619 
 
 BUILDER OF SHIP DELPHINE, 
 
 (E; W. Metcalf,) 
 
 Before the H. R. Judiciary Committee. 
 
 Judd & Detweiler, Printers. 
 
Class C - i 1 
 
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 J^75, 
 

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 Alabama Claims. 
 
 j1 Short History of Long Negotiations. 
 
 BY AN AMERICAN. 
 
 r/. 
 
 The rebellion was an effort to establish a new govern- 
 ment. According to Alexander H. Stevens, a govern- 
 ment, " tlie corner-stone of which should rest npon the 
 great truth that the negro is not the equal of the white 
 man, that slavery is his natural and moral condition." 
 
 The government of Great Britain made indecent haste 
 to confer upon this effort the privileges of lawful belli- 
 gerents. No sooner was it known in Europe that the 
 first gun had been fired in the interests of the rebellion, 
 than Great Britain announced its intention to give the 
 rebels those privileges which alone would make it pos- 
 sible for them to have and maintain vessels of war.* The 
 importance of this act cannot be over-estimated. That 
 such action was so hastily taken can only be accounted 
 for by the hypothesis that England so earnestly wished 
 the rebellion to succeed that she was willing to take the 
 most effective measures possible, short of open war, to 
 insure its success. That she so wished is shown by her 
 insisting upon special exceptions in favor of rebel priva- 
 teers, when the United States proposed adherence to the 
 "Declaration of Paris" that "Privateering is and re- 
 mains abolished." 
 
 The earnest wish of the government of Great Britain 
 
 * Correspondence concernicg claims against Great Britain Vol. III., pages 
 553, 660, 661. 
 
could not fail to find expression in the acts of its subjects : 
 — thence, wlien the granting to the rebels the privileges 
 •of belligerents resulted in the manning and sailing from 
 the Mississippi of the Sumter, she received in British 
 ports so warm a welcome, and such effective aid, as to 
 encourage the fitting out of others from Southern ports, 
 a-nd the building of still others in British poi'ts. In every 
 British port these British caused, or British-built "cor- 
 sairs," were sure to receive congratulations for destruc- 
 tions already accomplished, and assistance to enable them 
 still to destroy the merchant vessels belonging to citizens 
 of the United States. Thus, Great Britain was the moral 
 cause of, and became morally responsible for, all the de- 
 struction of American vessels. It was but simple justice 
 which afterwards compelled her to pay an amount suffi- 
 cient to indemnify the losers for all this destruction. 
 
 The Sumter escaped June 30th, 1861. On July 3rd, 
 she destroyed ship Golden Rocket, of Bangor, Maine. A 
 question of great interest to shipowners at once arose, — 
 Are the insurers bound to pay the owners for this 
 loss ? The owners claimed that the covenants of their 
 policy entitled them to recover from the insurance com- 
 pany. The insurers replied that the policy, although it 
 seemed to make them liable, was an ordinary one, made 
 before any danger of such destruction existed, hence 
 did not, could not, contemplate any such loss, — that the 
 danger and the loss were extraordinary, and not covered 
 by an ordinary policy. They refused payment. The 
 owners appealed to the courts. The courts sustained 
 the refusal. This so much alarmed shipowners that 
 most of them at once paid extra premiums for special 
 war insurance. Thus, although the amount of property 
 destroyed by the Sumter was small, the indirect injury 
 occasioned by her to owners of American vessels was 
 very great. The whole amount claimed for destructions 
 by her is but $179,697 67-100. 
 
 The next vessel which escaped from a Southern port, 
 
^nd was welcomed and assisted in English ports, was tlie 
 Naslimlle. She escaped from Charleston October 26th, 
 1861. On the 19th of November she burned ship Harvey 
 Birch, and on February 26tli, 1862, schooner Robert 
 GiJfiUan. Their value was claimed to be about $90,000. 
 All the other destructions, for which claims have been 
 preferred to our government, were caused by British 
 built vessels or their tenders, except the trifling amounts 
 of loss by the Boston, Jeff^Bams, Retribution and Sallie^ 
 — the claims for which in the aggregate amount to but 
 $42,710 53-100, of which $30,896 53-100 is claimed by in- 
 surance companies. There were six of these British-built 
 cruisers, (the Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Tallahasse 
 or Olustee, ChicTcamauga, and Shenandoah), three of 
 which, the Alabama, Georgia and Shenandoah, were 
 never in a port of the so-called Confederate States. 
 
 A very large majority of all the injury done to Ameri- 
 can commerce by Confederate cruisers was done by the 
 Alabama, the Florida with her tenders (the Clarence and 
 Tacony), and the Shenandoah, — the amounts claimed 
 being, for the Alabama, $7,050,293 76 : Florida and her 
 tenders, $4,293,869 60 ; Shenandoah, $6,656,838 81,— 
 making more than eighteen million dollars. 
 
 The amounts claimed for loss by the Ghickamauga^ 
 Georgia and Tallahasse were respectively $183,070 73, 
 $431,^60 72, and $836,841 83, or $1,451,073.28 (less than 
 one and a half million) for the three. It should be re- 
 membered that in these several amounts claimed are in- 
 cluded the very large amounts which were so properly 
 set aside by the Geneva Tribunal as "prospective earn- 
 ings, " " double claims for the same loss, and gross freight 
 exceeding net freight." 
 
 [These figures will be of interest when noticing the 
 results of the Geneva Arbitration. The Tribunal estab- 
 lished rules of international liability which would cover 
 the acts of the Alabama, the Florida, and her tenders, 
 and of the Shenandoah after she left Australia, or nearly 
 
seventeen millions five hundred thousand dollars of gross 
 claims ; vi^hile the gross claims for the acts of the Shenan- 
 doah before she reached Australia, and of all the other 
 cruisers, are less than two million three hundred thous- 
 and dollars.] 
 
 As was inevitable, the conduct of Great Britain caused 
 intense indignation among the loyal people, and earnest 
 protests from the government of the United States. These 
 protests were accompanied with demands for indemnity, 
 and notice that Great Britain would be held accountable 
 for the acts of the cruisers. So long, however, as the 
 government of England believed that the Confederate 
 States would succeed in establishing their government, 
 or that its masked but powerful aid could assure such 
 success, the remonstrances of the United States and the 
 demands for indemnity were unheeded, or served only 
 to make the support which the people of Great Britain 
 gave to the Confederate States more earnest and effective. 
 Great Britain realized that she was acting the part of an 
 enemy to the United States, that she would be defeated 
 by their victory. She dreaded the consequences of such 
 defeat. She tried to prevent it.* Hence, when the Ala- 
 bama was sunk by the Kearsage it was regarded and 
 deplored in England as if one of her naval ships had 
 been defeated. Lord Russell officially commended that 
 Englishman f who, contrary to the laws of war and honor, 
 saved to the Confederate service those officers and men 
 of the Alabama^ who so soon after were burning Ameri- 
 can ships in her successor, the Shenandoah. 
 
 The Confederate States did not succeed. In their de- 
 feat Great Britain was defeated. She began to review 
 her conduct, and dread its consequences. Her guilt 
 made her fear that tha million of trained soldiers and 
 
 * Correspondence concerning claims against Great Britain, Vol. III.,, 
 page 518, 519. 
 t Same, Vol. III., page 399. 
 
hundreds of sliips of war, whicli the United States could 
 -command, would be used to enforce a demand for full 
 apology, and prompt indemnity ; but with surprise and 
 relief she saw those soldiers disbanded, and the ships 
 sold or dismantled. 
 
 The United States, though abating nothing of its 
 just demands, chose .to wait with quiet dignity until the 
 government of Great Britain should see what a few of 
 her able statesmen had long foreseen, — that England 
 could not afford to let her conduct become a precedent, 
 to be followed by this and other nations, when she 
 might be at war. 
 
 In May, 1864, Mr. Baring, rising in the British Parlia- 
 ment to call attention to the circumstances under which 
 the Georgia had been allowed to enter the port of Liver- 
 pool, said : 
 
