l^^coe)Ov^'p toy o/sW^yio O/ veoovv-slde/yatiloVN of ■^^. Gla5s£aM Book Ail- ^' ! ,»>f'"^ ' #• / ^ I ^'pfl^ Reasons for asking a Reconsideration of the conclusions determined by the Sec- retary of State in the settlement of the claim of the Brig General Armstrong. _ — |v^^,L To the Hon. Fred'k T. Frelinghuysen^ Secretary of State^ Sir : Among the powers of the Executive, vested by Art. II, sec. 3 of the Constitution of the U. S. in the President, is that " he shall take care that the laws be faithfully exe- cuted'' To execute the law in good faith, it must be done in accordance with the meaning, spirit, and intent of the legislative will, construed by the established principles of ju- risprudence and a due regard to the attributes and elements of justice.. On this greatconservative principle, ordained for the protec. tion of the rights of the citizen, a reconsideration of the conclu- sion reached by the Department of State in the settlement of this case, is most respectfully solicited. And, while it is with great deference that this reconsideration is praj^d for, it is also not without a firm conviction that the views entertained by the Department of State have been arrived at by a miscon- ception and a misconstruction of the real purport and spirit of the act of Congress. The human mind, in the formation of its opinions and decisions, is not infallible, and it may not be irrelevant to add that if Chief Justice Marshall, nay, if the Supreme Court itself, could, by the enlightenment of reason, be convinced of its erroneous decisions and reverse the same, the legal mind of the eminent Secretary of State is not less susceptible of conviction. The following is a copy of the act : "An act for the relief of the captain, owners, officers, and crew of the late United states private-armed brig General Armstrong, their heirs, executors, administrators, agents, or assigns. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled^ That the Secre- tary of State be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to examine, and adjust the claims of the captain, owners, officers, and crew of the late private-armed brig; General Armstrono- growing out of the destruction of the said brig by a British force in the neutral port of Fayal in September, eighteen hundred and fourteen, upon the evidence established before the Court of Claims, and to settle the same on principles of justice and equity ; and that he be, and is hereby, further authorized and directed to draw his requisition in favor of said claimants, their heirs, executors, administrators, agents, or assigns, for the amount which may be by him found due to said claimants, on the Secretary of the Treasury, not exceed- ing seventy thousand, seven hundred and thirty-nine dol- lars, the amount irroved before the Court of Claims^ who is authorized to pay the same out of any money in the Treas- ury not otherwise appropriated." To determine with certainty, and fairly construe the act, it is first necessary to ascertain the object of the enactment, and what it calls for, in order to decide whether it has been faithfully executed. The first clause of the act authorizes and directs the Secre- tary of State " to examine and adjust " this claim "upon the ev- idence established before the Court of Claims, and to settle the same upon principles of justice and equity." The word " adjust" in the act, is used in its ordinary sense, and means " to arrange or prepare for settlement," in contradistinction to adjudge^ which means, "to settle and determine by ii ju- dicial decree.'^ For a comprehensive understanding of this clause of the act, it is of absolute importance first to ex- amine and ascertain the nature and character of the evi- (lence upon whicli the Secretary is directed to adjust and settle tiiis claim, and which is the key to the true construc- tion of this act. This evidence consists of depositions taken before a commissioner of said court, '' at the request of Sam. C. Reid, jr.," and proves the amount of losses of the owners, officers, and crew, and authenticates and confirms the docu. raentary testimony showing the assignment by the owners of all their interest to Captain Reid, "his heirs and assigns forever," and the as? i<>:riment by Captain Reid of "all his interest whatsoever in said brig and claim," to his son, Sam. C. Reid, jr., who was duly empowered to act as the agent and attorney for the claimants. (See evidence in Rep. Court of Claims, 1st sess. 35 Cong., vol. 2, 1857-58.) This is the nature and character of the evidence established before the Court of Claims, and upon which the Secretary is only authorized to adjust this claim. The word establish means " to fix unalterably, to confirm and ratify." Conse- buently, the rights of the claimants being adjudged by the court upon this evidence, it is fixed unalterably, and con- firmed and ratified, as the record shows. It cannot, there- fore, be questioned or impeached. We now proceed to consider the second clause of the act: ''And that he be, and is hereby, further authorized and di- rected to draw his requisition in favor of said claimants, their heirs, executors, administrators, agents or assigns, for the amount which may be by him found due to said claim- ants, on the Secretary of the Treasury, not exceeding $70,739 the amount proved before the Court of Claims," &c. Now, it being incontrovertible that Mr. Reid, by the evi- dence established before the court, is the agent and attorney of the officers and crew, and the assignee (through his father) of the owners, the Secretary of State, upon this evidence, is authorized and directed to draw his requisition in favor of the agent and assignee " for the amount which may be by him found due to said claimants." Or, in other words, in the language of the act, the Secretary is authorized "to draw his requisition in favor of said dodmants, their heirs, execu. tors, administrators, ogents^ or assigns for the amount which ma}- he by him found due to said claimants." So that, taking the two clauses of the act together, the true meaning, pur- pose, and intent of the law is manifestly clear and palpable that the Secretary is authorized and directed, only upon the evidence before the court, to draw his requisition in favor of the agruf or assignee representing the claimants "/o?