Class. U n ^KJ 
 
 Book 1LKl(L- 
 
 CopightN" 
 
 COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 
 
TRAINED 
 CITIZEN SOLDIERY 
 
 A SOLUTION OF 
 GENERAL UPTON'S PROBLEM 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR JOHN H. PARKER, U. S. A. 
 
 Pioneer of the Machine Gun Service 
 Gold Medalist Military Service Institution 
 
 GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 MENASHA, WISCONSIN 
 
'H/42'3 
 
 Copyright 1916 
 
 by 
 
 Major John H. Parker 
 
 ^ 
 
 M ~5l3i6 
 
 PRINTED AND BOUND BY 
 
 GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY, 
 
 MENASHA, WISCONSIN 
 
 ^C1,A4'31870 
 
UPTON'S PROBLEM 
 
 "The Causes of the weakness are as follows: 
 
 First. The employment of militia and undisciplined troops 
 commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the 
 military art. 
 
 Second. Short enlistments from three months to three years, 
 instead of for or during the war. 
 
 Third. Reliance upon voluntary enlistments, instead of 
 voluntary enlistments coupled with conscription. 
 
 Fourth. The intrusion of the States in military affairs and 
 the consequent waging of all our wars on the theory that we 
 are a confederacy instead of a nation. 
 
 Fifth. Confusing volunteers with militia and surrendering 
 to the States the right to commission officers of volunteers the 
 same as officers of militia. 
 
 Sixth. The bount}^ — a national consequence of voluntary 
 enlistments. 
 
 Seventh. The failure to appreciate military education, and 
 to distribute trained officers as battalion, regimental, and 
 higher commanders in our volunteer armies. 
 
 Eighth. The want of territorial recruitment and regi- 
 mental depots. 
 
 Ninth. The want of postgraduate schools to educate our 
 officers in strategy and the higher principles of the art of war. 
 
 Tenth. The assumption of command by the Secretary of 
 War. 
 
 The main features of the proposed system are as follows: 
 
 First. In time of peace and war the military forces of the 
 country to consist of — 
 
 The Regular Army, 
 
 The National Volunteers, and 
 
 The Militia. 
 
The Regular Army in time of peace to be organized on the 
 expansive principle and in proportion to the population, not 
 to exceed one thousand in one million. 
 
 The National Volunteers to be officered and supported by 
 the Government, to be organized on the expansive principle 
 and to consist in time of peace of one battalion of two hundred 
 men to each Congressional District. 
 
 The Militia to be supported exclusively by the States and 
 as a last resort to be used only as intended by the Constitution, 
 namely, to execute the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel 
 invasions." 
 
 —From "THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED 
 STATES," by Major General Emory Upton. Introduc- 
 tion, pages xiii and xiv. 
 
 General Upton's book was written in 1880. Since that 
 time some advancement has been made in the art of war. 
 The relations of the United States to other countries have 
 also undergone some vital changes since 1880. The solu- 
 tion herein proposed takes these changes into account, 
 and eliminates to a degree the political problems that 
 would follow from adoption of Congressional Districts 
 as a basis of organization. This solution is published 
 because of conviction that its publication is a civic duty 
 incumbent upon the author as a return to his Country 
 for education at West Point, and further education at 
 
 Fort Leavenworth. 
 
 John H. Parker. 
 
TRAINED CITIZEN SOLDIERY: A MILI- 
 TARY SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED 
 
 STATES 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Failure of our Present System. 
 
 T, ^ . In round numbers the cost of our army, 
 Peace Cost . _ • , 
 
 on our present scale of pay, is about 
 
 $1,000 per man, per year. This is in time of peace, 
 with every expenditure reduced to the minimum. 
 The appropriations run about a milUon dollars for 
 every thousand soldiers, whether privates in the 
 ranks, or brigadier generals on the retired list. The 
 lowest estimates for a "first line" army to meet the 
 first shock of w^ar with a civilized enemy, is half a 
 million men. This force would at once call for a 
 half a billion dollars per year, merely on a peace 
 basis. It would call at once for one-half of the 
 total revenues of the government. 
 T|7 ^ , But the peace cost of this force is no 
 basis on which to estimate its cost in time 
 of war. Then the whole power of an equal or su- 
 perior enemy would be actively engaged in trying 
 to destroy this military machine. Horses, clothing, 
 guns, cannon, aeroplanes, artillery projectiles, the 
 most expensive material, all of which is most care- 
 fully husbanded in time of peace, would be ex- 
 pended like water in time of war. Cavalry horses 
 
2 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 may cost about $150 each. In time of peace a horse 
 is normally good for about ten years of service. In 
 time of war the destruction of horses is simply 
 frightful. In war time they are much more expen- 
 sive than in time of peace. The projectile and 
 charge of a three-inch gun may cost twenty dollars. 
 In time of peace their expenditure is limited to 
 target practice, but in a battle the only limit is the 
 number necessary to win, if enough can be procured 
 for that purpose. The same principle applies in all 
 directions. If it costs three dollars per man per 
 day to maintain the army in time of peace it would 
 be conservative to estimate three or four times that 
 cost in time of war. Ten dollars per man per day 
 would be a conservative estimate for the war cost of 
 the same force. 
 
 An Impossible No country in the world ever tried 
 Condition to finance a war on a basis of $3 per 
 
 man per day, nor anything like it. No country 
 could possibly finance a war on such a basis, not to 
 speak of ten dollars per man per day. In our coun- 
 try the military system is financed on the theory of 
 hiring military service in open competition Avith 
 other bidders for labor. It is about the same rotten 
 condition that put the throne of the Caesars on the 
 auction block of the Praetorian Guards. Any Na- 
 tional Defense founded upon that idea, bought ser- 
 vice, is bound to fail. If a country is not worth 
 fighting for, and if its citizens are not willing to 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 3 
 
 fight for it, without a thought of profit, it ought to 
 become a minor and subject country, and will do 
 SO- No country ever yet maintained itself for any 
 great length of time by hired, or mercenary mili- 
 tary service. 
 
 The Correct The truth is, that every man owes to 
 Theory his country her defense, exactly as he 
 
 owes to his mother the duty of protection and de- 
 fense. He is under both moral and legal obliga- 
 tion to do his fair share of that military service, 
 which is her ultimate defense whenever his country 
 needs his services for that purpose. If she com- 
 pensates him at all for his military service, his prop- 
 er share of it, as long as other men do their equal 
 share, such compensation is an act of grace. 
 
 But where part of the citizens of a coun- 
 ^-,. 1 . try shirk their military duty, leaving it 
 ^ all to be done by a few, then those who 
 do it are equitably entitled to reimbursement of their 
 losses incident thereto, and to pay for their time, 
 for so much military duty as they perform in excess 
 of what would be their proper share if all citizens 
 did their just share of military duty. 
 
 __ _^_ . When a nation comes to the death 
 
 The Ultimate i 4? .i t -^ j-u tit 
 
 _ - grapple 01 the L<iege or the Marne, 
 
 Duty of n 4.U • J • J 
 
 ^, . ' . nne spun theories and wire drawn 
 
 Citizenship . . o 4.- ^ • 1 
 
 ^ exemptions 01 peace time tail. 
 
 Mother Patria then expects and must compel every 
 man to do his military duty, his due and proper 
 
4 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 share of the National Defense. She has an equal 
 right to expect and to require him to make adequate 
 personal preparation in time of peace to perform 
 that duty efficiently when the occasion arrives. 
 Without suitable personal preparation the citizen 
 cannot be, nor become an efficient soldier, no matter 
 how willing he may be, nor how brave he may be. 
 Men ignorant of their duties, and of how to care 
 for themselves in campaign, are a source of weak- 
 ness, not of strength in times of emergency in war. 
 An army, in peace or in war, ^' 
 
 J' T . , nanced on the theory that the citi- 
 
 Avvlyins; the -v. j 4. j. j-u 
 
 ^ to 2;en owes a military duty to the 
 
 Correct Theory . • -..^ .n 
 
 ^ country, is a very diiierent linan- 
 
 cial proposition from one on a basis of industrial 
 competition. Our country can finance the biggest 
 army, and the biggest navy in the world, on the 
 theory that National Defense is a patriotic obhga- 
 tion, that every citizen owes as a matter of duty 
 his personal military service to the country, and 
 with that duty, as a part of it, the equal duty of 
 personal preparation in time of peace, to perform 
 his military duty in time of war efficiently. It can- 
 not finance even a "fkst line" for a modern war on 
 the basis of industrial competition, without imme- 
 diately facing a bond issue, heavy taxation, and ul- 
 timate bankruptcy. It has been twice brought to 
 bankruptcy by that system, fortunately at times 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 5 
 
 when financial disaster did not entail military disas- 
 ter; but in modern war bankruptcy means imme- 
 diate military disaster, because the material for war 
 is now so much more expensive than formerly, and 
 successful war cannot be carried on without this 
 expensive material. We can finance anything that 
 can be humanly done, if we go about it right; but 
 it is not within human power to do the impossible. 
 It is not humanly possible to conduct modern war 
 on a mercenary basis. We must return to the true 
 basis that every citizen owes personal military serv- 
 ice to his country, just as he owes the duty of de- 
 fense and protection to the mother who bore him. 
 Return to that theory, carries with it at once a solu- 
 tion of all our problems of National Defense, 
 whether financial or material or military. 
 Precedents for Universal military service was 
 
 r^T T 4. h/t'tj. the original doctrine in our 
 Obiigatory Military rr^, -t • i 
 
 g^j.^1^^ ' country. The militia laws of 
 
 1795-6, provided that every 
 able-bodied male citizen between 18 and 45 years of 
 age should be enrolled in the militia, and should re- 
 ceive annually a suitable period of military train- 
 ing. These laws went further ; it was provided that 
 every citizen should furnish his own arms and equip- 
 ment. These were prescribed by the law. The 
 period of training was not long, but the principle 
 of obligatory service was thus asserted, by the very 
 founders of our government, the very men who 
 
6 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 framed our present Constitution, and the period of 
 training was ample for the necessities of that time. 
 All men were experienced in the principal duties of 
 a soldier in those da^^s ; shooting, walking, riding on 
 horses, the care of animals, and life in the open, 
 were the daily routine of the citizen of that time. 
 The laws of that time prescribed an adequate course 
 of military training for the needs of that time, con- 
 sidering the nature of the material and personnel 
 then available. No doubt, if additional training had 
 been necessary it would have been required. The 
 routine life of the American has changed since then. 
 Hunters, pioneers, woodsmen, men used to care for 
 themselves in the life of the open, are no longer 
 available in adequate numbers for the National 
 Defense. These things, learned at that time by 
 daily experience, must now be taught. Similarly, 
 equipment has changed. It is no longer practica- 
 ble to require each citizen to furnish his own arms, 
 because militar}^ weapons are not common, are not 
 accessible to the average citizen. They are more 
 expensive. They have been standardized, and the 
 use of the standardized type is necessary in modern 
 war. 
 
 But the principle is the same. The government 
 then required every man to be enrolled, and to be 
 adequately trained for the military service. We 
 must return to this theory, whether or not we 
 actually utilize all citizens. Once we return to the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 7 
 
 theory and practice of the Founders of the Republic 
 we can finance the National Defense, and due 
 preparation therefor, without even inconvenience 
 to our industries; even with positive benefit to 
 them. 
 
 We must return to that theory mi- 
 Remits of the j^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ National humilia- 
 Present System ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^1^.^^^^ humiliated 
 
 as a nation. American commerce is unsafe upon 
 the high seas. American industries are being as- 
 sailed insidiousty even at home. American lives are 
 not protected on sea or land by our flag. American 
 Citizens traveling on legitimate business or pleas- 
 ure, or engaged in legitimate business in other coun- 
 tries that was initiated, as in Mexico, with full con- 
 sent of the country of its location, have been plund- 
 ered, outraged by wanton lust, and murdered by 
 cruel violence. Our present system not only does 
 not protect them, but renders it impossible for the 
 government to protect them. Even our soldiers, 
 engaged in peacable protection of our own citizens 
 within our own territory, have been shot down by 
 lawless bandits, under the eyes of their own officers, 
 who were restrained by orders from protecting them, 
 because our country is not prepared even to chastise 
 a lawless bandit, with a corporal's guard of follow- 
 ing. 
 
 A nation that cannot, or dare not, command the 
 respect of its neighbors for its innocent citizens. 
 
8 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 residing or traveling abroad on legitimate busi- 
 ness or pleasure, that cannot, or dare not, resent 
 the assassination of its own soldiers, who are operat- 
 ing under lawful orders, will soon cease to command 
 the loyalty or respect of its citizens at home as well 
 as of its enemies. 
 
 It is thereby doubly and justly humiliated, both 
 at home and abroad. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 A New System. 
 
 _, .^-ryi O^i^ present system has bankrupt- 
 Specific Faults -, . , 4. j. • j u j 
 
 2 ' ed the country twice, and would do 
 
 of our 
 
 so again in a single year of mod- 
 
 V resent System t*. 4* ^v 
 
 ^ ern war. Its laults are: 
 
 1. Irresponsible expenditures by 48 different 
 states in time of war, to be eventually paid by the 
 Federal Government. 
 
 This one fault is suicidal. It is the worst fault, 
 and an ineradicable fault, of the militia system. 
 That system must therefore be abandoned, except 
 for its constitutional piu'poses. All attempts to 
 "federalize" the militia must fail, because of this 
 fault, which is inherent in the militia system. 
 
 2. Dual control of military forces. War cannot 
 be made with divided control. The militia and 
 "State Volunteer" system carries dual control, part- 
 ly by state authority and partly by federal author- 
 ity, by virtue of the limited constitutional author- 
 ity under which such forces are organized. They 
 are raised and officered by the states, and operated 
 partly under state and partly under federal author- 
 ity. They can be used only for three specific pur- 
 poses mentioned in the Constitution. Such a force 
 can hardly be classed as a military force at all in 
 the proper sense of that expression. Such a force 
 
10 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 may have uses; but such uses will not be found on 
 battlefields like those on which the fate of France, 
 Belgium and England are now being decided. 
 
 3. An impossibly high rate of pay and allowance 
 for any war force. This has grown up under a 
 system of volunteer service, in which men have to 
 be secured in competition with the industrial activi- 
 ties of the nation. 
 
 The officer or man who permanently gives up 
 civil occupations is fairly entitled to such compen- 
 sation as will enable him to live decently. In all 
 my acquaintance in the army, extending over a 
 period of nearly 30 years, I know of only one officer 
 who has saved any considerable sum of money. 
 
 The pay of these officers and men is not 
 j^ I too high for the service they render, in 
 consideration of what they have given up 
 to render that service. If anything it is too little to 
 enable them to live as they are required to live and 
 to also make any sort of provision for the future. 
 The mistake is in fixing the pay and allowances of 
 a war force, a temporary force, on the same basis. 
 It is a mistake to say that the man who renders a 
 temporary service is rendering the same service as 
 the one permanently on the job, even though the 
 temporary man may seem at any moment to be per- 
 forming the same duty as the permanent man. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 11 
 
 Th M'Vf Both in peace and in war, every man 
 ^7 . 7 owes military service to his country. 
 
 He owes his proper share of that 
 duty, which would he the amount of military duty 
 one man would do if all were doing their proper 
 share. Those in the United States who do not wish 
 to perform this duty have been permitted for many 
 years to shirk its performance, and the government 
 has hired a few to do what all should have done. The 
 military shirk paid what taxes he could not evade, 
 and that has been his share. The few have paid 
 their equal share of the taxes, and have performed 
 their own military duty, and have also performed 
 the share that was due from all those who have 
 avoided military duty, who have not cared to volun- 
 teer for the military training which, alone, can fit 
 any man to do his military duty efficiently. 
 
 In time of war, it is the nation's right, its only 
 means of self preservation, to compel the peace- 
 time shirk to perform his military duty in person. 
 The shirk does not thereby earn one cent of pay, 
 nor a stiver of allowances; he is merely paying in 
 this way a solemn, patriotic obligation which he 
 owes to his country. Whatever pay or allowances 
 he receives, come from the bounty and generosity 
 of his country, not as a matter of right or wages. 
 
 Furthermore, since the progress of the art of war 
 necessitates much preparatory training that cannot 
 be given after war is imminent, in order that this 
 
12 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 military duty may be efficiently performed the coun- 
 try has an equal right to require that every citizen 
 take this necessary preparatory training in time of 
 peace, and the nation incurs no obligation by such 
 training to pay that citizen a cent. The nation merely 
 collects what is due to it. The personal perform- 
 ance of a military obligation, equally incumbent 
 upon all is required as an indispensable means of 
 National Self Defense. Thus far, no obligation to 
 pay anybody a cent has been incurred by the nation. 
 
 But for its permanent corps of military instruct- 
 ors, who not only perform all their personal mili- 
 tary duty, but also give up all other vocations and 
 dedicate themselves solely to this, adequate pay is 
 due. They earn it. 
 
 When the problem of financing the National 
 Defense, is approached from this basis, it is capable 
 of solution, and from no other. Germany, France, 
 Argentina and Switzerland, have solved it on this 
 basis. Three of these countries are republics; so it 
 is idle to say that there is any difficulty inherent in a 
 republican form of government. 
 
 . In the United States, the power to pro- 
 ^ . vide for the National Defense is vested 
 
 ^ in the Congress, by the words "Con- 
 gress shall have power to levy and maintain armies." 
 This power is limited by the provision that no ap- 
 propriation for this purpose shall run longer than 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 13 
 
 two years, the legislative life of the representatives 
 who initiate the expense. 
 
 The power is ample. It is practically unlimited, 
 or limited only by the necessities of the case and the 
 will of the people. In the beginning of our present 
 form of government, is was exerted by the Congress 
 under the militia clause of the Constitution, but in 
 every crisis, where the peril to the nation has justi- 
 fied it Congress has exercised the power to go direct 
 to the people, without the intervention of the several 
 states, under the more general authority above 
 quoted. Thus in 1863, after the "State Volunteers" 
 and militia systems broke down, draft laws were 
 enacted; and in 1899, "Federal Volunteers" were 
 authorized to meet the emergency in the Philip- 
 pine Islands. 
 
 The power of Congress to enact effective laws 
 on this subject is unquestioned. A crisis has arrived 
 in our national life, when it is absolutely necessary 
 that this power be exercised effectively, and at once. 
 Failure to do so, will insure worse national humilia- 
 tion than our country has yet suffered, just as soon 
 as the victor of the present clash in Europe shall 
 emerge ready and eager to reimburse its losses at 
 the expense of our rich and defenseless country. 
 Who can doubt that the powers which have plunged 
 half the world into war's red ruin, will be as ready 
 to pillage our rich cities as they have been to dis- 
 regard all the solemn treaties which were negotiated 
 
14 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 to prevent just what is now happening in Europe? 
 Our only safety as a nation lies in timely prepara- 
 tion, not for aggression, but for self defense, and 
 the time to make that preparation is all too short if 
 the very next Congress were to enact the necessary 
 laws in the first week of its session. 
 
 This is no time for "pork barrel" appropriations, 
 nor for "political trading" for partisan advantage. 
 The public man who advocates the unnecessaiy ex- 
 penditure of a dollar of public funds, the appoint- 
 ment of a single incompetent officer as a trade for 
 his support of the bill, the delay of a single day, is 
 a traitor worse than Benedict Arnold. History 
 will pillory every such politician for public execra- 
 tion ; but it will glorify every statesman who helps 
 at this crisis, while there is yet time enough to save 
 the nation, to initiate the only system that can pos- 
 sibly be effective. 
 
 _, , TTr-77 I have studied with much care the 
 Plans that Will i n .u /-( i ox ^ x. 
 
 plans 01 the General htaiT, as pub- 
 lished in 1912, and have found 
 much therein of great assistance in developing a 
 satisfactory plan. Much of the reasoning in that 
 pamphlet is sound ; many of the deductions are cor- 
 rect ; but the plan does not work out on an adequate 
 scale, nor go sufficiently into detail, to be workable 
 as it stands. 
 
 I have studied the newspaper accounts of the 
 Continental Army, to be proposed to the next Con- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 15 
 
 gress, and have seen its two vital defects, either of 
 which will prevent it from accomplishing the de- 
 sired result as far as National Defense is concerned. 
 These two defects are ; 
 
 1. It depends entirely upon voluntary enroll- 
 ment for the Continental Army, and does not offer 
 any adequate inducement for such enrollment. A 
 plan that does not insure the necessary enrollment 
 is bound to fail. 
 
 2. It proposes to run the war establishment upon 
 the same basis of pay and allowances that has been 
 established for the small regular army in time of 
 peace, as a measure of necessity in order to secure 
 voluntary enlistments in competition with the in- 
 dustries of the country. Such a scale of expenses 
 would bankrupt the country in six months, and the 
 national defense v/ould fail, just as surely through 
 bankruptcy as it would through defeat in the field. 
 
 Other serious defects need not be mentioned, and 
 there are many of them. As a political measure for 
 the purpose of capturing votes in the next election, 
 it has many elements of strength; but with two 
 capital defects, either of which would cause the plan 
 to break down utterly in case of war, there is no 
 need for further comment. 
 
 _^ _, _ _ The very fundamental con- 
 
 The Fundamental -,... o i j.t. o. -n 
 
 _, _. . _. . _ dition oi anv plan that will 
 
 Conditicm: Financial . ^ - , 
 
 _ . 7 .7. promise success is to so ar- 
 
 Practicability xu ^ • i -j ^ -a. 
 
 ^ range the nnancial side 01 it 
 
 as to make the burden of National Defense in war 
 
16 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 with a civilized power supportable. It would not be 
 supportable under the present system, nor under 
 the proposed "Continental Army." Successful de- 
 fense must safeguard the nation from financial ex- 
 haustion; for that would bring defeat just as surely 
 as failure in battle. No system based on competi- 
 tion with industrial activities to secure men can be 
 successful. Any such system must attract men by 
 pay, and bounties, and allowances. Such expense 
 will be absolutely ruinous in modern war; it was 
 ruinous in the Revolutionary War, and it brought 
 national bankruptcy in the Civil War. It remains 
 to indicate a system in accord with American Insti- 
 tutions, that will not do this; one that can be sup- 
 ported by the minister, the peace advocate, the 
 mother, the teacher, as well as by the military man ; 
 one that cannot be possibly used for an aggressive 
 war, but that will insure the very strongest possible 
 development of our resources in the very shortest 
 time, at the very least expense, if we should ever be 
 compelled to fight a defensive war against wanton 
 aggression by a predatory power. 
 
 Classification : Men called to the military serv- 
 ice will necessarily be of two classes : 
 
 1. Permanent personnel, the few required for 
 permanent organization; a professional nucleus. 
 
 2. Transient personnel, the many required in 
 emergencies, when the very life of the nation is at 
 stake. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 17 
 
 The permanent personnel, will give up all civil 
 opportunities and their life career will be military. 
 They will perform more than their normal share 
 of military duty, and sacrifice more than their nor- 
 mal share of comfort, prosperity and liberty of 
 action, during the whole of their active life. Their 
 compensation will have to be fixed high enough 
 in money and in other military inducements to 
 attract to this profession competent men. The 
 military profession now embraces the technic 
 of all other professions in order to attain reasonable 
 proficiency. More than in any other art, the Master 
 of the Military Art, must be master of all arts ; for 
 in his profession he will have occasion to use all of 
 them. For the few commissioned officers of this 
 small permanent personnel, we need men of first- 
 rate ability, men of broad mind, of large and prac- 
 tical ideas, who know how to do anything. 
 
 On the other hand, we do occasionally get men 
 of first-rate ability, the peers of Edison, Ford, Deer- 
 ing, John Hays Hammond; but we get very few 
 of them because the inducements offered, will not 
 hold such men. It is not the pay, but the lack of 
 opportunity to rise in the profession, according to 
 their work and their merits, that prevents such men 
 from accepting a military career. Where rank is 
 not reached by longevity in the army, it is reached 
 by sheer favor in most cases. The mere fact 
 
18 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 that we are still groping in the dark for a suitable 
 military system for our country attests the point. 
 
 The necessary inducements must be something 
 more than mere pay ; they must include some sort of 
 a system, by which men of first-rate abihty will have 
 assurance of an opportunity to get forward in the 
 military profession to positions commensurate with 
 their ability and work. The issue involved is bigger 
 than the interests of any man, or class of men ; it is 
 one that is vital to the nation, because men of first- 
 rate ability are needed in the military service, both 
 in peace and in war, and needed as directors; more 
 needed, perhaps, in peace than in time of war. Op- 
 portunity to work and to get forward is what such 
 men demand. They will not stay in a profession 
 that denies them this opportunity. Therefore, 
 "seniority promotion" will have to be modified 
 enough, in some way, to permit such men to get 
 forward into the directive positions. 
 
 The army pay is ample, as it now is, without any 
 increase, and is not excessive for the small perma- 
 nent personnel. The necessary modification of the 
 system of promotion will be proposed later in this 
 study. 
 
 rr, . , The transient personnel assumes the 
 Transient , ^ ^ i-i- ^ i a. 
 
 -r> 7 character oi a soldier lor only tempor- 
 
 IT er Sonne L 
 
 ary service; long enough, in time of 
 
 peace to learn the essential elements of the military 
 
 art necessary for them to know, and in time of war, 
 
 long enough to restore peace. They do not give up 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 19 
 
 the opportunity of civil life; on the contrary, their 
 military service is frequently of aid to them in civil 
 life through the associations formed by them in 
 their military service. They render to their coun- 
 try only their minimum military obligation. They 
 are not by that service entitled to receive a cent of 
 pay. They are only discharging an obligation due 
 from them to the nation, in return for all the in- 
 calculable benefits conferred upon them, by the free 
 and civilized institutions to which they were born. 
 They do this in order to preserve those institutions, 
 and those benefits for themselves and their pos- 
 terity. So long as the burden of personal military 
 service is shared equally by all citizens, no compen- 
 sation is due to any of them for it. National safety 
 cannot be assured on any other basis ; and, moreover, 
 this basis is right and just to all. 
 
 In our country, however, the number of 
 
 Voluntary ... -i ^^ n -t. • • 
 
 _, . ^ citizens available lor military service is 
 
 Service i . .u j.u u 
 
 so much greater than the number re- 
 quired for it, and our traditions in favor of volun- 
 tary service are so strong, that since some sort of 
 system for the selection of the men for military 
 service is necessary, a system is preferable by which 
 an adequate number of voluntary applicants can 
 be secured, thereby exempting the great mass of 
 our citizenship from active mihtary service, except 
 in great emergencies. A system of voluntary mili- 
 tary service is preferable for us, provided it be 
 
20 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 within the financial reach of the country, and gives 
 adequate insurance against the predatory tenden- 
 cies of possible enemies. A system that will facili- 
 tate such voluntary service, while still reserving the 
 right and asserting the authority of the nation to 
 enforce obligatory military service when necessary, 
 is preferable to conscription, and the country can 
 well afford to incur a reasonable expense to institute 
 such a system. 
 
 ^. o ^r-T The best judgment of our ablest 
 
 Size of Military .... ,. . 
 
 ' T^ 7. military men agrees that we 
 
 Insurance Policy , 1 -i ui -t» • 
 
 "^ must make available lor imme- 
 diate action, at all times a trained force of about 
 500,000 men. This force must be trained, equipped, 
 organized in time of peace, and ready for instant 
 action; but need not necessarily be separated from 
 industrial activity until the occasion for its use ar- 
 rives, if any way can be found for its training and 
 organization consistent with normal industrial ac- 
 tivity of its members. The best military men we 
 have are agreed that such a force would be an ade- 
 quate insurance against war; would probably pre- 
 vent war from ever being made upon our country, 
 by any other country or group of countries. 
 
 The Permanent Personnel can be a part of this 
 force, and it can be utilized in training the remainder 
 of this force. Sound considerations of economy 
 require that the permanent personnel should be used 
 in both these ways, as far as practicable. The per- 
 manent personnel would thus have two functions. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 21 
 
 1. Ordinary military service in time of peace; a 
 sort of police duty. 
 
 2. The work of a great Training School for 
 Minute Men, in which the rest of our emergency 
 forces shall be shaped up and organized for instant 
 action in peace time. 
 
 The regular army has never been used as such a 
 training school in the past. The training school 
 for war, in all our past wars, has been the school of 
 War, the most expensive possible school for such 
 training. Always the most expensive school of 
 training, under modern conditions it is also the least 
 efficient, and is sure to lead to disaster. Trained 
 troops can be met successfully by none but troops 
 equally well trained, and the great peril before our 
 country at present is that it will be overwhelmed by 
 the European Victor, with tremendous numbers of 
 the best trained veterans of the greatest war in 
 history. So many grievances against our country 
 are being nursed by all the contestants, and so rich 
 is the prize that awaits the aggression of the victor, 
 that there can be no doubt of the pretext nor of the 
 peril. It is useless to discuss the subject with any- 
 one who cannot see, or will not admit these facts. 
 No appeal can be made to such intelligence. The 
 appeal to save our country by timely military prepa- 
 ration, if there yet be time, is to those who can 
 see the peril, and are willing to do what is possible 
 to avoid its effects. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 Preliminary Data for Estimates of Cost. 
 
 In order to make any intelligent esti- 
 mate of the cost of adequate prepa- 
 ^^ . ration two things must be determined; 
 
 1. Size and cost of Permanent Per- 
 sonnel. 
 
 2. Size and cost of War Force thought neces- 
 sary. 
 
 It would be well for purpose of comparison to 
 have also an idea of the present cost of our existing 
 system of unpreparedness. The cost of the regular 
 army, proper, is about one hundred millions per 
 3^ear. To this must be added the pension list of the 
 Civil War, a direct tax upon unpreparedness, of 
 about a hundred and forty millions per year. The 
 total cost of the present system, therefore, is very 
 nearly a quarter of a billion dollars per year. 
 
 The pension list of the Civil War is now declin- 
 ing, and its annual decrease might be diverted to 
 military preparation for the future without in any 
 way increasing the military burdens of the country. 
 No better monument to the veterans who saved the 
 nation could be made than to erect a bulwark of 
 safety to protect the future of that nation. In ten 
 years from now, in all probability, the decrease in 
 their pension roll will amount to a hundred milhons 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 23 
 
 per year. Hence any plan that would give us an 
 adequate military system at a cost of less than a 
 hundred millions per year can be put through with- 
 out entailing any increase whatever in military 
 expenses. 
 
 I would not decrease the allowances made to the 
 men of 1865 by a dollar. All honor to them. The 
 most distinguished chapter in American History is 
 that which records the substantial generosity ex- 
 tended to them in their time of need by the nation 
 they saved from disunion. But I would look to 
 the future and as their account is diminished by the 
 toll of time I would divert the saving thus made into 
 the creation of a permanent insurance of the Na- 
 tional Safety, a monument in their honor and to 
 their memory, in the form of a system of National 
 Defense that shall forever safeguard what they 
 fought for. 
 
 ... The size of the Permanent Per- 
 
 Divisions of the i -, -i •. 
 
 ' sonnel depends upon its uses. 
 
 Permanent rr*, .1 
 
 1 hese are three : 
 
 Personnel ^ ^ Training School for Na- 
 
 tional Defense. 
 
 2. An Expeditionary Force. 
 
 3. An Oversea Force. 
 
 These three elements of the permanent military 
 establishment are worthy of further discussion. 
 
24 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 _. . . - _ Such a Training School should 
 
 Divisions of the i . r. 
 
 . . ' cover every necessary element oi 
 
 ^ National Defense on the American 
 
 continent. It would necessarily be 
 divided into groups which would specialize upon 
 appropriate subjects, coast defense, mobile artil- 
 lery, machine gun development and service, aero 
 service, infantry, cavalry, signal service, sanitation, 
 and so on, would all be provided for, each in its due 
 proportion. We have already nucleii for nearly 
 all these groups. Each group nucleus would not 
 merely keep abreast of world development in its 
 specialty, but would also be charged with the de- 
 velopment, education, training and mobilization of 
 the complete force of that special unit required at 
 any time by the circumstances. 
 
 For example, the infantry group of 
 
 _, ' the training school would each year re- 
 
 Component • • . . • j • .i 
 
 ^ ceive, instruct, equip and organize, the 
 
 men destined to the infantry service in 
 case of war, and would mobilize these men whenever 
 directed to do so by proper authority. In like 
 manner the coast defense component, the aero com- 
 ponent, and each other component of the training 
 school, would receive, instruct, equip, organize, 
 mobilize when so ordered, and demobilize upon ex- 
 piration of service, the troops destined to service in 
 that specialty. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 25 
 
 Over all these complex opera- 
 Directorate of ^.^^^^ ^^^^ .^ p^^^^ ^^^ -^ ^^^^ 
 
 Training; ^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ..pj^^ Generals' Staff," a 
 T/i^ Generals ^^^^^^ ^^ technical military experts, 
 
 ^^ whose proper function is to assist 
 
 commanders in the formulation of orders for and 
 execution of military operations. The organiza- 
 tion and duties assigned to our general staff by 
 Secretary Root remain substantially unchanged. 
 They converted this body into an advisory council, 
 split up into committees and subcommittees, devoid 
 of responsibility, functioning in such a manner that 
 no one can be held responsible for mistakes in any- 
 thing it does. The very nature of military deci- 
 sions requires individual responsibility. This we 
 have not, and never have had, under the present or- 
 ganization, which is more noted for an elaborate 
 system of "passing the buck" than for any other 
 peculiarity. 
 
