3^ c«^^'-. o 0^ i' c x^ -^c^. ''i:'-^- ^ .€ O^^ s"> V ^/. ^c\ : ■^"■'% '^^L^ ^ ^^. ' '^ <-> '^^ rO >.o°- I'f' s m % * 3 .. » ' \* ,C °^^ ^ « -H. ^^/> -^A v^ xO^x. 1 ''-^- -f ■.* ^v" '^ "oo^ RUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST f&^ THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DAIXAS ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN CO, OP CANADA. Lm TORONTO RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST BY LEO PASVOLSKY AUTHOR OF "THE ECONOMICS OF COMMUNISM" I13eto gorfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1922 All rights reserved FEINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA rp-5 CJOPTRIGHT, 1922, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and printed. Published January, 1922. Press of J. J. Little & Ives Company New York, U. S. A. JAN 25 i322 ©GIA654367 PREFACE As this book goes to press, the Washington Confer- ence on the Limitation of Armament is still in session, with the question of Siberia on that part of the agenda, which the Conference has not as jet reached. The book, therefore, does not contain the actual decisions of the Conference on the Russian question. It appears likely that these decisions will be entirely within the scope of the American position with regard to the "moral trusteeship" over Eussia's national interests, and there is no doubt that the deliberations at the Con- ference will push to the fore many aspects of the Russian situation in the Far East. It is hoped, there- fore, that this book will furnish a background for a clearer imderstanding of this important situation. Materials on the various Russian phases of the Far Eastern question are not easily available in this country, and their interpretation is most difficult. I wish to express my gratitude to those who have helped me with suggestion and advice, and to thank particularly my vi PREFACE friend, Professor Samuel IST. Harper of the University of Chicago, for his invaluable cooperation. Leo Pasvolsky. Washing-ton, D. C, December 20, 1921 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I Russia and the Washington Conference ... 1 The Russian Question in Paris and in Washing- ton.— The idea of "Moral Trusteeship."— Three Conceptions of Russia. — The Purpose of the Book. ^ II Russian Expansion in Asia 9 Early Explorations. — The Acquisition of the Far East. — The Colonization of Siberia. ^ III Relations with China and Japan 21^ Chinese-Japanese Conflicts over Korea. — The Be- ginning of Russian Imperialism. — Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Korea. — The Boxer Uprising. — Far Eastern Agreements Preceding the Russo-Japanese War. — The War between Russia and Japan. rV Treaty Arrangements in the Far East ... 37 Russia and Japan after the War. — The Ports- mouth Treaty. — The Fisheries and the General Political Conventions. — The Russo-Japanese Se- cret Treaties. — Russia's Activities in Mongolia. — The Kyakhta Agreement. V The Bolsheviki and the Japanese in Siberia . . 56 Siberia during the Revolution. — The Activities of the Japanese Troops. — The Idea of the "Buffer" State. — The Far Eastern Republic. VI The Third International in Asia 71 Its General Aims and Purposes. — The Baku Con- gress. — Communist Activities in the Near East. — - The Soviet Diplomacy in China. — Communist Activities in India and Afghanistan. vii viii CONTENTS CHAPTBB PAflB VII The Soviet Strategy in the Far East ... 99 The Transfer of the Emphasis of Communist Ac- tivities from the Near to the Far East. — The Kamchatka Incident. — The Overthrow of the Au- thority of the Far Eastern Eepublic in Vladivo- stok. — The Soviet Troops in Mongolia. — The So- viets Banking on a War between Japan and the United States. VIII The Soviet Far Eastern Conference . . . 122 The Development of the Idea. — The Dairen Con- ference. — The Soviet Analysis of the Situation. — Relations between China and the Soviets. IX Russia's National Interests in the Far East . 138 National Interests vs. Imperialistic Aggression. — Territorial Integrity. — National Sovereignty.— Economic Cooperation with Foreign Powers. — Japan and the United States in Siberia. X Russia's Role in a World Balance of Powers . . 147 The World Equilibrium. — The New Importance of the Pacific Basin. — The Six Principal Factors in the World Situation. — Communist Russia as a Supernational Factor. — The Results of Commun- ist Activities in Asia. — The Probable Character of Reconstructed Russia. — The United States and Russia as the Upholders of the World Peace. APPENDIX : Text of Treaties and Documents . . 163 I Russia and Japan 163 J A. Political Convention of 1907 163 B. Secret Treaty of 1916 165 C. Secret Telegram of the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo Regarding the Lansing-Ishii Agreement 168 D. Chicherin's Note on the Far East .... 170 II Russia and China 174 A. Russo-Mongolian-Chinese Convention . . . 174 CONTENTS ix PA«B B. Appeal of the Eevolutionary Government of Mongolia ■^'" C. Chicherin's Reply to the Appeal of the Revolu- tionary Government of Mongolia .... 177 D. Soviet Note on Chinese-Mongolian Relations 180 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST CHAPTEK I RUSSIA AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE Russia is not represented at the Washington Confer- ence. For the second time since the termination of the World War, an international conference of far- reaching importance takes place with Eussia absent from the conference table. So it was in Paris in 1919 ; so it is in Washington in 1921. Yet there is a vast difference between the conditions attending these two instances when Russia is not present at a world con- clave of nations. At the Peace Conference in Paris no serious attempt was made to face squarely the problems presented by the state of affairs that had become established in Russia as a result of her Communist regime. The Conference dealt with problems resulting directly from 2 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST the World War, in whicli Russia was one of the prin- cipal participants and in which she suffered losses at least as great as any of her Allies. She had vital and direct interests at stake, which demanded determination and for which some provisions had to he made. Yet no such determination of Russia's interests was made; no such provision for the eventual satisfaction of these interests was attempted. What the Conference really did was to make every effort to push the Russian ques- tion into the background and leave it there hanging in the air. Almost throughout the duration of the Paris Con- ference the great powers which controlled it never seemed either decided or in accord even on the question of Russia's representation at the conference table. They attempted the Prinkipo Conference of different Russian groups. Russia was then in the throes of a civil war, and the differences between the combatant groups were obviously of such a nature as could not be composed by means of the kind of conference pro- posed from Paris. After the Prinkipo attempt at solving the Russian problem, the Paris Conference permitted the question to drop altogether. Occasionally this question would come up in the deliberations of the great powers, but never either for action or for any RUSSIA AND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 3 direct and binding declaration. For weeks tlie Con- ference conducted an exchange of notes with Admiral Kolchak, finally ending these protracted negotiations with a promise of assistance which, incidentally, was never carried out to the satisfaction of any Russian groups. As against this attitude to the Russian question on the part of the Paris Conference, we have quite a dif- ferent situation in Washington. The subject of "Si- beria" is on the *genda of the Conference, and there is an authoritative indication as to the attitude toward the Russian question on the part of at least one great power in the form of the declaration of the Gov- ernment of the United States, contained in the cablet- gram to the American Minister at Peking, dated September 19, 1921. This declaration was evoked by the fact that an agent of the Far Eastern Re^ public, the "buffer" state created by the Soviets in Eastern Siberia, sent a request to the American Lega- tion at Peking that representatives of that Republic be admitted to the Washingon Conference on Limitation of Armament. In reply to this, the Government of the United States instructed its Minister at Peking to communicate to the agent of the Far Eastern Republic the following "informal observations": 4 EUSSIA m THE FAR EAST "In the absence of a single, recognized Russian Govern- ment, the protection of legitimate Russian interests must devolve as a moral trusteeship upon the whole Conference. It is regrettable that the Conference, for reasons quite beyond the control of the participating powers, is to be deprived of the advantage of Russian cooperation in deliberations, but it is not to be conceived that the Conference will take deci- sions prejudicial to legitimate Russian interests or which would in any manner violate Russian rights. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Conference will establish general principles of inter- national action which will deserve and have the support of the people of Eastern Siberia and of all Russia by reason of their justice and efficacy in the settlement of outstanding difficulties." The thesis set forth in these "unofficial observations" represents, naturally, only tbe position of the United States. But it is inconceivable that the position of the whole Conference should be fundamentally at variance with that of the United States, the initiator of the Conference itself, and it is safe to assume that "the moral trusteeship" over Russia's interests will be the attitude toward the Russian problem on the part of the Washington Conference. If we compare the attitude toward the Russian ques^- tion at the Paris and the Washington Conferences, we find three basic differences. The Paris Confer- ence failed entirely to face the Russian question with the directness and squareness that the importance of this question merited and demanded; the Washington EUSSIA AND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 5 Conference, judging by so authoritative a forecast of its position as the September declaration of the Govern- ment of the United States, seems prepared to face the Russian question directly and squarely. The Paris Conference was never certain of its position as to whether or not the Soviet regime in Russia was entitled to representation at the conference table, and demon- strated this lack of assurance by its attempt to call the Prinkipo Conference; the Washington Conference, again judging by the same forecast as above, is decided on its refusal to admit the right of the Soviet regime or any of its vassal formations on the former Russian territory to act as the spokesmen for the national and international interests of the Russian people, or to re^ ceive officially the representatives of any of the Russian groups in emigration. Finally, the Paris Conference made no attempt to apply international action to any of Russia's legitimate interests, jeopardized in any way by the situation that has become created in Russia be^ cause of the existence there of the Soviet regime; the Washington Conference seems prepared not only to examine these legitimate interests of Russia, but also to defend them by international action and hold them in trust for the reconstructed Russia of the future. But the declaration of the Government of the United 6 EUSSIA m THE FAE EAST States, defining Eussia's position at the Washington Conference, raises two significant questions. The first of these questions is concerned with the nature and scope of Eussia's ^legitimate interests" and "rights." There is no doubt that the "unofiicial obser- vations" contained in the cablegram of September 19, 1921, were not intended to preclude an opportunity for various Eussian groups to present their interpretation of these interests and rights to the Washington Confer- ence, and there is equally no doubt that such interpre- tations have been presented. But it is the idea of "moral trusteeship" that is to be the main protection of Eussia's rights and interests, and it ought not to be difficult to distinguish between what may properly be considered as Eussia's legitimate interests, the result of healthy national policies, and the spurious and ques- tionable advantages wrested by the Eussian Imperial Government at different phases of its unhealthy imperialistic ventures. It seems most important, there- fore, in view of the situation, to review the historic background of the events that have recently unfolded themselves in Eussia. Moreover, it is most important to bear in mind that there are at least three conceptions of "Eussia" pre- sented to us by Eussia's recent history. The first is EUSSIA AND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 7 the conception of Imperial Kussia, the Eussia that waSj the Russia that was swept out of existence by the Eevolution of March, 1917. This Russia was often aggressive and imperialistic. The second is the con- ception of Soviet Russia, the Russia that, for the moment, is. This Russia is hound to be, by its very nature, insatiably aggressive and, though in a different sense from its Imperial predecessor, violently imperial- istic. The third is the conception of Democratic Russia, the Russia that will he. This Russia emerged for a few short months between the March Revolution and the November overthrow of the Provisional Govern- ment; it is this Russia that is bound to emerge from the suffering country's present-day tragic trials. The ^legitimate" interests of Russia are those in- terests the impairment or violation of which will be prejudicial to this third Russia. Only for such a Russia is a "moral trusteeship'' of the United States and of the Washington Conference conceivable. The second question is concerned with the impos- sibility to invite representatives of the Soviet Govern- ment or of any of its vassal formations to the confer- ence table in Washington. It is often argued that in its foreign policy the Soviet Government follows "nationalistic" lines and consequently defends and pro- 8 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST tects Eussia's national interests. And this argument is used as a basis for tlie belief that the Soviet Government is competent to act as the spokesman for Russia in all vital international relations. It is primarily to the answer to these two questions that this book is devoted. The attention is centered on the Far East, rather than on the Eussian situation generally, because the Washington Conference deals principally with the questions affecting the Far East. The book is an attempt to present the salient features of Eussia's concern with the Far East in the light of the history of her expansion and policies in Asia, as well as of the special problems presented by the recent activities in various parts of the Asiatic continent of the Eussian Soviet Government and of its ^^General Staff of the World Eevolution," known as the Third or Communist International, particularly with regard to their present-day politico-military strategy in the Far East. The concluding chapter is devoted to the relative position of Eussia and the United States, in the light both of their relations as separate national entities and of the role that they are likely to play in a world political equilibrium, the foundation for which it is hoped will be laid at the Washington Conference. CHAPTEK II RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA The story of Russia's expansion east of the Ural moun- tains is one of nearly five centuries of slow and gradual infiltration, followed by a quarter of a century of very intense and energetic activity. Out of this last quarter of a century grew a number of international conflictiS which had far-reaching consequences for the history of Eussia. As early as the thirteenth century, settlers from the more energetic of the Slavic principalities, at that time scattered like oases through the vast stretches of Euro- pean Russia, began to push their way across the Ural mountains and into the plains of Western Siberia. They conquered the aboriginal tribes which occupied these lands and built their trading outposts. The process continued through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, adventurous bands of Slavs pushing their way farther and farther into the fertile lands beyond the Urals. 9 10 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST In the second half of the sixteenth century, a band of adventurous Cossacks appeared on the territory of Siberia and, in the course of a series of expeditions, se- cured for Moscow a vast realm east of the Urals. The status of these bands and the precise reasons for their appearance in Siberia does not appear clear in historic records. One version makes them and particularly their leader, Yermak, refugees from justice; another version makes them semi-regular troops in the service of the Eussian authorities along the Siberian border. In any event, Yermak and his band pushed their way through the Siberian wilderness, and brought the aboriginal tribes to allegiance to the Tsar of Moscow. This event is usually taken as the historic beginning of definite and organized efforts on the part of the rapidly consolidating Russian state, centered around Moscow, to push its way eastward. From that time on, for a whole century, groups of adventurous traders went on and on into the heart of Asia. They were drawn by innumerable fantastic tales told by the aborigines of Siberia with whom they came in contact concerning the vast mineral wealth which lies farther and farther east. By the middle of the following cen- tury the power of Russia had already become extended as far as Lake Baikal. And all through the territory EUSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA 11 lying around the lake, the Eussian settlers heard stories about a wonderful river that was supposed to take its source in the heart of China and flow through marvel- ously rich country into the huge ocean that bounded the continent at its easternmost extremities. Enticed by these stories, an adventurous emissary sent by the governor of the Yakutsk province, which covers the north-central portion of Siberia, set out in search of the great river and its untold riches. This emissary, Yasily Poyarkov by name, succeeded in 1646 in reaching the Amur river, the great stream that had figured so prominently in the tales of the Siberian aborigines. He sailed down the river and returned to Yakutsk with an enthusiastic story of what he had seen on his journey. Three years after Poyarkov's explora- tion, Erofey Khabarov, an enterprising peasant settler in the Yakutsk province, sailed down the Amur river with a band of followers and began the real conquest of the land, which was to some extent inhabited by the Chinese and acknowledged the rule of the Manchu dynasty. Others followed Khabarov, and in the course of the next forty years a number of Kussian settlements sprang up along the Amur and in the surrounding country. However, the Peking Government objected to this 12 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST colonization, witli the result that in 1689 a treaty was signed at Nerchinsk between Russia and China, by virtue of which the whole Amur territory was officially recognized as a part of China. Tor a hundred and fifty years after that, the efforts of Russian colonizers in Siberia were restricted to the lands lying west of the Amur territory. But in 1846 Nicholas I ordered an investigation of the Amur quesr tion, as well as of the Amur territory itself. Following this order, the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, N. Muraviev, sent an expedition to the Amur river, led by Captain Nevelsky, a young and energetic officer, who started out on his mission in 1849. At that time Russia did not feel herself very strongly situated in her eastern possessions, while her general international situation was far from satisfactory: the clouds of the Crimean War, which was to result in an utter defeat of Russia, were already on the horizon. In view of this, the order for the investigation of the Amur territory was accompanied by strict instructions to avoid any conflict with China. In spite of these instructions, however. Captain Nevelsky in 1850 built a fort near the mouth of the Amur river on the site of the present city of Nikolayevsk, and, raising the RTTSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA 13 Russian flag over the city, claimed the whole territory as a part of the Russian Empire. Although the report of this exploit was received very unfavorably in St. Petersburg and the fort was ordered destroyed, the Russian Imperial Government soon after this resumed its efforts to gain possession of the Amur territory. Negotiations looking toward the cession of the Amur lands to Russia were conducted during the following five years by the Russian ambassa- dor in Peking. The Chinese Government at first refused the demands of the Russian ambassador, but finally gave in, and in 1858, by virtue of the Aigun treaty, the Amur territory became definitely and officially a part of the Russian Empire. Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, or ^ve hundred years after Russia began her movement toward the East, she finally ended her eastward march and came to rest on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. By the time of the signing of the Aigun treaty, Russian settlers were already scattered over the Amur territory and the various points of the coast. The first appear- ance of Russian settlers on the island of Sakhalin was in 1857, and on the peninsula of Kamchatka much, earlier than that. But the occupation of this whole territory did not 14 EUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST in any way imply an active policy of development on the part of the Eussian Government. On the contrary, for a number of decades, following the formal cession of the Amur territory to Eussia, scarcely anything was done for an active utilization of the vast resources which had thus been acquired by Eussia. One of the great difficulties was the question of transportation, which greatly hindered — in fact, rendered almost im- possible — any colonization scheme on a fairly large scale. Generally speaking, the colonization of Asiatic Eus^ sia began soon after Yermak^s formal conquest of the country. For three hundred years after that, i. e., until the second half of the nineteenth century, there were recurrent periods of slow infiltration of settler groups into the vast reaches of Siberia. These settlers were principally of four different classes : traders, mili- tary contingents, exiles, and free immigrants. The first colonizers of Siberia were mainly traders, attracted by the fur and mineral wealth of the new lands. Together with them came Cossack groups, who settled there and served for protection. In the eigh- teenth century, large groups of Cossacks from the Don district moved to the Transbaikal region and settled there. They received special privileges from the Gov- EUSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA 15 eminent. Numerically, however, neither of these two classes of settlers was important for the colonization of Siberia. The exiles were a much more important element in the work of colonizing Asiatic Kussia. The system of Siberian exile was begun as early as the seventeenth century, the first recorded legislation providing for exile to Siberia being in 1648. At the beginning, the system of exile was used merely as a punitive measure and was applied mostly to criminal offenders. Gradu- ally, however, economic importance began to be attached to it. The development of Siberia's natural wealth, particularly of its mineral resources, and the beginning of manufacturing in some of the larger centers, notably in Irkutsk, opened up the possibilities of utilizing the exiles as a source of labor supply. Political offenders and religious non-conformists were early added to the exile elements, and together the three exile groups con- stituted a rather important factor, from the viewpoint of both colonization and economic development. In 1753 capital punishment was abolished in Russia, and penal servitude in Siberia was substituted for it. This, naturally, resulted in a certain amount of increase in the number of exiles, though it scarcely improved the character of the exile elements. 16 EUSSIA m THE FAR EAST The fourtli and by far the most important class of settlers was the free immigrant element. During the early centuries of the colonization of Siberia this ele- ment was not very large. The Russian Government itself did not encourage free migration to Siberia, and until 1870 even made no efforts to separate the peaceful settlers from the exiles. But, beginning with the second half of the nineteenth century, the importance of the free immigrant element increased very considerably. The liberation of the serfs in 1861 provided a decided stimulus to free migration beyond the Urals. Soon after the actual liberation itself the peasants realized that the agrarian forms established under the new system would scarcely provide them in any part of Russia vdth sufficient amounts of land. New opportunities began to be sought elsewhere by the more energetic of the liberated peasants. Lack of transportation facilities, however, impeded greatly the work of colonization. But in the eighties of the past century, when the Russian Government began to take up a project of the construction of a txans- Siberian railroad, interest in free migration into Siberia increased very perceptibly. This interest continued to grow as the construction of the railroad was begun and EUSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA 17 was pushed farther and farther eastward. The com- pletion of the railroad line and the Russo-Japanese War served to induce an increasingly rapid tempo into the process of the colonization of Siberia. This constantly increasing tempo was in a rather interesting contrast with the slow movement of the first centuries of Russian occupation of Siberia. It has been calculated that from the time of the first migrations, following Yermak's conquest of Siberia and up to the second half of the nineteenth century, less than three million settlers had crossed the Urals. The number that crossed the great Eurasian divide during the last quarter of a century was several times that total. In the course of the half-decade from 1906 to 1910, nearly three million settlers left European Russia and went into the different parts of Siberia. There was another factor which served to stimulate the migration into Siberia during the years following the Russo-Japanese War, and that was the attitude on the part of the Russian Government, coupled with the direct result of a number of its agrarian measures. In 1906, over 200,000 square miles of governmental or so-called ''Cabinet" lands in Siberia were thrown open to general colonization. This in itself caused a rush of colonists, which was still further stimulated 18 RUSSIA m THE FAE EAST by the fact that, the following year, the agrarian pro- gram sponsored by Prime Minister Stolypin went into effect. This program consisted in abolishing some of the features of the traditional system of communal land tenure. Its object was to create a class of small peasant proprietors by permitting the cutting up of communally held lands and granting individual peasants the right of selling their lands without the consent of the com- munal organizations. AU this afforded the more ener- getic peasant elements more opportunity for migration, and rendered Siberia with its extensive and virgin land tracts more accessible to them. The migration to Siberia during the year 1906 itself comprised only 141,294 immigrants. But the very next year the number increased to 427,339, while in 1908 the high-water mark of the Siberian migration was reached: in the course of that year 664,777 immigrants entered Asiatic Eussia. Then the volume of migration began to decrease, though the number for 1909 was still 619,320. The colonists in Siberia occupy almost exclusively the "black-soil" belt, which runs through the southern part of the country and through which the Trans- Siberian Kailroad and the great Siberian roadway are laid. They spread away from this belt occasionally. EUSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA 19 hewing their way into the vast Siberian forests and clear- ing for themselves tremendously valuable virgin lands. The colonization of Eastern Siberia and particularly of the Far East proper is of more recent origin than that of the western portion of the country, though, curiously enough, in some territories here the percentage of Kussian immigrant population by comparison with the non-Kussian elements is very high. In the Transr baikal territory, it was calculated in 1900 that the percentage of Russian population was 64; it is much higher now. This territory was used for a long time as a place of exile for political offenders, and some of the most important political prisons and places of exile were located here. In the Amur territory the first colonizers were Cos- sacks who were ordered to settle there after 1857-8, when the territory was formally ceded by China to Eussia. Peasant colonization of the territory began in 1869. These settlers came to entirely unoccupied lands, for the native population was extremely sparse, while the Chinese were aggregated at a small number of centers, principally at the confluences of rivers. By 1911 the total population of the Amur territory was estimated at 286,000, of whom only about 44,000 were non-Russian. 