LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 
 
 Chap.Wf.,.. Copyright No... 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
 
 
 -/t- 
 
 ;:*^T 
 
 m 
 
The Battles 
 
 OF 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE 
 
 AND 
 
 GETTYSBURG 
 
 13^ 
 
 r3Vll-i Fenna. Vols. 
 
 Copyriglit by 
 
 CAF"r. iV. II. ISIEIaSOX, 
 
 2518 Taylor SI., Minneapolis*, Minn. 
 
 ISOO. 
 
y«til ^U 
 
 /'V^x 
 
 44327 
 
 TWO COPIES RECEIVED. 
 
 f 
 
 ^jP^VV^: .-• 
 
 utjl ^i id^3 
 
 ^^A 
 
 ^•^^ 
 
 . ,^* / 
 
 •« ./i*/ r.^r 
 
 Of 
 
 Nr^^ 
 
 SECOND COPY. 
 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In preparing this work, entitled "The Battles of Chancellors- 
 ville and Gettysburg," I have made free use of material fur- 
 nished by my own recollections, memoranda an''' correspond- 
 ence. Being an active participant in the two great battles, 
 which are taken as the basis of this narrative, makes much of 
 what I say my own story. That is, I mean to say T had 
 ideas of my own. They were as follows: When the Union 
 army took up its position that forced the enemy to come out of 
 its strong fortifications and fight the Union army on its own 
 chosen entrenched grounds, I wondered why the Union army, 
 the rank and file of which, it is generally conceded, was among 
 the bravest, most patriotic, gallant soldiers of which any army 
 was composed since civilization began, was defeated in one of 
 the great battles, and the other could hardly be called a very 
 creditable victory. The persistent investigation on my part has 
 unearthed positive evidence showing who was responsible for 
 the defeat at Chancellorsville and why Hooker's anticipations 
 were not realized at Gettysburg, namely, the.- jiestructio.n of the 
 Confederate army. To aid me in arriving at this conclusion I 
 quote such prominent names and numerous authorities that it 
 will not leave any room, after perusing this work, for the most" 
 skeptical persons to doubt the correctness of my conclusions. 
 The reader will wonder why someone did not possess the cour- 
 age to present these plain facts to the publicjears ^o in order 
 
to arrive at a more correct solution of the questions that are 
 involved in this inquiry. 
 
 As to the responsibility for the failure to accomplish all that 
 was anticipated by General Hooker, the army commander who 
 planned the battles of Chancellorsvilfe and Gettysburg. In my 
 opinion it .is necessary to consider two questions in advance. 
 First, the political conditions that brought on the war, and 
 second, the reason the war did not end sooner. In my opinion 
 a correct solution of why those two great battles did not end 
 more successfully to the Union army and meet the most san- 
 guine expectation of General Hooker cannot be correctly solved 
 and justice be done the rank and file of army without first con- 
 sidering the weak elements that were constantly undermining 
 the army's best efforts. The questions are plainly answered in 
 this work, why the war did not end sooner and why the battles 
 of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were not great Union vic- 
 tories. 
 
 This work will correct the history of one of the most mag- 
 nificently planned battles, by the Union commander, that was 
 ever fought on this continent. No one has ever pretended to 
 say that the plans of the battle of Chancellorsville and their exe- 
 cution under the immediate supervision of General Joseph 
 Hooker up to 6:30 p. m., Thursday, April 30, 1863, were not the 
 most magnificent in the world's history. From this point each 
 writer flies off on a tangent to find a flaw in Hooker's manage- 
 ment of the battle later that resulted in the final defeat of the 
 Union army. They have done this because of a misapprehen- 
 sion of facts that were covered up by the most wily tricks of 
 conspirators, which I propose to unearth. Many of these writer? 
 have passed away, but their works live on and are being read, 
 studied, commented upon and will be, if not corrected, to the 
 
end of time. They were written during and soon after the cam- 
 paign, when history was largely made from newspaper reports 
 of correspondents who were unrehable. Here the errors crept 
 into their works and for lack of thorough investigation have 
 been perpetuated. Over 35 years have passed since the great 
 battle of Chancellorsville. which started oft so magnificently, 
 but ended so barren of good results. As to the cause of the 
 defeat of the Union army, public opinion has been divided. I 
 propose to correct the errors that have led to this division and 
 make the cause of their defeat so plain that there will not be 
 any doubt in the future of the justification of my conclusions. 
 That there was treachery and the most wicked conspiracy on 
 the part of men high in rank and power to defeat the Union 
 army and drive General Hooker from his command will be 
 shown by such authorities that no one will question the correct- 
 ness of the above statements after reading this work. All I ask 
 is a fair, unprejudiced consideration of all the facts presented 
 The story is a sad one, but sad as it appears, the evidences of 
 its truthfulness are so abundant, as the work progresses, that no 
 fair-minded person will doubt my conclusions. A. H. X. 
 
COKTEINTS. 
 
 Part 1. 
 
 CHAPTER I. PACE. 
 The Political Conditions That Brought on the "War 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Gen. Joseph Hooker Appointed to Command Army of tlie Potomac.. 15 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Hooker's Movement on Chancellorsville 19 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1 26 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Battle of Chancellorsville, May 3 64 
 
 Part 2. 
 
 CHAPTER I. PACt. 
 Back to Camp Near Falmouth, Va. 83 
 
 CHAPTER IT. 
 Lee's Northern Invasion 65 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Union Army Changes Its Base, June 13 8R 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 OfficialOrders <J2 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Hooker Planned to Fight at Gettysburg, but is Relieved Before the 
 
 Battle 98 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Meade Opposed to Fighting at Gettysburg 123 
 
 'CHAPTER VII. 
 The Battle of Gettysburg, First Day. Gen. Reynolds Killed 125 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Battle of the Second Day 137 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Battle of the Third Day 160 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 The Confederate Army Retreats to Virginia 173 
 
THE. BATTIaB. 
 
 OK 
 
 GHANGRLaLaORSVILaLaEI. 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Papc 101, eierhth line, fifth word should re.id Frederick instead of 
 Fredericksburg-, 
 
 Page 79— The First Corps, killed and wounded should be 192, missing. 
 100; total. 292. The Third Corps, killed and wounded, 3,439; missing, 600: 
 total 4,039 The Twelfth Corps, killed and wounded, 2.383; missing 500; 
 total 2,883. Total Cavalry killed and wounded, l.'SO. Total LTniou losses at 
 Chancellorsville, killed and wounded, 12.197, missing .5.000: total. 17,197. 
 
THR BATTLaR 
 
 OK 
 
 GHANGRLAlAORSVILiLAR. 
 
 Part I. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Political Condition that Brought On the War of Rebellion, 
 the Cause of so ]\Iany Defeats of the Union Army, and the 
 Reason the Rebellion Was Not Put Down Sooner. 
 
 A few words as to the cause of the war will not be out of 
 place here, for this is in the line of our study and should precede 
 the description ot the battle of Chanccllorsville. When our fore- 
 fathers had struggled through seven long years of war with the 
 mother country, then the most powerful nation on earth, suffer- 
 ing greater privations than had ever been the lot of human be- 
 ings to endure in the same length of time, and forced that great 
 nation to acknowledge their independence, they then discovered 
 that their troubles were by no means ended, they were left 
 without a national organization, each colony was independent of 
 the rest, so a petition was circulated asking each colony to elect 
 and send delegates to a convention, to be held at Philadelphia, 
 May, 1787. When the delegates came together they found 
 great trouble in drafting a Constitution that would be adopted 
 
2 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 by the convention, principally on account of the institution of 
 slavery, that had been introduced while the colonies were a 
 province of Great Britain. The question, after a long struggle, 
 was compromised, so the word slave or involuntary servitude or 
 servant did not appear in that document. Therefore it was 
 adopted by the convention, and finally, after much time had 
 elapsed, was ratified by all the colonies, and they became the 
 United States; thus this vexed question of slavery was thought 
 to be settled. Many thought the institution would die a natural 
 death, but in this institution was sown the seeds that resulted 
 in one of the most cruel, obstinate sectional wars that ever 
 cursed any nation. " 
 
 War is a cruel manner of adjusting differences among nations 
 at the best, but is far more malignant when the war is between 
 states of the same nationality as a revolution, or a rebellion, of 
 one section of the same nation against the laws of that nation. 
 This was our condition in the War of Rebellion, the Southern 
 leaders claimed that they had a grievance, and that was that 
 the Northern states were about to despoil them of their institu- 
 tions and slaves, and the only way to save them was to dissolve 
 the union of states and set up a government for themselves. 
 The threat to do this had been made many years before any 
 move by the Southern secessionists, or overt act on their part 
 had been committed. They were constantly demanding further 
 concessions, in the way of special sectional laws that would in- 
 sure the perpetuation of their pet institutions. The last degree 
 of endurance by the Northern people was the passage of and 
 attempt to enforce the fugitive slave law, which made every 
 citizen of the Northern states a slave catcher, and compelled 
 them to return the escaped slaves to their masters at their own 
 expense, under pain and penalty of fine and imprisonment. Pec- 
 
THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSVILLE. 3 
 
 pie outside of congress in the Northern states became indignant 
 at this attempt to force them against their sense of reason and 
 better judgment, to become negro catchers and be forced to 
 take them back into a condition they abhorred as cruel and worse 
 than death; and they revolted against the law. In their several 
 states they passed laws relieving their citizens from tltis hu- 
 miliating obligation; by this means the fugitive slave law became 
 a dead letter, and for that reason the Southern "fire-eaters," 
 so-called, exerted all their energies to bring on a collision at 
 arms between the states. As a means to accomplish this they 
 began to force their institutions into the territories. That 
 brought on the issue. 
 
 The Southern agitators claimed they had the same right un- 
 der the Constitution to take their slaves into the territories, or 
 free states for that matter, and hold them there temporarily as 
 property, as Northern men had to take their horse, ox or other 
 property into a Southern state or territory. The people in the 
 free states said that property in slaves was different from other 
 property, the right of property in slaves was not recognized by 
 any state or nation outside of the state where the special local 
 laws of that state legalized the institution. On this issue po- 
 litical parties began to agitate and were divided as to what 
 should be the political status of the slave states and slavery. 
 There was no political party that could be united upon that 
 question until the organization of the Republican party. That 
 party came together in convention by an informal call of states 
 at Pittsburgh, Pa., Feb. 22, 1856, and organized by adopt- 
 ing a platform which declared that it was not the 
 purpose of the party to interfere with the institution 
 of slavery in states where it then existed, but that 
 no territory, then free, should ever tliercaftcr be ad- 
 
4 THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 mitted as a slave state. This informal convention completed 
 the organization of the party, and called a national convention, 
 to meet at Philadelphia, June 17th, 1856, for the purpose of nom- 
 inating candidates for president and vice-president, and this is 
 the manner of proceedings which gave the present Republican 
 party a legal national existence. From the above date began the 
 disintegration of the Whig and Democratic parties in the North- 
 ern and border states, and their final dissolution was a ques- 
 tion of but a short time. Not one state in the North would have 
 been left to the Democratic party any more than there was to 
 the Whigs at the election in 1856, if a portion of the Democratic 
 party, led by Stephen A. Douglas, had not resorted to the subter- 
 fuge of squatter sovereignty. When ]\Ir. Douglas and his fol- 
 lowers went on the stump and explained their platform and that 
 what squatter soverignty meant was, that when the people in a 
 territory desired to be admitted as a state of the Union, they would 
 ask congress for an enabling act to admit them, though it was 
 left for the inhabitants of the territory to decide by a majority 
 vote whether it should be a free or a slave state. This dodging of 
 the real issue by Mr. Douglas enabled him to save the party in 
 1856, electing James Buchanan president, on his modified plat- 
 form, but in i860 the Democratic party split, the pro slavery 
 wing nominated Breckenridge and the squatter sovereignty wing 
 nominated Stephen A. Douglas as their candidate for president. 
 Mr. Douglas made a brilliant campaign .and received a large 
 popular vote in every Northern state. While he did not get but 
 seventy-two electors, his popular vote was nearly as large as "Sir. 
 Lincoln's, who was elected president, getting 180 electoral votes, 
 but when the War of Rebellion broke out and the rebels fired on 
 Fort Sumter, Mr. Douglas became a strong Union man, and his 
 party in the Northern states followed his example. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYlLLE. 5 
 
 This made them very popular with the administration, who 
 favored them by appointments of the liighest rank m the army. 
 Soon they were known as war Democrats, and became as staunch 
 and radical Union men as the most radical Republicans. The 
 loyal action of the Douglas Democrats during the War of Rebel- 
 lion made it possible to perpetuate the Democratic party in the 
 Northern states. People seemed to soon forget that if the policy 
 of squatter sovereignty had prevailed slavery would have been 
 perpetuated and the country kept in a constant turmoil as long 
 as there were any territories to be admitted as states. Eighteen 
 hundred and fifty-six and i860 was an epoch in the history of the 
 United States that thoroughly tested the durability of a Demo- 
 cratic-Republican government. It would seem that elements 
 could not be devised to test the question of, are the American 
 people capable of self-government, more thoroughly than this 
 rebellion and the manner in which it was finally crushed out. 
 No monarchial government ever did or could have accomplished 
 this great work. The sections North and South were soon 
 organized for the election of 1856 and i860; the contest was a 
 heated one in both campaigns, on both sides. On the Southern 
 side some of their congressmen were very aggressive and abu- 
 sive in the halls of congress, and were not at all choice in the 
 language they used toward the Northern people. They called 
 them small-fistcd farmers, greasy mechanics, filthy operatives, 
 mudsills of society, and added to this insult that capital should 
 own the labor of the country no matter whether the laborer was 
 black or white. On this issue the Northern free states people 
 won in i860, electing Abraham Lincoln president, and for this 
 and no other cause the South began to arrange for war, and set 
 up an independent government, and on April 12th. 1861, Gen. 
 Beauregard with a Confederate army of 6.000 men, by order of 
 
6 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 the president of the Southern Confederacy, fired on the flag and 
 captured Fort Sumter. Then the war began in earnest. The 
 Northern men, under the President's call for soldiers, volunteer- 
 ed their services, regardless of party, faster than the government 
 could arm them, determined to crush out the rebellion and re- 
 store the union of states; they were fighting for a principle that 
 was near and dear to them. Their hearts were in the cause, 
 the rank and file being more intelligent than the Southern sol- 
 diers, ought to, and would have beaten them, all things else being 
 equal, man for man, but unequal as they were in numbers, should 
 have crushed them in one year. This is not said in a spirit of brag 
 or unfairness, but in a desire to be fair and to transmit the facts 
 as they existed down in truthful history to coming generations. 
 This was not because nature had done more for the North than 
 the Southern soldiers, but it was the curse of their institutions 
 that degraded the poor whites. They did not have any free 
 school system in the Southern slave states and the facilities for 
 educating the young in border slave states was very limited. 
 On the other hand the rank and file of the Northern soldiers 
 had the advantage of a free school system for many years, and 
 it was a very rare thing to find a soldier in the Union army that 
 did not have a fair business education, and it is a well known, 
 admitted fact that the more intelligent the rank and file of an 
 army is, the better soldiers they make. Weighing the men by 
 this standard, it will not be regarded an exaggeration to say that 
 the rank and file of the Union army were more than equal to the 
 Confederate, man for man, and being so much superior to them 
 in numbers, ought to have conquered the rebellion in 
 one year. I propose to show why they did not do it. 
 There are several potent reasons why the war did not end 
 sooner. In the first place, the Confederate army, especially in 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 7 
 
 East Virginia, being poorly fed, clothed and armed, won victory 
 after victory over the Union army. The reasons are: First, 
 Jefferson Davis, president of the Southern Confederacy, was not 
 only a great statesman, but was one of the best educated soldiers, 
 practically and theoretically, of his day and age in the United 
 States, and being president of the Confederacy, made him 
 commander-in-chief, with power to appoint, as well as direct 
 his generals. He was familiarly acquainted with every officer 
 in the regular army in the United States, knew them for all they 
 were worth. In selecting his generals for important commands, 
 he put the best men forward, men of military experience and edu- 
 cation, and never made a mistake. He w^as absolute monarch 
 in the Confederacy, their congress as well as their army was 
 ruled by him; thus his great abilities were available during the 
 war. 
 
 The Confederates of eastern Virginia were led by one of the 
 most clear headed, careful, cautious strategist this country ever 
 knew. His corps, division and brigade commanders never 
 failed to carry out promptly orders they received from him. If 
 an impartial history is ever written of the War of Rebellion, 
 General Robert E. Lee will rank as one of the greatest captains 
 the world ever knew. And his lieutenants, always prompt to obey 
 orders of their superiors, brave, intelligent soldiers, without 
 which no general could succeed, w^ere all worthy of a better 
 cause. General Lee planned to give his army the advantage of 
 the grounds, its conformation to the surrounding country, and 
 fortified them, which made one man, inside, equal to three or 
 four outside their works. This was like setting traps, and the 
 Union generals had no better judgment than to lead their men 
 straight into them instead of leading them on the flanks and rear, 
 which would render the enemy's intrenchments useless to them. 
 
8 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 If the Union army could have exchanged army commanders and 
 General Lee's heart had been in the Union cause, and the Con- 
 federates been led by our first army commanders, we could have 
 crushed the Confederate army of Virginia in less than one year. 
 General Lee never found his match as a strategist but once in the 
 history of the war, and that was in General Joseph Hooker, in 
 his movement of the army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville. 
 On the other hand, President Lincoln, when he was first elected 
 president, was a stranger to almost everybody outside of Illinois. 
 It is true, he was one term in congress, but did not become 
 much noted as a congressman, and while he was strange to the 
 public, he was a greater stranger to the army. He was influ- 
 enced in the appointment of his generals to command armies by 
 politicians who knew nothing of their merits as military men, 
 but recommended their personal friends for promotion, and re- 
 tained them in important commands, regardless of their qualifi- 
 cations. This practice was kept up to that extent that our best 
 generals were not known until near the close of the war. An- 
 other thing that weakened the Union army was the passage of 
 the $300 exemption and substitute law when the time came to 
 draft. This gave to the army foreign recruits who had no inter- 
 est in the country, and a great many of them deserted every 
 chance they got. Another reason was the accepting of ignorant 
 negroes as substitutes for intelligent white men, whose duty it 
 was to stand by the draft, and fight side by side with their honest, 
 intelligent neighbor who volunteered with the first 300,000, 
 which they pledged themselves to do when these soldiers 
 left their homes. These exemption and substitute laws were the 
 fault of our vacillating congress, not so much the President, 
 but he was at fault later on for making General Halleck, who 
 had never won a victory or fought a battle, commander-in-chief 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 9 
 
 of all the armies, with headquarters at Washington. No more 
 incompetent military man could have been selected for that posi- 
 tion, and the President ought to have known it. Halleck was 
 in the way of every progressive general during the war. Of all 
 others, he was the least competent major-general for the Presi- 
 dent's chief adviser. For these mistakes, brave officers and men 
 of the army, especially the army of the Potomac, had to suffer 
 to the extent of years of time, and thousands of lives were sacri- 
 ficed on' the battlefield. 
 
 I have always wondered why the President appointed Halleck 
 major-general so early in the war as to make him rank all other 
 major-generals in the army of the President's appointments. And 
 why, after he had appointed him and given him the command of 
 the department of ^Missouri, where he failed in every movement 
 of that army of which he was in immediate command, that he 
 should, with all his failures, and knowing his faults, promote 
 him to the command of all the armies in the War of the Rebel- 
 lion, with headquarters at Washington, D. C, and retain him 
 there, is a mystery I am not able to solve; and I have searched 
 all authorities I could get hold of, to see if I could find some 
 redeeming trait of character or military qualifications that 
 would influence the President to (ib this, but have failed. 
 
 The War of the Rebellion in the United States, from 1861 to 
 1865, was the most bitter partisan contest that has ever been 
 waged since civilization began. So intense and bitter was this 
 contest that the reports of the commanders on both sides in many 
 instances, that were made of battles were a tissue of falsehoods. 
 Each party to the action tried to magnify a defeat or drawn bat- 
 tle into a victory for their side, and the partisan spirit ran so 
 high that it was considered good politics of all, from the Presi- 
 dent down to the lowest politician, to encourage these false re- 
 
10 THE BATTLE OF CHAN(]ELLORSVILLE. 
 
 ports. If any officer was ever punished for making a false re- 
 port of battles he fought, the instance has escaped us. It seems 
 as though political rings were formed by officers high in rank, 
 who were possessed of low, selfish political cunning. So thor- 
 oughly dishonest and depraved were they that they would use 
 their rank and power in the army to defeat the Union army 
 for no other purpose than to cause the removal of the com- 
 manding officer, so as to get him out of their way, or pull one 
 down who was high in order to climb up on his ruin. Regard- 
 less of the lives of the troops engaged if they could accomplish 
 the disgrace of the general in command, they seemed happy. 
 Many of the defeats and drawn battles in the War of the Re- 
 bellion, on the side of the Union army, are directly chargeable to 
 the intrigues of under officers in the command, and in many in- 
 stances the hand of Gen. Halleck can be traced; and in no in- 
 stance does this vicious disposition crop out more than in Gen. 
 Halleck'<s conduct toward Gen. Hooker, from the time Hooker 
 took command of the Army of the Potomac until he was re- 
 lieved from that command. Halleck's olDJect, it seems to us, was 
 to destroy Hooker's influence as a military man so as to keep 
 himself at the head in rank in the army. The loss of life and the 
 disgrace of the army's defeat seemed to be a matter of small con- 
 sequence to him. This language, I am fully aware, is too strong 
 for a humble person like myself to use without high authority. 
 After giving a short biographical sketch of Halleck I will give 
 authorities to prove he was capable of the low, contemptible acts 
 I charge him with. 
 
 I give so much space here to Gen. Halleck because of his 
 interference with Gen. Hooker's movements while he com- 
 manded the Army of the Potomac. I believe him to have been 
 at the head of the conspiracy that defeated the army at Chan- 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 1] 
 
 cellorsville, and that his intentions were to drive Hooker from 
 command of the Army of the Potomac in disgrace, which he 
 accomplished before the battle of Gettysburg was fought. 
 
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL HAL- 
 
 LECK. 
 
 Henry W. Halleck— Born in Oneida county, N. Y., Jan. 15. 
 1816. Graduated at West Point, in 1839. Third in his class. 
 Classmates were Gens. Rickets, Ord and Canby. Made second 
 lieutenant of engineers in 1839. Served a short time in the Mexi- 
 can War. Was sent to CaHfornia and promoted to first lieu- 
 tenant of engineers in 1846. To captain in 1853. Resigned and 
 mustered out of service Aug. i, 1854. Formed the law partner- 
 ship of Halleck, Peachey & Billings at San Francisco, Cal., and 
 became very wealthy because of their being appointed agents 
 to settle the Spanish-Mexican land claims the United States 
 assumed with the annexation of California Territory. 
 
 Engaged in quicksilver mining. Became president of the 
 Pacific & Atlantic R. R.— from San Francisco to San Jose, Cal. 
 Was appointed major-general of state militia of California in 
 i860. Appointed major-general of the United States volun- 
 teers Aug. 19, 1861. Ordered to relieve Gen. Fremont at St. 
 Louis, and took command of that department Nov. 18, 1861. 
 Commanded that department until July 23,, 1862, when he was 
 made commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, 
 with headquarters at Washington, by order of tiie President. 
 Held that position until July i. 1865. Took command of the 
 Army of the Potomac Aug. 30. 1865, with headquarters at Rich- 
 mond, Va. Appointed to the military division of the Pacific 
 March 16, 1869. Died while he was on duty in that department. 
 Now let us see what leading military men say about Halleck: 
 
12 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 In his book, entitled "His Own Story," p. 137, Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan says of Halleck; "A day or two before he arrived in 
 Washington to take command as commander-in-chief, Secretary 
 Stanton cautioned me against trusting Halleck, who was, he 
 says, probably the greatest scoundrel and most barefaced vil- 
 lain in America. That he was totally destitute of principle and 
 that he (Stanton) had in the Almaden quicksilver case con- 
 victed Halleck of perjury in open court." 
 
 Gen. Butler, in his book, p. 871, says of Halleck: "I have 
 learned his character, which I find to be that of a lying, treach- 
 erous, hypocritical scoundrel, with no moral sense." 
 
 Gen. McClellan says, in his book, p. 539: "Halleck perjured 
 himself before the committee on the conduct of the war when 
 called in relation to his (McClellan's) campaigns. 
 
 McClellan's book, p. 216, says: "Halleck stole dispatches 
 from the office of the general-in-chief and destroyed them. That 
 Halleck, while he was in command of the Department of ]\Iis- 
 souri had sent to Gen. McClellan, who was then commander-in- 
 chief of all the armies, a dispatch relative to the conduct of Gen. 
 Grant, who was in Halleck's department. Halleck charged 
 Grant with being absent without leave, refusing to make reports 
 of his command, as ordered, and gave as a reason for this in- 
 subordination that he had learned that Grant had resumed his 
 former bad habits." This and much more of a similar nature 
 passed from Halleck to McClellan. McClellan answered, if 
 he (Halleck) thought it for the best interest of the service to 
 not hesitate to place Grant under arrest. Grant did not know 
 Halleck had made these charges against him until 1866. He 
 then asked McClellan for a copy, and for the first time learned 
 the facts, which had not appeared among the regular orders 
 when Grant came to Washington. After he had been appointed 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 13 
 
 lieutenant-general and had access to headquarters' books, the 
 above communications from Halleck to McClellan had disap- 
 peared. This fixes their abstraction from the records upon Hal- 
 leck. 
 
 Gen. Grant, in his ]\Iemoirs, Vol. i, p. 325, says that he did 
 not know until 1866 that Halleck had reported him absent with- 
 out leave and made other unfavorable reports about him. He 
 learned through a private source. He then asked Gen. McClel- 
 lan for, and obtained, a cop}' of the dispatches. He, in his book, 
 on page 325, as above stated, explains that he was not absent 
 without leave; that Halleck had never asked him for a report, 
 
 etc. See Gen. Grant's statement. 
 
 Butler's book, p. 872, says the records show that Halleck 
 misrepresented and betrayed Sherman, Butler, Grant and Mc- 
 Clellan, With such a record is it not strange that any power 
 on earth would be able to keep such a man at the head of the 
 army. We close our eyes and shudder when we reflect upon 
 how many noble men were sacrificed for no higher purpose than 
 the payment of political debts or the military destruction of gen- 
 erals who were in the way of an ambitious, incompetent, wicked 
 man, who had succeeded in being promoted to a position he 
 never should have received. 
 
 The rank and file of the Army of the Potomac won prodigys 
 of valor in spite of the political conditions that would have 
 demoralized any other than the truest patriots, such as com- 
 posed this army. 
 
 Generals ]\IcDowell, ]\IcClellan and Burnsides. three com- 
 manders of the Army of the Potomac during a period of over 
 two years. No one of them ever won a victory or showed their 
 competency as strategists at any period in their military history, 
 although they directed that noble army in many hard-fought bat- 
 
14 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 ties, where they developed their want of skill. Yet the army 
 never failed them, but fought on bravely, each and every time, 
 as though they never had been whipped. Why put these men 
 forward instead of Wool, Thomas, Hooker, Kerney, Hancock 
 and many others who had seen service. But after the useless 
 slaughter at Fredericksburg the rank and file of the army be- 
 came terribly demoralized, desertions were taking place at tlu 
 rate of 200 daily; 2,922 commissioned officers and 81.964 men in 
 rhe Union army were reported absent without leave. 
 
CHAPTER 11. 
 
 General Joseph Hooker, Appointed by the President to 
 Supersede General Ambros Burnside. How the Army Was 
 Demoralized After the Battle of Fredericksburg. Hooker's 
 Success as an Organizer and Restoring the Confidence of 
 the Army. 
 
 January 25, 1863, Gen. Hooker was appointed to supersede 
 Burnside, in command of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker 
 was a West Point graduate, was in the ^Mexican war, but soon 
 after that was ended resigned his commission in the regular 
 army and became a private citizen in California. Soon after 
 the breaking out of the War of the Rebellion he went to Wash- 
 ington, offered his services and was appointed brigadier, and 
 later major-general, by President Lincoln. He was a very pre- 
 possessing gentleman. A dashing, daring corps commander, 
 and earned justly in the Army of the Potomac the title of "Fight- 
 ing Joe Hooker." He handled his corps with great skill and 
 success and was a great favorite with his under officers and men, 
 but was never a favorite with Hallec 
 
 When General ]\IcClellan was relieved from command of the 
 army, Hooker's skill and claim to the promotion was passed 
 over and Burnsides, not belonging to the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, was appointed to the command. After Burnside's dis- 
 asterous failure at Fredericksburg Gen. Hooker was grudgingly 
 given the command of the army, as above stated. 
 
 Gen. Hooker had some enemies among the generals com- 
 
16 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. ^^ 
 
 manding brigades, divisions and corps. He went to work to 
 reorganize the army and soon brought it under better discipline 
 than it had ever been since its first organization. The deser- 
 tions stopped and the officers and men that were absent returned 
 to their commands, and before the first day of April the rank and 
 file was the most confident, proud, patriotic army that ever 
 shouldered a musket. And if they had not been mismanaged by 
 some of the corps commanders the battle of ChancelForsville 
 would have resulted in one of the greatest victories ever won. 
 Gen. Hooker had been in command but a few days before he 
 got a letter from President Lincoln informing him that strange 
 stories were rumored about him, such as an ambition to play 
 the role of dictator, and warned him w^hat would happen if he 
 allowed disaster to befall the Army of the Potomac. This would 
 indicate, as above stated, the fact that some of the officers of the 
 army that were his enemies had been complaining to the Presi- 
 dent. One reason was that some of the officers could never for- 
 give Gen. Hooker for the answer he made the Congressional 
 Committee on the conduct of the war, when they summoned him 
 before them and asked him why the army on the Peninsula under 
 Gen. McClellan did not succeed. His reply was: The incom- 
 petency of the commander. Gen. AlcClellan had many staunch 
 friends among the officers of that army, and for this answer some 
 of the officers could never forgive him. But it was thought by 
 Gen. Hooker's friends that time and the brilliant services he had 
 rendered the cause had obliterated this feeling among the offi- 
 cers. But what follows will prove their mistake. 
 
 When Gen. Hooker took command, I repeat, the outlook for 
 ever putting down the rebellion was indeed gloomy. This feel- 
 ing was pretty general throughout the whole army. It was no 
 uncommon thing to hear, as you were passing the camps, soldiers 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 17 
 
 using the most insurrectionary language. One day as I was 
 passing through a strange camp, about Feb. i6, 1863, I heard 
 men cursing the President and the commanding generals, and 
 boasted that they intended to desert the first opportunity. The 
 officers standing by did not attempt to rebuke them. This, in 
 view of the fact that we were soon to meet the enemy again 
 in battle, I must confess, made me feel very serious. When I 
 got to my own camp I reported what I had heard to our chap- 
 lain, :\IcAdams, and Dr. Lyman, regimental surgeon. After a 
 short consultation, we concluded that there ought to be some 
 resolutions drafted, and see if our regiment, the 57th Pennsyl- 
 vania Volunteers, would not adopt them, believing this would 
 be an example the whole army would pretty generally follow, 
 and thus crush out the insurrectionary element that was then 
 present in the army. We vv-ent to Lieutenant-Colonel Peter 
 Sydes, then commanding the regiment, and told him what we 
 had been discussing. He at once appointed us to draft resolu- 
 tions, which were soon prepared. The colonel called out the 
 regiment, formed in hollow square. Chaplain McAdams read 
 the resolutions, expressing confidence in the President and Gen. 
 Hooker, pledging ourselves to stand by them and our glorious 
 flag to the last man, or the war ended. With the restoration 
 of the union, as soon as they were read, a motion was made to 
 adopt them, which was carried unanimously. A sergeant then 
 stepped to the front and called for three cheers for the President, 
 three cheers for General Hooker, and three for the flag. And 
 three times three were given with a will. We then adjourned 
 to our quarters. Soon orderlies came galloping from division 
 and brigade headquarters to ascertain what so much noise 
 meant, thinking (I learned afterwards) that an insurrection had 
 already broken out. But this patriotic action was soon followed 
 
18 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 by other commands all over the army, and that army, under the 
 inspiration and discipline of General Hookef, soon became 
 stronger and more efficient than it had ever been since its or- 
 ganization. The cavalry up to this time were of little or no use. 
 They won their spurs and fought their first battle at Kelly's 
 Ford April 17, 1863. From that time on it became one of the 
 strongest armes of our service. It owes all its splendid and 
 efficient record in historv to Gen. Hooker. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 Gen. Hooker Prepares to ^lovc on the Enemy. The Movement 
 of the Several Corps to Gain Their Position at Chancellors- 
 ville. 
 
 Settled spring weather was now rapidly approaching and it 
 was apparent to all a great battle was soon to be fought. The 
 time came. ♦ 
 
 General Hooker's plans for that battle was scientific in all 
 its details. The cavalry was to detach itself from the infantry 
 ten days in advance of the general movement, pass to the rear 
 of the enemy, cut and destroy all his communications with 
 Richmond. Destroy all supplies in reach, then hold themselves 
 behind some of the rivers to prevent a re-establishment of com- 
 munications and check the retreat of the enemy on Richmond. 
 It was known General Lee had not at any time been able to 
 keep more than four days' supply of rations on account of his 
 limited transportation. When that was exhausted he would have 
 to retreat from his intrenched camp to his base of supplies. 
 
 The infantry was to make the famous flank movement. It 
 executed as soon as the effect on Gen. Lee's commissary had 
 time to take effect caused by the cavalry raid. In the planning 
 of the battle the movements of the Union army and the final 
 points of the enemy's lines to be attacked by the Union army, 
 General Lee was completely deceived. In all our previous move- 
 ments the enemy knew when, where and how we were to move 
 and attack. The result was that they were always on the ground 
 
20 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 in advance of us, entrenched and waiting our approach. Before 
 the battle of Chancellorsville began we had gained our position, 
 and our plans were not known to the enemy until General 
 Hooker proclaimed to the army his position by publication cf 
 orders — not even in Washington. As proof of this the royal 
 bloods of France (Prince de Joneville and Count de Paris), at- 
 taches in previous campaigns to headquarters, were in Wash- 
 ington and came to the army the second day. When they ap- 
 proached the Union lines they inquired for General Hooker's 
 headquarters. A noted v;ag stepped out and said to them: Keep 
 right on this road to the second line of intrenchments, pass that 
 line about a half a mile and you will come to another line of in- 
 trenchments; you pass that about a half mile and you will come 
 to the picket line; you pass that line about sixty rods, there 
 you will find General Hooker's headquarters. This shows the 
 opinion the army had of "Fighting Joe Hooker." He was al- 
 ways on the front line, in the thickest of the firing, encouraging 
 his men and ready to take advantage of weak points in the 
 enemy's lines. 
 
 I never knew how unreliable the history of the late War ot 
 Rebellion was, especially the history of the battle of Chancellors- 
 ville, until I began to search histories to aid me in preparing 
 this work. 
 
