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 ISSUES OF 
 A NEW EPOCH 
 
 I5f)e Codtl Strike 
 
 PdLadLinsL 
 
 PKilippiives etivd CubdL 
 
 BY 
 
 Joseph Bucklin Bishop 
 
 Antkor of "Our PoliiicaLl Dr&ma.." "CKe«Lp Money 
 Experiments," Etc. 
 
 Reprinted fronri 
 
 "The InternaLtionoLl Q\ia.rterly' 
 
 \^ 
 
 4Cpt90G 
 
 NEW YORK 
 SCOTT-THAW COMPANY 
 
 542 Fifth Avenxie 
 1904 
 
ISSUES OF 
 A NEW EPOCH 
 
 The Coal Strike 
 
 Panama 
 
 Philippines and Cuba 
 
 BY 
 
 JOSEPH BUCKLIN BISHOP 
 
 Author of "Our Political Drama," "Cheap Money Experiments,' 
 Etc. 
 
 Reprinted from 
 
 " The International Quarterly " 
 
 NEW YORK 
 SCOTT-THAW COMPANY 
 
 542 Fifth Avenue 
 1904 
 
 r^.j 
 
 <t -?_^ 
 

 CONTENTS 
 
 The CoAii Strike, .... 
 
 Panama Rf.pubijc and Canal, 
 
 Course of the American Government, 
 Why the President was Prompt, . 
 Complicity and Treaty Obligations, 
 Colombia's Usurping Government, 
 
 Ouii WoKK as a Civilizer, 
 The New Republic of Cuba, 
 Peace and Progress in the Philippines, 
 The Friars' Lands, 
 
 PAGE 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 10 
 13 
 17 
 19 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 26 
 29 
 
 Copyright, 1903-1904, by F. A. Richardson. 
 Copyright, 1904, by Joseph Bucklin Bishop. 
 
ISSUES OF A NEW EPOCH 
 
 THE COAL STRIKE. 
 
 THE anthracite coal strike whicli was ended through the inter- 
 vention of the President in October, 1902, was not only the 
 most serious contest of tlie kind this country has ever 
 known, but the most serious that the world has knov.'u. Other 
 strikes have involved a larger number of men and have entailed 
 nearly or quite as much financial loss, but nojie has affected the peo- 
 ple of the entire country to anything like the extent which this one 
 did, simply because none stopped the production of what lias 
 come to be regarded as a necessity of life. Of course anthracite 
 is not an absolute necessity of life. If the supply were to be ex- 
 hausted this year, substitutes for it as fuel would be found. The 
 world would have to learn to get on without it; but so long as 
 people regard it as a necessity, and so long as they know it exists 
 and can be obtained, they will not submit to having the supply 
 cut off without protest, more or less violent, according to their 
 needs and sufferings. That virtually all the people did believe 
 in October, 1902, that anthracite was a necessity both to their 
 comfort and their health, is not to be questioned. They be- 
 lieved it so implicitly that nothing which could be said to the 
 contrary had any appreciable effect upon them. Tlieir convic- 
 tion was so strong that the mere threat of a coal famine sent a 
 panicky feeling throughout every large city in the land. In the 
 country districts a sufficient supply of wood could be obtained, 
 but in the cities there was little or no hope of doing so. Bitu- 
 minous coal was an insufficient substitiite because nearly all 
 existing heating apparatus was not adapted to its use. Without 
 anthracite, every household in a large city was threatened with 
 discomfort and peril. It came about, therefore, that the whole 
 population had an intense personal interest in the strike based 
 upon two very strong reasons — first, danger to their individual 
 
 3 
 
THE COAL STRIKE. 
 
 well-being ; and, second, a heavy tax upon their resources to meet 
 the higher cost of fuel of any kind. 
 
 As weeks and months went by with one promise of settle- 
 ment after another proving a delusion, and with cold weather at 
 hand, this panicky feeling increased until it became a menace to 
 tlie public safety. For five months the mines had been idle, and 
 while the coal operators declared that there was no danger of a 
 coal famine, it was within the knowledge of every householder 
 that the famine was already in sight. It was only with extreme 
 difficulty that a single ton of coal could be obtahied in New York 
 and other large cities by a small consumer, and every householder 
 who had neglected to put in his winter's supply in the spring 
 found it impossible bo obtain it except in small quantities and at 
 steadily rising prices. Many dealers refused to take orders and 
 most of them were entirely without a supply. In the presence 
 of a condition like tliis it was worse than foolish for the mine 
 owners to persist in their statement, as they did daily, that there 
 was no scarcity, for their denial of what everybody knew to be 
 the actual fact served to arouse popular distrust of them and to 
 aggravate rather than to quiet the general uneasiness. It was 
 almost maddening to tell thousands of people who had been try- 
 ing in vain for days and weeks to get coal that there was plenty 
 of coal to be had and they were foolish to think there was not. 
 
 AVhen all efforts to bring about a settlement had failed, when 
 the state of Pennsylvania had shown itself powerless to even 
 maintain order in the coal region, it was natural for the people 
 of tlie country to turn to the Federal government for aid. This 
 they began to do early in October, when the approach of cold 
 weather sent a thrill of alarm throughout the land. Appeals to 
 President Roosevelt began to pour in from all quarters, both 
 from individuals and from persons in authority. Governor Crane 
 of Massachusetts, Mayor Low of New York City, and the heads 
 of municipal governments generally besought the President to 
 use his good offices in some way to bring about an adjustment in 
 order that the imminent peril of suffering and riot might be 
 warded from the land. The President could not be deaf to such 
 appeals. No president that the country has ever had could have 
 been, for not only the comfort and lives of countless numbers of 
 people were threatened, but stability and law^ful government, and 
 millions in property were at stake in every city of the land. The 
 President had no authority in law and no precedent to sustain 
 him. He was fully aware of this and he succeeded by never los- 
 ing sight of the fact that he had neither. No task that he had 
 
THE COAL STRIKE. 
 
 undertaken previously had involved so large an element of polit- 
 ical risk as this did. It Avas an entirely new departure. Noth- 
 ing like it had ever been done by a president. The great body 
 of conservative opinion in the country had serious doubts about 
 either the wisdom or the justification of the step. He felt moved 
 to act because of the great public need and great public peril in- 
 volved, and he could not escape the conviction that it was a mat- 
 ter of simple duty for him, as the people's president, to exert 
 all the moral influence he had in the interest of the people. 
 Criticism did not affect him at all, no matter what its source, 
 once he had made up his mind. He did not count the chances 
 of success or failure, and when lie was told, as he was re])eatedly, 
 that failure would ruin liim i)olitical]y, he went steadily and fear- 
 lessly ahead. While both sides to the quarrel repulsed his iirst 
 efforts and refused to step up to the high ground of public wel- 
 fare upon which he stood and to which he invited them, he per- 
 severed in his appeals to them till both came in the end, if not 
 willingly, at least with recognition of the fact that he had offered 
 to them a Avay out without surrender. He succeeded in this, as 
 he succeeded in all other like endeavors, by being open and 
 straightforward in all his proceedings. He had no hidden end 
 to serve; he leaned neither to one side nor to the other, but said 
 simply, " I offer you my services as mediator in order that this 
 contest which so seriously threatens the welfare and the peace 
 of the v/hole country may be brought to an end." His obvious 
 sincerity and singleness of purpose so impressed the whole coun- 
 try and, indeed, tlie whole world, that the contending forces 
 were fairly compelled to yield to his proposals. The chorus of 
 praise which arose from all quarters of the land, and from all 
 the leading countries of Europe, Avhen success was recorded, Avas 
 something that no other president had recei\'ed. He himself 
 Avas unable to comprehend it and thought it undeserved. When 
 it was spoken of in his presence, he said to his intimate friends, 
 " I am being A^ery much over-praised by everybody. I do not 
 deserve it. It leally seems to me that any man of average cour- 
 age and common sense, Avho felt as deeply as I did the terrible 
 calamity impending over our people, would have done just Avhat 
 I did." 
 
