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NOW IS THE TIME 
 
 
 TO 
 
 JS3E!«X-«X-X^1ES X-X". 
 
 SUGGESTIONS ON THE FUESENT CRISIS. 
 
 BY CHARLES ASTOR BRISTED. /n^ 
 
NOW IS THE TIME 
 
 TO 
 
 SUGGESTIONS ON THE PRESENT CRISIS. 
 
 BY CHARLES ASTOR BRISTED. 
 
 t * «>» » 
 
 MARTIN B. BROWN, BOOK AND JOB PRI NTER. 
 18 6 2. 
 
 L 
 

PREFACE. 
 
 [The author of this pamphlet has never had or attempted to 
 have auy practical experience of public life. But he has long been 
 a political student and has examined American politics from abroad, 
 as well as at home. As he has no axe to grind for himself or for 
 others, his absence of interested bias may possibly be a setoff to 
 the greater political knowledge of men better known. 
 
 The correctness of his former anticipations also gives him con- 
 fidence. Since arriving at man's estate he has never toadied or 
 yielded to a Southerner. He has never ceased to warn those of 
 his countrymen whom his feeble voice and influence could reach, 
 against the danger as well as wickedness of giving up every thing 
 to those aggressive semi-barbarians who have now torn the 
 country asunder. In reference to the present crisis, he predicted 
 almost at the very beginning of our troubles (in January, 1861), 
 a bloody and long war. Being in England that Spring he steadily 
 re-asserted his opinion, though unable to find a single person 
 agreeing with him. Neither the enemy's successes in the follow- 
 ing summer, nor ours last winter even made him deviate from i 
 or from the other opinion which he formed and expressed at the 
 first outbreak, that the war would be waged chiefly in the Border 
 States and must ultimately become in intention what it was in 
 reality, a war for the possession of those States. 
 
 These considerations embolden him to put forth his views in 
 print. They may be unpopular — but he never sought popularity 
 when a young and ambitious man with life and hope before him, 
 and under his present circumstances he regards it as less than 
 nothing. They may be misconstrued; he may even be suspected 
 of wishing to aid the enemy — but he has lived long enough to 
 learn that any man of strong convictions who expresses them 
 boldly, must be prepared to have his motives misinterpreted. On 
 one sole point does he desire to guard against the possibility of 
 misconception. These suggestions have been written and pub- 
 lished without his consulting any person ivhaiever. He, therefore, 
 hopes that no attempt will be made to consider any man but him- 
 self — still less any party or set of men, I'eposnsible for them.] 
 
NOW IS THE TIME TO SETTLE IT. 
 
 There is a lull in the war. Though our would- 
 be invaders have escaped, through our usual want 
 of promptness, the punishment which their audacity 
 deserved, yet no foot of these sanguinary vaga- 
 bonds has polluted the free soil of Pennsylvania. 
 On the other hand, our armies are as far off as 
 ever from Richmond, the Sebastdpol of this con- p 
 test. While both sides are pausing to recruit 
 after the late desperate battles, it seems a fitting 
 moment to inquire if nothing can be done to ter- 
 minate the fearful struggle, or at least to reduce 
 it within reasonable dimensions, and give it a rea- 
 sonable prospect of definite issue. 
 
 I propose that we acknowledge the independ- 
 ence of the ten so-called Confederate States, on 
 condition of their surrendering to us those por- 
 tions of Virginia still in their possession, and all 
 claim to the rest of the five Border States, and 
 giving us material guarantees for the free naviga- 
 tion of the Mississippi and the Mexican Gulf. 
 
 Not that I doubt our ability to conquer the se- 
 ceders. Had we made war from the first in 
 earnest — had we treated the enemy as an enemy, 
 we might by this time have subjugated, or, if need , 
 were, exterminated him. Even now it is not too 
 late. We might go on, losing man for man, till 
 
6 
 
 our opponents were swept off the earth, and we 
 should still remain a great people, and might re- 
 people their country. 
 
 Nor would any considerations of humanity pro- 
 perly intervene to stay such a proceeding. Could 
 the whole white population of the South be cut off 
 to-morrow, it would be exactly what nine-tenths 
 of them deserve. Their conspiracy is the most 
 wicked and unprovoked recorded in history. It is 
 a crime not only against their own government, 
 but against liberty, human progress and the world; 
 and no earthly punishment that could befal them, 
 would be too great. 
 
