V^K^^ ^0 >-c^ <^ ■•!iM - . -,/>->7 A, 0^ ^- ^ ^--S^'^ .^^". "^'^^ o. =3 c" .-^-=1 '^. •"^ '■ ^^\ »• /% «i- ^^\ "^^. \' .-^^^ ,0^^ ^s^^ -^.^ .0' ^•\ ■"'^. .0^^^ ^-: ^v? SENT BY COM.M''^nF. 0*-I AM^.P^CA^ r)oor»AOANDA. AND r\T]7r' '^N. THE TRAGEDY OF THIRTEEN DAYS IN 1914. (A review of tlie diplomatic correspondence preceding the World War of 1914.) An address before the Michigan State Bar Association, June 28, 1918. HORACE L. WILGUS, Professor of- Law, University of INIichigan. am J] 511 PKEFATORY NOTE. The substance of the following pages was read from notes, in an address in June to the Michigan State Bar Association. The Bar Association passed a resolution providing for the printing of the same. The "notes" were not then in shape for printing; in preparing them for printing, I have quoted more fully the exact language of the documents, and in a few places made fuller statements, than were possible in the time limits of the address; otherwise the matter is the same. I have made an effort to give the exact citation for every important sentence from the documents. The purpose has been to give as clear, concise, and accurate a statement, — with a maximum of the exact language used, and a minimum of comment, — of the diplomacy immediately preceding the war. At the time the address was given I had read the Collected Documents, Beck's Evidence in the Case, and part of Headlam's Twelve Bays. Since then I have examined with considerable care, the most important books in the annexed bibliography. I have found no sufficient reasons for changing the conclusions already formed and expressed herein. I have however added a few notes based on some of these other authorities. Any one who has read Mr. Beck's Evidence in the Case, will realize, as I do, how greatly I am indebted to him. Soon after the Collected Documents were printed in 1915, I received a copy through the courtesy of Sir Gilbert Parker. I read much of the material therein, — but w^as much confused by the semi-chronological arrangement by countries, which of course is the only proper official way; but it is ex- tremely difficult to make out the connected story for all the countries, and the index alone gives but little help. Sometime later I read Mr. Beck's book, and made extensive notes; I then undertook to verify them from the documents themselves; this was interesting and fascinating, but to get the full effect, I found that something like a concordance to the documents was necessary. I made one for my own use, and began the systematic study of the documents, for my own satisfaction, without thought of publication; while my conclusions are the same as Mr. Beck's and Mr. Archer's, they are based on my own study of the documents themselves; and it seems to me that any one with an open mind will be led irresistibly to the same conclusion by a like study. This paper cannot take the place of such a study, or of the larger works, but it is hoped tliat many, who have not the time to read more extensively, may find here a sufficient basis for feeling that "thrice is he armed, who has liis quarrel just." As much as possible I have used England, for Great Britain, Austria for Austria-Hungary, and Germany, for the German Empire; and also, the same, instead of the name of the particular official repre- sentative of the country, when it seemed unnecessary to be more specific. In 1914, I thought it probable the outbreak of the war was due much to bungling, and Machiavellian diplomacy, by incompetent diplomats, all being much, if not equally, to blame. I have been driven to the conclusion that, while that is true of the Central Powers, it is not true of the Allies; the latter, in my judgment, have been represented by high-minded, able men, — Sir Edward Grey, (England), Rene Viviani, (Prance), and M. Sazonof, (Russia), who did every thing they could honorably and honestly do to avoid v/ar; while those of the Central Powers, — the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, and Von Jagow, Secretary of State, (Germany), and Berchtold, (Austria), neither high-minded, nor so able, but vicious, did every- thing they could dishonorably and dishonestly to pretend to avoid a war which they had deliberately planned for their own iniquitous ends, — Austria to dominate Servia and the Balkans, and Germany to dominate Europe and the world. Ann Arbor, Aug. 15, 1918. SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY. Adkins, The War, Its Origins and Warnings, London, Unwin, 1914, 227 pp. Andrassy, Count Julius, Whose Sin is the World War? New York, New Era Pub. House, 1915, 154 pp. (Pro-Austrian.) Archer, Wm., The Thirteen Days— July 23-August 4, 1914, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915, 244 pp. ("Very excellent review.) Baldwin, E. F., The World War, How it looks to the Nations in- volved and what it means to us. New York, MacMillan, 1914, 267 pp. Beck, James M., The Double Alliance versus the Triple Entente, Ox- ford Pamphlets No. VIII, 1914, reprinted from the New York Times, 44 pp. (Best short statement.) Beck, James M., The Evidence in the Case, New York, Putnams, 1914, 200 pp. (One of the very best statements, indispensable.) Chitwood, O. P., The Immediate Causes of the Great War, New York, Crowell, 1917, 196 pp. (An absolutely colorless account.) Collected Documents. See page 15, infra. Dampierre, Jacques M. de, German Imperialism and International Law, London, Constable, 1917, 277 pp. Davenport, B., A History of the Great War, 1914 — , New York, Putnams, 1916, 545 pp. Dillon, Dr. B. J., A Scrap of Paper, 3d Ed., London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1914, xxvii, 220 pp. Durkheim, E. and Denis, E., Who Wanted War? Paris, Librarie Armand Cohn, 1915, 63 pp. (Excellent short statement.) Headlam, J. W., A History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th, 1914, London, Unwin, 1915, 412 pp. (Excellent.) Kennedy, J. M., How the War Began, London, Hodder and Stough- ton, 1914, xxvii, 187 pp. Ludwig, Ernest, Austria-Hungary and the War, New York, Ogilvie, 1915, 220 pp. (Pro-Austria.) Meyer, Eduard, England, Its Political Organization and Developement and the War against Germany, Boston, Ritter, 1916, 328 pp. (Pro- German. With this should be read Britain versus Germany, by J. M. Robertson, London, Unwin, 1917, — a review of Meyer's book.) Mowat, R. B., Select Treaties and Documents, Oxford Pamphlets, No. XVIII, Oxford Univ. Press, 1914-1915, 127 pp. Price, M. P., The Diplomatic History of the War, New York, Scrib- ner, 1914, 344+102 pp. (Contains many valuable documents and news- paper accounts, speeches, etc. So anti-Grey as to be almost pro- German. See Archer's criticisms in Appendix to Thirteen Days.) Rose, J.H., The Origins of the War, New York, Putnams, 1915, 201 pp. Schmitt, B. E., England and Germany, 1740-1914, Princeton Univ. Press, 1916, 524 pp. (Excellent for many things, especially the army and navy building competition.) Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870- 1914, Yale Univ. Press, 1914, 331 pp. Stowell, E. C, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, New York, Hough- ton, 1915, pp. (Very careful and judicial study, with many documents, and the best chronological table of the diplomatic events.) Willimore, J. S., The Great Crime and its Moral, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1917, 223 pp. (Valuable.) THE TRAGEDY OF THIRTEEN DAYS IN 1911. INTRODUCTION. The tragedy of which I shall speak this afternoon is the one that is revealed in the Diplomatic Correspondence of Europe, from July 23 to August 4, 1914, inclusive, immediately preceding and ending in the commencement of the World War. The occasion -of this correspondence was the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne, on June 28, 1914, — four years ago today. A very short historical review is necessary to understand the situation. We speak of English, French, German, Italian, and Russian peoples, Racee and and Teutonic and Slavic races, as if they were separate and distinct ^*^°'' ^^' races; these distinctions, however, are based more on language and nationality, than on real racial characteristics, of a hereditary nature, such as stature, shape of the head, and color of the eyes, hair, and skin. Race, language, and nationality are now considered distinct things, and are rarely co-extensive; racial lines, more frequently, cut across both national and linguistic groupings. Recent investigators agree that "the living people of Europe consist of layer upon layer of diverse" populations, one after another having been submerged for a time by new comers, who have in later centuries been bred out, in considerable degree, by their conquered predecessors. This is so to such an extent in Europe today that "in the majority of cases, the citizen of any European nation carries within himself a mixture of every race which made its appearance in Europe," and "from the racial point of view the present war is to a certain extent a civil war."^ Yet the history of Europe has largely been made up of the struggles between national groups — between French and German, Slav and Teuton. There are today perhaps, about 94 millions of Germans in Europe, of whom 64 millions are in Germany, 12 millions in Austria, and the remainder in the immediately adjacent countries. There are, too, some 140 millions of Slavs, comprising the Eastern, (Russia, Lithuania, Ruthenia), about 100 millions; the Western, (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks), about 25 millions, in a compact mass imme- diately adjoining the Germans on the east and north; and the South- ern, (Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), about 15 millions in a compact mass south of the Danube river to the Agean sea. 1. See Osborn, H. F., Mpn of the Old Stone Age, (1915) ; Ripley. W. Z.. The Races of Europe, (1899) ; Grant, M., The Passing of the Great Race, (1918). Political theories. Separating the east and west, from the south, Slavs, are the Hun- garians, (or Magyars), about 10 millions, immediately east of whom are the Rumanians, about 12 millions, — about one-third being in Austria-Hungary.= In 1683, the Polish patriot king, John Sobieski, turned back the high tide of Turkish conquest almost from the very gates of Vienna. It had then overflowed all the territory of central Europe from the Carpathian mountains on the north to the Agean sea on the south, and from the Black sea on the east to the Adriatic on the west. In 1699, Hungary and Transylvania were acquired by Austria; Croatia and Slavonia about 1718; Bohemia, 1741; and Galicia by the partition of Poland, 1772-1795; and Dalmatia in 1814. Russia and Germany, or rather Prussia, had acquired large parts of Poland, at its partition, 1772-1795; and Russia acquired Bessarabia in 1812. The territory south of the Danube river and the Transylvanian Alps constitutes what is called the Balkan States. They include Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, and Turkey in Europe, with nearly 200,000 square miles of territory, and about 25 million people,— that is nearly the size and more than one-third the popula- tion of Germany. A very large proportion of the people in this territory are Slavs, or of Slavic descent, or of strong Slavic admixture, closely related to the Russians. About 8 millions are Rumanians; 5 millions, Bul- garians; 6 millions, Serbs; 5 millions, Greeks; and a little more than one million Turks; all, however, except the Turks, have a large substratum of the Slavic blood. Nearly 20 millions are Christians, more than 18 millions being members of the Eastern or Grecian church in some of its branches. In addition to these Slavic peoples in the Balkan States, there are in southern Austria-Hungary, (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovania), 5 million more Slavs, (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), closely akin to the Serbs of Servia; while in the north of Austria-Hungary and southern and eastern Germany, there are about 21 million more Slavs, (Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, and Slovaks). A large part of these are Catholics.^ For more than 140 years, since the treaty of 1774, Russia has claimed, and has been conceded, to be the special champion of these Christians of the Greek church, against the oppression and cruelties of the Turks.^ Down nearly to the nineteenth century, the political theory on the continent of Europe was that of "Government by Divine Right," 2. See Stateman's Year Book, 1915, and Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Ed., Europe, with maps ; also may in Hayes, Modern Europe, Vol. 2, pp. 330, 427. 3. See Statesman's Year Book, 1915 ; Encyclopedia Britannica. 11th Ed., Europe, and the various countries ; and Hayes, C. J. "H., Modern Europe, Vol. 2, pp. 490-498. 4. Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, (1774), Hayes, Modern Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 38G, 387 ; Historians' History of the World, Vol. 24, p. 419. 9 centered in a Feudal Monarch, characterized by "absolute power," "divine authority," "hereditary right," and "private, exclusive, pro- prietary ownership" in the right to govern. The Kaiser still holds to this doctrine."' The English revolution, (1688), the American revolution, (1776), Straggle for and the French revolution, (1789), were direct and successful chal- ' ^^ ^" lenges to such political doctrines. Immediately following the Ameri- can and French revolutions, a wave of hope of freedom ran over Europe like an electric current; this and the genius and ambition of Napoleon threatened and imperiled the absolute monarchies of all Europe. In western Europe this cry for freedom demanded liberty secured by written constitutions; in the Balkan states it took, in addition, the shape of struggles to secure independence from the dominion of the Turk. The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815, made up of the one hundred ab- Consrress of solute monarchs, kings, and dukes, presided over by Metternich, after the downfall of Napoleon, re-arranged the map of Europe, on the principle of the status quo mite, and the "balance of power," wilfully disregarding all racial and national aspirations, restoring the boundaries of the reigning families, using the people as pawns for dynastic aggrandizement, and providing for the suppression of liberalism. It thereby blocked, but did not quench the hope of Liberty." For the most part the struggle from 1815 to 1850, resulted in the Constitutions. granting of "camouflage" constitutions, by absolute monarchs, giving the shadow, but withholding the substance of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." Montenegro early obtained her independence of Turkey, and Greece likewise, in 1830, but the other Balkan states failed until 1878-1908. Bismarck appeared on the scene as Prime Minister of Prussia, in Bismarck. 1862, announcing that great questions are not decided by votes and majorities, but by "blood and iron," and in violation of the Prussian constitution and contrary to the will of the majority of the people re-organized the Prussian army.* The next year he induced Austria .5. In a speech at Koenigsburs In 1910. the Kaiser said : "Here my grand- father placed the crown on his head, insisting that it was bestowed upon him by the grace of God alone, as the chosen instrument of heaven. I consider myself such an instrument of heaven." (i. Hayes, Modern Europe, Vol. II, pp. 1-148. 7. For example: The Prussian Constitution of January 31, 1850, still In force, was granted by "Frederick William, (IV). bv the grace of God, King of Prussia," etc.; in a suit in Missouri in 1856. (22 Mo. 550), he says he "is the absolute monarch of the kingdom of Prussia, and as king thereof is the sole government of tliat country ; that he Is unrestrained by any constitu- tion or law, and that his will, expressed in due form, is the law of that country, and is the only legal power there known to exist as law." The Kaiser says : "The supreme law is the will of the king." "That is the nature of monarchy ; there Is only one master, and that is I." ^•., JS''"=^i'' F'. K., Government and PoUiics of the German Empire. (1915), 10 to aid Prussia in wresting Sclileswig and Holstein from Denmark, in violation of the treaty of 1852, to whicli they were both parties." He then quarreled with Austria over the spoils; attacked her; defeated her in seven weeks; imposed $15,000,000 war indemnity on her; annexed Schleswig and Holstein, and added 30,000 square miles of territory and five million of people to Prussia. He then kicked Austria out of the old German confederation; formed the North German confederation in its stead with Austria left out, drew up its constitution over night, and forced the smaller north German states into it. This North German Confederation constitution is the basis of the present constitution of the German Empire.'" In 1870, he secretly induced Russia to break her treaty of 1856 as to its Black sea clauses, in order to discredit her with the other powers." The same year he secretely and vigorously urged the Hohen- zollern Prince Leopold, for succession to the Spanish throne, in order to stir up Prance, though publicly stoutly denying that the ministry had anything to do with it; and by modifying the Ems telegram, he deliberately brought on war with France.'- In six months France was crushed; $1,000,000,000 indemnity was imposed on her; 5,600 square miles of Alsace-Lorraine, with 1,600,000 population annexed to Prussia; and Potash mines, worth $3,000,000,000 and the greatest iron ore beds in Europe, were secured." ^ot^blee Bismarck then turned again to Austria, who had cooled off some- what, from her treatment in the Schleswig-Holstein matter, and suggested to her that she recoup herself for her losses, by annexa- 9. Mowat, R. B., Introduction to Select Treaties, Oxford Pamphlets, No. XVIII, (1914-15). 10. Prussia objected to the extension of the Danish constitution to Schles- wig, by the King of Denmark. Bismarck, falsely representing to the Danish king that England was about to intervene in his favor, thereby induced him to remain defiant ; this gave Bismarck the excuse he wanted to invade Schleswig and Holstein. Many years later he said, "fYom the beginning I kept annexa- tion constantly in mind." See, Mowat, as above ; Encyc. Brit., 11th Ed., Schleswig-Holstein Question : 2 Hayes, Modern Europe, p. 186. Hanover, Hesse-Cassel. Nassau, Frankfort, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Saxony made the mistake of siding with Austria in this matter, ana so they were "annexed" to Prussia, or an indemnity imposed upon them. See, Stevens, F. W., Prussia's Territory — Where Bid She Oct Jtf (1917), pp. 4-6. 11. Bismarck told the British Ambassador at Berlin, at the time that the Russian circular, denouncing these clauses, "had taken him ty surprise," but years later confessed that he had himself initiated and instigated Russia's action.— Pari. Papers, 1871, Cd. 245 ; Bismarck's Reminiscences. Vol. II, 115. 12. See 2 Hayes, Modern Europe, pp. 198-199 ; Encyc. Brit., 11th Ed.. Bismarck; Bismarck was "huffy" because King William, received and talked to the French Ambassador, at Ems, concerning the candidature of the Hohen- zollern Prince, without referring the matter to him, and had decided to resign. He had asked Roon and Moltke to dine with him, and told them his plans. They were much depressed. He says : "During our conversation a telcarram from Ems was handed to me. * * * i reduced the telegram by striking out words. * * * I read the concentrated edition to my guests. * * * I went on, 'If I communicate at oi.ce this text to the newspapers * * * it will be known in Paris before midnight, and * * * will have the effect of a red rag upon a Gallic bull.' Moltke said 'If I may but live to lead our armies In such a war, then the devil may come and fetch away the old carcass.' " — Bis- marck's Reminiscences. Vol. II, pp. 87-103. 13. See Stevens, P. W., Prussia's Territory, — Where Did She Get Jtt (1917), pp. 7-9. 