./\/Sf 580 'y 1 SPEECH P Mk,NILES, OF CONNECTICUT, ON THE OREGON QUESTION. DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1846. WASHINGTON; PRINTED AT THE UNION OFFIkT 1846. SPEECH. On tfu rttolution giving the twelve months* notict Jor the termination of the joint eceupanoy of the Oregon territory. Mr. NILES roM and said — Mr. PRStnoEirr: It was not his purpose, said Mr. N., to occupy much of the time of the Senate in the remarks he had to submit on this subject; he spoke of the general subject of dispute concerning what is called the Oregon territory, rather than the particu- lar bill under consideration; yet, considering its ex- tensive nature, and various ramifications, he was admonished not to preface his remarks by any al- lusion to their brevity, lest he should add another to the many examples that such an introduction was a sure indication of a long speech. In what he should have to say, it was not his intention to dis- cuss with a view to demonstrate or strengthen it — the title of the United States to that territory in any of its phases; nor did he propose to examine the Brit- ish claims, although he might allude to the grounds of them and their extent, as compared with the claims of the United States. These topics had been fully and ably debated here and elsewhere, and probably all had been said that could be offered to any advantage. Besides, he did not regard the dis- cussion of these disputed topics as having a very important bearing on the main question, which was, how this dispute between the two countries could be settled satisfactorily to the United States? We may convmce ourselves, and our own people, that our title to the whole of that territory is clear and unquestionable; but, if our facts and arguments were as "strong as proof of holy writ," would they con- vince the government of Great Britain or the peo- ple of England? Will they read our arguments; and if they do so, will they read them with that impartiality which will admit of conviction? And, if in any sense convinced, would it not be the case ofa person "convinced against his will, who re- mains of the same opinion still." Nor did Mr. N. propose to discuss either posi- tively or relatively the power and ability of the two countries, to sustain and prosecute a war — a ques- tion which, in his judgment, had little to do with this controversy in the present stage of it — a ques- tion which it would be time enough to discuss when a rupture between the two countries should become inevitable, or the danger of it much more imminent than he believed it to be at present. Nor would he indulge in that fruitful topicof declamation, the calam- ities of war either abstractly, or in respect to what might be peculiar to this country; as however great the evils of war might be, he did not regard that as a very sound reason why we should not insist on such a settlement of this dispute as should recognise our just and reasonable rights. There were some other things that he would not bring into this debate. If he did not attempt to establish our title, he certainly would not labor to prove that the United States had no title at all. Nor, if we had, would he argue that we were so weak as compared with Great Britain, that it was the part of wisdom not to insist on our rights, but to secure peace at any sacrifice. And he would not repeat what others had done, and what he had witnessed with profound regret — he would not bnng into this debate the resolution of the Balti- more convention either as proof that our title is clear and unquestionable, or as evidence of public opin- ion on this subject, nor as an argument to influence our action. Sir, that resolution was unauthorized. It was a subject with which that convention should not have intermeddled. It was, he believed, the first and certainly a dangerous example of giving a party character to a question connected with our foreign relations — a dispute with a foreign power which might result in war? And supposing such a result should follow, would it not give occasion for all who might be dissatisfied with the war to say that it had been brought upon the country by the proceedings ofa party convention, and that the war consequently was a mere party war? When he had heard frona some of his friends this ill-advised resolution press- ed into this debate, he had been ready to exclaim, as he now did, introduce any other topic, press any other argument, but, in the name of Heaven, spare us, save us from an argument drawn from the reso- lution of a party convention, on a question involv- ing the momentous issue of peace or war. At the coiflmcncement of the present session, said Mr. N., the President, in discharge of his constitu- tional duty, communicated to Congress the corres- pondence which had taken place between the Secre- tary of State anil the British plenipotentiary in re- gard to the disputed claims of the two countries to the territory on the northwest coast of America, and in his message gave a history of the negotiations which have taken place on that subject since their commencement in 1818. He also recommended certain measures to the consideration of Con- gress for the maintenance of our rights. Among these measures, and what seems to be regard- ed as first in order, was the necessary authori- ty to terminate the convention of 1818, renewed