous and Psevdonomous Literature of Great Britain 
 attributes The Barrier Treaty Vindicated (second edition, London, 1712) to Francis Hare. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 599 
 
 to the fleet of France would give her such a superiority at sea as no one I sup- 
 pose is sanguine enough to think we could dispute. We should in that case 
 not only suffer all the inconveniences that necessarily attend our being cut 
 off from the Continent, but we should be perpetually unsafe in our own 
 ports. For our whole strength, when without allies, is in the sea; and there- 
 fore when that seciu-ity is gone, we are in a state perfectly naked and de- 
 fenceless. And as our riches depend chiefly upon our trade, they also must 
 sink with it. Let therefore France but get the Netherlands, and our ruin 
 needs not wait for that of other countries upon the Continent. If France 
 can force the submission of the States, and have the use of their ports and 
 fleets, England must truckle to France, if the rest of Europe would be con- 
 tent to look on; and if they should not, all the efforts they could make 
 would be of little service to us. For while we have no maritime power on 
 our side, we can have no help at sea, where it would be most wanted; nor 
 any support in case of an invasion, tho' its suddenness and strength should 
 make it of the last necessity; and as for any efforts made in our favor on 
 the Continent, when the States are either slaves to or on the side of France, 
 we may be sure they would be too weak to make any great impression, or 
 to cause any considerable diversion in our favor. So that the ruin of Eng- 
 land seems to be the certain consequence of the loss of the Netherlands. 
 We must for want of strength in ourselves, or help from abroad, suffer the 
 fate of other nations; only with so much the greater misery, by how much 
 our present condition is happier than that of others. 
 
 If it were sufficient to have reason on one's side, I might think it needless 
 to say any more to prove that it is the true interest of England that there 
 should be a good barrier against France on the side of the Netherlands. But 
 because I write in a time in which authority seems to have much more force 
 than reason, I shall in further proof of this proposition appeal to authority, 
 and show that the Netherlands have in all times past been looked upon as 
 the barrier to England; and that it was always thought our interest to 
 hinder the growth of France on that side. To show this I might go back to the 
 time in which those countries were governed by the House of Burgundy, one 
 of the most ancient and most useful allies to the crown of England against 
 France. But this may seem looking too far backwards into the history of 
 ancient times; and therefore I shall only take notice of one memorable pas- 
 sage in the excellent history of Philip de Commines to this purpose; who 
 speaking in the beginning of his 6th Book, of the conquest of the Dominions 
 of the House of Biu-gundy by Lewis 11th, who laid the first foundation of 
 the greatness of France, begins his second chapter with these words : — 
 
 "Those," says he, "that hereafter shall read this History, will 
 
 wonder that the English suffered the King to take the towns bordering 
 
 so near upon them, namely Arras, Bolloin, Ardes and Hedin, with divers 
 
 other castles, and to lie so long with his camp before St. Omers." 
 
 And the reasons he gives for this are such as deserve to be remembered, 
 
 which are these; that 
 
 "the King of France in wisdom and sense surmounted far Edward 
 4th of England then reigning, who was a very corpulent man, and 
 much given to pleasures; and endeavored by all means possible to 
 content him and entertain him by Ambassadors, presents, and smooth 
 words, to the end he should not intermeddle with his affairs. That he 
 
600 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 knew well the English, as well Nobles and Commons, as the Clergy, 
 to be naturally inclined to make war upon his realm ; therefore he per- 
 ceived that he must in any wise keep the King of England and his 
 principal servants his friends, whom he saw altogether inclin'd to 
 quietness, and very greedy of his money; for the which cause he paid 
 duly at London the pension of 50,000 crowns, and farther gave yearly 
 16,000 crowns, besides many goodly presents, to the said King's prin- 
 cipal servants; and their acquittances are yet to be seen in the Chamber 
 of Accounts at Paris. Further, he gave goodly presents to all the Am- 
 bassadors that came to him, were their messages never so sharp and 
 bitter; and sent them home with goodly words and princely rewards, 
 that they returned well contented; and notwithstanding that some 
 of them understood that he did all this only to win time, the better 
 to achieve his enterprize in the conquest of the Duke of Burgundy's 
 Dominions, yet winked they at it, because of the great riches they 
 received at his hands; and so did the King of England himself, though 
 Bome of his Council told him plainly it would be very prejudicial to 
 his realm; and in Parliament divers wise men that smelt the dissimu- 
 lation of France afar off, and received no pension as the others did, 
 were very desirous, and yet the Commons of the realm more desirous, 
 that the King should send aid without delay to the Lady of Burgundy, 
 daughter of Duke Charles. And undoubtedly if the King had not 
 been prevailed upon by these and some other reasons, he would never 
 have suffered the King of France to take places bordering so near 
 upon the English Dominions, but have sought to defend them; and if 
 at the beginning he had declared himself for the said Lady, the King 
 had never weakened this House of Burgundy as he hath." 
 The whole chapter is very well worth reading, of which this is but an 
 abstract. And upon it I beg leave to make these few remarks : That this His- 
 tory was written about 230 years ago, by a person of great credit, who was 
 not only an eye-witness of these things, but had a principal hand in the 
 transacting of them; which leaves no room to doubt the truth of what he 
 eays; that it was then looked on as the known interest of England to hinder 
 the growth of France in the Low-Countries, even in those days, when the 
 French Dominions were bounded by the Soam; when the Dutchy of Britain, 
 with the Port of Brest, was no part of them; and the strength they have now 
 at sea was not so much as begun; that it was then a maxim in our Govern- 
 ment to cherish a strict alliance with the House of Burgundy, to prevent the 
 French from extending their Dominions on that side, and making nearer ap- 
 proaches towards us; the dangers being foreseen at that distance, which we 
 have since felt from the neighborhood of a power, which through our own 
 fault we have suffered to grow so very formidable. 
 
 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF BELGIUM BY THE TREATY OF 
 APRIL 19, 1839: INTERNATIONAL TREATIES REG- 
 ULATING THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 
 
 November 15, 1831, at London, was signed a treaty between Great Brit- 
 ain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, on the one hand and Belgium, on 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 601 
 
 the other, relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland. Article VII 
 established the independence and perpetual neutrality of Belgium. Article 
 XXV stipulated that the five powers would guarantee the execution of the 
 preceding articles.^ When at last Holland was ready to assent to the arrange- 
 ments adopted by the powers in regard to Belgium, the five powers and 
 Holland signed at London on April 19, 1839, a treaty of four articles, which 
 adopted in an annex having the same force as the treaty the first twenty- 
 four articles of the Treaty of London of November 15, 1831. This left out 
 Article XXV containing the guaranty of the first twenty-four articles, but 
 Article II of the new Treaty of April 19, 1839, declares: 
 
 "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
 and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary 
 and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the 
 King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, 
 declare that the Articles mentioned in the preceding Article, are con- 
 sidered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually 
 inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the 
 guarantee of their said Majesties." 
 The effect of this Article was to omit the guaranty contained in Article 
 XXV of the Treaty of November 15, 1831, and to substitute a declaration 
 of the five powers guaranteeing the annexed articles. Hence Article VII is 
 guaranteed by the five powers, but not by Holland. Belgium and Holland 
 also signed a separate treaty on the same day, April 19, 1839. This treaty 
 refers to the treaty of the same date between Holland and the five powers 
 and to the Treaty of November 15, 1831. The first twenty-four articles were 
 the same as those in the annex of the treaty between Belgium and the five 
 powers.^ 
 
 A third treaty was signed at London on this same day, April 19, 1839, 
 between the five powers and Belgium. The preamble refers to the treaties of 
 November 15, 1831, and the two other treaties of April 19, 1839. Article I 
 is as follows: — 
 
 "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
 and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary 
 and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the 
 King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, de- 
 clare, that the Articles hereunto annexed, and forming the tenor of the 
 Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Bel- 
 gians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of 
 Luxemburg, are considered as having the same force and validity as if 
 they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus 
 placed under the Guarantee of their said Majesties." ^ 
 Article II declares the Treaty of November 15, 1831, "not to be obliga- 
 tory on the High Contracting Parties." 
 
 Though this maze of treaties is hard to follow, the situation which results 
 may be summed up as follows : — 
 
 (1) The treaty of November 15, 1831, has no longer any force. 
 
 (2) The independence and perpetual neutrality of Belgimn has been 
 recognized by all the signatories of all three treaties of April 19, 1839. 
 
 I British and Foreign State Papers, 1830-31, vol 18, pp. 645-64. 
 
 » Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 994. London, 1875. 
 
 • Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, p. 997. London, 1875. 
 
602 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 (3) Holland and Belgium have not in any of the three treaties guaranteed 
 the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 (4) The five powers have substituted for the original Article XXV of the 
 Treaty of November 15, 1831, containing the guaranty a new guaranty in 
 each of the treaties signed by the five powers with Belgium and Holland. 
 
 (5) The situation and obligations of Belgium, according to Article VII of 
 the Annex (same as Article VII of the Treaty of 1831) are as follows: — 
 
 " Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall 
 form an Independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound 
 to observe such NeutraUty towards all other States." 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PRUSSIA, 
 
 RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND 
 
 NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 2 
 
 Signed at London, 9th August, 1870 
 Reference to Treaties of 19th April, 18S9 
 Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, being desirous at the present 
 time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the 
 Independence and Neutrality of Belgium, as provided in Article VII of the 
 Treaty signed at London on the 19th April, 1839, between Belgium and the 
 Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 
 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted 
 in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to con- 
 clude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or 
 invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary 
 and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotenti- 
 aries for that purpose, that is to say: 
 
 Cooperation of Great Britain with Prussia in case of violation of Neutrality of 
 Belgium by France 
 Article I. His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that not- 
 withstanding the Hostilities in which the North German Confederation is 
 engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the Neutrality 
 of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty 
 the Queen of the United ICingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part 
 declares that, if during the said Hostilities the Armies of France should vio- 
 late that Neutrality, she will be prepared to cooperate with His Prussian 
 Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually 
 agreed upon, employing for that purpose her Naval and Military Forces to 
 insure its olsservance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian 
 Majesty, then and thereafter, the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 Great Britian not engaged to take part in War between North German Confed- 
 eration and France, except as regards Violation of Belgian Neutrality. 
 It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United King- 
 dom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to 
 
 » Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. in, pp. 1886-88. London, 1875. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 603 
 
 take part in any of the general operations of the War now carried on be- 
 tween the North German Confederation and France, beyond the Limits of 
 Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgiiun and the Netherlands 
 of 19th April, 1839. 
 
 Cooperation of Prussia with Great Britain in case of Violation of Neutrality 
 of Belgium by France 
 Article II. His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the 
 event provided for in the foregoing Article, to cooperate with Her Majesty 
 the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing 
 his Naval and Military Forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case aris- 
 ing, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, sepa- 
 rately or in common, to secure the Neutrality and Independence of Belgium. 
 
 Treaty to be binding until concluMon of a Treaty of Peace between France and 
 Prussia 
 Article III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting 
 Parties during the continuance of the present War between the North 
 German Confederation and France, and for 12 months after the Ratification 
 of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties ; and on the expira- 
 tion of that time the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium will, so far 
 as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to 
 rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th April, 
 1839. 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, 
 
 FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, PRUSSIA, AND 
 
 RUSSIA RELATIVE TO THE GRAND DUCHY OF 
 
 LUXEMBURG AND THE DUCHY OF LIMBURG i 
 
 Signed at London, May 11, 1867 
 
 Maintenance of Rights of House of Orange-Nassau 
 Article I. His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of 
 
 Luxemburg, maintains the ties which attach the said Grand Duchy to 
 
 the House of Orange-Nassau, in virtue of the Treaties which placed that 
 
 State under the Sovereignty of the King Grand Duke, his descendants 
 
 and successors. 
 The Rights which the Agnates of the House of Nassau possess with 
 
 regard to the Succession of the Grand Duchy, in virtue of the same Treaties, 
 
 are maintained. 
 The High Contracting Parties accept the present Declaration, and place 
 
 it upon record. 
 
 Grand Duchy to form a Perpetual Neutral State under Guaranty of 
 Contracting Parties ' 
 
 Article II. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits de- 
 termined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th of April, 1839, 
 * Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. iii, pp. 1803-05. London, 1875. 
 
604 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 under the Guarantee of tlie Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prus- 
 sia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State. 
 
 It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other 
 States. 
 
 The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutral- 
 ity stipulated by the present Article. 
 
 That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective 
 Guarantee of the Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty, with the 
 exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral State. 
 
 Luxemburg to cease to be a Fortified City. Troops to be maintained by the 
 King Grand Duke 
 
 Article III. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being Neutralized, ac- 
 cording to the terms of the preceding Article, the maintenance or establish- 
 ment of Fortresses upon its Territory becomes without necessity as well as 
 without object. 
 
 In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the City of Luxem- 
 burg, considered in time past, in a military point of view, as a Federal For- 
 tress, shall cease to be a fortified city. 
 
 His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain in that 
 city the number of troops necessary to provide in it for the maintenance of 
 good order. 
 
 Evacuation of Fortress of Luxemburg by Prussian Troops 
 Article IV. In conformity with the stipulations contained in Articles II 
 and III, His Majesty the King of Prussia declares that his troops actually in 
 garrison in the Fortress of Luxemburg shall receive orders to proceed to the 
 Evacuation of that place immediately after the exchange of the Ratifica- 
 tions of the present Treaty. The withdrawal of the artillery, munitions, and 
 every object which forms part of the equipment of the said Fortress shall 
 commence simultaneously. During that operation there shall remain in it no 
 more than the number of troops necessary to provide for the safety of the 
 material of war, and to effect the dispatch thereof, which shall be completed 
 within the shortest time possible. 
 
 Demolition of Fortress of Luxemburg by the Netherlands 
 Article V. His Majesty the King Grand Duke, in virtue of the rights of 
 Sovereignty which he exercises over the City and Fortress of Luxemburg, 
 engages, on his part, to take the necessary measures for converting the said 
 Fortress into an open city by means of a demolition which His Majesty shall 
 deem sufficient to fulfil the intentions of the High Contracting Parties ex- 
 pressed in Article III of the present Treaty. The works requisite for that 
 purpose shall be commenced immediately after the withdrawal of the garri- 
 son. They shall be carried out with all the attention required for the interests 
 of the inhabitants of the city. 
 
 Fortifications not to be restored 
 His Majesty the King Grand Duke promises, moreover, that the Fortifi- 
 cations of the city of Luxemburg shall not be restored in future, and that no 
 Military EstabUshment shall be there maintained or created. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 605 
 
 Duchy of Limburg to form an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
 Article VI. The Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty recog- 
 nize that the Dissolution of the Germanic Confederation having equally 
 produced the Dissolution of the ties which united the Duchy of Limburg, 
 collectively with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, to the said Confedera- 
 tion, it results therefrom that the relations, of which mention is made in 
 Articles III, IV, and V of the Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839, between 
 the Grand Duchy and certain Territories belonging to the Duchy of Lim- 
 burg, have ceased to exist, the said Territories continuing to form an in- 
 tegral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
 
 Ratifications ^ 
 Article VII. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications 
 shall be exchanged at London within the space of four weeks, or sooner if 
 possible. 
 
 In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, 
 and have affixed thereto the Seals of their Arms. 
 Done at London, the 11th day of May. in the year of Our Lord, 1867. 
 
 (L.S.) Stanley. 
 (L.S.) Apponyi. 
 (L.S.) Van de Weyer. 
 (L.S.) La Tour d'Auvergnb. 
 (L.S.) D'Azeglio. 
 (L.S.) Bentinck. 
 (L.S.) Tornaco. 
 (L.S.) E. Servais. 
 (L.S.) Bernstorff. 
 (L.S.) Brunnow. 
 [During the war between France and Prussia in 1870-71, those powers 
 mutually engaged to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg.] 
 
 DECLARATIONS MADE BY FRANCE AND PRUSSIA TO 
 
 RESPECT THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG, 
 
 17TH JULY, 1870 2 
 
 Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville 
 
 Berlin, 17th July, 1870. 
 Mt Lord, — 
 
 Baron Thile informed me to-day that he had received a telegram from 
 M. Fohr, the Representative of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg at this 
 Court, stating that the French Government had officially notified their 
 intention to respect the Neutrality of the Grand Duchy, provided that it 
 was likewise respected by Prussia. 
 
 His Excellency, by order of Count Bismarck, immediately replied that 
 the North German Government would also respect the Neutrality of the 
 Grand Duchy as long as it was respected by France. 
 I have, etc., 
 
 Augustus Loftus. 
 
 ' Ratifications exchanged at London, 31st May, 1867. 
 
 » Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. in, p. 1877. London, 1875. 
 
606 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE NEUTRALITY OF 
 LUXEMBURG ^ 
 
 Grand Ducht of Luxemburg — Treaty of 1867 — The 
 Collective Guarantee Question 
 Lord Houghton: I rise, my Lords, for the purpose of asking Her Maj- 
 esty's Government the Question of which I gave notice some days ago, 
 and which has been inevitably postponed in consequence of the absence, 
 through illness, of the noble Earl the First Lord of the Treasury, who has 
 come down here to-day, I trust at no inconvenience to himself. I do not 
 desire to challenge any convenient ambiguity in diplomatic instructions; 
 but it is because there are certain words in the second article of the Treaty 
 respecting the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg which seem to me calculated 
 to raise a doubt to disturb the public opinion of Europe, to destroy the 
 pacific character of the Treaty, and to be irreconcilable with the declara- 
 tion of the Foreign Minister in the House of Commons, that I venture to 
 put this Question. When on the 7th of May last my Lord Stanley presided 
 at the Conference of the Powers on this subject, he brought forward a pro- 
 posal to the effect that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg should be a neutral 
 State, and that the contracting parties should engage to secure that neu- 
 trality. Now, this was a very solemn and honourable engagement which we 
 and the other parties to the Treaty were asked to enter into. The Prussian 
 Government, however, was not content, but asked for something more, 
 and the "something more" which they proposed was the sanction of the 
 collective guarantee of the European Powers. That was therefore intended 
 to be something different from, and an increase of, the former obligation 
 which Lord Stanley had proposed. At first Lord Stanley objected to the 
 new proposal; but after a consultation with the Cabinet he agreed to it. 
 Now, what is the practical effect of that guarantee to be when any necessity 
 for action arises? Whether that action is to be of a material or a moral 
 character must from the very nature of things depend on the circumstances 
 which arise. On that point I do not desire that our obligations should be more 
 strictly defined than they are now. But the interpretation placed upon the 
 Treaty the other day was to the effect that if any one of the signataries 
 defied that Treaty and violated the neutrality of the State of Luxemburg, 
 it would by that very act render the Treaty absolutely null, and discharge 
 all the other parties from their obligations. Now, it is perfectly clear that 
 the only parties against whom this Treaty was directed were signataries 
 to it. It was not Spain, or Greece, or Denmark, or Sweden that were the 
 objects of this Treaty as being likely to violate the neutrality of Luxem- 
 burg. The Duchy of Luxemburg has, on account of its peculiar Iqcal posi- 
 tion, acquired an importance which its natural extent and character among 
 the States of Europe wovdd not justify. In the eyes of Prussia the neutrality 
 of Luxemburg means the integrity of Belgium ; while in the eyes of France 
 the neutrality of Luxemburg means the integrity of Holland. Thus grave 
 questions are involved in what is apparently a small and trivial matter. 
 To use the expressive words of the Professor of International Law in the 
 University of Oxford, — 
 
 ' Extract from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. clxxxviii, pp. 966 to 
 979. House of Lords, July 4, 1867. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 607 
 
 "If the default of one of the parties to this Treaty does discharge 
 all other parties from their obligations, then the sole case in which 
 assistance can be invoked is a case in which that assistance is impos- 
 sible." 
 
 It appears to me that if the object of the Treaty is nullified by the very 
 act to prevent which it was entered into, you convert into a vague ceremony 
 what was intended to be a solemn act and a responsible obligation. And 
 now, one word on what passed in "another place" in reference to this sub- 
 ject. Lord Stanley stated that in assenting to the Treaty he had done so 
 with more doubt and anxiety than he had ever felt on any public question. 
 The weight of those words is to my mind very much increased by the char- 
 acter of the noble Lord, who is not a man to indulge in exaggerated state- 
 ments or even in strong language — these are therefore very grave words. 
 I believe that by the words of the Treaty the parties are bound to resist 
 any aggression whether it proceeds from one of the signataries or not. If 
 the aggressor is a signatary, he adds to the aggression a violation of the 
 Treaty. Lord Stanley used the words "limited liability" in reference to 
 this question; but I will leave it to your Lordships to say whether limited 
 liability may not involve a very serious responsibility. The Question which 
 I have given notice to put to the noble Earl is the more important, because 
 I am aware that there is political agitation going on both in France and 
 Prussia with respect to this subject. It would be a most dangerous thing 
 for any one in that or the other House of Parliament to give color to that 
 agitation, and I hope that no interpretation will be given to the Treaty 
 which would convert a sense of security in Europe into one of confusion and 
 alarm. I therefore ask the First Lord of the Treasury, What is the construc- 
 tion wliich Her Majesty's Government place on the words " Collective 
 guarantee" (garantie collective) in the Treaty of the 11th of May, 1867, rela- 
 tive to the Grand Duchy of Luxembm*g? 
 
 The Earl of Derby: My Lords, I regret that in consequence of an 
 attack of illness, from which I am still suffering slightly, I have been obliged 
 to put the noble Lord to the inconvenience of postponing more than once a 
 question to which he appears to attach considerable importance. In the first 
 place, I may be permitted to say, although I am ready to repeat the explana- 
 tion I have already given of this Treaty, but which does not appear to be 
 satisfactory to the noble Lord, that, whatever the interpretation which I 
 may put on particular words of the Treaty, or whatever the interpretation 
 which Her Majesty's Government may put on it, such interpretation can- 
 not affect the International Law by which the terms of all treaties are con- 
 strued. I, for one, am very unwilling, as I always have been, to underrate or 
 do away with any responsibihty which this country may have incurred. 
 Still less would it be my desire that we should shrink from carrying that 
 responsibility out as far as the means of this country would go, and as far 
 as we are bound by the terms of any treaty into which we may enter. In my 
 reference to the Treaty brought under our notice by the noble Lord, I hope 
 he will not understand me as speaking of moral obligations but of the tech- 
 nical obligations imposed by the Treaty. To the latter only the noble Lord's 
 question has reference, and to them alone shall I apply myself in my answer. 
 I am not much skilled in the ways of diplomatists, but I believe that if there 
 be one thing more clear than another it is the distinction between a collec- 
 
608 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 tive guarantee and a separate and several guarantee. A several guarantee 
 binds each of the parties to do its utmost individually to enforce the obser- 
 vance of the guarantee. A collective guarantee is one which is binding on 
 all the parties collectively; but which, if any difference of opinion should 
 arise, no one of them can be called upon to take upon itself the task of vin- 
 dication by force of arms. The guarantee is collective, and depends upon 
 the union of all the parties signing it; and no one of those parties is bound 
 to take upon itself the duty of enforcing the fulfilment of the guarantee. 
 The noble Lord expressed some surprise that with my noble Relative's 
 views of the limited nature of the guarantee contained in the Treaty of the 
 11th of May he should have said in " another place" that he never had con- 
 sented to any measure with greater reluctance than that which he had felt 
 in regard of the guarantee embodied in this Treaty. My Lords, I think it 
 is not very difficult to see why my noble Relative should have entertained 
 that reluctance. It was not till the first day of the meeting of the Conference 
 my noble Relative had an opportunity of knowing the extent of the guaran- 
 tee expected by Prussia; and what has passed this evening shows that he 
 was not unreasonable in his apprehensions that, however cautious the word- 
 ing of the guarantee might be, in the opinion of some we might be supposed 
 to have entered into engagements more extensive than those which we had 
 actually undertaken, and be by them held guilty of a breach of faith if we 
 did not carry our responsibility to a greater extent than the terms of the 
 Treaty warranted. I must now call your Lordship's attention to the precise 
 circumstances under which this guarantee was asked for and given. It is 
 quite true that, in the first place, Prussia laid down as one of the bases on 
 which she would enter into the Conference that she should receive a Euro- 
 pean guarantee for the neutrality of Luxemburg. My noble Relative, in 
 the project of a treaty which he prepared for the Conference, did not use 
 the word "guarantee"; but in reference to the Article declaring that the 
 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg should thenceforth form a perpetually inde- 
 pendent State proposed the words " the high contracting parties engage to 
 respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article." Prus- 
 sia did not think that went far enough; for the Protocol states: — 
 
 "The Plenipotentiary of Prussia says that he has in general no ob- 
 jection to make to the project of treaty presented by Lord Stanley, but 
 that he remarks in it a departure from the programme on the basis of 
 which his Government had accepted the invitation to the Conference; 
 that is to say, the European guarantee of the neutrality of the Grand 
 Duchy of Luxemburg; that, however, as all the Powers represented in 
 the Conference have admitted and accepted that programme, he thinks 
 himself justified in hoping that this omission will be supplied in the 
 discussion of Article II. The Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, the 
 Netherlands, and Russia, confirm the statement of the Plenipotentiary 
 of Prussia that the Powers had accepted as the basis of negotiation the 
 neutrality of Luxemburg under a collective guarantee. Lord Stanley 
 points out that in virtue of the Treaties of the 19th of April, 1839, the 
 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is already placed under a European guaran- 
 tee. As to the terms which, in the project of treaty which he has had the 
 honour of communicating to the Conference, refer to the neutrality to 
 be established for the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, they are identical 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 609 
 
 with those which declare the neutrality of Belgium in Article VII of 
 the Annex to the treaty signed in London on the 19th of April, 1839, 
 between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia on the 
 one part, and the Netherlands on the other part. Count de Bernstorflf 
 points out that the Treaty of 1839, although it places the territory of 
 Luxemburg under the guarantee of the Powers, does not guarantee its 
 neutrality. Now, the difference between this guarantee and that given 
 to Belgium is very important; and he expresses the hope of seeing the 
 same guarantee given by the Powers to the neutrality of Luxemburg 
 as is enjoyed by that of Belgiima. It is thereupon agreed between the 
 Plenipotentiaries to proceed to an examination of the project of treaty, 
 article by article. To add at the end of the Article the words: — 'That 
 principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective 
 (or common) guarantee of the Powers signing, parties to the present 
 treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.' 
 Baron de Brunnow says that he is authorized by his Court to assent 
 entirely to the principle of placing the neutrality of the Grand Duchy 
 of Luxemburg under a collective guarantee. He hopes that this prin- 
 ciple will be admitted and adopted unanimously as the best pledge that 
 can be offered for the maintenance of peace in Europe. Count Apponyi 
 declares that his Government has also accepted the guaranteed neu- 
 trahty of Luxemburg as the basis of negotiation." 
 And what does the Plenipotentiary for France say? — 
 
 " Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne says that, as far as he is concerned, 
 he has no special instructions respecting the question of a collective 
 guarantee; but that he must agree that this guarantee has hitherto 
 been put forward as the complement of the neutralization of the Grand 
 Duchy of Luxemburg; and, although, in fact, the engagement which 
 the Powers take to respect the neutrahty of Luxemburg has, in his 
 opinion, under the circumstances a value almost equal to that of a for- 
 mal guarantee, he cannot deny that the Prussian Ambassador is justi- 
 fied in his observations." 
 I wish the noble Lord, when in asking for an interpretation of the Treaty, 
 had been kind enough to inform us what is his interpretation of the guaran- 
 tee. I think it would be desirable to know what, in the view of the noble 
 Lord, is the true signification of a collective guarantee, signed by several 
 Powers; because if, as seems to be the noble Lord's inference, each of the 
 parties to such a guarantee is not only bound itself to respect the treaty, 
 but also to enforce individually its maintenance by all the other Powers who 
 were parties to the treaty, I think the French Plenipotentiary would hardly 
 have said the two terms were so similar that one was nearly equal to the 
 other. Let me give your Lordships one or two instances of separate guaran- 
 tees and of collective guarantees. The first I will take is a very remarkable 
 case — that with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. In the year 1831 
 a Conference of the five Great Powers laid down twenty-five Articles, which 
 were to determine the relations between Belgium and Holland, and which 
 were to form the basis of a treaty between those two countries. The Powers 
 who were parties to that Conference of 1831 bound themselves to uphold, 
 not collectively, but severally and individually, the integrity of the treaty. 
 That was a separate and individual guarantee. But, notwithstanding, in 
 
610 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 1832, when Belgium, who had not been put in possession of the territory 
 assigned to her by that treaty, called on the Powers parties to the Confer- 
 ence to enforce her rights, Prussia, Russia, and Austria declined to inter- 
 fere by force of arms for that purpose; while, on the other hand, France and 
 England, taking a stricter view of the obligations imposed upon them by the 
 treaty, proceeded to enforce it by combined naval and military operations. 
 In the same treaty there was comprised a guarantee for the possession of 
 Luxemburg by the King of Holland, not in his capacity as King of Hol- 
 land, but as Grand Duke of Luxembiu-g. In 1839, after a treaty had been 
 made between Belgium and Holland embodying the main provisions of the 
 Treaty of 1831, a separate one was entered into between the five Powers 
 and Belgium, in which the obhgations of the former Treaty of 1831 were 
 repeated and renewed, and the five Powers bound themselves separately 
 to maintain the integrity of Belgium, its neutrality and independence. The 
 Prussian Minister must have been perfectly well aware of the terms of that 
 treaty by which the five Powers, acting individually, guaranteed the inde- 
 pendence of Belgium; yet if he thought the one kind of guarantee equal to 
 the other, I want to know why he should have studiously altered the words 
 and asked not for a separate and several guarantee, but for a collective 
 guarantee by the Great Powers for the integrity and independence of Lux- 
 emburg? With regard to the difference between a collective and a several 
 guarantee, I may refer to another case in illustration of what I have said. 
 In 1856 an agreement was signed by seven great Powers — Great Britain, 
 Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey — with regard to 
 the independence of Tiu-key, and these are the terms in which that guaran- 
 tee is given. The several Potentates — 
 
 " declare the SubUme Porte admitted to participate in the advantages 
 of the public law and system (concert) of Europe. Their Majesties 
 engage," — and I wish you particularly to observe this, — "each on 
 his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the 
 Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that 
 engagement, and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its 
 violation as a question of general interest." 
 The engagement "each on his part" and "guarantee in common" are 
 precisely the terms introduced into the Treaty of May, 1867, on the request 
 of the Prussian Minister, and the security his Government desired to 
 obtain. Are these treaties, then, to be deemed binding on all the Powers, 
 signataries of the treaty, not only individually to respect, but collectively, 
 individually, and separately to guarantee and enforce the neutrality of 
 Luxemburg? I think the answer to that question is given by a treaty signed 
 only fifteen days after that from which I have just quoted; I refer to the 
 tripartite treaty signed between Great Britain, Austria, and France, having 
 for its object the very same purpose as the former treaty — the integrity 
 and independence of the territories of Turkey. Now, if that was secured by 
 the treaty among the seven Powers, signed only a fortnight before, and if 
 that engagement was binding, as I understood the noble Lord contends, 
 upon each of the Powers separately, I say there was no occasion for the sec- 
 ond treaty whatever. The very existence of the second treaty admits the 
 insufiiciency of its predecessor, and is couched in these terms — 
 
 " The high contracting parties guarantee, jointly and severally, the 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 611 
 
 independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in 
 the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856." 
 By this separate treaty the three Powers separately and individually 
 guarantee the same thing which a fortnight before had been collectively 
 guaranteed by the seven Powers. The three Powers found it necessary to 
 sign a treaty which should express an obligation upon each, because the 
 previous treaty was not binding separately and severally upon all the signa- 
 tary Powers. The treaty goes on to say — 
 
 " Any infraction of the stipulations of the said treaty will be consid- 
 ered by the Powers signing the present treaty as casus belli. They will 
 come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures 
 which have become necessary, and will without delay determine among 
 themselves as to the employment of their military and naval forces." 
 It is impossible more clearly to appreciate the distinction between a col- 
 lective guarantee and a several guarantee than by considering the cause, 
 wording, and effect of these two treaties, signed within a fortnight of each 
 other. If the noble Lord [Lord Houghton] is not satisfied with my view of 
 this treaty, — namely, that the integrity and neutrality of Luxemburg rests 
 upon the collective voice and upon the honour of all the Powers who are 
 signataries to it, — I should wish that he give us his interpretation of its 
 effect, and to what extent it is binding upon us. I will put a case to him. 
 Suppose that Prussia with a view of making war on France, or France with 
 a view of making war upon Prussia, were to enter the territory of Luxem- 
 burg, — thereby, of course, violating its neutrahty by the mere passage of 
 an army, for I am not dealing with the question of occupation or possession, 
 but of violating the neutrality of Luxemburg by passing an army through 
 it, — does the noble Lord mean to say that all the guaranteeing Powers in 
 this Treaty of 1867, or each singly, would be bound by the obligations 
 thrown on them by this treaty to go to war against the Power — whichever 
 it might be — which entered Luxemburg with an army? Would Prussia 
 desire this interpretation of the treaty? Suppose, in anticipation of any in- 
 vasion by France, Prussia thought it necessary to make defensive advances 
 into Luxemburg, would Prussia contend that all the other Powers would be 
 thereby bound to take part with France in a war against her for the purpose 
 of vindicating the neutrality of Luxemburg? And supposing, in a case, that 
 Russia and Austria held aloof from the fulfilment of their portion of the 
 guarantee in the event of any case for interference arising, does the noble 
 Lord for a moment contend that England — situated as she is, and abso- 
 lutely unable to put a sufficient mifitary force on the Continent for preserv- 
 ing this neutrality — has contracted the obligation of enforcing the guaran- 
 tee which she gave in common with all the other Powers of Europe? Such 
 a construction is contrary to all the rules of interpretation, and far beyond 
 what this country should undertake or carry through. Suppose, again, that 
 France and Prussia, for the purpose of coming to a contest, should simul- 
 taneously violate the neutrality, in what position would the other Powers 
 be? Should the remaining guarantors or England alone immediately begin 
 a sort of triangular duel, to prevent the violation of the treaty by Powers 
 who had already violated it? It is evident the conditions of the treaty must 
 be construed with a regard to what is reasonable and practicable; and I say 
 again that by a collective guarantee it is well understood that while in 
 
612 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 honor all the Powers who are parties to it severally engage to maintain, for 
 their own part, a strict respect for the territory for which neutrality is 
 guaranteed; and although, undoubtedly, any one Power has a perfect right 
 to declare a casus belli if she think fit because of the violation of the guaran- 
 tee, yet a single Power is not bound to take up the cudgels for all the other 
 Powers with whom she gave a collective guarantee. I can give no further 
 interpretation of the treaty than this — that as far as the honor of England 
 is concerned she will be bound to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg; and 
 I expect that all the other Powers will equally respect it; but she is not 
 bound to take upon herself the Quixotic duty, in the case of a violation of 
 the neutrality of Luxemburg by one of the other Powers, of interfering to 
 prevent its violation — because we have only undertaken to guarantee it in 
 common with all the other great Powers of Europe. The integrity of the 
 neutrality of Luxemburg must not rest upon the force of arms of any par- 
 ticular one of the guaranteeing Powers; but upon the honor of all the guar- 
 anteeing Powers together, upon the general obligation taken in the face of 
 Europe by all the signatary Powers; and if the neutrality should be vio- 
 lated by any one of them, then I say it is not a case of obligation, but a case 
 of discretion with each of the other signatary Powers as to how far they 
 should singly or collectively take upon themselves to vindicate the neu- 
 trality guaranteed. 
 
 Earl Russell: My Lords, I think it very unfortunate that in so short a 
 time after a treaty has been signed there should be a discussion in Parlia- 
 ment as to its precise meaning, and as to how far England is bound by it. 
 It is particularly unfortunate in this instance, because we know that the 
 explanations given by the noble Lord, reported as they have been in the 
 newspapers and otherwise, have created a very unpleasant feeling in Prus- 
 sia, and that it is commonly said there that it is no use to sign a treaty with 
 England, because England will find a means of escaping from the obhga- 
 tions imposed on her by it. That is a very unfortunate state of things; and 
 I think it also very unnecessary to discuss with regard to the treaty, as the 
 noble Earl has done, what this country is bound to do in a variety of sup- 
 posed cases. It is hardly possible to suppose a case which shall be exactly 
 what will occur, and I would much rather be contented with the arrange- 
 ment made. I should have thought that the declaration on the part of all 
 the Powers was suflficient security for the peace of Europe, and I could not 
 be surprised that the French Ambassador should say, on the part of France, 
 " We regard the engagement as very little more than a promise to respect 
 the principles of neutrality as stipulated in the present treaty"; — because 
 supposing all the powers to respect that principle of neutrality, or suppos- 
 ing France and Prussia to respect it, there is very little danger of interfer- 
 ence being required. With regard to the technical interpretation of the 
 treaty, I am inclined not to dispute that given by the noble Earl. There can 
 be no better instance by which to interpret the treaty than that to which 
 the noble Earl has referred. The treaty with regard to the integrity of the 
 Ottoman Empire was, I remember, the result of discussions which took place 
 at the time. The declaration of Russia always was that she was herself 
 ready to respect the integrity of Turkey, and that she had no intention or 
 wish to violate it; but that she was not inclined to agree to a stipulation that 
 in case that integrity was violated by Persia or any other neighboring Power 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 613 
 
 to Turkey, Russia should be bound at once to interfere by force of arms to 
 maintain the integrity of Turkey. 
 
 The Earl of Derby: Will the noble Earl permit me to say that Russia's 
 declaration was that she would not only for herself respect the integrity of 
 Turkey, but that she should join in a collective guarantee for that object, 
 and that collective guarantee was drawn up in the precise terms introduced 
 into this Treaty of 1856? 
 
 Earl Russell: It was for that reason that I said I am not disposed to 
 deny the technical obligation as stated by the noble Earl. The Govern- 
 ment of Russia declared, no doubt, that she agreed to a collective guarantee 
 in the form proposed, and that she did not feel bound by that guarantee to 
 interfere by force of arms if Turkey should be attacked. But I think the 
 noble Earl did much in the early part of his statement to do away with any 
 doubts or fears we might before have entertained upon the subject. The 
 noble Earl seemed to imply that because there was no individual guaran- 
 tee, there was no individual obligation; but he considered that a moral 
 obligation would rest upon this country which might have to be met. Now, 
 with regard to this it strikes me that if there is a moral obligation, that 
 moral obligation must entirely depend for its execution upon the circum- 
 stances which at any future time may exist. If one of those two Powers, 
 France or Prussia, were to violate the neutrality of Luxemburg, and the 
 Power which objected and protested against that violation were to appeal 
 to the other Powers, I should myself consider that there would be a moral 
 obligation upon those Powers to call upon the Power so violating the neu- 
 trahty to withdraw from its position, and to enforce that appeal if neces- 
 sary by resorting to arms. That appears to be the meaning of a moral 
 obligation, and that such is the meaning is, I think, obvious from the cir- 
 cumstances referred to by my noble Friend (Lord Houghton). I understand 
 that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated in the other House that it was 
 with the greatest doubt, hesitation, and reluctance that he acceded to the 
 proposal of the Prussian Government. The Prussian Government were 
 not content with the proposal originally made, and insisted with great 
 pertinacity on the collective guarantee, and it was upon these representa- 
 tions that Lord Stanley, with much hesitation, agreed to this collective 
 guarantee. Yet for some time we have been told, this House has been told, 
 and Europe has been told, that this article, which was demanded with so 
 much pertinacity by one Government, and assented to with so much reluc- 
 tance by another, was no more than waste paper, and that if one of these 
 Powers violated this neutrality it was immediately at an end. If this were 
 all, the article would be something less than the engagement respecting the 
 neutrality of the Duchy that already existed. I expect and hope, that the 
 article may be respected, and that the stipulations will be observed by all 
 the parties to the treaty. I do not myself believe that either France or 
 Prussia have any intention of violating their engagements with regard to 
 Luxemburg; but I think it would be a very unfortimate thing if this coun- 
 try were to be led into a mistaken notion of the nature of the obligation 
 incurred under the treaty, and thus be led so to act as to create the impres- 
 sion that we were willing to incur obligations without the intention of ful- 
 filling them when the time arrived for our so doing. I hope that no such 
 occasion may arise; but if it does arise, I trust that whatever may at the 
 
614 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 time be found to be the moral obligation of this country will be punctually 
 and faithfully performed. 
 
 Lord Lyveden said, that the term, a " collective guarantee," appeared 
 to be a misnomer for the treaty to which we had recently been parties. 
 From what had been stated it did not seem to be anything more than an 
 honourable arrangement by which each Power was bound by its own hon- 
 our to respect its stipulations, but was bound in no other way. He trusted 
 that the construction put upon the treaty by his noble Friend (Earl Russell) 
 was not the one put upon it by the Prime Minister, and that we had not 
 really incurred any such moral obligation as that to which his noble Friend 
 had alluded. 
 
 Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe addressed a few observations to the 
 House which were inaudible. 
 
 The Duke op Argyll said, that the answer which the noble Earl (the 
 Earl of Derby) had given some few weeks since to a Question which he had 
 put upon the Paper referring to this subject had created some sensation. 
 The noble Earl, in answering his Question, had not referred to what would 
 have to be done supposing the treaty were violated by one of the contract- 
 ing Powers, and the remainder called conjointly upon England to fulfil the 
 stipulations entered into. In that case he (the Duke of Argyll) believed 
 that the natural interpretation of the treaty would be that we were not only 
 morally, but also legally bound to act with the other Powers. That was not 
 the interpretation put upon it by the Government, and that was so far 
 satisfactory, because they hoped that the present Government might never 
 be called upon to take action in any way in consequence of the treaty; but 
 we had no security that any future Administration would put the same 
 interpretation upon it — they would, of course, put their own interpreta- 
 tion upon it, and act as circumstances required. 
 
 Earl Grey thought that these discussions were very greatly to be re- 
 gretted. He could only express a hope that after the explanation which 
 had been given by the noble Earl at the head of the Government the sub- 
 ject would not be pressed any further, because he felt persuaded that these 
 constant discussions were calculated to do harm, and could only lead to 
 difficulty and misunderstanding. 
 
 Lord Denman said, that guarantees seldom led to serious consequences 
 where there was perfect good faith and good-will on all sides; but he pro- 
 tested against the House discussing a question of the breach of a guarantee 
 until a breach appeared likely to take place. He was quite certain that in 
 case of the treaty being in danger, there would be a Conference of all the 
 parties to the treaty, and as the consequences of Austria not agreeing to a 
 Conference had been so serious to her, and to many States of Germany, and 
 aggression had been justified on the ground of the refusal to join one, he 
 believed that all would prefer a Conference to disunion. He thought the 
 guarantee perfectly safe, and believed that it was as advantageous to Hol- 
 land as in the case of the Quadruple Alliance, in which the contracting 
 parties bound themselves to "protect and guarantee all the dominions, 
 jurisdictions, etc., which the Lords, the States-General, possessed against 
 all persons whatsoever." 
 
 Lord Houghton, in reply, thought it would be exceedingly presump- 
 tuous in him to accept the challenge of the noble Earl opposite and place 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 615 
 
 his interpretation on the treaty, and the guarantee entered into under it. 
 Much must, of course, be left to the good sense and good feeling of the Pow- 
 ers of Europe; but he accepted the interpretation of the noble Earl (Earl 
 Russell) and of the noble Duke who followed him — that if the neutrality 
 of Luxemburg was invaded by one of the signataries to the treaty, and we 
 were called upon by the other signataries to cease amicable relations with 
 the aggressor, we should be bound in honour to answer that appeal. That, 
 he believed, was the sense in which, in this country and abroad, the treaty 
 would be generally understood. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES REGARDING THE 
 NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM i 
 
 House of Commons, August 9, 1870 
 Mr. Rylands said in part: It was only the other night, that the right hon. 
 Gentleman, the Member for Tam worth (Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer), whose 
 distinguished position gave him great authority on these subjects, had told 
 them of a remarkable circumstance which had naturally excited consider- 
 able attention in the country. His right hon. Friend had said that before 
 the ink with which the Treaty of 1831 guaranteeing Belgium was signed 
 was hardly dry, there was a negotiation between the French and Prussian 
 Ambassadors of that day to break its conditions. And just recently there 
 was the proposed Secret Treaty between France and Prussia which had 
 been brought to light not by diplomatists, but by the Press, and which gave 
 us the right to say, notwithstanding every denial and explanation, that the 
 course pursued by France and Prussia was open to grave suspicion. But 
 according to the Prime Minister, the Government had practically given up 
 a Treaty under which the independence of Belgium was guaranteed by 
 the five great Powers, for a separate Treaty with the two very Powers whose 
 agents so recently had been negotiating an infraction of the former Treaty. 
 It appeared that under the terms of the new Treaty if one of the belligerents 
 were crushed and its military forces destroyed, we were to fight alongside 
 that crushed Power, against the victorious Power, should the latter invade 
 Belgium. That was not a satisfactory position. The hon. Member for 
 Leicester seemed to think we ought to defend every small and independent 
 State against aggression; why, then, did we not interfere on behalf of 
 Schleswig-Holstein, of Hanover, and the Duchies and Archduchies which 
 were crushed out of existence by Prussia and by Italy? Did those Sover- 
 eigns not excite the sympathies of his hon. Friend? 
 