 He Avas not the only person in the land Avho felt the gravity 
 of the situation. It has been charged and is still charged by his 
 critics that he did Avhat no other president before him had done 
 and what few of them would ha\'e consented to do. It is no longer 
 a secret that in all that he did he had the hearty approval and 
 
6 THE COAL STRIKE. 
 
 sympathy of ex-President Cleveland. Early in his efforts to 
 bring about peace between the mine operators and the miners, 
 Mr. Cleveland took occasion to express his complete accord with 
 him. On the day following the hrst meeting before the Presi- 
 dent, at Washington, of the operators and representatives of the 
 strikers, which failed because of the refusal of the operators to 
 consent to a commission of arbitration, Mr. Cleveland wrote to 
 the President a letter which in addition to expressing approval 
 of the President's course, and some righteous indignation at the 
 obstinacy of the contestants, contained suggestions for a plan of 
 settlement, and gave as a reason for volunteering his views that 
 his doing so would at least " serve as an indication of the anxiety 
 felt by millions of our citizens on the subject." The only living 
 ex-President, and the only Democratic President that the coun- 
 try has had since the civil Avar, thus jouied hands with the Re- 
 publican President in believing that a crisis had arisen which 
 was so grave as to justify extraordinary action by the Executive 
 of the nation. It is also no longer a secret, that after receiving 
 this letter from Mr. Cleveland, President Roosevelt asked him if 
 he would consent to be a member of a commission of settle- 
 ment and that Mr. Cleveland replied in the affirmative. This 
 acceptance pei-suaded the President to appoint a commission with- 
 out the consent of the oj^erators, in case they continued in their 
 refusal to give it, and he proceeded to choose the members of it, 
 with Mr. Cleveland as the first. The men whom he selected 
 were mainly those subsequently appointed, but when the opera- 
 tors and their financial associates heard of the President's pui- 
 ])ose and heard also of Mr. Cleveland's selection as member of 
 the commission, they made haste to give their consent to the jjlan 
 of arbitration, but protested vigorously against the selection of 
 Mr. Cleveland. They realized keenly enough what the moral 
 effect would be upon the country of having it appear that the 
 only living ex-President, who was also the most eminent Demo- 
 crat in the land, stood shoulder to shoulder with President 
 R,oosevelt in what he had done and proposed to do. That would 
 have ended the "Constitutional" objection to Roosevelt's course 
 at once and forever. 
 
 But if the operators would not permit Mr. Cleveland to 
 serve on the commission, they did allow the President to appoint 
 to it a Democrat who indisputably ranks next to Mr. Cleveland in 
 ability and character, and in reputation for sound Constitutional 
 construction, when they consented to the choice of Judge George 
 Gray of Delaware. His approval of the President's course, ex- 
 
THE COAL STRIKE. 
 
 pressed after he had conducted the inquiry to a successful con- 
 clusion, should be a sufficient answer to the criticisms which are 
 made of the President's course. In an interview which was pub- 
 lished in the New York "World," on September 1, 1903, Judge 
 Gray said : 
 
 "I have no hesitation in sayiug that tlie President of the United States 
 Avas confronted in October, 1902, by the existence of a crisis more grave 
 and threatening than any tliat had occurred since tlie civil war. I mean 
 that the cessation of mining in the anthracite country, brought about by 
 the dispute between the miners and those who controlled the greatest uat- 
 lu-al monopoly in this country and perliaps in the world, had brought iipon 
 more than one-half of the American people a condition of deprivation of 
 one of the necessaries of life, and the probable continuance of the dispute 
 threatened not only the comfort and health, but the safety and good order, 
 of the nation. He was without legal or constitutional power to interfere, 
 but his position as President of the United States gave liim an influence, a 
 leadership, as first citizen of the republic, that enabled him to appeal to 
 the patriotism and good sense of the parties to the controversy and to place 
 upon them the moral coercion of public opinion to agree to an arbitrament 
 of the strike then existing and threatening consequences so direful to the 
 whole country. He acted promptly and courageously, and in so doing 
 averted the dangers to which I have alluded. 
 
 "So far from interfering or infringing upon property rights, the Presi- 
 dent's action tended to conserve them. The peculiar situation, as regards 
 the anthracite coal interest, was that they controlled a natural monopoly 
 of a jiroduct necessary to the comfort and to the very life of a large por- 
 tion of the people. A prolonged deprivation of the enjoyment of this 
 necessary of life Avould have tended to precipitate an attack upon these 
 property rights of which you speak : for, after all, it is vain to deny that 
 tliis property, so peculiar in its conditions, and wliich is properly spoken 
 of as a natural monopoly, is alfected with a public interest. 
 
 "I do not think that any president ever acted more Avisely, coura- 
 geously, or promptly in a national crisis. Mr. Roosevelt deserves unstinted 
 praise for what lie did." 
 
 It has always been contended by the President's critics that 
 if he had not intervened the strikers would have surrendered in 
 a very short time. Those who make this assertion overlook, in 
 the first place, the fact that tlie operators had been for fully two 
 months predicting daily the end of the strike. They overlook, 
 in the second place, the fact that under the Pennsylvania law 
 the entire body of available mine workers was with the strikers. 
 
 It was claijued by the mine operators that only about one- 
 half of the laborers in the coal region were members of the 
 organization which, under Mr. Mitchell's leadership, ordered the 
 strike ; that the other half were either members of local unions 
 or non-union men. The highest estimate which the operators 
 made of the number of persons whom they were able to induce 
 
8 THE COAL STRIKE. 
 
 to work while the strike was in progress was 17,000. Under the 
 Pennsylvania law, no person can be emi^loyed as a miner in the 
 ;inthracite mines nntil he has passed an examination by a state 
 board created for the purpose and has received a certificate or 
 license. One of the conditions of such license is "not less than 
 two years' practical experience as a mine laborer " in the anthra- 
 cite fields. It was this requirement which most seriously ham- 
 pered the operators in their efforts to work the mines without 
 the aid of the strikers, for men brought from other sections could 
 be employed only in violation of the law. The strikers claimed 
 that they controlled ninety-five per cent, of all the licensed 
 workers, and this was probably true. While the commission 
 was in session I asked one of the regular counsel of the opera- 
 tors if it was not true that, if the operators had been given ample 
 military jjrotection to prevent all intimidation and violence on 
 the part of the strikers toward the non-union men who were will- 
 ing to work, they would still have been unable, because of the 
 license law, to obtain a force of miners sufficient to produce a 
 supply of coal anything like adequate to the winter's demands. 
 He replied that it was true. That was an admission that Mitchell 
 was master of the situation and that unless the President had 
 intervened there would have been, if not a famine of coal, a scar- 
 city so serious as to cause suffering and probable riots in tlie 
 large cities. 
 
 One of the most interesting aspects of the President's com- 
 mission for final adjudication of the questions at issue between 
 the operators and their employees was the principle of arbitra- 
 tion embodied in it. This was a very different principle from 
 the one insisted upon by ]\Ir. Mitchell at the outset of the strug- 
 gle. It will be remembered that the Civic Federation, under 
 tlie leadersliip of Senator Hanna, made an earnest and prolonged 
 effort to settle the strike when it was first threatened in April. 
 A conference between the conflicting parties was held, and al- 
 though an armistice of thirty days was secured, failure ensued 
 l)ecause the operators refused to recognize the union by consent- 
 ing to an arbitration with it. In an arbitration of that kind the 
 claims of non-union men would have no standing whatever, for 
 there would simply be two parties to it, the operators and the 
 union. Under the President's plan, the commission was to con- 
 sider " all questions at issue between the respective companies 
 and their employees," and it was especially stipulated that pend- 
 ing its findings all miners should return to work and all interfer- 
 ence with and persecution of non-union men at present working 
 
THE COAL STRIKE. 
 
 or hereafter employed should cease. It Avas also stipulated, and 
 the stipulation was accepted by both parties, that when the com- 
 mission should have reached its finding these '' shall govern the 
 conditions of employment betv/een the respective companies and 
 their employees for a term of at least three years." 
 
