REPORT 
 
 BOARD OF ARMY OFFICERS, 
 
 >y KXRD BY 
 
 SPECIAL ORDERS No. 78, HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT 
 GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, APRIL 12, 1878, 
 
 )\ TUK CASE OF 
 
 FITZ-JOHN PORTER. dA 
 
 WASHIXGTOK: 
 
 CrOTERNMENT PRINTINa OFPIOE. 
 
 1879. 
 
Er.V-73 
 ■nz 
 
 y 
 
K 
 
 ! 
 
 REPORT 
 
 ^ OF THE 
 
 ^ BOARD OF ARMY OFFICERS 
 
 IX THE CASE OF 
 
 FITZ-JOHN i^OnTER. 
 
 New York City, March 19, 1879. 
 To the honorable the Secretary of War, Washington, D. G. : 
 
 Sir: We, the Board of Officers appointed by order of the President 
 to examine the evidence in the case of Fitz-John Porter, late Major- 
 Geueral of Volunteers, and to report, with the reasons for our conclu- 
 sions, what action (if any), in our opinion, justice requires should betaken 
 by the President on the application for relief in that case, have the 
 honor to make the following report. The Kecorder has been directed 
 to forward to the Adjutant General of the Army the printed record of 
 our proceeding, including all the evidence examined and the arguments 
 of counsel on either side : 
 
 We have made a very thorough examination of all the evidence pre- 
 sented and bearing in any manner upon the merits of the case. The 
 Kecorder has, under instructions from the Board, sought witb great 
 diligence for evidence in addition to that presented by the petitioner, 
 especially such as might appear to have a bearing adverse to the claims 
 urged by him. 
 
 Due care has been exercised not to inquire into the military operations 
 of the Army of Virginia, or the conduct of officers thereof, any further 
 than has seemed necessary to a full and fair elucidation of the subject 
 submitted to us for investigation. On the other hand, we have not hes-j 
 itated to examine fully into all the facts, accurate knowledge of which | 
 seemed to us to be necessary to the formation of a correct judgment 
 upon the merits of the case, and to the determination of the action which 
 justice requires should be taken by the President ou the petitioner's 
 api)lication for relief. 
 
 We have had tlie benetit of the testimony of a large number of officers 
 of the late Confederate army, a kind of testimony which was not available 
 at the time of General Porter's trial by court-martial. We have also 
 availed ourselves of the testimony of many offi(;ers and soldiers of the 
 Union forces who were present on the battle held and of much document- 
 ary evidence, to throw additioiuil light upon points not made perfectly 
 clear in the record of evidence taken before the court martial ; and we 
 have had the use of accurate maps of the battle-field of Manassas, con- 
 structed from recejit actual surveys made, uniier the direction of the 
 Chief of Engineers, by a distinguished oiiicer of that corps, who was 
 himself a participant in that battle. 
 
 Without such a map neither the testimony upon which General Por- 
 
4 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTEK. 
 
 ter was couvicted nor the additional testimony submitted to this Board 
 could have been correctly understood. 
 
 The evidence which we have thus been able to examine, in addition 
 to that which was before the court-martial, has placed beyond question 
 many important facts which were before the subjects of dispute and in 
 respect to some of which radically erroneous opinions were enter- 
 1802 tained by General Porter's accusers, and doubtless by the court- 
 martial that pronounced him guilty. 
 I The result has been, as we believe, to establish beyond reasonable 
 doubt ail the facts essential to the formation of a correct judgment upon 
 the merits of the case of Fitz John Porter. We are thus enabled to re- 
 port, witheutireunaJiiiiji^ witbout__djoubtJiijKir_jQjKJljn[nds, with 
 )the i'easons lor ourconclusions, \vh'at" action, in our opinion, jiitfice re- 
 quired should be taken by the President on the petitioner's application for 
 relief. 
 
 The evidence presents itself under several distinct heads, viz: 
 
 First. The imperfect, and in some respects erroneous, statements of 
 facts, due to tbe partial and incorrect knowledge in i^ossession of wit- 
 nesses at the time of the court-nuirtial, and the extremely inaccurate 
 maps and erroneous locations of troops thereon, by which erroneous state- 
 ments were made to convey still more erroneous impressions. 
 
 Second. The opinions and inferences of prominent officers based upon 
 this imperfect knowledge. 
 
 Third. The far more complete and accurate statements of facts now 
 made by a large number of eye-witnesses from both the contending 
 forces. 
 
 Fourth. The accurate maps of the field of operations and the exact 
 positions of troops thereon at different periods of time, by which state- 
 ments otherwise contradictory or irreconcilable are shown to be harmo- 
 nious, and opposing opinions are shown to have been based upon different 
 views of the same military situation; and. 
 
 Finally. The conflicting testimony relative to plans of operations, in- 
 terpretation of orders, motives of action, and relative degrees of respon- 
 sibility for unfortunate results, 
 
 A careful consideration of all the material facts now fully established, 
 in combination with. the conflicting or inconclusive testimony last above 
 referred to, gives rise to several diverse theories respecting the whole 
 subject with which General Porter's case is inseparably connected. These 
 diverse views of the subject necessarily involve, in a greater or less de- 
 gree, the acts, motives, and respouhibilities of others as well as those of 
 the i)etitioner. We have considered with great care and labor, and with 
 our best ability, each and all of these phases in which the subject can 
 be and has been presented, and we find that all these i)ossible views ot 
 the subject, when exaniined in the light of the facts which are fully 
 established by undisputed testimony, lead inevitably to one and the 
 samt; conclusion in respect to the guilt or innocence ot Fitz John Porter 
 of the specific charges ui)on which he was tried and i)r()nounced guilty 
 by tlie court-martial. 
 
 Therefore, while exjjosing Genera! Porter's condi;ct to the test of the 
 highest degree of resi)onsibility which recognized military prin(nples 
 attached to the command he held under the circumstances in which he 
 was placed, and the orders which he had received, we are able to take 
 that view of the whole subject which seems to involve in the least possi- 
 ble degree any question as to the acts, motives, or responsibility or 
 others. 
 
 We will now proceed to give, as concisely as we are able to do, a uar- 
 
CASE OP FITZ JOHN PORTER. 5 
 
 rative of the eveuts which gave rise to the charges against Maj. Gen. 
 Fitz-John Porter, omitting the niultitiule of interesting but unessen- 
 tial details and all facts liaviug no necessary' bearing upon his case, 
 and limiting ourselves to a plain statement of the essential facts of the I 
 case uhich have been established, as we believe, by positive proof. » 
 While the Army of the Potomac w;is withdrawing from its 
 1803 position on tlie James Kiver in August, 1862, the Army of Vir- 
 ginia, under Mnjor-General Pope, was ordered to hold the line of 
 the Rappahannock, and to stand on the defensive until all the forces 
 could be united behind that river. General Pope was given to under- 
 stand that, when this concentration was effected, Major General Ualleiik, 
 the General in-Chief, was to take the field in command of the combined 
 armies. On the other hand, it appears that Major-General McClellan, 
 then commanding the Army of the Potomac, was given to understand 
 that he was to direct the operations of all the forces in Virginia, as soon 
 as they should be united. 
 
 It appears that General Pope was notified on the 25th of August that 
 an active campaign was soon to be commenced, without waiting for a 
 union of all the forces, and under some commander other than either of 
 those before named. But this information appears lo have been of a 
 secret character, afterwards suppressed, and not made known to Gen- 
 eral McClellan and his subordinates until five days later, when the order 
 appeared from the War Department, depriving McClellan of the com- 
 mand of all his troops then between the Potomac and the Kappa han- 
 uock, although leaving him in nominal command of the Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 Thus General Porter, w^ho joined General Pope's army about that 
 time, was left under the impression, which all had previously shared, 
 that the operations of the army were to (;ontinue of a defensive charac- 
 ter until all the forces should be united aiul proi)er preparations made 
 for the commencement of an offensive campaign under a general desig- 
 nated by the President to command the combined armies. But just 
 then the Confederate general, Jackson, with three divisions of infantry, 
 one of cavalry, and some artillery, commenced his ujovement to turn 
 the Union right through Thoroughfare Gai), which gap he passed on 
 the 26th, and that night struck the rear of the Union Army at Bristoe 
 and Manassas Junction, The next morning, August 27, tlie Unioit 
 Army changed front to the rear, and was ordered to move on Gaines- 
 ville, Greenwich, and Warrenton Junction. 
 
 General Porter, with his two divisions of the Fifth Corps, arrived at 
 Warrenton Junction on the 27th, and there reported in person to Gen- 
 eral Pope. That afternoon Hooker's division was engaged with the en- 
 emy at Bristoe Station ; McDowell and Sigel were moving on Gaines- 
 ville, and Heintzelman and Eeuo on Greenwich. Banks was covering 
 the rear below Warrenton Junction, and guarding the trains in their 
 movement toward Manassas Junction. Porter was at first ordered to 
 move toward Greenwich upon the arrival of Banks at Warrenton Junc- 
 tion, but after Hooker's engagement at Bristoe the following order was 
 sent him, and he received it at 9.50 p. m. : 
 
 Headquarters Army oi^' Virginia, 
 
 Bristoe Station, August 27, 1862 — 6.30 p. m. 
 Major-General F. J. Porter, Warrenton Junction : 
 
 General : The major-general coniraauding directs that you start at 1 o'clock to- '• 
 night and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as 
 to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with 
 the enemy, with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded. The enemy has been 
 
6 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 •driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, 
 
 and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If 
 
 Morell has not joined yon, send him word to push forward immediately; also send 
 
 word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junc- 
 
 <,tiou. It is necessary on all accounts that you should be here by daylight. I send an 
 
 jofficer with this dispatch who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word 
 
 to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of 
 
 3.804 Bealetou. Say to Banks', also, that he had best run back the railroad trains to 
 
 this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him to that effect. 
 
 By command of General Pope. 
 
 GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 
 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
 
 P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two 
 pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immedi- 
 iitely upon his doing so. If Banks is not at the junction, instruct Colonel Clary to 
 run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and a section of 
 .artillery with it. 
 
 Bv command of General Pope. 
 
 GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff, 
 
 This order i)l;iitjly conteinplated an aggressive movement against the 
 enemy early on the 28th, and required the presence of General Porter's 
 corps at Bristoe Station ns early as possible in the morning, to take part 
 in the pursuit of and atta(!k upon the enemy. 
 
