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/&/f6S 
 
 NEW AND EXTENSIVE 
 
 ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE: 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 EVIDENCES OF DIFFERENCE. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDA- 
 TION OF MENTAL ACTION, AND ELEMENTS 
 OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUN- 
 DATION OF MORAL ACTION. 
 
 ABRIDGED. 
 
 DESIGNED FOR STUDENTS, SCHOOLS, SEMINARIES, AND COLLEGES. 
 
 BY 
 
 KEY. MOSES SMITH, A. ML 
 
 "KNOW THYSELF." 
 
 
 CINCINNATI: 
 PRINTED AT THE METHODIST BOOK CONCERN, 
 
 FOR THE AUTHOR. 
 
 R. P. THOMPSON, PRINTER. 
 1861. 
 
<ca 
 
 yy^ 
 
 V 
 
 Entered, according to Act of Cdngress, in €he year 1861, 
 BY E. J. SMITH, 
 
 in the Clerk's # Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
 - Southern District of Ohio. 
 
 / o i 
 
 ) 
 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 ■+++- 
 
 The design of laying this work, in abridged 
 form, before the public, is to present the Philoso- 
 phy of Mind in a clear light, and adapted to the 
 demands of the present age. The topics and ar- 
 guments are very numerous — the latter, brief, 
 plain, and freed from many and long-existing em- 
 barrassments. This volume is intended to contain 
 at least one-third more items and arguments, im- 
 mediately connected with the science, than any 
 other work of the same number of pages extant; 
 embracing those most important, and in their ap- 
 propriate order. The examination, unlike any 
 other, embracing the whole field of mental analysis, 
 leaves the various powers entirely unincumbered 
 by any law of fatality ; and clearly evolves the dif- 
 ference between elements lying at the foundation 
 
 of mental action, and those lying at the foundation 
 
 3 
 
4 PREFACE. 
 
 of moral action; which is indispensable to a cor- 
 rect understanding of the science. The arrange- 
 ment is convenient for a text-book — adapted to 
 general use, and is auxiliary to the investigation 
 
 and knowledge of truth. 
 
 The Author. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 -♦♦♦- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SCI- 
 ENCES COMPARED— ELEMENTS OF MATE- 
 RIALISM CAREFULLY EXAMINED. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Man, in the very essence or nature of his being, 
 has been left iviihout power to doubt the reality of 
 self. Being conscious that self is real, doubt in re- 
 gard to such entity is utterly impossible. Positive 
 knowledge is the end of all controversy. We know 
 that we are not non-existence, for nonentity can 
 have no knowledge of reality. 2. If he looks out 
 upon the varied and extended creations of God, 
 contemplating the reality, amplitude, and grandeur 
 of visible existence, or turns perception upon the 
 mingling harmony of all the rolling vast of uni- 
 versal being, together with the purity and powers 
 of imperishable mind, he is compelled to regard 
 all as composed only of spirit and matter. These 
 constitute the universe, and in regard to the same 
 all cogitation, or mental action, is restricted, how- 
 ever free in progressive research and power of 
 knowledge. 3. He exists, moving with freedom over 
 
6 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 the earth; has been called the noblest work of God, 
 and lord of this world. He has been styled a com- 
 pendium of creation, standing midway the kingdom 
 of nature and that of immortal spirits. He studies 
 to know every thing below himself — the earth, com- 
 pounded of its various qualities, and all appertain- 
 ing to it. He desires and labors to comprehend 
 all unexplored laws connected with zoology, vegeta- 
 tion, and crystallization. Looking abroad upon yon- 
 der heavens, he traces the rolling orbs of the vast uni- 
 verse — watches tempest and calm, rain and drought, 
 heat and cold, seed-time and harvest. Why, then, 
 should he not go still higher, and study to know him- 
 self? 4. His being is indestructible^ and can never be 
 discontinued by annihilation. The very nature and 
 action of all" elements of mind are averse to any 
 thing like a return to non-existence, or any idea 
 that we shall ever cease to be. We can have no 
 conception that an all-wise Being could or would 
 create us for the purpose of causing our non-exist- 
 ence. This conclusion can be sustained by the inde- 
 structibility of matter. 5. Matter may be decom- 
 posed, the elements united or consolidated ; may have 
 the laws of affinity and power of adhesion suspended 
 or destroyed; but we have no evidence of any pos- 
 sible annihilation of properties. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Man is compounded of spirit and matter; these 
 united constitute but the one being. The ties of 
 
MIND AND MATTER, 7 
 
 affection connecting the two natures seem to be so 
 arranged, that when severed by death, the soul sus- 
 tains no perceptible loss, either of faculties or true 
 knowledge. The body without the soul is lifeless 
 clay. Therefore, it is incapable of containing any 
 power of action or item of knowledge. If the soul 
 is possessed of powers and knowledge before death, 
 it has them afterward, unless death has annihilating 
 power, which is contrary to all evidence. 2. The 
 spirit contains the animating principle, or is the prin- 
 ciple of life. The science of psychology can not 
 be untrue; for the soul is indispensable to life and 
 knowledge of self. 3. The soul of man is the intel- 
 ligent part of his being. Reason, judgment, and 
 knowledge can not be matter, nor a result of mate- 
 rial elements. 4. It is an immaterial or spiritual 
 existence, as a whole, one and indivisible. It can 
 not be inert, neither is it ponderous, or capable of 
 annihilation. 5. It is immortal — limitless in dura- 
 tion. Its faculties are very numerous, vivid in 
 action, and powerful in conception and demonstra- 
 tion. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Matter is distinct from mind. Anthropology 
 can furnish no material element w r hich, in quality or 
 essence, can be called mind in whole or in part. 
 Matter is divisible, tangible, and ponderous — pos- 
 sessing density and extension, with gradations and 
 dissimilar organic properties. 2. Matter is said to 
 be inanimate when insensible and inactive within 
 
8 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 itself. Inert elements act only from impinging 
 causes, and in conformity to the law or force of 
 gravitation, but they can not possess any self-power 
 of action. 3. It is animate when it possesses sensi- 
 tive motion or action within itself. But the anima- 
 ting principle is not matter; for then all matter would 
 be sensitive, and have action and life. Sensitive 
 action belongs to that which has life; but matter 
 may have motion or action, without having sensation 
 or life. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. Mind is not matter. It is an internal and in- 
 tellectual power. It must either act itself, or act 
 from impinging causes. The natural tendency of 
 matter is to inactivity, and its nature is to be and 
 remain at rest. If moved by any external cause, 
 rest is restored so soon as the impinging agent is 
 wholly removed. Having no action within itself, 
 it is impossible for it either to act or cause action. 
 2. But the mind acts independent of remote, contin- 
 gent, or intermingling causes. It has power to under- 
 stand, conceive, judge, reason, and feel. 3. The 
 term mind is applied to a combination of faculties, 
 or an internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, 
 and wills. It is known to us by these faculties, 
 and they are made known by our consciousness, 
 the affirmations of which we can not doubt. 4. The 
 essence of mind has been referred to something back 
 of these faculties, or forming a still deeper founda- 
 tion of their being. We can have no clear concep- 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 9 
 
 tion or certain knowledge of such occult qualities. 
 To advance in search of such elements, would only- 
 plunge us into darkness and doubt. All such spec- 
 ulations would be uncertain, from our ignorance of 
 the subject; therefore, it is useless to try to decide 
 upon uncertainties, and such process would add noth- 
 ing to true science. 5. Imagine that we remove con- 
 secutively all faculties of the mind, and it would be 
 very difficult to conceive of some remaining some- 
 thing called essence. And if we could, how could 
 we analyze it, further than call it the power or in- 
 fluence which affinitates, in common, all functions 
 constituting the soul? Though this subject has 
 been the origin of many speculative arguments, and 
 in a way it is not capable of, words can not define or 
 make it known to us. It exists in facts or truths 
 wholly the objects of consciousness. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Knoivledge, the result of reasoning, is not so 
 clear, strong, and unerring, as that arising from 
 intuition. The latter is the only primary source of 
 receiving facts as facts, without either proof or dis- 
 proof. In argumentation, an appeal to conscious- 
 ness may be the last acknowledged resort, but is 
 the most conclusive and certain. Finite objects of 
 the external world, which strike the sense, can never 
 vie with this internal influence or power, nor be the 
 anterior cause of its existence. 2. We feel intui- 
 tively a power within entirely distinct from all prop- 
 
10 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 erties of materiality. This combination of elements 
 or internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and 
 wills, can not be questioned or doubted. Yet we 
 have real knowledge of such elements only by con- 
 sciousness. Matter combines properties which are 
 solid, ponderous, extended, and divisible. They are 
 known to us as such, by our senses. 3. If the power 
 constituting the faculties of mind, or of blending 
 them together in action, be matter, how could it act 
 w r ithin itself in recalling the past, and in contempla- 
 ting the future — the events and occurrences of the 
 one, and the objects and hopes of the other? And 
 how could it act in examining the nature and prop- 
 erties of tangible existences, and the design, as evi- 
 denced in the symmetry and harmony naturally 
 adapting them to the purposes and ends of their 
 being ? Could it send out pioneer thoughts through 
 unexplored creation and interminable duration? 
 How could it examine the properties and laws of 
 existences, and reason from nature up to nature's 
 God? 4. If the principle within us which thinks 
 and acts is matter, we are plunged into total dark- 
 ness, and are entirely ignorant as to the power of 
 perception, or knowledge of the existence of any 
 fact; for that which thinks is known to us only by 
 thinking. Matter is known by solidity, weight, and 
 extension. The former is known by properties en- 
 tirely different from the latter. Matter contains no 
 principle by which we love, hate, fear, triumph, re- 
 joice, sorrow, and suffer remorse or despair. 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 11 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. Matter is not mind. The substances composing 
 the material universe are severally ponderous, divisi- 
 ble, possessing density and extension; also existing 
 in liquids or air form. The principles of these exist- 
 ences are known as principles of matter and not of 
 mind. All properties of matter are naturally inert. 
 There are no elements or atoms belonging to the sci- 
 ence of physics which can have action within them- 
 selves, or self-action. All action or motion produced 
 in them by operative causes, tends to inertness or 
 rest at the suspension of the power of those causes. 
 2. All material elements tend naturally to rest. And 
 rest, or that which is at rest by natural tendency or 
 law, can not originate action, neither can it pervade 
 with action either rest or a series of entities at rest. 
 But mind at rest has power to act within itself, and to 
 cause action in insensible bodies, by voluntarily caus- 
 ing them to be impinged while at rest, and by accelera- 
 ting or counteracting their inertia. 8. The essence of 
 matter is difficult to define. That properties exist is 
 clearly demonstrable; but to go back of these in 
 search of some occult principle or essence, would be 
 attended with difficulty, and add confusion to true an- 
 alysis. Yet the mind should be tested to its utmost 
 power in trying to trace properties back to essence, 
 or in discriminating between them by distinguishing 
 their inhesive affinity in the union of compounds, 
 which, if dissevered and all clustering properties 
 
12 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 removed, there is something remaining as unknown 
 or imaginary, to which the term essence may be ap- 
 plied. But we can have no satisfactory knowledge of 
 any thing in physics anterior to, or, more correctly, 
 primary than properties. 4. If the ideas of materi- 
 alists be true, that there is nothing but matter in the 
 vast universe, and that, at farthest, the soul of man 
 is only the result of a particular organization of mat- 
 ter in the body, we have no reasons favoring the 
 knowledge of any existence. 5. For inert properties 
 can have no knowledge of their own existence, nor of 
 external existences. But we can not conceive of an 
 immensity of space filled with nothing. Nonentity 
 can have no perception or knowledge of non-exist- 
 ence, neither can it have knowledge of entity. Then 
 there must be an existence capable of thinking and 
 knowing, and something capable of being the object 
 of thought and knowledge. 6. If all bodies consist 
 of unextended atoms, moved only by some law or in- 
 fluence of attraction or resistance, how could we ac- 
 count for the existence and action of that law or 
 laws ? If law can not think, reason, and act within 
 and of itself, it is clear that there can be no power to 
 think and act contained in inanimate and inert atoms 
 of matter. 7. The non-existence of matter is more 
 reasonable than that nothing exists but matter ; for if 
 nothing exists but matter, we have seen that there 
 could be no knowledge of any reality; and if nothing 
 could be apprehended or known, then if there could 
 be existences, all knowledge of them would be lost 
 in non-existence. 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 13 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 1. If the soul is matter, it has power te think and 
 act. Then it follows that all matter has power to 
 think and act, which is absurd. If some definite por- 
 tion possesses this power, the difference is the result 
 of the different modifications, magnitude, figure, or 
 motion of some parts in respect to other parts, or to 
 the mass, or the power of thinking and acting must 
 be given to some systems of it and rejected from oth- 
 ers. 2. If all matter is cogitative, it is contrary to 
 all experience and knowledge we have of its nature. 
 And if so, our senses and faculties are formed only to 
 deceive us. A rock possesses no sign or evidence of 
 either cogitation or sense. The head is the great bat- 
 tery of thought, and there all the ministers of sensa- 
 tion make their appeal ; but if all matter be cogitative, 
 the feet would contain proportionably as much thought 
 as the head, and there would be as much in the 
 mountain rock as in either. Matter is not self-oper- 
 ative but inert, and is no more than substance ex- 
 tended and impenetrable to other matter. 3. Mate- 
 rialism, in more recent and modified forms, maintains 
 that mind is a result of organization, or a function of 
 the brain ; that the physical and mental faculties coin- 
 hering the same primary substances, grow, mature, 
 decay, and cease together. If the brain is only the 
 organ of the mind, it can not be the mind itself. It 
 may form the center in which exists that influence on 
 which depends sensation and motion. This organ is 
 
14 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 delicately connected, to a limited extent, with the 
 mind's states and developments. Chemical analysis 
 will show that all nervous matter in the entire system 
 possesses precisely the same properties as that of the 
 brain. Then if mind be matter, or the result of that 
 kind of matter, it would be located all through the 
 system; and if we could live we could have knowl- 
 edge, to a proportionable extent, as well without the 
 head as with it, or as well without it as without a hand 
 or a foot. 4. The various diseases of the brain often 
 modify, impair, or destroy the manifestations of mind. 
 This sequence, if uniform, would not make mind to 
 be the result of material elements, but would prove 
 the brain to be the organ through which the mind 
 acts and has access to external things. An object 
 reflecting light to a perfect eye can be seen ; but with- 
 out light sight would be lost — one of the bodily senses 
 is suspended; yet the mind has power still to retain a 
 knowledge of the object seen. Therefore, the power 
 of the mind to act is not limited to the senses, for it 
 can act when they are suspended. 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 1. Mind is independent of matter as to existence, 
 and as to properties or essence; but is dependent 
 in the origin of its knowledge in regard to them. 
 2. Matter can exist and be matter without the power 
 to either iliink or act. Mind without these ceases to 
 be mind. If we are wholly material, and matter can 
 think as matter, then we must continue to think 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 15 
 
 always, and in proportion to the number and size of 
 the particles contained in each compound. Then a 
 large body can think more and more powerfully than 
 a smaller one; and both must continue to think on 
 forever. 3. If matter can not be annihilated, then 
 materialists are immortal unawares and contrary to 
 their purposes and desires, but in perfect accordance 
 with the premises of their own assumption. At least 
 they must have a conscious state of being as long as 
 there are any elements of the body existing after 
 death. Therefore, embalmed and petrified bodies 
 must have consciousness, thought, and action for ages 
 and cycles of ages unnumbered. 4. If matter thinks 
 through the future, it must have always thought in the 
 past, and there has been no time of our actual physical 
 existence when the mind was not active and thinking. 
 5. What principle of materiality can possess sensation 
 within itself or in common, or can constitute that 
 w^hich loves, fears, joys, and sorrows, and is capable 
 of being ecstatic with hope, quickened and excited 
 with enthusiasm, or plunged into remorse or despair? 
 In perfect health passion, anger, regret, and remorse 
 may fill the soul; and peace, tranquillity, and hope 
 often possess the mind when the body is suffering in- 
 tensely or is even dying. 6. The septennial revolu- 
 tions, or renewing of the system by the changes of 
 its particles, does not change the identity of self, nor 
 the one continued being in which man lives, and which 
 he feels and knows to be himself. If self-action, 
 self-consciousness, and thinking constitute the ele- 
 
16 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 merits of matter, or are essential to them, all elements 
 of matter, abstractly or combined in every system 
 must contain them ; and then they would be impossi- 
 ble to any, for every system of materiality would pos- 
 sess self-action and a consciousness of its own exist- 
 ence individually in self- thought or thinking; and no 
 self-consciousness or thought of an individual prop- 
 erty can exist in common with other properties, or of 
 the compound. Then no element or atom of matter 
 in the vast universe could have knowledge of the ex- 
 istence of any thing besides or beyond itself. 7. If 
 impressions made upon material organs constitute the 
 knowledge of existence, the occurrences of early life 
 could not be commanded or recalled in old age ; for 
 the particles of the system so often changing, and be- 
 ing incapable of self-action, could make no transfer 
 of their knowledge to those succeeding them. Then 
 all knowledge of the past would cease to be, and we 
 could know nothing back of the present moment. 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 1. Mind is dissimilar and distinct from matter, or 
 even a result of materiality, only so far as matter 
 may be the organ of the mind, or through which it 
 holds intercourse with the external world. Thinking 
 can not arise from the figure, size, or motion of the 
 properties which think; for this would only result in 
 gradations of size, or as to the appearance and celer- 
 ity, which would differ from thinking. 2. The human 
 body is incapable of annihilation. So far as we can 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 17 
 
 analyze and understand, it appears that temporal 
 death has no power to annihilate the constitutional 
 elements of the body. The earth, air, and water con- 
 solidated in the forest oak, may be decomposed or 
 separated by fire; yet not one element or particle 
 of the primary principles can be utterly destroyed. 
 Death sunders the ties of affection connecting the 
 soul and body, and the effect of the change in the 
 body appears to be no more than the change of the 
 arrangements of its essential elements. 3. We have 
 no evidence of the annihilation of any existent, and 
 our conception of such a result is impossible. There 
 is no evidence of such a possibility in physical analy- 
 sis, or taught in revelation, and our experience and 
 belief are against it. 4. The accumulating weakness 
 of age and the very decay of the body indicates no 
 annihilation of matter, but a change in the affinity 
 and position of its elements, and is an additional proof 
 of the continuation of the soul ; for this decay is con- 
 tinued existence in change and under a new form or 
 abstracted entities. The term resurrection does not 
 convey the idea of a new creation, but a resuscitation 
 of the very identical body that went down to the 
 grave, in the recalling of the primary elements to 
 their wonted affinity and order in the new organized 
 body; thenceforth their union will be unbroken. 
 
 SECTION X. 
 
 1. Though we do not know matter to be eternal in 
 
 duration, yet we have no evidence to believe that its 
 
 2 
 
18 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 properties will ever be annihilated. Then, if matter 
 will exist in some way forever, it follows that there is 
 something connected with animal life and motion 
 which is superior in nature to mere matter, and is of 
 a mental character and nature clearly distinct from 
 matter, and must be called an immaterial or immortal 
 principle; and we have as little or less proof of its 
 pending annihilation as we have of the final non- 
 existence of matter. 2. The soul is superior to mat- 
 ter in the knowledge it has of its own existence, and 
 of the existence of matter, and its power of self-action. 
 These distinct differences show an immaterial inde- 
 pendence, and its states and manifestations are incom- 
 prehensible — almost an infinity of meaning within 
 itself. There is an internal spiritual dominion or um- 
 piracle principle, in which thoughts arise and are 
 commanded, and by and from which they are sent 
 forth through limitless creation like exploring lights, 
 dispersed all abroad. The materialist has this power, 
 and is conscious that he can employ his thoughts vol- 
 untarily about any business he may choose or desire. 
 3. To hear of or to see suffering will naturally move 
 the feelings of the soul, and words written often cre- 
 ate joy or excite alternately weeping and laughter. 
 The self-inactive characters on the paper can not me- 
 chanically or naturally move the observer in any way. 
 If words are spoken there can be nothing in the sim- 
 ple pulsations of the air that can effect matter cre- 
 ating self-motion, neither to effect in any way the 
 feelings or knowledge. That power which perceives 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 19 
 
 and apprehends the force and sense of these things 
 is far different from any principle of matter. Artic- 
 ulated sounds can awake sensibility and arouse the 
 soul in feelings or passion; and they can produce 
 mirth, tranquillity, or gloomy despair. These results 
 can not be the physical effects of the terms used, else 
 the effect would be the same and as extensive if not 
 understood as though they were. It is wholly the 
 sense conveyed, or supposed to be conveyed and 
 received, which is immaterial in itself, that excites 
 the soul and influences physical action. 4. He who 
 believes that matter possessed primarily causation, 
 or that it can of itself come out of nonentity into 
 self-existence, coalesce its particles and then live, 
 think, and act by any process of reduction or ar- 
 rangements of elements, possessing figure, or is ex- 
 cited to motion by laws of affinity or of repulsion, 
 should first discover and define the degree of fine- 
 ness existing in a divided hair, and be able to tell 
 all the points of intersection, angling the direc- 
 tions of their localities respectively. Then should he 
 proceed to define the alteration in the situation of the 
 particles of matter in which they begin to breathe life 
 from naught, live, act, and cogitate. 5. The self- 
 power of particles to change to or from each other, or 
 in degrees of difference, is impossible; and if they 
 could, it would still remain, that form, figure, and 
 magnitude are all material accidents. The substance 
 is matter, and, in this respect, can not differ in parts 
 one from another. Then if one part can think and 
 
20 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 act, all matter can think and act. Therefore, all 
 particles of matter possess causation and action, 
 and must be cogitative. And if there is such a 
 thing as matter thinking, that influence or power 
 must be superadded which implies a principle differ- 
 ing in essence or nature from matter, and can not 
 be a result of it, but must have been conferred by 
 a superior or an omnipotent cause. 6. No accident 
 of matter can produce action or cause cogitation, 
 either regularly or irregularly; and it can not super- 
 add that influence or power, for matter is divisible, 
 and that which thinks must be one, or of parts united, 
 so that the action is one. But matter is not one and 
 indivisible. However closely the particles adhere to- 
 gether, they still exist as particles and without self- 
 motion, and &re powerless in adhering to or in pene- 
 trating each other. If the power of thought existed 
 in those particles, it would exist whether they were in 
 contact or remotely located; and if these are divisi- 
 ble, or are capable of being sundered and scattered 
 abroad, there must be as many minds as there are 
 particles in matter. Then the mountain, the globe, 
 the sun, moon, and stars are all built of mind, or of a 
 combination of innumerable immaterialities, w r hich is 
 absurd. 7. On the other hand, if it requires a union 
 of the elements of matter in order to constitute a 
 power to think and act, there would be no power to 
 classify these elements, and it would require all the 
 material elements in the vast universe to form one 
 mind or souh Should there be some influence or es- 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 21 
 
 sence in which they unite or center, so their action or 
 thoughts may be but one, that influence or power is 
 not merely superadded, but is an existent superior to 
 and independent of matter. 
 
 SECTION XI. 
 
 1. Matter can not contain abstract ideas of any 
 thing, for the particles could not reflect upon what 
 passes within themselves, much less contemplate that 
 which was beyond ; for within themselves they could 
 find nothing but limited material representations or 
 impressions, and these could not form ideas, neither 
 could they be formed by ideas, abstracting them- 
 selves; nor have they self-power to form themselves 
 into trains of thought and metaphysical argumenta- 
 tion. 2. Matter, within itself, possesses no power 
 capable of correcting appearances or impressions. In 
 seeing the topsail of a ship, far away at sea, the nat- 
 ural idea would be like the appearance, the existence 
 of something very small; but as it is, there is some- 
 thing within which forms a more correct idea, bring- 
 ing into consideration the rotundity of the sea and 
 the feebleness of sight. 3. Man is conscious that he 
 lives and has liberty of motion, in thought and in 
 changing position of place, and by an instantaneous 
 thought change his course or purpose, and counteract, 
 in some instances, the laws both of capillary attrac- 
 tion and gravitation. Inert elements can not of 
 themselves voluntarily suspend the operations or ar- 
 rest the tendency and action of the laws of nature. 
 
22 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 4. The soul is not a faculty of the body, nor a remft 
 of matter, but dwells within the body, and governs it 
 in whole or in part, as the hands, feet, eyes, and 
 tongue. That which governs the body is not the 
 body nor particles of it, neither is it a superadded 
 materiality or accident, but a superior spiritual power 
 or soul. 5. The soul is incapable of annihilation, as 
 it is distinct and superior to matter: the latter is im- 
 perishable, or its elements can not cease to exist in 
 some way. We know nothing of the nature or the 
 essence of either mind or matter: and to try to define 
 them, or the nature of their mysterious union, would 
 be fruitless. 6. We have no evidence that anv c.v- 
 
 t can or will ever pass into )ion-t\vi$fenct\ If 
 the elements of matter are imperishable, and the im- 
 materiality of the soul is established, which would 
 render it more incapable of non-existence, so far as 
 our knowledge of its elements and being can extend, 
 how can we deny an unwavering belief of its immor- 
 tality ? The soul has naturally an indisposition to 
 tarry with the present moment and circumstances; 
 there is ever a disposition to pass on to the future, 
 and a desire for immortality. It can now feel an awe 
 of the future and of God. This varies with its shades 
 of conscientious rectitude or sense of wrong. We 
 look to the future with fear or hope, according to our 
 sense of guilt or innocence. 7. Conscience hasjM 
 
 If-action. and is often impinged or influenced to 
 action by some unseen cause, both in accordance with 
 and contrary to our will and natural desires. lie 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 23 
 
 who follows its dictations, and he who repels them, 
 are both compelled to acknowledge its quickening 
 influence and power. In contemplating the infinite 
 future, the righteous rejoice while the wicked sink 
 under feelings of remorse. 
 
 SECTION XII. 
 
 1. The soul has a conscious knowledge of self with 
 its continued being, while in health or in the wane of 
 life. There is no condition of helplessness or suffer- 
 ing, this side death, while reason remains, but that 
 the soul feels its nature and being to be immortal. 
 The immortality of the soul is reasonable, from its 
 vast capacities and dread of annihilation. It is evi- 
 dent from its great improvements, boundless desires, 
 natural dissatisfaction with time and things present, 
 a desire for the future and for some kind of religion. 
 2. The high moral obligations resting upon a rational, 
 immaterial, and immortal spirit, are clear and of 
 boundless importance; for the real existence of the 
 human soul is beyond all possibility of doubt; and in 
 the acknowledgment of the great government of an 
 infinite Creator, we are necessarily compelled to ac- 
 knowledge that all elements and existences should be 
 adapted to the claims and purity of the same, and all 
 that is impure must be rejected from the limitless pu- 
 rity of God in the future w T orld. 3. One great object 
 of our being is to cultivate the powers bestowed upon 
 us for usefulness, subjecting them all to the will and 
 service of God. There are impressions connected 
 
24 MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 with the consciousness of every rational being, assur- 
 ing him that the soul must live forever. We have 
 power to deny this, but there is an internal voice ever 
 arising from intuitive authority, thundering in affirm- 
 ative appeals of truth, reversing all such false as- 
 sumptions; and it can never be silenced by any 
 confession or avowed faith to the reverse. 4. It is 
 more reasonable for an atheist, skeptic, or materialist 
 naturally to believe in Revelation, the immortality of 
 the soul, and that that immortality of being may be 
 pure and holy, than it is to reject them as false. For 
 as Revelation is the only system claiming Divine ori- 
 gin on earth, should it be false, we can lose nothing 
 by believing it, as the same and common lot of man 
 will be ours in the future. But if we reject it, and in 
 the next world it proves to be true, then we are lost 
 forever. 5. As matter belongs to physical science, 
 we now close this part of our inquiries, and refer the 
 reader to that part of this work devoted more exclu- 
 sively to the philosophy of mind, where the powers 
 of the student can be fully tested in examining mental 
 elements. He should study to define clearly as pos- 
 sible the existence and office of the various properties 
 of mind. It will increase his confidence in the true 
 existence of immaterial elements, the self-power of 
 the soul to act, and of its immortality. His belief 
 will be established as to the existence and limitless 
 power, wisdom and goodness of the great First Cause. 
 As standing midway the ascending and descending 
 realities ranging two worlds, he should rejoice in try- 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 25 
 
 ing to contemplate all demonstrable truths. Though 
 willingly employed with the majesty of facts and mys- 
 teries interwoven with infinite creations, yet duty is 
 submission to God, as we wonder and adore, love and 
 praise. 
 
ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 
 
 -♦♦*- 
 
 PART I. 
 
 THE ELEMENTS OF MIND 
 
 WHICH 
 
 LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION, 
 
 " THE SOUL SHALL LIVE FOKEVEB." 
 
ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 
 
 -♦♦♦- 
 
 DIVISION FIRST. 
 
 »+• 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The mind of man is truly and clearly a spir- 
 itual existent, immaterial in essence or nature, and 
 unending in duration. 2. In the philosophy of mind 
 there are elements which may be called mental ele- 
 ments. These elements lie at the foundation of such 
 philosophy, are the sources of mental action, and 
 without their existence such action is inane. 3. If 
 moral feelings can exist in the mind, and if moral 
 action can proceed from it as an entity, or from its 
 states or motion, there must be elements of mind 
 connected directly with the origin of moral influ- 
 ences, or no moral feelings could ever exist as apper- 
 taining to or as a part of self; neither could we 
 ever be capable of moral action. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Those powers which lie at the foundation of 
 
 moral action, or are connected with the origin of 
 
 29 
 
30 PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 
 
 the moral influences of the soul, may be called 
 moral elements of mind. 2. If there is neither 
 mental nor moral elements in the mind, there can 
 be neither mental nor moral science, which can be 
 known to us as such. But mental and moral science 
 are acknowledged to exist and to be true; hence, 
 there must exist in the philosophy of mind both 
 mental and moral powers, when we compare the na- 
 ture of the actions which proceed from them; other- 
 wise the idea of the power, or the existence of either 
 mental or moral action, is absurd; for an effect to 
 exist without a foundation or cause is utterly impos- 
 sible. 
 
INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 31 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. There are various orders of mind. Finite 
 minds, from the lowest to the highest intelligence, 
 are responsible to the authority of the great infinite 
 mind and sovereign Ruler over all, to whom we 
 should ever be wholly submissive and obedient in 
 adoration, service, love, and praise. 2. The inferior 
 orders of animated and self-acting beings possess 
 something of the phenomena of mind. These prop- 
 erties, if they be only called instinct, are proper- 
 ties entirely dissimilar to and differing from those of 
 matter. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Matter has neither conscious sensation nor self- 
 motion, but has inertness, which is essential to its 
 nature and existence, and without which it ceases to 
 be matter. 2. That which is analogous to the states 
 and manifestations of mind in beasts, birds, and fish, 
 if perceptible at all, may be called instinct; yet in- 
 stinct alone is imperishable, from the fact that it is 
 distinct from and is superior to matter; and we have 
 no evidence to believe that any properties or par- 
 ticles of matter will ever cease to be. Hence, the 
 
32 INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 
 
 intellectual and immortal powers of the human mind 
 are now prominently before us, and form the true 
 objects of our inquiries. 
 
EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 33 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND 
 NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Mind is immaterial in nature, and exists in 
 essence, or, as to elements, dissimilarly to that of 
 matter, and has a continued being, which is inde- 
 pendent of any essential loss or elementary destruc- 
 tion by temporal disease or death. 2. It is not con- 
 stituted by thought, feeling, or any emotion or act, 
 but is that which feels, thinks, reasons, and acts. 
 Though we examine severally the elements or prop- 
 erties of mind, it can not be regarded as divisible, 
 but is one in essence or nature, and the union of prop- 
 erties in its existence is forever indivisible. 3. Our 
 knowledge of the existence of mind or of self, inde- 
 pendently of demonstration, falls back upon intui- 
 tion, and is knowledge, known to be true, in an 
 unerring assurance received and fully tested by self- 
 consciousness. If the power of knowing existing 
 facts be not referred back to innate elements as 
 truths or axioms, which lie at the foundation of the 
 philosophy of mind ; and if they be not the primary 
 source of the knowledge of all real entities to us, all 
 our knowledge would be inane, and all entities non- 
 existences. 4. These results, which are of the oper- 
 
34 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 
 
 ation or motion of the mind, are not the primary 
 knowledge of its existence, else the whole mind would 
 exist in motion, and motion can not exist where there 
 is no power of self-action, or cause capable of mov- 
 ing. But the pow T er of knowing all these acts and 
 results falls back upon self-consciousness and intui- 
 tion. 5. In matter such essences as possess solidity 
 and extension, or that which is essential to its entity, 
 are called primary properties. But contact with a 
 smell or odor awakens a conviction in the mind that 
 there is somewhere an unknown cause of this known 
 sensation. This, with color, temperature, and taste, 
 have been styled secondary properties of matter. 
 Yet these are only the effects or results, as proof of 
 primary elements. 6. If a knowledge of mind, as 
 an entity, iS wholly and only known by its motion, 
 then any knowledge of it is an accident; for motion 
 or action may or may not exist. 7. Any speculations 
 as to the cause of mind are far beyond philosophical 
 inquiries. It is not the cause of its own existence, 
 neither can entity be a result of non-existence. 8. 
 The nature or essence of mind is unknown to us. 
 We know nothing of the essence of either matter or 
 mind ; yet we are certain of the reality of that mys- 
 terious principle within us, w T hich is a permanent 
 existent of various phenomena or properties. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Philosophers generally agree with Mr. Stewart, 
 that "we are not immediately conscious of mind's 
 
EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 35 
 
 existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, 
 and volition; operations which imply the existence 
 of something which feels, thinks, and wills." To 
 what extent we are immediately conscious of its 
 existence, anterior to the mind's operations, is diffi- 
 cult to define with words. But to say that the power 
 of self- consciousness can extend no further back, in 
 any way, than the consciousness of sensation, thought, 
 and volition, and they admitted to be mere operations 
 of mind, is absurd. Operations of mind are no more 
 than the original power or primary elements in mo- 
 tion. It is impossible for those operations, which 
 are only sequences or results, to derive no power 
 from the primary cause and supporter of such opera- 
 tions; otherwise the operations or acts of the mind 
 would be the only primary principle or elements of 
 its being. Then, whenever the mind was wholly 
 inactive it would be annihilated, or, at least, we 
 could have no certain knowledge of self, as the mere 
 operations of mind may or may not exist; but if 
 they can "imply something which feels, thinks, and 
 wills," they imply a power which is capable of being 
 the origin of the conscious knowledge of all the acts 
 of the mind; otherwise an effect must be the origin 
 of the cause itself. 2. Axioms, in numerical science, 
 may, in some respects, represent axioms in the phi- 
 losophy of mind. The whole of mathematical dem- 
 onstrations or calculations can not be known to us 
 as certainly true or false, were it not for the fact 
 that they are based upon self-evident facts or truths 
 
36 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 
 
 called axioms. We are compelled to admit that things 
 which are equal to the same thing, are equal to one 
 another. If equals be added to equals the wholes 
 are equal. All right-angles are equal to one another. 
 A square block is a square block. Two added to 
 two make four. We know all these to be truths or 
 facts; but it is an absolute impossibility for us, by 
 any process of reasoning or demonstration, to prove 
 them to be either true or false. And without axioms 
 there can be neither mathematical demonstrations nor 
 science. 3. How can we know such truths to be 
 self-evident facts? No power can receive them as 
 facts, independently of all proof, but the intuitive, 
 self-evident axioms which are the foundation of the 
 philosophy of mind. The innate principles of the 
 soul form the final and conclusive source of appeals, 
 and are the primary test of the knowledge of facts 
 to us. 4. Why may not these self-evident facts, or 
 axioms of the mind, have knowledge of their own 
 existence? The origin of the power of knowledge 
 must exist in and arise from the innate elements of 
 mind; otherwise an effect must be the primary or 
 antecedent cause of itself. 
 
EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 37 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Our inquiries as to the phenomena of mind are 
 more properly confined to properties or elements. 
 The origin and nature or essence of mind is beyond 
 the limits of philosophical demonstrations. There is 
 not so much mastery connected with the examination 
 of the elements of mind. 2. The mind is capable of 
 a threefold division. (1.) Those which are clearly 
 mental elements. (2.) Those which may be called 
 moral elements of mind. (3.) The manifestations or 
 acts of mind. Mental elements are connected with 
 all mental acts, and without their existence mental 
 motion or action can not exist. They are the foun- 
 dation or origin properly of such action or character 
 of action. Moral elements of mind are connected 
 with the origin of all moral action, and without such 
 for a foundation no moral action can exist. 3. The 
 operations or acts of the mind have hitherto been re- 
 garded as involving, (1.) Our duties to Grod. (2.) The 
 duties we owe to ourselves. (3.) Our duties to one 
 another. All these have been claimed as the princi- 
 pal embodiment of moral philosophy. 
 
38 EXISTENCE AN!) NATURE OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. To every philosopher it is clear that the present 
 order of works on mental and moral science is incor- 
 rect ; for the natural character of the elements of 
 mind, according to the books, without any sufficiently 
 clear distinction, has been lost sight of from the fact 
 that they have been called only mental elements. No 
 separate work has been arranged exclusively upon 
 mental action, further than is found in connection 
 with the examination of the mental elements ; while, 
 on the other hand, the action of the mind has been, 
 by common consent, called moral action, connected 
 with moral duties as contained in moral philosophy. 
 But we should bear in mind that there are elements 
 of mind which may be called moral elements, growing 
 out of their relation to, and influence or position in, 
 the mind. 2. The mind, so regularly and naturally 
 arranged, contains within itself immediate power to 
 know and to extend knowledge by examining ele- 
 ments, laws, and affinities of existences. This is the 
 comparison of phenomena, and the discovery of their 
 agreement and disagreement. Though we can not ar- 
 rive at the nature of the essence of mind, yet we are 
 certain of something existing within, exhibiting a per- 
 manent subject of certain varying phenomena, of 
 which we are conscious, and to doubt it would be im- 
 possible. 
 
SENSATION. 39 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SENSATION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Sensation is the mind's reception of an action 
 felt and known to exist, or is an impression made 
 upon it. The senses form the medium through which 
 such an effect is realized. In another point of light 
 it may be regarded as a simple state of the mind, in a 
 peculiar way, and connected with action. Abstractly 
 it is incapable of self-action, and must be, to a certain 
 extent, a result of some influence or impingement, 
 which may arise in different ways. 2. It may be con- 
 nected with the change or influence of some one or 
 more of the organs of sense, or in being closely acces- 
 sory to the change of the physical powers. A change 
 in the internal state and condition of the body may 
 awaken the sensation of fatigue, pain, or heaviness. 
 3. Sensation can not be separated from the mind. 
 All sensation is in the mind, and is nothing more nor 
 less than the mind itself in a certain state. Our 
 sensations are diversified and are almost innumerable. 
 The body has parts, and can exist with the loss of 
 some of its members; but the mind and sensation are 
 forever indivisible. 
 
40 SENSATION. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. In another shade of meaning sensation is feeling 
 awakened by objects of the external world. The 
 knowledge it gives of external objects is quite imper- 
 fect. It requires a combined action of several facul- 
 ties in conveying to us a general idea of real exist- 
 ences. The various senses, acting separately, can 
 give us no correct idea of existences, nor of the prop- 
 erties of compounds. Sensation can convey to us a 
 result of a known or unknown existence; but of itself 
 can not give us a knowledge of either the essence or 
 properties of existences. 2. Sensation may be a state 
 of internal feelings , capable of being excited by spir- 
 itual influences, or by sensations of humility and awe 
 in the presence of the great God. It can be realized 
 in the bare remembrance of startling events in the 
 past* 3. In receiving impressions from external ob- 
 jects, we are to bear in mind that our sensations are 
 not the appearance or images of those entities, for the 
 true plaee of sensation is in the mind. No external 
 property can form any part of sensation, neither can 
 it be added. 4. The connection between sensation 
 and the physical organs is involved in mystery. Ex- 
 ternal objects make an impression or they affect the 
 physical organs, and through the medium of the 
 senses awake sensations in the mind. To explain the 
 change effected in those organs, or to define their con- 
 nection with the senses, is impossible. 5. As sensa- 
 tion is in the mind, and is the mind, in a certain way, 
 
SENSATION. 41 
 
 we are compelled to acknowledge its connection with 
 the primary elements ; for sensation can not exist only 
 in connection with the existence of mind. 
 
 4 
 
42 SENSE 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 SENSE. 
 
 SECTION I: 
 
 1. Sense, as connected with the human mind, is 
 that principle or faculty which has power to apprehend 
 the existence, and, to some extent, the qualities of 
 external objects. 2. It appears to hold a midway 
 relation between the existence and change of the 
 physical organs and the existence of real sensation. 
 3. In this position only it is immediately succeeded 
 by sensation, being the medium through which im- 
 pressions from external objects wake up the power 
 of sensation in the mind. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Sense, at least, apprehends some of the quali- 
 ties of the substances which cause sensations, such as 
 possess hardness, extension, and weight, which comes 
 in contact with physical organs. 2. Its simple state 
 is spontaneous, and its action may be wholly volun- 
 tary, as well as a result of either voluntary or invoked 
 causes. 3. It may be regarded as the perception of 
 the senses, or is that influence or motion immediately 
 successive to impressions made upon physical organs 
 toward the reality of that which is felt ere sensation 
 
SENSE. 43 
 
 refers it to the consideration of the mind. 4. It 
 may, in another point of light, be regarded as the dis- 
 eernment of the senses, which takes place on contact 
 with an object, and in relation to the real existence 
 of such object, almost at the same time the beginning 
 of the impression thus made is realized. 
 
44 THE SENSES 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE SENSES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The senses connect, in one respect, the sensa- 
 tions of the mind with the organs of sense in the 
 body, and have power to report to us the existence of 
 external things when they come in contact with the 
 physical organs, and can convey a knowledge of 
 their properties in connection with the action of 
 other powers of the mind. 2. The connection ex- 
 isting between the senses and the organs of sense in 
 the body can not be defined. 3. We are wholly de- 
 pendent upon our senses as the medium through 
 which we have knowledge of external things. While 
 they apprehend external things, and are a source of 
 knowledge, as to their real existence, yet we have 
 other sources of knowledge; otherwise the senses 
 would be the embodiment of all the faculties of the 
 mind. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We are dependent upon the senses only so far 
 as relates to existences in the external world, as the 
 primary medium of access in knowing their existence 
 to be real. Abstractly, we can not call the senses 
 the knowledge of external things. They are only 
 
THE SENSES. 45 
 
 the knowledge of external things in connection with 
 other powers of the mind. 2. The importance of the 
 senses as a source of knowledge in regard to ex- 
 ternal objects is indispensable. If we were deprived 
 of smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight, it would 
 be utterly impossible for us to know any thing of 
 external physical existences. 3. Yet the loss of all 
 these could not annihilate the mind, neither could 
 they deprive it of sensations within itself, nor from 
 other spiritual influences or existences. 4. We are 
 now about to enter upon the order of the five senses. 
 In examining them as they occur in their order, it 
 is not intended that we should define their power, 
 as they exist in the mind, disconnected with the 
 physical organs, but to define, as far as possible, 
 their office and power in their mysterious connection 
 with the organs of the body. 
 
46 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The organ of smell is said to consist in the ex- 
 tension of nerves to every part of the delicate mu- 
 cous membrane, with which the cavities of the nos- 
 trils are lined. These are connected to the sinews, 
 and extend up to the brain. So that by real phys- 
 ical entities, the organ of smell is delicately and 
 sensitively connected with the brain, which is re- 
 garded as the organ of the mind. 2. The sense of 
 smell is clearly connected with the nerves, and can 
 not be separated from them only in the destruction 
 of the physical organs; then that faculty may re- 
 main inactive, so far as it relates to the pow T er of 
 apprehending external objects. 3. The substance of 
 the nerves contains precisely the same properties 
 as that of the brain. That part of any nerve which 
 has been severed by disease or violence, loses all 
 sensation, and is doomed to perish. If all the nerves 
 of the system are sensorial, and are connected in 
 some way with the brain, then all physical organs of 
 sense are connected with the brain. And the senses 
 are inseparably connected with the nervous system. 
 4. The nasal nerves, or organ of sense, may be 
 
THE SENSE OF SMELL. 47 
 
 affected by the odor of a rose, and simultaneously is, 
 or exists, the sense of smell. The nerves and the 
 sense of smell are not one and the same; yet to 
 define the connection is impossible. Sensation is 
 immediately successive to the sense of smell, and 
 conveys to the mind the impression of external ob- 
 jects, apprehended by the organ of sense. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The sensations of smell are received by means 
 of the organ, which is the mind's primary, yet the 
 remote test in apprehending the existence of ex- 
 ternal things. 2. The nature and elements of that 
 which affects the organ may elude our knowledge, as 
 to a correct understanding of the manner of the op- 
 eration; yet there is a state of mind produced by it, 
 varying, in a great measure, voluntarily with the 
 nature and elements of that which produced the 
 impression. This peculiar mental affection is inva- 
 riably successive to the organic change. And the 
 nature of the connection blending the two in one 
 action is beyond all explanation. 3. We can not 
 classify, but to a limited extent, the sensations re- 
 ceived by the sense of smell, for they are numerous 
 and diversified. We may use such terms as sweet, 
 sour, and musty; but as a general rule, they are 
 classed, being distinguished by their connection with 
 the object which causes the sensation, as the smell 
 of a peach or an apple. The sensations received 
 through the organ of smell are naturally pleasant or 
 
48 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 
 
 disagreeable. Some of the objects which produce 
 them throw off an effluvia which is delightfully ex- 
 hilarating, and others produce death. 4. The sen- 
 sation of smell, through the means of the organ, has 
 an important influence upon life and health. It 
 aids in the right use of medicines, detecting the 
 harmless from the poisonous. It detects poisonous 
 odors emitted from objects, or destructive vapors 
 in the air. It aids in the selection of the right 
 kind of food, as well as to impart to us a knowl- 
 edge of thousands of sweet odors wafted upon the 
 winds of heaven. 5. It is the properties of exter- 
 nal bodies which produce these sensations. Odor- 
 iferous effluvia, or small particles, are emitted from 
 certain substances, and are diffused through the at- 
 mosphere. The air drawn through the nostrils is 
 impregnated with these particles, and brings them 
 in contact with the organ of the sense of smell 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. The "perceptions of smell" are not in distinc- 
 tion from sensation; for perceptions of smell can 
 not exist. Smell, within and of itself, is incapable 
 of perception. We can have perceptions of that 
 which is the object of smell, and we may have 
 certain perceptions of or in relation to the condition 
 and existence of the organ or sense within or of 
 themselves, but not as many writers define percep- 
 tions of smell. 2. The argument must differ from 
 former writers; for there can be no sense of smell 
 
THE SENSE OF SMELL. 49 
 
 till that organ has been affected. The action, then, 
 which is sensation, conveys the impression to the 
 mind. Till that action reaches the mind, there can 
 be no perception. If we can have perception of 
 smell, then perception must precede sensation, which 
 is impossible. There can be no smell, known to us 
 as such, till the organ is affected. Then if perception 
 precedes sensation, it must act without direction to 
 any definite object. Sensation within itself is not 
 the perception of itself, or of the cause of its own 
 action. 3. We can have perceptions of objects which 
 are the cause of the action of the sense of smell, and 
 these perceptions are in distinction from sensation. 
 
50 THE SENSE OF TASTE. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE SENSE OF TASTE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The organs of taste consist of nervous papillae, 
 covering the surface of the tongue, and particularly 
 that of the apex and sides. It exists also in the 
 mucous membrane, which lines the palate and cavity 
 of the mouth. The entrance of the alimentary canal 
 is so guarded that the suitableness of every thing 
 which enters into the stomach is fully tested by the 
 organ of taste. 2. The sense of taste is realized when 
 the organ comes in contact with substances of differ- 
 ent natures or qualities of properties. These effect 
 a change in the organ, which is immediately fol- 
 lowed by a corresponding influence of mind. 3. To 
 the sense of taste is connected the sensations of taste, 
 conveying to the mind, to some extent, something of 
 a corresponding impression arising from the quali- 
 ties of properties, or from the nature of the external 
 motive cause. 4. If any faculty or faculties have 
 power to convey to the mind any thing of the qual- 
 ities or nature of objects causing sensation, why may 
 not sense and sensation influence the mind in regard 
 to the cause of sensations, and favorably to appre- 
 hending the qualities of the same? for they are by 
 nature adapted, as the inlet of the mind, to the real- 
 
THE SENSE OF TASTE. 51 
 
 ity of such existences, and are designed to be more 
 closely connected with such objects than any other 
 faculty or power. 5. The doctrine that sense and 
 sensation, which are more nearly and more closely 
 connected with the causes which affect them than any 
 other power, can not influence the mind favorably to 
 the qualities and nature of such causes, is too absurd 
 to require refuting arguments, and especially so, when 
 all ever said to the reverse consists wholly in assump- 
 tions. 6. The nature of the sensations of taste are 
 known, and are items of experience. The mind hav- 
 ing been impressed by sensation, the affections are 
 immediately moved in search of some cause. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The modifications of taste consist in its power 
 to change, or inclination of the organ to adapt itself, or 
 to be adapted to the nature of the various qualities of 
 sapid objects. There is hardly any quality of objects 
 of taste so disagreeable but that use can make them to 
 be endured, and, perhaps, finally agreeable. And on 
 the other hand the pleasurable may lose its agree- 
 ableness by continued use. 2. The properties of 
 bodies which give rise to the sensation of taste are 
 called effluvia or flavors. The nature of the essence 
 of these flavors is unknown to us; yet we know that 
 such flavors exist. 3. Immediately upon the sensa- 
 tions of taste a state of mind ensues which refers 
 them to the external cause, and, in part, correspond- 
 ingly to the peculiar quality of some sapid object, 
 like unto those which are acrid, sweet, or bitter. 
 
52 THE SENSE OF HEARING 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The ear is the organ of sound or of hearing, 
 with location convenient and wisely arranged. Its 
 projection forms an external koilon, suitable to the 
 gathering of every pulsation of air wafted from every 
 direction. The internal cavity consists of circular 
 winding passages. These are partitioned or divided 
 by the tympanum, which is a delicate membrane, 
 called the drum, of the ear, and has a nerve deli- 
 cately and beautifully spread out upon its internal 
 surface. This is called the auditory nerve, connected 
 to the brain. 2. The sense of hearing consists in the 
 power or influence which is principally and myste- 
 riously connected with the union of the tympanum 
 and the auditory nerve. This is affected by the 
 action of the atmosphere. The undulations, waves, 
 or pulsations of the air move upon or impress the 
 tympanum. 3. The sensations of hearing are real- 
 ized when the. vibrations of agitated air are trans- 
 mitted through the labyrinth, impressing the trans- 
 parent membrane or drum, affecting the auditory 
 nerve connected with the brain. The sensation is 
 almost simultaneously conveyed from the organ, when 
 
THE SENSE OF HEARING. 53 
 
 affected, to the mind, which is followed by a new 
 state, in which we have perception, and an inquiry 
 as to the external cause. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The varieties of the sensation of sound are 
 almost innumerable. It has been said that the ear 
 is capable of detecting about five hundred variations 
 of tone, and as many variations in strength. We 
 are informed that when these are combined they 
 number about twenty thousand, varying in simple 
 sounds, degrees of strength, and difference of tone. 
 Many human voices may sound the tone represented 
 by three in the octave or stave, and each one will 
 differ from all the rest, though sounding the same 
 tone. Fifty different instruments may sound the 
 same note and the ear be capable to distinguish a 
 difference in all of them. A difference can be de- 
 tected which may arise from light or heavy atmos- 
 phere, the good or bad repair of the same instru- 
 ment; also of the voice in sickness contrasted with 
 the same in health, and pleasant with an angry mode, 
 or age with youth. 2. The cause of these sensations 
 is remotely in the object or agent which produces the 
 vibratory state of the atmosphere, as the air has not 
 irregular self-motion. A sonorous body, when struck, 
 agitates the atmosphere around it; this agitation 
 recedes from it in all directions in wave-like undu- 
 lations, resembling concentric encircling waves on 
 the surface of water at rest when ruptured by a 
 
54 THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
 
 falling stone. Yet the air in motion may be regarded 
 as the operative and impressing cause of the sensa- 
 tions of hearing. 3. The knowledge which simple 
 sounds convey to the mind is not intuitive. The 
 power of sensations of sound belongs to intuition; 
 but the knowledge we receive of the existence and 
 properties of external objects, as a sequence of 
 impressions made by sensations, is aided by other 
 faculties in connection with experience. The new 
 state of mind consequent upon the action of these 
 sensations, is that in which we have perceptions and 
 full knowledge of the existing cause. 4. We can 
 not tell the direction of sound, neither the distance 
 from us, nor the qualities of the cause wholly un- 
 aided by other faculties and experience. But in 
 gaining a knowledge of the direction, distance, and 
 existence of the cause, we can and must depend, 
 to a considerable extent, upon the sense of hearing, 
 more than experience. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. To have knowledge of sound it is indispensable 
 that we be in the direction and under the influence 
 of the waves of air as they strike the ear. The nat- 
 ural course and motion of sound is always from the 
 cause. There can be no sound without a motion of 
 the air, and motion recedes from the cause. If we 
 depend upon experience for direction and location, 
 we can arrive at them amid high and strong winds as 
 though all were calm. But this is absurd. 2. We 
 
THE SENSE OF HEARING. 55 
 
 gain our knowledge of location principally from the 
 direction of the motion of the undulations or pulsa- 
 tions of air which strike the ear, producing a corre- 
 sponding sensation; also of distance by the peculiar 
 modifications of strength or force of such pulsations; 
 for if there be nothing in the sensation corresponding 
 or agreeing in any way with the properties or nature 
 of the cause, then it follows that the mind, in trying 
 to determine the true cause by perception, acts with- 
 out a guide, and the result is wholly accidental; for 
 no faculty is calculated by nature, or has more power 
 to give correct direction to the perception of cause 
 than sense or sensation affected or created by it. 
 
 3. Further proof that we are in a degree dependent 
 upon the peculiar manner and way in which sound 
 strikes the ear in determining the cause and its loca- 
 tion, is found in the fact that when we have a con- 
 fused idea of the direction of sound we intuitively 
 turn the head in different directions to get the direc- 
 tion of the waves of air on the tympanum, in order 
 to know the true direction of the cause, and from 
 the peculiar modulations and force of the sound thus 
 conveyed we judge of the distance to the object. 
 
 4. The sense of hearing is of great importance. By 
 it we are made acquainted with the music of nature, 
 the melody in the discordant sounds of instruments 
 and of the living voice. Music has charms which are 
 exhilarating and soothing. Verbal language is wholly 
 dependent upon this sense. Articulated sounds or 
 speech in the reciprocal expression of feelings, fears, 
 
56 THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
 
 and hopes, forms one of the principal mediums and 
 sources of human happiness. For such inestimable 
 gifts praise should ever redound to the great Creator. 
 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 57 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The organ of touch may be said to be blended 
 -with and exists in the muscles or papillae, extending 
 over the whole surface of the body. The hands and 
 fingers have been regarded as the principal organ of 
 touch ; but it is not clear that there is naturally much 
 more minute delicacy or acute sensations in the ten- 
 dons, fibers, nerves, muscles, or skin of the hands 
 and fingers, than exists internally and over the entire 
 surface of the body. Very much depends upon the 
 frequent use of the hands and the concentration of 
 faculties to their use in realizing sensations. 2. The 
 sense of touch is far more extensive than the other 
 senses we have just examined; for in one sense }t in- 
 cludes them all in itself, possessing the surface of the 
 whole physical frame; yet a distinction can be made 
 and does naturally exist in the senses. 3. It is not 
 the essence of properties which compose the nervous 
 system; but is that power or influence of the mind 
 mysteriously and inseparably connected with the ten- 
 dons, fibers, nerves, and muscles, extending its con- 
 nection with them to the very apex of the papillae 
 spread over the surface of the body. Here it comes 
 in contact with and realizes the existence of external 
 objects. 4. The sensations of touch constitute that 
 
58 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
 
 which conveys to the mind impressions of objects 
 which affect the physical organs. Consequent upon 
 these sensations is a new state of mind which has 
 perceptions of the cause. But to define the mysteri- 
 ous union of the power of sensations of touch with 
 the physical organ, or nerves, is utterly impossible. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The extent and variations of the sensations of 
 touch differ from those senses we have noticed. By 
 the sense of smell we acquire a knowledge of the ef- 
 fluvia or odors of external objects. By the tongue 
 and palate we gain a knowledge of tastes ; and by the 
 ear we hear sounds. The knowledge gained by these 
 senses is restricted to the single medium of appropriate 
 operation peculiar to each one. But by the sense of 
 touch we acquire knowledge of various objects and of 
 different qualities, such as solidity, softness, hardness, 
 roughness, and smoothness, and such as heat, cold, 
 extension, and form. 2. The influence of the qualities 
 of external bodies upon the mind, through the me- 
 dium of the sense of touch, may and does, to some 
 extent, impart a knowledge of those properties cor- 
 responding to the peculiar nature of their existence. 
 This can be tested by contact with hardness, exten- 
 sion, and form, solidity, softness, roughness, smooth- 
 ness, and motion. 3. Whether these properties be of 
 primary or of secondary knowledge, in whole or in 
 part, does not prevent them from producing, when 
 brought in contact with the sense of touch, an inter- 
 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 59 
 
 nal sensation or feeling corresponding, to some ex- 
 tent, with the peculiar condition, state, or nature of 
 the cause. 4. Knowledge in the mind, which arises 
 from these sources, can not be perfect, received only 
 through the medium of any one of the senses without 
 the aid of other faculties. All sensations are in the 
 mind ; and the idea that they have no power, when 
 produced by external objects, to influence the mind in 
 any way or to any degree, as to the nature or prop- 
 erties of the affecting cause, is contrary to true analy- 
 sis and our conceptions of truth. 5. Connected with 
 the sense and sensation of touch is the origin of our 
 knowledge of the temperature of bodies. When heat 
 and cold affect the organs of the sense of touch, the 
 sensation may be capable of a corresponding action 
 in the peculiar state, nature, or modulations within 
 itself. And with the nature of its action upon the 
 mind is the origin of the idea of the qualities causing 
 action ; for without the medium of the sense of touch 
 we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. 6. 
 The sensation is not within itself the idea or the 
 knowledge of the existence of heat or cold; but con- 
 nected with the sensation is the origin of the idea of 
 such existences; for if the origin of such ideas be 
 not connected with the sense of touch, then we can 
 have no knowledge of either heat or cold. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. A sentient being may know that heat and cold 
 do exist, but as to the qualities of realities which are 
 
60 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
 
 called heat and cold we know nothing. There is a 
 difference between a sensation and an idea. A sensa- 
 tion may be immediately antecedent to an idea, and 
 we may form an idea of the cause of a sensation after 
 the sensation is gone ; yet the origin of the idea may 
 be connected with sensation, though that idea or no- 
 tion may be matured after it is gone. 2. That the 
 origin of the idea of external qualities which affect 
 the sense of touch, is connected with the sensation of 
 touch, has been acknowledged by all the leading phi- 
 losophers of past time ; but many of them contradict 
 their assumed premises in the conclusion of their own 
 arguments, by denying the origin of our knowledge 
 of any external substance as being connected in any 
 way with the sensation of touch. They have fallen 
 into this error by trying to keep up a logical distinc- 
 tion between the elements of mind, severing the affin- 
 ity of their united being by wild, abstract analysis. 
 3. This sense can not, within itself, convey to us a 
 matured knowledge of external existences ; yet the 
 sensations may be affected by the qualities of their 
 cause, sending them, with various modulations, to the 
 mind,' and varying in degrees of strength. How far 
 these can impress the mind in regard to the qualities 
 of causes we can not tell; but connected with the 
 sensations of touch is the origin of our knowledge of 
 the cause of such sensations. 
 
THE SENSE OP SIGHT. 61 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The eye is the organ of the sense of sight. Its 
 location is wisely arranged for convenience and use- 
 fulness, and where it can be most readily defended 
 from harm or danger. It consists of transparent 
 substances. The humors are of various refractive 
 powers. They are called the aqueous, crystalline, 
 and vitreous humors. The first refraction of the 
 rays of light takes pl*ace when they fall upon the 
 convexed surface of the cornea of the eye. This 
 exterior surface receives the rays of light and trans- 
 mits them to the aqueous humor. This transparent 
 fluid exists between the cornea and the crystalline 
 humor. The pupil is the center of the iris, and is 
 the avenue to admit, and is for the transmission of 
 the rays of light passing from the aqueous humor to 
 the crystalline lens. It is maintained that here they 
 are re-refracted and transmitted to the retina, which 
 is surrounded by the vitreous humor. 2. The retina 
 is a delicate membrane, w T hich lies at the bottom of 
 the eye, and contains upon it the expansion of the 
 sensitive optic nerve. Rays of light affect the sense 
 of vision while passing through the eye, and are un- 
 
62 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
 
 dergoing several refractions ; but they produce upon 
 the retina or optic nerve the true image of the object 
 which reflects the light. This sensitive organ re- 
 ceives the image of the external object impressed 
 upon it, and this impression is the origin of vision. 
 The primary power of vision is connected with the 
 optic nerve, and connected with it is the origin of the 
 sensations of sight which report to the mind. 3. The 
 importance of the sense of sight to our happiness and 
 knowledge is self-evident. We can not fully estimate 
 the true value without supposing ourselves to have 
 been always deprived of it. Yet in that ease we 
 could depend upon others ; therefore we must try to 
 imagine the condition of the whole world without the 
 power of vision. One glance of vision can survey 
 hill and valley, mountain and lake, the verdant plain 
 and rock-bound coast, flying clouds and rolling seas. 
 In an instant of time it traverses a great variety in 
 terrestrial existences — matches the flight of the vast 
 globe, then ranges amid the revolving orbs of the 
 planetary universe, But in the absence of vision 
 these might exist and move, yet all would be night. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The mysterious arrangement of the internal 
 structure of the eye, in adapting it to the effects pro- 
 duced by it, displays a design, skill, and wisdom infi- 
 nitely above the power of atheistic arguments; for it 
 nclusive evidence of an omnipotent Creator, who 
 fashioned it according to his infinite wisdom. The 
 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 63 
 
 rays of light are refracted to a proper point by the 
 different coats and humors. The muscular tendons 
 command the action of the ball in turning the pupil to 
 the desired object. A circular, prominent, and strong 
 orbit is set for its defense. It is protected by lids, 
 lashes, and glands, secreting tears which promote its 
 lubricity, supplying moisture, and, after washing the 
 eye, the fluid passes through the outlet into the nose. 
 This exquisite, mysterious, and successful arrange- 
 ment can not be a result of accident or chance. 
 2. The sense of sight must be connected with the re- 
 tina or optic nerve. It is not the nerve within itself, 
 neither is it the object of vision ; but its origin is with 
 the sensitiveness of the optic nerve. 3. When we 
 consider the acute sensitiveness of this nerve, if rays 
 of light reflected from objects paint or impress it with 
 the images of such objects in order to be seen, may 
 they not, in part, be felt by the optic nerve when 
 seen? 4. The sensations of sight are awakened 
 when rays of light from the object affect the retina or 
 optic nerve. These sensations impress the mind. A 
 state of mind ensues in which we have perception of 
 the cause of such sensations. 5. What modern phi- 
 losophers mean by " the perceptions of sight" we can 
 not understand. If they mean that sight has percep- 
 tion of objects within and of itself, we beg leave to 
 differ, as that would be utterly impossible. And if 
 they mean that we can have perception of the origin 
 of sight, by which we see an object, then sight would 
 be a sequence of perception, and dependent upon it 
 
64 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
 
 for existence, "which is not true. Therefore, there can 
 be no perceptions of sight, but we can have percep- 
 tions of the objects of sight. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Colors have been regarded as the principal cause 
 of the sensations of sight. But as to how they are 
 produced, or as to where they have their origin, is left 
 in obscurity. They may arise partly in the essence 
 or qualities of objects seen, as well as from the vari- 
 ous refracted rays of light reflected from those objects, 
 and which fall on the power of vision. Some bodies, 
 and even some properties, possess power to reflect 
 rays more abundantly than others. That light within 
 and of itself consists of rays of different colors, unaf- 
 fected by contact with other existences, is very doubt- 
 ful. Light passing through a glass prism presents 
 different colors ; why can Ave not have the same result 
 when it passes through prisms of other transparent 
 substances? 2. We find, to some extent, that colors 
 vary with the essence and qualities of the objects 
 refracting and reflecting the rays of light. They may 
 possess naturally a difference within themselves, but 
 if so we have no knowledge of the fact. It is more 
 reasonable to believe that color arises from the nature 
 of the objects which reflect the light to the eye, or 
 results from a modification of the principles of attrac- 
 tion, adhesion, density, or repulsion of such objects. 
 3. It is light reflected from external objects which 
 affects the fibrous expansion of the sensitive optic 
 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 65 
 
 nerve, and awakens sensations which extend to and 
 impress the mind of the existing action of the reflected 
 light, together w 7 ith the images of the objects which 
 cause such sensations. The modulations or change 
 imparted to the rays of light by the objects which re- 
 flect and refract them is carried by them to the sense 
 of sight, and a corresponding sensation extends to the 
 mind. This is reasonable, unless we deny that sensa- 
 tions are capable of change or modulations. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. We have power to modify or change the rays of 
 light which come from visual objects by intervening 
 transparent substances, and correspondingly our no- 
 tions of those objects. Though light is the primary 
 object of sight, yet, in order to see external things, 
 there must be objects from which it is reflected, and 
 the change and modulations of the reflected rays car- 
 rying with them the image of such objects to the power 
 of vision, or the eye of coats, humors, and retina, 
 or optic nerve. To define the precise office, nature, 
 and powers of any or of all these is beyond human 
 wisdom or philosophical analysis. 2. The knowledge 
 we receive through the sense of sight, can be affected 
 by graduated rays of light and shade coming from an 
 innumerable variety of objects and qualities. At once 
 we see the relative position of bodies, w r ith their mag- 
 nitude, figure, distance, and color, aided by percep- 
 tion, suggestion, association, and experience. To say 
 that the sense of sight, within itself, has power to im- 
 
66 THE SENSE E SIGHT. 
 
 part to us a full knowledge of visual objects is ab- 
 surd. And to say that within itself it has no power 
 to aid in arriving at a knowledge of such objects is 
 false ; for our knowledge of visual objects, as such, 
 has its origin with the sensations of sight. 3. Our 
 knowledge of color is derived from the sense of sight, 
 and the origin of this knowledge is original with the 
 power of vision. No one of the other senses can be 
 involved in the primary detection of color. Color may 
 be a property inherent in light, consisting in a differ- 
 ence or condition in the rays of light and shades, re- 
 fracted and reflected, or are so changed, which is a 
 result from contact with the bodies the appearance of 
 which they present or impress upon the optic nerve. 
 If white is not to be called a color, it may be regarded 
 as the primary quality from which colors gradate, as 
 red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. 
 These are imparted to the mind by the sensations of 
 
 sight only. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. The idea of extension as visual is not wholly 
 original from sight, but is dependent upon it for self- 
 correctness. Light is the primary object of vision, 
 but is not the only object of vision. The modu- 
 lations and inherent nature of its refracted and re- 
 flected rays present the appearance of objects to the 
 sense of sight. If the power of vision extends no 
 further than the retina of the eye, and that vision 
 consists in the first contact of light with it, then when 
 the image of an object was impressed upon the optic 
 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 67 
 
 nerve, it would continue to be seen, though the object 
 should be intercepted with a cloud or darkness. 2. 
 If a solid body can present to the eye nothing but 
 colors and light, will that prove that there is no con- 
 nection existing in any way between those colors and 
 light, and the object which causes them to fall on the 
 power of vision? We can see the effect of a strong 
 wind, but we can not see the element itself. But it 
 is different with a solid body ; it is the cause of a pe- 
 culiar light and color as the effect upon the eye; 
 these are continuously supported there by the object; 
 hence, the light and color either see for us the cause 
 which continues their stay, or the eye can see, first, 
 the primary objects, light and color, and, secondly, 
 by means of these the real objects. If the optic 
 nerve has power to feel the action of the rays of 
 light and the image impressed upon it, may it not 
 have power by means of them to feel the object which 
 causes their action upon the nerve, and continues it 
 as long as the eye is directed to such objects? 3. 
 Our knowledge of objects, through the sense of sight 
 only, is limited and confused. It has been ascer- 
 tained by removing the cataract from the eyes of 
 adult persons, that at first visual objects appeared to 
 be touching the eye; and it requires the aid of some 
 of the other senses, and of the action of the mind, to 
 correct these appearances. But as all our senses and 
 faculties are improved by action or use, so is sight, and 
 it tends to correct itself in regard to visual objects. 
 
68 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. If the sense of sight has no power, in any way, 
 or to any degree, of receiving visible extension, 
 length, and breadth, we can not tell how we are to 
 judge of the real size of objects, as we can do but 
 very little in association and in comparing distant ob- 
 jects by the sense of touch only. 2. In judging of 
 the magnitude of visual objects, we are much influ- 
 enced by the peculiar nature and way the modulations 
 of light strike the organ of sight, and in comparing 
 such objects with other objects, the size of which is 
 known. Objects, in a murky atmosphere, often ap- 
 pear larger and nearer than they would in clear air. 
 This may be caused by their dim appearance, and the 
 refraction of the rays of light passing through a 
 denser atmosphere. The sun and moon appear larger 
 in the horizon than they do in the zenith. The prin- 
 cipal cause of this is, that the rays of light coming 
 from them strike the atmosphere obliquely, and the 
 oblique portion of the atmosphere, which refracts the 
 rays, occupies an enlarged space in the field of vision 
 and subtends a greater angle at the eye. The refrac- 
 tion makes the appearance of the sun and moon 
 greater than they really are, and this difference in- 
 creases in proportion as the rays pass parallel with 
 the earth's surface in the denser part of the air. 3. 
 The purer the atmosphere the more accurate is our 
 estimation of the distance to objects. And an object 
 upon a smooth plain or a ship at sea, where there are 
 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 69 
 
 no intermediate objects, always appear to be nearer 
 to us than they really are. 4. Our perceptions of 
 distance, through the medium of sight, are principally 
 acquired. 5. Though the above position is correct, 
 yet we find, by correct analysis, that the primary 
 power of our perception of visual objects and of dis- 
 tance is original or intuitive. Take a child, before it 
 can reason, place a candle near its face, and its hand 
 will be but partially extended in order to grasp it. 
 But turn its face to the moon or some distant object, 
 and intuitively the arm will be extended at full length. 
 
70 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The senses may be regarded as a secondary 
 source of knowledge, when compared with knowl- 
 edge direct, or imparted to the mind or spirit as 
 the result of the mind's own internal action, or is 
 received by a superhuman spiritual influence without 
 the medium of physical organs. 2. If matter has no 
 self-power to impress or move material entities, only 
 when connected with spirit, then it follows that self- 
 motion belongs to spirit, and that spirit can impress 
 or move spirit independently of material organs. 
 Therefore, the internal feelings, influences, and im- 
 pressions, imparted by the Infinite Spirit to the mind, 
 may be regarded as knowledge direct, or that which 
 comes to us independently of any feeble, diseased, 
 and perishable material organs, which, from their na- 
 ture and condition, are liable to deceive us. Then 
 that which we experience from imperishable sources 
 is not only knowledge direct, but are primary sources 
 of knowledge, and worthy of far more confidence and 
 belief than any fact or knowledge received through 
 the medium of the senses, connected with diseased, 
 
 
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 71 
 
 deceptious, and perishing physical organs. 3. Ac- 
 cording to the preceding argument the senses may be 
 regarded as a secondary source of knowledge. And 
 the order of this world is to rely upon the senses in 
 testing the reality and nature of external things with 
 the highest degree of confidence or belief, while 
 knowledge direct to the mind is often disregarded and 
 rejected as worthless. 4. The senses can not, in con- 
 nection or abstractly, give us a perfect knowledge of 
 external things; otherwise each power of the senses 
 would be a perfect mind within itself. But they are 
 limited in conveying a knowledge of external objects, 
 which, however, is perfected when brought under the 
 inspection of the mind. The deception exists wholly 
 in the nature and condition of the physical organs. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Spirit being imperishable, is incapable of dis- 
 ease destroying its action or of decay; but the phys- 
 ical organs are subject to be enfeebled or rendered 
 inactive by disease, or may be entirely destroyed. 
 While under the influence of disease we can not 
 depend upon them with much certainty. The cor- 
 rectness of their reports is accidental, and the mind 
 often has great difficulty in correcting wrong impres- 
 sions made by them. 2. Our reliance upon the senses, 
 and our power to believe in the correctness of their 
 reports, does not arise in the existence and nature of 
 the senses, but has its origin in connection with an 
 internal conviction or consciousness that what they 
 
72 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 report is true. But as no one is disposed to doubt 
 the testimony of the senses when they are free from 
 the power of disease, we will not spend time in 
 proving the necessity of greater confidence in them. 
 3. The skeptic professes the most positive belief in 
 the existence and nature of facts tested by the senses, 
 while he rejects internal convictions and moral dem- 
 onstrations. A correct knowledge of external facts 
 reported to the mind depends upon intuitive power. 
 We can have no knowledge of external facts, as such, 
 but for the presence of intuition, to which all facto 
 may be referred in order to be fully known and the 
 mind satisfied. If internal affirmations and convic- 
 tions of truth are to be wholly rejected, then it is 
 utterly impossible to have knowledge of any existent 
 in the external world. 
 
DIVISION SECOND 
 
 ■++< 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PEECEPTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Perception* is that faculty of the mind which 
 has power of perceiving internal and external changes 
 and existences; and in action has power of perceiv- 
 ing and of receiving a knowledge of external objects 
 by means of the impressions they make on the senses, 
 or it leads to the full action of the mind in arriving 
 at a knowledge of real existences. 2. Sensation and 
 perception are regarded as the properties of mind, 
 by which we arrive at a knowledge of external things. 
 Sensation refers to the physical organs and their 
 mysterious union with the immaterial sensibilities, 
 and perception refers to the power and action of 
 mental influences and elements. Perception has been 
 regarded as an association formed between the im- 
 pressions made upon the organs of the senses and 
 the external substances which are the cause of such 
 impressions. But the acting power of this associa- 
 tion is connected with the primary elements of mind. 
 3. Perception is immediately successive to the action 
 
 of sensation, or arises with the new state of mind 
 
 7 73 
 
74 PERCEPTION. 
 
 ■which follows the impressions made by sensations. 
 Sensation within itself can have no perception of its 
 own existence, nor of the cause of such an existence ; 
 but impressions made through the medium of sensa- 
 tion are followed by a peculiar state of mind, in 
 which we have immediate perception of the affecting 
 cause. 4. Whether perception is a sequent of im- 
 pressions conveyed by sensations to the brain we 
 know not. The inlets of the mind, for comprehend- 
 ing external things, appear to be mysteriously con- 
 nected with the entire nervous system. The nerves 
 are connected with the brain, and thence receive their 
 influence. But this great medium may not require 
 sensations to go from the extremities to the brain 
 before there £an be any action of perception. The 
 mind may have power to perceive the affecting cause 
 upon its action on the organs of senses; but to de- 
 termine the precise mode of operation is impossible. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Perception may be regarded as a voluntary act 
 of the mind. That aggressive influence or power 
 which strikes out in maturing a knowledge of exter- 
 nal objects, requires an effort in order to a full degree 
 of perception which can be retained. 2. Sensation 
 is not necessarily followed by perception. We may 
 be employed in thought or in conversation, while a 
 numerous variety of objects pass through the field of 
 vision and none of them be retained in the mind. 
 This results from a want of the perception of those 
 
PERCEPTION. 75 
 
 objects. We may have experienced the sensations, 
 but no effort was made in retaining the impressions 
 of them; for the mind must attend to what is pass- 
 ing in order to a real perception of external objects. 
 3. To a limited extent perception may be regarded 
 as involuntary. We may open our eyes upon a beau- 
 tiful forest; the first tree seen may claim our atten- 
 tion till we suddenly turn away; yet we may have 
 faint perceptions of other trees which are still re- 
 tained in the mind, and were not voluntary objects 
 of either sight or perception. If we cast our eyes 
 upon a canvas of pictures and fix our mind upon one 
 of them, so that all the rest are almost as though 
 they did not exist, yet they are unintentionally seen, 
 and our perception of them is involuntary. In leav- 
 ing our room in eager quest of some object, we pass 
 two men in descending the stairway, one small and 
 the other large — the perception of the difference in 
 their size is wholly involuntary. 4. But voluntary 
 perception involves an act of the mind in attending 
 to the cause of sensations; and connected with this 
 act or action is our perception of external substances 
 and qualities. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Perception makes us acquainted with external 
 things, and has its origin in a peculiar mental state, 
 in which the influence or action refers to internal 
 affections of the mind, and also to external caus- 
 ation. It carries the mind out of or beyond the 
 
76 PERCEPTION. 
 
 existence of self, and introduces us to the external 
 world. It has power to cause external things to 
 pass in review. Perception is not the only medium 
 through which we are made acquainted with external 
 things. Our knowledge of them commences with 
 sensation, and sensation is a sequence of the im- 
 pingement or of contact with external things; and 
 perception following sensation fully presents to the 
 inspection of the mind the cause. 2. Our perception 
 of primary properties of matter differs from that of 
 sensation. Primary properties are essential to the ex- 
 istence of all material substances, and are known to 
 be such as solidity, extension, figure, and density, with 
 divisibility. These qualities belong to all real mate- 
 rial bodies ; but as to their essence we know nothing. 
 3. Sensation is a result of contact, in some way, with 
 external substances, and implies their existence as 
 the cause of such influences. Perception refers or 
 leads the mind to a knowledge of the cause of a 
 known sensation. 4. We have perception of the 
 difference between primary and secondary proper- 
 ties of matter. The latter are such as hardness, 
 softness, roughness, and smoothness, smell, taste, 
 heat, cold, sound, and color. These may cause cer- 
 tain effects in the mind, or awaken sensations which 
 are immediately followed by perception, bringing the 
 affecting cause under mental inspection. 
 
FALSE PERCEPTION. 77 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FALSE PERCEPTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. False perceptions take place when there are no 
 external objects corresponding with, and which are the 
 cause of them. When there are no external causes, 
 we are left to conclude that false perceptions exist 
 within ourselves, and in the mistake which the mind 
 makes of its own perceptions. 2. False perceptions 
 can arise first in the organs of sense. They can be 
 affected in various ways, and the succeeding sensations 
 are followed by perception, as to the act of the mind, 
 when there are no external substances as cause of 
 such sensations, or as objects of perception. These 
 organs can be changed or affected so as to produce 
 the appearance of realities by disease or by excite- 
 ment, fear, or grief. And they change within them- 
 selves, affected by age. 3. Again : false perceptions 
 may exist in connection with the changes in mental 
 states. The mind is capable of an internal error or 
 delusion in believing in the existence of objects as 
 real when they are not. It can be deceived in its own 
 conceptions of real existences. 4. False perceptions, 
 which arise in connection with the organs of sense, 
 are caused generally by bodily disorders. These per- 
 
78 FALSE PERCEPTION. 
 
 ceptions may be corrected, as we shall notice in the 
 order of the following section. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. By the concentrated action of the mind, as af- 
 fected through the medium of the other senses. Cor- 
 responding sensations, resulting from affecting causes 
 upon the organs of sense, contribute, in their united 
 appeals to the mind, toward correcting false percep- 
 tions. 2. False perceptions can be corrected by com- 
 paring our perceptions of objects we suppose to exist 
 or exist in a different way from their appearance, with 
 the perceptions of others in regard to them. The de- 
 liberate decision of several persons, by means of the 
 same organs^ of sense, while in health, and at the same 
 time, will not mislead. 3. A correction can be made 
 by a proper exercise of judgment in comparing with 
 some known object. 4. If we have perception of two 
 or more objects of the same or differing in kind, we can 
 turn to some one we know to be single, and if there 
 appears to be more than one, we know our perception 
 in that respect to be false. But in correcting all false 
 perceptions we are dependent upon a correct exercise 
 of the judgment. 
 
PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 79 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PERCEPTION AS CONNECTED WITH SMELL, 
 TASTE, HEARING, TOUCH, AND SIGHT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. We will now turn attention to our perceptions of 
 objects which affect the mind through the medium of 
 the sense of smell. The origin of our knowledge of 
 the existence and difference in odors commences with 
 the sensation of smell. 2. If it is impossible for sen- 
 sations to affect the mind in any way corresponding to 
 the object and qualities of the cause, then there is no 
 connection between the action of sensation and that 
 of perception. Then when we receive sensations from 
 the smell of a rose or jasmin, we would be as apt to 
 have perception of a rock or mountain as the object 
 as any other existent; and our perception as to the 
 true cause being wholly unguided, would be accidental 
 in results. 3. If there is no connection between sen- 
 sation and perception, it would be true that when we 
 have sensation we may or may not have perception; 
 and if, in any case, perception is immediately success- 
 ive, it could only be regarded as an accident. Dr. 
 Abercrombie mentions a blind philosopher who could 
 distinguish a black dress by smell. The origin of this 
 knowledge did not commence with perception, but 
 with sensation. And the sensation of smell, in this 
 
80 PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 
 
 case, appears to have impressed the mind with a 
 knowledge of the object and some of its qualities un- 
 aided by the other senses. Mr. Stewart speaks of 
 James Mitchel, who was deaf, speechless, and blind, 
 yet by smell he could detect the presence of a stran- 
 ger and give the direction to him. This knowledge 
 commenced with the sensations of smell, and without 
 the aid of other senses. In this case the mind must 
 have been influenced to correct decisions, in some 
 way, by the peculiar nature or character of the sensa- 
 tions of smell. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind, 
 through the medium of the sense of taste, should be 
 carefully examined. It has been said that sixteen dif- 
 ferent simple tastes exist. In the different combina- 
 tions there are almost innumerable modifications, as in 
 the degrees of strength, intensity, and weakness, 
 quickness, and slowness. The properties of external 
 substances which affect the organs of taste, awakening 
 sensations, are called flavors. 2. Habit, in relation to 
 taste, enables us to distinguish differences by repeated 
 or continuous efforts. In this way the epicurean dis- 
 tinguishes the flavor and qualities of the luxuries 
 of the table to a degree which would pass unnoticed 
 by others; and the physician, the difference in 
 drugs which are similar in appearance, and also in 
 taste, to one not accustomed to them. 3. Under the 
 law of habit some wine-dealers distinguish the flavor 
 of one wine from that of another, and tell where each 
 
PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 81 
 
 or all were made. 4. The proper direction of the ac- 
 tion of perception toward the cause must be, to a lim- 
 ited extent, dependent on the nature or modulations 
 of the sensation received ; for if there is no connec- 
 tion in any way, our perception as to being immedi- 
 ately successive to sensation, and in bringing the true 
 cause to the attention and inspection of the mind, 
 would be w T holly an accident. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. The perception we have of objects which affect 
 the mind through the medium of the sense of hearing 
 is worthy a passing notice. The sense of hearing is 
 more acute in some persons than in others, yet the 
 power of discriminating sounds and the difference 
 in tones or modulations may be cultivated. 2. The 
 sound of a cannon produces a stronger sensation 
 than that of a rifle. Who can say that perception 
 receives no influence as to the cause of sensations, 
 from the peculiar way they affect the mind? If 
 mind was divisible, then this might be impossible. 
 But the elements of mind can not be abstracted, 
 like blocks of marble, from the same mountain, and 
 examined by the rules of superfices and solids, and 
 the laws governing inert elements. 3. The appli- 
 cation of habit to the sense of hearing renders such 
 power more acute as repeated efforts are made. 
 There are instances of blind persons who can call the 
 names of others from the sound of their voices, 
 though they may not have heard them for years. 
 
82 PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 
 
 Others can tell when they are approaching a prec- 
 ipice or wall, by the peculiar sound of their feet 
 upon the ground. 4. If there is no connection in 
 any way between sensations produced by sound and 
 our perception of the cause of such sensations, then 
 our perception of the true cause may be accidental. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. We experience perceptions of objects which af- 
 fect the mind through the medium of the sense of 
 touch. And in proportion to the increase of the 
 exquisite acuteness in detecting and reporting exter- 
 nal substances to the mind, is the clearness and 
 proper action of our perception in bringing such 
 substances before the mind. 2. Blind persons can, 
 with greater safety, pass all through a house in a 
 dark night than any one who has the power of vision. 
 Some of them can tell the distance to a burning fire 
 by the action and degree of heat, and also of ap- 
 proaching contact with external bodies by the pe- 
 culiar action of the air. And by the sense of touch 
 they can be taught to read by means of large raised 
 letters. 3. Our knowledge of that which affects 
 the touch commences with sensations, and is more 
 fully developed to the mind by the action and power 
 of perception. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind 
 through the medium of the sense of sight is worthy 
 attention. Expansion of surface and color have been 
 
PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 83 
 
 regarded as primary objects of vision, but that of 
 distance and magnitude have been rejected. Yet 
 it is maintained that we judge of limited distances 
 by sight alone. If we can judge of small distances 
 by sight alone, why not, to some extent, judge of 
 greater distances, aided by the same power? 2. The 
 inclination of the axis of vision, which directs both 
 eyes to the same object, and the peculiar way in 
 which the reflected rays of light fall on the eyes, 
 appears to give rise to an influence which affects 
 the mind in deciding upon the true distance of such 
 an object. To touch any object immediately before 
 us with one eye closed is accidental, but certain 
 with the aid of both. 3. A child, before it can 
 reason or compare, shows an intuitive knowledge 
 of distance by sight, in extending its hand no farther 
 than the desired object when near, and at full length 
 when distant. Our knowledge of the distance and 
 magnitude of visual objects commences with sensa- 
 tions of sight. 4. Habit, in relation to the power of 
 vision, renders it acute in detecting the existence of 
 objects. And in proportion as we try to discrim- 
 inate, will we have clear perception of objects which 
 affect the organs of sight. By continued effort the 
 mariner can discover a ship as it nears in the dis- 
 tance, when it can not be seen by a person not 
 accustomed to maritime observations; and he can 
 call its name when nothing more than a blur can 
 be seen by the untrained eye upon the surface of 
 the ocean. Under the law of habit there is a quick 
 
84 PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 
 
 and vigorous action of the power of vision, and in 
 proportion to its improvement is the clearness and 
 power of our perception of visual objects. 
 
DIVISION THIRD 
 
 -♦*♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OUK KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND 
 CONTINGENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. It has been said that the phenomena of mind 
 consist of certain thoughts and feelings, and that the 
 true inquiry is as to the order in which they arise, 
 and of what these elements are constituted. Though 
 they are of great importance, yet we can not imagine 
 that within themselves they constitute all of mind. 
 2. We can not doubt the real existence of thought in 
 connection with the mind's states. Of the existence 
 and action of thought we can form some idea and 
 have a satisfactory knowledge. The nature of ele- 
 ments, which have been called the original elements 
 of thought, can not be clearly defined, though they 
 must have their origin in connection with the exist- 
 ence and action of primary mental powers. 3. Thought 
 is that which the mind thinks, and may be said to be 
 that, in part, which acts in thinking. And it is that 
 which is prominent and leads in cogitation, reflection, 
 contemplation, and meditation. 
 
 85 
 
86 PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1, Thought is not only real within and of itself, 
 but expresses action, as in thinking. It is the act or 
 operation of the mind when attending to any particu- 
 lar subject as existent, and in another sense it may 
 be regarded as the idea consequent on that operation. 
 
 2. Thought can not exist as a part of the mind if 
 separated from it. Hence, our thoughts are nothing 
 more than the mind itself in a peculiar way or in dif- 
 ferent states ; yet their proper office has been defined. 
 
 3. The importance of thought to our being, knowledge, 
 and happiness is forever beyond all power of descrip- 
 tion. By continued thought the student ever ex- 
 pands the powers of his mind with useful knowledge. 
 Think, think, always thinking, is the motto of true 
 greatness. It leads to the possession of that true 
 eminence where the mind, with triumphant composure, 
 scorns the perishable glory of earthly fame. 
 
IDEAS. 87 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 IDEAS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The term idea, as that of notion, applies to that 
 which perceives or observes in the mind; hence the 
 form or image of any thing in the mind possessed by 
 it for contemplation or inspection. It exists in the 
 mind, and can be a result of mental action. 2. Our 
 ideas may be said to vary with or correspond to their 
 objects in regard to their nature and mode or condi- 
 tion of existence. 3. Our idea of physical existences 
 may be regarded as contingent, from the fact that it is 
 natural for us to have conceptions of them as muta- 
 ble, and that it is possible for the power that made 
 them to cause them to cease to be. 4. Our idea of 
 physical entities may be said to be relative, as the 
 very notion of that which has bounds or finity will 
 suggest the opposite, which is infinity or non-limita- 
 tion. 5. Our idea of duration may be regarded as 
 absolute. We know that duration is and must con- 
 tinue, and that its annihilation is impossible. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Our idea of space has been said to be necessary 
 or absolute. To conceive of the annihilation of all 
 
88 IDEAS. 
 
 physical entities is possible, but to conceive of the 
 annihilation of unbounded space is utterly impossible. 
 Hence, the idea of space is necessary; for we can 
 have conception of the real existence of the object 
 of such an idea, and to try to conceive of the non- 
 existence of space is beyond our power. 2. Our idea 
 of space is absolute, which arises from the condition 
 of its existence. We are immediately impressed with 
 the fact; and our belief is unwavering that space 
 must be, and that it can not cease to be. 3. The idea 
 of space implies the absence of limitation. We can 
 not conceive of it only as real and infinite. Our ideas 
 of material elements, or of the finite, are contingent 
 and relative ; and those of space, or of the infinite, 
 are necessary and absolute. These exist in the mind, 
 and are distinct in their orders. 4. If the idea of 
 space and of the infinite is necessary and absolute, so 
 may we regard the idea of cause. Therefore, it is 
 reasonable for the atheist, when looking on the works 
 of nature, which are sequences, to intuitively infer a 
 cause of their existence, and to believe that such 
 cause is all-powerful and all-wise, from the vastness 
 and skill evidenced in visual and tangible existences. 
 
KNOAVLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 89 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTI- 
 MONY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Tile primary elements of mind may be regarded 
 as axioms, or self-evident truths, within themselves, 
 which are the foundation of mental philosophy. That 
 they have a real existence, and are true within them- 
 selves, is knowledge which we have no power to doubt; 
 and the primary elements are truths, the reality and 
 correctness of which are incapable of either proof or 
 disproof. 2. There is no possible way of proving the 
 axioms or self-evident truths, which are the founda- 
 tion of mathematical science, to be either true or false, 
 yet we receive them as truths. The power to do this 
 is not contained in those axioms or truths, but lies 
 back of all these, and can only exist in the intuitive 
 elements. Therefore, it is more reasonable for us to 
 regard the primary faculties as self-evident truths ; 
 for our knowledge of them, and of all other facts or 
 objects, turns upon their intuitive power to know 
 them to be true, and to reject that which is false. 
 3. The primary elements of mind are truths known to 
 be true only from the fact that we know them to be 
 
 such; and all the power we have of knowing any 
 
 8 
 
90 KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 
 
 thing of their existence, nature, action, or of any 
 other truth or fact in the vast universe, arises in con- 
 nection with and from the existence, nature, and ac- 
 tion of these original elements. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We can not arrive at a knowledge of their exist- 
 ence by any form of argument or from any external 
 testimony. They are their own witnesses, testifying 
 within, of, and to themselves, of their own existence, 
 which is knowledge. 2. With them is the origin of 
 the power to receive within and of themselves the 
 knowledge of their own existence. 3. With them is 
 the origin of the power to arrive at and to know the 
 truth in regard to external things, either without or 
 from testimony. 
 
KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 91 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. We have an intuitive power to arrive at a knowl- 
 edge of facts and truth from testimony. The imme- 
 diate self-knowledge we have of external things is 
 tested by and received through the medium of the 
 senses; but the greater part of our knowledge, in re- 
 gard to such existences, is obtained from other per- 
 sons upon tfre evidence of testimony. 2. Testimony 
 is a solemn declaration or attestation made for the 
 purpose of establishing or making known some fact. 
 It is the declaration of a fact, and evidence is the 
 effect of that declaration on the mind, or the degree 
 of light imparted by it. Facts are received by us 
 from personal observation far more readily than from 
 the declaration of others. We must first have confi- 
 dence in the ability and veracity of the narrator in 
 order to give full credence to the facts revealed. If 
 what he says comes true, we believe him more readily 
 at another time ; but if once deceived, his future testi- 
 mony is apt to be rejected. We can believe the state- 
 ments of a tried friend more readily than those of a 
 stranger. 3. Our intuitive power, in the reception and 
 belief of external facts, is influenced by the corre- 
 
92 KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 
 
 sponding agreement of such facts with those already- 
 known. We should look well to the evidence upon 
 which we receive facts, and to the capacity of the nar- 
 rator. A weak mind is apt to have boundless credu- 
 lity, and seldom ever thinks or reasons for itself. 
 The contracted mind is generally captious, skeptical, 
 and always inclined to reason from imperfect premises, 
 and arrives at false conclusions. An ignorant mind 
 or person rejects the testimony of all philosophers. 
 He believes the earth to be flat and its position fixed 
 immovably. He gives only one foot diameter to the 
 sun, and drives him through the heavens. 4. When 
 we are limited in our views and requirements, there 
 is a tendency to rely on our experience, and to reject 
 all knowledge.for which we have not the evidence of 
 our senses. A proper understanding of self, and of 
 the true method of arriving at a knowledge of exter- 
 nal facts, will remedy false perceptions and conclu- 
 sions. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. A well-regulated mind is influenced by the rec- 
 ollection of facts, which appeared at first to be decep- 
 tions or even false, but subsequently prove and are 
 known to be true. Hence the conclusion that there 
 may and does exist many elements and facts, decid- 
 edly marvelous or appalling to us at first. 2. We 
 have power to arrive at a correct knowledge of facts 
 from testimony; and have power to discriminate 
 credible testimony from that which is not, by contrast- 
 ing the manner, the arrangement of parts, or the con- 
 
KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 93 
 
 dition. When a sufficient amount of the right kind 
 of testimony has been received, we feel an internal 
 satisfaction in relying upon it without doubt. 3. Infi- 
 delity assumes that we can not believe testimony which 
 diflers from our uniform experience and the uniform 
 course of nature ; but we have seen already that this 
 position is false. The influence or power sustaining 
 and containing the elements of our belief in regard 
 to testimony, has its origin in intuition. To receive 
 proper testimony is natural, but to conscientiously 
 doubt it is unnatural and impossible. 4. To arrive at 
 a distinct belief of a miraculous interposition or act, 
 requires something more than to give credence to 
 facts which are in accordance with the uniform laws or 
 course of nature. 5. Miracle we understand to be 
 that which takes place in violation to, or deviating 
 from, the established course of nature, and that which 
 is contrary to our uniform experience. If miracles 
 exist in violation of, or deviating from, the regular 
 course of nature, their existence can not be a result 
 of this uniform course of nature, nor of the laws gov- 
 erning the material universe. Then, if miracles exist, 
 the cause of their existence must be distinct from and 
 superior to the course of nature. Therefore they ex- 
 ist by a direct interposition or act of Divine Power. 
 6. Divine Revelation is regarded as a miraculous gift 
 of Heaven, and, as a result, clearly demonstrates or 
 proves an adequate cause of its existence. All mir- 
 acles recorded in the Bible aid in proving the exist- 
 ence of Deity and his power to establish laws and 
 
94 KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 
 
 suspend them at pleasure. If he has power to order 
 
 and arrange common events, which are called natural, 
 
 he has power and does order uncommon events, called 
 
 miracles. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Infidels assume that events happening contrary 
 to the course of nature and our experience should be 
 rejected, and that it is more reasonable for men to lie, 
 and that several concur in propagating the same lie, 
 than that a miracle should take place, according to 
 their testimony, which would be a result contrary to 
 the course of nature and experience. The rejecters 
 of the Christian system hold and teach that the uni- 
 form course of nature is true, and that it is the uner- 
 ring truth of the universe. 2. Mr. Hume says, in 
 regard to the resurrection of Christ, " I must admit 
 one of two things — either that twelve men agreed to 
 tell a lie, or that a man arose from the dead. It is 
 more probable that men should lie, than that one 
 should return to life again." That is, if Christ rose 
 it would be contrary to the uniform course of nature, 
 which course of nature he regarded as infallible truth. 
 He then asserts that it is more reasonable for men to 
 lie than that Christ should arise from the dead. Ac- 
 cording to his own premises, arguments, and belief, 
 such a lie could not be a part of the course of nature, 
 which is truth, neither a result of it in any possible 
 way. Hence, such a lie being contrary to truth, is 
 contrary to the uniform course of nature, which is 
 truth. Then, according to his own creed and belief, 
 
KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 95 
 
 this lie would be a miracle ; yet lie regards it as that 
 which is the most reasonable, and adopts it as the 
 foundation of his faith and future hope. He then tries 
 to disprove the miracle of Christ's resurrection by as- 
 suming, in lieu thereof, the existence of another mir- 
 acle, according to his own faith and teachings, which 
 miracle, he says, is more reasonable, though he ac- 
 knowledges it to be a lie. And, of course, if in this 
 respect the foundation of his faith or belief be a lie, 
 all arguments and conclusions drawn from it must 
 be wholly and forever untrue. 3. And as this is the 
 only argument which has ever been referred to, which 
 can have any claims to be an argument against the 
 resurrection of Christ, it is, therefore, true, that 
 Christ rose from the dead, and the truthfulness of our 
 holy Christianity is forever incontrovertible, notwith- 
 standing the great and celebrated argument of Mr. 
 Hume. 
 
DIVISION FOURTH 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CONCEPTION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Conceptions exist in connection with peculiar 
 states and operations of the mind, by and in which 
 they appear to arise. 2. Conception of and within 
 itself is the power ', and acting is the act of conceiving 
 and of receiving, or of admitting facts to the inspec- 
 tion of the mind. It is closely connected with our 
 sensations and perceptions. When we have concep- 
 tions they are revived and followed by certain mental 
 states, in which present or past ideas, sensations, or 
 impressions can be and are examined. 3. In a cer- 
 tain sense we may have conceptions of ideas, images, 
 sentiments, and thoughts. And in another sense it 
 may apply to re-occurring facts and to re-existing 
 emotions and sensations, which we, at one time, had 
 realized. The mind, in the peculiar states with which 
 they are connected, is moved and influenced in refer- 
 ence to both external facts and internal feelings and 
 sensations of the soul. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 1. Conceptions in nature and action appear to dif- 
 fer from sensations and perceptions. Perception is 
 96 
 
CONCEPTION. 97 
 
 characterized by an egressive action, or by its striking 
 out in apprehending objects, while conception is more 
 passive, with internal power to be revived or awak- 
 ened as an inlet to the mind of existing facts, and of 
 the re-occurring of facts, feelings, and ideas which 
 had been real in the experience of the past. 2. Con- 
 ception differs from memory and from the action and 
 objects of remembrance. The causes and objects of 
 conceptions are absent, which is not true with sensa- 
 tions and perceptions. Sensation and perception act 
 from and in reference to their causes and objects; 
 but we have conceptions of truths in the remembrance 
 of past feelings and ideas, when the causes and ob- 
 jects are not taken into the account. In this way we 
 may have conceptions of any thing within the control 
 of memory, independently of time, condition, or place. 
 Our conceptions of past occurrences take no account 
 of the time when their causes were present; and the 
 regulation of them is influenced by the power and 
 laws of association, and can arise under the action 
 and controlling power of volition. 3. Conception is 
 not confined to our impressions of past time, but can 
 be connected with our feelings in regard to present 
 existences. We can not only haye conceptions of 
 present and real existences, but we can have them in 
 connection with peculiar mental states or conditions, 
 upon which depends the peculiarities of illusions, 
 dreaming, and partial insanity, though they may be 
 piisguided or be entirely false. 
 
 9 
 
98 MEMORY 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MEMORY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Memory is that faculty of the mind by which we 
 retain the knowledge of past events, or ideas which 
 are past. It is the power of retaining impressions, 
 facts, or events ; and remembrance, or recollection, is 
 the act of recalling them, and of presenting them, by 
 a voluntary effort, to the mind for inspection. By 
 conception we recall perceptions or the impressions 
 of scenes or events without reference to time, causes, 
 or objects, but memory retains past ideas or events 
 with but little effort in connection with time, causes, 
 and objects. Ideas, facts, and events seem to be 
 spontaneous or abiding realities in the existence of 
 memory; but remembrance, or the act of recalling 
 past events or ideas, is controlled by an effort of the 
 will. 2. Memory is that power or susceptibility of 
 the mind which contains and retains ideas or events 
 without any special, voluntary, or involuntary action. 
 Within itself its capacity or power contains facts in 
 connection with either active or inactive states of 
 mind. It is the retentive power of events or realities 
 which become the objects of thought and of knowl- 
 edge. This power, in vigorous and voluntary action, 
 
MEMORY. 99 
 
 calling up past events or truths, is remembrance, or 
 recollection. Memory is not the origin of knowledge, 
 but is a source of knowledge, in connection with other 
 mental pow T ers, and is essential in forming ideas of 
 realities. 3. The existence, nature, and power of 
 memory are closely connected with those of concep- 
 tion, perception, suggestion, association, and imag- 
 ination. 4. When we speak of an object of memory, 
 we have immediate conceptions of its appearance and 
 qualities. 5. In remembering objects which afflicted 
 us in the past there is an immediate recalling of per- 
 ceptions or impressions, in regard to which we have 
 perceptions of the relation of past time. 6. It is 
 common for us to say, when we think of a fact within 
 the compass of memory, that it suggests to us another 
 fact, perhaps from the similarity or their nearness in 
 the order of time. 7. Memory has been called a de- 
 partment of association, or, under and within the ex- 
 tent of its power, there is an affinity of ideas or 
 events, forming a chain or association, in which they 
 naturally recall each other. 8. Imagination is de- 
 pendent on memory in forming new combinations of 
 ideas from materials stored up in the memory. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. There appears to be original differences in the 
 power of memory. Some persons have remarkably 
 strong and retentive memories, which are essential to 
 a rapid and extensive acquisition of knowledge ; but 
 when memory is very prominent or predominant, it is 
 
100 MEMORY. 
 
 seldom connected with a properly-balanced and well- 
 regulated mind. The strength of the endowment of 
 such minds depends principally upon what has been 
 seen and heard, as they are apt to be very much lim- 
 ited in originality, yet quick and untiring in the pur- 
 suit of an object, with but little caution or judgment. 
 Some have been known to repeat almost any number 
 of words they had heard without any connection or 
 meaning. One writer speaks of a man who could re- 
 peat the entire contents of a newspaper, and of an- 
 other who could retain words spoken to the number 
 of six thousand, while their other intellectual powers 
 were of an inferior order, though this is not univer- 
 sally true with persons of such remarkable memories. 
 2. Memory founded upon and embracing real analo- 
 gies is an element of mind more important to true 
 mental cultivation and the acquisition of knowledge, 
 than that which remembers facts only in the order in 
 which they occurred. The former is an important 
 auxiliary in forming and arriving at intellectual at- 
 tainments and character, while the latter is connected 
 with but little judgment; yet appears to be more 
 sprightly, attended with show, and embraces that 
 class of facts in common demand. 3. We have em- 
 braced and implied, in the nature and power of mem- 
 ory, in its peculiar connection with the action of the 
 intellectual principle, (1.) A sensitive impression, or 
 a certain mental state, resulting from contact with 
 some previous existent, and synchronizing with the 
 perception of the cause recalled. (2.) The involun- 
 
MEMORY. 101 
 
 tary recurring of internal impressions and feelings, 
 or of those which may arise from their similarity to 
 some existent of present knowledge. (3.) An invol- 
 untary recurrence in the mind of some previous ex- 
 istent related to the object or cause apprehended in 
 close affinity or order of time. 4. It not only implies 
 suggestion, but conception of past events with the 
 perceptions of epochs in past time. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Local memory, which refers to and has power 
 over local entities or facts once known, existence 
 either in matter or mind, is generally combined with 
 but little caution and judgment. It merely remem- 
 bers facts or events in the order of their occurrence, 
 resting upon local or incidental relations, especially 
 in regard to place, order of priority, and aposteri- 
 ority. 2. Memory contributes to true knowledge and 
 the belief of truth. If its power to retain and re- 
 member facts be removed, our knowledge of past 
 events is swept away. 3. There are degrees in the 
 power of memory in different persons. There are 
 some who can not retain facts in the mind for any 
 length of time when compared with others. Some 
 recollect that which they have seen, but soon forget 
 that which they have heard. Others recollect that 
 which they have read or heard, but can not remember 
 objects of sight. Some of the greatest and most 
 affecting orators known in history could write in two 
 hours more than they could memorize in a week. It 
 
102 MEMORY. 
 
 is true that some persons can give a long chain of 
 facts narrated by an author, only in the author's 
 words ; while others can give all the facts, only in 
 their own language. 4. Philosophic memory em- 
 braces general principles and universal truths. Gen- 
 eral principles are of more importance than minor 
 items, and also the facts appertaining to and which 
 are explanatory of such principles. This description 
 of memory is sustained principally by the relations 
 of cause and effect, resemblance and contrast. Thus, 
 our inquiries extend to the nature and origin of ex- 
 istences, scanning their analogies and oppositions, 
 causes and results. 
 
 SECTION IV: 
 
 1. A ready memory embraces qualities, resem- 
 blances, and rules of progression with ease, and with- 
 out any special process of exploring and of under- 
 standing the truths or facts illustrative of general 
 principles. 2. A retentive memory is connected with 
 that species of memory called philosophic. It is sup- 
 ported by facts and realities, connected with general 
 principles, and in remembering any fact the action is 
 apt to be prolonged by recalling the general princi- 
 ples with which it is connected. Though it may be 
 slow, yet it is generally progressive and irresistible in 
 conquest. 3. Artificial memory is cultivated and at- 
 tained by connecting things easily remembered with 
 those not so readily recalled. This operation is con- 
 nected with and is dependent, to some extent, upon 
 
MEMORY. 103 
 
 suggestion in a modified form. The whole system of 
 mnemonics principally depends upon suggestion, as 
 when in recalling two synchronizing objects, with one 
 and the same state of mind, the object of easiest rec- 
 ollection exciting the mind in recalling the other of 
 more difficult remembrance. 4. An efficient memory 
 has power to retain facts, with vividness of action in 
 recalling them. There is an acuteness and peculiar 
 quickness of retentive power connected with the 
 memory of some persons which is not exercised by 
 others. A good memory is not only tenacious and 
 quick in the reception of facts, but retains impres- 
 sions or ideas with a great degree of freshness and 
 vividness amid the crumbling of mutable elements 
 and the blight of time. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. The memory of persons at advanced age is not 
 efficient as in earlier life. There is an apparent 
 weakness in the retentive power, and an inability to 
 recall ideas and facts. The loss of this power and 
 activity can not be regarded as w T holly arising within 
 and of itself, but is principally attributable to the 
 state or condition of the medium through which it 
 acts. 2. It is dependent upon perception for facts 
 with which it is stored, only so far as perception aids 
 in such bestowment. But it can not be regarded as 
 dependent upon it for retentive power, nor for its ac- 
 tion in the recalling of ideas or facts. 3. Memory 
 may be weakened by defects in attention from its 
 
104 MEMORY. 
 
 close connection with it; for with attention there is 
 an emotion of interest which is not so acute and 
 tenacious in old persons; yet it is necessary to im- 
 plant facts upon the mind so as to be readily remem- 
 bered. 4. The faculty or power of memory, in aged 
 persons, is not capable of any diminution or loss 
 within and of itself. The defect is attributable to the 
 change and enfeebledness of the organs or medium 
 through which its manifestations are realized. Other- 
 wise the mind of an aged person would be annihilated 
 in proportion as it ceases to be developed. But this 
 is contrary to experience and knowledge. The mem- 
 ory of the aged can retain the events of early life so 
 that they can be correctly rehearsed, while present 
 events or truths are forgotten by them in an hour. 
 This shows that the original power within itself has 
 suffered no elementary loss, and is free from any anni- 
 hilation. 5. He who fears to trust memory will always 
 feel embarrassed in delivering what he knows. In 
 order to conquer and feel at home on any or all sub- 
 jects, we must make memory responsible, and freely 
 throw ourselves upon it. 6. It should be constantly 
 exercised and burdened only with the most important 
 facts. 7. We should receive the impressions of 
 things to be remembered in their natural order — from 
 premises to relations and results, from elements to 
 manifestations, and from causes to effects. 
 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 105 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE 
 DURATION OF MEMORY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Remembrance is the retaining or the continuing 
 in the mind ideas or facts which have been present at 
 various mental states, or it is an idea or impression 
 previously received from some object recurring to the 
 mind at a subsequent period without the presence of 
 its cause. 2. Remembrance implies the occurring of 
 ideas or facts to the mind spontaneously, or with but 
 little mental effort. 3. The ease, distinctness, and 
 readiness with which we remember an impression or 
 fact, is proportionably to the tenacity with which they 
 are received. Deep impressions are lasting, and are 
 continued as property of the mind without any spe- 
 cial voluntary mental effort. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Recollection is the act of recalling impressions or 
 facts which have been the objects of memory at some 
 former time. 2. Remembrance differs from recollection. 
 The former implies that an idea or impression occurs to 
 the mind spontaneously or with but little voluntary ex- 
 ertion. The latter implies not only the power, but it is 
 
106 DURATION OF MEMORY. 
 
 the act of recalling ideas or facts which do not spon- 
 taneously recur to the mind, and with seemingly vol- 
 untary efforts. 3. Recollection, in one sense, is vol- 
 untary, and in another sense it is not. We can not 
 remember because we merely choose to remember. 
 To will to remember any fact or facts, implies that 
 such facts were once the objects of memory, and that 
 they are still in the reach and subject to the power 
 and the act which recalls them. 4. Memory may be 
 said to be the power which receives and retains ideas 
 or facts. Remembrance appears to preserve facts once 
 known from passing away from the mind so as to be 
 utterly beyond recovery. Recollection is the act of 
 recalling facts, once the objects of memory, for the 
 inspection and* use of the mind. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. The duration of memory is clearly evidenced in 
 its power to recall and present to the mind the events 
 of its past experience. Memory, within itself, is ab- 
 solutely imperishable, and thoughts which are the ob- 
 jects of memory are indestructible. If the impres- 
 sion is revived with which any thought in time past 
 was connected, the thought itself can be reproduced. 
 The reviving of any impression once realized necessa- 
 rily involves the presence and the action of a power 
 which can affect the recalling of thoughts coexisting 
 with it. 2. Thoughts and feelings, which have been 
 forgotten for years, often recur unexpectedly. It is 
 believed by some that the mind possesses within itself 
 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 107 
 
 power in its different states, and while affected altern- 
 ately by innumerable existences and influences, to 
 recall, at different periods, all the events and feelings 
 which have ever been the objects of memory. 3. It 
 can be and is affected by the physical organs, when 
 those organs are under the power and influence of 
 disease. There is a connection between the mind and 
 the physical organs, in which each exercises a recip- 
 rocal influence. The action of the mind may be in- 
 creased or diminished in proportion to the manner and 
 intensity of the influence of disease upon the body. 
 Accordingly as the body is affected the mind may be 
 retarded or quickened in action. 4. Memory may be 
 impaired from injuries of the head or affections of the 
 brain. An Englishman has been mentioned w T ho was 
 in a state of stupor, the result of an injury of the 
 head, who, when reviving, spoke only in Welsh. He 
 had been thirty years from his native country, and 
 previous to the injury had forgotten his native lan- 
 guage, and when restored to health he recovered the 
 English language again and could not recollect Welsh. 
 This was evidence that the power of memory had not 
 been destroyed, and that its inactivity in recalling facts 
 can not be attributed to any defect within and of itself. 
 A Frenchman on going to England when quite young, 
 lost the power of speaking French; but while suffer- 
 ing from an injury of the head he spoke only French. 
 5. When the body is affected in different ivays the ef- 
 fect upon memory differs. A boy has been mentioned 
 who seemed to be insensible under the operation of 
 
108 DURATION OF MEMORY. 
 
 trepan for fracture of the skull, and when he was re- 
 stored to health had no recollection of it ; but during 
 the delirium of a fever eleven years after, he gave a 
 correct description of the operation, and of the per- 
 sons present. An Italian gentleman, when first at- 
 tacked with disease of the brain, spoke English; as 
 the disease progressed he spoke French, and for some 
 time before his death spoke only Italian. These facts, 
 with many others, show that diseased organs have an 
 influence over memory, and also that memory must be 
 imperishable. 6. Often when the mind appears to be 
 in an inactive state of coma, the result of violent fever, 
 the powers and action of memory are not wholly sus- 
 pended. There are instances of persons thus affected, 
 and supposed to be perfectly unconscious, who, on re- 
 covery, have had a perfect recollection of the events 
 and conversation which took place. 7. Truths, which 
 are the first objects of memory with the young, are 
 those which are of most importance. Though they 
 are the first received, yet they are the last forgotten. 
 Those things which we learn first are generally closely 
 connected with our education, and they greatly influ- 
 ence our course in life, and aid in forming our char- 
 acters for eternity. 8. In view of the judgment of 
 the great day, what manner of persons ought we to 
 be ? Memory will then and there present to the mind 
 all the impressions, ideas, feelings, and acts of our 
 whole lives. All, all will be remembered. 
 
ATTENTION. 109 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ATTENTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Attention is that faculty of the mind which 
 has power to attend to or heed any reality. 2. By 
 general consent it has been defined to be the action 
 in, or the act of attending to objects or facts. 3. If 
 it has power to act, or be acted upon, then it is a real 
 entity. And if real, it must be capable of being 
 called an element of the mind. 4, If an element of 
 mind, it can not be a result of any other element or 
 elements. 5. The strong efforts made by some to 
 prove that it is not an original power, has convinced 
 us that the reverse is true, from the fact their 
 conclusions failed for want of correct arguments. 
 6. Attention expresses not only the state of mind, 
 but the act by which it is directed to any object or 
 fact, to the exclusion, for the time, of all other con- 
 siderations. Though closely connected with percep- 
 tion, yet we may have perceptions of objects, to some 
 extent, before the attention is directed to them. The 
 musician can perceive the order of the bass of a piece 
 of music which he is playing on an instrument, while 
 his attention is at the same time upon the air he is 
 singing. When our attention is steadily fixed upon an 
 
110 ATTENTION. 
 
 object, other objects may pass within the field of vi- 
 sion unheeded till our attention is withdrawn; then, 
 without difficulty, the mind can be directed to the ob- 
 ject which had received no previous notice. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Attention is said to be voluntary when under 
 the power and action of the will. An object may 
 have our attention so as to lead to a general exam- 
 ination of its appearance ; but we can determine to 
 attend to the nature or elements of such object or 
 objects, upon which a penetrating investigation takes 
 place. 2. It is said to be involuntary when suddenly 
 arrested and turned to an unexpected object before 
 the consent of the will is obtained to forsake an ob- 
 ject of previous pursuit or investigation. 3. Intense 
 and successful attention depends upon our determina- 
 tion to thoroughly investigate and understand the ob- 
 jects or facts to which the mind is directed. 4. 
 Memory is dependent upon attention. In proportion 
 as our attention to facts is intense or slight, so is our 
 remembrance vivid and of long continuance, or brief 
 and imperfect. That which receives our undivided 
 attention becomes the object of remembrance. If 
 the peculiarities of a tree in the midst of the grove 
 receives our undivided attention, it will be remem- 
 bered, while all those which surround it, with equal 
 peculiarities and within the field of vision, if remem- 
 bered at all will be as almost indistinct entities. 5. 
 Bodily diseases, in most cases, seem to affect this fac- 
 
ATTENTION. Ill 
 
 ulty of the mind first. And as disease advances its 
 victim becomes so far incapable of exercising atten- 
 tion that present occurrences can not be remembered. 
 When the mind is so much affected by disease that 
 we are incapable of receiving correct impressions 
 from external objects, and we begin to regard the ob- 
 jects of our thoughts as real existences, we are in 
 the first degree or state of delirium. 6. Fever, in- 
 temperance, and old age so affect the body, that in 
 the majority of cases attention can not be concentrated 
 upon a long chain of arguments, neither can it be 
 fixed for a long time upon any one object, yet the 
 power of attending to facts is in the mind, and is in- 
 capable of any essential destruction or annihilation 
 within and of itself. 
 
112 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The power of association is in the mind. This 
 power has its origin in connection with consciousness, 
 original and relative suggestion, and by it the objects 
 of their action seem to be blended for the inspection 
 and use of the mind. Its action is the associating of 
 ideas where two or more constantly or naturally fol- 
 low each other.in the mind, so that one almost infalli- 
 bly produces the other. 2. The act of associating is 
 sustained by a remarkable tendency, in which facts or 
 conceptions, having been contemplated together or in 
 immediate succession, become so connected in the dif- 
 ferent mental states, that one of them, at a subse- 
 quent period, recalls the others, or introduces a train 
 of thoughts which succeed each other in the order of 
 their original association. 3. Association may be 
 regarded as voluntary, to a certain extent. There 
 can be a mental effort made in calling up ideas or 
 facts which have been associated with those which are 
 clearly the objects of volitive action. 4. But we are 
 led to regard association principally as involuntary. 
 It is spontaneous when any fact present to the mind 
 suggests another resembling or having some kind of 
 
ASSOCIATION, 113 
 
 affinity to itself; this may suggest a third, and so on 
 till many arise. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. If association consists only in the adhering, 
 natural affinity and the blending of our ideas, or 
 thoughts, or feelings, then philosophers have argued 
 cogently and effectually. But if " resemblance, con- 
 trast, contiguity, in time and place, and cause and 
 effect" are primary laws of association, we can not 
 understand their undefined definition of the primary 
 power of association. If there is a power in the 
 mind capable of associating ideas, that power lies 
 back of the act of associating them; and if the act is 
 acknowledged, the cause of that act belongs to and, is 
 in the mind. It is impossible for the original power 
 of association to be a result of the action of one or 
 more elements of mind. No primary element has 
 power to form itself, and consequently can not, by 
 mere action, form a power which fills the office of a 
 mental faculty. 2. It is not contended that the asso- 
 ciating of ideas or facts, as a result, is an original 
 element of mind, nor that it is any thing more than 
 an ultimate existent in mental phenomena, but that 
 the power which acts is in the mind. 3. Association 
 is furnished with materials in the occurrences and 
 facts which are connected with the laws of cause and 
 effect, resemblance, contrast, and contiguity in time 
 and place. 
 
 30 
 
114 ASSOCIATION 
 
 SECTION III 
 
 1. Objects which are connected, or those which 
 sustain to each other the relation, to any degree, of 
 cause and effect, do suggest each other as objects of 
 the power of association. 2. Resemblance, in the 
 form or qualities of objects, will mutually suggest 
 each other to the mind, and the objects of facts thus 
 presented are the property of the power of associa- 
 tion. 3. Contrast appears to contribute to associa- 
 tion. A very large man suggests the idea of a dwarf, 
 the rivulet a river, and a lake the ocean. 4. Associ- 
 ation is aided by facts connected with the law of con- 
 tiguity of time and place. The nearness of time in 
 which facts occurred or feelings existed, and the close 
 connection of localities or places aids the power of 
 suggestion and contributes to association. Some par- 
 ents can always tell the ages of their neighbors' chil- 
 dren by recalling the birthdays of their own, which 
 are near, in time. When we think of the cities of 
 London and Paris, we immediately think of the coun- 
 tries where they are located. 5. Natural association 
 takes place when any fact, which is the object of at- 
 tention, is by the mind associated with some fact of 
 previous knowledge to which it has a resemblance or 
 relation. In this way associations may be formed. 
 The referring of facts to some principle or subject, 
 which they are calculated to illustrate, fixes them in 
 the mind, and the association is easy and natural. 
 
ASSOCIATION. 115 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The calling up of facts is voluntary when we 
 direct the mind to a particular train of truths or 
 thoughts best calculated to lead to those who wish to 
 command. We may have an impression of some 
 item of knowledge which we have been in the pos- 
 session of, and from the present knowledge of a por- 
 tion of facts belonging to a certain class, be enabled 
 to recall all others of the same association. 2. Asso- 
 ciations recur involuntarily when the mind is turned 
 to some subject which is calculated, in nature, or by 
 its elementary existence or tendency, to lead to them. 
 The mind can pursue trains of thought without any 
 volitive effort, and often without any consciousness of 
 its action, till some object arrests the attention. 3. 
 Casual associations are formed only in connection 
 with persons, incidents, or place. An idea or thought 
 is associated with the source it was received from; 
 the person, the book, or the place, of whom, or of 
 which, or where we came in possession of any truth 
 or fact. Such truths or facts are recalled in the mind 
 whenever the source is thought of, seen, or men- 
 tioned. If we think of a certain city where we have 
 been, the mind is immediately presented with direct 
 facts, incidents, or occurrences in connection with it 
 to almost an innumerable extent. 4. Facts or occur- 
 rences associated with places or localities are revived 
 when we think of or visit them. The Christian loves 
 to revisit the place where his manner of life was 
 
116 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 changed, and think of and review the associations 
 connected with it. And on the other hand, the mur- 
 derer dreads to think of or revisit places of his dark 
 criminal deeds, and shudders in dwelling upon the as- 
 sociations which there arise as portentous of wretch- 
 edness and woe. 5. Associations formed in connec- 
 tion with localities seem to impress the mind with 
 facts almost independent of memory. In some in- 
 stances occurrences, which have been experienced in 
 connection with certain locations, have been entirely- 
 forgotten till the place or places were . revisited, when 
 the facts associated with them were revived and re- 
 called. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Intentional association involves a volitive men- 
 tal action. The truths associated are not connected 
 so much by the external relation they sustain to each 
 other as that existing in the states and action of the 
 mind. We can establish a connection between the 
 thing we wish to remember and some other known 
 object, which may have no relation to that which is 
 to be remembered. 2. Often, when persons go in the 
 pursuit of two or more objects, and fearing that some 
 one will be forgotten, they select some familiar phrase, 
 carry something in their hand or pocket, only as 
 realities, to prevent forgetting the object desired. 3. 
 The principle of intentional association is further 
 illustrated by the way in which the mind is affected 
 in regard to the real existence of the Christian sys- 
 tem and the truths connected with it. Infidels who 
 
ASSOCIATION. 117 
 
 have urged that the common course of nature is the 
 only truth universal and infallible, have, on the other 
 hand, denied that human testimony is sufficient to 
 establish the events connected with our holy religion. 
 Though this is a sophism, yet it should be met. If 
 we had no means or way to judge of the lapse of 
 time, or of the remote ages of the world, than the 
 testimony of inert elements as found on the face of 
 the globe, or those which are now regarded as being 
 contained in the stratified archives of its own periods 
 and ages, we would as readily infer that the existence 
 of the earth was an accident of recent occurrence as 
 to have any other supposition. 4. A proper belief in 
 the arrangements and occurrences of such facts de- 
 pends upon human testimony and experience in rela- 
 tion to the chain of associated truths in the past. By 
 means of traditional and written testimony we are led 
 to the belief that the earth is more than five thousand 
 years old; but without this testimony it would all be 
 in the confusion of uncertainty, and in darkness. 5. 
 The commemorative rites or periodical observances, 
 can be transmitted from age to age by traditional 
 testimony, or that which has been written by many in- 
 dividuals, and at different times, during the lapse of 
 thousands of years ; yet there is the regular return 
 of the fact, the occasion and the day associated with 
 them, the unbroken series which carry us back to the 
 time of the original events, and the persons who wit- 
 nessed them. Hence, we have as much faith or belief 
 in the real existence of such facts as we have in the 
 
118 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 series of years which have marked the course of time 
 and the existence of the globe. 6. By the association 
 of events and facts connected with these observances 
 we are freed from every impression of false testimony, 
 from the fact that we are conducted back by regular 
 steps and periods to the time of the original events. 
 An impostor can not fabricate a system of theology 
 which can be even the object of investigation till it is 
 marked with rites, periods, and events ; then the har- 
 mony and regular occurrence of them would be of the 
 utmost importance. But such a system as this, bear- 
 ing sufficient resemblance to the Bible to be believed, 
 has never been known; while the Bible has them in 
 series of facts extending through the past and de- 
 scribed as pending in the unbounded future to a de- 
 gree and extent infinitely beyond all other books, 
 systems, or facts ever known. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. The true analysis of language will not allow the 
 terms " law or laws " to be applied to the principle of 
 association, nor to those principles or existences closely 
 connected with it, only as such connected entities 
 are clearly contingent in nature or relationship. 2. 
 Truths may sustain such relations to one another as to 
 mutually suggest each other; this relationship can 
 not reveal the law or laws of the principle of associa- 
 tion, but is that by which objects suggest each other 
 upon the ground of a common influence or impression 
 made by them upon the mind. 8. A variation of the 
 
ASSOCIATION. 119 
 
 associating principle may be found in, and in connec- 
 tion with, the original difference in mental powers. 
 It may arise from the difference in primary elements 
 and their action, all of which may affect the associa- 
 ting principle. One mind may differ from another by 
 possessing one or more faculties of a higher order 
 than those corresponding to them in the other mind. 
 The action of many minds differ, and these differences 
 influence the associating principle. Three men of 
 equal minds in strength journey together; one is nat- 
 urally inclined to notice the face of the country, a 
 second the road and internal improvements, and a 
 third the manners and customs of the people. All 
 these different objects give rise to corresponding asso- 
 ciations. 4. The associating principle varies with the 
 energy and strength of the emotions. Objects which 
 cause or have in connection with them realities, giving 
 rise to intense feelings of sorrow, are readily recalled; 
 as permanent columns, amid ruins, they stand out, the 
 enduring objects of memory, while facts connected 
 with slight emotions are soon numbered with things 
 that were. 5. The influence of the lapse of time af- 
 fects the existence and action of the associating prin- 
 ciple. Facts occurring last evening can be recalled 
 with clearness and far more readily than those of 
 many years' standing, from the fact that there is no 
 perceptible loss in the strength of the connection by 
 which the facts thus associated revive and restore 
 each other. 6. Mental associations may be under a 
 direct volitive power and action. By voluntary action 
 
120 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 we can not create associations nor the facts entering 
 into such combinations. And we can not will the ex- 
 istence of truths to be associated without first having 
 some idea or perception of those things we wish to 
 have exist; but we can will that facts or trains of 
 thought may be present with and under the full in- 
 spection of the mind ; and we have volitive power to 
 retain them as objects of such inspection. And on 
 the sudden perception of some unpleasant reality we 
 can instantly divert the attention and refuse to con- 
 template it, or the facts which may be associated with 
 it. 7. Associations can be and often are under indi- 
 rect voluntary power. A volitive power may be re- 
 garded as incapable of creating, by direct action, 
 either mental associations or the facts thus connected. 
 The skill and design interwoven and connected with 
 the works of nature lead us to think of the great First 
 Cause. Here we pause as though we would wish to 
 comprehend the infinity of such power or Being; yet 
 the regular course of such thought is no sooner 
 checked, than silvery trains of innumerable rolling 
 worlds he has made, fly through the field of mental 
 contemplation, ever burning with the glow of imper- 
 ishable light. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 1. The influence of association upon our ideas of 
 correct taste is worthy of notice. Great care should 
 be observed in receiving truths according to the rules 
 of correct taste. Orators famed for wisdom, a ready 
 and forcible delivery, often indulge in imperfections 
 
ASSOCIATION. 121 
 
 as to language, gestures, or manner of delivery, which 
 would be regarded as revolting and disgusting but for 
 the influence associated with the speaker. Though 
 such defects are noticed at first without pleasure upon 
 the part of admirers, yet in course of time such de- 
 fects, being associated with the man and his zeal, are 
 regarded as marks of great distinction. Hence, such 
 defects are copied and imitated, while traits of true 
 excellence pass unnoticed. 2. Our ideas of fashion 
 vary with the influence of association. The odd in- 
 signia or the peculiarity of the escutcheon upon which 
 is emblazoned the glory of some great warrior, how- 
 ever ludicrous they may appear within themselves, are 
 soon regarded as tasteful and glorious from their con- 
 nection with such personage. This is true, to some 
 extent, in regard to almost every extravagance in 
 dress. 3. That which would be abhorred, if intro- 
 duced by common persons, can be introduced by oth- 
 ers, and be extolled by almost universal consent, only 
 from its association with such persons. When the 
 multitude lay aside any extravagance, should any one 
 perpetuate it they are regarded as being destitute of 
 refinement. It w T ould appear that any person ever 
 conforming to the rules of a correct taste and fashion, 
 independently of the varying influence of association, 
 would be regarded as a wonder in the earth, being un- 
 worthy of imitation. 4. The tendency and effects of 
 improper associations are worthy of notice. They 
 may descend in degrees from those of simple error to 
 those of vicious and malicious tendencies and results. 
 
 n 
 
122 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 Many descriptive writers associate with wicked tend- 
 encies, deeds, and events, language full of imagery, 
 exciting the feelings w T ith sublimity, beauty, grandeur, 
 and delight, till that which is sinful can be contem- 
 plated without any feelings of abhorrence, and the 
 mind becomes inclined to crime. This course once 
 entered, without almost a miraculous interposition of 
 Divine power, the immortal soul is soon entangled and 
 black with crimes, attracting the electricity of unend- 
 ing wrath. 5. We here close with the tendency and 
 results of correct associations. That which is pure 
 within itself becomes the object of pure mental action. 
 A pure mind appears naturally so corelated to objects 
 that if some were not of a high order of purity, yet 
 the associations, if permitted to be formed, would be 
 pure and harmless. 6. He who wishes to succeed in 
 any branch of science must know that he has first 
 correctly fixed the primary principles, and then asso- 
 ciate Avith them those truths which are naturally 
 adapted to and are connected with their existence, in 
 order to arrive at and clearly comprehend correct 
 results. We can not speak of all the endlessly- 
 diversified applications of the associating principle, 
 yet their existence is indispensable in the acquisition 
 of knowledge. 
 
DIVISION FIFTH 
 
 •♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MENTAL STATES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. A simple mental state may be regarded as only 
 expressing the presence of one thought or object, 
 which appears to be disconnected and indivisible. 
 Such state of mind seems to be natural; for a simple 
 notion, feeling, or idea is indivisible; yet they can be 
 the object or objects of mental states. 2. If two or 
 more elements or existences, collected or connected 
 together, enter into mental states, such states are not 
 simple, but complex. 3. Though simple mental states 
 can not be defined, yet, like axioms, they may be re- 
 garded as self-evident truths, always to be known as 
 real entities within themselves. 4. Our belief in and 
 reliance upon them as real may be with boundless 
 confidence ; for there can be no imaginary existent in 
 a single idea, feeling, or fact abstracted and indivis- 
 ible. Here is natural truth, in which we can trust 
 without fear of deception. 5. Simple mental states 
 may be regarded as preceding those which are com- 
 plex. A simple idea, feeling, or fact must first enter 
 
 into mental states and be known, in order to the 
 
 123 
 
124 MENTAL STATES. 
 
 knowledge of the relationship of many truths in the 
 existence of complex states. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The existence of complex mental states may be 
 regarded as affected with the presence of a collection, 
 assemblage, or a complication of ideas, feelings, or 
 realities. If we think of any external existence, as 
 a tree, mountain, lake, or river, there are properties 
 and qualities embraced in the action of the mind in 
 relation to each or all of them. 2. Our thoughts and 
 feelings may arise from many objects or causes, but 
 all unite in the soul under the immediate inspection 
 of the mind, which can take into the account the one- 
 ness severally in their origin. 3. Our mental states 
 are complex in contemplating external objects. We 
 form an idea of the existence of ice from its proper- 
 ties, and we describe it only by giving those proper- 
 ties weight, friability, color, and hardness. Similar 
 complexness exists in regard to any other combina- 
 tion of properties. 4. Complex mental states may 
 exist in relation to that which is connected with ex- 
 ternal objects, differing from abstract elements. In 
 connection with qualities there may be presented to 
 the mind tendencies, appearances, and influences. 
 And we may be ready to acknowledge an essence or 
 foundation without being able to define it. The only 
 way we can study the existence and nature or essence 
 of material compounds, is by their elements and in- 
 ertness. And the only way that we can study the 
 
MENTAL STATES. 
 
 125 
 
 nature or essence of mind, is by its elements and ac- 
 tion. 5. Complex states of mind are often the result 
 of internal influences or realities. As a lake receives 
 from tributary streams, on every hand, so the mind 
 may be regarded as the receptacle of knowledge, be- 
 ing affected by almost innumerable influences and im- 
 pressions. We can judge of these as correctly as we 
 can of those arising from external existences. 
 
126 ABSTRACTION 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ABSTRACTION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Abstraction is the act or operation by which 
 elements are separated from each other and examined 
 individually. The original power of such action, and 
 by which it is known to exist, is in the mind. It may 
 take place when the mind is occupied with separated 
 facts, or when we contemplate some particular part or 
 property of a # compound, or of a complex object, as 
 disconnected from other existences of such combina- 
 tions. 2. By the mental exercise or the acting power 
 of abstraction, we can examine many objects, select- 
 ing definite properties in which they agree and can 
 be classified. And it can be still more comprehen- 
 sive in selecting a property or fact which is common 
 to an extensive collection of adhering or complex en- 
 tities. 3. An abstract notion or thought may arise 
 upon the ground of detected resemblance and differ- 
 ence in objects or properties, and in the special notice 
 or attention given to them individually. In the pres- 
 ence of compounds we can have conceptions of den- 
 sity, form, or friability without the introduction of 
 other properties. Properties may be so separated 
 from the combination as to be the objects of abstract 
 
ABSTRACTION. 127 
 
 thought, and any element may be so contemplated in 
 its separation as to be the object of special observa- 
 tion. If I say this apple is red, the color only may 
 be the object of abstract thought. 4. Mental opera- 
 tions in separating facts, or in abstracting certain 
 ideas, is worthy of a passing notice. The power of 
 abstraction is in the mind. If the mind has the 
 power of motion, and if it does act, we must admit 
 that notions or ideas arise in connection with or in 
 such action. In the origin of our ideas they may be 
 simple, or may exist separated from each other. 
 There appears to be a natural tendency uniting 
 them, giving rise to complex mental states. If this 
 union is formed of many simple ideas or truths, the 
 power in the mind, or that is connected with mental 
 operations, which is capable of separating these united 
 facts, in whole or in part, may be called abstraction. 
 The union of ideas forming complex mental states 
 may be either intentional or involuntary; but the sep- 
 arating or abstracting of them appears to be volun- 
 tary. 5. We may be said to have particular abstract 
 ideas on the presentation of an object to us having 
 color, fragrance, form, density, and extension, when 
 the mind is so entirely occupied with some one of 
 these qualities as to be almost insensible to the exist- 
 ence of the others. The particular abstraction takes 
 place when the action of the mind is limited to one 
 quality. When any object or quality existing in a 
 state of combination is separated by a mental process 
 for inspection, the idea we form of it may be said to 
 
128 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 be of particular abstraction. This may take place in 
 the mind either with or without a real separation of 
 the combined entities. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Gfeneral abstraction may apply to classification 
 when we examine one class of objects separate and 
 apart from other classes. Objects classified under 
 the terms of genera and species, may be contemplated 
 or examined under the law of general abstraction. 
 When a variety of objects are before us, it is easy 
 and almost natural for the properties or qualities of 
 agreement and disagreement to be presented to the 
 mind, giving rise to associations or classes. These 
 classes of many -objects may be represented by a sin- 
 gle term, and any one of them become the object of 
 mental action separate or abstracted from the others. 
 2. General abstract ideas will apply to almost innu- 
 merable classes of objects — the different orders or 
 classes in zoology, ornithology, vegetation, and crys- 
 tallization. 3. The process of abstraction is essential 
 to a well-regulated mind. Without it we can not 
 proceed correctly in analyzing the qualities or ele- 
 ments of objects; and we could not control the atten- 
 tion, concentrating the action of the mental powers 
 in the examination of any one object separated from 
 the thousands bestudding the field of vision, or that 
 are present with and are contained in the mind. 4. 
 It is influenced and affected by the power of dis- 
 ease, and can be so impaired or weakened, as disease 
 
ABSTRACTION 
 
 129 
 
 increases, that all objects are in a state of confusion 
 to the mind, and it naturally varies as to degrees 
 of acuteness and power in different minds. 
 
130 IMAGINATION. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Imagination is that power or faculty by the ac- 
 tion or exercise of which we form new T combinations 
 within the mind, gathered from real elements, scenes, 
 or facts. It is that which forms new associations of 
 ideas from the truths which are the property of mem- 
 ory, being subject to its power. From the materials 
 stored up in the memory it produces new combina- 
 tions, on the one hand, more pleasing, more brilliant, 
 or more sublime, or, on the other, more awful, more 
 terrible, or more horrible. 2. Imagination has been 
 regarded as an ulterior element of mind, or that it is 
 a result of certain primary elements when in action. 
 If its origin and existence wholly depends upon the 
 action of certain primary elements, then when those 
 elements are inactive the power and action of imag- 
 ination would be annihilated; and if ever its being 
 and action are recalled they would exist by the crea- 
 tive action of those primary elements. That primary 
 elements have such creative power is absurd. 3. Im- 
 agination is closely connected with the power of the 
 understanding and our conceptions and perceptions 
 of objects and facts. Under its influence and action 
 
IMAGINATION. 131 
 
 we are enabled to combine objects and qualities of 
 which we have conceptions, and extend our thoughts 
 to the contemplation of similar ones, or of other facts 
 as real, though unknown to us before, and we can 
 imagine such existences as being more pleasing or 
 awful than any fact of real existence in nature. In 
 some instances we can pursue and describe them to a 
 greater degree of clearness, beauty, and grandeur 
 than is contained in any similar fact or object of ma- 
 teriality. 4. Imagination may extend to the opera- 
 tions of apprehending and contemplating the arrange- 
 ments, qualities, resemblances, or influences connected 
 with objects of mental action, and the extension of 
 our thoughts in the formation of new ideas beyond 
 those which may be regarded as primary ones, to- 
 gether with the relative position and influence of the 
 same to and upon each other, and to the original 
 ideas. It recombines our ideas of the relative condi- 
 tion of things, and influences mental states in relation 
 to the beautiful, grand, and sublime, which transcends 
 the original ideas as our thoughts pass beyond them 
 and ascend higher. 5. It influences mental states, in 
 and by which the mind conceives and forms ideas 
 within itself, and of real and supposed external ob- 
 jects. It assembles images and paints them upon our 
 minds and on the minds of others. By it we can go 
 beyond all these in adding ideas and thoughts to those 
 already in the mind, and in adding any image or real- 
 ity necessary to fill or complete the scene or process 
 of apprehending till the mind is satisfied, or there is 
 
132 IMAGINATION. 
 
 a suspension of further action. 6. Imagination leads 
 in blending elements of diverse existences. Those 
 which belong to widely-diversified scenes can be com- 
 bined into one beautiful conception, presenting to the 
 mind that which is beautiful, grand, or partakes of 
 true sublimity. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The operations or exercise of imagination may 
 be said to be involuntary, when there is action without 
 any volitive effort, and such action can take place 
 when we are not immediately conscious of the fact till 
 some object or fact arrests our attention, and we recall 
 beautiful combinations. 2. Intentional imagination 
 involves artificial combinations, by means of which the 
 mind acting pass'es on, while extended thoughts and 
 facts arise, forming new objects of contemplation. 
 
 3. Fictitious delineations are dependent upon imagin- 
 ation for transactions, scenes, and imaginary facts. 
 
 4. Productions of the imagination are chaste and of 
 a high moral character in proportion to the moral 
 principle, taste, and habits of the author. 5. The 
 combinations of images, elements, or facts which are 
 produced by the imagination being vile, demoralizing, 
 and destructive in their nature and tendency, corre- 
 spond with the bad motives, the corrupt principles, and 
 the perverted habit of the author. 6. Imagination 
 differs from fancy in forming new combinations from 
 the materials stored up in the memory, graduating 
 them from the beautiful to the sublime, or from the 
 awful to the more terrible. Fancy is that by which 
 
IMAGINATION. 133 
 
 the mind forms images or representations of facts or 
 existences, while imagination is the power of combining 
 and increasing, or of diminishing the interest of men- 
 tal states. 7. Imagination differs from admiration ; 
 for the latter is no more than wonder mingled with 
 emotions of love or veneration, or of that which is 
 novel or great. 8. It differs from fictions in the re- 
 sults of its action. Fictions can only be regarded as 
 fictions ; but imagination blends elements of beauty, 
 grandeur, and sublimity into one grand conception. 
 9. There is a difference between the imagination and 
 bombast. The former may command, combine, and 
 blend elements into forms of beauty, grandeur, and 
 sublimity, w T hile the latter consists in high-sounding 
 words in an inflated style. A speaker, while enforc- 
 ing the truthfulness and claims of his theme, had 
 moved his audience with a general feeling of excite- 
 ment under his thrilling eloquence, and closed with 
 great applause and triumph in the following manner : 
 " Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one 
 foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Rocky 
 Mountains; thrusting my tongue into the thunder's 
 mouth, I would proclaim these truths to the ends of 
 the world." Subsequently a young speaker attempted 
 to use the same while delivering a discourse in a loud 
 tone of voice and with great confidence : " Now, my 
 audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon 
 the Andes and the other upon the Rocky Mountains, 
 and I would thrust my tongue into the thunder's 
 mouth, and I ? d, I Id, I 'd howl like a wolf." Here is 
 
134 IMAGINATION. 
 
 evidence that the action of the imagination was imper- 
 fect, and that at first he had but a meager conception 
 of what he wished to say. Bombast is without a cor- 
 rect blending of the beautiful, and without the proper 
 presence and arrangement of ideas and thoughts. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Imagination differs very much in nature and ac- 
 tion from that of burlesque. The solemn thoughtful- 
 ness or real nature of the latter is only feigned for 
 the purpose of exciting amusement or laughter by lu- 
 dicrous images or representations. 2. Imagination 
 differs from sarcasm. The latter may abound with 
 imagery or beautiful language, but at the same time 
 there is an ironical signification or expression. Though 
 there is a granting of the claims of any person or 
 people, yet there may be a keen, reproachful expres- 
 sion or satirical remark, with an influence, expres- 
 sion, or feeling of scorn, while imagination must be 
 regarded as free from such peculiarities. 3. Feelings 
 of sympathy are not wholly dependent upon imagin- 
 ation, though they may be aided by it. Though sym- 
 pathy can and does not originate with or from it, yet 
 a quick, active, and powerful imagination can and does 
 combine images of suffering, gloom, and despair. A 
 man whose moral sensibilities are still alive to action 
 always has sympathy intuitively on the presentation 
 of any object of suffering. But his feelings are much 
 increased when he begins to imagine himself in like 
 condition. 4. The imagination can be exercised in 
 
IMAGINATION. 135 
 
 works of fiction without injury only when such fiction 
 is immediately connected with truths or facts in nature, 
 and possessing the high moral character which Infinite 
 Wisdom has connected with all he has made. 5. The 
 influence of fictitious writings upon an active imagin- 
 ation is decidedly injurious. It weakens mental ac- 
 tion in the examination of real and important truths, 
 tends to fickleness and whimsicalness of mind, insta- 
 bility of character, and often leads to certain ruin. 
 The Divine Being has filled an infinite space with an 
 eternal range of existences or facts, so that the immor- 
 tal mind can dwell on real facts or truths without num- 
 ber, and to endless ages increasing in majesty and 
 glory. 6. The utility and importance of the imagin- 
 ation must be regarded as of no ordinary character. 
 In neglecting the cultivation of this noble and import- 
 ant faculty of the mind, is to impede the power and 
 action of the whole mind. 7. A vigorous and active 
 imagination, in conveying our thoughts, or in describ- 
 ing facts in writing, is of great importance. To pre- 
 sent imagery, or to correctly delineate scenes, facts, 
 or transactions, or to paint them in their combinations 
 and qualities, is effected principally under its control 
 and action. 8. An active imagination is essential to 
 true oratory. To conceive of a speaker's power to 
 excite, move, and thrill an audience without such aid, 
 is utterly impossible. True, affecting, and exciting 
 eloquence can never exist in connection with that 
 mind destitute of an active imagination. Under its 
 combinations and blendings, derived from the language 
 
IMAGINATION. 
 
 of trope and metaphor, the orator may launch thun- 
 der-peals, startling the feelings or emotions of all 
 around him. 9. The combinations, blendings, descrip- 
 tions, and painting of the poet are without air 
 
 it unless the action of the mind is pervaded 
 
 ub active imagination. 10. The sculptor's chisel 
 can not trace upon the marble the living and desired 
 expression or features of a friend if destitute of its 
 
 er. It is this which enables him to render every 
 form graceful and beautiful. And it is this faculty 
 which causes others to admire the work when com- 
 pleted. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The d lent or impn :t of the imagin- 
 
 ation can be secured by attending to the manner of 
 its exercise or action, by continued efforts to extend 
 its power and influence. 2. The influence of dm 
 
 the imagination: its action maybe directed 
 in improper object or in a wrong channel. 3. It 
 can lead as md improper action un- 
 
 less controlled by reason, motive, and virtue. We are 
 apt to imagine that great warriors or statesmen, who 
 have left the world, have died happy and are gone to 
 heaven, when they have not. at any time, given one 
 clear and conclusive evidence of such result, as re- 
 quired by the Gospel law. 4. It will lead to 
 
 . if allowed to wander uncontrolled amid myriads 
 of imaginary beings, or scenes of wealth and pleasure. 
 It soon tends to abstract the mind from real exist- 
 ences, and causes it to dwell on the beautiful forms 
 
IMAGINATION. 137 
 
 of fancy, which are false, and upon the most whim- 
 sical speculations. It ceases to contemplate real ex- 
 istences at hand as worthy attention. It soon with- 
 draws from all objects of worth and dwells in a world 
 of conjecture. When the mind advances to this point 
 it is midway from a rational state to that of insanity. 
 5. A continued love of and an untiring pursuit of fic- 
 tion often diseases and sends out the entire desires of 
 the mind upon the wing of supposition — feasting such 
 desires with inaccessible enjoyments and perishable 
 glory. Finally the mind becomes wearied with the 
 staleness of all demonstrable truths, and fictions ap- 
 pear as realities. The sympathies and affections of 
 the heart become cold and die for want of real and 
 accessible objects upon which they can act. Often 
 false opinions and lies become the dreams of life, an 
 additional gloom in death, and the bitterness of eter- 
 nal remorse. It would be far better to suffer, if pos- 
 sible, a thousand temporal deaths, than for the immor- 
 tal soul to perish with invoked madness. Never dwell 
 too long upon only one and the same idea if you 
 would be sane on all points. 
 
 12 
 
DIVISION SIXTH 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL OB- 
 
 IGIN AND INTELLECTUAL STATES 
 
 OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The powers of mind arranged under the preced- 
 ing divisions x>f this work, or the greater number of 
 them, have, by common consent of many writers, been 
 arranged under the general heading of "intellectual 
 states of external origin" and faculties, the defining 
 of which we are now commencing, have been arranged 
 under the heading of intellectual states of internal 
 origin. In this arrangement there appears to be a 
 distinction without a philosophical difference. 2. We 
 object to the doctrine of intellectual states of external 
 origin. They may exist as results of external causes ; 
 but for intellectual states to arise in the external 
 world, or out of or beyond the limits of the mind 
 itself, is clearly incorrect, and this is a philosophical 
 deduction from the heading referred to. 3. If it is 
 impossible for intellectual states to have external ori- 
 gin, then it is more absurd to regard the faculties or 
 
 powers of the mind couched under such heading, as 
 138 
 
ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 139 
 
 having their origin externally or in the external world. 
 There are external causes of mental states ; but mental 
 states and faculties can not have external origin till 
 they arise out of the mind, which is impossible. 4. If 
 we should say that any element or power of mind was 
 of external origin, as to either its existence or action, 
 would it not convey the idea that the origin, or com- 
 mencement of its being was in connection with some 
 inert element or existences of the external world? 
 5. If we say that any mental state is of external ori- 
 gin, would it not convey the idea that external phys- 
 ical elements have self-action, which action must first 
 take place in order to affect the mind, which is at rest, 
 creating new mental states ? 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. There can be no impropriety in saying that there 
 are intellectual states of internal origin ; for, although 
 external objects may affect the mind through the me- 
 dium of the senses, yet the mental state which follows 
 must be wholty of and within the mind. And this 
 state, though it follows an external cause, can not of it- 
 self be said to be of external origin. 2. The origin of all 
 knowledge known to us, as such, is in the mind. The 
 true study of psychology is of boundless importance. 
 The undying soul may be said to contain within itself 
 an eternity of meaning, being, and destiny. Through 
 the medium of the senses we become acquainted with the 
 realities, beauty, and grandeur of the external world; 
 but by means of internal powers we can and do have 
 
140 ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 
 
 knowledge independent of material entities. 3. The 
 most ulterior origin of knowledge in regard to exter- 
 nal things, must begin with sensation. This knowl- 
 edge only can embrace the fact that a sensation has 
 been received, and that we have the presence of such 
 an existent. 4. The action of sensation affecting the 
 mind is immediately followed by a new mental state, 
 which is the result of a reviving influence or action 
 of the internal power of the soul. 5. The existence 
 of simple thoughts and ideas must arise by and within 
 the action of the internal power of the soul. The ad- 
 vancing of these from simple to complex, and the 
 blending of them into combination, is real knowledge. 
 Thinking, believing, hoping, and doubting have their 
 origin wholly and only in the active internal power of 
 the soul. 
 
SUGGESTION. 141 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 SUGGESTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Suggestion appears to be the presentation of an 
 idea to the mind without the immediate aid of the 
 senses. It has power within and by its own ac- 
 tion to give rise to thoughts. We have notions, 
 thoughts, and ideas which appear to be inspired, and 
 arise from the internal action of the immaterial con- 
 stitution. 2. Simple suggestions may be regarded as 
 primary and natural. They have been regarded as 
 a spontaneous result of intuitive power, or that they 
 arise in the action of internal emotions or sensations. 
 3. From this internal action or states of the mind is 
 suggested the notion of self, or of mind as real, and 
 the cause and reality of change. That w r hich sug- 
 gests the idea of our being, or the notion of duration, 
 is independent of the power and action of the senses 
 or of sensation as to its origin. Such suggestions 
 appear to arise from intuitive pow r er and become the 
 objects of consciousness, and such intimations appear 
 to be essential to the nature of mind. 4. The idea 
 of self-existence can not be tested by the senses. We 
 can not see, hear, taste, or smell such an idea or fact, 
 neither can we feel to originate the same, but it arises 
 
142 SUGGESTION. 
 
 from the mind itself. It is suggested spontaneously, 
 from the very nature of the mind, as constituted by 
 its sovereign Creator. 5. The origin of the idea of 
 mind, as an existent, can not commence with the 
 senses; for the senses are properly affected by exter- 
 nal things, and no idea of mind can result abstractly 
 from the existence of materiality. The origin of the 
 notion is suggested by and from the nature of the 
 mind within itself. 6. The origin of the notion or 
 idea of personal identity is with the internal power 
 of the soul. The beginning of such an idea is con- 
 nected with the power of suggestion, and may be re- 
 garded as a simple idea, forever undefinable. But an 
 idea or thought implies and is action; therefore, the 
 self-acting power is of and within the mind itself. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Suggestion is involuntary when thoughts arise 
 in connection with other thoughts which are not at 
 the time the special objects of the attention or of 
 mental action. 2. This power may be said to be vol- 
 untary when we, by intentional cogitation, use certain 
 thoughts, feelings, or bearings of facts in order to 
 trace out other or similar things of which we have 
 had no clear perception before. The discovery of 
 each new fact suggests the idea of something as real 
 still beyond. 3. The origin of the idea of material 
 existences may be imparted to us through the medium 
 of the senses, but we could not, from sight or touch 
 alone, judge of the qualities or properties of a com- 
 
SUGGESTION. 143 
 
 pound beyond the surface which is seen or felt. But 
 that which is tested by contact with the senses can 
 and does suggest an idea of those properties which 
 exist within or beyond the outer surface. 4. We are 
 principally dependent upon suggestion as to the ori- 
 gin of our idea of motion. We can test the abstract 
 existence and qualities of objects which are in motion, 
 but there is a difference between that which moves 
 and motion itself. Our idea of that which changes 
 the relative position or order of things must be sug- 
 gested ; for motion can not be regarded as a real ob- 
 ject of the sense; hence, the idea or notion of it can 
 not arise from the power of the senses, but is sug- 
 gested in the change and relative position of things. 
 5. We are dependent, in an important sense, upon 
 suggestive power for our notion or idea of the relation 
 of effect to its cause. The character of an effect may 
 suggest the cause, guided in part by the presence and 
 action of the senses ; but the origin of the idea of 
 the cause is wholly of suggestion. If it requires 
 strength to raise a small stone from the earth, the 
 thought of lifting a larger one naturally suggests the 
 idea of additional power; hence, the presence of the 
 vast globe naturally suggests a First Cause, or omnip- 
 otent power. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. The origin of the idea of time is connected with 
 the suggestive power. Time is duration measured by 
 the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. We can not 
 have clear conceptions of duration existing in succes- 
 
144 SUGGESTION. 
 
 sion, though we can have of duration which can be 
 measured. The events which take place in time, and 
 the relative positions in the flight of the orbs which 
 measure it, can not give us a satisfactory idea of time; 
 hence, such an idea arises from an internal suggestive 
 power. 2. If duration measured can be called time, 
 then duration without being measured, or being unfin- 
 ished, may be called eternity. 3. We can not recall 
 the time when we first received an idea of space. It 
 appears to have arisen spontaneously, or is a result 
 of an intuitive suggestive power. There is no way 
 to represent space to the senses; it is without form, 
 figure, or bounds. 4. Resemblance may be regarded 
 as an ulterior law of suggestion. The primary power 
 of suggestion is connected with the intuitive powers 
 of the mind, as the previous argument will show. 
 The mutual or reciprocal resemblance of objects often 
 suggest each other, and is the occasion of recalling 
 past existences by means of the suggestive power 
 and its action. The house of a stranger may replace 
 in the mind clear or vivid conceptions of the old 
 homestead. The appearance of yonder grove, or the 
 banks of that rolling river instantly revives the place 
 of my childhood sports, and where my little brother 
 and sister sleep peacefully waiting the sound of the 
 last trump. The peculiar voice of a stranger may 
 recall, as from the grave, that of my father. 5. The 
 internal action of the suggestive power is aided by 
 the contrast involved in the nature and existence of 
 objects. The presence of the dead body of a cele- 
 
SUGGESTION. 145 
 
 brated warrior, statesman, or divine is almost in- 
 stantly followed by their appearance when living and 
 in their glory. 6. The extremes of conditions, in ex- 
 istences, suggest their opposites. In connection with 
 the idea of a suffering beggar is suggested the thought 
 of prosperity and happiness. The prairie which has 
 smiled under the rays of a thousand summer's suns 
 only affects the mind by the introduction of the 
 thought or idea of dark, silent groves, or majestic for- 
 ests waving in the living emerald of beauty and 
 grandeur. 7. In thinking of some one of cotempora- 
 neous existences often others of the same epoch are 
 suggested. If objects distinct from each other, yet 
 united by an invariable connection, as the batteries at 
 the extremities of a telegraphic wire, the thought of 
 the one often suggests the other. 8. The activity of 
 the suggestive power depends much upon the habit or 
 manner in which it is exercised. It should be tested 
 and exerted with care and with repeated egressive 
 efforts in presenting the mind with new and delightful 
 truths or facts. In the contemplating of these natu- 
 ral truths the mind rises, admiring the power and 
 goodness of Him who reared the forest, commands 
 the storm, rolls the ocean, and eliminated, as from the 
 uncreated light of Lights, the planetary lamps which 
 
 move in boundless space around us. 
 
 13 
 
146 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. In contemplating objects the mind is capable of 
 receiving impressions, or of being influenced in re- 
 gard to certain relations which such objects mutually 
 sustain to each other. That which awakens a feeling 
 or mental state in regard to the natural relationship 
 of objects is called relative suggestion. Without 
 doubt the mind is capable of such an influence, but 
 it is difficult to clearly define its office, as it appears 
 to be midway between the nature or character of sim- 
 ple suggestion and that of the judgment. Yet sug- 
 gestive power, in any way or to any degree of strength, 
 is clearly distinct from that of the judgment. 2. The 
 mind is capable of experiencing certain influences, 
 which are affected by a peculiar relationship of objects 
 of similar or dissimilar coordinate properties or qual- 
 ities, which give rise to a new class of feelings and 
 mental states. 3. Influences of relation may arise 
 and be suggested, or experienced by the mind, in the 
 notice or contemplation of a great variety of realities 
 or facts. The degrees of difference which glow in 
 the emerald hues of a summer forest, are the occa- 
 sions of giving rise to the first apprehensions, or per- 
 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 147 
 
 ceptions, of the different kinds of trees composing 
 that forest, and other relative facts. In the sound of 
 the national band, one instrument is loud, and another 
 soft; in touching frozen mercury and cotton, or in 
 tasting different kinds of fruit, there are natural dif- 
 ferences, the relations of which affect or influence the 
 mind in regard to them. 4. Terms of correlative 
 character may involve and express that which is in- 
 tended to be explained. The mere mention of them 
 involves the relation they sustain to other objects. 
 In the use of the terms father, mother, governor, or 
 commander, the relations are the more direct causes 
 of a full mental action. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Relative suggestion does not depend upon the 
 power of the senses for its existence, else brutes and 
 birds would have it as fully developed as man ; for 
 they can see and hear as well as we can; but as to 
 their power of suggestion, or their perception of rela- 
 tions being well developed is very doubtful. The idea 
 of the tallness of a tree could not be conveyed to us 
 by sight only ; for if no tree of any kind existed save 
 that one, it would, doubtless, appear neither tall nor 
 short; but if we know that tall and short trees are 
 before us, it is evident that their relation has been sug- 
 gested to the mind, and has been an object of mental 
 action. 2. We are not dependent upon the action of 
 the senses in recognizing, and in realizing the mutual 
 relationship of hope and expectation, love and joy, or 
 
148 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 
 
 that joy and grief are opposites; yet these relations 
 give rise to mental influences and new states of mind. 
 The number of relations which affect or cause action 
 of the suggestive power, in consequence of which new 
 mental states are experienced, or take place, are al- 
 most as the stars of heaven for number. What a lim- 
 itless variety of objects and facts contribute to the 
 action and resources of the mind ! What must mind 
 be contemplated in the perfection of its powers! 
 What an eternity of duration, and infinity of feeling, 
 memory, knowledge, action, and being within itself! 
 Imperishable gem, assert the power of immortal fac- 
 ulties ; for living thou shalt never cease to be. 3. The 
 extent of this power, and the number of objects and 
 facts involved in its action, can not readily be defined. 
 Its action is connected with relations of coexistence, 
 resemblance, diversity, degree, and position. With 
 more than lightning speed it sends forth pioneer 
 thoughts upon the road of interminable duration, with- 
 out ever arriving at the ulterior bounds of its domin- 
 ion. 4. Who can define and contemplate the soul 
 perfected in its departure from earth? Progressive 
 flight ! when millions of rising series in knowledge 
 have been numbered, comprehended, and passed, still 
 onward in knowing more, and still more, of the in- 
 comprehensible fullness, love, and goodness of that 
 Being to whom it owes its existence ! 
 
