{f Q- yxy /-/^^ Oj-^i^s- ,A ^jLy^y your Coamittee, ua beirg t!io first conflict of tbe national troopa A^ith armed treason upon the field of lati'e; und also bttcause <]io troops there enj,'v;f!ed formed ilio nucleus nrounil vrl icli baa einco been c> Heeled the vase and map;uiGcent Array of the Potoninc. The result of theii investigatiou yonr ConiinitteoEubn;it in a sepaiato report. Your Comn ttee have also investigated the disaster at Bal's 13!nir, that battle being the first coufiict of any extent iu which any of lie troops of the army of the Potomac v;ero engaged after its re-organiza- tion. A separate report of that disaster id also 6ub- fflitted. Immediately upon the organization of your Com- mittee, and before proceeding to the taking of any testimony, they adtlressed to Gen. McClelLn, who, by the retirement of Gen. Scott, bad become Gen- eral-in-Chief of the Army, the following commvmi- cation : " Washtsgton. D. C, Dec 21, 1861. "Sik: Ton nroawaro thit a Jotr.t Coilimittfo liaj been ap- pointed b; the fcenalu t^r.d House , of ISpprcseLitatiTes to in- quire into tlio ' coLiiuct of tie wp.r.» Our CnoLiuuce, st a meetin,' hnlj tliis m irnirg, nn3tuniiusly ixpTctsiJu drsire, before rfr tlio troopj to corapoBo tiieir commands, to rely upon the c jutinued patrioti-m of the people, and the z^A oftlio Execu- tives of the various States for the r^iiiing of thooe regiments which would enable tiaem to dejart for tho fields of duty a°3igned to them. No coLtidera- tion was for a niomeuc allowed to diminirh or ir'ipair the eCicicucy of tho Army of tho P( i , : iho uncx:mip!fcdepectaclo wi.aprefe:j:ed I as, who were intently watching tho cou: an this country, of tho 1 irj-'est army of thu p.-tso;/. cen- tury heing raised entirely by Tolautary eiilistmenta in the brief period of a few months. When Ccngreso assembled Ja this city, in the be- ginning of December, ISGlj 60 Buccesslul had been tlie exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their eountrs 's call, that tbo consoliaatcd mortiiag reports, furnished your Com- mittee by the Adjutant General of the army, show- ed that, exclusive of the command of Gen. Dix, at Baltimore, the Army of tho Potomac conaisied of about 185,000 men. Durii;g the time this large army had been collect- ina and organizing, nothing of importance h;id trans- pired in connection ^Yith it, excojjt tho closing of tho navigation of tho Potomac by the Kebels, which your Committee treat of more at length in another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluir, which is made the sahjcct of a separate report. The weather during the Fall season, and for soma weeks af^er tho c mveniug of Coni-ress, continued nnusuaUy favorable for active miliury operation*. As month after mouth passed without auythiog being done by the Army of' the Potomac, the pcopia became more and mora anxious for the annojnc<:ment that tho work of preparation had been completed and active operatioLS would toon bo commenced. From the lestimoay before your Commiltco it ap- peared that the Army of tho Potomao was well armed UT'.d cqiiippeJ, and had reached a high etato of discipline l>ytl;ol^st of September or tuo first of October. _Tho men were r.>adyaad ca'jer to com- mence active operations. The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed to goinij into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they bad no expectation of doing so. COnPS ORGAXIZATIOX. In reference to tho proper or -nr.:::ution of eo largv an army os that about V. . ' .: it might 1)0 tho better able ' .in tho field, the testimony ' __;:cd upon that point 'n remaiLa^ly uinuiuiouo. The generals mo^t familiar with tho eubj ct seemed to regard of the utmost importance tho division of tho army into CL»r;73 a''7rni^c', aaJ that, too, iu timo for the instruction of t'.o trr>"p3 in l';j r.:ovcrucnt« necessary to rendir i ' * "St efibctive. Your C ly necessary tliat they : . c. to the attention of tLo . i* immediate adoption with ir power. Tho Pretident c. .» > •. \.ax concurred with them in tho i : eu:h a measure; but it did notf'tn ' -! with muoli favor by Ckn. ;' '.n- ilcCIc.lan bt.atcd to your ■ ■ of their conference wiia Li !it atBoaetiii,o bocxpedie:it tu a.v.^.^' to army corps, tho Eui'iect wcs ono of i y. lio Kiid It was adcUc::te matter to «, , ...-j^rw generals bofcro they bad been tried by acvoal service, ana Dad ahowu tlicir fiioeu to ba selected to command 30,000 or 40,000 men. A major-gcaera,! could not be etowed away ia a pigeou-bole, if ha bhoalJ prove incompe- tent, 60 easily as a bii;jadier-g8a8ral. He proposed, therefore, to himself, maniige ihia entire army in some battle or campaij^n, ami then eelect froai the brigadiar-^eaera'.s ia it such as prove thtitnselves competent for bighcr commiiids. Consequently, the division of the r.rmy into army corps was uot even begun until after tiie iuovem:nt of the army in March had coainiencad, and then only iu parsuanco of the tLu-ecfc and repeated order.? of the President. Oen. McCl3llan,*LoT?evor, continued to oppose the organization of the army iato army corps, as 'i-vfiil be eefcn froaa the following diapacch to him "iiiom. the Secretary of War, datea 3Iay 9, 1352: ■Ji •'■xhel'rendeiitiaunv^aiiogto hav3 the army corpa organ- ization broken iiu, bue alBo uiiwiUiQg that tae commanaicg general Bhall bo'tiamiceledand embanaaBed ia actual skir- aiisbing, collision VfitU the enemy, auioa the eve of an ex- pected great buttle. Von, tlioret'ore, may temporarily suspend thatorsaoizaUon in tiio army under your immediate com- mand, aid adopt any you Boa lit, until further orders. He alao writeayoapriviite.y." . The provisional corps of Gen. Fitz-John Porter and Gen. Pranklin Wcra thereupon formed l)y re- ducing the other corps from three to two UiviBions. I STRENGTH OP THE ENEMY. Your Committee endeavored to obtain as accurate intormatioa as possible iu relation to the strength and position of laa enemy iu front of Washington. The testimony of the olhcera in our army here upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Eaily in December an order had been issued fiom lieadquarlers prohibitiuj? the commanders in the front irom examining any persona wiio should come into our lines fiom tne direction of the enemy, but «U Buch persons were to be sent, without examina- tion, to tne headquai-ters of the army. liestrictions •were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the Generals examined appeared to be akaost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only euch informa- tion as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon in- formation received at headquarters. A3 to the etreagth of the enemy's position, the general im- pression Beemed to be founded upon information ob- tained from the same source, that it was exceedingly formidable. Sa'osequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even tbe lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their foniiica- t (ioDB very greatly overestimated. I DEFENSES OP WASHINGTON. ' Tour Committoo also sought to ascertain what Dumber of men could be spared from this army for offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the enemy iu front were of each a charac- ter that it would not be advisable to move directly upon thsm. The estimate of the force neceBsary to be left in and around Washington to act entii'ely on the defensive, to render tiie capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses esarained upon ibat point, was from'50,000 to 80,000 snen, lea\'ing 100,03^) or upward that coiild bo used ■for expeditions at other points. In conneDlion with the same subject, your Com- mittee inquired in reference to wliat had been done to render the lortihcatWna hero, which had been constructed at such expenso and \yith bo great labor, most efiective for the defense of W'asliington. Your Committse are constrained to eay that adequate provisioA never was made to properly man ihcsa fortihcatioas and exercise men iu the inana.iirement of the guns. Several of the witnesses te'Jtiiied that they bad repeatedly called tiie attention of the authorities to the matter, but wilhoui success. And ■when the movemi;nt of the army commenced in March, the few rrgimcnto that had been placed in the forts and partituiy instructed in tho nso of the guns, were almost entirely withdrawn, leaving tho fortificatiouB to be manned by raw auil inexpetieaced troops. THE BLOCKADE OP THE POTOMAC. The subject of tho obstruction of the navigation of the Potomacnaturally demanded tho considera- tion of your Committee, Upon that poiut your Committee would call tae attention of Congress to the testimony of Caot. G. V. Fox, Assistaut Secre- tary of the Kavy. Upoa reference to bis testimony, it will appear that, ia Juae, 1361, the Navy Di. part^ ment propos d to the War Department that meas- ures bo adopted to tako posBcssion of Matthias Point, in ord-^r to eecuie the navigation of the Po- tomac from any danger of being iui eiropted. From Bomo cause, no etepa were then taken for that pur- pose. The eubjtct was again brougbt to the atten- tion of the War Department by the Navy Depart- ment in the mouth of August, shorily after the bat- tle of Bidl liun. Nothing, however, was done at that time in regard to it. In October, ISGl, the Navy Department again urged the mutter upon the consideration of tho War Department. The Port lioyal expedition was then in preparation, and would eoou be ready to start. The Navy Department represented that it would be absolutely necessary to send with that expedition, in order to insure its success, the greater portion of the Potomac ilotilla, because, being very powerful vessels, of light draught, with their machinery pro- tected, they were better fitted for that eervice than any other voasels in the possession of the Navy Department; and if anything was to ba done by them to eecure the uninterrupted navigation of the Potomac, it must be done before thsy lef t. It waa proposed to the Pre;.ident and the War Department that the jjunboats should take and destroy the liebel butteries'which had then begun to make their ap- pearance upon the river, and which even then en- dangered the safety of vessels passing up and down \the Potomac. Wuen that bad beeu done, it waa proposed that a sufficient number of troops should be landed at Matthias Poiut, &c., to intrench them- Belves, under tlie proteition of the gunboats, until they shoula be able, with the assistance of the smaller boats of the Potomac flotilla, to hold their position against any force the enemy would be likely to brmg against them. It was represented thai unless some such steps were taken the departure of those vessels upon the Port Royal expedition would be the signal for the closing of the nav.gation of the Potomac, which representation the result proved to ba correct. As waa well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army cooperate with the navy in eecuring the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed. WHY IT WAS NOT RAISED. After repeated efforts. Gen. McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. The Navy Department provided the necessary transports for the troops, and Capt. Cravon, commanding the Potomac flotilla, upon beiag notified to that effect, collected^ at Matthias Point all the boats of his flotula at the time named. The troops did npt arrive, and the Navy Department waa informed of the fact by Capt. Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of Gen. McCleLlau why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, waa informed by hiia lUat his ensmeera were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be lauded, and tberefore he had'concludel not to send them. Capt. Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge; that they bad provided the necessary means to accomplish the laud- mg Baccossfally ; that no inquiry had been mado of them ia regard to that matter, and no notihcation that tho troops were not to be sent. It was th'- a agreed that (he troops should be sent the next night. Capt. Craven was again notified. and again bod liis flotilla in rendinesa for the arrival of the troops. But uo troopn wcro sent dowu ut that timo, uor wcro any over ueut down fur that purpoBu. (Jiii-t. Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the Com- mitluo as to wtiut reatou w;.3 useiL^ccd lor not eeud- in^t tie troops :iccordiu;f to llie BcciniduyreiMUfci-.t, re- plied tba'i tLo only re.iuon, bo lar ha Lo could uhccr- tuin, 'was, that (jcu.McCleliau loared it uu^ilit briue on a geucriil cngagenieut. TLe rrcsidout, who Lad milted with the Navy De- partoitut in urgin;^ their propohiiioti, lirot npou Gen. 8coit and thiii upon Gcu. ALcCKllati, uiuuifested frcat dibuppoiutmcut wkcu ho h^arucd that tlio \-\,xa ad failed in coaBfequeQco ol tho trou^ti not being sent. And Capt. Craven threw up Lid coaiinaud on the Potoiuac and applied to be ueut to sea, euyiug that, by leaiaiuing Here and doiu^ nolhiug, Lo wan bat losing hid own reputaiioii, an ilie bkuiO for per- mittinpr iho Potomac to bo blockaded would be im- puted to Lim and the flotilla uudcr hia comuiund. Upon ihe failure ot ihia plan of tho N.ivy De- {>artmeut the cil'cciva veesels ot the Potouiac tlotiUa el't upon the Tort Lo^al expeuitiou. The iiavi- gatiou of the river waa almoeb immtUiately there- alter closed, and remained closed ouiil tho Ivebcia voluntarily evacuated Ibeir baiicrica in tho March following, no etepa Laving been taken, in tne rnedu- time, for reopening couiuiuuicaiion by that route. I ORDERS TO MOVE. On the lOlh of January, lSo2, the Prefeident of the United States, as Coaiaiauder-ia-Chief of the Army and Is'avy, isduod ordcia lor a general move- roent of idl the armies of the United bialed, one re- anlt ef %^hich waa the B<)ries of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Douelsou, &.c., which eo electrified the country and revived vue hopes of every loyal man in the land. I LINE OF OPERATIONS. .' After tliis long period of inaciion of tho Army of the Potomac tho President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862^ issued tiie following order: " EzECTTTiTR Mansiok, V/ABurnatos, Jan. 81, 1863. " InretulenL's Special \V ar Order iso. 1. " Ordered, 'iliitall tne i!i»posaV,:e f irce of tho Anny of th« Potoraao, BlicriT'iviJiug talLMy I'jrt.iO di-lVusoor Wa^iihn;- ton, boIormtU luco an tipfdmua lot ilio iuimeiliato 01 juct of aeiziug oiitl o;:cu|i;iiig a po.3t uj^oa thj itiurouJ buuiuu-cs'.- %raid of what la kucwQ a3 Maua«eai J unciion 1 alt tlo;&il« to be iii tiio disurctiun ol tlia Cieiiural-ia-Ciuer, aod tbo ox- p«dition to mnv« bet'ura or on tiio'.:JJ d ly 01' t'cbruary next. " AURaUAM LINCOL.N." To this order Gen. McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of the same date, o!jjectiug to the phn Iheieiu indicated us involving " the error of dividing our army by a very difficult cbstatle (iLo Occociuan) and by a disiauce too ^reat to enable tho two por- tions to support each other, should eiiher bo at- tacked by lao maseea of tho eneuiy, while the other id held in check." lie then protended to argue in favor of a movement by way of the liappahaunock or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to tae Kappuhanncck route, lie slated that 30 days would be req^aired to provide the uece;-cary means of traiia- portaiion. Uo statea that Le regarded " success as certain, by all liie chancea of war," by tuo route ho proposed, while it waa " by no means certain tuat we can beat them [ij^etTSfty] at rdanaasas." I To this the Presid« made the lollowing reply: : "EiEcmvic KLixsioy, Waibington, Feb. 3, 1%"2. "Mt Dt>Ail,jc — y ouii to e down l!'0 (.iiciipeaic, up tli» ltap|)aljiDr.oci: to Lj'aanDtt, and acrois land to tlio te. niiuus of ttie ii:lru&d ca V ork lUver ; luiiio tomovd diricily to B point oa the lallrouU kjutiiwobt of MiiDasiiii. If yv^a n i.l giro uje latikfictoty aa«wor* to the fol:>>v7Kii; queitioui 1 ib^U gladly ylcid my pmn to you.-«: " 1. Lijti iiotyoiir pUn iuvolve a greatly laiger exp«iidi£ate " /. Wbeitiin is a victory more certain by yoor plan than minet " 3. Wlieroin ia avictoiy more valuabU by your plan then mlnct "4. In fact, would is cot be Ust voluablo H thli. that It would b.-cat DO Kreat line of tiio oa>>aiy'i comoiunicotiOD, while mine would? ''^- J", f*— of dltutm. woold not a lafe rcireal be men dlnioult by yotir pltn tlian by uilue t ..Ml n " \;"".""'y. „ •' A LINCOLN. Your Commitieo have no evidence, either oral or documentary, cl ti.e disciimiunB thut (mh dirtba argutiKii'a tl at wcro mboiiittd to i ■ 'ion of tho Prod Lilt lliut led LimtortI •■vrn lino of operaliifi/Bund co:ii:< nt to I _ -, , aed by Gon. McClell ui, except tho rennli ol a couni U of war, held in Fehm.ify, 1-0'J. That conDti!— the lirtt,Bofar us yourConiD.iUco La- • ' ''to asLcrlain, ever called bv Gen. JIcl 1 on by tho direction of tha Presidei.i— . I of twelve teiaral!', na lolIoWf : JKl' cr, lleiuizjlni;in, Kiyo;^, Fiiz-John !• 'in, W. F. SiDiih, McCall, Bknker, A . 1 er, Barnard, and Nagle.) (lron»Gen.lIook.cr'al>ivi»ion). lo them was buomiited tho question whtlher ihoy woulU iudorso tho lino of optrat.ona whii h Ocn. McCk-Ilau dcKired to adopt. Tho re.'^nlt of tbo da- liheratiou waa u vote of eight to fur iti favor of the movement by w.iy of Annap' jo« down tho G-e.-:ipeiikc Bay, up the I k, landing at Uriiannn, and across the ' ■ _ 1 . juti- mond. Tho four Gencrala who voted ii^uiuettba projiosed uiovcoient were Geus. McDowell, Sumner, Ileuitzclmau and Barnani. Gen. Keyes voted for it with the qualificaion that no cliange should be made uniil tho enemy were driven froui their ball*- ries on the Potomac. At ihia point; it may be well to coneiiJer th» prin- cipal argnnicnla for and against tho moveraent apoa liichmoud direct from Wa^hinkiton, and tlie mova- ment by way of tho Lower Chesapeake, including that first proposed by way of the* lU; pahhnnocK river, and the one finally adopted by way of For* tress Munroo and the psoinaula. In exprissing opinions upon this and other sub- jects relaiingn.ore iiuniediaiely to military opera- tions in tho field, your Cooimiitee do not undertake to form and express opinions of their owa, but content th^selves with setting forth those ex- pressed in their testimony by military men wboee education and experience entitle taem to speak con- fidently upon thooo taojects pertamiug to ihcir pra- fcsaion. •WHY THE DIRECT ROUTE WAS BCST. The arguments in favor of tho uirect and against the lower route to Kic^moud were many and weighty. Some of iheai are most tertely cxprcesed in tbe letter oi the President lo Gen. JlcClellan, of February 3, ItIG,', before referred to. Beside thoae. the direct movement enabled (he Largest amount oi troops to operate actively in tlio field, hs tho army in its movement immediately covered WanhLugtoQi and thereby rendered the presence of a l.irio inco hero uuuecer*iiry. By tho adopiion of the lower route a divinon of the army was rendered im-^wra- tivc, in order to provide f<.r tho lafety of too Capitol against any attack Irom tho enemy, 'llius, to nan tho Liojuago of Gon. Mi tlellan Limtelf, lu lofcr- euco to tho movement propo!»ed aguiiat ti.e eromr while at Miiui-ssas, "c'i)H:>i;i'ig t!?'* error «fi) t'uu uu^er l> i.t.Id ia chock." Tho army In m-^'' " ■''•'■' <"- •< w "fon avoided all tho del.. 'U the cmLuikaiioii i 'a force with all i > 'i« moud oa tho : "ff from ono oft' m* ajdoali Yalicy, aau . t:r raida thrnijii that . ir- nlyzed aJl elTortB lu - . , — ia AVabhir.^toa to tho assistance ut Uiearu./ ou the peiiin"!!!!. • I " in bis tee" " ' 'y f.,1 v.ay of An. ■« li.-i^ . ., it prci)cr 8.-.; . •'«- Berved, to bo able to reach tbe vicinity of Richmond hefore the Rebel army at Manassas could be concen- trated there for ics defense. Whatever probability there may have beea for the realization of Buch a hope at the time the Rippaljainock route was de« cided upon, it was entirely removed when the enemy evacuated Manassas, before any actual movement was made by our army. And Gen. McClellau at once relinquished tbe Rappahannock route, and de- cided, witu the concarrence of his corps command- ers, to g> by way of Yorktown and the peninsula. One great objection to ibepeninanla route, as in- dicated by the testimony of all the witnesses who testify upon that point, iuclu'iing Gen. McClellaa himself, was tbe toal want of iuformatioa in refer- ence to the nature of the country there, the kind and condition of the roads, the preparations for defense, &c. The difficuliies and embarrassments oar army labored under from the beginning of that campaign, from that want of iutormation, are very evident from the testimony. DECISION OP THE COUNCIL. The decision of tho council of twelve Generals in February was to move by way of Annapolis anl thence to the Rappahannock. Tho question of reopenin,^ the navigatiou of the Potomac, by driving tne enemy fropi their batteries npon the river, was discussed. It was, however, finally decided that the enemy should be left in pos- session of their batteiies, and the movement should be made without disturbmg them. This is proven by the testimony, and also by tho eecond paragraph of the order of tlia Pretiiieut, dated Marcu 8, 1862, as follows: "EZEC0TIVB Mansiojt, March 8, 1362. " Fresident'a General H-ar Order Ko. 3. " Ordered, Thit ao change of tae base of operations of the Army of the i'otoul3C.s^hJ:l be ujaia without leivinsiiiand about WaBhinjton Bach a forca as, i.i t!ui opinion of the Geue- ral-iu-Cl.ief aiid tho Cornniauderj cf blithe Aimy Corps, shall leave the haid city entirely secure. " That no more than two Aiiiiy Corps (about fifty thousand troops) of BaiJ Army of the Totom-c s.iail Da luoveJ eii route for a new base of operatious uutil tha uavigat^oa of the foto- maofrom Washington to tho Ches-up-aka liiy ehall ba freed from the eneoiv'sbatteriesaiid othtrobetruciii-na, or until tbe President shall hareafter give cxpre a porixiLisiun. "That any niovem-ut aforesaiJeii route fjr anew bas« of opera' ions, which miybo ordered by tlia Uenerjii-in-oLiei', and which maybe iuienJed to move upon the Chtsapcake Bay, shall begin to move upon tho Bay as ea:ly astno 13th March Inst., ai-d tbe General-in-Chief shaU be respoueible that it HO move as early as that day. " Ordered, That tho Arujy and Navy co-oporate in an im- mediate effoit to ciptura too enemj'a batteries upon the Potomac between Wasliington and tho Chesapi-.ako Day. '• ABRaU^uM LINCOLN. " L. Thomas, Adjt.-Gen." Before the movement by way of Annapolis conld be executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at CentreviUe and Manassas, retiring to tho iiuo of the Rappahannock. MOVEMENT OP THE ARIHY. When Gen. McCiellan, then ia the City of Wash- ington, heard thit the enemy bad evacuated Manas- Baa, he proceeded across tha river and ordered a general movement of the wholj army ia the direc- tion of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The army moved on tu6 morniog of the 10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court-Honse. A small force of the army proceeded to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the rail- road bridge across it. On the 11th of March Gen. McCiellan ordered, by telegraph, the transports from Annapolis to Wash- ington (Alexandria?), to embark the army from there, and informed the Department that he pro- posed to occupy Manasaas with a portion of Gen. Banks's command, and throw all the force he could concentrate upon the line previously determined npon. Subseauent events in the valley of tho Shen- andoah, tenninating, for a time, in the battle of Winchester, of March 23, prevented tho force tmder G«n. Banka from leaving that valley. .ANOTHER COUNCIL. On the 13th of March Gen. McCiellan convened afc Fairfax Court-House a coun ;il of war, coneisting of four of the live commanders of army corps (Gen. Banka being absent), and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of tbe Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement by way of York^ and James Rivers. The result of the deliberations of that coun- cil was as follows: Hbadqwartees Army op ths Potomac, ) Fairfax Coukt-Hocse, March 13, 1S63. 