Rattle of (Gettysburg PRICE FIFTY CENTS ,.^ Th e Battle of (Gettysburg by Alfred E. Lee Late A. A. A. General First Brigade, Third Division, Eleventh Corps, Army of the Potomac, and Third Brigade, First Division, Twentieth Corps, Armies of the Cumberland and Georgia ; and Secretary of the Gettysburg Memorial Commission of Ohio Illustrated with Twenty Full Page I ft-'"'- ol Jobd / Engravings of the Ohio Memorials A. H. Smythe, Columbus, Ohio 1888 S.ft.T, .55 "The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here." — President Lincoln at Gettysburg Nov. 19, 1863. PRESS OF NITSCHKE BROTHERS. COLUMBUS. O. (ri?c Battle of (Bcttysburg [Copyrighted by Alfred E. Lee. CHE battle of (Tettysburo; was the supreme crisis of the war. All the circumstant'es under which it took place conspired at the time, and will ever conspire, to draw ii})on it the world's attention as the culininatinii' point in the struiigle. P]vervthini;- was staked upon its issue. Plad it resulted in a decisive dei'eat to the National army, the National cause would, in all prol)ability, have been lost. There was ])ractically but one obstacle to prevent the Confed- erate array from iioiuii; wdiere and doing Avhat it pleased, and that obstacle was the Army of the Potomac. Had that army been over- wlielraed. New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, aud Harrisburg would have been in ])eril of seizure by the enemy, the Natif)nal Capital would have been isolated, and tiie National Government captured or put to flight. All the great trunk line railways between the East and West would have been broken up, and the fierce mobs already iu preparation to resist the draft would have welcomed tlie triumphant Confederate host to all the principal seaboard cities. What would have saved the Union? l\aw, undisciplined militia would have been of bul Hi He avail to resist the march of such an army as that of (leneral Lee. That army had reached the summit of its power and prestige. It believed itself to be invincible. It was skill- fully led, well equipped, and composed of such fighting material as only Americans seasoned and trained in war can make. Excepting the forts around Washington, there were no f()rmida1)le artificial obstructions in its path. It was in a productive country, where it could subsist indefinitely. The armies of the West, even after the surrender of Vicksburg, could not have spared adequate help to resist 97 it. Those armies, as was soon demonstrated at ('liickamaui>;a, had quite sulhcient use lor all Iheir strength in their own Held of opera- tions. The success oi" Lee at Gettysburg would have freshly imparted a tremendous impetus to the secession movement. On the other hand, the permanent ebb of that cause began with the repulse of Longstreet on Cemetery Ridge. The little coppice which L'ickett aimed for, and beside which Armistead fell, was indeed " the high-water mark of the Rel)ellion." From the moment that supreme effort failed on the afternoon of July 3, 18(33, until the tinal collapse at Appomattox, the Confederacy steadily lost ground, and, what was worse, lost heart, hope, and prestige. Its mightiest army, under its greatest leader, had done its utmost and failed; the entire North was tired anew with patriotic resolve, and there was no reasonable hope left for the independence of the South. Had reason prevailed rather than pride and passion, the bloody logic of Gettysburg would have been accepted, and the war would have ended Ihen and there. Viewing it in its physical aspects, we are amazed at the magni- tude and fierceness of the battle. Never was there a more tremen- dous shock of arms. Greater armies have fought each other, but the concentrated rush and grapple of force with Ibrce at Gettysburg were perhaps unequaled. The fight continued three days and nights; its theatre covered a space of twenty-five square miles, and when it ended nearly fifty thousand men lay dead or wounded on the field. Nearly five thousand horses were slaughtered in the conflict. Forests through which the rage of the battle blazed were struck dead as by fire, and fields and hill-tops were plowed by hurricanes of shot and shell such as the eye of man had never before witnessed. Fighting as desperate took place afterwards in Grant's Wilderness campaigns, where the contending armies were for the most part hidden from each other by the dense forests, but never was there such a prodigious duel as here between two armies in full sight of each other. Gettysburg has been called the most dramatic battle of the war, and the arena in which it was fought was one well adapted to lend it scenic grandeur. The ancient Greeks, in constructing their open-air theatres, were accustomed to place the stage so as to bring some strik- ing object into view as a suitable setting to the play. At Taormina, smoking Etna was the background chosen, and at Syracuse it was a iiraiiite peaks. se])araied iVom each other ])y a narrow ravine, and known as Round Toj) and Little Round 'J'o]). The h)ttiest and most distant oi' these })eaks is Round Top, which rises to a height oC 400 feet above the waters of Plum Run. East of Gettysburg, and of Cemetery Hill, the Ridge terminates in a precipitous, forest-covered height known as Gulp's Hill, which is separated by the ravine of Rock C'reek frojn another eminence known as Wolf's Hill. The collision of the two armies on this field was an accident. Neither commander had planned to meet the other here. Each one hoped to light in a defensive position, and each expected to choose his own ground for so doing, l)ut neither of them seems to have thought of Gettysburg in this connection, or to have been at all acquainted with the country thereabouts. The advance columns of the C-onfed- erate army had approached the Susquehanna, and were about to move on Harrisburg when they were given pause In^ General Hooker's menaces upon their line of communications in the Cumberland Val- ley. To checkmate any movement of Hooker's in that direction, Gen- eral Lee determined to cross over the mountains to the east, and throw himself upon the broad open highways to Philadelphia and Baltimore. In this way he hoped to compel the National army to defend its own line of communications, or to uncover Washington, and tight, per- haps, at the gates of Baltimore or Philadel])hia. Accordingly, on the 29th of June, he gave orders which, if carried out, would have concen- trated the wdiole Confederate army at Cashtown, on the eastern slope of the South Mountain, ten miles from Gettysl)urg. The itinerary of the campaign prior to to this time may V)e briefly stated: On the 1st of June the armies of General Hooker and General Lee confronted each other along the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Falmouth and Fredericksburg. Their positions were those assumed directly after the battle of Chancellorsville. On the 3d, Lee, leaving A. P. Hill's Corps to watch and detain Hooker, started the Corps of Ew^ell and Longstreet on their northward march, via Culpeper. Long- street reached Culpeper on the 7th, and Ewell arrived there also on the 9th. Stuart's Cavalry (9,500 strong, with thirty guns) was at Fleets wood Hill, near Brandy Station. 