ML 021 140 2W t- Hollinger pH8.5 Mill Run F3-1955 D 646 .T3 Copy 1 THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY BY William Howard Taft Ex-President of the United States "/ verily believe we are in sight of the Promised Land" An Address delivered at the Convention of the League to Enforce Peace, at Madison, Wiscon- sin, under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin, November 9, 1918. Published by LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE Bush Terminal Sales Building 130 West 42nd Street New York I 0> -y & THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY By William Howard Taft THE international compact which is to follow this war is to be more ambitious than any ever made before. The world is larger, the nations are more numerous, the held of war has been greater, and the political changes are to be far more extensive than the world has ever known. The only peace comparable with this is that which was made after Napoleon's fall by the monarchs who constituted the Holy Alliance. That was a League of Nations, with a high sounding declaration of dis- interestedness and love of peace. It was a failure because the real pur- poses which governed its formation and life were wrong and unstable. It rested on the Divine right of Kings, and its objects were to recognize J.ynastic claims and to establish and maintain them. It took into con- sideration neither the interest nor the will of the peoples under the gov- ernments which it was setting up and proposed to maintain. After it had lived a few years, it became a by-word of reproach. The difference between the Holy Alliance and the League of Nations we propose is in the purpose and principle of its formation. Our League looks to a union of the democratic nations of the world, to the will of the peoples, expressed through their governments, as its basis and sanc- tion. It looks to the establishment of new governments by popular choice and control. It is to be founded on justice, impartially adminis- tered, and not on the interests of Kings or Emperors or dynasties. It is to rise as a structure built upon the ashes of militarism, and it is to rest on the pillars of justice and equality and the welfare of peoples. I have referred to the Holy Alliance not only to answer an argument, but also as a precedent to prove that a treaty of peace rearranging the map of Europe can not be made without a League of Nations. Think of what this present peace has to compass. We can realize it by consid- ering the points of President Wilson's message of January 8th, which make an outline of the terms of the peace which are to be fixed. Welfare of Backward Peoples In the first place, we are to have some disposition of the German colonies, in accord with the interests of the people who live in them. JUN 24 h)lb The Obligations of Victory 3 Germany has made such cruel despotisms of her colonies that it is quite likely the Allies will insist that they shall be put under some other power more to be trusted in securing the welfare of backward peoples. Thus we are to set up a new government in East and West Africa, in Austra- lasia, in China, and in some of the islands of the Pacific. Then we arc- to deal with Russia. If we separate from her the Ukraine, and the Baltic Provinces and Finland, there are three or four new nations to establish. Great Russia is now under the domination of bloody anarch- ists, and we must free her and give to her good people the opportunity to organize and establish a free and useful government. This is a problem of the utmost complexity. In Austria we are to create a nation of the Czecho-Slavs, embracing Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. We are to cut this nation out of the Dual Empire, and take it from Austria and from Hungary. We are to do the same thing with the Jugo Slavs on the south of Austria and Hungary and establish new boundaries there. W T e are to settle the boundaries of the Balkans. We are likely to give Rumania the Rumanians of Hungary and of Bessarabia. We are to establish a new state of Poland out of Russian, Austrian and German Poland, and we are to give this estate access to the sea. The fixing of these boundaries and the determination of the method of reaching the sea present issues of the utmost delicacy and difficulty. We are to determine the status of Constantinople and the small tract now known as Turkey in Europe. We are to fix the limits of Turkey in Asia, to set up a new government in Palestine, to recognize a new government of Arabia, to father, it may be, the creation of a new state in the Caucasus and to establish the freedom of Armenia. International Commission The mere recital of them is most convincing of the intricacy of these problems. The Congress of Nations will probably find it impos- sible definitely to settle them all. It will have to create Commissions, with judicial and conciliatory powers, able to devote time enough to make proper investigation and thus to reach just, defensible and prac- tical conclusions. When the boundaries are all fixed, when the innu- merable rights growing out of access to' the Baltic, access to the Danube, access to the Black Sea and access to the Aegean, together with rights of way across neighboring states for freedom of trade, are defined, with as much clarity as possible, there still will arise, in the practical opera- tion of the treaty, a multitude of irritating questions of interpretation. In fixing boundaries on distinctions of race and language, the Congress 4 The Obligations of Victory will encounter the obstruction of racial prejudice and blindness to rea- sonable conclusions. Neither line of race nor of language is always clear- ly drawn, so that convenient and compact states may be established within them. To attempt in a great world agreement to settle the boundaries and mutual rights of so many new nations, without provid- ing a tribunal whose decisions are to control, and are to be enforced by