5 " A council of the Geuerals commanding army corps at tha headquarters of the Army of tha Potomac were of the opiciou: ''First: That tbe enemy, having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, bthind the Rappahannock and tho Kapidan, it ia tha opinion of the gsnerala cominanding army corps that the operations to be carriea on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, bttweentheTorkand Jimes Rivers, upon Richmond; provided, fir=t, that th3 enemy's vessel, the Mer- limac, can ba neutralized; second, the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate trantler oftheforco to its new basecanbe ready at Washinjton and Alexandria to mova down the Potomac ; third, that a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries in York River; fourth, tliat the force to bo left to cover Wash- lagton shall bo such as to give au entire feeUn^ of security fo* its safety fiom menace. Unanimous. " Second: If tha foregoing cannot be, the army shonll then bo moved against tlje enemy behind tne Rappahannock at th« earliest possible moment, and the means far recoiistructinc bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with maerial sufficient for supplying iha army, should at once be collected for both tha Orange and Alexandria and the Acquia and Rich- mond Railroads. Unanimous. " Note — That with the f jrts on the lieht bank of the Po- ♦ tomao fully garrisoned, and those on tha left bank occu- pied, a covering forcq in front of the Virginia lino of2j,00O men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzeiman and McDowell.) A total of 40,0u0 men for the defense of the city would saffice, (Sumner.)" The same day Gen. McCiellan informed the War Department that "the Council of Commanders of Army Corps have nnanimously agreed upon a plan of operations, and Gen. McDowell will at onco pro- ceed with it to Washington and lay it before you." To this the Secretary of War replied: "What-- ever plan has been agreed upon proceed at once to execute, without losing an hotu' for my approval." THE president's ORDERS. The plan of operations was submitted to the Presi- dent on the sawe day, and he approved the same; but gave the following directions as to its executions " h'irat: Leave snch forca at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that tha enemy shall not repossais himself of that pofitioa and line of communication. " Heccnd : Leave Washington secure. " Third : Jlove the remainder of the force down the Poto- mac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywher* between here and there; or, at all evouts, mova such re- mainder of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by lome route." EMBARICATION OF THE ARMY. The aixny was directed to return to Alexandria to be embarked for the peninsula; previous to their embarkation all the corps to be concentrated npon tho division nearest Alexandria. The transporta- tion not proving sufficient for immediate embarka- tion, the troops were, lor several days, exposed to the rains which then set in, being decrivedof their former cumping accommodations, althoufih, in many instances, not far distant from them, having only shelter tents to protect them frojM the inclemency of tho weather. ^ To Gen. McDowell was at first assigned the ad- vance of the expedition. Bat when it was found that there was not transportation enough to embark at once his entire corps, ha consented, in order to ntii.ze what was there, to allow hia troops to remain until such time as they could be moved together, with the understanding that the troops preceding him should not operate npon bis proposed field oi labor. The result, however, was, that tho corps of Gen. McDowell was put off till the last, which, in pursuance of Bubsecjnent orders, led to bis corps being retained here for the defense of Washinfftoiu HOW TTASHINGTON WAS LEFT UNDEFENDED. By reference to tho President's general war order, No .3 of March 3, 18G2, it will be seen that no chaogo of bate of operations of the army of the Po- (omao was to b« niado wltlioni leaving in and about WasLinp'on eiieh u force ua ia tlio opinion not oulr of Gen. McClelliD, but of " the coniniiiutierd of iifl the army corps," was Bufliiient to render the capital entirely eecure. And by roferenco to the report of the canncil of war luld ut Tuirlax Coirtllouso, oh the 13th of March, 186:2, coDBiBliUK of Gens. McDow- ell, Sumner, Heiiilzelmiin, and Keyes, it will bo Been that three luombers of that council deemed necessary for the salety of Wasliint^ton " that the forts oa the right bank of the I'otomao ehould be f ally garrisoned; those on the left bank occupied, and a covering force of Do.OOO men." The other General (Sumner) tloemed 40,000 men in all eullicient. Notwithstanding this order of the President, and the decision of the council, when Gen. McClellan himself left Alexandrn for the peninsula, Ac tent back orders, toilUoui conference With. the cummand- ert cf corps, for all the corps cf the Army of the Po- tomac, but that of Gen, Banks, to embark at once for the peninsula. Just Brevious to leaving, Gen. McClellan addressed the following comraunicaiion to the Adjutant- General of the army: " Hbapquaeters Aemt op thb Potokac, ) "i>TEAMKRCoMMOD0UB, April i, laUi. J " Obkbral: I liavo to lequesttiiatvo J wi.ll.iy the follow- ing reconiinendation tcfore (lie lloaorulilo Secretary of War: 'Ihe ofproxiuinto t uiubers aud ro«iiicc» lc:t near wid in rearcftbo Araiycfthe I'utnniao nro nboutas f illowi: " Oe I. I)ix r.os, cfter eaarduig Vae railroad* under lili Cbaree, euUicient troops to give Mm 5 Cuo for tUo defense of Ballimoie; Bad 1 ,980 available lor tlie Eatlern Shore, Auiiopo- lia, &C. Fort Dtiiaware id very weli eurrijoned by about 400 men. ''The parriaoni of the forta around Wasbingtin amonnt to 10.000 oeij ; other diapoiable troops, with Uen. Wadawortb being a'jout II. 40U. ' "^he troopi employed In gnardirg th.j railway! In Mary- land Emouutto some 3,359 mcQ. Those it. Is dssigued to re- lieve, be-.ug eld re.:i;uent8. by dismoanted cavalry, aud to lend them f.-rwjrd to Mana^saa. " Gen. Aberco.iibie cccapleg ^'arrenton wl:h a force which, Includuig Col. (Jeary at \\ bile Plains, and the cavalry to bo ot Ilia disposal, will amovint to some 7,780 meu, with IS piecoa of artuiery. " I have the honor to request that a'.t the troops orjanlzod for service ia Peimsyivauia and in New-York, and in many of theL-istcrn Stales, may be orJtred U'W'aa.'iiutton. I loam from Oov. Cuttin that there are pome 3.500 men now ready In Peunsylvanid. This force I should bo glad toliavusont at once t3 Munassas. Kuur Ihouaaod mon from Oen. \Vads- wortnl dehire to le ordered to Wanasiaa. These troops with ther.iilroad guards aoovo a liided to, vill make up a force under Oen. Abercombie, to sonictbingliko 1 1. 033. ' '•It is luy debign (> ^usi Uon. m.-akcrs Varrentoii upon K'.rasburg. lie fhoulj remaiu ct t'trashnrg, too, to allow matters to essiime a deiiii;!o farm in that reziou before proceedicg 1 1 Lis ultimate destination. "Thotroopjia the Valley of theShi-mndoah will thns bo 3^,157 men. " It is designed Vi relieve Don. Ilookcr by some regiment — say 8..0 men, leaving, with WO cavalry, l,i50 men on the Lower Pbtomic. "To recapitulate: " At Warrenton there Is to be 7,780 men. • '• AtMonaesaslhereis t3 be 10.850 men. " In the Valley of the ShenaudoaU....8o.4ti7 men. " On the Lower Potomac 1.350 men. "In aU H<^ men. '' There will thus be left for the garrisons and the front of ^ya^!ilC(;ton. under Oen. VVadsworth, Wi^Mi men, exclusive cf the batteries under lastraction. •• Tho troops orgAnizing. or ready for ••rrlco In Now-Tork, I lear.i v.illi.rcbaUlyLumbermoro than 4,liiJ. 'jhrsosbouli be osser..bleJ rt U oihington, subject to oscd by Gen. McClellan, tnd feeling tho great importance of tho trust comniitted to Lis char-e, nnd tho total i.nadennacy of tho racang providcl 1 1 a for tbat inrpos?, addrcHacd to tho Sec- retary cf War the foUoTring comraur-ication: IlKADqoAKTCEi .MiLfTAwv DisTticr ft» WAsBtvora* J ., o >• . ",^^'*"'"«OTO'» I'. '■ . Al»Bt!.. !!.!!!.!!!! l]4 4 Total rresrnt for duty , ""TTTTT "1 b«vo no iinuiiicd llijlit ariji: " Several couipmiles ol t in to-- the Putomou aru still here, but Cb'. for service. '• From this fjroe T am ordered by Oen. MeCUllan !■» d*tail two regiments (good one.) t) J .in Jtl-h-ir-'Mi-:'. <"v s' r, (Sumner's corrs) as it taxes llir jugh A ' - luent to ieplorotUo3T'h N.w\oik \ , man's eld divi.lou ; oi o r.fliucDt to i Hooker's division at Ilu Id's lorry— 'oia' i ."^'^f^J^'^toxiej^diMtmoiauit by i,-.. ,,...;, i„ ^^ VUixijiiou tore.lovef.cn. Suii.n^ral Wsaaasaa aod Wanu- ton, that be may ou.b -.rk f rlnvl-*! "Iiiregirdtothnr . . . under my comiiiMid, It,, ," andimperfcitiy di ,,,.„ la a Very d^s T,-a; :. J _„ ■ it ia not ueccuary to »:a • tirrr, < been relieved from bri; idrs. »1.. Ia consi-qiience of thfir unfi-.r..^ ■< me.its teuiaiuing baring l.i< " Two l.oavy ar llliry r ,. r»M ment, which lad b..nd' v^' service, have been vi'liJfu. of tie Potomac, and I li ivi' with very new lufan'.ry r with tho duties of that anij, , . _ --._„......, preent position. •- . -- ._-.. .... ..uju "I am uol Informed as to the position which Msjor-Owi. Banks is dlrecU'ltonke; but it this lime he Is, as i coder- stand, oa the ither side of the V,».l I'.uu inourtalus. leaving niv command t> cover the front, f.-cm the MtoaAsaa Oap (abo•Jt2Jtl,^lesbc^Olld Mana.ss-) 1 3 A.-<]i!l» C-t • k. " I deemltiny duty tos-atelhat, I I'k: - ■ "'rloa: strcnjthsndcbaracter of Ihef rco u:iirr t| |, In my ludgrneLtriitiiclv l.iaLeqiute to, • I-a- portant duty to will -h It Is e<>.ijted. J , (j,- rrobablo that tie tciemy will ai>ui1 i;s ui I this belief Is based upon the hope that t'i'-y ; rrn- gaged 1 Is'-wbere, and may not ItMim the i „ . tku- aoter of tho f jrco left here. '■ 1 haTe the honor t > t e yonr obedlert servant, " JAb. S. AVADSWUllllI. " l''rir«Ciea. and MiUtarr Ooranor. Hon. Sbcrxtabt of Wab " Tho8« communicationB were bmntyht to the con- Fideration of the President liv ' .ryor\Var. Tho subject was at once rtf Acintani- Generulof the Army, and Al. . A.llitx-b- cock, with instructiouB to rep -rt kt tiuo wheiber tho orders of tho President Laid been coDipliod with. Their report ia as loUowa: " WA«ni:«r,T0.t. P. C, AprU J, 186?— 7:40 o'clock. " In compliance will! your inrlruclions, I b*v« rxsmloed the papers submitted to uie, and Lave the honor to make Um followitg report: ">'!>•< : The rresldrcl's war order, Ko. S, dated March <, requires t^at en taking up r: . i . a- I to . i < iB.-iti m, it,* City of WasUingiou sha 1 1 ■ iber poicts cf llie order it is i ■ tli* enemy, since Is date, l:>\e • and bct'erici on the Potomac, ti u ic .r«j i . n i; t..<< iLipp*. barmock. " a cond : The conncil cf F'neral ofRrers held at F«!rf«i COUrM !"•.'■" f'.n.U l.i (,.. l..n.-r I »,... ,IJ retired rear. lia err ■• i • i; .. o 1 :. ...■ ;,; TM :f..a:i i.\ .rt, Lr.:, i J.: - , -. :,n: :i 1, -.e U »'s report ti lb* A4j"- : the several poHsi^nsol : ICO Oefccse «.' Washiaiic*. fives a reproEeatation as foUowa: At Warrenton there is to be 7,780; at jManasFas, say, l(J,853j ia the valley of the Shonandoah, 35.407; on the Lower Potomac, 1,350. Total in all, 53.45G. And tbero would be left for tbo garrisoua and the front of Washiagtnn, under Gen. VVadsworth, eoma 13,0U0. Ia th« ebcvo enumeration, Gen. Bauks'a Ariny Corps ia included; but whether this corps, operating in the Sheniadoah Vallny, should ba rpgiidol as a ■ part of tiiB force availab'e for the protoctiou of tho imme- diate fiOut of WaihinatoQ, tha uadersigued espross no opinion. , „, . . . " i'ifch: Gen. Wadsworth'a report of April 21 gives his force as follows: iafautr?, 15,335; artillery, 4,494; cavalry, 858 — six corap Jnies only bei'.is mounted. 'XotSl, 20,477. " Deduct sick, in arrest and conhnement, 1,455. Total for duty, 19,022. "Frooi this force Gen. Wadsworth is directed to dotacn two gooil regiments to Richardson's division, Sumner's corps, which should be deducted from his command, one regiment to •replace th.'i® transports until after the enemy evacuated tlie place, whenthey were ordered to West Point. j ire WANTS TRANSPORTA-nON. J On the 6th of April Gen. McCleUan telegraphea to Vhe President, ''I have by no n^^^^^ti^^^ *Jf°^ portation I must have to move my army even a few UiIb;" and asks that aU his ordera for wagon traui^ &c., may at once be complied "with. Ail was ecnt to bim iirt dcBired, until even Gen. McDowell found himself bo stripped of t'jo traneporiiitii)U designed for liiti carps, thut when bo moved to Frcderickaljurg it Wis with the preafest difficulty bo could niovo aupi'liffl for Ms emull force fioui Ac(iuia toFuIaioutU nniii tbe railroad was cotEpleted. A month wu3 spent before Yorktown, onr army, in tbe opinion of ^onie of our ableat ofllcer*, becom- inj? more demoralized by the labors of a Ion;; Biejje t!>an it would have been even by an unBuccedufal assault. The retnma in tbe Adjutant-General's office, eigned by Gen. McClellan and bis AiijulaulGcutral, ahow that on the 30th of April, ISG-', tbe forces on tbe Peninsula under Gen. McCiellm amounted to 112,3y2 present for duty. HE WANTS GUNS. On the let of Way the TrCfident telegraphs to Gen. JlcClellan: '"Your call for Parrott guns from Wusbiugiou alarms me, chiefly becauso it urgucs in- defiuito procrastination. Is anyihiug to be dono?" YOilKTOWN EVACUATED— M'CLEIXAN CUA- GRIXED. On the night of tbe 3d and tho morning of the 4th of May, tho enemy evacuated Yorktown without loss. One of the witnesses teatilies that Gen. Mc- Clellan was very much chagrined and morttted at the evacuation, as be bad made bis preparations to open from Lis batteries on Monday, tiie 5th of May. PURSUIT OF TIIE KEBELS. Tbo evacuation was discovered by daylight on the XDOmiug of the 4tb. Between 10 and 11 o'clock, Gen. Stoueman, with tbe cavalry and Bome light horse artillery, started in pursuit. About 1 o'clock, Gen. Hooker, with bis division, left Yorktown, with orders to support Gen. JStonenmn. Gens. Sumner, Heiutzelmaa and Keyes also moved out during the day, with tbe whole or portions of tlieir corps. About Cvo miles from Yorktown tbe divitionof Gen. Hooker was delayed for some tima in consequence of other troops, coming from another direction, getting into the road before him. In the meantime Gen. Stoneman had overtaken the rear of the enemy with bis cavalry, and followed them up closely, keeping up a running lire all the time, until tbe enemy reacued fbeir works in the neighborhood of Wilnamsburg, when the pursuit was checked. Gov. Sprague was sent back lo hurry up the iufantry support under Gen. Hooker. Alter coa- Biderabis delay, findmg it impossible to pass the troops ahead of him. Gen. Hooker turned off and proceeded by another road, of which ho bad obtained information from some of the iL.hubitunt8; marched till H o'clock that night, rtncwed tho march at day- light, and came up lo tho advanced works of the enemy a li;tle after 7 o'clock, about half a mile from Fort Magrutler, and at oace engaged tha enemy. C.VTTLE OP WILLLUISDUKG. There seems lo have been great misapprehension and coufu6ion in relation to tho management of the troops at WilUamsbarg. When the pursuit first commenced on Sunday, Gen. Heintzclmau was in- Btructed by Gen. McC'lel!an to tak^s charge of oper- ations ia front. On the morning of Monday oruera were sent to Gen. Samner to take the command; Ccn. McClcUan nmaincd behind i>i Yorktown to superintend t'le sending of two divisions vptlie Yurli R.vcr to~\Veit Point. A heavy rain set la on Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracticable for tho pa:sago of troops. Tbe troops of the differ- ent commauds became mingled — divfsious and brig- ades, to Bomo extent, wcro Bepar.itcd from each other — and it seems to have been difllcult to get tho troo,8 up in time. Duiiug Monday foj-enoon Gen. Hooker, Cndinor himself haril pressed by t';io enemy, ULd unJerstand- iigtb'it Geo. Sumntr had 30,000 troops wiih him, eeat rei;eitedly for rceui'orceir.euts. Sj did Gen. Stoneman and Gen. Ueii.izclLi.au, but no rcCaforco- inenta arrived. Gen. Sumiicr states that, having ■eut Gen. Huncock to tho iiaht, Lo hud at tho center only ahont 3,000 infantry— tho cavalry there nr.t !>♦• ine fitted for operations oguinst the enemy, on ac- count of the country being so wood-!. I j-on re- ceiving tbo call for rcC'uforcemcntK ' ' j tbo left, to Gen. Hooker, be sent eta:! ; urry up troops Ironi tbo rear, bis own • • i omo ten miles off, and ordered Kearuiy to r«.-Lulorco Hooker, lie-r nforcements not coming up to Gen. Hooker as soon as needed, or perbaj s e.\pLCttd, tbe Piince de Joiuvillo and (iov. 8i)rague went to York- town to urge Gen. McClellan to como up to the front, and take charge of matters tbcrc. Gov. Sprayuo arrived at YoiktQxvn about 1 o'clock, hav- ing been about an hour ia goin^j down. Ho tcstiliei tbat ichen Gen, McClellan teas tt-ld the condttton of ajfairs at the front, he remarked that he had sup- posed "those tn front could attend to that little mai- ter." After tome time Gen. McClellan i.ta:ted from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Wiiliumflborg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. HOOKER DOES THE FIGITTIXG. By that timo Gen. Kearney had reached the field and re-enforced Gen. Hooker, taking command, being tho senior in rank to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hancock had been engaged on tho right, but, upon being re-enforcid, hud succeeded in repulsing the en- emy, losing about forty men. Tho principal Cebtinj^ was dene by the troops under Gen. Hooker, his di- vision sustaining a loss of about 1,700 men. Before he was re-enforced, his troops were obUt'cd to hold their position with tbo bayonet and such ammuni- . tion as the men could obtain from tbe bodita of thoae who bad fallen, tbe roads being so muddy that it was impossiblo to bring up fresh ammunilioD. RETREAT AND PURSUIT. Tbat night the enemy evacuated their poeition ftt Williamsburg. Gen. McClellan states that after he arrived on tho field he was so satisiied that the ene- my had been beaten and would be compelled to evac- uate their position that night or bo taken at a great disadvantage, that ho countermanded orders to the divisions of Kichardson and Sedgwick and sent them back to Yorktown. Tbe next day the pursuit was continued for a Bhort distance by Gen. Stoneman and tho cavalry, with a small body of infantry. Several cf the Ueii' erals testify that, had the enemy been promptly fjl- lowed vp after the battle of Williamsburg, they could have been followed right into Richmond — one nf them says without firing a pun. Gen. McClel- lan says thlt the roacfa wero bo bad, in consoquenc* of the raius, t'^at it was impracticable to nrnke ^ vigorous pursuit. ^rhe battle of W'illiamsbnrg appears to have been fougbt under many and serious disadvantage*. No.hing was known of tho nature of tbo country or tho delcnsive works of the enemy until our troopa arrived before tbem; tbcre was no controUing mind 111 charge of the moveii^ents; there was uncer- tainty in regard to who was in command; each Gen- eral fought as ho cons'd red Iks: ; and, by tut time the General Com J on tlic/idd, the principal part cf ■ vcr, I L. ^ ...... Soma three or four ua>8 wero epent at Williami- burg for the j)arpoRO ct I'rin^ivfj np Fo;ipli''«, &,c., and then tbo line ' tho Chickahoojiny. 1 tho nrmy Itft AVill! iken and't! bad been i ■ up- plies !- - -. .... .;, and tho lino ultcrwr. >•'!. Ihe conserjiienrn whh f lit'lo or 1 ar—y wiiti:, ia J d/, il U'll Lack t . ^ ^ _. . , -. .\ve3n Willi jms^nrir and tljfl line of v^pcraiiu.is uu tho Chickahonuny w.ia from forty to liuy miles, and the army waa most two we«M 10 in moving Ibat . Tfce fir^t troops that crossed the C'liickaboiiiiny were the corps of General Keyep, which croseed on the 24 h of May, followed by the c rpg of Gev. Heintzelman oa the 25th. The rest of our army remaiued on the left bank of the Chickahouiicjy until the battle of Pair Oaks, wbentbe cjrpaof Geu. Samner crossed to the as- sistance of Gen?. HeintzeL-uan and Keyes. M'CLELLAN STILL CALLIXQ FOR MORE TROOPS. Gen. McClellaa contiaaed callin/? for re-emcrce- mentp, representing that the force of the enemy iu hia froiit w;.a superior to his own, and that the force uuJer Gen. McDowell would do moro for the protection of Washingt&n, if sent to Lis armv, than m any other po.-idon in which it could be placed. In a letter written on the Slst of M^iy he asks tbat Gen. McDowell's corps \e sent to hici by water rather than by land, as the moro expeditious mode, and that he and bis forces be explicitly placed under his orders, " iu the ordinary way." He closes his letter by saying: " I believe there 13 a great strnggle before th'g army, but I am neither dismayed Dor discoiirageJ. 1 wish to Btrengtlien its force 83 much ES I can; but, in auy event, I ehail fii:lit it witUall the skill, an i c^uiioii.auJ d!;tfrinination tliat I pos- ses?. And I trutt that the resilt may either obtain f.,r me the permaneLt confidence of my Go»ernment, orthat it may close my career." ^ In reply to the request of Generi;! McClsllan that General JMcDowell should j ia nis forces by water, the President states, on tho 21fct ofMay: " McDowell caa reach you by Innd sonner tlir.n he could get aboaidof bcataif tho bca;a \vc.3 ready it Fiti!c;icksburg, unless his march shall ba resisted, ia wl.ic'i CiFa tI:o fjrca re- sisting him ivi.l net bo conlrontiii^' ylu ntJlichmonJ. By land he will reach ycu iu five days ai'tir stirtini;; wherd iiia o u yfUtral ot- tach. Should I find them boldingli.ni in a M-ry ttumg posi- tloD, I luav wuit for what tiooiia I cm briag up from Fort Monroe, liut the miraie of my troops is now Buch that I can venture iDuih. I do not fear for odjs ogaiuet uio. 'lUe>ic- tory is conii>l to, audall credit ia due to tbe gailaatry of out OffiCUISaud Ill;!U." The movemen|t was not made, however, as Gon. McCJel.au states, becauo« of the high etage of water and th§ bad roads. MORE KE-ENFOnCEMENTS. On the 6th of June McCaU's division of Gen. McDowell's corj'B.waa ordered to join tbe army on the peninsula. On the SiL of June Gen. Mc'Clellan tclei^raphB: " I shall be in perfect readiness to movo forward and take Kichruond the moment thut Mc- Calljeiclics lure and the ground will admit the pas8ai>!e of nnillery." On the lOtu or 11th of Juno McCall'fl troops commenced arriving at the Wiiito Uonee. l?reparation8 continned to be made in Washington to send down by land from Fredericiisburg the re- mainder of Gen. McDowell's corps, be being direct- ed to co-operate fully with Geo. AlcClcUan^ but re- taining au iuddPondent command. Tuis doKS not appear to have been in accordunco with General McClcllan's wishes; lor, on tbe IGth of June, he telegraphs to the Secretary of War: "ItouEht to be distinctly understood that JfcDowell and Lia trooisara coinpletely u;ider uiy control. 1 reoeived a telegram f.-oiu hiui iequi->iii)g that UcCuU'b divioiou tiiijat be placed eo 13 to jjin liiiniajiiieaia) ly upou Lis erriva'. That request dots not Lrta: he the proper spirit ; whatever troops cometo ine uiust be di.-p ;B'd of to es tj do (he i;iost eood, IdoEot feel that iu such circumstances as those iav.hichl am DOW placed tien. McDowell should wish tUo general in- terest to be Mcriliced lor the purpose of inc.caiitg Lis com- mand. If I cannot fully coatnd til Lis trjopsl want i:one of them, but would prefer to fi^ht the bdttio with what I have, fdid let others be leepousibla lor the resul.s." On the ISth of June, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the Secretary of \v"ar that bo has received informa- tion from descrtera to the effect that troops have left Richmond to re-enlorco Jackson; that the movement commenced on the 8th ; and that if re-enforcements have gone to Jackson, they ere probably noc less than 10,000 men; that be cannpt vouch for the truth of tbe statement, but that it Ecems pretty cer- tain that it is believed in liichmond and amoug the Ilebel troops. To this the Pretident replies, on the eame day, that the iafoi-mation ia corroborated by a dispatch from Gen. Iving at UrcJericksburg, and re- marks: "Jf tbia 13 true, it ii cs good as a le* •enforcement to yon of an etiunl force." On the tame day Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the Presideat: " A genenl engsftPinpnt- may take place at any hour. An advance by us i .volvcs a lattlomore or Ires decisive. The enemy (shiliittt every point a readincs to meet us. They certaluly lure great numbers tjid cxteueivo work^. If ten or filteen ihonsjni ujen Imvo K ft I'ic!imo:id t J re-crforce jacV- Bon, it illnstraes their f tn n-;tu and confi Jtuce. After to-mor- row we ohall C;ht the llcbcl c:my as eacn as TroTldence will peimit. Wo etia!] await or.ly a favorable condition cf the earth end ekj, and the completion of tome necessary pre- liminaries." STRENGTH OP THE ARUIY. The return.s cf Gen. McClellan to the Adjutant- General s cffico give tbe following ns the sirenfrlh of the army on the peninsula en tDo £Oth(f June: Present for duty, 115.102; special duty, dck and in arrest, 12,225; absent, 29,011— total, 150,838. STUART'S tiAXD. About tbia time tbe Kcbel General, Stuart, with bia cavalry, made bis celebrr.tcd raid, inakiug the en- lire circuit of our crmy unbarraed, and discovering the nature of ctir communications with tbe York Biver. J.iCRSON TfUlEATEN'S AN ATTACTC. On the iihh und 'JJth cf Jane, Gen. McClellan telegraphs the S crctary of War ibat ho ia in ormed by deeerters und couiritbandx that Jackson in con- tempbniiig an uitack upon bia right and rear. Ai this dispatch cf LJen. McClellan, and the one of the President in reply, arj dated immediately previoui to the " B8ven duyb' battle," they are given beru ia full. " XtecoWed 8.S0 p. in. MoCtET.T.H'^'fi Jnno25— <'^^T>. PI. "I have just Totnnied f.