 The selections which the President made for members of the 
 commission were in accordance with the spirit of his appeal. 
 He chose them with the single object in view of getting a deci- 
 sion in accordance with right and justice. It was the unanimous 
 opinion of the country that a more competent or more impartial 
 tribunal could not have been constituted. It was in every way 
 superior to the Civic Federation as an arbitrating body, for it 
 contained no member who was identified directly with either 
 party to the controversy. Tlie Civic Federation was, further- 
 more, a self-constituted body and could only offer its services in 
 labor controversies. It was not asked to arbitrate the coal strike, 
 and it could not get the consent of the operators to such arbitra- 
 tion. The President's commission entered upon its duties under 
 the high moral authority, if no other, of the highest officer in the 
 laud, and with the consent of both the contestants and tlieir promise 
 to accept its decrees. It sat for nearly five months, taking a great 
 mass of testimony and agreeing unanimously upon a report that 
 was a compromise, in which the strikers secured about half their 
 demands, while failing to get a hearing upon their main conten- 
 tion, which Avas the recognition of their union by the mine opera- 
 tors. The use of intimidation and violence in support of tlie 
 strike was strongly condemned, and for the settlement of futui'c 
 disputes a board of conciliation was proposed, to be made up of 
 three members from each side, Avho could appeal to the circuit 
 judge of the district to appoint an umpire whose decision should 
 be final. The report Avas generally regarded as equable, and 
 l)oth sides accepted it as they had pledged themselves in advance 
 to do. Since the verdict Avas rendered there has been peace in 
 the coal region. From time to time minor disputes have arisen 
 but they have been settled easily under the terms of the agree- 
 ment. The great results of the I'resident's course Avere, there- 
 fore, an immediate resumption of mining, Avhich supplied the 
 country Avith coal and thus warded off suffering ancl disorder, 
 and the establishment of peace in the region for three years. 
 The indirect but scarcely less beneficent result Avas the beginning 
 of a better understanding between operators and miners Avhich 
 every day of peace is developing and strengthening. 
 
PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 
 
 COURSE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
 THE future historian, when he sits down to write the nar- 
 rative of the establishment of the republic of Panama, 
 will treat it as the culminating step in a movement that 
 had been in progress for more than four hundred years. Viewed 
 in that perspective, it is likely to appear a far less hasty pro- 
 ceeding than it seemed to be at tlie time it was effected. Tlie 
 linul step was swift only when contemplated by itself. Consid- 
 ered in connection with the long and wearisome and annoying 
 journey which had preceded it, the wonder is not that it was 
 taken so quickly, but that human patience had delayed so long 
 before taking it. 
 
 I shall endeavor, in making a record of it, to treat it as com- 
 pletely as possible in the light of histor}' , for it has become his- 
 torical fact. The new republic is established with the recogni- 
 tion of the United States and all the leading nations of tlie 
 world, and the treaty by which the United States guarantees 
 and ])ledges itself to maintain the independence of the republic 
 of Panama was ratihed in the Senate by a vote of sixty-six to 
 fourteen, so many Democrats voting for it as to make approval 
 of the Roosevelt administration's course virtually non-partisan, 
 and hence popular. Instead of arguing the case for the govern- 
 ment, I shall content myself with a statement of its reasons for 
 the action which it took, citiug these as its answer to the main 
 points of the criticism which has been made against its course. 
 
 Did tlie Roosev^elt administration act too quickly in recog- 
 nizing the new republic? 
 
 lu considering this question, both the President and the Sec- 
 retary of State, according to their official explanations of their 
 course, recalled the long history of the efforts of the American 
 government to pierce the Isthmus with a canal. As early as 
 1528 a }n-o])osal was laid before the Emperor Charles V. for the 
 opening of such a way across the Isthmus of Panama. From 
 that day till 1904 the project continued to occupy a place among 
 
 10 
 
PANAMA EEPUBLIC AND CANAL, 11 
 
 the great enterprises yet to be accomplished. It remained uuful- 
 lilled only because the experience of four hundred years had 
 demonstrated that private effort was wholly inadequate to the 
 purpose, and that the work must be performed, if at all, under 
 the auspices of a government of the largest resources. There 
 was only one such government in a position to undertake it. By 
 a well settled policy, in which all American nations are under- 
 stood to concur, the assumption of the task by any of the great 
 governments of Europe was pronounced to be inadmissible. 
 Among American governments there was only one that seemed to 
 be able to assume the burden and that was tlie government of 
 the United States. To the accomplishment of this object that 
 government had for years directed its dii)lomacy. It occupied 
 a i)lace in the instructions to our delegates to the Panama Con- 
 gress during the administration of John Quincy Adams. It 
 formed the subject of a resolution of the Senate in 1835, and of 
 the House of Representatives in 1839. In 184G its importance 
 had become still more apparent by reason of the Mexican War, 
 when a treaty was made with New Granada in regard to it. 
 Four years later the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was entered into be- 
 tween this country and Great Britain. That treaty instead of 
 furthering the project proved to be an insuperable bar to it. 
 During the lifty-one years of its existence, notliing was done 
 toward the construction of a canal. It became, almost immedi- 
 ately after ratification, the subject of bitter attack in this coun- 
 try because of its violation of the Monroe Doctrine, in allowing 
 England and other Eurojiean nations to share Avitli us control of 
 a canal, and because of England's alleged failure to comply with 
 its conditions. From time to time, efforts were made to have 
 the treaty denounced, or declared by us void because of Eng- 
 land's failure to com})ly Avith its requirements, but tlie American 
 government refused steadily to take this view, holding that we 
 were bound in honor to abide by the treaty till England shoukl 
 consent to its abrogation. That consent was given, and in De- 
 cember, 1901, a new treaty was agreed ui)on, the main point of 
 which is the comi)lete withdrawal of Great Britain from part- 
 nership with the United States in the control of any canal tliat 
 may be constructed. It was to be built with American money, 
 and controlled by Americans, and its neutrality maintained by 
 Americans. The United States secured power " to maintain such 
 military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it 
 against lawlessness and disorder," but beyond that no express 
 power is given to fortify it, while the language of the treaty 
 
12 PANAMA EEPUBLIC AND CANAL. 
 
 seems to amount to a prohibition in that direction. " The canal," 
 it reads^ " shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and 
 of war of all nations observing the rules prescribed for the pres- 
 ervation of its neutrality, and shall never be blocked, nor shall 
 any right of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be com- 
 mitted within it." 
 
 The way now seemed clear for the construction of the canal. 
 On January 22, 1902, the second Pan-American Conference, sit- 
 ting at the City of Mexico, adojjted the following resolution : — 
 
 " The Republics assembled at tlie International Conference of Mexico 
 applaud the purpose of the United States government to construct an 
 iuter-oceanic canal, and acknowledge that this work will not only be 
 worthy of the greatness of the American people, but also in the highest 
 sense a work of civiliKation and to the greatest degree beneficial to the de- 
 velopment of commerce between the American States and the other coun- 
 tries of the world." 
 
 Among the delegates who signed this resolution, which was 
 adopted without dissent, was the delegate of Colombia. The 
 next step was the decision of the United States in favor of the 
 Panama route in preference to that of Nicaragua, and the pas- 
 sage of tlie Spooner Act in June, 1902, authorizing the President 
 to acquire at a cost not exceeding forty million dollars the prop- 
 erty and concession of the Panama Canal Company and to ob- 
 tain from Colombia, on such terms as he deemed reasonable, 
 control of the territory necessary for tlie canal. Therefore, nego- 
 tiations were opened vvith Colombia, and in January, 1903, the 
 Hay-Herran Treaty was agreed upon. This was ratified by the 
 Senate and was sent to Colombia for approval by its government. 
 While the treaty was in negotiation between the representatives 
 of the United States and Colombia, objection was made by the 
 Colombian government through its representatives to the first 
 article, which provided : " The government of Colombia autlior- 
 izes the new Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the 
 United States its rights, jirivileges, properties, and concessions, 
 as well as the Panama railroad and all the shares or part of the 
 shares of that company." The Colombian government asked to 
 have this modified so as to read that the permission accorded 
 by Colombia in regard to canal and railway rights should "be 
 regulated by previous special arrangement entered into by Colom- 
 bia." This request the American government refused to grant, 
 and it was abandoned by Colombia, whose representatives signed 
 the treaty Avith the full authorization as it stands in the article, 
 which is identical with that in the original draft of a treaty pre- 
 
PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 13 
 
 sented by Colombia itself through its minister to the American 
 government in March, 1902. Some time after the treaty had 
 been signed, tlie American government was surprised to learu 
 that the Colombian government, iu violation of this article, had 
 sent notices to the canal company saying that further permission, 
 in addition to that contained in the treaty, was necessary for the 
 transfer of its concession and those of the railway company to 
 the United States, and requiring the companies to cancel all 
 obligations of Colombia to them, and thus destroy the rights, 
 privileges, and concessions which Colombia by the treaty sol- 
 emnly authorized the canal company to sell to the United States. 
 That, if successful, would of course destroy the treaty by defeat- 
 ing its main purpose. This was one of many similar attacks, all 
 instigated by the Colombian government, against the treaty 
 which its representatives had signed, conduct which, as Secretary 
 Hay has pointed out, is in violation of the familiar rule that 
 "two governments, in agreeing to a treaty through their duly 
 authorized representatives, bind themselves, pending its ratifica- 
 tion, not only not to oppose its consummation, but also to do 
 nothing in contravention of its terms." The attack which is be- 
 lieved to have been the main cause of the rejection of the treaty 
 by the Colombian Congress was made in a report to the Colom- 
 bian Senate by its canal committee, in which it was held that at 
 the end of a year all the concessions granted by the government 
 to the Panama Canal Company would lapse, and that then Co- 
 lombia could take for itself the forty million dollars which the 
 United States had agreed to pay the Panama Canal Company. 
 After this the treaty was rejected and the congress adjourned. 
 