11 tions in the Balkans, then struggling for independence from Turkey. The time came in 1875-76, during Christian insurrection in Herze- govina and Bulgaria, repressed by such savage barbarity by the Turks as made all Europe indignant. The Turks developed unexpected strength. Russia came to the rescue. Austria shirked. After enorm- ous expense and sacrifice Russia defeated Turkey; the preliminary peace terms were not satisfactory to Austria, who claimed that Russia's effort alone to make peace with Turkey violated the pro- visions of the Protocol of 1871, — entered into by all the powers, at Bismarck's suggestion, after the notice of the repudiation of the Black sea clauses of the treaty of 1856, by Russia, referred to above, — "that no Power * * * can modify treaty provisions, except with the consent of the contracting parties by mutual agreement," since Aus- tria, Russia, Germany, France, England, and Turkey were parties to it. Russia submitted and consented to the calling of the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, under the presidency of Bismarck, who, acting as an "honest broker," failed to support Russia, as she had a right to expect, because of her neutrality in the Franco-Prussian war. Rumania, Servia, and Montenegro were made independent of Turkey; Bulgaria was not; Montenegro was placed under the tutelage of Austria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while left under Turkish sovereignty, were to be "occupied and administered" by Austria- Hungary. In this way Russia was very largely deprived of any of the larger advantages of her great sacrifice." England was, perhaps, as much to blame for the final results, as was Germany or Aystria. The six great powers of Europe were divided into two camps, the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, since 1882; and the Triple Entente, between Great Britain, France, and Russia, since 1904. Their exact terms have never been fully pub- lished. In 1879 Austria and Germany formed the Dual Alliance, by which they mutually agreed to support one another, if either was attacked by Russia, or by some other power aided by Russia, "with the whole of the military power of their empire." In 1882, Italy became a party to it, and in 1914, claimed it was only for defensive, and not aggressive, purposes.^' Sometime between 1891 and 1897 France and Russia entered into a defensive alliance, such that "the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia." In 1899, England and Russia came to mutual agree- ment concerning their relations with China, and in 1907, settled all their difliculties in reference to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. These, however, related only to their respective spheres of influence, 14. See, Mowat, Introduction Select Treaties, Oxford Pamphlets, (1914- 15) ; Encyc. Brit.. 11th Ed., Europe; Berlin, Gorifjress of : 2 Hayes, Modern Europe, pp. 498-509. 15. See Mowat, Select Treaties, Introduction, p. lii, and pp. 20, 23 ; also Scott, Diplomatic Docs., Vol. 1, pp. 335, 346. 12 and were not defensive alliances. In 1904, Great Britain and France had also come to satisfactory agreements as to Egypt, Morocco, New- foundland, and Senegambia, and thereby settling all outstanding difficulties between them. These constituted "the understandings" of, the Triple Entente, which was a "diplomatic group" instead of a defensive alliance, except as between France and Russia; it left Great Britain "free from engagements." For sometime, also, after 1905, French and British naval and military experts had, by au- thority, consulted together, but it was understood "that such con- sultation does not restrict the freedom of either government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force."^" in^Balkans^"^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ Turkish revolution occurred. Bulgaria declared her independence of Turkey. Austria, backed by Germany "in shining armor," and in violation of the treaties of 1871, and 1878, to which they both were parties, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. This greatly roused Turkey, Russia, and all the Slav states, especially Servia, which saw her hopes for access to the Adriatic sea disappear, and likewise her desire for economic independence of Austria. She appealed to Russia, who protested at Vienna without avail. England, also, vigorously protested at the high-handed manner of over-riding the provisions of solemn treaties. Great Britain, France, and Russia asked for a conference; Germany refused to join, unless Austria con- sented, and she refused. Germany then moblized her army against Russia, on the Polish frontier, and by a threatening autographic letter from the Kaiser, forced her to abandon her request for a conference, and assume $9,000,000 of the Turkish debt as compensation for the independence of Bulgaria. Russia was so obliged to humiliate her- self thus, for she had not yet recovered from the results . of the Japanese war." Prince Bulow, then German Chancellor, says: "The German sword had been thrown into the scale of the European decision, directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indirectly for the preservation of European peace, and above all for the sake of German credit, and the maintenance of our position in the world.^* Bitter feeling All this resulted in the creation in Russia and in the Balkan states resulting. generally, especially among the Slavic population, intensely bitter feelings, and for many years the organization of secret societies and extensive propaganda have taken place looking toward the establish- ment of greater Slavic states. This has been particularly pronounced in Servia, struggling for a "Greater Servia," with nationalist am- bitions incompatible with Austrian sovereignty over Bosnia and Her- 16. Mowat, Select Treaties, Introduction, pp. liii-lxi. and pp. 1-18 ; Col- lected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 79-82. 101 ; Scott. Diplomatic Does., pp. 623. 967-969, (Eng. White Paper, 10.5; French Yellow Paper, 74). 17. Mowat, Select Treatiei^. pp. 78-87 : Chitwood, O. P., The Immediate Causes of the Great War. (1917). op. 22-25. 18. Imperial Germain/, pp. 51-52. 13 zegovina, and other parts of the "Dual Monarchy," inhabited by Slavic peoples. Austria-Hungary was looked upon as a second Turkey, "where the groans and tears of the Servian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home." "The enemy is insatiable in his lusts; he holds millions of our brothers in slavery apd chains. He took law and freedom from them, and subjected them all to his ser- vice. The brothers murmur and beg for still quicker help. We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy enemy. We must hurry to their help." "We have dismembered the Turkish em- pire, we will dismember Austria too."" These were unofficial state- ments in newspapers and speeches, made after the declaration of 1909, whei-eby the Servian Government promised to renounce her attitude of protest to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereafter live on good neighborly terms with Austria.^" MUKDER OF TKE AECHDtTKE. June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, Crown Prince, and Took place iieir to the Austrian throne, and his wife, were murdered at ^" Austria, at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, one of the Austrian provinces an- nexed in 190S, about fifty miles from the Servian frontier, by two Bosniaks, both Austrian subjects, one of whom, when in Servia, had By Austrian been considered dangerous, and Servia had tried to expel him, but ^"^J^^te. was prevented by Austria claiming he was harmless."^ The Austrian Charged papers immediately charged that the murder was due to a Servian con- ^^^^^st Sema. spiracy." The Servian Royal family and the Government immediately sent messages of condolence, and canceled festivities to take place in Belgrade on that day." Two days later the Servian minister at Vienna, informed Austria that the Servian government was "prepared to sub- mit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that there are any in Servia.""* The Austrian papers, controlled by the Government, constantly charged that the Servian people rejoiced over the murder, especially at Belgrade, Nish, and Uskub, as an act of revenge for the annexation, and as a step looking to the detachment of territory from Austria.^^ Servian officials how- 19. These are sample quotations. The first and last are from Servian News- papers, of 1912-13 ; the middle one is from a speech of the President, (a major in the Servian army), of the "Sokol Society," in January, 1914. Col- lected Diplomatic Docs., pp. 474, 475, 481 ; Austrian Red Book, Appendix 1, 3. 20. Collected Diplomatic Docs., p. 3, Brit. Dip. Cor.. No. 4. 21. Col. Dip. Docs., pp. 27, 373 ; Brit. Dip. Cor. No. 27 ; Serv. Blue Book, No. 8. 22. Col. Dip Docs., pp. 372, 374, 376, 378, 384 ; Serv. Blue Book, Nos. 8, 12, 16, 17, 30. 23. Col. Dip. Docs., p. 384 ; Serv. Blue Book. No. 30. Austria claims festivities were not stopped for more than 5 hours, ARB. 448. 24. CDD, p. 371 ; SBB, No. 5. (Hereafter CDD=CoI. Dip. Docs., and SBB=Serv. Blue Book. 25. CDD. pp. 448, 449, 450; Austrian Red Book, (ARB.), Nos. 1, 3. 5, 6. 14 ever, claimed that "the Serajevo outrage has beeu most severely con- demned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognized that this outrage would be most prejudical not only to our good neighborly relations to Austria-Hun- gary, but also to our co-nationalists in that country," and that "it was of the greatest interest to Servia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Servia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects."-*' INVESTIGATION BY AUSTRIA. Results not A secret ministerial investigation was made by the Austrian Dis- ^" ^ ^ ■ trict court, in the prison at Serajevo; this lasted for nearly a month; Servia was not notified and was not asked to participate.^' Almost nothing was said officially during this time; the results of the find- ings were not published. There was little popular clamor at the time, although the Austrian papers persistently charged the Servian gov- ernment with complicity, at least by sufferance, in the murder; the German and English newspapers repeated these statements from the Austrian papers; to all these the Servian papers made bitter denials and counter-charges.'-' KNOWLEDGE OF DIPLOMATS. Germany Aside from German officials, none of the European diplomats had alone knew. any direct or definite knowledge of the results of the findings at the investigation, or the probable acts or claims of Austria. She studi- ously withheld these from the representatives of all the powers, in- 26. CDD. p. 372 ; SBB. No. S. Note. — The murder of the Archduke. The Archduke was a man of strong and independent will, greatly loved by the army, but almost hated by the Bosnians. His political views did not accord with those of the Austrian and German Emperors, whose policy was to dominate and repress the political aspirations of the Slav population of the Austrian Empire. The Archduke's hope was to appease these people, and erect them into a Slavic state, reaching to the Black Sea, making the dual monarchy a triple monarchy, each state having an independent status of its own but bound to the Monarchy, through the Emperor, in all affairs and interests it had in common with the others. This would have blocked the Servian hopes of a Greater Servia, and also the Kaiser's "Mittel-Europa" plans. The Kaiser and the Archduke were not friends; in fact detested one another; their last interview, a few days before the murder, was most stormy. The Archduke strongly objected to the pro- gramme of greatly increased military preparations, urged by the Kaiser, and the Hungarians, to be used for subjecting the Servians by force. The Kaiser immediately telegraphed Budapest of the Archduke's refusal to approve. That there was a plot to murder the Archduke, at his proposed visit to Sarajevo, was known at Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade. Servia warned Austria of this, yet the Archduke was not informed, nor was any effort made to dissuade him from making the visit, nor were any effective steps taken to protect him. — Davenport, History of the Great War, (1916). pp. 82-87. 27. CDD. pp. 371, 377, 381, 385 ; SBB. Nos. 5, 16, 23, 30. British and German Ideals, reprinted from Round Table. 1914, 1915, p. 107. 28. CDD. pp. 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 380, 382, 38.3, 384; FYB, No. 14; SBB, Nos. 1. 2. 3, 4. 7. 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 29, 30. 15 eluding her ally, -Italy,— except Germany.^" It was generally assumed that if the investigation showed Servian complicity, demands of some sort would be made on the Servian government, by Austria, but it was semi-officially stated that her claims would be moderate, and would "contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. "=" THE GREATER TRAGEDY. The murder of the Archduke and his wife was a tragedy, but in itself was not different from such as have occurred before. Its awful signifi- cance is in furnishing the occasion and pretext of that infinitely greater tragedy, that for the past four years has drenched the world in blood. It is my purpose to examine the responsibility for this calamity, — mainly from the records of the Diplomatic Correspondence immediate- ly preceding the commencement of the war. At the end, I will refer briefly to some matters that are not in the official records, but are fully established otherwise. THE RECORDS. These include the various official publications of the respective Full records governments, of parts or all of the diplomatic correspondence, con- between tained in the popularly called colored books or papers: The British Q^^any!^^ Blue Books, (BBB) (1) and (2), 342 pages, and 371 documents; the French Yellow Book, (FYB), 237 pages, 185 documents; Russian Orange Books, (ROB), (1) and (2), 107 pages, 177 documents; Belgian Grey Books, (BGB), (1) and (2), 182 pages, 198 documents; Serbian Blue Book, (SBB), 50 pages, 53 documents; Italian Green Book, (IGB), 120 pages, 73 documents; German White Book, (GWB), 90 pages, 43 documents; and Austrian Red Books, (ARB), (1) and (2), 344 pages, and 274 documents. With two exceptions, these documents give in detail what passed between the Capitals of Europe during these days. The two exceptions are: the communications made by Austria to Germany, Vienna to Berlin, and the reverse. The documents show that much communication took place between these capitals, but almost nothing of it is published in either the German White Book, or the Austrian Red Books. The terms of these com- munications have been withheld, and are conspicuous by their ab- sence." 29. CDD. pp. 30. 114. 1.58, 165, 176, 396; Brit. Blue Book (BBB.). Nos. 38, 161: French Yellow Book (FYB), Nos. 26, 27. 35, 50; SBB. No. 52. 30. CDD. pp. 115, 152. 395, 396 ; BBB. No. 161 ; FYB. No. 20 ; SBB. No. 52. 31. There are three principal collections of these documents : Collected Diplomatic Documents, (CDD), London. 1915, p. 561. This does not include BBB (2), BGB (2), ROB (2), nor ARB (2). BBB (2) contains correspond- 16 DELn-ERY OF THE X^LTIMATUM. Reply demanded in 48 hours. Diplomats on vacations. At 6 p. m., Thursday, July 23, 1914, the Austrian Minister at Bel- grade, handed a Note"- to the Acting Prime Minister of Servia, to be answered within 48 hours, that is, by 6 p. m., Saturday, and added that "he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favorable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated time."^" The Servian Ministers were absent from Belgrade, at the time; the President of France and the President of the Council and Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, were known to be at sea on their way home from St. Petersburg which they had left the same night; the German Emperor was in Scandinavia; and the Prussian Ambassador at Vienna had left a few days before, on the assurance of Austria "that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable." The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was also away from Rome."* The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs left Vienna on July 25, (the day Servia's reply was due) to go to Ischl, six hours away." ClIAKGES IX THE ULTIMAXr.M. Subversive This ultimatum alleged the existence in Servia of a "subversive ^alnS^Servia movement," born under "the eye of the Servian government," with alleged. 31. Con. ence between England and Turkey; BGB (2). between England and Belgium; ROB (2), between Russia and Turkey; ARB (2), between Austria and Turkey. Scott, J. B., Diplomatic Documents. (SDD), Parts 1 and 2, 1916. The Times (London) Documentary History of the War, Vols. 1 and 2, Diplomatic, (TDD), 1917. These documents are, in the main, arranged chronologically by coun- tries, and are given a number by which they are cited. These numbers do not exactly correspond, in a few cases, in the different collections. The CDD were the first to 1>e published, are official, and are the basis of all the others ; they were published as "British White Papers, (BPW). Miscellaneous." The BBB (1), Miscl. Nos. 6, 8. 10, Sept.. 1914; FYB, Miscl. No. 15, Dec, 1914; BGB (1), ROB (1), ARB (1). SBB, — all Miscl., Oct.. 1914. These and GWB (1) were gathered together and published as CDD in one volume in 191.5. The GWB (1) was laid before the Imperial Diet, August .3, 1914, and published very soon thereafter by the Imperial Foreign Office, with the "only authorized translation" into English, "by Liebheit and Thiesen," Berlin ; the second GWB was published by authority early in 1915, with an authorized translation into English ; all of GWB (1) is reprinted, but the new authorized translation diflCers somewhat from the "only authorized" one first published. BBB is often cited as BWP, (British White Paper), or BDC, (British Diplo- matic Correspondence), or EWB, or EWP, that is. English White Paper or Book, or just E. The others are also cited quite often as "Papers," as PYP. or BGP, etc. The TDD cites them : B=BBB ; G^BGB ; O^ROB ; R= ARB ; S<=SBB ; W=GWB ; Y=FYB. The TDD. seem to have much the best index and cross-references. Both SDD, and TDD have very helpful tables of contents of the separate "books," giving number, date, parties and con- tents of each document, chronologically, and page where found. 32. On July 23, the Austrian Ambassador at London told Earl Grey that the Note, (which he would deliver the next day), "would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum." The next day Austria insisted that it was a "demarche with a time limit." It was treated by all as an "ultimatum." CDD, pp. 2, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 157. 159, 424. 83. CDD, p. 388 ; 2 SDD, 1469 ; SBB, No. 33. 34. CDD, p. 388 ; 2 SDD, p. 1469 ; SBB, No. 33 ; CDD. p. 266 ; 2 SDD, p. 1331 ; ROB. No. 1 ; CDD, pp. 15, 154. 161. 165, 169. 171. 176 ; 2 SDD. pp. 880 ; 1 SDD, pp. 568, 582, 592. 594, 595, 604 ; BBB, No. 6 ; FYB, Nos. 22, 29, 41, 44, 45, 50, 51. 35. CDD, p. 23 ; 2 SDD, 893 ; BBB, No. 20. 17 the object of detaching territory from Austria; that Servia had done nothing to repress it; had permitted criminal nfachinations of vari- ous societies; tolerated and glorified their perpetrators in the public press; and allowed officials to participate therein, contrary to her promise of 1909. ■'' DEMANDS OF THE ULTIMATUM. Austria demanded that Servia publish in her Official Gazette on Humiliating Sunday, July 26, 1914, and as an order of the day to the Servian * ^^^^^ ^' army, and in the Army Bulletin, a declaration, prepared by Austria, substantially as follows:'" That Servia condemns all such propaganda; regrets that Servian officers have participated therein; and hinds herself to — 1. Suppress every publication inciting hatred of Austria; 2. Dissolve all secret societies engaging in, and confiscate their means of, such propaganda; 3. Eliminate all such from public instruction; 4. Remove all officers guilty, whose names Austria reserves the right to communicate to Servia; 5. "Accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the interfere with Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the ^" Servian sovereignty. subversive movement directed against the territorial integ- rity of the Monarchy"; (in GWB, this reads: "Consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarch") ; "Take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; the dele- gates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto"; (in GWB, this reads: "Commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government, will participate in the examina- tions") ; Arrest Major Tankosic, and Milan Ciganowic, officials, alleg- ed to be implicated in the crime; Prevent the smuggling of arms and explosives across the Austro-Servian frontier; Dismiss guilty army and civil officials; 36. CDD, pp. 3, 415 ; 2 SDD, 8G6, 781 ; BBB, No. 4 ; ARB, No. 7 ; FYB, No. 24 : ROB. No. 2 ; SBB, No. 31 ; GWB. "Original Telearams, etc." 37. CDD, pp. 3-8 ; 414-410 ; 2 SDD, 781 ; 2 SDD, 80G ; BBB, No. 4 ; GWB. Telcf/rams. 18 10. Explain alleged interviews by Servian officials, hostile to Austria. 11. Notify Austria without delay of the execution of the fore- going ; 12. Reply at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25tli July. ME5I0RAXDUM ANNEXED. There was a memorandum annexed to this ultimatum stating that the Austrian investigation at Serajevo showed:"* That the murder was planned in Belgrade by Princip, Ga- brinowic, Ciganowic, and Grabez, with the aid of Tankosic; that the six bombs and four pistols used, were obtained by Tankosic and Ciganowic, at the arsenal at Belgrade; that Ciganowic gave instruction in their use in a forest near there to Princip, Gabrinowic, and Grabez; that Ciganowic originated a secret system of transportation, by which, with the help of a Servian frontier captain and a custom officer, an entry into Bosnia was effected. No part of the evidence was then submitted or tendered to Serbia. The ultimatum is supposed to have been prepared under the general direction of Count Tisza, President of the Ministry of Hungary, by Count Forgach, former Austrian Minister to Servia, then Under Secre- tary of State for Foreign Affairs; he had been in 1908-9 notoriously connected with the forged papers, on which charges of Servian con- spiracies had been based in the Agram and Friedjung trials in 1909- 10.