100 On the 5th Hooker directed a reeonnoissance by tlie Sixth Corps, of which Howe's Division crossed below Fredericksbura; and encoun- tered Hill's Corps still in position. On the 7th Hooker ordered a reeonnoissance towards Culpeper l)v the cavalry, now under Pleas- onton. On the 9th Pleasonton, supported by two brigades of infantry (Ames's and Russell's), encountered Stuart at Fleetwood, and, after a severe action, had to withdraw, 1)ut not without unmasking Lee's move- ment. (Jeneral Hooker now proposed to cross the Kappahannock and move on Richmond, but the President demurred, telling him that Lee's army, and not Richmond, was his " true objective point." Hooker therefore Ijegan shifting his army to the right and rear, corre- sponding to the movements of his adversary. Placing General Rey- nolds in command of his Right Wing, comprising the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, and the cavalry, he directed him to proceed with it along the line of the Orange & Alexandria Railway towards Manassas. This movement began on the 12th, on which date the Eleventh Corps, marching from Brooks's Station, on the Acquia Creek Railway, arrived at Catlett's. The Third Corps at the same time took position at Rap- pahannock Station, and the P^irst at Bealton. Meanwhile EwelTs Corps, comprising three divisions and twenty batteries, and preceded by two brigades of cavalry under Jenkins and Imboden, having quitted Culpeper on the lOtli, pushed rapidly north- ward via Sperryville and Flint Hill, crossed the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and on the Pith penetrated the Shenandoah Valley at Front Royal. With two divisions, Early's and Johnson's, Ewell moved from Front Royal directly on Winchester, while Rodes's Division pushed ahead via Berryville towards Martinsburg. At this time General R. H. Milroy was in command in the Valley, under General R. C. Schenck as department commander, at Baltimore. Milroy's force comprised 7,000 etlectives, of which one brigade, under Colonel McReynolds, was at Berryville. Unadvised of and not suspecting Lee's movement, Milroy with- drew McReynolds I'rom the path of Rodes, but remained at AVin- chester, where he was surprised and virtually surrounded by Ewell on the 14th, and lost most of his command in killed, wounded, and captives. On the evening of the same day Rodes attacked the small 101 National garrison, under Colonel Tyler, at Martinsbiirg, and obliged it fall l)ack on Harper's Ferry. Pursuing Milroy's fugitives, Jenkins crossed the Potomac at Willianisport on the 14th, and on the lOtli entered Chambersburg. At the same time Imboden, advancing I'rom Romney, seized and broke uj) the Baltimore A: Ohio Railway, and on the 17tli occupied Cumberland. Awaiting the arrival of Longstreet and Hill, EwelPs three divisions remained at Willianisport and south to Winchester until the 19th, Rodes's Division being at Willianisport. Quitting Culpeper on the 15th, Longstreet moved along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, crossing which at kSnickers Gap, he neared Winchester on the 19th. This movement was covered by Stuart's cavalry, keeping to the right, and falling into frequent com- bats with Pleasonton's troopers while endeavoring, though not suc- cessfully, to dispute with them the passes of the Bull Run Mountains. Most notable among these combats were those at Aldie on the 17th, at Middleburg on the 19th, and at Uj)perville on the 21st, in all of which the Confederates were worsted. Forcing back Stuart, Pleasonton's squadrons gained the summit of the Blue Ridge, and from thence ol)served the movements of Lee's whole army down the Yalley. Admonished by EwelFs advance on Winchester, Llooker, on the 13th, put the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps in motion northward, and A. P. Hill, being thus relieved from further necessity of watching the Rappahannock, immediately set out upon the track of Ewell to rejoin Lee. General Hooker now kept his army well in hand, cover- ing Washington and Baltimore. On the 22d, the Eleventh and Twell'th Corps, supported by the First at Guilford, were on the line of (lOose Creek, near Leesburg ; the Fifth was at Aldie, and the Second was at Hopewell and Thoroughfare Gaps, supported l)y the Third at Gum Springs. Pleasonton's Cavalry, having withdrawn to Aldie, covered the approaches to Leesburg. Having concentrated his army on the banks of the Potomac, Lee now gave it the signal to advance into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Ewell's Corps, of which Johnson's Division had already been posted at Sharpsburg, led otf, with instructions to move on Harrisburg. On the 21th and 25th, A. P. Hill's Corps crossed the Potomac at Shep- herdslown, and Longstreet's at Williams])ort, and on the 27t]i united 102 their columns at Chambersburg. Taking with him the divisions of Johnson and Rodes, Ewell pushed rapidly up the Cumberland Val- ley, and readied Carlisle on the 27t]i, while Early, to cover the tiank ill tlie absence of Stuart's Cavalry, kept further to the right, with instructions to move on York, break up the Central Railway, burn the Susquehanna Bridge at Wrightsville, and rejoin Ewell at Carlisle. Early reached Greenwood and Gettysburg on the 26th, Berlin on the 27tli, and York and Wrightsville on the 28tli. On the 27tli, Jenkins, preceding EwelTs column, arrived at Kingston, from whence he ad- vanced, skirmishing, within three or four miles of Harrisburg. Gor- don's Brigade, which advanced to Wrightsville, intended to cross the Susquehanna at that point, and move l)y the left bank on Harrisburg, but was thwarted by the Pennsylvania militia, which fired the bridge and destroyed it. Meanwhile, Stuart, either misunderstanding or disregarding the wishes of Lee, started on a useless raid around General Hooker's right, lietween his army and Washington. From the time this raid began until it ended on the 2d of July, Stuart's force was practically "put out of the fight.'" Starting from Salem, and making a long detour to avoid the Second Corps, Stuart moved via Fairfax Station and Dranes- ville, crossed the Potomac at Seneca Creek, a few miles above Wash- ington, and then pushed nortliward via Rockville, where he captured and destroyed a large supply train. At Hanover, on the 30th. Stuart was intercepted by Kilpatrick's Division of Cavalry, but managed to disengage liimself and proceed to York and Carlisle. He missed Ewell at both places, and rejoined him first at Gettysburg on the 2d of July, with horses and men thoroughly jaded. On the 29th, Hill was at Fayetteville with two divisions of liis corps, the remaining division (Heth's) being thrown forward to Cash- town. On the same day Longstreet moved from C]iambersl)urg to (ireenwood, leaving behind him Pickett's Division to guard tlie trains. Early's Division had meanwhile been recalled from Carlisle to join in the intended advance, in force, on Harrisburg, and on the 30tli encamped near Heidlersburg. Adjusting himself to Lee's movement, General Hooker led his entire army across the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry, and grouped it around JMiddletown and Frederick. The First, Third, and Eleventh 103 Corps, comprisini;' the Left Wing, crossed on the 25th, tlie remaining corps, with the cavalry, on the 2()th and 271 li. Tlie Twellth Corps, under General Slocuni, proceeded to Knoxville, within three miles of Harper's Ferry, with instructions to unite with tlie garrison there in following closely upon Lee's rear, and severing liis communications with Virginia. With his army thus concentrated, and the tSouth Mountain defiles in his possession, General Hooker was prepared to precijiitate his entire force into the Cumberland Valley, in support of tSlocum, or to continue his movement northward along the eastern base of the Mountain, as circumstances might require. Upon learning that the enemy was at York and Carlisle he determined, says Double- day, '' to throw out his dilferent corps in a fan shape toward the Sus- quehanna, and advance in that direction with three corps on the lelt to defend that Hank, in case Longstreet and Hill should turn east, instead of keeping on toward the north. At the same time it was his intention to have Slocum follow up Lee's advance by keeping in his rear, to capture his trains and couriers, and to cut olf his retreat should he be defeated." In the meantime, the Governor of Pennsylvania had issued a proclamation calling out ()0,000 militia to assist in defending the State. To organize and command this force, and the new Department of the Susquehanna, General Couch was taken from the command of the Second Army Corps, which tliereupon devolved upon General Han- cock. Hooker requested that Couch should be subordinated to his own direction, and that the garrison at Harper's Ferry should be with- drawn from that post — which it was no longer im])ortant to defend — and added to the active forces in the field. Both these requests being denied by the General-in-Chief at Washington (Halleck), General Hooker, deeming liis plans thwarted, asked to be relieved of his com- mand, whicli, by direction, he transferred (on the 28th) to General George G. Meade, then commanding the Fifth Army Corps. Couches Department was at once subordinated to .Meade, who was also per- mitted ( although Hooker had been forl)idden ) to withdraw the Harper's Ferry garrison to Frederick. General Meade affirmed that he was not aware of Hooker's plans. However that may be, he decided to move forward at once on the main line from Frederick to Harris])urg, extending the wings of his army on l)oth sides as far as consistent with rapid concentration, and intending to continue this movement until the enemy should be 104 .s*, ,# ■^3 *fff$i£/f& CitM.r _ _^ll /^^ j.