* the amount ivhich may be by him found due to said claimants." And this for the reason that by the directions of the act the Secretary can only adjust and settle this claim upon the evidence before the court ; and the evidence before the court does not establish that any of the claimants are entitled to receive one cent of the appropriation, except through the agent and assignee, whose powers and rights are fully established by this evidence. No authorities need be cited to show that an act must be so construed that the whole must be carried into eft'ect ; that is, one part of the act cannot be executed without the other, and applying the test of the principles established for the construction of laws, it is obvious that the true spirit and intent of this act will not permit of any other construction than the one contended for. The purpose and intent of the act is, therefore, that the Secretary of State shall pay to the agent and assignee "the amount which may be by him found due to said claimants." The author of the act, Mr. Reid, drew it up with the purpose and intent of protecting his rights as agent and assignee, which had been recognized and confirmed by the evidence before the Court of Claims. Surely, then, the author of the language of the act should be capable of expressing as well as explaining its meaning and intention, which a large experi- ence of forty years at the bar ought to enable him to do. It is true that wliile the act directs the Secretary to draw his requisition in favor of the agent and assignee of the claim- ants, Mr. Reid's name is not mentioned as such, but the evi- dence before the Court of Claims does fully recosjiiize and confirm him in both capacities; and as the rights of the agent and assignee are superior to those of the heirs, execu- tors or administrators, the Secretary cannot recognize them in jireference, without great injustice, and onl}^ until after the agent and assignee ceases to act as such in behalf of the claimants. The intent and purpose of the bill, before it became an act of Congr^'ss, was explained to the Committees on Foreign Aflairs of both Houses that the appropriation would be paid to Mr. Reid as the agent and assignee of the claimants, which would appear by the evidence established before the Court of Claims, and which was not only so understood by them, but every Senator and Member who voted for the bill did so with a full understanding that this was the intention of the act, as the debates will show. In the record of the case of the brig General Armstrong, it is shown that the Department of State for over forty years has acknowledged and recog- nized Mr. Reid as the "sole and only authorized agent of the claimants." That in all the diplomatic correspondence Mr. Reid is alluded to and treated with, by the Department as the " sole authorized agent acting for the claimants." In all the congressional proceedings from 1844 the petitions, memorials, and reports of Congress show that Mr. Reid is recognized and affirmed as the " sole authorized agent of the claimants." That after this claim had been twice abandoned by this Government and finally lost by arbitration, it became an abandoned wreck, and was deserted by all persons and par- ties in interest, except Mr. Reid, who still continued to pros- ecute it in vindication of the national honor and for the benefit of the claimants. Pending this whole period all the expenses and costs, amounting to over $50,000, have been borne by Mr. Reid without adding his personal services, em. bracing tlie best years of his life, which wi^uld far exceed the sum appropriated. As agent for the officers and crew, and assignee of the owners, Mr. Reid's personal claims were upon testimony, ordered to be taken by the court, duly passed on and admitted, and fully confirmed and established. These rights were asserted by the Department of State, which has never (questioned his authority to control and manage this claim, as well as to receive the sum appropriated, until the late action of the present Hon. Secretary of State. The authority conferred by the act upon the Secretary is, " to examine and adjust these claims, upon the evidence estab- lished before the Court of Claims, iiud to settle the same on prin- ciples of justice and equity." The power given to the Secretary to adjad these claims is fixed and determined, and is strictly and directl}' coiijiaed to the evidence before the Court of Claims, as the basis upon which they shall be adjusted. The act gives no discretionary power to adjust these claims outside of this evidence, or upon any other basis than that adjudicated by the Court. The amount due having already been adjudged by the Court upon the evidence before it, and fixed and determined, the act gives no equitable discretion or authority^ to alter or change that evidence, even if the Secretary was of opinion that the claim- ants were entitled to a larger or lesser sum, much less to make any different disposition or award afiecting the rights of any of the claimants, for the reason that the act positively directs the Secretary to adjust these claims uiwn the evidence established before the Court. According to the act, then, the rights of these