 He brought this matter before the house simply as one of 
 English interest. An incident had recently occurred, which was 
 •of a most extraordinary chai-acter. A vessel of war carrying, as 
 they were told, the flag and commission of the Confederate gov- 
 ernment, had recently entered the port of Liverpool. She was 
 still there, and when the house heard her history it would be 
 somewhat surprised at the course which had been pursued. 
 This was her history : — The Japan, otherwise the Virginia^ 
 commonly known as the Georgia, was built at Dunbarton, on the 
 Clyde. She was equipped by a Liverpool firm. Her crew was 
 shipped by the same Liverpool firm for Shanghai, and sent round 
 to Greenock by steamer. She was entered on the 31st of March, 
 1863, as for Point de Galle and Hong Kong, with a crew of forty- 
 eight men. She cleared on the first of April, She left her 
 anchorage on the morning of the 2nd of April, ostensibly to try 
 her engines, but did not return. She had no armament on leav- 
 ing Greenock, but a few days after her departure, a small steamer 
 called the Allar, freighted with guns, shot, shell, etc., and having 
 on board a partner of the Liverpool firm, which had equipped 
 her, and shipped her crew, left New Haven and met the Georgia 
 off the coast of France, near Ushant. The cargo of the Allar 
 
was successfully transferred to the Georgia on the 8th or 9th of 
 April ; her crew consisted of British subjects. The Allar put 
 into Plymouth on the 11th of April, bringing the LiA'crpool 
 merchant, who ^had directed the proceedings throughout, and 
 bringing also fifteen seamen, who had refused to proceed in the 
 Georgia on learning her real character. The rest of the crew 
 remained. At the time of her departure the Georgia was regis* 
 tered as the property of a Liverpool merchant, a partner of the 
 firm which shipped the crew. She remained the property of this 
 person until the 23rd of June, when the register was cancelled, 
 he noiifying the collector of her sale to foreign owners. During 
 this period, viz : from the 1st of April to the 23rd of June, the 
 Georgia, being still registered in the name of a Liverpool mer- 
 chant, and thus his property, was carrying on war against the 
 United States with whom we were in alliance. It was while still 
 a British vessel that she captured and burnt the Dictator, and 
 captured and released under bond the Grisicold, the same vessel 
 which had brought corn to the Lancashire sufierers. The crew 
 of the Georgia was paid through the same Liverpool firm. A 
 copy of an advance note used was to be found in the diplomatic 
 correspondence. The same firm continued to act in this capac- 
 ity throughout the cruise of the Georgia. After cruising in the 
 Atlantic, and burning and bonding a number of vessels, the 
 Georgia made for Cherbourg, where she arrived on the 28th of 
 October. There was at the time much discontent among the 
 crew. Many deserted, leave of absence was given to others,, 
 and their wages were paid all along by the same Liverpool firm. 
 In order to get the Georgia to sea again, the Liverpool firm 
 enlisted in Liverpool some twenty seamen, and sent them to 
 Brest. The Georgia left Cherbourg on a second cruise, but 
 having no success, she returned to that port, and thence to Liver- 
 pool, where her crew have been paid off without any concealment,, 
 and the vessel is now laid up. 
 
 Here, then, was the case of a vessel clandestinely built, fraud- 
 ulently leaving the port of her construction, taking Englishmen 
 on board as her crew, and waging war against the United States^ 
 an ally of ours, without having once entered the port of the 
 power, the commission of which she bore, but being for some time 
 the property of an English subject The Gtorgiic 
 
had arrived in Liverpool and there discharged her crew, and what 
 guarantee had we that other vessels might not do the same ; 
 
 . . . and that we might not hereafter have to deal with a 
 state of things in which our position would be reversed ? . . 
 
 . He was likewise desirous of inviting the attention of the 
 House to the situation in which this country would be if the 
 precedents now established were acted upon in the event of our 
 being involved in war, while other states were neutral, . . , 
 Under the present construction of our municipal law there was 
 no necessity that a belligerent should have a port or even a sea- 
 shore. Provided she had money, or that money was supplied to 
 her by a neutral, she might fit out vessels, and those vessels 
 might go about the seas dealing destruction to British shipping 
 and property. Take the case, which I hope we shall avoid, of 
 our being at war with Germany. There would, as things now 
 stand, be nothing to prevent the Diet of Frankfort from having 
 a fleet. A number of the small states of Germany might unite 
 together and become a great naval power. Money was all that 
 was required for the purpose, and Saxony without a seashore 
 might have a First Lord of the Admiralty without any docks, 
 who might have a large fleet at his disposal. The only answer 
 we could make under those circumstances to France and the 
 United States, who as neutrals might fit out vessels against us 
 on the pretence that they were German cruisers, was that we 
 would go to war with them: so that by the course of policy 
 which we were pursuing we rendered ourselves liable to the 
 alternative of having our property completely destroyed, or 
 entering into a contest with every neutral power in the world. 
 We ought under these circumstances to ask ourselves what we 
 had at stake. . 
 
 What would be the result? That we must submit to the 
 destruction of our proj^erty, or that our shipping interests must 
 withdraw their ships from the ocean.* 
 
 Mr, W. E. Forster, in the same debate, spoke as fol- 
 low^s : 
 
 He thought there could scarcely be ground for alleging that 
 * Correspondence concerning Claims against Great Britain, Vol. 5, p. 577. 
 
8 
 
 the Georgia came liere for repairs, for she had been repaired at 
 Bordeaux, and had only made the voyage from that port to 
 Liverpool. It had been alleged that the Georgia came into an 
 English port to pay off her crew. He asked whether a Federal 
 vessel would be allowed to come inio one of our ports to pay 
 off her crew. The Georgia was a Confederate vessel which, 
 notoriously, had been built in England. She had sailed from 
 a port in Scotland, and the entire of her crew, with two 
 exceptions — one a Swede and the other a Russian — were 
 Englishmen. She had received on the coast of France her equip- 
 ment from England, and for a month after she began to take 
 her prizes she was owned by an English merchant. That ap- 
 peared from the Custom House papers, which stated that the 
 vessel belonged to a foreigner, j^er letter from the owner, dated 
 23d of June, 1863. In connection with these circumstances 
 ought to be taken the fact that from the time of the purchase 
 she had not been in a Confederate port. 
 
 Would not the facilities which we had given to this vessel tell 
 against ourselves in future, when, unfortunately, it should happen 
 that we were belligerents ? We could not suppose that the pre- 
 cedent we were now setting would not be used against us by 
 every neutral power in the future, whenever we might be at war. 
 Take the case of a possible war with Germany. Supposing 
 such a war should unfortunately arise, what would be our feel- 
 ings if, when, by our overwhelming naval force, we fancied that 
 we had made every German port safe, one vessel should steal out 
 of Marseilles, and another out of Brest, and that, meeting on 
 the coast of Italy, one of them, shipping a crew and armament 
 from the other, should be converted into a cruiser to sail off and 
 destroy British merchantmen wherever she could find them .'' 
 Should we allow France for a moment to do that? Certainly 
 not, if we dared to prevent her ; and with our usual pluck we 
 should dare, unless the war were a struggle for our very exist- 
 ence. This precedent, if we allowed it to be established, meant 
 for us a second war whenever we had a war on oiir hands, unless 
 we were fighting for our existence, and did not dare to undei*- 
 take another war. It was a comparatively easy matter to carry 
 on operations of this kind. All that a ship of that character 
 had to do was to attack vessels which could not resist her, and 
 run away from those which could. There was not the slightest 
 
9 
 
 •occasion for them ever to fight a battle. If this country were at 
 war, and if temptations were held out to foreign ship-owners, 
 there could be no doubt that, considering the large extent of 
 English cargoes, there would, instead of three or four, be thirty 
 •or forty ships engaged in preying upon their commerce. It 
 'would be a very cheap game to carry on. The persons engaged 
 in it, if they were taken, were only prisoners of war; if they 
 "were not taken they made their fortunes. Was it to these risks 
 that they would wish to expose British trade ? "* 
 
 Mr. Cobden said : 
 
 " If the people of the United States are to be told that not only 
 -do individuals here fit out cruisers to destroy their commerce, 
 but that our Government will allow these cruisers themselves 
 to enter our harbors, and there to be equipped — civilly equipped, 
 I mean — and victualed, see in what a predicament you place your- 
 •selves towards that country, in case you are ever again engaged 
 in war. Recollect her geographical position. She has one sea- 
 •coast in the Atlantic, and another in the Pacific, and her Pacific 
 •coast is within about a fortnight's steaming of your China trade. 
 Suppose then, you were at war with any other power, and you 
 had laid down this doctrine for other countries to imitate. Why, 
 let the American government be as true and as loyal to its prin- 
 ciples as it has been, can you doubt, if American nature is human 
 nature, if American nature is English nature, that out of their 
 numerous and almost inaccessible creeks and corners there will 
 not be persons to send forth these fleet steamers to prey on your 
 ■commerce. Why, many Americans will think it an act of abso- 
 lute patriotism to do this. They will say, ' We have lost our 
 mercantile marine through your doing this, and by doing the 
 ■same towards you we shall recover it again, and you will be 
 ■placed in the same position as we were. You will have a high 
 'rate of insurance, you will be obliged to sell your ships; you had 
 the profit before, now we shall have it, for the game is one that 
 two can play at.' But only look at the disadvantage you will 
 
 •experience under those circumstances Nor is it 
 
 merely in time of war that we shall feel the efiects of the existing 
 
 * Correspondence concerning claims against Great Britain Vol. 5, pagea 
 586 and 588. 
 
10 
 
 state of things. Do you suppose that Foreign Governments do 
 not fully appreciate our altered circumstances? ... I say 
 that foreign Governments will take into account the danger we 
 must incur in case of war, and will find in it a motive for our 
 remaining at peace. Look at what happened last Autumn. We 
 held out what was supposed to be a threat, that in conjunction 
 with France, we should go to war with Russia on the subject of 
 Poland. What did Russia do ? She sent her fleet immediately 
 to America ; and, knowing the astute, long headed men who rule 
 in St. Petersburg, does anybody doubt what the motive was? 
 