 Possibly the system adopted for the organization 
 of what we now call "The General Staff" was a 
 reflex of the routine method of passing responsibil- 
 ity that has been in vogue so long in the army ; pos- 
 sibly it was due to the fact that the whole subject 
 was new; as new to the officers of our service as it 
 was to Secretary Root. The Secretary took counsel 
 with the best available officers, notably with General 
 W. H. Carter, and no doubt he did the best that 
 could be done at that time; but the responsibility 
 
26 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 was his, and the defects of organization are justly 
 chargeable to him as well. No one will dispute that 
 a high level of excellence has been maintained in the 
 personnel of that body, but many may doubt 
 whether or not the results of their work have justi- 
 fied its existence as such a body. We are not per- 
 ceptibly nearer to a satisfactory state of National 
 Defense as a result of their efforts, but as a result 
 of a great public awakening of interest in the sub- 
 ject. This has been due primarily to an unselfish 
 campaign for publicity as to the needs of the nation 
 by certain army officers, who have paid the expenses 
 of that campaign out of their own pockets, and 
 secondarily to the events of the last year in other 
 countries by which Americans have been compelled 
 to take stock of their military resources. 
 
 _, .Be that as it may, in the sound or- 
 
 CJorrect its • • 
 
 ganization of our military resources 
 
 ' that should now be made, all known de- 
 
 fects should be corrected. Experience has de- 
 veloped them; observation of the working of "The 
 Generals' Staff" in other countries has furnished 
 a better conception of its correct organization and 
 use; advantage should be taken of these elements 
 of progress. It is properly a body of tactical ex- 
 perts, and should never be treated as anything else. 
 Let us make a plan that will insure competent 
 commanders, with picked "Generals' Staffs," and 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 27 
 
 will fix responsibility beyond the power of any man 
 to evade it. 
 
 Xow, with a conception first of the 
 The General ^^^^j ^^^,^^ ^^^^ should be prepared in 
 
 ^ time of peace for instant mobilization 
 
 ( 500,000 ) , and second of the part to be played by 
 the Permanent Personnel in this work under the 
 supervision of the "Generals' Staff," one element of 
 the problem is outlined and we may consider other 
 phases of it. 
 
 . ^ . A contractor estimating for the 
 
 Analogy of ^ i 4. • i j.- j 
 
 _, ^^ ' labor, materials, time and expense re- 
 ft Contractor . , • , i , . , 
 
 quired on any job, would consider 
 
 what he has to do, the available materials, and what 
 personnel he can command, in order to reach an 
 estimate of the time and the expense. We who 
 have been educated for that purpose by the Govern- 
 ment, who have been especially trained for the 
 military service of the country, and who have had 
 long experience in military work, may be regarded 
 as the expert estimators and overseers who are em- 
 ployed on this job by the Congress, as Contractor 
 for the National Defense for the American People. 
 Our work should be to make the necessary estimates, 
 and then to superintend the performance of the con- 
 tract. As such, we have now estimated for 500,000 
 men, the trainers to constitute a permanent gang of 
 workmen. This Permanent Personnel will have 
 two other jobs in addition to the training of the 
 
28 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 500,000 of which they will form a part. Before we 
 can determine the size of the Permanent Personnel 
 we must consider, therefore, the other two jobs that 
 will be assigned to it, in order to make an intelligent 
 estimate of the size of the permanent gang of work- 
 men. That is exactly the way any contractor 
 wovild approach a job. He would first determine 
 the size of his permanent gang, then how many 
 temporary employees he would need in the execu- 
 tion of his contract. With this data he could figure 
 out the size of his weekly pay roll. 
 
 ^_ ^_ Training of both permanent and tran- 
 
 The Three . . i j 4. i? 
 
 _ , - _ sient personnel, and arrangements lor 
 
 Jobs of the .1 ^• I? •^'^. 
 
 _ ' the necessary supplies lor military 
 
 Fermanent .. n .i u i ^ 
 
 operations lor the whole lorce on a war 
 
 basis, is the first of the tasks for the 
 permanent personnel. Its second task is the defense 
 of those oversea possessions which, unless we have a 
 ISTavy big enough to command both the Atlantic and 
 the Pacific Oceans, cannot be reinforced after war 
 becomes imminent. Their defense must therefore 
 be provided for in time of peace, and by the perma- 
 nent personnel, since it will be impossible to count 
 on utilizing the transient personnel for that purpose. 
 The third task is to create and to maintain an expe- 
 ditionary force of adequate size for necessary uses. 
 The relief of the liCgation in Pekin, and the Oc- 
 cupation of Vera Cruz, and the Texas Division 
 which has been under field orders now four years, 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 29 
 
 illustrate both the necessity and the solution of this 
 part of the task. 
 
 Colonial defense and expeditionary duty are 
 legitimate activities of the army which cannot be 
 performed by transient personnel. In the nature 
 of the case, since military responsibility terminates 
 with discharge from the military service, a tempor- 
 ary personnel is not suitable for employment on 
 work of these classes. The case of Captain 
 Brownell, brought to public notice in 1902 during 
 the investigation of the conduct of the war in the 
 Philippine Islands, illustrates one vital objection 
 to the employment of temporary forces for that 
 class of v."ork ; and the refusal of the militia of New 
 York state to cross to Queenstown in support of the 
 attack on that place in 1812 illuminates another 
 vital objection. With two vital objections it is not 
 worth while to discuss the use of transient personnel 
 for either of these purposes. These forces must be 
 part of the Permanent Personnel; and in addition 
 it must also comprise whatever number is necessary 
 to act as instructors for the Transient Personnel. 
 
 . When our estimate has been 
 
 Estimates for -, 4.1, i, • i? 
 
 _ ' prepared on the basis 01 our pres- 
 
 Permanent 4. • 4. 4.- i a a j.- 
 
 _ _ ent mternational and domestic 
 
 Personnel; i.t 4.- j 1, u 4.- 
 
 _ .77 obligations, and when such esti- 
 
 Do we include , \^ 4? x.\ r^ 
 
 _, ._. . mate comes beiore the Congress 
 
 the Philipvines? n -. • i 4.- -4. -n i. n 
 
 ^ ^ lor its consideration, it will be well 
 
 within the scope of congressional action to decide 
 
30 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 whether, in view of the additional cost, it is worth 
 while to defend that country which, if its represen- 
 tatives are to be believed sincere, is clamoring for 
 the chance to defend itself. It may be well to con- 
 sider whether or not our country should get rid of 
 an outlying dependency not worth from any stand- 
 point the cost of its defense, and that shows no 
 gratitude or appreciation for the advancement in 
 education, in manufactures, in roads, and in liberty 
 of speech and publication, that have been given to 
 its people under American Sovereignty. 
 
 Indeed, it is necessary that the question should be 
 considered whether or not its defense shall be in- 
 cluded, in order to make any intelligent estimate of 
 the Permanent Personnel required by our country 
 for its own defense ; for the outlying dependency is 
 a source of great weakness if considered from a 
 purely defensive point of view, but can be made an 
 element of great strength in case an "offensive de- 
 fensive" is contemplated. There are two ways of 
 conducting a defense. One is to sit still, await at- 
 tack, and let our own country bear the brunt of the 
 war. The other is to "Carry the war into Africa," 
 assail the enemy in his most vulnerable points, and 
 make his own people endure some of the hardships 
 of war. The Philippines can be made an element 
 of great strength in case our country should ever be 
 engaged in war with any Power that has Oriental 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 31 
 
 Possessions, provided our defense shall include of- 
 fensive action against such enemy. 
 
 It is not merely whether the Philippines are 
 worth to our country the cost of their defense, but 
 also whether or not there exists any constitutional 
 authority in our government, except the treaty mak- 
 ing power, by which their defense can be neglected. 
 The oath to support the constitution and execute 
 the laws of the United States, which is taken by 
 every member of the army from the President down 
 to the latest recruit, makes no exception of any part 
 of the territory of our country over which the Flag 
 legitimately flies. The surrender of Manila with- 
 out active defense would be just as disgraceful as 
 was the surrender of Detroit. Public property and 
 American Sovereignty belong to the United States 
 just as much in Manila as they do in Chicago or 
 New York. The very newspapers and peace advo- 
 cates who advocate the abandonment of the Philip- 
 pines would be the first to condemn an officer of the 
 army who should follow the example of General 
 Hull in Manila. 
 
 No doubt cession of territory to another country 
 by treaty would be just as legitimate as the acquire- 
 ment of territory from another country by treaty, 
 but this disposition of the Philippine Islands has 
 never been advocated by anybody, nor proposed by 
 any other country. It need not be considered here. 
 
32 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 But the question whether the right of secession, 
 finally denied to the states at Appomattox, may be 
 exercised by the Congress of the United States by 
 terminating American Sovereignty over any por- 
 tion of territory where it has been rightfully estab- 
 lished, is a novel one which has never been tested by 
 the Supreme Court nor adjudicated by the Arbitra- 
 ment of War. This question will have to be ad- 
 judicated before it will be possible to erect any part 
 of the territory of the United States into an inde- 
 pendent Sovereignty by Act of Congress, and then 
 terminate American Sovereignty over that territory 
 by ceding it to the independent State thus erected. 
 The proposition that while a State may not initiate 
 secession. Congress may do so by the exercise of 
 some sort of extra-constitutional power is a novel 
 one that need not concern us in this discussion. The 
 President, the Officers of the iVrmy, and all the 
 members of Congress are under an oath of office 
 to support and defend the existing constitution and 
 laws of the United States. When the proponents 
 of this new form of secession are face to face 
 with the responsibility of action, as these respon- 
 sible officers are now, it is probable that they 
 will prefer the legitimate method of seeking an 
 amendment to the constitution of the United 
 States granting specific authority for the proposed 
 action, to any overt act of secession in a new form 
 which might, possibly, subject them to impeach- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 33 
 
 ment for treason and to the penalties prescribed for 
 conviction of treason under such impeachment. 
 Secession was found a few years ago to be a serious 
 crime, costing much treasure and many lives. 
 Membership in Congress confers no more right to 
 initiate it than membership in the legislature of 
 South Carolina. Even the members of Congress 
 who were from the South resigned their seats in the 
 Congress of the United States before they assumed 
 part in the attempt at secession from its authority. 
 Time is the universal solvent, and 
 will, no doubt, solve the question as to 
 ' '' the ultimate disposition of the Philip- 
 
 pine Islands; but in the meantime all the officials 
 of the United States, army officers, congressmen, 
 Commander-in-chief, are under oath to support and 
 defend the Constitution and Laws of the United 
 States, and to see that, in the case of the President, 
 these laws be faithfully executed. All the judges 
 of the Supreme Court are bound by the same oath. 
 By this oath, until released from it in a lawful man- 
 ner, they are bound to support and to defend the 
 Sovereignty of the United States in every square 
 foot of territory in which it exists. The Sover- 
 eignty of the United States over the Philippine 
 Islands was acquired by treaty, by purchase and by 
 conquest, the three indefeasible means of acquiring 
 sovereignty, the same means by which the sover- 
 eignty of the United States has been established 
 
34 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 over all the other territory which it holds ; co-exten- 
 sive, co-equal, and of the same binding force in 
 every part of the jurisdiction of our country, 
 whether at Bladensburg, at Fort Sumpter, in Wash- 
 ington, in Honolulu, or in Manila. 
 
 An assault upon that sovereignty by 
 ^_ _. . a foreign nation, or a state of insurrec- 
 * tion by its own population, would be 
 
 exactly the same national insult, whether committed 
 at Jolo or at Sandy Hook. The responsible officers 
 of the government. Congress, the President and the 
 army and navy, would be under precisely the same 
 obligation to assert and to maintain that sovereignty 
 in Jolo or Manila as Charleston or in San Francisco 
 (in territory acquired by the same means, by con- 
 quest, by purchase and by treaty, though held a few 
 years longer). 
 
 _ . The estimate for the defense 
 
 Estimate n - .^ n 
 
 oi oversea possessions, there! ore, 
 
 TTtUoL inCLUCLe I' Till IP f> n n 
 
 _^ _^ . must include the del ense OI a// 01 
 
 Oversea Defense ,^ ji ^ i ^ 
 
 ' them, regardless oi ephemeral 
 
 and pernicious political agitation for a new form of 
 
 secession; agitation as pernicious as it was in 1860, 
 
 unless directed toward accomplishment of its object 
 
 in a lawful manner through due constitutional 
 
 amendment. Officers of the Army should have no 
 
 more to do with it than they should have had to do 
 
 with secession in 1861. This estimate must include 
 
 the defense of the Philippine Islands, because so 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 35 
 
 long as American Sovereignty extends to them they 
 must be defended by the United States. No mili- 
 tary man would consider the inhabitants capable of 
 defending them against any First-class Power, 
 least of all any officer who took part as the author 
 did in the conquest of the Philippines from 1899 
 to 1901. The bare idea that the natives, alone, 
 could do anything of the sort is merely ridiculous. 
 
 In like manner, these estimates must include the 
 defense of Alaska, of Porto Rico, of Hawaii, of 
 Guam, and of the Panama Canal. None of these 
 dependencies are capable of self defense, and none 
 of them could be sacrificed without loss to the pres- 
 tige and dignity of the United States, without viola- 
 tion of the oaths of office of the responsible officers 
 of the federal government. The last international 
 developments have brought home to even the most 
 obstinate peace propogandists that the "Scraps of 
 Paper" on which so many Americans have based 
 their hope for permanent world peace are utterly 
 valueless whenever the interest of any predatory 
 power may incline it to aggression. Whether we 
 consider England's plans for using Belgium as a 
 portal to Germany, or the above definition of a 
 treaty, or the double dealing of Belgium as proved 
 by the ofiScial publications of both England and 
 Germany and by the publication of its own captured 
 records, it is equally evident that no treaty can be 
 relied upon for National Defense, no Hague Con- 
 
36 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 vention will protect our countiy from rapine and 
 pillage, our citizens from wanton outrage and de- 
 struction. Indeed, many of them have already 
 suffered these, not merely at the hands of the bellig- 
 erent nations of Europe in spite of the official pro- 
 tests and threats of the Washington Government, 
 but also at the hands of irresponsible brigands in 
 JMexico, under the very eyes of military officers of 
 high rank (as at Douglas, Arizona, November 2 to 
 4, 1915), without reprisal and v/ithout protection, 
 for fear of worse consequences if we should try to 
 protect them, because our country is not prepared 
 for self defense. No treaty can protect the weak 
 against the rapacity of the strong. Only the Might 
 of the Eternal can do that, and if that JSIight was 
 not exercised to protect the Innocent on Calvary 
 what hope is there that it will protect the innocent 
 at Liege, at Louvain, or in New York or in Wash- 
 ington ? The Millenium is not yet, nor will be until 
 it is established by the Power of the Almighty. 
 The Filched millions of a foreign "philanthropist" 
 are as powerless to establish it is a Papal Bull to ex- 
 communicate science or the mandate of a king to 
 dam back the tides of the ocean. 
 
 The permanent establishment of World Peace 
 does not lie within human power to accomplish, and 
 until Divine Providence sees fit to give other Ex- 
 pressions to its Will than our present institutions, : 
 the son will owe protection and defense to the feeble- i 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 37 
 
 ness of the mother who bore him, the might of chiv- 
 alry must still protect the weakness of innocence 
 and virtue, the patriotic citizen must still unsheath 
 the sword of his glorious predecessors of all ages 
 and all countries when his country calls upon him in 
 her hour of need. 
 
 In the discharge of this duty it will not be for him 
 to say; "this part I will defend, that part I will 
 refuse to protect" ; but it will be his duty, as that of 
 all loyal, true and faithful soldiers, to defend with 
 all his might that station to which his country shall 
 assign him. It will be equally the duty, as it is the 
 sworn obligation, of her statesmen and lawmakers, 
 to defend and protect all parts of the country's terri- 
 tory, all its citizens, wherever they may be, without 
 regard to race, creed or condition. These duties 
 have always been discharged by American Soldiers 
 in the past, have always been provided for by 
 American Statesmen in the past. Please God, our 
 people have not become degenerates, nor forfeited 
 their birthright. They have the richest heritage on 
 the earth, they have the virility to not only develop 
 and enjoy that heritage, but also to protect and to 
 defend it, and to transmit it unimpaired to red 
 blooded descendants who will follow their example. 
 
 And so these oversea possessions of our country, 
 the acquisition of which was hailed as an extension 
 of the American System by Divine Providence, 
 must be defended as long as our Flag flies legiti- 
 
38 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 mately over them. And so the proper estimates for 
 their defense must be included, must be made by the 
 few trained officers who are capable of that sort of 
 work, must be provided for by the Congress of the 
 United States as part of its sworn duty, and will be 
 sanctioned by the People of the United States when- 
 ever the matter is presented to them as political issue 
 for their decision. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Estimate foe Permanent Personnel. 
 
 Estimates of this sort have been made 
 t^e J fYom time to time by the best military 
 s ima e ^f^^^j.^ ^y^ have. These estimates have 
 been revised by the best abihty of the General Staff. 
 The estimates thus made give the best starting point 
 we have for the solution of the problem of National 
 Defense. Thev call for one mobile Division, with 
 a proper complement of coast defense troops, for 
 the Philippine Islands ; one brigade each, with like 
 components of coast defense troops, for Hawaii and 
 for Panama; for a regiment and proper coast de- 
 fense components in Alaska, for smaller units for 
 other oversea defenses ; for an Expeditionary Divi- 
 sion always ready for action. This is the part of 
 the Permanent Personnel that must be always on a 
 basis for immediate active service. Summed up, 
 for oversea duty these estimates call for two com- 
 plete mobile divisions, and for coast defense troops 
 which make an aggregate of about 50,000 men. 
 
 This component of the Perma- 
 War Basis ^^^^ Personnel, in the opinion of all 
 A ecessary, competent officers, s h o u 1 d be or- 
 for this force ^^^^^^ed, maintained and trained, on 
 a war basis as to numbers, equipment and organiza- 
 tion, at all times. These troops can expect no help 
 
40 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 from the homeland until the seven seas shall have 
 been policed of all enemies. No reinforcements, 
 nor new equipment, nor additional ammunition, nor 
 food can reach them for many months after war 
 begins. In the case of the Philippine Islands there 
 is little room to doubt that insurrection by the Taga- 
 log Tribe (only) will add to their difficulties. The 
 Macabebees, the Igorrotes, the Ifugaos and the 
 JNIoros will probably remain loyal, but no sane man 
 who knows the Tagalog will trust that race, either 
 individually or collectively. No longer ago than 
 Christmas, 1914, while a bill was pending in Con- 
 gress with every prospect of being enacted into a 
 law which would have made the Tagalogs virtually 
 masters of the whole Philippine Islands, an attempt 
 was made by members of that tribe to start an in- 
 surrection with the avowed purpose of massacreing 
 the white people in the islands. Three times in a 
 single night were the troops at Fort William Mc- 
 Kinley turned out by the call, "To Arms!" The 
 attempt was unsuccessful, but no one who knows 
 them can doubt that its object meets the approval 
 of the whole Tagalog tribe. So there is no doubt 
 that this particular garrison will have insurrection 
 to contend with from within, as well as foes from 
 without, in the event of war. 
 
 Porto Rico dominates the Caribbean, and would 
 be a prize for any enemy. Hawaii dominates the 
 Pacific, and must be an object of attack in time of 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 41 
 
 war. The coal and gold of Alaska will be as potent 
 a magnet to draw attack as the strategical positions 
 of Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines, and the 
 Panama Canal is bound to bear the brunt of a stub- 
 born attempt to capture this commercial aorta of the 
 world. 
 
 ^^ _, . The estimates above made are 
 
 The Estimates ,^ • j -ui • • rj^i^ 
 
 ^^. . the uTeducible mmimum. Lhey 
 
 are Minimum .1 n ^ • j j 
 
 cannot be saiely revised down- 
 ward. If revised at all they must be increased. 
 They were made before the thunderbolt of August, 
 1914, was hurled at civilization; before the lessons 
 of the past year upset all previous notions of the 
 military art. 
 
 Since August 1914 the air has become peopled 
 above battlefields with armored aeroplanes armed 
 with machine guns and dropping death dealing 
 darts while they accurately locate ranges with smoke 
 bombs for 42 centimeter, 20 mile, asphyxiating artil- 
 lery; automobile trucks have raised the rate of 
 march for infantry from 15 miles per day to 120 
 miles per day, as in Gallieni's flank movement for 
 the Defense of Paris, have borrowed the scythes of 
 Boadicea to smash through mre entanglements, 
 and emulate with their machine guns on land the 
 torpedoes of the submarine in the sea ; search lights 
 have made every commander a Joshua who can 
 prolong the daylight at will for the enemy's 
 slaughter; infantry and cavalry are discarding the 
 
42 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 rifle, as they formerly did the crossbow, for the 
 more deadly and efficient machine gun. The whole 
 equipment of war has been changed in the last year. 
 These oversea garrisons will have to fight against 
 an enemy now panoplied with destructive arma- 
 ments of deadly power and will be themselves 
 armed with an equipment as obsolete as the Pliocene 
 Club of Pithecanthropus Erectus until we can 
 arouse the non-military American pubhc to the fact 
 that a new Art of War has sprung, full armed, 
 from the battlefields of Belgium and France dur- 
 ing the past year. 
 
 No; these estimates for oversea defense cannot 
 be revised downward. Any reconsideration must 
 augment them. Probably they should be greatly 
 increased in this discussion; but there are so many 
 things pressing to be done, the estimates made and 
 to be made will call for as much of an increase as 
 can be wisely made at one time on account of 
 scarcity of competent leadership to install a greater 
 increase at the present time, that we will adopt 
 these estimates as a working basis and go on with 
 the discussion. We cannot do all that is to be done 
 at a single stroke, either in estimate or in action. 
 Let these estimates stand as they are, inadequate 
 as they are. 
 
 -ri 7.^. The second element of the Per- 
 
 Exveditionary . ^ , . ^ ,. 
 
 j^ manent Personnel is an Expedi- 
 
 tionary Force. Our history is full 
 of occasions when it has been necessary to use such 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 43 
 
 a force. When it is necessary there is Httle time to 
 organize, and none to train it. An adequate body 
 of troops should, therefore, be estimated for in any 
 sound scheme of National Defense for this purpose. 
 From the very nature of their 
 Oversea and ^^^.^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ already estimated 
 Expeditionary ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^.^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^.j^ ^^^ ^^ 
 
 Forces cannot ^^.^ij^^le for an Expeditionary 
 be combined j,^^^^ rj.^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^.^ ^^ the 
 
 place assigned to them, more especially when the 
 storm clouds of international discord lower enough 
 to require the use of an expeditionary force. 
 
 The part of the Permanent Personnel to be as- 
 signed to the duty of training the citizen soldiery 
 will be obliged to work on a regular schedule if 
 their economical utility be considered. Such 
 schedules will no doubt start with homogeneous 
 classes of recruits, and will proceed through an in- 
 tensive course of training so as to make these re- 
 cruits serviceable in the shortest possible time. In 
 this way the smallest possible training force will be 
 required, and its output of trained soldiers, ready 
 for duty wherever they may be sent, will be the 
 maximum output practicable with the plant and 
 equipment. That is the way any contractor or 
 manufacturer would estimate for the use of any 
 plant and equipment, in order to obtain its maxi- 
 mum utility. The principles which govern this 
 problem are the same that govern any other in 
 
44 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 which the data are men, materials and time ; the re- 
 quirement, a finished product at the end of the 
 operation. 
 
 ^ . . ^77 This operation of turning 
 
 Trainins; School , n - i j j 4. x» n 
 
 ^ _ * _. . out a finished product 01 well 
 
 and Eojpeditionary . • -, i -i. . i 
 
 _^ 7 ^ trained soldiers cannot be eco- 
 
 Personnel Cannot . n • -, -i^ xi 
 
 7.7 nomically carried on 11 the 
 
 be Combined 4? a. • 1 4. • w a. 
 
 manuiacturmg plant is subject 
 
 to frequent interruptions, its skilled specialists fre- 
 quently pulled off their work and assigned to other 
 duties, to be replaced when the plant resumes opera- 
 tions with other overseers or instructors not ex- 
 perienced in the special work of this particular 
 plant, and its classes interrupted in the midst of 
 their course of training. 
 
 ^„ . . The case may be illustrated in 
 
 illustration from ,. 1.11 ^ 
 
 ' another way by college work. 
 
 Ly OLLej^e rV OrfC a ^ 1 n 11* 
 
 ® A class enters college and begins 
 
 a course of instruction. It is under skilled teachers. 
 If permitted to continue its work without interrup- 
 tion this class will complete its course in a certain 
 time, and its members will then receive their 
 diplomas as proficient in the course of instruction. 
 But if the class is frequently taken off its regular 
 work and put on other work for months at a time ; 
 if its teachers are frequently taken away in the 
 midst of their course of instruction and other teach- 
 ers assigned who are neither familiar with the 
 course nor with the personnel of the classes nor ac- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 45 
 
 quainted with the schedules; it is evident that the 
 time required hy this class for the completion of its 
 course of training will be greatly extended, its pro- 
 ficiency impaired, and the number of students who 
 will complete the course w^ill be smaller than if it 
 had proceeded without interruption under its origi- 
 nal instructors. 
 
 . 7. ,. J, This illustrates exactly what will 
 A V plication of , .^ ^ . . . i. j 4. 
 
 _, " -^ . ' happen 11 the attempt be made to 
 Illustration \. ^ ,.,. t7« 
 
 use the Jiixpeditionary b orce as a 
 
 training school. A call for the suppression of mob 
 violence in Colorado or Chicago or Pittsburgh; an 
 outrage on the Texas border; a sailor's row at 
 Valparaiso, Relief for a Legation in Pekin, any one 
 of a hundred calls such as have come unexpectedly 
 in the past will come in the future, will break up 
 schedules, will take away instructors, will paralyze 
 all efforts at systematic training of the transient 
 personnel. Thus if the Expeditionary force be 
 used for Training School duty the whole system 
 will fail. It will be at all times in a condition of 
 unstable equilibrium. 
 
 The objects for which an Expedition- 
 . . ary Force will be used, require at all 
 "^ times the highest condition of training 
 
 and discipline. Like war, the occasion will come 
 unexpectedly. The expedition must start at once 
 to be effective. There is no time for further train- 
 ing or for reorganization. If it were part of the 
 
46 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 Training School, it would be necessary to separate 
 the permanent part from the transient part of the 
 personnel, and raise the permanent part to war 
 strength by new assignments. At the same time 
 the training school would be disorganized by this 
 change of personnel. 
 
 If we consider taking the whole personnel, train- 
 ing school, both transient and permanent, that is, 
 both instructors and students (for that is what all 
 the transient personnel will be during the first 
 year), we have the old problem of using partially 
 trained forces. The present war in Europe ought 
 to make argument on that subject unnecessary. 
 Untrained forces, or partially trained forces, can- 
 not stand against well trained forces. That is all 
 there is to it. A hastily organized regiment, like the 
 "Rough Riders," containing picked material, com- 
 manded by one of the most forceful personalities 
 in the world, may acquit itself creditably in a head- 
 long dash, followed by a smashing charge, just as 
 the "Rough Riders" did; but such a force is not 
 well adapted to the gruelling work of guerrilla 
 warfare in the Philippines, or the years of "watch- 
 ful waiting" along the Rio Grande. The pacifi- 
 cation of the Philippines could not be accomplished 
 with such a force. It remained unfinished until 
 regular troops, with abiding, permanent responsi- 
 bility, could be furnished for that work. If the 
 Expeditionary Force were to be taken temporarily 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 47 
 
 from the troops assigned to training work for the 
 transient personnel, all these evils would be met 
 with; and if part of the transient personnel were 
 taken with it, then all these evils would be met, and 
 in addition, there would be a suspension of the work 
 of the training school, proper, as long as the emerg- 
 ency might exist. Sometimes these emergencies 
 last for many months, or even years; troops have 
 been on "temporary" duty on the Rio Grande now 
 for four years. 
 
 rwn j^ 1 • It may therefore be concluded 
 
 The Conclusion as ,. , ,. , i -, , ^ 
 
 _ .... that there should be an Eixpe- 
 
 to Eoopeditionary ,... -^ -, p 
 
 ^ ^ ditionary l^orce, composed oi 
 
 trained troops, with permanent 
 personnel, ready at all times for any service that 
 may be necessary, either in the continental limits 
 of the United States, or in any other place in the 
 world, where American Citizens may need protec- 
 tion for their persons or their interests. 
 
 The size of such a force for the 
 
 _ '.. . United States depends upon the 
 
 Expeditionary n u- u -4. i. 
 
 ^ ^ purposes lor which it may be re- 
 
 quired. The estimate for its size 
 should be based upon the uses made of such forces 
 in the past, and the probable future needs of the 
 country, as based upon our world relations and 
 needs. The amount to be set aside for this use, like 
 that for other purposes, is with the representatives 
 of the people to determine. It is the prerogative 
 
48 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 of the Congress, representing the People, to de- 
 termine finally all such matters. 
 
 In the matter of estimates, the smallest one that 
 any military expert will sanction is that unit which 
 contains within itself all the elements of an inde- 
 pendent military command. This is determined not 
 by the military experts of our own country, but by 
 those of the whole world. We who make a lifelong 
 profession of Arms, are as powerless to alter this 
 unit as a Member of Congress, for it is determined 
 by the military experience of all armies, in all coun- 
 tries, through all time. The name of the unit varies, 
 but the substance remains the same. That unit is 
 called, at the present time, in our Field Service 
 Regulations, A Division. 
 
 In the unanimous opinion of all military experts, 
 the very smallest possible force that will serve our 
 country's needs, for an Expeditionary Force, is one 
 complete division. Until further study of the sub- 
 ject by other officers equally expert, and supplied 
 with later data, shall indicate a change in these 
 figures, they must stand as the irreducable minimum 
 for this purpose. It is not likely that future esti- 
 mates will revise this estimate downward. The in- 
 ternal needs and external relations of the country 
 are much more likely to increase it, than to diminish 
 it. This calls for about 20,000 men. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 49 
 
 __ ^ . . The third element of the Perma- 
 
 The Traimns: . -o i • 4.u 4. 
 
 ^ nent Personnel, is that necessary 
 
 for the training of the Transient 
 
 Personnel. As in other matters of estimates, there 
 
 must be a just balance between the results required 
 
 and the means employed. 
 
 If the training of the transient person- 
 
 _, ^ . nel for National Defense, can be man- 
 
 Solution J J. • • J 1. 
 
 aged as a separate mission, and not com- 
 
 ^ plicated by the concurrent solution by 
 the same trainers of other problems, foreign to that 
 subject, it will be greatly simplified. For example, 
 if at a given time and place, there are 2,000 young 
 men, who are willing to be trained for military 
 duty, and if there are available, at the same time 
 enough regular officers and men, to conduct that 
 training, evidently the training of these 2,000 green 
 men can be carried through efficiently and most 
 quickly, by commencing with all of them at the same 
 time, and following a well considered schedule of 
 training without interruption to its completion, 
 under the same management from beginning to 
 end. 
 
 But if the training commence with groups of 
 various sizes, at irregular intervals in point of time, 
 if it be conducted by instructors whose tenure of 
 duty is uncertain, and who are changed from one 
 duty to another at frequent intervals, without warn- 
 ing, then if the whole course on instruction is liable 
 
50 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 to sudden, unforseen and unavoidable interruption 
 
 for irregular periods ; under the conditions the 2,000 
 
 men will not be as quickly trained, nor as well 
 
 trained, as in the former case. 
 
 Stated another way: the material is so many 
 
 green men; the job is to impart a certain course of 
 
 instruction, training and discipline; the means 
 
 available consist of certain material, equipment, and 
 
 a certain number of instructors. Manifestly, the 
 
 most economical utilization of these instructors and 
 
 of this material, both in time and in expense, will 
 
 be to place under instruction the maximum number 
 
 they can efficiently manage, arrange for continuous 
 
 instruction, and then keep everybody at work on 
 
 the job on schedule, until the course be completed. 
 