 The order did not indicate any anticipation of defensive action at 
 
 1 Bristoe, but, on the contrary, it indicated continuous, active, and aggres- 
 sive Ojierations duriiiii' the entire day of the L*8tli, to drive the enemy 
 from Manassas, and clear the country. Hence the troops must ariive 
 at Bristoe in condition for such service. 
 
 The evidence clearly shows tliat General Porter evinced an earnest 
 ilesire to comply literally with tlie terms of the order', and that he held 
 4\, consultatioir with his division (;omtnanders, some of his brigade com- 
 raanders, and his staff ofHcers oir the subject. One of his divisions had 
 arrived in cami) late in the evenirrg, after a long march, and was much 
 fatigued. 
 
 It tlie trooi)s nrarched at I o'clock, irone of them could have much 
 slee)> before starting, and, even if they could arrive at Bristoe by or soon 
 after daylight, they must be in poor condition for a vigorous pursuit of 
 tlie enemy, who was already some distance beyond Bristoe. But this 
 was not regarded by Geireral Porter as sufficient reason for hesitating 
 to make the attempt to comply literally with the order. He still urged, 
 against the advice of his division commanders, the necessity of imi)licit' 
 obedience. Then, further consideration of the subject disclosed the fact 
 that the load was filled with army trains, which iiad been prcissiug in 
 that (brectlion all day and as late at night as they could move, until the 
 way had become (;()inj)lete!y blocked with wagons. The trains of the 
 army movirrg back from the Hue of the Rappahannock had been ordered 
 to take that road to the number of ''two or tlir<e thousand." In the 
 language of one of the most intelligent witnesses, the mass of wagons 
 blocked together at i)laces in the road was " like a l()t of ice that jams 
 in on the shore." The night had become very dark, or, as testified by 
 
 (most of the witnesses, excessively dark. It woidd have been difficult 
 to march troops ui)on a plain and unol)structed road. It was a manifest 
 I physical impossibility to march over that road that night, or to remove 
 the obstructions in the darkness of the night. When this situation was 
 made evident, General Porter reluctantly consented to delaj^ the move- 
 meirt two hours, or until 3 o'clock. At that hour the march was com- 
 menced, but it was founil that no appreciable^'progress could be made 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 7 
 
 before daylight. Nothing was gaiued, or could have been gained, byl 
 the attempt to move before the dawn of day. It would have been wiser! 
 to liave delayed the attempt to move until 4 o'clock. 
 
 A vigorous and persistent effort to make that march, commencing at 
 
 1 o'clock, could only have resulted in greatly fatiguing the troops and 
 
 throwing them into disorder, from which they could not have been 
 
 1805 extricated until long after daylight, without making any material 
 
 progress, and would thus have caused the corps to arrive at 
 
 Bristoeat a later hour and in a miserable condition. 
 
 Abundant experience in situations similar to that above described 
 leaves no room for doubt what General Porter's duty was. He exer-l 
 cised only the very ordinary discretion of a corps commander, which iti 
 was his plain duty to exercise, in delaying the march until 3 o'clock, andr^^ 
 in his attempt to move at that time instead of at 4 o'clock he showedl ^ 
 only too anxious a desire to comply with the letter of his orders. 
 
 If the order had contemplated, as has been represented, an attack by 
 the enemy at dawn of day, then it would have been General Porter's 
 duly to start promptly, not at 1 o'clock, but at the moment he received 
 the order, so as to have brought at least some fragments of his infantry 
 to Bristoe in time to aid in repelling that attack. That was the mosti 
 that he could have done in any event, even by starting the moment the! 
 order was received, and then his troops would have been in no conditionfl 
 for any aggressive movement that day. • 
 
 General Porter reached Bristoe Station as soon as practicable with 
 his corps on the morning of the 28th, and there remained, under orders 
 from his superior commander, until the morning of the 29th, taking no 
 part in the operations of the 28th, 
 
 In the morning of the 28th, McDowell sent Ricketts' division of his 
 corps to Thoroughfare Gap to resist the advance of re-enforcements from 
 the main body of Lee's army, then known to be marching to join Jack- 
 son. Banks was at Warrenton Junction and Porter at Bristoe. The 
 rest of tiie army moved frouj Gainesvdks Greenwich, and Bristoe on 
 Manassas Junction to attack Jackson at that place; but that general 
 withdrew his forces durnig the night of the 27th and morning of the 
 28th, toward Sudley and Grovet^ou. He was followed by Ileintzelmau and 
 Eeno, via Centreviile; and ^McDowell and Sigel, after having marched 
 some distance toward Manassas, were ordered to direct their march to- 
 waid Centreviile. In this movement toward Centreviile, King's division 
 of McDowell's corps struck the right of Jackson's force, late in the after- 
 noon, just north of the Warrenton turnpike, a mile west of Groveton. 
 A sharp contest ensued, lasting until some time after dark, when King 
 still held his ground on the turnpike. Reynolds was then near the right 
 of King, Sigel on his right near the Stone House, Heintzelmau and Keuo 
 near Centreviile ; Kicketts, who had been sent in the morning to 
 Thoroughfare Gap, was disputing with Longstreet the passage of the 
 gap. 
 
 Thus it was still hoi)ed to strike Jackson a decisive blow on the morn- 
 ing of the 29th, before re-enforcements could reach him. In the mean 
 time the Confederate general had taken up a favorable position a little 
 to the north and west of Groveton and Sudley to await attack. 
 
 Under these conditions General Porter, who was still at Bristoe 
 Station, received, at 6 a. m., the following order from General Pope: 
 
 Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 
 Near Bull Run, August 29, 1862 — 3 a. ui. 
 General: McDowell has iutercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately 
 on the right of McDowell. Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at 
 
8 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTEE. 
 
 .early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Ceutreville, at the first 
 Idawu of day, with your whole comrtiand, leaving your trains to follow. It is very im- 
 jportant that you should be here at a very early liour in the moruiug. A severe en- 
 gagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary. 
 I am, general, very respectfully, vour obedient servant, 
 
 GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 
 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
 Major-General Porter, 
 
 TJiuler this order, General Porter marcbed^romptl^with his 
 corps toward Ceutreville. He had passed Manassa?Timctiou with 
 
 f 1806 
 
 \l corps towartiuentreviiie. He tiad passe 
 
 the head of his column, when he was baited by counter orders, issued in 
 icousequence of a grave cbange which had occurred in tbe situation since 
 |the night before. 
 
 1 King bad withdrawn from his jiosition near Jackson's rigbt, on tbe 
 
 'jWarrenton turnpike, and had fallen back to Manassas Junction. Eick- 
 
 'tetts bad fallen back in tbe nigbt from Tborongbfare Gap to Gainesville, 
 
 and tbeuce, in consequence of the movement of King, had retired to 
 
 Bristoe Station. 
 
 Tbus tbe way had been left open for tbe retreat of Jackson to Tbor- 
 ougbfare Gai), or for tbe advance of Longstreet from tbat point, and 
 
 (faraple-time had elapsed for tbem to effect a junction, eitber at the Gap 
 lor near Groveton, before a force could again be interposed to prevent it. 
 jThe opportunity to attack Jackson's detached force with superior num- 
 bers bad passed beyond tbe possibility of recall. 
 
 As soon as the withdrawal of King became known to General Pope, 
 he hastily sent a verbal message to General Porter to retrace his 
 steps and move towards Gainesville, and soon followed this message 
 with the following order, which was received by General Porter about 
 9.30 a. m.: 
 
 Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 
 Centreville, August 29, 1862. 
 Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, 
 upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton turni)ike. Be ex- 
 peditious or we will lose much. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-General, Commanding, 
 
 ■ Under these orders General Porter advanced promptly with his corps, 
 followed by King's division, on the direct road from Manassas Junction 
 toward Gainesville, having knowledge of tbe military situation as above 
 described. 
 
 General Porter bad met General McDowell near Manassas Junction, 
 and they bad conversed with each other relative to this order, placing 
 King's division under Porter's command. McDowell claims that it was 
 conceded tbat be might go forward and command tbe whole force, un- 
 der tbe 62d Article of War, but be desired to reunite all tbe divisions 
 of his corps on that part of the field where Eeynolds then was. Hence 
 he wrote to Pope on this subject, awaited his orders, and did not exer- 
 cise any command over Porter's corps until after tbe receipt of further 
 orders from Pope. 
 
 When, about 11.30 o'clock, the bead of Porter's column arrived at 
 Dawkins' Branch, about three and a half miles from Gainesville and 
 nine and a half miles from Thoroughfare Gap, be met tbe enemy's cav- 
 alry advance, and captured some of Longstreet's scouts. Tbe clouds 
 of dust in his front and to bis right, and extending back toward Thor- 
 oughfare Gap, showed the enemy coming in force, and already arriving 
 on the field in bis front. 
 
 Morell's division was at once deployed; Sykes closed up in support^ 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 9 
 
 King's division following. A regiment was sent forward across the* 
 creek, as skirmishers, and Butterfleld's brigade was started across the 
 creek to the front, and somewhat to the right, with orders to seize, in 
 advance of the enemy, if i)ossible, the commanding ground on the op- 
 posite ridge, about a mile distant. Morell's division, with Sykes in 
 support, was ready to advance at once to the su{)port of Butterfleld. 
 
 At this stage of Porter's operations, some time between 11.30 and 12 
 o'clock, McDowell, in person, arrived on the held and arrested the move- 
 ment Porter was making, saying to him in the hearing of several 
 1807 officers, "Porter, you are too far out. This is no place to fight 
 a battle," or words to that effect. 
 
 McDowell had received, a few minutes before, a dispatch from Buford, 
 informing him that seventeen regiments of infantry, a battery, and some 
 cavalry had i)assed through Gainesville at 8.45 o'clock, and moved down 
 the Centreville road toward Groveton, and hence must have been on the 
 field in front of Sigel and lieynolds at least two hours. 
 
 The dust in Porter's immediate front and extending across toward'' 
 Groveton, as well as back toward Gainesville, sliowed that large forces 
 of the enemy, in addition to those reported i)y Buford, were already on 
 the field. The latest inforuiation froui the Confederate army showed 
 the whole force of the enemy within reach of Gainesville by noon on the 
 29th. McDowell's troo])S (Hicketts' division and some cavalry) had de- 
 layed Long-street's advance at Thoroughfare (rap from about noon until 
 dark on the previous day, 28th. Hence, Lee's coluuin had had eighteen 
 hours by the morning of the 2!>th to close up in mass near the Gap, and 
 seven hours that moruing in which to march eight miles and form line 
 on the field of battle. 
 
