LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 
 
 u — x~z'^ — 
 
 Chap. Copyright No.. 
 
 Shell.Jrt.Si.'^. 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
INTERNATIONAL SERIES 
 
 LIEUT.-COIv. ARTHUR I.. WAGNER, 
 
 AMiitant Adjutant-Oeneral. U. S. Army; late Instructor in Art of War at the 
 U.S Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. 
 
 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 DEVELOPED FROM 
 
 MODERN MILITARY HISTORY. 
 
 PRITZ HOENIO. 
 
 H 
 
 'THE WOBDIS FREE. THE DEED MUTE, OBEDIENCE BLIND. 
 
 TrauKlatefl from the Foiirtli German Edition 
 
 uy 
 
 CARLREICHMANN, 
 
 FirHt Lieuteuaut NLuth Infantry, 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 KANSAS CITY, MO : 
 HUD.SONKIMBHRLY PUBLISHING CO. 
 1014-1010 Wyandotte Street. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & CO. (Limited), 
 
 13 Waterloo Placb, S. W. 
 
 PUBUISHRRS TO THE INDIA OFFICE, 
 
 2f\€i COPY, 
 1896. 
 
 ^^-'^^^ I 
 
^ 
 
 « ' ;>•> 
 
 ^y 
 
 
TA]^.i.\\ OK contp:nts. 
 
 
 Editor')! I'Ttfuct ♦ " >"""""""'" 
 
 I'ri-.l'Mif. lo Bftconfl Krl itioti ,,..»»." , . - . » ' • 
 
 Vrf.ffu:f Ut I'dtirDi I'Ailion . ,,,,,., i >•>•• ■ 
 
 2» 
 
 Intro'luctiou , , , 
 
 I'AkT I, 
 MiliUry-Hi»U>ncal Btttdie», 
 I. ThT Attark of the '^th Infantry I'.rt'/H'U: on tht I'arm»,t^a'l 
 of Hor anrl on th«: A'ljoininK, Hntrcncht'J, Woo'l of Hriz 
 in th«- Hattic of K>',nimiriiiz on July 3. 1866 ... ^'' 
 
 a. 'flu: March ^ 
 
 b. The lJ»Tploymcnt ..,,,/,,,... 70 
 
 C. Th«: I'.atll.-fieM , '^^ 
 
 d, Th«: Atla'k "^"^ 
 
 11. Th*: Attack of Ui»- )',<th Half Oiviuion 'JJSth infaniry lirr/,ii'lt) 
 
 on the H'Mj<h1> of J'.ruvill*: on th»: IfJth of Auyuf.^, I^JO lOl 
 
 a. The March to the Battle fiel'l '^^J 
 h. Tlic Ixrploynicnt ' ^^ 
 
 c. The Kattle-ficM ^'* 
 
 d. r.«j/inninj< of the Attack ,.,, ^^ 
 
 e. I'«:rhon;il <^>h»»crvationft -,..,. /,.,,,..,.... .128 
 
 f. Hvcnt» on the i»i'le of th»; French 1^ 
 
 f(. Course of the Atta<k *^ 
 
 III. Retro»pect» 1^ 
 
 IV. Ta/:tic« at I'roblu»-Bor on July 3, 1866 1*1 
 
 V. Tacticnat Marn-la-Tour on August le. IS70 J'5''^ 
 
 a I'Hy';holoj<ical Matter* '^'-^ 
 
 b. I<<;n»arkH on th«T Battle-field and on the Enemy'i 
 
 I'orce* ., '''^ 
 
 c. The I><r|>loyment ,...* '^'^ 
 
 d. Th«r Attack '7'' 
 
 e. Tb'- Kctreat J78 
 
 f. I/OhS«rH 1^7 
 
 K Note* to the Official Atxount Re;<ardinK the Ter- 
 rain '''*' 
 
8 rahlf of Contents. 
 
 Page. 
 
 VI. Objectives of the German and French Commanders 192 
 
 VII. How should the Attack of the 38th Brigade have been Ar- 
 ranged ? 194 
 
 VIII. Tactical Comments 197 
 
 a. The Tactical Forms Employed 201 
 
 b. Duration of the Attack 202 
 
 c. Expenditure of Ammunition and the Fire Effect.. 203 
 IX. Why was the Charge of the 1st Guard Dragoons Successful ?208 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Psychology.- and Tactics. 
 
 I. General 214 
 
 II. Maxims 222 
 
 III. Inijuiries into the Maxims .... 227 
 
 IV. Of the Moral Training of Troops 253 
 
 PART III. 
 Tactical Deductions. 
 
 I. Remarks on Tactical Tendencies 262 
 
 II. Results of Surgical and Ballistic Experiments 272 
 
 III. Smokeless Powder 280 
 
 IV. Tactical Deductions Regarding the Attack from the Experi- 
 
 ments of Bruns, from the Ballistic Properties of the Small- 
 Caliber Rifles and from the Properties of the Smokeless 
 
 Powder 290 
 
 V. Of the Extent of Ground in Battle, of Control, and of the 
 
 "Treffen" 305 
 
 VI. Of the Defense 327 
 
 VII. Of Reconnaissance and of Preparations by Artillery 339 
 
 VIII. Of Turning Movements 354 
 
 IX. Of the Frontal Action 375 
 
 X. Of Village and Wood Fighting 382 
 
 XI. Of Night Battles 392 
 
 XII. Conclusions 401 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 • The book horewitli presented for (Ih? lirst time in Eng- 
 lish is a development of the work entitled "Two Brigades," 
 and in its present form is, as the author says, what he orig- 
 inally luid in mind. In describing the pi-o<<*sH of evolution 
 by which the book has reached its present form, the author 
 remarks that though the original work was well received in 
 South Germany, France, Austria, and other European coun- 
 tries, it met with a cold reception in North (Jermany; prob- 
 ably because nobody likes to have his own mistakes pointed 
 out. He intimates that although the Official Account of the 
 Franco-German War is based on all publications and docu- 
 ments that appeared in jjrint previous to its publication, 
 and although it is undoubtedly the best technical account 
 of military operations ever published, it cannot be denied 
 that SOUK* tilings have either been glossed over or that the 
 compilers were, in some instances, misled by the defective 
 accounts and reports of eye-witnesses. In fact, it is impos- 
 sible to avoid the impression that the German General Staff, 
 in compiling the Official Account, was careful to let no oppor- 
 tunity slip to increase the prestige of the German arms, and 
 especially to avoid impairing that prestige when unpleasant 
 facts could be passed over with a few words. He also 
 I)oints out errors contained in regimental histories, and has 
 taken great pains to write as nearly as possible the exact 
 
1 E^iitors Ptrfacf, 
 
 tnuU in ivi^ani u> events that have often btvn dtvsioribtHl 
 Avith uioro patriotism than aecmaiv. 
 
 The it^ader v>t* any work mi the Franoo-Prussuan War is 
 likely to be so stivngly impresstnl with the visibU* niilitarv 
 ^H^wer of Prussia, and s<> dazzUnl by the series of events 
 whioh in a eaniimign of a few niontlis bnnijiht to its knet^ 
 the tirst military nation of Europe, that it is dittioult for 
 him to n»alize that on the side of the (.unmans military mat 
 ters wert^ not altogether pertWt. It is new and interesting* 
 to tiud that there was tactical deticiency on the part of some 
 of the higher German Uwders, and that the lack of orgmuKa- 
 tion of the system of iviH>rts and nu^siiges on the battle- 
 field left Von Moltke for some hours at i^ravelotte without 
 definite and re^liable information of what was going on. 
 AVe have heartl si> much of the magniticent energy of the 
 iierman U^iiders in marching to the sound of the cannon 
 and promptly joining battle wherever they could, that it is 
 wholesome for us to read that this wild euerg\- of the sub- 
 ordinate h^\der« was not always pn>ductive of the best re- 
 sults, and that the triH^ps often got completely beyond the 
 civutrol of their generals. The lack of tactical reiH^nuais- 
 samv was more marktHl than we have Invn leti to believe: 
 and. with all due rt^iHHt to the sujn^rior org^inizatiou and 
 the sui^rior training of the German Army, we art^ remindtni 
 of the old saying, that "Nothing succeeds like suihvss." 
 
 Honig unites the qualities so dt^rable in a tactical 
 writer; namely, a dtvp knowUnlge of his subjtvt and of 
 human nature, a facility of exv>ressicm. fearlessness in set- 
 ting forth his views, and a spirit of phih>sophical justice-, 
 which is shown in giving crtniit to his enemies as well as 
 bestowing pniise upon his friends. Even when we cannot 
 alti^'ther agrtv with his views, we are foreeil to respect 
 them, and his book will be welcomed bv those who are most 
 
Editor's Preface. 11 
 
 interested in military literature and tactical training. In 
 view of the many devices for sheltering troops under all cir- 
 cumstances, which has been somewhere happily designated 
 as "the cult of fear," it is refreshing to read the announce- 
 ment that great loss must be boldly faced and not shunned, 
 and that officers and troops must be instructed that these 
 losses are inevitable and have to be unflinchingly met. In 
 the same spirit is made the assertion that only those men 
 talk of night battles who are afraid of facing an enemy in 
 daytime. It excites our admiration to find a gifted German 
 soldier saying that the French infantr}- at Worth and 
 Gravelotte was one of the best that ever fought; and in 
 view of the manifest defects of short service, which is now 
 the rule everywhere in Europe, we can easily share his doubt 
 whether any French infantry will ever again fight with the 
 same determination. 
 
 It is, too, rather unusual to find a European author who 
 refers to the War of Secession as an evidence of a sound 
 military fact, and we cannot help remarking how far in 
 advance of most of the European critics he is when we read 
 the following passage: "The armor shields and armored 
 clothing prepared by the Danes and others do not seem suit- 
 able for field service as protection against projectiles, but, 
 on the other hand, the construction of rifled trenches, etc., 
 by means of the spade, will play a great role in future bat- 
 tles; occasions for their use will arise for the attacker as 
 well as for the defender, since it is very probable that there 
 will be battles of several days' duration — which, however, 
 are nothing new. In this connection it is sufficient to recall 
 the North American Civil War." 
 
 When a German critic can do full justice to a French 
 enemy, and acknowledge virtually that military lessons can 
 be drawn from Spottsylvania as well as from Gravelotte, 
 
12 Editor's Preface. 
 
 the American reader must necessarily be predisposed in his 
 favor, and it is confidently believed that this favorable pre- 
 disposition will not be in any way impaired by the perusal 
 of Honig's remarkable book. 
 
 Washington, D. C, November 16, 1897. 
 
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 "Books have their fortunes," says the proverb, and this 
 one has been no exception. Perhaps it w^ill interest the 
 reader to have me tell something about it; anyway, that is 
 what prompts me to do so. 
 
 The book appeared in 1881 under the title of "Two 
 Brigades," chiefly upon the urgent request of an officer, of 
 literary fame, who has since died, although I should have 
 preferred to postpone the publication for some years; in 
 addition to the above motive, it was the then controversy 
 whether it was to be long-range fire or short-range fire, open 
 order or a combination of close and open order, day or night 
 battles, etc., that prompted me to publish the book, believ- 
 ing that I would be able to contribute something toward the 
 settlement of the questions in dispute. 
 
 Any historical-tactical experiences I might want to 
 draw upon would, of course, have to be beyond the pale of 
 doubt; in that case it was to be premised that in some places 
 the book would not be received with favor, for no one likes 
 to have his errors pointed out. Of two cases, but one was 
 possible: either the Official Account was correct, or mine, as 
 their discrepancies are such that they cannot be reconciled. 
 But if anyone will take the trouble to compare the History 
 of the 57th Regiment published after the "Two Brigades" 
 and the Official Account, he will at once admit that, aside 
 
14 Preface to Second Edition. 
 
 from some small details, the aiitlior of the "Two Brigades" 
 is right. 
 
 The Official Account of the attack of the :i8th Brigade 
 on August 1(1, 1870, may therefore justly be considered as 
 superseded, and that of the attack of the 28th Brigade on 
 July 3, 18GG, as rectified in many essential points. I do not 
 know how the Official Account of the latter was prepared; as 
 regards the former, a well-known general officer, capable of 
 rendering judgment, wrote to me on October 10, 1883, that, 
 so far as he was concerned, the description of the episode 
 in question of August 10th, as given in that work, left much 
 to be desired, because (out of consideration for some of the 
 survivors) it silently passed over one of the most important 
 points: the retreat of the 10 intact battalions of the 20th Di- 
 vision at the very moment when Wedell's brigade advanced 
 — through some misunderstanding! In the History of the 
 57th Kegiment by Baron von Schimmelmann I. reference, 
 so far as that nuiy be ex])ected from a work of that char- 
 acter, to the incorrect statements of the Official Account, is 
 made by special note. 
 
 The edition before me ditfers essentially from the first 
 one — in fact, it is an entirely new book, such as I may have 
 had in mind from the first. Many communications from 
 officers of high and low rank have enabled me to interweave 
 events of imj)ortane'e, to elucidate others; and in that respect 
 my thanks are due, in the first place, to Major-General von 
 Hiller, who commanded the 28th Bi'igade at Koniggriitz; 
 to Lieutenant-Colonel von Leszczynski, of the auxiliary es- 
 tablishment of the great General b^tatl", who in 18()(j was 
 with the 1st Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment; and 
 to others, though I do not nanu^ them. 
 
 The Introduction and the Second Pari had to be completely 
 rewritten. Though the sentence placed at the head of the 
 
Preface to Second Edition. 15 
 
 book remains correct from the general tactical point of 
 view, still no intelligent man may gainsay the great in- 
 fluence exercised upon tactics by the small-caliber rifl^e, 
 smokeless powder, and the increased effect of artillery fire. 
 In making investigations in this field the new edition has 
 taken up various questions of general interest regarding 
 the future, which made the addition of a Third Part indis- 
 pensable. The historical part, on the other hand, has 
 merely been amplified. 
 
 A few more remarks on the fortunes of the First Edi- 
 tion : According to my observations, the same did not become 
 much known in Northern Germany, owing perhaps to some 
 inconvenient statements contained therein. I merely men- 
 tion the fact, and am not deeply concerned about the reasons 
 therefor; the reader may draw his own conclusions. The 
 "reserve" shown, however, failed of its object in this case. 
 The book was most favorably received in all countries, par- 
 ticularly in Austria-Hungary, France, Switzerland, Sweden, 
 Russia, and the Netherlands. 
 
 One day in 1883, when I was at the Hague, I called on 
 the Dutch Minister of War, Den Beer Portugal; the object 
 of my visit is immaterial. He received me with great civil- 
 ity and invited me to dine with him next day. There I met, 
 among other guests, several general staff officers from the 
 Hague, the minister having returned my call in due form. 
 The repast was a splendid one, and the tone at the table such 
 as may only be found among well-bred and well-educated 
 men. You could feel that these men had seen — and had 
 learned something; when the roast was on the table, the 
 Minister of War rose and most cordially toasted, in fluent 
 German, the German comrade and above all the author. 
 I responded in Dutch, and, after the lady of the house had 
 withdrawn, a genial mood began to reign. The gentlemen 
 
16 Preface to Second Edition. 
 
 proved thoroughly familiar with my writings, particularly 
 with the ''Two Brigades." Some of them recited entire 
 sentences, much to my surprise, and the War Minister him- 
 self proved no exception. One of the gentlemen cold me 
 that the book, which costs two florins in Holland, had 
 brought ten florins in some town (Flushing?) at the annual 
 auction of the regimental library. That, he said, showed 
 conclusively how much the book was held in esteem. If this 
 edition should meet the eyes of these gentlemen, I again con- 
 vey them herewith my thanks for the pleasant hours passed 
 in their society. 
 
 From Austria I have received quite enthusiastic 
 comments. 
 
 French officers, too, took much interest in the "Two 
 Brigades." One of them wrote me that, book in hand on 
 the battle-field, he endeavored to place himself in the situa- 
 tion of the 38th Brigade near Mars-la-Tour, and that he 
 vividly realized the awful drama there enacted; that in 
 Algiers the book was his constant companion; that the 
 German author was his master and favorite writer, etc. 
 
 Nor have tokens of approval failed to come from the 
 Fatherland. In the fall of 1882 I received by mail a pretty 
 drinking-horn. It bore the inscription: "To the Author ot 
 the 'Two Brigades.' " I herewith convey my thanks to the 
 kind givers. The drinking-horn is my pride, for the book 
 has evidently pleased the senders. 
 
 In the spring of 1884 I called on General of Cavalry 
 von Willisen, upon the request of a distinguished friend. 
 The general received me with the words: "I knew that you 
 were the author of the best book on modern infantry action, 
 but I can hardlv believe that vou are also the author of the 
 
Preface to Second Edition. 17 
 
 anonymous writings on cavalry,*" although I am assured 
 by two corps commanders that you are. Ever since I 
 have been wanting to see you, and if you had not come to 
 me, I should have gone to see you, if for uo other reason than 
 from a feeling of indebtedness, because heretofore no one 
 has written so clearly and convincingly on the employ- 
 ment of cavalry. Is it true that you are the author of these 
 writings?" I answered in the affirmative, and the general 
 shook me heartily by the hand and, as he said, gratefully! 
 He said that he had learned much from my writings. 1 
 have been in constant and cordial communication with liim 
 ever since. One day he led me to his desk, and, taking from 
 it a rather ragged book, he said: "Look at it; you will be 
 gratified." It was the "Two Brigades." On a blank leaf 
 was a list of gentlemen to whom he had loaned the book; 
 there were about fifty of them, among them a number of 
 general officers. "Kot one," he said, "has read it without 
 enthusiasm. It has traveled a good deal, and its outward 
 appearance is not very fine, but it remains one of my 
 favorite books." 
 
 One corps commander says that the description of the 
 historical-tactical events equals a photograph in precision. 
 Lieutenant-General von Legat, formerly commander of the 
 30th Division and who was my company commander in 1865, 
 wrote me from Metz, that lie had visited the battle-field of 
 Mars-la-Tour with the "Two Brigades" in his hand, that he 
 had found my statements and opinions correct, and that the 
 events passed his understanding. General von Hiller has 
 repeatedly thanked me for the precise and correct account 
 of events of the battle of Koniggratz, and quite a number 
 
 *1. "On the Armament, Training, Organization, and Employ- 
 ment of Cavalry." 2. "The Cavalry Division as a Battle Unit." 
 3. "Tactical Directives for the Formation and Leading of the Cavalry 
 Division." All three published by R. Felix, Berlin. 
 
18 Preface to Second Edition. 
 
 of communications, many of them from Metz and from vari- 
 ous regiments, testify to the correctness of my description. 
 In that respect the book has therefore fully accomplished 
 its object, and I hope that in its new form it may be instru- 
 mental to some extent in clearing up the various questions 
 now agitating the minds of militai'y men. 
 
 Fritz Honig. 
 Friedenau, February 12, 1890. 
 
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. 
 
 • Since the appearance of the Third Edition, now com- 
 pletely exhausted, no warlike event of great importance has 
 taken place; still the events in Chili constitute to a certain 
 extent a valuable confirmation of the principles and opin- 
 ions which were developed in the book before those events, 
 and based entirely on experience and on due consideration 
 of the progress in technique. 
 
 Yet practical peace experiments and theoretical study 
 also have clarified tactical theory in many respects, as 
 evidenced in Germany by the many modifications of the 
 various regulations and firing instructions, instructions for 
 field fortifications, etc., and the same may be said of other 
 countries. 
 
 In tactics there can be no standstill! The modifica- 
 tions made since 1890 had therefore to be taken into consid- 
 eration if for no other reason than that for the most part 
 they still have to stand practical test. Discussion, held in 
 keeping with war realities, of the principal questions, par- 
 ticularly of the infantry attack, will therefore continue to 
 form part of our daily bread. I have not limited myself 
 to them, however, but have endeavored to bring all tactical 
 phenomena of the battle-field within the scope of my in- 
 quiry. The elimination of old and the addition of new 
 matter was found necessary in order to again bring the con- 
 tents and form of the book up to date. 
 
20 Prefaec to Fourth J-Jdition. 
 
 Chapter I. of the First I'art is the oiilv one that has not 
 been modified; "Events on the Side of the French" has been 
 substituted for '^f;' Chapter II., of the First Part. A new 
 chapter, "Losses," has been added as section '7'" of Chapter 
 V. of the First Part. The Third Part has been supple- 
 mented by the chapters on "Extent of Ground in Battle," 
 "Defense," and "Street and Wood Fighting." The chapter 
 "Suggestions Kegarding the Reprint of 1880" has been 
 eliminated. 
 
 The title "^Inquiries, etc.,^' I have retained, because I 
 wish to leave it to the intelligent reader what position to 
 take with regard to my opinions; the inquiries are based 
 throughout on the results obtained in the various armies by 
 experience and experiments. 
 
 The example of the 28th Infantry Brigade at Konig- 
 gratz is antiquated, to be sure; still I did not feel at liberty 
 to eliminate it from this book, because many wishes ex- 
 pressed to me in the course of time made me aware that its 
 retention was desired, particularly in the Austrian Army. 
 As regards the infantry attack en masse, no more instructive 
 instance is to be found to-day than that of the 38th Infantry 
 Brigade at Ma.rs-la-Tour. notwithstanding its failure; but 
 such lessons alone should be drawn from it as are warranted 
 by the facts. 
 
 Both illustrations are the result of thorough study on 
 the spot of all the historical material available; in the 
 case of the 38th Infantry Brigade I was able to make some 
 valuable rectifications. Much of it is due to the contro- 
 versy carried on in the ^[ilitiir Wochenblaft, Xos. 71-78, of 
 1891. Since an approximately correct historical and tac- 
 tical account of the events was thereby rendered possible, I 
 was able to strike out all ])oints which u]> to that time had 
 been in controversv. 
 
Preface to Fourth Edition. 21 
 
 Tactics, however, cannot be exhausted by one example; 
 on the contrary, as many of them as possible; should be 
 adduced. That has been done in the Third Part, where the 
 relation of the defense to the attack has been specially dealt 
 with. I thought it necessary to give special care to tactical 
 reconnaissance and to the many questions closely connected 
 therewith and of luoic or less imjiortjince, including \\nt 
 task of leading an army, and to the discussion of the ad- 
 v^ced positions, the season for which, if they ever are to 
 be of any use, has probably been ushered in by smokeless 
 powder. The conclusions drawn will be worthy of note, 
 which does not mean, however, that they are claimed to be 
 correct in every particular. 
 
 There is no such thing as infantry tactics in battle any 
 more than tactics of any other arm; and a discussion of the 
 employment of all arms was therefore unavoidable. The 
 tactical considerations kept in mind throughout are those 
 which probably approximate the requirements of the battle- 
 field. All the incpjii-ies have, in the main, reference to the 
 fighting in a pitched battle. 
 
 Shortly after the adoption of the Drill Regulations of 
 1888 an article appeared in the Milildr Woclienhlatt, express- 
 ing the wish that discussions of the Regulations should for 
 the present be refrained from. The Regulations were to 
 be subsequently revised, on the basis of the official reports 
 of the corps commanders. The published wi-itings did in 
 fact show much reserve in that respect; the reports of the 
 corps commanders have of course never been made public. 
 But from the failure of the promised revision to materialize 
 it should not be inferred that the same is not necessary; 
 various recent phenomena point to the contrary. Mean- 
 while there has been ample time to test the fitness of 
 
22 Preface to Fourth Edition. 
 
 the Kegulations, and further observance of silence would 
 be wrong. 
 
 Fritz Honig. 
 Frledenau, November 30, 1893. 
 
 The improved fire-arms have not only modified troop- 
 leading in battle, but have circumscribed the same and 
 rendered it more difficult. 
 
 Tactics must become more psychological, if an army 
 would not forego victory. 
 
 Fritz Hbniq. 
 
 Cleve, October 1, 1881. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 • Motto: "Whenever art has decayed, the fault lay with the 
 artists.''— Schiller. 
 
 Fire-arms have undergone great improvements in a 
 comparatively short time, yet it would be rash to say that 
 greater rapidity of fire, greater accuracy, flatter and longer 
 trajectory, and greater penetrative force could not be ex- 
 pected. Although the aims of General Wille, as expressed 
 in "The Field Gun of the Future" and in "The Smallest 
 Caliber" (R. Eisenschmidt, Berlin), may encounter financial 
 and certain technical obstacles, still the time will come 
 when tactics will demand the realization of the principles 
 advocated by him. That future state of technique and its 
 influence on tactics must even now be taken into considera- 
 tion. Infantry is affected more than any other arm by 
 improved fire-arms and bj' the increased importance of fire. 
 Yet fire-arms will never extinguish the characteristics of 
 the various arms of the service. Infantry will, as heretofore, 
 carry to the end and decide the conflict, and will be unable 
 to fulfill that duty by fire-action at long range and by the 
 fire of masses delivered at those distances. It must take 
 upon itself the fighting at short range, close upon the enemy, 
 and drive him away by fire and shock, in order to occupy his 
 position. To preclude any misunderstanding of the word 
 short, is should be mentioned that according to the Firing 
 Instructions of September 9, 1893, ranges up to 600 meters 
 
24 Introduction. 
 
 are short ranges, theuce to 1000 meters medium ranges, and 
 beyond 1000 meters Joinj ranges. It is to be understood, 
 therefore, that infantry will suffer heavy losses in battle. 
 These the infantry should ncit shun, nor should it be 
 kept in ignorance that they are impending, and it should 
 be trained in that sense — /. e.. to recognize the dangers of 
 the battle-field, because there is no better means to keep 
 infantry in hand than a correct idea of the losses, and the 
 will (reason and energy) to brave the dangers. The action of 
 infantry will, as a rule, be limited to fire-action of masses of 
 skirmishers — any other form would be quickly and pre- 
 maturely shattered; whether that fire-action of masses of 
 skirmishers be styled "regulation" or "organized" is im- 
 material to me. In this method of fighting, infantry should 
 be thoroughly efficient, because leading and control can 
 make themselves felt only within certain limits, and fre- 
 quently become wholly impossible after the dispositions for 
 the attack, since most of the subordinate leaders will soon 
 be hors-de-comhat. These agencies will not prevent disorder. 
 One of the principal tasks to be mastered by infantry that 
 is to be capable of carrying an attack en masse through to 
 the end — for the entire question of ••infantry tactics" hinges 
 on that point — is that of fighting in disorder and of learn- 
 ing it in time of peace. As any movement is best assured by 
 some system, no matter how- simple and how flexible, when- 
 ever there is danger of failure from disorder, so infantry in 
 order not to be rendered impotent from the start w hen set in 
 motion against a common, extensive objective, needs for the 
 skirmish fighting en masse certain fixed laws, principles, 
 regulations, which will stand actual test; i. e., there should 
 be some organization to this skirmish fighting en masse. 
 Decisive results cannot be gained without the employment 
 of masses, and in that particular former and modt-rn tactics 
 
Introduction. 25 
 
 do not differ. The difference is to be found exclusively in 
 the tactical form by means of which life, energy and aim are 
 to be imparted to some principle; still the difference is con- 
 siderable, owing to the difficulties of that question. The 
 German infantry also fights in masses of skirmishers; 
 whether sufficiently so, and whether always on correct prin- 
 ciples, remain to be seen; and we may note right here that 
 no army has yet organized the skirmish fighting en masse in 
 a manner which promises to prove practical. 
 
 In comparing past events with the modern task system 
 (Auftragsverfaliren) as laid down in the Regulations, we 
 might say that the tactical events in front of Worth, at the 
 Mance ravine, and against La Folie on August 18, 1870 — 
 i. e., ideas which failed of success, have been adopted into 
 our Regulations. The task system at these points of the 
 battle-fields was no doubt different from what that of to-day 
 is meant to be. The system was improvised, and not regle- 
 mentary; it had not been practiced; still in their essen- 
 tial points the two are as much alike as two peas: em- 
 ployment of the troops by driblets, either w^ithout pre- 
 vious deployment and disposition for attack (Worth), fol- 
 lowed by belated, and again by premature, advance of 
 the rear echelons (Worth, Mance ravine); or with pre- 
 mature dispositions without previous deployment entail- 
 ing lack of proper arrangement as to depth and width, and 
 belated appearance of the supports (La Folie). In obtaining 
 what results were ultimate^ gained with much difficulty, the 
 system of tasks had to be perpetually "corrected'' without 
 thereby imparting unity and combination to the work — the 
 carrying through of the action ; here under the task system 
 all the forces were absorbed by the advanced positions (La 
 Folie), there opposite the main position (Point du Jour), 
 they were not even able to deploy, and yet there was an 
 
26 Introduction. 
 
 abundance of depressions and woods, which it is said are un- 
 favorable to the uuitj of action and favorable to the system 
 of tasks. The modern task system will certainly lead to 
 better results, because constantly appealing to the tactical 
 judgment of subordinate leaders; but as surely as no lieu- 
 tenant from his sphere is able to direct a battle, so surely 
 will the cumulation of results gained by any number of 
 detachments charged with tasks fail to decide the battle. 
 Yet healthy tactics require this. We do not mean to con- 
 demn the task system on general principles, but one should 
 not expect a pyramid to stand on its vertex. It is not a 
 question of task or order system, but of task and order sys- 
 tem — i. e., we want both and both are compatible when 
 placed in proper relation to each other. 
 
 Task implies something general, order something specific. 
 The former naturally is characteristic of the high command 
 in order that, and because, it may utilize many means; the 
 latter falls to the subordinate command, which is restricted 
 to limits that admit of the execution of an order only, by 
 cramping considerations of space, by its limited sphere of 
 action, and by the narrow front of its objective. That, how- 
 ever, is not the order of things in the Regulations; they 
 extend the task system too far downward. 
 
 The experiences of the G uard Corps — particularly of the 
 1st Brigade of the Guard at St. Privat — speak so decidedly 
 against the system then in vogue that it is superfluous to 
 waste words over it. The Guard had learned mass-fighting 
 only, and that hobby was instrumental at any rate in bring- 
 ing about some — though insufficient — development of front ; 
 our attempt at that time at the task system did not even 
 yield that much. On the other hand, the Saxons at Roncourt 
 —St. Privat. the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour. and Kott- 
 witz's brigade at Loigny knew how to preserve combination 
 
Introduction. 27 
 
 when fighting en masse, and they produced considerable efifect 
 in each instance. To be sure the attack of the five and one- 
 half battalions of the 3Sth Brigade failed, but, notwith- 
 standing its many defects, due to circumstances, it is and re- 
 mains, among all the attacks made en masse, the finest exam- 
 ple of a tactical offensive against the strategic flank. There 
 was therefore hardlj^ any good reason for declining to in- 
 vestigate whether more could not have been gained by 
 means of timely improvements and by due regard for com- 
 bined action, than by completely ignoring what good there 
 still remained and by entrusting the consummation of 
 the combat exclusively to the hands of the subordinate 
 leaders. 
 
 Intimately connected with these questions is the form 
 and method of giving out orders and tasks. The Field Serv- 
 ice Regulations leave no doubt that the written form should 
 be the rule, since they prescribe expressly: "Orders and 
 reports are to be transmitted in writing whenever time and 
 circumstances do not forbid." And further: "The orders 
 of higher troop commanders to their troops will usually be 
 in writing. Even where orders could be communicated 
 orally, as when the troops are assembled, orders of any 
 length will be dictated and taken down in writing. In the 
 case of some simple arrangement or of a single task, the 
 order is given orally, and eventually reduces itself to a mere 
 word of command." According to the Regulations, the task 
 system for infantry tactics begins with the brigade. The 
 latter receives orders and gives out tasks and uses the oral 
 form alone in transmission to the regiments, as do these to 
 the battalions and the latter to the companies, as indicated 
 in Nos. 95, 103, 112, and 113, Part II. of the Regulations of 
 1889. It should be observed, however, that the company and 
 battalion leaders have to issue specific and clear orders in the 
 
S8 iHtnuliivtion. 
 
 prosonoo. if possible, of all platoon or coiupauv oomniaiulors 
 without iiifiiu.uitis; on thoir fivodom of oxiviitioii. whilo tvjri- 
 m»M»tal ami In igado i-onimaiuloi-s adilrt^ss tlio imlividual 
 tasks to tho rojiiiuouts ami battalions. \\ itliin tho task 
 svstom thoiv is thoivforo a lino o( ilontarUation botwoon 
 ordorand task: tho formor omis with tho loinpanv. tho lattor 
 bt\i;ins with tlu» battalion. 
 
 It is dt^sirablo and nsi'fnl on many aooonnts that battlo 
 otxiors bo pi'oparod in writing if pi>ssiblo. and it would not 
 bt» iuootupaiibU> «Mtlun- with tht> task systoni or with tho lino 
 of domarkation botwtvn oihKm* and task, to issm> tln^ ordors 
 in ivjiard to tho fortmM- orally, thoso in ropird [o tho lattor in 
 writinii. Po bosuro. durinu thooontlii't it will in many oasos 
 bo mi>«5t dittlonlt ti» jiot an ordor thronuh to a battalion, and 
 still moro so to a oompany. Oi\ tho othor haml. whon rooon- 
 na.issani'o has violdtHl snt^ioitnu information ami whon tho 
 tljjhtinir of \\w ailvatu'o uiiard or tirsi lino has iltMrotl np tho 
 sitnatit>n.troi»p loadors will in most oasos havo snt^ioiont timo 
 to uso tht* written form. Ium-o mado applieabU> both to tho or- 
 dor and to tho task. A habit is thus formotl of ordtu-inu, only 
 what is ntvossary. to onior it at tht> risrht moniont and in tho 
 cltMirt^st and bi^t oonsidorini form, and tho roooivor of the 
 written order has timo to ivtleot on it ai\d impress it thor- 
 oujrhlv on his mind. Moreover, the written order seems par- 
 ticularly indispensable for the hiiiher leaders fivm the meri^ 
 standpoint of ivsponsiblity. The written form of orders 
 should thort^fort^ bo laid down as a rule for the battlo also. 
 Any one who has had practical oxporieuco and has atten- 
 tively followed the course of an action will concotlo that in 
 war few suportluons orders aiv given, in peace very many. 
 SubstHpiont critioism would bo instrumental in correctinjr 
 tbo suportluons onlers of iHWCt^timo and in rtnuleriuir tho 
 preparation for the battU^tield mort^ rtwl. l^attlo tactics 
 
Introducti/m. 29 
 
 rc'fjuiro nriintr'rrupf.od mutual rf.'laf ions fx-twfr-n ord^rrH from 
 above, comjiiijfji«;af iojiH to thff flank, and loportH from below. 
 'J'lir; maintenance of tliese mutrjjjj relations ban been ren- 
 <Jerr;(J mueb more difTieult by tbe improvements in fire-arms, 
 in tbat a larj^e number of leaders is early placed hors-rh- 
 combat, and tbat tbe deptb of space involved is very mucb 
 increased. All orders, communications, fjnd reports re<juire 
 tbffrefr»rr- more tiirje, and, on tbe otber band, tbe superior 
 leader from bis sljition can, even witb a good glass, follow 
 but imperfectly tbe course of the action from its beginning. 
 Tlie di/Iiculties presented by tb(;He relatively new phenom- 
 ena are not sufficiently illustrated in peace practice, and yet 
 practice should master them as mucb as possible. 
 
 It m.'iy be stated as the rule that no reports from the 
 firing line can reach the station of the leader (who will prob- 
 ably be with tbe rr-servej; yet tbat will be most necessary 
 when the ac-tion approaches sufieriorify of fire. Orders 
 from above to those below will, ax a rule, have to be trans- 
 mitted through regular channels, and refjorfs going in the 
 opposite direction will have to do the .same; in either case, 
 with the greatest possible rapidity. From this follows the 
 importance of superior direction for combined action as a 
 natural sefjuence. This indispensable system of orders, 
 reports, and communications should be adapted to the cir- 
 cumstances and regulated ho far as possible in each case. 
 It is not true tbat any measure not based on personal obser- 
 vation is ordered too late. It may, and in many cases it 
 will, be too late to give orders; for that very good reason, the 
 Regulations make the decision f.f important steps one of the 
 powers of the sutiordinate leaders who are nearest to the 
 enemy, and not one jf)t should be taken away from that 
 power. On the other hand, the range of the superior leader's 
 view should be supy^lemented and [perfected by every pos- 
 sible means on the part of the fighting troops, which alone 
 
iU> hitrothivtion. 
 
 will iMi;ibh> hiin \o form a oiH'ViH't i>i>iiuon. It is plain that 
 soiuo (aotii'al boinuiarv is imlisponsablo for the purpose; 
 that houmlarv lios within tho hrijiado. Tho laitor forms a 
 olarifviuii' statitnu so to spoaU. and should thoroforo bo pnv 
 vidod with sutVuiont nionntoil organs fi>r v'oniniunioation 
 with tho tlanks and with tho superiors. This niothod niiiilit 
 liouorally ho found praotioablo. and it points out tho jrroat 
 iniportanoo of tho briuado ooniniandor's position. 
 
 All roports sont by disniountod nion will arrivo too lato; 
 so says thoory. Kut tho aotual battlo t\old pormits niuoh. 
 just as it forbids niuoh. that oaii hardly bo sottlod in tin\o of 
 poaoo. In many oasos a kintl of "foot rolays" miiiht bo 
 ostablishod botwtvn battalion and briijado loadors. but only 
 whon tho situation oalls for it. It w ill bo found moro or loss 
 praotioablo whorovor dolayinu- aotion is roquirtnl. How 
 many roports mieht not havo btHMi sont from tht^ ri^ht and 
 loft winjrs and from tht' oontor duriuj; \\u' U>nii- dolays on tho 
 ISth of AusiustI How many woro rondorod? Woro not all 
 tho superior leaders near tho Mani'o ravine kept in unbroken 
 iiiiioranee of the aotual state of the battle, though their sta- 
 tion permitted a good view? And would not many things 
 have gone better had thert^ been no suoh laok of informa- 
 tion? In every oommand. tht>roforo. tho transmission of 
 orders and roports. t>von during battlo. should bo most oart'^ 
 fully systonuitizod. This requires the employment of well- 
 mounted oftloers and general statT otlioers for purposes of 
 observation, with speoitie onlers to send reports as soon as 
 possibU*: they would oluH>se their stations aooording to the 
 state of the aotion. and report everything of importance by 
 means of mounted orderlies Avhile continuing their observa- 
 tions. Comparatively safe pi>sts of observation are not 
 lacking on the modern battle-tield. as demonstrattni by the 
 events in the center and on the right at dravelotte. even 
 
Iittrodiiclioii. 31 
 
 ;»( S(, I'lival — MohJoih; I lie IIjiiikK of (lie ciicrny'H [lOHition 
 Hlioiild, li(»w(?v<T, fiiHl be iiHc«*rfjiiii«'(I. Apfirofniulc organi 
 /;i(i(iji oT Ihc h.\hIciii of ordcrH ;uHJ rcixtrlH in f)ul.l,le JH there- 
 fore more n('C('KK;ii".y llinii ever, :ui(l slioiild lie (r;ir«'fiilly 
 (aii};lil in [M'acc. Protracted and fluctualinj; finj-flghtH will 
 l)r()bal>ly not beabwtnt in the future, since the iniprovernentft 
 in fir(?-arniH have rather added (o than diminJHhwl the HJub- 
 T)ornneHH of (lie (ire-fi^hl. That, it in f)r('Hnin('d, will liohl 
 ^ood wilh oni- jM-enent rilleH, when in I he liaiidH of good 
 in fa Miry, of courHe. 
 
 It iH a fact that Hinc(; Ihe warH of 1870-71 and 1877-78, 
 all conlinental arniieH of Europe hav(* cha,ng(Mj and diniin- 
 JHlicd the terniH of Hervice, i)articiilar].y in the infantry, 
 while, on (lie other hand, the number of foot troopH ha8 been 
 greatly iiM reaHed. F( may Ite Hafely naid that a longer term 
 of Her vice mak<'H a, heKer infandy Holdier than a Hhorter 
 one, liencr' cejlain conHe()uences flowing from the reduction 
 of the term of Hervic(; will have to b(; reckoned with in the 
 tacticH of the battle-field. The infantry of the Imperial 
 Fr<'nc]i Army wan certainly on<,* of 1h(? bewt that haH (;ver 
 exiHted, bn( it failed in I lie selection of ils tactics and lacked 
 many incentives ix-ciiliar to Ihe ^ilerman infantry. Yet it 
 remains a matter of doubt whether any Fi-ench infantry will 
 ever ecpial that which fought at Worth and Gravelotte. 1 
 do not believe that it will. To a certain degree, the same 
 may br* Haid of any other infantry of to-day, yet the demands 
 made on it have certainly not be(;n diminished. There is 
 bound to be more disorder and skulking than heretofore, 
 and there is perhaps but one effective remedy for the 
 evil — i. e., more and efficient leaders in all subaltern grades 
 and some sjiecial organization in rear of the line; of bat- 
 tle for dealing with skulkers. Can it be done? The lat- 
 ter jierhaps, the foiiner — well, we'll wait and see. IIii- 
 
B2 Introduction. 
 
 man nature will not be denied, and the evil will affect both 
 sides; one reason more why everything should be done to 
 have a good system of supervision. 
 
 The mass-battle will require an enormous net of organs 
 for the transmission of orders, communications, and reports, 
 well organized, well trained, covering the battle-field, extend- 
 ing beyond the flanks, and operating laterally and trans- 
 versely on the principles of the relay service. On that basis 
 the strength of the staffs should be calculated and that of 
 the intermediate links and posts fixed, dependent on the 
 distances and on the presumable importance of each point 
 on the entire line. This is still more important in the case 
 of battles of several days' duration, nor can the force of this 
 consideration be impaired or broken by the idea that here- 
 after battles can be arranged from the strategic point of 
 view alone, and that the tactical execution should be left to 
 the judgment of the army. It is not permissible that the 
 central direction should be kept in ignorance of the progress 
 of the battle for hours, and that the armies should be with- 
 out communication with the central direction for an equal 
 space of time, as was the case at Gravelotte. 
 
 At any rate, in view of the modern armament and condi- 
 tion of infantry and in view of the uncertainties inseparable 
 therefrom, more consideration is to be given to the suffi- 
 ciency of infantry reserves, if the command of the army is 
 to retain a firm footing. So far-reaching is the effect of 
 improved armament in combination with shortened terms 
 of service. 
 
 The defender occupying prepared positions — and more, 
 perhaps, when the position is yet to be prepared — is going to 
 weigh the advantages to be derived from advanced positions, 
 and it is not at all improbable that they may play a much 
 greater role in the future than they have in the past. This 
 
Introduction. 33 
 
 is solely due to modern iufantry and artillery fire in com- 
 bination with the diminished tactical value of cavalry. The 
 attacker on his part must at this stage seek the best method 
 of reconnaissance and attack. It is of no use to appeal 
 to experience and principle; the question cannot be solved 
 in that way; it may at best be cleared up to a certain extent 
 by peace maneuvers planned with that object in view. That 
 should be done. It will then be found that movements of 
 large bodies must be made at night, that much shifting and 
 even changes of front become necessary; all arms must 
 therefore be well trained in this particular. 
 
 Many new or modified questions will therefore confront 
 the tactician which his experience will be insufficient to 
 solve. They should therefore be amplified and supple- 
 mented by reflection without losing sight of reality — i. e., we 
 must have a healthy theory of fighting, and that in peace 
 time. 
 
 The infantry was compelled to change its tactical forms 
 and to put up with many additional evils inseparable from 
 these modifications, though it did not have to change any of 
 its principles; whereas the artillery had yet to establish 
 some of its principles, before the two could become coordi- 
 nate sister arms. In their common action infantry has the 
 more difiicult task to perform ; that of the artillery, in fight- 
 ing, being facilitated by the technique and better chances 
 to carry out its principles. Infantry is unable to escape 
 complete dissolution, and is, in the end, restricted to skir- 
 mish fire, but it remains a tactical arm, notwithstanding its 
 state of dissolution. The artillery is called the solid frame- 
 work of the battle, but the frame must be subdivided into 
 small sections, whereby alone it is enabled to preserve the 
 requisite order and solidity, and to become pliable, dirigible, 
 and highlv effective. Formerlv in infantry firing it was not 
 
34 Introduction. 
 
 the mau who tired, but the officer who permitted him to tire. 
 To-day infantry lire can be controlled only by careful 
 training of the skirmisher by fire discipline, and artillery 
 tire only by careful training of the battery. Individualizing 
 the skirmishers and training the battery as a tactical funda- 
 mental tiring machine constitute the best means for the 
 action of each arm and for their combined action. Artillery 
 had to follow in the train of tactics in so far as small units 
 with considerable freedom and entrusted to many but suffi- 
 ciently trained hands were substituted for large units in 
 large combinations. In the pursuit of new principles, the 
 artillery aimed for a long time at the direction and control 
 of concentrated masses, but practice has shown their impos- 
 sibility; in the artillery, too, there remains to-day only mass- 
 elfect by means of individual effect, direction of masses by 
 means of individual direction. 
 
 During all the phases of the conflict up to the decision 
 it is no longer correct to speak of infantry as the principal 
 arm, as compared with artillery. In every action of any 
 extent the two arms are interdependent, both must stead- 
 fastly aim at the one object — to gain a superiority of fire 
 over the enemy, because that is the prerequisite for all 
 further action. During this, probably the most sanguin- 
 ary and protracted period, the artillery nmy here, the in- 
 fantry there, temporarily prove more effective than the sis- 
 ter arm, but the accomplishment of the common object calls 
 for the earliest possible employment of the full force of fire 
 of both. I am aware that I shall raise opposition by no 
 longer making any tactical distinction between infantry and 
 ai'tillery as the principal and auxiliary arms, as first and 
 second arms of the battle-field, and this breaking with tra- 
 dition may provoke a new controversy, which, far from fear- 
 ing. I earnestly desire. 
 
Introduction. 35 
 
 In the case of either arm superiority of fire presupposes 
 direction of fire, and the measure of effect produced depends 
 on the quality of the rifle and gun, on the number of both, 
 and on the proficiency in firing. I deem it an indisputable 
 truth that artillery fire is more easily directed than infantry 
 fire, because, in the first place, the former is effective at 
 greater distances than infantry fire, and because artillery 
 fire admits of more deliberation and better observation. 
 Under certain conditions the fire of the artillery is moreover 
 more effective than that of infantry; either arm should 
 therefore supplement the other tactically in view of their 
 object: they always belong together. 
 
 To be sure, my ideas presuppose many things, particu- 
 larly as regards artillery and the training of the leaders, 
 which still have to materialize or are to be improved. 
 Every artillery man should be able to Mt; during the fire the 
 piece must as much as possible be kept ready to fire, and 
 when that is accomplished, the question of rapid-firing guns 
 receives its best solution, depending as it does not on the 
 construction of the barrel, but on that of the carriage 
 (brake-apparatus). The proper foundation for the direction 
 of fire is obtained only when, in addition, the organization of 
 the artillery and the construction of the piece guarantee the 
 tactically highest possible eflflciency (masses of hits). That 
 would require the artillery to be assigned by regiments to 
 the divisions, the corps artillery to be abolished, and the 
 number of batteries in the regiment and the number of guns 
 in the battery to be diminished. How far the reduction 
 should be carried is not to be inquired into here; it suffices 
 to state that the present units are too large. Artillery acts 
 by batteries, and the smaller the units the better will be the 
 direction of fire, provided the artillery has learned how to 
 hit. Divisional artillery should be so incorporated with 
 
36 tutnHiHclHm, 
 
 (ho vlixision ihat iufamn ami artiUovv l>o<omo ooinplotoly 
 bloudoil (aiii^aUN ; ihai llu^ last jiim is in position l\\ tho 
 timo tUo iufaimv ot" tho viivision is it^aiK tor l>atiK\ that 
 the iufautrv is famiUar with tht^ t tVoot of aitiUorv tlvo. ami 
 the rtrtiUorv with tho otlVot of iufawtry tliv: a»ul, abovo all. 
 that ovtM'Y iivnoral.ii-rosjHvtivo <>f his ai*m (oavalvv inohuUni^, 
 IS thotvnijhlv at houto in tho t'nmlaniontal tluhiiuii" prinoi- 
 pK\s of iht^ two tiro hranrhos of tho soi'vioo. NN h\ should 
 it Ih^ mo»v dittlonlt for au infatitrv jiotioral to obstn m^ am\ 
 jntl^v artillorv thv than ittfautn tliv. whon tho aitilloiy 
 has btvomo invtloiont in thing In ImttoritMii and bv brijjavio 
 divisiious iAU\tihtHgfH)f Thoro is no ivason whatovor: it 
 will bo utvossivrv, tv^ bo sniv. to train ot\lotM-s from tho bo- 
 jjiuuing' to familiariBO ihomsohos with tho oharaotoristios 
 ami with tho spirit of all arnts, ami to loam how to jmlji-e 
 thorn. A iivnoral of i«frtutrj\ oavalry, or artillorv is sht^r 
 nonstnist\ wo utHHl but ouo ijvnoral. who. to bo snro, should 
 bo ablo ktvp his soat in all saddlos. 
 
 Tho oontrovorsY as to tho prinoii^U arm is thoi>^foro an 
 idlo ono: in many of tho phastvis at Wi^rth, Vionvillo. and 
 ilravolotto wo saw artillory play tho ri^lo of tho princi^hU 
 atMh and ju> dtvis^iow will ovor Iv jriviJUHl w ithoui tho fulhvst 
 omployiuont of artillory fire. Jiuljiing from tho poat"^ 
 manouvors, it would appoar that tho su^nnior oomuuindors 
 do not by auy mt\u\s invariably display tho rtH|uisito know b 
 ed|so of tho oai^aoity of artillery tir^; otherwise rnawy tbin^ 
 would not hapiHM\. Artillery will have to oxeroiso siHvial 
 oar\* in onlor not to K* ouirnlfetl in oatastn^pho at tho hands 
 of the enemy's artillory and infantry. \Vith artillery, thort^ 
 fo*v» everything:: doi^nids on ooiuing into |H»sition as t\niekly. 
 as skillfnlly. and in as iin\at strtMijjth as tn^ssiblo. and on 
 antioiiKUing tho enemy's artillery in (tifUi»(} the nuh;e. If it 
 aooomplisho^ that, artillery with its prt»sent prv^jtvtiles will 
 
Introduf:twn. 37 
 
 in ujany ca»e« alKO play a decisive r61e against infantry, 
 Th^re can be no doubt aw to thi«. If artiJleiy doeB not 
 attain this, infantry fire alone may lay it low by ranks, and 
 we may in the future read not of ''a batter-y of the dead," but 
 of entire brigade divinions. This power and weakness of 
 artillery should be familiar to the leaders of all arms; artil- 
 lery should not deceive itself on that point, and should 
 learn three things in peace: first, circumspection and judg- 
 ment; second, hitting; and third, how to develop its full 
 power of fire — in other words, how to get the range more 
 quickly than the opposing artillery. It appeared necessary 
 to me at this point to emphasize this vital question of mod- 
 ern artillery; on the other hand, it should not be forgotten 
 that thoughtless action may reduce the tactical life of the 
 best infantry to a minimum. 
 
 It is not merely the improved gun and the improved pro- 
 jectile that have been instrumental in the great ascendency 
 of the artillery; the same is due rather to the transmutation 
 incident to the course of instruction in their uses — i. «., the 
 tactical training of the personnel The progress of other 
 armU^ has been similar to that of Germany, and every offi- 
 cer should be cognizant of the fact, in order that he may 
 place an approximately correct estimate on the opponent 
 and enter on the battle-field with a certain amount of prep- 
 aration. The changes in the tactical training of artillery — 
 in Germany, at least — have been more important and far- 
 reaching than in any other arm. Up to a comparatively 
 recent time we could speak of the German artillery as a 
 "technical" arm, and it is in keeping with the truth to state 
 that it entered the War of 1870-71 trained in this limited 
 sense. Considering that the effect of that "technical" artil- 
 lery was frequently very great, how will it be in the future, 
 when superior construction is combined with progress in 
 
38 Introduction. 
 
 tactics such as but few prophets of the future would have 
 dreamed of in 1870-71? But they were there! It took 
 them some time to reach pkices of iuflueuce. The separate 
 training of the artillery, the course in firing at the firing 
 school instead of on the benches of the artillery and engineer 
 school, the detail of officers of the furloughed class to the 
 firing school, the entire system of training (which we will 
 not explain here) for imparting technical proficiency in the 
 art of shooting, the tactical exercises and tactical firing 
 exercises on the terrain, the organized combination of 
 infantry and artillery, the principles of reconnaissance and 
 of coming into position, and the observation and direction 
 of fire as developed in the course of practice, these and other 
 matters which I do not care to make public, prove that, 
 based on healthy and tried principles, artillery has at last — 
 it took a long time — worked itself up into a tactical arm 
 as to which all former tactical conceptions are antiquated. 
 And if ever, it is in the future that ignorance on the battle- 
 field will be paid for with rivers of blood. 
 
 Infantry and artillery are the decisive arms on the field 
 of battle, and intelligent cooperation is required on the part 
 of both. This applies equally to the foot artillery, because 
 the greater efficiency of the gun is going to compel the de- 
 fender to construct considerable artificial cover, which field 
 artillery will not always be able to destroy, especially where 
 there has been plenty of time to prepare the position. For 
 this reason armies will carry guns of heavier calibers with 
 them in the field, whose effect should be fully known by the 
 higher leaders at least. Here we encounter a new factor in 
 tactics, which extends to the preparation (defense) and at- 
 tack of artificial positions. The side which recognizes its 
 inferiority in strength will endeavor to strengthen its power 
 of resistance by artificial cover. Any body of troops and 
 
Introduction. 39 
 
 any army may find itself placed in the role of the inferior 
 (defender); hence the sujjerior leaders should be familiar 
 with the principles of the construction of entrenchments and 
 the troops with those of their execution. That is the reason 
 why in the future the use of the spade may under certain cir- 
 cumstances be of eminent importance, and the recognition 
 of this fact has in all armies brought forth special instruc- 
 tions under which leaders and troops are trained in time of 
 peace for these additional tasks on the field of battle. 
 Every officer should be as familiar with the instructions for 
 field fortifications of April 6, 1893, as with the Field Service 
 Regulations, the Drill Regulations, and the Firing Instruc- 
 tions. Together they constitute the tactical gospel: every 
 one should know how to read and apply them as he would 
 the gospel. These Regulations constitute parts of a whole, 
 they show how intimately artillery and infantry have to 
 cooperate, and that they are the real arms of the battle-field 
 requiring for the tactical act enlarged services from the 
 pioneers, as compared with former times. That the pioneers 
 have thereby gained in importance need not be specifically 
 stated. From all this it would appear that large, artificially 
 strengthened positions that must be attacked are to be reck- 
 oned with in the future. 
 
 Though in the future the principal arm of the cavalry 
 will be the horse, as it has been in the past, I remain op- 
 posed to the arming of all the cavalry with the lance. 
 The more active national spirit in combination with uni- 
 versal liability to service are bound to give any future war 
 the character of a national war to a greater extent than was 
 the case, for instance, on the Loire in 1870-71. It is true 
 that under the recruiting laws every able-bodied man is 
 employed in organized bodies up to his fortieth year. But 
 in a national war even the cripple is a soldier fit ad hoc, and 
 
40 Introduction. 
 
 the enthusiasm, miseries of the war, aud governmental 
 measures will no doubt compel those men who have eoni- 
 pleted their legal term of service to take up arms also. The 
 employment of the cavalry in front of the army, in the tac- 
 tical sense — one should call to mind the conditions on the 
 Loire during the last third of November. 1870 — will be beset 
 by extraordinary ditticulties; the lance may become an in- 
 convenient burd(Mi. whose bearer feels inclined to discard it. 
 I have seen such things myself in 1870-71. Raving to pay 
 more attention to the lance than to the enemy, the horseman 
 when on patrol is the more apt to tind himself at a disadvan- 
 tage, as with the cavalry everything passes otf quickly; in 
 short. I deem the lance su])erfluous and even harmful for 
 cavalry on reconnaissance. Nor does war experience award 
 to the lance the superiority in the charge. The Prussian 1st 
 Guard Dragoons brilliantly defeated the Austrian Alex- 
 ander Vhlans at Koniggriitz. Still I would approve of the 
 retention of the lance for a certain number of regiments — 
 for instance, for the medium and heavy cavalry; but for 
 light cavalry saber and carbine are sutticient. All regi- 
 ments should retain the carbine, while 1 would not hesitate 
 to discard the saber of the lancers. If in addition to the 
 horse, cavalry needs one common arm. it certainly is the car- 
 bine. The correctness of this would become at once appar- 
 ent in the operative employment of cavalry, which, however. 
 I do not desire to discuss here. Even in tactical reconnais- 
 sance it will be found good to supplement cavalry with artil- 
 lery and infantry as soon as it enters highly cultivated coun- 
 try. That bold galloping about of patrols, so misleading in 
 peace, will then cease, and many things observed and re- 
 ported by patrols in peace will not be observed and re- 
 ported in war. During the national war in 1870-71. the cav- 
 alry, despite its best efforts, proved unequal to its task in. 
 
Introduction. 41 
 
 reconuaissarioo on a largo scale; what little Informatlou was 
 gathered, waH elicited by a few gun-8hotK or by deployment 
 of Kome infantry. As j>henomena, such as observed on the 
 Loire, will hereafter be the rule, they should be constantly 
 keiit in mind in order to give the cavalry an appropriate 
 armament; nor should great expectations be entertained 
 even then. This point seems to have been lost sight of in 
 peace to an alarming degree, yet it is certain that nowhere 
 "will we suffer more disappointments than in the field of 
 strategical and tactical reconnaissance by cavalry. The 
 higher leaders will be more frequently placed in a state of 
 relative perplexity than formerly, and in order to learn any- 
 thing at all, they will be compelled to engage with all three 
 arras. It is not to be thought for a moment that such 
 demands will be made during the operations only; no, mod- 
 ern tactical reconnaissance, particularly before the decisive 
 battle, calls for them imperiously, nor can theory foretell 
 what measures are most likely to lead to success. It is ray 
 conviction that here there is ground for serious reflections, 
 inquiries, and experiments far from simple in character, and 
 that to comply with the enlarged principles the means now 
 at hand must be largely supplemented. 
 
 Great differences of arraaraent, training, organization, 
 and eraployraent of the various arms and battle units (divi- 
 sions) do not now exist among the large armies, and the 
 same raay be said of their tactics; in nurabers they are like- 
 wise about equal, and there are two points only on which 
 superiority — which cannot be accurately calculated in ad- 
 vance — raay be gained, and those are tactical training and 
 raoral education. Both should be brought to the highest 
 perfection. 
 
 The third role on the battle field falls to the cavalry. 
 As tactics stand to day, cavalry on the battle-field, as coqi- 
 
 4 
 
42 Introduction. 
 
 pai't'tl with ihe oiIum- twt)arms, is an aiixiliaiv aim, and I'an- 
 not be the principal arm except after the decision or before 
 the battU'. This is dne to the eompk'te revolntiou of the 
 conditions, especially to the chanjied numerical proportion 
 between cavalry and infantry, in connection with the large 
 total increase of the armies. To be sure, at Monyille — 
 ^lars-la Tour, on the Kith of Aujiust, 1870. cayalrv played a 
 l>rominent role on the battle ticld. but the case has remained 
 the exception. Neither in the >yar apiinst France nor in the 
 Turco-Kussian War has there been a repetition. ^loreoyer 
 the enemy's action at N'ion^ille was of no small assistance 
 to our cavalry; while, on the other hand, the French cavalry, 
 for instance, despite its sacrifices, never exercised a notable 
 intluence on the course of a battle, either at \Vorth or 
 Sedan. Xor did the cavalry bring about a decision at Vion- 
 rille, and it will not be able to do so in the future; still it 
 is the duty of cavalry, as it was in the past, to attack where 
 there is prospect of ailequate success. As tire-arms command 
 wider zones than formerly, as rapidity of tire has been large- 
 ly increased, both of Avh.ich can neyer be counterbalanced by 
 greater speed on the part of the cayalry. and as smoke has 
 been suppressed, the tactical employment of cayalry has be- 
 come more restricted and its leading more difticult. There 
 will nevertheless be cases on the battle-tield and up to the 
 yery decision of the battle where an enterprising and effi- 
 cient cayalry will find tempting objectiyes for attack; these 
 objeetiyes should then be charged under all circumstances. 
 This will particularly ai)])ly to silenced artillery and re- 
 pulsed infantry. Here the increased power of the tire-arms 
 fails to nullify the law of velocity, especially after the deci- 
 sion. The battle of the future is bound to mature scenes of 
 which eyen the liyeliest inmgination cannot gain a suffi- 
 cient conception: infantry morally spent to the degree of 
 
Introduction. 43 
 
 mcntiil irreKp(>iiKil)iliiy, juhI without aiiiriiunitiori; "batteries 
 of the dead"' iiicapahle of irioveinenl ; flags and eolorK, if 
 taken along, in profusion. The point therefore jh to inereane 
 the enteri)riKe of the lead<'rK, and to sharpen their tactical 
 judgment. The cavalry leader must track his quarry with 
 the patience of Ihe eagle and seize and carry it off with the 
 sani(? resoluteness. In this manner ca\'alry may render the 
 decision more deeisi\e on and immediately in rear of the 
 ISattle-field, render the opponent impotent, and enhance his 
 discomfiture to an unsuspected degrcHi. Human nature 
 never changes I Its moral failings and defects can be turned 
 to account only by the speed of the cavalry. 
 
 It goes without saying that in addition cavalry should 
 possess a certain degree of skill in dismounted fighting and 
 should be able to attack in any strength and in any forma- 
 tion. Whatever any aim is expected to know in war, it 
 should diligently practice in peace. For this reason I deem 
 the practice of the mass-attacks as important for cavalry as 
 the jiractice of fighting in masses of skirmishers on the part 
 of infantry, and field firing for artillery in teiTain that is as 
 little known as possible. 
 
 It is not my intention to write an outline of tacties; with 
 due consideration for the effect of modern arms, I shall cite 
 various events from military history in order to deduce 
 therefrom tactical principles and forms, such as will prom- 
 ise success under fire. 
 
 For no theory will ever lead to correct conclusions 
 unless based or. [)ractice and military history. 
 
 The Drill Regulations for the infantry of September 1, 
 18K8 (Reprint of 1880j, for the artillery of June 27, 1892, for 
 the foot artillery of ^farch H, 1889, and for the cavalry (\)yo- 
 visional) of 1803 are the tactical sediments of war experi- 
 ence, but the consequences which will ffillow from smoke- 
 
44 Introduction. 
 
 less powder, from the small-caliber rifle, and from the great- 
 ly increased fire-effect of the artillery, for the training and 
 leading of troops, for theoretical and applied tactics, are b}' no 
 means fully and accurately determined. Detailed discus- 
 sions would therefore be of some benefit, even if nothing 
 more than a greater incentive to reflection were gained. 
 
 In order to overcome the probabl}^ very great losses to 
 be expected in the future, much has been written for nearly 
 twenty yeai^s about the importance of night battles, and 
 there are '^tacticians" who seek to gain by the aid of dark- 
 ness what they do not dai'e to undertake in daylight. Un- 
 der certain circumstances comparatively great results, with- 
 in certain limits, may be gained by night actions, but night 
 battles are out of the question, and it is battles alone that 
 decide wars. Why then this tarrying over irrelevant 
 matters? 
 
 For the same reason the so-called "ravine theory," a 
 parasitic outgrowth of the "task system," has of late found 
 many advocates. Aside from the fact that the requisite 
 ravines are not likely to be at hand, their use would in most 
 cases bring about a deployment near the limits of short- 
 range fire, exactly the thing we want to avoid — viz., great 
 losses without opportunity to combat the enemy up to that 
 moment and without prospect of gaining the superiority 
 thereafter. 
 
 Others propose to throw the open lines in single rank 
 upon the enemy without stop, closely followed by all the 
 rear echelons, straight across country in the previously 
 determined direction of attack, and to within the limits of 
 short range, either in double time or at a run, and to advance 
 thence by rushes; others propose to creep up, with pauses, 
 after the medium range has been reached; again, others 
 
Introduction. 45 
 
 suggest traversing the middle and short ranges by means 
 of rushes not exceeding 30 paces, etc. 
 
 These suggestions should neither be found fault with 
 nor characterized as wrong and useless. Tactical disad- 
 vantages would not accrue from them unless one of these 
 "methods of fighting" were incorporated in the Regulations. 
 Cases might easily enough occur where, dependent on the 
 .terrain, the fire, and the task, this tactical '^sample case" 
 might have to be drawn upon by some organization. Free- 
 dom must be preserved to the subordinate leaders, if for no 
 other reason than that any other mode would be incom- 
 patible with the nature of the combat of masses of skir- 
 mishers. At some time, however, the moment must arrive 
 when variety will be entirely or almost entirely supplanted 
 by uniformity — namely, under short-range fire. Yet even in 
 spaces of 600 meters, some cover will frequently be availa- 
 ble. However that may be, good infantry to-day must be 
 able to push forward, creeping, running, rushing, etc., and 
 it must be instructed accordingly. That relative simultane- 
 ity is thereby destroyed is of no consequence; it is not 
 needed until the final rush, but then we must have it. 
 
 The armor shields and armored clothing prepared by 
 the Danes and others do not seem suitable for field service 
 as protection against projectiles; but, on the other hand, the 
 construction of rifle-trenches, etc., by means of the spade 
 will play a great role in future battles; occasions for their 
 use will arise for the attacker as well as for the defender, 
 since it is very probable that there will be battles of several 
 days' duration — which are nothing new, however. In this 
 connection it is sufficient to recall the North American 
 Civil War. 
 
 In tactics we find certain forms and principles restrict- 
 ed to longer or shorter periods. In the history of the tactics 
 
46 Introduction. 
 
 of antiquity aud of the middle ages these periods comprise 
 centuries; since the invention of gunpowder they have be- 
 come shorter; and since the appearance of the breech-loader 
 in 1SG4, tactical forms and regulations have been and are 
 subject to constant change. 
 
 Tactical changes are chiefly brought about by the arma- 
 ment; what never changes is man. 
 
 It is well known that it is a law^ of Nature that when 
 two or more persons are contending for victory, they study 
 each other's means of fighting, and that as soon as either 
 party recognizes the superiority of the other's methods, it 
 will adopt them in order to overcome the enemy by his 
 own methods. 
 
 Thus the Prussian company column, for instance, may 
 to-day be found in all armies; thus the swarm of skirmishers 
 has everywhere become the principal fighting form of in- 
 fantry and skirmish fire the principal kind of fire, and in all 
 these important questions the German infantry has led the 
 other armies. To be sure, the War of 1870-71 did not find 
 the German infantry at the height of the tactical application 
 of these principles, so that — and also because it had to con- 
 front unprepared a very much superior rifle — it had not yet 
 deduced the correct conclusions for the attack; still, after 
 the battles in August, the German infantry discovered more 
 suitable forms and applied them without difiiculty. 
 
 The tactical combination of movement and fire-effect, to 
 whose highest possible development the Great Frederick 
 had devoted a lifetime, has been occup,^-ing the tacticians 
 ever since the reign of the breech-loader was inaugurated. 
 
 But the times have changed and more perfect are the 
 weapons. While the Great King could lead forward his 
 closed lines in the cadenced step, while he was not com- 
 pelled to halt them, make them lie down, rise and resume 
 
Introduction. 47 
 
 the advance, etc., before he pomed an enormous fire on the 
 enemy and broke into his physically and morally shattered 
 ranks, without himself suffering great losses at long range 
 — to-day hundreds fall under the bullets of an enemy that 
 can barely be discerned and who can be fought only with 
 difficulty; in these times the act of battle, moreover, lasts 
 much longer. 
 
 Destructive infantry fire sweeps the ground for 1500 
 meters, and the question culminates in how to traverse it 
 with the greatest safetj, and how to reach a distance from 
 the enemy whence he may be subjected to, and shaken by, a 
 sustained and effective fire without having one's own fight- 
 ing strength reduced below the required degree. Looked at 
 from the theoretical standpoint, the excellent fire-arms of 
 to-day favor more especially the defender during the con- 
 flict; still a close examination, which we shall make below, 
 will point out many advantages for the attacker. In a 
 purely frontal affair the attack and defense can array an 
 equal number of men side b}' side, but on the part of the 
 defender more men are able to fire at the same time because 
 he is deployed for firing, perhaps in several lines, while the 
 attacker is again and again prevented by losses from gain- 
 ing the same development of fire for which he is striving. 
 The occurrences at Point du Jour show that mere numerical 
 superiority of the attacker will not necessarily give him 
 either frontal equality of fire or frontal sujieriority of fire. 
 The attacker must approach to within a certain distance and 
 expose himself, cover not being always available ; this is not 
 required of the defender, but if he does expose himself, it 
 will be at moments when the attacker is shaken and is less 
 to be feared. From the sweeping fire at long distances and 
 from the enormous force of penetration of small-caliber pro- 
 jectiles arises the necessity to preserve one's own forces as 
 
48 Introduction. 
 
 much as possible in order to enable them to act at all. Tac- 
 tics are expected to furnish the means thereto. 
 