 Neither should we be deterred from extreme 
 measures by any thought of what England or 
 France might say. Their animosity is such that, 
 were we inspired to behave like angels of light, we 
 should be depicted by them as in the blackness of 
 darkness. Whatever we have done, whatever 
 we can possibly do, is sure to be villified and 
 misrepresented by walking vinegar-cruets, like 
 Roebuck, antediluvian asses like Beresford Hope, 
 and all the miscellaneous lackeys of the French 
 emperor, to whom an honest man would be doing 
 too much honor by remembering their names. All 
 that they can or may utter, should " pass by us as 
 the idle wind." 
 
 But it is very clear that we — that is, our 
 Government, and the majority of us — are not pre- 
 pared to take this extreme course, and it is very 
 doubtful if anything short of a foreign invasion 
 would ever drive us to it. A feeling, strangely 
 compounded of good and bad motives, of the long- 
 animity of some and the cowardice of others, of 
 unwillingness to shed the blood of the guilty 
 
white, and indifference to the wrongs of the inno- 
 cent negro, of regard for the sacredness of prop- 
 erty, and reluctance to accept our full responsi- 
 bilities, has tied our hands and clogged our feet at 
 every step. The Government has evidently no 
 disposition to go " thorough," for every general 
 who gave symptoms of making real war, has been 
 effectually shelved. Those of us who would carry 
 on the conflict for the restoration of the'^Union, in 
 the only way that can possibly secure its success, 
 are, and are likely to remain, a minority. There- 
 fore, we had better let the seceders go, and get 
 rid of them, if we can, once for all. 
 
 [Just as the above was written, came the news 
 of the President's proclamation, " abolishing sla- 
 very," as the newspaper-headings say. This 
 seems, at first sight, to change the whole aspect of 
 affairs ; but, on second thought, its effect prom- 
 ises to be more apparent than real. However 
 honorable to its author, I fear that, for want of 
 the men to carry it out, it will prove but a hrutum 
 fulmen, and only add another to the many threats 
 which we have uttered without executing, not so 
 much from inability, as from want of fixed deter- 
 mination. I fear, too, that like most of our mili- 
 tary movements, it is well meant, but a little late.] 
 
 For as to the prevalent idea that we are to sub- 
 jugate them, without destroying or confiscating 
 their property, without freeing their slaves, with- 
 out hurting them more than is absolutely necessary, 
 and then to hold them in subjection, I consider it 
 an insane and impossible dream. 
 
 Let us look a moment at the composition of so- 
 ciety in the ten Southern States. There are, first 
 of all, the leaders in the movement, prominent poli- 
 
ticians and large slaveholders, probably 200,000 
 in number. This oligarchical class must, of course, 
 be exterminated or driven into exile. They have 
 staked their all on the rebellion, and cannot sub- 
 mit. 
 
 Then come the masses — about 4,000,000 of 
 " mean whites" — some of them small slaveholders, 
 but the majority non-slaveholders. This class is 
 known to be in the lowest stage of civilization, 
 but one remove above barbarism. Enterprising 
 tourists, like Olmstead, who have penetrated into 
 the interior of the country, bring back startling 
 reports of their ignorance, filth and general bru- 
 tality. They would soon have become formidable 
 to the wealthy class, had not the latter adroitly 
 averted their envy, and directed their hostility 
 against the North, by persuading them that a 
 panacea for their poverty and wretchedness would 
 be found in setting up an empire of their own, 
 which should give them unlimited slave trade, and 
 the opportunity of buying " niggers " cheap. 
 Thus, these people, more ignorant than the Irish 
 cotter or the French peasant, and scarcely less 
 barbarous than the New-Zealander, possessing, too, 
 a considerable amount of personal courage and 
 aptitude for the use of arms, have been taught, 
 probably for thirty years, certainly for more than 
 ten, to hate us — and they do hate us, as the devil 
 (according to the old proverb) hates holy water. 
 Supposing them once conquered, how are they to 
 stay conquered? It is clear that we must hold 
 them as the English Protestant holds the Irish 
 Papist, as the Frenchman holds the Roman, as the 
 Austrian holds the Venetian, as the Russian holds 
 the Pole. An army of half a million would not be 
 
9 
 
 too much for the purpose. Lastly, the blacks. 
 Whether these are all freed, or remain divided 
 between the conditions of freedom and slavery, 
 their relations to our army of occupation and to 
 the conquered whites will prove a constant source 
 of perplexity. [The idea that above three millions 
 of negroes are first to be freed and afterwards 
 colonized, I hold simply impracticable. Thrice 
 our resources, great as they are, would not suffice 
 to accomplish it.] 
 