20 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST The colonization of the Maritime or Primorsk Prov- ince proceeded under conditions practically analogous with those which obtained in the Amur territory. The percentage of Russian population there is somewhat lower, being a little over 60, though the total population is more than twice the population of the Amur territory. !N"either Sakhalin nor Kamchatka have been found suit- able for extensive colonization, except in certain points along the coast. By the time of the Revolution, Russia's possessions in Asia occupied the whole of the northern belt and a large part of the temperate zone of Asia, stretching clear across the continent^ from the Ural mountains to the Pacific Ocean. In some of its mid- Asiatic posses- sions, notably Turkestan, the Russian Empire pushed into the very heart of central Asia. One third of the total surface of the continent constituted Russian terri- tory. The population of this territory in that year was over twenty millions. The twelve provinces which constitute Siberia had at that time a population of about fifteen millions. E'ully seventy-five per cent, of this number were white, almost exclusively settlers from European Russia — the living forces of Russia's expan- sion in Asia. CHAPTEE III RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN The awakening of Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century led her to an aggressive policy on the continent of Asia and brought her into a series of violent conflicts, first with China and eventually with Russia. The first important appearance of Japan was the result of a commercial treaty which she signed in 1876 with the Government of Korea. Although at that time practically a vassal of China, Korea made her own international arrangements, of which the treaty of 1876 was probably the most important in her history, for it opened the door to foreigners, made Korea the arena of an international struggle, and led to her almost complete absorption by Japan. Korea's agreement with Japan was followed by simi- lar treaties with a number of European powers, the last one being with Eussia in 1884. The influx of for- eigners resulting from these arrangements caused very considerable resentment on the part of the Korean 21 22 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST people and led to a rebellion, which occurred soon after the signing of the Eussian treaty. The principal enmity of the Korean people was directed against the Japanese, who were both most active among the foreign groups and were generally considered the initiators and the principal cause of the whole situation. Japan sent troops to Korea, but, upon China's protest, withdrew them, for the rebellion had already been put down. But she conditioned the withdrawal of her troops upon a convention signed at the same time, by virtue of which both China and Japan reserved the right to send troops to Korea to establish order, but undertook to notify each other whenever such dispatching of troops would be in contemplation. Ten years later, in 1894, another rebellion occurred in Korea, and when the Korean Emperor appealed to Peking for help and the Chinese Government sent troops to Korea, Japan immediately dispatched her own troops there. Under the pretext of taking measures to quell the uprising, the Japanese troops occupied the city of Seoul, the Korean capital. At the same time the Japanese ambassador demanded from the Korean Gov- ernment the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops and the placing in the hands of the Japanese expedi- tionary force of the entire task of maintaining order RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN 23 in Korea. China served a counter-demand of tlie same nature upon the Japanese Government, and this counter- demand, served in the terms of an ultimatum, led to a war between China and Japan. The war was of a very short duration, and Japan was entirely successful in its conduct. On April 17, 1895, a treaty of peace was signed at the Japanese city of Simonoseki. By virtue of this treaty, China recog- nized the independence of Korea and ceded to Japan the island of Formosa, a number of other smaller islands, and, what was most important of all. Southern Manchuria and the naval base of Port Arthur; more^ over, a large contribution was provided for by this treaty. The treaty of Simonoseki brought to the Kussian Imperial Government a realization of the importance which the Far Eastern situation was beginning to as- sume. The Chinese colossus was apparently badly weakened. At the same time, a new power appeared on the continent of Asia in the form of the awakened Japan, which was rapidly forcing its influence and was becoming a force to be reckoned with through its acqui- sition of such an important continental base as rich and fertile Manchuria. Eussia immediately set to work to frustrate the plans of the Japanese. 24 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST An ultimatum was sent to Tokyo, demanding from Japan the immediate return to China of Manchuria and the city of Port Arthur. France and Germany joined in the Russian protest, which was supported very forcefully by the dispatching to the Chinese waters of a strong Ruasian-French-German fleet. Japan agreed to relinquish her claims to Manchuria, but insisted on retaining Port Arthur. To this the coalition powers would not consent, and Japan was forced in the end to give up Port Arthur. This first active interference on the part of Russia in the affairs of the Far East was decidedly a conflict between her and Japan, which resulted in her favor but left Japan very resentful. This initial resentment on the part of Japan increased greatly in intensity, when three years later Russia herself did precisely what Japan tried to do and was prevented from doing by the active interference on the part of Russia and her Allies. Its success in the reversing of the Simonoseki agree- ment was no doubt a powerful stimulus in changing the attitude of the Russian Government toward the affairs of the Far East. An excellent illustration of this may be found in its suddenly changed estimate of the sig- nificance of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the construc- tion of which by that time had already practically KELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN 25 reached the Amur River. Until its appearance as an active political factor in the Far Eastern situation, the Russian Imperial Government looked upon the Trans-Siberian Railroad solely as an artery of trade and an instrument of colonization. After the first en- counter with Japan the Siberian railroad began to loom in its eyes as a strategic possibility. \y^ The terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad is the city of Vladivostok. The question of how that city was to be connected by railroad with the already con- structed portions of the Trans-Siberian came up just about that time. A line could be run along the left- hand bank of the Amur, or else it could traverse Manchuria at a rather considerable distance from the right-hand bank of the Amur. The second course meant fewer technical difiiculties and a very important shorten- ing of the track, but it also involved political consid- erations of a prime importance, since fourteen hundred versts of the track had to be laid over Chinese territory. The possibility of a line through Manchuria had been discussed before, and its economic importance to Russia was fully realized since the Amur line, even- tually constructed after the Russo-Japanese War, obvi- ously presented great difficulties both of construction and maintenance. Negotiations relative to the con- 26 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST struction of this road had been carried on between the Eusso-Chinese Bank and the Chinese Government, and a contract was finally signed in 1896. The result of this contract was the construction of the Chinese East- em Eailroad and the cession to Russia of important privileges in a strip of Chinese territory, extending along both sides of the railroad. But the railroad agreement was followed two years later by a Russian-Chinese convention, which was of a tremendously far-reaching nature and which made it possible for the imperialistic groups in St. Petersburg to obscure the paramount economic importance of the Chinese Eastern Railroad by political considerations of a most dangerous nature. By virtue of this con- vention, signed in Peking on March 15, 1898, Russia leased from China for the period of twenty-five years the cities of Port Arthur and Talienwan, the two impor- tant ports in the southern part of Manchuria. Russia received also the right to connect these ports by means of a railroad line with the main line of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The lease was made renewable indefinitely by agreement of the two sides. By the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese agreement, Russia entered definitely upon a policy of imperialistic aggression in the Far East. Her role and that of Japan RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN 27 became reversed. She was now attempting to do, by pushing down from the north, what Japan had attempted to do by pushing up from the south, viz., to establish dominating control in Manchuria. An intense rivalry sprang up between Eussia and Japan which lasted for a number of years and finally brought them to an armed encounter. The scene of the rivalry was at first trans- ferred from Manchuria to Korea, only to be shifted back again on the very eve of the Eusso-Japanese War. Deprived of the advantages in Manchuria she had wrested from China by the Simonoseki treaty, Japan turned her attention definitely in the direction of Korea and began to establish her influence there. But she was again brought face to face with Eussia, which was quick to follow her to Korea. On May 14, 1896, a convention was signed between Eussia and Japan, by virtue of which both Eussia and Japan undertook to assist Korea in establishing internal order and other- wise reorganizing her affairs after her break with China. This assistance was to be in the form of the presence of Eussian and Japanese advisers in Seoul. In March, 1898, the Korean Government informed Eussia that order had been established in the country and that the presence of foreign advisers was no longer necessary. The Eussian Government replied to this 28 EUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST that it was quite willing to cease all active participation in the affairs of Korea, provided Korea had really established order and was in a position to defend her independence. Otherwise Russia would consider it necessary to take measures to insure this. This reply was obviously a mere formality on the part of the Russian Government, for neither Russia nor Japan were prepared to leave Korea. On the contrary, they were vying with each other in the work of economic penetration. Japan was particularly interested in the construction of railroads, while Russia sought timber concessions, which were a very poor disguise for stra- tegic advantages. This ostensibly economic but really military rivalry between Russia and Japan in Korea continued for several years and was one of the imme- diate causes of the war between the two countries. In the meantime, Russia was working in Manchuria with a truly feverish energy. Immediately upon her acquisition of the ports in southern Manchuria she began to construct a powerful naval fortress at Port Arthur and a commercial port at Talienwan, which she renamed Dalny. At the same time she was pushing the construction of the railroad line which was to con- nect these ports with the Trans-Siberian line. In 1900 a formidable revolt took place in China, Mm^. RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN 29 known as the Boxer uprising. This uprising was directed against all foreigners, who were acquiring greater and greater privileges in China and obtaining more and more a firm footing on Chinese territory. The revolt was put down by the intervention of the great world powers, which sent an international expe- ditionary force into China. But before the revolt was put down, much damage was done to foreign life and property. As far as Russia was concerned, the Boxer uprising affected particularly her property in Manchuria. By the time of the uprising, nearly 1300 versts of the Chinese Eastern Railroad had been laid, and of them over 900 versts were destroyed by the insurgents. Tremendous amounts of property and supplies were also destroyed. As a result of this, Russian troops occupied nearly the whole of Manchuria. When the Boxer uprising had been put down and the terms of the settlement arranged, the Chinese Gov- ernment took up with the Russian Government the ques- tion of the evacuation of Manchuria, which was still occupied by the Russian troops. On March 26, 1902, a Russo-Chinese convention was signed in Peking, which provided for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Manchuria, but this provision was made in very indefi- 30 KUSSIA IN" THE FAE EAST nite terms. At the same time, tlie convention placed Russia in an especially favorable situation with regard to her economic penetration there. So far as Manchuria was concerned, Eussia had practically obtained the application to that part of China of the principle of the "closed door," with herself as the holder of the key. Quite carried away by the success which had attended so far its imperialistic ventures in the Far East, the Russian Imperial Government became more and more ambitious in its Far Eastern policies. There were groups that even urged an annexation of the whole of Manchuria in lieu of the Boxer indemnities, to which Russia was entitled by the terms of the settlement following the Boxer uprising. While this part of the Russian diplomatic history is still unwritten, there is reason to believe that Germany was to a large extent responsible for the ambitious Far Eastern policy of the Government of Nicholas II. Russia's international position during that period was very strong, while internally she was going through a very rapid industrial development, which caused considerable apprehensions to Germany. Although the relations between Russia and Germany were very friendly, the Germans were growing more and more disturbed about Russia's eco- nomic progress, which, the Germans knew but too well, RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN 31 woiild bring with it an insistent demand for a non- freezing port and was bound to be a serious economic blow to Germany. To inspire Kussia with ambitions in the Far East, to fill her with fears of a "Yellow Peril/' to whisper into the ear of her Government the dreams of a, non-freezing port in Manchuria, to inveigle her in this manner in a hot-headed adventure in the Far East and draw her attention away from develop- ment in Europe — aU this, there is reason to believe, was planned and executed by the German Imperial Government. In 1901 a Far Eastern Convention was signed be- tween Great Britain and Germany. This convention guaranteed the integrity of China and freedom of trade there. But it did not mention Korea, and deliberately excluded Manchuria. This exclusion of Manchuria from guarantees of freedom of trade was made at the insistence of Germany with a view to Russian preten- sions there.* It was opposed by Great Britain, and not only rendered the whole convention practically inopera- tive but led to most important consequencer in the form * Prince Biilow, the German Imperial Chancellor, declared in the Reichstag with reference to the Germau-British convention that the German Imperial Government recognized defiiytely Russia's special rights in Manchuria. This declaration of the German Imperial Chancellor caused much jubilation at the time in the Russian govern- mental circles, which then little dreamt of the consequences that this apparently "friendly" attitude of the German Government was destined to have for Russia. 32 EUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST of an Anglo-Japanese agreement, signed the following year. The Anglo- Japanese agreement, signed in 1902, guar- anteed the independence of China and Korea. But it recognized special interests of Great Britain in China and of Japan in both China and Korea, as well as the right of each to protect its interests in these countries, if threatened by aggression of another countTy or by internal disorders. The agreement also provided that in case one of the contracting powers should be drawn into a war, the other must preserve neutrality and make every effort, to prevent other powers from joining against its ally. Should, however, another power join against the ally, the neutral contracting power would be obliged immediately to render assistance to its ally. This agreement was Russia's first reverse in the Far East. She countered it, however, by a Russo-French convention, signed the same year, in which the two contracting parties declared that they reserved a right to defend their interests in the Far East. The possi- bility of an armed conflict with other powers was men- tioned in the convention, which was generally taken as a notice on the part of France that the provisions of her offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, then already in existence, would apply in case of an armed EELATIOJSrS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN 33 encounter in tlie Far East. The Russian Government thought it had thus checkmated its opponent, but the very next year Russia's second reverse in the Far East took place. This second reverse was in the form of the American- Chinese convention, signed in 1903, which opened up for foreign trade the cities of Mukden and Andun and provided that the rules of foreign trade and of the resi- dence of foreigners, i. e., Americans, would be settled by agreement between China and the United States. These provisions were counter to the provisions of the Russo-Chinese convention of the previous year, and the Russian Government protested against it, hoping that it would not bo ratified in its original form. Pending the ratification of the convention, Russia interrupted the evacuation of Manchuria, which had already begun, and reoccupied the city of Mukden. However, the con- vention was ratified as originally drafted, and Russian claims to the establishment in Manchuria of her sphere of special interests was definitely shaken. This reverse was particularly telling for Russia, because Japan was entirely in harmony with the United States in the de- mand for the maintenance of the principle of "open door'' in Manchuria. All through the year 1903 negotiations were carried 34 EIJSSIA m THE FAR EAST on between Russia and Japan, looking toward a settle- ment of the Korean question and a composition of the difficulties between the two countries. Finally a tenta- tive agreement was reached, but Japan demanded that the settlement include also the Manchurian question. To this Russia would not consent, claiming that the two questions should not be confused, but should be settled separately. Then Japan suddenly broke off the negotiations and declared a war on Russia. The Russo-Japanese War began at the end of 1903 and lasted for nearly a year and a half, when it was terminated by an intervention of Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the United States. Japan was en- tirely victorious throughout the war. The reasons for this were numerous and varied. The Russian advance in Manchuria and Korea was not carried on with any degree of either military or economic skill. Russia was utterly unprepared for the war, in spite of the fact that, for months before it came, its clouds were unmistakable on the political horizon. There were not enough troops in the Far East or close enough to the Far Eastern theatre of war. Supplies were utterly insufficient. Transportation was wretched, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad still in an unfinished state. The naval equip- ment was thoroughly inadequate. The whole high 4 RELATI0:N'S with china and japan 35 administrative personnel, from the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeyev, down, seems to have been scarcely fitted for the difficult tasks at hand. Moreover, the war was never for a moment popular in Eussia herself. The public opinion of the country was never in sympathy with the Far Eastern ambitions of the Government, which were so obviously wasteful and unnecessary, the product of foreign intrigue and overbearing hot- headedness. Beginning with the daring sinking of three Eussian warships in the harbor of Port Arthur, which was the first act of war, and on through the victories of Mukden and Tsusima, as well as numerous other major and minor triumphs of the Japanese army and navy, Japan dealt Eussia one swift blow after another. But a year and a half of this impetuous fighting exhausted Japan. It is said — and probably, with justice — that at the time when the war was brought to a close by the American offer of good offices, Japan was in no position to conduct either offensive operations or a prolonged war, while Eussia, awakening from the stunning influence of her first defeats, had reorganized herself for very effective defensive operations. On the other hand, it is also true that the war had already thrown Eussia into the throes of the first revolution, which burst out in all its 36 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST fury immediately after the conclusion of the war and could scarcely have heen staved off by the Government. In any event, the Eusso-Japanese War ended the first period of Kussia's intense, though thoughtless, imperialism in the Far East. Japan's triumph and Russia's defeat once more reversed their positions in Far Eastern affairs, at least so far as Manchuria and Korea were concerned. Japan returned to the position she occupied after the Simonoseki treaty, now prac- tically unchallenged in her attempts at establishing her supremacy on the shores of the Yellow Sea. Russia lost all prestige in the south. But the forces of east- ward penetration which she had created during that decade of frenzied imperialism in Manchuria could not be crushed even by so serious a reverse as the defeat she suffered in the Russo-Japanese War. While Japan was busy with the securing of the fruits of her stupendous victory, Russia turned her attention in another direcr tioiL CHAPTEE IV TREATY ABEANGEMENTS IN THE FAR EAST The Russo-Japanese War brought to a close a decade of intense and persistent Russian imperialism in the Far East. It took Japan eight years of preparations and two years of the bloodiest war in her history to avenge herself and to get back what she had lost because of Russia's interference with the operation of the Simonoseki treaty. But, curiously enough, the lesson which should have been drawn by both the Russian and the Japanese empires from the fate of Russia's im- perialistic venture in Manchuria passed entirely un- learnt by either. Just as Russia, immediately after frustrating Japan in 1895, set to work to do precisely what she prevented Japan from doing, so Japan, after defeating Russia on the fields of Manchuria, imme- diately changed some of the fundamental ideas that had actuated her policies before and began to demand and assure to herself the kind of rights and privileges against which she had protested so strenuously when 37 38 EUSSIA IN THE PAE EAST they were held by Eussia. In eaeli case there was merely a change of technique and of the method of approach. In 1895 Japan wrested from China by force of arms the recognition of Manchuria as lying within the sphere of her special interests. Essentially, that meant the closing of Manchuria to all outsiders except Japan. During the following three years Eussia, by dint of national and international pressure, forced Japan to relinquish this position in Manchuria, and succeeded in replacing Japan by herself. Then Japan immediately began to demand the principle of "open door" in Manchuria. To this Eussia was strenuously opposed. The Eusso-Japanese War again shifted the position of the principals in this conflict, bringing Japan on top once more. But the Eusso-Japanese War left Japan fully mindful of the price she had had to pay for the political and military achievements in the course of the decade of her acute conflict with Eussia. Left panting and nearly exhausted by the war itself, Japan was nevertheless watching carefully the internal political developments in Eussia. It was most important for her to determine to what extent the internal perturbations in Eussia, brought about by the revolution of 1905, would divert TKEATY AERANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 39 the attention of the Eussian Imperial Government from the problems of the Far East. When, however, the revolution was put dowTi bj an armed hand and the Imperial Government seemed entrenched as strong as ever, Japan came to a realization that such an enemy's defeat may easily turn to bitter resentment and even- tually to revenge. And it was certainly far from Japan's thoughts to endanger the advantages she had won at such a price by another armed conflict with Russia, the outcome of which it would have been most j difficult to predict on the basis of the previous en- counter. The enemy had to be won over in another way. This policy pursued by Japan dictated a number of treaties and agreements which she concluded with Eussia in the course of the decade following the Eusso- Japanese War. And it is interesting to see how quickly Japan changed from an attempt to turn to advantage the temporary weakness of her opponent to a realization that a defeated enemy may sometimes be turned into a valuable partner. The treaty of peace which formally concluded the Eusso-Japanese War was signed at Portsmouth, N". H., in September, 1905. In this treaty the first phase of Japan's policy found ample expression. By the terms of the Portsmouth treaty, Eussia re- 40 EUSSIA m THE FAR EAST linquished formally all claims to any privileges or special interests in Korea and Southern Manchuria. She recognized Korea as lying within the sphere of Japan's special interests, and thereby opened the way to Japan's subsequent complete domination of the Korean Peninsula. She ceded to Japan all the rights she enjoyed in Port Arthur and Talienwan by virtue of the Kusso-Chinese agreement of 1898, as well as the railroad line, running from these ports to Changchun. She withdrew her troops from all parts of Manchuria, still unevacuated, and formally turned over this terri- tory to Japan, which undertook to restore it to China. She still retained the Chinese Eastern Kailroad, but obligated herself to use the line merely for economic, but never for military, purposes. So far as Russia's dominant position in Manchuria and Korea was con- cerned, these provisions of the Portsmouth treaty ended once for all her pretensions there. But Japan was not satisfied with merely forcing Russia to liquidate in this manner her whole imperial- istic venture in the Far East. She felt that she could also compel the defeated colossus to defray part of the expenses she had incurred during the war and the years that preceded it. The Russian delegation, headed by Count Sergius Witte, was entirely opposed to any pro- TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 41 vision for contributions to be paid by Russia to Japan. The wbole conduct of negotiations at Portsmoutb was permeated by this adamant position of the Russian delegation on the question of contributions. And the compromise arrived at in this regard resolved itself into territorial cession and economic advantages given to Japan by Russia as indemnity due to the victor in the war. The territorial cession consisted of the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, below the line of 50° N. lat. In this manner Russia relinquished to Japan a part of the territory in the Far East which she had been colonizing for nearly fifty years and which she held in formal possession for well over a quarter of a century. The colonization of this island began almost simul- taneously by the Russians and the Japanese in the fifties of the past century on the principle of the acquisition of possession of unoccupied lands. This chaotic distri- bution of mixed population on the island led to numer- ous clashes and difficulties, and in 1875 a treaty was concluded between Russia and Japan, by virtue of which Japan ceded to Russia all her rights in the Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands. By virtue of the Portsmouth treaty Japan received back the southern half of the island, which, during the years subsequent 42 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST to the treaty of 1875, was discovered to be a veritable treasure-house of natural wealth.* The economic advantages obtained by Japan as a result of the Portsmouth treaty consisted in a recog- nition by Russia of the right of Japanese subjects to engage in the fishing trade along the coast of Siberia. The provisions of the treaty with this regard were indefinite, consisting merely of a statement of the general principle involved, and looking toward a more detailed arrangement to be arrived at later on. This arrangement was made two years later in the form of the Russo-Japanese Fisheries Convention, signed on July 28, 1907. The fisheries rights given the Japanese by the Ports- mouth treaty were sweeping and all-inclusive in their nature. They were, however, defined and somewhat curtailed by the Fisheries convention of 1907. This convention and the General Political Convention, signed about the same time, indicate clearly Japan's change of policy in her relations with Russia that took place in the course of less than two years. By virtue of the Fisheries convention, the Japanese received the right to engage in various fishing pursuits, * Aa we shall see below, fifteen years after the Portsmouth Treaty Japan found a pretext for occupying the northern half of the island and is now in full military control of the whole of Sakhalin. Of. Chapter V. TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 43 both in the catching of fish and of other aquatic prod- ucts, and in manufacturing processes concerned with all such products. But the area open to them was no longer the whole of the Russian coast, as in the Portsmouth treaty, but somewhat restricted areas. A Protocol, atr tached to the Fisheries convention, defined these areas. The Japanese were specifically prohibited from fishing in the mouths of rivers and in a half-hundred or more enumerated bays and inlets. These exceptions were found to be necessary by Russia for both economic and strategic reasons. Moreover, the whole coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, which had not as yet been sufficiently explored, was subjected to a generalized restriction which provided that the Japanese could not fish in inlets the indentation of which exceeded by three times their width at the mouth. Outside of the restricted areas, however, the Japanese received full right to engage in fishing on an equal footing with the Russian subjects. The manner of granting concessions to the exploitation of any given fishing area, provided in the Fisheries convention, was that of an annual public auction, held by Russian Government officials at Vladivostok, with the Japanese subjects enjoying at these auctions the same rights as the Russian subjects. 