and continued by that of 1827. This matter having been brought before Congress, the first question aeemed to be, whether it was proper for us to do anything in relation to it? Whether it was best to act at all, or leave it where it is— in the hands of the Executive — for him to dispose of? And if it is deemed advisable to do anything, the next question is, whether it is expedient to pass the bill under con- sideration for abrogating the convention? What he had to say on this subject was intended to be of a practical nature, and with a view to results, it not being his intention to discuss disputed abstract ques- tions of right. Several senators who have address- ed the Senate have expressed much doubt whether they could vote for the authority to give the notice for terminating the convention. They said that would depend on circumstances on what might be developed in the course of the debate, on what use was to be made of the power to give the notice, and what measures might be likely to follow it. Such he under.-!tood to be the views of the senator from South Carolina, [Mr. Calhoun,] and the senator from Maine, [Mr. Evans.] The last named senator, said that if there was even a remote probability that authorizing the notice would give rise to other meas- ures which might disturb the peaceful relations be- tween the two countries, it behooved us to pause, and to act with great caution. To this he certainly did net object; he thought himself, that before we took the first step it was proper and the part of wis- dom to look ahead and see what other measures it might become necessary to adopt, how far we may be required to go, and where we can stop, and what condition we shall be in in regard to this controversy at that time. This measure might be unobjection- able in itself, but if it necessarily leads to others which would embarrass the subject, and tend to in- volve the country in war, that might be a sufficient objection to adopting it. Some gentlemen have considered this measuae as a peaceful one; others as :hostile, not because it was so in itself, but because ^it would necessarily lead to measures of a hostile land forcible nature. His friend from Michigan, f[Mr. Cass,] if he had understood him, seemed :to regard giving the notice to abrogate the conven- tion as the first in the series of measures which would result in taking forcible possession of the dis- puted territory. If you abrogate the treaty, then ex- tend your laws and jurisdiction over the territory, and attempt to dipossess the British settlers there, and if Great Britain should defend her subjects, as he thinks she probably would, why, then, war be- comes inevitable. Nothing, perhaps, can be more conclusive. If the premises are admitted, no one, he presumed, could deny the conclusion. But are these measures the natural consequence of abroga- ting the treaty? Are they a necessary result of it? if we give the notice, shall we be boihid to follow up that measure by all or any of the measures he had alluded to? Mr. N. thought not. He did not consider the notice as the first of a series of meas- ures for a forcible occupation of the disputed terri- tory. We shall be left entirely at liberty to pursue such measures as we please, pacific or otherwise, after abrogating the convention. There is nothing, therefore, in this objection. What reason is there opposed to passing this resolution? Can any other or better measure be proposed.' — or is it deemed the wisest policy to do nothing? To those who may think so, he had a word to say; he wished to know how those who took this position expected that this long and perplexing controversy was to be brought to a close. All must admit the importance of its being terminated; it had a tendency to disturb the harmony of the two countries. Do they look to time to bring about an adjustment? And how much time will be required? The negotiation has been pending for nearly thirty years, and we are no near- er a settlement than when it commenced. If in thirty years we have made no progress, how long will it take to obtain a recognition of our rights? But, it has been asked, why shall we abrogate the convention? What shall we gain by it? One object might be gained; it might favor negotiation, and conduce to a settlement. This, we had reason to believe, was, in part, the motive of the President in asking for the authority to annul the treaty; he be- lieved that it would favor negotiation; and is it not wise to strengthen the arm of the Executive, and give him every facility and advantage to bring this dis- pute to a close? The President, by the constitution, is entrusted with the power of conducting negotia- tions, and of adjusting disputes with foreign pow- ers; and he has asked for this authority, supposing it would bean advantage in the settlement of this controversy; and this (said Mr. N.) is a sufficient reason for giving it to him, unless there are strong objections to doing it. But there are other and sound reasons for terminatinj the convention — reasons in- dependent of its influence, favorable to a settle- ment of this dispute by negotiation. The arrange- ment was never a beneficial one to the United States; and if it ever was, it has ceased to be so now. He disagreed entirely with the senator from South Caro- lina [Mr. Calhoun] who said this convention