 Let no one say that the above is an exaggerated 
 picture of the anti-Union feeling among the sece- 
 ders. Let no one ask incredulously how such a 
 state of things could be produced in a few years. 
 The anti-Union feeling of the South is not a thing 
 of yesterday. The South has never been patriotic 
 in the same sense, or to the same extent, as the 
 North. The heresy of State Rights, and the nar- 
 rowing influences of slavery, caused the Southern- 
 ers to regard all questions in a sectional, rather 
 than a national light. Such secondary affection 
 as they had for the Union, was not from principle, 
 but for the advantages they derived from it. They 
 acquiesced in it, while they had the absolute con- 
 trol or greatly-predominating influence ; as soon 
 as this ceased to be the case, they broke it up. 
 Secession and civil war are but the legitimate de- 
 velopment of those doctrines and practices which 
 made the Southerner a Southerner first, and an 
 American long, long after. Politicans may not 
 have mentioned this, because it was against their 
 own petty temporary interests to do so ; the bulk 
 of our people may not have observed it, it was so 
 contrary to their wishes and feelings ; but men of 
 the world, often more sharp-sighted than profes- 
 
10 
 
 sional politicians, noted it at many times and in 
 many places. It was so salient, as even to strike 
 men who had a natural aversion to anything like 
 political speculation. Washington Irving observed 
 more than twenty years ago, when European 
 travel was less general than it now is, that while 
 the New-Yorker or New-Englander always signed 
 hiuiself on hotel-books as from " the United States 
 of America," the Virginian or Carolinian merely 
 appended the name of his State. It was impossi- 
 ble for a person of ordinary reflection to associate 
 with the rising generation of educated Southern- 
 ers, between 1830 and 1840, and not remark how 
 they looked at every point of morals or statesman- 
 ship through southern spectacles. And, if this 
 was the case with the comparatively respectable 
 class, the gentlemen and quasi-gQuilemen of that 
 region, how much more must it have been with the 
 " mean whites," who, prevented by ignorance from 
 taking any independent position, could only copy 
 and exaggerate the ideas of their superiors ? The 
 Border States, from their necessary contact with 
 freedom, could not escape a certain knowledge and 
 comprehension of the country's greatness; they 
 could not altogether overlook the advantages of 
 freedom, as exemplified in the superior wealth and 
 intelligence of the North. But the patriotism of 
 the Cotton States decreased, as their ignorance and 
 seclusion increased. 
 
 [This was written the day before Mr. Hurlbut's 
 third letter appeared in the Times. I have not 
 altered or added a syllable. Some of the expres- 
 sions read almost as if copied literally from his. 
 They are, indeed, common places among all men of 
 ordinary intelligence who have studied the South- 
 erner.] 
 
11 
 
 No doubt, there was an appreciable amount of 
 Union sentiment in all the seceding States, except 
 South Carolina ; and our Government was there- 
 fore bound to make the restoration of the Union 
 the original object of the war ; it would have been 
 cowarclly- not to give this feeling a chance. But 
 the event proved, what observant men had long 
 suspected, that it was a very secondary and feeble 
 Union sentiment, utterly unable to make head 
 against the supposed claims of State Rights-a 
 sentiment which, in comparison to the Union leel- 
 ing of the North, was "as moonlight unto sunlight, 
 or as water unto wine." , „ . 
 