 I was an attache of the Army of the Potomac for three years, 
 and desire to correct the history of that magnificent, patriotic 
 army, and to some extent place its failure to crush the enemy 
 when and where it came in contact with them, where it belongs. 
 From the first battle of Bull Run down to the surrender of 
 General Lee and his army, it fought like old, well drilled, battle 
 scarred veterans, but was cursed with the most incompetent army 
 commanders known in history. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 21 
 
 They were led against an army that were poorly armed, clad 
 and fed, and fewer in number, and yet they were nearly always 
 defeated by that ragamuffin army. Before the battle of Chan- 
 cellorsville began the Union army was composed of about 
 124.000 of all arms, 11,500 cavalfy, while General Lee's re- 
 ports show that they had but 62,000, 3,000 of which was cavalry. 
 With this disparity in numbers, when the enemy were dislodged 
 from their strong intrenched camp, forced to come out in open 
 field, they must have been defeated, if not totally destroyed, had 
 all moved and acted in concert, but General Stoneman, com- 
 manding the cavalry, did not cross the river as ordered April 13. 
 The order was repeated by General Hooker, but he got this for 
 reply: "The rivers and creeks are so high that we cannot pass 
 them." Finally, April 27, Gen. Hooker became impatient at the 
 delay of the cavalry and ordered the movement to begin of all 
 ^ arms at once. One reason Gen. Hooker rushed the movement 
 of his army was, he had learned that Gen. Lee had detached 
 Long-street with 24,000 soldiers to another department, and he 
 hoped to crush Gen. Lee before his army could be reunited. 
 Gen. Lee still had 62,000 soldiers present for duty. See his 
 
 report. 
 
 April 28th the Sixth corps (General Sedgwick's), the First 
 corps (General Reynolds'), moved down the river about four 
 miles below Fredericksburg, followed by the Third corps (Gen- 
 eral Sickels'), all under the immediate command of Gen. Sedg- 
 wick. Their mxOvement was in plain view of the enemy, which 
 led them to believe the whole army was moving to attack their 
 right flank. This made operations on the other flank easy. 
 
 April 28th two pontoon bridges were built at Franklin's old 
 crossing for the Sixth corps, and two more were laid one mile 
 below for the First corps to cross. Brooks' division of the Sixth 
 
22 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 corirs crossed the river with but little opposition, a few skir- 
 mishers along the banks of the river and firing of artillery from 
 the enemy's fortifications, which was at long range and did 
 but little damage, the valley at this point being wide. General 
 Wadsworth's division of the First corps crossed with equal suc- 
 cess below. 
 
 On the 27th General Hooker set three corps, the 5th, nth and 
 I2th, in motion to the right, under the immediate command of 
 Gen. Slocum, accompanied by three batteries to each corps. 
 This column's course was so far north of the river that its move- 
 ments could not be observed by the enemy, and they crossed the 
 Rappahannock river at Kelley's and Germania fords. On the 
 night of the 28th the cavalry crossed at the same place and pre- 
 ceded the infantry so as to cover their movements from the 
 enemy's cavalry. On the morning of the 29th the infantry was 
 on their way to the Rappidan and crossed that river at Morton* 
 and Racoon fords and proceeded to Chancellorsville, preceded 
 by a brigade of cavalry commanded by Gen. Pleasanton, wherp 
 they arrived at 6 p. m., April 30, and were joined by two divi- 
 sions of the 2d corps. The other division of the 2d corps was 
 left in camp at Falmouth, it being in plain view of the enemy, on 
 high ground, and was not moved, it having the appearance, to 
 the enemy leaving this division, that most of the Union army 
 was still in camp. So on the 30th Hooker found himself at 
 Chancellorsville with four corps, a movement he had made with- 
 out any loss. The cavalry under Stoneman proceeded on their 
 mission of destroying of public property and cutting communi- 
 cation between the enemy and Richmond, which they had been 
 ordered to do ten days earlier. 
 
 April 30th a circular order from General Hooker was read 
 to Sedgwick's command, informing them that the 5th, nth, 12th 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 23 
 
 and two divisions of the 2d corps had successfully crossed the 
 rivers and taken up a strong position at Chancellorsville, which 
 was on the right and rear of the enemy's intrenched camp 
 without the loss of a man, which would make the enemy come 
 out and fight the Union army on their own chosen ground, or 
 ignominously fly. 
 
 April 30th, late in the afternoon, General Sickle's 3rd corps 
 was ordered to Chancellorsville. On that night they camped on 
 the north bank of the Rappahannock river, near the 
 United. States ford. The mud was deep and that night 
 froze so it bore a horse. Think of it, the soldiers w^th 
 their underclothes wet with perspiration, with a thin blanket in 
 open fields, lying all night on this frozen ground! The writer 
 will give his experience of that night, which doubtless is the 
 same as many others on such occasions. The soldiers slept in 
 'groups of three and four, to make the blankets cover as many 
 as possible. So the outside ones are more or less exposed. On 
 this occasion I was one of the outside of our group. I awoke 
 some time in the night, and found my whole right side was para- 
 lyzed. I had no control of my right arm or limb. I reached 
 over and seized my right wrist with the left hand, drew it over 
 my body as far as I could, and working my left limb under my 
 right one as far as I could and by using all the force I possessed 
 was able to roll my frozen side to the comrade on my left. I 
 was a long time thawing out, but by turning often I got through 
 the night, but was not much rested. 
 
 May ist the 3rd corps arrived at Chancellorsville at about 
 II o'clock, and was posted in the rear and west of Chancellor 
 House. Fredericksburg is distant from Richmond about 50 or 
 60 miles east of south, Washington 40 miles east of north. Chan- 
 cellorsville is about 10 or 11 miles west of Fredericksburg. The 
 Rappahannock here runs in an easterly direction. The Confed- 
 
24 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. 
 
 erate fortifications extended along the crest of the hill three or 
 four lines deep, two miles above and four miles below Freder- 
 icksburg, with irregular redouts at intervals near all the fords 
 for twenty-five or thirty miles above and many miles below 
 the city. In a front attack Fredericksburg could not be 
 carried by six times their number if a" determined re- 
 sistance was made. Chancellorsville was a city of one 
 house, a country tavern. It is situated at the junction of 
 three roads that pass through and lead to Fredericksburg east. 
 Gordonsville and Culpepper west. One of these roads lead to 
 and down the river to Fredericksburg, and one, known as the 
 turnpike, passing along the higher grounds, and the other, 
 known as the plank road, passing along on lower ground and still 
 farther south. There were two other roads running parallel to 
 the plank and passing near the furnace, with cross or intersect- 
 ing roads at intervals, leading into the plank, both east and west 
 at Chancellorsville. Therefore our army at Chancellorsville took 
 the Fredericksburg intrenched camp in reverse. The enemy 
 were not only flanked but we were in their rear. This point of 
 advantage was gained before the enemy was aware of or had 
 any idea where the Union army were going to strike, and before 
 it had time to interpose any force to impede their progress. 
 
 On the evening of April 30th Stewart's cavalry had been 
 skirmishing with the Union cavalry in the direction of Gordons- 
 ville, and learned that there was a heavy column of infantry ap- 
 proaching Chancellorsville, and reported to General Lee the 
 Union army was coming down the river on the south side. 
 They were at Chancellorsville before this report reached Lee, 
 but this report satisfied him that their crossing below the city 
 was only a feint and the real attack would be on his left. 
 That night he ordered General Jackson, who was on his 
 
THE I5ATTLE OF CHANGELLORSVILLE. 25 
 
 extreme right, fifteen or twenty miles from Chancellors- 
 ville, and the rest of his army, except about 9,000 men 
 under General Early, to leave their intrenchments and 
 march out and check the army of the Potomac. On the night of 
 April 30th Gen. Hooker's line was advanced about one mile on 
 the road to Fredericksburg, on the plank and turnpike, and 
 on the river road still fartlier and near Bank's Ford. All that 
 night the enemy was forming and intrenching their new line. 
 General Jackson came up at 8 a, m.. May ist, and advanced 
 V-.heir lines still farther toward Chancellorsville, and at some 
 points into the thick timber and awaited developments. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Battle of Chancellorsville, May ist — The Formation of the 
 Union Lines Around Chancellorsville at Night, May ist — 
 Jackson's Movement and Attack of the nth Corps — Gen. 
 Howard's Incredulity and Defeat, May 2d. 
 
 About II a. m., May ist. General Hooker ordered an attack 
 on General Lee's lines, in the following order: General Slo- 
 cum's I2th corps, followed up by General Howard's nth corps, 
 took the plank road. Sikes' division of the 5th corps, General 
 Hancock's division of the 2d corps on the turnpike in the center, 
 the remainder of the 5th corps took the river road. Frenche's 
 division of the 2d corps turned to the right, crossed the plank 
 and advanced on a road about two miles south of the plank to 
 Todd's tavern. Each column was preceded by a detachment of 
 Pleasanton's cavalry. Sickels' 3rd corps, in reserve west of 
 the Chancellor House, except General Graham's brigade, which 
 was advanced to Dowdle's Tavern, on the plank, facing west. 
 This is sometimes called the Melzy Chancellor House. 
 
 General Hooker expected to advance rapidly in this order, 
 drive the enemy before him and establish his line, with his 
 right resting on Tabernacle church, about four miles east of 
 Chancellorsville, and his left covering Bank's Ford. But it was 
 soon found that the whole country, from the river south, a long 
 distance below the plank road, was an impenetrable thicket 
 through which troops could not be moved in concert. Every at- 
 tempt to deploy from the road to connect the moving columns 
 
28 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 resulted in a broken mass. The more they attempted to estab- 
 lish communications with the advancing columns the more 
 broken and disorganized they became. Aides trying to communi- 
 cate with the advancing columns got lost, not knowing where 
 they were going. The advance of such a line with any accuracy 
 is impossible. The more it advances, the more disorganized it 
 becomes. In this condition it met the enemy at rest, with a 
 fixed, well organized line. The contest was unequal. 
 
 (General Doubleday says it was like moving in a dense fog.) 
 Here the struggle was terrible. When night came on no one 
 knew whether friends or enemies were on their right or left 
 fiank, so Hooker ordered the Union army to fall back to a line 
 he had ordered laid out by Gen. Warren, of Hooker's staff, and 
 Capt. Pain, of the engineer corps, which they were able to 
 hold on the left flank with but little trouble as long as the army 
 remained on the south side of the river. 
 
 To show the density of the forest and the impossibility to 
 advance a line of battle in such a forest in face of the enemy, 
 when the order was given to fall back one of the Union brigades 
 got lost and floundered around and did not reach its place in 
 line assigned it until morning, May 2d. 
 
 The decision of Gen. Hooker to fall back and take up the 
 position on which the Union army rested on the morning of 
 May 2d was a wise and a humane thing to do. The Confederates 
 had taken up a strong position, with a force equal, if not greater, 
 at this point than that of the Union army, and many lives would 
 have been sacrificed, and the result was at best doubtful. It 
 was always Gen. Hooker's policy to never attack the enemy's 
 intrenched lines in front, and in this change of position the 
 enemy would have to attack him in his intrenched lines, or re- 
 tire within forty-eight hours. And he chose to fall back, in- 
 trench around Chancellorsville and await results. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 29 
 
 The Union line as now formed was in the shape of a U, bot- 
 tomside up, the left 5th corps resting on the river near Scott's 
 Dam, the 2d and uth corps east and south of the Chancellor 
 House, part of the 12th and 3d corps south and southwest of the 
 house. The nth corps crossed the plank about two miles west of 
 the Chancellor House, at the junction of the plank with the pike. 
 then turned west along the pike about one-half or three-fourths 
 of a mile, then made a slight turn to the right. But its right 
 did not rest upon 'tiny object, and as Shurtz told Howard, his 
 right was in the air. This was formed with the view of a front 
 attack on the plank or pike. Then in the rear of Hunting Creek 
 and right of the nth corps was Barrie's division of the 3rd 
 corps, which was soon relieved by the ist corps. And this 
 division was placed in reserve near the Chancellor House. About 
 one mile west of where General Howard's line crossed the plank 
 road forks, one branch runs northwest to Culpepper, the other 
 southwest to Orange Court House, about one mile west of the 
 forks of the plank road, the two roads passing the furnace and 
 running parallel to each other, crosses the plank and pike. The 
 prospects of Gen. Lee as darkness closed in on the engagement 
 of Alay ist was not very encouraging. He had carefully ex- 
 amined the position of the Union army and satisfied himself 
 that so far as the left and center was concerned it was unassail- 
 able with any prospect of success. But before giving up the 
 contest he ordered Gen. Stewart, commanding the Confeder3*c 
 cavalry to reconnoitre to the right. Stewart took the road*. 
 south of the finmace. which pass through a dense forest m 
 which a moving column could not be seen from the Union lines, 
 except at one or two short intervals where the road passed over 
 high ground. The timber stands thinner here, covered wagon? 
 and infantry columns could be seen plainly if they were moving. 
 
30 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 It was on these roads that Stewart passed to view^ the Eleventh 
 corps lines to the right and reported to Gen. Lee and Gen. 
 Jackson, about daylight on the morning of May 2d the result of 
 his reconnoissance. His report was that the right of Gen. How- 
 ard's line did not rest on any object, was unsupported and easily 
 turned. On this report General Jackson asked permission to 
 take his corps, 26.000 strong, and make a detour on the same 
 roads Gen. Stewart had passed, believing he could do so unob- 
 served by the enemy, and gain the right of Gen. Howard's line, 
 and with the help of the cavalry, unexpectedly fall upon and 
 crush Howard's force before reinforcements could reach him. 
 Is it possible that Stewart met Howard that night and arranged 
 with him to maintain this position until he returned with Jackson 
 and attacked him next day? Watch and see how it looks. 
 
 It is not my purpose to say that such a conference ever took 
 place, but I do say if it had, and Howard had pledged himself 
 to Gen. Stewart that the eleventh corps lines should not be 
 changed until Stewart should return with Jackson and his army 
 of twenty-six thousand and place them on the right flank and 
 rear of the nth corps and that no pickets or grand guard should 
 be sent out to give notice of their approach, nor should any de- 
 fense be thrown up for the protection of the eleventh corps on 
 that flank, and a written contract had been entered into by the 
 contracting parties for a consideration, I do say that neither 
 Generals Stewart, Jackson or Lee could ever complain that 
 there had been any breach of contract on Howard's part. This 
 position occupied by the eleventh corps became the key to the 
 battle field as soon as Jackson's movement began. If Jackson 
 failed in his attack the Confederate army v.as doomed to de- 
 struction. If he succeeded he would capture many prisoners and 
 possess himself of a commanding position which would ma- 
 
THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSYILLE. 31 
 
 terially increase the Confederates' chance of success. It was 
 the Confederates' belief if this move succeeded they could de- 
 stroy the Union army before they could recross the river or be 
 reinforced from their left. 
 
 Gen. Hooker has been censured because he did not pass 
 through the tliicket on the night of April 30th instead of stop- 
 ping over night at. Chancellorsville as he did. Doubtless this 
 course would have been the better one, from the fact that he 
 intended to finally take up his position three or four miles nearer 
 Fredericksburg, his right resting on Tabernacle church. He 
 could have reached that point tliat night before Gen. Jackson 
 could have reinforced Anderson's division, which was all that 
 was in his front. He would thus have easily pushed Anderson 
 out of the way. His position would have then been far better, 
 for two reason: His army would have been on open country, 
 which would have enabled him to use all his artillery to great 
 advantage, and left him four or five miles nearer his base of 
 supplies. And the second reason is. he would have been nearer 
 the 6th. 3rd and ist corps, which he had left to make the dem- 
 onstration on the enemy's right, while he with the other wing 
 of the army made this wonderfully successful flank movement 
 on Gen. Lee's left. But this, although it may have been a mis- 
 take and a disappointment, it was not necessarily fatal. The 
 position at Chancellorsville was on high ground, naturally strong 
 for defensive operations. The Union army's communication 
 with their base of supplies was perfect. Their formation was 
 strong for defensive operations, and. if the cavalry accomplished 
 their work of destroying all communications of the enemy with 
 their base of supplies, as directed by Gen. Hooker, the enemy 
 would have soon been compelled to retreat. This alone would 
 have l)ecn a victf>ry. All the Union army had to do was to 
 
32 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS VILLE. 
 
 hang on to this position and win, while, on the other side, the 
 successful flank movement of Gen. Jackson, or retreat, was all 
 that was left for the Confederates. If Gen. Lee's exeprience with 
 our former army commanders had not led him to place such im- 
 plicit confidence in Jackson and led him to hold our army com- 
 manders in such utter contempt, he would never have consented 
 to have thus divided his army in the face of this powerful enemy. 
 This move was what General Hooker desired. Nothing could 
 have pleased him better, and he proceeded to distribute his 
 corps to ma'ke sure of the enemy's destruction and to notify and 
 warn Howard of Jackson's movement on his right flank. (This 
 movement of Gen. Jackson was a bold, hazardous and reckless 
 move. Gen. Doubleday says: "It was a startling proposition 
 and contrary to all the principles of strategy." For when Jack- 
 son was gone Lee would be left with but few men to withstand 
 the shock of Gen. Hooker's entire army, and might be crushed 
 while Jackson would be powerless to render him any assistance.) 
 Jackson's position was equally as critical. If Gen. Howard had 
 prepared for Gen. Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified 
 and turned the right of his line to rest on Big Hunting Creek, 
 then his right could not have been turned by Jackson, and with 
 felled timber in front, tops out, and his artillery placed at the 
 angles of his breastworks, he could have held Gen. Jackson 
 for an indefinite period. But the failure of Gen. Howard to do 
 his duty and obey orders turned the scale and lost the battle, and 
 gave the victory to the Confederates, not only of May 2d, but 
 turned the tide by giving them an advantageous position and 
 making our position almost unattainable on that flank. That was 
 one of the most potent reasons that made the Union army 
 yield the field to the enemy and recross the river and go back to 
 their old camping grounds. Early in the morning of May 26. 
 
TPIE BATTLE OF CITANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 33 
 
 Gen. Graham's brigade of the 3rd corps, to which I belonged, 
 was ordered to report to Gen. Howard for duty with a battery of 
 artillery. The order was promptly obeyed and when we arrived 
 at nth corps headquarters Gen. Howard told Gen. Graham he 
 had no use for him, that his lines were so strong he could hold 
 the whole Confederate army, and desired them to attack him. I 
 was standing within twenty feet of Howard and heard every 
 word. He ordered us to report to Gen. Hooker and be placed 
 where we could be of some use, as we could be of none th re. 
 When we returned Gen. Sickles got permission to advance two 
 divisions of the 3d corps, which included Graham's brigade, to 
 the furnace, which was on the right center of our line, near 
 the two roads on which Gen. Jackson was seen to pass. This 
 movement of Jackson was reported by Gen. Birney in the morn- 
 ing at headquarters. We moved out and took possession of the 
 roads, capturing one entire regiment and other prisoners, cut- 
 ting all communicatons between Gen. Jackson and Gen. Lee. 
 Thus moving on Jackson's right flank and rear, expecting Gen. 
 Howard to hold him in front. The 3rd corps would then attack 
 his right, the ist corps being in echelon to the right of the nth 
 corps, and rear of Big Hunting Creek, and extending to the 
 river, would be able to strike Gen. Jackson in rear and on his 
 left flank. He would thus be held and it would be difficult for 
 him to escape us. Long before the 3rd corps took this advanced 
 position the following order was issued: 
 
 "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Chancellors- 
 ville. Va.. :May 2nd. 1863. 9:30 a. m. Major-Generals 
 Slocum and Howard: I am directed by the major-general com- 
 manding to say the disposition you have made with your corps 
 has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he 
 should throw himself upon your flanks, he wishes you to ex- 
 
34 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 amine the grounds and determine upon the position you will 
 take in that event. In order that you may be prepared for him 
 in whatever direction he advances, he suggests that you have 
 heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right 
 of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No arti- 
 ficial defense worth mentioning has been thrown up, and there 
 appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not in the gen- 
 eral's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. We have good 
 reasons to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please 
 advance your pickets as far as may be safe, in order to obtain 
 timely information of their approach. 
 
 (Signed) MMES H. VAN ALLEN, 
 
 Brig.-Gen. and Aide de Camp. 
 
 General Howard, in the Century Bound Volume, from May 
 to October 1886, denies that this order ever reached him or his 
 adjutant general. Col. T. A. Meysenburg, Century, page 766. 
 If this was true, as Gen. Howard says, that this order never came 
 to his headquarters, to his or to his adjutant general's knowledge, 
 there was some little excuse for his being surprised when Gen. 
 Jackson attacked his corps at 6 o'clock p. m., provided he had 
 not got any other notice of Jackson's movements. Men who 
 served in the War of Rebellion know that if the order was ever 
 issued and sent from headquarters it was delivered to Gen. How- 
 ard or some one at his headquarters who receipted for it, the or- 
 derly or aide who carried it would never dare to return to head- 
 quarters without some one having receipted for that important 
 order. So that point was settled at headquarters, they knew that 
 order had been delivered at its proper destination. Now the only 
 question is did Howard see this order. Major General Schurz, 
 who commanded a division of the nth corps, and was second in 
 
THE BATTLE OF CFIANCELLORSYILLE. 35 
 
 rank to Howard, says he was at Howard's headquarters when 
 Gen. How^ard came in and laid down to rest, and asked him 
 (Schurz)to open and read letters and dispatches that had accum- 
 ulated, and among the dispatches was the order above referred 
 to. Gen. Howard got up and they sat down and discussed the or- 
 der, but Howard did not act upon it. No change of front was or- 
 dered or defense thrown up, but he (Schurz), without orders, 
 faced some of his regiment to the right. He further says that 
 while Howard and I were discussing this order another order of 
 similar purport came from Gen. Hooker. I am not sure whether 
 Gen. Steinware was present or not. This happened about 12 
 o'clock m.. May 2nd, as near as I can remember. (Century bound 
 volume, May to October, 1886, page 780.) In further contradic- 
 tion of Howard's statements relative to this order from Hooker, 
 I will ofYer the affidavit of H. M. Kellogg which is a valuable 
 acquisition for the reason that it show^s a disposition not only 
 to tell a williul falsehood on the part of Howard and a disposition 
 to be treacherous to his superior, but to the army and his coun- 
 try; the hiding away of this important order for so long a time 
 until Gen. Hooker was relieved from his command, to our mind 
 shows a premeditated disposition to be false. It looks as though 
 the disappearance of this order from the files of the war depart- 
 ment was by Howard's hands or some one in his interest and 
 with his knowledge. That he has made a mistake is disproved 
 by his article in the Century of 1886, on page 766 — 23 years after 
 the occurrence he denies all knowledge of this important order. 
 Does it require more evidence to prove that Howard's very 
 singular conduct in the management of the 11th corps was pre- 
 meditated. It has that appearance. 
 Kelloug savs on oath: 
 
36 THE BATTLE OF CITANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 AFFIDAVIT. 
 
 State of New York, County of Cortland — ss. 
 
 Before me, F. J. Peck, a Notary Public in and for the County 
 of ^Cortland and State of New York, came Henry ]\I. Kellogg, 
 of No. 25 Main street, Cortland, New York, who. being by me 
 duly sworn according to law, deposes and says, that he is 56 
 years of age, a resident, and business man, of Cortland, New 
 York, where he has resided, and been engaged in business con- 
 tinuously, for the past 26 years. That on the 20th day of April, 
 1861, eight days after the attack upon Fort Sumter, S. C, he 
 enlisted and was mustered into the 5th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, 
 Company "G," at Cincinnati, Ohio. That at the expiration of 
 his term of service, he was honorably discharged and mustered 
 out. That on the 5th day of August, 1862, he re-enlisted, in 
 Company "G," 55th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, at Upper San- 
 dusky, Wyandot County, Ohio, and served continuously until 
 May 31st, 1865, when he was honorably discharged and mustered 
 out, at the close of the war. That after the Fredericksburg 
 campaign, and while his regiment (the 55th Ohio, Col. John 
 C. Lee) lay, camped in the woods, at Brooks Station, Va., at 
 the rerj^uest and on the recommendation of his Colonel, he ac- 
 cepted a detail for duty at headquarters of the nth army corps 
 and reported to Col. T. A. Meysenburg, assistant adjutant gen- 
 eral, at said headquarters at Stafford Court House, Va., on Feb- 
 ruary 28th, 1863: and remained on duty, in the adjutant general's 
 department, of said nth army corps, until the 31st. day o* 
 August, 1863, when by order of General Howard he was trans- 
 ferred to another department at his headquarters. That from 
 the 28th day of February, 1863, to August 31st, 1863, while con- 
 nected with the adjutant general's office, as stated above, he had 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 37 
 
 charge of the records and files of letters, telegrams, and orders 
 received at said ofticc. During that time, the two great cam- 
 paigns and terrible battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg 
 occurred. The tirst (the Chancellorsville) campaign began in 
 April and ended, by the nth army corps returning to its former 
 camping grounds, near Brooks Station, Va., the first week in 
 May, 1863. While in this camp during May, 1863. after the battle 
 of Chancellorsville. he tiled, endorsed and copied into the rec- 
 ord books of said adjutant general's department of the said 
 nth corps, all the papers and documents which came into his 
 possession in relation to said campaign. That he was ordered 
 by Col. Meysenburg, assistant adjutant general, to also make a 
 complete duplicate set of official copies of all said records ready 
 for use in Washington, if they should be called for. That he 
 prepared as directed the duplicate "official copies." that there 
 was not among these papers the famous and all important order 
 of May 2d, 9:30 a. m., from headquarters of the Army of the 
 Potomac at the Chancellorsville House, from General Joseph 
 Hooker to General O. O. Howard, commanding said corps.^ 
 directing him to be prepared for the enemy upon his right Hank. 
 Neither was the existence of such an order known to the affiant 
 at that time. That on the 13th day of June following, the nth 
 army corps began its march on what proved to be the Gettys- 
 burg campaign. The corps marched north to the Orange & 
 Alexandria railroad through Manassas, Centerville, Goose 
 Creek, to the Potomac, at- Edwards Ferry, crossing a pontoon 
 bridge into Maryland, thence via Jefferson and Middleton to 
 Frederick, Md., which place was reached at sundown, June 2Sih, 
 1863. That during the night of 28th, General Hooker was re- 
 lieved of the command of the army. The nth corps moved at 
 daylight (29th) and marched 30 miles that day to Emmettsburg. 
 
38 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSA'ILLE. 
 
 ]\Id., and during the day learned that General Meade, and not 
 Hooker, was then in command. The corps remained in camp 
 on the 30th of June (the day before Gettysburg battle began) 
 at Emmettsburg. Md.. 10 miles distant from Gettysburg. Pa.. 
 across the state line. During the day (June 30th) headquarter 
 tents were put up and he began work upon the accumulated 
 papers in his possession relating to the campaign of Gettysburg, 
 the accumulation of over two weeks. While seated at his desk 
 that 30th day of June, within 48 hours following the departure 
 of General Joseph Hooker from the said army as its commander. 
 Col. T. A. Meysenburg. assistant adjutant general, entered the 
 tent and handed him a field order, saying, "There is a very im- 
 portant order relating to the Chancellorsvillc campaign; you 
 will file it in its proper place, among the papers of that cam- 
 paign, and record it in your book, giving it its proper date, 
 ]\Iay 2d." He passed out of the tent, leaving it in affiant's pos- 
 session for record. That af^ant read it with amazement and 
 astonishment and immediately made a copy of the order from 
 the original field order, which for two months had been con- 
 cealed and kept from the files until General Hooker had been 
 relieved from his command. That said afhant filed said paper 
 in its proper place. That he is now credibly informed that it 
 has disappeared from the files in the War Department; that he 
 copied same in record book on that day arid that the said order 
 dated May 2d. "63, is official No. 78, and is recorded after other 
 orders dated June 12th. 1863, relating to another (the Gettys- 
 burg) campaign, in said record and is now in the vaults of the 
 War Department at Washington. D. C. in the handwriting of 
 said^ affiant. That the following is an exact copy of said order: 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
 
 Saturday, May 2d, 9:30 a. m., 1863. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 39 
 
 To General Howard: 
 
 General— I am directed by the Major General commanding 
 to say the disposition you have made of your corps has been 
 with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw 
 himself upon your flank he wishes you to examine the -round 
 and determine upon the position you will take in that event ni 
 order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction 
 he advances. 
 
 He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to 
 
 meet this contingency. 
 
 Your ob'dt servant. 
 
 (Signed) J. H. VAN ALLEN. 
 
 Brig. Genl. and A. D. C. 
 
 We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving 
 to our .right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of 
 observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely in- 
 formation of their approach. 
 
 H. M. KELLOGG. 
 
 Subscribed and sworn before me this 30th day of November. 
 
 1897. 
 
 (Notarial Seal.) F. J. PECK, 
 
 ^Notary Public. 
 
 The two orders, copies of which I have produced, 
 proves that Howard had knowledge of their existence, 
 read and talked the matter over with Gen. Schurz, thus estab- 
 lishing two facts which were as patent to the mind of Gen. How- 
 ard at that time, as they are to us now that Jackson was sure to 
 attack his corps on their right very soon. This places him in the 
 position of willfully disobeying orders of his superior in the face 
 of the enemy. The nth corps did not have any advance pickets 
 
40 THE BATTLE OF CHANCIELLORSVILLE. 
 
 in their right flank, yet Howard was frequently told the enemy 
 was moving to attack that flank. His disobeying Gen. Hooker's 
 orders at that time was one of the highest crimes known in mil- 
 itary law. The penalty is death. 
 
 Gen. Howard had no concern about Gen. Jackson and the 
 position of his army. Gen. Pleasanton sent rcconnoitering squads 
 who reported the position of the enemy to Gen. Howard; Sickles 
 and others did the same thing. To all he replied they were mis- 
 taken, but made no move to counteract the movements of the 
 enemy, or ascertain the facts of which he claimed to be in doubt. 
 Scouts repeatedly reported to Gen. Howard. He ignored them 
 all and scoffed at the idea of such a thing, and charged them 
 with telling a story, the offspring of their imagination or fears. 
 
 The colonel of the 157th N. Y. Volunteers of the nth corps 
 and another oflicer of the regiment went out beyond their line 
 and returned at 2 o'clock p. m. without orders from Howard and 
 reported to him. They distinctly heard the enemy massing their 
 troops on the right and rear of the nth corps line. Howard's 
 answer was: "You are new troops more scared than necessary." 
 Other officers of the corps reported to Gen. Howard the ap- 
 proach of the enemy. To all he turned a deaf ear. At the same 
 time Gen. Jackson rode forward close to the Union lines, 
 climbed a large hill about 2 p. m., from which he could have a 
 clear view that enabled him to inspect the nth corps lines, and 
 he took bearings that enabled him to form his corps on their 
 right flank and rear where there were no defenses or obstruction 
 save the natural forest and when this large force did strike the 
 exposed flank of the nth corps they were as helpless as little 
 children. Some of the regimental officers on the right of the nth 
 corps, requested Gen. Howard the privilege to change front and 
 asked for tools to intrench, to meet the enemy they knew was 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 41 
 
 soon coming down on them like an avalanche, but their requests 
 were refused. He told them he would look after the nth corps 
 formation. Gen. Howard was not surprised, Gen. Hooker had 
 warned him over eight hours before the enemy attacked. j\Iany 
 oilicers and scouts who had been out and viewed the enemy 
 forming for the attack, reported all their movements to him. 
 
 To show that the officers, and enlisted men of the nth corps 
 knew that Jackson was preparing to attack their right flank and 
 rear and his attack was no surprise, we will give an account of 
 Jackson's attack by Corporal Charles Stacy, of Co. D, 55th Ohio 
 regiment. Corporal Stacy was awarded a beautiful bronze medal 
 for gallantry at the battle of Gettysburg, July 2d, 1863. This is 
 what he has to say about the battle of Chancellorsville: 
 
 On the second day of May we took a position in line of bat- 
 tle along a road, being on the extreme right, with the exception 
 of a brigade of Germans. Col. John C. Lee, of the 55th Ohio, ob- 
 tained a map of a resident, a Union man, showing how the rebels 
 were massing troops on our right and sent it to Gen. Howard. 
 No notice was taken of it by Howard. 
 
 Col. Lee sent an orderly to Gen. Howard asking him if he 
 could change front, also saying "If you will furnish my regiment 
 with axes, I will soon make an impassible barrier to the enemy." 
 He received in reply an order to attend to his regiment and he, 
 Howard, would attend to the rest. At this time, 4 o'clock p. m., 
 May 2, 1863, says Stacy, the silence was ominous and the men 
 were. getting uneasy, for not one of us but knew we would soon 
 be attacked and we knew we were in a position in which we 
 could do nothing. Col. Lee at this time told our band to go to 
 the rear, the course of which was along our line to the left and 
 past Gen. Howard's headquarters. Howard halted the band and 
 wanted to know where thev were going. Thev told him Col. Lee 
 
42 THE BATTLE OF CIIANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 had ordered them to the rear, as there would be fighting inside 
 of twenty minutes. Turning to one of his staff Howard said, 
 I guess the colonel is getting scared and he ordered the band to 
 play; they played one tune and then began to play a piece called 
 Dixie ]\Iedley, the last part of which was, get out of the wilder- 
 ness, and while the band was playing this piece the battle began. 
 Just previous to this time two deers ran along in front of our 
 line. This satisfied all that they had been driven up by the ad- 
 vance of the enemy. Our position can be no better described 
 than by using a bow and arrow : the rebels were the bow, and the 
 55th Ohio was the arrow. Suddenly the rebels broke out from 
 the thick woods on our right, front and rear, and the firing be- 
 gan. The brigade to our right could make no resistance, and 
 were taken prisoners. This left the 55th Ohio on the extreme 
 right of the line. We were attacked from three sides. Oh! how 
 can I describe this terrible scene. Officers and men were doing 
 their best. It appears that I can now see our grand lieutenant, 
 F. H. Bolt, as he stood in the road, swinging his sword over his 
 head, saying, "give it to them, boys, give it to them." We took 
 the best position we could on such short notice, and with delib- 
 erate aim sent our shot crashing through the enemy's ranks in 
 our front, but it was found we were being surrounded and fell 
 back. I have made the claim that, for our numbers who were 
 engaged here, we lost the most men, for the length of time en- 
 gaged, of any command during the war.* This shows that the 
 rank and file of the nth corps would fight, and were as good and 
 brave soldiers as any army ever possessed. They actually 
 
 *We have been informed that the way Col. Lee obtained the 
 map from a citizen referred to by Corporal Stacy, was, the oM 
 resident marked it out in the sand, giving position and location 
 of the enemy, and Col. Lee drew the map on paper and sent it 
 to Gen. Howard. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 43 
 
 checked the enemy in their front, but seeing heavy columns \ 
 passing to their right and left flanks, knowing they would soon [ 
 be surrounded and all captured, fell back, the same as any other j 
 soldiers would under like circumstances. 
 
 It will be seen by the statements of Corporal Stacy regard- 
 ing the attack of Jackson on the nth corps' right, that the rank 
 and file of that corps were fully aware that the enemy was 
 crawling up on their right flank and rear, and that they were 
 liable to burst forth from the dense forest any moment. It must 
 have been a trying ordeal that these intelligent men passed 
 through for the six or eight hours that these soldiers were held 
 by the arbitrary orders of Gen. Howard. The wonder of citizens, 
 who have never been soldiers, will ahva3S be why such bright 
 men as Generals Carl Schurz, Steinwher, Ames, ■McLane, and 
 other military men of that corps, could have been held in such a 
 helpless position until the enemy attacked; but those who have 
 b:'en soldiers know the first thing they learned was to obey or- 
 ders and ask no questions. Does anybody believe Howard was 
 surprised? 
 