=^ SURPRISE AT THE CHARACTER OF THE ULTIMATUJI. The substance if not the complete text of the note, treated as an ultimatum, was immediately published in the European newspapers, before official copies were received by the Great Powers, other than Germany.*" It will be noted that it assumed guilty knowledge, active participation, and criminal complicity in the propaganda and crime charged, by the Servian Officials, and demanded immediate investiga- tion and suppression, removal of officials named by Austria, and supervision and participation by Austrian officials in such investiga- tion and suppression, in a way inconsistent with the laws and 38. CDD, pp. 12-13 ; 416-417 ; 2 SDD, 784. 877 : BBB, No. 4. 39. British and German Ideals, (The Round Table, Sept., 1914, March, 191.5). p. 107; The Britannica Year-Book, 1913, p. 961. CDD, 396; 2 SDD, 1482 : SBB, No. 52 ; FYB, No. 30. 40. CDD. 1.5.5. 158, 150. 161, 268, 396. 456; 1 SDD. 569, 579, 582: 2 SDD, 1338. 1482; FYB, Nos. 23, 27, 29, 29, 30; ROB, No. 7; ABB, No. 11; SBB, No. 52. ID sovereignty of Servia." Sir Edward Grey said lie "liad never before seen one state address to anotlier independent state a document of so formidable a character."'- Russian and French officials agreed that it was quite impossible for any independent state, however small, to accept,*' and Servia "would no longer be master in her own house" if she did." The German Secretary of State admitted she "could not swallow certain of the demands,"*' and all the representatives of the Great Powers at Vienna, except the German, were surprised and dumbfounded at its contents.*' GERMANY'S CLAIJI. Diplomatic correspondence among the other powers immediately began,— before Servia replied. And inasmuch as Germany made the first move, it is proper to state Germany's claims first, and then ex- amine them in the light of the actual records. Germany has from the first claimed, and yet claims: 1. The war is a defensive one on her part. In a speech from the Defensive war. balcony of the Royal Palace in Berlin, July 31, 1914, the Kaiser said: "Envious nations on all sides are forcing us to a justifiable defense. They are forcing the sword into my hands."*' And in his speech, at the opening of the Reichstag, August 4, 1914, he said: "In a war that has been forced upon us, with a clear con- science, and a clean hand we take up the sword."*^ 2. Russia was responsible: The sub-title of the German White Russia Book is: "How Russia and her ruler betrayed Germany's confidence, ^'^•^p°'^''^ and thereby made the European war." 3. She, Germany, did not know, and had nothing to do with, the Germany not ^ . accessorv. contents of Austria's ultimatum to Servia. GEKilAXY'S KNOWLEDGE. Throughout the negotiations German officials constantly told the 9''™'^(^^'j„ Russian, English, and French officials that "They had not known be- knowledge, forehand," were "entirely ignorant" of, and "exercised no influence on" the contents of the ultimatum, and there was "no concert," or 41. ODD. 13, 157, 2()S. 27;", 458 : 1 SDD. 57S : 2 SDD, 879, 1337, 1350 ; BBB, No. 5 ; FYB, Ko. 20 ; KOB. No. 6, 25 ; ARB, No. 14 ; CDD, 39 ; 2 SDD, 915 : BBB. No. 44. 42. CDD, 13, 1G5 ; 1 SDD, 586 ; 2 SDD, 879 : BBB, No. 5 ; FYB, No. 34. 43. CDD, 1G4, 281 ; 1 SDD,-o86 ; 2 SDD, 1358 ; FYB, No. 33 ; ROB, No. 41. 44. CDD, 458; 1 SDD, 24; ARB, No. 14. 45. CDD, 23 ; 2 SDD. 891 ; BBB, No. 18. 46. CDD, 158, 174, 39G ; 1 SDD, 579, 602 ; 2 SDD, 1482 ; FYB. Nos. 158, 174 : SBB, No. 52. 47. (iauss. German Kmperor as slioicn in his Public Acts, (Scribuer, 1915), p. 323. 4S. lb., p. 324. 20 Yet gave Austria free hand. "definite understanding" between Germany and Austria as to it."^* This was false, and after the war was begun the Foreign office ad- mitted that Austria asked Germany for her opinion, and she an- swered: "We were able to agree with" Austria's estimate of the situa- tion, and assure her "that any action considered necessary," by her "would meet with our approval," and we gave her "a completely free hand in her action against Servia." "We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude" of Austria "against Servia might bring Russia in," and "involve us in war, in accordance with our duties as allies."'" The time and extent of Germany's knowledge of the ulti- matum, and the part she had in it will be discussed later on. NEGOTIATIONS. Germany forbids intervention. Thursday, July 23, 1914. As indicated above, Germany made the first move. This was in the evening of the day the ultimatum was sent by Austria to Servia, July 23, and itself indicated Germany had prior knowledge of its contents. It was a communication sent by Germany to England, France, and Russia, and stated that "the action as tcell as the de- mands." of Austria, are "absolutely justifiable." "It is to be feared that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands." There would then be nothing left to Austria "but to press their de- mands," "and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with Austria." "We earnestly desire the localization of the conflict be- cause any intervention of another Power, owing to the various treaty- alliances, would entail inconceivable consequences."^^ In other words, Austria must have a free hand to crush Servia, and any intervention by any other power meant European war. Friday, July 24, 1914. Ultimatum The ultimatum reached England, France, Belgium, and Russia, meant war. about 10 o'clock, — one-third of the time limit already having passed." 49. CDD, pp. 14, 23, 25, 149. 161. 166, 169, 181, 196, 272. 273 ; 2 SDD, S80, 896; 1 SDD, 562, 563, 582, 588, 592, 609, 640; 2 SDD, 1346, 1347; BBB, Nos. 6, 18, 25 ; FYB, Nos. 15. 17, 30, 36, 41, 57, 78 ; ROB. 18, 19, 20. 50. CDD, 406 ; 2 SDD, 771 ; GWB, Statement of Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1914. 51. CDD, pp. 16, 159, 267. 424; 1 SDD, 579; 2 SDD, 798, 883, 1335; BBB, No. 9; FYB, No. 28; ROB. No. 3; GWB. Ex. 1. On July 21. the German Secretary of State Insisted that the "question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside In the discussions between these two countries." BBB, No. 2. The German Secretary of State told French Ambassador at Berlin "the note was forcible, and he approved it" ; "the question was a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes it will be localized." 52. CDD, pp. 2, 13. 155, 267, 300; 2 SDD, 864. 879; 1 SDD, 576: 2 SDD, 1335 ; 1 SDD, 300 ; BBB, Nos. 3. 5 ; FYB, No. 25 ; BGB, No. 1 ; ROB, No. 3. The English, French, Russian and German ofRcials all considered that it "meant war"; indeed that it was so "drawn as to make war in- evitable"; that Austria was determined to "inflict humiliation on Servia," and would "accept no intervention until the blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia."" Servia immediately appealed to Russia.-'* Russia immediately de- RuRsia clared she "could not remain indifferent," and "could not allow Aus- tria to crush Servia," and the question was not "merely between Servia and Austria, but a European" one.'" Russia urged France and England to stand with her; France agreed to support her in negotiations and as an ally "if necessity arose"; England refused to make such an agreement. '' Austria explained to Russia that she desired Servia "publicly to Austria disavow the tendencies directed against" Austria, "suppress them conquest of by administrative measures" and "make it possible to satisfy" her- Servia not self "that these were honestly carried out"; that she "did not aim at any increase of territory," "entertained no thought of conquest," "would not claim Servian territory" and did not "intend to * * * change the balance of powers in Balkans."' At the same time she also explained "in strict confidence" to England, that if a satisfactory reply was not received within the time limit, she would break off But de- diplomatic relations with Servia, begin military preparations, and u'se'force if was "absolutely resolved to carry through" her "just demands."'* necessary. Russia and England immediately made separate and joint requests, Extension of directly and indirectly through Germany, to Austria, for an extension p™]y "^^ of time for the Servian reply, to enable the powers to study the de- requested, mands of Austria, advise Servia, and "smooth away the difRculties that have arisen."''' Germany answered that she "passed on" this request to Austria, Request but that the Foreign Minister was not at home; that It was probably by Germany, "too late" to get "the time limit extended"; that Austria "wished to give the Servians a lesson and meant to take military action;" and that Servia "could not swallow certain of the demands.""" There is no record or indication that Germany made or joined in any request 53. CDD, pp. 38, 23. 37, 171 ; 2 SDD, SOI, 912. 913 ; 1 SDD, 595 ; BBB, Nos. 18, 40. 41 ; FYB, No. 45. 54. CDD, pp. 2G7, 389 ; 2 SDD. 1337. 1470 ; ROB. No. fi ; SBB, No. 37. 55. CDD. pp. 22, 163, 209. 3S9. 407, 427, 459 : 2 SDD. 890 : 1 SDD, 584; 2 SDD, 1339, 1470; 2 SDD. 774. 802, 26; BBB, No. 17; FYB, No. 31 ; ROB, No. 10 ; SBB, No. 36 ; GWB. Tel., etc., Ex. 4 ; ARB, No. 15. 56. CDD, p. 14 : 2 SDD, 880 ; BP.B, No. 0. 57. CDD. pp. 460, 426, 15 ; 1 SDD, 28 ; 2 SDD, 801, 882 ; ARB, No. IS ; GWB, Ex. 3; BBB, No. 7. 58. CDD, p. 460; 1 SDD. 27 ; -^RB, No. 17. 59. CDD. pp. 18, 19, 126, 167, 171. 499; 2 SDD, 885, 887. 897; 1 SDD, 590. 595, 75 ; BBB. Nos. 11. 13, 26 : FYB, Nos. 38. 45 : ARB. Nos. 20, 21. 60. CDD, pp. 22, 170 ; 2 SDD, 891 ; 1 SDD, 593 ; BBB, No. 18 ; FYB, No. 43. to Austria to extend the time. Austria, the next day, denied the request for any extension of time.''^ Servia urged to be conciliatory. Russia offers to stand aside. Powers request frontiers be not crossed. Germany refuses to join. Austria and Germany understood war probable. Saturday, July 25, 1914. England, France, and Russia, all urged Servia to give as concil- iatory answer as possible.''- Russia suggested to Servia that she appeal to the powers to help her; and if she did so, "Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany and Italy.""" England proposed the "four powers, — England, France, Germany and Italy, — join in asking the Austrian and Russian governments not to cross the Servian frontier, and give time for the four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try to arrange matters,'"'^ but "un- less Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna" it would be futile."' "No intervention would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, there- fore, be essential."'"' Germany refused: "the matter was a domestic one for Austria"; "all these demarches were too late"; Germany "supports the claims" of Austria against Servia "as justified," and "could only be guided by her duties as an ally" of Austria; "this question must be local- ized by virtue of all the powers refraining from intervention"; but said "we are prepared in the event of an Austro-Russia controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers."" It is difficult to understand what this last suggestion means, since she was being asked to intercede because the acts and demands of Austria, had from the first created a controversy with Russia. July 23, the Austrian ambassador at London had told Sir Edward Grey, "that all would depend on Russia"; and on July 25 the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs told his ambassador at St. Petersburg: "We were, of course aware, when we decided to take serious measures against Servia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute might develop into a collision with Russia" and assumed that he had al- ready "established a close understanding with" the German ambassa- dor at St. Petersburg, "who will certainly have been enjoined by 270; 1 SDD, 75; 2 SDD, 1340; ARB. Nos. 20. 21 Nos. 12, 15, 16. 17. Gl. CDD. pp. ROB, Nos. 11, 12. 62. CDD, pp. 19, 21; 2 SDD, SS6, SS9, 890; BB 63. CDD, pp. 21, 22; 2 SDD, 890; BBB, No. 17. 64. CDD, p. 25 ; 2 SDD, 895. 896 ; BBB, Nos. 24, 25. 65. CDD, pp. 17, 18: 2 SDD, 884, 885; BBB, Nos. 10, 11. 66. CDD, pp. 25. 274 ; 2 SDD, 895, 1349 ; BBB, No. 24 ; ROB. No. 22. 67. CDD. pp. 167. 169. 170. 272. 273, 429 ; 1 SDD, 588, 589. 592. 593 ; 2 SDD, 1347. 806 ; FYB, Nos. 36. 37, 41, 43 ; ROB, Nos. 18, 19 ; GWB, Ex. 13, (Scott. No. 15). his government to leave the Russian government no room for doubt that Austria in the event of a conflict with Russia would not stand alone." Austria was therefore at this time certain that Germany had already instructed her ambassador at St. Petersburg to let it be known that she would stand by Austria."* The German chancellor said later "We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria against Servia, might bring Russia upon the field, and might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duties as allies. '"'^ Yet under these circumstances the Austrian Minister for Foreign Pretended Affairs telegraphed his ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, Ruee™s^'^ and Rome, that he had. just handed to the German ambassador at interest. Vienna the statement that Austria "cannot conceal their astonish- ment that their action against Servia was directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans.'^" Russia's views as expressed to the British Ambassador at St. Peters- Russia's burg were: "Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia, posit'on- She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He (the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs), did not believe Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by" England's. If England took a "stand firmly with France and Russia, there would be no war." If England "failed them now, rivers of blood would flow," and she "would in the end be dragged into war." The British Ambassador replied "that England could play the role England not of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, aUiance.^ if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count on" England's neutrality. The British Ambassador also said all he "could to impress pru- dence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if) Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobiliza- tion, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably de- clare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia coulfl not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate."" 6S. CDD, pp. 3, 501 ; 2 SDD, S04 : 1 SDD, 81 ; BBB. No. 3 ; ARE, No. 26. 69. CDD, p. 406 ; 2 SDD. 771 : GWB. No. 1. 70. CDD, p. 521; 1 SDD. 100: ARB. No. 44. 71. CDD. pp. 21. 22 ; 2 SDD, 890 ; BBB, No. 17. 24 Servia agrees to nearly everything. Austria's demand to supervise. Reply declared un- satisfactory. Austria's objections. SERVIAN REPLY. Servia put in her reply to Austria at 5:45 p. m. It was conciliatory in the extreme;"- it granted everything possible; w^hile it did not admit official complicity in the propaganda and crimes charged, it promised immediate investigation and punishment of any found guilty, and removal of any such from office; it promised immediate dis- solution and suppression of the alleged offending societies, although there w^as no proof submitted of their guilt; it promised so to amend the constitution and laws, by the legislative bodies then about to meet, that the means of propaganda by such societies and newspapers could be confiscated, as requested; it promised to suppress such propaganda in all public instruction; and while it was not clear as to exactly what was meant by the demand that Austrian officials should be permitted to par- ticipate in the investigations and measures of suppression, Servia would do all that her own laws, the rules of international law, and good neighborly acts would permit or require; Tankosic had already been arrested; a warrant had been issued for Ciganowic, but he had not yet been found; with these modifications it promised to make the publications in the official bulletins as requested, and if any of the matters were not satisfactorily answered, it proposed that they be submitted to the Hague Peace Tribunal, or to a conference of the Powers." The Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade scarcely stopped to read the reply. He declared it unsatisfactory, and within three quarters of an hour left Belgrade with the whole diplomatic outfit.'^ Austria could make very little objection to its tone or contents, but declared it a sham and insincere, and later (July 25) sent to the other powers copies of the reply with her annotations and objections to each article of the reply, and a dossier, containing extensive quota- tions from alleged confessions, affidavits, and evidence obtained in the investigation made at Serajevo, to support her original charges, but which she had not furnished to Servia." She claimed that since peaceable means "were exhausted," she must "at last appeal to force," "in a fight that was forced" on her, "as a matter of self-defense," and "the Servians had refused the one thing — the co-operation of Austrian 72. Grey said it "went farther than could have been expected," "involved the greatest humiliation to Servia" that he "had ever seen a country under- go," and if Austria did not accept it but "marched into Servia it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs." CDD, pp. 41. 4.3. 281 ; 2 SDD, 916, 918, 1.3.59 ; BBB, Nos. 40, 48 ; ROB, No. 42. Russia thought "it exceeded all our expectations in its moderation," and could not see how Austria could ask more "unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for a war with Servia." CDD, 278 ; 2 SDD, 13.5.5 ; ROB, No. 3.5. 73. CDD, pp. 31, .390, 417, 501; 2 SDD. 904. 1477. 785; BBB. No. 39; SBB, No. 41 ; GWB, Tel., etc. : ARB, Nos. 34. 24. 74. CDD. pp. 24, 390, 391, 273. 279 ; 2 SDD, 895, 1476, 1477. 1348, 1356 ; BBB, No. 23 ; SBB, Nos. 40, 41, 42 ; ROB, Nos. 21, 37. 75. CDD, pp. 193. 197, 461: 1 SDD. 29. 637. 641: FYB. Nos. 75 (2), 80 ; CDD. pp. 417, 507 ; 2 SDD, 7S5 ; 1 SDD, 88 ; GWB, Tel., etc. ; ARB, Nos. 34, 19. officials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.'"" Explanation was to be made at St. Petersburg, "in strict confidence with regard to" point 5, — the participation of Austrian officials in the subversive movement in Servia — that "this clause was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended to infringe on the sovereignty of Servia."'' German officials maintained that "Servian concessions were all a Germany sham," and "The Servian Note, therefore is entirely a play for time."'^ y^ew\ ^'^™^ The reply was not printed in Germany, in full, until after July 28, nor in Austria, apparentlv, and was received in France after twenty Delay in ' '^^ publishing. hours delay, and about the same, in Russia.'^ Military preparations began at once. Servia issued an order for Servia. immediate mobilization, Austria claiming this was done at 3 o'clock, about three hours before the Servian reply was put in.**" On the other hand, as early as July 11, at Budapest cannon and ammunition were being sent by Austria to the Servian frontier;" on the 20th military Austria. preparations were being made "in the vicinity of the Servian frontier."**- On the 22 and 23, "eight army corps" were said "to be ready to start on the campaign" ;'*' on the 25th Austria said Servia could still "bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands" but she would have to reimburse "all costs and damage incurred by us through our military measures,"^ indicating that she had already taken military steps, probably the mobilization of the eight corps. On the 26th Austria certainly began mobilization, at least in part.**' Germany began clearing of trees, placing arma- Germany, ment, constructing batteries, and strengthening wire entanglements on the French frontier.'" This was before France had begun.^' Russia France, authorized the mobilization of thirteen army corps, to be used if I^^ssia. Austria brought armed pressure on Servia, but only after further notice was given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the 26th, "not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up" 76. CDD, p. 41; 2 SDD, 918; BBB. No. 48. (Communicated July 27, to Grey.) As to self-defense, it should he remembered that Austria had 52,000,000 population, and Servia, 4,500,000. However, about half of the population of Austria-Hungary is of Slavic descent, with more or less of Servian sympathies, dominated by about 22,000,000 Germans and Magyars. 77. CDD, p. 503 ; 1 SDD. S3 : ARB. Xo. 27. 78. CDD, pp. 29, 423 ; 2 SDD, 901 ; BBB. No. 32 ; GWB, Tel., etc. 79. CDD, pp. 282, 193, 506, 178, 270; 1 SDD, 637, 88, 607; 2 SDD, 1361, 1340; ROB, Nos. 46. 13 ; FYB, Nos. 75 (2); 56. 80. CDD, pp. 391, 500, 29: 2 SDD. 1477; 1 SDD, 76; 2 SDD, 900; SBB. No. 41 ; ARB, No. 23 ; BBB, No. 32. 81. CDD. p. 146; 1 SDD. 5.'-.S ; FYB. No. 11. 82. CDD, p. 388; 2 SDD, 1463; SBB, No. 31. 83. CDD, pp. 150, 152 ; 1 SDD, 504, 566 ; FYB, Nos. 18, 20. 