 We are supposed to have lost by this war, one 
 way and another, 200,000 men in less than two 
 years. If we made it summary and internecine, 
 we might crush and annihilate our enemy m ano- 
 ther /ear at the expense of as many additional 
 lives. But, by going on as we have been, we shall 
 lose the 200,000 more lives, and we shall not 
 
 crush the enemy. „ , r, j 
 
 I propose, therefore, that we offer the Seceders 
 peace on these terms : the independence of the ten 
 so-called Confederate States to be acknowledged, 
 they surrendering to us the whole _oi the five 
 Border States, and we, moreover, retaining two or 
 more strongholds, as material guarantees lor the 
 free navigation of the Mississippi and Mexican 
 
 Gulf 
 
 These are the only terms which we could accept, 
 consistently with our honor and safety. T''e ma- 
 iority of the inhabitants of four, Border States 
 and Western Virginia, have unmistakably andre- 
 peatedly declared their preference lor the Union. 
 To surrender them, would be the height of coward- 
 
12 
 
 ice, and a confession that we were conquered ; not 
 to mention the vital importance of Washington to 
 us, from its prestige as the capital. With respect 
 to Virginia proper, it is notorious that the Con- 
 federates established their capital at Richmond, for 
 the facility of operating thence against Washing- 
 ton. It cannot be left there as a standing menace 
 to us. Two rival capitals, in such proximity, are 
 not to be thought of. Even should we hereafter 
 find it convenient to transfer our metropolis else- 
 where, that of the Confederates must not remain at 
 Richmond. The inhabitants of Southern Virginia 
 are, doubtless, averse to our rule. But those of 
 Eastern Tennessee are equally so to the rule of the 
 Confederates. An exchange between the loyal 
 Tennesseans and disloyal Virginians, might be 
 effected without any formidable expense, or other 
 difficulty. 
 
 The possession of material guarantees for the 
 free navigation of the Mississippi and the Gulf is 
 absolutely necessary, from the impossibility of 
 trusting any promises or treaty stipulations which 
 the Confederates might otherwise make. 
 
 The advantages of such a peace would be mani- 
 fold, certain and immediate. We might disband, 
 at least, 400,000 men of our army. We should 
 ^ cease to augment our rapidly-accumulating debt— 
 ^^^y/C/- nay, m»^ entertain reasonable hopes of diminishing 
 it. We should certainly have stopped the progress 
 of slavery in one direction for ever. We should 
 have redeemed from slavery a large and valuable 
 tract of country, for the " institution" can be 
 eliminated from the Border States in comparatively 
 short time, with full compensation to the owners. 
 Thus, we should vindicate ourselves before God 
 
13 
 
 and the world, and gain the good opinion of all 
 nations, whose good opinion is worth having — 
 which category, it is hardly necessary to add, does 
 not include England or France. Starting anew 
 with twenty-four free States, and as many millions 
 of free population, our national energy and re- 
 sources would soon enable us to repair the losses 
 of war. Oar credit would soon stand higher than 
 ever. The oppressed and destitute of all lands 
 would, more than ever, flock to our shores. We 
 should go on better than before, because freed 
 from our great curse and our great drag-chain. 
 
 And if any one should say that by such an ar- 
 rangement the conspirators would get off too 
 cheaply, that their success in forming a separate 
 government would compensate them for their fail- 
 ure first, in retaining control over the whole 
 country by intrigue, and afterwards in conquering 
 it by a coup d'etat ; I reply, let us have a little 
 patience. Let us leave these men to their own 
 devices, and we shall see them punished to our 
 hearts' content. 
 
 It is not pleasant to be God's executioners. 
 When the natural working of His ordained laws 
 brings about His vengeance, our satisfaction is- 
 more complete. In the desolation wrought upon. 
 Virginia by her own inhabitants, and their pro- 
 fessed friends, we see the just retribution of her 
 wickedness in deliberately and willingly preferring 
 evil to good. The apparently accidental conflag- 
 ration of Charleston suited us better than if it had 
 been caused by our shells. Had Richmond, as 
 lately reported, been depopulated by pestilence, we 
 should have hailed it as a direct interposition of 
 Providence. Were a negro insurrection to break 
 