 While Corporal Stacy and all the of^cers and men of his 
 regiment knew Jackson was soon going to attack, that belief was 
 not shared by many others. It is reported that on the right of 
 Devens' division the men had stacked arms, and some were 
 cooking supper, others playing cards, others straggling around 
 their camp in various pursuits, far away from their arms, and 
 Confederate prisoners whom the 3d corps captured that night 
 in their midnight charge, said that when they struck and captured 
 the right of the nth corps line, that they captured whole rows 
 of guns whose stacks had not beerf broken. This would be nat- 
 ural, for Gen. Dcvcns did not seem to be much disturbed, and 
 was not. inclined to believe the report that Jackson was moving 
 
44 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 on his right, and it was natural the men would partake more or 
 less of the confidence of their corps and division commanders. 
 The strangest thing to account for is Howard's refusing rein- 
 forcements sent to him by Gen. Hooker. It is further evidence 
 of his incompetency, or premeditated treachery to the army of the 
 Potomac, and his denying that Gen. Hooker ever notified him 
 of the enemy's moving to his right. In view of the fact that 
 Gen. Schurz read to, and discussed the order with him, and, then, 
 who but he was interested in hiding that order for two months, 
 fearing court martial (sec Kelk;gg's affidavit), was there more 
 and better evidence of the treachery of Benedict Arnold, or Hull, 
 than this of Gen. Howard's? It is true the country surrounding 
 Chancellorsville is a dense forest, with here and there small 
 cleared farms, so that troops moving or at rest could not be ob- 
 served any distance if proper precaution was exercised by their 
 commanders. For this reason it was more necessary for corps 
 commanders to have their pickets stationed as far out in front of 
 their main line as was safe, supported by grand guards, so as to 
 give timely warning to the main lines to enable them to prepare 
 to meet the enemy, no matter in what direction they would ap- 
 proach. It was the duty of Gen. Howard to take this precaution 
 without waiting for orders from Gen. Hooker or anybody else. 
 And in addition to sending out pickets, he should have sent 
 scouts in every direction to ascertain the facts relative to reports 
 and the position of the enemy. This should have been done 
 immediately after learning from any source that the enemy was 
 moving in his direction. But if we believe that the evidence was 
 furnished Gen. Howard of the approach of the enemy, which 
 we have cited in the preceding pages, then we must look for 
 some cause other than a surprise, to account for General How- 
 ard's conduct on May 2nd. It seems that there was some sort 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 45 
 
 of investigation of this affair later by the congressional commit- 
 tee on the conduct of the war, but it was a farce and necessarily 
 unreliable. It could not very well be otherwise. Gen. Hooker 
 claimed that he had taken all the precaution necessary in the 
 formation of his lines and had given Gen. Howard timely notice 
 of Jackson's approach and Howard had been negligent, and 
 instead of making preparation to meet the enemy, refused to 
 believe the enemy was moving to his right and rear, although the 
 source of his information as to the enemy's movements ought 
 to have been considered the most reliable a general could obtain 
 even outside of the two orders issued at headquarters, apprising 
 him of all the facts as appears in full in the foregoing pages. I 
 desire to say a word here in explanation of the two orders of 
 the same date, May 2nd, 9:30 a. m., in almost the exact words: 
 My idea is, it happened this way: When the Union lines around 
 Chancellorsville was formed on the night of May ist, the for- 
 mation from left to right by corps, was beginning at the Rap- 
 pahannock river, as follows: The 5th corps on the extreme left; 
 next came the 2d corps; next came the 12th corps, facing south- 
 east and south of the Chancellor House; then came the nth 
 corps, which was west and southwest of the Chancellor House; 
 on their right was a division of the 3d corps and cavalry, which 
 held the right to the Rapidan river when Gen Hooker inspected 
 his lines. Early in the morning of I\Iay 2nd, he discovered 
 that the space between the nth and 12th corps was too broad 
 and that space was ordered filled up with Gen. Birney's division 
 of the 3d corps and immediately Birney, on taking this position, 
 discovered Jackson's movement to our right and reported it to 
 headquarters and this report caused the order of 9:30 a. m.. May 
 2nd, to be issued and in the haste of Gen, Van Allen to give 
 :ioticc, and knowing the weak point and open space that had 
 
46 THE BA.TTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 existed between the nth and 12th corps, addressed his first note 
 of warning and order to :Maj. Gen. Slocum and Maj. Gen. 
 Howard. Immediately alter this another order of a similar pur- 
 port was sent from headquarters, dated 9:30 a. m., and addressed 
 to !Maj. Gen. Howard. The first of these orders is the one 
 Howard calls the confused order, which he could not under- 
 stand, but it must have been discovered by Gen. Van Allen im- 
 mediately that the nth and 12th corps did not, at that time, join 
 Cirney. having filled up the gap. and that the enemy had passed 
 the aforementioned weak point and that it was the right of the 
 nth corps that was in danger of an attack by the enemy and 
 immediately issued the second order, same date, 9:30 a. m., May 
 2d, and directed it to Maj. Gen. Howard individually, which 
 speaks for itself. It is the second order that Gen. Schurz speaks 
 of as of the same import, coming while he and Howard were 
 discussing the first one and was smuggled away, but finally 
 recorded and filed nearly two months after the battle, and would 
 not now be known to exist had not ]\Ir. Kellogg carefully copied 
 the original (see affidavit in foregoing page), but Mr. Kellogg 
 tells me that at his request a gentleman searched the records 
 of the war department and found that the original order he 
 filed away has disappeared from the files, but in the record 
 book of the nth corps they found the order recorded. But 
 the order had disappeared from the files in the vaults of the war 
 department. 
 
 It would appear as though this very important order has been 
 stolen from the vaults of the war department. Who are the 
 thieves that would be interested in the removal of this order? 
 But inasmuch as a true copy has been preserved, and the afifidavit 
 of H. M. Kellogg, as to its authenticity published, it would seem 
 as though the abstractor of the original order might as well 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 47 
 
 return it to the vaults. The fact that it once existed has been 
 proven beyond a doubt, and the evidence fully shows that in the 
 order book of the nth corps they found a record of the order 
 and its official number in the book is 78. Now to the question 
 again, who stole that order and why did they do it, we leave this 
 for others to decide, and here we leave the matter. 
 
 Now let us return to the second day's battle, May 2d, and 
 the nth corps, and I want to say here and now, being an active 
 participant adjacent to that corps from start to finish, when 
 Jackson drove them out of the position they occupied in the 
 evening of ]\Iay 2d, that what I knew of the movements of the 
 enemy at that time, and have since learned, I want to go on 
 record and be understood that the attempt of General Howard 
 to charge the defeat of that corps to the cowardice of the rank 
 and file of his command, is the most unjust, wicked attempt to 
 shirk responsibility ever attempted by a human being. 
 
 There was not a corps in the army if they had been placed 
 in the same position, but what would have retreated, and prob- 
 ably in no better order than the nth corps did. The fact is, 
 all the officers and most of the enlisted men of the nth corps 
 knew it was reported that the enemy was massing in great force 
 on their right and rear. Some of their own command had been 
 so near as to satisfy them that the reports were true. They 
 heard the command of the enemy as they went into position. 
 The forest was so thick that it would not be safe for a man or 
 squad of men to crawl up to see their movements or count their 
 numbers, for they were liable to have pickets or scouts in ad- 
 vance that would capture the squad or individual that would 
 attempt to make close scrutiny. No one could see far in this 
 thick forest, but they could hear the commands for a long ways, 
 and know its meaning, and I no\er heard of an officer refusing 
 
48 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 the report of a scout who reported what he heard, if darkness 
 or other causes prevented a perfect ocular demonstration. Be- 
 fore Howard raised the objection at Chancellorsville, his course 
 here was to bluff everybody that talked that the enemy was 
 massing on their right and rear. Then when the enemy did 
 rush in in such heavy columns from the forest on the flank and 
 rear, every man realized that Howard's judgment w^as not to be 
 relied upon, or else he had willfully betrayed them and his ap- 
 pearance among the men so soon after he had made this great 
 blunder did not restore their confidence, but w'ould naturally 
 increase the panic that had possession of them. They had lost 
 confidence in their commander. The facts that appear as this 
 narrative procee'ds are quite enough to cause this corps to lose 
 confidence in Howard. Any corps treated as the nth corps 
 was by Howard would have lost confidence in him and would 
 not have halted under the pressure of Jackson's heavy column 
 and changed front under their fire and stopped the enemy, and 
 I now repeat that no troops, not even Napoleon's old guards, 
 had they been placed under Howard and handled and deceived 
 as he did the nth corps, would have done any better. 
 
 About 6:30 p. m., two divisions of the 3rd corps being far in 
 advance of the right center of our lines, heard a little sharp firr 
 ing on our right, and in the direction of the nth corps. At 
 once all the men along the line began to discuss the probable 
 battle. "The skirmishing has begun," they said. All were 
 looking upon this as the great turning point of the war, in our 
 favor. All the men in ranks understood we were advanced out 
 so far front to cut all communications between Generals Lee 
 and Jackson, and knew our position had accomplished that ob- 
 ject, and also knew our army was in a position to crush either 
 wing in detail and were anxiously waiting for General Jackson 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 49 
 
 to bring on an engagement which would enable us to locate and 
 then attack their right and rear, drive them in a huddle on the 
 ist and nth corps, and crush them. This !«= no idle boast or 
 delusion. If General Howard had made the stand it was rea- 
 sonable to expect he would, General Jackson's army would have 
 been destroyed, but judge our surprise when we heard no sound 
 of battle save the light skirmishing before referred to, and while 
 we were resting on our arms waiting for the order to advance, 
 to win a great victory that would soon end the war, firing 
 again broke out afresh, and more rapidly, and soon after we saw- 
 General Sickles coming down the road in the direction of arm^- 
 headquarters, his hat in his hand and horse on the dead run, 
 and ordered us to fall in immediately, telling us the nth corps 
 had broke and run, and General Jackson had captured many 
 prisoners and was in possession of the road we came out on, and 
 had established communication with General Lee, and w-e were 
 shut oil from the rest of our army, and had to cut our way 
 through the enemy's lines to join them, or be captured. \\"e 
 were soon in motion, retracing our steps and about ii o'clock 
 p. m. found the enemy, and in a grand bayonet charge of the 
 first brigade of Birney's division, commanded by Col. Eagans. 
 with uncapped guns established communicaiion with our army 
 and laid down on the ground on hazel grove hill, tired, and were 
 soon asleep thinking little and caring less, what was in store 
 for us the next day. 
 
 \\'hen it was about time for Jackson's attack on the nth 
 corps to begin, Lee caused an atiack all along the left of the 
 Union line from the river to the 12th corps. Of course this 
 was only a feint, intended to divert attention from Jackson's 
 movements, and was so regarded as appears in the foregoinjj'. 
 Even the men in ranks were discussing the result of Jackson's 
 
50 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 attack on the nth corps and the Union officer in the 3rd, nth, 
 and the right of the 12th corps who was on duty with his com- 
 mand, and could not locate the real attacking column to be 
 Jackson's, and the point of the Union lines to be attacked was 
 the right of the nth corps, was so stupid that he was unfit to 
 fill the position of eighth corporal. I say this advisedly, be- 
 cause of the general discussion among the men in the ranks in 
 my own command, and others I have conversed with, of other 
 commands. Gen. Howard could have learned all the facts to 
 his entire satisfaction if he had gone out with, or sent a strong 
 rcconnoitering party, preceded by a skirmish line. This would 
 have developed the enemy's movements and given him timely 
 warning, and by taking advantage of defensive positions, he could 
 have delayed the enemy's movements so as to have given time 
 to throw up defenses and prepare for the enemy's attack and the 
 firing of the reconnoisance would have given notice to General 
 Hooker of the position of the enemy, who would, in that event, 
 been able to have placed his reserve troops in position to support 
 the nth corps and counteract the movements of the enemy, but 
 no firing was heard until the crash cf Jackson's whole force 
 came like thunder, from a clear sky. 
 
 Let us now return to General Jackson and the nth corps. 
 General Jackson came down on the right flank and rear of the 
 nth corps, doubling them up and meeting little or no resistance, 
 so sudden and unexpected was his attack. At headquarters all 
 were surprised, for they had l:eard no firing. General Hooker 
 had ordered General Howard to change front, fortify, send out 
 pickets and locate the enemy, and well might he expect long 
 and continued firing on our right when General Jackson did at- 
 tack. Judge of the utter surprise of everybody when little or 
 no firincr had been heard along the line of the nth corps. To 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 51 
 
 see thousands of them stringing past headquarters, many hat- 
 less, coatless, and without arms, a wreck, a mob stampeding to 
 the rear. General Hooker rushed out and tried to stop them. 
 Two regiments of cavah-y charged on them. It was soon dis- 
 covered they were of no use and were permitted to pass on. 
 These were men on the extreme right of the nth corps, and the 
 first to receive the shock of General Jackson's attack. Farther 
 along down the line an attempt was made to resist this mad at- 
 tack, but they soon found they were without defenses, overlaped 
 in rear, on their right flank, and front in heavy column, which 
 doubled them up in a heap. Their only alternative was to flv 
 or be captured. Thus General Howard's wdiole line were 
 nearly all swept into a helpless flying mob. The only available 
 troops to stay the victorious army of General Jackson was 
 Berry's division of infantry which was near headquarters, and 
 three small regiments of cavalry, about 4.000 in all. These 
 troops went forward in great haste,, all the reserve artillery was 
 put into position soon as possible. It was thought the artillerv 
 would not have time to load their guns before the enemy, who 
 was emerging from the woods, would be upon them. Some- 
 thing desperate had to be done quickly. General Pleasanton 
 ordered }iIajor Peter Kcrnan. commanding the 8th Pennsylvania 
 cavalry, 400 strong, to charge, which was promptly done. The 
 major and most of his men went down. Brave, noble men. 
 they knew they w^ere riding to sure death, but with drawn sabers 
 and a cheer, they rushed into the timber and at the enemy, mak- 
 ing noise enough for ten thousand for a time. The enemy did 
 not know if their number was 400 or 40.000, while the enemy was 
 not less than ten thousand strong at, this point, and this small 
 regiment actually checked that overwhelming force, which en- 
 abled the Union artillery to load and aim, and when they fired 
 
52 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 double canister into the enemy's ranks, it fairly blew them 
 back into a whirling mass. All the reserve artillery soon got to 
 work, and with the small infantry reserve stopped General Jack- 
 son one-half or three-fourths of a mile west of the Chancellor 
 House. Darkness came on. Each side began to adjust their 
 line, preparatory for the next day's operations. This brought 
 on several collisions, and m one of them General Jackson got 
 his death wound. The Confederates claim it was his own men 
 fired on him and his escort, when they were returning from rec- 
 onnoitering. in front of flieir own lines. That may or may not 
 have been true, more than likely it was not true, for it is known 
 a few minutes later General A. P. Hill was severely wounded 
 while leaning over and sympathizing with General Jackson, by 
 shot coming from the Union men. Again, while Jackson was 
 being carried to the rear. General Pender recognized him and 
 complained of the demoralizing efifect of the artillery firing on 
 his men, but Jackson replied sharp and sternly: "You must hold 
 your ground, General Pender." This was General Jackson's last 
 command. Now, with all this terrible firing of infantry and ar- 
 tillery, who could tell in the night. v.hose shot made the fatal 
 wound, even though one might be between the lines, and what 
 is the difference. If theenemy insist they killed their own gen- 
 eral, they are welcome to all the honor there is in it; but after the 
 3rd corps had cut its way back and formed on General Berry's 
 left, with their left resting on an open field beyond Hazel Grove, 
 firing soon ceased, and all was quiet. General Hooker or- 
 dered the 3rd corps, at daylight, to swing their left east and con- 
 nect with the I2th corps. At 9 o'clock p. m., when General 
 Jackson's attack had been checked and a new line established. 
 General Hooker began to plan what could be done to counter- 
 act the advantage the Confederates had gained on ,our right by 
 
THE BATTLE OF CnANCELLORSYILLE. 53 
 
 the rout of the nth corps. Hooker knew that General Lef 
 would order every man from his right who could be spared, 
 leaving a very thin line there in his defense, in order to aid 
 General Jackson's old corps, that had gained the advantageous, 
 commanding position, to strike a crushing blow to the Union 
 army the next day at this broken, weakened point of the Union 
 lines. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Battle on May Third — General Hooker Orders General 
 Sedgwick to Cross the River at Falmouth and Attack Lee 
 in Reverse at Daylight — Sedgwick's Failure and Re-crosses 
 the River — Hooker Wounded — Meade Refuses to Re-cniorce 
 Sickles — Union Army Driven Back of the Chancellor House 
 Council of War May 4th — That Night Re-crossed the River, 
 Went Into Camp, Near Falmouth, Va. 
 
 General Hooker sent an order to General Sedgwick, who 
 was below Fredericksburg, to move on Lee's right and rear 
 with a force, when united with General Gibbons' Division of 
 the 2nd corps, which was resting at Falmouth, that would give 
 him at least 30,000 men. W^ith this large force Hooker ordered 
 Sedgwick to cross the river at Falmouth, three or four miles 
 above where his command was stationed, during the night, and 
 fall upon the thin line of Gen. Early at ^Nlarys Hill, and crush 
 them. Of course, this movement would have struck the left of 
 the enemy's line of entrenchments, which was held by a light 
 force, and could not have been but little stronger, at any one 
 point, than a very thin line of battle, for the reason that Early's 
 command consisted of only nine thousand men, and they had to 
 guard a line of not less than eight miles long. With Sedgwick's 
 heavy force secretly concentrated at any point, and moved for- 
 ward in successive columns in a night attack, would easily have 
 brushed the enemy's thin line out of the way and hurled them 
 back in the direction of Richmond In disorder, and left Sedg- 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 55 
 
 / 
 
 li.vT'ri^ii: OK TiiJ- 
 THIRD OF MAY 
 
 Ftdifal Lines 
 
 Onjiderat* Liiut i:Z^ 
 
 SCALE OF MILES 
 
 ^ I 
 
56 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 wick's command free to execute Gen. Hooker's orders to attack 
 Lee in the rear at daylight, while Early would have been power- 
 less to resist his onslaught. Sedgwick would have been in pos- 
 session of all the direct roads to Chancellorsville and could have 
 reached Lee's line, attacked them in reverse, and driven him 
 away from the left of the Union army's formation and united 
 the Union forces long before Early could have come to Lee's 
 support. 
 
 It is strange that most writers of this campaign and this 
 movement seek to find some means by which .they can fix the 
 responsibility for its failure on Gen. Hooker. Gen. Doubleday 
 in his memoirs, says, "doubtless when Gen. Hooker issued the 
 order to Sedgwick to cross the river at Falmouth, and attack 
 the enemy, he had forgotten that he had ordered Sedgwick 
 three miles below Fredericksburg and supposed none but 
 Howe's division had crossed the river." I say this was not at all 
 probable. Gen. Hooker ordered this movement to the enemy's 
 right by three corps, the sixth, third and first, all under the 
 personal command of Gen. Sedgwick. He was constantly in 
 communication with the commander of that movement and at 
 different times had ordered Sedgwick to detach corps from his 
 command to join him at Chancellorsville. First, Sedgwick de- 
 tached the 3d corps April 30th, which joined Hooker at Chan- 
 cellorsville, May ist. Then the ist corps was ordered to join 
 Hooker at Chancellorsville, and arrived on the evening of May 
 2d. This shows' that Sedgwick and Hooker were in constant 
 communication and that Gen. Hooker knew perfectly well at 9 
 o'clock p. m.. May 2d, where Sedgwick's whole command was 
 located, and knew it would not require any great exertion on 
 the part of the 6th corps to recross the river and march three 
 or four miles to Falmouth, cross again and brush the enemy out 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHAN(^ELLORSVILLE. 57 
 
 of the way, and attack Lee in rear at daylight. Gen. Sedgwick 
 need not have halted his corps until he struck the enemy. After 
 he had crossed the river at Falmouth, Gen. Benham was with 
 Sedgwick, with his engineer corps and would have taken up and 
 laid all the bridges necessary, so there need not have been any 
 waiting of the troops at the fords if the movement had been 
 made by crossing at Falmouth, all in the night time, the enemy 
 would have been surprised on account of the heavy fog that 
 settles here in the valley this time of the year. The movement 
 of armies cannot be seen until late in the morning. This was 
 demonstrated many times during the war at this point, but when 
 Sedgwick moved up on the Bowling Green road on the south 
 side of the river, close under the enemy's fortified lines, he en- 
 countered the enemy's pickets frequently and at Hazel Run met 
 a considerable force, where a sharp skirmish took place^ and 
 the position finally had to be carried by a charge. This skir- 
 mish and picket firing gave the enemy notice of Sedgwick's 
 movement and enabled them to reinforce their left and be in 
 their works in force ready and waiting the final attack. For this 
 reason the first attack of Sedgwick was unsuccessful and if 
 some of the division commanders can be credited, if the enemy 
 could have had three hundred more men, Sedgwick's army 
 could never have carried the heights. 
 
 It is strange that an officer of Gen. Sedgwick's experience 
 and military education would make the mistake to march his 
 corps up the Bowling Green road when his order was to cross 
 at Falmouth. This order meant a heavy column of Union 
 soldiers striking a thin line of Confederates, surprise them" in 
 the night time in a heavy fog, and easily brush them out of 
 the way. Gen. Hooker always claimed that if Sedgwick had 
 obeyed his order in spirit, the movement would have been a 
 
58 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS YILLE. 
 
 great success, and I fully agree with him; in fact, I cannot see 
 how the movement could have failed, except it was made in 
 the manner in which Sedgwick executed it. The movement on 
 the south side of the river was ill advised and poorly executed 
 by Sedgwick, and was a great misfortune to the army, for 
 which Gen. Hooker was not responsible. If Sedgwick had 
 ordered a brass band to play at the head of each of his brig- 
 ades, it would not have been a surer indication of his move- 
 ment to the enemy than the picket firings was along Bowling 
 Green road. He must have known he would encounter the 
 enemy's pickets along this road, and to avoid these pickets and 
 surprise the enemy and insure success, Gen. Hooker ordered 
 him to cross at Falmouth. All the forenoon of the third day 
 Gen. Hooker waited to hear Sedgwick's charge on Gen. Lee's 
 thin lines in reverse, that would stampede the enemy, but he 
 heard no sound, and wondered why his order that had been 
 issued at 9 o'clock the night before had not brought the re- 
 sults he had anticipated. Gen. Sedgwick started soon after 12 
 o'clock p. m. with two divisions of his corps by the way of the 
 Bowling Green road and reached Fredericksburg about 3 o'clock 
 a. m. Gen. Gibbons' division of the second corps laid pontoon 
 bridges, crossed over the river at Falmouth and reported to 
 Gen. Sedgwick at daylight. They attacked and carried the 
 heights about 10 o'clock a. m. and scattered the enemy toward 
 Richmond. Now, all that remained was for Gen. Sedgwick to 
 move immediately along the plank and attack Lee in the rear, 
 for all the force that was opposing him. Gen. Early's 9,000, was 
 scattered towards Richmond, and was not in his way, but he 
 waited to reorganize and send back for Gen. Brook's division 
 he had left behind, and it was 3 o'clock p. m. before he moved 
 on Gen. Lee. During this delay Lee was reinforced by Early's 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 59 
 
 scattered army, which had passed around Sedgwick's flank and 
 found Gen. Lee, and were faced about with reinforcements to 
 meet the 6th corps. If Gen. Sedgwick had marched with his 
 whole corps at 12 o'clock p. m., even though he marched via 
 Bowling Green road, his force would have been strong and he 
 could have moved straight out on the plank road, after capturing 
 the heights, and not met anything to prevent his striking Lee in 
 reverse, defeating him and uniting with Gen. Hooker, and saved 
 the third day at Chancellorsville; there is no doubt of this. 
 
 The failure of Gen. Sedgwick to move his whole force to the 
 attack of the heights and cross the river at Falmouth, instead 
 of marching on Bowling Green pike, was a bad mistake, which 
 caused many hours' delay and was fatal to the success of his 
 movement in aiding Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville. When 
 he did move he met Gen. Lee's united force and was defeated, 
 and instead of joining Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville at day- 
 light, May 3d, he was eight or ten miles away, and did not 
 move to attack until fifteen hours later. He then met the enemy's 
 forces he had scattered in his morning attack, reunited and rein- 
 forced, standing between him and Gen. Hooker strong enough 
 to assume the offensive; in fact, the enemy had become so 
 strong in Sedgwick's front that on the night of the 3rd he 
 thought it advisable to fall back, which he accomplished during 
 the night, and on the morning of May 4 he had taken a position 
 covering Bank's ford, where he assumed the defensive. This 
 was a very strong position, and Gen. Benham, class mate of 
 Sedgwick at West Point, advised him not to leave this position 
 unless Gen. Hooker ordered him to do so. He was able to, 
 and did, hold this position and repel all the force Gen. Lee was 
 able to bring against him on the evening of May 4; but that 
 night Sedgwick crossed the river without waiting for orders 
 
60 THE BATTLE OF CHxiNCELLOESVILLE. 
 
 from Gen. Hooker. There is evidence that Gen. Butterfield, 
 chief of staff, did send on his own responsibility an order to 
 Sedgwick, after urgent request from him for reinforcements or 
 the privilege to recross the river, giving him privilege to cross. 
 Gen. Hooker later sent an order to Sedgwick to hold his 
 ground, but Sedgwick deemed it too late, as all his command 
 but one brigade had then crossed. So the balance was crossed 
 over and the bridges taken up. Seems to us that if Sedgwick 
 had possessed the ambition a commander ought to, when Hook- 
 er sent the order for him to hold his ground, he would have 
 turned his men and marched back instead of completing the 
 crossing. We know the reserve artillery had been placed on 
 the high ground on the north side of the river; that would 
 sweep the ground of rebels if they attacked him. This crossing 
 of Sedgwick's was unnecessary and ought not to have been 
 done. His position was a strong, commanding one, and the 
 one Hooker started for May ist, when he got tangled up in 
 the thicket; it commanded the enemy's intrenchments in rear 
 of Fredericksburg, and if it had been held by Sedgwick it would 
 have accomplished all the results that Hooker's flank move- 
 ment was expected to do, and resulted in a great victory for the 
 Union army. 
 
 At this epoch in the battle at Chancellorsville Gen. Hooker 
 was undecided what to do. Sedgwick's movement had been a 
 failure. And while Gen. Hooker was paralyzed from the wound 
 on the third day the enemy had driven the Union army back and 
 got possession, not only of Chancellorsville, but all the main 
 roads leading to Fredericksburg. The question was: Shall the 
 Union army be concentrated at Chancellorsville, or with Sedg- 
 wick at Banksford? At the same time Sedgwick was pleading 
 for reinforcement or to be permitted to cross the river. Gen. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 61 
 
 Butterfield, chief of stafif, sent the order for him to cross, but 
 later Gen. Hooker countermanded the order, with the resuh 
 as before stated. Gen. Hooker then decided to take the whole 
 army back to camp, which, under the circumstances, was the 
 proper thing to do. 
 
 Gen. Howe, one of Sedgwick's division commanders, says 
 they could and ought to have held their position and not re- 
 crossed the river. Now, I venture the assertion that there never 
 was a more scientific, better planned battle than that of Gen, 
 Hooker's at Chancellorsville in the world's history, and none 
 better executed (barring the tardiness of the cavalry in starting 
 as ordered) up to April 30th, when the army arrived at Chan- 
 cellorsville. There is no doubt but what, if the army had con- 
 tinued their march that night, they could have reached Taber- 
 nacle church and taken up their position there with slight loss, 
 and their position would have been better, as before stated. 
 But a lack of energy on the part of some of the Union corps 
 commanders, such as was exhibited at Chancellorsville, and dis- 
 obedience of orders would defeat any army in any position. 
 Strategy of the world's best general could not save an army from 
 the wiles of some of the corps commanders of the Union army 
 at Chancellorsville. History will fail to produce such a combi- 
 nation of adverse conditions of an army over w-hich the com- 
 manding general was powerless to control. That these condi- 
 tions existed must be patent to all and cause the blush of shame 
 to creep over the countenance of every honest American citizen. 
 
 We will return to Chancellorsville and to the position of the 
 Union army on the morning of the third day. The point Gen. 
 Birney's division occupied the night of the second day was a 
 great strategic point, high grounds with large clearing, excel- 
 lent point to operate artillery, which would enfiladed both our 
 
62 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 own and the enemy's lines. So aides were posted to Gen. 
 Hooker's headquarters before daylight to get permission to 
 change the proposed line for the purpose of taking in this 
 high and commanding position. When the aide arrived at 
 headquarters Gen. Hooker was asleep, and nothing that could 
 be said or done would persuade the aide in charge to wake 
 him up, and while this parleying was going on Birney's divi- 
 sion, being in line of columns of regiments, by brigades, closed 
 en masse. Gen. Graham's brigade on the left and nearest to 
 the woods, in which we had reason to believe the enemy was in 
 force. The pickets in that direction began firing. It -was appar- 
 ent we were soon to be attacked from that point. !Mine was the 
 left company of my regiment; therefore I was on the left of 
 our brigade. I began to be uneasy and went to Gen. Graham 
 and asked him why we i-emained bunched up in a heap so. I 
 said I believed we would be attacked within ten minutes and 
 told him if we were deployed facing west and the woods we 
 could make it lively for the enemy. To this he agreed, but 
 replied he had been told by Gen. Birney we were going to 
 move, and every minute he was expecting the order — in what 
 direction he did not know — and did not dare to take the respon- 
 sibility. I then went to Col. Sides, commander of the 57th 
 Pennsylvania regiment, to which my company belonged, and 
 which was the outside regiment, facing north. I begged of him 
 to change front on my company; that would face us west on 
 the point the enemy was expected, had he changed front_for- 
 ward on my company the whole brigade, I believe, would have 
 followed, impelled by their natural instinct. No duty ever 
 seemed more plain, and, instead of running oft the field without 
 firing a gun, we would have met and driven the enemy back 
 and held that strategic point that, in a few minutes, we got 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 63 
 
 orders to hold, but it was too late; we were running off like 
 sheep, not able to fire a gun, without being in danger of shoot- 
 ing our own men. The brigade continued the retreat over the 
 low and swampy grounds to the ridge beyond, which was called 
 Fair\iew, and higher ground than Hazel Grove hill. Hazel hill 
 was soon covered with artillery by the enemy; that was very 
 annoying. The brigade faced about and formed a line of 
 battle. While we were forming, a man from Company B, as I 
 now remember him, of the 57th regiment came to me and said, 
 "I am going in with you, captain." I said, "Fall in," and I 
 supposed he went to the left of the company. Immediately the 
 order came down the line, "'Forward, " and we moved for- 
 ward for Hazel Grove hill, where the enemy had batteries playing 
 on us very lively, and when we reached the low grounds it was 
 quite wet and swampy. I noticed a large water hole. At a 
 glance I discovered that, by taking an oblique step to the right. 
 I would clear it. When I came to it I took the step as I had 
 calculated, and as I did so a shell exploded in our front, and a 
 piece of it cut the top of a man's head oft in rear of me. I 
 then discovered it was the man from Company B. He had 
 crowded the orderly sergeant down and was covering me. For 
 a second, perhaps, after the top of the man's head disappeared 
 he was still standing; the nerves then relaxed, and he went 
 down. In this charge we captured the enemy's batteries, their 
 called Fairview, and higher than Hazel Grove hill. Hazel hill 
 rifle pits and a number of prisoners, and we had possession of 
 Hazel Grove hill, with the enemy on three sides of us. This 
 left us in a pocket at the bottom of the pocket and in rear of 
 the enemy's main line which was facing east. The enemy was 
 making desperate eftorts to dislodge Gen. Mott's brigade on 
 our right and finally succeeded. This enabled them to close 
 
64 THE BATTLE OF CHAXCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 up the mouth of the pocket. Gen. Graham ordered us about 
 face and double quick out, while the enemy was firing on us from 
 three sides, and when we got out of this hole I found my 
 clothing had become so deranged that it was hard work to 
 make headway. I turned my company over to my lieutenant 
 and stepped to one side of the road between two water holes 
 and laid down on a brush heap to adjust my clothing. A sol- 
 dier of the I2th corps was filling canteens at one of these 
 places, and he gave me a drink of water. I then started for 
 the road to follow my regiment. I looked up and saw a shell 
 coming straight for me. I stopped and gazed at it, but could 
 not move. It dropped enough to .strike an oak sapling 
 about six inches through, eight or ten feet in front of me. and, 
 being a cap shell, exploded. I heard the explosion, then all was 
 blank. How long I lay there I do not know; the next I remem- 
 ber was a distant roaring in my head, and the soldier who had 
 given me the drink was steadying me on my feet and asked 
 me if I was hurt. I told him I had not been touched. He said, 
 "You was flat on the ground and dead as you ever will be." I 
 then discovered my sword was cut in two. and one piece •f 
 shell had struck me on my left side, striking on my blanket 
 rgll, and passed between my left arm and body. This is what 
 knocked me down, and this is the way it was done. In active 
 service, officers and enlisted men group themselves together in 
 threes and fours nights; in this way they are able to divide their 
 blankets, shelter tents, cookin utensils, etc., and when they 
 go into bivouac at night their house, beds, provisions and cook- 
 ing utensils are unloaded, and in ten minutes their tents are 
 up, and their supper is well under way. It was because of this 
 dividing up of these necessary traps that saved my life. On 
 this Sunday, May 3d, 1863, I was carrying my blanket and one- 
 

66 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 half of the roof of the shelter tent. The blanket was rolled 
 lengthwise, the tent roof rolled around the blanket, the two ends 
 of the package were brought together and fastened with a 
 strong cord. We then put our head and left arm through the 
 circle; that lets the roll rest on the right^ shoulder and against 
 the left hip. I looked up and saw a shell, as I said before, 
 coming as straight for me as you could point a gun. ]\Iany 
 times before this I have seen shells coming and stepped to one 
 side and let them pass. This is no uncommon thing for sol- 
 diers to do. but this time I seemed to have lost all control of 
 myself. I could not move, believing, in all probability, I would 
 not have more than one more breath of life in this world; yet 
 I was not able to control myself so as to step to one side, and 
 when it struck the sapling, it being a cap shell, the sapling was 
 solid enough to explode the shell and had resistance enough to 
 part the fragments of the shell, and probably send them each 
 side of me. On my left side we know just how close the frag- 
 ments came; my sword in its steel scabbard, was cut in two 
 just below the lower band fvhile it was hanging by my side; 
 another fragment struck on my roll of blankets, which yielded 
 enough to protect my body and permit the fragment to pass 
 between the body and arm without serious injury to either. I 
 now believe, if I had taken one or two steps forward, or side- 
 ways, I would have been terribly mangled, if not instantly 
 killed. As it was I was badly bruised. When I overtook my 
 regiment I fainted for the first time in my life, and I have been 
 afflicted in that manner many times later. The officers of my 
 regiment persuaded me to keep my mutilated sword. Soon after 
 the battle I had an opportunity to send it home, and I now 
 prize it very highly, I never knew or heard of an officer who 
 had his sword shot in twain while it was hanging by his 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 67 
 
 side, and li>;jg^.. tell how it was done. It was the most mirac- 
 ulous escape I ever knew or heard of. Later in the day. as the 
 3d corps was gradually being flanked out of their position, 
 facing Jackson's old command that had been reinforced, it let 
 the enemy in on the flank of the 12th corps and Hancock's 
 division of the 2d corps. Here is where Hancock displayed 
 his great abilities as a successful general, fighting the enemy 
 successfully, for a long time, who had attacked his division on 
 three sides, then withdrawing at his leisure (the Union army 
 on his right and left, having preceded him), with the loss of 
 but one regiment, the 27th Connecticut, which a subordinate 
 tailed (who was ordered) to notify them that the division was 
 falling back. 
 