 ^ n That is exactly what has never been 
 
 ^ jj done in the preparation of the Na- 
 
 ,-, tional Defense. It is exactly what 
 
 Jjj. oftev . 
 
 must be done in order to economically 
 
 utilize men, material, money and time. The prob- 
 lem of financing the national defense, depends upon 
 the economical expenditure of the funds appropri- 
 ated for that purpose, and this, in turn, depends 
 upon the economical utilization of the Permanent 
 Personnel. We must determine the minimum 
 number possible of permanent personnel to do the 
 work, the most efficient manner in which this mini- 
 mum number can be used in order to train the re- 
 quired number; and then we can estimate for the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 51 
 
 cost. There is no other way in which even an ap- 
 proximation to the cost can be reached; and H 
 is certain that the very first question that will be 
 asked by any Congressman, by any Voter, will be; 
 "How much will your plan cost?" His next ques- 
 tion will be; "How much of a force will your plan 
 produce?" The worst fault of all plans thus far 
 proposed is that neither of these questions can be 
 answered by their proponents, because they have 
 not approached the problem in the right way. Like 
 every other problem in the world, there is a correct 
 solution, and all other solutions are not correct. 
 
 rrn T^ ' ^1 ^ In making an estimate of the 
 
 The Basic Element; .. • i ^ ^ . j.i 
 
 ., . ,. ., , time required to tram the 
 
 the individual; ^ - r i 
 
 ^^ 7 .. o transient personnel we must 
 
 Hcmo much time? , , ..i .i i • -^^ j.i 
 
 start with the basic unit, the 
 
 individual. We can do no better than to accept the 
 
 consensus of expert military opinion as to the length 
 
 of time required to train the average individual to 
 
 a reasonable degree of military efficiency. This is 
 
 a matter which has been made a business by the 
 
 Germans, the French, the Swiss and the Italians. 
 
 With them it is reduced to an exact art. The lowest 
 
 time they consider adequate is two years. 
 
 We, also, have some valuable data on this subject. 
 
 In the Civil War it was not uncommon to send 
 
 green regiments to the firing hne. The first battle 
 
 of Bull Run is one example of the results. Later 
 
 in the war more time was given to preparation. 
 
52 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 There was more experienced leadership of the 
 higher units. We do not find a Commanding Gen- 
 eral performing the duties of a battalion and regi- 
 mental commander in 1863-65, and we do find 
 troops rather more effectively used than McI>owell 
 used them in 1861. But we do not find any really 
 efficient with less than a year of training, unless the 
 training has been in actual campaign, and we find 
 a terrible wastage of men and material, due to lack 
 of proper training all through that war. We had 
 some later experience in 1898, with similar results. 
 We believe that American men can take this train- 
 ing more quickly than any other men in the world, 
 especially if we reach that class which can be reached 
 only by a call upon their patriotism, a class which 
 will not volunteer in time of peace, but which will 
 readily respond when the life of the nation is in 
 peril. We are confident that this class of men can 
 be more quickly trained than any other, but we can- 
 not say to our fellow citizens, that even the best of 
 this class will be able to do the work without at 
 least one year of training in time of peace. 
 
 The best judgment of the most expert military 
 men in our country agrees that we cannot give 
 adequate training in time of peace, even to the very 
 best class of American material, in less than one 
 year. We can do it a little more quickly in time of 
 war, probably, when every faculty of both officers 
 and men will be keyed up to a higher pitch, but 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 53 
 
 it will be at very great expense of men and material 
 and money, and at very great risk of initial defeats 
 in the war which may cost the country very dear. 
 It is to avoid the possibilitj^ of these defeats, if 
 that be humanly possible, that we insist upon a 
 whole year of time for peace training. 
 
 It is not worth while to go into technical details 
 about this. The Banker who employs a skilled 
 architect to estimate for building a mansion would 
 be foolish to quibble with that architect over minor 
 details of the estimate; how many pounds of nails, 
 gallons of paint, feet of lumber, bundles of shingles, 
 would be required. He would employ the best archi- 
 tect he could afford, would consider the estimate as 
 a whole, and would build or not build according to 
 his pleasure, after considering the finished estimate. 
 
 He who projects building a railroad, would not 
 
 quibble with the contractor about how many days' 
 
 work or how many scrapers would be necessary, 
 
 for a given section of the road; he would consider 
 
 the bids and award the contract or not, according 
 
 to the price and time and ability of the contractor 
 
 to do the job as required. 
 
 . ^ . ,-, So in this case. Congress, for the 
 
 Anatomy of the ^^ ^. , • i . i i ^ - 
 
 ^ . . JNation, has a job to be done to m- 
 
 sure the National Defense. It can 
 
 award the contract to the skilled bidders, who know 
 
 how to make the correct estimates, who can deliver 
 
 the best work in the shortest time, at the lowest ex- 
 
54 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 pense; or it can defer the matter until some great 
 public emergency compels the acceptance of much 
 inferior work from less competent hands, at much 
 greater expense, and it will also run the additional 
 risk of failure to deliver at all, by unskilled con- 
 tractors, or even by the most skillful ones, by reason 
 of lack of time enough to do the job. In this case 
 Congress is acting like an owner of a warehouse 
 full of valuable and inflammable stores, who refuses 
 to take out any fire insurance, or to organize an 
 effective fire department, but depends upon a vol- 
 unteer "bucket brigade" to be organized after the 
 alarm is given. The bucket brigade may put out 
 the fire; it did in 1865, after four years of terrible 
 losses ; but the owner of the warehouse will probably 
 lose most of the contents of the building. When 
 the very life of a nation is the issue, such a course 
 of neglect is criminal folly. There is no other right 
 word for it. 
 
 _ ,. The most reliable estimates of the most 
 
 Estimate ^ ^ • j ^ 
 
 - _. expert tramed oihcers m our country 
 
 of Time ., . ^ 4.- • 4.U • •" 
 
 ' agree that one year oi time is the mini- 
 
 mum necessary for training each man, for his duty 
 as a member of the transient personnel, under the 
 best system we can devise, and under the most favor- 
 able conditions for that training. We will accept 
 that estimate as the basis of our calculations. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 55 
 
 They also agree that three commis- 
 j sioned officers and about 25 trained sol- 
 
 diers will make the most efficient and 
 effective instructors for the basic unit of one com- 
 pany, and that this unit of instructors can most 
 economically handle about 125 green men; in other 
 words, that if we take a cadre of three commissioned 
 officers and 25 trained soldiers, (comprising non- 
 commissioned officers, clerks, cooks, artificers and 
 trumpeters), and if we complete this company to 
 war strength of 150 men by the addition at one time 
 of 125 new recruits, this personnel will give the 
 best results possible when devoted exclusively to 
 the training of such a company. This arrange- 
 ment will give the permanent personnel full work 
 to occupy their entire time, and this number of new 
 and uninstructed men will be the maximum that can 
 be handled by this group of instructors, with that 
 individual care and attention that is necessary, in 
 order to secure the best and quickest results. Mili- 
 tary opinion is settled that such a unit as this will 
 result in the maximum of training with the minimum 
 expenditures of time and material. This unit will 
 function most economically for the purpose, be- 
 cause this is the correct adjustment of parts for the 
 
 purpose. 
 
 Military experts agree that such a 
 
 y . company as this is the primary unit 
 
 Organization n • ■• ^4.1, 
 
 ® 01 organization tor the purpose. 
 
 They substantially agree that these companies can 
 
56 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 be best managed when grouped in battalions of 
 four companies each, and can be best supervised 
 when these battahons are grouped into regiments 
 of three battahons each, with the two administra- 
 tive companies of the regiment in addition, as separ- 
 ate units belonging to the regiment, but not at- 
 tached to any battalion. 
 
 _ . , Such a regiment would have a Per- 
 
 Hes:imental . -r» i p ^ r^ • • j 
 
 * manent Personnel oi 49 commissioned 
 
 officers and 350 enlisted men. Its 
 Transient Personnel would be 1,750 enlisted men, 
 each man under instruction for a period of one year. 
 Its output, its product, considered as a manufactur- 
 ing plant, would be 1,750 Minute Men per year. 
 
 J T,'.' 7 ^ . This will furnish a basis on which 
 Additional Data , ,- ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ i n 
 
 ^ . , to estimate the total number oi 
 
 xCeouired 
 
 Permanent Personnel required in 
 
 the Training School section of the military service, 
 
 in order to make available the 500,000 required for 
 
 the national defense ; but before we can reach exact 
 
 figures it will be necessary to know how long the 
 
 obligation of the Minute Man is to last, after he 
 
 completes his year of training. Without entering 
 
 at this point into the calculations by which the term 
 
 was reached, it is enough to say that an obligation 
 
 of four years, of which the first year will be spent 
 
 in the Training School, will be found to establish 
 
 a just balance between the permanent and transient 
 
 personnel, by which the required total force can be 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 57 
 
 made available, the most approved system of re- 
 cruitment adopted for both peace and war, and the 
 cost of the system reduced to the absolute minimum, 
 because all its parts can be worked most economi- 
 cally at the rate of maximum efficiency both in peace 
 and in war. Therefore, the following periods of 
 obligation will be assumed: 
 
 Training School, one year. 
 
 Minute Men Obligation, after completion of 
 Training School, three years. 
 
 _ , „ The output, or manufactured product. 
 
 Estimate of o i • 4. p m rr< • • 
 
 ^ , '01 each reo^iment 01 the Irammff 
 
 Product . . 
 
 School will be 1,750 trained men per 
 
 year. This gives a total of 5,250 trained men at the 
 end of the third year, all under Minute Man Obliga- 
 tion for one year, one-third of them for two years, 
 and one-third of them for three years. We will thus 
 have, at the end of three years 5,250 trained men 
 per regiment, ready for immediate duty, in addition 
 to 350 men of the permanent personnel in each regi- 
 ment. This number will be maintained at all times 
 thereafter, as long as the system remains in opera- 
 tion. The results of this system, during any part 
 of the fourth year, may be summarized as follows: 
 84 regiments of Training School; 
 
 Minute Men, 5,250 men per regiment 440,800 
 
 Permanent Personnel, 350 men per regiment 29,400 
 
 Expeditionary Force, one Division on War Basis 20,000 
 
 Oversea Force, also on war basis, two Divisions 40,000 
 
 Coast Artillery Component of Oversea Force 10,000 
 
 Total well trained troops ready for service 540,200 
 
58 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 Militia, on present basis 120,000 
 
 Training School, current class under training 147,000 
 
 Partially trained troops, soon available, for reinforcement . . 367,000 
 
 This provides the 500,000 required ; allows 40,000 
 for casualities; and provides a partially trained 
 force, ready to supply losses. 
 
 Such a force as this would be, permanently avail- 
 able, ready for action as quickly as any possible 
 enemy could be ready, would not only insure victory 
 in case of war, but would be a practical insurance 
 against the possibility^ of war. No nation or com- 
 bination of nations, would care to attack a country 
 prepared to meet attack with such a formidable 
 force. 
 
 ^, , ^ The military forces of the United 
 
 Resume of ^, , j 4.I.- j. in • ^ 
 
 _ , ' States under this system would consist 
 
 Results n 
 
 of: 
 
 I. The Permanent Personnel. 
 
 (a) Oversea Defense, two divisions, war 
 
 basis, and complete coast artillery com- 
 ponent. 
 
 (b) Expeditionary Force, one division, war 
 
 basis. 
 
 (c) Training School element, 84 regiments or 
 
 equivalents, on training school basis of 
 3 commissioned officers and 25 picked 
 enlisted men per company. 
 
 II. The Minute Man Reserve. 
 
 This would consist of all men who had com- 
 pleted the full year of prescribed training 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 59 
 
 and who had not completed four years of 
 obligation. They would be on the legal status 
 of Furlough, subject to call whenever so 
 authorized by Congress, but armed and 
 equipped, ready for immediate mobilization. 
 III. The class under current instruction at the 
 Training School. 
 
 pAy. The National Guard, which should be de- 
 veloped paripassu, with the other forces of the coun- 
 try, because it is the constitutional check against 
 overdevelopment of the regular army and against 
 possible militarism. 
 
 Making due allowance for casual- 
 Actual Force ^.^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^1^ ^^.^ ^^ 
 
 Available respond at once, this system would 
 
 make immediately available half a million well 
 trained men ; would place 267,000 more on the fight- 
 ing line (at least a quarter of a million) in about 
 three months, and can be so managed as to establish 
 adequate recruiting and training depots from which 
 well trained men can be constantly supplied to re- 
 place losses and maintain the full strength of the 
 fighting line. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 Financial Estimates. 
 
 No estimate worthy of the name as to 
 
 . ^ expense could be made, until the size 
 
 Estimates ^ ^ , i> ,i n . i 
 
 ^_ and character oi the lorces to be con- 
 
 Necessarii • i i j x • j tt 
 
 '^ sidered were determined. Having 
 
 reached a reasonable conclusion on these points, it is 
 
 possible to estimate the cost. We need not consider 
 
 the cost of material, for no matter what system be 
 
 adopted that expense w^ill be to meet. Most of the 
 
 material for the infantry and cavalry elements is 
 
 already in existence, and a good part of the material 
 
 for mobile artillery has already been fabricated. 
 
 Whatever the cost may be, we can be sure that it 
 
 will be less with a well trained, properly organized, 
 
 adequate force than it will be with a less efficient 
 
 and less eiFective force. We may now proceed to 
 
 estimate the Financial Problem of preparation of 
 
 the personnel required for the National Defense. 
 
 _, 7 >77 o From the foregoing dis- 
 
 Fay and Allowances of - •. -n i, i • i a. 
 
 _. "^ _^ / cussion it will be logical to 
 
 Permanent Personnel x- j. i? .i . 
 
 estimate lor the permanent 
 
 personnel on the same basis of pay and allowances, 
 
 as now established by law. The total number of 
 
 enlisted men provided for above, is about 50,000 for 
 
 oversea service, 20,000 for expeditionary force, and 
 
 29,400 for the training school permanent personnel, 
 
 making an aggregate of 99,400 men. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 61 
 
 This is not very far from the number now author- 
 ized by law, and the appropriations for this element 
 will remain about the same as the current ones. 
 
 In order to provide for the permanent commis- 
 sioned personnel of the training school element, 
 however, there vnll necessarily be an increase in the 
 number of organizations, and consequently in the 
 number of officers. This is not a scheme for the ad- 
 vancement of promotion, nor would any increase of 
 commissioned officers be recommended, if it were 
 possible to avoid such recommendation. It is not 
 possible. In order to institute the system, certain 
 officers will be necessary. The system is the only 
 one possible, to meet the requirements of our na- 
 tional necessities, and therefore the necessary per- 
 sonnel, both enlisted and commissioned, must be 
 provided in order to put it into operation. 
 
 The necessity for this increase in commissioned 
 personnel will be apparent in a broad way, when it 
 is considered that the task of training annually 
 147,000 recruits is to be added to all the present 
 duties of the regular army. How this great task is 
 to be accomplished with a very small increase in 
 commissioned personnel will be duly explained in 
 its proper place, and the feasibility of the plan will 
 be fully apparent. Not one vacancy is to be created 
 for purposes of promotion ; not a single officer asked 
 for whose services are not absolutely indispensable. 
 
62 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 .-j-j.. Our present permanent force amounts 
 
 to the equivalent oi 80 regiments. Ihis 
 
 '' number of regiments will be increased 
 
 under the plan herein proposed, by placing the train- 
 ing school element on a training school basis, com- 
 posed of a cadre of 25 enlisted men per company 
 selected for dutj'' with a view to their fitness, and 
 a complete personnel of commissioned officers. The 
 total number of regiments, or equivalent bodies, re- 
 quired for the whole permanent personnel, on the 
 basis assumed is 138. This will require an increase 
 in commissioned personnel of very nearly 75 per 
 cent, and will be the only item in which the expenses 
 of the permanent establishment will be increased in 
 any way. 
 
 On the other hand, there will be economies by 
 utilizing a better system of organization, by decrease 
 in changes of station, by decrease in the retired list, 
 and by more economical operation of the whole 
 system in a businesslike way, that will practically 
 offset this increase of expense, leaving the appro- 
 priations for the permanent establishment very 
 nearly the same as they now are. The cost, there- 
 fore, of the Permanent Personnel, will be very near- 
 ly one hundred millions per year, $100,000,000. 
 
 , y The Banker who employs a skilled 
 
 ^'^ architect and contractor, to estimate 
 
 ^ for the construction of his mansion 
 
 must rely upon their technical knowledge and skill 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 63 
 
 in the minor details. It would be absurd for the 
 Banker to try to figure out the number of carpen- 
 ters, plasterers, stonemasons, bricklayers, plumbers, 
 and what not, required for the work. Knowledge of 
 these details is one of the prime essentials of the 
 training of the architect and of the contractor, but 
 it is not part of the Banker's training. Similarly, 
 knowledge of how many signalmen, how many in- 
 fantry, cavalry, artillery, airmen and the like, and 
 of how many officers will be required to properly 
 instruct, train and direct these workmen, is technical 
 military knowledge that should be within the scope 
 of training of the expert army officer (and is part 
 of his training), is a matter of daily experience 
 with him, but is not within the training or experience 
 of the average citizen or congressman. Here the 
 citizen and the congressman must depend upon the 
 integrity and the judgment of the trained military 
 expert. 
 
 It is correct to say, further, that some officers 
 have had more training, more experience, and have 
 better judgment than some other officers. We can- 
 not all be experts in every line of military activity. 
 One may be an expert school man, another an expert 
 tactician, another an expert Surgeon another expert 
 in law, and so on. Comparatively few are ex- 
 perts in economics, or give to that subject a single 
 thought ; yet economics must be the real foundation 
 of any successful military system. No system that 
 
64 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 takes large numbers of young men from industrial 
 activity can secure approval in our country, or 
 would be successful. No system that will finan- 
 cially exhaust the country can be successful ; yet the 
 plan of General W. H. Carter, the officer who had 
 more to do with the legislation of 1901, than any 
 other, and to whom Secretary Root, gave most of 
 the credit for the "General Staff," the most ex- 
 perienced officer alive in our service in matters of 
 legislation and organization, entirely omits con- 
 sideration of the cost of his plan, dismisses it with 
 the brief remark, that it would cost more than the 
 present system (Page 150, "The American Army," 
 by General W. H. Carter, published 1915) ; and the 
 proposed "Continental Army Plan" would bring 
 the country face to face with either a heavy increase 
 of taxes or a bond issue for our descendants to pay, 
 for a line of purely experimental organization, the 
 results of which can never possibly produce a well 
 trained military force under any conceivable cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 So, while the estimate for National Defense must 
 be made by trained regular officers, it is not every 
 one of them who is capable of devising a sound 
 plan, or even of appreciating it after it is proposed 
 by some one else. The best minds in the country 
 have worked on this problem, from General Wash- 
 ington, down to the present time. The final result, 
 a plan that will really work, must be from a special 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery Q5 
 
 student of organization; and if he should fail to 
 
 present a perfect plan it will be no discredit to be 
 
 listed in the same category as Washington, Grant, 
 
 Upton, Root and Carter. 
 
 Before we can make a rational estimate 
 
 _, / of the cost of the transient personnel two 
 [1. ra,7isient • • 
 
 things must be determined; the number 
 
 to be paid, and the rate of pay. The rest 
 is merely a question of arithmetic. We have the 
 data as to numbers in the foregoing discussion. It 
 remains to consider what pay shall be allotted to this 
 element of the National Defense, and what allow- 
 ances they shall receive. 
 
 _„, - , It is proposed to finance this element 
 
 Theory of the ,. ., .1 . -to. • • 
 
 ^_„. ^ ' on the theory that military service m 
 
 Military . . o ^ j . i 
 
 _ , ^. ^ time 01 war, and the necessary prepa- 
 
 Oolis:ation .. o .1 . • ... n 
 
 ® ration tor that service m time 01 
 
 peace, are an obligation of citizenship, due to the 
 
 nation from every able-bodied citizen, and for the 
 
 discharge of v/hich duty he is not entitled to one 
 
 cent of pay. The moment this theory is adopted 
 
 the Nation can adopt a system that will not compete 
 
 with industrial activities, and will not bankrupt the 
 
 country when war comes, at the time when of all 
 
 others its financial resources must be conserved and 
 
 safeguarded in order that the nation may live. 
 
 . , . . - , The adoption of this idea, how- 
 Application of the ^ . i j .i 
 
 ^_ , ^ ' ever, need not exclude the use 
 
 volunteer System n ^ , v n 
 
 "^ 01 volunteers, nor radically 
 
 alter our methods of securing adequate enrollment. 
 
66 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 In our country, only a relatively small force, com- 
 pared to the total population, will ever be needed, 
 even in a great war, if that force be properly trained 
 in advance. There is a solution of the problem that 
 permits a happy application of the principle of vol- 
 untary military service from patriotic motives, while 
 yet asserting legalty the doctrine of military obliga- 
 tion, and making all necessary arrangements for the 
 application of that idea, when such application is 
 necessary. That such a provision for obligatory 
 service is necessary in time of war, has been proved 
 in every war in our history; and the necessary ma- 
 chinery must be provided for in time of peace to 
 enforce mihtary service whenever that may be nec- 
 essary. 
 
 Compulsory Peace If the nation reserves and en- 
 Training Necessary forces the right to use the 
 for Adequate draft in time of war, it must 
 
 Preparedness also reserve and, if necessary, 
 
 enforce compulsory military training in time of 
 peace, in order to have available competent person- 
 nel in time of war. Modern conditions require ade- 
 quate preliminary military training before war be- 
 gins. To send absolutely untrained men up against 
 trained soldiers, under present conditions, is an un- 
 speakable crime, entailing useless and horrible butch- 
 ery. Adequate preliminary training of a sufficient 
 number for insurance against war, a sufficient num- 
 ber to prevent rapid conquest of large areas of our 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 67 
 
 territory by a better prepared enemy, is a necessity 
 of the present world conditions and environment of 
 our coimtry. Surely no argument is necessary on 
 this subject. It should be sufficient to point to 
 Belgium and France; to merely mention August, 
 1914. And if a sufficient number of citizens will 
 not take such preliminary training of their own 
 accord, upon the assurance of the law that they will 
 not be called upon for war service, except for the 
 National Defense, there is nothing left for the na- 
 tion but to assert and enforce its undoubted right 
 to require such training of an adequate number in 
 a fair and impartial manner. 
 
 . So our country must assert its 
 
 Combination of • i . 4. 4.u •1-4. • -p 
 
 ^ _ ' right to the military services 01 
 
 Compulsory and •. ♦.• • . • r» i 
 
 „ _ ^ "^ . its citizens in time 01 war, and 
 
 Voluntary Service , .i • j. • • • 4.- 
 
 ^ to their proper training m time 
 
 of peace for that duty ; at least to the proper train- 
 ing of the half million necessary to insure our 
 country against the fate of Belgium. In doing so, 
 however, there can be no objection to calling to the 
 Colors first those who desire to voluntarily discharge 
 this duty, nor to offering a reasonable inducement 
 to these volunteers. If a citizen voluntarily offers 
 himself not only for service in time of war, but also 
 to take the personal training in time of peace that 
 will fit him to be useful in time of war, that citizen 
 certainly merits more at the hands of his country, 
 than the one who fails to defend her, or refuses to 
 
68 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 take such training, and compels her to resort to 
 force to compel him to miwillingly discharge his 
 duty. 
 
 A system that would give preference to the patri- 
 otic volunteer, without inflicting any hardship upon 
 the citizen who does not volunteer, would therefore 
 commend itself to all right thinking people. 
 
 _ _ Such a system would be to offer a 
 
 Inducements \.^ - a -i. -p i 4. 
 
 reasonable mducement tor voluntary 
 
 ' applications to take the peace time 
 
 training, with its obligation to three years of Minute 
 Man readiness, and to draft the balance necessary 
 from those who do not volunteer, but without the 
 same inducement. If the inducement secured an 
 adequate mrniber of volunteers there would be no 
 draft ; but if it failed to do so enough men of mili- 
 tary age would be drafted to secure the necessary 
 number. The method of applying this idea is re- 
 sei'ved for later discussion, but the amount of the 
 obligation and of the inducement should be proposed 
 here in order to furnish a basis for financial estimates 
 for the Transient Personnel. 
 
 The obligation, in point of 
 Obligation and ^j^^^ ^^^^j^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ 
 
 Status of jj^ ^j.^gj. ^ provide for the 
 
 Transient Personnel ^^^^ economical and effective 
 system of training. Of this period the first year 
 would be devoted to military and vocational instruc- 
 tion and training and this is the only period, ex- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 69 
 
 cept in time of actual war, when the volunteer 
 would be separated from civil pursuits. This year 
 can be arranged at a time in a man's life when the 
 interruption will be minimum, and the training can 
 be arranged in many cases to be vocational training 
 which will be of direct advantage to the man in 
 civil life. In all cases military training is distinctly 
 beneficial, both physically and morally, to every 
 man who takes it, making him a better man in health, 
 physique and personal hygiene, a better man mor- 
 ally and intellectually, than he would have been 
 without it. 
 
 It is not asserted that every man who receives 
 military training is a better man than every man 
 who does not, but it is a fact that every man who 
 takes it is a better man all the days of his life, physi- 
 callv, morally and mentally, than he would have been 
 without it. The military art embraces all other 
 arts, and military training calls for experts in all 
 departments of human activity. Young men who 
 desire to fit themselves for any trade or profession 
 can find in the army an opportunity to learn prac- 
 tically the work of that trade or that profession, 
 and there is no reason why we should not take eco- 
 nomic advantage of this fact by assigning volun- 
 teers to those places in the military machine where 
 they will receive instruction as far as possible in the 
 very trade or profession which they intend to prac- 
 tice in civil life after their year of training. This 
 
70 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 can be made part of the inducement to suitable men 
 to take their year of military training, and should 
 be made a strong inducement to them in any ra- 
 tional scheme for such training. 
 
 During the other three years, the man's status 
 would be that of military furlough, without pay or 
 allowances, except as will be stated in the next 
 paragraph of this discussion. Furlough is a defi- 
 nite military status, which holds the man ready to 
 obey orders at a moment's notice, yet leaves him 
 free to go where he pleases, and do what he likes 
 until the call is made. We are planning for Na- 
 tional Defense, not aggression ; and in the law which 
 w411 be necessary to put this plan into operation 
 it can be provided that these "Minute Men" shall 
 not be called upon, except in case of special authori- 
 zation by the Congress of the United States. This 
 v/ill insure them against unnecessary interruptions 
 of their activities in civil life during this three years 
 of Minute JSIan obligation, and will yet maintain 
 them in a status of readiness for immediate service 
 in case of real necessity. They would be available 
 upon proclamation of the President, pursuant to 
 authorization by Congress to issue such a call. 
 
 The financial inducement proposed is a 
 ^ net bounty of one hundred dollars per 
 year, to be paid to the volunteer upon the expira- 
 tion of each year of his services. His food, clothing, 
 equipment, traveling expenses and care in case of 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 71 
 
 sickness in line of duty, are legitimate public ex- 
 penses in any case, whether he be volunteer or a 
 drafted man; but the drafted man has no claim to 
 bounty. Neither of them has any claim to pay, as 
 the military duty is to be performed as a public 
 obligation, just the same as a poll tax. 
 
 The theory on which any cash bounty 
 
 - _ . ^ can be offered rests on the idea that 
 
 of Bounties • j.- i i? 
 
 ' smce comparatively lew men are re- 
 
 quired it is better to utilize the services of those who 
 are willing to perform the duty voluntarily than to 
 make haphazard selection by the draft; and since 
 the voluntary service of these men exempts an equal 
 number of others, it is no more than just and right 
 that those exempted should make some cash return 
 to those who serve voluntarily. 
 
 It may be doubted whether the amount proposed 
 is adequate. There is no fixed principle involved in 
 the estimate of $100 per year. Any other amount, 
 so long as it is strictly accounted an equivalent ren- 
 dered by those who do not serve to those who do 
 serve voluntarily, would comply equally with all the 
 ethical and logical conditions of the problem, pro- 
 vided the desired result be secured. The principle 
 is that the nation needs a certain number of trained 
 men, has a right to call for them, and that those 
 who are not willing to do their share in person ought 
 to pay a proper cash indemnity to those who relieve 
 them of doing their personal share of this duty. 
 
72 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 This is a matter of principle ; the amount to be paid 
 is a matter of expediency and of convenience. 
 
 It is set forth as a principle that every citizen 
 owes to his country the duty of defense in time of 
 danger. It is a principle that every man should 
 be so trained that his personal service will be effi- 
 cient. It is a fact that this training must be given 
 in time of peace, in order to make it adequately 
 effective, under modern conditions of warfare. It 
 is a principle that the man who is exempted by the 
 law from rendering this personal service in time of 
 war, or taking the necessary training in time of 
 peace to be effective in time of war, should con- 
 tribute an equivalent in cash for the benefit of tlie 
 man who takes his place and thereby enables tlie 
 exempt citizen to exercise his free choice in the 
 matter. 
 
 The exact amount will be fixed by the law of 
 supply and demand, like the pay for all other per- 
 sonal services ; for every man who volunteers to take 
 the necessary training in time of peace, and to stand 
 ready for war service during a period of three years 
 after completion of his training period, will be ren- 
 dering a personal service to every man who does 
 not so volunteer. This service consists in assumin^y 
 a part of the moral and legal obligations of the non- 
 volunteer, and of rendering a personal service to 
 the nation that the non-volunteer is morally and 
 legally bound to render, unless this man volunteers, 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 73 
 
 all of which the volunteer assumes in addition to his 
 own share of the military duty, which is the same as 
 that incumbent upon every other citizen. 
 
 Understanding, then, that the amount to be paid 
 as a bounty to the volunteer is open to discussion, 
 it is thought that $100 per year, taken with the other 
 inducements, will be enough for the purpose. 
 
 The volunteer for this training has 
 
 ■^ no necessary expenses incident to the 
 
 year enoum? j . rru 
 
 ^ ^ duty. 1 he necessary expenses are a 
 
 charge on the government. His age must be taken 
 
 into consideration. It is very desirable to secure 
 
 young men for this training; from 19 to 23 years 
 
 of age. The earlier in life this military obligation 
 
 is discharged the better, in order that men may be 
 
 free to assume civic obligations that might be broken 
 
 up by military service. It is desirable to enroll 
 
 recruits while they are still young enough to be 
 
 plastic in mind and body. After a man passes 25 
 
 years of age something of the plasticity of youth 
 
 is usually lost. Military training is infinitely more 
 
 beneficial to the young man than to one of middle 
 
 age. 
 
 The class sought, thei^fore, is the young high 
 
 school graduate, the recent college graduate, the 
 
 young mechanic of about the same age. For the 
 
 young high school graduate who lacks the financial 
 
 resources to enter college a guarantee of $100 per 
 
 year would mean a college education, if he is worth 
 
74 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 his salt. To the recent graduate of college, without 
 the funds ^^dth which to begin a professional career, 
 a guarantee of $100 per year would mean financial 
 independence. The young farmer or mechanic who 
 had $100 per year for three years in sight would 
 have a very great advantage in his first three lean 
 years. To all these classes such a proposition would 
 appeal very strongly, and the number included in 
 these classes is enormous. As a matter of expe- 
 diency it would probably be better to pay it in a 
 lump sum at the end of each year. 
 
 ^__ . It is believed that the sum pro- 
 
 Allowance for •, 1 1 i -, . . 
 
 TT^ ^J posed would be adequate to se- 
 
 Ecvpense Money i . ^ j.u 
 
 ^ "^ cure as many volunteers lor the 
 
 training as would be necessary. Possibly it would 
 
 be advisable to also make a small allowance weekly 
 
 for pocket money while with the colors ; say a dollar 
 
 a week. This would be a trifling addition to the 
 
 expense, and would greatly promote contentment 
 
 among the men. 
 
 In addition to the general training 
 
 _ ^ and to the vocational training in 
 
 Inducement j 4. xu i, 4. 
 
 many cases, and to the bounty pro- 
 posed, there is one more inducement that should be 
 held out for voluntary service. There will be many 
 officers to appoint, both in time of peace and in war. 
 It should be a fundamental rule that no drafted man 
 should be eligible to any such appointment, whether 
 it be to the commissioned rank or only to the tempor- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 75 
 
 ary duty of an acting lance corporal. The man 
 who has to be forced to perform his military duty 
 should never be placed in a position of authority 
 above the one who vokmtarily assumed his military 
 obligation. Eligibility to promotion, opportunity 
 to win rank and command, would be therefore 
 added as a powerful incentive to every young man 
 to come forward and offer to take the proper train- 
 ing that would fit him for military duty. These 
 inducements would probably result in more than 
 the required number of voluntary applications, 
 which would be only 147,000 per year in our great 
 country. That year would be better than one year 
 of ordinary college training for every young man, 
 and would be passed at a time in life when every 
 young man craves novelty, adventure, and a chance 
 to see the world. If these inducements should fail 
 to produce the full number required, then it would 
 be necessary to exert the full power of the govern- 
 ment to secure the additional number required. 
 
 ,-- , . . As it is necessary that the funda- 
 
 Machmery for j_ i • i j_ p m 
 
 . ,. ,. mental riffht oi the nation to re- 
 
 AppLication . .,.f • r? n •. 
 
 /^f, , quire military service oi all its citi- 
 
 of the system ^ . ^. "^ ^ i n i 
 
 ' "^ zens m time oi war shall be reas- 
 
 serted, and as this carries with it the right to require 
 them to take the indispensable personal training 
 in time of peace, so the means should be provided 
 to make this provision of the plan real and effective. 
 It is necessary that the machinery for enforcement 
 
76 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 of this phase of the law shall be provided in time 
 of peace, that it be tested by actual operation, that 
 the people become accustomed to its operation. 
 From this point of view it is rather desirable than 
 otherwise that the number of apphcants for volun- 
 tary training should fall somewhat short of 147,000, 
 in order that the other provisions of the law, effec- 
 tive only upon such shortage, may become effective 
 in time of peace, and the machinery operated for 
 practice before war is upon us. 
 