-orii th.> I ■ ■■ ■- - ■ v in roitard to J jckinn. Sover.il c formation continuing the iuppi) IsatorueaT Ilauover C'our'.-llo . , _ lived, with strong re-cnforceiueiit., i J 1 I ioclino to tniuk that Jjcksoii v.jll uttc ThoUebel fore J is stated ut 200,0CO, i. u 13oaurei:iird. Ithall bdve to contend ag i.t \ .■ » , cri .r oddsif tlicsereporti betrne; butthisllrmy %. ill dj'nll ia the power of man to bold their liOsitiun ai.J n'pulso un altick. 1 regret my great iuferiority of i/uinbers. butl-el ilia'. I im In Jio wty respuut-ibla for it, as 1 Inveiiotf lilnl tj repreo nt re- pcateoly tlieliect 8>:ity of »e ealorccmeiits; Ihit this v.aitb* deci-ivo foiut ; undtl.at tU the a\ alia 'jIouicqm ( f the Guvern- moutEbouIdbe cuuceutrjtedbere. I willdo k'd tnat acouo- lalcindo with the cpl ndidurmy I have the honor to com- maud;tnd if it is des.r ^yeJ liy overwiieluili gijamber". can atleaatdio with U, andiliurei-.i fie. Hut if thoi<-8U.t oftua action which willoccur t i-niorrow. or wi'hin • thoit t.me, is B duaster, the tespousiliiity cjt.not be thrown on my shoal- dera; it innst reht vhcroit I elonga. "Siucu 1 c.)Ui!i«ncrd this, I Lave received additional Intel- ligence conhrijtiLg the euppoiitiou ia repaid t > Ja.ksou'i movements end Ueanreg.m's. 1 ihsU probably be a.t^cked to-morrow, and now gj to the other tide oftLe Chickabominy t J atrdugo for tlia tiefens j ca tUdt lide. I feel tliat there Is DO use in my agaui aiki ig for re-ciifo°c>:uicntB. "GEO. U. McCLhLL.ViN, Mcjor-Oeneral. "lion. E. M. St.\nton, Secretary cf War." The answer of the I?re.''i lent ii as follows: "Washington. Juno 26, 1852. '* Tonr three dispntchos of yeaterJay iu relation to the affiir, cn'ling with tbe stdteaieut thit _>'<'acamfleteiy tnccecded in making your i;oint, oro very trdti;>inp. "The later one of C^ p.m.. i.uj:esiln([ the probability of yonrbciug over IV helmed I y 2 ;0,OUj"iiien, a-id talhiii^iof whom there^poiifibiiiiy w id belong to, pains uo very inucb. I give vouuU I cjii. endacttti the reuijptt.,n that you will da the best you can with what you liave; while yoacoatinuc, ungen- erously I think, to e-sume tnat I coald give yon more if I would. I have omitt-^rd, 1 tha'.l emit, no OtKr(J. If, in 3 cur Ire- queut meution cf re;p:'i.siLiIiiy, you bad tho impression that I blame joafornetfloinginoiatkanyou cm, ileaaa be re- lieved of Euchiuipression. I only beg thit in like manner jouwillnotaski^ipossibilitieaof me. "Ifyouthi;^kioua:onot strocg enoaghtotike Riehmoncl justnoiff, IdoEotEsk yon to try just now. Save tije army, mattiial tud perscnnel, and I will strengthen it for the offea- Bive again as last 1 can." On the 3d of July, after the army had reacLed 13 Harrison's Bar, Gen, McClellan ■writes to tho Secre- tary of War: " I am la liopes that the enemy l9 c« corapletely worn out Mweurp; lio was ceitaiulj very severely punubi'd ia tho last battle. * * * * ' *,". It In. ol course, impoaoiblH ti eatlmate ns yet our loBsea, bnt I doubt wixibertliero are to-day uioio than 50,000 uioix with their cijlera. . „. , . . " To accompUnb tho great task of capfnting Richmond, ana putting ml e.iil to tliis rebellion, re-entorct-mtntJ ithould be aeiit me ratbrr much ever lUau leas t jan lUi>,UOUincu." THE ARMY iir.LPLrss. The retreat ot the army from Malvern to Ilarri- Bon'8 Bar waa very precipitate. Tbo troops, upon tbeirarrivnl tbere. ■weroliuiitlled tosetber in Rreat coLfnsioD, tlje entire army being collected withia a Birnco of about three miles along tba river. No or- dersivire piven the fint day for occupying the higlitswiiick commanded the position, vor vcre tlie troops S3 placed as to da able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and nothinff but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army there from de- struction. Tho enemy did snccceJ ia brineinpr np eomo of their artillery, and tbrew tome Buells into tHe camp, belore any preparations for defeufiO bad been inaae. On the 3d of July tbo bights wero taken possession of by our troops and -works of deleuse commenced, and" tten, and not until tiien, was our aimy secure in that position. NUMBER OP TROOPS. By reference to the testimony of Mr. Tucker. As- eiatant-Secretary of War, it will be seen tiiat prior to tbe 5th of Apiil, 1862, 121,500 men had been! landed on the peninsula. Shortly afterward Gen. Frankl.n's division of Gen. McDowell s corps, num- bering about 12,000 men, was sent down. In the early part of June Gen. McCall's division, of the same corps, of about 10,000 men, was sent down, together with about 11,000 men, from Baltimore and Fortress Monroe, and about the last of June, Bomo 5,000 men of Gen. Shields's division were also sent down. Total, 150,500 men. On the 20th of July, 1302, according to tbe returns ■enttothe Adjutaut-Geixeral's office by Gen. Mc- Clellan, the Army of tbo Potomac, uuder bis com- mand, was as follows: Present for duty, 101,601; special duty, sick, and in arrest, 17,828; absent, 38,- 795; total, 158,314. This included the corps of Gen. Dix, amounting to 9,997, present for duty, or in all, 11,778 men. m'clellan idle. The armv remained at Uarri on's Bar during the month of July and a part of Augu^st. It engaged in no active operations whatever, and was almost entirely unmolested by tbe enemy. The subject of the future operations of the army was a matter of much deliberation on the part of tbe Government. Gen. McCluUan claimed that tho James liiver was the true line of approach to Richmond, and that be ehotild be re-enforced in order to renew tho cam- paign against that place. Tho President visited the army about tbo 8th of July, but nothing was then decided upon. HIS ARMY ENERVATED. On the 25tb of July Gen. Halleck visited the army at Ilarnson'B Bar, accompnnied by Gen. llurnbide, who had come fro'ji North Carolina, with tho greater portion of his force, to Fortress Monroe. Tho gen- eral olDcera were called together, and the question of wittidra.viug tbo army was submitted to them. Tho co'.iuc.l was of rather an informal cburactor. The majority of tbo officers expressed tncuioclvcsin favor of a withdrawal of tho army. Gea. Barntido testifies that, aa b-j understood from tbo officers tbere, tbo army was not in a good condition, sickness wau increasiujr, many of tbo regiments were without sbeltcr and cooking utcutils, and many of tbo men were with lut arms" Tbo general opinion expressed by tbo leading officers was tha*. tbo men bad become very moc.i enervated. One of the leading officers said tkat his command could net, in his opinion, march tiiree miles and-Jight a tattle. Thia condition of the troops waa ore of tho reiBoriR OBsi^ed for tho final withdrawal of tbe army f r. m tbo pemnfluht. M'CLELL.\N'S DEMAND FOR IlL-nxroRCF.MENTS. Gen. McCkllan applied for 5J,<.'UiJ re--nl<.icenienta to cnaLlo Mm to rcbume active operuii •no. Gen. ll.all.ck, when bo vinted the army, inloi raed Gen. McClellan tbiit tbo Govemmcut couM fiirnnh bim only -0,000 aiidiiional tro-jps. Gen. Mi.C'ellan con- sented to renew ope/atious with that uu'ii'cr of ro« enforcements, and Gun. IlailoL-k l;ft witli t'.iut un- derbtauding. But tbo day thiit bo I'ltGeu. iMcClellan wroteUo lura, n.-kiisg for 15,1)00 o;- 20,000 troops from tho Wcateru army, in addition tu tbo-e promised to him, urging very atronuly that tbey sbouM be brougbt hero temporarily, to bo reiurne 1 to tbo West after liichmond Bboiild bavo been liken. As thia could not bo do-e, the ott'er was given lor tlio with- drawal of tbo army as ra; idly as p.>biibl'«, in order to co-operate witli tin force.i under GL-n. Pope, then in tho presenco of a euDciior force of tho enemy. M'CLELLAN'S TESTIMONY. In regard to the rc-eni'orcemeut of tbe array while at Harribon'a Landing, the testimony of Gen. Mc- Clellan is as follows: ^ , " Question. How many available men did you eilimalo that ' youliai atllairi^oii'rt tiar. uud how mauy more would yoa , bavo required iu order to undertaie a movemeat luccosafully v upon KicLruoLd? ^ . t, , "AuBwer. I thinkIbadaboatC5.OOOor93.OjO men at Har- 1 rlaon'a bar. Qud would hjvo undertaken another luovotuent ia i advaucewilU about 2J.0 lO more re-euforcetncu'i. My '^ioj^ , wa3 that pi e'.tv much cvervtbing tUst tho (Joveromeut could have controlled o;i;;lit to havo been mn«8ed ou tt;e Jamei - River. I did not believe ti.e enemy would troubla Vv'abins- • ton so Ion? as we h id a powerlul army i;i t;:o vicinity of lUch- mond.aud di 1 net th^rotlio nppreheniiotji lor tboBaIoCyot| Wasbi^gtontuat w.TO entertained by a g oat niaiy. "I ESiei for LO (lUO men at firat, on tiio ground tliat I thought the Brmy^houlJ be made aa strong aa prasibl.-, uud aa little M | possible Isit t3 chaiiCe. When Oeu. Ualleck canm down to ; Harris^^n's B.ir, my recollection ia tbat he said that 20,000 1 men, or something about that nnii;ber, wm til thatcouldbol had, and I said that 1 would try it egaiu with that number.) I have no recollection of having asked at a subsequent period ' for a greater n«mber than 20,(w0 aa a uecesuary preliminary to | a movemr nt. , , , , . r .u J "Question. About hov#iiany men hsd boon lost from tna | 25th of Juno until you reached Harrison's Dar, ia killod, j wounded, and mi.'sing ? , , „„„ t . t .it "Answer. I think the loss was about 14,000; butlconldj not tell positively witbout lookins at tho returns. ! " Queslion. ^\ ill you ttate in what your dunces for «ucc«MJ would have been greater, witti tbo addition of 'JO.OOO men to the number which you had at Harrison'a Laudius.-, than they wereiu front of Kichmond, and bel'ojo Jackson had lormed m | junction with tbe rtst of the enemy's forces? •' Answer. I sliould have counted upon the effect of tno battles, which had just taken place, upon tho em my. Wrt bad then itrong reasons to believe that tbo enemy's losses ha*, hcen very much heavier than our own. nud that portions of his army were vervmuoh dtmorallzeJ, cspociaUy alter thd« battle of Malyein iliU." ^ GEN. B.\RNARD'S REPORT. In closing their report upon the campaipn of thaj Peninsula, your Committee would reler to tho report of Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers of th* Army of the Potomac during tbat campaign, mad» to Gen. McClellan. The couclubioii of his report^ which ho terms "a retrospect pointiug out the mis- takes that wero made, and thus tracmg the canaea of its (the Peninsular campaign's) failure to their true sources," is as foltows: CAUSES OF M'CLELL.\N'S FAILURE. " Ono of the prominent among tbe causes of nltUJ mate failure was tho inaction of ci^'bt mouths, froi^' Au?u6t, 18G1, to April, 1862. More than a: y otheri wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In No^ Ycmlier, ISGl, tho Armv of the Potomac, if notfnllyl suop led with a' I tbo 'materiel,' wns yet about ael complete in numbers, discipline, an.! ■ ' a as it ever bcc.ime. For four ruontb", t yno avenue to tbo caoi^al of tho nation -> .''^ *i and tbat capital kept in a i^artial euio o; i :ei,c by ai greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army o4 "In tbo Winter of 1?61 and 18G2, Norfolk conlt,OT Biron? posi- S rrepared to ccvfr tbo dcbou>Ms fvom our bridges to th3 left bank of tba Chickabouimy. WitU tl es3 tho army would hava poss^Kaed Iree- doni of moiioa to coEceLtrate oa either Eide, and the disaatroua battle of the 27ih ^ould Bcarcely have °*^«"\Vhea tbo army reached the James River it needed no prophet to predict the disaslera vyhica have eince bti..i:en our country a cause. It tiie army tedsnstaned itecif nobly it cannot be denied thatEomuc'a fruivlrea toil, and eo much disaster, haddepriveditoftho^/aaTs-hichicEnltfl frora euc- ccssalone. It wa., moreover, pa ^^11^ 3 our forces elsewhere, eadly diminished la Dumbers. On the other hand, tho whole army, froa ita firbt low Btatc, Lad risen up au army mobt fcrmidable la numbers, exceUcut iu orgauisutiou, and inepired by a preal success. Had its number, indeed, apProached to thatattribuied to it-200,C00 Kec-thero 13 Uttle doubt that a march upon Waehicijtou vvould have eneedily followed oar withdrawal to tho James. «• From 6uch coQuderatious, as well as those lol- lowiDK from tho results of the paet operations, i counseled tho immediate withdrawal from the James to reuaito with oui forces coveimg Wafli- '°^'he* report cf Gen. Barnard ia the only report of the officers engaged iu tbo campaign of tbe PeninBula which your Commiltco havo obtaiucd. Tuo report by tho commandiDg gencrrA has not yet been made, and tlio rcporta cf Lia Bubordumtcs havo not been Bent by him to tho'Departmcnt. co-ori:R.\TioN witu gei?. pope. Gen. Eurucido, wiih hi.1 comurind, waa the first to leave iLo pcnineuLi. Uo landed at Accimannd proceeded to Frcdcrifkaburg, relieving G en. King, who proccodedat onco to rejoin hia corpa (ileUow- cll'a) then with Gtu. Pope. Soon after. Gen. L.arn- Eide was ordered to ecnd nil posaiblo aciiistauco to Gen. Pope, and at onco ordered two of hij three divioiona (lleno'a oivJ Stcvcns'f) up llio Rappahan- nock. Suorily after iLal tbc advanco cf tha army of tho Potomac. Filz JcLn Portci'o corp--, r-jiuhcd AC- quia. and waa sent forward by GiiC. Burneido to Q«n!Pope. Thorestoftbo Armyof tho PUoraac, except KeycB'a corps,, left to gHirisoQ Torklowa, procieaed to Alexandria, and frca tUirp joiood Oen. tope. Ge-. Samner slopped at Acqui.i and dejarked ft portion of hia corpd there; but ho received oiderato rc-eiubark theai uRam and procoed to Alexundiia, ^ThotrooiVsenttothe oesistanco of Gen. Pope were sent by ordera of Gen. llalleck; for tboso pc. t froui Acnui V tbo ordera wera given tbroug'i G'ia. Birn- e^d. ; for ihoto eent out froai Alexandria, tin orderj were uiveti direclly to t ho cori a^ corauiJndcrP, utilil Gen. McClellan arrived, oa ih . 'J3ui ot Aujsuac ; mter wLich iho ordera were ^ivcii ihrou- 1 him. Iho circuoiaianceicoanecleJwuh tha camp--x"drla) i" J^/'^-^'^J^ lUaXl. Sumner wU conimeuca roacUwij fcilmouux to- "^^At 12 m. on tho same day Gen. Ualleck tolographa toGen. McCkilau: '■Te'e"Tami from Gen. Porter to Geo. ^ ana Uickcit.. iiei^r \V ^.e-itou ; lieu j o . L. • marcMuijouWarreiitoatore^nlarcjFop- U«i.it7.tl aiau. Porter rerorl- b E^n .r.l KranUiu'a corps fbouU mova out by fo^u. 1 threat rf.nudiv3' provisions, to ba supp.i- ble, by railroad." , From Geu. IlcClcUan to Gen. HaUeck, same day, sent 1^2:5 p. m., received 1:40 v. m.: , .. My aidbas i-^/etur.edfro^Oex F^in-soj^mp^R- I t'aa corai ia readiuobs to m jva at onw. _ From Bama to Batne, Bent 1:15 p.m., received 1:50 p. m. ■■FrankUn'aarlUeiyhw no horse. ""P'^V'^'l^J"^ CieatCo.a,^oatf^.re-se. 1 U^vo ,^ ^^ , y,^^^,,, ^7aUou; liiJ f tiuery or cavjiry, e Jec , an/ n s. ui P^'^ ^^ of any of Vope'i Iroops x^ •■^^^^//^f"^ S.^oTuaud t. foriu . coa- L'ura wi?h P V; wUo!/c"ac "po^uoa «o d. no; kn,^. , Zowl sale in tUo direcaou ol' tlio vaUe j 1" At 1:50 p. m. Gen. Ilalle.k replies: .. Ye, , I think Su..ner-s coa. iVf:^ .iTr^ui^Sd;*.^ Theei.emyb_aaPl.uiredjLt L . -r.. on it ^^^^^ ^ ^ ^^^ officer at i^J:;wa'^ * «"/ ■ .-,.^, t , lur-. I'opo'* ri-bt. UtLerenowayof .. ,«iaiuio Oa .ho mornins of tho^-i.h cf Aujust, Gen. Hal^ leek telegraphs to Gen.^ I- raukliu:^ ^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^^ ^J " Oa piilinj wi:li P . , yoar monaiij it was ua'. ,, .jmy corps t^-diy toward \ hf fi cm tb J railroad, li.-. j-- ,._,,,, .^ ■...-.■fl aU or- nctiotarnedto Alexauu!..!. 1. ^ua u.T. .- i ' - "= mI Stm. of the eame day, the 23th. Gen. Mc- ; Ckllau tel'esrapba to Gen. HaUtck: -Toar dlrpatch to F-V'-/^'?,i-ai,'-'l?h'rmo1n'I.S 16 heBMll". * ^ * * * • • Pleaao sen Cor- nard, and be sure tho workn toward Chain Bridge are perfeot- 'yjepiyra. 1 look upon those woiks, especialiy Ethaa AUen end Marcy, as of the first importance." ■»AX^.i^^ P*™* ^^°* Halleck telegraphs to Gon. McClellan: *^ "Not a moment must be lost in poshing aa large a force as possible towaid Man;;S3a3, eo as to communicate with Pone Dblore tna enemy is re-eaCorcod." At 4:45 p. m. Gen. McClellan replies: " Tour dispatch receivocl. Neither Franklin's nor Snmner's corps 13 uov\r la condition to move and figbtabattle. It woudbeaEacrihcotofiendthemoutiiow. Ih vese-it aides to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tjlo- But! Bill tiirnk that a premature movement in email force will accomphsii nuthin? bnt the destruction of the troops Bont ^ t tT '■''?,''''' *-'^' lyiil 'osa 110 time in preparing the troops now here for the field, and that whatever orderl you may give, after heaiin? what I have lo Bay, will be carried out." *r4t',^;,^^ P- "• ^^°- HaUeck telegraplis to Gen. McClellan: " There nius,t be co further delay in moving Franklin's Corpa toward Manassas; they must go to-morrow mornln" ready 01 not ready._ If wo delay too long to cet ready there JviU be no Eccessity to go at all, for Pope will either be de- leated or viclohous witliout our aid. If there is a want of wagons, tlie men mnst carry provisions with them till tho wagons cin come to their relief." At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan tolcgraphg: " Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been or- .^. \''< 'i^l^^h"*' '^ o'ciock to-morrow morning. Sumner has •bout 14,0U0 lufaatry, without cavalry or artillery here." At 10:30 a. nn. of the 29th, Gen. McClellan tele- graphs 10 Gen. Halleck: _ " Franklin's corps is in motion ; started abont 6 a. m. I can rive lam but two squadrons cf cavalry. ***** jf Sumnor moves in support of Frankiin.it leaves ns without any trustworthy traops lu and near Washington. Yet Frank- iiu js_( 00 muc'b alone. What ehalJ bo done ? Have but three squadrons belongm,' to the Army of the Potomac. Franklia fias but forty rouods of ammunition, and no wajons to move ^■""t"-.-. ""'".'''*"'' ■''^"•""''""''i condiuoa to accomplish math if he meets strong resistance. 1 should not have moved mm bnt for your pressm;^ orders of last night." At 12 m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: ,. " D° yo'J wiih tho movement of Franklin's corps to con- tinue } He ifl without reserve ammunition and without transportation." — "• In another dispatch of same date he telegraphs: " Franklin has only between 10,003 and 11,000 ready for . duty. Uow far do you wish this force to advance 7" At 3 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Mc- Clellan: - "I '^a°' Franklin's corps to go far enongh to find cut fTr^^^:"^ '^^"' '^% «««'"y- re?naps he ma> get such iS- formaaon at Anaudale as to prevent hij goiag further- otherwise he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get some-' thing from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people mwi move more ac- tively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of At 2:40 p. m. the President asks of Gen. Mc- Clellan: "^^'^1*^'?®^^ ^'^°'^ direction of Manaasas Junction? What generally?" ' At 2:45 p. m., received 3:30 p. ra., Gen. McClel- lan repLjCB: " Tha last news 1 received from tho diroction of Jlanassas was from strag^-lers, to the effect that the enemy were evaca- etingCentrevilla and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. Xhisi^ by 1.0 means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses ehould ba adopted: First, To concentrate all our rrail.blo forces to open communication with Pope. Second, ■To leave Pope to get cut of h:3 scrape, and at once use nil means to make the capital perfectly sife. No middle course wi now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do uUia my power to acoampUsh it. I wish to know what my orders aid authority aro. I ask for nothin-, but wiU fw^r'*^ '^'1''' '"'^^" ^'°? »'™- ^ oalya'k a prompt decision, that 1 may at once give tho necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer." At 4.10 p. m. the PreEideuf replies: M^l^""""*^ *?'°"^'' J"^' received. I tliink yonr first Blterna- tive.towiu: 'toconcen.rate all car availablo forces to open forn^.T^'f^^'^"" l'°PO.'" the right one. But I wish noS Counsel"" """'^ '"'^^ ^° Gen?Halleck, aided by your FRANIiLIN'S DISOBEDIENCE. aioCleS-^' '"■ ^^"' ^^^^"^^ tolegTapLs to Gen. "Yon willtomediately send constrnctlon train andenMaB to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no deW if thU? 1 have jnstbeea told that Franklin's corps atopped at Ana* roi^VfrlV''^''"''^^' '"^^ evening in AlexandriT This is 5l di obpdin.f ^ Th "/'• I^^e««8^t« 'i°d report the fact of t£i cU^obedionce. That corpg must push forward, as I dhrect&i Msn^assaT" ' "'^'"^'^ ^"^ °^^° °" communications ?rtth M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m endeavoZ^ to arraneo for 6n oplies for his command. I am responsible fof both these circumstances, and do not iee that either was S r^ference^o F a^.^^r.' '"^'"- ^H'"" ^ive disthi;t orrrS S reiereacetoi hring them cut. Suchd^. guest, when Alexandria is full of troops and we JighiinatL to Gen.'McCkiliT'' ''' ''''" ^'""''^ ''''^^"^ ^Ztir^}'^ "° ■'?°^"' satisfied with Gen. Franklin's laaroh of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the ca^e. He was nfZTh^f fhi" n°P';"'° ^' Anand Je. Moreover, I Iearred7a" nght that the Quartermaster's Departmenfcould have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any thna •inceMs arrival at Alexandria. Uo knew the iaiportanc^f opening commumcation with Gen. Pope's army, ind ehotld nave acted more promptly." j, -"i. •uwum At 11 a. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: n/'r wT.V-^?"'^ Suipner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, fia Columbia Pike on Anandale and Fairfax Conrt-House, if this is the roateVoS wish them to take. He and Franklin ere both i^sLucted to iTenhra?rivrr'"^'"^°'"'""- ^'^^'^ <=°'«'^ >noyTljll At 12:20 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs: \r,17-„!^?°'^ ^°,°'^? Bhould land at Alexandria, and be im- mediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troop, whereat fiohtmot^. Let mefcnow when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time. * * * Send trSis. fX'' '^//l^ja to bring i np Enrnside's commanl Se telegraphed to him, and am a vvaiting his answer." , At 2: 15 p. m. Gen. Halleck tclegrapha : i wII'^^^^m"" n *°^ "j'l.ofSnmuer's corps should bo pushod for- Z^vi H" 5" P°'f '"'^ d^patch. They must uso their logs and make forced marches. Time now ia everything." "6"«^« Hail'ck-^* ™* ^^°* ^°^^^^^'*° telegraphs to Gen. *!,•' ^^P'^ Hnmmcrstcin of my stafi' reports, from two miles this pida of Cetreviile, at ifso p. m., that FranUl'n's mim was then advancing rapidly. Sunlner's' corps move J at ? « ?tV^' .^t ?w"^ Y''° ^^°"2'^' '1=0 <5i«P='tch from Hammer. m?Ip",h,lnl'i"J^ ''f ''•°r'='^ »hat the fighting commenced fiv9 iS^ H,?^^'?! Centreviile, and that our people had been driv? iDg^thcmaUdaj. HammerUein isyg aU he Icaras was favor. , jj^*jJO-^Jf> p. m. Gen HaUeck telegraphs to G«n. actuaUy required in the forti, should march to Pope's niiat ir iKeploea them with new regiment*. Frwiklin ibonld also bo Cjried ou to ro-tuforco royo." On tbo enmo day — Aug. 3D, honr not given — Gen. cClellau tent the following to Gen. Ilallcck. I "Evpr Bince Gen. Franklin rpcoived Dotica thatliowatto (inarcli f.