 It is plain that in clear Aveather the use of the ground 
 will play a more important part than heretofore, even before 
 the deployment. It will receive increased attention during 
 the march to the place of deployment and the advance guard 
 will find frequent use for good field-glasses. Both require- 
 ments involve danger. The use of the ground must not be 
 allowed to degenerate into a game of hide-and-seek, which, 
 aside from other disadvantages, will dull the sharp edge of 
 the attack which undeniably signalized the German in- 
 fantry, whatever may have been its shortcomings. We do 
 not mean here a reckless rushing in, but the deliberate ex- 
 pression of the will, particularly on the part o-f the subordi- 
 nate leaders, always, of course, preserving unity of action. 
 Any infantry is therefore apt to find itself in position where 
 it must expose itself, if only while rushing from cover to 
 cover. The entire execution of the combat must be char- 
 acterized by vigor. In comparing the fighting methods of 
 former and present times, it will be found that much of the 
 vigor has been lost and that diffident groping is noticeable, 
 which is not justified by the new arms. The necessity under 
 which the attacker will frequently find himself, of opening 
 fire at the medium ranges, impresses on modern fighting 
 methods the stamp of slowness. If that necessity should 
 be still greater in practice, it is all the more reason for doing 
 everything to sustain the tactical offensive spirit by all 
 available means. Therefore, there must be correct and 
 quick use of the ground ; the forward impulse must be the 
 inherent, elementary force of the troops; but the task system 
 pure and simple, as frequently practiced, does not invaria- 
 bly support that tactical principle, and herein I find one of 
 
Introduction. 49 
 
 its chief disadvantages — viz., the stunting of the vigor of the 
 infantry combat. 
 
 The use of field-glasses shuts out a general view and 
 favors the perception of details. This is not an inherent 
 property of the instrument; its use should be learned likp 
 that of a weapon, and one should be expert in scrutinizing 
 cover, from the mere furrow to the declivity and to the edge 
 of the woods; but such general survey with the bare eye as 
 his station and command may call for should not be neg- 
 lected by the commander. It seems proper to point this out 
 on account of some events that have occurred. 
 
 It is the duty of strategy to see to it that when fighting 
 is to take place, it be done in the most effective direction, 
 and with the greatest possible superiority of force. Strat- 
 egy therefore demands an unfailing eye to every phase of 
 the situation as regards the calculation of all factors of 
 time, space, materiel, and politics, and the utilization of all 
 means of communication. All strategists have been indus- 
 trious workers, good calculators, and have possessed a good 
 knowledge of the theaters of war and of military history and 
 an understanding for whatever may be of any advantage in 
 obtaining numerical superiority within a certain space and 
 time. For that reason strategists have at the same time 
 been men of science and, so to speak, men of a system or 
 method — i. e., of that peculiar to their own genius. Who- 
 ever desires to direct a large army must himself have calcu- 
 lated and proved everything that has any bearing on the 
 leading of masses. In that task assistants (general staff 
 officers) are indispensable to the strategist; and they may 
 do the preparatory work, but its examination and the final 
 arrangements are the duty of the chief of the general staff. 
 
 The large modern armies require even in peace a great 
 deal of preliminary work, arrangements, and provisions of 
 
60 Introdtirthn. 
 
 all Uiiuls. Sti-;U»\uv is orii;mi/.r«i lor si> niauv srt rasrs \vitl» 
 tluMi" sptH'ial rtHiuirtMHiMils. ilu> loUs air assij»iuHl, and moro 
 than ovtM' has stratojiv btu-oiiu' a scinicr, aiul iiu»ie lliau ov(M* 
 is it t^xposod to tlir daiiiior of inatufinji' a bnroaiu'ratic inon- 
 sitM- of luaiiv iiUorailiui; \n hotels ami of 0(hu"Uin>i' aiut train- 
 iuj; hiiirau cfiicfs iiish'iul of (Hiitnil staff ()//;V«/>'. In that i>nor- 
 nious uiachino (>ach individual occupies a ('oriain place, and 
 fi>r i\\i-\\ one (hero is a restive o\' threi' or four otVicers. for 
 the same plac(\ the same tluiv. ilu> same traiK. If one of 
 tluMii is transferred to anoiluM' place. thini;s dt> not lio >vell 
 at lirst, betause lu> cannot kni>\v evervthiui;; the "Kussian" 
 is not familiar widi the duties oi the "•Frenchman." while 
 either ma\ l>t> more faiuiliar >vith thest^ foreijiu armit^s than 
 with his t>wn. 'V\\o uudisturbtnl action of such a stupendiuis 
 whet^hvork retiuires a (iilitjenf and iittjenious mimt a man who, 
 so to speak, has imprt^ssed o\\ his mind \\\v oniline (>f any 
 possible t'ontiuii'ency in war. 
 
 That characteristic is to day inori' ov less ptnuliar to all 
 litMieral statYs; to deny it would be ft>i>lish. If tlu^ (jenerals 
 are there to h^id the armies, etc.. then a bureau chief may 
 suttU'e for a statY officer. NapohH>u 1. himself had at tirst 
 but a sinipuMon! Hut if lite mMu>rals are m>t tluMc. which 
 in view of human mediocrity in every tield may ptM-hai>s be 
 the normal condition, the failure to cultivate uiilitary his- 
 tory to the rt^iuisite decree would exact heavy ]HM\alties. 
 Properly cultivateih it may be instruunMital in lime of peace 
 in prtMeutii;,ii \\\o individual frt>m beconiinu;. as he would 
 under existing; conditions, a petlantic bureau t'hief. instead 
 of a frt^sh and active i^eneral statY officer schoided in militarT 
 history, and it would be nu>st salutary if ni> t>tVutM' were 
 admit ttnl to the jivneral statY of the army unless he had been 
 on duty in the section for military history. No one who is 
 t\>nd of military history, who is jjifted with imajiinatiou. and 
 
fntroditctwn. 5 1 
 
 who ji,|)|»i-«'cijil<'H vvliJil iiiJij Im* Icjinu'd \>y riK'suis f)f both, will 
 vycv l»c<()iiM' ;i iHii^'iiiKTiit ; li<- iiiiiy /lot Ix- llx- \)<:h\. chief of 
 hiircjiii, bill Ji, more <'nifi<'i!( jiihI iiHcful j^cnorjil HlalT ofTicf-r; 
 hJH fon<liH'HH for- mili(;ir'y hiHtory Ih not (liininiHhr-d, for il 
 growH after ii I;ihI<' for il han once been ac<jiiii-<'(J. The 
 
 MlilHHCH of llie fill NIC, to 1)0 HUfC, WllI llOf admit of HUch IMJIH- 
 
 lerly [XTforinaiKeH aH IhoHO of Najmlcon in February, 1814, 
 Th(?y will re(|uii'e tin; Hinii»leHt of ijlyriK fo keep one army 
 from crow(Jinj^ jnxi cruHliin^ the olher, und il is only in ^;aHe 
 unpleaHanl incidc'iilM Khonid llii<jw llw ;^ianl polypuH of a 
 modern army from ilH familiar track, that the dark HidcH of 
 tin? ^'enerjil Klaff bureaucracy aH now reij^ning in all coun- 
 IrieH would conie to light. 
 
 TliiH bureaucrncy Iijih been ftivoi-ed, HJid to Hay, in other 
 r(.'Hp(M;tH alHo. ]<\)rnjerly the g(Miernl hIjiH' ofTicer was re- 
 quired to command a comj»any for al)onl three yearH and a 
 battalion for I wo yearn, and remained Kuniciently in touch 
 with the nee<lH of the lrooj)H, wilh all jihaKeH of practical 
 Hervice, with Ihe life in Ihe lin<*, and — wilh laclicHl Recent- 
 ly the iibove ()eriodH hiive in jnoHt caK<'H been reduced to one 
 year, and what interoHt can an officer take in hiH troops 
 under hucIi circuniHtanceH, when he knowH 'Mn a year f nhall 
 be rid of IhiH duly and be back in my bureau"? lie haB 
 purely pernoiial iiilcrenlH, and. an a rule, those of Ihe trooi)K 
 will Hullei". A company that liaH IxMtn commanded by Kuch 
 ofTicerK for two or three yearn Ih bound to lack the rerjuinite 
 HoIi<Jity of interior Htriicture. Moreover, in Heveral in- 
 BtanccH ofTlcerH of I bene giJidcK were not rclui'iied to prac- 
 tical Hervice at all, ami, what Ih worne, Home Heem to con- 
 Hider il unn(M;(!HHary! Since the war academy haw been 
 pla* <'<l under the general staff, the graduates of tin? institu- 
 tion conHid(?r themselven at once candi<lateH for the general 
 staff, and they conliniic to lead a biireaiicrati*' life from a 
 
62 I nt rod net Ion. 
 
 comparatnilv vomig a^(\ wliik' none should be allowod to 
 become a major in the general staff unless he has taken one 
 oontiniivnt of men through their entire term of service. In 
 this uuuuier an ollieer learns the needs of the troops, and 
 that is exaetly Avhat everv general staff officer must know. 
 But, good heavens I he has hardly joined the troops, when 
 he is "missed" in the machine of the general staJi' because 
 with ueAv hands things do not run smoothly; and he is 
 recalled prematurt>ly through concern for that "machine 
 constantly kept under steam." Hence the growing pre- 
 ponderaiu'c of the hurcifucrafic part of this occupation (which 
 unfortunately, can no longer be avoided), over the act- 
 ire part. 
 
 The service of the general staffs attached to the troops 
 has likewise become more bureaucratic, the documents to be 
 prepared grow with every year, and the general statY officer 
 is preeminently a bureau chief. The work in preparation 
 for ajul during the nmneuvers, general staff journeys, and 
 other exercises are not a sutticient diversion, and aiv almost 
 wholly mechajiical in character: though new in the first 
 3'ear, the conditions are the same in subsequent years, with 
 the exception of a chajige of locality, and it cannot be gain- 
 said that in the discharge of such duties little jiuhjment is 
 required, ajid that with a modest measure of mechaiiicaJ 
 skill a satisfactory result can be accomplished. Like any 
 one else, the general staff officer can sharpen his tactical 
 judgment only by means of practical service, experience, and 
 exercises, and he needs tactical judgment to-day more than 
 ever before. A knowledge of the o]>]>onent's army and of its 
 institutions, of the theaters of war, and the sifting of mes- 
 sages and reports and their preparation are not sufficient: 
 the last kind of Mork appeals more particularly to the tac- 
 tical judgment. To be sure, the fact that the gentlemen 
 
Introductifjn. 53 
 
 of tli<; railway Hootiori aio bound to beoome bureaucrats 
 HpringH from the very nature of "strategy organized in 
 peace"; and there are many considerations and require- 
 ments that stand in the way of any extensive changes. 
 
 The \\'ar of 1870-71 demonstratef* the enormous supe- 
 riority of strategy over tactics. The superiority of strateg}' 
 was so great that surprising results were gained in spite of 
 racHliocre tactics, so that, properly speaking, the Germane 
 'won through strategy. It should not be forgotten, however, 
 that the moral qualities, the inipondr-rables, were present on 
 the German side to a high degree, and remaine<l so. In 
 future there will be little difference in the material value of 
 armies, yet tactics will continue to level the path of strat- 
 (;gy, and strategy will continue to receive its success at the 
 hands of tactics. The tactical training of officers, those of 
 the general staff included, should therefore be carried to the 
 highest degree, since victory will require greater efforts than 
 at Worth and Gravelotte, better judgment, more skill in 
 the moving of great concentrated masses, better coopera- 
 tion of the masses, and uninterrupted communication. The 
 masses placed in readiness by strategy will remain con- 
 centrated longer, their maintenance, fc^iding, and draining 
 channels must be highly organized, and so-called "grand tac- 
 tics" — viz., the moving of army corps and armies bj' bri- 
 gades and divisions beyond the confines of the battle-field — 
 are bound to become indispensable. These things must be 
 mastered in time of peace, for the reconnaissance, especially 
 of extensive positions, as at Gravelotte and on the Lisaine, 
 will probably require more time and effort than formerly; 
 to locate the enem>-^s flanks (before the completion of which 
 task no battle order should ever be issued) will itself require 
 a day, nor is this estimate considered too high in view of the 
 circumstances of the 17th and 18th of August. Even then 
 
54 Inti'iMhwtion. 
 
 imuh it'UKiius u> (.oiupK^U' a avoU cousidorod plan of baitlo. 
 linuitinjj this as probable, wo shall invariably tind onr- 
 solvos ronipollod to have rooonrso to the Napoloonir priii- 
 liplo of loniontration boforo tho battle, Nvhonover an oxton- 
 sive pit'parod poj^itimi is to bo attaoktHl. a.nd tht^ oonrontra- 
 tion will bo one of niassos oxoooding those at tlravelotte; 
 and >Ye shall moreover have to learn llo^Y to move these 
 masses from the plaee of preliminary \o that of detinite 
 deployment. 
 
 Whether the measnres for oonoentratii>t\. the system of 
 orders. reiH>rts. messiiges, and reoonnaissanee dnring oon- 
 oentration. the modifications in the deployment ivudered 
 neoessary by the results of the forejioinji. the onier for the 
 battle and the ooiiduet of the latter, be olassititHl as strate 
 irioal or taetieal. they all must reeeive impulse and aim from 
 supreme headquarters; the direotion must be in one hand 
 and be so organizetl that one hand is equal to the task. 
 The station for the central direction should therefore be 
 sehvttHi in accordance with the object of the battle, and the 
 givatest care should be exercised to maintain uninterrupted 
 communication with the cavalry divisions, army command 
 ers. and army corps. The cavalry divisions may be so situ- 
 attnl as to save time by making direct reports, and by send- 
 ing meivly a duplicate ivport to the army connnanders. 
 These reports will mostly contain the ivsults of reconnais- 
 s;xnces. and it may therefoi*e happen that, dependent on the 
 impivssion ivceived from the sum total of all reports, a 
 change of station niay be dtvmed necessary for the central 
 direction. >sor should the thread of communication Ivtwivu 
 all higher commandtMs ever be alloweil to bivak during the 
 deployment for battle or during the battle itself. The per- 
 ftvtion with whith this system works alone guarantees 
 direction. 
 
 It cannot now be prognosticateil as to how far the cap- 
 
/ atroiluct urn . Ij 5 
 
 tjv<' \ni\\()()it will in*-'-! i)i<- ''Xjx* talioiJH j>la<;*?«] upon it, J 
 Klill <onMid*T' if a caprioiorjM riU'auH of nt<:unnn\¥>¥>iuu'j' an<l 
 r<'I»orl, inforjor to tli<' w<'ll inou/itw], boM <>n\((-r. Moif; 
 HVHf<ni in, liov\'<fV<'r, r<?<|iJir<'rJ, arul wlu'ii that in ha<J, it fjiay 
 hf tak'-n for \!;ri\u\i't\ that r<i>orfM and ord^TH will arrivt' in 
 j^ood tini''. nior«- j»;irti<ijlarly ko with th*- aid of th<f U-lc- 
 t^raph. 1 do not h<-Hitat(f to Kay that th<; profXT orj^aniza 
 tirni of tli<' HVHtr'Ffi r>f rf^poHH and ord^TH \h th<; moHt ini[>ort- 
 ,Trit (i-uUn<- of a "^land \utin\i\\\iiV\t'A-¥,r* No on<; whow; work 
 ih «')H<,'wh<fo nfjould h^' toh'ralod tluT*'. It njay \n' aKMUWUid 
 thiit th<' j<iin<ip;j| hattl«'« will tak<' jila*'' on a f/ont of 18 — 2<) 
 kilonK't^TK. Jf \\\i'. h^fadqiiartwH aro on ono of \\ut fiankK, 
 <'ith<'i' during th^' df'[>lov'ni<-*nt or during iUi: battl<', orders 
 and roportH will mnivc too latr^; if it ix in thr^ cjtntMr, the 
 time will in cvcfy inKtance be rwlueed by one-half. It 
 Mhould he noted, however, that the armament of eavalry 
 and itK r-rrifWoynK'nt in <ornbination with artillery, perhajjH 
 in advanerfd poHitionK, may prompt the eentral direction 
 to effect the preliminary deployment at leaxt 12 kilometer-H 
 from the enemyV KuppoH^d pf>«ition. The diKtance« Ixi- 
 tween the variouK h^adquJirterK are thuH incr^-aKed, and the 
 central direction iH \\('yc confronted with an arithmetical 
 factor, wliow reduction to u formula in not pernilKKible, but 
 which may be determined with fair Htrategic accuracy from 
 experience and frotn the ntudy of Home battle«. Modem 
 organization of all higher headquarteiH. modern f^pjipment 
 of all. from the arrny corpH upwardH, with Hufficient organs 
 for the trfiiiKmiKKion of orderK and reports, and habituating 
 the varioijK headquartern, by meann of a well connidered 
 Hcheme, to the xno«t rapid and accurate p^mHJble rendering of 
 rejjortK to their HnfK?rior«, to their inferior-H, and to the 
 flankn — thew? are re<juirementH of the command which in 
 
 ^German t>?rTn for th^- h'ra^lquarU-rK of thf: commandf^r of 8*:vera' 
 arraleg, — Tr 
 
56 Introduction. 
 
 1870-71, for instance, were not sufficiently met. How such 
 a scheme should be arranged and kept in operation will not 
 be discussed here; reference to the conditions at Gravelotte 
 and elsewhere will enable any one to answer the main ques- 
 tion. So much is certain, however, that an army which is 
 abreast of the re(iuirements in this respect possesses a great 
 advantage and the faculty to solve more difficult problems 
 than those encountered by the Germans on the 17th and 
 18th of August. Whoever believes in a central direction 
 should study this example, as it unquestionably contains all 
 answers for the preparation and direction of the battle of 
 masses in the future. 
 
 That battle will probably require more than one deploy- 
 ment was shown on the German side at Gravelotte, where 
 the Germans made three difl'erent deployments: first along 
 the road R6zouville — Mai*s-la-Tour on the 17th; on the 18th 
 along the road Gravelotte — Caulre Ferme — Doncourt — 
 Jarny; and lastly, along the road Gravelotte — Verneville 
 — Ste. Marie-aux-Chdnes — Aubout^. To be sure, the reasons 
 for these deployments must be sought in very different 
 directions. The first deployment (at noon on the 17th) 
 had for its object the continuation of the battle on that day, 
 but, for reasons not to be discussed here, the battle was 
 subsequently postponed to the 18tli. The first deployment 
 on the 18th was the result of the embarassiug uncertainty 
 as to the enemy's whereabouts; the second deployment, 
 including the direction of march given to the II. Corps, was 
 the result of definite information as to the enemy's position. 
 Though the reconnaissance on the 17th and 18th may be 
 called anything but perfect, yet in future the task of locat- 
 ing the enemy's flanks will by no nieaus be an easy one, 
 even with better arrangements for this object. It will 
 hardly be possible to avoid several deployments, increasing 
 
Introduction. 5T 
 
 in degree of completeness, and, indeed, here we have the 
 sign-posts for the battle direction of the future, which is 
 out of the question without a suitable deployment in keep- 
 ing with the strategic intent. There are many reasons why 
 in the future the development of the final deployment for 
 battle from several preliminary deployments will be more 
 difficult, accompanied, probably by constant fighting, per- 
 haps by cavalry battles, while, moreover, the time required 
 will be much greater. In each one of the preliminary 
 deployments the armies will therefore have to observe 
 suitable distances and intervals to make them capable of 
 sudden and immediate changes of position or front. I 
 believe that here there is much that is new in the way of 
 grand tactics, or whatever you may call it, since the advan- 
 tages accruing to the defender in the selection of his posi- 
 tion, from the adoption of smokeless powder, are so great 
 that he will use every available means to deceive the 
 attacker and lead him astray, since heretofore the means 
 to that end were not at his disposal, and since, dependent 
 on his successful employment of ruses before the battle, 
 the defender will gain advantages for maneuvering and 
 moving his masses which may give him the superiority 
 and even the battle. It is only now that the active opera- 
 tive-tactical defense has become fully practicable, and why 
 should not a leader arise who knows how to draw from 
 the sum of these changes all their inherent advantages? 
 
 It follows that in such situations the headquarters will 
 in future have to remain within the zone of each deploy- 
 ment, and that smokeless powder affects in a high degree 
 even the formulation of decisions on the part of the central 
 direction, since all spaces are enlarged, all times extended, 
 and all problems before the battle rendered more difficult. 
 
58 Intnnhtvtion. 
 
 It also t'ollo^^s tluu the irt'uoral statY oHii-or in ])artuMilar 
 should possess a oonvot taotical ovo. whith i-an bo aoquirod 
 by praotioo only. In most oasos it may bo possible to infer 
 the jionenU direction of the enemy's position from stratejrie 
 considerations, aims, and principles; still, the examples of 
 Konijjjiratz, Ornvelotte, the Lisaiue, and OrU%ns show how- 
 easy it was in the past to be deceived as to the details of 
 the direction and as to the whereabouts of the enemy's main 
 body. Misapprehension on the part of the hiuher leaders 
 and tlie resultinj; Joiihf are greatly favored by the new arms. 
 
 It is. 110 doubt, to be ascribed to tln^ German system 
 that the tactical cajmbilities were not eipial to the strate- 
 gical: under that system general staff ofticers weri> almost 
 the only ones to reach high command, and the tattical 
 school, on the other hand, only produced men skilled in 
 detachnuMit tactics. The necessary connecting link in the 
 chain of command, brigade and division commanders firm in 
 every saddle, was wanting: hence in the battles of 1870-71 
 we have detachment tactics, instead of battle tactics proper. 
 Though detachment tactics may have sutticed. thanks to a 
 very superior strategy, we cannot count on the return of 
 such favorable conditions, and the more imperiously do tac- 
 tics iH>nunaud that we learn how to tight in large bodies, 
 that we discover the tactics of the battleinasses. 
 
 Though strategic discussion has no place in this biHd<. 
 I cannot omit touching upon one general matter connected 
 with the assembly before battle. Moltke's dictum. "March 
 divided, fight unittnl." has. thivugh ^loltke's genius, and in 
 the period of hi.< strategy, maturtnl the highest triumphs 
 since war has been wagtnl. To dispute this would be to 
 deny facts, liut if Moltke were still alive. I am convinced 
 that the cluuiges whioh have since occurreil, and which can- 
 not be iguoivd by strategy, would have prompted him to 
 
Introduction. 69 
 
 modify, Jirid jxrluipK to clian^c his (li<tiiiii into "March 
 united Jiiid fij^lil iiiiKcd." TliiK in [ilainly foreHhadowod 
 by the opcralioiiH around Mdz. W'Iumi Htsindinj^ by ifself, 
 how<'\'<'i-, Iho fir-Ht (|Uol('d Bontoncc is fio(jU(;ntly miHuuder- 
 stood ;iiid orronc'onHJy intorproted. TroopH will hereafter 
 also he divi<]cd on (lie ni!ii<li. })ijt not 8o long ah heretofore; 
 the ((tncenlnition will Ijik*- j)l}j<e earlier and part of the 
 operative tJisU will he solved with the troopH eoncentrated 
 — nnil<'<l. AI)ov<' mII, 1 would caution af^ainst the idea of a 
 return of the nia}4:nifieent Ktrategy which Moltke'H Hkill has 
 aeeuHtomed uk to connect with warfare. The {general laws 
 for i>lanninj^ and condticting operations will remain, but 
 the operations will b<- slowej-, their s<'vernl jjeriods will 
 re(juire crmsiderMhle time, and the results will probably be 
 less decisivf.', whoever may be the victor. It is due to the 
 masses that have to be set in motion and to the resistance 
 offered by the enemy's masses in connection with defens- 
 ively prepared districts, with fortresses, and with railroads. 
 To be sure, tli(^ masses harbor within themselves their great- 
 est enemy, and we must learn how to overcome him; there 
 are many indications that the matter is being given due con- 
 sideration in (iermany. Take the ecjuipment with tents, for 
 instance. Whether it will succfH'd remains to be seen. 
 I'.oth opponents, however, will sufTer from the same disad- 
 vantages, and it will sim[)ly be a (juestion which of the two 
 can better and longer preserve his armies, nrid thus gain 
 numerical superiority. Subjugation will not be effected by 
 battles alone; hunger will he a more efficient ally than it 
 was in 1870-71 . 
 
 It is radically wrong to believe that strategy extends 
 only to the edge of the battle-field and that the latter is 
 dominated by t;ictics ,'ilone. The two blend in the battle. 
 Leaving aside a few fundamental principles, strategy is sub- 
 ject to modifications engendered by the progress of science 
 
60 Introduction. 
 
 and civilization. It lies in the nature of strategy to utilize 
 every improvement, and for that reason every general staff 
 officer is, as regards science and that which may convey 
 superiority, invariably a promoter of a healthy progress. 
 
 While strategy is subject to considerable modifications, 
 constant change may be said to be the rule in tactics. Wise 
 regulations should therefore leave a certain amount of free- 
 dom to the intellect; where such is not the case, every army 
 ought to be provided with a printing establishment to fur- 
 nish new regulations that would be abreast of the times. 
 That is about the point we have reached, and it is due to the 
 fact that we delayed our reforms far too long. Indeed, the 
 omissions of two decades had to be made good in two years. 
 With tactics it is frequently as it is with fortresses. In- 
 stead of working ahead and discovering the laws for, and 
 the construction of, cover, the engineer as a rule provides 
 for present requirements, indulges in all kinds of fancies, 
 and loses himself in forms; and just as the fall of many a 
 fortress may be extenuated by the fact that at the time of its 
 completion it was already out of date and incapable of suc- 
 cessful defense, because a destructive gun is more rapidly 
 constructed than a fortress, so have armies been defeated 
 which had neither the insight nor the strength to promptly 
 relinquish their superannuated '^tactics," or which went 
 astray in seeking suitable tactics. And thus it will ever be. 
 Yet there are also armies which have been badly beaten 
 notwithstanding their timely regulations, but that was due 
 to the fact that strategy was neglected for the benefit of 
 tactics, that the strategic intellect was not sufficiently cul- 
 tivated. This cultivation must go hand in hand with that 
 of tactical judgment. 
 
 Strategy and tactics are both based on military history 
 and military science, and both may be acquired to a high 
 
Introduction. 61 
 
 degree. The method of application of what has been 
 learned shows the gift of leading, talent, genius, master- 
 mind of the individual. A correct school will therefore al- 
 ways consider strategy and tactics as inseparably connected 
 domains and conform thereto in its work. In that sense 
 all great leaders have acted, and they are the ones who from 
 their early age have done an immense amount of intel- 
 lectual work. If strategy is neglected, the individual will 
 never rise to the level of the ar-t; he will rather be moving in 
 lower spheres, he will not learn to reflect on the nature, 
 causes, and connection of the operations, and in the most 
 favorable case he will not rise above the skilled mechanic. 
 This has always exacted its penalties, and the disciples of 
 Mars should therefore be encouraged to take up the study of 
 strategy. His Majesty is not served with one strategist; he 
 can not have enough of them. This should be preached 
 from the house-tops; yet but a short while ago the very 
 opposite was affirmed and — approved! Why are so many 
 skilled tacticians useless as strategists? Why do such men 
 not feel themselves at home in strategy? There are so many 
 reasons for it that we do not care to enumerate them, and, 
 unfortunately, we cannot say that they are being systemat- 
 ically counteracted. If. on the other hand, tactics is neg- 
 lected, or if it goes astray, strategy will not have freedom 
 of operation. It is the whole army that must be able to 
 fight according to modern conditions ; strategy relies on this 
 being the case. 
 
 In tactics it should be kept in mind that the factors 
 entering into the calculation are men, and that the psycho- 
 logical motives — some, at least, if not all of them — of the 
 general, supposing them to be ideal, should find expression 
 to the same extent in tactics — i. e., in the individual man on 
 the battle-field. Improved modern fire-arms also teach us 
 
(VJ I ntroihtctioii. 
 
 to C'ilinuifi' more hialih/ the value of psiichohuji/ in taelic.< than iras 
 fornierlji neeessari/, aiul for tlml reason the irill-poirer of the 
 indiridnal ^ohtier should bo i)orsistontly ami intolliiiontly oul- 
 tivatod in ordor to niatuio in liinu by moans of tlio hijjh- 
 ost attainable cultivation of the ^^•ill-po^\■ol^ the dotorniina- 
 tion to 1)0 victorious undi'r all ciri'unistanoos. This very 
 point is but too froquiMitly noiilootod. and the oxporiniontinij 
 in fai'titious forms soon dojionoratos into a veritable virtiu)- 
 soshi[>. It is in the terrain alone that tactics acquires life 
 and health. \Vhat formerly swayed the jivneral alone or a 
 limited circle around him — passion and andntion, thirst for 
 honor and i»lory, enthusiasm for the object of the war — 
 must to-day permeate the army in its entiri'ty — sufficiently, 
 at least, to rouse the individual's own impulses to a certain 
 degree; and this store of moral force must be suitably 
 guided and utili/ed l\v nu-ans of a riuorous discipline, Jis 
 was that of the old Komans and that of the a.rmies of Fred- 
 erick the (ireat; otherwise the llnest principles and forms 
 renuvin devoid of vitality. Intelliirence and habit, fear 
 of punishnuMit, and hope of reward no lonuer suffice to 
 ovi>rcome the difficult situations in which the infaiitrynmn 
 to day is apt to tind himst>lf in any action where he means t(» 
 be victorious. More is re(|uired: the soldier must make the 
 lienerars cause his own, must carry within him the same 
 tire, must be sensible of the same ardor, or he will uot rise 
 from behind the eovering fold of ground to advance again 
 in the face of tlu' storm of bullets. 
 
 ^Vherever we may look, we see good ideas degemn-ate 
 into drill ground faui'ies. For the same reason the quon- 
 dam echelons of the threat Frederick became the fa.vorite 
 tactical features in the hands of unwise men who failed to 
 notice that a ditVerent era had long set in. And so it is in 
 our days; we have gone from one exti*eme to the other, we 
 
Introduction. 63 
 
 have lost the hjgical connection : ^'La recherche de la palernite 
 est interdiie" and a system is advocated which accords no 
 place to the action of the higher leaders. 
 
 Hordes we must have, bnt we must also have definite 
 principles for their fighting. 
 
 Besides certain precepts, the system of hordes of skir- 
 misliei-s also assumes that the soldier has been trained to 
 self-activity from the start, to the development of all his 
 moral and intellectual faculties and attributes, in order 
 that the sense of honor and of duty may actuate him when- 
 ever he is no longer under the constraint of form or under 
 the eye of the leader. It should never be forgotten, how- 
 ever, that human nature is frail, and that the soldier should 
 be acted upon directly and immediately by personal exam- 
 I>le wherever it can reasonably be done. 
 
 In the past few wars the tactics of the oj>ponents dif- 
 fered widely on account of the inequality of armament and 
 on account of the difference and lack of understanding of 
 the jirinciples and organization of the opponent; in no case 
 were the tactics in keeping with the spirit of the armament. 
 
 Certain it is: First, the armament of the infantry of 
 the attacker (Germans and Russians) was, on the average, 
 inferior. Both sulfered some extraordinary losses against 
 the better armed defender. 
 
 Second, the losses began to be felt at a distance, where 
 the opponent was unable [i. e., where his weapon did not 
 permit) to answer the fire effectively. 
 
 In the Prusso-Oerman campaign there were several 
 instances which invite reflection, and which, if properly 
 judged by the facts, ought to lead to proper deductions. 
 
 In that work such officers alone could take a useful part 
 as were present at the events, observed themselves, others, 
 and the opi)onents, and were in a position affording an ex- 
 
64 Introduction. 
 
 tensive survey; they slionld. however, closely folknv all im- 
 provements of arnunnent. so as not to teaoh things that are 
 ont of date. 
 
 This book is intended to be military-historical, psycho- 
 logical, and tactical. 
 
 For whoever has watched actual battle and the recent 
 technical improvements, and who has also considered the 
 growth of the national sentiment and of the military spirit 
 in France and Russia, is bound to examine the tactics of the 
 future under these three headings. 
 
PART I. 
 
 MILITARY-HISTORICAL STUDIES. 
 
 7. The Attach of the 28th Infantry Brigade on the Farmstead of 
 Bar and on the Adjoining Entrenched Wood of Briz in the 
 Battle of Koniggrdtz on July 3, 18GG. 
 
 (a) The March.— ()n the 3(1 of July, 1866, the 28th Bri- 
 gade had completed its deployment to the northwest of the 
 ridge of I'opowitz by 2 p. m. From our previous position 
 near Alt-Xechanitz on the right bank of the Bistritz we had 
 been able to observe the course of the battle as far as Lipa; 
 here we were as though shut off from theworld. We saw 
 nothing and could not be seen. The short march from 
 Nechanitz had taken the brigade over an hour, because, while 
 the infantry was crossing the Bistritz by the rex>aired nar- 
 row bridge, General von Hiller, who was on the further 
 bank, received orders to halt and to let the reserve artillery 
 pass.* As the bridge was too narrow for two columns 
 abreast, the 28th Brigade halted where it was. To send the 
 artillery to the front to prepare the attack was perfectly 
 correct. 
 
 After Alt-Xechanitz had been talcen, F. — 28tht followed 
 the Saxons by order of General von Scholer, marching 
 straight for the bridge. The latter was in flames and we 
 were in a dilemma. F. — 27th, with commendable devo- 
 
 *Statement of General von Hiller, February 10, 1890. 
 tMeans Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Regiment. See author's 
 footnote, page 67. — Tr. 
 
66 Inquiries into tliv Tactivs of the Ftitinr. 
 
 tion. crossed the Bistrit/. farthoi' to tho left with the water 
 up to their shoiikieis, but the main (luestioii was to save 
 the bridge for the passage of the main body. To accom- 
 plish that was the chief problem, and to show how in need 
 small means, when well organized, may accomplish great 
 things, I will brietly state what happened. F. — 2Sth 
 unstra[>ped their mess-tins, and, after the manner in which 
 formerly tires usini to be fought in the country district 
 where the regiment is recruited, formed two lines, which 
 the other men kept supplied with mess-tins tilled w ith water 
 from the Bistritz.* In this way the small means at hand 
 permitted great masses of water to be poured on the burn- 
 ing bridge. The men who were tighting the tire directly 
 stood in the midst of the tlames, not without great danger to 
 the devotion of F. — llSth, the tire was gotten under control, 
 the bridge was saved, and the open spaces were covered 
 with planks and boards procured by this battalion. Thus 
 the smart Khinelanders of F. — 2Sth had done a piece of 
 work that would have done honor to trained pioneers; the 
 latter were — not there I The value of the presence of mind 
 ajid of the organized work is evident, for, as matters stood, if 
 F. — ilSth had not acted so promptly, no great bodies of the 
 Elbe Army could have taken an active part in the battle, 
 since no other passages were construefed, as is well known. The 
 soldier should be familiar with such instances, that he may 
 know how to help himself in similar situations. 
 
 During this passage I stood in the middle of the en.er- 
 gency bridge, and, as it had no railing, my ]>osition was not a 
 pleasant one, because the bridge, of which a number of parts 
 were missing, was tottering under the weight of the guns 
 
 ♦Statement of Colonel Kneusels, the chief of 11th— 28th (11th 
 Company of the 2Sth Regiment). See author's note, page 67. — Tr. 
 
Military Historical Studies. 67 
 
 and carrriages (according to my notes, 6 batteries each of 
 the 7th and 8th Army Corpsj. During the long time it took 
 the artillery to cross, I was thinking more of what would be 
 the result if a few shells should burst here; and not without 
 reason, for as yet I had not noted any jjrouounced progress 
 of the battle; it rather seemed to be at a standstill, and from 
 Alt-Nechanitz I had been able to observe with the naked eye 
 the advance and retreat of several columns. Some appre- 
 hension seemed even to have seized the cool and heroic Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel von Schoning, commanding I. — r)7th,* whom 
 the circumstances had completely deprived of all control 
 over his battalion during the passage. Sullenly and impa- 
 tiently he looked on from the other bank, he himself with 
 the 1st Company being separated from the remainder of his 
 command. Under such circumstances time passes slowly, 
 every one feels the inconvenience of the situation, and the 
 oftener I consulted my watch, the more impatient I became. 
 Still I will state that the long column of artillery moved 
 with great steadiness, and that, with the exception of a few- 
 puffs and cuffs, no accidents occurred. I breathed more 
 freely, however, when the ar-tillery was across, for nothing 
 is more uncomfortable than to be deprived of all freedom 
 under such circumstances. The main thing was that the 
 bridge, which had been repaired by our infantry with com- 
 mendable care, proved eijual to the demands. 
 
 At Alt-Nechanitz I had observed few traces of the bat- 
 tle, and our long delay there from 10:80 a. m. until 1 p. m. in 
 no way differed from an ordinary assembly of troops in 
 peace. The ofTicers of the various regiments visited each 
 other, conversed, and shared what little edibles they had, 
 
 ♦The Roman numerals before the dash denote battalions, the 
 Arabic figures companies; after the dash the Arabic figures denote 
 regiments. 
 
08 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 and none seemed to have any premonition that the 3d of 
 July was to be a historic day in German history. To be 
 sure, the attention of the conversing groups was frequently 
 attracted by the battle-field, which extended in incompara- 
 ble grandeur to our extreme left, with its gigantic masses of 
 fire and dark, hovering, heavy clouds of smoke; but the con- 
 versation, as in the midst of peace, turned on the most harm- 
 less topics, nor did various adjutants, etc., inquiring for Gen- 
 eral von Herwarth, arouse unusual curiosity. The general 
 impression was that great masses were engaged on either 
 side, and even the men seemed to feel it; their quiet and dec- 
 orous behavior during that hour deserves special mention. 
 
 On the farther side of the bridge the picture changed; 
 the bodies of some Saxon soldiers and of a poorly clad 
 woman were the first dead I saw. Some of the houses along 
 the Bistritz had been badly damaged; the broad village 
 street, however, presented quite a peaceful appearance; its 
 solitude and various hospital flags alone reminded one of 
 war. Beyond the village we met a fusilier of the 17tli Regi- 
 ment; as he approached I recognized him as the servant of 
 Lieutenant von Czernicki (F. — 17th\ a friend of mine from 
 boyhood. I just had time to inquire for his master without 
 noticing that he was carrying an officer's cloak and saber; 
 as he pointed to them, I understood what the good man was 
 unable to utter. His master had been killed, and what the 
 fusilier was carrying were the dead man's belongings. The 
 meadows of Nechanitz spread in such luxuriant green that 
 signs of the not inconsiderable action which had taken place 
 there could hardly be discerned; here and there a body cov- 
 ered with a cloak was all: the field had been thoroughly 
 policed. In Lubno we first met some of our own troops. It 
 was the 7th Rifle Battalion which had taken position behind 
 the edge of the village to hold this point in case of a re- 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 69 
 
 verse. A few greetings, and on we went. It is one of the 
 cases in which such use of the rifles has been criticised. I 
 am unable to do so; the rifles could be spared because the 
 battle was constantly progressing, and there can be no 
 doubt that it was most important to hold the bridge, and the 
 rifles were the very men to develop their full fire power in 
 Lubno and in the surroundings of the village. Measures 
 should not be judged by their results; it should rather be 
 inquired what their object was, and whether that object was 
 of sufficient importance to keep back a whole battalion. In 
 this case the answer should be in the affirmative. 
 
 Although on the whole the (preparatory, tactical) meas- 
 ures of Generals von Herwarth and von Scholer and the 
 dispositions for the attack on Problus — Prim surpass many 
 greater and smaller attack movements of the wars of 1866 
 and 1870-71, still the most important matter was neglected 
 — i. e., timely provisions for crossing the Bistritz more rap- 
 idly. A single narrow bridge was not enough; two or three 
 should have been constructed here or near by, all the more 
 because the case of a reverse should have been reckoned 
 with. Had that been done, the Army of the Elbe would 
 have engaged earlier and in greater force, which was par- 
 ticularly desirable from the strategic point of view, because 
 the direction of Koniggratz, which might be assumed to be 
 the enemy's principal line of retreat, was more sensibly 
 menaced from the south than from any other point. If Bor 
 had been reached at 2 p. m., for instance, which would not 
 have been at all impossible, a retreat on Koniggratz would 
 have become impossible and the greater part of the enemy 
 would have fallen in the hands of the II. Army on the field 
 of battle. Thus the most trifling omissions of a tactical 
 character exact their penalties when considered from a 
 
TO I iKjiiirii'ft into the Toi'tics of tJic Future. 
 
 higlior point, ;md tlu're nv;is oertainly no IjU'k of time or 
 material for tlio t'oustriiction of (ho rtHiuisilo l)ridj!:es. 
 
 In such oast^s spocially solootod ollii'ors should bo sta- 
 tioned at the crossinjjs to assijiii the troops to bridges, and 
 it is advisable to assipi artillery and cavalry to one, and 
 infantry to another bridge. Under eireumstances like those 
 before ns the infantry bridge might perha])s not be very 
 strong, and had that been the ease, the oonstrnetion of a 
 seeond bridge for infantry ».'onld have presented no diftionl- 
 ties even in the absence of resources other than those found 
 in Nechanitz. l>ut Avhen iIumv is but one bridge, a bridge 
 guard becomes all the nmre indispensable. There was none, 
 and I remember vividly the bewildered faces of the infantry 
 as the artillery trotted through its ranks without ceremony, 
 and only came to a walk on the bridge. It was the "right 
 of the stronger." 
 
 By not making timely provision for the necessary cross- 
 ings the lu>adquarters of the army made a mistake that could 
 not be rectitied. The Prussian Otlicial Account does not 
 mention the incident, though it is one of the most instruct- 
 ive of recent wars; nor does the Austrian Account, which, as 
 regards our side, frequently draws on the Prussian source. 
 The former simply states, on page 308. "(hat (ho 2Sth Bri- 
 gade followed the 27th at 8(X) paces." That nu\y have been 
 the distance at the start, but the imident which I have 
 related incrt^istnl it to an hour's manh. The consequence 
 was that the 2Tth Brigade attacked before the 2Sth. al- 
 though it had farther to march than the latter. AVas that 
 intentional? In the subsequent course of the action the 
 two brigades never wore abreast of eaih other, although 
 the 2Sth accelerated its march. 
 
 (h) Tlw ]'>t'ploiinicuf. — The unpleasant imideiu had 
 placed General von llillor in a vory painful sidiation; since 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 7 1 
 
 the 27th lirigado liad entirely disappeared fioiii liiw view, 
 and as there was no one at the moment to tell him where to 
 march, nothing remained for him but to act on his own 
 responsibility. Marching on to Popowitz, he inquired of 
 Major von Sell, commanding the 7th Kifle Battalion left at 
 Lubno, who pointed out lo him the direction taken by the 
 27th Brigade. CJeneral von Ililler now gave orders for the 
 2Sth Brigade to follow the 27th. During Ihe march on 
 T^opowitz, Captain von Schadow, of General von Herwarth's 
 staff, brought an order to General von Hiller to halt the 
 head of his column, and form line to the right. General 
 von Ililler rode forward to inform himself of the situation, 
 and in doing so met General von Herwarth himself, who 
 pointed out to him on the left a barely visible s[)ire as the 
 objective of his attack, saying, "That is Problus; advance in 
 that direction."* That, according" to my notions, is the 
 "task sj^stem" (Auftraf/sverfahren). 
 
 On returning to his brigade. General von Hiller found it 
 still in the act of forujing uj), and had time to communicate 
 the order of General von Herwarth to the regimental and 
 battalion commanders. They then rode to the front with 
 General von Hilh^r beyond the ridge of Popowitz, so that 
 they also could inform themselves of the situation and qui- 
 etly talk the matter over. Meanwhile, the battalions had 
 formed in double column on the center in two lines, but the 
 "finer work" of dress and dircn-tion was still lacking. That 
 was now done in regulation style, so that the brigade was 
 facing due east, the battalions dressed accurately as with a 
 string. Since Golonel von der Osten (57th Regiment, in 
 first line) was an expert in these things, it was quickly done; 
 at any rate, the time spent on this calm and deliberate prep- 
 
 *From a letter of General von Hiller. 
 
72 Inquiries into the Tmtics of the Future. 
 
 aration amply paid for itself in the subsequent action 
 (Sketch I.). 
 
 In the first line were 2 battalions of the 57th Regiment,* 
 I. — 57th on the left, F. — 57th on the right ; in second line. 2 
 battalions of the 17th Regiment,! II. — 17th on the right. 
 I. — 17th on the left. Luxuriant fields of rye as tall as a 
 man covered the height and the entire space to the Problus 
 — Prim plateau, except the meadow bottom in front of Pro- 
 blus — Prim. All commanders were in front, and there was 
 a silence and attention among the regiments that could not 
 have been greater on the drill-ground. After convincing 
 himself that the brigade faced exactly in the desired direc- 
 tion. General von Hiller again repaired to Colonel von der 
 Osten,J of the 57th Regiment, pointed toward the southern 
 point of the wood of Popowitz, and said: "That is the direc- 
 tion for the present; afterward the church spire on the left.§ 
 "Have the colors displayed!" That done, Colonel von der 
 Osten turned toward his regiment, called for three cheers 
 for the King, which were given with a will, and added with 
 his fine, rich voice: "And now with God." His calmness 
 and assurance made a deep impression on those assembled. 
 The commanders then resumed front toward the enemy. 
 My own attention (I was on the right of the skirmish platoon 
 of the 2d — 57th) was deeply engrossed; I had hardly imag- 
 ined going into a battle in this manner; what I saw far sur- 
 passed my imagination. 
 
 Our men, who had not heard a gun shot except at Miinch- 
 engratz, and Mho to-day had for several hours watched the 
 advancing and retreating columns in the center, were in ex- 
 cellent spirits. They had marched 23 kilometers on soaked 
 
 *The II. formed the escort of the reserve artillery. 
 tF. — 17th was with the advance guard of General von Schuler. 
 $Died in Berlin as lieutenant-general. 
 §The church spire of Problus. 
 
rtr»;- 
 
Sketch of the yitUtck oft/ifl4*l>I)iviswn alKdnit/^rati Theza'^in/'nngjutihtfomheAiiatk. 
 
 t Austriana tnJJaxons. 
 XX AbaUis. 
 
 •*f_2-_U» 
 
 Sketch I. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 73 
 
 roads and across fields, and had been under arms for ten 
 hours without anything to eat. Having received its orders 
 early, the brigade had started early. At 9 :30 a. m. it stood 
 in rear of the right of the I. Army, whence it moved off to- 
 ward the south and reached Alt-Nechanitz about 10 :30 a. m. 
 The lack of bridges enforced a long delay, and the early start 
 of the brigade and its early arrival on the field remained 
 without effect on the course of events. But, the long delay 
 ended, and the brigade once on the field, it was the fine exam- 
 ple of all, particularly of the higher ofiicers, and the imper- 
 turbability and assurance they exhibited, that inspired the 
 men with faith and confidence. Early in the morning a fine 
 rain had fallen, which changed to a dense fog about 7 a. m. 
 It settled slowly about noon; the columns of smoke and 
 flames of the burning villages and woods drifted in long 
 lines slowly to the southwest, borne by a light northeast 
 wind. Toward 2 p. m. it cleared up, but the events on the 
 height of Problus could be seen but indistinctly, and it was 
 only after the heights had been taken that the weather 
 cleared up entirely. In consequence of the rain and fog, 
 the tall rye-fields were saturated with water, so that the 
 troops arrived at the heights of Problus as wet as though 
 they had been in water up to their necks. That was more 
 specially the case with the leading platoons, but all suffered 
 equally from the soaked ground, which impeded movement 
 very much. 
 
 At the command of General von Hiller, ''Brigade 
 march," the brigade moved off. At first all battalions were 
 in double column on the center. As soon as the ridge of 
 Popowitz had been crossed, the brigade assumed a different 
 formation; General von Hiller, who was riding on the 
 right of 2d — 57th with Lieutenant-Colonel von Schoning 
 (I. — 57th), ordering T. — 57th* to deploy. The other bat- 
 
 *4th — 57th was detached as escort to Schmelzer's battery. 
 
 G 
 
74 Itiquirk's into the Toi'tks of the Future. 
 
 talions meanwhile took the short step, which was done to 
 perfection despite the artillery fire, and 3d and 1st — 57th 
 deployed their skirmish platoons in donble time, their rear 
 platoons followin}:: at the regulation distance. Lieutenant- 
 Colonel von Sehoning now joined the skirmish line of 3d 
 and 1st — 57th, where he remained during the remainder of 
 the action. As General von Hiller and Colonel von der 
 Osten were riding (; — ]0 paces to my right until 2d — 57th 
 was deployed, I was in a fortunate position to hear every 
 word they spoke. After descending into the bottom be- 
 tween the ridges of Problus and Popowitz, the brigade had 
 about the following formation: Firing line, 3d and 1st — • 
 57th (at first one platoon deployed, afterward prolonged and 
 reinforced by another platoon) ; exactly in rear of the center 
 of these two companies (3d on the left, 1st on the right) was 
 2d — 57th ; closed in company column 200 paces to the right 
 and abreast of 2d — 57th was F. — 57th. In second line there 
 remained for the present TI. — 17th and I. — 17th. The bri- 
 gade had loaded before starting. 
 
 Having established the first few movements, I must 
 relate a curious incident. "When the brigade moved otT. the 
 bands of both regiments struck up; that of the 57th Regi- 
 ment was at first with I. — 57th, and when that battalion was 
 ordered into the firing line, it remained with 2d — 57th. 
 Notwithstanding the wet rye-fields, the soaked condition of 
 the ground, and a very severe artillery fire, the bands of both 
 regiments continued to play with perfect precision and with 
 the customary intermissions until the first line was within 
 250 meters of the abattis of the woods of Briz, and ceased 
 playing only when 2d — 57th was deployed. The last march 
 played by the band of the 57th was the men's favorite march, 
 in which, according to custon\, the pauses recurring between 
 the bars were filled up by the men joining in with: "O 
 
Military-HiHtorical Stud/ks. 7 5 
 
 Johnny, what a hat I" In this instance the men did not join 
 in, but the enemy did with a sudden and heavy hail of lead; I 
 still rememl>er how (-omical the situation was. The staff 
 ' oboist had failed to notice or hear the repeated orders of Col- 
 onel von der Osten to stop; the commander of 2d — 57th did 
 not seem inclined to interfere on account of the proximity of 
 the su7)eriorK, and was, moreover, about 50 paces in front on 
 horseback; the mounted officers could meanwhile see how 
 closely we had approached the enemy, but the troops them- 
 selves could not 3'et overlook the plateau, when the music 
 suddenly ceased. It was not the staff oboist, however, who 
 had given the signal to stop — it was the enemy; the former 
 looked angrily around, and Colonel von der Osten's order, 
 "Northe, stop," was heard jiist as the music had ceased. 
 
 I have related llie foregoing because it is a typical ex- 
 ample of how firmly peace habits are rooted, and because it 
 shows a nne piece of discipline, notwithstanding the comical 
 incidents connected with it. If peace habits are rooted 
 so firmly, then this harmless example conveys a serious 
 warning to teach the men in peace only reasonable things, in 
 order that their lives may not be fruitlessly sacrificed to 
 wrong habits. Moreover, can anj' other large body of troops 
 show a similar example? 
 
 After crossing the ridge of Popowitz, the view changed 
 completely, as though the curtain had been raised in the 
 theater, and a stage suddenly laid before our eyes. And 
 what a stage! The entire hostile front was wrapped in 
 smoke and flame in the fiillest sense of the word, from Prim 
 to Problus, Stresetilz, Lij>a, and Chluni. Between Prim 
 and Problus we saw one long line of artillery, and on our 
 side, as far as the eye could reach, advancing skirmishers 
 and columns, waving colors, playing bands. The effect of 
 the sudden transformation was noticeable also among the 
 
70 I iKiiiirits into the 'iact'wx of the I'litnir. 
 
 MUMi. I'lvtM'v om> I raiu'ii lii^ ium'U h) s(M\ and I can say hon- 
 I'slly dial I imajiinrd myself most anywhi'io oxt'opt in a 
 {^roat dtvisivo Itattlo. And tlio t'lVoct must havo been sim- 
 ilar on many, for ovon tho admiiinji "Ah!" was not lacking. 
 AVlu'thor anything grandor ovor oi'i'uncd in history bofore 
 1 do not know, bnt 1 may say (hat I ha\(^ novor stHMi any- 
 thing (>vtMi appiHiximaloly alTocting (ho imagination as this 
 battlo slago: and wIumi, nndiM- sui-h rirfnms(anoos. a snnirt 
 advance is k(>i»( u\\ (lie soldior contincrs wiihont knowing; 
 (ho advance was as (hough "well givased." A lively and 
 well-directed artillery fire grcvtod us, but we advanctHl 
 without hahing to within i!."iO meters of the abattis of the 
 wood i>f Briz. 
 
 (c) The Batllc-Field.—Tho battle-field of the brigade 
 was a wide depression extending 12000 meters north and 
 south between the ritlges of I'opowit/. and Troblus. Its 
 deepest point lies about midway botwtvn (he two. With 
 the exception of the cross-road Avhich h»ads from Popowitz 
 to the T.nbno— XiediM' Prim highroad and is lined with 
 trees, the baltle-tield was tMitirely bart> and JrvoiJ of cover, 
 while all tln^ riMuaining infantry of the Army of the Elbe 
 wail able to appro.ach nnd(M' I'over to within .'>00 and TOO 
 meters of the main poin(s of (he enemy's ])osi(ion.* The 
 villagi>s of Vroblus and Prim, which at th«^ (ime of the a((ack 
 of the 28th Brigade were still in the enemy's ]>oss(^ssion, 
 were, on the side toward us. pre]>ared for defense; that fact 
 was nnUni>wn to the higher conmmndei's, and nn(il after 
 the orders fov i\w attack had been given, the murky weather 
 prevent(Hl details from btnng nuide out even with a good 
 glass. Tn the subsequent loui-se of (he attack we were 
 
 ♦On page 369 of the Prussian OfBclal Account It is stated that 
 from the wood to tho villas^ the 27th Brigade had to traverse 1600 
 paces of open ground. The actuaj distance is 70l> — SOO meters. 
 
Milit(i/ry]liHtoric(il HtwUas. 77 
 
 very niiicli Hiii[)iiH<(I to Huddenly oncountor abattin, wliich 
 wore 15 feel liif^h ii) Hoiur* places and cncircl*'*! iJif entire 
 north and \v(?HtC'rn edffc of tlio woods of J>or and liri/.. A 
 rid^f? steeply sloping toward the west extends from Problus 
 to Nieder Prim, but it had not been prepared for defense. 
 The dislanee from the edge of the ridj^e 1o the wckkI of Briz 
 was then about '{HO meters, and aKhouj^h that may seem a 
 short distance now, it should be rememb(?red that the ground 
 was almost as flat and bare* as a table. Though about 800 
 meters from Problus low meadow grounds streteh to the 
 Bouth, where they closely approach Nieder Prim, they were 
 of little effect as cover, because no attention seemed to be 
 paid to them; at any rate, we mardu'd across them with- 
 out half. The field of action of the 2.S<h P.rigade must there- 
 fore be counted among those entirely devoid of cover and 
 shelter. What could hit Aow. there in 1800, however, will 
 no longer be practicable in the future, 
 
 Th(? distances had not been systematically marked by 
 the enemy; at any rate, I observed no marks except on 
 felled trees along the Lubno — Nieder Prim road; others 7 
 neither noticed, nor <li(l I hear of any. 
 
 (d) The Attack. — Maintaining the direction indicated by 
 General von Ililler, the brigade marched bravely onward; 
 some of the officers exhibited some exuberance of spirit, and 
 I believe that there are few examjiles in military history of 
 a large unit marching to battle with such a light heart. The 
 difficulty of maintaining a certain direction is shown by the 
 fact that, notwitliHtanding the careful pi-<'vious arrange- 
 ments, the brigade advanced its left shoulder more and more 
 toward Nieder Prim. When General von Uiller noticed 
 that, and also that the large felled trees on the Lubno — 
 Nieder Prim road were range marks prepared by the enemy, 
 he moved the entire brigade more to the left; still the skir- 
 
78 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 mishers of 1st — 57tli found an opportunity to subject the 
 enem^- to a lively fire as he withdrew from Nieder Prim. 
 1st — 5Tth passed through Nieder Prim followed by F. — 
 57th.* General von Hiller showed an icy coolness, but his 
 chestnut horse was all excitement and bathed in perspira- 
 tion. All his talking and petting could not quiet the ani- 
 mal. The horse was of noble blood, and there was a peculiar 
 charm for me in watching its movements and efforts; I do 
 not repent having made full use of the opportunity, for never 
 afterward have I seen a noble horse struggle so long with 
 excitement, or observed the beautiful attitudes peculiar to a 
 horse under such conditions. It is not less instructive or 
 enjoyable than the observation of a man under similar 
 circumstances. 
 
 Although the horse gave his rider a good deal of trouble, 
 the general never changed a muscle of his face. His peace- 
 ful, kind expression remained the same and he was as laconic 
 as was his habit in peace. "The church spire to the loft, 
 gentlemen, I pray!'' These and similar words he repeated 
 several times. B}^ the side of the small figure of the general. 
 Colonel von der Osten on his big horse looked like a knight. 
 He too was cool and attentive to his regiment and observant 
 of the enemy. While the brigade in this shape was crossing 
 the meadow west of Problus — Prim, we heard protracted 
 hurrahing from the left front. It came from the troops who 
 took Problus! Shortly afterward a cuirassier brigade 
 passed to the left of 2d — 57th, after attempting a charge on 
 the Saxon artillen- position at Problus — Prim. The charge 
 of this cavalry is very instructive, but, as is usually the case, 
 the most instructive incidents are very adroitly buried if 
 any blunder has been made. General von Kotze had ap- 
 
 *The positions of troops on the maps of the Austrian Official 
 Account are wrong. A better sketch of the attack will be found on 
 Plate I. of the History of the 16th Regiment, and on Plate I. of the 
 History of the 57th Regiment. 
 
Military-Historical IStudit'S. 79 
 
 preached under cover by the broad road which leads from 
 Popowitz through the wood to Problus, his squadrons march- 
 ing in rear of each other with half-platoon front. The 
 capture of Problus was calculated to suggest a charge on 
 the retreating enemy, whom the two cuirassier regiments 
 had approached under cover to within 700 meters; in that 
 case it was necessary for the cavalry leader to choose the right 
 moment by personal observation and judgment. To be sure. 
 General von Kotze did observe, but not with a tactical eye. 
 In view of the fact that in front and on the right there were 
 several batteries, but 700 meters distant, which during the 
 preceding conflict had had time to get the exact range and 
 which could not be attacked under cover, it certainly was a 
 mistake to come out of the wood 700 meters from that artillery, 
 to deploy and to charge that mass of artillery uphill* Owing to 
 the short distance, the first squadron of the Pomeranian 
 heavy cavalry, which marched at the head, received such a 
 fire that after some 400 paces it turned off to the right; the 
 squadrons following in rear attempted the same feat, but in 
 vain. As it usually goes with cavalry in such cases, the 
 fastest horse leads and all others follow. The cavalry could 
 not save itself by returning into the wood, and galloped 
 along its southern edge in the direction of the ridge of Popo> 
 witz, during which long and exposed ride it made a good 
 mark for the enemy. The two regiments hurried to the 
 rear intermingled in one big mass; this big ''pulk" rode 
 down the right wing of 11th — 28th, and the left wing of 
 the skirmishers of .'^>d — 57th and I. — 17th came near sharing 
 the same fate. The disorder was indescribable; the length- 
 ened commands "Ditch" informed us that the mass of horse- 
 men had also encountered obstacles, and for a moment we 
 
 *The same thing was attempted under similar circumstances, 
 but with larger bodies, at the Mance ravine on August 18, 1870. 
 
80 Inquiries into the Taeties of the Future. 
 
 saw as many legs of Lorses and men in the air as swords. 
 The horsemen in rear crowded those in front in panicky 
 flight, until the crowd was out of the enemy's fire, and even 
 then they continued their flight. The fallen horsemen grad- 
 ually disentangled themselves ajid hastened after the others 
 by ones, twos, and threes. The retreating mass did not make 
 an inspiring impression, and the greater was the merriment 
 proA^oked by a cuirassier of the 8th Regiment, who, in trot- 
 ting past 2d — 57th, called out: ''At them, boys; they are 
 retreating." This fine cavalry, which lost 1 officer, 32 men, 
 and 58 horses, was useless for the rest of the battle, and how 
 welcome would not that cavalry have been a few moments 
 later in the same direction ! If General von Kotze or any of 
 his advisers had manifested any tactical judgment what- 
 ever, it would have been easy after the capture of Problus 
 to reach that village under cover, and Bor in the same way 
 after it had been taken. The moment for attack would tlien 
 have arrived and the results would presumably have been 
 great. Thus the lack of tactical judgment exacts its penal- 
 ties. It is bad enough for the other arms, but cavalry can 
 never make good such blunders; it simply disappears from 
 the field for good. At the moment when the retreating mass 
 passed the first line of. the 28th Brigade, one-sixth of the 
 horsemen covered the ground and the remainder were no 
 longer masters of their horses.* 
 
 Soon after the general staff officer of the 14th Division, 
 Major von Thile. reached General von Hiller. ''Problus," 
 he said, pointing to the left, "has just been taken; the bri- 
 gade is no longer needed there; advance straight between 
 the villages" (Problus and Nieder Prim). The general lis- 
 
 *The Prussian Official Account does not mention the incident. 
 The Austrian Account does mention it (page 339, III.), but at the 
 wrong place and at a wrong (later) period. 
 
MiUtary-Hiatorical SttiMes. 8 1 
 
 tened and a loud "Very well" was all he answered. Major 
 Yon Thile's face was beaming with joy; he turned his horse 
 and rode away to the left, giving a few cheering words to the 
 •troops. As the brigade approximately had the indicated 
 direction, it was not ditlicult to carry out the task. The gen- 
 eral ordered the left (2d-^57th) to hold back a little, and the 
 thing was done. The height between Problus and Prim, 
 from which the Saxon artillery had iviihdrawn by this time, 
 was now being occupied by the 12th Saxon Infantry and 
 4th Rifle Battalions coming from Nieder Prim; we also ob- 
 served 2 or 8 columns which were rapidly retreating from 
 Problus and taking the direction of Bor. The 2 battalions 
 just named greeted 8d and 1st — 57th with several volleys, 
 which, however, did not do much damage.* The 12-pounder 
 smooth-bore battery (Schmelzer's) had followed the move- 
 ment of the 28th Brigade, and when Captain Schmelzer saw 
 the situation, the battery with gunners mounted on the car- 
 riages galloped forward through the midst of the skir- 
 mishers of the 3d Company of the Fifty-seventh, and coming 
 into lattery in front of them, opened on the enemy with can- 
 ister at 400 jiaces. Never since have I witnessed equally 
 resolute action, so much tactical judgment, and more deci- 
 sive effect of a battery. That was initiative, an initiative 
 by which not only the two hostile battalions were mown 
 down by ranks, but by which the confidence of the attack- 
 ing infantry was raised to exuberance. This example dem- 
 onstrates how great the moral effect of the proper use of 
 a battery may be on the other arms. The battery command- 
 er's ringing command, "400 paces, to the front, canister," 
 was carried beyond the skirmish lines of the 3d and 1st 
 
 *The statemert (see page 42, History of the 57th- Regiment) 
 that the 3d and 1st Companies halted and "took cover" against these 
 battalions is incorrect, as our skirmishers did not interrupt their 
 advance. 
 
82 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 Companies of the Fiftj^-seventli to the second line of the 
 brigade, and attiacted the attention of the entire brigade. 
 After a few ronnds liad driven the opi)osing infantry away, 
 Schmelzer's battery galloped to the top of the ridge, whence 
 it oi)ened with equal etlect on the two badly shaken bat- 
 talions, and on Bor, and on the abattis of the wood of Briz. 
 The OflBcial Account states that the battery executed that 
 maneuver against the village of Problus; at any rate, that 
 is the inference. It is possiUe that the battei-y had pre- 
 viously fired a few rounds on the above mentioned Saxon 
 detachments withdrawing from IM'oblus; it is not possible 
 that it fired on Problus, as the village was then occupied by 
 the 27th Brigade; moreover, the battery had accompanied 
 the 28th, not the 27th Brigade,* and had galloped, not 
 through the skirmishers of the 27tli Brigade, but through 
 those of the 3d Company of the Fifty-seventh. 
 
 Up to this time our infantry (."Ul and 1st Companies of 
 the Fifty-seventh) had each two platoons deployed; F. — 57th, 
 which, like the remainder of the brigade, with the exception 
 of I. — 57th, had moved in double column on the center, had 
 one platoon each of the 9th and 12th Companies deployed; 
 all the rest ^^'as in close order. From tlu^ psychological point, 
 the "literary" version of the Official Account, bottom of page 
 309, is not very intelligible; it is stated there that the en- 
 emy's lire was unable *'to accelerate the movement of our 
 men." We may also discard the statement on page 371, 
 "that the 28th Brigade suffered less at the hands of the hos- 
 tile artillery, because it got into a dead angle." During the 
 entire action there w-as a rare degrei* of attention from the 
 division down to the last musketeer, and, although the deter- 
 mined behavior of the higher leaders gave to the movement 
 
 ♦The Official Account states, on page 368, that the battery was 
 with the 28th Brigade in the second line of the division. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 83 
 
 the appearance of a resolute and determined advance, yet 
 the fire of llie Saxon art illery managed to considerably accel- 
 erate our movement, and what the artillery fire did not 
 •do, the division commander did. Before the brigade had 
 reached the crest of the ridge south of Problus, Major von 
 Thile had ridden along the front urging greater rapidity of 
 movement. About .'{ p. m., moreover, tin? Army of the Elbe 
 knew what was at stake. At that hour Problus had just 
 been taken. The results of the day could be fully reai)ed 
 only by the most rapid possible advance of fr(?sh forces, and for 
 that purpose the 28th Brigade was nearest at hand, as Pro- 
 blus formed the strategic point of the enemy's left. I will 
 also state that between the ridges of Problus and Popowitz 
 a dead angle does not exist and could not exist. The de- 
 pression is generally flat, and becomes steep only in its last 
 third. When we reached that point, the entire Saxon artil- 
 lery had prudently withdrawn from its position. From that mo- 
 ment until the wood of Brix was taken, we received no more 
 artillery fire. 
 
 The smaller losses of the 281h Brigade.as compared with 
 those of the 27th, must be exphiined by other circumstances. 
 
 There is, in the first place, the difference of time. Ever 
 since the blocking of the bridge nt Nechanitz the two bri- 
 gades had been completely separated.* The 27tli liiigade 
 had marched off at once without waiting for the 28th. f 
 Thus it came that the 27th Biigadc, which derived much 
 more cover from the wood of Popowitz than the 28th Bri- 
 gade found on its own ground, found Problus and the height 
 south of it strongly occupied, and had to withstand single- 
 handed the fire of that numerous artillery and infantry. 
 
 ♦Compare page 36. 
 
 fin all these descriptions the maps of the Austrian and PruS- 
 sian Official Accounts of the battle of Koniggriltz have been used. 
 
84 rnquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 SubseqiuMitly. avIumi llie 28th Brigade had crossed the ridge 
 of Popowitz, the change of the enemy's fire from the 27th to 
 the 28tli lirigade could be plainly observed. lint the former 
 h.id already sntTered severely. As Problns had fallen ear- 
 lier than (he height to the south of it, and as the Saxons had 
 abandoned their artillery position on the latter before the 
 28th Brigade came up, the 28th Brigade was less exposed to 
 lire and sutTered less. Moreover, most of the shells failed to 
 burst — they were Prussian percussion shells — and acted 
 only as solid shot, and the 28th Brigade accelerated its 
 march as much as possible in order to traverse the zone of the 
 annoying artillery fire as quickly as possible. 
 
 Schmelzer's battery, whit'h meanwhile was engaged on 
 the height south of Problns, had been closely followed by 
 our skirmishers exactly in the formation previously stated, 
 the second company of the Fifty-seventh being in close order 
 and in rear of the center of the skirmish line. 
 
 A curious incident may be stated here: While JM .and 
 1st of the Fifty-seventh, in conjunction with Schmelzer's 
 battery, were maintaining such an etTective fire on the two 
 Saxon battalions, Lieutenant-Colonel von Schoning, turn- 
 ing ai'ouud, noticed that the colors of I. — 57th were with the 
 second company. He sent his adjutant. First Lieutenant 
 Boker, to that company with orders to have the colors at 
 once taken to F. — 57th, which was still in close order. Hence 
 we saw, at that critical moment, the color section of L — 57th 
 struggling all alone to n^ach F. — 57th with the colors. Ow- 
 ing to the considerable distajice ajid the soaked condition of 
 the ground, the color section did not ivach F. — 57th until the 
 firing line came to a halt. btMug thus without any ])rotection 
 for about 20 minutes, ^^■hen the adjutant had rejoined Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel von Schoning, the latter remarked, "This is a 
 hellish fire." Lieutenant Boker replied, "It is a good thing 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 85 
 
 that not every bullel liils," aiul he had barely uttered the 
 last word, when he fell dead from his horse. (Statement of 
 Colonel von Schoninj?, subsefiuchtly wonnded at Vionville, 
 'and deceased.) Soon afterward Lien tenant-Colonel von 
 Schoning, whose horse had been hit several times, received 
 a glancing shot on the left side of the neck, but, hero that he 
 was, he remained in the saddle. The blood ran down over 
 his tunic; Von Schoning pulled out his handkerchief, tied it 
 over the wound, and led his battalion to the end of the 
 battle. 
 