 House of Lords, August 10, 1870 ^ 
 Lord Cairns said, in part: ... Now, I can conceive nothing more likely 
 than that a skilful politician, or an ingenious strategist, would be able with- 
 out very great difficulty so to arrange matters on behalf of one of the belli- 
 gerent Powers that it would become absolutely necessary for the other belli- 
 gerent to commit some act which would be a violation of that neutraUty; 
 and then, the moment that that act was done, the cooperation of England 
 
 1 Extract from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, vol. ccin, pp. 1742-43. 
 
 2 Extracts from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, vol. cciii, pp, 1751-52, e< 
 
616 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 is secured to that belligerent who has caused and necessitated the very act 
 of which we complain. I ask your Lordships what would be the effect on 
 public opinion in this country if anything of the kind occurred? Suppose 
 one of the belligerents, by this ingenuity, — which I think would not be very 
 difficult — succeeded in making it necessary for the other belligerent, for 
 the sake of its own preservation, to do some act which would be a violation 
 of the neutrality of Belgium ; and suppose the people of this country should 
 see, as they certainly would, that the real offender was not the belligerent 
 who actually and mechanically violated the neutrality, but the other, who 
 made that act necessary; what would the country say if it found the Gov- 
 ernment engaging us in a war on behalf of and in cooperation with that 
 belligerent which was morally the guilty party in the transaction? (Pp. 
 1751-52.) 
 
 Earl Granville said, in part: My Lords, I have heard the speech of my 
 noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) with a feeling of very great relief. 
 I expected — and my expectations have certainly been justified — that he 
 would speak with that reserve and fairness towards the Government on a 
 great international question which he was likely to exhibit on such an occa- 
 sion; but I knew also that, with regard to the particular form of the pro- 
 posal, every possible objection to it would be exhausted by the ability and 
 the skill of the noble and learned Lord, and I am much relieved at finding 
 what those objections seem to be. The noble and learned Lord very fairly 
 stated what course ought, in his judgment, to have been pursued by Her 
 Majesty's Government. He said we should have entered into no engage- 
 ment whatever, but have declared, without any menace to the belligerents, 
 our determination to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. Now, I ventured 
 the other day, with regard to the question of menace, to say that I believed 
 the form in which we had put it was less menacing and less offensive to those 
 Powers than any other way in which it could have been put. I will venture 
 to explain my meaning. It is mainly a matter as to form, and not as to sub- 
 stance — because if there were a difference of substance I should own we 
 had put ourselves in the wrong. It is sometimes useful to compare the ac- 
 tion of nations and that of individuals, and very often the conduct of a high- 
 spirited nation and of an honourable man is very much the same. I will 
 suppose that one of your Lordships found two persons about to engage in a 
 duel, and at once declared to them both the obligation he would feel under 
 to strike the one who took an unfair part in that duel. I believe that would 
 be regarded by both as an imputation upon their intentions, and might al- 
 most encourage them to do that which otherwise they would have thought 
 wrong by being precluded from doing it by menace. But if, instead of that, 
 the third person says to each — "'You say, as I have every reason to be- 
 lieve, you mean to fight without any unfair play whatever; but you express 
 a suspicion that fair play will not be exhibited by the person with whom 
 you are engaged in hostilities. If it is any pleasure to you that I should 
 agree with you to strike your opponent if he begins unfair play, I will do 
 bo; but, mind, this is a bargain which I must offer to the other equally." I 
 believe that exactly in proportion as they were confident of their own good 
 faith and suspicious of the bad faith of their opponent they would accept, as 
 France and Prussia have accepted, the proposal so made to them. The 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 617 
 
 noble and learned Lord says we ought, without menace, to have told them 
 what we were going to do, and then, he says, you should have strengthened 
 yourselves by going to the other great Powers parties to the guarantee of 
 1839; and this, he says, would have strengthened our position. Now, the 
 facts as they have happened show that the course which he suggests would 
 not have been successful. I stated the other day that we had received the 
 most friendly assurances from both Russia and Austria. Now, it is rather 
 curious that we have since received from Austria her distinct readiness to 
 agree to our proposal, supposing that France and Prussia do not object to 
 sign the Treaty. So that with regard to Austria we have exactly secured the 
 very promise and consent to our proposal which she would not have given 
 to a single menace on our part. From Russia we have received the most 
 friendly assurances; but there is certainly a disinclination on the part of 
 Russia to accede to this proposal; because Russia considers, and says that 
 the original Treaty binds them, and they would wish to have an understand- 
 ing of a much wider description — on the merits of which I do not now 
 say one word, one way or the other, but which understanding would cer- 
 tainly bring us under obligations we do not hold at this moment. Russia 
 would, therefore, in the same manner, have refused simply and solely to 
 join us in a single menace with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. These 
 facts show that the course advocated by the noble and learned Lord would 
 not have been the most judicious one. (Pp. 1754-55.) 
 
 Lord Granville said, in part : . . . As to this instrument in the slight- 
 est degree weakening the effect of the previous Treaty of 1839, I entirely 
 deny it. There is an express reservation of that Treaty; and, besides that, 
 as I mentioned the other day, there is an exact precedent to this case. The 
 seventh Article of the General Treaty of Paris, of March 30, 1856, between 
 England, France, Austria, Italy, Prussia, and Russia, stipulates as follows 
 — I am afraid I must read it in French, as I have no other copy by me — 
 " Leurs Majest^s s'engagent, chacune de son cot6, h respecter I'in- 
 d^pendance et I'int^grit^ territorial^ de I'Empire Ottoman; garantis- 
 sent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et consid- 
 ereront en consequence tout acte de nature k y porter atteinte comme 
 une question d'interet g^n^ral." 
 But a fortnight after this, without any event of importance having inter- 
 vened, England, Austria, and France signed, on the 16th of April follow- 
 ing, a separate treaty, by the first Article of which — 
 
 " Les Hautes Parties contractantes garantissent solidairement entre 
 elles I'independance et Tintegrit^ de I'Empire Ottoman conserves par 
 le Traits conclu k Paris 30, Mars, 1856." 
 This, I say, is a most complete precedent, and justifies us in saying that 
 the Treaty now almost concluded does not in the slightest degree weaken 
 the guarantee, whatever that may be, which was given by the Treaty of 
 1839. (Pp. 1757-58.) 
 
 Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe said, in part: ... I cannot doubt 
 that, while standing to our guarantee of Belgian independence and neu- 
 trality without prejudice to our desire of remaining at peace, it is the object 
 of Her Majesty's Ministers no less than the feeling of the country that we 
 
618 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 should keep in our hands as far as possible the means of limiting the range 
 and continuance of the war, and of tendering our mediation with good effect 
 whenever the opportunity occurs. Supposing that either of the two great 
 parties now opposed to each other should obtain an ascendancy dangerous 
 to the balance of power in Europe, and even to the very existence of some 
 independent States, it would surely be desirable that our position should be 
 such as to offer a hmit to the excessive pretensions of victory. (Pp. 1760- 
 61.) 
 
 House of Commons, August 10, 1870} 
 Mr. Gladstone said, in part: ... I will avail myself of this opportunity 
 of expressing my opinion, if I may presume to give it, that too much has been 
 said by my hon. and gallant Friend and others of the specially distinct, sepa- 
 rate, and exclusive interest which this country has in the maintenance of the 
 neutrality of Belgium. What is our interest in maintaining the neutrality of 
 Belgium? It is the same as that of every great Power in Europe. It is con- 
 trary to the interest of Europe that there should be unmeasured aggran- 
 dizement. Our interest is no more involved in the aggrandizement supposed 
 in this particular case than is the interest of the other Powers. That it is real 
 interest, a substantial interest, I do not deny; but I protest against the 
 attempt to attach to it the exclusive character which I never knew carried 
 into the region of caricature to such a degree as it has been by my hon. and 
 gallant Friend. What is the immediate moral effect of those exaggerated 
 statements of the separate interest of England? The immediate moral 
 effect of them is this — that every effort we make on behalf of Belgium on 
 other grounds than those of interest — as well as on grounds of interest, 
 goes forth to the world as a separate and selfish scheme of ours; and that 
 which we believe to be entitled to the dignity and credit of an effort on 
 behalf of the general peace, stability, and interest of Europe actually con- 
 tracts a taint of selfishness in the eyes of other nations because of the man- 
 ner in which the subject of Belgian neutrality is too frequently treated in 
 this House. If I may be allowed to speak of the motives which have actu- 
 ated Her Majesty's Government in the matter, I would say that while we 
 have recognized the interest of England, we have never looked upon it as 
 the sole motive, or even as the greatest of those considerations which have 
 urged us forward. There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not 
 necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question 
 of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty; but I am not able to sub- 
 scribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly 
 amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee 
 is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular 
 position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting 
 on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom 
 I have been accustomed to listen — such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord 
 Palmerston — never, to my knowledge, took that rigid and, if I may ven- 
 ture to say so, that impracticable view of a guarantee. The circumstance 
 that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an impor- 
 tant fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give 
 * Extracts from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, vol. cciii, pp. 1786-89. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 619 
 
 full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the 
 force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is the common interest 
 against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever. But there 
 is one other motive, which I shall place at the head of all, that attaches 
 peculiarly to the preservation of the independence of Belgium. What is that 
 country? It is a country containing 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 of people, with 
 much of an historic past, and imbued with a sentiment of nationahty and 
 a spirit of independence as warm and as genuine as that which beats in the 
 hearts of the proudest and most powerful nations. By the regulation of its 
 internal concerns, amid the shocks of revolution, Belgiimo, through all the 
 crises of the age, has set to Europe an example of a good and stable govern- 
 ment gracefully associated with the widest possible extension of the liberty 
 of the people. Looking at a country such as that, is there any man who 
 hears me who does not feel that if, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for 
 aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgimn were absorbed, the day 
 that witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right and 
 public law in Europe? But we have an interest in the independence of Bel- 
 gium which is wider than that — which is wider than that which we may 
 have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to 
 the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, 
 endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and wit- 
 ness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of 
 history, and thus become participators in the sin? (Pp. 1786-88.) 
 
 Mr. Gladstone said, in part: ... It is said that the Treaty of 1839 
 would have sufficed, and that we ought to have announced our determina- 
 tion to abide by it. But if we were disposed at once to act upon the guaran- 
 tee contained in that Treaty, what state of circumstances does it contem- 
 plate? It contemplates the invasion of the frontiers of Belgium and the 
 violation of the neutrahty of that country by some other Power. That is 
 the only case in which we covdd have been called upon to act under the 
 Treaty of 1839, and that is the only case in which we can be called upon to 
 act under the Treaty now before the House. But in what, then, lies the 
 difference between the two Treaties? It is in this — that, in accordance 
 with our obligations, we should have had to act under the Treaty of 1839 
 without any stipulated assurance of being supported from any quarter 
 whatever against any combination, however formidable; whereas by the 
 Treaty now formally before Parliament, under the conditions laid down in 
 it, we secure powerful support in the event of our having to act — a sup- 
 port with respect to which we may well say that it brings the object in view 
 within the sphere of the practicable and attainable, instead of leaving it 
 within the sphere of what might have been desirable, but which might have 
 been most difficult, imder all the circumstances, to have reahzed. The hon. 
 Member says that by entering into this engagement we have destroyed the 
 Treaty of 1839. But if he will carefully consider the terms of this instru- 
 ment he will see that there is nothing in them calculated to bear out that 
 statement. It is perfectly true that this is a cumulative Treaty, added to 
 the Treaty of 1839, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli), 
 with perfect precision, described it. Upon that ground, I very much agree 
 with the general opinion he expressed; but, at the same time, peculiar cir- 
 
620 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 cumstances call for a departure from general rules, and the circumstances 
 are most peculiar under which we have thought it right to adopt the method 
 of proceeding which we have actually done. The Treaty of 1839 loses noth- 
 ing of its force even during the existence of this present Treaty. There is 
 no derogation from it whatever. The Treaty of 1839 includes terms which 
 are expressly included in the present instrument, lest by any chance it 
 should be said that, in consequence of the existence of this instrument, the 
 Treaty of 1839 had been injured or impaired. That would have been a mere 
 opinion; but it is an opinion which we thought fit to provide against. (Pp. 
 1788-89.) 
 
 SPEECH MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE 
 OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914 1 
 
 After discussing the obhgations of England to support France, Sir Ed- 
 ward said : And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration — becoming 
 more serious every hour — there is the question of the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium. 
 
 I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position 
 in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this 
 is a Treaty with a history — a history accumulated since. In 1870, when 
 there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrahty 
 of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things. 
 Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that, confirming his verbal 
 assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous 
 in reference to the Treaty in existence — that the German Confederation 
 and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always under- 
 stood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent 
 Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of 
 the sacredness of these Treaty rights. 
 
 What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of 
 the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and 
 Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on the 8th of 
 August, 1870, used these words. He said : — 
 
 "We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that 
 we did not think this country was bound either morally or internation- 
 ally or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neu- 
 trality of Belgium, though this course might have had some conven- 
 iences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might 
 have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her 
 Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of 
 the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the 
 country's interests." 
 Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later: — 
 
 "There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, 
 nor would time permit me, to enter into the comphcated question of 
 the nature of the obligations of that Treaty; but I am not able to sub- 
 scribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly 
 amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guar- 
 
 i Extracts relating to Belgium, London Times, August 4, 1914. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 621 
 
 antee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the 
 particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the 
 occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon 
 foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord 
 Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid 
 and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guaran- 
 tee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in 
 force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the 
 case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There 
 is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel 
 deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured 
 aggrandisement of any Power whatever." 
 The Treaty is an old Treaty — 1839 — and that was the view taken of it 
 in 1870. It is one of those Treaties which are founded, not only on considera- 
 tion for Belgium, which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of 
 those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honom- and interests 
 are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow 
 view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those 
 obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. 
 
 I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When 
 mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most im- 
 portant element in our policy — a most important subject for the House of 
 Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris 
 and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French 
 and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an 
 engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I 
 got from the French Government this reply : — 
 
 "The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of 
 Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violat- 
 ing that neutrahty that France might find herself under the necessity, 
 in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. This 
 assurance has been given several times. The President of the Repub- 
 lic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at 
 Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs to-day." 
 From the German Government the reply was: — 
 
 "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give 
 an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor." 
 Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an 
 answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The 
 German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to un- 
 derstand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any 
 reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the unde- 
 sirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. 
 I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and 
 I got the following reply fi-om Sir Francis Villiers: — 
 
 "The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the communication, 
 and replies that Belgium will, to the utmost of her power, maintaio 
 neutrality, and expects and desires other Powers to observe and uphold 
 it. He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the 
 
622 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 neighboring Powers were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect 
 their intentions, but that the Belgian Government believe, in the case 
 of violation, they are in a position to defend the neutrality of their 
 country." 
 It now appears from the news I have received to-day — which has come 
 quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me 
 in an accurate form — that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by 
 Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with 
 Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German 
 troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely 
 definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would 
 say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute 
 information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as 
 to whether if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity 
 would be preserved that would content us. We replied that we could not 
 bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutral- 
 ity. 
 
 Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following 
 telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King — 
 King George: — 
 
 "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship 
 and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 
 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make 
 a supreme appeal to the Diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's 
 Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 
 Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can 
 diplomatic intervention do now? We have great vital interests in the 
 independence — and integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium 
 is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the 
 situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her 
 neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States 
 in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they 
 should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, 
 not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be inter- 
 fered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of 
 those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its 
 neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever 
 the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. 
 
 I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought 
 about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in Hansard, volume 
 203, page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify 
 the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make 
 any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said: — 
 
 "We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider 
 than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guaranty. 
 It is found in the answer to the question whether under the circum- 
 stances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and 
 power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the 
 direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become 
 participators in the sin." 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 623 
 
 No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an 
 ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, 
 whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone 
 if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will 
 follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to con- 
 sider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and 
 death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes sub- 
 ordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself — consequences 
 which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power 
 to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she 
 has shown so often — still, if that were to happen, and if Belgiiun fell 
 under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, 
 then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us 
 there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement 
 of any power. 
 
 It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our 
 strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end 
 of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own 
 point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of 
 honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, what- 
 ever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much 
 value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And I do not believe, 
 whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a 
 position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a pow- 
 erful fleet, which we beheve able to protect our commerce, to protect our 
 shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer 
 but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. 
 
 We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are 
 in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because 
 the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. 
 Continental nations engaged in war — all their populations, all their ener- 
 gies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — they cannot carry 
 on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we 
 are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment 
 that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we 
 should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to 
 undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of 
 the West of Europe opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war 
 — falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that 
 our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only 
 say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, be- 
 cause I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they 
 have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on 
 this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those 
 facts will lead if they are undisputed. 
 
 I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken 
 definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to 
 say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an ex- 
 peditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization of the fleet has 
 taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we have as yet 
 
624 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 taken no engagement, because I do feel that in the case of a European con- 
 flagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibihties 
 in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, 
 with all the unknown factors, we must take very carefully into considera- 
 tion the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the 
 country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say. 
 
 The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The 
 general feeling throughout Ireland — and I would like this to be clearly 
 understood abroad — does not make the Irish question a consideration 
 which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how 
 far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influ- 
 ence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how 
 vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in 
 which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keep- 
 ing outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a 
 proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have 
 made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which pre- 
 vents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgimn which 
 prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those 
 conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink 
 from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take 
 that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" 
 under no conditions — the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible posi- 
 tion in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may 
 happen to France from our failure to support France — if we were to say 
 that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we 
 would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name 
 and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and 
 grave economic consequences. 
 
 GLADSTONE'S LETTER TO BRIGHT ^ 
 
 ... On July 25 the Times divulged the text of a projected agreement in 
 1869 (it was in truth 1867) between the French and Prussian Governments 
 in five articles, including one that the incorporation of Belgium by France 
 would not be objected to by Prussia. The public was shocked and startled, 
 and many were inclined to put down the document for a forgery and a hoax. 
 As a matter of fact, in substance it was neither. The Prussian Ambassador 
 a few days before had informed Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, per- 
 sonally and in strict secrecy, that the draft of such a project existed in the 
 handwriting of M. Benedetti. This private communication was taken by 
 Mr. Gladstone to have been made with the object of prompting him to be 
 the agent in producing the evil news to the world, and thus to prejudice 
 France in the judgment of Europe. He thought that no part of his duty, and 
 took time to consider it, in the expectation that it was pretty sure to find 
 its way into print by some other means, as indeed soon happened. "For 
 the sake of peace," Bismarck explained to Lord Granville (July 28, 1870), 
 
 1 Extract from The Life of William Ewari Gladstone, by John Morley. New York, 
 1911, vol. II (bound in vol. i), pp. 340-42. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 625 
 
 "I kept the secret, and treated the propositions in a dilatory manner." 
 When the British Ambassador on one occasion had tried to sound him on 
 the suspected designs of France, Bismarck answered, "It is no business of 
 mine to tell French secrets." 
 
 There were members of the Cabinet who doubted the expediency of Eng- 
 land taking any action. The real position of affairs, they argued, was not 
 altered: the draft treaty only disclosed what everybody believed before, 
 namely that France sought compensation for Prussian aggrandisement, as 
 she had secured it for Italian aggrandisement by taking Savoy and Nice. 
 That Prussia would not object, provided the compensations were not at 
 the expense of people who spoke German, had all come out at the time of 
 the Luxemburg affair. If France and Prussia agreed, how could we help 
 Belgium, unless indeed Europe joined? But, then, what chance was there 
 of Russia and Austria joining against France and Prussia for the sake of 
 Belgium, in which neither of them had any direct interest? At the same 
 time Ministers knew that the pubUc in England expected them to do some- 
 thing, though a vote for men and money would probably suffice. The Cabi- 
 net, however, advanced a step beyond a parliamentary vote. On July 30 
 they met and took a decision to which Mr. Gladstone then and always after 
 attached high importance. England proposed a treaty to Prussia and 
 France, providing that if the armies of either violated the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium, Great Britain would cooperate with the other for its defence, but 
 without engaging to take part in the general operations of the war. The 
 treaty was to hold good for twelve months after the conclusion of the war. 
 Bismarck at once came into the engagement. France loitered a little, but 
 after the battle of Worth made no more difficulty, and the instrument was 
 signed on August 9. 
 
 The mind of the Government was described by Mr. Gladstone in a letter 
 to Bright (August 1): — 
 
 " Although some members of the Cabinet were inclined on the out- 
 break of this most miserable war to make military preparations, others, 
 Lord Granville and I among them, by no means shared that disposition, 
 nor I think was the feeling of parliament that way inclined. But the 
 publication of the treaty has altered all this, and has thrown upon us 
 the necessity either of doing something fresh to secure Belgium, or else 
 of saying that under no circumstances would we take any step to se- 
 cure her from absorption. This publication has wholly altered the feel- 
 ing of the House of Commons, and no Government could at this mo- 
 ment venture to give utterance to such an intention about Belgium. 
 But neither do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to an- 
 nounce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms, and see 
 actions done which would amount to a total extinction of public right 
 in Europe." 
 The idea of engagements that might some day involve resort to force 
 made Bright uneasy, and Mr. Gladstone wrote to him again (August 4)) : — 
 " It will be a great addition to the domestic portion of the griefs of this 
 most unhappy war, if it is to be the cause of a political severance be- 
 tween you and the present Administration. To this I know you would 
 justly reply that the claims of conviction are paramount. I hope, how- 
 ever, that the moment has not quite arrived. . . . You will, I am sure, 
 
626 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 give me credit for good faith when I say, especially on Lord Granville's 
 part as on my own, who are most of all responsible, that we take this 
 step in the interest of peace. . . . The recommendation set up in oppo- 
 sition to it generally is, that we should simply declare we will defend 
 the neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it should be attacked. Now 
 the sole or single-handed defence of Belgium would be an enterprise 
 which we incline to think Quixotic; and if these two great mihtary 
 powers combined against it — that combination is the only serious 
 danger; and this it is which by our proposed engagements we should 
 I hope render improbable to the very last degree. I add for myself this 
 confession of faith. If the Belgian people desire, on their own account, 
 to join France or any other country, I for one will be no party to taking 
 up arms to prevent it. But that the Belgians, whether they would or 
 not, should go 'plump' down the maw of another country to satisfy 
 dynastic greed, is another matter. The accomplishment of such a crime 
 as this implies would come near to an extinction of public right in 
 Europe, and I do not think we could look on while the sacrifice of free- 
 dom and independence was in course of consummation." 
 
 ANGLO-BELGIAN MILITARY PREPARATIONS 
 
 Document No. 1: Report of General Ducarme, Chief of the 
 Belgian General Staff, to the Belgian Minister of Wab 
 
 Confidential 
 Letter to the Minister Concerning the Confidential Conversations 
 
 Brussels, April 10, 1906. 
 Mr. Minister: — 
 
 I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which 
 I had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and which have already been 
 the subject of my oral communications. 
 
 The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston 
 referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to 
 the general political situation, and because of the possibility that war may 
 soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 
 100,000 troops was provided for. 
 
 The Lieutenant-Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded 
 by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not be 
 but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a 
 matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to 
 inform the Minister of War about it. 
 
 Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak 
 about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops 
 would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, 
 so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the Eng- 
 lish into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality 
 by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would take much more time, because 
 larger transports would be needed, and because on the other hand the safety 
 would be less complete. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 627 
 
 This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as 
 railway transportation, the question of requisitions which the English army 
 could make, the question concerning the chief command of the allied forces. 
 
 He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the de- 
 fense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of the Eng- 
 lish troops — which he estimated to last about ten days. 
 
 I answered him that the places Namur and Liege were protected from 
 a "coup de main" and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable 
 of intervention within four days. 
 
 After having expressed his fvdl satisfaction with my explanations, my 
 visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) that our conversation was 
 entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on his Government; (3) 
 that his Minister, the English General Staff ,jhe and I were, up to the present, 
 the only ones informed about the matter; (4) that he did not know whether 
 the opinion of his Sovereign had been consulted. 
 
 In a following discussion Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me 
 that he had never received confidential reports of the other military at- 
 taches about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the Eng- 
 lish forces; we could depend on it, that in twelve or thirteen days two army 
 corps, four cavalry brigades and two brigades of horse infantry would be 
 
 He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that 
 part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give 
 me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army. 
 
 He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our field 
 army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from this 
 army' to Namur and Liege, because these places were provided with garri- 
 sons of sufficient strength. _ 
 
 He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the Eng- 
 lish army the advantages which the regulations concerning the military 
 requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the question of the chief 
 
 command. , ,, • , x • i. 
 
 I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point 
 and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully. 
 
 Later on the English Military Attach^ confirmed his former calculations: 
 twelve days would at least be necessary to carry out the landmg at the 
 French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (one to two and a 
 half months) to land 100,000 men m Antwerp. 
 
 Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of 
 the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and that it 
 would be better to proceed with these, as when the troops arrived at the 
 coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as 
 to the number of troops that could be landed daily. 
 
 As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question 
 could be easily regulated. 
 
 The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer 
 became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that one half of 
 
628 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the English army could be landed within eight days; the rest at the conclu- 
 sion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the exception of the horse infan- 
 try, which could not be counted upon until later. 
 
 In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity of know- 
 ing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the rail- 
 way transportation for every day. 
 
 The English Military Attache conversed with me about several other 
 questions, namely : — 
 
 (1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict 
 secrecy from the Press; 
 
 (2) The advantages, which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to 
 each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer and 
 gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the British police troops. 
 
 In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and 
 I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German 
 offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the German 
 troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes 
 
 In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan which I 
 had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of General 
 Grierson, Chief of the EngUsh General Staff. 
 
 Other secondary questions which were likewise settled, had particular 
 reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photo- 
 graphs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English, of some Bel- 
 gian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English 
 provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of the allied armies, etc. 
 Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity which the Government or 
 the military authorities might exert on the Press. 
 
 During the final meetings which I had with the British Attache, he in- 
 formed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily disembarked 
 at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the last place, which 
 is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The 
 first corps would be disembarked on the tenth day, and the second on the 
 fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transportation so that the 
 arrival of the first corps, either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of 
 Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the eleventh day, and that of the sec- 
 ond on the sixteenth day. 
 
 I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the 
 necessity of hastening the sea-transports so that the English troops could 
 be with us between the eleventh and twelfth days. The happiest and most 
 favorable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action 
 of the allied forces. But if that cooperation should not take place, the fail- 
 ure would be most serious. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that every- 
 thing serving to this end would be done. 
 
 In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the Brit- 
 ish Military Attache that we were willing, so far as possible, to thwart the 
 movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the be- 
 gimung. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 629 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston on his part told me that, at the time, 
 he had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of Holland. 
 At the same time he informed me that his Government mtended to transfer 
 the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as 
 soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea. 
 
 In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the 
 secret news which he had concerning the miUtary circumstances and the 
 situation of our Eastern neighbors, etc. At the same time he emphasized 
 that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself constantly 
 informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit 
 that with us the surveillance-service abroad was, m times of peace, not 
 directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our Legations had no Mili- 
 tary Attaches. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether 
 the espionage service which is prescribed in our regulations, was in working 
 order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position which 
 places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable 
 
 ^°^°^^^ ■ Major-General, Chief of the General Staff. 
 
 {Initials of General Ducarme.) 
 
 Note When I met General Grierson at Compifegne, during the manoeu- 
 vres of 1906, he assured me the result of the reoganization of the English 
 armv would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that, 
 moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been 
 assumed above. Concluded September, 1906. 
 
 {Initials of General Ducarme.) 
 
 [Document No. 2 has been given in full in Chapter IX, § 5.] 
 
 Document No. 3. Report of Baron Greindl Belgian Minister 
 inBerlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
 (Copt) 
 Section 
 
 No.' 
 
 Enclosure 
 
 Reply to No. 
 General Department 
 
 ^^""^ ^^ Berlin, December 23, 1911. 
 
 Belgian Legation, 
 No. 3022-1626. 
 
 Strictly Confidential 
 What is Belgium to do in Case of War f 
 
 ^I h^v^hrd'helionor to receive the dispatch of the 27 November last, 
 P without docket-number, registration number 1108. . . . 
 
630 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 [After the superscription and opening sentence the contents of this doc- 
 ument have not been made public except for the following extract. The 
 following explanations of the nature of this docimient and the reason for 
 withholding the remainder are given:] 
 
 On the 23d of December, 1911, Baron Greindl, then and for many years 
 Belgian Minister in Berlin, made a report to the Belgian Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs. There was found in Brussels a copy of this report; although a 
 copy, the official character of this third document found in Brussels is evi- 
 dent from the oflficial imprint on the paper on which the copy stands. 
 
 "Baron Greindl's report is an extremely long one. Extracts from it 
 were published in the North German Gazette of October 13. A facsimile 
 has been made of the first page only of the document, because of its great 
 length. 
 
 " From the French side danger threatens not only in the south of Luxem- 
 burg, it threatens us on our entire joint frontier. We are not reduced to 
 conjectures for this assertion. We have positive evidence of it. 
 
 "Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north 
 forms part of the scheme of the Entente Cordiale. If that were not the 
 case, then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such 
 an outbiirst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the 
 Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their 
 aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to Ant- 
 werp, which means to establish^in our country a basis of operation for an 
 offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to 
 make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be difficult, for, after 
 the surrender of our national center of refuge, we would, through our own 
 fault, renounce every possibility of opposing the demands of our doubtful 
 protectors after having been so unwise as to permit their entrance into our 
 country. Colonel Bamardiston's announcements at the time of the conclu- 
 sion of the Entente Cordiale, which were just as perfidious as they were 
 naive, have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became 
 evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the pretended 
 danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not entirely abandoned, 
 but modified in so far as the British army was not to land on the Belgian 
 coast, but at the nearest French harbors. 
 
 "The revelations of Captain Faber, which were denied as little as the 
 newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several 
 respects, also testify to this. This British army, at Calais and Dunkirk, 
 would by no means march along our frontier to Longway in order to reach 
 Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest. That 
 would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations immediately, 
 to encounter the Belgian army in a region where we could not depend on 
 any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, that would make 
 it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in all kinds of resources and, at 
 any rate, to prevent our mobilization or only to permit it after we had for- 
 mally pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive ad- 
 vantage of England and her allies. 
 
 " It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the Belgian 
 army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the interest of our mUi- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 631 
 
 tary defense as well as for the sake of the direction of our foreign policy, in 
 case of war between Germany and France." ^ 
 
 REMARKS INTRODUCTORY TO THE SECRET DOCU- 
 MENTS BY DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG 
 
 Herewith are published facsimiles of papers found among the docu- 
 ments of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, referring to arrangements 
 between the English Military Attache and the Belgian Minister of War re- 
 garding British intervention in Belgium. 
 
 It will be remembered from the British White Book that m November, 
 1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French 
 Minister in London, in which it was stated that British and French military 
 and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as to plans to 
 be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this correspondence that m 
 accordance with such prearranged plans the French fleet would stay m the 
 Mediterranean to safeguard the joint interests there, whereas the British 
 fleet would safeguard their interests in the north. Of this correspondence 
 the members of the British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet 
 meeting immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on 
 August 2 that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed 
 into the channel, England would give all the assistance m her power (Bri- 
 tish White Papers, no. 148), and it was also, of course, concealed from the 
 British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey on August 3. It will be 
 remembered that in consequence of this revelation the British Minister of 
 Commerce, Mr. John Bums, and two other members. Lord Morley and 
 Mr Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet under protest; that the leader of 
 the British Labor Party, Mr. Ramsey McDonald, resigned from the leader- 
 ship and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby in his famous letter denounced Su- 
 Edward Grey's practices. , .. x ^i, 
 
 Mr Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there 
 were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to 
 France's assistance and yet they found themselves now so hopeless y en- 
 tangled that as a matter of fact the British Government could not back out. 
 
 The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of mobi- 
 
 i This document with a commentary appeared in the North German GazMe of October 13. 
 1914, and is included as Exhibit 39 in the German edition of the German White Book [Deut- 
 sches Weissbuch viit nachtraglichen Erganzungeii]. The comment reads: The above exposi- 
 tion, coming from an unprejudiced source, convincingly proves the fact that the same Eng- 
 land which is now posing as the protector of Belgian neutrality, has forced Belgium to a 
 one-sided partisanship in favor of the powers of the Entente and that she at ""f /nT ^^^f^ 
 thought of a violation of the neutrality of Holland. It is, furthermore, clear that the Bel- 
 gian government, by lending an ear to the English whisperings, is guilty of a severe violation 
 of the duties incumbent upon it as a neutral power. The right fulfillment of these dut es 
 would have compelled the Belgian Government to foresee in her plans for defense the viola- 
 tion of Belgian neutrality by France and to conclude, for this eventuality, with Germany 
 agreements analogous to those concluded with France and England. The discovered offi- 
 cial papers constitute a documentary proof of the fact, well known to conipetent German au- 
 thorities, long before the outbreak of the war, that Belgium connived with the powers of the 
 Entente. They serve as a justification for our military procedure and as a confirmation of the 
 information obtained by the German military authorities about France a intentions. They 
 may open the eyes of the Belgian people with regard to the question to whom it owes the 
 catastrophe which has swept over the unfortunate country." 
 
632 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 lization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to the two 
 alUes and which include the landing of English troops in France, is now fully 
 established by the annexed documents. They show that these conversations 
 were also held with Belgium, that plans had been concerted to invade Bel- 
 gium with an army of 100,000 men by way of three French ports — viz., 
 Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne — and that the British plans even consid- 
 ered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus violating also Dutch neutrality. 
 
 The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that 
 Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in order 
 to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from 1906. 
 
 The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well-known Belgian 
 patriot, protested to his Government. The heading of his protest is also 
 given in facsimile. In it he said that it was not quite safe to trust to the 
 British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that it was not wise to 
 take all measures only against a German infraction of Belgian neutrality 
 and that the British spirit was clearly shown by the words of Colonel Bam- 
 ardiston that the Scheldt might be used for transporting troops into Bel- 
 gium. 
 
 Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French Gov- 
 ernments violently protested when the plans were made public that the 
 Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in 1906. 
 But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British went one 
 step further. When Colonel Bridges, in a conversation with General Jung- 
 bluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, said that England was ready 
 to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed, and that they would 
 land them as soon as any European conflict should break out. General 
 Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of Belgium was 
 necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it, but thought that, 
 as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect herself, England would 
 land troops anyway. General Jungbluth answered that Belgium felt strong 
 enough to protect herself, which is in keeping with her declaration to France, 
 when she offered to protect Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the 
 British White Book. The position of England was therefore that, while in 
 1906 they had already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England 
 intended action in any case, should a European conflagration break out. 
 
 Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward 
 Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to Sir 
 E. Goschen: " The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the 
 issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of interfering in it. 
 But if Germany became involved in it and then France, the issue might be 
 so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish 
 him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped 
 would continue — into thinking that we should stand aside." (British 
 White Papers, no. 89.) 
 
 This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all. It 
 only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus the 
 British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British White Book, 
 prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which she had taken 
 in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against the German inva- 
 sion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French invasion of Bel- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 633 
 
 gium. A similar agreement was suggested by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir 
 Edward Grey on August 1, 1914, as reported in the English White Book, 
 no. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey whether if Germany gave 
 a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality England would engage to remain 
 neutral, upon which Grey repUed that he could not say that. 
 
 It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of a Ger- 
 man war that was sure to be brought about by Russia's mobilization against 
 Germany, England would go to war against Germany, and it has been 
 proved that the English assiu-ance to that effect has strengthened the hands 
 of the Russian war party, which thereupon got the upper hand and forced 
 the Russian Czar into the war. (See report of Belgian Charge d 'Affaires at 
 St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.) 
 
 In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without 
 Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's neutrality, 
 in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were marching through 
 Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been made in 1912 or any 
 time thereafter until August 4 in the German Reichstag. It is further 
 evident that as soon as Russia mobilized, Germany would have to fight 
 Russia as well as France and England and that in such a fight she was 
 forced to draw quickly when she saw her enemies reaching for their hip 
 pockets. And only the prompt action at Liege that put this important rail- 
 way center commanding the railway connections to France and Germany 
 into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium. 
 
 The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the first 
 place, in making and concerting plans with the English and French Govern- 
 ments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of the French mobi- 
 lization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be presumed that the 
 conference between British and French experts was unknown to the British 
 Military Attach^ in Brussels. It is furthermore impossible to believe that 
 the French railway for the shipping of British troops from Calais, Dunkirk 
 and Boulogne into Belgium in Belgian cars could have been used without 
 the knowledge of the French authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not 
 heed the advice of Baron Greindl and did not try to insure her independence 
 in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract 
 with her. This disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversation 
 had a purely defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one- 
 sidedness of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all 
 Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier. 
 
 The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that Ger- 
 many demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans 
 against the French and the English, and the truth had become known only 
 three full months later, when the Belgian Gray Book was published. Then 
 Belgium was practically occupied territory. While Belgium pretended neu- 
 trality and friendship toward Germany, it was secretly planning for her de- 
 feat in a war which was considered unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, 
 however, must suffer because of the large ambitions of King Leopold of 
 Congo fame and of a broken-down diplomacy. 
 
 The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof 
 that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This 
 proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the Chan- 
 
634 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 cellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had to 
 regret that it violated international law. This law of necessity has been 
 recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent statesman, including 
 Gladstone, and by all teachers of international law, even by the United 
 States Supreme Court's decision, volume 130, page 601, stating in regard to 
 the treaty with China concerning Chinese immigration into the United 
 States: " It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the 
 Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of 
 the country, but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify 
 the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the in- 
 terests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unex- 
 pected events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to 
 strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered in 1908, 
 may be cited, stating that, " while it would be a matter of the utmost grav- 
 ity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a pre- 
 rogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting 
 its independence." 
 
 We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves. 
 
 VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY BY ENGLAND 
 AND BELGIUM ^ 
 
 The assertion of the British Government that the violation of Belgian 
 neutrality by Germany has caused England's intervention in the present 
 war has already, through Sir Edward Grey's own statements, been proven 
 untenable. The moral indignation with which the entrance of German 
 troops into Belgium was utilized by England to create ill-feeling against 
 Germany in the neutral countries undergoes a new and peculiar elucidation 
 through certain documents which the German army administration dis- 
 covered in the archives of the Belgian General Army Staff in Brussels. 
 
 From the contents of a portfolio which bears the title Intervention An- 
 glaise en Belgique, — English intervention in Belgium, — it is clear that 
 as early as 1906 the dispatch of an English expeditionary force to Belgium 
 in case of a Franco-German war had been arranged for. According to a 
 report dated April 10, 1906, the Chief of the Belgian General Army Staff, 
 in collaboration with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, at that time Brit- 
 ish Military Attach^ in Brussels, had, at the latter's instigation, in repeated 
 conferences drawn up a detailed plan for the joint operation of an English 
 expeditionary corps of 100,000 troops with the Belgian army against Ger- 
 many. The plan was approved by the Chief of the English General Staff, 
 Major-General Grierson. The Belgian General Army Staff was furnished 
 with all the data concerning the strength and composition of the various 
 parts of the British army, the composition of the expeditionary corps, the 
 ports for debarkation, together with an exact computation with regard to 
 the time of transportation, etc. On the basis of these data the Belgian 
 General Army Staff had made careful preparations for the transportation 
 of the English troops into the Belgian line of defense, for their quartering 
 
 1 This is the translation, given out by the German Information Service, of Exhibit 38 of 
 the German White Book [Deutsches Weissbuch mil nachtrdglichen Erganzungen], which was 
 printed in the North German Gazette of October 13, 1914, as an officially inspired statement. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 635 
 
 and provisioning. The plans for this cooperation were carefully worked out 
 to the last detail. For instance, a large number of interpreters and Belgian 
 gendarmes were to be put at the disposal of the English forces and the neces- 
 sary maps delivered to them. Even for the care of the English wounded 
 provision had been made. 
 
 Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne had been decided upon as the points of 
 landing for the British troops. From there they were to be brought by 
 Belgian railways to the line of defense. The fact that it had been decided 
 to land those troops in French ports and transport them through French 
 territory proves that the English-Belgian arrangement had been preceded 
 by an agreement with the French General Army Staff. Those three powers, 
 then, had minutely determined the plans for a cooperation of the "allied 
 armies," as they are termed in the document. The fact that a map for use 
 in the French border mobilization was foimd in the secret archives also tes- 
 tifies to this. 
 
 The above-mentioned report contains several remarks of special interest. 
 In one place it is stated that Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had made 
 the remark that the support of Holland could not be counted on at the time. 
 He had, moreover, given the confidential information that the British 
 Government had the intention of establishing the basis for the English 
 supplies in Antwerp as soon as the North Sea should be swept clean of Ger- 
 man warships. Furthermore, the British Military Attach^ proposed the 
 establishment of a Belgian spy service in the German Rhine province. 
 
 The above-mentioned plans, discovered at Brussels, are supplemented in 
 a most striking manner by a diplomatic document, likewise found among 
 the secret papers. This is a report of Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian 
 Envoy in Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the 
 writer reveals with great astuteness the ulterior motives underlying the 
 English proposal and draws attention to the danger of the situation in which 
 Belgium had become involved by a one-sided partisanship in favor of the 
 powers of the Entente. In this very detailed report, dated December 23, 
 1911 (which may be published in full at some future opportunity). Baron 
 Greindl explains that the plan of the General Army Staff for the defense of 
 Belgian neutrality in a Franco-German war as communicated to him only 
 concerned the question as to what military measures should be adopted in 
 case Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The hypothesis of a French 
 attack on Germany through Belgium had, however, just as much probabil- 
 ity in itself. 
 
 STATEMENT OF M. HAVENITH, BELGIAN MINISTER TO 
 
 THE UNITED STATES, REGARDING THE PUBLICATION 
 
 OF THE BELGIAN DOCUMENTS WITH EXPLANATION 
 
 BY DR. DERNBURGi 
 
 The German Government has at last decided to publish the documents 
 which it says were found in Brussels, and which it claims prove that Bel- 
 gium violated her neutrality. 
 
 As the Belgian Government has no press bureau in the United States to 
 > From the New York TitTiea. December 22, 1914. 
 
636 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 disseminate its views, the Legation of the King will, on this one occasion, 
 respond to the communication published in the American newspapers on 
 behalf of Germany. 
 
 The Belgian Minister does not know whether or not these published docu- 
 ments are authentic; but, far from discussing their authenticity, he declares 
 that if he had had them in his possession he would have published them long 
 ago, as they constitute the strongest proof of the innocence of the Belgian 
 Government. 
 
 It seems unnecessary that these documents should have been pubhshed 
 
 with a preface of long explanations. The text itself is the interesting part, 
 
 and there seems no need to teach the American people to read or to think. 
 
 Document No. 1 refers to a conversation between Major-General Du- 
 
 carme and the English Military Attach^, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston. 
 
 " The English Military Attach^ went to call on the Belgian General 
 
 and told him of the anxiety on the part of the English General Staff 
 
 in regard to the general political situation and the possibility of war. 
 
 In case Belgium should be attacked the sending of about 100,000 
 
 troops was provided for. 
 
 " He [the British Military Attache] proceeded in the following terms: 
 
 'The landing of the British troops would take place on the French 
 
 coast. . . . The entry of the English into Belgium would take place 
 
 only after the violation of our [Belgian] neutrality by Germany.' " 
 
 It almost seems as if Colonel Barnardiston had foreseen the future. The 
 
 document continues as follows: — 
 
 "My visitor laid emphasis on the following fact: That it was not 
 binding on his Government." 
 It was thus clearly shown by the British Military Attache that his com- 
 munication was simply a conversation ; it is, moreover, perfectly well known 
 that military attaches have no power to make conventional agreements. 
 The document further continues: — 
 
 " In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard- 
 iston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event 
 of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object, and under the hypo- 
 thesis of the German troops marching through our [Belgium] country 
 in order to reach the French Ardennes; " 
 — an additional proof that the object of the conversation was solely to 
 prevent a violation of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 Document 2 refers to a conversation between the British Military At- 
 tach6 and General Jungbluth, in which the former said that the British 
 troops would effect a landing even if we [the Belgians] did not ask for 
 assistance. This is an additional proof that no agreement or convention 
 had been made. 
 
 To this the Belgian General replied that our [Belgium's] consent was 
 necessary, and he added that we [Belgians] were, moreover, perfectly able 
 to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium, showing his anxiety 
 to preserve the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 Document 3 contains, according to Dr. Dernburg, the personal views of 
 the Belgian Minister in Berlin, but it does not in any way indicate the exist- 
 ence of an agreement between Belgium and England against Germany. 
 The Belgian Minister is unable to see how it can be said that these docu- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 637 
 
 ments constitute a proof of an agreement between England and Belgium 
 against Germany, unless one accepts the idea that Germany had a right to 
 violate Belgium's neutrality, and that all measures taken as a precaution 
 against violation of neutrality must therefore have been taken against Ger- 
 many. 
 