claimants must first be examined and adjusted upon the evidence before the Court, before they can be settled., in order that the settlc- 7nent may be in accordance with the evidence: Mr. Reid being one of the claimants, as well as agent and assignee, his claim and his rights must first be adjusted according to the evi- dence establishing those rights, before a final settlement or payment can legally be made. After authorizing the Secretary of State to make this ex- amination and adjustment in accordance with the established evidence, the act directs him to settle the same " on princi- ples of Justice and equity.'' These words were inserted by the author of the bill by way of caution, in order to obviate any strict technical objections which might arise upon the docu- mentary evidence^ upon which the settlement is to be made ac- c^rdino- to the evidence before the Court, proving Mr. Reid to be the authorized agent, and legal assignee and represent- ative of the owners. They can have no relation or applica- tion to the adjusting of any claims of either the owners, offi- cers, or crew, because the onl}- question involved in their case, is the amount of their claims, which is fixed and deter- mined by the evidence, and which the act also declares, shall " not exceed $70,739, the amount proved before the Court of Claims" The Secretary, consequently, can apply no "prin- ci{)les of justice and equit}^ " to adjust their claims. The only rational applicability, therefore, of the words "to settle the same on principles of justice and equity," is the intention alread}' ex[)lained. They require the Secretary to act on " principles of justice and equity " with regard to the rights of the party whom the evidence before the Court of Chiims establishes as the agent of the officers and crew, and assignee and representative of the owners. The Secretary is, conse- quently, only vested with discretio.iary powers for the furtherance of justice and equity, for the protection of the rights of the agent and assignee, should any legal technical- ities be raised to defeat those rights. While his duty, then, is con lined to adjust these claims upon the evidence before the Court,the discretionary power given, " to settle the same upon principles of justice and equity," is also confined and limited to "the evidence established before the Court of Claims." There is no authority given by the act to settle these claims on any other basis, or in any other manner, than that warranted, by the evidence. Nor can the Secretary en- large his powers by a construction not warranted by the Avords of the act " to settle the same on principles of justice and equity," and undertake to adjudicate the settlement of this claim upon the conceived opinions or views of the De- partment of State as to what may be deemed just and equit- able. He has no power under the act to exercise judicial 8 authority by a settlement on any discretionary or compro- mise basis, as between the officers and crews and the agent, nor undertake the distribution of this fund, as no such power is contained in, and never was contemplated by the act. Nor can the Secretary act judioially under the act to settle this claim as to the mode of settlement between the owners and assignee, as that is settled by law under the act of assign- ment, which has been proved to be legally authenticated, and confirmed by the evidence of the Court. The Supreme Court of the U. S. has decided, in the case of Beatty's Exr., that " no part of the Judicial poirer, under the Constitution of the U. S. can be conferred upon an exec- utive officer," And in the case of Stnrgis, Bennett & Co., where an act of Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to refund money paid by importers " whenever it should be shown to his satisfaction," that it had been illegally exacted, this court decided " that the power which it (the act) confers upon the Secretary of the Treasury is purely ad- ministrative, and in no sense judicial." And the court fur- ther said that " it would be a most dangerous j^rinciple to es- tablish, that the acts of a ministerial officer, when done in good, faith, however injurious to -private rights, and unsupported, by law, shoxdd afford no grounds for legal i^edress ;" that " it (the law) did not vest the Secretary of the Treasury with the power to decide upon the rights of the claimant, except to the extent that he may he i^equircd to act upon them." For, said the court, " it is no answer to this view, that in such a case the party was without remedy except by an appeal to the legis- lative department of the Government ; for if that were suf- ficient then there would be but few Q.2i%Q^ oi contract of which this court could take cognizance." This decision covers this whole case,and defines the extent of powers vested by the act in question in the Secretary of State. The law does not vest the Secretary " //•///;, the power to decide upon the rights of the claimants, except to the extent that he might be required to act upon them" For the intent of the act is to treat as res judicata the action of the Court of Claims, and to deny to any other tribunal the power to dis- turb its judicial findings. The act exi)licitly says that the evidence taken before the Court of Claims was established ; in other words, that the respective rights of the parties must be deemed and treated as fully and finally settled by the court, leaving to the officer named in the act the power sim- ply to disburse the sum appropriated wholly and entirely in accordance with the evidence so fixed and established by that court. And this is the extent to which the Secretary is re- quired by law to act on the rights of the claimants. It must not be overlooked that this, law is " for the relief OF THE AGENTS AND ASSIGNS of the Captain, owucrs, officers, and crew, as well as of the parties themselves, which the title of the act declares. The Secretary, therefore, cannot decide upon the rights of the elcimants, " except to the extent that HE MIGHT BE .REQUIRED TO ACT vpou them " uuder the law. That extent is "to adjust the claims upon the evidence established before the Court of Claims^ and to settle the mme on principles of justice and equity." JSfow, what are the rights of Mr. Reid, the claimant, agent, and assignee, in this case, and who is alluded to as such by all the judges of the Court of Claims in their decisions, and for whose relief this act was passed as well as any other of the claimants ? 