 The Russian Government reasoned thus ; ' If England and 
 France are going to attack us again, we will take care to be in a 
 position to carry on reprisals, and particularly we will carry on 
 operations against the commerce of England, in the same way as 
 the Confederates are carrying on war against the commerce of 
 the United States.' Therefore, they sent their fleet, and, what 
 is still more important, they sent their crews to America, no 
 doubt with the intention of putting those crews into the swiftest 
 vessels that could be obtained, both on the Atlantic and on the 
 Pacific side, in order that they might be employed against our 
 commerce. Take the case of Germany. Recently the German 
 newspapers have often pointed to the vulnerability of England^ 
 in consequence of the state of the law as established by ourselves' 
 in the case of these cruisers. We have, in truth, set a most peril- 
 ous example, the effect of which, I believe, will be felt in our 
 Foreign-office, in negotiations with Brazil, or the weakest power 
 we could have transactions with."* 
 
 [The history of the outfitting, sailing and returning to 
 England of the Oeorgia as thus given by Englishmen, 
 would, with change of names and dates, be the liistory 
 of the Shenandoah in these respects, except that the 
 Shenandoah was partly manned by men from the 
 Alabama, wrongfully rescued by Englishmen from 
 drowning or capture, and that the Shenandoah remained 
 registered as an English ship during a greater part of her 
 
 * Correspondence concerning claims against Great Britian, Vol. 5, pages 
 589,591. 
 
11 
 
 destroying cruise, and returned to England long after 
 the war was ended.] 
 
 Though thus earnestly warned by honest Englishmen,, 
 the Government of Great Britain, with that mental ob- 
 tuseness wliicli so often accompanies moral obliquity, 
 when they saw that our great army and navy were not 
 to be used to enforce our demands, declined either to- 
 make reparation, or refer the question of liability to any 
 foreign state. 
 
 Lord Clarendon, however, made the very cool pro- 
 position to "letby-gonesbeby-gones," while suggesting 
 improvements in international law, which would protect 
 England in the future from the consequences of her bad 
 example in the past.* 
 
 Mr. Seward, in reply, said : 
 
 " There is not one member of this Government, and so far as I 
 know, not one citizen of the United States, who expects that this, 
 country will waive, in any case, the demands that we have hereto- 
 fore made upon the British government for redress of wrongs 
 committed in violation of international law. I think that the 
 country would be equally unanimous in declining every form of 
 negotiation that should have in view merely prospective regula- 
 tions of national intercourse, so long as the justice of our existing 
 claims for indemnity is denied by Her Majesty's Government, 
 and these claims are refused to be made the subject of friendly 
 but impartial examination." f 
 
 As time passed and the political horizon of Europe 
 began to be obscured by mists which might develope into 
 war cloitds, the words of Baring, Forester and Cobden,. 
 with which they warned their government of the con- 
 sequences which must result from its conduct in regard 
 to the Georgia, began to be remembered and appreciated 
 
 * Correspondence concerning claims against Great Britain Vol. III., page 
 626, and British case Am. Ed., Vol. III., page 747. 
 t Same, Vol. III., page 628. 
 
12 
 
 "by the people of England. A change of the English 
 Ministry took place, negotiations were reopened, which, 
 after much correspondence, resulted, on the 10th of 
 November, 1868, in the signing at London of the Stanley- 
 Johnson convention, which was unsatisfactory to our 
 administration. Mr. Seward suggested important 
 amendments, pending the discussion of which the 
 Ministry of England was again clianged, Lord Clarendon 
 becoming Secretary of Foreign Affairs in place of Lord 
 Stanley. The exigencies, present and prospective, of 
 England's foreign relations and the growing appreciation 
 of the difficulties which must surround her in these rela- 
 tions, so long as the claims of the United States should 
 remain unadjusted, made Lord Clarendon anxious to 
 renew and complete the negotiations. In the United 
 States, too, the administration of President Johnson, in 
 which Mr. Seward was Secretary of State would, on the 
 ensuing 4th of March, give place to that of General Grant, 
 the president elect. Mr. Seward's very great anxiety to 
 have a settlement reached under his direction, during his 
 term of office,* while natural and commendable, perhaps 
 influenced him to approve the Clarendon-Johnson con- 
 vention which might have been unsatisfactory to him 
 had it been negotiated by his successor. This treaty was 
 signed on the 14th of January, 1869, and provided that 
 all claims on the part of citizens of the United States upon 
 the government of Her Britanic Majesty, including the 
 so-called Alabama claims, and all claims on the part of 
 subjects of Her Britanic Majesty upon the government 
 of the United States, which may have been presented to 
 either government for its interposition with the other 
 
 since the 26th of July, 1853, should be referred 
 
 to four commissioners, &c.t On the 15th of January, it 
 
 * Correspondence concerning claims against Great Britain, Vol. Ill , page 
 ^97, Yol. V. top ol page 720. 
 t Same, Vol. III., page 753. 
 
13 
 
 was presented to the Senate of the United States, and re- 
 ferred to its committee on foreign relations, who, through 
 their chairman, Mr. Sumner, advised the Senate to re- 
 fuse to sanction its ratification. Mr. Sumner, in an 
 elaborate speech, objected that it provided only for 
 claims of citizens of the United States against Great 
 Britain, and made no mention oi national injuries. He 
 claimed that England ought to be required to indemnify 
 the government for injuries more remote but more 
 important than the destruction by Confederate cruisers, 
 of the property of private citizens, — that the encourage- 
 ment and assistance given by England to the re- 
 bellion had vastly increased the expense, and pro- 
 longed the time of subduing it ; had driven our com- 
 merce from the ocean, and caused millions of dollars to- 
 be paid as increased premiums for war risks, and that 
 no full friendship could exist between the two nations- 
 until these wrongs had been apologized for, and satisfac- 
 tion given.* The treaty was rejected by the Senate.- 
 Mr. Reverdy Johnson, who negotiated the treaty, said,, 
 in regard to this objection, 
 
 "I am at a loss to imagine what would be the measure 
 of the damage which it supposes our government should 
 be indemnilied for. How is it to be ascertained % By 
 what rule is it to be measured \ A nations' s honor can, 
 have no compensation in money, and the depredations of 
 the Alabama were of property in which our nation had 
 
 no direct pecuniary interest 
 
 The government never exacted anything on its own 
 account. It acted only as the guardian and protector of 
 its own citizens, and therefore only required that this (the 
 English) government should pay their losses, or agree to 
 submit the question of its liability to friendly arbitrament. 
 To demand more now, and particularly to make a de- 
 mand to which no limit can well be assigned, would be 
 an entire departure from our previous course ; and would, 
 
 * Correspondence concerning claims against Great Britain, Vol. V., page 
 719. 
 
14 
 
 I am sure not be listened to by this government or coun- 
 tenanced by other nations. We have obtained by the 
 Convention in question all that we have ever asked, and 
 with perfect opportunity of knowing what the sentiment 
 of this government and people is, I am satisfied that 
 nothing more can be accomplished. And I am equally 
 satisfied that if the Convention goes into operation, every 
 dollar due on what are known as the Alabama claims will 
 be recovered."* 
 
 Mr. Sumner's speech, and the rejection of the treaty 
 by the Senate, caused intense excitement among the 
 people of England. They received the speech as a fair 
 exponent of American demands and expectations. They 
 stood aghast at their vastness, and seemed to think the 
 only alternative was national humiliation and ruin, — or 
 war. The voice of the English press, in view of this 
 alternative, was almost unanimous for war, if it must 
 come — but no war came. 
 
 President Grant, on coming into office soon after, simply 
 instructed our Minister to Great Britain that he thought 
 the state of feeling on both sides not favorable to an 
 immediate attempt at renewed negotiation. In his first 
 message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1869), he spoke of the pro- 
 visions of the treaty as "wholly inadequate for the settle- 
 ment of the great wrongs that had been sustained by this 
 government as well as by its citizens. . . . Not a 
 word was found in the treaty, and not an inference could 
 be drawn from it to remove the sense of the unfriendliness 
 of the course of Great Britain in our struggle for existence, 
 which had so deeply and universally impressed itself 
 
 upon the people of this country I 
 
 regarded the action of the Senate in rejecting tlie treaty 
 to have been wisely taken in the interest of peace, and as 
 a necessary step in the direction of a perfect and cordial 
 friendship between the two countries. A sensitive people, 
 conscious of their power, are more at ease under a great 
 
 *Message and Documents 1868 and 1869; Part 1, page 418. j 
 
16 
 
 wrong wholly unatoned, than under the restraint of a 
 settlement which satisfies neither their ideas of justice, 
 nor the grave sense of the grievance they have sustained. 
 I hope the time may soon arrive when the two govern- 
 ments can approach the solution of this momentous 
 question with an appreciation of what is due to the rights, 
 dignity and honor of each, and the determination not 
 only to remove the causes of complaint in the past, but 
 to lay the foundation of a broad principle of public law 
 which will prevent future differences and tend to firm and 
 continued peace and friendship." 
 
 These were suggestive words, which, doubtless, were 
 often pondered by England's statesmen during the year 
 which passed before President Grant's next annual 
 message to Congress. 
 