 The documents contain merely conversations between military officers in 
 regard to a possible future cooperation of their armies in the event of viola- 
 tion of Belgian territory by Germany. They never even resulted in an 
 agreement between those Governments, military attaches having no au- 
 thority to make such agreements. 
 
 The events that happened last August and the sudden invasion of Bel- 
 gium by Germany show that the British Government was fully justified in 
 fearing the violation of Belgian territory by Germany. It seems incredible, 
 after what has passed, that the German Government should denounce the 
 British Government for approaching the Belgian military officers and tak- 
 ing precautions against the very thing which eventually happened. 
 
 In the preface published with the documents it is said that "only the 
 prompt action at Liege that put this important railway center commanding 
 the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands pre- 
 vented the English landing and invading Belgium." 
 
 It is impossible to conceive how the taking of Liege prevented the Eng- 
 lish from landing and invading Belgium. That statement is hardly a com- 
 pliment to the intelligence or the geographical knowledge of the American 
 people. The fact is that Liege was taken a long time before the British 
 troops arrived at Calais, and it is still to-day in the hands of the Germans, 
 without in the least interfering with the arrival of British reinforcements in 
 France and in the territory still left in the possession of Belgium. 
 
 The fact is that Liege was not taken to prevent the British from entering 
 Belgium, but because it was part of the plan of the German Staff to invade 
 Belgium at once, and, marching across her territory, to crush the army of 
 France as soon as possible, and then turn to attack the Russians on the 
 east. Did not Herr von Jagow say to the British Ambassador that the 
 shortest and easiest way was through Belgium? 
 
 The truth is that every step taken by Germany was a clear indication of 
 her intentions against Belgium. Her strategic railroads are concentrated 
 on the Belgian frontier, and her military writers, Von Bemhardi, Von 
 Schliefenbach, and Von der Goltz, made no secret of her plan to carry on 
 her war by means of an invasion of Belgium's neutral country. Events 
 have shown how, long before the war, preparations had been made to carry 
 this plan into effect. 
 
 Dr. Dernburg says that the one-sidedness of the Belgian inclination is 
 indicated by the placing of all Belgian fortresses on the eastern frontier. 
 The distinguished statesman (apparently confused by the ardor of discus- 
 sion) has already in another article, published in The Independent of Decem- 
 ber 7, 1914, placed Antwerp at the mouth of the Rhine; to-day he places 
 Namur on the German frontier, whereas that fortress is situated near the 
 frontier of France. There are two fortresses in East Belgium — Liege and 
 Namur; Namur being near the French frontier, could menace Germany 
 only in case the Germans should have penetrated about one third of Bel- 
 gium. It is, in fact, a fortress against France. 
 
638 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 No proof has been brought forward to show that if Germany had not 
 invaded Belgium, France or England would have done so. 
 
 The advocates of Germany cite a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States and attempt to apply it to the case of Germany's violation 
 of Belgian neutrality and to justify Germany by the law of necessity. The 
 example chosen (the Chinese question) does not involve massacres, bom- 
 bardments, nor the burning of towns. It is not an analogous case. The 
 following would be a closer analogy to Germany's action in regard to Bel- 
 gium: A man, pretending that he has been attacked in the street by a power- 
 ful enemy, claims that he is justified in killing an innocent person if by 
 doing so he gets the best of his adversary. 
 
 I do not believe that any one could produce a decision of the Supreme 
 Court justifying a crime on the plea that the perpetration of the crime was 
 advantageous to the culprit who committed it. 
 
 When a nation has to resort to such arguments to defend its actions, it 
 must realize that its case is desperate. 
 
 Germany has converted smiling and peaceful Belgium into a land of sor- 
 row, of mourning, and of ruins. There is not a family that does not mourn 
 one of its dear ones. In the face of the indignation which has aroused the 
 world, Germany to-day endeavors to refute the accusation which rises 
 against her from so many tombs, and she endeavors to throw upon the 
 innocent the terrible responsibihty of her own crimes. 
 
 The Belgian Minister cannot believe that this course of action will win 
 back Germany the sympathy which she has lost throughout the world. 
 
 THE NATURE OF NEUTRALITY ^ 
 
 . . . Civilized nations cannot permit barbarities to be perpetrated by 
 their next-door neighbors, any more than individuals living in a commun- 
 ity can tolerate lawlessness on the part of other persons. Hence arise the 
 rights of supervision, intervention, and compulsory reform; rights which, 
 upon close analysis, are found to be rather of the nature of public duties. 
 
 International Intervention and Sttpervision 
 It was in pursuance of this line of obligation, that the so-called " Concert 
 of Europe" was formed, a syndicate of the Great Powers acting — nomi- 
 nally at least — for the purpose of enforcing order in less perfectly organ- 
 ized and less highly developed States, whose conduct had become intoler- 
 able; but, unfortunately, this concert was so frequently actuated in its 
 operations by conflicting national interests as to defeat in great measure 
 the reforms which it professed to be aiming to accomplish. More recently, 
 the United States, in the interest of tranquillity and humanity, without in 
 the least wishing to extend its territories, — but not always fully under- 
 stood by others as respects its philantliropic motives, — has twice occu- 
 pied and attempted to regenerate Cuba, and is at present undertaking to 
 maintain order in the Philippines. 
 
 It cannot be doubted that these supervisory undertakings are, to a cer- 
 tain extent, guarantees that juristic principles will be applied in portions 
 
 » Extract from World Organization as Affected by the Nature of the Modem State, by David 
 Jayne Hill. New York, 1911, pp. 140-43. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 639 
 
 of the world not yet completely brought under the rule of justice as opposed 
 to the rule of force. In so far as they are loyal to the high sense of duty 
 which justifies them, they are to be commended; and should be recognized 
 as among the tasks which fall to the elder brothers in the family of man- 
 kind. But it is important that here also international guarantees should be 
 given. As an evidence of high and imselfish purpose, the best forna of 
 guarantee is the open door of trade, the equality of rights for all nations 
 in the domain of business enterprise, each protecting State taking only bo 
 much revenue from the inhabitants as may be necessary for the support of 
 its administration. By this method, all the outlying portions of the world 
 which might otherwise become the field of conflicting national interests, 
 and even of armed strife, may be taken out of the arena of dispute, and 
 placed under a just and educative police surveillance useful to their m- 
 habitants and beneficial to all mankind. 
 
 The Principle of Neutralization 
 Independent States, which have proved their capacity to maintain a 
 responsible government, being members of the society of States, possess 
 equally perfect rights, without regard to the size of their territory or the 
 extent of their population. Some of them may, however, from a material 
 point of view, require special guarantees of rights which unaided they might 
 not be able to defend against foreign aggression. This necessity has been 
 in some cases recognized, and provided for by " neutralization ; that is, 
 certain States have been declared "neutral" in the conflicts that may arise 
 between their more powerful neighbors, and their independence has by 
 special compacts been taken under the united protection of the guarantors. 
 Thus Switzerland since 1815, Belgium since 1831, and Luxemburg since 
 1867 _ while retaining their entii-e poUtical independence, which is guaran- 
 teed by the Greater Powers — are by treaty rendered perpetually neutral. 
 While this arrangement prevents making their territories the scene of hos- 
 tilities, it does not deprive these States of the right of self-defence. On the 
 contrar>^ it imposes upon them the duty of defending their neutrality to 
 the best of their ability ; but, as they enjoy the guarantee of the Powers that 
 they will aid them in this respect, it is improbable that their neutrality will 
 ever be violated. During the entire period since the neutralization of the 
 three countries just named, their right of neutrality has been uniformly 
 
 By the neutralization of these countries, the Powers which border upon 
 them have voluntarily renounced an apparent advantage in case of war; 
 for if this restriction did not exist, the border State that could soonest 
 mobilize its forces and take possession of the adjacent territory could 
 thereby cover its own frontiers from attack, and thus obtam a considerable 
 strategic advantage. It is evident, however, that, if defence is the object 
 in question, it is greatly promoted by the erection of such moral barriers; 
 for neutralization not only limits the field of hostilities but diminishes the 
 avenues through which invasion is legally possible. There can be no doubt, 
 that in every instance where neutralization has been applied, the arrange- 
 ment has been a wise and useful one for all the Powers concerned. 
 
 1 For the neutraUzation treaties, with comments, see Wicker, Neutralization. London and 
 New York, 1911. 
 
640 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 "THE ALLEGED INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF- 
 PRESERVATION " » 
 
 The objections which we have urged against the general doctrine of the 
 inherent rights of states must now be followed by an examination of the 
 one of those rights which is recognized on all hands as being the most im- 
 portant, that of self-preservation. We will take the account of what we 
 oppose from Rivier, honoris causa, and especially because of his authority 
 in Roman law, the doctrine of which with regard to individuals has been 
 made a foundation for what is asserted in the case of states. 
 
 "When," Rivier says, a "conflict arises between the right of self- 
 preservation of a state and the duty of that state to respect the right 
 of another, the right of self-preservation overrides the duty. Primum 
 vivere. A man may be free to sacrifice himself . It is never permitted to a 
 government to sacrifice the state of which the destinies are confided 
 to it. The government is then authorized, and even in certain circum- 
 stances bound, to violate the right of another country for the safety 
 (salut) of its own. That is the excuse of necessity, an application of the 
 reason of state. It is a legitimate excuse." ^ 
 We will here pause to remark that an argument which may be good as 
 between a state and a government entrusted by it with its destinies is not 
 necessarily good between it and that government together and another 
 state; or we may put it that no state can entrust its government with wider 
 powers than itself possesses. But Rivier adds: — 
 
 "The excuse of necessity has always been allowed to private persons; 
 a/ortiori it will not be refused to states. — Ulpian,!. 29, Sec. S, Ad legem 
 Aquiliam, 9, 2: Item Labeo scribit si, cum vi ventorum navis impulsa 
 esset in Junes anchoranim alterius el nautae funes praecidissent, si nvllo 
 alio modo nisi praecisis funibus explicare se potuit, nullam actionem 
 dandam. The same, 1. 49, Sec. 1, same title." ' 
 In the case so put by Labeo there seems to have been an accidental physi- 
 cal entanglement of two ships which had to be ended in one way or another, 
 but the cases in which the right of self-preservation is invoked to justify 
 the political action of a state are those in which action clearly aggressive in 
 its external character, and not demanded by any physical necessity, is as- 
 serted to fall in its intrinsic character within that right. There, whatever 
 may have been the Roman law, British law does not permit a man to ward 
 off danger from himself by transferring it to an innocent person. If he has 
 preserved himself by action externally aggressive against another, he can- 
 not justify his action as intrinsically defensive unless the person against 
 whom it was directed was in fault towards him. Thus it has been held in 
 England that, when a shipwrecked crew is in danger of starvation, it is not 
 lawful for them to kill and eat one of their number, however pressing the 
 necessity.* And it has been held in Scotland that a ship, in harbour during 
 
 1 Extract from John Westlake, International Law, Part i, "Peace." Cambridge, 1910, 
 pp. 309, 310, 311, 312. 
 
 * Principes du Droit des Gens, t. i, p. 277. [Westlake's note.] 
 « Ibid., p. 278. [Westlake's note.] 
 
 * Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273; decided unanimously by Lord Chief Jus- 
 tice Coleridge, Justices Grove and Denman, and Barons Pollock and Huddleston. Their 
 lordships stated that they had Justice Stephen's authority for repudiating an inference in 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 641 
 
 a gale and in want of searoom, may not cut the ropes of another ship and 
 send her adrift even though it is her only means of escape, but must pay 
 compensation. 1 Liability to suffer hurt, whether in person, in property or 
 in rights, and whether by sentence of law or by private action which the 
 law permits, presupposes a duty violated by the person who is to suffer it. 
 When a small injury is inflicted in obedience to an almost irresistible im- 
 pulse, the law may overlook it, but in principle we may not hurt another 
 or infringe his rights, even for our self-preservation, when he has not failed 
 in any duty towards us. 
 
 Self-preservation, when carried beyond this point, is a natural impulse, 
 an effect of the laws to which human nature is subject in the stage of ad- 
 vancement to which it has yet attained. But the office of jural law is not 
 to register and consecrate the effect of the laws of nature, but to control 
 them by the introduction of the principle of justice, where an unreflecting 
 submission to the tendencies which in their untamed state they promote 
 would be destructive of society. In that way human nature itself has been 
 gradually improved, and we may hope will continue to be so; but the con- 
 trast between, on the one hand, the generalisations which express whatever 
 with regard to self-preservation may be its actual condition from time to 
 time, and on the other hand the rules to be enforced by government on the 
 same subject, furnish an instructive instance of the difference, too often over- 
 looked, between the laws of nature, which are the generalised expression of 
 what is, and jural laws, which lay down what is to be done.^ In the case of a 
 state the impulse or tendency which justice must control is not even that 
 which arises spontaneously on the appearance of danger to natural life or 
 individual welfare, but that which arises from the secondary attachment 
 formed to human institutions. No doubt the state is of all human institu- 
 tions that to which attachment is the most elevating to the emotions and 
 the moral sentiments, especially when, as is the case of most states, its ori- 
 gin is so remote that the steps which have led up to it are forgotten, and it 
 wears the semblance of being a mould appointed by superior power for the 
 feelings of its members to take shape from. Then those feelings, directed 
 towards it, come nearest to pure altruism, having the smallest ingredient of 
 satisfaction for ourselves or in our own work. But even then, although as a 
 general rule we must admit the truth of Wolff's principle, that a state ought 
 to preserve and perfect itself as an association of its citizens in order to 
 promote their common good, patriotism should not allow us to forget that 
 even our own good, and still less that of the world, does not always and 
 imperatively require the maintenance of our state,' still less its maintenance 
 
 favor of the contrary opinion which had been drawn from some passages in his writings 
 (p. 286). [Westlake's note.] 
 
 1 Currie v. Allan, 31 Scottish Law Reporter, 814. See the article on that case in 6 Juridical 
 Review, 354-61, in which Mr. W. Galbraith Meller criticizes the common view of the 
 Roman law. [Westlake's note.] 
 
 ' See Westlake: International Law, part I, p. 5. [Westlake's note.] 
 
 ' Rivier gets a glimpse of this. Un Hat peut-il perdre son droit d Vexistence, en itre dSclarS 
 d&chuf C'est a quoi s'exposerait sans doute celui qui violerait d'une mani&re persistante les 
 regies du droit des gens, qui agirait contrairement d toute bonne foi, d toute humaniti; il se met- 
 trait ainsi hors du droit des gens, hors la loi internationalc. Immediately, however, he seems 
 to set upaga in the absolute right to existence, by asking mais qui sera juge.f (Principes du 
 Droit des Gens, t. i, p. 256.) If such a case arose, as it may arise with regard to Turkey, the 
 states called on by the circumstances to deal with it must in the present imperfect organiza- 
 
642 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 in its actual limits and with undiminished resources. The first interest of a 
 society, national or international, is justice; and justice is violated when any 
 state which has not failed in its duty is subjected to aggression intended for 
 the preservation or perfection of another. 
 
 THE QUEEN v. DUDLEY AND STEPHENS » 
 
 Indictment for the murder of Richard Parker on the high seas within 
 the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. 
 
 At the trial before Huddleston, B., at the Devon and Cornwall Winter 
 Assizes, November 7, 1884, the jury, at the suggestion of the learned judge, 
 found the facts of the case in a special verdict which stated "that on July 
 5, 1884, the prisoners, Thomas Dudley and Edward Stephens, with one 
 Brooks, all able-bodied English seamen, and the deceased also an English 
 boy, between seventeen and eighteen years of age, the crew of an English 
 yacht, a registered English vessel, were cast away in a storm on the high 
 seas 1600 miles from the Cape of Good Hope, and were compelled to put 
 into an open boat belonging to the said yacht. That in this boat they had no 
 supply of water and no supply of food, except two 1 lb. tins of turnips, and 
 for three days they had nothing else to subsist upon. That on the fourth 
 day they caught a small turtle, upon which they subsisted for a few days, 
 and this was the only food they had up to the twentieth day when the act 
 now in question was committed. That on the twelfth day the remains of 
 the turtle were entirely consumed, and for the next eight days they had 
 nothing to eat. That they had no fresh water, except such rain as they from 
 time to time caught in their oilskin capes. That the boat was drifting on 
 the ocean, and was probably more than 1000 miles away from land. That 
 on the eighteenth day, when they had been seven days without food and 
 five without water, the prisoners spoke to Brooks as to what should be 
 done if no succour came, and suggested that some one should be sacrificed to 
 save the rest, but Brooks dissented, and the boy, to whom they were under- 
 stood to refer, was not consulted. That on the 24th of July, the day before 
 the act now in question, the prisoner Dudley proposed to Stephens and 
 Brooks that lots should be cast who should be put to death to save the 
 rest, but Brooks refused to consent, and it was not put to the boy, and in 
 point of fact there was no drawing of lots. That on that day the prisoners 
 spoke of their having families, and suggested it would be better to kill the 
 boy that their lives should be saved, and Dudley proposed that if there was 
 no vessel in sight by the morrow morning the boy should be killed. That 
 next day, the 25th of July, no vessel appearing, Dudley told Brooks that 
 he had better go and have a sleep, and made signs to Stephens and Brooks 
 that the boy had better be killed. The prisoner Stephens agreed to the act, 
 but Brooks dissented from it. That the boy was then lying at the bottom 
 of the boat quite helpless, and extremely weakened by famine and by drink- 
 ing sea water, and unable to make any resistance, nor did he ever assent to 
 
 tion of the world be the judges of their own political action, as the great powers were in 1815, 
 when they justly determined to exclude Napoleon from the throne of France, whatever 
 other government France might give herself. (Westlake's note.] 
 
 I Law Reports of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Queen's Bench Division, vol. xiv, 
 pp. 273-83. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 643 
 
 his being killed. The prisoner Dudley offered a prayer asking forgiveness 
 for them all if either of them should be tempted to commit a rash act, and 
 that their souls might be saved. That Dudley, with the assent of Stephens, 
 went to the boy, and telling him that his time was come, put a knife mto 
 his throat and killed him then and there; that the three men fed upon the 
 body and blood of the boy for four days; that on the fourth day after the 
 act had been committed the boat was picked up by a passing vessel, and the 
 prisoners were rescued, still alive, but in the lowest state of prostration. 
 That they were carried to the port of Falmouth, and committed for trial at 
 Exeter. That if the men had not fed upon the body of the boy they would 
 probably not have survived to be so picked up and rescued, but would 
 within the four days have died of famine. That the boy, being in a much 
 weaker condition, was likely to have died before them. That at the time of 
 the act in question there was no sail in sight, nor any reasonable prospect 
 of relief. That under these circumstances there appeared to the prisoners 
 every probability that unless they then fed or very soon fed upon the boy 
 or one of themselves they would die of starvation. That there was no 
 appreciable chance of saving life except by kiUing some one for the others 
 to eat. That assuming any necessity to kill anybody, there was no greater 
 necessity for killing the boy than any of the other three men. But whether, 
 upon the whole matter by the jurors found, the killing of Richard Parker 
 by Dudley and Stephens be felony and murder, the jurors are ignorant, 
 and pray the advice of the Court thereupon, and if upon the whole matter 
 the Court shall be of opinion that the killing of Richard Parker be felony 
 and murder, then the jurors say that Dudley and Stephens were each guilty 
 of felony and murder as alleged in the indictment." 
 
 The learned judge then adjourned the assizes until the 25th of Novem- 
 ber at the Royal Courts of Justice. On the application of the Crown they 
 were again adjourned to the 4th of December, and the case ordered to be 
 argued before a Court consisting of five judges. 
 
 [After hearing argument of counsel. Lord Coleridge, Chief Justice, deliv- 
 ered the unanimous opinion of the court. The Chief Justice reviewed the 
 arguments brought forward for the defendants. He declared that the ob- 
 jections to the jurisdiction of the court were not well taken and that there 
 were no precedents to guide the court. In regard to the opinion of Lord 
 Bacon Lord Coleridge said:] _ 
 
 "The one real authority of former time is Lord Bacon, who, in his com- 
 mentary on the maxim, 'necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata,' 
 lays down the law as follows : — ' Necessity carrieth a privilege in itself. 
 Necessity is of three sorts — necessity of conservation of life, necessity of 
 obedience, and necessity of the act of God or of a stranger. Fu-st of conser- 
 vation of life; if a man steal viands to satisfy his present hunger, this is no 
 felony nor larceny. So if divers be in danger of drowning by the casting 
 away of some boat or barge, and one of them get to some plank, or on the 
 boat's side to keep himself above water, and another to save his life thrust 
 him from it, whereby he is drowned, this is neither se defendendo nor by 
 misadventure, but justifiable.' On this it is to be observed that Lord Bacon's 
 proposition that stealing to satisfy hunger is no larceny is hardly supported 
 by Staundforde, whom he cites for it, and is expressly contradicted by Lord 
 Hale in the passage already cited. And for the proposition as to the plank 
 
644 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 or boat, it is said to be derived from the canonists. At any rate he cites no 
 authority for it, and it must stand upon his own. Lord Bacon was great 
 even as a lawyer; but it is permissible to much smaller men, relying upon 
 principle and on the authority of others, the equals and even the superiors 
 of Lord Bacon as lawyers, to question the soundness of his dictum. There 
 are many conceivable states of things in which it might possibly be true, 
 but if Lord Bacon meant to lay down the broad proposition that a man 
 may save his life by killing, if necessary, an innocent and unoffending neigh- 
 bor, it certainly is not law at the present day." 
 
 [The conclusion of the judgment was as follows]: 
 
 "Now, except for the purpose of testing how far the conservation of a 
 man's own life is in all cases and under all circumstances, an absolute, un- 
 qualified, and paramount duty, we exclude from our consideration all the 
 incidents of war. We are dealing with a case of private homicide, not one 
 imposed upon men in the service of their Sovereign and in the defence of 
 their country. Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this un- 
 oflfending and unresisting boy was clearly murder, unless the killing can be 
 justified by some well-recognised excuse admitted by the law. It is further 
 admitted that there was in this case no such excuse, unless the killing was 
 justified by what has been called 'necessity.' But the temptation to the 
 act which existed here was not what the law has ever called necessity. Nor 
 is this to be regretted. Though law and morality are not the same, and 
 many things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the abso- 
 lute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such 
 divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case were to be 
 held by law an absolute defence of it. It is not so. To preserve one's life is 
 generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and the highest duty 
 to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in which it is a man's duty not to live, 
 but to die. The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the 
 crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and children, as in the noble 
 case of the Birkenhead; these duties impose on men the moral necessity, 
 not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others, from 
 which in no country, least of all, it is to be hoped, in England, will men ever 
 shrink, as indeed, they have not shrunk. It is not correct, therefore, to say 
 that there is any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve one's life. 
 'Necesse est ut cam, non ut vivam,' is a saying of a Roman officer quoted 
 by Lord Bacon himself with high eulogy in the very chapter on necessity to 
 which so much reference has been made. It would be a very easy and cheap 
 display of commonplace learning to quote from Greek and Latin authors, 
 from Horace, from Juvenal, from Cicero, from Euripides, passage after 
 passage, in which the duty of dying for others has been laid down in glow- 
 ing and emphatic language as resulting from the principlesof heathen ethics; 
 it is enough in a Christian country to remind ourselves of the Great Ex- 
 ample whom we profess to follow. It is not needful to point out the awful 
 danger of admitting the principle which has been contended for. Who is 
 to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the compara- 
 tive value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what? 
 It is plain that the principle leaves to him who is to profit by it to determine 
 the necessity which will justify him in deliberately taking another's life to 
 save his own. In this case the weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 645 
 
 was chosen. Was it more necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? 
 The answer must be ' No ' — 
 
 " ' So spake the Fiend, and with necessity. 
 
 The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds.' 
 
 It is not suggested that in this particular case the deeds were 'devilish,' 
 but it is quite plain that such a principle once admitted might be made the 
 legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime. There is no safe path 
 for judges to tread but to ascertain the law to the best of their abiUty and 
 to declare it according to their judgment; and if in any case the law appears 
 to be too severe on individuals, to leave it to the Sovereign to exercise that 
 prerogative of mercy which the Constitution has intrusted to the hands 
 fittest to dispense it. • • u 
 
 " It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be an 
 excuse for crime it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; how awful 
 the suffering; how hard in such trials to keep the judgment straight and the 
 conduct pure. We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach 
 ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But 
 a man has no right to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might 
 himself have yielded to it, nor allow compassion for the criminal to change 
 or weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime. It is therefore 
 our duty to declare that the prisoners' act in this case was wilful murder, 
 that the facts as stated in the verdict are no legal justification of the homi- 
 cide; and to say that in our unanimous opinion the prisoners are upon this 
 special verdict guilty of murder." i 
 
 [The following note was appended to the judgment] : 
 
 " My brother Grove has furnished me with the following suggestion, too 
 late to be embodied in the judgment but well worth preserving: 'If the two 
 accused men were justified in killing Parker, then if not rescued m time, 
 two of the three survivors would be justified in killing the third, and of the 
 two who remained the stronger would be justified in killing the weaker, so 
 that three men might be justifiably killed to give the fourth a chance of 
 surviving.' " 
 
 THE MELIANS' DEFENSE OF THEIR NEUTRALITY 
 AGAINST THE ATHENIANS ^ 
 
 In the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships, and 
 seized any of the Argives who were still suspected to be of the Lacedemo- 
 nian faction, to the number of three hundred; and the Athenians deposited 
 them in the subject islands near at hand. The Athenians next made an 
 expedition against the island of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six 
 Chian, and two Lesbian, twelve hundred hoplites and three hundred archers 
 besides twenty mounted archers of their own, and about fifteen hundred 
 hophtes furnished by their allies in the islands. The Melians are colonists 
 of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit to Athens like the other 
 islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part. But when the Athen- 
 ians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into 
 
 1 This sentence was afterwards commuted by the Crown to six months' imprisonment. 
 J Thucydides, translated into English, by B. Jowett, vol. ii, PP. 167-77. Second edition, 
 revised, Oxford, 1900. 
 
646 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 open hostilities. The generals, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tisias 
 the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the Athenian forces on the island. 
 But before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to negotiate 
 with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the people, the 
 Melians desired them to explain their errand to the magistrates and to the 
 dominant class. They spoke as follows: — 
 
 "Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, forsooth, a mul- 
 titude should be deceived by seductive and unanswerable arguments which 
 they would hear set forth in a single uninterrupted oration (for we are per- 
 fectly aware that this is what you mean in bringing us before a select few), 
 you who are sitting here may as well make assurance yet surer. Let us 
 have no set speeches at all, but do you reply to each several statement of 
 which you disapprove, and criticise it at once. Say first of all how you like 
 this mode of proceeding." 
 
 The Melian representatives answered: — "The quiet interchange of 
 explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But your 
 warlike movements, which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, 
 seem to belie your words. We see that, although you may reason with us, 
 you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of the discussion, if the jus- 
 tice of our cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect 
 war; if we are convinced by you, slavery." 
 
 Ath. "Nay, but if you are only going to argue from fancies about the 
 future, or if you meet us with any other purpose than that of looking your 
 circumstances in the face and saving your city, we have done; but if this is 
 your intention we will proceed." 
 
 Mel. "It is an excusable and natural thing that men in our position 
 should neglect no argument and no view which may avail. But we ad- 
 mit that this conference has met to consider the question of our preserva- 
 tion; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which you pro- 
 pose." 
 
 Ath. "Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go 
 out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because we 
 overthrew the Persians; or that we attack you now because we are suffering 
 any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did; nor must 
 you expect to convince us by arguing that, although a colony of the Lace- 
 daemonians, you have taken no part in their expeditions, or that you have 
 never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, 
 and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the dis- 
 cussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is 
 equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and 
 the weak grant what they must." 
 
 Mel. "Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite us to speak of 
 expediency, in our judgment it is certainly expedient that you should re- 
 spect a principle which is for the common good; that to every man when 
 in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and any 
 plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the point a little, should 
 help his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as great as ours, in- 
 asmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be 
 the most terrible example to mankind." 
 
 Ath. "The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is not an event to which 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 647 
 
 we look forward with dismay; for ruling states such as Lacedsemon are not 
 cruel to their vanquished enemies. With the Lacedaemonians, however, we 
 are not now contending; the real danger is from our many subject states, 
 who may of their own motion rise up and overcome their masters. But 
 this is a danger which you may leave to us. And we will now endeavor 
 to show that we have come in the interests of our empire, and that in what 
 we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation of your city. For 
 we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for 
 the interests of us both that you should not be destroyed." 
 
 Mel. "It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours 
 to be your slaves?" 
 
 Ath. "To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the 
 worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation." 
 
 Mel. " But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends 
 if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?" 
 
 Ath. "No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friend- 
 ship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, 
 the other of our weakness." 
 
 Mel. "But are your subjects really unable to distinguish between states 
 in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly your own col- 
 onies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued by you?" 
 
 Ath. "Why, they do not doubt that both of them have a good deal to 
 say for themselves on the score of justice, but they think that states like 
 yours are left free because they are able to defend themselves, and that we 
 do not attack them because we dare not. So that your subjection will give 
 us an increase of security, as well as an extension of empire. For we are 
 masters of the sea, and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders 
 too, must not be allowed to escape us." 
 
 Mel. "But do you not recognize another danger? For, once more, since 
 you drive us from the plea of justice and press upon us your doctrine of 
 expediency, we must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be for 
 yours also, may hope to convince you: — Will you not be making enemies 
 of all who are now neutrals? When they see how you are treating us they 
 will expect you some day to turn against them; and if so, are you not 
 strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you 
 others, who, if they could help, would never dream of being yoiu- enemies 
 at all?" 
 
 Ath. "We do not consider our really dangerous enemies to be any of the 
 peoples inhabiting the mainland who, secure in their freedom, may defer 
 indefinitely any measures of precaution which they take against us, but 
 islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, and all who may 
 be already irritated by the necessity of submission to our empire — these 
 are our real enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring 
 themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee." 
 
 Mel. "Surely, then, if you and your subjects will brave all this risk, you 
 to preserve your empire and they to be quit of it, how base and cowardly 
 it would be in us, who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything 
 rather than be your slaves." 
 
 Ath. "Not so, if you calmly reflect; for you are not fighting against 
 equals to whom you cannot yield without disgrace, but you are taking 
 
648 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 counsel whether or no you shall resist an overwhelming force. The ques- 
 tion is not one of honor but of prudence." 
 
 Mel. "But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial, and 
 not always on the side of numbers. If we yield now, all is over; but if we 
 fight, there is yet a hope that we may stand upright." 
 
 Ath. "Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, and when men 
 have something else to depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous. 
 But when her spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they 
 see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then. 'VMiile the 
 knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she never fails. You 
 are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be 
 thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who, although 
 they might still be saved if they would take the natural means, when visible 
 grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to the invisible, to 
 prophecies and oracles and the like, which ruin men by the hopes which 
 they inspire in them." 
 
 Mel. "We know only too well how hard the struggle must be against 
 your power, and against fortune, if she does not mean to be impartial. 
 Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as 
 you in the favor of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom 
 we contend are unrighteous, and we are satisfied that our deficiency in 
 power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians; they 
 cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the 
 sake of their own honor. And therefore our confidence is not so utterly 
 bhnd as you suppose." 
 
 Ath. "As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favor 
 as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond com- 
 mon opinion about divine or men's desires about human things. For of the 
 Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature where- 
 ever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not 
 the first who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath 
 it to all time, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong 
 as we are, would do as we do. So much for the Gods; we have told you why 
 we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. And then as to the 
 Lacedaemonians — when you imagine that out of very shame they will 
 assist you, we admire the innocence of your idea, but we do not envy you 
 the folly of it. The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly virtuous among them- 
 selves, and according to their national standard of morality. But, in re- 
 spect of their dealings with others, although many things might be said, 
 they can be described in a few words — of all men whom we know they are the 
 most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honorable, and 
 what is expedient with what is just. But how inconsistent is such a charac- 
 ter with your present blind hope of dehverance!" 
 
 Mel. " That is the very reason why we trust them; they will look to their 
 interest, and therefore will not be willing to betray the Melians, who are 
 their own colonists, lest they should be distrusted by their friends in Hellas 
 and play into the hands of their enemies." 
 
 Ath. "But do you not see that the path of expediency is safe, whereas 
 justice and honor involve danger in practice, and such dangers the Lace- 
 daemonians seldom care to face?" 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 649 
 
 Mel "On the other hand, we think that whatever perils there may be, 
 thev will be ready to face them for our sakes, and will consider danger ess 
 JanJous where we are concerned. For if they need om- aid we are close 
 at hanH^d they can better trust our loyal feeling because we are their 
 
 ^'^ir'^'Yes, but what encourages men who are invited to join in a con- 
 flict is clearly not the good-will of those who summon them to their side, 
 but a decSed superiority in real power. To this no men look more keenly 
 than the LacedJLionians; so little confidence have they m their own re- 
 BouLs that they only attack their neighbors when they have numerous 
 Xes, and therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to 
 nn inland when we are masters of the sea." _ 
 
 MZ' 'But they may send their allies: the Cretan sea is a large place; 
 and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty m overtaking vessels 
 ththwaTto escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should 
 StlTmarinvade Attica itseff , and find their way to allies of yours whom 
 Bisidas Xd not reach; and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest 
 of a land in wtth you'have no concern, but nearer home, for the preserva- 
 tinn of vour confederacy and of your own territory. 
 
 tion of yo^^ ^«^^ y f^^^ Laceda^mon to you as it has come to others 
 anl should you ever have actual experience of it, then you wi 1 loiow that 
 never once have the Athenians retired from a siege through fear of a foe 
 e^Iwhere Y^u told us that the safety of your city would be your first care 
 but we remark that, in this long discussion, not a word has been uttered by 
 you wh cTwould giVe a reasonable man expectation of dehverance. Your 
 strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what power you have is not to 
 be comta'ed with that which is already arrayed -g^^-- J^^^^^ 
 we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now you may, to a wiser 
 
 merely payTg tribute ;lnd that you will certainly gam no to-r;f having 
 
 "choose between two alternatives, -^^^y/^^t'; J^e fo^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
 
 the worse. To maintain our rights agamst equals, to be P^^^^J^ ^'^ .^ , 
 
 mmmsmm 
 
650 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of the Gods has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedae- 
 monians, and endeavor to save ourselves. We are ready, however, to be 
 your friends, and the enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedaemonians, 
 and we ask you to leave our country when you have made such a peace as 
 may appear to be in the interest of both parties." 
 
 Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, as they quitted the 
 conference, spoke as follows: — "Well, we must say, judging from the deci- 
 sion at which you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the 
 future to be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as al- 
 ready reaUzed in your fond anticipation, and that the more you cast your- 
 selves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune and hope, and trust them, the 
 more complete will be your ruin." 
 
 The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the generals, when 
 they found that the Melians would not yield, immediately commenced 
 hostilities. They sun-ounded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the 
 work among the several contingents. They then left troops of their own 
 and of the allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, and retired with 
 the greater part of their army ; the remainder carried on the blockade. 
 
 About the same time the Argives made an inroad into Phliasia, and lost 
 nearly eighty men, who were caught in an ambuscade by the Phliasians 
 and the Argive exiles. The Athenian garrison in Pylos took much spoil 
 from the Lacedsemonians; nevertheless, the latter did not renounce the 
 peace and go to war, but only notified by a proclamation that if any one of 
 their own people had a mind to make reprisals on the Athenians he might. 
 The Corinthians next declared war upon the Athenians on some private 
 grounds, but the rest of the Peloponnesians did not join them. The MeUans 
 took that part of the Athenian wall which looked towards the agora by a 
 night assault, killed a few men, and brought in as much com and other ne- 
 cessaries as they could; they then retreated and remained inactive. After 
 this the Athenians set a better watch. So the summer ended. 
 
 In the following winter the Lacedsemonians had intended to make an 
 expedition into the Argive territory, but finding that the sacrifices which 
 they offered at the frontier were unfavorable, they returned home. The 
 Argives, suspecting that the threatened invasion was instigated by citi- 
 zens of their own, apprehended some of them; others, however, escaped. 
 
 About the same time the Melians took another part of the Athenian wall; 
 for the fortifications were insuflBciently guarded. Whereupon the Athen- 
 ians sent fresh troops under the command of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. 
 The place was now closely invested, and there was treachery among the 
 citizens themselves. So the Melians were induced to surrender at discre- 
 tion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, 
 and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonized the is- 
 land, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own. (b.c. 416.) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 651 
 
 THE WAR 
 
 HAGUE CONVENTION OF OCTOBER 18, 1907, RELATIVE 
 TO SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES ^ 
 
 Part II. — Good Offices and Mediation 
 Article III. Independently of this recourse, the Contracting Powers 
 deem it expedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the 
 dispute, should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may al- 
 low, offer their good offices or mediation to the States at variance. 
 
 Powers strangers to the dispute have the right to offer good offices or 
 mediation even during the course of hostilities. 
 
 The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties 
 in dispute as an unfriendly act. 
 
 HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1907 RELATIVE TO THE 
 OPENING OF HOSTILITIES 2 
 
 Considering that it is important, in order to ensure the maintenance 
 of pacific relations, that hostilities should not commence without previous 
 warning. 
 
 That it is equally important that the existence of a state of war should 
 be notified without delay to neutral Powers; 
 
 Being desirous of concluding a Convention to this effect, have appointed 
 the following as their Plenipotentiaries : 
 
 (For names of Plenipotentiaries, see Final Act.) 
 
 Who, after depositing their full powers, found in good and due form, have 
 agreed upon the following provisions : — 
 
 Article I. The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between 
 themselves must not commence without previous and exphcit warning, in 
 the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with 
 conditional declaration of war. 
 
 Article II. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the 
 neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them 
 until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by 
 telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on the absence of 
 notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the 
 existence of a state of war. 
 
 Article III. Article I of the present Convention shall take effect in case 
 of war between two or more of the Contracting Powers. 
 
 Article II is binding as between a belligerent Power which is a party to 
 the Convention and neutral Powers which are also parties to the Conven- 
 tion. 
 
 » Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907. part ii, p. 1182. Washington, 1910. 
 » Ibid., pp. 1202-03. 
 
652 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 THE LARGER MEANINGS OF THE WAR ^ 
 
 In an address on "The Larger Meanings of the War," dehvered before 
 the Institute of Arts and Sciences of Columbia University, Professor Frank- 
 lin H. Giddings discussed the race characteristics of the Germans and 
 concluded with this striking analysis of the conflict of ideas paralleling 
 the struggle between the Germans and the Allies: — 
 
 " But if Germany's achievement in the fields of art and science, though 
 great and admirable, are not yet surpassing, her achievement in the do- 
 main of social policy and organization challenges and will continue to chal- 
 lenge the attention of the world. She has repudiated the philosophy of laissez 
 faire and flatly denied the maxim that the government is best which governs 
 least. She has developed government as an instrumentality of social wel- 
 fare on a scale and with a measure of success never before or elsewhere seen. 
 While England and America have been awakening to the humane convic- 
 tion that ignorance, inefficiency, unemployment, vagabondage and misery 
 ought if possible to be prevented, Germany has said that they can and shall 
 be prevented, and by preventing them she has created a collective efl5ciency 
 which the rest of Europe will henceforth respect. Whether it has been 
 attained at too great a sacrifice of individual hberty, initiative, and self- 
 reliance, time and the fortunes of war may determine. Perhaps the fate 
 of the contending nations will turn precisely upon this point. Whatever 
 befalls, it is a safe prediction that mankind will presently inquire whether 
 a way can be found to conserve liberty and yet profit by the German in- 
 vention of competent social government. 
 
 " There remain those supposedly important factors of civiUzation, ideal- 
 ism and morality. What of them? Germany proclaims to the world that 
 her paramount discovery lies in the realm of moral philosophy, and that 
 her true greatness is now to be seen in the fearlessness with which she ap- 
 plies it to life. She has discovered, it seems, as a truth of reason, that 
 'might' really does make 'right' — and itself is the only right. It had been 
 suspected that Machiavelli taught something like this, but he was an Italian 
 and lived before the publication of the Origin of Species through Natural 
 Selection. Darwin wrote the Origin of Species, but he was an Englishman, 
 and clung to an old-fashioned morality. Nietzsche, the German, was the 
 first to see that if there really is a struggle for existence in which the strong 
 alone survive and the weak miserably perish, weakness must be essential 
 evil; might, essential righteousness; compassion, the only sin. Not the 
 Christ but the superman must come, and the German is the superman. 
 Treitschke was Nietzsche's disciple and the mantle has fallen upon Bern- 
 hardi. Promulgate this philosophy, they have said, embody it in diplomacy, 
 teach it to the army, preach it to the people, and then you shall see Deutsch- 
 land uber Alles. 
 
 " What can the rest of mankind say? Only this. The tiger and the savage 
 proceed with simple directness to the end of view. Civilized man has as- 
 sumed that the quality of means no less than the desirability of ends should 
 receive consideration, and this attention to means as well as to ends he has 
 called morality. He has made these assumptions and adjusted his conduct 
 
 1 Extract from an address by Franklin H. Giddings. This address was printed in the 
 Survey of November 7, 1914. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 653 
 
 to them because, long ago, he stumbled upon two important discoveries. 
 One was, that mutual aid is a more important factor in the struggle for 
 existence than claw or fist. The other was, that mutual aid is possible only 
 among men that can trust one another, who tell the truth and keep their 
 word, abiding by their covenants though they have sworn to their own hurt. 
 And all this seems at least plausible. Outside of Germany it is held to be 
 not only a rather decent folkway, but also, good Darwinism. 
 
 "And now we turn to our second question: Do the characteristics of 
 these contrasted civiUzations — one the historic Latin-Celtic-Saxon blend; 
 the other, a young and lusty Teutonic — and the terrific conflict in which 
 they are engaged afford us intimations of the future? Must war, increas- 
 ingly terrible, recur forever, generation after generation, or may we reason- 
 ably hope and work for lasting peace? 
 
 "One thing stands forth clearly from the foregoing analysis. Peoples 
 and civilizations grow. They are supreme manifestations of 'the will to 
 live.' They must then have place to live and room to grow. Hemmed in and 
 denied, they burst their barriers, exploding in the wrath of war. Now two 
 ways and only two have been found in human experience so far to provide 
 for expansion by a virile people developing its own characteristic civilization. 
 One is the acquisition of territory by conquest or purchase; the other is the 
 removal of commercial barriers. Or, to put it more bluntly and unequivo- 
 cally, the choice is between war and free trade. There are some millions 
 of men and women in the United States and elsewhere who do not believe 
 this or will not admit it. They will be forced by the facts of life and history 
 to admit it. Until they are ready for world-wide free trade they will waste 
 their breath in praying for world peace. 
 
 "Commercial freedom would make peace possible but not certain. The 
 passions of primitive man survive in us all and easily break through the in- 
 hibitions that civilization has with infinite difficulty provided. Of all known 
 inhibitions the thinking habit is most to be relied on. It halts us, to look 
 and listen. And the thinking habit is bound up with the time-wasting prac- 
 tice of discussion. This is the priceless contribution of democracy to human 
 progress. Democracy has its own hmitations and imperfections but on the 
 whole it is fairly described and defined as the thinking and impulse-inhibit- 
 ing habit developed in an entire people. Exceptional instances occur to 
 mind, but as a general truth of history popular sovereignty does not hast- 
 ily make war. Monarchical sovereignty does. If we are to have universal 
 peace the kings, the good ones with the bad ones, must go. 
 
 "And one more tiling must go. The rehgion of barbarism must go. The 
 world is weary of it. It has withstood the religion of peace on earth already 
 too long. The trinity of king, cannon and God has outlived its usefulness. 
 If civilization is indeed better than savagery, the God we worship must 
 be a power other and worthier than a mere Head Devil of the Universe." 
 
 APPEAL TO THE UNIVERSITIES OF AMERICA » 
 
 In a time when half of the world falls upon Germany full of hatred and 
 envy, we Germans derive great benefit from the idea of our being sure of 
 the friendly feeling of the American universities. If from any quarter in 
 1 From the New York Evening Post, September 24, 1914. 
 
654 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 the world it must be from them that we expect the right comprehension of 
 the present situation and present attitude of Germany. Numerous Ameri- 
 can scholars who received their scientific training at our universities have 
 convinced themselves of the quality and the peaceful tendency of German 
 work, the exchange of scientists has proved of deepening influence on the 
 mutual understanding, the lasting intercourse of scholarly research gives 
 us the feeling of being members of one great community. This is why we 
 entertain the hope that the scientific circles of America will not give credit 
 to the libels our enemies propagate against us. 
 