-oii Aleian J:ia, ho I123 bocn iisiag every effjrt to get itranspoit t'f D lorlii ici'.ra ommuulcjoa. Uut lio w«i uui- formly t j!J by t':o Quartermi»;e.Bl;(rj that tlioro was nona 'disiiosalilo, auJ his couiiniuU iiurcbi J wiihoutwasoiia. After Itbodcpaitaro tf hijcorpn, etc a. la. jcstorday, he prociired SO WBgana to cirry aporc;0!i cf liianniinutiliioii, by uuloadiug Isomocf O'en. Ba£k'i's£iipply train for that purpOie. " GcD. Sumuer w,:gci.o rntifo dv/iii eDdeavoring, by»p- Iplicotioniipoa Quiiieriiia^tors and ctJiers, to pot a Bufficieut [Btimberor wajji.1l > t:aufport his reserve Qiiimuriition, but fwitliout succcij. n-.;^! was obliged to march w.tUnu' It. " I havolhia iroruing tent lU my hoadquaitera train that i» landed to ho ct c Ci' londcJ wit'i atiimnuitioa I'jr Bumr.cr and Fianklu;, but tlioy will not go for toward supplying tbo defi- ciency. '* Eighty-Cvo wagons were got togplhcr by the Qnartermas- toi last Li;:ht, loaded with subsistence, and scut forward under an escort at 1 a. ci., via Alexandria. " Every cC";rt hii bceu luado to carry out yonr initmctions promptly, 'x'he rilficul'.y eeems to cousibt in tlio fact that the^eater part of tbotr^inspartation ou hand at Alexandria itnd \Va8h;n;;toa liai been needed for current supplies of tha igaiiisocs. At all event?, euch is tho statoot' tl)0 caso as rep- resenteu to mo by t Jo (Quartermaster, and it appears to bo true. I tako it fjr granted that this liaa not beeu properly ex- I-loined to you." At 10:45 fl. m. of the 31et of Angust, Gen. Pope iBfcnde tbe folio wiag to Gen. llalleck from Centreville : " Our troops are all here, and In position, though mnch used up end %^-:ii out, I think it would, perhaps, havo beeu peatly better if Sumi'.cr and Fr^nlilin had been hero three or .four days a;o. Uutyou i:iay rely upon our civlng them (the J enemy) as dcsperilo a Cgbt as I can loroo our men to sLand lOpto. I should liko to know whether you feel secure about iWashlngtoD, should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it , as long as a iLan will stand up to the work. You must judge |what ij to bodoae, haviiigi:i view the safety cf the capital. The enemy i3 already pusliiu.'; a cavalry reconuoiisance iu our front ut Cub Kuii, whether in advauco cf on attack to-day I don't yet know. I send jou this that you may k£oir our position and my purpose." On tbo 2d of Soptember Gen. Pope wai ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Wasbington, where hia jarmy came under the command of Gen. McClellan. 'm'CLELLAN responsible for. pope's DEFEAT. The following is from tbo testimony of Gen. Hal- lock: "Question. Bad the Army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the Army of Virginia with tho utmost energy tnct circumstarces would havo permitted, in yonr iudgnicnt, as a military man, would it not have resulted in onr vietory instead of our defeat 7 " Answer. I thought so at tho time, and still think so." i In relation to tbe command of Gen. McClellan, be Ihimseli' testiiles as follows: ^ " Question. What position did yon occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded tho troops which had been under your command to tha assistance of Gen. Pope t ; " Answer. I was for some little time— one or two days, two ]or three days, perhaps — without any position; merely at my camp, without niy command. On Monday, tho 1st of Sep- tember, I received verbal lustruclions from Gen. llalleck to take command of tho defenses of Washington. I was, how- ever, cxptessiy prohibited from, in ouy way, assuming any control over tuo troops under Gen. Pope. I think It was on tho next day after that I was lustmctcd verbally by the Prcsi^icat and (jen. Ilallcck to go cut aud meet tho army which was coming in, and to ossumq command of it when it approached the pcs.tiop that 1 considered it ought to occupy for defeusive purpoocs, and to post it properly." Tbo testimony of Gen. Ilalleclc npon tbo aamo point is 09 follows : '• Question, ^^'hat was the position of Gen. McClellan In regard to tho troops of the Army cf tho Pofomno as thov laudcdatAcquii (.'reek and Alexandria? Were tuey under bis commtnU ; aud u to, how long did tho)r remain under hia COmmiudT '-AiiBWcr. Gen. McClellan retained tbe command of the Army of tho Potonjac as it landed at thoso two p'jiuts, except such portions of it as were sent into tho held niidcr Gen. I'op". 'Ihosoporliona wore consid- ercdm teu.;criii;y dotich.-a Ironi hil command, butitLlbe- lon^iiig t ' hn uruiy, Bi.d be V. Hi directed that all orJeritent from hi:a to t.ol.oops asdetaeheJ, whi!» under G n. rcpo'i Imnieeliate command, maitbo sent tli'ojgh the heauqusiters at Wa3..iug.cn. lio retained command of a'l thot.ootsof his army ci tli-^y landed at thoso i I. cciuntil k nt iutolho field, ELil rtpo.tcj to Gen. Pope ; oad llicv continued to ro- Ciain under hi 1 command, Willi tho oxccptio.1 of hia detach* mcnts, uulil Gen. Pope's army fell back on Washingtcn, when oU came under Gen. MoCleilan'a oomioand. Gu his (Oen, McClellan'e) arrival at Alcrandria bs traa Mi to talc* Jmmodiatn roujiiuiiid of all tbo troops in (md a'jout NVuhlng- ton. In adJiti.u to tjoso which propeily be'.oi';;cJ to I ho Army of tbo Potomac, tionio dav« lifter h» had I c ii vrrb liy direct- ed to taho bu(Ii coniniun J Ima^Led for n fjrmal or lor, which was iisued l.-^om tho Ad,iitiiit-Geno«ra ofli -e. 1 he ordef l.-eucd from tho Aiijtt iLttJeueral'^pifiico was afier Gen. Pope's army commu:icu I falling back, and was diltd Hept. 3; but Gen. McClcUoji had beea iu command ever since bis arri- Tilin Alexo'Jdria. " Qiicstiou, At what time did ho arrive In Alexandrlat "Answer. Ilo arrived at Alexand.ia on tbo »(ith of August. Tlio (ormal onlcr v. an i su'-d that ho nii-ht havo no difficulty with Gon. Popu's forces: that they mli^ht not question hia aathority." THE CAMPAIGN IN M.\RYLAND. Very Boon after Gen. Popo and Lis army fell back on \Vncbington tbe liebcl army enteretl Maryland. Prepuratious wcro immediately mado by tbe autbor- itiea in Wasbington to follow tlicra. In relation to tbo command of tbe army in Mary- land your Committee will tiaoto from tbo tealimonv of Gen. McClallm and Gen, llalleck. Tbe tegtl- ; mony of Gen. McClellan is as follows: "Question. What position did you occupy after your ar- rival at Aloxacdria, and you hid forwarded tho troops which had been under your command to the assistance of Geo. Popo? " Auswer. I was for some little time— one or two days, two cr thrco days, perhaps — without anyposiilou; merely al my camp, without any command. On Monday, tho 1st of •September, 1 received verbal instructions from Gen. llalleck to tako command cf the dcfeuees of Wcshiogton. I waa, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over tho troops under Gen. Pcpe. I think It waa on'tho next day after that that I was Instructed verbally by the President and Gen. llalleck to go out and meet tbe army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it | approached the position which I considered it ought to occa* 1 py for defensive purposes, and to post it properly. } M'CLELLAN FORGETS. ' "Question. EIow long did you remain in command of tb«i defenses cf Washinitou, and what orders did jou nextr»-| ceive, and from whom 1 '• Answer, 1 do not think that ordef, assigning tha defense! cf Washingtou, was ever rescinded, or any other one issued in its place. 1 had only verbal communications with Gen. Llal- leck boloro I started on the Antietam campaign. And it was never dehnitely decided, up to tho time that I left, B» to whether 1 was to go or not, I asked the question two or three times of Gen. llalleck, whether 1 was to command tho troopi iirtbo field, and bo said it had not been determined. And I do not think that it ever was. I think that \cat one of thote thingt , that grew into thcpeiiidf. When the time came I vent out." Tbe following is tbo testimony of Gen. Halleckj upon tbat point : ! " Question. By whose orders was Oen. McClellan placed la eommaad of the army that left Washington to operate in | •Maryland ; and were these orders verbal or in writing 7 • "Answer. As 1 stated the other d».j, the order %oai giten verhally to Gen. McClellan by the Prctidenl. at Gen. McClel- lan' t houte, about 9 o'clock in tht morning, previotu to Ctn. MO' CleUan leaving the citi/for Rockville. •' 1 will add that Gen. WcCie Ian, in virtue of b!l belnc placed in command of tho foitiUcations of Washington and the troops fordefonso within them, was really in command of all tho trooj a here at that time. 'I'he question was discussed by tho President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops tbat wcro to go into tho lielJ. Th» decition uai made by htmtclf, and announced to Gen, McCM' laninmypriicnce. I did not know what the decision wai, nntil I heard it thus announced." M'CLELL.\N FORGETS AGAIX. In regard to tbo instructions given to Gen. McClel- lan bis testimony is as follows: " Question. Did yon havo any interriewwith the President In relation to taking comn-and cf tho troops for tho Sla-yland eampaign, or receive any iustrucUona from him ou thai point t ,, „ "Answer. I do not think he catt m* any tnitractvmi afttr that morninn, when I was t'-'ld to tnko comiaand of tho aimy Infrontof vVashirigtnn. I do not think he gavo me any in- atructionsaboutlhp Maryland cimpaign. " After you commenced tho muvcmcnt, did you receive any inntructlots from any onol . ..i , » j " Ai!8%vcr. I received some telefrram", fft"? r-.-.r'^.t be l^vkrd vponi.^ the tia'ura cf instrur-l.or.t, fr ' ' d from the Pic-iJer-t. 'Iho p'^^erul t patches wo9i:iat/»"Cj camm <.'.;;/ <;■> ■ ' away fr, m \i ailnt.rjton; tJ-.i.t I vci i, ^ , *- llebaJ t loia pej'ion tliDt the iniia fur. o uf I..0 > n^aiy was onl.of uth t.tloof tlol'otomoc, and i:.at thry bid only a smalf, colli liont cf nio to d.-aw me o-), and tuen^tae^ wou'dcon.ofr,to\\'aihin;*ouln rear. As lito B") t.^o l^lhof Sept mbpr, IrocohectQ telegram cfOcn. Ualcck in which bo pressed that Bamo Idea, and told m« that I waa wtoas la going go far away." 18 , The tfistimony of Gtn. Halldck upon that poiut is as follows: ' " Qnestion. Wliat insiractions, it any, were giron to Gen ,' McClellan iu resaid ta the conduct of the campaiga in Mary, land? "Answer. Tho d^y the President gave Gen. McCU^lan di- rections to take comiaav^^f the forces i:i tlio Cel J, wo had a long conversatioa i a regffd to the campaign in Jljrjiand. It W23 agreed belu'eeau3 that the troops EhouUniov-^up th? Potoiiac, an:', if p^fsil^e, sepurale that poniou cf Gen. Lee's army whic'i I12J cros-ei tbe Fotomao fro u t!;e remjinder on the Virgin!! fi;>. Thero were co deiinito instructions, far- ther than that ui^Jerstaadicg hetweea us, as to the general plan of t!.o csmpaipn. "I submit herewith copies of dispatches to and from Gen. McCleilan, a'"terheleft Washinstou tJ talio comraiiLd of op- erations iallaryland, to tha tima thitliowaj re-ievcd from common 1. 'I'hesa paper? comprise a 1 tbe di-patchesEent to and received fr rm Gen. BlcClellan, so far aa I know, except a letter dated October!:?, addressed to him bytho President, ani which wasEhon-utomojuEt as tho Presidentwaa about to ' dati rep!, lhi3re.;o't.J " LircrjardfoCen. McCtellan't going too fast or too far from V/''s'i,.nit:.n, there can be J'oundno such telezram from metohim. ifel.asuiistr'.kenthe laeaning of thg telegrams I sectirn. T telf •jrsphedhim th;t he was goin'? too far, not froiaV/asli:no,!o !, bi.tfrom tho Potomac, leaving Gen. Lea tho opportaui y tjcome dowuthe Potomac end get between liita and Washin_qtoii. I thousht Gen. JloClcllan eh^nldkeep more iipo.i the Potomac, and press forward his l8:t rather than hi5 ritht-, soas tl:siuora readily to relieva Harper's Ferry, whicli vas (ho point then in mcst immediate dancer; that he was pusMn 5 forward his light too fast relatively to the move- men's cfh'jlpf;— not tliat the army was naovius too fast or too far from W a;!uDgtou." TiiG letter of Gcd. Hdleck of Sept. 13, refecred to by Gen. McClellan, is as follows: " SentlO-A'S a. m. " War DEPARTsrEirr, 1 " WAsnixGTON, D. C, Sept. 13, 18S3. ) "MAJor.-GEN. McClellax: Yours of 5i3Jp. m., yester- day, isjustrtccivtd. Gen. i; ants cannot safely spare eight new regiments froo here. You must remember that very few troops are nov/ received from (he North, nearly all bcieg ttopred to cuard tho raiiroid. Four regimeuta we: e ordered to Gen. Dix to replaco Peck's division. Porter took away \esterdzy over 23,CUJ. Until you know mora certainly the enemy's f;rco Eo:ith of tho Potomac you a-o wren? in thus nncoveiitisthocafitah lam of opir.i a ih^t tho enemy wDl send a Email column to Pennsjlvc nil, so as to draw yonr forces in that direction, tiien suddenly move on AVashingtoa with thd forces south of the Potomac, cud those bo may cross ever. " In yonr letter cf the lllh yot> attac'i too little importance to the capital. I as-suroyou that you a'e wronj-. The capture of this ptaco will throw U3 back blx montI:s, if it should not destroy us. Dcwaro of the evils I cow point out to you. Yoa saw them when here, but yoa eeem to I'arget them in the dis- tance. No more troofs can bo tent from hero till we bays fresh anivals from the North." M'CLELLAN PROPOSES TO SACRIFICE WASH- INGTON. TI19 lef^or from Gen. McClellan, of tlie 11th, to whicIi Gen. Halleck here refers, contains tho fol- io-wing: " I believe this army fully appreciates tha Importance of a Tictory at this time, and will fj^ht well; but the result of a general battle, with such cdds es tho enemy now appears to have Rsainst u?, might, to say the least, bo doubtful; and, if wa should be defeated, tho consecjuyiccs to tho country would be disastrous in the extreme. iJndcr these circum- stance'", I wotld recommend thc;t one cr two cf the three army corps now en the Potomac, opposite Washington, be at once wittidrawn, and seut to re-enforce this army. I would also adviso ti:at tho force cf Col. Wiles at Harper's Ferry, wbero it can bo of llttlo use, and is continually exposed to be out cif by tie enemy, b3 iaamediately ordered here. This wouHaddal;oul2j,0 old troops to our present foree, and would f rta ly stroKsthen us. " J f tuere aro any Uebcl forces remaining on the other side cf tho Potomac, they must be BO few that the troops left in tho lortj, eff er t.'i3 tv,"o corps sha 1 havo been withdrawn, will bo sufficient to check them; and with the largo cavalry force now on that sidrt, kept wcU out in front to give warning of tho distant approacU of anyvery largo army, a part cf this army migi:! bo sent back within thq intrenchments to assist in ropelLng an attack. I^rt evon if V/ashngton thould be taken while the;o armies are confiomii.g each other, this would not, la my judgment, bear comparison wi.h the luia and disasteia which would follow a singlo defeat of thisarmy. If we should be 6ncco?ettl in conqueuug tho gigantio febel army befors n», we wou-.d hav.3 no ditlicuity iar-oovcingit. Ontheother hand, ebould thoir forco prove sufficieutlypowerfrd to defeat as, could ell the forces now around Wasiiuigton bo sufficient ^o prevent such a viotcrious army from carrying tho works en tliia Bide of the Potomao after thoy are uncovered by our aimy? I think not." Yonr Connnittee having gone so f ally into the d©« tails of tbe PenitiGula cainpaicjD, do not deem It necessary to devote Eo much space ti> the cmnpaign in Maryland. Tii3 eamo raind that controlled tns movements npca tfce Peninsula controlled tlioee im Maryland, r.nd tho same general fea'.urei character- iz3 tLa oue catr'paiga that characterized tbe other. In each may be Eeen t-e same inireadiuess to move proinp.ly and act vi.wrously ; tbo eamo de&iro for more troops belbro advancius; and t'je eamo refer- ences to tbo great superioricy of numbers on tho part of tbe eneay. Your Committee, therefore, con- tent tbemEelvei with i-eferring briefly to the leading operations of the campaign. HARPER'S FERRY. In relation to tha Burrender of Harper's Ferry, your Committee havo not deemed it neceseary to | tako much testimony upon that subject. The mili- tary commission which was convened in this city in Octooer last folly investigated that subject, and their report baa been given to tho public. Attention is 1 called merely to two telegrams of Sept. 11, whiclk I passed between Gen. McClellan and Gen. Halleck, and which are as follows : ] "EocKviLLB, Sept. 11— 9:45 a. m. \ ] " Col. Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, I understand, I with 9,003 troops. He con dj nothing whera he is, but could I be of great seivico if ordered to jjia me. I Busiest that h9 be j orderedat once tojoia me by tbe mostpracticablo route. "GEO. B. McCLEuLAN, | " Msjor-CeneralCommandioj. " Major-Gee. H. W. Hallzgs, Geteral-ic-Chief." '' Wati Department, ) '■ ^VA3Hl^•aT0N■, D. C, Sept. U, I8j-— Sent 2:20 p m. 5 "Thero is no way for Col. JMilcs to jon you at present. Tlia only charco is to dnfend his works uutd you can cpen a communication witij him. AVhenyoadi so, ha will be sub- ject to your orders. £1. W. HALLECK, " Generai-in-Chie^ " Major-Gen. McCi.Ki.LA>f, EocfcvUle." SOUTH jiouKTAm. On the 14th of September tte battle of South Monntain was fought-^tho troops at Turner's Gap being under command of Gen. Barnside, and tbosa at Crampton's Gap being tinder tho command of Gen. Franlslin — resulliag in tbe enemy retiring to the vicinity of Shepberdstown. AXTIETAM. On tbe 17th of September tho battle of Antietam ■was foo.iht. It wa:i commenced by Gen. Hoaker on the rigbt, at dawn, our troops driving tbe CJemy before them, and gairing an important position. When Gen. Hooker was wounded and taken from the field, Gen. Sumner took command of our rigbt. , Gen. Sumner had teen ordered to hold bis corps ia readiness to advance an honr before daylight, but did not receive the order to advance Uitil 7:20 in •the moming. Gen. Mansfield, who had come up to the support of Gen. Hooker, had been killed. Oar troopp, seeing their leaders fall, and being very heavily pressed by the enemy, were forced back for some distanco from the advanced position Gon. Hooker had reached; but finally, with tho aesistanco of the troops brought up by Gen. ^umner, checked tho enemy's progress and maintained t-eir position. On the left, Geo. Burnsido, about 10 o'cbck, waa ordered to attack tho enemy at the bridge across tho Antietam ia his front, and to effect a crossing there. The advance of Gen. Bumsido was met by a most obstinate resistance on tbe part of tbe enemy, and it was not until 1 J o'clock that tho bridge was carried. By 3 o'clock Gen. Burnside'a whole command had crossed and taken position on some elevated ground just above tho bridge. He was then ordered to take tbe bights commanoing tho town of ShepherdstowD, wbich was done after desperate fighiicg. By that time tho enemy on our left had been re-eaforced by withdrawing some of their troops from oppoeite our right, where our advance had been checked, and . Gen. Burnside waa coanpelled to give up eoma of the ground he had succeeded in occupying. Ho had sent to Gen. McClellan for re-enfercements, but ro- oeived in reply that there were none to be had, but ho must hold the bridge at all hazards. 19 The corPB of Oen. Filz John Porter, in the center, wasnot b7m.chti,.toactionatall. Gen. nookerte.ti fiea that I.e had been given to "°'l-^/""^','^'^'' 'i? were to be ait icks ma3e .imultancoualy on the n-ht, TeX %nd Ufc of oar ar.uy. He attacked at dawn; but Gen nun.Bide on the left waa not ordered to at Uck ..mil 10 o'clock, and there was no attack made in the center by Gen. Porter. M'CLELLAN ATTACKS BY pI^l^^^ETS. In regard to the manner of conducung the attack at Antietam, Gen. Sumner testifies: "1 hove alwavB believ.d th»t, I..«teaa of iendlnR the« ^ "'oi'iertioo. And aU e.cpe for the enamy would have been impoesiblo? '•Aus«er. I think 10." The buttle closed at dark, our army hayiog gained Bome little advantages, at a heavy loss, but nothing decifiive. The attack was not renewed t 'e ueil day, the two armies occupying the positnnfl held t>y them at the closeVf the yesterday's baule. WHY THE ATTACK WAS KOT TwEXEWEP. In relation to the policy of renewing the attack on the day after the battle, Gen. McClellan testifiea: "The next mornir.g (the 13th) I found that our Iob. had beensocreat. ocdtl.e o was eo much di.Dr?icization la some of the co.i.niaad*. that I iliJ not cmsiJer it proper to reuj.w day of two fre-U divisinis. ou:ouut.ng to about lo.OOO men. AaaninstauceoftbecouJitonof 8o:.ie of the tJo^P» «■/'« tnoroing, I happened to le.ollcct «''0.^°'"7» °' 'f°f '^'' Corp,— JCD. Hooker's— made tao morning of the 13.h. by ■which toeie were about 3,it)l) men reported present far duty. Four day* after thit the roturni of the aaoie corps showed 13,800. THE REBELS ELUDE M'CLELLAN. " I bed arrn-iEeJ. however, to renew tlie a-.tack at daybreak on the 19th. bui I 1 wned eaiue timeaJJ-iaSHiQ !=■'=.'•' ""^^'^l]^ inthemo:uiuf. that tha enemy hid a .cU-doLed hij position. Itafie-wud proved that houioved«i,h troit rapid'.ty, and, not buiaz incumbered by Wd-ons, wis cnab.ea to get ^i» troopa acro.a t:ie liv.-r before we could do him ''^y fe"'^"' *"" iary 1 thiuk lUat, liking iu-.o consiU-jratioa what tae troopa lad gone tnrousb. wo got ai much out cf them in thu AaUe- tam campiigu aji huuiiu eudurauoe would bear. WHAT EUHNSIDE TIIOUGUT. The testimonv of Gen. Barraide, on the subject of ivnewia.,' ilie aitick^ipon the enemy the day after ibe buttle, ia aa lollowa: "Questioa. Did von express any opinion to Oen. M;Clel- lan rr to eny OLO tt't headouatterB, in rela'.ion to renewing the attaf-k the uezt div j aad if bj, %Tha'. opiuiou did yon express I "Answer. I did'espreBi an opinion to Ucu. Mc^iel:au on the iubject., Alter my com.nani was all in rft-'on-iajbli o'clock ot t!?ht-i wcntcvertjOiU. McL!tU^'*heaJquar- teiB atCalv.-wle, asd eierts ed tie opinion tJ UenMurcy, hi. c.iief of'bt .ti, thit tije aitaik <.u;;ljt toLe rcncwod the next mormi-a ot 5 o'clock. 1 also cxi..c._ed tha tamo opmion to oiher i^iemberi of Gen. llcLlcl^'i tt ilf. l^cn. Marcy told melh.tIoL.shtt0 69oUea.Mc:iolhiJ and fell hm what 1 thouKi.tof tne matter. 1 went i .to Con. McCialbn a tent, andijiiieourse cf tha cauversa-.bn I ex^reB.eUjo same opinioato him, and told Umth.U it 1 coul J Lave 5,0OJ fresh troopit 3 pasi in advance e( uiii.e I wcuM be \vj.ii;:s to com- mence ts' i/ttick f^n the next murning. He s.id that ho had baentl U r over acd v.ou.d luske up hU mind dSrit-g 1 :. i: 1 ^^-ould .C.J a HilT cfiicer to h.. lieaiq: ;:i there cverni-ht. ho would leud me Pfi. ,, .ciiig; audifhoconc.udcd to renew the L asj.id mo li-.rj liccesiiry men. 1 did send the i r, but G.-n. MoClellau concluded not to renew ■*■ ^ . \Voulai ;ore hive been any difficnlty in fur- ni'lj'L ' : •• ■■ tCO frcsLi foo; 3 wiiich yoa desired, as the cori s ofL.i " 1 . .• lohnPo.-tcr, » me 1j,'»J or 20,0(iU men, had not ho ■ I ? ■i here would hiT._- been no dJfEcnlty In fumlsh- j. , , i.cihtrojpt. Ill f.i'-t, Goa. McCltUan »Ud send (jou. ,=i ; ./ddiv.sioD, of qaitoll.at ^trenglh, to ropjlt to me, but uot wiih orders to me tJ reuow tha attick." FRANKLtN'S OPINION. Gen. Franklin tcslitics: " Question. Were yon consulted in relation to renewing the attack the next day 1 "Answor. Whan Oen. McClolUn rislted therUhtln tha ^r>...,.^„„ I .l.owcd him a potitioo nn the richt of thit wood 1 nieiilioncd, in which w.ii llio UunkiTClnroll, V tcoiiimnndedtlie wond. and thit ii'liciuld be ; ,.1 drive t ..i < n my f.o.'ii l'f< .■■•■■ \ '■■)■ -..--ir^f Lu.J r..;lhi« I'ui'it. I • on thit plico the no^• 1 Ihoujht Ihero w.is : We had pleury of a. in.. i. .,., cni'iiiy fiom tiiore tlmt aiiei .i I no d •uut tiat we could take that place th-> i hud 1 thou»hl that would uncover the whole l 1' y •'Uue«iioii. lfihith*dbccui-.au.. a-.J . i bean carried, what would hjve bi-en tlie ilioct v t "Answer, ll would have been very iji , i. " Qucition- Wliat reasons were given l jr n^t m iluuj tha attack the next iiioruiugl "Answer. 1 old not hear the direct roisin of I'l? Oeneral Comiuauding. but I hiva uuderitood that tiie lea-o i wi«, that Lo extfictedsoiue Citeen thju .mu new troj.i.— /A .h^tcAicA ■wjutd make Vie thing a certain thing— r^ai he pnf rtrd t« wait to make this attack on the right, uutil theio now troops cime. •' Quentlon. And that delay gan t\4 enemy an opportunttif to etcape ? •• AueweT. I think it did." ' On the night of the 13th of September the enemy abandoned ihtir position and retired across the Poto- miC into Virginia, without molestaiion. Our army Blowly followoJ, aud took up a position sIouk the Potomac, on the Maryland bide, occupy iug Maryland lli^jhta ou tuo iJOth, aud llarper'a Ferry on the 23d- LOSSES ON DOXn SIDES. Gen. McChllan, on the 2i)th of ^5eptembeT, r«- porta our losses at South Mountain at 2,3Jo; at An- tietam, 12,4G'J— toUil lojses in both balilas, 14.7i)4. In relation to the losses of the enemy in bo',h those battles, in killed, wounded, prisonera and atragglers, Gen. McClellan says: " It may be sifely oonclnded, therefore, that the Rebel army l^at at lea^ SJ.tWO of their best troops in their brief cam- paigu in ilaryUnd." M'CLELLAN WANTS MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS. After the battle of Aulistara ,Geu. McCl dlan called for re-enforcements, and announced bia deter- mination to fortitV Maryl lud lligbls, niuki ig a r«>- qui-iiion on Gcn.'Wadswartb, then iu \V<8'iiiigtou, for 2,000 contrabands for taat purposj. On the 27Ui of September he writes to Gen. lI.illecW: AND PROPOSES TO FORM A MILITARY SCHOOL. " My present purpose ia to hold the army about as it now \i lenJeiirig lUrper'a Kerry fecure, aud watch. ug the river closely, iuUnJLn8to«ltdClt the enemy should ha att.mptto cross to this biJe. Our possesaju of a.irper's I'erry t'ves nj tue erccit adviutspe of a s -cure de^nuch'. ; but we ciuuo. avaU ourselves cf it until the railroid bridge is huisUed. bec^iuso we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops tlian we now have on the Vwgiuia Mo at that point. \\ ncu t je rivet rises 60 thit tue cueuiy cannot c.'oss in force, 1 purpose con- centrititiS the urmysoiuewlieru near Uarpc.'sl'er.