 Jackson, who had been sup[)osed anxious to retreat, and for whom the 
 way had been left oi)en, had not retreated, but was still holding his posi- 
 tion of the {)revious evening, as if confident of adequate reinforcements. 
 Sigel's pursuit had been checked, where it started that morning, at 
 Groveton. 
 
 It was certain that the head of column of Lee's main army had arrived 
 on the field in front of Groveton at least two hours in advance of the ar- 
 rival of the head of column of Porter's and McDowell's corps at Dawkins' 
 Branch, and it w^as so nearly certain that the main body of Lee's army 
 was already on the field and in line of battle as to absolutely require 
 corresponding action. This was Porter's impression at the time, and 
 he conveyed it to McDowell by words and gesture that left no doubt in 
 the mind of the latter that he (Porter) believed the enemy was in force in 
 his immediate front. 
 
 In contrast to this evident preparation of the enemy for battle, only 
 Porter's nine or ten thousand men were ready for action, of the thirty 
 five thousand men then composing the left wing of the Union Army. 
 
 Banks' corps, ten thousand, was still at Bristoe without orders to move 
 beyond that point. liicketts' division, eight thousand, was near Bristoe, 
 under orders to move to the front, but his tuen were so worn out by con- 
 stant marciiing, night and day, that they could not possibly be got to 
 the field even for defensive action that day. King's division, seven thou- 
 sand, was just in rear of Porter, but was so fatigued as to be unfit for 
 offensive action, and hardly al)le to march. 
 
 Thus this long column, stretching back from Dawliins' Branch bj way 
 of Manassas Junction to and even beyond Bristoe, had struck the right 
 wing of the Confederate army in line of battle, while a gap of nearly 
 two miles retnaiaed in the Union line between Porter and Reynolds, who 
 wa^ on the left of Sigel, near Groveton. 
 
10 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTEK. 
 
 The accompanjing map, marked Board Map No. 1, illustrates the 
 positions of the Union troops at noon of August 29th, and the probable 
 positions of the Confederate troops at the same time, as indicated by 
 the information then in possession of the Union generals. This niaf) is 
 not intended to show the actual positions of the troops at that time, but 
 to correctly interpret the information upon which the Union geiierals 
 then acted. 
 
 This was the military situation on the Union left and Confederate right 
 of the tield when McDowell arrested Porters advance, and Porter's 
 1808 operations under thedirectorders from Pope heretofore mentioned 
 ceased, and, under new orders just received. Porter became sub- 
 ordinate to McDowell. 
 
 Not only had the effort to destroy Jackson before he could be rein- 
 forced totally failed, but the Confederate army was on the field and in 
 line, while the Union army was not. The time to resume defensive ac- 
 tion, awaiting the concentration of the army, had not only arrived, but 
 had been too long postponed. 
 
 On his way to the front McDowell had received the following order 
 from General Pope, addressed jointly to him and Porter, and Porter 
 had received a copy of the same order a moment before McDowell's ar- 
 rival : 
 
 [General Order No. 5. ] 
 
 Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 ' CentreviUe, August 29, ISG'i. 
 
 Generals McDowell and Porter : Yon will please move forward with your joint 
 commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that eftect an 
 hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warreutou 
 turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that as soon as commu- 
 nication is established between this force and your own the whole command shall halt. 
 It may bo necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at CentreviUe, to-night. I presume 
 It will be so on accouut of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to 
 Eicketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, 
 except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on 
 the Warrenton iiike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and 
 rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to tind out 
 w:bere General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will 
 take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to re- 
 join the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advan- 
 tages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. 
 One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from wJiich 
 they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole 
 force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by 
 to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with. 
 Heiutzelnian's corps or at this place. 
 ■,| JOHN POPE, 
 
 _;• Major-General, Commanding. 
 
 This order and the r)2d Article of War made it the duty of McDowell 
 to command the combined cor[)s, so long as they should continue to act 
 together, and General Pope should be absent from the field. In this in- 
 terpretation of the law Generals McDowell and Porter agreed, and upon 
 it they acted at the time. Upon McDowell devolved the resi)onsibilitv 
 of modifying the joint order as its terms authorized, and as the military 
 situation seemed imperatively to require. 
 
 The terms of the oider contemplating that communication shouhl be 
 established with the troops on the other road, or, as General McDowell 
 interpreted it, that line should be formed in connection with those tioojts,, 
 that the whole command should then halt, and that the troops musr not 
 go beyond a point from which they could reach Bull Run by that night 
 
 II 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 11 
 
 or the next moriiiiijr, aiul the military situation as it then appeared to 
 them, was briefly discussed by the two generals. 
 
 The situation was i'xceedin»ly critical. If the enemy shonld attack, 
 as he seemed about ready to do, Porter's two divisions, about nine thou- 
 sand men, were all the force then ready to stand between Lee's ?nain 
 army, just arrived on the tield, and McDowell's long and weary column, 
 or tiie left flank of Pope's army near Groveton. IMcDowell was " excess- 
 ively anxious" to get King's division over on the left of Keynolds, who 
 then occupied with his small division that exposed flank ; and he quickly 
 decided that "considerable advantages" were " to be gained" b^Mlepart- 
 ing from the terms of the joint order, so far as to make no attempt 
 1809 to go further toward Gainesville, and to at once foira line with the 
 troops then engaged near Groveton ; and this departure from the 
 strict letter of the joint oidcr was evidently recpiired by the military 
 situation as it then ap})eared and as it did actually exist. 
 
 After this lirief (!Onsultation the two generals rode together through 
 the woods to the right, about three (juarters of a mile toward Groveton, 
 and made u personal examination of the ground. As soon as this was 
 done. McDowell decided not to take the troops through these woods, 
 but to separate his own corps from Porter's, take King's division (Rick- 
 etts following) around the woods by the Sudley Springs road, and thus 
 l)ut them in beyond the woods and on the left of Itcynolds. 
 
 ^McDowell then leit Porter very hurriedly, announcing his decision, as 
 he testifit'd, by the words, " You put your force in here, and I will take 
 mine up the ^Sudley Si)rings road on the left of the trooi)s engaged at 
 that point against the enemy," or words to that effect. Even these few 
 words, we are satisfied, Porter did not hear, or did not undei stand, for he 
 called, as McDowell rode away, "What shall I do?" and McDowell 
 gave no audible answer, but only a w.ive of the hand. In this state of 
 uncertainty, according to the testimony of one of General Porter's staff 
 officers, Porter sent a message to King's division to ascertain positively 
 if that division was ordered away by McDowell, and, if not, to give 
 proper orders for its action with his corps, and a reply was returned by 
 McDowell himself that lie was going to the right and should take that 
 division with hiu) ; that Porter had better stay wdiere he was, ai>d it 
 necessary to fall back, he could do on McDowell's left. 
 
 This testimony has given rise to much controversy ; but, in our opin- 
 ion, the question whether that message was or was not sent is unimportant. 
 If it was sent, it did not differ in substance from the instructions which 
 General McDowell testifies he had previously given to General Porter, 
 " You put your force in here," &c. Neither could be construed as <hrect- 
 ing what Porter's action should be, but only as deciding that he should 
 continue on that line while McDowell w^ould take his own troops to an- 
 other part of the field. 
 
 There ai)[)ears to have been an understanding, derived either from 
 previous conversation or from the terms of the joint order, that when 
 McDowell did get King's division on the other side of the woods, Morell's 
 division on the right of Porter's (jorps slioidd make such conne(;tion or 
 establish such communication with that of King as might be i)racticable 
 through the woods. Notu^ of them then knew how wide was that belt 
 of woods, nor what was its (tharacter beyond where they had reonnoi- 
 tered, nor whether the ground beyond was in possession of the enemy. 
 
 When the two generals had started to take that ride to the right,, 
 Morell's troops had been ordered to follow them, and Griffin's brigade 
 had led off after its pickets had been called in. After McDowell took: 
 his departure this movement was continued for some time and until ' 
 
12 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 Griffin had crossed the railroad and reached a point near half way across 
 the belt of woods and where the forest became dense. There the move- 
 ment was arrested. This movement might have meant an attempt to 
 •stretch out Morell's line through the woods, so as to connect with King's 
 on the right, or a completion of the deployment for an attack upon the 
 ■enemy in front. General Porter explained it as intended for an imme- 
 diate attack upon the enemy if he found he could keep King in support, 
 and that he only desisted ui)on being informed that King was going 
 away. But the attack wouhl have been a rash one under the circum- 
 stances, even with King's support. Soon after this, scouts were 
 1810 sent on through the woods to look for King, Reynolds, Sigel, 
 or somebody of Union troops in the direction where artillery tir- 
 ing was heard. 
 
 Presently Griflin was withdrawn to the south side of the railroad. 
 The enemy's aitillery opened on his troops dnring this latter movement, 
 and was replied to by one of Morell's batteries, but few shots being 
 fired on either side. Then ]\Torel's division was put in defensive order 
 to hold the ground then occupied and under cover from the enemy's 
 artillery. The scouts sent tlirough the woods ran upon the enemy's 
 pickets, and were driven back. This effort to get scouts through the 
 woods was repeated frojn time to tin e until late in the atternoon, but 
 every effort failed. The scouts were all driven back or captured. As it 
 turned out, this resulted irom the fact that King's division did not get 
 up on the right of the woods at all. That division reache<l a point some 
 distance in the rear of its position in the line about 4.30 j). m., and then, 
 after some marching and countermarching, was sent northward to the 
 Warrenton pike. Thus the gap in the line which McDowell's troops 
 were to occupy renuiined open all the afternoon, and the margin of the 
 ■ timber remained in possession of the ememy's pickets. 
 
 These failures to connect or to communicate directly along the front 
 were reported by Porter to McDowell by way of the Sudley Springs 
 road, on which McDowell had gone. The reports were made in at least 
 four different written dispatches, which have been preserved. The hour 
 'Was nameil in only one, apparently the latest, sent at 6 o'clock in the 
 evening. Two reports — one about 4 o'clock and the other about 6.30 
 p. m. — were sent to General Pope direct. Both of these were received 
 *by him, but have not been preserved. 
 
 About the time General McDowell arrived on the field at Porter's po- 
 •sition, and tor an hour or two thereafter, a heavy artillery combat was 
 going on betw^eeu the Union batteries near Groveton and the Conleder- 
 <ite artillery. During this artillery combat, and until 5 o'clock p. m., 
 these was no infantry engagement, exce[)t skirmishing and some short 
 iuid siiar[) contests b.^tween small portions of the opi^osiug forces, and 
 luntil (5.30 p. ui. no musketry was audible to any one in Porter's corps. 
 