 Those libels above all accuse Germany of having brought about the pres- 
 ent war, she being responsible for the monstrous struggle which is extend- 
 ing more and more over the whole world. The truth points to the contrary. 
 Our foes have disturbed us in our peaceful work forcing the war upon us 
 very much against our desire. We are at a righteous war for the preserva- 
 tion of our existence and at the same time of sacred goods of humanity. 
 The murder of Serajevo was not our work; it was the outcome of a widely 
 extended conspiracy pointing back to Servia where for many years already 
 a passionate agitation against Austria had been carried on, supported by 
 Russia. It was Russia, therefore, that took the assassins under her wings, 
 and some weeks already before the war broke out she promised her assistance 
 to the blood-stained state. Nobody but Russia has given the dangerous 
 turn to the conflict, nobody but Russia is to blame for the outbreak of the 
 war. The German Emperor, who has proved his love of peace by a peaceful 
 reign of more than twenty-five years in face of the imminent danger, tried 
 to intermediate between Austria and Russia with the greatest zeal, but 
 while he was negotiating with the Tsar Russia was busy with the mobiliza- 
 tion of a large army towards the German frontier. This necessitated an 
 open and decisive inquiry that led to the war. This only happened because 
 Russia wanted it so, because she wanted to raise the Moscovites against 
 the Germans and the Western Slavs and to lead Asia into the field against 
 Europe. 
 
 France, too, might have kept the peace, the decision resting solely with 
 her. The security of Germany demanded that she should inquire what 
 France would do in the impending war; the answer of France unmistakably 
 betrayed her intention to join in the war. As a matter of fact it was not 
 Germany but France who commenced the war. 
 
 England already before the war stood in close relations to France. From 
 the very beginning she has clearly shown that she by no means wanted to 
 keep absolutely neutral. From the very beginning she made endeavors to 
 protect France against Germany. Undoubtedly the German invasion in 
 Belgium served England as a welcome pretext to openly declare her hos- 
 tility. In reality, before the German invasion already the neutrality of 
 Belgium had been given up in favor of the French. It has been officially 
 stated, e.g., that not only before but also after the outbreak of the war French 
 officers have been at Lifege in order to instruct the Belgian soldiers as to the 
 fortification service. England's complaints of the violation of international 
 law, however, are the most atrocious hypocrisy and the vilest Pharisaism. At 
 all times English pohtics have unscrupulously disregarded all forms of 
 law as soon as their own interest was touched. During the last few weeks 
 the same method has been quite sufficiently manifested in the imlawful cap- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 655 
 
 ture of the Turkish warshipsand still more so in the instigation of the Japan- 
 ese to undertake the detestable raid upon the German territory in China 
 which needs must end in strengthening the power of that Mongolian nation 
 at the cost of Europeans and Americans. 
 
 How is it possible for a nation that in such a way has betrayed precious 
 interests of Western culture as soon as it seems to benefit them, how is it 
 possible for these accomplices of the Japanese robbery to put on the air of 
 being the guardians of morality? 
 
 We Germans did not want this war, but as it has been forced upon us 
 we shall carry it on bravely and vigorously. In the face of all envy and 
 hatred, all brutality and hypocrisy Germany feels unshakably conscious of 
 serving a righteous cause and of standing up for the preservation of her 
 national self as well as for sacred goods of humanity, indeed for the very 
 progress of true culture. It is from this conviction that she draws her unre- 
 lenting force and the absolute certainty that she will beat back the assault 
 of all her enemies. This conviction does not stand in need of any encourage- 
 ment from abroad, our country absolutely relies upon itself and confides 
 in the strength of its right. 
 
 Nevertheless, the idea of our American friends' thoughts and sympathies 
 being with us gives us a strong feeling of comfort in this gigantic struggle. 
 We both of us feel especially justified in pronouncing this as being the con- 
 viction of all German scientists, as so many scientific and personal relations 
 connect us both with the universities of America. These universities know 
 what German culture means to the world, so we trust they will stand by 
 Germany. 
 
 Rudolf Eucken. 
 
 Jena, August 31. Ernst Haeckel. 
 
 AMERICA AND THE ISSUES OF EUROPEAN WARi 
 By Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard 
 
 To the Editor of the New York Times: 
 
 The numerous pamphlets which German writers are now distributing 
 in the United States, and the many letters about the European war which 
 Americans are now receiving from German and German-American friends, 
 are convincing thoughtful people in this country that American public 
 opinion has some weight with the German Government and people, or, at 
 least, some interest for them; but that the reasons which determine Ameri- 
 can sympathy with the Allies, rather than with Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary, are not understood in Germany and are not always appreci- 
 ated by persons of German birth who have lived long in the United States. 
 
 It would be a serious mistake to suppose that Americans feel any hostility 
 or jealousy toward Germany, or fail to recognize the immense obligations 
 under which she has placed all the rest of the world, although they now feel 
 that the German nation has been going wrong in theoretical and practical 
 politics for more than a hundred years, and is to-day reaping the conse- 
 quences of her own wrong-thinking and wrong-doing. 
 
 There are many important matters concerning which American sympa- 
 thy is strongly with Germany: (l)The unification of Germany, which Bis- 
 1 Published in the New York Times of October 2, 1914. 
 
656 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 marck and his co-workers accomplished, naturally commended itself to 
 Americans, whose own country is a firm federation of many more or less 
 different States, containing more or less different peoples. While most 
 Americans did not approve Bismarck's methods and means, they cordially 
 approved his accomplishment of German unification. (2) Americans have 
 felt unqualified admiration for the commercial and financial growth of Ger- 
 many during the past forty years, believing it to be primarily the fruit of 
 well-directed industry and enterprise. (3) All educated Americans feel 
 strong gratitude to the German nation for its extraordinary achievements 
 in letters, science, and education within the last hundred years. Jealousy 
 of Germany in these matters is absolutely foreign to American thought, 
 and that any external power or influence should undertake to restrict or 
 impair German progi'ess in these respects would seem to all Americans in- 
 tolerable, and, indeed, incredible. (4) AH Americans who have had any ex- 
 perience in governmental or educational administration recognize the fact 
 that German administration — both in peace and in war — is the most 
 eflScient in the world; and for that efficiency they feel nothing but respect 
 and admiration, unless the efficiency requires an inexpedient suppression 
 or restriction of individual liberty. (5) Americans sympathize with a 
 unanimous popular sentiment in favor of a war which the people believe 
 to be essential to the greatness, and even the safety, of their country, — a 
 sentiment which prompts to family and property sacrifices very distress- 
 ing at the moment, and irremediable in the future; and they believe that 
 the German people to-day are inspired by just such an overwhelming sen- 
 timent. 
 
 How is it, then, that, with all these strong American feelings tending to 
 make them sympathize with the German people in good times or bad, in 
 peace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion is on the side of the 
 Allies in the present war? The reasons are to be found, of course, in the 
 political and social history of the American people, and in its govern- 
 mental philosophy and practice to-day. These reasons have come out of the 
 past, and are intrenched in all the present ideals and practices in the 
 American Commonwealth. They inevitably lead Americans to object 
 strongly and irrevocably to certain German national practices of great mo- 
 ment, practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories, and experi- 
 ences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred years. 
 In the hope that American public opinion about the European war may be 
 a little better understood abroad it seems worth while to enumerate those 
 German practices which do not conform to American standards in the con- 
 duct of pubfic affairs : — 
 
 (a) Americans object to the committal of a nation to grave measures of 
 foreign policy by a permanent Executive — Czar, Kaiser, or King — ad- 
 vised in secret by professional diplomatists who consider themselves the 
 personal representatives of their respective sovereigns. The American 
 people have no permanent Executive, and the profession of diplomacy 
 hardly exists among them. In the conduct of their national affairs they ut- 
 terly distrust secrecy, and are accustomed to demand and secure the ut- 
 most publicity. 
 
 {b) They object to placing in any ruler's hands the power to order 
 mobilization or declare war in advance of deliberate consultation with a 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 657 
 
 representative assembly, and of cooperative action thereby. The fact that 
 German mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the meeting of 
 the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices about the rights 
 of the people and the proper limits of Executive authority. 
 
 (c) The secrecy of European diplomatic intercourse and of international 
 understandings and terms of alliance in Europe is in the view of ordinary 
 Americans not only inexpedient, but dangerous and unjustifiable. Under 
 the Constitution of the United States no treaty negotiated by the Presi- 
 dent and his Cabinet is valid until it has been pubhcly discussed and rati- 
 fied by the Senate. During this discussion the people can make their voice 
 heard through the press, the telegraph, and the telephone. 
 
 (d) The reliance on mihtary force as the foundation of true national 
 greatness seems to thinking Americans erroneous, and in the long run de- 
 grading to a Christian nation. They conceive that the United States may 
 fairly be called a great nation; but that its greatness is due to intellectual 
 and moral forces acting through adequate material forces and expressed in 
 education, public health and order, agriculture, manufacturing, and com- 
 merce, and the resulting general well-being of the people. It has never in 
 all its history organized what could be called a standing or a conscripted 
 army; and, until twenty years ago, its navy was very small, considering 
 the length of its seacoasts. There is nothing in the history of the American 
 people to make them believe that the true greatness of nations depends on 
 military power. 
 
 (e) They object to the extension of national territory by force, contrary 
 to the wishes of the population concerned. This objection is the inevitable 
 result of democratic institutions; and the American people have been faith- 
 ful to this democratic opinion under circumstances of considerable diflBculty 
 — as, for example, in withdrawing from Cuba, the rich island which had 
 been occupied by American troops during the short war with Spain (1898) 
 and in the refusing to intervene by force in Mexico for the protection of 
 American investors, when that contiguous country was distracted by fac- 
 tional fighting. This objection applies to long-past acts of the German Gov- 
 ernment, as well as to its proceedings in the present war — as, for example, 
 to the taking of Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, as well as to the 
 projected occupation of Belgium. 
 
 (/) Americans object strenuously to the violation of treaties between 
 nations on the allegation of military necessity or for any other reason what- 
 ever. They believe that the progress of civilization will depend in future 
 on the general acceptance of the sanctity of contracts or solemn agreements 
 between nations and on the development by common consent of interna- 
 tional law. The neutralization treaties, the arbitration treaties, the Hague 
 Conferences, and some of the serious attempts at mediation, although none 
 of them go far enough, and many of them have been rudely violated on 
 occasion, illustrate a strong tendency in the civilized parts of the world to 
 prevent international wars by means of agreements deliberately made in 
 time of peace. The United States has proposed and made more of these 
 agreements than any other power, has adhered to them, and profited by 
 them. Under one such agreement, made nearly a hundred years ago, 
 Canada and the United States have avoided forts and armaments against 
 each other, although they have had serious differences of opinion and clashes 
 
658 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 of interests, and the frontier is three thousand miles long and for the most 
 part without natural barriers. Cherishing the hope that the peace of Eu- 
 rope and the rights of its peoples may be secured through solemn com- 
 pacts (which should include the establishment of a permanent international 
 judicial tribimal, supported by an international force) Americans see, in 
 the treatment of the German Government of the Belgium neutraUzation 
 treaty as nothing but a piece of paper which might be torn up on the ground 
 of military necessity, evidence of the adoption by Germany of a retrograde 
 policy of the most alarming sort. That single act on the part of Germany 
 — the violation of the neutral territory of Belgium — would have deter- 
 mined American opinion in favor of the Allies, if it had stood alone by it- 
 self — the reason being that American hopes for the peace and order of the 
 world are based on the sanctity of treaties. 
 
 (g) American pubhc opinion, however, has been greatly shocked in 
 other ways by the German conduct of the war. The American common 
 people see no justification for the dropping of bombs, to which no specific 
 aim can be given, into cities and towns chiefly inhabited by non-combatants, 
 the burning or blowing up of large portions of unfortified towns and cities, 
 the destruction of precious monuments and treasuries of art, the strewing 
 of floating mines through the North Sea, the exacting of ransoms from cities 
 and towns under threat of destroying them, and the holding of unarmed 
 citizens as hostages for the peaceable behavior of a large population under 
 threat of summary execution of the hostages in case of any disorder. All 
 these seem to Americans unnecessary, inexpedient, and unjustifiable methods 
 of warfare, sure to breed hatred and contempt toward the nation that uses 
 them, and therefore to make it diflicult for future generations to maintain 
 peace and order in Europe. They cannot help imagining the losses civiliza- 
 tion would suffer if the Russians should every carry into western Europe 
 the kind of war which the Germans are now waging in Belgium and France. 
 They have supposed that war was to be waged in this century only against 
 public, armed forces and their supplies and shelters. 
 
 These opinions and prepossessions on the part of the American people 
 have obviously grown out of the ideals which the early EngHsh colonists 
 carried with them to the American wilderness in the seventeenth century, 
 out of the long fighting and public discussion which preceded the adoption 
 of the Constitution of the United States in the eighteenth century, and out 
 of the peculiar experiences of the free Commonwealths which make up the 
 United States, as they have spread across the almost vminhabited continent 
 during the past one hundred and twenty-five years. 
 
 The experience and the situation of modern Germany have been utterly 
 different. Germany was divided for centuries into discordant parts, had 
 ambitious and martial neighbors, and often felt the weight of their attacks. 
 Out of the war came accessions of territory for Prussia, and at last German 
 unity. The reliance of intelligent and patriotic Germany on military force 
 as the basis of national greatness is a natural result of its experiences. 
 Americans, however, believe that this reliance is unsound both theoretically 
 and practically. The wars in Europe since 1870-71, the many threateninga 
 of war, and the present catastrophe seem to Americans to demonstrate 
 that no amount of military preparedness on the part of the nations of Eu- 
 rope can possibly keep the peace of the continent, or indeed prevent fre- 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 659 
 
 quent explosions of destructive warfare. They think, too, that preparation 
 for war on the part of Germany better than any of her neighbors can make 
 will not keep her at peace or protect her from invasion, even if this better 
 preparation include advantages of detail which have been successfully 
 kept secret. All the nations which surround Germany are capable of develop- 
 ing a strong fighting spirit; and all the countries of Europe, except England 
 and Russia, possess the means of quickly assembling and getting into action 
 great bodies of men. In other words, all the European states are capable of 
 developing a passionate patriotism, and all possess the railroads, roads, 
 conveyances, telegraphs, and telephones which make rapid mobilization 
 possible. No perfection of military forces, and no amount of previous study 
 of feasible campaigns against neighbors, can give peaceful security to Ger- 
 many in the present condition of the great European states. In the actual 
 development of weapons and munitions, and of the art of quick intrenching, 
 the attacking force in battle on land is at a great disadvantage in compari- 
 son with the force on the defensive. That means indecisive battles and ulti- 
 mately an indecisive war, unless each party is resolved to push the war to 
 the utter exhaustion and humiliation of the other — a long process which 
 involves incalculable losses and wastes, and endless miseries. Americans 
 have always before them the memory of their four years' civil war, which, 
 although resolutely prosecuted on both sides, could not be brought to a 
 close until the resources of the Southern States in men and material were 
 exhausted. In that dreadful process the whole capital of the Southern 
 States was wiped out. 
 
 Now that the sudden attack on Paris has failed, and adequate time has 
 been secured to summon the slower-moving forces of Russia and England, 
 and these two resolute and persistent peoples have decided to use all their 
 spiritual and material forces in cooperation with France against Germany, 
 thoughtful Americans can see but one possible issue of the struggle, whether 
 it be long or short, namely, the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 in their present undertakings, and the abandonment by both peoples of the 
 doctrine that their salvation depends on militarism and the maintenance 
 of autocratic executives entrusted with the power and the means to make 
 sudden war. They believe that no human being should ever be trusted with 
 such power. The alternative is, of course, genuine constitutional govern- 
 ment, with the military power subject to the civil power. 
 
 The American people grieve over the fruitless sacrifices of life, property, 
 and the natural human joys which the German people are making to a wrong 
 and impossible ideal of national power and welfare. The sacrifices which 
 Germany is imposing on the Allies are fearfully heavy, but there is reason 
 to hope that these will not be fruitless, for out of them may come great gains 
 for liberty and peace in Europe. 
 
 All experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic are well aware that 
 nine tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English and 
 French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful not to form judg- 
 ments about details until the events and deeds tell their own story. They 
 cannot even tell to which side victory incfines in a long, far-extended battle 
 until recognizable changes in the positions of the combatants show what the 
 successes or failures must have been. The English and French win some ad- 
 vantage so far as the formation of public opinion in this country is concerned, 
 
660 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 because those two Governments send hither oflScial reports on current 
 events more frequently than the German Government does, and with more 
 corroborative details. The amount of secrecy with which the campaign is 
 surrounded on both sides is, however, a new and unwelcome experience for 
 both the English and the American public. 
 
 The pamphlets by German publicists and men of letters which are now 
 coming to this country, and the various similar pubhcations written here, 
 seem to indicate that the German public is still kept by its Government in 
 ignorance about the real antecedents of the war and about many of the 
 incidents and aspects of the portentous combat. These documents seem 
 to Americans to contain a large amount of misinformation about the attack 
 of Austria- Hungary on Servia, the diplomatic negotiations and the corres- 
 pondence between the sovereigns which immediately preceded the war, 
 and the state of mind of the Belgian and English peoples. American be- 
 lievers in the good sense and good feeling of the common people naturally 
 imagine, when an awful calamity befalls a nation, that the people cannot 
 have been warned of its approach, else they would have avoided it. In this 
 case they fear that the Emperor, the Chancellery, and the General Staff 
 have themselves been misinformed in important respects, have made serious 
 miscalculations which they are proposing to conceal as long as possible, 
 and are not taking the common people into their confidence. American 
 sympathies are with the German people in their sufferings and losses, but 
 not with their rulers, or with the military class, or with the professors and 
 men of letters who have been teaching for more than a generation that 
 Might makes Right. That short phrase contains the fundamental fallacy 
 which for fifty years has been poisoning the springs of German thought and 
 German policy in public affairs. 
 
 Dread of the Muscovite does not seem to Americans a reasonable ex- 
 planation of the present actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary, except 
 so far as irrational panic can be said to be an explanation. Against possible, 
 though not probable, Russian aggression, a firm defensive alliance of all 
 western Europe would be a much better protection than the single Might of 
 Germany. It were easy to imagine also two new "buffer" States — a re- 
 constructed Poland and a Balkan Confederation. As to French "revenge," 
 it is the inevitable and praiseworthy consequence of Germany's treatment 
 of France in 1870-71. The great success of Germany in expanding her com- 
 merce during the past thirty years makes it hard for Americans to under- 
 stand the hot indignation of the Germans against the British because of 
 whatever ineffective opposition Great Britain may have offered to that ex- 
 pansion. No amount of commercial selfishness on the part of insular Eng- 
 land can justify Germany in attempting to seize supreme power in Eu- 
 rope and thence, perhaps, in the world. 
 
 Finally, Americans hope and expect that there will be no such fatal issue 
 of the present struggle as the destruction or ruin of the German nation. On 
 the contrary, they believe that Germany will be freer, happier, and greater 
 than ever, when once she has got rid of the monstrous Bismarck policies 
 and the Emperor's archaic conception of his function, and has enjoyed 
 twenty years of real peace. 
 
 AsTicou, Maine. Yout obedient Servant, 
 
 September 28. 1914. ChAELES W. EuOT. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 661 
 
 GERMANY'S TREATY RECORD* 
 By Dr. Bernhaed Dernburg 
 
 To the Editor oj the New York Times: 
 
 Professor Eliot is conferring a great favor on the exponents of the Ger- 
 man side in the present struggle in explaining to them what he thinks of 
 the so-called anti-German feeling in the United States. I am sure his views 
 will be read also in Germany with a great deal of attention, although he 
 will certainly not remain unchallenged in nearly all essential points. The 
 compliment that Professor Eliot pays to the German people as a whole must 
 be specially appreciated, the more so as it comes from a scientist whose great 
 authority is equally recognized on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
 The anti-German feeling, according to Professor Eliot, takes its source 
 from the American objection to the committal of a nation to grave mistakes 
 by a permanent executive. But then, with the exception of France, all the 
 warring nations have permanent executives, professional diplomatists; 
 all their affairs are conducted in secret, and all their rulers have the power, 
 including the President of France, to embroil their nations in war. The Ger- 
 man Emperor is in this respect certainly more restricted than the other 
 heads of state, and I have not read that the declaration of war has been 
 expressly sanctioned by the English Parliament, and certainly the mobiUza- 
 tion of the English fleet that took place in July, and the mobilization of the 
 Russian army that took place at the same time, have not even been brought 
 to the knowledge of the respective Parliaments. When, therefore, the same 
 conditions prevail in all the warring states, how can they be made the rea- 
 son for such an anti-German feeling? 
 
 The same objection holds good with the American antipathy against the 
 power of rulers to order mobilization or declare war in advance without 
 consultation of Parliament, to which I have only to say that the English 
 fleet was mobilized without consulting the English Parliament, while in 
 Germany the Bundesrat, the representatives of the Federal States, as 
 well as of the Federal Diets, had been duly consulted. I may add that also 
 the party leaders of the Reichstag, which could not be convoked earlier 
 than two days after the declaration of the war, have been continuously 
 informed and consulted. 
 
 Against the next paragraph, where Professor Eliot complains of the 
 secrecy of European diplomacy and of international treaties and under- 
 standings, the same objection must be made. The state described here as 
 particular to Germany prevails in all European countries, and neither the 
 treaty of the Russian-French alliance nor the arrangements of the Triple 
 Entente have ever been submitted to the French or British Parliaments. 
 As regards the American attitude toward armaments, I purposely refrain 
 from adducing the American example into my argument, much as I could 
 show that with a very large part of the American nation the idea of defend- 
 ing the American coast against any invader and the maintenance of a strong 
 Pan-American policy, if need be by arms, is just as fixed a tenet as the 
 German idea that the Fatherland should be held safe from invasion or de- 
 struction by the will and the strength of its people. England has always 
 held the same, if not through her army so through her navy, and so did the 
 » Letter to the New York Times, October 5, 1914, in answer to Dr. Eliot's letter. 
 
662 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 rest of Europe; and there is no argument to be gotten from that for an anti- 
 German feeling. 
 
 Americans object to the extension of territory by force. Germany has 
 never done that, even if one goes back as far as Professor Eliot wishes to go. 
 Mr. Eliot is absolutely mistaken as to the history of the incorporation of 
 Schleswig-Holstein into Prussia. Schleswig-Holstein was a dual-dukedom, 
 had never belonged to Denmark, but having a duke, was under the sway 
 of the King of Denmark as long as he belonged to the elder line of the House 
 of Oldenburg. This elder line was extinct when King Christian VIII died 
 without male issue. His successor wanted to incorporate the two German 
 dukedoms into Denmark. Then the people stood up and expressed the desire 
 to remain with the German Federation, to which it had always belonged, 
 and there it is now, of its own free will. The natural dividing line between 
 Denmark and Germany, however, is the river Eider. There are about 
 30,000 Danes south of the Eider, who have been absorbed against their 
 will, a thing that can never be avoided and that has sometimes given Prussia 
 a little trouble. 
 
 As to Alsace-Lorraine, the facts are known to be that it had belonged to 
 Germany until it had been taken, against the will of the people, by France 
 under Louis XIV, and it was returned to Germany as a matter of right, 
 more than three quarters of the population being of German descent and 
 speaking the German language. • ■ i 
 
 But let me ask in return, Mr. Eliot, when did ever in her political career 
 England consult the will of the people when she took a country? Can he 
 say that, when England tore the treaty of Majuba Hill, like a "scrap of 
 paper," and made war on the Boers? Did she consult the people of Cyprus 
 in 1878? Does he know of any plebiscite, in India? Has she consulted the 
 Persians, or has France consulted the people of Morocco, or of Indo-China, 
 Italy the people of Tripoli? Since Germany has not acted here in any other 
 way forty years ago than all the other nations, why does Dr. Eliot consider 
 the American people justified in taking anti-German views for reason of 
 such an old date, while he forgives the nations of the party he favors for 
 much more recent infringements of his rule? 
 
 " Americans object to the violation of treaties." So do the Germans. We 
 have always kept our treaties, and mean to do so in the future. The fact 
 with Belgium is that her neutrality was very one-sided; that, as can be 
 proved, as early as the 25th of June, Liege was full of French soldiers, 
 that Belgian fortifications were all directed against Germany, and that, 
 for years past, it was the Belgian press that outdid the French press in 
 attacks against Germany. But I can give Mr. Eliot here some authority 
 that he has so far not challenged. When Sir Edward Grey presented the 
 English case in the House of Commons on the 3d of August, he declared 
 that the British attitude was laid down by the British Government in 
 1870, and he verbally cited Mr. Gladstone's speech, in which he said he 
 could not subscribe to the assertion that the simple fact of the existence of 
 a guarantee was binding on every party, irrespective altogether of the 
 particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occa- 
 sion for acting on the guarantee arises. He called that assertion a "string- 
 ent and impracticable" view of the guarantee, and the whole treaty a 
 "complicated question." So Mr. Gladstone, and with him Sir Edward 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR 663 
 
 Grey, has held the Belgian neutrality treaty not binding on every party, 
 when it was against the interest which the particular situation dictated 
 when the war broke out. It was the interest of Great Britain to maintain 
 the treaty, and that is why she acted. It was against German interest to 
 maintam the treaty, and that is why she broke it. That is the British 
 and not the German theory, and I could very well rest my case here. My 
 theory is with the German Chancellor, that I greatly regret the necessity 
 of violating the Belgian neutrality, after Belgium had chosen to repel the 
 German overtures for a free passage. 
 
 It is quite certain that the breach of the Belgian neutrality by Germany 
 was used in Great Britain as a powerful instrument to influence the public 
 sentiment. Every war must be borne by national unity, and it is the duty 
 of the nation's leaders to secure such unity by all practicable means. But 
 has it been forgotten that the attitude of Sir Edward Grey caused such 
 excellent men as Lord Morley, John Burns, and Sir John Trevelyan to 
 leave the Cabinet, where they were looked upon as the best and most liberal 
 members of the ruling combination? Bernard Shaw says of Great Britain 
 that she has never been at a loss for an effective moral attitude. Such an 
 attitude is a powerful weapon in diplomatical and actual warfare, and it 
 must be resorted to, if the necessity arises. But that cannot blind us to the 
 fact that the British Government allowed the political interest to be the 
 paramount consideration in this Belgian neutrality matter. The German 
 interest for not acting on the guarantee was just as strong as the English 
 to act for it. 
 
 The proof is found in the English " White Paper." I cite the famous re- 
 print of the Times (dispatch no. 148 of August 2 to Paris). Here Sir Edward 
 Grey says: "We were considering . . . whether we should declare viola- 
 tion of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli." 
 
 I am an ardent believer in all international arrangements to prevent diffi- 
 culties and wars between nations, and I rejoice with the American people in 
 the signal success this policy is now having in this country. But interna- 
 tional treaties must not be overrated. There are questions which cannot be 
 settled by them. It is too difficult to explain just the nature of such situa- 
 tions as arose in Europe, so I may be permitted for once to ask this question : 
 Does Professor Eliot believe that the majority of the American people think 
 that the unwritten Monroe Doctrine could be made the subject of arbitra- 
 tion, whether it had a right to exist or to be enforced? I must emphatically 
 say. No, it could not. It can be as little arbitrated upon as a matter of re- 
 ligion or of personal morals. 
 
 Mr. Eliot thinks a happy result of the war would be that American insti- 
 tutions should prevail in Germany thereafter. Why should Germany only 
 become a representative republic? Does he not demand the same regarding 
 Russia, England, Italy, Austria, and Japan? And if not, why not? 
 
 From all this I fail to see the point in the reasons given by Professor 
 Eliot why fair-minded Americans should side with the Allies, because the 
 objections made against German procedure, down to the breach of the 
 Belgian neutrality, must be made against all other European states. Brit- 
 ish history is just teeming with examples of broken treaties and torn " scraps 
 of paper." The chasing of German diplomatic representatives out of neutral 
 Egypt is a case in point. 
 
664 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 I must insist that whatever anti-German feeling there is is not fully ex- 
 plained by Professor Eliot, and his article cannot be made a code by which 
 German behavior could be regulated in the future. Professor Eliot is a 
 scholar; business interests do not come very near him. So he is especially 
 concerned with the ethical aspect of the matter. He believes the Germans 
 think that " might is right." This is very unjust. Our history proves that we 
 have never acted on this principle. We have never got or attempted to get 
 a world empire such as England has won, all of which, with a very few ex- 
 ceptions, by might, by war, and by conquest. The German writers who have 
 expounded this doctrine have only shown how the large world empires 
 of England and France were welded together, what means have been 
 adopted for that purpose, and against what sort of political doctrines we 
 must beware. 
 
 As Dr. Eliot makes his remarks for the benefit of his German confreres, 
 may I be permitted to say to them what I consider the reason for the 
 American attitude? There is, in the first place, the ethical side. Americans 
 have a very strong sense of generosity, and are, as a rule, very good sports. 
 They think Belgium a small nation, brutally attacked by a much bigger 
 fellow; they feel that the little man stands up bravely and gamely, and fights 
 for all he is worth. Such a situation will always command American sym- 
 pathy and antagonism against the stronger. Then there is the business side. 
 Americans feel that this war is endangering their political and commer- 
 cial interests, so they are naturally angry against the people who, they 
 believe, have brought the war about. 
 
 As Germany has not had an opportunity to make herself heard as amply 
 as her adversaries, they think that it was Germany which set the world 
 afire, and that is what they resent, and in which they were justified, if it 
 were true. But the question of the hour is not the question of the past, but 
 of the present and of the future, and the people on this side who will give 
 Germany fair play because it is just in them will examine the situation in 
 the light of their interests. Then they will find that Belgium has been in 
 league with the Allies long before the conflagration broke out, only to be 
 left to its own resources when the critical hour arose. They will further find 
 that it is not Germany but England and her allies that are throttling 
 commerce, maiming cables, stopping mails, and breaking neutrality and 
 other treaties to further their aims; that, finally, to-day England has estab- 
 lished a world rule on the sea to which even America must submit. They 
 will then soon come to the conclusion that, no matter what happened in 
 the past, the peace of the world can only be assured by a good understanding 
 between Germany and the United States as a sort of counterbalance against 
 the unmeasured aggrandizement of English sea power. Then the feeling 
 toward Germany will be considerably better, and I may add that even now 
 it is not so very bad after all. 
 
 I make these remarks with due respect to Professor Eliot and his views, 
 and with great reluctance for being compelled to enter the field against a 
 personality whose undoubted superiority I wish to be the first to acknow- 
 ledge. 
 
 Bernhard Dernburq. 
 
 New Yobk, October 4, 1914. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 CHRONOLOGY 
 CITATION OF DOCUMENTS 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 CHRONOLOGY 
 
 June 24. The Kaiser inaugurates the enlarged Kiel Canal. 
 
 June 28. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenburg 
 assassinated at Serajevo. 
 
 July 2. The French Ambassador at Vienna reports resentment against 
 Servia because of Serajevo assassination, and preparations to force 
 an issue on Servia. (F. Y. B. no. 8.) 
 
 July 4. The German Foreign Office gives reasons for being confident that 
 Servia will give satisfaction to Austria's demands, and thus avoid 
 possibility of tension. (F. Y. B. no. 9.) 
 
 July 6. The intimation of the Austrian representative that his Govern- 
 ment may be forced to carry on an investigation on Servian terri- 
 tory is met by indignant warning from the Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. (F. Y. B. no. 10.) 
 
 July 10. M. N. de Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, died suddenly 
 while paying a visit to the Austrian Minister. 
 
 July II. The French Consul at Budapest sends his Government a remark- 
 able report, discussing the attitude of the Hungarian Government 
 and public toward Servia, in which he points out the various signs 
 indicating that Austria is preparing a coup. He also draws at- 
 tention to the unprecedented fall of the Hungarian 4 per cents. 
 (F. Y. B. no. 11.) 
 
 July 14. The French Minister of War in the Senate admitted serious defi- 
 ciencies in the state of preparedness of the army. 
 
 July 15. The French Ambassador at Vienna reports bellicose tone of Vien- 
 nese press toward Servia, and opines that the situation in France 
 and Russia affords a favorable opportunity for action. (F. Y. B. 
 no. 12.) 
 
 July 16. Sir Edward Grey learns from Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British 
 Ambassador at Vienna, a forecast derived from a private source 
 of the " impending storm." (B. W. P. Miscellaneous, no. 10.) 
 
 Editorial in the London Times criticizing Servia for her anti- 
 Austrian propaganda, and for not making an inquiry, and declar- 
 ing that Austria was " entitled to effective guaranties against the 
 support of what is a seditious movement by the subjects of King 
 Peter." 
 
 President Poincar^ and Prime Minister and Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs Viviani depart for St. Petersburg. 
 
 July 17. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs warns Austria against 
 insulting Servia or interfering with her independence. (S. B. B. 
 no. 28.) 
 
 July 20. The Russian Ambassador leaves Vienna. (B. W. P., Miscellalie- 
 ous, no. 10.) 
 
668 APPENDIX 
 
 French consular report from Vienna, pointing out Austria's 
 plans and reasons for bringing on a general war, and predicting the 
 nature of the Austrian demands. (F. Y. B. no. 14.) 
 
 Poincar^ and Viviani arrive at Cronstadt. 
 July 21. Extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse. (F. Y, B. no. 16.) 
 
 Von Jagow, alluding to the forthcoming Austrian d-marche at 
 Belgrade, in conversation with the British Charge, insisted that 
 the question at issue should be settled between Servia and Aus- 
 tria alone, and considered it inadvisable that Germany should 
 approach Austria on the matter. (B. W. P. no. 2; cf. F. Y. B. 
 no. 16.) 
 
 Meeting of Home Rule Conference in Buckingham Palace at 
 King's suggestions. 
 
 Trial of Madame Caillaux at Paris commences. 
 July 23. The Russian Ambassador, on leaving Vienna for Russia, after 
 receiving reassuring declarations from the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, confides to the French Ambassador that Russia will make 
 no objection to Austria's taking steps for the punishment of the 
 guilty and for the dissolution of revolutionary associations, but 
 cannot admit exactions humiliating to Servian national feeling. 
 (F. Y. B. no. 18.) 
 
 Von Tchirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, shows himself a 
 partisan of Austria in her " violent resolution" against Servia. At 
 the same time he lets it be understood that the German Imperial 
 Chancellor may not be in complete agreement with him. (F. Y. B. 
 no. 18.) 
 Jixly 23. The Austrian Ambassador at London explains privately to Sir 
 Edward Grey the nature of the Austrian demand. Sir Edward's 
 objection to an ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 3.) 
 
 Austrian ultimatum delivered to Servia at 6 p.m. 
 
 Austria allows forty-eight hours for an imconditional accept- 
 ance. (R. O. P. nos. 1, 2.) 
 
 According to oflBcial statement 120,000 workers in the strike at 
 St. Petersburg. 
 July 24. Austrian ultimatum communicated. (B. W. P. no. 4.) 
 
 Russia learned the contents of the note at 10 a.m. (R. O. P. 
 no. 3.) 
 
 Russian Cabinet Council at which it is decided to make military 
 preparations. (G. W. B. Exhibit 23a.) 
 
 Germany supports Austria's demands and insists upon the 
 "localization" of the Austro-Servian dispute. (B. W. P. no. 9; 
 F. Y. B. no. 28.) 
 
 Sazonof directs protest to be made at Vienna against the short 
 delay of the ultimatum. (R. O. P. no. 4.) 
 
 Prince Alexander of Servia appeals to the Tsar for support. 
 (R. O. P. no. 6.) 
 
 Austria assures Russia as to her intentions regarding Servia. 
 (G. W. B. exhibit 3.) 
 
 Russia says that she cannot permit localization of the dispute. 
 (G. W. B. exhibit 4.) 
 
APPENDIX 669 
 
 French Ambassador at St. Petersburg gives British colleague to 
 understand that France will support Russia. (B. W. P. no. 6; cf. 
 F. Y. B. no. 22.) 
 
 Sazonof and the French and British representatives discuss the 
 action to be taken. 
 
 French Ambassador says his Government will support Russia. 
 
 British Ambassador explains England's position: no interest in 
 Servia; concern for European peace; will not make declaration of 
 solidarity with France and Russia; perhaps will make representa- 
 tions to Germany and Austria. (B. W. P. no. 6 ; cf . F. Y. B. no. 22.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey plans quadruple mediation in event of Russia's 
 mobilization. But M. Paul Cambon advises immediate mediation 
 between Austria and Servia. (B. W. P. no. 10; F. Y. B. nos. 32, 34.) 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky suggests effort to secure favorable reply from 
 Servia. (B. W. P. no. 11.) 
 
 The French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that 
 Servia propose arbitration "to escape from the direct clutch of 
 Austria." (F. Y. B. no. 26.) 
 
 The French Premier Viviani from Reval informs acting Minis- 
 ter for Foreign Affairs for transmission to Vienna, that he has 
 agreed with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to try to prevent 
 a demand on Servia equivalent to intervention, and wishes to 
 secure cooperation of British Ambassador at Vienna to counsel 
 moderation. (F. Y. B. no. 22.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey criticizes the unusual terms of the Austrian 
 Ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 4.) 
 
 Sir Edward declares he should concern himself from point of 
 view of the peace of Europe. (B. W. P. no. 5.) 
 
 The French Foreign Office comments to the Austrian Ambas- 
 sador upon the effect upon public opinion of the presentation of 
 the Austrian note at a time when the President of the Republic, 
 and the Premier, who is also Minister for Foreign Affairs, were on 
 the high seas. (F. Y. B. no. 25.) 
 
 The French Ambassador, at Berlin, in a personal exchange of 
 views, expresses surprise that the German Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs shoiild have supported the Austrian pretensions 
 when he was ignorant of the nature and limit of them. (F. Y. B. 
 no. 30.) 
 
 The Russian Ambassador at London tells his French colleague 
 he suspects a surprise, and gives the reasons why he thinks Ger- 
 many wants war with Russia. (F. Y. B. no. 32.) 
 
 The First Lord of the British Admiralty stops the demobiliza- 
 tion of the First Fleet. (F. Y. B. no. 66.) 
 
 Belgium sends note to the Belgian representatives, for use when 
 instructed by telegraph, declaring her intention to fulfill her inter- 
 national obligations in respect to her neutrality. (B. G. P. no. 2.) 
 Germany " passes on" to Vienna British suggestion for mediation. 
 (B. W. P. no. 18.) 
 
 The German Government makes an official statement of its 
 view regarding the Austro-Servian conflict. (R. O. P. no. 18.) 
 
670 APPENDIX 
 
 Russia makes communique that she is attentively watching the 
 course of events, and cannot remain indifferent to the develop- 
 ments of the Serbo-Austrian conflict. (R. O. P. no. 10.) 
 
 Russian Charge at Vienna telegraphs Coimt Berchtold, asking 
 Austria to increase the time limit of the ultimatum. (R. 0. P. no. 
 11,F. Y. B. no. 42.) 
 
 The French and English representatives at Vienna are instructed 
 to support the Russian request. (R. O. P. nos. 15, 16; B. W. P. no. 
 26; cf. F. Y. B. no. 44.) 
 
 Von Jagow refuses to counsel Austria to extend the time limit. 
 (R. O. P. no. 14.) 
 
 Austria refuses to extend the time limit. (R. O. P. no. 12.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey also directs the British Ambassador, in case 
 it is too late to raise the question of extending the time-limit, to 
 try to obtain a stay of operations to serve as a base of discussions. 
 (R. O. P. no. 16; B. W. P. no. 26.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey says he is ready, if Germany agrees to 
 mediation proposal, to tell French Government that he thinks it 
 the right thing to act upon it. (B. W. P. no. 2.5.) 
 
 Austrian Minister informs the Servian Government that the 
 reply is not satisfactory, and leaves Belgrade at 6.30 p.m. (R. O. 
 P. no. 2; B. W. P. no. 23; S. B. B. no. 40.) 
 
 If Servia appeals to the powers, Russia is ready to stand aside. 
 (B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 
 If situation becomes threatening, Germany is ready to take part 
 in mediation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. (B. W. P. no. 18.) 
 
 Germany declares that she had not known about the Austrian 
 note. (B. W. P. no. 18; R. O. P. no. 18; F. Y. B. no. 41; cf. F. Y. B. 
 no. 30.) 
 
 Sazonof instructs the Russian representative at London to urge 
 England, in case the situation becomes worse, to stand on the side 
 of France and Russia. (R. O. P. no. 17.) 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky says that Germany might be able to accept 
 mediation between Austria and Russia. (B. W. P. no. 25.) 
 
 Servian Government and the diplomatic corps leave Belgrade 
 in the evening for Nish. (B. W. P. no. 23; R. O. P. no. 21.) 
 
 From Vienna the British Ambassador reports that war is 
 thought to be imminent. (B. W. P. no. 31.) 
 
 Austrian Ambassador at London tells Sir Edward Grey that, on 
 breaking off diplomatic relations with Servia, Austria would com- 
 mence military preparations, but not military operations. (B. W. 
 P. no. 25.) 
 
 Count Berchtold goes to Ischl to communicate to the Emperor 
 Servian reply when it arrives. (B. W. P. no. 20.) 
 
 Sazonof says Germany's attitude decided by England's, and 
 Germany thinks England will remain neutral. (B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 
 England warns Russia that her mobilization might decide 
 Germany to declare war. (B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 
 Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Servia and become pre- 
 dominant power in the Balkans. (B. W. P. no. 17.) 
 
APPENDIX 671 
 
 The German Secretary of State considers that between Austria 
 and Servia there was no question of war, but of " execution" in a 
 local matter, and refuses to believe that any danger of a general 
 war exists. (F. Y. B. no. 43.) 
 
 The Belgian Minister considers that Austria and Germany are 
 attempting to take advantage of the domestic difficulties of 
 France, England, and Russia, and of the disorganization of the 
 Entente. (F. Y. B. no. 35.) 
 
 The French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs tells German 
 Ambassador that the terms of his declaration disclose the wish of 
 Germany to thrust herseU between the powers and Austria. 
 (F. Y. B. no. 36.) 
 
 The German Honorary Aide-de-camp to the Tsar reports Russia 
 making certain military preparations against Austria. (G. W. B. 
 exhibit 6.) 
 
 Servia issues the decree for mobilization shortly after 3.00 p.m. 
 (B. G. P. no. 5. Cf. A. R. B. no. 39.) 
 
 It is reported that partial mobilization has been begun in Rus- 
 sia. (See M. P. Price, Diplomatic History of the War, p. 96; cf. 
 B. W. P. no. 44.) 
 
 Russia advises Servia to appeal to English mediation. (F. Y. B. 
 no. 53.) 
 
 Sazonof instructs Russian Ambassador to express to Count 
 Berchtold his hope that the Austrian Ambassador may be author- 
 ized to exchange views relative to a modification of the Austrian 
 note. (R. O. P. no. 25; F. Y. B. no. 54.) 
 
 Hostile demonstrations before the Russian Embassy at Berlin. 
 (R. O. P. no. 30.) 
 
 Emperor William returns to Berlin on his own initiative, and 
 to the regret of the German Foreign Office. (B. W. P. no. 33.) 
 
 German Government, in spirit of cooperation, instructs German 
 Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Government Sir 
 Edward Grey's hopes that they may take a favorable view of the 
 Servian reply. (B. W. P. no. 34; cf. F. Y. B. no. 68.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey issues invitation to three powers to join a 
 conference at London, and asks them to request Belgrade, Vienna, 
 and St. Petersburg to suspend all military operations. (B. W. P. 
 no. 36.) 
 
 Fighting in Dublm streets, 3 killed, 32 wounded. (London 
 Times, July 28.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at Paris suggests to the French For- 
 eign Office a communique to the press. " The German Ambassador, 
 after his d-marche yesterday with a view to the soothing interven- 
 tion of France in St. Petersburg, returned, as I have informed you, 
 to the Political Direction, on the pretext that it might be well to 
 communicate a short note to the press showing the pacific and 
 friendly nature of the conversation. He even suggested the follow- 
 ing terms: 'The Ambassador and the Minister have had a further 
 interview, in the course of which the means which might be em- 
 ployed for the maintenance of general peace were examined in a 
 
672 APPENDIX 
 
 very friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity.' It was 
 at once replied to him that the terms appeared to be excessive and 
 calculated to create illusions in public opinion as to the actual sit- 
 uation, but that, nevertheless, a brief note of the nature indicated, 
 that is to say, a note' reporting a conversation in which were dis- 
 cussed the means adopted for the safeguard of peace, might be 
 issued if the Minister approved of it. The following is the com- 
 munication made: 'The German Ambassador and the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs have had a further interview, in the course of which 
 they sought for a means of action of the powers for the mainte- 
 nance of peace.'" But when issued, it was modified to avoid 
 "solidarity with Germany." (F. Y. B. nos. 57, 62.) 
 
 Sazonof asks Von Jagow to influence Vienna to that effect. 
 (R. O. P. no. 26.) 
 
 The French Director of the Pohtical Department considers that 
 German action at Paris is intended to intimidate France, and lead 
 to her intervention at St. Petersburg. (R. O. P. no. 29.) 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky considers the Servian reply a sham. (B. W. 
 P. no. 26.) 
 
 The German military attach^ at St. Petersburg reports mobiliza- 
 tion as certain in Kieff and Odessa; (in Warsaw and Moscow?)as 
 open to doubt. (G. W. B. exhibit 7.) 
 July 27. Germany says she cannot accept quadruple conference at Lon- 
 don. (G. W. B. exhibit 12; F. Y. B. nos. 73, 74; A. R. B. no. 35.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey warns Austria of the dangers of using force 
 against Servia. (B. W. P. no. 48; A. R. B. no. 38.) 
 