 President Grant, wishing to protect the nation's interests 
 and the interests of humanity in the broadest and most 
 comprehensive way, while doing no injustice to the private 
 citizens"of the United States, in his message, December 
 5, 1870, said : 
 
 "The Cabinet of London, so far as its views have 
 been expressed, does not appear to be willing to con- 
 cede that her Majesty's government was guilty of any 
 negligence, or did or permitted any act during the 
 war by which the United States has just cause of com- 
 plaint. Our firm and unalterable convictions are di- 
 rectly the reverse. 1 therefore recommend to Congress 
 to authorize the appointment of a Commission., to take 
 proof of the amount and the ownership of these several 
 claims on notice to the representative of her Majesty at 
 Washington., and that authority he given for the settle- 
 ment of these claims by the United States, so that the 
 government shall have the ownership of the private 
 claims as loell as the responsible control of all the de- 
 mands against Great Britain.'''' 
 
 Caleb Cushing, in his "Treaty of Washington," says : 
 
16 
 
 *'In this incident there was matter of grave and serious; 
 reflection to Great Britain."* 
 
 It probably influenced her conduct, for a few days after- 
 wards; (January 26th, 1871,) the British government for- 
 mally proposed the appointment of the Joint High Com- 
 mission, the deliberations of which resulted in the Treaty 
 of Washington. 
 
 This treaty provided that all the claims "generically 
 known as the Alabama claims," should be referred to a 
 Tribunal of Arbitration — the five arbitrators to be ap- 
 pointed by the heads of five different nations — established 
 three rules binding neutrals to certain obligations, — these 
 rules to be binding retrospectively on Great Britain, and 
 prospectively on both nations, both nations agreeing to 
 invite other maritime powers to accede to them, — and 
 referred all claims, other than ^'■Alabama Claims," of 
 citizens of both nations, to a mixed Commission, — the 
 Northwestern boundary question to the Emperor of 
 Germany ; England expressing regret for the escape of 
 the Alabama and the other vessels. Perhaps no Treaty 
 negotiated in modern times has given greater promise of 
 benefit to the human race, or been so important a step in 
 the direction of justice and peace. 
 
 No tribunal was ever convened with more august 
 appointments, or whose decisions would be entitled to 
 more respect than those of the tribunal at Geneva. 
 
 Secretary Seward had insisted that England owed apol- 
 ogy and indemnity for her hasty recognition of the rebels 
 as belligerents, and relied on this to support the claims of 
 private citizens. He had declined all plans of Arbitration 
 which should not consider this recognition as a basis of 
 these claims, t England, after persistent refusal, :j: had 
 
 * " Treaty of Washington," Gushing, page 19. 
 
 f Correspondence Claims vs. Great Britain, Vol. ill, pages 634, 674, 683,. 
 686, 688. 
 
 X Same, Vol. Ill, lower part of pages 652 and 669. 
 
17 
 
 at last consented that it be so considered. * But President 
 Orant, not wishing to compromise the proud position of 
 influence for good to all nations which this nation was 
 ■entitled to hold in the future, would consent to no 
 restriction upon our right to decide for ourselves when 
 and how to give moral support to a people struggling for 
 independent nationality. Hence he refused to base any 
 olaim in the treaty or in our case against England on the 
 fact of her having exercised her right with ill-judged and 
 unfriendly haste. He thus abandoned a most powerful 
 argument in support of one part of the claims of citizens 
 of the United States against England, f It would have 
 been wrong for him to have done otherwise. It was 
 condoning England's wrong for a consideration valu- 
 able to the nation, thus transferring England's obli- 
 gation, so far as concerned citizens of the United States, 
 to the government of the United States. But the nation 
 -could aflbrd and had the right to act upon the President's 
 recommendation to indemnify these citizens for England' s 
 wrong. It could not afford, had not the right to lessen 
 its own power for good among the nations. 
 
 So short a time elapsed between the President' s recom- 
 mendation that the government should (assuming their 
 claims against Great Britain) indemnify its private citizens 
 *' so that the government should have the ownership of the 
 private claims," and the appointment of the Joint High 
 Commission, that no action on the subject had been 
 reached by Congress. But Secretary Fish and his asso- 
 ciate Commissioners in negotiating the Treaty of Wash- 
 ington seemed to assume that Congress would take some 
 action so far as regards the private claims ' ' growing out 
 of the acts of the several vessels which have given rise to 
 the claims generically known as the ' Alabama Claims,' " 
 
 * Message ard Documents, 1868 and 1869, part 1, page 415. 
 f Papers relating to Treaty ofWashingion, Vol. Ill, page 196, 
 
18 
 
 which would be equivalent to the President' s recommend- 
 ation. Special provision was made in Article 12 of the 
 Treaty, for all the claims upon Great Britain, other than 
 the Alabama claims, of corporations, companies or pri- 
 vate individuals, citizens of the United States. 
 
 The Alabama claims were treated as belonging exclu- 
 sively to the government, no mention whatever being 
 made in the Treaty of any interest of corporations or 
 private individuals in them. 
 
 Mr. Fish, as Secretary of State, instructed the agent 
 and counsel of the United States, at Geneva, that 
 
 ' ' The President desires to have the subject discussed as- 
 one between the two governments^ and he directs me to urge 
 upon you strongly to secure, if possible, the award of a 
 sum in gross. In the discussion of this question, and in 
 the treatment of the entire case, you will be careful not to- 
 commit the government as to the disposition of what may 
 be awarded, or what may be recovered, in the event of 
 the appointment of the Board of Assessors, mentioned in 
 the tenth article of the Treaty. It is possible that there 
 may be duplicate claims for some of the property, 
 alleged to have been captured or destroyed, as in the cases" 
 of insurers and insured. The Government wishes to hold 
 itself free to decide as to the rights and claims of in- 
 surers, upon the termination of the case. If tlie value 
 of the jprojierty captured or destroyed, he recovered in the 
 name of the Government, the distribution of the amount 
 recovered will be made by this government tcithout com- 
 mittal as to the mode of distribution. It is expected 
 thai all such committal be avoided in the arguments of 
 counsel.'''"^ 
 
 The counsel said to the Tribunal at Geneva, 
 
 ''These claims are all preferred by the United States 
 as a nation, against Great Britain as a nation, and are to 
 be so computed and paid, whether awarded as a sum in 
 gross, under the seventh article of the Treaty, or awarded 
 for assessment of amounts under the tenth article." f 
 
 * Papers relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. 2, page 416. 
 \ Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. 3, page 16. 
 
19 
 
 This aiTcingemeiit was of great importance. It was 
 important that the Government should be left free to- 
 distribute whatever amount might be recovered, as indem- 
 nity to the losers, according|to principles of equity and 
 justice, uncontrolled by any question of international 
 obligation. It was more important that the Govern- 
 ment should be in a position to labor in all its dealings 
 with the Tribunal, to establish those principles which, 
 would be most advantageous in the future to itself, as a 
 nation, and to guard against the danger that by the 
 action of the Tribunal neutral nations should be held to 
 such strict accountabiliy for tlie acts of their subjects as 
 to make their position difficult and dangerous. The 
 interests of private claimants were opposed to the broader 
 interests of the nation in these respects. It was well or 
 the nation to relieve itself from the embarrassment under 
 which it would have been placed had it gone before the 
 Tribunal as agent or attorney for these private claimants, 
 with the obligations which such relation would impose. 
 
 While right-minded men of all nations were rejoicing 
 in the expectation that benefits broad and lasting would 
 result from the Treaty^ its provisions having been fully 
 met by both nations up to and including the presenting 
 of the respective cases to the Arbitrators, a new difficulty 
 unexpectedly arose which threatened for a time to make all 
 abortive. The British Government, after holding the 
 American case without objection for fifty days, protested 
 that a very important part of the claims presented by the 
 United States was not contemplated by the Treaty and 
 could not properly be brought before the Arbitrators for 
 adjudication.* This protest was probably the result of the 
 excitement of the English people and Parliament, caused 
 by the full appreciation of the facts as presented in the 
 American case. The omissions and commissions of the 
 British Government and people had, besides the direct 
 
 * Papers rilaling to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. 2, page 426, 
 
20 
 
 injury by the destruction of property, caused our com- 
 mercial marine to be transferred to otlier flags, our mer- 
 chants to pay millions of dollars of increased premiums 
 for war insurance, and our war to be prolonged. The 
 English people knew it. With however much compla- 
 cency these results might have been contemplated when 
 the furtlier result of the success of the rebellion was con- 
 fidently expected, it afforded them no pleasure to estimate 
 (which our government left them to do for themselves,) 
 the amount of money it would take to indemnify for these 
 injuries, their consciences telling them that a just Tribunal 
 might require them to respond. Excited by their recollec- 
 tions and their fears they utterly failed to comprehend the 
 motives which caused our government to insist that the 
 judgment of the Tribunal, as regards these claims, should 
 be given and recorded. America's statesmen in charge 
 of her case, were neither narrow-minded nor short- 
 sighted. They realised that this was the golden oppor- 
 tunity to gain advantage not only for our nation but for 
 all nations, advantage compared with which any amount 
 of mere money indemnity would be insignificant. Our 
 policy so wisely inaugurated by Washington had always 
 been to avoid complications with foreign powers, and to 
 be strictly neutral in foreign wars. Hence we had been 
 the champion of the rights of neutrals, which England 
 had habitually infringed upon or disregarded. As ex- 
 pressed by our counsel at Geneva, "both the sentiments 
 and the interests of the United States, their history and 
 their future, have made and will make them the principal 
 advocates and defenders of the rights of neutrals before 
 all the world."* 
 
 We desired and expected to be at peace, wished to en- 
 large the privileges, and protect the rights of peaceful 
 nations. England, so often belligerent and confident in 
 her military glory and naval strength, had always 
 
 * Papers relating to Treaty of WasLinglon, Vol. 3, page 157. 
 