 WHY THE PEESIDENT WAS PROMPT. 
 
 It is the contention of the American government that Colom- 
 bia's course in regard to the treaty showed conclusively the 
 hopelessness of ever getting a satisfactory agreement from her. 
 That was the conclusion of the people of Panama, for they made 
 up their minds that in case the treaty was rejected they would 
 revolt, and they made elaborate preparations, months in advance 
 to do so, fully anticipating rejection. 
 
 This was the situation when the revolution took place on 
 November 3, 1903. President Roosevelt had become so thor- 
 oughly convinced, when the treaty was rejected, that further 
 efforts to reach agreement with Colombia on fair and equitable 
 terms would be useless, that his intention was, he said in a sub- 
 
14 PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 
 
 sequent message, " to consult the congress as to whether under 
 such circumstances it would not be proper to announce that the 
 canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms 
 that we had offered and no others; and that if such terms were 
 not agreed to we would enter into an arrangement with Panama 
 direct, or take what other steps were needful in order to begin 
 the enterprise." Li taking this position, he was acting in ac- 
 cordance with a sentiment expressed by Secretary Cass, in 1858, 
 in the following official statement of the American government's 
 attitude : — - 
 
 " While tlie rights of sovereignty of the states occupying this region 
 (Central America) should always be respected, we shall expect that these 
 rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the occasion, and the wants and 
 circumstances that have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties as well as its 
 rights, and none of these local governments, even if administered with 
 more regard to tlie just demands of otlier nations than they have been, 
 would be permitted, in a spirit of eastern isolation, to close the gates of in- 
 tercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify the act by the 
 pretension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them, and that 
 they choose to shut, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them with 
 sucli unjust relations as would prevent their general use." 
 
 Forty-six years had jiassed since that opinion was expressed, 
 and during that time no progress had been made toward begin- 
 ning the construction of the canal. Finally, Colombia had 
 placed herself in the pathway of progress in precisely the ob- 
 structive manner which Secretary Cass had declared would not 
 be permitted. This Avas the hnal provocation, not only to the 
 United States but to Panama. The latter rose in revolt and de- 
 clared its independence, and the United States government rec- 
 ognized its independent existence as a republic immediately. In 
 justification of such prompt action, the Roosevelt administration 
 cited the condition of affairs on the Isthums at the moment. 
 Panama had been accumulating material for war for several 
 months. The Isthmus was, according to the reports of trust- 
 worthy authorities, a perfect arsenal and its people were deter- 
 mined to make the most desperate resistance to the efforts of 
 Colombia to subdue them. That Colombia was also prepared is 
 shown by the fact that at the moment when independence was 
 proclaimed, on the morning of November 3, she had a gunboat 
 with between four and five hundred troops off" Colon on the way 
 to Panama. Secretary Hay, in his reply to General Reyes, thus 
 defines the situation : — 
 
 " On the one hand stood the government of Colombia invoking in the 
 name of the treaty of 1846 the aid of this government in its efforts to sup- 
 
PANAMA EEPUBLIC AND CANAL. 15 
 
 press the revolution ; on the other hand stood the republic of Panama that 
 liad come into being in order that the great design of that treaty might 
 not be forever frustrated, but might be fulfilled. The Isthmus was threat- 
 ened witli desolation bj^ another civil Avar, nor were the rights and inter- 
 ests of the United States alone at stake; the interests of the whole civil- 
 ized world were involved. The republic of Panama stood for those 
 interests; the government of Colombia opposed them. Compelled to 
 choose between these two alternatives, the government of the United 
 States, in no wise responsible for the situation that had arisen, did not hesi- 
 tate. It recognized the independence of the republic of Panama, and upon 
 its judgment'and action in the emergency the Powers of the world have 
 set "the seal ^-f their approval." 
 
 That civil Avar woixld have begun immediately on November 
 8 but for the intervention of the United States, is proved by 
 the official report of Commander Hubbard, of tlie United States 
 gunboat, " Nashville," who had been ordered by the American 
 government to Colon to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus 
 along tlie line of the Panama Kaihvay . The commanding officers 
 of the Colombian troops had asked for transportation over the 
 railway to Panama for their troops and it had been granted, but 
 it was prohibited by Commander Hubbard as in violation of the 
 perfect neutrality of the line of transit which the United States 
 is bound to maintain. If Commander Hubbard had not been on 
 the spot, the troops would have gone to Panama and civil war 
 would have been begun on November fourth. The Colombian 
 troops, after failing to get transportation to Panama, sought to 
 occupy Colon on November tifth, in violation of an agreement 
 between their commanding officers and Commander Hubbard. 
 The latter, as soon as he learned of this intention, landed his 
 full force of marines, only forty-two in number, for the avowed 
 purpose of protecthig the lives and property of American citizens 
 if threatened, and by doing this and maintaining a cool and firm 
 attitude in the presence of the Colombian troops when they en- 
 tered the city, he prevented bloodshed and the beginning of civil 
 war. President Roosevelt said on this point in his message of 
 January 4, 1904 : - 
 
 " Instead of there having been too much prevision by tlie American 
 government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life and 
 property on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of American war- 
 ships had been too long delayed ; so long, in fact, that there were but 
 forty -two marines and sailors available to land and protect the lives of 
 American men and women * * * It clearly appears that tlie fact that 
 there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was directly due,— and only due, 
 —to the prompt and firm enforcement by the United States of its tradi- 
 tional policy." 
 
16 PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 
 
 If civil war had once begun, liow long would it have lasted, 
 and how wide would its complications have extended? In con- 
 sidering this question, the President and Secretary Hay had to 
 judge the future in the light of the past. During the previous 
 tifty-seven years, tliere had been on the Isthmus no less than 
 fifty-three revolutions, almost one a year, some of them lasting 
 for several years, and a recent one between Panama and Colom- 
 bia extending over three years. In none of these had there been 
 such provocation for revolt as the rejection of the treaty, or 
 such formidable preparations for resistance. The people of 
 Panama were convinced that their future as a community or 
 state, financial and other, depended absolutely upou the con- 
 struction of the canal. If that were built, a future of steadily 
 increasing power and importance lay before them. If it were 
 not built in their teriitory it would be built in Nicaragua, and 
 the doom of the cities of Panama and Colon would be sounded, 
 for even the Isthmian Eailway would cease to be operated and 
 Panama would fall into a speedy and hopeless decline. As one 
 of the leading citizens of Panama said soon after the revolution : — 
 
 "We loolied upon the building of the canal as a matter of life or death 
 to us. "We wanted that because it meant, with the United States in con- 
 trol of it, peace and prosperity for us. 
 
 "Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the wa}' of 
 revenues, she did not bridge for us a single river, nor make a single road- 
 way, nor erect a single college where our children could be educated, nor 
 do anything at all to advance our industries. " 
 
 Under these conditions, great provocation followed by unusual 
 preparations for resistance, it was a reasonable supposition that 
 civil war, once instituted, woidd last for several years. It was 
 the avowed intention of Colombia to delay the whole question of 
 a canal for a year in order to get into position to claim for her- 
 self the forty million dollars that had been promised by the 
 United States to the Panama Canal Company. If, after a year 
 of conflict, with the United States government constantly on 
 guard to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus and to keep its 
 line of transit open, Colombia had endeavored to enforce its con- 
 tention that all rights and concessions to the canal company had 
 lapsed and had reverted to herself, she would unquestionably 
 have brought France into the conflict, for that government Avould 
 be compelled to uphold the rights of its citizens who were stock- 
 holders in the canal company. Under these circumstances, it 
 would have been very diflficult for the United States to avoid 
 being drawn into the conflict, if our government had used its 
 
PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 17 
 
 power to aid Colombia in suppressing the revolt, or had refrained 
 from exerting its influence in the direction of peace by promptly 
 recognizing the independence of Pananui. It was a case of hi- 
 stant recognition, or a long and bloody conflict, with possible 
 international complications. 1'he Roosevelt administration, 
 called to decide between these alternatives, decided for instant 
 recognition. As President Roosevelt put it in his message of 
 January 4, 1904 :— 
 
 "Recognitiou by this governmeot was based upon a state of facts iu 
 no way dependent for its j ustitication upon our action iu ordinary cases. 
 I liave not denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the validity or the pi-o- 
 priety of the general rule that a new state should not be recognized as ni- 
 dependent till it has shown its abihty to maintain its independence. This 
 rule is derived from the principle of non-intervention, and as a corollary 
 of that principle has generally been observed by the United States. But, 
 like the principle from which it is deduced, the rule is subject to excep- 
 tions; and there are, iu my opinion, clear and imperative reasons why a 
 departure from it was justified and even required iu the present instance. 
 These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our national inter- 
 ests and safety; and, third, the interests of collective civilization. _ 
 
 " Instead of using our forces, as we were invited by Colombia to do, 
 for the twofold purpose of defeating our own rights and interests and the 
 interests of the civilized world, and of compelling the submission of the 
 people of the Isthmus to those whom.they regarded as oppressors, we shall, 
 as in duty bound, keep the transit open, and prevent its invasion." 
 