-y.aai then BCtine according to circumstances, viz: Moving oaWlnoues- toril fiomtheposilijn and atti'.ude of the enemy, wo ore likelTtogainagicataJvantase nydoings); or tI.edevoUng a reasDuabio lime t J t^e crianizr.ioii of the nrmy aud instruc- tion of the new troops preparatory to au aJva ce on what- ever lino may be deierm-n^i. In cuy eyo.it, I ^-g'^J"" abaoUitc-ly ueces-^iary f> seud new resiu'eals at on-e i j the old c"rpifjrPurP''»"'""'"'*""°''°°*""*"' ^"^ oliregimeatJ be hlloJ at once. , • • " My ownvievof the proper policy to be pur-nellilo re- tain in Woshiugton merely the f jr-.o i ■ •''■■ and to seud ev.-ry iliin;! cl o aviilab.e t The riilroads give us the means c. i i «\'ashiugion, should it bo nec^ssiry. I. i u ;. t< -^ ,,u.c- > ». l as'K and umaloivediotikemy own course, I \nU hold my- self rei'poLBiulo for the safety of Washington. M'CLELL.\N KEEPS HIS MEN IN C.OIP. On the 7th of October Gijn. llalletk replies. Af- ter referring to the draft, fXi>ected in some of the Northorn States he says: " But •'OU rrnn^ d I-t the o;>eTfitlon» of f 'le urmy for these help all.' , want of I ■ h. " 1 om i- ,^ mond. '^ J ,^, Tnsr.'is; ^ ru'- ■ ,,. "^ ^ bu: mire...;.:, li.' V 110 I. i i.i i ■...■.■■. <. , , , " \(;cc a h^rd march cue coy iJ lime onough Jo rest; ljln« sliu" beyond that tiaae dooa not rest the men. If we compeiJ 20 the average distance marctecl per month by onr troops for the last year with that of the Rebele, or with European armies in the field, we will sne why onr troops march no bet- ter. Tliey are not sufficiently exercised to make them good and efficient soldibrs." On the let of October Gen. McClellaa asked for authority to boild a double track suspension bridge and a permanent wagon bridse across the Potomac at Harper'o Ferry, which Gen. Hilleck declined to give. About that time the President visited the army. Alter his return to Washington the follow- ing order was sent to Gea. McClellan by Gen. Ilal- leck: M'CLELLAN ORDERED TO MOVE. " War Department. ) " Washington, D. C, Oct. 6. 1862. } "I am instrocted to telegraoh you as follows: The Presi- dent directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South. Your army muat move now while the roads are good. " If you cross the river between the enemy and AVashing- ton, and cover the Utter by your line of operations, you can be re-t'nforced with 30,000 men. If you more up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 13,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Waaliington and the enemy, but does not order it. Ee is very desirous (hat year army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what time you adopt, and where yon intend to cross the river ; also, to what point the re-enforce- ments are to be sent. It is necessary that a plan of your operations bo positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges or repairing railroads. "lam directed to add that the Secretary of War and the Oeneral-ia-Chlef fully concur with the Freudeut in these iBstructions. " W. H. HaLLECK, General-in-CUef. "Maj.-Gen. McClellan." To this Gen. McClellan replies on the same day: " It Is important, in making my decision regarding the ronte to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, vhat description of troops I am to be re-enlorced with npou the Shenandoah route, and also upon the other ronte between the enemy and Washington ; whether they are to be old or new troops, or what proportion of each. If possible, I should be glad to have Peck's division gent to me, if it can begot here within a reasonable time. " Second, vyill you inform me what the present condition of the Alexandria and Leesburg Railroad is j also the Mauassaa Gap Railroad; and what time it would require to put them in working order? It is believed that th') Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad is not materially injured." To this Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th: '* The Manassas Gap Road can be repaired in a few days. The Leesburg Koad ia much more injured. You can reach the former in less time than would be required to repair the Utter. The troops to be sent you will be partly new and partly «ld — mostly new." HIS PLANS AND FEARS. On the same day Gen. McClellan telegraphs: "After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my Ticinity, I have deteruiined to adopt the line of the Shenan- doah for immediate operations against theenemy now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the en- emy to recross into Maryland, and thus check thn movements. In the same c?8e we would voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of tlie Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by ns in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement between the Shenandoah and Washington. "I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as important for ulterior objects. It ia important only 60 long as the enemy remains near Winches- ter. And we cannot follow that line far beyond that point*. simply because the country is destitute of supplies, an J w© have not sufficient means of transpor;ation to enable na to ad- vance more than iO or 35 miles bevond a railrond or canal ter- minus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon Btaunton, it willbeimpossibla for us to pursue him by that route, and we must then take a new line of operations based upon water or railway communication. " The only possible object to Ije gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat, we have nothing to gain by pursuing them, and, in fact, cannot do so to any great distauce. Tne objects I pro- posed to myself are— to tjgnt the enemy, if they remain near Winchester; or, failing In that, to force them to abandon the Valley of the Shenandoah, there to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike at t l;e heart of the llobeiLon "I have taken ail possible measures to iosare the most prompt equipment of the troops. But, from all that I can leam, it will be at least three days before the first, fif„b, and rixth corps are in readiness to move from their present camps. They need shoes and ether indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelcer tents, &c. I beg to assure you that not an hour shall be lost in carrying your instraotions into effect. • 'Please send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. I would prefer that the new resiments be sent as regiments, not brigaded, unless already done so with eld troopj. I would again tsk for Peek's division, and, ifpo=B^b!e, Heintzplman'a corps. If the enemy !;ive fipht near Winr;hcster, it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our resourcrta. I hope tLat no time will be lost in sending forward the re enforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible." STUART'S CAVALRY RAID. Ou the 10th of October the Rebel General, Stnart, made his raid into Pennsylvania, returuing into Vir- giaia, having made the entire circnit of our army. On the 13th Gen. McClellan reported to Gea. Hal- leck the result of the raid, and ascribed is buccsss to the deficiency of our cavalry, andurjjed " the imper- ative necessity of at once sapnlving this army, in- cluding the command of Gen. JBanks, -with a eufB- cient number of horses to remomit every dismounted cavalry soldier within the shortest possible time. If this is not done we shall be constantly exposed to Kebel cavalry raids." To this Gen. Halleck replies: " Tour telegram of 7 p. m. yesterday ia just received. As I have already informed you, the Government hRs been acd is mak- ing every possibla effort to increase the cavalry force. Eemonnts are sent to you as rapidly as they can be procured. The President has read your tel- egram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would not be so hkely to make raids north of tt." THE PRESIDENT TO M'CLELLAN. On the 13th of October the Pretident wrote to Gen. McClellan concerning the operations of the army. And on the 17th of October Gen. McClellan wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the reply of Gen. McClellan are as follows; " Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 13, 18G2. " Mt Dear Sir : You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that yoa cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should yon not claim to be at least hia equal in prowess, and act upon the claim 7 " Ab I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to tkat point be put in working order. But tne enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a dis- tance nearly twice as great from railroad transporta- tion aa you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper •'Court-House, which is jnst about twice as far aa you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not mora than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper'a_ Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of Autumn to give it to you, and ia fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and musli not be ignored. " Again, one of the standard maxims of war, aa you know, is, ' to operate upon the enemy's commu- nications aa much as possible without exposing your own.' You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change posi- tions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with liichmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to yoa absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to lollowa;id ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon aad beat what ia left behind all the easier. _" Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route t^at you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him. unless you admit that he is mora than your equal on a march 7 His route is the arc of a circle, wnile yoars ia the chord. The roads are as good ou yoi^rs aa on hia. " You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shen- andoah and Blue liidge. My idea was, that this 21 wonld at once meuaco the eneiny'a commnnications, wbicia 1 would seize if be woalJ permit. If he ahonld move uorthward, I wonlJ loUow iiim closely, holiJin« Liu comiuuuicationa. If he sbould preveut our Beiziii!,' Ilia couinnuiicatione, nnd move toward Eicbniond, I would press closely to Lim, fight Liiu if a fuvorublo opportonity should present, aud iit least try lobeutliioitoKichinoudoa tbeiusida track. I Bay Hry;' if wo never try, wo shall never succeed. If beniukeuEtand at Winchester, movintj nciiber north nor south, I would light him there, on the idea that if \\» cannot beat luiu when he bears tho waat- ago of coaiinir to us, wo never can when wo bear the wasta;,'e of goincc to biin. This proposition isu eimplo truth, und ij too'iiuportant to bo Ijst si^ht of lor a moment. la coraiu!,'to us, ho tenders us an advan- tage which we should cot waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As wa must beat him somewhere, or fail linally, we can do it, if at all, eerier near to ua than far away. If wo can- not beat, tho ciRUiy where he now is, we never can, be again being within the intrenchments of Eich- mond. " Kecarring to the idea of going to Kichmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the Bide, away from tho enemy, is remarkable, as it were by tho differcBt spokes of a wheel, extending from tlio hub toward tho lim, and this, whether you move dire.ilv by tho chord or on tUo inside arc, hugging the Blue Kidge more closely. The chord- line, 08 you E09, cariics you by Aldie, Ilaymarket and Fredericksburg, and yon see how tiurnpikes, railroads, and hnally the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, meet you at a:4 points from Washington. Tho same, only the lines lengthened a littlo, if yon press closer to tho Blue Eidge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Kidge I understand to bo about tho following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, live miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashhy's, twenty-eight; Man- assas, thirty-eight; Chestef, forty-five, and Thorn- ton's, City-three. I should think it preferable to take the rooto nearest tho enemy, disabling bim to make an important move without your knowledge, and coaiptl ling him to kesp hia forces toget||er for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of tho way yon would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Kichmond, enabling ns to eparo yoa the greatest numbef of troops from bore. When, at length, tunning for Kichmond abead of him enables Li Ji to move this way; if he does so, turn and attack bim in the rear. But I think ho should bo engaged long before such poirt is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the ene- my, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order. " Yonrs, truly, " A. LINCOLN. "Msj.-Gen. MoCi.EU.AS." " Hbabquarthrs Armt OF THB Potomac, I •' Camp is i'LBA9.v>T Valley, Oct. 17, 1862. 5 " SrR ; Tout letter of tliBl:Jtl» inst. reached lae yesterday morLiu?. by the hands of Col. I'eTkina. " 1 had Ecnt ont strong rfcinnoismnces, early in the mom- iDB.intha direcliou of CharUstown, Leetown. &c., aud, as sharp artOlcry firing was heard, 1 folt it incumbent to go to thefrout. loiJuot leave Charlestown until dart, so tliat I have been unable to give to your Excellency's lelter that fall and ro-pectful consideration wlilch it merits at uiy hands. " I douot wi-ihtodetain Col. Tcrkius beyoud this morn- ing's train. I therefore think it best to send Lim back with this siuiPle aciinowlLdgmcnt of tho receipt oi your Excel- lency'" letter. I nm ih t wedded to any particular plan or operalioBS. I hope to Inve, to-day, rcliailo iaformaliou as to tliepo.-itloaof tbocn-- y, whom I still beliavo to bo be- tween i;u;.ki.r lillland \Vi.xhe4er. I promise you that I will ^ivi) to your Ticws tho fullest acd most unprejudiced considora'.iou, and that it is my intention to advance tl;o mo- ment my men B'e shad, and my cavalry ore BUtUcieDtly reno- vated to ha avaUable. " Your Kictllc icy may be asBiired that I will not adopt » ConraovkliJcli diilers ct all lro:n your views, wi'.houtlirst fully exi'liiii'^S my reasons, aul Ei^i"S JO" tlmo to issue such instrocti^us as may seem bc5t to yju. •' I am. Bir, very resnectfolly, your ohodicnt semnt. ' ' ■' ' • ••GEO. r.. iMcCLELLAiJ. " Jf Bjor-Ocncral Uuited States Army. " Hi» Excellojicj the Presiueht." MORE RE-EXFOnCEMENTS WANTED. Gen. McClellaucouiinneJ to ask for ro-ouforce* mentB — forboroes — aying that the issue to his army waa only 150 jicr week; aud for clotbiu", Etatinflr that his army needed shoes and other ariit-l-js of clothing, and " iia I for sonio time pa^.t been Buffering for tl)o want of it," and that ho wiis " conbtra ned lo bslievo that it was in a treat (icL,'rco owing to tho want of proper ad ion oa tho part of ilioQ lar crmao- tcr's Department." The subject was lelerrcd to tho Quartermustcr-Gencral, and lie was ca led upoa for a statement in regard to the matter. Thero waa much corrcEpondenco upon the subject between Gen. llallcck, Gen. McClcUun, and Gen. Mei'ja. Tho ro- Bult of the cxamiuation is fully stated ia tho fullow- incr communiciition of the Secretary of W;.r, cf ihd 27th of October, and the reply of Gen. Ualleck, of , the 28th of October: M'CLELLAN'S anSREPRESENTATIONS. " WaU DrPAUTMKNT, ) ■' WAsniNGToM City, Oc-. 27, inC2. 5 "GBTraRAL: It has beeu publicly stated th.it tho army under Ocn. McClcllaa has been unablo to move, during tho Cue weather of this Kail, for want of shoes, clotblug, and other supplies. You will please report to this Uepartmout upou the I'ollowiDc points: " Fint: lo whom, and la what manner, tho requisitions for supplies tot; a ai my under Gen. McLIlellan have br en u^a/io slMceyou assumed coruniandasCeneral-inChicf; and wlieiher any requiiition for supplies of any Kind has since thattiiuo beeu made upou thn tii ciotary of War, or comhjunicatiou had with him, except Ihrju-ljyou? "Second: If you, as UeucraMn-Chlef, have taken pains to ascertain tho condition of tbo army iu respect to iho mpi-Iiei of bhoes, clothiu?, arms, ami other nece84aries; an! whether there has been any neglect or delay, byauy Department o* Bureau, iu Ullinu tho requisi. ions lor supplies; and what has been, and is, the condiii'.u of that army, as comiarcdwilh other armies, iu respect to Boppliea'? ... ., "Third: At what date, afcer the battle of An'.ietam, tho orders to advance egiiust tha enemy were given to Uon. Mo Clellan, and how otten have they been repeated? "Fourth: Whether, in your opinion, thero has been any ■want in tho army under Oen. McClellan of shoes, clothing, arms, or other equipments or supplies, that ought to have pre- vented its advance against the enemy whea tho order waa given? , , " Fifth : How long was it afler the orders to advance were eiveu to Oen. McClelUu before he lnt;>rmed vou that any shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are hu means of promptly eommunicating the wauts of tho army to vou, or to tho proper bureaus ol the \Var D.pcrtment i ^ ' *^ '^ "EDWIN M. SIANTON, ; " Stcretary of War. j "Maj.-Oen. Sallbok, General-in-Chief." ; " WASniSQTON, Oct. 28, 1862. ; " Sm; In reply to tho several inttrrogatorie* contained In • your letter of yesterday, I have to report : "First: That requisitions for supplies to tho army under Gen. McClellan are made by his staff-officers on the chiefs of bureaus here; th .t is, for Quartermaster's supplies by hi« , Chief Quarterma'iter en fio Quartermaster-Oeneial ; for com- missary suppllta by his Cliief Commissary oa tho Commis- . sirj-Ueneral, i,c No such lequititions hsvo bu-en, tJ my knowledge, mado upon tno rieciotary of War, and none upoa , the General-in-Chief. .,-,,„ , . , • " Second: Ou sevoral occasions Oen. McClellan has telo- graphed to mo that his ormy was deficient ii certain supplies. All thoEo telegrams were immediately relerrcd to the b> ads of bureaus, v.ith orders to report. It was ascertaiucd t.:; t in ; every Instanco tiio requisitions had been luimLUiately hlled, , excejt one, wlitre llie Quar.ermas:cr-Oeneral had beea , oblieed to send from Phiiad<.lpliii certain articles of clothing, ; tents, tc., not having a iLllBupily htre. " There has not been, bo far as 1 could stcertaiD, any neg- i Icct or delay in any department or bureau iu i eiur.g ail sup- , pHes asked for by Gen. McClellan, or by the olUocrs of his staff. Do:ay3 lavo OLcaslonaUy occurred ia forwardiiR sup- plies by rail, oi ac.-ouut of tho crowded coudiuoa of the de- pots cr of o want ol carj ; but whenever not.iiod cf this, ^.gcnts havob'ea Bent out to rcuiovo iho diliiciUty. L idcr tho ex- cellent surcriutcudciicj cf Uen. llau^t 1 think thtsid.Liys have been l-js.t fitqueiit end cf shorter duration t au i< csual with Irti-'ht ttaiuj. An/ army of the Blzo?".'^,'i,*^^' everyluiug had gone forivard. On the wl^^,^* <'''?'',''' ^^ Epckeofmany of Lis horses bavin- broken down by fatigae. On the 12tb he compluios that thi rateof supply was only 1:0 horses per weekfor the entire «^Ja'.^"?.'°^ *° ^'^"""^f Washincton. I immediately di^ MCted the Qaarterma ter-General to inquire into t.iis mfttw. and to report why a larger number was tot furnislicd, Geo GeT//.f l' f^ '" ^^^ H"^ th^t tl^e average i,sue of horses to Gen. McUcliun's army, m the field aud in front of Was'iin"- h^dfVu^'^^^}'^^^- si^.'^^ee'*". liad been 1.453 per %veeif, St ^u^m-a^l^u^^iW""' ""=1* '"'Se number cf mul.s had been fupphedi aud that t;ie number of animals with Gem McCIel- lan>8 army, on the Upper Potomac, was over 31,0f0 He also Ku!d procurer'' '^'" sending to the army all the horses "On the ISili' Gen. McClellan states, in regard to Gen and i?llh?"°''v'''** 5? ^"^ ^""1 ^^"y requisiti^on for sho? and Clothing: 'Gen. Me;g3 miy hive o.-deredthosa articles to be forivarded. but they have not reached cur depsTund un- Ih^^^'T''^^'^ tjin.ure irau^tt t.ansmissioa i.made by as weilremaia in Kew-^iorlc or l-hiladtlphia, eo fir as this army 18 concerned.' 1 immediately called Gen. J)JeWs atteD. K.V^'/PP""^"' "''S'^^* ^^ »^" department oStiJei'^rh of bo^ If f i " '"° l''?l' °^ ^'"' ^^'^e^t'o^i^n, that 43,C(7j pal s Gen rrnriii °r' ^'"^ been received by the quartermaster of Ha°;r.to;vi.^ /^^^f/n^^' Harper's K-rry,^ Frederick, and wa^erbtoivn; t.at 2J,t;03 pairs v ere at Uaroer'a i crrv Hetint on the 21st ; that lO.UUO more were on their^^vay ■ aud li ^00 more ordered. Col I galls, aid«.de-cam"Ud chief qu^'tc* ?n!nr,fl.i 2""; H''9''}\'''' tele.r.ph.d on the 25:h ' ^n^suf- fnrnsforwantofctothwgis exisgorated I think and cer- ment^.^^ ,' k"^** ^"° ^^"^ ^^^ by timely lequiaitions of i egi- meutil end brigade quartermaster.,.' On tao 24th he tele- • graphed to toe quarterma.ter-gcneral that: 'the clolhin Avas ™dts?'^-XWaft;-' %\ 'h f-P^iBiBUcb compilnrsare gron^a.esj. iheidoti^, the clotuing eriives find is issued • Eat more 13 still needed. I have o.dered more than would .eem nece. -^ary from any d.ta furnlsbed me i and I bts^o re- aiDd you that you cave el.vajsvery jromptly net ell mv isToVaSt'' 'il^^^^''^^ '' conj^rjed. ^o'ur depanJn^i for^^l ,• *' provides as soon as duo notice is civen. I foresee ro time when an army of over lUO.tOO men wiS not call for clothmgaad other articles.' "ieu wm not ^w'V'P'''' '" 9"°: ^IcCl^riari's means of promptly commn- Cf the VvKoa ?mfrf 'f''^^*'' "^^V^^ '° \'^ I.:op/r buTe^u, rir^V -1 t'eP'irtment. I repeat that, in aiuition tj tJio orci- L7onX tefe'apb!''"" "^ ''°"''^ communicauon with Vvih'- convof^^.^I'^,'^^"- ^r«5e' that Ishonla submit herewith • f3^^d°ocn:^e!^iT '" ^ "'"" '''" G*". McCleUan' '• Very reapectfally, your obedient servant, " Hon Fnxr,„ l\r"c^- ^^- ^^>,LLECK, GfUeral-ia-ChieC tton. iLDwiN M. Stanton, Secreta-y of War." - ^ M'CLELLAN STILL DI^LAYS. fkS^i °?*" ^^' ^?°- ^^<=Clellan informs Gan. flalleck that ho haa nearly accomplished Bapplyia-r Lis army with the clothing abooluiely necissirv'far mircE Sncladls^^' ^^'^^^^^' °^' ^" want of cavalry, and ♦1.1' J^i"^°l' °'°''® °^T*^''y '^°''«°» onr commuEicaticng from the moment we march, would be as the m-^v- cf t^o 1 r^ cavalry lores of tae enemy, and it w^ul 1 coT be^ pos-d^ le fbr M to cover our fl.mks proper v, or to obtain the n^cesary iu- fcimationof theposicion and moveme. is of tho e^cmvTu «uch a way as to insure success. Uy experience h-s ?^o t. n the necessity of a large and efficient cava^i^ f^ice ifud^r t«B dent^r.? ?"<="™/taoc-s. 1 be.- leave t/as/whetber the Fre.f- fheree.'^foT.f h'^-'^'^'* ^ '■"" ^^^^Wet cnco or to await btlntJ^ .^ °^ ^■^^ "S"^ ^°"»''^' every pi.aiblo step havine Been talen to lusure their prompt arrival." "'■i-i' uaving 3:% p!'m'?*'°* Halleck roiiLes on tho eame day. at now, in condition to obey it, vou will be ahU f ,, >. „ u On the 22d of October Gen. McClaUari telegraphs- Leesburg, Hillsborough, Si:ickersvillo, &c. I sha"l need all WasSon!'"'"''^^^ re-enlorcementl you cLtnd mefrol' On the 23d Gen. Halleck replies: " Should you inove as proposed in yonr teleeram of Ti.iit«>». fo%oySu°'''"'^ "'"'"* '"■'"" '"'^" l^oli VVas^ironlo'^t'^T. ABOUT CAVAIHY. On the 25;h of October Gen. McClellan ttansmita to Gen. Ilalleck a report of Col. Robert WilliamT commandmg a detachment of cavalry, in whioh it ii stated that nearly half Lis horses are unsound, from sore tongue, grease, and consequoDt lauienesa aud eore backs," and that "the horses which are still want offeS'''* ^^^^" '^""•'^ from fatigue and To this the President replied to Gen. McClellan on Ice same day: t;.'npH'l!fj'"" '■,?^„y''" ^i'Patch about sore tongue and f». tigued horses. Will jou perdou me for askin- what th« horses of your ormy have done Bince the bftti^of ArTu-lm that fatigues anytbing?" tht>™ Gen. McClellan replies on the same day: ■ s'at^^VoPnTh^Ar'.'^--^''''" °f ^?"> «-'at«. I liave the honor to S.ate, lorn the timalnu army lelt Wa,ningto i, on the 7th of September, n y c .val.y 1ms beencon.-.t>.nily em, byed in mak- cl Anae nm £;x rc-imeius have made a trip of 2C0 miles, march- ,nit55md.Bino..eda.y,uhi!o.ndeavo,ingToreuchfctui?i"av- alry. Ocn. ri.nsanrjn, in his officiulrepoit, states that he. with the rainainder of our av^Uable cavalry, while on Stuart^g track, marched 78 miles iaS4 tours. Bedde th-se two te- markablo txpeditiou?., cor cavalry has been engaged in i icket- i> g aad Ecouliijg 1„0 milts of river front since tae battle of Ai.tietam, andhi^ma^e repeated reeom.oiisanctg sincefhat \'°>^-'^mi^"Stiiee^ea,y cu every occasion, and, indeed, it has per dfmed haraer service tince the battle tima before? I beg that you will also consider that this same civalry %vas brought trom the peninsul-, where it encouiitered most la- horioua service, ad was, tt the commenceme:it cfthis cam- paign, in low condiaon, and from that time to the p.