THE JUDGMENT. 149 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE JUDGMENT. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The faculty of the human mind called judgment 
 has often been acknowledged, while something else 
 has been defined in lieu of it. Its existence can not 
 but be acknowledged, for it is a real faculty, and as 
 such should be defined. 2. It is that faculty of the 
 mind by which we are enabled to compare ideas or 
 thoughts, and to determine upon the evidence as to 
 preferences, or that which is right or wrong. By it 
 we not only compare ideas and thoughts, but we ad- 
 vance to compare the relations of terms, of proposi- 
 tions, and of arguments; also to determine upon that 
 which is correct. 3. It is that which may be called 
 the determination of the mind, in which we become 
 satisfied from the evidence and influence received in 
 comparing the relations of ideas, thoughts, proposi- 
 tions, and arguments. 4. It is not only the act of 
 judging, but is the power by which such process or 
 action is concluded. And if it has power to examine 
 the agreement or disagreement of things in order to 
 arrive at the truth, it has power to determine or de- 
 cide upon that truth after it is found or defined. It 
 not only has power to examine and determine upon 
 
150 THE JUDGMENT. 
 
 relations, and the correct stages of argumentation, 
 but is the concluding action of the mind in regard to 
 determining the truthfulness of objects or entities, 
 and of determining the mind favorably to truths, 
 whether casual or substantial. 5. The faculty of 
 judgment is a particular power within itself; it is not 
 to be taught in order to have being ; its origin is con- 
 nected with the existence and action of the primary 
 elements. It is not originated by education, but ex- 
 ists only to be exercised. If it is naturally deficient, 
 there is no process of instruction that can supply the 
 defect. The understanding may be naturally perfect, 
 and the same may be true of suggestion, or other 
 powers ; but if* the judgment is deficient, the mind 
 generally acts hastily and at the first intention. 
 6. The judgment has not only power to determine an 
 action, concluding, or of finishing that which may be 
 called a mental process satisfactorily, but can analyze, 
 abstract, classify, and generalize. By it we can class 
 an individual existent under a general notion in the af- 
 firmation, as that is an animal of a certain kind, or that 
 is a tree of a special kind, or from a certain mountain. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. A naturally-defective faculty of judgment is at- 
 tended with great uncertainty and much confusion, 
 as to a proper discrimination and action in regard to 
 what is right or wrong. Such minds may desire to" 
 do right and act conscientiously in all things, but 
 there is plainly a want of proper and safe decisions. 
 
THE JUDGMENT. 151 
 
 They should share of the charity of others rather than 
 suffer severe penalties in case of wrong acts. 2. The 
 judgment presupposes the understanding. The latter 
 may exist without the former, but the judgment can 
 not exist with any special manifestation without the 
 understanding. The latter furnishes the materials or 
 facts upon which the former acts. It furnishes to the 
 judgment that which is capable of being analyzed, 
 abstracted, classified, or generalized. 3. The under- 
 standing only knows objects as they really exist, and 
 as they are presented to the mind ; but the judgment 
 must discriminate by arranging them together, and by 
 evolving those things which agree or disagree ; and it 
 depends upon this power to give a decision accord- 
 ingly and correctly. 4. The action of the faculty of 
 judgment is so closely connected with reason, that 
 reference to the one may aid in explaining the other. 
 Reason embraces the ground of an opinion, or the 
 premises of an argument upon, and from which the 
 argument is based, and carefully carried through to the 
 conclusion. The judgment appears to inspect this 
 process, and weighs the facts presented in the different 
 objects so as to decide upon them, or the correctness 
 of the conclusion of an argument, by deciding upon 
 all the facts involved in the argument, even to the cor- 
 rectness of the premises, unless such premises be free 
 from confusion or doubt, and then the judgment must 
 approve the same. That the judgment is really and 
 only reason is absurd. Reason, unaided by judgment, 
 does not appear to know any thing but the premises 
 
152 THE JUDGMENT. 
 
 and conclusion, with the regular argument, or success- 
 ive steps in going from the one to the other, while 
 the judgment appears to decide upon the truthfulness 
 and the amount of weight that should be attached to 
 all the facts, together with the justness of the con- 
 clusion. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. We may readily decompose a compound, but it 
 requires the presence of the judgment in attending to 
 the agreement or disagreement of the properties and 
 the relations of resemblances — the natural adaptation 
 and agreement of the parts to each other and to the 
 whole. It is the work of the judgment to clearly 
 discriminate these facts, and to so satisfy the mind in 
 regard to them. 2. The truthfulness of axioms, and 
 the relations of angles and propositions, are objects 
 of the judgment. If we say that all axioms which 
 lie at the foundation of mathematical science are self- 
 evident truths, incapable of either proof or disproof, 
 it requires the exercise of the judgment in order to 
 receive them as such free from doubt. 3. The skill 
 and success of a physician greatly depends upon this 
 faculty, or mental power. He must be able to judge 
 of the symptoms by which a disease may be known, 
 though they may resemble those of other diseases, as 
 well as the effect of certain remedies upon disease, 
 and upon different physical constitutions. 4. Deci- 
 sions may be true or false, in proportion to the clear- 
 ness and distinctness with which we judge in weigh- 
 ing all the facts and influences connected with the 
 
THE JUDGMENT. 153 
 
 premises, argument, and conclusion. He who arrives 
 at conclusions upon slight, partial, or imperfect evi- 
 dence, and is unwilling to admit corrective facts, will 
 be almost invariably wrong in his decisions. If, w T ith 
 pure motive, he attempts to regulate his own conduct, 
 and is not guided by a proper judgment, he is liable 
 to be led, by the most hasty impressions or feelings, 
 to quick and rash conclusions ; therefore, we should 
 form our opinions w T ith care, properly judging all the 
 facts which w T ould naturally lead to sound results. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The faculty or power of judging differs from 
 that of the understanding. The understanding seems 
 to know notions or objects as they appear, but it re- 
 quires the exercise of judgment to abstract or classify 
 according to natural principles and differences, so we 
 can have clear and real knowledge of their existence. 
 That which is the object of the understanding is that 
 which is decided upon by a well-developed judgment. 
 If the power of the understanding be vigorous and 
 well developed, and that of the judgment radically 
 deficient, the mind will have experienced the presence 
 of many facts without the power of combining them, 
 so as to have distinct and decisive use of them: hence 
 the knowledge of many things, but the control of al- 
 most none to advantage. 2. The power of judging is 
 closely connected with that of suggestion. The latter 
 consists in the first intimation, or presentation, of a 
 fact or ideas to the mind, but the former has decisive 
 
154 THE JUDGMENT. 
 
 power in regard to them, which proceeds upon the 
 notice of, and the influence or weight of all the differ- 
 ences compared and balanced. The action of the 
 power of judging is clearly different and distinct from 
 that of suggestion. 3. The power and action of rela- 
 tive suggestion is not one and the same with that of 
 judgment. The former takes place when the mind 
 experiences the first effects, or influences, which arise 
 out of certain relations that different objects mutually 
 sustain to each other. The making known to the 
 mind, merely, the first intimations of mutual relation- 
 ship may be called relative suggestion, but it requires 
 an act of judgment to decide upon the causes of these 
 relations, and the importance that should be attached 
 to each, or all the facts connected ; and we can not 
 have clear conceptions and a distinctive command 
 over them, only as it is given by the correct exercise 
 of judgment. That the judgment only acts under 
 the controlling influence of suggestion, or that of rel- 
 ative suggestion, is absurd; but it has the natural 
 right, and does act upon and in regard to all facts or 
 influences which are the objects of mental action, be- 
 ing embraced in the power of suggestion, or of rela- 
 tive suggestion. And it is clearly and unquestiona- 
 bly true that it differs from them both as to its nature 
 and office in the mind. 4. The importance of a well- 
 developed and active judgment is incalculable. The 
 acquisition of knowledge, and right use of it, in 
 adding to our own happiness and to the happiness 
 of others, depends upon it. If we are deficient in 
 
THE JUDGMENT. 155 
 
 regard to the power of this faculty, we never can act 
 with that degree of prudence and discretion that the 
 laws of propriety and right require; but with a mature 
 and well-regulated judgment we are furnished with 
 facts from all sources, together with an unshaken be- 
 lief in, and command of them, upon which we can 
 depend with the utmost confidence, and can arrange 
 either to hide from the dangers and storms of earth, 
 or triumph over and beyond their power. 
 
DIVISION SEVENTH 
 
 -♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 EEASON. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Reason is a faculty of the mind, having power 
 to act, or of remaining at rest. It is connected with 
 the intuitive elements of our being, and can be culti- 
 vated so as to increase its power of vividness in ac- 
 tion, but it is impossible for its origin to be the result 
 of education. It is that principle of the mind by 
 which it distinguishes truth from error, and good 
 from evil. In the exercise of this function other fac- 
 ulties appear to harmonize, and can be called into ac- 
 tion as auxiliaries in the investigation of truth, and in 
 distinguishing between that which is correct and that 
 which is false. 2. This principle enables us to allege 
 or assert, w r ith confidence, the ground or cause of 
 opinion upon which is to be built the elements of 
 argumentation, or facts leading from the cause to the 
 conclusion. 3. Ratiocination can not exist without a 
 power competent to be the foundation of such action. 
 It is this power which enables us to arrive at a knowl- 
 edge of the process of demonstration, both as to the 
 
 facts involved and the correctness of the process. 4. 
 156 
 
REASON. 157 
 
 Reason is not only a power existing in the mind, but 
 is capable of action. It is a faculty capable of act- 
 ing, and such action is reasoning when appropriate 
 facts are involved as materials of argumentation, and 
 influences and results are correctly deducted from the 
 premises. Reason, as to its natural and real exist- 
 ence, is correct, and so we may regard it when in ac- 
 tion; for we can not have conceptions of incorrect 
 reasoning. The judgment will admit of degrees, but 
 the moment reason is incorrect it ceases to be reason. 
 The chain of facts is broken, or the relation of effect 
 to cause, or of cause to effect, is unjointed, and the 
 action of reason being intercepted, ceases to be either 
 reason or reasonable. 5. Reason differs from the un- 
 derstanding. The latter is that which apprehends 
 and embraces things presented to it, but reason pro- 
 ceeds, in the investigation, to the certain knowledge 
 of their real existence and character. Notions may 
 arise with, or be given by the understanding, but rea- 
 son enables the mind to investigate the truthfulness 
 of them, or to know that which is true and that which 
 is false. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The power of reason exists in the mind, and is 
 connected with its intuitive faculties. Its origin is 
 neither the result of habit nor of education, and the ob- 
 jects of its action can not be numbered. 2. There are 
 certain intuitive facts, and self-evident truths, which 
 can not be tested by reason. Such self-evident ex- 
 istences are in the mind, and lie at the foundation of 
 
158 REASON. 
 
 rationality. 3. Self-evident truths may be divided 
 into two classes: (1.) Those truths which lie at the 
 foundation of the philosophy of mind; and, (2.) 
 Those truths which belong to, and are connected with, 
 the science which appertains to external things. The 
 axioms, or self-evident truths, upon which the whole 
 of mathematical science stands, or is based, are inca- 
 pable of either proof or disproof; yet we are com- 
 pelled to receive them, as facts, independently of any 
 pow T er of reason; therefore, what power is capable of 
 receiving the primary, self-evident facts which lie at 
 the foundation of all external science or knowledge, 
 but the intuitive, self-evident elements which lie at 
 the foundation of the philosophy of mind? 4. These 
 intuitive principles are the foundation and origin of 
 all knowledge to us : hence intuitive internal facts, or 
 elements, with our feelings and experience, are to be 
 depended upon as true with more absolute certainty 
 than the knowledge of all external things; for the 
 latter are tested by and through the medium of the 
 senses, which may deceive us by reason of their con- 
 nection, often, with diseased physical nerves, while 
 internal feelings, or facts, are objects of direct knowl- 
 edge, without the interception of physical elements. 
 5. A knowledge of our own existence arises in con- 
 nection with the power and action of the primary 
 elements of the mind. Self-evident truths, which are 
 the foundation of the philosophy of mind, have power 
 to affirm and know our own existence; and in their 
 existence and power we have knowledge of all other 
 
REASON. 159 
 
 facts within the bounds of mental action. With them 
 arises the conviction of our own existence ; and being 
 identified with their being and nature, it is utterly im- 
 possible for us to avoid the knowledge of our real 
 entity. With the same powers arises the conviction 
 as to the distinct nature of the mind from the body, 
 and that the mind is capable of thinking and acting 
 without the aid of the material organs. Knowledge 
 implies a power capable of knowing, and objects ca- 
 pable of being known. Those elements which are 
 capable of experiencing a conviction of their own ex- 
 istence, and that of other existences, may be regarded 
 as primary, self-evident principles. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. In connection with the power of reason is our 
 confidence in the uniformity of the laws of nature, 
 The cognizance of the exactness, or uniform manner 
 in the succession of phenomena, evolving the relations 
 of sequences and antecedents, of effect and cause, 
 gives rise to a conviction and notion of their order 
 and obedience to law, all of which enters into 
 our experience and knowledge. The origin of such 
 conviction is connected with intuitive power. Ex- 
 perience, guided by reason, enables us to apply 
 it to the proper objects, or process, in success- 
 ive events. 2. Our immediate confidence in the uni- 
 formity of phenomena gives origin to the notion 
 of causation. The regular tendency of one event to 
 follow another, becoming or affecting an abiding expe- 
 
160 REASON. 
 
 rience, gives rise to the conviction that the former is 
 that of cause, and the latter is the result or effect. 
 We then regard the cause as adequate to the effect. 
 The next item is, to notice the character or nature of 
 both cause and effect, and if these uniformly harmo- 
 nize, we come to the conclusion that the same cause, 
 under the same laws, will invariably produce the same 
 effect. 3. The conduct of all persons shows their be- 
 lief in the existence of primary truths, whether they 
 acknowledge or deny such existences. No skeptical 
 philosopher can proceed in the investigation of any 
 fact without involving a reference, and clear evidence 
 of his belief in their existence, though he may deny 
 the same at every step or degree of his argument. 
 If he is in quest of some primary truth, the absence 
 of which would soon involve him in sufferings or 
 death, it would be revolting to all his feelings to be 
 informed that there was no such thing in existence ; 
 and his dismay would be augmented if he should be 
 reminded that to prove such an existent, is that he 
 own his own existence to be utterly impossible. How 
 can he prove origin to self-knowledge, or the begin- 
 ning in which he knows his own existence to be real ? 
 Without confidence in such settled facts, how could he 
 contemplate that which, from the regular chain of such 
 truths, will affect his interest or happiness in the fu- 
 ture, or be certain that the pain he had received, in 
 time past, was experienced by the same person, called 
 by his name, and which he now thinks to be himself? 
 4. If he looks upon a beautifully-finished tower, it is 
 
REASON. 161 
 
 natural for the mind to run back to the beginning, at 
 the foundation, and to inquire as to the process of 
 building, and also as to who the builder was. Not- 
 withstanding he is assured by thousands that it exists 
 without a cause, builder, or beginning, which would 
 accord with his avowed faith, yet an internal, intuitive 
 conviction would appeal to his understanding, and 
 thunder the perpetual lie to such defective assertions. 
 In all cases, those who labor to deny first truths are 
 wholly dependent upon them for facts by which they 
 are rendered capable of doubting or of denying the 
 very truths which are the foundation of all the knowl- 
 edge their minds are capable of. 5. There is a differ- 
 ence between the process of argumentation and the 
 mere action of the reasoning power, in arriving at 
 primary truths. The mind, which is capable of cor- 
 rect argumentation, has power to evolve facts by bas- 
 ing one upon another, or by connecting them in a cor- 
 rect chain from the first to the final result. It is nat- 
 ural and easy for us to believe that an effect must 
 have an adequate cause. When we look on the trem- 
 bling fires of yonder heavens, we believe in a great 
 First Cause, and see the power and design of Deity 
 as written in the existing flower, rustling leaf, burning 
 sun, or flying orbs. 6. Reason differs from conscious- 
 ness, the latter being the knowledge of mental opera- 
 tions and of sensations, or that act of the mind which 
 makes known internal objects or feelings. The former 
 evolves and connects facts in arriving at results, and 
 
 apprehends truths necessary, absolute, and universal. 
 
 14 
 
162 REASON. 
 
 7. Its power differs from that of the senses. The lat- 
 ter may be regarded as the medium through which 
 sensations make their appeal to the mind; but the 
 former commands the energies of the mind in ampli- 
 fying its research, and in extending its knowledge. 
 
 8. It differs from the judgment. It appertains to the 
 latter to discriminate, combine, and decide upon the 
 truthfulness of that which is used in argumentation, 
 and also the relations of facts and the correctness of 
 the state, and each position of the argument; but it 
 requires the presence and action of reason to prop- 
 erly connect this chain, and in forming a correct proc- 
 ess and conclusion. 9. Reason differs, also, from 
 the understanding. The latter apprehends the real 
 state of that which is presented to it, or is the power 
 of believing ; while the former leads to a satisfactory 
 result, or certain knowledge. 10. In connection with 
 the power of reason arises convictions in relation to 
 right and wrong. The mind is capable of being influ- 
 enced, and has intuitive power to act in reference to, 
 and in distinguishing between good or bad, right or 
 wrong. An intuitive influence affects the mind favor- 
 ably in regard to right, and deters it in relation to 
 evil. 11. In connection with the power of reason, we 
 may experience, or have, to some extent, ideas of that 
 which is beautiful or sublime. Many objects of the 
 same class may differ in degree of beauty; that in 
 each which approaches nearest the most perfect one, 
 or to our conceptions of a perfect model, requires the 
 presence and action of reason, in arriving to a correct 
 
REASON. 163 
 
 equilibrium, or balancing of them, and to just conclu- 
 sions. The descriptions of an orator may surpass the 
 perfections of that which forms the object. The 
 painter may surpass the natural beauties of the land- 
 scape, or the graphic sublimity of some occurrence or 
 reality. The arrangement and regularity of these 
 must require the presence and action of reason. 
 
164 REASONING. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 BEASONING. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Reasoning is the power of reason in action. It 
 is the act or process of exercising the faculty of rea- 
 son, in and by which new or unknown propositions or 
 facts are deduced from previous ones, and previous 
 facts are established from the relation and character 
 of their results or effects. 2. The correct exercise of 
 reason is destructive to atheism or the foundation of 
 infidelity. We know that an effect can not exist 
 without a cause, and we can not believe in a cause 
 that is inadequate to the effect which follows it. Uni- 
 versal existences all around us confirm our belief in 
 the existence of a great First Cause; and the idea of 
 such cause, or Being, is a first truth of reason. 3. 
 Two modes of argumentation will settle and confirm 
 our belief. The first evidence or proofs are drawn 
 from the necessity that such a being must exist inde- 
 pendently of the evidences which are every-where 
 written upon his works. The second embraces proofs 
 or evidences of his being and perfections as given in 
 his works. We now proceed to examine these two 
 modes of argumentation. 
 
REASONING. 165 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. If there be no one being in infinite space but 
 such as might possibly not have had a being, it would 
 follow that there might possibly have never been any 
 existent; hence the possibility that such an entity 
 might have arisen from nonentity. This is impossi- 
 ble. Then it is impossible that there might have 
 been no existence in any way; therefore, an impossi- 
 bility of not existing must be true, and there must 
 have been a being whose non-existence is impossible, 
 otherwise the truthfulness of all reason and knowl- 
 edge would be reversed. 2. All the essence and at- 
 tributes of an unoriginated being must be unorigin- 
 ated, and necessarily self- existent. Such an essence, 
 or being, can not give origin to its own attributes, un- 
 less it had power to act before it existed, which would 
 be impossible. Such a being must be real, absolute, 
 self-existing, and eternal ; for any thing finite, or con- 
 tingent, must have a cause which would be anterior, 
 and show that such finity, or contingent, could not be 
 causation nor eternal. 8. The attributes of an un- 
 originated being must be absolute and limitless, other- 
 wise they would be imperfect or limited, and that 
 would involve a modifying cause ; but no such cause 
 can be acknowledged, as such cause would be imper- 
 fect. But the cause of which we speak, being per- 
 fect, lies back of all things, and may be styled the 
 cause of causes, being infinite or eternal. No modi- 
 fying cause can be allowed, as such could not be 
 
166 REASONING. 
 
 absolute in perfection, and could not be eternal; and 
 all imperfect attributes, or any attribute which is not 
 infinitely perfect within itself, is finite to some degree, 
 and must be capable of greater perfection by im- 
 provement, exercise, and experience. This would 
 prove imperfection in an unoriginated being, and that 
 he was perfecting his attributes and existence by self- 
 action, experience, and further acquaintance with his 
 own works. His being, and each attribute, must be 
 perfect and unoriginated. 4. Such an unoriginated 
 and infinite being must exist every-where, in the same 
 way and manner he does any where, otherwise there 
 must be a cause by which his existence and presence 
 is limited. But there is and can be no cause limiting 
 the existence, action, or presence of Deity ; for there 
 can be but one first cause, which cause, from neces- 
 sity, must be unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and 
 eternal. It is utterly impossible for us to have con- 
 ception of more than one infinite space, and beyond 
 this thought can not travel ; neither can w T e have any 
 idea of any out border, or limitation to the innumer- 
 able worlds which are the result of a cause lying still 
 back of their origin and motion. Then if there is 
 only one infinite space, it can contain only one infinite 
 series of points in that limitless space; therefore, 
 that reality which is capable of filling each point in 
 infinite space must be indivisible, one, and infinite. 
 As two or more infinite beings can not occupy one 
 and the same infinite space, filled with only one series 
 of infinite points, without being one and the same 
 
REASONING. 167 
 
 being, therefore there is one, and only one unorigin- 
 ated, self-existent, infinite, and eternal cause and Gov- 
 ernor of the universe. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. This unoriginated being must be a reality, pre- 
 cisely the same in every place, not consisting of parts, 
 as they would naturally exist independently; nor of 
 whole, for that would imply a combination of parts; 
 nor of degree, as that would signify imperfection and 
 quantity with comparison ; therefore, this being is one 
 and omnipresent, without any thing like degrees, 
 comparison, or limitation. 2. Such a being can not 
 be materiality, for this would come under the laws 
 which govern it, and would have density, divisibility, 
 form with limitation. Nonentity can not give origin 
 to matter; and matter which is limited can not give 
 origin to matter, for it contains no power of self- 
 action; much less could it produce an existent with 
 self-cogitative power, being within and of itself un- 
 thinking ; and if a portion of matter was eternal, it 
 could not originate other inert elements, much less 
 give origin to self-acting and cogitative intelligences. 
 8. If matter and motion were both eternal, and could 
 be connected together, yet they never could pro- 
 duce a cogitative mind. Matter and motion, though 
 changed or varied in any possible way, yet the parti- 
 cles could only meet, impel, and resist each other. 
 Then, if nothing were eternal, matter could never 
 have had origin, as it could not result from nothing. 
 If matter without motion were eternal, then motion 
 
168 REASONING. 
 
 could never have a beginning ; for matter has no self- 
 motion. If only matter and motion are eternal, then 
 thought or intellectual action could never have be- 
 ing ; for matter, either at rest or in motion, can not 
 originate cogitation and knowledge ; neither is it ca- 
 pable, abstractly, within and of itself, to act and feel 
 joy, pleasure, or grief. Then the first being must be 
 infinite, and must have self-power to act, think, fore- 
 see, and arrange the beginning and real existence of 
 all finite things ; and that which is first of all things 
 must really possess, of necessity, absolute perfections, 
 as nothing which is essential to such an existent could 
 ever be added ; for that w r hich was added would be 
 finite, and in this respect imperfect, and would be 
 created. 4. Such a being must possess wisdom and 
 power without limitation, and all other attributes must 
 be, within themselves, absolutely perfect. 5. The ex- 
 istence of more than one unoriginated being in the 
 universe, or the same infinite space, is utterly impos- 
 sible. Such a being is possessed of infinite attributes, 
 and must, of necessity, be present in every point in 
 infinity. A second unoriginated being must be equal 
 to the first in every respect, as both must, necessarily, 
 be eternal, from the fact that they are unoriginated ; 
 therefore, as there can be only one infinity to be oc- 
 cupied or filled by them, that infinity can be no more 
 than perfectly filled; and those two unoriginated and 
 infinite beings must, necessarily, be the same in es- 
 sence or nature, every-where present, incapable of 
 any distinction or dissimilarity, and, of absolute ne- 
 cessity, they would have to be one and the same. 6. 
 
REASONING. 169 
 
 The absolute omnipotent power of Deity does not 
 make his acts either arbitrary or of necessity. They 
 are free in their nature and power, and are with effort, 
 otherwise such acts would be of necessity, which 
 necessity would be the cause, and not the free power 
 of absolute perfection in unison. What he willeth he 
 can do, yet nothing is done by him only that which is 
 right. He is too wise to err, and too good to be 
 unkind. 7. His omnipotence does not necessitate his 
 knowledge; yet he knows all things, and there is 
 nothing hid from him. Necessity would imply some- 
 thing that was, or is yet to be explored by him; 
 whereas, if there is any thing which he would not 
 choose to know, as contingent or otherwise, it would 
 imply that he must first know what that is before he 
 would choose not to know it. 8. From reason we 
 may infer that the object of man's existence was to 
 share of the endless goodness of God; his duty was 
 to glorify his Creator ; and that the performance of 
 this duty wholly depends upon volition ; therefore, he 
 must be created free to serve and glorify God. If 
 such service was of necessity, or by requisition, then 
 such requisition would be the agent in rendering 
 glory, while man would be passive: hence, the object 
 of our being would have been cut off by law, and, of 
 course, our existence would have been impossible. 
 
 SECTION IV 
 
 1. We now proceed to the second mode of reason- 
 ing, which is to establish or prove the existence of 
 
 15 
 
170 REASONING. 
 
 Deity, by arguing from effect to cause. 2. Our con- 
 ceptions of a being of infinite power and wisdom 
 would naturally lead us to suppose such power and 
 wisdom would be evidenced in the variety, multi- 
 plicity, agreement, dependence, mystery, and design 
 which exist in, and in connection with all his works. 
 That which we can comprehend, and those things 
 which we can not comprehend, are alike characteristic 
 of his power and wisdom, and are evidences of his 
 being. 3. There is evidence of the wisdom and 
 power of Deity in the different systems of innumer- 
 able orbs which glow in the heavens. The order, dis- 
 tances, velocity, gravitation, and centripetal forces ; 
 the diurnal and orbitual motions, all of these are con- 
 clusive evidences of the wisdom, power, and existence 
 of God; for these things are neither of self-origin 
 nor accidental. 4. The earth contains, in its own 
 structure, evidences of the presence and power of an 
 infinite Creator. Its internal order contains the arch- 
 ives of its own periods and ages. Vegetation upon 
 its surface is mysteriously promoted by the circula- 
 tion of nutritious properties elevated by capillary in- 
 fluences, forming ligneous fibers, or is consolidated in 
 trunks, boughs, and leaves. The delicate fibers and 
 glowing tints of almost an endless variety of flowers, 
 can only be regarded as so many evidences of the 
 wisdom and goodness of the great Creator. 5. There 
 is evidence of the existence of Deity in the order of 
 providence, which meets the demands of all animated 
 or self-moving beings — the regular return of the sea- 
 
REASONING. 171 
 
 sons, the descending rain, and warming sun, each year 
 yielding a sufficiency, and not too much. 6. Life, 
 sleep, vision, and muscular action are evidences, and 
 furnish positive proof of the existence of Deity. It 
 is utterly impossible for any finite existence or influ- 
 ence to originate, and keep in regular action, the ex- 
 pansion and contraction of the intercostal nerves, by 
 which, in part, the lungs are enabled to inhale the at- 
 mospheric air, receive the oxygen, and throw off the 
 carbon from the blood. We have no self-power to 
 keep up this process, yet it goes on whether we sleep 
 or wake. Reason, together with the facts in the case, 
 teaches us that this process is arranged and continued 
 by the wisdom and constant presence of a merciful 
 Creator, and the very moment the influence of his 
 presence is withdrawn from these nerves our breath is 
 paused forever. 7. Another source of evidence may 
 be found in connection with the circulation of the 
 blood. It is stated that in health the heart, in one 
 minute of time, makes eighty pulsations, and a little 
 over two ounces of blood are expelled into the aorta 
 at each pulsation — about nine thousand six hundred 
 ounces every hour, and about one thousand four hun- 
 dred and forty pounds per day! It is also stated 
 that each pulsation of the heart propels the blood 
 eight inches, making fifty feet in one minute ! The 
 average quantity of blood in each human body is 
 about thirty pounds, and is said to pass through the 
 heart twenty-three times in one hour. In calculating 
 the velocity, and the force necessary to effect action 
 
172 REASONING. 
 
 to the remotest extremities of the arteries, or where 
 their anastomosis with the veins take place, and the 
 mysterious counteraction of the blood in the veins to 
 the heart again, would require the heart, in its legiti- 
 mate office and action, to possess the astonishing 
 power of four hundred pounds. Who is prepared to 
 acknowledge that the realities and processes of action 
 are the result of inert materiality, or of chance or 
 
 accident? 
 
 SECTION V, 
 
 1. But how are we to account for the irregular, yet 
 continuous, expansion and contraction of the muscles 
 and cords of the heart, which gives motion to the 
 blood, upon which depends the perpetuity of life? 
 These muscles and cords, being matter, have no self- 
 power to move or act, and the suspension of such 
 action is death. Human knowledge has never at- 
 tempted to solve the mystery, but in one way that 
 had the least appearance of reason ; that is, that the 
 pulsations of the heart are caused by the stimulating 
 nature of the blood. 2. This has been disproved by 
 the following experiments: (1.) If we apply a stim- 
 ulus to the muscles of the heart of an animal after it 
 is emptied, it will dilate and contract as if it were 
 full. (2.) If all the large vessels of the heart be en- 
 tirely emptied, the dilations and contractions will 
 continue for some time, in the entire absence of the 
 blood, and it will be discovered that the dilations are 
 as forcible as are the contractions. 3. The continued 
 and unwearied action of the heart is evidence, of the 
 
REASONING. 173 
 
 infinite wisdom and presence of its Creator. That 
 which exhausts all other muscles of the body increases 
 the power and action of the heart. This action is 
 wholly involuntary, and the muscles and delicate cords 
 of the heart, unlike any other physical powers, may 
 act incessantly, and without weariness, for a hundred 
 years. Natural laws can never explain this. 4. Rea- 
 son may be regarded, in a certain sense, to be the 
 power, and reasoning the action, or process, of de- 
 ducing conclusions from premises. This process adds 
 a second step to that which has been used, and a 
 third to the second, and so on to the last, or the con- 
 clusion. In other words, it may be regarded as that 
 process of action which connects a chain of facts, or 
 a train of reasoning, involving them as a whole, and, 
 in their legitimate order, or appropriate fitness, as 
 parts most naturally adapted to the nature of the 
 premises or proposition. Reasoning is the continued 
 exercise of reason, in the demonstration or investiga- 
 tion of subjects, or series of facts, tracing their rela- 
 tions, arriving at and establishing legitimate conclu- 
 sions. 5. Reasoning is a source of specific and certain 
 knowledge, giving the mind a controlling power over 
 the different steps, degrees, or relations of things, or 
 realities, which would be too complicated and obscure 
 to be known to us in any other way. It enables the 
 mind to penetrate the unexplored mysteries of nature, 
 and its action is the occasion of the origin of new 
 ideas and new series of interwoven facts, or change 
 of propositions. 
 
174 REASONING 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. When effect is the object of a reasoning process, 
 its cause is implied; for such an object, first known to 
 us as a result, or effect, would involve reasons as to 
 w T hy it is thus characterized, and an investigation 
 would employ the power of reason in tracing back- 
 ward each step to a cause, and such a cause as would 
 be adequate to the effect, and corresponding in nature 
 or qualities* 2. Reasoning a priori deduces conse- 
 quences or results from definitions formed, or facts 
 assumed, or infers effects from causes previously 
 known ; and is that process, or kind of reasoning, by 
 which an effect' or result is proved from a cause. 
 From the nature and relation of combined facts, or 
 propositions, we can readily assume results corre- 
 sponding to the legitimate tendency of such antece- 
 dents or causes. That general adaptation or fitness, 
 blending and harmonizing existences, naturally leads 
 us to infer or believe in other corresponding realities. 
 This kind of reasoning is common, whether in the 
 mind abstractly, or carried on in relation to external 
 things through the medium of the senses. 3. Reason- 
 ing a posteriori is drawn or proceeds from effect, facts, 
 or results. We might say that reasoning a priori is 
 from cause to effect; but reasoning a posteriori is from 
 effect to cause; yet both methods can be varied in ac- 
 cordance with different varieties of facts or proposi- 
 tions. A process of reasoning may commence with 
 an effect or result, and extend back to a cause, or to 
 
REASONING. 175 
 
 something of anterior existence. 4. In every correct 
 process of reasoning there are three things which must 
 claim our attention. (1.) We must know the prem- 
 ises to be correct or true. If not, we can not proceed 
 correctly ; and if there is any doubt in regard to this, 
 we should prove the premises true, if susceptible of 
 proof. (2.) The truthfulness of the premises being 
 established, the chain of reasoning, it may be, consist- 
 ing of numerous distinct facts, arguments, proposi- 
 tions, or steps, must all be true within themselves, and 
 correspond in respect to the same premises, and so 
 connected that one step in the argument becomes an 
 essential part of the premises of the subsequent one, 
 till the entire argument is completed. All interme- 
 diate steps, from the premises to the conclusion, must 
 be carefully examined and known to be correct. (3.) 
 With caution in the preceding steps, the conclusion or 
 result will be easy and natural; but we must know 
 that such conclusion is a legitimate result of the pre- 
 ceding argument, corresponding to the correct force, 
 natural existence, condition, or influence of the truths 
 which have compelled such a result or conclusion. 
 5. The power of correct reasoning depends very much 
 upon attention and the judgment. Progressive reason- 
 ing evolves new facts, attention places them under the 
 inspection of the mind. The judgment discriminates 
 and decides upon their appropriateness and truthful- 
 ness. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 1. Mathematical reasoning has been regarded as 
 being superior to mental reasoning, from the fact that 
 
176 REASONING. 
 
 there are fewer intermingling or connected contin- 
 gencies, and we have not so many things to assume. 
 This, in part, is true ; but we are not prepared to ad- 
 mit that mathematical propositions or demonstrations 
 are worthy of as much confidence or belief as those 
 which are mental or moral. 2. If, in numerical rea- 
 soning, nothing is assumed or taken for granted, in 
 regard to the truthfulness and existence of premises, 
 upon which the reasoning is founded ; and if all nec- 
 essary assumptions are few, contingent, and easily 
 freed from intricacy, yet the power of knowing and 
 of receiving these as true realities, is found connected 
 with and in the intuitive power of the mind* 3. No 
 fact, tested by the power, or received through the me- 
 dium of the senses, can be known as real and true 
 only as the internal, intuitive poiver of the primary 
 elements of the mind enables us to receive and know 
 them to be such. It is this power alone which ena- 
 bles us to know that the axioms which are the founda- 
 tion of all mathematical calculations and demonstra- 
 tions, are self-evident truths. 4. Internal mental or 
 moral reasoning can not be said to be of remote ori- 
 gin, and received, in whole or in part, through inter- 
 cepting mediums ; but our knowledge of such is di- 
 rect, present, and experimental. 5. Demonstrative 
 reasoning is used to probably a greater extent among 
 the masses than any other, progressing from cause to 
 effect, or from premises to the conclusion, showing, or 
 proving, by clear and certain evidence, the result. 
 6. Investigative reasoning is that kind of disquisition 
 
REASONING. 177 
 
 which involves the idea of vivid, keen, and penetra- 
 ting mental action ; and is that kind of progressive 
 mental action which forces its way into hidden fields 
 of realities. It searches minutely, bringing to light 
 new facts, which may evolve others connecting, or add- 
 ing them into appropriate incursive chains, rendering 
 such dormant treasures the conquest of research and 
 imperishable knowledge. 7. False investigative rea- 
 soning may take place or exist when the acknowledged 
 primary facts are untrue, either in whole or in part, 
 or in their conditioned combination or relation. 8. 
 False reasoning may take place by assuming premises 
 or propositions which are incorrect within themselves, 
 or which are not naturally adapted to the conclusion 
 desired. (1.) By assuming a proposition asserted to 
 be a conclusion of some previous process of reason- 
 ing, without examining such former process, or know- 
 ing it to have existed, and to be true or correct. (2.) 
 By confusing the distinctiveness of each step in the 
 connected links or chain of reasoning, thoroughly 
 rendering a change in position possible, and without 
 detection. (3.) By commencing the argument at some 
 point far removed from the premises. (4.) By petitio 
 principii, or begging the question in assuming a prin- 
 ciple which amounts to the same thing to be proved, 
 or which may vary slightly in some almost impercep- 
 tible way. (5.) By assuming a principle, and then 
 wandering off, reasoning on many contingent things, 
 till they can be combined together, from which the 
 reasoning commences, without any connection with 
 
178 REASONING. 
 
 the first assumed principle ; or by reasoning in a cir- 
 cle, in assuming a principle, and employing it to es- 
 tablish some other reality or facts, which fact or facts 
 are used to prove the first assumed principle. (6.) 
 False reasoning may arise by means of the sophisti- 
 cal use of terms and analogies in principles assumed, 
 all of which can be corrected by careful examination. 
 9. Reasoning may be influenced improperly by an 
 impure motive. This will so bias the efforts of the 
 mind as to cause more than a due proportion of atten- 
 tion to be bestowed upon those things most intimately 
 connected with some conclusion designed or desired, 
 while real facts, naturally adapted to the argument, 
 receive such a. slight proportion of attention as to 
 be finally lost from the argument, or have no special 
 influence. 10. Prejudice will affect reasoning so as 
 to distract or destroy its accuracy; for in this way 
 opinions are formed before the subject has been inves- 
 tigated or examined. Reader, if you would start 
 right, and continue in a right course, never prejudge 
 the subject of your inquiries, and never dare to act 
 according to or with an improper or vitiated motive ! 
 Let motive be pure forever. 
 
 
DIVISION EIGHTH 
 
 ^♦^ 
 
 CHAPTER I . 
 
 D R E A M I N G 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Dreaming is having thoughts, notions, or ideas 
 in or during sleep. They may arise in connection 
 with only one subject, or we may experience a series 
 of thoughts or moral impressions. Under the above 
 heading we shall define that which may be called 
 mental dreaming; and, in another place, we will de- 
 fine moral dreaming, as there are two kinds clearly 
 distinct in nature. 2. It may be regarded as wholly 
 involuntary ; for we often experience impressions, or 
 ideas, which arise in the mind, of an unpleasant na- 
 ture, or those which are revolting to us, but have no 
 power to divert our notice of them, though we experi- 
 ence an effort to effect such change. 3. Dream- 
 ing is common to all persons ; yet some dream much 
 more frequently than others. But very few have ever 
 asserted that they have never experienced any thing 
 of the kind. Those who think so, may have dreamed 
 and be unable to recall them in waking hours. 4. 
 Mental dreaming, as a general rule, arises in the 
 mind, or is one of those states which take place in 
 
 179 
 
180 BREAMING. 
 
 sleep, immediately following and corresponding with 
 those facts, or subjects, which were the objects of 
 mental action previous to the slumber in which such 
 ideas arise. 5. Mental states of mind, which take 
 place under the influence of dreams, are not to be de- 
 pended upon as true preludes of things to come. 
 They are mere circumstantial or casual states, which 
 can not be regarded as positive evidence that those 
 things made known in dreams will ever occur, or that 
 their opposites will come true. 6. Dreaming may, in 
 some degree, be caused by physical debilitation. On 
 careful observation it has been ascertained that dreams 
 are pleasant or revolting in proportion to the strength 
 and health of the body. In good health the occur- 
 rences experienced in the mind, while under the influ- 
 ence of slumber, are apt to be of an agreeable or 
 pleasant character ; and if we are verging to an attack 
 of disease, we are apt to rest imperfectly in sleep, and 
 our dreams are oppressive and generally of a disa- 
 greeable character. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. There is no fixed law of conformity or of agree- 
 ment in relation to dreams ; for there is great disa- 
 greement and contradiction in them. Such thoughts 
 are often disconnected and desultory. These irregu- 
 larities are not corrected by reason, judgment, and 
 the exercise of the senses, in regard to definite truths 
 and settled laws in external things; and those mental 
 powers which have a correcting control over the mind 
 
DREAMING. 181 
 
 are partially suspended. 2. We are now prepared to 
 go still further, and say that we may have facts re- 
 vealed to us in dreams of which we have never had 
 any conclusive knowledge. Students have been known 
 to work late at night at propositions in mathematics, 
 and retired to rest without solving them ; but solved 
 the difficulty in a dream, and, on waking, with joy 
 placed all the work on paper correctly, and without 
 trouble. 3. Our conceptions of the length of time oc- 
 cupied in dreaming appears of very long duration, 
 when, in fact, it can only extend to a few minutes. 
 A chain of events may pass through the mind in one 
 dream which would require many*days in reviewing, 
 but on waking we discover that it has been the work 
 of a few minutes. 4. Dreaming conceptions are not 
 confined to old conceptions. Under the influence of 
 slumber, poets have composed parts of poems, and, 
 in waking hours, have written out the same. The 
 logician has unraveled mysterious things, and con- 
 cluded his argument correctly; the mathematician has 
 concluded his demonstration; and the linguist seen 
 how to translate a difficult passage. 5. It is useless 
 trying to define the causes of dreams. The best we 
 can do is to regard them as varying with the many 
 and mysterious influences connected with the phe- 
 nomena of mind. Each person can best determine 
 the cause of mental influences, or states, by carefully 
 attending to his own experience in regard to them. 
 All facts connected with the phenomena of dreaming 
 are evidences that mind is ever active and imperishable. 
 
182 CLAIRVOYANCE. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CLAIRVOYANCE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 V 
 
 1. Clairvoyance does not properly belong to this 
 work, and should not receive this brief notice, were 
 it not that it has been regarded, by many, as being 
 an essential part of the phenomena of mind. 2. It 
 is the clear-sightedness of the mind in perceiving, or 
 in apprehending facts or events, without the aid of 
 the senses, as a medium in arriving at a knowledge 
 of such facts, or events. This is, in reality, closely 
 connected with dreaming, though it appears to take 
 place further removed from any internal controlling 
 power governing it. This ulterior process appears to 
 occur when we are under the deepest influence of 
 Somnus, and the senses entirely inactive to external 
 affecting causes, so far as can be determined. 3. It 
 is a power attributed to persons in a mesmeric state, 
 of perceiving, or discriminating objects or realities 
 not present with, nor objects of the action of the 
 senses. 4. Such power does not appear to be com- 
 mon or naturally connected with earthly intelligence, 
 in the proper existence and relationship which char- 
 acterizes them. However natural it may be to the 
 action of spirit within itself, abstracted from bodily 
 
CLAIRVOYANCE. 183 
 
 organs, yet such action is not common to the masses, 
 or, if so, we are unable to recall such action in wak- 
 ing hours. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. If such power does really exist in connection 
 with some minds when unknown to others, or to the 
 great majority of persons, we can not account for its 
 existence as an essential element of spirit, or any 
 thing superadded to one that is withheld from an- 
 other; therefore, the only rational way of meeting 
 the subject is, that such differences depend upon some 
 peculiarity in the nervous constitution, connected 
 with the mind's developments. The nerves connected 
 with the brain are so inseparably connected with the 
 sensations experienced, that mental states may be af- 
 fected by them; and we know not how far such states 
 may vary or correspond to the peculiar sensitiveness, 
 condition, or influence of the nervous system. 2. 
 How far or to what extent the doctrine of clairvoy- 
 ance is true, we shall not determine ; but too much 
 faith or belief in such things is deceptious, danger- 
 ous, and adds no essential truths to knowledge. 3. 
 That a simple state of clairvoyance may be experi- 
 enced by some minds connected with a peculiar nerv- 
 ous constitution, is neither unnatural nor new in sci- 
 entific research. Such persons are so naturally con- 
 stituted that they can be affected by mesmerism, 
 anxiety of mind, fatigue, or disease, so as to have 
 some kind of stupor over the action of the senses, 
 and, at the same time, experience some kind of per- 
 
184 CLAIRVOYANCE. 
 
 ception of things which can be the objects of mental 
 action. This is no new theory, either in reality or in 
 the investigations of science. It is as old as this 
 kind of peculiar nervous constitutions. It is natural 
 with the nervous sensitiveness of some persons, though 
 the perverted use often made of it, in the necromancy 
 and feats performed in the world, is deceptious, tend- 
 ing to absurdities and ruin. 4. So far as any person 
 has a natural disposition and tendency to such mental 
 states as may be included under the meaning of clair- 
 voyance, it is innocent; but when an intentional per- 
 version takes place, it becomes wickedly absurd. No 
 one can be so operated on by another as to reveal 
 facts of the spirit-world beyond the limits of personal 
 identity, or mental resources and action. 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 185 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SOMNAMBULISM. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. This is the act or practice of walking in sleep. 
 In dreaming the mind acts, but the somnambulist 
 walks abroad, or has power voluntarily to move from 
 place to place while under the influence of sleep. 
 This singular affection differs from dreaming. Simple 
 dreaming involves only the action of the mind, while 
 somnambulism includes the affection and action of the 
 physical powers in connection with mental inclinations 
 and action. 2. It differs from dreaming as to the ex- 
 ercise of the mind. The mind may be fixed upon its 
 own impressions, or ideas, which are passing under its 
 inspection, but there appears to be less power in recall- 
 ing such exercise in our waking hours than to recall the 
 substance of dreams. There are but few if any som- 
 nambulists who can ever recall the fact of walking in 
 sleep. As a general thing they never have the slight- 
 est knowledge, in their waking hours, that ever such 
 occurrence took place. 3. The same appears true in 
 regard to talking in sleep. There is, perhaps, not one 
 case out of a thousand where persons in the habit of 
 talking in sleep, ever have the slightest knowledge of 
 such fact from any action of their own minds, though 
 
186 SOMNAMBULISM. 
 
 highly probable they are dreaming, or the mind is act- 
 ing in some way all the time. 4. The first degree of 
 somnambulism, with some persons, is an inclination to 
 talk in sleep, though others are not known to talk. 
 The former often rehearse what is passing in the mind, 
 and frequently that which was not intended to be 
 known. If this propensity increases, we may expect 
 them to walk during sleep. A friend of mine lodged 
 in the same room with a man who was in the habit of 
 walking during sleep, intending to follow him. About 
 midnight the somnambulist arose, walked down stairs, 
 passed out at the door, took a path across the field, 
 crossed a water-course on a high log, not touching the 
 hand-pole, and without either stooping or pausing. 
 In this way he could not pass over in waking hours by 
 daylight, yet he passed on without any difficulty; 
 then turning into a dark valley, ascended and seated 
 himself upon drift wood ; in a few moments returned 
 by the same way, to his room and bed, and knew 
 nothing of the. occurrence next morning. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Somnambulism differs from dreaming, in the 
 power which the action of the mind has over the mus- 
 cles and nervous system, whether such mental action 
 or volitions can be recalled in our waking hours or 
 not. Dreams appear to be real in the mind, and the 
 same appears true in regard to that which is passing 
 in the mind of the somnambulist. The additional 
 power is added by which he can and does put his 
 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 187 
 
 physical powers in motion. A servant in the South, 
 during sleep, often responds to his master's call, takes 
 his horse, waters him, puts him in the stable, feeds 
 him and fastens the door, returns to bed, and knows 
 nothing of the transaction next morning. 2. Another 
 peculiarity is, that in sleep the senses and muscles ap- 
 pear powerless and inactive; but in somnambulism the 
 latter are active, while the former are inactive. This can 
 not be defined unless it exists in connection with that 
 peculiar sensitive class of nerves connected with the 
 muscles, and not with the senses, being affected in 
 some way and manner as to invoke or induce an effort 
 of the muscular powers under the influence of mental 
 volitions. 3. The absence of fear is another peculi- 
 arity connected with somnambulism. The somnam- 
 bulist can go where he could not in his waking state 
 without fear or loss of life. They have been known 
 to pass out of windows and climb up on the tops of 
 houses, and, in an erect posture, walk narrow joists or 
 beams from twenty to forty feet above the ground. 
 
 4. A very singular phenomenon is sometimes wit- 
 nessed in the presence of paroxysms, which come on 
 in daytime as well as at night. At times they are 
 preluded by a singular sensation or noise in the head, 
 but frequently are experienced without warning. The 
 mind seems abstracted from external impressions, yet 
 there is no apparent difficulty in conversing about 
 that which is passing through the mind at the time. 
 
 5. Some persons are totally unconscious of any exter- 
 nal thing; others can hear and answer questions. 
 
188 SOMNAMBULISM. 
 
 There have been instances given where persons have, 
 while under the paroxysm, conversed readily in Latin, 
 which they could not do at other times. 6. A contin- 
 gent feature of this affection has been referred to as 
 being produced by an attack of somnolency. In re- 
 covering from one attack, persons have lost all literary 
 knowledge ; but in recovering from the second, all lost 
 attainments have been restored, and thus alternating 
 for years. 7. It would almost appear that, under 
 such paroxysms, the mind or spirit has sight and per- 
 ception independently of the senses. Philosophers 
 have given instances of persons who have had 'their 
 eyes closed while under the paroxysm, and bandaged 
 with many thicknesses of black silk; yet they could 
 read and answer questions in regard to distinct objects 
 correctly, and in regard to some things which they 
 had never seen before. We know of no way to ex- 
 plain this, unless in proportion as the soul is ab- 
 stracted from the bodily organs, the more perfectly 
 its powers are developed. 8. Whatever there may be 
 that is strange or novel in this chapter, yet it should 
 be borne in mind that all these facts go to show that 
 mind can act without the body, from which it is rea- 
 sonable to believe in its superiority, and to infer its 
 imperishable nature or eternal duration. 
 
MESMERISM. 189 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 MESMERISM. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. By mesmerism we understand animal magnetism, 
 or the existence of a peculiar kind of sleep, in which 
 the mind is active, though the mesmerized person ap- 
 pears unconscious of external objects. 2. The act of 
 mesmerizing is that of affecting the body in different 
 ways, so as to produce a species or kind of sleep, 
 while the mind retains its activity and power. This 
 is no new discovery in scientific research and knowl- 
 edge. Long has it been known, and it has and does 
 exist, in reality, in the very natural constitution of 
 some persons. 3. A constitution capable of being 
 mesmerized is almost the same as those which come 
 under the influence of somnambulism. The mesmeric 
 susceptibility is connected with a peculiar condition or 
 nature of the nervous system, and never can be im- 
 parted to one who has it not; yet the influence or 
 power of disease might effect such change, or condi- 
 tion of the nerves, as to render a person capable of 
 being mesmerized who had no natural disposition to 
 it. This constitutional or natural affinity to mesmeric 
 affection, or influence, can be affected or produced by 
 external agencies or causes, neither marvelous nor 
 
190 MESMERISM. 
 
 uncommon. 4. There are but very few persons, if 
 any, who are in the habit of talking or walking in 
 sleep, while in health, but can be mesmerized; yet 
 this can not be done contrary to the will or permission 
 of the subject. 5. Some subjects, under the influence 
 of mesmerism, are wholly unconscious of external 
 things, while others are not, but have no immediate 
 power to break the influence. Mesmerizers claim that 
 the former class can be operated upon by will, in com- 
 manding them to do as they please, while the latter 
 can resist only in part. It may be that persons, being 
 mesmerized, go into that state with the mind entirely 
 directed to the .operator, and when stupor comes over 
 the power of the senses, the mind still having liberty 
 to act, and the operator being the object of the mind, 
 he may have more controlling power over it than any 
 other person, and more than would seem natural; but 
 there is far more contained in the assertions of such 
 agents than in facts as they are. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. In this way the truthfulness of phrenology has 
 been established by the action of mesmerized persons 
 corresponding to the nature of the organ touched by 
 the operator: but this is no proof, if what the mes- 
 merizer claims is true, that subjects can be oper- 
 ated upon by will; for he knows what organ he is 
 touching, and the kind of action he expects. This 
 being fixed in his mind would be that which he would 
 will : hence, the action of the subject would correspond 
 
MESMERISM. 191 
 
 to the will of the operator. With all the obscurity 
 and doubt of the correctness of this conclusion, yet 
 that spirit can thus operate upon spirit is far more 
 reasonable than to believe a mere physical organ of 
 the head can possess within itself spiritual rationality 
 sufficient to act. If spirit can act as spirit, why may 
 it not act without involving the inert medium of the 
 skull. The truthfulness of phrenology can not be 
 established by mesmerism w T hile mind and matter are 
 dissimilar and divisible. 2. If the somnambulist be- 
 comes lost to every thing but that upon which his 
 mind is intently fixed, and if he has power to walk 
 abroad in obedience to any internal inclination, may 
 not a person, on being mesmerized, become uncon- 
 scious of every thing in regard to the action of the 
 senses, yet controlled by the thoughts of the mind, 
 w r hich still cluster around the existence and will of the 
 operator, so as to be thus influenced in some w T ay? 
 But deceptions in regard to these things are far more 
 probable than conjectures in favor of such mysteries. 
 3. Some persons, who, under mesmeric influences, are 
 partially sensible of what is passing, are unable to 
 move from any position placed in, though they try to 
 do so. By a well-tried effort, some have succeeded in 
 breaking the influence. 4. There is another class 
 which appears unconscious of every thing, yet they 
 will respond to questions, or walk, if ordered to do so. 
 This may be accounted for upon the same principle 
 that a person continues to converse with another in 
 sleep; they will answer almost any question asked. 
 
192 MESMERISM. 
 
 In this way confidential truths have been revealed. 
 But to fully explain such phenomena must be the 
 work of each one who thinks upon the subject. 5. 
 Though this constitutional or natural tendency to, or 
 susceptibility of mesmeric states can not be defined, 
 yet we can but believe, to some extent, in its mysteri- 
 ous existence; but, when properly viewed, it contains 
 no more mystery than dreaming or somnambulism. 
 This far we may go in safety ; but the idea that men 
 send the spirits of others to distant worlds, or have 
 the facts of the spirit-world revealed by them, is not 
 only absurd, but tends to ruin. Finity has no such 
 power. 
 
PHRENOLOGY. 193 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Phrenology proceeds upon the supposition that 
 the brain is the organ of thought and passion ; that 
 the science of the human mind is inseparably con- 
 nected with this supposed organ; and that the differ- 
 ent powers may be determined principally by the size 
 and shape of the head, together with the undulations 
 of the skull, embracing the position and condition of 
 such undulations. As to the general features, or out- 
 line of phrenology, we file no very special objections; 
 but when w T e come to define and settle the divisions 
 of the organ, we are plunged into darkness and con- 
 fusion. 2. The size and the general appearance of 
 the head, together w r ith the expression of the eye and 
 countenance, are important in forming a correct judg- 
 ment in regard to the mind. Doubtless more is indi- 
 cated by physiognomy than by phrenology. The 
 expression of the countenance, as a general thing, is 
 more important in deciding upon the strength and 
 character of the mind, than all that can be gathered 
 from the different sections in craniology. 3. There 
 are several important points to be settled, and ac- 
 knowledged as true, before the philosophy of mind, 
 
 17 
 
194 PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 with its well-tried chain of truths, can be supplanted 
 by it. We do not regard the doctrine of phrenology 
 as being sufficiently interwoven with mental science 
 to require an extensive analysis: hence, we shall 
 refer briefly to only a few connected facts. 4. The 
 truths which support the doctrine of phrenology must 
 be sufficiently clear and strong to show that it is, in 
 fact, a science; but no two writers have agreed, in 
 every respect, in regard to the localities of different 
 organs, as indicated by the peculiar shape of the 
 skull, which, according to phrenology, is essential to 
 such theory or doctrine. 5. It must be demonstrated 
 without doubt, that the brain is, wholly, the organ of 
 the mind, otherwise the cranium might deceive us; 
 and as all nervous matter in the entire system is of 
 the very same properties as that of the brain, and is, 
 to some extent, connected with it, there might be 
 some difficulty involved in locating the organ of the 
 mind. 6. Phrenologists should first prove that the 
 brain is the organ of the mind, and then they must 
 agree in locating the different powers or faculties ac- 
 cording to the exterior surface of the skull, and 
 especially those locations should be made and defined 
 without doubt, which have so long been the objects of 
 doubt and contention among different writers. An 
 intelligent world will expect these questions to be set- 
 tled before they will consent to regard such system, 
 as a whole, consistent with reason, or science. 7. It 
 must be clearly shown how the skull bone, which is 
 inert, is better adapted to the development of the 
 
PHRENOLOGY. 195 
 
 various influences and powers of an immaterial nature, 
 than such nature would be to develop its own powers 
 and action. 8. If we adhere to the exactness of 
 phrenological claims, it must be demonstrated, accord- 
 ing to general uniformity, that each undulation on 
 the external surface of the skull has a concavity cor- 
 responding on the inner surface, answering to the 
 different lobes of the brain, which lobes have been 
 assumed as being the basis respectively from which 
 the action of the various powers of the mind are elim- 
 inated; but this is impossible. 9. There should be a 
 clear showing, or proof, that the brain does really 
 contain lobes, or protuberances, as assumed, and just 
 a sufficient number to correspond with the different 
 powers and affections of the mind; but the almost 
 imperceptible waves of the brain can not be called 
 lobes, as is set forth in the doctrine of phrenology. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Should such lobes exist as organs of the differ- 
 ent powers of the mind, it would appear that they 
 exist in immediate contact with the skull, so that the 
 external surface would indicate the size and strength 
 of such organs thus manifested; therefore, no vacuum, 
 or space, could exist between the brain and the skull 
 without confusing the definite location and action of 
 the various mental powers. But there is a vacuum 
 between the brain and skull which severs the connec- 
 tion between the two, and renders it impossible to 
 trace the connection between the external surface of 
 
196 PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 the skull and brain at any time, without taking into 
 the account the changes under different circumstances. 
 2. Philosophers agree that the brain may be regarded 
 as the organ of the mind by reason of the wise order 
 in the arrangement of Infinite Wisdom, and not from 
 its peculiar essence, or natural qualities ; for in this 
 case the whole nervous system would be the organ of 
 the mind, as it is connected with the brain, and con- 
 tains precisely the same essence, or properties. 3. 
 The idea that the mind is wholly dependent upon the 
 nature and condition of the physical organs, in order 
 to be manifested, or for the character of its action, is 
 dbsurd ; for we have already seen that mind can act 
 without the bodily organs, and when the senses are 
 locked up, or their power is suspended by sleep. 4. 
 The doctrine of phrenology, not sufficiently guarded, 
 often misleads the mind. In some instances it has 
 given origin to tendencies which have resulted in the 
 worst forms of infidelity, by and in which it has been 
 assumed that all sufferings of both body and mind are 
 the results of imperfect physical organization, and 
 that the fall of man affects only the physical powers, 
 by and through which mind acts. If this be true, 
 and it is possible for us to have any consciousness of 
 guilt or sin, then that which tests this fact must be 
 matter, and when the body dies all our consciousness 
 of guilt must perish with it. This would result in the 
 doctrine or idea of annihilation, which is false. 5. 
 The physical organs, being inert within themselves 
 have no power to comprehend the knowledge of suf- 
 
PHRENOLOGY. 197 
 
 fering, and report the same to the mind, in order 
 to be known. Matter can never originate intuitive 
 mental convictions and feelings of our lost estate ; for 
 it is by the existence, and self-action of innate mental 
 elements that we can have any knowledge of the ca- 
 pability of the body to suffer, or that it ever has 
 experienced pain. 6. Injuries received upon the 
 head often affect some power, and an injury received 
 upon a certain organ affects one mind very differently 
 from the result the same cause would produce upon 
 another. The same organ in kind may be affected on 
 different heads, and the results are not similar; but, 
 in most instances, very different. The same organ in. 
 the same head may be affected by a blow, at different 
 times, without producing similar effects upon the 
 mind; therefore, it is impossible to locate the differ- 
 ent organs from the similarity in the effects realized. 
 7. Different portions of the brain may be diseased 
 without affecting the mind corresponding to the office, 
 nature, and action of the organs thus affected. A 
 lady has been mentioned, one-half of whose brain 
 was completely paralyzed by disease, yet the faculties 
 of her mind were perfect. A man has been men- 
 tioned who retained the right use of all his faculties 
 up to the moment of his sudden death, and on open- 
 ing his head it was discovered that suppuration had 
 destroyed the whole right hemisphere of his brain. 
 Though one-half of his cerebral organs were de- 
 stroyed, yet his mind was not affected. Operators 
 testify that they have removed, in a similar way, as 
 
198 PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 much as a half pound of matter found in the brain, 
 when the mind did not appear to have been affected 
 up to the time of death. 8. We learn, from different 
 experiments, that large portions of the brain have 
 been often removed without destroying the exercise 
 of the mental faculties. A man has been mentioned, 
 whose head had been so injured that a large portion 
 of the right wing of the os frontis w r as removed, sup- 
 puration had taken place, while at each dressing, for 
 over two months, the matter discharged brought with 
 it large quantities of the brain ; yet he retained the 
 right use of all his faculties to the time of his death. 
 9. Instances have been given, in cases of fracture of 
 the skull, when large portions of the brain have been 
 removed without the slightest injury to the minds of 
 the persons thus suffering. These facts are conclu- 
 sive evidences that different organs in the brain can 
 be entirely destroyed without marring the correct ac- 
 tion of the mind. 10. How can this be accounted for 
 upon the principles of phrenology? There is only 
 one way of escape; that is, when the organs on one 
 side of the head are destroyed, we have to assume 
 that there are double organs, and those on the other 
 side correspond to those lost. But this is only as- 
 sumption, as it can not be based upon any primary 
 principle of phrenology. 11. While the general prin- 
 ciples of phrenology may be regarded as true, we are 
 unprepared to adopt it in lieu of mental philosophy, 
 as the latter has been long established upon correct 
 principles, attested by almost any amount of experi- 
 ments and facts known to be true. 
 
DIVISION NINTH. 
 
 ++- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 BEFLECTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Reflection is the act or operation of the mind 
 by which it turns its views, or thoughts, back upon 
 itself or its operations. 2. By this power our 
 thoughts may be thrown back upon the past, or 
 upon that which is absent. In this way the field of 
 past events can be entered, and diligent search insti- 
 tuted, in regard to facts which are desired to be used 
 by the mind in forming combinations, or in tracing 
 relations and associations of truths. 3. Reflection is 
 involuntary when it takes place without any willing 
 or intentional effort. 4. It is voluntary when we 
 pause the action of the mental powers, and throw 
 back our thoughts in search of some express object, 
 or for some special purpose. 5. It is connected with 
 the power of reason, but more intimately with the 
 power of remembering past perceptions, and past 
 mental acts or processes, so that they can be com- 
 pared with present facts, feelings, and inclinations as 
 experienced by the same sentient being. It traces 
 the laws by which the processes of mental action are 
 
 governed, regulated, and known. 
 
 199 
 
200 REFLECTION. 
 
 SECTION II 
 
 1. While the mind, by the power of reflection, is 
 canvassing and considering past events or realities, 
 there is called into action the power of memory, com- 
 parison, and judgment, which give rise to new states 
 of mind, and new trains of thought. 2. In connec- 
 tion with these, there arises certain internal convic- 
 tions, and the exercise of an intuitive belief in exter- 
 nal and internal realities. 3. Under the process of 
 reflecting, we experience an internal conviction and 
 belief that we are real existences, and that we possess 
 cogitative minds, with powers superior to materiality. 
 
 4. While the aption of the mind is paused to give 
 place to mature and deliberate reflection, there arises, 
 in connection with the mind's intuitions, a conviction 
 of the truthfulness of the report of the senses, and 
 the power to believe in the reality of external things. 
 
 5. The importance of reflection is invaluable. It 
 leads to the safest and most effectual preventives of 
 evil, and enables us to take, in due time, the necessary 
 steps to avoid danger and ruin. 
 
APPARITIONS. 201 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 APPARITIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Apparitions are only another source of evidence 
 showing the connection and influence which physical 
 organs have over mental states. Such visibilities 
 are mere appearances, and are opposed to reality. 
 Persons often speak of seeing angels, or individuals 
 who are absent from them. Others suppose they see 
 ghosts or spirits of departed friends. 2. These may 
 be caused by the effect and influence of disease upon 
 the eye. All that enters into the composition of the 
 eye is more or less affected by disease. The transpar- 
 ent properties are liable to change, so as to present 
 the appearance of objects which do not exist. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The effect produced upon the retina, or optic 
 nerve, is the greatest cause of deception, giving rise 
 to perceptions of objects as real, which do not exist. 
 The organ of the visual sense is far more perfect in 
 health than when diseased, and it is not a difficult task 
 to mark the variations of its power passing under the 
 influence of different kinds of disease. 2. Internal 
 mental excitement may have power to change, in some 
 
202 APPARITIONS. 
 
 way, the retina, or optic nerve, in whole or in part, 
 so as to give origin to perceptions of existences which 
 have no present or real being. This would suppose 
 self-power with nervous constitutions to affect the op- 
 tic nerve, by sudden alarm or excitement, so as to 
 give origin to the notion of entities where they do not 
 exist; and as such changes belong to the physical 
 system, and as such perceptions, through the medium 
 of the visual sense, are not intentional or voluntary, 
 that which is seen and thought to be real, but has no 
 existence, is at first received with the utmost confi- 
 dence, and often requires a strict exercise of reason 
 in correcting the perceptions arising in this way. 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 203 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Spectral illusions may be regarded as being of 
 more importance than is proper or right. Those who 
 are accustomed to such illusions have, as a general 
 thing, the utmost confidence that the beings they see 
 are real. 2. An instance has been recorded of a man 
 advanced in life, possessed of a sound mind, and hav- 
 ing enjoyed good health, in the latter years of his life, 
 who had almost daily visitations from spectral forms. 
 These forms or figures generally appeared as human 
 beings. The forms often varied, but the countenances 
 appeared to be the same. He could see them at dif- 
 ferent times, and with his eyes either opened or closed. 
 By pressure on his eyes, they disappeared ; yet, when 
 present, their appearance was pleasant, and features 
 clear and distinct. Any stimulant or excitement in- 
 creased the number of those visitors. By examining 
 this history, we have no difficulty in accounting for 
 this, as any thing which excited him produced the 
 presence of those existences. His constitution was 
 so easily affected that the optic nerve was influenced, 
 and forms appeared which had no existence. 3. Im- 
 ages or persons, which seem to appear to individuals 
 
204 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 
 
 influenced out of the ordinary way, either physically, 
 or by the effect of excited minds upon physical or- 
 gans, seldom speak or answer any questions; but, in 
 some instances, they are reported as having conversed. 
 There is a case recorded, where a man, mourning over 
 the loss of his wife, who had been the victim of sud- 
 den death, realized, as he thought, while in deep 
 study, the door of his room open. The form of his 
 wife reappeared, and informed him that she had en- 
 tered into rest, and desired him to prepare for 
 the same happiness in the future. The specter could 
 have been the result of a change in the visual organs, 
 while the language he thought she spoke might have 
 originated in a dream of which he was not sensible, 
 the mind being intensely exercised at the time. 4. A 
 case has been given, and attested as true, of a man 
 seated in a worshiping congregation, who suddenly 
 shrieked out with great intrepidation, rising to his 
 feet, steadily looking toward the stand, and exclaimed, 
 " Do you not see the minister clothed in a shroud ?" 
 In a few minutes, the minister, who had not yet ar- 
 rived, came, entered the stand, and preached. Before 
 the next Sabbath he was dead, and in his grave. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Nyctalopia, in its various forms, exerts no an- 
 nihilating power over the mental elements, but exhib- 
 its a peculiar acuteness and power of the visual organ, 
 by which the sensibility of the optic nerve must be 
 very much increased. This is only another evidence 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 205 
 
 that it is capable of various changes, and that the 
 presence of spectral illusions depends upon certain 
 influences affecting the retina or optic nerve. If the 
 eye was perfect in all its parts, and free from the 
 power of disease, it would be relieved of phantoms, 
 or specters. 2. Those who are approaching epilejrtic 
 fits, often are troubled with the appearing of phan- 
 toms or specters. The evidence of a man has been 
 recorded, who says that the prelude to the paroxysm 
 was, the appearing of a peculiar-looking human being, 
 who struck him on the head ; then the paroxysm com- 
 menced. This specter was, no doubt, caused by the 
 effect the approaching attack had upon the brain and 
 eyes. 3. The influence of febrile diseases upon the pe- 
 culiar sensitiveness of some constitutions, may be re- 
 garded as occasions of the origin of spectral illusions. 
 A case has been given, where a man thus affected, 
 while under the influence of a violent pain in the head, 
 distinctly saw his family in the room, who were, at 
 that time, three thousand miles distant. A lady has 
 been mentioned, who, under the influence of severe 
 illness, saw her father, at different times, come into 
 her room, and speak in his natural tone of voice, 
 though he had not been there at any time. 4. A too 
 highly-excited imagination may lead to a belief in ex- 
 istences as real when they are not. An excitable 
 mind, when aroused, can imagine fearful sounds, or 
 the footsteps of an enemy approaching. They see 
 something in the distance, which appears nearing, and 
 enlarges with more perfect form, till the beholder is 
 
206 SPECTKAL ILLUSIONS. 
 
 terrified, awed, or overcome -with fear. 5. All these 
 facts show that our knowledge, which we receive 
 through the medium of the senses, can be rendered 
 uncertain, as the organs can be so easily affected by 
 disease ; but our internal knowledge of the existence 
 of self can not be doubted, as we do not depend upon 
 any physical elements in arriving at the certainty of 
 such knowledge, or in knowing that we do really ex- 
 ist. 
 
SPIRIT-RAPPING. 207 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SPIRIT-RAPPING. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Necromancy, though not intimately or closely- 
 connected with mental science, has been involved with 
 mental phenomena, for the purpose of adding import- 
 ance to the office of modern teachers, or those who 
 would be gifted in enchantment or conjuring. It is 
 styled, or called, the art of revealing future facts or 
 events. There is a pretended medium of communi- 
 cation w T ith the dead, or minds disembodied. 2. 
 S}ririt-rapping may be called a delusion. That some 
 peculiar nervous constitutions may be affected in a 
 w r ay mysterious to the individuals themselves, and to 
 others, is perfectly correct; but that such physical 
 constitutions are, or can be, the medium of other finite 
 spirits in communicating facts to us from the spirit- 
 world, is contrary to the laws of both mind and mat- 
 ter, and must be absurd. 3. Persons who style 
 themselves mediums may be sincere in not under- 
 standing why the physical organs have an involuntary 
 action, and often contrary to their wish. The delu- 
 sion is not in the fact that such action takes place, but 
 exists in that their excited minds refer the cause of 
 such action to spirits, when it is natural to their pecu- 
 
208 SPIRIT-RAPPING. 
 
 liar nervous constitutions. That palsied man can not 
 tell why he shakes contrary to his will. He might 
 attribute such action to spirits with as much propriety 
 as a medium can refer to them — the motion by which 
 his hand writes. The mere turning of the mind of a 
 nervous person to the thought that they are moved by 
 spirits, will startle them, and cause involuntary action. 
 If they can keep their own excited spirits from rap- 
 ping out thoughts by accidental marks, or their own 
 intentional thoughts, they will not be troubled by the 
 spirits of others. 4. If it is right for finite spirits to 
 communicate future events to us after they have left 
 the world, why done in such an obscure way, and with 
 so much doubt or imperfection? It is reasonable to 
 suppose that such knowledge is perfect, and that it 
 should be conveyed correctly; then why should they 
 move a nervous arm to write it with irregular or acci- 
 dental motions? If it is right they should send im- 
 portant messages to earth, it has always been so; 
 then why have the spirits of dear departed friends 
 been so idle and careless in this respect, during the 
 past ages of the world? 5. That disembodied spirits 
 can reveal facts, or ideas to us, must be either true or 
 false. If false, further argument would be useless; 
 but if true, then those privileges and communications 
 must be either right or wrong. If right, they are not 
 only permitted, but take place according to the will 
 and purposes of Deity. If these things are ordered 
 of Heaven, they must be right, and arranged for the 
 good and happiness of this world's inhabitants. All 
 
SPIKIT-RAPPING. 209 
 
 means employed by Infinite "Wisdom for our happi- 
 ness, are adapted to all ages and all circumstances 
 connected with our race; therefore, such messages 
 would not have been delayed for the discoveries of 
 modern mediums, and without regard to the moral 
 character of such agents. 6. If these things be or- 
 dered and sent by the Divine Being, the object must 
 be pure and holy, and all connected influences and 
 operations must correspond in purity and holiness. 
 Then, none but holy beings can reveal such messages, 
 or be mediums for pure spirits. None but good mes- 
 sages can be sent, and such as are calculated to do good 
 to man, and cause him to glorify God. 7. Therefore, 
 according to all our ideas of infinite purity, and the 
 holiness of good spirits, it would be utterly impossible 
 for such finities to communicate to any on earth but 
 pure and holy mediums. 8. The character of all such 
 messages must not only be pure, but must correspond 
 with truth as evidenced in the works of nature; and 
 must agree with the volume of Revelation, and in no 
 case deviate from its truths. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. But if the tidings thus revealed be impure, or 
 contrary to these sources of truth, we have a right to 
 suspect the medium is bad, or vile ; and if this be 
 true, the spirit which moves or influences such an un- 
 holy medium, must be vile or wicked within itself. 2. 
 If such spirit is from Satan, or from under his influ- 
 ence, we have a right to question its declarations, as 
 
 18 
 
210 SPIRIT-RAPPING. 
 
 he would not have any truth published to us, as that 
 would thwart his own interests and purposes. Then, 
 if such tidings be from an evil source, and calculated 
 to lead to delusion and misery, the less we have of 
 such news the better for the world. We have a right 
 to doubt the correctness and truthfulness of such 
 things, as we have no evidence that the Lord ever in- 
 tended to instruct the world in this way. 3. This 
 view of the subject would compel us to believe in, and 
 to be much influenced by what has been called demon- 
 ology. This would comport with the intimations of 
 some alchemists of England, who profess to have bor- 
 rowed much of their skill, in turning common metals 
 into silver and gold, from Satan. We know not what 
 or how much power Satan may have over wicked men, 
 in regard to such things, but one thing appears cer- 
 tain, that tidings calculated to do good, and from a 
 pure source, never could come from an unholy me- 
 dium. If spirit-rappings be true, we have no evi- 
 dence that they could be either ordered or blessed of 
 Heaven. 4. As these things have been improperly 
 connected with mental phenomena by many writers, 
 we can only add that philosophy knows no principle 
 or action of mind, abstracted from the peculiar sensi- 
 tiveness of physical organs, capable of forming a 
 basis for such spiritual revelations. 
 
CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 211 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON 
 INSANITY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. We understand by excited conceptions those 
 which arise, or take place, in connection with an ex- 
 cited nervous system and vivid or highly-wrought 
 mental states. An unnatural excitement depends 
 very much upon the proper organization and health 
 of the physical powers. 2. A mind w T ith unusual 
 power of action, connected with a frail, nervous sys- 
 tem, gradually sinking by disease, may overpower the 
 strength of the physical organs, with which its action 
 is connected, and become bewildered with excited con- 
 ceptions till the system becomes paralyzed, and the 
 mind either inactive or incapable of rational life. 
 3. The strong physical constitution may retain its 
 strength, while some organ essential to the right use 
 of reason may become diseased or prostrated by some 
 extraordinary mental effort, leaving the mind to wan- 
 der amid the wildness of excited conceptions and im- 
 aginations of things that exist only in phantom. 4. 
 General debility, caused by disease, often produces 
 excited conceptions, or wildness of thought, which 
 disqualifies the mind for usefulness; yet it seldom 
 
212 CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 
 
 affects all the organs of sense in the same way, or 
 to the same degree. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We can not conceive that the mind, abstractly, 
 or within and of itself, is capable of either excited 
 conceptions or of delirium; for these affections can 
 exist only in its connection with the body, otherwise 
 delirium or idiocy might exist on forever, which is 
 absurd. 2. The excitement of great joy often gives 
 rise to excited conceptions, and we see things very 
 differently, for a short length of time, from what we 
 do ordinarily. 3. The effect produced by grief or 
 despair appears'to almost hang the earth in mourning. 
 Under such influences we have conceptions only of ■ 
 scenes or facts, like those we have just witnessed; 
 and as thoughts pioneer the road of misfortune, we 
 have vivid conceptions of series of calamities, which 
 become the principal objects of mental action. 4. 
 Though the principal cause of excited conceptions 
 may be found in the effect and influence which dis- 
 ease exerts upon the visual organ and the brain, an 
 instance is recorded of a man, whose physical organs 
 were so affected, that for months, in his waking hours, 
 he saw passing through the field of vision the forms 
 of men, women, animals, and birds. Under all such 
 exciting influences, the mind is only advancing to a 
 midway condition between a rational state and that of 
 insanity. 5. The last general cause we shall notice 
 is, that which exists in febrile influences upon the 
 
 
CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 213 
 
 physical organs. This influence is not only general 
 upon the system, but the exciting effect it produces 
 upon the nervous system, and the brain in particu- 
 lar, causes singular and strange excited irregularities 
 in the action of the mental powers. 
 
214 PARTIAL INSANITY 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PARTIAL INSANITY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The mind, under the influence of partial insan- 
 ity, is disqualified for healthy action; though perfectly- 
 sane or correct on some subjects, it is the reverse on 
 other topics. . Often, when such mind is employed on 
 subjects foreign from those upon which it is wild, all 
 appears right and reasonable ; but when we speak of 
 any thing which has a relevancy or connection with 
 that upon which its action is imperfect, there is an 
 immediate change in the excitability of the mental 
 state or action, and from this the chain of thoughts 
 begins to disconnect, and the mind wanders. There is 
 an instance recorded, where a man brought before the 
 court for examination gave no evidence of insanity. 
 When the man was about to be dismissed, an intimate 
 friend proposed that he be asked when he was going 
 to judge the world. He was instantly excited, and 
 assumed the character of the judge of the universe. 
 2. The mind may be called partially insane when it 
 gives evidence of wildness upon certain topics only 
 periodically. There are such persons who, at times, 
 and in their deliberate moments, appear reasonable 
 and mild in their feelings or disposition, but, at other 
 
PARTIAL INSANITY. 215 
 
 times, can not control the action of their mental pow- 
 ers. 3. Another class of individuals appear to be 
 sane on all the events or occurrences of early life, 
 but can not converse, in a connected way, upon recent 
 facts or events. This change is clearly the effect of 
 physical debility. 4. This affection may exist in the 
 unhealthy state or defective action of one or more 
 faculties, though the mind may act correctly, with the 
 exception of the affected element or department. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The influence of insanity can exist in connec- 
 tion with the judgment. When there is no healthy 
 action of this faculty we lose the correct power of 
 perceiving relations, and of rightly discriminating dif- 
 ferences ; it can not confidently decide upon the same, 
 or in relation to them ; and when decisions are thus 
 made, they are as likely to be absurd as correct, or 
 they are almost certain to be wrong in some way. 
 The mind appears to arrive at conclusions accident- 
 ally, and to abandon them at pleasure; so action is 
 like a log floating upon the waves of the sea, and its 
 decisions can not be depended upon. 2. Partial insan- 
 ity may be connected with the imperfect action of 
 original suggestion. The ideas and convictions which 
 arise in connection with this power must be objects 
 of belief or unwavering confidence. We must be- 
 lieve that we exist, and have personal identity, and 
 that the objects of belief remain unchanged; for with- 
 out this we can not be sane. 3. The power of associ- 
 
216 PARTIAL INSANITY. 
 
 ation may act so imperfectly that decisions can not be 
 regarded as correct. When the power of associating 
 ideas or facts is defective, there is evidence of great 
 recklessness in the arrangement of facts. The 
 thoughts fly in every direction, and words are apt to be 
 used without number, and without any special force, 
 unless to weary those to whom they are addressed. 
 Minds of this character seldom ever retain the objects 
 of conversation for any length of time. All it dwells 
 upon seems to be visionary and like the morning 
 cloud or early dew. 4. The physical organs connected 
 with the senses may, under the influence of disease, 
 cause deception in the character of sensations experi- 
 enced, and a s^ate of partial insanity ensue. This 
 brings us to the general cause of insanity, the effect 
 of material organs upon the action of the mind, which 
 are imperfect within themselves, or paralyzed in some 
 way by disease. 
 