44 EUSSIA m THE FAE EAST In order to assure the Japanese this position of equality with the Russians in the exploitation of the fisheries in the conventional waters, the convention specifically provided that the Japanese should not be subjected to any restrictions or taxes, from which the Russians in the same locality may be exempt. On the other hand, of course, they were subjected to all the Russian laws with regard to the manner of exploitation, the employment of foreign labor, etc. The Russian Government agreed to impose no taxes on fish and aquatic products caught or prepared in the Maritime and the Amur Provinces, when intended for exportation to Japan, while the Japanese Government agreed to admit such products into Japan free of duty. The restrictions regarding non-conventional waters were to apply only to the process of fishing proper, but not to the processes of preparation and manufacture of fish and other aquatic products, with respect to which the Japanese were granted certain rights. The Fisheries convention was concluded for twelve years, and provisions were made for its renewal or imodification at the expiration of that period. Almost simultaneously with the Fisheries convention a General Political Convention between Russia and Japan was signed in St. Petersburg on July 30, 1907. TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN TPAR EAST 45 This convention signified the complete establishment of amicable relations between Eussia and Japan and, by its Article 2, pledged both Eussia and Japan to the principle of ^^open door" in China. This convention, however, was merely a screen to conceal the secret arrangements made at the same time between Eussia and Japan, which were of an entirely different nature. The Convention of 1907 was very short, consisting of only two articles. In Article 1 each of the contracting parties obligated itself to "respect the territorial in- tegrity of the other.'^ A similar obligation was assumed by each of the parties to respect the rights accruing to each of them from all agreements between them and China, operative on the date of the signing of the convention, as well as from the Portsmouth treaty and subsequent special agreements between Eussia and Japan. So far, the convention merely guaranteed the continuation of the general politico- economic conditions that had become established in the Far East, in so far as they concerned the interests of Eussia and Japan. Article 2 referred to China. The two contracting parties recognized the independence of China and the integrity of the territory of the Chinese Empire. But besides this they also recognized "the principle of the 46 EUSSIA m THE FAE EAST general equality of rights with regard to trade and in- dustry in that Empire for all nations." And having thus solemnly proclaimed the principle of the "open door" in China, the two contracting parties undertook to "preserve and defend the status quo and the ahove- mentioned principle hy all peaceful means at their i disposal." * together with this Convention, Kussia concluded a secret treaty with Japan, signed on the same day. The text of this secret treaty is not availahle at the present, though its existence is estahlished definitely hy refer- ences to it found in the text of other secret treaties, as puhlished by the Bolsheviki soon after their accession to power in Eussia. It is therefore possible only to surmise the nature of the arrangements which were being concluded between the erstwhile enemies. Eefer- ences to this treaty, found in other secret documents published by the Bolsheviki, indicate very clearly that at least one provision of the secret treaty dealt with the question of the division of Eussian and Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria, which was obviously in contradiction to the establishment of the principle of the "open door" in China in Article 2 of the General Political Convention, since by the provisions of the ♦ For full text of this Convention see Appendix I, TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 47 Portsmouth treaty Manchuria was to be completely restored to China, and consequently, in 1907, consti- tuted indisputably a part of the Chinese Empire. Eeferences in other secret documents published by the Bolsheviki indicate also the existence of two more secret treaties between Eussia and Japan, concluded before the World War, on July 4, 1910, and July 8, 1912. Again, the text of these treaties is not available, and their nature may be only surmised. One feature of all these agreements, however, appears certain. While the General Political Convention of 1907 provided specifically that the contracting parties undertook to defend their interests in the Far East by "all peaceful means at their disposal," the secret treaties, concluded simultaneously with the Convention and on later occasions, dealt with distinctly military matters and contained provisions for martial preparations. The last secret agreement between Eussia and Japan was concluded in 1916. The text of this treaty was made available by its publication in the official organ of the Soviet Government soon after the Bolsheviki came to power.* The secret treaty of 1916 sheds a most interesting * Gazette of the Provisional Workmen»Peasant8 Government. Decem- ber 8 (21), 1917. 48 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST light upon tlie relations which at that time existed between the Russian Imperial Government and the Government of Japan, as well as on the nature of the preceding secret agreements. The treaty began as follows : "The Eussian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government, for the purpose of further strengthen- ing their close friendship established between them by the secret agreements of July 17 (30), 1907, June 21 (July 4), 1910, and June 25 (July 8), 1912, have agreed to supplement the above-mentioned secret agreements with the following articles." ' The treaty itself dealt with the situation in China and the manner in which it was likely to affect the interests of Russia and Japan. Article 1 stated the agreement of the contracting parties on the need, so far as the "vital interests" of each of them was con- cerned, of preserving China "from the political domi- nation of any third power, holding inimical aims against Russia or Japan." The treaty foresaw an eventuality in which an attempt at such a dom- ination may be made, in which case one or the other of the contracting parties would consider itself called upon to take measures in order to prevent "the establishment (in China) of such a state of affairs." And if such measures should lead to a declaration of war upon one of the contracting powers by a third % TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 49 power, tlie other contracting party undertook, by the terms of the treaty, to come to the assistance of its ally. The secret treaty of 1916 was thus a defensive alli- ance between Kussia and Japan, which pledged each of them to a war, in case the special interests that each of them sought to acquire in China should at any time be threatened. The two contracting Governments visualized the possibility of such a conflict as rather imminent at the time, for the agreement was concluded for the period of five years, to expire on July 14, 1921, but continue automatically after that, unless denounced by either of the parties. This agreement could have been directed against one of two groups of powers. The first was Germany and her allies, at that time still holding their own on the battlefields of the world war. But it is rather incon- ceivable that Russia and Japan should have felt their interests in China threatened by Germany. In the first place, Germany was never particularly interested in the Far East, but preferred, as we have already seen, to push Russia into dangerous ventures and experiments there. And in the second place, Germany could have been a menace only if victorious in the war, in which case both Russia and Japan would have been at her mercy as defeated enemies. There is no doubt that the 60 EUSSIA m THE FAR EAST secret Eusso- Japanese agreement of 1916 was directed against the United States, as the power vitally inter- ested in the affairs of the Far East, particularly basing her whole policy there on the strict application of the principle of the "open door" in China. And it is inter- esting that in publishing the text of this agreement the Bolsheviki gave it the following significant title : "SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN, witb Reference to a Possibility of Their Armed Conflict together against America and Great Britain in the Far East before the Summer of 1921/' * The secret treaty of 1916 was the last agreement concluded between Russia and Japan before the Russian Revolution. The imperialist elements in Russia and in Japan were close friends, akin in the spirit that actuated them. It is very interesting also to watch the interplay of Imperial Russia's network of diplomatic intrigue with Japan, as embodied in the open and secret agreements between them, against the background of the activities * For full text of this treaty see Appendix I. While the explanation of the purpose of this secret treaty given in the text is the current explanation, I have been informed by persons who have discussed the question with the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, that the Russian Government did have Germany in mind and that its chief purpose in signing the treaty was to bind Japan to the Entente by another agreement. Sazonov is reported as saying that Russia was at that time too busy with the problems of the war to give serious thought to possible aggression in China. Even if this explanation is true, nevertheless, by signing the secret treaty with Japan, Russia was giving the latter a powerful instrument for possible use in the near future, as may be clearly seen from the secret telegram on the Lansing- Ishii agreement, the text of which may also be found in Appendix I. TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 51 whicli eacli of them pursued in various parts of China. Whether by tacit understanding or as a result of one of the secret agreements, the text of which is still un- known to us, Russia and Japan seem to have had no difficulty in delimiting the spheres of their activities. Japan maintained her paramount domination in Korea, in portions of Manchuria, and was rapidly and insist- ently building up her influence in other parts of China. Russia concentrated all her attention on Outer Mon- golia, where the Japanese let her have an entirely free hand. The basic agreement, under which Russia was con- ducting her diplomatic relations with China all through this period, was a thirty-year treaty, concluded in 1881, fundamentally built on a previous convention, viz., that of 1860. By virtue of these two agreements, the boun- dary line between Russia and China was well defined, and a provision was made for the establishment of a fifty-verst zone along the whole frontier, within which there were to be collected no customs duties. This pro- vision stimulated greatly the penetration of Russia into some portions of the Chinese territory, notably in Mongolia. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, the interest which Mongolia held for the Russian Imperial Government 52' ETJSSIA IN" THE FAR EAST was primarily commercial and economic generally. But after the war, when Russia found herself out of Korea and Manchuria, Mongolia began to loom large in the eyes of the Russian Government as a political possi- bility. Russian interest in Mongolia increased very greatly, and some ambitious Russian diplomats began even to dream of an independent Mongol state, under Russian influence and, possibly, suzerainty, constituting a living barrier between Russia and China. Such a barrier was thought necessary and desirable for two reasons. In the first place, should China pass through as rapid a transformation as Japan and appear on the scene as an active power, the Mongolian barrier would prove excellent protection to Russia — so ran the argu- ments of the protagonists of the Mongolian barrier. In the second place, as a base for economic penetration into China, Russian-controlled Mongolia would be a most valuable asset for whatever imperialistic designs the Russian Government still entertained. In 1910-11, as the time drew near for the expiration of the treaty of 1881, the Russian Government began to urge upon the Government of the Chinese Empire a renewal and revision of the treaty. One of the re- visions sought by the Russian Government was an enlargement of Russian rights in Mongolia. The TEEATY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 53 Chinese Government, however, persistently refused to accede to the Russian requests in this regard. In Octo- ber, 1911, the Chinese Revolution broke out and intro- duced a radical change in the whole situation. Even before the Revolution, however, in July, 1911, Hu-tukh-tu, the Living Buddha of Mongolia, convoked a council of Mongol princes to discuss the question of relations with the Chinese. Administratively, Mon- golia was part- of the Chinese territory and was ruled by Chinese officials who were despotic and oppressive. Their rule caused widespread dissatisfaction among the nomadic population of Mongolia, and the council of princes decided to seek Russia's protection. A delega- tion was sent to St. Petersburg, and the Russian Gov- ernment promised the Mongols to make representations in Peking. In accordance with this, Russia proposed to China an arrangement whereby Mongolia would be given administrative autonomy. But this proposal was rejected by the Chinese Government. Immediately following the Chinese Revolution, Mon- golia declared her independence, claiming that the over- throw of the Manchu dynasty absolved the Mongols from their allegiance to the central Government of China. Again the Mongols turned to Russia for protection, and the Russian Government proposed to the new Chinese 54 RUSSIA IN" THE FAR EAST Government an arrangement with Mongolia similar to that of the preceding year. But the Chinese Govern- ment again rejected the Russian proposal. Then the Russian Government declared that it would negotiate directly with the Mongol authorities in Urga, the capital of Mongolia. The result of these negotiations was a treaty, concluded between Russia and Mongolia, in September, 1912. While, in concluding this treaty, Russia formally acknowledged the independence of Mongolia, she never- theless declared her willingness to recognize China's sovereignty over Mongolia on condition of the accept- ance by the Government at Peking of the conditions of Mongolian autonomy proposed originally by Russia. China entered a formal protest against the Russo- Mongolian treaty and refused to acknowledge it. Then negotiations began between Peking and St. Petersburg, and finally resulted in a Russo-Chinese-Mongolian agreement, signed in the city of Kyakhta, whereby Mon- golia was made into an autonomous state, with its Living Buddha as the supreme ruler, but under Chinese suzerainty.* By this agreement Russia secured valu- able rights and privileges on the territory of autono- mous Mongolia. * For the principal provisions of this tripartite agreement see Appendix II. ( TEEATY AERANGEMENTS IN FAE EAST 55 To what extent the events in Mongolia ever since 1911 were the work of the agents of the Eussian Im- perial Government is not known, but that such agents had a hand in their unfolding, especially after the Chi- nese Kevolution, appears fairly certain. After the con- clusion of the Russo-Chinese Mongolian agreement, Rus- sian activities in Mongolia increased. And while Russia was busy with her Mongolian venture, Japan was pushing very energetically her own penetration in other parts of China. The open agreements between Imperial Russia and Imperial Japan remained merely the screen of the understanding between the two Gov- ernments; the spirit which animated the relations be- tween the two was the spirit of undisguised imperial- ism that permeated their secret agreements. In March, 1917, came the Russian Revolution and swept out of existence the Russian member of the Russo-Japanese imperialistic partnership. CHAPTEE V THE BOLSHEVIKI AND THE JAPANESE IN SIBEEIA During the World War and the first stages of the Revo- lution, Siberia acquired a great importance because it provided Eussia with heT best available means of com- munication with the outside world. The port of Vladi- vostok was literally the door to 'Eussia. Immense quantities of munitions and railroad supplies were brought in through it. The March Eevolution affected Siberia at the same time that it did the rest of Eussia, and its processes presented nothing novel. The authority of the Pro- visional Government was readily recognized, and the change at the center was acclaimed with great enthu- siasm. Then, during the months that followed, Siberia passed through the same process of the disintegration of the revolutionary ideas through which European Eussia passed and which eventually culminated in the over- throw of the Provisional Government in !N"ovember, 1917, and the establishment of the so-called Soviet regime. 56 BOLSHEVIKI AND JAPANESE IN SIBEEIA 57 The Soviet authority was introduced in Siberia soon after the establishment of the Soviet regime in European Eussia. It appeared in different centers at different dates, but by January, 1918, it was established in all the important parts of Siberia and the Far East. It existed until the late summer of that year, when various isolated uprisings, coupled with the appearance in Siberia of Allied forces landing from the East and the Czecho-Slovak detachments entering Siberia from the West, overthrew the Soviet authority everywhere. The establishment of the Omsk Government, by the removal thither of the Directorate elected by the members of the former Constituent Assembly at Oufa, furnished a center around which the anti-Bolshevist movement in I Siberia began to group itself. On November 18, 1918, I the Directorate was overthrown, and Admiral Kolchak assumed control. His rule lasted until the beginning of 1920, when his forces were crushed by the Ked Armies, while he himself was captured and executed. The Bolshevist armies marched nearly as far as Lake Baikal and there halted, pending negotiations with the political groups of Eastern Siberia.* * A detailed examination of the anti-Bolshevist movement in Siberia and an evaluation of its various factors is entirely outside the scope of this book. For this reason, the events that had taken place in Siberia and in the Far East prior to the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic are told here in their broad outlines. 58 EUSSIA m THE FAE EAST The Allies withdrew their forces eastward with the retreat of Kolchak's armies, and eventually took them out of Siberia altogether. The only troops that re- mained over in Siberia were the Japanese. Practically all the Kussian groups in Siberia are agreed on accusing the Allies of never giving full-fledged support to the anti-Bolshevist movements in Siberia. But the most direct accusation was against the Japa- nese, who were numerically the largest foreign power in Siberia, and, for obvious reasons, were more directly concerned with the developments in Siberia than any of the others. The Japanese are specifically *' accused of never giving full support to the principal movement, but rather staking on individual leaders and playing them against each other. ^ The part of Siberia which is of special concern to Japan is the territory lying between the seaboard and Lake Baikal. The key to this part of Siberia is the port of Vladivostok. During the existence of the Omsk Government almost this whole territority was only under a nominal control of that Government. Different parts of it were held by leaders of armed bands, some of them commanding rather large forces and enjoying outside assistance. The most important of these were the Atamans Semenov and Kalmykov, and General BOLSHEYIKI AND JAPANESE IN SIBERIA 59 Kosanov. The latter was stationed in Vladivostok. While nominally under orders from Omsk, he acted, in reality, in an entirely independent manner, and his actions were offensive to all democratic elements. Many attempts were made at Omsk to have Rosanov removed, and finally, on October 25, 1919, Admiral Kolchak or- dered Rosanov to give up his command and come to Omsk. But Rosanov appealed to Semenov and Kalmy- kov for assistance, and having been assured of their support and — so the Vladivostok version runs — of the good-will of the Japanese, he refused to obey the order from Omsk. The Omsk Government could not enforce its au- thority, and Rosanov remained the virtual master of the situation. His rule in Vladivostok lasted until January 31, 1920, by which time his authority had degenerated entirely and its remnants were easily over- thrown by the partisan forces at the disposal of the Vladivostok Zemstvo, which then set up a Provisional Government. The next important event in the Russian Far East occurred on April 4-5, when a series of armed clashes took place between the Russian and Japanese troops. During the two months which preceded the clash the relations between the Japanese and the Russians in 60 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST Vladivostok and the adjacent territory were becoming more and more strained. The allied troops were being evacuated, but the Japanese made no preparations for leaving. The Provisional Government, headed by the President of the Zemstvo, A. S. Medvyedev, maintained cordial relations with the Japanese political mission at Vladivostok, although its relations with the military command were strained. The Provisional Government declared as its object the ending of the civil war and the coming to some understanding with Moscow, and its chief objection against the Japanese was that they were not in favor of such a program. On the other hand, the Japanese objected most strenuously to the manner in which Medvyedev's Government attempted to hasten the evacuation of the Japanese troops. There seems to be no doubt that the hostility against the Japanese was something that the Provisional Gov- ernment could not control, even if it desired to do so. It was growing all the time and expressed itself more and more in open clashes. This growing hostility against the Japanese was accompanied by an increasing popularity of the Bol- sheviki, who were extremely active all the time. The liberal leaders realized that the Japanese would feel entirely free to take any military measures they chose, BOLSHEVIKI AND JAPANESE IN SIBERIA 61 if a Soviet regime should become established in Vladi- vostok and they attempted to prevent such an eventu- ality warning the extreme elements of the danger of the situation. /^ These warnings were not heeded, however, by the local Bolshevist groups, while the departure of the American troops left the Japanese alone in the field, who then apparently decided to take effective measures. On . April 2 an ultimatum was presented to the Provisional Government. The substance of the ultimatum was that there should be no interference with the actions of the Japanese military authorities, so far as those actions concerned military affairs; that all activities of secret groups or societies considered harmful for the Japa- nese troops or for Manchuria and Korea should be for- bidden ; that all publications directed against the Japa- nese Empire, its existence or its army, should be sup- pressed. On April 3, the Soviet of Workmen's and Peasant's Deputies met in Vladivostok, as if in answer to the Jap- anese ultimatum. On the next day, the Provisional Gov- ernment accepted the Japanese ultimatum in its entirety, but it was already too late. Everything was ready for an explosion; only the first spark was lacking, and it was supplied on the night of that same day. Although 62 RUSSIA IlSr THE FAR EAST the Provisional Government officially denied it, the Japanese command claimed that during the night Jap- anese patrols were fired upon in some parts of the city, and on the following morning, General Oi, commanding the troops at Vladivostok, ordered all Russian troops disarmed. This order was carried out with considerahle bloodshed, both in Vladivostok and in J^ikolsk and IQiabarovsk. The Provisional Government disclaimed responsi- bility for the attacks on the Japanese patrols and en- tered into negotiations with the Japanese military com- mand for the adjustment of the situation. An agree- ment was finally signed in Vladivostok on April 29. By virtue of this agreement no Russian troops were to be permitted within thirty kilometers of the Ussuriysk and the Suchansk railroad lines and of the China- Korea border. The only exception was made in the case of militia on police duty, but its number was to be determined only by agreement with the Japanese command. Thus the Japanese military command assumed absolute control of all the means of transportation and the Suchansk coal mines. The Provisional Govern- ment was not forbidden to have troops of its own, but it was cut off from all sources of military supplies. BOLSHEYIKI AND JAPANESE IN SIBERIA 63 And wliat was even more important, practically all cities and towns of importance, with tlie exception of two or three small ones, came under the military control of the Japanese, for they are all situated on or near the railroad lines. No wonder that the chief representative of the Rus- sian command said: ^^It is with a heavy feeling that we, the representatives of the Russian military com- mand, sign this agreement." Nor was this all. At ahout the same time, a hand of partisan troops was reported marching toward the city on Nikolayevsk, at the mouth of the Amur river, which had a considerahle Russian population and a small Japanese garrison. Various and conflicting stories are told as to what happened during the strug- gle for the city, some accounts even making the Japa- nese command in Siberia directly responsible for the city's inability to offer sufficient resistance. In any event, the occupation of the city was accompanied by a horrible massacre, as a result of which 700 Japanese and 4,000 Russians lost their lives. Whatever were the circumstances under which the Nikolayevsk tragedy took place, it provided the Japa- nese with an excuse for occupying the city and thus acquiring possession of the mouth of the Amur river. II 64 EUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST Moreover, not content with the occupation of Kikolay- evsk, the Japanese also occupied the northern, or Rus- sian, half of the island of Sakhalin, which lies oppo- site the mouth of the Amur. A little later, Japanese warships appeared off the coast of Kamchatka, a landing of military forces was effected, and, according to a reliahle report, a military post and a radio station was constructed there. Thus, by the summer of 1920, practically the whole seaboard of Siberia was in the hands of the Japanese, held by them on terms of military occupation. In the meantime, while all this was going on, a new plan was unfolding itself in Eastern Siberia, a plan of creating a temporarily independent state on the Rus- sian territory lying east of Lake Baikal, that would act as a ^'buffer" between Soviet Russia and Japan. This idea grew out of the circumstances that charac- terized the political situation in Eastern Siberia prior to the overthrow of the Kolchak Government. Admiral Kolchak was deposed and his regime was overthrown in Irkutsk shortly after the seat of gov- ernment was removed thither from Omsk. The over- throw was effected by the so-called Political Center, created some time before that by the liberal Zemstvo elements. In October, 1919, a conference of repre- BOLSHEVIKI AND JAPANESE IN SIBERIA 65 sentatives of sixteeoi Zemstvos in Eastern Siberia took place and decided upon tlie overthrow of the Kolchak Government on the ground that it had degenerated into an utterly reactionary regime. The groups represented at this conference later on created the Political Center, and assumed authority on the deposing of the Admiral. The idea of creating a '^buffer" state was originally brought forward by these groups. One of the first actions of the Political Center after assuming authority was to enter into negotiations with the Soviet authorities concerning the idea of the "buffer'^ state. On January 19, 1920, a conference took place at Tomsk, between the representatives of the Irkutsk groups and the Soviet leaders. It was decided to create such a state with its capital at Irkutsk, and on Sep- tember 21 Moscow sanctioned this agreement by tele- graph. But even before the Irkutsk delegates returned from Tomsk, the Government which they represent-ed was overthrown by the local Bolsheviki, and the whole western part of the proposed ''buffer" state was offi- cially declared part of the Soviet territory. However, tbe idea of the ''buffer'' state was not given up. The city of Verkhneudinsk was declared capital of the new state, and Moscow hastened to recognize it. 66 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST The situation that became established as a result of all this by the beginning of the summer of 1920, was as follows: the Soviet authority officially extended as far as the Verkhneudinsk "buffer'^ state. Beyond the ^'buffer/' which was controlled from Moscow, was Chita and its district, controlled by Ataman Semenov, j who resisted all pressure from the west and from the east and was openly supported by the Japanese. On the coast was the Provisional Government of the Mari- time Province, located in Vladivostok, but practically powerless because of the conditions of the Japanese control. Besides these larger centers, there were sev- eral of lesser importance, but nevertheless powers unto themselves. Such were Blagovyeshchensk and Khaba- rovsk. During the summer, a number of attempts were made to unite all these independent groups into one state, but it was not until the fall of 1920 that such a unification was finally effected. During this period there were three elements in the situation. The first element comprised the Bolshevist or Communist groups, directed from Moscow. The sec- ond consisted of the Japanese, who dominated the situ- ation. The third element consisted of the local non- Bolshevist groups, finding themselves wedged in between their fear of permanent Japanese control of the terri- BOLSHEVIKI AND JAPANESE IN SIBERIA 67 tory and its consequent loss to Russia, and tlie alterna- tive of making peace with tlie Bolsheviki. They chose the second course. At the Tomsk conference, the leader of the Irkutsk delegation expressed the views of these groups in the following way: "We are not speaking here of any moral or academic considerations; we are interested in a mere evaluation of forces. If Soviet Russia has at the present time sufficient strength to crush the Japanese reaction and the Japanese militarism, then the question is very simple: let the Soviet troops continue their march to Irkutsk and on beyond Irkutsk. Then no 'buffer' state is necessary. But if Soviet Russia does not possess such forces at the present time, then, for the sake of preserving the unity of Russia and the re- unification of Eastern Siberia with the rest of Russia, it is necessary to create a special democratic formation. As far as Soviet Russia is concerned, the creation of such a ^buffer' state would be rendered easier for it by the fact that the Siberian democracy will not conduct a struggle against it. The Siberian democracy has determined quite firmly the line it is to follow: the giving up of all struggle on the western frontier of Siberia, and the concentration of all forces on the eastern frontier for a struggle against the reaction." * In the negotiations which were conducted between the Japanese and the Soviet representatives during this period, the former were inclined to accept the idea of the "buffer" state, provided its forms of organization would not be Communistic. On the other hand, the Soviet representatives readily assured the Japanese * From a speech by E. E. Kolossov, quoted in Sovremennyia Zapiski, No. 3, for 1921. 