-esent has hadnottmoto recruit. If any instance can be fou.d where . overworked caval.y has periormed more labor than mine S1DC3 tao battlo cf Artie am I am not conseious of it " The follovviDg is the reply of the Treeident: "Yours, in reply t) mine, about horses, received Of course, 3 ou know the facta better than L v Still, t rt-o considera tions remain: fctuatt'a cavalry outmarched curs, Laving cer- tainly doue moie ina-ktd si^rvioe on the jeninaula aLd every- where since. Secondly, will i,ot a n ovemtnt cf our army be B rel'ff to tho cavalry, compeding the enemy to concen- trate instead ot 'loraglng' ia squads everywhere?" RIOPvE MEN WANTED. On tho £7.h of October, Gen. McClelLin tele- graphed to the President : •'Your excellency is aware of the very great reduction of nnmbers that has ta.-en place iu most of the old regiments of this command, and how i-ecessary it ia to fii up these skele- tons belore tal-iaK taom again into acti .r. I have the honor therefore, to request toat tho order to bll up the ohl regiments with dralted men may at once bo issued." To this the President reolies aa follows on the same day: •• i'our dispa'ch of 3 p. m. cf to-day. in regard to filHne np oil regiments with drafted men, ia r^rceived, aud tae requesj t"«/ei:i shall be con.pLic;d witu es far as pracdcable. ' Andnowlaskadistinctonswtrto tjeques-.iou: Ij it yoni purpose rot tj go iitD Ec'.ionag:in until the t: en row being dralted in the StaLea,are i.iC-orpoiated in the old legimcnls 1" The followiag is Gen. llcClcllan'e reply— after re- fon-iug to provioas coiiimimicatiuns iarc.adon to fill- ing up t'je old rcgimLCts, Le says: " Iu thi 1 rets of baciDe:s, I tlien called an aide, and telling Liai 1 Iiad conversed 'R-ith yon upon the subject, 1 directed Lim to write for lue s. dispatch, a;-liiug your excellency (0 LavotLe reczssaiy order given. I regret to etty iLiat tuii cliicer. af .er v.riiing the dispatch, fiading ise tiiii engiged,' eent it to the telegraiih ciEco wit out li.Et Eabmittingit to me, tiadcr theimpreeeion t jat he had commtmicatcd my 23 views. He, however, nnfortnnately addcJ, ' beiore takin" them into action ngain.' This iiUruso wia not Buthonzed or iaieuded by me. It liud couveyed al- togothtr au erroneoua imprcition as to my plana aud Intention^. To yourexcelleucy's quoalioa I answer distinctly that I hiivo not liai any idea of postponing tbo Bdv;»uco until tbo old reiiiineuta aro uUed_ by draftt-d men. I comineno d crossing tbo array into Virgiiui yesterday, and aliall putU forward ua rap- idlv'aB poasiblo to eudoavorto meet the enemy/' _ I'oiir Commuteo wocld Siy tuat, in their opinion, a BtuU" cOicer who could. Irom ne^litreuco or oiher cause, add to a. disi^atc'j from tho General comuiand- ina an army to tho I'resident, that wbic'a " waa not auihoiued or ia- ended," aUould ut leiwt be aaaigueJ to eomo other duty. Bl'CLELLAN TAKES FOUR AVEEKS TO CROSS TUE POTO:^LVC. The movement of tho array across the river, which waa couiuienced upon tho "Julli of October, continued elowly, uLt.l on the 5[li of November Gej. McLlel- lan announced to tho rresiJeut that tho last corpa of hi* uruiy liuish«d croBsiUi,' oto tho 3d of Novem- ber, jusi/ciur tcccks froui the time the order tj crois «as given. , , _ lu tbo letter to tbo President, of tho 1. th of Oc- tober, Gen. McCleliau writes: " Your r.xcelleuoy ciny bu aiiurea that I wUl not adopt a coarse wbicli differ j at a.l from yjur viewj wituout first fuilr expluiniasiuy leisousatj giving you time to utuo euch lu- ttruciious Hi may seem best to joa." THE EXD OP M'CLELLAX. Gen. McClil!an wjs relieved from the command of ttio Army of the I'otouiac, ia parsflance of the following orders : "Ubadqcartkrs of thb Armt. I '• Wa.-ui.ngio.v, D. C. Nov. 5, 18C2. 5 "Okkbral: On rfceptcfuja order tf the President, seiit herewith. JO J vriiliuiiue iatil/ turi ovlt jour coaimaud to Maior-Uen. UcruslJe. au.l repair tJ Trenlon, New-Jersey, reporting on your arr iv. 1 at tliat phce by telegraph lor tUitUor crdei». Very respectl'ully. your obe.ricuteeivdut. •■XI, W. HAI.LECK, Generel-in-Cliief. " JlBJor-Oen. McClellax, Commduuins, iiC, Uo." " Wah Depaktmext, AD.^CT.'^T•GE^^ERA^'a Officb. } " U ASUINGVON, I'.i-V. 5, loli. 5 . "Obvkral Orders. No. 13:.— Uy diicciiou of iho I'resi- dent o( tho United Slates, it in ordered iliat Muicr-Gen. McClelUn be relieved Irom the commui.d of iLo Aimy cf tbe Potomac, aud lliat Mtjoi-Geu. fiurn.ide take Uie oommaud of tbat arm.v. • " By order of tho Secretary of \\ar. " K. D. TuWISsil.NU, Assii-.uiit Adjutant-Ocneral." OPI.RATIOXS LNDIJl GEN. iSURNSIDE. Upon assunftjg command cf the Army of the Poto- mac, Gen. BurDside at onco determined to follow tho line cf operations which lie hud previoatly euj;- gcstedtoGen. McCltlUn; ihut is, to make Fred- ericksburg tho base cf his optratione. llo assumed command on tbo 7 h or 8ih of November, and on tbo 9lhforwarded to 'Wagliingtoa Lis propoied plan of operations. Ou tbo lijtbcf Novtmbcr Gen. Llalleck camo to Warrenton, and, with Gen. Meigs, had a conversation \s ith Oen. Burnsido upoa tt.e futuie movements of the army. Gen. Burusido stated that Lia plan waa " to con- centrate tho army in tbo nei;3'bLorbood of Warreu- ton J to make a email movement acrota the Rajpa- hannock, na a ieint, wi.a a view to , divert ilio attention cf the eneujy, and lead them to believo that we were goiug to move in tL© direction of Gor- donsviile, and ihen to u^ako a rai id movement of tho whole army to Fredctiekfeburg-," for tl.o rcacon that " wo would all the t.mo be as near Wai' iugtou as would the enen/, aud alter arriving £t Fr<:di.r- icksbartr we would' bo ut a point nearer to liich- mond tbau we would bo even if we ehciild take GordoDBvule." TUE PONTOONS — WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR di:lay7 Gen. Bumstdo des red to have provitioua natl forage, togi.t: er wicU pontoons to enublo tho army to croea the Kafpuhanuock. Gen. Mei;;3 tcstiliea tbat while at Warrenton ho wrote aa c-.der to Gen. Woodbary, in Waabiuttoa, to call ou tb.o Quarter- laaater at Washingtoa for trauftortaiixB lor the pontoons to Acquii Crock, which order Gea. llalleck signed, aud it was tent olf to the telegraph ollicc. WOODnUKY 6AY3 HE WAS NOT, Qon. Woodbury Ktatia that lo received t'lsit order on the morning ot tbo 13th of N>v. He tei*! \iu-t- -. " Oen. IIciIlec'vNord.'rt) i "-Oi that ibo orii.y w h j reiiiiina ■ A» totlio li;ae wlii'utii.J laov. ' '•■ ceiveJ ai y i loriii tiv . 1- , :'•]*- inontwojd b ' prtv:ii'itit'. ! I'-Pi auJurgedl.i;ii t,> doljy t l.o i: ''der that lUo niHSO-sary jr ^I'v, ■ -luro euccci'. To tlili ho I ' i.o w-^.il a i irj ..ai< ta drliy for oil iu»'iii.t of th j iiru.y on Ulch- nioiid. I r.j i I. If.' ''>J WO'. ' :'••■!'!• dto caused. ! ' > I r v ■ : i . In i" . .»*• tiou I I. t oulytotOB poi' in* landing-! ited lor tlio Quart. : ou»- UALLECIC SAYS UE WAS NOT. Gen. llalleck teaiilies: "I will itite that all the trnops in Wa'hington aoditi vi- cinity were under tUo coimuand of c;«n. McCielian whoa be wa3 relieve-', and lo i*iieJ bi» o.dcrs directly to tlio com- maiiiiiig officer of KVaebiiitton, »vlih ouo .iuglo rcilr ction: thutuo tr.-nuJ hh u'ld bo niotc.l froia the couia,aQaof \\ atb- iuj'OQ UQiil I WM Boiibed by G.-.i. .V.'-i.M. i ort'-.o com- maiidin:^ officer hw<>. laaloihcn > 11 un- dt-r hiaiirecti^u. Oen. BurDii e, v . >va> toldtlmttlieytemaineJiir ci-el/t ' niy vieittJ Gen. Hurusi.le, at \\arn'nu., . V . em- ber, ill »i'ei:»ii.i e'.'ojt thoboatia id tu-. ireJ from her.-. I r.-peate 1 lo hi^ii ll.ut lliey « . ; '«"• orders Willi that enjlerseeplion- Top: .ii>ty cf tlia couiiududlog offif:ir bero reporti..-{ t-; ' r ri.r lUa boats here, tli.J order waa draw n up upou Li* tut)!.-, sl.I tisncd by me, directly lo Gei'. Woodbjry. oa tlio cTeiii. g of the 12th. I thlLk-iho cveuiug that I wa-ifheie. I i.^v Gen. Woodbnrv oa my return, ai.d bo toll uie bo Uji I rec. ivca tli« order. I io d him tbat in i H thee luiltera be w-n uudtr Oen. Burntide'«direciio:i. I bui nolhiuifurtbcr to gue liiJi, tX- cei.ttoCiiiimuui..iiot!i»torJ'-rtohiiu. Iacouver»itioii mli bimaudCeu.Mi-l^^ it WBJ proposed (hat UjO littni of pou- toonsfbbouMpodowuby la:id, ai tliey couldbe g-l.^ J '-vj sooner iu tlmt way, withji.t ii.terletlrg wiUi i which had to ba Be..t to Aniuia Creek. 1 g^va J or direc'.ion in relation to tl.o mi:"ert."-.i :.: t tcr« were u.der Gen. Curi: uie, while at Warreiitoo, t lieera, had also sent tn o. tool train the.e to go d/^.. . ^ ^. . They biiii3un-ler Get). EurL.sid»;'3 i.i,iiieui..to fai.i uucoi cu— ■ mand, 1 did nut iaterlero ut i. 1 ia rel-Uuii to them. •' QuestioD. Do >ou kn.jW whaher lli..te waa any delay ill »tartini«tl)om, ori-ilhelriirogreostberel •'Answer. I beard thatlicru wasadeltiy from tho Bteam- eri geUia«8iTuui.d wl'.U^tl.o paiitooi:^: o-: t th-T^^yn■^a:!ajire«„;tJ maii.ly froni aci ident and the elements, Hut no luaa bad aiiy COiilr 1 ever. Ge.i.. Uurusi Jo teltgraphe 1 to uia la reUtiou to Uen. Woouhury, thiulxinj that halia.1 ui.t u^cl duo diligence ; butofterwa^dloUin.'hs was p-nectly tat.saod wit j what Gun. Uooiil.uty bail d jue. ai.d tn .t ho did u< t kno-.v but wbet tha commauuai^ clhcer cf the train th-t wei.t d j» a bad dt do Lia duty alko; tbi-t le waj diB;>oc£d to mako lo lurtiicr la- veotipation cf tlu.t mutter ; thit bo waa pretty we.l tati-bed. •'Ciue.-ucu. \\<.» there any icaucst for ycu to dtl^y tto advabceff the men until the boats arrived, or aJOthitj cf ""^•'ilfiwlr. No. Sir. I remember thiMhst Oen. Wood- bury, in converbatiaii with me, aaid ihat Gun. liuru'ide could net get down for Beveral d.-ja ulKJr 1 tl him, ai. 1 that ha couldnotlandthoboauuntlGeii. Emns^do air.ved ; 1 thiuk Iremikod lo hiai that I did not kno^vtiacily tho d.-y when Gen. Uuiualdo wouid move; but 1 could ii .t t- Ub.ia. ai tho OeueruUi inotknowUims.l'. WLilo 1 wastt W axieir.oabo proposeltLlimovemeU, and »>•» Y''^-.'^''*-'?^i ...'"p" il^ni Dnur-.ticui l.r it. but not to be-in it until the rre-idont wrBcooKuUeJ. Ireiuritd en luo cfl. rnocn cf tbo KiiI-, aud. ltii.k,oul..omornn:.f ti... lib,! bad a;,i. 'e v. vivith tl.o Pici.!. 1.'. iu N. etled to Ce. plan-, a^dli.au:oCi dtohiiat... btti prop> »•-.■'. 1 1. • ' ""■';* "■ ■■ de.eyiut'-t-"^t:.9 t...;j n-.;.i_ : -.i- hau;.oo* K v. r, oa account of l ■ r °\ tf. ,.,-.,>,(::;' II, 6ic.. hutuo other e . ° • r tv^r a rou.:!! Ci: — . , ' aiei- ili\i!2 tl.o Liid;.,! V...J iw :;. . tJ J.e, fioni L« if tho puuioiii.ii wuo lad tha uu^er : . waBConnderahljd.!i.y intln.t. \> o ouMnot Cui-V c ' CO l.iO repair cftiior-i road uut.lcii a. Purn uotoot no atJao-.i of It. as it wa^ all in tiio pi 9.e»aonof tho enemy. It:- 1 wiBun'cr-'ro.llirv.vccn h'la Lnd Gen. Liaiij.t, lo my "once. (1 ' ' '^^-^ •"" '""'m.'''°! ri' ,.,,„, m.-itf .» o-Mly nspoit.iblo. Ire- moSrr-\iu. .J„tLa^.oUii.«. but wouid have . . .. .- - — - - ^ / ■ ^ ••'<^" " ^e C^uLl, and 24 when he found Gon. Bamside was in possession, ho w&nld comtneuce, BURNSIDE EVIDENTLY WAS NOT. Gen. Bnrnside testifies in relation to the forward- ing of the poatooDB: •' I undiistood that Gen. Halleck was to give the nocesfary orderi, acd llieu Ilia cfiipers vvho should receive those orders were t^ie ones Idspocioible for- ths jioEtoo:^s coming here (FrcderScksbure). I cobld have carried out tlict part of the plan tUroujifr officers of niy own; bat, hiv^Dg just taken the command of a.i army wich which 1 was but little acquainted, It wnaeviJeut thatit waias much as I could attend to, with the assistarcecf ailmy rfficers, to change its p:si£ion from Warrenr n to Fredsricksburg; and 1 feU, indeed I tspected, that all t ho parts of tne plan which were to be executed la Washington would be ettended to by the officers at that place, under the direction of the different departments to which these parts of the plan sppertalned. "Ci'restion. Did you or not undtrstaad that you yourself were to be responsijle for seeing that those orders were car- ried out ? '■Auswer. I did not. I never imagined for a moment that I had 1 5 caiTy out anything that required to be done in Waah- iogtcn." On the 16th of November Gen. Barnside started the columns of his army from Warrenton to Freder- icksburg, not having: hard anything of the delay of the pontoons from Washington. The telegram an- nounciig the delay did not reach Gen. Barnside until the 19tb of A^'ovemher. The corps of Gen. Sumner was in the advance, and it was the intention that he should cross over to Fredericksburg and take possession of the place. But the non-arrival of the pontoons in time prevented the movement wliich bad been contemplated, and necessitated the adop- tion of other measures. THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. Gen. Buraside then besan to make preparations for another movement, bringing up the pontoons as rapidly as possible, to enable his forces to cross the riverj The plan determined upon was to cross the river at two points; the rio;ht wing to cross opposite Fred- ericksburg, and the left wins to cross from three to four miles below the city. The left wing was com- posed of the Left Grand Division, with a corps from en nn ®°'®^ Grand Division, making a force of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, the whole being under com- mand of Maj.-Gen. Franklin. The crossing was made successtully at both points, but with much op- position Irom sharpshooters on the right. PLAN OF CATTLE. ^Gen. Buraside states the following in regard to hia plan of attack: " 'ihe enemy had cat a road along in the rear of the line of tights where we made cur attack, by meaas of which thev connectedthe two wings of their army, and avoided along detour around through a bad country. I obtained from I colored man, from the other Bide of the town, informaticn in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to ootaiu possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack cu the extreme left. I d.dnJt intend to muke the attack on the right until that positi^ had r,tf"„^^f°= T'""^- ^ '"PPo^ef ^^""Id Btagger the enemy, cutlxng their hne in two; and then 1 proposed to make a direct attack on theirfront and drive them out of their works " ORDERS TO FRANKLIN. The following is the order to Gen. Franklin, who 'commanded the left: j «•"" " Headquaeters Armt of thk Potomac, J ,.,-, TT i.. .„ ■ " I^ecemberl3, 5:o5a. m. S Gen. Hardie will carry thi J dispatch to you and remain With you during the day The general commanding directs that you teep your whole command ia position fo? a rapid movemeni; down the old Richmond road, tnd you wiU send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield to seize, ifpossiule, the bights near Capt. Hamilton's, on this Eide of lie Mass-iFOuas, taking care to keep it well sinported and lU line ot retreat open. He has ordered another coS cfadivi-ionormore to be moved Irom Gen. Kumnei's com- maiid up the plank road to its intersection of th^ telegraS^ road, vhere they will divide, with a view to Be^in^^M« ii-ht3 on both of those roads.'Holding thesrhigbtsf wUh tie bights rear Capt. liamilton's, will. 1 hope, compel he enemy to evacuate toe whole ridge between these pcinu. He inakes these i;:ovo3 by Miumns, distant from eaciTother Trtth a viewofav,.idingm possibility of a coU^ion of our own forces, which might (Tccur in a genera movement du ing tie fog. Two ot Gen. Hooker's divisions are ia your rear at tiB bridges, tnd w.U remain there as supports. Copies of instruct tions to Gc„s. burner ai.d Hoolter wU be f.rwided to you Sf.n i-;r-acHn'e''7t'"°"- ^i^""'" ''"'^ ^o" ^vhole cC ^hi , ^ ■ f ^'? r-°^° '^- °"ce 03 soon as the foe lUts I hsve tijo honor to be, Gsneral, very respectfully your o^iedient servant, •• JOHN G. PARKE, Chief of StiiT. • Major-Ge:!. fKANKLljr, Commanding Department, Grand Division Army of Potomac." rRAi;KLIN'S INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. Gen._ FrankUn states, when last examined, that be received the above order at about 7:30 a. m., and that he at once took measures to carry out what he considered to be the meaning of tbe order, that is, " an armed observation to ascertain where tbe enemy was." In his tcsiimony, given when your Commit- tee were at Falmouth, he says: ''I put in all the troops that I tliought it proper and prudent to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command, as far as I could, and at the game time keep my connection with the river open." FRANKLIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFEAT. From the testimony it would appear that the at- tack was in reality made by one of the emallest di- visions in Gen. Franklin's command— the division of Gen. Meade, numbering about 4,500 men. This division was supported on its right by Gen. Gib^oa'i Division of about 5,030 men. On the left was Gen, Doubleday's Division, forming the extreme left of our line, nearly at right angles with Gen. Meade's Division, and extending to the river. Just as Gen. Meade's Division advanced to the attack. Gen. Bir- ney's Division, of Gen. Stoneman's corps, uumberinff about 7,GC0, came up and took position immediately in rear of Gen. Meade. GEN. BIRNEY FAILS TO SUPPORT MEADE'S AT- TACK. The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing the iirst line of the enemy, and gaimng the crest of tae hill. (7en. Gibbon, sseiog Gen. Meade advanc- ing to the attack, ordered his division forward. Af- ter his last brigade had advanced, driving the enemy with the bayonet, and he was preparing his batter- ies to open upon a Kebel regiment that made their appearance on his left. Gen. Gibbon was wounded audtaken from the field. Gen. Meade's division havingreached the crest of tlie hill, formed them- selves in tbe presence of the reserves of tho enemy who opened fire upon them in front, and they also re- ceived a fire upon their flunk. The superiority of tbe enemy was so overwhehning that Meade's divis- K>n was forced bick, as waa also Gibbon's division. The enemy pursued uniil checked by Birney's divis- ion. Ourlorces continued to hold their position Without renewing the attacli, until thev were or- dered to withdraw across the river. The losses sustained in the attack, in killed wounded, and misdng, were as foilows: Meade's oivision, l,/t)Oj Gibbon's tlivision, 1,249: Bimev'u division, 961. ■^ I^RANKLIN DISOBEYS A DIRECT ORDER TO ATTACK. Gen. Bnrnside, upon hearing of the small forca ordereti to attack the enemy, sent an order to Gen. i! rankun to make a vigorous attack with his whole lorce. Several of the witnesses testify that had the attnck been renewed with all the avail;;ble force tinder Gen. Franklin's command it would have been Buccessful. Gen. Franklin testifies that it was not an order, but a request, and that when he received it It was too late to renew the attack, and therefore he oidBbtdoit. Gen. Franklin testifies as follows: Jlli^^ ?^^' under which J was acting directed that the line h^lJ^',!,'^' '^°"''^ ^^ ""^f* "P'^''- " '-l^o directed th.t 1 should ^n,^ ^'5'"'^^"'I'°";'''"''^'''''-r''l '^'^'-ch down the Ricb- !??!;l^f'^^^.'^^,T"'''-."'^e'ltl;at this was consiuorcd wa !l'°^°\^-f^^^,''^'^-'^[^^i^ce the h2.iae took il.ice. At that ' time I had no idea that ic was the main attac::, but supposed Uwaaan^armedobseivation to ascertain whwe the cEemy /t'.'frhe^rdw)^"'^^*^''''**^^*''* staff cfilcer^^who brought •ro'n*^^t^'i°"' ^^i ^."^ "°* understand, from this order, that ?,° M.f'"'V"'^'^ /^".'.""""P^ necessary to sdze and bold the 4,'S nl.^?"" ^"^Hu fis'^ilton's. and that the General command- iLgconsiaercd that that was necessary to be done in order to ocCarO success f wn'„n",'r>T,i^°,'^-^^°°'-. I should suppose that the order J^^ If ■; ^^ imted me to ' at least a divUion,' as tbe word- rH?.^L L^^''''t' ^-'^ ^"'^'^ i*^*""^ '''^ intention ; end. besides, he cUrectsmetokeepmy whole command in position to move 25 along the old Richmond rcid. If ho had intended me to nw my whole f-nai. if uecBsary. to hold t'.i^it hill, he hardir TOOdldhdvo coupled is wltU tno c-iiiiiuoii to iocp luy com- cuudiu readiiCii for this other Uiovexint. a„,.i,. " Quostio.i. \\ ■=» tli» other i;iovem> nt io;iiiblaniitil after the noB6e-8i.-aofih..'hi^hUbyourtroo|.»J „ „ h. i l„./,n '•Answer. I tliiiiii tL.it t!iB othor niovemrnt, if it hadbocn ordered \wii mv wholoforco, would hr.voiiec<-8«riiy involved theD)S,esio 1 . f ttioie higlits. Hadl bren ordtredto inuveuiy whole {^Tca alou,' tiio Rioiiiuoud roaJ, I should liave boon com- pelled to tao a.l that wu;ilJ bo foaud in tha roud, aud thoie hights wo ilJ h .ve bOPii la tlio load. ■ 1 1 v "QiiHfti-n Aait waiiudi^peii-ublo that wo should havo posses.!.. II of tao.ehi;4h-.^ in order to uiove down the old Kichujo:! I roaJ, .^ud at ;ou wora or.'ered to so id out at loust onedivi^ ntopi8.ibeloiv SmithficlJ o.iJ scizo. if poayblo, those hi -hf, did i ou i.ut deem tb^t tho order required of you that you bhoulJ, when repulned ia tho fiiat atteiupt, renew ••Au'swer. 1 think it did; but by the time tha Uebols were driven bick iuto the wood« by Himey'a diviaion aud Sickles s diviairu. it \> ai pa<,t 3 o'cloct. It was da*, at tbit time, by lo'clot'.i, Kudit v.ajtojlato then to make each au attempt iriththo'b!i:;!i:o£t hoi)oofB'J0C*i'8." The UUuiioiiy vf uU tke icUnesses before your CommiUie proves most conclusively tliot, kad l/ie attack been made upon the left Kith, all the force which Gen. Fraukltii could have used for that pur- pose, the plain f Gen. Burnside u-ould have been completely successi'nl, and our army would have achieved a must brilliant victory. After the attack on Sutarday, our army remained in positioa uutil Jlouday ni-lit, when it was -with- drawn fccrosB tbo river without loss. Yoar Coinmiuoo have not cocBidered it essential to revolt upon the operiliooB of the right wing of our army ia tbii battle, for the reason that the euc- cess of tho movement ev:dently depended to a very great extent upon tha successful opera-ion of the left. Altuon^^h our troops on the liLjht fought most gallantly, making repeated attacks, the strength of theeL'eiLy'apo&uion waSBUch that our forces wero oompelleU to retire. AFTSR FREDERICKSBURG. On Jan. 26, 1«63, tlio following resolution was adopted by tho Senate, and referred to your Com- " Jiesolred, That the Committee on the Condnct of the War be instructed to inquire whether Major-Gen. A. K. BurnEido hB3 fiiitotlie bjttlecf Freaerirtsburj, formed any plans lor the movement c f the Army of tlie I'otomac, or any pjrticn of the same ; ai.d it so, wae:l;er any suboidioiite OeneraLS ol said army have «iittua to or viaied Wftehiujton, to cppose or Interfere with the execution of such uiovemetit?, and whelber saoh proposed movements havo been arretted or itterfored with.uudif EO, by whatauihoiity." . Under that resolution, yoar Committee proceeded to take tLo testimony of Major-Gens. A. E. Burn- Bide and John a. Parke, and Brig.-Geua. John New- ton, John Cochrane, and William W. Averill. That testimony hrin^sto light tho following facts: » BURXSIDE'S PLAKS. uioiiw"!-. *^^ ►" army was to cross at a pi Bome six or Boven miles below Fredericksburg. The positions for iho artillery to protect tho crossing were all Belected, the roada wtro all surveyed, and the corduroy was cut for preparing the roads. At the same limo a feint of crossing was to be made Bomo diitanco above Falmouth, which feii-t could be turned iuto a positive attack fihould tho enemy discover tee movement below; otherwise the main attack waa to bo made below. A GRA^•D CAVALRY EXPEDITION. In connection with this movement of the main army, a cuvaliy exj edition was organized, consist- ing of 2,5bU ot the best cavalry in tho Army of tho Po- tomac, i,OOJ of whom were picked men. Tho plan of that expedition was as follows: Accompaciod by cross, and to proceed to tLo Iia;,idan and crocs that river at liaccoon Ford ; then to go onward and cross the Virginia Central liailrcad at Louisa Court- Hcnsc; tho J".u:ea itiver at Coocabad or Carter's, blowing up the locks of tho Jam s Kivcr Canal nt tho place of crossing; crocs t'^o Kichmond and Lyn5ibnrg Kailroad at a point south of there, blow- ing up tho irou-bridge at the place of croesiDj?; crost the Richmond. Petersburg and VVeMoa E.ilroad whero it cm^sai the Nottoway River, destroyiug tho raiLoad bridge there j and then proceed on by Gen. Pryoi's con uiand, uud ctf-ict u junction with Gen. Peck, at SutiolK, where 8f earners weraio be in w^ait- iflg to take them to Acciuia Creek. To distract ttia atioiition of tho enemy, and de- ceive tbeia in regard to which body oi cuvulry yfj,a the attacking column, i;t tho tune tho thousand picked men crosted tho Rippahuiiuock, a iionion of tho rem lining l.OvvO was to procsed toward Wurren- tou; another portion toward Culpepper Cjurt- House; and the remaiuder were to actotiipuny the thousand picked men as far as Raccoou Foid, and then return. While this country expedition was in progress, the general movement was to be made across tho river. On the 2Gih of December, an order was issued for tho entire command to prepare three days' cooked ratious; to havo their wu;,'0u8 tilled with ten djys' small rations, if possible; to have from ten to twelve days' supply of beef cuttio with them'; to take forage for their teams and their artillery and cavalry horses, and the reciuisue amount of ammunition — ia fact, to bo in a condition to movo at twelve houra' notice. GENS. COCnR.