21 
 
 guarded well the rights of war, had claimed, exercised, 
 and even fought to maintain the right to search neutral 
 vessels, and take from them her subjects on every sea,— 
 had even been willing to compel neutral nations to respect 
 a mere ' ' paper blockade. ' ' The world needed, and it was 
 especially the interest of the United States, to have not 
 only the privileges but the obligations of neutrals well 
 delined and established. England^ s sympathy with the 
 rebellion, as expressed in the Trent affair, had been skil- 
 fully used by Mr. Seward to obtain from her such a con- 
 demnation of her traditional policy and endorsement of 
 ours in regard to the right of search, as she can never 
 
 recede from. 
 
 Her willingness to escape the consequences of her own 
 acts, committed while claiming to be neutral, and her 
 necessity for friendly relations with the United States, 
 must now be used to bind her in the future to ask no more 
 of neutrals than she, as a neutral, should be now obliged 
 
 to give. 
 
 These indirect claims were not originated by the 
 men who, on our part, negotiated the Treaty and had 
 charge of our case. When these men assumed then- 
 responsible offices tlii3se claims were, and had been for 
 years the subject of discussion in both countries. The 
 questions had' been raised ; it was needful now that they 
 be settled. It was of vast prospective importance to this 
 country that they be settled right. However dreadful the 
 asked-for verdict of the Tribunal might seem to the ex- 
 cited English mind, our statesmen were well aware that 
 the Tribunal would realise the legal difficulties and ob- 
 jections to allowing indemnity in cases where there could 
 be no fixed rule by which the amount could be deter- 
 mined, and where different modes of computation might 
 make the same claim almost nothing or almost infinite m 
 amount. They were aware, too, that the injuries which 
 England had inflicted on the United States were such as 
 money could not pay for, and though "regretted" by 
 
22 
 
 England in the Treaty, would never be forgotten by 
 Americans. They hoped that our nation would always 
 Ibe at peace. They expected that England, if left unre- 
 strained, would often be at war. They knew that wliat 
 Richard Cobden had said during the debate in the English 
 Parliament, in regard to the Georgia was true — that we 
 have a sea-coast on the Atlantic, and another on the 
 Paciiic ; that however vigilant, loyal, and true to its 
 principles the American government might be, when 
 England should be at war "If American nature is 
 human nature, that out of their numerous and almost 
 inaccessible creeks and corners there will be persons to 
 send forth fleet steamers, to prey upon her commerce. 
 Why, many Americans will think it an act of actual pa- 
 triotism to do so." 
 
 England had been already asked to indemnify us for 
 the remote and indirect results of its subjects' wrongful 
 acts. Our statesmen knew that if the question were left 
 imdecided the risk would be imminent and important, 
 that we should be asked to indemnify England for simi- 
 lar results in large amounts. They therefore wisely in- 
 sisted that the Tribunal should give its judgment on these 
 claims. They placed the facts and the claims before the 
 Tribunal, hoping that they would be regarded "as a 
 reason why a gross sum should be awarded, which should 
 be an ample and liberal compensation for our losses by 
 captures and burnings."* 
 
 But England persistently refused to allow the judg- 
 ment to be taken. A Fenian said England's statesmen 
 seemed to regard her as in the position of his unfortunate 
 countryman, who, on being assured by his lawyer that 
 the Court before which he was to be tried would do 
 him justice, replied with earnestness, " Why, that is just 
 what I am afraid of ! " 
 
 An exhuustive diplomatic correspondence ensued, ex- 
 
 * Papeti relating to Treaty of Washiagton, Vol. 11., page 598. 
 
23 
 
 liaustive of the subject, of patience, and of time. Our 
 government stated that " the object of the United States 
 in insisting on retaining these indirect claims before the 
 Tribunal was, 
 
 1st, The right under the treaty to present them ; 
 2d, To have them disposed of and removed from further 
 controversy ; 
 
 3d, To obtain a decision either for or against the 
 liability of a neutral for claims of that description ; 
 
 4th, If the liability of a neutral for such claims is 
 admitted in the future, then to insist on payment by 
 Great Britain for those of the past ; 
 
 5th, Having a case against Great Britain, to have the 
 same principles applied to it that may in the tuture be 
 invoked against the United States. * ' ' 
 
 It however offered to accept a new rule, " that both 
 governments adopt for the future the principle that claims 
 for remote or indirect losses should not be admitted as 
 he result of failure to observe neutral obligations,— f "as 
 the consideration for, and as a final settlement of the 
 • three classes of the indirect claims put forth in the case 
 of the United States, to which the government of Great 
 Britain have objecte(^." X 
 
 No conclusion of the controversy was reached until, at 
 the last moment, it was concluded by the Tribunal giving 
 a decision against the indirect claims, which was satis- 
 factory to both nations. 
 
 The Tribunal then proceeded according to the pro- 
 visions of the Treaty to decide the other questions laid 
 before them by the two nations. "First, to determine 
 as to each vessel separately whether Great Britain has 
 by any act or omission failed to fulfil any of the duties 
 set forth in the forgoing three rules, or recognized by the 
 principles of international law not inconsistent with said 
 
 * Papers relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. II., page 528. 
 
 t Same, Vol. II., page 536. t Same, Vol. II., page 560. 
 
24 
 
 rules, and certify such fact as to each of the said vessels,"" 
 —thus determining for the future the liability of neutrals; 
 in similiar cases ; then, according to the request of the 
 United States and the power conferred by Article 7th of 
 the Treaty, to award a sum in gross for all the claims 
 referred to it. 
 
 Great Britain was held derelict as regards the acts of 
 only two vessels, with their tenders, and a*part of the acts 
 of a third, but $15,500,000 was awarded as the sum in gross. 
 to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for all 
 the claims referred to the Tribunal, 
 
 This determining and limiting the liability of neutrals 
 for the future was of vast importance to the United States, 
 of vastly greater importance than the amount awarded, 
 for we had disposed of slavery, the only difficulty which 
 could be likely to cause war among ourselves, and set- 
 tled those questions which might have involved us in war 
 with others. We had reason confidently to expect always 
 to be at place, and always to be neutral. It might, 
 however, have been unfortunate for individual sufferers if, 
 their rights as regards either nation had been determined 
 by these purely national considerations. 
 
 The contest thus haj^pily ended, had been long, and 
 sometimes had promised issue bitter for both nations. 
 
 A moment's consideration and comparison of the 
 benefits derived by each nation from the mode of its- 
 settlement may be of interest. 
 
 The greatest benefit possible [for England to have 
 derived, was the re-establishment in the American mind 
 of feelings of cordial friendship and respect, so that in 
 future circumstances of difficulty she could confidently 
 rely upon America's moral support and sympathy, in- 
 stead of being in constant dread of retaliation for the 
 injuries she had infficted, and that such sympathy and 
 support might be given to her enemies. She was so un- 
 fortunate as to forego a part of this benefit by her 
 conduct in regard to the decision of the indirect claims by 
 
25 
 
 the Tribunal, — a compensation to her people and the- 
 world may perhaps be found in the continuation of what 
 Mr. Cobden called a motive for her remaining at peace. 
 
 Lord Ripon, the chief of the British High Commission 
 said, *' Great Britain accomplished a signal benefit in 
 binding the American government by rules 'from which 
 no country on the face of the earth is likely to derive so 
 much benefit as England.' " These words are very sug- 
 gestive, as embodying his opinion of the probable future 
 of the two countries. The rules defined the duties of 
 neutrals to belligerents, bound England when neutral as 
 much as America to their performance, and also bound 
 England to serious responsibility before the Tribunal for 
 violating them in the past. Why does he speak of them 
 as "binding the American government," and of so 
 much benefit to England, unless he expected England 
 soon and often to be belligerent, while the United States^. 
 would habitually be neutral. They are an interesting 
 comment, too, upon the relative advantage to the two 
 countries of the authoritative interpretation of these- 
 rules, embodied in the decision of the Tribunal, as ta- 
 each vessel separately. 
 
 The United States, (?il though going before the Tribunal 
 as a belligerent with a case against a neutral,) expressly 
 stated by its counsel to the Tribunal, that "both the 
 sentiments and the interests of the United States, their 
 history and their future, have made, and will make them 
 the principal advocates and defenders of the rights of 
 neutrals before all the world. It is not for their interests 
 to exaggerate the responsibilities of neutrals, but only in 
 the sense of their action in this respect, throughout their 
 whole national life-time, to restrain the field of arms, and 
 enlarge that of peace. " * . . . 
 