 Therefore, in case there be not enough 
 ^ ^ applicants who can pass the physical 
 
 requirements to fill up the annual 
 quota of 147,000 for any year, resort should be had 
 to compulsory service of a sufficient number to com- 
 plete the annual quota. For this purpose complete 
 lists of all men of military age should be estab- 
 lished, card indexed, and provisions made by which 
 immediately after closing the list of voluntary 
 applicants, say one month before the beginning of 
 the year of military training, the required number 
 should be selected by the best practicable system, 
 notified when and where to report for duty, and 
 compelled to obey the notice. There would be, 
 however, this difference; those thus drafted for 
 service would not become eligible for any promo- 
 tion during their four years of obligatory service, 
 nor would they receive any of the bounty which 
 would be paid to the men who take the training 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 77 
 
 voluntarily, nor should any drafted man be ever 
 
 eligible to receive a dollar of pension in case of 
 
 injury. 
 
 ^ _ This provision of the law should 
 
 A^o Pan • • 
 
 \j -n ^^ rigid. In this provision lies 
 
 ' ^''. the binding force, the "Sanction" 
 
 No Promotion^ ^ 4.1 i u- u -n i -4- 
 
 . ^01 the law, which will make it 
 
 No Pension J ^ x- rri.- • • • 4-u 
 
 enective. ihis provision is the 
 
 ' ' tangible assertion of the right of 
 
 the Nation to live, its right to self defense in order 
 that it may live. This provision of the law will in- 
 sure that each annual quota will be full. It will 
 forever put an end to anarchy and twaddle about 
 "peace at any price," "horrors of war," benefits of 
 "pacifism," and all the other milksop, mollycoddle 
 nonsense that has been so much preached in our 
 country in the last few years. If this plan were of 
 possible use for aggression against any other 
 country there might be some objection to it; but 
 its very foundation is in self defense, its antithesis 
 is aggression. It is hedged about by the provision 
 that these Minute Men cannot be called out without 
 the sanction of Congress, by whom they can be 
 called out am'^vay, whether or not. Its only object 
 is to make these men effective and efficient for na- 
 tional defense, and for no other purpose. Any 
 person who opposes adequate provision for that is 
 a traitor, unworthy to live in our country and enjoy 
 the benefits of its institutions. There may be dis- 
 
78 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 agreement as to what preparation is required and 
 necessary''. Those who are without military train- 
 ing and who oppose this plan may justify their 
 opposition by their ignorance; but even they can 
 only maintain that some other plan is, in their 
 opinion, better. No patriot, no loyal citizen, no 
 sane and honest person, will dispute that adequate 
 and proper pro^dsions should be made for the na- 
 tional defense. It is for those who oppose this 
 plan to propose a better one ; and when they do so 
 the author will be for it. 
 
 „ . _„ . Assuming this as a working 
 
 Cost of Transient i • m .i i . 
 
 _, ' , basis, then, the best one prac- 
 
 Fer sonnet, x- i,i j j.i, j. 
 
 ticable under the present 
 
 $58,800,000 per year .... . ,... r. ., 
 
 ^ ^ political conditions oi the 
 
 United States, we are now able to make an intelli- 
 gent estimate of the cost of the Transient Person- 
 nel for the National Defense. Our discussion calls 
 for the equivalent of 84 regiments in the training 
 school for Minute JMen, each of which is to instruct 
 1750 Minute Men annually, and these Minute Men 
 are to assume the military obligation of standing 
 ready for a period of three years after the comple- 
 tion of their instruction in the training school. As- 
 suming that there are enough voluntary applica- 
 tions, so that every Minute Man will receive the 
 bounty, and that there are no discharges, we reach 
 the maximum number at the end of the 4th year, 
 which is 441,000 Minute Men standing ready, and 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 79 
 
 147,000 in the then current class under instruction. 
 With the beginning of the 5th year one entire class 
 of Minute Men will be discharged from their obliga- 
 tion, and from that time on there will be always 
 588,000 men drawing the bounty of $100 per man 
 per year; a total of $58,800,000, per year. 
 
 This amount Avill be in addition to the present 
 appropriations made for military expenses, and in 
 return for this money, if this plan be adopted for 
 the National Defense, there mil always be available 
 for instant service the following trained forces: 
 
 !Two Di\asions Oversea Forces 40,000 
 One Division, Expeditionary Force 20,000 
 Oversea Coast Artillery Component 10,000 
 Minute Men, Trained and Equipped 441,000 
 Trained Total 511,000 
 
 /Minute Men, partially trained, fully equipped, 
 I stiffened by 25 selected old soldiers per 
 
 Partially \ company, with picked officers 168,000 
 
 Trained for ) National Guard, as at present organized 120,000 
 
 Reinforce- \ 
 
 ments. / Total reinforcement 288,000 
 
 \ Aggregate 799,000 
 
 And the total cost of this huge force, which 
 would forever guarantee the peace of the Western 
 Hemisphere, would be only fifty-nine million dol- 
 lars per year more than we are paying for our 
 present imbecility. 
 
 It may be worth while to compare this 
 
 Other Plans i -4.7 j.i i ^i j. 1, u 
 
 plan v/ith other plans that have been 
 
 ^ proposed. A scheme has been made 
 
 public, the fundamental feature of which is a 
 
80 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 "Continental Army." This plan proposes some 
 such idea as a regiment to each congressional dis- 
 trict; about 400 regiments or equivalent if carried 
 out on that basis. The cost has been omitted from 
 published estimates. If these men are to be paid 
 on the same basis as the present army such a force 
 would cost eight hundred million dollars per year. 
 It is proposed to give these "Continentals" two 
 months training per year, presumably under can- 
 vas, the most expensive shelter ever devised for 
 troops. If paid for only the actual time under 
 training under this scheme at the same rate as the 
 present regular army schedule, the cost would be 
 one sixth of eight hundred millions, or $133,333,333 
 per year in addition to present appropriations. 
 This is more than twice as much as the foregoing 
 plan would cost. If we count the two months 
 casual training that would be possible under the 
 proposed "Continental" system as of value equal 
 to the solid and thorough training above proposed 
 in this plan, the "Continentals" would receive 
 only six months training in three years, or only 
 half as much training, in three widely separ- 
 ated periods of two months each. The "Con- 
 tinentals" would have to be mobilized and de- 
 mobilized three times to get one half as many 
 days of instruction. When we come to plans for 
 mobilization, which imply sound organization, we 
 shall see that the plan herein proposed is capable of 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 81 
 
 being effective because it is sound and correct. No 
 military man who considers the "Continental" plan 
 from a purely military standpoint can honestly say 
 that the proposed training would be of any real 
 value, or the system capable of effective use in the 
 first six months of a real year. 
 
 General W. H. Carter has proposed a plan based 
 on the Congressional Districts in his last work, 
 The American Army, recently published. In 
 many respects General Carter's plan shows logical 
 thought and wide information; but on three vital 
 points it utterly fails. These vital points are: 
 
 1. Complete failure to estimate the cost. Gen- 
 eral Carter dismisses this element of the subject 
 with a dozen words, and without a single estimate of 
 expenses. 
 
 2. We find no indication of how men are 
 to be supplied for his proposed volunteer army. 
 The National Guard has reached its possible with- 
 out federal pay; patriotism, unsupported, can do 
 no more. It is not apparent in what manner the 
 federal volunteers outlined in General Carter's 
 scheme are to be obtained in time of peace, nor how 
 they are to be paid, nor how much. Without ade- 
 quate provision on these points no plan whatever 
 is practicable. 
 
 3. We look in vain in "The American Army" 
 for any system of organization on practical lines 
 which would be ready for immediate use; it might 
 
82 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 be possible to organize these "Federal Volunteers" 
 if we were to have as much time as President 
 Lincoln ; but this possibility is vetoed by the events 
 of August, 1914. 
 
 With so many vital defects, no plan, however 
 illustrious its author, measures up to the national 
 requirements. The proposal of the Secretary of 
 War in 1914, to merely add about 25,000 men and 
 a thousand officers to the regular army, is ludicrous. 
 No well informed military man would give such a 
 proposal a second thought with the problem of 
 real National Defense under consideration. 
 
 Summary of Estimates: 
 
 1. Men. 
 
 Trained, Organized and equipped, ready at once . . . 511,000 
 
 National Guards, available for reinforcements 120,000 
 
 Personnel for Training School Depot 168,000 
 
 Aggregate 799,000 
 
 2. Cost. 
 
 Permanent Personnel, per year $100,000,000 
 
 Transient Personnel, per year 59,000,000 
 
 These estimates apply both in time of war and 
 in time of peace. 
 
 Total cost of complete preparedness 
 
 (personnel) $159,000,000 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The Alternative. 
 _ One is a sufficient increase of the 
 
 Jl*WO 
 
 -r, .7 .7. . regular army to meet any possible 
 Possibilities m ' 1 1 ^ 
 
 emergency, iliis would requn^e a 
 
 standing army of a half million men, and would 
 cost $5,000,000,000 per year. It would take at least 
 ten years to develop such an army, if Congress were 
 to enact the necessary legislation this coming ses- 
 sion, if we are to go along the present lines of in- 
 efficiency from the standpoint of National Defense. 
 Nothing more need be said. The thing is not only 
 impossible ; it is undesirable. It would be not only 
 a crime against the industries and institutions of 
 our country, but also a blunder of the worst sort. 
 
 The other possibility is the development of the 
 militia to such a state of numbers and efficiency 
 that it will supply the needs of the National De- 
 fense. There are insuperable objections to this 
 alternative. 
 
 In the first place, the constitutional function of 
 the militia is that of a state force, available for only 
 three possible contingencies for national use. To 
 make it available for oversea or expeditionary use 
 an amendment to the constitution would be neces- 
 sary. Tinkering with that charter of human 
 liberty might be excused if there were the least 
 
84 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 necessity for it; but ample authority is given to 
 Congress by the constitution under the general war, 
 power to levy and maintain armies, and there is no 
 occasion to tinker with the constitution. All that is 
 necessary is for Congress to exercise its proper 
 power in relation to this subject. Tinkering with 
 the constitution, in addition to being dangerous to 
 American institutions, is also a slow business; and 
 if the national security depends upon such an 
 amendment as that there is httle probability that 
 national defense will be attended to in time to ward 
 off or meet the approaching danger. 
 
 ^In the second place, the militia is not, and from 
 its very nature, cannot be made a suitable force for 
 national defense or for offensive use. It has never 
 yet developed its own personnel to anything like 
 "Minute Man" efficiency and has never given any 
 reason to believe that it can do so. It must inevit- 
 ably undergo a federalizing reorganization in case 
 of war, ehminate the unfit, and recruit with green 
 men to war strength. This is a permanent condi- 
 tion with all militia organizations, cannot be re- 
 moved by legislation, and will forever prevent the 
 militia, as a body, from ever attaining such stand- 
 ards as would qualify it for immediate duty against 
 well trained troops in case of war. There are in- 
 dividual exceptions, of course; Moriarity's regi- 
 ment was fit in 1898, and went instantly, as it stood; 
 but the 71st New York also went as it stood, and 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 85 
 
 took the place that should have been taken by effec- 
 tive troops ; and the 7th New York, with its years of 
 boasting about its readiness and efficiency, did not 
 go at all — refused to go, just as New York militia 
 refused to go to Queenstown. There is no way of 
 overcoming this defect, which is inherent in the mili- 
 tia system. We cannot build the defense of our 
 country safely out of such material ; thighs of brass 
 and feet of clay. We must have homogeneous ma- 
 terial, and all of it trained to a high degree of excel- 
 lence, when we come to our death grapple of Liege 
 or the Marne. 
 
 Another vital objection to the militia system is 
 financial. We would have 48 different states 
 spending money to be repaid from the Federal 
 Treasury, without a check during the period of 
 organization. If all other defects could be over- 
 come, this one alone would prohibit the use of state 
 troops in time of war. It bankrupted the country 
 in the War of the Revolution ; strained its resources 
 to the elastic hmit in 1814-15; bankrupted the na- 
 tion again in 1863; and imposed hundreds of mil- 
 lions of unnecessary expense in 1898. Why not 
 learn from the School of Experience? 
 
 To increase the regular army to a half million 
 would be impossible in time of peace without con- 
 scription; and the American people will not sub- 
 mit to conscription except as a last resort. If the 
 thing could be done it would withdraw that many 
 
86 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 men from the productive activity in the industries 
 of the country, and would establish a military caste 
 which would mark the beginning of the "Decline 
 and Fall" of republican America. 
 
 To attract half a million to the militia service 
 would be equally impossible, and would be open to 
 the objection that it would organize a poHtico-mili- 
 tary clique in politics that would be even more 
 dangerous to free institutions than a regular estab- 
 lishment which cannot vote. It is with the very 
 greatest difficulty now that militia organizations 
 maintain a strength sufficient to draw their federal 
 pay. To increase their enrollinent very much 
 would be an impossibility. 
 
 No. All these alternatives are futile. None of 
 them can succeed. Like every problem, there is one 
 correct solution ; and the one herein proposed is the 
 correct solution of the problem of National De- 
 fense. The one reason in its favor that outweighs 
 all others is that it tcill work. The one reason 
 against all the others that is decisive is that they will 
 not work; none of them mil work. 
 
 Under this plan the permanent personnel will 
 become a productive body. The regular army will 
 become a well regulated factory, in which will be 
 elaborated the units of National Defense. Hav- 
 ing a definite, tangible object to accomplish, it will 
 be systematically organized to do that work in the 
 most economical manner. Its product will be Na- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 87 
 
 tional Security, guaranteed by the trained men 
 turned out from this factory ready to command this 
 security by force against any aggressor. It will 
 not withdraw a inan from productive activity, hut 
 will educate 147^000 young men each year for 
 greater economic value in a training school, tvith- 
 out an equal, and return them at once to productive 
 industries with their practical value greatly in- 
 creased. This factory of national security will 
 produce trained men for that purpose, and will 
 maintain an adequate number always in a state of 
 satisfactory training. This has never yet been done 
 by any system in our country, and cannot be done 
 by any other system that has ever been proposed. 
 ^ , The discussion has thus far related, 
 
 T, 7, .77 primarily to the financial side of the 
 Kesults will 1 1 T^ . . . o ^ 1 
 
 , , , problem. ±<jstimates oi numbers and 
 
 oe reached 
 
 details of methods have been given 
 
 only to enable us to reach a sound conclusion as to 
 the necessary cost. In that connection it was not 
 practicable to discuss methods of organization or 
 training, or to explain in detail how the different 
 elements of the proposed training school would be 
 distributed to accomplish the results desired. 
 
 A contractor, however, would go into details in 
 his estimates. He would determine how many 
 bricklayers, stonemasons, carpenters, painters, ex- 
 perts and unskilled laborers, would be required for 
 his contract. In the same way this discussion 
 
88 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 should show the organization, subdivision, main- 
 tenance and operation, of the forces proposed; 
 how many men would be assigned to each element, 
 as infantry, cavalry, machine guns, mobile artillery- 
 men, coast defense, special units, etc.; how the 
 147,000 members of the annual class of Minute 
 Men would be distributed among these units, and 
 how the necessary trained officers would be provided 
 for them. This is technical discussion, and should 
 be given in a work of this kind, in order that the 
 estimates may be revised by other military men. 
 But it belongs in subsequent chapters. The pre- 
 ceding chapters are intended as a financial summary, 
 with incidental analysis of the proposed system 
 enough to make it intelligible. The technical dis- 
 cussions follow in subsequent chapters. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Preliminary Discussion of Military 
 Organization. 
 
 We have reached a satisfactory finan- 
 Purpose of ^.^j estimate on a sound basis for the 
 Discussion j^^^^^^^i Defense. It is now pro- 
 posed to deduce a suitable system of organization to 
 insure the maximum return for the expenditure. 
 Let us continue the analogy of the contractor. 
 
 The banker determines that the necessities of his 
 position require the erection of a mansion on a site 
 selected by him. In a general way, from knowl- 
 edge of what other men in a similar condition of life 
 are using, he knows about what sort of a mansion he 
 wants, and so he goes to a competent architect for 
 detailed plans. With these plans he engages a 
 competent contractor for the purpose of embodying 
 in steel, stone, wood and plaster, the conception 
 which originated in his own mind, which was em- 
 bodied in working plans by the architect, and is to 
 be executed by the contractor. The Banker is not 
 himself an architect, nor a skilled builder; yet he 
 can tell by the use of ordinary common sense 
 whether or not the plans of the architect embody his 
 idea, and whether or not the contractor is faithfully 
 executing these plans, provided he pays enough at- 
 tention to the matter. If he does not pay attention 
 
90 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 to it he must rely upon the integrity of his employees 
 for its faithful execution. 
 
 So in this matter of the National De- 
 
 . ' . . fense. Congress, for the American 
 
 Application ^ j. i xi i r. . i 
 
 ^^ people, may take the place oi the 
 
 Banker; it is the agent of the nation, charged on 
 the oaths of office of its members with the duty of 
 providing for the National Defense. He who 
 formulates the plans may be compared to the archi- 
 tect, and he who supervises their execution may 
 represent the contractor. The military experts of 
 the General Staff, to whom any such plans will no 
 doubt be referred before their approval, may be 
 likened to a body of consulting architects who finally 
 approve the first draft of the architect's plans, after 
 such alterations as may be found necessary. The 
 Permanent Personnel of the army is the working 
 force of the Secretary of War, who stands in the 
 relation of overseer of the work. The part essayed 
 by the present writer is that of draftsman, making 
 an attemDt to formulate the first rouffh draft of a 
 
 J- o 
 
 workable plan. 
 
 __ . The subject of National Defense has 
 Previous , • i i 
 
 never been considered on a permanent 
 
 basis by Congress, and but few military 
 men have done more than try to meet the emergen- 
 cies of the passing day as best they could with a 
 makeshift expedient. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 91 
 
 Upton, the most brilliant mind our military sys- 
 tem has ever produced, rendered a great service b}^ 
 showing how it should not be done; but his con- 
 structive suggestions are too vague for practical 
 use. Carter, a great constructive mind of our 
 time, shows conclusively the necessity for half a 
 million men, but when we come to details his pro- 
 ject lacks the definite, clear-cut sharpness necessary 
 for constructive v/ork. Furthermore, his plans 
 would entail national bankruptcy in case of a real 
 war. Wagner was the great constructive military 
 mind between Upton and Carter; but Wagner's 
 work related wholly to two details, viz. ; infantry or- 
 ganization and scholastic instruction. The results 
 of his work may be summed up in two items; the 
 3 -battalion organization and the scholastic system 
 for instruction of commissioned officers. It does 
 not cover preparation for national defense in any 
 particular. In the same way Carter's great work 
 is the General Staff and the detailed staff system, 
 a great detail, but a mere detail in the great ques- 
 tion we are now at work on, and that detail relating 
 to the minor, almost negligible, organization of what 
 we know as "The Regular Army." 
 
 All these were stcT^s forward. 
 
 No Satisfactory i . -.i " . . 
 
 _, . ' , "^ but neither as separate steps, 
 
 Plan in Eooistence • n j i i -4.1, 
 
 nor as a jumbled whole with- 
 out articulation into any sort of system worthy of 
 the name, do these steps bring to the nation any 
 
92 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 real preparation for self defense. It is just for 
 that very reason, that none of those who have 
 worked on the mihtary work of the nation has pro- 
 duced a real system, that we can take their measure 
 and say that Upton's mind has not yet been sur- 
 passed in our military history. 
 
 These men have done some pretty big thinking; 
 some thinking in five figures; but as the late 
 Thomas B. Reed said, "This is a billion dollar 
 country." We must think in ten figures, not five; 
 for a century, not for the political exigencies of a 
 moment or one election or to gain a little promo- 
 tion. So far as I know, there has never yet been 
 formulated any comprehensive plan for the Na- 
 tional Defense, based upon correct principles, 
 worked out to detail enough to make it practicable, 
 looking to a permanent solution of this problem. 
 
 The National Defense has been left to be dealt 
 with when the crisis arrives, by those who may be 
 temporarily responsible for the public safety. The 
 methods adopted have always resulted from the 
 exigencies of the moment, and these exigencies have 
 more often been political than military. For exam- 
 ple, I happen to know that on the 26th of February, 
 1899, it was a purely political exigency that im- 
 pelled President McKinley to accept short term 
 volunteers under the Cockrell plan, in lieu of an 
 adequate increase of the regular army, under the 
 Hawley bill, then pending; I know this on state- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 93 
 
 ments made to me, personally, by both Senator 
 Cockrell and President McKinley. A similar poli- 
 tical consideration forced short term, state militia 
 and volunteers upon President Lincoln in 1861. 
 It is quite possible that a like political exigencj^ has 
 resulted in the plan for a "Continental" army, now 
 under public consideration. The national peril from 
 lack of any sort of preparation for self defense, 
 has grown exactly in the same ratio as the military 
 growth of other nations, and the world expansion 
 of our own country, exactly in proportion to the tre- 
 mendous advances in transportation, in proportion 
 to the invention of more scientific methods of war- 
 fare. 
 
 This peril has grown until it looms up today as 
 the one and only great issue before our country. The 
 very life of the nation is at stake, or may be at stake 
 at the will of any one of half a dozen nations. That 
 life cannot be safeguarded by "scraps of paper." 
 It must be protected by adequate preparation for 
 self defense, permanent preparation, instead of 
 patchwork, put together for reasons of political ex- 
 pediency. This preparation cannot be made after 
 the enemy strikes. It must be made in advance, in 
 time of peace, by men who will probably not be 
 officially responsible when the time of trial comes, 
 because they will have gone out of office, but who 
 will be responsible in History, for either lack of 
 foresight and capacity, or lack of moral courage. 
 
94 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 to do what they well know they ought to do. The 
 first public man who can take a national position, 
 as champion of this idea, ^^dll deserve to be elected 
 President, and mil become President upon this 
 issue, if the people can still have their way. The 
 people of the United States are neither "sissies" 
 nor "mollycoddles," neither cowards nor degener- 
 ates. They are just as ready to defend their coun- 
 try, and to make adequate, timely preparation to 
 defend it, as ever their forefathers were. And they 
 are fast awakening to the importance of immediate 
 action on that line. 
 
 _. _ ^ This will be my excuse for consult- 
 
 Pioneer Work . • • i 4.u o-u 
 
 mg principles, rather than prece- 
 dents, common sense, rather than common politics, 
 in formulating such a scheme of organization. It 
 is a form of pioneering. The ancient landmarks 
 of the military art have been swept away. Trained 
 imagination, the "Vision" of the seer, rather than 
 the laborious patience of the military pedant and 
 compiler, are demanded in the solution of this prob- 
 lem. The architect who planned the first steel sky- 
 scraper was not much helped by previous formulae. 
 
 _ _ _, . . Compilation of past statistics will 
 
 No Statistics are . -i • 4. -4. j.- 
 
 . __ - not do m our present situation. 
 
 now of Value ^ttt^ . . . . , . . , 
 
 ' We must not repeat the mistakes 
 
 of Lincoln and McKinley in organization. A revo- 
 lution has occurred in the art of war. Such mis- 
 takes would now be fatal. The machine gun, the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 95 
 
 aeroplane, the 42 -centimeter, 20-mile artillery hurl- 
 ing asphyxiating gas, wireless communication from 
 the sky for fire direction, the automobile transpor- 
 tation, have so revolutionized equipment, tactics and 
 organization, that statistics or opinions prior to 1914 
 are of little value. Accurate knowledge of the 
 military details of 1914-1915 will not be available 
 for many months. Our need for an organization 
 which will be capable of utilizing that knowledge 
 promptly when it becomes available, is imperative. 
 Our possible future enemies already have all this 
 knowledge, and have already taken full advantage 
 of it in their organization. We know that our 
 present disorganization, or present lack of a system 
 (for we have none worthy of the name) will abso- 
 lutely make it impossible to utilize new information 
 for years. We must prepare to face an enemy who 
 already has full information, already has full experi- 
 ence, has already perfected his armies in the use of 
 every one of the new devices, many of which we 
 do not yet know even by name. Just as surely as 
 some nation, or group of nations is going to emerge 
 from the clash in Europe as victor, just that surely 
 the victor is going to demand "reparation" from 
 the United States for alleged wrongs; just that 
 surely we must stand and deliver upon demand, 
 unless we prepare ourselves to defend our rights and 
 our country. Our need is pressing. The only 
 faculty that can grasp the situation is the trained 
 
96 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 military imagination, using the critical lens of com- 
 mon sense, through the medium of clear, pitiless 
 logic. 
 
 Therefore, in the details of organi- 
 Declaration of ^^^.^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ j ^j^^H ^^^ ^^-^ 
 
 Independence ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^ dismayed because the 
 plan is at variance with those previously submitted 
 by distinguished officers. Less attention will be 
 paid to precedents than to our needs. Sweeping 
 changes of organization will be recommended; but 
 with sure vision, clear vision, tested vision ; I know 
 what results will follow if the plan herein outlined 
 be adopted, and know that it must be adopted, sooner 
 or later, because it is right. It will work. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 ' The Proposed Organization. 
 
 One Division, complete, for the Philip- 
 
 Permanent . t i ^ 
 pme Islands. 
 
 Personnel q^^ Division, complete, Hawaii and 
 Panama. 
 
 One Division, complete. Expeditionary Force. 
 
 Ten Thousand Coast Artillery, Oversea Defense. 
 
 All these troops are to be established and main- 
 tained at all times on a war basis, ready for imme- 
 diate action. 
 
 In addition, an adequate permanent personnel, 
 as a part of the regular army, for a great training 
 school of transient personnel, for the duty of Minute 
 Men, to be used only for purposes of National 
 Self Defense, when so authorized by special Act of 
 Congress. 
 
 _ . . A division is a body of troops com- 
 
 Composition i . ..i . .. ^n n -i-. 
 
 v.. . . plete withm itseli, lor military pur- 
 
 of a Division • j.u ^ i j to. • ^.u " n 4. 
 
 ' poses m the held. It is the smallest 
 
 mobile force that contains all the elements neces- 
 sary for complete independent action. It contains 
 suitable proportions of infantry, cavalry, mobile 
 artillery, machine guns, signal troops, sanitary 
 troops, svipply troops, transportation, and other 
 auxihary units, necessaiy for independent opera- 
 tions in its theater of operations. The composi- 
 
98 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 tion of a division will vary with its theater of opera- 
 tions. For example, that for Panama, in a limited 
 field, for passive defense only, is one thing; that 
 for the Philippine Islands, where the theater of 
 operations is very large and extremely diversified, 
 is quite another thing. The composition of a divi- 
 sion must depend upon the theater of its operations ; 
 that of an Expeditionary Division, must contain 
 all the auxiliaries it is likely to need in any part of 
 the world to which it may be sent, from Alaska to 
 Jolo, from Cape Horn to Athabasca. The Expe- 
 ditionary Division, therefore, may be taken as the 
 complete one which must be organized, as the model, 
 to be modified in the cases of other divisions, accord- 
 ing to the particular requirements of their field of 
 operation. 
 
 . Organization depends, primarih^ 
 
 Analysis of ' • 4. rriu i. • -j. 
 
 _ . . upon equipment, ihe basic unit, 
 
 Ors^amzation . ^ • 4.u 4. u- i i. 
 
 ^ in all cases, is that Vv^nich can be 
 
 most effectively managed under the conditions 
 of its service by a single ofHcer. It may be 
 subdivided; he may use assistants; each of these 
 assistants may have, probably will have, a sub- 
 division of the unit, or an allotment of the duties 
 pertaining to it; but the basic vmit of all organiza- 
 tion, civil or military, economic, social or industrial, 
 is that number which can be most economically and 
 effectively controlled and used by one trained, cap- 
 able overseer, who is responsible for that unit, and 
 for the efficiency with which it is operated. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 99 
 
 In the military service, it is customary to desig- 
 nate this unit as a company, and it is commanded 
 by a captain. 
 
 .In construction work, such a unit would 
 
 na ogies ^^ ^ "gang," and its overseer would cor- 
 respond to a captain. In construction work, a con- 
 venient number of such "gangs" would be grouped 
 imder a superintendent, each gang doing its own 
 work under its o^vn overseer. Similarly, in an army 
 companies are grouped for tactical management 
 into battalions, and into regiments for administra- 
 tive direction. This is part of the technical side of 
 the military art, and it is just as difficult to explain 
 the reasons for the particular grouping adopted 
 in an army to a non-military man, as it is for a boss 
 mechanic to explain to a person totally ignorant 
 of machine shop practice why his workmen are 
 distributed thus and so. In both cases the non- 
 expert has employed a technical expert to manage 
 this distribution, and on matters of technical detail 
 it is logical and correct to accept the views of the 
 technical expert within the scope of his proper 
 duties. 
 
 ^^ .,. , There are two phases to this or- 
 
 Utilize what ... , , ^ i . 
 
 ^ . . gamzation problem. One relates 
 
 Organization we , ^ 4.-0 i j-i, 
 
 ^ to Permanent Personnel, the 
 
 already have, ^ .i . m • j. -r» it 
 
 . . ^ other to I ransient Personnel. In 
 
 far as it can be ,^ ^ . -r> i . i, 
 
 ' the Permanent Personnel there 
 
 C_/ tlLlZeCL I 1 • • • p 1 1 11 
 
 are two divisions 01 the problem; 
 that part always on a war basis, and that part which 
 
100 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 will be the permanent element of the training 
 school for Minute Men. These two parts of the 
 Permanent Personnel may be treated separately, 
 commencing with that part which will be always on 
 a war basis; the oversea defense and the expedi- 
 tionary force. 
 
 It is true that great changes in equipment, with 
 corresponding changes in organization, are immi- 
 nently impending. The automatic rifle is about to 
 displace the present rifle for infantry. The separ- 
 ate machine gun corps is now recognized as a neces- 
 sity, and England has adopted it under the stress 
 of the present war. With the adoption of this 
 corps will disappear the hybrid organization in 
 which machine guns form a part of each regiment. 
 It ought never have been adopted, and never would 
 have been adopted, if any sort of machine gun 
 organization could have been secured in any other 
 way. 
 
 The old officers did not want machine guns or- 
 ganized at all. Now, perhaps, after England has 
 shown us how, we may get them correctly organized. 
 An aero service must be recognized as a necessity; 
 not one run by men who cannot fly, but run by 
 bird men who can themselves fly, and know what 
 is necessary for that branch of the service by per- 
 sonal experience. Automobile transportation is with 
 us to stay, and must be organized. We have none. 
 Artillery material must be brought up to date again. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 101 
 
 If Germany can produce a 42 -centimeter mobile 
 gun, it is not beyond American inventive genius 
 to produce a better one. The day of anchoring the 
 personnel of the sea coast fortifications in concrete 
 emplacements is past. Their great guns should 
 be as mobile, within their theater of operations, as 
 required by the situation, and should be able to 
 fire toward the land side as a part of their own 
 defense. Railroad tracks, gasoline trucks, can be 
 used here as well as anywhere. Military coast rail- 
 roads on which such artillery and its supporting 
 troops could be moved would be of value far beyond 
 fixed forts, which can be avoided by the enemy. 
 The uses of the artillery, both coast and field, from 
 a vocational training point of view, should be de- 
 veloped. There is hardly any occupation of elec- 
 tric or mechanical nature in which these branches 
 of the service do not give a valuable training, valua- 
 ble in civil life. Such training could be made a 
 powerful factor in seeking enrollments for these 
 arms, and others that give similarly valuable training 
 in any rational scheme for military preparedness. 
 These changes will change all the drill books, change 
 the minor tactics, change the administrative routine 
 in some respects. So much is apparent to all think- 
 ing men ; but it would need the genius of Napoleon 
 to develop all these changes from the brain of one 
 man — and also as many secretaries as Napoleon 
 had. 
 
102 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 What is far better, far more important, for our 
 service, is to establish a system hy which changes are 
 bound to come in an orderly manner as rapidly as 
 they can surely be made. In devising such a system 
 it is far better to utilize what we have, than to 
 abandon it. In many cases only slight modifica- 
 tions of existing things will be necessary; in all 
 cases better and quicker results can be had by util- 
 izing what we have than by trying to create a new 
 military machine. We should create new machinery 
 only where the present organization cannot be used 
 economically for our purpose. 
 