84. CDD, p. 499 ; 1 SDD. 75 ; ARB. No. 20. 85. CDD, 181 ; 1 SDD. 609 ; FYB, No. 57. 86. CDD, p. 215 ; 1 SDD, 663 ; FYB, No. 106 ; CDD, p. 223 ; 1 SDD. 674 ; FYB. No. 118. 87. CDD. pp. 174. 503 ; 1 SDD. 602, 84 ; FYB, No. 50 ; ARB, No. 28. IT, but only "measures of preparation in the military districts of Kioff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and Moscow" had been taken. Sunday, July 26, 1914. Russia requests Austria to exchange views. French and German intercession. TEngland requests conference of flowers. '"Germany refuses. Kaiser returns. Rtissia asked Austria to exchange private views with her with the object of changing some of the demands of the ultimatum.''*' No answer being received promptly, she then asked Germany to advise or request Austria to do this.^" This however was not done, and Austria declined Russia's request two days later."" The German ambassador asked France to intercede with Russia, claiming that "the prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia." Prance replied "that Russia was moderate," there was "no doubt as to her moderation," and "Germany ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoid- ing military operations leading to the occupation of Servia." He refused, — "this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany 'that the question concerned only Austria and Servia.' "" England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in London to confer in order to preserve the peace.-'- France,"' and Italy"^ imme- diately agreed to this. Russia also immediately agreed to this, "or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict," if her own "direct conversations," already urged with Austria were denied.'"' Germany at once refused, — this "would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia,""" and it was in vain that it was explained the plan "had nothing to do with arbitra- tion, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly in- terested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation." The Kaiser, "to the regret" of the German Foreign Office, suddenly returned on his own initiative, to Berlin, from Norway, where he had gone about three weeks before, ostensibly for his health."' It was feared "that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement." ARB, 88. CDD, pp. 39, 40, 47, 177, 275; 2 SDD, 914. 916, 925, 1350; 1 SDD. 606 ; BBB, Nos. 43. 45, 47 ; FYB, No. 54 ; ROB. No. 25. 89. ODD, p. 275 : 2 SDD, 1351 ; BOB, No. 26. 90. CDD, pp. 58, 517 ; .2 SDD, 939 ; 1 SDD, 101 ; BBB, No. No. 30. 91. CDD, pp. 179. 181 ; 1 SDD. 607, 009 ; FYB, Nos. 50. 57. 92. CDD, pp. 30, 38, 42. 45, 47. 52 ; 2 SDD, 902, 913. 918, 920. 924, 925. 931 : BBB. Nos. 36. 42. 43, 49. 52, 53, 60. 93. CDD, pp. 38, 47 ; 2 SDD, 913. 924 ; BBB, Nos. 42, 52. 94. CDD, p. 43 : 2 SDD, 920 ; BBB. No. 49. 95. CDD, pp. 47, 49 ; 2 SDD, 925. 927 ; BBB. Nos. 53, 55. 96. CDD. pp. 38. 52. 515 ; 2 SDD. 914, 931 ; 1 SDD, 98 ; BBB, Nos. 43, 60, 01. 62 ; ABB. No. 35. 97. CDD. p. 29 ; 2 SDD, 901 : BBB. No. 33 ; Beck. Ev. in Case, p. 103. Monday, July 27, 1914. France urged that England, France, Germany, and Italy again re- ^q^|g® ^^ quest Servla and Austria not to invade each other's territory, but invasion, that more time be given for negotiations."* Germany immediately refused, "because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia," and she "could not consent to anything" of the kind."" It had already been explained that this Germany , ,, „ „ ,,,<<•,..•,, i 1 refuses to assumed specter of a conference, and mediation, meant no such join. thing as Germany urged, but only "friendly advice," "peaceful words," or "friendly conversations."""' Russia asked Germany to urge, — "to press with greater insistence"— Gemiany Austria to accept Russia's suggestion of direct conversations with fnre^ct con-'^^^ her "to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views," such versations. "a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands" as "would be acceptable to both parties."^"' The German Secretary of State offered to telegraph to the German ambassador at Vienna "in this sense," but refused "to advise Austria to give way." On the next day Austria answered Austria she "could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the ^^ ^^^*'' terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."^°- The Austrian Under Secre- tary of State informed the Russian ambassador at Vienna, that a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, begun by the Servians.^"'-' The Russian ambassador then offered to do ''all he could Russia offers to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet se/vfa.'^'^'" take place" and would advise his government to urge Servia "to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance." The Secretary promised to "submit this sugges- tion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs."'"^ Nothing came of it. As just stated Austria claimed that acts of aggression had occurred -Servias allesred by Servian troops firing on Austrian troops "on the Danube" and invasion of "on the frontier," and this was alleged as one of the excuses for de- ^"'^^"a. daring war the next day, and refusing England's proposals for pre- venting "the outbreak of hostilities.'""' It is difficult to believe that little Servia should deliberately begin an attack on big Austria, just at a time when she knew all her friends were making every effort to prevent war. The German Secretary of State said "he was obliged to keep his German secretary not yet read 98. CDD, pp. 183, 188, 189, 280 ; 1 SDD. 612, 618, 619 ; 2 SDD, 1357 ; Servian reply FYB, Nos. 61, 68, 70 ; ROB, No. 39. Servian repiy. 99. CDD, pp. 190, 191, 280 ; 1 SDD, 622 ; 2 SDD, 1357 ; FYB, Nos. 73, 74; ROB, No. 39. 100. CDD, pp. 52, 181, 189, 278; 1 SDD, 609, 019; 2 SDD, 931 1354; BBB. No. 62 ; FYB, Nos. 59. 70 ; ROB, No. 34. 101. CDD. p. 279 ; 2 SDD. 1356 ; ROB, No. 38. 102. CDD. p. 70; 2 SDD, 954; BBB, No. 93 (1). 103. CDD, p. 50 ; 2 SDD, 928 ; BBB. No. 56. 104. CDD, p. 50 ; 2 SDD. 928 ; BBB, No. 56. 105. CDD, pp. 50, 518, 519; 2 SDD. 928; 1 SDD. 102. 103; BBB, No. 56; ARB, Nos. 40, 41. 28 engagements towards Austria," although he had "not yet had time" to read the Servian reply which he had received that morning. The French ambassador entreated him "in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in" his conscience and not to assume a part of the responsi- bility for the catastrophe which he was "allowing to be prepared.""" The German Chancellor told England that "we have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Ed- ward Grey," and communicated Russia's desire "for a direct parley with Vienna," and that Austria answers "that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.""' The published records of neither Germany nor Austria disclose how or when mediation was started by Germany, nor how urgent it was, nor why it became "belated," — since war was not declared till the next day. Tuesday, July 28, 1914. Although yesterday Russia told Austria that she "was not prepared to give way again as she had * * * during the annexation crisis of 1909,""* Austria declared "that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; war would be declared today, (28th); the well- known pacific character of the Emperor, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable," and "Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be postponed.""' The German ambassador at Paris stated "that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia," but as to "whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.""" Russia "would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might make on these two points" if she attacked Servia,'" and Sir Edward Grey thought it would be quite possible "without nominally interfering with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory to turn her into a sort of a vassal state.""- War was then declared at noon this day against Servia by Austria, and her army mobilized,"^ if it had not been before. Vl) to this jwint, five concrete proposals for peace, — a joint request by all the powers, except Germany, for an extension of the time for the Servian reply, — Russia's request for a modification of some of the 100. ODD, p. 191 : 1 SDD. 622 : PYB. No. 74. 107. CDD, 429, 430; 2 SDD, S06, 807; GWB, Nos. 14. 15, 16, (Scott. Nos. 16, 17. 18). 108. CDD. p. 50 ; 2 SDD, 928 ; P.BR. No. 56. 109. ODD, p. 52 ; 2 SDD, 9.S1 ; BBB, No. 62. 110. CDD, p. 51 ; 2 SDD, 930 ; BBB, No. 59. 111. CDD, p. 57 ; 2 SDD, 937 ; BBB, No. 72. 112. CDD, p. 69 ; 2 SDD, 95.T ; BBB. No. 91. 113. CDD. pp. 43, 51, 54, 515 ; 2 SDD. 920, 930, 934 ; 1 SDD. 99 : BBB. Nos. 50, 59, 66 ; ARB, No. 37. 29 Austrian demands, by a direct exchange of views between herself and Austria, — England's request that frontiers be not crossed by Austria or Servia until time was allowed for further consideration, — England and France's request that conversations by the disinterested powers, including Germany, take place at Vienna and St. Petersburg,— and England's proposal for a joint conference of the same powers at London, — had been made, all coming from England, France, or Russia, and all agreed to by them; but all had been rejected or de- layed by Austria and Germany."^ The Kaiser now took a hand. At 10:45 p. m. he telegraphed the Kaiser takes Czar of Russia to this effect: "The inscrupulous agitation which ^'^ has been going on for years in Servia" led to the murder; this spirit still dominates that country; all sovereigns have a common interest to see deserved punishment Inflicted. "I shall use my entire in- fluence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia.""^ Wednesday, July 29, 1914. The German ambassador informed Russia "in the name of the Germany's Chancellor, that Germany has not ceasM to exercise a moderating ^"^' '""■ influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war.""° What this "modera^ng influence" was is not revealed by the text of any document made public by Germany or Austria. The Chancellor told the British ambassador at Berlin "that events had marched too rapidly to act" on England's "suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion"; that on receiv- ing the Servian reply he had "despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made on her," Austria "could not rest satisfied In view of their past experience"; "that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia, had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees," since Austria had "already assured" Russia "that they had no terri- torial designs." "He advised" Austria, "should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense" and "such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings;" and "since he had gone so far in giving advice at Vienna" he hoped England "would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of 114. See Sazonof. SDD. p. 101 ; 2 SDD. 994 : BBB. No. 139. 115. CDD, p. 431 ; 2 SDD, 808, (No. 22-1) ; GWB. No. 20. 116. CDD, p. 71; 2 SDD, 9.55; BBB, No. 93 (2), 30 European complications," and "doing his best to support"' England's "efforts in the cause of general peace.""' The same day the German Secretary of State reminded the British ambassador at Berlin, that he had said "the other day that he had to be very careful of giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate mat- ters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his~communication of" England's "sugges- tion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hasten- ed declaration of war" by Austria.^'* Truly German "mediation and advice" were not effective. This same day too, "The German ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof, (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs), that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilize." Sazonof replied that Russia's mobilization was caused by the "uncompromising attitude of Austria," and "that eight » Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilized.""" Sazonof also explained to the German ambassador that none of these military measures "were directed against Germany; neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their ex- planation being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro- Hungarian army."^-° The French ambassador-«t St. Petersburg says "The tone in which" the German ambassador "delivered this communication has decided Russia this very night to order the mobilization of thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.'"-^ The German ambassa- dor must have acted with authority, and if so, German mediation at Vienna took the shape of threats at St. Petersburg, as requested by Austria the day before, to tell Russia — "in a friendly manner," that, — although Russia has given her word of honor that up to then mobilization had not been ordered, but would be in "the military dis- tricts which border on Austria-Hungary, — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kasan," if the Austrian troops "cross the Servian frontier,"^"should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Ally, the German Empire."^-- Russia had the same day, apparently before she knew Austria had declared war, suggested that both direct discussions, and the plans for a conference of the four powers continue;'-^ but after Austria re- fused the further direct exchange of views with Russia, Sazonof said 117. CDD, p. 58 ; 2 SDD, 939 ; BBB. No. 75. 118. CDD, p. 59; 2 SDD. 940; BBB. No. 76. 119. CDD, p. 210; 1 SDD, 658; FYB, No. 100. 120. CDD, p. 71; 1 SDD. 955: BBB. No. 93 (2). 121. CDD, p. 210 ; 1 SDD, 658 ; FYB. No. 100. 122. CDD, p. 520, 524 ; 1 SDD, 104 ; ARB. No. 42. 123. CDD, p. 60 ; 2 SDD, 941 ; BBB, No. 78. 31 that he would agree to auy arrangement approved by France, England, and Italy, or the four powers, "provided it was acceptable to Servia; Russia favors he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia," and indicated that, if thought advisable, the Austrian ambassador might be called into the proposed conference. The German ambassador at London told Sir Edward Grey that the Germany German Chancellor was "endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and conference. St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success." Sir Edward replied that Austria had declined this, but that the German govern- ment had before said "they were favorable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think that the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations a quatre in London too formal a method." He then "urged that the German Government should suggest amj method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put in operation by any method that Germany could suggest; * * * by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'pres? the button' in the interests of peace. "''^ The French Prime Minister, Viviani, told the German ambassador at Paris that "if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation"; the ambassador said "the words 'conference' or 'arbitration' alarmed Austria." "Vivi- ani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation." He added that "France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete harmony with her allies and friends."^-' The unsatisfactory answer to these suggestions of France and England is given tomorrow. The German ambassador at Vienna was still feign- ing "surprise that the Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia."'-' The Czar of Russia, telegraphed the Kaiser at 1 p. m., saying: "I help^from ^"'^ am glad you are back in Germany. * * * j ^sk you to help me. An Kaiser, ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. * * * I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.'"-' 124. CDD, p. 63 : 2 SDD. 94G ; BBB. No. 84 also, CDD. pp. 08. 209, 28-5 ; 2 SDD, 951, 1366: 1 SDD. 6.^6: BBB. No. 90; FYB, No. 98; ROB, No. 54. 125. CDD, p. 286 ; 2 SDD, 1360 : ROB. No. 55. 126. CDD, p. 73 ; 2 SDD, 958 ; BBB. No. 94. 127. CDD, p. 431 ; 2 SDD, 809, No. 22. II ; GWB, No. 21. 32 Austria was then bombarding Belgrade, the capital of Servia.''^ The Kaiser answered the Czar's telegram at 6:30 p. m., saying: "I share your desire for the conservation of peace. * * * j cannot con- sider the action of" Austria "as an 'ignominious war'"; it is "an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into deeds." Austria "intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia." * * * n is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without draw- ing Europe into the most terrible war it has even seen." "I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between" Russia and Austria, which "my government endeavors to aid with all possi- ble effort." "Military measures by Russia which might be construed as a menace by" Austria "would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator," which on your appeal for my aid "I willingly accepted."^-" It should be noted that the Czar had asked the Kaiser's help to restrain his ally from going too far. "What, if anything, the Kaiser did in the line of this request, is not divulged in the published records; but what he did otherwise will soon appear. The Czar answered at 8:20 p. m. "Thanks for your telegram which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented today by your ambassador to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague Tri- bunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.""" (See the threat of German mobilization, by the German ambassador, above.) England It should be noted that Sir Edward Grey today informed the Ger- involved. man ambassador at London, that in case Germany and France be- came involved he "did not wish him to be misled into thinking that we should stand aside, ""^ and at the same time he told France not to be "misled into supposing that we had decided what to do" "in such a contingency.""- Thursday, July 30, 1914. Kaiser's The Kaiser answered the last telegram of the Czar, at 1 a. m.: Rusefan Austria "has mobilized only against Servia, and only part of her army. mobilization jf Russia * * * mobilizes against" Austria, "the part of mediator interfere with mediation. with which you have entrusted me * * * and which I have accepted 128. Baldwin, The "World War, p. 238 ; Beck, Evidence in the Case, p. 113. (Archer, however, says not till afternoon.) 129. CDD, p. 431 ; 2 SDD, 809. No. 22, III ; GWB, No. 22. 130. CDD, p. 542 : 2 SDD, 1029 ; (This telegram is not printed with the others given in the GWB). 131. CDD, pp C7, 78 ; 2 SDD, 950, 905 ; BBB, Nos, 89, 102. 132. CDD, p. 65 ; 2 SDD, 948 ; BBB, No. 87. upon your express desire, is threatened if not impossible. * * * You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace."'^^ At 2 a. ni. the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, "completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable," "appealed to Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to the German government as a last hope.""S Sazonof replied: "The Emperor Russia makes . ,, . -r • ^ T another Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make -a proposition. new proposal to you in his name: 'If Austria, recognizing that her dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ulti- matum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations.' '""■ This was sent to Berlin at once, and answered by the German Secretary of Germany State, (Von Jagow), "that he considered it impossible for Austria down, to accept,'"''"' or "he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria."^^'' "Mediation" by Germany had again failed. At this moment news of proclamation of general mobilization by Austria reached St. Peters- burg,' "a although it seems not to have been declared till 1 a. m. the next morning.'"'b As to England, France, and Italy's request of yesterday that Ger- Powers many suggest oni/ method of preserving peace, — the German Secretary Germany to of State "to draw up himself the formula for the intervention of the ^ffj^g* '"^^ disinterested powers," — the Secretary of State said: "that to gain time, he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria Referred to to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with '^°'^^- her,'"'* "and was still awaiting to hear from her ally.'"'^ "No answer had, however, yet been returned." The Chancellor said "he was 'press- Germany ing the button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether butVon."^ he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise."'*" Again the language in which moderation was urged, and the manner of 'pressing the button' are withheld; but the French ambassador, at Vienna, had word from Berlin, that the German ambassador at Vienna "is in- structed to speak seriously" to Austria, "against acting in the man- ner calculated to provoke European war," but unfortunately he "is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian 133. CDD, p. 432 ; 2 SDD, 810, No. 22, V : GWB, No. 23. 134. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD. 900 ; BBB. No. 97. 135. CDD, p. 212; 1 SDD, 660; FYB. No. 103. See also, CDD. pp. 75, 91, 288, 291; 2 SDD, 960, 965, 981, 1369, 1373; BBB, Nos. 97, ]0:',, 120; ROB. Nos. 60, 67. 