14 
 
 out spontaneously anywhere in the South, we 
 should regard it with less mingled feelings than 
 one directly fomented by ourselves. Let us, then, 
 I repeat it, but have a little patience, and we shall 
 soon see the new Confederacy an object of pity, 
 rather than of hatred or fear. It is founded on 
 a suicidal principle, the right of mutual dissolu- 
 tion. At present, its members are held together 
 by the bond of resistance to us. The outside 
 pressure of war once removed, they will begin to 
 quarrel among themselves. The mean whites are 
 naturally disposed to envy their rulers. Now, as 
 for the last fifteen years or more, their common 
 hatred of us, holds both classes together ; remove 
 our contact, and the masses will speedily grow un- 
 easy. Their fear of Abraham Lincoln's imaginary 
 despotism once dissipated, they will not tarry to 
 realize the actual despotism of Jefferson Davis. 
 The bad faith, inherent in all classes, will soon 
 embroil them with some of their foreign friends, 
 and destroy what little credit they might other- 
 wise have. They will find themselves poorer out 
 of the Union than they were in it. The partial 
 success of their plans, will prove their own most 
 deserved punishment. 
 
 So far, so good ; but the prospect is not entirely 
 roseate. There are strong objections to be urged 
 against this plan, or any plan, of separation. 
 These objections let us proceed to consider. 
 
 The first impediment to any offer of terms on 
 our part — I put it first, really believing it to be 
 at the root of the whole difficulty — is our pride. 
 Tiie Union is considered by us to be the cause (as 
 it really was the principal cause) of our greatness. 
 It has been a name to conjure with. Our devotion 
 
15 
 
 to it, has been our patriotism and loyalty com- 
 bined. A portion of the glory of the Union 
 attached to every individual citizen. Any diminu- 
 tion of this glory, was every individual citizen's 
 personal loss. Then we have been taunted by 
 Englishmen, and Frenchmen, and Southerners with 
 the dissolution of the Union, till our great wish^ is 
 to give their taunts a practical answer, by main- 
 taining it in spite of them all. 
 
 Now, the original Union is undoubtedly a great 
 thing, but it is not quite the one thing and only 
 thing needful. Let us take an extreme case. 
 Suppose it could be restored to-morrow, on condi- 
 tion that Jefferson Davis was its president, and 
 the Breckenridge programme carried out, slavery 
 made national, Kansas a slave State, all freedom 
 of discussion everywhere suppressed. Who would 
 accept the Union on such terms ? A few hundred, 
 perhaps a few thousand, miserable wretches might 
 be gleaned throughout the country who would do 
 so, but surely the great bulk of the nation would 
 reject the offer with indignant loathing. 
 
 Devotion to the Union is our loyalty. The 
 English are an eminently loyal people, yet they 
 did not hesitate to change their dynasty in 1688, 
 when their liberties depended on the change. De- 
 votion to the Union is our patriotism. The Dutch 
 are an eminently patriotic people, yet, wlien in 
 danger of being conquered by Louis XIV., they 
 resolved, if the alternative could not be avoided, 
 to leave their country, rather than yield to the 
 tyrant. 
 
 Once admit that there may be something more 
 valuable than the old Union, and the charm is 
 broken. We can see that we have idolized it — 
 
16 
 
 that is, have put an exaggerated value on it, as 
 men frequently do on really valuable objects. 
 
 No man does wisely in disregarding words and 
 names, for they often involve the most important 
 things. Still, when the reality can be preserved 
 by yielding the semblance, it is the part of a wise 
 man to yield the semblance, though it cause a tem- 
 porary loss of prestige. 
 
 This line of argument will be more fully and 
 naturally developed in treating of the second ob- 
 jection. 
 
 Doubtless, to give up the Union in its entireness, 
 implies a certain humiliation. But it must be con- 
 sidered that we have only a choice of evils, evils, 
 too, for which we are not wholly unaccountable. 
 The guilt of the conspirators is, indeed, measure- 
 less, but our own conduct has not been without re- 
 proach. Let us confess frankly, that the coward- 
 ice or stupidity, or both, of the Democrats and 
 Old-Line Whigs, who, until recently, made up be- 
 tween them a large majority of the country, had 
 brought us to a pass from which we could not 
 escape without humiliation. We have suffered 
 humiliations. We suffer them now. England 
 bullied us in the Trent affair. France shamelessly 
 invades Mexico under our noses. Spain has 
 threatened St. Domingo. The very Mormons 
 assume airs of superiority towards us. Our na- 
 tional stock, which used to be at 16 per cent, 
 premium, is now virtually at 16 per cent, discount. 
 If we can escape the recurrence of these and simi- 
 lar evils, would it not be well to do so, rather 
 than struggle against the chance of escaping a 
 single humiliation, which we may have to undergo 
 after all ? 
 