TOTAL INSANITY, 217 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 TOTAL INSANITY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. We understand by insanity a deranged mind or 
 intellect. When the judgment is dethroned, or reason 
 broken, the trains of thought suspended, so we can not 
 go from the premises to the conclusion, the mind is 
 insane without the destruction of other faculties. But 
 we now come to that state of delirium which is a total 
 disorganization of mind, or of correct mental action. 
 The power of reasoning is wholly in ruins. 2. In- 
 sanity destroys the healthy action of the mind and the 
 power it has over its own mental states, of connecting 
 and directing the chains of thoughts, fixing the atten- 
 tion on internal realities, or upon those of the exter- 
 ternal world. 3. The potver of mental action may 
 cease in regard to all subjects only in a wild and ut- 
 terly-confused manner. There may be an indistinct 
 apprehending of things, but without any rational con- 
 ception of order, classification, or law. 4. The mind 
 may be influenced by only one impression, without any 
 power of varying from it, or of dismissing it from the 
 most intense excitement. There is an instance re- 
 corded of a man who became insane; he always moved 
 as though in great haste. The only answer he ever 
 
 19 
 
218 TOTAL INSANITY. 
 
 gave to any inquiry was, " I am going home," though 
 it could not be discovered that any thing had the 
 slightest degree of his attention. The melancholy 
 case of a young minister has been recorded, who, by 
 a fall, was deranged, while on his way to be married. 
 Never afterward was he known to pay attention to 
 any thing ; and never was he known to speak of any 
 thing but his expected marriage. 5. Mania may be 
 regarded as varying in degree of mental range or ac- 
 tion from certain limited abstract impressions to a wild, 
 amplified view of imaginary realities. Though such a 
 mind may glance at real truths, yet there can be no ex- 
 ercise of reason in relation to them. 6. The halluci- 
 nations of a maniac can not be corrected, as the dis- 
 ordered action of the principal mental faculties is so 
 extensive that there is no way or means of correcting 
 that which is wrong. The maniac will continue to 
 fancy himself a king or ruler of this world, having a 
 right to command and to force obedience to his author- 
 ity. Though such persons may be of the lowest de- 
 gree of obscurity, still they appear to have concep- 
 tions of great honor and power, and that all the world 
 contributes to their glory. 7. A common character- 
 istic of maniacs is evidenced in the fact that some im- 
 pression or idea has taken possession of them, and 
 upon the oneness of the theme the mind acts, without 
 being corrected by truths, which would produce an 
 equilibrium of the intensity of mental action, and re- 
 lieve wrong impressions. Whenever the mind is per- 
 mitted to act upon some one idea, excluding all other 
 
TOTAL INSANITY. 219 
 
 facts which would be examined in connection with it, 
 such action will become intense, and the longer we 
 dwell upon one thought the more excited the concen- 
 trated action will become, and the tendency to lose 
 all power of reason or control in relation to the exist- 
 ence of real facts will be increased. 8. In total in- 
 sanity the mind is incapable of correct reasoning on 
 either correct or false premises. The connection of 
 thoughts or facts in argumentation is broken and so 
 confused that no correct steps can be taken in pursu- 
 ing any subject; all is confusion and uncertainty. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Mental hallucinations may suspend or dismiss 
 the impressions which have been of abiding experi- 
 ence, and, after a long interval, they may be suddenly 
 revived, which can not be accounted for, unless attrib- 
 utable to some change in the physical constitution, 
 either in regard to increased degrees of maturity, or 
 the diminishing power of disease, so that the mind 
 can be more vigorously exerted. Instances are given 
 of persons, when doing a certain piece of work, sud- 
 denly struck with insanity; and, after the lapse of 
 years, on being restored, the first thing of their in- 
 quiries was in regard to the work in which they were 
 employed when they went into insanity, while all the 
 time and events which had intervened were entirely 
 lost. It has been stated that persons who are addicted 
 to periodical paroxysms of delirium, have been known 
 to resume the conversation on their recovery precisely 
 
220 TOTAL INSANITY. 
 
 at the place where they left- off when the paroxysm 
 came on, without any knowledge of what transpired 
 in the interim ; and it has been stated that some of 
 these persons, when the paroxysm reappeared, com- 
 menced with that part or subject of their hallucination 
 precisely where they left off when reason returned; 
 but, as a general thing, there is not such uniformity. 
 It is more generally characterized by a fearful erratic 
 wildness. 2. The extremes and modulations which 
 characterize the feelings, and the deportment or acts, 
 of maniacs, may be accounted for, in part, as corre- 
 sponding to the different temperaments connected 
 with each constitution; and they may arise, in part, 
 from the uncultivated viciousness of the one and the 
 guarded mildness of the other. They may vary again 
 with the mind that had been under religious influence, 
 contrasted with the mind which had always been 
 vicious and revengeful. 3. Insanity, as it exists in 
 the case of the maniac, is apt to be of a restless and 
 turbulent character. Great excitement generally pre- 
 vails over, and is connected with the entire mental 
 powers. There appears to be a constant disposition 
 to keep moving or to be traveling from place to place. 
 This is not the kind of derangement, under the influ- 
 ence of which the person loathes life and seeks death; 
 for persons under the influence of this kind of de- 
 rangement are always suspecting danger, and are fly- 
 ing from it with feelings of appalling frenzy or dread. 
 4. The general character of mental derangement is 
 that which has connected with it a fearful apprehen- 
 
TOTAL INSANITY. 221 
 
 • 
 
 sion of danger or death; and such persons are always 
 trying to escape from harm. Such persons are gen- 
 erally harmless, and have no disposition to inflict inju- 
 ries upon their fellow-beings, though the care of such 
 is attended with great trouble. 5. There is another 
 class of insane persons, who are malicious in feelings, 
 and are always seeking revenge. It is not unfre- 
 quently the case that they imagine they are expressly 
 ordered to take the life of some fellow-being ; and, as 
 a general thing, those w T ho are selected to be tortured 
 or put to death are the nearest and dearest friends. 
 
 / 
 
222 INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. That kind of mental depression called melan* 
 cJiolia may be regarded as a result of some kind of 
 disease upon the physical constitution, or it may have 
 its origin in connection with repeated and excited 
 mental exertion, prostrating the power of the organs 
 through which mind acts. There is a difference be- 
 tween real mania and melancholia. The former is 
 connected with the presence of hallucination, under 
 the influence of which the individual appears carried 
 away with excited conceptions of his condition in life, 
 and does not appear to be under any sense of want, 
 or that such a state of things could be possible. The 
 latter condition is connected with those who are de- 
 pressed in feeling, and may arise from the influence 
 of lingering disease, or with trouble of mind, which 
 prostrates the bodily powers, rendering them subject 
 to disease. This gloomy or melancholy state may in- 
 crease till maniacal excitement takes place ; but mel- 
 ancholia generally continues in a state of mental 
 depression. 2. A very peculiar difference between 
 melancholia and mania is, that a person under the in- 
 fluence of the former has power to reason more accu- 
 
INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 223 
 
 rately, and the mind evinces stronger features of 
 reason than in the latter state; yet, the impres- 
 sions of such mind can be changed with far greater 
 difficulty than those of the maniac. 3. Melancholia 
 differs in a peculiar manner from mania, in the tend- 
 ency of minds, under such influence, to commit sui- 
 cide. Real maniacal insanity seldom ever gives rise 
 to any feeling or inclination which would lead to such 
 an act or horrible result. It is very common, when 
 suicide is committed, to say that the person was 
 totally insane, or devoid of all reason ; but there is no 
 instance recorded of totally-deranged persons, or one 
 devoid of all reason, ever being guilty of suicide. 4. 
 A raving maniac has never been known to commit 
 suicide. All their feelings and manifested inclina- 
 tions are averse to any thing of the kind. When 
 they possess any traits of reason, or conscientious 
 thought, they evince the utmost degree of excitement 
 and horror in regard to any thing like danger or 
 death, and are ever flying from their own apprehen- 
 sions of danger in seeking safety. 5. It is depression 
 or melancholia which leads to suicide, and that, too, 
 before reason has entirely left the mind. We are 
 forced to the gloomy acknowledgment that all persons 
 who commit this horrible act have sufficient amount 
 of reason remaining to know what they are about to 
 do when they use the weapons of death; otherwise, 
 the act could not and would not be perpetrated. 6. 
 All persons who commit suicide do so of their own 
 individual and voluntary choice. It is impossible for 
 
224 IX SAN ITT — MELANCHOLIA. 
 
 any totally deranged to have the control of their 
 mental . or thoughts, long enough to carry such 
 
 intention into effect. By the most accurate examina- 
 tion, no feeling or tenden<; uicide can be discov- 
 ered in minds devoid of reason. 7. He who takes his 
 own life has the rigid n*e of r 
 
 \ to know what poisonous drug, or weapon of 
 death, will effect the work ; the amount necessar 
 be taken, or the manner of applying the deadly 
 weapon, requires some degree of rationality and judg- 
 ment. 8. Another proof that such persons are not 
 
 Uj insane is manifested in their conduct. With 
 what tenacity they keep such intentions from being 
 known to othe: \ ! See th :. shrewd, artful, and cun- 
 ning management, avoiding detection in obtaining 
 that which will take life, often securing it under false 
 pretense ! How carefully they I a time and place 
 
 .ble to avoid all detection, so their design and 
 plans may be carried into effect ! All these facts 
 show that such persons are not totally deranged. 9. 
 are compelled to the conclusion, that all who de- 
 liberately commit suicide have a sufficient amount of 
 
 on to know what they are going to do, and how 
 they are going to effect the work ; also, what the re- 
 sult will be, otherwise they would not have presence 
 and control of mind to determine upon such a com 
 and if they had, the mind would k -uch 
 
 arrangement before they could arrive at the final 
 suit. If a person must be totally devoid of reason, 
 in order to commit suicide, then he would have no 
 
INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 225 
 
 inclination to do so; for a child, before it has the right 
 exercise of reason, never manifests any inclination to 
 destroy its own existence. The same fact is true in 
 relation to idiots. If persons could commit suicide 
 totally ignorant of what they were doing, then it 
 would be innocent; but if they know what they are 
 doing, in laying violent hands on their own lives, they 
 are guilty of sin, and will be held accountable for 
 
 such offenses. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The hallucination which takes place under the 
 influence of melancholia, or depression, becomes the 
 only object of mental action. All other impressions, 
 or facts, naturally connected, which would correct any 
 excited perception in regard to supposed realities, can 
 not become the object of attention, The mind be- 
 comes bewildered and overwhelmed with hopeless 
 misery, and, being unable to contemplate any future 
 relief, the whole soul appears plunged into a cloud 
 of augmented gloom. Many persons, under such 
 circumstances, are apt to begin to imagine that all 
 their friends have forsaken them, and then begin to 
 lose confidence in every person. The very appear- 
 ance of nature is gloomy and mournful. They 
 begin to feel that life is a burden, and commence 
 forming conclusions to leave the world. When such 
 resolutions are once formed, then the mind acts 
 upon them exclusively, by connecting with such pur- 
 poses the most effectual way to accomplish the dread- 
 ful act; which act becomes more harmless, in their 
 
226 INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 
 
 opinion, as the mind, under great excitement, dwells 
 upon it. 2. Such purposes can he and have been 
 abandoned when the mind has been suddenly arrested 
 by some new and alarming object of thought. A 
 man has been mentioned, who left home at night for 
 the purpose of drowning himself; but, on being sud- 
 denly attacked by robbers, fled for refuge, where he 
 soon realized that all inclination to suicide was gone. 
 3. There is an impression of insanity, connected with 
 the idea of suicide, which the mind appears to possess 
 while there is the least manifestation of reason re- 
 maining; and it is certainly true, that when the mind 
 is totally lost to all reason, it is incapable of determ- 
 ining upon suicide. 4. Another hallucination often 
 arises in connection with the impression of the crimi- 
 nality of suicicLe. Persons have been known, in the 
 history of the past, to commit murder for the sole 
 purpose of rendering their lives up to the require- 
 ments of the law of the land, and thereby die by the 
 requirements of justice. This they seem to have sup- 
 posed frees them from the sin of suicide. Many have 
 avowed their intention of murdering some one, with- 
 out having the first improper feeling toward them ; 
 and often such selections were made of some one 
 whom they loved more than any other. They have 
 confessed, on some occasions, that they only wished 
 to commit murder in order that they themselves might 
 die by the just sentence of the law; and have been 
 known to go still farther, by selecting a child, which 
 they believed would be happy after death, and console 
 
INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 227 
 
 themselves that it would be no special injury to the 
 child to take its life, and then they could themselves 
 die by the hand of justice. The right exercise of rea- 
 son is lost with such persons, and it would appear that 
 their long-cherished desire to die had always been 
 checked by connection with the exceeding sinfulness 
 of suicide: hence, the resolve on the death of some 
 innocent person was favorably entertained from the 
 thought that such persons would be happy after death, 
 and it would give themselves the opportunity of dying 
 according to justice. 
 
228 idiocy 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 IDIOCY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The term idiocy conveys to the mind the idea of 
 natural defect of the understanding. The degrees 
 which have been acknowledged to exist in idiocy are 
 not well defined, as any thing like partial idiocy is 
 only another department of partial insanity; yet 
 there are some distinctions by which a difference 
 may be discriminated. 2. Fatuity includes that kind 
 of mental weakness which differs from the turbulence 
 and fierceness of the maniac, on the one hand, and 
 that of a desponding state of insanity on the other. 
 In the latter case or state, part of the faculties may 
 retain power of healthy action; but, under fatuitous 
 influences, the mind appears to suffer a general sus- 
 pension of healthy action in all its departments. 3. 
 Cretinism, as it was anciently understood among the 
 valleys of the Alps, contained an amplitude of signifi- 
 cation, which will not philosophically apply to a cor- 
 rect idea of idiocy. The cretins were classified so as 
 to convey an idea of the strength and action of the 
 mind. The intellectual action of the first class was 
 not far removed from animal life, having no language 
 to convey thoughts, or judgment in seeking happi- 
 
idiocy. 229 
 
 ness, or in avoiding danger. 4. There is another 
 class, which evinces some signs of intellectual action, 
 with occasional traces of rationality; but the whole 
 mental powers are so inactive that, ift looking on such 
 countenance, we have conceptions of the presence of 
 a form, while the mind or soul appears to have taken 
 its departure. 5. An idiot is one who has ever been 
 under the influence of mental imbecility, so that the 
 mind can not be said to have been, at any time, sound 
 or rational. The mind of such person has alivays 
 been in ruins. 6. Idiocy is incurable in this life, 
 from the fact that the cause, which is principally de- 
 formity, can not be removed by remedies which re- 
 move the power and influence of disease. We can 
 have no conception that the essence called mind can 
 be naturally deformed, or that it can be, within and 
 of itself, under the influence and power of idiocy ; for 
 such conclusion would be without proof; therefore, all 
 our ideas of idiocy have their origin in connection 
 with the deformities and imperfections which we be- 
 lieve to exist in the physical nature. 7. We can have 
 no conceptions of the mind, or spiritual existent nat- 
 urally defective in faculties, or without the right use 
 of them ; for if such defects exist wholly in the mind, 
 then it must suffer such defects forever, as we have 
 no promise of any new creations in the future. To 
 suppose the existence of a mind naturally imperfect 
 in its immaterial nature, or as to the existence of some 
 or all of its faculties, and that it can and will main- 
 tain such imperfect existence in the spirit-world, is to 
 
230 IDIOCY. 
 
 suppose an absurdity, and reflect dishonor upon the 
 wisdom and goodness of its Creator. Then it will 
 follow, as an irresistible conclusion, that if the soul 
 can be or always has been totally insane, or idiotic, it 
 has violated no law or rule of right, and must be sane 
 in heaven. An idiot in heaven can never fulfill the 
 design of a gracious Creator, in glorifying and prais- 
 ing the Author of all good. The idiot will be saved, 
 but will leave his idiocy with the deformity of his 
 body in the grave, while his rational and exalted spirit 
 will ever move the harp of eternity. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We have evidence of the destructive influence of 
 the physical organs over the power of memory in the 
 aged. An active and retentive memory often loses its 
 power of action as we advance in age. If we say 
 this loss of power is wholly in the mind, then it would 
 follow that it is capable of losing its faculties, and it 
 would be reasonable to suppose that they were entirely 
 destroyed by temporal death. But this is absurd; for 
 when aged persons are unable to recollect the occur- 
 rences of one. hour past, yet, if their attention is di- 
 rected to what took place in the early part of their 
 lives, they can narrate that which transpired, and con- 
 nect facts and events together, without any hesitancy. 
 This is conclusive proof that the power of memory is 
 not lost, nor can it cease to be. 2. That the physical 
 nature curtails the power of hearing, is clearly demon- 
 strated in the example of those who are far advanced 
 
IDIOCY. 231 
 
 in age. Such persons often become deaf; and if this 
 defect was abstractly in the mind, then we could con- 
 clude that the mind, in this respect, was becoming 
 annihilated ; but when the ear-trumpet is applied the 
 hearing is restored ; hence the power is not gone nor 
 destroyed, but is ever living in the nature and essence 
 of the imperishable mind. 3. The same evidence is 
 true in regard to the organ of sight. The eye be- 
 comes affected as persons advance to old age, so they 
 dimly see, but when an optic is applied, the sight is 
 restored. The power is still there, and the whole dif- 
 ficulty must exist in the physical organs. 4. Then 
 we are forced to the conclusion that the cause of idi- 
 ocy is wholly connected with the bodily powers. 
 5. If sin, either directly or indirectly, can cause idi- 
 ocy, then it follows that the remedial plan, in destroy- 
 ing such power and influence, will reveal rationality 
 as inherent in the very nature of those elements which 
 were locked up during the existence of the body; 
 therefore, we are led to believe, that when the soul of 
 an idiot is released from his sin-diseased body, it will 
 be possessed of rational powers and knowledge, in 
 the enjoyment of which it will flourish in immortality. 
 
DIVISION TENTH 
 
 CHAPTER I . 
 
 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The soul has knowledge in itself, and its power 
 to know and retain knowledge is wisely arranged by 
 the great Author. It has internally perception, think- 
 ing, reasoning, believing, doubting, knowing, with va- 
 rious mental operations, or acts, which are experi- 
 enced, and we are conscious of their real existence, 
 in connection with which w T e receive distinct ideas of 
 them, or in relation to them, without traveling beyond 
 the internal being and action of mind, and unaided by 
 the power of the senses as a medium of knowledge in 
 regard to external things. 2. The mind has power 
 of knowledge within itself which power is connected 
 with the existence and action of intuitive mental ele- 
 ments. The mind is not capable of receiving or pos- 
 sessing knowledge of external things unless it has 
 knowledge of purely-internal origin; for all knowl- 
 edge of external facts is unknown to us only as we 
 have internal power to receive them as such. And 
 if those elements connected with the origin of intui- 
 tions, have internal power to receive external exist- 
 232 
 
INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 233 
 
 ences as facts, they have power within themselves to 
 know thoughts of internal origin, and to have ideas 
 of interior operations or mental action. 3. The pri- 
 mary power of knowledge is not material, but mental, 
 and has its origin in connection with the internal men- 
 tal elements. Connected with these is the self-power 
 of knowing existing truths, and with them is the ori- 
 gin of all our knowledge. 4. Knowledge received 
 through the medium of the senses from the external 
 world, and in regard to external things, may be re- 
 garded as of secondary order, or of an ulterior nature, 
 when compared with that of internal origin. 5. The 
 internal action of the mind, by which items of knowl- 
 edge are apprehended, is so connected with such an 
 immaterial essence, or being, that rational force and 
 vigor are derived from it; yet the soul employs mate- 
 rial elements or organs to aid in the acquisition and 
 perfecting of knowledge in regard to the external 
 universe of materialities. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knoivledge is of internal origin, though it may 
 
 be said to begin in the senses ; yet only so far as 
 
 sensations through the medium of the senses, being 
 
 caused by external things, are necessarily followed by 
 
 new mental states. But knowledge does not and can 
 
 not begin with the senses, unless sensation within 
 
 itself can be called knowledge ere it makes its report 
 
 to the mind ; otherwise, we can have no knowledge of 
 
 external things, till sensation is followed by percep- 
 
 20 
 
234 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 tion of the cause or causes, and the mind decides 
 upon them. 2. Ideas of internal origin may be read- 
 ily and clearly defined. The origin of the idea ex- 
 pressed by the terms thinking, willing, and believing, 
 can not be traced to the power or action of the senses; 
 for they are not the objects of the test or action of 
 any of the senses. Neither can we say that the ideas 
 of cause and effect, right and wrong, space or infin- 
 ity, order, truth, and power can have their origin in 
 the senses. The internal operations of the mind can 
 exist and be known to us as primary sources of knowl- 
 edge. 3. The primary origin of knowledge can not 
 be said, philosophically, to commence with any ulte- 
 rior faculty or medium of mental action, but must be 
 connected with the power of intuition. Intuitions 
 appear to be spontaneous, and when they are brought 
 under the power and action of reason and the judg- 
 ment, may be known as ideas or notions. 4. This 
 may be extended by noticing complex ideas of internal 
 origin. Such ideas are composed of elementary facts, 
 and these parts are simple or individual entities. The 
 process of combining these ideas may be carried on 
 without reference to external things, and may be en- 
 tirely an internal action or mental operation. 
 
EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 235 
 
 CHAPTER II. - 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND AN- 
 THROPOLOGY CONTRASTED IN THE EX- 
 AMINATION OF THAT WHICH RE- 
 SEMBLES MIND IN BRUTES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. We do not introduce all the contents of this 
 chapter as properly belonging to the analysis of mind, 
 yet it contains many things which should be studied. 
 That mind or spirit exists can not be doubted; and 
 almost the next inquiry is in regard to the extent of 
 mental or spiritual existence. Can any order or form 
 of physical existence below that of man possess any 
 thing which in nature is similar, in any respect, to the 
 human soul. 2. A portion of clay may lie in the 
 earth for thousands of years, without any increase or 
 diminution, or change, so far as we can determine; 
 but there are evidences which indicate and even estab- 
 lish the fact that other combinations increase in size, 
 or grow with, seemingly, no cessation or interruption. 
 Petrifactions are conclusive of the beginning and ad- 
 vancement of the work of change. The formation 
 and growth of rock can not be doubted. This process 
 of advancement or growth, which characterizes the 
 various degrees or conditions of such inert existences, 
 has been called inanimate life in contradistinction to 
 
236 EXTENT OE MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 
 
 those existences which contain no real or contingent 
 evidences of change. If the advancement or change 
 indicated in maturing petrifactions, crystallization, and 
 enlargement of rocks can be called life, it is certainly 
 the lowest order of life of which the mind can have 
 any conception. We will simply say that no geolo- 
 gist, lapidarian, or mineralogist, will dissent from the 
 fact that such life, or change, is very different from, 
 and is of a lower degree or order than the life of tim- 
 ber or vegetation. The latter is periodical, and de- 
 pends upon the change and condition of the seasons, 
 while the former appears to be continuous and of an 
 inherent nature, independent of the influence of the 
 vernal sun, summer solstice, or tropical shadow; but 
 in connection with this change, there is no evidence 
 of mind or spirit. 3. That kind of inanimate life in 
 the growth of timber or vegetation, is of a higher 
 order than that to which our attention has just been 
 called. The growth of vegetation depends upon cer- 
 tain influences immediately connected, such as the 
 warming and invigorating power of the sun, and the 
 reviving effect and motion of the atmosphere; but a 
 sufficient cause can destroy the emerald hues of the 
 summer forest, yet there is not any thing which indi- 
 cates the presence of mental or spiritual influences. 
 4. Animated existences, or animal life, is very differ- 
 ent from that of inanimate realities. Animals or 
 brutes are classed in a higher order or scale of beings, 
 and we are forced to the conclusion that beasts, birds, 
 and fish possess something more than is or can be 
 
EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 237 
 
 contained only in material elements or existences. 
 5. Brutes exist either wholly of material elements, or 
 that influence or power which is connected with such 
 elements differing from them, must be superadded or 
 is superior to any essence or elements of matter. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Brutes differ from inert existences in being pos- 
 sessed of life with sensitiveness, or are capable of expe- 
 riencing sensations; and they can not experience sen- 
 sations without having internal power to realize such 
 influences ; and if they are capable of realizing or ex- 
 periencing sensations, that internal power by which 
 such sensations are tested is different from crude mat- 
 ter, and is superior to it. 2. Brutes have poiver of self - 
 action, which is perfectly opposed to the nature of 
 matter, and contradictory to all laws governing mate- 
 rial elements or existences. 3. To a certain extent 
 brutes see, feel, taste, smell, and hear. Some of these 
 powers are more acute than they are in connection 
 with the human body, yet they are not connected with 
 a mind that can reason or that is capable of moral 
 influences. 4. This internal and superior natural 
 and motive power possessed by brutes has been called 
 instinct ; but what is instinct with the lowest degree 
 of meaning that can be properly attached to it, but 
 mind? 5. Volition, to some extent, is evidenced in 
 the freedom of animal action. This can be noticed 
 in the manner of their movements. If escaping from 
 danger, there is care manifested in selecting the safest 
 
238 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 
 
 and quickest way; they never choose the direction of 
 danger or of their foe. 6. Brutes appear to have 
 naturally a knowledge of courses, and have but little 
 confusion in determining and in pursuing the proper 
 direction to any place where they have ever been, and 
 often are seen moving from one section of the globe 
 to a more plentiful region, though they may have 
 never passed that way before. Bears, in times of 
 great scarcity, have traveled from their native woods 
 through cultivated parts of the country for hundreds 
 of miles, on a direct course to a new wilderness 
 abounding with supplies. And with what exactness 
 and certainty do the different kinds of birds direct 
 their course in the heavens, alternating with the sea- 
 sons in going from one climate to another! 7. The 
 horse and dog know their masters by sight, and by the 
 sound of their voice. They are capable of being 
 trained to move in different ways by certain motions 
 or sounds of the voice. 8. The power of judgment 
 and comparison appear to be evidenced to some de- 
 gree. A fox was once observed to run down into 
 water, and gradually sink under, holding a lock of 
 wool in his mouth. On drawing his head under the 
 water, the wool floated off', which was found full of 
 fleas. Another instance is given of a fox that was 
 observed in a field, playing round a group of pigs as 
 though the large swine were objects of terror. The 
 fox suddenly caught up a piece of wood about the 
 size of a pig, and running toward the fence, jumped 
 through a large crack; then dropped the wood, re- 
 
EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 239 
 
 turned to the swine, seized a pig, and ran through the 
 fence with it at the very same place. He compared 
 the pig with the size of the wood, in order to judge 
 of the chance to escape with his prey. All these 
 traits of mind or spirit can not be the result of insen- 
 sible matter. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. There is a great dissimilarity existing between 
 the powers of man and that of the brute. The former 
 is naturally constituted with superior powers, and has 
 control of them in the examination of any subject. 
 The brute may be said to have perceptions of external 
 things, and may move in the direction of some object 
 of sight; yet there is no power to combine facts or 
 reason in regard to them. 2. The human mind, from 
 the nature of its structure and action, is really scien- 
 tific in research. The brute appears to act from what 
 he sees, hears, and feels, without any reference to the 
 cause, or as to why such cause or causes exist. 3. 
 The human mind is capable of progressive improve- 
 ment, and its rising efforts and conquests in scientific 
 knowledge appear to be bounded only by the feeble- 
 ness or paralyzing weakness of physical organs. 
 Brute intelligence appears to be susceptible of im- 
 provement, in some instances, to a very limited ex- 
 tent, but can not pass beyond certain limits or bounds. 
 They may be said to remain in their generations in 
 the same limitations of instinctive action ; but the im- 
 perishable mind of man, limitless in research, sends 
 out exploring thoughts, like a burning sun radiates its 
 
240 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 
 
 million beams of light, filling the universe with the 
 brilliancy of effulgent day. Man is possessed of a 
 conscience, and feels himself to be a moral agent, and 
 accountable to God; but the brute is without any in- 
 nate moral principle. 4. The human mind can not 
 become familiar with scientific research, and arrive at 
 true knowledge, without the presence and action of 
 self -consciousness j reason, original suggestion, the un- 
 derstanding, and the judgment. These appear to be 
 absent in the manifestations of brute intelligence. 5. 
 Man is a moral agent, subject to moral feelings, his 
 conscience constituting the great court of appeal; 
 and, in connection with it, the moral sensibilities, 
 emotions, and feelings appear to harmonize. Here 
 intuitive convictions arise in regard to right and 
 wrong ; but the brute, being totally destitute of all 
 these, must hold a lower position in the scale of 
 
 beings. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The dog can be taught to go errands for his 
 master, and look for game in any direction, by the 
 motion of the hand. If he is commanded to watch at 
 any certain place, he will remain there till released 
 by his master. The sound of two words will change 
 alternately the course of a horse. 2. Animals have 
 been learned to dance at the sound of music. This 
 has been thought to arise from the fact they were 
 trained upon hot plates of iron in the first place, and 
 that ever afterward, on hearing music similar to that 
 played while they were dancing on hot iron, they 
 
EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 241 
 
 would begin to dance; "and that the associations 
 which had been established between the sound of 
 music and the mere animal sensibilities reproduced 
 dancing." If this is true, and proves any thing, it 
 proves too much; for then the brute must have power 
 to distinguish such associations of music from other 
 associations, or sounds, in order to know when to 
 dance ; and, in the next place, it proves that the brute 
 has power of memory in calling up the associations 
 connected with music and circumstances long since 
 past. 3. A horse can recollect the road in returning 
 to his home from a distant country. We have an ac- 
 count of a horse, owned by an itinerant minister in 
 this country. In one part of his circuit he always 
 turned off from the highway, along a path at a certain 
 tree. After the lapse of seven years, returning along 
 the same highway, he came to the same tree, and 
 the horse turned off with enlivened speed; it was 
 with difficulty he could be turned back to the 
 road. 4. The term ruach, as used in the Hebrew 
 Bible, when applied to human beings, means the soul; 
 but the same term is used in Scripture in regard to 
 beasts, and means, without doubt, the spirit, or soul. 
 But there are other terms which define the great dif- 
 ference which exists between the human soul and the 
 soul of the beast. It is clear that, from the meaning 
 of the term, men have souls, and that beasts have 
 souls. 5. If the brute has a spirit, or soul, will it not 
 exist forever ? We may base an argument on this 
 
 position upon the indestructibility of matter; we have 
 
 21 
 
242 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS, 
 
 no proof that any property of matter can or will ever 
 cease to be. If this be true, it is reasonable to infer 
 that the spirit of brutes, which we have seen differs 
 from, and to be superior to matter, will exist forever, 
 and that, in connection w T ith their bodies, immortal- 
 ized in the restoration of all things. 6. Does it not 
 appear reasonable, that if beasts existed before the 
 fall of man, they were pure in nature and free from 
 servitude ; and that they were designed to be happy 
 forever? If their sufferings and death were brought 
 upon them by man, and are the results of sin, what 
 can be their condition when sin and its effects are 
 wholly removed, but that of happiness and life? If 
 the brute suffers innocently it is only reasonable to 
 suppose that they will be restored. 7. It is impossi- 
 ble to conceive that an All-Wise Being would create 
 beasts for the purpose of annihilating them at some 
 future time. If they had been created suffering and 
 dying before the fall, then we might have room to 
 doubt ; but as they were originally pure and happy, it 
 is reasonable to suppose that such will be their condi- 
 tion in the final restoration. 
 
INTUITIONS. 243 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 INTUITIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. By mental intuition is understood a natural in- 
 ternal power which acts in perceiving realities. It is 
 the act by which the mind perceives the agreement or 
 disagreement of two or more ideas, or real facts or 
 truths, the moment they are presented. It is the 
 power of perceiving facts immediately, without the 
 intervention of reason, arguments, or testimony. It 
 presents truths to the mind on bare inspection, and 
 this simple inspection is knowledge. 2. This intui- 
 tive power has its origin in connection with the pri- 
 mary elements. Here philosophical inquiries must 
 pause, as we can go no further back than original 
 elements. 3. Several of the primary elements of 
 mind may be regarded as intuition faculties ; but no 
 powers of our being are more closely connected with 
 the origin of intuitions than consciousness and con- 
 science. 4. In the reciprocal relations of intuitions 
 it is impossible for them to be opposed to each other. 
 They appear to arise as perfect spontaneities of em- 
 pirical order. They are simple in their origin, being 
 free from all contingent influences which may follow ; 
 as there can be nothing in the philosophy of mind 
 
244 INTUITIONS. 
 
 anterior to those primary elements which lie at the 
 foundation of mind. 5. Ideas arise in the mind in 
 connection with the nature and power of original ele- 
 ments. When intuitions arise they are immediately 
 followed by the action of the judgment, in discrim- 
 inating difference and resemblance, which presupposes 
 the presence of consciousness, and afterward they are 
 embraced by the understanding and reason. 6. Sim- 
 ple ideas arise without natural classification. It re- 
 quires a special action of mind in evolving them as 
 objects of reason, and in combining or eliminating 
 from the original, simple concrete. 7. Greneral ideas, 
 or notions, may arise in connection with simple or 
 even eliminated ones. We may, in the first instance, 
 have the perception of a tree without any general 
 idea of more at.first than a specific tree ; but the per- 
 ception of a second tree is succeeded by the sugges- 
 tion of a third or more, till the judgment, discrim- 
 inating, causes the mind to be led in contemplating an 
 extended number of trees. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Spontaneous action, or developments of the in- 
 telligence, are those which exist in the mind anterior 
 to attention and a full apprehension of them ; but a 
 correct and distinct apprehension of objects depends 
 upon attention, in which they become the objects of 
 reason and judgment. 2. When spontaneous devel- 
 opments are sufficiently apprehended to secure atten- 
 tion, then the full apprehension of them, in connection 
 
INTUITIONS 
 
 245 
 
 "with which they are conditioned and decided upon, is 
 voluntary as well as the exercise of those other pow- 
 ers in receiving them as knowledge. 3. In connec- 
 tion with the action of these internal spontaneous af- 
 firmations is the intuitive conviction of self, and by 
 reason of such action is the mind revealed to itself, 
 and its real existence becomes knowledge. 4. Though 
 a knowledge of self is revealed by reason of these 
 spontaneities, acting out or from natural intuitive 
 power, yet the character of self must begin with ap- 
 prehension, attention, reflection, and consideration. 
 
246 COMMON-SENSE 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 COMMON-SENSE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Common-sense may be regarded as the process 
 or power of practical judgment. In character it is 
 regarded as that which is sound and safe, and is effi- 
 cient in directing us in proper deportment and to cor- 
 rect action. 2. It may be defined as the immediate 
 or instantaneous decision of correct reason. It is 
 universally appealed to as a correct guide in detecting 
 falsehood, and testing that which is true. 3. Mental 
 affirmations, which arise in connection with the same 
 order or classes of truths common to all minds, being 
 a result of unaffected reason, forms the peculiar con- 
 dition and sound mental action, inspecting and pre- 
 senting to us those events or facts which we immedi- 
 ately depend on and receive as true. 4. The vivid 
 and correct exercise of this mental power, which is 
 not really a faculty, is of the utmost importance in 
 constituting a well-regulated mind. Some minds are 
 capable of being called great and overwhelming in 
 that which might be called uncommon sense, while 
 they are almost entirely destitute of common-sense. 
 The former is attended with strong, hasty, and ill- 
 timed efforts or action, while the latter is character- 
 
COMMON-SENSE. 247 
 
 ized with prudence and successful efforts with increas- 
 ing influence. 5. The mental action or power called 
 common-sense is manifested by no appeal to casualties 
 or assumption, but commences with the real affirma- 
 tions of the mind. The origin of its action is not 
 with external objects, but commences wholly within 
 the mind, in connection with truths apprehended, and 
 the immediate action of reason. 6. The reality of 
 common-sense involves a general understanding of 
 facts, notions, and feelings evident in themselves, 
 which are the objects of the judgment, giving 
 strength to the belief and direction to our action. 
 In the very nature of this power there appears to 
 be a healthy action of the various faculties concen- 
 trating in a common consent to, and a correct under- 
 standing of that which is true of the thousands of 
 facts and events which are present. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. If common-sense be affirmations common to all 
 minds, and that these are immediately connected 
 with the exercise of reason and judgment, then it can 
 not be absent in any mind, or such mind must act 
 almost by accident, and always appear unsettled and 
 unhappy in the midst of contentions, or when sur- 
 rounded by storms. 2. Common-sense directs in cor- 
 rect investigations, and is a guide to truth. Its aid 
 in the detection of error is of the utmost importance. 
 An appeal may be made to this power with full assur- 
 ance, and with confidence of certain success. 3. This 
 
248 COMMON- SENSE. 
 
 power, so indispensably connected with a well-regu- 
 lated mind, may be cultivated and rendered more 
 efficient in directing to proper conclusions. This may 
 be done by carefully attending to the process or rea- 
 soning, and the true and correct discriminating power 
 of the judgment. It is an invaluable treasure of the 
 soul, and wherever it exists the mind is capacitated 
 for undisturbed happiness and great usefulness in the 
 world. 
 
DIVISION ELEVENTH 
 
 ■♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 VOLITION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Volition has been regarded as the power of 
 willing or of determining. It is essential to the ex- 
 istence of sentient beings of high moral destiny. 
 This power is very closely connected with the exist- 
 ence and nature of the entire faculties of the mind, 
 or soul. 2. It is also to be the act of willing and the 
 act of determining choice, or of forming purposes to 
 be carried out by the action of the w T hole mind. 3. 
 The president of a college, favorably and extensively 
 known, defined volition, in a baccalaureate address, as 
 follows : u Volition in man is that power which moves 
 his body. That it has, in whole or in part, any power 
 or influence over the mind, is a doctrine we think 
 long since lost in oblivion." If volition has power to 
 move matter, and has no power or influence over 
 mind, then it is neither matter nor immaterial in na- 
 ture. If matter it would be inert, and if of mind it 
 would act with the mental powers, and have influence, 
 otherwise it would not have power to move the body. 
 
 4. Volition is, in nature, freedom within itself It 
 
 249 
 
250 VOLITION. 
 
 has power to act or refuse to act. This is implied in 
 the use of the very term, its meaning and nature. 
 5. There is or there is not such power as volition. If 
 there is no such power, then all arguments about it 
 are unmeaning ; but the existence of such faculty or 
 power has been acknowledged by general consent. 
 If there is such mental power, it is characterized by 
 its nature, office, and relation to other faculties. 6. 
 The doctrine that volition is only and simply the 
 " act " of the will, or that the " will is the mental 
 power or susceptibility by which we put forth voli- 
 tions,' 5 and admit such volitions to be simple action, 
 can not be clearly sustained ; for action is only action ; 
 and if we say the will has power to act, then volition 
 would be lost in the same action, unless it was a sec- 
 ondary or double action in one. But this would be 
 absurd; therefore, there is a more extensive and 
 deeper meaning to be attributed to volition than sim- 
 ple will-act or will-action. 7. If volition be only sim- 
 ple action, such action may be applied to the action 
 of water, or atmosphere, with as much propriety as to 
 the action of the will, if its reality is wholly depend- 
 ent upon the action of the will. 8. Volition can not 
 be any thing more or less than an internal power ex- 
 isting naturally of self-freedom in action. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Volitions differ from volition only in the plural- 
 ity of their various actions, or the almost simultane- 
 ous eliminations of spontaneous motion, correspond- 
 
VOLITION. 251 
 
 ing to various qualities of objects, or those entities 
 closely combined. 2. It is impossible to give a true 
 definition of the nature of volition or of volitions. It 
 is not proper to say they are simple states of mind, 
 or that they are either mental determinations or con- 
 clusions ; for they are still more important, and lie 
 back of all these. The moment we appeal to con- 
 science and our experience, we are satisfied as to the 
 existence of the power and action of volition, though 
 the nature of either or both can not be defined. 3. 
 Volition may exist in reference to some object or ob- 
 jects, and also without any object. The belief that it 
 can not exist without some object, is contrary to all 
 our conceptions of its nature and office. If it only 
 exists with an object, then its existence is either an 
 accident, as an object may or may not exist, or the 
 object is the cause of its existence ; therefore, such 
 an existence has its origin wholly in connection with 
 the object which may be inert; but this is absurd. 
 4. If volition can not exist only in relation to or with 
 an object, then it follows that, if there is no object 
 present, volition is non-existence. 5. It is utterly 
 impossible for volition to consist only and wholly in 
 the action of any faculty or faculties of mind ; for then 
 its existence would be an accident, as such faculty or 
 faculties may or may not act ; and if such action was 
 not put forth, volition could not be called up from 
 nonentity, which would be natural to it ; and if it 
 could, then each appearing would be a new creation, 
 which is absurd, as no element of the mind has power 
 
252 VOLITION. 
 
 to create another element or faculty. 6. Volition 
 can and does exist of and within its own essential na- 
 ture ; and such real existence is independent of all 
 contingent entities. It exists either with reference 
 or without any reference to what we believe to be in our 
 power. The latter consideration, which may be the 
 object of belief, can neither create nor annihilate the 
 abstract existence of volition as belonging to and ex- 
 isting in the mind ; and the action of belief has noth- 
 ing to do in originating this internal power. 7. The 
 exercise or action of volition can exist either in refer- 
 ence to or without any reference to what we believe 
 to be in our power. 8. Volition is one thing, and 
 volitive action is another. The former is an abiding 
 power and the latter may or may not exist. The 
 former may exist -without the latter, but the latter can 
 not exist without the former. No man believes that 
 he can fly, yet he has power to desire to do so. We 
 are not to understand, therefore, that volition implies 
 that the act desired is actually performed in order to 
 constitute volitive action ; for, in that case, it would 
 appear that the action must first be completed, in or- 
 der to know that we have had volitive action. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Volition and desire are not one and the same. 
 The former may exist in nature independent of the 
 latter, and may act in reference to an object, or refuse 
 to act. It can also act in relation to inaccessible ob- 
 jects, or those we do not expect to obtain ; yet such 
 
VOLITION. 253 
 
 action is soon suspended on the clear apprehending 
 of intervening impossibilities; but desire, in many 
 instances, seems to be undying in nature. When we 
 have fondly cherished desires for some object, though 
 there is not the slightest possibility of realizing 
 such object, yet we can not totally suppress our 
 desires. 2. A difference between desire and volition 
 can be tested by consciousness. We can experience 
 an internal discovery and decision of the two exist- 
 ences w T ith a conviction of the reality of that which is 
 peculiar to the nature or character of each as clearly 
 distinct. If from consciousness and experience we 
 can have knowledge of such pow T ers, with their dissim- 
 ilar characteristics, then it is impossible for us to ever 
 have conceptions of them as one and the same. These 
 differences have already been discussed to a sufficient 
 length. We know that we often have volitions, and 
 act entirely contrary to our desires. Persons may 
 desire to participate in some luxury, pleasure, or gain 
 of earth, fraught, to some extent, with evil, while the 
 strength of such desires is overruled by the volitive 
 power, in determining and in pursuing a high and 
 holy Christian course. 3. Volition differs from de- 
 sire in its power of sudden change, and its controlling 
 power over or in counteracting it, while the latter can 
 not readily change, and can only affect the action of 
 the former by a mild influence, inducing action. Vo- 
 litions can be changed with the rapidity of thought, 
 till such changes may number thousands in a few 
 hours. So rapid is this process, that we have only 
 
254 VOLITION. 
 
 to appeal to the action of this power as experienced 
 in each mind, as proof or knowledge of the fact; but 
 desire, though attended with joy or heaviness of 
 spirit, can not be easily changed under certain cir- 
 cumstances. The traveler from home may desire to 
 return, but he voluntarily conquers its power by pur- 
 suing his lonely journey, while his eyes give vent to 
 his feelings in a flood of tears. That man who has 
 been exposed to the storms of maritime life can not 
 change his desires to see his loved friends at home, 
 having been long absent from them. No person 
 rocked on ocean waves, in returning from some trans- 
 marine country, can cease to cherish a thrilling desire 
 to see his home and dearest friends in his native land. 
 4. If the power of volition necessarily acted in con- 
 formity with om: highest or strongest desire, we would 
 be destitute of any rule of morality capable of re- 
 straining from any evil a depraved nature could wish ; 
 but conscience furnishes correction to evil desires by 
 dictating that which is right and should be done. In 
 this way conscience furnishes motive to volition, but 
 in no case can it command or control it. 5. Intel- 
 lectual and moral beings are capable of being led by 
 pure motive, and such motive is furnished by those 
 mental powers which lie at the foundation of moral 
 action. Without the development of these powers, 
 man would be like the brute, led by desires which 
 correspond to and act in conformity with mere animal 
 nature; but, possessed of moral susceptibilities, we 
 have light to act correctly, and if we refuse, guilt is 
 
VOLITION. 255 
 
 the result. And when we voluntarily act in reference 
 to any object, we have an immediate, internal convic- 
 tion as to whether it be right or wrong. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The volitive power is manifested with various 
 degrees of strength. Like other powers, it may be 
 strongly or vigorously developed in some minds, while 
 others appear to possess not so much strength or de- 
 grees of power. 2. The same degrees of difference 
 may be applied to the force of action of the volitive 
 power. Action may be either weak or strong, and 
 the force must, necessarily, depend upon the original 
 power to act; for without such power action would be 
 wholly an accident, if it could possibly have an exist- 
 ence. 3. Volition differs from feeling. The former 
 is the power of free or liberty-action, and its leading 
 characteristic is motion, and not emotion or feeling: 
 hence, it is not necessitated by preference, feeling, or 
 desire. 4. Volition relates to self-action, both of 
 body and mind. The body may move voluntarily or 
 involuntarily, yet it can be made to move. We may 
 determine to put forth action of the bodily powers 
 instantaneously, or that it shall be done at a certain 
 epoch in the future. The mind can act in arranging 
 any process of future or contemplated events or facts. 
 It is difficult to express the liberty and limitlessness 
 of this power. It is peculiar in nature to itself, and 
 can not be arbitrarily trammeled by preference, de- 
 sires, or motive. 5. We have seen, by the preceding 
 
256 VOLITION. 
 
 argument, that volition, in nature, embraces more 
 than mere action, being a power capable of action, 
 and at liberty to act in any way independently of 
 other powers. We have demonstrated that mere ac- 
 tion can not exist if there is nothing capable of act- 
 ing. 6. Volition differs from choice. If our liberty 
 consists wholly and only in acting according to choice, 
 then choice must invariably precede action, and be 
 the cause of such action ; therefore, we can not com- 
 mit crime till we first choose to do so, neither can we 
 do a righteous act till we choose so to do ; but when a 
 variety of objects are presented to us at the same 
 time, we can have no voluntary mental action of any 
 kind in comparing the properties or preferable quali- 
 ties of them, in order to choose which we prefer, till 
 we first choose to know that we can apprehend differ- 
 ences, and that we can choose to originate mental ac- 
 tion in apprehending their existence at all. This is 
 absurd. 7. Volitive liberty is, within itself, the power 
 of acting or not acting, and that either with or with- 
 out choice. Choice has no creative power by which 
 volition is a mandatory result. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Volition is anterior to choice; for choice, in its 
 very nature, implies the possibility of a different or 
 opposite selection to that which is made. Then if a 
 different selection could have been made, the power 
 and liberty of such selecting must necessarily exist 
 anterior to choice, and the selection made ; therefore, 
 
VOLITION. 257 
 
 choice can not exist till we have volitive action, at 
 least, in connection with apprehending the presence 
 of objects of choice. 2. There is an antecedent voli- 
 tive power, in which there is always an alternative to 
 that which the mind decides on, with the conscious- 
 ness that we can choose either. This liberty we can 
 not doubt. If many objects are presented to the 
 mind, we are in possession of the same liberty to 
 choose or not to choose any one or class of them ; 
 and to deny this is to disorganize the rational mind. 
 3. Then it follows that our choice, or act of choosing, 
 is free, being opposed to any thing like an unchang- 
 ing necessity. Volitions can exist as opposed to the 
 laws over matter and natural causation, and even the 
 laws of instinct. Thus, the mind has power to choose, 
 in which alternatives are disposed of without respect 
 to any natural relationship, elements, or cause and 
 effect. 4. Volition is possessed either of self-freedom 
 or is under the law of fatal necessity. If governed 
 by choice, and choice is an effect of our constitutional 
 organization, then the whole mind is under the law of 
 necessity, whether it be regarded in a primary or a 
 secondary point of light. It has been asserted that 
 we are free, or are at liberty to act according to 
 choice; but we have seen that volition is anterior to 
 choice, and that choice is dependent on it for exist- 
 ence, The wheels of an extensive manufactory tend 
 to rest, but they can all be thrown into motion by the 
 great water-wheel, which yields to the weight of water, 
 
 according to the law of gravitation. The force of 
 
 22 
 
258 VOLITION. 
 
 this law is the cause or necessity of action. If man 
 acts only under the law of necessity, then it is the 
 law which is accountable for either good or bad deeds. 
 5. Another false proposition is, that "motives are 
 causes, of which volitions are effects." It is again 
 asserted that "every volition has a motive, and if the 
 motive be single, which operates upon the will, such 
 motive will determine it; but if there are several op- 
 erating upon it at the same time, the strongest one 
 will determine the will-action." It would appear that 
 no proposition, or propositions, could be much more 
 unreasonable or absurd. 6. Motive may be regarded 
 as that which has power to invoke will- action ; and 
 when we speak of it, in connection with volition, we 
 do not say motive is action, but it is that which in- 
 vokes action of the volitive power; otherwise, motive 
 and volitive action would be one and the same. If 
 motive is not volition, then it can only influence the 
 mind to action in a secondary way; for it can not act 
 either as or for volition, but is rather a contingent in- 
 fluence inducing volitions. Then, in all cases, volitive 
 power must exist anterior to motive, and motive can 
 invoke volitive action, which may be granted or re- 
 fused at the pleasure of the will. 7. The origin and 
 arrangement of motives, presuppose and prove the 
 pre-existence and action of the volitive power. If 
 we can pre-arrange motives to produce in the mind 
 certain volitions, then the determining to make such 
 pre-arrangements is a volition, which must exist pre- 
 vious to motive, as its being is a prelude to the origin 
 
VOLITION. 259 
 
 and arrangement of motive. It can exist, in the or- 
 der of time, after, but can never precede and give 
 origin, to the power of volition. 8. Volitions are 
 spontaneous, and can exist independent of motive, 
 and, in many instances, without being influenced by it 
 in the slightest degree. We know, from the pre- 
 ceding argument, that motive can only have a sec- 
 ondary or an ulterior influence upon volition. The 
 relation of cause and effect, when referred to the acts 
 of the Divine Being, destroys all law of motive-con- 
 trol. Such law, then, could not exist unless by Divine 
 volition. Then, if he could act once without motive- 
 influence, he could continue doing so forever. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. Motive can not control the Divine Mind. Dr. 
 Edwards, in trying to sustain the doctrine of motive, 
 gives us to understand that the "energy of motives 
 exists in the nature of things anterior to the will of 
 God." Mr. Upham says that "the Supreme Being is 
 inevitably governed, in all his doings, by what, in the 
 range of events, is wisest and best." Thus, he is in- 
 evitably subordinate to that which is superior in con- 
 trol, and which governs him; therefore, motive is 
 superior and governs all beings in the vast universe. 
 If the above propositions be true, the Sovereign Ruler 
 of universal being is the energy of motives. This 
 conclusion, if true, or if we could believe it true, 
 would compel us to adopt atheism as an inevitable 
 result; but we have seen already the absurdity of 
 
260 VOLITION. 
 
 such statements, in the fact that volition in mind any 
 where is anterior to motive. 2. Such high motive- 
 law leads to materialism; for the mind could not 
 move only as it was influenced by motive, and in the 
 same direction, and to the same degree. Then, if the 
 volitions of the mind should be operated upon by two 
 or more motives of the same or equal importance in 
 every way, the mind must cease to act, and remain at 
 rest forever; therefore, mind would become inert, and 
 if so it would become insensible, as sensation would 
 imply action, and action could not take place. Deity 
 in wisdom placed fixed laws over the material uni- 
 verse, but he has placed self-moving and imperishable 
 minds under very different laws. 3. It is utterly im- 
 possible to establish a conclusion that motive governs 
 volition, without reasoning in a circle. If we ask 
 certain philosophers what controls and determines 
 the volitions, they answer, the strongest motive. But 
 what constitutes the strongest motive? They say, 
 that which determines the volitions. And they can 
 not, neither dare travel beyond this circle ; otherwise, 
 this high law of motive is broken or severed forever. 
 4. That volitions are authoritatively controlled and 
 determined by either motive or choice is directly op- 
 posed to the consciousness of mankind. Of nothing 
 are we more competent to judge, or are we more 
 thoroughly prepared to decide, than that the volitive 
 power lies back of both motive and choice ; and noth- 
 ing do we know with more absolute certainty than in 
 regard to the action of the volitive power, as to 
 
VOLITION. 261 
 
 whether it is necessitated or free. Evidence, reported 
 to the mind through the medium of the senses, may 
 deceive us, from the fact that the physical organs 
 connected with the senses may be affected or even 
 paralyzed by disease; but an appeal to consciousness 
 is an end to all controversy or doubt. Its evidence 
 can not be increased within itself, and its testimony is 
 direct without the frailty of intervening material 
 nerves, tending to paralysis and decay. If it be un- 
 reasonable to doubt evidence or testimony from exter- 
 nal objects, it is infinitely more unreasonable and ab- 
 surd to doubt our consciousness or its evidence. Its 
 voice is without contingencies, or the possibility of 
 deception, and to doubt its unerring truthfulness is to 
 be coerced into universal doubt and skepticism. 5. 
 In the unerring truthfulness of consciousness, we feel 
 and know that our action in choice, and even in the 
 selection of correct motive from evil, is not arbitrary, 
 but free; and we can no more doubt it than we can 
 the consciousness of self as a reality. In calling up 
 our past acts which were evil, we feel that we were 
 free at the time to have acted differently: hence the 
 responsibility and accountability, a sense of which we 
 could not feel if our acts were necessitated. If we 
 intend to do wrong, at a certain time in the future, 
 we feel that it is positively in our power to avoid such 
 an act, and consequently we feel and know we shall 
 incur guilt, a sense of which we could not have if our 
 volitions were controlled and determined by either 
 choice or motives. 6. The untrammeled liberty of 
 
262 VOLITION. 
 
 our volitions is clearly established, from the fact that 
 the existence of consciousness in man prevents him 
 from being effectually reasoned out of a sense of his 
 accountability. They who have faithfully tried to ex- 
 tinguish this internal light, have found it to be like 
 smuggling subterraneous fires, the accumulation of 
 which suddenly rends every obstruction with the 
 throes of an earthquake. The reason is plain. We 
 are more absolutely conscious of the liberty of our 
 volitions in acting right or wrong, than we can be of 
 any law of motives or even as to whether they can 
 have any existence at all. We can have no sense of 
 remorse for any act, however bad, without conscious- 
 ness. While we feel that our evil acts are freely our 
 own, we experience condemnation; but if our acts are 
 not wholly voluntary, it is impossible to feel that 
 we have done wrong. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 1. We are more vividly conscious of the sensations 
 or feelings we experience in voluntarily choosing mo- 
 tive, than we can be even of the real objects of choice. 
 When many motives influence the. mind, such influ- 
 ence implies a previous voluntary action, which must 
 take place in apprehending the presence or existence 
 of such motives. The strongest among many motives 
 can not be determined till a previous voluntary action 
 takes place: first, in apprehending them; and, sec- 
 ondly, in comparing them, in order to determine upon 
 the preferable or strongest one; otherwise, the 
 
VOLITION. 263 
 
 strongest could never be known to the mind, as such 
 motive or motives have not self-power to make them- 
 selves known. 2. There is a difference between re- 
 solving to act according to the strongest motive, after 
 it is voluntarily discovered, and acting from fatal 
 necessity. In the very act of yielding to the strong- 
 est motive, after voluntarily determined, we distinctly 
 feel, in the resolving to conform to it, that, at the 
 same time, we are entirely able and free to resolve on 
 a different course. While standing on the projecting 
 rocks of Niagara Falls, I may determine not to throw 
 myself over, and, at the same moment, feel that I am 
 able and can leap over into the abyss below. 3. The 
 strongest motive affecting the mind is embraced in the 
 law of self -preservation ; yet we feel and know that it 
 depends upon ourselves whether we may adhere to 
 such law or not. It is, with us, to become obedient 
 to the rules or laws of health, or to be intentionally 
 reckless of them, or we are at liberty to destroy life 
 by violence ; but if we were compelled to this by mo- 
 tive, the act would be perfectly harmless, as we have 
 seen. 4. The law of motive-necessity is contrary to 
 the conscious feeling and acts of mankind in general. 
 All claim to refer, in some way, to right and wrong, 
 reward and punishment, merit and demerit. There is 
 a universal feeling prompting to reward him who does 
 right, and to punish the transgressor. This universal 
 conformity of belief, conduct, and actions, which are 
 regulated according to an internal conscious feeling 
 of liberty, in which we know that they can be correct 
 
264 VOLITION. 
 
 or the reverse, according to the freedom of the voli- 
 tive power, forever destroys any necessitated restric- 
 tions upon our spontaneous volitions. 5. The re- 
 membrance of past acts is attended with a conviction 
 or consciousness the most positive, that, in the same 
 condition, or under identically the same circumstances, 
 our volition and acts might have been precisely the 
 reverse of what they were. In the recalling of any 
 act, the consciousness of our power to have volunta- 
 rily determined and acted differently will be distinctly 
 recalled in connection with the act, and the one is as 
 clearly vivid as the other. 6. In deciding upon the 
 acts of others, we have a conscious sense of that 
 which is right or wrong. These convictions arise 
 from a consciousness of mental liberty. We have an 
 unerring conviction that all offenders might act differ- 
 ently if they would : hence their condemnation ; for 
 if we could feel and believe that their acts were neces- 
 sitated, it would be impossible to censure them for 
 any wrong. 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 1. This conscious sense of liberty is evidenced in 
 regard to acts of present time. If a variety of ob- 
 jects are presented to the mind, we know that we have 
 power to collect any one of them, or any class ; and 
 by this volition the object or motive is distinguished 
 and selected, in connection with which we can act, con- 
 tinue to act, or refuse to act at any time. 2. The doc- 
 trine that " motive produces volition, and that volition 
 produces the act, and all the circumstances taken to- 
 
VOLITION. 265 
 
 gether constitute the motive," is only favored with 
 words and confusion of thought. It is a specimen of 
 that continuous, argumentative circle which is adopted 
 by all who vindicate the laws of fatality. 3. The 
 ground of our accountability exists in the possession of 
 a liberty-power to do right, and to refrain from evil 
 or wrong. No where can we find the ground of ac- 
 countability beyond the fact and nature of voluntari- 
 ness. We are satisfied that man is accountable for 
 all his voluntary acts, and we are equally as well sat- 
 isfied that he is not accountable for any thing beyond 
 this. 4. Man naturally possesses volition, and he is 
 capable of volitive action, or of putting forth volitions. 
 If he is not capable of voluntary action, then it is 
 needless to exhort him to do right; for he has no 
 power to act. 5. Mr. Stewart says that "will prop- 
 erly expresses that power of the mind of which voli- 
 tion is the act." If volition is only the act of the 
 will, why call it volition? for the act of the will is the 
 act of the will, and no more or less. If will has real 
 action, it would be foolish to say that volition was the 
 same action, and only the same, yet this would be the 
 case if volition is the action of the will ; but this is 
 false. Then, if volition be only the action of the 
 will, and is dependent upon such action for its origin, 
 and can not be the action of the will, as the will is 
 acknowledged to have its own action, it must be an 
 accidental and superadded action, which may have a 
 casual being, and then sink into annihilation ; but this 
 
 is absurd. 6. Then we must come to a more rational 
 
 23 
 
266 VOLITION. 
 
 conclusion that volition can not exist only as action, 
 unless there is something capable of moving. The 
 very idea of action implies a power capable of acting. 
 7. Mr. Upham says the will is "the mental power or 
 susceptibility, by which we put forth volitions." This 
 amounts to about the same thing as that given by Mr. 
 Stewart. But it would stand thus: that volition, or 
 the act of the will, is that which puts forth the act of 
 the will. 8. Volition and the will are not distinct 
 powers of the mind, neither are they co-ordinate 
 branches of any mental power. One can not give 
 rise to the other, nor are they dependent upon each 
 other for existence. The two terms refer the mind to 
 the different conditions and degrees of strength nat- 
 urally connected with and contained in the one intel- 
 lectual power. (1.) The term volition refers the mind 
 to the natural liberty-power, essentially free to act in 
 any way or manner corresponding to the nature of 
 such freedom. (2.) The term will refers the mind to 
 the same mental power of action, embracing not only 
 its primary spontaneity, but involves an idea of its 
 higher degrees of strength, authoritative and manda- 
 tory power, not only in giving origin to action, but in 
 continuing, counteracting, and in compelling action. 
 All the difference that need be referred to in this 
 place, in the meaning of the two terms, is embraced 
 in the nature of the condition of the one power in its 
 varied manifestations. We now enter upon the anal- 
 ysis of the will in its more extensive manifestations, 
 and will define, in brief form, its relation to other fac- 
 ulties of the mind. 
 
THE WILL. 267 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE WILL. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The will is that faculty of the mind by which we 
 determine either to do or forbear an action. It is an 
 inherent power or faculty which we exercise in decid- 
 ing among two or more objects, as to which we shall 
 choose or pursue. 2. The will, in its very nature, is 
 the liberty-poiver of the mind. The peculiar condi- 
 tion of its essential being is self-freedom and self- 
 power of action. 3. It is not only free in its very 
 nature, but has determining power, deciding in the 
 mind that something shall be done or forborne. 4. 
 The will is closely connected with the judgment, and 
 is often influenced by it; yet, while the latter can dis- 
 criminate and decide upon realities or facts, it requires 
 the presence of the former in determining or in com- 
 pelling action. The judgment can only act in rela- 
 tion to truths ; and when it decides, such decision is 
 knowledge ; but the mind is wholly free to act or to 
 forbear action. But when we will to secure that which 
 is the object of decision, the powers of the mind are 
 directed to the work necessary to be accomplished. 
 5. The understanding can not control the will. It has 
 power to contain or embrace all that is necessary to 
 
268 THE WILL. 
 
 be brought under the inspection of the mind, and can 
 go no further than to invoke volitive action. 6. 
 Reason may connect the different steps, or chain of 
 facts, from the premises to the result, but has no au- 
 thority over the will in causing action. Its power is 
 under the control of the will, by which its action can 
 be continued or suspended at pleasure. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We object to the order of the " classification of 
 the mental powers," according to the arrangement of 
 some writers, upon the nature of the will. A fine 
 specimen of seemingly-unintentional, though inten- 
 tional, design may be detected in the assumption, that 
 "a knowledge *of the will implies a preliminary knowl- 
 edge of the intellect;" and that such " knowledge 
 implies a preliminary knowledge of the sensibilities." 
 This arrangement will claim that we have knowledge 
 of the existence and action of several faculties as an- 
 terior to our knowledge of the will, thereby fixing a 
 previous basis containing laws governing the will. 
 The absurdity of this arrangement will be clearly de- 
 fined hereafter. 2. To define the relation of the will 
 to other faculties, or to all of them combined, in or- 
 der to find some or combined influence as a law or 
 laws of the will, by which it may be and is governed, 
 is wholly unnecessary, as the very nature and relation 
 of the will to all other powers of the mind will for- 
 ever preclude any idea of the correctness of such con- 
 fused argumentation. 3. Feeling, thinking, and will- 
 
THE WILL. 269 
 
 ing are three faculties distinct from each other. They 
 have been known as the sensibility, intellect, and the 
 will. All sensitive states and feelings are referred to 
 the first; all intellectual operations are referred to the 
 second; all mental determinations are referred to the 
 third. It is improper to call an act of the will either 
 a thought or feeling. 4. We object to "laws of the 
 will." No material element, or elements, anterior to 
 the existence of will in the human mind, can, within 
 themselves, contain any "law or laws" possessing ac- 
 tion; and if inertness would be essential to the nature 
 of such existences, they could have no power over the 
 will. 5. If they intend, by the "laws of the will/' to 
 say that the laws which Deity has fixed over the ma- 
 terial universe have power to control the will, then 
 mind is matter, and the will is inert; but this is false. 
 6. It can not be possible that they refer to the exist- 
 ence and controlling power of the Divine Being ; for 
 they could not call such existence the "laws of the 
 will," and if they do, it would follow that he is the 
 action of our wills, and we are both passive and not 
 accountable. 7. It can not be that they refer to any 
 other faculty of the same finite mind ; for it would be 
 just as improper for any faculty to have volitive 
 power to act in the place of and for the will, as it 
 would be for the will to act for itself 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. We have already seen that " laws of the ivill" 
 as contained in some works on mental philosophy, can 
 
270 THE WILL. 
 
 not exist, or, the human mind is incapable of having 
 any satisfactory knowledge of them. 2. The will is 
 governed by its own law, and from its nature it is im- 
 possible that any other faculty or faculties should con- 
 trol it. 3. " Contingent action of the will" implies 
 the continued being and power of action as possessed 
 by other faculties of the mind, and that volitive ac- 
 tion is accidental. If the action of the will is wholly 
 accidental, then there is no abiding or real principle 
 capable of being called the will. Then, if the will is 
 contingent, or only exists in action, it follows that, 
 when such action is suspended, it is annihilated; but 
 contingent volitive action, as taught by many, is false, 
 and is resorted to only for the purpose of destroying 
 liberty-power. "4. If the mind has power to act within 
 and of itself, the condition of such power is freedom, 
 or liberty; otherwise, no action could take place with- 
 out an impinging cause. And if action is compelled, 
 in any way, or by any pow T er, beyond the identity of 
 self, it is caused by such influence. Then that which 
 causes mental action is that which acts while the mind 
 is passive or wholly inactive; but if the mind has 
 self-power to act, it is reasonable to suppose that it 
 possesses some faculty capable of acting, or of determ- 
 ining action. It is just as reasonable to suppose 
 that the will possesses such volitive power as to refer 
 such power to any other faculty or influence. 5. The 
 doctrine that the " will has its laivs preliminary to that 
 of its freedom" as taught by Mr. Upham, and others, 
 is clearly incorrect. Under this proposition, it is as- 
 
THE WILL. 271 
 
 sumed that "the will is subject to laws." An argu- 
 ment to prove this is drawn from the fact that all 
 things in the universe are subject to law, and that the 
 mind of man can not be regarded as an exception. 
 This general blending is very objectionable. Why 
 was there not a distinction made between the laws 
 governing the inert part of the universe, and the laws 
 governing the intellectual and immortal soul ? If an 
 uplifted rock is ponderous, and naturally gravitate to 
 the earth, is that conclusive proof that the soul is 
 ponderous, and must naturally and always obey the 
 same law? If so we are undone forever. 6. The 
 decision having been made, that " the will is subject 
 to laws" then they make this deduction: " The free- 
 dom of the will, ivhatever may be its nature, mast ac- 
 commodate itself to this preliminary fact" Here we 
 have at least the will fatalized. 7. The argument 
 seems to stand thus: The will is subject to and is gov- 
 erned by laws, and that the freedom of the will is the 
 "liberty of acting" under and according to the na- 
 ture and requirements of such laws. These laws are 
 regarded as being infinite, and all they require is of 
 infinite necessity. This system of philosophy teaches 
 and enforces the doctrine of free will, which is our 
 "freedom or liberty" to act according to necessity. 
 8. We have already seen that the will is not subject to 
 such laws; and it will be remembered that "laws of 
 the will" have been assumed without any attempt to 
 define them, or any one of them. The first position 
 assumed was, that a knowledge of the will implied a 
 
272 THE WILL. 
 
 " previous knowledge of other powers of the mind." 
 If that be true, it does not follow that those previ- 
 ously-known powers were laws governing the will; 
 for the very nature of those powers, as specified, 
 would forever refute such a position. The next gen- 
 eral position is, that " the will has its laws preliminary 
 to that of its freedom." Here "laws" are assumed 
 without telling us what they are. We will now pro- 
 ceed to notice those things which have been specific- 
 ally mentioned and pointed out by them as governing 
 
 the will. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The ivill may he influenced by desire, but can 
 never be controlled by it, only in a subordinate w r ay. 
 Desire is no moVe than a mere emotion or excitement 
 of the mind, directed to the attainment of an object. 
 It is an inclination or wish for something to be en- 
 joyed. That which w 7 e wish for or desire may become 
 the object of the determining power of the will, or we 
 may determine to pay no attention to it, though the 
 strength of such desires may remain unchanged. In 
 traveling from home and friends, we may often desire 
 to return ; yet we have volitive power to continue our 
 onw T ard course to some far-off and perhaps uninter- 
 esting part of the world. 2. Desires may arise vol- 
 untarily and involuntarily. We have volitive power 
 to turn our attention to an object, or class of objects, 
 till such object, or something connected, becomes the 
 object of desire; and, in connection with some pecu- 
 liar condition or fitness, which claims our voluntary 
 
THE WILL. 273 
 
 attention, may arise a desire to have the same in our 
 possession. In this way desire may be successive to 
 volition, if not a result of volitive action. They may 
 be involuntary, though the will has power to cross or 
 counteract the strength of such desires, and, by re- 
 peated efforts, diminish and destroy them. 3. An- 
 other position assumed by many writers, to enslave 
 the will, is, that it is positively controlled by choice. 
 The liberty of the will consists in the power of acting 
 according to choice ; therefore, our liberty is wholly 
 embraced in obeying choice. If choice has mandatory 
 control of the will, it would follow that, when it is ex- 
 ercised by any inert object, such object governs 
 choice, which controls the will. 4. The very nature 
 of choice implies the possibility of a different selec- 
 tion to that which is made. We intuitively feel that 
 there is always an alternative to that which we choose 
 or decide on; and as we compare different objects to- 
 gether, we have an abiding consciousness that we are 
 at liberty to choose any one under our inspection. 
 We know that we have volitive power to choose or 
 not to choose. When two or more objects are pre- 
 sented to the mind, we feel that we have power to 
 choose any one of them, or refuse making any choice. 
 If choice can not be controlled in any way by the 
 -will, and is the result of some anterior constitutional 
 determination, then it would follow that choice is in- 
 evitable, and that it can only take place as effect fol- 
 lows its cause. Then, it could never take place only 
 in an involuntary way. 5. We know that choice does 
 
274 THE WILL. 
 
 exist ; then its origin must be caused by the laws of 
 natural necessity, or the mind has natural and volitive 
 power to decide between alternatives. Choice can 
 never be free if it be produced by the laws of neces- 
 sity. Our freedom to act according to such necessity 
 is bondage. If choice is produced by laws of natural 
 necessity, it can never be free ; but it implies liberty 
 or freedom, and without this it ceases to be choice. 
 6. The position of some writers is, that choice controls 
 the will, and is the effect of the laws of natural neces- 
 sity. Then, for the effect of a natural cause to gov- 
 ern the manner, qualities, or condition of itself is 
 
 impossible. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Another assumption is, that the will is governed 
 by motive. Mr. Upham says that "the will acts in 
 view of the strongest motive, and necessarily so acts" 
 If such action is necessitated, it could not be other- 
 wise. 2. Motive is that which incites to action, having 
 only subordinate influence upon the will. The very 
 nature of motive implies no mandatory power over its 
 own origin and action; and if it possesses no self- 
 power of government, it would be impossible for it to 
 govern the will or any other faculty in a positive way. 
 3. The only way for motive to govern the will is, that 
 its action be anterior, in the order of time, to the ori- 
 gin of the action of the will. It is utterly impossible 
 to prove that the action of motive in the mind is an- 
 terior to the origin of the action of the will; and if it 
 could be done, it would be no evidence that motive- 
 
THE WILL. 275 
 
 action could control the will. 4. If motive has power 
 to act, and such action can only be induced by the 
 presence of an object, then the object controls the 
 motive, and the motive controls the will. Then it 
 would follow, that when the object was inert it would 
 control the mind. 5. It has been maintained by 
 many writers, that motive governs mind in general; 
 that it governs volitions in the human mind ; and that 
 in the same way it applies to the Divine Mind. Mr. 
 Upham says, " Our condition, in this respect, seems 
 to be essentially the same with that of the Supreme 
 Being himself. He is inevitably governed, in all his 
 doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wis- 
 est and best;" therefore, the Divine Being is "inevita- 
 bly" governed by a superior. We understand Dr. 
 Edwards, that the " energy of motives " existed, in the 
 nature of things, anterior to the will of God. In this 
 way, many writers take the ground that motive gov- 
 erns the will of man, and the will of Deity, being an- 
 terior to it : hence, we are driven to the conclusion 
 that motive governs all beings, and that it must be, 
 of necessity, supreme. 6. Motive, in the Divine 
 Mind, is subordinate to volitions. If "motive" or 
 any " certain fixed and irresistible influences" control 
 the acts of Deity, such controlling power could not 
 have been originated and arranged by him ; for, in that 
 case, he must have willed the existence and arrange- 
 ment of such pre-existing and controlling power. 
 Then it follows, that such controlling pow T er must 
 either be anterior to any act of Deity, and thereby 
 
276 THE WILL. 
 
 superior to him, or such an assumed controlling power 
 could not have existed till the Divine volition willed it 
 into real being; and if it could only exist by the will 
 of Deity, he had power to act independent of such 
 supposed influence. If he had power to act once in- 
 dependently of this motive, or natural irresistible in- 
 fluence, he has power to act on independently of such 
 supposed influences forever : so, farewell to the eter- 
 nal sovereignty of motive ! 7. We are as conscious 
 of the existence of spiritual-self, as we can be of the 
 reality of matter. Then if such finite spirit can exist 
 somewhere, it is reasonable to suppose that an Infinite 
 Spirit may exist every-where. And if a finite spirit 
 can know some things, an Infinite Spirit may know all 
 things, being evcry-where present. If the former can 
 know some things as they come to pass, and such 
 knowledge not the necessity of their being, then the 
 latter may know all things coming to pass, and such 
 knowledge be not the necessity of such existences. 
 Deity foresaw that man, in his essential liberty, would 
 voluntarily depart from right, and not that he should. 
 There could be no necessity for the latter, in causing 
 the very thing he had already seen coming to pass. 
 8. We have already seen that motive has no power to 
 control the volitive power in the human mind. It may 
 have subordinate influence in inducing volitive action, 
 but nothing more ; for, in order to control the will, it 
 must be proved, without doubt, that it exists anterior 
 to the action of the will, and has volitive power to act 
 in causing the will to act ; but, from its very nature, 
 
THE WILL. 277 
 
 it can not have such power ; and if it could, it would 
 be just as fatal to the law of necessity as to refer 
 such power to the will where it belongs. 9. Another 
 position assumed and strongly argued by Mr. Ed- 
 wards, is, that "the will always is as the greatest ap- 
 parent good;" but he explains this by admitting that 
 the "will is determined by the greatest apparent 
 good." To blend the will with the intellect is absurd; 
 for we can not say that it is a thought; and it is 
 equally as incorrect to blend it with the sensibilities, 
 for it is not a feeling. And if motive can induce vol- 
 itive action, under the law of necessity, then it would 
 follow that when an inert existence was the object of 
 motive; that as the object controlled the motive, so 
 would such object control the will: hence, we would 
 be compelled to serve material elements and laws in 
 common with every thing else possessed with power 
 to influence motive ; but this is false. 10. That the 
 will is untramrneled is in perfect accordance with the 
 consciousness of mankind. Of nothing are we more 
 positively certain than in regard to our acts, whether 
 they be voluntary or of necessity. Knowledge re- 
 ceived through the senses, connected with diseased 
 and perishing physical organs, may deceive us; but 
 consciousness, possessed of its own evidence, is knowl- 
 edge, without demanding an increase of testimony 
 from the senses. It is of and within its own ex- 
 istence and nature the end of all controversy or 
 doubt. To doubt its power is to doubt the reality 
 of all things. Our consciousness of self-action as 
 
278 THE WILL. 
 
 to whether such action is of infinite necessity, or 
 is free, equals our consciousness of existence it- 
 self; and we can no more doubt this than we can 
 doubt the existence of self and that of every thing 
 else. When we contemplate future action in regard to 
 many objects, we feel and know that we have natural 
 volitive power, or ability, to choose any one, or to de- 
 termine on any course we please in relation to one 
 or all of them ; and we are perfectly confident that 
 we have power to refuse action contrary to either mo- 
 tive or the power of choice. When we reflect upon a 
 wrong act in the past, we feel an internal conviction 
 that we were free to have done differently: hence our 
 deep regret or sense of sin ; for without this conscious 
 liberty, we couH never regret the imperfections of the 
 past, or feel that we had ever sinned. As long as we 
 feel that we are accountable for our acts, we feel a 
 consciousness of liberty in acting. If a conscious- 
 ness of liberty could be removed from the mind, just 
 as long as such sense was gone, we would be incapa- 
 ble of any regret or remorse. However much we 
 may dread the results, yet if we do not feel an intui- 
 tive liberty, we never can experience any thing like 
 regret or remorse in regard to any past act. Just 
 as long as we could feel that we had no conscious lib- 
 erty, we would be compelled to feel our acts were not 
 our own. 
 
LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 279 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The expression "free will" is, to some extent, 
 objectionable, as it would seem to imply the opposite, 
 or that there could be such a thing as the will en- 
 slaved under a law of infinite necessity, which we 
 have seen to be incorrect. Witt, in its very essence, 
 or nature, is a free principle. Liberty is its essential 
 condition or law. Free will is as incorrect as hound 
 will. Liberty is essential to its nature, and it is not 
 will if it be not free; and if it be bound, it ceases to 
 be will. Volitive power of action is essential to the 
 being of the soul, and to all rational, intellectual, and 
 accountable beings. Action and self-action are essen- 
 tial differences between matter and spirit. Spirit has 
 self-power of choice; matter has not. Ratiocination 
 is essential to intellect, and can not take place without 
 action. Connected with these, volition is forever in- 
 separable ; therefore, mind can not exist without self- 
 liberty of action. 2. The will, in its acts and de- 
 terminations, is subject to the law of self-liberty in 
 opposition to the law of necessity. We have seen 
 already that the will can not fall under the law of in- 
 finite necessity; therefore, it must fall under that of 
 
280 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 
 
 liberty, as opposed to necessity. If we know that we 
 are under the law of necessity, then we have the 
 same power of knowing that we are not accountable. 
 To suppose and believe that our actions are neces- 
 sary, and that we are accountable for such actions, is 
 to suppose and believe an absurdity ; for we never 
 can experience remorse for any act, or acts, which are 
 not wholly voluntary, either by intention or permis- 
 sion. 3. The doctrine of liberty is clearly established 
 by consciousness, in which there is a universal convic- 
 tion that our past acts, even under the same circum- 
 stances, might have been very different. Such con- 
 viction could not exist only in spontaneous origin or 
 liberty. 4. In connection with the presence of many 
 objects of choice, we have a positive consciousness 
 that two or more acts of the will may be put forth, or 
 that we may will to refuse them all, and that contrary 
 to motive, desire, or choice. This truth can be tested 
 by any one, at this moment, in regard to the very 
 next act of the mind. The consciousness of liberty 
 we now have, can no more be doubted than we can 
 doubt our own existence. 5. We objected wholly to 
 " laws of the will/ 5 as used by different writers. The 
 will knows no law only that of liberty, which liberty 
 may be regarded as absolute, being entirely and for- 
 ever opposed to any law or laws of necessity. 6. I 
 may determine to go to London, and while this determ- 
 ination remains unchanged, all other powers of the mind 
 must be subject to the will. This determination may 
 be continued or suspended only by the will. 7. The 
 
LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 281 
 
 effort to sustain the law of necessity has involved rea- 
 soning in a circle. Necessitarians have assumed that 
 the "action of the will is always in the direction of 
 the strongest motive." In defining the strongest mo- 
 tive, they say it is the motive in the direction of which 
 the will does act. They have no way to define the 
 strongest motive, but wait till the will acts, and then 
 assume that the motive, in the direction of its action, 
 is the strongest. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The spirit of dependence can not exist under the 
 law of necessity. The conviction that we are lost 
 without an interest in the merit of Christ, is common 
 to all; but to properly feel our dependence implies a 
 voluntary act, in which we humbly and confidently 
 rest all our hope upon Divine assistance. 2. But the 
 doctrine of necessity can not naturally tend to mellow 
 the exercise of the heart, and enkindle, with holy awe, 
 the spirit of fervent love to the great Donor of all 
 good. 3. If the doctrine of liberty be true, Deity 
 does not preside over the myriads of earth's popula- 
 tion for the purpose of executing the laws of stern and 
 infinite fate ; for such laws could need no additional 
 power to enforce their claims, as such claims have 
 been executed and enforced from all eternity. From 
 the very necessity in their natural existence, no new 
 claim or arrangement can ever take place, or ever has 
 legally taken place. Such laws must either be self- 
 existent and eternal, or there must have been a point 
 
 24 
 
282 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 
 
 somewhere in the range of duration when they took 
 place, or became real. Necessitarians can not admit 
 that they were created by Deity; for he would have 
 willed their existence. Then they must have had an 
 existence anterior to any volitions in the Divine Mind : 
 hence, the existence and claims of the laws of fate 
 were all arranged before they came to the knowledge 
 of the Divine Being ; and, of course, he is subordi- 
 nate to their control. Such a conclusion is worse 
 than atheism. 4. A design in the creation of man 
 was, that he might voluntarily serve God; and with- 
 out such power, he could never glorify his Creator. 
 Doubtless, without natural liberty to glorify God, the 
 design of our being would have been destroyed, and 
 this would havfi prevented our existence at all. Man 
 must exist free to serve his Creator, or service would 
 not be acceptable to God. And if it is necessary to 
 have natural liberty, in order to glorify his Creator, 
 then he is free to pervert the exercise o*r action of 
 such liberty-power, and voluntarily fall from the favor 
 of God, as in the case of our federal head. The 
 mind is free, and, under this power, we may aim at 
 the sun, step the silent paths of innumerable worlds, 
 shout to their eternal flight; we may will the approach 
 of heaven, the possession of its joys, and the full 
 glory of endless day. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. It is difficult to define the difference between the 
 liberty and the power of the will. Some have thought 
 
LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 283 
 
 that power was capable of degrees, while liberty re- 
 mains the same. Whether there be naturally degrees 
 in the power of the will, is not easily decided; for the 
 apparent difference may be caused, to a considerable 
 extent, by imperfect or diseased physical organs ; yet 
 it would appear that liberty, in all orders of mind, 
 was essentially the same. The partially-developed 
 mind, or that of a child, as well as the strong mind, 
 enjoys the same liberty. The power of the will, as to 
 the quality of its essential nature, can not admit of 
 degrees; but it differs in different minds as to the 
 degrees of vigor, vividness, and strength in its man- 
 datory action. While liberty may be regarded as ab- 
 solute, being opposed to every thing like infinite 
 necessity, power may be regarded as more dependent. 
 Liberty is without any compulsatory infringement in 
 any possible way; yet power is often incumbered by 
 many contingencies. Liberty does not appear to be 
 capable of being increased; but power, by repeated 
 efforts, can become more vigorous and irresistible. 2. 
 The power and freedom of the will is clearly evi- 
 denced in self-preservation. If I were in a boat, 
 peacefully floating on the silvery waters of Niagara, 
 above the Falls, I feel distinctly that life depends 
 upon the efforts of myself, and only upon myself. I 
 feel as conscious as I can of any thing, that I have 
 power either to determine to row to the shore, or to 
 go over the Falls without any effort. 3. The will has 
 self- determining power. It is not a matter of aston- 
 ishment that necessitarians should doubt the self- 
 
284 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 
 
 determining power of the will ; but they acknowledge 
 that the mind, as a whole, has self-determining power. 
 We hold that the will, in its nature and office, presides 
 over all other faculties, and determines all the proc- 
 esses and acts of the mind. No event, object, or fact 
 can be made the subject of knowledge only by the 
 self-determining power of the mind; for nothing can 
 be brought under the inspection of the mind without 
 mental action, and such action is in the mind, and is 
 a result of its self-determining power. 4. Mr. Up- 
 ham says, "If by the phrase self-determining power 
 of the will be merely meant that the will itself, that 
 distinct susceptibility of the mind which we thus de- 
 nominate, has power of action, we grant that it is so ;" 
 that is, the will- can act, but not authoritatively — it 
 can only act under the control of law or the strongest 
 motive. The freedom of such action is in conforming 
 to necessity. But again: "The will acts, and with 
 such freedom and such power as to lay the basis of 
 accountability/' That is, " It is free to act according 
 to the law of necessity." This is the substance, and 
 amounts to the fact that such action is coerced by the 
 law of fate. 5. Mr. Edwards says, "If the will de- 
 termines the willy then choice orders and determines 
 choice." If the will can determine the mind, it cer- 
 tainly can determine the will; for the will is a faculty 
 of the mind, and the self-determining power of the 
 mind has been acknowledged to be true. We have 
 already seen that no faculty or faculties can determ- 
 ine the mind except the will. 
 
LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 285 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The superior power of the will is that peculiar 
 power by which it is not only distinguished from other 
 faculties, but determines the action of the mental pow- 
 ers as a whole. 2. The ground of offense in the sight 
 of God, is not only our power to perceive the differ- 
 ence between right and wrong, and an abiding convic- 
 tion as to what we should do, but is embraced in the 
 fact that we possess the power to do that which is 
 right, and to refuse to do that which is contrary to the 
 Divine will. 3. Connected with voluntariness is the 
 ground of all accountability. Take this away, and it 
 is utterly impossible for us ever to be called to an ac- 
 count for any thought or act. We can neither be ap- 
 plauded nor blamed. 4. The will possesses mandatory 
 power. The mind certainly has self-determining 
 power, by the consent of philosophers, and in the very 
 nature of its being and operations. By general con- 
 sent, and true analysis, this power has not been de- 
 fined as being diffused through the nature and power 
 of all the faculties, separately or combined; but the de- 
 termining power has been referred to some one faculty. 
 No faculty, from its essential nature, can possess man- 
 datory power but the will. 5. The will appears to pre- 
 side over the combined action of the other faculties, 
 and has power to control mental action. 6. Some 
 necessitarians have erred in trying to confound the 
 will with the sensibilities, and refused to appeal to 
 special and universal consciousness. 7. Another evi- 
 
286 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 
 
 dence of the independence and controlling power of 
 the will, is contained in the fact that we can will to 
 perform impossibilities ; that is, we can will the real- 
 ity of an impossibility. The atheist may be pos- 
 sessed of such horrible dread of the truths of the 
 Bible, that, with all his soul, he may will its annihila- 
 tion; yet he knows, at the same time, that this is impos- 
 sible. 8. Such is the will, the free liberty -power of the 
 imperishable mind. Under its vivid power and man- 
 datory control, minds of the high and the lowly, en- 
 kindling with feelings of lofty and holy aspirations, 
 assert their right to triumph over all embarrassments 
 and storms, the mere results of physical tendencies, 
 or the requirements of their laws, mind, intellectual 
 and immortal, may determine upon the advance of in- 
 finite happiness, and the interminable progression of 
 imperishable knowledge. How can we define the true 
 character of the soul, when perfected in its separation 
 from the decay of physical organs which trammeled 
 its manifestations in time ? Possessed of all the facts 
 and knowledge of the past, its thoughts freely range 
 all through the boundless future; but infinitely higher 
 to our conceptions must be the character of that soul 
 perfected in the knowledge, favor, and love of God ! 
 With holy triumph and increasing joy, burn on, thou 
 spirit of endless day ! As the accelerated travel of a 
 star, range the progressive series of heavenly knowl- 
 edge. Endowed with angelic reach of thought and 
 gaze of fire, a bright immortality of universal being 
 only extends the raptures of increasing delight, 
 
LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 287 
 
 whether paused amid brilliant perceptions of sur- 
 rounding good and grandeur, or, contemplating the 
 glow and varied motion of distant rolling worlds, 
 tracing the mysterious vast of great eternity. 
 
ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 THE ELEMENTS OF MIND 
 
 WHICH 
 
 LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION. 
 
 THERE IS A SPIRIT IN MAN ; AND THE INSPIRATION OP THE 
 ALMIGHTY GIVETH THEM UNDERSTANDING." 
 
 25 
 
ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 
 
 -»♦♦- 
 
 DIVISION FIRST 
 
 CHAPTER I . 
 
 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Our attention will be directed, in the second part 
 of these philosophical inquiries, to the analysis of 
 moral elements of mind. The first part of this work 
 contains the analysis of those faculties which lie at 
 the foundation of mental action. 2. The present ob- 
 ject is to define the real existence, inherent powers and 
 office of elements which lie at the foundation of moral 
 action, without which Such action could not exist. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. A correct understanding of the intellectual and 
 moral elements of mind, with a desire to know and 
 properly appreciate their merited worth, vies in import- 
 ance with all relative finities, or the dearest pleasures 
 of invoked attainments. A correct knowledge of 
 mind gives a conscious satisfaction in regard to self, 
 and serves as head-light radiance, thrown on the way 
 
 of rapid and illimitable progression. As the scintil- 
 
 291 
 
292 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 lated travel of a star, so should the transit of a per- 
 fect soul on the disk of departing time reflect intel- 
 lectual and moral light. Such living traces of great- 
 ness and sublimity, with moral beauty and worth, are 
 pioneer sentiments guarding the way of triumph, and 
 pointing out the opening future, every-where subtend- 
 ed with the glorious reversions of vast eternity. 2. 
 Though the human mind, in relative contrast, be re- 
 garded as a mere atom, yet its being and knowledge 
 is unending. Such finity is real in infinity, of bounded 
 identity, but sustained by omnipotence. The true 
 study of mind, embracing purity of mental and moral 
 action, should be regarded as the great science of 
 earth. It hangs the golden clouds of another life, 
 high and glowing, around the setting sun of this ! 
 Then enter this spiritual domain burdened with a 
 sense of immortal destiny. 
 
MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 293 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 REAL EXISTENCE OF MORAL ELEMENTS OF 
 
 MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The existence of moral powers is evident. Ef- 
 fect can not exist without a cause. Neither can a 
 beginning or change take place without a cause. 
 Conscious convictions of the impossibility of inert 
 causation, move us to look for a cause equal to the 
 known effect. Of nothing are we more certain than 
 that moral influences exist in the soul, and that we 
 are capable of moral action; for such action, as a 
 result, can not arise from non-existence. 2. As the 
 mind matures from childhood, there is evidence of 
 internal moral powers. When the attention is ar- 
 rested by either sad or joyful news, the feelings will 
 naturally correspond to either extreme; and there 
 will be an intuitive approval or disapproval, as the 
 case may be. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We have conscious belief in moral faculties. 
 When inspecting internal emotions and feelings, we 
 have self-evident consciousness in regard to what is 
 right or wrong, sanctioning or condemning, approv- 
 ing or disapproving. 2. Revelation appeals to the 
 
294 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 moral nature of the soul with positive certainty; 
 then man is capable of knowing right from wrong, 
 and can feel obligations upon him to do right. 3. 
 The Almighty has often called upon man to decide 
 upon the deportment of others of our race, as to 
 whether they be right or wrong, and as to the char- 
 acter of acquittal or degree of punishment. This is 
 evidence of a moral nature with liberty of correct 
 self-action. 
 
NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 295 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The nature and condition of moral faculties 
 can be determined by reference to our consciousness 
 of their being, and comparing them with elements 
 purely mental. The affections, or influences of the 
 soul enable us to form correct conclusions in regard 
 to the power of the elements to which they corre- 
 spond and by which supported. A pure conscience is 
 connected with right motive and happy mind; but 
 when the moral powers are connected with an evil 
 conscience, the whole mind is gloomy and miserable. 
 2. The moral nature is evidenced by the purity or 
 impurity of motive. The vicious and lawless of earth 
 are looked upon only to be dreaded, and feelings of 
 horror are spontaneous in reviewing their acts. On 
 the other hand, kindness and merciful acts are ap- 
 plauded by the warm hearts of thousands. 3. The 
 harmony and peace pervading civil government, is 
 evidence of moral powers and influences stronger 
 than that arising from impure and vicious minds. 
 Had we no moral nature capable of being influenced 
 by moral suasion, the whole earth would be confu- 
 sion and scenes of blood. 4. Our capability and 
 
296 NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 
 
 enjoyment of happiness in the performance of duty, 
 and remorse in doing wrong, prove the existence of 
 a moral nature, with its character, 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The relative existence of the moral powers to 
 the whole mind refers us, (1.) To the relative claims 
 of the two classes of elements. The states of the 
 intellect differ from the feelings and emotions con- 
 nected with such states. The former is free to 
 enforce investigative thought, regardless of conse- 
 quences; while the latter has a feeling of caution, 
 awe, and dependence. (2.) The action of the mental 
 powers appears to be in the direction of the desirable : 
 apprehending and contemplating the wisdom, sub- 
 limity, and grandeur of universal realities; while that 
 of the moral powers looks to the good, the right; 
 and that which is happy under the Divine approval. 
 
DIVISION SECOND 
 
 ■♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Conscience is a primary or intuitive power of 
 the soul. Its origin is not a result of education, but 
 exists and remains to be exercised. It was created 
 by Infinite Wisdom, with superior power and influ- 
 ence in connection with the original elements of our 
 spiritual being. 2. Connected with it is the power to 
 know self; such reality can not be fully known, with- 
 out the response, approval, and affirmation of con- 
 science. 3. The real existence of external facts can 
 be traced to this faculty, as a connected primary 
 power in the knowledge of such realities. Millions 
 of entities may crowd space around us, but a satis- 
 factory knowledge of them is impossible till we ex- 
 perience a conscious feeling or sense that they are 
 real. 4. Things mentally apprehended become ob- 
 jects of belief, and are received as true when we feel 
 a conscious affirmation or satisfaction in regard to 
 them. Then only is the mind at rest. 5. The Scrip- 
 ture evidence of the existence and nature of con- 
 science is conclusive. Though all other sources were 
 
 297 
 
298 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 silent, Revelation, internal experience, and self-con- 
 scious knowledge would render unbelief impossible. 
 6. The Bible teaches the positive existence of our 
 moral nature, and that such nature centers in that 
 which is called conscience, and by this name our 
 moral nature is influenced, addressed, and commanded. 
 The commands of Heaven show that we have power 
 to know right from wrong, and that conscience influ- 
 ences and moves us to pursue the right. 7. The ex- 
 istence, nature, power, and laivs of conscience may be 
 learned from the following expressions : " Testimony 
 of conscience. A good conscience. Commend our- 
 selves to every man's conscience. Are a law unto 
 themselves ; which show the work of the law written 
 in their hearts, their conscience also bearing wit- 
 ness/' We pause; this is enough. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Belief in the existence and power of conscience 
 is the inevitable result of an intuition which is a part 
 of self; and into this belief we are driven by a thou- 
 sand realities from which mind can never be withheld, 
 and there can be no belief, except intuitive. 2. This 
 power of our moral constitution possesses an inde- 
 pendence and importance among the moral ele- 
 ments and emotions too generally denied. It is called 
 by the world-renowned critic, a the great master- 
 power, the sovereign-regulator of the moral system 
 in man, and placed there by God himself for this 
 specific purpose." It is the superior faculty of the 
 
CONSCIENCE. 299 
 
 moral elements, rightfully claiming persuasive and 
 dictatorial sovereignty, when exercised properly in its 
 heaven-invested influence and power. 3. Mankind, 
 by a general concurrence of feeling and action, inde- 
 pendent of either denied or acknowledged belief,* 
 have awarded to conscience such high jurisdiction. 
 Though it may be the last court of appeal, yet it is 
 the final and conclusive test to that certainty in knowl- 
 edge, where a tendency to belief is wholly undis- 
 turbed. Its righteous dictates should alwavs rule. 
 
300 LAWS OF CONSCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL AND EELATIVE LAWS OF 
 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. It is not the business of conscience to say what 
 is right or wrong existing anterior to self, separate or 
 abstractly, for the real existence or nature of either 
 is beyond its legislation. 2. Neither does it attempt 
 to settle the origin of the law of self-being; but it can 
 be, and is, in part, a witness or evidence in the origin 
 of the knowledge of self-reality. 3. It is within the 
 power and is the business of conscience to decide on 
 our own right or wrong, involving our relation either 
 to innocence or guilt. 4. It does not settle, but as- 
 sumes as settled, the great principles of moral recti- 
 tude, and its influence over our feelings and actions 
 corresponds accordingly. 5. It is a primary prerog- 
 ative, or constitutional law of conscience to lead in 
 deciding on self-right or wrong, to approve or disap- 
 prove. And its voice, under the influence of the Di- 
 vine Spirit, should never be silenced, while all other 
 powers should submit to its righteous dictation. 6. It 
 is a law to man. Notwithstanding the near relation of 
 the understanding, emotions, and will, its natural right 
 is to reign supreme in impressive and dictatorial influ- 
 
LAWS OF CONSCIENCE. 301 
 
 ence of the moral powers, and should be untrameled 
 by either the will or; heart. 7. As the condition and 
 action of our moral nature is essential to happiness in 
 time and eternity, the light of heaven should guide 
 conscience in all we do. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. If conscience be not a real power, and is, as as- 
 serted by a great mind, to be only " a general princi- 
 ple of moral approbation or disapprobation" then, 
 when the mind is not influenced either way, conscience 
 would be non-existence ; and if so, we could have no 
 knowledge of it again without a new creation. It is 
 not another faculty under change, neither can other 
 faculties originate it; therefore, if, at any time, we are 
 capable of experiencing moral influence, called con- 
 science, there must be a cause which is abiding and 
 part of self. Though a superhuman influence be 
 added to mind, yet that would neither be an element 
 or part of self. 2. It has self-power and intuitive 
 right to lead or influence in deciding on right or 
 wrong, the merit or demerit of our own actions, feel- 
 ings, and affections. 8. Conscience-conception refers 
 to the peculiar natural susceptibility, in its central 
 moral position and condition to receive, possess, and 
 retain the first intimations of influences or impressions 
 in regard to the great principles of moral rectitude, 
 subject to the will and approval of the Divine Being. 
 4. Conscience-perception may refer to its natural and 
 peculiar spontaneous acuteness and action, in appre- 
 
302 LAWS OF CONSCIENCE. 
 
 tending and receiving the first influences by which 
 it is affected, moving the mind to action, and constitu- 
 tionally serving as a moral check against the aliena- 
 tion of other powers from right. 5. The moral con- 
 dition and ulterior laws of conscience are of the ut- 
 most importance. (1.) A right conscience exists in 
 the mind connected with a uniform pure motive and 
 freedom from guilt, approved of God, and tenacious 
 of the interests and happiness of self and our fellow- 
 beings. (2.) A pure conscience is possessed of the 
 renewing and hallowed power of Divine grace, by 
 which it is free from the control of sin, and all the 
 emotions and feelings tranquilized with peace and 
 happiness. (3.) Such conscience is under the influ- 
 ence of pure love to God and all mankind. 6. It is 
 said to be evil when it ceases to correctly influence 
 the mind in regard to right and wrong. 7. It is de- 
 scribed as being "seared" when it possesses no pain 
 or misgivings, as the mind reflects upon wickedness 
 or contemplates wrong. Then the soul is ruined. 
 Yet it may return to illimitable love and the purity 
 of immortal thought, transcendent in beauty, grand- 
 eur, and sublimity on the one hand, with sweet, efful- 
 gent glory and grace on the other, spreading soothing 
 and mellowing light, as upon the despair of the almost 
 lost. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 303 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Conscience exists at the foundation of the 
 soul's moral nature, with power to influence and 
 move the same; while consciousness is more closely 
 connected with the states, action, and conclusions of 
 the intellectual distinctions and decisions. 2. Con- 
 sciousness, in one sense, is conscience in action. Its 
 moral condition and influence appears to be connected 
 with the existence and influence of conscience, and 
 extends its adjudicatorial prerogatives over mental 
 operations and sensations of external and internal 
 origin. 3. It is an internal sense or decision from 
 observation or experience resulting in real knowl- 
 edge. 4. In another sense, it may be called a per- 
 ception of what is passing in the mind, while con- 
 science, by intuitive power and right, extends to all 
 our actions, physical and mental. Consciousness is 
 properly the knowledge of the existence; and con- 
 science, of the moral nature of actions. The former 
 is busied with, and more naturally appertains to, met- 
 aphysics; and the latter, with morality. 5. Conscious- 
 ness is self-evident in the philosophy of mind, known 
 to be true, independently of either proof or disproof. 
 
304 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 By it we are positively aware that self is real, and in 
 opposition to non-existence; or, that I am not, or 
 am not myself. Doubt is impossible, unless we could 
 first cease to be ; then there would be nothing capable 
 of doubting. 6. Self- consciousness is sustained by 
 conscience, and from the very natural laws of being 
 neither of them can ever be doubted. 7. Conscious- 
 ness is self-recognition, not only of the processes 
 and emotions of the mind, but is also the mind know- 
 ing itself in these. 8. Self-consciousness, in the very 
 nature of its existence, implies, (1.) An inherent 
 knowledge of self-reality as absolute. (2.) That self- 
 reality and action are its subjects. (3.) And that 
 which is beyond self-finity, is its object or objects 
 of ulterior knowledge. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Consciousness is not only real, but is conditioned 
 by a spontaneous constitutional law of intellectual be- 
 ing — evidenced, from its influence and action ; results 
 known to exist in the experience of persons gener- 
 ally, but no result can take place with sufficient caus- 
 ative power. 2. It can not be a result of other 
 faculties. Could any one of them, or all combined, 
 create this power, then the original or first one may 
 have created itself, which is absurd. 3. In the orig- 
 inal spontaneity of consciousness there is decisive 
 power in regard to mental phenomena. Belief in the 
 testimony and decisions of consciousness and con- 
 science can not be doubted till we know self to be 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 305 
 
 non-existence, but this is impossible. 4. A knowl- 
 edge of personal identity begins with conscience and 
 is matured more fully by consciousness. But belief 
 in the uniformity of such identity is dependent upon 
 memory and reason. Memory calls up past mental 
 feelings and states; reason connects them in one 
 chain up to the present conscious mental state, in 
 w r hich the conviction is irresistible that they all be- 
 longed to the same sentient being. 5. It has direct 
 respect to the present; as we can not be said to be 
 conscious, abstractly, of any thing which does not 
 exist at the present time* We may have conscious 
 remembrance of past events and a conscious con- 
 templation of that which is future ; but this involves, 
 in part, the presence of other faculties. 6. Con- 
 sciousness is not a " second source of internal knowl- 
 edge." Neither can the organs of sense be a " pri- 
 mary source" of knowledge. It is not made known 
 "by suggestion" That a "knowledge of self" does 
 not have its origin in connection with consciousness 
 and conscience, is absurd. Suggestion has no self- 
 power to originate it, nor abstractly its own existence. 
 The doctrine that " impressions from external objects 
 must be experienced, in order to give origin to the 
 idea of self," is untrue, unless mind is derived from 
 matter. 7. All degrees of belief are matters of con- 
 sciousness, and there is no belief but intuitive. It is 
 a source of knowledge, including emotions of the 
 beautiful, the grand, and the sublime : then descends 
 
 to the ludicrous and those of horror. It includes feel- 
 
 26 
 
306 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 ings of pleasure, hope, joy, and happiness; and on 
 the other hand, those of pain, despondency, and re- 
 morse. 8. When we experience feelings of friend- 
 ship, sympathy, gratitude, aifeetion, and love; or those 
 of hatred, anger, jealousy, revenge, and envy, we 
 have conscious knowledge that they are real and be- 
 long to ourselves. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Consciousness , as well as conscience, is a pri- 
 mary source of knowledge. It has power to witness 
 of, and to self, in the origin of self-knowledge. In- 
 tuitive knowledge of self-identity is the (1.) or pri- 
 mary — the origin and the highest source of knowl- 
 edge. The (2.) source is that which our spirits 
 receive from the Divine Spirit in the evidence of par- 
 don impressed or witnessed to our spirits, which is 
 knowledge direct, being independent of any aid or 
 hinderance from our abstract physical nature. Con- 
 scious experience can not be doubted. (3.) An ulte- 
 rior source of knowledge is that from the external 
 world derived through the medium of the senses. 2. 
 Consciousness includes and is the test of all moral and 
 religious emotions and feelings. Convictions, repent- 
 ance, humility, adoration, dependence, forgiveness, 
 the influence of pardon and the experimental evi- 
 dence of salvation, together with approval, disap- 
 proval, or remorse, all are subject to the state, condi- 
 tion, and power of conscience and consciousness. 3. 
 Then a conscious and heart-felt religion is the only effi- 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 307 
 
 cient and effectual known to man. Affecting the 
 moral elements of the soul, it is, therefore, both rea- 
 sonable and scientific, from the glow of its first dawn 
 on earth to the infinity of its perfectness in heaven. 
 It neither destroys nor creates faculties, but changes 
 their condition and moral relation: giving spiritual 
 freedom from bondage, joy for heaviness, peace for 
 trouble, light for darkness, love for hatred, and happi- 
 ness boundless — directing to safety and triumph, 
 when the last trump shall sound, the seas dry up, and 
 mountains dissolve. 4. If the revolt of a single star 
 from its orbit shakes the earth, if not all worlds, then 
 may not the revolt of a rational soul, priceless in pur- 
 chase, all price beyond, move the moral universe ? Its 
 condition and action may affect either hell or heaven ; 
 deepening the wail of the one, or inspiring the song 
 of the other. Look constantly to moral purity. 
 Though the lamps of night's outer temple cease to 
 burn, yet the soul shall live forever. 
 
308 THE HEART 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE HEART. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The heart is a muscular or nervous viscus, situ- 
 ated in the thorax. It originates the blood's motion 
 through the arteries to the different parts of the body. 
 It is the great center or seat of animal life. As it is 
 the center of the physical organization, and has, by 
 natural right, # a mandatory control over all physical 
 powers, so has the heart in our spiritual nature been 
 regarded as the central power of the soul. 2. It is 
 natural for all physical powers to become weary, ex- 
 cept the nerves and cords connected with the contin- 
 ued action of the heart and lungs. We have no way 
 to account for this, unless such unwearied action is 
 caused by the continued presence of Divine power. 
 3. This feature of unweariedness very fitly represents 
 the untiring vivacity and action of the soul. But we 
 now confine our thoughts to the heart, as referred to 
 our spiritual nature. ■ 4. It is not an element of mind, 
 but appears to be the central influence, or power, 
 where all the elements of the soul concentrate, and 
 by which they appear to be connected in unison of 
 feeling, decision, and action. 5. In nature, condition, 
 and position, it appears to be midway and modulating 
 
THE HEART. 309 
 
 the ulterior natural distinction of conscience, the tvill, 
 and the understanding. 6. The heart, correlatively, 
 within itself, possesses central power and influence 
 with and over all mental faculties, emotions, and affec- 
 tions, and is the disposition of the mind. (1.) The 
 judgment not only informs the heart, but has influ- 
 ence in presenting its decisions with correct distinc- 
 tions of realities and worth. Yet the heart, with in- 
 herent power, often blinds the judgment till error 
 and ruin are the results. (2.) The will has power 
 over the heart, but the latter, filled with perverseness, 
 often induces improper volitive action. (3.) Memory 
 furnishes the heart with treasured realities in experi- 
 ence, yet the latter often refuses those facts putting 
 out the light of hope. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The heart is influenced by moral elements of 
 mind. (1.) Conscience connects it with Divine influ- 
 ences, restraining from evil and directing to grace 
 and pardon, but its impurities often rend all such re- 
 strictions. (2.) It is the seat of affections, and by 
 the strength of these may its relation to evil or good 
 be tested. (3.) In proportion as the heart is under 
 the influence of love, is it controlled by it. Could 
 there be a heart naturally incapable of pure love, the 
 wandering Arab might humbly beg to be saved from 
 its tender mercies. A true, loving heart, with pure 
 motive, lives near heaven, and should never be broken 
 of imperceptible companionship with angels. But 
 
310 THE HEART. 
 
 the heart can resist all the charms of love. In it the 
 consuming fires of sin and depravity may burn, or 
 upon it the dews of grace may distill, mellowing in 
 the breaking light of eternal day. 2. We now turn 
 to the Scripture testimony and descriptions of the 
 heart. It is said to be " dilated with joy, contracted 
 and depressed with sadness, broken by sorrow, and 
 hardened by prosperity. It is desolate in affliction 
 and melts under discouragements." There is "an 
 honest and a good heart, a broken and a clean heart, 
 a liberal and an evil heart." 3. A depraved heart is 
 said to be " deceitful above all things and desperately 
 wicked." And it requires Divine power to renovate 
 it. "And I will give them an heart to know me : they 
 shall return unto me with their whole heart." 4. 
 Hardness of heart takes place under sin when the Di- 
 vine Spirit withdraws from it. 5. A pure heart is 
 constituted such by Divine grace. " His Spirit bear- 
 eth witness with our spirit. Whosoever is born of 
 God sinneth not. Love one another with a pure 
 heart. Perfect love casteth out all fear." Keep thy 
 heart pure and God will keep thee forever. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. The heart is the central power of the soul, cor- 
 relating mental elements, either in natural existence 
 or relative influences in action. It lies back of the 
 power of association. The hill and valley, mountain 
 and sea, flying clouds and blooming flowers, all pre- 
 sent varied trains of thought with crowding images; 
 
THE HEART. 311 
 
 beautiful or mean, grand or revolting, corresponding 
 with previous trains of thought, chiefly dependent on, 
 conditioned and sustained by the heart. 2. It may 
 be restrained by grace. The understanding, will, and 
 conscience serve as its checks and modifiers, yet it 
 may resist them all. 3. True eloquence never can 
 proceed from a cold, unfeeling heart. It must feel 
 the burden of its message till the deep internal fires 
 of excited genius and energy thrill every active prin- 
 ciple and emotion of the soul, all concentrating in the 
 power and quickening throes of the great, the mighty 
 heart. Then is realized the lightning and the storm, 
 the thunder and the bolt ! 4. It bears up and onward 
 the full burden of the soul. What we feel we can 
 make known and cause others to feel. It can not 
 make thought, but is susceptible, and carries, in ap- 
 proximation, a greater infinity of thought and mean- 
 ing than the inert bosom of a thousand moving worlds. 
 5. Love, pure and holy, should ever rule the vivid 
 energies of such internal power, stupendous in re- 
 search, feeling, and joy, and majestic in imperishabil- 
 ity. 
 
DIVISION THIRD. 
 
 -♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTERNAL MORAL POWER IN THE OR- 
 IGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The original powers of mind apprehend the re- 
 ality of self, and are self- witnesses to, and of, self- 
 reality. Such power of knowledge, abstractly, can 
 neither be increased nor diminished, without varying 
 the natural identity and essence of such faculties ; 
 for we can have no knowledge of abstract, relative 
 self-elementary degrees. 2. Such elements have nat- 
 ural 'power to know the reality of self-being. And 
 with them is the power to know facts beyond self. 
 3. Primary mental and moral elements are the foun- 
 dation and source of all knowledge. 4. The moral 
 element enters into and constitutes, perhaps, the most 
 extensive part of this original basis in apprehending 
 facts. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Conscience is connected with this original power 
 to know realities. Spontaneous intuitions and convic- 
 tions in regard to entities can not be separated from 
 
 conscience. And the mind is only satisfied in refer- 
 
 312 
 
INTERNAL POWER OF KNOWLEDGE. 313 
 
 ence to such truths in experiencing a conscious feel- 
 ing of their truthfulness. 2. With the nature and 
 essence of such faculties is the only origin of real 
 knowledge. 3. Internal ideas or notions may and do 
 arise in connection with intuitive power, and no where 
 else. If the soul had no power of knowledge in 
 itself, it could have none beyond self. 
 
 27 
 
314 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE SOUL HAS ONLY THREE GENERAL 
 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE: 1. INHER- 
 ENT. 2. DIRECT. 3. ULTERIOR. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Inherent knowledge is contained in, and is in- 
 separably connected with original faculties. Such 
 elements are not only the natural power, but the 
 foundation of our capability to know facts. 2. Then 
 the power and 'origin of knowledge must be ever and 
 inseparably connected with the primary mental facul- 
 ties. 3. Therefore inherent knowledge is identified 
 ■with the very nature of original elements, and consti- 
 tutes the first and most absolute source of self- 
 knowledge. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knowledge direct is that which is immediately 
 and spiritually imparted or impressed, by the Divine 
 Spirit, upon our spirits, without, and independently 
 of, any aid from physical organs. 2. If our immate- 
 rial nature is capable of animating the physical or- 
 gans of sense, so as to capacitate them to receive 
 sensations by contact with external things, then it has 
 power to receive spiritual impressions and knowledge 
 without the inertness of such organs. 8. The soul 
 
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 315 
 
 has spiritual perception, sight, light, and knowledge. 
 Any conscious-felt fact is knowledge, and can not be 
 doubted. 4. The soul is immaterial, and its knowl- 
 edge is immaterial; hence influences and truths im- 
 parted to it by the Divine Spirit are true, and form 
 the second source of knowledge, being direct and in- 
 dependent of all physical entities or laws. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Knowledge by means of the physical organs of 
 the senses is not absolute in perfection. This is the 
 third and ulterior source of knowledge. 2. The phys- 
 ical organs have neither perfection nor natural ability 
 to act, only as imparted by the connected immaterial 
 nature. As inertness, decay, and death belong to 
 them, our knowledge from such source is both ulterior 
 and deceptious. 3. But the soul contains an internal 
 world of positive and imperishable reality. The vivid 
 celerity of thought makes the sluggish lightning 
 flash. Sacred joy rising, swells upon the distant 
 limits of possibility, certifying us of a happy infinity 
 beyond. 
 
316 CHRISTIANITY AND INFIDELITY 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 RELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHKISTI ANI TY AND 
 
 INFIDELITY — HOW TESTED BY THE 
 
 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND — THE 
 
 POWER AND ORIGIN OF BELIEF. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The relative claims of Christianity and infidelity 
 can only be fully tested by the moral elements of 
 mind. Positive confidence can not exist without the 
 approval of our moral nature. 2. Infidelity is either 
 true or false. If true, it should be approved; but if 
 false, such delusion is ruinous and fatal. 3. To be a 
 consistent infidel, we must have always been one con- 
 stitutionally or in nature. Our conscious intuitions, 
 convictions, and emotions must have always been in- 
 fidel in nature. Then belief must have always of 
 necessity corresponded, and we never could have 
 doubted infidelity. But the moral nature is univers- 
 ally opposed to such credence. Faith in infidelity is 
 by effort, hence unnatural. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. There are three general classes of evidence es- 
 tablishing the truthfulness of Christianity, all tested 
 by the moral powers. (1.) External evidence, as 
 found in the existence, designs, and laws of nature, 
 
CHRISTIANITY AND INFIDELITY. 317 
 
 and evidenced in history; the power and reality of 
 miracle; the existence and correctness of prophetic 
 fulfillment; together with the existence, harmony, and 
 wonderful preservation of the Scriptures — all may 
 affect the mind through the medium of the senses; 
 yet neither that nor sensation has self-power to know 
 them to be true. The test is with the intuitive ele- 
 ments of the mind. (2.) The internal evidence con- 
 taining the harmony of the several parts of Revela- 
 tion, written by some fifty different persons, without 
 concert, ranging about fifteen hundred years. The 
 chain is unbroken, harmonizing with itself, the light 
 of nature, and the internal convictions and feelings 
 of the soul. (3.) Experimental evidence is the high- 
 est, and far more convincing than the other classes, 
 becoming a part of conscious knowledge. 
 
318 MORAL REASONING. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 RELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHRISTIANITY AND IN- 
 FIDELITY— EVIDENCE OF SPIRITUAL IN- 
 FLUENCE AND PARDON— CONSCIOUS AND 
 POSITIVE KNOWLEDGE AS DERIVED 
 FROM THREE SOURCES: 1. INHER- 
 ENT. 2. DIRECT. 3. ULTERIOR. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Inherent knowledge is connected with the nat- 
 ural power and action of original faculties. What I 
 feel I am conscious of; and I am conscious of nothing 
 but what I fe'el. If I am conscious of sensations of 
 happiness or joy, it is only because I feel them. If 
 conscious of pain, I know it only because I feel it. 
 Conscience is connected with the origin of conscious 
 feeling. 2. Consciousness is an original suscepti- 
 bility of mind, coexisting with thought and feeling. 
 Thought is known to the thinking principle, and feel- 
 ing is a sensitive change affecting the original powers, 
 and can only be known because felt. To talk of 
 thought and feeling not felt, is unmeaning and utter 
 foolishness. 3. If I feel, I am as sensible of the ex- 
 istence of the feeling I or self as I can be of the 
 emotion felt. If all thought, feeling, and self are 
 felt, in order to be known, then spirit can influence 
 spirit, and the conscious evidence of pardon can equal 
 a knowledge of self. 
 
MORAL REASONING. 319 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knowledge direct, involves the power, action, 
 and affecting influence of spirit upon spirit. This we 
 know to exist, and believe with confidence. (1.) Spirit, 
 in its immaterial nature, is adapted to spirit, and to 
 doubt such fact would equal a denial of self. (2.) We 
 have knowledge of any conscious change affecting our 
 spirits. The pardon of sins is known to be true, and 
 when fully realized can not be questioned or rejected. 
 2. The third or ulterior source of knowledge, by 
 means of the physical organs of the senses, may de- 
 ceive us. (1.) From the inert nature of the organs of 
 sense. (2.) In being affected by the paralyzing effect 
 of disease. But a conscious knowledge of salvation 
 from sin destroys the power of death, presenting the 
 glories of eternal life to the soul in its fearless travel 
 to the future. Therefore, the origin of all positive 
 knowledge, whether of a mental or moral character, 
 is in connection with the primary elements of the 
 mind ; and physical elements can not add strength to 
 the decisions of this internal court. Hence, knowl- 
 edge inherent in powers certifying self-reality is 
 independent of doubt. And the influence of the 
 Infinite Spirit upon such immaterialities is direct, 
 independent of physical organs, and without decep- 
 tion. The power of this intuitive court lies back 
 of all materiality and infidelity — the uncertainty and 
 deception of both are measured by it and left in 
 total ruins. 
 
DIVISION FOURTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE CONDITION AND PECULIAR STATES OF 
 THE MORAL NATURE OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. If God in the creation of the soul always pur- 
 posed that it should live forever, then its immortality 
 is natural and of necessity. For such purpose would 
 be a law of hi& being extending to immortality, and 
 securing the indestructibility of the soul. And in 
 this purpose he created us with a conscious feeling, 
 sense, and ever-anxious aspirings for the future, a 
 natural longing after immortality and happiness. It 
 is contrary to the purity of his being that we should 
 be thus constituted only to be disappointed. 2. Con- 
 science lies at the foundation of our moral nature, and 
 such nature is established from consciousness. That 
 which we experience in regard to right or wrong, ap- 
 proval or disapproval, is found only in such nature. 
 3. Faith, in one sense, is natural to mind, and con- 
 nected with our moral nature. (1.) The faith of cre- 
 dence, by which we accredit testimony or receive facts, 
 is natural and universal. Angels and men have it, and 
 
 even devils believe and tremble. (2.) The faith of 
 320 
 
MORAL DREAMING. 321 
 
 reliance is of higher order, and involves action of 
 the moral powers under Divine influences. It is pos- 
 sessed by the true penitent. (3.) The faith of assur- 
 ance is that by which a penitent soul is adopted into 
 the favor of God, and realizes a renewing change of 
 its moral nature. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Moral dreaming refers to that condition of mind 
 in which we have thoughts in sleep, yet it differs in 
 nature or character from mental dreaming. 2. Mere 
 mental dreaming is only evidence of the ever-active 
 nature of mind, but thoughts thus arising are not to 
 be depended upon as true; they may or may not 
 come to pass. 3. But moral dreaming is closely con- 
 nected with the moral powers, and generally arises 
 from impressions made upon them by Divine Good- 
 ness, which influence the mind and are lasting. 
 They should be cherished, as they are always given 
 for some good purpose. 4. These impressions are 
 made upon the conscience or heart. " God speaketh 
 in a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep 
 falleth upon men ; then he openeth the ears of men 
 and sealeth their instruction, that he may withdraw 
 man from his purpose." 
 
322 RELATION OF THE WILL. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE MORAL NA- 
 TURE OR ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The will has power over the moral faculties or 
 nature ; though such powers have a persuasive attrac- 
 tion or invoking influence upon the will, yet they can 
 not command or force it to act. 2. The very term 
 will implies freedom, and is liberty in self-nature. 
 The expression "free will is objectionable, as it would 
 imply hound will. If it be not free in essential na- 
 ture, it can not be called will ; and if it be bound, it 
 ceases to be will. Therefore, self -liberty is essential 
 to its nature and being. And if we are conscious that 
 it is now a free principle, it has always been so. 3. 
 Man is fallen. The act of falling was either free or 
 of necessity, by a perverted act of self-liberty or Di- 
 vine decree. If by the latter, there was an epoch in 
 eternity when such decree took place, and such act 
 must sustain a certain relation to his foreknowledge. 
 Three positions will cover the whole ground. (1.) 
 The act took place after his foreknowledge; or, (2.) 
 It must proceed with and be in essence his foreknowl- 
 edge; or, (3.) The act must have taken place before 
 his foreknowledge. We will examine these positions. 
 
RELATION OF THE WILL. 323 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. If the decree took place after foreknowledge it 
 would involve an absurdity. We must admit that 
 Deity foreknew all things, and nothing was hid from 
 him. Then it would be wholly useless, seeing that 
 man would fall, to decree that he should. A bird 
 flies through my window, but I did not compel it to do 
 so. Man was made free to act, and this was essential 
 to his being. God saw that in the exercise of this 
 liberty he would fall, and not that he should, for he 
 was cautioned and entreated not to transgress. There- 
 fore a decree of such fall could not, in the order of 
 time, follow foreknowledge. 2. If foreknowledge 
 and the decreeing act are one in essence or nature, 
 then such nature would be a part of or enter into the 
 Divine existence, implying imperfection, and our 
 fall by the motion of Infinite perfection. This is re- 
 volting. Perfect holiness can not cause such ruin. 
 Foreknowledge and the will or act of Deity are divis- 
 ible and distinct. I know that I have power to raise 
 my hand to my head, but not willing to do so, it re- 
 mains inactive. If our fall was decreed, it took place 
 before foreknowledge. 3. For such decree to take 
 place before the existence of foreknowledge, is ab- 
 surd. But if true, then Deity knew not that man 
 would fall till his decree revealed the fact. Then all 
 men are innocent, having only and necessarily obeyed 
 the law of infinite fate, and if recovered must be 
 saved by the same. But this is absurd. 4. Angels 
 
324 RELATION OF THE WILL. 
 
 were made free, and some of them " kept not their 
 first estate, but left their own habitation/' This was 
 their own voluntary act. 5. Man was created with 
 liberty of voluntary service to God, but in this essen- 
 tial freedom he departed, which separation was ruinous. 
 6. That mind is free to voluntary action, is without 
 doubt. And upon this rests the soul's destiny. Sin 
 filled the heavens with thick clouds, and made turbid 
 the moral night of earth; yet hope dawned with im- 
 perishable light, spread over distant hills and mount- 
 ains of God, and penetrated the gloomy valley of death 
 with the glow of immortality. 
 
DIVISION FIFTH 
 
 -♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRIMARY EMOTIONS IMMEDIATELY CON- 
 NECTED WITH THE MORAL ELE- 
 MENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions refer to an internal motion, agitation, 
 or excitement of the mind, which may increase slowly 
 or rapidly, and pass away without desire; for if fol- 
 lowed by desire it is called passion. 2. They arise 
 in connection with the nature of mental and moral 
 elements. But from experience, their conditioned 
 distinctions evolve a more intimate dependence upon 
 the moral powers. 3. Conscience enters into the 
 basis supporting emotions with power to realize or 
 have conscious cognizance of such influences. 4. 
 Emotions differ from desires. The former arise, 
 move, swell, and diminish, like waves of the sea. The 
 latter may follow, and in common be based upon emo- 
 tions, but differ in nature. They are realized subse- 
 quent to the mind's perceptive and cognitive acts, 
 and more remotely than emotions. But perception, 
 apprehension, and cognition can not lay the founda- 
 tion, nor give origin to desires. The object of such 
 
 325 
 
326 MORAL EMOTIONS. 
 
 acts might be revolting, and nothing but that which 
 excites pleasing emotions can be desired. In this 
 respect desires follow and are dependent upon emo- 
 tions. 5. Emotions are said to be natural when they 
 arise between the action of the moral elements and 
 our conscious feelings of moral rectitude or obliga- 
 tion. But they must follow perception, as we can 
 not experience emotions in regard to any thing of 
 which we have had no conscience-perception or feeling. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The character of moral emotions changes in as- 
 similation, or conformity to that of our moral percep- 
 tion or apprehension of realities adapted to our moral 
 nature. 2. The order of succession is, (1.) mental 
 states; (2.) emotions, and, (3.) desires. But such 
 states are distinguished or conditioned by the moral 
 influences or acts of our moral nature. Emotions are 
 known only because felt; and they vary with the con- 
 dition or character of that which causes their exist- 
 ence, whether in the intellectual or moral world. 
 
ORAL EMOTIONS, 327 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS, OR EMOTIONS OF 
 MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Primary moral emotions refer us to that class 
 more immediately connected with the existence and 
 influence of the moral powers. 2. Such emotions of 
 approval and disapproval have their origin in connec- 
 tion with conscience and consciousness. They are 
 capable of degrees of excitement, swelling higher, like 
 waves on the silvery surface of a lake before the 
 rising breeze ; then retiring back to undisturbed re- 
 pose. 3. That there are no moral emotions except 
 those of " approval and disapproval" is absurd. 
 Without moral elements, we can experience no con- 
 scious-felt emotion in regard to any fact. 4. They 
 are experienced immediately successive to the action 
 and first influence of the moral elements, and follow 
 perception. But perception morally has a twofold 
 power of action. (1.) In regard to objects of the 
 external world, reported through the medium of the 
 senses. (2.) And the internal moral powers of the 
 soul have spiritual perception in regard to character, 
 right and wrong. 5. That we can have " no moral 
 emotions without antecedent perceptions" of external 
 
328 MORAL EMOTIONS. 
 
 things, is false; for emotions of moral approval and 
 disapproval can exist in mind without reference to ex- 
 ternal things. 6. Emotions of moral approval and 
 disapproval are not "the basis of the subsequent feel- 
 ings of moral obligation ;" but they are connected 
 with conscience, consciousness, and the heart, which 
 constitutes the true basis of obligatory feelings, and 
 where they arise in reference to right and wrong. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Moral emotions change corresponding with the 
 condition, in change, of antecedent perceptions. If 
 a friend saves me from sudden death, my emotions 
 instantly approve the act. But here is a case of 
 murder; my emotions instantly change to positive dis- 
 approval. 2. Conscience-perception of internal spirit- 
 ual influences is more positive than those of external 
 realities, and are worthy of full confidence. 3. Con- 
 science gives law to emotions of approval and disap- 
 proval, and without it we could not have knowledge 
 of such realities. Though, like ocean-waves, they 
 wake from the slumber of the deep, subject to the 
 changes of a thousand wrecking storms, yet, as the 
 w T aves of ocean tell the direction and condition of 
 passing tempests, so moral emotions approve or 
 disapprove, while conscience is the final court of ap- 
 peal in correct decisions. Emotions may appear and 
 retire, but conscience, true to its heaven-endowed pre- 
 rogatives, holds to right. 4. It is absurd to say that 
 the basis of " the emotions of approval which we ex- 
 
MORAL EMOTIONS. 329 
 
 ercise toward an object, lies, in all probability, upon 
 the extreme boundaries of human knowledge." This 
 is beyond our comprehension, as all the reports of 
 spiritual self must be made to intuitive powers of our 
 being, in order to real knowledge. 5. An act of 
 kindness is approved, because our emotions in regard 
 to it are agreeable and sanctioned by conscience. 6. 
 A vicious act is rejected, being opposed to the nature 
 of our moral emotions and the decisions of a righteous 
 
 conscience. 
 
 28 
 
330 OBJECTS OF MORAL EMOTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF 
 MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The primary objects of the emotions of moral 
 approval and disapproval are moral agents. (1.) 
 Such agents must have power of self-action. (2.) 
 They must be endowed with the power of self-cogita- 
 tion. (3.) They must possess a moral nature or con- 
 science. 2. None but such agents can have conscious 
 knowledge of moral action or of what constitutes 
 moral rectitude. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Secondary objects of the emotions of moral ap- 
 proval and disapproval may embrace, (1.) All objects 
 of self-action, possessing animate life, below the ra- 
 tional mind of man, which evidence in their nature 
 arid actions any thing of passion or calm, rage or 
 mildness. For we have seen that all self-moving ani- 
 mate beings have spirits or souls, and any manifesta- 
 tion of the same which agrees or disagrees with a 
 uniform moral rectitude is an ulterior object of emo- 
 tions of approval or disapproval. Though no such 
 deviations can be regarded as involving guilt in such 
 
OBJECTS OF MORAL EMOTIONS. 331 
 
 beings, yet we can not withhold the action of our 
 emotions in regard to such extremes of conduct, often 
 associating such acts with moral agents while our 
 emotions are experienced beyond doubt. (2.) Deport- 
 ment is subject to emotions of approval or disapproval 
 in proportion as they conform to, or deviate from true 
 rectitude. (3.) Expressions or sentiments delivered 
 of a moral or immoral nature excite emotions of ap- 
 proval or disapproval. (4.) Moral or immoral senti- 
 ments written give origin to emotions of moral ap- 
 proval or disapproval. 
 
332 SIMPLE MORAL EMOTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SIMPLE PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Simple emotions are very numerous, yet we shall 
 speak in reference to only those more important. 
 (1.) Joy enlivens the spirit and is excited in the mind 
 in the accomplishment or reception of some good. 
 (2.) It is a strojiger emotion, and more uniform in its 
 deep abiding nature than either goodness or cheer- 
 fulness. (3.) Regard is a primary, simple, moral 
 emotion. It may be called a motion of the moral 
 powers in reference to any thing exciting high admi- 
 ration. (4.) Reverence is realized when the moral 
 faculties have been exercised in regard to combina- 
 tions of superior excellences and moral worth, con- 
 trasted with the deep wretchedness and worthlessness 
 of beings. When thoughts arise from a pure heart, 
 in contemplating the perfections of the Divine Being, 
 we experience what is called adoration. (5.) Sur- 
 prise is experienced when some unexpected moral 
 reality or revelation is made known. (6.) Astonishment 
 is a strong, vigorous, and decided emotion in regard 
 to sudden realities of surprise. 
 
SIMPLE MORAL EMOTIONS. 333 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Emotions of melancholy exist in connection with 
 the moral faculties, which may be much influenced by 
 diseased bodily powers. (1.) We experience dissatis- 
 faction. (2.) Distrust in regard to others. (3.) De- 
 pression and weariness of life. 2. Sorrow is experi- 
 enced when the spirit is sad or heart-broken. 3. 
 Grief arises in reference to the misfortunes and re- 
 grets of the past. 4. Dissatisfaction takes place, 
 having endured a diversity of disappointments, and 
 nothing contemplated with pleasure or certainty. 5. 
 An emotion of displeasure is experienced when the 
 mind strongly disapproves any object or measure. 6. 
 A conscious emotion of disgust for any thing mean is 
 common. 7. An emotion of wonder is experienced 
 when many seemingly-moral traits, yet conflicting in 
 ultimate tendencies, are presented suddenly to the 
 mind. 8. The emotion of delight is closely connected 
 with cheerfulness, but is stronger. 9. The emotion 
 of gladness is more closely connected with the moral 
 nature than delight. 10. The emotion of modesty is 
 lovely within itself, and heavenly in its influence and 
 tendency. 11. The emotion of shame is experienced 
 when we are involved in wrong. The soul, with pure 
 motive, and always under happy emotions, travels with 
 triumph over all of sin ; its spiritual course sweeps the 
 fiery w T ake of departing time, unharmed by any war 
 of elements or crash of worlds. 
 
DIVISION SIXTH. 
 
 -++— 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 SECONDABY MOKAL EMOTIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of moral beauty arise in connection 
 with the existence and condition of moral elements? 
 and the primary moral emotions are regarded as being 
 more closely connected with such elements, while sec- 
 ondary emotions are more remote. 2. Mental emo- 
 tions are not "natural," while moral ones are subor- 
 dinate, inferior, or unnatural. For the latter is as 
 natural to the mind as the former. 3. The objects of 
 the emotions of moral beauty may exist within the 
 mind's states in meditation, reflection, and contempla- 
 tion. 4. The affirmation of moral beauty implies a 
 negative, which is tested by experience. The strength 
 and vividness of moral emotions of beauty vary with 
 the constitutional aptness of different minds to readily 
 apprehend moral objects involving the lustral attrac- 
 tions of purity. 5. The perception of that which ex- 
 cites emotions of moral beauty is a source of happi- 
 ness. 6. The contemplation of the virtue and benev- 
 olent acts of others gives origin to emotions of moral 
 
 beauty, imparting real happiness. 7. The contem- 
 334 
 
EMOTIONS OF MORAL BEAUTY. 335 
 
 plation of a pure act or heart adorned with the sweet 
 graces of heaven never fails to awake emotions of 
 moral beauty, and increases the happiness of the soul. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. A pure mind can not contemplate the holy na- 
 ture of angels with their acts of love without experi- 
 encing emotions of moral beauty. 2. Moral leauty is 
 made known to the mind by moral emotions, or only 
 by them can it be fully known as a source of happi- 
 ness. 3. These emotions of pleasure are as a celestial 
 fountain of joy and light, swelling in proportion to 
 the degree of its purity and brightness, elevating the 
 soul, while all objects of earth recede and fade in the 
 evening of temporal life. 4. We experience such 
 emotions in contemplating the character of the Divine 
 Being. (1.) By the internal vision, perception, or 
 feeling of the soul. The love of God, revealed to the 
 heart of a sinner saved, gives origin to emotions which 
 flow as a river, or roll as waves of the sea. (2.) In 
 contemplating Divine wisdom and goodness, as im- 
 pressed and typed in the works of creation, and made 
 known through the medium of the senses, we experi- 
 ence emotions of moral beauty. The devout soul can 
 not look abroad upon the verdant earth, range the 
 silent paths, or watch the flight of innumerable 
 worlds brightening in the mingling rays of mellow 
 light, without realizing an onward wafting of pure, 
 beautiful, and heavenly emotions. 
 
336 OBJECTS OF BEAUTY 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EMOTIONS OF MORAL BEAUTY FROM ASSOCI- 
 ATED OBJECTS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of moral beauty are natural to mind, 
 and arise in connection with the moral powers. 2. A 
 single object may be beautiful within itself, and capa- 
 ble of giving origin to emotions of beauty, and if de- 
 composed, each element or quality may cause an 
 emotion of beauty. 3. Objects may become beautiful 
 only by association. While listening to the full tones 
 of spirited music, when unnatural semi-tones are 
 sounded we experience an unpleasant emotion; but 
 on hearing the same applauded by one in whose taste 
 and judgment we have full confidence, then the asso- 
 ciations of the effect in such a mind, and the other 
 parts of the music, often create emotions of beauty. 
 4. In walking down from the Temple walls, in Jeru- 
 salem, to survey sad Gethsemane, though the ground, 
 the lonely palm, the city and Mount of Olives, are all 
 wreathed in clouds of gloom, or exist as mere thun- 
 der-scathed sentinels of desolation, yet the associa- 
 tion of the purity and love of Him who there once 
 suffered to recover a revolted world from death, even 
 the solitary rocks and waste places surrounding be- 
 
OBJECTS OF BEAUTY. 337 
 
 come morally grand and lovely, exciting emotion- 
 waves of moral beauty, filling the soul with boundless 
 gratitude. 5. And on revisiting the place where the 
 depressed and despairing spirit was first freed from 
 moral death, realizing the joys of heavenly day, all 
 surrounding objects associated in the remembrance of 
 the event give origin to emotions of beauty and hap- 
 piness. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The capacity of the human mind to enjoy emo- 
 tions caused by associated objects of beauty is exten- 
 sive and of positive reality. Such associated objects 
 form almost innumerable sources of pleasing emotions 
 and joy, which are essential to true and enduring 
 happiness. 2. Moral purity is not only an element 
 of, but causes emotions of moral beauty. 3. Such 
 purity, existing in moral beings, their lives, acts, and 
 influences, and made known to us through the me- 
 dium of the senses, give origin to emotions of beauty. 
 4. Moral purity, as internally apprehended, realized, 
 and felt, in connection with spiritual and holy influ- 
 ences affecting our conscious being, create pure and 
 sacred emotions of peace and happiness. 5. Emo- 
 tions of moral beauty arising from associated objects, 
 impart happiness as from thousands of combinations. 
 Such emotions are inseparably connected with the 
 soul made pure, whether in time or vast eternity. 
 
 29 
 
338 EMOTIONS OF MORAL SUBLIMITY. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EMOTIONS OF MOEAL SUBLIMITY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of moral sublimity refer to those 
 motions or feelings of moral grandeur, elevated in 
 character and consisting of a pleasing union of aston- 
 ishment, awe, and gratitude in contemplating great 
 realities and influences of pure moral excellence. 2. 
 That which excites emotions of moral sublimity must 
 be good and true. Waves gently undulating the 
 placid surface of ocean may be called beautiful, but 
 as increasing action swells them higher before the 
 rising storm, the scene hightens into sublimity. So 
 the moral emotions of the soul may rise into the full- 
 ness of sublimity. 3. Fortitude in sustaining right, 
 amid peril, danger, and death, creates emotions of 
 moral sublimity. A certain princess about to be un- 
 justly beheaded, a friend advanced, saying, " I will 
 die in her place." This touched the feelings of the 
 emperor, who caused both to be released. A noble- 
 man remarked, "Did you see the emperor? was not 
 that a great act saving your life?" She replied, "I 
 saw no emperor, nor did I so much as think whether 
 any emperor was present, I only saw and thought of 
 that man, who said he would die for me." Such an 
 
EMOTIONS OF MORAL SUBLIMITY. 339 
 
 act would give rise to emotions of moral sublimity. 
 4. A calm and unyielding purpose to do good to 
 friends and enemies, enkindles ennobling feelings 
 morally grand and overwhelming. 5. But the perse- 
 cuted and storm-tried Christian, driven from home, 
 the graves of a loved ancestry, and all sacred associa- 
 tions, yet dares to die on the road to duty, causes 
 emotions of moral excellence. 6. We are capable of 
 internal emotions of moral sublimity, in connection 
 with the mind's states and acts, moved only by spir- 
 itual influences, dwelling upon contemplated hap- 
 piness. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knoivledge of emotions of moral sublimity de- 
 pends much upon the moral condition of the heart. 
 When the heart is pure and in the love of God, al- 
 most every thing in the chain of moral and inert 
 existences appears to glow with Divine goodness, and 
 from them emotions can not be withheld. 2. An im- 
 pure heart or conscience will realize perceptions fol- 
 lowed by emotions, or feelings, which are fearful or 
 of terrific sublimity. 3. But the soul filled with the 
 indwelling peace of heaven can experience emotions 
 of moral sublimity from all objects of grandeur, com- 
 binations of facts, or elements bearing the impress of 
 Divine goodness or moral worth. 
 
340 EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 NATURE OF EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of the ludicrous are not wholly moral 
 emotions, yet they are closely connected with the 
 distinctive condition of our moral powers. 2. They 
 can not exist when the moral faculties are depressed 
 with grief or vailed in clouds of gloom. They only 
 exist when the conscience is free from remorse and 
 the heart light, 3. Such emotions follow our percep- 
 tion of something peculiar, or incongruous, in the 
 saying, appearance, or person attracting attention. 
 4. They may arise in connection with our internal 
 thoughts and feelings, being wholly immaterial, or 
 from what we witness in external objects — some pecu- 
 liarity or unsuitableness. 5. Such emotions may arise 
 with a cheerful state of mind or in playful delight, 
 when some uncouthness suddenly discovered gives in- 
 tense excitement. 6. They are involuntary when the 
 mind is free from any expected excitement. The 
 mortification of some sudden and uncouth failure in 
 an eager effort at refined achievement, may fill the 
 soul with emotions of the ludicrous. 7. Emotions of 
 the ludicrous, properly guarded, are of practical util- 
 ity. (1.) Lively emotions are important to the healthy 
 
> wit. ■ 341 
 
 action of mental powers. (2.) Lively or cheerful feel- 
 ings are essential to healthy action of the physical 
 powers. (3.) The spirit of ridicule, improperly exer- 
 cised, is revolting, but, if properly guarded, can oper- 
 ate as one of the most effectual checks and remedies 
 of thoughtless, inconsistent, and egotistic conduct. 
 We need something to expel gloom and counteract 
 feelings of despair. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Though wit, in some respects, may resemble the 
 nature of emotions of the ludicrous, yet it is more 
 closely connected with the nature of genius, and to 
 some extent included with the power of the under- 
 standing. 2. It is the power of associating ideas in 
 a new and unexpected manner. It excites the mind 
 in connection with such associations, producing sur- 
 prise joined with pleasure. 3. It is closely connected 
 with the nature of humor, satire, irony, and burlesque. 
 Wit has, when guarded, an important influence upon 
 mental action; yet, if not restrained, dissipation is 
 inevitable. 4. Humor is less vivid and poignant 
 than wit; yet it is far more agreeable. The latter, 
 directed against folly and egotism, often gives offense 
 and excites resentment; while the former is agree- 
 able, making us ashamed of our follies. 5. It is evi- 
 dence of a pleasant disposition and kind heart. Its 
 vividness and life-inspiring influence depends much 
 upon the condition of the moral elements. When 
 properly guarded, it has a happy influence upon the 
 
342 LEVITY. 
 
 soul in sustaining an animated spirit of progression. 
 6. Levity is connected with the lively emotions and 
 feelings of the mind. But when the heart is sad or 
 crushed with grief, it is suspended ; hence the state of 
 the moral powers determines its vivacity. 7. It is an 
 extravagance of mirthful emotions, or lightness of 
 mind, which should always be governed by judgment 
 and checked by moral restraint. 8. It not only tends 
 to dissipation, but fickleness, inconstancy, and the ban- 
 ishment of moral seriousness and w T orth. If not 
 guarded, its extremes are followed by loss of confi- 
 dence and gloom without hope. 
 
LANGUOR. 343 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 LANGUOR. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Languor, in its general acceptation, refers to 
 lassitude or feebleness of both body and mind. 2. 
 Intense and continued mental effort often over- 
 powers and prostrates the nervous system, produc- 
 ing languor in regard to physical and mental ac- 
 tion. 3. But when the organs of the senses and 
 nerves connected are enfeebled by disease mental ac- 
 tion is often stupefied and imperfect. 4. Languor 
 properly arises in connection w T ith the diseased or 
 prostrated condition of the bodily powers, for all our 
 conceptions of mind abstractly force the belief, that 
 of and w T ithin itself there can be no such thing as 
 
 spirit-languor. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. When we speak of languor as belonging to the 
 manifestations of mind, we can not mean, that the 
 essence of mind, uninfluenced by physical powers, is 
 capable of immaterial loss or enfeebleness. 2. Then 
 languor is caused by the peculiar state or diseased 
 condition of the physical powers or organs of the 
 senses through which mind acts. Beyond the grave 
 the soul can have no languid emotion. 3. Languor 
 
344 LANGUOR. 
 
 may serve as a prudent check to delusive or ill- 
 founded joys, or of hope in regard to inaccessible 
 objects of pursuit. 4. It may follow us down to 
 death, but can not travel beyond. At the sound of 
 the last trump, both soul and body will be free from 
 such influence, whatever may be our condition in other 
 points of real character. 
 
DIVISION SEVENTH 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRIMARY EMOTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE 
 
 EXISTENCE, ACTION, AND INFLUENCE 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL AND MO.RAL 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of beauty are made known by conscious- 
 ness, and are more fully tested when brought under the 
 inspection of the mind. But they are so numerous we 
 can only speak in regard to those most important. 
 
 2. Objects of emotions may exist in the external 
 world, or wholly within the operations of mind itself. 
 
 3. Primary emotions exist in connection with intel- 
 lectual and moral powers. 4. Emotions of beauty are 
 always interesting, enlivening, and pleasing. They 
 can not apply to unpleasant mental states of feel- 
 ings, neither can the term beauty refer to any thing 
 unpleasant. 5. We have conscious knowledge of emo- 
 tions of beauty excited by external things, and are 
 equally as conscious of emotions of beauty excited 
 by internal spiritual influences. 6. Emotions change 
 with our perceptions. Being subsequent to intellec- 
 tions or internal conscious distinctions, and dependent 
 
 345 
 
846 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY, 
 
 on such realities, they vary with our perceptions. 
 Objects of a beautiful scenery may be intercepted, 
 the relations of beauty disturbed, and the emotions 
 become unpleasant. But they are perfectly restored 
 when the obstructions are removed. 7. There are 
 great varieties in objects and qualities calculated to 
 excite emotions of beauty. And these within them- 
 selves are called beautiful. Our feelings in regard 
 to certain entities are indifferent, and there are other 
 realities which excite decidedly-unpleasant sensations. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. A beautiful object possesses something within 
 itself calculated to cause emotions of beauty, and 
 from this fact we call them beautiful. Such objects 
 are distinguished from others, and are known to differ 
 from them by something within themselves, an inher- 
 ent trait or original quality. 2. Some objects of 
 beauty possess something like an awe of grandeur. 
 The dawn of the far-spreading light of morn, the 
 golden glow of the setting sun, the majesty of the 
 silvery moon traveling in the heavens, together with 
 millions of worlds, as bright sentinels bounding the 
 Saharas of immensity, all are beautiful and move in 
 the awe of grandeur. 3. But there is a milder and 
 sweeter class of emotions, in regard to immediate ob- 
 jects of beauty, composed of more brilliant qualities 
 and finer texture. In looking out upon blooming 
 flowers, waving forests, and verdant plains, we are 
 excited by a different class of feelings. 4. The 
 
EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 347 
 
 grounds or occasions of emotions of beauty have 
 caused some diversity of opinion. Yet they have 
 many sources or causes. (1.) Beauty connected with 
 and wholly in the mind, is one and indivisible. (2.) 
 Such emotions may be excited in the mind by other 
 spiritual influences, or in connection with the impres- 
 sions of spirit upon spirit. (3.) They may be caused 
 by objects of the external world. It is absurd to say 
 that in qualities and objects of beauty there is only 
 " one common quality" which is the ground or cause 
 of internal emotions. Beauty is not only in the per- 
 ception of relation, and* of a fitness or utility, but is 
 experienced in connection with these, while the inter- 
 nal power knowing such facts may, in some way, re- 
 ceive influences corresponding to the cause. 
 
348 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRIMARY EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY CONNECTED 
 
 WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The mind is capable of emotions of beauty 
 within itself, and are often experienced when no defi- 
 nite cause is known. But the presence of a beautiful 
 object excites pleasing emotions, strong or passive in 
 proportion to the degree of beauty it contains. 2. 
 But an object, beautiful within itself, may delight the 
 mind at one time under certain circumstances, and at 
 another time, and under different circumstances, would 
 cause unpleasant emotions. The change may not be 
 in the object so much as in the condition of the mind 
 itself. 3. The falling cascade with its romantic scenery 
 fills us with pleasing emotions. But if, while stand- 
 ing upon the lofty bank of evergreen, a loved friend 
 falls into the ruinous abyss below, ever afterward 
 this same scenery would appear sad and gloomy, giv- 
 ing rise to unpleasant emotions. 4. Though there be 
 no identity or oneness in the almost endlessly-diversi- 
 fied external causes of emotions of beauty, yet they 
 affect one and the same internal power. 
 
EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 349 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We will now turn to the examination of objects 
 which excite emotions of beauty, giving rise to almost 
 numerous emotions and varying in condition, intensity, 
 or passiveness. 2. Strong emotions are apt to arise 
 in contemplating some material object. Mountains, 
 valleys, groves, rivers, seas, and oceans, all excite in- 
 tense emotions of beauty. They fill the soul as we 
 look out upon the perfections of Deity. See him 
 empurpling the east with the breaking light of the 
 rising king of day, and wheeling the orb on which we 
 live! Behold him throwing the mantle of darkness 
 over me in the evening, and kindling the skies into 
 radiance by unvailing suns and innumerable worlds ! 
 We must feel as we see glowing tints in the flower, 
 with shade melting into shade, infinitely above any 
 combination of colors art can produce. 3. We feel 
 emotions of beauty in contemplating the majesty of 
 nature. From the summit of some lofty mountain 
 watch the rising cloud, and observe the evening spread 
 her gray and dusky mantle over the mellow features 
 of the landscape, till lost in earth's cone of night. 
 Our feelings arouse as the eye rests with delight on 
 the stars as they break, one by one, through the in- 
 creasing obscurity. What fountains of pleasure fill 
 the soul as contemplation rises from the sweet flower 
 in the valley to waving forests, and from the mighty 
 globe to the glory of innumerable planets and burn- 
 ing suns ! 4. That which has been called intrinsic 
 
350 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 
 
 beauty, exists in the forms of objects, and is essential 
 to the very nature of their existence. (1.) Objects 
 which are oval or circular are regarded as possessing 
 original beauty. The surface of a ball has something 
 interesting, and especially when there are many con- 
 trasted of different magnitudes. (2.) There is beauty 
 in circles, the orbicular form of the earth, together with 
 that of the heavenly bodies, mingling in harmony, 
 yet differing in size and appearance. (3.) There is 
 intrinsic beauty in circular forms, or that w T hich is a 
 curvature in form or action — the windings of the 
 tender vine, the flowing stream or rolling river, the 
 waving grain or bending forests, or the still more 
 graceful curved of the w r eeping w 7 illow. If orators 
 wish to have graceful, easy, and impressive gestures, 
 let them imitate the curvatures of w r illow branches 
 waving to an increasing breeze. (4.) There is beauty 
 in motion. The sparkling brook and majestic river are 
 beautiful, because their waters are restless, rolling on 
 forever. Each flying bird, loitering cloud, running 
 horse, and racing cars, together with rolling ocean 
 waves, crowned with moving ships, bearing onward a 
 mighty commerce, thrill and stir the soul with exciting 
 emotions. 5. Elements of beauty are connected with 
 reasoning. Feelings of pleasure and delight are ex- 
 perienced in pursuing argumentation, or a perfect and 
 unbroken train of thought. 6. The mathematician 
 realizes pleasing delight in axioms, numbers, proposi- 
 tions, and theorems. 7. We have pleasing emotions 
 in tracing vivid lines of poetry, the living descriptions 
 
EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY, 351 
 
 and boldness of thought can not fail to interest. 8. 
 The painter admires the beauty in the appearance and 
 execution of the picture, and feels an enkindled an- 
 imation. 9. There is beauty in music, and every 
 lover of sweet melody not only has emotions pleasing, 
 but feels that such vary with the character of the 
 music. There are any number of variations and de- 
 grees in sounds, ranging from the natural, deep tones 
 of the murmuring sea, to the mellow sweetness of the 
 iEolian harp. 10. Beauty in sound is original with 
 savages. It calms the rage of war and delights with 
 pleasing emotions. 11. It is original with some kinds 
 of brutes. It can not arise from association; never- 
 theless, they are often tamed in the wild woods, and 
 evince delight at the sound of music. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Of objects called beautiful it is acknowledged 
 that the intelligent beings of earth surpass all besides, 
 and properly command a higher regard than other 
 existences. An immortal being, with a refined intel- 
 lect, pure heart, and neat appearance, always pos- 
 sesses attractions, moral worth, and beauty, from 
 which the approving feelings of the soul can neither 
 be indifferent nor withheld. 2. Man in his proper 
 character is not only noble and impressive in appear- 
 ance, but gives origin to emotions of approval and 
 admiration. The thought of that noble form, possess- 
 ing an immortal spirit, capable of almost an endless 
 research and knowledge, consecrated to the will of 
 
352 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 
 
 God, creates delight. 3. Such moral worth, char- 
 acterizing and adorning the soul, and conditioning it 
 with a calm, thoughtful, and agreeable disposition, to- 
 gether with an unyielding determination to be right, 
 and to act in accordance with the will of his Creator, 
 and the true honor and dignity of his high calling 
 and destiny, attracts the confidence and love of the 
 intelligences of both earth and heaven. Dignified in 
 purity of purpose, he adorns human nature, is a de- 
 fense to the helpless, a counselor of safety, and a 
 waylight to happiness. The heavenly serenity of his 
 countenance with kind expression, his noble appear- 
 ance and majestic movements possess intrinsic beauty. 
 He is worthy the attractions, affections, and love so 
 justly inspired and willingly bestowed. He should 
 dare to be wise and good, carrying the confidence and 
 affections, if possible, of gathering thousands to the 
 acme of wisdom, the Cross of Christ, and the bright- 
 ening hopes of eternal joys. 4. Correct mental anal- 
 ysis evolves no evidence that the mind of woman, 
 abstractly or within itself, is in any way naturally infe- 
 rior to that of the other sex. The only difference is 
 in the condition and character of its manifestations. 
 Such modulations or conditioned action are influ- 
 enced by the physical organs of the senses upon 
 which mind is dependent, as there can be no natural 
 defect in spirit itself. The opinion that there is such 
 defect or weakness in the spiritual nature of the fe- 
 male mind, lying back of any influence from the con- 
 dition of the physical organs of sense, is contrary to 
 
EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 353 
 
 all reliable facts in the nature of mind. 5. Woman 
 of high mental and moral attainments is worthy the 
 sacred confidence and pure regard of earthly intelli- 
 gences. Of pious heart, generous in feeling and kind 
 in spirit, with a love to promote the happiness of all 
 within her influence, she is, in a moral light, beauti- 
 ful, an angel of mercy, loved on earth and in heaven. 
 Such attractions are increased in manifested cheerful- 
 ness, sympathy, and love, as she administers relief to 
 the aged, infirm, and dries the lonely orphan's tears. 
 Of neat appearance, graceful in form and action, 
 sympathetic, kind, affectionate, and confiding till death, 
 a high and holy destiny awaits her. By general con- 
 sent she is regarded as the most beautiful of God's 
 creation on earth. True amiability of mind, the 
 loveliness of a sweet and affectionate spirit, should 
 always be sacred to faith and protection, and he who 
 is reckless to either is an outlaw and unworthy of 
 notice. 
 
 30 
 
354 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SECONDARY EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY CON* 
 
 NECTED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND 
 
 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Secondary emotions of beauty are not distinct 
 in origin and nature from those we have just been de- 
 scribing, but are regarded as more ulterior in intens- 
 ity or influence. 2. We have conscious power to 
 experience either class of emotions, and though in na- 
 ture can not be defined, yet their existence must be 
 admitted. They arise in connection with reasoning, 
 fanciful descriptions, and the sweet melody of music. 
 3. They do not arise in regard to all objects, for there 
 are almost any variety calculated to produce disagree- 
 able feelings. Those agreeable are called beautiful, 
 but they may vary, as all persons are not affected 
 alike ; hence their power to give origin to secondary 
 emotions of beauty. 4. The beauty of forms may be 
 very vivid and impressive; the simple or combined 
 cause may exist in those more indistinct, or as faded 
 traces of light. The glowing features which refresh 
 innumerable waving flowers may imperceptibly im- 
 press us with delight, but the peculiar forms of ob- 
 jects, singly or in contrast, impart pleasing feelings 
 
EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 355 
 
 of pleasure. 5. There is beauty in the contrast of 
 straight and angular forms. Various winding, angu- 
 lar, and serpentine forms fill the mind with peculiar 
 feelings in common with general blendings of the 
 mass. The delicate flower of the vale, or running 
 vine at our feet, possesses interest and beauty. The 
 oak which rises up before us in majestic form, spread- 
 ing broad a green arch over our heads and waving its 
 tall head on high, can cause lively admiration. 6. 
 The changing seasons, in contrast, cause emotions of 
 pleasure. Look out upon the world; see the wide- 
 spread desolation of Winter. Old Boreas lets loose 
 his northern car — fountains, streams, and rivers are 
 chained with ice ; the surrounding hills and summits 
 of distant mountains are brightly mantled with de- 
 scending snow. Soon all is changed. The bland air 
 of Spring and Summer blows gently on nature — for- 
 ests wave in the emerald of smiling Summer. Then 
 come the frosts, murky sky, and falling leaves of 
 Autumn. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The mathematician sees beauty in the form of 
 the circle, the square, or the cubical and triangular. 
 That which is useful in science and for practical pur- 
 poses becomes beautiful from such considerations. 2. 
 There is beauty connected with the various kinds of 
 architecture. Each style has admirers ; but the blend- 
 ing of the distinctive differences fills the mind with 
 emotions calculated to interest and please. The walls, 
 buildings, and streets of Jerusalem, though broken, 
 
356 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 
 
 gloomy with age and a thousand sad remembrances, 
 yet such time-honored witnesses of the greatest 
 events of earth render them morally grand and 
 beautiful. 3. There is beauty in the relative exist- 
 ence and blendings of colors. As innumerable varie- 
 ties pass through the field of vision, we experience 
 pleasing sensations. Though the j ' asure in behold- 
 ing them appears intuitive, as the early notice of 
 childhood will demonstrate, yet our love of colors 
 may be so increased by cultivation. Color will gain 
 the attention of a child, from intuitive inclination, 
 while every other connected property, however good, 
 will be unnoticed. 4. Beauty in colors is evidenced 
 in the conduct and preferences of savage tribes. 
 They try to appear in colors of artificial beauty, and 
 wreathe crowns of taste and fame with flowers which 
 bloom on the wild banks of distant murmuring brooks. 
 It is innocent to cultivate a love for flowers, and right 
 and wise to admire beauties of God's creation. The 
 tendency of such love refines the condition and feel- 
 ings of the heart. If we can not admire, with a pure 
 heart, the innocent beauties of earth, we shall be illy 
 prepared to feel at home amid the fadeless glories of 
 heaven. 5. It has been stated that persons blind 
 from their birth, on being suddenly restored to sight, 
 have become more delighted with the colors of ob- 
 jects than any other reality, and the effect is very 
 invigorating. 6. There is beauty in motion. An ex- 
 tended valley or plain of flowers, though motionless, 
 fills the mind with pleasure ; but when they begin to 
 
EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 357 
 
 wave to the passing breeze, the scene becomes beauti- 
 ful and grand. The distant roar of a cascade may 
 create secondary emotions, but they increase when we 
 see a foaming sheet of water breaking out from the 
 mountain summit and plunging into the depths below. 
 The majesty of rolling clouds, yon waving forest of 
 pine, with the flow of earth's mighty waters, all create 
 feelings of delight. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Our emotions of beauty are affected by the char- 
 acter of motion. (1.) Motion in a direct line is 
 pleasing, but not so free and natural as vibrations or 
 undulations. The cycloidal flight of birds, the rock- 
 ing ship under sail, together with the undulations of 
 waves, or sheets of flame, impart pleasure. (2.) Reg- 
 ular motion is more pleasant than that which is irreg- 
 ular. For the latter creates extra mental effort, soon 
 attended with weariness. (3.) Motion uniformly ac- 
 celerated is very agreeable. A stone rolled from the 
 summit of a mountain accumulates interest as its 
 velocity increases. (4.) The agreeableness of motion 
 varies with quickness and slowness; yet, in either 
 case, if long continued, the interest abates. (5.) Con- 
 tinued slowness of motion retards the natural ease and 
 activity of our perceptions; hence, impatience and 
 loss of interest follows. 2. Objects exciting emotions 
 of beauty may be wholly intellectual. With all possi- 
 ble interest connected with materiality, all inert nature 
 is much like a beautiful corpse — the spirit fled. All the 
 
358 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY, 
 
 sweetness and beauty of the human countenance, if 
 contemplated without the idea of a soul, would cause 
 very slight emotions of beauty. But if the counte- 
 nance expresses the presence of a rational soul, amia- 
 ble, persevering, and full of intellectual light, it is 
 regarded as beautiful, independent of its physical ap- 
 pearance. 3. The mind's contemplations within itself 
 of spiritual realities and influences give pleasing 
 emotions. 4. Moral objects in the spiritual universe 
 give internal pleasure. He who seeks and obtains a 
 pure heart, is as conscious of the change as he can 
 be of self-reality, and the emotions of happiness felt 
 are beyond description. 5. The power of the soul to 
 know the reality of pleasing emotions, is in the pri- 
 mary elements of its being. This power and the 
 knowledge of such emotions can not cease to be. 
 
ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY. 359 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY IN THE 
 
 PHYSICAL, SPIRITUAL, AND MORAL 
 
 WORLDS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The material universe contains an innumerable 
 variety of objects of beauty. The properties associ- 
 ated in each compound may be beautiful in abstract 
 entities, but far more delightful when blended to- 
 gether. 2. A single sound in music has intrinsic 
 beauty; but associated tones, skillfully played, pro- 
 duce the most exciting emotions of pleasure. 3. A 
 single color of the most beautiful flower possesses 
 beauty ; but when the various hues and glowing tints 
 are associated, we realize feelings of thrilling delight. 
 4. The bright luster of a Spring morning, and the 
 mellow radiance of a Summer evening, without the 
 golden clouds, undulated earth, living trees, and 
 blooming flowers, would fail to please. But our feel- 
 ings riso higher as we associate the earth with the 
 sun, moon, and stars, which fill the vast of infinity. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The soul has internal power to know the reality 
 of spiritual and physical entities. It looks out upon the 
 beauties of nature by means of physical organs. The 
 
360 ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY. 
 
 latter, doomed to disease and decay, can add no power 
 to the former, for we shall see when separated from 
 them. 2. Intellectual facts in the mind are objects not 
 only of contemplation, but cause pleasure, in regard to 
 either simple thought or associated realities. 8. The 
 mind has not only power within itself to enjoy truths 
 stored in memory, but can force investigative thought 
 into new fields of science and arrange beautiful facts, 
 images, and plans, either plain or complicated, with 
 continued delight. 4. Of nothing are we more con- 
 scious than that we experience moral feelings or emo- 
 tions of beauty. They can arise in connection with 
 the influence exerted upon the mind by external 
 moral agents, m their appearance, conduct, and move- 
 ments. 5. A simple thought has some influence, but 
 the contents of a letter from a friend have more. 
 The contemplation of heaven, to the pure in heart, is 
 overwhelming, but in adding an endless variety in 
 scenery and influences, together with innumerable 
 holy and happy beings, we are lost in wonder and 
 praise. 6. If lost in a wilderness, and the arrival 
 of midnight is made terrific by mingling elements of 
 the passing storm, the conscious belief that an Infinite 
 Power throws protection around us is agreeable. 7. 
 The revelation of Almighty Goodness to our spirits 
 gives happiness in prosperity or the wane of life. 
 When the angry cloud throws its brow of night over 
 the face of a troubled sea, and mountain waves roll on 
 the highway of ruin, we feel that the Infinite Power 
 controlling all things is our Father. 
 
EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 361 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PRIMARY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CON- 
 NECTED WITH THE MENTAL AND MORAL 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of sublimity are important to knowl- 
 edge and happiness. We are naturally inclined and 
 attached to things great and elevated. A sublime ob- 
 ject or thought can affect us even to transport of 
 feeling; and many such objects or thoughts associated 
 impart still greater force. Physical, intellectual, and 
 moral objects often cause emotions of sublimity, as 
 they separately and suddenly break upon our percep- 
 tion, independently of all trains of thought or any 
 associating process. But this belongs more properly 
 to purely-intellectual states and thoughts than to 
 emotions. The latter do not rise in trains like 
 thoughts, but governed by different laws. 2. Emo- 
 tions of sublimity differ from those of beauty. The 
 latter are always pleasant and agreeable, and charac- 
 terized by gentleness, mildness, and sweet attractive- 
 ness; but the former, with strong and overwhelming 
 emotions of the sublime. The sweet waters of limpid 
 streams meandering among the hills and through green 
 
 groves are beautiful; the flowing river moves with 
 
 81 
 
362 EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 
 
 grandeur, but the pouring of its mighty current into 
 the immensity of ocean gives origin .to emotions of 
 sublimity; and such emotions are beyond description, 
 as a world of waves rise up before us, rolling on for- 
 ever. 3. An emotion of sublimity may be regarded 
 as an excited arid elevated feeling, consisting of a 
 union of astonishment and awe at the contemplation 
 of great scenes and objects. 4. An orator may eas- 
 ily carry his audience with vivid, beautiful, and thrill- 
 ing descriptions. But when the internal fires of gen- 
 ius begin to burn out in lofty sentiment, free and 
 impressive with boldness of thought and description, 
 then emotions of sublimity move the whole empire of 
 spirit around him. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Emotions of sublimity are the direct subjects of 
 consciousness; though not clearly definable, yet we 
 are not ignorant of their nature. (1.) The contem- 
 plation of great hight causes emotions of sublimity. 
 That vast mountain rising in massive form before us, 
 lifting its nightless head far above the storm-cloud's 
 path, or lightning vale of the thunder's home, com- 
 mands every thought, exciting intense feelings of 
 sublimity. (2.) The action and poiver of great objects 
 create such emotions. While standing upon the banks 
 of Niagara Falls the mind is startled in contempla- 
 ting the rapidity and mighty power of the descending 
 flood plunging into the abyss below. The trembling 
 earth, rising cloud, foaming waves, with the thunder 
 
EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 363 
 
 of its power, excite the soul with vivid and intense 
 emotions of sublimity. (3.) They are originated by 
 great depth. If, stationed upon the top of some lofty 
 mountain, we look into the vast plain below, our feel- 
 ings will be affected. And he who rides in his balloon 
 through the heavens, can not look upon the vast globe 
 rolling beneath without strong feelings of sublimity. 
 2. They are caused by colors in terrific objects — the 
 mingling hues of flame, smoke, and lava, amid the 
 darkness of night. We are affected in looking upon 
 the augmenting gloom and blackness of the rising 
 storm. 3. There is sublimity in motion — the lapse 
 of a mighty river overflowing its banks, or leaping 
 down a precipice, the rapid travel of the hurricane 
 with uplifted forests shaking the everlasting hills in 
 its highway of desolation. 4. There is a sublimity in 
 sound. The deep, solemn peals of the organ, the 
 thunder of the cataract, the distant roar of high 
 winds, and the perpetual tones of the murmuring sea, 
 all waft emotions of sublimity over the soul. 
 
364 EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 SECONDARY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CON- 
 NECTED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND 
 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Primary emotions of sublimity arise almost en- 
 tirely from natural susceptibility, and those called 
 secondary, more properly, from association. The un- 
 cultivated mind experiences primary emotions of the 
 sublime, on witnessing the cloud and lightning of 
 approaching storm; while the investigative intellect 
 has secondary emotions from distant associated facts. 
 2. We understand such secondary emotions to be 
 caused by ulterior considerations, requiring a greater 
 voluntary or intentional act of mind, and involves 
 consideration and contrast in association. 3. A sim- 
 ple sound may excite but little emotion, till its pecu- 
 liar character recalls associations imparting intense 
 feelings. The sound of a cannon can excite such 
 emotions, to a limited extent; but when it calls up 
 the victory of the battle-field, with all the associated 
 facts of triumph, the feelings become strong and ex- 
 citing. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The appearance of a lone star, giving origin to 
 emotions of sublimity, may be only slightly percepti- 
 
EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 365 
 
 ble from original susceptibility ; but when other orbs 
 are associated with it, till the whole heavens, filled 
 with innumerable worlds, glow in the field of contem- 
 plation, our feelings are vivid and intense. 2. The 
 rumbling of a wagon often suggests the sublimity of 
 thunder, clouds of darkness, livid lightning, and hast- 
 ening rain. And the distant thunder brings to re- 
 membrance the mighty earthquake, from which our 
 feelings can not be withheld. 3. If standing on the 
 top of Mount Sinai, such emotions might be slight ; 
 but when we contemplate the Almighty, in infinite 
 glory and majesty, descending the parting heavens 
 on bending pavement of clouds mingled with fire, the 
 earth shaking as the mountain is clothed with terror 
 and death, the soul is overpowered with emotions of 
 a scene so sublime. 
 
366 OBJECTS OF SUBLIMITY. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF EMO- 
 TIONS OF SUBLIMITY, INFLUENCING 
 THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
 STATES OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Primary objects of emotions of sublimity must 
 be regarded as of sufficient importance to wake up 
 and affect the natural susceptibility of the mind to 
 vivid or intens'e feelings in regard to them. 2. There 
 are objects originally sublime — vast extent, great 
 hight or depth, with rapid motion or great power. A 
 child will intuitively evidence feelings of awe and ad- 
 miration when a primary object is suddenly presented, 
 such as a house in flames at night. 3. Secondary ob- 
 jects of sublimity affecting our intellectual states and 
 causing emotions, may be regarded as very numerous, 
 and enter into combinations and associations, so as to 
 excite feelings of sublimity. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. There are primary objects giving origin to emo- 
 tions of moral sublimity. Sympathy and benevolence 
 under exciting and trying circumstances may cause 
 feelings of moral sublimity. That man who has 
 
OBJECTS OF SUBLIMITY. 367 
 
 pledged his life and services to right, and rather than 
 deny his Lord, submits to the curling flames of mar- 
 tyrdom, evidences moral worth and dignity, which can 
 not fail moving the heart. 2. Objects of moral sub- 
 limity may exist wholly in the mind. Spiritual influ- 
 ences and simple trains of thought may so accumulate 
 in meditation and contemplation as to excite us. 3. 
 Secondary emotions of moral sublimity can be ex- 
 cited by objects of various kinds. An extended no- 
 tice and action of the mind, connected with a simple 
 fact, may apprehend associated constellations of ma- 
 jestic thoughts and sublime realities. 4. If the con- 
 templation of an angel or a saint in the spirit-world 
 moves the feelings of a pure heart, such feelings will 
 increase as multiplied millions of such beings throng 
 the field of the mind's view. But a greater scene 
 opens, as we contemplate innumerable saints and an- 
 gels gathering around the final Judge and great 
 white throne, descending, with clouds of infinite glory, 
 to the waking of the dead and renewing of the world. 
 
368 SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 
 SECTION I, 
 
 1. Splendor refers the mind to the distinctive 
 qualities, condition, or appearance of objects. That 
 which is magnificent, of brilliant luster and great 
 show of elegance, is splendid in consequence of its 
 superior charms and attractions. 2. Our feelings are 
 excited in contemplating, or reviewing the great and 
 magnanimous acts of mighty Warriors, who from ne- 
 cessity have saved peaceable cities, kingdoms, and 
 empires, when all advantages appeared against them. 
 3. The light of the rising sun, breaking along the 
 hemisphere of night, possesses natural splendor, and 
 our emotions correspond to the brilliancy of the 
 scene. The mellow light of the setting sun, spread- 
 ing on the horizon, and withdrawing from receding 
 valleys, hills, and mountains, enraptures the mind. 
 The golden clouds hung high and glowing around the 
 descending king of day only add splendor to the 
 scene. 4. We are capable of internal moral feelings 
 under the approval of Divine Goodness, and in con- 
 templating the splendor of that light which fills the 
 moral universe. 
 
SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 369 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Majesty is connected with greatness and dignity 
 in the appearance of an object, and feelings of awe 
 or reverence inspired in the mind of the beholder. 2. 
 A great general, honored with the victories of many 
 battle-fields in contending for pure liberty, graceful 
 in motion, and of lofty air, neat in form and bold in 
 appearance, is said to be majestic in nature and ac- 
 tion. And when we associate such noble acts and 
 achievements with the man, we can not contemplate 
 them without distinct emotions in regard to the same. 
 3. True dignity of character and elevation in honors, 
 as those of a queen, king, or emperor, give rise to a 
 peculiar class of feelings connected with majestic ob- 
 jects. 4. The lofty blue sky, vaulting the heavens 
 and filled with bright stars, is majestic, and enkindles 
 feelings corresponding to the same. 5. In the moral 
 world, while contemplating the lofty heavenly home of 
 the just, the majesty of that Being who fills immens- 
 ity with light and love, our emotions are intense. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Grrandeur differs from the loftiness and awing 
 boldness of majesty; is more agreeable and not so 
 brilliant and vivid in its effects upon our feelings as 
 influences connected with splendor. (1.) We experi- 
 ence emotions of beauty as we watch the crystal 
 fountain rolling over its pebbly bed and hastening 
 from its banks enameled with flowers — now each drop 
 
370 SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 
 
 sparkles in the light of the sun, and then shaded with 
 green foliage overhanging its onward course. (2.) And 
 we have emotions of grandeur as the same stream deep- 
 ens and expands into a mighty river, dividing strong 
 empires — its banks ranged with verdant groves, fruitful 
 hills and valleys, with almost innumerable villages and 
 cities bestudding the winding borders of its opposing 
 shores, while its silvery bosom bears the passing com- 
 merce of nations. 3. But we have emotions of sub- 
 limity as this majestic river rolls its mighty waters 
 into the wide extent and depth of illimitable ocean, 
 heaving and rocking in all the pride of natural inde- 
 pendence, hanging its waves in the clouds of storm; 
 now dashing the thunder of its strength against the 
 distant shore, and then burying in its dark depths the 
 rival navies of the world — the scene is overwhelming ; 
 we are wrapped in emotions beyond description. 
 There is moral grandeur in the pure achievements and 
 attainments of moral agents, the life of holy song, and 
 the stirring vigor of choral anthems, connected with 
 the purity of Almighty Goodness. 
 
DIVISION EIGHTH. 
 
 -♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE DESIEES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 •1. A desire is a motion, passion, or excitement of 
 the mind directed to some attainment or attracting 
 object. It is the conscious feeling or uneasiness ex- 
 perienced in want of an object believed to possess 
 something pleasurable. 2. The power to desire arises 
 in connection with original elements, otherwise they 
 would be either accidents or inane; but we have con- 
 scious power to know their real existence and dis- 
 tinctive nature. 3. They are evidenced, not only in 
 appetency, inclination, and craving, but in wishing for 
 and coveting the possession and enjoyment of an ob- 
 ject, with a greater or less degree of earnestness. 
 4. Desires are so closely connected with the influence 
 of affection, propensity, and appetite, that they can 
 not be regarded as wholly abstract realities. Their 
 distinctive character in origin and action is determined 
 by conscious knowledge. 5. They have power and in- 
 fluence to invoke mental action, but never can compel 
 such action. 6. Desires are not ulterior in origin 
 
 to emotions, and wholly dependent upon them. The 
 
 371 
 
372 THE DESIRES. 
 
 latter may become vivid and then subside; but the 
 former, though often counteracted, remains strong 
 and undiminished. 7. They are said to be voluntary 
 when arising in connection with repeated examina- 
 tions of objects, and in efforts to admire that which 
 is beautiful, till it becomes attracting and we desire 
 its possession. 8. They are wholly involuntary 
 when arising either spontaneously or without any 
 volitive mental effort. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. From the instinctive character of desire it is 
 independent of any antecedent emotion as its cause. 
 Desire for safety and food exists in the minds of 
 brutes, and we can not say it is based only on emo- 
 tions or voluntary mental states. 2. The character of 
 desires evidence a definite permanency of their na- 
 ture. Emotions may come and go as waves of the 
 sea ; such action is violent, gentle, or gradual, in pro- 
 portion to the degrees of strength in the affecting 
 power. But desires are not subject to such changes ; 
 they are strong and more abiding. 3. The effect of 
 despair upon emotions and desires is evidence that 
 the latter are too closely connected with intuition to 
 originate only with emotions. The exile on some 
 rocky isle of the sea, or mariner on a sinking ship, 
 has strong and unyielding desires for life and to see 
 his distant home and friends, while his emotions 
 are in ruins. 4. Desires vary in degrees of strength. 
 Such variations may arise, (1.) In connection with 
 
THE DESIRES. 373 
 
 the degree or extent of our conscious want in regard 
 to that which is desired. (2.) They may arise in 
 connection with the degrees of vividness and strength 
 in the action of the emotions. (3.) They arise in con- 
 nection with the condition of the perception and under- 
 standing. In proportion as we correctly perceive and 
 understand an object of interest, may be the strength 
 of desires. 5. Though they can not be said to truly 
 exist without implying an object, yet the power of 
 desires can be real without any object. They have 
 power to excite us and induce action, but can never 
 be the "motive state 7 ' of the mind. 6. Objects of 
 pleasure are desired, but evil is gained by will. We 
 may desire pleasure which will be followed by re- 
 morse, but we can not desire a positive injury, only 
 to deprecate a worse calamity, which is inevitable, if 
 the less be not chosen. 7. The mind can become so. 
 debased as to desire evil objects and advantages, only 
 to gratify a malicious selfishness and revenge in 
 regard to others. 
 
374 IMMEDIATE DESIRES. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRIMARY OE IMMEDIATE DESIKES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Primary or immediate desires are closely con- 
 nected with mental states. They must be of self-ori- 
 gin, or arise in connection with some other power. 
 But it is clear that desire has its origin with the very 
 elements of the soul. 2. Its power is in the mind, 
 and its action .can be the object of consciousness, 
 whether we are immediately conscious of the presence 
 of a cause or not. 3. An instinctive desire, whether 
 arising in the human mind or in the soul of the brute, 
 must be regarded as primary. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We desire to exist, and that such existence be 
 perpetuated. This is experienced independently of 
 any reference to either the hope or expectation of 
 continued life. 2. Such desire is natural and spon- 
 taneous, is almost universal, and we can not create its 
 origin. 3. The desire of existence is intuitive, yet 
 becoming stronger in meditating upon the bright 
 hope and expectations which illume the future. 4. 
 The preciousness of life attaches us to existence, and 
 the danger of losing it gives origin to an additional 
 tie of endearment. 
 
SECONDARY DESIRES. 375 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SECONDARY OR RETROSPECTIVE AND PRO- 
 SPECTIVE DESIRES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Retrospective desires refer to past events or 
 realities in some way. It is natural to desire that 
 many things had been different, and we would recall 
 them, if possible, to make changes for better and hap- 
 pier results. The remembrance of our wicked acts is 
 followed with a desire to have them changed. 2. 
 Prospective desires refer to facts or events ranging 
 the future. (1.) The desire of society is inseparably 
 connected with the nature of our being. The con- 
 stitutional existence of man evidences that Heaven 
 formed and designed him for society. Such attach- 
 ments to society exist, not only in his wants, affec- 
 tionate relations of dependence, but by social and 
 natural instincts and desires. It is not a result of 
 education, but arises out of his essential nature, inde- 
 pendent of either convenience or interest. (2.) There 
 is an internal principle of social union, vivid and 
 strong. We are the offspring of social ties; and had 
 we been created without kind sympathies, this single 
 fact would have been proof that God had not created 
 us in mercy and did not intend our happiness. We 
 
376 SECONDARY DESIRES. 
 
 instinctively sigh for the friendship, love, and com- 
 munion of our fellow-beings. If exiled to a lonely 
 death they are not destroyed. They live in the high- 
 est degrees of virtue, and will not die in the lowest ex- 
 tremes of vice. (3.) The desire of knoivledge is nat- 
 ural. Heaven created us to know, and such inclina- 
 tion can never be abated. It seeks all that may be 
 known, involving the facts, variations, and grandeur 
 of universal being ; then ranges the infinite field of 
 possibilities and imagination. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The desire of esteem belongs to human nature. 
 It appears to # be a want of the soul, but should be 
 guarded. It always causes a reciprocal action of 
 kindness for kindness. Here is a power, which, if 
 connected with pure motive, can mature from sim- 
 ple kindness into respect, then into regard, affection, 
 and the glow of confidence and devoted love. Our 
 feelings can never be withheld from cherishing the 
 wellbeing of those who love us and have our esteem. 
 Could we be conscious that we had not the esteem of 
 any, then our social existence would be without the 
 light of hope, and suddenly would all happiness end. 
 2. The desire of emulation is connected with the soul, 
 and may be either good or bad. A wish to excel in 
 the accomplishment of good, only increases happi- 
 ness; but if for superiority, regardless of the rights 
 and claims of others, it is selfish and unholy. The 
 full throes of a sanctified ambition electrify mind, 
 
SECONDARY DESIRES. 377 
 
 move the world, and would scale obstructing mount- 
 ains of opposing impossibilities. 3. A desire of 
 pleasure belongs to mind, and nothing not inconsist- 
 ent with moral rectitude and purity has Heaven with- 
 held from us. To the pure mind there is a universe 
 of pure objects calculated to delight and please. 4. 
 A desire of fame applies to mind, and in some way or 
 degree is possessed by all. It is natural to wish the 
 attention and regard of others. When free from self- 
 ish and improper motives, the mind is quickened and 
 roused to action. Unholy desires only gravitate to 
 death ; but when pure, they inspire the soul with holy 
 and lofty efforts to accomplish good. 5. The desire 
 of glory is natural to mind, and is harmless in arriv- 
 ing at distinction while we would carry all the world 
 with us to superior excellence. But the moment we 
 would detract from others, in order to rise, we are 
 sinful and on the way to ruin. Such feelings differ 
 from envy and jealousy. It is right to wish to excel 
 by promoting the happiness of others. How just the 
 remark, "It is much better to deserve distinction, 
 without having it, than to have it without deserving 
 it!" 6. The desire of power invests every human 
 mind to some extent. We are naturally fond of in- 
 fluence and wish to attract the attention and regard 
 of others. It is as original with the slave as the king 
 or conqueror of nations. Its inspiring utility is evi- 
 denced in view of the vast amount of good it secures 
 to our race, and the unbounded happiness it con- 
 fers. But if misdirected or incumbered with vile 
 
 32 
 
378 SECONDARY DESIRES. 
 
 motives, ruin is the result. Thus poor mortality, as 
 numbering cycles move on, is doomed to hopeless 
 wretchedness. 
 
HOPE AND FEAR. 379 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 HOPE AND FEAR. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Hope in the mind is a power capable of active 
 influence, and possesses anxiety with solicitous look- 
 ing to some good, accompanied with a slight expecta- 
 tion of obtaining it, or faint belief that it may be 
 obtained. 2. It is that which has power, and furnishes 
 in the mind the ground of expectation, and promises 
 such desired good or reality sought. 3. It is never 
 retrospective, and can not extend to things in the past, 
 but always looks to the future, and that which is sep- 
 arate from the reality of self. It can not apply to 
 possession or any fact connected with self-conscious- 
 ness, without ceasing to exist, as faith and conscious 
 knowledge embrace present possession. 4. It differs 
 from wish and desire in that it implies some expecta- 
 tion of obtaining the good sought; while desire may 
 remain firm and unchanged without any expectation 
 of obtaining its object. The latter may extend to 
 past events, but hope can not. Hope always gives 
 pleasure or joy; but desire may extend to that which 
 causes the reverse. The latter may excite to an effort 
 for impossibilities — the former can not. 5. Hope 
 differs from faith. The latter embraces abiding pos- 
 
380 HOPE AND FEAR. 
 
 session or conscious-felt and known facts, feelings, 
 and influences in the soul; while the former can never 
 apply to what we now possess or experience. If we 
 hope for an object, we have it not; it is still in the 
 future. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Fear is a painful emotion or passion excited in 
 the mind by the expectation of evil, or the apprehen- 
 sion of impending danger. It is active when we feel 
 a painful apprehension of impending calamities caus- 
 ing solicitude, awe, or alarm. 2. Dread often follows 
 fear, differing in the increased degrees of apprehend- 
 ing alarm. And terror or fright are connected with 
 a still more sudden, strong, and vivid apprehension 
 of evil or danger. 3. Fear may be examined in two 
 points of light. (1.) A filial fear involves pleasing 
 obedience, in which a tender regard, affection, and 
 love are connected with an awe declining every thing 
 that would mar or offend. (2.) A slavish fear, if con- 
 tinued, ends in dismay, terror, and death. Casual 
 gleams of hope are as livid lightning in the turbid 
 storm of midnight, leaving the scene in augmented 
 darkness. 4. We may hope for some future good, but 
 fear it is not to be obtained. It may be desired, but 
 possession can be defeated by loss of confidence. 5. 
 Fear involves two essential elements — the apprehen- 
 sion of evil, and the wish or desire to avoid it. In 
 this way it becomes a ground of safety in waking up 
 the mind to a vivid sense of danger and in warning 
 against evil. Yet it may be a medium of sorrow and 
 
HOPE AND FEAR. 381 
 
 ■wretchedness. 6. There appears to be a difference 
 in the susceptibility of fear. Some are easily excited, 
 while others remain unmoved. The former are always 
 apprehending danger ; but the latter are apt to be in 
 danger without being alarmed. An extreme in ex- 
 cited passion, may suppress the voice of conscience 
 and bewilder conformity to moral rectitude. 7. It 
 causes the imagination to be too vivid, extravagant, 
 and wild, and often produces prostration and despair. 
 
382 EXPECTATION AND ANTICIPATION. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EXPECTATION, ANTICIPATION, CONFIDENCE, 
 AND TKUST. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The mind is said to be in a state of expectancy 
 when we look to future events, believing that they 
 will take place. (1.) Expectation differs from hope 
 and desire. We can desire an impossibility, and hope 
 for that which is almost impossible, but expectation 
 is founded in conscious reasons which render or cause 
 the probable event to be looked for with less inclina- 
 tion to doubt. (2.) We can not desire evil; and hope 
 can only be directed to some good ; while expectation 
 can be directed to both good and evil, and may exist 
 in connection with both hope and fear. 2. Anticipa- 
 tion differs from expectation, involving a peculiar 
 mental condition, or state, which assumes or is im- 
 pressed with conviction of that which is coming to 
 pass. 3. It is said to be & previous feeling or impres- 
 sion of what is to take place. They may arise from 
 casualties, but often appear spontaneous. 4. They 
 are of immense value, and form a basis of protection 
 in aiding to foresee evil and hide from it. 
 
CONFIDENCE AND TRUST. 383 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Confidence is a reliance in true and abiding real- 
 ities, and is the mind's assurance. It may involve a 
 belief in self-competency or power to accomplish de- 
 sired results in opposition to distrust. (1.) It may 
 be regarded as that in which belief rests, involving 
 the reliance of others, and our dependence upon as- 
 sociated truths. (2.) It should be guarded, or, con- 
 nected with some constitutions, it may lead to boldness 
 of an excessive character, both vain and reckless, if 
 not egotistic presumption. But with proper restric- 
 tions it is of incalculable value. 2. Trust differs 
 from confidence in that it is more pointed, settled, and 
 unyielding. The latter involves the idea of reliance 
 upon associated facts tested; while the former con- 
 centrating, fastens upon and holds some prominent 
 good, or reality. 3. It takes hold of, or enters an 
 approved object as part of the mind's possession and 
 enjoyment. 4. The power to trust is in the mind. 
 Such motion or action fastens upon the mercy of 
 Heaven, while faith is present in realizing the influ- 
 ence of spirit upon spirit in pardon, peace, and joy. 
 It holds its object without inclination of release. 5. 
 It may become a law of action ; and though false ob- 
 jects, causing deep anguish, sorrow, and disappoint- 
 ment, have to be torn away, yet the vastness of 
 universal being, pure and holy, sustains and imparts 
 happiness to the confiding soul. 
 
384 INSTINCTS 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 INSTINCTS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Instinct refers to that kind of motion, anima- 
 tion, or excitement which belongs only to immaterial- 
 ity. It is the natural inclination and spontaneous 
 action of spirit, independent of all materiality. 2. 
 The dead body of a brute has no more self-action or 
 instinctive distinctions than a lump of clay, or rock 
 slumbering in the mountain. But while living, it dif- 
 fered in self-motion, natural inclination for suste- 
 nance and comfort, with a knowledge of courses and 
 sense of self-protection, together with power of choos- 
 ing the best and quickest way of escape from danger* 
 Therefore, instinct, in all orders of existences, is con- 
 nected only with spirit, and clearly proves that brutes 
 have souls with more than simple action. (1.) The 
 brute breathes, the blood flows, and, on examination, 
 we find the stomach has natural power to extract 
 qualities and strength from food to supply the body ; 
 this is called vital power. And though it acts natu- 
 rally without mental effort, yet such active power can 
 never take place where matter is not animated with a 
 soul. This order of vital power is not called instinct- 
 ive, but is below, though connected with the basis of 
 
INSTINCTS. 385 
 
 an instinctive nature. (2.) Contemplate the whole 
 animal frame in motion. It goes from place to place 
 and from one desired object of food to another. It 
 seeks out and chooses that which is suited to taste, 
 and adapted, in nature and quality, to its stomach 
 and nourishment, evidencing not only inclination, but 
 power of distinction and choice. (3.) The degree 
 of wisdom, activity, choice, comparison, care, and 
 judgment, which some animals possess, is worthy of 
 being called instinctive intelligence. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Instincts in the human mind are not varied and 
 so numerous as those connected with the brute. (1.) 
 A little child, before it can reason, gives instinctive 
 evidence of fear when falling, by throwing up its 
 arms, and the agitated expression of its face. (2.) It 
 instinctively seeks nourishment and receives the same 
 without being taught. By the same power it gives 
 evidence of pain or suffering. 2. The origin of ef- 
 forts in self-preservation is instinctive. We instinct- 
 ively repel the sudden blow of a robber, check our- 
 selves from falling, and close the eyelids on near ap- 
 proach of objects, before reason can come to our relief. 
 3. We can experience instinctive resentment by imme- 
 diate feelings in regard to the cause of affliction, and 
 when reading of sudden and cruel tortures imposed 
 upon a dear friend. A child naturally resents an in- 
 jury when the cause is wholly inert. Signs of pain, 
 
 joy, or sorrow are often instinctive evidences, and 
 
 38 
 
386 INSTINCTS. 
 
 excite corresponding emotions and action upon the 
 part of beholders. They are natural, and designed to 
 protect us, before reason can possibly come to our re- 
 lief. They are a part of the mental constitution, and 
 upon them we are dependent for safety. 4. The men- 
 tal process of man differs from the spirit acts of the 
 brute. When the former perceives objects, reason 
 satisfies him in regard to such phenomena, and the 
 judgment decides upon the same. But the brute, 
 without reason and judgment, has an instinctive ap- 
 prehension of that which is desirable or to be feared. 
 The former often acts from natural inclination, and 
 not from reason. The latter has instinctive action 
 in connection with natural inclination, and not from 
 reason. 5. The maritime navigator, with all his 
 knowledge and skill, often becomes unsuccessful in 
 reaching his desired destination, and, through tim- 
 idity or want of knowing his position, becomes bewil- 
 dered and lost at sea. But the migratory bird is tri- 
 umphant. He bounds through trackless fields of air, 
 spreads his wing to the rising breeze, encounters 
 storms, passes seas, lakes, and lands unknown, and 
 then returns without mistake or failure. 6. The wis- 
 dom and skill of the bee and the ant evidence in- 
 stinctive intelligence, in putting forth efforts to ac- 
 complish certain results. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Man is scientific and capable of almost bound- 
 less knowledge. He can analyze the laws and nature 
 
INSTINCTS. 387 
 
 of existences, forcing investigative thought in explor- 
 ing hidden fields of natural truths. But the brute, 
 without these, never seeks an explanation of what he 
 sees. 2. Man is progressive by means of self-appli- 
 cation and effort, gathering items from all objects 
 around him ; but the brute has no power of self-prog- 
 ress in knowledge. 3. Man is a moral agent, has a 
 conscience admonishing of evil and influencing him to 
 do right. But the brute has none of these ; his emo- 
 tions give no evidence of gladness, happiness, or fear, 
 as involved by moral relationship and rectitude ; yet 
 they may have feelings varying with their temporal 
 condition and kindness received. 4. Their action is 
 both voluntary and involuntary. To say they have 
 no liberty or exercise of will is absurd, but they are 
 principally influenced by natural inclination. Some 
 of them give evidence of comparison and judgment. 
 5. Brute memory is without doubt. They who deny 
 it say, " When the brute has been affected in a given 
 manner in given circumstances, the same sensations 
 are reproduced in him when he comes into similar cir- 
 cumstances again, and hence the same actions are re- 
 peated." But such "sensations" must be either 
 mind or matter. If the latter, they can never be re- 
 produced ; and if mind, they can not be reproduced 
 by such "circumstantial" causes, unless they have 
 power to know such causes are present and differ 
 from all others. This would involve both memory 
 and comparison. 
 
388 APPETITES. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 APPETITES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Appetites arise in connection with certain feel- 
 ings of uneasiness or want natural to the physical 
 organization and spiritual self. Such feelings always 
 precede appetites, the latter being a known maturity 
 of the former. 2. They divide into two general 
 heads — hunger and thirst. Yet there are branches 
 differing both in character and origin. Though 
 they arise in connection with the physical functions, 
 yet they apply, to some extent, to the condition and 
 states of the mind. 3. Hunger or desire for food 
 arises in connection with the natural condition of the 
 physical powers in want or craving demands. 4. 
 Thirst, or desire for drink, is an uneasy necessity or 
 demand, arising in the peculiar wants of our physical 
 nature. 5. Though appetites arise in connection with 
 bodily organization, yet they never take place with 
 material elements or compounds in the entire absence 
 of spirit. They are common both to man and brute. 
 6. Action is intuitively connected with appetite. 
 Hunger in an infant instinctively prompts seeking and 
 receiving appropriate supplies. 
 
APPETITES. 389 
 
 SECTION II 
 
 1. Animals moved by hunger instinctively seek 
 supplies, and of the proper kind and quality. If 
 wearied, rest is an instinctive inclination. 2. Appe- 
 tites are necessary to our preservation. They enable 
 us to properly observe the laws of health, avoiding 
 danger and even death. Reason and experience 
 might give us knowledge of the necessity of food, 
 but it remains only for appetite to give the time of 
 eating, and the quality and quantity required. 3. 
 Animals may have this information by nature, but it 
 remains for instinct to guide them in choosing good 
 from that which is poisonous, and direct them to that 
 which they should take in health, as well as that they 
 should use in sickness, or to counteract poison. 4. 
 In its original or instinctive nature appetite is inno- 
 cent. Aided by it we not only adapt elements to 
 health, but detect that which produces affliction and 
 death. 5. When an artificial appetite is acquired for 
 inebriating liquors or intoxicating drugs, it is immoral 
 and sinful. 6. A natural appetite, properly guarded, 
 is very important in guiding to safety and the attain- 
 ment of health. It is a source of great enjoyment 
 and happiness. 7. It not only applies to the physical 
 nature, but extends to that peculiar uneasiness called 
 mental hunger or thirst for learning, or moral spirit- 
 ual good. But when the mind is wholly abandoned 
 to vitiated appetites and propensities, both body and 
 soul are soon in ruins. 
 
390 TASTE 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 TASTE CONSIDERED AS CONNECTED WITH 
 OUR PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND 
 MORAL NATURES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Taste, as connected with our physical nature, is 
 caused bv contact with material entities, and refers to 
 the natural power of perceiving by means of the 
 mouth, and experiencing certain sensations in conse- 
 quence of something applied to the tongue. It is not 
 only to taste or try, but to relish or have enjoyment. 
 2. This implies an . intrinsic or connected, discrimin- 
 ating or distinguishing power in regard to properties 
 and qualities of objects, receiving the agreeable and 
 pleasurable, and rejecting the disagreeable and per- 
 nicious. 3. Taste is closely connected with the ap- 
 petites, or the peculiar natural condition or want of 
 the physical organs on the one hand, and the sensa- 
 tions and affected states of the mind on the other. 
 It was designed as a medium of relief to the one and 
 of enjoyment to the other, and should only promote 
 
 happiness. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Intellectual taste is very extensive, and is the 
 feeling or experiencing of sensations. It implies the 
 
TASTE. 391 
 
 presence of perception, apprehension, and judgment. 
 Connected with such feelings is the relishing of true 
 excellences, and the discerning of beauty, symmetry, 
 and grandeur. 2. It is the sensibility of the mind by 
 which we cognize both the beauties and deformities of 
 universal existences — a prelude power in receiving 
 and of relishing pleasure from the former, and of ad- 
 mitting suffering, pain, or sorrow from the latter. 3. 
 It differs from mere feeling or quickness of feeling, 
 yet is so closely connected that the absence of the 
 latter would be fatal to the former. 4. There are 
 degrees of taste, varying with different mental consti- 
 tutions. That which is beautiful to one does not so 
 appear to another. Taste, with some, is developed as 
 a prominent feature connected with perception and 
 quick discrimination, while others pass over fields of 
 beauties almost wholly unaffected. Though it is nat- 
 ural, yet it is capable of a high degree of cultivation 
 in comparing pleasing or beautiful objects with those 
 deformed. And in comparing objects we think beau- 
 tiful, with those selected by others, our power of dis- 
 crimination becomes more acute. 5. While taste, to 
 some degree, is regarded as universal, and all minds 
 with this endowment are affected by a great variety 
 of objects, yet they do not recognize the same quality 
 of beauty in the same object; neither are all con- 
 scious of the same degree of emotion. 6. Three men 
 travel through a section of country; one is delighted 
 with the beauty of nature, another by the beauty or 
 taste manifested in the improvements or works of art, 
 
392 TASTE. 
 
 and the third with the cultivated taste and manners 
 of the inhabitants. But all have conscious emotions 
 with distinct differences, looking upon the darkening 
 brow of the rising storm rapidly vaulting the heavens. 
 Light in contrast with darkness, and clouds mingling 
 in the lightning-flash, all vary our emotions and taste 
 corresponding to such objects. 7. Taste varies with 
 the same mind as we advance to old age. Gay or 
 bright colors are pleasant and attracting to youth, 
 causing vivid excitement. But our pleasure in age is 
 derived from that which is more important, weighty, 
 and grave. 8. It extends to objects exciting emo- 
 tions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, yet differs 
 from desires. It may extend to islands of ice upon 
 rolling seas, glittering before the rising sun, or the 
 descending flood of Niagara, yet we could not desire 
 
 to own them. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Colors examined separately involve the power 
 of taste ; but the mingling hues of flowers or rain- 
 bow excite intense feelings of delight. 2. Colors are 
 not only beautiful, but in some instances possess 
 grandeur and sublimity. The varying shades of liv- 
 ing green spread over a thousand waving forests, or 
 reflected from sun-lighted seas and oceans, together 
 with vivid lightning-traces upon midnight darkness, 
 all involve elements of beauty, grandeur, and sub- 
 limity. 3. Symmetry can influence taste. There is 
 something pleasing in the correct proportions of the 
 several parts of a body to each other, with a conform- 
 
TASTE. 393 
 
 ity of the members of the whole work in unison and 
 harmony. 4. Form, uniformity, magnitude, and mo- 
 tion, all influence the power of taste. Form involves 
 endless diversity and variety. Uniformity extends 
 regularity and harmony. Magnitude inspires with 
 the idea of vastness, as sight ranges immense mount- 
 ains, lifting their w T ild forms and lofty heads as if to 
 gaze perpetually into the face of the sun-extended 
 oceans, heaving and tossing in all the natural pride 
 of unconquered independence : all cause emotions, 
 with elements of beauty and grandeur. Motion is 
 pleasing, if slow — quick motion is sublime. A train 
 of cars in motion possesses elements of grandeur; 
 but when at rest, the interest is abated. 5. Taste 
 extends to causes of sound affecting the ear, and 
 more abstractly to the beauty of sound within itself. 
 It is beautiful, and taste is present in detecting the 
 character and relation of tones. In this way discord 
 is distinguished from concord. A mellow, soothing 
 sound is beautiful ; but the sound of a cannon or peal 
 of thunder awakens emotions of sublimity or fear. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. Taste extends to immaterial objects and quali- 
 ties. Interesting, beautiful, and lovely characteristics 
 or traits of minds around us, excite pleasing feelings. 
 Affection and kindness manifested by others toward 
 us, always produce grateful emotions. 2. Vivid and 
 correct displays of intellectual power, whether spoken 
 or written, come under the rules of taste which har- 
 
394 TASTE. 
 
 monize with the general feelings of mankind. 3. A 
 correct taste is closely connected with the moral ele- 
 ments of mind; and moral objects, together with the 
 fitness and character of moral acts, come directly 
 under its laws. 4. Taste differs from conscience. 
 The former, in an important sense, is dependent upon 
 and is influenced by the latter. Conscience decides 
 upon right, or in regard to wrong. Taste directs the 
 mind to that which is agreeable and pleasant. 5. It 
 differs from imagination. By the latter we form con- 
 ceptions, pictures, and combinations; and by the 
 former we are led to decide upon the beauty, fitness, 
 and utility. 6. It differs from moral emotions. The 
 latter excites in regard to right or wrong — conformity 
 or refusal to comply with rectitude. But the former 
 merely cognizes fitness and beauty without reference 
 to moral obligation. 7. Taste extends to the moral 
 condition, feelings, and happiness of a pure soul, in 
 contemplating eternal life. The spangled heavens 
 above, the rolling earth beneath, flying clouds and 
 changing seasons; the sound of the rain, murmur of 
 the rill, and thunder of the cataract; the flight of 
 armies, sweet songs of birds, or the wild scream of 
 the eagle; the still home of the lily or the highway 
 of the hurricane — all excite the mind with either 
 pleasure or awe, pain or happiness. 
 
MUSCULAR ACTION. 395 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 RELATION OF MUSCULAR ACTION TO THE 
 MENTAL AND MORAL POWERS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Muscular action refers to those muscles in the 
 physical system which are organs of motion, consist- 
 ing of fibers or bundles of fibers delicately arranged. 
 But their action is connected with and dependent on 
 the mind. 2. Such action is instinctive, as we natu- 
 rally flinch or draw back from sudden puncture, pain, 
 or danger; yet it may be both involuntary and vol- 
 untary. 3. Our hands can be trained to almost an 
 endless variety of work which is not of instinctive 
 skill. 4. The art of painting or writing requires a 
 special training of the muscles, and the work when 
 done varies in accordance with such education or 
 habits, as well as taste or judgment. 5. Injuries 
 may affect, or even suspend such action. If the 
 spinal cord be broken, all below the injury must 
 
 perish. 
 
 SECTION Hi 
 
 1. Muscular action may be of instinctive origin; 
 yet it can not take place where there is no vitality or 
 presence of mind. 2. Such action may be involun- 
 tary or take place in regard to something outside of 
 
396 MUSCULAR ACTION. 
 
 that in which the mind is wholly absorbed at the time. 
 3. But such action is principally voluntary, or caused 
 by the mandatory power of the will. 4. When vol- 
 untary action accords with moral rectitude, it is harm- 
 less; but when vile, we are sinful. 
 
DIVISION NINTH 
 
 .«• 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PKOPENSITIES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Propensities refer to a great variety of mani- 
 festations, inclinations, or influences connected with 
 mental phenomena. A propensity is a natural turn 
 or bent of mind, arising in connection with the exist- 
 ence and action of the intellectual and moral pow- 
 ers. 2. It has been called a natural bias or procliv- 
 ity — an influence toward an object with an invoked 
 readiness in regard to the same. But it may be re- 
 garded as a proneness arising in the nature of mental 
 states ; yet it is a natural inclination connected with 
 mind of which we are conscious. 3. Propensi- 
 ties may be divided into four different orders or 
 classes. (1.) Natural propensities are spontaneous 
 in origin and inseparably connected with mental ele- 
 ments. We are conscious of such influences, and of 
 the way the mind is affected by the same, but know 
 very little of their essential nature. (2.) Acquired 
 propensities appear to be educated, and are results of 
 mental effort. When attention is turned repeatedly 
 
 and long to an object, new influences often arise in 
 
 397 
 
398 PROPENSITIES. 
 
 connection with such mental action. (3.) Evil propen- 
 sities are very common, and arise under the influence 
 of a depraved nature; but they are increased with 
 desire for, and advance in, crime. Natural pro- 
 pensities to evil are restricted to the simple liberty of 
 depravity in our first departure from innocence, while 
 acquired strength or maturity leads to, and ends in, 
 ruin, (4.) Pure moral propensities are inclined only 
 to that which is right, or is in accordance with moral 
 rectitude. They are connected with pure motive, a 
 righteous conscience, and correct decisions of mind* 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Propensities differing from appetites are of higher 
 order and of more importance, being less dependent 
 upon the physical functions. They possess something 
 of curiosity, sociality, self-preservation, and desire of 
 knowledge and happiness. The idea of long life is 
 pleasing, but that of annihilation is inexpressibly hor- 
 rible. 2. We are intuitively prone to desire an im- 
 mortality of happy existence, for no one could wish for 
 more sorrow than he experiences at the present time. 
 A natural inclination to appear respectable and share 
 universal friendship, is common to man. 3. A natu- 
 ral longing for life is both instinctive and voluntary. 
 The origin of efforts to escape from sudden danger, 
 the spreading of the hands to avoid falling, is in- 
 stinctive, preceding any act of reason; but existing 
 in connection with reason they are voluntary. 4. We 
 have a propensive inclination to investigate truths and 
 
PROPENSITIES. 399 
 
 acquire knowledge, and in regard to that which is 
 truth the action of the mind can not be withheld. 
 Curiosity is not only natural to, but excites to inves- 
 tigative action with peculiar delight. 5. Curiosity in- 
 spires action, ever adding new interest to investiga- 
 tion, and is essential to thrilling and affecting oratory. 
 The continued newness in which facts and figures are 
 thrown together and presented, looms up in living 
 vividness, and as with the wild grandeur of lofty 
 mountain scenery, naturally excites as to what lies 
 beyond. 6. Much of the fresh vividness of poetic 
 effusions and descriptive romance, is connected with 
 a desire to know the facts and beauty of nature, and 
 we are naturally inclined to conform to that which we 
 see and admire in others. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. We have a mental inclination to conform to the 
 laws of taste, and there is something unseemly in vi- 
 olating or neglecting them. The mind is naturally 
 inclined to imitation, as is evidenced in the acts of 
 children. There is almost an unconquerable disposition 
 to follow in the steps of a beloved friend, and whether 
 their instruction be good or bad, it is with great diffi- 
 culty we can depart from it. 2. The mind is prone 
 to adhere to the rules of common law, consisting of 
 those maxims, sayings, and traditions generally re- 
 ceived and gainsayed by none. Therefore the im- 
 portance of correct early training, as the first facts 
 and impressions received by the mind will bias its 
 
400 PROPENSITIES. 
 
 action in some way for life. 3. An inclination to 
 seek fame exists in the mind, and with proper checks 
 serves to rouse the powers to action ; but if such- re- 
 strictions are thrown off, the soul is soon wrecked 
 on the strand of despair. 4. The proneness to self- 
 esteem and desire of esteem are apt to increase. In 
 nature they are innocent, but if indulged the mind is 
 ruined. It is natural to love applause, but we should 
 only wish to have the righteous and continued ap- 
 proval of others. A desire of power may be natural 
 or acquired. The former may be harmless, but the lat- 
 ter vicious, having been cultivated with impure motive. 
 6. We are naturally inclined to utter and love truth, 
 and if this is ruled out of the soul, it is by impurity 
 in some way. 7. The propensity to eat and sleep is 
 natural, which should be indulged with thankfulness, 
 but to indulge in extremes is injurious. 8. The mind 
 is naturally disposed to friendship. We have an 
 internal fondness for peace, and it is unnatural not to 
 love sweet tones of music. Not satisfied with the 
 present moment, we anxiously look for change. 
 Watching the seasons of rolling years, we sigh for 
 the fullness of coming joys. 
 
DIVISION TENTH 
 
 —*+• 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Feeling may be defined to be that power which 
 belongs to, and is naturally connected with, original 
 mental elements, capable of great sensibility. 2. 
 Feelings may refer to the variety of ways in which 
 such power may be affected, or to the distinctive dif- 
 ferences in their nature or manifestations. They are 
 not only the basis, but the origin of the passions. 3. 
 They move, and such ability to act is proof of their 
 power to affect and be affected. Then there is some- 
 thing capable of being thus influenced, for non-exist- 
 ence can not be affected in any way. Therefore, feel- 
 ings, from their very nature, are essential to the exist- 
 ence of the soul, and real knowledge of such reality. 
 4. The poiver of feeling is original with mind, and is 
 not only a susceptibility, but a sensibility inseparably 
 connected with the existence and nature of mental 
 elements, and without which we could have no real 
 knowledge of self. 5. We can not say that self is 
 real only as we consciously feel such existence to be 
 
 true; and till then we can have no belief in such 
 
 34 401 
 
402 THE FEELINGS. 
 
 entity as positive. 6. If I experience pain or joy, it 
 is only because I feel them ; and I am just as con- 
 scious of the feelings as I can be of the emotion felt. 
 Therefore, we have internal conscious power to feel 
 self as real, and upon this depends the origin of such 
 
 knowledge. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The old scholastic and skeptical theory, that we 
 arrive at a knowledge of self-existence from external 
 facts affecting the organs of the senses, is false; un- 
 less such objects have conscious being and power to 
 impart to us, by self-action, a knowledge of our exist- 
 ence; but this is impossible. 2. We must have an 
 internal conscious knowledge of self before we can 
 know any reality beyond. An object impressed upon 
 the optic nerve may by the sensation imparted be felt 
 as well as seen. All power to know external facts 
 refers back to an internal feeling, intuition, or con- 
 scious self-power of knowledge, 3. Feeling differs 
 from perception: being the sense of, or is perceiving 
 by the touch. Perception is in part dependent upon 
 feeling, for sensation or feeling must be experienced 
 in order to the origin of perceiving affecting causes. 
 4. It differs in one respect from sensation. The lat- 
 ter may follow affected organs of sense, or perception, 
 and be dependent upon them ; but the power of feel- 
 ing lies back of these, and is connected with the 
 origin of such influences. 5. Feelings differ from 
 affections, as the latter are more closely connected 
 with emotions, may be caused by impingement, then 
 
THE FEELINGS. 403 
 
 subside ; while feeling is essential in the origin of the 
 knowledge of such influences. 6. Feeling differs from 
 passion. The latter is no more than an intense ex- 
 citement of the former, which may soon disappear, 
 while the power of feeling is not diminished. 7. If 
 we could contemplate a soul always destitute of feel- 
 ing, it would be without knowledge, for the origin of 
 knowledge can not arise only as we have conscious 
 feeling of such reality. 8. Feeling exists in the 
 origin of the known differences distinguishing the 
 mental and moral states of mind. And by means of 
 the same we are led to determine sensations in the 
 physical system and as to what part is affected. By 
 feeling we are led to determine between mental and 
 moral joy. I positively know I am right only when I 
 have conscience-feeling in regard to right. Otherwise 
 we can have no certain knowledge as to when we have 
 arrived at the standard of moral rectitude. 
 
404 BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Benevolent feelings refer to those classes con- 
 ditioned with kindness and love to our race. When 
 controlled by them, our efforts are to do good, relieve 
 sufferings, and console the broken-hearted. How sweet 
 the light of affection and love that spreads joy over 
 the depressed and dying! 2. Such feelings are always 
 connected with a pure moral nature. Vicious desires 
 do not belong to a pure heart, for sin can only impart 
 that which is sinful and destructive. 3. Feelings con- 
 nected with the mental states are impure when the 
 moral powers are evil, in condition and inclination; 
 yet no element of mind is in self-nature evil. Its 
 condition and moral relationship became so by either 
 permitted or intentional alienation. 4. Feeling is not 
 only, in one sense, the moral perceiving of the mind, 
 but is a present, sensible, and experimental realiza- 
 tion, which can not be dispensed with without destroy- 
 ing all pure knowledge. A righteous soul is always 
 filled with benevolent feelings; any heart destitute of 
 them is impure, and, assuming to be righteous, is 
 deceived and should awake to sudden alarm. The 
 
BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 405 
 
 power of Christianity can not dwell in an unfeel- 
 ing and selfish heart. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Though love be regarded as an emotion or affec- 
 tion, yet these can not exist independent of feelings. 
 The love of existence is interwoven with feelings of 
 fondness, in which we prefer life to death. The love 
 of self is connected with feelings which continue a 
 natural preference for our position in society to do 
 good and be respected. But egotism is connected 
 with feelings of pride, ambition, and selfishness. 2. 
 The last state of egotism is mental alienation or par- 
 tial insanity. When self becomes the one idea of the 
 mind, with feeling of great satisfaction and approval, 
 danger is inevitable. The only certain remedy is to 
 suppress the first appearing of such feelings and ap- 
 peal to conscience and reason. 3. Love for our race 
 exists in connection with benevolent feelings, which 
 are irresistibly joined in the nature of our being and 
 coextensive with the existence of mind itself. Such 
 feelings may be destroyed by sinful acts; yet de- 
 struction implies the reality of that which is capable 
 of being destroyed. 4. Domestic love involves that 
 of husband and w^ife, parents and children, and exists 
 only in connection with benevolent feelings. To 
 speak of love without these, is only to speak of self- 
 ishness, which never can render the domestic circle 
 happy. Magnanimous feelings must not only be cher- 
 ished and cultivated, but sent abroad, far beyond the 
 
406 BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
 
 material limits of the heart. A niggardly soul an- 
 swers no purpose of Infinite Wisdom, not worthy of 
 life, and disqualified for the future. As the love we 
 have for each other is innate, therefore benevolent 
 feelings are essential to our being. 5. We experience 
 feelings of humility in which we possess humbleness 
 of mind. And in a moral point of light such feelings 
 are blended with lowliness of heart, assuming no self- 
 claim, but realizing a deep sense of unworthiness and 
 dependence in the sight of God. 6. Feelings of awe 
 may extend to fear or terror; but in a moral sense 
 they include filial fear mingled with admiration and 
 reverence. And reverence inspires sensations of re- 
 spect? and esteem, with emotions of veneration. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Philanthropic feelings possess general benevo- 
 lence, and are connected with the origin of good will 
 toward all men. 2. Magnanimous feelings character- 
 ize a great, honorable, and brave mind, seemingly dis- 
 interested, and of elevated sentiment. 3. Patriotic 
 feelings and love of country arise in connection with 
 the welfare of the land of home, containing the graves 
 of a beloved ancestry. 4. Feelings of friendship are 
 natural to our being and are known to be real. And 
 feelings of compassion refer to our capability and sens- 
 itive suffering with others. 5. Piety refers to the 
 condition and relation of the moral powers in which 
 we have proper and pure feelings of veneration and 
 reverence of the Supreme Being, with love of his 
 
BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 407 
 
 character. We know self to be real only because we 
 feel such reality. This feeling, I or self, being spirit, 
 is adapted to, and has as much power to realize the 
 presence and influence of the Infinite Spirit, as it can 
 have of self-reality. 6. It is natural for us to expe- 
 rience feelings of gratitude or joy ; for a conscious 
 difference between pleasant and unpleasant feelings 
 can not be doubted. 7. Love of saints, of angels, and 
 to God, involves distinct classes of feelings of which 
 we are capable of knowing, and to doubt them is im- 
 possible. The moral condition of our feelings de- 
 pends upon the influence of Divine power over them. 
 8. Correct feelings check every ambitious desire to 
 lower the position of either angels or men. A pure 
 heart can not wish to be less useful, but cheerfully 
 desires the prosperity and success of all others. He 
 who can not bear to see others rise and surpass him- 
 self in doing good, must either change in feelings, or 
 consent to descend, shorn of influence, to a gloomy 
 death, While society suffers no essential loss. 
 
408 MALEVOLENT PEELINGS. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Malevolent feelings belong and enter into that 
 disposition of mind called evil. An evil disposition 
 in regard to others involves a certain condition of 
 our mental nature. On becoming intensely excited we 
 experience feelings of a malevolent character, made 
 known to us by consciousness. 2. Dislike or disap- 
 proval involves contrariety of feelings. This may 
 take place from want of kindness, attention, or affec- 
 tion. And it may be the result of some intentional 
 act or wrong influence upon us. 3. Resentment is 
 common to a depraved nature, and often takes place 
 without thought; but such feelings may be increased 
 or diminished under the power of the will. Instinct- 
 ive resentment arises from a depraved nature before 
 the affecting cause has been brought under the test of 
 reason. 4. The moral character of resentment in- 
 volves the degree of such sensitive dispositions. (1.) 
 Intuitive resentment, before reason can be consulted, 
 may be harmless if the w^hole mind, before such injury 
 received, was peaceful and seeking the welfare of the 
 cause or person offending. (2.) But all intentional 
 resentment is wrong, unless some good to the parties 
 
MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 409 
 
 was intended with pure motive, and more good accom- 
 plished by it than evil. 5. Resistance in regard to 
 evil, and all evil, is not only right, but duty. The 
 kindness of others should be resisted, if containing 
 any thing of intended wrong. All efforts to harm us 
 should be resisted; and when a malicious attack, 
 wholly unprovoked, is made upon our life and peace- 
 able escape impossible, we are justifiable in defending 
 life, regardless of the fate of our foe. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Hatred is wholly impious, and its highest degree 
 of strength is criminal. Envy involves excited feel- 
 ings at the prosperity of others, with hatred and de- 
 structiveness. But gloom refers to heaviness, sorrow, 
 or sadness of mind. 2. Anger is a violent passion ex- 
 cited by some real or supposed injury. Stormy feel- 
 ings of wrath, fury, indignation, and revenge, are im- 
 moral and can be controlled. The susceptibility to 
 become angry may serve ta wake the slumbering ener- 
 gies from stupor, but should always be under moral 
 restraint. 3. Jealousy is founded in feelings arising 
 from a fear of rivalship, and is ruinous to peace and 
 happiness wherever its desolating touch sweeps the 
 chords of affection. 4. Pride arises in connection 
 with feelings of inordinate self-esteem, a high and 
 haughty opinion of self-superiority in accomplish- 
 ments, beauty, talents, or wealth. Such feelings dis- 
 qualify for usefulness and tend to ruin. (1.) Its 
 
 higher degrees lead to insolent exultation and rude 
 
 35 
 
410 MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
 
 treatment of others. (2.) A modification of pride 
 may cause us to speak only as of neatness or taste — 
 the Summer's pride, pride of the lily, or pride of 
 beauty. 5. Impatience includes feelings of uneasi- 
 ness, sufferings, or restlessness. Peevishness refers 
 to an unsettled or irritable disposition. Revenge pos- 
 sesses greater intimations of maliciousness. 6. We 
 are capable of feelings of remorse, in which the mind 
 appears to experience keen pain or anguish excited 
 by a sense of guilt. It is compunction of conscience 
 for crimes committed, with but little hope of release or 
 pardon. 7. The soul is capable of feelings of despair. 
 This is realized in hopeless loss. 
 
SYMPATHY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 411 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND MORAL RELATION OF SYM- 
 PATHY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Sympathy may be regarded as that quality of 
 mental disposition capable of being affected by the 
 sad condition or sorrows of another, and involves feel- 
 ings correspondent in kind, and, in some instances, in 
 degree. 2. In another point of light it possesses and 
 assumes a peculiar agreement of affections or inclina- 
 tions, in which there is a conformity of natural tem- 
 perament, causing persons to be pleased with one 
 another, and feel an interest in each other's sufferings 
 and triumphs. 3. The power of sympathy is insepa- 
 rably connected with the moral elements, extending 
 to involuntary sympathetic feelings on the sudden 
 appearance of suffering. This power is intuitive, yet 
 can be much increased by reason, association, and 
 imagination. 4. It is not based upon imagination 
 for existence, yet internal sympathetic feelings may 
 be increased when we begin to imagine ourselves in 
 the place of those who suffer. 5. The importance of 
 sympathy is essential to commiseration, tenderness, 
 and condolence — an angelic quality blending the hopes 
 and happiness of our race. 
 
412 SYMPATHY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1, The povjer of attachment is connected with moral 
 elements of mind. We have conscious knowledge of 
 its reality, and of its active power in binding heart to 
 heart. 2. Vile attachment is realized in connection 
 with the heart given up to wickedness. 3. True and 
 pure attachment is essential to happiness, the har- 
 mony of society and governments. 4. The power of 
 belief is connected with the nature of mind. Without 
 power to believe in realities, all certainty of knowl- 
 edge is gone forever; but with it facts are received 
 and known to be true. 5. It is not only a persuasion 
 of, assent to, or declaration of truth upon the ground 
 of evidence, but is a concluded persuasion of truth, 
 and of that which should be done to fill the claims of 
 religion. 6. It includes, to some degree, credence, 
 trust, and confidence. 
 
PHYSICAL SENSATIONS. 413 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 FEELINGS CONNECTED WITH THE PHYSICAL 
 
 NATURE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. When speaking of physical sensation or feeling 
 we only refer to it as connected with a spiritual na- 
 ture ; for all sensations and feelings are properly in 
 the mind, though apparently in the nerves and mus- 
 cles; yet all matter is inert. 2. The origin of our 
 knowledge of physical self is connected with conscious 
 feeling, and without this we can know nothing of ex- 
 ternal facts. 3. If feeling is natural to mind, it is 
 natural to our bodily existence so long as the soul is 
 connected with it. 4. We know our physical nature 
 exists from a conscious feeling of such reality, and 
 this ends all unbelief. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We have nervous and muscular sensitiveness or 
 feeling, and as such is connected with the mind, then 
 the soul has power to feel in regard to the origin of 
 all knowledge. 2. The moral relation of feelings im- 
 mediately connected with the nervous system or phys- 
 ical nature, is determined by the purity or impurity 
 of the heart and the intention of the mind. 3. Moral 
 
414 PHYSICAL SENSATIONS. 
 
 accountability does not appear to extend to any minds 
 but such as have reason, judgment, and conscience, 
 and to some extent a correct exercise of the same. 
 All rational beings are accountable. 4. When reason 
 is paralyzed, thoughts suspended, and the judgment 
 dethroned, the mind is deranged, and thought to be 
 not accountable. 
 
THE PASSIONS. 415 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE PASSIONS— HOW RELATED TO THE 
 
 PHYSICAL NATURE, THE MENTAL AND 
 
 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Passion is a sensitive impression or effect pro- 
 duced by external objects or causes upon the body, or 
 perceived by the mind through the medium of the 
 senses. 2. The term passions includes much that be- 
 longs to feelings, with variations corresponding to the 
 different kinds of influences called passions, together 
 with their degrees of strength. 3. It is a suscepti- 
 bility of influences or impressions from external causes 
 affecting the mind; and in another point of light is 
 a sensitive feeling or sensible excitement from im- 
 pressions, which arise often very hastily and with 
 great intensity of action. 4. It differs from feelings 
 in violent agitation, acting without consideration or 
 judgment in regard to injuries received. Feeling is 
 natural to mind and abiding, while passion may soon 
 subside. 5. Physical elements, abstractly, possess 
 no passion in any way. We often hear persons speak 
 of " animal passions or propensities/' as though inert- 
 ness could possess these ! All such influences belong 
 to, and are part of, mind, the purity or impurity of 
 
416 THE PASSIONS. 
 
 which must be charged to the heart and conscience. 
 Though their origin may be realized in connection 
 with them, yet such passion belongs to immateriality, 
 so that no impurity can take place in regard to them, 
 morally, unless willingly granted by the moral pow- 
 ers. 6. All kinds of dissipation, both of the mental 
 and physical natures, deviating from moral rectitude, 
 begin in the heart. So apologizing for crime, charg- 
 ing the natural physical disposition or propensities 
 with such responsibility, is absurd. With the moral 
 condition of the heart voluntary action must corre- 
 spond. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Passion, as connected with the mental elements, 
 may be increased. And in proportion as the brain 
 and nerves become very sensitive, mental action is 
 increased. Such physical organs, if taxed too much, 
 are in danger of increasing sensitiveness till paraly- 
 sis ensues, then mental alienation or insanity is apt 
 to be the result. 2. A modification of passion is re- 
 garded as pleasing and healthful. It tends to enliven 
 and invigorate, as pleasing objects of bearuty rise up 
 before us, or make up scenes of far-spreading grand- 
 eur. 3. When we speak of passions interwoven with 
 the moral powers, we not only acknowledge their en- 
 tity, but are led to classify them as either good or 
 bad. They are not only harmless when in conformity 
 with propriety and moral rectitude, but pure if the 
 heart is holy. 4. When either theologians or philoso- 
 phers speak of "Divine truths," in religious excite- 
 
THE PASSIONS. 417 
 
 ments, " working only on the vulgar passions, causing 
 many to profess religion/' they either speak of that 
 of which they are profoundly ignorant, or have inten- 
 tionally failed to examine the nature and laws of 
 mind. Vulgar passions are pure when the heart 
 attains true purity. Divine truths can not affect them 
 without first moving the conscience or heart. All 
 true reformation must begin in the moral nature of 
 the soul. (1.) It will not do to say that such "truths" 
 must first affect the physical powers in order to excite 
 the passions. (2.) For then the passions must have 
 self-power to determine on a partial reform. This 
 conclusion is inevitable and perfectly absurd. 5. All 
 the passions and propensities are subject to the voice 
 of conscience, flow out from it, and without its con- 
 sent and action can never reform in whole or in part. 
 
DIVISION ELEVENTH. 
 
 -♦♦♦- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE AFFECTIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Affections refer to and involve a state of being 
 affected. This sensitive change conditioning the mind 
 is made known by consciousness. 2. The mind is 
 capable of affecting, affection, or of being affected. It 
 can originate action, and in connection with this, feel- 
 ing and affection are inseparable. This internal 
 world of distinctive changes can fill the mind with 
 either unutterable joys or sadness. 3. We can be 
 affected by physical realities or influences within and 
 beyond the identity of self. 4. Affections differ from 
 disposition. The former refer more properly to the 
 activity of certain mental tendencies, while the latter 
 to the manner of certain inclinations as completed or 
 conformed to uniformity. 5. They differ from pas- 
 sion involving the motion or gradual change of the 
 mind, while the other is suddenly excited. 6. They 
 differ from emotion ; w T hen once formed are not easily 
 broken or diminished, while the latter may arise and 
 diminish like waves of the sea. 7. They differ from 
 418 
 
THE AFFECTIONS. 419 
 
 desires in distinctive variations of a higher and more 
 pleasing position in our esteem. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Natural affection applies to thai which is con- 
 nected with our essential being and of generous or 
 humane character in counter-distinction with any- 
 thing like selfishness of sensibility, calmly extending 
 to the welfare of our race. 2. The mind is said to be 
 affected mentally, when such elements are moved or 
 excited in some way by surrounding objects adapted 
 to intellectual action. We have evidence of this in 
 tracing the different branches of learning. 3. Beauty 
 affects the mind as we look out upon wide and far- 
 spreading scenery filled with beautiful objects, vary- 
 ing in qualities and contrasted excellences. And ob- 
 jects of grandeur and sublimity only add vigor to 
 our feelings. 4. We are capable of moral affections 
 referring to influences in connection with the moral 
 nature, in which we are conscious of the difference 
 between right and wrong. 5. We are not only af- 
 fected by our condition in innocence, but are influ- 
 enced by the moral condition and acts of those living 
 holy lives around us ; the presence of saints or the 
 thought of angels enkindles new joys. 6. We are 
 inspired while contemplating the pure and holy state 
 and associations of coming eternity. 
 
420 PURE AFFECTIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PURE AFFECTIONS HARMONIZING WITH 
 MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The affections imply, not only a power capable 
 of moving or of being excited, but involve the dis- 
 tinguishing character as to purity or impurity. 2. Of 
 nothing are we more conscious than that we can be 
 affected in regard to the perpetuity of self-existence 
 and happiness, and we can not withhold our feelings 
 from desired possession and enjoyment of the same. 
 3. Our affection for mankind is innate or natural, but 
 is capable of cultivation and of degrees. (1.) In re- 
 gard to natural things, a vast variety of objects may 
 skirt the field of vision — we have no affection for 
 some, but others are very desirable. (2.) Acquired 
 affections arise in connection with continued attention 
 to objects, till something interesting attracts the 
 mind. 4. Parental affection is original in a natural 
 disposition or feeling dependent on the principle of 
 love which parents possess for their offspring. Thus 
 influenced they have good will for and cherish their 
 children with protection and care, and efforts to pre- 
 serve their natural lives should never suppress the 
 fond desire to conform them to the will of God, and 
 
PURE AFFECTIONS. 421 
 
 train them for happy immortality. 5. Maternal af- 
 fection, though naturally mild, is sacred and unyield- 
 ing. Its vital flame glows through life, and continues 
 burning in the soul amid the mourning drapery of the 
 dark valley and shadow of death. 6. The affection of 
 children for their parents, though natural, depends 
 very much upon the love extended to them in early 
 life by their parents. Yet sons or daughters who 
 abandon, despise, and abuse their parents, are un- 
 worthy of life, and death w r ould be revolting. But if 
 parents, by intention or neglect, permit a child to 
 form a dislike or hatred for them, they must not feel 
 disappointed if abandoned to want and suffering in 
 old age. It is natural to love our parents, and feel 
 unutterable grief when the cold hand of death gathers 
 them to the grave. Still the love of a faithful child 
 pursues the flight of such spirits, and sighs for the 
 associations of a bright immortality. 7. They are 
 clearly involuntary, often realized before w r ill-action 
 is real, though they may be cultivated to some extent. 
 8. Voluntary affection can not be called original, but 
 arises in connection with volitive attention to objects, 
 till something becomes attractive. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. We are naturally inclined to stronger affections 
 in regard to consanguineous persons, than those of 
 foreign nations. 2. Filial affection is not so strong 
 as that of parental. The latter is universal, intense, 
 and undying, while the former is natural, though not 
 
422 PURE AFFECTIONS. 
 
 so intense, but is universally experienced where the 
 heart is ruled by moral principle. 3. Fraternal affec- 
 tions involve the attachment of brothers, which is 
 natural. Family association may tend to strengthen 
 such feelings, but can not implant them in our nature. 
 4. Secondary affections may arise in connection with 
 associated objects, yet they are based upon the im- 
 planted power of affections. 5. Domestic affections 
 refer to the home circle, where many endearing in- 
 terests unite. Home is sweet. Consecrated to holy 
 feelings and tender regard, it is the dearest spot on 
 earth. Happiness at home is an unbounded source 
 of consolation. With such retreat, the maddening 
 fury of earth is unheeded, though breaking in thun- 
 der-peals all around us. But if home-confidence, cra- 
 dled in storms, is rocked by the violence of internal 
 restlessness or rage, life is imbittered, hope flies, and 
 despair often invokes death and the night of the 
 tomb. The moral character of such influences is sus- 
 tained and continued by the purity of the heart. The 
 offspring of every domestic circle should always be 
 dedicated to the will of Heaven. 6. Voluntary affec- 
 tions take place in connection with continued atten- 
 tion to some object or objects. But involuntary 
 affections are natural, existing in connection with in- 
 stinctive powers. 7. They may be created by kind- 
 ness. And affections of friendship differ from any 
 thing of hatred. 8. They may exist in regard to 
 pity, being instinctive in origin, amiable, and virtuous. 
 The same is true of affections of sympathy. All such 
 
PURE AFFECTIONS. 423 
 
 influences enter into the minds of the great and good. 
 9. Affections of gratitude, as well as those caused by 
 sudden deliverance from death, include emotions of 
 delight and joy, combined with a desire of good toward 
 the cause of such deliverance. 
 
424 EVIL AFFECTIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EVIL AFFECTIONS, OR THOSE DEVIATING 
 FROM MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Affections are pure or impure, corresponding to 
 the moral or immoral condition of the heart. They 
 are regarded as pure in their instinctive origin, or 
 when conformed to the dictates of an enlightened and 
 correct conscience. But when the heart willingly 
 indulges in evil the affections are alienated and im- 
 pure. 2. Resentment is a departure from right. 
 Self-protection is allowable, but the returning of evil 
 for evil is sinful. 3. Instinctive resentment has been re- 
 garded as innocent, from the fact that it arises sud- 
 denly and acts without thought or reflection. Such 
 action within itself is wrong, and the question of 
 guilt turns upon whether the mind has been properly 
 disciplined and guarded against injury continuously. 
 The power of such resentment, as implanted in the 
 mind, is useful as a source of immediate protection, 
 though unguarded action may be wrong while the in- 
 tention was good. 4. To say that " instinctive resent- 
 ment has no moral character " is absurd, unless it is 
 distinct from and superior to mind. But it belongs 
 to mind which has moral character, and can not be 
 regarded as superior. 5. Involuntary resentment 
 
EVIL AFFECTIONS. 425 
 
 refers to that which is instinctive in origin. This is 
 called harmless, but should be guarded. 6. Volun- 
 tary resentment is evil, as it takes into the account 
 not only the sufferings inflicted, but the intention of 
 the agent. If good can not be intended to both par- 
 ties the act is wrong. 7. Anger is a violent affection 
 or passion excited by some real or supposed cause, 
 usually involving a propensity to take vengeance or 
 obtain satisfaction of the offender. It may increase 
 to indignation, rage, or wrath. Such excess of feel- 
 ing is wrong, and tends to the destruction of both 
 body and mind. It is harmless only when free from 
 any violation of right. (1.) Excessive anger renders 
 the judgment incapable of deciding according to the 
 weight of testimony, the purity or impurity of the 
 offender's motive, together with the degree of intended 
 wrong. (2.) It is liable to deceive us, exciting per- 
 ceptions of things which never existed. (3.) The ex- 
 istence of the power to become angry or aroused in 
 resisting evil, with pure intention to injure no one, but 
 to put down sin and rescue the offenders, may be 
 called harmless. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Anger in nature is not a selfish passion, but 
 may become such by continued efforts. Being a nat- 
 ural mental affection, it appears to have been designed 
 to excite to vigorous self-defense in emergencies and 
 lettered attainment. 2. It includes elements of be- 
 
 nevolence, interesting us in the defense of others when 
 
 36 
 
426 EVIL AFFECTIONS. 
 
 injured or cruelly abused. Such influences, within 
 proper limits and only exerted in securing the gen- 
 eral good, are not only allowable but praiseworthy. 
 It appears that Heaven has armed the bosom of every 
 man with such feelings to be prudently exercised in 
 correcting evil and wrong, and without them individ- 
 uals and society would be almost without protection. 
 A thunderbolt in the hands of a crowd without nerve 
 or power to launch it would be bereft of dreaded 
 power. 3. This excitement in others or the masses, 
 by injury sustained upon the part of some one, or a 
 feeble minority, is more properly styled indignation, 
 being an element of sympathetic character. 4. This 
 affection becomes evil when abused or misdirected. 
 It may be too sudden, violent, and blind. If contin- 
 ued too long it degenerates into malice. The remedy 
 is to cultivate kind feelings for all, and especially 
 our enemies. 5. JEnvy is a peculiar kind of affection 
 which often takes place in contemplating the superi- 
 ority of those superior to self. It is too hateful to 
 allow further description. All such influences fall 
 like mildew upon the freshness of the rose. 6. Ha- 
 tred, being enmity or ill-will, is ruinous to self and 
 others, and can only be harmless when indulged 
 against sin as an abstract reality. 7. Jealousy in- 
 volves a painful emotion caused by some loved object, 
 arising out of a feeling or suspicion of rivalship. It 
 is often attended with an evil desire toward the object 
 of love, if there is any evidence that others may be 
 preferred. It is supported by egotism and love of 
 
EVIL AFFECTIONS. 427 
 
 fame. It ranges from simple distrust to unkindness 
 and violence. 8. Revenge involves a desire to return 
 injury for injury, and often leads in deliberate and 
 premeditated plans of crime. 9. Fear can only be 
 regarded as evil, when we yield to loss of confidence, 
 give up to despair, contented to die, inactive as to 
 duty, and risk the consequences of the future, with- 
 out an effort to inquire after and do that which is 
 right. 10. Malice may be regarded as extreme and 
 fixed enmity of heart, disposed to afflict and injure 
 others without a cause. The soul is miserable within 
 itself, and unworthy the confidence of any being 
 whatever. 
 
 SECTION III . 
 
 1. The disordered action of the affections may be 
 caused in different ways. (1.) Natural defects in the 
 organs of sense influence the correctness of mental 
 states and feelings. (2.) The influence of disease 
 often destroys the capability of being affected in a 
 uniform way, and mental states are apt to change 
 with the increase of debilitation. (3.) The effect of a 
 blow or fall often changes the character of mental 
 manifestations. Age can not change the nature of 
 mental elements, but affects their manifestations. 2. 
 An unhealthy nervous constitution influences the 
 character of mental action. If reason is suspended 
 or the judgment biased our feelings vary. 3. Neat- 
 ness and cleanliness, with chaste mental sentiment and 
 purity of purpose, have a happy effect in correcting 
 such disordered action of the affections. 
 
428 love 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 LOVE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The poiver to love is connected with the sensi- 
 tive, natural susceptibilities and elements of the soul. 
 This power is realized in the mind's peculiar action 
 in regard to beauty and worth of any kind. 2. It 
 has been called an affection, which is true in one 
 sense ; but affection has no power of self-origin. If 
 the cause of such affection be pure, attracting beauty 
 or worth, the origin of such motion is sustained to a 
 certain extent by the power of love, which is more 
 closely identified with our inherent mental nature. 3. 
 Love is frequently called an emotion, but is stronger, 
 more abiding, and extends to the very nature of the 
 moral constitution. The one may arise and subside, 
 while the other continues. Emotion is without any 
 element of desire; but an unyielding desire for an 
 object loved will continue while its attractions remain 
 without change. 4. It is the susceptibility and capa- 
 bility of mind to be excited and moved by beauty and 
 worth, differing from mere affection by involving 
 strong desire. 5. It is opposed to dislike and hatred, 
 pure and sacred within its self-nature. It appears to 
 have been intended to be holy, and inspiring to the 
 
love. 429 
 
 mind, and without it happiness would be in ruins. 6. 
 It involves a fondness for, or attachment to our coun- 
 try, the land of a beloved ancestry and containing the 
 graves of friends departed. 
 