136. CDD, 280 ; 2 SDD, 1371 ; ROB No. 63. 137. CDD, p. 216 ; 1 SDD, 664 ; FYB. No. 107. 137a. CDD, p. 297 ; 2 SDD, 1378 ; ROB, No. 77. See CDD, p. 216 ; 1 SDD, 664 ; FYB, No. 107. 137b. CDD, pp. 222 ; 1 SDD, 672 ; FYB, No. 115. 138. CDD, p. 216; 1 SDD. 666: FYB, No. 109. 139. CDD, p. 215 ; 1 SDD, 664 ; FYB, No. 107. 140. CDD. p. 84 ; 2 SDD. 972 ; BBB, No. 107. 34 Czar's answer again urges Kaiser to put pressure on Austria. Germany asks England's aid to induce France and Russia to remain neutral. feeling in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity."""^ The Czar answered the Kaiser's morning telegram, at 1:20 p. m., saying: "The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope * * * these measures will not influence in any manner your position as mediator. * * * We need your strong pres- sure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.""' It will be noted that the Kaiser's telegram of 6:30 the night before took the position that Russia should remain a spectator, while Austria crushed Servia "in the Austro-Servian war"; but the Czar was asking him to put pressure on to restrain his ally from going too far, -as he had promised to do in his telegram of the 2Sth., and which presaged so well. (Unfortunately there is no record of what, if any, effort was made by the Kaiser in this direction. It is difficult to believe he would not have been successful if he had made any real effort.) Prince Henry of Prussia telegraphed King George of England tell- ing him of Russia's military preparations, and "that France is mak- ing military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbors continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war," and proposed that he should use his "influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. * * * I consider this a certain and, perhaps, the only way of maintaining the peace of Europe.""- This telegram had the approval of the Kaiser. There is no indication of any pressure being put on Austria. She was still to be left free to crush Servia. 140a. CDD, p. 74 ; 2 SDD, 959 ; BBB, No. 95. (a) Note. — Mr. Archer, (Thirteen Days, p. 134), and Mr. Ileadlam, (Twelve Days, p. 239), give a copy of a telegram, dated today, July 30, and printed in the Westminster Gazette of August 1, purporting to have been sent by the German Chancellor to the German ambassador at Vienna, saying : "We cannot expect Austria to negotiate with Servia, with which she is" at war. "The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake. We are ready to fulfill our duty as an ally. We must, however refuse to be drawn into a world-conflagration through Austria not respecting our advice. Your excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness." This telegram is not printed in either the GWB, or the ARB. Because the French ambassador heard of this proposed "serious" talk, on the same day, Mr. Archer thinks there is some probability of the telegram being genuine : if it is genuine^ it is the only bit of evidence, that has come to light in which, the actual words in which Germany put any pressure on Austria, are given. If it accomplished any- thing, it did no more than induce Austria to open up negotiations with Russia,- — only to be overthrown immediately by the Kaiser's demobilizing ultimatum. ' It is very doubtful, to me, if it was genuine, or that it had the effect supposed, in view of the record, given in the text, relating to the Kaiser's telegram of 2 o'clock of this day. It seems to me that a more obvious ex- planation of this belated, unofficially published, telegram is that it was in- vented and publlslied at a critical time, for English consumption, instead of for Austrian action. 141. CDD. p. 432 ; 2 SDD. 810. No. 22, VI ; GWB, No. 23a. 142. CDD, p. 538 ; 2 SDD, 1023. 35 King George answered: That England was "doing the utmost pos- King George sible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further Aus1dft\old military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied Bein:ra(le as a with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Servian terri- tory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his 'great influence in order to in- duce Austria to accept this proposal.""' It seems that the suggestion that Austria hold Belgrade as a pledge was made July 29, by Sir Edward Grey, to the German ambassador at London, who, today (30th) said the "German government would endeavor to influence Germany Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of fnfluence frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavored Austria, to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied.'"" The German Secretary of State says "he asked Austro- Hungarian government whether they would be willing to accept mediation" on this basis, but "has up till now received no reply" No reply, and "fears Rilssian mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria, who has as yet only mobilized against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia," and if Russia will agree "to above basis" and "take no steps which might be re- garded as an act of aggression against Austria," there is some chance to preserve peace."'*' The German Chancellor says "he had begged Austria to reply to" this proposal, and "had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes Referred to „ , , T-i i.1, • • >>ii,- Austrian of the Emperor this morning. '*" Emperor. Yesterday the Russian ambassador at Vienna had requested that direct conversations between Sazonof and the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg be resumed, but his request was "flatly refused."'" Today, however, "it was agreed that pourparlers should be resumed" Disfus.sions ,.„ , . . , . „ . , , ,, ,. to be renewed, not to modify the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, but only "to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige" of Russia and Austria. This revived hope, to be dispelled instantly, for just then "news of the German mobilization arrived in Vienna.""*^ (It is claimed that this was a mistake, and is considered below.) The instructions given to the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg for carrying on the discussion were to make "any explanation he desired with regard to the note — which in any case appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war; * * * it was never intended to depart in But not to change demands. 143. CDD. p. 538; 2 SDD, 1024. 144. CDD, p. 78 ; 2 SDD, 9G5 ; EBB, No. 103. 14.5. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD. 901 : BBB, No. 98. 146. CDD. p. 87 ; 2 SDD. 97.5 ; BBB. No. 112. 147. CDD. p. 205 ; 1 SDD, 652 ; FYB. No. 93. 148. CDD, p. 213 ; 1 SDD, 662 ; FYB. No. 104. 36 any way from the points contained in the note." It was stated in these instructions that Austria "had mobilized exclusively against Servia; against Russia, not a single man,'"" although in the earlier conversation moblization in Galicia (which would be toward Russia) was admitted, but stated to "have no aggressive intention and" is only to maintain "the situation as it stands."^"" France reported that Germany had recalled "the reservists by tens of thousands"; "officers of reserve have been summoned"; "the Ger- man army has its outposts on our frontier; the whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to -Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier." And "al- though Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred meters from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometers (6 miles) from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer." "On two oc- casions yesterday (29th) German patrols penetrated our territory."^=^ en^gland's neuteaj.it y. This, perhaps, is a good place to say something more about Eng- land's neutrality, — "perfidious Albion." As we saw above, (July 25), England was urged from the first to stand solidly with Russia and Prance, — otherwise Germany and Austria would count on her neutral- ity, — but refused on the ground that she could mediate with them better as a friend, than as an ally of Russia.^'- On July 24, she post- poned the demobilization of her First Fleet, assembled a few days before at Portland, for review. On the 27th this was made public,^=^ and the Russian ambassador at London was told it meant nothing more "than diplomatic action was promised.'"^* On the same day the German ambassador was informed by Grey "that our fieet was to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to let" it do so; "there was no menace in what we had done, but owing to the possi- bility of an European conflagration, it was impossible for us to dis- perse our forces at the moment."^'' As we saw above, yesterday afternoon, (29th), Grey warned the Ger- man ambassador at London that Germany could not count on Eng- land's neutrality if all efforts to preserve peace failed.'*^ The German 149. 150. 151. 106. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. CDD, p. 525 ; 1 SDD. Ill ; ARB, No. 50. ODD, p. 213 ; 1 SDD, 662 ; FYB. No. 104. CDD, pp. 76, 214 ; 2 SDD, 962 ; 1 SDD, 663 : BBB, No. 99; FYB, No. CDD, pp. 14. 22, 39 ; 2 SDD. SSO. 890, 915 ; BBB, Nos. 6, 17, 44. CDD, p. 187 ; 1 SDD, 017 ; FYB, No. 66. CDD, p. 41 ; 2 SDD, 917 : BBB, No. 47. CDD, p. 43 : 2 SDD, 918 ; BBB. No. 48. CDD, pp. 67, 05; 2 SDD, 950, 948; BBB. Nos. 89, 87. ambassador sent a telegram to that effect, which reached Berlin late that night."' Before it is said to have been delivered, the German Chancellor, who "had just returned from Potsdam," invited the British ambassador to call on him that evening. He said, "should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might become in- evitable owing to Germany's obligation as Austria's ally," and made "the following strong bid for British neutrality," saying that "so far Germany as he was able to judge * * * Great Britain would never stand by and EngUgh allow France to be crushed; * * * that was not the object at which neutrality. Germany aimed;" if the "neutrality of Great Britain were certain every assurance would be given to" England that Germany "aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should" Germany be "victorious in any war that might ensue." When asked "about the French colonies, he said he was unable to give a similar under- taking," but would respect the territory of Holland and Belgium if her adversaries did the same. The British ambassador answered at once that he did not think England would bind herself, but would "desire to retain full liberty.""* Sir Edward Grey answered this "bid," today, (30th), this way: England "cannot for a moment enter- England tain the Chancellor's proposal" to bind herself "to neutrality on such bound! ^° ^ terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory" in Europe. "Such a proposal is un- acceptable, for France * * * could be so crushed as to lose her posi- tion as a great Power, and become subordinate to German policy; it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover." The Chancellor also asks us to bargain away our interest in the neutrality of Belgium. "We could not entertain that bargain either."™ Today also the German ambassador asked "why Great Britain was Englu^h taking military measures both on lan^ and sea" and was told "that '"" ' '^'^ ^'^^' these measures had no aggressive character, but the situation was such that each power must be ready. "^'"^ Friday, July 31, 1914. At 1 a. m. today Austria declared mobilization for all men between 19 and 42 years of age.'"^ The Russian ambassador at Vienna reported that Austria is deter- Russia will mined not to yield to intervention of powers, and was moving troops "°* yi^^'i^- 157. CDD, pp. 78, 76; 2 SDD, 965, 961; BBB. Nos. 102, 9S. 158. CDD, p. 64 ; 2 SDD. 947 ; BBB, No. 85. 159. CDD, p. 77: 2 SDD. 964; BBB. No. 101. 160. CDD. p. 290; 2 SDD, 1372; ROB, No. 65. 161. CDD. p. 222 ; 1 SDD. 672 ; FYB. No. 115. Russia's and England's proposals fail. Germany requested to urge mediation. Further proposals by England. against Russia, as well as against Servia. Russia then ordered gen- eral mobilization/"- early in the day. Russia's proposition to stop military preparations if Austria would recognize the European character of the Servian question, and allow some modification of the terms of the ultimatum, (which the German Secretary of State, yesterday refused to forward to Austria), and England's proposition that Austria hold Belgrade as a pledge, and stop further military advances, (referred to the Austrian Emperor to he answered this morning), were amalgamated into one to the effect: If Austria will agree to check her advance on Servian terri- tory; recognize the dispute is of European interest; and allow the powers to determine whether Servia can satisfy Austria without impairing her independence and sovereignty, Russia will maintain her waiting attitude.^'" This was sent to Vienna at once, but neither it nor the original proposition seems to have received any considera- tion.^-* On the 29th England urged Germany to propose some method by which the four powers could work together to preserve peace, but Russia insisted that Austria suspend military operations against Servia in the meantime, otherwise mediation would drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia. Sir Edward Grey, however, thought that mediation might still be possible, even after Belgrade was seized, if Austria would advance no further, "pending an effort of powers to mediate between her and Russia," and that it "was more important than ever that Germany should take up" this matter with Austria.^'" This seems to have been sent through Germany the next day to Austria,^"'' and reply sent today, (31st), by Austria, but not received till August 1, at London and St. Petersburg, to this effect: "We are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Servia. The conditions are * * * that our military action against Servia should continue to take its course" and England should induce Russia to bring to a standstill her mobil- ization against us, and we will cancel our defensive milita,ry counter- measures in Galicia.^' Again German mediation had only had the effect that Austria persisted in her derhand that she be allowed a free hand to crush Servia, while negotiations went on. Today Sir Edward Grey made two further proposals to Germany: 1. That if Germany would sound Austria, he would sound St. Peters- burg, as to whether it would not be possible for the four powers to 162. CDD, p. 87 ; 2 SDD, 97G ; BBB, No. 11.3. Also CDD, p. 527 ; 1 SDD, 113; ARB, No. 52. 163. CDD, p. 91, 291: 2 SDD. 981. 1373; BBB, No. 120; ROB, No. 67; CDD. pp. 219, 220 : 1 SDD. 669. 670 ; FYB, No.s. 112, 113. 164. CDD. p. 102: 2 SDD. 994; BBB, No. 139. 165. CDD, p. 66: 2 SDD, 949; BBB. No. 88. 166. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD, 961 ; BBB. No. 98. 167. CDD. p. 526 ; 1 SDD, 112 ; ARB, No. 51. guarantee Austria full satisfaction against Servia, without impair- ing her sovereignty and Integrity, on the one hand, and on the other, guaranteeing to Russia that Servia's sovereignty and integrity, should not be impaired, by Austria. And 2, he said: "If Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable If they rejected it," he "would support it at St. Petersburg and at Paris," and if they would not accept it England "would have nothing more to do with the con- sequences." The only answer was that "it was Impossible for" Ger- many "to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their" ultimatum to demobilize immediately, sent that day and referred to below. ^''^ Yet, for some reason, not clearly disclosed by the record, Austria Austria agreea today suddenly faced about, and agreed to renew discussions, — and " '"cubj. "far from harboring any designs against the integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other Powers";""'' "to discuss with Russia" and "to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objection to the formula which Russia originally suggested";'"" "to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia.''^ Austria then knew that Russia had ordered general mobilization, early in the day,'"' and had herself taken military measures in Galicia, but these had no aggressive intention, and were not to stop pourparlers between Russia and Austria, and from which she hoped "things will quiet down all round."'"' Russia immediately accepted this offer, suggested "that the dis- cussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers," and hoped England "would assume the direction of these discussions." "It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory," but this was not made a condition of Russia's acceptance.'"^ Here seemed to be a wide-open opportunity for discussion and media- tion, with every chance of settlement, — but war "is the game that kings play at" The Czar telegraphed the Kaiser, as to Russian military prepara- Czar's tions, which had been so strenuously objected to: "It is technically about Rueeia'a impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been preparations made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. * * * As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word there- 1G8. CDD, pp. 86, 92; 2 SDD, 974. 982; BBB. Nos. Ill, 121. 169. CDD, p. 293; 2 SDD, 1375; ROB, No. 73. 170. CDD, p. 97 ; 2 SDD, 988 : BBB, No. 131. 171. CDD, p. 97; 2 SDD, 989: BBB. No. 1.33. 172. CDD, p. 527; 1 SDD, 113: ARB, No. 52. 173. CDD. p. 527; 1 SDD. 113: ARB. No. 53. 174. CDD, p. 98; 2 SDD, 989; BBB, No. 133. 40 Qjj 175 rpj^jg assumes Austria had agreed to reopen negotiations, (as she had), and although she had not agreed to stop her military meas- ures, Russia was willing to give assurance that her troops would take no action. Kaiser's This telegram of the Czar was crossed by one to the Czar, sent at about^Russia'B 2 P- m. by the Kaiser, mainly scolding him for mobilizing against mobilization. Austria, "my ally," whereby "my mediation has become almost illus- ory," but saying further "I receive reliable news that serious prepara- tions for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence." * * * "No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation." * * * "tl^^e peace of Europe can still be preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which • menace Germany and Austria- Hungary.""" It is clear that since Austria had already agreed to negotiate further, of which the Czar already had knowledge. Austria's change was not due to the Kaiser's "mediation," or the Kaiser was ignorant of his own success, up to 2 o'clock, or prevaricated. I can- not believe he was ignorant. Neither can I believe his Chancellor and Secretary of State were ignorant of Austria's agreement to ne- gotiate further, — although the latter, late this evening, declared that the Kaiser and the Foreign Office "had even up to last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions, — but Russian mobilization had spoilt everything.""" This last statement was untrue, for Austria knew Russia had issued order for general mobilization before she agreed to negotiate further,'"* and the claim of the German Secretary of State, made the next day, "that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna," was false."" Germany's Notwithstanding this agreement of Austria, and notwithstanding Rus'Sa^"™*" that "so long as conversation with Austria continued" the Czar "un- dertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier," — all of which must have been known to the Kaiser and his Chancellor, — they sent an ultimatum to Russia, at midnight that night, July 31, to be answered within 12 hours, that is by noon, Saturday, demanding that Russia immediately demobilize her whole army, against both Austria, and Germany, — "if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect," mobilization of the German army is bound to follow; "although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army 175. CDD, p. 411 ; 2 SDD. 778 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3 176. CDD, p. 411 : 2 SDD, 778 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3d. 177. CDD, p. 92; 2 SDD, 982; BBB, No. 121. 178. CDD, p. 527 ; 1 SDD. 113 ; ARB, Nos. 52. 53. 179. CDD, p. 100; 2 SDD, 993; BBB. No. 138. 41 and navy, hence also against us," and we have thereby "been forced for the safety of the country to proclaim the threatening state of war, (Eriegsgcfahrzustand) which does not yet imply mobilization."^'" Austria had mobilized at 1 a. m. ; Russia, "early in the day," "as Mobilization a result of the general mobilization of Austria and of the measures ^ ermany. for mobilization taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days,"'*' as reported by the French ambassador at St. Peters- burg, in contradiction of the German Chancellor's statement above. The "state of danger of war," {Kriegsgefahrzustand-ioar-danger-state) is admittedly a German technical term, which after being proclaimed, according to the Chancellor, "Mobilization would follow almost im- mediately" ;'-= and according to the German ambassador's statement to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the publication of this was impending as early as the 29th, "and under the protection of this screen," after its publication at mid-day today, (31st),"*' Germany "immediately began mobilization in the proper sense of the word.""