17 
 
 As to the taunts of the French and English, I 
 have already said, and now repeat it, that we 
 ought to treat whatever they say about us with 
 utter indifference. It has always been one of our 
 greatest national weaknesses, that we are curious 
 to see ourselves abused. If no man in the country 
 ever read a line extracted from an English paper, 
 beyond the actual items of European news, we 
 should be all the better for it. Suppose that after 
 the five thousand false prophecies which these 
 lying scribes have uttered, one of their predictions 
 should prove partially true, is that a triumph 
 which should grieve or concern us ? Is the pre- 
 vention of such a triumph worth the sacrifice of a 
 single life, or the expenditure of a single dol- 
 lar ? 
 
 Stiil less reason would the Confederates have to 
 brag, or we to care for their bragging. If they 
 dictated the terms of separation to us, they might, 
 indeed, triumph. If, however, we assign the 
 terms, they will not " have achieved their inde- 
 pendence," but we shall have kicked them out as un- 
 worthy oar society, which they doubtless are. 
 
 National pride is not a feeling to be reprehended, 
 but it may sometimes take the wrong direction. 
 In this respect, it might be well if we could borrow 
 a little of our enemy's exuberant self-reliance. 
 What, shall 300,000 half-civilized South Caro- 
 linians, whom we could put into one of the sub- 
 urbs of New-York, set up to constitute a nation, 
 and are twenty-four great States, with as many 
 million of inhabitants, not able to stand by them- 
 selves ? Shall we let our inferiors suppose that 
 we cannot do without them ? 
 
 The second objection is, that of internal danger. 
 
18 
 
 It is imagined that the separatioii of a portion, will 
 be equivalent to a dissolution of the whole ; and 
 that by consenting to the independence of the 
 Confederates, we shall be acknowleda:ino: the rio-ht 
 of secession as a principle, and thereby destroying 
 the key-stone of our governmental fabric. 
 
 Now, so far from admitting that separation im- 
 plies dissolution, I believe that the remaining 
 
 Union would have much stronger cohesive power 
 than the original one ; and so does the acute and 
 profound historian of the Netherlands, to judge 
 from the last paragraph of his pamphlet. We 
 have seen that, owing to the prevalence of slavery, 
 and the belief in " State Rights," the South has 
 never— never for the last forty years, at least — 
 been patriotic in the same sense as the North. 
 The Southerners were, so to speak, only incidental 
 Americans. These two elements of discord were 
 always threatening our national existence. As 
 regards real unity, therefore, the separation of 
 these ten States is rather a gain than a loss. It is 
 not the destruction of the body politic, but the 
 amputation of a diseased and troublesome limb. 
 It is not the bankruptcy of the estate^ but the 
 alienation of a property mortgaged above its 
 value. 
 
 As to acknowledging the principle of secession, 
 I cannot see that we should do so in the least. If 
 the Irish should ever succeed in making themselves 
 too troublesome for England to hold, would she, 
 by conceding their independence, adopt the Romish 
 faith ? Did she become a republic, when she ac- 
 knowledged our independence? Had we allowed 
 the conspiracy to take its own course, that would 
 
19 
 
 have been legalizing secession; but the very fact 
 of war shows that the movement is an insurrection, 
 and our utmost admission will be that the insur- 
 rection has been partially successful. Nay, the 
 Carolinians themselves, when they fired upon 
 Sumter, renounced their absurd theory of peaceful 
 secession, and confessed that they were seeking a 
 pro-slavery revolution. 
 
 The third objection (to which many would pro- 
 bably give the first place, if they dealt truly with 
 themselves) is that of external danger, the constant 
 risk of invasion from a slave-iiolding empire on 
 our borders. 
 