-'_n syz i/a.?Tio- ooLcn dari' \ - — — ^^ ^__^. _._ ^ ~ ~ ^~-^ ~ — \ - — C.!T;tniii< Taneytown - - obliged to turn from the Susqiielianna and give battle. Accordingly, on the 21)th of June, the Army of the Potomac, directed by its new commander, resumed its march, and spread its moving columns out like a fan, with Huford's Cavalry on the left, Gregg's on the rigiit, and Kilpatrick's in advance. The Left Wing, comprising the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, was led by General Reynolds, who gave over the command of his own corps ( First ) to General Doubleday. The Right Wing — Second, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps — was directed by Generla Meade in person. Tiie First and Eleventh Corps had already reached Emmittsburg, a beautiful Maryland village near the base of the South Mountain, twelve miles from (lettysl)urg. The Third and Twelfth Corps were now ordered to Taneytown, the Second, to Frizelburg, and the Sixth to New Windsor. 105 Still not aware that Lee was turning back from the Susquehanna, and concentrating towards Cashtown, General Meade, on the 80th, gave dire(^tions lor resuming the march July 1, as follows: The Third Corps (Sickles) to go to Emmittsburg; the Second (Hancock) to Taney town; the Plfth ( Sykes ) to Hanover; the Sixth (Sedgwick) to Manchester; the Twelfth ( Sh)cum ) to Two Taverns, and the First ( Doubleday ) and Eleventh ( Howard ) to Gettysburg. But during the night of the 30tli, Meade learned of Lee's change of programme, and thereupon prepared a circular, withdrawing Reynolds and Slocum, and giving detailed instructions for the formation of the army in a de- fensive position at I'ipe ('reek, iifteen miles southeast from (Jettys- burg. This circular seems to have been intended as a 2)recaution rather than as a positive command, but whatever its purpose was, the name of Pipe Creek was not destined to emblazon the pages of history. The execution of the instructions embraced in the circular rested upon the contingency that the enemy should " assume the offensive and attack,'' yet by this very contingency the instructions were thwarted. They came too late to supersede the orders of march already issued for July 1, and thus, on that day, the two armies, as if guided by some iuvisible destiny, approached each other at a point where neither of them had planned or expected to meet. Lee's eastward movement was shnv, and on the night of the 30th his army was yet scattered, as follows : Of Longstreet's Corps, Pick. etfs Division w^as at Chambersburg, and Hood's and McLaws's at Fay- etteville. Of Ewell's (\)rps, the divisions of Rodes and Early were at Heidlersburg, and Johnson's was at Scotland, west of the Cashtown defile. Of A. P. Hill's (^orps, Anderson's Division was at the South Mountain Pass, on the Chambersburg Road, Pender's at Mummasburg, and Heth's at Cashtown. On the morning of June 30, Pettigrew's Brigade of Heth's Divi- sion pushed on from Cashtown towards Gettysburg, expecting to cap- ture there a supply of shoes, of wdiich the brigade was much in need. Much to his surprise, Pettigrew ran afoul of Buford's Cavalry ( which happened to be approaching i'rom Fountain Dale ) and withdrew to Marsh Creek, where he reported to Hill, at Cashtown, what had hap- pened. Buford, on the other hand, moved off towards Emmittsburg, and reported to Reynolds, by whose direction he proceeded at once to Gettysburg, with instructions to seize and hold the town. At the same time Hill ordered Pettigrew to march for Gettysburg at day- break next morning, and gave the same orders to his entire corps. 106 iL\}c Battles of tt^e ^irst I>aij 5U0H was the chain of accidents whicli brouiilit tlie two armies into contact. BuforcVs force comprised bnt two Bria;ades — Devin's and Gamble's — with Oalefs Battery of liiiht guns, in all 2,200 men. Advancing beyond Seminary Kidge, he disposed this force — jjartly dismounted — in a semi-circle, cover- ing all the approaches i'rom the west and north. Devin's Brigade held his right. Gamble's his left. Bulbrd was firmly convinced that the enemy would attack him in force in his present position, and that a great battle would be fought there, or in that vicinity. ''Tomorrow morning," he said, " they will come booming down upon us three lines deep, and we shall have to fight desperately to hold our own until the infantry comes up.'' Accordingly Buford instructed his signal officers to keep a sharp look out for camp fires during the night, and in the morning for dust, and not long after sunrise the following morning plenty of "dust " made its appearance in front of his pickets. By six o'clock the enemy's head of column, Heth's Division, was seen approaching, and by eight his lines were sweeping down toward Willougliby Run. Buford's men, well ambuslied along the Run, with reserves on Seminary Ridge, opened fire, and the Battle of Gettysburg was begun. Heth puslied forward the brigades of Archer and Davis, which were soon followed and supported by those of Brockenbrough and Pettigrew. The fight soon grew hot, and Buford, confronted by an outnum- bering and rapidly increasing force, was becoming very anxious when his signal officer in the Seminary belfry announced the ap- proach of a long column of infantry by the Knimittsburg Road. 107 Hiilbrd went u]) (o llie belfry to verily the news, and while there lieard a familiar voice calling him. It was the voice of Reynolds, who had galloped ahead of Wadsworth's (First Corps) Division, which was the column the signal officer had descried. "What's the matter, JohnT' inquired lieynolds. "The deuce is to pay,'' answered Buford. " Can you hold out until the first Corps arrives ? " " I reckon I can," replied the sturdy cavalry chief. Reynolds immediately dispatched messengers to hurry the First Corps forw^ard, and also sent stressing messages to Sickles and Howard — Third Corps and Eleventh. To a staff officer of Howard's he expressed the wish tliat the Eleventh Corps, as it arrived, should be drawn up on Cemetery Hill as a reserve. The leading First Corps Division (Wadsworth's) arrived about 10 a. m. It comprised Cutler's Brigade, and the so-called Iron Brigade, formerly Gibbon's. Cutler's Brigade, which arrived first, was immediately pushed forward by Reynolds to i-elieve (Tamble's cavalry, which was being hardly pressed. Taking Hall's Battery,^ ^ Commanded by Captain, afterwards Brigadier General James A. Hall. and two of Cutler's regiments,- Reynolds moved out to the Ridge 2 The Fourteentli Brooklyn and the Ninety-fifth New York. next east of Willoughby Run, and there posted the battery on the Chambersburg Road, and the regiments on the left of a railroad grade crossing the Ridge, while Wadsworth, with Cutler's three remaining regiments,^ extended the line on the right of the grade. * The Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, and the Seventy-sixth and One Hundred Forty-seventh New York. In this position Cutler was at once violently assailed by Davis, while Archer, on Davis' right, advanced to seize a triangular strip of timber known as McPherson's Wood, which covered the Western slope of the Ridge on Cutler's left. About this time General Doubleday, who had been l)ringing forward the divisions of Rowley and Robinson, arrived on the field, and sent for instructions to Reynolds, who replied : '' Tell Double- day I will hold this road [to Chambersburg] and he must hold that 108 ^-^i*^>f.^^ fiSIMlALISElCTFIi -V .-% .