 On the Confederate side, as it now ai)pears, Porter's dis[)lay of troops 
 — three brigades in line — in the early {)art of the afternoon, had given 
 rise to the expectation of an attack on their right. 'J'his having been 
 lejtorted to General Longstreet, that eommander sent ids reserve divis- 
 ion (Wilcox's) from his extreme left, just north of the Warrenton turu- 
 I)ike, to his extreme right on the Manassas and Gainesville road. Wil- 
 } cox reached this latter position about 4 o'clock p. m., and Porter having 
 I before that time withdrawn his troops under cover, some troops from 
 the Confederate right (D. 11. Jones') were pushed to the front in the 
 woods occupied b^- Porter's skirmishers, ai)p;u'eni,ly to reconnoiter. 
 If This movement gave rise to the impression among Porter's officers 
 I (Morell's division) that the enemy was about to attack about 5 p. m. 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 13 
 
 General Pope having arrived som«^ time after nooD, on the field in 
 the rear of Groveton. and General McDowell's column a{>[)roa(;hing that 
 part of the field by the Manassas and Sadl(\y road, an attack was or- 
 dered npon the enemy's extreme left near Sndley, and a written order 
 was f-ent, dated 4.30 p. m., to Porter to attack the enemy's right, and, if 
 possible, his rear. After some time had elapsed. General Pope ordered 
 McDowell, with King's division and other tr()oi)S, to i)nrsue np the War- 
 renton turnpike the enemy, who, thus to be assailed n[)on both flanks, 
 would be compelled to retreat. 
 
 The attack on Jackson's left was begun by Kearney about 5 p. m. ; 
 but the order to Porter was not delivered in time. The messenger 
 1811 did not find General Porter until sunset. Thus, at 5 o'clock, 
 nothing having occurred to suggest to General Porter any change 
 in the plan indicated in the joint order to retire behind Bull Run in 
 stead or giving battle that day, the sound of artillery near Sudle\, so 
 much api)arently to the rear of Grovcton, suggested to Porter, who was 
 then at Bethlehem Church, that Sigel was retiring or perhaps being 
 diiven back, and that liis artillery was then in a new position near the 
 Sudley Springs road. 
 
 If it \\as true that Sigel was being driven back, the military situation! 
 was extremely perilous, and Porter must instantly do what he could to) 
 avert disaster. His order to Morell. which must have been issued atj 
 that instant, shows what he pro[)Osed to do. It is as follows, viz : 
 
 Genekal Mokell: Push over to the aid of Sigel anil strike iu his rear. If you j 
 reach a road np which Kin<r is niovinj^,* and he has got ahead of yon, let him pass; \ 
 but see if yon ca.nnot give help to Sigel, If you tind hini retiring, move back toward 
 Mauassas. and, should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Ceu- '• 
 treville. If you find the direct road tilled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to ' 
 the right as yon return. 
 
 F. .J. PORTER, 
 
 Look to the points of the compass for Manassas. 
 
 Major-General. 
 F. J. PORTER. 
 
 This movement would have left Porter with Sykes alone to hold the 
 Manassas road and cover the retreat of Ricketts' worn out troops, who 
 then were stretched along the road for four or five miles both toward 
 Sudley and back toward Manassas Junction, while Morell should cover 
 the retreat of the center of the army. But now, before Morell had time 
 to commence this movement, came a rei)ort from him that the enemy 
 was coming down in force to attack both his front and flank. Porter 
 might in a few minutes have to meet the attack of twenty thousand men. 
 The purpose to cover the retreat of Sigel must needs be abandoned. 
 Hence Porter dispatched to Moiell : 
 
 General Morell : Hold on, if yon can, to your present place. What is passing .' 
 
 F. J. PORTER. 
 
 Again — 
 
 General Mokell: Tell me what is passing quickly. If the enemy is coming, hold to 
 him and I will come up. Post your men to repulse him. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 Alajor-Gcvcral. 
 
 And again, in reply to advice from Morell that they had better retire, 
 &c. : •' We cannot retire while McDowell holds on." 
 
 Notwithstanding contradictory testimony, we believe it was at this 
 time that Porter ordered Piatt's brigade, of Sturgis' command, about 
 
 *The Sudley road. 
 
14 CASE OF FITZ JOHN POKTER. 
 
 eigbt bnncTred men, ro move back to Manassas Junction and take np a 
 deteiisive i)OSJtion to cover tlie expected retreat. 
 
 General Porter rej)(>rted to General McDowell liis views and intentions 
 in the following dispatches : 
 
 Generals McDowll and King : I found it impossible to coranjnnicate by crossing 
 tlie woods to Grovetou. The enemy are in j^reat force on this road, and as they appear 
 to have driven our foiccs back, the fire of the enemy having advanced, and ours re- 
 tired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communi- 
 cate with McDowell and Sigel, bnt my messengers have run into the enemy. They 
 have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of 
 1812 dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the col- 
 umn to see what is jiassing and how affairs are going and I will communicate- 
 wirh yon. Had von not better send your train back f 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 Major-General . 
 
 General McDowkll or King: I have been wandering over the woods and failed to 
 get a communication to yon. Tell how matters go with yon. The enemy is in strong 
 force in front of nie, and I wish to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I 
 shall have to retire tor food and water, which I cannot get here. How goes the bat- 
 tle? It seems to go to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 Major- Genera I VoUiii leers. 
 
 General McDowell: The firing on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot ad- 
 'vauce and have faileii to get over to yon, except l)y the route taken by King, I shall 
 'withdraw to Manassas. If yon have anything to communicate, please do so. -I have 
 gent many messengers to you and General Sigcl and get nothing. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 Major- General. 
 
 i An artillery duel is going on now ; been skirmishing for a long time. 
 
 F. .T. P. 
 
 General McDowell: Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about 
 the woods for a time I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery opened upon us. 
 My scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I be- 
 lieve some have been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a bat- 
 tery, but have not succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from 
 reports of scouts, think the enemy'are moving largely in that way. Please communicate 
 the way this messenger came. I have no cava'ry or messengers now. Please let me 
 know your designs, whether yon retire or not. I cannot get water and am out of provis- 
 ions. Have lost a few men from infantry firing. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 Major-General Vol idi leers. 
 Aug. 29— G p. m. 
 
 But Porter soon found the sounds of artillery had deceived him. Tlie 
 ^renewal of the tiring toward Grovetou showeil tluit Pope's troops werer 
 'still there. Piatt's brigade was then recalled, and no further prepara- 
 tions for retreat weie made. 
 
 Next came to Porter about 0.30 o'clock a report from the right that 
 the enemy was in full retreat, and heavy sounds of musketry soon after 
 showed that serious work had commenced near Grovetou. Porter or- 
 dered Morell to make a strong reconnoissance to learn the truth. Morell 
 knowing tlie report must be false, at least as to the enemy in his front, 
 prepared to support this reconnoissance with his whole division. While 
 this i»repaiatiou was lieing made came the long delayed order, dated 
 4,30 p. m., to attack the enemy in Hank or rear : 
 
 Headquarters in the Field, 
 . Aiigu8t2d—4.:]0 \).m. 
 
 ff Major-General Poktei: : Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right lltuik.. 
 // I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's tiank and, it possible, 
 7 onlu-iear kcepii).' your right in coMniiinication with General Reynolds. The enemy 
 is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage- 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. J5 
 
 their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your _ 
 right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear,, ,7 
 so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-General Commanding. 
 
 This order, though dated at 4.30 p. ra., was not received by Porter, at: 
 Bethlehem Church, before 6.30 p. m. 
 
 The evidence before the court-martial tending to show that Porter 
 received the " 4.30 " order in time to execute it is found in the testimony 
 of the oflticer who carried the order, and of oue of the orderlies wha 
 1813 accomi)anied him. Neither of these two witnesses appears to 
 have carried a watch, and their several statements of the time 
 when the order was delivered were based on estimates of the time occu- 
 pied by them in riding from General Pope's headquarters to the i>lace 
 where they found General Porter. One of them at least knew from an 
 inspection of the order that it was dated at 4.30 ; he, and probably both 
 of them, therefore assumed that it was then that they started to deliver 
 it, and adding to that hour the estimated time occupied by them, they 
 severally fixed the hour of delivery. It is now proved by the testimony 
 of the ofQcer who wrote the dispatch that "4.30" was not the hour when -. 
 the messenger started, but was the hour when he began to write tlie 
 dispatch, and consequently that it was after that hour that the ofticer 
 started to deliver it. 
 
 It is also shown that these messengers did not and could not, if otlier 
 parts of their own testimony are true, have traveled over the route which 
 they supposed they liad taken. Moreover, it w;is proved by unquestion- \ 
 able testimony that since the court-martial trial one of tliese witnesses had 
 made statements and admissions inconsistent with and contradictory of 
 his former testimony, and the other witness confessed before us that 
 recently he had deliberately made false statements in regard to the<;:^ ^ 
 route taken while carrying the dispati;)). \Ve have therefore felt com- ^^~ 
 pelled to lay the testimony of these witnesses out of the case. An at- 
 tempt was made to sui>poit these witnesses by the testimony of another 
 person who, as it was alleged, also accompanied as an orderly the of . 
 ficer charged with the dispatch, but his testimony was so completely- 
 broken down by cross-examination that we regard it as entitled to no 
 weight whatever. 
 
 On the other hand, the testimony of General Sykes, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Locke, Captain Montieth, Lieutenant Ingham, and Lieutenant Weld 
 before the court-martial, that the order in question was not delivered 
 until about sundown, either a little before or a little after that hour, has 
 now been supported by a new and entirely independent witness. Captain 
 Randol, and has been sin«iuiarly eonfliined by the production, for the 
 first time, of the dispatch from Porter to McDowell, dated p. m., the 
 terms of which utterly forbid the supi)osition that at that time Porter 
 had received the order. 
 