 ^. ^ _ ^ . The Field Service Regulations pre- 
 
 Field Service -i, 4.u i. 4. • i- ^ -r> 
 
 . scribe the best organization lor Fer- 
 
 Kes:ulations . -r, i i • 
 
 * manent I'ersonnel, on a war basis, 
 
 that our mihtary experts have been able to devise, 
 
 in the light of all our experience and knowledge of 
 
 the military art. In many respects they are far 
 
 ahead of the statutory provisions, and they can be 
 
 changed by an Executive Order, which cannot be 
 
 done with statutory requirements. It is therefore 
 
 considered that the Field Service Regulations 
 
 should be adopted as the basis for the organization 
 
 of the Permanent Personnel, except in the item of 
 
 machine guns, subject to adequate provisions for 
 
 elasticity of system to be hereafter explained. This 
 
 covers the oversea defense and the Expeditionary 
 
 Force, a total of three divisions. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 103 
 
 _ _ _ But there is another element 
 
 Permanent Personnel ^^ ^^^ Permanent Personnel 
 of Training School ^^^^ j^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ 
 
 Field Service Regulations, and is so intimately re- 
 lated to the Transient Personnel, that its organiza- 
 tion must be considered in connection with that ele- 
 ment of the National Defense. This is the 84 regi- 
 ments, or equivalent bodies of troops, that will be 
 devoted to the training of the Transient Personnel. 
 The organization of this body will constitute the 
 "Training School for Minute Men," and in its 
 organization will be considered the necessary provi- 
 sions for continental coast defense, not heretofore 
 mentioned in this discussion. In order, therefore, 
 to devise a suitable organization for this part of the 
 Permanent Personnel, we must consider two other 
 things; the continental coast defense, and the dis- 
 tribution of the Transient Personnel to the differ- 
 ent elements of the service. 
 
 ^ . , ^ Continental coast defense is 
 
 Continental Coast m ^ j- • tx. 
 
 __ . _,, worthy oi some discussion. It 
 
 Defense Flans • ^-v -j i_i 
 
 ' mimobilizes a considerable num- 
 
 ber of men, and a very large amount of money ; how 
 much, may be conjectured from the statement that 
 over a million dollars has been spent at the one place 
 of Corregidor Island on insulated electric wire, 
 alone. If the pretensions of the extremists of that 
 branch were taken at face value the whole income of 
 the United States Government could be spent on 
 
104 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 coast defense alone, and all promotion in the whole 
 army would be given to coast artillery officers; a 
 branch of the service that has never fired a hostile 
 shot in action, and when taken alone is absolutely 
 helpless against attack from the rear. 
 
 Back in the administration of President Cleve- 
 land, a very distinguished Board, composed of high 
 officers and influential politicians, headed by Secre- 
 tary Endicott, elaborated an extensive scheme of 
 coast defense, which has been gradually carried into 
 effect by Congress. The subject has been treated 
 by subsequent Boards, as new territory has been 
 added to our country, until it has reached elaborate 
 proportions indeed. 
 
 The principal justification for the extreme im- 
 mobilization of men and money required by this 
 scheme is that the non-military population of the 
 seaboard cities fall into hysterical panic at the sug- 
 gestion of war, and that this elaborate plan is neces- 
 sary in order to protect them from the consequences 
 of their own fears, which would follow an invasion 
 in the shape of financial panic. It seems to be over- 
 looked that these fortifications invite attack, cancel 
 the immunity of unfortified places which is the best 
 protection of these places from destruction, and 
 that they are utterly defenseless except from direct, 
 frontal attack from the sea. Any enemy might 
 land at a distance of a single march, a few miles 
 up or down the coast, and could take them in the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 105 
 
 rear, where they are utterly undefended, and cannot 
 be defended except by a mobile army. No coast 
 defense of the United States has ever fired a hos- 
 tile shot except Forts Moultrie and Sumpter, the 
 latter against an attack from the land side by our 
 own people, illustrating the helplessness of all such 
 "Forts" when so attacked on the land side. Neither 
 was effective for the purpose for which designed. 
 Except in case of an invasion there is no human 
 probability that a shot will ever be fired from one 
 of them in hostility; and in that case the enemy 
 will be composed of well trained men, who will 
 certainly not sacrifice themselves by direct, frontal 
 attack, when a short march will accomplish their 
 purpose without loss. 
 
 ^^. . . _ Conceding that a certain number 
 
 Minimize the n - . . ... i, i j u 
 
 . 01 important positions should be 
 
 Immobilization of n .-n j •■ . -n i i • n 
 
 _ _ , ^^ ' lortmed, it may still be logicalh?' 
 
 Men and Money i 1 1 .1 . .1 ••• i ii 
 
 ^ held that these positions should 
 
 be selected for military reasons, rather than for poli- 
 tical considerations, and that every man and every 
 dollar that is unnecessarily immobilized is a detri- 
 ment to the National Defense. The present esti- 
 mates call for about 18,000 men for one relief in 
 the coast defenses. Three full reliefs are indispen- 
 sible to successful resistance to even a frontal at- 
 tack for any period longer than a couple of days. 
 This estimate is for permanent, fixed ordnance, and 
 not for the infantry defense of the rear, which must 
 
106 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 be organized in addition to the personnel just men- 
 tioned. 
 
 ^ T^ 7- /. /.Thus the equivalent of a dozen regi- 
 
 One Relief of . . i . .1 . ^ 
 
 ' ' ments must be at once taken out 01 
 
 the 84 regiments for Training School 
 
 Jrerounnet ip ii* t jy j* ±^1 
 
 work I or this one reliei 01 the sea 
 
 coast fortifications of continental United States. 
 The conditions of that service require a consider- 
 able proportion of expert men of special qualifica- 
 tions, whose instruction will afford opportunity for 
 such vocational training of Minute Men; but it is 
 believed, if the Permanent Personnel of the Coast 
 Defense comprises one complete rehef, and if this 
 relief is used as instructors for the other two reliefs, 
 composed of Transient Personnel or Minute Men, 
 the legitimate requirements of coast defense can be 
 adequately met. 
 ^. . . Each fortification has its own pecu- 
 
 . _„ .^ * liar conditions, and it is desirable to 
 of Tributary ... . . . n 
 
 ' 7 . maintain a certain amount 01 secrecy 
 
 Jropulation . j j. j.u -a.- ^ 
 
 ^ m regard to the organization and 
 
 equipment of these places. The best way to do this 
 will be to draw the Transient Personnel needed, all 
 the Minute Men that will be required, for any par- 
 ticular fortification, from a territorial district adjac- 
 ent to it, where they can be kept in closer touch with 
 their war duties than other Minute Men. This indi- 
 cates the designation of a district of suitable popu- 
 lation for each coast defense fortification, from 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 107 
 
 which shall be taken the Minute Men necessary for 
 that fortification, and this district should be exempt 
 from other military demands upon its inhabitants. 
 Preferably this district will be territory served by 
 the fortification in question, and thus there will be 
 an element of self interest on the part of the people 
 of this district in making its personnel effective. 
 
 But this provision, alone, is not a 
 Land Defense ^^^^^^^^ ^oast defense. Unless the 
 also Necessary fortifications are also protected by an 
 adequate mobile force on the land side, it is a waste 
 of money to spend a dollar on them. 
 
 As an example, the case of Portland, Maine, may 
 be cited. In 1902, I proposed a joint maneuver of 
 the army and the navy at that point, with a view to 
 fixing attention upon the landward side of the prob- 
 lem, and submitted a discussion of that phase of 
 coast defense through military channels. The result 
 was a decision to hold the proposed joint maneuver 
 in 1903, the first time such a joint maneuver of the 
 army and navy was ever held in this country. As 
 the only available officer of the mobile army, I was 
 requested to submit a scheme for the mobile element, 
 of the land defense of this maneuver, and therefore 
 made a very careful study of that terrain. 
 
 It was thought, after riding all over the ground, 
 after taking into consideration all the probable land- 
 ing places of the enemy, after careful consideration 
 of all the known factors of the problem to the best 
 
108 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 of my ability, that not less than 36,800 mobile troops 
 would be necessary to resist with any prospect of 
 success a well directed attack upon this harbor. The 
 available mobile troops were then utilized in the 
 plan submitted to outline the advanced elements of 
 this mobile force in the proposed maneuvers, which 
 were held on that basis. The details matter little in 
 this discussion; the significant thing is that prac- 
 tically two complete divisions of mobile troops would 
 be required for the landward defense of this port, 
 alone; and that these conditions are typical of the 
 conditions at all the other coast defense fortifica- 
 tions. 
 
 _^ , ., _ - The mobile troops assigned to 
 
 Mobile Forces for ... -i . • u m u 
 
 ^ 7 T^ « this duty m each case will have 
 
 Ltand Defense • i ui j 
 
 ' a special problem, and may re- 
 
 quire special training. For example, the conditions 
 at Corregidor are peculiar to that place. It is a 
 small island, dominated within easy artillery range 
 by a mountain accessible to the enemy, but an island 
 that can be rendered virtually impregnable within 
 its own defenses by infantry properly trained in 
 the special lines necessary for that particular situa- 
 tion. It can therefore hold out against all enemies 
 except lack of food, water and munitions, for an 
 indefinite period, if such infantry be assigned and 
 specially trained for its duties. The mobile defense 
 on the mainland, while essential to the defense of 
 Manila from land and sea attack, is not in this case 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 109 
 
 essential to a prolonged defense of Manila's coast 
 defense fortifications, which can be sustained for a 
 long time after Manila falls from land attack, if 
 properly prepared in advance, and if there is any 
 reason for holding Corregidor after Manila falls 
 into the possession of the enemy. 
 
 These examples illustrate the necessity 
 
 ^ -,. . I or special trammg lor the miantry 
 
 Conditions, ^ j.u i.-i 4- ^ 
 
 component, the mobile component, 01 
 
 ^ . . the coast defense, and the numbers of 
 
 ^ mobile troops that may be called upon 
 for that sort of service. Special requirements fre- 
 quently call for special organization and special 
 training. The mobile troops of the Minute Man 
 class located in the territory adjacent to such forti- 
 fications should therefore be organized and trained 
 with special reference to the conditions in their re- 
 spective localities. The Minute Man component 
 assigned to the coast defense fixed armament, es- 
 pecially, should be specially organized and trained 
 in its particular duties. In cases, as at Corregidor, 
 where the mobile troops also require special organi- 
 zation and training, this should be taken into ac- 
 count; but in the general case any well organized 
 mobile force can be adapted to the landward defense 
 of any fixed fortification more economically than a 
 special body can be assigned and trained for the 
 special purpose. It will be well to make the mobile 
 contingent in every locality familiar with the special 
 
110 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 requirements of that locality, and to assign it for 
 duty in that locality in case the developments of 
 the campaign result in military operations in that 
 theater of war; but save in the one case of Corre- 
 gidor it is thought that no special assignment of 
 mobile troops to any particular coast fortification 
 is necessary, and that the assignment of one com- 
 plete relief of Permanent Personnel, equivalent to 
 12 regiments from the Training School component, 
 will give to the coast defense an adequate working 
 force. The assignment of this Permanent Person- 
 nel as instructors in the Training School for the 
 Minute Men who will be required in their particu- 
 lar fortification is a satisfactory application of the 
 Training School idea for this purpose; and the as- 
 signment of the available citizens of the adjacent 
 territory to furnish the Minute Men, or Transient 
 Personnel, will insure that the peace time garrisons 
 can be raised to a war basis with the least possible 
 delay; a war force specially interested in their as- 
 signed duty, and specially trained to perform it 
 properly. This system would give adequate and 
 efficient service for the fixed fortifications, without 
 great increase, undue increase, disproportional in- 
 crease, in the number of troops, either of Perma- 
 nent Personnel or Transient Personnel, immobilized 
 for that purpose. Each fixed fortification would 
 have its due number of Permanent Personnel for 
 one complete relief, and these men would be the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 111 
 
 trainers and instructors of the Transient Personnel 
 which would be assigned to the service of that forti- 
 fication in time of war, men having local interest in 
 its service in addition to their general patriotic in- 
 terest in their country's defense. The mobile ele- 
 ments would all receive a general training that 
 would fit them for service anywhere, and they would 
 not be immobilized, unless the attack fell upon their 
 particular locality. In that case, of course, the mo- 
 bile component, trained in that locality, would have 
 a peculiar value for service in its own environment. 
 We therefore assign the equivalent of 12 regi- 
 ments for Permanent Personnel of Sea Coast For- 
 > 
 
 tifications, with the additional duty of training the 
 transient personnel that will be assigned for the 
 same duty. 
 
 Before an intelligent discussion of the 
 ' . "^ problem of organizing the training school 
 
 can be made, it is also necessary to con- 
 sider certain other features, and to determine what 
 proportion of the permanent personnel of the train- 
 in*? school shall be assigned to the auxiliary services. 
 Aviators who can really fly, as well as draw "flying 
 pa^^"; Signalmen; Sanitary service; Quartermaster 
 Corps; Engineers, and all the auxiliary elements 
 that do not find a suitable place within the organi- 
 zation of the four principal arms, infantry, machine 
 guns, mobile artillery and cavalry, must be taken 
 into account in organizing the training school. Spe- 
 
112 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 cial instruction, special organization, are necessary 
 to the highest degree of efficiency in these units. 
 These requirements can be better met if specially 
 selected men are assigned to them. Not every man 
 can become a wireless operator or an aviator; not 
 every man possesses the mechanical ability to oper- 
 ate automobile transportation, or the business abil- 
 ity to become an efficient member of the Quarter- 
 master's Corps. A way must be provided to put 
 the round pegs in the round holes, if we would at- 
 tain the maximum possibilities of any system. This 
 must be done, too, without robbing the fighting line 
 of its best men. A way can be found. 
 
 Thus far we have dealt with tactical 
 
 Administrative ... • .u • 4. 4.- ^ • 
 
 . . organization, with instruction oi m- 
 
 ® dividuals, and methods of organiza- 
 
 tion to promote individual instruction. But we must 
 also consider the larger phases of organization and 
 administration, the training of grouped tactical units 
 in cooperation, in team play, if we wish to design a 
 satisfactory system of organization. This part of 
 military organization has never been completed in 
 our country in time of peace. In time of war it has 
 always been absolutely haphazard, never based upon 
 any preconceived plan arranged for in time of 
 peace. Neither General Carter's plan published in 
 The American Army, nor "the plan" for a "Con- 
 tinental" army, offers any attempt to provide for 
 this part of organization. Both leave us floundering 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 113 
 
 along with individual tactical units until the very 
 beginning of War, then to bring together for the 
 first time for the defense of some American Lou vain 
 the elements which must be articulated to form an 
 army. This omission would be enough to condemn 
 any plan. 
 
 . . . Just as the basic unit for individual 
 
 Administrative . • • • .1 o-u 4. .<? 
 
 . . trammg is the company, that lor 
 
 ( fT" CTfl 711 ^fltt OTI * . 
 
 ^ . * . minor tactics is the battalion, and 
 
 The Basic Unit . 1 . -? j + -i j j • • 4. a.- 
 
 that tor detailed administration is 
 
 normally the regiment, so there is a basic unit for 
 grand tactics, the method of using combined ele- 
 ments in war, for superior administration, for the 
 activities of general officers who should think in big 
 numbers rather than in terms of individual units. 
 That unit is the Division. 
 
 This is the military unit of smallest size that is 
 complete within itself for campaign operations. It 
 is the first unit as we progress in combining elements 
 that contains in due proportion all the components 
 of the service necessary to military operations. In 
 this unit is a complete miniature army, with full ad- 
 ministrative authority ; infantry, machine guns, mo- 
 bile artillery, cavalry, sanitary service, signal serv- 
 ice, engineer element and supply service, all com- 
 plete. 
 
 In command of this unit we find for the first time 
 adequate rank and proven capacity (or should find 
 it) for big military problems, in a Major General. 
 
114 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 This unit, therefore, is the fundamental basis for 
 the organization of the training school. 
 
 This unit is likewise the logical basis for the terri- 
 torial divisions into which the training school will 
 necessarily be divided, and which will correspond to 
 the tactical divisions of the training school. Each 
 territorial division will contain a tactical division. 
 It will be commanded by a Major General, and 
 divided into three brigade districts for the infantry 
 brigades of the division, w^hile the other troops, the 
 auxiliary troops, will be raised at large within the 
 territorial limits of the division. Each of these 
 brigade districts will expand automatically into a 
 division in time of war, and will receive its due share 
 of special troops from the central training school 
 for that auxiliary, according to the assignment of 
 the division to duty, and as the army commander (in 
 time of peace the JMajor General of the original 
 division) may determine. 
 
 Each division will have a central training school 
 for its auxiliary parts, not necessarily all located 
 at the same place ; and these, as well as the training 
 schools for the infantry, will be under the INIajor 
 General Commanding the division. Each brigade 
 commander will automatically become a division 
 commander of an expanded brigade, expanded into 
 a division of infantry by the assignment to duty of 
 its Minute JNIen the instant the war becomes immi- 
 nent. Each expanded brigade, or war division, will 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 115 
 
 be completed by the assignment of its proper share 
 of auxiharies by the commanding general. The 
 whole army will come automatically into existence 
 by proclamation of the President, whenever Con- 
 gress may so authorize. The War Department will 
 have nothing to do whatever with the details of this 
 organization or its expansion to a war basis, and, 
 thus relieved of a mass of detail that should never 
 be attended to in any war department, its chiefs 
 will have time for the larger questions of strategy 
 and war policy that should be determined in the war 
 office instead of in the newspaper offices. Let us 
 decentralize. 
 
 We have already allotted the equiva- 
 
 _, . lent of 12 regiments of the training 
 
 Estimates i i . 4. 4.u x. a 4* 
 
 school components to the coast deiense 
 
 ^ of continental United States. We are 
 
 Component 4. j 4. • u 
 
 ^ now to determine how many more 
 
 Elements i 1 j u • j 4? • i 
 
 should be assigned tor special purposes 
 
 and how many divisions can be organized in the 
 training school. We can not do better in this allot- 
 ment than to be guided by experience, stipulating 
 for sufficient flexibility of organization for sub- 
 sequent improvements. The question of flexibility 
 of organization is to be discussed in a later chapter, 
 and need not enter into the summary of present 
 experience. The summarized experience of all the 
 mihtary men of all time, brought down to date as 
 nearly as I am able to do it, indicates the following 
 
116 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 ratios of component parts of an army division, in 
 terms of regimental units or fractional parts there- 
 of. 
 
 Infantry 9. 
 
 Cavalry 3. 
 
 Mobile Artillery 3. 
 
 Separate Machine Gun Corps 33j 
 
 Engineers 66§ 
 
 Signalmen QQ 
 
 Sanitary 50 
 
 Quartermaster Corps 50 
 
 Administrative personnel 33J 
 
 Total parts 18. 
 
 We have estimated for the equivalent of 84 regi- 
 ments, of which we have set aside 12 regiments for 
 coast defense. This leaves the equivalent of 72 
 regiments to be divided among the foregoing ele- 
 ments in the ratios above indicated to form the per- 
 manent personnel of the Training School for 
 Minute Men. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Organization, continued. 
 
 As ^ve have 72 regiments dispos- 
 Four Divisions in ^^-^^^ ^^j^ ^^^^^^ ^j^^^ j^^t ^^^^ 
 
 Training School divisions for the training school. 
 The tactical and the territorial division will be com- 
 bined for simplicity. Continental United States 
 will, therefore, be divided into four territorial divi- 
 sions, and one tactical division of the training school 
 will be assigned to each territorial division. Each 
 territorial division will have one complete tactical 
 division of the training school, with all of the Per- 
 manent Personnel of the training school that 
 belono-s to that work. Each of these divisions will 
 maintain a complete training school system for 
 Minute Men. Each will provide for the mobiliza- 
 tion of its own entire personnel. Each will attend 
 to all the details of organization, both in peace and 
 in war, for all the forces assigned to or trained 
 within it. Each will be complete within itself. Each 
 division will be commanded by a Major General, 
 who will have all the subordinate commanders and 
 staff necessary for his work. He will have an ade- 
 quate permanent personnel for the training of the 
 Minute Men to be raised in his division and in- 
 structed by it; and he will be charged with the duty 
 
118 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 of preparing it for war and commanding it when 
 it is called for service in war. 
 
 The organization of the coast de- 
 l. as J ns ^gj^gg transient personnel centers in 
 each coast defense district about the Permanent 
 Personnel, which will be located in the permanent, 
 fixed fortifications of that district. At these points 
 the Minute Men of that coast defense district 
 report for their year of training ; to the same points 
 they report at once when the President issues his 
 proclamation that a public emergency exists that re- 
 quires the mobilization of the trained Minute Men 
 of the nation. They will serve the same guns at 
 which they were trained, and will be commanded 
 by the same officers who trained them. 
 
 . . In each territorial division will be 
 
 Ors;anization j • • 4. j.- j. 4. u- u 
 
 . j^. . . an admmistrative center at wmcn 
 
 ' will be established the instructional 
 
 facihties for the special auxiliaries of that division, 
 and to which will report those members of the tran- 
 sient personnel selected for assignment to these 
 auxiliary services, such as sanitary personnel, signal- 
 men, and other elements enumerated above of 
 minor numerical importance, but of a tactical im- 
 portance far beyond their numerical index. Here 
 also will be the administrative center of the tactical 
 division, charged with the training of all the men in 
 the division, with their enrollment, their mobiliza- 
 tion, the supervision of their supply and equipment, 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 119 
 
 their assignments to organizations for war service, 
 and their demobilization at the end of their service. 
 
 ^ _ ^. . . Such a division will naturally be too 
 
 Subdivisions , 4. u ji -o-i, 4. u^- • • 
 
 large to handle without subdivisions. 
 
 The militaiy organization of the division into 
 brigades is happily adapted to such subdivisions; 
 the logical scheme of expansion for war service will 
 fit equally well into a rational scheme of subdivision. 
 The special units will be provided for at the central 
 place of administration, though the actual training 
 schools for these units may be located at the most 
 convenient point. The division, therefore, can be 
 logically divided into three districts, each of which 
 will have the personnel of one training school 
 brigade, and all the Minute Men that will be trained 
 by that personnel. Each of these will be under the 
 command of a brigadier general, charged with the 
 supervision of its operations in time of peace, with 
 the mobilization of its entire trained force for war, 
 and with the command of that force in the cam- 
 paign that will follow its mobilization. The Per- 
 manent Personnel will be charged with the instruc- 
 tion of the Minute Men, with their enrollment, their 
 assignment, and their transfers as occasion may 
 require. Each district will be a complete Lmit 
 within itself as far as the infantry service is con- 
 cerned, and will furnish the infantry organization 
 for one complete division in case of war. The 
 records of instruction, assignment and transfers. 
 
120 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 for the special, auxiliary arms, would be kept at 
 the Division Headquarters, at which the enrolled 
 men would be received on enrollment cards from 
 the district headquarters at the beginning of the 
 school year. The special arms would thus be re- 
 lieved entirely of the labor of enrollment, in view of 
 the extra labor which they will have to properly in- 
 struct their men wdthin the time assigned for the 
 purpose; but they will keep all records pertaining 
 to their own men after their enrollment. 
 
 ^^ _ . ^ The proper proportion of this ele- 
 
 Machine Gun . . i. 4. 4. i • 4. u 
 
 ment is one batt^^lion to each 
 
 ^ brigade, the battalion being three 
 
 companies of three platoons each, the whole work- 
 ing under the orders of the brigade commander. 
 There must also be an adequate reserve in addi- 
 tion to the foregoing organization. The estimates 
 for the infantry regiments above given include one 
 company of machine guns to each regiment, as now 
 provided in the Field Service Regulations of our 
 army. In addition the proportional parts indicated 
 also provide for 33 J % of a regiment in numbers to 
 each division as a separate machine gun corps. 
 When the Field Service Regulations shall be 
 amended in this particular so as to separate the 
 machine gun service from infantry and cavalry 
 these estimates will give, when combined in a separ- 
 ate corps, the proper pro rata allowance of machine 
 guns in the division. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 121 
 
 This machine gun organization will be suscept- 
 ible of expansion in just the same way as any other 
 part of the system. It will constitute one of the 
 special units of auxiliary troops to be handled at 
 division headquarters in time of peace, and will be 
 treated as a separate corps in the rest of this dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 . . Infantry is the basis of all armies. It 
 
 ^ will be the basis of this training school. 
 
 The territorial division of the country 
 
 ' "^ will be based on the tactical divisions 
 of the infantry, after setting aside the necessary 
 districts for coast defense. The whole country 
 (less artillerj^ coast defense districts) will be divided 
 into four divisions. Each of these divisions will be 
 subdivided into three districts, and the districts may 
 be subdivided into subdistricts for the regimental 
 training schools, local branches of the great national 
 training school. To each territorial division will 
 be assigned one tactical division of the permanent 
 Pei^sonnel of the Training School, on a training 
 school basis as to organization and numbers. To 
 each district will be assigned one brigade of this 
 tactical division, and to each subdistrict one regi- 
 ment. Each of these regiments will constitute a 
 local or regimental branch of the national training 
 school, for the purpose of enrolling, training, equip- 
 ping, assigning, mobilizing on call and demobiliz- 
 
122 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 ing at expiration of the emergency, the transient 
 personnel, or Minute Men of its subdistrict. 
 
 The special training school branches required in 
 the division for training the personnel of the auxil- 
 iary services will be located at the most convenient 
 points within the district for the purpose. They 
 may be managed as one training school branch in 
 each division for each special arm, or may be divided 
 into three brigade branches, as a matter of conve- 
 nience, to be determined by the circumstances. In 
 general it will be better to make one such branch in 
 each division than to split these special schools up 
 into brigade branches. The proper quota of 
 Minute IMen students will be supplied for each of 
 them from the regimental subdistricts ; and since 
 the only object is to so assign men as to produce the 
 best results it will be possible to send to these special 
 schools men who desire as much vocational training 
 in their military course as possible. 
 
 __ . . ci 1 1 Each company of this training 
 
 Trainins; School , i -n • . ^ j.u 
 
 _ .*. school will consist oi three 
 
 Ormnization, • • j xe j «- 
 
 ^ ® . commissioned omcers and 23 
 
 interior • i j u- i. 
 
 picked soldiers as permanent 
 
 personnel, organized into battalions, regiments and 
 brigades and divisions as now prescribed, or may be 
 hereafter prescribed in the Field Service Regula- 
 tions. An element of flexibility is to be introduced 
 into the organization in this way, to be explained 
 more fully in the next chapter. At the most con- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 123 
 
 venient date in each year each company will receive 
 125 members of the Transient Personnel for a 
 period of one j^ear, to be trained as highly as possi- 
 ble in that time. These trained men will then store 
 their fitted equipments and take the status of fur- 
 lough for 3 years as Minute ISIen, subject to call 
 when so authorized by Congress. 
 
 The details of this course of training 
 
 Details of -ii j i,j. • j-^ x 
 
 _„ . . ' will vary, no doubt, m diiierent arms 
 
 Traininsr p . . " - -, . 
 
 ^ 01 the service and m one year, more or 
 
 less, from that given in preceding years. There is 
 no occasion in this discussion to write schedules of 
 training. It is enough to indicate, for example, 
 that a certain period will be devoted to enrollment 
 and organization; then a period of theoretical in- 
 struction, as at West Point; then one, possibly a 
 month, devoted to practical work, during which 
 designated elements of the f urloughed Minute Men 
 may be called out for a brief review of their pre- 
 vious training, and to become acquainted with the 
 new personnel; a suitable period would follow for 
 completing the year's work by issuing furloughs 
 to the new Minute Men who had just completed 
 their year of training, discharging those who had 
 completed their three years of special liability, dis- 
 banding the transient personnel, storing equipment, 
 and assigning the recently furloughed men to their 
 proper places in the expanded organization; and, 
 
124 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 last, a period of rest and relaxation during which 
 the permanent personnel of the training school 
 would enjoy a vacation analogous to that of col- 
 leges in lieu of the usual leaves of absence now 
 given to officers. 
 
 rri. V ri 1 "^^^^^ cycle will constitute the or- 
 
 J^ y ' dinary year's work for the train- 
 
 Fleocibility of .^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^, Minute Men. The 
 
 ^ ^ same phase of the cycle need not 
 
 necessarily be in progress at the same time in all the 
 divisions, or even in all the districts of a division. 
 That is a matter to be regulated according to the 
 climatic and industrial conditions in each district, 
 and this flexibility will be used to obtain the best 
 results in each district. The month or so, for exam- 
 ple, for practical training would be assigned just 
 before the period of demobilization and should fall 
 in that time of year that will permit the maximum 
 out-of-door work at the minimum inconvenience 
 industriall}^ to the furloughed classes. This would 
 cause the cycle to begin at different times of the 
 year in diiFerent districts, a matter of consequence 
 only as a matter of convenience, since each district 
 can be made practically independent of all the 
 others in the arrangement of its schedules of 
 
 instruction. 
 
 Two of these periods will be specially 
 
 important. These are the enrollment 
 
 and the demobilization periods. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 125 
 
 Since we have reasserted the doctrine of obliga- 
 tory mihtary sei^ice, it becomes necessary to make 
 and keep an enrolhnent of all male citizens of mili- 
 tary age. This will be one of the most tedious and 
 laborious of all the preliminary jobs by which the 
 system will be installed. The census tables, the 
 grand jury lists of judicial districts, even the party 
 lists of county committees, and especially the lists 
 that can be furnished by postmasters, will give the 
 preliminary data for this work. Dividing the whole 
 country into divisions, and these into districts and 
 subdistricts, with reference to population and trans- 
 portation facilities, will be the first step in this work. 
 Then will come the assignment of the proper quotas 
 of the Permanent Personnel to their respective dis- 
 tricts ; but before this can be done it will be neces- 
 sary to reorganize the regular army upon the new 
 
 basis. 
 
 Deferring discussion of army re- 
 un ary organization and assuming that 
 Enrollments distribution has been made of the 
 Permanent Personnel of the training school, then 
 will come the call for voluntary enrollments in 
 the training school. This must be made in a 
 campaign of publicity in order to familiarize 
 the American people with the idea. The offi- 
 cers and men of the training school must be used 
 to make practically a personal canvass of their 
 territory, explaining to everybody just what the 
 
126 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 new training school is, what it will teach, how it will 
 proceed, and what liability to military service will 
 be incurred bv voluntary enrollment, what advan- 
 tages will follov/ voluntary enrollment, and what 
 disadvantages will result from drafted service. A 
 strong appeal to the latent patriotism of the people 
 must be made. The high standards of the regular 
 service must be exhibited to the people by the con- 
 duct of these officers and men, and every possible 
 appeal made to the public intelligence in order that 
 its citizens shall loyally support the only system that 
 can ever enable the country to defend itself. Right 
 along with this canvassing campaign can be con- 
 ducted the first enumeration of all those liable to 
 military service. 
 
 At a fixed date it would be necessary 
 
 ,^. ^, to close this canvassine^ campaign. 
 
 Minute Men n^^ u ^ i 4. n 
 
 ine number 01 voluntary enroll- 
 ments for the first class would then be known, 
 there would be a list of all citizens liable to 
 military service who had not volunteered, and it 
 would be possible to select from this list those 
 who must be drafted to complete the first an- 
 nual class. There are many ways in which this 
 draft could be made. All of a certain age might 
 be taken, enough to insure complete classes with a 
 surplus; then exemptions could be made from this 
 list to reduce it ; and out of the remainder the neces- 
 sary number could be chosen by lot. Other and 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 127 
 
 better plans may be suggested ; but there would be 
 no difficulty in devising a plan that would insure 
 the completion of the annual class. This is a ques- 
 tion of the ability of the nation to live; a question 
 where the inclinations of the individual, and his pri- 
 vate interests, must give way for the general good 
 of the whole country. The nation has a right to the 
 services of her citizens in war ; and it has an equal 
 right to require them to take the necessary personal 
 training to make their services efficient. The re- 
 quired training cannot be given in time of war with- 
 out paying a frightful penalty for impreparedness, 
 and possibly meeting national disaster as a result of 
 it. Therefore, the rights, if they have any rights, 
 of the few must give way in order that the rights 
 (as they surely have) of the many may be served. 
 With the annual class thus comnleted, the train- 
 ing school would proceed to the execution of its 
 instructional program; and from that time all its 
 operations would proceed upon well ordered lines 
 of activity. 
 
 ^ _ _ _ In the course of this preliminary 
 
 Card Indexes .. n . , v ui 4. -r 
 
 enumeration oi those liable to mili- 
 tary service it would be expedient to create a card 
 index covering the v/hole population of each dis- 
 trict, at least the whole military population. The 
 creation of this card index would require the assign- 
 ment of certain members of the permanent piersonnel 
 
128 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 to this particular duty. Possibly it might be that 
 the Census Bureau could be usefully employed on 
 this duty in connection with the training school, to 
 avoid duplication of labor by the Federal Govern- 
 ment ; but if not, the military personnel could keep 
 its owTi records. Provision should be made so that 
 the card of any person could be forwarded from one 
 district to another upon change of residence, so that 
 no man could evade his military duty by mere 
 change of residence. This is the weakest element in 
 any militia system; for if Private John Smith, of 
 the militia of Ohio, sees fit to remove his residence 
 to Indiana, there is no federal law by which Smith 
 can be held to his military obligation in Ohio, and 
 no mere state law can cover the case. As a matter 
 of fact this defect of our militia system is frequently 
 resorted to by men who wish to drop their duty as 
 members of the militia. 
 
 These card index records and their permanent 
 clerks would become the key to the whole system of 
 National Defense ; and if, at a later date, the num- 
 ber of voluntary enrollments should be inadequate, 
 this office force w^ould be charged with the duty of 
 drawing the additional number of cards required 
 to complete the annual training school class, and 
 with notifying the selected men w^hen and where to 
 report for duty. 
 