 The crest of the ridge, which had been taken under fire 
 by Schmelzer's battery and by our skirmishers, was covered 
 with an unusually large; number of dead and wounded. The 
 cries of many of the latter were heartrending, but, being in 
 column, we could not always step over them as carefully as 
 we should have liked to, particularly because we were just 
 then wheeling to the left in order to gain the direction of Bor 
 and of the wood of Briz.* We all were surprised to see only 
 wounded and dead Saxons, and Colonel von der Osten said: 
 "Why, they are Saxons! (Jood-niorning!" Soon after- 
 ward a wounded Saxon officer raised himself up from these 
 tangled heaps and said to General von lliller, as he ap- 
 proached: "Back: you won't be able to get through here!" 
 The leading of Ihe brigade as well as of the regiments at this 
 time deserves the highest praise. Distances and intervals 
 between the lines had been strictly observed, and after 
 marching 1.50(1 melei's through high rye-fields and suffering 
 severe losses, the brigade reached the height of IM-oblus in 
 such fine shape that the wheel to the left conld be made with- 
 out first coining to a halt, despite the uninteiTU[)ted'fire of the 
 enemy. The oblique movement to the right and the wheel 
 
 *The History of the 57th Regiment here speaks of a third Saxon 
 battalion, stated to have come from Nieder Prim. I did not notice it. 
 
86 Iiiqiiirtcs into the Taetk\s of the Future. 
 
 to the left had uncovered the I'lont of I. — 17th; to cover the 
 new front General von Hiller ordered two companies of this 
 battalion forward to ])rolong; the line to the north of 3d — 
 571h. (roncral von Hiller, a man of great modesty, pre- 
 served a. heroic coolness. The wheel having made an exten- 
 sion of the skirmish line to the southeast necessary, two pla- 
 toons of the 2d Company of the Fifty-seventh were deployed 
 for the purpose.* They advanced in double time until 
 abreast of 3d and 1st, and soon after the entire first line 
 halted.f Now we became aware that we were in front of a 
 strongly entrenched position, from which an uninterrupted 
 skirmish tire was maintained. Notwithstanding the short 
 distance, the strength of the defenders could not be made 
 out, and nothing remained but to open fire on the high 
 abattis just for luck. 
 
 General von Hiller saw at once that on this ground, 
 which was perfectly fiat and devoid of cover of any kind, 
 every minute's delay was dangerous, and decided to take the 
 wood as quickly as possible. He ordered the second and 
 third line to close on the first. Just as the second line had 
 almost reached the first and we were on the point of making 
 the assault with united forces, the signal "Cavalry" resound- 
 ed on all sides. The situation was critical. We were on 
 open ground and about 200 meters from a strongly occupied 
 abattis (1 brigade of 5 battalions and tlie 1st Rifle Bat- 
 talion at Kor). Th(> skirmishers rallied, the battalions 
 formed sc^uare; we waited in suspense half a minutes a min- 
 ute — the cavalry did not come! A Saxon squadron, which 
 had lost its way in the wood of Briz, had suddenly appeared 
 at the edge of the wood, and on seeing its mistake and com- 
 
 *About 300 meters in front of the abattis. 
 
 tThe music had just ceased playing. See page 75. 
 
Military-Historical ^Studies. 87 
 
 ing iiiid<'i- 11)0 fire of the 1st — 57th, it turned about and trot- 
 ted back. That was all. 
 
 This little incident had checked the advance. It goes 
 to show what harm signals may do, particularly when given 
 before the facts are ascertained. Had that particular 
 trumpeter not sounded the signal, which, in accordance with 
 the Kcgulations, was repeated right and left, the abattis 
 would have been taken without much loss and many pris- 
 oners captured. On Uut battle-field all trumpet signals 
 except "All advance" should be carefully guarded against. 
 They are prohibited, but they are not thereby prevented.* 
 
 While forming groups the rifle platoon of 2d — 57th re- 
 ceived a severe fire from front and flank, and the leader. 
 Lieutenant von Stojentin, was mortally wounded. He 
 turned the command over to me, saying: "I am done for; 
 hurry to get up there, or all are going to be killed here! 
 Adieu I" I did not see the gentleman again. He was a 
 brave officer. 
 
 A description of the line of battle becomes the more nec- 
 essary at this ])oint, as no satisfactory' idea of the situation 
 can be gained from the Prussian and Austrian Official 
 Accounts, or from the Histories of the 17th and 57th Regi- 
 ments, either from the texts or from the troops marked on 
 the maps; the troops shown on the maps of the Histories of 
 those two regiments rather obscure the text. AVhen all 
 three lines had ascended the plateau between Problus and 
 Nieder Prim, it was not possible to change the direction of 
 the long skirmish line of 'Ad and Ist — 57th. They continued 
 the march straight to the front and brought up against that 
 part of the edge of the wood which lies exactly in the mid- 
 
 ♦Simllar mischief had just before been done by the signal 
 "Assembly" after the capture of Problus. Details will be found 
 on page 230 of the History of the Sixteenth. 
 
88 I iKjitiiiiis into the Taclics of the Fiitinr. 
 
 (lie bowU'on tln'lwo piualli'l roads leudinj; Iroin IM-obhis aiui 
 NuhUm- Trim [o iho woiul of \\\\/.\ both (•ouipjiiiios lijiHod 
 about L'OO iiiotiMs from llu> abatlis. iM -oTlli was uoav 
 thrown forward to (ho rij;ht (I'astwarcl). whooliiij; at tho 
 sauio timo to tlio loft; l'\ — fiTth roinniiuHl on tlio oxtroiao 
 iii;ht. st> that tho skinuishors of its !)th (\>uipauv toiu'lunl 
 tho road from NitMliM* rriiu to tho \\i>od of l»fi/. and halted 
 abroast o( tho tirst lino. 1. ITth had k(>pt strais;ht to the 
 front likt> ;U1 and 1st — oTth. As this ba.ttalit)n had a oon- 
 sidiM-ablv shortiM- distamu' to tho wood, it onconntorod. to- 
 j^othor with tho two just nuMitionod conipa-nios of tho l"''ifty- 
 sovonth, V(M'v obsiinato rosista.noo botwtuMi tho northorn 
 think of tho :>d — oTth a.iid tho n>ad from Vroblus to the 
 \\«md of llriz, wliioh canstnl it to roinfori'O its skirniisliers. 
 The skirmish lino now was facing; tho abattis at a dis- 
 tanee of 1*00 nuMors in tho following order from riiiht to 
 left: 11.. skirmish platoon; 1.. skirmish platoon; lib. i»la- 
 toon;.")ih, platoon; H'. ami 1 1 1.. skirmish platoons. The II. — 
 17tb. following in rt>ar of 2d — 57111, fornnnl S(inare during 
 the incident 1 havt* rt^atiHl. about 50 paees to the left 
 rear of lM— 5Tth. As 1.— 57th. I.— 17th. and F.— 57th 
 had (U^ploved strong skirmish lint>s (1st — 57th all IhrtM^ ]>la- 
 toons, ;>d — 57th and l2d- 57th twt> idatoons (>a(h. II. — 17th 
 two and V. — 57th four i>la toons), the skirmish line of tlu» 
 brigade exttMuhnl from the road Troblus — liriz wiuul to the 
 roiid NiiHler Trim — -Hri/. win>tl, eompassing tlu» wo«nl in a. 
 seniieirele. i^Sot^ S^keteh 1.) 
 
 .\fter the tM-ror eanstnl bv the signal hatl betM\ eleared 
 up. and when Ilu> skirmishers had not vtM (»r had barely 
 rt>aehed ihtMr former places, (General von lliller, fei^ling tho 
 gravity of the crisis a.nd turair of ///<' ilifficiillit of ijcltiiuj a 
 h/ing-iloun finiuj line fonranl, roile hack lo 11. — 17th. niul (jnve 
 or(h'i\'i to ^fdjor ron 7^i"(7'c/>7ci'» "/(> adraiur in JonhJc fiinc and 
 
paHH the sIcirmiHh line in ordc/r to (jive a nevj irnpvhe lo the whole 
 movcrnenL" (Jciicml von Hillcr joined the l(?ff; of i\nt bat- 
 lalion, and, on rcarhin^ the HkiriniHij lino, ^aiJopod forward, 
 raising? IiIh Hwor<l Jiiid <;illin;<, "Willi me, HkirrniHhorH!" 
 "'riio etiMic lino," llic ^cncr-iil conliniioH, "roHo and riiHhod 
 rcHoluloly forwjird willi druniH boalin^, Tlio cjiooririfi wjih 
 continuouH and llio cnoniy'H line? waH broken iil :ill |)oinlH 
 al alinoHJ llie Hanie lime." TjoHe on my lefl II. — 1711) clam- 
 bered over I In? nbatliH, bill, b<'in^ in yloHr' order, llie bat<al- 
 ion naturally IohI Wh formal ion and wan Homewliat dJH- 
 huieed by llie moic nimble skirmiKlierH fai'llier norlli. 
 
 II iH (pjeer llial allliouj^li many aceonnlH of lliin ev(?nt 
 liave been wrilten, jl di<J nol ocenr lo any of llie liiHlorianH 
 lo aHcerlain who gave llie inipnlHo to tho aHKaiill. Had llir- 
 re^imenlH, an I have* done, addroHHed the man lo whom they 
 owe HO mncli in eonneclion willi lliiH foal of arnm, we would 
 read in llieir re«;inienlal liiHlorien whal I have wrillen here, 
 inHlead of I hone lavoiile bul iiiaiH- jdiiaHeH. InHtead of 
 j^lorioijH fealH, Hie re{^'iiiM'nlH would lunc on<' t/loriovs feat, 
 worlli more llian Hie dozeriH vvliicli eannol be HubHianlialed. 
 My liea.H impelH me lo ei'e<'l HiIh niei-ilcd mojiiimenl lo lh<i 
 liei-o of lior and lo make up f(jr Hie neglect of the troops 
 whom lu; led to Hueh j^loriouH victory. From the tactical 
 point of view, it waH my duly lo i^ci lo Ihe bottom of this 
 oxam[de, which, nmhiHs jiriilrnifJis, \h ajjplicabh? to-day in 
 ma,ny i)haHeH of bailie, in oi'der (ujoin and at/ain to preach the 
 truth ill v'liirh f liclii'ic, that trodfis mill conquer only when led, and 
 I feel (lee|)ly iiidcbled lo Hw i-evorod general for actpiaint- 
 ing me, 1 hough relucianlly, with the details of the affair. 
 
 The most obslinale rcHiHtance was encountered by I. — 
 I7Hi and 1.-57111, Hie least by F.— .57111. I.— 57lh encoun- 
 tered cloH(»d bodicK wliicli liad lo b<' overpowered by ha.nd-to 
 hand fighting, and Ii'm-c Caplaiii a(»ii Ledebiir, comnianding 
 
90 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the 4th Company, was killed at a range of 10 yards. The 
 deployed platoons of I. — 17th and I. — 57th followed the 
 enemy in the general direction of Bor, which farmstead was 
 subseqnently taken by 2d — 17th. At the further edge of 
 the northern one of the two copses situated here, 3d and 
 4th — 17th encountered one battalion of the Sigismund regi- 
 ment, which was totally dispersed by rapid fire delivered 
 at 50 paces, and left several officers and about 150 prisoners 
 in our hands. Subset|uently II. — 17th and I. — 17th met 
 in Bor, after the fighting there had ceased. Both battalions 
 were halted there by General von Hiller. Some platoon» 
 had an opi)ortunity to fire on Coudenhove's cavalry division 
 at a range of GOO — 700 paces. About 5:.'^0 p. m., the King 
 came riding along from the north and was surrounded by 
 the jubilant men of the 3d, 6th, and 7th Companies of the Sev- 
 enteenth. The war lord stopped his horse a moment and 
 addressed some gracious words to the troops. All three 
 companies of I. — 57th likewise followed in the direc- 
 tion of the retreating enemy. At the point where I was, 
 the enemy did not leave the abattis until we closed on 
 them; on the further side a man from the 1st Battal- 
 ion of the 1st Saxon Infantry Brigade fell into my 
 hands and entreated: 'Tlease do not harm me; I am only 
 a carpenter." Si>ecially remarkable is the fact that the 
 men, though carrying their packs, made the long rush of 
 200 meters ivithont stop. The consequence was that the 
 additional effort in climbing over the abattis so exhausted 
 the men that immediate pursuit became impracticable, and 
 it would, moreover, have been very difficult in many places, 
 owing to the dense underwood. As these various causes 
 had loosened the formation, some of the commanders as- 
 sembled their men on the road leading from Bor southward 
 through the wood ; thus II. — 17th and 2d — .^>7th. In forming 
 
Military -Historical Studies. 9 1 
 
 the company my servant, a small Westphalian, came up to 
 me; he had been shot through the cheeks before the assault 
 on the abattis. As he happened to be quite near to me at 
 4he time, I told him to go to the rear. But the brave little 
 fellow thought otherwise; he said he wanted to be in the 
 attack on the abattis, and he kept his word ! Now he went in 
 quest of a dressing station. His name was Werthmann, and, 
 on my recommendation, he got the medal of honor, but the 
 regimental histories fail to say anything about the afifair. 
 The delay mentioned explains why II. — 17th and 2d — 57th 
 were late in reaching the further edge of the wood. In cross- 
 ing the wood, where the Fifty-seventh took about 140 pris- 
 oners, we saw the effect of our own guns, with which the Sax- 
 ons were also armed. After the infantry had withdrawn 
 from the wood, the Saxon artillery opened a severe shell fire, 
 and I confess that the din, the echo, the flying splinters of 
 wood and iron have deeply impressed themselves on my 
 memory ; and those who had to stand that artillery fire will 
 understand why in 1870-71 the French showed some nerv- 
 ousness under it. Up to that time there was nothing more 
 terrible than a bursting percussion shell, and the Saxon 
 artillery shot well. As soon as the men had been assembled, 
 therefore, the advance was resumed, but 2d — 57th lost tem- 
 porarily all connection with the other units of the rf»c:i 
 ment. Emerging from the nothern edge of the wood, 2d — 
 57th met General von Killer, Colonel von der Osten, Col- 
 onel von Kottwitz (17th Eegiment), and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 von Schoning, the latter with a bloodstained handkerchief 
 about his neck; they had ridden around the wood on ac- 
 count of the abattis. 2d — 57th advanced thence in a north- 
 erly direction, resting its right on the northern edge of the 
 northern copse of Bor, the greater part of the company ex- 
 tending westward over the open field and facing north. At 
 
92 Itiquirh\'< into the Tacticfi of the Fiitiiir. 
 
 that mouuMit the si}j:iuil "Cavalry" again rang out along the 
 >YhoU' lino. The ofVu'ors just naiuod sought tho sholtor of 
 the wood and so did 2d — 57th; but, as no cava.lrv could 
 bo soon from thoro. iM — HTth rosuniod its fornior position, 
 ■\vhonoo it ^^•itnossod tho grand attack of Coiidonhovo's cav- 
 alry division and tho charg(> of tho 1st (luard Dragoons. I 
 do not boliovo that a single shot >vas fired, and indeed the 
 view of those splendid lines of horsemen wa« so overwhelm- 
 ing that the men from sheer surprise and suspense forgot 
 their rilles altt^gether, althongh the distance of about 700 
 paces admitted of elTective tire; and 1, though their com- 
 mandtM". did no bettor! Soon many ridt'rless horses ran 
 panting here and there; several came through our skirmish 
 lines, where some of tluMU were caught, so that the offieera, 
 nmuy of whom had had their horses killed, could provide 
 themselves Avith mounts. Thus, Captain von Stwolinski 
 (1st — 57th), First Lieutenant von liernewitz (lid — 57th). etc. 
 (Their hoi'st^s had betMi strm-k by several bullets.) CeneraJ 
 von Ililler now ordertnl 2d — 57th to return to the northern 
 edge of the wood of Kriz and to occupy the same for the 
 present. Meanwhile, we heard prolonged clu^rs from Bor; 
 it was the greeting which the Seventeenth, posted there, 
 were giving to their war lord (page 00). In that way I 
 unfoiiunately was deprived of the enjoyment of this scene, 
 of which 1 (uily learntnl in the evening, when the brigade 
 was assembled.* 
 
 I must mer.lion here a special incident. Shortly be- 
 fore proctHHling to the assault on the abattis, we observed 
 tlothes waving along the entire front of the abattis befoi"e 
 us, which gave us the impression that the enemy meant to 
 surrender; that was not the case, however, the Saxons 
 
 ♦These axe the facts! What is stated on page 45 of the History 
 of the 57th Regiment is incorrect. Queer that nothing is srad there 
 about the King, whom 3d — 57th should have seen. 
 
Military-Historical studies. 98 
 
 maintaining a severe skirmish fire against us to the la«t. 
 The waving of the clotlies was observed by many, but, 
 notwi(hK(iUMling my elToHH, I have been unable to ascer- 
 tain the cause. 
 
 It seems that tlie Saxons made good us(; of the time we 
 lost in forming KciuaicH, for the withdrawal of their main 
 ]»()(ly; oIliciwiKe iiioi-c prisoners would, under the circum- 
 stances, have fallen in our hands. As regards our own fire, 
 the dead and wounded lying in rear of the abattis showed 
 it to have been more effective than we imagined, particular- 
 ly op[)Osite 2d — HTth, which may be explained by the fact 
 that Ihe enemy here was enfiladed by 1st — 57th, On mak- 
 ing a closer examination next morning, I found that most 
 shols had gone high, jis flu? branches of the abattis and of 
 the trees on the edg(? of the wood bore many marks of in- 
 fantry bullets 15 to 20 feet above the ground. In the wood 
 of lUi'A neither infantry fired much, though single shots 
 could Ix' heard there until next morning (the pieces which 
 were picked up loaded were being discharged). 
 
 The fight at the abattis was very obstinate, but I did 
 not see any hand-to-hand fighting with the btiyonet any- 
 where; several Saxons were still firing as I was crawling 
 through the abattis, and my (;ompany commander. First 
 Lieutenant von Bernewitz, who had the hardihood to remain 
 mounted until he reached the abattis with the .'id platoon 
 of 2d — 57tli (which was in (;loHe order), became the target for 
 a heavy &re, and his horse received several shots at close 
 range. TFc now dismounted, ''only," he said, "because he 
 could not ride the beast over the abattis." The scene was 
 not devoid of comic features, when at his call "Ilorseholder" 
 quite a number of men promptly volunteered for that duty. 
 The list of casualties shows a first lieutenant of the Land- 
 wehr, lMiilii)pi, 2d — 571 h (tth platoon), as wounded in the 
 
94 Inquiries into tltc Tiwtics of the Future. 
 
 foot by a bayouet lliriist. riiilippi was uot picked up near 
 the abattis, but was found deep in the wood by Ensign 
 Schroiber, who assisted him to mount a captured horse and 
 in that way transported the not very military figure to the 
 dressing station after the fight was over. It was a queer 
 sight: the small ensign with a big sword by his side, in top 
 boots, holding the big sword with his left hand to keep it 
 from getting between his legs, and with the right carefully 
 leading a. big black Austrian chai'ger on which sat Philippi, 
 knapsack on his back, holding on to the saddle with both 
 hands, his legs pulled up high, his back arched, and in reai' 
 of the liorse, as "escort," a troop of 20 captured Austrians 
 and Saxons of all arms, some in odd garb; the procession 
 provoked ringing laughter. Thus are grave and comical 
 scenes combined. 
 
 According to statements made to me by Lieutenant von 
 Kedern of F. — 10th, who had met Philippi afterward, the 
 "bayonet thrust" was an accident due to his own awkward- 
 ness. But, as it usually goes with such things. Philippi 
 became an "interesting" personality, and however often he 
 told his story, I have never believed it. The "bayonet 
 thrust" in the first edition of the Regimental History of the 
 57th Regiment has been changed to a "contusion" of the 
 foot, probably in consequence of my w'ritings. 
 
 The Saxon Official Account says that the 1st Rifle Bat- 
 talion distinguished itself highly by its stubborn defense of 
 the abattis, though at the time threatened in rear. It was 
 the ."^d Company of the 57th Regiment that advanced against 
 the rear of the 1st Rifle Battalion. The battalion had occu- 
 pied a copse to the north of the wood of Briz, and its retreat 
 was probably difficult. It also lost the greatest number of 
 prisoners. There Avas no bayonet fighting at this point 
 either, but there was probably a stubborn fire fight at 50 
 paces, and closer, against I. — 17th. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 95 
 
 The tactical leading must be pronounced excellent. 
 The action of the 28th Brigade in forming squares under the 
 circumstances might be criticised, and I have been told that, 
 instead of complying with the signal, General von Hiller 
 meant to proceed at once to the assault on the abattis. To 
 this it may be replied that, the signal having once been 
 given, the general could not prevent the troops from obey- 
 ing it. It has never been ascertained who gave the signal.* 
 
 Owing to the cover in front, the appearance of cavalry 
 was not at all an impossibility. 
 
 The Prussian Official Account says, on page 394, that 
 "further pursuit was entrusted to Captain Streccius with 
 the 2d Company of the 17th and 2d Company of the 57th 
 Regiments and some re-formed skirmish platoons." The 
 reader may decide for himself whether and how far Cap- 
 tain Streccius' advance (to the northeastern edge of the copse 
 of Bor) may be called a pursuit. It is certain that the 
 2d Company of the 57th Regiment was never for a minute 
 under Captain Streccius' orders, whom I never saw on 
 the day of the battle, and that none but men from the Sev- 
 enteenth could have been among the formed skirmish pla- 
 toons. For the 3d, 1st, and 2d Companies of the 57th Regi- 
 ment, which were following the same direction in open 
 order, were never separated from the regiment; F. — 57th 
 was too far away from the 17th Regiment; II. — 17th did 
 not reach Bor until after it had been taken by I. — 17th, and 
 no one got farther than that point I 
 
 The wood of Briz was now occupied as follows (5 p. 
 m.):t northern edge and northeastern angle, including Bor, 
 
 *This is confirmed by a letter from Greneral von Hiller of Feb- 
 ruary, 1890, to the author. 
 
 tAs regards time, I will state that, according to my observa- 
 tions, Problus fell about 2:45 p. m., and that the farmstead of Bor 
 and the wood of Briz may have been taken about 3:30 p. m. 
 
96 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 3d — 57th, 1st — 57tli; eastern edge, F. — 57th; northern edge, 
 2d — 57th; Bor and the two copses, I. — 17th and II. — 17th. 
 About 6:30 p. m., General von lliller conducted the 28th 
 Brigade to the plateau west of the wood of Briz, where the 
 entire brigade camped during the night. The 27th Brigade 
 bivouacked in and around Problus. 
 
 Hiller's brigade had purchased its success with the loss 
 of 10 officers and 190 men, and had captured 12 officers and 
 300 men. 
 
 Of these losses, S officers and 99 men fell on the 8 com- 
 panies of the Fifty-seventh, and 2 officers and 91 men on 
 the 8 companies of the Seventeenth; the 3 companies of 
 I. — 57th (firing line) had suffered most — viz., 6 officers and 
 64 men; the 2d company lost 2 officers and 20 men. 
 
 The account on page 43 of the History of the Fifty- 
 seventh would make the reader believe that General von 
 Hiller was encouraged to make the attack by the King's 
 adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel von Stiehle, and that the 
 lieutenant-colonel arrived before the signal "Cavalry." 
 According to the written statement of General von Hiller, 
 now before me, both statements are in error. If it were 
 otherwise, the general's credit as a leader and as a hero 
 would be lowered. In fact, Lieutenant-Colonel von Stiehle 
 did not arrive until after General von Hiller had brought 
 up Bieberstein's battalion (II. — 17th) and "the lieutenant- 
 colonel did not strengthen the general's resolution to at- 
 tack," hut hrorigJit him. a categorical order not to advance further 
 when he saw what arrangements General von Hiller had made for 
 the occupation of Bor and of the tvood of Briz! After General 
 von Hiller had arranged for the occupation of the edge of 
 Bor, the troops there received fire from the southeast; from 
 their headgear. General von Hiller recognized the firing 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 97 
 
 troops as Prussians, and sent the adjutant of I. — 17th, Lieu- 
 tenant Hesse, to inform them of their error. When he 
 reached them, he found that the second battalion of the 
 Thirty-third, under Major von Bieberstein, had taken the 
 Prussians at Bor for enemies. Further mischief was thufe 
 happily averted. Not until after these incidents did Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel von Stiehle find General von Hiller. Soon 
 afterward, after dark, an order came from the 14th Division 
 for the brigade to move to Problus. As the men were very 
 much fatigued, General von Hiller sent his adjutant. Lieu- 
 tenant Arndt, to request permission of Count Mtinster to 
 let the brigade camp where it was, which request Count 
 Miinster granted. 
 
 When yet beyond the enemy's fire the brigade had been 
 divided into two lines, and after the advance had begun, 
 three lines were formed. This formation was retained un- 
 til the first halt (250 meters from the abattis). The regi- 
 ments were one in rear of the other. Their march was 
 across open fields, and during the movement a considerable 
 oblique movement and a wheel to the left were made. 
 Within effective infantry range (200 — 250 meters) the bri- 
 gade passed from the open to the close formation (squares), 
 and then resumed open order; all its forces closed on the 
 enemy simultaneously, surmounted high abattis, closely fol- 
 lowed the withdrawing enemy through underbrush, very 
 dense in parts, and soon after overthrowing the enemy the 
 brigade again stood assembled and formed as though after a 
 bloodless peace exercise. It traversed over 2000 meters, 
 and used exclusively double column on the center with skir- 
 mishers in front. I. — 57th alone, whose able commander 
 was subsequently, as colonel of the Eleventh, wounded at 
 R^zonville on August 16, 1870, in one of the many bloody 
 
98 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 attacks on Height 1)70, had been completely deployed during 
 the action, with the exception of 2 platoons.* 
 
 At about ;>r)() meters the slvirmishers [lid and 1st — 57th) 
 opened fire and flred while in motion, and not without good 
 i-esults, as we found later. Notwithstanding their op^Mi 
 order, they sulTered the greatest losses, which may be in 
 pai't attributed to the signal "Cavalry." The small losses 
 of the strong columns may, in view of the uniform character 
 of the terrain, be thus explaimHl: that the Saxon musket did 
 not carry as far as the second and third lines. All officers, 
 including company commanders, remained mounted during 
 the whole of the action. 
 
 The attack may well be tailed a model of brigade lead- 
 ing, and General von Herwarth, who had watched it attent- 
 ively, used to speak of it up to his death. General von 
 Falckenstein said to General von Ilillcr at Hanover that 
 (Jeneral von llerwarth had expressed himself to him to the 
 effect that he owed his success to the 14th Division, and I 
 can testify that General von Falckenstein addressed the 
 regiments (IGth and 57th) in the same sense at Hanover 
 when they were transferred from his own to the X. Corps, 
 then in the process of formation. 
 
 The night on the plateau of Problus was very chilly and 
 
 *One of my readers has written me on this point as follows: 
 Colonel von Schoning had been severely, though not mortally, 
 wounded by a rifle bullet in the upper part of the arm. He was to 
 be carried off by four fusiliei-s on their rifles, and gave his consent. 
 But as the French soon afterward made a counter-attack. Colonel 
 von Sch(>ning ordered the men to leave him and retire alone. "I 
 don't want you to be killed on my account." he added. In the attack 
 subsequently made on our side, the Eleventh reached the place where 
 Colonel von Schoning was lying immovable on his back, his face 
 toward the enemy. "Never again," saj's my correspondent, Mr 
 Heinemann, of Altona, "have I had such an opportunity to admire 
 a hero as here. Notwithstanding his sufferings, he called to us: 
 'Children, are we winning?' 'Yes, Colonel.' 'Well, then, let us 
 give cheers for our king'' and we gave three cheers with a will. I 
 have not seen him since." 
 
Military-Historical f^tudies. 99 
 
 rarely have I suffered so much from cold; but I was able to 
 satisfy my hunger. Up to that time my food on July 3d 
 had consisted of a small, hard piece of bread, which I had 
 been carrying in my knapsack since Mtinchengratz. At 
 Bor two musketeers of the Forty-ninth reported to me and I 
 put them in my platoon and kept them until next morning. 
 My wounded servant had meanwhile been taken to Problus, 
 so that I was destitute of the most necessary things, and 
 when night descended, I fell asleep in the midst of the men 
 buzzing about like so many bees and hunting for food. 
 Their pains were in vain, however, as darkness rendered 
 their "expeditions of discovery" difficult, and the men had 
 to content themselves with coffee without anything else. 
 During the first refreshing sleep I was aroused by the two 
 brave Pomeranians; one of them had a steaming pot in 
 his hand, the other raised me up: ''Ensign," said the first, 
 "here is something to eat." I was touched by their good- 
 ness of heart and gratefully accepted the kind offer, which 
 consisted of rice soup with bacon. I have never forgotten 
 these kind Pomeranians, nor has that night been effaced 
 from my memory. The men, closely crowding together for 
 mutual warmth, were sleeping between numerous small 
 cooking fires; others moved between them like shadows; 
 flaring masses of fire rose in the distance; the air was im- 
 pregnated with the well-known resinous odor of burning 
 pine; some shots would fall in the wood, and off and on I 
 would hear the groans of the wounded. I rose and walked 
 some distance northward, but the irregular groups of the 
 men soon caused me to cease my wanderings, and I lay down 
 again. I did not wake up until 0, when all were on their 
 feet. The commanders now restored order and regularity; 
 part of the men went for water and food; others were 
 detailed to bury the dead, which I was to superintend. 
 
100 hiquiriva into the Tavtica of the Future. 
 
 \\hh\[ \0 i\. \\\. \\c hoiXixn to oook wUixi i\\\u\ii'\[\o\\i^ ami pro- 
 vision Nvjiii»»us lijul tnniisluHl; it was luiiihtv lil(h\ About 
 ui>ou I ho oOiotM's sMul doloiiJi lions of nuMi from tho rojjinionts 
 «>f (ho IJth l>i\isit>n nvimK to Tivblns (o burv tho doad ot^l- 
 ooi*s in ih(> mavovard of ih(> villajio. (Mr. It was an impi-os- 
 sivo ooi*onu>nv; all tho hiiihof otVtooi-s \vort» a^sonibltHl 
 around tho jirav»>s. and n»>\t to tluMii \voro tho o«>rps of otlb 
 oors. MinistiM's o\' both d(Mn>n»inati»»ns pr»>nonm't>d briof 
 funoral sonuotis; oaoh of us thott stoppod up to pav tho hist 
 t^arthlv iributo to tlu> di^id. and thoti >vo loft tho vlllajjo. 
 whith now niado tho iinprossion «>f tt>tal tlovastatii>n. On 
 our arrival at tho camp o\\ i\\o platoan wo lu^ard tho jovful 
 HOWS that tho train had i-omo up with bii^ad. and mtMi woro 
 at onoo soin to draw tho rations. l>ut our disappointnnMtt 
 was irroat: tho broad wa.s sti nuWd.v that it \\i\d \o bo buriod 
 at ouot*: rii'<\ poas. oi>lVot\ and salt wtM't* itt insutUoiont i^uan- 
 tttios. V\'tto, howovor. iti suoh situatiiMis frotpnMitlv o]>ons 
 a wido tit^d to morrimont. a.nd joUtvs on tln^ "huniioi" oam 
 paiu'n," as it was ovon thon justly oalUnl, wtM-o not lai'kinu-. 
 Standinji' about in jiii>tips. tht» ovonts of tho battlo woro 
 disiiisstHi; »moi\v tuu^ undorst ood that a viotmn had boon 
 won. but ovtM-v thouuhtfnl i>t^K'or roali/.od tin* total absoitoo 
 of pursuit. I romombiM' laouttMumt l.anooUo sayinu- in a 
 vory dissatistlod way: ">\'hat havt* wo iiot? nothinu but 
 tho battlo t\old." About 'J p. n\.. 1 wont alom^ into tho wood 
 of l\r\r. to s<H> what kind o\' a ivtitMt tho onomy had matl(\ 
 Wltat I saw il(Mit\s tiosoripti<>n: tht> oorpst^s of inon and 
 horsos wort^ litorally pilod in hoai>s wluMovor I lookod. I 
 start od baik; tho sun shom^ ploasai\tly i>n tlu^ othorwiso 
 loYoly valloy of tho Klbo. 1 had hanily ivjoinod tlu^ bat- 
 talion, vvhon wo woro ordoitni to liot roady to ntaroh. Wo 
 inarolttH^ aloni; tho wostorn tnliro of tho W(Mid of l>ri/. and 
 saw tho ontirt> battlo «;rtuind (*f tho ir>th Hivisiini. In tho 
 
M ilitary 1 1 iHlorwal Sludi('H. 101 
 
 (tlcariiif^H Im'Iw<'''Ii K(«'inf«'l(l ;iri<l KU-zirck the (•(>v]m<'H lay ho 
 <l(;iiHO lliaL I caniiol. rcmainlxtv hccAih^ il. woi'hc irj the Franco- 
 I'njHHian War at Mar-H-Ia-Tour; the riflcH hjid all br^en Hluck 
 in tbo ground vvilli (lio bayonet, an tliouj^li Hie vietorH 
 (lenired to hIiovv I he ext<'iil of <h(! enerny'H de'feal, and an the 
 heavy bultH were np, the riflcH hnd a HJanlin^ poHJIion, ko 
 that the cloarin^jH in I Ik- full H<'nHc ;if)j)r'iir('(l liUf hji'^f,- hop- 
 ficldH. I'ruHHianH I Haw lyin^ about Hi'nf^ly; the diHtance 
 betvv(-'en IJieirj and (he Haxonn and llie AnsfrianH of th(; 
 VIII. Corjm aveni^ed loO — 200 pacen. The men were Bing- 
 iiiK on Mm- ii\:tv<\\, l)ul ;i( lliiil Hi^:ht the eoliium became 
 Hih-nl; (ncn I he hij^liei- crMninander K<'e(ned nITecled, for the 
 bn.H.'ilioriH rnjiih' a nliorl Inill, ;is fliou^h to t^ive i'vcry oik; an 
 o[)poil unit y lo observe wli;il loHKen the i-epenled ollenKive 
 of (In? opponent ii/^aiiiHt (he J5(li I>iviHioii had eoHt him. 
 At)out 0:.'>0 J), in. we resiched (he village of I.«ibc}in, prettily 
 Hitunied on (he mountain HJope; the entire valley of tin; Elbe 
 jiH fji.r n,H Koni^^rJil/, Hpre;i<| pict ureHfjiiely before uh in the 
 nivH of the setting snn, but the iinn^er would not let uh 
 think of anything but eatifi^. At that (inn; l^ibcan had big 
 cheri7 orchards, and it wan not lon^ t»efore the men 
 were [)erched in the Hplendid cherry-trees to the topmost 
 bninchen; t)y next iriorning th(r lre(«H were entirely bare, 
 ivarge |)o(a,to heldn were phmj^hed uji, but the potjitoen were 
 not bigK'^*'' than a finger. We did not get brend until we 
 reached Kollin I 
 //. 77tc AUacIc of Ilia lUlh Half- Division (S8Ui Infantry JJri- 
 
 f/nde) on the Jleif/hl.s of Jiruvilh in the Battle of VionviHe 
 
 on the 10th of August, J 870. 
 
 (a) The March to the lialtle- Field.— At ry.'.U) a. m. on 
 the loth of AugUHt, tJie .''8th Infantry Hrig.'i<l(;, KegiinentH 
 N(w. 10 :ind r,7, with LM I-ight and 2d IFr-avy I'.;ittery, 
 
102 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futnir. 
 
 aiul with iho '2d ;unl ',k\ oomnjuiios of pionoers of (ho X. 
 An\iy Torps. siartod from Thiauoourt undor (lOiiornl von 
 Si'hw;u/.ko|>i>iMK Aooordiuji- to (ho Historv of (ho 1st 
 ((iKUil l>r;\>ioon KoiiiiiUMU. bv H. von Kohr. iho bripnh^ 
 had boon piooodoil a( 4::U) a. n\. bv (ho dnaid dragoon Hri- 
 jiado widi (ho horso ba((orv (^lMani(/.). This do(at'hniont 
 arrivod a( S(. llilairo. (ho oonmion dostina(ion of (ho 
 troops. a( 10 a. ni.* (\nin( Hiandonbavg 11.. (ho ooni- 
 niandor. on hoarinji' at'(iUoi\v tiro from (ho oas(. doi'idod, 
 ui(h (ho oononrrtMU'o of lionoral von Sohwar/.koppon. (o 
 nniroh (oward (ho si>nntl of (lio gnns.i Tln^ ls( linard 
 Dragoon Kojiimon( and (ho horso ba((iM-\ wori» aUuu^ avail- 
 ablo for tho pnrposo at tho timo. 
 
 l.iontonant (uMioral von Sohwar/.koppon know boforo 
 tho s(ar( from 'rhianoonr( (ha( a roi'onnoi(orinji" dotaohniont 
 nndor l.ion(onan( t\>lonol von Oaprivi, ohiof of s(alY of tho 
 X. Army thorps, had boon son( on( to asoor(ain (ho whoro- 
 aboiKs of (lu^ lariio bodios of (l\o onomy obsorv^nl on Angnst 
 15th. noar Vionvillo, and ho miglu liavo oonnootod (ho ar(il- 
 lory t\iv with tho nvonnaissanoo. \\c was jKn-sonally with 
 tho 10th Half-Division. I as appoars from tho statonumts of 
 A'on Kohr and of \\\c o7(h l\ogimon( (pajio 771. 
 
 AUhoniih it was an in(onsoly ho( Anu;ns( day. (ho 
 infan(ry marolunl so smardy (hat i( roachod S(. llilairo 
 shordy aftor 11 a. m. A( ^VotM a rost of 1(^ nunn(os was 
 1akoi\. and m> odior hah was mado.^j 
 
 Aooordinji (o n\y oalonladon. tho distanoo from Thian- 
 court to St. llilairo is nt h-nst '2'2 kilomotors: aooordinir (o 
 
 ♦Official Account, page 602. I. The cavalry, according to this 
 statement, made 22 kilometers in 5U hours. 
 
 tText of tho Offldixl Account. 
 
 3:Page 266 of the History of Regiment No. 16. 
 
 §The Official Account. T.. page 594. fixes the hour of dovvxrture 
 of the 19th Half-Pivision fivm Thiaucourt at 7 a. m. The distance 
 
M Uilari/ H isloricul ^ladlcH. 103 
 
 that of thr- l<;ili Uc^'irrM'iit, liO kilornctorH. (Sor- pa^(; 2(i(; of 
 the rogirnon(al hiHJory.j* 
 
 from Thiauftourt to Woi'-l Ih 17 kilomf;torH. As the best Infantry can 
 not keop up a faHtc;r paco than at the rate of 12 mlnuteH per^kilo- 
 meter, the march to W(w"'l required .'{ h/jurs and 34 mlnutcH, including 
 a rcKt of 10 minutcH. The Official A<;count further HtatcH that General 
 von VoiKtH-llhet.z left Wof-l at 10 a. rc to ride to the battle-fieUl. As 
 
 he was in rear of the half-diviHion, the latter must have been pant 
 Woi'l at 10 a. m.; otherwise we should have seen General von Voigls- 
 .Ithetz. That alone is Biiffieient to prove tiiat the 19th Half-lJivision 
 sidilcd from Thidiicoiirl hcforc 7 a. vi. it was not until later that Gen- 
 eral von Sfhwarzkopjjen Icarnrd tiiat General von Vrjigts-Rhetz had 
 ridden toward the sound of the guns. 
 
 ]j(it us compare with this the statements of the 1st Guard 
 Dragoon and of the ItJth and r»7th infantry Ilegiments. On page 
 124 of the history of the former Ijy Von ilohr it is stated: "The 
 brigade (iirandenfjurg fl.) started at 4:30 a. m. and marched through 
 
 St. iJenoit en \Vo("'vre and Woi-I to St. Hilaire. The 5th Squadron 
 of the 2d Guard Diagoons (Von Trotha) formed the advance guard. 
 Just as the brigade (-onimander was about to post outposts at St. 
 Hilaire, the sound of guns was heard from the direction of Metz. 
 As it increased every minute, ('(junt van lirandenburg marched 
 
 toward the Kound of the guns with our regiment, i^lanitz's battery, 
 anil with the 4th Squadron (Von fiindenburg) of the 2d Guard 
 Dragoons, whicii latter was joined by the commander of that regi- 
 ment. Count PMnckenstein, and ncrU a mcntiafio to thai (■(feet to demral 
 ron Srlnrdrzhojiitcn, with the, remark timt Trotha'x Hqiuidron left in 
 the oiilixt.st posUioii vas at the dispoftat of the divinioH." 
 
 It does not sf;cm probable that the cavalry started two and one- 
 half hours before the infantry. On the other hand, the difference 
 between his statement and that of th(; Official Account as to the cir- 
 cumstances attending the departure of General von Brandenburg II. 
 for the Imttle-fleld is by no means trifling (compare page 602 of the 
 Official Accxjunt, I.). 
 
 On page 2(10 of the History of the 16th Regiment we read: 
 "The detachment [the 10th Half-Division, author's note| started 
 
 from Thiaucourt at 6 ><. m. for St. Hilaire, the Fusilier Battalion of 
 the 16th Regiment forming the advance guard, and arrived there 
 about 12 o'clock." 
 
 In the History of the 57th Regiment by Von Schimmelmann, 
 published in 1883, page 77, the hour of departure is stated at 6 a. m., 
 that of the arrival at St. Hilaire as 12 o'clock noon. 
 
 ■^Since August 9fh the infantry of the 19th Division had been 
 marching without packs. At St. Ingbert the packs had been loaded 
 on the cars at the railway station under the supervision of an adju- 
 tant from each regiment; in the case of the 57th Regiment that duty 
 had devolved on me. The men carried the mess-tins strapped to the 
 rolled overcoat, an(' the ammunition in the knapsack was transferred 
 to the haversack. / ccording to the calculation in the preceding foot- 
 note, the 19th Half- Division must have been past Woel by 10 a. m. 
 
104 liKiuirUfS into thv Tactics of the Fiitiiir. 
 
 Tho pivsumixion was thnl (Ihmmiimwy was rinifaiiuii to 
 \'tM"diu\. ill part on [he vo'm\ on whii-li \vi» (hiMi weiv. ami on 
 that aoi'oiint tluMc had boon soino anxiot v ainonu; iho slalYs 
 ilurini; tho niaroh to St. Uihiiiv. Tho maps >voiv fivoly 
 oonsnltoil. a.iul the surprise was jjiwit >vhou >vo roavhed tho 
 ononiv's lino of rotroat without sooinj; a traco of hint. Tho 
 o battalions, tho _ battorios. and 'J pioiuHM- oiunpanios wont 
 into oanip siMithoast of St. Uilairo. tho outposts boins; 
 furnisluHl bv F. — oTth and Trotha's S(\uadron of tho iM 
 Guaitl Dra^roons. Moanwhilo. tho tollinj:- of tho ihurvh- 
 bolls in the snrroundius; oountrv piiH'lainiod tho arrival of 
 tho onomy. Tho view Avas unobstructed as far as the hills 
 of the Mouse, and there was no traoe of a bivt^/.e. .Vs far 
 baok as St. Honoit en >V(.h'>vio others had drawn my atten- 
 tion to uun shots, whieh 1 was unable to hear in spitt^ of my 
 bt^t endeavors, and only here in the eamp at Wool 1 was 
 able to distinjiuish them. 1 thoui^ht the sound eame from 
 our i*ij;lit rear. In that t-aiie we would have been in rear 
 of the enemy, whieh ito one was disposini to believe. It soon 
 turned out to be a faet. 
 
 At St. llilaire tlu^ troops were orderetl to oook. despite 
 our vexiuix situation.* Ouriui; this time 1 was with the 
 rijrht thuik guard with several other otVieers. amonu: them 
 Lieutenaut-Ooloiiel von Koll. The otVuers were listiMiin-; 
 attentively to the sound of the guns, aiul thought that we 
 
 Fivm tluMV to St, lUlairo tho distaiioo is 5 kilometei-^. which can 
 rei\vlily bo oovoroii in U, hovn-s. Thoro is no donbt. thoroforo. that 
 tho SSth Pri^arjuio trorht'il St. Hiloiir tyirlicr than stated in tho Othoial 
 Aoconnt and in tho historios of the "liUh and r«7th Rogimonts. Ao- 
 conling to tho timo of tho I. Battalion of tho "-Tth Kfi^iuuMU it w.is 
 just 11 o'clock. Being aiijntant of that battalion, and it InMng my 
 wook to got tho oniors. on which occasion tho watches wore daily 
 ixnnparod with that of the g^Munal staff oflicer of tho division. Major 
 von SchertT. my st.atoments may safely make some claim to tvlative 
 accuracy. 
 
 ♦Tho Olhcial .\ivonnt savs nothing about that. 
 
MiUtary-Ilutorical studies. 106 
 
 would rcHunic I Ik- riuirch u.i. orico, ThiH "bat fit; fover" ih 
 almoHt invjuiahly tin; n-HuH. of ihit \n\(<-vin\i\\y of the 
 troopH n-^sirdin^ Iho plariH of tho coininandor in (-hief. It 
 waH not HO hen*. Kinoo ihc. morning of tho IfJth, alrnoHt 
 evory ofTlc«T kru-w tin- Htratcgic Hituation approximately and 
 the obj«*(l of our rruircli c/xddly. The eonverHation had 
 tunH'<l on the Kul)jc«| during; fhe march; all wer«* in ex[)ef;- 
 tation of w. g^i-cnf cvcnl ;uid highly Huri>riH<Mj to find Ht. 
 riilairc unoccujjied, altliougli the* Houiid of guriH iuid been 
 heard from th(; right for Hom(; time. 
 
 Tlu' order to cook, received by the troojis nf)t without 
 iniHgivingH, Ih Hignificant in judging (Icncral von Schwarz- 
 kf)i)i>en'H conccj>lion of the si tun lion. It showed a i)ur[>OHe 
 to remain at St. Ilil;iir<* until further orders should be re- 
 ceived; alHO that the ojiinion jtrr-vjiilcd thnt there was am- 
 jile time to cook before; tlje arrival of orders, notwitlistand- 
 ing tliat the sound of guns haxl been audible for some time 
 and was getting stronger. It is certainly cr)rrect to use 
 fVf'vy oj)i)ortunity to cook in fu-der th;it the ti-oojis rn;iy not 
 reach their destirifition in jiri enfeebled stale. I'ut (^leneral 
 von Hchwarzkojipen liad failed to find the enemy where he 
 expected to meet him, and from the right rear he heard 
 continued, severe artillery fire; the enemy must therefore 
 have been engaged atHorneotheryjoint, Unfortunately, we do 
 not know the general's conception of the situation in detail; 
 it HufTices tluit al that time he had no idea of what was going 
 on in his rear, that he hejird the sound of the guns and did 
 nothiny to ascertain its <;ause, negle(;ting fin; first duty of a 
 commander who finds that the premises on which an order 
 is based are wrong. In view of the fact that Count Bran- 
 d(mburg had his susfu'cions Jis enrly as 10 a. m., and acted 
 accordingly and sent word to General von Kchwarzkoppen, 
 
 that the former never thought of cooking, but was imbued 
 8 — 
 
106 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 with the sole idea of marching to the sound of the guns — 
 it might be supposed that General von Schwarzkoppen 
 should have come to the same conclusion, all the more as 
 Count Brandenburg had shown him the right road, as it 
 were. While the fires were burning, some horsemen came 
 galloping from the east, attracting every one's attention. 
 On the right of the Fifty-seventh, where the view to the 
 right was unobstructed, the men felt so certain of our im- 
 mediate departure that they were pouring the boiling soup 
 on the ground before it was ordered, and the alarm signal 
 was not given until an officer arrived on a horse covered 
 with foam. The camp-kettles were now emptied and the 
 troops put in march. It was 12 o'clock noon,* our destina- 
 tion was Chambley. We hardly believed our eyes when 
 we found the place on the map. 
 
 The order of march was as follows: 4th Squadron of the 
 2d Guard Dragoons,! Fusilier Battalion of the 16th Regi- 
 ment,J 2d Light Battery X., I.— 16th, II.— 16th, 2d Heavy 
 Battery X., F. — 57th, I. — 57th, two pioneer companies X. 
 The II. — 57th, with some mounted orderlies from the 4th 
 Squadron of the 2d Guard Dragoons, was left to the north- 
 west of St. Hilaire for the protection of the train. 
 
 At this point we will briefly refer to the opinion pre- 
 vailing at the headquarters of the II. Army regarding the 
 situation on the evening of the 15th. It was believed that 
 
 *The Official Account, page 603, 1., fixes the time of our departure 
 from St. Hilaire at 12:30; the History of the 16th Regiment (page 
 266) at "soon after 12:30 p. m."; the History of the 57th leaves the 
 question open. 
 
 fOne squadron of the regiment had been ordered to report to 
 the commander of the X. Corps, General von Voigts-Rhetz; another 
 had been detached to the brigade division of horse artillery of the 
 X. Corps; the third had gone with Count Brandenburg. 
 
 $At Suzemont F. — 16th turned off to the south to establish com- 
 munication with the remaining portions of the X. Corps by way of 
 Mariaville Ferme. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 107 
 
 the hostile army would do its best to get unmolested across 
 the Meuse, and the anticipation of the enemy at that river 
 with the greater part of the II. Army was made the goal of 
 the operations. Orders to that effect were issued from 
 army headquarters at 7 p. m. on August 15th. But the 
 same order assigned to the smaller portion of the II. Army, 
 consisting of the III. and X. Corps and the 6th and 5th 
 Cavalry Divisions, a different direction of march, which 
 implied a certain tactical task. The parts of the II. Army 
 diverged in two principal directions on the 16th of August, 
 the main part westward, the smaller part northward. The 
 object of the latter was to attack a strong hostile rear 
 guard, which it was thought might possibly be on the Metz 
 — Vionville — St. Hilaire road. Subsequently the right 
 wing of the II. Army was to follow the main body westward 
 according to circumstances. In reality, however, some- 
 thing else happened; the smaller right wing of the II. Army 
 encountered the entire hostile army, and the main body, 
 abandoning its original direction, had to be brought up to 
 the right wing. The interesting events connected there, 
 with and their consequences we shall not discuss here. If 
 any one desires to study them in detail, we refer him to 
 the Militdr Wochenhlatt, Nos. 71-78 of 1891; it should be 
 stated, however, that the destination of the III. Corps was 
 Vionville (Mars-la-Tour), and of the X. Corps, St. Hilaire. 
 A more detailed examination of General von Schwarz- 
 koppen's conception of the situation is here necessary. 
 General von Voigts-Rhetz knew that on the 15th the en- 
 emy was still west of Metz; it had been reported among 
 others by the 9th Dragoons from Nov^ant. and was -the 
 cause of the measures presently to be discussed. Army 
 headquarters, corps headquarters, and division headquar- 
 ters were on the 15th in Pont k Mousson. Here "the en- 
 
I OS Inquiries into thf l\idics of tlit Fututr. 
 
 oinv's plans and owv own." as tluMi assuiU(Ml. wiM't* disonssod 
 l>t>(>vt»tMi tho rrim»> ami CuMUMal von Wnjits l\h(M;'. ; >vhcllu>r 
 (uMicral vou Sil\\vailvi>ppiM» \vas piuv^tMil, 1 do \\o\ Um»w. 
 Tht^ (lisoussioii luul r«>ft>r«MHt> onlv to what Iho Prinro 
 loarmnl or assununl o( tho »>utMii} u\> to tlio arrival of in- 
 struotions from (l(MUM-aI von Moltk«* ^ll):.'U) \^. \\\.). That 
 was sutliti«Mit [o liiroot (uMioral von N'oi^ts Khot/'s attoii- 
 tion nu<n^ to ilu> iiort!: than to tho ir<\<!, sinco W boliov»Hl 
 that.owinji' ti> tho rt^pv>rt(Ml prostMUt* of tl\o FrtMU'h at Ko/.oii- 
 villo ami Mot/, it n»ii:l\t IxH'onn* noi't^ssarv to or»hM- tho 
 X. (\»rps to nun t> to tlu^ lirt^at road sonimvhai farthiM- to 
 {\w oixsi o( St. Hilairo. It is not to bo snppostMl that (umi- 
 oral von NtMjits Khot/. withhold fri>ni (uMu^ral von Schwarz- 
 koi>pon tho opiniiH\ ho ha»l fiMMno«l. and as tlu» latttM- i^iMi- 
 oral, boinii fartlu^si to ilu^ U>ft. woiild probaMx hav«> tho 
 luoivdiftloult task, ho shonld havo ondoavorod from tho tlrst 
 to Av»»/> in rommunicotion ^(U^tworti with lho,<t' troofK'i which had 
 hr'm iu<itiijnt<d that dinvtion by l^onoral von Voijrts-Khot/., «,<? 
 Otnfnil von Schtcankoppcn ircU htftr. Mntiial twchan^c of m« 
 fonuation is ono of tho most in\portant dntit^s in tho oaso of 
 sovoral oobnnns. partii'nlarly wIumi thoy W(M*(^ s«> far sopa- 
 ratotl fron\ t>at'h othor as horo aiid wIumi tho situation itst^lf 
 was s»> shrou(h>d in donbt. I'roni tho b(\uinninu- of tho 
 n\arih (uMUM-al von Sohwar/Uopi^tMi shonld havo iMnploytni 
 for that pnrpost^ part of tho strong- oavalrv nndtM- his I'om- 
 inanii. and a half sqnadri>n wouM havo sntVu'tHl. l>nt that 
 renj <'>\<f'«/»<»/ was noj^lootod, witli tho rosnlt that ono of tho 
 main oolninns was ignorant of tho dt^injrs of tho othors. 
 Ami loast of all slionld that pnvantion havo boon noj;lootod 
 aft or tlu> liontM'al hford the fsound of ^uns from the fast! 
 
 iuMUM-al von Voiiits Khot/. had boon diroottnl to ivaohSt. 
 llilairo Mai/.oray with tho \. Corps, "brinsiinjr np as noar 
 as possibh^ tho portioiis of tho i-orps still at Voui ^ Mons 
 
M Hilary- 1 lidorical Htudien. 109 
 
 HOfi ;irj<] in Ih*- v;ill<-y ()f \\\c M«h<'II<*." fri af^cfjrnpliHhing 
 hiH laHk ;iri(l in vif'vv of Ifir- *\\\Scrcu((' of oi>iriion \n-iwo<tn 
 hiinH(;lf and (hf rririf^c, (iouoral von Voij^tH Ithotz drow 
 very clevr-rlv orji of I lie dil(frnrna. H** w;nt only the 10th 
 Ilalf-DiviHion ;ind duiud l)r;it^'oon Hri^ude to Ht. Ililaire. 
 making,' ;il I Ik* huuh' firrif a rr-'onnaiHHanf;f in force a(;ainst 
 flie froo|»H of)H< rvt'<l Jif Itz-zonv illf on the fvfnin^ of the 
 inth (I., n41, (>ni<i;il Arconntj. Thr- Hth r'avalry DiviHion 
 waH to make the reconnaiHHanee, Not eontent with that, he 
 diHpatchcd hiw chief of HlafT, Lifutcnant Colonel von Cap- 
 rivi, with 2 hoiHe hattcrieH and a H(iu;idron of the 2d Guard 
 Draj^ooriH fioni 'riiijiiicourt to Xonville. At Thianeonrt 
 waH the JMhI Itc^'irnenf and 1.— 7Sth, at Xovr'-jint I\. and 
 F.— 7S(li, iHt Lit^hl liattery, Int and '.U] HrjUfidronH of the 9th 
 Dra^ooiiH. I'.ofli of theHe detaohrnentH were to aHHenible 
 at (>harnl)ley irj Hijj»|»oif of llie reconnaiHHanee; the 20th 
 I)iviHir)n wJix to follow to Tliijiiicourt. 
 
 Xonville jirid riiMrnbley are HJtuated 5 kilonieterH to the 
 HouthweHt ;uid houIIi reHpectively of MarH-la-Tour, Thian- 
 (;ourt iH fiboiit IS kilornetepH from Marw la Tour, and Bt. 
 Ililaire iH 15 kilomr-terH from Mars laTonr; the T'liambley— 
 Xonville — Snzerrifint road iH ajiproximately parallel to the 
 St. I'erioil S(. llihiire roJid, and the dintanee between 
 them av<'r;ij^r'H iiboiit 15 kilonieterH. In examininj^ the de«- 
 tination of the III. rorj)H, a point half way between Vion- 
 ville and MarH-la-Tonr, the conception and x^lan of General 
 von Voi^tH Khetz become (piite plain from hiH diHpOHitions. 
 Tie meant to comply with the T'rince'H order and at the HJime 
 time tjik*' fiH much ground io the northwent ;ih jiOHnible, ho 
 ;iH to be .'ible, in ciiw of necennity, to bring three-quarters 
 of the X. GorpH to the Hupport of the TTI. OorpH by the 
 HhortcHt route. In view of the above diHtanccH, the diKymRl- 
 tionfi certainly permitted of thin for three-quarterH of the 
 
110 Inqitiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 corps on llie 10th, tliouj-b it is doubtful whether the 19tb 
 Half-Division, etc., Avonld have been able to arrive in 
 time after it once reached St. Hilaire. Since General vou 
 Schwarzkoppen knew of these ai'rangements before the 
 march from Thiaucourt, it was incumbent upon him to 
 adhere to this plan. That could be done only by maintain- 
 ing communication with the Chambley — Xonville — Su7,e- 
 mont road by cavalry. It may be a matter of dispiitl^ 
 whether that was the duty of General von ^\1ili•ts-Ehetz or 
 of General von Schwarzkoppen. According to my opinion, 
 it was an obvious duty for the latter, since he commanded 
 the column, while General von Yoigts-Rhetz merely ac- 
 companied it: and the general was very jealous of his 
 prerogatives. 
 
 It having been neglected to place cavalry between the 
 two roads on which the X. Corps marched, it was the more 
 necessary to take the proper steps at the first sign of a con- 
 flict in the east, as no enemy was in sight at St. Hilaire and 
 vicinity. As many organs of communication as possible should 
 have been set in o})eration before 10 a. m.; first, toward 
 (Chambley: second, toward Xonville; and third, even toward 
 Thiaucourt. They would have learned how things were 
 looked at there and what was being done, and would have 
 informed General von Schwarzkoppen. The situation at 
 St. Hilaire being known, several orderly officers, officers' 
 patrols, should have been dispatched in these directions, 
 while the general staff officer of the lOtli Division should 
 have been sent in the direction of Xonville, where every 
 endeavor should have been made to discover the most 
 important spot, the trail of Lieutenant-Colonel von Capri vi. 
 
 The soundness of my propositions is proven by the Offi- 
 cial Account (I., 505). 1. rrompted by the artillery fire 
 resounding from the north. General vou Kraatz, before 
 
Military-Historical Studies. HI 
 
 reaching Thiaucourt with the 20th Division at 11:30 a. m., 
 had dispatched officers' patrols northward. The statement 
 points out what General von Schwarzkoppen should have 
 done in the same direction. General von Kraatz then 
 marched his division toward the sound of the guns. So 
 much as regards reconnaissance. 2. The detachment of the 
 Seventy-eighth, etc., above referred to, had been at Nov<5ant, 
 whence it was to join the 91st Regiment (minus 1st and 2d 
 Companies), I.— T.^th, 1st Heavy Battery and 2 sciuadrons of 
 the 9th Dragoons at Chambley. The leader of the latter 
 employed half a squadron to establish communication with 
 the detachment at Novdant; this is an illustration of the 
 communication between the marching columns (Official Ae> 
 count, I., 5G9). 3. The 20th Division was at Thiaucourt at 
 11:30 a. m. (Official Account, I., 595); Lehmann's detachment 
 (of the 91st, etc.) placed itself at the disposal of the III. 
 Corps as early as 11:45 a. m. (Official Account, I., 569), like 
 wise on account of the artillery fire heard at Chambley; the 
 distance thence to Vionville being G^ kilometers, the rear 
 of Lehmann's detachment was probably still at Chambley 
 at 10 a. m. Had patrols, from the first, been sent out toward 
 Chambley (15 kilometers) to maintain communication, 
 they would have learned that that detachment was con- 
 tinuing its march to the northeast, and General von 
 Schwarzkoppen could have known by 10:30 a. m., that the 
 detachment at Chambley was also marching toward the 
 sound of the guns. Maintenance of communication would 
 have evolved a system of reports from the decisive direc- 
 tion! The order to march to Chambley did not reach the 
 Nov^ant detachment until it had marched off to follow the 
 5th Division; when, at Gorze, the leader of the detachment 
 heard continued artillery fire, he also marched toward the 
 battle-field (I., 555). We see thus the leaders along the 
 
119 Inqvirifs into the Tadics of fhti Futurt, 
 
 wholo lino tioviato from (heir oixiors for i\\c dixy on thrir own 
 rfS^HUiaibiliifi iuui in <*«>M>vt/N«'M(Y of fh^ir ;>r(*ri(M<.< m(>nsurcit, 
 spontoneousifi /dlvH.' I. i\MiMt HrainlonlMirii m;\r»ht^s from 
 St. llilnirt^ at l(^ a. tu. on at roiu\t of \\\o artilloiv llrt\ >vhtM\ 
 tho IIM1\ Half l>ivisii>n was snll a iriH>d ho\u's inartli in roar 
 (l>orhaps \o tho south of WooU: *J. t\>U>iu>l l.t>huiann 
 marolu^ about 10 o'olook from ("hambU^v f»>r tho samo 
 rtnison: .'^. ("olont^l voa l.vnkor maroht^s ovtMi lu>fon^ that 
 hour fro»»\ Nov»\M\t; i. r>onoral you Kraatr. maivluvs froui 
 Thiaut-ourt at U :.'U^ a. u».: o. l.itMitonant t\>hu»ol von i'ap- 
 rivi luaroht^s from XinwiUt^ ttoutTal vi>u Sohwarr.koppou 
 >vas thooulv ou»^ whodivl not maroh. althi>ujrh ho Utumv that 
 tho oiitMuv was not at St. Uihiirt^ a.uil as tho liMh llalf- 
 Pivisiot» was mortH>vor farthost otT tho main dirootii>n. \W 
 uooossity 10 bo "i) f>ort(^f" was tht» uu>st prossiuir it\ tho oaso 
 of tho half division. It was Oonoral von Sohwar/.koppou's 
 dntv to n\ako tho utH-ossarv arrauiromtMUs whirh wtM'o v«»ry 
 simpU* imitHHi. V'vtMi hail somo of tho moasnros boon too 
 lato at\d had thov faiUn! to produoo tho dosirini otTtvt. still 
 thoy would havo st^t him richt as a loailor. 
 
 Tho distanot^ luMwoon Mars la Tour and St. llilairo is 
 lo kilomotors; had tht^ oth Oavalry Pivisiou aoooniplishod 
 its task, it mijiht havo iuformtni litMioral von \oii:ti« Hhotr. 
 (and Sohwarr.koppoiO on tho ri^ail to St. llilairo not \-Mov 
 than \0 a. m. V\^r tho Trinoo at Tout ;^ Moussou roooivtnl 
 tho tirst rt^port from Niouvillo from lltM\tM*al voii .Mvous 
 lobon at 10;.*>0 a. m.. whiv-h is alumt (» kiUunott^rs miM'o than 
 tho distanoo thonoo to tho Thiauoourt^-8t. Hilain^ roail. 
 Tho omission rtMjdortnl tho situation of tho l!>th Half- 
 l>ivisioi\ dit^ioult: it is woll known, howovor. how roadily 
 tho rtMnliM-iuir of tln^ most important roports is fors^iMton 
 in tho boat of battlo. Front all thoso ivasons 1 boliovo that 
 tho onlor to oook. oto.. was injiulioious, and lonsidor niysolf 
 
Military II iKtoricM HluduM. 118 
 
 homr; out by lfi<* furi Wr.ii t\u' 20fli [>iviHion, which wuh in 
 rear arid whi'fi al Thiaiioourt wan farJh«r from fJi<r batJh;- 
 i'n-\i\ (li;ifi l)i<- IfltJi waM at Hf. Hilair^', <Jif) not f-ook, but. 
 iri;irrh<-(l ;i,n«l H«fil r<-[)0(lH; ;iii«J in lii'- hilU-r vcH\ift\ tii'- f;ir- 
 «(itnHj»cr(ion of i(H i^cix-nil ;ifnl iJi*' coriN-rifH of tiiH vc\><>vtH 
 {() the army <:ttuitniu\t\<v rruiv Ix- onHid'-rfrJ um <-x«:fu\>\iU'y* 
 Th<* jfffKTal alMO inforKicl Hi<- lf)ili hiviMJon MpontarK-oiiMly 
 of hiH »fi;uf fi (o Mk- h;illl«- fi<hl. VV'jiH Ih^rr* any rrtoiprocfil 
 a<'(ion on (h«- i);ir( of i\n' lOlfi iJivinion toward th*- 20lh? 
 And W5IH not tin- fonuov witfi itH Htronpj cavalry in a f;<'rtain 
 W?nH'- Um- ^.'iiid'- of Wn- hitl<-r? 
 
 The (J<'Hf inalion of Hie FII. CorpH waH MarH laTonr — 
 Vionvilh', t)ijf the FrctK\i rnij^iit very wr-II hav*- paHK^-d bf?- 
 yorid MjjrH hi Toi/r by (lu* firrK- tti*- III, Cor[)H rr-ach'-d the 
 tiijrhro;id. 'I'h'- ;irlion rnii.'hl (liiiH \niv<- \)<->-u f;ikinj.' ]A',u-m 
 •,\.\ ;i |»oint l«-HH ()i;in 15 kilonK-lcrH Ji w;iy, for if iH wr-ll known 
 that Hoijn(J may \}C vftry d(*'0[»f ivr- jH-r-orrJirif.' fo w«;ilh«r and 
 direction of wind. 
 
 (h) Ucjiloymcnt. — \'u to liiH arrival !if Kijzr*niont, tiie 
 diviHionjil crjrrirriandcr int<'nd<'d \<} takr- liic ffK-my in fbink 
 t»y w;iy of Vilh- Hur Vrrjn; t)iif, on Jirrivint^ fhoro, that flir<-f- 
 tiori H<''-ni<-d loo riM)(y. I-'roni our liorHfH wr* could only HOff 
 lon{< firing lincH Jind dcuHc cloudH of rJUKi, but tho Hovority of 
 th(; tiro, ;i.nd fli<' woundr-d of \\\<- III. CorfiH corninf^ toward 
 the a[)i»roa(liinj^ luilf (liviHif>n, witli no ycry favorablo re- 
 I)or(H of I Ik- h(;)I<* of I Ik- h;iltl«', ni;iy hfivc [>roini»l«d liiiri to 
 Hcok in lh<' firHf iil;i«-o to drsiw fi<-;ir*'r \o t|i<- r<'ni;iin<l'-f of the 
 X. TorjiH, whi<-h wjih r|iii(«' ri;;lil. 
 
 Arrionf^ the wounded I recot^ni/ed f jeij(cn;iril I)reiHinj^, 
 adjutant of the n2<j (?) Rejiiirir-nl ; horne jirid rider were cov- 
 ered with (>erH[)ir-;i lion ;i.nd dnHt .;in<l tlx- rider H'-<-r(i<-d loh;ive 
 
 ••'Kri';' ;";;';hlchf,ll(;ho Klriz«:lw;hrlfU5D," No. 1), pri^': fi'il. 
 