 COMPLICITY AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS. 
 
 Was there complicity between the American government, or 
 any of its representatives, and the revolutionists ? 
 
 On this point it is necessary only to cite the official utter- 
 ances of the President and Secretary Hay. In his message of 
 January 4, 1904, the President said : — 
 
 "I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which have been made 
 of complicity by this government in the revolutionary movement iu 
 Panama. They are as destitute of foundation as of propriety. The only 
 excuse for my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons might 
 mistake for acquiescence'the silence of mere self-respect. I think proper 
 to say, therefore, that no one connected with this government had any 
 part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on tho 
 Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of our military and naval 
 officers, giveu above, no one connected with this government had any pre- 
 vious knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any 
 person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a 
 current acquaintance with public affairs." 
 
 In his reply of January 5 to the formal statement of Colom- 
 bia's grievances which General Reyes made to him on December 
 23, Secretary Hay said :— 
 
18 PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 
 
 "The press in this country is entirely free and as a neeessary eonse- 
 quence represents substantially every pliase of hunian tictivity, interest, 
 and disposition. Not only is (he course of the government in all matters 
 subject to daily comment, but the motives of public men are as fi'eely dis- 
 cussed as their acts; and if, as sometimes happens, criticism proceeds to 
 tlie point of calumnj', the evil is left to work its own cure. Diplomatic 
 representatives, however, aie not supposed to seek in such sources mate- 
 lial for arguments, much less for grave accusations. Any charge that 
 this government, or any responsible member of it, held intercourse, 
 whether official or unofficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia, is 
 utterly without justification. 
 
 "Erjually so is the insinuation that any action of this government piior 
 to the revolution in Panama was the result of complicity with the plans 
 of the revolutionists. The department sees tit to make these denials, and 
 it makes them finally." 
 
 Were our treaty obligations violated in refusing to aid Colom- 
 bia to put down the revolution ? 
 
 It is not only contended but proved by the supporters of the 
 government's conduct, that under the treaty of 1846 the United 
 States was bound to aid Colombia in maintaining her sovereigut}- 
 only in case an effoi't were made to attach Panama to a foreign 
 power. Citations from official records show a continuous line of 
 interpretation by our secretaries of state from 18(i5 to the pres- 
 ent time in accord with this dispatch from Secretar}^ Seward to 
 the American minister at Bogota : — 
 
 "November 9, 1865. 
 " Sir : — The question which has recently arisen under the thirty-fifth 
 article of the treaty with New Granada, as to the obligation of this gov- 
 ernment to comply with a requisition of the President of the United States 
 of Colombia for a force to protect the Isthmus of Panama from invasion 
 by a body of insurgents of that country, has been submitted to the consid- 
 eration of the Attorney-General. His opinion is that neitlier the te.xt nor 
 the spirit of the stipulation in that article, by which the United States 
 engages to preserve the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, imposes an 
 obligation on this government to comply with a requisition like that re- 
 ferred to. The pui-pose of the stipuation was to guarantee the Isthmus 
 against seizure or invasion by a foreign power only. It could not have 
 been contemplated that we were to become a party to any civil war in 
 that country by defending the Isthmus against another party. As it may 
 be presumed, however, that our object in entering into such a stipulation 
 was to secure the freedom of transit acrosss the Isthmus if that freedom 
 should be endangered or obstructed, the employment of force on our part 
 to prevent this would be a question of grave expediency to be determined 
 by circumstances. The department is not aware that there is yet occasion 
 for a decision upon this point." 
 
 From the date of that dispatch to the present time this con- 
 struction has been imposed upon the treaty of 1846 by every 
 diplomatic agent and secretary of state in the American govern- 
 
PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 19 
 
 ment. Furthermore, the Colombian government has itself ac- 
 cepted the same construction, for Mr. Burton, in replying to Sec- 
 retary Seward's dispatch in 1865, wrote that he had opened up 
 this subject of the construction of the treaty of 1846 with the 
 diplomatic agents and ministers of the Colombian government, 
 and added : — 
 
 " The result has been that the Colombian government declares that it 
 does not feel itself authorized by the treaty to require the aid of the 
 United States for tlie suppression of an insurrection, rebellion, or other 
 disturbance on the Isthmus on the part of the Colombian citizens ; not even 
 an invasion by another Colombian state, unless such movement be intended 
 to detach the state of Panama from the Colombian union and to annex it to 
 a foreign power. This would seem to leave the Isthmus free to declare 
 itself independent of the United States of Colombia, without the fear of 
 tlie forced intervention of the United States of America, provided such 
 declaration be not accompanied by the end of annexation to a foreign 
 power. " 
 
 That was the situation in 1846, as interpreted about twenty 
 years later. The question was a very different one in 1903. 
 The railway which was constructed from ocean to ocean by 
 American capital has thirty-two stations, and at each of these 
 there is a group of population. At one end is Colon with a 
 population of fourteen thousand, and at the other is Panama 
 with a population of twenty thousand. There are warehouses, 
 storehouses, stations, yards, and cars and other property be- 
 longing to the railway company scattered along the road's length. 
 In addition are the dredges and machinery of the canal com- 
 pany, which the Canal Commission estimated as worth one mil- 
 lion dollars. The American government must consider, when 
 confronted with the question of interrupting transit on the Isth- 
 mus, not its obligations merely under the treaty of 1846, but its 
 inherent right to safeguard the great interests and right of 
 American capital invested there. When Colombia sought to use 
 the railway in order to institute civil war, she herself violated 
 the treaty, for civil war would have closed the Isthmus and 
 made necessary American intervention to reopen traffic and keep 
 it open. 
 
 COLOMBIA'S USURPING GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Was there a constitutional government in Colombia at the 
 time of the Panama revolution ? 
 
 On this point I shall follow the argument of ex- Secretary 
 Root in his speech in Chicago on February 2o, 1904. He claimed 
 
20 PANAMA EEPUBLIC AND CANAL. 
 
 that Panama retained an independent sovereignty as a state first 
 in the republic of New Granada and later in the republic of 
 Colombia, quoting from the different constitutions of those con- 
 federations to show that for nearly fifty years Panama " has 
 never voluntarily surrendered her sovereignty." When the new 
 constitution of Colombia was adopted in 1863, Mr. King, the 
 American minister at Bogota, reported to the Secretary of State 
 at Washington that under it " the states comprising the union 
 Avere vested with absolute and unqualified sovereignty. From 
 them emanated all authority, and without their assent none could 
 be exercised by the federal functionaries of the nation." Under 
 that constitution Panama lived as a sovereign state in coopera- 
 tion with the other states of Colombia for twenty-three years. 
 In 1885 Rafael Nunez became president. He undertook to gov- 
 ern in disregard of constitutional limitations, and was resisted in 
 many parts of the republic, including Panama. He overcame 
 the resistance and then declared that the "constitution of 1863 
 no longer exists." He put Panama under martial law and ap- 
 l)ointed a governor for it and for the other states. He then 
 directed these governors to appoint delegates to a constitutional 
 convention, and these delegates framed the constitution of 1886. 
 The two delegates who represented Panama had never set foot 
 in that state. The new constitution was adopted without com- 
 pliance with a single one of the requisites prescribed by the con- 
 stitution of 1863 for its amendment. It robbed the people of 
 Panama of every vestige of self-government. It gave them a 
 governor to be appointed at Bogota, and he in turn appointed 
 all his subordinate administrative ofiicers. The new constitution 
 was never submitted to the people of Panama for approval or re- 
 jection. Mr. Root said of the situation at and subsequent to 
 this subjugation : " The people of Panama fought to exhaustion 
 in 1885 to prevent the loss of their liberty, and they were de- 
 feated through the action of the naval forces of the United 
 States. Three times since then they have risen in rebellion 
 against their oppressors. In 1895 they arose and were sup- 
 pressed by force ; in 1899 they arose again and for three years 
 maintained a war for liberation, which ended in 1902 through 
 the interposition of the United States by armed force. The ris- 
 ing of November, 1903, was the fourth attempt of this people to 
 regain the rights of which they had been deprived by the usur- 
 pation of Nunez." 
 