 The 3d corps giving away, let the enem}- in on the right 
 flank and rear of the 12th and 2d corps, and the struggle for 
 them to swing around their right to the rear to keep in touch 
 with the 3d corps was a desperate one. 
 
 This was a terrible day and the most desperate fighting the 
 army had ever experienced. The nth corps giving away, left 
 the enemy in possession of a commanding position for their in- 
 fantry, and gave them Hazel Grove hill, high grounds and 
 open fields, where they placed their artillery at an angle that 
 enfiladed our lines right and left with plunging shell and can- 
 ister, which was terrible to stand. While Gen. Hooker was 
 leaning against a post of the veranda of the Chancellor House 
 a shell struck the post he was leaning against and shattered it. 
 The fragments struck and severely wounded him. He was help- 
 ed on his horse and rode a short distance to the rear, when he 
 got faint and was taken off his horse and laid on a blanket. Ho 
 soon felt better and was assisted to mount. As he did so a 
 shell came and struck exactly where he had laid, tearing the 
 
68 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESA' ILLE. 
 
 blankets on which he had laid into shreds. Gen. ®ouch, second 
 in rank, then started out to inspect the lines and arrange artil- 
 lery to check the fire of the enemy on Hazel Grove hill. The 
 battle was raging fiercely on our right front center south and 
 southwest of the Chancellor House. 
 
 Gen. Sickles' 3rd corps, southwest or right center, was being 
 terribly punished by the enemy's infantry in front and eufiladed 
 by artillery on his left flank. He sent Gen. Treemain with a 
 dispatch to Gen. Hooker, not knowing he had been wounded, 
 requesting support. Gen. Hooker was suffering paroxysms of 
 pain and he directed the aide to pass the request over to Gen. 
 Meade, who was present, lor his action. Hooker was then 
 taken to the rear for treatment. There was at that time available 
 in the rear and right flank 37,000 fresh troops, composed of the 
 ist, 5th and what was left of the nth corps. Gen. ]\leade was 
 in command of that flank. He hesitated and finally decided not 
 to act without the express order of Gen. Hooker, who was 
 not able to give an order, or sanction of Couch, who was not to 
 be found. While this parleying was going on our line in front 
 was being pushed back and had to be abandoned for a new po- 
 sition farther to the rear. Gen. Hooker intended to use these 
 reserve troops when the enemy wore themselves out in his front 
 The time had come to strike. Gen. Doubleday says probably 
 the reason Gen. ]\Ieade hesitated and finally refused to act was 
 he feared Gen. Hooker might come to at any time and assume 
 command. If successful, claim all the honoi. If a failure, 
 charge it all to Gen. ]\Ieade. 
 
 What selfishness and lack of patriotism. A major-general 
 high in rank, who subsequently became commander-in-chief of 
 the Army of the Potomac, hesitating when our noble officers 
 and men were being driven in and slaughtered by thousands. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 69 
 
 when he had at his command, being senior officer of that part 
 of the line, and the request for support being handed him by 
 order of the disabled commander. Gen. !Meade, by reason of 
 seniority at that part of the line, could have used the reserve, 
 and ought to have done so, to support Gen. Sickles and then at- 
 tacked the enemy in flank. It v^as one of the turning points in 
 the battle of Chancellorsville, and to save the day required 
 prompt action. That hesitating again lost the day's battle. It 
 was the propitious time of all others to act promptly. A grand 
 victory was in reach of the Union army at this moment. This 
 failure at this point and time must be charged up to Gen. Meade. 
 Suppose Gen. Lew Wallace, at the battle of Fort Donaldson, the 
 second day had waited for orders from Gen. Grant, who was far 
 away and could not be found by Wallace's aides, and did not 
 know the army had been attacked. Suppose he had waited to 
 change front and attack the enemy until Grant ordered it. The 
 whole army would have been driven into the Cumberland river 
 or disasterously defeated before Gen. Grant could have been 
 founl3 or reached the field to give the order. But Gen. Wallace 
 did change front without orders, thus changing a sure defeat into 
 a grand victory. Gen. Meade could have done the same thing. 
 But he refused to act, and for want of support brigade after 
 brigade was driven out of position and the day was lost. 
 
 When Gen. Stoneman failed to cross the river, pass to the 
 rear of Gen. Lee, cut his communications on the 13th day of 
 April, that was a serious mistake and the time frittered away 
 from the 13th to the 28th day of April, seems like criminal 
 negligence. He could, and a more active general would, have 
 gone higher up the river and passed over at some point above 
 and been doing his work and not set down and wait fifteen days 
 for the water to run past. Promptness and secrecy and rapid 
 
70 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 movements Gen. Hooker knew were neccssar}^ to our success. 
 That is mistake No. i. 
 
 No, 2. The failure of Gen. Howard to change front to 
 meet Gen. Jackson, fortify, etc., as ordered by Gen. Hooker. 
 And his misleading report to Gen. Hooker when he ordered the 
 return of a detachment of the 3rd corps, and said he could hold 
 the whole Confederate army if they should attack him, was 
 criminal deception, and as the facts developed later, was un- 
 doubtedly said for the purpose of deceiving Gen. Hooker and 
 defeating the army. He was not surprised. He knew the 
 enemy was massing to attack the nth corps' right, and knew 
 when they did attack his corps would be helpless. But instead 
 of obeying Gen. Hooker's orders to advance his pickets to as- 
 certain the position of the enemy and their whereabouts, he 
 simply did nothing. Officers of his own corps went out with- 
 out orders and discovered the enemy massing on an open plain 
 nearly two miles to the right and rear of the nth corps' lines, 
 at a point indicating that if they attacked from that direction it 
 would be where the nth corps had no defences, no pickets, and 
 were not faced in that direction. Had he heeded the warning 
 of the officers of his own corps, who at two o'clock p. m. had 
 located the enemy, he would then have had four hours to 
 change front, throw up breastworks, fell the heavy timber in his 
 front, tops out, and so arranged his artillery that he could have 
 held Gen. Jackson's disorganized lines that had marched in 
 line two miles through a dense forest and necessarily broken 
 and disorganized ranks, any length of time, and destroyed 
 them before they could have crossed over the felled timber to 
 have reached his breast works. Why did Gen. Howard, if he 
 intended to be honest, deny that Gen. Hooker had warned him 
 of Jackson's movements to his right. A sure thing if a court 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 71 
 
 martial had taken place, as was expected, liis intention was to 
 brazenly face Gen. Hooker and with his lone, sanctimonious face 
 insist that he never got the order, as he did before the board of 
 inquiry that made a whitewashing report. Had he heeded this 
 order he would have had eight hours to change his lines, fortify, 
 cut the timber in his front, get reinforcement?, if he needed 
 them. He could then, as he told the reinforcements that he sent 
 away, have held not only Gen. Jackson, but the whole Confed- 
 erate army if they attacked him. Taking all the evidence that we 
 have produced, does it not prove conclusively that Gen. Howard 
 purposely threw away on the 2d day of ]\Iay, 1863, the greatest 
 opportunity for crushing the Confederate army under Gen. Lee 
 and ending the war, that was ever presented to the army before 
 or since. Had Gen. Howard obeyed orders there would never 
 have been in history the battle of Gettysburg, Wilderness, Spot- 
 sylvania, Cold Arbor, Petersburg or Five Forks. Our victorious 
 army under such a brilliant commander as Gen. Hooker could 
 never have been checked. All the sacrifice of lives since in bat- 
 tle and Southern prisons can and ought to be charged up to 
 Gen. O. O. Howard. 
 
 History furnishes but one parallel case, says Gen. Doubleday 
 in his book, and that was the massacre of the garrison of Fort 
 Sims by the savages in 1813 near ]\Iobile, Ala., soon after a 
 negro had been severely flogged by the commanding officer for 
 reporting that he had seen Indians lurking around the post. 
 
 Such conduct by a corps commander holding a responsible 
 position, as the nth corps held at Chanccllorsville, would de- 
 feat the best general and the noblest tried and true army that 
 ever trod the earth. 
 
 Xo. 3. Gen. Hooker expected Gen. Sedgwick's 6th corps, 
 and ordered him to march at 9 o'clock p. ni.. May 2. from below 
 
72 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSAILLE. 
 
 Fredericksburg and attack Gen. Lee in reverse at daylight. But 
 Gen. Hooker's order was to cross the river at Falmouth. This 
 was three or four miles above where Sedgwick's corps laid when 
 he received the orders from Gen. Hooker. To comply with 
 the order it was necessary for Sedgwick to quietly move his 
 corps back to the north side of the river and march to Falmouth, 
 and there cross in the night in a dense fog attack and sur- 
 prise the enemy in their works, and with his own overwhelm- 
 ing force easily brush the enemy out of the way and move rapid- 
 ly by the plank road and attack Lee's army in reverse at day- 
 light. It was not unreasonable to think this movement could 
 be made successfully. The only chance for a failure it seems to 
 us was the manner in which Sedgwick failed in carrying out 
 the order as Gen. Hooker directed, which contemplated the 
 massing of the Union forces on the extreme left of Gen. Ewell's 
 thin lines, which was composed of but nine thousand men scat- 
 tered along a line of six or eight miles. It was no diliicult 
 matter for Gen. Sedgwick to secretly withdraw his forces from 
 the south side of the river, three or four miles below Fredericks- 
 burg (where most of the enemy were, to watch and keep Sedg- 
 wick from turning that flank), in the night, in a heavy fog 
 that prevailed, crush tlieir left flank before reinforcements could 
 have been brought up from the enemy's right to fill their de- 
 fenses. But. as before stated, Sedgwick moved along the Bowl- 
 ing Green road, encountered the enemy's pickets all along their 
 line of march, who gave notice to their comrades by their ^irin^ 
 on Sedgwick's command, which enabled them to move on a 
 parallel line and fill their defenses at the point attacked. The 
 wonder is that the Union forces ever captured the heights. 
 Such bravery as was exhibited by the rank and file of this com- 
 mand has rarely, if ever, been exhibited in any army on this 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 73 
 
 continent. If we should attempt to describe the steadiness of 
 these charging columns while their ranks were being swept into 
 eternity it would challenge the world's admiration. But how 
 sad to reflect that those noble men were sacrificed and that no 
 good results came from it. We do not agree with Gen. Double- 
 day in his comparison of this movement to the history of lost 
 nations and empires. This was not a movement of converging 
 columns. The army at Chancellorsville was stationary and 
 expected to remain so. This order was intended for 
 a movement of Sedgwick's heavy column, to be rap- 
 idly thrown against a distant slightly defended flank of 
 the eneni}-, brush them out of the way, which would 
 separate that command from the balance of Lee's main army, 
 and then attack Lee in reverse with this heavy column and 
 crush the enemy on that flank and unite the Union army 
 (not a converging of columns, as Doubleday says) and give 
 them a grand victory. Had the spirit of Gen. Hooker's order 
 been obeyed by Gen. Sedgwick., it is hafd to see how 
 the movement could have resulted otherwise than a grand 
 victory. Again we say, it was not a movement of con- 
 verging columns at all. There can scarcely be a doubt if Gen. 
 Hooker's order to Sedgwick had been carried out in spirit and 
 good faith, it is hardly possible to conceive a condition of cir- 
 cumstances that would result adversely to the Union army. So 
 much has been written that serves to mislead the public relative 
 to the battle of Chancellorsville that one would suppose that 
 Gen. Doubleday in his memoirs of the battles of Chancellorsville 
 and Gettysburg, published in 1882. would have had time enough 
 to have cooled ofi sufficiently so that he would be able to have 
 weighed all the facts connected with those two great events 
 without prejudice to the commander of the Union army. Where 
 
74 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 was his reason and fairness when he says on page 44 that Gen. 
 Hooker did not know when he gave the order for Sedgwick 
 to cross at Falmouth that Sedgwick was on the south side of the 
 river, three miles below, etc. I say he did know where Sedg- 
 wick was. He knew one of his divisions was the first to cross 
 the river to mislead the enemy. It was Hooker's direct order 
 for the 6th corps to lead in this movement. It was the plan of 
 battle. 
 
 Again on page 53 Doubleday says Hooker felt certain that if 
 Sedgwick assailed Lee in rear while he advanced in front the 
 Confederate army was doomed. And when the time came to 
 co-operate that Hooker failed and let the whole weight fall upon 
 Sedgwick. Now let us see what reason there is for this coloring 
 of the facts. Everybody knows that Gibbons' division, which 
 was temporarily assigned to Sedgwick's command and was to 
 co-operate with him in this movement, was at Falmouth, had 
 not yet broken camp. Now was there anything unreasonable 
 for Gen. Hooker in his order to suppose that Gen. Sedgwick 
 would order Gen. Gibbons to cross the river at Falmouth im- 
 mediately and then quietly withdraw the 6th corps and se- 
 cretly march to Falmouth by the north side of the river and 
 cross on the same bridge and unite his whole force for 
 the attack of the heights. This was what Gen. Hooker's order 
 contemplated. Had this order been carried out to the letter 
 and in the spirit of an active commander, and failed," then in 
 that instance Gen. Hooker would and could have been held re- 
 sponsible for the failure. But we fail to see any justice in an 
 attempt to hold Gen. Hooker responsible for this failure, when 
 his- orders were not obeyed by Sedgwick. Again it seems 
 strange that Doubleday, who, in most instances in his account 
 of that great battle is so fair and impartial, should say on page 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSTILLE. 75 
 
 53 that when the time came to carry out the program Hooker 
 failed to hold up his end. Doubleday knew that Hooker or- 
 dered Sedgwick to attack Lee in reverse at daylight, May 3d. 
 At the time Sedgwick should have attacked he was eight or ten 
 miles away, and never came nearer than three miles of the 
 point he was to attack at daylight, and did not reach this point 
 until night, ten or twelve hours later than he was expected. In 
 these ten or twelve hours that had elapsed the whole aspect had 
 changed and the army at Chancellorsville had enough to do 
 where they were without going out to hunt for Sedgwick. How 
 unjust it is to infer at this point that Gen. Hooker failed to 
 carry out his part of this movement, and for this cause Sedg- 
 wick's movement failed. 
 
 If Gen. Sedgwick had struck on Gen. Lee's right and rear 
 any time that forenoon, as he could have done if he had moved 
 his whole corps on the morning of Alay 3d. instead of two 
 divisions, and the movement had been on the north side of the 
 river crossing at Falmouth, that move would have been a sure 
 winner. That part of Gen. Lee's army at that time of day was 
 disorganized and scattered, and the striking of 26.000 or 30,000 
 men at that point, under the circumstances, must have scattered 
 the enemy more and given the victory to the Union army. 
 Every move of the army of the Potomac, from the time it 
 broke camp, April 27th, was the most scientific successive strat- 
 egic movements in history; the final formations of the Union 
 lines and their Dosition was a strong one, which completely 
 turned the enemy's fortified camp without loss. This alone was 
 a victory greater than was ever won on the continent by so 
 large an army over one nearly as large and active, all conditions 
 considered; and the success of that great strategic movement 
 was finally thrown away by these four corps commanders In 
 degree as before stated. 
 
76 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 
 
 Gen. Howard ought to have been tried by drumhead court- 
 martial and shot before the army recrossed the river for wih"ul 
 disobedience of orders of a superior in the face of the enemy. 
 And the enemy would have shown most wonderful ingratitude 
 had they not subsequently erected a monument to his memory 
 for the valuable services he had rendered to the lost cause. 
 Gen. Meade should have been cashiered for his refusal to rein- 
 force Gen. Sickles on the third day, according to regulations 
 of the army. He was in command on that wing; he could 
 have saved the day if he had acted promptly. Gen. Stoneman 
 should have been relieved from command for incompetency, 
 which did happen soon after. Gen. Sedgwick should have been 
 relieved for taking his command across the river without orders 
 from Gen. Hooker, and his failure to carry out in spirit the 
 orders he received from Hooker. The failure at Chancellors- 
 ville is justly chargeable to these four corps commanders in 
 degree as before stated. 
 
 Note: In reviewing this work, and comparing notes, I find 
 that I have unintentionally done Gen. Stoneman an injustice, 
 and was glad to find among notes in my mem^orandum evidence 
 that would cause me to add this note in vindication of that 
 gentleman. I knew him and his family when we were boys of 
 the same county, Chautauqua, N. Y., and part of the time in the 
 same neighborhood. He went to West Point and I to Penn- 
 sylvania lumber woods where I lost track of him. When the 
 war broke out he was soon made a major general and came to 
 command the third corps to which I was assigned, where we 
 renewed acquaintances. From our corps he was promoted to 
 command the cavalry corps, and I did not see him again until 
 after the battle of Chancellorsville, and he had been relieved 
 from his command. We met in Washington, D. C. Among 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. " 
 
 other things we talked about the battle of Chanccllorsville. He 
 blamed Gen. Hooker because he had caused him, as he be- 
 lieved to be relieved from his command in the manner he was. 
 He said he had a painful disability which came upon h,m some 
 tinre before the campaign began, and became chronic, wh.ch 
 so disabled hint that he was not able to ride a horse. I learned 
 from our conversation that he was a true patriot, and that h.s 
 fault consisted in his ambition to make a campaign tor which 
 he was physically disqualified. I am glad to be able to add this 
 
 explanatory note. 
 
 On the night of May 4th. Gen. Hooker called a council o. 
 war, and after stating the situation, absented himself to enable 
 his corps commanders to discuss the matter and not be ham- 
 pered by his presence. Gen. Slocum was not present. Gen. 
 Reynolds did not act. but said he would agree to what Gen. 
 Meade said; Meade voted to not retreat, because he said it 
 would be impossible to cross the river in presence of the enemy 
 Gen Howard wanted to stay. Gens. Sickles and Couch voted 
 ,0 retreat. Gen. Hooker ordered a retreat and recrossed the 
 river unobserved by the enemy. This again proved him to be 
 a superior strategist; although he had been defeated, he took 
 his army across a deep river, that had raised to overflow its 
 banks, during the battle, and safely into camp, but it was alter 
 three days' hard lighting with a terrible loss of life to both 
 armies \11 the advantageous grounds and roads that made 
 Chanccllorsville a desirable position had been lost, and it was 
 Oie proper thing to do. The movement back to camp was a 
 sad one. The losses had been terrible, and to look upon the 
 thinned ranks of the yomig and vigorous men as they hied into 
 camp, seeking new tentmates to take the place of the killed and 
 wounded, was in many instances heart-breaking; m some m- 
 
78 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSYILLE. 
 
 stances brothers as well as tentmates were separated. Not 
 knowing w'hether they were killed, wounded or prisoners, that, 
 taken with the disappointment of having to go back into their 
 old camps instead of moving on to Richmond, as they fondly 
 hoped they would do when they so successfully accomplished 
 this wonderful flank movement, was truly a very sad disappoint- 
 ment. I never saw the army seem so gloomy. Each one was 
 trying to find out some cause for our defeat. Some were ac- 
 tively engaged in trying to fix the responsibility upon Gen. 
 Hooker, but when they were met with the reply that the army 
 was never moved as scientifically, his enemies would loolv for 
 some other horn to hang on. Gen. Howard soon gave out as 
 an excuse that he was surprised, not knowing that the enemy 
 was moving on his flank; that he did not receive any notice 
 from Gen. Hooker notifying him of the movement of the enemy 
 to the right, and when the enemy did strike his men broke and 
 ran. and he could not hold them. It was then remembered that 
 not long before Gen. Siegal had commanded that corps and that 
 the rank and fdc of that corps were Germans, and they had 
 resented the removal of their old commander and substituting 
 Gen. Howard to command the nth corps. This statement was 
 not only unjust, but it was untrue. This corps was not all 
 Germans. Fully one-third, if not half, of that corps were not 
 only American born, but were not even of German parents, but 
 all of that corps were made to bear the disgrace, and was 
 made responsible for the defeat of the Union army at Chan- 
 cellorsville, and when one of that corps was seen wath their 
 badge on passing through the camps or on the highways, 
 they were sure to be accosted by soldiers of others commands 
 thus: "You fights mit Seigal and runs mit Howard, you tam 
 cov.-ards." As unjust as we now know this epithet to be. it was 
 
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 79 
 
 applied to the members of that corps as long as they remained 
 in the army of the Potomac, and I am glad that I am now- 
 able to clear up this vile slander of as noble organization and 
 true patriots as was ever mustered into the Union service in the 
 War of Rebellion, and place their defeat and disgrace at Chan- 
 cellorsville, wholly upon Gen. O. O. Howard where it belongs. 
 The losses in battle at Chancellorsville were as follows: 
 
 UNION ARMY. 
 
 Killed and 
 Wounded. Missing. Total. 
 
 First corps I9- loo ^2,^ 
 
 Second corps i.5-'5 500 2,025 
 
 Third corps 3.459 ^00 4>039 
 
 Fifth corps 399 300 699 
 
 Sixth corps 3.6oi i.ooo 4:6oi 
 
 Eleventh corps 508 2.000 2.508 
 
 Twelfth corps 2.38S 500 ^.883 
 
 12,062 5,000 16,997 
 
 CONFEDERATE AR:MY. 
 
 Early ^5i 500 i-55i 
 
 Hill' -'085 500 3.083 
 
 Colston 1.868 450 2.318 
 
 Rodes ^^^7i 713 -'.891 
 
 Anderson 1.180 210 1.591 
 
 McLellan '• • • 1.379 380 1.759 
 
 Cavalry and artillery 227 227 
 
 10.266 2.753 13-019 
 
 Grand totals 22.j\,6i 30.216 
 
 The Confederate loss is believed to have been much greater 
 than reported. 
 
THR BATTLR 
 
 OR 
 
 QRTTYSBURG 
 
THE. BATTIaR 
 
 OR 
 
 QKTTYSBURQ. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Army of the Potomac. Back to Camp. Near Falmouth, \'a., 
 . to Await the Filling up of Ranks. 
 
 After the battle of Chancellorsville, and the Union army had 
 resumed their position near Falmouth, on the north side of the 
 Rappahannock, they proceeded to make themselves as comfort- 
 able as it was possible, so they could get the much needed rest 
 after the fatigue of battle and marches in the past few days 
 they had heroically endured, and await the tilling up of their 
 ranks to take the place of the killed, wounded and prisoners 
 lost in battle, and the 30,000 two years and nine months' men 
 that had been mustered out on account of the expiration of 
 their term of service. Many of the wounded soon returned, 
 recruits and drilled reinforcements came in. and the army was 
 soon filled up to about eighty thousand, but the question often 
 came up in camp as to what caused the defeat of the Union army 
 at Chancellorsville. The reply was always, whether the dis- 
 cussion was among commissiuned ollicers or enlisted men, that 
 it was the cowardice of the nth corps, for Gen. Howard, their 
 
84 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 corps commander, said they ran, and he could not do anything 
 with them. Some of the commissioned officers of that corps 
 resigned to escape the unjust disgrace their corps commander 
 had thrust upon them, but the poor enHsted men could not 
 thus escape their humiliation, and it looked as if they were 
 all liable to pass into eternity weighed down to their graves by 
 the hypocritical falsehood advanced by their corps commander, 
 which was that the corps broke and ran without cause and that 
 he could not control them. This is partly true; they did break 
 and run; and that their corps commander did rush out and 
 tried to stop them is true. But this was at a time when all was 
 chaos, and his efforts to stop his corps under the galling fire 
 and cheers of a delighted successful enemy who had gained this 
 victory without loss, and pressing down, in solid column, on 
 front flank and rear. J say it was no credit to the corps com- 
 mander. Its tendency was to render the condition of his men 
 more chaotic and not to inspire them with confidence in him 
 as a commander. Not one of them that did not know, if they 
 halted, they would be shot down like dogs, without any show of 
 stopping the enemy, or else be taken prisoners, and they chose 
 to continue the retreat. But if the truth could have been pre- 
 sented to the army at this time, I doubt if the atmosphere in the 
 Army of the Potomac would have been a healthy one for Gen.' 
 Howard to have lived in. But while this discussion and prep- 
 aration was going on in the Union camp the Confederates were 
 actively filling up their ranks with conscripts and organized 
 reinforcements, and they soon had a force greater than the 
 Army of the Potomac and determined on an invasion of Mary- 
 land and Pennsvlvania. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 ^Movement of Confederates for Northern Invasion Begun. 
 Hooker Going to Attack Hilk Halleck and the President 
 Will Not Permit It. 
 
 Towards the latter part of May Gen. Hooker learned by 
 spies and prisoners that a movement by the enemy for an inva- 
 sion of Maryland and Pennsylvania had begun, and so informed 
 the President on ]\Iay 28th. He immediately began sending out 
 reconnoissances in force to verify his suspicion. One division 
 of Sedgwick's 6th corps crossed the river below Fredericks- 
 burg and was attacked with such spirit by Hill that Sedgwick 
 reported it was his belief that the greater portion of the 
 enemy's force still held their old positions. This division main- 
 tained their position on the south side of the river. On June 
 5th Hooker detached the 5th corps and posted them at Banks 
 and U. S. fords. On the 7th he ordered Pleasanton, with all 
 the cavalry of the army and two brigades of infantry, to make 
 a reconnoissance in the vicinity of Culpepper to ascertain to a 
 certainty if the enemy had begun the movement for an invasion 
 to the North. This move of "the cavalry resulted in a hard 
 fought and hotly contested cavalry battle and capturing of dis- 
 patches from the Confederates that proved to Hooker that 
 Longstreet's corps was at Culpepper, 2S or 30 miles from Fred- 
 ericksburg, and Ewell had preceded him and was passing 
 through Sperryville, Va.. while more than two-thirds of the 
 Confederate armv had made this move, leaving Hill 25 or 30 
 
86 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 miles in the rear. Hooker determined to cross the river in 
 iorce and crush Hill and force Lee to return and try to save 
 Hill and his communications with Richmond and abandon his 
 premeditated mvasion; and he notified Halleck of his intention. 
 Both Halleck and the President vigorously opposed this move, 
 which compelled Hooker to abandon his plans. The President 
 in his letter to Gen. Hooker in opposition to his crossing the 
 river said this, by way of illustration: "T would not take the 
 risk of being tangled up on the river like an ox jumped half 
 over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, 
 without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other." 
 This letter was dated June 5th, 1863. Hooker's idea was to cross 
 the river and crush Hill, then follow up Lee's two other corps 
 if they did not return, and dispose of them. This move must have 
 resulted in a grand victory if Hooker could have had his own 
 way. He had decided on this move before Pleaianton's recon- 
 noissance. It is not often that an army becomes so divided as 
 to enable an enemy to throw themselves in the breach, leaving a 
 margin of 30 miles to operate in, and crush them in detail, but 
 this was Lee's condition at this time. He was fortunate in hav- 
 ing Halleck and the President to interpose in time to save him 
 and his army from the most signal victory for the Union army 
 ever won on this continent. 
 
 There had never been a more favorable opportunity to crush 
 the Confederate army. Ewell with his corps led in this move- 
 ment and halted at Sperryville, followed by Longstreet, who 
 halted at Culpepper, which was 30 miles from Hill, while the 
 Union army lay along the north bank of the Rappahannock in 
 a position that they could cross on pontoons, between Hill and 
 Longstreet, and destroy Hill's corps before Longstreet could 
 returp to support him. At the same time the Union army was 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 87 
 
 stationed at the fords so as to detain Ewell and Longstreet, if 
 they attempted to move on Washington, until Plooker had dis- 
 posed of Hill. But inasmuch as Hooker was not allowed to 
 attack Hill, the movement of the Union .army to the rear 
 parallel to Lee was begun, and the base of operations cf the 
 Union army was changed from Aquia to Orange & Alexandria 
 railroad. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Union Army Changes Its Base June 13th. Left the Rap- 
 paliannock to Follow Up the Enemy on Their Northern 
 Invasion. 
 
 Hooker finally gave up his position in front of Fredericks- 
 burg, June 13th, and ordered Sedgwick's 6th corps on the south 
 side of the Rappahannock to recross the river and follow, thus 
 leaving Hill to follow Ewell and Longstreet, without being 
 molested. And the march for Gettysburg was fairly begun. 
 That Hooker guided the enemy where he desired them to go 
 is proven by Gen. Butterfield, who says, after the movement 
 from Fredericksburg begun: "Gen. Hooker said to me. 'They 
 blame me for not trying to prevent Lee from crossing the 
 Potomac and going into Maryland from Pennsylvania. Why, 
 he said to me, 'that is what I want him to do. I would lay 
 the bridges for him and present arms to his forces, rather than 
 they should not cross.' He then took a map of Pennsylvania, 
 pointing to it, said to me: 'Gen. Lee will repeat his cam- 
 paign of last year, cross the Potomac here' (pointing to Will- 
 iamsport on the map) ; 'we will guide his march after he 
 crosses and keep him to the other side of the ridge' (pointing 
 to the range of mountains, laid down on the map, extending 
 from the Potomac to the vicinity of Gettysburg) ; 'and we will 
 fight the battle here' (pointing to Gettysburg). 'We will have 
 every available man in the field, and if Lee escapes with his 
 
THE BATTLE OP GETTYSBURG. 
 
 89 
 
 lootDall. (See Butterfidfrs printed nrlrlro^- . 
 ri-,.,^. o piiHiea aclclrcss at reun on at 
 
 --; >=r:::;;c^!J-;■: 
 drilled soldiers, which Hallprl- .(, , . 
 
 I'.v direction of .,,. P ,r, " , ""';"" '"'' '''''''■ "^ '"''- 
 te„,poran,v ,o Gen ,11 '™'^' "^'«"^'' '""^ '-°P3 
 HooXe,- had ,„,o„.n ,„„„.„- ,„ be a aLi^ " ""^' 
 
 ■" '-■ L-.-on a,.„,. His nK.ven,e„; Z ! ^.^^ C, '" T" 
 
 villc and his checkmnto nf T • , • ' ^'^^"cellors- 
 
 sfeerin, ,.„ i o , : /rV,: '■;:;.'-:-"' °' '■--" and 
 P-iden. confidence ii; T, , "^^ l""'^, ';- «^-" "- 
 
 -m.v. HooK-e,-. a.tacl. on Hi, f u, rT"""^- ''"''' "- 
 -i.c it, n„,st „ave resumed in t, o, ,' ■ "V''"'"'"^' '° 
 corps and would I,ave eon,„elledL '''""'""" °' ^'"'^ 
 
 «o trv and sav'e Hid a 1 "'""' '"""^diately 
 
 .•a.led .0 accon,, ,s," r,. :;:,d iV °"'"""-^- """'^ "-^ 
 viiic to RiCnnond , ,t„ P e ' I.r'T''^' ^ ''^ ^°^^°- 
 
 'I'e only safe course left to Lee f H t , """'''.'■^'ve been 
 '° ."ove on Hi,l, as be a „H n d 7 " ■ """ "'""''''' 
 
 ™.^o ,b,bba.dar:d:i.:-ri:rr-:! 
 
 '.■"<! and lennsylvania or atte„,pte<l to unci- \\- i • 
 And here comes a test or , Washington, 
 
 -^oner, and ,h J , , ''"'' '""''' ""■ "'^- "^ "°' -^'"^ 
 ..itutionallv Tl ""'' '■""''"''■'"' S---'™"'ent, con- 
 
 ''-' •" "H- army. „„t „,e Secretary „f XV:„, as „o,v p„c. 
 
10 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSL Ur^G. 
 
 ticed; and there it stops. This is wrong: it should define his 
 powers as to what extent he could command the army in the 
 field in times of war or else it should provide that no man 
 should be President who had not been bred a soldier. The 
 persistence of the President in directing the movements of the 
 Union army in the field while he remained in Washington, D. 
 C, is wrong, and the politicians who were by him made major- 
 generals to rank men who, by education both practical and 
 theoretical, were competent to command, as I have said be- 
 fore, was a source of weakness in the Union army and caused 
 r.uich dissatisfaction and discussion as to the merits of the 
 presidential power. This subject was frequently under dis- 
 cussion among the o£icers, and no one I ever knew was able 
 to give good reasons why the President, who had no military 
 education, should assume to dictate the movements of the army 
 in the field and override the field commander, a bred soldier, 
 an acknowtedged strategist, one of the most aclive. most brill- 
 iant soldiers of the United States. 
 
 We ask why a system is continued in tlic United States, 
 vesting the President with pov/crs in the army. t!ie details of 
 which he is not familiar with, over bright men who have made 
 the subject a life study and practice. Hear what Gen. Butler- 
 field has to say about the President's declaration of the move- 
 ments of troops in the field in active campaign: 
 
 Gen. Butterfield, chief of staff, in a dispatch to Gen. Ingals. 
 chief cjuartermaster, June 17, 8:20 p. m., at Washington, asking 
 him (Ingals) to get reliable informatiQ.n relative to the num- 
 ber of Confederate cavalry in Maryland and Pennsylvania and 
 damages they were doing, added this: '"Since we were not per- 
 mitted to cross the river and whip Hill, while Longstreet and 
 Ewell were moving through Culpepper and Sperryville. we have 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 91 
 
 lost the opportunity of doing a thing we knew to a certainty 
 we could accomplish," etc. So there can be no doubt Hooker 
 was ordered by Halleck not to attack Hill; but Hooker man- 
 euvered the right of his army to cover the fords and defend 
 Washington against an attack of Ew.ell's and Longstreet's 
 corps, the Confederate advance. Lee kenw full well that Hill 
 could not last long if attacked vigorously by the left wing of 
 the Union army. Nor could he get away from Hooker. All 
 he could do would be to try and hold out until Lee could 
 relieve him, which would not have been possible for Lee to do. 
 Gen. Lee made this grand play knowing the risk he took in 
 such a movement in front of such a vigilant commander; but 
 in war as well as in other business men take chances, depend- 
 ing upon certain conditions which may or may not make their 
 enterprise successful. The conditions that Lee depended upon 
 were the duplicity of Halleck and his influence with the Presi- 
 dent, and it was a winner, not because Lee was a greater gen- 
 eral than Hooker, but it was because Hooker was handicapped 
 by the duplicity of those who never should have ranked him, 
 but the following general orders and official dispatches, coupled 
 with their being countermanded by Halleck. will show the 
 most determined disposition to either drive Hooker from his 
 command or defeat the army, it seems to us, that was ever 
 attempted upon any general commanding an army. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 V 
 
 Official Orders From the President. Ilalleck and Secretary 
 Stanton to General Hooker. 
 
 Notes from oflicial record, dispatches, orders and reports 
 and correspondence between the President. Gen. Halleck. Sec. 
 Stanton and Gen. Hooker, relative to the movements of the 
 Army of the Potomac prior to the battle of Gettysburg, from 
 June 5 to June 27, 1863. Date of order relieving Gen. Hooker 
 from the command of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 June 6, 1863, Hooker, at 8 p. m., telegraphs Halleck, asking 
 co-operation of Heintzelman's and other forces. 
 
 Halleck replies to Hooker's telegram by order of the Presi- 
 dent: "Any movement you may suggest of these commands 
 (Heintzelman, Dix and Schenk) will be ordered if deemed prac- 
 ticable."'— Vol XXVn, Part I, Page 31. 
 
 June 5th. President wrote Hooker relative to being tangled 
 up on the river like an ox jumped over a fence with dogs tear- 
 ing in front and rear, etc. 
 
 Plooker advises Stanton, secretary of war, of the concentra- 
 tion of 20,000 of enemy's cavalry in Culpepper county. June 5. 
 1863.— Vol. XX Vn. Part i. Page 31. 
 
 June 6th. Hooker reports to Halleck severe engagement of 
 Union cavalry with rebel cavalry. 
 