\NE AND NEWTON TRY TO PRE- JUDICE THE PRESIDENT AG.UNST BURN- SIDE. Shortly after that order was issued Gsn. John Newton and Gen. John Cochrane — the one com- manding a division and the other a bn^'ada in tho left Grand Division, under Geo. Wm. B. Franklin came up to Wtishington on leave of absence. Pre- vious to obtaining leave of absence from Gen. Franklin, they informed him and Gen. Wih. P. Smith that when they came to Washington they should take tho opportuuuy to represent to sotae one ia authority here tho dispirited condition of tho army, and the danger there was ia attempting any movement against tue enemy at that time. When they reached Waauington, Gen. Cochrane, as ho states, endeavored to find certain members of Concress, to whom to make the desired communica- tioaf Failing to hud them, hp determined to seek an interview with the President for the purnoeo of making tha communication directly to bim. On proceeding to the Pi-esideni's house, he there met Secretary Seward, to whom he exp'ained the objict of his being there aud the general purport of bis pro- posed communication to the President, and requested him to procure an interview for them, which Mr. Seward promised to do, and which he did do. TUE GENEli.VLS PREVARICATE. That day tho interview took rhice, and Gen. Newton opened the subject to the President. At first tho President, as Gen. Newton expresses it, " very naturally conceived that they had come thero for tho purpose of injuring Gen. Burnside, aud sug- gesting some other person to fill hispLicc." Gen. Newton states, that while ho firmly believed tuat the principal cause of tho dispirited condition of tho army was the want of conhdeuca in the military ca- pacity of Gen. Burnside, ho deemed it ijupioper to say so to tho President " right square out," and therefore endeavored to convey tho same idea indi- rectly. When asked if he considered it any less im- proper to do such a thing indirectly than It was to do it directly, he qualiUcd his previous ass. rtiou by saying that his object was to iniormtho PresiJeut of what'he considered to bo tho coadition of ihoaimy, in the hope that tha President would uiako itiquiry aud learn tho true cc , : for LimteLT. Upon perceiv- ing this impression upon tho mind of tho Preaident, Gens. Newton and Cochrane state that they hast- ened to assure tho President that be w>;o entirely mistaken, aud s J ftir succeeded that at the closoof tha interview tho Presidcut s.iid to them ho waa glad they had called upon bim, and taat he hoped that good would rcpu'.t troji tho interview. TUE PRESIDENT INTERFERf-S. To return to Geu. Burnbido. Tho cavalry expt- 26 dition bad started; the brigade of infantry detailed to Bccompaay it Lad crossed the Kappahanuock at EicUard'a Ford and returned by way of Ellis'a Ford, leaving the way clear for the cavalry to croes at Kelly's Ford. The day they had arranged to make the crossing Gen. Barnbide received from the Presi- dent tlie followrag telegram: '{I bare good reasou for baying that you must not moke a geoeial uiovemeat without letting me kuow of it." Gen, Buroside Btates that he could not imagiae, at the time, what reaaou the President could have for seudtag him Buch u telegram. Noue of the officers of Lis command, except one or two of bis staff who had remained in camp, had been told anything of hia plan beyond the simple fact that a movement was to be made. Ho could only suppose that the dispatch related in some way to 'important mihtary movements in other parts of the coxmtry, in which it WHS necessary to have cooperation. THE CAVALRY HALTING. Upon the receipt of that telegram, steps were im- mediately taken to halt the cavalry expedition where it then was (at Kelly's Ford) until further orders. A portion of it was shortly afterward sent off to intercept Stuart, who had just made a raid to Dumfries and the neighborhood of Fairfax Court- House, which it failed to do. BURNSIDE COMES TO WASfflNGTON. Gen. Burnside flame to Washington to ascertain from the President the true state of the case. He was informed by the President that Bome general officers from the Army of the Potomac, whose names he declined to ^ve, had called upon him and repre- sented that Gen. Burnside contemplated soon mak- iog a movement, and that the army was so dispirited and demoralized that any attempt to make a move- ment at that lime must result in disaster; that no prominent offisers in tQe Army of the Potomac were lu favor of any movement at that time. Gen. BurnBide informed the President that none of his olncera Lad been informed what his plan was, and then proceeded to explain it in detail to the President. Ha urged upon the President to grant hun permission to carry it out, but the President de- chned to do so at that time. Gen. Halleck and Sec- retary Stanton were-Bsnt for, ana then learned, for the trst time, of the President's action in stoppine the movement; although Gjn. Halleck was pre- viously aware that a movement was contemplated by Gen. Burnside, Gen. Halleck, with Gen. Barn- eide, held that the officers who had made those repre- eentations to the President should be at once dia- misoed the ssrvice. Gen. Burnside remained here at that time for two days/but no conclusion was reached upon the subject. HIS PLANS BECOME KNOWN TO THE REBELS. When he returned to his camp he learned that many of the detaUs of the general movement, and the details of the cavalry expedition, had become known to the Eebel sympathizers in VTash- jagton, thereby rendering that plan impracticable. iVhea asked to whom he had communicated his plans, lie stated that he had told no one in Wash- ington, except the President, Secretary Stanton, and Uen. Halleck; and in his camp none knew of it except one or two of his sfajf officers, toho remained tH camp all the time. He proteased himself unable to teU how Lis plans had become known to the enemy. HE ASKS FOR ORDERS BUT GETS NDNE. A correspondence then took place between the 1 resident, Gen. Halleck and Gen. Burnside. Gen. Burnside desired distinct authority from Gen. Hal- leck, cr some one r.uthorized to give it, to mate a movement across the river. While urging the im- portance and necessity for such a movem'ent, he can- diil:y fidmuted that there waahardlv a general officer la his command wno approv ed of ij. While wiHiue to take upon himself all the responsibihty of thi movement, end promismg to keep in view the Presi- • TJ^J ^f^^\on concemmg any risk of cieBtroyiag the f-^^r?*i.^^?-^°'''°'^''''^« '^es'^e'l tj hiive at least uen. ualleck a sanction or permission to make the laovcment. Gen. HaUeck replied that while he had always favored a forward movement, he conld cot tak^the responsibility of giving any directionii as to how and when it should be made. HE TAKES THE RESPONSIBILITY. i Gen. Burnside then determined to make a move- ment without any farther correspondence on the subject. He was unable to devise any as promising as the one juet thwarted by this interference of his eubordiuate officers, which interference gave the ene- my trie time, if not the means, to ascertain what he had proposed to do. He, however, devised a plaja of movement, and proceeded to put it in execution. As ia well known, it was rendered abortive in con- eequence of the severe storm wMch took place ehortly after the movement began. Gen. Burnside states that, besides the inclemency of the weather, there was another powerful reason for abandoning the movement, viz: the almost uni- versal feeling among his general officers against it. Some of those officers freely gave vent to their feel- ings in the presence of their inferiors. GENERAL ORDER NO. 8. In consequence of thi^, and also what had taken place during the battle of Fredericksburg, &o., Qen. Burnside directed an order to be issued, which h« styled general order No. 8. That order dismissed some officers from the ser- vice, subject to tho approval of the President, re- lieved others from duty with the army of the Poto- mac, and also pronounced sentence of death upon some deserters who had been tried and convictea. Gen. Burnside states that he had become satisfied that it was absolutely necessary that some such ex- amples should be made, ia order to enable him to maintain the proper authority over the army under hia command. The order was duly signed and i«- Bued, and only waited publication. Two or three of his most trusted staff officers rep- resented to Gen. Burnside that should he then pub- lish that order, he would force upon the President the necessity of at once sanctioniug it, or, by refus- ing his approval, assume an attitude of hostibty to Gen. Burnside. The pubhcation of the order was accordingly delayed for the time. THE PRESIDENT REFUSES TO SUSTAIN BURN- SIDE. Gen. Burnside came to Washington and laid th« order before the President, with the distinct assur- ouce that in no other way could he exercise a proper command over the Army of the Potomac; and he asked the President to sanction the order, or accept his resignation as major-general. The President acknowledged that Gen. Burnside was right, but declined to decide without consulting with some of his advisers. To thia Gen. Buruaide rephed that, if the President took time for consultation, he would not be allowed to publish that order, and therefor© asked to have hia resignation accepted at once. This the President decliued to do. HOW BURNSIDE CAME TO BE RELIEVED. Gen. Burnside returned to hia camp and came again to Washington that night at' the request of the President, aud the next morning called upon the President for his decision. He wat» informed that the President declined to approve nia order No. 8, but had concluded to re'jave him from the commana of the Army of the Potomac, and to appoint Gen. Hooker in his place. Thereupon Gen, Burnside again insisted that hia resignation be accepted. This the President dechned to do; and, after some urg- ing, Gen. Burnside consented to take a leave of ab- Bonce for thirty days, with the understanding that at the end cf that time he shoold be assigned to duty, as ho deemed it improper to hold a commission as major-general and receive his pay without ren- dering Eervice therefor. Gen. Burnside objectedto the wording of the order which relieved him from hit command, and which stated that it was " at hit own request," as being unjust to him and unfound' ed infact; but upon the representation that any other order would do injury to the cause, he con- seated to let tt remain as it then read. Tho f .>regoiug statement of the facts proved, to 27 rether witn tho toatimony herowitti Bubtnitted, so folly and directly meet ibo re<|uirotiientd of the roaolation leferred to them, that your Cbramitteo deem any comment by them to bo euurely unnc- cesaary. CONCLUSION. Your committee think it belter to submit the leotU mony wi.ich they bdva taken iu relation to the con- duct of ibo war, -without cnlicidm to any coubidei-- abla extent of military pland or movemeuts, Icavintf each reader to form lua owu conclusiona Irom the testimony, and such opinioni of competent military men us ii may coutain. , , , Aaibey look baek over the 8truffi:lo of the past two years, thev feel that although wo havonot ac- compliehedfiU'tiiat -we hoped and expected within the time, b iU tho great proKress made given us full assuraULO cf liiial success. Wlieu tho Governmetit took its flrst act ivo steps towaid resist iug the Itebellion the Uebela had been for more than five mouths actively and openly makiu!? preparations to resist its authority and defy itajuiisdioiion. They Lad usurped the coutrol of tho machinery of one Stuto goverument after another, and thus overawed tho loyal people of those States. They bad even so far conuol of tho Federal Govern- ment itsef as to make it not only acquiesce, for the time beiug, in measures for its own dcsiructiou, but contiibuie to that end. Thay bad seized and takea into their po=sessioa the arms and muuiiiou^of war of the government. They bad scattered and demoralized the array, and 'sent tho navy to the most distant parts of tho world. There was treason in tho Executive mantion, treason in the Cabinet, treason iu the Senate aud the House of liepresentatives, treason ia tho army and navy, treason in every department, bureau aud office connected with the 'Government. When the new Aduiinistratiou came into power it was neces- iarily ohli}i;ed to adopt its measures wi.h the greatest caution, scarcely knowiug Iriend from foe. An army and navy had to be created. There was scarcely a battalion of loyal national troops to protect the capi- tal; aud the first sense of security felt iu the capital was wUeu the volunteer troo[i8 entered it, summoned from tbeir homes for its protection. At the same lime It was with great diificulty that the loyal peo- ple could make themselves believe that any serious resistaice to tue authority of tUe Government would beattemped. There were not wanting those who confidently assei^ed that it was but aa outburst of disappointed partisan spiiit, which they predicted would yield to aa exhibition of force, and a deter- mined aud united spirit ou the part of the people of the loyal States to suppress it. Instead of such aa easy supprejeion, we have spent two years, almost, in wartare. We have thrown into tho field a mil- lion of men. We have poured out our resources like water, and wo find ourselves still engaged in the fearful struffgle. But tho nation il cause ia not the only one for •which false anticipations were formed — for which the present coudiuou of lbiaj;3 prebcutj a striking contrast with tho early vi.-ious of its supporters. Thoso who heard, in (Joagreta and elsewhere, tho extravagances of the conspirators will know what wero i/t'-'.r hopes, what their expectations. A speedy marcli upon the capital; a speedy over- throw of the legal Governmeut; a speedy submis- Bion of a people loo pu;iUauimou9 to maiLtaia their rights; aud a speedy subjection of the whole country to tbeasBumpti; ns'of t!ie South, were the prominent features of their delusion. The conepiratora taug'at their people to believe that if war came it would rot be ou tueir s&i'. Aa yet, the hos.ile loot baa scircely trod tho soil of a tree State, and it ia upon the soil of the States iu open rebellion that tUe contest liaa muiniy been waged. The Eebe!8 found themselves, almost vrithont resistance, in possession of every fort aud harbor on tho sea-coast of tho revolted "States, except Fort Pickens, Pentacolu harbor, and tho iaoLited lortifica- ijona and harbors of Tortugos and Key West. Tboy were, for tho time beinpr, masters of the terri- tory of the revolted States, of the depots, arj>enali ana fortifications of tho Government, and bad high hopes th.it all tlio Bbiveholdiog Bord<;r S'-atea would soon bo united wii h them. Tiie fact that bo many of these States hold to-dar their true and loyal position in tho Government demonstr.itej that true patrioiism and loyally is not 'confined to any section of tho country, and gives ta:l ussurfliico that the Government will be maintained, iis juris- diction over every foot of our territory established, aud our uiitionality vi:idicated. Tho events of tho past two years are too freab in the memor'ea of all to require recapitulation. WHAT THE WAR HAS ACCOMPLISfinD. Tour Comnii'.tee will, however, briefly call attention to the fact that, from tbe comuiencoment of active mili ary and naval oporatons in tho Winter and Spring of 18G3, alaiost uuinterrnpted success for eight mouiba attended all our operations, resulting in vast conquests. Tao triumphs of tho navy at Ilatteras, Tort Royal and Fort Henry, wero followed by tho vi'^tories and conques's of the army at iMill Spiiog, Fort DoneUon aud lioanoke Island. Missouri was wrenched from the liebcl grasp, aud tbo Kebel armi.ia dr. ven into Arkansas, where they w^ere defeated iu a pitched battle at Pea Eidge. By the capture of Fort Donelson Kentucky waa permanently redeemed, the capital of one of tho largest revolted Statts seized, her givat rivers kid open toour fio illiS, a^d tha war carried to tlio bor- ders of tbe Gulf State?. Too liehpl fitrongiold on the Mississippi, Columbus, Islaua No. 10, Fort Pil- low, togelber with Mempliis, tho most important commercial city of the State, fell into our bauds. Tbe autumn of 18C1 had witne sedtho important capture of llatteraa and Port Royal by tie navy. These successes wero followed through tiiO combined OperatiouB of tho army atjd navy, in the Winter and Spring of 180:2, by tho capture of Ro moke inland and Newberu, Beautort aud Fort Maco-i, anU by the redaction of the important fort, Pulaski, con- trolling the entrance to the Savdnuah river; of Fort Clinch, controlling i he harbor and railroad depot of Femaudina; of Fort Marion, at St. Augur-tiuc. By the first-named operations we acquired control of tbe Bpacious inland waters of North Caiolina ( Albemarl3 and Pamlico s junde), and their adj.iccut sliorts, and of one of her two important seaports — Beaufort. By the last, we made ourselves luaoters of the ricb Bea islands and imporiaut harbors txteuding along the coast froai Charksrou to St. John's; le iviug iu tho possession of the Rebels, ou llieAiLnitic coast, but two harbors. Char estou and Wiln-iugton. But the brilliant triumphs of our army and navy eliiewhere were surpassed by tho capturo of tho great city of tbo Gulf, tho depot of tbo grsat Valley of the Mississippi — New-Orleans; an ucliiivemeut which, estimatt-dby the importance of tho conquest and tbo noble daiiug of its execution, is scarcely sur- passed ill history. By this important conquest we obtained control of a large portion of Loui:i.uia, and accomuliehed tho mo.-t iiuiiortant aud dilficult step toward obtaiijiug tue eaiiro control of tbo Missis- sippi River, aud caused the surrender of the Ijarbor of Peusacola, with the lorts yet held by the Rebels, Iu tbese hastily sketched military and naval ope- rations, extendiug iu llio West throujili tho States of Arkansas, Missouri, Tonnet-ste and Keutuiky, and on tho Atlantic teaboard from llatter.is to Florida, and ou tho Gulf from Pensacola to the mouths of tho Mississippi, we really made conque^ta as vattaais often lails to the lot of the modi powerful and war- like nations to muka in so s'lort a period of time. We pushed our couquesta by laud throui^b Missouri, Kentucky aud Tennessee to tbo very boundaries of the Gidt Siates; obtai ;ed control of tho Missisiippi River, except about 20 J mil-.'s; occupied tho coasts of North Carolina,* South Carolina and Georgia— • largo portio.1 of Louisiana; seized every important fort and barboc i.i the Rebel territory, save threo ^Wilaiiugtoti, Charleat.u a d Mobile,) reuuai.g to a 28 •corresponding extent the labors of the bloctading equadron; captured fourteen permanent sea-coast forts, among wbich were tho larj^est on the South- ern coast, Buch aa Pulaski, Barrancas, McRae, Jack- .8on, aud St. Philip. Following these conquests was the reduction of Torktowu and the evaouation of Norloik, by wbich the waters of the J imes and York Itivera were laidopen to our fleets, and the Hebels deprived of tLie facilities furnished by a great navy-yard, aud compe'iedtodestroy their only means of menacing our fleets in Hampton Eoads— the Mer- . rimac. WHAT JnCHT HAVE BEEN. I _ Had the success of the Army of the Potomac dur- ''■ ing this period correspo-ded wit^ the success of our .^ ai'insiu other parts ox the couutry, there is reason to believe that the termination ot the campaign of 186^ would have eesn the liebellion well-nigh, if not entirely, overthrown. i H^d Noriolk bean captured during the Winter of I 1861-C'J, aud tbe Merrimac taken possession of or I destroyed, the way to- Kichmoad, by means of tbe I James Itiver, would have beea open, and the fatal 1 delays of tbe Peninsula avoided; or had the enemy, when at Manassas, some time during tbe Autumn of 18G1 or Witter of 1861-62, have been compelled to I come out from his iutrenchments and give us I batiJe, as be might have been, by threatening or ■ actually interrupting hia commnaic&tion between Eichmond aud Manassas, on which be wholly da- ! pended for suppliee— a line so long and difficult to j maintain that we subsequently did not deem it practicable for ns — we could have met bim with an army greater tban it was ever proposed to take I against Richmond, and either have opened the way to the liebel capital or made it tumecessary to go there. In military movements delay is generally bad— in- decision is almost always fatal. la our movements we seem to have too often forgotten that momentum IS made up of weight and velocity ; that the force of the blow may depend as much upoathe celerity of Uie movement as upon the weight of tae body moved. The world's history shows" that the successful ^ Geaer;il has met bis enemv the day before be was I expected— uot the week' or month after. Some of our pomts 01 attack have been so clearly indicated I tothe enemy beforehand, and our movements made j with 60 much delay and Lesitation, tliat he has been able not only^to fortify bis positions aud concentrate liislorces, but even to call into tbe field new armies j to meet us. At ench points we have failed. It is particularly worthy of note that, in the re- j verses which followed the failure of the Peninsula j campaign, at the time when the army of the Rebels 1 had reached Us greatest strengih and its highest state i of enthusiasm, they did not permanently regain any territory or recapture and hold any of the important 1 or controlling pomts before held by us on Rebel soiL Taeir marches upon Washington, Maryland, and also Louisville, were little more than raids, from ; wliieb they were obliged to retire before our oppos- ' ing lorces. This fact clearly shows that while it is iinpoMibIs for us to constantly retain militarv Dos- Bession ot all the vast Rebel territory over which we may bo called upon to pass in our operations against taeir armies, sUll the teiritory once held or occupied by us ca-juoo ba permanently regained by them— a 8nre indicaticn oi our ultimate success. • J 1? ^i*®'"' Jiotwithatanding its errors and reverses. 16 tQli of encouragement, aud gives full assurance ot" nnai eueceas. Ko great war was ever conducted bv any; people or Government without great misiakea— giving to the critics of the time and tbose of sac- ceeding generationa a wide and ample bold for their Jabors. 2; o people on earth were ever caLed sud- douiy into a great war more totally unprepared than •wore the loyal people of this Government: We telt BO -vveiJ assured of our position amoaa; the powers of the world that we had almost concluded we had fought our last battle, and our army and navy bad to^hi?^^' '^-^"^"^ ^?.