had been important to us; that it had established «\xr rights, and that without it, we should have had to abandon them, or to have sustained them by force. He did not understand how this treaty has sustain- ed our rights, when, profesedly, it had nothing to do with the rights of the parties to it; it left those in abeyance; its only object was to provide for a tem- porary use of the country, and to prevent disputes among those engaged in the fur-trade. And how had it effected this object? Why, by driving our traders entirely out of that trade, as had been shown by the senator from Missouri, [Mr. Benton,] and securing a monopoly of it to the Hudson Bay Com- pany. But this treaty arrangement, had obstructed the settlement of the country by our citizens; it was inconsistent with the settlement of the country, and as this was our object, it became important to re- move the embarrassment which this treaty inter- posed. He regarded the act of ParUament of 1821, extending British laws over the country, so far as respects her own subjects, a violation of the spirit of the convention. That act had contributied to the settlement of the country by British subjects, if it was not so intended. And the Puget Sound Com- pany, with a large capital, had been incorporated for the express purpose of encouraging the settlement and cultivation of the country. But our citizens had been discouraged from settling there, because our laws and jurisdiction, did not reach them for their protection. As matters now are, the British have every advan- tage; they have a monopoly of the fur-trade, and in- ducements for settlement. Let us, then, put an end to this unequal state of things. And let us see what condition we shall be in, when the treaty obligations are disolved. We shall be restored to the condition we were in before the treaty took effect, and put into the exclusive possession of a part of the territory, and possess our rights to the whole, unfettered and unembarrassed, and be at liberty to enforce them as we may see fit. The senator from Georgia, [Mr. Berrien,] is mistaken, in supposing that the British will be in possession of two-thirds of the territory; she will not have the exclusive possession of any portion of it. The right of possession, like the title and jurisdiction, will be in dispute, and that party will have the advantage, which possesses the great- est facility for settling the country; and that will be the United States. We have settlements much nearer to it; and our citizens are more hardy and ad- venturous in effecting settlements in a new country in advance of civilization. The discovery of the South Ptiss, has removed the mountain barrier, and opened the country to the hardy enterprise of our citizens, particularly in the great valley of the Mississippi. Should there be no adjustment, the settlements by both parties will be attended by some embarrassment, but no greater on our part than on that of Great Britain. They have extended their laws over their subjects, and we can extend our laws over our citizens. This will be an embar- rassing state of things — a double jurisdiction over the same country, but not essentially different from what it is at present, except that the parties will be on an equality in respect to rights and protection, and nov/ the British have the advantage. There was, in his judgment, no well-founded ob- jections to abrogating the convention, and strong reasons in its favor. But a question has been raised as to the farm of the notice; and there are several forms proposed, in the shape of amendments. Some had spoken of a qualified and an absolute notice; but there could be no qualified notice; the notice must be such as to terminate the treaty; it must do that, or it amounts to nothing, and it can do no more than that. But the notice may be accompa- nied by a declaration respecting negotiation, and there were several resolutions of that kind. He considered a simple notice — and as nearly in the words of the treaty as possible — as the most proper and dignified; and there would be no propriety in connecting any resolution or declaration of any de- scription with it, was it not that in the debate the notice had been regarded by some as a hostile measure, or as the first in a series of measures, for the forcible occupation of the territory. In view of this, it might be proper, and certainly was not ob- jectionable, to accompany the notice with a declara- tion that it was not intended to foreclose, or in any way interfere with a settlement of the controversy by negotiation. The resolution from the House amounted to no more than this, and met his approba- tion; and, with his present views, he should vote for the House resolutions, and against all amend- ments. In regard to the amendment offered by the senator from Geoi^ia, [Mr. Colquitt,] he thought that went too far, and was too supplicating. He would not accompany the resolution for abrogating; the convention with another resolution, which seemed to say that we are afraid of what we are doing. He would not say to Great Brifam we think we have a right, and think it is for our interest to- annul the convention, but are almost afraid to do itj we hope you will not be offended; we are ex- tremely anxious to compromise the dispute on almost any terms, to quiet the minds of our people, who wouhl