 The French Government accepts the British proposal for medi- 
 ation, and suggests that the success of the British proposal de- 
 pends upon the cooperation of Germany. (B. W. P. no. 51.) 
 
 Von Jagow refuses to agree to the Cambon formula as a basis 
 upon which to constitute the proposed mediation. (R. O. P. 
 no. 39.) 
 
 Russia willing to accept quadruple mediation if the direct nego- 
 tiations with Austria already commenced should fail. (R. O. P, 
 no. 32; B. W. P. nos. 53, 55.) 
 
 Austrian Government announces that it is obliged to use force 
 against Servia. (B. W. P. no. 48.) 
 
 The Tsar counsels Servia to make every effort to conciliate, and 
 promises Russian support in case of need. (R. O. P. no. 40.) 
 
 The British Ambassador at Rome informs Sir Edward Grey 
 of the Marquis di San Giuliano's suggestion that mediation should 
 be based on Servian acceptance of the terms of the Austrian note. 
 (B. W. P. no. 57; cf. B. W. P. no. 64; F. Y. B. no. 72.) 
 
 Germany has not yet accepted the British mediation proposal. 
 The Emperor will decide. (B. G. P. no. 6.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey considers mediatory action required by Ger- 
 many should be taken at Vienna rather than at St. Petersburg, 
 since Austria refuses to consider the conciliatory reply due to 
 Russia's influence. The British Government was ready to coop- 
 erate with Germany when wishing for peace, but when Germany 
 
APPENDIX 673 
 
 was acting contrarily, the British Government reserved its full 
 hberty of action. (R. O. P. no. 42; B. W. P. no. 46.) 
 
 The French Minister of Justice thinks Germany aims to sepa- 
 rate Russia and France. (R. O. P. no. 35.) 
 
 Austria thought to have purposely delayed French and Russian 
 telegrams about Servia's reply. (R. O. P. no. 36; cf. F. Y. B. no. 
 
 69.) ^ . 
 
 The Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, returns to Rome, and tells the French Ambassador that he 
 had been aware that the Austrian note would be vigorous, but had 
 no idea that it would take such a form. (F. Y. B. no. 72.) 
 
 Germany answers France that she will not consider it necessary 
 to mobilize if Russia mobilizes only on her Austrian frontier. 
 (F. Y. B. no. 67.) , ,. j . 
 
 Sir Edward Grey tells the Russian Ambassador that the order to 
 keep the First Fleet concentrated should dispel the idea that Eng- 
 land would in any event stand aside. (B. W. P. no. 47; cf. F. Y. B. 
 nos. 63, 65.) 
 
 French Fourteenth Army Corps discontinues maneuvers. 
 (G. W. B. exhibit 27.) ^ , ^ ^ 
 
 The German Chancellor instructs the German Ambassador at 
 London that Russia expected to call reserves immediately ; if true, 
 will force Germany to take counter measure. (G. W. B. exhibit 10.) 
 Russian Secretary of War declares no order for mobilization 
 has been issued. (G. W. B. exhibit 11.) . 
 
 Servia opens hostiUties against Austria on the Hungarian bor- 
 der. (A. R. B. nos. 40, 41.) • • u • 
 Tulv 28. Austria refuses to consider any suggestion of negotiations on basis 
 ^ of the Servian reply. (B. W. P. nos. 61, 74; R. O. P. no. 45; G. W. 
 B. exhibit 16; F. Y. B. no. 83; A. R. B. nos. 38, 40, 41.) 
 
 Germany, considering the declaration of war has not altered the 
 situation between Austria and Russia, urges Vienna to elucidate 
 satisfactorily to Russia the object and scope of her action agamst 
 Servia. (G. W. B. exhibit 14; B. W. P. no. 75.) 
 
 Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged. (B. W. P. no. 65.) 
 Austria declares war against Servia. (B. W. P. nos. 66, 71; 
 A. R. B. no. 37; S. B. B. no. 45.) 
 
 Servian Charg6 at Rome thinks that Servia might be willing to 
 accept the whole Austrian note if Austria should give certain 
 explanations to the powers. (B. W. P. no. 64.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at Vienna brings forward the l.ng- 
 Ush proposal that Austria accept the Servian note or consider it a 
 basis for negotiation. (A. R. B. no. 43.) 
 
 Russia considers that the Austrian declaration of war puts an 
 end to the idea of direct communications between Austria ana 
 Russia. But the Russian Ambassador at Vienna is not recalled, 
 and considers that the only hope of peace lies in mediation on the 
 basis of a suspension of Austrian military operations agamst 
 Servia. (B. W. P. no. 70.) . 
 
 Sazonof says that if Servia is attacked, Russia wdl not be satis- 
 
674 APPENDIX 
 
 fied with any engagement which Austria may take regarding 
 Servian integrity and independence, and that the order for mobil- 
 ization against Austria will be issued on the day Austria crossed 
 the Servian frontier. (B. W. P. no. 72.) 
 
 The German Imperial Government makes a confidential com- 
 munication to the Governments of the German Empire of its views 
 of the situation, explaining why Germany must support Austria. 
 (G. W. B. exhibit no. 2.) 
 
 Sazonof blames Germany for the crisis, and thinks that England 
 is best situated to influence Germany to exert the necessary check 
 on Austria. (R. O. P. no. 43.) 
 
 The British and Italian Ambassadors at Berlin hold a conference 
 with the French Ambassador and agree that German objection to 
 the form of mediation might be obviated by change of label. (F. 
 Y. B. no. 81.) 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin thinks war imlikely, since 
 Russia neither wants nor is in a position to make war. (B. W. P. 
 no. 71.) 
 
 Russia receives reports that Austria has mobilized in Slavonia, 
 Croatia, and Fiume, and that the decree for the general mobiliza- 
 tion has been signed. (R. O. P. nos. 44, 47; F. Y. B. no. 77.) 
 
 In consequence of Austria's declaration of war, Russia informs 
 Germany that she will mobilize the next day, July 29, in the mili- 
 tary districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan, but disclaims 
 any hostile intention toward Germany. (B. W. P. no. 70.) 
 
 Austria urges Germany to inform Russia that the latter's 
 mobilization against Austria would be answered by both Ger- 
 many and Austria. (A. R. B. no. 42.) 
 July 29. At Germany's suggestion the Austrian Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg is authorized to enter into conversations with Sazonof. (G. 
 W. B., Memorandum, p. 7.) 
 
 Germany makes offers to guarantee the integrity of France's 
 European territory, to secure England's neutrality in case of a war. 
 (B. W. P. no. 85.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey asks the German Government to indicate what 
 form of mediation would be acceptable. (R. O. P. no. 54.) 
 
 The Tsar appeals to the Kaiser to restrain Austria (G. W. B. 
 exhibit 21), to which the Kaiser replies by confirming Austria's 
 declarations as to her intentions, giving his opinion that Russia 
 may well stand aside. The Kaiser says that he agrees to the Tsar's 
 request that he act as mediator between Austria and Russia. 
 (G. W. B. exhibit 22. Of. also King George to Tsar,,London Times, 
 August 5.) 
 
 Sazonof informs the Russian Ambassador at Paris that the 
 German Ambassador has notified the Russian Government that 
 Germany will mobiUze unless Russia ceases her military prepara- 
 tions; and, since they cannot agree, the Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs thinks that they must consider war probably inevitable and 
 hasten their armament. (R. O. P. no. 58.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey tells M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, 
 
APPENDIX 675 
 
 that he purposes to tell the German Ambassador that they must 
 not feel secure that England wiU stand aside in case of war, but 
 Sir Edward also tells M. Cambon that England does not consider 
 herself bound to support France if she becomes involved. (B. W. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey points out to the German Ambassador that 
 mediation might be established on the basis of Austria's occupa- 
 tion of Belgrade. (B. W. P. no. 88.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, without wanting to say that England will 
 intervene, warns the German Ambassador that if France is in- 
 volved she may feel that British interests requure her to do so. 
 (B. W. P. no. 89.) . ^ ^. _ 
 
 The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg informs his Govern- 
 ment that from this moment he is able to give assurance that 
 Russia will acquiesce in any step proposed by France and England 
 to safeguard peace. (F. Y. B. no. 86.) ^ . , a 
 
 The German Secretary of State tells the French Ambassador 
 that the Servian reply might constitute a possible basis o negotia- 
 tion, the capital point relating to Servia's guaranties. (F. Y. B. 
 
 ^°Poincar6 and Viviani reach Paris on return from Russia. 
 
 Count Berchtold hands the German Ambassador a memorial 
 explaining the reasons for refusing the EngUsh suggestion for 
 mediation communicated by the German Ambassador. (A. K. B. 
 
 \wilni French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 instructs M. Paul Cambon to ask Sir Edward Grey to renew his 
 proposal for mediation. (F. Y. B. no. 97.) 
 
 The French Ambassador learns that this action was taken be- 
 cause of the tone employed by the German Ambassador. {b.Y. 
 
 ^M^Cambon makes a suggestion of mediation on the basis of 
 Austrian occupation of Servian territory. (B. W- P- no. 7b. 
 
 The Italian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that Russia would be 
 satisfied if Austria converted the assurances regarding her inten- 
 tions toward Servia into a binding engagement to Europe, but is 
 convinced that Austria would refuse (B W-^^- ^^ / Pprm^nv 
 
 The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that Germany 
 is opposed to conference, but is going t«"^g«Berhn to adhere to 
 the idea of an exchange of views m London. (B. W. P. no. ^^:^ 
 
 Sir Edward Grey says that he cannot mitiate discussions smce 
 Austria will not accept any discussion on the basis of the Sem^n 
 reply, and he infers that she wUl accept no mediation between 
 Austria and Servia. (B. W. P. no. 81.) sua^ests 
 
 Because of the failure of direct negotiations, Sazonof suggests 
 return to the British mediation proposal, and says that Russia is 
 ready to agree to any arrangement acceptable to England and 
 France for the carrying on of the conversations. He considers that 
 the only way to avert war is to find some formula that Austria can 
 be induced to accept. (B. W. P. no. 78.) 
 
676 APPENDIX 
 
 Sazonof says that Russia will agree to the proposal for a col- 
 lective guaranty (see B. W. P. no. 57) if acceptable to Servia, but 
 says that some supplementary statement or explanation will 
 have to be made to tone down the sharpness of the Austrian 
 ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 78.) 
 
 Austria and Russia seem to continue in constant touch. (B. W. P. 
 no. 84.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg expresses the opin- 
 ion that after Russia's mobilization, an exchange of ideas proposed 
 by Russia is extremely difficult if not impossible. (G. W. B., 
 Memorandum, p. 6; A. R. B. no. 46.) 
 
 Bulgaria declares her neutrality. (R. O. P. no. 52.) 
 
 Sazonof, before he learns of Austria's refusing to continue 
 negotiations, suggests to the German Ambassador that, while 
 Austria and Russia continue a direct exchange of views, the four 
 powers should arrange for a conference to carry on parallel dis- 
 cussions. (B. W. P. no. 93; R. O. P. nos. 49, 50.) 
 
 M. Paul Cambon tells Sir Edward Grey that he anticipates a 
 demand from Germany that France remain neutral while Germany 
 attacks Russia. (B. W. P. no. 87.) 
 
 The French Government assures the Russian Government of 
 its determination to support Russia, and urges Sir Edward Grey 
 to renew as soon as possible the proposal for mediation. (R. O. 
 P. nos. 55, 58.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey brings to the attention of the German Ambas- 
 sador the Italian suggestion for mediation (July 28, B. W. P. no. 
 64), though he does not propose it because of Austria's refusal 
 to consider any proposal. He also says that mediation between 
 Austria and Russia cannot be simply putting pressure on Russia 
 in the interests of Austria. (B. W. P. no. 90.) 
 
 The Marquis di San Giuliano advocates that England and Italy, 
 each representing one group, should continue to exchange views 
 even if impossible to induce Germany to take part in mediation. 
 (B. W. P. no. 80.) 
 
 Although Austria is not willing to discuss text of note she is 
 ready to discuss Austro-Russian relations. (A. R. B. no. 47.) 
 
 The German Secretary of State fears that as a result of his com- 
 munication of the English suggestion, regarding the discussion of 
 the terms of the note to Servia, Austria has felt that she was being 
 pressed and caused them to present a fait accompli by hastening 
 the declaration of war against Servia. (B. W. P. no. 76.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey tells M. Cambon that he has little hope of a 
 pacific solution. (F. Y. B. no. 98.) 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador at London remarks that before the 
 Balkan War Servia had always been regarded as being in the 
 Austrian sphere of influence. (B. W. P. no. 91.) 
 
 The German Secretary of State and the French Ambassador at 
 Berlin each considers that the other's Government is making 
 military preparations. (B. W. P. no. 76.) 
 
 The French Government receives report of military preparation 
 
APPENDIX 677 
 
 in Germany and Austria, and of mobilization on the Russian 
 frontier. (F. Y. B. nos. 88, 91.) 
 
 Austria urges Germany to make representations at St. Peters- 
 burg and Paris that Russian mobilization if continued will lead 
 to counter measures entailing serious consequences. (A. R. B. 
 no. 48.) 
 
 The Russian Ambassador returns to Berlin, and informs the 
 German Government that Russia is mobilizing in four southern 
 governments. (B. W. P. no. 76.) 
 
 The German Secretary of State tells the British Ambassador 
 that he is much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia 
 and of certain military measures being taken in France. (B. W. P. 
 no. 76.) 
 
 The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs explains to the German 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg the necessity of Russia's mobiliza- 
 tion. (B. W. P. no. 78; A. R. B. no. 47.) 
 
 Belgium makes certain military preparation for defense. (B, 
 G. P. no. 8; F. Y. B. no. 87.) 
 
 The German Military Attache at St. Petersburg considers that 
 the Russian Government is trying to deceive Germany as to the 
 military preparations actually being carried out. (G. W. B., 
 Memorandum, p. 7; cf. F. Y. B. no. 102.) 
 
 The German Chancellor instructs the German Ambassador at 
 Paris to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact 
 that their military preparations, if continued, will necessitate 
 countermeasures such as "Drohende Kriegesgefahr," which would 
 increase the tension. (G. W. B. exhibit 17; A. R. B. no. 45.) 
 
 Extraordinary council meets in the evening at Potsdam under 
 presidency of the Kaiser and decides upon mobilization. (F. Y. 
 B. no. 105.) [For various reasons this decision was changed.] 
 July 30. Austria bombards Belgrade. (F. Y. B. no. 113.) 
 
 The Kaiser telegraphs the Tsar that his mission as mediator is 
 rendered difficult if not impossible by Russia's mobilization against 
 Austria. (G. W. B. exhibit 23.) 
 
 To which the Tsar explains that the measures are for defense, 
 and hopes that the Kaiser will continue his mediation. (G. W. B. 
 exhibit 23A.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg declares that the 
 German Government will guarantee that Austria will respect 
 Servian integrity. (B. W. P. no. 97.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg asks M. Sazonof to 
 indicate the conditions upon which Russia could agree to suspend 
 her armament, whereupon Sazonof dictates the following declara- 
 tion: "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has 
 assumed character of question of European interest, declares her- 
 self ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate 
 principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all mili- 
 tary preparations." (B. W. P. no. 97; R. O. P. no. 60; F. Y. B. 
 no. 103.) 
 
 The German Government declares that it considers (trouvait) 
 
678 APPENDIX 
 
 the Russian formula (R. O. P. no. 60) proposed by Sazonof unac- 
 ceptable for Austria. (R. O. P. no. 63; F. Y. B. no. 107.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey gives his reasons for refusing the German 
 Chancellor's proposal to secure British neutrality. He declares 
 that the British Government must reserve its freedom of action, 
 but holds out hope of a general agreement between the powers 
 to prevent aggression against Germany if the present crisis can 
 be surmounted. (B. W. P. no. 101.) 
 
 M. Paul Cambon reminds Sir Edward Grey of an exchange of 
 letters agreeing, if the peace of Europe should be threatened, to 
 discuss what they were prepared to do. M. Cambon does not ask 
 Sir Edward to agree to intervene, but asks him to say what the 
 British Government will do in case of aggression by Germany on 
 France. Sir Edward replies that he will see him after the 
 Cabinet meeting next day. (B. W. P. no. 105; cf. F. Y. B. no. 108.) 
 
 British Cabinet postpones the second reading of the Amending 
 Bill in the interest of national unity in the face of the European 
 crisis. (London Times, July 31.) 
 
 The President of the French Republic considers England might 
 prevent war by standing with Russia and France, and says that 
 she will be drawn in the war in any event to protect her vital inter- 
 ests. He further states that all France had done was to make 
 preparations for mobilization. (B. W. P. no. 99; F. Y. B. no. 106.) 
 
 As a slender chance of preserving peace. Sir Edward Grey pro- 
 poses to Russia to modify the Russian formula so as to make it 
 more acceptable to Austria. (B. W. P. no. 103.) 
 
 The German Government, when asked to suggest some proposal 
 for mediation, had thought to save time by asking Austria what 
 would satisfy her, but no answer has as yet been received. 
 (B. W. P. no. 107; F. Y. B. no. 109.) 
 
 The Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg informs his Government 
 that, feeling at last secure of England's support (G. W. B. exhibit 
 28), the war party in Russia has the upper hand, and is pushing 
 preparations. 
 
 M. Paul Cambon submits to the British Government a memo- 
 randum showing the efforts of France to preserve peace, and how 
 she has retired her troops ten kilometers from the frontier. Ger- 
 many, on the other hand, is accused of aggressively pushing her 
 preparation. (B. W. P. no. 105, enclosure 3; F. Y. B. no. 106.) 
 
 A German newspaper issues an extra with a premature an- 
 nouncement of the promulgation of the German order of mobiliza- 
 tion. (R. O. P. nos. 61, 62; F. Y. B. no. 105.) 
 
 Sazonof says that he has proof of German military and naval 
 preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of 
 the Gulf of Finland. (B. W. P. no. 97; F. Y. B. no. 102.) 
 
 The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs tells the French 
 Ambassador at Berlin that his saying Germany would not con- 
 sider herself forced to mobilize unless Russia mobilized on the 
 German frontier did not constitute a firm engagement on his 
 part. (F. Y. B. no. 109.) 
 
APPENDIX 679 
 
 Germany urges Austria to exchange views with Russia. (In- 
 structions printed in the Westminster Gazette, August 1, see C. M. 
 Price, Diplomatic History of the War, pp. 51, 251.) 
 
 Count Berchtold tells the Russian Ambassador at Vienna that 
 Austria must as a measure of precaution mobilize in answer to 
 Russia. He says he has no objection to continuation of conversa- 
 tions at St. Petersbiu-g. These communications make a favorable 
 impression on the Ambassador, who was preparing to depart in 
 expectation that Austria would declare war against Russia. (B. 
 W. P. no. 96; F. Y. B. no. 104; A. R. B. 50.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at London asks why England is 
 making military preparations, and Sir Edward Grey says that the 
 measures are not aggressive, but the situation is such that each 
 power must prepare. (R. O. P. no. 65; cf. B. W. P. nos. 89, 101, 
 102; F. Y. B. no. 108.) 
 July 31. Germany closes bridges across the Luxemburg-German frontier, 
 and the Luxembvu-g Minister of State asks the French and German 
 Ministers if they will respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. (F, 
 Y. B. no. 111.) 
 
 The German Chancellor tells the British Ambassador at Berlin 
 that Count Berchtold replied last night, to a request for an answer 
 to the British proposal, that he would consult the Emperor this 
 morning. (B. W. P. no. 112.) 
 
 The Belgian Government call the attention of the German 
 Minister to the assurances that Germany had already given of her 
 intention to respect Belgium's neutrality, and receive the assur- 
 ance that Germany has not changed her views. (B. G. P. no. 12.) 
 
 The German Chancellor instructs the German Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg to present an ultimatum to Russia, threatening, 
 unless she demobilizes within twelve hours, that German mobiliza- 
 tion will be ordered. (G. W. B. exhibit 24.) 
 
 The German Secretary of State is not ready to answer what 
 course Germany will take regarding Belgium and the British 
 Ambassador at Berlin informs Sir Edward Grey that a definite 
 answer seems remote. (B. W. P. no. 122.) 
 
 The British Government unwilling to give any pledge of inter- 
 vention, but tell France that they will consider the situation again 
 directly there is a new development. (B. W. P. no. 116; F. Y. B. 
 no. 110.) 
 
 The French Minister for Foreign Affairs informs England of the 
 German ultimatum to Russia and the impending German mobili- 
 zation, and asks what will be the attitude of England. (B. W. P. 
 no. 117.) 
 
 Assassination of Jaures in a Paris caf^. 
 
 Bank of England doubles discount rate — 8 per cent. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey tells the French Ambassador that the British 
 Government cannot give any pledge at the present time. The neu- 
 trality of Belgium might be. Sir Edward would not say a decisive, 
 but an important, factor in determining their attitude. Parliament 
 would wish to know how they stood regarding Belgian neutraUty. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 Sir Edward also says that he has informed the German Ambas- 
 sador, that if France and Germany become involved in war, Eng- 
 land will be drawn into it, but that that was not the same thing 
 as making an engagement to France. (B. W. P. no. 119.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey suggests that Germany might sound Vienna 
 and he St. Petersburg as to four powers guaranteeing Austria 
 satisfaction from Servia without impairing the latter's sovereignty 
 or integrity, all powers meanwhile suspending military operations 
 and preparations. (B. W. P. no. Ill; F. Y. B. no. 112.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey tells Lichnowsky that if France and Russia 
 rejected any reasonable Austro-German proposal, the British 
 Government would have nothing more to do with the conse- 
 quences. (B. W. P. no. 111.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey asks France and Germany whether they will 
 respect Belgian neutrality, and notifies Belgium that he assumes 
 she will defend to the utmost her neutrality, which he expects 
 other powers to uphold and observe. (B. W. P. nos. 114, 115.) 
 J Sir Edward Goschen urges the German Secretary of State to 
 accept mediation after the occupation of Belgrade on the basis of 
 a collective guaranty (see B. W. P. no. Ill; F. Y. B. no. 112). But 
 Von Jagow said it was no use to discuss it till Russia had answered 
 Germany's ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 121.) 
 
 The French Minister at Brussels declares to the Belgian Gov- 
 ernment that French troops will not invade Belgium even if an 
 important massing of troops on the Belgian frontier should occur. 
 (B. G. P. no. 9.) 
 
 The French Government declare that they will respect Bel- 
 gium's neutrality. (B. W. P. no. 125; F. Y. B. nos. 119, 122.) 
 
 The Tsar appeals to the Kaiser to continue to exert his media- 
 tory influence. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.) 
 
 Sazonof communicates to the French and British Ambassadors 
 at St. Petersburg the Russian formula (see B. W. P. no. 97) modi- 
 fied in accordance with Sir Edward Grey's request. (R. O. P. no. 
 67; B. W. P. no. 120; F. Y. B. no. 113.) 
 
 Italy declares, in answer to Germany's interrogations, "The war 
 undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, 
 had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggres- 
 sive object. Both were, therefore, in conflict with the purely 
 defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circum- 
 stances Italy would remain neutral." (B. W. P. no. 152; F. Y. B. 
 no. 124.) 
 
 At the British Foreign Office the French Ambassador is told that 
 Sir Edward Grey will resume the discussion of cooperation with 
 France at the meeting of the Cabinet next day. (F. Y. B. no. 110.) 
 
 The arrangements are made for the delivery of President Poin- 
 car^'s autograph letter to King George. (F. Y. B. no. 110.) 
 
 The German Chancellor says that his peace efforts at Vienna are 
 handicapped by Russian mobihzation against Austria. (B. W. P. 
 no. 108.) 
 
 The German Chancellor says that Germany must shortly take 
 
APPENDIX 681 
 
 some serious step in answer to measures Russia is taking against 
 her, and that he was about to have an audience with the Emperor. 
 The news of these preparations arrived just when the Emperor, in 
 answer to the Tsar's appeal, was mediating at Vienna. (B. W. P. 
 no. 108.) 
 
 The Kaiser reproaches the Tsar for threatening peace by un- 
 necessarily mobilizing. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey informs Prince Lichnowsky that he cannot 
 urge Russia to suspend military preparations unless some limit is 
 put on the advance of Austrian troops into Servia. (B. W. P. 
 no. 110.) 
 
 General mobilization decreed in Austria. (F. Y. B. no. 115.) 
 
 The mobilization of the Belgian army is ordered. (B. G. P. 
 no. 10. ) 
 
 The German Chancellor explains to the British Ambassador at 
 Berlin the nature of Kriegsgefahrzustandt, which he says will be 
 proclaimed at once. (B. W. P. no. 112; F. Y. B. no. 116.) 
 
 The German Secretary of State explains why Germany had 
 demanded that Russia demobilize in the south as well. (B. W. P. 
 no. 121.) 
 
 Sazonof explains that Russia cannot arrest her mobilization 
 once in progress, but declares that Russia has no hostile intention 
 and will not cross the frontier. (B. W. P. no. 120.) 
 
 When Russia learns that Austria will not yield to the inter- 
 vention of the powers, and that Austria and Germany are making 
 military preparations against her, she decides to give orders for 
 general mobilization. (B. W. P. no. 113; F. Y. B. no. 118; R. O. 
 P. nos. 77, 78.) 
 
 A further exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and the 
 Kaiser regarding Russian mobiUzation. (G. W. B., Memoran- 
 dum, p. 9.) 
 
 The French Ambassador presents Poincar^'s letter to King 
 George. (F. Y. B. no. 110; London Times, Aug. 3.) 
 
 Kaiser telegraphs King George informing him of Russian mo- 
 bilization. 
 
 At midnight the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presents 
 the ultimatum to the Russian Foreign Minister, but when ques- 
 tioned says it does not constitute war, though very near it. (R. 
 O. P. no. 70.) 
 Aug. I. At 7.10 P.M. the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presents a 
 note declaring war against Russia. (R. O. P. no. 76; G. W. B. 
 exhibit 26.) 
 
 King George telegraphs the Tsar urging the acceptance of medi- 
 ation. 
 
 The Tsar repUes he would gladly accept but that Germany has 
 just declared war. (London Times, Aug. 5, 1914.) 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador at Paris says that his Government is 
 ready to discuss with the other powers the settlement of its conflict 
 with Servia. (R. O. P. no. 73; F. Y. B. no. 120.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey learns that Austria is ready to consider favor- 
 
682 APPENDIX 
 
 ably his proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia, and 
 tells the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that if Russia can 
 agree to stop mobilization it still appears possible to preserve 
 peace. (B. W. P. no. 135.) 
 
 The Belgian Government informs the British Minister that they 
 consider themselves in a position to make good their intention 
 of defending their territory against intrusion. (B. W. P. no. 128.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey tells the German Ambassador that they regret 
 Germany's failure to give an assurance that she would respect 
 Belgian neutrality. The Secretary adds that they are considering 
 the course they should take, and that, though respect for Belgium's 
 neutrality would be an important factor, they could not promise 
 neutrality on that condition alone. But when asked, Sir Edward 
 declines to specify what conditions would be satisfactory, though 
 Prince Lichnowsky suggests that the integrity of France and her 
 colonies might be guaranteed. (B. W. P. no. 123.) 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky informs his Government that Sir Edward 
 Grey has just asked him by telephone whether Germany would 
 agree not to attack France if she remained neutral. (G. W. B. 
 exhibit 33.) The Kaiser and Chancellor telegraph to accept the 
 proposal (G. W. B. exhibits 32, 34), but King George telegraphs 
 that there must be some misunderstanding. (G. W. B. exhibit 35.) 
 
 France replies to the German inquiry if she will remain neutral 
 in the event of a Russo-German war, that France will take the 
 course her interests dictate. (G. W. B. exhibit 27; F. Y. B. nos. 
 116, 117.) 
 
 France declares that she will respect the neutraUty of Luxem- 
 burg. (F. Y. B. nos. 128, 129.) 
 
 Austria gives assurances regarding Servia and informs St. 
 Petersburg that she has not "banged the door" on all further 
 conversations. (B. W. P. no. 137.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey protests against the detention of British ves- 
 sels at Hamburg (B. W. P. no. 130), which are ordered released. 
 (B. W. P. no. 143.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey tells the Russian Ambassador that he con- 
 siders the new Russian formula offers the best chance for a peaceful 
 settlement, and that he hopes no power will commence hostihties 
 before examining it. (R. O. P. no. 71.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey telegraphs the British Ambassador at Berlin 
 of the telegram of July 31 from Sazonof, communicated by De 
 Etter regarding Austria's acceptance of mediation and Sazonof's 
 desire that England assume direction of discussions. (B. W. P. 
 no. 133.) 
 
 Mobihzation of French army ordered. (B. W. P. no. 136.) 
 
 General mobilization of the Austrian army and fleet. (B. W. P. 
 no. 127.) 
 
 Sir Edward Goschen tries to persuade the German Secretary of 
 State that Germany should hold her hand now that the principals, 
 Austria and Russia, are ready to discuss. But Von Jagow replies 
 that Russia by mobiUzing has made this impossible, since Ger- 
 
APPENDIX 683 
 
 many, having the speed and Russia the numbers, could not allow 
 Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide 
 dominions. Hence Germany must consider Russia's refusal to 
 demobilize as creating a state of war. (B. W. P. no. 138; F. Y. B. 
 no. 121.) 
 
 Germany issues orders for the general mobilization of the navy 
 and army, the first day of the mobilization to be August 2. (B. 
 W. P. no. 142.) 
 
 Poincare tells the Russian Ambassador at Paris that the Aus- 
 trian Ambassador says that Austria declared to Russia that she 
 was ready to respect not only Servia's integrity, but also her 
 sovereign rights, and that Russia had, according to the Austrian 
 Ambassador, taken no notice of this declaration. This the Rus- 
 sian Ambassador denied categorically. (R. O. P. no. 75.) 
 
 Sazonof states Russia's view in regard to Servia and the Balkan 
 situation, and compares Russia's conciliatory efforts with ob- 
 stacles placed in the way of a peaceful solution by Germany. 
 (B. W. P. no. 139.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey learns the text of the Russian formula amended 
 to meet his suggestion. (B. W. P. no. 132.) 
 
 The French Government orders mobilization as soon as it learns 
 from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg of Germany's 
 announcement that she had decided to order mobihzation that 
 day. (R. O. P. no. 74.) 
 
 The French Government thinks that Germany is mobilizing 
 under cover of " Kriegszustand." (R. O. P. no. 73.) 
 Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium, declaring that she 
 has reason to believe that France is preparing to violate Belgium's 
 neutrality, and demanding that Belgium allow her to pass through 
 her territory. (G. W. B. exhibit 37; B. G. P. no. 20.) 
 
 Germany notifies the Belgian Government of the violation of 
 German territory by France as indicating the probability of 
 other violations of international law by France. (B. G. P. no. 21.) 
 
 French representatives abroad are informed of German viola- 
 tion of French territory (F. Y. B. no. 136), and the Ambassador at 
 Berlin is instructed to protest. (F. Y. B. no. 139.) 
 
 Germany violates the neutrality of Luxemburg. (B. W. P. 
 nos. 129, 146, 147.) 
 
 M. Paul Cambon asks Sir Edward Grey about the attitude of 
 the British Government regarding the violation of the neutrahty 
 of Luxemburg and Belgium. (B. W. P. no. 148.) 
 
 Germany considers state of war exists by reason of Russian 
 troops crossing the frontier. (B. W. P. no. 144.) 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky from London telegraphs: "Sir E. Grey'a 
 suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for 
 England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based 
 on a previous understanding with France, and made without 
 knowledge of our mobilization, they have been abandoned as 
 absolutely hopeless." (G. W. B., exhibit 36.) 
 
 England assures France that if the German fleet comes into the 
 
684 APPENDIX 
 
 Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations 
 against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the 
 protection in its power. (B. W. P. no. 148; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 126, 
 137, 138.) 
 
 A. Bonar Law pledges the Unionist Party by writing Asquith 
 that in the opinion of Lord Landsdowne, of himself, and of his 
 colleagues, it would be fatal to the honor and security of England 
 to hesitate in supporting France and Russia. (Published in the 
 London Times, December 15.) 
 
 The German Government explains that detention of British 
 vessels was due to laying of mines. (B. W. P. no. 145.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey instructs Sir Edward Goschen to protest 
 against the detention of cargoes of sugar unloaded from British 
 vessels. (B. W. P. no. 149.) 
 
 Germany informs France that the measures taken in Luxemburg 
 are not hostile, but merely preventive. (F. Y. B. nos. 132, 133.) 
 Aug. 3. The German Ambassador at London in commwiiquS to press 
 states that if England remains neutral Germany will forego all 
 naval operations, and will not use the Belgian coasts as supporting 
 base. (F. Y. B. no. 144.) 
 
 The German Ambassador at Paris declares that, in view of 
 French violation of Belgian and German territory, the German 
 Empire considers itself to be in a state of war with France. (F. Y. 
 B. nos. 147, 157.) 
 
 Belgium appeals to the diplomatic intervention of England to 
 protect her neutrality. (B. G. P. no. 25.) 
 
 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphs Sir Edward Grey that no in- 
 formation is obtainable regarding the detention of British vessels 
 at Hamburg. (B. W. P. no. 150.) 
 
 Belgium, declining for the present French offers of assistance, 
 announces that she does not intend in the actual circumstances to 
 appeal to the guaranty of the powers. (B. W. P. no. 151; B. G. P. 
 no. 24; F. Y. B. no. 142.) 
 Aug. 4. Germany informs Belgium that she is obliged to use force to 
 protect herself against France. (B. G. P. no. 27.) 
 
 German troops enter Belgium. (B. W. P. no. 158; B. G. P. no. 
 30; F. Y. B. no. 140.) 
 
 Germany assures England that she will not annex Belgian ter- 
 ritory, and excuses the necessity of violating Belgium's neutrality 
 on the ground of an intended French invasion of Belgium. (B. W. 
 P. no. 157.) 
 
 England presents ultimatum to Germany demanding assurances 
 regarding the respecting of Belgian neutrality. (B. W. P. no. 159.) 
 
 England informs Belgium that she expects Belgium to resist any 
 attempt by Germany to violate her neutrality, and that the British 
 Government will support her, and that they are ready to join with 
 Russia and France to aid her in resisting, and to guarantee and 
 maintain her independence and integrity. (B. W. P. no. 155; B. G. 
 P. no. 28.) 
 
 The Belgian Government hands his passports to the German 
 
APPENDIX 685 
 
 Minister (B. G. P. no. 31), who turns over the legation to the 
 Minister of the United States. (B. G. P. no. 32.) 
 
 England notifies Norway and Holland, as well as Belgium, that 
 she will assist them to protect their neutrahty and to maintain 
 their independence. (B. G. P. no. 37.) 
 
 The British Governmemt protests to Germany against further 
 detentions of British vessels. (B. W. P. no. 156.) 
 
 The French Ambassador at Berlin writes a letter of protest to 
 the German Secretary of State at the treatment he received while 
 returning to France. (F. Y. B. no. 155.) 
 
 The Belgian Minister at Berhn transmits to his Government 
 an account of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag, 
 admitting that Germany's action was a violation of international 
 law, but to be excused by necessity. (B. G. P. no. 35.) 
 
CITATIONS OF DOCUMENTS 
 
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APPENDIX 
 
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688 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
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 691 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 In order to avoid a confusion 'of unimportant references, in certain instances where 
 the names and titles of the principal diplomats have been included in this index, no ac- 
 companying reference to the pages of the volume has been added. 
 
 Abyssinia: 11, 24. 
 
 Acland, Parliamentary Under-Sec- 
 retary for Foreign Affairs: 435 n. 
 Adriatic: 21, 28-29, 32. 
 iEgean Islands: 26-27. 
 iEgean Sea: 30, 123. 
 Aerenthal:20. 
 
 Afghanistan: Anglo-Russian agree- 
 ment concerning, 548-549. 
 Agadir incident (1911) : 22-24; effect 
 on Germany, 35; Grey on English 
 policy regarding, 289^290. 
 Aggression: condemnation of, 14 n, 
 189-190 n, 489; difficulty in deter- 
 mining what constitutes, 459-460; 
 Italy says Triple Alliance does not 
 cover, 470; significance of Italy's 
 stand as showing Austro-German, 
 472-473; forced on Germany be- 
 cause of hostage policy towards 
 France, 488; fundamental reasons 
 for German, 505-508; England's 
 policy had nothing of, 511-512 n; 
 aim of diplomacy to force upon 
 opponent, 521; territorial, denied 
 by United States (1898) and Aus- 
 tria (1914), 585. 
 Agram: trial at, 43 n, 125. 
 Albania: made independent state by 
 powers, 28-29, 149; designs of 
 Italy and Austria on, 32, 41 ; ques- 
 tion, how settled (1913), 229. 
 Albert, King of Belgium: telegram of, 
 to King George, 355-358; World 
 interview with, regarding Anglo- 
 Belgian conversations, 407; de- 
 fense of Belgian neutrality, 407 n. 
 Alexander, King of Servia: 30, 147. 
 Alexander, Prince of Servia: 82; tele- 
 graphs Tsar, 99-100. 
 Algeciras Conference: 12-18; Grey 
 on English policy at time of, 289- 
 290; Italy at, 457. 
 Algiers: 11. 
 
 Allen, Clifford: England's reason for 
 entering war, 314-315 n. 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine: effect upon rela- 
 tions of France and Germany, 13- 
 15, 503; inhabitants of, forbidden 
 to cross frontier (July 1914), 170; 
 proposal (1870) to neutralize, 
 453 n. 
 Ambassador: see English, French, 
 
 German, etc.. Ambassador. 
 America (see also United States) : and 
 the issues of the European War, 
 655-660. 
 American affairs: Anglo-American 
 
 cooperation in regard to, 542. 
 American Association for Interna- 
 tional Conciliation, publications 
 of: 64 n, 130 n, 445 n. 
 American Delegation at the First 
 Hague Conference: declaration of, 
 concerning Monroe Doctrine, 539. 
 Afnerican Journal of International 
 
 Law: viii, 541 n, 544 n, 551, 572. 
 Andrassy, Count: interpellation on 
 
 Austro-Servian situation, 46. 
 Anglo-American cooperation: in re- 
 gard to American affairs, 542. 
 Anglo-American treaty: concerning 
 
 arbitration, 543. 
 Anglo-Belgian agreement: no reality 
 
 to, 405-406. 
 Anglo-Belgian conversations: 395- 
 411; nature of (Munroe-Smith), 
 405 n] World interview with King 
 of Belgium, 407: statement of 
 Belgian Government regarding, 
 (transmitted by Havenith), 407- 
 408; German Minister informed 
 of, by Belgian Government, 407- 
 408; Chancellor comments on, 
 455 n. ^ ^. , 
 
 Anglo-French Entente: formation ot, 
 12; disturbs Germany, 15-16; 
 strength of, shown at Algeciras, 
 17; England will not support if 
 France rejects reasonable German 
 proposal, 233; Poincare's letter to 
 King George, 276; Grey-Cambon 
 
696 
 
 INDEX 
 
 letters 1912, 283-284; Cambon- 
 Grey conversations, 285-288; 
 Grey's speech in Commons Aug. 3, 
 288-292, 345-352; cooperative dis- 
 position of Anglo-French fleets, 
 498; extent to which England 
 bound to aid France, 527. 
 
 Anglo-German agreement (see also 
 Anglo-German relations) : Asquith 
 remarks, 282 n; obstacle to, 511 n. 
 
 Anglo-German conflict: was not 
 inevitable, 488 n. 
 
 Anglo-German relations: Delbriick 
 predicts war, 560; price of Anglo- 
 German Entente (Delbriick), 561; 
 secret treaty of 1898 relative to 
 the eventual dismemberment of 
 the Portuguese Colonies, refer- 
 ences to, 562-563; colonial devel- 
 opment and removal of conflicting 
 interests (Johnston), 566; com- 
 mercial and economic competition 
 (Rathgen), 567-568; Bethmann- 
 Hollweg's speech in Reichstag 
 regarding, 568-569; Asquith's 
 Cardiff speech concerning, 568. 
 
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance: 12, 498. 
 
 Anglo-Russian agreement, concern- 
 ing Persia, 17-18, 498, 546-548. 
 
 Anglo-Russian Entente: 292 n, 556- 
 557. 
 
 Antwerp: England's intention to use 
 as base, 410. 
 
 Apponyi, Count Albert: Criticism of 
 Servia, 588. 
 
 Arbitration : suggested by Servia, 64; 
 Sazonof thinks Servia may pro- 
 pose, 201 ; Germany thinks Grey's 
 conference equivalent to, 208; Saz- 
 onof modified formula, constitutes 
 powers arbitrators, 238 7i; obliga- 
 tory, Germany's attitude towards, 
 503; Biberstein opposes obliga- 
 tory, at Hague, 513; Anglo-Ameri- 
 can treaty, 543; offered by Servia 
 (1914) and Spain (1898), 584. 
 
 Areopagus: German Chancellor ob- 
 jects to, 210; a European, 230; 
 judgment of, 272-273. 
 
 Armament of Powers: increase of, 35. 
 
 Asia: agreement of England and 
 Russia concerning their interests 
 in, 546-550. 
 
 Asia Minor: 20, 123. 
 
 Asquith, English Premier: Cardiff 
 speech, 282 n, 569; statement, 
 
 July 31, regal ding Russian mobil- 
 ization, 335; the Cabinet crisis, 
 341-342; 342 n; Shaw on, 356 n; 
 England's Entente policy and 
 Anglo-German agreement, 511- 
 512, 512 n. 
 
 Assassination: see regicide. 
 
 Associated Press : 365 n; Grey au- 
 thorizes statement (Jan. 27) com- 
 menting on Chancellor's interview 
 with, 406-407, 407 n. 
 
 Atlantic Monthly : 185-186 n; 275 n; 
 405 re; 415 re; 488 re. 
 
 Austria {see also, Austrian ultima- 
 tum — Austro-Servian conflict — 
 Balkans — Conversations — Lo- 
 calization — Mediation — Mobil- 
 ization) : obtains administrative 
 control of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 (1878), 7-8; joins with Germany 
 in Dual Alliance (1879), 7-8; 
 540-541; racial and political ele- 
 ments of, 8, 33; joins with Ger- 
 many and Italy in Triple Alliance 
 (1883), 8; rivalry with Russia in 
 Balkans, 19, 91-94, 96, 147-149; 
 annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 (1908), 20, 30-31, 76 re; Entente 
 powers resent annexation of Bos- 
 nia by, 21, 457, 520; threatened 
 by Servia's increased strength, 
 29-35, 89, 91 re, 93, 123-124, 
 127-128, 148-149; "Pig War," 
 30, 147; designs of, upon Alba- 
 nia, 32, 41; designs on Salonika, 
 524; Archduke of, assassinated 
 (June 28) 1914, 34, 155; intends 
 war on Servia (1913) with Ger- 
 many's consent, 35; presents ul- 
 timatum to Servia (July 23), 
 1914, 36-37; prepares public for 
 ultimatum through press, 44-45 re, 
 • 46-47 re, 50, 74-75 re, 88-89 re, 92, 
 156; lays on Russia responsibility 
 for a possible European war, 50- 
 51; assumes Servia responsible to 
 her alone and not to powers, 52, 
 61-62 re, 107-108; furnishes Eng- 
 land with special explanation of 
 ultimatum, 56-58; refuses to ex- 
 tend time limit of ultimatum, 61, 
 234 re; rejects Servia's reply, 65, 
 78-81; popular feeling in, against 
 Servia, 65, 85, 88 and re, 91-92; 
 rejoinder of, to Servian note, 65- 
 75; 79; begins military prepara- 
 
INDEX 
 
 tions, not operations, 80-81 ; urged 
 by powers to accept Servian reply- 
 as basis for discussion, 81-83; pur- 
 pose of, regarding Servia, 84-85, 
 89-95, 97, 101, 104, 105, 106, 128, 
 139, 153, 154, 223-224; believes 
 Russia will yield (July 26), 468; 
 declares war on Servia (July 28), 
 85-89, 100; action of, against Ser- 
 via for prestige, 91-92, 107, 213; 
 public opinion of against Russia, 
 103, 105 ; shares with Russia con- 
 trol of Balkan matters, 147, 188; 
 hegemony of, in the Balkans, 188- 
 189; refuses mediation on basis of 
 Servian note, 212; refuses direct 
 conversations with Russia con- 
 cerning Servia, 219-222, 226; 
 assumes a more conciliatory atti- 
 tude, 223-224, 226; exchange of 
 views with Russia, 225-226; did 
 not "bang the door," 226, 231; 
 after rupture Servia must also in- 
 demnize Austria, 234 n, 263; prob- 
 ably not to be satisfied even with 
 Servia's complete acceptance of 
 ultimatum (Grey), 234-235; Saz- 
 onof's remark concerning rupture 
 of conversations by, 243 n; unjust 
 to accuse of dilatory tactics, 251; 
 agrees to mediation, 252-264; Saz- 
 onof emphasizes importance of 
 arresting action against Servia by, 
 257; considers Grey's proposal for 
 mediation between Austria and 
 Servia, 258; diplomacy of, de- 
 scribed by Viviani, 258-259; might 
 give Servia or power speaking for 
 Servia her terms, 259; agreement 
 with Russia almost in sight, 261, 
 263 ; could not be expected to put 
 off attack on Servia (Bunsen), 262; 
 and Russia, agreement of, not in- 
 terrupted by German ultimatum, 
 263; limits of concessions of, to 
 Russia, 263; Russia could not al- 
 low invasion of Servia by, 264; op- 
 posed to compromise, 266-267 n; 
 attitude of, toward mediation, 
 271-273; believes England will 
 remain neutral, 274; appeals to 
 England to prevent war, 278; de- 
 clares war on Russia Aug. 5, 350 n; 
 Italy considers action of, against 
 Servia aggressive, 470; to blame for 
 disregarding diplomatic procedure, 
 
 483; measures of force justifiable 
 against Servia, 483; threat of, to 
 mobilize as excuse for Russian 
 mobilization, 487 n; responsibility 
 of, for war less than Germany's, 
 491; claims to use "peace power" 
 towards Servia, 501-502; did pre- 
 cipitate the war? 519; intentions of, 
 concerning Servian independence, 
 525; action in 1914 compared with 
 action of the United States in 
 1898, 579, 583-586. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador at Berlin: 
 see Count Szogyeny. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador at London: see 
 Mensdorff. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador at Paris: see 
 Szecsen. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg: see Count Szapary. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador to United 
 States: see Dumba. 
 