 The moment this order was received Porter sent his ehief of staff, Col- 
 onel Locke, to G<Mieral Morell with orders to make the attack at once.. 
 He then wrote and sent a reply to Pope, and immediately rode to the 
 front. On his arrival there Morell had about completed his preparations^ 
 for the attack under the i)revious order to make a reconnoissance, but 
 darkness had already come on. It was evidently impossible to accom- 
 plish any good that night, for, even if Morell might have begun the attack n^ 
 before dark, Sykes could not have been got into line after the order was 
 received. The contest at Groveton had already so far spent its force as 
 to derive no possible aid from Morell's attack. The order was based | 
 upon conditions manifestly erroneous and directed what was impossible j 
 
16 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 to be done. To push Morell's division against the enemy in tbe dark 
 would have been in no sense obedience to that order. Porter wiselj' 
 ordered the |»reparations to cease, and the troops were put into position 
 to pnss tlie nigiit. picketing in all directions, for Porter had but a few 
 mounted men and the enemy had two thousand five hundred cavalry 
 near his flank. 
 
 About this time, when darkness had come on, the rear of McDowell's 
 column of weary troops was passing by the rear of Porter's column, still 
 several miles from their destined placte on the held. TLie Union Army 
 Avas not even yet leady for battle. 
 
 The accompanying maps, marked. Board Maps Nos. 2 and 3, 
 
 1814 exhibit substantially the military sit^uatiou at the time the 4.30 
 
 p. m. order was issued and that which was then understood by 
 
 Geneial Po])e to exist, as explained lo the coiut-niartial upon the trial 
 
 of General Porter. 
 
 We believe this plain ami simple naiaiive of the events of the 29th of 
 Aujiust clearly shows the true character of General Porter's conduct 
 during ihat time. We are unable to find in that conduct anything sub- 
 ject to criticism, much less deserving of (^ensure or condenuiation. 
 
 Porter's duty that afternj_)Oii^ was too ])laiii and s imple t( )_a(i'JL!ltj>f dis- 
 cussion. It NvaTToTioTT' hiiT'imsition and covei-'the deploymenroT 
 McDowell's trooi)S until the latter, or some of them, should get into line; 
 then to connect with them as far as might be necessary and practicable, 
 and then, in the absence of further orders, to act in concert with those 
 troops and others to tiie right. 
 
 It King's division had come up on the right, as was expected, and had 
 advanced to attack, Porter would have known it instantly, and thus 
 could have joined in the movement. 
 
 If the main army retired, as indicated in the joint order, it was Por- 
 ter's duty to retire also, after having held his ground long enough to 
 piott ct its left flank and to cover the retreat of Kicketts' troops. 
 
 n Porter did for a moment entertain the purpose of trying to give aid to 
 Sigel, who was supposed to be retiring before McDowell had got King's 
 j^<livision up to his support. That was the nearest to making a mistake 
 [[that Porter came that afternoon. But it soon enough became evident 
 , that such a puri)0se must be abandoned : Porter had quite his full share 
 1] of responsibility where he was. 
 
 ,, The i)reparat'ions made for retreat were the ordinary soldierly disposi- 
 Ijtions to enable him to do promptly what he had good reason to expect 
 jjlie might be required to do at any moment and must do at nightfall. 
 ' He nuide frequent reports to his superiors, stating what he had done 
 I and what he had been unable to do; wluit his situation was in respect 
 to the enemy in his front and the strength of the enemy there ; what his 
 impressions'were from the sounds of action toward his right; how he 
 had tailed thus far to get any communications from an> commander in 
 the main army, or any orders'from General Pope, asking McDowell, who 
 was neatest to him, for such information and his (McDowell's) designs for 
 the nUjht; sending an aide de-camp to General Pope for orders and re- 
 ceiving no reply, not even information that the 4.30 order Inul been sent 
 to him. and, finally, informing his superiors that if left to himself, with- 
 out orders, he would have to retire at night for food and water, which 
 he could not get where he was. These reports were sent not only fre- 
 quently, but early enough to insure the receipt of orders from Pope or 
 correct information from McDowell, if they had any to send him, before 
 V it would be time for him to withdraw. All these dispatches were sent 
 , 'in the latter part of the afternoon. Tliey all indicated a purpose to re- 
 
re./ 
 
 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 17 
 
 tire ouly after being assured that the main armv was retiring, and then/ 
 to cover the retreat of tlie army as far as |>ossible, or to withdraw atterj 
 nightfall, as the joint order had indicated, if no fnrther orders or in- 
 formation of (xeneral Pope's plans conld be obtained. 
 
 There is no indication in any of those dispatches, when fairly con- 
 strued, nor in anything wLich Porter did or said, of any intention to 
 withdraw until after dark, unless compelled to do so by the retreat of, 
 the main army; and even then he was coin|)elled to hold on until 
 McDowell's troops could get out of the way, and that was not until after 
 dark, for Ricketts' division was on the road in Porter's rear all the after- 
 noon. 
 1815 It is perfectly clear that Porter had no thought whatever of re 
 treating /Vow? the enemy, or of withdrawing because of the enem 
 in his front; for when the enemy was reported advancing as if to attac 
 his orders were: '• If the enemy is coming, hold to him." " Post your 
 troops to repulse him." " We cauuot retire while McDowell holds on.'' 
 It appears to have been assumed in the condemnation of General 
 Porter's conduct that he had some order to attack or some information 
 of aggressive plans on the part of General Pope, or some intimation, 
 suggestion, or direction to that effect from General MciDowell, or that 
 there was such a battle going on within his hearing, or something else 
 in the military situation that required him to attack the enemy without i 
 orders before receiving the 4.30 p. m. order at sunset. All this was the/ r 
 exact reverse of the truth. General Pope's last order, General ^Ic-/j 
 Dowell's directions while he was with General Porter, the military situ- 
 ation as then known to both Porter and McDowell, and the movement 
 McDowell had decided to make to get his own tiooi)s into line of battle, 
 and the state of the action on the right of the held, all combined to ab- 
 solutely forbid any attack by Porter during that entire afternoon until 
 he received Pope's order at sunset, and eveu that order could uoD possi- 
 bly have been given if the situation had been correctly understood. An 
 attack by him would have been a violatio n of the spirit of bis orcTers^ 
 and a criminal l)liinder leadin^i to nieviTalTre disasfer. in snort, he haci 
 
 ^ DO choice a s ;i faithful soldier Ixit to do substantially wh at he did do 
 The range of our investigation has not rnabled us to ascertain the 
 source of the great error which was committed iu the testimony before 
 General Porter's court-martial' respecting the time of arrival of the main 
 body of Lee's army on the field of Manassas. But the information which 
 was in possession of the Union officers at noon of the 29th of August, 
 •and afterward published in their ofiicial reports, together with the tes- 
 timony before the court martial, affords clear, explicit, and convincing 
 proof that the main body of that army must have been there on the field 
 at that time. 
 
 The recent testimony of Confederate officers hardly adds anything to 
 the conclusiveness of that proof, but rather diminishes its force by show- 
 ing that one division (Anderson's) did not arrive until the next morning; 
 while the information in their possession at that time required the Union 
 officers to assume that that division as well as the others had arrived on 
 the 29th. Yet General Porter's conduct \yas adjudged upon the assump- 
 tion that not more than one division under Longstreet had arrived on 
 the field, and that Porter had no considerable force in his front. 
 
 The fact is that Longstreet, with/owr divisions of full 25,000 men, was 
 there on the field before Porter arrived with his two divisions of 9,000 
 men ; that the Confederate geueral-in-chief was there iu person at least 
 two or three hours before the commander of the Army of Virginia him-|tf 
 self arrived on the field, and that Porter, with his two divisions, saved! j 
 
18 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 tbe Army of Virginia tbat day from the disaster naturally due to the 
 enemy's earlier preparation for battle. 
 
 If the 4.30 order had been promptly <lelivered, a very grave responsi- 
 bility would have devolved upon General Porter. The order was based 
 upon conditions which were essentially erroneous, and upon expecta- 
 tions which could not possibly be realized. 
 ./; It required an attack upon the enemy's flank or rear, which could not 
 J l y>^ made , and that the attacking force keep closed on Reynolds, who w-as 
 ' far to tlie right and beyond reach. Yet it would have been too late to 
 correct the error and have the order modified. That order appeared 
 1816 to be part of a general plan. It must be executed promptly or 
 not at all. If Porter had made not the impossible attack which 
 ^vas ordered, but a direct attack upon the enemy's right wing, would he 
 have been blameless for the fruitless sacrifice of his troops? We be- 
 lieve not. It is a well established military maxim that a corps com- 
 mandtr is not justifiable in making an apparently hopeless attack in 
 obedience to an order trom a superior who is not on the spot, and who 
 , is evidently in error in respect to the essential conditions upon which 
 the order is based. The duty of the corps commander in such a case is 
 to make not a real attack, but a strong demonstration, so as to prevent 
 the enemy in his front fron- sending re-enforcen)ents to other parts of 
 his line. 
 
 JJ This is all that Porter would have been justifiable in doing, even if 
 
 / he had received the 4.30 order at 5 o'clock ; and such a demonstration, 
 
 y, or even a real attack made after 5 o'clock by Porter alone, could have 
 
 if had no beneficial effect whatever upon the general result. It would not 
 
 have diminished in the least the resistance offered to the attacks made 
 
 /at other points that atternoon. The display of troop s made by Porter 
 eailier in the atternoon had all the desired and all possi ble beneficial 
 effect. It caused Longstreei's reserve division to be sent to his extreme 
 /right in front of Porter's position. There that division remained until 
 / about (5 o'clock — too late for it to take any effective part in the opera- 
 1 tions at other points of the line. 
 
 ' I A powerful and well-sustained attack by the combined forces of Por- 
 / tei's corps and Kiny's division u{)on the enemy's right wing, if it had 
 been commenced early in the afternoon, might have drawn to that part 
 of the field so large a part of Longstreet's force as to have given Pope 
 some ciiance of success against Jackson; but an attack by Porter alone 
 could have been but an inetfective blow, destructive oidy to the force 
 that made it, and, followed by a counter-attack, disastrous to the Union 
 army. ^uch^iLiittacJitJUuder such circumstances, would have been not 
 only a grefiT blunder, but, on the part of an in telligent ofticer, it would 
 have Ween a great crime. 
 