 SECTION II.- 
 
 1. Love between the sexes has been regarded as a 
 " compound affection, consisting of esteem, benevo- 
 lence, and animal desire." Though it may have an 
 element in, or influence with these, yet we can not 
 regard them as correctly analyzing its true nature. 
 It is an implanted power, natural to the essential ele- 
 ments of the soul. 2. It enters into the basis of be- 
 nevolence, in which we possess a disposition to kindly 
 esteem others, and accompanied with a desire to pro- 
 mote their happiness. Friendship is dependent upon 
 it, otherwise we could not bestow kindness in any 
 way upon an object of hatred, as a spontaneous act 
 of the heart, unaided by the power of Christianity. 
 3. It supports tenderness of heart and feelings. In 
 proportion as such power is diminished, dislike or 
 hatred is apt to be increased, and the latter can never 
 form a basis of kindness. 4. Delight and joy can not 
 arise in any heart destitute of love ; and in propor- 
 tion as we love purity and pure objects is happiness 
 increased. 5. Parental love of children is often so 
 manifested as to prove its implanted nature, and in 
 many instances operates instinctively. This is evi- 
 dent when it acts before reason and without premed- 
 itated purpose. Such action is involuntary, and is 
 
430 LOVE. 
 
 voluntary when arising with deliberate attention and 
 processes of reasoning. 6. Love for the human race 
 is implanted and natural. We are naturally either 
 wholly indifferent to the welfare of our fellow-beings, 
 or have natural care and regard for them, which can 
 only arise from this basis. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. It may be said to be innate, from the universal 
 conduct of nations, found in their certain rules and 
 laws securing mutual union, happiness, and protection. 
 This springs out of love for each other. It lives and 
 glows in the light of science, civilization, and religion. 
 There is no cloud on heathen mountains so dark as to 
 hide all traits* of natural affection and love. 2. Man 
 is created with power to love his Creator, of which he 
 has conscious knowledge. If any love not God, it is 
 by reason of sin. If he is love, which truth is evi- 
 denced in universal being, and man was created in the 
 image of his Maker, then he was so typed, originally, 
 to the Divine Goodness as to possess the principle of 
 love. It is naturally in our power to love God, and 
 to refuse is unnatural and sinful. A pure heart not 
 only loves God, but loves angels, and all that is holy 
 in time and the coming vast of eternity. The oppo- 
 sites of love and hope are hatred and remorse. 3. 
 It is capable of degrees and modifications, increasing 
 from regard to friendship, and from fond to fixed 
 feelings of devoted attachment. The diversity ex- 
 tends not only to degree, but to kind. Love in 
 
LOVE. 431 
 
 friendship varies from that of relations or country. 
 4. It is complexed in nature, involving assumed excel- 
 lences in that which is loved, with a desire of good to 
 the same. When confident our affections are justly 
 and worthily bestowed, the emotion is strong, delight- 
 ful, and exalted. 5. It appears to proceed with per- 
 ception and pleasurable sensations, and can not be 
 selfish. 6. The happy results of this affection, in 
 every form of government and social organizations, 
 embracing the casualties of individual fortune and 
 destiny of nations, are of the utmost importance. It 
 is implanted in the soul, and tends to unite with ties 
 of sacred regard and happiness the whole world, and 
 reflects the beneficence of a merciful Creator. 
 
DIVISION TWELFTH. 
 
 -♦♦*- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 NATURE AND POWER OF CONSCIENCE IN 
 THE KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINC- 
 TIONS AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Having defined conscience in another place, we 
 wish to add something more upon its nature and 
 power in the knowledge of moral distinctions and 
 obligations. 2. It appears to rule the moral elements 
 of the soul, and is a primary power in the origin of 
 the knowledge of moral distinctions and obligation, 
 which, by the will, is brought under the inspection of 
 the mind. 3. In Revelation it is appealed to as that 
 faculty which, by the assistance of Divine Grace, sees 
 at one and the same time. (1.) Our own tempers, 
 dispositions, propensities, and lives; the real nature 
 and quality of our feelings, thoughts, words, and ac- 
 tions. (2.) It is regarded as the rule whereby we are 
 to be directed, having superior, if not exclusive, 
 power to dictate in regard to right or wrong. 4. 
 Heaven appears to have bestowed upon it the power 
 of perceiving in reference to moral agreement or dis- 
 agreement. (1.) It is a faculty entering into the 
 432 
 
CONSCIENCE AND OBLIGATION. 433 
 
 knowledge of self, discerning, both in general and in 
 particular, tempers, feelings, thoughts, and actions. 
 (2.) It is a knowledge of the moral rule of duty — 
 our appeal in doubt, and ground of happiness in de- 
 liverance. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. A correct conscience implies a knowledge that 
 all our thoughts and acts conform to the will of 
 Heaven, as contained in Revelation. 2. A good con- 
 science possesses a sacred awe in adhering to the will 
 of Heaven, and an internal satisfaction and pleasure 
 in regard to the same. 3. Some of the Greek fathers 
 said, " Conscience is a Divine principle, and is by God 
 himself implanted in our souls." Though subject to 
 spiritual influences and holy impressions, yet it can 
 not be a Divine principle in nature. 4. The term 
 conscience, compounded of con, together or with, and 
 scio, to know, evidences its province in knowledge or 
 in influencing, convincing, or dictating. 5. A right- 
 eous conscience is, through infinite mercy, acquitted 
 of guilt, and willingly conformed to moral obligation 
 and rectitude. 6. A bad or evil conscience implies 
 the connected presence and influence of guilt, with 
 alienated propensities. 7. A tender conscience is 
 realized under the mild influence and light of Divine 
 Grace moving us to duty and happiness. 8. A dark- 
 ened or hardened conscience refers to the condition of 
 our moral nature when the light and peace of Heaven 
 is withdrawn, and the feelings become indifferent or 
 
 vicious. 9. A seared conscience belongs to the soul 
 
 37 
 
434 CONSCIENCE AND OBLIGATION. 
 
 abandoned to crime and ruin. This moral principle 
 should always be kept pure, ever mellowing the feel- 
 ings of the heart under the radiance of the Cross. 
 
THE SENSIBILITIES. 435 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE SENSI- 
 BILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
 PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND 
 MORAL ELEMENTS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Sensibility is a susceptibility of impressions or 
 peculiar power capable of being affected and extend- 
 ing to the physical organs of the senses. It is not 
 feeling exclusively, but, being easily affected, gives 
 origin to sensations or feelings which may be increased 
 or prolonged. 2. Sensibility, when applied to the 
 physical nature, does not convey the idea that matter 
 has such susceptibility, but we are simply referred to 
 the delicate or exquisite acuteness of the physical or- 
 gans of the senses, where sensations appear to arise. 
 3. Though feeling is immediately connected with sen- 
 sibility, yet the latter may be called the susceptible 
 power, and the former such power in action. The 
 impression upon the sensibility may subside, while 
 feeling may be prolonged, increased, or varied. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Sensibility as connected with the mental ele- 
 ments refers to the peculiar power of our spiritual 
 
436 THE SENSIBILITIES. 
 
 nature susceptible of impressions, which can exist 
 either with or without any connected materiality. 2. 
 We have seen that sensibility differs from feeling. 
 Capability to act when affected differs from action ex- 
 perienced. Yet with this power of feeling is the 
 known origin that affection has taken place, but such 
 impression must precede it. 3. Sensibility connected 
 with the moral element of the soul, refers us, not only 
 to the susceptibility of impressions, but to our con- 
 scious power in distinguishing moral influences from 
 those which are purely mental, whether of internal 
 or external origin. 4. Words spoken, or that which 
 we read, may appeal to our moral nature and stir the 
 emotions. 5. The extent of such affection varies 
 with different constitutions. The feelings may be 
 saddened or excited with joy. Now we laugh — in a 
 moment weep; now lively with hope, but immedi- 
 ately filled with despair. 
 
FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 437 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EXISTENCE OF FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLI- 
 GATION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The power of feeling is essential to mind, not 
 only extending to the organs of sense, but to affected 
 motion experienced in the soul. 2. Moral feelings 
 arise in connection with moral elements, and make 
 their appeal to conscience. 3. Feelings of moral 
 obligation possess a sense of binding force or power, 
 with reference to action and right. They differ from 
 those of approval and disapproval — the latter refer- 
 ring to the agreement or disagreement of conscience, 
 sanctioned by the judgment ; the former looks more to 
 requirement and penalty in regard to actions. 4. We 
 have only to appeal to consciousness in order to know 
 both the existence and nature of obligatory feelings, 
 experiencing a peculiar restraint in reference to what 
 ought or ought not to be done. 5. It is not true that 
 " moral sensibilities" is conscience; neither is it con- 
 stituted of "moral emotions and feelings of moral ob- 
 ligation." These arise in connection with the moral 
 nature, and imply such existing power capable of sup- 
 porting them and giving their moral distinctions, as 
 they can not create their own being and character. 
 
438 FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 
 
 6. Moral obligation is evidenced in conscious convic- 
 tions of duty; also from our desires, hopes, and fears 
 in regard to right. 7. We can act, from a sense of 
 moral duty, independently of self-interest, in securing 
 the welfare and happiness of even our enemies, and 
 feel that we have done right. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The care of man for his fellow-man, and our 
 race in general, appears natural, and evolves a con- 
 scious, realized sense of obligation. 2. Such feelings 
 arise with our conscious care for the moral condition 
 and safety of self and others, that no one be lost. 3. 
 In an important sense such obligatory feelings are 
 universal. The rules and laws of nations involve an 
 important element of care for the security and safety 
 of the people. The words and language of leading 
 spirits in different ages of the world and under vari- 
 ous forms of government, indicate deep, heart-felt 
 regard for truth and right. 
 
OBLIGATORY FEELINGS. 439 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 NATURE AND D ISTINCTION OF OBLIGATORY 
 
 FEELINGS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Feelings of obligation are simple in experience, 
 but undefinable in nature. We have origin to the 
 knowledge of feelings only by feeling. The power to 
 feel, and of feeling, is essential to mind. Could it be 
 wholly without such power, it would be either matter 
 or non-existence. 2. I know the existence of self 
 only because I feel it to be real — myself and not an- 
 other. Consciousness of the feeling I or self equals 
 the certainty of the emotion felt. It enters into the 
 basis of consciousness. 3. Moral obligatory feelings 
 refer to the peculiar character of some contrasted 
 with others. They may possess modulations or de- 
 grees, from slight to strong inducement, and from im- 
 perfect to perfect obligation. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. They are authoritative in regard to that which 
 should be done, yet proper action may be intention- 
 ally withheld. We can feel no conscious moral obli- 
 gation to do wrong. And that which is conferred by 
 Divine Goodness can impose no wrong, and can not 
 
440 OBLIGATORY PEELINGS, 
 
 mislead us. 2. They differ from moral approval and 
 disapproval. The latter may arise suddenly and re- 
 tire, while the former continues so long as we feel 
 such obligation upon us. 3. Such feelings involve a 
 sense of obligation and duty in regard to self, others, 
 and the boundless future. 
 
ACTION OF MORAL FEELINGS. 441 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL 
 FEELINGS— HOW CONDITIONED. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Uniformity in the action of moral feelings con- 
 forms principally to the power and influence of con- 
 science, which has much to do in conditioning the 
 distinctions in the character of feelings. 2. Such 
 uniformity of action implies the existence of some 
 law or court capable of influence and decisions, not 
 exclusively intellectual, but properly belonging to the 
 decisions of our moral nature. 3. The first law of 
 this court is found in principle, to which our moral 
 nature is inclined to adhere. A heart without prin- 
 ciple is only prepared to do mischief. 4. In con- 
 science is the associated power of uniformity — the 
 grand center of monitory moral power, arranged by 
 Infinite Wisdom; to and from which, aided by the 
 heart, ebb and flow the moral pulsations of our world. 
 Here is the basis of moral action moving the empire 
 of spirit in all parts of the globe. Its voice is the 
 same, whether uttered in Christendom or some silvan 
 shade of heathenism — in the valley or on the mount- 
 ain, upon the wide waste of ocean or nature's distant, 
 wildest shore. 5. The nature of conscience evidences 
 
442 ACTION OF MORAL FEELINGS. 
 
 not only its co-natural power in constituting the soul, 
 but is realized in the character of uniform action. Its 
 variations in decisions can not take place in regard to 
 the reality of self, nor of purity. 6. The variations 
 of such decisions are not only allowable from self- 
 nature, but are real, and may occur in one and the 
 same mind. They may arise in connection with a 
 moral proposition, involving many varying facts. The 
 first one may influence and effect a decision, but the 
 weight of other truths may cause a decision varying 
 from the first, and all the facts may vary a third de- 
 cision, while the moral principle is unchanged. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Differences in intellectual powers may vary such 
 decisions. A moral question or duty, under certain 
 circumstances, may by one be regarded as right, while 
 another believes it wrong. The actions may differ 
 while motive in both is pure. One is influenced often 
 by ulterior facts, while another looks only to the pres- 
 ent time. 2. Conscience within itself, as a moral prin- 
 ciple, changes not, yet we can be so influenced by 
 facts as to vary action. Degrees in knowledge may 
 vary moral action and not change such internal na- 
 ture. 3. Feelings and decisions change with the force 
 and character of minds. The force of one is compar- 
 ison ; a second, accuracy of judgment ; while a third 
 has memory. All these tend to vary action, and we 
 are left to the correctness of the moral powers for 
 real satisfaction. 4. The intention and moral action 
 
ACTION OF MORAL FEELINGS. 443 
 
 of a heathen may be harmless, compared with an en- 
 lightened mind, being only guided by the light of 
 nature. 5. The doctrine that " our moral nature is 
 always changing, and that conscience is wholly a crea- 
 ture of education/' is false. Education can not orig- 
 inate that which is to be taught; then there must be 
 something capable of being educated, and we have 
 seen that the moral nature can not change within 
 itself. 6. In the whole race of man conscience has 
 spontaneous dictation, and, un trammeled by other pow- 
 ers, is inclined to conform to right. All experience 
 feelings in regard to right and wrong. It tells us of 
 loss sustained, prompts to worship universally, and 
 leads us to sigh for peace, rest, and immortality. 
 
444 VARIATIONS OF JUDGMENT 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 RELATION OF THE JUDGMENT TO OUR MORAL 
 NATURE— HOW VARIED. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Though conscience in nature can not change, 
 yet the judgment often varies in regard to moral real- 
 ities. The former may be trammeled by ulterior influ- 
 ences, but is unchanged in nature. The latter is 
 influenced by other mental powers and the great 
 diversity of facts brought under consideration, some 
 hastily examined, and others overlooked or valued too 
 highly. 2.* Men vary in judgment about the same 
 thing. One decides against certain moral govern- 
 ments, having detected some features in them very 
 defective and tolerating evil. The second approves 
 of the same, as they accomplish an incalculable 
 amount of good; yet both are equally opposed to 
 evil. 3. Objectors say if conscience were real, evil 
 would be universally condemned; yet falsehood, with 
 some nations, is not punished ; and with others, theft 
 is not criminal. This is no proof that conscience is 
 inactive, but that the judgment is improperly influ- 
 enced in regard to proper decisions. 4. The fact that 
 heathens can be taught the value of property, the dif- 
 ference between right and wrong, is evidence of a 
 
VARIATIONS OF JUDGMENT. 445 
 
 moral nature. The mind naturally revolts at the idea 
 of assassination. The first murderous act is attended 
 with unspeakable horror, but this subsides as con- 
 science becomes subdued by increased crime. And 
 the heart must become hardened before such crime 
 can be committed, which evidences departure from its 
 first acuteness, and alienation of judgment. 5. All 
 cruel acts are advanced to by degrees, which is in vio- 
 lation to the moral checks upon us, being overruled 
 by the propensities and incorrect judgment. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The cruel laws of nations are results of minds 
 removed from original righteousness. They arise 
 with blinded judgment, and do not flow from inno- 
 cent, pure hearts. If there were no moral nature, old 
 sinners would always have been so, as there could be 
 no innocence from which to depart. 2. Almost aban- 
 doned sinners retain some conscious feeling. Thieves 
 and robbers evidence kindness among themselves, 
 and take care of each other in extreme sufferings. 
 Pledges made are kept inviolate. 3. All savage tribes 
 have forms of worship, wholly the promptings of 
 conscience, but the judgment is at fault in carrying 
 out rules of right. 4. The mass of mankind are not 
 lawless offenders. There is a moral influence, to 
 some extent, connected with the councils and intel- 
 lectual march of earth's millions. And without it 
 the whole world would be a scene of blood and car- 
 nage. Speculative theories may vary the judgment, 
 
446 VARIATIONS OF JUDGMENT. 
 
 but the moral nature is uniform. 5. The judgment 
 of Christians may vary on doctrines, while the moral 
 feelings and purpose are uniform and abiding. 6. 
 The associations of early life often vary the judg- 
 ment. That which is learned first has great force in 
 controlling the judgment, but can not destroy the 
 moral nature. 
 
DIVISION THIRTEENTH 
 
 >♦♦*- 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MORAL RECTITUDE, 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Moral rectitude embraces correctness or tight- 
 ness of principle. And principle refers to the nature 
 of intuitive power as conditioned by the influence of 
 conscience, when the mind is self-possessed or con- 
 templating good or bad results, connected with which 
 we feel a sense of right. 2. It leads us to inquire as 
 to what is right God has a nature changeless from 
 all eternity. Being absolute in perfection and holi- 
 ness, is intrinsically right. Any change from what 
 he is would be evil. Whatever he approves is right, 
 and whatever he disapproves is wrong. As we ad- 
 here to the light of his Spirit and become restored to 
 his moral image, we instinctively approve that which 
 he approves, and disapprove such things as he disap- 
 proves. With this condition of intuition we experi- 
 ence convictions of good and evil, right and wrong. 
 3. It extends to practice. The thought or influence 
 in the origin of action must arise in connection with 
 this internal basis and conform to the righteousness 
 
 of external laws, whether human or Divine, and must 
 
 447 
 
448 MORAL RECTITUDE, 
 
 be in exact agreement with truth, and to the utter ex- 
 clusion of error or falsehood. 4. The rules for 
 moral conduct harmonize with a conscious sense of 
 purity, and correspond with the correctness of exter- 
 nal truths and righteous laws. 5. The mind's satis- 
 faction in regard to uprightness must agree with and 
 conform to the principles of honesty and justice. 
 6. Integrity refers to that abiding fixedness which 
 holds the mind to uniformity of purpose and purity 
 of motive. 7. Honesty involves an upright disposi- 
 tion and moral rectitude of heart, conforming to jus- 
 tice and pure principles of truth. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. A true standard of rectitude exists in connec- 
 tion with the power to know right and wrong. We 
 approve or disapprove certain actions, feeling the dif- 
 ference between right and wrong. 2. Moral rectitude 
 is evidenced in the common conformity and action of 
 all minds. An individual mind is inclined to form 
 ideas, rules, and laws, distinguishing between right 
 and wrong. The masses naturally harmonize and 
 unite upon general rules and principles, discrimina- 
 ting between good and bad. 3. This is evidenced in 
 the nature and arrangement of the laws of nations. 
 4. It extends to retvards and punishments, entering 
 into the condition of our feelings in regard to the 
 propriety of approval or disapproval, acquittal or pun- 
 ishment. 5. It enters into the government of the 
 Supreme Being. He is just and righteous. The 
 
MORAL RECTITUDE. 449 
 
 doctrine that Deity " has taken the ground, not only 
 that the principles of rectitude are eternal and immu- 
 table, but that he himself, with all his transcendent 
 excellences, is amenable, and desires to be considered 
 amenable to them," is incorrect and very unfortunate 
 language. It implies that he is amenable or con- 
 trolled by rectitude or law superior to himself. He 
 who would limit the absolute existence, perfect and 
 infinite attributes of the great First Cause, would do 
 well to turn back to first principles and be satisfied 
 to profess humble attainments. 
 
 38 
 
450 MORAL DISTINCTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Though distinction is the act of separating or 
 distinguishing, yet differences are often very appar- 
 ent in realities causing mental action. The power to 
 know moral distinctions begins with the moral nature 
 by which we approve or disapprove. 2. The potver 
 of knowing right from wrong can not originate with 
 the senses. It is not an object of either tangibility or 
 sight. 3. That moral distinctions, in every respect, 
 " are immutable," is incorrect. No immutability of 
 right or righteousness can exist as inherent and limit- 
 less in mind fallen. 4. Our moral nature, under 
 grace and a sense of righteousness, can determine on 
 that which is correct, but in self-nature there can be 
 no positive law of immutable moral distinctions. But 
 the mind always possesses the power of moral distinc- 
 tions or of arriving at that which is correct in its con- 
 stitutional being and relationship. This is not of infi- 
 nite law in the necessity of things. 5. Immutability 
 belongs to Deity, but is not the law of the human 
 mind nor the moral condition of the soul. 
 
MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 451 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Heaven gave us conscience with intuitive con- 
 victions of right, capable of disapproving evil. This 
 guide, originally intended to be true, may be stultified 
 or varied by degrees of crime. But so long as con- 
 science exists it has some power to approve right and 
 disapprove wrong. 2. The power of approval and 
 disapproval appears to be essential to the existence 
 of the moral nature. Without this, if we could have 
 moral decisions, they would be either accidental or 
 ruinous. But to attribute such power to know moral 
 distinctions to an " immutable law in the infinite ne- 
 cessity of things," to which both man and Deity " are 
 amenable," is not only beyond the field of philosoph- 
 ical inquiries, but ends in conjectural confusion. 3. 
 An effort to prove an immutable law in the necessity 
 of things, asserted that Deity can not will wrong 
 right nor right wrong; hence the distinction has been 
 settled by an " anterior immutable law of necessity." 
 Then such necessity being anterior to any volitions 
 of Deity must be superior to him. This is not only 
 materialism, but atheism in the worst form. 4. The 
 origin of our knowledge of right and wrong appears 
 to be instinctive, as the mind often acts correctly be- 
 fore reason can be called into action. 
 
452 DISORDERED MORAL ACTION. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL 
 
 POWERS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The moral nature has power to discriminate 
 and approve or disapprove in regard to right and 
 wrong, but may be so overwhelmed by sin and evil pro- 
 pensities as to crush its vivacity, yet without wholly 
 destroying moral dictation. 2. With the moral na- 
 ture wholly depraved and removed from Divine mercy 
 and restraints, we are not capable of desiring the 
 society of holy saints or angels, either on earth or in 
 heaven. We might desire relief and approve right, 
 but to desire moral change would be doubtful, when 
 the soul would be incapable of hope. 3. Moral de- 
 rangement takes place when the moral nature is over- 
 whelmed by vicious purposes and acts, and the voice 
 of conscience unheeded. 4. Disordered action is af- 
 fected by various causes calculated to hush or repress 
 the remonstrances of conscience, which, if withdrawn 
 from moral desire or hope of happiness, must live in 
 the certainty of self, right and wrong. To say that 
 conscience can be " annihilated" by sin, is impossible, 
 so long as the soul has immateriality and immortality. 
 Even devils have knowledge of good and evil, without 
 
DISORDERED MORAL ACTION. 453 
 
 hope of relief. 5. Such action is voluntary when 
 wrong is intended. The moral powers may, and often 
 do, yield to the action of the will and force of the pro- 
 pensities. The mind loses sight of vicious results till 
 the remonstrances of conscience are almost unnoticed. 
 A life filled with heinous crimes is the result of re- 
 peated efforts from slight offenses to those of dark 
 deeds of horror or death. If conscience could be an- 
 nihilated by sin, and such sinner could be converted, 
 he could not be repossessed with kind feelings or love 
 for Heaven or his race. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Involuntary disordered moral action takes place 
 when principle and admonitions of conscience are re- 
 garded with reckless indifference, while evil propens- 
 ities and emotions carry us into neglect of duty and 
 unintentional crime. 2. Such action is natural when 
 resulting from imperfect mental organization or insan- 
 ity. The doctrine that we can come into the world 
 "without a conscience," as readily as to exist without 
 " reason," is absurd. The inactivity of conscience in 
 some instances, has been attributed to a species of 
 moral insanity, in which its vigor has been suppressed. 
 3. In all grades of insanity the action of conscience 
 is more uniform than any other faculty. Such supe- 
 riority is the bestowment of Infinite Wisdom, upon 
 which shines most successfully the guiding light of 
 Heaven. 4. We are morally accountable for all 
 wicked acts, even though conscience should, at the 
 
454 DISORDERED MORAL ACTION. 
 
 time, appear withdrawn, provided our vicious course 
 in life tended to stupefy and render such moral remon- 
 strances inactive. 5. We are accountable for all acts 
 committed in the absence of reason, when knowingly 
 or intentionally we destroy reason, as in drunkenness 
 or fits of delirium tremens. By placing ourselves in 
 a condition to do wrong, together with the act, we are 
 guilty as though possessed of reason. 6. In propor- 
 tion as the mind becomes insane, without intentional 
 effort, our moral accountability is ameliorated. But 
 all efforts to clear criminals upon the ground of insan- 
 ity without positive and well-defined mental ruin, 
 only aggravates the claims of the moral law which 
 holds them guilty unto the decisions of the great day. 
 
MOKAL ACTION VARIED. 455 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE ACTION OF OUR MORAL NATURE VARIED 
 
 BY THE DISORDERED INFLUENCE OF THE 
 
 APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Disordered action of the appetites influences 
 and varies the action of the moral powers, but can not 
 totally destroy any essential element of their exist- 
 ence. They continue to strengthen by repeated in- 
 dulgence, and though the remonstrance of conscience 
 and decisions of the judgment are opposed, yet there 
 is a yielding, and we begin to seek for something jus- 
 tifying such indulgence. 2. Appetite, when vitiated, 
 wars more successfully against judgment and our con- 
 scious sense of propriety and right, than any disposi- 
 tion or propensity. The sight of the eye may be 
 overcome, the sense of hearing may be avoided, and 
 the love of sport and gambling can be subdued, but a 
 false or vitiated appetite, in some instances, can not 
 be destroyed. 3. The drunkard may abstain from 
 intoxication, but his appetite is only slumbering, and 
 may awake, rending all hope of success. 4. The in- 
 dulgence of an inordinate appetite leads to disease, 
 and can affect the whole system so as to produce in- 
 sanitv. The resolves of an inebriate often broken, 
 
456 MORAL ACTION VARIED. 
 
 result in loss of confidence and ruin. 5. The social 
 propensity may affect moral action. If deprived of 
 society, and especially those loved, the anxiety and 
 intense misery ensuing, in many cases, have created 
 disease and mental alienation, in which former objects 
 of love are hated and scorned with revengeful madness. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Love of home, when disappointed, frequently 
 produces derangement of our moral feelings, and so 
 intense may such desires become as to be followed 
 by disease, mental alienation, and death. 2. The 
 principle of self-preservation may be varied or weak- 
 ened by repeated trials or disappointments. That 
 which induces melancholy often contributes to dimin- 
 ishing the desire of life. 3. The possessory principle 
 may be improperly influenced, and in proportion as 
 the miser accumulates wealth is his covetousness in- 
 creased. Soon all thought is absorbed in money, 
 gain, and how to save from loss. 4. The possessory 
 principle resulting in theft or stealing, is neither con- 
 genital nor constitutional, unless such is of natural 
 necessity or infinite law. If so, such minds are in- 
 capable of blame or punishment. 5. Disordered ac- 
 tion takes place in regard to self-preservation. Un- 
 der the natural desire of continued existence we begin 
 to multiply supposed dangers till the mind becomes 
 filled with terror, causing physical prostration and 
 disease. 6. The principle of veracity may be varied. 
 The moral powers may have always been repressed, 
 
MORAL ACTION VARIED. 457 
 
 the judgment and memory defective, which will cause 
 
 confused action in narrating correctly. 7. Love of 
 
 esteem exalts self, but depreciates worth in others. 
 
 39 
 
458 IMITATION 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 IMITATION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The mind is possessed with an internal disposi- 
 tion or principle, giving origin to imitation. There is 
 a natural inclination to imitate those we admire. We 
 are attracted by the intellectual gifts and attainments 
 of those whose reach of thought and gaze of fire 
 kindles new interest as the mind investigates extended 
 fields of science. All laudable, great, and mighty 
 mental acts naturally inspire assimilation. 2. Ambi- 
 tion causes inclinations to imitate great and noble 
 acts ; but care should be exercised or ruin is inevita- 
 ble. 3. Moral imitation refers to the action of the 
 moral powers and connected disposition to conform 
 to rectitude qualifying elements of happiness. It is 
 involved not only in a conscious relation to right, but 
 to the great First Cause, in which we feel interested 
 in that which is innocent, magnanimous, and honora- 
 ble. 4. All objects of moral beauty are calculated to 
 gain our attention, and instill desires of assimilation in 
 some way. However opposed by malevolent feelings, 
 yet we experience a rising preference for purity, and 
 to acknowledge and honor the right. 5. In recalling 
 the past, we experience great satisfaction in having 
 
IMITATION. 459 
 
 imitated perfections which were just and approved of 
 conscience and heaven. And in contemplating the 
 future, we can not resist the desire to conform to 
 truth, that we may be happy. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Sympathetic imitation may extend to the feel- 
 ings of many persons, involving the influence of 
 spirit upon spirit, under peculiar and intense excite- 
 ment, in which one is affected by the condition of 
 others. 2. The countenance and feelings change with 
 circumstances. In looking upon a mirthful or sad 
 face, our feelings and expression naturally change 
 correspondingly. The mangled form of one just 
 fallen from an upper window creates involuntary sad- 
 ness. 3. The same is true of children; if one be- 
 comes sad and weeps, those associated often become 
 affected and weep. 4. The shout of victory on the 
 field of battle fills the whole army with joy. But the 
 signal to surrender spreads universal dismay. The 
 cloud of despair arching the commander's brow soon 
 gathers upon the feelings of battling warriors. Loss 
 of confidence yields to the thunders of an advancing 
 foe. 5. We are apt to imitate the defects of orators 
 first. If great men have uncouth expressions or ac- 
 tions, natural or from habit, they are often copied by 
 those who admire such illustrious giants in knowledge, 
 while their. excellences are not imitated. 
 
460 SPIRITUALISM 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 SPIRITUALISM. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Spiritualism, though not a mental element, be- 
 longs to mind, is opposed to materialism, and once 
 taught that all existences are spirit. We have seen 
 the absurdity of materialism, and that all realities are 
 spirit or soul is equally untrue. 2. Spinoza, near 
 the middle of the seventeenth century, attempted the 
 reconciliation of these extremes, by assuming only 
 one substance in nature, and that the same was endued 
 with an infinite variety of attributes, embracing solid- 
 ity, extension, and cogitation; and that all bodies in 
 the universe are modifications of this one substance ; 
 that all souls of men are modifications of the same; 
 and that God is an infinitely-perfect Being — cause of 
 all things ; yet there is but one being or nature, how- 
 ever endlessly diversified in distinctions. Such ab- 
 surdity is atheism, and needs no comment. 3. In pro- 
 portion as the mind is withdrawn from the physical 
 organs of sense, is its action perfected. By so far as 
 diseased bodily organs tend to inertness, is mind tram- 
 meled in action. 4. But modern spiritualism is of 
 extensive application, embracing the power of spirit 
 to affect spirit, either directly or by means of physical 
 
SPIRITUALISM. 461 
 
 organs. The living converse with the dead. From 
 the nature and relation of spirit to matter, if a de- 
 parted soul can not move the organs of its own dead 
 body to communicate with us, how can it have power 
 to move the inert powers of another medium already 
 in the possession of a spiritual nature? All such af- 
 firmations are averse to the nature and laws of mind 
 and matter, and are absurd. Our physical natures can 
 not be mediums for the departed, unless such spirits 
 first move our spirits to act in conveying their 
 thoughts, then our minds must first receive such 
 thoughts before they can be made known. 5. From 
 the natural adaptation and moral fitness of things, a 
 holy message from a holy world can never come to us 
 through vile or impure mediums. Deity does not em- 
 ploy wicked persons as mediums of his mercy and 
 pleasure ; neither can saint or angel use such agen- 
 cies. Therefore, the unrighteous heart, if capable of 
 being a medium, or physical organs connected with it, 
 they can only be used by unholy beings of the spirit- 
 world, and we have a right to reject their messages. 
 6. It appears that finite spirits may be moved by the 
 influence of Satanic power, performing feats of a 
 miraculous character; but all such are denounced 
 by Divine authority. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The Scriptures furnish examples of spiritual in- 
 fluences, but they are always characterized as either 
 good or bad, right or wrong. All such influences, 
 
462 SPIRITUALISM. 
 
 approved of God, are holy; and those unholy, are 
 condemned. 2. Necromancy is the art of revealing 
 coming events by pretended communication with the 
 dead. This practice arose in Egypt, the mother of 
 occult sciences, and was carried by the Israelites 
 through all the East. Whether conversing with the 
 dead is true or false, was unsettled in past ages. If 
 true, it was grounded upon diabolical agencies and 
 denounced by the law of God with the penalty of 
 death. " A man or a woman that hath a familiar 
 spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to 
 death." Persons under the influence of their demon 
 w T ere said to become greatly inflated, giving answers 
 in frenzy. As souls have been possessed with 
 devils, we know not how far we may place ourselves 
 under their power. 3. Soothsaying was distinguished 
 from prophecy in assuming power to foretell future 
 events without Divine aid or authority, which, if true, 
 can only be evil. 4. Astrology, though mystified by 
 the Chaldeans and Egyptians, embraced nothing more 
 than assumed science of foretelling events by the sit- 
 uation and influence of the stars. 5. ^Enchantment 
 embraced fascinations, charms, or spells, in order to 
 deceive, which is opposed to every idea of right and 
 purity. 6. Magic, as practiced by the magicians, was 
 of the spirit of Python, claiming nothing of higher 
 purity. Moses punished them with death. Daniel 
 speaks of them among the Chaldeans, as averse to 
 righteousness, evidently founded on imposture and 
 devilism. 
 
SPIRITUALISM. 463 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Witchcraft is a supernatural power, which per- 
 sons were supposed to obtain in compact with Satan. 
 It was not till God had forsaken Saul, that he resorted 
 to the Witch of Endor, one of the very class he had 
 been legally destroying throughout the whole land. 
 Bewildered in. apostasy, he desired first to see the 
 Lord's prophet. The pythoness, in calling Samuel, 
 doubtless expected only her familiar spirit, as she was 
 more astonished than Saul at what she saw ; not re- 
 garding it as the prophet, she exclaimed, " I saw gods 
 ascending out of the earth." It appears that the Lord, 
 at that time, saw fit to send Samuel, not in obedience 
 to, but contrary to her expectation, to tell Saul his 
 awful fate. 2. This power, in the sixteenth and sev- 
 enteenth centuries, in Europe, yielded to the alche- 
 mists, who claimed to turn base metals into silver and 
 fine gold, saying that Satan is a friend to every one 
 wishing to be skilled in the occult arts. 3. Demon- 
 ology, in the same way, must be regarded as the basis 
 of such spiritual influences and acts, not approved by 
 Heaven. Though the magicians of Egypt, by enchant- 
 ment, appeared to turn rods into serpents, yet it was 
 opposed to the order and will of Deity. 4. That kind 
 of spiritualism in which the Spirit of God influences 
 and renews our spirits to a life of righteousness, is 
 beyond the possibility of doubt. But confidence in 
 the influence and communications of finite spirits with 
 each other, can only safely exist where the medium is 
 holy or desiring to conform to rectitude and purity, 
 
464 GENIUS 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GENIUS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Genius may be regarded as a peculiar structure 
 of mind, natural and essential to every intellect inves- 
 tigating science and successful in lettered attainment. 
 It has been called a natural disposition or bent of 
 mind which belongs, in some degree, to all rational 
 beings, qualifying them for a peculiar or specific work. 
 2. It is a peculiar natural susceptibility, power, or apt- 
 itude for a particular study or branch of science, 
 quickening the mind with energy and vividness. It 
 imparts a love for the intricate and mysterious, and 
 inspires a determination to conquer. It is an active 
 strength developing uncommon manifestations of in- 
 tellectual power, and particularly that of investiga- 
 tion. 3. It naturally gives condition, disposition, and 
 character to mind, in which it loves activity, pene- 
 trates and explores hidden fields of science. Its in- 
 ternal fires kindle as we range universal facts, ever 
 attracted by the displays of infinite skill and wisdom. 
 As the travel of a star thought sweeps the rising fu- 
 ture, still onward, as with seraphic reach of percep- 
 tion and gaze of fire, peering into the mysterious vast 
 of coming eternity. 4. It is closely connected with 
 
GENIUS. 465 
 
 originality. The latter embraces the basis or realities, 
 while the former leads to an examination of them, in 
 which arises the apprehension of distinctions and force 
 in knowledge. The latter furnishes materials or facts, 
 but genius carries them to the court of inspection and 
 investigation, evolving new features of pleasing discov- 
 ery. 5. Primary or absolute originality belongs only 
 to Deity. He created all matter and mind in which 
 arises every idea and thought. Finities may change, 
 but can neither create nor annihilate the smallest 
 atom. We may change or pervert ideas, but can not 
 make them; yet genius renders investigation delight- 
 ful. 6. The vast universe is the great source of ideas 
 created by Infinite Wisdom, and only such can we 
 know, but can use ideas which have or have not been 
 possessed by other finite minds, and such be called 
 original. The examination of these causes the inter- 
 nal fires of genius to glow, sending out to every men- 
 tal capability thrills of delight. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Grenius is involved in the origin and perfecting 
 of investigations and inventions. Mind inspired by 
 it dares to be wise and useful. Put out its fires and 
 intellectual effort is paralyzed. Its pulsations shake 
 a slumbering world, waking fondest expectancy, 
 while thought ranges universal truths with pleasing 
 imperishability. 2. It is present in decomposing and 
 recombining in the alteration of the relation and prop- 
 erties of realities, giving new applications when dis- 
 
466 GENIUS. 
 
 coveries are made. 3. It not only aids in the dis- 
 crimination and suitable arrangement of facts, but 
 produces mental animation. This depends upon the 
 interest felt or inspired by genius. It exerts a favor- 
 able influence upon memory in fixing the attention 
 upon every desired fact. 4. Imagination receives 
 aid from the strength of genius in exciting mental 
 action. It exerts a favorable influence upon the 
 judgment, penetrating facts, and evolving their rela- 
 tive importance. 5. It is almost indispensable to true 
 eloquence, conferring clearness of thought and ex- 
 pression. It excites the orator in clearly compre- 
 hending and enforcing the truths of his message. 
 
DIVISION FOURTEENTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MORAL EDUCATION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The term education implies something capable of 
 being instructed, and that such entity belongs to and is 
 natural to mind. We are informed or enlightened by 
 receiving principles of the arts, science, morals, and 
 religion. 2. Mental education refers to the cultivation 
 of the intellectual powers, and moral education to the 
 cultivation of the moral elements of mind. The former 
 is essential in acquiring knowledge, and the latter is 
 indispensable to usefulness and true happiness. The 
 former without the latter only capacitates the soul for 
 increasing shades of crime and ruin. 3. The mind, 
 with high intellectual culture, and pure moral powers, 
 controlled by the will of God, is a star burning in the 
 moral firmament, attracting and fadeless. 4. In pro- 
 portion as we adhere to the intimations of the moral 
 elements and dictates of conscience, we are apt to be 
 biased and directed to right in opposition to wrong. 
 They can discriminate and be influenced by good and 
 bad, but will be ever occupied by either right or evil. 
 
 5. Education may be said to begin with the first 
 
 467 
 
468 MORAL EDUCATION. 
 
 rational notice of a child, and synchronizing with 
 such notice, it naturally detects something of the dif- 
 ference between smiles of parental approval and 
 frowning expressions of disapproval. The former 
 affects a consciousness of peace, love, and rising intu- 
 itions of right, while the latter saddens the feelings 
 and affects consciousness of dissatisfaction or wrong. 
 6. As the faith of the parent is received for the 
 child while incapable of knowing right from wrong, 
 there is no period of such existence when it should 
 not be wholly consecrated to the will of God, and 
 that without reserve forever. This, followed by cor- 
 rect moral training, confiding in the faithfulness of 
 Heaven to save our offspring, would not fail, and 
 universally adopted, earth's teeming millions would 
 soon proclaim the millennium arrived. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Perceptive action is first, but immediately suc- 
 cessive is sensitive action. The latter may develop 
 or mature more rapidly than the former. Youthful 
 persons properly instructed have a clearer sense of 
 moral obligation and duty, than of scientific truths at 
 the same age. An early disregard to such conscious 
 sense of right is the beginning of ruin. 2. It is the 
 desecration and departure of the moral powers and 
 intention which constitutes the vagabond and lawless 
 transgressor. The present and future happiness of 
 the soul depends upon the cultivation of the moral 
 powers, conforming them to the will of God, and is 
 
MORAL EDUCATION. 469 
 
 more essential than intellectual education. 3. The 
 first truths imparted to youthful minds should be 
 moral and religious. That which is first learned is 
 last forgotten, and those facts received during the 
 first ten years of life, generally give direction and 
 character to our being. Parents often weep over 
 their offspring ruined, when half the concern and 
 care at the right time w r ould have saved them. 4. 
 Moral education must include instruction in reference 
 to the existence and character of the Supreme Being, 
 and those religious duties we owe to him, to ourselves 
 and one another. Without moral susceptibility and 
 religious discipline thrones would fall, governments 
 dissolve, and the whole earth present continued scenes 
 of blood and carnage. 5. The highest state of man 
 consists in his purity as a moral being. He must 
 look to this in preparing for temporal usefulness and 
 happiness in the coming future. The longings of the 
 soul dissatisfied with earthly things soar beyond the 
 scenes of sensible things, finding no object filling such 
 capacity till resting in the contemplation of Deity. 
 6. Our only safety is in constantly watching over and 
 investigating the character of our intellectual and 
 moral condition, guarding our feelings, desires, attach- 
 ments, and our antipathies. Moral purity must con- 
 trol the heart. Without this the mind may range the 
 highest attainments in science, measure the earth, 
 silently step the zodiac, travel with the stars, and 
 shout to the varying flight of distant rolling worlds. 
 Yet, without God in the soul all is but loss. 7. With- 
 
470 MORAL EDUCATION. 
 
 out moral influence and power the faculties are 
 wrecked and soul ruined. It is the moral nature that 
 gives origin to ideas of right, obligation, and duty, 
 harmonizing warring elements affecting the throes of 
 the great heart. It invokes the will to mighty con- 
 flict, evil is overruled, and devils fly. The first per- 
 ception or idea of right possessed by a little child, in 
 moral worth, surpasses angels fallen. The latter, 
 though understanding the mysteries of heaven and 
 earth, the history of created worlds, and obtained all 
 knowledge, yet without a sense of right to guide in 
 purity, love, and happiness, all would sink into insig- 
 nificance. 8. How painful to contemplate a man de- 
 prived of vision, hearing, or action ; but still more 
 awful to watch the retiring of reason and memory, 
 yet we can love such an object. But if self-govern- 
 ment is gone," the light of conscience extinct, and all 
 power to love right, men, angels, and God wholly de- 
 stroyed, though the intellect kindle with the brilliancy 
 of a thousand suns, the soul is lost. But vivid 
 thought, with true moral purity, outstrips the light- 
 ning, compasses space, scales heaven, fathoms hell, 
 and fills the soul with holy and blissful emotions. 
 
WELL-BALANCED POWERS. 471 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 WELL-BALANCED INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
 POWERS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Well-balanced intellectual and moral elements 
 of mind, refer to the perfectness of their essential 
 existence and relative activity or force in manifesta- 
 tion. 2. As the physical organs change the action of 
 the different powers of mind often vary, as in youth 
 and age, sickness and health. 3. The wisest and 
 safest man is he whose mind is well-balanced in the 
 proper exercise of all its faculties, and not so in- 
 tensely as to paralyze any of the organs on which 
 manifestations depend. 4. The succession of our 
 thoughts should be guarded with exactness, and con- 
 trolled with an intention to conquer. 5. Our entire 
 attention should be devoted to the single object under 
 consideration, but when weariness begins we should 
 in that moment turn to some other fact. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. There are classes of objects involving purely-in- 
 tellectual action, in which beauty, sublimity, and 
 grandeur excite an eager reach of thought and de- 
 lightful range of facts, without reading the presence 
 
472 WELL-BALANCED POWERS. 
 
 of Infinite Goodness and Wisdom. 2. Moral facts 
 support the devout mind, while holy emotions inspire 
 confidence, love, and praise. Though outer worlds 
 glow in the light of unending sublimity, the world 
 within outvies them all, centered in life and enjoy- 
 ment without restriction. 3. We should be careful to 
 call into action all the faculties of the soul ; each one in 
 its proper office and force of power allowed by natural 
 being and endowment. 4. To become perfect, the 
 mind must know and love purity, and that God is the 
 center and circumference of all knowledge, and our 
 souls should rest in him. Every ray of moral and 
 scientific light traced upward and downward, toward 
 the unchanging north or distant south, farthest east 
 or remotest west, proves there is but one infinite full- 
 ness — the Eternal One. 
 
THE SOUL. 473 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SOUL. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The doctrine of the soul was regarded by some 
 schools of antiquity as embodying more than mind; 
 the latter comprehending mere faculties of thought, 
 reason, and power of knowledge, while the former in- 
 volved the idea of the entire spiritual nature. It is 
 spirit in essence, not subject to age or annihilation; 
 the oneness of mind and soul distinct from the body, 
 and imperishable. 2. It is the vital part or power of 
 existence; thinks, reasons, and constitutes man a 
 moral, intellectual, and immortal being, capable of the 
 glorious government of God. 3. In considering the 
 soul, we assume that every human being possesses a 
 conviction and consciousness, of which we can not 
 rid ourselves, that the sentient principle within is 
 real, one and indivisible. We can not resist the per- 
 suasion of self-reality and absolute individuality, op- 
 posed to all ulterior facts and every thing like plural- 
 ity, an uncompromising sense of unalterable oneness. 
 This felt unity is contradictory to any possible suppo- 
 sition that feeling and thought owe their existence 
 and character to multiplied thousands of varying par- 
 ticles, with different affinities toward each other, and 
 
 40 
 
474 THE SOUL. 
 
 coexisting in the same body. 4. As all portions of 
 matter are infinitely divisible, and as each must hold 
 an independent existence in all compounds, then 
 thought and feeling, results of these, must be infi- 
 nitely divisible, tangible, and extended. Our feel- 
 ings would be made up of lines, circles, triangles, and 
 squares ; and as all things must conform to the laws 
 of materiality, each element of mind must be as di- 
 visible and destructible as matter. 5. If the soul be 
 a result of either material entities or laws, it must 
 conform to the condition of relative particles and the 
 composition of thought. This would compel our con- 
 templation of the same to stumble at every step upon 
 the monstrous and absurd. A feeling would have 
 form, weight, and extension. We would meet with 
 the half of a belief, the quarter of a doubt, the tenth 
 part of an idea, a square hope, an angular action, a 
 conic feeling, the north corner of a feeling, a circu- 
 lar remembrance, or the south-west corner of an emo- 
 tion. As foolish as this may appear, nevertheless 
 mind must conform to the nature of matter if it is 
 causative. But if mind is a mere accident of material 
 organization, it has only a relative and no absolute 
 existence. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The term life may be applied to the growth of 
 rocks, the maturing of the coral, or advance of pet- 
 rifactions, which is the first law of motion in matter, 
 differing from that of impinging influences. But it 
 is without sensitive or instinctive action. 2. It has 
 
THE SOUL. 475 
 
 been assumed that the instinct and sensitiveness of 
 vegetable life indicates as much contrivance as that 
 of animals, and if instinct be referred to mind in the 
 latter it must in the former. Vegetable life is inani- 
 mate, without sensitive feelings, and different from 
 that of animals. 3. Arguments against the spiritual 
 nature or soul, have been founded upon the acknowl- 
 edged instinct and sagacity of the brute creation. 
 But reason in man and instinct in animals differ in 
 sources, character, and nature. The former must be 
 guided by judgment, which involves apprehension and 
 contrast, and extends to the present, past, and future. 
 The latter is a feeling in nature, founded in aptitudes 
 or inclinations. 4. If mind is a mere accident, then 
 virtue and vice are accidents, incapable of rewards or 
 punishment; man is a machine, and such accidents 
 bear no relationship to him. 5. We are positive that 
 no part of the physical nature is essential to con- 
 sciousness. The loss of parts or members of such 
 nature can not diminish consciousness of self. We 
 intuitively and irresistibly feel an internal power 
 which neither time nor death can destroy. 
 
476 the soul's immortality. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S IMMORTALITY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The doctrine of the soul's immortality is full of 
 interest, and never fails to excite with fondest hope, 
 attracting vivid and pleasing inquiries. The idea of 
 annihilation is horrible. He who holds such belief 
 becomes a fearful spectacle to his race, his society is 
 avoided, and his deportment and spirit is cold, unkind, 
 and heartless. ( His home appears shaded with gloom, 
 and the winds of heaven passing over his grave sing 
 requiems of doleful despair. 2. The soul, in original 
 nature, is independent of the changes and accidents 
 of matter. It is the great immaterial source, the im- 
 perishable fountain of feeling, thought, emotion, and 
 knowledge. A simple, uncompounded essence, it re- 
 ceived from God the elements of incorruptibility, and 
 its constituted being is immortality. 3. In the crea- 
 tion of the soul Deity either intended its immortality 
 or that, at some epoch subsequent, it should cease to 
 be. If the latter be true, then it is mortal and must 
 cease to exist; for such purposes in its creation are 
 changeless. 
 
the soul's immortality. 477 
 
 section ii. 
 
 1. But if God purposed in its creation life forever, 
 then it is naturally, essentially, and necessarily im- 
 mortal ; for such purpose, in this respect, is the law 
 of its being, and, extending to immortality, secures its 
 indestructibility. 2. The creation, nature, powers, 
 relations, and internal aspirings of the soul, in which 
 it anxiously moves to the future, and struggles for 
 greater liberty, knowledge, and bliss, all impress us 
 of an open door to coming boundlessness, and an infi- 
 nite perspective of being. 3. A deep, conscious con- 
 viction and feeling, unobstructedly force the persua- 
 sion of our immortality. This feeling appears to have 
 naturally possessed the soul in every nation and con- 
 dition of man. 4. Heathen nations, beneath murky 
 skies of confusion, with all their superstition and 
 prejudice, give evidence of a conviction and longing 
 for life in the future. Such feelings are always offer- 
 ing homage to virtue, and hopes of happiness unend- 
 ing. 5. The vast capacities, boundless desires, and 
 great improvements of the soul evidence its adapta- 
 tion to, and the reality of being where all can be 
 satisfied. We feel a dissatisfaction with the present 
 time and state, and desire a suitable preparation that 
 we may avoid every thing like disappointment in 
 eternity. 
 
478 the soul's value 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S VALUE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. All evidence favors the doctrine of the souVs 
 immortality. An act of omnipotence was necessary 
 to create it, and nothing less than the same power 
 can cause its non-existence. 2. By intuition and 
 consciousness we are impressed of its indestructibility. 
 We feel and knozv that we are immortal. Nature 
 never gravitates to naught. Her intuitive lessons, 
 aside and apart from sin and its influence, are imper- 
 ishable truth. 3. It is the soul that tests the truth- 
 fulness and power of revealed religion, in conforma- 
 tion of the religion of nature. In the latter it reads 
 the revelation of a God, and by the former experi- 
 ences his presence and approval. So full is the bur- 
 den of testimony, that to be an atheist implies a pre- 
 vious qualification of being a fool. 4. Its value is 
 increased by original feelings and notions of virtue. 
 We experience an involuntary and indefinable drifting 
 to moral preferences and rectitude. 5. It has con- 
 templative and active powers, understanding, con- 
 science and the will, suggestion, thought, and feeling, 
 all indispensable to knowledge, and without these 
 what is man? 6. It is the ivorld of thought within 
 
the soul's value. 479 
 
 that presents elements, affinities, and relations, stupen- 
 dous in wisdom and worth, and powerful in action 
 and appeal. It contemplates the higher principles of 
 our destiny, resolves knowledge into constituent 
 parts, tracing to original sources, and evolves the fact 
 that the laws of mind, to some extent, become the laws 
 of every science. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The influence of thought upon language is found 
 in the nature and laws of mind, a knowledge of 
 which being necessary to the best systems of rhetoric 
 and logic known. 2. Taste evidences the value of 
 mind. The importance of the rippling rill is lost as 
 the soul surveys the mighty Ganges or Amazon, roll- 
 ing a broad wave through cities, plains, forests, hills, 
 and mountains, bearing a mighty commerce to the 
 heaving bosom of ocean independence. In the mind 
 arises the contrast between the bird sporting in the 
 bower, and the eagle now spreading his wing to the 
 hastening storm — then burning in the sun. 3. Mind 
 gives value to special and national laws ; and without 
 this, the management of the world is a failure, and 
 millions of our race have been doomed to hopeless 
 wretchedness. It is the only real wealth of nations. 
 4. The value of the soul is supported by the fact that 
 intellectual and moral resources are our principal and 
 most boundless store of enjoyment. It is the wealth 
 of the beggar and the triumph of the mighty. 5. Its 
 value is implied from the fact that the neglect of 
 proper mental and moral culture did for cycles of 
 
480 the soul's value. 
 
 ages rob man of both liberty and happiness. But 
 when genius awoke from the slumber of more than a 
 thousand years, despotism began to vanish at the 
 coming tread of indignant millions. Enlightened by 
 Revelation, it threw radiance over the empire of spirit, 
 linking our energies to the improvement of this world 
 and the happy reversions of life eternal. 6. The 
 value of the soul is exalted, when all other orders of 
 earth are contrasted with its active elaborations of 
 thought. Enter this interior temple of nature; range 
 the scenes of unrivaled magnificence; look upon the 
 conscious altars, covered with light, and the sacred 
 curtain woven by the finger of God, with indwelling 
 aspirations ftfr a holy immortality; and mind absorbs 
 all thought, carrying accumulating knowledge that 
 would weigh down the inert bosom of a thousand Ju- 
 piters. 7. The soul is above valuation. Its salvation 
 embraces self, and to be lost is the ruin of ourselves. 
 It has interested heaven from all eternity. For thou- 
 sands of years mercy has pleaded our cause. Earth has 
 rolled her boundless resources to supply our wants; 
 and hell exerts all its fiendish toil for our destruction. 
 8. If it was great to speak a world from naught, but 
 greater to redeem, how shall we weigh its value? 
 Creation is by the word of power, but redemption 
 involved the highest gift of Almighty Goodness; price 
 all price beyond. 9. Nature, at the crucifixion, gave 
 evidence of the soul's value, in consternation and inver- 
 sion of her laws — the darkened heavens, shaking 
 earth, rending vail, the breaking rocks and rising dead. 
 
IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MIND. 481 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE NATURE AND 
 
 POWERS OF THE SOUL, AS THE GREAT 
 
 AND SUPERIOR SCIENCE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Mind is the science of our being, and all knowl- 
 edge in regard to the works of art and nature is in- 
 debted to this study. And it gives tact, keenness of 
 perception, laying bare the great field of thought. It 
 brings to view the elements of the moral universe. 
 By the condition of the world within, the central 
 source of distinction is the character of outward ac- 
 tion. 2. The study of mind seeks knowledge of every 
 element of being, and if its powers be unknown, how 
 shall the wants of our spiritual being be supplied? 
 Every correct system of education must embrace 
 physical, intellectual, and moral discipline. 3. This 
 study discovers the foundation elements of natural re- 
 ligion, which appears in the existence, beauty, and 
 design of nature. 4. Man is intuitively instructed 
 from self and his Creator. He receives it through 
 the works of creation, the ever-unfolding wisdom of 
 Providence and never-failing goodness. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The study of mind is not properly esteemed by 
 
 the masses. Many capable of stepping an unexplored 
 
 41 
 
482 IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MIND. 
 
 zodiac, tracing worlds rolling on high, and of throwing 
 burning thought upon the plain of endless life, all 
 alive with the approach of heaven, turn away wholly 
 absorbed in the fight of two chickens, or the fleetness 
 of two mules contending in a race. 2. In proportion 
 as mental culture is neglected, despotism is extended. 
 Often when the latter was not intended, fetters have 
 been riveted upon the people and unborn generations 
 crushed by misguided rulers, intending good but not 
 knowing how it should be attained. 3. It is mental 
 and moral improvement that gives liberty and stability 
 to government, otherwise cannons, fleets, and armies, 
 with extended seas or lofty Alps, must forever fail. 
 4. Philosophical genius refers directly to the study of 
 our intellectual and moral powers. A total neglect is 
 connected with a mind weak or in ruins. The mind 
 must think in the right way, and upon true and pure 
 subjects, in order to be wise and good. It must be 
 able to turn in upon itself without disgust, and find 
 there the vivid activity and pure objects for which we 
 were created. 
 
MIND AND BODY. 483 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 MUTUAL RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND 
 ANTHROPOLOGY, EVOLVING THE CON- 
 DITION AND CHARACTER OF 
 THE SOUL IN TIME. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. It is impossible to define the mysterious ties 
 uniting the soul and body. But we can not deny the 
 fact that spirit and matter compose our real being. 
 2. These two natures influence each other, and either 
 can be affected by the other. The bodily organs 
 should be perfect and in vigorous health, in order to 
 correct mental action. 3. Natural defects often con- 
 stitute idiots, and frequently trammel correct reason- 
 ing. 4. A paralysis of the delicate nerves connected 
 and sympathizing with the brain, often destroys cor- 
 rect mental action. 5. Disease or general debility 
 will affect the mind in some way, and often to mental 
 
 alienation. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The mind exerts a very strong influence over 
 the body. A uniform, cheerful, and happy class of 
 feelings will contribute to the vigor and health of the 
 body. 2. A troubled, depressed, or gloomy class of 
 feelings, or wretched state of mind, will impair the 
 health and bring us to a premature grave. 3. The 
 
484 MIND AND BODY. 
 
 remorse of the murderer will hastily devour his ener- 
 gies and terminate life. 4. We are comforted in the 
 belief that all minds deprived of reason in this life 
 will be rational on leaving the body. 5. All idiots 
 will be sane and happy in heaven, as their innocence 
 banishes all doubt in regard to their future joy. 
 
IMPORTANCE OF MORAL CULTURE. 485 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 CULTIVATION OF THE MORAL POWERS, WITH 
 
 THE SOUL'S CONFORMITY TO THE WILL 
 
 OF GOD, MORE IMPORTANT THAN ONLY 
 
 INTELLECTUAL IMPROVEMENT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The soul is preeminently endued with con- 
 science and various moral powers. The innocence and 
 purity of these are essential to virtuous life and con- 
 tinued happiness. 2. Religion does not destroy any 
 faculty nor create new ones ; but adoption by grace 
 changes the moral condition and relation of the soul 
 to its Creator in light, peace, and joy. 3. Though we 
 could grasp all scientific knowledge, and command an 
 angel's thoughts, if we love not God, neither adhere 
 to truth and rectitude, the soul is only capacitated for 
 deeper degrees of unending remorse. 4. All history 
 proves that where moral suasion rules the people, and 
 virtue is honored, there is peace and happiness. But 
 where moral influences are rejected, mind is vicious 
 and the world mad. Each morning breath is burdened 
 with groans, and the evening dew is blood. True joy 
 can never be derived from the shock of battle or shout 
 of arms. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. In studying the nature and office of the moral 
 powers, we are impressed and convinced of the com- 
 
486 IMPORTANCE OF MORAL CULTURE. 
 
 mon nature and proper equality of our race. We can 
 not resist the conviction, that all men are equal in 
 their origin, relations, dependence, dissolution, and 
 immortality ; and that the various shades, formations, 
 and divisions of society are mere accidents of being, 
 and exist essentially extrinsic of original nature. 2. 
 We are taught both by religion and philosophy, that 
 all classes of our race have one Father, who created 
 us for usefulness and happiness. 3. This study will 
 enable us to perceive and expel the evils of supersti- 
 tion and skepticism. It qualifies us to penetrate all 
 sources of error, whether political, philosophical, or 
 religious. Our highest emotions and love must be 
 given to Him who is able to save. 4. It is moral cul- 
 tivation that renders mind useful, elevates the world, 
 and saves the soul. And without it, law is powerless, 
 resolution exists in frenzy, and the whole moral heav- 
 ens are hung in mourning. 
 
THE SOUL IN TEMPORAL DEATH. 487 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE SOUL— HOW AFFECTED BY TEMPORAL 
 DISEASE AND DEATH. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. We have seen that diseased physical organs af- 
 fect mental action. Almost the first lesson should be 
 to study how to promote health. The neglect of one 
 item often aifects and maddens the whole system. 
 An impure quality of food or water received into the 
 stomach, sends impure chyle to the vena cava, vitia- 
 ting the nature of the blood, which, on being pumped 
 by the heart to the brain, affects the whole cerebral 
 mass. The connected nerves influence the whole sys- 
 tem ; we fall sick ; the mind becomes flighty and acts 
 imperfectly. 2. The soul in its intellectual, sensitive, 
 and moral nature becomes sympathetically affected by 
 reason of its connection with diseased bodily powers. 
 3. We can only expect perfect mental action when 
 free from fallen earthly fetters. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The death of the body takes place in the sepa- 
 ration of the soul from it. The delicate ties and affin- 
 ity uniting the two natures being sundered, the body 
 becomes decomposed, without any annihilation of its 
 
488 THE SOUL IN TEMPORAL DEATH. 
 
 essential elements, till the sound of the last trump 
 calls it up a " spiritual body." 2. The identity of the 
 soul and its power of action and knowledge, appear 
 undisturbed in such separation; but our being is not 
 entire till soul and body are united again. 3. Tern- 
 foral death appears to have no annihilating pow r er 
 over the soul or its elements. 
 
THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 489 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE SOUL IN ETEKNITY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Reason, unaided by Revelation, can only follow 
 in the wake of life's brief journey, and leaning upon 
 the tomb, is silent. When all such efforts end, Rev- 
 elation points out the travel of the soul beyond, en- 
 tering the opening future. Upon it our helplessness 
 hangs wholly dependent for the certainty of immor- 
 tality, the reality of heaven, and the character and 
 happiness of the redeemed. 2. We naturally desire 
 to contemplate the existence and character of the soul 
 in eternity. We may reason from the nature and 
 analysis of mind, but all positive certainty is found in 
 the revealed will of God to man. 3. We are led to 
 contemplate the soul on leaving the body as being 
 naturally perfect, whether it has become morally so or 
 not. All its susceptibilities and powers are imperish- 
 able and wholly untrammeled by matter. 4. All items 
 of knowledge ever stored in memory are imperishable, 
 as we have no proof that any entity can ever cease 
 to be. Fading facts, or traces of immaterialities, will 
 be retained and live with the reality of the essence 
 upon which they were impressed or written. But the 
 remembrance of evil can not annoy the soul saved 
 
490 THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 
 
 from all such impurity. 5. Memory being immortal, 
 however varied or trammeled with materiality, every 
 fact impressed upon such immaterial essence never 
 can be erased, as finity has no power of annihilation. 
 
 SECTION II, 
 
 1. Perception can never die. As its power, by 
 means of physical organs, is wholly of and within the 
 mind, it must of necessity exist unimpaired in spir- 
 itual vividness, separated from the body. 2. The 
 power of vision and hearing belongs to mind, and must 
 continue with it, disembodied. 3. Feeling and emo- 
 tions are of mind, and must continue as long as such 
 existence shall endure. 4. We are induced to believe 
 that on the dissolution of the body, the soul is per- 
 fected in development and power of action. It is un- 
 fettered on the highway of light and knowledge. 5. 
 A world of meaning might fail to describe the immortal 
 throes, the lofty capacity and ability of the soul to 
 know, act, and progress in knowledge when free and 
 happy in eternity. Heaven in tears, all worlds in 
 mourning, may fail to make known to us the full sor- 
 rows of the soul lost forever. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. A pure soul departing from earth enters not a 
 world of dark conjecture or doubt, but of reality, 
 beauty, and happiness. Heaven is adapted to man 
 and calculated to fill every holy desire; as infinite 
 perfection could not be -otherwise. 2. Spirit must 
 
THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 491 
 
 have spiritual sight or perception of spirits. We 
 shall see our friends and know them in that bright 
 world. Mingled feelings of joy kindle as we look to 
 the extended domain, rolling river, the beautiful city, 
 and waving trees of life. 3. We shall know the re- 
 deemed. Apostles knew Moses and Elias on the 
 Mount, though they had lived in previous ages. The 
 rich man knew Abraham and Lazarus. It is reason- 
 able to believe that the very inspiration of heaven will 
 reveal the names of those we knew in time, and all 
 the inhabitants of that blessed world. 4. The whole 
 family of Christ in heaven will be morally one, in 
 heart, mind, and will. As He is one, so must the re- 
 deemed be one, in union, perfectly according with his 
 will and decisions, even against friends who have re- 
 jected salvation, and can not give us pain, as our wills 
 and approval will be perfectly absorbed and united in 
 our Savior. What he does will be right and in perfect 
 harmony with purity and happiness. 5. It appears 
 that all the redeemed in heaven have but one circle, 
 class, or union. The idea of orders, grades, and de- 
 grees, as taught by Swedenborg, is contrary to all our 
 conceptions of the nature and character of heaven. 
 If there are grades, circles, and orders, then naturally 
 follows preferences, classification, separations, divi- 
 sions, and discord. The very moment the union of 
 heaven is broken, it ceases to be heaven. So long as 
 Christ is one and indivisible, his family will constitute 
 one union in perfect happiness forever. 
 
492 THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. By so far as one soul may have done and suffered 
 more for Christ and his cause than another, the Lord 
 may bestow upon him more in quantity but not in 
 quality or kind, while each one will enjoy a complete 
 fullness. 2. It would seem that the love of the saints 
 will be uniform. We can do no more than love our 
 pa-rents perfectly and with all the soul ; then it is do- 
 ing them no injustice if we love every other soul 
 saved in the same way. 3. As Christ is one and his 
 children are united in him, will not our love for the 
 saints be conformed to, and conditioned by his love 
 for each one saved through his mercy? If so, how 
 can there be natural preferences or partiality? If 
 any contemplate superiority, let him be careful lest he 
 fail entering that holy world. 4. The life of the soul 
 in the future is eternal. It is imperishable; and 
 though material worlds cease to be, it will live on, 
 light and joy increasing. If permitted to travel out 
 amid distant creations of Deity, it is neither re- 
 stricted by time nor limited in happiness. 5. The 
 heart kindles with unearthly fire as we would summon 
 every power trying to contemplate the soul perfect in 
 heaven. 0, eternity ! thought stupendous, great, and 
 glorious ! home of earth's redeemed ! Hail, happy 
 millions, saved by grace, enter with triumphant ac- 
 claim, prolonged in the exchanging shout of worlds ! 
 
INDEX. 
 
 -++• 
 
 REFERRING TO EACH DIVISION, AND ARRANGED AS 
 A BASIS OF QUESTIONS FOR TEACHERS. 
 
 .♦. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 TSICAL AND MENTAL SCIENC 
 CLAIMS OF MATERIALISM EXAMINED. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Man an existent. Can he doubt self-reality ? 5 
 
 2. Universal being composed of spirit and matter — is knowledge 
 
 restricted to these? 5 
 
 3. His liberty of action 5 
 
 4. His being indestructible 6 
 
 5. Matter decomposed, not annihilated 6 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Man of spirit and matter — not annihilated by death 6 
 
 2. Spirit, animation or life 7 
 
 3. The soul intellectual, and power of reason 7 
 
 4. It is spirit — indivisible 7 
 
 5. It is immortal — vivid in action 7 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Matter distinct from mind, in property 7 
 
 2. Matter inanimate — when? 7 
 
 3. It is inanimate, separated from mind 8 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. Mind not matter — its internal power 8 
 
 2. Its power to act without matter 8 
 
 3. To what the term, mind, applies 8 
 
 4. The essence of mind 8 
 
 5. Difficulty in proving essence of mind 9 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Knowledge from reasoning and intuition — preference 9 
 
 2. We feel power within not material 9 
 
 3. Matter can not recall the past or contemplate the future 10 
 
 4. Principle of thought not matter — how varied 10 
 
 493 
 
494 INDEX, 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Pagb, 
 
 1. Matter not mind— how differing 11 
 
 2. Inactivity and tendency to rest 11 
 
 3. Essence difficult to define 11 
 
 4. Idea of materialists incorrect 12 
 
 5. Inertness lias no knowledge of self ' 12 
 
 6. Atoms moved bylaws of attraction and resistance 12 
 
 7. Non-existence more reasonable than only materialism 12 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 1. If the soul be matter, it thinks — what of all matter? 13 
 
 2. All matter cogitative 13 
 
 3. Mind a function of the brain — the result , 13 
 
 4. Mind — how affected by diseases of brain 14 
 
 S E CTION VIII. 
 
 1. Mind independent of matter — how? , 14 
 
 2. If matter can think, and mind is matter, what the result? 14 
 
 3. Materialists immortal — how? 15 
 
 4. Material thinking eternal — how? 15 
 
 5. Matter without emotions — how? 15 
 
 6. Self not changed with matter in knowledge 15 
 
 7. Knowledge of the past impossible — how? 16 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 1. Mind distinct from matter — how dependent ? 16 
 
 2. The body indestructible— why ? 16 
 
 3. No evidence of the annihilation of any thing 17 
 
 4. Decay of the bocly no evidence of annihilation 17 
 
 SECTION X . 
 
 1. Probable eternity of matter as to the future 17 
 
 2. The soul superior to matter — how? 18 
 
 3. The feeling of soul — how affected? 18 
 
 4. Matter with primary causation — how absurd? 19 
 
 5. Motion of particles impossible — cogitation absurd 19 
 
 6. No action of matter can cause cogitation 20 
 
 7. Union of elements to think impossible- — how? 20 
 
 SECTION XI. 
 
 1. Matter has no power to reflect beyond self 21 
 
 2. It can not correct appearances 21 
 
 3. Man feels power to change 21 
 
 4. The soul not a faculty of the body 22 
 
 5. It is incapable of annihilation 22 
 
 6. No evidence that any thing will cease to be 22 
 
 7. Conscious action — how influenced 22 
 
 SECTION XII. 
 
 1. The soul's conscious knowledge of self 23 
 
 2. High moral obligations upon us 23 
 
 3. The object of mental cultivation 23 
 
 4. Reasonableness of atheists believing Christianity 24 
 
 5. Matter belongs to physical science 24 
 
INDEX. 495 
 
 PART I. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND 
 
 WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION. 
 
 DIVISION FIRST. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Mind, spiritual in nature and unending in duration 29 
 
 2. Mental elements the origin of mental action 29 
 
 3. Elements the origin of moral action 29 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Powers at the origin of moral feelings — moral elements 29 
 
 2. "Without elements there can be no science 30 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Various orders of mind 31 
 
 2. Inferior orders — how conditioned? 31 
 
 SECTIO N II. 
 
 1. Matter without sensation or motion 31 
 
 2. What of instinct in different orders ? — imperishability 31 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE 
 
 OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Mind— how denned? 33 
 
 2. Not constituted by thought or feeling— what is it? 33 
 
 3. Knowledge of self arises from intuition and demonstration 33 
 
 4. What is the primary knowledge of mind's existence? 34 
 
 5. Difference between primary and secondary properties 34 
 
 6. Knowledge of mind not only by motion 34 
 
 7. The cause of mind beyond our inquiries 34 
 
 8. Its essence unknown 34 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Error of Mr. Stewart. What is his mistake ? 34 
 
 2. What of axioms in mathematics and mind ? 35 
 
496 INDEX 
 
 Pagk 
 
 3. How do we know self-evident truths? > 36 
 
 4. Axioms of mind have knowledge of self 36 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Inquiries of mental phenomena embrace properties, not essence.... 37 
 
 2. Threefold division of mind. (1.) Mental elements. (2.) Moral 
 
 elements. (3.) Manifestations 37 
 
 3. The acts of mind. (1.) Duties to God. (2.) Duties to ourselves. 
 
 (3.) Duties to one another 37 
 
 s ECTIO N II. 
 
 1. Improper order in philosophy — what is wrong? 38 
 
 2. Inherent power to know 38 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SENSATION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Sensation defined 39 
 
 2. How it may arise 39 
 
 3. It can not be separated from mind — why not? 39 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. How is it feeling by external objects? 40 
 
 2. How internal — wjiat causes it? 40 
 
 3. It is not the appearance of objects 40 
 
 4. Mysterious connection with physical organs 40 
 
 5. Its connection with mental elements 40 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 SENSE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Sense defined — relation to existences and qualities 42 
 
 2. Relation to the change of organs and to sensation 42 
 
 3. How is it succeeded by sensations 42 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. What it apprehends — how? 42 
 
 2. Simple state spontaneous — what of action? 42 
 
 3. How it is the perception of the senses 42 
 
 4. How the discernment of the senses « 43 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE SENSES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The senses defined — power of the same 44 
 
 2. Connection of the senses with the organs, mysterious 44 
 
 3. Wholly dependent on the senses for knowledge of external things. 44 
 
INDEX. 497 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Pagk. 
 
 1. How far dependent upon the senses for knowledge 44 
 
 2. Importance of the senses for knowledge of external things 45 
 
 3. The loss of this power can not destroy mind 45 
 
 4. The order of the five senses — not abstracted from the organs 45 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Organ of smell defined 46 
 
 2. Sense of smell connected with the nerves 46 
 
 3. Substance of the nerves — their sensitiveness 46 
 
 4. The nerves and sense not the same 46 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. How sensations are received 47 
 
 2. Knowledge eluded — how corrected? 47 
 
 3. How classify sensations 47 
 
 4. Influence upon life and health 48 
 
 5. How such sensations are produced 48 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. " Perceptions of smell " incorrect 48 
 
 2. How sense of smell is affected 48 
 
 3. We have perception of the objects of smell 49 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE SENSE OF TASTE. 
 S E CTION I. 
 
 1. The organs of taste 50 
 
 2. Origin of the sense of taste 50 
 
 3. Connection of sense and sensations of taste 50 
 
 4. Corresponding to the object 50 
 
 5. Affect not corresponding absurd 51 
 
 6. The mind affected as to causation 51 
 
 SE CTION II. 
 
 1. Modifications of taste — how affected? 51 
 
 2. Properties originating such sensations 51 
 
 3. State of mind referring to the cause of action 51 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE SENSE OF HEAEING. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Organ of sound defined 52 
 
 2. Sense of hearing defined 52 
 
 3. Sensations of hearing — how realized? 52 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Variations of sensations of sound innumerable 53 
 
 2. The cause of such sensations 53 
 
 42 
 
498 INDEX. 
 
 3. Knowledge of simple sounds not intuitive 54 
 
 4. How we tell the direction of sound 54 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. How to gain the direction to objects of sound 54 
 
 2. To locate objects of sound . 54 
 
 3. To determine the direction of sound 55 
 
 4. Importance of the sense of hearing 55 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Organ of touch defined — extensiveness 57 
 
 2. It is more extensive than other senses — how? 57 
 
 3. Its nature — how conditioned? 57 
 
 4. Its office — but connection with nerves undefinable 57 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Its variations differ from other senses •. 58 
 
 2. Character of impressions from external objects 58 
 
 3. Origin of feeling corresponding with the cause 58 
 
 4. Knowledge from this source only, imperfect 59 
 
 5. With touch is the origin of the knowledge of temperature 59 
 
 6. It is not the idea of the fact but is causative 59 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. "We know heat aqd cold to exist — how defined? 59 
 
 2. Error of philosophers 60 
 
 3. Office of sense and sensation in receiving facts 60 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The eye the organ of sight — how arranged? 61 
 
 2. The retina — arrangement and office 61 
 
 3. Its importance to happiness — its power 62 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Internal structure of the eye — location — evidence of wisdom 62 
 
 2. Sense of sight in the optic nerve 63 
 
 3. Objects seen and felt 63 
 
 4. This sense, how awakened 63 
 
 5. "Perceptions of sight" incorrect 63 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Color, cause of sensations of sight — how distinguished? 64 
 
 2. Colors vary with objects of sight , 64 
 
 3. Light reflected awakens sensations — how is mind affected? 64 
 
 SECTION iv. 
 
 1. Sight modified — how? 65 
 
 2. Knowledge by sight — how conditioned? 65 
 
 3. Knowledge of color from the sense of sight — how conditioned? 66 
 
INDEX. 499 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Pace. 
 
 1. Idea of extension — how far dependent on sight 66 
 
 2. How affected by colors and light — primary object seen 67 
 
 3. Such knowledge — how limited 67 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. Visible extension — how received 68 
 
 2. Judging of magnitude — on what dependent 68 
 
 3. Effect of pure atmosphere 68 
 
 4. Perception of distance — how gained 69 
 
 5. How far is it intuitive? 69 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PEIMAEY AND SECONDARY S IT E C E S OF KNOWL- 
 EDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The senses secondary source of knowledge — what a direct or pri- 
 
 mary source? 70 
 
 2. Self-motion belongs to spirit — what is its power? 70 
 
 3. Senses secondary source of knowledge — how regarded by many... 71 
 
 4. They can not give perfect knowledge 71 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Spirit incapable of deception 71 
 
 2. Reliance on the senses is found in consciousness 71 
 
 3. A skeptic's delusion 72 
 
 DIVISION SECOND. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PERCEPTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Perception defined 73 
 
 2. Relation of sensation and perception — what is the office of each ?... 73 
 
 3. Perception successive to sensation 73 
 
 4. Mystery of perception as sequel to impressions received 74 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Perception, voluntary act of mind 74 
 
 2. Sensation not necessarily followed by perception 74 
 
 3. When is it involuntary? 75 
 
 4. Voluntary perception 75 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Perception acquaints us with external things 75 
 
 2. Perception of primary properties differs from sensation 76 
 
 3. How sensation differs from perception 76 
 
 4. Perception of difference in primary and secondary properties 76 
 
500 INDEX. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FALSE PERCEPTION. 
 
 SE CTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. When false perception takes place 77 
 
 2. May arise with the organs of sense 77 
 
 3. They exist in changes of mental states 77 
 
 4. They arise connected with disordered organs 77 
 
 SECTION II. . 
 