 Austrian Councilor, Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs: see Macchio. 
 
 Austrian General Secretary of the 
 Ministry for Foreign Affairs: see 
 Macchio. 
 
 Austrian Minister at Belgrade: see 
 Geisl von Geislingen. 
 
 Austrian Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs: see Berchtold. 
 
 Austrian Red Book: substantiates 
 statements in British White Pa- 
 per, V. 
 
 Austrian Ultimatum : (see also Austro- 
 Servian conflict — Localization — 
 Servian Note) : delivered July 23, 
 1914, 33-37; secrecy surrounding 
 drafting of, 41-47; tenor of, known 
 by von Tchirsky, 42; did Tchirsky 
 telegraph to Kaiser, 529; foreseen 
 by Servia, 42-43 ??, 45, 47-48; ac- 
 tivities of Austrian press preced- 
 ing, 44-45 n; 46-47 and n, 50 n, 
 74-75 n, 88-89 n, 92, 156; drawn 
 up by Forgach, 42 n; Italy not 
 informed of preparation of, 45, 
 120-121, 467-468; not communi- 
 cated to England or Russia until 
 day after its communication to 
 Servia, 48, 51, 60; terms not 
 known to Germany, but Germany 
 back of, 119-125, 520-521; as- 
 sumes Servia responsible to Aus- 
 tria alone and not to powers, 52, 
 61-62 n, 107-108; terms of, 52-53; 
 
698 
 
 INDEX 
 
 text of, 574-576; charges of, 
 against Servia not proved, 53, 98; 
 time limit of, 53-54, 56; diplomatic 
 consensus of opinion regarding, 
 54-56, 58-59, 64, 70-71 n, 98, 106, 
 119; effect of, on neutral sympa- 
 thy, 55 n; -a demarche with time 
 limit or an ultimatum? 56-58, 86- 
 87; efforts of powers to secure ex- 
 tension of time limit of, 59-61; 
 Entente powers influence Servia to 
 make conciliatory reply to, 62-64; 
 Servia's reply to, rejected by Aus- 
 tria, 65; correlation of, with Ser- 
 via's reply and Austrian rejoinder, 
 64-75; sixth demand of, supported 
 by precedent, 72 n, 76 n; Fischer- 
 auer on, 76-77 n; Lloyd George re- 
 marks upon, 586; inevitable mobili- 
 zation following, 186; Berchtold 
 refuses mediation concerning, 212; 
 discussed by Sazonof, 214; pro- 
 posed modification of, 214; Berch- 
 told does not agree to discuss mod- 
 ification of, 255 ; Berchtold author- 
 izes Schebeko to give explanation | 
 about, 257; Sazonof announces i 
 readiness of Austria to discuss, 
 257; Austria agrees to submit 
 terms to mediation (Bunsen), 261; 
 Austria not willing to modify, 263 ; 
 Servia should have accepted (San 
 Giuliano), 462; not intended to be 
 accepted, 519; affected Servian 
 independence, 525. 
 
 Austrian Under Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs: see Forgach. 
 
 Austro-German Alliance: treaty of 
 Oct. 7, 1879, 540. 
 
 Austro-Servian conflict: Russia's in- 
 terest in, 96-104; Dumba on, 587. 
 
 Avarna, Due d', Italian Ambassador 
 at Vienna: kept in dark about 
 Austrian ultimatum, 45-46, 468. 
 
 Aviators, French: alleged violation 
 by, of German territory, 173-174 
 n, 325. 
 
 Avlona: designs of Italy and Austria 
 on, 32. 
 
 Bagdad Railway: 20, 123. 
 
 Balance of Power: Dual Alliance 
 helps to effect, 9; reestablished by 
 Dual Alliance, 15; between En- 
 tente and Albania, effect on peace 
 of Europe, 15; affected not merely 
 
 by annexation of territory (Mun- 
 roe Smith), 99 n; reaffirmation of, 
 276; English policy of, 313-314; 
 displacement of, cause of the war, 
 476-479; Germany checked by 
 English policy of, 511 n. Belgium 
 and the balance of power (Usher), 
 597. 
 
 Balance of power in Balkans: Aus- 
 trian assurances regarding, 84-85, 
 97, 101, 139; Russian fears regard- 
 ing, 105-108. 
 
 Balin : criticizes Grey, 354 n. 
 
 Balkans (see also Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina — Bulgaria — Servia — 
 Turkey): general concern of Eu- 
 rope, 4, 195-197, 519; Russian 
 and Austrian ambitions in, 19, 91- 
 94, 96, 147-149, 482; attitude of 
 France and England toward, 21, 
 29, 31, 147, 195-196, 289, 293-295; 
 bi-partisan control of, 147, 188, 
 195; Bismarck's policy regarding, 
 485 n; unite against Turkey, 2&- 
 27; Treaty of London (1913), 27; 
 quarrel over spoils, 28-29; Treaty 
 of Bukharest (1913), 29; how af- 
 fected by Balkan wars, 78; Aus- 
 trian assurances regarding balance 
 of power in, 84-85, 97, 101, 139; 
 Russia's interpretation of Austrian 
 assurances, 105-108, 254 n; Eng- 
 lish position regarding question of, 
 278. 
 
 Balkan Wars: 26-34. 
 
 Bank of England: 308. 
 
 Barnardiston, Lieutenant Colonel: 
 395 j^.; perfidious announcements 
 of, 398. 
 
 Barrere, French Ambassador to Italy. 
 
 Beer, George Louis: answers Dern- 
 burg on " Willy-Georgie-Nicky " 
 correspondence, 335 n. 
 
 Belgian Documents {see also Anglo- 
 Belgian Conversations) : method 
 of publication of, 399 n. 
 
 Belgian Gray Paper: viii. 
 
 Belgian Minister at Berlin: see Bey- 
 ens, Greindl. 
 
 Belgian Minister at Washington: see 
 Havenith. 
 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
 see Davignan. 
 
 Belgian neutrality (see also Neutrali- 
 zation — Neutrality) : established 
 (1831) by Concert of Powers, 5-6; 
 
INDEX 
 
 international treaties (1831, 1839, 
 1870) regulating, 600, 602; re- 
 spected during Franco-Prussian 
 War, 6-7; English position regard- 
 ing, 287; part of Germany's bid 
 for England's neutrality, 297-303, 
 332 n, 353-354; affects English 
 opinion, 300-301; diplomatic im- 
 portance to England of question 
 of, 313-316, 332 n; Henry James 
 on violation of, 314; England, 
 France, Germany and Belgium 
 regarding, 316-323, 332 n; Eng- 
 land's inquiry relative to, 316- 
 328; German jr's reason for not 
 stating attitude, 317, 321, 404; 
 Jagow on, 321-322, 362-364; Ger- 
 many's ultimatum and Belgium's 
 reply, 323-328, 361-362; violation 
 of, casus belli for England, 352- 
 370; violated by Germany (Aug. 
 4), 362-363 ;__llacran_ of paper" 
 (Bethmann-Holhveg), 365-366; 
 (David Jayne Hillj, 382; Grey's 
 statement (1913) regarding, 401- 
 402; England's intention of violat- 
 ing, 396-397, 401, 402-405; Grey 
 gives no assurance that France will 
 respect (Delbrlick), 405 n; right to 
 defend without appeal from Bel- 
 gium, 405; King Albert's defense 
 of, 407 n; attitude of Holland to- 
 wards defense of, 411; alleged vio- 
 lations of, 415-422; French viola- 
 tions of, 415-422; France not 
 likely to violate, 417-418; right of 
 Belgium to defend, 431-441; Grey 
 calls upon Belgium to defend, 435; 
 and English intervention (Beth- 
 mann-Hollweg), 443-445; did 
 France plan violation of, 520; no 
 evidence of violations of, alleged 
 by Germany, 526; parliamentary 
 debates regarding (text), 615 ff. 
 Anglo-Belgian military prepara- 
 tions to defend (text of secret docu- 
 ments), 626; documents published 
 by Germany relative to violation 
 of, by England and Belgium, 631, 
 634. 
 
 Belgian preparations: against Ger- 
 man invasion, effects of, 411- 
 415. 
 
 Belgian resistance: reasons for, 434; 
 necessary to preserve independ- 
 ence, 453. 
 
 Belgian Secretary General to Minis- 
 try of Foreign Affairs: see Elst. 
 
 Belgian spy system: Barnardiston 
 urges adoption of, 395 n. 
 
 Belgium {see also Belgian neutrality 
 — Belgian resistance — mobiliza- 
 tion, Belgian, etc.): Richelieu's 
 proposal regarding, 595; united to 
 Holland by Congress of Vienna 
 (1815), 5; a "buffer" or "stopper" 
 state, 5 n; revolts from Holland 
 (1830), 5; England wishes to main- 
 tain independence of, 5; made per- 
 petually neutral by Concert of 
 Powers (1831), 6; French designs 
 upon, before Franco-Prussian War, 
 5-6; mobilization of, 310 n; hostile 
 acts of, 317; to maintain neutral- 
 ity, 319-320; relations with Ger- 
 many, 322-323, 409-410; at the 
 Hague Conference, 322, 409; Ger- 
 man ultimatum to, 323-324; an- 
 swers German demands, 326-327; 
 Germany violates, 362-363; mean- 
 ing of Gladstone's statement re- 
 garding, 386; changed conditions, 
 effect on treaty of (1839), 387; 
 obligation of United States to 
 protect, 391; England's plans for 
 the invasion of, 398; warns Ger- 
 man Minister against unauthor- 
 ized conversations, 407-408; Min- 
 ister of, at Washington, transmits 
 statement regarding Anglo-Bel- 
 gian conversations, 407-408; right 
 to defend neutralization, 431-441; 
 and the balance of power (Usher) , 
 597; England's position in regard 
 to (Grey), 620^.; Gladstone's let- 
 ter to Bright concerning incorpo- 
 ration of, by France, 624. 
 
 Belgium, the case of {see also Anglo- 
 Belgian Conversations): 624-631. 
 
 Belgium, invasion of: duty of all 
 states to prevent, 390-391; Eng- 
 land's plans for, 398; list of Ger- 
 man excuses, 402; violation of in- 
 ternational law (Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg), 445; France not intending, 
 448; Germany has another feasible 
 plan, 449; compared to trespass, 
 452; causes influencing Germany 
 to, 480-481; France intends (Del- 
 brlick), 488 71 : forced on Germany 
 because of "hostage" policy to- 
 wards France, 488; strategic con- 
 
700 
 
 INDEX 
 
 siderations leading Germany to 
 make (Delbriick), 488 n; why Ger- 
 many provoked England by, 522; 
 not necessary, 522; England's atti- 
 tude towards, 526; popular error 
 concerning, in England and Ger- 
 many, 526; effect upon England, 
 as compared with effect of inva- 
 sion of Holland, 526. 
 
 Belgium, King of: see Albert, King of 
 Belgium. 
 
 Belgrade: bombardment of , 140, 244; 
 induced to yield by powers, 231; 
 occupation of, 236-239; mediation 
 after occupation of, 236-239. 
 
 Below-Saleske, von, German Minis- 
 ter at Brussels: announces that 
 Germany will employ force against 
 Belgium, 439. 
 
 Benckendorff, Count, Russian Am- 
 bassador at London. 
 
 Benedetti : proposes partition of Bel- 
 gium, 6; plan of, to incorporate 
 Belgium in France (Gladstone), 
 624. 
 
 Benton, William S.: 76 n. 
 
 Berchtold, Count, Austrian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs: on Treaty of 
 London (1913), 32 n; tells of Aus- 
 trian d-marche, 57; on Servian 
 note, 79; Austrian "prestige en- 
 gaged," 107; instructions of, to 
 German representatives (July 28), 
 131-132; refuses mediation pro- 
 posal, 212; urges Germany to 
 threaten Russia to arrest mobiliza- 
 tion, 246 n; authorizes Szapary to 
 give explanations about Austrian 
 ultimatum, 257. 
 
 Berthelot, of the French Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs: Germany aims at 
 war (July 27), 161. 
 
 Bertie, Sir Francis, English Ambas- 
 sador at Paris. 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German 
 Chancellor: efforts of, to preach 
 peace at Vienna, 114-115; speech 
 of, in Reichstag (Aug. 4), 130 n, 
 145-146, 173; announces danger of 
 war, 138, 141; tells of Emperor's 
 mediation, 141; counsel to Aus- 
 tria, 233; blames rupture on Rus- 
 sian mobilization, 242; England 
 responsible for war, 278 n; English 
 replies, 278 n, 282 n; policy of, to 
 effect better understanding be- 
 
 tween England and Germany, 
 280-282, 364-366; bids for Eng- 
 land's neutrality, 297-299, 307; 
 asks French reply on Belgium, 
 317-318; Belgian neutrality, 321, 
 416; telegram on French neutral- 
 ity, 329; states Germany's posi- 
 tion regarding Luxemburg, 338; 
 "just for a scrap of paper," 365- 
 366; Grey's commentary on press 
 interview with, 406-407 7i; remark 
 in Reichstag about England and 
 Belgian neutrality (speech Dec. 2), 
 443; text of speech, 568-569; inva- 
 sion of Belgium, violation of inter- 
 national law, 445; translation of 
 remarks of, concerning necessity, 
 445-446 n; remarks concerning 
 observance of treaties compared 
 with Bismarck, 453 n; "scrap of 
 paper" remark causes unfavorable 
 impression in U.S., 454 n; remarks 
 on Grey statement of England's 
 intentions toward Belgium, 455 n; 
 England's policy to check Ger- 
 many through balance of power, 
 511 n. (Speech Dec. 2) England's 
 policy prevents agreement, 568- 
 569. 
 
 Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin: 
 disbelief of, regarding Germany's 
 ignorance of Austrian ultimatum, 
 121; interview with Jagow, 43&- 
 438. 
 
 Bieberstein, Baron, Marschall von: 
 diplomacy of, at Constantinople, 
 20, 22-23 «, 505; opposes obliga- 
 tory arbitration at Hague, 513. 
 
 Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
 Minister of Justice: believes Ger- 
 many is trying to alienate France 
 and Russia, 153-154; sums up 
 situation (July 29), 154-155; on 
 attitude of Germany and Aus- 
 tria (July 27), 160-161; concern- 
 ing French representations at St. 
 Petersburg, 163-164. 
 
 Biological test : states favored by, 452. 
 
 Bipartisan control of Balkan affairs: 
 
 ' 195. 
 
 Birth control: Germany's view of, 
 506-507. 
 
 Bismarck: diplomacy regarding pro- 
 posed partition of Belgium, 6 ; pol- 
 icy of, toward Austria, 7-8; speech 
 
INDEX 
 
 701 
 
 (Feb. 6, 1888), 533 #.; distrust of 
 policy of settlement colonies, 13; 
 against aggression, 14 n, 189- 
 190 n, 489; on mobilization, 135 n; 
 "le plus sage cede," 247 n; re- 
 marks about observing treaties 
 compared with Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg's, 453 n; anticipated action of 
 Italy, 472; evil consequences of 
 example of, 493-495, 514. 
 
 Black Sea: Bulgarian forts on, 30. 
 
 Bokhara: 93. 
 
 Bombardment of Belgrade: 140, 244. 
 
 Bompard, French Ambassador at 
 Constantinople. 
 
 Bonar Law, A: pledges support to 
 Asquith, 343. 
 
 Boppe, French Minister to Servia. 
 
 Boschkovitch, Servian Minister at 
 London. 
 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina: falls under 
 administrative control of Austria 
 (1878), 7-8; Austria annexes 
 (1908), 19^22, 25, 30-31; Entente 
 powers object to annexation of, 21, 
 457, 520; Turkish sympathies of 
 (1908), 20; designs of Servia on, 
 30, 66-67, 124, 147-148; Young- 
 Turk movement to recover, 76 n. 
 
 Bourse (Berlin) : 156-157. 
 
 Bresslau, Harry: 537 n. 
 
 Bridges, Lieutenant-Colonel: 395^. 
 
 Bright: Gladstone's letter to, 624- 
 626. 
 
 British Empire: classification of the 
 possessions of, 497. 
 
 British White Paper: veracity of, v, 
 285-286 n, 335 n. 
 
 British: see English. 
 
 Bronewsky, Russian Chargi d'Af- 
 faires at Berlin: 157. 
 
 Buch, von, German Minister to 
 Liixemhurg. 
 
 Buchanan, Sir George, British Am- 
 bassador at St. Petersburg: Russian 
 mobilization means declaration of 
 war by Germany, 133; urges Rus- 
 sia to defer order for mobilization, 
 186. 
 
 Budapest: 46. 
 
 "Buffer" State {see also "Stopper 
 State"): Belgium to serve as, 5 n. 
 
 Bulgaria: 20, 26-33, 94, 124, 149; 
 secret appendix to treaty of friend- 
 ship and alliance with Servia, 
 572-574. 
 
 Billow, Prince von, Ex-Chancellor of 
 Germany: the Triple Alliance, 9 n, 
 478-479 n; Franco-Russian and 
 German- Russian relations, 16 n; 
 Germany's interest in Morocco, 
 23 n; Germany and the Near East, 
 27-28 n; Italy and the Triple Alli- 
 ance, 457, 471-472. 
 
 Bunsen, Sir Maurice: British Ambas- 
 sador at Vienna: account of events 
 preceding war, 42-47; England has 
 no sympathy for Servia, 127 n; 
 Austria agrees to submit ultima- 
 tum to mediation, 261; Sazonof 
 accepts mediation if Servia is not 
 invaded, 261; Austria could not 
 be expected to put off attack on 
 Servia, 262; statement at variance 
 with Austrian Red Book, 262. 
 
 Bureaucracy: efficient, of Germany, 
 514. 
 
 Burns: resigns from Cabinet, 341- 
 342 n. 
 
 Cabinet, English: crisis in, 311, 
 340 n, 355 n; responsibility of, to 
 Parliament (George Louis Beer), 
 335 n; changes in, 341-343 n. 
 
 Caillaux: trial of Mme., 36. 
 
 Cairo: 11. 
 
 Camarilla, court : of military authori- 
 ties, possibility of, 140. 
 
 Cambon, Jules, French Ambassador 
 at Berlin: remarks German efforts 
 to explain ignorance of Austrian 
 ultimatum, 121; on situation July 
 24, 125; distrust of Germany, 161- 
 162; suggests formula, 209; sug- 
 gestion for mediation after Aus- 
 trian occupation of Belgrade, 236- 
 239; German ultimatum signifi- 
 cant of bellicose policy, 260. 
 
 Cambon, Paul, French Ambassador 
 at London: on Austrian ultimatum, 
 55; criticism of views of, 200; sug- 
 gests] deferring proposal of medi- 
 ation to [Russia, 200; asks Grey 
 about violation of Luxemburg, 
 338; violation of Belgium would be 
 considered a casus belli by Eng- 
 land, 353; negotiations of, with 
 Grey regarding unprovoked attack 
 on France by a third power, 283- 
 288, 290-291. 
 
 Cambon suggestion of mediation 
 after Austria's occupation of Bel- 
 
702 
 
 INDEX 
 
 grade: 236-239; why so desig- 
 nated, 236 n; Jagow thinks pos- 
 sible to accept if Russia does, 236- 
 237; Germany forwards to Vienna, 
 237; Viviani urges Russia to ad- 
 here to, 238-239; Viviani says 
 Russia ready to accept, 259. 
 
 Cape Colony: 5, 11. 
 
 Casablanca Affair (1908): 18-19, 22. 
 
 Casus foederis: 459; Italy only bound 
 if consulted beforehand, 468; Italy 
 says Triple AUiance does not in- 
 clude aggressive war, 470; under 
 Triple Alliance Italy considers 
 (1913) aggression on Servia does 
 not constitute, 470-471; no, for 
 Italy when England involved, 473; 
 for Italy under Triple Alliance, 
 490 n. 
 
 Causes of the war: suggested and 
 alleged, 475-476; significance of 
 variety of alleged, 476; what we 
 mean by, 479; immediate causes, 
 479, 491; voluntary or rational 
 as opposed to irrational, 479-480; 
 determining causes, 491-495; re- 
 sponsibility of William II, 521. 
 
 Chancellor, German: see Bethmann- 
 Hollweg. 
 
 Chimay, Troupe of: 413 n. 
 
 China {see also Manchuria) : 12, 13, 
 24; collective intervention, 501; 
 treaty of Japan and Russia guar- 
 anteeing integrity of, and "Open 
 Door" in, 550. 
 
 Chirol, Sir Valentine: 224 n. 
 
 Chronology: 667-685. 
 
 Ciganovic: 49 n, 74. 
 
 Citation of documents: 686^. 
 
 Cities: determine national attitude 
 towards peace, 188 n. 
 
 Clarendon, Lord: 338-339. 
 
 Coblenz: 173 n. 
 
 Collective action: 204 n; purpose of, 
 501. * 
 
 Collective guaranty: see Guaranty- 
 Luxemburg. 
 
 Collective note of October 8, 1912: 
 27. 
 
 Cologne: 169-170. 
 
 Colonial policy of England: 4-5. 
 
 Colonies: Germany desires, 504. 
 
 Commercial competition : of England 
 and Germany, 567-568. 
 
 Commons, House of: freedom of 
 action, 291. 
 
 Communique of Baron Kuhlmann: 
 360-361. 
 
 Competition: commercial, of Eng- 
 land and Germany, 567-568. 
 
 Compromise: Sazonof thinks can 
 reach, at London, 256; Russia 
 ready to accept any reasonable, 
 262; failure to reach, 264-267; 
 Giesl opposed to, 266 n; Jagow 
 says Sazonof more inclined to, 
 
 266 n; importance of, in diplo- 
 macy, 266-267 ; Austria opposed to, 
 
 267 n; treaty of peace will be, 515. 
 Concert of Powers: formation of, 3- 
 
 4; ratifies Treaty of Vienna 1815, 
 3, 4; serves as shock-absorber, 
 4; establishes Belgian neutrality 
 (1831), 6; effect of Dual AUiance 
 upon balance of power, 9; divides 
 into Triple Alliance and Triple 
 Entente, 7-18; position of Eng- 
 land in, 9; weakness of, 27; estab- 
 lishes independent Albania, 28; 
 restrains Servia, 31-32; settlement 
 of Balkan affairs, 195; Italy takes 
 place in, 425. 
 
 Conference: of the powers proposed 
 by Grey, 197-204, 206-207; Saz- 
 onof proposes to parallel "conver- 
 sations" by, 221 ; urged by powers, 
 229-231; made difficult by Rus- 
 sian mobilization (Pourtales), 243- 
 244; responsibility of Germany for 
 refusal to participate in, 484. 
 
 Congo: 11, 505. 
 
 Congo Free State: effect on Belgian 
 poUcy, 410 n. 
 
 Congo, French: 24. 
 
 Congress of Vienna (1815): 3-5. 
 
 Conservatives: support Entente, 
 309. 
 
 Constantinople: Russian ambitions 
 to secure, 10, 19; German influence 
 at, 16, 19-20, 22-23; Austrian 
 ambitions regarding, 33, 106. 
 
 Constitution : Bismarck violates 
 Prussian, 493-494. 
 
 Contem-porary Review: (Delbrixck), 
 561. 
 
 Continental policy of England: 10. 
 
 Continental Times, Berlin: (Apponyi), 
 588. 
 
 Convention: see Treaty. 
 
 Conversations (see also Anglo-Bel- 
 gian conversations) : between Vien- 
 na and St. Petersburg, 209-210, 
 
INDEX 
 
 703 
 
 213, 227; Sazonof proposes to 
 parallel, by conference, 221; Du- 
 maine explains interruption of, 
 226; Kaiser urges Austria to con- 
 tinue, 242; Sazonof statement in 
 regard to the breaking off, by Aus- 
 tria, 243 n; Russia receives word 
 of Austria's refusal to continue, 
 246; Berchtold (July 30) has no 
 objection to continuance of, 255; 
 Austro-Russian, interrupted by 
 German ultimatum, 262; Szapary 
 explains Austria ready to con- 
 tinue, 262-263; Sazonof (Aug. 1) 
 expresses satisfaction that Austria 
 will continue, 263. 
 
 Conybeare, Dr. F. C: attacks Grey, 
 357-359 n. 
 
 Cook, Sir Edward: 352 n. 
 
 Correspondence Bureau. Austrian: 
 activities of, against Servia, 44- 
 45 71. 
 
 Counter-mobilization: see Mobiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 Crandall, S. B. : succession of treaty 
 obligations, 385 n. 
 
 Crete: 19. 
 
 Crimea: 10. 
 
 Crises: European, before war, 9-10. 
 
 Croatia: 109. 
 
 Cyrenaica: 25-26. 
 
 Damascus: 23. 
 
 Dardanelles: Russian commerce 
 through, 524. 
 
 Davignon, Belgian Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs. 
 
 Davis, J. C. Bancroft: succession of 
 treaty obligations, 385 n. 
 
 Declaration of London, February 26, 
 1909: Austria will observe, 88. 
 
 Defensive alliance: right of neutra- 
 lized states to enter into, 408; 
 nature of, 460. 
 
 Delbriick, Prof. Hans: Russian mo- 
 bilization, 185-186 n; Grey re- 
 sponsible for war, 275 n; Grey 
 gives no assurance that France 
 will respect Belgium, 405 ?i; 
 French and English violation of 
 Belgian neutrality, 415 n; why 
 Germany invaded Belgium, 448; 
 strategic reason for invasion of 
 Belgium, 488 7i; predicts war be- 
 tween Germany and England, 560. 
 
 Delcass^, French Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs: diplomacy of, after Fash- 
 oda, 12; Germany secures resigna- 
 tion of, 17. 
 
 Demarche: defined, 57 n 2, 86 n 2. ; 
 
 Denis: see Durkheim and Denis. 
 
 Derby, Lord: 338. 
 
 Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard: Grey re- 
 sponsible for war, 275 n, 296 n; 
 criticism of British White Paper 
 and reply of B. L. Beer, 335 n; 
 Bethmann-HoUweg's right to ap- 
 peal to law of necessity, 416 n.; re- 
 marks introductory to Belgian se- 
 cret documents, 631-634; Ger- 
 many's treaty record, 661-664. 
 
 Destruction of the Maine: negotia- 
 tions of the Spanish and American 
 governments following, 579, 584. 
 
 Determining causes of the war (see 
 also Causes of the war): 491-495. 
 
 Diplomacy: Viviani describes Aus- 
 trian, 258-259; of England, 268; 
 governments express in foreign 
 relations resultant of internal 
 forces, 492; of Germany, weakness 
 of, 521 ; aim of, 521; correctness of 
 Russian, 522. 
 
 Diplomatic documents, their verac- 
 ity: V, vi, 155-156 n, 285-286 n, 
 335 ». 
 
 Diplomatic intervention: see Inter- 
 vention, diplomatic. 
 
 Diplomatic procedure: powers hope 
 to employ same, as for Albanian 
 negotiation, 230; must be em- 
 ployed before recourse to force, 
 454; Austria to blame for disre- 
 garding, 483. 
 
 Diplomats: efforts of, to preserve 
 peace, 187-188, 197. 
 
 Direct conversations: see Conver- 
 sations. 
 
 Disarmament: reason why Germany 
 opposed, 477; super-empire per- 
 mits limitation of armaments, 499; 
 Germany refuses to consider, 513. 
 
 Discrimination: against state disre- 
 garding ideals of humanity, 451. 
 
 Documents, diplomatic: see Diplo- 
 matic documents. 
 
 Dollot; Les Origines de la Neutralite 
 de la Belgique: 316 n, 373-375. 
 
 Draga, Queen, of Servia: 147. 
 
 Dual Alliance between Austria and 
 Germany: formed (1879), 8; text 
 of, 540-541; becomes Triple Al- 
 
704 
 
 INDEX 
 
 liance (1883), 8; prestige of, af- 
 fected by Balkan Wars, 35. 
 
 Dual Alliance between Russia and 
 France: formed (1891), 8^9 ; effect 
 of, and Triplice in maintaining 
 balance of power, 15; weakened by 
 Russo-Japanese War, 16. 
 
 Dual Monarchy: see Austria. 
 
 Ducarne, General: 395^. 
 
 Duggan, S. P.: 20 n, 21 n, 32 n. 
 
 Dumaine, French Ambassador at 
 Vienna: suspicions of, regarding 
 Germany, 161-162; explains inter- 
 ruption of conversations, 226. 
 
 Dumba, Constantin Theodor, Aus- 
 trian Ambassador to United States: 
 69 n; The Austro-Servian Conflict, 
 587. 
 
 Durkheim and Denis: 164 n, 256 n, 
 261 n, 325 n, 336 n. 
 
 Echo de Paris: 150. 
 
 Economist: 309. 
 
 Edward VII: efforts' toward Anglo- 
 French accord, 12-13; attempt 
 upon the life of, at Brussels, 410 n. 
 
 Efficiency: basis of super-empire, 
 500. 
 
 Egypt: clash of English and French 
 interests in, 11, 22; Fashoda in- 
 cident, 11; agreement between 
 
 '' France and England regarding, 13. 
 
 Elst, Baron von der, Belgian Secre- 
 tary General to Ministry for Foreign 
 Affairs. 
 
 Emigration: Germany objects to loss 
 by, 502, 506. 
 
 Empires: growth of, 496-497. 
 
 Encyclopaedia Britannica: 8 n, 30 n, 
 91 n. 
 
 England (see also Asquith — Bel- 
 gium — Belgian neutrality — 
 England's intervention — Grey — 
 Luxemburg): colonial possessions 
 of, 4-5; efforts of, in establishing 
 neutrality of Belgium, 5-6; trea- 
 ty regarding Belgian neutrality 
 (text), 602; does not at first join 
 continental alliances, 9-10; con- 
 tinental policy of, 9-10, 15, 477; 
 former fear of Russian expansion, 
 10; rivalry with France for colonial 
 possessions, 11; defensive alliance 
 with Japan against Russia (1902), 
 12; friendly understanding with 
 France (1904), 12-13, 283-284; 
 
 understanding with France (1904) 
 respecting Egypt and Morocco 
 (text), 544-546; supports France 
 in Morocco, 16-17; considers Ger- 
 many as rival, 17; agreement with 
 Russia (1907) regarding Asia, 17- 
 18; (text), 546-550; replaced by 
 Germany as protector of Turkey, 
 19; supports France at Agadir, 23; 
 increasing friendly relations of, 
 with Germany, 280-282, 304, 364 
 -366; Anglo-German Relations, 
 560-571; on verge of civil war 
 (1914), 36, 307-308; receives from 
 Austria special explanation of 
 ultimatum, 56-58; endeavors to 
 secure extension of time limit of 
 Austrian ultimatum, 59, 270; in- 
 fluences Servia to make concilia- 
 tory reply, 63-64, 270; tries to de- 
 lay hostilities between Austria and 
 Servia, 82-83; and France unable 
 to advise Russia to submit, 189; 
 belief, would support Russia, 192; 
 and Italy possible mediators, 193- 
 194 ; refuses to take sides — wisdom 
 of this course, 194, 273-282, 286- 
 288, 293-295, 303-307, 310-311, 
 356 n, 367-369 n; not willing to 
 fight over Balkan question, 21, 29, 
 31, 130, 148, 289, 293-295; policy 
 concerning Balkan affairs, 195- 
 196; weakness of Balkan policy, 
 197; urges mediation on basis of 
 Servian note, 211-212; mediation 
 proposal of, accepted by Russia, 
 217; proposes Cambon suggestion, 
 237-239; and France not notified 
 of Russian general mobilization, 
 253 n; important role of, 268-269; 
 efforts of, to organize mediation, 
 270-273; influence for peace, docu- 
 ments showing, 270 n; declaration 
 of, to support France, 275; urged 
 by Austria and Germany to pre- 
 vent war, 278; obligation of, to 
 France (Grey), 288-292; negotia- 
 tions of, with France and Russia, 
 292 n; warns Germany she will 
 not hold aloof if France is involv- 
 ed, 295-296; Baron Kuhlmann's 
 communique, 360-361 ; refuses Ger- 
 many's bid for England's neutral- 
 ity, 297-303, 348, 355 n; diverg- 
 enceof opinion in, 303-311; Liberal 
 Party in power and opposed to 
 
INDEX 
 
 705 
 
 war, 309; vital interests of, 311- 
 316, 339-352; position in regard to 
 Belgium (Grey), 620; inquiry of, 
 relative to Belgium's neutrality, 
 316-328; asked to guarantee neu- 
 trality of France, 328-336; respon- 
 sibility of English Cabinet (Beer), 
 335 n; merchant vessels of, de- 
 tained by Germany, 336-337; 
 agrees to protect French coast, 
 339-352; thus conditionally enter- 
 ing war, 351-352; violation of Bel- 
 gium casus belli for, 352-370; in- 
 tends to land troops in Belgium 
 without her permission, 396-397; 
 objects to fortification of the 
 Scheldt, 397-398; Anglo-Belgian 
 agreement against Germany (Del- 
 bruck),405 n; violation of the neu- 
 trality of Holland, 410; right to 
 use Scheldt as route to Antwerp, 
 411; Bethmann-Hollweg discusses 
 reasons for intervention, 455 n; 
 abandons "splendid isolation," 
 476-477; supremacy at sea, 511 n; 
 no policy of aggression towards 
 Germany (Asquith), 511 n; policy 
 to check Germany through bal- 
 ance of power (Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg), 511 w; not responsible for 
 the war, 528. 
 
 England's intervention: England's 
 reasons for, 312-313; effect of Ger- 
 man attitude towards Belgium, 
 481; reasons for, _ 487, 525-526; 
 how Germany might have pre- 
 vented, 489. 
 
 English: see also British. 
 
 English Ambassador at Berlin: see 
 Goschen. 
 
 English Ambassador at Paris: see 
 Bertie. 
 
 English Ambassador at Rome: see 
 Rodd. 
 
 English Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg: see Buchanan. 
 
 English Ambassador at Vienna: see 
 Bunsen. 
 
 English Councilor of Embassy at 
 Berlin: see Rumbold. 
 
 English Minister to Belgium: see 
 Villiers. 
 
 English Minister to Luxemburg: see 
 Johnstone. 
 
 English neutrality: Germany's bid 
 for, 297-303, 348, 355 n. 
 
 English Premier: see Asquith. 
 
 English Secretary for Foreign Af- 
 fairs: see Grey. 
 
 English ultimatum: 352-370. ^ 
 
 English Under Secretary for Foreign 
 Affairs: see Nicholson. 
 
 Entente: {see also Anglo-French En- 
 tente — Anglo-Russian Entente 
 — Triple Entente): nature of, 
 292 n; Jagow's objection to group- 
 ing of, against Triplice, 209; Eng- 
 land will not sacrifice, 312 n; 
 difficult for English to remember 
 attitude towards, in July, 488. 
 
 Entente cordiale: see Anglo-French 
 Entente. 
 
 Ententes: Asquith refers to Eng- 
 land's policy of, 511 n. 
 
 Equality of states: and the right to 
 make war, 391 ff.; invasion of Bel- 
 gium violates principle of, 390- 
 391; before the law, 454. 
 
 Etter, de, Russian Councilor of 
 Embassy at London. 
 
 Europe: evolution towards dual 
 grouping of powers, 8-18, 476-477. 
 
 European Concert: see Concert of 
 Powers. 
 
 Expansion: conflict in policies of 
 Austria and Servia, 483. 
 
 Explanations about Austrian ulti- 
 matum authorized by Berchtold, 
 257. 
 
 Extraterritorial jurisdiction: 19. 
 
 Eyschen, President of Luxemburg 
 Government. 
 
 Faber, Captain: revelations of, 398. 
 
 Fait accompli: Austria brings about 
 a, 271. 
 
 Far East: 22, 31, 188. 
 
 Fashoda : England encounters France 
 at, 10; claim to, yielded by France 
 to England (1898), 11-12, 17. 
 
 Fatherland: 447 n. 
 
 Finland, Gulf of: 140. 
 
 Fischerauer, Fritz, Austrian vice- 
 Consul: on Austro-Servian rela- 
 tions and Austrian ultimatum, 
 76-77 n. 
 
 Fiume: 109. 
 
 Fleuriau, de, French Charge d' Af- 
 faires at London. 
 
 Flotow, von, German Ambassador to 
 Italy. 
 
 Flushmg: fortification of, 397; Eng- 
 
706 
 
 INDEX 
 
 land's view of fortification of, 410 
 
 411 TO. ' 
 
 Force: use of, 302; should be consid- 
 ered in political matters, 393; con- 
 ditions for rightful use of, 394- 
 395; [obligation |to observe i for- 
 malities before employing, 454; 
 measures of, Austria justified in 
 usmg, 483; use of, more favorably 
 considered in Germany, 495; use of 
 "peace power" to compel respect 
 for international law, 500; danger 
 in the use of, 501. 
 Foreign Legion in Morocco: 18. 
 Forgach, Count, Austrian Under 
 Secretary of State for Foreian 
 Affairs: 42-43 n, 44. 
 Formalities: obligation of states to 
 
 observe, 454. 
 Formula for mediation: efforts to 
 
 discover, 229-231. 
 Fortnightly Review: 413 n. 
 France (see also Belgian Neutrality 
 . -;- Bienvenu-Martin — Mobiliza- 
 ■ tion — Neutralization, the various 
 treaties — Viviani) : wishes to an- 
 nex Belgium, 5-6; policy toward 
 Belgium, 6; enters into alliance 
 with Russia (1891), 8-9; rivalry 
 with England for Colonial posses- 
 sions, 11; yields Fashoda to avoid 
 war with England, 11; enters into 
 friendly understanding with Eng- 
 land (1904), 12-13, 283-284; atti- 
 tude toward Germany on account 
 of Alsace-Lorraine, 13-15; rela- 
 tions with Russia undermined by 
 Japanese war, 16; Anglo-French 
 understanding in regard to Mo- 
 rocco confirmed by Algeciras Con- 
 ference, 17; the Casablanca affair 
 in Morocco (1908), 18-19; Mo- 
 roccan protectorate by, recognized 
 by Germany (1911), 23-24; posi- 
 tion of, in Morocco resented by 
 Germany, 35; increases armament, 
 35; critical internal situation of 
 (1914), 36; endeavors to secure 
 extension of time limit, 59-61, 270; 
 Anabassador of, at St. Petersburg 
 believes that only firm united 
 action of Entente can avert war, 
 59; influences Servia to make con- 
 cihatory reply, 62-64, 270; atti- 
 tude towards Balkan matters, 
 147-148; asked by Germany to 
 
 influence Russia against war, 147- 
 155; believes Germany intends to 
 precipitate a war, 155-163; will 
 support! Russia (July 29), 163- 
 166; military preparations, 166- 
 174; receives German ultimatum, 
 174-177; Germany plans to make, 
 hostage for Russia, 180, 488; mo- 
 bilization system, 180-181; weak 
 spots in frontier, 180-181; and 
 England unable to advise Russia 
 to submit, 189; French representa- 
 tives instructed to support British 
 proposal, 231 n; England refuses 
 to side with, to prevent war, 273- 
 282; Germany's bid for England's 
 neutrality refused by England, 
 297-303, 348; respects neutrality 
 of Belgium, 318; England asked to 
 guarantee neutrality of, 328-336; 
 assured of England's support in 
 case of German attack on French 
 coast, 339-352; neutrality of (0.\- 
 ford Faculty of Modern History), 
 336 to; why agreed to neutraliza- 
 tion of Belgium, 387-388; reasons 
 why unlikely to violate Belgian 
 neutrality, 417-418; Germany ac- 
 cuses, of violating Belgian and 
 German territory, 419-425; offers 
 assistance to Belgium to defend 
 neutrality, 438-439; no intention 
 to invade Belgium, 448; learns 
 Italy is likely to maintain an atti- 
 tude of observation, 468-469; plan 
 of campaign through Belgium 
 (Delbruck), 488; did she first cross 
 frontier, 519; did she influence 
 Russia for peace, 519-520; peace- 
 ful intentions of, 520. 
 Franco-Prussian War: readjustment 
 
 of Europe following upon, 7-9. 
 Franco-Russian Alliance: signed 
 
 (1891), 8-9. ^ 
 
 Frankischer Kurrier: 325 n. 
 Franklin: proposal for the immunity 
 of private property at sea, 503- 
 504. 
 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke: active 
 in annexing Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, 20; plans of, for political 
 reconstruction, 32-33; assassina- 
 ted (June 28, 1914), 34, 155. 
 Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria: 
 
 Frederick the Great: 503. 
 
INDEX 
 
 707 
 
 Freie Presse: 127. 
 Fremdenhlatt: 46. 
 French Acting Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs: see Bienvenu-Martin. 
 French Ambassador _ to Austria- 
 Hungary: see Dumaine. 
 French Ambassador at Berlin: see 
 
 Cambon, Jules. 
 French Ambassador at Constanti- 
 nople: see Bompard. 
 French Ambassador to Italy: see 
 
 Barrere. 
 French Ambassador at London: see 
 
 Cambon, Paul. 
 French Ambassador to Russia: see 
 
 Paleologue. 
 French Charged d' Affaires at London: 
 
 see Fleuriau, de. 
 French Coast: obligation of England 
 
 to protect, 307 n. 
 French Consul General at Budapest: 
 
 see d'Apchier Le Maugin. 
 French frontier: violation of, 170, 
 
 173-174, 286 n. 
 French Minister at Brussels: see 
 
 Klobukowski. 
 French Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
 
 see Delcass6. 
 French Minister of Justice: see Bien- 
 venu-Martin. 
 French Minister to Luxemburg: see 
 
 MoUard. 
 French Minister to Servia: see 
 
 Boppe. 
 French Minister for War (former): 
 
 see Messimy. 
 French Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
 
 see Berthelot. 
 French Yellow Book: discrepancies 
 
 of, vi, 285-286 n. 
 Friedjung: trial at, 43 n, 125. 
 Frontier, Franco-German: alleged 
 violations of, 170, 173-174, 286 n, 
 325, 386 n. 
 Fuller, Chief Justice: Terlinden v. 
 Ames, succession of treaty obliga- 
 tions, 385 n. 
 Fullerton, Wm. Morton: Problems of 
 Power, 562 n. 
 
 Galicia: 191. 
 
 Gambetta: 15. 
 
 Gauvin: date of Austrian mobiliza- 
 tion, 335-336 n. 
 
 George V, King of England: trans- 
 mits Kaiser's telegram and appeals 
 
 to Tsar in interest of peace, 254 n; 
 Tsar answers that German declar- 
 ation of war prevents acceptance 
 of English proposal, 254-255 n; 
 letter to Poincare (Aug. 1), 276- 
 277 n; Kaiser's telegram to, 286; 
 efforts of, to avoid civil war, 308; 
 telegram to Kaiser (Aug. 1), 329; 
 telegram (July 30) to Henry of 
 Prussia, 330; visit to Paris relative 
 to Triple Entente, 553-554. 
 Gerard, American Ambassador to 
 
 Germany: 370. 
 German Ambassador to Italy: see 
 
 von Flotow. 
 German Ambassador at London: see 
 
 Lichnowsky. 
 German Ambassador at Paris: see 
 
 Schoen. 
 German Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg: see Pourtales. 
 German Ambassador at Vienna: see 
 
 Tchirsky. 
 German Chancellor: see Bethmann- 
 
 Hollweg. 
 German frontier: violation of, 173, 
 
 286 n, 325. 
 German General Staff, Chief of: see 
 
 von Moltke. 
 German Minister at Brussels: see 
 
 Below-Saleske. 
 German Minister to Luxemburg: 
 
 see von Buch. 
 German Minister of War: see 
 
 Heeringen. 
 German proposal: England will 
 desert France and Russia if they 
 reject reasonable, 233. 
 German Secretary of State for For- 
 eign Affairs: see Jagow. 
 German ultimatum to Belgium: 323- 
 326, 353, 361-362; Belgium's reply 
 to, 326-328; Germany justifies, by 
 French intentions and acts, 419-' 
 
 421. 
 German ultimatum to France: 174- 
 
 177. 
 German ultimatum to Russia: de- 
 mands Russian demobilization 
 within twelve hours, 138-139, 142, 
 174; followed by declaration of 
 war on Russia, 142-145; Jagow 
 refuses to accept Grey formula 
 until Russia answers, 241-242; not 
 justified since Russia agrees to 
 arrest mobilization, 259; signiti- 
 
708 
 
 INDEX 
 
 cant of bellicose policy, 260; effect 
 on Austro-Russian relations, 262- 
 263; only one answer possible, 262. 
 