 What General Porfei^ctually did do, although his situation was by 
 
 no means free from embarrassment and anxiety at the time, now seems 
 
 to have been only the simple, necessary action which an intelligent sol- 
 
 ; /dier had no choice but to take. It is not possible that any court-martial 
 
 //could have condemned such coiTduct if it had been correctly niiderstomtT 
 
 / On thercontrary, that conduct was obedient, subordinate, faithful, and 
 
 I /.judicious. It sav ed the Union ar my from disaster ou th e 29th of Au- 
 
 y/ gust. ~~" ' ' 
 
 /( This ends the transactions upon which were based the charges of 
 
 which General Porter was pronounced guilty ; but some account of the 
 
 part taken by him and iiis corps m tlie events of the following day, Au- 
 
 -gust 30th, which gave rise to a charge which was withdrawn, is neces- 
 
 Tsary to a full understanding of the merits of the case. 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 19 
 
 At 3 a. m. of the 30tb, Gei)eral Porter received the following order, 
 aud ill compliance with it promptly withdrew from his position in pres- 
 ence of the enemy aud marched rapidly by the Sudley road to the center 
 of the battle-tield, where he reported to General Pope for orders : 
 
 Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 
 IN THE Field near Bull Run, 
 
 August 29, 1862—8.50 p. m. 
 
 General: Immediately upon receipt of tbis order, the precise liour of receiving which 
 
 yon will acknowledge, you will marcli yonr command to the field of battle of to-day, 
 
 and report to me in person for orders. Yon are to understand that yon are ex- 
 
 1817 pected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within 
 
 three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-General Commanding. 
 Major-General F. J. Porter. 
 [Received August 30—3. 30 a. m. 1 
 
 At first sight it would appear that in this prompt aud unhesitating|{ 
 movement, under this order, General Porter committed a grave fault/ j 
 He was already on the field of battle confronting the enemy in force, 
 and holding a position of vital importance to the security of Pope's i 
 army; while the latter ai)peared, from the order, to be wholly in the [ 
 dark respecting these all-important facts. It is true the order was most 
 positive, imperative, and also distrustful in its terms. But those very 
 terms served to show only the more forcibly that the order was based 
 upon a total misapprehension of the essential facts, without which mis- 
 apprehension it would not seem possible that such an order could have 
 been issued. The well-established military rule is that such an order 
 must never be obeyed until the commander who gave it has been in- 
 formed of his error and given an opportunity to correct it ; but, upon ' 
 close examinatiorij jhe opposite view o f Porter's conduct under tliis o r- ; i 
 der appears to be the just one. 1 1 
 
 Porter had repeatedly reported to McDowell the presence of the enemy 
 in large force in his front. Presumably these reports had gone to Pope, \ 
 as one of them had in fact. Porter had also sent an aide-de-camp A 
 with a written message to Pope about 4 p. m., and had sent a written \ 
 re[)1y to the 4.30 p. m. order, after G.3() p. m. These last two dispat(;hes 
 bave not been preserved by General Pope, and litMice their contents are 
 not known to us; but we are bound to presume that they reported the \ ■% 
 situation as Porter then knew it, and as he had frequently reported it \ 
 to McDowell, and the last of these disftatches, in re[)ly to the 4.30 p. m. 
 order, was later than the latest of those in which Porter had spoken of 
 any intention to fall back. Hence, Porter had already given to his 
 superior all the information which it was i)ossible for him to give, and 
 nothing remained for him but to obey the order. This movement of 
 Porter's corps on the morning of the 30th was the beginning of the uu- il 
 fortunate operation of that day. This corps, which had been protecting jf 
 the left flank of Pope's army, was withdrawn from its important posi-ij 
 tion, leaving the left wing and flank exi)osed to attack by greatly supe- 
 rior force of the enemy, brought to the center of the field aud then 
 ordered '' in pursuit of the enemy." 
 
 SPECIAL ORDER NO.—. 
 
 Headquarters near Groveton, 
 
 August 30, 1S62— 12 m. 
 The following forces will be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy 
 and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is as- 
 signed to the command of the pursuit ; Major-General Porter's corps will push for- 
 
20 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 ward on the W.arrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals 
 King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier-General Ricketr.s will pursue the Hay 
 Market road, followed by the corps of Major-Geiieral Heintzelinan. The necessary 
 cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom reg- 
 ular and frequent reports will be made. The general headquarters will be somewhere 
 on the Warren'on turnpike. 
 
 By command of Major-General Pope : 
 
 GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
 
 Hdqrs. Third Corps, Army of Virginia, 
 
 August 30, 1S6-2. 
 Major-General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue 
 the enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immedi- 
 1818 ately by King's division, sup[)orted by Reynolds. Heiutzelman with his corps, 
 preceded by Ricketts' division, will move on your right, on the road from Sud- 
 ley Springs to Haj' Market. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, 
 which is desirable you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters 
 will be at the head of Reynolds' division, on the Warreuton road. Organize a strong 
 advance to precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until 
 you come in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered 
 to report to you ; push it well to the left as you advance. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 ED. SCHRIVER, 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
 Major General Porter, 
 
 Commanding, etc. 
 
 These orders led to an attack upou the Confederate left winji'. Jack- 
 sou's comnuiud, made tuainly by Butterfield's and Barnes' brigadi'S, of 
 Morell's division, and by iSykes' division, which is de.scribed as follows 
 by the Confederate generals : 
 
 [Extract from General Lee's report of operatious of the Array of Northern Virginia, battle of Ma- 
 nassas.] 
 
 Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia, March 6, 1863. 
 Sir : * * About 3 p. m. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of Gen- 
 eral Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed 
 forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was 
 checked, and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line, of great 
 .strength, moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy range of a 
 position a little in advance of Lougstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two bat- 
 teries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Col. S. D. Lee, 
 under their well-directed and destructive fire the supporting lines were broken and 
 fell back in confusion. Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's 
 trooj^s being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press 
 steadily forward, driving the enemy before them. He retreated in confusion, suli'er- 
 ing severely from our artillerj-, which advanced as he retiied. Geueral Longstreet, 
 anticii)ating the order for a general advance, now threw bis whole command against 
 the Federal center and left. * * * 
 
 I have the houor to be, verv respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. LEE, General. 
 Geueral S. Cooper, 
 
 Adjutant and Insjjector-General, Eiehmond, Va. 
 
 [Extract from the report of General James Longstreet, October 10, 1862.] 
 
 * * * During the day Colonel S. D. Lee with his rese've artillery placed iu the 
 position occupied the day previous by Colonel Walton, and engaged the enemy iu a 
 very severe artillery combat. The result was, as the day previous, a success. At 3.30 
 o'clock in the afternoon I rode to the front for the purpose of completing arrange- 
 ments for making a diversion iu favor of a Hank movement then under contemplation. 
 Just after reaching my front line I received a message for reiuforcemeuts for General 
 Jackson, who was said to be severely pressed. From an eminence near by, one portion 
 of the enemy's masses attacking General Jackson were immediately witliin my view 
 and in easy range of batteries in that position. It gave me an advantage that I had 
 not expected to have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 21 
 
 purpose, and oue placed in position immediately and opened. Just as this fire began 
 I received a inessajje from tbe commanding general informing me of General Jacksou'a 
 condition and his wants. As it was evident that the attack against General Jackson 
 could not be continued ten minntes under th© fire of these batteries, I made no move- 
 ment with mv troops. 
 
 *■ ■■ V # # *■ » # 
 
 [Extract from report of General Jackson of operations from August 15 to September 5, 1862.] 
 
 Headquarters Second Corps, A. N. V., April 27, 1863. 
 General: After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the 
 day, tbe Federal infantry, about 4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under 
 1819 cover of the wood and advanced in several lines, lirst engaging the right, but 
 soon extending its attack to the center and le(t. In a few moments our entire 
 line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinaiy struggle with the enemy. As one line was 
 repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if determined, by force of num- 
 bers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So im[)etnons and well sus- 
 tained were tl'cse oi sets as to induce me to send to tiie cotnmanding general for lein- 
 forceuients ; V)ut the timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet (Hi the right 
 relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelmi?ig numbers, and gave to these 
 brave men the chances of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet pressed upon the right 
 the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was 
 ordered. 
 
 T. J. JACKSON, 
 
 Lituteiiaiit-General. 
 Brigadier-General R. H. CniLTOX, 
 
 A, A. A. General, Headquarters Department A. X. V. 
 
 As Lontrstreet's army pressed forward to strike Po})e's exposed left 
 wing aud tlaiik, Warren, with iiis little brigade, sprung into the gap and 
 breasted the storm until but a liandlul of his brave men were left alive. 
 Then iSykes, with his disciplined brigades, and lieynolds with his gallant 
 Pennsylvania Reserves, seized the comnianding grcjund in rear, and, like 
 a rock, withstood the advance of the victorious enemy and saved tbe 
 U^nion Army from rtnit. 
 
 Thus did this gallant cor])S nobly and atnply vindicate the character 
 ''of their trusted cliief, ami demonstrate to all the world that " disobe- 
 dience of orders" an<l " misbehavior in the presence of the enemy" are 
 crimes which could not possiblj^ tind place in the head or heart ot^him . 
 who thus commande<l that corps. >>— ™- „....,- .„. 
 
 These events ot the 30th of August were excluded from the evidence 
 before the court-martial that tried General Pt)rter; but justice retjuires 
 that they should be mentioned here as having an important bearing 
 upon the question of animus which was so stron|?,ly dwelt u[)on in the 
 review of Porter's case by the Jtuige- Advocate-General. 
 
 The foregoing is the simple histor.s of the part taken by Porter and 
 his corps in the events which gave rise to the following charges and 
 specifications, tindiugs and sentence, and executive action : 
 
 GENERAL ORDERS NO. 18. 
 
 War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, 
 
 Wasliingtoii, January 'Z2, 1863. 
 
 I. Before a general court-martial which convened in the city of Washington, D. C, 
 November 27, ld6"2, pursuant to Special Oiders No. 3t)'i dated Headquarters of the 
 Army, November 25, I8(i2, and of which M.i.jor-Geiieral D. Hunter. U. S. Vcdunteers, 
 is president, was arraigned aud tried Majur-Geueral Fitz-Johu Porter, U. S. Volun- 
 teers. 
 
 Charge I. " Vicdation of the 9th Article of War." 
 
 Specification 1st. "In this: that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of the 
 volunteers ot tlie United States, having received a lawful order, on or about the 27th 
 August, 18(52, while at or near Warreufou Juuotion, in Virginia, from Major-General 
 John I'ope, his superior aud commanding officer, in the following figures aud letters, 
 to wit : 
 
22 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 ' Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 'August 27, 1862 — 6.30 p. m., Bristoe Station. 
 'General: The major-geueral coiumanding directs that you start at one o'clock 
 tonight and come forward with yonr whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, 
 fio as to be here hy daylight to-uiorrovv morning. Hooker has had a very severe action 
 with Ihe orieiny, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy 
 has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from 
 Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell 
 is. If Morell has not joined you, send word to him to push forward immediately; 
 also send word to Banks to liurry forward with all speed to take your place at War- 
 reuton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here l)y day- 
 light. I send an officer Mith this disjiatch, who will conduct you to this place. 
 1820 Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, proliably 
 in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the 
 railroad train to this side of Ctdar Run. If he is not with you, write him to that 
 tfiect. 
 