68 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST that the "buffer" would have forms of government that would he quite acceptable to them. As early as April, the Soviet Plenipotentiary in the Far East, V. D. Yilensky, assured the head of the Japanese Diplomatic Mission, Count Matzudaira, that the Soviet Govern- ment considered the "buffer" state as "a zone, in which the capitalistic activities of the foreigners, particularly the Japanese, could be carried on in conditions more customary for them than would have been the existence of Soviet forms." * An obstacle to the creation of a unified "buffer" in Eastern Siberia was the existence of the barrier between Verkhneudinsk and Vladivostok in the form of the Semenov Government at Chita. The Japanese com- mand was inclined to remain on friendly terms with the Ataman, and as late as June, 1920, the Central Information Bureau of Vladivostok reported the fol- lowing interview with General Takayanaga, Chief of Staff of the Japanese expeditionary forces : ^The General considers that the territory controlled by Semenov must be considered as a separate political entity in the negotiations for the unification of the Far Eastern forma- tions. According to Semenov's claims, his authority is sup- ported by at least 75 per cent, of the population, by the Cossacks, the Buryats and a part of the Zemstvos. The liquidation of the barrier is desirable, but it must be done * Vladirostok DalnevoatocTmoye Ohozreniye, April 29, 1920. BOLSHEVIKI AND JAPANESE IN SIBERIA 69 without violence, through agreement on the part of the political groups and a free expression of the will of the people." * In spite of this, efforts were continued to call a con- ference, representing the whole of Eastern Siheria. Finally, arrangements for such a conference were com' pleted, and the final attempt was made to eliminate Semenov. On the night of Octoher 21, a surprise at- tack was undertaken against Chita, Semenov was de- feated and the city was occupied by the troops of the Verkhneudinsk Government. Several days later, the conference for the creation of the ^'buffer" state met in Chita. It consisted of representatives of Verkhneu- dinsk, Chita, Blagovyeshchensk, and Vladivostok. The result of the conference was that the four territories agreed to unite into a state to be known as the Far Eastern Republic, and that elections were to be held to elect a Constituent Assembly. These elections were held at the beginning of 1921, and returned a peasant majority, though the elections were so manipulated that the Communists actually eon- trolled the Assembly. To what extent is the Far Eastern Republic under the control of Moscow? This is the question that ac- ♦ Vladivostok DalnevoBtochnoue Ohoereniye, June 2, 1920. 70 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST quires vital importance in connection with the whole situation in the Far East. Speaking at the Chita con- ference!, the first premier, of the Far Eastern Re- public, Krasnoshchekov, said: "Our Republic has a sign, and there is writing on both sides of the sign. On one side it is written, 'Democracy/ What is inscribed on the other side is for us, for our own consumption." The story of its organization, the purpose for which it has been organized, and the activities of the Far Eastern Republic, as we shall see later on, indicate unmistakably that it is completely under the control of Moscow. It is a truly vassal formation of Soviet Russia. The Far Eastern Republic merely represents a meth- od by which the Bolsheviki and the Japanese are at- tempting to carry out their policies in Siberia. Of and by itself it is of comparatively little importance and interest. But as a channel for the activities of these two elements in the Russian Far East, it has a distinct significance and interest. CHAPTEE YI THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA Domination in Siberia and in tlie Russian mid-Asiatic possessions could not, of course, satisfy the Moscow leaders. In their dreams of a world social revolution, Asia with her numberless millions always loomed very large. And soon after the establishment of their power in Siberia through the overthrow of tte Kolchak Gov-, emment, the Communist leaders turned their attention definitely to activities in different parts of Asia. "Real revolution on a world scale will not begin until Asia's eight hundred millions of people will join our move- ment." With these words, constituting the central point of his address at the Baku Congress of the Nations of the Orient, G. Zinoviev, president of the executive commit- tee of the Third or Communist International, pro- claimed, in the summer of 1920, the policy and the aim of the Communist movement in Asia. It is almost a paradox that a group of men who have 71 72 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 1 thought out, in the very heart of the civilization of the | West, their ideas of social philosophy and the methods of applying these ideas should now be the inspirers and the leaders of this agitation of the East against the West. Yet it is the Third International, the Moscow General Staff of the World Revolution, that in the summer of 1920 began to make attempts to organize, co-ordinate and lead through its various agencies and instrumentalities the numerous and variegated move- ments which agitate the Orient. And today, every- where in Asia, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the utmost reaches of China, from the tundras of I^orthem Siberia to the southernmost point of India, the agents of Communism are at work, bending all their energies toward the consummation of their ends.. Movements of all sorts agitated the Orient before the leaders of the world Communism thought of diverting the energies and the forces thus aroused to their own ends. But these movements were sporadic, poorly or- ganized, in most cases mutually antagonistic, with scarcely any coordination, either in the aims they pur- sued or the methods they used. Moreover, the aims of most of these movements have been and still are either not in correspondence with or even directly opposed to the aims which the world Communism sets before itself. THE THIED INTERNATIOlSrAL IN ASIA 73 Yet these difficulties do not deter the Third Inter- national from making an attempt to befriend and con- trol all these movements. For the tactics of Communism render not only permissible but actually necessary the utilization of movements that are not Communistic in their nature, provided those movements are working toward the disruption or the destruction of institutions and organizations which it is necessary for Communism to disrupt or destroy in order to achieve its objects. And so confident are the leaders of Communism of the ultimate triumph of their aims that they are willing, for reasons of expediency, to permit their oftentimes incongruous allies to enjoy temporarily a triumph of their particular aims, achieved with the assistance of the masters of Communism. N^owhere are these tactics illustrated better than in the work which the active agencies of Communism are doing in the East. There are two lines of activities that are pursued there by the general staff of the revolution in Moscow, and out of the two there rapidly emerges now a third, more formidable than either of the others. Through its various channels of propaganda the Third Intema-- tional makes every effort to bring down to the widest possible masses of the Orient the simplest of the ideas of Communism, the doctrine of destruction, that would 74 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST set them aflame and prepare them for an uprising, in which the Communist leaders hope their trusted agents will be the guiding spirits. Through the diplomatic agencies which now constitute such an important part of the Eussian Soviet Government, the leaders of Com- munism make active efforts to bring within the sphere of their influence all the official and semi-official, formu- lated and half-formulated governmental centers of the Orient. Finally, under the protection and with the complete assistance of Moscow and its military organi- zation, armed forces are being brought into existence in some parts of the Orient. In order to co-ordinate the work of propaganda in different parts of Asia, the Third International, at the time of its Second World Congress, held in Moscow in July and August, 1920, decided to call a special con- ference of the representatives of the various movements in the countries and territories of the Near and Far East that are either in sympathy or at least in contact with the Communist movement. For the seat of this Conference, the city of Baku, the important oil port on Nthe Caspian Sea, was chosen. An appeal was issued by the executive committee of the Third International, signed by its president and also by delegates to the THE THIED INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 75 Second Congress from the most important countries of the world, including the United States. X, This conference, known officially as the Congress of the Nations of the Orient, opened on September 1, 1920, and lasted for more than two weeks. It represented twenty nationalities of the Near East, Central Asia and the Far East, among them the following: Turkey, China, Turkestan, Hindustan, Daghestan, Khiva, Bokhara, Armenia, Persia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan. The outstanding figure at the Baku Congress was G. Zinoviev, the president of the executive committee of the Third International and the head of the govern- ment in Petrograd, one of the most active and promi- nent leaders of the Communist movement. Zinoviev was chosen honorary president of the congress, and de- livered an address at the opening session in which he stated the program which the Third International ex- pected the movements represented at the Baku Congress to carry out. At the outset of his address Zinoviev noted particu- larly the fact that the congress in Baku, organized under the auspices of the Communist International, really represented, as far as the majority of its delegates was 76 EXJSSIA m THE FAR EAST concerned, movements that are not Communistic in their nature. But this circumstance was more than offset, in the opinion of the International, by the fact that the congi*ess represented for the first time at least tentative unity of purpose and action on the part of twenty or more nations of the Orient which had been until then either isolated from each other or more or less hostile to each other. The great task of the co^ gross was to find common ground upon which these na- tions could unite for co-operation and the strength of collective effort. This common ground the Communist movement makes it its object to supply and develop. The nations of the Orient have differences of old standing and mu- tual enmities that are traditional. But at the same time all of them have grievances that may be reduced to simple terms and a common denominator. All of them find themselves in a condition of political and economic dependence upon the so-called great powers of the world. A compounding of these grievances, an accumulation of hostilities springing from these griev- ances, and a consequent releasing of forces and energies which may be turned against the dominating powers — all these, if properly directed and handled, may be or- ganized for an active struggle. This work of organiz- / THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 77 ing the force's in the Orient is the aim of the Third International in its activities in Asia. The stimula- tion of this work was the object of the Baku Congress. Eevolution in the Orient, sweeping like wildfire x through all the expanses of Asia — that is the ideal of .,,■ Communism. Revolution, as conceived by the Com- munist movement, is and must he a world-wide aifair. But it is not proceeding at an even pace or developing into similar forms in the West and in the East. There are really two streams of the world revolution. That of the West Zinoviev characterized in his speech as rapid and turbulent and direct, hurling itself in a definite direction, making rapid inroads into all those phases of life in the West which it must traverse in order to reach the goal toward which it is striving. The stream in the East is slow and hesitant. The nations of the West, whose powers and efforts feed the stream of the revolution there, know what they want and proceed to get it. The nations of the East have not as yet awak^^ ened to definite and complete desires. The stream of the revolution fed by their movements has, in conse- quence, different characteristics from the stream in the West. It is the object of the directing center of the world Communist movement, the Third International, to 7S KUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST work for the uniting of these two streams. But such a union is possible only if the forces which direct, stimu- late and hurl forward the stream of the West should turn their attention to the stream of the East, in order to arouse its activities and bring them to a pitch which would make the movements that make it up a really effective factor for the world revolution. Whatever the movements in the East which were represented at the Baku Congress have now as their aim, ultimately their efforts must result in the estab- lishment of Communism there. But none of the coun- tries of the Orient or of the territories which have not as yet risen to the dignity of statehood has anything like the degree of capitalistic development which is usually presupposed as a necessary condition for the establishment of Communism. In other words, is it necessary to wait until capitalistic development should come to the Orient before attempting to light up there the fires of revolution which would eventually lead to the establishment of Communism? Zinoviev answered this query in a negative sense, and offered a very general and simple formula, universally applicable in its simplicity. As long as Soviet power has become established in Russia or in any other one country, that is the signal and the guarantee of success THE THIED INTEENATIONAL IN" ASIA 79 for any movement looking to the establishment of Communism in any country, even if that country is V economically backward. In its application to the countries of the Orient this formula assumes a very definite political form^ in tacti- cal conformity with the general character of the move- ments actually existing there. These movements are either agrarian or national-democratic in character. The first kind of movements assures the participation of the great masses of the people, for the vast majority of the population of Asia is agricultural. The system of landholding in most of the countries there is such that the best lands are generally held by large land proprie- tors on the basis of very extensive holdings and of an exploitation of the masses of the people. Resentment on the part of the peasantry against such an agrarian scheme may easily be turned to account, provided enough propaganda can be conducted among the peas- antry with the view of convincing them that the chief cause of such a state of affairs lies in the fact of their economic and territorial dependence upon the particular great power which holds the protectorate over their country. In this way the agrarian movements which have narrow and immediate aims may be used as a powerful adjunct of the other kind of movements, the 80 RUSSIA m THE FAB EAST control over whicli the leaders of the Communist move- ment are striving to seize — namely, movements for the political independence or the liberation from economic domination of the countries and the territories of the Orient. These political or national-democratic movements are\ essentially of two kinds. In countries like China, Tur- key, Persia, which have officially independent existence as sovereign states, but are in reality politically and economically dependent upon one or another of the great powers active in the affairs of Asia, the national- democratic movements have the character of a struggle against this unofficial but nevertheless real political and y economic dependence. In countries like India, which even officially do not have the status of sovereign states, these movements, in their political aspects, assume the character of a struggle for independence. The task of Communism is to render sufficient assistance to these movements to exact from them in return pledges to accept the Soviet form of government, once their inde- pendence or complete liberation is achieved. Soviets must be organized throughout the Orient. This is the order of the day from the general staff of the world revolution. And they must be real Soviets — so Zinoviev admonished the delegates to the Baku THE THIED INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 81 Congress; not toy Soviets of the kind that exists in Turkey. Yet the Communists in Moscow are ready to support even these toy Soviets if there are any pros- pects of utilizing whatever force they may represent. Zinoviev himself illustrated this by giving a vivid de- scription of the character of that movement in Turkey which had then the support of the Third International and of the Moscow government, the peasant movement in Anatolia, the Turkish province in Asia Minor, led by Mustapha Kemal. This movement is essentially religious in character and as different from Communism as day from night. According to Zinoviev the only thing that Kemal is fighting for is the re-establishment of the religious su- premacy of the Sultan. To Kemal the person of the Sultan is sacred, although in deference to present-day tendencies he has invented a title for him that is in keeping with the general trend of modem affairs. The Sultan, as he is represented by Kemal and his follow- ers to the peasants whom they urge to rise at their bid- ding, is the President of the Democratic Union of the Islamic Nations. But at the present time the Sultan has fallen into the power of foreign non-believers, and his exalted position has become degraded. Kemal has declared a holy war against the invader for the purpose 82 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST of saving the Sultan from this degradation and freeing him from his enemies. If such is the character of the Kemal movement it is logically absurd and paradoxical for Communism to support it. And yet it has enjoyed that support, because there is one element in it which, in the estimation of the Communist leaders, offsets all the possible contra- dictions to the Communist movement itself that there may be in the monarchic-religious movement led by Kemal and disguised but very thinly by his clumsy adaptations of modern terminology. That element lies in the fact that the Kemal movement is primarily di- rected against Great Britain as the great European power with extensive interests and influence in the Near East. In relating the circumstances under which Com- munism finds it possible to support such a movement as that led by Kemal, Zinoviev laid down the most impor- tant of the fundamental theses of the whole policy and program of Communism in Asia. In his own words this policy is: "We are ready to support any revolutionary struggle against Great Britain." / In presenting this program to the Baku Congress and in laying down the fundamentals of the Communist THE THIRD INTERISTATIONAL IN ASIA 83 policy in the East, Zinoviev, in the name of the Third International, appealed to the nations of the Orient to co-ordinate all their efforts for a struggle against the ^y^ European power in the East. The watchword under which this struggle was to be carried on was presented by him to the congress in the following form : "Declare a holy war against European imperialism, particularly against Great Britain." This watchword was adopted by the congress, and efforts began to be made to write it in plain letters upon the standards of every revolutionary movement in the East. The Baku Congress resulted in two definite actions.*V The firsjt consisted in a signed pledge to fight the world capitalism. Besides the signatures of the delegates from the Oriental countries, the pledge bears also those of many of the guests at the congress — that is, of promi- nent leaders of Communism from Soviet Russia, as well as other countries of the world, including the United States, who attended the congress. The second action of the Baku Congress was the organization of a Council for Propaganda and Action in the Countries of the Orient. This Council was elected at the congress to act as the agent of the executive committee of the Third 84 RUSSIA IJSr THE FAE EAST International, which now issues its instructions to the various leaders of the movements in the East through this Council. The Baku Congress was intended particularly to serve the purpose of organizing an apparatus of propa- ' ganda in the various countries of Asia. It represented movements which are essentially revolutionary in char- acter. It did not, of course, represent the nations themselves in which these movements exist. In each one of these countries there is a political organization which finds its expression in definite governmental in- stitutions. The Baku Congress was convoked for the purpose of reaching the movements, hut Communism is not content with reaching them alone. Wherever pos- sible it strives to exert its influence also over the gov- ernmental institutions. \^ This requires the work of diplomacy, and for this purpose the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government and its various diplomatic agencies are utilized by the Third International to the largest extent possible. During the months following the first steps in the organization of Communist work in Asia, the Soviet diplomacy devoted considerable attention to China, as a politically independent power, presumably amenable THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 85 to diplomatic influences. The general political situa- tion in China, as the Soviet diplomats visualized it, was characterized during the year 1920 by the fact that the government which existed there at the beginning of that year was pro-Japanese in its sympathies and orienta- tion. The Anfu party, which was in power, was re- sponsible for the Japanese-Chinese agreement which rendered possible the penetration of the Japanese influ- ence into China, and, if we take for it the word of the Soviet experts on Far Eastern affairs, placed China en- tirely under the domination of Japan. Through its agencies in Siberia, ever since the collapse of the Kol- chak movement, the Soviet Government has been doing everything in its power to effect the overthrow of this government. The Soviet diplomatic plan was built on the follow- ing considerations: China has for her neighbors two powers which are antagonistic to each other — namely, Japan and Soviet Russia. As long as the Anfu group remained in power and continued its pro-Japanese orientation the chances of any influence in the affairs of China that could be exerted by Soviet Russia were very small. On the other hand, the policy pursued by the Anfu group was never popular among the masses of the people in China; there has been a growing and 86 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST widespread opposition to the Japanese. This opposi-^ tion was counted upon by the Soviet agents as a possible instrument for the overthrow of the pro- Japanese / regime. They expected that if properly stimulated and directed this popular opposition would eventually trans- fer its resentment against the Japanese to the whole Anfu group and its regime, fastening upon it the blame for the Japanese domination. If such transferred reK^ sentment could result in an overthrow of the Anfu regime, it was reasonable to expect, according to the Soviet diplomatic plan, that its successor in power, hav- ing broken with the Japanese orientations, would have to seek a rapprochement with the other of China's neighbors — that is, with Soviet Eussia. When the Anfu regime fell, its place was taken by a strongly anti-Japanese regime, in which the power be- hind the throne was, for the time being. General Wu-/ ■ Pei-Fu. The Soviet diplomats interpreted this change as signifying unquestionably the imminence of a defi- nite Chinese orientation in favor of and in the direc- tion of Soviet Russia. V. Vilensky, the former high commissary of the Soviet Government in Siberia and one of the most prominent Soviet experts on the Far East, in an article devoted to this phase of the Far THE THIED INTEENATIONAL IN ASIA 87 Eastern situation,* cbaracterized the change in the Chinese regime in the following terms : "Wu-Pei-Fu has hung out his flag over the events which are taking place in China, and it is clear that under this flag the new Chinese cabinet must take an orientation in favor of Soviet Russia/' In arguing for what he called the "logical and ob- jective necessity" of such a step on the part of the Chinese Government, Vilensky cited three definite ac- " — •—- - - — » jfcions then already taken by the latter in the direction of establishing friendly relations with Moscow. The first s tep was initiated by Moscow, and sanctioned by Peking. It consisted of a commercial treaty signed by /^ the representatives of the Soviet authorities in Russian Turkestan and the group in power in Chinese Turkes- tan. The treaty provided for the establishment of diplomatic as well as commercial representation in both territories, and the total mutual abrogation of exterri- torial rights. The contact thus established provided Soviet Russia with an unmolested access into China. Officially the Turkestan treaty was not valid until ap- proved by Moscow and Peking. The Moscow sanction was naturally not long in coming. The sanction from Peking, given September, 1920, finally settled the mat- * Moscow Izvestiya, October 9, 1920. 