 _ . Of course there would be certain ex- 
 
 Exemvtions .. . . .n . • i 
 
 ^ emptions by law. All countries have 
 
 that feature. Such a feature is properly based upon 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 129 
 
 the fact that the exempted person is rendering 
 equivalent necessary service to the nation that must 
 go on in time of war, or has some disabihty that 
 would prevent him from rendering effective mili- 
 tary service. The only support of a family; the 
 student who is pursuing an equivalent course of in- 
 struction in a military or professional school, the 
 profession being one useful to the national defense ; 
 the cripple; the member of the militia actually en- 
 rolled and performing his militia duty according to 
 lavv^; these would be exempt from draft. The ex- 
 emption of militiamen from draft would at once fill 
 up the ranks of that organization with competent 
 men and put new life into the organized militia. 
 The passage of a suitable pay bill for the militia, by 
 which the Federal Government would give to that 
 body of patriotic men reasonable recognition for 
 their valuable and patriotic services, would complete 
 a chain of help for the militia which would make it a 
 really effective body in the National Defense, to be 
 used, as it was properly used in the beginning of the 
 government, for local defense for emergencies, and 
 for the three purposes mentioned in the constitution 
 of the United States. There are many able-bodied 
 citizens who would gladh^ serve in the militia, under 
 the constitutional restrictions, who could not and 
 would not willingly undertake the wider liability of 
 oversea or expeditionary service; service which 
 might be required for the offensive defense of the 
 
130 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 country in time of war, the "canying of the war into 
 Africa" which is sometimes the best possible defense, 
 but which might be imcompatible with their personal 
 necessities, and yet perfectly compatible with local 
 service, a necessary service which must be rendered 
 in order to permit other bodies of troops to make the 
 offensive return which may decide the war. 
 
 Possibly the Civil War expedient of hiring a sub- 
 stitute might be permitted under some restriction. 
 Provided the substitute be an acceptable man, and 
 the exempt be a useful citizen in some other direc- 
 tion, there might be sound reasons why such sub- 
 stitution could be permitted in many cases. The 
 system should be flexible in such particulars. 
 Regulations would be prescribed to govern this 
 subject, and would be amended from time to time; 
 but the institution of a card index enumeration 
 would be the first preliminary v/ork of the training 
 school personnel, the basis of all this application of 
 the law, and its maintenance up to date from year 
 to year would be an important routine duty. 
 Whatever might be the regulations as to exemp- 
 tions, the drawings should be absolutely impartial, 
 and the exemptions should be impartially accorded 
 to all citizens. I am aware that this proposition is 
 likely to be the stumbling block in the adoption of 
 this plan for the National Defense; but no plan 
 can be effective that does not make sure provision 
 for the annual classes. There must reside in the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 131 
 
 Federal Government the right and the power, as 
 there does reside in it the undoubted duty, to pro- 
 vide adequately for the National Defense. It is a 
 matter of self preservation, of self defense, that we 
 are considering. The very ability of the nation to 
 live is at stake in this thing. Nothing less than the 
 above provisions will be effective; therefore, since 
 these are the irreducible minimum conditions of na- 
 tional self defense, they must be complied with by 
 the Congress and the American People. 
 
 Immediately upon the arrival of the 
 . ' annual class at the designated ren- 
 
 ^ ^ dezvous would come their assign- 
 
 ment to duty and the issue to them, as soon as they 
 could be made ready to care for it, of their arms 
 and equipment. First would be the selection and 
 assignment of the quotas necessary for the special 
 arms, to be sent to the division schools for these 
 auxiliaries, and there to be at once entered upon the 
 proper course of training for their special services. 
 The issue of equipments would be a permanent 
 issue, to be kept for the same man during the whole 
 period of his military service. This would elimi- 
 nate one of the most tedious delays met with here- 
 tofore in the organization of volunteers. The 
 soldier would retain and use this equipment during 
 his whole year at the training school, and it would 
 then be stored, properly tagged with his name, at 
 the rendezvous, ready for immediate use by him 
 
132 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 upon emergency call. Even his shoes would be 
 fitted and broken into service in time of peace; a 
 small, but exceedingly important detail, for it goes 
 directly to the initial marching abihty of troops in 
 time of war when marching ability is of the utmost 
 importance. 
 
 At the close of the training year would 
 come two important details of organiza- 
 . p tion work. The first of these would be 
 the completion of the cards of the fur- 
 lough class. This would include notation of pro- 
 ficiency, indication of any special qualifications, 
 permanent assignment of the man to company, 
 regiment and brigade, his rank and designation of 
 the rendezvous to which he would report upon issue 
 of the President's proclamation, and his postofiice 
 address. A copy of this card would be given to the 
 man as his furlough authority, a copy filed with the 
 card index of the organization to which he was as- 
 signed, and a copy filed with the general card index 
 of men liable to military service. One card form 
 would be sufficient for all this work, and the filling 
 out of this card form would begin with the fkst 
 enumeration of the districts. 
 
 ^. . The other vitally important duty 
 
 JStorasre of u i, x xT j 
 
 _, .* ' would be to secure the arms and 
 
 Equipments . . o ^i n i i i 
 
 ^ ^ equipments oi the imioughed men, 
 
 put them in proper shape for storage, and place 
 them in suitable warehouses in due order with all 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 133 
 
 that pertains to the assigned organization. The 
 more carefully this work be done the more perfect 
 will be the mobilization when there is an emergency. 
 By this system practically all the labor of mobiliza- 
 tion will be done at the end of the school year, and 
 when the time for action comes nothing will be 
 necessary but the proclamation. The special 
 branches of the training school for the auxiliary ser- 
 vices would proceed in exactly the same way through 
 the annual cycle. They would tag and sort equip- 
 ments in the same way, and would be ready for ac- 
 tion just as quickly as the infantry under this 
 system. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 _, ^ In the military art, as in all other 
 
 General ^ 4. i j • 1. u 
 
 ^ _ . arts, tools and equipments are be- 
 
 C onsiderations . . .i • j . i 
 
 mg constantly improved, new tools 
 
 are being designed, and new applications of old 
 
 ideas constantly made. It is therefore an error to 
 
 fix our organizations by statutory requirements and 
 
 limitations so they cannot be changed to meet the 
 
 new conditions. This is one of the most serious 
 
 errors that has handicapped the development of the 
 
 National Defense in our country; that and the 
 
 lack of adequate sanction for experimental work. 
 
 As an illustration of how this rigidity 
 Illustration j. . 1 . i j.i ^ j. j. 
 
 /. 7 T^ /. 01 system w^orks, take the eirort to 
 of the Detect -, 1 ,^ i- • -i-u 
 
 ' ' develop the machine gun service, with 
 
 vdiich I am familiar. 
 
 In 1897, the project of organizing a machine gun 
 service was reduced to proper form, and submitted 
 to the Commandant of the Ft. Leavenworth School 
 (General Hamilton S. Hawkins), by whom every 
 possible encouragement was given to continue the 
 special studies along that line. He submitted the 
 plans to the Faculty, by w^hich these plans were 
 favorably considered and he forwarded the plans 
 to the War Department with a favorable endorse- 
 ment, recommending that they be developed. 
 Nothing came of it. There was no statutory sane- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 135 
 
 tion for any such experiment, or for the necessary 
 organization. 
 
 The War with Spain came on. Even then there 
 was no sanction for a new thing that had been 
 favorably considered by the ablest body of tactical 
 experts then in om* service. Application after ap- 
 plication to move along that line was turned down, 
 and the applicant was made to feel severety that he 
 was in strong disfavor, by reason of his activity 
 along a line that did not meet with the favor of 
 those in authority. The preliminary steps for an 
 organization had to be covered under the pretext of 
 a detail for duty at the Ordnance Depot, by which 
 means a dozen men were got together who were 
 willing to learn how to use a machine gun as an 
 extra piece of work in addition to strenuous duty. 
 
 The time came for the expedition to Santiago to 
 embark. This unofficial organization was omitted 
 from the orders for embarkation, was left stranded 
 as a depot guard, and had to be smuggled aboard 
 ship in the technical status of "absent without leave" 
 from their assigned station and duty at the depot, 
 a status that ten days would convert into the more 
 serious status of "Desertion in time of war." These 
 men accepted this risk, just as they afterward ac- 
 cepted the chances of battle, in order to render a 
 service unprecedented in warfare, the demonstra- 
 tion to superiors who were unwilling to see it of 
 a new arm of the service, a new weapon in offensive 
 warfare. 
 
136 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 Without a chance to fire a single shot in target 
 practice, they broke the back of Spanish resistance 
 at the critical moment when victory or defeat 
 depended upon their efforts. They created a new 
 epoch in warfare that is now recognized on all the 
 battle lines in Europe, and outlined a correct system 
 of organization for a new arm of the service that has 
 just received the absolute recognition of England 
 after a year of experience with all sorts of substi- 
 tutes for the correct thing. 
 
 But they did all this without recognition, without 
 
 orders, in the face of jeers and official opposition 
 
 of the most galling kind, at the risk of being classed 
 
 as "Deserters" in the face of the enemy. 
 
 ^ Ti^-7 7 7 It should not be necessary for any 
 A Hidebound .i • . ^ i . •. j \ 
 
 ^ new thmff to hm\i its way under such 
 
 System . . . . . 
 
 ^ difficulties in any sound organization. 
 
 But there is worse to tell. For 17 years since that 
 time it has been the same uphill work to secure any 
 sort of organization for the machine gun service, 
 some sort of legal status for it, and still the fight is 
 unsuccessful. In 1905, after substantially every 
 other great nation in the world had adopted some 
 sort of machine gun organization, one was proposed 
 for the United States, only to be met v/ith the ob- 
 jection that the organization of our army is pre- 
 scribed by statute, and that no legal sanction for 
 any such organization was in existence. This ob- 
 jection, of course, was raised by officials who did 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 137 
 
 not want to see any such organization, either because 
 they were professionally so far behind the times that 
 they did not see the necessity, or else because they 
 did not want to be bothered with the work of or- 
 ganizing a new thing. 
 
 After months of study to find a way around this 
 technical objection, a way was found to accomplish 
 something, a very unsatisfactory thing, but still 
 something, under cover of legal sanction, that was 
 never intended by the statesmen who enacted the 
 law. 
 
 A plan was drafted in 1906, and submitted to 
 President Roosevelt, proposing that he cause the 
 necessary guns to be bought as "equipment" of in- 
 fantry and cavalry which is not prescribed by Act 
 of Congress; and that he then order the necessary 
 number of infantrymen and cavalrymen detailed to 
 work these guns, under his general authority. The 
 organizations thus formed had to be designated as 
 "provisional." It was found that this could be done 
 without such a transgression of the law as would 
 entail the impeachment of the President by a hos- 
 tile Congress. It so happened that Colonel Roose- 
 velt believed in the proposed use of such guns, be- 
 cause he had personal knowledge of their use at 
 Santiago, and that on this one occasion he followed 
 his personal views, in spite of all opposition, being 
 absolutely sure that even in this objectionable form 
 the provisional organization would give a good ac- 
 
138 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 count of itself in action. Thus a system of "pro- 
 visional" platoons was established in 1906, but ab- 
 solutely without legal status. 
 
 As expected, the evils of this imperfect system of 
 organization led to so much protest that by 1908, 
 it was necessary to make some new move to save the 
 situation; so a "provisional" company was proposed 
 for experimental work, under the same color of 
 legal sanction. Again receiving the aid of Presi- 
 dent Roosevelt, based as before on his personal 
 knowledge of the fighting value of such an organi- 
 zation, it was found possible to crystallize public 
 sentiment in favor of the retention of the provi- 
 sional platoon organization, in spite of its obvious 
 defects, in order that our army might not be totally 
 deficient in this element of the service. 
 
 Similar conditions are met with in other depart- 
 ments of the service. 
 
 All officers who exhibit originality and enter- 
 prise have similar experiences. It is on a par with 
 the custom of department clerks to make it hot for 
 any clerk who works overtime, or works more effi- 
 ciently than themselves, "make it hot" for him, 
 because his example may mean increased work and 
 higher standards for them. 
 
 A fundamental defect of our system is indicated. 
 Instead of penalizing originality, progressiveness, 
 and "Vision," there should be means provided in 
 our system by which these qualities would be en- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 139 
 
 couraged and rewarded by suitable recognition. A 
 way is proposed in this discussion, by which this 
 can be done without detriment to the interests or 
 promotion of others. 
 
 . If the stress laid on this point seems 
 
 ...... to be out of place and unreasonable, 
 
 Fleooibility of ^.^^^^i^^^ that on this point hangs 
 
 ^ the whole question of adequate pre- 
 
 paration for National Defense. Unless we make 
 suitable provision for experimental work, and 
 for the adoption and application of its results 
 when demonstrated to be sound, with adequate 
 recognition for those who do such work, however 
 well we may prepare on the basis of our present 
 knowledge of the military art, we shall be just as 
 badly outstripped in a few years in some new direc- 
 tion as we have been distanced in the last few 
 years in the machine gun service and in the aero 
 service. Both of these originated in our own coun- 
 try, and both have been brought to a high state of 
 perfection in Europe, while we have stood still on 
 account of the absolute unadaptability of our mili- 
 tary system to utilize new devices or new methods. 
 
 rw^-, T^. 1 i^,T . The thinff above all other things 
 
 The Vital Thing .. , ^ , . ^ . . ., ^ . 
 
 * vital, supremely important, is that 
 
 we should have a system by which we can utilize 
 
 the fruits of our own ingenuity and keep other 
 
 countries from stealing our ideas and inventions. 
 
 There is no desire here to censure any individual, 
 
140 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 but to call attention to a condition; to focus atten- 
 tion upon a grave defect of system, in the hope of 
 bringing about improvement, bringing about the 
 adoption of a system whereby improvements in the 
 military art, originating with Americans, can be 
 utilized by some means less cmnbersome than the 
 education of the non-military American Public 
 into an overwhelming political demand for action 
 by Congress. That method is too slow, too public, 
 and insures that the other fellow will "beat us 
 to it" every time. 
 
 If we were to accept the schedule of organiza- 
 tions above indicated as correct, without some pro- 
 vision that would permit of readjustment as the 
 art of war is developed, and were to enact this 
 scheme into statute by Act of Congress, parts of 
 this legislation would begin to be obsolete before the 
 statute could be printed. No matter what form of 
 organization be adopted now, if we incorporate in 
 the statute a reasonable provision for flexibility of 
 organization, for elasticity to meet and adopt and to 
 develop improvements, then this system can be 
 brought up to date and kept up to date. Such a 
 provision is far more important than the form of 
 organization that may exist, or may be adopted at 
 any given time. 
 
 Of course the reply is that provision already 
 exists through the Board of Ordnance and Fortifi- 
 cation, the Ordnance Department and the Quarter- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 141 
 
 master Department, for such developments. But 
 the fact remains that in spite of all these channels, 
 and in spite of all these explanations, the present 
 means are not effective. So long as those who labor 
 to devise new things only succeed in preparing our 
 possible enemies to use them, as has been the case 
 in the machine gun service and in the aero service, 
 so long as their ideas, like the social elect of the 
 "400," must have the stamp "Approved in Ger- 
 many" or "Approved Abroad" upon them in order 
 to be recognized and adopted in our own country, 
 so long as there is even a general impression (which 
 there is without a doubt) that no idea stands a 
 chance of adoption unless it originates in the de- 
 partment concerned, that long our system is fatally 
 defective. 
 
 There must be some sort of a board of review 
 for such things that can take them out of the hands 
 of the interested departments, in which the officials 
 are only too apt to feel that any suggestion for 
 improvement that does not originate with them is 
 a reflection upon themselves, not to be tolerated for 
 a moment. That is the kernel of the nut, say what 
 you will; and the decision in all such matters must 
 be made by disinterested experts who are above such 
 petty considerations. 
 
 Possibly Secretary Daniels may have rendered a 
 very great service to the country by the organiza- 
 tion of his Board of Advisory Technical Experts. 
 
142 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 The mere existence of such a board will tend to 
 secure a fair hearing for new ideas such as they 
 have never had in the past. But this advisory 
 Board of Experts is not a complete solution. The 
 President should have statutory power to regulate 
 the matter, and to reserve for the exclusive use of 
 the United States all valuable products of Ameri- 
 can Genius that can be utilized in its defense. This 
 cannot be justly done without adequate power to 
 suitably reward the inventors or discoverers of such 
 devices or ideas. There is no sound reason why 
 officers of the army and navy should be exempt from 
 the benefits of such a law. The products of inven- 
 tive genius or original research are above and out- 
 side of routine duty. That is the very theory on 
 which patents and copyrights are based. The reward 
 for them should be above and beyond the regular 
 stipend paid for routine service. The government 
 might exercise a right analogous to that of "Emi- 
 nent Domain" in such cases, but that right is not 
 invoked without suitable appraisement and reim- 
 bursement. 
 
 G reat stress has been laid upon this point, because 
 it is thought to be the supreme defect of our system, 
 or lack of system. With adequate provisions to 
 correct this defect all other needed improvements 
 will follow as a matter of course, provided we do 
 not tie up the new organization by statutory enact- 
 ments as to details, but leave it free to adopt and 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 143 
 
 utilize the products of American Genius. Without 
 correction of this vital defect, we can never have a 
 system of National Defense that will be up to date. 
 Republican institutions do not lend themselves 
 readily to prompt adoption of improvements. They 
 are really more conservative than autocratic govern- 
 ments in such matters. An edict from the Mikado, 
 adopted our machine gun system in July, 1908, 
 before the report on the original JMachine Gun 
 Company could be completed. A Ukase from the 
 Czar makes a national change in habits overnight. 
 A military order from the Kaiser is sufficient to 
 develop aero and submarine service as quickly as 
 human ingenuity and German thoroughness can 
 do it. But in our country, under present conditions, 
 specific authority from Congress is necessary for 
 the change of the most insignificant detail of mili- 
 tary organization. Each department of the mili- 
 tary service is pulling with all its might for what 
 it can get for its own little interest, and this is ac- 
 centuated by a wretched system of promotion which 
 fixes the whole personal interest of each officer upon 
 the augmentation of his own little special branch 
 of the service. The Member of Congress who seeks 
 for military advice from two different departments, 
 is sure to hear two different sets of arguments, each 
 hostile to the other, both from public and selfish 
 iaterest; and if he extends his inquiries to other 
 departments his activity will develop just as many 
 
144 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 lines of special pleading as he enters different de- 
 partments. The creation of a great popular demand 
 for specific legislation, is always very difficult. 
 
 Proposed Law on this Subject. Be it enacted, 
 etc. 
 
 1. The President shall have power to prescribe 
 all needful rules and regulations, from time to time, 
 for the military forces of the United States, and 
 to make such changes in organization as he may 
 see fit; provided that the annual appropriations 
 made by Congress shall not be exceeded as a result 
 of any such change of regulations or of organiza- 
 tion. 
 
 2. The President shall have power to consider 
 and to test any new idea or invention, whether of 
 equipment, ordnance, tactics or organization, under 
 such regulations as he may prescribe from time to 
 time. Provided, that if as a result, any such idea, 
 device, equipment or other suggestion, be foimd to 
 have a military value, the President shall have power 
 to cause the same to be reserved for the exclusive 
 use of the United States, and to determine in what 
 manner and by what amount the author or inventor 
 of such device, idea or suggestion, shall be rewarded 
 by the United States. 
 
 The contractor who built the Banker's 
 
 • T mansion, used the very best and latest 
 
 tools and materials. 11 he had not done 
 
 so, the Supervising Architect would have protested. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 145 
 
 The contractor also employed the most competent 
 workmen he could find. Again, if he had not done 
 so, the Supervising Architect would have protested 
 to the Banker. On this protest the Banker would 
 justly have cancelled the contract and employed 
 another contractor. In using these materials and 
 men, the contractor would have used the latest, best, 
 and surest methods. Again, if he had not done so 
 the Supervising Architect would have made a pro- 
 test, and the methods would have been brought up 
 to date or a new contractor employed. 
 
 Now, in this analogy Congress may 
 Applications ^^^^^^^^^ ^.j^^ Banker, the President 
 to this case ^^^ Contractor, and the Secretary of 
 War the Supervising Architect. Construction of 
 the edifice of National Security from Predatory 
 Attack — which no man since August 1914, may 
 deny to be a danger that threatens our country — 
 is surely worthy of at least as much care as the con- 
 struction of a house for a private banker. In our 
 analogy, we have strained nothing. Let us apply 
 the deductions honestly, no matter where the shoe 
 pinches. We must have an honest Contractor, who 
 really intends to construct a satisfactory National 
 Defense, and not to merely use that national neces- 
 sity as a means to gain advantage in politics. We 
 must have a competent Supervising Architect ; com- 
 petent from a military point of view, one who knows 
 the business just as well as the Supervising Archi- 
 
146 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 tect that the Banker would employ, not one who 
 is merely a good lawyer or a good judge or an 
 astute politician. For the sure elaboration of a 
 sure National Defense, the country needs a Secre- 
 tary of War who is technically competent to super- 
 vise military work, not merely an amiable man or 
 one distinguished in some other profession. 
 
 It will also be necessary to provide for the best 
 and latest equipment, not in a piecemeal, haphazard 
 fashion, but as hberally as the work demands, and 
 as fast as it can be used. When would that Banker's 
 mansion have been built if the materials had been 
 doled out scrap by scrap, with long intervals of 
 delay before each issue; and how much would the 
 cost be increased by such a method of supplying 
 the material? The nation needs this edifice of se- 
 curity from predatory attack a good deal worse 
 than the Banker's Family needed the new house. 
 The Banker could rent a house, or buy one that 
 would serve his necessities temporarily, or could go 
 to a hotel. The nation cannot do any of the things 
 that would correspond to these expedients, and just 
 as surely as some nation or group of nations is go- 
 ing to come out of this European War with advan- 
 tage, just that surely our country is going to be 
 called upon to settle a big score of grievances and 
 to defend the integrity of the Western Hemisphere 
 which will be attacked under the pretext of Mexican 
 intervention or adjustment of claims growing out 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 147 
 
 of the existing disorders in that country. Unless 
 we supply all the necessary materials, employ the 
 best talent we have on the job, and utilize the ser- 
 vices of a technically capable man for Supervising 
 Architect, we shall be absolutely at the mercy of 
 any such aggression, and the bill will be many times 
 over more than it would cost to make adequate 
 preparation to meet the emergency, and make that 
 preparation while there is yet time enough to do it. 
 This provision must include adequate flexibility of 
 organization and equipment, on the lines above in- 
 dicated, to be successful. 
 
 A little discussion will make this clearer 
 .® ^ to the non-military reader. Equipments 
 " ^ vary from age to age. To the Greek 
 
 phalanx, the 16-foot spear; to the Roman legion, 
 the throwing javelin and the short sword; to the 
 mailed Crusader, his armor, mace, battle axe, lance 
 and the long sword; to Frederick's Grenadiers, the 
 matchlock and the bayonet; to Napoleon, over- 
 whelming artillery ; to William of Prussia the needle 
 gun ; to his grandson, William of Germany, the ma- 
 chine gun, the taube, asphyxiating gas, submarines, 
 20-mile artillery, mreless communication, the motor 
 transportation. The end of invention is not yet. 
 Our own Edison has predicted that our next war 
 will be one of machinery (in which he is wrong, for 
 war is never a conflict of machinery, but of the skill 
 that uses machinery) ; but we can foresee some of 
 
148 • Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 the imminent changes now impending, and we can 
 be sure that the future will bring as many as the 
 past has brought. 
 
 Changes of equipment bring changes of 
 ^^ drill and instruction, for these are only a 
 ' sort of training in the use of equipments 
 
 combined with the discipline that results from 
 proper subordination for organization. The infan- 
 tryman learns at drill how to load and aim his rifle 
 and use his bayonet ; the artilleryman how to deter- 
 mine ranges and work his guns to make hits where 
 the fire commander directs ; and so on. Any change 
 in the detail of equipment brings a corresponding 
 change in the details of drill and instruction. The 
 manual of arms with the present rifle is quite 
 difl*erent from that with the Springfield forty-five 
 of thirty years ago. The drill of the field artillery- 
 man is vastly difl*erent now from what it was with 
 the old brass, muzzle loading "Napoleon" of the 
 Civil War. 
 
 _,- - Tactics, the art of managing com- 
 
 C nances or i • -, i . ^ .1 
 
 p ' bmed elements 01 an army on the 
 
 battlefield, also changes with equip- 
 ment and with drill. The tactics of the phalanx 
 failed before those of the legion. Those of the 
 muzzle loader failed before those of the needle gun. 
 Shock tactics for infantry virtually died at New 
 Orleans when Packenham's veterans went down to 
 defeat before the sharpshooters of the backwoods. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 149 
 
 Now that the machine gun has come to its own, 
 new tactics must be devised to meet a new equip- 
 ment. It has produced a deadlock along the whole 
 Western Line in Europe, in spite of the aero service 
 and the heavy artillery. Nothing but the use of 
 machine guns on both sides prevents one or the 
 other from breaking the line of the other side at 
 some point. 
 
 Other forms of equipment vary. 
 other Changes .^,,^^ automobiles of Gallieni 
 
 showed that a new system of transportation must be 
 reckoned with in the future. The soup cart and 
 the fireless cooker have made individual cooking 
 out of date. The wireless combined with aero ser- 
 vice has revolutionized the service of security and 
 information. Prophylaxis has revolutionized the 
 science of sanitation. No more does the surgeon 
 regard gangrene as a necessary evil; no more high 
 rate of mortality from typhoid and camp dysentery. 
 The interior management of the hospital, corres- 
 ponding to the "drill" of line troops, has undergone 
 as great a change as its exterior service in relation 
 to other parts of an army. The preventable diseases 
 like typhoid and small pox, are treated at the re- 
 cruiting office by prophylactic inoculation. 
 
 Dysentery and malaria are treated at the camp 
 kitchen and cess pools. Instead of long wards full of 
 patients the modern military surgeon is busy teach- 
 ing men to filter their water, screen their food, 
 
150 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 avoid mosquitos, and safeguard themselves from 
 incapitating consequences of other unavoidable 
 diseases; how to establish and to maintain aseptic 
 conditions in case of wound and injury. 
 
 _ - Many of these improvements are so 
 
 Kecentness of j. 4.1, x • • 1 1. 
 
 _ ' recent that no provision has been 
 
 Improvements -, . • ^ .i ^r^^^ 
 
 ^ made m our service lor them. Ihe 
 
 combination of aero service with wireless communi- 
 cation has been made since August 1914, but has 
 not reached us yet. The automatic rifle that works 
 was invented by an American officer, but was re- 
 jected in our service. It was then accepted by 
 Belgium, and demonstrated on the firing line. It 
 is now being furnished to Belgium, France and 
 England, from American factories, by American 
 talent, but not to the United States Army. The 
 immediate adoption of such a rifle for our infantry 
 is indicated by the tactical developments of the last 
 year, but we have not even begun to consider how 
 such an automatic rifle should be organized, and a 
 discussion of this topic is prohibited — as if discus- 
 sion or nondiscussion would alter the facts. The 
 ostrich hides its head in the sand. 
 
 ^ . _ _, Now the point being made is not 
 
 Defect of System .... n u j 1, x xi. a. 
 ' ' ^ criticism 01 anybody, but that we 
 
 are working under a defective system. The de- 
 velopment of new equipment, new drill to go with 
 it, new organization to satisfy the requirements of 
 both, must not be checked by the incorrect judg- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 151 
 
 ment of any one man or group of men. The 
 establishment of a national system by which such 
 improvements can be made in spite of such oppo- 
 nents is infinitely more important than any particu- 
 lar kind of equipment, drill, tactics or organization. 
 The encouragement of our people, especially our 
 permanent officers, to think in terms of the Moni- 
 tor, the Gushing Torpedo, the aeroplane, the ma- 
 chine gun, the automatic rifle, wireless communi- 
 cation; in terms of progress, that is the important 
 thing. 
 
 We must have a statute requiring that every new 
 idea, every new invention, shall be submitted to 
 practical tests by persons of adequate skill who have 
 no ossification of initiative, no personal pique or 
 interest, in order that their valuable features may 
 be developed for the exclusive use of our own coun- 
 try. With such a law the separate machine gun 
 service, long ago demonstrated as the only correct 
 form of organization for that service, would have 
 been adopted in our country years ago. Under 
 such a law experiments would have been begun as 
 soon as Browning invented the automatic pistol to 
 apply this principle to the rifle and to determine 
 what changes of organization are necessary in order 
 to introduce such a rifle into the service. No sen- 
 sible man has doubted that, sooner or later, the auto- 
 matic principle must replace the less efl'ective 
 
152 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 weapon for rifles as well as pistols; but it took 15 
 years to get even the automatic pistol adopted. 
 
 . In this case it is easy to see 
 
 An Apphcation of j^^^ ^^^j^ experiments could 
 the Proposed System ^^ conducted. A sufficient 
 number of automatic rifles could be handed to one 
 or more live-wire captains, with orders to work it 
 out; find out just how many such rifles can be 
 advantageously used in their companies; just what 
 changes of equipment will be necessary; just what 
 sort of drill regulations must be written in order to 
 utilize it to the best advantage; just what changes 
 in organization should be made in their companies. 
 Then their report should be tested in the same way 
 by the next higher unit, the battaUon, and one or 
 a dozen comparisons made by means of suitable tac- 
 tical problems with the present rifle and system. 
 
 Such a series of tests would speedily settle all 
 questions in regard to the matter, and under our 
 proposed system there would be ample authority in 
 the President to make the best idea effective for 
 immediate application, within the current appro- 
 priations. If it were of sufficient importance to 
 make such action desirable, he could apply to Con- 
 gress for a special appropriation; but in any case 
 there would be action, and the pitiful state of un- 
 preparedness we now have could not be traced to 
 any defect of the military system. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 153 
 
 Precisely the same sort of logic applies to every 
 military problem. It is only a matter of applying 
 the rule of common sense, just as a business man 
 uses common sense about his own affairs. It is quite 
 possible that the best form for this idea to take 
 might be a Bureau of Invention and Improvement, 
 *a technical bureau, furnished with adequate funds, 
 authorized to use as many line troops as might be 
 necessary for its experimental work, and having 
 jurisdiction of all such matters. Such a bureau 
 would have saved the Wright aeroplane ideas for 
 our own use, instead of driving them abroad for 
 recognition; would have perfected the Lewis Rifle, 
 with its correct design for the dissipation of heat, 
 instead of driving it to Belgium; would have ar- 
 ranged long ago for a separate machine gun organi- 
 zation; would now be considering the automatic 
 rifle for infantry and the changes resulting from 
 its adoption; would be working upon some prac- 
 ticable system of feeding our men; also some way 
 to supply them with water ; might have a dozen other 
 valuable ideas before it that have never been pre- 
 sented because there is not at present any hope that 
 any such idea can receive practical consideration. 
 
 To such a bureau the President might say: "It 
 is clear that the Belgians have put one over on us 
 in this matter of the Lewis Automatic Rifle. They 
 have a good thing which we have not got. The 
 Germans have a better way of feeding their men 
 
154 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 than we have. The Japs have a better bayonet. 
 The French have worked out a hand grenade that 
 we have not got. The EngUsh are doing something 
 new with wireless from aeroplanes to manage ar- 
 tillery fire. Take what mobile troops you need and 
 in three months from now make me a full report 
 on these subjects, with practical recommendations, 
 estimates, and textbooks where such books are 
 necessary." 
 
 Then this bureau would designate the man who 
 was interested in this sort of work, a round peg 
 for a round hole, and would say: "Here is the order 
 of the President ; here is your material or the money 
 to get it ; here are the troops you need for the work. 
 Take these things and get out the report on this 
 subject," and the work v>^ould be done. 
 
 That is the way to get such things done. 
 
 Then the President would avail himself of the 
 proposed flexibility of system, and would direct 
 that the approved results be put into effect as fast 
 as appropriations might permit. There would be 
 no nonsensical talk about securing the unanimous 
 agreement of 3,000 scattered officers, most of them 
 ignorant of the subject; the approved report of a 
 bureau of disinterested experts would govern the 
 matter, and at once. 
 
 It is not enough to have merely an "Advisory 
 Board of Technical Experts." Such a body has 
 no statutory authority, nor has the President any 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 155 
 
 statutory authority to utilize its services or its recom- 
 mendations, if these entail any expense. It may 
 go out of existence by the same whim that created 
 it, or by the whim of some succeeding Secretary. 
 The views of such a Board can never command the 
 loyalty of bureaus composed of permanent officials, 
 whose noses are necessarily more or less out of joint 
 by the mere fact that such a board is in existence. 
 Its mere existence is a reflection upon them and their 
 departments. They only await the opportune 
 moment to kill everj^ suggestion of such a body, 
 and just because they are permanent while it is 
 transient, such an opportunity will be presented. 
 
 But with a permanent Bureau of Inventions and 
 Improvement there would be an open forum for the 
 discussion of all such questions: the duty would be 
 assigned to those officers most attracted to that sort 
 of work and therefore most competent to do that 
 sort of work, and results would follow. 
 