I 14 Inquiries into the 'l\ic(ics of the Future. 
 
 had a fall; ho was also slu>t throuuh tho h\u; ami his foat- 
 uri'swtM'i^ almost bovontl fiH'i\iiiution. As wo hadboon cathMs 
 toj;t>thor. I rodo up to him and shook hands, makinjj a tow 
 romarUs. hut ho lodo listlossly on. Ou askinj; his sorvant 
 about tho stato oi tlu^ battU\ ho said, "HadI" Soon aftor- 
 ward 1 mot auothor ofliotM- of tho llOth ['!) Hoiiimont. who 
 was shi>t tlu'ouiih tho ohost. Hofoiv I had timo to spoak, ho 
 said: "\\\^11. 1 luipo viui will bt^ moi'o lucky than wo havo 
 btHMi. You will bo suiprisod. This is no oat-killinji. as 
 iu '()(»." That did not sound voiy onoourajiinii. but thoiv 
 was a touoh of soldiorly humor in his words. Thoso and 
 others, all had takoa tho road to St. Hilairo. Uoinji struck 
 by that faot. 1 oallod tho attoujion of my oon\n\andor to it. 
 and was ordorod by him to dolloot tho stroam, as ho oallod 
 it. of tho woundod ti>ward tho south. Most of tho lattor did 
 not ijuito undoistaml my loason. but tho sorvaait of Liou- 
 tonant Oroisiui::. a ouuuinu: liraudonbnrgor, at oneo turnod 
 his mastor's horso iu that dirootion and tho othors foUowod. 
 so that 1 was ablo to rosumo my ]^laoo in a fow miuutos. 
 Fato willod it that l.ioutonant Oroisinu; should bo my noigh- 
 bor that nijxht. In tho tomporary hospital our trousors 
 woto probably oxohaiiijtxl by mistako: at any rato. on tho 
 noxt day I had ridinir trousors with a shot-holo through 
 tho oalf. whilo my own woro missinj::. and 1 was trans- 
 ]>ortod to tho roar in Droisinii's trousors. 
 
 Tln^ Othoial Aooount statics, on pajro t>04, that, aftor dt^ 
 ployiuj; for battlo at Sii/.omont. tho 4 battalions had ro- 
 sumod thoir advamo ou Tronvillo. aiul tixos tho hour of 
 doploynumt at 4 p. m.; both statements are in error. 
 
 The brijrade deploytni but onoe for battle, and that was 
 not at Suzomont. but about 1000 meters southwest of Mars- 
 la-Tour on tho U^ft batik of tho doopout branoh of tho Yron. 
 on whose stooy> slope a surgeon of I. — 57th, Pr. .loston, fell 
 
Military- J J islorical Studies. 
 
 115 
 
 Willi liiH lioi'Hc.* As fiirdici- Hiipport, for my Hlatement 1 
 liuve a iiM'dicinc cjirl, u siirj^coii, and homk* hoHjiital aHHiHt- 
 antw; tlio cart had lont a vvliccl; the Hurgcoii told iiic in an- 
 Hwor to my iiKjuiry how h(! Imd come there, that he had bare- 
 ly escaped «ome chanseurH, who had attacked hiH drcHsing- 
 HtJifion. Sii(;li iiKiidoiilH fiirninh good markw for the 
 iiiciiiory. 
 
 The brigade was drawn up facing Tronville,t and, more- 
 over, it waH not at Suzemont at 4 p. rn. The dintance from 
 St. Hilaire to Marn-ia-Tonr in 15 k ilometerH; we marched 
 
 ♦During the fall the horse slipped off the bridle, the reins being 
 torn. In his embarrassment, the doctor asked me what to do. I told 
 him to let his horse stay with the broken-down medicine cart men- 
 tioned below, which he did. 
 
 fSketch of the deployment of the 19th Half-Division, 1000 meters 
 southwest of Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 RoKimont No. Ti?. 
 I. Hnttiilion. Fn-i. Hatt/dion. 
 
 Piori. X. 
 
 2d Hoavy Unttory. 2<1 Li«ht Battery. 
 
 Rffffiinoiit No. 10. 
 II. ISiittalion. I. Hattalioti. 
 
 ^V 
 
 To Maiiaville Fermo, where 
 F. —Kith was posted 
 
 (Compare Hketcli pa^e 604, Vol. I., 
 of tiio Official Account.) 
 
116 Tnq^uirics into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 without n n///,//c |>;his«\ aiul must liave ilrawu up southwost 
 of Mars la Tour not lator than o :.'>() p. ni.* 
 
 From Su/.omont, (uMiorals von St'hwar/.kopptMi ami von 
 ^Vt^loll had riddon forward to inform thiMustMvos of tho 
 situation anti o\' tho terrain. Dotinito information of tho 
 lattor could havo btHMi obtaimnl. as (uMUM-al (\>unt HrandtMi- 
 burji" 11. had Ihhmi on tho litliio from Hrnvillo to Villo sur 
 Yron and i'h^s(> to tlu> onomv siui't^ noon with 1. an*l lator. 
 with 5 squadrons and a hattorv. Whon tho onemy's IV. 
 Corps bojian to doploy on tho loft of our 111. Corps (from 
 St. Marool to (^royt^ro FtM'mo). (^ount l>i-andonburjr was 
 obliiit'd to withdraw \o Mars la-Tour, whoro ho arrivod at 
 ."i p. m. It is thus I'ortain that tho H'. C\>rps arrired on the 
 
 *Tho Rosimental History of tho KUh Rofrimont states, on page 
 2lU\ as follows: ".\t o:;>0 tlio brigado drew up iitwr Snzomont on a 
 meadow soutli of the villaso. and traversed hy a bra-ueh of the Yixin 
 brook." That a^rret^ with my nott^. only Mars-la-Tonr should be 
 substituted for Suzemout. as we formed nearer to the former than to 
 the latter. 
 
 The Regimental Hist.or>- of the 57th. page 75. approximatt^ my 
 statements more closely, in that it tlxes the hour of our formatiou at 
 3:45 aud locates the place betwivn Maa-s-la-Tour and Suzemont, 
 south of the sivat road; on the other hand, ita statement that the 
 liUh Regiment was in first line is incorrtvt, as the 57th Regiment, 
 which had been marching in ivar of the UUh, was. much to our sur- 
 prise, moved to the front through the ranks of the KUh. probably 
 bet^-ause it was the junior regiment, which the tlieu custom assigned 
 to the first line. 
 
 The ernM- of tJie OfhciaJ Account at this point is thus explaine<l 
 on page 70 of the History of the 57th Regiment, -'thaf in the piriutni- 
 tion of the Offirial Arcointt onli/ those offirial tr[H)rts were araihihlc which 
 tear irrittcn imniatinttl!/ after the btittle, aimm<) whirh that of the .uth 
 RetjinieiU inis not sii/tieientlii e.rha list ire." I want to state in this con- 
 ntvtion that the report written immediately after the battle com- 
 prist\> but about 10 lines, and contains next to nothing; that the 
 "researches of the author" of that regimental history were probablv 
 limited to the "Two Brig-adt^s, " the only available source at the time; 
 aaul that the description of the Othcial .\ccouut was prepared bv the 
 historical section of the general staff, based on the preliminarv 
 study of an othcer, then a major of the general staff. To be sure, 
 the report of the 57th Regiment was very incomplete, but instead 
 of simply stating these facts, which were probably known not to me 
 alone, ajid which exonerate the description in the Official .\ccount. 
 the author attempts to whitewash the general staff— at the expense 
 of the innocent regiment, without accomplishing his other object' 
 
Military-Historical Studies. ] ] 7 
 
 line of battle at and after 2 p. m. Tlu* j^oneral, therefore, was 
 the best autliority on the terrain and on the enemy's forces, 
 and innst have made reports about them. The l.'Uh Dra- 
 goons must likewise liave made reports. Whetiicr they 
 were sufTieient is an o[)en (jueslion, but no reports of that 
 kind reached Oencral von Sfliwar/koi)j)fn. 
 
 After 2 p. m. the (ierman line of battle, which uf) to 
 that time had extended to the northern edge of the Tron- 
 ville copse, oblicjuely across the (Iravelottfi — Mars-la-Tour 
 — Verdun rr)ad, luid been pushed back to tliat road. IJy 
 2 p. m. (irenier's division liad already occupied Height 840,* 
 and ]>y 2MU p. m. the northern edge of the Tronville copse ;t 
 at 4 o'clock j)ortions of Cissey's division j)rolonged the line 
 in the direction of (trcyf'rc Ferme. Hastening to the front, 
 the ntli Chasseur t)attalion of (Jrenier's division o(;cupied 
 the wood lo the norlh of .Mars la-Tour on Ihe angle between 
 the two creeks atiout 2:.'»0 p. m., and was subserjuently 
 join(;d by the !J8th Regiment. Altliough the French cav- 
 alry ymsted at Ville sur Yron was not very active, it had 
 n<'vertheless noted the approach of hostile forces in rear of 
 its position f'>S(h ]'>r'iga(h'), and iiad informed (leneral 
 i^admirault, who tiien oidered the at>ove movement and 
 hastened to occupy the strong natural 7>o8ition north of 
 Mars-la-Tour.J 
 
 ♦All references to the terrain are based on the maps of the 
 Official Account. 
 
 tThe French never had poKsession of the entire copse of Tron- 
 ville, but. only of its northern portion, and the danger of our being 
 assailed from there was small, as the copse was impassable, or, at 
 any rate, difficult to cross, on af;fxjunt of the dense underbrush. 
 It seems that (leneral Crenier purposely avoided the copse on that 
 account. This will alH<f> appear from the subsfKjuent description, 
 inasmuch as one of his brigades tcyok the diref;tion of Mars-la-Tour 
 from the northern edge of the copse, while the 20th Divifiion only 
 encountered small detachments and dispersed men in the brush. 
 
 JMarshal MacMahon had also urged the acceleration of the 
 march. 
 
118 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 lleiiiht S4(> -was the si ratejric jitunt of tlio battle-field on 
 the left, north of the VionvilU> — Mars-la Torn* road. It 
 toninianded the eonntrv in all directions (1 have oonvineed 
 myself of this subset|uently). and it lies exactly on 
 the line Flavijjny — \'ionvilK^ — l>ois de Ti-onvilU^ — Uruville. 
 Thence the French tired on Mars-la-Tcur and had the en- 
 tire battle-field of the :v^th l^riijade nnder fire. Flaviug 
 failed to anticipate the enemy on lleiuht S4(>. \ve shonld 
 never have thonjrht of assaultinjj it. as failure was certain. 
 
 The case of an isolated weak brigade, far out on tTie 
 enemy's fiank. approachinir the battlefield on his line of 
 retreat, is so strange that it could not but fill the enemy 
 with api>rehension. For the latter, noting the movement 
 from lleiiiht 84(5, had naturally to assume that further 
 forces would come from the same direction and that so 
 far the advanced troops alone were in sight. Placing our- 
 selves in the enemy's situation, we would ivach that con- 
 clusion solely because any other action on our part would 
 have seemed unintelligibU'. Without further infornunion, 
 the enemy was not at liberty to assume that a single bri- 
 gade alone was advancing from that direction. It is neces- 
 sary to point this out: otherwise the suitden {-heeJc of Lad- 
 mirouWs counter-uttncl- in the battle at the moment when he 
 was victorious and when he held the fate of the French 
 army in his hands is unintelligible. In addition, the cap- 
 ture of Prussian Guard Dragoons tended to strengthen his 
 belief that the Prussian (luard had arrived. (Compare the 
 statements of Ba/.aine and vt>n Kohr.^ 
 
 We cannot close with these remarks. The interesting 
 situation calls for an investigation as to what might have 
 been if General von Sclnvar/.koppen had more seriously con- 
 sidered the circumstances. Shortly after 11 a. m.* his de- 
 
 *A11 data as to time are based on notes made by himself on 
 that day by order of Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll. When I wi\s 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 119 
 
 tachment Btood at Kt. Ililairo roady to march; he could have 
 marched. Was it permissible to march? Y(tn, without a 
 doiibl, j)r'r)vid('d he n'poitcd his a<;tioii at once! (leneral von 
 Schwarzkoi)j>eii had orders to reach St. Hilaire; he ap- 
 proved of the departure of General Count Brandenburg and 
 remained in rear himHcIf at a moment when the general 
 K(rat('gic KJl nation had Ivoi KlripjM'd by the kindling, battle 
 of the obHcurity heretofore euBhrouding it. If he merely 
 decided to divide IiIk forcew, Hhould he not have ordered: 
 "I'jirt of the cavalry remains here," and should he not have 
 led the infantry and artilh-ry without delay toward the 
 sound of the guns? Had there been any demand for the 
 cavaby hiter, it could have reached Mars-la-Tour by 
 2 p. m. We are therefore justified in saying that not only 
 the situation, but also the characteristics of the arms were 
 misunderstood, inasmuch as the cavalry was given an in- 
 fantry task and vice versa. 
 
 Had (Jieneral von Kchwarzkoppen started at 10 a. m. to 
 march from Woel to Mars-laTour on learning that the 
 vicinity of St. Hilaire was free of the enemy, the half- 
 division would assuredly have been able to reach the battle- 
 fiehl by 1 p. m,, and in that case the seizure of Height 840 
 would probably have been considered. 
 
 (c) The Ballle-Field.— At :\:P>0 p. m. the half-division 
 had reached the previously stated point to the southwest of 
 Mars-la-Tour. Our previous description has already given 
 some data on the conformation of the battle-field. In refer- 
 ring tlu* reader to <lie maps of the Official Account I wish to 
 state that Mars-la-Tour is commanded from the north and 
 
 wounded, I dropped the note-book. It bore my name, contained a 
 change of ribbon for my decorations and other marks serving to 
 Identify the owner. On policing the battle-field the note-book was 
 found near the body of Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll and sent to 
 me at the hospital. 
 
120 Inquinea into //(c Tnclics of (he Ftihnr. 
 
 wcM. It w:is (litMi !i inisiMiibh' villap;(> and ocrupic*! h\ :\ few 
 rlu»ss(Mirs A »lit>v!il, who wit lulirw ou our aitproach. Tin* (lis 
 taiu'o from [\\c 'Vvou\'\\\v copsi* to tlio Mais la Tour ,laniy 
 voixd is L'oDt) uu'liMs; t l\(Mlislauc(> fi'iMu ll«M,ulit SU» («n\vt'^ro 
 1'\muu> I»> tho Mars la Tour N'ionvillo road is tho sanu\ 
 A ravine start ini: on tlu> oast of Mars-la 'l\)ur oncirt-U^s 
 tho villa^o on tlio oast and north; opposili* tho >vost- 
 orn oxtrtMuit.v of llu^ villair*" it turns sharpl.v to i\\o tiorth, 
 an»l hiloi- on boais (lu> nan\t> of Vr(»n. About ('>()(• nuMors 
 si>nth *)f (irt\v^ro I'Nmmuo it is jointMl bv anolhor ravino com- 
 iu}; from (ho oast from th«> Uois {\o Triuivillo. which oncir- 
 clos that oo|>S(M>n tho (>ast and tho north and on roachiuii" tho 
 nortluM'n point of tlu> copst^ takos a wostoi-lv oourso. Its 
 iivtM-aj;o tlistam-o from tho b'rtMuh position (lloiuht v'^U* — 
 (<ro,V('^r(» l"\'rn\(>1 is ab(>ut (lot) !iu>t(Ms. At tlu» Uois do 
 Tr«>nvill(> llu^ sidos, i\oi sto(>p at first, boconu' prot-ipitons, 
 and n\idwav b(>two<Mi thtM'opso and (iroN^ro l'\Mnn> thov aro 
 abt>nt \'2 motiMs in luM^lit. tho bottom itsolf btMuj; about 
 ('»() mot(M-s witl<\ Tho oonlli;uration of tho tlrst of thoso 
 ravin(>s. tho owe rnnniuix to tht> north, was similar; both 
 woro iUy and liard on \\\c da.v of tlu> batth\ thi» bottt>m of 
 tho formor sonu^what w idtM*. howi^vor. Tln> hii;host pi»iut of 
 Uw l'""romh position was lloiiiht SUJ, which falls awav io tho 
 w»>st to Contour T'Jt). About half wa.v b(>tw(>on thoso points, 
 and oblitpiolv to tluMr (•onnoctinj', lint\ a r«>ad ran fr(>m l>rn 
 villo to Mars la Tour, which was jointMl farther oast b_v a 
 sot'ond also oblitiui* n>ad from ih(> same villa_m\ Holh l(>d 
 obliquolv across iho ravint^ in front of tho FrtMich position. 
 Tlio lattor >u>t onlv I'ommandtHl tin* battlotU>ld in this wlnjx. 
 but had in its front a considorablo obstach\whicli t'onld not 
 bo approailuHl ntith'v conr oxct^pt from tho Tronvilh* t'opso 
 and from tln^ ravim* which runs from st>uth to nortli. 
 Othorwiso tho quadranjjlo. w hoso sid(> had a lonjith of L'otH) 
 
MiUlary-f/iHlorical HlwUm. 121 
 
 rn<'l<T'H, ofr<T<<J litll'- <ov<f. 'V\\i- Hrjrfjior; liaH 5i j;<'fi<Tul in- 
 
 rliiiJilion lo (fi<- Hoiilh ;ih f;ir .'ih \\\c Vionvilh; — MufM-la- 
 
 Toiir ro;j<l, jjjkI IIk-ii il f^^j^ijjH <o rJHr* nlif^hfly towjird Ihf; 
 
 Moulli, Our hf-Hl. )i;if rjf i\]i]innu\\ wuh llif; ruvjru; vvhif;fi ex- 
 
 ffn(I<-<I norHivvMrd, buf ru'coifti'i'/.tu^ i(H irni>orf;inr;r;, <^Jf?noral 
 
 I,;i<lmir;ii)ll Ii;mI < Ioh«'<I i( hy fho 5fli ChaMHfMjr iiattalion h(;- 
 
 forc (lio ;j.rriv;il of flic .",><( Ii Uri^jidf. In flir? aiiiiU' vvIkto 
 
 Ihc I wo r;i viticH join vvjik ;i Hiruill <-<)\ih<', vvliifh w:iH hf-lf) by 
 
 tlijil rlijjHH'-iir b;il t;ilioJi ; li<'fi<<' ;i, (urnin;^ '>f lb«- l-'p'-noh 
 
 pOMJIir)ri fforn IhiH ot li<'r'wiH<M'X<;<'ll<*nt Win- of iii»]n<ni(;]i waH 
 
 irni>njr(i';ibl<' ufifil i\\<- (■<t]>H<- Hhoiild ]><■ fjikcn. ]''rofri tho 
 
 (wcHlfffij roii<J from I'mvillo lo Mnrn Iji Tour, Jif ;i f>oifit 
 
 ;iboiil HO M)() rrH'IciH Houlh (»!' Iho rjiviti'- runiiifi}.' <-uhI ;iru] 
 
 wohI, au <-iti\)UtiUitict\i and fir-dj^f cxb-ndf-d r-aHtward for 
 
 ahoul ino ifirflcfH; IhiH bnrik of r;ar(,h waH of threat irrifiort- 
 
 aiMc in (lir* HubHcqufTit (^votiIh. I rnenliori il on that ac- 
 
 rounl ; i(, ftior<-ovcr, foriti<(l lli<- only cov(;r avail.'iblf in lliat 
 
 wliol*' H<*flion nordi of T'onlour 780. Not only of)ulrl jhiH 
 
 bsiHIr- j^round jiol bo lurnod ;jnrJ wjih dovoid of covi-v, but 
 
 olli*'f obHtncb'H vv<T*' jiIho HubH^fjU'-nl ly cnrounffffd, which 
 
 tli(? OfTi^ijil A<<oiinl fjiiJH fo rnonlion.* Thr- ravino oncir- 
 
 c.Wuif Mar-H la Tour cotiHiHlod of Hulxlividod rnoadowH, which 
 
 woro fi-nrtod in wifh wiro and (-xb'ndr'd lo <''onfr)ur 780 — i. e., 
 
 from III*' MarH-Ia-ToiJi' — Vionvilh- ro;id (o fli<- «orilour; fhoy 
 
 <ov<rod a Hi);i.fo of oOO rno(<iH. I'orlioriH of thiH ground 
 
 could not ]><' fovf-rod by Iho onorny'H infantry lirff, Htill tho 
 
 cullin}^ of IIk- i'i-tii-('H cauH<'d a Iohh of time and chocked the 
 
 moviricnl jiiid brf)ii^li( on (li<- 571 h K<-f^imont HoriouH \ohwh 
 
 from arlill"ry, milrnilhuHf, ;ind infantry i\v(t. 
 
 ThoHo (h-hiilH of I ho ;^round were nof Hhown on fho ^cn- 
 
 enil Hhifl ni;i|i and wore unknown (o fho troopH; moroover, 
 
 •M<!rit.)ori of f.h<;m Ih only marlo In f/>nnf;r;t.lon with thr; charge; of 
 the Int fliianl lJraKf>onH; y«jt. It woh chlofly tho Infantry that had 
 been delayed by theae obHtaclea. 
 
 9 
 
fl\o substHiuont «lopU\\ u\»MU of iho T^ l>;U(aHo\>s was n\i>ilo 
 so rniMi^lv that thort^ was uo thwo for oxatnlnittji tho ground. 
 
 All thtv^o things mi:hi havt^ l>oou VnorM to tho hijihor 
 Uwiiors. as that onthv sootiotj had b<sM\ \\\ our um!isp\»t<Hl 
 jHvsst^sion up to « p. in.: atui wo »^m\m- )\ot mon^lv (»> tho ttM" 
 rain, but also tt> tho strtM\jith of tho onotwv, r»ut tho\j>ih 
 thot>^ was laok of infonuatiou ott tho lattor poittt hofort^ 
 wo wvi>* or\iortHl to attaoU. wo oouhi n»ako out tho j^Mf^mw'.* 
 w»K<.vyv< alonjj tho wholo lit\o faJrlv woll with tho In^iv oyo 
 just hofotv tho attaok. 
 
 Ot\ our sidt^ o hattaUons wo»^^ a\ailahh\ siiviuu t\ot 
 Quito 2 tuou por tuotor. Tho hattlo jHH>uutl of tht\so hat- 
 taUous waii, luortnnor, dovoid of oovor fr\uu i^otttour 'J^O to 
 Uoijjht S4t> — Ort\\^rt* bVnuo. 1\> vat»qnish tho ouotu^y- thoy 
 had to trjworso from Toutowr 7S(> to tho ouotuv. V.U>0 u\ottM*s 
 of j^Mitlv slopii\ii jrr\Miud with a ooi\sidt^rablo and \inkui>wn 
 obstaoh^ ah>t>j» tht^ ot\tir^^ fnMtt atid with auotluM- iU»staolo 
 rtlouj; i^irt of tho jir\>uud. Pisiistor was oortaiu ovou if wo 
 had to travorso. ftvtu Contour TSO to tho onouiv, 11H>0 t»»otori4 
 Althvnigh tho oxivtitiou of tho attaok is o^hmj io oritioism 
 fn>m tho thiH^rtMioal |H>iut of viow\ vot its taotioak at\d |»j\r- 
 tiouk'jrlv it^ morak otTtvt on tho onoinv was vorv jjrtwt. bt^ 
 oaust^ it was oartitnl t>ut with an onorijv vorv ratvlv tn^ualod 
 sinoo. Tho visjx^r of tho attack oont\nutHl t^onoral \A\i\' 
 mirj^ult's apprt^housiou th^it fuH^tr Otrman fi^fr^ «yr* jijik 
 /»r\S),-%««.; '♦\>»jj v^K //»7,)»»Y.* His anxioty for his rij^rht riv^ 
 otxHl i^onoral U'\dmirault*s attontioti ii\ that dir»vtion. and 
 his ftwr v>f boinjj assiviUnl thort^ with superior foroos kopt 
 him friMU rx\'tpititf tho full bonotlt of his taotioal suo- 
 vH>ss, \MuH\ iitu^tio»uHi»howovor, bofon^ tho court of iu» 
 
 ♦Th? OfRctal Act>owt\t. T.. iv W>1, statps thts tn ttaJIcs. 
 
MilUo/ry-niHt/trical HludU^. 1^'' 
 
 qrjjry, why he. ha/1 not ]ir<ft\U'<\ from hb mioxtftm, be an- 
 
 WhiUf \\\tt '.'M\\\ Hr'ni.hi^t' h\(><n\ timwn up »^>ijthwf^.t of 
 Man* )a-Toiir, Ihrj oh;iplainH «yJrJrr-«>^-d fhf; rrK^n. The Prot- 
 imijiut chaplain, A(t\t*trt, who «fK>ke fimt, naU'McA Him wordu 
 >w> injridi'riouMly, wai« k^> dr-^fply rnov^d hhnw^f, an^l n\n»\n' in 
 Much a whiijjnfr way, fhal no one corjjrj h^^ much edified by 
 that Horf. of "spiritual comfort," and the incident hau rjon- 
 vinced me that, uuUmn he alK^> nmrtlff'ntM wAHUtU feelingn, 
 a chaplain may do more harm than jto^kI in nuch momentu, 
 and that in moMt can^^H it. will he h^-*«t to k^f^'p the chapJain« 
 away from the troof»« alt/>gether. While Chaplain Aebert 
 waM H])('',ik\fiii, we Haw a Hinj.'le rider cominj^ from Tronville 
 at full Kpeed, hiK ¥>\ir\)\\cM tiuW-nnij^ in the air, and an he 
 approached, f recoj^niz^d him a« the Catholic chaplain, 
 Ktuckmann, a d*^r friend of mine since l>40ft. In front of 
 <^'oIofiel von <^.'ranach Hxt line; he reifrned up like a f>^-rfe«'rt 
 horxeman, the nij^ht of which in itnelf had a revivinj^ effect, 
 and, after exchan^in^ a few word« with the colonel, he rr>«f; 
 in bin Mtirnifm and Hpoke in hiw wharp VVVf«tphalian diale^rt: 
 "Comr-jjuJ^fH, the [II. (l<n'\t¥> \h enj^aged in a K^rvere Htruj(f^Ie, 
 To you han fallen the duty to nave it. Attiick therefore the 
 enemy with intrepidity and <^)od will bf^ with you. A men I" 
 That Hounded more like it, and acted lik^' a charm. Imme- 
 diately afterward the rejrimentn unfurled their colorn. the 
 ]nn(:<in were loa/Jed, and Colonel von Cranach n(h\r(^nft<\ hin 
 men about an followH: "You have nhown yourwelve** jjal- 
 larit fcIlowH on the march; Khow yourm-lvftn now the name 
 in halt le, and, whatever may happen to you, keep your colors 
 hij^h, HO that no Prenchraan'n hand may touch them. Xow 
 with Cod!" 
 
 '^ofy Jjc/}inninfi of fM Attack. — Upon the arrival of the 
 10th and 20th DivinionH and of their hfoAcin on the battle- 
 
194 Inquiries into ihe Tactics of the Future, 
 
 tieUl. r«oiunal von Noiiits-Khetz luul at his disposal S 
 frt'>sl\ biigados, and, in view ot" the state of tho bat- 
 tle, ho thoujiht it iuomuboiu upon him to omv^lov thorn 
 ottonsivolv for tho roHof of tho 111. Corps. Tho arraujio- 
 iiiouts iiuulo for tho purposo t>v tho X. (\nps vvoro as 
 follows: 1. Conoral von Kraatx with 10 frosh battal 
 ions was to advanco through tlio oo\>so of 'rroiivillo against 
 tho hoight of Kruvillo, so that, as tho battlo stood, 
 tho fnnUal attaok propor foil to hiui. 2. Ooueral von 
 Sohwarzkoppon was to support this frontal attaok by an 
 attaok in a uorthoastorly dirootion ^northwost auglo of tho 
 Tronvillo oopsel. It was boliovod at tho hoadquartors of 
 the X. Oori>s that this latter attaok would take tho enemy 
 in flank, t^. Both attaoks were to be made in oombiuation. 
 Assuminti that an otTensive of that kind under existinj; oir- 
 cumstauot^ was oonsideivitnl proper, the same was wt^ll 
 planutHl by the oomniauder of the X. Corps; for. assuming 
 oorroot oonooption and judgment on tho part of the loaders 
 of tho two moYomeuts. the Hois do 'rronvillo otTorod tho 
 safest approaoh. and had the ll> fresh battalions soon after- 
 wanl appeaitnl on the northern edge of the oopse. Grenier's 
 division would not have btvn able to take the otTensive in 
 the dirtH'tion of Mai*s-la-Tour. and would have at least been 
 oontaintHi. Within oortain limits the 10th TTalf-Division 
 also had some oover in the Yron ravine. l*ut the suoooss 
 of the two movements depended on tho loaders of tln^ two 
 attaoking groups; and they should have oonsulted together. 
 But between the issue of the order on the part of the oorps 
 commander and the attaok of the ;^Sth Brigade, the situ- 
 ation on tho enemy's side ohangtxl, inasmuch as the latter 
 considerably extondtHl his line toward the west, so that by 
 continuing to make tho northwest angle of tho Bois de 
 Tronville its point of attaok. the :>Sth Brigade would be 
 
Mxl.xUj,rijli%>M/ruM HtwluH, \2i/ 
 
 tisiiiktitl Uni'M, iunUmA of flanking Uu; Hm^my. Thtirh wnumn 
 Ut tinvi'. ft4'Mn wtutt' \tiiviU'M\ii.r tllttit-jilty on that day in rhf^n 
 latJng a coniiAin^d uttjutk of larg<; tt^nlUm fontn-A udur tintth 
 other, UtHMUiHi'.U hm thtt [tlau whm not only not cjarrSttA out, 
 ////./ ihf. 10 h(dUdv/Ti.H of Ifi/i 20ik hxxiai/m vAlMr^M aX lliA rAry 
 ifi//f(iMd VjivfM t'm W^/klCx Wujo.rk oMo/MfA. The e/fUUimplaUid 
 frontal attiwM faiUitl Ut UiSLUfr\A\\7j(t aXUp^etUer, nad the 
 \m\HU'A 'AitmU of iUe UnU Ifalf lHvinion r*^nUM. It in 
 not ihe luieuiloit to examine why th'? eonthlneA atta/;k an 
 plann<^j emmhleA fiont ihe U-j(inninjf. hut yhe commanding 
 t^enei'iil of tbft X. <Utr\m an well a« the ^^^mroander of the 
 IfMfi htv'mion were \Aiu:tH\ in the fn<r/«t \m.\nfn\ nittiAtUm. f<ft 
 they did not J^-arn the r-f:*t) «tiiU; of ntfiurfi until tyK> late. It 
 l« hard t/> unthtrHiMu] how that ^^>uld have liaf/fKfn*!^ had 
 there f>ee» the ne<^«««ary comrnnnieation Ytetwfum th* com- 
 manding general and the two division commandertj and be- 
 tween the latter \\ieutnt'.\ven; >«»ill it may l><- explaine^l by 
 the fa/di that at that monrieot the attention of the c^^ramand' 
 ing general and of the commander of the ir;>th f>ivi«jon wa« 
 ii\Xrii.i:Uti\ hy movemeniM the enemy whm. making toward 
 dreyere Vermn. To l>^f «ure, a ^infe <ti^;f</.i:^ nhould not be 
 made until the /ro»/ In tudlvely engaged. In that ren^tefd 
 deneral von K^rh warzkopjK'n wax left in the lurch, and no 
 bjani'- 'ran aUiuh to him, but Htiil he wa* not depriv<-rl of 
 the [fini,M\n\\ty of finding ont what (Uiueral von Kraatz 
 waj* doing. 
 
 General von B^rhwarzkopfA-n had commnmented hi« in- 
 UmtionH tjo General von U'edell, but the lower officers were 
 not informed at all, and even ('AtioneXn von Cranaeb and von 
 linxen hud merely the g^-nr-ral direction jpoiuUid out to 
 them. At any rat^?, Hueh an opfK^rtune, exhauKtive, mutoal 
 r^mMultation an at Pof>owit7. did not take place, and the 
 whole YtuHinem bore the Ht^mp of precipiiaium and uncertnin- 
 ty frf)ni the beginning. I know for f-ertjihi that the battalion 
 
126 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 commanders did not know ^^bat was expected of thoni, for 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Koll, who was subsequently killed, 
 said saroastioally: "If Stuckniaun had not been there, I 
 should have been totally in the dark. What little I know 
 I have learned from the address he made. Stuckmann, it 
 seems to me, is in charge to-day." As General von Wedell 
 and Colonel von Cranach were ridini; some 50 paces in front 
 of Koll, I suggested that he make inquiry there. INIean- 
 "while, I. — r)7th was crossing the ravine about 1000 meters 
 southwest of Mars-la-Tour, whose slopes were so steep in 
 part that order could only be preserved with the greatest 
 ditticulty and the two batteries advancing to the left of 
 I. — 57th got into a serious predicament. They succeeded, 
 however, in coming from the trot down to a walk and in 
 taking the slopes obliquely; neither battery had an idea of 
 their character. The incident with its comical and serious 
 aspects prevented von Roll from following my suggestion. 
 As General von Wedell and Colonel von Crajiach were 
 watching the passage of the ravine from its eastern edge, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Koll had an opportunity to join 
 them, and I was again in position to observe all measures 
 taken by the superiors up to the divisional commander. I 
 did not hear much, to be sure, but I saw all the more. 
 
 Meanwhile, the French had resumed the fire; against 
 whom we did not know, but soon learned. II. — 16th was 
 marching from the point of assembly straight on Greyt^re 
 Ferme, passing by the west of Mars-la-Tour; I. — IGth ad- 
 vanced through Mars-la-Tour, and the enemy's increased 
 fire was chiefiy meant for these two battalions, which were 
 engaged, when F. — IGth, I. — 57th, F. — 57th, 2 pioneer com- 
 panies, and the 2 batteries were still south of Mars-la-Tour 
 and west of the great road leading thence to Les Barques. 
 They all passed the village on the east. There was nO 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 127 
 
 Buch thing aH preparation \>y artillery, which took up itn firBt 
 pOHition Kouth of th<' MaiH-la-Tour — Vionvillo road when 
 the infantry fll. and I, — IfJth) waH already under fire. 
 There was no sign of any selection of a firing position or of 
 any orders for the artillery. It was not until we crossed 
 the Mars-la-Tour — Les Baraques road, which is lined with 
 poplar trees, that we could fairly well make out the enemy's 
 position, which extended from Height 840 to Greyiire Ferme. 
 At the same moment a storm of shells was fiying about us, 
 an indication that the French had noticed our movement 
 and had been waiting for our appearance. About 200 paces 
 farther on. General von Hchwarzkopjien joined the officers 
 above mentioned, and at that moment our batteries opened 
 from their first position. The 38th Brigade here formed a 
 single line from left to right, as follows: II. — IGth, I. — 
 10th, F. — 10th, I. — 57th, F. — 57th, and 2 pionef-r companies 
 X., F. — ICth being somewhat in rear at first fit came from 
 Mariaville Fermej. Up to that time, a moment of deci- 
 sive ini})ortance for his tactical dispositions, General von 
 Bchwarzkoppen was southeast of Mars-la-Tour. It is an 
 established fact that up to that moment the commanding 
 general of the X. Corps personally directed the left wing of 
 the battle, and that he considered the duty of the X. Corps 
 to be to save the III. Corps from being crushed. Defensive 
 action would not have accomplished the object; it became 
 the duly of tactics to understand the situation and to act 
 accordingly. 
 
 The question is: 1. AN'as General von Schwarzkoppen 
 aware of the general situation? 2. Did he correctly under- 
 stand his order? 'i. Did he make report of the change of the 
 situation on the enemy's side (extension of his right), or did 
 he take steps to meet it? The first will never be known; 
 2 and 3 are inconsistent with his measures. There is no 
 
128 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 doubt that the commander of the X. Corps had ordered an 
 attach, iut, on account of the intervening changes on the enemifs 
 side, it became the duty of the commander of the 19th Half -Division 
 to regulate the attach, so far as concerns the 38th Brigade, accord- 
 ing to time and circumstances. It was the duty of the division 
 commander, and it was practicable, to give unmistakable 
 orders how far to advance and what to hold. As regards 
 infantry tactics. General von Schwarzkoppen, wherever he 
 was present, endeavored to have the proper tactical forms 
 employed. It was exactly 4 o'clock* when the brigade 
 started. We had been facing east, as above stated, and the 
 left flank battalion (II. — 16th) was nearest to Mars-la-Tour. 
 As that battalion advanced straight from the spot on 
 Grey^re, while the companies on the extreme right had to 
 make a wheel of some 2500 meters, the movement was loose and 
 ragged from the beginning. II. — 16th was firing when the 
 other battalions were just starting, and the general result 
 was a successive arrival of the battalions on the line of bat- 
 tle; and, as the troops, the more they had to take ground to 
 the east, endeavored to make up for the greater distance by a 
 faster pace, this caused precipitation. But, despite the accel- 
 erated pace, it was impossible to restore proper uniformity 
 to the movement; the battalions were defeated in detail from 
 left to right,a,nd. the right reached the enemy's line completely 
 exhausted and at a time when the battalions on the left had 
 already suffered defeat. 
 
 (e) Personal Observations. — In executing the move- 
 ment we passed the southwestern edge of Mars-la-Tour, 
 where General von Schwarzkoppen and Major von Scherfif 
 were halting mounted in the midst of a severe artillery fire. 
 
 *Von Rohr says, page 127, that the 38th Brigade passed Mars-la- 
 Tour at 5 p. m., and fixes the attack of the 1st Guard Dragoons at 
 5:45 p. m. The former is too late; the latter is correct. 
 
Military -Historical Studies. 120 
 
 Near them, somewhat in rear, were 2 squadrons of the 4th 
 Cuirassiers, which, however, soon turned about and with- 
 drew when tlie artillery fire ineieased (see Sketch II.j; tli(* 
 1st Guard Dragoons took their place; Count Brandenburg 
 II. was riding along tlie Vionvillc — Mars-la-Tour chauss(?e. 
 The troops were rapidly advancing, and when the skir- 
 mishers of 1st — 57th, with which Lieutenant-Colonel von 
 Roll was riding, passed General von Schwarzkoppen, the 
 brave general joined him, addressing some cheering words 
 to the troops. When the severity of the mitrailleuse, artil- 
 lery, and infantry fire from the left front gained an amazing 
 severity. General von Schwarzkoppen remarked to Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel von Roll: "Roll, deploy strong skirmish 
 lines, and we'll catch them;" and later, "The left shoulder 
 forward a little, toward the angle of the wood," pointing to 
 the northwest angle of the Tronville copse. Meanwhile, 
 1st — 57th had deployed 2 platoons and taken the direction 
 of that angle of the Bois de Tronville, so that it looked as 
 though there was going to be a gap between the 16th and 
 57th Regiments. General von Schwarzkoppen, who re- 
 mained for some time with Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, 
 then ordered: "Roll, put a whole company in there." It 
 was done (2d — 57th). Soon after, the horse of the captain 
 of that company was killed; the captain, being very short- 
 sighted and pinned to the ground for a little while by the 
 horse, lost the supervision of the company, which was ad- 
 vancing its right shoulder too much. That was due to the 
 direction of the ravine around Mars-la-Tour, into which the 
 men crowded in quest of shelter from the enemy's murder- 
 ous fire. The 3d platoon connected with the left of the 
 skirmishers of the Ist — 57th, and the gap between the Six- 
 teenth and Fifty-seventh was only closed when Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Sannow pushed in F. — 16th. Originally F. — 16th 
 
130 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Fidiire. 
 
 was about 150 meters to the rear of 1st aud 2d — 57th, but, 
 haviufj a shortor wlieol to make, the battalion subsequently 
 gained that distance. AVe anticipate this in order to ex- 
 plain how the line of battle was formed, because, when it 
 halted, the companies of F. — 10th were between 1st and 
 2d — oTth, which were deployed. 
 
 Outside of these orders from the division commander, 
 none were received by the troops during the action, except 
 the order of retreat. The brigade commander rode north- 
 ward of Mars-la-Tour, followed by Colonel von Cranach, 
 and as I. — 57th was crossing the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville 
 road, both batteries came in position to the north of the 
 village. T will now state what else I heard and saw while 
 in the vicinity of the division commander. Lieutenant 
 Eggeling, from the staif of the comanding general of the 
 X. Corps, was just riding away, when Major von Scherflf 
 pointed to the map and, turning to the west, remarked to 
 General von Schwarzkoppen : ''That is the 5th Cavalry 
 Division which is going to support the attack on the flank."* 
 At this time the division was trotting past Mars-la-Tour 
 on the south. As I. — 57th reached the Vionville — Mars- 
 la-Tour road, I noticed to the right rear the approach of 
 heavy columns (it Avas the 40th Brigade); soon afterward 1 
 noticed some statf to our rear riding on and alongside of the 
 chauss«^e (Count Brandenburg IT.). Of the line of battle 
 east of the Bois de Tronville nothing whatever could be 
 seen. On reaching the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville road. Gen- 
 eral von Schwarzkoppen turned his horse and rode back 
 with Major von Scherff. 
 
 (f) Events on the Side of the French. — Before detail- 
 
 *It is to be inferred, therefore, that this officer communicated to 
 General von Schwarzkoppen the intentions of General von Voigta- 
 Rhetz regarding that cavalry division. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 131 
 
 iiig the course of the attack, I deem it necesHary to state 
 how things had devr^loped up to that hour on the enemy's 
 side, according to present results of historical research. On 
 receiving orders to join in the battle. General Ladmir- 
 ault directed Grenier's and Cissey's divisions to turn south- 
 ward, Grenier in front, Cissey behind him, Legrand's cav- 
 alry division bringing up the rear, the artillery reserve 
 between the last two divisions. After the corps had been 
 given the direction of liruville, the general, hastening to the 
 front with his staff, reconnoitered in person the ground 
 from the Yron to the Bois de Tronville. On arriving at 
 Grey^re Ferme he saw the necessity of securely closing the 
 valleys (of approach) joining here from the south and east.* 
 He therefore ordered at once: 
 
 1. A 12-pounder battery to be brought up, which he 
 posted himself to the west of Grey^re Ferme so as to sweep 
 the valley to the south. That battery opened fire as early as 
 2 o'clock against the 4 squadrons of the 1st Guard Drag- 
 oons then opposite the battery, killing the horse of Lieutenant 
 von Bismarck,1[ and continued its fire without interruption as it 
 found objects to fire at. 
 
 2. To secure his flank, General Ladmirault ordered up 
 the 5th Rifle Battalion, and subsequently — 
 
 3. The entire 98th Regiment, to the vicinity of Grey^re 
 Ferme. These troops, at 2:'Uj p. m., stood as follows: 5th 
 Rifle Battalion to the west of the valley covered by the bat- 
 tery, and 500 meters to the latter's front (south); the 98th 
 Regiment stood east of the valley and southeast of the 
 battery. After the general had thus posted the troops 
 marching at the head (advance guard) of Grenier's division, 
 the main body came up, w hich he allowed to continue the 
 
 ♦Bonie, Campagne de 1870, quoted by von Rohr, p. 125. 
 tVon Rohr, p. 125. 
 
182 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 luaroh dm^ south (^approximatt' dhtHtion of Tronville). 
 Suooossful at tirst in its oftViisivo moveuuMit. tlio division 
 Avas drivon baok by tlio iJOtli ^liornian. — Tr.) Division, and 
 had approximatoly the foUoAvinj; positit>n on the ridjie of 
 Bniville before the arrival of General von SohNvar/.koppen: 
 Kejrinient No. 13 depU\ved as skirmisliers, nortli of the rav- 
 ine within 1200 meters of the great road liruvilK^^ — ]Mars la- 
 Tour; in its rear juul overhippinu' on the U^ft Avas the 48d 
 Keginunu; farther in rear, baok of the right of the 13th 
 Kegimeut. was the tUth Hegiinent. extending ajs far as the 
 great road. On the great road was a mitraiUense battery, 
 and another battery on Height 840 ^both beU^nging to 
 tlivnier's di visional. 
 
 l>y 3 p. m. the entire artillery of Oissey's division had 
 eome forward and had taken up one oontinuous position 
 west of the great road from Bruville; the 57th and T3d Regi- 
 ments of Cissey's division are said to have been resting 
 siuoe 2:30 p. m.. "north of the ravine of Orey^re." removing 
 their packs. The regiments "Nos. 1 and t». the -0th Chas- 
 seurs, the artillery reserve, and Legrand's oavalry division 
 were approaching. But lIOOO meters north of Orey^re 
 Ferme, west of the road to Jarny. 1 regiment of Chasseurs 
 d'Afrique, 1 of Guard Dragoons, and 1 of Cuard Lancers 
 had been posted since 2 o'clock. Hence there were quite 
 considerable forces of all arms between the great road from 
 Bruville and the road to Jarny and west of the latter be- 
 fore the arrival of Ceneral von Schwar/.koppen. Though 
 they were not directly visible, still artillery and infantry 
 fire had been kept up from Creyt^re Ferme ever since 
 2 o'clock, the former being directed against Mars-la-Tour 
 about the time of General von Schwarzkoppen's arrival. 
 Generals von Barbv and Count Brandenburg had with- 
 
Military Uisloricai Hludien. J '^'> 
 
 drawn to Mui-h la-Tour hefore tliat iirtt, before 2 i>. rn. roni':ial 
 
 Account, I., r/>o, oo:',^ 
 
 To give the rffadcr a connrjcted ar;count of the develop- 
 ment of the French line of battle, I Hhould Htiite: AfU^r 4, 
 Mnd h<'fore5 o'clock p. rn.,the entire divJKion of CiMKey hucc^^- 
 Hively join^-d the Jirnt line; firnt, the 57th i^'ginIent (f^Mt of, 
 and on, Ww. great roiid from lirnville; to itK right rear the VUl 
 Uegiujent; they were HubHequently joined on the right 
 (witnif by the 20th ChaKHeur battalion and reginjr-nlK Now. 1 
 and «, the former in ftrKt, the latter in Kccond line. I have 
 be(;n unable to aHf;er1iiin accurately the time when the artil- 
 lery rcHcr v<- joj n <'<l i n 1 he arrtion . I have the i mpr*?«Hion that 
 it wan at the i'nno when w^' w^-re crwHing the Vionville— 
 MarH-la-Tour road — t. e., when we were attiu;king (about 
 4:.">0 p. m.^; for from that time on the artillery fire became 
 much more Hevere and we could fe^d from the detonations 
 that reinforcenx'ntH rnuKt have arrived. All the batterif^ 
 having Hufl'ered loKneK,* it Ik evident that the entire artillery 
 rftWirxo, took part; in the caHe of one battery only, 7th— 8th 
 (Dick HayH 9th— 8thi, no figureH are given. 
 
 Though it may not have been practicable to observe 
 directly from tlK- O^-rman left after 'A.'Mi p. m.f what troopH 
 were in the vicinity t,f Grey^:;re Ferme and what was f/oing on 
 to the wcKtof the great road from liruville,* ntill it could be 
 seen: 1, that the entire Bruville ridge waw Htrongly occu- 
 pied; 2, KhotH were conHtantly heard from the vicinity of 
 Grey^re Ferme, even artillery fire, which nat Marfs-la-Tour 
 on fire about 4 p. m.; Ti, an immeuHe cloud of duKt waH viHi- 
 ble in the air for a long time over the wtction north of Grey- 
 ere Ferme. The atmo«f»here waw clear, pure, and light. 
 
 •Dick, pa«e 242-275. 
 
 f Standpoint of General ron Schwarzkoppen. See sketch. 
 
134 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 The immense cloud of dust was the first thing to engross 
 our attention on that day, more even than the fire, and was 
 Tisiblo before "we turned off toward the place of assenMy of the 
 brigade, 1000 meters southwest of Mars-la-Tour. It was 
 our "point de rue.'' As one is in tlie habit of observing 
 the flight of a baUoon, so we followed that oloud of dust 
 around which we were moving in a semicircle. We de- 
 bated what it might be, and my commander, with his unus- 
 ually keen eyes, declared that the enormous wall of dust was 
 steadily moving from northeast to southwest. I did not 
 notice any break in it while we were circling around it. On 
 approaching the standpoint of General von Schwarzkoppen, 
 w'e could see plainly: 1, that the dust cloud was moring; 
 and 2, to the soufhirest. exactly toward Grey^re Ferme; 
 3, also that the heights of Bruville were strongly held, and 
 therefore that the cause of that dust-cloud was still adire. 
 What was that cause? llie nwvcment of large bodies, which, 
 however, could not be discerned themselves! But the sight was 
 so striking, (I have never seen the like in my military career), 
 and having plainly before our eyes the heights of Bruville 
 garnished with masses of troops, it was not difficult to 
 foresee that something of importance would soon develop 
 from Grey^re Ferme. 
 
 (g) Course of the Afiacl-. — The arri^■al of considera- 
 ble reinforcements on the enemy's side had been noticed 
 since 2 o'clock; active movements were observed in his 
 line at R^zonville (withdrawal of the IT. Corps, inser- 
 tion of the Guard Corps and of a division of the III. 
 Corps), and no diminution of the forces in the center 
 was perceptible. At 2 p. m. it was known on the Ger- 
 man side, from captured prisoners, that the II.. VI., and 
 Guard Corps were present on the other side. At 3:15 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 135 
 
 p. m. the length of the French line of battle was almost 
 doubled— from St. Marcel to Oroy^re Ferme— and the con- 
 viction gained ground on the Cjerman side that the entire 
 Army of the Rhine was in front of us. On our side 2 army 
 corps, a division, and 2 cavalry divisions could be counted 
 on becoming successively available until late in the even- 
 ing; the enemy's withdrawal had been prevented: Flav- 
 igny, Vionville, Mars-la-Tour were in our hands; only our 
 left wing had temporarily quitted the Bois de Tronville 
 because ontflanlccd after 2 ]). m. by two fresh army corps 
 (III. and IV.). 
 
 Between 2 and a:15 p. m. the situation had been crit- 
 ical, for the enemy might at any moment be expected to ad- 
 vance across the Vionville — Mars-la-Tour road. When 
 these anxious hours were over, the 88th Brigade had reached 
 Mars-la-Tour, the enemy having withdrawn from the Bois de 
 Tronville since 3:1.5 p. m. The left of Orenier's division and 
 some batteries had continued their advance on the west of 
 the Tronville copse until about 3:15 p. m., and until opposite 
 the southern edge of the northern portion of the copse. 
 They withdrew to the position, ITeight 840— Grey^re Ferme, 
 when they met the artillery which had hastened forward in 
 advance of the 20th Division under Colonel von der Goltz. 
 At a point 600 meters north of the Vionville— Mars-la- 
 Tour road, where shortly before the enemy's artillery had 
 been. Colonel von der C.oltz took up the battle about 3:30 
 p. m. Two battalions of the Seventy-ninth were in the 
 Tronville copse, while the remainder of the 20th Division 
 was forming up. The batteries of Colonel von der Goltz 
 were joined by those of the 40th Brigade, so that after 3:30 
 p. m. he had 24 guns under him west of the Tronville copse. 
 The appearance of these fresh forces in front in connection 
 with the reported approach of German troops from Hannon- 
 
136 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 Tille against his right flank, and the order from Marshal 
 Bazaine to hold the position, were the causes of Ladmir- 
 ault's defensive. A subsequent offensive on the part of the 
 French, as soon as they should feel strong enough, was not 
 precluded. 
 
 General von Yoigts-Khetz decided to take the offensive 
 himself against these new forces, and issued the necessary 
 orders at 3:30 p. m. The general meant the 20th Division 
 to attack in front, the 3Sth Brigade to attack the enemy's 
 right flank, and the 5th Cavalry Division to act on the ex- 
 treme left according to circumstances. The commander of 
 the 20th Division misunderstood that order — at any rate, he 
 did not act in accordance with it. For that reason the at- 
 tack was not carried out as planned, inasmuch as of the 15 
 half-hattalions ordered to make the afta-cJc, 10 — those of General 
 von Kraatz of the 20th Division — ivithdrew in consequence of the 
 misunderstanding at the very minute when General von Schwarz- 
 Jcoppen, agreeahly to his directions, had thrown forward the SSth 
 Brigade. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles left Pout t\ Mousson on horse- 
 back at 2 p. m., and was at Vionville at 4 p. m. (26 kilo- 
 meters). The commander-in-chief intended to keep on the 
 defensive on his right and to attack the heights of Bruville 
 with his left, X. Army Corps (see Official Account, I., 611), 
 which was in perfect accord with the measures initiated by 
 General von A'oigts-Khetz. 
 
 General von Schwarzkoppen had been ordered to sup- 
 port the frontal attack of the 20th Division by a flank at- 
 tack. The execution had been left to him, and it became 
 his duty to make certain of the cooperation of the 20th Divi- 
 sion, by waiting the latters development, and by keeping a 
 sharp eye on the doings of the enemy. The general's station 
 permitted both of the foregoing to be done, and although the 
 
Military-Hislorical Studies. 137 
 
 criHiH juKt paHW^d had been Herious, Btill at this hour, about 
 4 p. m,, there was nothing pre8Hing in the 8ituation; the en- 
 emy wa« rather delaying. Hince General von Hchwarzkop- 
 pen had received the order to attack, the situation on 
 the Wu\<'. i)i the enemy had been conKiderably changed 
 Cwhich, however. General von VoigtB-Rhetz could not Re<f 
 from hi8 station at Tronville), the French right having 
 been extended to the road to Jarny and advanced to 
 Grey^re Ferme. Admitting that General von Bchwarzkop- 
 pen was unable from his station to gain a suflScient idea of 
 the strength and extent of the French right, still the above 
 mentioned movements on the part of the enemy could 
 hardly have escaped him altogethf^r. and in looking over 
 the wide space between the road to Jarny and the Tron- 
 ville copse, he should have realized that 5 half-battal- 
 ions were not sufficient for an attack there, and that if 
 he attacked nevertheless, his front would be too extended 
 and he would be taken in flank himself. Timely repre- 
 sentation made under these circumstances would perhaps 
 have caused General von Voigts-Khetz to modify his order. 
 No such message was sent and — what is much worse — Gen- 
 eral von Hchwarzkoppen did not wait for the deployment of 
 the 2mh Division. 
 
 For the execution of the attack General von Bchwarzkop- 
 pen assigned to the right wing (I., F. — ^57th. 2 pioneer com- 
 panies), the northwest angle of the Bois de Tronville (^Official 
 Account, I., 605); to the left (11., I. — 10th), he gave a due 
 north direction toward Greyere Ferme (^Oflficial Account. I., 
 C07j, whence it becomes plain that, as the brigade was deploy- 
 ing by wings. F. — 10th and I. — 57th would have to advance 
 in a northeasterly direction between the two wings. These 
 dispositions having been made, the attack was undertaken 
 without obtaining sufficient information of the extent and 
 
 10 — 
 
188 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future, 
 
 strength of tlio ononiv's lijilit wiiij; — a fradirt' that was ro- 
 peated two days lattM- a( St. l*i-ivat — tliouj^h such infonna- 
 tion shoiihl bo aseorlaiiiod before ani/ attack; moroovor, as 
 the objectives of attack assigned to the wings of the brigade 
 were widelj' apart, the one being to the north, the other to 
 the northeast, and as the brigade had been formed on the 
 then prescribed maximum front 1000 meters southwest of 
 ^lars-la-Tour and facing toward Tronville, scattering and 
 irreguhir movements became unavoidable, unless front was 
 first taken toward Oreyt^re Ferme and toward the north- 
 west angle of the Bois de Tronville. 
 
 That General von Voigts-Khetz dispatched the 5th Cav- 
 alry Division to the vicinity of Yille sur Yron to act against 
 the enemy's right during the contemplated attack of the 
 8 brigades was probably due to a higher consideration, inas- 
 much as it sprang from accurate information of the em^- 
 my's doings furnished by the latest rei)orts from Barby's 
 brigade. Barby's reports were sent to corps headipiarters, 
 and they were probably not, certainly not early enough, 
 communicated to General von Schwarzkoppen. That 
 should be kept well in mind in criticisiug General von 
 Schwarzkoppen's measures. On the withdrawal of Barby's 
 brigade. General Count Brandenburg "also" withdrew at 
 3 p. m. in the direction of Mars-la-Tour. The cavalry had 
 therefore been in close touch with the enemy since he had 
 emerged from Doncourt, it had seen w^ell, and had reported; 
 that was 2 hours before the attack of the 88tli Brigade, but 
 the proper rules and necessary arrangements for an effi- 
 cient system of reports, particularly on the Hanks, do not 
 seem to have prevailed. Thus it may be explained that 
 General von Schwarzkoi)pen, who should have been best 
 informed and to whom, as the senior officer present, all 
 reports should have been brought — if merely shown him in 
 

Mililary-IIulorical Studies. 139 
 
 puHHiriK — v\JiH ill fiicl not. in u ponilioii lo fuHill llio rolo that 
 under Huch cirouinHtancoK fallH to the lot of the Henior ofTi<fT 
 on the \'.ic\\c;i\ ari<] Htnifej^icnl flnnk. It Ih one of many 
 inHt}in<<'H (hat ^o lo hIiow i\ut irnportanee of a properly 
 rr'^iil;il<'<l KyKlfMn of r^poilH. 
 
 The allaek of Ihe Iroojm of the .''>8th lirigade whi(;h 
 were advaneinj? (^antward was diHJointed, and ho waw that 
 of the individual hallalions. I waH from beginninf^ to end 
 exactly in the eenlf-r of th^ line of fjattle, mounted, and 
 eoijh] Koe in nil dii<'<( ioriH unlil Ihe Hmoke became ho denne 
 that 11. — IfJLh and I. — lOth were liicM^n from my vi<'w; I 
 :im (iMMcfore an eye-witncHH. 
 
 The individnul battalionH HUCceHHively advanced from 
 left to ri^hl lovvnrd the north and norfheaHt, tlie two battcr- 
 icH Hupjjorlin^ tin* movement fi-om Iheir Cnecondj position 
 norlli of MarH-la-Tour. 'I'ho two left llnnk battalionH, It. 
 and I. — loth, havinj^ the HhortoHt road, advanced farth- 
 <;Ht to the north, croHHed the ravine of Hruville, preserved 
 their lead to the end of the action, and may be Haid to have 
 fought a separate action under Colonel von lUixen, On 
 the ri^ht F. — 571h and the 2 f*ioneer comf)anieH had to 
 doHcribe the greatest arc, and when we consider that the 
 lino which executed the wheel extended as far as the Bois 
 de Tronville and had a length of 2500 meters, it becomes 
 plain that, nothwithstanding the acceleration of its march, 
 that wing would arriv<*d on (he line of battle al, least half an 
 hour after Ihe battalions on (he left. The su[)f)ortH of the 
 two center battalionH (12th and IJth— lOth of F. — Kith, and 
 4(h and '.Ul — r»7th of I. — 571 hj moved forward exactly on a 
 line, while (lie skirminhers of 2d — 57th became mingled with 
 those of 10th— 16th. (Bee Sketch III.)* 
 
 ♦It, wiJH owing to the fact that V. — 16th did not reaf;h Its place 
 from Mariaville Ferme until iHt and 2d — 57th had deployed skirmish- 
 
liO Inquiries inio the Tactics of ihe Future. 
 
 lu\c:inuinii at Oontonr ISO. tho forniatioii of \\\o hv\iX'M\o 
 (vom lofi to rijiht was as follows: 
 
 Fu"«t lino: oth UUh. T(h- UUh. 'M Itiih. iM Kith. 
 llth — U»th. *J platoons of lM — oTth. lOth— l(»th. I plattHUi 
 of l!d — o7ih. o platoons of Ist — oTtli as skirntishors as far aa 
 tho l>ois do Tronvillo. 
 
 Sorond lint\ lot* ttitMois in voiw. Sth. t>th lt>ih: Hit. 
 liSt—ldtlK 1-th. ;)(h-U»th; tth. :Ui oTih: Utli. !Mh :>7th; 
 I2th.10th— r>7th:2r. T. X. 
 
 From this point and from tho i-avim» north of Mars la 
 Tour tho formation was ohaniiod as follows, singlo lino ho- 
 inj; formod ovorywhoro and tho sorond lim^ ]nishini; in 
 whort^vor it found room: 
 
 rirsi lino: 5th— KUh. (Uh— l(>th.* Tth Kith, v^th— 
 KUh.t 4th— U>th. :'.d— UUh. "Jd- lt»th. llth— l(»th. 1st— l»5th. 
 i! platoons of 2d — oTth. \0{\\ — IGtli. 1 platoon of i!d — 57th. 
 12th. Oth— ItUh.J 1 platoon of 1st— o7th. llth. l^th— o7th. 
 1 platoon of 1st -o7th. I'Jth. U>th -o7th. 1 platoon of 
 1st — 57 th. 
 
 ors south of tho Vionvillo — Mars-la-Tour chausstV by Couer.nl von 
 Sohwaiv.UoiHHMi's onior. b\— liUh then tidvanood oxaotly botwtvn tho 
 loft of tho skirmishors of 1st— fiTth and tho risht of 2d— r>Tlh and 
 maintaiuod its souoral dlrei'tiou. thus hroakiug up 1.— STth from the 
 bosinniug. 
 
 *0u tho maps of the Rogimoutal Historios of tho KUh and 57th 
 Rogimonts, tho r-.th and (Uh Oomvvvnios of tho KUh Rosimont aro 
 shown too far to tho north, noar tho nwino rnnniug oast aud wost. 
 I disputed that in tho first edition of this book, and to-day. after 
 ivpoatod n->soatvh. 1 repeat that it is wrong, for tho 5th Frenoh 
 Chasseur l»attalion Jioror ct'ont'd to hold the angle where the two 
 ravines join. 
 
 tit is doubtful which of the two oompanios. Tth or Sth. was on 
 the right; it is of no taotioal oons^Hiuonoo jvnyway. 
 
 JThis statement agrot^s with page 271 of tho History of tho UUh 
 Regiment, hut ditTers materially with rog-jxrd to tho Fusilier I'at- 
 t:Uion of tho regiment. Captain Ohly has oontirmed my statement. 
 
 While abroad in tho fall of ISSO. I Uwrned of tho impending 
 publication of the History of the l(5th Regiment. Knowing th.at 
 such publications boar an official character. I endeavored to come 
 
Military- JI iHlorical. Hl/udiefs. I H 
 
 K<'f;orul lirif, 20() iii>-\«-vh to thr; Houth: 4fh — 57th, 'Ul — 
 
 r,7th, 2 r. (;. x. 
 
 (.'f> to Tonlour 7S0 t\\c )ohh<'H wcrx' not vr-ry hoavy, Jind 
 vvhiU- ilir- advance waH coniifni'd thence to the north, we 
 could diHiinctly Hee the advance of a portion — ffHtimated by 
 von Koll af OhaftalionH — of (/reni^'r'H divJHion in a Hontherly 
 dir<''lioii. II moved with threat rafjidity, in double time, 
 <h»ufi III'- Hlfjpe, and rear^hefj lli'- norflu-rn edj^e of the ravine 
 before we liad apf)roach<'d to within 80 — 100 inetr-rH of the 
 Huiiw from the Houth, <^)p[)OHed to thin infantry of the 
 enemy waH the j^reater f^art of F. — IfJth, f. — 57th, F. — 57th, 
 2 ]i')<)ii<-cr 'oinpanieH, X. 
 
 On the other hand, II.— Hith and I.- Hilli ff^uiid the 
 further edi;e of the ravine unoccupied, aw CiHHcy'H divi.sion 
 waH Htill on the niarr;h between Orey?^re Ferine and the 
 great road i'voiu P.tuville to MarH-la-Tour; I could plainly 
 obHcrve the movement frf>m my horne fbein^ with F. — 10th 
 and I.-57thj. The rij^lit and eenter of the brij^ade were 
 (jnder Hevr-re fire from Heve/;i| tieiH M, from the northern eflj^e 
 of the ravine; 2, from Ibti^ht 84t» to the road liruvilh — MarH 
 laTourj, Tlie Iohhch increaxed; we had ex[)ected to take the 
 enemy in flank, and now were flanked ourHelvcB fronn 
 Oreyere Ferme (CiHHey'H diviHionj. Thref? deployed bri- 
 gadeH of the enemy were i^itted against us at 5 o'clock, 
 
 to an iin']f;rHt,anfllng with thf rf;girriffnt in order to prevent further 
 incorre<;t HtaternentB by furniHhinK data bawed on my extenwive 
 r('.H«-/,i.r(.ht:H. It would have been Impertinent on my r^art to Inform 
 tbe re^^lment dlreetly that Hueh and Kueb KtatementH v/ere ineorreet. 
 I therefore aHked the regimental eomrnander for anKwerH it) Heveral 
 fjueHtlonw whieh I Htated would be Important for a taetleal study 
 baw;d on tbat event. I Ktated at the same time that it waH my Inten- 
 tion to publiKh the Htudy In 1881. The regimental commander 
 declined, and Hlmply informed me of the Impending appearance of 
 the IflHtory of the l«th Regiment, and that I would find In it 
 the anHwerH to my queHtlonH. The settlement of doubtful jxjintH 
 thuH became Impractlcahle. 
 
142 Inqviries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 which, subsequently, were reinl'oreetl by half a brigade (of 
 Cissey's division) and 1 chasseur battalion (of Grenier's 
 division). Up to this time our opponents were lying- 
 flat on the ground, so that nothing was visible except 
 the upturned visors of their headgear, and they cov- 
 ered our detachments on that shelterless ground with 
 a destructive fire. At about 80 — 100 meters south of 
 the ravine F. — Kith, and the line from F. — 10th eastward, 
 halted and attempted to reply to the enemy's fire. From 
 that moment the attadc flagged; the men lay down, but even 
 then failed to obtain cover; two-thirds of the oflicers were 
 hors-de-coni1)ot, and, deprived of its soul, the attack col- 
 lapsed. The men held out for a little while longer, then the 
 unavoidable happened — they fell back. 
 The following was the result: 
 
 1. The 5 battalions did not make their appearance be- 
 yond the ravine of Mars-la-Tour as brave assailants, for, out 
 of the 20 companies, but 8 (1st, 2d, 8d, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th— 
 16th and 2d — a7th) reached its northern edge. The troops of 
 the 16th Regiment opened the action before the center and 
 I'ight as stated, having the shorter distance to cover; they 
 did not find the battle-field so well prepared by the enemy as 
 did the others, and anticipated Cissey's division at the north 
 ern edge of the ravine; only when the latter came up in dou- 
 ble time were our companies compelled to give way before 
 the enemy's greatly superior numbers. 
 
 2. With the exception of these 8 companies, no pavt 
 of the line got farther north than a point 80 — 100 meters 
 south of the ravine. 
 
 8. Needle-gun and chassep6t did not mutually exer- 
 cise their destructive effect; the destruction fell on us alone. 
 
 4. After we had begun to retreat, the French got 
 within 50 to 30 meters of us simply because, concealed 
 
Mililary-IIislorical Studies. H3 
 
 by the denso smoke, they surijiised us, and because our in- 
 fantry was too exhausted to run. On the left of the bri- 
 gade alone (I. and parts of II.— IGth) the French inter- 
 mingled with our men; hence the 400 prisoners lost by the 
 16th Keglment. 
 
 5. It was only now, on the retreat, that our losses 
 amounted to destruction. Details will be found in the 
 chapter on losses. 
 
 As the French line arrived within 150 meters north of 
 Contour 780 the 1st Guard Dragoons appeared and whirled 
 the enemy's infantry down. The latter ran to the rear, 
 masking the front of the French position ; they forgot to fire, 
 or fired wildly, and threw away knapsacks and arms. A gen- 
 eral pause ensued along the entire line of battle; even the 
 artillery was silent; the action seemed ended. The brave 
 horsemen saved many of our men from captivity. 
 
 Subsequently the signal "All advance" was heard from 
 the direction of the Tronville copse.* It came from .the 
 20th Division. A few minutes later the 38th Brigade could 
 be seen divided into two groups, one in the angle between 
 the Tronville copse and the Vionville — Mars-la-Tour road, 
 the other 500 meters east of Mars-la-Tour: the former the 
 57th Regiment, under Major von Modem; the latter the 16th 
 Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sannow. Six bat- 
 teries were in action north of the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville 
 road. The above is the course of the action. 
 
 To reach the battle-field the 38th Brigade had marched 
 37 kilometers under an oppressive heat;t still its strength 
 was not all spent. 
 
 At a distance of 2500 — 2000 meters (approximate dis- 
 tance of the Vionville — Mars-la-Tour road from the line 
 
 *Itmay have been 5:45 or 6 p.m. 
 
 fThe Oflficial Account states the distance as 42 kilometers. 
 
144 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 Height S46 — Grey^re Ferme) one-third of the companies 
 were deployed as skirmishers.* At the beginning the first 
 line was formed of skirmish lines supported by a platoon 
 each. In second line followed, in half-battalion formation, 
 8th, 6th— 16th; 4th, 1st— 16th; ,12th, 9th— 16th; 11th, 
 9th — 57th; 12th, 10th — 57th (in company column, two to- 
 gether); while 4th — 56th, 3d — 57th, 2 pioneer companies, X. 
 followed as individual company columns. When the first 
 line halted 80 or 100 meters south of the ravine, it was 
 joined by the second line. The 4th — 57th and 3d — 57th were 
 retained lying on the ground in close order 200 meters far- 
 ther south upon signal from Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll.f 
 In the last stage of the action 12th, 9th — 16th were lying 
 doivn in close order, 11th, 9th — 57th and 12th, 10th — 57th were 
 standing in closed line; 11th, 9th — 57th fired several volleys, 
 after which the advance was resumed, which, 20 — 30 meters 
 
 ♦General von Schwarzkoppen accompanied the troops on horse- 
 back as far as the Mars-la-Toiir — Vionville road — ;. c, within the 
 zone of infantry fire, remarking repeatedly, "Skirmishers only, 
 gentlemen." 
 
 tHe did not wish these two companies to slip from his hand, 
 because, as he said, he anticipated bad results from this "chase" and 
 from the disorder. Both companies suffered small losses. (Compare 
 later on with chapter on losses.) In the History of the 57th Regi- 
 ment, -which in other respects has profited much from the first edition 
 of this book, these two companies have been located on the extreme 
 right by the side of I. — 57th. The author's error is all the more 
 unintelligible to me as he was with 4th — 57th, and I can still see him 
 as he fell when hit by a glancing bullet. I moreover saw both com- 
 panies on the retreat. Had they been at the spot indicated in that 
 history, atid formed as a half -battalion hi company columns, their losses 
 would have been treble those they suffered, and something like those 
 of 12th, 10th— 57th. 
 