 I have no intention of slurring over this objec- 
 tion, or trying to shut my eyes to its very formid- 
 able appearance. It may be admitted that, while 
 the ruling class at the South are only fit for war 
 and political intrigue, the ignorant masses are fit 
 for nothing but war. They have no aptitude for 
 manufactures, or any branch of peaceful industry. 
 To prevent them from thinking of their own rights 
 and wrongs, and becoming too troublesome to their 
 rulers, those rulers must impel them into war. 
 Fulfilling the oft-repeated promise of re-establish- 
 ing the African slave trade, might, indeed, tem- 
 porarily pacify the " mean whites ;" but fearful as 
 the hypocrisy of England and France has been, 
 we can hardly expect so monstrous a tergiversation 
 of principle, as their acquiescence in this measure. 
 To war, then. Dictator Davis must go, just as 
 Louis Napoleon is compelled to war every three 
 years, to sustain his bayonet-propped throne. The 
 sight of our prosperity, naturally taking a great 
 start with the return of peace, would whet the hate 
 of theConfederates. Nor is it impossible that the 
 
20 
 
 Western Europeans, from sheer antipathy to us, 
 might again indirectly assist the Southerners. The 
 hypocrisy of a Russell might then, as now, find some 
 pretext for declaring that " the North was fighting 
 for empire, and the South for independence ;" and 
 the French Emperor, who bags large slices of his 
 neighbor's territory, under the plea of " rectifying 
 his frontier," would applaud a similar rascality in 
 his western imitator. Thus, our peace would be 
 only an armed truce, and we should be obliged to 
 continue our military and naval array, for fear of 
 invasion. 
 
 In stating the argument thus, no one can accuse 
 me of having understated it. 
 
 To answer it, I might take high ground. I 
 might say that, in any event, we must keep up a 
 large army and navy for some time to come ; that 
 if the Cotton States are subjugated, we must have 
 a large force to keep them quiet ; that even in the 
 improbable case of their being not only subdued 
 but pacified, the threatening attitude of foreign 
 nations would not allow us to go back to our old 
 condition ; that 200,000 men may amply suffice for 
 an army of defence, when thrice that number 
 would not be enough for an army of occupation ; 
 that the late rising in Pennsylvania shows what 
 little chance of success an invader would have ; 
 finally, that to persevere in a bloody and expensive 
 war, lest we may hereafter be threatened with one 
 less bloody and expensive, is like a man committ- 
 ing suicide for fear of death. 
 
 But while believing all this to be perfectly true, 
 I consider that there is another line of argument 
 more eff'ectual. Had we acceded to tlie demands 
 of the Confederates without a fight (as our disin- 
 
21 
 
 terested European friends advised), there would 
 have been a likelihood, amounting to a certainty, of 
 their invading us. The foreign bankers who had 
 speculated in Confederate stock, would have urged 
 them to it. Our own cowardice would have 
 tempted them. Did we, after any amount of fight- 
 ing, yield to their terms, the danger of invasion 
 would be very great. But under the circumstances 
 of a separation granted by ourselves, this danger 
 will be so far diminished as to become, I do not 
 say inappreciable, but certainly far from serious. 
 
 How far the resources of the Southerners are ex- 
 hausted, is a question ; but of this we may be cer- 
 tain, that they have sustained serious losses, both 
 of life and property, and would be very glad of 
 an opportunity to repose and recruit awhile. The 
 transition from war to peace prices would be a 
 pleasing novelty. Their newly-formed nationality 
 would tickle their vanity and amuse their fancy. 
 The fatigue of the recent contest, the enjoyment of 
 the present peace, would keep them quiet for some 
 years. And while it would be the policy of their 
 governors to engage them in war again at the 
 earliest possible moment, as the readiest means of 
 preventing political and social dissensions, still it 
 is very possible that these dissensions mignt get 
 the start of the government, and the loosely con- 
 nected machine might well fall to pieces before its 
 energies could be directed against us. 
 