 In 1898 M. A. Sanclamente was elected president, and J. M. 
 Maroquiu vice-president, of the republic of Colombia. On July 
 
PAKAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 21 
 
 31, 1900, the vice-president, Maroquin, executed a " coup d'etat " 
 by seizing tlie person of the president, Sanclamente, and impris- 
 oning him at a place a few miles outside of Bogota. Maroquin 
 thereupon declared himself possessed of the executive power be- 
 cause of the absence of the president. He then issued a decree 
 tluit public order was disturbed, and, upon that ground, assumed 
 to himself legislative power under another provision of the con- 
 stitution. Tlience forth, Maroquin, without the aid of any legis- 
 lative body, ruled as the supreme executive, legislative, civil, 
 and military authority in the so-called republic of Colombia. 
 The absence of Sanclamente from the capital became permanent 
 by his death in prison in the year 1902. When the people of 
 Panama declared their independence in November, 1903, no con- 
 gress had sat in Colombia since the year 1898, except the special 
 congress called by Maroquin to reject the canal treaty, and which 
 did reject it by a unanimous vote, and adjourned without legis- 
 lating on any other subject. The constitution of 1886 had taken 
 away from Panama the pov/er of self-government and vested it 
 in Colombia. The couj) cV etat of Maroquin took away from Co- 
 lombia herself the i)ower of government and vested it in an irre- 
 sponsible dictator. 
 
 After the revolution of Panama, General Reyes, in behalf of 
 the Colombian government, made an offer to the American gov- 
 ernment, through the American minister, to ratify the treatj^, 
 either by calling the congress together again or by decree, thus 
 admitting that constitutional government did not exist in Colom- 
 bia. The question thus placed before the government of the 
 United States then became not one of interest, said Mr. Root, 
 for treaty and canal were secure, but a " question of right, a 
 question of justice, a question of national conscience." The peo- 
 })le of Panama were the real owners of the canal route. They 
 had never parted with their title to it, but constituted the federal 
 government its trustee. The trustee was faithless to the trust, 
 liad repudiated its obligations, and had seized with the strong 
 hand of military power the rights which it Avas bound to protect. 
 Mr. Root's conclusion is likely to be that of the American peo- 
 ple : — 
 
 "The question for the United States was, Sliall we take this treaty 
 from the true owner, or shall we take it from the faithless trustee, and for 
 that purpose a third time put back the yoke of foreign domination upon 
 the neck of Panama by the request of that government which lias tried to 
 play toward us the part of the highwayman'? By all the principles of 
 justice among men and among nations that we have learned from our 
 fathers, and all peoples and all governments should maintain, the revolu- 
 
22 PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL. 
 
 tionists ill Panama were right, tlie people of Panama were entitled to be 
 free again, the Istlimus was theirs, and they were entitled to govern it, 
 and it would have been a shameful thing for the government of the United 
 States to return them again to servitude." 
 
 Was the act of recognition justified by the interests of civili- 
 zation ? 
 
 President Roosevelt firmly believed it was. He said in his 
 message of January 4, 1904 : " I confidently maintain that the 
 recognition of tlie republic of Panama was an act justified by the 
 interests of colle(!tive civilization. If ever a government could 
 be said to have received a mandate from civilization to effect an 
 object tlie accomi)lishment of which was demanded in the inter- 
 est of mankind, the United States holds that position with regard 
 to the inter-oceanic canal." The civilized world very promptly 
 confirmed this view of our position as the mandatory of civiliza- 
 tion Avhen through fifteen of its governments, including those of 
 the leading nations, it recognized the independence of the new 
 republic. Putting all other considerations aside, it is easy to 
 discern that the great force which moved not only the United 
 States government but the governments of the civilized world as 
 a body forward so unanimously in this matter, was self-interest 
 in three forms. First, the self-interest of Panama, which com- 
 pelled the revolution as the only method of escape from destruc- 
 tion. Seccond, self-interest of the United States, which demands 
 a canal for its commerce and the development of its resources. 
 Third, self-interest of civilization throughout the world. On 
 this point, — that an isthmian oanal free to the commerce of the 
 world is an inestimable boon to all mankind,— there is no dis- 
 senting voice. By rejecting the new treaty, for the reasons 
 given and in the manner followed, Colombia jiut herself athwart 
 the pathway of the progress of the world, and the world united 
 to brush her aside. Then, too, there was that sympathy with 
 Panama which always goes forth to a people striving to rid them- 
 selves of op})ression. As Vattel says: " When a people for good 
 reasons take up arms against an o})pressor, it is but an act of 
 justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their 
 liberties." 
 
OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER. 
 
 I REMEMBER hearing an asttrte observer, who had made a 
 lifelong study of American politics and character, say, after 
 the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, "Well, that starts 
 us as a nation on a new and disastrous career. We are to go 
 into the business of colonization, and no people were ever more 
 utterly unlit for such work than we are. Our colonial adminis- 
 tration will be saturated with S})oils politics and be directed by 
 s]joils politicians. We shall inake a dreadful mess of it, dis- 
 gracing ourselves in the eyes of the civilized world." Never did 
 prediction fail luore completely of fulfillment than this has 
 failed. Precisely the opposite has ha})pened. AVe have shown 
 that we are exceptioiuilly lit for the work of colonization, we 
 have kept spoils politics and spoils politicians out of the work 
 entirely, and Ave have honored ourselves in the eyes of the world 
 by the way in which we have performed it. For this highly 
 creditable achievement the nation is indebted primarily to Presi- 
 dent McKinley. He made it not only possible but certain when 
 he selected as pioneers in this new held of American endeavor 
 such men as Generals Ludlow and Wood for Cuba, Judge Taft 
 for the Philippines, and ]\Ir. Allen for Porto Rico. Of each of 
 tliese men it can be said, as President Roosevelt said so finely of 
 General Wood in his Harvard commencement address in 1902, 
 " credit to him ! Yes, in a way. In another no particular credit, 
 because he was built so that he could do nothing else." If Presi- 
 dent McKinley had done his country no other service than to 
 select these men for this new task he would have earned the last- 
 ing gratitude of the American people, for it was a service tliat 
 not only brought honor to his country, but advanced the cause of 
 civilization throughout the world. This is not panegyric, but 
 the simple language of fact, as a plain statement of what tliese 
 men have done within three years will demonstrate. 
 
 THE KEW REPLTP.LLC OF CUBA. 
 
 The story of what was done in Oidja, before it was turned 
 over to its people for self-go\'ernment, reads like a romance. 
 General Wood, in his admirable account of his work in the island, 
 
 23 
 
24 OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER. 
 
 wliicli he gave before the Williams College aluinin in 1902, said 
 that the only instructions which President McKinley gave him 
 when he asked him to go to Cuba were : " I want you to go down 
 there to get the people ready for a republican form of government, 
 1 leave the details of procedure to you. Give them a good 
 school system ; try to straighten out their courts, and put them on 
 their feet as best you can. We want to do all we can for them, 
 and we want to get ready to get out of the island as soon as we 
 can safely do so." Could the work of helping a people, just re- 
 lieved from centuries of oppression, to start forward in the path 
 of civilization have been outlined more simply or more wisely or 
 more magnanimously than that ? General Wood carried out his 
 instructions in the spirit in which they were given, and the bare 
 account of what he succeeded in doing reads like a tale'from the 
 "Arabian Nights"; like a sum]nary of results achieved through 
 the rise of an Aladdin's lamp or of a magic wand. He found 
 the island without a goverjiment, without either a school or a 
 court system worthy of the name, and in a condition of tilth 
 which made the cities of Havana and Santiago the most unhealthy 
 in the world. Within less than four years later, he left the 
 island with an established form of republican government, under 
 a constitution modeled closely u])on that of the United States, 
 with a comprehensive, intelligent, and upright court system, 
 with a public school system that extended through all the prov- 
 inces, and with a system of sanitation that had made the cities 
 as healthy as any in the Avorld, and had freed the island from 
 contagious diseases, including yellow fever, for the first time in 
 its history. When Santiago surrendered, its condition from a 
 sanitary jjoint of view was beyond description. Its death-rate 
 was 300 a day in a ])opulation of 40,000. In one province there 
 were 3,000 cases of smallpox, and in one hospital 1,200 victims. 
 When General Wood left Cuba, less than four years later, the 
 death-rate was on a line with that of New England, and the 
 cities of Havana and Santiago had a cleaner bill of health than 
 the city of Washington. INIillions of dollars had been spent in 
 the work of sanitation, and the incalculably valuable discovery 
 had been made of the variety of mosquito that transmitted the 
 germs of yellow fever. As far back as 1881 an old Cuban physi- 
 cian, Dr. Finlay, advanced the theory that yellow fever is trans- 
 mitted by mosquitoes, but never found the particular variety of 
 mosquito that produced the infection. After the American gov- 
 ernment began the reconstruction of Cuba, different methods 
 were tried for the extermiuatiou of yellow fever. First came 
 
OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER. 25 
 
 the experiments with corrosive siiblimate, then the successful 
 campaigns against the mosquito. The yellow fever commission 
 was formed, which made heroes of its three members and a mar- 
 tyr of one. The discovery that yellow fever cannot be trans- 
 mitted by contact, but by the sting of a mosquito. General ^Vood 
 says, was worth the whole cost of the war, and is the most im- 
 portant discovery in medical science since that of vaccination. 
 
 In his work of establishing a school system General Wood 
 2)roceeded with equal energy and good judgment. He found al- 
 most enough prisons, military hospitals, and barracks in Cuba 
 to make schoolhouses for the people. He found only one uni- 
 versity on the island, and iu each province a single institute or 
 high school having many professors and few students. The pub- 
 lic school was unknown. When he left Cuba there were 3,786 
 schools, with 4,000 teachers, and the yearly enrolment of pupils 
 was 252,000, with a daily attendance of 140,000. Of the total 
 revenue $4,200,000, or twenty -live per cent., was spent for educa- 
 tional purposes. General Wood believes in the large school, 
 and what he says of the one which he established in tlie old and 
 indescribably filthy military barracks in Havana, shows what a 
 genuine missionary spirit animated him iu this field of his colo- 
 nizing work: "We spent a great deal of money on this building 
 in the plumbing and in all kinds of up-to-date sanitary arrange- 
 ments. We sjjent it because I believe that a big school like that, 
 in the center of a city of 300,000 people, most of whom are 
 ignorant of the very principles of sanitation, with every sanitary 
 improvement put into the building, will be much moie valuable 
 than any books we can give to the children. For this is un ob- 
 ject lesson, and in going back to their homes the children v/ill 
 make demands for improved sanitary conditions." Tlie Ohio 
 school law was put into Spanish and adopted, and has been very 
 successful, and to-day there is a uniform school system through- 
 out the island of Cuba. 
 
 When, on May 20, 1002, General Wood turned the island 
 over to President Palma and the new government, Cuba was free 
 from debt and had a more promising political future than was 
 enjoyed by any other Latin-American community. The people 
 liad received during these few years of American control an ob- 
 jcet lesson in government that was of the highest value. They 
 Jiad seen the transformation made from medi.neval barbarism to 
 modern civilization, and had acquired an elementary knowledge 
 at least of the fundamental principles and methods of civilized 
 government. They had seen that government established first 
 
26 OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER, 
 
 in the municipalities, tben extended to the provinces, then em- 
 bodied and formulated in a constitution for a republic. Many 
 of them as members of municipal bodies, or as municipal offi- 
 cials, had acquired practical knowledge of the operation of gov- 
 ernment. We had, in short, done our full duty in starting them 
 on the road that President McKinley marked out in his instruc- 
 tions to General Wood. 
 
 PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE PHILIPPINES. 
 
 What has been accomplished in the Philippines is, when the 
 immensely greater obstacles encountered are considered, fully as 
 notable as the result achieved in Cuba. There was no insurrec- 
 tion in Cuba, no opposition to American control, and the work 
 of amelioration began immediately upon American possession. 
 In the Philippines an organized insurrection began with the first 
 moment of American possession and continued with varying de- 
 grees of activity for more than three years. During most of that 
 time the islands Avere under military rule, and whatever civil 
 government there was was merely a branch of the military. The 
 military government called into requisition the services of mili- 
 tary officers by detailing them to civil duties. Till July, 1901, 
 the commanding general of the army in the islands was civil ex- 
 ecutive as well. Under his direction, and working in harmony 
 with him, the Taft Commission began to lay the foundations of 
 civil rule, seeking to place them firm and enduring in the princi- 
 ples of popular government. SIoav but sure progress was made 
 in this work, one province after another passhig under control 
 of civil rule, with a government in which their own leading men 
 took a greater or less part according to varying local conditions, 
 until in July of the present year the entire archipelago passed 
 under civil rule, Avith Judge Taft as governor, and military rule 
 was withdrawn. The islands were then at peace with the United 
 States throughout their entire extent, and have remained so since. 
 In a communication which he sent to the Senate at that time, 
 Secretary Root gave the total amount expended by the American 
 government in the islands as about $170,000,000, and said of 
 the military forces : " In the middle of the fiscal year ending 
 June 20, 1901, there were about 70,000 American soldiers in the 
 island. That number is now reduced to about 23,000. Orders 
 have now been issued for the return of the Eighth, Fifteenth, 
 Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-tifth Infantry and a squadron of the 
 Tenth Cavalry, and when these orders have been executed the 
 
OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER. 27 
 
 uiunber of Aiiiericau troops in the Philippiues will have beea re- 
 duced to 18,000." 
 
 The bare recital of the results achieved by the Taft Comtnis- 
 sion up to the time of the establishment of supreme civil gov'ern- 
 meiit is a really marvellous story. Provincial governments had 
 been established in nearly all the provinces and municipal gov- 
 ernments in nearly all the larger towns. A civil service law had 
 been enacted, and for several years had been working admirably, 
 which is a stricter application of the merit system than any simi- 
 lar law in the United States. Four million dollars had been 
 appropriated for Iiarbor and road improvements. A public school 
 system, with 1,000 American teachers and 2,500 Filipino teach- 
 ers, had been established and schools had been opened in 500 of 
 the 900 towns in the island. In addition normal and manual 
 training schools had been organized. There had been established 
 a judiciary system, with a supreme court made up of three 
 American and four Filipino judges, with appellate jurisdiction, 
 and fifteen judicial district courts with general, civil, and crimi- 
 nal jurisdiction. A local police and insular constabulary force 
 had been organized with 5,000 men, about 150 in each province, 
 under insjjectors partly American and partly Filipino, of which 
 Governor Taft said in May last: " I am glad to say that thus far- 
 the operation of the constabulary system has been most satisfac- 
 tory, and ladronism (brigandage) is rapidly disappearing. The: 
 selection of men for its ranks has been very carefully made.. 
 The system of selecting only residents of the province for serv- 
 ice in the province avoids the danger of abuse and looting by the 
 members of the constabulary themselves. In a force of some 
 5,000 men there have been reported but few desertions. The 
 constabulary costs the Philippine government $250 a man yearly, 
 on the average." There had also been established a Health De- 
 partment, cooperating with local health officials in all parts of 
 the island, an Agricultural Bureau, Bureau of Mining, Bureau of 
 Ethnology, a Bureau of Forestry, and a Postal System. Thus 
 far the government had been self-supporting, its income being 
 mostly from customs receipts. Surely this is a record of prog- 
 ress in less than two years which is a striking tribute to Gov- 
 ernor Taft's ability as an administrator and to American capac- 
 ity in the work of civilization and colonization. When it is 
 added that on July 4, 1903, a proclamation was issued granting 
 amnesty to all Filipino prisoners, including Aguinaldo, and that 
 no outbreak of any kind has followed to disturb the peace of the 
 islands, the record of pacification is seen to be complete, thus. 
 
28 OUE WOEK AS A CIVILIZEK. 
 
 opening tlie way to a rapid continuance of the civilizing work al- 
 ready so well begun. 
 