 But in addition these two companies, as the action stood, could 
 not have reached that point except by a diagonal movement, irliich 
 wotild have carried them over about 1000 meters of the most exposed part 
 of the entire battle-field. This statement alone has been sufficient to 
 draw from every practical officer to whom I have mentioned the sub- 
 ject the remark that it u'as impossible. But I saw these things plainly, 
 and the small losses of 4th, 3d — 57th constitute additional proof. 
 Aside from the military-historical point of view, such errors are to 
 be deplored as standing in the way of correct conclusions and lessons! 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 145 
 
 further, brought it up against the advancing masses of the 
 enemy (skirmishers and columns intermingled in one line). 
 
 The brigade thus had employed very different forma- 
 tions, ''swarms of skirmishers," ''closed platoons," "closed 
 company columns,'' half-battalions "in column" and "in 
 line," and that on ground of uniform character. This consti- 
 tuted a tactical error from the moment when Contour 780 
 was crossed; beyond that line skirmishers should alone have 
 been used, but in those days we had neither an accurate 
 knowledge of the efficiency of the enemy's rifle nor the requi- 
 site skill in the fighting of masses of skirmishers. 
 
 The regiments of the brigade fought abreast of each 
 other, and on arriving 80 — 100 meters south of the ravine 
 had crossed 1400 meters under the fire of the enemy's 
 masses; according to the Official Account, they lost 72 offi- 
 cers and 2542 men out of 95 officers and 4546 men which 
 they numbered before the battle. The strength as given 
 is approximately correct; in the case of the losses the fig- 
 ures are incorrect.* There was no lying down or rushes 
 during the advance. Three battalions of the brigade, 
 F. — IGth, I. — 57th, and F. — 57th, advanced in the then much 
 affected "accelerated" step, without pause of any kind, and 
 did not halt until forced by the fire and by the attack of the 
 enemy. Hence the expression "chase" on the part of 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, and hence the physical ex- 
 haustion when forced to halt. I am unable to state 
 whether II.— IGth and I. — 16th advanced by lying down and 
 by rushes; I could not always observe them; but I consider 
 that statement to be one of the stories which are wont to be 
 spread as history and by other means in connection with 
 most any event. The 57th Regiment is indebted to the 
 1st Guard Dragoons for losing but few prisoners and for 
 
 ♦Compare later chapter on losses. 
 
146 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 tbe escape of most of those that had been captured; the 
 10th Regimeut fared N\orse and lost more than 300 men, 
 mostly from the 2d and 1st battalions, because the charge 
 of the dragoons could have no effect in that quarter. From 
 the right of 3d — 57th (extreme limit of their attack to the 
 north and east), the dragoons wheeled to the left and gal- 
 loped back circling around Mars-la-Tour 250 meters to the 
 north of Contour 780. The material results of the attack 
 were not proportioned to the losses. Lieutenant von Streit, 
 who visited the enemy's position on the next morning, as- 
 sured me that not 10 French dead were lying north of the 
 ravine which runs east and west. The half-division had 
 had nothing to eat all day. 
 
 III. Eefrospects. 
 
 Of the two attacks which we have undertaken to eluci- 
 date after thorough research, the first, in view of the mod- 
 ern state of tactics, can claim historical interest only; its 
 details could not be carried out against an opponent armed 
 with small-caliber rifles,* and what was formerly practica- 
 ble in the way of tactical leading of large units is barred 
 by the modern rifle with its flat trajectory, long range, and 
 great penetration. The second attack, on the other hand, 
 remains to-day almost the only source from which, by 
 judicious use, we may derive practical laws for the tactics 
 of the future; for that purpose it is necessary, however, to 
 dissect the events under the magnifying-glass, so to speak. 
 
 Notwithstanding the difference in the general state of 
 the battle, of the numbers engaged, of the armament, and 
 of the unequal results of the attacks, both have many fea- 
 tures in common which provoke instructive reflections. 
 
 ♦Wherever small-caliber rifles are mentioned, smokeless pow- 
 der is also assumed. 
 
Military-IIisiorical Studies. 147 
 
 The dissimilarities are to be found in the first place in 
 the objects of the opponents. The object of the defense of 
 the wood of Briz was, and could not be anything else but 
 to cover a retreat already begun. At Vionville (Mars-la- 
 Tour), liowever, the French meant to hold the field of battle 
 and to repulse our attacks. At Problus the forces of the 
 defender were about equal to those of the attacker; at Mars- 
 la-Tour they were far superior to ours. 
 
 The armament of the f?axon-Austrian infantry was 
 inferior, that of the artillery equal to ours, if not superior, 
 but at Vionville (Mars-la-Tour) the arm of the French in- 
 fantry was much better than that of the German infantry, 
 while the artillery of the latter excelled that of the French. 
 
 The attack on Problus-Bor succeeded; that on the 
 heights of Bruville was the greatest tactical defeat suffered 
 in any attack in the entire war. The conditions were 
 similar at Konnigratz and Vionville: 1, as regards the 
 morale of the Saxons and of the French; 2, as regards their 
 tactical efficiency; and 3, as regards the field of battle. 
 The position in the wood of Briz had been artificially 
 strengthened, but it was not thereby rendered more difficult 
 to assault than was the other by the ravine extending along 
 the front of the French position; and if the obstacles on 
 the latter field are considered — wire fences, which were cov- 
 ered by the enemy's infantry fire — the French position is to 
 be considered stronger than the Austrian. 
 
 The attacks of the 14th Division on Problus-Bor and 
 of the 19th Half-Division on the heights of Bruville differ 
 chiefly in respect to the preparations, the deployment, the 
 proper disi»ositions, and the promulgation in unmistakable 
 form of the object of the action ; as regards the leading of 
 large units under the enemy's fire, they are instructive on 
 account of what was done as well as on account of what 
 
Its Inquirit's into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 WAS i\oi tloiu\ 'riu> \\'\\\ \o \vi\i\ Mini i'oniritl was (lu> saiut* 
 on ho{\\ oiOMsious; llu> sUill dilTorcil. 
 
 I am (lisiiu'liiuMl to admit as a faot that dirtH-tiiui >vns 
 moriMlilVuull at Mars la 'l\n\r than it was at IM-oMus; tluuiiih 
 ii was moiT ri^strioltHl— /. c. in spai-t'. Tlu* (HHUMillit's of 
 loadinji' and control wtMo probably jiroattM* at Trobhis. for 
 thoro loatitM's and troops w(Mt> aliUo without warliko t>xptM'\- 
 oniH» — »'. ('., prartii'o. and 1 bolit>vo that on that vorv ai'coiint 
 llu> ailiim was diroctt^l with (ho ii't>n strii-lni^ss. and at 
 tlu^ san»t> timo with tho si-rupuhmsnoss. ohara^'ttM'istic of a 
 poaotM^xot'iiso. At Mars la 'Pour all tho headers and uiauy 
 of tho nuMi had war t>x|>(>rionrt>. 'V\\v arnnnl poav'o from 
 18(U> to ISTO and tho manifost dosiro for war on tho part of 
 tho Fronoh had uiortH>vor rompt^lod ns to stndv tlioir tao 
 tics, so that a knowliHluo of thorn on our ])art may b(» as 
 sumod. Oral and writltm instructions issutnl bt^foro tho 
 war attest that. It cannot bo admitttnl that wo faiUul to 
 foresee bt>fort> the collision what was impendiuii' and what 
 would be required of tlu» leaders. They knew that on 
 ground devoid of shelter and under destructive infantry 
 fnv combined dirtnMion was bound to conic to an end. and 
 that, once that point was reached, the troops would be out 
 of hamf : if such was tht^ fact, practical success could not be 
 ijainiHl under !iuch circunisti}nee.<. If, n\oreover, the leadiM's 
 exposed themselves unduly — as was dom^ — fiu* the purpose 
 of compt^Uinji- success — the loss of the leaders, t^vtMi of the 
 superior leaders, became unavoidabh\ which happenoil, as 
 we know, and nothitiji' could remain of a large body of 
 troops but dead scoria\ morally and physically broken, with- 
 out orjjauizativui, without leaders, and for the time heini] nut\t 
 for stM'vice. 
 
 It is wrouii' to exan\int^ the situation of individual 
 troop units in an abstract way. Frontal attacks against 
 
Military- ffistorkal Htudip./t. 149 
 
 :i w«'ll l<'<l <-ii<-tiiv proiiiiH*- rcHullH only Jiflcr lli«- Hup'-riorify 
 of fin- liJJH br'cri j^aiiicfJ. To (l;iy the dociHiori jh Wic work of 
 (lio fIsinkH more IIijjii t-vi'V, and horo Ihf; action of Iho Army 
 of flic Klhc on .Inly ''., IHOfJ, alHO forniH {^oo<l illuHfrafioii. 
 Mh niiirvli (o (he field is (»|>cn lo fril iciHiii, ;iri(l in Hfafirijj 
 Oiaf flic Jiriny waH i(>]\i\H'\\c(\ to wiiMJ through a <l<'flIo 
 (Xccluniilzj tlic ()tli(;iii.| A(:<:ot]nt \h in error.* To ndrlnco 
 [)ioor iH (piitc nnn«'<'('HHary. Rtill, after the delay of (wo 
 lionrH, the cxeollenc*' of Hut leading of the Army of the Elbe 
 (Mtli and IHtli DiviHioriH) eannot be denied. The initiative 
 of the Hubor-dinate lead<'rH never tr-ariHf^reHHed beyond the 
 boiindH of llie fij^htin^-f^ronnd of (he brigade, and the mo- 
 ment, a HnceeHH had been won, meanureH were; taken to 
 Hecure it before i)ro('eedint^ further.! We have here nii- 
 merouH nieaHureH, none of whieh waH laekin^^ in uniformity 
 an<l eombiriJition of leading. It might be ealied ;iti ideal 
 cawe of the liiHk HyHt<'jn, but ;i moment'H reflection will show 
 that modern conditionK would <all for material modifica- 
 tiouH. Such i»rogreHHive, HyHtematic, and cautiouH action 
 loHt to the victor great reHultH, to be Huro, for there can be no 
 doubt flint after the capture of the wood of I*ri7>, the entire 
 2Kth I'ligjKh' might have advaneed on liriz and KoHnitz, if 
 the Mill) Division li;id followed (he j4(li by the HhorteHt route 
 through Pi'obluH and KoHiiifz, iuHtead of making a long 
 detour and getting Htuck, and if the IHth DiviHion had 
 been y)ut in motion in the HJiine direction, which waw not at 
 :ill iriifiracticable. Tli;i( would have rcHnlted in a catas- 
 trophe to the AuHtriauH on the field of battle. One of the 
 
 ♦PaKo. 399, II., Omcfal Af.coiint of 1800. 
 
 tSelziir<; of lli(! croHHitiK .'if NffliunH.K, ejipl iiie of .Ncfluinitz, utn] 
 Liibrio, oftfii nation of f,h»! wf)0'l and riffRo of I'opowltz, of the wooi] 
 of 0()fM-I'rlrn, of the villaKfrH of Nffii- and Nifjdor-I'rlm, of the pheaH- 
 antry of .lehlitz, of Stezire)<, Steinfelrl, 01)er-l'rlnri, ProbluH, height of 
 ProinuH, wood of liriz, and farmstead of IJor. 
 
1;>0 Inquiries info ihe Tactics of the Future. 
 
 oluof roasous >vliv things iliil noi lakt' siuli a uiiu was ra*ii- 
 oral voii Horwartli's failure to havo tho loqiiisito bridijos 
 built at tlu> proper time. Kut even as utattois aotuallv 
 stoiHl. the luaiu foiees. .'> ilivisious of the Arniv of the Klbt\ 
 would have reaehed the Austrian line of retreat sutVu'ieutly 
 earlv. if the eoiuiuander oi tln> h»th division had resolutely 
 followed the direetion of Problus. The division -would eer- 
 tainly have been joined by the troops at that village and in 
 the vicinity, a^si they felt themselves morally ami physically 
 equal to it, ami tlu> situation dematuh\i the utovement. 
 That was wt^U reoojjni/.ed by the 14th Division. Here, 
 however, we have the ease of (uMieral von Kt/.el, which 
 resembles that of tuMieral voii Kraat/. at \ionviUe. lu 
 order to see the connection of thinjjs, it is necessary to lay 
 bare the causes without sparinj;: otherwise we fail to arrive 
 at history or at correct deductions, or to jiain anythiup: use- 
 ful. Moreovt>r. the tnitire cavalry should have been at 
 CMiarbnsit/. which was likewise practicable. 
 
 The fact that we confronted an opponent whom we 
 never had overcome in a ui'eat battle, and whose ethcieney 
 we respected, accounts for these cautious tactics; they re- 
 (luired the presence of the hiijhest leaders at the decisive 
 points. In that respect the attack of the 14th Oivision 
 airain furnishes a model. 
 
 Subsequent history has demonstrated how easily the 
 lutxiern tire tijjht may degenerate into an action of numerous 
 companies and smaller bodies impelled forward by the more 
 bold than enlightened initiative of their oflicers. ^Ve have 
 had to experience the mischievous side of such individual- 
 i/.ed combat but rarely and in a limited way, but the tiuestion 
 of what will result when the individualized contlict emls in 
 ilefeat is most uncomfortable. The question might have been 
 answered by the battles of Vionville on August ItUh. and of 
 
M Hilary- I/islorical Hludun. 151 
 
 Loijfny on IX'coniber 2, 1870, IijkI not Ww. cwcmy b*.'<;n i»oh 
 hchh<mJ of Hiirli iiiiliiiiilcd Hhort-HiglitodnoHH. 
 
 / V. '/'aclicH at l'rohlunlior on July S, 1806. 
 On .July .'', IHOfJ, w<; boliold an fiiliro diviHion on diffi- 
 cult ground and ncvf-r for u rnorriont Hlipping from thu 
 graHp of itfi cornniiiinjc;' fr-oui hr-j^inning to (;nd of the 
 •action; everything waH reguhitod, and whatevf-r did creep 
 in waH at once Hnhjfctfd to control. in the attack, long 
 HkirrnJHli lincH followed by Hniall HiipportH alternated with 
 llic double eoliinin on the cr-ntr-r (FuHilier Battalion 57tli, 
 II. and I. Jiattalion ITtlij. At the key-point of the enemy'H 
 poHition, one battalion (F. — 5fith) Hnffered Ioshch er|ual to 
 thoHe HnH'err'd in 1H70 at the handH of Irn[>erial French 
 troo[)H ju-nied with breecfiloaderH, Jind uKliou^li deprived 
 of ilH leadei-H, it carried tli<; obntinately defended village by 
 aHHault. Immediately after the HucceHHfiil aHHault the flrHt 
 care waH for the defenne of the captured point. The diH- 
 ordered Hwarmn were re formed. Everywhere the diviwion 
 and brigadr; genenilH were active in the first line, gave their 
 orders there in perHon, jind Hfmrred on the troopH. The bat- 
 taliooH were re formed id ;i, v<-vy short space of time, and 
 every cover was carefully utilized to minimize the losseH. 
 In that way an entire division remained in the hands of 
 one man all the time and throughout the several hours of a 
 difficult attack; he always knew where the tactical units 
 (battalionsj were. It was the ben u( if ill idejil of a Inrge move- 
 ment in attack, carried out vvilh a perfection probably never 
 seen on any other occasion. 
 
 Not only did the officers throughout the military hier- 
 archy, each in his place, h;ep their Iroops in hand, but there 
 was at the same time no neglect of the second great tactical 
 hiw of Iceepinf/ the troops in motion as long as possible and of de- 
 
152 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 laying the lire until it promised good results. The action 
 of the entire 14th Division as it was would have been im- 
 possible had not time and circumstances been utilized before 
 the battle in the manner in which they actually were. 
 The lirst requisites for any tactical success are correct dis- 
 position, correct direction, undisturbed posting of the indi- 
 vidual, principal units (brigades) beyond the enemy's fire; 
 and, after the completion of the deployment from the 
 marching column, resolute and uniform advance to the at- 
 tack. These preparations are not the least instrumental 
 in securing success, and we attach the greater importance to 
 them in the attack because all were not sutticieutly respected 
 in the attack of the 38th Brigade on August IG, 1870, and be- 
 cause plan, disposition, and deployment are rendered more 
 difficult by smokeless powder and long-range rifles. Generals 
 and general staff officers had spent the forenoon of July 3d in 
 familiarizing themselves with the battle-ground; to be sure, 
 they had more time than on August 16, 1870. After the 
 tactical bodies had been directed into their courses, the 
 most important law on which all tactics are based, that of 
 human nature, was strictly observed. The march was not 
 stopped at the edge of the zone of fire, but continued within 
 the same, without, however, losing control of the troops. The 
 first halt in the attack of the 28th Brigade being made within 
 250 meters of the enemy's abattis. Up to that time the resist- 
 ance of two Saxon battalions on the edge of the height south 
 of Problus had to be overcome, and the rows of dead Saxons 
 bore witness to the efficiency of our infantry fire. The height 
 of Problus commanded the entire fi^ld which the 28th Brigade 
 had to cross, and in front of the abattis of the w^ood of Briz 
 the ground was devoid of any cover for .300 meters. That 
 we were able to advance so far without check was due to 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 153 
 
 the enemy's armament, to the tactical forms employed by 
 the assailant, to the unequal distribution of the defender's 
 forces,* and to the uniformity, celerity, and vigor of our 
 movements. 
 
 Psychological Matters. — The great Frederick overcame 
 the armies of half of Europe, not only because of his great 
 personal military superiority, but also because his tactics, 
 their nature, and the appropriateness with which he applied 
 them, rested on a sound basis, on a knowledge of human na- 
 ture. Where he deviated therefrom, as at Kollin, his grena- 
 diers, notwithstanding their iron discipline, vanished as did 
 the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour. The great king and leader 
 was a psychologist, and expressed himself in that direction 
 as unreservedly as in all other directions. Hence his con- 
 tinued success. When his army was already imbued with 
 the confident military spirit which generals spread, the 
 great king in his secret instructions to his generals w-rote as 
 follows: ''The average Prussian soldier is indolenff — i. e., 
 he does little or nothing of his own accord, he has to be 
 driven. The great king never forgot that no one likes to die, 
 and that natural egotism strives for the longest possible 
 preservation of life and shuns mortal danger, and his words 
 may still be applied to many of our men. In taking notice 
 of this fact we gain an approximately correct idea of what 
 may be expected of the man in the way of self-sacrifice, and 
 how much remains to be accomplished by discipline and by 
 the personal example of the officers. This knowledge will 
 assist us in devising suitable forms by w^hich we can make 
 use of the indolent individuals. There is an anecdote 
 
 *F.— 57th. for instance, hardly met with any resistance, so that 
 it would seem that the enemy had withdrawn from that point, while 
 I.— 57th as well as I. and II. — 17th encountered obstinate resistance. 
 
 t'Tlie General Pilnciples of War 'ir struct ions by Frederick the 
 Great after the second Silesian war. 
 11 — 
 
154 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 Avliicli, like many others, characterizes the lack of suscepti- 
 bility of our men, aud I quote it as showiuj; (hat beautiful 
 words aud fervent speeches frequeutly are lost on them. 
 A commander of the Pouieraniau Cuirassier Regimeut, in 
 proud remembrance of the past achievements of the regi- 
 ment, is said to have begun his address as follows: "Cuir- 
 assiers, lloheufriedberg Cuirassiers," etc. The words 
 sounded strauge, and through the ranks of the armored 
 horsemen passed a whisper: "What 's that? We are Pase- 
 walk Cuirassiers!"* 
 
 Many of our men are inii)ri'ssed by one thing only, by 
 deed. Hence, the great king rewarded on the spot every dar- 
 ing deed, every bold resolve, in order to spur ambition and 
 exercise a direct intluence on the masses through the zeal 
 and heroism of the ollicers. Success in the great king's 
 attacks rested on the conviction that any check in the attack 
 movement was equal to a failure of the attack. Hence he 
 did not create artiricial rest- and breathing-spells, but 
 endeavored to aroid them, and tactics culminated in the 
 cultivation of that sense of honor of the olticers which is 
 our particular strength, and in the develojnnent of their 
 will-power. 
 
 That constituted their training. The moral effect of 
 fire is, as a rule, more destructive than the material effect; 
 this is still more the case to-day in consequence of the small- 
 caliber ritles, and particularly of the new projectiles (im- 
 proved shrapnel, torpedo shells), than formerly; and in the 
 purely theoretical sense those tactics ought to be the best 
 in which the moral force of the leaders is most effectively 
 manifested. But the attack on decisive points was as 
 bloody under the linear tactics of Frederick as at the time 
 of Napoleon's column tactics, and in the more recent past. 
 
 ♦The regiment was quartered in Pasewallj.— T/*. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 155 
 
 which partakes of both. The great king's tactics were 
 based on disriplino as strict as that of the Romans, and his 
 generals were heroes like the generals of old Rome. Move- 
 ment and fire effect were intimately connected, the soldier 
 fired by command; the ranks were kept closed as much as 
 possible; fire was opened at short range (about 200 paces), 
 and with a heretofore unknown intensity and rapidity; anfl 
 that which the great king accomplished by closing on the 
 enemy with as many muskets as possible, and then shaking 
 him by fire regulated hy command, constitutes to-day the 
 aim of many tacticians; compare the "Summer Night's 
 Dream."* It is a significant fact that in the case of 
 every large attack heavy losses were reckoned with from 
 the beginning, and that the will to be the first in the hostile 
 ranks and the last to withdraw was systematically culti- 
 vated. The bold spirit of the attack of the Prussian Army 
 is the gift of the great king, and should be fostered par- 
 ticularly on account of the modern arms. The tactics of 
 the great king took account of the weakness of human na- 
 ture, were in keeping with time and circumstances, and were 
 healthy. We, on the other hand, take no account, or too 
 little account, of human egotism, and look upon man as part 
 of some sjjlcndid mechanism and expect him to act with 
 the same precision, instead of giving due consideration to 
 the failings of human nature. Meckel and his followers 
 represent one extreme with impossible demands on the pres- 
 ervation of closed "firing machines," and their opponents rep- 
 resent another extreme with impossible demands on the 
 morale of the men, such as the majority of them are. There 
 the closed ''firing machine" — i. e., the officer — is expected to 
 do everything; here demands are made on the man such as 
 will be fulfilled only in an army of heroes, in the belief that 
 
 ♦Berlin, E. S. Mittler &. Son, 1887. 
 
150 Int]uiri(\< into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the iniiul Nvoultl rt^placo the soul, and intolliiiviu-o, courage. 
 Of all tho levors, ogotisiu alone never ceases to operate; 
 it sni)presses the other forces in the case of most men when in 
 great danger; and if self-preservation is habitually looked 
 upon as the most natural aim, while the leader, on the other 
 hand, must at all times insist on the highest personal sacri- 
 fice, that of the man's life, this existing and permanent 
 antagonism should prompt us to lay our stress on the culti- 
 vation of nu>ral ftu'ce and intelligence, and to endeavoi' to 
 retain or regain the command and control of men, so that 
 the leader may be able to lead his men and nmy be held 
 accounfahU for the fulfillment of his duty. The requisite con- 
 ditions, contempt of death and heroism, will-power and zeal, 
 determination and discipline of the s]urit. can be found in 
 satisfactory (|uality tmly among i>rofessional si^ldiers; not 
 among hirelings, and only in a corps of oflficers which, wher- 
 ever it may be, makes intelligence and moral force and un- 
 swerving sense of duty its aim. and which is burning with an 
 v.raltcd ambition, the ambition of devotion to the common 
 weal, to king, fatherland, and nation, to all the ideals which 
 fill the breast of the man of superior education, of sujierior 
 moral strength and of noble views of life, which make a man 
 of the officer and exalt him. These moral forces will ever be 
 intrinsic properties of healthy tactics, but they do not de- 
 velop their beneficent eftects until the individual is sufti- 
 eiently advanced in years to comprehend the meaning of 
 the term rcsponsihilitif. Responsibility in itself compels 
 reflection and Jahor, generates a moral conception of the 
 profession, a sense of duty, a love for one's own goal, and 
 inspires men who are appointed to act with courage, 
 provided they possess inner worth, faith, and confidence. 
 Weak men invariably shun responsibility; instead of dis- 
 closing and stimulating their determination, responsibility 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 157 
 
 does not manifest itself in such men at all. It is requisite, 
 therefore, that among men whose inldlectual powers are ex- 
 pected to operate consciously in great danger and under great re- 
 sponsihility, the strengthening of the character be made the 
 basis for everything else; and although unusual strength of 
 character is, as a rule, an inherited gift, yet it may be im- 
 parted to a certain degree to all well-disposed men by sensible 
 training; chiefly by the citation of fine examples of deeds 
 of devotion and self-sacrifice, by assigning a conspicuous 
 place to the ethic-moral principle in the theory of life and 
 in education, by the exercise of abstinence and of renunciation 
 of the pleasures of life, hy an introspective mode of life, by the 
 acquirement of love for v;orh, which of all is the only lasting 
 pleasure on earth. Legitimate and moral egotism is not 
 debarred by such a theory of life from having a strong, 
 material aspect, which is fortunate, since everything, in 
 order to be sound, should have a moral and a material side. 
 The sense of duty and consciousness of responsibility to- 
 gether are the chief levers stimulating the intellectual 
 powers, for it is only under the agency of the sense of respon- 
 sibility that one works seriously. Eesponsibility teaches 
 reflection! Acute thinking, if continuous, is the greatest 
 strain that can be imposed on man. Its effect is strength- 
 ening, not weakening; for it becomes indispensable to the 
 brain, which forces the material substance to follow, even 
 though the miserable body be struggling against it. Re- 
 sponsibility also engenders the proper sense of shame, which 
 constitutes a powerful lever in overcoming moments of 
 weakness. I have seen men who succumbed in such mo- 
 ments, and have convinced myself in the course of associa- 
 tion that they were men devoid of innate worth, or possess- 
 ing it only to a small degree, but who, in the absence of the 
 true sense of shame, were all the more haughty. Culture en- 
 
158 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 genders modesty, lack of culture arrogance; and though, iu think- 
 ing of the many dangerous situations in which I have been, 
 I can by no means deny a creeping sensation, I have in every 
 case inwardly rejoiced to have overcome the weakness and 
 to have risen superior to the lower instincts inborn in man; 
 and I am free to state that I invariably rose superior, without 
 asserting that I am naturally and unusually brave. In 
 inquiring what made me invariably rise superior to myself, 
 I find in the main two forces: intellect, and through it duty; 
 responsibility, and through it shame. I have made a psy- 
 chological study of myself iu order to render an honest ac- 
 count to myself in every instance as to how my heart stood, 
 whether I retained control of my mental powers, etc. 
 I considered it a discipline of intrinsic attraction to me, and 
 have made the discovery, that progress therein is toilsome, 
 that it frequently has to be begun over again, and that the goal 
 cannot he reached unless the mind has previously heen trained to 
 work. I therefore think less of the "smartness (Schneid) of 
 youth," though it frequently leads to fine results, than I do 
 of that of the more mature age, because the latter implies 
 greater development of the mental powers; the smartness 
 of youth and the will-power of women frequently resemble 
 each other. Human nature, however, easily defies far-reach- 
 ing theories; the more developed mind of mature years 
 should, therefore, never be in doubt as to what it wants — 
 what is reasonable, in order not to ruin the buds of youth be- 
 fore they unfold into blossoms. I could almost wish again, 
 in my more advanced age, to see a war with man-killing bat- 
 tles for the sole purpose of comparing my own self of these 
 years with that of my youth. In no danger did I ever con- 
 sider myself more than a fair average, but I have seen many 
 officers above this average, and some below; among the for- 
 mer were those for whom I could not suppress my adraira- 
 
Military -Historical Studies. 159 
 
 tion, and I must add that many soldiers have also excited my 
 admiration, and these brave men I place above the best of the 
 officers. I cannot say that I ever felt hatred, or that hope 
 of reward was much of a spur to me; on the other hand, 
 an understanding of the situation, keeping my eyes and ears 
 open, observing the action of my peace-time acquaintances, 
 that of our own troops, and of the enemy, etc., has had a 
 greater attraction, for to me man has ever been and is most 
 instructive; I found that man changes more or less, not 
 excepting those whom I ought not hesitate to consider as 
 endowed by Nature with the essential gifts of the hero. 
 
 Since I am an average man, who, nevertheless, re- 
 mained master of his intellect in serious, staggering situa- 
 tions, it ought to prove, that by means of careful education 
 and training the same average measure of moral strength 
 may be produced in the case of all men who are not dejenerafed 
 — officers as well as men — particularly so in the case of 
 officers; and it would be right to administer inexorable punish- 
 ment tchenever that average fails to materialize. In this respect, 
 however, we seem to have become very indulgent; great 
 victories have induced a disijosition to leniency. This is of 
 doubtful expediency, and may lead to evil consequences. In 
 order to avoid sensation and publicity, many things have 
 been covered with the veil of charity; this may be political, 
 tut it is not military. Even in the case of people of superior 
 order, the effect of shame on their actions should not be 
 underrated. Shame was a powerful stimulus in the 
 rising of 1813. Shame then spurred the officers to the 
 highest human efforts — shame over the defeats suffered, 
 shame over the lost position in the state, in society, 
 and in the intellectual world. Shame presupposes con- 
 temporaneous society and a certain relation between 
 the same and the individual. If the contemporaries 
 
160 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 remain in ignorance of shameful deeds, tlieir noble 
 impulses will not be roused to action, and it was the recog- 
 nition of the necessity of this action that prompted the 
 great Romans to adopt their punitive measures. Again, if a 
 member of a community has the comforting knowledge that 
 nothing will penetrate beyond the four walls, such knowl- 
 edge may be instrumental in stunting the sense of shame, 
 the sense of responsibility, etc. Publicity, like everything 
 else, has its disadvantages; but, as war constitutes an act in 
 which all passions and forces of the individual are publicly 
 manifested, punishments should be made public no less 
 than rewards. And in the case of men who are not degen- 
 erate fear of punishment is a much more effective means than 
 hope of reward. 
 
 I have observed that those who were conscious that 1 
 knew of some weakness they had shown were ashamed, no 
 matter how often they had done the utmost of which human 
 nature is capable; I have known others w^ho avoided me on 
 that account, who could no longer look straight into my 
 eyes. Shame is invariably the lever, and it should therefore 
 be utilized. 
 
 If an army is composed of the dregs of society, the 
 officer with his moral qualities is everything, his men are in 
 reality nothing but a shooting-machine in battle; and when- 
 ever the battle has gone against them, these machines have 
 collapsed, even under Frederick, since the parts of the dis- 
 ordered machine have run so far that they could not be 
 gotten back under fire. Frederick himself has bequeathed 
 to us much classic testimony in this particular. When, 
 however, the army represents the sum of the nation's 
 strength, as is the case to-day, the distance between oflScers 
 and men as regards their qualities naturally becomes less; 
 and nothing is gained by the rod and other means, which 
 
Military-Historical Studies. J 61 
 
 formerly served their purpose. The greater respect for the 
 oflQcers should therefore be inspired by their higher intel- 
 lectual level, the road to which should be prepared with 
 clearnessand directness. The presenceof themost ideal class 
 of enlisted men in a national army, however, cannot extin- 
 guish the moral differences between officers and men; it can 
 merely modify them. Tacticians are wrong, therefore, in 
 •resuscitating the forms of Frederick or those of the attack 
 of the 14th Division at Problus-Bor (though it otherwise 
 stands as a model in military annals) as the only means 
 for controlling the forces, necessary for a decision, in the 
 act of advancing on the enemy; but it is no less wrong to 
 renounce at once all forms on the battle-field, and leave 
 the man to his own devices, because that puts leading out of 
 the question altogether, and because most men will not ad- 
 vance sufficiently close if left to themselves from the be- 
 ginning. The days of closed formations in the execution 
 of the attack are over, and probably no one believes in their 
 practicability to-day. Every important action is bound to 
 be a conflict of masses of skirmishers, and it only remains to 
 determine whether, in the application of this correct princi- 
 ple, the proper means have been adopted. Fighting in masses 
 of skirmishers restricts the authority of the leaders; and the 
 disorder thereby rendered unavoidable threatens to destroy 
 it entirely. Officers from the captain down should be par- 
 ticularly impressed with this fact. It will not be practica- 
 ble to eradicate the evil completely, but reasonable steps 
 should be taken to minimize it. The proper means will be 
 found in suitable tactics, in the moral training of the sol- 
 dier, in the efficiency of the officers, and in the greatest pos- 
 sible number of subalterns and non-commissioned officers. 
 Modern tactics require more subalterns and non-commis- 
 
162 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 sioned officers tbau formerl}', but this xery essential is 
 impossible with our modern mass-armies. 
 
 V. The Tactics at Mars-la-Tour on August 16, 1S70. 
 
 (a) PsycJiological Matters. — Before analyzing the action 
 of the 38th Brigade, I ask the reader to return with me to 
 the description which I have given. 
 
 The work is not very cheerful, but it is indispensable in 
 order to gain correct ideas and, perhaps, no less correct de- 
 ductions. The circumstances antecedent to the action of 
 the brigade and the psychical and physical condition of 
 the men will also have to be considered, since the tension of 
 the spirit in most men of the lowlier kind is dependent on 
 the physical condition of the body. 
 
 The 38th Brigade had marched from Bingen to Pont h 
 Mousson in ten days, and had stood the fatigues well despite 
 the heat. During the march news of victories arrived from 
 right and left, and the men were looking forward to an 
 encounter with the enemy with the greatest confidence. I 
 dislike the term "burning with eagerness," since it consti- 
 tutes simply a falsification of human nature, which would 
 rather preserve life than sacrifice it. But in this case 
 Napoleon's wicked declaration of war had affronted king 
 and nation; there was but one opinion and one sentiment 
 as to the king's resentment of the neighbors' insolent pre- 
 sumption, and what was then imbuing the German soldiers 
 was ardent love of country and fervent patriotism — in one 
 word, passion. The individuals therefore exerted their 
 strength spontaneously, and their splendid marching and 
 good behavior in battle constitute a fine field for inquiry as 
 to how far offended political honor may affect the morale of 
 troops in battle. 
 
 The cause of the general had become that of the sol- 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 163 
 
 dier, the cause of the nation that of the army, producing a 
 degree of most intimate and passionate fusion, the equal of 
 which is rarely shown by the psychology of war, even in its 
 fortunate periods. The course of events nevertheless 
 shows what passion may accomplish and what it may not, and 
 it may well warn us not to place too high expectations on it. 
 The battalions of the 38th Brigade reached the battle-field of 
 the 16th of August with an average strength of 900 men — 
 truly a splendid feat.* In comparing therewith the high 
 percentage of losses from sickness and infirmity customary 
 on marches in peace and in war, it becomes plain that here 
 will-power was the underlying cause: the will-power of the 
 individual, and thus of the army, withstood fatigues and 
 night marches, and insufficiency and irregularity of food. 
 With the thousand kinds of danger, however, in which 
 the life of the individual is directly threatened and where 
 the individual remains constantly under the impression of 
 such danger, battle reiiuires a much higher degree of will- 
 power. While it manifests itself on the march in dogged 
 perseverance, here it calls for buoyancy and heroism, and 
 frequently the same man who has marched until ready to 
 drop cannot he gotten from behind sheltering cover by word 
 or whistle, order or command, or even the repeated and 
 heroic example of the officer, to advance again over the fire- 
 swept space; and the same non-commissioned officer who 
 through a long term of service has enjoyed the reputation 
 of being a brave soldier, and has returned from some other 
 war decorated with the outward signs of his bravery, who is 
 expected to possess superior morale, and who is appointed 
 to the honorable duty of holding on high the symbol of 
 
 ♦According to the History of the 57th Regiment, the two bat- 
 talions of the Fifty-seventh numbered 31 officers and 1825 men as 
 they entered the battle (page 88), which agrees with the figures I 
 gave in the first edition. 
 
0\o \hvKm"« \>hou tho ort\oo\\«* NNUtoUful t\\o is not, or ran l><> 
 »\o Um\)SV>\ ou hi\«» «iui 0»ou oul,v »U>«s^ tho muoi^hI ou\Mou\ 
 wrtvx^ ovov 0\o rtoUi whou iho oomumu«l ^'Ooloi^w on \\\^W u^- 
 \s^U* 0\o Ih^»mvv t^nwjHM^U'U^Y tv> his \hU,Y, Suoh U \»i»u au»l 
 s«oh ttUo \s iW ^*o^^io^^ h\"»<iv of *U^Ut> rhawji^^s \uo?»( of 
 thorn oom\^UM<^lv> awtt viyivotT m>o>\ (htM>>Nol\os u»n,\ vS\jo 
 
 \ ««\t> t^> its 
 
 Whoow^^ U^uis* (»>»o\vN luust Kuow \uo\\» i\\\\\ iho ortloor 
 who o\Mo»^ thou\ into knOo shouUi uovor forjjx^t (hat tho 
 mtNj^suw ho av\^U<^ to himsolf Is j^»)>Uoahh^ to hut fow of 
 J\i« t\wn>» Nor !iho\th< ho forjjxM that wUl powor, <h^YOtiow, 
 \HMm^H^\ auti hra\on »K^ not \u\arlahlv aot \\\ tl\o sa>uo do 
 jiiw \« an othor\v\so <>t\so\uto uuu\, Vavio\\s phouo»uo»a 
 au\i !i^nuimo«t?ix h\M^il\ «tul «\o«ttt\ ^^lvS|H\!4Uiot\s, wUI t«\\v<\tr 
 tho s\>«\Ns stt>n>jith; uoYor xyJU it ho to iU^^y a?* it was ,Y<\stxM^ 
 *^«l\\ a«d tomovtvYY it XYiU W ditYo\v«t ftv«> \Yhat it is to 
 *hv>» TTho t>^oiutiou to ^iio a )ii>^M and uohU\ oaiu> atnl 
 hoixYio dtv^th marks that mowont \Yho« »ua« oxalts hitwsolf 
 to tho hijjhtvit ottioiouoY, ln>t it is not tho t)*M'*).3v .vf^iUfum of 
 jvs^Yohioai \it\\ l»v stud^viuji \vs^Yoholoj£\ iu taotios yyo o«« 
 wot tt^\m^ with kno\Yt\ quatuitit'^s, sitt^v \vj^>'ohi\^U viuai\titio«t 
 <^itYor as nw^oh as do \\\ow a«d van in tNU*h of thon\ OYor,\* 
 motnontx Tho s^uno dt^nt that I \><M'fortu toda.Y »\\sol«to\,v 
 and ««h*^itati«>il,Y t«a> at somo othor momont tiud \uo it^ss 
 \vt\^\^mH^ aud t\\ul^v. Tho S4UU0 is tht^ t^^st^ with tho tnajoi^ 
 itY of ot^»v\^ and ho who snviv{\ss»^s this \n»\>sntv is a\> ox 
 tmot>Una»\v n\an; ho has stnj^jHHi hi\>\solf of h\uuanit,Y; ho 
 is ji\>>«Uv F»«»tio wiU and othi^-^t will aiHHnnvUst\ jM^ai^ 
 ti^N^ll^v tho siuno t>^sn\ts, Tho iattor oxaits wan ahovo 
 hnman watnrt^; \vhi\o tho fornvor in>hn»^ him YYith an onthns 
 iasiu whioh »\*»m*\s him to tho limits of hnman aohioYo^nont^ 
 
 b\ an art^vv >vx^ havx^ no nst^ for fanaticism on a^^^nnt of 
 
fh*' ((.'■■ . /^. 
 
 m*! f'jfttntmfry . .-ink, h r>.fU^ »,, ;,'^(>n,j 
 
 ffftA* r J»W' 
 
 rr, .v*^fy 
 
 #*j*f*, h*fW0^*^t trill *t^#rf r*wMphi' ** *r%fr*^$^m ih fh*r fn\0f^ T> 
 )^ 'A \nAy(' fA ♦h i ' < r*^ If r^ «M mll*ir*A wMf fh^ 
 
 ff(0t(^, ithti Uft/f ;vv4 *fMM f^M^**, ^Pftr ffvwf* 
 
 I9r*<^^ rth4*^ th*' fftHft*^^A *A *rrtrfytUiftf( fh»f »ft*^>** *ft4 
 
 r^^Mvt^f 9ihA *rif*m ihtr mi^iu^M Ws*A * ^ftj^mr SA*^, f%ikt if 
 ' 'yft fA iAU^ miffrpffj HU^j^ fftt a nnnitj^iMi 
 
 '* (^^l>f^/^ tdhA mrrff *A ffc* ifi*'r '-^' '' ^ A t fl 
 
 \.. A 1-^ k^ \U fd'iftA. ffiA ftU fllM*«r»r tif, '% 
 
 yr*^*rm tit*'. f0if^tA*r irftm ^^'itt^ «r*/? 4fiA fh*^ imltt^A i/ft 
 
 .n\A h*^ * i¥mr*'jk tA ftAU'tcfym fjfp fh*'. *Att^A:f, h*/;t^m€ 
 mUmftAi/fAHitt r ftnA 
 
 <■;.-. .n 
 
 *'/mttt fh*', *Aff^':f 'A fh<^ bfliffl*' »« ';tf*<tf^^ Ir. 
 
166 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 with it. booauso it will enable bim as a leader to give 
 sensible orders. 
 
 I do not hesitate to aoknowledire that the tire at Mars- 
 hi-Tour atVeeted niv nerves for months. Troops exposed to 
 anything similar are demoralized for some time — the oflS- 
 cers as well as the men: nor am I alone in holding this 
 opinion. General SkobeletV. whose force and rare personal 
 courage no unbiased mind will deny, said after the third 
 battle of rievna: "We have made the assault and taken 
 the enemy's works, but the assault has cost us less than 
 the retreat. The terrible fire has demoralized oflBcers and 
 men. It should be well considered whether the prize is 
 worth such exhaustion. Demoralization is infectious, even 
 in the best army." Yet the losses of his troops did not 
 equal those of the oSth Brigade at Mars-la-Tour. Serious, 
 thinking men will not gainsay what 1 assert, since they know 
 themselves and human nature and judge its failings lenient- 
 ly: narrow, vain minds will oppose it, and to attempt to eon- 
 Tinee them would be to carry owls to Athens. Couragt 
 not based on transcendental convictions will soon pale. It 
 is said that before going to the war, Skobeleff consulted a 
 fortune-teller, and that she prophesied that he would escape 
 all danger unscathed; that from that time on he wore a tal- 
 isman in which he reposed implicit faith. It would not be 
 the first of such instances. Trajan, one of the finest and 
 most heroic personages in the annals of war, did the same. 
 Their opponents may call it weak, superstitious, unworthy, 
 and unchristian, and so it may be. but the warrior's Psyche 
 has nothing in common with the word : whence she derives 
 her strength is inmiaterial to the cause, so long as she is 
 there and is of the moral kind. 
 
 (i) Bemarhs on the Battle-Field and on the Enemy's Forces. 
 — Of the line of battle of the X. and III. Corps east of 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 167 
 
 Mar8-la-Tour nothing waH viKible except four batterifiS, 
 which were in action north of the MaiK-la-Tour — Vionville 
 road and west of the Tronville copse. On horweback, how- 
 ever (from Slope 780 of the map, Houth of the Mars-la- 
 Tour — Vionville roadj, we could survey the French position, 
 which extended from Height 840 to Oreyere Ferme; we even 
 could diHtinguinh a mounted group of some size among the 
 Troops on Height 846. It wan General Ladmirault with his 
 staff. To the right and left were long lines which we could 
 follow to the west as far as Greyere Ferme. Among the 
 infantry we could make out lines of artillery, which even 
 then were directing a lively fire on Mars-la-Tour and on the 
 4th Cuirassiers. It was not jjossible to make a correct es- 
 timate of the enemy's forces, but there could be no doubt 
 that at least we had a division in front of us. Moreover, the 
 sun was shining slantingly along the entire French position, 
 which was as yet free of smoke and dust. The conditions 
 were as favorable for a good view as they could be at that 
 distance. The clock pointed to 4 o'clock as the brigade 
 started.* 
 
 In time of peace any general officer who would attack 
 an opponent of whom he has no information, learning when 
 too late that he had run up againts a position unassailable by 
 frontal attack, and which was held by greatly superior and 
 better armed forces than his own, would be sent to Cov- 
 entry on the spot. That standard of measure is inappli- 
 cable in war, because in actual war various favorable circum- 
 stances might counterbalance the numerical inferiority of 
 the attacker. Such circumstances could not, however, be 
 counted here, as the enemy was awaiting us in deployed lines 
 under cover.r and we could not expect to surprise him. The 
 
 ♦When the 57th Regiment moved off, I wajj asked: "What time?" 
 I answered in a loud tone of voice: "It is 4 o'clock." 
 
 ^At lea.st Grenier'8 division. 
 
168 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 Vvvuch posilit)!! was as stroiiu as Ihoujjh Nalnrc meant lo 
 show by (his cxampK' how positions shonhl bo soh'ctod in fn- 
 turo. A slanlinij exposed plane oipiallin};' in oxiont tho i-an<:;(^ of 
 the rifle; at niedivni range an obstacU' in tho shapo of a nioad- 
 o\v-bottom Ji — 400 i)ares wido and en I np b.v nnniorous wire 
 fonees; at close ranuv a ravint^ which rondorod tho position 
 noxt to nnassailabU'. Ami of all this thoso in connnand 
 know nothinij, althoniih that part of tho uronnd had b(>on in 
 onr possession the whole forenoon I Tho example is 1_v])ieal 
 for the seleetion of a i)osilion on the part of a defender 
 who desires to profit to the fnllest extent by the small- 
 caliber rifle; f lie samo (>xami)h' also u;o(^s to show how caralrjf 
 should not act, how the si/steni of orders should not be r(\i:;nlated, 
 how the sifsteni of reports should not he mana.ued. Snftieient 
 reconnaissanee and eorrei-t and quick leports will pretMui- 
 nentl}' be required in the future, and the omissions in these 
 respects and on fhat ground are valuable lessons. 
 
 Before ii'oin.U" into battle on the llUli of August, Grenier's 
 division nnmberiHl, accordini;- to the latest resean-hes, 7750 
 rifles. At the time when the ;>8th r>rii>ade attacked that 
 division, the latter no lonjjer had the same strength, as it 
 had previously taken the offensive and been driven back to 
 the height of Bruville. Let us nevertheless take that figure. 
 The 08fh "Regiment and the ."th Chasseur TJatfalion of this 
 division stood at (^reyC're Ferme, whence they maintained 
 a rather weak tire action. The :^8th Brigade witli its 4400 
 rifles was fluM-efore pitttnl against 7750 rilles ou the 
 other side. 
 
 Cisseif's division numbered S350 rifles; it did not take 
 part, however, until the catastro]>he had become imminent. 
 The 57th and 7:>d Kegiments and part of the 20th Chas- 
 seur Battalion (about one-half of Cissey's division, some 
 
Military -II islorical Studies. 109 
 
 417.1 i\\\cH} \\\vuc(\ oil I Ik- ."'^tli lirij^adf, whilo \\\c rf-rnain- 
 iuiL, 4175 rifloH v/cac (ttii^nircil in tho dirf?frtion of MarH-Ia 
 Tour and againnf fho Ooinian artillfry y>OKtod farlh*fr woHt. 
 
 At tho (MJJininatin^^ point of tho action, thr-rofon', th<; 
 oppoHinj; forcfH wore 11,925 rifleH a^ainnt 4400; tho former 
 w*'ro on flu' Hfiot from thr- b^'j^inninf^, thf lattor r-nj^agod 
 f>.v.r:res<iii:':l.y and <it ahorter ranj(o, 
 
 A flirt lior jioint aj^ainHt the OermanH Khould be «pecial- 
 ly mentioned — viz., the very j^reat Huperiority In the nt]m- 
 ber of FrfiH-h t^unn, and in that partifiilar the attack of the 
 .'{Sth IJrif^ade diflerH materially from others. The fact haH 
 been eHtabliHhed that the entire Frr-rnh artillery of both 
 diviKioriH and the icH'^rv*' artillery were in action at the 
 time when the .'{8th lirij^ade wan croKHinj; the Vionville — 
 MarH-la-Tour road — i. «., 'id, 12, 12, and in addition 2 mit- 
 railleuHe batterlcK, making in all 72 giinH. Ah against 
 these 72 guns we had but '50. The nnperiority of fir^, not 
 only of the French infantry, but also of the artillery, could 
 not but be great under the 'ircurnHtanceB. 
 
 {cj The Dephymmt. — Thr; brigade as formed to the . 
 south w^Kt of Mars-la Tour lent its flank so much to the enemy 
 that its line was almost perpendicular to the enemy's front, 
 which may be explained, but not justified, by the fact that 
 Tronville had been assignf-d to thf brigade as its first objec- 
 tive. The order to attack was now received. The battle- 
 ground sprc*ad before us extended 2.500 meters from left to 
 right, and the regiment which had to take most ground (^57th 
 Regiment and 2 pioneer companies X.) should first have 
 gained its new front by a large wheel to the left, before the 
 general advance was begun. That was not done, as I have 
 shown above. 
 
 During the movement the unavoidable evil results be- 
 came apjmrent, and to minimize them every battalion com- 
 \z — 
 
170 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 mandor urged his troops forward at an increased pace. It 
 did not lu'li) any. The original error could not be made good 
 by a more rapid gait. The brigade had not paid sufficient 
 heed to the question of "space"; the battalions, even the 
 'Companies, became successively engaged, and were succes- 
 sively rei)ulsed, from left to right, so that the IGth Regi- 
 ment (.11. and I. liattalion) had already come to a halt at 
 the moment when the Fusilier Battalion of the Fifty- 
 seventh (right Hank of the brigade) just reached the skir- 
 mish line. The numerical conditions were quite inade- 
 quate for carrying out the attack, and the method of em- 
 ployment of our forces destroyed the last hoi)e of success. 
 
 To the blunder of ignorance as to the enemy's strength, 
 his position, and the battle-field, another no less fatal one 
 was added: proceedimj to ihc a I lad- irifhout previous suitahle 
 deployment* 
 
 (d) The .-l/^rtrA-.— During the great wheel to the left the 
 I. Batallion of the Fifty-seventh, when about 2500 meters 
 from the enemy (south of the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville road), 
 deployed two-thirds of 2 companies (1st and 2d) as skirmish- 
 ers by order of the division commander, and one of these 
 companies (2d — 57th) was directed by the division com- 
 mander in person toward the IGth Regiment, so that when 
 the battle came to a standstill, the distribution of the trooi>s 
 was as indicated in Sketch 111. 
 
 During the advance the troops crossed each other 
 obliquely. The attack itself was a "chase," so that the men 
 colla]>sed in front of the enemy's position from sheer ex- 
 
 *At the inspection of F. — 57th on the drill-ground on the Cher- 
 near Tours, by General von Voigrts-Rhetz in February, 1S71, General 
 von Schwarzkoppen was present, who just before had resumed com- 
 mand of the 19th Division. On noticing me, he came riding up and 
 said, in his jovial way: "Comrade, you were the adjutant of the 
 brave Lieutenant-Colonel von Riill. That was a had bufihirs>t at Mars- 
 la-Tour. Who could have guessed that so many were against us?" 
 
Military -Historical Studies. 171 
 
 haustiou. This brings me to the ravine at Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 The Oflicial Account states that all 5 battalions crossed 
 the ravine. I say only 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th— KUh 
 and 2d — 57th. During our advance the French opposed to 
 F.— IGth, I.— 57th, F.— 57th, 2 C. P. X. a strong line which 
 came forward to the northern edge of the ravine; our 3 half 
 battalions halted 80 — 100 meters south of the southern 
 ^dge of the ravine and did not get one step farther. It is not 
 sufficient to say so, however; proof must be adduced. In 
 doing that I beg indulgence for stating some personal ex- 
 I)eriences which I cannot omit, as they are part of the proof. 
 1 do not thereby intend to bring myself to the fore, and in 
 order to escape any such suspicion, the first edition of this 
 book was publislH'd anonymously.* 
 
 As far as 150 meters to the north of Contour 780, 
 Ohly's half-battalion (12th, 9th— IGth) and 4th, 3d— 57th 
 moved abreast of each other. The latter here threw them- 
 selves down upon signal from Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, 
 while the former continued its march by an order from 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Sannow, delivered, according to the 
 History of the Sixteenth, by the adjutant, Lieuten.ant von 
 novel. I was at the most 30 meters to the right of 12th, 
 9th — IGth. At that moment Vice-Sergeant-Major Thiel, who 
 commanded a platoon of 2d — 57th, came up from the left 
 and reported to Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll: "I report 
 respectfully that my platoon no longer follows me. They 
 are lying down. I have repeatedly rushed forward. It 
 was of no use." • Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, a man of 
 quick disposition, turned to me saying: "These fellows!" 
 and ordered summarily; "Ride back with the platoon 
 leader. You will find me with Lieutenant von Warendorff" 
 
 •Various reasons have in the meantime prompted me to put 
 my name on the title-page. 
 
IT'J ltujuirit'!< into the 'l\u'tics of the Future. 
 
 ^Ist — 57th). I rt';uh(>(l llu> platooti. :in«l tlu> brave ])l;»l(H)n 
 U'!\dtM'. a Uovo in iUv t'ullcsl si'use o{ i\\v wovA, wavitii:; his 
 8\vonl and calliii.u; "l'\>r\vardl" suctMMHh'd in cari'vin*;' sonu' 
 noui'oniniissioncd olVictTs and men >viHi liini. Most of tho 
 rtMunininj; nuM\ \v«M-t' Ivinu' d»>ad or wt>nn(h'd o\\ \\w urouud ns 
 [\\c\ had stood in [ho ranks, anions thi'ni sovtM'al whom 1 had 
 trained as i-ocrnits ii\ lS(!(i and IStlT. and whom 1 kniMv wtdl. 
 'rh»\v had ah-oad.v nu>t tho I'ati* of tho bravt> sohli(>r.* 
 To tho h'ft roar. ah>nsido of (Milv's half hat talitm, woro 
 (ho rt^st of those whi> advant'(>d to the foremost line. 
 TluM'e the plattXHi leadtM*. N'iet* St>rm>ant IMajor Thiol, was 
 UilltMl, iu\i\ also two non I'onimissiontHl oflieers whom 1 
 knew. 1 rejoined Lieutenant Colont^l von \\o\] t^xactly in 
 rt»ar of th(> riuht of Ohlv's half battalion. At that moment 
 nth. !Mh— oTth was o\\ onr riiiht foiinini; line and t»rin«; 
 •J or ."* vi>lh\vs. l.iiMittMiant (''i>lonel von Kidl remarked: 
 "Well. AVai'ondortY [Ist — r»7th| will bo lilad." [Uo assumed 
 that that eom])an,v was btMUtr sh(>t into U'ou\ the rear.) Kid- 
 inu straijjht forward, lu^ said to me: "Is that laentonnnt- 
 (^oliMiel Sannow?" 1 said it was. l.itMitenant (^olonel 
 von ludl rtMiiarktHl: "1 am lilad; we must iret sonu> order 
 in this business. V.- -.~)7th is lirinij into my llrst I'lMupany 
 U'ou\ tlu> rear, my stH'ond eompany has botMi torn apart by 
 tlu> nuMi of the Sixtt^enth. If only Hernewit/. [chief of 
 ;M — r>7th] will take .mux! oiwo of (h(> iH>lors. That is a 
 hellish tirt\" 
 
 He made several i>thtM- rtMuarks. 1 omit tluMu bt>eause 
 they were of a personal eharaettM- and had little io do with 
 the nuitter before us. 
 
 Thus we reaohed F. — l()(h. The followiuii was tho 
 sight wo behold: Liontonant-Coloiud Sannow had ordered 
 
 •Although oomplotoly iloployoil as skiimishors. tho company 
 lost 8 officers and 90 men. 
 
M Hilary- Historical Studies. 173 
 
 Oljly'H half'-halalljo/i to lie down in roar of \\nt hrd^f; which 
 haH Heveral timcH been mentioned, and waH availing hiinnelf 
 of the cov(!r alHo. To the right lay hin adjutant, Lieutenant 
 von Hovel, Heverely wounded, and the dead liorHen of both. 
 Cai)tain Ohiy wan in the center of 12th, 0th — lf»th, mounted, 
 clifrriiig liiH UM-n jind firing re[>eatedly from the Haddle. In 
 front and on i-iWM-v Hide of the h}j|f hafjillion, HkirniiHherH 
 W(?re lying on tli<- ground: thoHr; on flu- left from 10th — lOtli 
 and 2<l—r>7ih, thoHO on the right from Int — 57th; the half- 
 battalion itHelf wan in cIohc formation; a few nhotH were 
 fired from the firnt linr*, but no regular fire action was 
 maintainffd. Never have I Heen an oflicer of Huch cooIuchh 
 jjrid bravery an Cai)tain Olily, chief of 12th — IfJth. The 
 Higlit Ih indelibly inipreHKcd on my mind. IIIh Hharji voice 
 rang (hrough Ihe rolling fire of the enemy: "F.^rwiird. lids!" 
 ''Then; they come; look out!" Again: "High the colorw!" 
 Finally he rode* forward to carry (everybody with him, but 
 it wJiH in vain. The dr-ad and wounded were too many.* 
 Ah Lieutenant-Colonel von Koll halted in front of Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Hannow, the latter Hald: "Roll, you had 
 better dinmount." He did ho; immediately afterward the 
 horHe wan hit in the chewt; it rearr-d, and after a few boundn 
 foil dead. Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll then knelt bcHide 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Hannow, the latter remarking: "This 
 iH the only Hhelter. VV'e cannot advance an long aH the fire 
 Ih ho Hevere. We have to wait until they have fired away 
 their ammunition." 
 
 iH HO Hevere. We will have to wjjit until they have fired 
 awjiy their ammunition." 
 
 A f(;w minutcH later Lieutenant von Wolzogen, adju 
 tant of I. — lOtli, reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Hannow, 
 HiH white borne wan bleeding from Heveral woundH; he him- 
 
 •Thls half-battalion lost 8 offlcors and about 210 men. 
 
174 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 solf was uutoiuhod mul prosorved a horoio coolness* The 
 import of his inessajjo was: "My commander is wounded, 
 we are repulsed [I. — lOth], Colonel von Brixen is dead." 
 
 The adjutant had barely finished his words when the 
 enemy eharjjed from all directions cryinj;; ''En avant, en 
 arant! courage, courage Tf Lieutenant-Colonel Saiinow 
 ordertnl: "Back to the ravine; assemble there." Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel von Roll: "Warendortf [1st — HTth], there!"J 
 That ofticer, however, turned instead toward the Bois de 
 Tronville. Then: "Take n>y adjutant to the rear." These 
 were his la^t words; a bullet pierced his brave heivrt, and he 
 fell without a sound. 
 
 He was sickly, and suiTerinj; from abdominal a 'id 
 nervous ailments, but a rare will-power swayed the feeble 
 frame of his body. 11 Is heart was full of noble impulst^s. 
 A lucid intellect and admirable judgment were his. Idea 
 succeeded idea in rapid succession; the mind was never at 
 rest. To his nuMi he was a father; his sentiments were 
 those of a sterling Prussian otticer. Honor, duty, devotion, 
 
 •Of all the mounted officers who entered the zone of th.nt sweep- 
 ing fire, but three remained untouched: Captain Ohly and the Lieu- 
 tenants von Wolzogen and Bermuth, all of the liUh Regiment. Their 
 horses bore several wounds. 
 
 tF. — 16tJi and I. — 57th were probably 20 — 25 minutes behind and 
 on the flank of the hedge. 
 
 tOvD this part of the battle-field not a man got to the north of 
 the ravine of Mars-la-Tour. V^'hen visiting Captain Ohly in Cologne, 
 after the appearance of the portion of the Official Account here con- 
 cerned, I expressed my surprise as to who could have prepared that 
 statement. Captain Ohly's words were: "You know best where 
 I was juid my half-battalion. You were there." The fable of the 
 drummer who. after the victory of Belle Alliance, was put on a horse 
 to alarm the tlooing enemy, has been preserved down to our days. 
 Ollech, in his biography of General Reyher, mentions only one. 
 Delbriick, in his biography of General Gneisenau. mentions severaJ, 
 although the falsity of that widespread statement is proven by the 
 History of the 2d Dragoon Regiment, which appeared several years 
 before Delbriick's book. The attack of the SSth Brigade has lii like 
 manner been converted into a fable to the detriment of history. I 
 do not care to be instrximental in perpetuating the fable. 
 
Military- II igtorical Studies. 175 
 
 and kindnoKH j^uidod him. ff urnan fa'iUut^H, which, sm a rule, 
 iLr(t har'KhJy uud njfJiU'HKJy oori<J'-rnn<?r3, wcr^re invariably 
 irt'iiUid hy him with indnJgr:fnoe. 
 
 IliH nij^hlK wfffC' for the moKt part \hihh('<] without 
 HU'ftp. In i]\<t i\<']t] }\('. liardly r^vor indultjod in more than a 
 modfrato drink of wine or a cup of coffee. 
 
 Ife waH fond of Ktirnulatinj^ youn;^ offleerH to reflection, 
 and never evaded eriticiKm wljen preferred in a befitting 
 and conHiderate manner. He HometiraeH «eemed to pro- 
 voke criticiHm in order to change the Kubject and to know 
 the men. He knew them and mjide a formal ntudy of them, 
 lie had a lueKentiment of hiK death. ()u tfie march to the 
 battle-field, he Haid to me: "I nhall noon have an opportu- 
 nity to prove my pf^ace exjimple — but no;! shall not survive it/* 
 lid became Hilent then. After a while, he got out hiH cigar- 
 oaHe. "We will divide," he remarked, "PerhapH, it Ik the 
 IfiHt thing I give you. The battle will be bloody, verv 
 bloody. liemembf'r me when I anj no more and when, at 
 Kome future day in beautiful Hanover, you are Kpeaking of 
 to-day." He then relapwed into a brooding «ilence; it wa« 
 only in the battle that the buoyancy of hlH Bpirit returned. 
 
 I want to mention Komething else. At Pont a Moub- 
 Kon we were (iuart<rfd on a noble family, and the lady of 
 the houHe Hhowed uHtounding familiarity with the French 
 Army. At Hupper a lively conver-«ation developed, which 
 turned on generalH, armie«, etc.; afterwardH wc letired to 
 our room. During the night, an I waH about to lie down, 
 Home one knocked at ray dfK>r. "Do not lie down," 8aid the 
 lieutenant-f'olonel on entering. "It Ik clear outsid*; and 
 quiet, the warlike noine haH Kubnided, there is a beautiful 
 Htarlight 8ky; let u« enjoy it, and take a walk in the Hlum- 
 bering KtreetH." The convernation turned on the probable 
 outcomr' of the w^r. On the market Houarc Lieutenant- 
 
176 //;</// 1 /iV.s' i"///() the Tactics of llic Future. 
 
 (\\Un\v\ voii K('>ll s(op|)('il ill Iroiil of (lu> (own hall and 
 spoke ill an aninialcd lone: "He nhaJl overthrow the imjieriul 
 arntics, the throne of Nupotcon irill rollupsc, I'dris will fall. 'I'lte 
 nation is sicl- ami orcr-i'.rcitctt and is noinu to rise. Thinl- of the 
 l>ufi-e of Urunsirieli-, tlrink of Napoleon I. t>uch a man is (joinij 
 to arise III is time also; the name of the modern dirlulor vill proh- 
 ably be Leon (iambetta." Hardly had (ho echo diod away, 
 when an ahinn sijiiial ronsod (lu» sihMit camp. It was 
 Napoh'on (hiy, (ho \TA\\ of An«;iis(, and wo nn>vod in(o a 
 ]>osi(ion of ro.uiiiicss Ixm-miiso ini'oniia(ion had Ixmmi I'o- 
 ooivod (ha( on (iu> ir>(h of Any;nsl (ho I'^ronch niii;h( (Mk»> 
 tho olVonsi\(>. 
 
 lltM'o I nins( diijjiTss for a inonion( \o o(hor ihMails, bo- 
 oauso (hoy aro instruotivo. As 1 shall i>rov(> in iUo chap 
 tor on lossi^s. ours Inid boon <;roa( so far; s(ill no( so heavy 
 thai W(> would luwc Ixmmi (o(ally incapable of sonu' rosist- 
 anco. NN'liy did wo not niako that rosistanco? Uocauso 
 wo woro surpris(Ml in (ho fulU>s( sonso of (ho ((Mmu; so much 
 so (ha( (ho (roops, already for (he mos( part deprived of (hoir 
 oHlcors. lost (hoii' heads. ]\'<iirholo(jiral mot ires, therefore, 
 surprise and rinisternation with their ronsequenres, irere in part 
 the causes of the disaster. The course of ovonls was such (hat 
 bo(h sides, takinj; (ho olV(Misivt\ burst upon each olhor at the 
 most eritieal pidut and at the most eritieal moment, so (hat in 
 some places tho opponen(s aclnally ran iu(o one aiioduM*. 
 
 Holh had exocu(od a bi«j wheel (o (he lef( at tin* same 
 (inu\ Tin* Frencli wi(h Knoll S4(5, tho Oermans with Mars 
 la 'l\uir as (ho pivt)(. Tuilor llu^se cii'cnnistaiu'os. it w.is 
 natural (hat our rij^ht winii' encoun(iM-od (ha( i)or(ion of 
 tin* iMUMiiy wliiih had doploytMl durinu' our advaiico, or bet- 
 ter, which was awailinji' us. wliile our loft and llu> tMiemy's 
 rijjht mulually mi^t on tho otTensivo. 
 
 l?nt whih* wt> had Won unabh* to do the oiumuv either 
 
Military -Historical Studies. 177 
 
 niutorial or iiioriil (huiiaj^o, his poHilion, arranged in ticrn, 
 permitted of Die employment of liiH fire-arms on the most 
 extensive; scale, and of tin* employment of a part of Ida forces 
 on tin; offcjiMvc at Uie sanu' time. Tliereby we suffered much 
 materially and niorally. 1'li(* fire increased instead of 
 diminislied, it came nearer and nearer, the smoke became 
 imi>»;netrable. A greatly superior force; stood close in our 
 front unsuspected. Had the French not halted 80 — 100 me- 
 ters south of the ravine, and had they fought instead of 
 despoilin<; oiii- dead and wounded ukmi and liorseH, Ihe l»ri- 
 gad<' would liavt* been done for, and future history would 
 have chronicled: "To this jioint five brave I'russian bat- 
 talions i)enetrated; none canu* back." It would at the same 
 time; liav(; been the most suitable inscription on their monu- 
 ment on the field of honor as iji the annals of war. 
 
 I was being led to the r<*ar by a fusilier of the Sixteenth 
 and by a musketeer of I. — n7tli, part of the time by the 
 side of Lieutenant-Colonel Sannow. After he had turned 
 to the east, Lieutenant Ililken, of F.— 57th, came along; he 
 was leading the horse of Captain Kcholten, of the Sixteenth, 
 who had been killed, and asked me: "Don't you want to 
 mount?" I replied: "I can't; I am wounded." He said: 
 "Kteinmetz has probably got enough by this time.* What 
 nonsense this is! Thank heaven, the French are not send- 
 ing cavalry after us." 
 
 When he had gone along a few paces, a fusilier of 
 12th — 57th by the name of Opderbeck passed us; In? was 
 shot through the left arm or through the left liand. which he 
 held out, scicaming with pain. T addressed him rather 
 roughly, "Don't yell so;" Dpd<'rbeck then took the direction 
 
 *It was ihon believed that the battle was being conducted by 
 General von Steinmetz in continuation, as it were, of that of the 
 14th of August, and he was the first that would be credited with 
 "taking the bull by the horns." 
 
178 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 of Mars la-Tour, Avith cvidcMit doliberation, and I noticed 
 generally dial I lie men had well observed the terrain, as 
 those who >\t'r(> without leaders went back to where they 
 had come from.* Immediately afterward my two men 
 were hit; they fell, and we all remained lyinj? on the sr«""d. 
 
 The French hailed in (he i)osi(lon relinqnished by ns 
 (80 — 100 meters south of the ravine)t in order to close np 
 their lines in rear, which had probably biH'ome disordered 
 in crossing? the steep ravine. Jt was not nn(il some time 
 afterward that Greuier's division passed over ns, first a 
 skirmish line, then anoth(M\ then battalions in line. The 
 first skirmish line kept u]) a brisk fire; in the second the 
 men were iu(erminj;lin<i' in confusion. 
 