^=^y ^3 "^^^ess appendages to the Government. We had concluded thl^ doFng justice to the nations of the world, we shoild re- ceive justice la retornj and the loy^ porlioa of the people were devoting all tbeir energies and powers to the arts of peace, the advancement of civil za- tion, the development of the rich and varied re- sources of ournew and greit country; and in these every man fouudfuU occupation for his talents aud a wide field for bis ambition — no man ever dreaming that the parricidal arm would ever be raised against a Government so mild in its sway, so benignant in its influence over all its subjects. It was indeed dlflicuU for a people thus engrossed, suddenly and almost without warning, to turn its attention to war. The Ethels believed us to be so entirely devoted to the pursuits of peace that we should yield to their demands rather than be di- verted from them ; and hence their nefarious at- tempt to overthrow this fair Governmeur, and erect on its ruins that horrid deformity, « free Gov- ernment with human Slavery for its corner-stone. How terribly they Lave been mistaken, tbe past baa already shown; and yet the energies and powers and resources of the loyal people have hardly be- gun to be applied to the suppression of the Re- bellion. They must meet and contend in battle with that strength aud power aud intelligence whicb has built factories and workshops, railroads and steamboats, covered the ocean witu ships, and filled the markets of tbe world with the product of its brain and hands ; and they will find these no less powerlul for dsstrustion than for production, when once fully applied in that direction. AH* the great industrial iuttrests of the loyal States were never more active, more prosperous, than at this time. All that has been lost by the supply of men to tbe army has been made up by in- creased activity and energy, and the adaptation of machinery to woik heretofore done by the human hand. Tbere is only this marked difi'erence: here- tofore all tbese great forces have been applied for the benefit of the arts of peace; now they all look primarily to the prosecution of war; acd years would have (o elapse — far more than would be re- ; quired to crush out the Rebellion — before we should i develop ou r full strength for war. Within less than two years wa have thrown into and sustained in the field an army of a million of men. We have created a navy with which we have blockaded a coast greater in extent than was ever attempted by any Government before, and by our inventions and improvements so completely revolu- tionized naval warfare as to render the oaviea and eea-coast defenses of the world well nigh useless. The efficiency of this blockade is attested not only by the destitution of the Rebels in every article of foreign production, but by ttie cry that comes to ni every day from all parts of the world, in any degree dependent upon the products of the blockaded terri- tory, stimulating ns to Etill greater exertion to crash out this Eebeilion, that the blockaded ports may be thrown open to tbe legitimate commerce of the world. And while, in our efforts to maintain our Govern- ment and vindicate free institutions, we neither asked nor desired the aid of any foreign nation or Government, we did at least ex'Dect of the leauing Powers of Europe that they should refrain from ex- tending aid and encouragement to a liebellion against a friendly Government, thereby prolonging a Strug- gle whicb can only bring misery aud suflering upon the whole civilized world, and may in the end lead to a war between our Government aud some of tbose Povrers, the full efiects of wbich the future alone can uisclose. OUR RESOURCES. We have carried on, shall carry on and conclude this war, without touch'ng one dollar of the accumu- lated capital of the country. We are already aston- ished ao the revenue now being raised from tbe tax- ation of our daily production*, aud vet we do not be- gm to reahze the amount to he ypilded by the sys- tem already adopted, or the extent to wuicU that system may ha enlarged, without impoiin^ any grievous btu-dens upon the people— any burden to which they will not cheerfully submit to accomplish the object intended. No Government can long carry on a war which < 29 must be BUBtained by the accumulated capital of the ooKitrv. aud there ia ecartely a Umit to ihetimo war maybe prosecuted by a GoveninieuC whose credit ia 6ustai;.cd by the revenues derived /rom the accu- mulauny wealth of the c<*iiuiT. REBEL DEFICirAXIES. Everv dolJar tijo liebeU have expended or can eiirend ii ibis Kebeilion has been and must toiuiauo to bo drawn from their accuaia- lated c .pitil. Their intercourso with loreigii uaiionB Lasbutn abaost wholly tuspended, all their indus- trial iutereeia bavo been paralyzed, aud ti^croiduo source trom which they can derive leveiiue or uieans tor the muntfiuaLce ot the war, except by depriving the people of their property, day after day, and year Jiitcr Year, eo ioug as ino war eUall eoutiuue, thus redacinsf them to poverty and want^ This is a truth wliich tiie people in the revolted btates axe alieady be^; inning to realize. They bad been made to behev^ that an export duty on coMou, which the world would be obi t;ed to pay, would yield tliem tho ricLest revenuo ever re-ilized by c-y Govern- ment, aud that if the Federal Goveramtat Bhonld attempt iuttrference with its exportation, they could command the nriaies and navies of Europe to fight their banks for ihem. How bitter must be their disappoiutment as they apply Willi their own hands the torch which consigns ii to ashes, and then are coai polled to supply to ilieirljadera.Jjoui their other property, the means to euatain the Kebeluon I Their currei.cy has almost ceased to be regarded, even by theajselves, as the representative of value. CoDBcriptioa has exhausted their people, and the wealth Which long years of uninterrupted prospenty under the bett govermuent the world ever saw, had placed in their haads, baa already been expended, and tney are now Etruggliuff on with the vain hope that disseuoions among oui-sulves, orforeigniaterveu- tion, may save them from that rain which they eee clearly impending over them. Every day most show them mora and more clearly that cu neither of these sources can they rely for help. The utter ecorn and contempt with which every man in the I iyal States ■who proposes acy aiijnetment of this contest except the absolute, unqualiiieU, and unconditional subju- gatiou of every Kebel ia the land to the Constitution and the laws, ia held by every officer and soldier in our army, and every loval man in the country, must banish irom th^ir minds the last ray ot hope from that source. The reacdon which followed the recent Blight manifestations of a willingness on the part of a few Seceesion sympathizers to ofler terms of com- promise must convince them that they have no allies in the layal States on whom they can rely; and the present condition of affairs in Europe must forever crush tbat lako aud delusive hope which they have lierefofore entertained, that the intervention of Earooean powers might enable them to accomplish what' they knoyr full well they can never attain un- aided. THE TASK BEFORE US. We now see clearly what we have to do. _ W« must obtain uninterrupted conrol of the Musis- aippi. We msst reach those -great railroad arteries — the one borderm:? th^ AtUintio seabourd, the other Btretchiug through the Virginia and Teunetsee val- leys to t.,e went aud south. We must, as eooa as possible, take tho few fortified seaports remaiamg in pooscsaon of the Kebels, cut it oil" from all ex- ternal fcources of food and arms, and have surround- ed it by forces which can press upon it from any quarter, at the satuo time severhig mto t oMted por- tions the lle-el territory and destroying their meass of iiitcrcommauicaiioa, by which alone they have hitherto been enabled to meet us in force wiierovcr we bavo presented ourselves, and by which alone they have been able to feed aud supply their armies. liy possess'.na; ourselves of, aud kee^^ing open, the great nalural highways aloue (and a possesuion of a navy by us ebouid have early sug^^esced this), w» sever partd of tiicir territory muiu^Uy dependent, and, whib cri^'pling them, cnible ourLclves to epeedily concentrate our forces at any point wuero it may be adviaable to Btiike. These d(H>i?ivo meaeureowe are actually execut- ing or prppM-iug to execute. The LUccosseband con- qiiesta we bavo alrcudv described have cirried ufl trough tho preLaduary s ages, and the blows we now eirikt— each one of tbeja that eucceeda— will reach tho very vitafa of tiie liebellion. Let i»Dy j.ne cast liis eye upon tae map, and these truths will be apparent. , , It may be in the future, as in the past, wa snau meet with reverses: tbey are tho inevitable in i- denta of a great war extending over bo v:i .t a terri- tory, and rLouiring great aruiics ki so widely sepa- rated T>oint3. We have ah-eady Been t ha'- it is nd? our true I'olicy to attempt an actual mihtary occu- pation of the rebel territory, except, at a lew 8b< in)p"rtact coulroiliug poiuts. Wa muit destroj their armies, and to do tins wo must coucuUrate, not scatter, our foicea. It ia beUer tooj.eruioEUC- ccsstally against one stronghold or one ani.y thau td attempt t irea aud tail. Tue indications now clearly are that, both in the E^staud West, the cuinpaigoof 18G3 will give us biil iaut acliieveraent— .leeiaive victories. Our Generuls now in luo field huvo the full confidence ot the soldiers aud the pfople, and the armiea will t'O forth, kuowiug that ii.tir ranks are to be inada full; tiiat every day thaD pa«-*es wiU add to, not dindnibh, their strength or numbers. Never beiore did tue world see such an army in the field; never before did Genemh lead such men to battle. Each man goes forth feeling, not only that bo has a soldier's reputation to miiwitain, hut also that he has a country to defend in waici bis inter- est ia as great as that of the tigbest officer in the land. Such an army, with its energy, power, intel- ligence and will, properly directed, must be luvin- cit)le. The past has already demonstrated that the true American soldier can ba relied upon, to dare, do, and endure all tbat human power can attempt, ac- complish, or sustain. Let no men be placed or kept in command of such men who have not the ability to command aad the will to do; tbus the errors a:id mif^takea of the past will be avoided in the future, the fond hopes and anticipations of a true and loyal people realized, the Government vindicated and leboliioa speedily and forever crushed. . We know tnat this contest has cost ui and wiJJ cost us treasnresand blood— the bestbloodever shed by any people in uiainteuance of their Government and in dtfeuse of fi-eeinsiitutions— the blood of the flower of our land. Let ua not make their lives a vain ofieiicg, by for a moment entertaining the Idea of a partition of our territory, which would forever involve ua in anarchy aud border wars, or by any base compromise with llebels. , ^ i • Wa owe it to the noble dead who have shed their blood in founding and defending this Government; we owe it to ourselves; we owe it to the counties* millions who are to come after us, to maintaia this Govemment and the institutions we have iihented from our fathers— the richest legacy ever bequeathed by one generation to another— uud to trauamit them to our posterity, if not improved, certainly unun- In conclusion, your Committee will only say, that all the men who hold higb po.-itiona in tho army and navy and h.tve renderci valuable serviced to the • country, with whoui they have held iatercoarse, imilo in the opinion that fijhliag, and cnly liguiiug, can end thia Kebeilion; that every tr;,. or in the land must and thall bo made to ackno\v;eogo and yield absolute, unqualified and unooniiitional obe- dience to the ConttauuDn and laws. And your Committee believo tbia to be tho senti- ment, not only of tho army and navy, but of every man in the country— traitors and cowards alono ©K- '^i'^**^- ■ B. F. WADE. z. c. CiiA:^uLEa. On tlie pait of vho SeB»U. 0. W. OOOCII. joh:< cu'UUE, g. w. julian, M. F. OUtLL, Ob the put «f the Houi*. 30; LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL. The British Envoy at ■Washington has hitherto had credit for a forbearance and impartklity with regard to our internal quarrel whereof Earl Russell has seen fit suddenly to disrobe him. , The follow- ing dispatch, written by Lord Lyons to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the ITth of last Novem- ber, gives an edifying account of a visit by Lord L. to this city on the 8th, and of certain remarkable conferences had by him here with certain persons whom he characterizes as "the conservative leaders. " Washington, Nov. 17, 1862. Mt Lord: In his dispatches of the 17th and 24th ultimo, and of the 7th instant, Mr. Stuart reported to your Lordship the results of the elections for members of Congress and Stale oflSccra which have recently taken place in several of the most important States of the Union. Witboat repeatmg the details, It will be sufBcient for me too'^serva that the success of thepemocraticor (asit now stvlesitself) theCon- eervativo party, has been bo great as to manifest a change in public feeling among tbe most rapid and the most complete that has evi;r been witnessed, eveu in this country. On my arrival at New-Tork on the 8th instant I found the Conservative leaders exulting in the crown- mg success achieved by the partv in that State. They appeared to rejoice, above all, in the conviction that personal liberty and freedom of speech had been securedfor the principal State of the Union. They believed that the Government must at once desist from exercising in the State of New-Tork the extra- ordmary (ind as they regarded them) illegal and un- constitutional powers w^ich it had assumed. They were confident that al; all events after the 1st of January next, on which day the newly-elected (jrovernor would come into office, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus could not be practically maintained. They seemed to be persuaded that the result of the elections would be accepted by the President as a declaration of the will of the people; that he would increase the moderate and conserva- tive element in the Cabinet; that he would seek to terminate the war, not to push it to extremity; that he would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the people <5f the South, and renounce the idea of subjugating or exterminating them. On the following moroiag, however, intelligence arrived from Washington which dashed therisin" hopes of the Conservatives. Ic was announced that Oren. McCiellan had been dismissed from the com- mand of the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to repair to Lis home; that he had, in fact been re- moved altogether from active service. The General had been regarded as the representative of Conser- vative princiLles in the army. Support of lim had been made one of the articles of the Conservative electoral programme. His dismissal Tiaas taken as a sign that the President had thrown himself entu-ely. into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and that tne atteu.pc to carry cut the policy of that party wouid bo persiated in. The irritation of the Conservatives at New-Tork was certamly very great; it seemed, however, to be not unmixed witli consternatioa and despondency. Several of the leaders of the Democratic party BOUgUiuterviews Willi me, both hefore and after the a,rrival of the intelhgence of Gen. McClellan's dismissal. Ihe subject uppermost in their mmds wmie they were speaking to ma was naturaUy that 01 loreiMU mediation letwcen tlie Norih and South. , Many ot. them seemed to think that this mecJia'Joa musi come at last; but they appeared to be very much afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident that they apprehended that a nremature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the Radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and of thus defeating the peaceful plans of the Conserva- tives. They appeared to regard the present moment as pecrdiarly unfavorable for such au offer, and, in- deed, to hold that it would bs essential to the sac- cess of any proposal from abroad that it should be deferred %util the control of the Executive Govern- ment shou-d be in the hands of the Convervative party. I gave DO opinion on the subject. I did not say Whether or not I myself thought foreign interven- tion probabb or advisable; but I listeued with at- tention to the accounts given me of the plans and nopesofthe Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I peiceived a desire to pu^ an end to the war, even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether; but it was p^ain that it was not thought prudent to avow this desire. Indeed, some Lints of it, dropped before the elections, were so ill received that a strong de.Iaiatioa in the contrary 8?nsd waa deemed necessary by the Democratic Icadtfj. At the present moment, therefore, the cuiefs of the Conservative party call loudly for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, andreproach the Government with sLickness as well as with want of success in its mihtary measures, lint they repudiate all idea of interfering with the institutions of the Southern peo- ple, or of waging a war of subjugation or extermiua- Uon. Taey maintain that the object of the military operations should bo to place the North in a position to demand an armistice with honor and with effect The armistice should (they hold) be followed by a Convention, m which such changes of the Constitu- tion should be proposed as would give the South ample security on the subject of its slave property, and would enaWa tha North and the South to reunite and to hve together in peace and -harmony. The Conservatives pr jfess to think that the South mi^ht be induced to take part in such a Convention, and that a restoration of the Uuion would be the result. Ihe more sagacious members of the party must However, look upon' the proposal of a Convention merely us a last experiment to test the possibility of reunion. They are no doubt well aware that the mora probable consequence of au ariiiistico woulJ be the ejtablisumeut of Southern independence; but they perceiTO that if the South is to utterly aheuated that no possible concessions will induce it to return voluntarily to the Uuion, it is wiser to agree to separation than to prosecute a cruel and hopeless It is with reference to such an armistice as thev desire to attain that the leaders of tho Conservative party regard tho question of forei -a mediation. They think that the oiler of mediation, if made, t j a Rad- ical Adn.inistration, would be rejected; that if made at an unpropitioua moment it might increase the virulence with which the war ia prosecuted. If ttifcir own party were m power, or virtually coa- 31 trolled the Administration. th>y wocll ratlier if poaeibb, obt lia an armiatioe -without the aid ot lor- eiffnG)verT.nient8; but t ley wouli be disposed to accept an off-r of mediation if it appeared to be the only ineaoBof paUioR a stop to hostilities. i!iey would dedro that the off r ebould come from the great Po\*er8 of Europe coDJiintiy, and in parlicular that 1.8 little prominence as possible Bjould be given to Great Britaio. . , , ^ ,.• /f% Wasbioffton I liivo had fewer opportunities than I bad at Nev-Tork of ascertainiog the preseut ^'i3WB of the cliie b of the political parties. At the interview which I had with Mr. Seward, one day after my arrival, be showed no dispositian to enter upon roli'.l^l niavtere. lie did not appear to expect or to de'^itcPto receive from me any Bpecial communi- cation fron her Majesty's Government. The Pres- ident, when I waited upon hi^, talked to me only on ordinary topics. I, for my part, gladly ehunned all allusion to foreign intervention, my principal ob- ject being to avoid eaving anyihin< which mMht embarrass me in c irrying out any iuatructions on the eubiect which I may receive from your lordship. All things considered, my own opinion certainly is that the present moment is not a favorable one for making an offer of mediation. It migat embarrass the I e ice party, and even oblige them, in order to maintain their yiopularity, to make some public de- clarations against it, and this might make it dilficult for them to accept a si nilar offer ut a more propitious time. It would in all probability be rejected by the President, who appears to Lave thrown himself into the arms of the extreme radical party. The views of that party are clear and definite. They deckre that there is no hope of reconciliation with the Southern people; that the war must be pursued, per fasaut nefas, until the disloyal men of the South are ruined and emjngated, if not exterminated; that not an inch of the old territory of the Republic must be given up ; that foreign intervention, in any shape, must be rejected and resented.^ Thio party would desire to turn an offer of mediation to account, for therurposeofialiaming the war spirit and produc- ing a react'on against the Conservatives. It 13 probable, too, that the Government would urge, in answer to an offer of mediation, that it has by no means abandoned the hope of putting down the Rebellion within a reasonable time; that, at all events, this ia not a moment at which it can reason- tbly bo called upon to put a stop to hostilities. It would observe that the armies of the United States are everywhere advancing, and that expeditions are prepared against Texas, as well as against Charles- ton, Mobile, and other points on the coast. It would noint out that it had equipped a considerabla nu;n- ber of war vessels, iron-clad as well as others, at a vast expense; tiiat the season haijast arrivedwhen the Autumn rains would render the rivers navijab'.o by armed vetsels, and when the Southern coast would Lo free from epidemic disease. It might even represent an advance of the Army of the Potomae to Richmond as a probable event. The experience cf the past is certiiin'y.uot calculated to inspire any gre-it cjnfideuce ia the results of these warlike preparations; but in the political interests of the party liow ia power render a continuance of the war a necessity to it. Its only chance of regaiaiag Us l.ist popularity lies ia successfcl military opera- tions. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public esimation than it now occupies, not only Will its tenure cf power become extremely precarious, *>at bomo of its leading members may be csiUed to a BiYere account for their extra lejral proceedina:*. During the session of CongresB whijh besfint next month, the present Adminiitratioa haa indeed reason to expect an uncompromiKi'ig support from a ma- jori'y of both Ilouies 9f Con/f^es. But on the 4'h of Mirch next the existing House of Representatives ia dissolved by the terms of the Constitation, and at the same time several of the present Senators go out of office. The majority of the membera chosen at the recent elections for the new Hoise of Representa- tives are of the Democratic or Conservative party, and in eome States Senators of that party will be TRtumed ia the room of those whose termi of office expire next March. The new Congreaa is in fact lik-lv to be hostile to the Administration and to the radical party; and, althouKh it will not, iu the ordinary course of thinga, assemble until the last mouth of next year, the President will hardly be able to persist in I is present policy and in his aa- Bumption of extraordinary powers, uuless he can, in virtue of military successes obtain a reputation wi'h the people which will sustain him in a contest with the Legislature. It would Beem, then, to be vain to make an offer of mediation to the present Government, in their present mood, with any notion that it would bo ac- cepted. A change of mood may, however, take place after the 4th of March, if no great military successes occur ia the interval. Such a change may possibly be produced sooner by military reverses. A proposal, however, to mediate, made even under present circumstances, by three or more of the Great Powers of Europe conjointly, might not pro- duce any great inconvenience. It is, indeed, urged by some people tbat mediation should be offered, not so much with a view to its be- ing accepted, as to i'.s clearing the way for a recog- nition of the Southern Confederacy. And, indeed, If it were determined that the time had come for re- cognizing that Confederacy, no doubt an offer of mediation would be a Buitable preliminary. But I do not cl3ar!y understand what advantage is expect- ed to result from a simple reco.i^ni ion of the South- ern Government; and I T)resume that the European Powers do not cantemplate breaking up the block- ade by force of arm?, or engagiag ia hostilitiea with the United States in support of t:ie independenco of the South. I have, indeed, heard it maintainel that Great Britain fchould reco^niz^ the independence of the South as soon aa possible, with a view to impede the Buccass of the efforts of the Conservative party to reconstruct the Union. The advocates of this opin- ion consider a reunion a probable event, and appre- hend that the first result of it would be that the combined forces of the North and South would be lit loose u;ion Canada. I cdrtaialy do not at pres- ent share these npprshensions. All hops of the re- con8tructi,nof tie Union appears to befadingaway, even from the minds of those who most ardently de- sire it. But if the reconstruction be still possible, I do not think that we need coucluda that it would lead to au iavasion of Cmada, or to any consequev- cea inj uriona to Great Britain. At any rate, dangers of this kind are remote. The imaediiie and obvioiu interest of Great Britain, as well aa the rest of Eu- rope, is that peace and prosperity s'lould bo restored to thii country as Boon at possible. The point chiefly worthy of consideration appears to bo wheth- er separatioa or reunion bo the more likely to eHect this object. I have, &c , Lyo.ns. 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