the major force of the world, will be to make a treaty that will become a laughing stock. The New Map of Europe We know that we have got to rearrange the map of Europe, and, in so far as it is practicable in that arrangement, to follow popular choice of the peoples to be governed. But such a flowing phrase will not settle the difficulty. It is merely a general principle that in its actual application often does not offer a completely satisfactory solu- tion ; and after the Congress shall have made the decisions, sore places will be left, local enmities will arise, and if that permanent peace which justifies the war is to be attained, the world compact must itself con- tain the machinery for settlement of such inevitable disputes. In other words, we don't have to argue in favor of a League to Enforce Peace — the nations which enter this Congress can not do otherwise than establish it. It faces them as the only possible way to achieve their object. Germany and Austria and Bulgaria and Turkey are to indemnify the countries which they have outraged and devastated. Commissions must be created, judicial in their nature, to pass upon what the amount of the indemnity shall be, and then an international force must exist to levy execution if necessary for the judgment upon the countries whose criminal torts are to be indemnified. We must, therefore, not only have, as a result of the Congress, the machinery of justice and conciliation, but we must retain a combined military force of the Allies and victors to see to it that these just judgments are carried out. Moreover, the Congress can not meet without enlarging the scope of international law and making more definite its provisions. The very functions which the Congress is to exercise in fixing the terms of peace will necessitate a statement of the principles upon which it has been guided. That will lead to a broadening of the scope of existing prin- ciples of international law and a greater variety in their applications. Therefore, whether those who are in the Congress wish it or not, they can not solve the problems which are set before them without adopt- ing the principles of our League to Enforce Peace in its four planks The Obligations of Victory 5 in our original platform — a court, a Commission of Conciliation, en- forcement of submission and a Legislative International Congress to make International Law. They will have to ereate such machinery for the administration and enforcement of the treat)- as to the central powers, the new nations created, and Russia. Having gone so far as they must, can they fail to extend their work only a little to include the settlement of all future differences between all the nations that are parties to the League? A League for such future purposes will be no more difficult to make and maintain than the League into which they are driven by the necessities of the situation. League Not Responsible for Extreme Views Now I want to take up some of the arguments made against the League. In the first place, a good many have created a straw League and have knocked it down without difficulty. They have attributed to us the views and principles held by extremists who perhaps sup- port our League, but whose extreme views we don't adopt or need to adopt. Thus it is said that we favor internationalism, that we are op- posed to nationalism, that we wish to dilute the patriotic spirit into a vague universal brotherhood. That there are socialists and others who entertain this view, and who perhaps support the League to Enforce Peace, may be true, but the assumption that such views are necessary to a consistent support of the League is entirely without warrant. I believe in nationalism and patriotism, as distinguished from universal brotherhood as firmly as any one can. I believe that the national spirit and the patriotic love of country are as essential in the progress of the world as the family and the love of family are essential in domestic com- munities. But as the family and the love of family are not inconsistent with the love of country, but only strengthen it, so a proper, pure and patriotic nationalism stimulates a sense of international justice and does not detract in any way from the spirit of universal brotherhood. No Interference with Internal Affairs Again it is said that in the League we injure nationalism by abridg- ing the sovereignty of our country in that we are to yield to an inter- national council and an international tribunal, in which we only have one representative, the decisions of questions of justice and of national policy. Sovereignty is a matter of definition. The League does not contem- plate the slightest interference with the internal government of any coun- try. The League does not propose to interfere, except where the claims 6 The Obligations of Victory of right of one country clash with the claims of right of another. To submit such claims of right to an imperial tribunal no more interferes with the sovereignty of a nation than the submission of an individual to a hearing and decree of court interferes with his liberty. The League is merely introducing into the world's sphere, liberty of action regu- lated by law, instead of license uncontrolled except by the greed and passion of the individual nation. It is said that we are giving up our right to make war or to with- hold from making it. We can not take away from our Congress the right to declare war, and no one would wish to do so. But that is no reason why we should not enter into an agreement to defend the im- partial judgments of the League and to repress palpable violations of its covenants by those who have entered it. The question must al- ways be for the decision of Congress whether our obligations under the League require us in honor to make war. We have guar- anteed the integrity of Cuba, we have guaranteed the integrity of Pan- ama. Does that deprive us of sovereignty? Yet we are under an obli- gation to make war if another