 Of course, the opposing statement that we already 
 have all the facilities for such work in existence in 
 the various departments of the Army is foreseen. 
 The one and unaswerable reply is: "It does not 
 work out that way now. Our American ideas have 
 to go abroad to get recognition under the present 
 system. We want a system that will work for us; 
 not one that drives our ideas abroad to the advant- 
 age of our rivals, our possible enemies." 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Commissioned Personnel. 
 
 One of the principal causes of 
 
 ' ' the totally inadequate condition 
 
 Present System p .i a^ j.- i t^ ^ 
 
 ^ 01 the JNational iJeiense, our 
 
 absurd lack of system, and of the extremely un- 
 economical expenditures of public funds (we spend 
 nearly as much on our unpreparedness as Germany 
 does on her magnificently efficient system) , is in the 
 improper coordination of promotion in the regular 
 army. Time after time Congressional Committees 
 have expressed a willingness to legislate for the na- 
 tional defense provided the officers of the regular 
 army would agree as to what is needed. This agree- 
 ment has never been reached. In the nature of 
 the case it cannot be reached. There will not even be 
 agreement upon this plan. Looking at the whole 
 thing in a dispassionate way, a stranger from Mars 
 would suspect that Congress had always acted 
 toward the army on the principle "Divide and 
 Rule," because officers are so placed by reason of the 
 methods of promotion that they cannot advocate 
 what they know to be correct without at the same 
 time advocating something that is detrimental to 
 their own interests. The personal interest, because 
 the personal promotion of each one, is tied up in 
 legislation which will specially increase his separate 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 157 
 
 branch. It is mighty easy to argue that which bene- 
 fits my own branch benefits nie, and what benefits 
 me must necessarily benefit the country. It is a 
 very easy and very natural mental attitude that your 
 duty is to your own arm or branch of the service, 
 only; that what promotes the interest of that arm, 
 and incidentally promotes your own, must also be of 
 general interest. This attitude does not imply men- 
 tal dishonesty, but merely lack of perspective. 
 
 This accounts for the extreme efforts made in the 
 past, and being made now, by officers identified with 
 particular elements of the service to secure legisla- 
 tion for disproportionate increase of their ow^n 
 branches. As long as the condition exists the re- 
 sults will follow. Cavalry officers will work for 
 cavalry increase, artillery officers for artillery in- 
 crease, staff department officers for increase of their 
 respective staff departments, and so on. Just that 
 long citizens and congressmen will be able to point 
 to the diverse views published by army officers, and 
 to use this as an excuse for inaction. 
 
 The remedy is simple. All officers ren- 
 der the same service, in a broad way, to 
 ^ the nation. All of them give up civil 
 pursuits and devote their talents to the military ser- 
 vice. Some work in one line of activity, some in 
 another; but all give up civil life, and all devote 
 their time to the army. Then let them share and 
 share alike the hardships and the benefits of that 
 
158 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 service, as far as Congressional action can make this 
 possible. Rank and authority should depend upon 
 capacity, duty and assignment; but there is no 
 reason in the world why pay and quarters and allow- 
 ances should depend upon accident. Rank and 
 authority will come, in the end, when military 
 opportunity is presented, to him who, hke Grant, 
 knows how to use them; but there should be 
 no discrimination based upon legislative favor. 
 Let the question of personal advantage be for- 
 ever settled, in time of peace, by making rank 
 depend upon length of commissioned service for all 
 ahke, leaving assignments to duty to be made by the 
 War Department according to fitness and qualifica- 
 tions. Those who have profited by special promo- 
 tion above their fellows in the past should be the 
 last (though they will probably be the first) to ob- 
 struct the development of a satisfactory scheme of 
 National Defense by holding up constructive plans 
 until further advantage shall be given to them. 
 They have already profited. Let them be content 
 with what legislative favor they have already re- 
 ceived. The solution is to place all officers on one 
 list for promotion, according to length of commis- 
 sioned service. Those who have already been pro- 
 moted beyond where they would have been by this 
 method should be simply held to their present 
 grades until those now below them, but who would 
 be above if this equitable plan had been always fol- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 159 
 
 lowed, shall reach their proper places. They will 
 not be deprived of any rank or pay by this readjust- 
 ment, but they will not gain any further advantage 
 over their fellows. They should not desire to do so ; 
 and if any so do desire, their desire should not be 
 gratified. 
 
 With the introduction of this fea- 
 ^, J ture in promotion, there will be no 
 ' longer any element of personal in- 
 
 terest or any special interest inimical to the general 
 interest in any part of the service. There will be 
 some, of course, whose field of vision will be so nar- 
 row that they cannot take in anything that lies out- 
 side the scope of their own special duties. There 
 are company commanders who place the advantage 
 of their companies above the general interest of 
 their regiments; quartermasters ready, through 
 shortsightedness, to sacrifice the interest of the 
 troops to that supposed by them to be the special 
 interest of their departments ; brigade commanders 
 willing to sacrifice the interest of the whole com- 
 mand to look out for the special interest of their 
 own brigade. In a much larger way, the interest 
 of the Line of the army, the fighting element of it, 
 which have never been permanently represented in 
 Washington, have always been sacrificed in favor 
 of those of the Permanent Staff Departments, 
 which have always been strongly represented there. 
 But all these special interests will cease to exist with 
 
160 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 the adoption of the simple rule that an officer's rank 
 and pay shall depend solely, in time of peace, upon 
 his date of commission, that all officers shall share 
 alike in promotion, though assignment to station 
 and duty will depend upon fitness and attainments. 
 It is desirable to introduce a feature 
 
 ^ . permitting special promotion for spe- 
 
 Promotion . i . i. 4. u ^ 4. i. 
 
 cial services; but such leature can be 
 
 introduced in a way that will do no injustice to any 
 one, and will not break the general rule above indi- 
 cated. Certain additional officers are always neces- 
 sary for details of various kinds on detached service. 
 College duty, militia duty, instructors in West 
 Point and other service schools, and the necessary 
 number of officers to form what would be known as 
 "The Generals' Staff," must all be provided for in 
 any system, in addition to the exact number required 
 to complete the organizations laid down in the tables 
 of organization. An allowance of ten per cent in 
 each grade for these purposes will be adequate, 
 which allowance should be made in the form of a 
 "Distinguished Service List," to which promotions 
 should be made from the next lower grade for 
 appropriate services, valid in the advance grade 
 until the same grade be reached by ordinary pro- 
 motion, and then terminated by such promotion, to 
 be filled by another detail of some other meritorious 
 officer. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 161 
 
 Such a provision as this would give every legiti- 
 mate opportunity for special reward for special 
 services, yet would not in any way interfere with 
 nor invalidate the rule of strictly impartial promo- 
 tion of all officers according to length of commis- 
 sioned service. Also, it would limit rewards to rea- 
 sonable amounts, would not cause any blocks in sub- 
 sequent promotion by loading up the higher grades 
 with young officers, and would offer every reason- 
 able incentive to all officers to merit such recogni- 
 tion by suitable service. 
 
 The adoption of these provisions would terminate 
 dissension among officers based upon self interest 
 or corps interest, for with the adoption of these pro- 
 visions there would be no divergence of interests 
 among officers. Unity of views can never be 
 reached, because of differences of education, of 
 information, and of judgment. But with the elimi- 
 nation of self interest and unfair self seeking 
 through dangerous special inflations of different 
 arms or elements, much less divergence of views 
 would be found. 
 
 The educated men to complete the 
 
 ^ I F Jf organization of the Minute Men 
 
 Commissioned i j -i i,i • 
 
 are already available m our coun- 
 
 '' try; men educated in the technical 
 
 military sense. The education of a commissioned 
 
 officer is never complete. It never ends. But the 
 
 preliminary education necessary to start in the per- 
 
162 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 formance of the duties of the lower grades, up to 
 include those of a company commander, has been 
 given annually to about 10,000 young men in the 
 United States through the direct activity of the 
 United States Government, for the last fifty years. 
 The moment we get away from the volunteer idea 
 of raising men, which is based on the personal popu- 
 larity of the officer, the minute we enforce the duty 
 of military service as a dutv, the same as payment 
 of taxes, we can avail ourselves of this supply of 
 material for commissioned officers and begin to train 
 them, as well as their men, in their duties. There 
 are not less than a hundred thousand well trained 
 graduates of military schools suitable for the duties 
 of lieutenant and captain, and of suitable military 
 age, in this country. These men are graduates of 
 such military schools as V. M. I., Culver, St. Johns, 
 Kemper, and a hundred others ; schools second only 
 to West Point. The service postgraduate schools 
 are available for the further training of sucli of 
 these men as may be commissioned "Officers of 
 JVIinute jMen." Their practical duty in the Training 
 School for Minute Men with the very same organi- 
 zations and very same men with whom they are to be 
 associated in time of war vdll complete their training 
 and make of them the best lot of officers in the whole 
 world. Each of them will loiow in person every 
 man of his organization. These men do not enter 
 the militia, as a rule. After having been graduated 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 163 
 
 from a good military school they do not care to 
 enter as privates, and since at their age they cannot 
 have wardheeler influence in politics they are wholly 
 deficient in the sort of popularity that would cause 
 them to be elected to office in the militia. But they 
 are the best material in the country for company 
 officers of federal volunteers or of Minute Men, 
 and the number already trained is far in excess of 
 the necessities of the situation, while the military 
 schools, a hundred of them, some a little better than 
 others but all good, are turning them out at the 
 rate of 10,000 per year. 
 
 . The system of expansion to be pro- 
 
 P posed, by which the national forces 
 
 ' will be mobilized, must be sufficiently 
 
 indicated here to show just how these officers will 
 fit into it. 
 
 Each regiment of the Training School will fur- 
 nish a brigade of the v/ar force, and every man of 
 it a trained man, accustomed to touch elbows in 
 ranks with the man on his right and left. In addi- 
 tion, each regiment of the Training School will also 
 have enough trained personnel, after the third year, 
 to leave an organized, working force at the training 
 school at work training recruits for this brigade to 
 be ready to take the places of those who will drop 
 out as soon as war begins. 
 
 The Division will become an armv of three divi- 
 sions of infantry, with corresponding amounts of 
 
164 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 all the auxiliary arms in due proportion. Each 
 brigade will become a division of three brigades in 
 this war organization. Each regiment w^ill furnish 
 the entire personnel of a brigade of three regi- 
 ments, all trained, on furlough, equipped, accus- 
 tomed at the annual maneuver camp to working 
 together, ready for instant action. Each battalion 
 w^ill become a regiment. 
 
 The division commander will become the army 
 commander; each brigade commander will become 
 a division commander; each regimental commander 
 wdll become a brigade commander. The new regi- 
 ments will receive commanders from the Field 
 Officers of the parent regiment, and each will be 
 furnished a trained staff from the subaltern officers 
 of the training school. Thus every administrative 
 position, every place of command in this whole 
 army, will be filled by not merely a capable, trained 
 officer, but by the very best possible one, the very 
 man who trained this group of men, the man known 
 as an instructor by every one of them. 
 
 Now all that is necessary to make this the best 
 officered force in the world is equally capable com- 
 pany officers, and these will all be taken from the 
 ranks of the Training School itself, out of the 
 trained college graduates of military colleges who 
 will have already a four years' course next in value 
 to that at West Point before they volunteer for the 
 Minute Men service. It would be impossible to 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 165 
 
 devise a more perfect system of selecting the neces- 
 sary commissioned officers for our war force. It is 
 actually better than it would be to have all of them 
 West Pointers, for these officers of ]\Iinute Men 
 will not have to break down any popular prejudice, 
 nor to overcome any tendency to "snobbishness." 
 Trained, capable, and suitable, that very training 
 will justify their selection for the duties of officers 
 to their comrades and instructors; yet they are of 
 the common people, and able to look at things from 
 the same point of view as their men. No better 
 system of selecting and appointing officers could be 
 possibly devised. No other, ever proposed, offers 
 any such system; and this advantage, alone, should 
 be decisive as to its adoption. 
 
 Each officer of INiinute Men should receive his 
 commission as an officer in time of peace and enter 
 upon his duties at the annual maneuver camps at 
 the end of the training school year, when all the 
 INIinute JMen would be annually called out for re- 
 view of their past work and refitting of their equip- 
 ment. Thus every officer, from the Commanding 
 General down to the last lance corporal, would gain 
 actual experience with his own organization, and 
 enter upon the war service, when called, perfectly 
 prepared, fully acquainted with all the personnel of 
 that organization. After war begins his promotion 
 will be according to his services. Any man among 
 these Minute Men may be a Von Moltke, a Grant, 
 or a McKinley. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The Transition Period. 
 
 . - This discussion would be incomplete 
 
 Analos:y -.i . i j i 
 
 , -J without one more lesson drawn irom 
 
 the analogy oi the 13 anker, the Con- 
 tractor, and the Supervising Architect. The first 
 care of an honest Contractor would be to put a 
 competent, technically competent, Supervising 
 Architect on the job, and the first care of the 
 Banker would be to see that there was a competent, 
 technically competent. Supervising Architect on 
 the job. If there was any doubt in the mind of 
 the Banker on that point he would at once put 
 a man of his own selection on that job. A million 
 dollar contract for a fine mansion would be too 
 important a thing to trust to an amiable clergy- 
 man, or an upright judge, or a reputable doctor, or 
 even to an honest lawyer (if there is one — I am a 
 lawyer myself). He would insist that this work 
 be done under the constant supervision of a tech- 
 nically capable man. In our analogy the Secretary 
 of War may stand in the same relation to the 
 National Defense that Supervising Architect vrould 
 stand to the construction of the Banker's mansion. 
 
 This is not written to criticise any in- 
 
 _. , . dividual; far from it. Still less is it 
 
 Disclaimer • . j j . ri . .i .. 
 
 mtended to renect upon the motives, 
 
 integrity, or good faith of any individual. Our 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 167 
 
 people are only too prone to make scape goats of 
 the most convenient public official when things do 
 not go right, and often without proper assessment 
 of responsibility for failures. We can all remem- 
 ber the storm of criticism that burst upon Secretary 
 Alger when sickness developed among the hastily 
 assembled, untaught, and imperfectly organized 
 volunteers of 1898. A Secretary of War once had 
 to make his escape from Washington and from 
 office without even the formality of public an- 
 nouncement, after the "Battle of Bladensburg." 
 Possibly the latter Secretary had tried to do some- 
 thing that was beyond his military capacity, and the 
 President's injunction to "leave the management 
 of military operations to the military commanders" 
 may have been amply justified by the facts; but 
 both these Secretaries suffered from the evil effects 
 of a system of which they were at least as much the 
 victims as the beneficiaries. The system should be 
 improved so that none but technically competent 
 men can be called to that office ; and the individual 
 should be judged in the light of the system of 
 which he was a part. 
 
 . —, , . „ We have had able politicians on 
 A Technicalhi .i . • i rm i \ • . 
 
 ^ ^^ that ]ob. 1 here have been emment 
 
 Capable n p • .i, . ^ 
 
 ^ ^ college proiessors m that oince. 
 
 Secretary j-ii,i, j.ij. j 
 
 ^ and it has been at least once graced 
 
 by a jurist who developed into Presidential timber. 
 
 But who can name one of them who was technically 
 
168 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 capable of performing the duties of a Supervising 
 Architect in the construction of the Edifice of Na- 
 tional Defense? A Secretary with a mania for exer- 
 cising personal military command fled from the 
 battlefield of Bladensburg by the light of the burn- 
 ing Capitol which was captured by the British as a 
 result of his incompetence. Another forced on the 
 country an inefficient system of military organiza- 
 tion that prolonged the Civil War three years at 
 least ; or rather this was done by a Secretary of the 
 Treasury, acting for a Secretary of War who was 
 not performing the duties of a Supervising Archi- 
 tect but was allowing them to be performed by one 
 of his colleagues in the Cabinet ; his successor, men- 
 tioned in our school histories as "The Great War 
 Secretary," blundered along, interfering time after 
 time with military operations which would probably 
 have been successful without his interference, until 
 the tremendous personality of a Grant took the mili- 
 tary command out of his hands and brought the 
 war to an end; another permitted the adoption of 
 a false system for the "General Staff," whereby its 
 usefulness as a military body is at least greatly im- 
 paired. 
 
 If the administration of the Supervising Archi- 
 tect on the construction of the Banker's mansion 
 were of this character, neither the Banker's money, 
 nor the Architect's plans, nor the Contractor's 
 honesty and experience would avail to build the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 169 
 
 desired mansion. His money would be uselessly 
 frittered away, and the completed edifice would not 
 correspond in any way to the plan that the Banker 
 had in mind. 
 
 So it has been with the preparation 
 Look at the ^^ ^j^^ National Defense. Congress 
 esu s in Y^^^ |)eei^ exceedingly liberal in the 
 e case oj appropriation of money for that 
 National purpose; but there is no National 
 
 ejense Defense in existence; none w^orthy 
 
 of the name, and no plan in sight prepared by any 
 of these superintendents. Under the management 
 of Secretaries of War ignorant of the technical 
 work of the job the country has twice gone bank- 
 rupt (1779-1863) , has squandered annually as much 
 money to get results as the German Empire has 
 spent for its magnificent preparedness, and has 
 nothing whatever to show for it. What we have 
 for the national defense is virtually nothing; it 
 would not be a drop in the bucket of a modern war ; 
 and the false system that incapacity has fastened 
 upon the country would lead fii^st to humiliation, 
 then to bankruptcy, and at last to ruin. What we 
 have as a result of political management of our 
 national military resources for over a hundred years 
 is absolutely worse than nothing at all. 
 
 Therefore, without criticism of any in- 
 dividual in word or thought, the first 
 ^ step in the application of this plan, the 
 only plan that will work, should be the appoint- 
 
170 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 ment of a technically capable Secretary of War to 
 supervise its execution. 
 
 The plans above suggested are radical; but they 
 are correct. These plans will be eventually 
 adopted ; perhaps not in the day of the author, per- 
 haps not in time to prevent a great national disaster, 
 but will be adopted in the end because they are the 
 only possible way in which adequate preparation 
 can be made in time of peace for the National De- 
 fense. When they are adopted the first step in 
 their development will be the appointment of a 
 technically capable Secretary of War, of such a 
 tremendous personality that he can command the 
 loyalty of those under him because they know his 
 technical abihty, know his integrity, know him to be 
 as ruthless as he is fearless, and know that the man 
 who opposes him treacherously will be discovered 
 and remorselessly broken on the wheel. 
 
 -r ^ m . The installation of this system after 
 
 installation . , j. ^ ^ xi " ^ - 
 
 J, ^ the enactment oi the necessary legis- 
 
 of the system i . . -n . i,- • i, j -n 
 
 ' ^ lation, will be a big job, and will re- 
 
 quire considerable time, even in the hands of such a 
 Secretary as above indicated. Some of the details 
 of the transition can be foreseen; others would 
 have to be worked out as the occasions arise. 
 
 The Distinguished Service Order 
 ^ * * '' will at once take the place of the 
 
 present "General Staff," and will 
 '' place at the disposal of command- 
 
 ing officers an adequate body of officers selected on 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 171 
 
 account of distinguished services and thereby 
 marked as exceptional men. The assignment of 
 these officers to duty is left open in the plan, in 
 order that such assignments may be unrestricted. 
 The creation of the Distinguished Service Order 
 gives a legitimate opportunity to reward excep- 
 tional merit, and since the determination of such 
 cases is not provided for by statute it is necessarily 
 open to regulation by the President. A peanut 
 politician will be able to abuse this power; but the 
 abuse cannot be permanent, nor extend beyond 
 temporary promotion of a single grade; a wise 
 administration can make of this opening a powerful 
 incentive to greater energy, initiative and efficiency, 
 in all officers, by basing such selections solely upon 
 known merit. 
 
 _. _, . The first task will naturalh^ be the 
 
 First Step in ... p .1 4. • • 
 
 _ . . organization 01 the new training 
 
 Organization ^ ^ , ^ a 
 
 * school permanent personnel, and 
 
 the assignment of the various organizations of the 
 regular service to their proper places as compon- 
 ents of the new forces. This will include the or- 
 ganization of the oversea defense on a permanent 
 basis, the organization of the expeditionary force, 
 the assignment of the permanent personnel to the 
 sea coast defenses, and assignments to the four divi- 
 sions of the national training school for Minute 
 Men. It will involve reduction of strength in some 
 organizations, increases in others, and transfers of 
 
172 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 selected men to the places where their services will 
 be the most useful; a general adjustment of round 
 peg to round holes and square pegs to square holes. 
 Promotions As soon as the assignments of regi- 
 and ments to their duties can be deter- 
 
 Assignments mined the resulting promotions and 
 assignments of commissioned officers will be made. 
 This will be the much desired opportunity to re- 
 adjust the whole matter of promotion among offi- 
 cers; for the number of promotions incident to 
 these changes will be so great that even those offi- 
 cers who have benefitted greatly by legislative 
 eccentricities or executive favoritism in the past will 
 not lose anything by the change. Probably not a 
 single officer will be compelled to "mark time" in 
 grade on account of the readjustment upon an 
 equitable basis of promotion. The troops assigned 
 to oversea and expeditionary duty will proceed to 
 their proper stations at such times thereafter as may 
 be convenient, and their adjustment to their new 
 duties will at once become a routine matter to be 
 handled by their commanders. The troops assigned 
 to duty as part of the training school personnel will 
 be sent to stations at the most convenient places in 
 their respective divisions, utilizing the great posts 
 already in existence as far as practicable for train- 
 ing school stations. The officers and men to form 
 these cadres will be selected with care, for such 
 original work as this requires the highest available 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 173 
 
 order of talent; but once assigned, the further de- 
 velopment of the training school work will take 
 place normally under the commanders assigned to 
 the four divisions and to the coast defense districts. 
 
 The Expeditionary Force should 
 
 Eocpeditionarii . ^ iuij-4.4. -4. 
 
 -^ by all means be held mtact as a unit 
 
 at some place where the climatic 
 conditions permit year-round training, and where 
 transportation facilities permit rapid movement of 
 a division in any direction. For example the cli- 
 matic conditions and the terrain about Atascadero, 
 California, would be ideal for a compact canton- 
 ment of such a division. The transportation facili- 
 ties are good at that point, but the geographic loca- 
 tion might be considered too far west, though it is 
 nearer the actual geographic center of our terri- 
 torial possessions than any other satisfactory point. 
 Texas affords places where such a division could 
 operate all the year round as a whole, and there are 
 many other suitable locations in other parts of the 
 country. It might be thought advisable to distri- 
 bute this force in three or four brigade canton- 
 ments, or even to station parts of it in or near large 
 cities. In such cases no doubt the European system 
 of quartering troops in compact barracks, instead 
 of in the big parks which we miscall "Forts" or 
 "Posts," would be preferable. These military reser- 
 vations have a far greater value in connection with 
 the training school system and for mobilization 
 
174 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 points than for the use of expeditionary forces. 
 But whatever might be the disposition of this force 
 as to locaHty, the very last thing that should govern 
 it would be the benefit of some group of land specu- 
 lators or of the grocery and dry goods merchants of 
 a locality which might be represented by an influen- 
 tial Congressman. A wise location of it would cer- 
 tainly not place it on a sandspit which is flooded by 
 a tidal wave every time a high wind happens to 
 coincide with a neap tide. Such a division would 
 be kept in compact form, with the smallest possible 
 accimiulation of impedimenta that could retard its 
 promptness or initiative of action. 
 
 . The oversea defense would require 
 
 j^ J. immediate attention. Especially the 
 
 ' whole policy in the Philippine Islands 
 
 would be overhauled. The division assigned to that 
 duty would be removed from the unhealthy low- 
 lands and rice paddies near jManila. It would be 
 located in a healthy place in the uplands, where the 
 white man can bear his bui^den without contracting 
 seven different kinds of skin disease every time he 
 hits a golf ball far enough to make the caddy hunt 
 for it. The policy of trying to "conciliate" the 
 Tagalog would be abandoned and that race would 
 have a chance to get its feet out of the public 
 trough long enough to realize just how small and 
 insignificant it really is in the big sum total of 
 Philippine Islands. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 175 
 
 . Instead of making the defense 
 
 Philip vine Defense am t^u-t • i, ^ 
 
 ^ ^ ' 01 the i^hihppmes a burden 
 
 Not a Burden . .1 yy •. -i o. . •. 1. 
 
 to the United States it can be 
 
 out an Asset i j 1 1 1 i. a 
 
 made, and shoula be made, a 
 
 source of strength and a powerful base of operations 
 in the Orient. To do this would be the simplest 
 thing in the world; so simple that a mere outline 
 will be convincing. 
 
 First of all, our countiy should be true and loyal 
 to its own friends. It has plenty of them in the 
 Philippines; natives who aided us in suppressing 
 the Tagalog insurrection of 1899-1900, and who 
 find in United States sovereignty their only protec- 
 tion. Among these known and tested friends may 
 be mentioned the Macabeebes, the Ifugaos, the 
 Ilongots and the Igorrotes; all mountain tribes, 
 hardy people, good material for soldiers, and all 
 opposed to Tagalog supremacy as a matter of self- 
 preservation. They know by bitter experience that 
 they have nothing to expect that is good from Taga- 
 log domination, and nothing bad to expect from 
 American rule. 
 
 . In the northern mountains there are 
 
 . ... . not less than 200,000 fighting men 
 
 Auooilianes ^ ,, . ., , ... . i. 
 
 01 these tribes only waiting to be 
 
 organized into the finest force of native auxiliaries 
 
 in the world. Their loyalty to the United States has 
 
 already been proved by the touchstone of domestic 
 
 war. Their hatred of the Tagalog is based not only 
 
176 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 on racial animosity, but also on the unspeakable out- 
 rages committed by that tribe during the period of 
 guerrilla warfare after the fall of Malolos in 1899 
 and before the final establishment of actual Ameri- 
 can authority in 1902 in their country. Here, in a 
 temperate climate, where the white man thrives, and 
 where his food products can be made prolific by a 
 demand for them, should be stationed the division 
 that will constitute the mobile defense of the Philip- 
 pine Islands. It would be within easy reach of 
 Manila at any time, on the flank of any enemy who 
 might come from the north, in the face of one that 
 might come from the south, and in exactly the right 
 position to protect the land side of Corregidor, the 
 only vulnerable point in the sea coast defense of 
 Manila. Here it should organize these friendly 
 tribes into a huge army of fighting men, trained 
 for guerrilla warfare as native auxiliaries. Their 
 native customs and ways of living should not be ob- 
 literated, but their fighting men should be enrolled, 
 armed and trained, with military pay and allow- 
 ances, especially in the way of food supplies, that 
 would make their life more comfortable. They 
 should be taught how to cultivate their fertile hills 
 and valleys to produce the food and forage required 
 for the American division, which would thus be 
 rendered independent of the homeland in its food 
 and forage supplies. Today we are still shipping 
 oats and baled hay for the horses of the cavalry in 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 177 
 
 the Philippines, beans and bacon to the soldiers. 
 These supplies would be cut off at the first alarm of 
 war; but if the mountain country were mobilized as 
 above indicated for defense the American division 
 would be made independent of the homeland in these 
 supplies, and the mountain inhabitants made com- 
 paratively wealthy by the increase that would result 
 in their industrial activities. 
 
 In a year this policy could be made to 
 develop a native auxiliary force of a 
 hundred thousand fighting men who hate the Taga- 
 log and dread nothing so much as Tagalog suprem- 
 acy, who have the fatalistic courage of the oriental, 
 and who would fight loyally by the side of the 
 American Soldiers against any enemy, as they have 
 done in the past. In three years there could be 
 organized over 200,000 of these native troops, with 
 an impregnable base in a healthy climate, producing 
 everything necessary for the indefinite maintenance 
 of all the forces engaged, yet not capable of inde- 
 pendent action that could embroil us with any other 
 country. To successfully attack Manila from the 
 North would be impossible for any country with 
 such a force as this in the mountain fastnesses on 
 its flank. An attack from the South would have 
 distinct advantages for the defenders. A direct at- 
 tack from the sea upon Manila could not be m.ade as 
 long as Corregidor stands, and Corregidor could not 
 fall as long as the heights at Mariveles were com- 
 
178 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 manded by the strategic position of this force. This 
 pohcj^ would expose the Tagalog to all the risks and 
 hardships of war, if they should again solicit the help 
 of a foreign foe, to help them drive out or kill all 
 the white people. Possibly such a policy as this 
 might even open the ej^es of this tribe, to the 
 difference between American rule and what it 
 might expect under Japanese or German dominion. 
 It would expose an enemy to the enervating 
 influence of a climate inimical to people from 
 the temperate zone, while our own forces would 
 have a healthy base in the temperate mountains from 
 which they could draw practically inexhaustible sup- 
 plies and levies of trained auxiliaries. The general 
 policy of trained Minute Men could be adapted to 
 this situation, and the American division would be- 
 come the training school of this element. If, in the 
 course of time, it might be possible to develop a 
 body of natives capable of defending their country, 
 this would be the very best evidence of their capa- 
 city for self government, and the United States 
 might then withdraw from it honorably, leaving it 
 in their hands, if any constitutional method can be 
 found for such withdrawal. 
 
 Tx^T . 7 The only reason why such a policy 
 
 , as this has not been instituted long 
 
 ^ ^ ■ ago in the Philippines, is that we 
 
 have never had a policy on that subject. Our coun- 
 try drifted into this problem by accident. It has 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 179 
 
 drifted along from year to year. Nothing has been 
 done on the theory of permanency, because there has 
 always been a pernicious agitation for a new doc- 
 trine of secession. The possibility of secession by 
 Act of Congress, upon the demand of a single tribe 
 of discontented and incapable agitators, is as grave- 
 ly discussed today, as that of secession by Act of 
 a State Legislature was discussed in 1860, and 
 with consequences as evil. 
 
 This policy would have to be changed 
 ■p J. radically; reversed. Our friendship, 
 
 ^ our favors, our loyal support, are due 
 
 to these tribes collectively, and to those persons 
 individually, who have shown loyalty and friend- 
 ship to us. We should arm and equip them, place 
 them in positions of honor and trust, seize the stra- 
 tegic points of value for health and defense, and 
 make the Philippine Islands an asset in case of 
 Oriental disturbances, instead of an element of na- 
 tional weakness from every point of view. The 
 policy thus outlined, civil and military, would speed- 
 ily have that result. It would make the Philippine 
 Islands unassailable and would place in the hands of 
 the United States a powerful army of native troops, 
 absolutely loyal, first-class fighting men, ready to 
 throw a heavy sword into the scales of diplomacy 
 whenever our interests might call for such a make- 
 weight. Such a system would remove the Japanese 
 
180 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 bogy from the field of American politics, and would 
 insure either the permanence of Chinese sovereignty 
 or a due consideration of American interests in the 
 division of spoils whenever that may come. 
 
 The system of Minute Men development herein 
 proposed would no doubt be modified more or less 
 to suit the conditions of the Phihppines; but the 
 elasticity of the system would provide ample lati- 
 tude for such modifications, and its application 
 would make of the Philippine Division, like the 
 other divisions of the training school, a productive 
 agency, actively engaged in training the necessary 
 personnel for defense of its territory. It would 
 employ these Filipinos who are worthy of trust in 
 the defense of their own country; and if, at some 
 future time, it should please Providence to make 
 them completely capable and responsible for their 
 own defense there would be an adequate force, 
 properly trained, with which to meet that responsi- 
 bility for a time. It is not at all necessary that the 
 Philippine Islands should be a "White Elephant"; 
 but if they are to be redeemed, there must be at least 
 a small degree of human intelligence used in their 
 management, a small degree of loyalty shown to 
 our friends, a little reasonable foresight employed. 
 
 _ _ . ... . The permanent personnel as- 
 
 Other Auxiliaries . -i . tt •• t3 ^„ 
 
 signed to Hawaii, Panama, 
 
 Alaska, Porto Rico, would find considerable oppor- 
 tunity to develop similar auxiliaries in their respec- 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 181 
 
 tive divisions, and would utilize the local material 
 and personnel as far as possible. The resources 
 available in these localities would be much smaller 
 than in the Philippines, but their proximity to the 
 United States would make it probably possible to 
 reinforce them after war becomes imminent. The 
 geographical location of the Philippines would make 
 such reinforcement impossible until after the mast- 
 ery of the Pacific Ocean should be determined by 
 naval operations. Hence the development of local 
 Minute Men in the other oversea possessions is not 
 as important as it is in the Philippine Islands. 
 
 The training school features of this 
 
 _ ,_ . plan present the great advantage that 
 
 Installation .. j . -i i, • a. n j 
 
 it need not necessarily be installed as 
 
 a whole, at one time. A single regiment, even, 
 could be sent as a training school nucleus to each 
 division, and the system could be started on a re- 
 duced scale, to be expanded as Congress may see 
 fit to authorize the personnel. It could be thus ex- 
 panded from time to time without in any way 
 affecting the underlying principles of the system 
 until the complete scheme would be in operation; 
 and if at some future time it should be found that 
 a larger war insurance is necessary the system herein 
 outlined would be capable of indefinite expansion 
 to meet such necessity. 
 
182 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 __ _ /. I^^ the original installation of this 
 
 No Increase of , x i? i i ^ 
 
 . . . ' system, on account of lack of 
 
 Appropriations . • j /a^ • j. -j. 
 