 June loth. Hooker to President Lincoln, urging movement 
 at once on Richmond and enemy's rear. — Vol. XXVH. Part i. 
 Page 34. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 93 
 
 Halleck to Hooker, June lo, 1863, 6:40 p. m.: -The Presi- 
 dent fears ill results from uncovering Washington." 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The above dispatches explains and confirms the fact that 
 Gen. Hooker, after Gen. Pleasanton had captured such dispatches 
 of the Confederates that proved conclusively the enemy had be- 
 gun the movement for a Northern invasion, and that Ewell's 
 and Longstreet's corps had passed to our right, that Long- 
 street was at Culpepper, and that Ewell had passed or was about 
 to 'jass into the Shenandoah valley. Hooker's dispatch to the 
 President. June loth. was for the purpose of getting permission 
 to attack Hill.— See general orders. 
 
 Dumfries, June 13. 1863.— Field orders. June 14. 1863.— Staf- 
 ford. C. H. Gen. Hancock. Gen. Hooker says, hold Banks 
 Ford stoutly to the last. Butterfield chief of stafT. 
 
 Dispatch from Hancock to Butterfield. June 14. j8()3. 8 p. m.: 
 '•Lee. with Longstreet and Ewell, and about 70.000 men about 
 Culpepper yesterday. Hill at Hamilton's crossing with between 
 20.000 and 30.000 men and 60 pieces of artillery. 
 
 Halleck to Hooker. June 13, 1863, 2 p. m.: ••Vnur army is 
 entirely free to operate as you desire against Lee's army, so Ion- 
 as you keep his main army from Washington." 
 
 June 16. 1863. 7:30 1). m. Hooker to Halleck: '-Gen-in- 
 chief. In compliance with your direction. I shall march to the 
 relief of Harper's Ferry." 
 
 Hooker to the President. June ]6, 1803, 9:40 i). m.: "My 
 orders are t.ut to march at 3 o'clock tomorrow morning. It 
 will likely be one of vigor and power." 
 
 Hooker to Halleck, Fairfax Station. June 17. 1863: "As 
 soon as the intentions of the enemy are km.wn to me I shall be 
 
94 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBTRG. 
 
 able to advance with rapidity." — Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 48. 
 Butterfield to Gen. Stahel, Fairfax Station, June 17, 1863: 
 "We have tonight a corps at Drainsvillc, one at Guilford Sta- 
 tion, one on Goose Creek, near Trap Rock, one at Gum Springs, 
 one at Centreville, one at Songsters Station, one at Fairfax 
 Station. The cavalry at Aldie."— Vol. XXVII, Part III, Page 
 176. 
 
 Gen, Hooker to Hallcck, June 17, 1863, 2 p. m. : "Advice 
 of the abandonment of Harper's Ferry renders forced marches 
 unnecessary to relieve it." — Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 49. 
 
 Hooker to the President, June 21, 1863, 5 p. m.: "Pleasan- 
 ton's cavalry and two brigades of Meade's infantry were di- 
 rected to attack Stuart's cavalry this morning. The fight com- 
 menced about 7 o'clock and for severa 1 hours raged with- 
 great violence."— Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 54. 
 
 Dispatches and general orders by Halleck relative to the 
 co-operation of placing other troops temporarily under Gen. 
 Hooker's command to co-operate with the Army of the Poto- 
 mac. 
 
 June 22, 1863. Ffalleck to Hooker: "Orders placing all 
 that part of the 8th corps and the middle department east of the 
 Cumberland under your immediate command . The President 
 directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable." 
 —Vol. XXVII, Part I, Pages 54 and 55. 
 
 Hooker to Halleck, June 22, 1863, 4:30 p. m.: "Yes; pro- 
 vided same authority is continued to me that I now have to give 
 orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals 
 Schenk and Heintzclman."— Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 55. 
 
 Headquarters, June 22, 1863, 9:30 p. m.: "President, my 
 latest advice from Gen. Pleasanton, dated 4:30 p. m., tke 21st: 
 At that time he had driven the rebel cavalry through Upperville, 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 95 
 
 capturing some of his artillery, and still pursuing. Appearances 
 favoral)lc." Joseph Hooker, Major-General.— Vol. XXVII. 
 Part I, Page 54. 
 
 DISPATCH. 
 
 Hooker to Halleck. June 24. 1863: "Cannot Icarn the 
 strength of Heintzelman's and Schenk's commands, nor where 
 they are stationed. Hence I send my chief of staff. Butterfield, 
 to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also to start 
 out a column of about fifteen thousand men on the National 
 road as far as Frederick City."— Vol XXVII. Part I. Page 56. 
 
 Butterfield reports as follows: 
 
 Headquarters, A. P.. June 27, 1863, Poolsville, ]\Id.: Report 
 in part of Major-Gen. Butterfield. complying v/ith Gen. Hook- 
 er's instruction of June 24: "I called immediately upon Tvlajor- 
 Gen. Halleck and stated the object of my visit. Halleck replied 
 that no troops could be spared from the defences of Washing- 
 ton. Receiving no assurance from Halleck I called upon his 
 -excellency, the President. The President said to me I had heard 
 Halleck's views that it was impossible to get any more troops 
 from Washington. I was unable to find Gen. Heintzclman or 
 any of' his stafif at his headquarters. Therefore I could get from 
 him no report of the forces in and about the defences of Wash- 
 ington. I then proceeded immediately to Baltimore and laid 
 my orders before Major-Gen. Schenk. who freely accorded to 
 me authority to take from his command whatever troops could 
 be used for the purpose of my instruction. T took all the avail- 
 able troops, about 2,500 strong, put them on the road in accord- 
 ance with my instructions, leaving a small garrison for the City 
 of Baltimore, consisting chiefly of New York militia, and in 
 
 accordance with your instructions returned to headquarters." — 
 
96 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Vol. XWII. Part III, Pages 33? and 358. 
 
 Dispatches hert- intervened between Gens. Hooker and Hal- 
 Icck, Hooker nrging the necessity of attaching the troops 
 around Washington to the Arnn ot the Potomac, and how use- 
 less they were there, the enemy's army having passed far 
 beyond, and hnally sent the foliowing dispatch: 
 
 Hooker to Halleck, Poolsville, June 27. 1863: ""^^ly whole 
 force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed 105,000."' — Vol. 
 XXVn, Part I, Page 59. 
 
 Halleck to Hooker, June 27, 1863, 10:30 a. m.: "Maryland 
 Heights have ahvays been regarded as an imp-ortant point to 
 be held by us, and much e.\i)ense and labor has been incurred in 
 fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, except 
 in case of absolute necessity." — \'ol. XX\'I, Part I, Page 59. 
 
 Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863. 2:55 p. m. Hooker to Halleck: 
 "I find 10.000 men at Harper's Ferry in condition tu take the 
 field. Plere they are no earthly account. They cannot defend 
 a ford of the river. And as far as Harper's Perry is concerned, 
 there is nothing in it. As for the fortifications, the work of the 
 troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy 
 will ever take possession of them, for them. This is my opinion. 
 All the public property could have been secured tonight and the 
 troops marched to where they could be of some service. Now 
 they are but a bait to the rebels. Should they return I beg that 
 this may be presented to the Secretary of War and his excel- 
 lency, the President." 
 
 Hooker to Halleck, Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863, i p. m.: 
 "My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry 
 and Washington. I have now imposed upon me in addition an 
 enemy in my front of more than-my number. I beg to be un- 
 derstood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to complv 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 97 
 
 ^vith this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestlv 
 reque>t that I may at once be rehe\ ed from the pcsition I oc- 
 cupy." Joseph Hooker, Major-General.— \'ol. XX\'II, Part I. 
 Page 00. 
 
 General Order No. 196, War Department, Adjutant Gen- 
 eral's Office, Washington, June 2-], 1863: By direction of the 
 President ]\Iajor-Gen. Joseph Hooker is relieved from the Army 
 ot the Potomac and Alajor-Gen. George G. .Meade is appointed 
 to the command of that army ar.d the troops temporarily as- 
 signed to duty with it by order of the Secretary of War. — E. D. 
 Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General. — \'ol. XX\'n, Part 
 ni, Page 369. 
 
 It is currently reported and never contradicted that Gen. 
 Hooker asked to waive his rank and be assigned the command 
 of the corps of his successor, but it was refused and he was or- 
 ^'.ercd to report at Baltimore for duty. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 Hooker Planned to Fight at Gettysburg. Movement of the 
 Army to Force the Enemy to Fight at that Place. Hooker's 
 Order Countermanded by Halleck. Hooker Asks to be Re- 
 lieved, which was Promptly Complied With, and George G. 
 ^leade Succeeded Him. 
 
 I here present so many dispatches and orders that passed 
 between the president, Gen. Halleck and Gen. Hooker in order 
 to show that certain troops had been placed under Gen. Hook- 
 er's command, by orders of the president through Hallock. and 
 in all honor and military regulations were a part of Hooker's 
 comm.and as much as any corps of the army of the Potomac, and 
 Hooker was no more obliged to ask Halleck's permission to use 
 those troops than any other corps of his army. In ail histories 
 of the battle of Gettysburg I ever saw they state that Hooker 
 asked to use troops over which he had no control, and asked 
 to be relieved from his command because Halleck would not 
 assign troops to him that did not belong to his command. I 
 am plea>ed to furnish official orders and dispatches that prove 
 their mistake, and that Hooker had no other alternative — either 
 be relieved or submit to seeing his whole plans neutralized, and 
 then be held responsible for the results. 
 
 The refusal of these troops at this time was a crushing blow 
 to Gen Hooker. It will be seen by official dispatches I have 
 copied in this work that Gen. Hooker had been promised that 
 these troops should be attached to his command; in fact, they 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 99 
 
 were turned over to him by order of the president, hence he 
 did not feel the disappointment he would otherwise on account 
 of his being denied the privilege of attacking Hill. Having 
 command of these extra troops, he expected to accomplish his 
 work later, and in his conversation with Gen. Butterfield it 
 shows he depended upon Heintzclman's and Schenk's forces, 
 and his plans were to destroy Lee's army before they could 
 reach Virginia again, but when he saw. on the eve of the great 
 battle, that fully one-fourth, if not one-third, of the forces he 
 had depended upon to accomplish this great work had been 
 snatched from him, for no reasonable cause, he was discour- 
 aged. His coup-de-main for the destruction of Lee's army 
 seemed dashed to earth, never to rise again. He had exhausted 
 every reasonable argument to secure the co-operation of this 
 force that had now passed into an inert army of observation. 
 His ambition, pride and heart was broken. 
 
 If permission of the president had been given HtDoker to 
 cross the river with all the force he could command, or so 
 much as was necessary, and crush Hill, who commanded all the 
 rebel forces in front of the Union army. Hill's entire force was 
 not more than 20.000 or 30,000 troops, and his nearest support 
 was Longstreet, who was thirty miles away. This would make 
 it sure that Hill could not have defended himself against the 
 Union army two hours after they attacked him; and no one 
 knew this better than Gen. Lee, but he depended upon the 
 timidity of the president and his advisers at Washington, be- 
 lieving that his movement, with his two corps and cavalry, to the 
 right of the Union army would so menace Washington and 
 Baltimore that such pressure would 'be brought to bear by the 
 powers at Washington that Hooker would be forced to leave 
 the Rappahannock and bring his whole force to the defense of 
 
100 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Washington and Baltimore. Lee's was a most desperate move, 
 for the reason he so uncovered his base of supplies that the 
 force left was powerless to defend them one hour against the 
 Union army if the Union army attacked Hill. Lee would 
 either have to attempt to return to save Hill's small army, or 
 else continue his raid and let Hill take care of himself as best 
 he could. In either case, if Gen. Hooker had been permitted 
 to act, as a general having knowledge of strategy should have 
 been permitted to act at this time, it is hard to imagine condi- 
 tions that would have saved Lee's army from an inglorious 
 defeat, if not total destruction, but Gen. Hooker was handi- 
 capped in his desire to strike the enemy a crushing blow here, 
 as well as later, and Lee's army, through the constant blunder- 
 ing at Washington, was permitted to continue its raid into the 
 Northern states and return at its leisure. 
 
 Hooker felt that there was a studied determination to handi- 
 cap and defeat any successful movement he might suggest, and 
 asked to be relieved from the command of the army of the 
 Potomac. It was always Gen. Hooker's plan, after he got com- 
 mand of the army, to so maneuver his command as to destroy 
 Lee's army and end the war at one dash. His move on Chan- 
 cellorsville would have resulted with that end had his plans 
 and orders been honestly executed, and now, when he again 
 had succeeded in getting the enemy out of his entrenched lines 
 and into states of the Union where almost every citizen was a 
 Union man, ready to report the movements of the enemy to 
 him, he felt sure the end was near. Well might he become so 
 elated as to use the expression that with the superior force he 
 would have when the reinforceinents were placed at his disposal 
 that had been assigned to him, that if he did not destroy the 
 Confederate army, tlic public wa? entitled to. and ought to, have 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 101 
 
 liis head for a football. And he so maneuvered his army after 
 he crossed the Potomac to cut off Lee's communications with 
 Richmond and compel him to fight at Gettj'sburg, but when 
 Halleck refused the co-operation of the army corps in and 
 around Washington and Baltimore that had been assigned to 
 him, he felt that although some of his army was within twelve 
 miles of Gettysburg, the place he had planned to fight the battle, 
 and headquarters were at Fredericksburg, and the battle of 
 Gettysburg must be fought within two or three days, that Hal- 
 lock was bound to cripple and defeat him. He was out of 
 patience, and asked to be relieved from ihe command of the 
 army, which was promptly done. Hallock was always in the 
 way, and seemed delighted to say "No" to department com- 
 manders. He exhibited his evil disposition to a high degree by 
 placing Gen. Hooker under arrest as soon as he arrived in 
 Washington. This act, more than any other, should have 
 shown the president the animus of the man. Hallock, for evil 
 to the service, and the president should have relieved him from 
 his responsible position. As commander-in-chief of all the 
 armies, he had showni in every instance, from the time he was 
 called by the president to Washington to take command, that 
 he did not possess the strategic ability to become a leader of a 
 great army, nor did he possess any executive abilities that 
 would make him useful to the administration. He failed to 
 support McClellan on the peninsula. He failed to furnish suit- 
 able transportation to rapidly remove the army of the Potomac 
 from the peninsula to the support of Pope, and kept a large 
 portion of the Potomac army at Alexandria waiting for two or 
 three days for wagon trains to carry their supplies forward, 
 while Pope and kis army were suffering for the want of the 
 co-operation of this force that was wrongfully kept from him, 
 
102 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBTRG. 
 
 and for this reason this large portion of the army of the Poto- 
 mac was not able to take part in the battle of Second Bull 
 Run. The Potomac army's cavalry was kept from Pope for a 
 similar reason, an arm of the service he so much needed. Hal- 
 lock was far more responsible for Pope's defeat than Fitzjohn 
 Porter. Gen. Burnside claimed that Hallock agreed to have 
 pontoons at Fredericksburg as soon as the army could reach 
 there, so they could cross the river immediately on their arrival 
 but instead of that the army had to wait about one week for 
 the pontoons to arrive. These failures, it would seem, ought to 
 have been enough to have satisfied the president, and he ought 
 to have interfered to prevent his defeating Gen. Hooker's plans, 
 who had shown himself to be a great strategist. It was not 
 unreasonable for Gen. Hooker to ask that Gen. Schenk's corps, 
 stationed at Baltimore, Harper's Ferry, etc., together with Gen! 
 Heintzelman's corps, stationed at Washington, should be at- 
 tached temporarily to the army of the Potomac, even if they 
 had not already been ordered there, to aid it in repelling the 
 invasion of the Confederate army. And more especially'' was 
 the reasonableness of his request apparent when it is known that 
 Gen. Hooker, by his superior stratagem, forced the enemy's 
 invading army into the valley and to cross the Potomac at 
 Williamsport, and that they passed on beyond Washington and 
 Baltimore. So these two corps were no longer needed to pro- 
 tect those two cities, and at this juncture of affairs it would seem 
 strange that one could be found pig-headed enough to oppose 
 uniting the two corps temporarily to the army of the Potomac. 
 Hooker expected the co-operation of all forces in and around 
 Washington and Baltimore, and when he said to Gen. Butter- 
 field that if Gen. Lee got back into Virginia with the Con- 
 federate army, the public would be entitled to, and ought to, 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYlSBURG. 103 
 
 have his head lor a football, it was not unreasonable lor him to 
 use the strong language he did. 
 
 The movement of Dix's force caused great consternation at 
 Richmond for the r:;ason that Lee had taken nearly all the 
 available troops out of Virginia with him to Pennsylvania and 
 left Richmond in a helpless condition. This move had a good 
 effect in aid of the Army of the Potomac. It compelled all the 
 forces that could reach Richmond to rush to that city and re- 
 main there in its defense, and Lee to halt and await develop- 
 ments. 
 
 Ewell's corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, June 
 22d, Longstreet and Hill crossed the former at Williamsport, the 
 latter at Shepherdstown, June 24th, and united their columns 
 at Hagerstown the next day, thus supported Ewell, marched to 
 Carlile, which he occupied June 27th. They immediately sent 
 out the foraging parties to prey on the farmers and small 
 towns. July 27th Longstreet's and Hill's columns reached 
 Chambersburg and began their work of despoliation and rob- 
 bing of farmers and townspeople, on a great scale. And on the 
 evening of June 27th, Early, after damaging the Northern 
 Central railroad quite extensively, marched into York. Forag- 
 ing parties preceded these columns and did a thirving business 
 foraging supplies for their armies, giving in exchange in many 
 instances Confederate notes. Early at York did not enact the 
 farce of exchanging Confederate money for supplies; he made 
 a levy on the city for a hundred thousand dollars cash, 200 bar- 
 rels of flour, 30,000 bushels of corn, one thousand pairs of 
 shoes, etc. He got his contributions and moved on. From the 
 time the Confederate's movement began north it was no part 
 of Gen. Hooker's plans to form the Army of the Potomac 
 for a parallel race into the Northern states, then fight a drawn 
 
104 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 battle on ground selected by the Confederates and then to exe- 
 cute the same parallel movement back into Virginia again, 
 permitting the enemy to take with them the wealth they had 
 plundered from the Northern states, as had been done before; 
 but he intended to change the entire program, knowing, as he 
 did, that the strength of the two opposing armies was nearly 
 equal numerically, and if a difference existed it was in favor 
 of the Confederate army: and if the Union army gained any 
 decided victory it must be gained by some strategy thai would 
 give the Union army a decided advantage. He began to man- 
 euver his army for the advantage sought. The time came to 
 strike, when Lee left Hill in front of the Union army, thirty 
 miles from any support, but Halleck and the president would 
 not permit Gen. PTookcr to strike the blow that must have 
 proven a great success, and when Gen. Hooker was foiled in 
 this he began to plead with Halleck and the president that the 
 isolated corps be temporarily attached to the Army of the 
 Potomac, such as Dix's command at Fortress Monroe. Heint- 
 zelman's at Washington and Schenk's at Baltimore. Harper's 
 Ferry, etc. This request was granted. (See general orders of 
 Halleck. June 5th and June 22d.) Telegraphic dispatches to Gen. 
 Hooker, when it was settled that these corps should be directed 
 by Gen. Hooker. He directed the movements of the Army of 
 the Potomac, so that those dififerent commands v,-ould co- 
 operate so as to strike a crushing blow to the Confederates 
 and insure a lasting victory for the Union army. 
 
 The first thing necessary for him to accomplish was to 
 secure the co-operation of these detached forces before named. 
 This having been done (see dispatches from Halleck to Hooker, 
 June 5th and June 22d, he asked Halleck to direct Gen, Dix, 
 at Fortress Monroe, to march on Richmond with his whole 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 105 
 
 force and place himself firmly on Gen. Lee's communication?. 
 Hal'cck had no confidence in this move and ordered Gen. 
 Dix to make a reconnoisance to Riclimond. This was done 
 in a feeble way. The force for this movement was landed at 
 Yorktown and marched to the White House. They were then 
 divided into two columns. Gen. Getty, in command of one 
 column, of about seven thousand men, moved, June 13th. to 
 Hanover Junciion, with orders to destroy the bridge over the 
 North and South Anna and railroads in that section. At 
 the same time Gen. Keys, with another column of about five 
 thousand men. moved to Bottom's Bridge on the Chicka- 
 hominy. On the 15th. the head of Keys' column reached New 
 Ketit court house, fifteen miles from Richmond. Notwith- 
 standing the decorum this large body of troops maintained 
 towards this weak and defenseless city in maintaining the mag- 
 nificent distance of fifteen miles from the head of their colmun 
 for a short time, it struck the Richmond' government with con- 
 sternation. At first their fears knew no bounds. They dis- 
 patched every station for reinforcements, and all authorities 
 agree that they had in contemplation ordering Gen. Lee's re- 
 call. But it vv'as soon discovered by the Richmond authorities 
 that this move of the Union army was a harmless reconnois- 
 sance and that they would soon return to their intrenchments, 
 and as they made no attempt to come any nearer the Rich- 
 mond government calrned down and" awaited reinforcements 
 from, the Carolinas and other Southern states. And Lee went 
 forward on his raid. The result of this reconnoissance shows 
 that if Gen. Dix. with his whole force of fifteen thousand or 
 more well drilled soldiers, had made a sudden attack on Rich- 
 mond. It would have resulted in the return of Lee's army 
 or the fall of that city, one or both. It will be remembered that 
 
106 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 the head of Lee's invading column (Ewell's corps) did not cross 
 the Potomac until June 22d, seven days after Dix's column had 
 made its appearance at New Kent court hou^s^e. This seems 
 plain to us, if Dix had attacked Richmond vigorously, Lee's 
 army would have been recalled and instead of their invading 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania, it would have been a race between 
 them and the Union army for Richmond. Hooker knew the 
 man he had to deal with was a great general and was not rash 
 enough to permit* a powerful enemy to establish themselves 
 between him and his base of supplies, and every attempt to do 
 this would make Lee turn and fight to keep open and protect 
 his communications. Dix's weak effort failing, Hooker deter- 
 mined to use the same strategy later under his own supervision. 
 The time came. Longstreet and Hill, rear of Lee's army, 
 crossed the Potomac, united at VVilliamsport June 24th, Hagers- 
 town, June 25th, moved on into Pennsylvania by the Cumber- 
 land valley, their objective point being Harrisburg and Phila- 
 delphia. Hooker crossed the Potomac river with the Army of 
 the Potomac, June 25th, paying no attention to Stewart's cav- 
 alry Lee had left behind to harrass the Union army, and 
 moved rapidly to Frederick. He then ordered the 1st, 
 nth and 3d corps with one division of cavalry, all under the 
 command of Gen. Reynolds as the left wing of the army, to 
 advance. The nth corps to Boonsboro, the ist in front and 
 the 3d corps in rear of Middletown. So they would be in 
 readiness to hold either Crump's or Turner's gaps. The 2d, 
 5th and 6th corps came to Frederick, on June 26th, to be at 
 hand to support the ist, lith and 3d. The 12th corps was 
 ordered to Harper's Ferry to unite with the garrison at that 
 place, of ten thousand men, then to move forward into the 
 Cumberland valley in rear of but in supporting distance of the 
 
The Country R-oia the Potomac to Harrlsbnrg; 
 
108 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 rest of the army, thus cutting all communication between Lee's 
 army and Richmond and holding the gaps, which would keep 
 up communications with the main body and block that of the 
 Confederate*. The Union troops were moving on the east side 
 of the South Mountain to Gettysburg, this being the order of 
 march, the ist, 3d and nth corps and one division of cavalry 
 was ordered in advance. Gen. Reynolds in command. And on 
 the night of June 28th the ist corps halted at Fairfield, the 
 nth at Emmettsburg, other corps to follow in supporting dis- 
 tance. June 28th Lee learned from a gentleman of the country 
 that Gen. Hooker*s army had crossed the Potomac and had 
 advanced to Frederick that night. He sent dispatches to his 
 whole army to fall back to Gettysburg; thus both armies were 
 in motion at the same time, for the same objective point: 
 Lee to save his communications with Richmond and Hooker 
 to bring on the engagement at Gettysburg and defeat Lee, 
 cut off his communication, and retreat to Richmond and de- 
 stroy his army before it could return to Virginia. While it 
 will be seen that Gen. Hooker's strategy worked as he had 
 planned, which was that as soon as Gen. Lee found that his 
 communications with Richmond were liable to be broken, he 
 would turn and fall back, to protect it, this would compel 
 the Confederate army to attack the Union army on grounds 
 of their own choosing, and on the defensive, which gives them 
 very much the advantage man for man. The result of the battle 
 shows that, if Gen. Hooker's plans had been carried out, it 
 must have ended in a disastrous defeat of the Confederate arm}^ 
 but Gen. Hooker was doomed to disappointment. Halleck 
 was in the way. It will be remembered that by order from 
 Halleck to Hooker, of June 5th and June 22d, the isolated 
 departments had been temporarily placed under Gen. Hooker's 
 
THiD BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 109 
 
 comirand. as will more fully appear in the order of the 22d, 
 and Hooker's reply, as follows: 
 
 June 22d. '6^. Halleck to Hooker. Orders placing all that 
 part of the 8th corps and of the middle department east of 
 Cumberland under your immediate command. * * * 'p^^ 
 President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be 
 agreeable. Vol. XXVH., Part i, pages 54-55. 
 
 Hooker to Halleck, June 22d. 4:30 p. m. In reply I have 
 to state yes, if, provided the same authority is continued to 
 me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the 
 troops in the departments of Gen. Schenk and Heintzelman. 
 Vol. XXVH., Part i. 
 
 Now the sincerity of the men is put to a test. As before 
 stated, Hooker ordered Gen. Slocum, commanding the 12th 
 corps, June 26th, to move to Herper's Ferry and uniting his 
 corps with the gasrison at that place cf 10,000 troops, and with 
 a detachment of cavalry push forward up the Cumberland 
 valley and hold the gaps, harass Lee and intercept all convoys 
 and dispatches to and from Lee to Richmond and cut off his 
 retreat if defeated by the Union army. This order of Hooker's 
 Halleck countermanded. He would not permit the troops sta- 
 tioned at Maryland heights to be united with the Army of the 
 Potomac to aid them in repelling the invading army. Gen. 
 Hooker used all the arguments at his command to persuade 
 Halleck to consent. He told him the troops were indispen- 
 sable to the success of the Union army; that where they were 
 stationed they could not so much as guard a ford and were of 
 no earthly use; that all the public property could be moved 
 to a place of safety that night; ihat the earth works could be 
 left temporarily without any risk to the government and tho 
 troops marched to where they can be of «onie service. Xow 
 they are but a bait for the rebels should thev return. I beg 
 
110 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 that this matter may be presented to the secretary of war and 
 his excellency, the President. 
 
 It does seem as though nothing could be more reasonable 
 than Gen. Hooker's order and request, as he said the troops 
 now, where they were, were of no earthly use, and it would 
 seem that the administration would desire, in view of the fact 
 that the enemy had sacked several large towns and cities in 
 Pennsylvania, as well as a large tract of rich agricultural dis- 
 trict, and was about to strike Harrisburg and Philadelphia — 
 and it would seem that at this crisis no one could have been 
 found that w^ould withhold any means at their command to 
 repel the invader. And it does seem as though the arguments 
 of Gen. Hooker were so reasonable and convincing that they 
 should have convinced any honest patriot; and if any one can 
 see a good reason and that it was for the best interest of the 
 service to withhold the troops from Hooker, I confess I can 
 not. It looks to me, in view of w'hat followed, that the object 
 was finally attained. And that was to drive Hooker to such 
 desperation that he would ask to be relieved from the command 
 of the army or else to defeat him at any cost, life or treasure 
 not considered. And we think Hooker took the same view 
 of the situation. After exhausting all arguments he could think 
 of, with Halleck, he in desperation sent the following dispatch: 
 
 Hooker to Halleck. Sandy Hook, June 27th, 1863, i p. m. 
 My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry 
 and Washington. I have now^ imposed upon me, in addition, 
 
 an enemy on my front of more than my number. I beg to be 
 understood respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to com- 
 ply with this condition with the means at my disposal and 
 earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the posi- 
 tion I occupy, Joseph Hooker, Major-General. of^cial quo- 
 tations. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. Ill 
 
 Bear in mind these troops that Hooker was pleading with 
 Halleck to have sent forward was a part of Hooker's com- 
 mand, having been temporarily assigned, and Halleck's order- 
 ing them not to obey Hooker was equivalent to his halting a 
 part of the old army and telling the balance to go on and 
 fight Lee. It was a childish exercise of power for a purpose. 
 And what purpose will soon appear by the following corre- 
 spondence: 
 
 Hallock to Hooker. Washington, June 27th, 1863, 8 p. m. 
 Your application to be relieved from your present command 
 has been received and referred for executive action, etc. 
 
 Halleck must have certified to the President Hooker's re- 
 quest to be relieved, in strong language, for all appearances 
 go to show that the President did not take much time for 
 deliberation. His order to relieve Gen. Hooker must have 
 been issued immediately on the receipt of Hooker's request. 
 The following is a copy of the President's order: 
 
 G. O. No. 194. War Department, Adjutant General's Ofifice, 
 Washington, June 27th, 1863. By direction of the President, 
 Major General Joseph Hooker is relieved from the command 
 of the Army of the Potomac, and Major General George G. 
 Meade is appointed to the command of that army and of all 
 the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it. By order of the 
 Secretary of War. E. D. Townsend, Asst. Adjutant General. 
 Vol. XXVn., Part HI., page 369. 
 
 It has been stated by some writers that the President waived 
 his constitutional rank as commander-in-chief of the Army of 
 the Potomac temporarily to Gen. :Meade when he placed him 
 in command of the army, which would infer that Gen. Meade 
 had been clothed with greater powers than Gen. Hooker pos- 
 sessed when he was in command of the army. This is not true. 
 
112 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 The fact is that Gen. Hooker had been vested by the President 
 with power to command the departments of Dix, Heintzehnan 
 and Schenk, and middle department east of the Cumberland. 
 
 See official orders from Halleck to Hooker, June 22, 1863. 
 and Hooker's reply, 4:30 p. m., same date. 
 
 When the time came that Gen. Hooker wanted to use these 
 troops he complained to Halleck, June 24, 1863, as follows: "I 
 cannot learn the strength of Heintzelman's and Schenk's com- 
 mands, nor where stationed. Hence I send my chief of staff, 
 Butterfield. to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also 
 to start out a column of about 15,000 men on the National road 
 as far as Frederick City." 
 
 See the official dispatches in preceding pages; also see But- 
 terfield's report on same pages relative to his visit to Wash- 
 ington. He was not able to get any report of the strength of 
 Heintzelman's corps, and Halleck positively refused to permit 
 any of that corps to go to aid the Army of the Potomac in 
 driving the invading Confederates from Pennsylvania and Mary- 
 land. Gen. Butterfield then appealed to the President in per- 
 son and got for reply: ''You have heard what Halleck says." 
 This places the President in rather an awkward position. It 
 had long been acknowledged by our best military men that Hal- 
 leck did not possess strategy necessary to enable him to success- 
 fully command a large army. And it was a common expres- 
 sion among the officers of the army that he was wonderfully 
 deficient in executive abilities and moral character. See follow- 
 ing quotations: 
 
 Secretary Stanton said to McClellan that Halleck was the 
 greatest scoundrel and most barefaced villian in America. See 
 McClellan's book, page 137. 
 
 Gen. Butler, in his book, page 871, says: "I have learned 
 
THE I^ATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 113 
 
 his character, which I find to be that of a lying, treacherous, 
 hypocritical scoundrel, with no moral sense." 
 
 McClellan's book, page 539, says: "Halleck perjured himself 
 before the congressional committee on the conduct of the war."' 
 
 This is the kind of a man the President selected and stren- 
 uously held in power as his chief military advisor. 
 
 Gen. Hooker had learned from his former experience since 
 he had been in command of the army how tickle Gen. Halleck 
 was. And inasmuch as he had not been able to get any reports 
 from the departments that had been assigned to his command, 
 sent Gen. Butterfield. his chief of staff, to ascertain the facts 
 and report. See Butterfield's report in ofificial orders on fore- 
 going page. Gen. Butterfield was a major-general in the vol- 
 unteer army and a graduate of West Point, and was looked upon 
 as one of the very brightest officers in the Union army. His 
 social standing as a citizen was second to none. Doubtless 
 these considerations were the cause of Gen. Hooker's selecting 
 him for the mission, as a last resort, thinking his high standing 
 and known ability would influence Halleck and cause him to 
 see the necessity for the co-operation of the troops of these 
 departments and cause the president to give the matter a more 
 serious consideration. But Hooker w^as unfortunate in this ac- 
 tion, as in all others, when the crisis came. Halleck was sure 
 to be where he could block his operations. And in this in- 
 stance he had influence enough to use the the president for thc^ 
 same purpose, who said: "You have heard what Halleck says."" 
 (Sec Gen. Butterfield's report, among official records, and tele- 
 grams on foregoing page.) Still Gen. Hooker had not lost 
 all hope. For when Gen. Butterfield called on Gen. Schenk at 
 Baltimore. Schenk promised all the aid to Gen. Hooker from 
 his department in his power. (See Butterfield's report.) Whh 
 
lU THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 this Gen. Hooker seemed encouraged, and he ordered Gen. Slo- 
 cum with the 12th corps to proceed to Harper's Ferry and unite 
 with the 10,000 troops stationed there of Schenk's command and 
 march, as before stated, up the Cumberland valley in conjunc- 
 tion with the balance of Hooker's command who were to move 
 on the east side of South Mountain to Gettysburg and fight Lee 
 there, as he had planned and expressed himself to Gen. But- 
 terfield some days before. The army crossed the Potomac, but 
 here he was again doomed to disappointment. While Gen. 
 Schenk had assured Hooker, through Gen. Butterfield, that he 
 would render all assistance in his power. (See Butterfield's 
 ofificial report.) Halleck stepped in and countermanded Hook- 
 er's order and would not permit the troops to leave their forti- 
 fications, although the troops were of Schenk's command, thus 
 banishing the last hope of Gen. Hooker. With this disappoint- 
 ment all hope of the success- of his plans fled, and being con- 
 vinced that he was to be hampered and that the president would 
 stand by Halleck. as he had at all previous tests, he concluded to 
 apply one more remedy. Hooker knew the battle must be 
 fought in three or four days at the furthest, and if the same illib- 
 eral policy was to be continued towards him to the end the com- 
 ing battle must result in either a drawn battle or perhaps worse 
 for the Union cause. And inasmuch as the idea had for a long 
 time become potent to Gen. Hooker that some drastic meas- 
 ures must be pursued towards the Confederates if the rebellion 
 was ever put down and that the garrisoning of cities or the 
 attacking the enemy in their intrenched camps by the front was 
 not the true policy, but to draw them out and crush them in one 
 great battle, was his idea. That would have been the result 
 of Chancellorsville if his plans had been honestly executed. He 
 now proposed, with a greater force, in an open country, under 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 115 
 
 his persona! supervision, to determine, if troops were not with- 
 held that had hcen promised him, to crush Lee's 
 army here in Pennsylvania. That Hooker was suspicious 
 that Halleck would interfere with him, and to make sure of 
 his premises he sent Gen. Butterfield in person to Halleck and 
 the president. Butterfield got an answer direct that no troops 
 should be taken from Washington. That, of course, meant Heint- 
 zelman's corps. But this corps, it will be seen, was one of the 
 corps named, as official dispatches show, that was placed tem- 
 porarily under Hooker's command. It will be seen by Butter- 
 field's official report that no objection was made to taking any 
 portion of Gen. Schenk's command, for he proceeded from 
 Washington direct to Baltimore and Gen. Schenk immediately 
 detached 2,500 men from Baltimore and all the aid in his power 
 at that pomt to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hooker had asked that 
 15,000 men should be sent out from Washington on the Na- 
 tional road to Frederick. Butterfield got 2,500 from Baltimore 
 and Hooker found 10,000 men at Harper's Ferry. This gave 
 him nearly the number of men he had asked for originally. And 
 these troops at Harper's Ferry being isolated and of Schenk's 
 corps, not in a position to defend either Washington or Balti- 
 more, the enemy having passed beyond those cities. Hooker 
 ordered them, as he had a right, to march up the Cumberland 
 valley with the 12th corps to cut Lee's communications. This 
 was a proper thing to do and Hooker was satisfied, although 
 the troops at Washington had been refused to co-operate with his 
 army. The troops which he found at Harper's Ferry were satis- 
 factory to him and he gave the order for them to march. Hal- 
 leck countermanded the order, and he was blind and deaf to the 
 reasonable arguments Hooker could advance. Halleck attained 
 the object he sought. He goaded Hooker on to the last ex- 
 
116 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 treme to where his intelligence and manhood could not stand 
 any more. The end came as Halleck had planned. Hooker 
 was driven from the command of the army and one of Halleck's 
 pets took his place, and the army and country by this act of 
 Halleck's met a loss that was never restored to them. 
 