^- one [to Haiierstowii].''"' At this jiinrtiire the Iron Brig;a(le (Mor- row's)^ was ap])roachin«j:;, and General Reynolds crossed over to tlie * Under Colouel Henry A. Morrow, of tlie Twenty-fourth Michigan In- fantry. edge of the timber to direct its movements. As soon as the lead- ing regiment^ arrived, he ordered it to charge into the wood, which * Second Wisconsin, under Colonel Lucius Fairchild. was lull of Confederate sharp-shooters. Tiien turning to see whether the supj)orts were coming, he was struck in the head by a mnsket ball, and fell dead from his horse. Thus, in the very l)eginning of the action the Army of tlie Potomac was deprived of one of its ablest and most promising officers. Not observing the fall of Rey- nolds, in the eagerness of its advance, Morrow's I^rigade charged through the wood, captured Archer, and one thousand of his men, and drove the rest of his lirigade across Willoughl)y Run at the l)oint of the fjayonet. While these events were taking ])lace on the lelt disaster befel the right, where Cutler's two right regiments were taken in fiank l)y Davis and driven ))ack. This obliged Wadsworth to recall the other regiments of (Sutler's Brigade, but one of them (the One Hundred Forty-seventy New York ) did not receive the order, and ])eiug nearlv surrounded, sutfered heavy loss. Hall's Battery, tiring canister, did great execution there, but lost one gun of which the iiorses were all killed. With loud yells the enemy pursued the beaten regiments toward the town. P'ortunately, Doul)]eday, now commanding the First Corps, had posted the Sixth Wisconsin ( Colonel Dawes ) and the Iron Brigade Headquarters (iuard as a reserve, and this force he now threw upon Davis's flank. Dawes was joined by Cutler's two left regiments under Prowler, and made such a vigorous attack that Davis was obliged to turn from the pursuit of ('utler and seek refuge in the Railroad Cut. Here the enemy made stubborn resistance, but Dawes brought a gun to bear enfilading the Cut, and Fowler swej)! it at the same time with his musketry. This cleared the Cut and obliged a good many of Davis' men to throw down their arms, while the remainder fled promiscuously. Alter tliis success by which the One Hundred Forty-seventh New York was relieved and HalFs 10!) abandoned gun retaken, Morrow's Brigade was drawn back to MePher- soii's Wood, and Cutler's Brigade, of wliich the two right regiments had retreated to the town, was thrown forward to its original position. A pause in the coml)at now ensued, during which the First Corps might have l)een successfully and i:)erhaps advantageously witlidrawn to Cemetery Ridge. But Doubleday received no orders to withdraw, and preferred not to take the responsi])ility of quitting his position without orders. He therefore proceeded to extend and strengthen his line with Rowley's Division, which arrived at 11:30 a. .m,, followed by Robinson's. These divisions contained two brigades each, and num- bered, in all, between five and six thousand men. By Doubleday's direction, Rowley de])l()yed Riddle's Brigade forward on high ground to the leit of Morrow's Brigade, and put in Stone's Brigade'^ between "Known as the " Bucktail Brigade," and comprising the One Hundred Forty-second, -Forty-ninth, and-Fiftieth Pennsylvania Regiments. Morrow's and Cutler's, near the Chambersburg Pike. Robinson's Division was posted as a reserve near the Seminary, and there threw up a barricade. At the same time the enemy rectified his shattered line, which Hill re-enforced with the four heavy brigades of Pender's Division,'' and all the reserve artiller}^ numbering about eighty pieces. ^ " It must be remembered that the enemy had but three corps, while the Union army had seven. Each of their corps represented a third, and each of ours a seventh of our total force. The same ratio extended to divisions and brigades."— Doubleday. While these events were taking place out on Seminary Ridge, General Howard arrived, and being tlie senior officer on the field, assumed the chief command. Seeing how severely Doubleday was pressed, and observing the retreat of j)art of Cutler's Brigade, Howard sent word ( mistakenly ) to Meade that the First Corps had been worsted, and dispatched messengers to hurry forward the Eleventh C'Orps and call up the Third. He also sent a request to Slocum to bring up the Twelfth Corps which was only iive miles distant.'' * General Howard so claims, but the request seems not to have reached General Slocum. At the recent dedication of New York memorials on ("ulp's Hill (July 2, 1888), General Slocum said, referring to the movements of the Twelfth Corps: "At noon on July 1 we were resting and awaiting orders at Two Taverns. The sound of the guns at the opening of this great battle on July 1 were heard 110 fifty miles to the north and west of the field, while we, owing to the crest of the hills between us and Gettysburg, and to the direction of the wind, lieard nothing of it, although we were only four miles distant. The first information I received came from a citizen living near Gettysburg, who stated that a battle was in prog- ress. Orders were at once given to move to this place, and Major Guindon, of my staff, was sent forward to give information of our approach, and learn where we were most needed. On our arrival Geary's division was sent at once to the left, to the Round Tops, and Williams's was placed on the crest east of Rock Creek." Tlie Eleventh Corps ( now under Schurz ) })e2;an to arrive about noon, having; marched from Emmittsbnrg ( twelve miles ) almost without a halt. As soon as the leading division ( Schurz's, under Sehimmel pfennig) reached the town, it was rushed through the streets on the " doul)le-quick,''' and into the open country beyond, with instructions to advance to Seminary Ridge and extend Doubleday's line along that eminence to Oak Hill. Barlow's Division, following, was directed to move out and take position on the right of Schimmel- l)fennig''s. Von Steinwehr's little division, with the reserve artillery of the Corps, was posted in reserve on Cemetery Hill. Fortunately, Von Steinwehr, an old Prussian officer, seeing the importance of this position, immediately fortitied it, and his heavy lunettes, though grass-grown, still alford visible evidence of his decision and foresight. Schimmelpfennig and Barlow, while moving through the open fields north of Gettysburg, soon ran against an obstacle. The batteries which Hill had posted on the Ridge, opposite Doubleday's riglit, let loose on them, but this was not all. While Doubleday had been fighting A. P. HilTs Corps, the divisions of Early and Rodes, of Ewell's Corps, had been nearing the field. Rodes coming ( from Car- lisle ) by the Newville, and Early ( from York ) by the Hunterstown Road, arrived at nearly the same time and swelled the Confederate force present and ready for action to fully treble our own. Rodes had five brigades and five l>atteries, all oi" which he deployed along the heights east of Willoughby Run, facing south. Iverson's Brigade, supported by Daniel's and Ramseur's, held his right, O'Neil's his centre, and Doles', extending as far east as the Carlisle Road, his left. Heth and Pender, whose divisions were by this time in lull strength, extended l)y the left so as to connect with Rodes's right. Thus Doul)leday's right fiank and rear were threatened by Rodes, and Schurz's by Early. Doubleday immediately drew back 112 his rifiht so as to adapt it to the new situation. What the Eleventh Corps (lid will be recounted further on. One of liodes's batteries, posted on Oak Hill, y;ave Doubleday his iirst notice that Ewell had arrived. Soon battery after battery opened fire from the same direction, and the whole range of hills east of Wil- loughby Kun was ablaze with Confederate cannon. The dispositions made by General l)()ul)leday to meet this new emergency were these: Cutler's Brigade, holdiug Wadsworth's right, was drawn back into the timl)er just north of the Railroad Cut on Seminary Ridge; Stone's Brigade, on Cutler's left, retained its commanding position — "the key point of the first day's battle," as Doubleday calls it — west of the ridge; Morrow's Brigade remained in the McPherson Wood; Biddle's Brigade faced to the nortli, and Baxter's Brigade, of Robinson's Division was directed, but failed, to fill the vacancy on Cutler's right between the right of the First Corps and left of the Eleventh. These arrangements were skillful