 German Under Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs: see Zimmer- 
 man. 
 
 German White Book: vii. 
 
 Germany {see also Belgian Neutral- 
 ity — Belgium, invasion of — 
 Bethmann-Hollweg — German 
 ultimatum — Jagow — Localiza- 
 tion of Austro-Servian conflict — 
 Mobilization, German — Prussia) : 
 gains for Austria administrative 
 control of Bosnia and Herzegov- 
 ina (1878), 7-8; joins with Aus- 
 tria and Italy in Triple Alliance 
 (1883), 8; joins with Austria in 
 Dual Alliance (1879), 8; appre- 
 hension at formation of Anglo- 
 French Entente, 12; policy to re- 
 main on good terms with Eng- 
 land, 13; modifies colonial policy 
 of Bismarck, 13; interest of, in 
 maintaining open door in Mo- j 
 rocco and China, 13; sees danger 
 of French-English plans for Mo- ' 
 rocco, 15-16; Moroccan designs of , 1 
 thwarted by Algeciras Conference, i 
 17; compels resignation of Del- 1 
 cass6, 17; attitude toward France 
 on account of Alsace-Lorraine, 13- 
 15; development of, on sea, alarms ; 
 England, 17; hemmed in by Triple 
 Entente, 18; clashes with France : 
 over Casablanca affair in Morocco '• 
 (1908), 18-19; joins Austria in be- j 
 friending Turk against Russian 
 ambitions, 19; Turkish policies of, 
 threatened by Young Turks 
 (1908), 20; supports Austria in 
 annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, 20-21; at Agadir, again 
 attacks French Moroccan inter- 
 ests, 22-23; fears Italy will desert 
 Alliance, 25; new Army Bill neces- 
 sary after Turkey's dismember- 
 ment, 27-28, 35; cherishes resent- 
 ment against France for Morocco, 
 35; increasing friendly relations of, 
 with England, 280-282, 304, 364- 
 366, 560-571 ;'Anglo-German Rela- 
 tions, 560-571; "passes on" to 
 Austria Grey's suggestion regard- 
 ing time limit of Austrian ultima- 
 tum, 60-61 ; view of, regarding Ser- 
 
 vian note, 79; Servian note not 
 pubhshed in, 80; lacks will to pre- 
 serve peace, 80; backs Austria, 84, 
 92,117-118,123-126,132,156-157; 
 public opinion of, against Russia 
 and France, 103, 105 n; handi- 
 capped in mediation between Aus- 
 tria and Russia by Russian mobili- 
 zation, 114-115, 523; interest in the 
 dispute, 117-118; denies previous 
 knowledge of Austrian ultima- 
 tum, 119-123, 125; situation with 
 Russia becomes acute, 133-142; 
 delivers an ultimatum to Russia, 
 142-146; asks France to use her 
 influence with Russia, 147-155; 
 believed by France to be precipitat- 
 ing war, 155-163, 490; attitude of, 
 toward mediation, 158-165, 271- 
 273; ultimatum of, to France, 174- 
 277; purpose of, to make France 
 "hostage" for Russia, 180; pre- 
 paredness of, 181; did not want 
 war, 191; believes war inevitable, 
 191-192; complains of prepara- 
 tions in France and Russia, 192; 
 cooperation of, necessary to medi- 
 ation, 200-201, 216; objects to 
 mediation, 205^.; declines con- 
 ference, 208-210; warned by Grey 
 of consequences of supporting 
 Austria, 211; influence of, on Aus- 
 tria, 213, 224; discourages direct 
 conversations, 219; position of, as 
 Austria's ally, 223-224; Chancel- 
 lor advises Austria to speak openly, 
 228; powers consider, alone able to 
 speak at Vienna, 228; asked to 
 "press the button," 231-234; in- 
 consistency regarding mediation, 
 232; England will desert France 
 and Russia if they reject reasona- 
 ble proposal of, 233 ; Jagow thinks 
 possible to accept Cambon sugges- 
 tion if Russia does, 236-237; for- 
 wards Cambon suggestion to Vi- 
 enna, 237; refuses to accept Grey 
 proposal till Russia answers ulti- 
 matum, 241-242; Kaiser urges 
 Austria to continue conversations, 
 242; asks Russia to propose a for- 
 mula, 242-252; readiness to act as 
 mediator, 244; cannot allow Rus- 
 sia to mobilize, 250; by accepting 
 Grey proposal might have avoided 
 war, 251; declaration of war forced 
 
INDEX 
 
 709 
 
 by Russian mobilization, 251, 254- 
 255; unjust to accuse of dilatory 
 tactics, 251; advantage of, to force 
 issue, 251-252, 267; belief that war 
 could be avoided, 251-252; recom- 
 mends to Vienna consideration of 
 English proposals, 254 n; effect of 
 ultimatum of, upon peace pros- 
 pects, 259-260; direct conflict with 
 Russia, 262; believes England will 
 remain neutral, 273-278, 286-287, 
 295; appeals to England to pre- 
 vent war, 278; warned that Eng- 
 land will not hold aloof if France is 
 involved, 295-296; bids for Eng- 
 land's neutrality, 297-303, 348; 
 proclaims martial law, 310 n; 
 charges violations of frontier, 325; 
 believes England will guarantee 
 French neutrality, 328-336, 355 n, 
 522; detention by, of English ves- 
 sels, 336-337; invades Luxemburg, 
 337-339; England will protect 
 France against naval attack of, 
 339-352; violation of Belgium 
 casus belli to England, 352-370, 
 popular demonstration against 
 English Ambassador, 367-370; 
 good faith assailed by the Belgian 
 government, 400; warned by Bel- 
 gian Government of unauthorized 
 Anglo-Belgium military conversa- 
 tions, 407-408; view concerning 
 sanctity of treaties, 417; calls vio- 
 lation of Luxemburg not hostile 
 but preventive act, 430; conse- 
 quence and purpose of invasion of 
 Belgium, 432-433; view concern- 
 ing Belgian resistance, 441; ac- 
 cuses England of misrepresenta- 
 tions in regard to Belgium, 441- 
 445; plea of, of necessity, 445-4o6; 
 consideration actuating, in regard 
 to invasion of Belgium, 448; di- 
 plomacy of, in Turco-Italian War, 
 458; will not put pressure on Aus- 
 tria (Giuliano), 462; asks Italy her 
 intentions (Aug. 1), 469-470; pol- 
 icy of, 477; dilemma of, requiring 
 immediate decision, 478 n; why 
 opportune moment to make war, 
 479; should have foreseen Enghsh 
 intervention, 480; philosophy and 
 military influence led to Belgian 
 invasion, 480-481 ; sacrifices inter- 
 national law to strategic consider- 
 
 ations, 480-481; risked peace of 
 Europe to gain prestige, 485; 
 blames war on Russian mobiliza- 
 tion, 485-486; to blame for Eng- 
 land's intervention, 487, 489; had 
 a better plan of campaign, 489; 
 responsibility of, for the war, 491; 
 responsible for war, because sup- 
 ported Austria's localization of 
 question, 484; responsible for Rus- 
 sian and Austrian causal action for 
 war, 491; responsibility for change 
 of attitude towards Russian mobil- 
 ization, 492; thinks differently 
 from rest of world, 493; geographi- 
 cal position, and effects of, 493, 
 500; refused to join the super- 
 empire, 499-500; nationalistic con- 
 ceptions of, 502-508, 510-511; at 
 parting of the ways, 503; embit- 
 tered by diplomatic checks, 505; 
 aggression, reason for, 505-508; 
 increase of population, 506; race- 
 suicide, 506-507; doctrine of na- 
 tional necessity, 508-509; won- 
 derful mental mobilization, 510; 
 opposed to status quo, 511; free de- 
 velopment checked by balance of 
 power (Bethmann-Hollweg), 511 rj; 
 national philosophy of force, 512; 
 view of, of international law 
 anachronism, 513; lesson taught 
 by, 514; efforts to avoid war, 
 520-521; conduct of, likely to 
 force war, 521; aggression against 
 France, 521; weakness of diplom- 
 acy of, 521; why did, disregard 
 usual procedure, 528; treaty of 
 alliance with Austria, 540-541; 
 treaty record of (Dernburg), 661. 
 Gibraltar: 24. 
 Giddings, Franklin H.: The Larger 
 
 Meanings of the War, 652. 
 Giesl von Gieshngen, Baron, Aus- 
 trian Minister at Belgrade: opposed 
 to "foul compromise," 266 n. 
 Giolitti, ex-Premier of Italy: Italy 
 refuses (1913) to countenance Aus- 
 tria's intended aggression against 
 Servia, 35, 121, 470-471. 
 Giuliano: see San Giuliano. 
 Givet:323. ^ c. ^ t 
 
 Gladstone : binding effect of treaty of 
 1839, 386; view of obligations re- 
 garding Belgian guaranty, 389- 
 390; meaning of obscure statement 
 
710 
 
 INDEX 
 
 regarding Belgium, 386; letter to 
 Bright concerning Belgium, 624. 
 
 Goltz, von der: 20. 
 
 Good faith : of Germany, assailed by 
 the Belgian Government, 400; in 
 observance of treaties, 453; of 
 Italy, 460. 
 
 Good offices: nature of, 205, 227 n, 
 244; powers employ at Vienna and 
 Petersburg, 227-229; King George 
 appeals to Tsar in interest of 
 peace, 254 n; Germany recom- 
 mends to Austria consideration of 
 English proposal, 254 n; Hague 
 Convention (Oct. 18, 1907) rela- 
 tive to, 651. 
 
 Goschen, Sir Edward, British Am- 
 bassador at Berlin: final interviews 
 in Berlin (Aug. 4), 363-370. 
 
 Governments: trustees for human- 
 ity, 451; responsibility of, easier to 
 fix in foreign than internal affairs, 
 492. 
 
 Grain: Belgian retention of, bound 
 to Germany, 421. 
 
 Great Britain: see England. 
 
 Greater Servia: hope of, 21, 30-31; 
 secret organizations of, 33-34; 
 (London Times), 74r-75. 
 
 Greece: 19, 26-27. 
 
 Greindl, Baron, Belgian Minister at 
 Berlin: aware of English prepar- 
 ations to invade Belgium, 396 n- 
 397; necessity of preparations 
 against England, 398-399; consid- 
 eration of report of, 399; report of, 
 evidence of Belgian good faith, 
 400; Belgian Government explains 
 meaning of report of, 400 n. 
 
 Grey, Sir Edward, English Secretary 
 for Foreign Affairs: biographical 
 note, 268 n; responsibility of, 268- 
 279; Treaty of London, 27; sees 
 danger of time limit in Austrian 
 ultimatum, 48, 54, 270; fears war, 
 51; on Servian note, 79, 83; on 
 Russian mobilization, 115-116, 
 186; "Servia a danger to European 
 peace," 127 n; Austrian ultima- 
 tum made, powerless to influence 
 Russia, 189; unable to intervene 
 for peace, 194; policy of not taking 
 sides and the preservation of 
 peace, 194, 273-282, 293-295; 
 303-307, 354-359 n; proposes con- 
 ference of the powers, 197-213, 
 
 guarantees France will accept 
 mediation, 202; urges moderation 
 at Vienna, 211; warns Germany of 
 consequences of supporting Aus- 
 tria, 211; makes official proposal 
 of mediation, 215-216; approves 
 direct conversations between Rus- 
 sia and Austria, 217-218; deplores 
 European conflict, 217-218; asks 
 Chancellor's aid, 228-229; plan of 
 mediation of powers, 231; says 
 England will support France and 
 Russia only if they do not reject 
 reasonable German proposal, 233; 
 can do nothing in face of Austrian 
 refusal of mediation, 228, 235; 
 Germany criticizes, for not pressing 
 mediation, 235 n; approves Cam- 
 bon suggestion, 237-238; asks 
 Russia to change Sazonof formula, 
 237-238; proposal of, for a collec- 
 tive guaranty of powers, 239-242; 
 stumbling-block between Austria 
 and Russia, 240; Germany refuses 
 to accept proposal of, till Russia 
 answers ultimatum, 241-242; 
 promises to take into account 
 Germany's unconciliatory atti- 
 tude, 247-248; Sazonof modifies 
 formula at request of, 249 ; accept- 
 ance of proposal of, might have 
 avoided war, 251; possibility of 
 preserving peace if Russia will 
 arrest mobilization, 258; situation 
 in which he brought forward his 
 proposal, 265-266; gives reasons 
 for failure of peace negotiations, 
 267; efforts of, to organize media- 
 tion, 270-273; influence of Eng- 
 land for peace, list of references, 
 270 n; refrains from forcing issue, 
 279-280; encourages Germany to 
 peaceful concession, 282; letter to 
 P. Cambon, 1912, and his reply 
 regarding unprovoked attack by a 
 third power, 283-284, 290-291, 
 652-553; account of formation of 
 Entente, 288, 291; reserves inde- 
 pendence of action, 294-295 ; warns 
 Germany England will not hold 
 aloof if France is involved, 295- 
 296; refuses Germany's bid for 
 English neutrality, 298-303, 332 n, 
 348; answers Keir Hardie in Par- 
 liament Aug. 27, 302-303 n, 358- 
 359 n; attacked by MacDonald,. 
 
INDEX 
 
 711 
 
 302 n; diplomatic importance of 
 question of, addressed to Bel- 
 gian regarding neutrality, 311-316, 
 332 n; the question of, to Belgium 
 and its reply, 316-318, 332 n; 
 asks assurance of Belgium regard- 
 ing resistance, 318-320; Lichnow- 
 sky incident (guaranty by England 
 of neutrality of France), 328-336, 
 355 n, 358-359 n; protests against 
 German detention of English ves- 
 sels, 336-337; on Luxemburg neu- 
 trality, 338-339; agreement to 
 France to protect French coasts, 
 339-352 ; England's interest and ob- 
 ligation to protect France (speech 
 in Commons Aug. 3), 345-351; 
 nature of Anglo-French Entente 
 (speech in Commons, Aug. 3), 
 351-352; neutrality of Belgium 
 (speech in Commons, Aug. 3), 353- 
 360, 620; Conybeare's arraign- 
 ment of, 357-359 n; unjustly as- 
 sailed, 359 n; statement (1913) 
 regarding Belgian neutrality, 401- 
 402; authorizes statement (Jan. 
 27) commenting on Chancellor's 
 associated press interview, 406- 
 407 n; call upon Belgium to defend 
 neutrality, 435; Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg discusses statement of, con- 
 cerning Belgian neutrality, 455 n; 
 effect of warning to Germany, 487; 
 sane conduct of English policy, 
 491; attitude regarding German 
 invasion of Belgium, 526; diplo- 
 macy of, 527; considers action of 
 Russia defensive, 527; statement 
 of, regarding intervention, persi- 
 flage, 527; admirable diplomacy 
 of, analyzed, 528. 
 
 Grotius: 316. 
 
 Gruic, General Secretary of the Ser- 
 vian Foreign Office: 49 n. 
 
 Guardian, Manchester: 309 n, 313 n, 
 360-361 n. 
 
 Guaranty: Grey proposal for collec- 
 tive, of powers, 239-242; of powers 
 to Austria and Russia, 265-266; 
 England's obligation in regard to 
 Belgium, 386; of neutrality, obli- 
 gation to make good, 387 jf.; of 
 Belgian neutrality, England will 
 not violate first, 401 ; of England 
 and France under Treaty of 
 (1839), 405; nature of collective, 
 
 applymg to Luxemburg, 423; col- 
 lective, opinion of Milovanovitch, 
 
 424 n, 
 
 Hague Conventions: application of, 
 to neutralization of Belgium, 
 391 n; Belgian Government de- 
 clares resistance under, not hostile 
 act, 440; of 1907 relative to set- 
 tlement of international disputes 
 (text), 651; of 1907 relative to 
 the opening of hostilities, 87-88, 
 352 n,- (text), 651. 
 
 Hague 'Tribunal: decision of Casa- 
 blanca affair, 19; Servia offers to 
 submit dispute with Austria to, 
 64-65. 
 
 Haldane: 342. 
 
 Hansard : Parliamentary Debates, 
 606-624. 
 
 Hardie, Keir: interrogates Grey in 
 Parliament Aug. 27, 302 n, 358- 
 359 n: Grey answers, 301-303 n. 
 
 Hare, Francis: The Barrier Treaty 
 vindicated, 598. 
 
 Havenith, Belgian Minister at Wash- 
 ington: transmits a statement of 
 Belgian Government regarding 
 Anglo-Belgian conversations, 407- 
 408; statement regarding the pub- 
 lication of the Belgian documents 
 with explanation by Dr. Dern- 
 burg, 635. 
 
 Heads of state: direct action by, 
 252-253 n. 
 
 Heeringen, von, German Minister 
 of War: neutrality of Belgium, 
 322. 
 
 Helfferich, German Secretary of the 
 Treasury: "menace allemande," 
 150 n; authenticity of F. Y. B., 
 155-156 n; why France assured 
 Russia of support, 165-166 n, 
 296 n, 306 n; the peace of the 
 world vs. the Entente, 312 n; Eng- 
 land's provisional declaration of 
 war, 352 n. 
 
 Hengelmuller, Baron L.: reason for 
 England's intervention, 443. 
 
 Henry, Prince, of Prussia: telegraphs 
 King George (July 30), 329-330. 
 
 Herzegovina: see Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina. 
 
 Hill, David Jayne: neutrality of 
 Belgium, 382; nature of neutrality, 
 638. 
 
712 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Hohenburg, Duchess of: 34, 76 n. 
 
 Holland: Congress of Vienna (1815) 
 gives Belgium to, 5; Belgium re- 
 volts from, 5; Germany ready to 
 give conditional pledge regarding 
 neutrality of, 297; mobilization of, 
 310 n; attitude towards the treaty 
 of 1839, 389; \'iolation of the neu- 
 trality of, by England, 410; atti- 
 tude towards defense of Belgian 
 neutrality, 411; colonial posses- 
 sions of, 505 ; England's attitude in 
 case of, 526; Barrier Treaty of 
 1709 with England, 596, 598. 
 
 Holls; Peace Conference at The 
 Hague: 539. 
 
 Home Rule Bill: amending of, 308. 
 
 Hostage: Germany plans to make 
 France, for Russia, 488. 
 
 Hostilities: Hague Convention of 
 1907 relative to the opening of, 87- 
 88, 352 w, 651. 
 
 Humanity : interests of, sacrificed to 
 narrow nationalism, 496; basis of 
 the unity of, 509-510. 
 
 Ideals: maintenance of, 450; survival 
 of fit, 451. 
 
 Imperator, the: 310 n. 
 
 Indemnization: Austria requires of 
 Servia, 234 n, 263. 
 
 Independence: of states, German in- 
 vasion of Belgiimi violates princi- 
 ple of, 390-391 ; of Belgium, resist- 
 ance necessary to preserve, 453 ; of 
 Servia, Italy interested in preserv- 
 ing, 461 ; of Servia, Austrian inten- 
 tions concerning, 525; difference 
 between formal and real, 483. 
 
 India: 10-11. 
 
 "Influenced": (territories of the em- 
 pire states), 497. 
 
 Intention: of France to invade Bel- 
 gium, 488 n; of France made justi- 
 fication of German violation, 419- 
 421. 
 
 Intermediate military preparation: 
 see Military preparations — Mo- 
 bilization. 
 
 International commission : to control 
 police inquiry in Servia, 242. 
 
 International Conciliation Pamphlet 
 (no. 84) : Speech of von Bethmann- 
 HoUweg in Reichstag Aug. 4, 145- 
 146 n. 
 
 International cooperation: 513. 
 
 International court: establishment 
 of, 501 n. 
 
 International disputes: Hague Con- 
 vention of Oct. 18, 1907, relative 
 to settlement of, 651. 
 
 Internationalism : development of, 
 496; German attitude in regard to, 
 513. 
 
 International law: importance of 
 forms and courtesies to, 77 n; duty 
 of all states to prevent invasion of 
 Belgium, 390-391; enforcing of, 
 391; sanctions of, 392; status of 
 neutrality according to, 393; 
 method of 'growth of (Westlake), 
 393 n; fundamental principles of, 
 453-456; practical nature of, 455; 
 penalty for violation, 456; Ger- 
 many sacrifices, to strategic con- 
 siderations, 480-481; Bismarck's 
 example encourages to violation of, 
 494; German attitude tends to 
 minimize, 504; German view of, an 
 anachronism, 513. 
 
 International police {see also Peace 
 Power) : 500; dangers of, 501 n. 
 
 Intervention : mediation distin- 
 guished from diplomatic, 205, 
 244 n, 279; covers political de- 
 signs, 392; armed, hastened by 
 destruction of Maine (1898) and 
 assassination of Arch-Duke (1914), 
 583-585. 
 
 Intervention of England: see Eng- 
 land's Intervention. 
 
 Inviolability of private property at 
 sea: 503-504. 
 
 Ireland: political situation in, 308. 
 
 Ischl: 61. 
 
 Isvolsky, Riissian Ambassador at 
 Paris. 
 
 Italia irredenta : 457. 
 
 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
 see San Guiliano. 
 
 Italy (see also Casus foederis — San 
 Giuliano — Triple Alliance) : joins 
 Germany and Austria in Triple 
 Alliance (1883), 8; irritated by 
 Austrian annexation of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, 21, 457; policy of 
 expansion, 24—25; deserts allies to 
 wage Turco-Italian War (1911- 
 12), 25-26; acquires Tripoli and 
 Cyrenaica, 26; works with Austria 
 against Servia and Montenegro, 
 28-29; designs of, upon Albania, 
 
INDEX 
 
 713 
 
 32, 41; refuses (1913) to join in 
 aggression upon Servia, 35, 470- 
 471; kept ignorant regarding Aus- 
 trian ultimatum, 45, 120-121, 
 467-468; joins Entente powers in 
 endeavors to extend time limit of 
 Austrian ultimatum, 61, 270; min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs of, criti- 
 cizes Austria for rejecting Servian 
 note, 75; urges Germany and Aus- 
 tria to take favorable view of 
 Servian note, 83; believes Austria 
 determined to punish Servia, 83; a 
 possible mediator, 193-194; plan 
 for mediation, 234-236; urges 
 England to declare herself on side 
 of France and Russia, 277-278; 
 remains neutral, 347, 467-473; 
 takes her place in European con- 
 cert (1867), 423; desire for peace, 
 457-462; obligation to stand with 
 allies, 460; Russian efforts to de- 
 tach from Triplice (Price), 461 n; 
 cooperation with England, 465- 
 467, 490; attitude of observation 
 likely, 468-469; Germany asks 
 intentions of (Aug. 1), 469-470; 
 considers Austrian action aggres- 
 sive, 470; significance of attitude 
 of, as showing Austro-German 
 aggression, 472-473; not bound by 
 Triple Alliance to join war against 
 England (Thayer), 473; balances 
 between Entente and triplice, 
 478 n; restricted by Triple Alli- 
 ance in action upon Germany, 
 490 n. 
 Ito, Marquis: 12. 
 
 Jagow, von, German Secretary for 
 Foreign Affairs: on Austrian ulti- 
 matum, 56, 119-120; declares Aus- 
 trian intentions on Servia, 58; 
 passes on suggestion to secure ex- 
 tension of time limit at Vienna, 61 ; 
 believes Russia will not move, 102; 
 on Russian mobilization "against 
 Germany," 133, 139-140; says 
 conference not practical, 208-209; 
 objects to grouping of Entente 
 against Triplice, 209; thinks Cam- 
 bon suggestion may be acceptable, 
 236-237; refuses to accept Grey 
 proposal until Russia answers 
 ultimatum, 241-242; on England's 
 refusal of Germany's bid for neu- 
 
 trality, 300; on Belgian neutrality, 
 (Reichstag, April, 1913), 321-322; 
 final interviews with Goschen, 
 (Aug. 4), 363-365; apology of, to 
 Goschen, 367-368; interview with 
 the Belgian Minister, 436-438. 
 
 James, Henry: on violation of Bel- 
 gian neutrality, 314 n. 
 
 Japan: enters into alliance with 
 England (1902), 12; effect of war 
 with, on Russia, 188, 195; treaty 
 with Russia guaranteeing the pres- 
 ent territory of each, the integrity 
 of China and the "Open Door" in 
 China, 550; agreement with Rus- 
 sia concerning Manchuria, 551; 
 care for British interests, 498; 
 agreement with Great Britain, 
 1911 (text), 541-542. 
 
 Jaures: assassinated (July 31, 1914), 
 308 n. 
 
 Johnstone, Sir A., British Minister to 
 Luxemburg. 
 
 Johnston, Sir Harry; Colonial Devel- 
 opment and Removal of Conflicting 
 Interests: 566. 
 
 Joint intervention: see Collective 
 action. 
 
 Joncherey: 173 n. 
 
 Jougo-Slave: see Southern Slav. 
 
 Journal des Debats, Paris : 174 n, 
 265 n. 
 
 Jovanovitch, Servian Minister at 
 Vienna: predicts Austria's action 
 on Serajevo crime, 42-43 n, 47- 
 48; recounts attack on Servian 
 flag in Vienna, 88 n. 
 
 Jowett, B.: extract from Thucydides, 
 645. 
 
 Jungbluth, General: 396^. 
 
 Kaiser of Germany: see William II. 
 
 Kamerun: 24. 
 
 Karageorgevich : 76 n. 
 
 Kazan: 111, 135. 
 
 Khedive of Egypt: 11. 
 
 Kiderlen-Waechte: 155-156 n. 
 
 Kieff: 110, 135. 
 
 Kitchener: 11, 342-343 n. 
 
 Klobukowski, French Minister at 
 Brussels: on intention of France 
 regarding defense of Belgium, 
 327-328. 
 
 Koelnische Zeitung: 323 n, 446 n. 
 
 Korea: 12. 
 
 Kovno: 111. 
 
714 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Kriegsgefahr {see also Mobilization) : 
 defined, 141, 170-171; proclaimed 
 JulySl, 138, 141, 170-171, 184, 193. 
 
 Kriegsraison: 504 n. 
 
 Kriegsverlauf: 409 n. 
 
 Kudachef, Russian Charge d' Affaires 
 and Councilor of Embassy at Vi- 
 enna: on Austrian Ultimatum, 55; 
 consults with Count Berchtold, 
 96-97. 
 
 Kuhlmann, Baron: Councilor of the 
 German Embassy in London: com- 
 m^m^que of, to press (Aug. 3), 360- 
 361. 
 
 La Fere: 413 n. 
 
 Lansdowne: pledges support to 
 Asquith, 343. 
 
 Laon: 413 n. 
 
 Law, A. Bonar: pledges support to 
 Asquith, 343. 
 
 Law of Nations: see International 
 law. 
 
 Laws of War: (see also International 
 law): Germany considers Kriegs- 
 raison superior to, 504. 
 
 Liao-tung: 12. 
 
 Liberal Party (England) : 309. 
 
 Lichnowsky, Prince, German Ambas- 
 sador at London: anxiety of, 63, 
 158; urges localization, 211; per- 
 sonal bid of, for England's neu- 
 trality, 300-303, 357-359 n; com- 
 munique to press Aug. 3, 303, 
 360-361; mistake of, regarding 
 guaranty by England of French 
 neutrality, 328-336, 355 n, 358- 
 359 n ; Shaw on, 356 n. 
 
 Li6ge: 362. 
 
 Limburg: treaty of the powers (May 
 11, 1867) relative to the Duchy of, 
 603. 
 
 Limitation of armament: see Dis- 
 armament. 
 
 Lincoln: as example for German 
 youth, 494. 
 
 Literary Digest: (Delbruck) : 560. 
 
 Lloyd George: 23, 73 n, 76 n; speech 
 on Austrian ultimatum and Serv- 
 ian reply (text), 586. 
 
 Localization of Austro-Servian con- 
 flict (see also Austrian Ultimatum 
 — Mobilization, German — Mo- 
 bilization, Russian) : possible (Aus- 
 tria and Germany), 101-103, 105; 
 impossible (Russia), 99, 105-111; 
 
 favored by London Times, 126, 
 126 n; Grey and P. Cambon on, 
 130 n, 278; Germany insists upon, 
 126-130, 149-150, 158-159; Spa- 
 laikovitch on, 129 n; Russia will 
 be responsible for failure of (Ger- 
 many), 131-133, 151, 1.53; Ger- 
 many asks French intervention 
 with Russia regarding, 151-155; 
 Echo de Paris concerning, 150; 
 Bienvenu-Martin on, 163-164 n; 
 France will support Russia (July 
 29), 163-166; Germany declares 
 war on Russia, 143-145. 
 
 Lockal Anzeiger: 125, 157, 168. 
 
 Lorraine: see Alsace-Lorraine. 
 
 Louis XIV: 9. 
 
 Ludwig, Ernest: 72 n. 
 
 Luxemburg: treaty of powers guar- 
 anteeing neutrality of (text), 603; 
 declarations (1870) of France and 
 Prussia to respect neutrality of 
 (text), 605; German military prep- 
 arations extend from, 169; invaded 
 by Germany, 337-338; English 
 interpretation of treaty guaran- 
 teeing neutrality of, 338-339, 423- 
 429; history of, 422-423; violation 
 of the neutrality of, 422-431; col- 
 lective guaranty of neutrality of, 
 423; law of succession to, 424; in- 
 vasion of, Germany considers not 
 hostile but preventive act, 430, 
 529; Germany's invasion of, act of 
 war against France, 521; Parlia- 
 mentary Debate on the neutrality 
 of, 606. 
 
 Macchio, Baron von. Under Secre- 
 tary of the Austro-Hungarian For- 
 eign Office: " Interest an excuse for 
 not being courteous," 77 n. 
 
 MacDonald, J. Ramsay: attack 
 upon Grey, 302 n. 
 
 Macedonia: 19, 26-27, 124. 
 
 Mach, Dr. Edmund von; What Ger- 
 many wants: 130 n, 135 n, 401, 
 485 n. 
 
 Magyars: place in Austro-Hungarian 
 state, and Dual Alliance, 8; Franz 
 Ferdinand's plans regarding, 32- 
 33. 
 
 Mahommedans: 23, 91. 
 
 Mail, London Daily: 309 n. 
 
 Maine, The: 95; negotiations of the 
 Spanish and American Govern- 
 
INDEX 
 
 715 
 
 ments following the destruction of, 
 579. 
 
 Manchuria: agreement between Rus- 
 sia and Japan concerning (text), 
 551. 
 
 Marchand, Captain: 11. 
 
 Maubeuge: presence of British troops 
 and stores at, 421. 
 
 Mediation (see also Conference): 
 distinction between, and interven- 
 tion, 205 n, 244 n, 279; Hague 
 Convention (1907) relative to 
 (text), 651; efforts of Tsar and 
 Kaiser toward, 112, 115, 145- 
 146 n, 252-254 n, 329-330; atti- 
 tude of Germany toward, 158-165; 
 renewal of, 164; England and Italy- 
 could offer, 193; of the four less 
 interested powers, 198-200, 203- 
 204; between Austria and Servia, 
 199 n; Paul Cambon suggests de- 
 ferring proposal of, 200; Grey 
 guarantees France will accept, 
 202; Germany objects to, 205^.; 
 concerning Austrian ultimatum, 
 Berchtold refuses, 212; efforts to 
 discover a formula for, 229-231; 
 principle of, accepted by Germany, 
 231 ; Germany inconsistent regard- 
 ing, 232; San Giuliano suggestions 
 for, 234-235; Bethmann-Hollweg 
 criticizes Grey for not continuing 
 to press, 235; after occupation 
 of Belgrade (Cambon), 236-239; 
 Austria agrees to, 252-264; Berch- 
 told does not agree to discuss mod- 
 ification of Austrian ultimatum, 
 255; Tsar declares Russian troops 
 will not attack while it continues, 
 255 n; if Russia arrests mobil- 
 ization Austria will accept, 256; 
 between Austria and Servia, pro- 
 posal for, 258; criticism of Vivi- 
 ani's statement concerning Rus- 
 sia's acceptance of proposal for, 
 259-260 n; efforts to organize, 
 270-273; Germany blames Russia 
 for mobilization during, 523; pos- 
 sibility of England's, between 
 Germany and Russia, 528. 
 
 Mediterranean: Italy cannot control, 
 24; Triple Alliance does not cover, 
 478 n. 
 
 Mehans: defend their neutrality 
 against Athenians, 645. 
 
 Mensdorff, Count, Austrian Ambas- 
 
 sador at London: on Servian note, 
 71 n; on Austrian policy toward 
 Servia, 89. 
 
 Mental mobilization : in time of war, 
 510. 
 
 Messimy, Former French Minister for 
 War. 
 
 Metz: 169-170. 
 
 Meuse Valley: 323, 413 n. 
 
 Michigan Law Review: 504. 
 
 Mignet, F. A. : Negocialions relatives 
 a la Succession d'Espagne, 595. 
 
 Mikado of Japan: 12. 
 
 Milhaud, Edg.:325w. 
 
 Militarism: heads of German army 
 insist upon mobilization, 250; pe- 
 culiar view of military men, 405 n. 
 
 Military economy: determined by 
 political situation, 179-190. 
 
 Military preparations: in Germany 
 and France, 166-174; intermedi- 
 ate, 183-184; suspension of, by 
 powers, 259; Anglo-Belgian (text 
 of secret documents regarding), 
 626. 
 
 Milovanovitch: opinion of, concern- 
 ing collective guaranty, 424 n. 
 
 Minister, see English, French, Ger- 
 man, etc., minister. 
 
 Ministerial Council, Russian: 192. 
 
 "Mobilitis": Europe afflicted with, 
 184-185. 
 
 Mobilization: meaning and effect of, 
 178-181; rapidity of, 179; efforts 
 of statesmen to withhold, 188; 
 issuance of the general order for, 
 181-183; intermediate prepara- 
 tions, 183-184; Kriegsgefahrzu- 
 stand, nature of, 184; contagion of, 
 184 ff.; fatal succession of mobiliz- 
 ations, 184-194; Germany obliged 
 by strategic considerations to 
 make war once mobilization be- 
 gun, 185 ; German attitude to- 
 wards Russia's partial mobiliza- 
 tion, 191; Russia cannot permit 
 negotiations to cover German and 
 Austrian, 245 ; impossible to arrest, 
 in middle, 250 n. 
 
 Mobilization, Austrian: against 
 Servia, 80-81, 335-336 n; how 
 affected by Russian mobilization, 
 134-136; why Russia feared, 160; 
 previous to Russian (Viviani), 
 335 7i; Russia cannot permit nego- 
 tiations to cover, 245. 
 
716 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Mobilization, Belgian (July 31): 
 280 n, 310 n, 319-320. 
 
 Mobilization, Dutch: 310 w, 319. 
 
 Mobilization, French: 166-174, 
 310 n. 
 
 Mobilization, German (see also Ger- 
 man ultimatum) : Germany threat- 
 ens counter mobilization, 136-137; 
 false alarm of, July 30, 137, 168; 
 "danger of war" declared July 31, 
 138, 141, 174; made necessary 
 by Russian mobilization, 133-143, 
 145-146 n; ordered August 1, 143- 
 144, 145, 146 n; certain reservists 
 called to "attention" July 21 (J. 
 Cambon), 166; against France, 
 166-174, 310 n; excellence of, 180; 
 advantage of, due to rapidity, 185; 
 Russia cannot permit negotiations 
 to cloak, 245; delay of, costly to 
 Germany, 250; officers insist upon, 
 250; Aug. 1 pending guaranty of 
 French neutrality, 329. 
 
 Mobilization, Russian (see also Ger- 
 man ultimatum): (July 29), 109- 
 116, 135-136, 310 n, 335-336; order 
 for, withheld by Russia, 110- 
 111; alarming reports of, reach 
 Germany, 110-114, 133-134; im- 
 possible to halt, 115; "against 
 Germany" defined (Jagow), 133; 
 effect of, on Austria and Germany, 
 133-142, 146 n; Germany threat- 
 ens counter mobilization, 136, 137; 
 definition of, "against Germany" 
 modified, 139-140; justifiable?, 
 165 n; Buchanan urges Russia to 
 defer order for, 186; reason for, 
 against Austria, 186; against Aus- 
 tria, Grey considers inevitable, 
 186; date of, 192-193; reasons for, 
 193; Hollweg says, spoilt every- 
 thing, 242; Pourtales says makes 
 conference difficult, 243-244; gen- 
 eral mobilization will be ordered 
 if Sazonof formula rejected, 245; 
 Russia cannot postpone general, 
 when Germany is arming, 245; 
 Berchtold urges Germany to ar- 
 rest, by threats, 246 n; Sazonof 
 says must hasten, 246; general 
 mobilization, effect of upon term 
 of Sazonof formula, 249-250; 
 Germany cannot allow Russia to 
 undertake, 250; forced Germany 
 to declare war, 251; reasons why 
 
 Russia could refrain from, 251; 
 ordered, 253; impossible to arrest, 
 253 n; measures decided upon July 
 25, 253 n; general mobilization 
 premature and regrettable step, 
 253 n; effect of menacing tone of 
 Kaiser to Tsar, 253 ?i; general 
 mobilization, France and England 
 not notified of, 253 n ; general 
 mobilization, England learns of 
 from Germany, 253-254 n; general 
 mobilization. Tsar explains why 
 necessary, 255 n; if Russia arrests, 
 Austria will accept mediation, 256; 
 Buchanan gives reason for, 257; 
 Grey says possibility of preserving 
 peace if Russia will arrest, 258; 
 German ultimatum not justified 
 since Russia agrees to arrest, 259; 
 Viviani says Russia agrees to ar- 
 rest, 259; Viviani mistaken that 
 Russia agrees to arrest, 260 n; 
 German ultimatum demands de- 
 mob ihzation of, 260; Szapary 
 tells Sazonof he ignores effect 
 upon Austria of, 263; perhaps 
 caused by fear of intervention in 
 favor of Austria, 264; why could 
 not be arrested, 264; of army and 
 fleet, 335; precipitate nature of, 
 336; discussed (Durkheim and 
 Denis), 336 w; would necessitate 
 German declaration of war, 459; 
 Germany blames, for war, 485- 
 486; German change of attitude 
 towards partial, 486; destroyed 
 last hope of peace, 486; effects of 
 slow, on German strategy (Del- 
 briick), 488 n; effect of Austria's 
 threat to mobilize, 487 n. 
 
 Mobilization, Servian: (July 25), 
 79-80, 86. 
 
 Modified quotation: explanation of 
 term, 42 n. 
 
 Mollard, French Minister to Luxem- 
 burg. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine: why England ac- 
 cepted, 497; excludes Germany 
 from South America, 505; Declar- 
 ation of American delegates at 
 Hague, 539; American policy of, 
 officially adopted by Congress 
 (1901), 543; official exposition of 
 (1901) (Roosevelt), 543. 
 
 Montenegro: 26, 28-30. 
 
 Moore, John Basset: 539 n. 
 
INDEX 
 
 717 
 
 Morley: resignation of, from Cabi- 
 net, 341-342 n; The Life of Wil- 
 liam Ewart Gladstone, 624. 
 
 Morocco:, England undertakes to 
 support France in (1904), 13; 
 declaration (1904) of England and 
 France respecting (text), 544-546; 
 coveted by Germany, 13, 505; 
 Franco-English understanding in 
 regard to, frets Germany, 15-16; 
 German Emperor visits (1905), 
 16; Algeciras Conference confirms 
 French interests, 17; the Casa- 
 blanca affair, 18-19; decision of 
 Hague Tribunal in regard to Casa- 
 blanca affair, 19; Agadir incident 
 (1911), 22-23, 289-290; recognized 
 by Germany as French protector- 
 ate (1911), 23-24; Grey on English 
 policy toward France regarding, 
 288-290. 
 
 Moscow: 102, 110, 135. 
 
 Namur: 323. 
 
 Napoleon I: 3-4, 6, 9-10. 
 
 Napoleon 111:387. 
 
 Narodna Odbrana: activities of, 69; 
 dissolution of, demanded by Aus- 
 tria, 68-69, 76 n; Servia's reply 
 regarding, 65-66, 68; Russian sym- 
 pathies for activities of, 69 n. See 
 also documents, 574-578, 586-588. 
 
 National interest: determines na- 
 tional policy, 508. 
 
 National necessity: see Necessity. _ 
 
 National states: age of, on the point 
 of passing, 495. 
 
 Nationalism: conceptions of, re- 
 placed by internationalism, 495- 
 496; Germany's nationalistic con- 
 ception, 502-508; compared with 
 internationalism, 508-514. 
 
 Nationality: Italy claims of Austrian 
 territory under plea of, 457. 
 
 Nations: see also States — Govern- 
 ments. 
 
 Naval Strength: England's arrange- 
 ments to maintain, 498. 
 
 Near East: see Balkans. 
 
 "Near" — ultimatum: first Sazonof 
 formula was, 248. 
 
 Necessity: Germany at first justifies 
 violation of Belgium by, 400; law 
 of, Chancellor right to appeal to, 
 416 n; translations of remarks of 
 Chancellor regarding, 445-446 n : 
 
 why Germany supports doctrine 
 of, 508-509; German views in re- 
 gard to scope of, 417; Germany's 
 plea of, 445--456; attitude of world 
 toward Chancellor's plea of, 520; 
 Germany's invasion of Belgium 
 not a case of, 522. 
 
 Negotiations: of the Spanish and 
 American Governments following 
 the destruction of the Maine, 579, 
 584. 
 
 Netherlands: see Holland. 
 
 Neiie Freie Press: 46, 75 n. 
 
 Neueste Nachrichten: Leipziger, 74 n. 
 
 Neues Wiener TageUait: 46. 
 
 Neutrality: (see also Belgian Neu- 
 trality — English Neutrality — 
 French Neutrality — Luxemburg 
 — Neutralization) : nature of 
 (Hill), 638; distinction between, 
 and neutralization, 7; reason for, 
 392; in case of violation of inter- 
 national law, 393; defended by 
 Melians against Athenians (ex- 
 tract from Thucydides), 645. 
 
 Neutrality League: 309 n. 
 
 Neutralization (see also Luxemburg 
 ■ — Neutrality — Neutralization of 
 Belgium) : difference between, and 
 ordinary neutrality, 7; purpose of 
 Belgian, 379^.; Palmerston, views 
 on, 384 n; Germany bound by 
 treaty (of 1839), 385; obligation 
 to make good guaranty of neutral- 
 ity, 387^.; English view regarding 
 treaty of 1831, 388; Wicker criti- 
 cizes right of neutralized state to 
 defend, 432; application to Alsace 
 and Lorraine, 453 n. 
 
 Neutralization of Belgium: intended 
 to establish "stopper state," 387; 
 why France agreed to, 387-388; 
 views of powers regarding (in 
 1831), 388; application of the 
 Hague Convention, 391 n; effect 
 of fortifications on, 412 n; evil re- 
 sults of, 432. 
 
 Neutral States: right to enter into 
 defensive treaties, 408. 
 
 Newfoundland: 13. 
 
 News, London Daily: 555. 
 
 Nicholas, Tsar of Russia: telegraphs 
 Servian Prince, 100; appeals to 
 Kaiser to restrain Austria (July 
 29), 112, 115, 145 n, 252 n; pledges 
 Kaiser that army will not threaten 
 
718 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Austria pending negotiations, 115, 
 146 n, 253 n; appeals to England 
 for support, 255 n; declares Rus- 
 sian troops will not assemble while 
 mediation continues, 255 n; Ger- 
 man declaration of war prevents 
 acceptance of English proposal, 
 254 n. 
 
 Nicholson, Sir Arthur, British Under- 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs: re- 
 mark to Paul Cambon, 295. 
 
 Niemeyer, Prof., Kiel University: 
 view concerning Kriegsraison, 
 504 n. 
 
 Nile, upper: 11. 
 
 Nish: 100. 
 
 Non-resistance: doctrine of, 501 n. 
 
 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung: 
 denial of knowledge of Austrian 
 ultimatum (Bavarian Govern- 
 ment), 120 n; semi-official organ 
 of Government, 126 n; advocates 
 localization of Austro-Servian dis- 
 pute, 126 n; Chancellor condemns 
 conference of the powers as an 
 "areopagus," 210; attacks verac- 
 ity of B. W. P.; answer to, 285- 
 286 n; documents on Entente nego- 
 tiations (England, France, and 
 Russia), 292 n, 551; Belgian neu- 
 trality, 321-322; telegrams of 
 Kaiser, King George, Prince 
 Henry, 329-330; French neutral- 
 ity correspondence, 330-333; Case 
 of Belgium, 395; challenged by 
 London Times concerning secret 
 documents, 399 n; secret agree- 
 ment of Belgium and England, 
 409-410 n; formation of Triple 
 Entente (ofRcial correspondence), 
 551-559; Document (3) Anglo- 
 Belgian military preparations, 
 626 ff.; exhibit 38 of German White 
 Book: violation of Belgian neu- 
 trality by England and Belgium, 
 634. 
 