 Every one seemed bent on enconraji;in'i; himself by yell- 
 ing, ^'Courage, courage! En avanir No one jiaid heed to the 
 enemy except to those of his men and horses that were 
 stretched on the ground. This was the moment when the 
 1st Guard Dragoons charged. 
 
 (c) The Betreat. — 1 am unable 1o state how long the 
 French remained south of the ravine, because time is wont to 
 
 *Opderbeck and I had been cadets together. Afterward, as an 
 artillery officer, he committed some indiscretion Ihat cost him his 
 office: at the outbreak of the war, he reported as a volnneer to the 
 57th Regiment. In this rather difficult position he behaved toward me 
 with much tact, and was a source of much merriment to the men on 
 account of his irrepressibly cheerful disposition; he bore all fatigues 
 of the march, etc., without apparent effort, and yet he did not strike 
 one as strong. Opderbock was soon cured, but was again wounded 
 in the same arm at Beaune, on November 2Sth, and so severely that 
 an amputation was necessary. Owing to his valorous bearing, he 
 was again commissioned, and is at present mayor of Liidenscheid. 
 
 tHere Lieutenant von H(>vel, adjutant of F. — 16th, who waa 
 lying some 200 meters north of me, was picked up. carried off. and 
 brought before General Tiadmirault. who asked him to what army 
 the troops engaged here belonged. Hiivel said, "To that of the 
 Crown Prince," which caused visible surprise. It Is possible that 
 the statement was of decisive influence on the enemy's measures. 
 Lieutenant von H«ivel told me this when we both, subsequently, were 
 undergoing treatment at Bonn. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 1T9 
 
 fly during such occurrences. It should be noted, however, 
 that the French infantry did not penetrate into Mars-la-Tour, 
 wliich had been burning ever since the beginning of the bat- 
 tle, or get farther on the east of the village than to within 150 
 meters to the north of Contour 780. General von Voigts- 
 Rhetz, observing the ill fortune of the 38th Brigade, ordered 
 the Onard Dragoon Brigade to attack, but the 1st Guard 
 Dragoons alone were on the spot. Coming around the east of 
 Mars-la-Tour, th^y charged; tho hostile infantry lost every 
 vestige of order, the lines intermingled, though in the main 
 remaining on the spot,* and busied themselves, as hereto- 
 fore, with policing the field and leading back wounded and 
 unwounded prisoners. For a little while the hostile in- 
 fantry fire ceased altogether, and it would have been pos- 
 sible to assemble all parts of the brigade in an orderly 
 manner and lead them to the rear; at any rate, we could now 
 see numerous men endeavoring to carry off their wounded 
 comrades. A little man of 2d— .57th, who with another 
 was leading a wounded man, picked me up, saying: "Boy, 
 carry him alone; there lies our adjutant, I'll fetch him." 
 The name of the brave man to whom I probably owe my 
 life was Dienemer; he lived at Solingen, where subsequent- 
 ly (1873-74), as adjutant at Griifrath, I saw him frequently. 
 A fatal circumstance here occurred: An adjutant gallop- 
 ing along the brigade from left to right called out at the 
 top of his voice, "Retreat to Thiaucourt."t I raised myself 
 
 ♦The statement to the contrary on page 86 of the History of 
 the Fifty-seventh is wrong. 
 
 tit was the adjutant of the brigade. In the manuscript of my 
 winter essay, 1872-73, the fact is noted on the margin in the hand- 
 writing of Colonel Arnold, no doubt after he had found my state- 
 ments correct. The brigade adjutant was von Kalbacher, recently 
 deceased, as colonel and commander of the 74th Regiment. The 
 order for the retreat had been issued by General von Schwarzkoppen 
 not by General von Wedell. The order had been delivered by Lieu- 
 tenant von Bernuth I. On hearing of it, General von Voigts-Rhetz 
 
m* to oast a lrts( ^^inuw o>»m' tho iioU\. VvvvxXAc mis»M-\ all 
 ar\MUul im\ ««<t thou that onior; could 1 asv«»uuu^ auvihiuir 
 olso but that ovorvthiuij was hvst? l>otl\ iv.^jiniouts hail 
 h^f tu^irlv all (htMi* ot\U>tMs; tht^ nion sul>s»^|uontlv tiH>K in 
 l^^rt tho dirtvtiou of Trouvillo. luaiulv tuulov l.iouUMiaiu 
 Tolouol Siuuiow: tho jjrtNitor i^uM, without ot^loors, it^trao<^i 
 thoir stoi^ ou tho r\v\ii to Thiauoourt, aiu! tlU! uot ivjolu 
 thoJr vH^h>rs uutU tho uoxt aftoruoou. This o\au»|>lo ^ijtu^ to 
 shinv hvnv u\isohioYOUs suoh a *Muoihi>t\ of doUvoriujs onltMs" 
 ma^Y Ih\ Afitn* i»ouoral \am\ WtHh^ll ivooJy<h\ tho oitlor. in 
 ssti^ul of iHnumuuioatiujj tho satuo quiotlv to i\^louol vou 
 l>auaoh auil Major you M^hUmu. both v>f wIumu oimUi oasilv 
 UuYO Ihvu fouudx au^l iustt^ul of huutiu^j u\> a fow uioiv 
 ot^loors. for which thorr^ was au\ph^ timo, tho atl^jutaut noIUhI 
 rt^lH^\ttHilY at tho top of his luuus. "Kotivat to Thiauoourt." 
 ^YOt uouo of tho oommauiUujj otthvrs rtvoivtHl tho vudor! At 
 that \uotuout tho rtMuuauts of tho briiiat^o wtMV uothiuu but 
 shadows, 
 
 Tho sjuuo prtvi^utatiou which charactorixtnl the ad 
 \auiV prtnaiUni ou tho n^trtwt, aud it was oulv boYoud (\ub 
 tour 7v^^ that thiujjs moudtnl. Hort\ ou tho tlold strt^wti 
 with tho cor|vst\!5 of mou aud horst^ attd uudtn* artillUn\v 
 t\rt\ which had btvu nn^ivutni with tho jjrtwtt^t voI\ouum»co. 
 l.ioutouaut Nouuioistor. fnnu tho statT of tho X. Corps, was 
 ridiuj* at a walk aloujr tho liuo of attack, stoppiujr hort* aud 
 thort^ aud jjiviujj ortiors. Tho otiicor displavtHi horruc 
 strxnijrth of charactor aud is dtNsorYiug of tho hijjht^t praise 
 for his doYOtiou aud ciH^htc^i^. It hms he r.^iV'ftf tt^ho HHtan.}lfJ 
 ihf ("Atvvt. His u\orit is as imiH^rishablo as u\y jjratitndo. 
 *'Ooiwnxdo," he said» *'ha\-v yt[»«r«olf taken over there. wbort> 
 
 countt"»n«ank\tHl iho c>r\i«t»r. Th<» troojvs w*r* to be ass<»mb\tHl ii\ th* 
 iltr^-tion of l^xnwtlle. but tt was ti>i> late to r^^aU ;Ul tho mi^u 
 d<e>jvrlYiHt of th^lr l^^i^der*. 
 
MtliUxrij HuU/rwU Hbuiwi. I hi 
 
 ^UtfTh \n a 4r*fmiuie/ittjAiiof$,** It wan to 1^ tifmth *A Majm- 
 laTour. 'Th'/**- uoi i»o »/j» tf*ait r'iWa^t'.^ t^r MiM, 
 
 '# rj«*;' \n our iu-nrtM that all m\0tt n^fi \ttt Uftd; ft^m of joy 
 f.*'\U'A in our *fyt^. U'h^f t(*^ufhfU-n$tM 4o ufft wirar fb^ war- 
 rJof'« h<-art at, K»i''h mtttttfuiM'! U'hat <J/m* wr/f. tb^ an- 
 ffHinUt'A wni\, tb*; t/rrHblr iUi*st\f\rf>\uU'i\ m\nA <A \%tn\hftrA ai$d 
 i'/rttHAirttt nufti^ think, aftd f<?*rl, and bop^?? How awfnllj 
 '/ '- i« tb^f af/f/f<y'ia»jori ^/f KU'b a At^f-at*. On^ ft*?** 
 
 f; ';;i/j tb'- ^fv^f ift'TiftitM; ou*-. woul4 lik/r t// know bow 
 
 tiiiufcn Ht**, %'nuv: on tlw; brft and H0it; wi^ baK but 'jw-e bfcau 
 Han it b^i^fn *fnd/*d In o«r faror? liff^tat, ^K^ore ii«, oiw*r- 
 tuiniy around ri«, jn fblx w/Kt t/rrrlbb? '/f all unfniinhfin w« 
 b-av<f f b*; ifHtxlti'iif'Ul, Tb^r <jfJu1ort'iu% un^n tbat "tb^ jf':r»- 
 <'fai niUiai.iifU in Wft iinfarr^rabb^ d/i<« not r*;a^rb nu; arid 
 on H'f w^mf, (Sflt-^u-A. «bot t/> \f\tii'jt^, nnifatbt^U^, toward our 
 
 Tb^r r*dr<iat of tb«> '{^tb Firi^cad^? r^/njttjt«t^* tb^ modt 
 horrible drama of tli/; j^«iai war. Tti/? brigade? loirt 53 p^r 
 (■*'%ii.* \\\H \tro\t<tr\'\<tu of th'r d/t*id to tb^r worjnd*^! ' ': t; 
 
 strong m^j drof/j^-d d<;«»/J; tbfr t/rrribb- b^^asit, tb'r , ,',^ 
 
 *-xfra/frdInary marcb, and tb** f^jnalljr ^fxtraordlnary at- 
 t^^;k b^ t'/ffintim*iil lh*'. Istnt r'ffonant of ijtr'fnjftb. and tfa^ 
 t,*'.hnYior of tUt^nti U^rrWAy dj^aj/p^/jnt/rd warriom wan aji 
 varying a« tb^^ir b<-art«, f saw m/m cry Iik^ cbildren, 
 otb^-tn <'.o\\A\mt'. without a mtuni^: in nn^^t caw*?* tb*; n^*fd of 
 
 *A/;^/r4tD« to pSM^ ((2< of tlM OtUiM A*jttfmm, 1,, ^/t p^ e^tL 
 ^ \ufAnAtA. Tb« latter ar<^ al«o SmtSnAhA \n thf: fiirnr«« of 
 
18'2 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ^v;l(^M• supprt^ssod ;\11 otluM* t'colinu,s; (lio bodv tltMuandt^d its 
 riijhts. •'\>';itorI watorl" \vas jibout llu^ only sound I 
 h(>ard from (hoso phantoms. Tho onomy's load dropjuHl 
 anu>n.ii- tlio misiM'ablo (/(7»ri's liko hail; tht\v nun-iMl on slowly, 
 thoir lu\uls droopinj;' from fatiiiuo. foaturos oovtM'od with 
 linn^stono dust oiiniiinj;- to tho porspirinu,- faoos, disiortotl 
 and oblitonitod. Tho tonsion oxooodod human oapaoity; 
 {he man had ooasod to bo siisoi^ptiblo to anythina:; noithor 
 tho sublime nor tho vulgar appoalod to him; ho faihMl to 
 rtH'ojiiiizo his frionds and his superiors. Thus tho mon 
 moved ai'ross the Held where shortly InM'ort^ tht\v had been 
 singinji" eheerfnl mart'hing songs. A ftnv nimble s»iuadrons 
 juul t\ot a soul would have esoaped. Anyone who has over 
 IooUihI intelligently into such features knows how deeply 
 they impress themselves, for they remind one of the expres- 
 sion of ihe madman: mad from bodily over-exertion, mad 
 from awful impressions on his soul; and madmen seemed 
 to be there in faot. Through the midst of these infantry 
 phantoms single riders, powerful men on big steeds, are 
 galloping in the direction of Tronville, the saber at the 
 ihargw eonvulsivoly gripping the panting horse with the 
 thighs, their faces red atid streaming with perspiration. 
 They were cuirassiers (No. \). What did they want? No 
 one knew, for they did not know themselves. Evidently 
 they believe themselves still in the charge. 
 
 •AVhen^ are yi>ur otVicers?" asked the comrades i^f the 
 batteries in actiott of those passing. "We have no more." 
 was the sad rt^ply. lltMt^ and ther(\ however, one was left, 
 and thus, after all the ntisery. the blood-soaked tleld still 
 witnessed some heroic sights. We mention here, in the 
 first place. Tolom^l von Oranach. who, riding toward the 
 ileJtris of 1. — 57th. took the colors from the hands of the 
 
Military -Historical Studies. 183 
 
 exhausted bearer and brought them to a place of Haf<*ty.* 
 Keveral irufii had been wounded or killed while carrying the 
 colors of F. — 57th, when Lieutenant von Streit Haw itw lawt 
 bearer (Lance Corporal Dorn) fall some 25 meters in rear. 
 Roin(? Fren(;h HkiriniHherH were wilhin a few steps of Dorn; 
 and now tli(!re was a race for the colors between them and 
 Htreit. The young officer was quicker; he seized the colors; 
 on all sides rang out the "Vive'Vempereur!" everywhere the 
 enemy's bands struck up; joy there, apathetic men here. 
 Th(? Hoiinds of the music cut deep to the heart, destructive 
 fire HweejiH the field, but the young officer has no thought 
 but that of saving flu; colors; some Frenchmen run after 
 him, others send Iheir bullets, none hits the mark, the lead 
 seems to honor virtue; the strength of the hero does not 
 flag, panting he carries the colors out of the zone of fire, and 
 finally finds safety for fhem with 1st — 57th. f Too 'great 
 efTorts had been demanded of the troops, physical and 
 psychical exhaustion was the result; an accident was instru- 
 mental in saving their honor. Had not Providence been 
 kind, execration, dishonor, and ignominy would have at- 
 tached to the number of the regiment, and no one would 
 ever muster sufficient courage to write in its vindication. 
 Yet these troojis did Iheir duty like brave men, and the 
 annals of war probably do not record an instance wliich, 
 taken all in all, can be compared to this one; yet the sacri- 
 fices will not have been made in vain, if the proper lessons 
 are deducted therefrom. 
 
 Another young officer of F. — 57th, Lieutenant de R6ge, 
 came unscathed out of the battle. Men were wandering 
 
 ♦Prince Frederick Charles, who heard of it, intended to have the 
 scene painted. So far as I know, the preparations had all been made, 
 when he suddenly died. The Fifty-seventh was thus deprived of the 
 great honor of becoming the counterpart of Keith at Hochkirch. 
 
 tFrom a written communication from Lieutenant von Streit. 
 
184 //N//n'r/V.s- iitto the Tdclica of the Fiihirc. 
 
 sinjilv about (hi> wide badlo tii'Ul ; lu> stMztvs a stray ami rid- 
 crU'ss horse aiul nuii'klv mounts. Kaisiuu' his sword, ho 
 coUofts tho orphauod uumi ou tho road fituu Mars laTour 
 lo NioMviUo. So(>u a bodv ol' ,■")()—(>() mon is assombhMl; 
 froutinji (htMjunly assaulttnl position, Iho bravo mou stand 
 in nudes, toars slroaminj»; from thoir (\v«»s. It is tlio young 
 (dVii'or who sliows what tjroatnoss can (K). "I loads up, 
 men I" ho says; "wo aro not dot'oatod; wo iwo n\oroly ro- 
 pulsod. Tlio foituno ol" war is ohanuH^ablo. To-«lay wo 
 havo bo(Mi 'lii'kod'; tho noxt tlnu^ wo 'II pay thoso f'oUows 
 bai'k with intorost." llo i^ivos ilu> comnuind "About," and 
 llu^ nuMi march ou{ of tho enemy's tiro. 
 
 Only tlu)so who havt> hovu prosont in a similar mur- 
 tlorous contlict. when almost ovory stH'ond man was shot 
 dowU' *■'*'• form an idi-a of what moral strouiith and con- 
 tidonco in one's own powt'r wi'ro necessary to act thus at a 
 monuMit when nothini»' was loft of the briuade but sonu^ 
 phantom like forms. That is the Psyche the army m>eds 
 that wishes lo comiut>r. As reijards tlu> uumi. 1 will not 
 «unil to mention that 1 did not see a siujile num throw away 
 his ritle ov auythinji' else; hardly did 1 hear a wounded man 
 numii ov wail. The well-trained soldier, it seems, ])reserves 
 a certain ureatness o( soul (>ven in tlu> nmst terrible 
 misforlum>. 
 
 .\ft(M' dark some fu^itivc^s of tlu> ;?Sth l>rij;ade arrived 
 at the camp of St. llilaire, where, as jM-evionsly stati'd. 
 11. — r>Tth, with some Canard Drajjoons and the headquarters 
 jiuard of the X. .\rmy (''orps had been left for the safety of 
 the trains of ilu> l!Mh Hivislon. of the (luard Drajioon Uri- 
 j:ade, and (>f ihe ht^idquarters of tlu' X. Corps. 
 
 At about l():;>0, ou the t>veninji- of the KUh. the column 
 marched otY for Thiam-ourt in the foUowinu: order: At the 
 
MiliUirylliHlorical Studies. 185 
 
 hfad tho adjutant of the battalion,* with the headquarterB 
 t^nard and (Jlnard Ora^oonH next, the train, II. — 57th bring- 
 iiijj^ uj» tlie rear. I>(;tw'een .'* and 4, on the morning of the 
 17th, the head reached the deserted and Hilent village of 
 Tliiaiiroiirt. Iff-re an intendanee councillor of the X. CorpH 
 brought the adjutant an order to march to the battle-field 
 of AuguHt 10th. The adjutant rode back on the road to 
 St. Hilaire to communicate the order to hiH commander, and 
 found the battalion between 5 and a. m., near St. lienoit, 
 soundly HleejMng on both Kid<'H of the road. IIIh oom- 
 njander had meanwhile r^'f-eiv^d the same order from 
 another Kource. 
 
 Between and 7 the start for Tronville was made. 
 When the commanding general of the X. Army Corps saw 
 the battalion intact, he shed tears. 
 
 1 have been unable to ascertain by whose order the 
 battalion retreated to Thiaucourt during the night. It is 
 possible that the statements of the fugitives of the 10th 
 promjjted the commander to retreat; if the order origin- 
 ated with some higher commander, it would likewise ex- 
 f)laiii tlif situation. 
 
 On that evening the 38th Brigade stood southeast •t 
 Tronville. None of the battalions numbered more than 
 .'{00 men. 
 
 The result of my observation is as follows: 
 
 1. The brave assailants did not emerge in front of the 
 ••nemy VlTt paces beyond the ravine; they did not get 
 farther than to a point 80—100 meters south of the ravine 
 (F.— lOth, I.— 57th, F.— 57th, 2 P. C); I.— 10th, 7th, 8th— 
 10th, 11th— 10th, and 2d— 57th alone got farther north. 
 I'roof: The first three battalions were never out of my 
 sight from beginning to end. 1 was mounted up to the re- 
 
 •Accordlng to a communication from him (Lieutenant Kropp). 
 
180 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 treat, was able to see and had a good view, and rode the 
 distance from F. — 57tli to I. — lOtli (see my previous state- 
 ment)* l\v order of my late commander, who did not want to 
 lose his second company. I also walked over the battle- 
 field during November, 1870, and found that the large 
 graves corresponded with these statements. I established 
 the extreme line of the 10th and 57th Regiments by corpses, 
 buttons with numbers, scabbards, etc. One of the largest 
 graves was just south of the bank and hedgef behind which 
 3 companies had sought shelter.J The bank and hedge 
 still existed in the fall of 1S7G. 
 
 2. The distance was not passed over hi/ rushes, certainh/ 
 not in the case of F.— 10th, I.— 57th, F.— 57th, and 2 P. C. 
 According to Major Meissuer's statement (Milifar ]Yochen- 
 hlatt, 1891), II. and I. — IGth did advance by rushes, but I 
 doubt it. for the reason that in those days the advance by 
 rushes was not practiced and such things cannot be im]n'o- 
 vised. The entire distance was covered at the accelerated 
 step and the movement was checked 100 meters south of 
 the ravine. The men lay down, and nothing human or 
 divine could have gotten them forward once more. Those 
 who may, nevertheless, think that it might have been jios- 
 sible, fail to consider the moral strength of the musketeer, 
 in connection with that tire, the exposed plateau, those 
 
 ♦Position of troops. Sketch III. 
 
 t Sketch III. 
 
 ; Nothing is to be seen to-day of the former large graves on the 
 battle-field of the 38th Brigade. The ground is French territory, and 
 the French Government had the bodies exhumed and reinterred in 
 a large cemetery near Mars-la-Toui-. There on a bare slope rest 4.000 
 warriors I Since then local studies in that respect have become 
 impossible. I will also state that the French Government had a 
 grand monument erected in the cemetery: somewhat displeasing, to 
 be sure, since it does not seem to stand to the honor and glory of her 
 dead warriors, but as a monument of vengeance. 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 1S7 
 
 losseft, and the cornplete physical exhaustion. Devotion 
 and self-sacrifice have their limits. 
 
 '.i. Beyond (north ofj the ravine, Chasse[>6t and needle- 
 gun did not mutually do their work of destruction; the 
 effectiveness of the fire was all on the French side. For, 
 (a J We never were where we are said to have been. 
 {bj During the entire action, both regiments fired but few 
 ► rounds. The statement under fa) is not likely to be con- 
 tradicted by military history; that under fbj will presently 
 be explained. Although they are based solely on the tes- 
 timony of jjarticipants, my statements will be found indis- 
 putable in so far as the .38th Brigade did not succeed in 
 opening a regular fire action, and could therefore inflict 
 but insignificant losses on the enemy. Bince the French 
 losses were considerable, they must have been inflicted by 
 some one else — i. e., by the German artillery and by the 
 Heventy-ninth. 
 
 (f) Losses. — The German losses were as follows: 
 
 (a) Regiment Xo. 10: 
 
 KILLED. WOUNDED. CAPTUBED. 
 
 Officers. Men. Officers. Meti. Officerg. Men. 
 
 I. Battalion "| 220 ^i 269 
 
 IL Battalion y 27 123 y 21 220 . 1 356 
 
 F. Battalion j 1&3 j 292 j 
 
 Total 27 526 21 m T ~356 
 
 48 officers and 1313 men, exclusive of 1 officer and 
 423 men missing, of whom 1 officer and 356 men had been 
 capture^l, which statement agrees with the Oificial Account. 
 Total loss, 48 officers and 1736 men. 
 
188 
 
 Inquiries into the Tactics pf the Future. 
 
 (bj Kegimom No. 57 
 
 1st I'onipanv . . . 
 
 -d C'ompanv .... 
 
 od Company 1 
 
 4th Ooinpnnv ... 
 
 5th Ooiupanv . . . 
 
 <>th Ooiupanv ... 
 
 Tth Ooni]\'iny ... 
 
 8th Company ... 
 
 0th Company ... 
 
 10th Cinnpany . . . 
 
 1 1th Company. . . 
 
 l'2th Company . . . 
 
 KlLUKl^. 
 
 \VOlNl->Kl>. 
 Oftuvrs. Mon. 
 
 OArVlKED. 
 Orticors. Mou. 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 
 51 ^ 
 
 
 1 
 
 ;ii> 
 
 2 
 
 58 
 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 O 
 
 4-2 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 41 
 
 
 y 1 
 
 ^26 
 
 10 
 
 o 
 
 37 
 
 48 
 
 .) 
 
 82 
 
 44 
 
 o 
 
 48 
 
 44 
 
 1 
 
 ^4 
 
 423 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 G 230 1 8 
 Total loss, 24 otfioors, t>53 mon. f 
 
 ic) 2d and ;'d IMonoor Companies No. N.: 1 officer, 
 8 men. 
 
 (i1) 1st Foot •'Abtheilnnir*' of the Hanoverian Field 
 Artillery Kegiment No. X.: 44 mon and 40 horses. 
 
 (e) 1st Guard Dragoon Kegiment: 14 officers, 82 
 ujeu. 204 horses.:|: 
 
 On the French Side: 
 
 I. Orenier's Division: Keirimeut 08th: 1 officer. 10 
 men. Chasseui-s No. 5: 1 officer, 20 men. The forejroini; 
 troops fought against 5th and 0th — 10th, the latter losing 
 in all officers ;.nd 127 men: the contliot therefore was least 
 Moody at this point. 
 
 ♦According to the OflicijU Account. IS men. 
 
 tAcciirding to the regimental records. The Official Account 
 states the losses of the 57th Regiment as follows: 
 
 Killevl, 6 otlicers, 3t?6 men; wounded. 17 officers, 42i! men; cap- 
 tured. IS men; total loss, -o officers, S06 men. 
 
 tPage lo4 of the History of the 1st Guard Dragoons by H. von 
 Rohr the losses are stated as 15 officers. 126 men. 246 horses. 
 
MilUaryHUtoriml Htvditi. 1*>9 
 
 llhy^xmt'Mt No. L'i: f; oflScerw and 91 men, killed and 
 wonnded. 
 
 liej^irnent No. 4^'>: 5 otfifjirn and 18^1 men killed^ 
 wounded, and rn'mniBi:. 
 
 K^fginrient Xo. f;4: 1 officer and 2^ men. 
 
 Artillerj': 14 men. 
 
 yVAiZ, />^ offtctitu find ZJtZ ro/:n. TTieir ^'nn<r /»>«« exT/fride^J 
 from the {rr-'-at road from liruville to about the Hoi>j d<- 
 Tronville. 
 
 Ke^ment« Xo«, I'ilh and 4.>1 were »abered by the lirt: 
 Otiard Draji^rxjnH and fired into from the rear Tby Herentr- 
 ninth, (itiniiiiU). The lr^He« of these reg^iment^ of Orenier'g 
 diviiiion are thereby explained. They were probably, «f 
 <A<f< A//ttr, mostly due to the fire of the H*ivhTtty ninth, which 
 fired into the wildly retiring maHHes withont receiving fire 
 in return. It should al»o l>e noted that in the foregoing 
 figures are included the Umnen suffered by the regimentJi 
 Xr>«, i;i and 4'i ^^e^'/re the arrival of the 38th Brigade, during 
 Grenier's offensive movement toward the road Mar»-la- 
 Tour — \'ionville; in other word*. the«e regiments snffered 
 their principal losses to the «oa//t of the ravine. 
 
 2. Cissey's Division: 
 
 Regiment Xo. 1: 10 officers and 4<K) men. 
 
 Regiment Xo. 6: 3 officers and 17 men. 
 
 Regiment Xo. 57: 23 officers and 279 men (97 killed, 
 177 wounded, 5 missing^ 
 
 Regiment Xo. 73: 18 officers, 347 men Skilled, wounded 
 and missing), 
 
 Chasfieurs X'o. 20: 5 officers. 68 men Hcilled and 
 wounded;. 
 
 Artillerj': 20 officers. <5 men. 
 
 To^a?; 5-5 <:;)^cerj? ar</? 77/7 m«n. 
 
 Who inflicted these losses on the division? With the 
 
ISH") Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 attiU'k of Cissov's division tho battlo at this point was prac- 
 tically ended. The 88th lirifrade encountered in its front 
 the regiments Nos. 18 and 48, which sntTered comparatively 
 little. It is impossible that at this point (^hassep6t and 
 needle-gun mutually did their deadly work. 'V\w French 
 Kegiments Xos. 57 and ~'.\ did not attack until the strength 
 of the 88th lirigade was as good as spent; nu>reover, they 
 took the debris in the left flank, nor did the French Fifty- 
 seventh suffer so very much. 
 8. Artillery Keserve: 
 
 Battery tUh — Sth 1 man. 
 
 Battery 7th— Sth \ 
 
 Battery oth — 17th 1 othccr, 4 men. 
 
 Battery (S\\\ — 17th *J otHcers, (> men. 
 
 Battery 1 Ith — 1st 5 men. 
 
 Battery 12th -Ut 8 men. 
 
 8 otiicers, 24 men. 
 Add l.egrand's Cavalry Division (4th): 
 
 2<l Hussars 28 otticers, 80 men. 
 
 7th Hussars 9 officers, 53 men. 
 
 3d Dragoons 13 officers, 105 men. 
 
 45 officers, 238 men. 
 
 According to French sources, therefore, the entire 
 IV. French Army Corps lost 
 
 Grenier's Division 14 officers, 348 men, 
 
 Oissey's Division 85 officers, 1117 men. 
 
 Artillery Keserve 3 officers, 24 men, 
 
 Legrand's Cavalry Division 45 officers, 238 men. 
 
 147 officers, 1722 men, 
 as compared with the heretofore accepted figure of 200 
 oi^cers and 2258 men. 
 
 It should be borne in mind that the statenuMits as given 
 by the various troop units are based on ditVerent assump- 
 tions. Some merelv uive killed and woundt^l; others also 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 101 
 
 Ihff miHHing; othor-H rncroly give the total number hors-de' 
 conihal. To go into the detailH of these figures would 
 had UH too far; an<l having given an account of the devel- 
 opment of the French firing line, I must leave it to the 
 reader to judge in how far these losses may have been in- 
 flicted by the 38th Brigade. 
 
 ((j) Notes to the Official Account Ihfjardinfj the Terrain. 
 — The description of the terrain is insufficient, and how 
 liarmful such inaccuracies may turn out is shown by the 
 fact that in Colonel von Lettow's tactical examples, which 
 are intended for instruction at the war schools, the attack 
 of the '>8th Brigade is described as taking i)lace over open 
 ground. It vjas more than that, although up to Contour 780 
 II., I., F.— U;th and I.— 57th found some, and F.— 57th and 
 2 P. C. found less cover. For it was the two great ob- 
 stacles (wire fences and ravine), in connection with the 
 absence of cover, that gave the ground its character. 
 
 The land around Mars-la-Tour is ver}- much subdivided. 
 The subdivisions were then enclosed by wire fences, like- 
 wise the meadows along the brook which encircles Mars-Ia- 
 Tour in the north. The wires had to be cut with the sword 
 bayonet under the enemy's fire, causing checks, delays, and 
 losses. Hince the general direction of the movement was 
 from south to north, the transverse wires alone were cut, 
 and when subsequently the 1st Guard Dragoon Regiment 
 I»assed around the south of Mars-la-Tour to attack the hos- 
 tile infantry, it encountered the intact longitudinal wires, 
 and had to jump them. These circumstances are men- 
 tioned in connection with the dragoons, not with the in- 
 fantry. The fences extended up to Contour 780. 
 
 It was necessary to mention the bank and hedge on 
 Height 780, 80 — 100 meters south of the ravine, because they 
 constituted our sole cover, and the natural objective of our 
 
19:J Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 luarvli and targtn for the tHunnv. In fact, about ouetifth 
 i>f the luigado was Iviug near it.* 
 
 IV. Objectives of the French and German Commanders. 
 Tlio eneui\' iuterrupttHi liis movement in onler to re- 
 pulse the attack of lieruians, intendinu to resume the march 
 so imivrativelv deuiandtnl bv the situation of the French 
 armv.f That a oajKible letxder might have secured a tactical 
 victory is uudisputtHl. AH the I\'. French Corps had to do to 
 have victory fall in its lap was to advance after r>::'0 p. m., 
 and to take the direi'tion of Tronville, as there was not 
 a single effei'tive Imttalion to op^H^se the advance of these 
 15.000 men. The situation of the Germans would, for a 
 time, have btvn most critical: but in view of the positions of 
 the German XII.. IX.. ^ 111.. \ II.. and Gimni Corps, it is 
 a matter of doubt whether the victory would have atYorded 
 the Fi-ench ijVi tVtrt' results. But that uetnl not have bt^n 
 the Marshal's aim: having shaken himself loose at 5 p. m.. 
 
 •Plan 5B of tha Official Account shows the position of both sides 
 nnder the designation '"in the 5th hour of the afternoon." On this 
 plan, as well as on that given in the History of the 1st (.Juani Dra- 
 goons, the lines marking the attack of our infantry are prolonged 
 to the north of the triinsvei"se hi\x>k in front of the French p<.>sition. 
 That is incorrect. In like manner, the charge of the 1st Guard Dra- 
 goons is incorrectly notevi on plan oB of the Official Account and on 
 the plan of the little in the History of the Sixteenth: the 4th Cuii-as- 
 sier Regiment also seems to be markeii incorrectly. At one time the 
 1st and Sd squadrons are southeast of Tronville. at another time 
 the Sd and 4th squadrons are west of the Bois de Tronville. More- 
 over, in the onlir dt tnUitilie (.Supplement I., page 11. I.) Legrand's 
 cavalrj- division is mentioned as having 16 squadrons, while on Plan 
 SB it numbers IS. 
 
 The trooj»s of the 3Sth Brigade are marked altogether wrong 
 on Plan 5B of the Official Account (.compare Sketch HI."*. The History 
 of the Sixteenth goes still farther, in that it shows the entire SSth 
 Brigade, with the exception of -fith 16th. t) the north of the ravine, 
 how it really was has been explained. 
 
 "♦"We shall not attempt to inquire whether that cv ntinued to be 
 yiiirsMtl Ba:aine's intention on the afternoon. According to their 
 statements before the court, the commanding generals had no other 
 plan; Ladmirault's action is not otherwise intelligible. 
 
Oft tbif? Wtti, hM uUfmld r*4.ih*^ havfi tcuAfrstrtfrti^ to withArHiW 
 towHtd fiwf iaUfrUfT hr every AnuUiftU: road; aor eaw it b*; 
 Afttit'A ihax fit- miiiht Jiar*r 490« uo until ftooft on tb^ 17tb, 
 wft^:*- Mp t// tMt hour tUti ^fervaoLOM voold uot hsLwe Yteeo af>l<e 
 to reuew tbeir attack, \>ntiu% thht upajfjt; of tim^ RaaoListe 
 mi^ht havf psiiaed a irtart r/f 3*1 ktU/mtfUfm. Aod virfit'tiier ttr 
 ftot he i'jftild \iaiV*t ]o\ueiA huftdM with yhif'Mii\if/u d^ytgoAtA 
 Oft tU*; fjxafrtiiftg itttwi-f*. of hiM Hirfsiy. Ifowf v<ir poorty^ 
 VfHyjiirie utay have \teeu iuf'trmed. he t-xmUl not fmt naUer- 
 Hiaud tfiat if he reniaUteA vKrt*/rioij>j on tb<e J^Jtik and falVed 
 to wijarcb a«rar at oor^^, Iw; ira« *'.eniiXu ttt \te samaSMk by 
 auiMfrior Un-t-M* Anrtuf^ tbfr iMjxt f^w da/K. For to tli« novtli 
 of M^rtz^ where tfaie Oermsum were adraoefo^ «w a broad 
 f r'^t, thier*; waj* ufftMiuiL Ut o{t\ttDV!^. them, 
 
 iu jod^og tb^ fj/urae td eren^ tke fttrate0e i^nsL- 
 tion rnoKt \te kefA: in rtew, Bazaiae bad fteen brooj^t to 
 bar, he bad itei-'U forcM to a hUt*Ar \taxt\e. hM phuM had 
 Xteen dm-jfutierted. stud he aUowod h\mi¥>M to \te iaHnfmeed 
 Yfx the result of tb<e battle to Uinu tm the Ufrtrem of lAetx. 
 
 \S'bil<e <wi tbfe French isid^ it «ra» mseemarj to he rU:- 
 UfTwoM — L e^ tft rec^fOfiner the battle-fidd «f the i0tk amd to 
 regs^ tbe VUmrlWe — Mjuu-la-Toar r*tad, the Oenmam iaA 
 wan to for^^tall tb<e eoetny and to liare fmperior Ufreem tm 
 hand for tbe a<ext few dar« f<M(> t]»e por):^;«e of wioumfi the 
 tactical d^ri«ioo in battle, Tbe »fetlM»d deyeoded extixt^j 
 on tfa<e fm<:ta/t§ aeti«w; tb^^ objeet eonld iM»t be igaioed fry 
 imrely defennire aetUm^ the offimnire 9kM»e eoold roodMHife 
 it, Tb<? qaeKtMm va« i«o t/, fsaatge the attaek an t/t remam 
 nafHetesiily i^r*m% for defeuxe td what nrigltt be j^ain^d. 
 That wnM dfme hy tbe ^tb and <Stb THrhmnm, To b<e «are. 
 tbej v<;«»; nu:tf»; farorablr mtaated after i ft, m^ a» no offeo- 
 tire waa latuiehedagatut them after that honr, InhatOe 
 it i« «onnd to aamine Ihe eaemx ax afUntL in tbe manner one 
 
liH Inquiries into the Tactics of the Ftttttre. 
 
 would adopt if in bis plaoo. Ilis aim should uaturallv havt* 
 boeu a tactiral viotorv ou his right, aud tho t^onuan aim to 
 proveut such a viotorv. If in doing so \vt^ exhausted our- 
 selves, Nve would be facilitating his task; if we remained ou 
 the purely defensive, we would not be giving him enough 
 TO do. Action >Aas therefore called for on the Oerman side, 
 offensive action, but not without due IuhhI to the smallness 
 of the force on hand. That was not done: the llOth Division 
 failed to attack altogether and the ;>8th Urigade was de- 
 stroyed at the decisive strafeijicol point of the htftle-feld. 
 
 The order for the X. Corps to attack Avas j^erfectly 
 proper under the circumstances; the execution was the duty 
 of the subordinates, whose eyes should have supplemented 
 those of the commanding general. In view of the small- 
 ness of the available force, it was evident that the enemy 
 could not be driven from the Height 84(5 — (^rey^re Ferme. 
 
 VII. How Should the Attaek of the SSth Briijade Have 
 
 Been Arranged? 
 
 1. The order should have stated: The brigade will 
 attack: line of direction is Height S4l> — Grey^re Ferme; 
 northern limit of the attack is Contour 780. Communica- 
 tion with The Trouville copse aud with The SevenTy-ninth. 
 which advanced to that point. 
 
 2. The signal for The aTTack will be The advance of the 
 20th Division. 
 
 o. Execution, (a) 2 P. C. occupy Mars-la-Tour and 
 prepare the village for defense. 
 
 (h) Opening out the brigade and wheel to the left. 
 
 (c) The brigade commander Takes sTation uorih of 
 Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 ((/) Battle formation and de]iloynuMit of skirmishers 
 on the VionvilU^^ — Mars-la Tour road, clearing awav ob- 
 
Military -lliHtorical Studies. 195 
 
 HtriJctiorjH, inlv'dx\<<t to Contour 780, halt. DiHtribution of 
 
 th<,' trooj>K from wff«t to ea«t:* 
 
 On Height 7ii5: 
 ."ith— l<Jth, 6lb — 16th, and a battery; 
 
 then 7th— 16tb, 8tb— 16tb, l»t— 16tb, 2.1— HJtb, 3d— 16tb, Bojg 
 
 4th— 16tb. de 
 
 Ist-oTtb, 2d-r,7th, 3d-57tb, 9tb-57th, 10tb-'i7th, llth-57lb, Tron- 
 
 4th-57tb, 12th-57tb, ville. 
 
 The ii.\('.r'd.y^<t dJKtarjco betwrftTj Contour 780 K^Hith of 
 
 thfi brook and the Hamr? contour north of the brook m 
 
 oOO maUiiH. For our then arm, thJH dJHtance wa« to<j frreat, 
 
 and a fire action could not be conducted with effect. If we 
 
 could not entice the French to come farther to the Houth, 
 
 where we could belter deal with them, there remained the 
 
 pOHHibility of maintaining a careful fire, during which our 
 
 loBHCH would have b^^^n nmall and which would have accorn- 
 
 pUf.hed our ohjed. And up to thai point our loHKeH had in fact 
 
 been Hnjall; they be<'ame great only on the ridgf. 
 
 {ej One battery to take position north of MarH- 
 la-Tour. 
 
 II., I. — HJth and I. — .'j7th could approach under cover; 
 F, — 57th wa« le«H favorably Hituated. Xone but Bkir- 
 miKherK nhould therefore have been thrown out on the ex- 
 pOH/rd plane; in other rf-Hpef-t.s the artill^-ry Khorjld have 
 maintained the action .f 
 
 (f) F. — 16th an reserve at Marn-la-Tour. 
 
 All thewearrangementH could have bf^r-n made, but they 
 
 could not have been directed and watched by the brigade 
 
 commander. In ca.se the enemy failed to come forward, 
 
 I. — 57th might have been puHhf-d forward to the bank 
 
 and hedge IfiO meters HOuth of the brook, and J. — 
 
 Ifith might hiave been sent forward an e<iual distance to 
 
 tWe know that 24 guns, under Colonel von der Goltz, were here 
 posted. Compare page 13,-. 
 
 "The Comj>anies 4th — 6th and 4th and 12th —.57th formed a second 
 line, and were posted in rear of th*; companies underneath whose 
 numbers they are placed. 
 
tho wtv^t undor oovor uloujr Oonlour 7S0: ihoso n»ovoi\\o>\is 
 
 jjjuio vH>miuaiuior. but that was tho HtnJt. For as sooti as 
 tho infantrv oan»o on tho phu<\\\u tho trattsmissiou of oniors 
 wouKi Kvomo imi>o^bK^ and sdivrior dirtvtion would 
 vHWso altv>jivthor. It was absolntoly uivt^siirv that tho 
 brijfjido oommaudor shouUi ivtain a ix^orvo of iufai»trv. tho 
 t\jihtinjj jHnvor of tho 1st l»uar\i Oraji\HM\s for such a pur- 
 iH^so iHMUjr tiH> UntittHl and out'^sidtni. 
 
 Tht^o lv\ttalions, having soino oo\or. inniM probablv 
 havo hold this oxtont of jinMuid «non ajjainst unwt sii^tM-ii^r- 
 itv of foriv. it\ }>r\>of of whivh wo mav aooopi tho ciotiou of 
 tho SiVino tivoi^s ajr;iii\st ovoii 4i«\^\tor suporioritv at \»oauno 
 la Kohmdo. whon tho bouos of thoir bi^t nion wort^ bloaoh- 
 injr ot\ tho tlold of Marsda Tour, and whon tho nMt\oni bran 00 
 of that dav stiU olung to thorn, a faot not oalonlatini to in- 
 ortwst^ thoir tfK'>\ik. Tho supi^ortinir ooni|>;init^ shoisld 
 havo Ihvu br\>ujiht nj> oKvso to tho skirtuishorjt. and with 
 tho ojHm tiold of t\n^ of tho platt\iu in our fr\>nt. wo niiuht 
 havo awaitiHl tho ovonts with oontldonoo. No division 
 would havo iHvn jr;\i!UHl in that wav. l>ut it was tu^f /i> our 
 oMr/HVvY to stvk it ; it was to our intort^t to tlijht a dolavinjr 
 aotion and to i>rt^orvo our strtMiijth. In that oaso. »"> half- 
 Ivittalions and a fortitunl villajiv would havo stotni whoiv 
 now thort^ was a tiohl oovortnl with oorpsos. and no soldiors. 
 Had tho att;\ok of tho X. Oori^s on this iv\rt of tho tlold btvn 
 oarritHi out on that plan, its pri^ivtration. oxtvution, and ri^ 
 suits would oortainly havo bivn mort^ in ktvpinir with tho 
 j;ttnioral situation than it was now, whon tho loft of th? 
 ^<}N.<M? (irmit laokoii all supiH>rt and was doprivinl of in 
 faiUry whi^o prt^sionoo to tho ond of tho battlo was 
 indisiHM»s;\blo. 
 
SHliiarij IhA'/ric/tX Hludm. 1^7 
 
 All ihcw- uicitum'tm would \f*: i'(\tiii\\y pratXn-HhU: with 
 
 V/ //. 7'o.dU;al C^/Mmenf.M. 
 'The, c.iiMc. will \t*', rar^'whffra a Wiy^mlc of 5 baJfbaf till ion « 
 in rliar-jrwl with ;j duty Ilk*' that at Marj^laToaf ; »till rar^rr 
 Jin- iuHtiiiU't-n whi'-h, lik<' fh<' ou*- Iti'foro »j«, afford an ojipor- 
 tiinity for (■xntu'imuu, into th*.- xfjit^hilit^' of thj« or that 
 im'i'u'A] form in th*; attar^k and drawing? f/nuAnnUmH. (hia 
 thinj<, \u>WHVfir, which no power on (mrih, no i¥t\A\\nirj, can 
 oxipuui!/'. from th<f pa(r^*< of Utnlory: the ''^th fJrijrarl^; car 
 ri<'d Hi*' uWai-M {(nwnn] without ch*,'ck until it luUfrtfuu- 
 \i\ci\ with Jifi *-ncrny douhly Mui^^frior in rirt*-** and doub- 
 ly HUf><;Hor in ^unn. It accurat/;ly prtiw-rsi-A th^r dir^-c- 
 tion indicat^fd by th«f division cornrnand^fr, «nd, a* a 
 bri^ad*-, remained within th'f lirnitM of the Kj»a/r<' aMKi^ied 
 lo it in the battle. Whatever may tx; a/lvanced aj?ain><t 
 ^ome minor matterH, the brigade did accomplish what 
 on all other occai4ionH failed aj^ainut the imj^rrial army: 
 il <:nrr'u-<\ o,n oMach cm ma.nii.c wc.r the, open fidd, thouj(h uniufj^ 
 antirjuated forrnM, J vividly remember the wonln ad 
 drenned by <^'olon<'l von ('r»ttn<h to the a«Hembb-d (tff'u.*rrn 
 during? the mobilization of 1870. when urgint? them to prar:- 
 tice their compani^^. Amon^ other thin^M, he said: "Ttie 
 French are not goin^ to att^rk; they will wait for hh in lon^ 
 lin^*«. Tliey will let uh come on before advancing? them- 
 Ht-lvcn. They have abandoned th'-ir o/TenHive in/tt'icM and 
 lay their nirf^n on tJre tiicticM. TlicAr fire-arm h^adx them to 
 that. You Hhould therefore indu«triouHly practice a lively 
 and vi^orouH advance, »^> that we may «/>mewhat counter- 
 balance the inferiority of our arm by rapidity of move- 
 ment."* The hint wax more significant than any one, the 
 
 •On July 18, 1870, LJ^^nit.fmant-Cok/nel Count von WaldCTJtee, then 
 military aWit-M at ParJ«, roadt full wrltt*!n Tfi\f(m to King William 
 
l^^S iHtiuirifs into tMf 7\jdic$ of the Futitrt. 
 
 sijHakor not oxoopttnl. tbon susptvttHi. and wo woiv soon ti 
 Iv oouvinoiHl of it* ooruvtuoss. Kvou bofoio the War of 
 1S70. the opiuiou pnnaiKyl in ilit^ r«ein\au Aiiuv that our 
 thou oou\i^w\>- oolmun taotios wort* no longvr applioablo 
 whon oppo!5iHl to tho tiro of tho Ohaj*s5ov0>t. \Vhilo now 
 forms wort^ boing studitHl. war was lioolarod and tho infant 
 rv tiH>k tho t\old oousoioiis of tho inforioritv of its arm and 
 of its lack of praotiiv in tho attack «»m m<}oJ>v. Wo woro snro 
 that wo wonUi rtvoi\o oiTootivt^ iiifaiitrv tiiv at jiivat dis- 
 tiuu^^ and had to bo propartni to cross that r.ono with- 
 out replying to tho onomv's t\rt* and nudor oonsidorabU* 
 lo$st\s, Uut howovor much tin* arms may bo imprv>vtHl. it 
 rtnnains tvrtain that tho attaokor who dosirtvs to boat down 
 tho dofoudor and to occupy his iH>sition must advance, and 
 thri>u4rh a distance at which tho fnllost otYoct may bo oxpoct 
 tnl fnnu his tirt^ — iHH^ motors and mort^ — iloponding on what 
 maybt* tacticallxcorrtvt under tho circumstances to produce 
 the des^ireil ettWt. The "how" of tho advauoe aa\d the "how" 
 of the action at cU>so range have chaniitnl, but both continue 
 to exist. Tho Frtntch won^ the tinjJt to systematically prac 
 titv loug-raugt* tire, aud to apply it in the War of IJ^TO. The 
 FrtMich infantry was traiutnl and skilUnl in it to a hiirh d(^ 
 jrrtv. The Fnuich did not choose tho l>;utU^tield of the ItUh 
 of Aujrust; they were forv'tni to jrive battle ajrainsi their 
 wilL It was due to accidfnt, not to prtMutnlitation. that at 
 most of the imiH^rtant points the battlt^tlold wasfavorablo to 
 the otTtvi of tho ritU\ It rtxlounds to the jrlory of tho FriMich 
 headers to have discornetl the advantages of tbe jxvsition frt^m 
 Height S4(? to On\v^re Forme, and to have turntnl the same to 
 immiHiiate account. The attack of the :>Sth Rrigjule, on the 
 
 on tlie taotk*s of the French Army, which was printe<t and distrihuted 
 iuucm^ the trooiv?, Everythins: turned out as Count von Walder^ee 
 had predicted. tvij-ticularl>- in regnrxi to infantry tactic*, but the time 
 was too short to modify our method of attack. 
 
uWii'.V h'AlA,, t;Oht^Uin UihtH HM Ut whfftUf^ in l,h/r friVir': k'lrU 
 
 n ztfUh of tivh uiny txr f:r*fim*^ with/>ut Umt of all fizM^f-'^ 
 <rflficj<fiirry, Tli'; t^n*mt.Uff$n am: t. Wan It rftsum tirt^ with 
 whir;b <it*'.tt\tit'n i\t'.\t\o}'*^ 6'tvMfm arid tb^; nntrntmnafttly ijtti- 
 \f\o\'\uv, rJ»vi«ion of •" 'zrtif^^rA *' ' r^iAftt* 2, CV/W 
 
 th<f fir*; hav*; !/«;<?« . 'J a« r^jr- nurfi}f^ of rifl** 
 
 hrofiiiUt to tt*:nr'! 'A, Uiny a \ttftUir diredu/n of fire SMd a 
 r/w>r« *«tr<;r« and rn^rre effedhe fSrft \p(' <fXp^:l/nl fr<nn xtnAhni 
 w«all'<raliUrf arrnx? 4, Wan th^r 'ASMukHt ivtSi-^nA with 
 fir*; at /ort// rang**? 5, Ik th/; fir*; of utnm*iin *iff etctirn at 
 %f(ti%.Uir rAnf/^frn than h/?r*f? 
 
 To I, 2, .'{, 4, rny an«ir*fr j«, V*;»; t/» o. \o. 
 
 In ord/fT to lUnnimlJi tb*; *;ff#;r;t of fftsum fim hy an ex- 
 arripb;, tl»/; attarrk/^r dbould U; aiM»nwi/;d t/> t^ lal^orinj^ tiudhr 
 tht'. njo#rt unfavorablfe eirfcttmHijanfjut, I bare »boirrj that 
 tb<; fnt^ifuMl of (irnfAoymhnt of ih*-. ZHth IWiyLnAh wan annaita- 
 bbr, y*'t that atfiick i« th*- MJo«t in«trrjrrtive a« tt^vAriiik 
 ■xtuAtmi tar;tic«. 
 
 1. \\'h*:m tb*; .'{8th SWi'^uAc, d*fplov*^l for th^ att.a*;k at 
 4, f>. ffj-, th*; ttut'irt', front froth Jf*;jj?ht 8^1*; to <}r*iyer(i Ferme 
 (fully 2o(Xi mtftjirn} wan b*;ld by trr^opK of all arniM. Or*;- 
 nier** (llvinUnt kUmmI in tUfjtloyfid liiw*, in two tieru, oiMr iii 
 r^-ar of th*; oth^rr T' 7><() and %J^;;. Tlie ffrrmer wan 
 
 erownwj by d/rn»</r - lin*-« (2 rfrnitnunU, Jitm. iZ and 
 
 ^;, the latt^ir by th«r remaind^ of th*f infantrj- and by the 
 art'tlUiry of tbr? divi»ion, IVrtb fir*;d inc^f^Mantly, and an we 
 nuij-hiTii ih*; Vionville — 3far»« la Tour r^/a/I both infantry and 
 anUU-ry fire. r*fa*rh*fd rin, Hcvcr^tl ni*Ti fell on the road, and 
 
 'Aeeordtoc to mr ofMi«^ati<nw, eonqMUiwnw, and intptMe*, 
 )^r»» twdtes of ClAwr'f dfrtefon did not take part tmttl we had ero—ed 
 Cont/>9r 740: np to tliat tine tbe fire we r<eefred from the dfreetion 
 of c >nDe waji re«trl/:t>^ to the *«th Resfnieot, the 5th Cba*- 
 
 •et. ri, nomerotM ArtlUtrr, and, ft would Mem, 2 mitrailletMe 
 
 tiatj^r:'r'.. wooM pfewoee wa« •fsnified bjr tbefr tinguiar eraekUnt 
 
 TOlt 
 
200 Inquiries into the I'octics of the Future. 
 
 the leador of 4th — 57th, First Lioutonant von Itoroko, was 
 woiuuhd thiM't\ At tlrst wo otuild distinjiiiisli tho rapiil llro 
 of thoskinuishors from tho voUov tlrins; of tho chist^d ti'oops. 
 V\^ {o Coniouv 7S0, 11., 1., F. — l(5th ami I. — .Mtli iDnml i't)vor 
 in tho im^adow bottom. Imt tho tiro m>vor slacUom'il. 
 
 L\ Tho front of l!r>(H) motors was o»H'n|>it>il l>> two divi- 
 sions, all of ono and ono half of tho otlnM' IxMnjx doployod 
 and tlrinu — i". (•., ll.!)L*5 ritios;* l»«Mwt>on tluMo T'J i^nns wort* 
 in action, inolndinj; VJ mitraillousos. l.oavinu- Ki^iirand's 
 cavalrv ilivision ont of lonsidtMation. wt> tind for tho 'JaOO 
 motors. r> mon por vard in a dofonsivo position. 
 
 .■^. A moro sovoro. hot tor dirootod mass tiro, and otio 
 moro olYootivo. owini: to tlattor trajootory, jjroator ponotra- 
 tion and aoonracy. than on tho l(>th of .Xniiiist. is prartioa- 
 hh>. althoniih tlu'rt> was no panso whatt'viM- and tho liro ro 
 taim>d its inttMisity np to tlu> miuntMit whon tho FrtMU'h 
 infantry attaokod; wo conld disiiniinish. howovor, that thr 
 v(dh\v tirinir booamo moro irroi;tilar, and toward tho ond bo- 
 oamo irivijular rapid tiro. Tlu> lattor foatnro may bo ron- 
 sidortnl tho rnio in fiituro. 
 
 t. From tho timo whon mo orosstMl tho \'ionvilIo — 
 Mars-la-Tonr road. tlu> rnomy maintainod an nnintorrnptod 
 tiro. Tho distam'o from thoro to Oontonr ISO ^north of tho 
 ravino) is ir>00 motors; to lloijiht S4t> it is ilotU) motors. It 
 was thoroforo a mass tiro at lonir-ranjjro. n.^ we inulerafand it 
 to-itoii, and tho atiaikor was oovonnl with tiro at 1500 — 
 •JOOO motors. 
 
 ."■). Kvon with modorn arms, a mass tir»^ at greattM' 
 rani^os is \\o\ to bo rtH'omnunuhHl. Tho followiiiir ironorat 
 t'onsidorations aro statod in this oonnootion: 1. Tbo on- 
 
 •In 1ST5 General Cissey stated to tho Chamber that hts entire 
 division was engaged. It is not clear whether he therehy meant the 
 fire action or the subsequent advance of the division. 
 
MilUaryJIiHU/rical Studies. 201 
 
 tiro ih\i\ of fif; wjjlh HWffj^f, v\'it}j tho <:x<M\ti\<)U of th<; low 
 ttKTiuhiWH (iXUituViui; arounrl th^f north of MarH-Ia-Tour (II., I., 
 F. — Kith, I. — itlWi), othf;rwiw; wan inoKt Mujt^blo for (^tfftcA- 
 ivc muMH tint at lonj^ ranj^o. 2. Of the* 2.'i — 25^K) mnUiVH of 
 Hw<'j»t ground, th<? hrigad<; U'iiVtfin(;d: II. and I. — 10th, 
 1000 timiern; F.— 10th, I.— 57th, F.— «7th, and 2d P. C, 
 HOO iiKticr-H. 
 
 All thoHC f;irr;ijinHtiinc<*K coml/iiitt to rnakf; it an attiick 
 with grr*at nuni^rkral inferiority, with iufcrior armament, 
 and on ground and in a general Htate of the battle without 
 a parallel. 
 
 We expeeted to take the enemy in flank, but were tak'-ri 
 in flank ourwdve** and rolled up from left to right. 
 
 ^«y 77a« To/Mcal Vorran EmpU/ijeA. — H^i far ax J could 
 aneertain, they were an follovvn: 
 At 2500 meterh: 
 
 II. — 10th. Conjpany eolumuH, 
 I. — 10th. Comjiuny eolumnn ('.'A, 2dj; in rear the 
 
 ha If -battalion 4 th— iHt. 
 F. — 10th. ('jnii\niuy eoiumnn filth, l^Khj in rear the 
 
 half-battalion 12th— 9th. 
 I. — 57th. lOntire eompanirfH deployed! aw KkirminherH 
 Hsf. 2di; in rh«-ir rear ilh, '.Ui — ^57th in 
 half-battalion and, HubHerjaently, at 1500 
 meterH, in company eolumnH. 
 y. — 57tl!. liouble column on the center. 100 meterH 
 Houth of the road Vionville — MarH la Tour 
 change to half battalionH, 11th — 9th and 
 12th— 10th. rin thiK battalion the le-aderH 
 of the 0th and 12lh CompanicH were firHt 
 lientenantB; of 10th and 11th, cajjtainH. 
 In order to have each half-batalion com- 
 manded by a captain, the battalion com- 
 
 14 — 
 
*JOl* Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 iiiaiultM- m;ul«> llu> t\»rni;Uioii lUh. SMh — 
 r»7tli. I-lli. lOih- r»T(h. 
 
 2d. 'M\ 1*. r. roinpauv <'i>hMuns ai laOO uuMors. 
 
 Ad\MiH'«> in owv fri>nt. bolh rt^jjiuuMits siih* bv sido; on 
 haltin.u in ilu> (Mumuv's front,* Slh— KiUi; •tth--l()th; 12th, 
 JMh- Uilli; inii. ^Mli r»7tli: IJlh. lOili r>7(h wcro broujjht 
 inti» (he llrsi line. 
 
 Half o\' th(> romnanics of ilu> brijiado liad doplovod 
 tluMi* platoons as skirmisluMs; tho ft>llo>vini; ronuiinod o1os(m1 
 thronjihont \\w aition: rJth. !)(h— Kltli; Ith— 57th: :U1 — 
 :.7(h: lltlu Sbh— ;)7th;t TJili. KMli :.7ili: "Jd. 'M V. C. 
 
 (/•) Ihtration of the Attach-. I assnnio thai wtMnade lOOO 
 nictors in \'2 niinntos. Tho av«>raji(> liriMind uaintMl to tho 
 front bv all tlio conipanit^s was '2000 niottM-s.| tlioso on tho 
 rij;ht liavini; lo «>\iond inor«^ and nun-o in that dirootion. 
 The attack was brisk, ronntinii in ilio delav oaused bv the 
 
 •Compare Sketch III. 
 
 IThe entire front of F. — 67th was oovorod by \\w skirmisbors of 
 lst--57(h. oxtoniUnj; ;»s far as tlu lUiis ilo TiMnviUo. Aoi'onling to 
 Lioutonant SohroilHM-, thon adjiilant. tho two half-battalions of F. — 
 r<7th joinoil tho skirinishors in litic. Thoy throw out no skirmishors 
 througbotit tho action, an unhoard-of oaso. at any rato undor snob 
 oiroumstanoos. wbioh roqniros oxplanation. Tho battalion oom- 
 mandor wantod to jiot tho battalion noar tho ouomy as qulokly as 
 possible. a.nd nuioh tinio bad boon lost by tho whoel. Tho minomout 
 now was so aoooloratod that it was impossiblo to throw skirmishors 
 to tho front, and as Major von Modon\ saw skirintsbors in his front, 
 none woro thrown out from tho battalion. Half-battalion 1 1th. 
 J>th--fi7tb thod two or throo voUoys boforo roaohing tho lino of skir- 
 mishors. advanood with drums boatin.i;. and roaohod, liko Half-bat 
 talion 12tb. 10th- 67tb. tho s,>iitlitTii odgo of tho ravino. Tho lattor 
 did not tiro at all whllo advanoinj;. and only tlrod (( ftic sbots on tho 
 rotroat. Tho two balf-bat'alions had baroly roaohod tho sonthorn 
 odiio of tho ravino. whon tho Fronoh triXH^s. who woro lyitis on tho 
 fnrthor odso. i(«c'.r;i(V/»^//i/ burst on thorn out of tho donso snuiko. 
 Horo tho fusiliers soattorod. F.- r«7th was tho only battalion that 
 found no oovor of any kind: It romaii\od but a briof nu>mont in tho flr« 
 ing lino and lost 10 othoors and ;?Si'> mon out of 900, tbo 10th Company 
 alone losing S oftloors and ISO mon. 
 
 lOouuting from the starting-point southwest of Mars-la-Tour. 
 
' M ilitaryJI intorical Hindus. 20.^ 
 
 iMiiovjil of Ww. otjHtacN.H in i\u: rnr-adow bottom, I rnakr^ it 
 .'{0 rniniJtc*H until th*? coxxicr (F. — IfJth, f. — 57th; rcfuhff} the 
 h<'<)^r^ and bank. In jwldition, 'JO rnjnntr'« for the entire line^ 
 dnrint^ \vhif:ii ]Ki\()f] U\c action w«h Htationary, and .'{0 rnin^ 
 nl^H for thf K-Uciil. I fhuM nuike the total duration 1^ 
 honr-H. The remnantH of the brij^ade were probably aHHem- 
 , I)i<d Houffi of th»- r-fjjid Ahirs la Tour — Vionville, uft'T 
 5:1.1 p. ni, 
 
 fcj I'Jxpendilure of ArarauidlAon o.nd Fire Eff eel. — The 
 ealeulafion of the ammunition <x\nu(\t-<\ in very difficalt, 
 HH I did not find /^liable data in thin reHfHjet in the reports 
 an<l reoordH of the froopH. The opinion wan general Ihal 
 v:e vere horH-de-cornhal before v:e fired a nhd. I fence, we Hhall 
 havr- to content onrwdvcrx with a probability. 
 
 The .*> batfalionH moved into battle with a Htrength of 
 ti." ofTifrerH and 454(1 men,* 
 
 The loMHeH until the eaMt-and-went ravine wan reached 
 were jirobybly 20 ficj- cent; h^-rice thr- number of riflew at 
 that point w{ji< .'iOJO; not a Hfiot uaH tired by 12th, 0th — lOth, 
 4th — 57th, 'id — 57th, KHtimatinj? these organizationn at 
 000 rillcH and deducting therefrom 20 per cent for loHHeH, 
 there remained 2010 rifh-H in ii'tirm. According to the 
 HtatemcntH of Hr-veral ofTir-erH, tiie companicH of F. — 57th 
 may have tired between .'' and 5 rounds. Assuming 4 as 
 the average and 10 for (he rather troops, we have 21,850-|- 
 200K=2I.7.'^ shots. At this point we have a further dim- 
 inution from losses which reached u?, per cent during the 
 ar;tion, and since the f^rcnicr part of the same was inflicted 
 rjn thr- retreat, further estimates become v<;ry unreliable. 
 XeverthelesM the total expenditure of ammunition of the 
 brigade may be f>laced at about 18 — 20,000 cartridgf^.f 
 
 •Official Account, page 626, I. 
 
 tMaJor MelBHner HtateB in the MlUtfir Wtxhrnftlatt of 1891 that 
 
204 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 The oxpoiulituro of nunminiiiou on the pari of tho on- 
 emj could not be ascertained. But it must have been very 
 great during that brief space of time, as General Tiadmir- 
 ault (IV. Armv Corps) reports on the evening of the KUli 
 that he is short of anununition. On the ITth ninny cart- 
 ridges were found aUmg the French positions, which served 
 to indicate the extent of the enemy's line. Some men of 
 Grenier's division stated that they had tired as many as 
 150 rounds> and that their rifles were so hot they could 
 barely hold them. 
 
 Assuming that the enemy expended but SO rounds ]>er 
 man. the 11.025 ritles in action would have tired 054.000 
 shots. According to this. 1 bullet out of 452 reached its 
 billet* under the following conditions: long range, tlat 
 trajectory, absence of cover, employment of closed columns 
 and lines on our side: artillery aiul mitrailleuse fire not in- 
 cluded in the calculation. To be sure, we must consider that 
 many men were hit by more than oiu^ bullet: indeed, dead 
 and woundeii with four ami five shot woumls were not at all 
 rare. Of course, this calculation is but an estimate, but it 
 is not saying too much, that the modern ritie. with its long 
 range, its greater accuracy, tlatter trajectory, and greatly 
 increased peiuM ration, would at many ]Hunts have trebled 
 or quadrupled the losses, if the same tactical forms were 
 used again. 
 
 some men of the 5th Company fired 30 rounds. Admitting the state- 
 ment to be correct, the total result is but little affected thereby. 
 
 •This calculation is based on the figures in the chapter on losses, 
 v.. (f1. page 1S7: 
 
 Regiment No. 16. 4S otficers. 33S0 men; Regiment No. 57. 24 offi- 
 cers, 653 men. among them one man of the 5th company: making 72 
 otficers. 2033 men. Total. 2105 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 
 
 205 
 
 There were placed hors-de-comhat . 
 
 Killed or Woundf-rl. 
 Officers. Men. 
 
 Mi8Hin«. 
 Offic<;rH. Men 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 l8t— 16th 7 
 
 2d —16th 5 
 
 3rl _16th 5 
 
 4th— 16th 3 
 
 5th— 16th 2 
 
 6th— 16th 4 
 
 7th— 16th 2 
 
 8th— 16th 3 
 
 9th— 16th 5 
 
 10th— 16th 4 
 
 nth— 16th 4 
 
 12th— 16th 4 
 
 48 
 
 1st— 57th 4 
 
 2d —57th 3 
 
 3d —57th 3 
 
 4th— 57th 3 
 
 9th— 57th 3 
 
 10th— 57th 3 
 
 nth— 57th 2 
 
 12th— 57th 3 
 
 423 
 
 ^ 
 
 Cover as far 
 
 as 
 Contour 780. 
 
 26 I Over open 
 \ ground 
 C b jth ways. 
 
 J 
 
 24 t653 
 
 Total 72 1966 2 449 
 
 Of those missing from the 16th Regiment (1 officer, 
 423 men), 1 officer and 356 men returned from captivity on 
 the 25th of August, 1870;$ the remaining 07 have to be 
 added to the losses of the regiment in the battle, which thus 
 
 ♦Companies marked ? lost more than 100 men. 
 
 IThe figures given In the first edition of the Abridged History 
 of the 57th Regiment, by Capt. Hilken, have been correspondingly 
 amended in the second edition of 1889. 
 
 iPage 278 of the History of the 16th Regiment. 
 
'J0(> Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 reach a total of 48 otticers and 1."'80 uhmi. It is piobaMy 
 tho jiroatost loss sunVrod by any ivyinuMit in 1870-71. The 
 total lossos of tho o battalions from tho enemy's tire there- 
 fore amount to 7i! ot\toers and )l(y^'^ men, not counting 
 prisoners.* 
 
 The tirst reliable accoimt of the end of the battle I 
 received throuiih a letter from (\donel von Cranach.f which 
 had been written a few days after the battle with a view of 
 being sent to von l^ernewitz. von Neree. von Rorcke. and 
 to myself. It said, among other things: *'Tt was on tlu> 
 succtHHling day that T fully comprehended what the regi- 
 ment [57th] had done, and 1 must say that the men fought 
 like lions; T am now all the ]M'ouder of being at the head of 
 the regiment Urave Erhardt [com- 
 manding the 12th Company] died soon after the battle, and 
 the same fate seemed likely for brave Schreiber [adjutant ()f 
 F. — 57th]," who was shot through the right temple, tlu^ 
 bullet coming out on the left, destroying the right eye and 
 severely injuring the left, ami he had another shot in the 
 foot, lie was given up by everybody, but the Lord directs. 
 Sohreiber was restored, is now captain on the retired list, 
 and for the fourth time representing the district of Nord- 
 liausen in the Diet. lie is the same man who was men 
 tioned at Problus as ensign, and his wound is a case in point 
 
 ♦The singular ways of Providence are shown by the following: 
 Among the killed was Lieutenant Weiuhagen. who was adjutant at 
 Griifrath. On the completion of the mobilization he had taken a 
 leave for the purpose of being present in at least one action, after 
 which he intended to return. He joined the regiment on the 11th of 
 August and was assigned to the l'2th Company of the Fifty-seventh. 
 When we were marching to the battle of the 10th. he was full of 
 happy anticipation: but the tirst action, by which he meant to satisfy 
 his ambition, which we can easily understand, cost him his life. 
 Oddly enough, warrants for his arrest, giving his personal descrip- 
 tion, were issued for this brave man long after he was slumbering 
 under the soil of Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 tLives now at Berlin and is general of infantry. 
 