and timely. Morrow's Brigade and Cutler's were concealed l)y timber; Biddle's front was covered by a ridge; Stone's was partially protected in like manner, and Baxter's, after liecoming engaged, was posted behind a stone fence. The bat- teries of Cooper and Stewart, and part of Reynolds', were put forward into action, and Stevens's was held in reserve. About half past two o'clock. Early got into position on Rodes's left, and Ewell and Hill sounded a general advance. '^From my position," says Colonel Stone, ''I was enabled to trace their formation for at least two miles. It appeared to be a nearly continuous double line of deployed battalions in mass as reserves." Two-thirds of the Confederate army was now on the field, and its lines stretched in a vast semi-circle clear around from the Millerstown Road on the south to the York Turnpike on the east, thus reaching beyond and envelop- ing both Hanks of the two little army corps now resolutely struggling against this overwhelming mass. The First Corps was first attacked. While fiercely plying his batteries, Rodes launched the Brigades of O'Neil, Iverson, and Daniels against those of Baxter, Cutler, and Stone. While taking position on Cutler's right, Baxter was assailed, first on his right flank and then on his lel't, by O'Neil, who was both times repulsed, Baxter then advanced and ainl)uslied his men ])eliind a stone Cence, which 113 Iverson's Brigade was aj)pr()achinii-. Waitini;' until Iverson's lines had approached within close rani;e, Baxter's men spranu up I'roni l)eliind the stone fence and delivered a volley with terrible eilect. Simulta- neously with this, Iverson's right was struck by Cutler, by Co()])er's Battery, and by the distant tire of Stone. AH this elfectually used up Iverson for the time being, and about a thousand of his men threw down their arms. While these events were passing, Stone's position was assailed by Daniels's Brigade, assisted by Davis's, of Hill's Corps. One of Stone's three regiments (the One Hundred Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight) was at this time posted in the Railroad Cut, some distance in front of the main line. After allowing the enemy to come up to a fence, within ])istol range, Dwight tired two volleys in rapid succession, and then charged and cleared his front with the bayonet. Upon returning to the Cut, Dwight found it entil- aded by the enemy's artillery, and withdrew to his original position on the Chambersbnrg Road. During this affair of Dwight's, Colonel Stone was severely wounded, and w^as succeeded in command by Colonel Wister, of the One Hundred Fiftieth Pennsylvania. Ramseur's Brigade now came to the assistance of Iverson, and Robinson personally led Paul's Brigade — Doubleday's last reserve — to the relief of Baxter. Then Daniels and Davis renewed their assault upon Stone's Brigade (under Wister), and on their right Brockenbrough and Pettigrew led their brigades against Morrow's. Wister repulsed the attack made upon him, and the Iron Brigade held its ground. During this aifair. Colonels Wister and Huidekoper were severely wounded, the latter while leading a charge with Wister's Regiment. During the progress of the battle on this part of the field, an old man in a swallow-tailed coat and bell-crowned hat came stalking across the fields from the town, and made his aj^pearance at Colonel Stone's position. With a musket in his hand and ammunition in his pockets, this venerable citizen asked Colonel AVister's permission to fight. Wister directed him to go over to the Iron Brigade, wliere he would be sheltered by the woods; but the old man insisted on going forward to the skirmish line, then and there. He was allowed to do 114 so, and continued firinii' until the skirmishers retired. He afterwards fought witli the Iron Bripide, where he received three wounds. This patriotic and lieroic citizen was Consta])le John Burns, of (irettysburg. The First Corps had by this time sutlered heavy loss, and had all its reserves in line. The enemy, on the other hand, had plenty of reserves, and had gained ])ositions for his batteries wdiich gave an immense leverage to his onset. Directly the storm burst again. Hill's Division, and part of Rodes's, fell unitedly upon the First Corps and enveloped its Hanks, right and left. To this assault our troops, infan- try, and artillery made obstinate l)ut unavailing resistance. On the left, Biddle, though his lines were entiladed, made the Confederates pay dearly for every inch of gronnd they gained. In the center. Mor- row's Brigade, reserving its tire nntil the enemy came within eighty paces, repelled and nearly annihilated Scales's Brigade. Cutler, taking position in the Railroad Cut, held out long enough to enalde our bat- teries to limber up and get aw^ay. During these struggles, General Paul was struck l)y a musket ball, which passed through l)()th his eyes, leaving him totally Idind. Colonel Morrow was also wounded, and the entire line was forced back on Seminary Ridge. There twelve jDieces of artillery were massed behind the rail l)arricade thrown up by Robinson, aud a last stand was attempted. By the resistance made there, the enemy was held back sufficiently to enable the artillery and ambulances to with- draw. Then, leaving ])e!iind it one gun and a few caissons, what was left of the First Corps fell back to Cemetery Hill. We now turn to the events which took place on the right. Forestalled by Rodes in the occupation of Oak Hill, Schimmel- pfennig's light division of the Eleventh Corps was brought to a halt in the open fields about midway between Seminary Ridge and the town. The left of the division rested on the Mummasl)urg Road. Van Ams- berg's Brigade occupied the space between that Road and the Carlisle Road, and Krzyzanowski's Brigade prolonged the line from the Carlisle Road across the wheat fields and meadows to the right, where Barlow's Division was advancing. Wheeler's Battery and four pieces of Dilger's Avere stationed on the left of the Carlisle Road, and two of Dilger's on the right of that Road, near the Poor House Lane. Between the left of the Eleventh Corps, on the Mummasburg Road, and the right of the 115 First Corps on Seminary Kidge, there was a vacancy in the line liilly a quarter of a mile wide. Some hundreds of yards in front of Krzyzanowski a brook coursed across the meadows I'rom Seminary Ridge to Rock Creek, and Barlow was aiming to establish his right upon the high tiinl)ered ground — now known as BarlowV Knoll — near the mouth of this streamlet. Devin's cavalry brigade had just quitted that position and Ew^elFs pickets had just occupied it. To retake it, Barlow's men, dropping their knap- sacks at the Alms House, dashed forward on the double quick. Von Gilsa's Brigade quickly cleared the timl)er, and went into position with its right resting on Rock Creek. Ames's Bi-igade came up between Von Gilsa and Krzyzanowski, and Wilkinson's United States Battery was brought Ibrward to assist in holding the ground taken. Antecedent to these movements Early's Division of Ewell's Corps had arrived by the York Road, and had been deployed on the hills east of Rock Creek. (lordon's Brigade held Early's right, Hays's his centre, and Hoke's his left. Smith's followed in reserve. The situation of the Eleventh Corps at this time was, in some respects, strikingly similar to that wdiicli it occupied at Chancellors- ville just prior to Stonewall Jackson's onslaught. Here, as there, neither its right or left flank had any connection; here, as there, but more fortunately than there, an important part of its Ibrce was detached and absent; and here, as there, Jackson's old command was ])earing down upon its right and rear. Reaching far out beyond its right, part of Early's Division was already making straight for the town of Gettysburg, From its position on the plain, Schimmelpfennig's Division had witnessed Doubleday's struggle with O'Neil, Brockenbrough, and Iver- son, and from the same position it now, with still livelier interest, saw Doles's Brigade coming down trom Seminary Ridge to attack Von Amsberg. Doles's left flank had no apparent support or connection, and Barlow was about to go forward and strike it just as Von Gilsa, holding (as