* The Gervian Chancellor's telegram above to Russia, to demobilize within 12 hours, says that "we have up to this hour made no prepara- tions for mobilization." "At the same time the Imperial (German) ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Gov- ernment a declaration within 18 hours whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.'"'^ The text of the telegram sent to France, (as it appears in the German text of the German White Book), also says "we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilization." However, the German "only authorized translation" into English, leaves out this statement. Since Germany's ultimata to Russia and France, are specifically based on her alleged knowledge of Russia's order for general mobil- ization, and Russia's order was itself based on the alleged mobiliza- tion of Austria and Germany, it is necessary to look into these matters a little more. There is no important difference, as between Austria and Russia, — both understood they were mobilizing against one an- other, but not with aggressive purposes, while the discussions were going on as agreed. As between Germany and Russia, the documents show much uncertainty. When Germany sent her "demobilizing ultimatum" to Russia, she undoubtedly had knowledge of Russia's order of mobilization; the hour when the telegram was sent is not given; it however was de- livered at midnight;"" the one sent to France, "at the same time," 180. CDD. p. 433 ; 2 SDD, Sll, No. 23 ; GWB. Ex. 24. 181. CDD, p. 223: 1 SDD, 674; FYB, No. 118. 182. CDD, p. 80 : 2 SDD. 975 ; BBB. No. 112. 183. CDD, p. 222 ; 1 SDD, 673 ; FYB, No. 117. 184. CDD, p. 231 ; 1 SDD, G81 ; FYB. No. 127. 185. CDD. p. 412 ; 2 SDD, 779 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3. 186. CDD, p. 412 ; 2 SDD. 779 ; GWB, Statemont Aus. 3. 42 and marked with "utmost speed,'' was delivered at 7 p. m.^" The Kaiser said in his telegram to King George, sent in the evening, that his Chancellor had just heard that "Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilization of his entire army and fleet." Evening, in Germany, means from 5 to 10 p. m. In the Kaiser's telegram above, sent at 2 p. m., he complains of Russia's mobilization against his* ally, Austria, not against Germany, but only of "reliable news of serious prepara- tions for war going on on my eastern front." If he had then had knowledge of the mobilization of Russia's "entire army and navy, hence also against us," he would have said so; yet the German au- thorized English text, (for use in England), of the statement made August 3d by the German Foreign Office, (after war was declared with Russia), says "the mobilization of all the Russian forces ob- viously directed against us and already ordered in the afternoon was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon." The German text of' the same document (for use in Germany), says that Russia mobilized in the Tnorning.^^^ It seems a reasonable inference. that Germany first learned of Russia's mohilization, in the evening, (after 5 p. m.), instead of afternoon, (2 p. m.), or in the morning, as stated in the juggled documents. Is there any reason for this juggling? Let us consider. Germany's ultimatum to Russia to demohlize, also said that Russia's mobilization was the cause of Germany's declaring her "state of danger of war," (Kiiegsgefahrziistand, literally, war-clanger-state), also. This was decided on at mid-day that day,"" at least two hours before the German authorized English text of the statement of August 3d, says Russia had mobilized, and several hours before the Kaiser knew of it in the evening; for German use at least it therefore would be necessary to allege that Russia's mobilization was known in Germany in the morning, otherwise Germany's declaration of a "state of danger of war," could not be based on the reasons claimed. It has come to light since that the German proclamation decided on at mid-day, instead of announcing a "state of danger of war," (Eriegsgefahrznstand), as told to England, France and Russia, ac- tually proclaimed a "state of war," (Kriegsziistand, — war-state), — {das ReichsgeMet wlrd hierdurch in Eriegszustand erklart) .^^^ Just before 2 o'clock, a director of the North German Lloyd, sent to Berlin to ascertain conditions, telegraphed his board, "that the declaration of a state of war (Kriegsziistand) , would at once be made public," and later in the day notified them of "the declaration of the 187. CDD, pp. 88, 222, 527 ; 2 SDD, 978 ; 1 SDD, 673, 114 ; BBB, No. 117 ; FYB, No. 117 ; ARB. No. 54. 188. CDD, p. 412 : 2 SDD, 779 : GWB. Statement, Aug. 3. 189. CDD, p. 222: 1 SDD. 673: FYB. No. 117. 190. Wilson. H. W., New Light on Germanv's Treachery, Nineteenth Century, June, 1917. pp. 1204-1214. 43 state of war for the German Empire, owing to tlie threatening danger of war," — again not giving Russian mobilization as the reason, but only the threatening danger of war."' Now, the difference between Kriegsgefahrzxistand, {war-clanger-state) , and Kriegszustand, ( war- state), is important, for the German mobilization cards, held by Ger- man soldiers, direct them automatically to report at once to their headquarters, "upon the existence of a 'state of war," " but not on the existence of a "state of danger of war." So that by this trick of proclaiming a "state of war" at mid-day, July 31, instead of "a state of danger of war" as reported to the other governments, they were misled, and the German soldiers called to their posts. But Russia mobilized because she understood Germany was secretly Russian and doing so. Did she have any substantial reason to think so? mobilization. In the evening of July 29, an Extraordinary Council was held at Potsdam with the military authorities, under the presidency of the Kaiser, and decided on mobilization, and probably on the invasion of Belgium. About 1 o'clock p. m., July 30, the Lokal Anzeiger, a semi-official newspaper, in a special edition, published news of the mobilization of the German army and fleet."- This was immediately telegraphed to Russia,"' — 18 to 20 hours before Russian mobilization was ordered. News of the German mobilization was received in Vienna at about the same time."* At 2 o'clock p. m., the German Secretary of State, telephoned the French and Russian ambassadors at Berlin, that "the news of mobil- ization of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, is false; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they now have been confiscated."'''' The English and Austrian ambassadors do not seem to have been so notified. The French ambassador at Berlin said he believed "that all the measures for mobilization which can be taken before the general order of mobilization have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilization first, in order to attribute the responsibility to us.'"'"' The same reasons and remarks would equally apply to Russia. It has since been learned that the Berlin correspondent for a Vienna newspaper, at 10 o'clock a. m.', July 30, telegraphed his paper announcing that German mobilization had been proclaimed, and that • he had received this news "from one of the Emperor's staff." So, too, it now appears that four other Berlin newspapers, besides the 191. The Kronprinzessln, (1916), 228 Fed. Rep. 940, 901. 192. CDD, p. 213 ; 1 SDD, 002 ; FYB, No. 105. 193. CDD, p. 289 ; 2 SDD. 1370 ; ROB, No. 01. 194. CDD, 213; 1 SDD, 061; FYB, No. 104. 19.5. CDD. p. 289 ; 2 SDD. 1370 ; ROB, No. 02. 196. CDD, p. 214 ; 1 SDD, 002 ; FYB. No. 105. u Lokal Anzeiger, at the same time published special editions announc- ing mobilization by Germany. It is difficult to believe that all of these could suddenly have conceived such an idea at the same time as to special editions, unless they had been authoritatively so informed.'" On the same day the 20th French army corps at Nancy intercepted a telephone message between Metz and Strassburg, saying that mobil- ization began that evening. After the German Secretary of State said this publication was false, the Russian ambassador at Berlin so notified his home government, as above given. Other facts however make it certain that what was substantially equivalent to mobilization"^ was going on in Germany from July 21, when it was secretly begun by Germany's peculiar preliminary no- tice.'™ On the 23d, German officers on leave in Basle were ordered to return to Germany.-"" On the 24th, the colonels of the German regiments at Metz, began giving their officers instructions as to the duties of covering troops, only given immediately before mobiliza- tion. On the 25th railway stations in Germany were filled with sol- diers in uniform, and for the next two days movement by trains of cavalry, artillery, and infantry toward the Belgian frontier was be- gun. We have already noted above the German activities on the French frontier on this date. On the 26th, the German fleet in Norway was ordered to return to Germany.-"' Reservists were di- rected to hold themselves at the disposition of the Kommanclatur at any moment.-'" On the 27th motor car owners in Baden were secretly notified (under penalty of fine) to hold their cars at the disposal of the military authorities within two days after call.-"' Men on leave were ordered to rejoin their regiments; five classes of reservists, (1,250,000 men), were called; these with the peace strength, (over 800,000 men), made more than 2,000,000 men; German officers at Antwerp were secretly directed to report to their regiments; German troops began to deploy on the Luxemburg frontier. On the 28th and 29th uniformed troops were passing through Frankfort from Darm- stadt, Cassel and Mayence, which were full of soldiers, and bridges 197. Wilson, H. W., New Light on Germany's Treachery, Nineteenth Century, June. 1917, pp. 1204-1214. 198. "Careful usage distinguishes between" militarii preparations and moMlization, "though it is hard to draw the line." Mobilization means to make mobile, making ready to move, bringing together men, materials, and all other military paraphernalia for instant use in war, such as filling up the regiments of the first line to full war strength by recalling men on furlough, summoning reservists and forming them into second and third lines, corre- sponding to the first line, taking over railways, and collecting and equipping all the machinery of transportation and communication, — telegraphs, tele- phones, motor cars, horses, vehicles, ships, etc., for army service; gathering, forwarding and providing for the distribution of arms, ammunition, uniforms, food supply, etc., necessary before beginning to move to various places of assembly, to be from there deployed in battle array. 199. CDD, pp. 134, 149: 1 SDD. 544, 562, FYB, Nos. 3, 15. 200. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD, 612 ; FYB, No. 60. 201. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD. 612 ; FYB, No. r,8. 202. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD. 611 ; FYB, No. 59. 203. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD, 612 ; FYB, No. 00. 45 and railways were guarded, under pretext of preparation for autumn manoeuvers;'"* mills in Alsace were directed to stop deliveries to clients and hold supplies for the army; at Strassburg motor-guns were going forward; non-commissioned officers of Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, in Bavaria on harvest leave, received orders to return immediately, under pretext of change in autumn manoeu- ers.-"' Hamburg American and North German Lloyd steamers were directed to embark reservists. On the 29th the whole German cover- ing force were at their posts on the French frontier; 30 military trains passed between Metz and Treves, and the ISth army corps was concentrated at Frankfurt. In Bavaria and Wurtemburg army corps were marching west. The Ersatz. — reservists, — (1,500,000 men), received notices which automatically called them up on the proclama- tion of a state of war. This was the condition of things when the War Council met that evening. We have already noted the German military activities on the French frontier on the 30th. By that time an army of more than 3,500,000 men was practically mobilized by Germany. Yet the Chancellor, about 5 p. m., July 31, telegraphs Russia saying "we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization."-'"' On the other hand Sazonof said on the 30th, "that absolute proof was in the possession of Russian Government that Ger- many was making military and naval preparations against Russia — • more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland."""' Which was probably correct?-"' But without any reference as to who mobilized first, the Kaiser, after knowing that Austria had expressed a willingness to negotiate with responsibility. Russia, or with all the Powers, and after he had the Czar's promise on his honor that his army would take no action as long as negotia- tions continued, sent this ultimatum to Russia, to be answered within 12 hours demanding that she demoMlize her whole army, against both Austria and Germany, and without any promise or suggestion that he or Austria would do the same. The reason why demobilization against Austria as well as against Germany was demanded, was, as stated by the Secretary of State, Von Jagow, "in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.""^"" 204. ODD, p. 202 ; SDD, 648 ; FYB. No. 88. 20.5. CDD, p. 202 : 1 SDD. 649 ; FYB. No. 89. 206. CDD, p. 433 2 SDD. 811. No. 23 ; GWB. No. 24. 207. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD, 900 ; BBB, No. 97. 208. The facts conceruing mobilization by Germany above given for which no specific reference is given, are from Wilson's article in the Nineteenth Century, for June. 1917, New Light on Germany's Treachery, pp. 1204-1214. 209. CDD, p. 92 ; 2 SDD, 982 ; BBB. No. 121. 4G Saturday, August 1, 1914. The Csar answered the Kaiser, (not within the 12 hour limit, but at 2 o'clock), saying "I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries, and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts."-'" The Kaiser answered: "I have shown yesterday to your govern- ment the way (that is, by immediate demobilization) through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my ambassador has reached me with the reply of your government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate and unmistakable reply of your govern- ment is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of your telegram."-" At 12:52 p. m. the German Chancellor notified the German ambassa- dor at St. Petersburg that "If the Russian Government gives no satis- factory reply to our demand," you "will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time), the following: * * * Russia having refused to comply with this demand, and having shown by this refusal that her action was directed against Germany. * * * i have the honor * * * to inform your Excellency as follows: — His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia."-" This was delivered at 7:10 p. m.=" England again urged that since Austria and Russia were willing to discuss matters, and if "Germany did not want war on her own ac- count" she "should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement." The Secretary of State replied that "Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized all would have been well. But Russia by abstain- ing from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could per- fectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions.'"" 210. CDD, p. 413 ; 2 SDD. 779 : GWB, Statement Aug. 3. 211. CDD, 413 ; 2 SDD, 770 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3. 212. CDD, pp. 294, 433; 2 SDD, 1377, 811, No. 25; ROB, No. 76; GWB, No. 26. 213. Same references. 214. CDD, p. 100; 2 SDD, 993; BBB, No. 138. 47 According to the statement of the German Foreign office to the Ger- Germany man people, August 3, 1914, in the afternoon of August 1, before the fnv^e(?he?!'' delivery of the order declaring war "Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory. Thus Russia began war against us."=" This same document also says: "As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H. M., the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German army and navy on August 1, at 5 p. m." In the document declaring war Russian moMlisation, not Russian invasion, is given as the cause of the declaration of war. Germ-any has constantly claimed that she did not mobilize until ^i.t['"|''^^ar is August 1, at 5 p. m., Saturday, and after Russia had mobilized against defensive one. her and had invaded her territory, and her war was, therefore, one of de- fence only, as claimed in the Kaiser's speech referred to in the early part of this paper. As to invasion of Germany by Russia: this is inher- ently improbable; Russia did not want war with Germany; she and Aus- tria were about to discuss, instead of fight; although she had given or- ders to mobilize before Germany claims to have given her order, yet Germany had the speed, and Russia the numbers when she got them to- gether, but since she certainly had not yet accomplished this, why should she attack Germany before she was ready? Besides, the Czar had given his word of bonor to the Kaiser that not a man should cross the line while negotiations continued. "We have already discussed what Germany had been doing in the way of mobilizing for the past 15 days. As to these matters of invasion and mobilization it is well to re- Triple member a few bits of history. As we have seen the Triple Alliance, defenetve'^war. is one of defense, and not of offense. Austria and Italy were bound by it to stand by Germany only in case she were attacked by Russia. So, too, by the constitution of the German Empire, the Kaiser has no right to declare an offensive war, but only a defensive one."" As Conetitution we have seen, this war was declared by the Kaiser, and not by the ^!^ ^ ° Bundesrat; it had to be made a defensive one therefore. At the begin- ning of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, it was said that "On July 19, at noon, a body of French soldiers crossed the Prussian frontier at Saarbrucken, and were driven back by the Uhlans. This was the Similar first hostile act committed before the formal declaration of war." Franco- Subsequent histories make no mention of this. It had a special pur- Prussian war. pose to subserve then: Bavaria was then bound only by a defensive alliance to Prussia, and was wavering in her support, in the dis- cussions in her legislative body, when this "act of hostility" was re- 215. CDD, p. 413 ; 2 SDD, 780 ; GWB, Statement August 3. 21G. "For a declaration of war in tbe name of the Empire, the consent of the Rundosrat is required, unless an attack is made upon the federal territory or its coasts." — IV, Art. 11, Dodd, Modern Constitutions, Vol. 1, p. 331. 48 ported at the proper time, and with the desired result.^'" So, here, Austria declared war on Russia, (August 6th), because slie "has seen fit to open hostilities against Germany."-" On August 1, however, Italy declared that this war was not a defensive one, but an aggressive war on the part of Austria, and she was not obliged under the terms of the Triple Alliance to take part in it."" Just as in the beginning of the Franco-Prussian war hostile acts of France were counted on as above noted, so when Germany declared war on France, at 6:45 p. m., August 3, 1914, she claimed France was guilty of "a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory," specifying: "yesterday morning (August 2,) eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in tivelve motor cars at Walbeck"; and French military aviators have "attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel," and "throwii bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe, and Nuremburg." Now the 80 French officers in their 12 motor cars, would not only have to cross Belgium, but also 30 miles of Holland, to reach Walbeck; it is strange that they were seen by no one but Germans in their violation of the neutral territory of Belgium and Holland, on their 140 mile trip, and have not been heard from since; so, too, Wesel, is 150 miles from the French frontier, 30 of which is also across Holland; Carlsruhe is 85 miles from France, and Nuremburg 200; these early aviators have made no report, — they seem still to be in the air. The German officer in command at Nuremburg has publicly denied that any bombing of the railway at that time occurred; and when the German govern- ment delivered her ultimatum to Belgium, August 2, she did not, and could not, allege any violation of Belgian territory by France, but only that she had "reliable information" of "the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany." With these claims in mind, which were so far from the truth, the allegation that Russia began the war against Germany, does not carry much weight. It and the rest of them served their purpose, just as Bismarck's "modified" Ems telegram in 1870 did. The Kaiser, therefore, with full knowledge of the willingness of Austria and Russia to negotiate further, with the assurance that Russia would take no military action while the negotiations con- tinued, and would stop military preparations if he would do the same, deliberatelj^ refused, declared war, and blocked all possibility of peace. And this is "How Russia and her ruler betrayed Germany's confi- dence and thereby made the European war." 217. Wilson, H. W.. New Light on Germany's Treachery, Nineteenth Century, June, 1917, pp. 1204-1214. 