 Hence, when the Arbitrators decided as regards so- 
 many of the vessels that England had not violated the- 
 
 * Papers relating to Treaty ofWashingtoa, Vol. III., page 223, 
 
26 
 
 three rules, or tlie laws of nations, thus defining the 
 effect and value of those rules and laws for all future 
 time, it was a decision in favor of, not against, the United 
 States. The President, through the Secretary of State, 
 had officially spoken of the national injuries inliicted by 
 Oreat Britain on the United States, as of "larger ac- 
 count" than the indemnity due to individual citizens* 
 for the destruction of their property by lebel cruisers. 
 Yet the government offered to accept as full considera- 
 tion for this " larger account" a new rule, to be adopted 
 by both governments, — that neutrals should not be held 
 responsible for remote or indirect results of failure to ob- 
 serve neutral obligations. Was it not sufficient con- 
 sideration for less than one-eighth part of the smaller 
 account, that the obligations of neutrals should be so 
 defined as to relieve them from responsibility for the 
 results, direct or indirect, of acts such as those committed 
 b}^ the Georgia or the Shenandoah before she reached 
 Australia. The English agent and counsel earned the 
 thanks of the United States, not of England^ when they 
 urged the fact in regard to the Georgia^ that 
 
 " Information about the construction and outfit of the 
 vessel had for a long time before her departure been in 
 the possession of Mr. Adams: and Mr. Dudley, who was 
 in constant communication with Mr. Adams, knew of the 
 hiring of seamen for her, and had her examined by a man 
 sent on board by him for tliat purpose . . . that no com- 
 munication was made by him (Mr. Adams) to Her Ma- 
 jesty's government on the subject, until six days after 
 the ship had sailed." f 
 
 When they urged that 
 
 "The complaints of the United States might not have 
 been necessary if Mr. Adams had communicated in good 
 time such information as he possessed, instead of keep- 
 ing it undisclosed until six days after the sailing of the 
 
 * Papers relating to Treaty of Washingtoa, Vol. Ill, page 18. 
 f British Case, Vol.1., page 173. 
 
27 
 
 ixenrfla, and more than three days after the departure 
 of the J-ZZar." 
 
 When they urged, in regard to the Shenandoah^ that 
 "It will have been seen also that no representation had 
 l)een made to Her Majesty's government respecting her 
 by Mr. Adams "'^ — for the decision of the Tribunal, (so 
 valuable for neutrals, and so unfortunate for belligerents), 
 as regards these vessels, seems to have resulted from the 
 lack of proof that English officials had knowledge of 
 their character before they sailed. It is not probable 
 that any representations of the facts by Mr. Adams, who 
 had reason to become so much discouraged by Lord 
 Hussell's conduct that he was "not much disposed to 
 w^aste any more discussion," f would have changed the 
 .conduct of the English government, but it might have 
 ■changed the verdict of the Tribunal. 
 
 Minister Schenck said, respecting the new rule in 
 regard to indirect damages, which was to be accepted 
 :as consideration for the indirect claims, 
 
 ' ' I think the principle declared in this Article for future 
 observance between the two nations is one which, if settled 
 and maintained, must be of inestimable advantage to the 
 United States. With our chances of being generally neu- 
 tral, when Great Britain and the other European States are 
 belligerent, the benefits of the rule are to be principally 
 -and oftenest ours. Our continental position, our ex- 
 tended sea-coast, our numerous ports, the enterprising 
 character of our citizens, and the difficulty of restraining 
 their spirit of adventure, surely make the rule that would 
 thus be established more valuable and more favorable to 
 the United States than to perhaps any other country.":}: 
 
 With how much more force this may be said of the 
 ■decision which settles and maintains a construction of 
 the Treaty rules, by which a neutral escapes liability for 
 the acts of the Georgia and the Shenandoah before she 
 
 *British Case, Vol. I., page 183. 
 
 •)■ Papers relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. II., page 516. 
 4 Message anb Documents 1864 and 1865, part 1, page 724. 
 
28 
 
 reached Australia, can be estimated by reading the ex- 
 tracts quoted above from English speeches, or the history 
 of these vessels, in the British or American case. 
 
 The settlement of the less important matter of money in- 
 demnity was such as ought to be satisfactory to the United 
 States, for the amount awarded is sufficient to pa}^ a fair 
 indemnity for all the destruction of property for which 
 claims were presented to the Tribunal. The United 
 States offered to accept as consideration for the na- 
 tional claims, a rule which would have precisely the 
 same effect as the decision excluding them, given by th© 
 Tribunal. The value of the property captured or de- 
 stroyed ' ' had been recovered in the name of the govern- 
 ment," and the government left "free to decide as to the^ 
 rights and claims of insurers. ' ' * 
 
 If Congress should decide according to its reserved 
 right that Insurers are not entitled to share in the dis- 
 tribution of the award, there will be a surplus, after 
 paying for all the destructions by all the rebel cruisers, 
 which could be used to reimburse those who paid war 
 premiums. Thus it will be seen that the solution of the 
 difficulty ought to be eminently satisfactory to Ameri- 
 cans. 
 
 England, too, ought to be satisfied, for, though under 
 the pressure of her political necessities, she approved a. 
 treaty which was sure to give abundant satisfaction ta 
 the United States for every claim, the full satisfaction of 
 which in money she should not be held to give, it com- 
 pelled her to do no more than justice — she ought to be 
 satisfied to do no less. Though the decisions under the 
 Treaty keep her still under heavy bonds to keep the 
 peace, the Treaty provides an example and suggests a 
 way by which she or any other nation may keep the 
 peace and keep its honor. 
 
 It is to be hoped that Americans will not fail to re- 
 member that through all the struggle, they had many, 
 
 * Papers relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. II., page 416. 
 
29 
 
 very many, warm friends among the English people, 
 willing always to be just, and that just reparation for 
 jvrongs should be fully ^and promptly made. Let us hope 
 and endeavor that the conduct of the American govern- 
 ment and people towards England, in the future, shall 
 be such as to increase the number of our friends, until 
 they shall have controlling influence in their government. 
 And, although if England should be so unfortunate as 
 soon to be at war, it would be impossible to restrain 
 many Americans, who, remembering what we suffered, 
 w^ould visit retribution uj)on her in kind, which the con- 
 struction, by the Tribunal, as regards the Georgia and 
 the Shenandoali of the rules of neutral obligations 
 would enable them to do, without subjecting us to lia- 
 bility for indemnity. Let our government earnestly en- 
 deavor, in the interests of abiding friendship, to make this 
 retribution as light as possible. 
 
 May we not hope that all nations will so appreciate 
 the benefits to peaceful neutrals, and the restraints upon 
 belligerents, which the Treaty has secured, that they 
 shall all and always be determined to keep in those re- 
 lations which will secure to themselves the benefits, and 
 avoid the restraints. 
 
 When the contest was ended, questions arose as to the 
 distribution of the award. Intelligent and disinterested 
 statesmen differed widely, while interested parties urged 
 opposing claims. Caleb Gushing says of the "Effect of 
 the award:" 
 
 "In reflecting on this award, and seeking to deter- 
 mine its true construction, let us see, in the first place, 
 what it actually expresses, either by inclusion or ex- 
 clusion. 
 
 "The award is to the United States, in conformity with 
 the letter of the Treaty, which has for its well-defined 
 object to remove and adjust complaints and claims "on 
 the part of the United States." 
 
 "But the history of the Treaty and of the Arbitration 
 shows that the United States recover, not for the benefit 
 
30 
 
 of tlie American Oovernment as such, but of such indi- 
 vidual citizens of the United States as shall appear to 
 have suffered loss by the acts or neglects of the British 
 Government, It is, however, not a special trust legally 
 affected to any particular claim or claimants, but a gen- 
 eral fund to be administered by the United States in good 
 faith, in conformity with their own conceptions of justice 
 and equity, within the range of the award. If according 
 to any theory of distribution adopted by the United 
 States, the sum awarded prove inadequate, we have no 
 claim on Great Britain to supply the deficiency ; on the 
 other hand, if the aw^ard should prove to be in excess, 
 we are not accountable to Great Britain for any balance. 
 On this point, precedents exist in the diplomatic history 
 of Great Britain herself. 
 
 ' ' The Tribunal does not afford us any rules of limitation 
 affecting the distribution of the Award, unless in the 
 declaration that 'prospective earnings,' 'double claims' 
 for the same losses, and 'claims for gross freights, so far 
 as they exceed net freights,' cannot properly be made 
 the subject of compensation,— that is to say, as against 
 Great Britain. 
 
 '*Nor does the Tribunal define affirmatively what 
 claims should be satisfied otherwise than in the compre- 
 hensive terms of the Award, which declares that the sura 
 awarded is 'the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain 
 to the United States for the satisfaction of all the claims 
 referred to the consideration of the Tribnnal^ conform- 
 ably to the provisions contained in Article VII. of the 
 aforesaid Treaty.' The Arbitrators, — be it observed, — 
 do not say for tJie satisfaction of certain specific claims 
 among those referred to the consideration of the Tri- 
 bunal, butof 'aZZ the claims' so referred conformably 
 to the provisions of the Treaty. 
 
 "Now, the practical question which arises is, whether 
 the schedules of claims, which were presented to the 
 Tribunal as documentary proofs on the part of the United 
 States are conclusive, either as to what they contain or 
 what they do not contain, to establish rules of distribu- 
 tion under the Award. 
 