at Chancellors ville) the extreme right of the Eleventh Corps, discovered Early's Division moving upon his right flank and rear." '^ In a recent conversation with the writer (July 2, 1888,) General Gordon stated, in explanation of the movements of his brijjade, that as he approached Barlow's Knoll from the York Turnpike he could plainly perceive that our troops 116 .. cf THtesirts:- '^Y^ !a «•'■'■., (Eleventh Corps) were driving back the left of Doles's Brigade. General Gordon further stated that his attack, falling upon Barlow's right and rear, relieved Doles and enabled him to swing around on a right wheel and join his left with Gordon's right. The two brigades (Doles's and Gordon's) then advanced simultaneously, a part of Gordon's, as General Gordon himself informed nie, reaching the town in advance of anj- of our troops. [A. E. L. Tliere now remained to Sclmrz's two small divisions but one pos- sible chance of makinj;- snccessfiil resistance, and that was by change of front to the riiiht and rear, in echelon with the right of the First Corps. ^ ^^ But just the opposite of this was done, and the two divisions, '"The Conite de Paris, an impartial and capable military judge, says (vol. Ill, p. 560 ) : " Since he declined to [rather could not] occupy Oak Hill, Howard should have brought back the Eleventh Corps to the rear in order to form a strong connection between his left and the right of the First Corps. * * * Instead of this, he leaves unoccupied between these two corps a space battered by the guns of Oak Hill to which his two batteries cannot reply ettectively, and instead of closing up his line by a retrograde movement of Schimmelpfennig, divides it by carr3ing forward his extreme right, formed by Barlow's Division." To the same effect Doubleday : "It seems to me that the Eleventh Corps was too far out. It would have been better, in my opinion, if its left had been echeloned in rear of the right of the First Corps, and its right had rested on the sti'ong brick building, with stone foundations, at the Alms House. The enemy then could not have turned the right without compromising the safety of the turning column and endangering his communications, a movement he would hardlj* like to make, especially as he did not know what troops might be coming up." — Chancellor svWc and Gettfjshwg, }}. 141- changing front to the right, pushed out to meet the advancing enemy. On the heights occupied l)y Rodes, Ewell had been watching for Early's approach, and waiting for him to get into position. Early's formation being complete, Ewell and Hill signaled a general advance, and all along the line their batteries opened and their infantry sprang forward. What took place on the left — how the First Corps stub- bornly withstood the enemy's onsets, but was finally overcome and obliged to fall back to the town — has been narrated. How the Eleventh Corps was thrown out into the open plain where it had no choice or advantages of ground — not a ridge, hillock, or any other shelter for its line — has been explained. How the enemy availed himself of this advanced and exposed position of that corps will now be seen. Crossing Rock Creek, Gordon and Hays fell with overwiielming force upon Barlow's Division, drove it after an obstinate struggle, 117 from its position, and obliged it to i'all hack rapidly to the Alms House. Here Barlow fell severely wounded, and his division, taken in Hank by Hoke's column, which had come down the York Pike, was driven back into the town. Schimmelpfennig, as soon as Early's presence on the right was announced, changed front and began advancing across the wheatfields and meadows towards Kock Creek. Gordon's Brigade was then in the act of crossing the creek, and Doles's was approaching from Seminary Ridge. Von Amsberg's Brigade presented its front to Doles's, and Krzyzanowski's moved in solid squares to meet the united forces of Doles and Gordon. The hostile lines soon met each other in the open tields, and blazed away at close range into each other's faces. The struggle was stubborn but brief. Enfiladed l)v the ()ak Hill batteries, outflanked on l)oth sides and heavily assailed in I'ront, our thin unsupported line was soon forced back, and, under a heavy lire, withdrew across the open ground toward the town. In the course of this movement, both the infantry and the artillery halted at intervals, and fired Parthian volleys at their pursuers. "During the whole war 1 never saw a more orderly retreat," says a veteran officer of the Sixty-first Ohio. Moving by the Harrisburg Road and across the fields east of it, portions of Early's Division reached the town in advance of the Eleventh Corps, and obliged the troops of that corps to fight their way through the streets to Cemetery Hill. It seems surprising now that a man of the corps escaped death or capture. To cover the retreat. General Howard hurried Coster's Brigade down from Cemetery Hill, but almost uselessly. Coster's four little regiments were speedily swept away by the advancing masses of the enemy. Heckman's Ohio Battery, stationed in reserve on the present grounds of the Pennsyl- vania College, fought desperately, but was taken in flank and obliged to retire with a loss of fifteen men and two guns. The losses of the Eleventh Corps Brigades which took part in this engagement were very heavy. Among the wounded and captured were (general Barlow% commanding the First Division, and Colonel J. S. Robinson, commanding the Eighty-second Ohio Infantry. ( V)lonel Francis Mahler, commanding the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry, was mortally wounded. The One Hundred Fifty-seventh New 118 York Inlaiitry — a small regiment — lost 309 men, and was nearly destroyed. The One Hundred Seventh Ohio Infantry lost 211 men, and the Eighty-second Ohio Infantry lost 181 of its 258 officers and men engaged. A large number of Eleventh Corps men were killed, wounded or captured while tighting their way through the streets of the town. General Schimmelpfennig, finding his retreat intercepted, concealed himself and eluded the enemy. The value of the service performed by Von Steinwehr in forti- fying Cemetery Hill was now seen. The strong lunettes, with artillery in position, made the height seem like a fortress. Doubt- less these works made a great impression upon the enemy, while to our own troops, coming in from the bloody struggles beyond the town, they seemed, indeed, a welcome refuge. Such was the battle of the First Day, in which the losses — greater than on either of the other two days — attest the severity of the fighting. ' ' The enemy had been too severely punished to pursue his advantage, ' - and it is at least doubtful whether he '' "Tfie First Corps," says Bates, "went into the tiglit with 8,200 men and came out with 2,450. The Eleventh Corps went in with 7,400, and retired with a little more than half that number." '2 On this point General Hunt contributes the following valuable testi- mony in a recent article in the Century Magazine: " Ewell's men were in no condition for an immediate assault. Of Rodes's 8,000 nearly 3,000 were hors de combat. Early had lost over 500, and had but two brigades disposable, the other two having been sent on the report of the advance of Federal troops, probably the Twelfth Corps, then near by, to watch the York Road. Hill's two divisions liad been very roughly handled, had lost heavily, and he withdrew them to Seminary Hill, as Ewell entered the town, leaving the latter without more than 8,000 men to secure the town and the prisoners. Ewell's absent division was expected soon, but it did not arrive until near sunset, when the Twelfth Federal Corps and Stannard's Vermont Brigade were also up, and the Third Corps arriving. In fact an assault by the Confederates was not practicable before 5:30 p. m., and after that the position was perfectly secure." could have carried Cemetery Hill that evening, even if he had attempted it. When Costers's Brigade was sent out by Howard to cover the retreat of Schimmelpfennig and Barlow, the only troops remaining on Cemetery Hill were the Reserve Artillery and Orland Smith's Brigade, of Von Steinwehr's Division. On this little nucleus the Army of the Potomac now formed its line, right ;ind left. Smith's 111) Brigade comprised the Fifty-iiftli and Seventy-third Ohio, tlie One Hundred Thirty-sixth- New York, and the Thirty-third Massa- chusetts Infantry. The positiou of tlie Fifty-fifth Ohio throui;hout tlie battle was at the crossing of the Emniittsburg and Taneytown roads, on the south side of the town. The Seventy-third Ohio, after holding several positions on Cemetery Hill, was placed on the left of the Fifty-fifth, with its line extending along the Taneytown Road. The shattered remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps rallied on Smith's Brigade, and prolonged its lines on Cemetery Hill and and Bidge. At this moment (5 p. m.) General Hancock arrived, and he was in himself a host. General Meade, who was at Taney- town, twelve miles distant, had sent him forward with orders to take command. Assisted by Howard, Warren, and Doubleday, Hancock applied himself to re-establishing the line, and soon had everything in readiness to meet an assault should one be attempted. "He was much pleased with the position on the heights," says Dou- bleday, "and considered it admirably adapted for a battle field. Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders to shelter infantry, and its rugged Ijut commanding eminences on either flank where far-reaching batteries could be posted were great advan- tages. It covered the principal roads to Washington and Baltimore, and its convex shaj^e, enabling troops to reinforce with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving along the chord of the arc, was probably the cause of our final success." General Geary's Division, of the Twelfth Corps, was the first re-enforcement to reach the field. It began to arrive about 5.30 p. m., and took position a little north of the Bound Tops. Williams's Divi- sion, of the same corps, came up later in the evening, and made a demonstration on the Confederate left. Next came Stannard's Ver- mont Brigade, wdiich re-enforced Doubleday; then, at sundown, Bir- ney's, and at midnight, Humphreys's Division, of tlie vSecond Corps. After putting things to rights, Hancock, leaving Slocum in com- mand, rode back and reported the situation at the front to General Meade, who thereupon ordered the concentration of his army at Gettysburg. An hour after midnight, General Meade arrived in per- son on the field, and at daylight July 2 he began posting his army for \20 battle. Two army corps — the Fifth and Sixth — were yet distant, l)ut, spurred by repeated messages, were hastening as rapidly as possible to the front. The Kleventh Corps remained in its position curving around the l)old salient of Cemetery Hill. Schurz''s Division lay across the Baltimore Pike, and extended over the ground now occu- pied by the National Cemetery, with Von Steinwehr's Division cover- ing its left front, and Barlow's, now under Ames, at its right and rear. The First Corj3s, of which (ireneral Newton had taken command by Meade's order^-^, was divided. Wadsworth, on the right of Ames '^ General Meade's reasons for not retaining (ieneral Doubleday in com- mand of the First Corps are not clear. The admirable conduct of the corps under Doubleday in the First Day's battle had covered it with imperishable laurels. (succeeding Barlow), held Culp's Hill, and Robinson's Division, on Von Steinwehr's lelt, extended across the Taneytown Road to Ziegler's Grove. Doubleday, now leading his own division, held it in reserve. At a little I'rame house behind Ziegler's (Trove General Meade estal)- lished his headquarters. The Twelfth Corps, including Geary's Divi- sion, which had l)een halted near Little Round Top, was put into position prolonging Wadsworth's line on Culp's Hill. The Second Corps, of which General Hancock resumed command, was put in to the left of the Eleventh, and the Third Corps (Sickles's) was directed to occii])y the ground vacated by Geary. The Fifth Corps, which did not arrive until one o'clock p. m., was at first held as a reserve on Cemetery Hill, but later in the day was moved over to the left to support the Third Corps and occupy the Round Tops. The Sixth Corps, which had to march from Manchester, Md., thirty-four miles distant, reached the field at 4 p. m., and was posted on the left as a reserve. 121 cLilc Battles of t\}c Scconb Day (3 ENERAL LEE joined Ewell niul Hill cluriiiii- the lull tide of their success on Wednesday alternoou, and established his headquarters on Seminary Eidi;e. By noon of the 2d he had his entire army with him, except Stuart's Cavalry and Pickett's Divi- sion, which was marching from Ohambersburg. Ewell's Corps, which had possession of the town of Gettysburg, held the left. Hill's the centre, and Longstreet's the right of the Confederate line. After examining General Meade's disjjositions, Lee determined to precipitate Longstreet's Corps against our left, held by Sickles, while Ewell should hold himself in readiness to spring upon our right, and Hill should press our centre sutliciently to prevent our sending reinforce- ments to either tlank. In the absence of Pickett's Division, Anderson's Division of Hill's Corps was directed to co-operate with Longstreet. It was Meade's intention that Sickles should extend the line from Hancock's left along Cemetery Ridge as far as the Round Top ^loun- tain. Claiming that a portion of the ground on this part of the line was too low, and was commanded by higher ground farther out. Sickles advanced his corps half a mile or more beyond the intended position, and posted it upon the cross ridge along which the Emmittsbnrg Road leads to the town. At a point on that road known as the Peach Orchard, Sickles's line formed an angle with the apex turned towards the enemy. The right was held by Humphrey's Division, extending iVom the Peach Orchard back towards the Second Corps, and the lelt by Birney's Division, with Graham's Brigade at the salient. De Tro- briand's Brigade held Birney's centre, and Ward's Brigade his left, which rested at the wild, rocky gorge known as the Devil's Den. Behind Ward was the Little Round Top, and behind De Trobriand was a triangular wheat tield. Sickles's line was very long, and his centre at the I'each Orchard was much exposed. Between his right and Han- cock's left was a vacancy of live hundred yards. 123 These dispositions consumed the day until 8 o'chx-k v. m., u]) to whicli hour only the artillery and skirniisliei-s had been eniiai;ed. About 4 o'clock Meade rode out to the left, and Ibiiiid I he Third Corps much farther advanced than he had intended. Sickles ottered to with- draw it, but Meade said he feared it was then too late. At that instant the enemy's batteries opened, and the battle of the Second Day began. For more than an hour a terrific artillery tire was directed ai:;ainst Sickles's salient, and also ajrainst our ])osili()n on Cemetery Hill. "Splinters of iiun carriaii'es, pieces of tond)stones, even human leiis and arms and palpitaliuii' tlesh were llyiui;' about in every direction,'' says an eye-witness. Strange to say a woman's courage braved it all. "Mrs. General Barlow was waiting on the tield to tind her wounded husband, who never knew fear himself, a prisoner in the town. She was seen at this time, riding beside dreneral Howard in the terrible storm of shot and shell, calm and apparently fearless." — Underwood. Directly after four o'clock, a mighty crash of musketry was heard on the lelt. The storm had burst upon Sickles. AVith Hood's Division on his right, and McLaws's on his left, Longstreet fell like a thunder- bolt u])on Birney, and swept around by the left toward Bound Top. General AVarren, wdio had gone out with Meade to inspect Sickles's line, stood on Little Round Top, and saw Longstreet's line of battle sweep forward, a mile and a half in length. Ward was struck tirst, and then De Trobriand, and then Graham. De Trobriand's men had thrown up a hasty breastwork of rocks and logs, and they held it with obstinate valor. Each soldier fought as if he felt that the destiny of the country depended upon his personal etforts. With wild yells the foe pressed on, but he was repelled. Along Graham's front bayonets were crossed, and the combatants fought hand to hand. Our artillery there, of whicli