 1. How perception may be corrected 78 
 
 2. By comparing perceptions with those of other persons 78 
 
 3. By exercise of judgment 78 
 
 4. How they may be corrected in reference to objects 78 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PERCEPTION AS CONNECTED WITH SMELL, TASTE, 
 HEARING, TOUCH, AND SIGHT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Perceptions in regard to smell 79 
 
 2. Old view of sensations renders perceptions accidental 79 
 
 3. Connection between sensations and perceptions — important cases.. 79 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Perceptions connected with taste 80 
 
 2. Habit in relation to taste 80 
 
 3. Law of habit with wine-dealers 80 
 
 4. Direction of perception — how dependent 81 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Perception in regard to hearing 81 
 
 2. How affected by strong and weak sensations 81 
 
 3. Effect of habit— perception of the blind 81 
 
 4. When perception maybe accidental 82 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. Perception and touch — how increased 82 
 
 2. Power of blind persons 82 
 
 3. Knowledge of that which affects touch arises with sensation 82 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Perception and sight — what of expansion and distance? 82 
 
 2. Inclination of axis of vision — the effect 83 
 
 3. Distance intuitive with children 83 
 
 4. Habit in regard to distance — what of mariners? 83 
 
INDEX. 501 
 
 DIVISION THIRD. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OTJB KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTIN- 
 GENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Thoughts and feelings not all of the phenomena of mind 85 
 
 2. Existence and nature of thought 85 
 
 3. What is thought?— different orders? 85 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. It is real and expresses action 86 
 
 2. If separated from mind it is non-existence 86 
 
 3. Importance of thought — action and great results 86 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 IDEAS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Idea defined — where does it exist? 87 
 
 2. How do ideas vary? 87 
 
 3. Ideas of materiality contingent 87 
 
 4. When they are relative 87 
 
 5. Ideas of duration absolute 87 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Ideas of space necessary or absolute 87 
 
 2. When ideas of space absolute 88 
 
 3. Idea of space implies absence of limitation 88 
 
 4. Idea of space and cause necessary 88 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. What may primary elements of mind be called? 89 
 
 2. Axioms can not be proved true — how received? 89 
 
 3. Primary elements of mind — how known? 89 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knowledge of primary elements — how gained? 90 
 
 2. Power to know self-reality with them 90 
 
 3. With them is the origin of the power to know external things 90 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE FEOM TESTIMONY. 
 SECTIO N I. 
 
 1. Intuitive power to arrive at facts from testimony 91 
 
 2. Testimony defined 91 
 
502 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 3. Belief in external facts — what of weak and ignorant minds? 91 
 
 4. If limited in views, we rely on experience 92 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Influence of facts upon well-regulated minds 92 
 
 2. We can arrive at a knowledge of facts — how? 92 
 
 3. Infidelity rejects testimony — how? 93 
 
 4. Greater faith to believe in miracles 93 
 
 5. What is a miracle? 93 
 
 6. Divine Revelation a miraculous gift — what does it establish ?....,... 93 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. How infidels adhere to the regular course of nature 94 
 
 2. What is Mr. Hume's celebrated argument against Christ's resur- 
 
 rection — how incorrect? 94 
 
 3. The doctrine of his resurrection true 95 
 
 DIVISION FOURTH. 
 CHAPTER, I. 
 
 CONCEPTION. 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. How conception exists 96 
 
 2. Conception defined 96 
 
 3. Conception of ideas, images, and sentiments — how conditioned?... 96 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. How differ from sensations and perceptions? 96 
 
 2. It differs from memory 97 
 
 3. It is not confined to impressions of past time 97 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MEMORY. 
 SECTIO N I. 
 
 1. Memory defined — what is remembrance ? 98 
 
 2. Memory contains and retains ideas and facts — when voluntary, 
 
 what is it?....' 98 
 
 3. To what is its nature and power closely connected? 99 
 
 4. What follows thinking of an object of memory? 99 
 
 5. Remembering past objects — how are perceptions recalled? 99 
 
 6. Suggestion connected with remembering facts 99 
 
 7. It is a department of association 99 
 
 8. Imagination dependent on memory 99 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Original difference in the power of memory 99 
 
 2. Memory founded upon analogy 100 
 
 3. Embraced in memory. (1.) Sensitive impression of certain men- 
 
 tal state. (2.) Involuntary recurring of impressions. (3.) In- 
 voluntary recurrence of some previous existent 100 
 
 4. It implies suggestion, conception, and perception 101 
 
INDEX. 503 
 
 SECTI ON III. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Local memory defined 101 
 
 2. It contributes to knowledge and belief of truth 101 
 
 3. Degrees in power of memory 101 
 
 4. Philosophic memory — what it embraces 102 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. A ready memory 102 
 
 2. Retentive memory connected with philosophic 102 
 
 3. Artificial memory cultivated 102 
 
 4. Efficient memory retains facts 103 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Decline of memory in the aged 103 
 
 2. It is dependent on perception 103 
 
 3. Weak by defects in attention 103 
 
 4. Memory in the aged not destroyed 104 
 
 5. We must trust memory 104 
 
 6. Should be exercised only with that most important fact 104 
 
 7. Should receive objects to be remembered in natural order 104 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE DURA- 
 TION OF MEMORY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Remembrance defined 105 
 
 2. Implies occurring of facts spontaneously 105 
 
 3. Ease in remembering dependent on tenacity in reception 105 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Recollection defined 105 
 
 2. It differs from remembrance 105 
 
 3. Recollection — when voluntary? 106 
 
 4. Relation in memory, remembrance, and recollection 106 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Duration of memory evidenced in recalling past acts 106 
 
 2. Unexpected recurring of past thoughts and feelings 106 
 
 3. How memory is affected by physical organs 107 
 
 4. How injuries of the head or brain affect memory. Example 107 
 
 5. How affections of body influence memory. Examples 107 
 
 6. What the effect is when the mind is in a state of coma 108 
 
 7. First truths learned, last forgotten 108 
 
 8. Memory will command all it ever possessed, in the day of judgment 108 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ATTENTION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. What is attention? 109 
 
 2. Attention defined by general consent 109 
 
 3. It is a real faculty 109 
 
 4. It can not result from other faculties 109 
 
504 INDEX. 
 
 Pagk. 
 
 5. It is an original power 109 
 
 6. It expresses not only a state, but action — relation to perception... 109 
 
 S ECTION II. 
 
 1. "When attention is voluntary 110 
 
 2. When it is involuntary 110 
 
 3. Successful attention — how conditioned ? 110 
 
 4. Memory dependent on attention 110 
 
 5. Attention first affected by disease 110 
 
 6. Effect of fever, intemperance, and age — is this annihilation? Ill 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ASSOCIATION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Power of association in the mind 112 
 
 2. The act of associating — how conditioned? 112 
 
 3. When it is voluntary 112 
 
 4. It is principally involuntary 112 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Error of philosophers. Power of associating lies back of the act. 113 
 
 2. The acting power is in the mind 113 
 
 3. It is furnished with materials in regard to cause and effect 113 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Related objects suggest facts for association 114 
 
 2. Resemblance aids association 114 
 
 3. Contrast contributes to association 114 
 
 4. It is aided by the law of contiguity of time and place 114 
 
 5. When natural association takes place 114 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. Calling up of facts — when voluntary? 115 
 
 2. Associations recur involuntary 115 
 
 3. Casual associations — how formed? 115 
 
 4. Recurring facts connected with localities 115 
 
 5. Strong impressions connected with localities 116 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Intentional association — volitive 116 
 
 2. How exercised to aid memory 116 
 
 3. Its use in regard to the truth of Christianity against infidelity... 116 
 
 4. How dependent upon human testimony 117 
 
 5. Testimony strengthened by the commemorative rites 117 
 
 6. Such association frees us from doubt as to truth 118 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. Law or laws, used by philosophers, improper 118 
 
 2. Truths may suggest each other 118 
 
 3. How association varies 118 
 
 4. It varies with the strength and energy of emotions 119 
 
 5. How affected by the lapse of time 119 
 
 6. Mental association under volition 119 
 
 7. When they are under indirect volition 120 
 
INDEX. 505 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Influence of association upon correct taste 120 
 
 2. Ideas of fashion vary with association 121 
 
 3. Taste, how influenced "by common and honorable persons 121 
 
 4. Dreadful tendency of improper associations 121 
 
 5. The tendency of correct associations 122 
 
 6. Principles and associations correctly fixed, essential to success... 122 
 
 DIVISION FIFTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MENTAL STATES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Simple mental state defined 123 
 
 2. Two or more elements render it complex 123 
 
 3. Simple mental states, known but undefinable 123 
 
 4. Belief in and reliance on them without doubt 123 
 
 5. They precede those of complex character 123 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Complex states — how conditioned? 124 
 
 2. Many thoughts unite in the soul 124 
 
 3. Complex states in reference to external facts 124 
 
 4. They exist with external objects differing from abstract elements. 124 
 
 5. Complex states result from internal influences 125 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Abstraction defined , 126 
 
 2. It gives us command of many objects 126 
 
 3. It may arise with detected resemblance and difference 126 
 
 4. Mental operations in abstracting facts 127 
 
 5. How we may have particular abstract ideas 127 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. General abstraction applies to classification — when? 128 
 
 2. It applies to almost innumerable classes of objects. 128 
 
 3. Process of abstraction essential 128 
 
 4. How affected by disease 128 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Imagination defined 130 
 
 2. It is not an ulterior element 130 
 
 3. It is closely connected with the understanding 130 
 
 4. It extends to apprehending and contemplating 13}. 
 
 43 
 
506 INDEX. 
 
 Pag*: 
 
 5. It influences mental states 131 
 
 6. It leads in blending elements 132 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. When imagination is involuntary 132 
 
 2. Intentional imagination involves artificial combinations 132 
 
 3. Fictions dependent on imagination 132 
 
 4. Productions of imagination conform to the moral character of . 
 
 authors 132 
 
 5. When they are evil — what the result? 132 
 
 6. It differs from fancy 132 
 
 7. It differs from admiration 133 
 
 8. It differs from fiction — how? 133 
 
 9. It differs from bombast — how? 133 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Imagination differs from burlesque 134 
 
 2. It differs from sarcasm 134 
 
 3. Sympathy not wholly dependent on imagination 134 
 
 4. When imagination can indulge in fiction uninjured 134 
 
 5. Influence of fiction injurious..., 135 
 
 6. Utility and importance of imagination 135 
 
 7. Its importance in description 135 
 
 8. Its activity essential to oratory 135 
 
 9. Painting and poetry dependent on it 136 
 
 10. The sculptor dependent on it. So are admirers of his work 136 
 
 S ECTION IV. 
 
 1. How it may be improved 136 
 
 2. How affected*by disease 136 
 
 3. It is liable to mislead 136 
 
 4. It may lead to deception— in what way?..'. 136 
 
 5. Love of fiction when too strong, dangerous — how? 137 
 
 DIVISION SIXTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL OEIGIN AND 
 
 INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTEENAL OEIGIN. 
 
 SECTIO N I. 
 
 1. Incorrect position of philosophers , 138 
 
 2. Intellectual states of external origin incorrect 138 
 
 2r. Impossibility of such external states 138 
 
 4. No element of mind can be external in origin 139 
 
 5. Absurdity of external mental states 139 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. There are intellectual states of internal origin 139 
 
 2. The origin of all knowledge is in the mind 139 
 
 3. The most ulterior origin of knowledge is with the senses 140 
 
 4. Sensation is followed by a new mental state 140 
 
 5. Simple thoughts and ideas within the soul 140 
 
INDEX. 507 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 SUGGESTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Suggestion defined 141 
 
 2. Simple suggestion natural 141 
 
 3. Notion of self real. Independent of the senses 141 
 
 4. Self-existence not tested by the senses 141 
 
 5. Origin of the idea of mind independent of the senses 142 
 
 6. Origin of the idea of personal identity original with the soul 142 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Suggestion — when involuntary? 142 
 
 2. When it is voluntary 142 
 
 3. Origin of the idea of materiality 142 
 
 4. Origin of the idea of motion dependent on suggestion 143 
 
 5. Dependence upon suggestion for origin of the idea of motion 143 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Origin of the idea of time connected with suggestion 143 
 
 2. Duration measured, called time — what is it unmeasured? 144 
 
 3. Origin of the idea of space intuitive 144 
 
 4. Resemblance ulterior law of suggestion 144 
 
 5. Action of suggestion aided by contrast 144 
 
 6. Extremes of conditions suggest their opposites 145 
 
 7. It takes place when thinking of cotemporaneous existences 145 
 
 8. Its activity depends upon the habit of exercise 145 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 BELATIVE SUGGESTION. 
 SE CTION I. 
 
 1. Suggestion defined 146 
 
 2. Mind affected — in what way? 146 
 
 3. Influences of relation — how arise? 146 
 
 4. How affected by terms of correlative character 147 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Relative suggestion not dependent on the senses 147 
 
 2. Action of senses in regard to hope, love, joy 147 
 
 3. The extent of this power 148 
 
 4. Perfection of the soul disembodied 148 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE JUDGMENT. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Real existence of the judgment 149 
 
 2. What is the judgment? 149 
 
 3. Further defined. 149 
 
 4. Not only the act, but the power of judging 149 
 
 5. Its origin is not of education 150 
 
 6. It determines and finishes action 150 
 
508 INDEX. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 , Page. 
 
 1. When naturally defective attended with uncertainty 150 
 
 2. It presupposes the understanding 151 
 
 3. Condition of the understanding and judgment 151 
 
 4. It is closely connected with reason — how related? 151 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. It attends to agreement or disagreement of things 152 
 
 2. Truthfulness of axioms hased upon it 152 
 
 3. Important to physician's success 152 
 
 4. Decisions — how dependent on it? . 152 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1! It differs from the understanding 153 
 
 2. Closely connected with suggestion 153 
 
 3. It differs from relative suggestion 154 
 
 4. Importance of correct judgment 154 
 
 DIVISION SEVENTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 SEASON. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Reason defined 156 
 
 2. Its power 156 
 
 3. Ratiocination — how established? 156 
 
 4. Reason, a power and action 157 
 
 5. It differs from the understanding 157 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Its power in the mind 157 
 
 2. Intuitive facts and self-evident truths not tested by it 157 
 
 3. Self-evident truths divided. (1.) Those which lie at the founda- 
 
 tion of mind. (2.) Those appertaining to external things 158 
 
 4. Intuitive principles the origin of knowledge 158 
 
 5. With these is. the origin of the knowledge of self 158 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. With this power is confidence in uniformity of nature's laws.... 159 
 
 2. Confidence in uniformity of phenomena gives origin to the idea 
 
 of causation 159 
 
 3. Universal confidence in truths — how with those denying them?... 160 
 
 4. Ground of skeptic's belief 160 
 
 5. Difference between argumentation and mere action 161 
 
 6. Reason differs from consciousness 161 
 
 7. It differs from the power of the senses 162 
 
 8. It differs from the judgment 162 
 
 9. It differs from the understanding 162 
 
 10. With this power is convictions of right and wrong 162 
 
 11. With it arise ideas of the beautiful and sublime 162 
 
INDEX. 509 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 REASONING. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Reasoning defined 164 
 
 2. It is destructive to atheism 164 
 
 3. The two modes of argumentation — what are they? 164 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Non-existence of First Cause impossible 165 
 
 2. All his essence and attributes self-existing 165 
 
 3. All his attributes unoriginated — why? 165 
 
 4. He must exist every-where — why? 166 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. He must be precisely the same in every place 167 
 
 2. Can not be materiality 167 
 
 3. What if matter and motion were eternal? 167 
 
 4. Such being possesses inlinite wisdom and power 168 
 
 5. Existence of more than one such being impossible — why? 168 
 
 6. His acts are not arbitrary or of necessity 168 
 
 7. Omnipotence does not necessitate his knowledge 169 
 
 8. True object of man's creation 169 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. What is the second mode of reasoning ? 169 
 
 2. Creation proves his existence 170 
 
 3. The heavens declare his being and power 170 
 
 4. Earthly existences appeal to the same as true 170 
 
 5. Order of providence proves his reality 170 
 
 6. Evidences in life, sleep, vision, and muscular action 171 
 
 7. Evidence in the circulation of the blood — how? 171 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Evidence in the motion of the heart 172 
 
 2. Cause of the motion of the blood disproved. (1.) How apply 
 
 stimulus? (2.) What of the contractions ? 172 
 
 3. Unwearied action of the heart 172 
 
 4. Relations of reason and reasoning 173 
 
 5. Reasoning, a certain source of knowledge 173 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. Effect, the object of reasoning 174 
 
 2. What is reasoning a priori? 174 
 
 3. Reasoning a posteriori — how different? 174 
 
 4. Three things necessary to reasoning. (1.) Correct premises. (2.) 
 
 All added truths must be correct. (3.) Caution in building the 
 argument , 175 
 
 5. Correct reasoning depends upon attention and judgment 175 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 1. Mathematical reasoning denned 175 
 
 2. How dependent upon intuitive power 176 
 
 3. All knowledge dependent upon primary elements of mind 176 
 
 4. Mental and moral reasoning worthy of all confidence 176 
 
 5. Character of demonstrative reasoning 176 
 
510 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 6. Investigative reasoning defined 176 
 
 7. When false investigative reasoning takes place.. 177 
 
 8. False reasoning can 'take place. (1.) In assuming a proposi- 
 
 tion. (2.) By confusing each step. (3.) Wrong beginning of 
 argument. (4.) By petitio principii. (5.) By assuming a prin- 
 ciple 177 
 
 (6.) Arises in sophistical use of terms 178 
 
 9. Influenced properly 178 
 
 10. Prejudice affects it 178 
 
 DIVISION EIGHTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DREAMING. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Dreaming defined 179 
 
 2. Wholly involuntary 179 
 
 3. Common to all persons , 179 
 
 4. Mental dreaming 179 
 
 5. Such mental states not to be depended on 180 
 
 6. Caused by physical debility 180 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. No fixed law of conformity 180 
 
 2. New facts may arise in dreams 181 
 
 3. Conceptions of length of time 181 
 
 4. They are not confined to old conceptions 181 
 
 5. Cause of them unknown 181 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CLAIRVOYANCE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. It does not properly belong to this work 182 
 
 2. Clairvoyance defined 182 
 
 3. Attributed to mesmeric state 182 
 
 4. Not common to mind 182 
 
 S ECTION II. 
 
 1. How unaccountable in nature 183 
 
 2. How far true 183 
 
 3. It is natural to some constitutions 183 
 
 4. When innocent 184 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SOMNAMBULISM. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. What is somnambulism? 185 
 
 2. It differs from dreaming 185 
 
 3. Knowledge of talking in sleep 185 
 
 4. Such talking the first degrees of somnambulism 186 
 
INDEX. 511 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Pack. 
 
 1. It differs from dreaming ]86 
 
 2. Muscles powerless in sleep active in the former 187 
 
 3. Absence of fear 187 
 
 4. Effect of paroxysms 187 
 
 5. Unconsciousness of some persons 187 
 
 6. Effect of somnambulency 188 
 
 7. Spirit has sight 188 
 
 8. Mind is ever active 188 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 MESMERISM. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Mesmerism denned 189 
 
 2. The act of mesmerizing not a new discovery 189 
 
 3. Its relation to somnambulism — how natural? 189 
 
 4. Who are capable of being mesmerized 190 
 
 5. Some wholly unconscious when thus influenced — how affected by 
 
 will? 190 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Phrenology not established by mesmerism 190 
 
 2. Can they be affected by will? 191 
 
 3. Effort to counteract muscular position 191 
 
 4. Others unconscious will converse 191 
 
 5. Natural mystery < 192 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. What is the basis of phrenology? 193 
 
 2. Outlines true, but physiognomy more to be depended upon 193 
 
 3. Important points to be settled 193 
 
 4. Truths necessary to constitute it a science 194 
 
 5. That which must be true or settled — what difficulty mentioned? 194 
 
 6. The brain the organ, the faculties must be settled 194 
 
 7. The skull-bone not mental development 194 
 
 8. Formation of the skull and brain 195 
 
 9. Lobes of the brain and mental powers 195 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Lobes must connect with the skull — how? 195 
 
 2. Agreement of philosophers 196 
 
 3. Mind wholly dependent on materiality for action, untrue 196 
 
 4. Pvesults in materialism and annihilation 196 
 
 5. Power of material organs 196 
 
 6. Effect of injuries on the head 197 
 
 7. Brain diseased — examples 197 
 
 8. Brain removed — examples 198 
 
 9. Fracture of skull— how affected ? 198 
 
 10. These facts beyond the claims of phrenology — apology offered... 198 
 
 11. General principles only true 198 
 
512 INDEX. 
 
 DIVISION NINTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 REFLECTION. 
 SECTI ON I. 
 
 PaGK. 
 
 1. Reflection defined 199 
 
 2. Thoughts thrown back upon themselves 199 
 
 3. When involuntary? 199 
 
 4. When voluntary? 199 
 
 5. Connected with reason and remembering 199 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Exercise of reflection calls other powers into action 200 
 
 2. Connected with these arises internal convictions 200 
 
 3. Convictions of realities 200 
 
 4. With reflection is conviction of truths , 200 
 
 5. Its importance avoiding danger 200 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 APPARITIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Nature and character of apparitions 201 
 
 2. Caused by disease 201 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The retina— how affected? 201 
 
 2. Internal excitement — its powers and influence 201 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Spectral illusions defined 203 
 
 2. An instance given 203 
 
 3. Images of persons which seem to appear — examples 203 
 
 4. Admonition of death 204 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Effect of nyctalopia 204 
 
 2. Influence of epileptic fits 205 
 
 3. Influence of febrile diseases — case given 205 
 
 4. Effect of highly-excited imagination 205 
 
 5. Uncertainty of knowledge by the senses 206 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SPIRIT-RAPPING. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Effect of necromancy 207 
 
 2. Spirit-rapping a delusion 207 
 
 3. Uncertain knowledge of mediums 207 
 
 4. Pvighteousness of such claims 208 
 
 5. That spirits can reveal facts is either true or false 208 
 
INDEX. 513 
 
 Page. 
 
 6. If of God— the object 209 
 
 7. Righteous messages must have pure mediums 209 
 
 8. The character of such messages 209 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Our suspicion if the tidings are impure 209 
 
 2. Right to reject if from Satan 209 
 
 3. Forced to believe in demonology . 210 
 
 4. Design in referring to this subject 210 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BOEDEEINGON INSANITY. 
 
 SECTIO N I. 
 
 1. What are excited conceptions bordering on insanity ? 211 
 
 2. A strong mind connected with weak nerves 211 
 
 3. Defects by disease or effort 211 
 
 4. Effect of general debility 211 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Mind of itself incapable of such conceptions 212 
 
 2. The effect of joy 212 
 
 3. Effect of grief or despair 212 
 
 4. Effect of physical organs 212 
 
 5. Effect of febrile influences 212 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PAETIAL INSANITY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Effect of partial insanity 214 
 
 2. When partially insane 214 
 
 3. Variations of mind 215 
 
 4. Affection of faculties 215 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Influence of insanity on the judgment 215 
 
 2. It may be connected with original suggestion 215 
 
 3. Power of association may act imperfectly 215 
 
 4. Sensations may deceive us 216 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 TOTAL INSANITY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. What constitutes insanity? 217 
 
 2. The work of insanity 217 
 
 3. Power of mental action may cease — how? 217 
 
 4. Influence of one impression 217 
 
 5. The character of mania 218 
 
 6. Hallucinations of a maniac 218 
 
 7. Common characteristics of maniacs 218 
 
 8. Total insanity 219 
 
514 INDEX 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Hallucinations suspended and revived again 219 
 
 2. Modulations accounted for 220 
 
 3. Character of the insanity of the maniac 220 
 
 4. General character of derangement — death revolting 220 
 
 5. Another character vicious 221 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Insanity — melancholia defined 222 
 
 2. It differs from mania 222 
 
 3. Differs in regard to suicide 223 
 
 4. Not committed by maniacs... 223 
 
 5. Melancholia leads to suicide ■. 223 
 
 6. Such crime is of choice 223 
 
 7. The self-murder has some reason 224 
 
 8. Proof that such persons are not totally insane 224 
 
 9. Knowledge of its criminality 224 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Hallucination under melancholia 225 
 
 2. Intention of suicide abandoned 226 
 
 3. Total derangement is lost to suicide 226 
 
 4. Hallucination to commit murder 226 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 IDIOCY. 
 SECTI ON I. 
 
 1. Idiocy defined 228 
 
 2. Character of fatuity 228 
 
 3. Orders of criticism 228 
 
 4. A higher class 229 
 
 5. An idiot always so 229 
 
 6. It is incurable in this life 229 
 
 7. The mind abstractly sane — sane in the future 229 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Influence of bodily organs over memory 230 
 
 2. Influence overhearing 230 
 
 3. Influence over sight 231 
 
 4. Cause of idiocy wholly of materiality 231 
 
 5. If caused by sin the soul will be happy in the future 231 
 
 DIVISION TENTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The soul has knowledge within itself 232 
 
 2. Power of knowledge connected with intuition 232 
 
INDEX. 515 
 
 Page. 
 
 3. Primary power of knowledge mental 233 
 
 4. Knowledge from the senses secondary 233 
 
 5. Apprehension connected with immaterial essence 233 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knowledge by the senses internal in origin 233 
 
 2. Internal origin of ideas defined 234 
 
 3. Primary origin connected with intuition 234 
 
 4. Extended to complex ideas 234 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THEDOCTEINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 CONTRASTED IN THE EXAMINATION OF THAT 
 
 WHICH EESEIBLES MIND IN BRUTES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Introductory statement 235 
 
 2. Inactive and expansive matter 235 
 
 3. Life of timber or vegetation in graded scale 236 
 
 4. Animated life... 236 
 
 5. Superadded power of brutes 237 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Brutes differ from inert matter 237 
 
 2. They have power of self-action 237 
 
 3. Power of senses 237 
 
 4. Instinct is mind 237 
 
 5. Volition in animal action 237 
 
 6. Brutes have knowledge of courses 23S 
 
 7. The horse and dog know by sight and hearing 238 
 
 8. They have something of comparison — examples , 238 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Powers of man differ from the brute 239 
 
 2. The human mind scientific 239 
 
 3. Capable of progressive improvement 239 
 
 4. Self-consciousness essential to knowledge 240 
 
 5. Man a moral agent — how different? 240 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The dog capable of being taught 240 
 
 2. Animals learned to dance — error of philosophers 240 
 
 3. Recollection of the horse — example 241 
 
 4. Meaning of the Hebrew term ruach— -how extended? 241 
 
 5. The spirit of brutes immortal 241 
 
 6. Condition of brutes before the fall of man — what of the future ? 242 
 
 7. They were not made to be annihilated 242 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 INTUITIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Mature of intuitions 243 
 
 2. Origin of such power 243 
 
516 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 3. Intuition faculties 243 
 
 4. Reciprocal relations 243 
 
 5. How ideas arise 244 
 
 6. Simple ideas arise without classification 244 
 
 7. General ideas — how arise? 244 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Nature of spontaneous action 244 
 
 2. When they are apprehended 244 
 
 3. "With these is the conviction of self 245 
 
 4. Nature of the knowledge of self 245 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 C M M N-S ENSE, 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Common-sense defined 246 
 
 2. Immediate decision of reason 246 
 
 3. Mental affirmations — how common to all mind? 246 
 
 4. Common-sense not a faculty of mind ? 246 
 
 5. It commences with real affirmations of mind 247 
 
 6. It involves a general understanding of facts 247 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. It is affirmations common to all minds — what of the reverse? 247 
 
 2. Guides, in correct investigations 247 
 
 3. It is indispensable to a well-regulated mind....... 247 
 
 DIVISION ELEVENTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 VOLITION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Volition defined 249 
 
 2. Act of willing and determined choice 249 
 
 3. Prominent error — how incorrect? 249 
 
 4. Volition, self-freedom 249 
 
 5. Power of volition either true or false 250 
 
 6. Error of philosophers — how absurd? 250 
 
 7. Volition is more than simple action 250 
 
 8. It is an internal power 250 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Volitions differ from volition 250 
 
 2. True nature mysterious 251 
 
 3. It exists with or without an object c... 251 
 
 4. It is dependent on an object, without one it ceases to be 251 
 
 5. Its existence is not wholly in other elements 251 
 
 6. Its existence real 252 
 
 7. It exists without belief in possibilities 252 
 
 8. It differs from volitive action 252 
 
INDEX. 517 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Page, 
 
 1. Volition and desire not the same 252 
 
 2. Difference tested by consciousness 253 
 
 3. It differs from desire in sudden chance — in what respect? 253 
 
 4. If of necessity it acted, we would have no standard of morality... 254 
 
 5. How are we led by motive ? 254 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. It has various degrees of strength 255 
 
 2. Degrees apply to force of action 255 
 
 3. Volition differs from feeling 255 
 
 4. It extends self-action of body and mind 255 
 
 5. It embraces more than mere action 255 
 
 6. It differs from choice — in what way? 256 
 
 7. It has power to act or refuse action 256 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 1. Volition is anterior to choice » 256 
 
 2. Antecedent volitive power with an alternative choosing 257 
 
 3. Choosing is free 257 
 
 4. It is either free or bound — if the latter, what the result? 257 
 
 5. False proposition of philosophers 258 
 
 6. Motive can invoke nothing more 258 
 
 7. Motive proves preexisting volition 258 
 
 8. Volitions spontaneous — how? 259 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 1. Motive can not control the Divine Mind — error of Drs. Edwards 
 
 and Upham 259 
 
 2. Such views lead to materialism 260 
 
 3. Motive can not govern volition » 260 
 
 4. Motive and choice can not govern volition 260 
 
 5. Action free from consciousness 261 
 
 6. Established from consciousness of accountability 261 
 
 SE CTIO N V II . 
 
 1. More conscious of voluntary choosing than of the objects of choice 262 
 
 2. Resolving to act according to motive after it is discovered 263 
 
 3. Self-preservation strongest motive 263 
 
 4. Law of motive-necessity contrary to consciousness 263 
 
 5. We are conscious of power to amend past acts could they be re- 
 
 called 264 
 
 6. We are conscious of right and wrong in others or we could not 
 
 judge them 264 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 1. Conscious liberty evident in regard to present time 264 
 
 2. Error of philosophers 264 
 
 3. Ground of accountability — how conditioned? 265 
 
 4. Naturally possessed of volition 265 
 
 5. Error of Mr. Stewart 265 
 
 6. Volition is more than action 266 
 
 7. Error of Mr. Upham 266 
 
 8. Volition and the will not distinct mental powers. (1.) Volition 
 
 refers to natural liberty. (2.) Will refers to the same power 
 fully manifested 266 
 
518 INDEX 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE WILL. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. The will defined 267 
 
 2. Its nature liberty-power 267 
 
 3. It has determining power 267 
 
 4. Is closely connected with the judgment — how? 267 
 
 5. The understanding can not control the will 267 
 
 6. Relation of reason to the will 268 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Error of philosophers as to order objected to — how wrong? 268 
 
 2. Relation of the will to other faculties 268 
 
 3. Feeling, thinking, and willing distinct — in what way? 268 
 
 4. The ground of objection to the error of " laws of the will " 269 
 
 5. Philosophers can not by this refer to material laws 269 
 
 6. Certainly they do not refer it to Deity 269 
 
 7. They can not refer to any other faculty 269 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. " Laws of the will," as used by philosophers, incorrect 269 
 
 2. The will is governed by its own action 270 
 
 3. Absurdity of contingent action of the will, as used by them 270 
 
 4. If mind has self-action the condition is freedom 270 
 
 5. Error of Mr. Upham and others that the "will has its laws pre- 
 
 liminary to that of its freedom " 270 
 
 6. Error of Mr. Upham that " will is subject to laws and prelimi- 
 
 nary fact" 271 
 
 7. Error of that freedom is only to act according to necessity 271 
 
 8. Sophistical positions of philosophers trammeling the will. Exam- 
 
 ine them 271 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The will may be influenced by desire 272 
 
 2. Voluntary and involuntary desires.. 272 
 
 3. Will not controlled by choice 273 
 
 4. Nature of choice implies possibility of a different selection 273 
 
 5. Choice either free or bound 273 
 
 6. It can not control the will 274 
 
 section v. 
 
 1. Mr. Upham's position that will is governed by motive — how in- 
 
 correct? 274 
 
 2. What is motive? 274 
 
 3. To govern will it must act anterior to it 274 
 
 4. Object of motive governs the will 275 
 
 5. Absurdity of motive governing the mind of man and Deity. Mr. 
 
 Upham's statement. Motive over all beings 275 
 
 6. Motive in the Divine Mind is subordinate to volitions — how ?... 275 
 
 7. Our knowledge of spirit-knowledge not of infinite necessity 276 
 
 8. Motive has no power to control volitions 276 
 
 9. Will determined by the greatest good — error of Mr. Edwards... 277 
 10. The will untrammeled, a matter of consciousness — what evidence ? 277 
 
INDEX. 519 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Term " free will " objectionable — what is will? 279 
 
 2. It is subject only to the law of self-liberty 279 
 
 3. Doctrine of liberty established by consciousness 280 
 
 4. Will can act contrary to motive or refuse action 280 
 
 5. Laws of the will absurd — it knows no law but liberty 280 
 
 6. I may determine to act and suspend it at pleasure 280 
 
 7. All efforts to sustain fatality is reasoning in a circle 280 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Spirit of dependence can not exist without liberty 281 
 
 2. Necessity can not mellow the feelings of the heart 281 
 
 3. Deity can not execute the laws of infinite fate 281 
 
 4. Man could only be created and exist in freedom 282 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Difference between liberty and power 282 
 
 2. Freedom of the will evidenced from self-preservation 283 
 
 3. Self-determining power of the will 283 
 
 4. Freedom to act according to fate. Error of Mr. Upham 284 
 
 5. Sophistry and error of Mr. Edwards against the will determining 
 
 the will 284 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. The superior power of the will 285 
 
 2. True ground of offense in the sight of God 285 
 
 3. Xo offense only connected with voluntariness 285 
 
 4. The will possesses mandatory power 285 
 
 5. The will presides over the mind 285 
 
 6. Error in confounding will with the sensibilities 285 
 
 7. Evidence of freedom in that we can will impossibilities 286 
 
 8. Such is the will, free liberty-power 286 
 
520 INDEX, 
 
 PART II. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND 
 
 WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION. 
 
 DIVISION FIRST. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Pagb. 
 
 1. Analysis of Moral Elements of Mind — how differing from the 
 
 first part? 291 
 
 2. The second part defines moral elements — what of their charac- 
 
 ter? 291 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Correct understanding of intellectual and moral elements import- 
 
 ant 291 
 
 2. Study of mind the great science of earth 292 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 REAL EXISTENCE OF MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Moral powers real 293 
 
 2. Such existences evidenced in childhood 293 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Conscious belief in moral faculties .' 293 
 
 2. Revelation appeals to the moral nature 293 
 
 3. They exist — evidenced in the requirements of Deity 294 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Nature and condition of moral faculties 295 
 
 2. Moral nature evidenced by pure or impure motive 295 
 
 3. Evidenced in the harmony and peace of governments 295 
 
 4. Evidenced in our capability of feelings of joy or sorrow 295 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Moral powers relative to the whole mind. (1,) Refers to rela- 
 tive claims of the two classes. (2.) Direction of mental action 
 and of moral action , 29§ 
 
INDEX, 521 
 
 DIVISION SECOND. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 SECTION I. Page . 
 
 1. Conscience a primary power 297 
 
 2. A power in knowing self 297 
 
 3. Knowledge of external facts — how traced to this faculty ? 297 
 
 4. How belief is affected by it 297 
 
 5. Scripture evidence of conscience. 297 
 
 6. Positive existence of our moral nature 298 
 
 7. Scripture descriptions of the nature and power of conscience.... 298 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Belief in the existence and power of conscience 298 
 
 2. Its superior independence 298 
 
 3. High jurisdiction by general concurrence 299 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL AND RELATIVE LAWS OF CON- 
 SCIENCE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Conscience does not say what is right or wrong anterior to self.. 300 
 
 2. Does not settle the origin of the law of self-being 300 
 
 3. It decides on right and wrong in regard to self 300 
 
 4. Assumes as settled the principles of moral rectitude 300 
 
 5. Its law leads in deciding on self-right or wrong 300 
 
 6. It is a law to man 300 
 
 7. It should be guided by the will of Heaven 301 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Conscience not a power — error of a great mind 301 
 
 2. Self-power and intuitive right 301 
 
 3. Conscience — conception 301 
 
 4. Conscience — perception 301 
 
 5. Moral condition and ulterior laws of conscience. (1.) A right 
 
 conscience. (2.) A pure conscience. (3.) Character of such 
 
 conscience 302 
 
 6. When it is evil 302 
 
 7. When seared 302 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Relation of conscience and consciousness 303 
 
 2. Consciousness is conscience in action 303 
 
 3. Internal sense or decision 303 
 
 4. When called perception 303 
 
 5. Consciousness independent of proof 303 
 
 6. How it is sustained 304 
 
 7. It is self-recognition 304 
 
 44 
 
522 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 8. Self-consciousness implies, (1.) Inherent knowledge of self. 
 
 (2.) What its subjects. (3.) Objects of ulterior knowledge.... 304 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Conditioned by spontaneous law 304 
 
 2. Not a result of other faculties 304 
 
 3. In it is decisive power in regard to mental phenomena 304 
 
 4. Origin of the knowledge of personal identity 305 
 
 5. It has direct respect to the present 305 
 
 6. Error — it is not a second source of knowledge 305 
 
 7. Degrees of belief connected with consciousness, and intuitive 305 
 
 8. Contrasted feelings prove the identity of self 306 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. It is a primary source of knowledge. (1.) Source. (2.) Source. 
 
 (3.) Source 306 
 
 2. It is the test of all moral and religious feelings 306 
 
 3. Truthfulness of a heart-felt religion 306 
 
 4. Importance of moral purity 307 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE HE AET . 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The heart material and spiritual 308 
 
 2. Character of the physical heart 308 
 
 3. Unweariedness — how relative? 308 
 
 4. The heart not an element of mind 308 
 
 5. Its nature and condition...., 308 
 
 6. Its power — how influenced? (1.) By the judgment. (2.) The 
 
 will. (3.) By memory 309 
 
 S ECTIO N II. 
 
 1. It is influenced by moral elements of mind. (1.) By conscience. 
 
 (2.) Relation to evil and good. (3.) Its action influenced by 
 
 love 309 
 
 2. Scripture testimony and descriptions of the heart 310 
 
 3. Depraved heart 310 
 
 4. Hardness of heart... 310 
 
 5. Pure heart 310 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. It is the central power of the soul 310 
 
 2. Restrained — how checked? 311 
 
 3. True eloquence never connected with an unfeeling heart 311 
 
 4. It bears up the burden of the soul 311 
 
 5. It should always be ruled by love 311 
 
 DIVISION THIRD. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTERNAL MORAL POWER IN THE ORIGIN OF 
 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Original powers possess knowledge of self 312 
 
 2. Natural power of such elements 312 
 
INDEX. 523 
 
 Page. 
 
 3. Primary mental and moral powers 312 
 
 4. Moral elements important 312 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Conscience — how connected with origin of knowledge 312 
 
 2. Nature and essence of such faculties 313 
 
 3. Internal ideas — how they arise 313 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE SOUL HAS ONLY THEEE GENEEAL SOURCES OF 
 
 KNOWLEDGE: 1. INHEEENT. 2. DIEECT. 
 
 3. ULTEEIOE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Inherent knowledge defined 314 
 
 2. Power and origin of knowledge 314 
 
 3. How identified 314 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knowledge direct defined 314 
 
 2. Capability of spirit to move spirit 314 
 
 3. The soul has spiritual perception and sight 315 
 
 4. Knowledge immaterial in nature. 315 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Knowledge by means of the senses imperfect 315 
 
 2. Such organs no power to act — how deceptious « 315 
 
 3. The soul's active power 315 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHEISTIANITY AND INFI- 
 DELITY—HOW TESTED BY THE MOEAL ELE- 
 MENTS OF MIND — OEIGIN OF BELIEF. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Such claims tested by moral powers 316 
 
 2. Infidelity either true or false 316 
 
 3. Consistent infidelity must be such always in nature 316 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Three general classes of evidence of the truth of Christianity. 
 
 (1.) External. (2.) Internal. (3.) Experimental 316 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHEISTIANITY AND INFI- 
 DELITY — EVIDENCE OF SPIEITUAL INFLUENCE 
 AND PAEDON — CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE DE- 
 EIVED FEOM THEEE SOUECES: 1. INHEE- 
 ENT. 2. DIEECT. 3. ULTEEIOE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Inherent knowledge — how defined? 318 
 
 2. Consciousness, relation, and power 318 
 
 3. Feeling— how known? »»*.*. 318 
 
524 INDEX. 
 
 SECTION II. Pagk 
 
 1. Knowledge direct — evidence of spirit with spirit. (1.) Spirit 
 
 adapted to spirit. (2.) Conscious of spiritual change.. 319 
 
 2. Ulterior or third source of knowledge by physical organs. (1.) 
 
 Inertness deceptious. (2.) By paralysis or disease, not so of 
 spirit 319 
 
 DIVISION FOURTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CONDITION AND PECULIAE STATES OF THE 
 
 MOEAL NATURE OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Unchanging purposes of God in regard to the soul 320 
 
 2. Conscience at the foundation of the moral constitution..... 320 
 
 3. Faith natural to our nature. (1.) Faith of credence. (2.) Faith 
 
 of reliance. (3.) Faith of assurance 320 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Moral dreaming defined 321 
 
 2. Mental dreaming accidental 321 
 
 3. Moral dreaming — how true? 321 
 
 4. Such impressions — how from God ? 321 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE MORAL NATURE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Relation of the will to other faculties 322 
 
 2. Term will implies freedom — what if bound? 322 
 
 3. Liberty in the fall of man. (1.) The act after foreknowledge. 
 
 (2.) The act and foreknowledge one in essence. (3.) The act 
 before foreknowledge 322 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Decree after foreknowledge impossible , 323 
 
 2. The decree and foreknowledge not one in essence 323 
 
 3. Such decree could not precede foreknowledge 323 
 
 4. Angels appear to have been created with self-liberty 324 
 
 5. Liberty essential to the existence of intellectual man 324 
 
 6. Liberty natural to the soul 324 
 
 DIVISION FIFTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRIMARY EMOTIONS IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED 
 WITH THE MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions defined 325 
 
 2. Connection with elements 325 
 
INDEX. 525 
 
 3. Conscience extends to the basis of emotions 325 
 
 4. Emotions differ from desires 325 
 
 5. Nature as arising between action of mind and sense of rectitude. 326 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Character of moral emotions — how changed? 326 
 
 2. The order of succession. (1.) Mental states. (2.) Emotions. 
 
 (3.) Desires 326 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS, OR EMOTIONS OP 
 MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Primary moral emotions 327 
 
 2. Origin of emotions of approval and disapproval 327 
 
 3. That there are no emotions but approval and disapproval absurd. 327 
 
 4. When experienced. (1.) In regard to objects of the external 
 
 world. (2.) Spiritual perception 327 
 
 5. Error in regard to perceptions 327 
 
 6. Error — emotions not the basis of moral rectitude 328 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Moral emotions — how changed? 328 
 
 2. Conscience — perception — how conditioned? 328 
 
 3. It gives law to emotions 328 
 
 4. Absurdity of Mr. Upham 328 
 
 5. Acts of kindness approved 329 
 
 6. Vicious acts — how rejected? 329 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF MORAL 
 APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Objects of such emotions moral agents. (1.) Such agents power 
 
 of self-action. (2.) Have self-cogitation. (3.) Have a moral 
 nature 330 
 
 2. Only such have knowledge of moral action........ 330 
 
 S ECTION II. 
 
 1. Secondary objects embrace, (1.) All objects of self-action. (2.) 
 Deportment. (3.) Expressions spoken. (4.) Sentiments writ- 
 ten 331 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SIMPLE PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 1. Simple emotions numerous. (1.) Joy. (2.) Strength. (3.) Re- 
 gard. (4.) Revenge. (5.) Surprise. (6.) Astonishment 332 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Emotions of melancholy. (1.) Dissatisfaction. (2.) Distrust. 
 
 (3.) Depression 333 
 
526 INDEX. 
 
 Pagb. 
 
 2. Sorrow — when experienced? 333 
 
 3. Grief — when arises? 333 
 
 4. Dissatisfaction — how originated? 333 
 
 5. When emotions of displeasure arise 333 
 
 6. "When those of disgust 333 
 
 7. Character of those of wonder 333 
 
 8. Emotions of delight 333 
 
 9. Gladness denned . 333 
 
 10. Character of those of modesty 333 
 
 11. When we experience emotions of shame 333 
 
 DIVISION SIXTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 SECONDAEY MOEAL EMOTIONS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of moral beauty — how conditioned? 334 
 
 2. Error — moral emotions are natural 334 
 
 3. Objects of such emotions may exist in the mind's states 334 
 
 4. Affections of moral beauty imply a negative 334 
 
 5. Perceptions excite happiness 334 
 
 6. Such emotions are connected with perceptions of virtue 334 
 
 7. Contemplating pure acts gives origin to such emotions 334 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The contemplation of angels — how affected? .'... 335 
 
 2. Moral beauty made known by moral emotions., 335 
 
 3. Such emotions a fountain of joy 335 
 
 4. Experienced in contemplating the character of Deity. (1.) By 
 
 internal perception. (2.) Divine Goodness impressed in cre- 
 ation 335 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EMOTIONS OF MOEAL BEAUTY FEOM ASSOCIATED 
 
 OBJECTS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of moral beauty natural 336 
 
 2. A single object beautiful 336 
 
 3. Objects beautiful by association 336 
 
 4. How they arise amid scenes at Jerusalem , 336 
 
 5. Feelings on revisiting the place of our reform in life 337 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The mind's capacity to enjoy emotions from associated objects.. 337 
 
 2. Moral purity an element of such emotions .". 337 
 
 3. Such purity in moral beings 337 
 
 4. Moral purity apprehends internally 337 
 
 5. Extent of emotions of moral beauty 337 
 
INDEX. 527 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EMOTIONS OF MORAL SUBLIMITY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Emotions of moral sublimity defined 338 
 
 2. Character of that which excites such emotions 338 
 
 3. Fortitude in sustaining right — example 338 
 
 4. Unyielding purpose to do good 339 
 
 5. Example of a persecuted Christian 339 
 
 6. How capable of internal feelings ? 339 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Knowledge of such emotions dependent on the heart 339 
 
 2. Character of emotions connected with a bad heart 339 
 
 3. Character of emotions of purity 339 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 NATURE OF EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICEOUS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Such emotions not wholly moral in origin 340 
 
 2. Can not exist when moral faculties are depressed 340 
 
 3. Their character 340 
 
 4. They may arise with our thoughts 340 
 
 5. They arise with a cheerful state of mind 340 
 
 6. When involuntary 340 
 
 7. Such emotions properly guarded. (1.) How important 340 
 
 (2.) How essential to health. (3.) If not guarded, revolting. 341 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Wit defined 341 
 
 2. Its character 341 
 
 3. Closely connected with humor 341 
 
 4. Humor less poignant than wit 341 
 
 5. The former evidence of a pleasant disposition 341 
 
 6. Character of levity 342 
 
 7. Extravagance of mirthful emotions 342 
 
 8. It tends to dissipation 342 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 LANGUOR. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. What it refers to 343 
 
 2. Influence of intense and continued mental effort 343 
 
 3. How affected by the organs of sense 343 
 
 4. It arises in connection with disease 343 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. It is not the essence of mind 343 
 
 2. Caused by diseased physical powers 343 
 
 3. How it is a check 343 
 
 4. It is limited to this life 344 
 
528 INDEX 
 
 DIVISION SEVENTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PEIMAET EMOTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE EX- 
 ISTENCE, ACTION, AND INFLUENCE OF 
 THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Emotions of beauty primary 345 
 
 2. How objects of emotions may exist 345 
 
 3. Relation of primary emotions 345 
 
 4. Emotions of beauty always interesting 345 
 
 5. Conscious knowledge of such emotions.... 345 
 
 6. Emotions change with perceptions 345 
 
 7. Emotions change with great varieties and qualities in objects... 346 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Influence of beautiful objects 346 
 
 2. Some objects possess an awe of grandeur 346 
 
 3. A milder class of emotions 346 
 
 4. The grounds of emotions of beauty. (1.) Beauty — when indi- 
 
 visible? (2.) Excited by spiritual influences. (3.) Caused by 
 
 external objects — an absurdity met ; 347 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PEIMAEY EMQTIONS OF BEAUTY CONNECTED WITH 
 THE INTELLECTUAL AND MOEAL ELE- 
 MENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Emotions of beauty within the mind 348 
 
 2. The mind — how influenced by objects of beauty? 348 
 
 3. Influence of a falling cascade 348 
 
 4. The same power affected by various objects 348 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Examination of objects of beauty 349 
 
 2. How strong emotions arise 349 
 
 3. They arise in contemplating the majesty of nature 349 
 
 4. Character of intrinsic beauty 349 
 
 (1.) Oval objects. (2.) Circles. (3.) Circular forms or action. 
 (4.) Beauty in motion. 350 
 
 5. Beauty in reasoning 350 
 
 6. Beauty in axioms and propositions 350 
 
 7. Beauty connected with poetry 350 
 
 8. Beauty in a picture 351 
 
 9. Beauty in music 351 
 
 10. Beauty in sound 351 
 
 11. It is original with some brutes 351 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Intellectual beings surpass all earthly objects of beauty 351 
 
 2. Man an object of beauty 351 
 
INDEX. 529 
 
 Pagk, 
 
 3. Beautiful characterized with moral worth 352 
 
 4. Woman equal to man in essence of intellectual being. 352 
 
 5. Woman of high moral attainments worthy of confidence — an ob- 
 
 ject of beauty by general consent 353 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SECONDARY EMOTIONS OP BEAUTY CONNECTED 
 
 WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Secondary emotions of beauty 354 
 
 2. We can experience two classes 354 
 
 3. Objects producing unpleasant emotions 354 
 
 4. Beauty of forms 354 
 
 5. Contrast of straight and angular forms 355 
 
 6. Effect of changing seasons 355 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Beauty in the form of circle, square, and cubical 355 
 
 2. Each style in architecture — how connected with beauty? 355 
 
 3. Beauty in colors 356 
 
 4. Beauty in colors evidenced by the conduct of savages 356 
 
 5. Effect upon persons restored to sight 356 
 
 6. Contrasted beauty in motion 356 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Emotions of beauty affected by the character of motion. (1.) Mo- 
 
 tion in a direct line. (2.) Regular motion. (3.) Uniform ac- 
 celerated. (4.) Quickness and slowness. (5.) Slowness of 
 
 motion 357 
 
 2. Objects of beauty may be intellectual 357 
 
 3. They arise in the mind 358 
 
 4. Caused by moral objects 358 
 
 5. Power to know pleasing emotions 358 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY IN THE PHYS- 
 ICAL, SPIRITUAL, AND MORAL WORLDS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Material objects of beauty 359 
 
 2. A single sound has intrinsic beauty 359 
 
 3. A single color has intrinsic beauty 359 
 
 4. Bright luster of morning — when beautiful? 359 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The soul's power to know facts 359 
 
 2. Intellectual facts cause pleasure 360 
 
 3. Power to force investigation 360 
 
 4. Truth of moral feelings 360 
 
 5. Contrasted truths 360 
 
 6. Infinite protection in trial 360 
 
 7. Almighty goodness gives pleasure , 360 
 
 45 
 
530 INDEX. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PRIMAEY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CONNECTED 
 
 WITH THE MENTAL AND MOEAL 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I . Pagk. 
 
 1. Emotions of sublimity important 361 
 
 2. They differ from those of beauty , 361 
 
 3. Character of emotions of sublimity 362 
 
 4. Effect in oratory , 362 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Such emotions objects of consciousness. (1.) In contemplating 
 
 great hight. (2.) Influence of great objects and power 362 
 
 (3.) Great depth . x . 363 
 
 2. Caused by colors in terrific objects 363 
 
 3. Sublimity of motion 363 
 
 4. Sublimity in sound 363 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 SECONDAEY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CONNECTED 
 
 WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MOEAL 
 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Difference between primary and secondary emotions of sublimity. 364 
 
 2. Secondary emotions — how caused? 364 
 
 3. How caused by sound? 364 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. In contrast of star with worlds 364 
 
 2. Caused by rumbling sounds 365 
 
 3. If on Mount Sinai — how affected ? 365 
 
 CHAP T E R Y II . 
 
 PEIMAEY AND SECONDAEY OBJECTS OF EMO- 
 TIONS OF SUBLIMITY INFLUENCING THE 
 INTELLECTUAL AND MOEAL 
 STATES OF MIND. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Primary objects — importance 366 
 
 2. Contrasted objects of sublimity 366 
 
 3. Secondary objects of sublimity 366 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Primary objects of emotions of moral sublimity 366 
 
 2. They may exist wholly in the mind 367 
 
 3. Causes of secondary emotions 367 
 
 4. In contemplating an angel in contrast 367 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 
 SECTION I 
 
 1. Splendor denned 368 
 
 2. Caused in contemplating great acts 368 
 
INDEX. 531 
 
 Pagk. 
 
 3. Natural splendor 368 
 
 4. Internal moral feelings 368 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Majesty defined 369 
 
 2. Illustrated 369 
 
 3. Dignity and honor 369 
 
 4. Influence in looking abroad upon the heavens 369 
 
 5. In the moral world 369 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Grandeur defined. (1.) Emotions defined 369 
 
 (2.) Of grandeur. (3.) Of sublimity 370 
 
 DIVISION EIGHTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE DESIRES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Desire defined 371 
 
 2. Its origin 371 
 
 3. Their existence and character 371 
 
 4. Connection with other powers 371 
 
 5. Can not command action 371 
 
 6. They are not ulterior to emotions 371 
 
 7. When voluntary? 372 
 
 8. When involuntary? 372 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Instinctive character of desires 372 
 
 2. Definite permanencv of nature 372 
 
 3. Effect of despair.....'. 372 
 
 4. Desires vary in degrees of strength. (1.) With degree of want. 
 
 (2.) With vividness of emotions. (3.) With perception 372 
 
 5. Imply an object — but "are not motive " 373 
 
 6. Objects of pleasure only desired 373 
 
 7. Evil not desired 373 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRIMARY OR IMMEDIATE DESIRES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Primary or immediate desires .. 374 
 
 2. Its power 374 
 
 3. Character of instinctive desire , 374 
 
 s ECTION II. 
 
 1. Desire of existence 374 
 
 2. Such desire natural and spontaneous 374 
 
 3. Character of intuitive desire 374 
 
 4. Preciousness of life — how we are attached.*. 374 
 
532 INDEX 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SECONDAEY OR E E TE O S P E C T I V E AND PROSPECT- 
 IVE DESIRES. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Retrospective desires defined 375 
 
 2. Prospective desires — how extended ? (1.) Desire of society. (2.) 
 
 Social principle. (3.) Desire of knowledge natural 375 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Desire of esteem 376 
 
 2. Desire of emulation 376 
 
 3. Desire of pleasure 377 
 
 4. Desire of fame 377 
 
 5. Desire of glory 377 
 
 6. Desire of power . 377 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 HOPE AND FEAR. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Hope defined 379 
 
 2. Further defined 379 
 
 3. It is never retrospective 379 
 
 4. It differs from wish and desire 379 
 
 5. It differs from faith 379 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Nature of fear 380 
 
 2. Dread defined 380 
 
 3. Fear extends, (1.) To filial fear. (2.) Slavish fear 380 
 
 4. Condition of hope 380 
 
 5. Fear involves apprehension of and desire to avoid evil 380 
 
 6. Difference in susceptibility of fear 381 
 
 7. It affects the imagination 381 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EXPECTATION, ANTICIPATION, CONFIDENCE, AND 
 
 TRUST. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The mind in state of expectancy. (1.) Expectation differs from 
 
 hope. (2.) We may expect both good and evil. 382 
 
 2. Anticipation differs from expectation 382 
 
 3. Previous feeling of what is to take place 382 
 
 4. Their importance 382 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Confidence defined. (1.) Basis of belief. (2.) How of value ?.. 383 
 
 2. Trust differs from confidence 383 
 
 3. It enters on approved objects .' 383 
 
 4. Trust in regard to mercy 383 
 
 5. It is a law of action , 383 
 
INDEX. 533 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 INSTINCTS. 
 
 SECTION I . p ArB 
 
 1. Instinct defined 384 
 
 2. The body dead without it. (1.) The condition of brute existence. 
 
 (2.) Power of knowledge. (3.) Degree of wisdom 384 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Instincts in the human mind compared with the brute. (1.) 
 
 With a child. (2.) Seeks nourishment 385 
 
 2. Origin of self-preservation... 385 
 
 3. Instinctive resentment 385 
 
 4. Mental process — how conditioned ? 386 
 
 5. Wisdom of birds 386 
 
 6. Wisdom of the bee and ant 386 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Man scientific contrasted with the brute 386 
 
 2. Man progressive — brute is not 387 
 
 3. Man moral agent — brute with it 387 
 
 4. Voluntary and involuntary 387 
 
 5. Brute memory — error of Mr. Upham 387 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 APPETITES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Appetites defined 388 
 
 2. Divided into hunger and thirst 388 
 
 3. Origin of hunger 388 
 
 4. Origin of thirst 388 
 
 5. Origin of appetites not without spirit 388 
 
 6. Action intuitive with appetite 388 
 
 SECTION II . 
 
 1. Animals instinctively move with hunger. 389 
 
 2. Appetites necessary to preservation 389 
 
 3. Power of instinct in choice 389 
 
 4. Appetite — when innocent? 389 
 
 5. Appetite for intoxication immoral 389 
 
 6. Natural appetite important 389 
 
 7. Applied to mind and body 389 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 TASTE CONSIDERED AS CONNECTED WITH OTJE 
 
 PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND 
 
 MORAL NATURES. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Taste as connected with physical nature 390 
 
 2. Intrinsic discrimination 390 
 
 3. Taste as connected with appetites 390 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Intellectual taste defined 390 
 
 2. A sensibility of mind 391 
 
534 INDEX 
 
 3. Differs from feeling 391 
 
 4. Degrees of taste — how varied? 391 
 
 5. Taste — how universal? 391 
 
 6. Illustrated 391 
 
 7. It varies with youth and age 392 
 
 8. It differs from desires 392 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Colors involve the power of taste 392 
 
 2. They are beautiful, grand, and sublime 392 
 
 3. Influence of symmetry 392 
 
 4. Influence of uniformity, magnitude, and motion 393 
 
 5. It extends to sound 393 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. It extends to immaterial objects 393 
 
 2. Extend to intellectual action..... 393 
 
 3. Correct taste connected with moral elements 394 
 
 4. It differs from conscience 394 
 
 5. It differs from imagination 394 
 
 6. It differs from moral emotions 394 
 
 7. It extends to moral feelings 394 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 RELATION OF MUSCULAR ACTION TO THE MENTAL 
 
 AND MORAL POWERS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Muscular action defined 395 
 
 2. Such action instinctive 395 
 
 3. Action of the hands , 395 
 
 4. Action in painting or writing 395 
 
 5. Influences of injuries 395 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Muscular action instinctive in origin 395 
 
 2. When involuntary 395 
 
 3. When voluntary..' 396 
 
 4. When such action is harmless 396 
 
 DIVISION NINTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PROPENSITIES. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Propensities defined 397 
 
 2. Called natural bias 397 
 
 3. They may be divided. (1.) Natural. (2.) Acquired. (3.) Evil. 
 
 (4.) Pure propensities 397 
 
 S ECTION II. 
 
 1. They differ from appetites 398 
 
 2. Condition of intuitive proneness 398 
 
INDEX. 535 
 
 Park. 
 
 3. Character of natural longing for life 398 
 
 4. Inclination to investigate truths 398 
 
 5. Curiosity inspires action 399 
 
 6. A desire for romance 399 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Mental inclination to conform to taste 399 
 
 2. Prone to adhere to common law 399 
 
 3. Inclination to seek fame 400 
 
 4. Proneness to self-esteem 400 
 
 5. Desire of power 400 
 
 6. Naturally inclined to utter truth 400 
 
 7. Propensity to eat and sleep 400 
 
 8. Naturally disposed to friendship 400 
 
 DIVISION TENTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE FEELINGS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Feelings denned 401 
 
 2. Variation of such power 401 
 
 3. Power of such motion 401 
 
 4. Power of feeling original with mind 401 
 
 5. Conscious feeling in knowing self 401 
 
 6. Only method of knowing pain or joy 402 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Old scholastic theory absurd 402 
 
 2. Conscious knowledge of self is first 402 
 
 3. Feelings differ from perception 402 
 
 4. It differs from sensation 402 
 
 5. Feelings differ from affections 402 
 
 6. It differs from passion 403 
 
 7. Knowledge — how dependent upon feeling? 403 
 
 8. It extends to the difference in mental and moral states 403 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. To what benevolent feelings refer 404 
 
 2. Such feelings always connected with pure moral nature 404 
 
 3. When feelings are impure 404 
 
 4. Further definition of feelings 404 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Love an emotion not independent of feelings 405 
 
 2. Egotism mental alienation 405 
 
 3. Love for our race connected with benevolent feelings 405 
 
 4. Relation of domestic love 405 
 
 5. Feelings of humility real 406 
 
 6. Feeling of awe extends to fear 406 
 
536 INDEX. 
 
 SECTION III. Pagb 
 
 1. Character of philanthropic feelings 406 
 
 2. Magnanimous feelings 406 
 
 3. Love of country 406 
 
 4. Feelings of friendship 406 
 
 5. Piety refers to condition of moral powers 406 
 
 6. Feelings of gratitude or joy 407 
 
 7. Nature — the love of saints and angels 407 
 
 8. Nature of correct feelings 407 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Malevolent feelings defined 408 
 
 2. Feelings of dislike 408 
 
 3. Relation and nature of resentment 408 
 
 4. Moral character of resentment. (1.) Intuitive resentment. (2.) 
 
 Intentional resentment is wrong 408 
 
 5. Resistance to evil right 409 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Hatred wholly impious 409 
 
 2. Anger — how conditioned?.... 409 
 
 3. Jealousy always desolating 409 
 
 4. Pride ruinous — how modified? (1.) Higher degrees insolent. 
 
 (2.) A modification of taste 409 
 
 5. Impatience 410 
 
 6. Feelings of remorse « 410 
 
 7. Feelings of despair , 410 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND MORAL RELATION OF SYMPA- 
 THY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Sympathy defined 411 
 
 2. Further illustrated 411 
 
 3. Such power connected with moral nature 411 
 
 4. Not based on imagination 411 
 
 5. Its importance 411 
 
 SECTION II . 
 
 1. Attachment defined 412 
 
 2. Nature of vile attachment 412 
 
 3. Pure attachment 412 
 
 4. Power of belief defined 412 
 
 5. Persuasion and declaration of truth 412 
 
 6. It includes credence, trust, and confidence 412 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 FEELINGS CONNECTED WITH THE PHYSICAL 
 
 NATURE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Nature of physical sensation 413 
 
 2. Origin of the knowledge of physical self 413 
 
INDEX. 537 
 
 Page. 
 
 3. Bodily feelings dependent 413 
 
 4. Knowledge of physical nature — how tested? 413 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Muscular sensitiveness 413 
 
 2. Moral relation of feeling 413 
 
 3. Moral accountability 413 
 
 4. The mind insane 414 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE PASSIONS — HOW RELATED TO THE PHYS- 
 ICAL NATURE, THE MENTAL AND MORAL 
 ELEMENTS OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Passion denned 415 
 
 2. Passion includes much of feeling 415 
 
 3. Further illustration 415 
 
 4. It differs from feelings 415 
 
 5. Physical elements without passion 415 
 
 6. All dissipation begins in the heart 416 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Passion — how conditioned? 416 
 
 2. Modification healthful 416 
 
 3. Passion distinguished 416 
 
 4L Error of divines and philosophers. (1.) Divine truth. (2.) Pas- 
 sions have self-power 416 
 
 5. Conscience rules 417 
 
 DIVISION ELEVENTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE AFFECTIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Affections defined 418 
 
 2. Further illustration 418 
 
 3. Effect of materialities 418 
 
 4. They differ from disposition 418 
 
 5. They differ from passion 418 
 
 6. They differ from emotion 418 
 
 7. They differ from desires 418 
 
 S ECTION II. 
 
 1. Natural affection — how conditioned ? 419 
 
 2. How affected mentally? 419 
 
 3. Beauty affects the mind 419 
 
 4. Moral affections 419 
 
 5. Affected by innocence 419 
 
 6. Inspired in contemplations 419 
 
 46 
 
538 INDEX. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PURE AFFECTIONS HARMONIZINGWITH MORAL 
 PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 
 
 SECTION I. Pagb 
 
 1. Affections — what they imply? 420 
 
 2. Affected in regard to self-perpetuity 420 
 
 3. Affection innate or natural. (1.) Natural things. (2.) Acquired 
 
 affections 420 
 
 4. Parental affection natural 420 
 
 5. Maternal affection 421 
 
 .6. Affection of children 421 
 
 7. When involuntary 421 
 
 8. When voluntary 421 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Affection of consanguinity 421 
 
 2. Filial affection 421 
 
 3. Fraternal affection 422 
 
 4. Secondary affections 422 
 
 5. Domestic affections 422 
 
 6. Voluntary affections — when involuntary ? 422 
 
 7. Created by kindness . 422 
 
 8. Exist in regard to piety 422 
 
 9. Affections of gratitude 423 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EVIL AFFECTIONS, OR THOSE DEVIATING FROM 
 
 MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Affections — when pure or impure? ..~ 424 
 
 2. Eesentment 424 
 
 3. Instinctive resentment 424 
 
 4. An absurdity of philosophers 424 
 
 5. Involuntary resentment 424 
 
 6. Voluntary resentment 425 
 
 7. Anger — when harmless? (1.) Excessive. (2.) Deceptive. (3.) 
 
 When allowable ? 425 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Anger not selfish in nature 425 
 
 2. Includes elements of benevolence 425 
 
 3. When it is indignation 426 
 
 4. When it is evil 426 
 
 5. Envy 426 
 
 6. Hatred 426 
 
 7. Jealousy 426 
 
 8. Revenge 427 
 
 9. Fear 427 
 
 10. Malice , 427 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Disordered action of affections. (1.) Natural defects. (2.) Dis- 
 
 ease. (3.) Effect of a wound 427 
 
 2. Unhealthy nerves 427 
 
 3. Neatness— happy influence 427 
 
INDEX. 539 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 LOVE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Power to love 428 
 
 2. Called an affection — how different? 428 
 
 3. Differs from emotion 428 
 
 4. Susceptibility of being moved by beauty 428 
 
 5. It is opposed to dislike 428 
 
 6. Fondness of country 429 
 
 s ECTION II. 
 
 1. Love between the sexes — error of philosophers 429 
 
 2. It enters into the basis of benevolence 429 
 
 3. Supports tenderness of heart 429 
 
 4. Delight and joy 429 
 
 5. Parental love 429 
 
 6. Love of our race 430 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. When innate 430 
 
 2. Love to the Creator 430 
 
 3. Degrees and modifications 430 
 
 4. Complexed in nature 431 
 
 5. Proceeds with perception 431 
 
 6. Happy results 431 
 
 DIVISION TWE L PTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 NATURE AND POWER OF CONSCIENCE IN THE 
 
 KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS 
 
 AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Power of conscience in the knowledge of moral distinctions 432 
 
 2. Power to rule moral elements 432 
 
 3. Evidence of revelation. (1.) Our tempers. (2.) Rule of right 
 
 and wrong 432 
 
 4. Power of moral agreement and disagreement. (1.) Faculty in 
 
 knowledge of self. (2.) Knowledge of moral rule of duty 432 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. "What is a correct conscience? 433 
 
 2. Good conscience 433 
 
 3. Philosophy of Greek fathers 433 
 
 4. Term conscience defined 433 
 
 5. Righteous conscience 433 
 
 6. Bad or evil conscience 433 
 
 7. Tender conscience 433 
 
 8. Darkened or hardened conscience 433 
 
 9. A seared conscience.... 433 
 
540 INDEX. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE SENSIBILITIES 
 IN CONNECTION WITH THE PHYSICAL, MEN- 
 TAL, AND MOEAL ELEMENTS, 
 
 SECTION I. Pagk 
 
 1. Sensibility defined 435 
 
 2. When applied to the physical nature 435 
 
 3. Relation of feeling and susceptibility 435 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Sensibility as connected with the mental elements 435 
 
 2. Sensibility differs from feeling 436 
 
 3. Further definition 436 
 
 4. Words spoken or written 436 
 
 5. Extent of such affection 436 
 
 C HAPTER III. 
 
 EXISTENCE OF FEELINGS OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 
 
 SECTIO N I. 
 
 1. Feeling is essential to mind ,... 437 
 
 2. How moral feelings arise 437 
 
 3. Character of feelings of moral obligation 437 
 
 4. Appeal to consciousness in reality of both 437 
 
 5. Moral sensibilities is not conscience — error of philosophers 437 
 
 6. Moral obligation evidenced in conscious convictions. 438 
 
 7. We can act from sense of duty 438 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Our care for each other proves such obligation 438 
 
 2. Such feelings arise in our moral care for self 438 
 
 3. Such feelings — how universal? t 438 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 NATTJEE AND DISTINCTION OF OBLIGATORY 
 
 FEELINGS. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Feelings of obligation simple in experience, but undefinable 439 
 
 2. Self-existence known by feeling 439 
 
 3. Moral obligatory feelings — how conditioned? 439 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. They are authoritative as to what should be done 439 
 
 2. They differ from moral approval and disapproval 440 
 
 3. Such feelings involve a sense of obligation 440 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 UNIFORMITY OFACTION IN THE MOEAL FEEL- 
 INGS — HOW CONDITIONED? 
 
 SECTION I . 
 1. Uniformity in the action of such feelings influenced by con- 
 
 science. 
 
 441 
 
INDEX. 541 
 
 Pagz. 
 
 2. Such uniformity of action implies controlling power 441 
 
 3. First law found in principle 441 
 
 4. In conscience is associated power of uniformity 441 
 
 5. Nature of conscience in the soul 442 
 
 6. Variations allowable 442 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Difference in intellectual powers varying decisions 442 
 
 2. Conscience in moral self — changeless 442 
 
 3. Feelings change with character 442 
 
 4. Intention and moral action of heathen harmless — when? 443 
 
 5. Error of philosophers that moral nature is always changing 443 
 
 6. Spontaneous dictation of conscience 443 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 RELATION OF THE JUDGMENT TO OUR MORAL 
 NATURE — HOW VARIED? 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Judgment varies — can not conscience? 444 
 
 2. Men vary in judgment 444 
 
 3. Objectors to conscience in error 444 
 
 4. Evidence drawn from heathens 444 
 
 5. All cruelty advanced to by degrees 445 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Origin of cruel laws 445 
 
 2. Conscious feelings retained by thieves and robbers 445 
 
 3. All savage tribes inclined to worship 445 
 
 4. The mass of mankind not lawless offenders 445 
 
 5. Christians may vary in doctrine 446 
 
 DIVISION THIRTEENTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MORAL RECTITUDE. 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Moral rectitude defined 447 
 
 2. What is right? 447 
 
 3. It extends to practice 447 
 
 4. Rules of moral conduct 448 
 
 5. The mind's satisfaction in moral conduct 448 
 
 6. Character of integrity 448 
 
 7. Honesty includes uprightness 448 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. True standard of rectitude 448 
 
 2. Rectitude evidenced in common conformity 448 
 
 3. Evidenced in the arrangements of laws of nations 448 
 
 4. Extends to rewards and punishments 448 
 
 5. Enters into the government of the Supreme Being — error of Mr. 
 
 Upham 448 
 
542 INDEX 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. Pagb 
 
 1. Moral distinctions defined 450 
 
 2. Power of knowing right from wrong 450 
 
 3. Such distinctions immutable incorrect 450 
 
 4. Determining power of moral nature 450 
 
 5. Immutability belongs to Deity 450 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Intuitive convictions of right 451 
 
 2. Approval and disapproval essential — error of philosophers 451 
 
 3. Error of necessitarians 451 
 
 4. Instinctive power 451 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 DISOEDEEED ACTION OF THE MOEAL POWEKS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Moral nature with discrimination 452 
 
 2. Moral nature depraved 452 
 
 3. Moral derangement 452 
 
 4. Disordered action — how realized? 452 
 
 5. When such action is voluntary 453 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Involuntary disordered moral action 453 
 
 2. When such action" is natural 453 
 
 3. Uniform action of conscience in insanity 453 
 
 4. When morally accountable 453 
 
 5. Acts in absence of reason 454 
 
 6. Insanity without our effort 454 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE ACTION OF OUR MOEAL NATURE VARIED 
 
 BY THE DISORDERED INFLUENCE OF THE 
 
 APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Effect of disordered appetites 455 
 
 2. Effect of vitiated appetites 455 
 
 3. Appetite of a drunkard 455 
 
 4. Inordinate appetite 455 
 
 5. Influence of the social propensity 456 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Love of home, disappointed 456 
 
 2. Desire of life — how weakened? ; 456 
 
 3. Possessory principle — how influenced? 456 
 
 4. Such principle — when vile? 456 
 
 5. Disordered action in self-preservation 456 
 
 6. Veracity — how varied? 456 
 
 7. Results of love of esteem 457 
 
INDEX. 543 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 IMITATION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Imitation defined 458 
 
 2. Originates with ambition 458 
 
 3. Moral imitation defined 458 
 
 4. All objects of moral beauty — how they influence ? 458 
 
 5. Effect of recalling past experience 458 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Sympathetic imitation 459 
 
 2. Change of feelings 459 
 
 3. Such feelings among children 459 
 
 4. Effect of the shout of victory 459 
 
 5. We apt to imitate defects 459 
 
 CHAPTER VI, 
 
 SPIRITUALISM. 
 
 SECTION I . 
 
 1. Spiritualism defined ., 460 
 
 2. Views of Spinoza — how absurd? r 460 
 
 3. Action of mind abstracted ... t . 460 
 
 4. Modern spiritualism f 460 
 
 5. How inconsistent? , 461 
 
 6. Satanic power 461 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Scripture evidences , 461 
 
 2. Necromancy 462 
 
 3. Soothsaying 462 
 
 4. Astrology 462 
 
 5. Enchantment 462 
 
 6. Magic 462 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Witchcraft 463 
 
 2. Connected with alchemists 463 
 
 3. Demonology , 463 
 
 4. True spiritualism 463 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GENIUS. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Genius defined 464 
 
 2. A peculiar susceptibility 464 
 
 3. Its natural tendency 464 
 
 4. Closely connected with originality 465 
 
 5. Absolute originality 465 
 
 6. The work of genius , 465 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Genius is involved in investigations 465 
 
 2. Present in decomposing and recombining...... ......... ,,,.,. 465 
 
544 INDEX. 
 
 Pag*. 
 
 3. Discrimination and mental animation — how dependent? 466 
 
 4. Imagination influenced by it 466 
 
 5. Indispensable to true eloquence 466 
 
 DIVISION FOURTEENTH. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MORAL EDUCATION. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. What implied by moral education 467 
 
 2. Mental education 467 
 
 3. Intellectual culture 467 
 
 4. How connected with the moral nature 467 
 
 5. Early beginning of education 467 
 
 6. Faith of a parent for the child 468 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Perceptive action 468 
 
 2. What constitutes the vagabond? 468 
 
 3. First truths most important 469 
 
 4. Moral education — how conditioned? 469 
 
 5. Purity the highest state of man . 469 
 
 6. Ground of safety , 469 
 
 7. Without moral influence we are ruined 470 
 
 8. Retiring of conscience painful , 470 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 WELL-BALANCED INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
 
 POWERS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Well-balanced powers — how conditioned? 471 
 
 2. Change of physical powers 471 
 
 3. Wisest and safest minds 471 
 
 4. Manner of succession of thoughts 471 
 
 5. Character of attention 471 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Objects of intellectual action 471 
 
 2. Influence of moral facts * 472 
 
 3. All our faculties should be exercised 472 
 
 4. We must know and love purity 472 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SOUL. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The doctrine of the soul 473 
 
 2. Vital power of existence 473 
 
 3. Idea of the soul as real 473 
 
 4. Matter infinitely divisible 474 
 
 5. The soul not a result of matter — how conformed? 474 
 
INDEX. 545 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Pagb. 
 
 1. Term life — how applied ? 474 
 
 2. Instinct of vegetable life 474 
 
 3. Arguments against the soul 475 
 
 4. What if mind is a mere accident 475 
 
 5. Physical nature is not consciousness 475 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S IMMORTALITY. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The soul's immortality 476 
 
 2. The soul's original nature 476 
 
 3. The design of Deity 476 
 
 S ECTION II. 
 
 1. If God purposed its unending life ? 477 
 
 2. Inclinations of the soul 477 
 
 3. Conscious conviction of immortality 477 
 
 4. Such conviction among heathen nations 477 
 
 5. Vast capacities and desires 477 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S VALUE. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The soul immortal 478 
 
 2. Intuitive impressions of continued life 478 
 
 3. How the truthfulness of religion is tested 478 
 
 4. Its value — how increased? 478 
 
 5. Character of its action 478 
 
 6. It is a world of thought within 478 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Influence of thought upon language 479 
 
 2. Taste evidences its value 479 
 
 3. It gives value to laws — how? 479 
 
 4. Its value further established 479 
 
 5. Its value — how implied? 479 
 
 6. Its value exalted in contrast 480 
 
 7. It is above value 480 
 
 8. Great in creation 480 
 
 9. Its value evidenced in the solemnity of the crucifixion 480 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE NATURE AND 
 
 POWERS OF THE SOUL AS THE GREAT 
 
 AND SUPERIOR SCIENCE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Mind the science of our being 481 
 
 2. Its study seeks knowledge of every element of being 481 
 
 3. It discovers the foundation elements of natural religion 481 
 
 4. Man intuitively instructed 481 
 
546 INDEX. 
 
 • SECTION II. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Study of mind not properly appreciated 481 
 
 2. As mental culture is neglected, despotism increases 482 
 
 3. It is mental improvement gives stability to government 482 
 
 4. Philosophical genius 482 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 MUTUAL RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND AN- 
 THROPOLOGY, EVOLVING THE CONDITION AND 
 CHARACTER OF THE SOUL IN TIME. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. Mysterious ties uniting soul and body 483 
 
 2. Laws of nature influence each other 483 
 
 3. Influence of defects 483 
 
 4. Paralysis of nerves 483 
 
 5. Disease and debility 483 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Influence of mind over the body.. 483 
 
 2. Influence of trouble 483 
 
 3. Remorse of the murderer 483 
 
 4. All minds rational in eternity 484 
 
 5. Idiots sane in the future 484 
 
 CHAP TER VIII . 
 
 CULTIVATION OF THE MORAL POWERS WITH THE 
 SOUL'S CONFORMITY TO THE WILL OF GOD 
 MORE IMPORTANT THAN ONLY INTEL- 
 LECTUAL IMPROVEMENT. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. The soul endued 485 
 
 2. Effect of religion 485 
 
 3. Importance of love to God 485 
 
 4. Moral suasion — how indispensable ? 485 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Conviction in this study 485 
 
 2. How taught? 486 
 
 3. Expels evil influences 486 
 
 4. Importance of guarding the moral powers 486 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE SOUL — HOW AFFECTED BY TEMPORAL DIS- 
 EASE AND DEATH. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 1. How the mind is affected 487 
 
 2. How the soul is sympathetically affected 487 
 
 3. Perfect mental action 487 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. The death of the body 487 
 
 2. Identity of the soul 488 
 
 3. No annihilation 488 
 
INDEX. 547 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE SOUL IN ETEKNITY. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Pack. 
 
 1. Reason and revelation 489 
 
 2. Desire to contemplate the soul in the future 489 
 
 3. The soul perfect leaving the body 489 
 
 4. All items of knowledge 489 
 
 5. Memory immortal 490 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 1. Perception immortal 490 
 
 2. Vision perpetual 490 
 
 3. Feeling, condition unending 490 
 
 4. Soul perfected 490 
 
 5. Its salvation or loss 490 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 1. Its condition leaving earth 490 
 
 2. Spiritual sight and perception 491 
 
 3. Its knowledge 491 
 
 4. Oneness in heaven 491 
 
 5. One circle or class 491 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 1. Its rewards 492 
 
 2. Love uniform 492 
 
 3. Further argument 492 
 
 4. Its life eternal 492 
 
 5. Unbounded joy , 492 
 
 THE END 
 
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