 In this genuine service to civilization Governor Taft was the 
 leading force, the dominating influence, as distinctl}^ as was Gen- 
 eral Wood in Cuba. President Eoosevelt's estimate of his char- 
 acter and work, in his speech at Harvard, was as just as it was 
 eloquent and generous. It has been my inestimable privilege to 
 enjoy intimate personal friendship with Governor Taft since his 
 appointment to the Philippines by President INIcKinley in the 
 spring of 1900. I had many long talks Avith him on the eve of 
 his departure to the islands, and there Avas percejjtible in him 
 then the awakening of that genuine missionary spirit which after- 
 wards took complete possession of him. He. told me then that 
 he had been against the Avar Avith Spain, had believed it to be an 
 unnecessary Avar, and regretted that it had left us Avith the 
 Philippines on our hands. But the Treaty of Paris closed that 
 part of the case. All there Avas for every American to do after 
 that Avas to help his country to soh^e tlie ncAv problems Avliich 
 the Avar had left on its hands. When President jMcKinley asked 
 him to aid in this task, he felt that he had no right to refuse. 
 He resigned his seat on the bench of the United States Circuit 
 Court, although his tastes and ambition impelled him to a judi- 
 cial career, and accepted the call of his country. I talked Avith 
 him freely about his plans, and as I look back over his Avork in 
 the islands I can see few or no really important particulars in 
 Avhich he has departed from them. His intellectual grasp of the 
 problem had been so strong, his foresight so clear, that he Avas 
 able to map out his Avork in all its largest details before he had 
 started for the scene. This Avas especially the case in regard to 
 the lands held by the friars, for the solution Avhich he had in 
 mind then is the one Avhich he has brought to success now, and 
 which he presented Avith such ability and tact at Pome as to 
 command both the coulidence and Avin the approval of the Pope 
 and the authorities of the Catholic Church. 
 
 What the President said of him was based on personal knowl- 
 edge of all this and of much more of the same character. He 
 said he had, during Governor Taft's visit to this country, said to 
 him that he Avas aware of his ambition to become a justice of the 
 Supreme Court, but that if a vacancy Avere to occur then he did 
 not see hoAv he could possibly give it to him because the country 
 needed him Avhere he Avas; and that to this GoA'ernor Taft re- 
 plied: "Mr. President, it has ahvays been ni}^ dream to be in the 
 Supreme Court; but if you should offer me a justiceship now 
 
OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER. 29 
 
 and at the same time Congress should take off entirely my salary 
 as governor, I should go straight back to the Philippines never- 
 theless; for these people need me and expect nie back and be- 
 lieve I won't desert them." Every one who met Governor Taft 
 during that visit found him imbued with this spirit and concurred 
 heartily with tlie estimate which the President made of him after 
 his return : *' He has gone back, gone as a strong friend among 
 weaker friends to help them upward along the stony and difficult 
 path of self-government; to do his part, and a great part, in 
 making the American name a symbol of honor and of good faith 
 in the Philippine Islands; to govern with justice and with that 
 tirinness, that absence of weakness, which is only another side of 
 justice. He has gone back to do all that because it is his duty 
 as he sees it. We are to be congratulated, we Americans, that 
 we have a fellow American like Taft." 
 
 THE FRIARS' LANDS. 
 
 In no part of his great task in the Philippines has Governor 
 Taft displayed higher ability than in tha,t relating to the disposi- 
 tion of the lands held by the friars. He realized at the start 
 that this was the crucial element in the problem, for unless the 
 friars could be banished permanently from the islands there 
 could be little real progress made in the direction of pacifica- 
 tion and improvement. The one subject upon which all the 
 Filipinos were united was that of hostility to the friars. 
 This was based upon the political power which the friars ex- 
 ercised for fifty years previous to the battle of Manila Baj-. 
 As Governor Taft put it : " The friars were the policemen of 
 Spain. They exercised absolute power in every municipality 
 within their respective parishes, and they Avere made responsible 
 by the people for every act of oppression, individual or general, 
 which might be charged to the Spanish government." While 
 the Filipinos of these parishes were Catholics and devoted t(; 
 their Church, they would not tolerate these representatives of 
 the Church any longer among them. The last insurrection 
 against Spain, shortly before the battle of Manila, was caused 
 largely by hatred of the friars, 50 of whom were killed in it, 
 and 300 of whom were prisoners when the Americans took pos- 
 session of Manila and released them. They owned in various 
 provinces about 420,000 acres of land, some of which they had 
 greatly improved by irrigation and other processes. After the 
 insurrection, or for four years or more, the friars were unable to 
 
30 OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER. 
 
 collect any rents from tlie people occupying the lands, but under 
 the Treaty of Paris they were lawful owners of the lauds, were 
 entitled to the use of them and the fruits of them, and if they 
 were allowed to return and seek to enforce the rights of owner- 
 ship the certaui result would be riot and insurrection. What 
 Governor Taft proposed was the purchase of the lands from them 
 by the United States government and their sale in small hold- 
 ings to the present tenants, on long and easy payments, the gov- 
 ernment to issue bonds in an amount sufficient for the purchase, 
 and the proceeds of sales to go into a sinking fund for the re- 
 demption of the bonds. Congress authorized this proceeding, 
 and in December, 1903, all the lands were bought for $7,239,- 
 000, Avith the exception of about 10,000 acres that had been sold 
 to a railway (Company. About three-fifths of the lands purchased 
 are higlily cultivated and thickly inhabited by thousands of ten- 
 ants. In his tinal report as Civil Governor, previous to leaving 
 the islands to assume the duties of Secretary of War at Wash- 
 ington, Mr. Taft said, in speaking of this transaction : " It is not 
 thought that the income from the islands for several years will 
 be enougli to meet the actual outgo, but with a restoration of 
 normal conditions — speaking for myself alone — I hope that tlie 
 lands will sell for as much as we have paid for them. Other 
 members of the Commission do not think so. It is to be noted, 
 however, that the insular government has not entered upon the 
 purchase of these lands with a view to a profitable investment, 
 but that it is knowingly paying a considerable sum of money 
 merely for the purpose of ridding the administration of the gov- 
 ernment in the islands of an issue dangerous to the peace and 
 prosperity of the people of the islands. 
 
 " Following the policy wliieh it was announced by the Vatican 
 would be ]>ursued, the bishops who were Spanish friars in all the 
 dioceses of the islands have been allowed to resign and their 
 places have been filled by American Catholic bishops. I cannot 
 state with too much emphasis the satisfaction I feel in this 
 change. It means, in my judgment, the beginning of a new era 
 in the islands. It is to be expected that a large part of the peo- 
 ple of the islands will continue to be communicants of the Roman 
 Catholic Church, and it cannot but have a liberalizing effect 
 upon them that their bisliops shall be Americans with American 
 ideas of a separation of church and state, and with the American 
 respect for individual rights and individual liberties." 
 
 It may be well, in order to coinplete the record, to cite what 
 President McKinley said to Judge Taft, when he selected him 
 
OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER. 31 
 
 to go to the Philippines. It is very like in tone and temper to 
 what he said to General Wood. In his speech at a banquet 
 which was given in his honor by his fellow citizens of Cincinnati, 
 after his appointment, Judge Taft said : " The high and patriotic 
 purpose of the President in the present juncture is to give to the 
 jjeople of the Philippine Islands the best civil government which 
 he can provide, with the largest measure of self-government con- 
 sistent with stability. He seeks only the welfare of the Filiinno 
 and the betterment of his condition." Speaking for him at the 
 same time. Judge Taft said : " The problems seem certainly for- 
 midable enough. It will take patience, persistence, and tact to 
 work them out. Doubtless we shall make mistakes which will 
 deserve criticism, but if we maintain our purpose steadfast, to do 
 nothing save for the good of the Filipino people, we hope, in 
 spite of their formidable character, to surmount the obstacles 
 and win success. If we can thus relieve a hitherto unfortunate 
 and oppressed people from the evil of three centuries of misgov- 
 ernment the end will be worth the struggle." In his formal in- 
 structions to the Taft Commission, President McKinley said: 
 " A high and sacred obligation rests upon the government of the 
 United States to give protection for property and life, civil and 
 religious freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the 
 paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the ]^hilippine 
 Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full perform- 
 ance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience 
 of their country." 
 
 A few months later, in his letter accepting a renomination, 
 President McKinley said : " It is our purpose to establish in the 
 Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of 
 the inhabitants, and to prepare them for self-government, and 
 to give them self-government when they are ready for it, and as 
 rapidly as they are ready for it." It is because these instruc- 
 tions have been carried forward in letter and in spirit that tlie 
 work which we are doing in the Philippines is a great service to 
 the civilization of the world.