the horses were all killed, was saved only by a bayonet charge. On the lelt. Ward repelled two assaults, but was at length overl)orne by weight of numl)ers. Birney sent to his assistance the Fortieth New York, under ( V)lonel Egan, from De Trobriand's Brigade. Fortunately, still further re-enforcements were at hand. General Warren's clear military perceptions took in the situation at a glance. He realized the vital importance of the Bound Tops, and the immi- nent danger we were in of losing those strongholds. The enemy had already ascended, an; front to Wilcox, and with its artillery plowed his lines irom end to end. At the same time Stannard iaoed aljout and fell ni)on Wilcox's flank, just as he had before fallen upon Pickett's. Thus resisted and assailed, the right Confederate flanking column turned and fled from the field, leaving in Stannard's hands scores of battle flags and hundreds of prisoners. On the op^wsite flank the Eighth Ohio Infantry, which had stubbornly kept to its advanced position although Pickett's column swept past it, now charged in like manner, and gathered in three flags and many captives. The Confederate brigades of Perry and Wright were yet in reserve, and awaited orders to renew the combat, but none came. Seated on a fence, Longstreet saw^ the remnants of Pickett's Division disappear, and merely directed his staft' officers to gather up the strag- glers. He was thinking more of the possibilities of withstanding an attack from our side than of resuming the aggressive. The battle of (lettysburg was over. Notable among its closing scenes were the cavalry operations, by which the enemy attempted to raid around our right flank, while w^e, reciprocally, undertook to raid the enemy's right, and fall upon his ammunition trains. This latter enterprise was essayed by General Kilpatrick, simultaneously with Pickett's assault. Moving out by the leit, Kilpatrick, with Farnsworth's and Merritt's Cavalry Brigades, and (Jraham's and Elder's Batteries, encountered part of Hood's Division then making a demonstration against the Round To})s. A stubborn combat took place, resulting in severe loss to our trooj)ers, and their withdrawal, though not without their having held the attention of forces that might otherwise have co-operated with Pickett. In this aflair. Colonel Farnsworth, a valuable cavalry ofhcer, lost his life while leading a charge. On the right, Stuart, with the ( 'Onfederate cavalry divisions of Wade Hampton and Fitz Hugh Lee, crossed the Y(n"k Turnpike, and advanced southward towards the Bonaughtown Road, intending to fall u])on our rear and harass our retreat in the event of Pickett's success. But Generals Custer, Mcintosh, and Gregg came in Stuart's way, and 138 after a desperate contest, partly witli sabres, and lasting several hours, succeeded in repelling this raid, and obliged 8tuart to go back and rejoin Ewell. After Picketfs repulse. General Meade 1 bought of making a counter attack with the Fifth and Sixth Corps, and with this purpose in view he rode over to the left, and directed Crawford to send out a reconnaissance. Crawford sent McCandless' Brigade, which advanced across tlie Bloody Wheat Field, where hundreds of tlie wounded, dying, and dead of Tliursday's l)attle were yet lying. McCandless attacked and drove back first Benning's Brigade and then Kershaw's, of McLaws's Division, and captured one gun and 300 prisoners. While General Meade and his son were watching this movement from the Little Round Top, their horses were killed by shots from a Confederate battery. Meanwhile night approached, and the idea of a counter attack was abandoned, although Longstreet, as he has since declared, thought it unaccountable that we did not pursue the advantages we had gained. That night General Lee gave instructions for the retreat of his army to Virginia. At a late hour he and A. P. Hill were seen sitting together in HilFs tent, engaged in low and earnest conversation. Before them was spread a county map, which they examined by the light of a solitary candle. By tiie time Lee rode to his headquarters it was one o'clock in the morning. General Imboden, of the Confederate cavalry, who (by request) was awaiting him there, says: ''AVlien he approached and saw us, he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount. The ertbrt to do so betrayed so much physi- cal exhaustion that I stepped forward to assist him, but before I reached him he had alighted. He threw his arm across his saddle to rest himself, and, tixing his eyes upon the ground, leaned in silence upon his equally weary horse, the two forming a striking group, as motionless as a statue. The moon shone full upon his massive features, and revealed an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that tine countenance l)eibre in any of the vicissitudes of the war through which we had passed. I waited for him to speak until the silence became embarrassing, when, to break i1, and change the cur- 139 rent of liis thoiiiilils, I remarked, in a sympathetic tone, and in allu- sion to his great fatigue: '■•'General, tills has been a hard day on you/ "This attracted his attention. He looked up and replied mourn- fully : '•'' Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,' and immediately relapsed into his thoughtful attitude. After a minute or two, he suddenly straightened up to his full height, and turning to me with more anima- tion, energy, and excitement of manner than 1 had ever seen in him before, he addressed me in a voice tremulous with emotion, and said: " ' General, 1 never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's Division of Virginians did to-day in their grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been supported as they were to have been — but for some reason not yet i'ully explained to me they were not — we would have held the position they so gloriously won at such a fearful cost of noble lives, and the day would have been ours.' "' After a moment he added in a tone almost of agony : '"Too bad! Too bad! Uh, too, too bad!'" "I shall never forget as long as I live," adds Imboden, "his lan- guage, his manner, and his appearance and expression of mental sullering.'' 140 istohiocavalp 20AN:5D0IVfSIG^ CAW "T /-■^t X .\ L n i» '-' ffR^^HESfAfl 0^ Uttiu (L\}c ^idb anb its Illcnxorials i j |ITHIN the space of three days and iiiirhts five .iireat battles .^^\./ were fought at Gettysburg, exclusive of the collisions of the cavalry. Two important cavalry engagements took place on the tield, additional to that of July 1, between General Buford's command and A. P. HilFs infantry. Until recenty public atlention has been chiefly drawn to Long- street's prodigious assault and bloody repulse during the afternoon of July third, but a more considerate study of the field shows that the struggles of July first and second were quite as desperate as that of the third, and even more critical to the National arms. The success of Longstreet's final assault was scarcely possible. Had Pickett's column penetrated our lines even farther and more effectually than it did, it would probably have been crushed — as it certainly could have been — by the Sixth Corps, held in reserve. But had the Gonfederate army been successful in its efforts to reach Ceme- tery Hill on the First Day, or to storm it on the Second; or had Long-street captured Little Round Top, or succeeded in crushing our Left Center, all of which he came so near doing on July second, a great and perhaps irretrievable disaster would have befallen the army of General Meade. The most perilous crisis of all to that army culminated during the night of the second, when General Ewell possessed himself of the breastworks on Gulp's Hill, Avhich had })een vacated by the Twelfth Corps. The recapture of those works cost one of the most desperate struggles, and was one of the most gallant performances of the entire battle. 141 The resistance made by the First and Eleventh Corps to the ad- vance of Hill and Ewell on the First Day has not received the atten- tion or appreciation it deserves. The First Corps covered itself with <;lory on that occasion, and the Eleventh, thongh far less iortunately situated, or al)ly commanded, did all that brave men fi