 "This point is settled by what occurred in discussions 
 before the Tribunal. 
 
 ' ' Great Britain had presented a table, composed in large 
 part of estimates, appreciations, and arbitrary or sup- 
 
31 
 
 posititious averages ; inconsequence of which the United 
 States presented other tables, to which the British Agent 
 objected that these tables comprehended claimants, and 
 subjects of claims, not comprised in the actual schedules 
 tiled b}^ the United States ; to which the American Agent 
 replied by showing that the Tribunal had before it, in 
 virtue of the Treaty, all the reclamations made by the 
 United States in the interests of individuals injured, 
 and comprised under the generic name of Alabama 
 Claims. 
 
 "Some discussions on the same subject afterward oc- 
 curred between Mr. Staemptli and Sir Alexander 
 Cockburn, which conclusively prove that the result 
 reached did not accept as binding either the tables pre- 
 sented by the United States or the deductions therefrom 
 claimed by Great Britain. The estimate of Mr. Staemptli 
 seems to have been the basis of conclusion ; and that 
 estimate is founded on dividing the ditference between 
 the American estimate of $14,437,000 and the British 
 estimate of $7,074,000, the mean of which is $10,905,000: 
 which mean does not in any sort represent the actual 
 claims of the United States. Indeed, one of the Arbitra- 
 tors expressly declared that, in arriving at a conclusion, 
 the Arbitrators were not to be regarded as making an 
 assessment, or confining themselves to the schedules, 
 estimates, or tables of either of the two governments. 
 "Whether the sum awarded be adequate, depends, in my 
 opinion, on whether distribution be made among actual 
 losers only and citizens of the United States. '^^'' 
 
 Private claims were presented by the United States to 
 the Geneva Tribunal for destructions by the 
 
 Alabama $7,050,293 1^ 
 
 Florida $4,057,934 69 
 
 Clarence, ) , , . ^. ., 66,736 ]0 
 
 rr, ' ^ tenders to Florida i/^omo oi 
 
 Tacony, \ .... 169,198 81 
 
 4,293,869 60 
 
 Shenandoah after Australia 6,112,028 32 
 
 $17,456,191 58 
 
 " Treaty of Washington" Gushing, page 164 
 
32 
 
 Brought forward, $17,456,191 58 
 
 Shenandoah before Australia 554,810 49 
 
 Boston 400 00 
 
 ■Chickaraauga 183,070 73 
 
 Georgia 431,160 72 
 
 Jeff Davis 7,752 00 
 
 Nashville 108,435 95 
 
 Retribution 29,018 53 
 
 Sallie 5,540 00 
 
 ;Sumter 179,697 67 
 
 Tallahasse 836,841 83 
 
 2,326,726 12 
 
 $19,782,917 60 
 
 Miscellaneous 479,033 00 
 
 Increased insurance. 6,146,219 71 
 
 The above table includes about $6,700,000 of " double claims 
 for the same loss," " prospective earnings,'' and " gross freight 
 where it exceeds net freight," leaving say $13,550,000 as the 
 amount (at owner's estimate of value) of property destroyed by 
 all the rebel cruisers. The losers have received from insurance 
 companies about $5,750,000, leaving say $7,800,000 of claims, 
 for which the losers have received no indemnity. 
 
 The insurers ha,ye paid about $5,750,000 for losses, and received 
 the increased premiums for war-risks, which are variously esti- 
 mated at from $8,000,000 to $12,000,000. 
 
 There was considerable loss for which no claims have yet been 
 presented to our government, probably, however, not more than 
 ■enough to balance the over-estimates of the losses for which 
 •claims have been presented. Thus we reach the following 
 •estimates : 
 
 •Claims for losses by the Alabama, Florida, 
 with her tenders, and the Shenandoah after 
 
 Australia $6,455,000 00 
 
 Shenandoah before Australia $230,000 
 
 All other cruisers 1,115,000 
 
 1,345,000 00 
 
 Total unindemnified loss $7,80u,000 00 
 
 Insurance companies paid out $5,750,000 00 
 
 Increased premiums paid to insurance companies $10,000,000 00 
 
To the Committee on the Judiciary, 
 
 House of Represerdatives. 
 Gentlemen : 
 
 I built ship Delpliiiie, m Bangor, Maine, and sold part of 
 her to persons whose interest I represent. 
 
 She was burned by the Shenandoah, just before that 
 English corsair reached Australia. 
 
 I had no insurance. Her captain, who owned one-eighth 
 of the ship, without insurance, was left with his wife and 
 child destitute in Australia. 
 
 We, the owners and captain, ask of this nation indemnity 
 for our loss. 
 
 We respectfully ask this Honorable Committee to recom- 
 mend legislation which will insure such indemnity. 
 
 We are confident — glad to he confident — that if our 
 prayer is one which ought not to be granted, the committee, 
 in its wisdom and justice, will see its duty, and refuse to 
 grant it. 
 
 For thus we are sure that if right, justice, and national 
 honor ask for what we ask, their prayer will be granted. 
 
 I know nothing whatever of law, but may not Congress, 
 which makes the laws, and makes the courts to administer 
 them — besides is a court of equity to right those wrongs 
 which the law, by reason of its generality, cannot reach — 
 may not Congress examine questions in the light of moral 
 obligation and just expediency ? Does anything deprive Con- 
 gress of the right to do right ? 
 
 If not, the question before you is — lohat is right? 
 
 If we have suffered wrong from which our Government 
 was under obligation to use due diligence to protect us, and 
 our Government, for consideration of value to itself , has con- 
 doned that wrong, and deprived us of remedy against the 
 wrongdoer, is it not right that we should be indemnified by 
 our Government ? 
 
 If the nation has endorsed our claim, and we still hold 
 that endorsement, is it not right that our claim should be 
 held good against the nation? 
 
 If our Government has received money exclusively as in- 
 demnity for wrongs done to itself, in the persons of its citi- 
 
zons, ought it not to pay those citizens who saftered by the 
 wrong ? 
 
 Wouki it be right to pay any part of the money to those 
 who were not injured, but benefited, by the acts of the wrong- 
 doer, to the exclusion of those who suffered loss by those 
 acts? 
 
 If our Govern nient refused to give, and the tribunal at 
 Geneva refused to take jurisdiction of the question, what 
 claimants should share in the sum awarded; would it be 
 right to make the decision of any iniernatioml question, by 
 that tribunal, decisive as to who should share in the distri- 
 bution ? 
 
 Has a purely international tribunal any jurisdiction over 
 questions of the obligations of either Government to its own 
 citizens ? 
 
 If not, have the decisions of the tribunal at Geneva im- 
 posed on this Government any trusteeship for the benefit of 
 any specific claimants or classes of claimants? Any obliga- 
 tion but to administer the amount awarded with impartial 
 justice ? 
 
 If the members of this committee are not already so con- 
 vinced, I think a moment's thought will convince them that 
 we have suffered, by the wrongful acts of England, from 
 which we had the right to ask protection of our Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 That our Government has condoned the wrong has de- 
 prived us of all remedy against England, and in the con- 
 doning has received abundant consideration for the injury 
 done to us; that the nation has endorsed our claim ; that as 
 against this nation we still hold that endorsement ; that our 
 Government, by virtue of the award at Geneva, has received 
 money enough to pay all claims as meritorious as ours ; that 
 insurers were not injured but benefited by England's wrong- 
 ful acts ; that it would be wrong to pay any part of the sum 
 awarded to insurers, to the exclusion of citizens who suffered 
 loss ; that our Government refused to give the tribunal juris- 
 diction of the question, who should share in the distribu- 
 tion of the award ; that the tribunal refused to take such 
 
jiirisdietion ; that the tribunal was purely international ; that 
 it had no jurisdiction over questions of obligation of either 
 Government to its subjects, hence imposed no trusteeship on 
 this Government but the obligation to do impartial justice 
 with its award. 
 
 If these are facts, do not right, justice, and national honor 
 unite in asking that our prayer be granted ? 
 
 A few words will explain the reasons for believing that 
 they are facts. 
 
 We have sutiered by England's acts, which were wrong. 
 
 The producing act, from which came all the losses which 
 loyal Americans sutfered on the sea, was that first act of 
 England by which she created the possibility and the fact of 
 belligerance on the sea. Without it no Confederate vessel 
 could have existed outside of Confederate waters. 
 
 Without it no English vessel in Confederate guise could 
 have destroyed a single ship. It changed the conflict on the 
 land from an insurrection to a war. 
 
 The moral character of an act always, the legal often, 
 depends upon the motive and intention of the actor, Eng- 
 land wished and intended these results. Her act was wrong. 
 
 Secretary Seward relied upon and persistently urged this 
 first act as good foundation for the claim that England 
 should pay for all the losses caused by ail the rebel cruisers, 
 and England had st last consented, in the Clarendon-John- 
 son Convention, that this act, as well as the acts resulting 
 from it, should be considered in the question of her liability. 
 Our Government, for reasons doubtless wise and good, con- 
 doned this wrong, abandoned it as basis for its claims for 
 indemnity. 
 
 The considerations bearing upon our foreign relations in 
 the future were such that the United States could much bet- 
 ter afford to pay the comparatively small amount of claims 
 that were thus virtually abandoned, than to have the settle- 
 ment other than it was. 
 