88 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST ter, and Soviet Russia acquired a recognized frontier with China, regulated by treaty. The second step of the Chinese Government in the direction of a rapprochement v^ith Soviet Russia, ac- cording to Vilensky, indicated still further the correct- ness of the Moscow^ analysis of the diplomatic situa- tion in the Far East. Under the Anfu regime China still continued to recognize officially the Russian am- bassador remaining there after the overthrow of the Provisional Government. All diplomatic courtesy was extended to him, and his status was more or less for- mally acknowledged. The action of the Peking govern- ment in refusing to continue the recognition of this status of the Russian ambassador, announced on Sep- tember 23, 1920, was logically a preliminary step to the negotiations which China was expected to inaugu- rate with Moscow. This second step was almost immediately followed by the third, for which it obviously cleared the way. A Chinese military-diplomatic mission was sent to Soviet Russia, reaching Moscow at the end of September. This mission, headed by General Chjan-Si-Lin, one of the younger followers of Wu-Pei-Fu was charged with the task of negotiating with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The tenor of these negotiations was obviously THE THIKD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 89 an attempt to push China into an armed conflict with^ Japan, with which, incidentally, the Soviet diplomats were at that time negotiating for an agreement through the instrumentality of their diplomatic agents in the Far East and through the Far Eastern Repuhlic. But it was not merely as a cat's-paw against Japan that the Soviet Government is ready to use China and her possibilities. We must always remember when dealing with any of the activities of the Soviet Govern- ment that it has no policies of its own, but that what- ever step it undertakes is of necessity in furtherance of the larger plans of the Third International, that gen- eral staif of the world revolution. The International and the Soviet Government are parts of the same mechanism; the International therefore is behind the activities of the Moscow Commissariat of Foreign Af- fairs. Now what is the situation in China from the point of view of the Communist International ? According to the report presented to the Second Congress of the Third International by the Chinese delegate, Lai,* the nationalist-revolutionary movement in China has been stimulated particularly by the fact that, as he expressed it, "China was refused everything * For text of this report, as well as other reports on the Communist situation in various countries of Asia, mentioned below, see a Memo- randum, entitled "The 2nd Congress of the Third or Communist Inter- national," published by the Department of State in 1920. 90 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST at the Peace Conference." This movement of resent- ment, headed very largely by students and by the indus- trial elements of Shanghai, took the form of strikes and of similar manifestations of discontent and protest. The shifting in the political scenery of China, of which we have already spoken and which took place since the , congress, indicates what forms the activities of these elements in China have assumed. | Delegate Lai's report discussed also the agrarian and ] the industrial situation from the point of view of Com- munism. The two outstanding features of the agrarian ' situation in China are the absence of large landed estates and the general shortage of land. The over- whelming majority of the population in China is agri- j cultural, and the problem of land shortage is a very real one there. An agrarian movement therefore is scarcely possible, because it would have nothing to strive for. The solution of the problem resulting from the agricultural and agrarian crisis is obviously in in- dustrial development, which would divert large num- bers of the surplus rural population to the industrial centers and relieve the land shortage as far as possible. At the present time, however, China's industrial devel- opment is a thing that scarcely has any existence at all. According to Lai's statement, the industrial proletariat THE THIKD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 91 in China is just beginning to come into existence. But whatever there is of it, weak as it is in numbers, the industrial proletariat of China is violently revolution- ary in its tendencies. \ The intensity of the nationalist revolutionary move- ment and the revolutionary nature of the Chinese pro- letariat constitute the basis of the work which the lead- ers of the Third International consider possible in China. From the point of view of the methods and tactics of Communism, the situation in China presents conditions that are almost ideal. China is a country of tremendous potential resources. The vast bulk of her population is agitated by various kinds of resent- ment, swept by different kinds of discontent. There is a small minority of the population, very active, very determined, very ambitious. If this minority could be won over to try an experiment in Communism in an attempt to further its own aims the Third Interna- tional would have just what it desires in China — a Soviet Government, organized and run by a determined minority, with the masses of the population induced to unprotesting acquiescence by the methods of dema- goguery, of which the Communist leaders are such past masters. In other countries of the Far East preparations for 92 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST a revolution are being made similar in kind to those in China, except that there the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Government are not available as an adjunct of the propaganda work of the Third International. But everywhere the scheme is the same. A determined minority is called into being, organized and prepared for the eventualities which the Third International foresees as possible. I Looking at the situation in these countries, again through the eyes of the reports presented to the con- gress of the Third International, we find that in the Dutch Indies, for example, the Socialist propaganda, which has been going on for the last five years, is now rapidly growing in intensity and gaining in the influence it exerts by being directed primarily against foreign cap- ital. In Java, where of its thirty million population three millions are proletarians, the mass movement of the latter began as far back as 1912. But in the course of the past three years this movement has been rapidly gathering momentum as far as its revolutionary inten- sity is concerned. Special attention is being given to the organization of railroad workmen. Out of the forty thousand railroad workmen on the island, ten thousand have already been organized. Though the revolutionary Socialist party numbers only sixteen hundred members. THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 93 of whom fifteen hundred are natives, it is a very com- pact and very active body. In Korea a revolutionary movement of a purely political nature began in 1914, and included in its ranks at the beginning only the nobility and the richer elements. But now the revo- lutionary tendencies have begun to penetrate into the masses of the people. For the past year and a half this latter phase of the movement has been developing quite satisfactorily from the point of view of Communism. In India the situation appears to be almost least promising of all. Judging by the report of the Hindu delegate to the congress of the Third International, Roy, though a movement of a political and nationalist character began in India in the eighties of the past cen- tury, this movement has been centered almost exclu- sively among the students and the middle classes, find- ing very small response in the masses of the people. The latter are interested exclusively in problems of narrowly economic character. The agrarian question plays a very important role and is characterized by the existence of large landed estates, the shortage of land among the great masses of the population and the fact that the exports of foodstuffs from India are too great in proportion to the agricultural production of the coun- try. Because of the last circumstance, very largely, A 94 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST there are frequent famines in India. The industrial proletariat is very small numerically, and is very poorly organized. There is as yet no Communist party, al- 11 though there exists a movement for the creation of one. ' However, this movement makes every effort to isolate itself from the movement for national independence, looking upon the latter as bourgeois in character. In this the Communist leaders in India present a rather marked opposition to the general policies of the Third International in the East. Their attitude on this quesr tion constitutes a rather important problem for Mos- C0V7, since it weakens considerably the position of the Third International in India. However, the situation in India, though it would be affected profoundly by any events that may take place in China, is not expected to be directly affected by the conditions there. In 1920 the situation in India was expected to be affected from the Communist storm cen- ter in the Near East, which was then rapidly being built up in Afghanistan. In their work of organizing this storm center in the Near East, the Third International and the Russian Soviet Government followed the same methods as those they pursued in the Far East. Propaganda was carried on actively, and wherever possible diplomatic alliances THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 95 were attempted. A very important alliance of this kind was effected in Afghanistan. But to these two weapons of the Communist movement a third one was added here, which rendered the activities in the Near East far more formidable and important, at least for the time being, than those in the Far East. There the Coromunists found an opportunity for actually creating armed forces that would be directly under Moscow's control and orders. !Next to Zinoviev, the most prominent figure at the Baku Congress was the former Turkish general, Enver Pasha, who in the course of the past three years has gone through a most amazing transformation. From a trusty agent of the German Imperial Government and the military genius of the Turkish armed forces at the time when they were controlled from Berlin, Enver has become converted into a no less trusty agent of the Kus- sian Soviet Government, and was intrusted with a mili- tary mission of high importance. Driven out of Turkey by the eventualities of the war, Enver Pasha found refuge and warm welcome in Moscow. In the fall of 1920 he was again in the Near East, charged with the execution of plans which were much more vast than anything he had ever dreamed of under the Sultans and their protectors in Berlin. 96 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST Enver did not arrive in Baku in time to attend the congress. He reached Baku only a day or two before the congress ended, but he was received with all the pomp and enthusiasm accorded to the most prominent representatives there. He made his views known by addressing a large meeting held in his honor. Enver Pasha has now two ambitions in life. His first ambi- tion is an old one — to fight Great Britain and the British to the last ditch. To this ambition he was devoted all through the war, stimulated in his per- severance in it by the German gold that flowed so freely into the Turkish coffers. His second ambition is new — ^he is now fighting for the overthrow of the Sultan and his power. And in both of these ambitions Enver is strongly supported by the masters of Moscow. Enver Pasha left Moscow accompanied by a large gi'oup of military and civil specialists. His destina- tion was Afghanistan, and his route lay through the Caucasus; hence his presence in Baku at the time of the congress. The task intrusted to him consisted in organizing and coordinating the military efforts of the various movements in the 'Near East. Ever since the Soviet troops helped the natives of Afghanistan practically to free themselves from the I 1 THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA 97 British control the little country in Central Asia became a special object of attention for the leaders in Moscow. From dependence upon the British, Afghanistan fell into a still greater dependence upon Soviet Russia. It is a sort of connecting link between the former Russian possessions in Central Asia which are still entirely con- trolled by Soviet Russia on the one hand and India and Persia on the other. It constitutes, therefore, an ex- cellent base for Communist operations in these two important outposts of the British interests. It is an ideal center from which to direct the struggle against the European — particularly the British — supremacy in the Near East. Moreover, ever since its falling under the virtual protectorate of Soviet Russia, Afghanistan has become a refuge for all kinds of malcontents in India, Persia, Turkey and other countries of the Orient. All these refugees constitute inflammable ma- terial for the revolution and an excellent foundation for a military force. The immediate purpose of Enver's mission in Af- ghanistan was the recruiting of these refugees, particu- larly those from India, for the Soviet armies. It was reported that he had been officially designated as chief of staff of the various revolutionary armies of the 98 RUSSIA m THE. FAR EAST j Orient, and that there were under his command and direction considerable bodies of troops, whose equijt- ment and armament came from Soviet Russia. For several months, the agents of Communism car- ried on feverish activities in the Near East, no doubt, to some extent for political purposes, involved in their negotiations with Great Britain for trade relations and possible recognition. One of the British stipulations was a cessation of Communist propaganda in the coun- tries of the Near East. Partly for this reason and part-y for other reasons, which we shall take up in the next chapter, the Communist activities in the Near East slackened considerably in the spring of 1921, and the main emphasis of the Communist work in Asia was transferred definitely to the Far East. CHAPTER VII THE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAE EAST On July 12, 1921, the Soviet radio service in Moscow announced to the world the fact that a revolutionary government had just heen formed in Mongolia. This simple announcement passed practically unnoticed by the world at large. And yet the event it described represented a most important achievement of the Com-^ munist work in Asia. Of itself, wind-swept and bar- ren, Mongolia, lost in the mountains of Asia, has no special significance. But it happens to have been the storm-center of some very acute problems in the Far East and is particularly important to-day, because it is the center of the Soviet strategy in the Ear East, which is unmistakably the most important phase now of all the Communist activities in the Orient. In 1920, the main emphasis of the Communist work in Asia was on the iN'ear East; in 1921, this emphasis became transferred to the Far East. This does not mean, of course, that the Soviets have abandoned their work in other parts of Asia or even 99 100 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST curtailed their activities there. On tJie contrary, in all their latest discussions of the world situation, their activities in the Orient loom even larger titan before. For example, in describing the world situation from the viewpoint of aggressive Communism, no less an authority than Trotsky * has stated that from now on the chief struggle against the "world imperialism'^ will be in the East, rather than in Western Europe as here- tofore. A writer in the official organ of the Soviet Government f in discussing the Soviet policy in the East, stated that this policy is based on the fact that "Soviet Russia and the East really complement each other." Soviet Russia, according to this writer, is a "support for the East" in the latter's struggle against the great European powers; while the East is the Soviet's "powerful ally in the struggle against the world imperialism." And if the Soviets now transfer the emphasis of their activities to the Far East, it is because, in the first place, they have very definite and pressing aims in that part of the world, and in the second place, be- cause they are rather disappointed with their work in the Central and Near East. ■>., ^ * Speech before the 3rd World Congress of the Third International, in July, 1921. t Moscow Issvestiya, July 17, 1921. SOVIET STRATEGY m THE FAR EAST 101 The Baku Conference last summer had for its object the organization of the work of anti-Allied, particularly anti-British, propaganda in the countries of Central Asia and of the IN'ear East. As we saw above,* the Soviets were not, however, satisfied with the work of propaganda alone. Their agents were laying the foun- dation for aggressive activities all through these por- tions of Asia. But by the time of the Third Congress of the International in July, 1921, it was already quite apparent that all these efforts had failed. It has been reported that the Soviet plans in Cen- tral Asia called for an armed expedition into India, calculated to arouse whatever revolutionary fires may be smouldering in that land. For this purpose a num- ber of measures were taken. Special detachments of reliable troops were being trained in Turkestan and recruiting efforts were made in Afghanistan. A school of propaganda instruction was organized in Samarkand, and by the summer of 1921, 916 Hindu and 500 Afghan instructors were graduated from it. A great deal of work was done for the organization of transportation and liaison service in Afghanistan. But when all these military preparations were already well under way, in fact, practically completed, it was suddenly discov- * See the preceding chapter. 102 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST ered that the political situation in Afghanistan was most unfavorable for the carrying out of the original plans. The fires of nationalism there are reported as having subsided very considerably. In view of this, the ambitious expedition into India had to be post- poned indefinitely. Afghanistan was also to be used as a base for work in Persia and Turkey. But here, too, the results so far have not been altogether gratifying to the Soviets. The new Persian Government, established after the "revolutionary" outbreak of the bands of Persian Cosr sacks, was headed by Seid Zia as Prime Minister, who has behind him a long period of pro-English activities.* Two years ago he was an ardent supporter of an al- liance with Great Britain. It is true that after his elevation to power, he refused definitely to sign any agreement with the British and has demanded an evacuation of Persia by the British troops, still his rule causes considerable uneasiness to the Soviets. The new Persian Government rests particularly on the support of the bourgeois class, i.e._, principally the trading elements, who are anti-British for purely com- mercial reasons. The whole coup d'etat was directed against the landed aristocracy, for one of the first acts ♦ Moscow Izveatiydj May 21, 1921. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 103 of Seid Zia was the nationalization of the large estates, the division of state lands among the peasantry, and the arrest of practically the whole aristocracy of Te- heran, the capital of Persia. It is interesting that among those arrested were the Shah's uncle and a well- known pro-British leader, Ferman, a close personal friend of Lord Curzon. According to the Soviet re- ports from Persia, the Shah asked Seid Zia for the release of his uncle, while Lord Curzon similarly asked for the release of his friend; but both requests were refused. At the present time, the Soviet Government is doing everything in its power to keep the new Persian Gov- ^ ernment under its influence. It has concluded a treaty with it, which was signed in Moscow. Moreover, as a sort of token of good will, it has formally handed over to it the Bank of Persia, formerly owned by the Rus- sian Government. It is doing everything in its power to promote trade relations with Persia. But with all that, it is rather uneasy about the "revolutionary'' Government, especially about its present head. Once so easy a convert from a pro-British to a violently anti- British orientation, Seid Zia may perform the somer- sault over again, only reversing the direction. It has been intimated that the radical groups in Persia have 104 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST promised Lis Government support just so long as it remains anti-British. Witli the situation in Turkey, i. e., principally in Anatolia, the seat of the "^Nationalist Government" and the headquarters of Mustapha Kemal, the Soviets are thoroughly disgusted. They knew all the time and admitted it readily enough that the Kemal move- ment is far from being Communistic in its aims or purposes. However, to the extent to which it was vio- lently anti-European, particularly anti-British, it en- joyed the good graces and the support of the Soviets. But it now appears that the estimates of the -"revolu- tionary" value of the Anatolia movement have been very grossly exaggerated. Writers in the official Soviet press seem to stand aghast before some of Kemal's ac- tivities. For example, in discussing the budget of the "^Nationalist Government" they point out the fact that huge sums of money are spent for the maintenance of the Sultan's Government and household,* and they must be wondering what part of the subsidies that the Anatolian "nationalists" had obtained from Moscow at one time or another had been used for this worthy purpose. All through this time the Soviets were rather quiea- ♦ Moscow Izvestiya, July 13, 1921. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 105 cent in tlie Far East. Propaganda, of course, was car- ried on, especially in China and Korea, but, generally speaking, the policy of the Soviets there was one of "watchful waiting." As the People's Commissar of !N'ational Minorities recently explained it, the Soviets did not feel that they had enough forces, particularly from the point of view of Communist leadership, to do active work at both ends of the vast Asiatic continent. Until the spring of 1921, the situation in the Rus- sian Far East remained very much the same as it finally crystallized during the months following the defeat of Admiral Kolchak's armies and the overthrow of the Omsk Government. The power of Moscow of- ficially extended only to Lake Baikal. All the terri- tory east of that, stretching clear to the Pacific Ocean, was the Far Eastern Republic, or the "buffer" state, as it is usually termed. In the spring of 1921, the Soviet Government began to show very considerable interest in the affairs of the Far East. The first notable indication of this in- creased interest came in the form of a formal cession by the IN'ational Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic to Soviet Russia of the peninsula of Kamchatka. This act was, no doubt, dictated by a number of considera- tions, the most important of which seems to lie in the 106 KUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST fact that the Moscow leaders suddenly discovered that by recognizing the independence of the Far Eastern Eepublic they had officially rendered Eussia no longer a power on the Pacific Ocean. As such, Soviet Eussia would have no claim whatever to participation in any discussions dealing with the Pacific problems. The cession of Kamchatka was one of the ways of repairing this situation so far as the possible Soviet claims were concerned. Moreover, the re-acquisition of Kamchatka was important to the Soviets in view of their notion, frankly expressed by Lenin and other responsible lead- ers, that by granting concessions in Kamchatka to the Vanderlip group and to other American capitalists they would be able to embroil the United States in a war with Japan. The Kamchatka incident was followed by a rather important development in the Maritime or Primorsk Province of the Far Eastern Eepublic, which stretches for thousands of miles along the coast. This develop- ment consisted of a revolt against the authority of the Far Eastern Eepublic in the city of Vladivostok, which was successful and spread to several other im- portant towns. On May 26, 1921, a new government was established there, consisting of non-Socialistic elements. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 107 What part the Japanese played in this revolt it is very difficult to determine with any degree of precision. Both the Soviet Government in Moscow and the Gov- ernment of the Far Eastern Republic, of course, lay the blame on the Japanese. On May 30, I. L. Yurin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, sent a note to Tokyo, demanding the imme- diate cessation of all Japanese interference with the affairs of the Russian Far East.* He asked the Japa- nese whether or not they want friendly relations with the Far Eastern Republic and the consummation of a trade agreement with it, and if so why Japan does not withdraw her troops from the Siberian territory and give the Government of the Far Eastern Republic a free hand in dealing with the situation. Specifically, he demanded an open and definite declaration of the Japanese Government and of the Japanese Command in Siberia on their attitude with regard to the new Vladivostok Government, headed by Merkulov; the return of arms to the militia of popular defense (troops of the Far Eastern Government) which had been dis- armed by the Japanese; and no interference on the part of the Japanese with any action that the emis- • The text of this Note was published in the Moscow Izveatvya, June 9, 1921. 108 KUSSIA IN" THE FAE EAST saries of the Far Eastern Government may take for the purpose of putting down Merkulov's revolt and pun- ishing its leaders. At the same time, George Chicherin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs in the Moscow Government, sent a wireless note on the Far Eastern situation to the Gov- ernments of Great Britain, France, and Italy. In this note,* Chicherin cited a number of actions of the Japa- nese Government, interpreted as inimical by the Soviets. The most important of these actions consisted of alleged usurpation of Kussian fishing rights in Kamchatka by the Japanese authorities and their allotment to Japa- nese subjects, rather than to Kussian citizens, and of the rendering of assistance by the Japanese to various Eussian anti-Soviet groups in the Far East, notably those of Ataman Semenov and Baron Ungern in Mon- golia and the remnants of the Kappel troops, which were instrumental in bringing about the Vladivostok overthrow. In this connection Chicherin issued the following warning to Japan: "The Soviet Government, expressing the will of the Russian masses, warns the Japanese Government that the masses of the Russian people, having taken their fate into their own hands and having repelled all attacks of their enemies, will be able to conduct victoriously this new * For complete text of this Note see Appendix I. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 109 struggle and will make those who have attacked them feel their strength." But the Soviet Government was not satisfied with merely issuing this warning to Japan. It sought at the same time to fasten the blame for the events in the Far East upon the Allied powers generally; for this reason the Chicherin note was addressed to the three great European powers. The Moscow Commissar stated that the Soviet Government considers these powers ^ ^morally responsible for this new link in the chain of intervention." This statemen(t he an- nounced as applying particularly to Great Britain, which he accused of hostile acts with respect to the Soviet Government, ^'entirely out of keeping with the Anglo-Eussian agreement." The note ended with the following significant words, which state with all clarity the vassal position of the Far Eastern Kepublic with respect to the Moscow Government : "The Russian Government protests most energetically against these acts directed against Soviet Russia as such or through the Far Eastern Republic which is friendly with her, as an intermediary step." However, about the time that the Yurin note went to Tokyo and the Chicherin note was put on the Soviet radio, the Far Eastern Republic Embassy in Moscow 110 EUSSIA IlSr THE FAE EAST issued an official statement, summarizing the situation for the period ending June 1.* In this statement it was announced that although the authority in the Primorsk Province is in the hands of the Merkulov Government, the attitude of the Japanese towards this group is nega- tive, since it not only refuses to furnish it with arms, but even avoids all contact with it. According to the statement, the Merkulov forces consist of 600 bayonets in Vladivostok and of 345 bayonets in iN'ikolsk- Ussuriysk. Moreover, the. statement announced that a conference took place between Comrade Tseitlin, the representative of the Far Eastern Republic, and the Japanese representatives, in the course of which the latter declared that the events in the Primorsk Prov- ince will have no influence upon the relations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic and were disposed to blame the Military Command for what had actually taken place. But the events in Vladivostok and the Primorsk Province generally were by no means the most im- portant feature of the Far Eastern situation. Of far greater significance were the events that took place in Mongolia during the spring and summer of 1921. As we have already seen, the general political im- * Published in Moscow Izvestiya, June 9, 1921. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 111 portance of Mongolia lies in the fact that its geo- graphical position makes of it a barrier between Siberia and China proper. Its immediate political importance last summer lay in the fact that it had become the refuge for the remnants of anti-Bolshevist forces that had operated in Siberia against the Bolsheviki, princi- pally under Ataman Semenov. In the spring of 1921, one of the more energetic of Semenov's officers, Baron Ungem, made his way into Mongolia with small de- tachments of troops and entered into an agreement with the Living Buddha^ the ruler of Mongolia, to free the country of the Chinese, who had occupied it some time previously, in violation of the officially recognized autonomy of Mongolia. With the aid of the Mongolian troops, Ungem drove out the Chinese division which constituted the army of occupation, and arrived at Urga, the capital of Mongolia, where he entered into a more definite arrangement with the Living Buddha. Ungern became a Mongolian subject and was given a very high position; according to one report, he was made Minister of War and was given complete au- thority to recruit an army for the purpose of recover- ing from China the portion of Mongolia known as Inner Mongolia.