country attacks them. Germany Must Disarm First Then the question is as to disarmament. The fourth of the Presi- dent's fourteen points contains the provision that adequate guaranties must be given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. That represents an aim and aspiration, but it can not have immediate and practical opera- tion. We are the victors in this war which grew out of the extensive armament and military power of Germany. It will be a legitimate con- dition of peace exacted by the victors that Germany shall substantially disarm and leave the Allied Powers in a position with armament sufficient to keep Germany within law and right. How far disarma- ment can be carried must be determined by experience. Disarma- ment will be accomplished effectively in great measure by the economic pressure that will be felt intensely by all nations after this war, sec- ondly by such mutual covenants and general supervision of an inter- national council as experience may dictate, and third and ultimately by a sense of security in the successful operation of this League to Enforce Peace. Question of Military Training For the time being the people who are afraid that the United States will make itself helpless to defend its rights against unjust aggression The Obligations of Victory 7 are unduly exercised. Any practical League of Nations will require the United States to maintain a potential military force sufficient to comply promptly with its obligations to contribute to an international army whenever called upon for League purposes. Such obligation may well be made the basis and reason for universal training of youth, in accord with the Australian or the Swiss system — a system that trains youth for a year physically and mentally and gives them a proper sense of duty and obligation to the state. There may be a difference of opinion as to whether we should have such a system, but there is noth- ing in the League to Enforce Peace and its principles which prevents its adoption, and either that or some other means of maintaining an adequate force to discharge our obligations under a League must be found. While we should lay broad the foundations for a League look- ing as far into the future as we may, we must trust to the future to work out the application to those principles, to amend the details of our ma- chinery and to adapt it to the lessons of experience. We know that the real hope of reducing armament and keeping it down is the mainten- ance of a League which shall insure justice and apply in its aid the major force of the world. As the operation of that League is more and more acquiesced in, the possibility of the safe reduction of armaments in all countries will become apparent to all and will be realized. When Germany May Enter Another question that has agitated a good many people is whether we should let Germany into the League. That depends upon whether Germany makes herself fit for the League. If she gets rid of the Hohen- zollerns, if she establishes a real popular government, if she shows by her national policies that she has acted on the lessons which the war should teach her, indeed if she brings forth works meet for repentance, then of course we ought to admit her and encourage her by putting her on an equality with other nations and by using her influence and her power to make the League more effective. The long drawn out pay- ment of indemnities will keep her in a chastened condition and will keep alive in her mind the evils of militarism. I don't now discuss the difference in the obligations of the members of such a League as between the Great Powers and the lesser powers. All should have a voice in the general policy of the League, but it is well worthy of consideration whether with the burden of enforcing the obligations of the League by military force which the greater powers must carry, they should not have the larger voice in executive control. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 8 The Obligations of Victory ® ®^1 * 40 ^53 2 As they are the only ones likely to be able to create the major force of the world, they may reasonably claim a right to more administrative power. The rights of the smaller nations will be protected in the Con- gress in which they have a full voice, and by the impartial judgments of the judicial tribunals and the recommendations of the Commission of Conciliation. There is not the slightest likelihood that the mere ex- ecutive control by the larger powers would lead to oppression of the smaller powers because should selfishness disclose itself in one of the great powers, we could be confident of the wish of the other great powers to repress it. Stable Gover. .nents Must Dominate One of the difficulties in the mainteiicice of a League of all nations will be the instability of the governments of its members if the League embraces all nations. On the whole, the greater powers are the more stable and the more responsible. It is well therefore that upon them shall fall the chief executive responsibility. While the principles of the League would prevent interference with the internal governments as a general rule, the utter instability of a government might authorize an at- tempt to stabilize it. That this might better be done by a disinterested League than by a single nation goes without saying. The possibilities of many sided world benefit from a League after it is well established and is working smoothly, it is hard to overestimate. For the present, as the result of this Congress of Nations to meet and settle the terms of peace, we may well be content to have a League established on broad lines, with principles firmly and clearly stated, and with constructive provision^ f or amendment as experience shall indi- cate their necessity. I verily believe we are in the sight of the Promised Land. I hope we may not be denied its enjoyment. UBRARY 021 AAO 2W * Hollinger P H8.5 Mill Run F3-1955 \ Hollinger pH8.5 Mill Run F3-1955