1st. As the agent of the officers and crew he is stamped and authenticated as such on every official act and proceed- ing of every department of the Government, legislative, judi- cial, and executive, relating to this case, and his ri_g/i..'< /ort'ver," for it would be treating the act of transfer as a nul- lity, and abrogating the law of contracts. The Department of State, in Feb., 1879, at the instance of President Hayes, and by the request of Mr.Reid, after a full investigation of all the official correspondence, documents, and evidence in this case by the law officer of the Depart meut of State, decided that the Government "is bound under 12 the extraordinary circumstances of this case, in equity, iu morals, and in honor, to make reparation to their own citi- zen, the private claimant." Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, fully approved of this report, and "the justice and equity of the claimant's appeal (Mr. Reid) to his own govern u 'en t," and recommended Congress to make the appropriation. The law officer of the Department, at the time of this report, had made thorough a examination of this case in all its branches, and Mr. Reid was fully recognized at the time as the agent and assignee of this claim. On the bill becoming a law, the right of Mr. Reid to re- ceive the amount appropriated as agent and assignee was submitted to the law officer upon the evidence produced be- fore the Court of Claims. In his report he states that " Mr. Reid, jr., the present claimant, has been recognized and known to the Department, the President, to Congress, and the Court of Claims, as the sole and only agent and repre- sentative of t^iis claim, from 1840 to the present day." * * * " SuH|iect only to such equity liens as Sam. C. Reid, jr., may have created upon the fund during the prosecution of the claim, I am of the opinion that he is entitled at law and in equity to receive and receipt for the whole amount appropriated by the act of Congress." " The heirs-at-law of Captain Reid have no standing in court against this fund ; he long ago assigned atid trans- ferred all his interest, remoie and contingent, to the present claimant, Sam. C. Reid, Jr. Under the various powers and transfers, he, Reid, Jr., is also entitled to receive and re- ceipt on account of the officers and crew ; he is to settle and adjust with them. It is not the business of the Department. They have made him, Reid, their trustee, agent, and re[»re- sentative, and he certainly has shown himself a most faith- ful representative." The law officer, on the 14th of July, 1882, on intimation from the Assistant Secretary, that the above report did not present the proper mode of distribution according to the in- tent and meaning ot the act of Congress, an additional report was made in which the legality of the documentary evidence 13 before the court is pronounced upon. This report sa3^s: " The assignment of December 12, 1856, from Capt. Reicl to his son, Sam C. Reid, Jr., is an assignment of all and singu- lar his rights in the vessel and the daim^ and all that he, the assignor, might have in any moneys recovered to Reid, Jr., the claimant. This document is also good in form and sub- stance. But suppose his legal right is questioned, is he not clearly entitled on the plainest principles of equity ? He has prosecuted the case for more than an ordinary lifetime." vi ""^ In justice to myself, perhaps, and to prevent any misun- fs derstanding of my motives in so strenuously presenting these views to the Hon. Secretary, I should add, that there never has been any purpose on my part to evade paying to any per- son entitled to any portion of the sum appropriated, -^nd, further, that my only purpose is, to insist on my clear right to receive the entire sum, {less the amounts already paid out,) as established by the evidence, holding myself ready hereafter to make just application and payment to any person who may be entitled to receive any portion thereof. In other words, the act of Congress intends that the executive officer shall make payment in the first instance to Sam C Reid, Jr., as agent and assignee, leaving upon him the_duty to distribute justly and fairly as t':'ustee to the respective beneficiaries^^ their respective proportions and shares.yThe assurance is need- less that if the trustee should fail in his duties, the benefici- aries can enforce their rights in the appropriate judicial tri- bunals, whose methods of procedure are far better adapted to ascertain and fix the rights of the parties, than any de- partment witn its imperfect modes of inquiry,and which cer- tainly are inadequate to the attainment of this object. With the fullest confidence in the desire of the Honor- able Secretary of State faithfully to execute the law by con- formino; with the true meaning and intention of this act of Congress, and to render that justice which the spirit of equity demands, I most respectfully submit the foregoing to his careful consideration. SAM. C. REID. Washington, D. C, Nov. W, 188^. ^v w