* The Peking Government instructed ♦ Vladivostok Daily News, June 24, 1921. 112 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST the Inspector-General of Chinese forces in Northern Manchuria, Chan-Tso-Lin, to send troops into Mon- golia. But these instructions were not carried out, the current explanation being that the Inspector-General, who has great ambitions for the acquisition of power in the internal affairs of China, was not willing to weaken his forces by an expedition into Mongolia, especially since the Ungem activities represented no direct menace to him. The Soviet explanation of the whole affair, however, is different. In spite of an official denial of the Japa- nese Government of any connection with the Ungem affair, the Soviet explanation makes the whole incident the result of Japanese intrigue and part of the general Japanese plans. An editorial article in the Moscow Izvestiya of June 7, signed by U. Steklov, the respon- sible editor of the paper, described these plans as con- sisting primarily of two parts. The first is the creation of a base of operations against Soviet Russia in the southern part of the Primorsk Province, i. e.j in Vladi- vostok and ISTikolsk-Ussuriysk. The second is the creation of a similar base in Mongolia, which would make it possible for the Japanese to invade Siberia in the direction of Lake Baikal and cut off the Far Eastern Republic from the Soviet territory proper. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 113 A more detailed version of the Soviet explanation, more specially with reference to Mongolia, is found in an article by Vilensky, which was published in the Moscow Izvestiya of July 13. According to Yi- lensky, Baron Ungern, in his operations in Mongolia, was simply carrying out the plans of the Japanese. He says that Japanese agents had been working in Mongolia for a long time and had succeeded in bribing the Living Buddha and most of his dignitaries, while at the same time, even before the final defeat of Ataman Semenov, who was notoriously supported by the Japa- nese, the Ungem groups were concentrating arms and munitions on the Mongolian border. He quoted Chi- nese newspapers as having reported contraband deliv- eries of rifles, ammunition, and even machine guns, concealed in bags of rice, to the palace of the Living Buddha. The reason why Marshal Chan-Tso-Lin made no ef- fort to move against Mongolia, according to Vilensky, was that he is pro-Japanese and represents the groups of Chinese reactionaries who are banking on Japanese assistance for the furtherance of their political ambi- tions in internal politics. Japan's interest in Mon- golia he explained on the basis of her plans of imperial- istic control of Eastern Asia, which, says Vilensky, 114 EUSSIA m THE FAE EAST call for the creation of a living barrier between China and Soviet Eussia along the line Manchuria-Mongolia, both under Japanese control. The policy of the Far Eastern Kepublic with regard to this situation was described in the Steklov editorial. In its military phases, it was to consist of energetic efforts to crush oppositionary armed bands, while polit- ically it was to be a "struggle against the monarchists of iN'orthern China and the reactionaries of Mongolia by a close contact with the working masses of China and Mongolia.'^ Steklov particularly emphasized the fact that the various activities of the Far Eastern Re- public along these lines should be carefully coordinated with the revolutionary activities of the Chinese and Mongolian masses. And a month later, Yilensky re- ported the formation of a "popular-revolutionary party in Mongolia organized to fight for self-determination." It can be very easily surmised that the appearance of this party was a direct result of the policy of "coordina- tion of activities." There was a special reason, too, for the formation of such a party. The Soviet technique of promoting revo- lutions in territories bordering on Russia consists of bringing into life in such a territory a Communist SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 115 group, however small and insignificant; of inducing such a group to proclaim itself the provisional revolu- tionary government of the territory in question and to appeal to Moscow for military assistance, which would be immediately furnished. This was the program gone through in the Caucasus and elsewhere. And this was precisely the plan worked out for Mongolia. The Soviets made an attempt to do this sort of thing in November, 1920. The following note, sent by the Peking Government to the Chinese ambassador in Lon- don and handed by the latter to Krassin on December 31, 1920, tells the story of this first attempt of the Soviet Government to send its troops into China : "In his telegram of November 10, the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs stated that the Soviet Government, upon the request of the Chinese authorities in Urga, ordered the Siberian Command to dispatch troops to Mongolia in order to assist in the liquidation of the Semenov bands, whereupon those troops were to return to the Russian Soviet territory. On November 27, another telegram stated that, since the Chinese troops had already driven out the Semenov bands, the Soviet Government did not intend any longer to send troops there; however, should the followers of Semenov be found again within the boundaries of Mongolia, and should the Chinese authorities apply to Russia for assistance, such assistance will be given. "We consider it necessary to state that the crossing of the frontiers of one country by the troops of another violates the sovereignty of that country, and that the statement in the first telegram to the effect that we asked for assistance is not 116 EUSSIA m THE FAR EAST true. Though the dispatching of troops did not actually take place, there still remains the offer of military assistance, which we should not accept." * Five months after this incident, however, the Red troops actually crossed the Chinese frontier. Again the reason given for this was a request for assistance on the part of Chinese authorities, which would seem rather doubtful in view of the above-quoted note. The os- tensible objective of the expedition was an attack upon some detachments of anti-Soviet forces in Eastern Si- beria which had fled to China and had been interned by the Chinese in the district of Chuguchak. These troops were commanded by General Bakich and were joined in May by remnants of the detachments under the command of Gnoyev, which were until then still operating in the Semipalatinsk district of Siberia. On May 24, the Red troops attacked the Bakich forces and surrounded the city of Chuguchak. Forced to retreat, Bakich turned in the direction of Mongolia and was reported in June as attempting to effect a juncture with the forces of Baron Ungem, operating on the Mongolian territory — with the Red troops in pursuit, f * The Russian text of this note was published in Moscow Izveatiya, January 5, 1921. t Moscow Izvestiya, June 11, 1921. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 117 All this cleared the way for an effective Soviet expe- dition to Mongolia and furnished the first impetus to such an expedition. The "popular-revolutionary party" proclaimed itself Government and attempted to capture the capital of Mongolia, TJrga. It already had an army, organized and equipped on Russian territory.* At its request, the Red troops in the Baikal region im- mediately concentrated all their attention on Mongolia. The troops commanded hy Ungem v^ere defeated and were forced to retreat into the Eastern steppes. And soon after that, the Soviets staged the most farcical feature of the whole Mongolian incident. At the end of July the Mongolian People's Revolu- tionary Government addressed an official appeal to the Moscow Government, in which it requested the latter "not to withdraw the Soviet troops from the territory of Mongolia," until there can be effected a "complete removal of the menace from the common enemy." The appeal explained that the Mongolian's People's Revolu- tionary Government had not as yet succeeded in organ- izing and perfecting its apparatus of governmental authority and need the aid of the Red troops for the purpose of maintaining the security of the Mongolian ♦ Moscow IisvesUm, November 6, 1921. 118 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST territory and of the frontiers of the Eussian Socialist Federated Soviet Eepublie. * The Moscow Government immediately and most gra- ciously acceded to this request. Through the repre- sentative of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs at Irkutsk, Chicherin transmitted to the Revolutionary Government of Mongolia a pompous note^ which began as follows: "The Russian Soviet Government, in alliance with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, ordered its troops, operating side by side with the revolutionary army of the Provisional Government of Mongolia, to deal a crush- ing blow to the common enemy, the Tsarist General Ungern, who has subjected the Mongolian people to unprecedented enslavement and oppression; violated the rights of autono- mous Mongolia; at the same time threatening the security of Soviet Russia, and the inviolability of the territory of the fraternal Far Eastern Republic." This is the explanation Chicherin offers for the ap- pearance, in the first place, of the Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia. The Russian Soviet Govern- ment "notes with great satisfaction" the appeal ad- dressed to it by the Mongolian Provisional Revolution- ary Government "that the Soviet troops should not be removed from the territory of Mongolia." The Soviet Government considers this appeal a manifesta- tion of "close and friendly bonds" that now unite ♦ For fuU text of this note see Appendix II. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 119 the people of Russia with the people of Mongolia. It announces its firm decision to withdraw the Red troops just as soon "as the menace to the free development of the Mongolian people and to the security of the Russian Repuhlic and of the Far Eastern Republic shall have been removed." But the Russian Government is in complete agreement with the Revolutionary Govern- ment of Mongolia on the fact that the moment when such withdrawal of its troops may be possible "has not yet arrived." And for this reason, the Soviet Govern- ment has decided to accede to the request of the Revo- lutionary Government of Mongolia and order its troops to remain on the territory of Mongolia.* Several days after the dispatching of this note, the Soviet press reported new successes of the Red troops operating in Mongolia. It was stated that after the capture of Urga by the Red troops, IJngem retreated east and was pursued for over 100 versts, where he was finally defeated by the pursuers. A large number of prisoners was taken, including many of Ungem's im- mediate assistants. Baron Ungem himself was captured soon after that, and on September 10 the Moscow wire- less announced his execution together with sixty-one of his officers. • For full text of thia note see Appendix II. 120 EUSSIA IN THE FAK EAST The Hongolian incident, however, is far from being closed. Nevertheless, its culmination is, undoubtedly, a brilliant victory for the Soviet'policy in the Far East. Another state with a definite Moscow orientation has been created, and the territory controlled by the Third International has been pushed to the very boundaries of China proper. There is one more phase of the Soviet Far Eastern strategy that deserves attention in this connection. The Chicherin note of protest against the Japanese activities in the Far East was addressed to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and against these countries the accusation of support of the Japanese was directed. The United States was omitted from the list of the accused powers and, apparently, by implication exonerated from the accusation. This was not, by any means, an oversight or an accident on the part of the Soviet diplomacy. It was entirely in keeping with the whole Soviet view of the American position in the Far East. The Soviets are frankly banking on a possibility of a war between the United States and Japan. Whatever the outcome of such a war, the Soviet leaders believe that the war would exhaust both sides and, possibly, lead to a social revolution in both, and even if the revo- SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST 121 lution should not take place, both sides would be weak- ened very greatly by the eifort. This is particularly important for the Soviets in the case of Japan, as in that manner their only strong adversary in the Far East would be eliminated. Thus, whatever the outcome of an armed encounter between the United States and Japan, the Soviet leaders feel that they would be the only and the real winners. And they are ready to spare no efforts for the consummation of this end. CHAPTER VIII THE SOVIET FAR EASTERN CONFERENCE The sovietization of Mongolia was not only a distinct triumph for the Soviet strategy in the Far East, but it opened before the Moscow leaders rather alluring and timely possibilities in connection with the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. The Soviet Government never had any illusions as to the possibility of its being asked to send representatives to the Conference in Washington. Its July note of pro- test against not being invited was merely a matter of form and of rhetorical exercise for the facile and elo- quent Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. For a time, the Soviet Government rather hoped that the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic might bo invited to attend the Washington parley. Then the Moscow Government would be able to speak through them, in the same way in which it had thus conducted indirect negotiations with China and Japan. The agent of the Far Eastern Republic in Peking even 122 SOVIET FAE EASTERN CONPEEENCE 123 applied for an invitation to Washington, but the posi- tion taken by the Government of the United States, which issued the invitations, was one of inalterable opposition to this. It so happens that this is not the first time that the Soviet Government fails to receive an invitation to a world parley. When the Peace Conference was in progress and the Moscow Government found itself un- invited to it, it immediately organized a world congress of Communist groups and hastened to organize them into the Third International, which it pronounced as an "antidote'' to the League of JSTations. This Interna- tional has proven to be a most valuable instrument in the hands of the Soviet Government. It is brought into play whenever the Soviet Government wishes something done for which it can, if necessary, disclaim responsi- bility. So the Third International is now being pushed forward in the Far East for the purpose of organizing a Soviet Far Eastern Conference in competition with the Washington Conference, in so far as it deals pri- marily with the problems of the Far East. The question of a possible Far Eastern conference to be called by Moscow was first raised in the Soviet press by V". Vilensky. In an article, published in the official organ of the Executive Coiomittee of Soviets, 124 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST i.e., the political organ of the Government,* he urged the need of such a conference, to oppose the Washington Conference. According to his analysis of the situation, the four great powers to be represented in Washington — the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France — are primarily interested in a division of their control over the Pacific ocean and the territories lying on the Pacific. The Washington Conference is bound to be- come a conflict of "the contradictions which exist among these four pretenders to hegemony in the Pacific." Whatever compromises or decisions may be reached at the Washington Conference are bound, according to Vilensky, to be at the expense of the interests of the peoples which inhabit the Far East, viz., China, Mon- golia, the Far Eastern Kepublic, and Soviet Russia. Consequently, a counter-conference of these four na- tions is not only desirable but essential from the point of view of safeguarding the interests of these nations. The next step in the development of this idea was a discussion of the question, taken up where Vilensky left it off, in the leading article in the official economic organ of the Soviet Government, f This article approached • Moscow Jzvestiya, August 2, 1921. t Moscow Ekonomicheskaya Zhian, August 10, 1921, SOVIET FAR EASTERN" CONFERENCE 125 the question entirely from the economic viewpoint. Its thesis was that "if the peoples of the Far East are to be able to offer sufficient resistance to imperialistic aggression, no matter whence it comes, it is necessary for them to determine and unify their own interests." This unification of interests has to proceed along two lines, the external and the internal. The external unity of interests lies in a coordination of the forces of these nations for defense against direct imperialistic aggression. But this external unity can never be effective, unless it is based upon a mutuality of economic interests, which would act as a force of internal cohesion. There are three stages, maintains the author of the article, in the process of effecting such internal unity. The first is the establishment of close economic rela- tions between Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Re- public. This is the easiest of the three stages, for what is called the Far Eastern Republic has been carved out of Russian territory, and, by the very nature of its development since the first days of its settlement by Russia, constitutes an integral part of the rest of Siberia and of the whole of Russia. The second stage is more difficult, consisting of a similar unification of the economic interests of Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern 126 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST Bepublic on the one hand and of Mongolia on the other. This task — according to the Soviet analysis we are quoting — is facilitated by two circumstances. In the first place, Mongolia is more easily accessible to Russia than to any other country, including China herself, of which Mongolia was until recently a component part; and in the second place, the primitive character of the Mongolian market makes it possible for Russia, even in her present state of industrial collapse, to satisfy its needs, while Mongolia's exports, consisting of meat and hides, can easily be consumed by the Russian markets. Moreover, the recent events in Mongolia and the con- trol, which Soviet Russia now has over the country, renders quite possible very close relations between Soviet Russia, its Far Eastern vassal, and Mongolia. But there is also one disturbing factor, viz., the attitude on the part of China, of which we shall speak below. With regard to China, there is a number of important questions which require solution in any event, i.e., even apart from the possibility of a conference, and which would determine the inter-relations among her, Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic. These are ques- tions of customs; trade routes, overland as well as by water ; the status of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, etc. SOVIET FAE EASTERN CONFERENCE 127 The article we are quoting ended with the hopeful assertion that the solution of all these questions is not only possible, but inevitable, and that a Soviet Far Eastern Conference would be the best method of weld- ing the four territories enumerated into an economic unity. The conference would have to define their common aims, determine their common interests, and lay down the fundamentals of a plan of collaboration and of coordination of forces. In all this preliminary discussion of a possible Far Eastern Conference, the distinguishing feature was that it was to be a conference of nations, in which the representatives of the governments of the four coun- tries would gather around a conference table. But, apparently, something was going on behind the scenes of the Soviet diplomacy all this time, and before long the idea of the Far Eastern Conference reappeared in a new guise. The next step in the development of the idea was the publication of the Theses of the Executive Committee of the Third International on the Washington Confer- ence, in the official organ of the Russian Communist Party.* These theses give the view which the Third * Moscow Pravda, September 1, 1921. The Theses are signed by Carl Radek, Secretary of the Executive Committee. 128 RUSSIA m THE FAE EAST International takes of the situation and tlie position which it intends to take with regard to the whole matter. The Washington Conference is defined in these theses as "an attempt on the part of the United States to take away from Japan by diplomatic means the fruits of the latter's victory," which consist of economic ad- vantages in China and Siberia. The Conference may result in a compromise, in which case Great Britain will side with the United States, and the two together will force Japan to give up the advantages which the United States seeks for herself. In that case, just as it happened when Russia, Great Britain and France forced Japan to give up the advantages she had wrested from China by the Simonoseki treaty, such an enforced compromise will be the basis for new international groupings and for new world conflicts. Or else, the Washington Conference may settle nothing, in which case the economic competition and the armament rivalry will go on at an even more rapid tempo than heretofore. But in either case, the fundamental contradictions which exist among the great capitalistic powers will remain uncomposed, and consequently, the Conference as such is doomed to failure. The concluding paragraphs of these theses are in the SOVIET FAR EASTERN CONFERENCE 129 form of a warning, issued by the Executive Committee of the International "to the laboring masses and to the enslaved peoples of the colonies", that they should ex- pect no alleviation from the Washington Conference in the way of removing militaristic dangers. At the same time, the Executive Committee appealed to the Communist parties and labor organizations in all coun- tries "to increase their agitation and struggle against the imperialistic states," and to the masses of the popu- lation of Eastern Siberia, China, and Korea, "to unite more closely with Soviet Russia." For a whole month after that, the question of a Soviet Far Eastern Conference was not discussed in the Moscow press. Then V. Vilensky again took up the question,* and his discussion disclosed a very important and interesting fact. In that interval, the question of calling a counter-conference was settled by the Soviet leaders, and the decision was to have the Executive Committee of the Third International, rather than the Soviet Government, call this conference. It is to be a "congress of the toiling masses of Eastern Asia," not a conference of the representatives of governments. The reason for this decision does not appear clearly, but some of the events that have taken place • Moscow IzvesUua, September 30, 1921. 130 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST in tlie Far East during the interval shed a very inter- esting light on what is going on behind the scenes of the Soviet diplomacy. For it was certainly not with- out a reason that the Soviet leaders gave up the idea of staging a regular diplomatic conference, with four nations represented, to offer to the world their own solution of the problems which stand out in such sharp relief at the present time. Ever since the creation of the Far Eastern Republic at Chita, the Soviet Government has been doing every- thing in its power to arrange for an official conference between the representatives of that Eepublic and Japan. That was really the primary purpose for which the Soviet leaders agreed in the first place to the creation of the "buffer" state, for they hoped to be able to use it as a channel for an understanding which it wanted with Japan. On the other hand, Japan quite obviously consented to the creation of this "buffer'' between her- self and Soviet Russia, because she expected to derive advantages out of the situation that would have thus come about. But at the same time, Japan continued her old policy of making no definite and clear-cut declarations of her position with regard to the Russian Far East. She continued to hold the coast and the island of Sakhalin SOVIET FAR EASTERN" CONFERENCE 131 on the plea of defending her interests, and yet ostensibly preserved a state of neutrality with regard to the Far Eastern Eepuhlic itself. Finally, a conference took place early in September between the representatives of Chita and of Tokyo in the city of Dairen, in Manchuria. What took place at the Dairen Conference is not known. The Conference was interrupted about the middle of October, and then resumed in ^November. The questions of a trade agreement and of the evacuation of the Russian Far East were taken up seriously in Dairen, and the Japanese representatives showed themselves quite willing to settle both of these questions quite satisfactorily to the Chita Government. These two points appear obvious from Vilensky's dis- cussion. He took this apparent change of front on the part of the Japanese diplomats in conjunction with the Japanese negotiations with China regarding the Shantung question. And the point of his argument was that all this does not, necessarily, indicate a reversal of Japan's postwar policy with regard to the continental Far East. His explanation of Japan's motives ran as follows : "With the aid of all these 'conferences' and 'negotiations' Japan merely attempts, on the eve of the Washington Con- 132 RUSSIA m THE FAE EAST ference, to safeguard her rear so far as the continent of Asia is concerned. The current task of the Japanese diplomacy- is to bind China or the Far Eastern Republic by means of some sort of agreements. The Hara Cabinet wants to be able to say that all the acute problems of the Far East have already been settled by Japan's direct negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic and with China." In accordance with this analysis, Vilensky forecast the following as the basic object of the congress of the toiling masses of Eastern Asia, that is being convoked by the Third International: "To disclose the schemes of the Japanese imperialism, which is the chief oppressor of the nations of the Far East, and to oppose to it the organized will of the toiling masses of Eastern Asia." The Dairen negotiations were not broken off, however, and the Soviet Government does not risk the calling of a diplomatic Ear Eastern conference. It is so much simpler to relegate the task to the Third International, to make the conference serve the agitation and propa- ganda purposes which, in any event, would have been the only possible outcome of any Soviet Far Eastern Conference, and then, if necessary, to disclaim all of- ficial responsibility for any criticism or decisions in which the conference might indulge. There is another reason why the Soviet diplomats are rather diffident about lauching a diplomatic counter- conference. The position of China, the participation of SOVIET FAE EASTERN CONFERENCE 133 which in such a conference is vital, is far from being favorable to the Soviet plans. The Peking Government is not at all in sympathy with the efforts made in the course of the past months by Moscow to reach a friendly understanding with it. After the overthrow of the Anfu party and the accession to power of the present regime, the Soviet diplomats, as we saw above, had great hopes of reaching such an understanding with the new Government. Their calculations were based on the strongly anti-Japanese position of General Wu-Pei- Fu, whose antagonism to Japan they expected to turn into friendship for Soviet Russia. But their anticipa- tions in this regard failed of materialization almost completely, while Wu-Pei-Fu's own influence in Peking lasted but a very short time. The present Peking Gov- ernment is very cold to the Soviet advances. This coldness on the part'of Peking toward Moscow was not, of course, dispelled by the recent activities of the Soviets on the Chinese frontier; rather was it in- creased. Ever since the Chinese revolution furnished an opportunity for the Imperial Russian Government to establish its ascendency in Mongolia and elsewhere along the Chinese boundary, there have been constant difficulties between Peking and Petrograd regarding the status of these territories. The Mongolian question 134 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST was finally regulated by the tri-partite Kyakhta agree- ment in 1915,* but tbe question of tbe Urankbai Terri- tory, for example, was never settled even tentatively. Tbe establishment in Mongolia, in tbe summer of 1921, of a government tbat rests almost exclusively on tbe bayonets of tbe Russian Red troops can scarcely be con- sidered by tbe Peking Government as furthering its own aims. Tbe Kyakbta agreement made Mongolia an autono- mous state under China's suzerainty. Tbe Mongols were not satisfied with this agreement, for they de- manded complete independence. But such as it was, the agreement stood until 1919, when it was abrogated by China, and Mongolia was included in tbe territory of the Chinese Republic. This state of affairs lasted until the events which we described in the last chapter unfolded themselves, and the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, established with the aid of tbe Russian Red troops, placed itself under tbe pro- tection of Soviet Russia. Peking's reply to this was expressed in new instruc- tions to Marshal Chan-Tso-Lin to march against Mon- golia. This time Chan-Tso-Lin decided to carry out tbe instructions, and began making preparations for tbe * For the important provisions of this agreement see Appendix II. SOVIET FAR EASTERN CONFERENCE 135 expedition. But these preparations were halted when the Canton Government began its war against Peking. In the meantime the Soviets have done everything in their power to reach an understanding with China over the Mongolian question. All the means at its disposal have been utilized to this end. In a note, addressed on September 14, 1921, to the head of the People's Eevolutionarj Government of Mongolia, its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bodo, George Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, said: "More than once has the Russian Government approached the Government of China, both directly and through the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic who were in communication with the latter, with offers to begin nego- tiations on these questions (relations between Mongolia and China)." All these efforts failed, however, and in September, 1921, the Soviet Government decided to send a special mission to take up this question. In order to have a pretext for this mission, which was to go in the guise of a trade delegation, the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was inspired from Moscow to request the Soviet Government to present to the Chinese Gov- ernment an offer of the new rulers of Mongolia to enter into negotiations with Peking. * For complete text of this note see Appendix II. 136 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST In tlie meantime the Soviet troops had occupied not only Mongolia but also the Urankhai Territory. Here, again, the pretext was the need for the Soviet Govern- ment to defend its frontiers from "white guard bands" which were claimed to have found refuge in the moun- tains of Urankhai. And just as with Mongolia, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs dispatched an official note to the shepherds of Urankhai, assuring the "people of the Urankhai Territory" that the sole object of the occupation of their land by the Russian Red troops was to defend them from the "reactionary tsarist officers who had found refuge among them" and to protect the territory of Soviet Russia from these "bands." The note also contains assurances that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn as soon as these dangers would be removed.