218. CDD, pp. 298, 529 ; 2 SDD, 1381 ; 1 SDD, 117 ; FYB, No. 79 ; AIIB, No. 59. 219. CDD, pp. 106, 228 ; 2 SDD. 1002 ; 1 SDD. G79 ; BBB, No. 152 ; FYB, No. 124. 49 Sunday, August 2, 1914. German troops violated French territory in at least 11 different Invasion of places, — at one, Joncliery, six miles from the frontier. Lieutenant Mayer of the 5th mounted Jagers, of the 144 army corps blew out the brains of a French corporal, and was himself killed, and two German troopers were taken prisoner;--" also invaded Luxemburg, and Ger- many demanded that permission be given by Belgium to Germany for her troops to cross Belgian territory to invade France. INVASION OF BELGIUM. By the settlement at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, Holland and Neutrality of Belgium were joined together under the name of The Netherlands, ^^^^slum. This was not a happy union, and in 1830, Belgium declared her in- dependence of Holland; Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, by treaty xoith her in 1831, recognized her independence "as a perpetually neutral state," and "guaranteed perpetual neutrality." Holland then objected, but in 1839, joined these powers in a treaty Treaties. by which Belgium was to "form an independent and perpetually neutral state" placed "under the guarantee of" these powers, — this guarantee being considered from the beginning to be "to uphold, not collectively but severally and individually, the integrity of the treaty," and not jointly, as in the treaty of 1867, concerning the neutrality of Luxemburg."' By treaty of 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia, (prac- tically on behalf of the North German Confederation, with which France was technically at war), declared her intention "to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France" and England agreed to cooperate with Prussia, in case France violated that neutrality. This treaty between Prussia and England was to last during the continuance of the war and for 12 months after the ratification of peace, but "without impairing or invalidating the conditions of" the treaty of 1839, being only "subsidiary and accessory to it."--- A precisely similar treaty was entered into by England and France at the same time. In 1911, the German Chancellor had declared to Belgium "that Confirmation^i. 220. CDD, pp. 234, 23G : 1 SDD, 686, 687, 689 ; FYB, Nos. 136, 130. The Gei-man Chancellor says this was against express orders ; GWB, Speech, Aug. 4, CDD, p. 438. 221. Mowat, R. B., Select Treaties, Oxford Pamphlets, Introduction, and pp. 37, 42. Arts. 9 and 10 of Treaty of 1831, and Art. 7 of Treat.v of 1839. 222. Mowat. Select Treaties, p. 39. Prof. Burgess, argues that Germanj- is not a party to either of these treaties, since they were not made with either her or the North German Confederation. He also says that Germany was not a party to the Hague Convention of 1907. As to this last he is mis- taken : as to the first, the original treaty of 1839 was made with his Majesty the "King of Prusma,'' the present Kaiser, is still King of Prussia, and by virtue of this, is Emperor of Germany. Besides the German Chancellor did not think of such a flimsy excuse. 50 Belgium's duty of self defense. France agrees to respect Belgian neutrality. Germany Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality;" in 1913,. the German Secretary of State had publically declared to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, that "Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions, and Germany is determined to respect those conventions." On July 31, 1914, the German Minister to Belgium, upon specific inquiry, told the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he knew of these declarations of the Chancellor and Secretary of State, and "the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed." And again on August 2, (the day that Germany later in the day delivered her ultimatum to Belgium), the German Minister to Belgium confirmed "the feelings of security" which Belgium "had the right to entertain towards" her "eastern neighbors. "-= By the treaty of 1839, Belgium was bound to do all she could, to defend her own neutrality, in case it was threatened or invaded. The Hague Conference, 1907, declared the territory of neutral powers is inviolable, and belligerents are forbidden to move troops across it, and resistence is not an hostile act.='^ Germany had signed this declaration. July 24, 1914, Belgium mobilized her small army, and put her forts in a state of defense, and on the 29th "strengthened her peace foot- ing" in order to perform heir duty to protect her own neutrality.--^ July 31, the French Minister to Belgium, as soon as he learned of "the state of war in Germany" with Russia, immediately declared to the Belgian Foreign Minister, "that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed, upon the frontiers of your country." The same day England asked Belgium if she would "do her utmost to maintain her neutrality," and also asked France and Germany if they would respect Belgian neutrality, if violated by no other power.-" France answered "Yes," at once, and on the same day so informed the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.-' The German Secretary of State answered "that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancel- lor before he could possibly answer," and for fear of disclosing part "of their plan of campaign," he was "very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all."-' The next day, Saturday, August 1, England insisted on an answer from Germany, saying "if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other 223. CDD, p. 305 ; 1 SDD, 366 ; BGB. No. 12. 224. Convention V, Chapter I. Articles 1, 2, 10. Germany's claims that Belgium had violated her duty of neutrality by understanding with England prior to the war are too flimsev to need comment. 225. CDD, pp. 300, 303 ; 1 SDD. 356. 364 ; BGB, Nos. 2, S. 226. CDD, pp. 87, 307 ; 2 SDD. 976, 977 ; 1 SDD, 368 ; BBB, Nos. 114, 115; BGB, No. 13. 227. CDD, pp. 94, 227, 307 ; 2 SDD, 985 ; 1 SDD, 367, 369 ; BBB, No. 125 ; FYB, No. 122 ; BGB, No. 15. 228. ODD, pp. 92, 227 ; 2 SDD, 983 ; 1 SDD, 568 ; BBB, No. 92 ; FYB, No. 123. 51 respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.""" At 1:05 p. m. France answered Germany's ulti- matum to her of the night before, "that France would do that which her interest dictated."-^" "The Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p. m.," according to the Chancellor, — "the first day of mobilization to be 2d August," according to the newspaper reports.-"^ (But see above.) France mobilized at 3:40 p. m.= '- Sunday, August 2, at 7 p. m. Germnmj presented an ultimatum Germany marked "very confidential" to Belgium, saying: "Reliable informa- u^tYi^atum to tion has been received by" Germany "that French forces intend to Belgium demandmg march * * * through Belgian territory against Germany," who fears permiesion to "that Belgium * * * will be unable without assistance to repel so to^France™^^ considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to * * * guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate such hostile attack." And would regret "if Belgium regarded as an act of hos- tility" the "fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory." If this was permitted Germany proposed "at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian King- dom in full;" "to evacuate Belgian territory at the conclusion of peace"; "to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops." Should Belgium oppose * * * Ger- many will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy," and "the eventual adjustment of relations between the two states must be left to the decision of arms.""^" "A time limit of twelve hours was allowed in which to reply."''^ At 1:30 a. m., the German Minister to Belgium, asked to see the Secretary General to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell him "he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law." When asked, Where? he replied, "in Germany." The Secretary then said "he could not understand the object of the communication," — when the German Minister answered that "these acts, which were contrary to international law. were calculated to lead to the supposi- tion that other acts, contrary to international law, would be com- 229. TDD, p. 9.3 ; 2 SDD, 984 : BBB. No. 123. 230. CDD, pp. 434, 223; 2 SDD, 813, No. 26; 1 SDD, 673; GWB, Ex. 26 ; FYB. No. 117. 231. CDD, pp. 413, 103, 232 ; 2 SDD, 780, 997 ; 1 SDD, 784 ; GWB, State- ment Aug. 3 ; BBB, No. 142 : FYB. No. 130. 232. CDD, p. 99 ; 2 SDD, 991 ; BBB. No. 136. 233. CDD, pp. 309, 312 : 1 SDD. 371. 375 ; BGB. Nos. 20 23. 234. CDD, p. 312 ; 1 SDD, 375 ; BGB, No. 23. oi: Belgium replies in negative. France offers support. England warns Germany. Germany declares war on Belgium. mitted by Prance."-" Six and a half hours earlier the German Gov- ernment could only allege "we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium"-^" according to the Chancellor, and make that, "the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us,"-" according to Viviani, as the basis of the ultimatum to Belgium. At 7 a. m. Monday, August 3, Belgium rejiUed:. "This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government. The intentions attributed to France by Germany" contradict France's formal declarations; if "Belgian neutrality should be violated by France," Belgium "would offer the most vigorous resistance." "The treaties of 1839" and 1870, "vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers" including Prussia. "Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations." "The attack upon her independence" which Germany threatens "con- stitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic in- terest justifies such a violation of law." If Belgium "were to accept the proposals submitted," she "would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray" her "duty towards Europe," and she is "firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in" her power, "every attack upon" her rights.- - Caesar said more than nineteen hundred years ago, "Of all the Gauls, the Belgae are the bravest.""' France immediately offered Belgium "the support of five French army corps," but she said she was "making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the powers."=" At 6:45 p. m., Germany declared war on France, because of the alleged acts of aggression above noted.-" Belgium appealed to England for diplomatic intervention on her behalf, and England immediately protested "against this viola- tion of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with" her, and requested an assurance from Germany that she would respect the neutrality of Belgium.^*' On Tuesday, August 4, England told Belgium that if Germany ap- plied pressure to induce her to depart from neutrality, she would expect her to resist by any means in her power, and she stood ready to join France and Russia "for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against" her.=^^ At 6 a. m., Germany declared war on Belgium, "in consequence of the refusal" by her "to entertain the 235. CDD, p. 311 ; 1 SDD, 37.^, ; BGB, No. 21. 236. CDD, p. 317 ; 1 SDD, 381 ; BGB. No. 35. 237. CDD, p. 259 ; 1 SDD, 715 ; FYB, No. 159. 238. CDD, pp. 311, 323 : 1 SDD, 373, 389 ; BGB, Nos. 22. 44. 239. The area of Belgium is 11,373 sq. mi. : population. 7.500.000 ; Ger- many, area, 208.000 sq. mi.; population. 67,000,000. In 1914, Belgium's war strength was 222,000, and Germany's, 5.200,000. 240. CDD, pp. 106, 313 ; 2 SDD. 1001 ; 1 SDD, 375 ; BBB, No. 151 ; BGB, No. 24. 241. CDD, pp. 240, 241 ; 1 SDD, 693. 694 : FYB. Nos. 147, 148. 242. CDD, pp. 107, 313; 2 SDD. 1002; 1 SDD. 376; BBB, No. 153; BGB, No. 25. 243. CDD, p. 108; 2 SDD, 1003; BBB, No. 155. well-intentioned proposals" of Germany,'" and immediately proceeded to invade her territory.-" The reasons given by the German Chancellor were: "We were in Reasons a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law. Our troops neclssity. have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to * * * international law. France has * * * de- clared * * * that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank * * * might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate pro- tests" of Luxemburg and Belgium. "For the wrongs which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our mili- tary object is attained." "He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only con- sider how he is to hack his way through."-^'' The German Secre- tary of State gave as reasons that Germany "had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way,"-^' and the Kaiser (in his suppressed cablegram to President Wilson, August 10, 1914), because of "strategical grounds, nc^vs having been received that France was already preparing to enter Belgium." (In the original, the word knowledge, was crossed out, and news, written instead.)-"* Belgium appealed "to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-oper- Belgium ate as guaranteeing powers in the defence of her territory."-^" Ger- powers. many sent word to England that she "will, under no pretense what- ever, annex Belgian territory"; the "German army could not be ex- posed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned accord- ing to absolutely unimpeachable information. "''" England again requested Germany to give assurances by midnight EnKland's to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and proceed no further with German™ their violation of "her frontier," and if not given then England would "feel bound to take all steps in" her "power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as" England.-"^ That afternoon, the German Secretary of State answered "No," say- Germany's ing the German troops had crossed the frontier in the morning, and onl^'^'^aTcrap "Belgian neutrality had been already violated. * * * the safety of o^ paper." 244. CDD. p. 314 ; 1 SDD. .377 ; BOB, No. 27. 245. CDD. pp. 100, 316, 321 ; 2 SDD, 1005 ; 1 SDD, 379, 386 ; BBB. No. 158 : BGB, Nos. 30. 40. 246. CDD, pp. 317, 438 : 1 SDD, 381 : BGB. No. 35 ; GWB. Appendix, CbancelIor'.s Speecli to tlie ReichstaR, August 4, 1914. 247. CDD, p. 110; 2 SDD. 1000; BBB, No. 160. 248. Ambassador Gerard's "My Four Years in Germany," p. 438 ; Plill. Public Ledger, Aug. 5, 1917. 249. CDD. p. 321 ; 1 SDD, 386 ; BGB, No. 40. 250. CDD, p. 109; 2 SDD, 1004; BBB. No. 157. 251. CDD, p. 109, 110; 2 SDD, 1005; BBB. Nos. 159, IGO. 54 England's reply. the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium." And that evening the Chancellor said that the step taken by England "was terrible to a degree; just for a word — 'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her."-^- England replied "for the honor of Great Britain, she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutral- ity if attacked, "-^^ and "Germany, having rejected the British pro- posals" declared "that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 o'clock" that night.^^* ENGLAND'S RESPONSIBILITY. Germany- first blames Russia. Then England The statement of the German Foreign Office, August 3, 1914, says: "Russia began the war against us," and the German Chancellor the next day said to the Reichstag, "Russia has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France, — a war that has been forced upon us." In the Chancellor's speech, four months later, December 2, he de- clares that while the outer responsibility for the war is on Russia, the inner, lies upon England, for she gave Russia to understand that she placed herself at the side of Russia and France; she could have made it impossible, had she declared she would not suffer a European war to grow out of the Austro-Servian dispute; France would then have energetically warned Russia against military action; "then the way would have been clear for our mediatory action." Russia's efforts Rii^ssia's efforts toward peace have already been set forth in detail; peace^^^"^^^ from the first she declared she could not stand by and see Servia crushed, deprived of her integrity and independence, and become a vassal of Austria; she held to this throughout, yet in the beginning, (July 26) she told Austria that her claims were legitimate if she had no other aim than the protection of her territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but her procedure was indefensible, and Sazanof said: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result" ;''' and at the end he accurately sum- med up his efforts, saying he "was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavors he had made to avoid war. No suggestions held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a confer- ence of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct con- versations between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria- 252. CDD, pp. 110, 111 ; 2 SDD, 1000, 1007 ; BBB, No. 160. 253. CDD, p. Ill ; 2 SDD, 1007 ; BBB. No. 160. 254. CDD, p. 322 ; 1 SDD, 387 ; BOB. No. 41. 255. CDD, p. 177 ; 1 SDD. 606 ; FYB, No. 54, Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by- evasive replies or had refused them altogther."^'" France from the beginning told Russia that she would support her France's , position, in negotiations, and as an ally in case of necessity; a course she adhered to throughout, yet supporting every effort tovc^ard peace made by any of the parties, counseling moderation at all times, and on the 29th July, at the critical time, inducing Russia to suspend for the time being every military measure that could offer Germany any pretext for general mobilization.^"''' We have already seen above how, from the very first, (July 24), England's England, although strongly urged, refused to make any engagement P°"' '°^' to support Russia and France by force of arms.'"'^ On July 25, Russia and Germany were informed that while the conflict continued be- tween Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected, but Austrian mobilization might lead to Russian mobiliza- tion; then the interests of all the powers would be involved, in which case England "reserved to herself full liberty of action," and refused then to bring "conciliatory pressure" on Russia, at Germany's re- quest.-'" On the 27th, the German and Austrian ambassadors in London al- Warns lowed it to be understood that they were sure England would re- early!^"^ main neutral if a conflict broke out,^'^'' but the German ambassador was immediately informed otherwise.^"^ On the 29th Sir Edward Grey made still clearer England's position to France and Germany. He told the French ambassador that in a "Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France became involved, so that the questions became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was neces- sary for us to do";-''- and to the German ambassador he said: "There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved"; but if British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid.""^ At the same time he told both that they should not be misled by these statements, — France into relying upon England's support, or Germany into thinking she would stand aside. 'We have already told how England declined Germany's bid for her Refuses neutrality, made this day, the 29th. On the 30th the French Presi- bidto"^'^ neutrality. 256. CDD. p. 101; 2 SDD, 994; BBB, No. 139. 257. CDD, p. 211 ; 1 SDD, 659 ; FYB, No. 102. 258. CDD, pp. 14, 163 ; 2 SDD, 880 ; 1 SDD, 584 ; BBB, No. 14 ; FYB, No. 163. 259. CDD, p. 273 ; 2 SDD, 1348 ; ROB, No. 20. 260. CDD, p. 185 ; 1 SDD, 616 ; FYB. So. 63. 261. CDD, p. 43 ; 2 SDD. 918 ; also, CDD, p. 41 ; 2 SDD, 917 ; BBB, Nos. 47, 48 ; also CDD, p. 282 ; 2 SDD, 1359 ; ROB, No. 42. 262. CDD, p. 65; 2 SDD, 948; BBB, No. 87. 263. CDD, p. 67; 2 SDD, 950; BBB, No. 89. 5G dent again urged England to agree to come to her aid in case of a war between France and Germany, saying "tliere would then be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude," but England declined.-" The next day in answer to a direct question by the Ger- man ambassador, whether Great Britain would remain neutral, he was told that if the conflict became general, and especially if France were involved, England would not be able to remain neutral, but would be brought in; at the same time France was informed that England could not then guarantee intervention on behalf of France, "but it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop."-"^ Although England had several times refused to agree to stand solidly with Russia and France, Russia today thanked her for "the firm attitude" and "firm and friendly tone" adopted by her.-"" On the 2d of August, however, subject to the approval of Parliament, Sir Edward Grey assured France that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power," but this "did not bind" England to go to war with Germany unless she took the action stated.-'" Such is the Record of England; she gave neither Russia, France, nor Germany to understand that she placed herself at the side of Russia and France; the only way she could have made the war im- possible, in the way the Chancellor stated, was to have told Russia and France that Austria and Germany were to have a free hand, under any circumstances. Only in such a sense can England be said to be responsible, at least so far as Germany and Austria are concerned. But further as to the Chancellor's charge against England. The German documents themselves exonerate England from this charge. In the statement of the German Government sent to King George, August 1, 1914, that "The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration."-''* And the official statement of the German Foreign Office, August 3, 1914, says "Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna" offer- ing the possibility of peace."'' These relate to efforts claimed to have been made at Vienna. — and admit, by implication at least, none were made there by Germany except such as England suggested. But as to Russia, the Chancellor himself says in his speech, August ; SDD. 962 ; BBB, No. 99. 543 ; 1 SDD, 667 ; 2 SDD, 1029 : FYB, No. 110; Tele- 264. CDD, p. 76; 265. CDD, pp. 217 grams, etc., V. 1. 266. CDD, pp. 91. 291; 2 SDD. 981. 1374; BBB, No. 120; ROB. No. 69. 267. CDD, p. 105; 2 SDD. 999; BBB, No. 148. 268. CDD, p. 536 ; 2 SDD, 1020 ; Ti^legrams, (?tc.. I. 1. 269. CDD, p. 410 ; 2 SDD, 777 ; GWB, Statement, Aug. 3. 57 4, 1914: "Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg." And tlie declaration of war by Germany against Russia, August 1, says "the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator be- tween the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg." Here again Great Britain's efforts at mediation with Russia, are admitted. "Our (Ger- many's) mediatory action," therefore was not blocked, by England, either at Vienna or St. Petersburg. But ivhat of German mediations' That it was being continuously ex- German -.^ . ^, , mediation, ercised, is constantly asserted, over and over again, by Kaiser, Chancel- lor, and Secretary of State. So much so that "The lady doth protest too much, methinks." The terms of not a single peace proposal by Germany is divulged by the published records. There is nothing but assertion, and demand of "localization," "no intervention," or "demobil- ization," under threat of mobilization by Austria or Germany, re- vealed by the documents, as the method of German mediation. It was not only sterile of peaceful results, but had exactly the opposite effect. Its absolute failure was attributed by Germany to the un- approachably haughty touchiness of Austria, or the "mobilization," or "invasion," by Servia, Russia, or France, bent on attacking their peace-loving neighbors, Austria and Germany. i FACTS NOT IN THE RECORD. Such is the result of the published official records, with the few Matters not additional facts referred to in the notes. There are, also, some other matters, not in the official records, yet fully established, that are necessary to complete the story. Two of these are: Further facts as to Germany's prior knowledge of the Servian ultimatum, and the Potsdam meeting. As to the first: Herr von Jagow, the German Secretary of State, Germany's on July 21st, before the ultimatum was delivered, told the Russian Austrian and French representatives at Berlin, "That he was in complete ultimatum, ignorance of the contents of that note."-'" The next day he repeated "he knew nothing of the text."-'^ On the 24th, the day after the note was delivered to Servia, when asked by the French Ambassador at Berlin, "if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade," said, "that that was so."-'- On the 25th, in answer to a similar in- quiry by the English representative at Berlin, "he received so clear reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further."-" On the same day the German ambassador at London read 270. CDD, p. 149 ; 1 SDD, 502 : FYB. No. 15. 271. CDD. p. 149; 1 SDD. 563; FYB, No. 17. 272. CDD, p. 161; 1 SDD, 582; FYB, No. 30. 273. CDD, p. 169 ; 1 SDD, 592 ; FYB, No. 41. 58 a telegram to Sir Edward Grey, from the German Foreign Office say- ing "that his government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia."-" England immediately sent this word to Russia.-" At the same time the German ambassador at Paris said "that there had been no 'concert' between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowl- edge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subse- quently."-"' And on this same day, 25th July, the German ambassa- dor to Russia, handed a verbal note to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, saying: "We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers to the effect that the action of Austria at Belgrade, was instigated by Germany, is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany."-"' July 26th, the German ambassador at Paris again "affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, and had only approved it after its delivery."-" This was re- iterated the 28th.='^ And finally in the Official Statement August 3, of the German Foreign Office, it is said "We guaranteed Austria a completely free hand, but have not participated in her preparations."^^* On the other hand, on July 23d, the President of the Bavarian Council told the French Minister at Munich that "the contents of the Austrian note were known to him."-'^ On the 24th Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Austria "would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been con- sulted,"-*- and this was the universal belief, despite the German de- nials. On the 30th the British ambassador at Vienna reports that "Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador (here) knew the text of the ultimatum before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor."^*^ Such is what the record shows. But since this was published other facts have become known: On September 3, 1916, Count Tisza, President of the Hungarian Ministry, in answer to the question if he had not talked over the Austrian note to Servia with German officials, said: "I do not care to answer 274. CDD, p. 2.5; 2 SDD, 896; BBB, No. 25. 275. CDD, p. 273: ; 2 SDD, 1348 ; ROB, No. 20. 276. CDD, p. 166 ; 1 SDD, 588; FYB, No. 36. 277. CDD, P- 272; ; 2 SDD, 1347 ; ROB, No. 18. 278. CDD, p. 181: ; 1 SDD. 610; FYB, No. 57. 279. CDD, p. 196 : ; 1 SDD, 640; FYB. No. 78. 280. CDD, p. 406; : 2 SDD, 773. 281. CDD, p. 153 ; 1 SDD. 567; FYB. No. 21. 282. CDD, p. 14; 2 SDD. 880: BBB. No. 6. 283. CDD, P- 74 ; 2 SDD, 959 ; BBB. No. 95. 59 that question directly. But you can draw your own conclusions. If a person has a very close and strong friend, and if he is about to take a step of the most terrible gravity, does he, or does he not, discuss the whole matter with his friend, and finally tell his friend what he has decided to do?" Three weeks later, Von Jagow, himself, the German Secretary of State, when asked a question, based on what Tisza had divulged, said: "I did not have a hand in preparing the note. * * * I saw it at 8 o'clock the night before it was presented in Belgrade, where it was presented at 10 o'clock the next morning. That was too late to do anything about it. All we had done was to assure Austria that we would back her up in an attempt to punish Serbia."-^^ (The note reached Belgrade at 10 o'clock, but was not actually delivered until 6 p. m.) Again, July 14, eight days before the note was delivered, Baron Wangenheim, German ambassador at Constantinople, told the Italian ambassador there that "the Austrian note to Serbia would be such as to render war inevitable."-'"^ And again: In the middle of July, 1914, Dr. Muhlon then a director The Kaiser of Krupp's Works, at Eisen, was told by Dr. Helfferich, then a director approved. of the Deutsche Bank, in Berlin, and later Vice-Chancellor of Ger- many, the following: "The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Servia with a very short interval for the answer. * * * The ultimatum will contain certain demands such as punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal investigation by Aus- trian officials, and in fact a whole series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria will declare war on Serbia; * * * the Kaiser expressed his decided approval of this procedure, and regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these two countries, in which he would permit no other state to in- terfere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize, and mobilization meant immediate war." When this was reported to Herr Krupp von Bohlen, he confirmed it and added, "the Kaiser had told him he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he would not turn about. * * * No one would be able to accuse him of indecision." On the day the Austrian ulti- matum appeared Dr. Helfferich told Dr. Muhlon, "the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise as a blind, but was remaining close at hand and keeping in close touch." The German Government's reply to Dr. Muhlon's statement is that "the author is in a 'pathological state,' and consequently not responsible."^^" 284. W. C. Bullitt, interview with Tisza and Von Jagow, Phil. Pub. Ledger, Aug. 6, 1917. 2S5. Speech of M. Barzilai, of the Italian Government, at Naples, Sept. 24, 1915, — Facts about the War, No. 22. p. 3. 286. Pacts about the War, No. 82, May, 191S ; Germany's Confession, U. S. Committee on Public Information. GO But still further: Dr. E. J. Dillon, Special Correspondent from south- eastern Europe for the London Daily Telegraph, and an authority on European Affairs, says as to the Austrian ultimatum: "Nothing was kept back from the politicians of the Wilhelmsrasse but the rough draft of the note. The German ambassador, von Tschirscky, however, was one of the few who were initiated into that mystery; * * * (he) saw the proposed text of the ultimatum; * * * it was he who tele- graphed the wording of the document to the Kaiser. * * * I advance this statement with a full knowledge of what actually took place. This communication was made not merely for the purpose of keeping the War Lord informed, * * * but also to secure his express assent to exact terms of an official paper which was intended to bring about hostilities between Austria and Servia, and might * * * precipitate a European conflict; * * * the rough draft did not obtain (his) un- conditional approval; (he) suggested a certain amendment, and fixed a time limit * * * to leave no room for evasion or loophole for escape; * * * the verbal amendments,^ — to sharpen the terms — were embodied in the ultimatum, * * * and duly presented."-"' Now as to the Potsdam meeting. September 14, 1914, a Berlin cor- respondent telegraphed to his Rotterdam paper that a Crown Council was held at Potsdam, July 5, 1914. July 19, 1917, Herr Haase, Ger- man minority Socialist leader, in the Reichstag, said: "What the peace resolution says of the origin of the war is not tenable in fact or in history. * * * We do not forget the conference at Berlin on July 5, 1914." This was published only in the Leipziger Tolkszeitung, the next morning; the allusion to this meeting was suppressed in the reports of the Reichstag proceedings, published in other German papers. No member of the German Government, then challenged the statement. With these clues, a London Times reporter, July 27, 1917, ascertained that there was such a meeting held, a week after the murder of the Archduke, Franz Ferdinand. "Those who took part in the conference were: the Emperor, his Chancellor von Bethemann-Hollweg, Admiral Tirpitz, General Palkenhayen, Mr. "Von Strumm, Count Berchtold. Count Tisza, the Austrian and Hungarian Premiers, General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian staff. They dis- cussed and settled the chief points of the ultimatum that Austria was to send, eighteen days later, to Serbia;" it was recognized that Russia would object; that war would result; but it was definitely decided to accept this; the date of mobilization was probably fixed; the Kaiser left for Norway to throw dust in the eyes of France and Russia. Two months before, at a secret meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, a Socialist member, Cohn, challenged the minister to deny 287 'A scrap of Paper," by E. .T. Dillon. 1014, pp. 61 these facts, but he did not do so. August 1, 1917, the German Gov- Denied by German government. ernment issued an official denial, and authorized the Wolff Bureau to declare "these statements and all the details were pure invention; that neither on the day named, nor any other day in July, did such a conference occur either with or without the Emperor; and that the Government was completely ignorant of the contents of the ultimatum before its despatch. "=*'* But since then a fuller account of this meeting has been given by Morgenthau's Mr. Morgenthau, American Ambassador at Constantinople, who had infomlation. it first hand from Baron Wangenheim, German Ambassador at Con- stantinople, who attended the meeting at the summons of the Kaiser. Mr. Morganthau says: "This meeting took place at Potsdam, July Kaiser directs. 5, (1914); the Kaiser presided; nearly all the ambassadors attended; Wangenheim came to tell of Turkey. * * * Molkte, chief of staff, was there representing the army, and Admiral von Tirpitz spoke for the navy. The great bankers, railroad directors and captains of German industry, all of whom were as necessary to German war preparations as the army itself, also attended. Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser solemnly put the question to each man in turn. Was he ready for war? All replied, "Yes," except the financiers. They said that they must have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make loans. This conference * * * decided to give the bankers time to readjust their finances for the coming war, and then the sev- eral members went quietly back to their work or started on vacations. The Kaiser went to Norway in his yacht. Von Bethmann-HoUweg left for a rest, and Wangenheim returned to Constantinople. In telling me about this conference Wangenheim, of course, admitted that Germany precipitated the war. I think he was rather proud of the whole performance. * * * * f^e conspiracy that has caused this greatest of human tragedies was hatched by the Kaiser and his im- perial crew at the Potsdam conference of July 5, 1914."-'" All these matters have been lately more fully confirmed if possible. Confirmation by the publication of Prince Lichnoto sky's "My London Mission, 1912- ambassador 1914," prepared by him in August, 1916, "for his family archives," ^° England. but copies of which were furnished to a few friends, including the head of the Hamburg-American Line, the head of the Deutsche Bank, the editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, and to an officer connected with the German General Staff. Through a breach of confidence his state- ment was made public. Prince Lichnowsky was German Ambassador to England, for the two years immediately preceding the commence- ment of the war. Among many other things he says: "I learned that at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5, the inquiry 288. Phil. Pub. Ledger, Monday, August G, 1917, p. 2. Facts about the War, No. GO, August, 1917. 289. World's Work, June, 1918, pp. 170-171. 6- Lichnoweky' summary. Germany's bad faith. addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the per- sons in authority; indeed they added that there would be no harm if war with. Russia were to result. So at any rate it is stated in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorf, Austrian Ambassador, re- ceived in London. Soon after Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to dis- cuss everything with Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister." He summarizes the whole action of Germany, as follows: "As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation: 1. "We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Servia, al- though no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us, — whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indiffer- ence." 2. "In the days before July 2.3, and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack on Servia, we rejected the British proposals of media- tion, although Servia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agree- ment about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy him- self with the Servian reply." 3. "On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and on July 31, we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations con- tinued, not a man should march, — so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement." "In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the World War."=°'' And Dr. Dernburg, formerly the Kaiser's personal representative in this country, correctly characterizes Germany's bad faith when he says: "Our lies are coarse and improbable, our ambiguity is pitiful simplicity, and our intrigues are without salt and without grace. The history of this war proves this by a hundred examples."-"^ Truly this war was "made in Germany" and nowhere else. Austria, urged by Germany, precipitated the conflict for the domina- tion of the Balkans, — but at the last moment drew back; Germany then forced the war for her own schemes of world dominion; Russia honorably came to the rescue of a weak, kindred nation, but at the 290. New York Times. April 21, 1918. 291. In Deutsche Politik, September 28, 1911 War Cyclopedia, p. 112. 3477-1 Id 62 63 same time had important interests of her own to preserve and pro- tect; France, valiant and glorious, rushed to the defence of her rights and her liberty; England, for her own honor, and likewise to preserve her own interests, nobly came to the aid of Belgium, France and Russia. But Belgium? — with her little army, and her forts without modern equipment, — in the eighteen days of her agony from Liege to Mons, she stemmed the onrush of the Hun deluge, until France could revise her plan of defense, and the little army of English heroes could reach the battle line. Belgium! disinterested Belgium! In the dim watches of the night, from Sunday 7 p. m. to Monday 7 a. m., August 2-3, 1914, — with her peace, her prosperity, her safety, and her life itself, on one side, and her honor on the other, — chose honor, and the cross, — and was crucified, — even as Christ of old, — that the rest of us might be free. Henceforth her hallowed land shall be the Gethsemane of the Nations, — and all the world looks forward, with hope, for the day of her resurrection. And lohat of Germany? "Belshazzar, the king, made a great feast to a thousand of his lords .... They drank wine and praised the gods of gold, and of silver, of brass, of iron, of wood, and of stone. .... And fingers of a man's hand wrote upon the plaster of the wall of the king's palace: Mene; God hath numbered thy kingdom and finished it. Tekel; Thou art weighed in the balances and found wanting." "Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen, and is become the habitation of devils and the hold of every foul spirit and a cage for every unclean and hateful bird .... her sins have reached unto heaven and God hath remembered her iniquities. . . . Therefore shall her plagues come in one day, death and mourning and famine and the merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn over her; for no man buyeth their merchandise any more cinna- mon and odors and ointments and frankincense and wine and oil and fine flour and wheat and beasts and sheep and horses and chariots and slaves and the souls of men." Dan. V, 1-27; Rev. XVIII, 2 et seq. r <>,A^ .^^ ,V^ <^ /^v;' c, , ■ 0- \ '-'^^4' ^^ c .-. .- '-.;, Vw., , '" ' %/ ^»: %.^ ^^ "^/ -ife %.^ ;v:-\^% ^^" /\«- ^./%^ ^Sf.' /% 4 o^ >^'"^- c, ^p t"n ' "^k^*^ " "v^ - l?#^^^ '^ c Deacidified „....«>..-- — ,c,''V. °k(>ftW^ .<> -^ " f%}^' ^ ^^ Neutralizing agent: Magne ^ ^^^ ''?'^4,'^d\* '^ ^ -'^itV'^^'^ <^ Treatment Date: M/^Y 2001 ' \/^ . • ^-, ^ .""-^o " ' ' ^.^^^ .0 0^= ..% " ^,o^\ . ^ Preser c^ ^:? V .*^ •■. -cr^\ „ '' Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: Wf^ 2001 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION ' >- ;/' A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVA' 111 Thomson Parlt Drive Cranberry Township, PA 1606S > ^^ o h ^ r^ -t.-o^ :^^ ,'"^^.. vV-^ ^/ "^M- %.^ -'M^'- %/ -SS^ ~^^^ -^ ■0? "^ 0^ ^" r .^^ ^0 o V 4 O ^:c^° ;i^^ •^ \*'* ^^.s^* \ V i » • , ■^•N. < ^ t • <> r^ C\^ s • • ,