 North-German Gazette: see Nord- 
 deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 
 
 Norway: 10. 
 
 Novibazar: 91 n. 
 
 Novoe Vremya: 131. 
 
 Nuremberg: 173 n. 
 
 Obligation, of England to France: 
 
 291-292. 
 Obrenovic, Milos: 76 n. 
 
 Observation: Italy likely to maintain 
 attitude of, 468^69. 
 
 Occupation of Belgrade: see Bel- 
 grade. 
 
 Odessa: 110, 135. 
 
 Oligarchy, Military: 492. 
 
 "Open Door": Germany wants, in 
 Morocco and China, 13; Germany 
 might have exerted influence for, 
 504; Russo-Japanese treaty guar- 
 anteeing in China, 550. 
 
 Oriental Railway: 20. 
 
 Orsova: 87. 
 
 Outlook: (Dumba), 69 n, 587. 
 
 Oxford Faculty of Modern History: 
 on Lichnowsky incident, 336 n. 
 
 Pacifists: some errors of, 501 n. 
 
 Pakrac: 50. 
 
 Pal(5ologue, French Ambassador to 
 Russia. 
 
 Palmerston, Lord: relations with 
 Belgium; 5-6; views on neutraliza- 
 tion, 384 n. 
 
 Pan-Serb agitation: 130, 145 n. 
 
 Pan-Slav: see Southern Slav. 
 
 Panther, The: German cruiser at 
 Agadir, 23. 
 
 Parliamentary debates: concerning 
 neutrality of Belgium and Luxem- 
 burg, 606 ff. 
 
 Pascal: nature of custom, 391. 
 
 Pashitch, Servian Premier and Min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs: declares 
 Servia sincere, 49-50; defends Ser- 
 vian Government from Austrian 
 imputations (July 1), 53 n; state- 
 ment of, to press (July 1914), 74- 
 75 n; "The Tsar is great and 
 clement," 100-101. 
 
 Peace : of Europe, maintained by bal- 
 ance between Entente and Alli- 
 ance, 15; the will to preserve, 80; 
 London Tiines, on European, 126; 
 cities determine nation's attitude 
 towards, 188 n; possibility of 
 Anglo-Italian cooperation to se- 
 cure, 490; treaty of, will be a com- 
 promise, 515. 
 
 "Peace power": nature of, 500-502. 
 
 Perpetual neutrality {see Neutraliza- 
 tion): difference between, and 
 ordinary neutrality, 7. 
 
 Persia: Russian ambitions to se- 
 cure, formerly feared by England, 
 10; partition of, by England and 
 
INDEX 
 
 719 
 
 Russia (1907), 18; Anglo-Russian 
 agreement concerning, 498 ; Anglo- 
 Russian agreement (text), 546- 
 548. 
 
 Persian Gulf: 20. 
 
 Peter the Great: aprocyphal will of, 
 537-539. 
 
 Phillips: Modern Euro-pe, 422. 
 
 "Pig War": 30, 147. 
 
 "Place in the Sun": 504. 
 
 Poincare, President of the French 
 Republic: France pacific (July 30), 
 167; believes Sazonof formula will 
 not be accepted, 248; letter to 
 King George July 31, 275 and n; 
 visit to Russia relative to Triple 
 Entente, 558. 
 
 Pola: 32. 
 
 Poland: 3, 8 «. 
 
 Policies: protection of, of state, 392; 
 of England, France and Germany, 
 477; political aims of powers, 
 530 #. 
 
 Political Science Quarterly: (Munroe 
 Smith), 14 n, 55 w, 99 n, 107 n, 
 140 n, 405 n, 415 n, 433 n, 442 n, 
 442-443 n; (S. P. Duggan), 20 n, 
 21 n, 32 n. 
 
 Post, New York Evening: 302 n, 
 309 n, 655. 
 
 Port Arthur: 12. 
 
 Portugal: British satellite, 30; Anglo- 
 German discussions relative to 
 eventual partition of colonies of, 
 304 n; references to the Anglo- 
 German secret treaty of 1898 rela- 
 tive to the eventual dismember- 
 ment of the colonies of, 562-563. 
 
 Pourparlers: see Conversations. 
 
 Pourtales, German Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg: says Russian mobiliza- 
 tion makes conference difficult, 
 243-244; breaks down when war 
 inevitable, 244-245; appeals to 
 Sazonof for suggestion, 245; 
 change of tone toward Russia 
 (July 29), 246. 
 
 Powers {see also Concert of Powers 
 — the varioirs Treaties) : neutral- 
 ize Belgium, 6; note of to Balkan 
 allies, 27; try to secure extension 
 of the time limit, 59-61 ; influence 
 Servia to make a conciliatory re- 
 ply, 62-64; efforts of, to prevent 
 Russian intervention, 96; Jagow's 
 objection to grouping of Entente 
 
 against Alliance, 209; employ their 
 good offices at Vienna and St. 
 Petersburg, 227-229; urge ambas- 
 sadorial conference, 229-231; in- 
 duce Belgrade to yield, 231 ; collec- 
 tive guaranty of, proposed by 
 Grey, 239-242; guaranty of, to 
 Russia and Austria, 265-266. 
 
 Press: Austrian, 44-45 n, 46-47 n, 
 50 n, 74-75 n, 88-89 n, 92, 156; 
 English, 309 n, 313; German, 80, 
 137, 168, 325 n; Servian, see Press, 
 Austrian. 
 
 Prestige: of Austria engaged, 91, 107, 
 236; Bismarck condemns policy 
 seeking, 485 n. 
 
 Preventive war: England did not 
 engage in, 512 n; 1914 best date 
 for Germany to make, 512 n. 
 
 Price, M. P.; The Diplomatic History 
 of the War: 192-193 n, 224 n, 
 238 n, 354 n, 460-461 n. 
 
 Princip, Gavrilo: 34. 
 
 Procedure : see Diplomatic procedure. 
 
 Protectorates: 497. 
 
 Prussia: anxious for "buffer" state, 
 5 n; disposition of Alsace-Lorraine, 
 14; view regarding neutralization 
 of Belgium, 388; what, did for 
 Germany (Sarolea), 493; treaty of, 
 to respect Belgian neutrality 
 (text), 602; promises to respect 
 neutrality of Luxemburg (text of 
 treaty 1870), 605. 
 
 Pubhc opinion: Russia unable to 
 hold back unless Austria makes 
 concession, 245; sanction of inter- 
 national law, 392; in Italy against 
 war, 464; ultimate force which 
 exacts compliance with law, 501 n; 
 comparison of effect on, of Sera- 
 jevo crime (1914), and of Maine 
 disaster (1898), 585. 
 
 Pulnik, General, Sennan Chief-of- 
 Staff: arrested in Hungary, 86 n. 
 
 Quadruple Conference: see Confer- 
 ence. 
 
 Quai d'Orsay: 150 n, 176. 
 
 Queen Draga: 30. 
 
 I Queen v. Dudley and Stephens: 452; 
 ' e.vtracts from, 642. 
 
 Quotation, modified, explained, 42 n. 
 
 Race-suicide: German view of, 506- 
 507. 
 
720 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Railways: military operations re- 
 garding, 170; Russia lacks, for 
 rapid mobilization, 488. 
 
 Rapidity of mobilization: see Mobil- 
 ization. 
 
 Rapprochement: between Germany 
 and England, 281-282. 
 
 Rathgen, Prof. Karl: 567-568. 
 
 Realpolitik: meaning of, 494. 
 
 Rebus sic standibus: rule of, 379. 
 
 Regicide: monarchical interest to 
 suppress, 252 n. 
 
 Reichsland: 14. 
 
 Reichspost: 47 n, 75 n. 
 
 Reichstag: 15. 
 
 Relativity of rights: soundness of 
 idea, 452. 
 
 Reservists: of Germany summoned, 
 170-172. 
 
 Responsibility: Grey promises to 
 Russia to take into account Ger- 
 many's, 247-248; German theory 
 of, 278 n; of Government easier to 
 fix for foreign than for internal 
 affairs, 492; of a nation difficult to 
 determine, 492. 
 
 Responsibility for the war: Austrian, 
 483; Germany's part in, because 
 of localization policy, 484; Ger- 
 many's part of, for refusal to join 
 Conference, 484; Russia's, because 
 of mobilization, 486; how to fix, 
 491 #. 
 
 Resultant: Governments in foreign 
 affairs give expression to, of inter- 
 nal views, 492. 
 
 Results of the war: 514-515. 
 
 Retaliation: against Germany for 
 view of national necessity, 509. 
 
 Reventlow, Count: 15. 
 
 Revue de Paris : 335-336 n. 
 
 Richelieu: proposal for the inde- 
 pendence of Belgium, 595. 
 
 Rights of states: see International 
 law. 
 
 Rodd, Sir R., British Ambassador at 
 Rome. 
 
 Roosevelt, Theodore: message to 
 Congress (1901) concerning Mon- 
 roe Doctrine, 543. 
 
 Roumelia: 20. 
 
 Round Table, The: 33 n. 
 
 Rumania: 28-29, 94, 124. 
 
 Rumbold, Sir H., English Cotincilor 
 of Embassy at Berlin. 
 
 Russia (see also Balkans — German 
 
 ultimatum — Localization of Aus- 
 tro-Servian conflict — Mobilization 
 — Mobilization, Russian — Nich- 
 olas — Responsibility — Sazonof ) : 
 enters into alliance with France, 
 (1891), 8-9; expansion of, former 
 fears of England for, 10; alliance 
 of England and Japan against 
 (1902), 12; Russo-Japanese war, 
 reveals weakness of Russia, 16; 
 enters into convention with Eng- 
 land, (1907), 17-18; rivalry with 
 Austria in Balkans, 19, 28-29, 93- 
 94, 96, 147-149; forced to accept 
 Austria's fait accompli, 1908, 21- 
 22, 31; influence of, strengthened 
 in Servia after Balkan Wars, 32- 
 33; increases armament, 35; criti- 
 cal internal situation of (1914), 
 36; kept ignorant of drafting of 
 Austrian ultimatum, 45; diploma- 
 tic opinion of, regarding Austrian 
 ultimatum, 55-56, 64, 70-71 n, 
 106; endeavors to secure exten- 
 sion of time limit of Austrian ulti- 
 matum, 59-61, 270; influences 
 Servia to make conciliatory reply, 
 62-64, 270; tries to delay hostili- 
 ties between Austria and Servia, 
 81-83; "protector of Servia," 96- 
 101, 107-108, 131-132, 216-217; 
 interest of, in the Austro-Servian 
 conflict, 96-104; conciliatory atti- 
 tude of, toward Austria, 103-104, 
 151-152; believes Austria's action 
 directed against herself, 105-108; 
 considers immediate action neces- 
 sary, 108-109; partially mobilizes 
 against Austria, 109-111; mobili- 
 zation of, ordered, 114-115; pres- 
 tige of, in the Balkans, 131 ; respon- 
 sibility of, for supporting Servia, 
 131-133; situation with Germany 
 becomes acute, 133-142; mobiliza- 
 tion of, 138; Germany declares 
 war upon (August 1), 143-145; 
 shares with Austria control of Bal- 
 kan matters, 147, 188; France will 
 support, (July 29), 163-166; 
 mobilization system, 179, 187; 
 threatens mobilization if Austria 
 attacks Servia, 186; dilemma of, 
 186; cannot yield to Austrian dic- 
 tation, 188; distrust of Austria, 
 188-189; England and France 
 unable to advise submission of, 
 
INDEX 
 
 721 
 
 189; war thrust upon, 189; belief 
 that England would support, 192; 
 war party in control, 192; orders 
 general mobilization, 192-193; 
 proposes conversations with Aus- 
 tria, 213-227; interposition of, 
 between Austria and Servia, 214; 
 interests of, in mediation, 216-217; 
 position of, as protector of Servia, 
 216-217; ready to accept Eng- 
 land's mediation proposal, 217; 
 interests of, in Balkans, 223; ex- 
 change of views with Austria, 225- 
 226; unable to hold back public 
 opinion without concessions, 245; 
 cause of change of attitude, 246- 
 247; Grey promises, to take into 
 account German responsibility for 
 situation, 247-248; efforts to pre- 
 serve peace up to July 29, 250-251 ; 
 by mobilization forced German 
 declaration of war, 251; orders 
 general mobilization, 253; France 
 and England not notified of gen- 
 eral mobilization by, 253 n; be- 
 lieves Germany making active 
 military preparations, 257; mobil- 
 ization of, 257; cannot accept 
 Germany's ultimatum, 259; criti- 
 cism of Viviani's statement con- 
 cerning acceptance of mediation 
 proposal, 259-260 n; acceptance of 
 the English proposal, 260; Viviani 
 mistaken as to agreement to arrest 
 mobilization by, 260 n; ready to 
 accept any reasonable compromise, 
 262; German ultimatum did not 
 interrupt agreement of Austria 
 and, 263; limits of Austrian con- 
 cessions to, 263; could not allow 
 Austria to invade Servia, 264; fear 
 of intervention in favor of Austria 
 perhaps caused mobilization, 264; 
 England refuses to side with, to 
 prevent war, 273-282; war party 
 gains control (July 30), 308 n; 
 proclaims general mobilization, 
 310 n; Austria believes, will yield, 
 468; fear of Austrian domination 
 over Servia, 482-483; fears Aus- 
 trian advance on Salonika, 483; 
 obliged to come to support of Ser- 
 via, 484; excuses for action of, in 
 ordering premature mobilization, 
 486; conciliatory attitude of, 486; 
 consideration of efforts of, to avoid 
 
 war, 522-524; responsibility of, for 
 the war, 522-524; English assur- 
 ances to, against aggression might 
 have delayed mobilization, 523; 
 independence of Servia vital inter- 
 est for, 524; popular reason for 
 wars of, 524; public opinion in, for 
 intervention, 524; violations of 
 German territory by, 525; Grey 
 considers action of, defensive, 527. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Berlin: De 
 Swerbeew. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at London: 
 Count Benckendorff. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Paris: 
 Isvolsky. 
 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna: see 
 Scheb^ko. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Bel- 
 grade: Strandtman. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin: 
 see Bronewsky. 
 
 Russian Charg6 d' Affaires at Paris: 
 Sevastopoulo. 
 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna: 
 see Kudachef. 
 
 Russian Councilor of Embassy at 
 London : De Etter. 
 
 Russian Councilor of Embassy at 
 Vienna: see Kudachef. 
 
 Russian formula: see Sazonof for- 
 mula. 
 
 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
 see Sazonof. 
 
 Russian Minister of War: Suchom- 
 linof. 
 
 Russian Orange Paper: confusion in, 
 regarding Sazonof's statement, 
 243 n; date of Pourtales-Sazonof 
 interview, 244 n. 
 
 St. Petersburg: strike in, 36, 111. 
 
 Salandra Italian Premier: statement 
 concerning the Austrian Ultima- 
 tum, 469. 
 
 Salonika: 30, 91, 106, 195, 524. 
 
 Sambre: 413. 
 
 Samouprava: 75 n. 
 
 Sanctions : of international law, 392. 
 
 San Giuliano, Marquis di, Italian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs: on 
 rejection by Austria of Servian 
 reply, 75; on Russia's probable 
 move, 102-103; on Austrian ulti- 
 matum, 120-121; agrees to media- 
 tion, 232; suggestion for media- 
 
722 
 
 INDEX 
 
 tion, 234-235; thinks Servia may 
 accept ultimatum uncondition- 
 ally, 234; urges England to side 
 with Russia and France, 277-278; 
 Italy's interest in maintaining 
 independence of Servia, 461; 
 makes helpful suggestions, 462- 
 465. 
 
 Sanjak, the, of Novibazar: 75 n, 
 91 n, 258. 
 
 Sarolea, Charles; The Anglo-German 
 Problem: Belgian mobilization, 
 280 n; France and Belgium the 
 Achilles heel of Britain, 316 n; 
 Prussia's gifts to Germany, 493. 
 
 Saxony: 3. 
 
 Sazonof, Russian Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs {see also Sazonof 
 formula) : on Austrian ultimatum, 
 55, 64, 70-71 n, 106; endeavors to 
 secure extension of time limit of 
 Austrian ultimatum, 60; Russia 
 ready to leave question to powers, 
 201; thinks Servia may propose 
 arbitration, 201 ; efforts at concili- 
 ation, 213-214; trusts Grey will 
 keep in touch, 216-217; ready to 
 stand aside, 216; proposes to par- 
 allel "conversations" by confer- 
 ence, 221 ; will accept any arrange- 
 ment approved by France and 
 England, 243; statement of, re- 
 garding rupture of conversations, 
 243 n; date of interview with 
 Pourtales, 244 n; formula (of July 
 30), 245; Russia cannot permit 
 negotiations to cloak German and 
 Austrian military preparations, 
 245; hands Pourtales formula, 245; 
 says Russia unable to arrest mobil- 
 ization and must hasten prepara- 
 tions, 246; action in modifying 
 first formula, 250; thinks compro- 
 mise can be reached only at Lon- 
 don, 256; emphasizes importance 
 of Austria's arresting action 
 against Servia, 257; announces 
 readiness of Austria to discuss sub- 
 stance of Austrian ultimatum, 
 257; accepts mediation if Ser- 
 via not invaded (Bunsen), 261; 
 (Aug. 1) satisfaction that Austria 
 will continue conversations, 263; 
 Jagow says, more inclined to com- 
 promise, 266 11. 
 
 Sazonof formula (first): Grey asks 
 
 Russia to change, 237-238; differ- 
 ence between, and suggested modi- 
 fication, 238 n; handed to Pour- 
 tales, 245; Russia will order gen- 
 eral mobilization if rejected, 245 
 something in nature of ultimatum 
 245-246; "near "-ultimatum, 248 
 will not be accepted (Poincar6) 
 248; effect of mobilization upon 
 modification of, 249-250; modifi- 
 cation of, 250; almost ultimatum, 
 254-255. 
 
 Sazonof formula (modified) : to meet 
 Grey's request, 249; French text 
 of, 249 n; communicated to the 
 powers, 249; less humiliating for 
 Austria, 255. 
 
 Schaffhausen : 413 n. 
 
 Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at 
 Vienna: absent from Vienna (July 
 23), 45; optimism of (July 27), 81; 
 on localization of war, 99, 130-131. 
 
 Scheldt : reason why England objects 
 to fortification of, 397-398; right 
 to use in defending Belgian neu- 
 trahty, 411. 
 
 Schiff, Jacob H.: does not defend 
 violation of Belgian neutrality, 
 443. 
 
 Schluchtpass: 173. 
 
 Schoen, Baron von, German Ambas- 
 sador at Paris: denies intention to 
 threaten France, 150; puts blame 
 on Russia, 153; asks for passports 
 (Aug. 3), 176-177; leaves Paris 
 (Aug. 3), 350 n. 
 
 "Scrap of Paper": Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg on Belgian neutrality treaty, 
 365; use of expression causes un- 
 favorable impression in U.S., 
 454 n; Bethmann-HoUweg ex- 
 plains meaning of, 454-455 n. 
 
 Scutari: 28. 
 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs: see 
 English, French, German, etc.. 
 Secretary. 
 
 Security: desire of England and 
 France, 497. 
 
 Self-preservation: restriction of ac- 
 tion for, 449; alleged inherent 
 right of (Westlake), 640. 
 
 Serajevo Crime (June 28, 1914): 
 34, 36, 53, 66, 73, 75-76 n. 
 
 Servia {see also Austrian ultimatum 
 — Greater Servia — Mobilization, 
 Servian — Narodna Odbrana — 
 
INDEX 
 
 723 
 
 Servian note) : ambitions of, for a 
 Greater Servia, 21, 29-31, 127- 
 128; forced to accept Austria's 
 annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, (March 31, 1909), 21-22, 
 31, 52, 188; unites with other Bal- 
 kan states against Turkey, 26-27; 
 secret appendix to treaty of friend- 
 ship and alliance with Bulgaria 
 (1912), 572-574; Treaty of Bukha- 
 rest (1913), 29; increased strength 
 of, threatens Austria, 29-30, 89, 
 91 n, 93, 123-124, 127-128, 148- 
 149; "Pig War" with Austria 
 (1906), 30, 147; propaganda for 
 uniting Bosnia to, 33-34, 147-148; 
 Austrian Archduke assassinated 
 in (June 28, 1914), 34; confronted 
 with Austrian ultimatum (July 23, 
 1914), 36-37; foresees ultimatum, 
 42-43 n, 45, 47-48; Austrian press 
 campaign against, 44-45 n, 46- 
 47 n, 50 n, 74-75 n, 88-89 n, 156; 
 institutes no investigation of Sera- 
 jevo crime, 49-50; ready to bring 
 criminals to justice, 49-50; cannot 
 accept Austrian ultimatum — dip- 
 lomatic consensus of opinion, 54- 
 56; powers endeavor to gain time 
 for, 59-61; Entente powers influ- 
 ence, to make conciliatory reply, 
 62-64, 270; makes conciliatory 
 reply (July 25, 1914), 64-77; Aus- 
 tria rejects note of, 65; popular 
 feeling in Austria against, 65, 85, 
 88, 91-92; continually confronted 
 by a "Greater Austrian" propa- 
 ganda, 75 n; England and Russia 
 try to prevent hostilities between, 
 and Austria, 81-83; designs of 
 Austria upon sovereignty of, 84- 
 85, 89-95, 97, 101, 104-105, 132, 
 139, 153-154, 223, 245, 254 n, 258, 
 263, 525; opens hostilities (July 
 27), 86; Austria declares war 
 upon (July 28), 86-89, 100; for- 
 merly in the Austrian sphere of 
 influence, 93; looks to Russia as 
 protector, 99-101; relations of 
 powers to, 147-149; Sazonof favors 
 Servia's appealing to powers, 201; 
 sovereignty of, 210, 223, 245, 248, 
 258, 263, 266; San Giuhano sug- 
 gestion for mediation after uncon- 
 ditional acceptance by, of ultima- 
 tum, 234-235; Tsar says Austria 
 
 would make a vassal of, 254 n: 
 Sazonof emphasizes importance of 
 Austria's arresting action against, 
 257; Austrian terms might be 
 given to Servia or power speaking 
 for Servia, 259; invasion of, 261- 
 262, 264; Russia could not allow 
 Austria to invade, 264; Italy inter- 
 ested in maintaining independence 
 of, 461; should have instituted in- 
 vestigation of Serajevo, 481-482; 
 not to blame for the war, 482; 
 Russia obliged to support, 484; 
 unable to arrest propaganda 
 against Austria, 519; Austria's 
 action in regard to Servia's answer 
 (1914) compared with American 
 action in regard to the Maine 
 (1898), 583, criticism of (Ap- 
 ponyi), 588. 
 
 Servia, Prmce of: see Alexander, 
 Prince of Servia. 
 
 Servian Blue Book: viii. 
 
 Servian Minister at Vienna: see 
 Jovanovitch. 
 
 Servian Minister at London: see 
 Boschkovitch. 
 
 Servian Minister at St. Petersburg: 
 see Spalaikovitch. 
 
 Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
 see Pashitch. 
 
 Servian Note, July 25, 1914: text of, 
 576-578; correlated with Austrian 
 ultimatum and Austrian rejoinder, 
 64-77; satisfactory in opinion of 
 Austrian Ambassador at Paris, 
 65 n; Berchtold on, 79; Dumba on, 
 587; Fischerauer on, 76-77 n; 
 Lloyd George on, 586; Sir E. Grey 
 on, 79, 83; Mensdorff on, 71 n; von 
 Tchirsky on, 79; San Giuliano on 
 Austria's rejection of, 75; the case 
 of Austria v. Servia summed up, 
 76-78, see also 65-75; not pub- 
 lished in German press up to July 
 28, 80; Sazonof forecasts, 201; a 
 basis for discussion, 212, 217-218; 
 Austria willing to discuss with 
 Russia, 263-264. 
 
 Servian Premier: see Pashitch. 
 
 Sevastopoulo, Russian Charge d'Af- 
 f aires at Paris. 
 
 Shaw, George Bernard: attack upon 
 Grey, 274 n; Grey's diplomacy, 
 356 n; criticizes England's inter- 
 vention, 356 n. 
 
724 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Shock-absorber: European Concert 
 acts as a, 4. 
 
 Sicily: 24. 
 
 Skoupchtina: 49 n. 
 
 Slav agitation: 32, 43, 148. 
 
 Slavonia: 109. 
 
 Small states: protection of, Eng- 
 land's policy, 10, 511 n. 
 
 Smith, Munroe: policy of Bismarck 
 to avoid aggression, 14 n; Servia 
 cannot accept Austrian ultimatum, 
 55 n; balance of power, 99 n; Aus- 
 trian "prestige," 107 n; Jagow 
 overborne by strategists, 140 n; 
 binding force of treaty (of 1839), 
 386 n; nature of Anglo-Belgian 
 conversations, 405 n; peculiar 
 view of military men, 405 n; 
 German allegations against Bel- 
 gium, 415; Germany's purpose 
 in invading Belgium, 432-433 n; 
 why England intervened, 441- 
 442 n. 
 
 Socialists, radical: confidence of, in 
 French Government, 164. 
 
 Solidarity, monarchical: 125, 145 n, 
 157. 
 
 South Africa: 24. 
 
 South America: 24. 
 
 Sovereigns: see Heads of State. 
 
 Spain: 23; negotiations with Ameri- 
 can Government following the 
 destruction of the Maine, 579 ff. 
 
 Spalaikovitch, Servian Minister at 
 St. Petersburg: appeal of, to Rus- 
 sia, 100; on localization of Austro- 
 Servian conflict, 129 n. 
 
 Spectator, London: 354 n. 
 
 Speed of Mobilization: see Mobiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 Spheres of influence: apportionment 
 of, between empires, 498. 
 
 "Splendid isolation": England 
 abandons, 476-477. 
 
 Spy system, Belgian: 395 n. 
 
 Status quo: maintained by European 
 concert, 4; note of powers regard- 
 ing, in Balkans, 27; France be- 
 lieves purpose of war to overthrow, 
 148; Austria aims to overthrow, in 
 Balkans, 201; Germany had to 
 accept or strike immediately, 478; 
 Germany opposes, 511. 
 
 Stephens and Dudley, Case of 
 Queen against, 642. 
 
 Stock Exchange: Austrian, 45-46 n, 
 
 126 n; German, 156-157; English, 
 308. 
 
 "Stopper" state: Prussia wishes 
 Belgium to serve as, against 
 France, 5; neutralization of Bel- 
 gium intended to establish, 387. 
 
 Strandtman, Russian Charge d'Af- 
 f aires at Belgrade. 
 
 Sublime Porte: 19, 26. 
 
 Suchomlinof, Russian Minister of 
 War. 
 
 Sultan: 26. 
 
 Sun, New York: 76 n, 86 n, 105 n, 
 335 n, 421 n, 446 n. 
 
 "Super-Empire": the formation of, 
 496-500. 
 
 Survival: mental mobilization of 
 war-thought advantage for, 510; 
 of fit ideals, 451. 
 
 Sweden: 10. 
 
 Swerb^ew, de, Russian Ambassador 
 at Berlin. 
 
 Sybel : Historische Zeitschrift, 537 n. 
 
 Szapary, Count, Austrian Ambassa- 
 dor at St. Petersburg. 
 
 Sz^csen, Count, Austrian Ambassa- 
 dor at Paris: thought Servian reply 
 satisfactory, 65 n. 
 
 Szogycny, Count, Austrian Ambas- 
 sador at Berlin: believes Russia 
 will not move, 102-103. 
 
 Switzerland : perpetual neutrality of, 
 7; Treaty of Lausanne, 1912, 25- 
 26; defense of the neutrality of, 
 413 n. 
 
 Tageblatt, Berliner: "pestilential" 
 (Jagow), 137, 367; Sazonof on, 
 558. 
 
 Talleyrand: 3-4. 
 
 Tangier: 16, 23. 
 
 Tankositch: arrest demanded by 
 Austria, 74. 
 
 Tardieu:9, 540 n, 562 n. 
 
 Tchirsky, von, German Ambassador 
 at Vienna: in touch with drafting 
 of Austrian ultimatum, 42, 122; 
 on Servian note, 79; beUeves Rus- 
 sia will not act, 101-102; "Ger- 
 many knows what she is about in 
 backing Austria," 125; Pan-Ger- 
 manist and Russophobe senti- 
 ments, 162; declares readiness of 
 Germany to act as mediator, 244; 
 uncompromising attitude of, 492; 
 disturbing action of, 522; did. 
 
INDEX 
 
 725 
 
 telegraph Austrian ultimatum to 
 Kaiser? 529. 
 
 Tension: national, makes war likely, 
 479. 
 
 Terlinden v. Ames: treaty obliga- 
 tions, 385 n. 
 
 Territorial jurisdiction: disregard of 
 by Austria (1914) and the United 
 States (1898), 584. 
 
 Thayer, Roscoe W.: Italy and the 
 terms of the Triple Alliance, 
 473. 
 
 Thibet: 12, Anglo-Russian agree- 
 ment concerning, 549-550. 
 
 Threats: difference between and 
 warning, 306 n; Berchtold urges 
 Germany to employ, to Russia, 
 246; menacing tone of Kaiser to 
 Tsar, effect on Russian mobiliza- 
 tion, 253 n. 
 
 Times, London : policies of, 309 n; 
 reports from Vienna (July 22-23), 
 46-47 ra; "Greater Servia scare," 
 74-75 n; favors localization of 
 Austro-Servian conflict, 126; Grey 
 in Commons (July 27), 217-218 n; 
 personal messages between King 
 George and Tsar, 255; letters be- 
 tween Poincare and King George, 
 275-277 n; editorial, "The Ger- 
 man Premise," 278 n; authorized 
 criticism of German Chancellor's 
 published interview, 282 n; Parlia- 
 mentary debate (Aug. 27) Keir 
 Hardie vs. Sir E. Grey, 302-303 n; 
 "Europe in Arms," 310 n; 311 n; 
 313 n; Grey in Commons on guar- 
 anty of neutrality of France, 330- 
 331; publishes Lichnowsky letter 
 omitted by Norddeutsche Allge- 
 meine Zeitung, q. v. comments on 
 omission, 331 n, 334-335 n, 335 n; 
 English Cabinet crisis, 340 n, 341- 
 343 n; on England's vital interests, 
 340-341 n; speech of Bonar Law, 
 343 n; Balin criticizes Grey, 354 n; 
 reply of Belgian Government to 
 German accusations relative to 
 Anglo-Belgian relations, 399- 
 400 n; ' ' Luxemburg — another 
 broken treaty," 427 n; San Giuli- 
 ano's diplomacy, 464 n; (Asquith), 
 611 n, 512 n; Lloyd George on 
 case of Servia, 586; Grey in Com- 
 mons (Aug. 3, 1914), 624. 
 
 Times, N.Y.: enterprise of, in pub- 
 
 lishing oflBcial documents, viii; 
 article by Helflferich, 150 n, 155- 
 156 n, 165-166 n, 296 w, 306 n, 
 312 n, 352 n, 218 n, 259 n; docu- 
 ments on entente negotiations, 
 292 n, 551, 314 n, 311 n; (George 
 Bernard Shaw), 356 ??, 401 r?; 
 (Grey on Bethmann-Hollweg), 
 407 n, 409 n, 421 n, 435 n; (Jacob 
 H. Schiff), 443 7i, 446 n, 447 n, 471 
 n, 472 n; (Formation of the Triple 
 Entente), 551-559; (Anglo-Ger- 
 man agreement in regard to Por- 
 tuguese colonies), 502 n, 563 n; 
 (Apponyi), 447 n, 588; statement 
 of M. Havenith regarding publi- 
 cation of Belgian documents, 635; 
 (Eliot, Dernburg), 655. 
 
 Tisza, Count: 46 n, 58 n. 
 
 Transcript, Boston Evening: 403 n, 
 420 n. 
 
 Treaties (see also "Scrap of paper") : 
 rebus sic stantibus, rule of, 379; for 
 the event of war, 380 iT-/ effect of 
 duress upon, 381 ; differ from con- 
 tracts, 381 n; English views re- 
 garding treaty of 1831, 388; of de- 
 fense, right of neutralized states to 
 enter into, 408; German view in 
 regard to sanctity of, 417, 503, 
 513; binding force of, 429; observ- 
 ance of, remarks of Bethmann- 
 Hollweg and Bismarck, 453 n; 
 observance of, fundamental prin- 
 ciple, 453-454; Germany's treaty 
 record, 661-664. 
 
 Treaty: Anglo-German secret treaty 
 of 1898 relative to the eventual dis- 
 memberment of the Portuguese 
 colonies, references to, 562-563. 
 
 Treaty: " The Barrier Treaty " (Oct. 
 29, 1709) between Great Britain 
 and Holland, 596. 
 
 Treaty (Nov. 4, 1911): between 
 France and Germany, 23-24; 
 resented by Germany, 35. 
 
 Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878): 
 (Article 25, text), 572; gives to 
 Austria administration of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, 7-8, 31; vio- 
 lated by Austria in annexation of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908), 
 20-21, 31, 148; relative to Sanjak 
 of Novibazar, 91 n. 
 
 Treaty of Bukharest (Aug. 6, 1913): 
 29; Austria tries to modify, 149. 
 
726 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 18, 1912): 
 26. 
 
 Treaty of London (June 26, 1831): 
 purpose of Belgian neutralization, 
 379 ff.; England's views regarding, 
 388 
 
 Treaty of London (Nov. 15, 1831): 
 relative to separation of Belgium 
 from Holland, 600. 
 
 Treaty of London (April 19, 1839) : 
 
 . relative to neutralization of Bel- 
 gium (text), 600; purpose of Bel- 
 gian neutralization, 378^.; reasons 
 why terminated, 383 #.; Germany 
 bound by, 385; binding force of 
 (Gladstone), 386; (Munroe Smith), 
 386 n; changed conditions of Bel- 
 gium, effect on, 387; attitude of 
 Holland towards, 389; serves Eng- 
 land as excuse for war (Hollweg), 
 455 n; Niemeyer's view of, 504. 
 
 Treaty of London (May 11, 1867): 
 (text), 603; 338-339, 422-431; 
 England's misinterpretation of, 
 423/. 
 
 Treaty of London (Aug. 9, 1870) 
 (see also Neutralization) : between 
 Great Britain and Prussia, relative 
 to the independence and neutral- 
 ity of Belgium (text), 602; effect 
 of, on treaty of 1839, 383. 
 
 Treaty of London (Jan. 17, 1871): 
 broken by Austria in annexation 
 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21, 
 429. 
 
 Treaty of London (July 13, 1911): 
 between Great Britain and Japan 
 (text), 541-542. 
 
 Treaty of London (May 30, 1913): 
 following Balkan wars, 27, 32. 
 
 (Treaty) Declaration of London 
 (Feb. 26, 1909) : 88. 
 
 Treaty of Sofia (signed at Sofia, Feb. 
 29, 1912) : of friendship and alli- 
 ance between Bulgaria and Servia, 
 secret appendix to (text), 572-574. 
 
 Treaty of St. Petersburg (July 30, 
 1907) : between Japan and Russia 
 guaranteeing the present territory 
 of each, the integrity of China and 
 the "Open Door," in China (text), 
 550. 
 
 Treaty of St. Petersburg (Aug. 31, 
 1907) : agreement of England and 
 Russia concerning their interests 
 in Asia (text), 546-550. 
 
 Treaty of St. Petersburg (July 4, 
 1910): convention between Russia 
 and Japan concerning Manchuria, 
 (text), 551. 
 
 Treaty of Vienna (Oct. 7, 1879): 
 Austro-German Alliance, 540-541. 
 
 Trespass: fallacious comparison of 
 Belgian invasion to, 452. 
 
 Treves: 169-170. 
 
 Trieste: 32. 
 
 Triple Alliance (see also Casus 
 foederis): formation of, 3-9; treaty 
 (1879) between Austria and Ger- 
 many (text), 540-.541; (Germany, 
 Austria, Italy) established (1883), 
 8 ; Billow explains effects of , 9 ; Tur- 
 key practically a member of, 20; 
 Italy an independent member of, 
 25-26, 35, 75, 83; increasing arma- 
 ment of, 35; Jagow's objection to 
 opposing of, by the Entente, 209; 
 challenges Triple Entente (Paris 
 Journal des Debats), 265; contains 
 seeds of own dissolution, 457; 
 Italy's interests opposed to, 457- 
 459; Italy declares defensive na- 
 ture of, excludes aggression, 470; 
 Italy refuses to agree to aggression 
 against Servia, 471-472; Bulow 
 considers, will prevent Italy from 
 attacking Germany, 471-472; 
 member of, required to commu- 
 nicate diplomatic transactions 
 (Thayer), 472; does not apply to 
 Mediterranean, 478 n; stabilizing 
 effect of (Biilow), 478; Triple 
 Entente gaining on, 478. 
 
 Triple Entente (see also Anglo- 
 French Entente): formation of, 
 3-18, 551; declaration (1904) of 
 England and France respecting 
 Egypt and Morocco, 544-546; 
 Convention (1907) between Great 
 Britain and Russia concerning in- 
 terests in Asia, 546-550; forced 
 to accept Austria's annexation of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908), 
 21-22; increasing armament of, 
 35; critical internal situation of 
 each power of (1914), 36; en- 
 deavors of, to secure extention of 
 time limit of Austrian ultimatum, 
 59-61, 270; influences Servia to 
 make conciliatory reply, 62-64, 
 270; urges moderation on Austria, 
 82; efforts of, for mediation, 270- 
 
INDEX 
 
 727 
 
 273; England refuses to take side 
 of, 273-282, 286-288, 293-295; 
 Grey's account of, 288-292, 313; 
 interest of England to preserve, 
 311-316; gaining strength over 
 Triple Alliance, 478. 
 
 Triplice: see Triple Alliance. 
 
 Tripoli: 24-26. 
 
 Troubetzkoy, General, Attache to the 
 Military Household of the Tsar of 
 Russia. 
 
 Tsar of Russia, see Nicholas. 
 
 Tunis: acquisition of, by France, 8. 
 
 Turkey: befriended by Austria and 
 Germany, 19; revolution of Young 
 Turks, 20; Russian designs upon, 
 after (1908), 93-94, 123-124; 
 Turco-Italian War (1911-12), 24- 
 26; Balkan Wars, 26-27; Treaty of 
 London, 27; von Blilow considers 
 importance of, for Germany, 27- 
 28; Treaty of Bukharest (1913), 
 29; German diplomacy in Turco- 
 Italian War, 458. 
 
 Ubangi: 24. 
 
 Ultimatum (see also English ulti- 
 matum, German ultimatum to 
 Belgium, German ultimatum to 
 France, German ultimatum to 
 Russia) : defined, 51 n, 52; pre- 
 sented by United States (1898) 
 and Austria (1914), 584; first 
 Sazonof formula in the nature of, 
 245-246, 248. 
 United States: obligation to protect 
 Belgium, 391; unfavorable im- 
 pression caused by "scrap of 
 paper" remark in, 454 n; interest 
 of, in the war, 474-475; under- 
 standing with England, 498; place 
 of, in development of international 
 law, 513; negotiations with Span- 
 ish Government following the de- 
 struction of the Maine, 579, 584; 
 action in case of Maine compared 
 with Austria's action in regard to 
 Servia, 579, 583. 
 
 United States Census: 475 n. 
 
 Universities of America: appeal to, 
 653. 
 
 Unter den Linden: 105 n. 
 
 Usher, Roland G.: Belgium and the 
 balance of power (extract from 
 Pan-Germanism), 597. 
 
 Uskub: 33. 
 
 Vallona: see Avlona. 
 
 Vaterland: 310 n. 
 
 Venezuela: difference with England 
 concerning boundary, 542-543. 
 
 Victoria, Queen: speech of, regarding 
 Anglo-American cooperation in 
 American affairs, 542; speech of, 
 regarding Anglo-American arbi- 
 tration, 543. 
 
 Vienna: Congress of, 1815, 3-4. 
 
 VUliers, Sir F., British Minister to 
 Belgium. 
 
 Vilna: 111, 113. 
 
 Violation of Prussian Constitution: 
 Bismarck guilty of, 494. 
 
 Vital interest: definition of a, 524; 
 states should confine policies to, 
 485 n; independence of Servia, for 
 Russia, 524; England entered war 
 to protect, 526. 
 
 Vital issue: 357-359 n. 
 
 Viviani, Rene, Premier of France 
 and Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
 attitude of Germany (July 31), 
 162-163; German and French 
 mobilization, 169-172; Germjin 
 ultimatum to France, 174-176; 
 approves Grey's plan of mediation, 
 206-207; urges Russia to adhere 
 to Cambon suggestion, 238-239; 
 describes Austrian diplomacy, 
 258-259; says Russia agrees to 
 arrest mobilization, 259; criticism 
 of statement of, concerning Rus- 
 sia's acceptance of mediation pro- 
 posal, 259-260 n; mistake of, that 
 Russia agrees to arrest mobiliza- 
 tion, 260 n. 
 169. 
 
 Waiting attitude: Russia willing to 
 maintain, 249. 
 
 Waliszewski, K:537n. 
 
 War (see also Causes of the war — 
 Laws of war — Responsibility for 
 the war) : European situation pre- 
 ceding, 34-37; German people did 
 not want, 188; efforts to prevent, 
 188; thrust upon Russia, 189; 
 Germany did not want, 191; 
 avoidance of, by acceptance of 
 Grey proposal, 251; Germany be- 
 lieves can be avoided, 251-^52, 
 Germany's declaration of, forced 
 by Russian mobilization, 251; 
 Tsar says German declaration pre- 
 
728 
 
 INDEX 
 
 vents acceptance of English pro- 
 posal, 254-255 n; treaties for the 
 event of, 380^.; right to make, 
 391 ff.; and the equality of states, 
 391^.; Italy declares Austrian 
 action aggressive, 470; avoidable, 
 considered crime, 475; why mo- 
 ment for, opportune for Germany, 
 479; responsibility for, 480; Ger- 
 many declares, because of Russian 
 mobilization, 488 n; Grey could 
 not have prevented, 491; respon- 
 sibility for, not personal, 492; 
 regarded more highly in Germany, 
 495; danger of, known to lie in 
 European Dualism, 499; cause of, 
 different way of thinking, 508; 
 results of the, of 1914, 514-515; 
 aim of diplomacy to avoid, 521; 
 popular reason for every Russian, 
 524; public opinion in Russia con- 
 cernmg, 524; Delbriick predicts, 
 between Germany and England, 
 560; larger meanings of (Gid- 
 dings), 652; issues of, as affecting 
 America (Eliot), 655. 
 
 War Chronicle: 120 n, 285-286. 
 
 War party: at Vienna, 156. 
 
 War power: distinguished from 
 "peace power," 50(?-501. 
 
 Warning: difference between, and 
 threats, 306 n. 
 
 "War-thought": 510. 
 
 Warsaw: 110, 113. 
 
 Washington: effect of example of, 
 494; Farewell Address, 530-533. 
 
 Waxweiler, E.; La Belgiqve neutre el 
 loyale: 400 n, 409 r?, 438 n, 453 n. 
 
 Weltpolitik: 497. 
 
 Westlake, John: consideration to be 
 given special interest and prepon- 
 derating power, 393 n; the alleged 
 
 inherent right of self-preservation, 
 640. 
 
 Westminsler Gazette: 224 n, 309 n, 
 556. 
 
 Wicker, Cjoiis French; Neutraliza- 
 tion: extracts from, 339, 432 n, 
 639. 
 
 William II, Em-peror of Germany: 
 interest in Morocco, 16, 23; tries 
 to mediate between Austria and 
 Russia, 112, 115, 145-146 n, 329- 
 330; but hampered by Russian 
 mobilization, 115, 145-146 n; af- 
 fected by monarchical solidarity 
 (J. Cambon), 125, 145 w, 157; 
 urges Austria to continue discus- 
 sion, 242; appeals to Tsar to sup- 
 press regicide, 252 n; holds Tsar 
 responsible for outcome, 253 n; 
 telegram to King George, 286 n; 
 telegram regarding French neu- 
 trality, 328-329; message to Sir E. 
 Goschen, Aug. 5, 368-369; has had 
 no Chancellor, 495; responsibility 
 of, for the war, 521; Daily Tele- 
 graph's interview with, 563. 
 
 Wolff Press Agency : 80. 
 
 World: answers question of respon- 
 sibility for the war, 495-496. 
 
 World, New York: 354 n, 407 n. 
 
 World organization (see also Super- 
 Empire) : 495. 
 
 Yellow Book, French: mistakes in, 
 
 285-286 n. 
 Young Turks: 18, 20, 76 n. 
 
 Zimmerman, von, German Under- 
 Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs: believes Russia will not 
 act, 102. 
 
 D - 1.2. 5 
 
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