 I want to go on record right here and now as saying, and 
 don't believe any one will ever attempt to gainsay it, that Gen. 
 Hooker was one of the greatest strategists the War of the Re- 
 bellion developed on the Union side, and the only one from 
 start to the finish of the war that was able to out-general Lee. 
 This is proven by his movement of the Union army to Chan- 
 cellorsville without loss and the ability he showed in check- 
 mating Lee in every movement he ever made from the time he 
 left the Rappahannock until he forced him to face about and 
 forego the sacking of Harrisburg and Philadelphia and fight 
 at Gettysburg, the grounds Hooker had selected. The rank and 
 file of the army who had left their comfortable homes voluntarily 
 to save the Union, their friends and citizens at home, had a right 
 to the services of the man who had developed the abilities this 
 man had shown. And if patriotism and love -of country had 
 prevailed, instead of an unworthy desire to rule arbitrarily, Gen. 
 Hooker would have fought the battle of Gettysburg and had 
 the force he desired. Had that been done it would have been 
 the last battle and Gen. Lee would never have gone back with 
 his army into Virginia. June 28, 1863, the order relieving Gen. 
 Llooker from the command of the Army of the Potomac and the 
 appointing of Gen. George C. Meade to the command, was pub- 
 lished to the army and of all troops temporarily assigned to 
 duty with it. So it will be seen that the troops assigned to Hook- 
 er by general orders were turned over to ]Mcade, and he was not 
 not given any greater power than Gen. Hooker possessed. No 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 117 
 
 more, no less. Gen. Hooker took leave of the officers assembled 
 at headquarters, read to them his farewell address, which was 
 published later to the whole army. We again repeat, it was 
 reported and never contradicted that when Gen. flooker re- 
 ceived the order relieving him from the command of the army 
 of the Potomac, that he asked the president to assign him to 
 the command of a corps under his late subordinate. His re- 
 quest was refused. That act shows him to have been a true 
 patriot, unselfish to a degree that challenges comparison 
 in history. It was a sad day. when the news spread 
 through the army that Gen. Hooker had been relieved from 
 the command. The general expression with the rank and file 
 was that it was a great mistake to relieve an army commander 
 on the eve of a great battle and place one in command who 
 had not had any experience in handling a large army. June jSih 
 Gen. Meade, commander of the fifth corps, assumed commar.d 
 of the army of the Potomac, and as was stated in the order, 
 relieving Hoooker, and appointing him to the command also of 
 all the troops temporarily assigned to that army. Gen. Meado 
 was a man of bright intellect, a brave soldier, whose experience 
 in the army had been such as gave him the reputation of a 
 brave officer, but it could not be said that he had won any 
 victories that would entitle him to rank as exceedingly brilliani. 
 Xor had he met any reverses. The army, from the major- 
 generals commanding corps to the private soldiers, were de- 
 termined to drive the invaders from the states of Pennsylvania 
 and Maryland or die in the attempt. Gen. Meade was a favorite 
 wiili Hallock and the administration, as will appear later, but it 
 cannot truthfully be said that Gen. Meade was deficient in con- 
 ceit or self-esteem. As soon as Hooker turned over the com- 
 mand to him he abandoned all movements against Lee's line 
 
118 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 of retreat and ordered Slocum's twelfth corps that was in the 
 valley to rejoin the arm}-, and all the troops to concentrate in 
 Frederick where he proposed to have a grand review. To this 
 proposition other officers made a vigorous protest. Among the 
 most persistent ones was Gen. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of 
 staff. He argued this would cause much dela}' and give Lee 
 time to cross the Susquehanna and capture Harrisburg and 
 Philadelphia. Meade finally concluded to let Hooker's orders 
 stand, with some very material changes. But what surprised 
 everybody was that Meade would exercise the hardihood which 
 he did to order the garrison at Harper's Ferry to be broken up 
 and march to Frederick; this, too, without any protest from 
 Washington. These same troops Halleck had refused Hooker 
 less than forty-eight hours previous. To some this may seem 
 strange, but to us, after the investigation we have been com- 
 pelled to make in order to get material for this work, and the 
 personal knowledge we experienced of men and measures in the 
 army, we learned that men, no matter what their stations are 
 in life, are human, not saints, and sometimes politicians were 
 wonderfully politic in the War of the Rebellion. We had poli- 
 ticians in the army as well as in congress or the White House. 
 These politicians knew Hooker was a brilliant, daring corps 
 commander, who had justly earned the title of Fighting Joe 
 Hooker, but had never suspected he w^as the great strategist 
 his movement of the army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville and 
 his checkmating Lee at every turn, from the time he left 
 Fredericksburg, Va., until he passed up the Cumberland valley 
 to Chambersburg, Carlisle and York, demonstrated; and when 
 the enemy was about to reach out and capture Harrisburg and 
 Philadelphia he was surprised to learn from a countryman that 
 Hooker's army was following close on his rear and about to 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 119 
 
 cut his communications with Richmond. He immediately or- 
 dered his army to turn and fall back on Gettysburg, just exactly 
 as Hooker had planned. Now the objective point of both ar- 
 mies was Gettysburg, with Hooker practically directing the 
 movements of both armies when he was relieved; and the 
 sequel shows that if Hooker had not been relieved when he 
 was that the Union army would have reached Gettysburg first 
 and, with the isolated commands that had been assigned, closed 
 up to aid the Potomac army. The movement must have re- 
 sulted in one of two things; either the surrender or the annihila- 
 tion of the Confederate army. Had this result been obtained, 
 "the final result of this great victory would have been that 
 Hooker would have been looked upon, as he deserved to be, as 
 the greatest general in America, and the popular clamor would 
 liave demanded that Halleck's vacillating dictation to the army 
 must cease, and that Hooker take his place; and it may have 
 gone further and made Hooker the nominee for the presidency 
 instead of Mr. Lincoln's second term. If there was no selfish 
 motive for the removal of Gen. Hooker, why was he handi- 
 capped at every turn? Why was Gen. Dix ordered to make a 
 reconnoisance with a part of his command in the vicinity of 
 Richmond, and then return to camp instead of moving his 
 v/hole force, as Gen. Hooker recommended, attack that city, 
 and if not able to capture it, to besiege and cut all communica- 
 tions with the city and Lee's army? The result of this re- 
 connoisance proves that although the column did not approach 
 Richmond nearer than about fifteen miles, that Lee's army 
 halted and the Richmond government was about to, and would 
 have ordered his return, but they soon discovered that the city 
 was in no immediate danger from that column, and Lee pro- 
 ceeded on his march, and the Richmond government depended 
 
120 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 on reinforcements from Southern garrisons for their defense. 
 The sequel proves that if Dix had made an attack on Richmond 
 and carried out Hooker's plans, Lee would have returned to 
 raise the siege, and there would not have been any invasion of 
 Pennsylvania and Maryland. If naught but patriotism governed 
 the administration and Halleck in their actions towards Gen. 
 Hooker in this campaign, why did they permit department 
 commanders whose commands by general orders had been tem- 
 porarily assigned to him, refuse to report their numbers, and 
 where stationed to Gen. Hooker. (See general orders, dispatches 
 and official reports, etc.. on foregoing page.) Why did Hal- 
 leck refuse any troops from Washington after the enemy had 
 passed that city, and why did the president say to Gen. Butter- 
 field, "You have heard what Halleck says." (See Butterfield's 
 official report.) If the administration and Halleck were not 
 governed by some selfish motive or personal prejudice to Gen. 
 Hooker, why did Halleck interfere and countermand Gen. 
 Hooker's field order to troops that had been assigned to his 
 command, and insist on holding them in a position where they 
 were of no use, and keep them from Hooker, where their 
 services were indispensable to the army of the Potomac in the 
 great battle soon to be fought? And why, after he had been 
 driven to the last ditch, where his pride would not permit him 
 to stand any further humiliation, he turned as a last resort, 
 thinking the authorities would yield, and asked to be relieved 
 from the command of the army, giving his reasons, which must 
 be apparent to all fair-minded persons? Why was his request 
 so promptly accepted and his successor appointed and Hooker 
 ordered to report to Baltimore for orders, and when he went 
 forward to Washington to explain to the president, did Hal- 
 leck promptly place him under arrest? And again we ask if 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 121 
 
 there were no undue inHuences at worlc to drive Hooker from 
 the eoniniand of the army and humihate him. why was Hooker's 
 suecessor, as soon as he took command, permitted without a 
 protest to break up the same garrison and order them to join 
 him that Halleck had refused Hooker? All of these successive 
 acts of Halleck happening within a few days of each other, 
 make a bad record; but whether those things were simply errors 
 or done with a malignant purpose, it makes no difference now 
 to the principal actors, or the rank and file of gallant heroes 
 who were unnecessarih' sacrificed to save the Union. But it is 
 due the living heroes who survived not only the shot, shell and 
 canister of the enemy, but endured years of camp life and 
 marches, and their friends at home, North and South, that the 
 whole truth be told, so the actors, the rank and file of the 
 army, will realize the sacrifice they have made, and that society 
 generally will appreciate the wonderful service these heroes gave 
 their country. It being true, as we have said, that Hooker 
 was the only man who ever commanded the arm}' of the Poto- 
 mac that was a match as a strategist for Gen. R. E. Lee, the 
 result of his removal from the command of that army was that 
 the Potomac army was never able to deal the enemy a crush- 
 ing blow in any one battle, but was forced to fight many useless 
 drawn battles at great sacrifice of life, and finally wear the 
 enemy out, in spite of the blunders of incompetent commanders 
 placed over them. That there was a conspiracy, composed of 
 Halleck and some of the corps commanders of the army of the 
 Potomac, I think we have shown to exist to thwart the best 
 efforts of Gen. Hooker and defeat the army. The corps com- 
 mander> at Chancellors\ille, each for themselves, Howard and 
 Sedgwick, either one of them if they had obeyed Hooker's 
 orders, the result would have been a urand victorv for the 
 
122 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Union army. Meade's failure to use the large and idle force at 
 his command to reinforce Sickles and strike the enemy in flank 
 at the time Gen. Hooker was paralyzed by the explosion of a 
 shell was an act hard to explain as consistent with a brave, 
 patriotic corps commander. The animus of the man was 
 more fully exemplified when he was appointed to command the 
 army in his determination to change the order of march and 
 battle Gen. Hooker had ordered, and the persistency with which 
 he opposed fighting at Gettysburg, and the efforts he made to 
 aliminate every semblance of Gen. Hooker's plans goes very 
 far to explain why he did not put his force into action at 
 Chancellorsville. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Meade Opposed Fighting at Gettysburg. The Battle was 
 Fought there by the Combined Eflforts of Corps Command- 
 ers, in Spite of Meade's Opposition. 
 
 Meade, as has been said before, had no idea of fighting at 
 Gettysburg, but continued to move his army slowly in that 
 direction, with the different corps marching in separate col- 
 umns on different roads east of South Mountain, so that the 
 formation was much in the shape of a fan spread out. This is 
 in the same order in which Hooker was marching the army 
 on this side of the mountain, with this difference: Hooker's 
 objective point was Gettysburg and Meade's idea was that when 
 one of the advanced corps struck the enemy they were to 
 fight and fall back and all concentrate on a line he had caused 
 to be laved out and entrenched, running from Mechanicstown 
 on the left east crossing the Monocacy river, thence via Pipe 
 creek to the vicinity of Taneytown, making a line of twenty-five 
 or thirty miles long. The object in selecting this line for the 
 battle instead of Gettysburg I cannot see. It did not cover 
 Washington and Baltimore as well as Gettysburg; its disad- 
 vantages consisted in the fact that the line was more than twice 
 as long as was necessary to have at Gettysburg, for the reason 
 that all the main roads from Chambersburg. Carlisle and York 
 to Baltimore and Washington centered at Gettysburg, and from 
 Gettysburg these great highways spread out in a northeasterly 
 
124 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 direction north of Gettysburg, and southwesterly direction to 
 Baltimore and Wasliington, the great coininercial cities, so that 
 an army stationed at Gettysburg, their flanks would be protected 
 largely from a flank attack by the enemy, for the reason there 
 are no traveled roads in that direction over which an enemy 
 could pass a heavy attacking column rapidly enough to make the 
 movement successful. This made Gettysburg a strong position 
 to fight a defensive battle, but Gen. Meade was not inclined to 
 take this view of the situation. If he had favored Gettysburg 
 as the battle ground, it would have been just as easy to have 
 concentrated the Union army at Gettysburg June 30, ur even 
 on the night of the 2gth, as it was to wait until the night of 
 July I. On the 30th ^Meade learned to a certainty from scouts 
 and advanced cavalry pickets that the enemy had turned his 
 whole column and was marching on the three converging roads 
 from Chambersburg, Carhsle and York to Gettysburg, and so 
 informed his corps commanders, but he gave them no orders to 
 move forward, nor did he do so July i. If Meade had ordered 
 the army to march to Gettysburg on the night of June 30 or 
 early morning of July i, the whole Union army, except possibly 
 the fifth and sixth corps, would have been resting in Gettysburg, 
 and in easy supporting distance when the Confederate army 
 approached the town. It was understood by Meade that when 
 any of the advance corps met the enemy they were to show 
 fight and fall back to Pipe creek. 
 
CHAPTER YU. 
 
 The Battle of Gettysburg, First Day Gen. Reynolds Killed. 
 
 Gen. Plesanton, commanding cavalry corps, ordered Buford. 
 commanding division of cavalry, June 29th to march to Gettys- 
 burg on the morning of the 30th and hold that place until 
 relieved by the infantry. The sequel of Gen. Plesanton, Rey- 
 ii^olds, Buford. Hancock, Sickles and Slocum's movements on 
 Gettysburg- goes to show that they had no such idea, as will 
 appear as we go along, of falling back on Pipe 
 creek. Gen. Buford was m advance on the left 
 wing. This wing of the army was composed of Buford's 
 cavalry, the first, third and eleventh corps, all under the imme- 
 diate command of Gen, Reynolds. Buford attempted, June 30. 
 to march direct to Gettysburg to carry out Plesanton's order, 
 his direct route being through the mountain at Fountaindale 
 Gap. where he found a brigade of Confederate infantry. This 
 caused him to turn back and take the route by way of Emmets- 
 burg, but he arrived at Gettysburg early in the day, and fully 
 established- his lines. His pickets were advanced almost to 
 .Ca>htown and Hunterstown. He posted Gamble's brigade across 
 Chambersburg pike and Devm's brigade across the .Mumsburg 
 road. Buford's main lines were about one mile west of Gettys- 
 bm-g. well over the ridge. His first or picket line was extended 
 beyond Willoughby's run, a branch of the ^lonocacy river. The 
 country here is broken and rough surface, largely covered with 
 
126 
 
 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURO. 
 
 GETTTSBtTRG.— Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Secxmd Day.* 
 
 The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield and Hanuvcr roads. The 
 second day's battle south of the same roads. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 127 
 
 timber, making the position well adapted for defensive opera- 
 tions, and this is the position the cavalry occupied during the 
 night of June 30th. In the morning of July ist the enemy 
 started on the diverging roads for Gettysburg, and very soon 
 came in contact with the pickets Buford had placed in advance 
 on main roads the night before, and skirmishing began in earn- 
 est. It had been arranged by Buford and Reynolds that when 
 the enemy advanced in force that three cannon shots should be 
 fired in quick succession as a signal. At this signal Gen. Rey- 
 nolds ordered the first corps to go forward to the support of 
 the cavalry, and ordered the eleventh corps to follow. Just 
 why he did not order the third corps forward at this time I 
 never knew, for that corps was assigned to his immediate com- 
 mand, the same as the eleventh corps. It has been stated that he 
 suggested or in some way recommended that it should come 
 forv>ard. This I very much doubt. There must be some mis- 
 take about this report. I was a member of the third corps from 
 its first organization; so was Gen. Sickles, the corps command- 
 er, and I know him to be one of the bravest, most patriotic and 
 brilliant ofificers that ever drew a sword in the defense of his 
 country, and if he had got a hint that his services were needed 
 the first day he would have marched the third corps to Semi- 
 nary Ridge and placed therrt in line of battle as soon as their 
 strength would have permitted them to have made the march. 
 He was no sluggard, nor was he ever known to sulk in his 
 tent. Quite likely the reason the third corps was not ordered 
 up early on the first day is that Gen. Reynolds was killed about 
 eleven o'clock a. m. before he had got the first division of the 
 first corps all in position. The second, third and twelfth corps 
 could, if they had been ordered up early in the morning, have 
 been on the ground by twelve o'clock noon, readv to go into 
 
128 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 action, and with the aid of either one of these corps, had ihey 
 come upon the field by 2 o'clock p. m., would have changed 
 the result of the first day's battle from a defeat into a general 
 victory for the Union army. The fall of Gen. Reynolds, hap- 
 pening at the time and under the circumstances, was a great 
 loss to the army, the country and its cause. He was a West 
 Point graduate, had seen service in the Mexican war and on the 
 frontier and War of Rebellion from the first, a Pennsylvanian, a 
 gallant ofhcer. none more patriotic. He said to Gen. Double- 
 day: "We must fight the enemy as soon as we can find them, 
 or the}- will ruin the stale of /'cnnsylvania." Tie had no idea 
 of fighting and falling back. If he had lived he would have 
 made haste to order up Sickles* third corps and requested Gen. 
 Slocum of the twelfth corps to conic to his su])port. who was 
 not more than five miles from Gettysburg. Sickles was under 
 Reynolds' immediate command at that lime, and lie liad a 
 right to order the third corps forward; and his high standing 
 in the army was such that his request of Gen. Slocum to 
 assist him would have been sufficient to have promptly brought 
 that corps to his assistance. But he fell while he was aiding 
 in the formation of the first division. Gen. Doubleday was in 
 command of a division of the first corps, and when Gen. Hook- 
 er placed Gen. Reynolds in command of the left wing of the 
 army, Revnolds turned over the command of the corps to 
 Doubleday, and on the morning of July ist. Gen. 
 Reynolds was encamped with the first corps at 
 Marsh creek, and when Gen. Buford's cavalry com- 
 mand fired the three successive cannon shots, the signal that 
 had been agreed upon as a notice that the enemy had attacked 
 the cavalry, and that Gen. Revnolds v.-as to move the infantry 
 forward to their support, he promptly ordered \\'adsworth to 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 129 
 
 move at once, and Doubleday to call in the pickets and put the 
 two other divisions, with artillery, etc.. on the road to move 
 forward as rapidly as possible. He then ordered Howard's 
 eleventh corps, to march to Gettysburg-, then mounted his horse 
 and rode to the front to consult with Gen. P.uford. whom he 
 found in the bell tower of the theological seminary which stands 
 on top of the ridge west of Gettysburg, known as Seminary 
 Ridge. This position gave them a splendid vicv.- of the enemy's 
 firing line, who were pushing the cavalry in front and Hank. It 
 also gave them a view of the approaching troops of the first 
 corps. The head of Wadsworth's division came up. and he 
 descended to the ground and directed them where to move into 
 line. At this time one of Gen. Howard's aides rode up and 
 asked for orders for the eleventh corps. Reynolds told him 
 to say to Howard to halt his corps on Cemetery ridge and 
 form them there as a reserve. He then went forward to assist 
 in placing Wadsworth's division in position to check the over- 
 whelming force that was forcing back the dismounted cavalry 
 on the Chambersburg pike. At this time Doubleday had got 
 the two last divisions of the first corps well on their wa\- to the 
 front, galloped ahead and overtook Meredith's brigade, which 
 was the last or left of W^idsworth's division on the Fairfield 
 road. Just as they were moving forward on to the firing line, 
 he halted and sent an aide over -to Reynolds, who was on a high 
 wooded ridge on the Chambersburg road on the east side of 
 Willoughby's run. This position gave him a good front view. 
 as well as to the rear, the direction in which reinforcements 
 were coming. He said to the aide. "Tell Doubleday to watch 
 the Fairfield road and left flank and T will hold on to this road." 
 But his lines were weak at this point, and the enemy was over- 
 lapping them, and there was danger of their turning his flanks 
 
130 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 before the other divisions could reach him. He ordered up 
 more artillery, and m his anxiety lor the arrival of reinforce- 
 ments kept turning his head, looking back. This he repeated 
 several times. At last, when he turned his head to look back, 
 a minie ball struck him in the back of the head, passing straight 
 through, coming out just over his eye, killing him instantly. 
 So far the attacking column was Hill's corps. It is well to 
 understand here the organization of the two armies. They were 
 about equal numerically. The Confederates had three corps, 
 while the Union army was composed of seven corps. One of 
 the Confederate corps was equal to two and three-sevenths of 
 the Union army's corps. Divisions and brigades in the same 
 ratio. When Reynolds fell, the command oi the left wing of 
 the army devolved temporarily upon Gen. Doubleday, who 
 distributed the balance of the first corps very ingeniously as they 
 came up, and the first corps, under his command July ist, won 
 prodigies of valor, holding back from 9 o'clock a. m. until 
 three p. m., a force equal to three or four tu their one. But 
 they were so favorably posted that the enemy could never have 
 forced them back by a front attack. Their danger consisted in 
 the enemy's getting on their dank and subjecting them to a 
 cross fire. This often happened during the day. The enemy's 
 numbers being so much greater, they could swing to either 
 flank and subject the Union army to a murderous cross fire, 
 which caused the Union army as often to change front to meet 
 these flank attacks. It requires a cool commander and the 
 coolest soldiers to successfully change front under a heavy flank 
 fire. The Union soldiers performed this feat several times dur- 
 ing the day. The report of killed and wounded tells how des- 
 perate and destructive was the fire of the enemy. Gen. Wads- 
 worth reported one-half of his division either killed or wounded. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. I'U 
 
 Gen. Rowley's division, one-half killed and wounded; Gen. 
 Stone's division lost two-thirds killed and wounded. Nearly 
 every field officer killed or wounded. Gen. Robison's brigade of 
 2,500 men for duty lost 1,667 nien killed and wounded. 
 
 The 24th Michigan, commanded by Col. Marrow, had five 
 color bearers killed. The colonel then seized and held them 
 up, but was immediately wounded. A private then seized them, 
 who soon got a mortal wound, but he firmly held the regi- 
 ment's colors in place. While this terrible fighting was taking 
 place on the left center by the ist corps with six small bri- 
 gades, who relieved Buford's cavalry and were opposed by 
 eight large brigades of Hill's corps, Howard rode forward in 
 advance of his corps, arriving on the ground about 11:30 
 a. m. Seeing the desperate fighting being maintained by the 
 ist corps against Hill, he dispatched an aide to the nth corps 
 to hurry up double quick. He then learned of the death of 
 Gen. Reynolds and by reason of his rank assumed command 
 of the left wing of the army. He sent a dispatch to Meade to 
 notify him of the death of Reynolds. He requested the 12th 
 corps, commanded by Slocum, resting at two taverns about 
 five miles from Gettysburg, to come forward and take part m 
 the battle. This Slocum refused to do without orders from 
 Gen. Meade, and Mead^ was at Taneytown, fifteen miles away, 
 but knew on the afternoon of the 30th that Lee's army wa- 
 marching on Gettysburg; that Buford's cavalry was west of that 
 town; that the ist corps rested that night within six miles, 
 and the nth would move forward the next morning, and that 
 the I2th corps was resting five miles south of the town, and. 
 in all probability, a battle would be fought the next day. Still 
 Meade did not consider the matter of importance enough to 
 ride forward so as to keep in easy communication with the 
 
J 32 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 advanced columns, Slocum had been ordered by Meade to tlic 
 position he occupied within easy sound of the battle with no 
 one at hand with power to order him forward to aid the ist 
 corps, and Buford's cavalry in their desperate struggle against 
 an enemy very largely outnumbering them. When Gen. Meade 
 learned that Reynolds had fallen he ordered Gen. Hancock to 
 go forward and assume command of the left wing. The head 
 of the nth corps arrived at Gettysburg at 12:45 and the last 
 division at 1:45. Howard having assumed command of the 
 left wing of the army, turned the command of the nth corps 
 over to Maj.-Gen. Carl Shurz. who turned over the command 
 of his division to Gen. Barlowe. Schimmelpfenning's and Bar- 
 low's divisions were immediately put into action on the right 
 of the 1st corps, on Seminary Ridge. The other division, that 
 of Steinwchr, was placed in rear, on Cemetery Ridge, together 
 with the artillery, that was- not in action, as a reserve. Stein- 
 wehr utilized his time in strengthening his position wherever 
 rocks and stone fences did not afford the necessary shelter from 
 the enemy's fire for his command, and strengthened the posi- 
 tion generally. At 2:45 it was discovered that Ewell's corps was 
 close at hand on the Carlisle road. This heavy column of the 
 Confederates coming from that direction would strike the right 
 flank of the Union line. Gen. Doubleday, on receiving this in- 
 formation from Gen. Buford, sent an aide to Gen. Howard, 
 telling him if he would direct the nth corps to keep in check 
 Ewell's colmun, he would try to hold Hill. Howard caused 
 Barlowe's division of the nth corps to change front to meet 
 Ewell and Early. When they executed this movement Deven's 
 brigade of cavalry, that had been covering this position, fell 
 back and took a position to the right and rear. The fighting, 
 was desperate all along the lines from left to the right of the 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 133 
 
 Union lines. In the morning the Confederates thought they 
 onl}' had raw militia to contend with and were careless about 
 their movements and met some heavy losses in the fore part 
 of the day. On that account they expected that they would 
 only meet militia and that the advance division, Heth's, of 
 Hill's corps, would march into Gettysburg without a halt. But 
 Gen. Plcasanton. in command of the Union cavalry corps, one 
 of the most brilliant major generals in the Union army, ordered 
 Gen. Buford, on the 29th. to occupy Gettysburg on the 30th 
 and hold it until the infantry of the Army of the Potomac 
 came to his relief. Thus it will be seen he realized the im- 
 portance of this position to the future success of the Union 
 army, and if it had not been for the efforts of Generals Hooker 
 first, then Pleasanton and Reynolds and Hancock, the battle 
 would never have been fought at Gettysburg, and Lee would 
 have marched his army into Gettysburg with no more opposi- 
 tion than he first anticipated — that of the militia. But after 
 the iitii corps had changed front and Schimmelfenning's and 
 Barlowe's divisions were fighting desperately with Ewell's col- 
 umn, on the Carlisle road, Early's division at 3:30 p. m. came 
 up on the York road which struck Barlowe's division on their 
 right flank. Tliis heavy column was too much for them. No 
 changing front or thro.wing forward light reserves could check 
 them. This practically decided the first day's battle in favor 
 of the Confederates. Here was the time the 12th corps should 
 have been in position to meet Early. This would have insured 
 a victory for the Union army the first day. Here the corps 
 commanders, who was determined the battle should be fought 
 at Gettysburg, made their first failure, in not having some one 
 in advance if misfortune should overtake Reynolds, who would 
 have been respected enough that their request for reinforce- 
 
134 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 ments would have brought forward the 12th and 3d corps. 
 Then the Union victory would have been complete; but, no 
 reinforcements being at hand, the two divisions of the nth 
 corps were compelled to fall back, retreat to Cemetery Ridge. 
 Barlowe was wounded, Von Amburg's brigade was nearly all 
 captured, the two divisions of the nth corps, or what was left 
 of them, made a hasty retreat to Cemetery Ridge, where their 
 reserve was stationed. This left the ist corps, under Double- 
 day, in a very critical situation. A very heavy reinforced line 
 of the enemy was steadily bearing down on the weakened lines 
 of the I St corps, but the enemy had learned in the early part 
 of the day that it did not pay to try to crush that corps in a 
 rapid front attack, but the great danger to the 1st corps con- 
 sisted now in the headlong movement of Ewell's corps on both 
 their right flank and their rear, threatening their total destruc- 
 tion. About this time, Doubleday says, he sent aides at two 
 different times to request that Gen. Howard send him reinforce- 
 ments from the reserve on Cemetery Ridge, but it was refused. 
 Doubleday says for a long time he saw the perilous condition 
 the I St corps was getting into. The enemy was overlapping 
 them on either flank, and thinking Howard would see this 
 when his attention was called to their situation by repeated 
 calls for reinforcements, he -would order them to fall back to 
 the reserve. But he insists that Howard, never gave the order. 
 Howard claims he sent an aide with an order to fall back. 
 Doubleday says the order never came, but when the situation 
 became so desperate that it was doubtful if he could save his 
 artillery he gave the order, on his own responsibility, to fall 
 back. One piece of artillery was abandoned, because the horses 
 that hauled it were shot, and there was no time to unhitch 
 them and three broken caissons were abandoned on the field. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 135 
 
 The different brigades began the movement to the rear, slowly 
 and coolly, taking advantage of every favorable position, to 
 re-form. And as the enemy would approach, both infantry 
 and artillery would open a murderous fire. This made the 
 enemy very cautious and gave most of what was left alive and 
 sound plenty of time to take their place in line on Cemetery 
 Ridge, which was some time between 3 and 4 o'clock p. m. Han- 
 cock claims to have arrived on the ground at 3:30 and took com- 
 mand of the left wing of the army by order of Gen. Meade. 
 There seems to be considerable difference in time at this point 
 from different reports. It is agreed that Early's attack on Bar- 
 lowe's right occurred at about 3:30. Much time must have 
 been consumed after Early's attack and the nth corps falling 
 back to Cemetery Ridge, and Doubleday's sending aides at two 
 different times to get reinforcements or permission to fall back; 
 and then, after all this, really retreated two miles, to Cemetery 
 Ridge, on a slow walk in this interval; much time must have 
 intervened. Then Doubleday says he found Howard surrounded 
 by his aides at the main gate of the cemetery, who gave him 
 orders, etc. Hancock claims he came on the ground and took 
 command by order of Meade at 3:30 p. m. Howard says 
 Hancock did not take command until 7 p. m. Doubleday is 
 inclined to think Hancock correct. It looks to us as though 
 Howard was nearest correct. I was in the 3d corps. 'We came 
 up and took our position on the left at Cemetery Ridge before 
 sundown. There had not been any fighting for some time 
 previous to our arrival except light skirmishing. If this differ- 
 ence in time could be settled it would go very far in settling 
 the question that has been raised between Howard's and Han- 
 cock's friends as to which of those gentlemen, or if either of 
 them, selected Cemetery Ridge as the final battle ground. 
 
136 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 It i? evident that Hancock was highly pleased with the ridge; 
 that he was very active in establishing the line; then rode back 
 that night to Taneytown and persuaded Meade to order np the 
 balance of the army and come forward himself at the same 
 time. 
 
CHAPTER VITI. 
 
 Battle of the Second Day. Hancock Persuades Meade to Come 
 to Gettysburg and Order Up the Balance of the Army. 
 Lee Order an Attack. Is Defeated, Meade Objects to 
 Fight at Gettysburg. 
 