Military- 1 1 inlorical Hludies. 207 
 
 in oonnocliofi with tho oxporimcntH mado by ProfoHHor 
 iJi-uriH and otiiorH, to bo roform] to ialr-r on. Tha wound of 
 entrance can barely be diHcerned to-day; that of exit, which 
 waH Hornewhat larger, \h move conHpir:nonH. 
 
 Tlu- n b;if<;iIioriH of the .''.Sth Hrif^ndf* went into battle 
 with or, oHifeKij and 454(; rnen. They loHt 72 officerH and 
 20;{:', men in kilh'd and wounded — i. e., 74^ per cent of riflfi- 
 cerH, and 45 per font of men, not counting thoHe captured. 
 
 The Frencli fV. Army forf»H iian Htated itH Iohhch on 
 tlic HVth of AugiiHt, ;iH 200 ofTicerH and 2258 rnen. Thewe 
 HgiircH we have rcdiucd on jtjige 190 to 147 ofTlcerH and 1722 
 men, incluHive of f.cgnind'H cavalry diviHion ; thfw? lf>sHeH are 
 great in vir*w of tiie brief fire action on the part of the 38th 
 Brigade and of itH vary Hmall expenditure of ammunition. 
 The greater part of fhf-Hf h>HHeH iH probjibly due to our jirfil- 
 lery and to the Keventy-ninth. Jn order to elucidate this 
 and other matterH, I addrcHsed mvHelf to rJeneralH Ladmir- 
 ault, (irenier, and CiHsey; the tirwf jidlK-red to the ofTieial 
 ttgureH, the other two failed to anHwer. 
 
 It iH probably Hafe to annume that one-half of our Ioksch 
 were incurred on the retreat; henee 5 battalions loHt .",0 
 OfTicerH and 1010 men, while advancing 1,500 meterH, and 
 before the rcU-cat. The brigade therefore arrived within 
 then effective range of the enemy in good condition, not- 
 withHtanding the long attack movement under the moHt un- 
 favorable eircumHtanceH. The tactical formw employed— 
 i. e., advance without halt and without fire, with nkir- 
 miHherH and company columnn— proved ade(|uate undf-r 
 long-range and nhort-range mass fire, it being moreover a 
 frontal attack taken in flank by the enemy. 
 
 The defeat of the brigade, at the same time, was due 
 more to its numerical inferiority and lack of knowledge of 
 the enemy, than to its tactics. The ground wan afl unfavor- 
 
208 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ahlo to an attack as it posv^^iMv oouUl be. atul as suitablo for 
 mass thv at lotiir ami slu>rt ranj^o as thoniih it had boon 
 siHHMallv prt»v>arod; yot in tliis tlankod frontal attack np to 
 tlio retroat tho lossos woro no un^ator than in othor niodorn 
 battlos assnniinij tho tlguros handod down to ns to bo oor 
 root, and OAon sniallor than in many a battlo of Fivdoriok 
 and Napoloon wIumo tho th>oision liad to bo aainod by 
 assanlt. 
 
 Tho oironmstanoos oan thoroforo not bo oallod oxtra- 
 ordinary. On tlio othor hand, do not the battlos of T^oanno. 
 of Villiors, of l>apannu\ and on tho T.isaino 1:0 to show that 
 tho opponent siilYorod similar lossos aijainst ns? To be 
 sure tho Oormans wtro tactically mnch tho superiors of 
 those troops of tho enemy. 
 
 Tho picture 1 have presented of tho battle, and tho man- 
 ner in which 1 have endeavored to analy/.e it and to explain 
 its details, should ]>revont false conclusions. The small- 
 caliber rities, etc.. have furnished the opponents of all 
 closed formations with now arguments for their theories, to 
 bo sure, but it is by no means certain that tluu'o will not be 
 situations in the futui-o whore it will bt^ possible to advance 
 in closed formation to within t> — 400 motors of the enemy. 
 
 IX. ^Vhl/ Was the Charge of the 1st Guard Dragoons Successful? 
 
 Evorythinir I have stHMi. heard, and read of the Austro- 
 Saxon troops cajiuot but impress their friends atid enemies 
 alike with respect for their discipline and for their behavior 
 on the battk^tield. In ISOO tht^ Saxons, for instance, prt^ 
 served their onlor and tactical formations under dostruct 
 ivo infantry tiiv. and it was only the defeat that destroyed 
 them. It also ap]>earod that wherever (hoy wore tem- 
 porarily victorious, their spirit and discipline did not desren- 
 orato into reprehensible and low outbursts of hatred or 
 
M Hilary IJiHUrrical Sttuiies. 2<i'.j 
 
 oWtcr wil<l imnHiouH, oven wU<:u iiit- itit'it wr-n- not \nn\*'V con 
 frol or rjrj(J<-r o!)wrv;itiori. T'.idK'.il ;<-;iko/i« n<-v<r cj'Hmni to 
 (»r«<Jof/iinat<-, ;in<J fh'? itovtciU-yn, wourKl**! or rj/iwound'r^J, 
 pfiHorKT waH Kure of kind treatrnr^nt. 
 
 Our <'.x\><'y\i'n<H'n on fh^' baffUf-fi^jJd of Mar-K-laTour 
 w^'f-r; diff'T'-nf, I jun t^hid to Jtrknow U'df('? that w<f thf^n hrfid 
 our ofijjon'-nt in rnilifjirv uu<\ mora) n-wf^-rrt, knowinj^ that 
 *th<- Vvt'\\<]\ nation r-onnifl'-r'-d itH<')f ;if th'- h^iid of ^iviliza- 
 fion. JI<rif<*, v\f' ronid not w<ll ^nt'•rlain a j>oor id'-a of tho 
 Hpiril, of Ml*' imperial frf>^>pH, and our diKafipointrnr^nt waw 
 i\\*'it'Un'tt all thr^ t^rttnUtr. I would paxK fh'f rnatt'T- ov^t in 
 Hik'riw were it not that it in iriHtnu'tiv*-. 
 
 Kitfint? at the i!r<^-ti tabh- on^ lookn, at hu^Ij rnattr-iH 
 diffr•r^ntly than wh^n lyin;^ wound'-d on the battle-field. 
 l\ IK hut natural that in the latter eawe one rnav make min- 
 takeM, hut even the <juiet of the Htudy, where reanon Ih ex- 
 I>eete<l to manter paMHioii.iM no bar to errorH. There are th(m(t 
 who think that the imjierial Freneh infantry wax taetic- 
 ally Htjperior to the German; amon^ them are very influen- 
 tial AuHtriari ofTi'^rH, and evr-n the (ifrrfiuriH do not deny the 
 Frenf;h Kuj^eriority in the employment of fire and in village- 
 fighting, where the Frenehmen can nhow hiH fine qnalitie«. 
 In other rr^HpeetH, alKO, the German infantry committed 
 many tactir-al errorn in the firKt period of the war, but what 
 waH the courne of the French attack here? 
 
 After the 88th Brigade had br-en Hwept away, it wa» 
 followed firHt by a divinion. and then by half of another in 
 Keveral lineH. Neither had effective infantry to encounter, 
 Btill the advance waH clumKy and kIow, Firnt came a Hkir- 
 miwh line, in which everybody commingled, in which every- 
 body yelled, in which there waH no tactical order, and which, 
 moreover, halted rcf^-atedly, although there wan no r^twint- 
 ance. It wan fr»llovvrd by a Hecond HkirmiHh line, and tiio 
 
210 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 latter by battalions in lino, with tlioir eajjles. INIoro I was 
 unable to obser\e. The artillery did not join in the move- 
 ment and remained in its position, with the exception of 
 one battery of Cissey's division, which followed as far as the 
 northern edg^e of the frequently mentioned ravine and 
 opened fire on Tronville. The first skirmish line fired, 
 7nost]y from the hip, without aiming; both skirmish lines 
 passed over us. and the battalions halted on the line where 
 most of our dead and wounded were lying, 150 — 300 meters 
 south of the ravine. The distances between their lines 
 were very unequal, and during the advance portions of the 
 first two lines became intermingled. The French had prob 
 ably arrived within about 150 meters to the north of Con- 
 tour 780, when they were attacked by the 1st Guard Dra- 
 goons, and now there arose an indescribable confusion. 
 Both skirmish lines rushed to the rear — throwing away 
 ritles and equipments; other skirmishers laid themselves 
 down alongside of and between us or endeavored to form 
 groups; the men were firing in all directions and an irregu- 
 lar fire came from the closed battalions. Considering their 
 small strength and the unfavorable conditions of the at- 
 tack, it sounds incredible that 3 squadrons of the 1st Guard 
 Dragoons rode through three lines, threw two into flight 
 and the third, closed one, into disorder, and staggered all 
 three of them. TTere is the point, and however mucli has been 
 written on that (jlorious event, not a single officer has tried to find 
 the explanation. I shall give it; it is simple indeed. Had 
 the French infantry been in possession of that which an 
 eflScient body of troops cannot do without — viz., tactical 
 order and discipline, no cavalry could have gained the least 
 success under circumstances where the unobstructed view 
 of the field pr(M'luded amjthing lilr surprise. Yet the sur- 
 prise was com])lete: hence the confusion and stupefaction 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 211 
 
 ■of the enemy. That is what gave the dragoons success. 
 How could they have surprised the enemy? Because the 
 hostile infantry masked the greater part of their own rifles 
 by an advance of the 13th and 4.3d Regiments from the left 
 of Grenier's division in a sharp westerly direction toward 
 Mars-la-Tonr. Forming an acute angle with the Fren<'h 
 front, they prevented the latter from firing and lent their 
 flank to us, and their rear to the Seventy-ninth, to portions 
 of the Fifty-seventh in the Bois de Tronville, and to the 
 artillery southwest of the latter. To these tactical errors 
 are to be added other circumstances which tended to 
 lighten the work of the 1st Cluard Dragoons: namely, the 
 boundless disorder, the lack of discipline, the bad spirit of 
 that infantry, the helplessness of the oflScers and the lack of 
 heed paid to the enemy. When the skirmishers of the 13th 
 Regiment joined those of the infantry in the first line — 
 right over our dead and wounded — it was as though the 
 happy meeting and victory wore to be celebrated together; 
 there may have been cause for that, to be sure, but they 
 were not yet masters of the battle-field. They shouted, 
 called, and drank to each other, waved their forage caps, 
 and occupied themselves exclusively with the unfortunate 
 victims of the battle, heaping all kinds of ignominy on 
 them. Whole groups stopped at a prostrate Prussian, and 
 what did that infantry do? It polluted its name by inde- 
 scribable cynicism or by brutalities with which it threatened 
 our wounded. " The first greeting presented to most of us 
 was the muzzle of a gun, the coats of most of us were torn 
 open from top to bottom, most of us were robbed of our pos- 
 sessions, and if that had only been the worst! Entire com- 
 panies disappeared as tactical bodies, the men picking up 
 Prussians that were not yet dead and carrying them off as 
 prisoners, or unsaddling our officers' horses which were lying 
 
*212 Itujuirics into the Tactics of the Futttre. 
 
 \\vvi\ and taking saddles and bridles to a safo plaoo. 1 niy- 
 st'lf >vas spaivd any molestation, bocanso a FnMU'Ti otVioor 
 took I'liarjio of mo; but while .liivinp; mo a drink from his 
 rantoon, his luvu tapped hin\ on the shoulder in a most 
 familiar wav, as thonjih to i>xpress their disapj>roval. That 
 was the reason thev felt themselves masters of the battle- 
 tield. and oeeupiinl themselves with thins;s whieh should 
 not have been tolerated; order was destroved. and in the 
 midst of this heedh>ssn»>ss burst our eavalrv; it was sueeess- 
 ful and was bound to W. 1 would not. however, advise it 
 to attempt the same thinj; aj;ainst sonu^ other infantry, for 
 it would not eheek them for "10 minutes." This cavalry 
 did not jiet fartluM* east than to the extreme rijjht of 
 ;U1 — 57th; thert> it wheeled to the left, rode throujih and 
 oonfoundiHl the lines alonj: the entirt> front, and. passin,-; 
 around the north of Mars-la-Tour. disappeared behind the 
 villaiiv. (^ur front was now elear. and those who eould 
 erawl to the rear saved themselves, as a perfectly nnid fire 
 from the rijiht front was sweepinj; for some tinn' ovtM* 
 the battle-tield. on whieh not an enemy was standiuir. The 
 statement is not corrtH't. that the FriMU'h infantry did not 
 auain advance, as luiiiht b»> inferred from all books dealini; 
 with this evtmt. and as is expressly stated in the Histories 
 of the KUh and 571 h Kejjinu^nts. whieh j::o so far as to assert 
 that the hostile infantry recrossed the ravine in conse- 
 quence of that attat'k. On the contrary, as soon as the 
 dra,mH)ns had disapi>eared. it aiiain advanced fi-oni tln^ rij::ht, 
 utilizinj; the time to police the tield. Tn this period falls 
 the capture of the brave liorseless or wounded draii-oons, 
 and of many ofticers and men of F. — Kith. I. — 57th, and 
 F. — 57th. The ca]>ture of the drajroons in itself proves the 
 accuracy of my statement. How could they have been cap- 
 tured if the FrtMuh had run awav before iheui across the 
 
Military-Historical Studies. 213 
 
 ravine? It wuh not until later that a general withdrawal 
 to the original ponition took place in consequence of the 
 appearance of lth(;inbaben'H Cavalry Division at Ville 
 Hur Yron. The withdrawal wan made in the warne carelesH 
 manner an had been the advance; the lin(;H were without 
 any protection and nimjily faced about. On our extreme 
 h'ft they w(;re i>receded by a lonj; dark column: it was 
 our captured men. It iH therefore due to the bad Hpirit 
 and the lack of diHcipline, in addition to tactical errorn, 
 that the French failed to gain anything beyond the direct 
 rcHultH of their fire. 
 
214 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY AND TACTICS. 
 
 1. General. 
 Tlu' will is tlu^ powor that diroi-ts tho masses, and dis- 
 cipline is the niodinni throiij^h whioh the will is bronuht to 
 bear on the men; a clear and determined will and rnthless 
 exercise of discipline are in battle the most valuable quali- 
 ties of the lower otticers. whose constant endeavor should 
 be to preserve the ascendency over their subordinatt^s by 
 means of their higher moral strength and their tactically 
 trained intellect. The most perfect arms may moilify, but 
 will never ahro(jate. that law, and those alone will travel the 
 right road in tactics who keep in mind that many thousands 
 of men are involved, who all. however ditVerent tht\v may be 
 in other respects, have in common the natural egotism luhich 
 aims at the safeti/ and preserration of one's life. By the side 
 of the material egotism there is a transcendental, moral, 
 national — in brief, a psychical tine, which may exert a ]>ow'- 
 erful iufluenoe. The higher the development of the latter, 
 the better will it rise above the im])ulses of material ego- 
 tism. Mohammed showed himself the type of an army psy- 
 chologist in teaching that the beyond is all. and the present 
 life nothing. In any nation this moral egotism can only 
 spring from conditions and causes germane to the indi- 
 vidual; it cannot be imparted by influences operating from 
 without. Tactics should be in keeping with it. should be 
 national. There are times when the gn^t mass is im]>elled 
 by the motive of the war. and such a time has been men- 
 tioned (1870). Although this is an exception, still it will 
 
Psychology and Taciics. '216 
 
 be necf^HHary in tacticH to reckon with a feature which for- 
 merly waH not HO dominant as it may be expected to be in 
 the fntnre — i. e.. the increaHe of the national sentiment. 
 More than that, in the case of our prospective opponents, 
 the Russians and French, there is a sj^ecial psychic aug- 
 mentation in the shape of hatred which has been artificially 
 ^created and nurtured through a whole generation. On the 
 I>art of the French the hatred arose from the defeats suf- 
 fered in 1870-71 ; on the jjart of the Russians, from their dis- 
 content with the results of the victorious \\'ar of 1877-78. 
 Moreover, in both nations, the military spirit has grown 
 much, because all their ho7>es are based on their armies. 
 In Russia the x>olitical hatred is fed by the orthodox clergy, 
 in France by the Roman Catholic clergy, and the Czar is 
 not only the political, judicial, and military, but also the 
 religious, head of the state. The moral strength of the 
 army is bound to be benefited by both of these sources, and 
 the future war is bound to be a national war. a war of the 
 peojile. The armies of nations aiming at ends whose ac- 
 complishment they believe indispensable for the mainte- 
 nance of their political honor, are likely to be moved by 
 more effective moral influences than the armies of nations 
 which are politically satiated, so to speak, and merely bent 
 on the defense of their possessions, their position among 
 the nations, etc. 
 
 This constitutes a matter doubly impjortant in tactics, 
 where the personal influence of the superior can no longer 
 exercise the sway it did in former tactics. Much will there- 
 fore in the future depend on the moral strength jjossessed 
 in each case by the soldier; indeed, the tactics of masses 
 of skirmishers will be feasible, if at all, chiefly because 
 grounded on this basis. The increased sense of x>^i'«'^nal 
 honor and the principle of national honor are alone able to 
 
216 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 eounterbalauee to a certain degree the lessened personal 
 inlluence of the leader over the masses. Armies will 
 be opposed to each other more equal iu strength, condi- 
 tion, armament, and training than ever before, and each 
 army is bound to display those superior qualities which 
 live and operate in its nation. National psychology thus 
 becomes a true element in future war, and, naturally, 
 also in tactics. Every officer should industriously labor 
 to understand it thoroughly, and that opponent will have a 
 great advantage, so far as tactics is concerned, who has 
 secured for himself the superiority in moral influences by 
 peace training. I am abstaining from a comparison be- 
 tween these forces of the prospective opponents, because 
 it is so easy to err; but everything should be done to 
 strengthen the moral spirit. Tactics would have light 
 work, if we should ever reach the stage where every man 
 would regard the assailing of our national honor or the vio- 
 lation of our territory as an attack in an equal degree, and 
 where every one w'ould be urged, from his own inner motives, 
 to demand satisfaction, and to offer life or limb to 
 obtain national redress. This cannot be hoped for 
 to-day, for in all modern nations a continuous and bit- 
 ter struggle is waging between the material and moral 
 egotism. The entire modern society is embroiled in it, and 
 the discontent with the existing social, political, and relig- 
 ious conditions absorbs a large part of the moral strength. 
 Society and the people, the state and its institutions, are 
 exhausting themselves in the mutual struggle and consume 
 most precious forces. Some nations show a certain intel- 
 lectual and political apathy, and it is doubtful whether 
 their national sentiment can mature those advantages for 
 tactics which are to be expected from healthy moral 
 conditions. Even at times when flaming patriotism 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 217 
 
 8\vays every man's heart, the enthusiasm of the great 
 majority grows dumb at the door of death, material 
 egotism gains the mastery over idealism, hodily weakness 
 over intellectual strength, and the instinct of self-preser- 
 vation over the spirit of self-sacrifice. A small minority 
 alone preserves its enthusiasm, and among the many vex- 
 mtions, fatigues, and deprivations of war hut few of this 
 minority retain the same buoyancy of spirit and will-power 
 and the same resoluteness in all dangers. In my own case 
 I admit that these forces changed just as does one's dis- 
 position, the condition of the body, and the atmosphere in 
 which we live. The low egotism knocks many times, and 
 man, clinging much to the material world, much more than 
 is believed by non-penetrative persons, frequently becomes 
 more or less the '^personal battle-field," where human weak- 
 ness struggles against noble and sturdy impulses. Some 
 acknowledge it; others are ashamed to do so. It should 
 not be covered with silence; on the contrary, it should be 
 particularly brought out. as it is only wiien every one under- 
 stands it, that we reach healthy views and the means to 
 conquer ourselves. Then collapses the current theory 
 of the soldier's courage; it is a myth, and, as a rule, cannot 
 be anything else; manful examples alone will hold a great and, 
 according to my experience, calming, influence over men with the 
 sense of honor. In the school of war man gathers warlike 
 experience; there the leader continuously disciplines his 
 mental, moral, and physical powers in reaching for higher 
 aims and in looking upon war from the standpoint of the 
 artist. It may be stated as a rule, that in war courage in- 
 creases in few, not in the great mass, and these few, officers 
 as well as men, are the soul of the troops. The most cour- 
 ageous soldier is the one who has not been under fire, since 
 peace habitudes maybe so strong in him that hewill for some 
 
 16 — 
 
218 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 time move in battle as on the maneuver ground. But not 
 always; it will only be so long as he does not know the 
 danger into which he has been led. As soon as he becomes 
 conscious of the danger, he is beset by uneasiness for his 
 own self instead of finding in himself courage and strength 
 for the cause and for the idea. When an advancing body of 
 troops suddenly stops, it cannot be explained psychologic- 
 ally in any other way but that the men have become con- 
 scious of the peril of the situation ; these are decisive mo- 
 ments which are overcome only by a few strong spirits of 
 sufficient vigor to revive by their own will-power the falter- 
 ing courage of the troops and to carry them over such mo- 
 ments of w^eakness. Between these moments, however, and 
 the phenomena arising from a consciousness of numerical 
 inferiority, there is a vast difference. 
 
 The brigade which carried out the attack on Height 846 
 would hardly repeat it in the same manner now that it 
 knows the danger. No human power could have made it 
 rise and advance after it once lay dowm near the enemy. 
 There are limits in tactics where will-power fails and w^here 
 personal ascendency is no longer effective, and the appre- 
 ciation of these limits on the part of officers and men is a 
 purely instinctive one, springing, as it were, from the recog- 
 nition of the enemy's materially superior fighting power — 
 i. e., of their ow'n tactical inferiority. It cannot be explained 
 in any other way, that in such moments leaders and men 
 suddenly turn about without previous arrangement, with- 
 out orders, without signal of any kind, etc.; that a closed 
 body of troops which at one moment exhibits the finest of 
 bearing, completely collapses at the next like a house built 
 of cards. Passion, enthusiasm, and the courage of the in- 
 dividual should not, therefore, be solely relied upon, but it 
 should be borne in mind that as regards tactics, the major- 
 
Psycliologij and Tactics. 219 
 
 ity of the men remain indolent — for anyone who acts not 
 spontaneously, but merely upon exterior impulses, may in 
 so far be called indolent. In keeping that in mind, despite 
 universal liability to service and other assertions, we shall 
 best serve our king, country, and nation, and be apt to take 
 the correct steps in an emergency. What officer who has 
 Jbeen exposed to destructive fire, is willing to assert that it 
 did not cost him a struggle to rise from behind the cover 
 and to rush forward over the open field where death and 
 destruction were reigning? "NA'ho will deny that the same 
 readiness of resolve cannot be the gift of the majority of the 
 men; that, unlike the ofQcers, they do not act spontaneously, 
 but in response to an exterior impelling force? Who has 
 not observed that the signal of the whistle, though heard, 
 was unheeded; that when the men were under cover, but 
 few followed resolutely from the beginning when the officer 
 rushed to the front, others slowly, others not at all, and that 
 the entire advance came to a stop as soon, for instance, as 
 the leading officer fell under the enemy's fire? We have 
 musketeers behind us, not heroes. Under the modern 
 destructive mass fire, it is not only difficult to cause the 
 swarms of skirmishers to quit their cover and to carry them 
 forward, but the combined leading of man}- small detach- 
 ments is much more difficult than formerly, and on open 
 ground it will frequently be found impossible. As striking 
 illustrations, we have selected the two examples (Problus 
 and Mars-la-Tour), separated by an interval of four years, 
 which took place under circumstances resembling each 
 other in many particulars. While in the former attack 
 the army of the Elbe retained unbroken control over 
 the divisions, brigades, and even some battalions and 
 companies; while division, brigade, and regimental com- 
 manders were from beginning to end with the skirmish lines 
 
220 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 or >vith their supports; and whiU\ for instaiu'i'. Major von 
 Thiole, j^eueral staff oftioor of tho 14th Division, traversed 
 the distance from the captured viUay;e of Problus (27th 
 Brijjade) to the soutlieast and back in close proximity to the 
 enemy's entrenched position, in order to deliver to tlu> 'JSth 
 Brigade the order to attack the wood of Hriz; while the I'Sth 
 Brigade executed a ditticult wheel under etlective tire for 
 the purpose of attacking the wood; while the connecting link 
 between leader and combatants never broke — at INIars-la- 
 Tour the entire brigade quickly slipped from the hands of 
 the superior leaders. What was practicable four years 
 before on the same kind of ground was impracticable then 
 within the zone of the mass lire of the breech-loader, and it 
 will remain so forever under like circumstances. 
 
 In all fire tactics the knowledge' of the fallings of 
 human nature heretofore called for the longest possibh' ki>ep- 
 ing together of bodies controllable by one hand; to-day the 
 small-caliber ritie by no means relieves us from that i>rinci- 
 ple, it com]>els us rather to ai>]ily it intelligently if there is 
 to be any control at all. If the latter is detMued retiuisite, 
 the meajis must be shaped accordingly, for whoever wants 
 a certain end necessarily wants the means thereto. 
 
 No tactician should contend against this principle, and 
 it should be left to the artist to sha]>e the same into a use- 
 ful and sufficient tactical means iinder the vicissitudes of 
 the battle-field. It requlrc^s a clear, tactical eye, rational 
 peace experience, a knowledge of the ballistic qualities of 
 the arm (infantry and artillery), etc., matters not always 
 found where modern conditions require that they should be, 
 in the ranks of the subordinate leaders. Since even enthusi- 
 asm fails to remedy the failings of hunmn nature, it follows 
 that modern tactics requires on the part of all leaders Ji 
 higher degree of knowledge and abilitv, of initiative and 
 
I'Hijt-holfxjy and Tactics. 221 
 
 vi^^or, of innij^lil jiikJ jxTKcvcranoe than formerly; that, in a 
 word, (adicH lias b<'(;oin<' nior*? pHijcliolof/ifMl. Ah ooinparod 
 M'ilh tlic action in itH entiroty, attackn on poHitionH, an at 
 I'l-obliJH, MarH-la-Tour, and Kt. Privat, will bo exceptional; yet 
 wKli inteJlif^ent preparation Jind utilization of the terrain 
 they might b(,' cani^-d out to day denpite Kniallcalibf^r rifleg, 
 etc., without exjjosing ijh to annihilation; and rar<;r Htill will 
 lie the caHe, an at MarH-Ia-Tonr, of a ningle brigade flinging 
 ItKflf againKl an impregnable position without making the 
 aftenipl of acfing wifh one of ifs baffalionH agjiinnt the 
 enemy's flank or without being supported by such a flank 
 movement on the part of troops engaged alongside. That 
 whi<;h the .'{8th Brigade, on August 1«, 1870, the 1st Brigade 
 of the Ouard at Kt. I'rival, and the various brigades at the 
 Mance ravin<* on the 181h of August, wanted and were 
 ordered to do, wjih Ijound to f;iil b('(;au»e based on a miscon- 
 ception of the situation. It would have been equally disas- 
 trous in the days of Frederick or of Napoleon as in 1870, be- 
 cause not in kee{)ing with taclics. A frontal attack under 
 such conditions will never lead to a decision; it will rather 
 have to be bi-ouglit about by tlj<' troops on the right and left; 
 and just as the '>8th Brigade was bound to succumb before 
 sui)erior hostile forces in a strong position, so it is certain 
 that under like circumstances, at St. Privat, the Guard 
 r'orps would never have taken the village by assault had not 
 the turning movement of the XII. Army Corps gained that 
 decision on the flank which could not be obtained in front. 
 What a hopeless situation for tlir- troojjH which are thrown 
 against the front I No, not liopeless; as honorable as pos- 
 sible, as demonstrated, not by the leading, but by th(; bear- 
 ing of the Guards at St. Privat and of the 1.5th Division at 
 fit. Hubert. They are called upon to bear the heaviest losses, 
 and to hold out under a destructivr- fire; only to relinquish 
 
222 Ttiquirics into the Taciics of the Future. 
 
 the palm of virtof.v propiM* (o others. TIkmt lanks ai'e 
 thiuiKHl every miiuile; at Hu* seeiuiiifxiv opporhiiu^ uionuMit 
 the eiuMiiv st>eks io ailvaiu't> in orihM- lo crush (he dross uiultM' 
 his het>l; (htMi it is that troops show the stnlT th(\\ arc ina<h^ 
 of and of what th(\v must l)e capabh'. Tlie.vshonhl not h)8»' their 
 vu)rah\ and in this respect they can be materially assisted by 
 the snpei-ior leaders taUinj; into consideration the phi/fiirnl 
 streuijth of the men. >\h(Mi that is spent to the same d«\iiroe 
 as that of the :>Sth Krijiade at INIars la Tonr. a man is no bet- 
 ter than a stick of wood, and can be kicked out of the way 
 us easily: he can no lonijer defend himstMf. It is not the 
 size of the loss(^s that nu\isurcs tln^ valn(> of troops; it is 
 their behavior notwithstanding; tlu^ loss(>s — /. c. the dciirt^e 
 of their power of resistance and of their efliciency in action: 
 in other words, their moral force is what ttMls. It in tnrn 
 depends ou the i)hysical strenjjth, and what the Guards were 
 able io accomi>lish at St. Privat, because their physical 
 strcnjjth was not s])ent, was bound to be impt)ssibh> for the 
 3Sth lirijjadeat ]\rars-la-Tour, even had tluMuimerical condi- 
 tions been more favorable on both sidt^s. simply bccaust* the 
 brij^ade ii'(},< phi/.^iicolli/ spent. 
 
 11. MtLviins. 
 
 From what has been said the followinj;- jiiMUMal maxims 
 may ho dedncinl: 
 
 1. K(\nar(l for hnman wt^iknc^ss, which set^vs cover 
 rather than i^xposure. 
 
 12. St'lcction of snch forms for tlu^ attack as olTci- to 
 the (MUMuy the poorest possible tariitMs. and urantinji to the 
 individual sntlicient freiMlom for the purpose of utili/inp: the 
 terrain and his arrti, for fjaininji' a favorable tirinj; ])osition. 
 jind for obtaining: there the sui)eriority of tire. 
 
 .*>. The infantrv attai'k is a conllit'l of masses of skir- 
 
I'Hycholoffy and TacticH. 323 
 
 TfiiKlifrH v*'(\\n\\\\\r, <'jirly and Hiifficifiit i\i'\i'\<>\>mc\\t of 
 HkJrrniHhoiH and opportune' an-ival of Hiiflficient HupportH. 
 For the movement, the fire, the attainment of the position, 
 the reinforcement, and the ruHh from firinjij position to fir- 
 ing? poKJlion, there can be but one formation — namely, an 
 o[>r'n, HJngle rank line. There can b^' but one kind of fire; 
 fire of skirmiHherH, That in the universal fighting method 
 of infantry. 
 
 4. liJHorder and intermingling of organizations become 
 the rule. Jt is one of the foremost duti'-s of the subordinate 
 leadr-rs to r;xercis<? such control as will best preserve the 
 figJiting eflif-iency at each point; heme an increaiie in the 
 number of subordirfate leaders is requisite. 
 
 5. In carrying out the attack there will no longer be 
 sucessive arrays (Treffen) down to include the reser-ves; 
 there will be nf>thing but opened single-rank lines; even the 
 term "e<helon" is antiquated. On the other hand, the 
 "7V«/few" are indispensable, previous to \\\c deployment. 
 The use of smokeless powder is presumed, of course, for the 
 present generation will probably not fight with any other. 
 The term ''normal attack" should not be used at all, and 
 the tfrms ''long-range fire" and "short-range fire," in the 
 sense of 1870-71, an* sirnply confusing rubbish, the dispute 
 as to their admissibility having been settled, Movf^mont 
 and fire are but the different forms of one act. As to the 
 distance between supports, there is only a maximum limit, 
 which may be deviatf'd from. dey)f'nding on the character of 
 lli<; gi'ound. 
 
 0. Deployment, forming for attack, and execution of 
 the attack are thr^-e separate stages for which some r^gle- 
 mentary prescriptions arc indispensable; otherwise, there 
 would be no means of control in connection with a tactical 
 division of labor, none for the organized action of the 
 
224 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futttre. 
 
 uiassos of sUirmisluTs. uouc U)v i'ouivolWuiX (lisordiT, 
 Evory brijiiulo sliould strirlly cDiilino ilst>H' lo (lu- allot (i>d 
 oxtoiil of front. Witliiu tlio bripulo fiout aiul ilopiMuling 
 on tlu» tonain, doviations from tho ordinary oxtonts of 
 front aro frotintMitly nnavoulablo. Thoy slionld thoroforo 
 l>t> porniiittHl. N\ luMi lljihtinji' in deep formation ( "(U/.s* dcr 
 Tiefe I'echtcn'^ ) tho brijijulo front may, in (ho pitcluul battle, 
 bo oxtondod to 1 U)0 motors. 
 
 7. I'rontal attacks ovor opon j;ronnd aro to bo 
 avoidod as n\nrli as possiblo; if that is impossiblo. tho foroos 
 omployod shonld bo so nnmorous that aftor sntlorinji; hoavy 
 lossos, thoy still rotain sntliciont moral sironjith to hold 
 out, and sntVu-iont moral and physical ttaotioal) stron»»tli to 
 resist. IUmu-o pri>por apportitmmont of rt>sorvt>s, selection 
 of a suitable pt»sition for tluMn, and sondinu thorn promptly 
 forward. 
 
 v'N, The aitai-k in-oper. the sciutir of the cnenuf-s position, 
 will usually require fresh troops. I'uless a superiority 
 of tire has been gained by the infantry and artillery, any 
 attack is hopeless, and. nu>reovor, the particular moment is 
 dirticult to recojiui/e, and ihcroforo also that for briniiitiii up 
 fresh troops, a duty exclusively bcli>n,uinii- to tho hiuluM* 
 loaders. 
 
 !». Tho advanc(^ to be continued as lonu- as possible 
 \Yithout halt, at tho same tinte utilizinsi- t^very cover, for 
 protection, not for a pruhuKjcit stai/. This "vvlll in most 
 cases bo found practicable for swarms of skirmishers \^^ to 
 within (!l>0 motors of tho enemy; and at shorttM* distances 
 and even in closed formations, when tluMV is cover. 
 
 10. The tire action should be opened accordinjily, and 
 so ns to cover the entire front allotted to tho brigade. 
 
 11. All elTective means should bt> employed for the 
 rush forward; tho best way is to carry tho uumi alonp: with 
 
pHycholof/}/ and 'luctu^a. 225 
 
 fr*'Hh troojm, even if the latter Jx; ?>iit hastily gatherffd 
 MfjiiafJH; it will be practicable in rnoHt eaK*^ to bring thern 
 up at the rij^hi moment , if tbe field of fire i« 0[K;n, they 
 Hhould move in HwarrnM of MlcirmiHherM only, flow many 
 ruHh<m iL borly of troofm in capable of making; in very miu'MV- 
 tain. We have no Huflicient rlat>i on that point, and 
 nowhere i>*'rha|>H Hhall we meet with w> many rJi>iapj»oint- 
 mentH an in tlie a/lvance by ruMh^fH, becaun^; it will be diffi- 
 cult in moMt caH^fH to harmonize theory with the practical 
 actual conditionH, J place no j^reat hofK-H on the a/lvance 
 by ruHh^;«, particularly when begun at a great diKtance. 
 
 12, Infantry in to be Hupported by a vigorouH artil- 
 lery fire. 
 
 l'{. Jf the enemy givf^ way, the victorn nhould follow 
 him up rapidly, but all the engaged troopH which do not 
 have an oppoH unity to fire, Hhould be rapidly re-forrnf^. 
 
 14. If the attack failB, artillery will be called upon to 
 offer the firKt reKiKtance. Hujifjorted by the r^-^^^rve of the 
 variouK armn. 
 
 The attacker winheK to conquer, and for that purjHXie 
 he muKt advance to day aw much aH formerly, nkillfully util- 
 izing the terrain i>reviouHly reconnoitered by the lea/lern, 
 until at a range at which the fire can have the requisite 
 effect. KeconnaiHHance and utilization of the terrain were 
 formerly of great importance; that importance ha« b*^;i» 
 materially increased by wmokeleHH powder, TheKe duti^*H 
 have, moreover, I>een renderwl more difficult, and one 
 Hhould rcHolutely face the unavoidable fact that every 
 attack coHtH blood; the man Hhould be trained to that, 
 nhould he hahituaied to that idea; and it nhould be t^ken into 
 account in adopting tactical forrnn for battle. 
 
 DoffH not military hintory tc^ach that attackn on Htrong- 
 
226 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ly occupied positions, even before the introduction of the 
 breech-loader, cost as many men as in the War of 1870? 
 Compare Leipsic* 
 
 Attacks by large bodies of troops over open ground may 
 become necessary, and should therefore be practiced in 
 peace. Even the knowledge that the attack will fail of its 
 object should not be suffered to remove that necessity. 
 The effect of an attack, though it be unsuccessful, may be 
 very great. 
 
 The smaller the losses, the better will the morale of the 
 troop usually be preserved. But in every case of attack in 
 peace the soldier should be informed of the great impend- 
 ing losses and be psychologically (morally) trained on that 
 point. Unless the soldier is possessed with a high degree 
 of will-power, unless his training is such as to show him in 
 everything and everywhere the necessity of self-control and 
 disregard of danger, unless there is vigor and will — the 
 will to advajice — all forms will remain artifices and fail 
 to mature results. 
 
 Not infantry alone, but artillery also has been pro- 
 vided with improved arms, and both arms have become 
 more independent and capable of resistance. 
 
 Where the conformation of the ground compels the 
 infantry to halt at medium range from the enemy and to 
 hold out there (in first line, on open, swept ground), it will 
 probably be practicable to carry on the action in combina- 
 
 *The Prussians lost 40 per cent at Leipsic, 38 per cent at Zorn- 
 dorf, 40 per cent at Kunersdorf; the French 30 per cent at Borodino, 
 50 per cent at Aspern; the Germans 22 per cent at Mars-la-Tour, the 
 bloodiest battle of the War of 1870-71. To be sure, the data of former 
 days cannot be strictly authenticated. I cannot discuss that subject 
 here. Those who wish to inform themselves are referred to the 
 essays of Bleibtreu, von Boguslawski, and von Lettow in the Mili- 
 Uir Wochcnhlntt of 1893. and of von Roloff in No. 69 of the 
 DeKtsche Hcercszcitinw of 1893, and in the April number of the Preus- 
 sische Jahrbiiclier for 1893. 
 
Psycholofjy and Tactics. 227 
 
 tion with strong artillery as implied in the characteristics 
 of that arm. Should infantry believe itself capable of 
 fighting independently in the future, it will have to pay 
 a heavy penalty in blood. The defense has gained in 
 strength, and will jn'obably make more extensive use of pre- 
 pared positions, and the. attack and defense of the latter 
 will be materially modified. 
 
 ///. Inquiries into the Maxims. 
 
 It requires no argument to prove that troops lying 
 behind cover will not, without exterior impulse from their 
 officers, rise in order to repair from a place of comparative 
 immunity from danger to one of great peril, and every 
 action in which the officers wore killed or placed hors-de- 
 conibat furnishes examples. In such cases there is usually an 
 end to further advance, and more cannot be expected of the 
 troops than that they hold the [)oint they have reached. In 
 carrying out something extraordinary, man requires extra- 
 ordinary resolution and great will-power, which spring 
 only from an absolute devotion to the cause. Devotion to 
 ideals may in itself be able to suppress the impulses of 
 material egotism, to enroll man in the service of higher 
 aims, and to induce him to surrender his own existence. 
 The soldier, like the artist, should therefore have an ideal- 
 ism in which he believes, and for which he is prepared to 
 sacrifice his all. This is a theorem, but it does not imply 
 that its requirements could be fulfilled in the case of every 
 soldier. Idealism may be as different as man; whether it 
 bear the name of faith, fidelity, love of country, political 
 creed, whether it may seek glory and honor, greatness and 
 elevation, its action will be the same, and that is its import- 
 ant point in tactics. iiTo one will deny that the risking of 
 one's life is something extraordinary, likewise that the 
 
228 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futtire. 
 
 umsketeer, by himself, cannot, as a rule, have the jjift of 
 devotion to the cause for which he is calhnl upon to sur- 
 render his life; he should therefore be trained with j^reat 
 care, and that is the duty of his officers in jx^ace. Should 
 any military man decline to subscribe to this, I would like 
 to ask him, whether that courage ever existed which is 
 habitually spoken of in non-military and, unforunately, 
 also in military accounts; whether cases did not occur 
 within his own exi>erlence where not only a heroic per- 
 sonal example was necessary to get the men to rise from 
 behind the cover and to advance, but also something more 
 which no one likes to mention — the gods know why — i. c, 
 jtalpable aids? The majority of men will endeavor to 
 avoid endangering their lives as long as possible, and in 
 battle but few will spontaneouslif overcome the temptation 
 to seek shelter in the ditch they are crossing; these few 
 deserve the highest ]n'aise, they are the heroes of their 
 fatherland. The remainder ultimately obey necessittf alone 
 — i. e., discipline and the ascendency of their officers. It is 
 well to keep this in mind even where the motive of the war 
 has seized upon the great mass of the amny and has impas- 
 sioned them more or less. We know then how^ much the 
 men are apt to yield uj) spontaneously, and how much has to 
 he extorted. This extortion, requiring for its most efficient 
 application closed formations which are no longer practicable 
 on open ground, has been rendered very difficult by modern 
 arms. For, as we shall explain later, closed formations of 
 any kind on open ground, beginning at a distance of 1500 
 meters, are prohibited by the flat trajectory, the great 
 range and penetration of small-caJiber arms and by the 
 enormously increased fire effect of the artillery. Wherever 
 the ground admits of their use, th^y should be retained as 
 the surest means of getting the units to the spot where we 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 229 
 
 want them; where that is impracticable, a sensible substi- 
 tute should be sought for the formations no longer prac- 
 ticable, and here we are decidedly favored by HrnokeJess 
 powder. I have frccjuently seen the smoke of black powder 
 so obscure the view that at a distance of 20— '{0 meters 
 closed bodies of troops could be made out in ill-defined out- 
 line only. In such cases — they were the rule in the decisive 
 stages — closed formations in no way favored the [)ersonal in- 
 fluence of the leaders, or but very little. That is worthy of seri- 
 ovs considernlion. It was about the same as though we were 
 in a dense fog. Smokeless y)owder has changed this; the 
 leaders can always see their men and the men their leaders, 
 other circumstances which may happen not prohibiting. 
 The control of leaders over swarms of skirmishers ns com- 
 pared with closed formations never was nil and is not 
 now; it is simply less, and since the advent of smokeless 
 powder, the personal exami)le can be more easily seen, be- 
 cause the view is clearer. There are, moreover, two other 
 means to strengthen the control over swarms. The first 
 lies in a careful moral training of men and leaders; the sec- 
 ond in an increase of leaders. The former is feasible at once; 
 the latter requires an increase of officers and non-commis- 
 sioned officers on the peace establishment. Although I do 
 not believe that the leaders of swarms would thereby 
 be relieved of all disadvantages, still these would bo 
 greatly diminished and the troops would preserve a certain 
 fighting power, which with the use of closed formations 
 would quickly disappear, since with the collapse of these 
 formations the fighting power is also lost. It seems to me 
 to admit of no doubt that, on open ground and with the use 
 of modern arms, closed formations are bound to collapse, 
 even at long and medium distances. 
 
 In view of the fact that, .is n rule, man exposes himself 
 
230 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 to daujicr only uiulor ooin])ulsioii. tl\o (ju'tiral forms should 
 bo siu'h that tompulsion tan bo bronijht to boar on tho unit. 
 Tbo oolumn tattios, old as woll as modorn. woro bost suitod 
 to tho purposo. uoxt tho oloso lino, loast of all tho skirmish 
 lino; tho tirst. moroovor. admits of livoatot- rapidity and 
 prooisiou of niovoniont. 
 
 Tho moro fXtondt>d tho swarms, and tho nioro thov aro 
 ooYorod and concealed by folds of tho i;ronnd. (ho moro aro 
 tontrol and oompulsion rostriotod. and tho jjroator is tho 
 tomptation to whioh human woaknoss is oxposod, and it is 
 /•(■(//// here uhoro a groator moasuro of direct compulsion is 
 indispensable. It involves a taitioal ])roblom. To j;o bai'k 
 to oloso formation for tho sako of this compulsion. ])orhaps 
 by olosinj; tho mou toj^othor in a moohanioal way. would 
 ontail unjustitiablo saoritioos for (ho sako of a priuoi- 
 plo without any oorrospoudin^- irain. t\Mupulsion should 
 thorofort* bo suppUMUontod by (raininj; (ho loadors to ijreafer 
 actirittf, ami tho mon to (jreater attentiveness. Tho task of 
 tho stdwriiinale loaders booomos moro diflfioult simn^ tlu\v 
 booomo tho roal supports of tho tiro action in all its stages, 
 and tho exercise of their trill should bo nu>ro an infellectual 
 than a mechanical one in consotpionco of thoir trainiuj;, 
 »'ducation. practice. mu(nal unih'rstandiuii of each other, 
 tactical judjiuiout. and thoir uniformi(y of (raininji'. Dur- 
 in«; the contiict modorn tactics chiotly rest on tho subordi- 
 nate loaders and on tho qualities of the individual; such is 
 their nature; tho morale should bo as hv^h as possible, so as 
 not to nu^lt under tiro. The former should bo tacticians (o a 
 jxroater t>xtont than formerly, and tho latter should bo able 
 always to understand tho tacticians. Shrapnel (ire and 
 torpedo shells of the artillery, which spread over tho tiold 
 like the jots of a rose-head, make columns and close lines 
 useless at considerable distances, small-ialiber rides pro- 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 231 
 
 hibit them altogether at medium and short ranges, and a« 
 infantry and artillery- may be expected to direct their fire 
 Hkillfully, and as they moreover always fight in eonjune- 
 tion, columns and close lines of any kind on open ground 
 are barred from the battle-field altogether. The close line 
 I>articularly is impracticfible. owing to the width of target it 
 jiresents and its unhandinens. and there remains the single- 
 rank swarm alone, as the most unfavorable target and as the 
 best formation for movement under thesecircumstances. The 
 H warms should not be too large; 'iO men in 3 groups of 10 
 men each would probably be the most suitable limit for 
 their control. 
 
 But it should be kept in mind that with this fighting 
 method troops will, as a rule, slip rapidly from the grasp of 
 the higher leaders, and in many cases also from the hands 
 of the subordinate leaders during subsequent stages of the 
 action. It should also be remembered that it is not a ques- 
 tion of controlling a battalion, but of employing brigades 
 and divisions, no longer in the Napoleonic form, but in the 
 Napoleonic spirit, as great problems — to which all struggles 
 for decisive points belong — ran only be solved with masses. 
 In order that they may be controlled from above to some 
 df-gree at least, their leaders should know what they are 
 expected to do and what they want to do; they should base 
 their measures on thorough reconnaissance and be held respon- 
 sible for their decisions and orders. Hence the scox^r* of 
 their authority should be fully established and known. 
 
 It is by reconnaissance alone that the leader can form 
 an idea of his opponent and of the measures to be taken for 
 overcoming him. This duty should never be left to the 
 subordinate leaders; it should pertain exclusively to the 
 superior leaders from the brigade commander up. Prepara- 
 tion (deploymentj, and forming for attack are the exclu- 
 
232 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Fiiiurc. 
 
 sive duties of tho latter; in the execution of the combat the 
 hij>hei' and subordinate leaders both share, but even at that 
 stag:e it is chiefly the superior leaders who take the ])roi)er 
 steps for a prompt advance of the supports in order to gain 
 an elfective firing position and, subse(]uently, the superior- 
 ity of fire. Whatever the skill and self-activity of the 
 subordinate leaders may be, it is ini])ossible for them to 
 judge from the bearing of the firing skirmish line when the 
 proper moment for advance of the supports has arrived. 
 No one who has had war exi)erience will deny this, for in 
 most cases the very first retiuisite, a good view of the whole, 
 is lacking, and sufficient view and deliberation can only be 
 expected on the part of the superior leaders: hence if tho 
 execution of the combat is not to be left to chance, a 
 proper scox>e must be conceded to the superior leaders dur- 
 ing its execution, since it is in that way alone that a proper 
 degree of combination and uniformity of the act — i. e., of 
 the organized action of masses of skirmishers, can be 
 secured. 
 
 It is altogether erroneous to assume that the initiative 
 of the subordinate leaders is thereby suppressed; they are 
 rather restrained from license, and it is only thus that the 
 brigades are enabled to preserve the assigned direction 
 (spaces), that army corps are enabled to reckon with fight- 
 ing spaces of divisions, and aimies with fighting spaces of 
 army corps. These things are so simpU^ that they hardly 
 need comment. If. however, platoons, companies, and bat- 
 talions are at liberty to choose their direction (space) 
 according to the ground (cover), lateral movements and dis- 
 placements are unavoidable, which, beginning below, ulti- 
 mately affect the highest units and block and render im])os- 
 sible control on the i)art of the superior leaders. Avho bear 
 the responsibility. It is only necessary to look at these 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 233 
 
 thinf^H from the mechanical point of view to realize that 
 they must not be allowed to happen. 
 
 I am goin^ furllier and aHsert that in many cases the 
 superior leaders will best be able, besides allotting the front, 
 to desij^nate the principal firing station, and to make the 
 same known before the deployment. It is in obstructed 
 terrain alone — i. e., in all cases where the fighting will be 
 all the more intense, that they will be less able to see than 
 the subordinate leaders in front. It is quite in keeping 
 with the law of control to designate the firing station 
 approximately, without thereby either suppressing or re- 
 stricting the freedom of the subordinate leaders. More- 
 over, it stands to reason that in many cases this freedom 
 will only be operative beyond the "approximate" firing- 
 station, and will chiefly consist in "correcting" the approx- 
 imate to the best possible firing-station. Huch are the 
 facts. From the time when this "correcting" begins, the 
 control in front passes more and more to the subordinate 
 leaders, but the limits of space assigned to the brigade 
 should be observed as much as possible. Any transgres- 
 sion of these limits on the right or left is justified only by 
 i m perati ve ci re u m stan ces. 
 
 With the "correcting" there coincides in point of time 
 the increase of the number of rifles — i. e., the arrival of 
 sufficient sujiports at the main firing-stations to gain and 
 preserve the superiority of fire. Probably none who has 
 had war experience will deny that the superior leaders 
 alone are in position to attend to these matters; hence it is 
 their duty to provide, according to time and circumstances, 
 for the arrival of supports (sustaining the fire). More than 
 this is not to be required of them, until the time for the 
 employment of the correctly posted reserves arrives. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the effect produced by the 
 
 16 — 
 
234 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 main firing-station can be better observed from the front 
 than by the superior leaders farther in the rear, and it is 
 therefore quite right that the impulse for seizing the 
 enemy's position should come from the former. But even 
 at that point — i. c, just before the decision, the relations 
 betvreen superior and subordinate leaders should not cease 
 to be reciprocal. 
 
 In many cases, depending on time and space, it will be 
 diflScult to define these relations; it will hardly be possible 
 to maintain communication between front and rear, to 
 promptly supplement each other's decisions and measures; 
 at this stage the decision is left to the tactical intuition of 
 the subordinate and higher leaders. These difficulties 
 should be fully recognized. 
 
 It follows that I am, as I always have been, opposed to 
 the so-called ''normal attack," but I am an unreserved advo- 
 cate of the fundamental law of control in action. In former 
 times it was very important to properly gauge the deploy- 
 ment as to time and place, and to promptly gain and hold a 
 vantage-point from which to survey the ground. Accord- 
 ing to the experiences of 1870-71, the entire leading should 
 exclusively rest in the hands of the superior leaders ; it was 
 found impracticable and we were in a tactical quandary. 
 The ''normal attack" was abolished; it was well; but the 
 control was also surrendered. We must regain the latter. 
 
 Since the long-range, small-caliber rifles restrict us to 
 a greater distance before entering into battle, the work of 
 the leaders as regards the deployment, direction of attack, 
 and the preparatory measures for lateral and longitudinal 
 extension (forming for attack) is rendered much more diffi- 
 cult. It is therefore all the more necessary to lay down 
 some fixed rule for the action of the leaders of the higher 
 grades at these stages. 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 235- 
 
 The superior leaders will probably be to the front 
 early, and as far out as possible, accompanied by suflBcient 
 mounted orderlies, about 4 — f> to a brigade commander. 
 There they will pass through several "stages of doubt," 
 continue to observe to the front and flank, and to send 
 orders to the rear. It will therefore happen that divisions 
 sometimes complete their "preliminary" tactical deploy- 
 ment far from the enemy, as has been described in the intro- 
 duction in the case of armies. From that time on "correc- 
 tions" of the tactical deployment will be found necessary at 
 many points, perhaps while the advance guard is engaged, 
 which will in turn require precision of marching on the 
 part of closed brigades. For this purpose we must be pro- 
 ficient in everything required in connection therewith, and 
 we can do neither without columns nor without lines [Tref- 
 fen), as there is no longer such a thing as passing from the 
 "preliminary tactical deployment" to the marching col- 
 umn; the units must make all the "corrections" while de- 
 ployed. On this point, therefore, the Regulations should 
 as much contain precise prescriptions as to the maximum 
 width (and depth) of the brigade, the maximum limits of 
 the supporting lines, and of the position of the reserves. 
 
 These constitute the maximum limits for the scope of 
 the brigade commander's activity in forming for and carry- 
 ing out the attack. If the battle-field everywhere pre- 
 sented the same conditions, if it showed the same character 
 at all points, and if the action fought on it did likewise, a 
 scheme for a normal attack would of necessity formulate 
 itself. The great battles of the future will require a space 
 25 — .30 kilometers square for the stages of deployment of 
 both opponents, for forming for attack, and for its execu- 
 tion; a great variety of terrain is thus of necessity encoun- 
 tered, and it falls within the scope — in fact, it is the duty 
 
236 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futvre. 
 
 — of the superior loadoi's to make provisions oomj)ortinj; 
 therewith. 
 
 Ill carrying out the combat the troops will certainly 
 arrive at a stage where they will act like "hordes." but there 
 should nevertheless, or rather ou that account there should, 
 be definite rules, because at any rate it is more ditticult to 
 tight a controlled action than to learn the theoryofa"uormal 
 attack." In the place of regulations which would endanger 
 the control, we need such as will be its safeguard. 'riu> dis- 
 tances of the supporting lines may vary; but the supporting 
 bodies should be pro])erly fornuHl and suitably posted in rear 
 of each other. The brigade commander alone is the man to 
 give the orders for that. It follows that for the preserva- 
 tion of control the latter must be conceded some definite, 
 and at the same time indispensable, powers; that two bri- 
 gades will never be formed for the attack in the same way, or 
 that they will carry out the attack in an identical manner; 
 hence controlled attack and normal attack are two ditferent 
 things. St'herlT and his adhei-'Mits advocate the former, and 
 their opponents alone construe it into a mechanical normal 
 attack. Another proof of how readily the letter may kill 
 the spirit. 
 
 I have repeatedly spoken of "corrections" on a large and 
 small scale. So far. I have nowhere heard this new feat- 
 ure of tactics prominently mentioned, which modern arms 
 render unavoidable. Modt'rn arms make uncertainty 
 greater, increased uncertainty enjoins greater caution, the 
 latter calls for more reflection for every emergency. In 
 modern tactics, therefore, no leader can from the beginning 
 be in possession of so much that is detinite on which to 
 base his conception and arrangements as formerly. That 
 basis can by no means be gained by mere observation and 
 reconnaissance; an action will be necessary in many cases. 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 2'67 
 
 From thin ^ifal, rolativo, and yjrotracted state of uncer- 
 tainty followH the neeesKity of eonntant ''correction"; it goes 
 through the entire higher and minor tactics; both are, in 
 fact, nothing but "corrections from case to case," based, 
 however, on the spaces provided for the deployment of the 
 brigade in the pitched battle. It will be conceded that such 
 "corrections" have a special object; that they should be 
 made accordingly; that control is requisite, which should 
 rest in the hands of the brigade commander without preju- 
 dice to the freedom of the subordinate leaders in the front 
 line. The function of "tactical corrector" is his to a much 
 higher degree than could formerly be the case, and no one 
 can solve the j)roblem better and more quickly by suitable 
 subdivision of his brigade, by pushing forward subdivi- 
 sions according to the tactical necessities. For these rea- 
 sons I consider the brigade commanders the leading pillars 
 in the pitched battle, and they should attach the greatest 
 importance to a subdivision suited to the circumstances in 
 each case. Fighting in a formation of great depth is to-day 
 the universal task of leaders; it is maintained in its legiti- 
 mate place by this continuous "correction," as "correc- 
 tions" can best be ordered and made from the rear. While 
 a normal system would be wrecked by the many varieties 
 of the battle-ground, the difficulties of terrain which im- 
 pede control should not be underestimated. Under fire 
 any cover exercises ai>owerful attraction, as is well known, 
 and though it may be possible to resist it, yet the tactician 
 should look upon all cover also in its cay>acity as an obsta- 
 cle to the forward movement and as a hindrance in the con- 
 trolled attack. With respect to the attraction of cover, I 
 call to mind the ravine of Mars-la-Tour, and the bank and 
 hedge, and above all, Kt. Hubert, where a whole division was 
 crowded together. As regards obstacles to movement, I call 
 
238 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 to miud the wive fences at Mars-la-Tour, the hop-tiekls at 
 ^y6l'th, the gardenlike character of the country around 
 Orleans and Le Mans, with its innumerable scattered farm- 
 steads, houses, and villages, the various hedge and wall- 
 fences, the guttered vineyards, etc. To look upon un- 
 broken skirmish lines as constant features of the controlled 
 system would be to mistake the hitter's object and nature. 
 Should the ground consist of short undulations, as at Worth 
 and Beaune, it is unavoidable that the skirmish action 
 should ninke unequal progress within the same brigade; 
 that it will stand still at one point perhaps, and recede tem- 
 porarily at another, though the attacker have the advan- 
 tage at other points. None of these considerations should 
 be allowed to invalidate the idea of control or be considered 
 a sound objection. AVithout the initiative of the subordi- 
 nate leaders the controlled system is inapplicable. Both 
 belong together: they are but different forms of the same 
 act. It is the subordinate leaders that should make up for 
 the lack of personal observation on the part of their supe- 
 riors; that should constantly look to the tactical coherence 
 in the controlled system; that should maintain the action, 
 or revive it when at a standstill, because the occasions are 
 rare when such steps can be promptly ordered by the supe- 
 rior leaders. In that connection the War of 1870-71 offers 
 several typical examples, not only within the limits of the 
 brigade, but within the limits of larger bodies, made up in 
 some instances of two or more army corps, whatever may 
 have been the deficiencies in the details of execution. Here 
 belong, for instance, the systematic tactics of the XI. Corps 
 at Worth, and its cooperation with the V. Corps, more par- 
 ticularly the capture of Froschweiler by troops of four 
 army corps encircling the hostile center. Here belongs 
 the cooperation of brigades of two army corps at St. Marie- 
 
Pfsycholoyy and Tuctics. 2'6i) 
 
 aiJx-Ch^iiC-t,, at Ht. Privat, and at IMi^ny. In the first 
 ca«e both flankB were turned in connection with a frontal 
 aHBault ; in the la«t two cai*e« the flank attack of con 
 trolled hi'li^iuh^. an at Worth, gives the impulj^e for the 
 frontal asBault and becomes the controlled, and combined 
 action of several army corp»s. The battle of the VIII., VII., 
 and II. Corps, at the Mance ravine constitutes a grand exam- 
 ple of the reverfre, and at the capture of Bt. Quentin the 
 commanding general failed to obtain the control he wanted. 
 Here, as at the Mance ravine, it wai» found impossible to 
 retain the desired degree of control over the battle act. 
 because the control of the tactical act was lacking. Con- 
 trol of the battle act imperativelv re^juires control of the 
 attack of briga/les. and control is therefore equally indis- 
 pensable from the point of view of the conduct of the bat- 
 tle. Rtill the circumHtanf-es at the Mance ravine should not 
 be exclusively jndged by the tactical features. The exam- 
 ple shows that the greatest possible accumulation of troops 
 within a fighting space for not more than a division neither 
 constitutes a controlled system nor is it calculated to pro- 
 mote control, because such concentration no longer j>er- 
 mits of extension for battle; but if we imagine the com- 
 manders of the 15th and 13th Divisions and several brigade 
 commanders replaced by men like Treskow. Wittich, and 
 Kottwitz, things would have taken a different course at 
 the Mance ravine. There three evils combined: lack of 
 control in the attack, incapacity of many superior leaders, 
 and lack of control of the battle act. 
 
 The companies and battalions forming the firing lines 
 are no longer to be considered as under the control of the 
 superior leaders; all these swarms are more or Jess lost to them; 
 they fight simply straight to the front! It follows that the 
 sui>erior leaders should understand from the first how 
 
24(^ I iu}uirii\< into the Tactirs of Ihc Fithtrr. 
 
 miit'li tlu\v cjui s|>nr»> ft)r <lu' llr»» action, nnd how nuuh tlioy 
 must U«>(>p back in onltT to Itc nblo to «Mujthiisi/.(> tlit> t\ro- 
 aotion at llio docisiv*' nu>niont for biinjxin}; about tho (bu't- 
 sion, or to uxovi tIumUs. Moiu-o brijiados can no lonpM* nso 
 "'/'n/ZV/i" in the traditional sense, but onlv lines natnrally 
 dilTerinji' in nnniber. str(M»«;th, distanct^s. an«l forms accord- 
 iui;- \o circumstances. 
 
 nissolntion is not bi'set by the dan^jtM's witli whicli its 
 op|>onents would surround it. ^^>r. 1, the tMUMny is, as a 
 rule, no bettiM* olT. except in |)rc|tarc«l positions; 2. infantry 
 and artilitM'y always (iulil in combination: ;>, fire is very 
 »>lT(>ctive at MH) nn>ters. .Vs reijards the decisit)n, it will in 
 nuun/ ames itot Iw fotitut iinpossil)J(' in the latter phnsea of the hat- 
 ih to hriug up {tiuall chK^ed bodies even over open (jround, hecauae 
 the enemif^s fi<ihtin<j power diminiaheti from hour to hour. At 
 8»ich moments, a con»parativ<>ly snnill closed body may jiain 
 a dei'ision (\.i\ 'ruilerit>), wliiih could not have Wow «:;ained 
 by mere fire. It follows, in turn, that the su[>erior leaders 
 should from the first employ the fire-aetion of infantry and 
 artillery with the sjn^atest enerjiy in order to «iain the supe 
 rit>rity of \\n\ That onct\i;ain(Hl, the decision will in future 
 differ hnt Utile from that of the past, and restM-ves must be kept 
 in hand ft)r the purpose. Nor should frontal attacks sup- 
 ported by turninj; n\ovements W shunm>d: they should not 
 be undertaktMi. however, until the suptM'iority of tirt> has 
 betMi ,i;ain»>tl. 
 
 To day the ilistanc(> bt>twe(Mi the last flrini^-station and 
 the point o{ attack is bimnd to bt^ much iireater, as a rule, 
 than forn\tMly. and will hardly ever be* less (han WW mettM's. 
 It constitutes a jiravi* disatlvanta,ue in die (inal rush. 
 There have been rushes of 'JtK) — 24t) meters without stop, 
 but th<^ conseqmMit exhaustion is diMrinuMital. Mort^ ditll- 
 oult than (he accomplishmtMit of thai physical task is the 
 
I'Mt/ffiolof/i/ arid TaMicn. 241 
 
 N'rrojrnition of fh'- rifrht inorrxnt for th<- t-u\\A<)\u\*i\\ of th^f 
 rcHcrvcn, whioli oonHtif uffts thr- rnoMt rjjffjoult itrohlcm con- 
 fronting thr; brigade? ooxumninXcv . I'ltUmn the rfmarva han 
 moved forward in aeeordance with the Mtiite of the arjtion, 
 it JH apt to be too Ijite for th^ 'amhumW and will be of no iK^Tje- 
 fit. Again, it will be doi/btful in many r;aH*-*« whether the 
 r«'Herve can follow without loHing itH fighting jx/wer. 
 
 In analyzing the attaek of the 'i8th Brigade I have 
 Hhown that a field of attack aH at MarH-la-Tonr Ik rare and 
 <xe<'ptional; that notwithstanding the then (^defective) tiic 
 tifral fontiH Tchiefiy company eoInmn« with a front of 'iO 
 meterMj, controlled lejiding of the \)r\i[ii/\<'. wonld have br-^-n 
 I>raetieable aH far aH Coritour 780; that notwithstanding the 
 then tactical forms, and without losing all fighting power, 
 the brigade appro()/:hed the Hhelkred enemy to within 150 
 meters and closer, and '-ven intermingled with him, he 
 being ultimately completely concealed by the increasing 
 density of the smoke, which dung heavily to the ground; 
 and that the brigade would not have b*f<fn defr^ted had 
 ofher brigades been available in support as at Ht. I'rivat. 
 A general tiictical inquiry should not be re«tricted to the 
 action of a single brigade, to Jk? sure, but should cover a 
 number of events taking place on a front of 12 — lo kilo- 
 nxtf-rs and more, Kince battle-fields of such extent 'an 
 hardly be fissumed to t>e devoid of cover, it may be tiiken 
 for granted that iif> to 000 meters from the enemy the 
 majority of the infantry will find more shelter from his fire 
 than at Mars-la-Tour and Ht. Privat. Ifow a brigade 
 should cross that spa/;e no one can determine in advance 
 for every case and for every kind of troops, since the decid- 
 ing circumstancf:rs — t. «., opponent, armament, enemy's tac- 
 tics, and terrain — will differ in each case; the solution must 
 
242 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 be loft to the discretion of the brijjade commanders in con- 
 ueotion with the initiative of the subordinate leaders. 
 
 These retiections. though based on psychology, facts, 
 and experience, are not meant to establish a universal 
 law to be followed under all circumstances; they merely 
 constitute considei'ations whose application is the business 
 of the tactician. In unwise hands, and without theimi>ellini; 
 force of the will, the best tactical doctrines remain a thing 
 without life that had better be left in a pigeon-hole. 
 Where they may or should be applied or deviated from can 
 be determined solely by the individuality of the leaders, 
 by their military talent (ability), but the fundamental prin- 
 ciple of all tactics — ;'. e., aiming at the ascendency over the 
 individual bodies with a view to their control, remains 
 sound whether long-range and mass fire or not, and the 
 prescriptions of any regulations should rest on that basis. 
 It will not always be found practicable, but an endeavor 
 should be made to regain control if lost, since those troops 
 alone will conquer which can be led. IModern fire-action 
 thus makes very high demands on the efficiencii of the indi- 
 riitual sohh'er and on the lenders of many men. and the major- 
 ity of them will be found wanting as in all unusual things. 
 
 The fact that, according to the official reports, the sec- 
 ond line of the Congressionals at Placilla in 1801 followed 
 in close fornuition at a distance of 500 meters furnishes food 
 for reflection.* 
 
 As regards the movement, halts during the advance 
 should be avoided as much as possible, as they may be con- 
 sidered nails in the coflfin of healthy tactics. Up to this 
 day the Fi*ench infantry constantly practice movements 
 
 ♦For details see "The Decisive Conflicts in the Civil War in 
 Chili. 1892 " Vienna. Reichswehr. 1S92. and Hugo Kunz. "The Civil 
 War in Chili." Leipsic. 1892, F. A. Brockhaus. 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 243 
 
 in double time, and Cis.sev'8 division at Mars-la-Tour was 
 enabled to take a timely part against the 38th Brigade, 
 simply because it alternately marched and ran. The sol- 
 dier, as a rule, carries his pack, which makes movements in 
 double time very difficult and fatiguing; moreover, even a 
 regulated double time will bring on unsteadiness and 
 exhaustion of physical strength. For that reason I am 
 ox>posed to the suggested use of double time in the case of 
 small, handy bodies in all zones of fire. On the other hand, all 
 troops must to-day be able to move more smartly than ever; 
 precipitation, as at Mars-la-Tour, in taking a rapid gait, 
 more running than walking, which uses up lungs and mus- 
 cles, and whifh brings the troops in front of the enemy in 
 an exhausted condition, should be avoided. 
 
 After the War of 18G4, General von Moltke published 
 a book, "Notes on the Effect of Improved Fire-arms on 
 Tactics." in which he says, among other things: '-'It may 
 be assumed that at a distance of a quarter of a mile (not 
 quite 1900 meters) a close column will not be able to JwJd 
 out under the fire of a rifled battery. The opponent is 
 forced to deploy, and finds his only protection in the dis- 
 persed order and in motion." 
 
 In the same place we read aboiit the fire of the breech- 
 loader: ''Under ordinary circumstances, and in the 
 pitched battle, the decision will be gained not by fine marks- 
 manship, but by mass fire at those ranges where the unavoida- 
 ble errors in eslimating the range are neutralized." 
 