be alarmed at the very thought of war. There was little dignity in this supplicating tone, this begging for a compro- mise; and he thought there could be nothing gained by it. But, said Mr. IN., the main question is, as alj must admit, what policy on our part is best calcula- ted to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of this long-.3tanding controversy.' We wish it settled; but on terms containing a reasonable recognition of our rights. We differ as to the extent of our rightsj, : but all must agree that it is important that the dis- pute be settled, if it can be, on terms reasonably satisfactory, without disturbing the peace of the country. If we abrogate the treaty, there will be three ways in which this dispute may terminate. First, by negotiation and compromise; second, by one of the parties taking forcible possession of the ' disputed territory; and thirdly, by leaving it to time ' and the settlement of the country. The first he re- garded as the most desirable, anc', a;; long as there is any prospect that our object could be attained in that way, it v/ould seem to be our true policy to adapt our measures to this end. He believed that this dispute could be settled by negotiation, and therefore regarded it as important that Congress and the Executive should occupy a position favorable to such a result. We should .■stand where we ever have stood in regard to this controversy. We have from the first asserted a title or claim to the whole territory; but have recognised this claim to be in di.spute, and have admitted that Great Britain may have certain rights in the territory. This has been our position. Shall we adhere to it.' or shall we take a new position, and not only assert a claim to the whole territory, but deny all right,'? to Great Britain, and thus exclude ail hopes of settling the dispute by negotiation.' He regarded it as unwise and unsafe to assume such a position. He did not believe it prudent or wise to insist «jn our claim to- ils utmost extent, attended, as all must admit it to- be, with some doubts and difficulties. If we insist - on having the whole, we may lose all, besides in- curring the hazard of involving the country in war. Have we any reason to suppose that Great Britain will yield to our claims to this extent, and relinquish her whole pretensions? It would be the greatest folly to believe this. If we insist on a claim to the whole territory, we must expect to defend it by- force; and what right have we to assume that we shall be successful in such an attempt' As he had already said, he would not discuss the means or power of Great Britain or of the United States to sustain and prosecute a war. Both were powerful; and who could foresee the result' In insisting on all, we may lose all, besides bringing on the coun- try the calamities of war. A moderate but firm course, he thought the best. He would not push our claims to the utmost extent, but would insist on a recognition of our reasonable rights. This had been our policy hitherto, and he saw no reason to change it. There was not only hazard in doing it, but there was difficulty arising fronn our own acts. We have repeatedly recognised certain rights in Great Britain, and have proposed to compromise the dispute. How can we now deny all rights in her, and insist on a claim to the whole territory? What reason can we assign for this change in our position? Have we acquired any new rights since the renewal of the convention in 1827? We had acquired the Spanish title previous to that period. In what way is our title strengthened or better now, than it was at that time? Can we even say that we were ignorant of our just claims, and have obtained new light in regard to them? Shall we not expose ourselves to the charge of asserting a more exten- sive claim now than we have heretofore, merely be- cause we are more able to defend iL' Shall we suf- fer it to be supposed that our claims increase with the growing resources and power of the country? He did not contend that the faith of the country was pledged to an adjustment on the basis of the forty-ninth degree of north latitude; the propositions we have made were offered in the spirit of compro- mise, and did not amount to a limitation of our claims, or an admission that we had no claim be- yond forty-nine. What he contended was, that in the negotiations oh the subject, whilst asserting a claim to the whole, we have conceded that there -was so much doubt or difficulty attending our claim, that we had been willing to concede a part to secure the recognition of the rest. This was the position we have occupied, and he thought we could not, with propriety, change it, without some good rea- rsons for doing so. The character of our govern- ment and country for a respect for justice, and for fairness and moderation in its transactions with other nations, is of some importance, and should not be lightly hazarded. It is sound policy to main- tain a position in this controversy so clear- ly just and reasonable as to secure the appro- val of other powers; and in case it should unfortunately result in disturbing the peace of ithe two countries, we might then justly expect the sympathy if not the assistance of some of them. Should a war follow, we must abide the verdict of the civilized world, and should endeavor to secure the good o(