 ' Bv coniniaiid of !Major-General Pope. 
 
 'GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
 
 ' CoJouel and Chief of Staff. 
 'Major-General F. J. Porter, Warnnton Junction. 
 
 'P. S. — If Banks is not at ^Yarrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and 
 two pieces of artillery as a guard till he conies uji, with instructions to follow yon im- 
 mediiitely. If Banks is not at the Junction instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains 
 back to this side of Cedar Run. and post a regiment and section of artillery with it. 
 'By command of Major-General Pope. 
 
 'GEO. D. RUGGLES. 
 
 'Colonel and Chief of Staff? 
 
 Did then and there disobey the said order, being at the time iu the face of the enemy. 
 This at or near Warreuton, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 28th of August, 
 1862." 
 
 SPECiFirATiON 2d. — " In this: that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being 
 in front of the enemy, at Manassas, Virginia, on or about the morning of August 29, 
 1862, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, 
 a lawful order, in the following letters and tigurcs, to wit : 
 
 ' Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 
 ' Centrcinlle, August 29, 1862. 
 'You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I 
 sent General Porter written orders to that, etfect au hour and a half ago. Heintzel- 
 man, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not 
 ■ far from Gainesville. I desire that as soon as ccimiuunication is established between 
 this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall 
 back behind Bull Run at Ceutreville to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our 
 supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere 
 in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I .sent by his aide- 
 de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the 
 troops from here should fall on the enemy's liank and rear. I do not even know Rick- 
 etts' position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until 
 a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communi- 
 cate with General Ricketts and instruct him to join the other divisions of his corps as 
 soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from 
 this order, it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be held in view : that 
 the tioops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by 
 morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this 
 direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow niglit or the nt^xt day. 
 Mv own headfiuarters will for the present be with Heiutzelman's corps, or at this place, 
 
 'JOHN POPE, 
 * Major-General Commanding. 
 'Generals McDoweel and Porter.' 
 
 Which order the said Major-fieneral Porter did then and there disobey. Ti-is at or 
 near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 2'Jth of August, 1862." 
 
 Specification 3d. — "In this: that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, having 
 been in front of the enemy during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the '29th of Au- 
 gust, 1862, did on that day receive Irom Major-General John Pope, his superior and 
 commanding officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to wit : 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 9?. 
 
 'Headquarters in the Field, August 29, lSG-2 — 4.oO p. m. 
 'Your line of march brings yon iu on the enemy's right Hunk. I desire yon to push 
 forward into action at once on the enemy's fi;ink, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping 
 your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the 
 woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as yon engage their Hank. Keep 
 ieavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. 
 In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to yonr right and rear, so as to keep you ia 
 close communication with the right wing. 
 
 'JOHN POPE, 
 ' Major-Gentral, Coitimaudlng. 
 ■ Major-General Poirna?.' 
 
 1821 Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there disobey, and 
 did fail to push forward bis forces into action either on the enemy's liauk or rear, 
 and in all other respects did fail to obey said order. This at or near Manassas, in the 
 State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862." 
 
 Specification 4tii.— " In that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or 
 near Manassas Junction on the night of 29th Augusr, 1862, did receive from Major- 
 General John Pope, his superior and commanding oiiicer, a lawful order, iu figures and 
 words as follows, to wit : 
 
 'Headquarters Army Virginia, in the Field near Bull Run, 
 
 'Jugusl 29, 1862— 8.r)0 p. m. 
 
 'General: Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving 
 which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of 
 to-day, and report to me in i)erson for orders. You are to understand that you are ex- 
 pected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three 
 Lours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning. 
 
 'JOHN POPE, 
 ' Major- General, Commandhig. 
 ' Major-General F. J. Porter.' 
 
 And the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter did then and there disobey the said 
 order, and did permit one of the brigadiers of his command to march to Centreville — 
 out of the way of the field of battle — and there to remain during the entire day of 
 Saturday, the 30th of August. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Vir- 
 ginia, on the 29th and oOth days of August, 1862." 
 
 Specification 5th. — "In this: that the said Major General Fifz-Johu Porter, being 
 at or near Manassas Station, iu the State of Virginia, ou the night of the 29th August, 
 1862, and having received from his superior commanding officer, Major-General John 
 Pope, the lawful order set forth in specification fourth to this charge, did then and 
 there divsobey the same, and did permit one other brigade attached to his command — 
 being the brigade commanded by Brigadier-General A. S. Piatt — to march to Centre- 
 ville, and did thereby greatly delay the arrival of the said General Piatt's brigade on 
 the field of the battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 30th August, 18()2. This at or 
 near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th day of August, 1862." 
 
 Charge II. — " Violation of the 52d Article of War." 
 
 Specification 1st. — "In this: that the said Major General Fitz-John Porter, during 
 the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th August, 1862, and while withiti sight of the 
 field and in full hearing of its artillery, did receive from Major-General Joiiu Pope, 
 his superior and conmianding officer, a lawful order to attack the enemy, in the follow- 
 ing figures and letters, to wit : 
 
 ' Headquarters in the Field, August 29, 1862 — 4.30 p. m, 
 ' Your line of march brings you iu on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push 
 forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if pot^sible,on his rear, keeping 
 your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the 
 woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep 
 heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. 
 In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to ^our right and rear, so as to keep you in 
 close communication with the right wing. 
 
 'JOHN POPE, 
 ' Major-dincraJ, Coinnuniding. 
 'Major-General Portei:.' 
 
24 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there shamefully dis- 
 obey, and did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy without any attempt to en- 
 gage them, or to aid the troops who were already fighting greatly superior numbers, 
 and were relying on the flank attack he was thus ordered to make to 8^cure a decisive 
 victory and to capture the enemy's army, a result which must have followed from said 
 flank attack had it been made by the said General Porter in compliance with the said 
 order which he so shamefully disobeyed. This at or near Manassas, in the State of 
 Virginia, on or about the 29lh of August, 18G2." 
 
 Specuication '2d. — "In this: that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being 
 with his army corps on Friday, the i29th August, l.S6'2, between Manassas Station and 
 the field of battle then pending between the forces of the United States and those of 
 
 the rebels, and within sound of ihe guns and in the presence of the enemy, and 
 1822 knowing that a severe action of great conisequence was being fought, and that 
 
 the aid of his corps was greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on to the field, 
 and did shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy without any 
 attempt to give them battle, and without knowing the forces from which he shame- 
 fully retreated. This near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th of 
 Angust, 1862." 
 
 SPFX'iriCATiox 3d. — "In that the said Mnjor-Geueral Fitz-John Porter, being with 
 his army corps near the field of battle of Manassas on the 29th of August, 1862, while 
 a severe action was being fought by the troops of Major-General Pope's command, and 
 beingjn the belief that the troops of the said General Pope were sustaining defeat and. 
 retiring from th;- field, did shamefully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and gen- 
 eral, and did shamefully retreat away, and did fall back with his army to the Manassas 
 Junction, and leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army; and did fail, 
 by any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortune of a disaster 
 that would have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. This at or near 
 Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th day of August, 1862." 
 
 Specificatiox 4th. — "In this: that the said Majcu'-General Fitz-John Porter, on 
 the field of battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 3dth August, 1862, having received 
 a lawful order from his superior oliScer and commanding general, Major-General John 
 Pope, to engage the enemy's lines, and to carry a position near their centre, and to 
 take an annoying battery there posted, did proceed in the execution of that order with 
 unnecessary slowness, and by delays give the enemy opportunities to watch and know 
 his movements, and to prepare to meet his attack ; and did finally so feebly fall upon 
 the enemy's lines as to make little or no impression on the same, and did fall back and 
 draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without making any of the great personal 
 efforts to rally his troops or to keep their lines, or to inspire his troops to meet the 
 sacrifices and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of his position, and 
 the momentous consequences and disasters of a retreat at so critical a juncture of the 
 day." 
 
 To which charges and specifications the accused, Miijor-General Fitz-John Porter, 
 United States Volunteers, pleaded as follows : 
 
 To specification 1st, "Not guilty." 
 To specification 2d, "Not guilty." 
 To specification :5d, " Not guilty." 
 To specification 4lh, '• Not guilty.'' 
 To specification .5th, " Not guilry." 
 And to the charge, " Not guilty." 
 
 CHARGE II. 
 
 To specification 1st, " Not guilty." 
 To specification 2d, " Not guilty." 
 To specification 3d, " Not guilty." 
 And to the charge, " Not guilty." 
 
 The court, having maturely considered the evidence adduced, finds the accused, 
 Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of United States Volunteers, as follows: 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 25 
 
 CIIARGK T. 
 
 Of the Ist specificatiou, " Guilty.'' 
 Of the 2(1 specification, " Guilty." 
 Of the 3d specification, " Gnilty." 
 Of the 4th specification, " Not guilty." 
 Of the 5th specification, " Not guilty." 
 Of the charge, "Guilty." 
 
 Charge II. — Of the 1st specification, " Gnilty, except so much of the specification 
 as implies that he, the accused, ' did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy,' after 
 the receipt of the order set forth in said specification." Of the 2d specification, " Gnilty." 
 Of file third specification, " Guilty, except the words, ' to the Manassas Junction.' " Of 
 the charge, "Guilty." 
 
 SENTENCE. 
 
 And the court does therefore sentence him, Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of the 
 United States Volunteers, " to be cashiered, and to be forever diyf/uaJlfied from holdiny avy 
 office of trust or profit under the Government of the United states." 
 
 1823 II. In compliance with the CiSth of the Rules and Articles of War, the whole 
 proceedings of the general court-martial in the foregoing case have been trans- 
 mitted to the Secretary of War, and by him laid before the President of the United 
 States. 
 
 The following are the orders of the President : "The foregoing proceedings, findings, 
 and sentence in the foregoing case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter are approved and 
 confirmed ; and it is ordered that the said Fitz-John Porter be, and hereby is, cashiered 
 and dismissed from the service of the United States as a major-general of volunteers, 
 and as colonel and brevet brigadier-general in the regular service of the United States, 
 and forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Govern- 
 ment of the United States. 
 