* Knowing only too well the Soviet technique of over- throwing governments in territories contiguous with Soviet Russia, the Peking Government has been watch- ing with considerable apprehension this massing of Russian Red troops in the vicinity of l^orthern China. Its leaders know that the possibility is not precluded that some group may appear there, subsidized and * The text of this note was published in the Moscow Izveatiya, September 17, 1921. SOVIET FAR EASTEEISr CONFEEENCE 137 instructed from Moscow, declare itself a govemment and immediately apply to Soviet Russia* for military assistance. Under these conditions it is more tlian likely that the Peking Government would rather trust itself to the "imperialistic intrigue" of the Washington 'Con- ference than participate in a Soviet diplomatic confer- ence. And without China such a conference would be worthless, as the Soviet leaders themselves fully realize. But neither were the Soviet leaders willing to let such an opportunity of general international interest in the affairs of the Far East as presents itself in connection with the Washington Conference pass unutilized by them. The Congress of the Toiling Masses of Eastern Asia was the natural outcome of the situation that had thus unfolded itself in the Far East on the eve of the Washington Conference. CHAPTEK IX The story of tlie Eussian phase of the Far Eastern question, given in the preceding chapters, incomplete though it he, hrings out two important things. The first is that the interplay of a numher of factors opera- tive in the 'Course of the past quarter of a century has ohscured and rendered confusingly complex the hasic elements of Russia's position in the Far East. The second is that it is most important to distinguish in the situation between the fundamental structure of Russia's real national interests and the confusing superstructures of the highly questionable policies followed by the Russian Imperial regime during the years of its imperialistic aggression and by the Soviet regime in its present-day activities. Let us attempt to make such a differentiation. The elemental eastward movement of Russian colon- ization through the centuries, in the course of which Russia had made her way across the virgin stretches 138 NATIONAL INTERESTS IN FAR EAST 139 of Siberia and finally came to rest on the shores of the Pacific, is the first and the most important element in the situation. To settle this vast territory and introduce into it modem civilization has been a truly stupendous task that required sturdy colonizing genius and colossal expenditures of effort, human life, and material wealth. The Russian settlers in Siberia came to an economic- ally virgin land that had very little native population. There were no organized states to conquer, no foreign nations to absorb. Russia came into these vast Asiatic stretches, bringing with her the arts of civilization, millions of her own population, and the resources of a powerful, organized state. She developed the coun- try and made of it an organic part of her own politico^ economic whole. This applies to the Far East with even greater justice than to the rest of Siberia, for the conditions that Russia encountered there were even more difficult to overcome than those with which she met in the western portions of the country. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the violent imperialism of the Russian Government intruded itself upon this process of peaceful colonization. Fed by inordinate ambitions and by questionable intrigue, this Russian imperialism proceeded to wrest for itself ad- vantages in places where such acquisitions could be of 140 EUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST no possible good to tlie national interests of Eussia. The whole Manchurian episode of Russia's history, ending so ingloriouslj with the Eusso-Japanese War, involved no national interests and could not possibly have brought Eussia any permanent and necessary advantages. Of equally questionable value were the advantages which the Imperial Eussian Government wrested from China after the revolution took place there in 1911. There seems little doubt that the manner in which the Eussian Imperial Government handled the Mongolian situation was merely an echo of the methods it had employed on a larger scale in Korea and Manchuria ten years before. But if the Far Eastern imperialism of the Tsar's Government was entirely foreign to the national inter- ests of Eussia, the present-day activities of the Soviet regime in the Far East are even more foreign to these interests. Of what possible interest to the people of Eussia can be the question of the sort of government that exists in Mongolia, when this question presents no threat whatever to the honor or the prosperity of Eussia? Eussia is being frankly used by her Com- munist rulers as merely the base for a world revolution, and the foreign ventures of the Soviet Government and NATIONAL INTERESTS IN FAR EAST 141 of the Third International cannot be regarded as having in view any national interests of Eussia. Moreover, the Soviets are doing on the territory of China precisely what they accuse Japan of doing on the territory of Siberia. They demand from the Japanese the evacuation of the Maritime Province, and at the same time occupy Mongolia, offering the same excuse that the Japanese had given for their acts and making the same sort of solemn promises of withdrawal. Anyone reading carefully the Chicherin notes on the Far Eastern Republic and on Mongolia, given in the Appendix, cannot but be struck by this similarity. So after all it is not so difficult to distinguish between Russia's national interests and the activities which have been and are carried on in her name by her Imperial or Soviet masters. In Russia's present situation these fundamental interests seem to be divided into two broad classes: those of territorial integrity, and those of na- tional sovereignty. Both of these two classes of inter- ests are involved m the Russian Far Eastern situation. The boundaries of the Russian empire were well defined. These boundaries remained defined as the frontiers of Russia when the Provisional Government was in existence. Since the overthrow of that govern- ment and the disappearance in Russia of any legal and 142 EUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST recognized government, numerous attempts have been made to dismember Russia. Only a Russia restored to national statehood can deal authoritatively with the question of the preservation or non-preservation of the territorial integrity of what was formerly the Russian empire. Therefore the interests of Russia's national integrity demand that no power, friendly to Russia, should make attempts to enter into agreements with the governments which now exist unrecognized on any portion of the former Russian empire concerning per- manent disposition of any portion of this territory. Specifically, so far as the Far Eastern question is con- cerned, the interests of Russia's territorial integrity require that the great powers sanction or accept no permanent separation from Russia of any territory within the frontiers of the former Russian empire. The interests of national sovereignty are concerned with the rights which have accrued to Russia by virtue of the international agreements that had been made by her recognized governments. This means, first of all, the application to Russia of the principle of the sanctity of treaties. On September 23, 1920, the Chinese Government violated all the treaties which had existed between Russia and China. This act undoubtedly constituted NATIONAL INTERESTS IN FAE EAST 143 a direct violation of the interests of Kussia's national sovereignty. The treaties which had existed between Russia and China may or may not have been inter- nationally just. They may or may not have been to the best interests of Russia. But whatever they were, they cannot be abrogated arbitrarily by one of the signatories. One of these agreements between Russia and China was concerned with the Russian control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Aside from the legal considerations involved in this question, the continuation of this con- trol constitutes a matter of great economic importance to Russia. The economic development of Siberia depends to a large extent upon the country's unhampered and con- venient exit to the sea. This exit is provided by the port of Vladivostok, and the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the construction of which cost Russia over 300,000,000 roubles, has its vital importance in the fact that it pro- vides the only possible convenient and economical con- nection between the interior of Siberia and the port terminal. The railroad was originally conceived of as an economic necessity, and Count Witte in his Memoirs spoke of it as "designed exclusively for cultural and peaceful purposes," though "jingoist adventurers turned 144 EUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST it into a means of political aggression." Even the Japanese recognized the economic need to Russia of this railroad, and the Portsmouth treaty specifically pro- vided for the continuation of Russia's economic use of the railroad, while precluding just as specifically any utilization of it for political purposes. But apart from these general interests which must enter properly within the category of Russia's "legiti- mate" interests, over which a "moral trusteeship" has heen proposed hy the Government of the United States, Russia's national interests in the Ear East require permanent peace there. The economic havoc wrought there, as well as elsewhere in the country, hy the Com- munist experiments, can he repaired only hy means of rapid and energetic development, and such development IS possible only if Russia succeeds in enlisting for it the aid of foreign capital, and if such capital can work in conditions of free and unhampered activity. There are two nations that can engage in such eco- nomic activity in the Russian Far East on a large enough scale to be commensurate with the needs of the situation. These two nations are the United States and Japan. And there is no doubt that restored Russia would be willing to open her door wide to both of them, if they came in the proper spirit. N^ATIONAL INTERESTS IN FAE EAST 145 It is not only conceivable but, in the long run, in- evitable that Kussia and Japan should be friends. True, in order that this should take place, Japan would have to undergo something of a transformation. It would have to be a different Japan, just as it would be a different Eussia. It would have to be a Japan that will have learnt the lesson which Germany's experi- ence in the course of the past decade taught the world — a Japan that will realize that one hundred thousand bayonets cannot give her one hundred satisfied cus- tomers or friends. That such a Japan is possible there seems to be very little doubt. And with such a Japan, Kussia can, and, no doubt, will be friends. Freedom of economic opportunities in Siberia, which a restored Russia would undoubtedly offer to the world, would place Japan in a position of advantage which nothing short of specific restrictions against her can take away. Her geographical proximity, her knowl- edge of the local conditions and her ability to adapt herself to these peculiar conditions presented by Siberia, are bound to put her in the same position with regard to Asiatic Russia that Germany is certain to enjoy with regard to European Russia. But whatever scope Japan's economic activities may assume in Siberia, the greatest share in the development 146 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST of that country would still go to the United States. The United States is the only country in the world to- day that possesses the necessary resources for financing the large phases of the constructive work which would have to proceed in Siberia in the near future on a truly gigantic scale. The similarity of the problems which Siberia faces today with the problems which America faced during the past fifty years in the development of her own West, coupled with the accumulation of capitalistic resources in America, which has come about as a result of the World War, renders the United States unmistakably the most important factor in the economic development of Siberia. And the traditional friend- ship which has existed between Russia and the United States for generations, and which was greatly accentu- ated by America's friendship for Russia since the revolution, make such an economic partnership between Russia and America a certainty. CHAPTER X Russia's role in a world balance of powers It is not only in their attitude toward each other as nation to nation, however, that^lies the importance of the relations between the United States and Russia. The world political situation of the present time places demands of vastly more far-reaching importance upon their possible accord and a harmony of their views on certain fundamental questions of policy and action. The role that each of them plays or is likely to play in the new political equilibrium of the world which is coming about as a result of the World War is a question to which scarcely any other is superior today in para- mount importance. At the time of the Peace Conference in Paris, a French diplomat was complaining on one occasion to an eminent Russian statesman of the difficulties en- countered by the Preliminary Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers, and of the lack of steadiness 'of purpose that characterized so prominently that con- 147 148 RUSSIA IN THE FAE EAST clave of nations. The Russian statesman gave the following reply to his French colleague: "What would you expect? Russia is not represented at the Conference. In former European conferences, it was she, with her massive strength of two hundred millions of people, that supplied the steadying and stabilizing influence. Now there is nothing to take her place." The Russian statesman, watching the work of the Peace Conference, visualized it from the viewpoint of what he rightly interpreted as an irreparable disturb- ance of that European balance of powers, which existed so prominently before the war and which was shattered forever when the first shot of the war was fired. He himself had taken a very important part in the network of diplomatic intrigue which had created and main- tained that balance. The negative factor of Russians absence from the Paris Conference, which of itself rendered the reestablishment of the old balance im- possible, naturally loomed in his eyes as the outstanding feature of the situation. Yet there was another factor in the situation as it unfolded itself at the Paris Conference, and this factor was even more important, positively, than the absence of Russia was negatively. It was the presence of the United States, for the first time in history projecting herself into a world situation and placed by the circum- WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS 149 stances attending that situation in a position of un- precedented dominance. There is no doubt that at the time of the Paris Conference, i. e., in the spring and the summer of 1919, this position of the United States was not, by any means, as clearly defined and as widely accepted as it is today. On the contrary, ostensibly the European diplomats of the old school, instinct with the psychology of a European balance of powers, were in control of the situation. But whether or not the leaders of the Peace Con- ference realized the new importance which America was destined by the war to play in the affairs of the world, the two years that have elapsed since that Conference have offered ample demonstration of America's new role. The alacrity and readiness with which the great powers consented to attend the new world confer- ence, proposed by the President of the United States, furnish the most convincing proof of this acceptance of America's leadership, while the almost complete absence of opposition to having the capital of the United States as the seat of the conference was the crowning manifes- tation of America's position. And it is most important to note that this supreme importance of the new role of the United States lies in the fact that it is America's 150 EUSSIA m THE FAR EAST larger interests that now hold the center of the world stage and that the incidence of these interests, coupled, of course, with a number of other factors, constitutes the decisive influence in the determination of what and where that center is to be. The Paris Conference worked in an atmosphere which radiated from a tradition of Europe as the center of world affairs and the European balance of powers as the most important factor in the world situation. The Washington Conference meets in an atmosphere that radiates from a center of world affairs which has moved to the vast reaches of the Pacific ocean and a balance of powers that is truly world-wide in its scope, rather than essentially European. The war and the storm of acute social unrest which followed in its wake have left the continent of Europe a panting wreck. Europe's sources of basic raw mate- rials are less accessible than before — partly because of war's devastations, as in Northern France; partly be- cause of general disorganization, as in some of the newly created states; partly because of sporadic political con- troversies, as in Silesia or Western Germany. Its mechanical industrial equipment was almost everywhere impaired by the war. Its manpower deteriorated dur- ing the war and the war's aftermath from the point of WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS 151 view of both physical strength and psychological attitude toward the processes of economic production. The spoliation and ruin of Russia by her Communist vivi- sectionists have left a breach in the continental economy of Europe that will not be repaired for a long time to come. Finally, the creation of a number of new states on the continent and the status in which the war left the two great continental states, France and Germany, render the internal political situation in Europe one of confusion and uncertainty. At the same time the war, by its very demands upon the economy of the whole world, expressed in the far- flung processes of its conduct, has crystallized the politico-economic status on a world scope of that part of the earth upon which at least one side in the conflict drew for its resources. The United States and the British Overseas Dominions were to a large extent the inexhaustible source of strength from which the Allies drew the possibility of victory. The war forced these countries into a new attitude toward the world problems. It left them in a politico-economic status that renders them the active bases of the world reconstruction after the ravages of the conflict. At the same time, the war increased the importance of the undeveloped countries of the East as the passive bases of such reconstruction. 153 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST And all these countries have the Pacific ocean for their center of interests and the world comity that is now formulating itself ahont the problems of the Pacific as a nucleus for their principal concern.* Thus, the importance acquired by the Pacific in the affairs of the world is no longer due primarily to a menacing or even a significant awakening of the Orient — a "Yellow Peril/' with the specter of which the former German Emperor strove so hard to frighten the world. Rather is it due to a new projection of the Occident into the possibilities of development held by the Orient. This projection is not a new thing, of course. But the crystallization of the Occident's strength in the Orient has been rapid and spectacular in recent years through its emergence out of the World War. I^ot only has this process taken place under the conditions and in terms of a rapidly growing vital economic dependence of the war-wrecked Europe upon the war-developed basin of the Pacific ocean, but this basin has acquired its new world significance, because the Pacific has become, to a very important extent, the white man's sea^ — no longer solely as an object of * I am indebted for some of the ideas expressed here to an excellent series of articles on the general subject of "Europe's Decline," by Alexander Kerensky, former head of the Provisional Government of Russia, published in the Prague Volj/a RossU and translated in part in The Living Age. WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS 153 exploitation, but as a place in which the white man makes his habitat and begins to build up great national states. To this kind of white man's appearance in the Pacific there is very strenuous opposition on the part of one Oriental power — Japan — which has adopted the European technique and is bent on using it for the establishment of its hegemony in some parts of the Orient, besides making quite a definite bid for a control of the Pacific. To the extent to which it deals primarily with the problems of the Pacific, the Washington Conference is confronted by this very complex and inherently unstable situation, in which the following are the principal national factors: 1. Japan, which is for the present moment still dominated by ambitions, imperialistic elements that are striving to secure and maintain a hegemony in the East and a control of the Pacific, and at the same time confronted by such vital internal problems as the growth and the distribution of her population and a danger of economic exhaustion due to the staggering drain on her resources of her stupendous military and naval prep- arations. 2. Great Britain, faced by disturbing internal diffi- culties due to the war's aftermath, and still more di&- 154 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST turbing symptoms exhibited by the radical changes wbich have taken place in her intra-Imperial relations, as between the Metropolis and the Dominions, striving at the same time to secure her colonial empire and looking to Japan for at least temporary assistance in this regard. 3. The British Dominions, finding themselves on terms of competition with Japan, rather than of the possible cooperation sought by the mother-country, con- fronted by what appears to be an inevitability of serious conflicts with Japan on the questions of racial migra- tions and economic rivalry. 4. China, over which Japan seeks to establish dom- inating control in order to use her as a powerful base for a possible carrying out of her own ambitions. 5. Continental Europe, temporarily passive because of its internal economic situation and the rapidly re- emerging rivalry between France and Germany for continental hegemony, but vitally interested in the eastern developments. 