 But further ; allowing that the rapacity and fe- 
 rocity of the Confederates will naturally lead them 
 into war after the necessary interval of repose, 
 and admitting that Davis may have succeeded du- 
 ring that interval in consolidating his loose Con- 
 federation into an Empire, is it certain, or even 
 
22 
 
 probable, that we should be the first object of 
 attack ? The Southerners have received some 
 hard rubs in this conflict. " Apostolic blows and 
 knocks" have taught them that one " chivalry" is 
 not necessarily equal to five " mudsills." Besides, 
 Davis, though a tremendous scoundrel, is no fool, 
 except in the sense in which every wicked man is 
 a fool. Whatever his ideas may have been at 
 first, he has by this time pretty well taken the 
 measure of his power, and understands what he 
 can not do. (It would be well were all our people 
 as wise). His known reluctance to acquiesce in 
 the attempt at northern invasion is a clear proof 
 of this. We may reasonably conclude then, that 
 the first display of his aggressive cupidity will be 
 in another direction. It will seek lands at the 
 same time more fertile and less defended. The 
 "golden circle" hopelessly shorn of its northern 
 segment, will try to extend itself Southward. 
 Mexico or the West Indies will be attacked. 
 
 This brings us to a fourth objection, that we 
 should be conniving at a crime against humanity 
 if we allowed the establishment of this fillibuster- 
 ing and slave-extending empire. 
 
 This may be briefly disposed of. We are not 
 bound to look after the whole world's interests. 
 See the sacrifices we have made to liberty and 
 humanity in this war, and the thanks we have had 
 from Europe ! We shall have done our share in 
 freeing the Border States, and any annoyance or 
 injury which England or Erance may receive from 
 i\\Q\Y proteges will be a just retribution for their 
 present conduct towards us. It will then be our 
 turn to look on and laugh. What a delightful 
 spectacle to all honest men if Louis Napoleon and 
 
23 
 
 Jefferson Davis, the representatives of falsehood 
 and perfidy, treason and conspiracy on both sides 
 of the Atlantic, should go to loggerheads about 
 Mexico or some other coveted country I 
 
 The next objection is one of expense and 
 trouble, rather than principle or safety. It is 
 said, we should have an immense line of Southern 
 frontier to protect, over all of which the South- 
 erners would smuggle imported goods for the sake 
 of ruining our manufactories. 
 
 I cannot but regard this danger as greatly ex- 
 aggerated. We have a long line of Northern 
 fro'iitier, yet smuggling from Canada has never as- 
 sumed the proportions of a serious evil. And if 
 we are enabled to disband 400,000 soldiers, we 
 can afford to support a goodly number of custom 
 house guards. It might also be suggested that our 
 present tariff', however useful as a temporary 
 measure, has not such intrinsic value that it ought 
 to be regarded as a "possession forever." 
 
 Lastly, it may be asked, are the Confederates to 
 carry off the vast amount of plunder, public and 
 private, which they seized at the commence- 
 ment of hostilities? This being a pecuniary 
 question, might be settled as such questions fre- 
 quently are, by compromise ; for instance, they 
 midit 'be allowed to retain their public stealings 
 on'condition of refunding their private confisca- 
 tions. 
 
 After all, there remains one great practical 
 question. Will the Confederates accept these 
 terms when offered ? Certainly, to expect that a 
 Confederate will entertain any just or reasonable 
 proposition requires a sanguine temperament. 
 Something might depend on the advic- of their 
 
24 
 
 foreign backers, yet, after weighing all the chances 
 on both sides, and duly considering the arrogance 
 of the Southern leaders, the ignorance of the South- 
 ern masses, and the obstinacy of both, I must ad- 
 mit that there is a probability against their accept- 
 ance of our terms. In that case our course would 
 be plain. Waging the war in a more limited area, 
 and with a more definite view, we should have a 
 greater chance of bringing it to a successful and 
 speedy termination. Abandoning all the territory 
 of the Southern States, except the posts necessary 
 as^ material guarantees (which should be strongly 
 reinforced), and leaving Kentucky and Missouri to 
 take care of tliemselves for awhile, we should direct 
 every man and gunboat against Richmond, ard at- 
 tack it on all sides with a force of at least 400,000 
 men, seizing all property, and freeing all slaves as 
 they advance. That nest of traitors once destroyed, 
 the enemy having lost the main object for which 
 they were fighting, would soon come to terms. 
 
 Even then we should have to guard against a 
 final danger. Like other semi-barbarians, these 
 men are more formidable in intrigue than in war. 
 They might open negotiations in the hope of play- 
 ing us some trick. It would, therefore, be neces- 
 sary not to relax the vigilance of our blockade or 
 the continuance of our military preparations till 
 everything was settled. 
 
 Lenox, Mass., Sept. 23, 1862. 
 

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