 ^^ ^ trained omcers m our country, it 
 
 would be advisable to proceed by successive steps. 
 First should be organized the fighting First Line 
 Divisions of the permanent personnel and the one 
 relief of the permanent personnel of the coast 
 defense. One brigade could be assigned to each of 
 the four divisions of the training school without any 
 increase of the personnel of the regular army, except 
 possibly, a few more commissioned officers. The 
 next year could see the organization of a second 
 brigade of the training school, the third brigade 
 being organized in the third year. This gradual 
 application of the system would make it possible to 
 supply trained officers for the permanent personnel. 
 The gradual development of the Minute Man com- 
 ponent would give time to develop a system for 
 selecting and training the commissioned officers of 
 that component. No tremendous increase of un- 
 trained personnel in any grade would be necessary. 
 No big increase of appropriations, in fact no increase 
 at all, would be necessary. It would only be neces- 
 sary to maintain the pension appropriations at their 
 present schedule, and to make the surplus unex- 
 pended in that way from year to year, available for 
 the use of the President in the gradual expansion 
 of this system to its complete basis. This would 
 insure its application in a progressive manner as 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 183 
 
 fast as the trained officers could be supplied ; and in 
 ten years from now the United States would be the 
 best prepared, strongest nation in the world for self 
 defense. 
 
 Every unit of our forces would be homogeneous. 
 All its members would be equally well taught, all 
 trained in the same system, for the same length of 
 time. All will look upon any military problem in 
 the same way, can count upon one another to do the 
 expected thing, to show team play. 
 
 There would be no delay for the fabrication and 
 issue of equipment, or requisitioning of military sup- 
 plies. The only immediate problem in mobilization 
 will be that of the grocer; and whether we feed a 
 few thousand of our great population in one place 
 or another is a small matter in our country, with its 
 great transportation facilities. The arms, equip- 
 ment and clothing, of every Minute Man will be 
 already issued, ready at his rendezvous for instant 
 use. The whole concern would break into action 
 with all the snap and vim of a well trained fire de- 
 partment. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Legislation. 
 
 An act of Congress embodying the correct prin- 
 ciples will be necessary to put a sound scheme of 
 National Defense (or any other scheme) into opera- 
 tion. It might take the following form : 
 Be it enacted, etc. 
 
 All able-bodied male citizens of the 
 United States, and all foreign born 
 persons who have declared their intention to become 
 citizens, between the ages of 18 and 45 years of 
 age, shall be enrolled as liable to military service for 
 the National Defense. 
 
 __ _ __ ^ It shall be the duty of every citizen 
 
 How Enrolled i- 1 1 j -u ^ • a.- i 4. 
 
 liable under the loregomg article to 
 
 render a personal report on such form as may be 
 prescribed by the President on the first of January 
 each year, and failure to render such report shall 
 be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less 
 than five hundred nor more that five thousand dol- 
 lars. Jurisdiction over this offense is hereby ex- 
 pressly conferred upon any general court-martial 
 before which may be arraigned any person duly 
 charged with this offense, according to the regular 
 methods of military procedure. In case of failure or 
 inability to pay said fine the reviewing authority is 
 empowered to commute said fine into military ser- 
 vice, one year for each one hundred dollars of the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 185 
 
 fine, in addition to any other military service due 
 from the dehnquent and not subject to any exemp- 
 tion, to be counted as drafted service. 
 
 For the purpose of this enrollment, the 
 whole territory of the United States shall 
 be divided into divisions, as hereinafter prescribed, 
 and the reports shall be kept in the form of a card 
 indexed card record, to be kept in such form as may 
 be prescribed by the President, as part of the mili- 
 tary records of the United States. For the purpose 
 of keeping these records the services of men who 
 are physically disqualified for other forms of duty 
 will be utilized as far as practicable. 
 
 . The following classes of persons 
 
 II, Eocemptions -ii u x. xf ^ -f*. a 
 
 ^ will be exempt irom drait under 
 
 the provisions of this act, under such regulations as 
 may be prescribed by the President, but shall pay 
 in lieu of military service the sum of one hundred 
 dollars per year, which payments shall be covered 
 into the Treasury of the United States and credited 
 to the funds for the support of the National De- 
 fense ; the head or only support of a family ; teachers 
 in military schools, approved by the President, mem- 
 bers of municipal police and fire departments duly 
 certified as such by the proper authorities ; regularly 
 enrolled members of the organized militia; provided 
 that no payment shall be required from any member 
 of the regularly enrolled militia. 
 
186 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 xTx ^7 -r . The whole body of enrolled citi- 
 
 III, Classification v ui 4. tj. jo. u n 
 
 ' zens liable to military duty shall 
 
 be divided into three classes, as follows (after de- 
 ducting the Permanent Personnel of National 
 Defense) : 
 
 Class A, Minute Men, available for immediate 
 service, under obligation for a term of four 
 years. 
 Class B, Honor Men, composed of Minute Men 
 who have completed their period of obligation 
 for immediate service, but are still of military 
 age and who have volunteered for additional 
 service as "Volunteers" in case of attack upon 
 the United States. These men shall be author- 
 ized to wear a suitable decoration to be known 
 as "The Badge of Honor," to be furnished 
 by the United States. 
 Class C, all other citizens of military age not ex- 
 empt from military service under the provisions 
 of this Act. 
 
 The Permanent Person- 
 
 IV. Permanent Personnel i i, n u o-u i 
 
 nel shall be the regular 
 
 army of the United States, which shall receive the 
 pay and allowances now prescribed by law and shall 
 be organized under such regulations as may be pre- 
 scribed by the President, as follows: 
 
 Two Divisions for Oversea Defense ; one Expedi- 
 tionary Division; one Relief for the permanent 
 Coast Defense Fortifications that have been or mav 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 187 
 
 be hereafter authorized by Congress ; and four divi- 
 sions on a training school basis as hereinafter pre- 
 scribed; provided that in this Act a Division shall 
 be taken to consist of the smallest body comprising 
 all components of the service in due proportion, com- 
 plete in itself for independent service, as provided 
 in the Field Service Regulations of 1914, and sub- 
 ject to such modifications from time to time as 
 shall be warranted by the progress of the military 
 art, and authorized by the President in Field Service 
 Regulations. It is the appropriate command for a 
 Major General in our service. 
 
 Permanent personnel shall be assigned to the 
 training school divisions at the rate of a full comple- 
 ment of commissioned officers and 25 selected en- 
 listed men per company, and this Permanent Per- 
 sonnel shall be the trainers and instructors of the 
 transient personnel; provided that in the coast de- 
 fenses Permanent Personnel shall consist of one 
 complete relief for the permanent fortifications 
 authorized by law, and Transient Personnel shall 
 consist of two reliefs, to be under instruction by the 
 Permanent Personnel in like manner as other mem- 
 bers of the transient personnel. 
 
 _ _ . _ _ The Transient Personnel 
 
 V, Transient Personnel u n i. j- -j ^ • 4.^ 
 
 shall be divided into two 
 
 parts : 
 
 1. The members of the Training School under 
 
 instruction. The number authorized for this pur- 
 
188 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 pose, shall be at the rate of 125 men for each com- 
 pany of the training school; this being the number 
 necessary to give to each company the full quota 
 authorized in the training school, 150 enlisted men 
 per company, 25 old soldiers and 125 recruits under 
 training to become Minute Men upon completion 
 of their year of training. 
 
 The Transient Personnel of the training schools 
 shall be known as Students of the National Train- 
 ing School, and shall be entitled to wear a suitable 
 badge to be furnished by the government while on 
 that status. 
 
 Students of the National Training School shall 
 receive free instruction in all its courses of instruc- 
 tion which shall comprise the military duties of a citi- 
 zen and such vocational training as may be found 
 practicable in addition thereto; shall be furnished 
 with uniforms and food and medical attendance free 
 of expense ; shall be furnished quarters suitable for 
 their duties free of expense; and shall receive a 
 bounty of $100 upon honorable completion of the 
 course of training ; provided that all Students of the 
 National Training School shall agree upon entrance 
 therein to perform the duties of "Minute Men in 
 the National Defense" for a period of three years 
 after the completion of their course of instruction, 
 which agreement shall be in writing and shall be 
 held as a valid contract subjecting the maker of it 
 to military service of the United States as a Minute 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 189 
 
 Man in accordance with the Rules and Articles of 
 War. 
 
 2. Minute Men; which class shall comprise all 
 those who shall have completed the course of instruc- 
 tion in the Training School, and who shall be held 
 to Hability for mihtary service as Minute Men for a 
 period of three years as provided in their contracts 
 upon entrance into the training school. 
 
 Provided; that the total number of Students of 
 the National Training School shall not exceed the 
 number prescribed in the Field Service Regula- 
 tions that shall be prescribed by the President, nor 
 shall the annual appropriations for the support of 
 the National Defense be exceeded by reason of any 
 change in said Field Service Regulations, but all 
 pay and allowances shall cease upon exhaustion of 
 said appropriations until further appropriations 
 shall be made by Congress. 
 
 The course of instruction in the 
 training school shall be arranged 
 under such regulations as may be prescribed by the 
 President, and shall cover one year of time, divided 
 into the following periods : 
 
 1. Enrollment and Organization. 
 
 2. Theoretical Instruction. 
 
 3. Practical Instruction. 
 
 4. Reduction to Cadre basis. 
 
 5. Vacation of not to exceed one month. 
 
 VI, Training 
 
190 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 These periods of instruction shall be arranged in 
 accordance with such Regulations for the National 
 Training School as may be prescribed by the Presi- 
 dent; and during the third period the Minute Men 
 may be recalled for a period of 14 days for addi- 
 tional instruction, completion of organization, and 
 refitment of equipments. 
 
 Each graduate of the National Training School 
 shall be furnished with a Diploma, setting forth his 
 qualifications as a Graduate of the National Train- 
 ing School, and a suitable badge indicating his 
 status as a Minute Man, which he will be authorized 
 to wear at all times as a badge of honor. 
 
 . i. c, -I From the 1st of July to 
 
 Selection of Students, ^^ ^,^^ g^^^ ^^ j^l ;^^^ 
 
 Voluntarij A vviications ,^ j ^ i? 
 
 ^ ^^ year the record omces oi 
 
 each division of the National Training School shall 
 receive voluntary applications from suitable persons 
 for enrollment as Students of the National Train- 
 ing School. Each applicant will cause to be filled 
 out in the proper place on his card the certificate 
 of a medical officer that the applicant is physically 
 suitable to perform the duties of a soldier, and a 
 certificate by two reputable citizens that the appli- 
 cant is a personal of good moral character, a citizen 
 of the United States or has declared his intention 
 to become a citizen, and is recommended by them as 
 suitable to receive the benefits of the Training 
 School. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 191 
 
 The period for voluntary applications shall close 
 on the 31st of July, and as soon as may be there- 
 after the necessary number of Students shall be 
 selected by lot from those who are eligible and who 
 have applied according to law. 
 
 ^ „ , _ , In case the total number of apph- 
 
 Draf tea Students . n j t -ui in . t_ 
 ' cants lound eligible shall not be 
 
 sufficient to complete the number of students re- 
 quired for the annual class (147,000) the necessary 
 number to complete the annual class shall be selected 
 by lot from those citizens enrolled under the provi- 
 sions of Ai'ticle I of this Act, as liable to military 
 duty, under such regulations as the President may 
 from time to time prescribe, and the men so selected 
 shall be notified to report for duty as Students of 
 the National Training School at the opening of its 
 next regular annual session, at the place that may 
 be designated by proper authority, under the penal- 
 ties provided in Article I of this Act for non-com- 
 pliance. 
 
 Students drafted for service under these provi- 
 sions shall not receive any bounty, pension or promo- 
 tion, but shall be held to the personal performance 
 of the duties of Students of the National Training 
 School and of Minute Men in like manner as other 
 students and Minute Men, and jurisdiction is hereby 
 expressly conferred upon any general court-martial 
 before which any person may be properly arraigned 
 
192 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 charged with violation of said duties according to 
 the regular methods of military procedure. 
 
 At the close of the period of practical 
 
 _,^. {^ instruction in the National Training 
 
 Minute Men oii-io. j. ii i 
 
 School the Students who have honor- 
 ably completed its course of instruction shall be 
 given their Diplomas, and furloughed for a period 
 of three years as Minute Men. Each Minute Man 
 shall be issued a card on which his rank, organiza- 
 tion, duty, rendezvous in case of call to active ser- 
 vice, and status as a volunteer or drafted Minute 
 Man shall be indicated. A duplicate card shall be 
 retained with the records of the Training School, 
 which shall also contain the address of the man. 
 It shall be the duty of the Minute Man to promptly 
 notify the proper officers of the training school in 
 case of a permanent change of his address, in order 
 that his card may be transferred to the most con- 
 venient organization. The arms and equipment of 
 each Minute Man shall be stored at the proper ren- 
 dezvous and notation shall be made on his card by 
 which his equipments can be located in the store- 
 room. 
 ___,_ _^ , .,. . A period of three years must 
 
 Vll. Mobilization i , p ±.^ i? ^^ 14. -tf 
 
 elapse beiore the lull results oi 
 the training school system will be attained. When 
 this shall be accomplished, each regiment of the 
 training school will be able to mobilize a complete 
 brigade of Minute Men, in addition to maintaining 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 193 
 
 the complete operation of its branch of the Train- 
 ing School; the three classes of Minute Men fur- 
 nishing the men for the brigade and the current 
 class continuing its duty in the training school. In 
 all mobilizations of the Minute Men the permanent 
 officers of the training school shall be assigned to 
 the higher duties of command and administration. 
 The battalion commanders shall be assigned to the 
 regiments into which their battalions will be ex- 
 panded, the regimental commanders of the training 
 school shall be assigned to command the brigades 
 into which their regiments will be expanded, and 
 the brigade commanders to command the divisions 
 into which their respective brigades will be ex- 
 panded. From the other permanent officers of the 
 training school shall be assigned the staff and ad- 
 ministrative officers of the expanded armies thus 
 created. 
 
 . At the end of the fost year of the 
 
 Ecvpanston .. n ±.u j. • - u i 
 
 -^ operation oi the trammg school a 
 
 schedule of mobilization shall be pre- 
 pared on a basis of expansion to twice the size of 
 the training school, by calling to the active service 
 the JMinute Men in addition to the students of the 
 Training School. This schedule of mobilization 
 shall govern until the end of the second year of the 
 operation of the Training School. 
 
 Officers shall be provided by first promoting the 
 permanent officers of the training school, and then 
 
194 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 by filling vacancies by promotion from the eligible 
 classes for such appointment, in the following 
 order : 
 
 1. From the Permanent Personnel, enlisted, if 
 any are eligible. 
 
 2. From graduates of the Training School who 
 are eligible. 
 
 3. From graduates of approved Military Col- 
 leges. 
 
 4. From Civil Life. 
 
 Commissions in the proper grades as Commis- 
 sioned Officers of Minute Men for a period of one 
 year shall be issued regularly to all these officers, 
 from whatever source they may be appointed, and 
 the officers thus appointed shall be regularly as- 
 signed to duty in the scheme of mobilization for 
 that year. 
 
 ■c . At the end of the second year of 
 
 Jixpansion , ^ , n^ . . r^ , i 
 
 cf J Tr operation of the Trammff School a 
 iS ecoTKjL x^ ear 
 
 new schedule of mobilization shall be 
 
 prepared, on a basis of expanding the training 
 school to three times its normal size, by calling to 
 active service two classes of Minute Men, in addi- 
 tion to the current class under instruction in the 
 Training School, and vacancies in the various 
 grades of commissioned officers shall be filled as 
 before by appointments for one year. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 195 
 
 _ . At the end of the third year of opera- 
 
 Eccpansion .. r. .i 4. • • 1, 1 
 
 t tion 01 the training school a new 
 
 schedule of mobilization shall be pre- 
 pared on a basis of calling three classes of Minute 
 Men to active service, and continuing the opera- 
 tion of the training school as a depot for recruiting 
 and training of recruits. 
 
 In this schedule of mobilization, provision shall 
 be made for a sufficient number of commissioned 
 officers for the active force and also for the opera- 
 tion of the Training School, from the following 
 sources : 
 
 1. The Commissioned Officers of the Permanent 
 
 Personnel shall be promoted to fill all vacan- 
 cies in the war force and training school, as 
 far as this supply will go, filhng all posi- 
 tions of command and administration in the 
 higher grades. 
 
 2. Officers who have held one-year commissions 
 as Commissioned Officers of Minute Men, 
 and whose service has been satisfactory, form 
 the next class of eligibles from which pro- 
 motions will be made. 
 
 3. The other classes above enumerated as eli- 
 gible will then be used in the order enumer- 
 ated for the remainder of commissioned 
 officers of Minute ]VIen necessary. Regular 
 commissions as Officers of Minute JNIen will 
 
196 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 be issued for a period of one year, by the 
 Secretary of War, under such regulations 
 as may be prescribed by the President. In 
 Hke manner commissioned officers will be 
 provided for annually in annual schedules 
 for mobilization. 
 
 . . After the original assignments have 
 
 PromotKms tn i -, a. 4. 4.1, ^ 
 
 _. „ been made pursuant to the loreffo- 
 
 Time of War . . . . i 
 
 ' mg provisions, promotions and as- 
 
 signments in time of war shall be made by the 
 President under such regulations as he may pre- 
 scribe. 
 
 To fill vacancies created by 
 
 VIII. Appointments .1 .. ^ xi • a 4. • 
 
 _ _ ^^ . . the operation 01 this Act in 
 
 and Promotions in .^ -n . -r» i 
 
 the Permanent Personnel, 
 
 Permanent Personnel in • a.u 4. 1 n 
 
 and all vacancies that shall 
 
 occur in the Permanent Personnel after this Act 
 shall take efiPect, separate lists of eligibles shall be 
 established as hereinafter provided, and each list 
 of eligibles shall be exhausted for the time being 
 before any nomination shall be made from the next 
 list of eligibles in order. 
 
 ^ Commissioned OfiScers of the Perma- 
 
 nent Personnel of the Army, in the 
 order determined by their length of service as com- 
 missioned ofiScers in the service of the United States. 
 For the purposes of this Act, all service as com- 
 missioned ofificers shall be counted, whether in the 
 army, the navy, the marine corps, in regulars or 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 197 
 
 in volunteers. Service as a commissioned officer 
 of militia shall not be counted on this list, unless 
 such service shall have been rendered in the service 
 of the United States pursuant to a regular call by 
 the President as prescribed by law for calling the 
 militia into the service of the United States. 
 
 Upon the occurrence of a vacancy in any branch 
 of the service the vacancy shall be tendered to the 
 officer at the top of the next lower list, and if he 
 shall decline such vacancy it shall pass to the officer 
 next on that list, and so on until it shall be filled. 
 The object of this provision is to enable officers of 
 technical training in special arms to await the oc- 
 currence of a vacancy in that arm of the service in 
 which they have been specially trained (e.g., Medi- 
 cal Corps ) . 
 
 If any comumissioned officer, having been nomi- 
 nated for a vacancy in the branch of the service 
 in which he has had technical training, shall decline 
 such appointment, he shall retain his then rank and 
 commission, but his name shall be stricken from all 
 lists for promotion and the President shall be author- 
 ized to retire such officer whenever, in the judgment 
 of the President, such retirement shall be to the 
 best interests of the service. The Graduates of 
 the United States IVIilitary Academy shall be placed 
 each year at the bottom of the list for promotion 
 in the order of their graduation standing. 
 
198 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 . Enlisted men of the Permanent Per- 
 
 sonnel who shall have passed a satis- 
 factory examination under such regulations as the 
 President may prescribe, as long as they remain 
 eligible. To be eligible an enlisted man must be 
 unmarried, must have at least four years service, 
 and must have passed a satisfactory examination, 
 and be of an age between 21 and 30 years. 
 
 ^ . ,^ Graduates of approved Military Col- 
 
 ListNo.3 1 , , 1 4. -1 T J 4} 
 
 leges who have voluntarily applied lor 
 
 the enrollment in the Training School and have ren- 
 dered approved service therein. 
 
 . Applicants from civil life, unmarried, 
 
 of good moral character, between 21 
 and 30 years of age, who shall have passed a satis- 
 factory examination under such regulations as may 
 be prescribed by the President. 
 _,^ _. . ^ Enlistments in the Permanent Per- 
 
 - ^_ ,. . sonnel shall be lor a period ol live 
 
 of Oblimtion -, , i . . 
 
 ' * years, under such regulations as 
 
 may be prescribed by the President. 
 
 Students in the Training School shall serve one 
 year as Students, and shall then be under the mili- 
 tary obhgation of a Minute Man for a period of 
 three years. 
 
 ^ . 1 rr, ' • The President shall have 
 
 Jl . Annual Trainms, , n n at- o. tvt 
 
 *' power to call all Minute Men 
 
 into active service for practical training for a period 
 
 of not to exceed one month each year. 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 199 
 
 Provided; that no contract for personal service 
 between any Minute Man and any employer shall 
 be abrogated or impaired on account of such prac- 
 tical training, and that every employer who dis- 
 charges any Minute Man on account of such prac- 
 tical training shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor pun- 
 ishable by a fine of one year's pay of said Minute 
 Man under the terms of his contract, which fine shall 
 be payable to the Minute Man by said employer 
 upon order and execution from any federal court 
 in lieu of all damages to said Minute Man from 
 loss of position or employment, costs of the process 
 to be paid by the employer upon judgment and 
 execution by the court. 
 
 T^^ ^ 7 T^ /. The citizens of the United 
 
 XI. Other Forces of n., . v ui 4. -va- 
 
 rr • T cy States liable to military ser- 
 
 United States; • 4. • i j j • 4.1, t3 
 
 vice not included m the Fer- 
 
 Class C J. Ti 1 • 
 
 manent Jrersonnel, nor m 
 
 the Training School as Students, nor in the Minute 
 Men, nor in the Organized Militia, enrolled in Class 
 C of this Act, shall not be called into the mihtary 
 service except when specially authorized by Con- 
 gress; but when so called shall be organized as 
 hereinafter provided. 
 
 J .' . The number authorized by Con- 
 
 Avportionment , n , . v 1 
 
 gress shall be apportioned to the 
 
 divisions and districts in proportion to population, 
 
 and the apportionment shall specify the number and 
 
 classes of troops called for from each district. 
 
200 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 A period shall be alloted during which 
 
 „ "^ voluntary enrollments shall be made 
 
 Enrollments • 4. 4.u n ^ 1-4. 
 
 m response to the call, and applicants 
 
 for such enrollment examined to determine their 
 
 fitness for the military service. All such applicants 
 
 shall be entitled to the same bounty as Minute Men 
 
 if accepted. 
 
 ^ _ At the expiration of the period for 
 
 Compulsory ^ , no. /» • 4. 
 
 x' voluntary enrollment a sumcient 
 
 Enrollment i _n u u u j i. i 4. 
 
 number 01 men shall be drawn by lot, 
 
 under such regulations as may be prescribed by the 
 President, to complete the number called for in the 
 apportionment. But no man who is thus drafted 
 shall be entitled to any bounty, pension, or promo- 
 tion except that any soldier may be promoted for 
 gallantry in action in time of war under such regu- 
 lations as the President may prescribe. 
 
 Tjy .. The same rules shall govern exemp- 
 
 Eooemptions . • 1 i • , i i n 
 
 tions as provided m the annual draits 
 
 for Students in the Training School. 
 
 _, _ . In case anv drafted man shall offer a 
 
 Substitutes 1 4. •. 4. *^ • • u 11 t. A ' 
 
 substitute, inquiry shall be made m 
 
 regard to the conditions. The substitute must be 
 a man who was not himself drafted nor otherwise 
 under obligation to serve at this time, must be ac- 
 ceptable in every way, and the man who seeks ex- 
 emption must be a citizen engaged in some occupa- 
 tion useful to the nation as well as to himself. The 
 exempt must pay to the substitute a bounty at the 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 201 
 
 same rate as that paid by the government to JNIinute 
 Men, and shall in addition indemnify the substitute 
 for loss of time and risk incurred. If all these con- 
 ditions are complied with, substitutes may be ac- 
 cepted under such regulations as may be prescribed 
 by the President. 
 
 All commissioned officers of 
 Supply of Officers g^j^ ^^^j, ^j^^^ ^^ appointed by 
 
 selection from the permanent personnel to tempo- 
 rary commissions, which appointments shall make 
 temporary vacancies in the Permanent Personnel, 
 to be filled with temporary appointments as pro- 
 vided for regular vacancies, such appointees being 
 in all respects on the same basis as other officers of 
 the Permanent Personnel, except that they hold 
 temporary commissions to be vacated when the oc- 
 casion for their services shall have passed. 
 
 All other commissioned officers shall be filled by 
 selection from the following classes, in the order 
 named : 
 
 1. From the Permanent Personnel, as far as 
 
 consistent with the interest of the pubhc ser- 
 vice, to be determined by the President. 
 
 2. From the Minute Men, under the same con- 
 
 ditions; "Honor Men" to be counted as 
 Minute Men for this purpose. 
 
 3. From Civil Life, under such regulations as 
 the President may prescribe for that pur- 
 pose. 
 
202 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 . All promotions in the volunteer forces 
 
 of the United States shall be made by 
 
 selection, under such regulations as the President 
 
 may prescribe. 
 
 ^_,_. ^ -_ 1. The pav and allowances of the 
 
 Xll. ray and ^ ."^^ i i n i 
 
 ,„ ^ Permanent Personnel shall be as 
 
 Allowances -i j i i 
 
 now prescribed by law. 
 
 2. The allowances of Students at the Training 
 School and of Minute Men shall be the same as 
 those of the permanent personnel while on active 
 duty. In addition, the allowances of students at the 
 training school and of Minute Men while on active 
 service, shall include an amount equal to ten per 
 cent of the pay of the permanent personnel as ex- 
 pense money. Drafted men are entitled to the 
 ten per cent allowance for expense money and to 
 all allowances while on active duty. Minute Men 
 are not entitled to allowances of any kind while on 
 a status of furlough. 
 
 3. Every man who is voluntarily enrolled as a 
 Student at the Training School shall be entitled to 
 a bounty of one hundred dollars at the end of his 
 year of service at the training school, and to a 
 further bounty of one hundred dollars at the end 
 of each year of his service as a Minute Man. 
 
 This bounty shall not be subject to fines or for- 
 feitures except for desertion from the service. 
 
 All volunteers for enrollment accepted upon a call 
 by the President for additional troops from Class 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 203 
 
 C shall be entitled to the same bounty as Minute 
 Men, and all men accepted for service whether by 
 voluntary enrollment or by draft from Class C 
 shall be entitled to the same allowances, including 
 the ten per cent expense money, as Minute Men. 
 
 4. No drafted man shall receive bounty or pen- 
 sion in any form. 
 
 x^Txr -r^ • ^^ mQn not drafted shall have the 
 
 XIV, Pensions j. 4. • a ^ 
 
 same status m regard to pensions 
 
 as now provided by law. 
 
 x^rr T^ 7 T 1- The rules and Articles of War 
 
 XV, Rules and in xi, m • • c u i 
 
 . shall govern the irammg School, 
 
 ®^ Minute Men when called into ac- 
 
 tive service, and additional forces of Class C when 
 such forces are called into the service. 
 
 2. The President shall have power to prescribe 
 all needful rules and regulations to carry into effect 
 the provisions of this Act ; provided that in no case 
 shall the amount of money appropriated by Con- 
 gress be exceeded. 
 
 nrxTrx Tx^T ^ _ . The provisions of this Act 
 
 XVI. When Effective u n 4. 1 ^4. -4. 
 
 " shall take eiiect upon its 
 
 signature by the President. 
 
 xxx^xT J • . For contingent expenses 
 
 XVII. Appropriation , . .i • . n .• ^ 
 
 ^^ ^ during the installation 01 
 
 the system herein provided for, to be expended in 
 the discretion of the President for any purpose in 
 his judgment necessary in this work and not other- 
 
204 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 wise provided for by law, there is hereby appropri- 
 ated and set aside the sum of fifty miUion dollars 
 from any fmids in the Treasury of the United 
 States not otherwise appropriated, to be available at 
 once, and to continue available until exhausted or 
 until the installation of the system shall be com- 
 plete and all its incidental expenses shall be other- 
 wise provided for by law, and any remaining bal- 
 ance thereof shall thereupon revert to the Treasury 
 of the United States when in the judgment of the 
 President such appropriation is no longer neces- 
 sary. 
 
 ^_._^^_ _ . . . _ ^ There shall be established 
 
 XV 111. Distinmiished • .i -r> . /-, 
 
 _, . _^ _ * m the Jrermanent Commis- 
 
 bervice Order • j t> i j 
 
 sioned Personnel an order 
 
 to be known as "The Distinguished Service Order," 
 
 upon the installation of this system for the National 
 
 Defense. 
 
 The number of officers in the distinguished service 
 order shall be equal in each grade to ten per cent 
 of the total number of officers provided for by the 
 Field Service Regulations, and this number shall be 
 in excess of the number provided for by the Field 
 Service Regulations. 
 
 Commissions in the Distinguished Service Order 
 shall be given in the name of the President, for dis- 
 tinguished service, to be determined by such means 
 as the President may direct. Eligible lists for this 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 205 
 
 promotion shall be established once per year, and 
 shall remain in force for one year. Promotions to 
 the Distinguished Service Order shall be made from 
 the next lower grade, and shall remain in force 
 until the officer shall be promoted to the same grade 
 by ordinary promotion, when his commission in the 
 Distinguished Service Order shall cease and deter- 
 mine. The resulting vacancy shall be filled as in 
 the case of other vacancies on this list. 
 
 The object of this provision is to place within the 
 power of the President the opportunity to reward 
 meritorious or specially distinguished service by a 
 promotion of one grade, without thereby retarding 
 the promotion or impairing the rights of other offi- 
 cers who may be equally meritorious, but may not 
 have had equal opportunity to win such reward. 
 
 The Officers commissioned to the Distinguished 
 
 Service Order shall constitute "The Generals' 
 
 Staff" of the Army, and may be assigned to any 
 
 duty consistent with their rank. 
 
 xrxT^ yrr . .7 r'or the purposes of this Act the 
 XIX, Terntonal . ... ^ ,. tt -x j ox j. 
 -^. . . territories 01 the United states 
 
 Divisions 1, n 1. J- -J J ^ n 
 
 shall be divided as lollows: 
 
 1. Territorial Divisions, one for each tactical 
 division of the mobile army, shall be established, and 
 one tactical division of the army shall be assigned 
 to each territorial division. 
 
 2. Each territorial division shall be subdivided 
 into districts, one district for each brigade of inf an- 
 
206 Trained Citizen Soldiery 
 
 try in the mobile army, and one brigade of infantry 
 shall be assigned to that district. 
 
 The district may be subdivided into subdistricts, 
 at the rate of one for each regiment of the brigade, 
 in the discretion of the brigade commander, who 
 shall be responsible for the administration of all 
 military provisions of the law of the United States 
 in his district. 
 
 3. For each permanent fortification of the sea 
 coast of the United States there shall be set aside 
 one coast defense district, which shall not be in- 
 cluded in any division, but shall be administered by 
 the proper officers of the sea coast defense Perma- 
 nent Personnel. 
 
 „ „ ^ . The President shall have power 
 
 XX. Inventions . • -, j 4. 4. 
 
 _ _ to consider and test any new 
 
 and Improvements .-, - s.- u 4.u j? 
 
 ^ idea or invention, whether 01 
 
 equipment, ordnance, tactics, or of organization, 
 under such rules and regulations as he may pre- 
 scribe from time to time, and to that end he shall 
 have power to establish a Bureau to be known as 
 "The Bureau of Inventions and Improvements," 
 and to detail for duty therein such officers of the 
 Distinguished Service Order as may be necessary. 
 Provided; that if as a result of such test any idea, 
 device, suggestion or equipment, be found to have 
 a military value, the President shall have power to 
 cause the same to be reserved for the exclusive use 
 
Trained Citizen Soldiery 207 
 
 of the United States, and to determine in what 
 manner and by what amount the author or inventor 
 of such idea, device, suggestion or equipment, shall 
 be rewarded by the United States. 
 
 XXI. The military service herein provided for 
 shall take the place of the military establishment 
 heretofore prescribed by law; and all Acts or parts 
 of Acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act 
 are hereby repealed. 
 
 XXII. For the purpose of providing for the 
 National Defense an adequate body of trained 
 troops, until the foregoing provisions shall have 
 resulted in an adequate body of Minute Men, the 
 President is authorized to enroll as Minute Men, 
 at once, any veteran of the War with Spain, or of 
 the Philippine Insurrection, and any honorably 
 discharged soldier of the United States, who shall 
 apply for such enrollment and who shall pass a satis- 
 factory physical examination, for a period of two 
 years ; and such veterans shall be entitled to all the 
 rights, privileges, bounties, promotions, pensions, 
 and other emoluments and rewards, as are herein 
 prescribed for Minute Men who shall be hereafter 
 graduated from the National Training School for 
 Minute Men.