6. The United States, finding herself in a position with regard to Japan practically identical with that of the British Dominions, but faced at the same time by the realization that America alone can and must act as the stabilizing factor in this highly unstable situation. WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS 155 These are tJie six principal factors in the world situation. Out of them the Washington Conference is making an attempt to create a world balance of powers. But here again, as in Paris in 1919, one factor is absent, which by its very absence makes the creation of a world balance of powers in Washington just as im- possible as its absence in Paris rendered untliinkable a re-creation there of a European balance. This absentee is Kussia, the seventh factor in the world situation. Russia is not represented at the Washington Con- ference, but it is impossible to strike out of the world situation her one-seventh of the earth's surface, which includes one-third of the total continent of Asia, or the massive strength of her teeming millions, or her cen- turies of active international history. All this gives her a place in the world balance of powers, the impor- tance of which can neither be gainsaid nor minimized with immunity. The existence of the Communist regime in Russia sets her apart from the rest of the world. The six factors in the world situation which we enumerated above are moved by national and international con- siderations. The present regime in Russia is actuated by what may be termed super-national considerations. It wants to change the whole fabric of political and 156 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST economic relations, and it has no vital or basic interest in relations among separate national units. Certainly it has no interest whatever in any efforts to reconstruct these relations on a different plan from that which exists today. From the story of the activities of the Third Inter- national in Asia generally, and of its more recent strategic moves in the Far East, as told in the chapters of this book devoted to those topics, it is quite apparent that, in the best case, individual and group arrange- ments among the various national units interest the leaders of Russian Communism only to the extent to which these arrangements and the consequent relations may be utilized by them for purposes of their own. Their tactics are plain. They are ready to make the most incongruous alliances, provided those alliances afford them an opportunity for stimulating discord and conflicts among nations. In this regard, their aims are inherently antagonistic to the aims which actuate the Washington Conference. But while this condition is the inevitable consequence of the very nature of Communism, there is no doubt that there are only two outcomes possible for the processes which the Moscow regime brings into being: either Communism will spread to the rest of the world, WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS 157 or it will disappear in Russia herself. The national existence of the Communistic and the non-Communistic systems side by side is rendered impossible by the very nature of Communism; the Communist leaders them- selves are most emphatic in the statement of this fact. To the extent to which we believe that the second, rather than the first, of the two outcomes will be the fate of Russian Communism, it is a matter of certainty that Russia is bound to return to the status of a national state, rather than remain merely a base for the super- national activities of the Soviet Government and the Third International. Until that time comes, Russia cannot be a part of any world balance of powers ; but at the same time any such balance that may be established can be merely tentative, pending the determination of what will be Russia's role in it. By all signs of logic and all tests of politico-economic prognosis. Communism is bound to disappear in Russia. But the years of its existence and the far-flung nature of its activities cannot pass unnoticed in the history of the world. And nowhere will these effects be felt more than in the situation which is rapidly shaping itself in Asia under the influence of a number of important factors. The two outstanding results of the existence and the 158 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST activities of Russian Communism in Asia are as follows: First, the stimulus that these activities have given to military ambitions on the part of Japan ; and, second, the general agitation of the East against the West, for which the Communist propaganda and activ- ities have served as an active ferment. Both of these heritages of Russian Conununism the world has to face as a whole. It is hoped that the first of these conditions will he met at the Washington Conference. Allured by the possibilities which seemed to have opened before them for playing a lone hand in the field of imperialistic intrigue in the Far East by the disappearance of Im- perial Russia, Japan's militaristic elements eagerly seized the excuse given them by the Communist activi- ties in the Far East to push forward a bold policy of military imperialism. Under such circumstances a per- manent weakening of Russia would have been a most welcome contingency so far as Japan is concerned. But Japan's military imperialism may — and, it is hoped, will — evolve into virile economic energy, which would be a most welcome change for 'the peace of the world. In that case she will have no occasion to fear a regeneration of Russia, for economically she has more to gain from a peaceful cooperation with Siberia than WOELD BALANCE OF POWERS 159 from military control there, backed by a policy of snarl- ing at the rest of the world and, incidentally, exhausting herself by an insupportable burden of naval armament. As for the revolutionary ferment in the East gener- ally, stimulated so powerfully by the agents of Com- munism, that may or may not develop into a serious menace. Sooner or later it must become clear to the peoples of the Orient, which are goaded into a blind and unreasoning fury by the Communist propaganda, that they have chosen very poor allies for the consummation of their national aims. Communism has no more sympathy with their fierce and revolutionary national- ism than it has with any other movement, not conform- ing to its own dogma. With the disappearance of Russian Communism much of this revolutionary activity in the East will, of necessity, have to subside. But there is no doubt that at least some of its effects wiU not wear off. The present fermentation will un- doubtedly crystallize, all through the Orient, forces that will be active in re^shaping the views and the policies of the various territories affected by the process. The development of these processes it is difficult to fore' cast at the present time with any degree of precision, but it would be most unwise to disregard them as very imminent possibilities, and certainly disastrous to fail 160 EIJSSIA IN THE FAK EAST to lay a foundation for meeting them. For even now their general outlines are quite distinct: economic rivalry, from beyond which appear possible racial conflicts. The Washington Conference will not be able to solve all the problems that agitate the world. It may solve some. It may merely bring them out in more or less sharp relief. But there is one thing that the Confer- ence can do, and, it is hoped, will accomplish. It can lay down the fundamentals of an idealistic international polici/, which has been so characteristic of America's view of the world ever since she appeared as a factor in the world situation. Only such a policy, if con- sistently carried out, can really bring into the world situation, rendered complex and highly unstable by the war and its aftermath, the stabilizing influence that the United States can, and, no doubt, will exert. But to the extent to which this stabilized equilibrium of the world depends upon peace in the Far East, the United States will scarcely be able to exert a sufficiently powerful influence in this direction unless she has, working side by side with her, a strong, democratic Kussia, actuated by the same international idealism, working toward the same ends. And such a Kussia can WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS 161 be neither the ImpeTial Russia, with its aggressive imperialism, nor the Soviet Russia, with its irrevocable pledge to a world revolution. It can be only the third Russia, the Russia that is really representative of the country's national character and shapes her policies in correspondence with the people's actual needs, and not in conformity with aggressive, predatory aims. Wha't reasons are there to believe that it will be such a Russia that will emerge out of the country's present trials ? These reasons lie in the tasks which a nation- ally reconstructed Russia will inevitably have to face, after she will have reacquired her political status as an organized state with a recognized government. The first of these tasks will be internal reconstruction. Too much has been torn down in the mad orgy of the various phases of her revolution. She must turn her attention to actual rebuilding, or else go down in a welter of utter chaos and ruin. She must have peace with her neighbors, if for no other reason than because she will have no strength to fight and build at the same time. And since these two conditions are fundamental, even apart from the natural inclinations of the Russian people, traditionally prone to idealism, reconstructed Russia is bound to be most sympathetic in her partici- 162 EUSSIA IN THE FAK EAST pation in all intemational agreements looking toward universal peace, tlie reduction of the burden of arma- ments, etc. Russia's future is still before her. Her historic destiny has not yet run out. And it is most significant that the United States, the giant of the Western Hemi- sphere, should be so clear in her realization of this fact and so emphatic in expressing the need of concerted intemational action to conserve the national heritage of the temporarily prostrate giant of the Eastern Hemi- sphere. The world still needs, even more than ever, the stabilizing effect of Eussia's massive strength — this time on a truly world scale. The paths of Russia's and America's historic destiny have converged, and their common path is the road of the world peace. RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST APPENDIX TEXT OF TREATIES AND DOCUMENTS 1. RUSSIA AND JAPAN. A, POLITICAL CONVENTION OF 1907. [Translation from the Official Text published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] The Government of His Majesty, the Emperor of All Russia, and the Government of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, desirous of strengthening the peace- ful and neighborly relations so happily established between Russia and Japan, and of removing all cause of misunderstandings in the future between the two Empires, have agreed to the following: Article 1. Each of the High Contracting Parties obligates itself to respect the territorial integrity of the other and all 163 164 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST the rights accruing to each of the Parties by virtue of all treaties, conventions, and contracts, existing between them and China, copies of which have been exchanged by the High Contracting Parties (in so far as these rights are compatible with the principle of the general equality of rights) ; by virtue of the Portsmouth Treaty of August 23 (September 5), 1905 ; as well as by virtue of all special agreements concluded between Russia and Japan. Article 2. Both High Contracting Parties recognize the inde- pendence and the territorial integi^ity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of the general equality of rights with regard to trade and industry in that Empire for all nations, and undertake to preserve and defend the status quo and the above-mentioned principle by all peaceful means at their disposal. In witness of this, the signatories hereto, properly authorized by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures and seals to this Convention. Concluded in St. Petersburg, on July 17 (30), 1907, which corresponds to the 30th day of the 7th month of the 40th year of Meidji. IZVOLSKT. MOTONO. APPENDIX 165 B. SECKET TKEATY OF 1916. [Translation from the text published in the Gazette of the Provisional W orhmerirPeasants Government, December 8 (21), 1917.] The Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government, for the purpose of further strengthening their close friendship established between them by the Secret Agreements of July 17 (30), 1907; June 21 (July 4), 1910; and June 25 (July 8), 1912, have agreed to supplement the above-mentioned Agree- ments by the following Articles: Article 1. Both High Contracting Parties recognize that the vital interests of each of them demand the preservation of China from political domination by any third power holding inimical aims against Russia or Japan and therefore mutually obligate themselves in the future, every time when circumstances would make it necessary, to enter with each other into frank and sincere relations based upon complete trust, in order to take together all measures necessary for the prevention of the possibility of the establishment (in China) of such a state of affairs. Article 2. In case that, as a result of measures taken by mutual consent by Russia and Japan on the basis of the pre- 166 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST ceding Article, there should come about a declaration of war against one of the High Contracting Parties by any third power contemplated in Article 1 of this Agree- ment, the other High Contracting Party must come to the assistance of its ally at the latter's first request; each of the High Contracting Parties hereby obligates itself, in case of such a contingency, not to conclude peace with the common enemy without the preliminary consent to it of its ally. Article 3. The conditions under which each of the High Con- tracting Parties shall render armed assistance to the other in accordance with the preceding Article, as well as the methods by means of which such assistance shall be rendered, must be determined by common agreement of the proper authorities of both High Contracting Parties. Article 4. It must be especially noted that neither the one nor the other of the High Contracting Parties shall consider itself bound by Article 2 of this Agreement to render its ally armed assistance * to the extent to which it itself shall be given guarantees by its own allies that they would render it assistance corresponding in scop© to the seriousness of the impending conflict. * The word "except" is obviously omitted in the Russian text, from which this translation has been made. — L. P. 1 APPEIjTDIX 167 Article 5. The present Agreement goes into effect from tJie moment of its signing and will remain in force until July 1 (14), 1921. In case neither of the High Con- tracting Parties would consider it necessary to declare its unwillingness to prolong this Agreement twelve months before its expiration, the same shall continue in force until one year shall have elapsed from the moment of the declaration of one of the High Con- tracting Parties concerning its renouncing. Article 6. The present Agreement must remain a profound secret for all, except the two High Contracting Parties. In witness of this, the representatives of the two Parties have set their signatures and seals to this Agree- ment in the city of Petrograd, on June 20 (July 3), 1916, which corresponds to the following Japanese date: the third day of the seventh month of the fifth year of the rule of Taisse. Sazonov. MOTONO. 168 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST C. SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT TOKYO REGARDING THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT. [Translation from tlie Gazette of the Provisional Work- menrPeasants Government^ December 2 (15), 1917.] To the Minister: October 19, 1917. Having invited me to call on bim today, the Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated to me confidentially, but at the same time quite officially, tbe text (trans- mitted by me in telegram No. 2) of the Notes wbicli will be exchanged in Washington on November 2 or 3, new style, between the American Secretary of State and Viscount Ishii. A similar communication was made today to the British Ambassador here. The text of the Notes will be communicated in a few days pri- vately for their information to the French and the Italian ambassadors. The publication will take place, probably, on November 7. Until that time, the Min- ister requests that this communication be kept secret. In communicating to me the text of the Notes, Viscount Motono stated that he had received it in its final form only yesterday by telegraph from Washington, and since Viscount Ishii must leave in the evening of the day after tomorrow, in spite of the (desire) on the part of the Japanese Government to acquaint itself with APPENDIX 169 the opinion of the Russian Government on this matter before the signing of the Notes, the affixing of the sig- natures could not be postponed. The Minister hopes that no blame will be attached to him in Petrograd, especially since he is certain that the Japanese-American Agreement in question cannot meet with any opposition on our part. Viscount Motono mentioned then that in the conclusion * among other things, with the view of putting an end to the German intrigues, directed toward inciting distrust between Japan and the United States of North America, and thus show most clearly to China that there is between these two powers complete agreement with regard to China, which, there- fore, should not expect to gain anything for herself by playing them against each other. To my question whether he does not apprehend mis- understandings in the future that may spring from a difference of interpretation on the part of Japan and of the United States of the phrases "special position'' and "special interests" of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied that * Neverthcr less, the impression produced on me by the Minister's words was to the effect that he realizes the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but considers that in such a case Japan would have at her disposal * Omission in the original, indicated by dots. It is most regret- table that the Bolsheviki, in publishing the text of this telegram, omitted such obviously important portions of it. — L. P. iro RUSSIA IN" THE FAR EAST better means for applying in practice her interpretation, than would the United States. Krupensky. 2>. CHICHERm'S NOTE ON THE EAR EAST. [Translation from the Russian text published in the Moscow Izvestiya, June 3, 1921.] Note addressed to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, dated June 1, 1921. The struggle of the toiling masses of Russia for peace and for the right of disposing independently of their own fate has entered upon a stage of new trials. Having gloriously repulsed, by gigantic effort and miracles of heroism, the combined attacks of the counter-revolution from within and of the majority of foreign powers from without, the toiling masses have won the right to govern themselves by means of their own Soviets of workmen and peasants. They had hoped to assure for themselves a free opportunity to devote their forces to an internal reconstruction of Russia, in collaboration with other countries for mutual interests and for the achievement of the economic aims that confront them. Unfortunately, their hopes have been blasted by a new attempt at external interference and a new coordi- nated attack of the Russian counter-revolution and the foreign Governments. Under the protection of the APPENDIX 171 Japanese bayonets, the white gnardists of Vladivostok, who constitute but an insignificant clique, suddenly- seized authority in that city. A similar coaip d'etat has been effected in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk and in other local- ities occupied by the Japanese. Thus, the most open sort of counter-revolution has been installed by the Japanese armed forces in the territory of their occu- pation. The Russian masses of peasants and workmen in the Far East have done everything in their power to obtain an acceptable peace with Japan. They have organized a separate democratic republic in order to make this peace possible, and the independent Far Eastern Re- public, with this in view, signed an agreement with Japan, which, under this condition, was ready to with- draw her troops from this territory and to return free- dom to the Russian popular masses of, the Far East. In their name, the Government of their Republic con- stantly strove toward the consummation of a complete agreement with Japan, in order to live with her in peace and in friendly and neighborly relations. But the Japanese Government replied to their peaceful efforts with a new cruel attack upon their internal freedom and their external independence. The bitterest foes of the Russian popular masses, the extreme reactionaries, whose obvious object is to conquer Siberia with the aid of the Japanese bayonets and then become there the subservient agents of the Japanese 172 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST conquerors, have, by violence, seized authority in those places, in which the Japanese armed forces are in con- trol. However, this first test step on the road of the conquest of Siberia is not an isolated fact. The Jap- anese Government distributes among its own capitalists the fishing rights in the waters of Kamchatka, which rights have hitherto belonged to the Russian coopera- tives and to others of our citizens. Japan has intro- duced her own control there and has seized the revenues accruing from the Kamchatka fisheries ; this constitutes an act of arbitrary seizure and plunder of Russia's wealth, which the Russian Government considers a vio- lation of the elementary rights of the popular masses of Russia. At the same time, with the aid of Japanese armed forces, the remnants of the counter-revolutionary bands of Semenov and Kappel retain their positions on the boundaries of China and continue to occupy the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Only with the assistance of Japanese auxiliary troops are Ungem's bands able to terrorize Mongolia and prepare their attacks against the Russian Republic. The agents of the Japanese imperialism penetrate even into Central Asia, attempt- ing to start insurrections therei, while the emissaries of the Turkestan counter-revolutionary elements gather in Japan in order to work out their plans in common. The Russian Republic has, on a number of occasions, offered peace to the Japanese Government, and yet, in spite of all of Russia's efforts toward peace, the Jap- APPENDIX 173 anese Government is at the present time the initiator of a new interventionalist campaign, directed against the rule of the Russian workmen and peasants. The Soviet Government, expressing the will of the Russian masses, warns the Japanese Government that the great popular masses of Russia, having taken their fate into their own hands and having repelled all the attacks of their enemies, will he ahle to conduct vic- toriously this new struggle, and will make those who have attacked them feel their strength more than suf- ficiently. However, the responsihility for these inimical acts cannot be laid at the door of the Japanese Government alone. There are proofs to the effect that the French Government, in its irreconcilable enmity toward the rule of workmen and peasants in Russia, is one of the active instigators of this new interventionalist campaign and takes part in Japan's plans of conquest in Siberia. Soviet Russia cannot but consider all the powers of the Entente morally responsible for this new link in the chain of intervention, which is a product of the collec- tive workmanship of the Entente powers. It considers this on the part of the British Government as a mani- festation of inimical activity, entirely out of keeping with the Anglo-Russian Agreement. The Russian Government protests most energetically against these acts, directed against Russia herself or through the Far Eastern Republic which is friendly 174 RUSSIA m THE FAR EAST with her as an intermediary stage, and retains the right to draw from this the inevitable conclusions. The People's Commissary of Fokeign Affaibs, Chicherin. 3. RUSSIA AND CHINA, A, THE KUSSO-MONGOLIAlSr-CHINESE AGREEMENT OF 1915. [Text of Articles 1 to 8.] Article 1. Outer Mongolia recognizes the Chinese-Russian Declaration and the Notes exchanged between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (October 23, 1913). Article 2. Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty, China and Russia recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, forming part of Chinese territory. Article 3. Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude inter- national treaties with foreign powers respecting political and territorial questions. As regards questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government engages to conform to Article 2 of the Note exchanged between China and Russia on the APPENDIX 175 5tli day of the lltli month of the 2iid year of the Kepuhlio of China (October 23, 1913). Article 4. The title ^'Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Ku-tukh-tu Khan of Outer Mongolia" is conferred by the President of the Republic of China. The calendar of the Republic as well as the Mongol calendar of cyclical signs are to be used in official documents. Article 5. China and Russia, in conformity with Articles 2 and 3 of the Sino-Russian Declaration of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (October 23, 1913), recognize the exclusive right of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the affairs of its internal administration and to conclude with foreign powers international treaties and agreements respecting all questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning autono- mous Mongolia. Article 6. In conformity with the same Article 3 of the Decla- ration, China and Russia engage not to interfere in the system of autonomous internal administration existing in Outer Mongolia. Article 7. The military escort of the Chinese dignitary at Urga provided for by Article 3 of the above-mentioned Decla- 176 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST ration is not to exceed two hundred men. The military escorts of his assistants at Uliassutai^ at Kobdo, and at Mongolian-Kyakhta are not to exceed fifty men each. If, by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, Assistants of the Chinese Dignitary are appointed in other localities in Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not to exceed fifty men each. Article 8. The Imperial Government of Russia is not to send more than one hundred and fifty men as consular guard for its representative at Urga. The military escorts of the Imperial consulate and vice-consulates of Russia, which have already been established or which may be established by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, are not to exceed fifty men each. B. APPEAL OF THE PROVISIONAL REVO- LUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF MONGOLIA. [Translation from the Russian text published in the Moscow Izvestiya, August 10, 1921.] The People's Revolutionary Government of Mon- golia addresses to the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic a request not to withdraw the Soviet troops from the territory of Mon- APPENDIX 177 golia until the complete removal of the menace from the common enemy, who is now seeking reinforcements in the Eastern Steppes. The People's Revolutionary Government finds it necessary to address this request to the Government of the R. S. F. S. R., because the Mongolian Government has not as yet completed the organization of the apparatus of the new authority. The presence of the Soviet troops is dictated by cir- cumstances, its purpose being to preserve the security of the territory of Mongolia and of the frontiers of the R. S. F. S. R. The People's Provisional Revolutionary Government of Mongolia is confident that the Govern- ment of the R. S. F. S. R. will realize the seriousness of the situation and the common interest in the defeat of the common enemy, and will accede to this request. Members of tpie People's Revoltjtionaey Government of Mongolia, Bono. Bolyuk-Sai-Khan. C. CHICHERm'S REPLY TO THE APPEAL OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONTARY GOVERNMENT OF MONGOLIA. [Translation from the Russian text published in the Moscow Izvestiya, August 12, 1921.] The Russian Soviet Government, in alliance with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, ordered its 178 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST troops, side by side with tlie revolutionary army of the Provisional Government of Mongolia, to deal a crushing blow to their common enemy the Tsarist General, Ungem, who has subjected the Mongolian people to unprecedented enslavement and oppression, violated the rights of autonomous Mongolia, at the same time threat- ening the security of Soviet Russia and the inviolability of the territory of the fraternal Far Eastern Republic. The appearance of the Soviet troops on the territory of autonomous Mongolia has for its sole aim the destruc- tion of the common enemy, thus removing the danger which threatens the Soviet territory, and safeguarding the free development and self-determination of autono- mous Mongolia. Welcoming the first steps of the People's Revolu- tionary Govermnent of Mongolia on the road toward creating a new order in its country, now freed from the enemy by common effort, the Russian Government notes with great satisfaction the Appeal addressed to it by the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, which appeal expresses the wish that the Soviet troops should not be removed from ihe territory of Mongolia until the complete destruction of the common enemy shall have been encompassed. Considering this pro- posal a manifestation of the steadfast, close and friendly bonds which unite the liberated people of Mongolia with the workmen and peasants of Russia who have thrown off the yoke of the exploiters, the Russian Gov- APPENDIX 179 eminent declares that it recognizes fully the seriousness of the situation and the common interest of Eussia and Mongolia in the destruction of the common enemy. Having firmly decided to withdraw its troops from the territory of autonomous Mongolia, which is hound to Soviet Eussia only by the ties of mutual friendship and common interests, just as soon as the menace to the free development of the Mongolian people and to the secur- ity of the Eussian Eepublic and of the Far Eastern Eepublic shall have been removed, the Eussian Govern- ment, in complete harmony with the People's Eevolu- tionary Government of Mongolia, notes that this moment has not yet arrived. In response to the request addressed to it by the People's Eevolutionary Government of Mongolia, the Eussian Government announces its deci- sion to give this request complete satisfaction. The Eussian Government is convinced that, in the near future, by the united efforts of the two peoples who are struggling against the violence of the Tsarist generals and against foreign oppression and exploitation, the free development of the Mongolian people will be secured on the basis of its autonomy, and that, as a result of the organization of the apparatus of popular revolutionary authority in Mongolia, such authority will be definitely established and firmly secured there. The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chichebin. August 10, 1921. 180 EUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST D. SOVIET ITOTE ON CHUSTESE-MON- GOLIAIST EELATIONS. [Translation from the Eussian text published in the Moscow Izvestiya, September 17, 1921.] Telegram sent by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council of Min- isters and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, Bodo, dated September 14, 1921: The toiling masses of Russia and the Workmen- Peasants Government which expresses their will greeted with joy the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia and the liberation of the friendly Mongolian people from a foreign yoke and from the bloody rule of the former Tsarist General, Ungem. The glorious Red army of the Russian Soviet Republic, together with the troops of the friendly and allied Far Eastern Republic, hand in hand with the people's revolutionary army of Mongolia, fought against the enslavers of the Mongolian people, who are at the same time enemies of the workmen and peasants of Russia, and assisted in the liberation of the Mongolian people from oppression. The Russian Government expresses its gratitude to the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia for the friendly feelings toward the toiling masses of APPENDIX 181 Russia and toward the Soviet Government and for the confidence in them, expressed in the l^ote of citizen Bodo of September 10. The Russian Government shares the conviction of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia as to the need of establishing peaceful and business-like relations between Mongolia and China. It hopes that the steps it is taking in this direction will lead to favorable results in the near future, provided the Mongolian people at the same time applies its right to &elf-determination. More than once has the Russian Government ap- proached the Government of China, both directly and through the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic who were in communication with the latter, with offers to begin negotiations on this question. In the near future the Russian Government expects to enter into permanent relations with the Government of China by means of a trade delegation which is being sent to Peking. The Russian Government notes with joy the readiness of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government to enter into negotiations with China on this question, as expressed in citizen Bodo's N"ote of September 10. It hopes that the Chinese Government will receive favorably this offer, which it will present in the spirit of good offices, in order to remove the possibility of a conflict between the peoples and the governments of Mongolia and of China. ^ ^ Chicheein. - '■.NO-' . ^O ^^