 The settlement, in express terms, deprived us of all rem- 
 edy against England. 
 
 It was England's ship, sailing from her port, manned by 
 
her men, the successor to the Alabama, that burned our 
 ship. (See Alabama Claims' Correspondence, vol. 3, pages 
 319,320,330, &c.) From this wrong we had the right to 
 ask our Government's protection. The right to govern in- 
 volves the obligation to protect. But in our nation there is 
 a broad distinction between this obligation on the land and 
 on the sea. 
 
 On the land a subject looks for protection and indemnity 
 for wrong to the authority of the town, county, or State in 
 which he lives, and may seldom look beyond. He forfeits 
 his right to protection if he places himself within the danger 
 to which the authority subjects its enemies. 
 
 We on the sea have no boundaries to limit our dangers; 
 can look only to the nation for protection. 
 
 This distinction relieves the present question of indemnity 
 from some embarrassments which have been supposed to 
 surround it. 
 
 The nation endorsed our claim. 
 
 Before it was known that she had destroyed a ship, Mr. 
 Adams was instructed to notify Lord Russell " that this 
 Government consider that Her Majesty's Government may 
 be justly held responsible for any losses accruing to citizens 
 of the United States through the depredations of the Sea 
 King." 
 
 See Alabama Claims, &c., vol. 3, p. 330. 
 
 As soon as her first depredations were known, Mr. Seward 
 wrote to Mr. Adams : " I have to request you to inform Her 
 Majesty's Government that the United States will claim 
 redress for the injuries inflicted on their citizens by the Sea 
 King or Shenandoah." (Same, page 335.) 
 
 And he did notify Lord Russell that " my Government 
 cannot avoid entailing upon the Government of Great Brit- 
 ain the responsibility for this damage." (Same page, 345.) 
 
 Note that all this relates to the Shenandoah before she 
 reached Australia. 
 
 We still hold that endorsement, for the settlement with 
 the respondent by the endorser, where he receives full value 
 
for the elaira, cannot cancel, but must strengthen, the obliga- 
 tion of that endorser to the claimant. 
 
 Our Government has received, in political considerations, 
 more important than money, many times the value of all 
 the unindemnified loss caused by all the cruisers not included 
 in the rules of international obligation established by the 
 Geneva tribunal. 
 
 It has received in the value of the Shenandoah and 
 Georgia themselves nearly or quite enough to pay for all the 
 loss caused by them, which was excluded from the rules of 
 international obligation, and for which the losers have re- 
 ceived no indemnity. 
 
 The Shenandoah was in an English port, without a claim- 
 ant ; no change of ownership had been made since her 
 wrongful act; she was open to libel in the English courts 
 for damage wrongfully done. The Minister of the United 
 States took possession of her for the benefit of the United 
 States, thus depriving me of a remedy against her, which I 
 had determined and prepared to seek. 
 
 (She had been sold for 45,000 pounds sterling, about 
 $220,000 in gold, at that time, |440,000 in greenbacks.) 
 
 Alabama Claims Correspondence, &c., vol. 3, p. 447. 
 
 And our Government has received in money more than 
 enough to indemnify all claims as meritorious as our own. 
 
 Your honorable chairman, last year, in his report from 
 this committee, after proving that " the amount awarded at 
 Geneva is the money of the United States, to be disposed of 
 at its pleasure, subject to no trust," said : " Your committee 
 can have no doubt that the persons who ought first to be 
 considered in this distribution are those who sufiered losses 
 while carrying on the commerce of the country, and have 
 received no indemnity whatever therefor." We are clearly 
 of that class of persons. 
 
 A careful examination of the list of claims shows that 
 the whole amount, at owners' estimates of value, of actual 
 unindemnified loss caused by all the cruisers is but about 
 $7,800,000. With interest at 6 per cent, for ten years, it 
 
6 
 
 would be but $12,480,000. -The proceeds of the Geneva 
 award, at market value, are more than $17,000,000. 
 
 Insurers were not injured, but benelited by England's 
 wrong. 
 
 Without England's first wrong act there would have been 
 no marine warfare, hence no marine war risks, or losses ; 
 there would have been no war premituns either. 
 
 The losses paid by insurers were about five and three- 
 quarter millions ; the war premiums paid to them from eight 
 to twelve millions. 
 
 Does that which causes one to receive ten million dollars 
 and return but six injure him financially ? 
 
 Insurance companies live by the fears of danger. If there 
 were no danger there would be no fears, and they could not 
 live. 
 
 If no ship had ever been lost at sea, would any Marine 
 Insurance Company have declared a dividend? 
 
 Would life insurance be profitable if no one ever died ? 
 The award was expressly as ''indemnity^'' for England's 
 wrong. Would it be reason to indemnify a man, in money, 
 for that which made him rich ? 
 
 Would it not be morally wrong, yes, morally absurd, to do 
 so to the exclusion of one who lost by the wrong? 
 
 It was right for England to pay this Government, in 
 money, for all the property lost to the nation by her fault, 
 (I say Government, nation, for in its foreign relations each 
 Government is a unit, a bodi/ politic, every citizen is a mem- 
 ber of that body, belonging to that Government, as my 
 thumbs are a part of and belong to me.) 
 
 Such payment being made it would be wrong for the na- 
 tion not to pay those of its citizens who lost by England's 
 fault. 
 
 If a man should maliciously bruise my thumb, and I 
 should demand indemnity, it would be for myself. It would 
 be a foolish wrong to bind up the ivell thumb and neglect 
 the bruised one. 
 
 If insurers had lost, instead of making millions, then 
 hey would have suti:ered no wrong from England — neither 
 
would they have any claim for iiuleiiinity upon the United 
 States. 
 
 England's wrong to the nation was no wrong to them. It 
 created a large field for speculation, in their way, which they 
 could enter or refuse to enter as they chose. Neither Eng- 
 land nor the United States compelled or asked them to go 
 in. They went in at their own option, and on their own 
 terms; it v/as their voluntary act from the consequences of 
 which they have no right to ask protection of their Govern- 
 ment. Idiots and insane persons have right to protection 
 from their own acts. 
 
 Our Government refused to give jurisdiction of the ques- 
 tion who should share in the distribution of its award, when 
 it said, by counsel, to the tribunal, in accordance with defi- 
 nite instructions to that counsel, " these claims are all pre- 
 ferred by the United States as a nation against Great 
 Britain as a nation, and are to be so computed and paid, 
 whether awarded as a sum in gross under the seventh arti- 
 cle of the treaty, or awarded for assessment of amount un- 
 der the tenth article." 
 
 The tribunal refused to take such jurisdiction when it 
 received this statement without objection, and in making its 
 award chose the way farthest removed from deciding any 
 such question. 
 
 That the tribunal was purely international and had no 
 jurisdiction over questions of the obligation of either Gov- 
 ernment to its citizens, is apparent from the fact that Gov- 
 ernments only, no citizens as such, had any part, or were 
 represented in that portion of the treaty which created the 
 tribunal, or in or before the tribunal itself. 
 
 No question of obligation of governaient to citizen was 
 submitted to or considered by the tribunal, hence its action 
 could decide no such question, or impose upon this Govern- 
 ment any trusteeship or obligation in favor of any citizen or 
 class of citizens, other than to administer its award with im- 
 partial justice. 
 
 I am aware that all the arguments which can be urged in 
 favor of our claim have equal force in favor of paying claims 
 
for other losses caused under similar circumstances by the 
 Shenandoah — nearly all for destruction by the Georgia — 
 most of them in favor of those caused by any rebel cruiser. 
 
 But the whole amount of unindemnified loss, not included 
 in the rules of international obligation established by the 
 Geneva tribunal, is comparatively small, not exceeding, ex- 
 clusive of interest, $220,000 by the Shenandoah, $180,000 
 by the Georgia, and $800,000 by all other rebel cruisers. 
 
 The question whether all the money received as indemnity 
 should be paid out, is one more of policy than right. A 
 thousand eager evil eyes are watching for any opening to 
 the treasury to insert a lever and pry open its door. 
 
 Whether they would be baflled more by leaving the 
 amount partly inside and partly outside of that door, or by 
 having the amount received as indemnity paid out as indem- 
 nity, and the accoimi closed, may be a question worth con- 
 sidering. 
 
 It was the shipping interests broadly, at the time of the 
 war, which suffered most by England's fault. 
 
 Perhaps no more equitable bill of relief to those interests 
 of that time could now be enacted than one which would 
 distribute the remainder among those w^ho paid war pre- 
 miums; but as their loss was caused by the/er/r rather than 
 by the/(?d of destructions, I think no word of mine need 
 be added to support the opinion of the Judiciary Committee 
 so ably expressed by your honorable chairman "that the 
 persons who ought first to be considered " is that class of 
 claimants to which we belong;. 
 
 In support of every statement I have made, I submit the 
 authorities pointed to in the foot notes of a little statement 
 of facts which, with your permission, I will lay before you. 
 
 I am very grateful for the kind attention which you have 
 given to my weak presentation of wliart we believe to be 
 our very strong case. 
 
 E. W. Metcalf, 
 Builder of Skip Delphine. 
 
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