 Hancock turned over the command of the left wing of the 
 army to Gen. Slocum. Gen. Sickles', commanding the 3d 
 corps (all but two brigades), went forward without orders. It 
 and the 12th corps arrived on the ground about sundown. The 
 2d and 5th corps came during the night and were assigned 
 position in line. The 6th corps arrived in the after- 
 noon of July jd. having marched over 30 miles that night. 
 and was placed in rear of little round top in reserve. Gen. 
 ]\Ieade arrived on the ground about i o'clock a. m. of July 2d 
 and established headquarters at a frame dwelling on the Taney- 
 town road, near Ziglar's grove. At dawn he began massing his 
 forces with a view of attacking Lee's left, but Gen. Warren, of 
 Meade's staff, and some of the corps commanders opposed the 
 movement, and it was abandoned. Meade was dissatisfied with 
 Gettysburg as the battle ground, and at one time placed the 
 cavalry in position to cover the retreat to Pipe creek, the place 
 he had selected to fight Lee; but the corps commanders 
 pleaded for Gettysburg, and Meade reluctantly yielded to their 
 decision, but insisted on assuming the offensive. His plan of 
 attack was to strike a crushing blow on the enemy's left and, 
 as before said, ordered his forces massed on the L^nion rierht 
 
138 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 for that purpose, but Gen. Warren and Slocum both reported 
 that the plan was impracticable, and Meade abandoned the 
 project. He then turned his attention to the enemy's right, with 
 a view to attacking them on that flank. Attacking the enemy 
 on their right would have been a far better movement for the 
 Union army to have made for two reasons: First, if the attack 
 had been successful it would have resulted in forcing the 
 enemy north and west and firmly placing the Union army be- 
 tween the Confederates Baltimore and Washington, and placed 
 the Confederates' force in danger of being cut off from all 
 future supply of ammunition. This would mean certain dis- 
 astrous defeat to the Confederates if not immediately remedied. 
 An army is compelled to move with a limited supply of artillery 
 cartridges. Pitched battles and constant skirmishes is a constant 
 drain on this supply that must be replenished only from their 
 base where large amounts are constantly kept stored for that 
 purpose. Once that base is cut an army commander will make 
 great haste to restore his communications with his base of 
 supplies, so that safe convoys can frequently reach them. If 
 these convoys fail to reach an army, especially in artillery car- 
 tridges, that army is doomed to a disastrous defeat. This was 
 why Hooker insisted on having the Harper's Ferry f^arrison 
 broken up so as to give him sufficient force to enable him to 
 effectually cut Lee's communications and compel him to turn and 
 fight him on his own chosen ground in open country. Lee's am- 
 munition would soon give out, and disastrous defeat of his army 
 would have followed. This Lee knew as w'ell as Hooker, and 
 that knowledge caused him to immediately face about, retrace 
 his steps as soon as he learned of Hooker's movements to cut 
 his base, but if Meade's proposition he first advanced had pre- 
 vailed and he had succeeded in breaking down Lee's left, its 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 139 
 
 result would have been, in the first place, to have weakened 
 the line of the Union army on their left. If the attack had 
 been successful, which I doubt very much, its tendency would 
 ha\e been to weaken the Union line, and especially on their 
 left, while the reverse would be true with the Confederates. 
 Their columns would be turned towards their base, and the 
 Union army's base would have been in great danger. Further 
 than this, the army acting on the defensive, on either side, had 
 decidedly the advantage for the reason that, as the armies were 
 drawn up in line on each side of Gettysburg on high, command- 
 ing ridges, which ran parallel to each other, the Union army 
 facing west and the Confederates east, separated by a valley of 
 about one mile in width in which is situated Gettysburg. All 
 roads in this vicinity radiate from this town. So its appearance 
 is something like a wagon hub with its spokes running in 
 different directions. So an army stationed as above described, 
 one could not move a heavy attacking column suddenly on 
 the flank of the other, and if a flank movement was attempted 
 its operations must necessarily be slow because no roads lead 
 in that direction. This will explain why the Confederates' 
 attempts on the Union army's flank, w'ere no more successful. 
 There is scarcely a doubt if ]\Ieade had made the attack on the 
 Confederates on either flank, as he desired, disastrous defeat 
 awaited him, but there is no knowing what the result would 
 have been. The topography of the country, as above described, 
 gave the defense much the advantage, while Meade was debating 
 as to which flank of the enemy he would attack, and not giving 
 any attention to the strong formation of his own lines. The Sth 
 corps came up tired and footsore at i p. m., July .2nd, and was 
 placed in the rear on the right center, in reserve. The 6th corps 
 arrived at 3 p. m., and was placed in reserve on the left, in 
 
140 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 rear of Little Round Top. This corps was forced to march in 
 lieat and dust over thirty miles that day, and. of course, was in 
 no condition to be put into action until they had some rest. 
 But not much time was given those tired soldiers for rest. 
 ]\Ieade had blundered by placing those two corps so far away; 
 so they must suffer because of his mismanagement. A consulta- 
 tion of corps commanders was held at headquarters in the after- 
 noon of the 2nd, and the unanimous voice was to fight at Gettys- 
 burg. It is a little singular that the corps .commanders of both 
 armies should agree so well as to the line of action both should 
 pursue. Longstrcet was positive that Lee should take up a po- 
 sition and hold it and compel ]\Ieade to attack him, while the 
 Union corps commanders were united that the best course for 
 the Union army to pursue was to assume the defensive. The 
 L'nion corps commanders were successful in persuading their 
 commander. Longstreet was not. Lee ordered an attack on 
 both fiianks of the Union lines at 9 o'clock a. m., July 2nd. 
 Ewell on the Union right and Longstreet on the left, while ITill 
 was to keep up a demonstration on the center to prevent any 
 rc-cnforcing of the Union flanks from the center. It is very 
 evident that Lcc had not stopped to consider the natural bar- 
 riers that would beset his corps commanders at almost every step 
 of the con^'crging roads and rottgh, broken country, fences, 
 roads and ravines over and through which thej'' had to pass or 
 else he would have ordered the movement to have taken place 
 the night before in order to give the attacking cohimns the whole 
 night to get into position, or else ordered the attack to have 
 taken place mitch later in the day. The seciutl proves two facts 
 very conclusively. First, that the commanders of either army 
 did not take into consideration the disadxantage the attackmg 
 column must labor under in passing to the flanks of the enem}^ 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 141 
 
 in the direction of whicli there was no roads passing, and that 
 the movements of the attackin.f^ cohimns must be made far to 
 the rear to avoid the view of the enemy, aild to prevent a coun- 
 ter movement by them. If he had taken those conditions into 
 consideration lie would never have ordered the attack on l)0th 
 flanks of the Union army at 9 a. m.. for he would have known 
 that it would be an impossibility for his corps commanders to 
 comply with his order. It is true Long'street delayed his move- 
 ment some time, in tlie morninp;. in order to let Law's brigade 
 coitie up. which was some distance in the rear; and after it 
 came up and was ready for action, there was the marching to the 
 rear of ridges and ra\ines in order to a\-oid exposing its move- 
 ments to the \'iews of the L'nion army, but after Longstreet's 
 wait for a portion of his command to come tip. he was able to 
 bring his corps into action several hours before Lwell could 
 reach the L'nion lines to dcli\er the blow he was ordered to 
 strike at 9 o'clock a. m. The Confederates, after the battle, 
 blamed Longstreet for not lu'inging on the engagement earlier 
 in the day. We claim great injustice has been done those corps 
 commanders. They had the natural and artificial obstructions 
 to overcome. No man could, in advance, accurately measure 
 the time it would require to accomplish the work that had been 
 assigned them. But before describing the attack of the Confed- 
 erates, it will be best to give some idea of the position the Union 
 army had assumed at this time, for it can hardly be said after 
 the evening, or night, of July ist that any one general was re- 
 sponsible for its formation. That night, when Hancock had 
 ordered the different corps into line as they came up. their for- 
 mation was somewhat in the shape of a crescent. The right 
 of the T2th corps rested on Powers Hill. Thi>^ hill, called 
 Powers Hill, is situated on the west bank of Rock creek, and 
 
]42 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 this creek is the east branch of the Monacacy river, which unites 
 with the west branch about ten or twelve miles south of Gettys- 
 burg. From this point it is known as the Monocacy river. So 
 it Will be seen Rock creek is quite a stream, and the rough 
 nature of the ground and timber made it more difficult for 
 the Confederates to reach this flank of the Union army with a 
 well organized force of artillery at Powers' Hill. The right 
 of the I2th corps, the Union line passed along the ridge of said 
 creek north to Gulp's Hill. Here one division, Wadsworth's, 
 of the I St corps, was stationed. Here the line turned west, leav- 
 ing Rock creek, to Cemetery Hill, on which was stationed the 
 nth corps, the left tlank of that corps turned south, along the 
 ridge, and was joined on their left by two divisions of the ist 
 corps. On their left was the 2nd corps. Then came the 3rd 
 corps, their left resting at the base of Little Round Top, so- 
 called to distinguish it from a larger spur that shoots up far 
 above the surrounding ridges. Little Round Top, I would 
 judge to be about two hundred and fifty feet high, from its base 
 to the top. while south of this one-half or three-fourths of a 
 mile is Big Round Top, which is fifty or seventy-five feet higher 
 These two spurs were the key to the whole situation, so far as 
 the Union army was concerned. Once in the hands of the Con- 
 federates they could place artillery on the crest of these spurs, 
 and the Union lines, as strong as they were, if attacked in front, 
 could not have been maintained against the enemy a moment. 
 So, too, if it had been decided from the first by the Union com- 
 mander that this was to be the battle ground, these two spurs 
 would have been crowned with all the batteries and infantry that 
 could have been placed to advantage, on the night of July ist. 
 If this had been done, Longstreet's attack on the 2nd would 
 have resulted in a disastrous defeat to the Confederates, and the 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 143- 
 
 3d corps would not ha\c been driven from its position on the 
 Eninietsburg- road. Peach Orchard and Dexil's Den, as will ap- 
 pear by a glance at the map. The force and facts of this statement 
 will appear more fully %& we proceed with this narrative. As 
 before said, the corps commanders were invited by Meade to 
 head(inarters for a conference on the afternoon of July 2nd, 
 and by the unanimous voice it was decided to hold the positioti 
 the Unio!i army occupied: and when this conference was in ses- 
 sion the Confederates under L,ongstreet attacked the 3rd corps, 
 and when Gen. Sickles mounted to ride over to his corps, which 
 was being attacked. Gen. Meade rode with hiu], and it is said 
 that Meade objected to the position the 3rd corps was placed in; 
 but inasmuch as the engagement was on, and Longstreet was 
 forcing the fight, that it was better to permit the line to remain 
 where it was. This may or may not be true. Gen. Sickles says 
 that he made an effort to get Gen. Meade to direct the position 
 the 3rd corps should be placed in. That the ridge, about one- 
 half or three-quarters of a mile in advance of the ridge the 3rd 
 corps occupied on the night of July ist. along the Emmetsburg 
 road running southwest and turning, as it finally did. 
 at the peach orchard and running southeast, the left resting at 
 or near Little Round Top, was the better position. Gen. Meade 
 did not give the placing of this line his personal attention, but 
 sent a statT otilcer. Gen. ]{unt. chief of artillery, approved 
 of the position, and the corps was finally placed where the battle 
 was fought. It will be seen that this part of the Union line 
 had been neglected by Meade. The line, as finally posted, was 
 crude to excess. There was no force to protect or support its 
 left flank, and the high, commanding round tops that ranked 
 so high and commanding above the surrounding country, was 
 occupied otdy as a signal station. Soon aflj?r Longstreet'^ at- 
 
144 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 tack un llic 3rd corps began, the 5tli corps came forward and . 
 formed in the rear of Little Round Top, Crawford's division, 
 on the right, and ad\anced in supporting distance of tlie 3rd 
 corps formation, and while the battle was raging furiously on 
 the left of the 3rd corps, where Hood's division of Longstreet's 
 corps had formed heavy columns to strike the left flank and 
 rear of the Third corps, composed of Ward's and DeTrobriand's 
 bi'igades of Birne\"s di\ isi(jn. Gen. Warren, chief engineer of 
 Meade's staff, rode to the crest of Little Round Top to view 
 the result of the great shock of Hood's attack, and at once dis- 
 covered that the left Hank of Ward's brigade was bound to be 
 turned, and the enemy's intentions were to possess themselves of 
 Little Round Top. which had no force in position to defend it.' 
 lie saw Barne^■ division of the 5th corps forming at the right 
 for a charge, and about to go to the relief of DeTrobriand. who 
 was being sorely pressed. He also saw the enemy making 
 straight for Little Round Top. the key to the whole battle 
 field, and no troops to defend it. Li an instant he grasped the 
 situation. Tf the enemy got possession the victory was theirs, 
 and the Union army would be compelled to abandon the field. 
 Gen. Warren v.lK-eled his horse and galloped over to Barnes' 
 di\i>ion, and hurriedly detached Gen. Strong Vincent's brigade 
 from Gen. Barne>' division, who went on double (juick to the 
 crest, none to soon, for the enemy was there in force; and not 
 having time to load, they gave the enemy the cold steel, and 
 forced them down the hill. But it was at a terrible sacrifice of 
 precious lives. \'incent soon found that he was confronted with 
 an overwhelming force, and called on Gen. Barnes for re-en- 
 forcements, who sent a battery and the one hundred and fortieth 
 Xew York regiment. This was the most hotly contested point 
 in the whole battle, or of anv on the continent. It was the turn- 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. l-lo 
 
 ing point of the day. If the Union rirmy was driven from this 
 point the result would be a defeat, if not a di-aster. to tlie Union 
 army. The Confederates saw the defenseless condition of this 
 commnading position, and started for it with a rush, and it 
 can truthfully be said that if ever Proxidence did intervene to 
 aid one anny. or prever.t the other from the deslrnetion of their 
 opponents, this is one of the instances where the theory 
 could be applied that the Allwise guided the hand that smote the 
 enemy and sa\-ed the Union army from defeat. Whetlicr it was 
 Providence that caused Gen. ^^'arren to gallop to the crest ^^f 
 Little Round Top at this time or not, his efforts on this occa- 
 sion made it possible to record the battle of Gettysburg — second 
 day — in history, as a Union \ictory. But the possession of these 
 wonderful slrategetical points was finally saved to the Union 
 army, at a great sacrifice of life. Generals \'incent and ^^'eede 
 both fell on the crest. The struggle on and around this strate- 
 gic point was desperate. The ground was fought over, back 
 and forward, and was very reluctantly al)andoned by the Con- 
 federates. T cannot refrain from going back o\er the ground 
 again to ask why the commander of the I/nion army, or some 
 one for him. did not see to it tliat these wonderful strategetical 
 points. Little aiid Big Round Tops, were not seized, fortified 
 and manned, either on the night of July ist. or early morning 
 of the .2nd. Here they were, separate mounds, standing about 
 one-half mile apart, tou-ering about three hundred feet above, 
 and commanding the surrounding country as far as artillery 
 could reach. General TTood, who commanded the division on 
 the right of Longstreet's corps, when he marched that division 
 south of«thc base of Big Round Top in order to strike the left 
 Rank of the .^rd corps. ntu>t have been surprised and highly 
 gratified' to find that batteries had not been placed by the L"^nion 
 
14(5 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 army on that high accessible lower that would sweep his division 
 from right to left Hank, and when he moved on a half mile fur- 
 ther and found Little Round Top not belching forth iron and 
 lead hail to the destruction of his command, he ordered the 
 right of his command to change front and pass to the rear of 
 AVard's brigade, which was on the left of the 3rd corps" line, 
 and capture Little Round Top, and this was the movement 
 Warren discovered that caused him to rush on double quick 
 the first bragade he came to on the crest of the mountain. 
 
 Since I began the narrative pertaining to the movement on 
 this flank of the army. I have wondered and asked why, the 
 necessity being so apparent to everybody, that these strategctical 
 ])oints were not seized by the Union army and fortified. To me 
 now it is plain. Meade protested against fighting here from 
 the start, and no one knew, until after the conference of the corps 
 commanders with Gen. Meade, at his headciuarters. whether the 
 battle, on the Union side, was to Ijc fought on the offensive 
 or defensive, or whether they would fight at Gettysburg at all. 
 But while this conference was taking place. Lee solved the 
 question by "bringing on the engagement on the left, a point, 
 unfortunately foj; the Union army, that had received no atten- 
 tion from Meade, and very little from any one else. But when 
 the enemy attacked, on July 3rd, the center of the Union lines 
 lie found Little and Big Round Tops fortified and covered with 
 plenty of artillery and troops. This artillery, although it was 
 long range, raked picket lines from right to left, and did much 
 to demoralize Wilcox and others that Pickett expected would 
 support his charge. We repeat, if the Round Tops had been 
 fortified and mounted with artillery the same the second day 
 when the enemy attacked that tlicy contained the third day, the 
 3rd corps would never have been driven from their position. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. H"; 
 
 Nor would anyone ever have heard anytliing about the weakness 
 of the position of ihe 3rd corps July 2nd, although Little 
 Round Top, the key to the situation when the battle began, 
 was not fortified, nor was there an armed man on it. And when 
 the Confederates made a dash for it and passed the left flank and 
 rear of Ward's brigade in large force, together with the heavy 
 force in his front, his position on his left became vulnerable, 
 that part of the 3rd corps line was gradually forced back, but not 
 until after the most desperate struggle by Ward and DeTro- 
 briand's brigades. Reinforcements were put into this breach 
 of two brigades of the 5th corps, and later two brigades of the 
 Second corps, but they were not able to stay the onset of the 
 overwhelming force Longstreet was able to throw into the 
 breach. They swung to the right, resting on the ridge to the 
 right of Little Round Top. By this time the 5th corps was in 
 line, their left resting on and rear of Little Round Top and ex- 
 tending along the ridge to the right, towards the cemetery, and 
 two brigades of the 6th corps came up and went into line to the 
 left of Little Round Top. Longstreet then gave up any further 
 attempts to break through at this point of the Union line. 
 but the entire line originally occupied by Birney's division of 
 the 3rd corps at the beginning of this battle, was abandoned, 
 because it had been so completely turned on its left fiank that 
 the position was untenable, but in addition to the loss of gen- 
 eral officers already mentioned in this struggle on the L'nion 
 side, was killed Cross and York; wounded. Sickles, from which 
 he lost his leg; and Gen. Graham severely, who was taken pris- 
 oner. The right of the 3rd corps, up to this time, composed of 
 the second division, commanded by Gen. Humphreys, had not 
 been actively engaged, and when Birney's division fell back 
 to the ridge east of the Emmetsburg road. Sickles, having been 
 wounded, left Birney in command of ihe 3rd corps. 
 
148 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Humphreys' division was still on the Emmetsbnrg road. At 
 this point the road runs southwest. The other division of the 
 3rd corps, now commanded by Gen. Hobart Ward, was resting 
 on the ridge in ihe rear, whose general direction was north 
 and south. This left the right of Ward's division about a mile 
 in rear of Ilumidircys' left, a position, if it had been attacked 
 from the left, could not have been maintained for one minute. 
 Birney ordered Humphreys to fall back in prolongation of 
 Ward's line. This clianging of front to the rear is a beauti- 
 ful movement in brigade, division or corps drill, but when it 
 comes to excculing it under a severe artillery and infantry Hank 
 and fron.t fire, coupled with the charge of Andersons division 
 in front and Barksdale's brigade of McLav/'s division on the 
 left llank, as ihcy were at this time, it is different, and reciuircs 
 the coolest veteran to successfully execute this beautiful mo\-e- 
 ment under such conditions. But tliis is just what did happen. 
 Humphreys' division coolly took up their position on the pro- 
 longation of the 3rd corps' nev,- line, and at the same time de- 
 livering stunning blows to their assailants. Three brigades of 
 Anderson's division. Wright, Wilcox, and Perry, immediately 
 followed up Htniiijhreys with a furious charge. Il will be re- 
 membered we haN'C stated in the foregoing pages that the forma- 
 tion of the two armies were such that a brigade of the Confed- 
 erate army was eqtial r.umerically to a division of the Union 
 arniy. and so on up and down through their organization. The 
 cause of this dilTerence in the organization (;f the army, and its 
 effect on the Tfnion army. I will discuss later. The three brig- 
 ades cf Anders(;n"s di\-ision that led in this charge were expect- 
 ing the stipport of tliree other brigades as soon as they became 
 engaged, but the supporting brigades, for some reason, failed to 
 come forwar<l. Anderson made a heroic charge. On and on 
 
THE r>ATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. ]40 
 
 they came. Wilcox on the right. Perry in the center and Wright 
 on the lefl. \\'rig-!rL struck the 2nd corps and actually broke 
 through the main line, capturing sevel'al pieces of artillery, and 
 turned them on the Union forces, who rallied their forces and 
 cliargcd back, recapturing: their lost guns, and drove the enemy 
 from the field. Perry, in the center, did not succeed as well. 
 The concentrated fire on his brigade was too much for him, 
 and he fell back before reaching the main line. This left 
 ^\'right and Wilcox brigade's flanks unprotected, and the con- 
 sequence was the innlading; fire was terrible, and they were 
 driven off. with great slaughter, v.h.ich v.ould liave been saved to 
 tliem if Posy. }.Iahone and Pender's brigades had followed up 
 in 'support of the charge as it !iad been arranged they should do. 
 Pi v/as a streak of good luck for the Union army that it hap- 
 pened so, for there is no knov.-ing where this powerful column 
 would have been cliecked. Tt is quite sure they v.-ould have 
 gone through the first line, and might have caused the Union 
 army to have retreated. This ended th.e battle on the Uni(jn 
 army's left for July 2nd. Perhaps I may |->e pardoned if I s:iv 
 something of my own personal experience the secon.d day cm 
 the left at the peach orchard. My regiment was the 57th Penn- 
 sylvania vols., and was in Graham's brigade. When the bri- 
 gade was forming to the right of the peach or- 
 chard, an order came to the regiment • to detail 
 fiileen picked men and send them to the front as skir- 
 mishers. Col. Sykes ordered me to fill th.e detail, which I did. 
 and placed the detail in charge of Lieut. Crosley. who imme- 
 duitely deployed the men an.d moved forward to a clump ot 
 1)ni!dings to th.e right of the pcacli orchard; and among the 
 buildings was a brick house. The l)uiklings were standing on 
 the \'.( -I <i(le of the Kmmetrsburg road. S(M">n the whole bri- 
 
ICO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 gade moved forward, and my regiment halted in the rear of the 
 buildings, where they were soon engaged with the enemy same 
 as the rest of Birney's division. When the enemy broke 
 through on our left, near Little Round Top, regiment after regi- 
 ment was doubled back from the left and passed in rear of us 
 and to the right on the Emmetsburg road. Nearly all the regi- 
 ments on our left had passed us, when I became very anxious 
 about the detail I had sent forward, and the last I saw of them 
 ihey were taking shelter, under a J-iot fire from the enemy, in the 
 brick house and out buildings. I walked up to the colonel, and, 
 pointing to the retreating regiment, said: "Tt looks as though 
 we will soon have to move out of here, or be captured." He 
 turned his head to the left, and seeing the regiments near us on 
 the left, going to the rear, said; "Yes, I think we will go now." 
 I remonstrated with lum. saying that many oi the regiment had 
 taken shelter in the buildings, and that we ought to make a detail 
 who would rush around to the several buildings, and warn the of- 
 ficers and men and the detail I had sent out as skirmishers, that 
 we were going to fall back, but he insisted on taking the regi- 
 ment out then, replying that I could stay and get as many out 
 as I could. I turned the company over to the second lieutenant. 
 and started on a run from one building to the other. The roar 
 of artillery and bursting of shells and musketry was such that it 
 was necessary to take hold of and shake a man to get his at- 
 tention. This made slow work, for one man. to get over the 
 ground. When I had made the rounds of the outbuildings 
 and got the men started to the rear. I then went to the main 
 building, and, looking down to the left and seeing that no ad- 
 vance was being made on our west front, thought the enemy 
 was far enough away so I could make a run through the house, 
 up-stairs and down, and get^a good many out before the enemy 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 151 
 
 would reach me. The entrance to the house was from the 
 north, into a hall that led upstairs. I ran up the stairs and 
 from one room to the other, and started them to the rear as 
 fast as I could get them to understand what I wanted of them. 
 I then started down stairs to notify those in the lower part of 
 the house. When I reached the hall, I thought I would look 
 down to the left, where the enemy first broke through our lines, 
 to see how far tiiey had progressed in my direction. I had al- 
 ways said I would never be taken prisoner as long as I could 
 fight or run. There was nothing I dreaded so much as to be 
 taken prisoner. But when I looked out, and there, horror of 
 horrors, the enemy was in the yard in large force not fifty feet 
 away. They saw me as soon as I did them, and ordered me to 
 surrender. I saw .at a glance that they were in a bunch, and 
 but few of them could shoot without endangering themselves. 
 So I thought I could run quartering past them, and possibly 
 escape. I took the chance, and made the dive past them, then 
 firing began. Either their aim was poor, or else I outran their 
 shots, for they never touched me. As each shot would whiz/ 
 past me it increased my efforts. There was some kind of a yard 
 fence around the buildings, how high I do not know; what I do 
 know is, that I did not touch it; nor did I ever make better 
 time on a railroad car than I did until I got out of range of these 
 gentlemen wlio were so anxious to introduce me to their 
 Southern friends. Of course, the soldiers I had started on 
 ahead had quite a long distance the start of me, but I soon over- 
 took them. While we were passing to our new lines in the 
 rear, we were in range of shells that were thrown by the Con- 
 federates at the Union soldiers who were forming their new 
 line, and the shot was traveling on the same line with our squad, 
 and what I want to call attention to. is that a man was killed 
 
152 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 by a shell that never touched him. It was this way. The men 
 that I had started ahead of me were following: up the rejziments 
 in an irregular form, and were men of many regiments who had 
 joined our squad, and shells were dropping in quite thick. At 
 this i)oint in particular one passed very close to me; so close 
 that there was not much room to spare between me and the 
 shell. A man in front I thought was in range, and feared it 
 would strike him square on the back of his head, but instead 
 it just missed him. but he dropped as dead and limp as though 
 his head had been cut ofif. T know he was not touched, for I 
 rolled him over, and there was no bruise on his head or face. 
 
 As I said when we started ofif on this chapter, that Gen. Lee 
 ordered the Union' lines to be attacked on br»»;h flanks at the 
 same time,, nine o'clock a. m. Longstrect's corps, which was 
 to strike the Union army on their left, was not able to deliver 
 the crushing blow until near four o'clock p. m.. nearly seven 
 hours later, but he was fully three hours ahead of Ewell. who 
 was ordered to attack the Union army on their right at the 
 same time. This proves what we said about Gettysburg being 
 a strong position on which to fight a battle on the defense, but 
 weak for ofifensive movements. The reason is. as before said, 
 that all roads from all cities, north, south, east and west, con- 
 verge at Gettysburg. All roads lead to this center, and none to 
 the flanks or around Gettysburg to the fianks of the army. 
 Longstrect's attack was near being successful, because the 
 Union army had made but little if any preparations on that 
 flank, and had neglected to occupy and fortify the key to the 
 whole battle field. Little and Big Round Tops. When Long- 
 street's furious attack had been repulsed, at every point, and all 
 sound quieting down at that llank, strange as it may seem. Gen. 
 Meade ordered Gen. Gearv. commanding a division of the T2th 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 153 
 
 corps, which was intrenched on the extreme right of the Union 
 army, to leave his intrenchments and report to Gen. Sykes, at 
 Little Round Top; and what is still more strange, Gen. Slocum, 
 commanding the 12th corps, to which Gen. Geary belonged, pro- 
 tested that the enemy in heavy column was advancing on his 
 corps, and begged to have Geary's division remain where it 
 was. But Meade would not yield, and Geary moved his division 
 out of his intrenched line, where he was needed, to Little Round 
 Top, where he was not wanted, while Ewell's corps was, as Slo- 
 cum had reported, moving into position to strike the Union line 
 on their extreme right. Johnson's division was swinging 
 around on the Confederates' extreme left for that purpose, and 
 attacked furiously about sundown. The Confederates were 
 defeated at every point where the Union men were in line, and 
 were driven back, but the trenches that Gen. Geary's di- 
 vision had been ordered to vacate were easily taken possession 
 of. This gave Johnson a strong, fortified position, not only 
 on the right flank of the Union army, but, on account of the 
 horseshoe shape of the Union line, they held a commanding po- 
 sition in their rear, and quite close to headquarters, where the 
 artillery, anmiunition and other trains were packed. Fortunately 
 for the Union army, darkness overtook the enemy, and they 
 were compelled to rest here until morning. The time this strug- 
 gle ended was nine p. m. This success of the enemy would 
 never have been if Meade had left Geary's division where 
 it was needed, instead of ordering it to a part of the field where 
 it was of no use, and it would not have been necessary for Gen. 
 Geary to have sacrificed the many precious lives he did the next 
 morning to get possession of his works, and drive Johnson oiit. 
 Soon after Johnson's attack on the Union right began, Early's 
 division composed of four brigades, one of hi? brigades, how- 
 
154 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 ever, that of Smith, was sent to support Johnson; but three, 
 those of Hayes, Hook and Gordon, supported by Rhodes and 
 Pender's divisions, began an attack on Cemetery hill. Before this 
 advance struck the Union lines, a vigorous artillery fire, by the 
 Confederates from Benner's hill was kept up for some time, 
 but this part of the Union lines had been fortified with great 
 care, so the Union men and artillery were well protected. And 
 when the Union guns opened in reply they soon silenced the 
 Confederates" guns. Then the enemy's infantry moved forward 
 and struck the position occupied by Von Gilsa's brigade on the 
 right and Anus' on the left. These brigades were posted at the 
 base of the hill behind stone fences. In their rear were posted 
 Rickett's and W'cidrick's batteries. On higher ground, further 
 to the rear still was Steware's, Reynold's and Stephen's batteries, 
 and as the enemy came in range all opened on the rebels' left 
 such a terrible fire that they fell back, but their right being shel- 
 tered by rough ground, came on and charged through Von 
 Gilsa's brigade infantry line, and captured some of their guns 
 in rear. Darkness favored the Confederates in this movement. 
 If the battery men could have seen to have kept the range of the 
 eneiny, they would have cleaned the ground, by use of double 
 canister, of c\ cry living Confederate. As it was, the battery men 
 stood by their guns and fought them as long as they were able 
 to fire, and v/hen the enemy rushed on so they could not load, 
 they fought hand to hand with rammers, hand spikes and 
 stones — anything they could lay their hands on. Re-enforce- 
 ments came from the 2nd corps; also from Gen. Shurz's di- 
 vision, who charged the victorious Confederates and drove them 
 down the hill pell mcll. This gave the artillery another oppor- 
 tunity to open a murderous fire on the retreating enemy, and 
 nothing but the smoke of battle, which settled down, and dark- 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 155 
 
 ness, saved this attacking column from total annihilation. As 
 it was the enemy on this front suffered great slaughter. As a 
 sample the Louisiana Tigers, on which the Confederates doted 
 (their name was expected to strike terror to the hearts of the 
 Yankees), went into this engagement with 1,750 men and came 
 out with only one hundred and fifty men, and, it is said, they 
 never attempted to organize this command again. This closed 
 the fighting for the second day, with the defeat of the Confed- 
 erates at every point. It is true Johnson had walked into some 
 of the Union vacant entrenchments and had the privilege of 
 resting in them over night, but he was isolated from the balance 
 of the Confederate army, and although Lee determined to re- 
 enforce him, he failed to do this in time to save him from defeat 
 in the morning, he being attacked at daylight by Geary's di- 
 vision, who returned that night. The reason Johnson was not 
 re-enforced in time to save his defeat by Geary in the morn- 
 ing, was the converging roads running into Gettysburg, making 
 it necessary for the Confederates to travel so far to reach him 
 that they were not able to get there in time. Then the Union 
 line being formed something in the shape of a horse shoe, or 
 fish hook, rather, gave them a short distance to travel to re- 
 enforce either fiank or center on short notice. On the night of 
 July 2nd a council of war was held at Meade's headquarters, and 
 the corps commanders voted unanimously to stay and fight it 
 out where they were. Meade reluctantly acquiesced in their de- 
 cision. He said this was no place to fight a battle. But here 
 was Johnson's division holding a position that was a dangerous 
 one to the Union army if he should be re-enforced in time. 
 Hence it was necessary to attack hirn early in the morning. For 
 that purpose batteries, as before stated, were placed at every 
 point, to rake his lines, that were possible. When Geary came 
 
156 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 up with his division about twelve o'clock that night he formed 
 his lines on the flank and front of Johnson. Then waited for 
 daylight to appear for the final attack. In the meantime Geary's 
 division was reinforced from other commands, which the short 
 distance from one fiank to the other enabled the Union army 
 to do rapidly without endangering any other part of their lines. 
 Gen. Early was determined to reinforce Johnson, and hold on 
 to the advantageous ground as a basis from which to rout the 
 Union army. And his best efforts failed, because he was not 
 able to reach Johnson in time with re-enforcements, but as soon 
 as the first ray of light made its appearance, the Union artillery 
 opened an enfilading nre on the Confederates. They did not 
 bring any artillery with them because of the roughness of the 
 country, and no highways over which they could transport it, 
 and where troops have no means of defense except musketry 
 it is hard to hold them very long under this kind of artillery 
 fire. In Johnson's case there was but one of two things to do. 
 Either charge the enemy in front and secure a better position, 
 or fall back to cover for his men. He chose the former and 
 ordered a charge, led by Stonewall Jackson's old brigade. They 
 met Kane's brigade, who had never permitted the enemy to 
 run over them. Here the contest was a most desperate one for 
 four hours on the rough ground, among the rocks and trees. 
 Finally the Union forces were working around on the enemy's 
 flank and rear, .vhich compelled Johnson to order his men to 
 fall back in time to save them from being taken prisoners. This 
 ended tLe fighting of infantry on the Union right and the Union 
 lines were coinpletely restored. This last fighting was wholly 
 caused by the great blunder of Meade in ordering Geary to leave 
 his entrenchments where he was needed, as before stated, and 
 where the enemy was known to be moving for an attack, and go 
 
THE BA.TTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 167 
 
 to a point where he was not needed. When the fighting on the 
 right had ceased, which was about ii a. ni., all was quiet, and 
 the men in the Union army were seeking rest in some reclining 
 position, and pretty generally drawing their rations of whiskey, 
 which had been ordered issued, and never were they more ap- 
 preciated. I was in command of my regiment, the 57th Pa. 
 Vols., by reason of being senior captain. The major was cap- 
 tured the day before, and the colonel being wounded in one of 
 his fingers after he left me at the brick house, and I did not see 
 him again in five months. I instructed the adjutant to send in 
 the report of the morning before, July 2nd. on which we would 
 draw whiskey rations. Although we had been reduced so we 
 did not have more than one-third of that number, I believed 
 it was right then, and have never changed my mind. Within 
 two hours of the issue of whiskey my brigade was required to 
 make a double quick march for a mile and a half or two miles 
 in the hot sun to the right to meet Pickett's charge, and we 
 accomplished it without a single straggler. With the men in 
 the vv'orn-out physical condition the 3rd corps was July 3rd, I am 
 sure they could not have accomplished that march on such good 
 time without this stimulant. T don't consider this any argu- 
 ment in favor of guzzling whiskey ordinarily, but to show how 
 an exhausted body of men can be stimulated to perform almost 
 superhuman acts, while the stimulant lasts. When we had made 
 this double quick march the whiskey was so well worked out of 
 the command, that they were in excellent trim for a charge. It 
 was a great disappointment to Gen. Lee and Gen. Ewell that 
 Johnson's division was driven out on the morning of the 3rd 
 from the trenches he had captured the night of July 2nd. If he 
 could have been re-enforced in time to hold his position and 
 had succeeded in it. there is not a doubt but what the Union 
 
J 58 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 army would have been defeated at Gettysburg. How disastrous 
 the defeat would have been no one can tell, for no one could 
 tell how many more such blunders Meade would have made. 
 The ordering of Geary out of his trenches by Meade at a time 
 when he knew, from the report of Slocum, one of the most 
 reliable officers in the army, that the enemy was near and about 
 to attack this point, it was at least childish and a pettish thing to 
 do, entirely unnecessary. The Sixth corps, one of the strongest 
 corps, was in reserve nearer to Little Round Top than Geary's 
 division. One of their divisions, or the whole corps for that 
 matter, could have been ordered to take the trenches. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 159 
 
 Diagram of the Attack on the Left Centre. July :i,l. 
 
CHAPTER IX, 
 
 Battle of the Third Day. Steward Tries to Secure a Position 
 to Rear of Union Lines. Was Defeated. Pickett's Charge 
 ond Defeat. Corps Commanders Desire to Make a Counter 
 Charge. ]\Ieade Not Inclined to Do It. 
 
 Geary had left and the great sacrifice of human life that 
 was made to regain the trenches would have been saved, to say 
 nothing of the chance of losing for ever a commanding position 
 that would force the Union army to abandon the field, or subject 
 themselves to a disastrous defeat and the only reason they were 
 not compelled to choose between these alternatives was there 
 were no direct roads, and the country was so rough that rein- 
 forcements could not reach Johnson in time to enable him tc 
 maintain his position. The driving of Johnson out of Geary's 
 tranches takes us up to eleven o'clock, July 3d. All the morning 
 the Confederates had worked industriously to move troops to 
 reinforce Johnson. At the same time Lee was planning and 
 organizing a storming column that w'ould strike the right center 
 of the Union army with great force, while at the same time 
 Johnson with his reinforced columns, as Lee expected, would 
 come forward with all his force to meet the storming column 
 in front. The result of this move could not be doubted. But 
 by the prowess of the rank and file of this noble band, the 
 grandest army on earth, who offered themselves a sacrifice that 
 the Union might live, this little plan was spoiled. Johnson was 
 not m position to aid h's Confederates. For this the thanks 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 161 
 
 of a reunited nation should be extended to the rank and file for 
 all time, but the Confederates' storming columns that were ex- 
 pected to strike the right center f the Union line had been 
 organized and taken their places for the onslaught. Now the 
 chances for their success had been materially lessened by t'.ie 
 defeat of Johnson. He was no longer in position to aid them. 
 The situation was being narrowed down on the part of the 
 Confederates to the alternatives of going forward with the 
 charge that had been planned, notwithstanding the changed 
 conditions, or to retreat on Richmond. If tic latter course should 
 be adopted the Confederate army and the whole Confederacy 
 would be humiliated beyond reparation. It was conceded by 
 the Confederate government that the fall of Vicksburg was 
 only a question of time, and unless Lee's invasion of the North- 
 ern states was a success, so as to counteract the fall or Vicks- 
 burg, that the credit of the Confederacy would be gone and all 
 foreign credit and sympathy would be destroyed. Thus Lee 
 was goaded on to almost desperation, and he determined to 
 make the charge of July 3d, 186:5. The judgment of his corps 
 commanders was opposed to any further offensive movements 
 on their part, but Lee was obdurate and would not yield. Pick- 
 ett's division was the only one In the Confederate army that 
 had not suffered to any great extent at this time. So they were 
 early in the day marshalled for the fray in the timber and broken 
 ground to the right of the Seminary, but with all their precau- 
 tion it was known that the Confederates were massing for some 
 purpose. The Union lines had been strengthened at every 
 'point. The two Rdund Tops had been entrenched and crowned 
 with as much artillery and men as could be used. Just a: they 
 should have been on the morning of July 2d. and Gen. Hunt 
 chief of artillery, ordered up as many gun- as could be placroiii. 
 