 " January 21, 1863." ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 III. The general court-martial, of which Major-General Hunter is president, is hereby 
 dissolved. 
 
 By order of the Secretary of War. 
 
 L. THOMAS, JdJuiant-GeneyoL 
 Official 
 
 Assistant Adjufant-Gcnei'aJ. 
 
 These charges and specifications certainly bear no rliscern ible resem - /// 
 blance to the facts of the case as now establishe^T"Tret it has been our jl/ 
 duty to carefully comjjare with these facts the views entertained by the 
 court-martial, as shown in the findings and in the review of the case 
 which was prepared for the information of the President by the Judge- 
 Advocate General who bad conducted the prosecution, and thus to 
 clearly perceive every error into which the court-martial was led. We 
 trust it is not necessary for us to submit in detail the results of this 
 comparison, and that it will be sufticient for us to point out the funda- 
 mental errors, and to say that all the essential facts in every instance;/ 
 stand out in clear and absolute contrast to those supposed facts upon / 
 which General Porter was adjudged guilty. I' 
 
 The fun^lamental errors upon which the conviction of General Porter//} 
 depended may be summed up in few words. It Avas maintained, aud[// 
 apparently established to the satisfaction of the court-martial, that only 
 about one-half of the Confederate army was on the field of Manassas on 
 the2l)th of August, while General Lee, with the other half, was still be- 
 yond the Bull-Kun Mountains; that General Pope's army, exclusive of 
 Porter's corps, was engaged in a severe and nearly equal contest with 
 the enemy, and only needed the aid of a flank attack which Porter was 
 expected to make to insure the defeat and destruction or capture of the 
 Confederate force in their front under General Jackson ; that McDowell 
 
26 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 ami Porter, with tlieir joint forces, Porter's leading, bad advanced to- 
 wards Gainesville until the head of their cohnnn had reached a point 
 near the Warrenton turnpike, where they found a division of Conteder- 
 ate troops, "seventeen regiments," which Bnford had counted as they 
 passed through Gainesville, marching along the road across Porter's 
 front, and going toward the tield ot battle at Grovetou ; that McDowell 
 ordered Porter to at once attack that column thus moving to join Jack- 
 sou, oi- the flank and rear of the line if they had formed in line, while 
 he would take his own troops by the Sudley Springs road and throw 
 them upon the enem3''s center near Grovetou ; that Porter, McDowell 
 having then separated from him, disobeyed that order to attack, allovfed 
 that division of the enemy's troops to pass him unmolested, and then 
 fell back and retreated toward Manassas Junction ; that Porter then 
 remained in the rear all the afternoon, listening to the sounds of battle 
 and coolly contemplating a presumed defeat of his comrades on the cen- 
 ter and right of the field ; that this division of the enemy having {>assed 
 Porter's column and formed on the right of Jackson's line, near Grove- 
 ton, an order was sent to Porter to attack the right flank or rear of the 
 eneniy's line, upou which his own line of march must bring him, but that 
 ' he had willfully disobeyed, and made no attempt to execute that 
 1824 order ; that in this way was lost the opi)ortunity to destroy Jack- 
 son's detached force before the other wing of General Lee's army 
 could join it, and that this junction ha\iug been ett'ected during the 
 night of the UOth, the defeat of General Pope's army on the 30th thus 
 resulted from General Porter's neglect and disobedience. 
 
 Now, in contrast to these fundamental errors, the following all-impor- 
 tant facts are fully established : 
 
 As Porter was advancing towaid Guuesville, and while yet nearly four 
 miles from that i)lace and more than two miles from the uearest point 
 of the Warrenton turnpike, he met the right wing of the Confederate 
 army, twenty five thousand strong, which had arrived on the Held that 
 morning and was already in line of b ittle. Not being at that moment 
 quite fully informed of the enemy's movements, and being then uiuler 
 orders from Pope to push rapidly tovrard Gainesville, Porter was pressing 
 forward to attack the enemy iu his front, when M(;Dowell arrived on 
 the field with later information of the enemy, aud later and very dif- 
 foment orders from Pope, assumed the command, and arresteil Porter's 
 advance. This latter information left no room for doubt that the maia 
 body of Lee's army was already on the tielil and far iu advance of 
 Pope's army in preparation for battle. General McDowell proMH>tly de- 
 cided not to attempt to go further to the front, but to deploy his column 
 so as to form line in connection with General Pope's right wing, which, 
 was then engaged with Jackson. To do this General McDowell sepa- 
 rated his corps entirely froui General Porter's, aud thus relinquished 
 the command and all right to the command of Porter's corps. McDow- 
 ell did not give Porter any order to attack, nor did he give him any 
 order whatever to govern his action after their separation. 
 
 It does not appear from the testimony that he conveyed to General 
 Porter in any way the erroneous view of the military situation which 
 was afterward maintained before the court-martial, nor that he sug- 
 gested to General Porter any eApectation that he would make an attack. 
 On the contrary, the testimony of all the witnesses as to what was act- 
 ually said and done; the infornuition ^^hich McDowell and Porter then 
 had respecting the enemy, and the movement which McDowell decided 
 to make, and did make, with his own troops, prove conclusively that 
 there was left no room for doubt in Porter's mind that his duty was to 
 
CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 27 
 
 stand on the defensive and hold liis position until McDoweli's movement // 
 could be completed. It wonhl have indicated a great error of military// 
 iudgmeut to have done or ordered the contrary, in the situation as then// 
 tully known to both McDowell and Porter. '/ 
 
 General Po pe a])pears from his orders and from his testimony to have /// 
 been at that time wholly i^gnorant of the true situ ation. lie had disap-''' 
 ])roved of the seiuTin<]f of Rickctt s 'To~TTrorou^!italTnjrTi p to meet Long- 
 street on the 28th, lu'lieving that the main body of Lee's army conid not 
 reach the field of Manassas before the night of the oOth. Hence, he 
 sent the order to I'orter d<ited 4.30 p. m. to attack Jackson's right flank 
 or rear, 'Fortunately that order did not reach Porter until about sun- 
 set — too late for any attack to be made. Any attack w hich Porter could 
 have made at any time that afternoon must necessarily hav^e been tVuit- 
 less of any_ g:o od result . Porter's faithful, subordinate, and intelligent ^ 
 conTlu(-t t jiat^aT ferrioon sav-ed t be Unibn Army from the defeat which Ij 
 ^vould (TnTer\vi's7' I laTI '~n'?iTTTeTrTTi at day from the cncnn's more si)eedy 1 1 
 concentration. I'lic only serion.sl y'critical period of that campa ign, viz , j 
 Ix'tween 11 a. m. and Mitiset of Au gust l!l>, was t [His"sar(-Ty"p:~sse<1. Por- j 
 ter h;td undei stood and iippreciated the military situation, and, so far as 
 he had acted upon his own judgment, his action jmdjK 'en wise aiul judi 
 
 cious. For the disaster of the succeeding davTTe'was in no degree ^ 
 1825 responsible. Whoever else may have be en responsible, it did not 
 flow from any action or inaction of his. 
 
 The judgment of tiie court-martial upon (jeneral Porter's conduct was 
 evidently based upon greatly erroneous itnpressions, not only respecting 
 what that conduct really was aiul the orders under which he was acting, 
 but also respecting all the circumstances under which he acted. Espe- 
 cially was this true in respect to the cliaracter of the battle of the 29th 
 of August. That battle consisted of a number of sharp and gallant 
 combats between sn)all portions ot the opposing forces. Those combats 
 were of short duration and were separated by long intervals of simple 
 skirmishing and artillery duels. Until after G o'clock oidy a small part 
 of the troops on either side were engaged at any time during the after- 
 noon. Then, about sunset, one additional division on each side was 
 engaged near Groveton. The musketry of that last contest ami the yells 
 of the Confederate troops about dark were distinctly heard by the officers 
 of Porter's corps; but at no other time during all tliat afternoon was the 
 volume of musketry such that it could be heard at the position ol' Por- 
 ter's trooi)s. No souiul but tliat of artillery was heard l>y them during 
 all those hours when Porter was understood by the court-mai tial to have 
 been listening to the sounds of a furious battle raging immediately to 
 his right. And those sounds of artillery were by no means such as to 
 indicate a general battle. 
 
 The reports of the 29th and those of the 30th of August have some- 
 how been strangely confounded with each other. Even the Confederate 
 reports have, since the termination of the war, been similarly miscon- 
 strued. Those of the 30th have been misquoted as referring to the 20th, 
 thus to prove that a furious battle was going on while Porter wa§ com- 
 
 paratively inactive on the 29th. _lMieJi^'c^_^^V-,gallanjfc_stn 
 own troops on the obth has thus been us.«j/(rto sustaViT^il'e "ii-^" 
 "under which he was coiideMi necn Qy. i. er aPPbrfer was "," * '' 
 "demned for not having taken "a iiy partTtTE Ts own battle. Sn, ' 
 error upon which General Porter was prdiKuiiieed guTTt^■ c 
 shanu'ful crime known among soldiers. We believe not one 
 "the gallant soldiers on that bh K>i[yje'ra''was less deserving of such coi 
 <lemnation than lie. "" ~~ ' ~"^ ~ — - 
 
 i»l| 
 
 ill. 
 anioii; 
 
28 CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTEE. 
 
 The evidence of bad animus in Porter's case ceases to be material in 
 view of tlie evidence of his soldierly and faithful conduct. But it is our 
 dut> to say that the indiscreet and unkind terms in which General Por- 
 ter expressed his distrust of the capacity of his superior commander 
 cannot be defended. And to that indiscretion was due, in very great 
 measure, the misinterpretation of both his motives and his conduct and 
 his consequent condemnation. 
 
 Having thus given the reasons for our conclusions, we have the honor 
 TO report, in accordance with the President's order, that, in our opinion, 
 justice requires at his hands such action as may be necessary to annul 
 and set aside the findings and sentence of the court martial in the case 
 of Major General Fitz-John Porter, and to restore him to the positions 
 of which that sentence deprived liin) — such restoration to take effect 
 from the date of his dismissal from the service. 
 Very respectiuUy, your obedient Servants, 
 
 J. M. SCHOFIELD, 
 
 Major General U. 8. Army. 
 ALFia^D H. TERRY, 
 Brigadier- General U. iS. Army. 
 GEO. W, GETTY, 
 Ihccet Ma/or General U. S. Army. Colonel ?>'l ArfUIery.