162 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 position to work to advantage, along the Union line, which was 
 eighty. The Confederates brought in line to oppose these one 
 hundred and fifteen guns. The reason the enemy could bring 
 more artillery into use was their line was much longer, on 
 account of its concave formation, while the Union line being 
 convex, made their line present a shorter front to face any given 
 point on the enemy's line. While the enemy could arrange 
 guns to bear on the Union front from any point on their lines, 
 the Union convex line in passing from right to left would turn 
 so much that it would soon take the guns out of range of the 
 Confederate center. The Union line was much more convex 
 than the Confederates was concave. The preparations for the 
 third day's struggle was going on up to near one o'clock p. m. 
 After Johnson had been driven out of the position he occupied 
 the night before it became necessary to supply his place in rear 
 of the Union line, if possible, with some Confederate force 
 that would be in position if Pickett's charge was successful in 
 breaking through the Union lines to charge from the rear, and 
 aid Pickett to maintain his position and strike a stunning blow 
 on the right flank of the Union army, where the breach had 
 been made by Pickett for this purpose. Stewart's cavalry was 
 hastily thrown in. hoping they would gain a position of ad- 
 vantage that would to a great extent compensate for the one 
 Johnson had been driven out of earlier in the day. Stewart went 
 forward and struck the Union cavalry commanded by Gen. Mc- 
 Gregg, at White's creek, where it crosses the Baltimore pike. 
 Here was fought one of the most desperate cavalry battles dur- 
 ing the war. There were charges and counter charges on each 
 side successively, of the most desperate nature. The indi- 
 vidual daring exhibited in this battle lias never been excelled in 
 any war. Stewart claimed if Pickett had succeeded he was in a 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 163 
 
 position to cut off the Union arm3's retreat. But wc don't 
 see how the army was in much danger from him if he was not 
 able to get away with Gregg's division of cavalry, aided only by 
 Custers brigade, for he was driven back. In the evening Stew- 
 art fell back to guard the left flank of Ewell's corps. This was 
 looked upon as the turning point of the war. All in the Union 
 army looked upon this as the turning point, and hoped to end 
 the war before the enemy could reach Virginia again. The 
 time came for the final test, the enemy had, it is claimed, seven- 
 teen thousand troops massed for this charge. Supported on 
 the left by Pettigrew commanding Heath's division, and Pend- 
 er's division and in rear of Pender was Wright's brigade. 
 Pickett was supported on his right by Wilcox's brigade and such 
 other support as Longstreet could send forward for that pur- 
 pose. It did not require much time for the Union army tn 
 form to meet the attack of the Confederates. Their lines were 
 so formed they could reinforce any point in less than one half 
 the time it would take the Confederates to reinforce theirs. 
 One o'clock p. m. was the time set to open fire by the Confed- 
 erates, and promptly at that time the first gun was fired. In 
 no time the whole one hundred and fifteen guns were paying 
 their respects to the Union army by dropping their bursting 
 shells among them in every direction. The eighty Union guns 
 immediately replied and soon ihc ground was being torn up and 
 fragments of shells was sweeping the ground in every direc- 
 tion. Gun carriages and limber boxes were knocked into 
 smithereens. Caisons filled with ammunition were blown up 
 in every direction, destroying every living thing near them. 
 Fully twelve of those monster amnnniition wagons were blown 
 up on the Unio" side and about as many more of the Confed- 
 erates, Each one would make the ground tremble something 
 
164 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 like an earthquake. For two long hours this terrible fire was 
 kept up without cessation. It really seemed much longer to 
 the troops that were supporting the artillery. No more trying 
 position can be found to place a soldier in than supporting bat- 
 teries when there is no enemy near, so they can use their own 
 guns. A duel of artillery so-called, like this, for two hours 
 renders a great many guns unserviceable. Some that had been 
 injured by some parts being broken by reason of their having 
 been struck with shots from the enemy's guns and all more or 
 less useless by heat, after two hours steady firing. General 
 Hunt, chief of artillery, ordered his men to cease firing and 
 immediately ordered all disabled guns out of line, and replaced 
 them with guns from the reserve that had not been in action, 
 and the whole line was then replaced with serviceable guns and 
 cartridges. This allowed the hot guns that had not been broken. 
 time to cool ofif. This stop deceived the Confederates. They 
 thought that they had so disabled the Union guns that they could 
 not be used any more and that their charging columns would 
 have an easy walk-over, until they came in range of the in- 
 fantry fire. We have stated that Gen. Longstreet was opposed 
 to fighting at Gettysburg an offensive battle. Alexander Steph- 
 ens, vice-president of the Confederacy, says in his history of the 
 War of Rebellion. "When the time came for the charge July 
 3rd, Picket waited for Longstreet's order to move. When the 
 signal gun was fired at headquarters for the column to start, 
 Pickett rode over to where Longstreet was and not getting 
 orders to start, said to Longstreet, T shall go forward, sir,' to 
 which he got no reply, but Pickett gave the order to move." 
 The distance the attacking column had to travel to reach the 
 Union line on the crest of Cemetery Ridge, was at least a mile 
 and a half. Most of that distance was an open plain. As soon 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 165 
 
 as the Confederate column cleared the timber on Seminary 
 Ridge, the Union artillery opened fire on them, first with solid 
 shot and then shell, and as soon as they came in range, with 
 double canister. The guns on Little Round Top did ex- 
 cellent service, raking the enemy's columns from right to left. 
 The enemy's guns were not idle all this time. As soon as the 
 Union batteries opened on Pickett's charging column, the Con- 
 federate guns opened on them. They had to be cautious about 
 their fire and kept out of range of their own columns, but the 
 Union batteries were tearing great gaps through Pickett's 
 charging columns which would immediately close up. Never 
 slackening their forward, headlong march but once, when the 
 head of their column was near the Emmetsburg road, they 
 coolly haulted and in spite of the canister shot that was plow- 
 ing great gaps through their columns, they changed front ob- 
 liquely to their left, then rushed forward. Their last course 
 brought them up against the 2nd corps, but it seems to us this 
 last move was a bad one, for two reasons, it separated Pickett's 
 column for a long distance from Wilcox's brigade, which did 
 not change to follow Pickett's movement, and permitted a bri- 
 gade of the 1st corps, they missed by this oblique movement, to 
 swing around on their right flank and rear and pour in volley 
 after volley in their closed columns, and exposed their right to 
 the fire of the ist corps as tiiey passed in range of them, so 
 that when they reached the 2nd corps they were too badly shat- 
 tered to make any serious impression upon that corps, but they 
 were desperate and pushed forward, even breaking through the 
 first line and General Armstead leading what was left of his bri- 
 gade, in a mad. crazy fit of desperation, took off his hat and 
 put it on the point of his sword, waved it in the air, shouted, 
 "Come on. give them the cold steel." and rushed up to and 
 
166 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 laid his hand on one of the Union guns, where he was shot 
 down, while this broken mass of men were desperate and rush- 
 ing headlong into certain death, the great mass in their rear 
 were being taken prisoners or scattered and retreating. Gen. 
 Armstead, it is said, fought on the Union side at the first battle 
 of Bull Run, but for some cause went over to the Confederates, 
 which he doubtless regretted afterwards, for in his death strug- 
 gle, he signalled .^ome one to come to him, and in a weak voice, 
 said, "Tell Hancock I have wronged him and wronged mv 
 country." When this charge of Pickett's was over and the 
 enemy was straggling to the rear demoralized, the officers of 
 Graham's brigade to which I belonged, was wondering if we 
 would be put in on a counter-charge. We knew we had run a 
 mile or more to our right, while Pickett's charge was going on 
 and saw other troops moving to the same point. We all knew 
 the 6th corps, one of the strongest in the army, had not been 
 engaged. If any man but Meade had been in command that 
 corps would have been placed in position as well as the 12th 
 corps, which was still strong, and in rear of ist and 2nd corps, 
 where Pickett's columns were steering for. This preparation 
 ought to have all been made when Pickett first developed his 
 movement. Gibbons sent an aide to Meade to notify him of Pick- 
 ett's advance, thinking probably that he would ride to the 
 front so as to be where he could direct his columns in a counter- 
 charge, for it seems that all the officers were expecting some- 
 thing of this kind. The Confederates, for two days in succes- 
 sion, had made desperate efforts to break the Union lines, and 
 if this, rhe third effort failed, it was expected every available 
 man would be massed to be ready for a counter-charge, which 
 would crush the enemy. Hancock was wounded and laying irf 
 an ambulance in rear, wrote a note to Meade urging him to 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 167 
 
 mass his forces and make a counter-charge before the enemy 
 had time to rally. All the officers knew that in the attacks 
 of the second and third day, that the enemy would exhaust 
 themselves so they could make but feeble resistance if a counter- 
 charge should be made by the Union army, but if the Union 
 army waited until the Confederates had time to reinforce their 
 shattered lines and dig trenches, the chances for success would 
 be materially diminished if not nearly impracticable. But Gen. 
 Meade did not make any arrangements for a counter-charge, 
 nor did he have any idea of such a movement. In fact he took 
 but little interest in the battle of Gettysburg from first to last. 
 His greatest effort was to prevent the battles being fought 
 there. When the artillery firing began July 3rd. his headquar- 
 ters were invaded by the enemy's shells, to the txtent that a 
 horse or two belonging to his aides were killed, and others 
 struck uncomfortably close. He then moved Headquarters over 
 with Gen. Slocum at Power's hill, and gave little, if any, personal 
 attention to the battle. It was unfortunate for the army that 
 a billions cholic or some other serious attack of sickness could 
 not have seized Meade on June 29th, so he would have been 
 compelled to have been taken to Washington and held there 
 in hospital until about the tenth or twelfth of July. If this 
 had happened and either Reynolds, Sickles. Sedgwick, Slocum. 
 Hancock, Pleasanton. or, in fact most any of the corps com- 
 manders, had taken his place, they would have moved the army 
 so they would all have been in supporting distance at Gettysburg 
 July 1st, which would have saved the ist corps from almost anni- 
 silation by an overwhelming force of the enemy on that day. So, 
 loo. would they in all probability have fortified Little and Big 
 Round Tops, and been prepared to fight a successful battle at 
 Gettysburg each day. and not one but what would have ordered a 
 
168 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 counter-charge July 3rd. Here is where some optimist will 
 say, "any one can criticise after it is all over, but very few, if 
 any can forsee the events that are to take place." and then re- 
 peat the trite saying of Henry Ward Beecher about his fore- 
 sight not being as perfect as his hind sight, etc., and when they 
 have said this think they have produced an argument which is 
 not susceptible of further discussion. But I want to say to 
 those gentlemen that all military movements, if the army has 
 a competent commander, are governed by perfect scientific prin- 
 ciples, among which are these: When an army is moved against 
 the enemy, the commander knows what the enemy must do to 
 counteract his movement and each watches the other, and having 
 well developed plans of battle in case a battle takes place. Every 
 general who is fit to command an army has well matured plans 
 of all great battles he engages in before the battle takes place. 
 Hooker's plan of the battle of Gettysburg was fully developed 
 long before the army crossed the Potomac. When ]\Ieade took 
 command his first acts were to obliterate all of Hooker's plans 
 as far as possible. One of Hooker's plans was to fight at 
 Gettysburg. This ]\Ieade determined should not be. although 
 he finally yielded to the judgment of his corps commanders, 
 for the reason he could not help it. the battle was on when l\e 
 arrived. He seemed to act like a stubborn child, as though 
 he did not care whether the battle turned out to be a defeat 
 or a victory. Corps commanders on the third day, when the 
 enemy's movements developed, advised the concentration of all 
 available troops on their right center, where it developed the 
 enmy would strike, for two reasons, first was. if the enemy 
 broke through the lines that had been formed to receive them, 
 that the concentrated forces would be at hand to crush their 
 shattered forces, and the second reason was that thev would 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 169 
 
 be at hand to n.akc a counter-charge. By all the rules of war- 
 fare this should have been done. Meade has said he intended 
 to attack the enemy on their right flank, with the 5th corp. 
 Doubleday says he does not beh'eve Meade intended to attack 
 the enemy on their right July 3rd. for he says he converged 
 with a corps commander the next morning, July 4th. who had 
 just left Gen. Meade, and he said Meade says he thinks he can 
 hold out here part of another day if the enemy attacks This 
 shows Meade to have been a very timid man, unfit to lead a 
 gallant army like that of the Potomac, to operate against a 
 brave, energetic strategist like Robert E. Lee. This was the 
 situation: the enemy had made two unsuccessful attacks on both 
 flanks of the Union army, and having met with great slaughter 
 and defeat, with net one division or brigade of their army but 
 what was badly crippled, while the Union army had three corps, 
 the 5th, 6th and 12, that were comparatively fresh. The 6th 
 had not been engaged, and the balance of the army although 
 they had fought desperate battles in the past three days, would 
 have rejoiced to have learned that the enemy was going to 
 make the third attack on Cemetery Ridge. Yet the commander 
 of that gallant army, looking across the valley or plain of a mile 
 and a half, at an enemy whose ranks had been broken, shat- 
 tered and discouraged. Not one of its divisions but what had 
 suffered great loss in the past three days. Some completely 
 disorganized. One can hardly bring themselves to believe that 
 the commander of this gallant Union army could be brought to 
 make the humiliating statement that if the enemy attacked he 
 might be able to hold on there for only a half day longer, and 
 yet the evidence is of such a reliable character that he did say 
 this, that we are compelled to give it credence, and his manage- 
 ment of the army later. prr^Pc he meant what he said. But his 
 
170 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 failure to profit hy the advice of his corps commanders, and pre- 
 pare to make the counter-charge on the third day was a mis- 
 take that permitted the enemy to fortify their shattered lines and 
 enable them to begin their retreat to Virginia, which they be- 
 gan as soon as their heavy train could be moved in that direc- 
 tion. When Pickett's charge failed, the officers of the Confed- 
 erate army were surprised that the Union army did not follow 
 Pickett's shattered columns up with a counter-charge. Hear 
 what they have to say: Gen. Longstreet says, "When Pickett's 
 charge failed I expected, of course, the enemy would throw 
 themselves agiinst our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I 
 sent my stafT officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, 
 and hurried to our line of batteries, as the only support I could 
 give them. I knew if the army was to be saved these batteries 
 must check the enemy. For unaccountable reasons the enemy 
 did not pursue his advantage." 
 
 Colonel Alexander, chief of Longstreet's artillery, says: "'I 
 have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest op- 
 portunity they ever had for routing Lee's army by a prompt of- 
 fensive—is it necessary now to add any statement as to the su- 
 periority of the federal forces or the exhausted and shattered 
 condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in 
 their very center to show that a great opportunity was thrown 
 away. I think General Lee himself was quite apprehensive that 
 the enemy would, and it was that apprehension whicli brought 
 him alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the in- 
 dications." 
 
 The above was a communication to the Southern historical 
 
 papers. 
 
 General Triumble who commanded a division of Hill's corps 
 which supported Pickett in his charge, says: "By all the rules 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 171 
 
 of warfare the federal troops should, (as I supposed they would), 
 liave marched against our shattered columns and sought to cover 
 oOT army with an overwhelming defeat." 
 
 Colonel Simms, who commanded a Georgia brigade, wrote in 
 a letter to General Crawford, of the Union army, as follows: 
 
 ■"There was much confusion in our army so far as my obser- 
 vation extended, and I think we would ha\e made but feeble 
 resistance if you had pressed on on the evening of the 3rd." 
 
 General Doubleday says: "General Meade, however, over- 
 come with the great responsibilities of his position, still clung 
 to the ridge and fearful of a possible disaster would not take the 
 risk of making an advance, and yet if he could have succeeded 
 in crushing Lee's army then and there, he would have saved 
 two years of war with its immense loss of life and countless 
 evils. He might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's corps. 
 ^vhich had not been actively engaged in the battle, for even if it 
 had been repulsed the blows it gave would leave the enemy 
 little inclination to again assail the heights. 
 
 It should have been known to Meade and probably was, 
 that the enemy's artillery cartridges were exhausted, and on ac- 
 count of the long distance it would have to be transported, and 
 reports that came to the Union army of the capture of convoys 
 of ammunition and when firing ceased on the Confederate side 
 they barely had twenty rounds of artillery cartridges left to each 
 gun, and there was a mile from Hill's right to Longstreet's left. 
 That there were no troops to fill their trenches and Longstreet 
 tells us that he knew if the Union army made a counter-charge 
 and the Confederate army was saved, it must be by the use oi 
 their artillery, which he went to arrange in the best position 
 for that purpose. How desperate must have been the situa- 
 tion of the Confederates. The general officers rushing from 
 
172 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 one point to another, encouraging their commands, trying to 
 arrange them in a position to make the best defense possible, 
 knowing it must be feeble if the Union army followed up their 
 advantage, but were happy when night put an end to the day's 
 carnage. The difference in the situation of the two armies 
 when Pickett's charge on the evening of July 3rd failed, the 
 Confederate officers from Gen. Lee down, were united that if 
 the Union army made a counter-charge and followed Pickett's 
 shattered command up closely that the result would prove dis- 
 astrous to the Confederates and they were aiding their com- 
 mander to try and avert the coming disaster to their army. 
 Whereas the Union under officers, were trying to urge upon 
 their commander the necessity of arranging a reserve to be ready 
 in case of Pickett's defeat, to go forward in a counter-charge. 
 But their advice was not heeded. Meade seemed to act as 
 though his army was the only one in danger and if he saved 
 them from annihilation by the Confederates and caused the 
 enemy to retreat back into Virginia, he had done all that was 
 required of him. At 6:30 o'clock p. m., firing on both sides 
 ceased and the battle of Gettysburg was practically ended. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Confederate Army Retreats To Virginia Soil With Very- 
 Little Inconvenience Caused By General ^Meade. 
 
 On the night of July 3rd, Lee sent for his trusted officers, 
 and, as one of them writes to the southern historical journal 
 (copied into Stephens' history), they arrived at headquarters 
 some time in advance of their chief, and when he rode up he 
 dismounted and without saying a word leaned over, placing 
 his arms over his horse's neck and his head resting on his arms, 
 remained in that position, it seemed, half an hour. No one 
 spoke, the reverence which they held for their chief prevented 
 any con\'crsation on their part. After the lapse of this time, 
 he lifted his head and said: "It is all my fault, no one is to 
 blame for this defeat but myself. We have got to retreat, go 
 back to Virginia." Me then gave orders for each one to execute, 
 etc. Lee's anxiety seemed to be how he was going to get his 
 army back into Virginia with their long train of wagons, which 
 would stretch out over thirty miles. This was a problem no 
 one could solve. Meade held the key to the situation, and re- 
 solved to use ii with such due decorum as would enable 
 Lee to get back into Virginia with the least inconvenience to 
 himself and his army. On the 4th of July, the Confederates 
 began their retreat, preceded by a large portion of their train. 
 The outposts reported the Confederates were retreating. It 
 was hard to make Meade believe this. He thought it was a 
 trick Lee was playino; to draw him out, a trap set. He sent 
 
174 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 
 
 the cavalry out to ascertain where the enemy was. General 
 Birney, of the 3rd corps, advanced a reconnoitering party, who 
 found the enemy moving in the direction of Fairfield, to all 
 appearance in a big hurry and retreating. Birney's advance 
 opened fire on them with a battery, but Meade checked this ad- 
 vance and cautioned them that on no account to bring on an 
 engagement. When this reconnoitering party returned, as they 
 were ordered, we talked with some of the ollicers and they were 
 indignant to think they were not permitted to pursue the enemy. 
 Meade ordered the ca\alry to follow in the direction of Fred- 
 erick. It got on the llank of the retreating army and dashed in 
 at different passes in South Mountain cutout and destroyed 
 large blocks of the ^.nemy\< train on the 5lh of July. It was 
 known to a certainty that tlie enemy had left their lines of en- 
 trenchments in front of the Unicjn army and was in full retreat. 
 General Meade ordered Sedgwick, of the 6th corps, to follow the 
 enemy up. No other corps was ordered to move. The 6th 
 corps came up with the rear guard of the enemy at Fairfield 
 Pass July 6th. This column of the enemy was commanded by 
 General Early. He was in great trouble trying to get his 
 train out of the mud, which was badly tangled up. Sedgwick 
 started a harmless artillery fusilade which was kept up for some 
 time. He then retired and reported that the position was too 
 -Strong to be carried. 
 
 Gen. Doubleday thinks differently. He thinks Sedgwick 
 ought to have attacked Early and the whole army should have 
 been brought up, that this pass was two miles wide and if Lee 
 had turned back and formed line to prevent Meade's progress 
 against Early it would leave his wagon train more exposed, and 
 the Union cavalry reinforced by the troops that marched out 
 from Washington and Baltimore, could have annihilated Lee's 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 175 
 
 train, and on account of a great rise in the Potomac and Lee's 
 pontoons having been destroyed, could ha\e intercepted tlie 
 enemy's convoy of artillery cartridges and with reinforcements 
 that were near could and doubtless would have destroyed the 
 Confederate army. He expected help frum militia that were 
 forming in Pennsylvania. 
 
 Doubleday's ideas and reasoning was all right, but his plans 
 were based upon the supposition that the Uniun army would 
 be commanded by a dashing, daring generl, who would take ad- 
 vantage of all th.e conditions that were favorable for the Union 
 army. But General Meade was not that kind of a general. 
 His whole career, from the time he took command of the army 
 until Lee surrendered, is proof against probable success, and that 
 }>Ieade could not be relied upon to make an active, brilliant 
 campaign; his opportunities were many while he commanded 
 the army, but in no instance did he take advantage of a single 
 one whereby he could, had he been a brilliant army com- 
 mander, have destroyed Lee's Confederate organization. Time 
 and the results of the campaign go to pro\e that if Meade 
 had followed the campaign Hooker had planned, Lee'.- army 
 would never have reached Virginia. But in order to please 
 Halleck, his first official act was to change Hooker's plans as 
 far as he could with the acquiesence of his corps commanders 
 and stafT. By doing this he failed to ha\e his army massed at 
 Gettysburg, on or before July ist, in early morning, result, for 
 want of proper support the first corps was so badly cut up as to 
 nearly ruin it, and the nth corps was badly crippled for the 
 same reason. These two infantry corps and Gen. Buford's 
 division of cavalry were compelled to fight, unaided, four times 
 their numbcT. It is true this small command by their un- 
 exampled valor, held this overwhelming enemy, unaided, from 
 
176 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 nine o'clock a. m. until near six p. m.. when they were rein- 
 forced by the arrival of the 3rd and 12th coros. The result 
 of this day's battle was that this small Union force by their in- 
 domitable prowess saved Cemetery Ridge, which has gone 
 down in history as the ground on which was fought the second 
 and third days' battle of Gettysburg. But the usefulness of 
 those corps had been too much impaired by reason of their not 
 having been supported in time the first day, and of course, af- 
 fected materially the result of the three days' battle and all be- 
 cause Meade was determined to so change Hooker's plans that 
 the battle would not be fought at Gettysburg, and as a further 
 result of Meade's determination to change Hooker's plan of 
 battle which worked adversely to the final success of the Union 
 army was his ordering the force which Hooker had placed in 
 the Cumberland Valley, to vacate that position. This accord- 
 ing to an old trite saying left the enemy a clear and unencum- 
 bered highway by which they did, after their defeat, fold their 
 tents and quietly steal away behind their entrenched camps into 
 Virginiaj with little or no opposition, also left those great high- 
 ways open by which they were enabled .to replenish their much 
 needed and exhausted supply of artillery cartridges. It will be 
 remembered that after the third day's battle the enemy only 
 had twenty rounds of artillery ammunition left for each gun. 
 which, if their source of supply was cut ofif would soon be ex- 
 hausted and they would then be in a helpless condition. But it 
 now stood this way, the avenue was left open and when the 
 enemy retreated he was left to pursue his course comparatively 
 peacefully, and soon met his artillery cartridge convoys, from 
 which a full supply was obtained. This was the direct result of 
 changing Hooker's plans which made the enemy's escape into 
 Virginia possible. About noon Saturday, July 4th. it began to 
 
THE BA.TTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 177 
 
 rai 1, in fact it poured and continued until late, or near Sunday 
 morning, July 5tli. TIk country here is mostly clay loam, and 
 as soon as the army hegan to move artillery and heavy wagons, 
 horses and troops, the mud was worked to a fearful depth and 
 it is a wonder the enemy ever got through with their thirty 
 miles of wagon train, and if they h;id heui hurried they could 
 never have made it. On July 7th, the SJlh. i F4th and 141st Penn- 
 sylvania regiments were temporarily consolidated by order of 
 General Hobart Ward, commanding the division. By this order I 
 was placed in coriimand of the three regiments. This was done 
 because the three regiments had become so used up in battle 
 the second da}- that it was thought best to consolidate them in 
 order to make a respectable appearing command. The regi- 
 ments went into action July 2d. with from ^~s ^<^ 500 guns each. 
 My recollection is when they were united. July 7th, the whole 
 command could not muster but 375 guns, and not a field officer 
 left in either regiment. This consolidation did not last more 
 than a week or ten days, or until the sick and wounded officers 
 and men returned to their commands. T(j that extent so each 
 regiment was again enabled to assume their separate regimental 
 duties on Tuesday, July 7th. The whole Union army was in 
 motion, very slowly following up the Confederates. Our fol- 
 lowing was not in rear urging the enemy out (^f the country, 
 but was a parallel movement at a respectful distance on the east 
 side of South Mountain. The Confederates were on the west 
 side, 15 or 20 miles apart on parallel lines. The Confederates' 
 objective point was Williamsport. and Falling Waters, where 
 they expected to cross the Potomac river into \'irginia. To 
 reach this point they would have to march about forty-five miles 
 to reach Falling Waters, or forty miles to reach Williamsport. 
 On Tuesday. July 7th. the main body of the Confederate army 
 
378 THB BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 was at Hagerstown. five miles from Williamsport, or ten miles 
 from Falling Waters, but here their trouble began. The river 
 had raised so as to overflow its banks and General French, 
 whose division had been stationed at Frederick, sent out an 
 expedition to Williamsport and Falling Waters, that destroyed 
 all the enemy's pontoon bridges. They were in a bad condition 
 if an active enemy had been pushing them, but the Confederates 
 began cutting timber for a bridge, replenished their artillery 
 cartridges and built strong earthworks from Williamsport to a 
 point five miles below Falling Waters, where the right of their 
 army rested and in one of the strongest natural positions that 
 could have been selected. I don't believe they could have been 
 driven from it if a determined resistence had been made by foin* 
 times their number. The time had passed for the Union army 
 to strike a crushing IjIqw in thi^ campaign. If, as General 
 Doubleday says, the Union army had followed up and attacked 
 vigorousl3' Sunday. July 5th. or Monday, the 6th, while the 
 enemy was on the move, their artillery cartridges nearly ex- 
 hausted, a long wagon train to look after and get through the 
 mud, there is very little doubt but. what the Union army would 
 have gained a great victory, possibly the destruction of the 
 Confederate army would have followed, and quite probably il 
 the troops at Washington, Baltimore and Harpers' Ferry had 
 co-operated, but what is the use in speculating in what would 
 be the result, wdiile General George G. Meade commanded the 
 army. The press and even the president became restless, and 
 the president ordered Meade to attack. But when the Union 
 army finally started in pursuit it took a route 25 or 30 miles 
 farther than the Confederates had to travel to reach their cross- 
 in-. So when the Union army started to follow- the Confed- 
 -erates up July 7th, they were 65 or 70 miles from Williamsport. 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 179 
 
 or Falling WatcM's, the point at which the Confederates must 
 cross into Virginia. While the Confederates were only ten 
 miles from their crossing. The Union army, after marching five 
 days, came up with the Confederates in their entrenched camp 
 around Falling Waters and Wiliamsport, Sunday, July 12. The 
 rank and file of the Union army expected, and desired to at- 
 tack the enemy immediately, but the day was used up in get- 
 ting into position. The next day. }>Ionday, July 13th, was set 
 lor the attack. .\I1 day was spent in reconnoitering and getting 
 into position. The next morning was set as a sure thing. The 
 3rd corps was on the left of the army, below Falling Waters, 
 and closed up to the enemy's works in easy range of their rifles, 
 on open ground. No guns were fired. Tuesday morning. 
 July 14th, all were up and had breakfast over by daylight and 
 were anxiously waiting for the general order, forward. Soon 
 after sunrise skirmishing began on our right, which did not 
 last long. Then came a cheer from tjie skirmishers. \\'e 
 knew the cheer came from Union men and hoped that the Con- 
 federates had surrendered, and while we were thus speculating, 
 the news came down the line to us that the enemy had com- 
 l)leted the construction of their bridge on the slight of Monday. 
 July 13th and all had succeeded in getting across the river safe 
 on Virginia soil, except about fifteen hundred, the rear guard. 
 who had been captured. This was sad news to the rank and 
 hie of the Union army. \^ery few were disposed to boast of 
 their victory at Gettysburg. They had hoped to end the war in 
 Pennsylvania. It is hard now to find language at this late day 
 to express the disappointment of the rank and file of the Union 
 army at the result of this campaign. They were as sanguine of 
 their success in this campaign as their commander. Gen. Hooker. 
 v;-.s. They knew the two last days' fighting at Gettysburg had 
 
180 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 been very disastrous to the Confederate army, and as a result the 
 Confederate organization had been greatly weakened, and should 
 have been destroyed before they could again have reached Vir- 
 ginia, and wondered why it was not done. All were hopeful 
 this would be the final result, until the Confederates finally 
 crossed the Pctomac river on the night of July 13. Then did 
 the rank and tile of the Union army realize for the first time 
 since the battle began that a great victory had slipped from 
 them through the timidity, over-cautious incompetency of their 
 present commander. Lee had out-generaled Meade and got 
 away. There was nothing left for the Union -army to do but 
 move on a parallel line to the Confederates and protect Wash- 
 ington. They were soon in motion; slowly but sadly they wended 
 their way to Harper's Ferry, where they crossed into Virginia. 
 It was more like a funeral procession than the proud army 
 that marched into Pennsylvania and fought one of the most 
 desperate battles that was ever fought on this continent. All 
 realized that their new commander was too timid and for the 
 balance of the year the army settled down to the humiliat^fig 
 position of an army of observation, but Halleck_ and the ad- 
 ministration seemed to be perfectly satisfied with Meade as a 
 commander of the army of the Potomac. Probably for the 
 reason that he was not liable to become brilliant enough to be 
 a dangerous rival to either. 
 
 General F. W. Pelfry, who wrote for Scribners' Sons, one of 
 a series of pubhcations known as Antietam and Fredericksburg^ 
 has this to say of the army of the Potomac: "It would be too 
 much to say that there are no sadder stories in military history 
 than that of the army of the Potomac, but its story is sad 
 enough, always better than its commanders, always ready to 
 stand in the evil hour and having done all, to stand. It marched 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 181 
 
 and fought, and hungered and thirsted for four long years, 
 hardly ever animated by viclory. It showed in all it endured 
 and achieved that it was an admirable instrument for the hand 
 that knew how lo wield it. but it never had the good fortune 
 to be commanded by a soldier who was worthy of it. It fought 
 through to the end. It did its work and gained its crown, but 
 its path was long and rough and seldom cheered, and one of its 
 saddest and sharpest experiences was its brave, hopeless effort 
 at Fredericksburg." 
 
 The above wc most heartily endorse, except in one instance, 
 and one paragraph. That one instance is in relation to the com- 
 mander of the army ot the Potomac. It once had a commander 
 who was worth}' of it. and that one instance was in General 
 Joseph Hooker. General Pelfry did not know how Hooker 
 was handicapped while he had command of the army, for all 
 the facts had not come to light when he wrote the foregoing, 
 for if they had I am sure he had the courage and independence 
 to have given that gallant commander credit for his masterly 
 cftorts of the battle of Chancellorsville, the truth of which 
 has never been written nor was it known to Comrade Pelfry 
 that Hooker was about to cross the Rappahannock and crush 
 Hill, whose nearest support was thirty miles away, but was 
 stopped by the president and Halleck. Nor did he know when 
 the foregoing was written by him. that the troops of Dix, Hint- 
 zleman, Schenk and the Middle department had been assigned 
 to Hooker's commancT by order of the president, and when tlic 
 time came that Hooker could use some of these troops to crush 
 the Confederate army then in Pennsylvania, he issued the order 
 placing them in line on the eve of a great battle. Halleck 
 seated in his comfortable ofilice in \\'ashington, countermanded 
 the order and was backed up and sustained by the president, and 
 
182 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 on account of successive rebuffs. General Hooker was driven 
 from his command. If Comrade Pelfry could have seen Hook- 
 er's order to Howard, of Hooker to Sedgwick. If he had 
 possessed the knowledge of the fact that Meade, in command 
 of 37,000 fresh troops, refused a request from General Sickles 
 for reinforcements, Hooker being at this time paralyzed by 
 the explosion of a shell. This and Sedgwick's unnecessary rc- 
 crossing the river, if we believe Gen. Howe, one of his division 
 commanders, who said it was unnecessary. All this makes a 
 different story. We thank General Pelfry for his kind and 
 truthful words for the army of the Potomac, and hope he and 
 all other writers of the War of Rebellion will hereafter do justice 
 to their grand old commander, Gen. Joseph Hooker, who was 
 the victim of a most wicked and powerful conspiracy. The sad- 
 dest misfortune of the army was when he was relieved from the 
 command. Pie was a strategist, more than a match for General 
 Lee. His being removed and Meade substituted, compelled the 
 army of the Potomac to wear the enemy out by main strength 
 in spite of the incompetent commanders who were placed over 
 them. No army ever accomplished as much under such ad- 
 verse conditions, a grateful people should never fail to recog- 
 nize this primafacie fact and try even at this late day to do those 
 noble heroes the justice and give them the credit for crushing; 
 the greatest, best organized rebellion the world ever knew, in- 
 stead of lavishing all the praise for this work upon incompetent 
 commanders who happened to be placed Over them. Let merit 
 not rank, be the basis for our gratitude in the future. W^ill the 
 time ever come? God knows, I hope so. 
 
 The killed and wounded in the battle of Gettysburg, taken, 
 from Alexander Stephens' history, which, we think, is nearly- 
 correct, is as follows: 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSHURG. 18.1 
 
 ConfcdcraUs. Union. 
 
 ^''■^'^^ 5.00O 2,834 
 
 Wounded ,3 000 13,523 
 
 hissing 8,000 6,643 
 
 Total 
 
 36.000 23.000 
 
^K 
 
 <7^m \i- 
 
 '■*^^:;:^ 
 
 '^yt^ 
 
 % 
 
 .ri^ 
 
 ^^^^^^^^^^■^^ 
 
 ^^'