 Who in 1865 would have thought of the perfection of 
 the fire-arms of infantry and artillery which has been 
 reached to-day, by all armies of the European powers? In 
 the case of the infantry the improvement had so far pro- 
 gressed by 1870 that, under circumstances as at Mars-la- 
 Tour and St. Privat, the mass fire of the infantry produced 
 
244 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 a sensible material and great moral effect at almost the same 
 ranges as artillery fire, and that will be still more so in 
 future. It was bound to liaye a further effect on ''forma- 
 tion" and "movement"; but the "dispersed order" should 
 not be permitted to degenerate into a condition making 
 leading impossible, nor should "movement" become a 
 "chase," or "seeking of cover" a theory that paralyzes the 
 will, the initiative, the application of compulsion, makes 
 personal example impossible, and delivers tactics over to 
 license. The modern fire-arms of infantry are more con- 
 structed for a flat trajectory than for fine marksmanship — 
 i. e., the greatest possible extension of the swept zone was 
 sought and attained, and the fire is effective not only at 
 short, but also at long-ranges. The soundness of the 
 words of Count Moltke has thus increased with time; 
 another bright mind (Captain May, who was killed at 
 Amiens), who asserted in 1869 that with rifles with flat 
 trajectory mere horizontal aim would ensure effective fire, 
 became the object of derision and hostility.* His tactical 
 suggestions, which have since been adopted in practice, 
 were in part based on that theory. 
 
 Where the defender has the choice of position, he will 
 select one with a wide field of fire; he will not always be 
 able to do so, because interfered with by the enemy. At 
 Vionville — Mars-la-Tour we haA^e seen that the defender was 
 able to do so although he was surprised; hence tactics should 
 invariably reckon on the long-range fire, and the attacker 
 should seek to minimize its effect by adroit advance and 
 by rapidity of movement, while the infantry, thrown to the 
 
 ♦The idea of the horizontal aim did not originate with Captain 
 May. As early as the wars of the Revolution the French generals 
 converted the same into practice, because they had learned that in 
 the excitement of battle the horizontal aim is one of the few things 
 the soldier may be relied on to observe in firing. 
 
Psrjchology and Tactics. 245 
 
 front for fire-action and gradually reinforced, will, in com- 
 bination with the artillery, keep the enemy busy, shake 
 and demolish him. I consider the advance by rushes prac- 
 ticable only when the leaders are many, the units small, 
 and the distances short; I do not believe that more than 
 three rushes could be gotten out of troops in the absence 
 of these prerequisites. How far do we get in rushing and 
 where does the outer limit for the beginning of rushes lie? 
 I do not believe that a large unit can advance by rushes 
 without injury to their control; I do not believe in the prac- 
 ticability of fire and movement as exemplified in the "rush 
 tactics"; I do not believe in it at all, owing to the amount of 
 freedom, akin to license, which the Regulations concede to 
 the subordinate leaders in the "choice of the ground." I 
 consider these tactics an office production. I would rather 
 have the entire infantry creep on all fours in single rank 
 lines; it would at any rate be approaching the enemy. 
 Within the brigade, full authority should be given for the 
 use of all means that will make it possible to reach effective 
 distances. Dissimilitude and ridiculousness should not be 
 permitted to constitute a bar. How many things matured 
 by the battle-field would be ridiculous if they were not so 
 serious! It should not be concluded that the infantry 
 should be drilled always to approach to within 600 meters, 
 indiscriminately; that would be a pernicious scheme. It 
 should rather observe the rule of remaining as long as pos- 
 sible in motion without stop. The force of that rule dates 
 only from the adoption of the open single-rank line. In 
 fact, it will be the losses that fix the time for making a halt 
 and for advancing subsequently by rushing or creeping. 
 I believe, above all, that the "attack by rushes" robs the 
 spirit of the attack of much of its determination and dash. 
 This subtilizing with the terrain is bound to make pedants, 
 
246 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 is bound to impair vigor; and those who deny that an' attack 
 movement can be carried to effective range without stop 
 are thinking more of the drill-ground than of the battle-field. 
 On the latter we moreover stand in need of every moral lever; 
 an attack on a large scale is something tremendously inspir- 
 ing, it carries everything with it; rush tactics are wholly 
 without such influences. They have not even been tried. 
 Of the former we know at least what may be expected from 
 it. The Congressionals are said to have advanced by rushes 
 in the battle of Placilla, but I cannot believe it. That pro- 
 cedure would require a state of efficiency such as troops 
 which for the most part had but 2 — 3 weeks' training could 
 not possess. The statement is moreover controverted by 
 the arrangements for the attack, under which the reserves 
 were to follow in close formation at a distance of 500 
 meters, and the first line to reserve its fire until within 400 
 meters (Placilla). We have there the same tactical features 
 that are to be observed with militia troops. The victory 
 of the Congressionals was due to superior leading, to 
 superior armament, and to the enemy. There can be no 
 doubt, however, that the fire was opened at such a. late 
 stage because the experiences at Concon had shown its 
 necessity in order to prevent the recurrence of a deficiency 
 in ammunition. Those objects were not accomplished, how- 
 ever.* In general, both parties expended 150 — 200 rounds 
 per man in 2 — 3 hours. The reports show that the superior 
 arm gave superior results. According to these reports, 
 the Balmacedists lost 20 per cent at Concon and 30 per cent 
 at Placilla, the Congressionals 10 per cent and 10 per cent 
 respectively. The tactics of the side which possessed the 
 superior armament were on the whole as follows: Ad- 
 
 *See the reports of Tel Canto and KiJrner in the writings above 
 cited. 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 247 
 
 vance of the skirmishers without stop and without fire to 
 within 4 — 300 meters; opening fire at that range; reserves 
 follow at 500 meters. No conclusive deductions should be 
 made therefrom, because Balmaceda's army was a very 
 poor one. 
 
 As regards the opening of fire on the part of the 
 assailant, I am unable to change my opinion on account of 
 the small-caliber rifle. The danger of running out of ammuni- 
 tion is much diminished by the fact that every man now car- 
 ries 150 rounds instead of 100, as he did up to 1890. That, 
 however, does not free us from the danger of a consumption 
 of all our ammunition which is invited by the magazine 
 rifles. Although a late opening of fire does not protect 
 troops from the danger of firing away all their ammuni- 
 tion, still it constitutes an additional means for diminish- 
 ing that danger. I advocate a late opening of fire on 
 the further ground that an early opening of fire is the 
 greatest enemy of a vigorous advance. I am not, of course, 
 referring to the cases where volleys are practicable. Unless 
 they promise unusually fine results, it is better to do with- 
 out them, to seek to approach under cover, to save ammu- 
 nition, and to engage in fire action at a range where the 
 ballistic qualities of the rifle promise corresponding tacti- 
 cal results, which, as a rule, is at 600 meters. Cases where 
 fire at longer ranges may be of some value will probably 
 not be exceptional, but in general the attacker will have 
 to advance to about 600 meters, as at and within that dis- 
 tance infantry will best be able to quickly gain the superiority 
 of fire. The advocates of long-range fire suggest the open- 
 ing of the fire action at 1200 meters with increasing inten- 
 sity; it may be useful under certain circumstances, but to 
 accept it as a rule would be to greatly handicap the offen- 
 sive power of infantry and to diminish and even endanger its 
 
248 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 entire tightiug power with lospeot to later stages; the advo- 
 cates of long-range fire (more than 1000 meters) are usiialli/ 
 men who do not thinl- highh/ of the effect of arliUery, aud who, 
 altliougU not saviug so iu so many words, are inwardly cou- 
 viueed that the infantry can do the business alone. They 
 are infantry-tacticians, not tacticians, as the latter always 
 reckon with the three arms. 
 
 If we would make it an invariable rule to open fire at 
 600 meters, we would be foregoing the benefit of many 
 moral and material advantages of the arm. It would be 
 quite absurd to use a rille of great etficiency at 1000 meters 
 in the same way as one which possesses the same qualities 
 only up to 400 meters. 
 
 In our army there is, unfortunately, an excessive reli- 
 ance on iiifanlri/ hi/ itself. In battle the latter is no longer 
 the principal arm in all stages up to the decision; without 
 artillery it will frequently be unable to advance or to hold 
 its ground; it is therefore dependent on the artillery, and 
 the latter in turn on the infantry. The artillery has made 
 gigantic progress by the improvements in the gun, in the 
 projectile, in training, etc. In consequence of smokeless 
 powder and increased elfeet of fire the artillery has become 
 more independent and capable of resistance, and can now 
 carry on the action until just before the decision without 
 interfering with its own infantry, while in 1870-71 the 
 troops were much endangered by the artillery when firing 
 over them. The view remaining unobstructed, artillery can 
 always see, always aim. always observe, and make better 
 practice. For the same reason such direction of fire as 
 meets higher demands has become practicable and the 
 fire may now be coiicentrafed on the decisive points, which was 
 im]>ossible heretofore. Nor should the tests and experi- 
 ments be considered as concluded in this respect. For all 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 249 
 
 these reasons tlie firo action at ^reat distances should, as 
 a rule, be left to the artillery. There will be exceptions, 
 of course, and infantry had better abandon the idea of 
 initiating?, carrying out, and deciding the battle. It has 
 cost us bitter lessons and many lives, and has brought us 
 little or no result against the breech-loader. In looking 
 over all the imjiortant actions against the Imperial French 
 Army in 1870, we find Sedan the only instance where the 
 artillery is employed in a manner in keeping with modern 
 tactics; there its fire destroyed the enemy, and the infantry 
 relying on its effect could be held back. 
 
 At Worth, Vionville, and (Jravelotte fMir infantry was, 
 as a rule, employed too soon and the artillery too late; but 
 even then (III. Corps at Vionville, Guard at St. Privat, 
 VII. and VIII. Corps at (iravelotte), the artillery, whenever 
 it acted in large bodies, took charr/e of the fire action at lonq 
 range. In view of the unfavorable conditions at Vionville 
 and St. Privat, its action was moreover of great general 
 significance tactically and of incalculable effect on the 
 situation of the infantry of the III. and Guard Corps. 
 Infantry should, as a rule, leave long-range fire to the 
 artillery. 
 
 If artillery delays its fire until the main body of the 
 infantry is thrown into the action, it cannot suflSciently 
 shake the enemy by the time when delay means destruction 
 to the infantry, and when the latter must seek to hasten 
 the decision as much as possible. Tliis law is of greater 
 force to-day than formerly, because, according to human 
 calculation, the increased fire effect may under certain 
 circumstances perhaps bring about the decision even before 
 that moment. No body of troops will to-day be able to 
 stand a well-directed combined infantry and artillery fire 
 as long as was possible in the past. Hence the artillerv 
 
260 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Fufure. 
 
 s\\o\\\{] ho (h'irlopcd (If! carlii otuJ in ofi ijrcat aircnijlh as possible. 
 If it sm'ooeds in j;<>ttiiij; in pt>sition witlioiit drawing ftre 
 and in antiiipatinu; (ho tMuuny in «i(>((inj; \\\o ran<2:(\ ono 
 principal povlion of tlio work is done. All ils (MTorls shonld 
 he bi'ut to (hat end. '1\) ho snro. artillorv should ho pro- 
 ttH'tod (0(hjv from (ho tirst by infan(ry (hrown sonio 500 — - 
 (iOO n\o((M*s (o (lu> front; odiorwiso it niijiht bo provtMit(>d by 
 (ho ontMny's infan(ry tir(» froni ooninjj into action at all. 
 
 How in ( ach cast> \ho h>adinu; of iho Wwos. in roar is (o 
 bo r(\i;nla(od depends on (ho si(na(ion. and in (hat con- 
 no('(itin (ho nso of prtH'iso points of dirocdon and (ho obsorv- 
 anci> of (ho aljo((od spaco aro indisponsablo. If tho 
 irronnd is opon, (ho distanoos bo(wo(>n (ho linos shouUl 
 bo incroasod: if tho jrronnd is nioro covorod, tho distanoos 
 may bo diminishod. dt^ptMidin*; on tho amount of covor. On 
 opon ji'ronnd (horo will bo no ihoict^ bnt (o nso singlo-rank, 
 oponod, linos with jiroat dis(ancos. Sinco tho lii.i>:lu>r 
 ballistic qualitios i>f (In* ritlo t'onftM' on tlu* skirmish linos 
 incroasiHl powors of rosis(anc(>. thor(> will bo no risk in 
 inoreasinjr tho dis(anc(>s. Hut ox<'rcisos of lari;t> nnits in 
 closo formation in [ho terrain shonld not. on that accoimt, bo 
 dispensed with, and in travorsinji' woods particular stress 
 shonld bo laid on tattical cohesion. Woods play a great 
 role in battle; 1 will merely mention (hat of ^laslowod and 
 tho Rois dos (^(''nivanx; (heir ns(* for covering (ho approach 
 in (ho manner of (ho *JT(h l>riuado a( Problus will probably 
 be frot]uen( in the future, when opportunit i(>s will be atVord- 
 ed to (ako advajitajio of closo forniations and to cover the 
 enemy at a comparatively short ranjje with a crushing 
 tire. Tho very thing tho 27th brigade did at Problus for 
 mnsking its approach will, under similar circumstances, 
 be practii'ablo in the future. no(withs(anding tho small- 
 caliber arms. 
 
Psychology and TurticH. 251 
 
 The diBruption of units Bhould also be avoided as much 
 as possible. The intermingling of troops within a certain 
 space, however, which is inseparable from the eombat of 
 masses of skirmishers, should not be confounded with 
 divergence of troops in different directions and transgres- 
 sion beyond the allotted battle-space, whereby fractions of 
 different units become intermingled without having a com- 
 mon object. That lies chiefly within the power of division 
 and brigade commanders; a sufficient reserve must be pro- 
 vided at all events. For those who have observed the condi- 
 tion of troof)H thnt have ber-n unfortunate in battle will ad- 
 mit that in the hands of men physically exhausted and mor- 
 ally spent the best rifles are no better than none. In 1870 
 battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, and even army 
 c(U'7>s, were mixed in wild confusion; at the first shot every- 
 bodyrushed to the front as though it were a signal that there- 
 after no orders need be given or obeyed. For hours battalion, 
 regimental, and brigade commander did not have a man in 
 hand; the soldier was fighting the battle, in fact. Divi- 
 sional generals did not have even companies at their dis 
 posal — not even in defeat — because their brigades had 
 crumbled to pieces at the most heterogeneous j>oint8. 
 Corps commanders had two or three little reduced battal- 
 ions under them, while in the front the fate of the battle 
 was hanging in the balance for hours. With such tactics 
 we need only lieutenants and soldiers, but they will 
 accomplish no great result; the latter will invariably 
 require superior, well-planned leading, the employment and 
 ( ontrol of masses for a definite object, and, within these lim- 
 its, control on the part of the infantry brigade commanders. 
 
 In capturing the enemy's jjosition, its increa.sed distance 
 fiom the last firing-station will form a distinctive feature 
 as compared with former conditions. Any one, however, 
 
253 lnqtiiri$s into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 who has visitiHl tho battlo iiiomuis oi Kissinji'en aiul 
 Worth will oome to tho oonolusion that in i\\v strujiiile tor 
 tho koy of a }H>sition tho samo phononioiia whioh ai>pt»artHl 
 horo will froquoutlv room* in tho fntnrt^ — i'. t*.. that it will 
 bo jKussiMo to appioaoh within S(> — 100 nnMors. Tho 
 oaptnro of Fiosohwoilor is tvpioal for tho ailvanoo of tho 
 rosorvo (StarkloiY's Wiiitoniborii lU-iuatloV for tho impulso 
 to tho tinal rnsh. for tho intonninjiling- of troops of four 
 ditforout arinv oorps in tho oaptnrotl villajro. and also v>n 
 aooount of tho rapidity with whioh thov ro-fonnod. This* 
 oxaniplo absolntoly illustratos all tho lossons and is a jjood 
 reforonoo for any snooossfnl attaok. It is approxiniatod 
 among- tho important aotions, by tho attacks on St. Trivat 
 (north). Loigny. and t^t. Qnontin: bnt in fntnro tho tinal 
 nssanlt >Yill probably bo dirootod moro against artitioial 
 keys than against villagos. This doos not modify tho prin- 
 ciples of oxooution in any ^^•ay. 
 
 In tho oaso of an unsnooossful attai'k tho dofoatod 
 troops will hardly lind immodiato snpport fiom infantry in 
 their rear; the support will oome exolusively from the artil- 
 lery. On that aooount T atu opposed to having tho artillery 
 aooompany tho attacking infantry, t^hangos of positions, 
 being easily visible, should bo avoided as mui'h as possible; 
 excepting moral grounds, theiv is no reason why artillery 
 should accompany tho attack, for the use of smokeless 
 powder makes it protitable for artillery to remain \v, ono 
 etTectivo tiring position, and tho improvement of tho prin- 
 oijnil projectile ishrapnob admits of groat etfoct at dis- 
 tances which render it wholly unnecessary to accompany 
 the attack. Yet it may bo useful in some cases. Kut the 
 rapid occupation of a captured position by artillery is im- 
 practicable per se on many grounds. 
 
 At the moment of tho defeat of an infautrv attack cav- 
 
•a\v\' will find t>\t\Ktr\nuit'u^ tor fraining hrWVmni. ¥,niAA')m, 
 <-Hj><'<'jaIJv if it. ¥>\u\i\('%i\\ nAvamj-n from *:oin'J:ii\m*fUt <fHt, 
 (■itufutinf. Vai'JoiJM IntMentM at VumviWti t^^faeb tlwi? iMiine 
 U-%%tm. ('avalry niiouM th^T^'for^' K<^'k favorahUt ]tfmilUmn 
 for Kijch t'%u('%'i[t'Ut''U'%. i'la/rJJJa nhown iYmt a titu;*-^nfn\ 
 iufauxry aiiiuk i-uiinufj-n mifcjinti to an unF^/uud'^l d^^tp"*:^. 
 TUitr*'. \n mxu'h to U^r U^ruttd from fiial ttsamxA*^.. 
 
 I V, Of itc4! Mf/ral Trainiruj of Trwp». 
 \t in not alway« <;ai*y to rtti'My^'v/M tht^ ta/rticaDy rt/>< 
 UihUioiit. Tlj<- <'n<f«iy rnay <i*^:H\v*i un m t>iat rei<jM^;t.- an be 
 ^JJ<J at VionvilJeand (irn\'<i\otUr, and. «j^>f*^>v*;r, one may be 
 rni«titken on one's own j^art for other niOMimn. In that 
 caw*' the %r<K)\m niunt hold their trround, for e%'ery conqof^ed 
 t>it of i'arih njii>»t h<' held on jj^^fwr^i] principles; here it i« 
 where the moral strength of \roti\tv, shows itself. At Ht. 
 Privat the Ouard« held out f^>r three botirs nnder a destnjct- 
 jv*' fire, though, to tMf sure, th^'V were nr^ calUtl ufK>n to meet 
 a ttountcraU^-.k; the 'J8th brigade held out 'i'i minute* 
 within 8^J — loO meters of the tftufmy without the support of 
 other infantry or of sufficient artillery. I state tbiu in 
 reply to the a^s^^rtion that "no body of troo\m will remain 
 halted under sww^ping* fire; that it will crowd either for- 
 ward or to the r^iiar." That is a pernicious doctrine, par- 
 ticularly to-^lay, when the continuous danger sf/ace extend* 
 f^'Mi meters from the muzzle. It thus be^romes incumbent 
 on infantry to hold out; otherwise- an action could not be 
 fought within the continuous danger n\fa('M. I doubt that a 
 Kujx^riority of fire. ><nfficjent for a de*fisioD, can be gained 
 at a greater range tlian fXK) meters. 
 
 *Tb6 aatbor tues the t^m "raiemt," meaning tbat ao part of tlie 
 trajecv^ry exceed* the beifdiit of a marj. We hare no eo r re^ondtog 
 technical term. In the abtsenee of anytbinj? better, the term "sweep- 
 ing" haJ5 been premsed into »«^ice. — TrnrusUitvr. 
 
Soi Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 Losses will have to be put up with. ;uul tlu' resolution 
 to bear them should be injiraiued in tlii> troops bv peaee- 
 training:, for that moral foree is the most precious jiit't the 
 soldier and subordinate holder ean ])ossess. '1\) develop it 
 is the work of the ps\ehoU>.irieal education of troops in 
 peace; we should take care not to mistake exttM-ior matters, 
 such as a smart manual, tirm step, loud auswiM's. etc., for 
 the spirit, or to judiie the moral (MVicieucv of a rejiiment by 
 its display of these thiniis. Tht^ moral efficiency of troops 
 is not so much the result of practical exercises as oi intel- 
 ligently and judiciously conducted instruction. 
 
 At the time the 08th liriiiade employed in part the most 
 dangerous tactical forms; yet it advanced without sto]> until 
 intermingling with the enemy. What does that teach? 
 That the moral (i^sychical) education of the troops should be 
 looked to above all. because it outweighs everything else, 
 and it is the point to which I constantly recur. 
 
 The last few wars do not show a single instance of a 
 devoted and deadly attack that can at all be compared with 
 that of the :?8th lirigade. 
 
 Kottwitz's brigade at Loigny and Skobeleff's attack in 
 the third battle of Plevna approximate, but are not equal 
 to this instance, because in either case the circumstances 
 were more favorable to the assailant. 
 
 The feat of arms culminated in a horrible disaster, but 
 it is instructive as showing what stout-hearted regiments 
 can do. 
 
 And passing to the nniterial side: if losses constituted 
 the greatest glory, the 3Sth Brigade would be entitled to it. 
 Of all the Gernnin troops it sutlered the greatest losses 
 in the shortest time as compared with other units. 
 The occurrence is therefore equally singular and notable 
 both from the psychical (moral) and tactical ])oints of view. 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 255 
 
 It iH rnoro difficult to ooutrol many small dotachm^ntn 
 than few largo oneH; it Ib moro difficult yet to control bri- 
 gadoH fighting entirely as BkirrniHherH, which will be the 
 rnh'. ThiK undeniable disadvantage of the superior leaders 
 should be nullified as much as possible by the tactical train 
 ing of the leaders and the moral training of the troops. 
 
 Conceding the control on the part of the higher leaders 
 within the zone of destructive fire to be i>erforce restricted, 
 how can that deficiency be compensated for? I have men- 
 tioned in this connection: 1, careful training of the sol- 
 dier in skirmishing and in firing; 2, development of the 
 feeling of self-reliance based on the confidence in the arm 
 and on the training of the skirmisher; '.',. higher tactical 
 efficiency of the subordinate leaders of all grades; 4, in- 
 crease of the number of the lower leaders; 5, clear and pre- 
 cise orders regarding the object to all officers down to the 
 captains before entering the action, and the endeavor to 
 prevent misunderstanding during the action. All these 
 requirements are of purely mechanical character or addr^^ss 
 themselves to the intellect alone, and remain without effect 
 if both fail. It should therefore be endeavored to prevent 
 that failure; the means thereto are purely moral. It 
 is hardly necessary to refer here to the officers, as they are 
 all more or less imbued with an idealism for the sake of 
 which they are pr(?pared to surrender their all. That is 
 not sufficient, however; it should be endeavored to develop 
 some degr(? of idealism among the great mass of the com- 
 batants. In the case of more highly developed men and 
 strong characters (^officersj this may spring from very different 
 groundSjbut in tlie caseof thesoldier it should be basedon the 
 most natural grounds. They are faith, national sentiment, love 
 of country, esprit. The entire training of the soldier should 
 be systematically built up on the basis of these four qualities, 
 
256 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 so that he may learn to distinguish between virtue and 
 wealcness. It is by no means easy, because the development 
 of culture, intellect, and moral sense of the men differ very 
 much in degree, aud it requires no small amount of time, 
 patience, and devotion on the part of the officers. The 
 choice of the means will therefore very much depend on the 
 character of the troops, and they should be so chosen as 
 to enlarge the soldier's conception by instruction, to rouse 
 and increase his susceptibility for the sublime; in a word, 
 the man should be subjected to moral training, keeping the 
 enlargement of his intellect in view at the same time. 
 The best means to insure progress in each one of the four 
 qualities consists, in the first place, in rousing the men's 
 interest, inclination, zeal, and love for the profession; in 
 making intelligible to them the sublimity of the duties to 
 which they are called; in strengthening their hearts by 
 numerous examples of how the heroes of the Fatherland, 
 whether carrying the marshaVs taton or the nmsl-et, have con- 
 ceived these duties and have surrendered their lives for 
 them. That can always be done, opportunity for it is never 
 lacking in military life, and even in practical exercises this 
 or that example may be interwoven and enlarged upon. 
 The chief work will, however, have to be accomplished by 
 instruction by such oflScers alone as can speak in a compre- 
 hensible and stirring manner on such topics. What may in 
 this way be gained by the right kind of officers may easily 
 be undone by less able officers, because a man's feelings are 
 very sensitive and should be touched only by a careful and 
 gentle hand. While the powers of the intellect and feeling 
 are thus being roused, kind treatment, such as will make 
 the man aware that he is profiting hy it, should be used to 
 rouse his ambition, because we need that for everything and 
 always, and because the entire training must rest on the 
 
Psychology and Tactics. 257 
 
 sense of honor; in it the soldier's aims and life should cul- 
 minate, and he should be unable to separate his own honor 
 from that of his corps, of the army, and of the country. It 
 is always the sense of pride and shame which in the case of 
 the soldier — because with him everything takes place pub- 
 licly — are of such great moral effect on the whole character 
 of the army and its behavior in battle, and not a day should 
 be allowed to pass by without the officers thinking over it 
 and acting accordingly. It is true, part of the men to-day 
 are indolent in Frederick's sense, but the remainder are 
 easily susceptible to a higher and nobler conception of the 
 duties of their profession. That fact should be judiciously 
 and strenuously taken advantage of, and hours of instruc- 
 tion are worth more than days of spirit-killing drill, al- 
 though I would not have one iota abated from the custom- 
 ary rigor and precision. Although a taste for the sub- 
 lime and heroic is far from making heroes, still, once roused 
 and refined, it furnishes us with a means to act on the pride 
 and shame of the men and to quicken their sense of honor, 
 their will-p6w^er, and their sense of responsibility toward 
 God and man, toward their king, their fellow-citizens, their 
 families, and toward their own wordly goods. There are 
 plenty of means available for this end, but I omit them 
 because it is not within the scope of this work to enumerate 
 and discuss them. 
 
 If the soldier can be made susceptible to honor, pride, 
 and shame, courage may also, to a certain degree, be trained 
 into him; history shows instances where injury to their 
 honor has driven men not in themselves courageous to 
 heroic resolves, to great vigor of action, and to a remarka- 
 ble degree of devotion ! But we find them invariably men 
 of but one faith, however singular that faith may have been ; 
 hence I am convinced that a careful moral training of any 
 
iJ5S Inquinfit into the Tactks of the Future, 
 
 tivu>ps will lu^ toll on tho battlo tii>Ui. juul ihat troops sua- 
 ivptiblo to uoMo impulsos will alono oomo up to tho iviiuirt^- 
 uitMits luaiio on iho unni In (ho modorn tlrotlnlu. This 
 boiuii I ho oiilv moans, all (-duciition and triiininij should be 
 bastHl i>n it; anil havinii loarntnl, bv a oloso sorntinv of my 
 o>vn uaturo, thai sv>UlitMlv courajio admits of otiltivation. 
 1 fail to stv whv tho samo shouUl uoi bo pi>ssibU» with tho 
 bt^ttor I'lass of tho mon. 
 
 Tho ivsnlts aooomplislunl will not bt^ unit'orm : n portion 
 of tho mtMi will iiivo no proof whatt^vor of thoir poaoo- 
 traiuinii on tho battUMiold. Thov aro a class of boasts; 
 with othors will and woaknoss will t'lMtttMid ajjainst oaoh 
 other, tho struuiilo onditiii' in favor of tho lattor: tho third 
 (smallest^ part will stantl tho tt^si. Tht\v art» ilu> proilmi of 
 iiiberittHi qualitit^ juui subsonuont training in tho school, 
 in tho homo, and in sooioty ; thov aro tho hoart of tho troops, 
 and with thom and with tho otYorts of tht* ot^U'ors it w ill bo 
 possible tomakt> tho sooond i-lassstand to thoir uiins. Wo aro 
 duly appreoiatinii' the evil otVoets protlneod on human nature 
 by the skirmish tijiht. but it would be wronu to rejeet that 
 method of tightinir on account of their existenoe. It is 
 only ntvessary that ovtM'y one should be eoijni/.ant of the 
 weaknesses and dark sides of his profession, the ot^U'or ot 
 those of his taetiis. in ordtM- to oonnteraet them intelli- 
 jjently. They will m^tu" bi> oompletely oradit'attHi from 
 taetios. as that would mean to eradieato human nature. 
 Stout hearts are moreover found everywhere: Nature does 
 not piek out a special class of men for that, and the loaders 
 should honor thom suitably where they come to the fore; it 
 will inviiTorato the military spirit and stimulate all wtMl 
 disposiHl characters. 
 
 Every battlo-tiold roiiuiros special measures! Obsta- 
 cles of all kinds exert their otVov't and cause delay, displace- 
 
i/i.'/i»H, ;j.»,rj vrrf,<iuU,.riiu».. Jf. jm fjj«; aim .,/ //,« ///^-^ior// /mimn,^ 
 »l IM UafkrH lo ov«'ir;oHi<^ thctti anrj to k^^jp in i\ut utUUt of 
 <Uti:M\(t itui\ uuirx\H'MUti\ itt,uti\\'u,un an oj><fTJ <'y<; on fh«; 
 ro;irJ« which h^J to Uit'XUMl nuiHirlorU.y; iu.nt jh wUant thn 
 ^liU-n-nrM hcXwi.,.u tmritUuulr.il m-Mon and iUtt Una iMWMp- 
 Hon of Uiir Hitn:i.iion, IM vo.hiH of p^ynonaX rMroAUridwH, which 
 wiiJ i-yi,v U: of /j/yi Jn/,,orfanw, will b^^corn*. uvauSU^X. 
 
 W'*- niaj^ H^fioct any innovation and any flrdrj imu-Mi-A 
 f/j I he Hunie; in fhr-ir aj^pli^af ion nia/i r-aKily ovcrHh^K>fH fh*^ 
 nja/k, anrj i/, (Joinj< Mr, inflin on hiniH^if morr, or h^M painful 
 wounriH. Thoot'ht antidpat.^ fa.;t ^^jK^ciilativrr th.^orvj. 
 ;in(J cxj,r.H..nr:c alone can dcnionHlraf/; what th« riw^rit** of 
 Wi*- j/inovafion n.aijy arc. Trnc, war alone oflTcrn fhc f„|J 
 nica>.urc of that cx/x-ricncc, hut ninch can he done in jxrace 
 in the way of i;re,,aratio«, if the innovations are followed 
 in(elliKenf ly and wUhoiif hian for principlr^. On no field im 
 (he p.iniHhnM-nt of faJn*; speculation k<^ fafal aj< on that of 
 tactics, and nowhere shorjid wrf be more careful rhan th^-re, 
 Whr-n one of the lar^e anni^-s bad adopt/-d lon^^ range 
 /JrearnjM, oUier ronjpetinj( arnilr^s could not afford to re- 
 main behind, and hji/i to <'nter on the path of progrr:««. If 
 not on others, it was necessary on moral grounds, as they 
 are all imj/ortant in baffle. It should be kept in mind, how 
 ever, thaf fhe rmn who shoots is more important than the 
 f<hol,htul that m fur as n</i?/ra/ -?/7/>^wm and the m Uhh irddivfihU 
 irukknce iutt I'.otKtarinu}, man remains the same df^pit*- sujx- 
 rior education and a higher moral level. /fence fhos*? 
 troopH alone will comjmr wkick ar". led. It is certain that 
 under many circumstance^ leading will rin\n'mt gn^ater 
 Hiu:ni'Kj-H fhan fornierly; who falls, di*;s for his country, 
 for his profr-sMJon, and also for his— in this instance, noble^ 
 egotism, 
 
 Ifj war the most sublime is to be looked for in the soul. 
 
2l>0 Inquiries into the 'I\ictics of the Futuir. 
 
 On it tlio tiii'htinsi: prinoii^los should Ih^ Inisod and Tho iiuid- 
 inji' idoas (ov iraininji and Icadiui:; bo built u]>; with the holp 
 of oxporitMU'o. tho tii;ht views will tluMi bo lakou. Tho 
 attaokor ivaohos all too earlv tho point whoro ovoi\v rule is 
 shattered and supplanted l\v irre«;ularity, and in the chaos 
 whiih is utuivoidabU> bef(U-e. at. aud afttM" the deeisiiui, uutn 
 should stand above disorder aud confusion, still capabU^ of 
 exertiuii his will-power, uiiided bv the intellect, to bend so 
 niauv unchained forces under his swav; to briuj; them for- 
 ward auaiu under control is the second part of this ditVicult 
 problem. If sm-h men cHunmand in battle, tuir baniuM's 
 will continue to wave over captured heiiihts. There sluuild 
 be constant tMult>avor io reduce the numy ai'cideuts of bat- 
 tle which tan not be wholly eliminated. To transfer the 
 battle to the niuht.iu luder to estape the moral and material 
 etTects is to formally invite these accidents, and no wise nuiu 
 will coui'ur in that proposititm. 
 
 1 have frctiuiUitly sought Un- the rt^ason of our "phil- 
 osophy of losses." Is the same justitled bei-ause we no 
 longer look at things in the right way, or have we become 
 weaklings as compared with our progenitors, or does the 
 superior nuiterial of uumi constituting nunleru armies cause 
 that wail to go up after every battle, or is it the nu)ral 
 effect of the breech-loader that has set so many springs in 
 operation? 
 
 Many theories might be adv;nu'iHl on this point; I 
 refrain from advancing any, because wt> art' already laboring 
 under a pletluua of them. It is certain, however, that a 
 particular degree of civilization also engenders effeminacy, 
 aud strengthens that egotism which culminates in personal 
 comfort or craves high living, thus sapping virile strength 
 and self-sacritice; also that the stuptMying lire of the breech- 
 loader produces an overptnvering niornl imju'ession on by 
 
Fnycholofjy and Tactics. '^^Bl 
 
 far fh<- groat majority. We kw*, therefore, that taetieally 
 the greater portion of warfare falls aH much within the 
 Hi>here of the will an huH always been the case strategically. 
 'Jo lliose who would charge rne with lapsing from justi- 
 fied psycliological requirements into psychological reveries, 
 1 make this brief re[)ly: ''^'onsider that all we have — all we 
 enjoy — has been gained by long p(;riodH of suffering on the 
 j)arl of our- forefathers. They liavr- given us all. They ask 
 as much of us. They gave us the body, protected it, and 
 fonned and united our soul. They ask our body and soul for 
 themsrdves. However freely we may spread our pinions as 
 individuals, we remain a(;countable to these creditors for the 
 use of our [towers, even if such accountability make legiti- 
 mate demands for both body and soul." A military system 
 that does not constitMle a training sdiool in virtue, fails in 
 its duty to the state; and the uninterrupted cultivation of 
 all the ethical qualities of the men will ultimately inure to 
 the benefit of tactics on the battle-field. The great mass is 
 not converted; that is not necessary, liut we shall convert 
 some, and that sufTicf-s for f>ur jtiupose and is worth the 
 labor. 
 
'202 Inquirit\< info the Tocfica of the Fiihur. 
 
 PART 111. 
 
 TACTUW L DKDrcn^ONS. 
 
 /. Iic marls on 'J'arlical 'reiuJt'ncics. 
 
 Had tho ballistii' iiualitics of (he chassopAt beon geiior 
 ally known in our army bt^foro 1870, tlio (lornians would 
 not havo ontored nj)t)n llio war with any doubt as to what 
 was in storo for thoni. Tho authoritit^s (h>aliu,<; with such 
 nuittors niijiht havo readily asoortainod tho ballistic quali- 
 ties of that rillo, since it had been in their possession, 
 tojjether with the retiuisite aninnmition, since 18(58. Instead 
 of spreading;' c(U'rei't notions of that rille. the error was 
 ('onunitted of concealiuy; from the students of the tirinj; 
 school and from th(> army at lar^e the ureat superiority of 
 the (^hassepot over the needle liun in ballistic (lualities.* 
 Hence it is not the troops and the otlicers on practical ser- 
 vice that iwc to be charji'ed, in the lii'st place, with the iireat 
 losses, which might have easily been avoidt>d. and which 
 freiiiuMitly failed of any j;ood result \vhal(>V(M'. Still tlu> 
 troops had learned a jiood vleal of the truth by other means; 
 but as nothingwas done to I'onform their traininiiaml tactics 
 to that truth, the infantry was in a very unfavorable posi- 
 tion in 1870, which was aii'.iiravated by th(> fact that the 
 correct ideas advocated in the "Tactical l\t>trospt>cts" (open 
 lines, liorizontal aim) were prom])tly smotlu>r(Hl by the 
 (alh^jjed) "official" reply of l>ronsart and others. Arnu'd 
 with an inferior ritle and aware that the cnstonuiry tactics 
 were inapplicable ai;ainst the Chassepot, the troops at the 
 sudden outbreak of the war were suspended between heaven 
 and earth, as it were, and it was only after the saiijjjuin- 
 
 *See page 3-5, •■Wintertagswirklichkelt"("Wintei-day Facts "), 
 Berlin, R. Felix.mllltary publisher. 
 
Tactical Deductions. '2fi^ 
 
 uvy t-xitcv'iciK<-H of t[i<' Auf/uHt h<)ltl<K tfijif th<- infantry 
 b<'^an to toiJ<;h f hut tar;tioal j^round wliich iniKht hnvc bof;ri 
 (•anily found bf^forff th(? war ha<l th<5 balliHtir (pjalitirfH of 
 tlu- CbnHHr'pof boon rnad(? HufWcutuWy known. Thin, too, 
 alfhoij^'l) two yt'itvH liad clapHod Hinoo tho "rniracIeH" 
 wroijj^ht by tho ]'r<-n<li ri/lo at Montana! Wo can 
 hardly Kpoak in truth of nuix-rior ta<;tioH on i\n- part of 
 thff Oorrnnn infantry in tlio Au^'UHt battlon; Uu- Oer- 
 rnanH oon<|uorod abovo all throuj^h Huporior Htrato^'v of Huoh 
 firopond^rant w^itrht that victory foil to tho (iovuinn loadorH 
 notwitliMtandirij^ thoir antiquiitcd tuoticH. ThiH provJ-H inoi- 
 dontjilly how much Huporior Htrato^y aHHJHtH in tho HUOOffMH- 
 fuj iHMuo of a war. 
 
 Mcanwhilo a now loaf has boon turnod ovor in Oorrnany, 
 and it may bo Htatod that tho Hupronio authoritioM and mili- 
 tary writorH havo dono ovrfrythinj? to Kjjrf^id tru'- and oor 
 roct idojiH of tho r-ffcrt of modern armn, inKuffi^iontly por- 
 ha|>H, amon^ tho infantry and cavjilry an ro^ardH knowlrf<Jgo 
 of the offect of artiJIory firo. ft now romainH with the 
 troopH to digoHt what haH br-cn pr^wontod i<, thcrn by the»e 
 
 HOUroffH. 
 
 Whorovor wo may turn in th'- Hnnaln of war, ij^no- 
 ranoo and arrogance have invariably boon tho chief cauHen 
 of dofoat, and it iH a Kin^nlar fact that th<*«o two aro always 
 found in combination in ovory nation. In that particular, 
 thoy are aH alike an two poaK. It Ih not HufTiciont to HprcnA 
 knowlodgo;it \h ne^.-OHHary to drawfrorn f h'- roKultK of experi- 
 montH practical and tjictical d^ductiouH for tho roj/ulationg 
 and fi^htinj^ rules wliich aro ho very variable; for tho rjuan- 
 titioH determined in Hcientific wavH offer in time of peace 
 imjiortant HupportH for a Hound development of ovorything 
 that haM roforonco to tho mutable Hide of tarrticH. Tho true 
 corrigent, however, of thoretical roHoarchoK and practi- 
 
ctt\ ex|>*^rlm<MU» Ih (ho oxjhm'Umuv of [\w l>a(tloi\oU< It 
 «iihouUi ovor Ih^ oousuUtnl. i\( oinlor to jjuaiti against uu^uikt^v 
 
 Kvor siuoo Moltko o«moou( with hi?* bo*>k,* (ho tuviioal 
 aw«trt>vo»^^\ h«?» uoYor »"tv>»l<H\; thinm^h Mav*H "Taotlv^ttl 
 Koti^Ksj^vl**" tho q\u^(iou>» ut l«t*»o >i»U\uHl ^nmuil \\\ k\\\ 
 ^vrwi anouv^, hut it U woU kuo\v»> {\u\t ta^tU-al luuovatlo»>H 
 I'xNIuitv a KMiji timo to ^^^^^aiU In Uoituauv iworo than two 
 thviuhvs \^\Hs<Ht aftor tho puhUoutlou ot MoUkoV book ht^f\M*t* 
 uow \V4i»»lat\ous f^u* iufiu\tn taotios >votv I^siuhU uotwith- 
 stamiiuji tho faot that tho war of lS7tV7t hail oxpostnl tho 
 uti\vhoh\s\uoou<\s!4 of tho tliou taotio?*, aiui that tho iv 
 anuamout with tho Ma«soi' ritio lM\uan i\un\»HUatolY aft«>r 
 tho war! 
 
 Was uot that au inoousistonov? 
 
 lu ISTtVTl tho i^onuau iufautrv kuow »>o normal 
 attaok; it ha^l almnvhM\»Hi tho thon lino ( t*»v/^>M) taotios, b«t 
 faihnl to t^^rthor Uovolop tho oon\|><\nY oohmm taotios in 
 tho s^M»5»o of tht^ sikirmishinu of inasst\>4; at tho onthrr^jik of 
 tho war it hail t»o svstotn of attack of anv kitul and ouo 
 was fornwihu^Hl Uurinjj tho war, insutWoiout, of iH>nrst\ as it 
 was bound to bo, and not a noin\al svstom i»\ tho tru«^ stM\s«v 
 llonw tho shovtov»nuniis obsorvabh^ in n»\>ulv all attaoks 
 ou a larjiv soalo should not bo oharjjtH^ to traitdn^is \\\ a 
 normal attack. Om tho ^vntrar^w U mav bo assun>tMl that 
 had tho it^fantrv btvn in possession of. and skilhnl in. a nor 
 mal sYstom. it would haYo foujiht to much btMttM- advantaijo. 
 Tho rt^^j^on why tho attack tactics wtMt^ such a faiUu>^ lit^ 
 in tho fact that tho uifantrv did not know how t<> tljiht 
 t^attack^ in mass*^; it did not know, b»va»ist* it had not boo»> 
 tn\intH\ d\irinu \h^\iV in u suitable sYstom. and btvanso tho 
 actual sYstom was rt^triotv^l YYithin tht^ linvits of dotach 
 mout tactics, i^till wo havo thrtv jirt^U attacks during:: which 
 
tuiht'^ !., J,.. ''.'■■"■" .„. ...- ., .;,.,-.... '- ?-i- ?.*** 
 
 %%w HffX/fftn; H4*A flMr mtM Wfnt tMt4^ Iff th^ Imifft^^ *A Hf^lr 
 
 wt' fir*' U4^*'f,ffitt/'tuM) vn^U Uif- 
 
 *^f'Utn'i¥t4f, Wyff^M" fh^ iufsoftrf tt^tit*^^k*A *rt$ rlMr nAiUt ^4 
 
 in t- '- - ' - ' - ■ " .■ -■ ■ '^^^ t4 
 
 Su'/ *• 
 
 W^/ftl» flMr UtfMttrf t4 fliMr %\, Army iUtr\m nU*m*^\ 
 
 nfii,tp$m hi \\,t' ^Hf in ;,..> ./ . ,/- f// t$t^ -.-.,,.>>. ^ ,.,.: ,r,tmf 
 
 ''''$< - .: - - < " ' ". 
 
 n*rw r"iinhfUmn in f^mltrrttti^y witt$ fh^ r*rfinir*^t*^fin *4 
 
 fSl.U.' ■ .'■• ' • ■ ■ ''.^t9^,¥f,^iU(■ 
 
 WAM fi'nU'4 in ifm tntp^fff Urtt/U^Mf pttt4 %\mft^ wtm n ^/m- 
 ntnttt ftwiif'ft^i wfH4tfiUr \t*^wtr^t iU^ n*i\p*^Ufr ttJttA itfi*<t^tf 
 
 fjffftftffir ■' -:'■-' '■-- ■-■-■'-- - - -• -..-^ .* :.. '-^^ fj,^ 
 
 itfTttttf Jt, HttA 
 
 tim ffifiif^ f'H4tHi ItfT fi4jnntfft*<fft^ whif^h ws4m ttr^/mtp\Mt*r4 
 
 hy fU*' .'' '/r»« fff ik^. Ut ff tun: ■<-. imp*'. 
 
 v\tff c/m ■. ,hftMtun^',h ftn rt»^ ' '" ' ,..,,'*af wttM 
 
 t^tirttn^i'A to tit*' iuitititivk tA fttU\ *^*fry 
 
 ^'\%im*'jf, *4 cjimtftA wfiM imrrf*fuA*tt'A, 'Htitt \n nifttpiy to jmt 
 
 How *U/\ vft' f(H to thftt if^Atff! 
 
 T\itr ttumt ffr*ftftift*f$t chfuu^Afftm t4 imirahi*' f*r%nWti^ffmt 
 t» 
 
266 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 in so far as they have committed themselves to the press, 
 are successively Moltke, May, Boguslawski, Schlichting, 
 Liebert. The oldest and most prominent opponents, not so 
 much in regard to principles as to specific suggestions, are 
 Bronsart, Scherfe, Meckel. Recently the former current 
 was joined by Honig and Kleim, but Malachowski has gone 
 far beyond the pretensions of this category, and so has the 
 Militdr Woclienhlatt during the past few years. 
 
 All concurred in the opinion that new regulations were 
 necessary and the greater the improvements in fire-arms, 
 the more urgent became the necessity. 
 
 In the course of time several fusions and reactions took 
 place. Shortly before his death, the late General of 
 Infantry von Bronsart, the man who had for a long time 
 thrown the weight of his voice in the scales against new 
 regulations on May's plan and whose public expressions 
 marked him as the chief advocate of a system of control, 
 joined May's colors and rejected the normal attack; in this 
 case the system of control, though normal attack and con- 
 trol are usually two very different things.* 
 
 Meckel, in following up the important moral princi- 
 ple during the execution of the combat, went so far as to 
 demand the closing together of extended lines; he became 
 reactionary.! 
 
 Boguslawski long and strenuously championed a suita- 
 ble training and tactics in various writings and numerous 
 essays; his demands were so far outdone in the Regulations 
 of 1888 that he also appears reactionary, though he never 
 was; for that general neither changed nor modified his posi- 
 tion. It is likewise with Honig, Keim, and probably with 
 
 *See "Betrachtungen iiber eine zeitgemasse Fechtweise der In- 
 fanterie," E. S. Mittler, 1891. 
 
 tSee "Sommernachtstraun-!," E. S. Mittler. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 267 
 
 Liebert. They are all opposed to a normal attack in so far 
 as it is understood to mean a fixed, reglementary scheme 
 for the execution of the combat that is not to be departed 
 from. All are agreed that deployment, forming for attack, 
 and execution of the combat constitute three separate 
 stages succeeding one another in time and space, for which 
 some reglementary provisions should be made in order 
 to render possible the control of masses in attack. All 
 demand but one formation for movement, the single-rank, 
 open line; but one formation for fighting, the swarm of skir- 
 mishers; but one kind of fire, skirmish fire. Boguslaw^ski 
 and Honig also recommend fire while in motion. 
 
 The Regulations of 1888 intensified the dispute because 
 the task system was formally adopted, the fullest freedom 
 of the subordinate leaders in the execution of the action 
 was invested with the force of principle, and the princi- 
 ple of control in action was surrendered. In view of the 
 improvements of fire-arms. General von Scherff, the old 
 and tried champion of control in action, modified his regle- 
 mentary requirements in the course of time and his propo- 
 sitions ultimately fused, in so far as that is possible, with 
 the views held by Boguslawski and Honig. He contrasts 
 the task system with control in action, not with the normal 
 attack.* 
 
 Until he wrote the book mentioned under 3, Von Schei*ff 
 did not employ the deductive method in his expositions, 
 since up to that time he did not base his writings on the tac- 
 tical phenomena of the battle-field; he was battling for prin- 
 ciples w^hich he absorbed from his war experience in gen- 
 eral, and had evolved from them his system of control in 
 
 *1. "Reglementarische Studien," Berlin, 1891-92, A. Bath. 
 2. "Praktische Taktik und Taktische Theorie," 1893, R. Felix, Berlin. 
 S. "Unsere heutige Infanterietaktik im Spiegel der Augustkiimpfe, 
 1870 urn Mete," 1893, R. Felix, Berlin. 
 
268 Iiiqiiirli's into the TacHcs of the Future. 
 
 action. As loiijj; as noitlun* Si'Ium'IT uov his adherents 
 addni'od ])i'oofs, based on facts, for the soundness of that 
 system, Seherll's opponents — /. c, the advocates of our ]>res- 
 ent refjuhitions — were free to charj^e them ^^ith beinj; mere 
 theoretical specuhitors, whereupon opinion stood against 
 opinion and princii)le asiainst ])rincii)le. In this dispute 
 Lieutenant (\)lonel von JNIahichowski joined witli the most 
 radical demands.* He rejects all nt)rninl action (c'ontrol in 
 action), and carries the "principles" and points of the task 
 system to the extreme: according to him, the execution of 
 the combat is a "horde-like" combat of masses of skirmish- 
 ers conducted by the subordinati' leaders. He thus con- 
 curs in the views of Oeneral von Sehlichting. and these two, 
 in their writings, are the nu)st radical advocates of the 
 task system. 
 
 Having in view his "Inquiries into Tactics," Honig was 
 meanwhile basing himself on the phenomena of the battle- 
 field in his "24 Hours of Moltke's Strategy" and the "Strug- 
 gle for the Quarries of Rozerieulles, ' and deej) research led 
 him to the conclusion that all actions fought in 1870, by the 
 troops of all army corps in the sense of the modern task 
 system, failed, and that nothing could be gained by these 
 tactics. 
 
 (leneral von SchertV fo\ind in these expositions welcome 
 material for substantiating his own views,and by employing 
 Honig's method in his own way in his subsequent studies he 
 was able to prove the soundnessof his views to the last detail 
 in his "Unsere heutige Infanterietaktik." Whatever may be 
 the opinion entertained by the authorities on this point and 
 on the Regulations of 188S, I believe that the ''task battle,'- 
 which was found wanting in 1870, has been adopted in these 
 
 *"Scharfe Taktik und Revuetaktik," E. S. Mittler. 
 
Tady-al Deduciions. 209 
 
 Regulations, and with it a normal HjHtcni, which it had been 
 the intention to aboliwh aH sonietliing perniciouH. I am 
 convinced that the tank HVHteni is not in keeping with the 
 times, that it should be relin(|nished — i. e., that the Regula- 
 tions should be revised and that we should return to the 
 system of undivided authority, if the execution of the 
 action is not to be left to the license of the subordinate 
 leaders. 
 
 Closely connected therewith are the questions of long- 
 ynd short range fire, of the advance to effective range, of 
 gaining the superiority of fire, and of turning movements. 
 
 In the Regulations of 1888 the task system simply 
 becomes a normal system, since the German infantry 
 attacks now on the task system alone. The freedom con- 
 ceded to the subordinate leaders is too great, it is bound to 
 lead to tactical license, and it has done so. It was bound 
 to impair control and the practicability of an early develop- 
 ment of strong firing lines. The necessity of seeking cover 
 has sensibly dulled the recpiisite keenness and destroyed 
 the observance of normal sjjaces. Things cannot remain 
 that way and the signs of a revulsion have from year to 
 year become more apparent. It would not do to wipe out 
 whatever good there is in the task battle, and to advance 
 some normal scheme; the question rather is one of restor- 
 ing to the superior leaders the ways and means of control. 
 Such initiative as is requisite on the part of the subordi- 
 nates and can be exercised by them alone is perfectly com- 
 patible therewith. The opposing tactical tendencies are 
 not, as formerly, "task system or normal attack"; thorough 
 investigation has reduced them to this: controlled system, 
 and within the same, beyond certain variable limits, task 
 system or horde-system. 
 
270 Inquiries into the 2'actics of the Future. 
 
 By means of a sauaoions comparison* Oouoral von 
 SohortY has donionstratod that in 1870 tho Oiormans gainod 
 the suporiority of tho only ^horo tho attaoktM* opposed to 
 tho assailant a broadtM* front of tiro. Whoro that was sno- 
 oossfnlly done, a strong dovolopmont of front somotimos 
 rolioYod tho attaokor from tho necessity of an assault 
 altoirother. In proof he cites from the battle of Oravolotto, 
 the events at St. Marie. Konconrt— St. Privat (north\ and 
 St. Herbert, and it would not be ditlicult to multiply the 
 instaaices. On the other hand, all the nndertakinsrs in the 
 center and on tho ritrht at Oravelotte faiUnl. because the tire 
 front did not overlap the eneniv : the ireneral iniuht belter 
 have said: because there was no infantry tire front at all. 
 And this, notwithstanding; the conctMit ration of an enor- 
 mous numerical superiority at the Mance ravine. Here the 
 task system collapsed completely, not the slightest advan- 
 tage wa^ derived from the great numerical superiority be- 
 cause in ma.ny cases lateral deveU^pment ^ravine theory), 
 having btHMi neglected in t]\e beginning, became inipt>ssi- 
 blo altogether, notwithstanding that every "task leader" 
 sought to enforce it. If sui>eriority of tire is desired, the 
 broadest possible front is necessary from the beginning, as 
 well as an advance in that formation to otYoctivo range. 
 
 On account of the "ravine theory." neither frontal 
 development nor a firing-station was attained at Oravelotte 
 preparatory to the attack! At St. Marie and St. Trivat 
 (north) we gained both, despite the then not very ideal yet 
 controlled system. Again, with the ravine practice we 
 sutlVred much greater losses than with an early develop- 
 ment of front. Oeneral von ScherlT moreover demon- 
 strates that when not in themselves strong enough for the 
 assiiult, troops brought forward on a broad front and under 
 
 ♦Pages 192-194 of "Unsere heutlge Infanterietaktik." 
 
Tactical iJeduclions. 271 
 
 control ((UiiirdH at Ht. i'rivat, 8th KifloH and thfi Kixty- 
 Hovonlli at St. Ifnlx-it) \v<.Tr; ablf to maintain t]\ftmH<i]\<-H on 
 Iho ground tlioy had gain^^d, wh<iioaH thoy invariably lackf^l 
 pow^^r of roHiHtanco whenever there waH no frontal develop- 
 ment from the Htart (Point du Jourj. Th<*«e roKftarcheH are 
 imporlniit in d^oiflinj^ what infantry tiu-AicH Khould ha; ihay 
 muHt be baK<'d on unrlividr'd authority and control und thiiH 
 it will ever be. 
 
 In examining the mapH of the battle-fieldB of the 28th 
 Brij^ade at ProbluH, of the .''.8th Brij^ade at MarH-la-Tonr, 
 and of the iHt Guard lirij^ade at St. Privat, any one will ad- 
 mit that under modern conditions and with a judicious use of 
 the ground, open lines could be moved forward without stop 
 to within 000 meters of tlie enemy. Troops will hardily ever 
 have to faf:e a more unfavorable situation. At Problus as 
 well as at Mas-la-Tour and St. Privat the combat in front 
 would, according to modern ideas, be chiefly carried on by 
 the artillerv', which would be quite able to perform that 
 duty; in all thref^ casfts sufficient cover could be found for 
 the infantry to approa/;h by various methods to within effect- 
 ive range (000 meters), and, advancing thence by rush^fS, 
 to gain an a^lditional 150 meters, if greater fire effect may 
 there be expected. Notwithstanding the difficulty of such 
 situations and despite modern fire-arms, entire brigades, led 
 and conlrolkd, could in this way be brought to within 000 
 meters of the enemy; when at that point they are flung into 
 the destructive fire action, superior leading ceases, the fur- 
 ther conduct of the action rests with the subordinate leaders, 
 with the efficiency of the individual soldier and in the timely 
 employment of sufficiently strong reser-^'es on the part of 
 the superior leaders. I do not believe that much sound 
 argument could be advanced against this. 
 
 At any rate, we must rigorously adhere to the basis of 
 
272 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the whole — namely, eonsideration for man's frail nature — 
 and for that reason most of the men should be kept as long 
 as possible under the eye and will of the leaders. The prob- 
 lem of bringing the greatest possible number of rifles to 
 within fiOO meters of the enemy is therefore not to be 
 entrusted to the task system, but is a matter of brigade 
 leading, and is best solved by skillful use of the ground and 
 by a smart advance. That will remain true despite all improve- 
 ments of the rifles. In advancing to the first firins-station 
 the infantry would of course have to be vigorously sup- 
 ported by the artillery. The latter will be able to do so only 
 by anticipating the opposing artillery in getting the range. 
 If the enemy's artillery is not thus anticipated, the advance 
 of the infantry will soon reach its limit, and infantry will 
 be restricted to fire-action at long range. 
 
 //. Besults of Surgical and Ballistic E.rperiments. 
 
 According to page 50of "Die Geschosswirkungder neuen 
 Kleinkalibergewehre" ("Effects of the New Small-Caliber 
 Rifles"), by Professor Dr. Paul Bruns, Tubingen, 1889, H. 
 Laupp, one and the same bullet goes through 4 — 5 ranks at a 
 range of 100 meters, even when it strikes the heaviest bones 
 of the human body; through .'? — 4 ranks at 400 meters, and 
 through 2 — 'A ranks at 800 — 1200 meters. Experiments 
 with the Lebel rifle in France and with the ^lannlicher 
 rifle in Austria have given similar results, so that, as regards 
 the ballistic qualities of their rifles, the opponents will in 
 the future be about on an ecjual footing. 
 
 Since the appearance of the Third Edition of this book 
 these data have been confirmed by further experiments in 
 many respects, with which the tactician should be familiar. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 273 
 
 I shall therefore mention them briefly, and in doing ho fol- 
 low Dr. Johann Habart.* 
 
 With the assistance of the Austrian military authori- 
 ties, Dr. Habart conducted a series of experiments on live 
 animals and comparative experiments on human corpses. 
 In addition he made examinations of suiciders, of men acci- 
 dentally killed on the target-ranges and at labor riots, and 
 took account of the phenomena on the various theaters of 
 war from that of 1870-71 to include the Chilian War of 1891. 
 
 Near Hermannstadt a rifleman was mortally wounded 
 by a shot through the occipital bone from the Mannlicher 
 rifle at a range of 2700 paces. 
 
 On May 20, 1890, a platoon of 10 rifles at Nurschau 
 fired 5 volleys into a mob of workingraen at a range of 
 30—80 paces. It is stated that 10 bullets made 32 hits, 
 making 3 — 4 and perhaps 5 hits for 1 bullet. Seven were 
 killed on the spot, G died the next few days of their wounds, 
 19 wounded recovered. The propor-tion of the killed to the 
 wounded is therefore 1:3.5; almost the same as at Biala, 
 where, out of 18 hit, 4 were killed. The destructive effect of 
 the bullet at short range is thus proven beyond a doubt. 
 
 The loss of the Dalmacedists at Concon was about even 
 in killed and wounded, at Placilla the proportion is reported 
 to have been 1 :2.o7. 
 
 At Cilli a man in the act of aiming was hit by an 8 milli- 
 meter bullet (Mannlicher) which had passed through a butt 
 of earth 140 centimeters in thickness. The projectile 
 remained in the body. The man died on the sixth day. 
 
 At a range of 3000 meters, a bullet entered the thorax 
 of a woman and remained there. 
 
 ♦Fragment of an experimental study and lecture delivered at the 
 Austro-Hungarian Army Firing School at Bruck on the Leitha, July 
 1, 1892. 
 
274 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 At Rosenkreuz three of Witboi's men were killed by 
 one bullet (German mod, 88). 
 
 The results at Concon and Plaeilla I have already men- 
 tioned; the losses of the interiorly armed defender were 
 almost double those of the attacker, one-third of whom at 
 the most were armed with Mannlicher and Gras rifles. The 
 moral effect of the superior armament on the Balmacedists 
 must have been such as to shake them; these troops, how- 
 ever, should not be regarded in the same light as good 
 European troops. Hence the tactical importance accorded 
 to these various phenomena in Chili should be a quali- 
 fied one. 
 
 Among the experiments here enumerated, those made 
 at the firing schools of the various armies should also find 
 a place. The results of these experiments have not become 
 much known publicly, and in Germany particularly pro- 
 found silence has been observed in that respect. But, on 
 the one hand, we can draw very conclusive deductions from 
 the German Regulations on these points; on the other hand, 
 they are confirmed by experiments in Austria and France. 
 Here should be mentioned in the first place the valuable 
 data given by Lieutenant-Colonel Regenspursky.* We 
 read there: 
 
 "Recent firing experiments have proven that a closed 
 platoon will suffer sensible losses at 1600 meters (15 per 
 cent); that the small company column forms a good target 
 at 2100 paces (44 hits out of 215 shots), and that a battalion 
 in the act of changing from column to a broader formation 
 received 56 hits out of 400 shots (18 per cent) at 2000 paces. 
 
 *"Studien iiber den taktischen Inhalt des Exerzirreglements fiir 
 die k. u. k. Fusstruppen" ("Studies on the Tactical Contents of the 
 Drill Regulations for the Austro-Hungarian Foot Troops"), Wien, 
 L. W. Seidel und Sohn, 1892. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 275 
 
 "It was found at the same time that at medium ranges 
 troops in double rank suffered four times, and in single rank 
 double, the losses that troops in single open line, with 1 
 pace interval between men, did at the same distances. The 
 results of these peace experiments make it advisable to de- 
 ploy the platoons at long ranges (1500 — 1600 paces), to group 
 the companies designated for the fire action in skirmish lines 
 and company reserves when 3000 and 2000 paces from the 
 enemy, while battalions and larger units will have to relin- 
 quish the deep column on entering the zone of infantry fire 
 (about 3000 paces)." 
 
 Comparative experiments were next made in Austria, 
 based on the prinicples of the reglementary frontal attack on 
 one hand and on those of K. v. K.'s battle attack.* "The 
 reglementary attack," says Regenspursky, "lasted 26 min- 
 utes and 38 seconds, of which 12 minutes and 18 seconds 
 were fire pauses and 14 minutes and 20 seconds were taken 
 up in firing. Total hits, 27,7 per cent. The so-called battle 
 attack (two ranks, beginning at long distances, constantly' 
 passing each other in double time and delivering a rapid 
 fire, are to reach the enemy as quickly as possible) lasted 
 only 18 minutes and 40 seconds, of which 7 minutes and 40 
 seconds were pauses and 11 minutes were consumed in fir- 
 ing. Total hits, 20 per cent. The reglementary attack 
 came within 200 paces, the battle attack within 100 paces of 
 the enemy. Alternate rushes, passing of the front line, and 
 firing, was done between the distances of 1400 and 600 paces 
 from the enemy, the battle attack scoring 49 hits out of 700 
 shots, or 7 per cent, while the reglementary attack at the 
 same distances scored 117 hits out of 700 shots, or 16.7 
 per cent. 
 
 *"Wie sollea wir im nachsten Kriege angreifen?" K. v. K., 
 1890, R. Felix, military publisher, Berlin. 
 
270 Inquiries into fhe Tactics of the Future. 
 
 The battle attack thus provod itself inferior in tire 
 pinver. and the men >vere exhausted and uutit for further 
 service for the time beinji'. 
 
 iMMween (\0{) — lt)0 paces from the enemv the battle 
 attack scored 4."v> hits out of 1(572 shots, or '2T\.{\ per cent; the 
 rei;lementary attat-k betwtHMi (500 — 100 paces T^iVA hits out of 
 1582 shots, or .'h~».(5 per cent. 
 
 The procedure was no\v reversed, the battle attack and 
 the rejrlementary skirmish line beinir shot at bv the defender 
 from l.'iOO paces on. 
 
 "lietwtHMi l.'UX) — 700 {tai'cs the defenders scored on tlu' 
 ta-rj;ets of the battle attack 2;n hits out of 700 shots, or 
 3J> per cent, and ou the targets of the rejxlementarv attack 
 only 128 hits out of 1400 shots, or 1>.2 per cent; bet ween (500 — 
 200 paces the targets of the battle attack ret'eived 500 hits 
 out of 5>r)8 shots or (51.5 jhm- cent, the targets of the rejjle- 
 mentary attack (540 hits out of ir>l4 shots, or 45.8 per cent. 
 The averajje number of hits received by the target of the 
 battle attack was 51.2 per cent ; of thivse of the reglementary 
 attack. :>2.2 per cent." 
 
 In all armic^s the question of tiring while in motion is 
 btMiig agitated, because during the tire pauses of the attack 
 no etTect is produced on the enemy at the very time when the 
 latter can produce his greatest tire eftVct. With a view to 
 having the tire in motion ottiiially adopted. (^leneral Tiuisson 
 invented an attachment to the ritU>s. which 1 shall not dis- 
 cuss here.* Firing experiments lasting two wt>eks were then 
 made at the camp of Ohalons-surMarne with detachments 
 of 20 men each of nunlium firing proficiency. The average 
 results were: 
 
 •Formation und Taktik dor franzosischen Armee. Berlin. 1892. 
 R. Eisenschmidt. 
 
Tactical JJeductionH. '^77 
 
 1. Inrontrollcr] firo at Iho oharKiriK {<ait from 200—100 
 
 ijKffx'fH; 18 [XT <;onl. hitH, 
 
 2. (JncoritrolN'd fire at the frharj^lnj? gait from 100 — 50 
 
 m<'tfrH; .'iO per f:enl hitK. 
 .'',. I'nf'onfrolN-rl fin- ijt donhW- lirrif from 200 — TOO ificii-VH; 
 18 per r-ent liitH. 
 
 4. I'neonlrolled tint in double lim*- from 100 — oO meters; 
 
 42 per cent hitH. 
 
 5. Firint.' by command, firMt at Ihe eliarginj? gait, next 
 
 in double timr-, from 'iOO — 50 nieterH; 21 per cent hitH.* 
 The rapidity of firf waH 10 shotK i>er minute; the targeth 
 were 2 meters in heiglit, pont^d on a front of 20 meterH, equal 
 to the front of the platoon. 
 
 The fear k^t the men might hit <'iic]\ oUx-r [proved 
 groundleHH, According to liuiHHon, the attack vvilh fire Hhould 
 begin 400 nu'lern from llie on^my at the charging gait, the 
 firr? being kei>t u{> until within 100 met(,'rH from the enemy. 
 Fifteen paccH in rear of the first KkirmiKh line folIowB a 
 Hecond line to promptly fill the gapH in front; 15 pacen in 
 rear of the Hecond line donr-d bodies are to follow to give 
 the atta(;k energy and momentum. f 
 
 According to the Firing Inntructions, the German rifle 
 model 88 has an initial wlocity of 020 meters, and a range of 
 '',800 meters with an elevation of 'i'Z"^. Its projectile will 
 pierce 45 centimeters of pine at 400 meters, and 25 centi- 
 moters of pine at 800 meters, and jienetrates 50 centimeters 
 into fresh sand at 400 metern and 'i5 centimetern at 800 
 
 ♦Charging gait, 140 meters per minute; double time, 180 meters 
 per minute. 
 
 lAs is well known, bullet-proof uniforms have been suggested 
 a« protection against modern fire. I do not believe in them. F^or 
 defensive purposes, however, thf "Holsteln shield" might be taken 
 lnU.> eonsideration, which has been made part of the Danish equip- 
 ment. The Idea may be susceptible of Improvement, and for pur- 
 poses of defense, Is not without advocates in France. 
 
278 Inquiries into the Tactia> of the Future. 
 
 nu'tci'H; lliin brick walls jirr iiisiinici<'ii| prolcclion, as tlicy 
 arc ]>('fl()i-al<'(l wlicii several sliols sh-ikc (lie saine spot. 
 
 The averaj;-e onliiiales of I lie Imllel in iiielers above 
 and below the horizon hil lino of wight are 0.2 at 2(K) motors; 
 0.5 at 400 meters; 1.0 a( 000 meters; e(c., a( SOO, 1000, 1200, 
 1400 meters. 
 
 The vertical dispersion a.t 200 meters is 25 centimeters, 
 the horizontal dispersion 2t) centimeters; at 400, (100, 800, 
 1000 meters these tiKuroH are 70, 42, 140, 04, and 200, 112, 
 208, 100 centimeters, roBpoctively. 
 
 With the lixed sight all objocte representing a target 
 CJin to 2.0 meters in height lie within the dangorons space; 
 with the small leaf all targets O.S.'"» to 2.0 meters in height; 
 with the 500 meter sight all targets 1.70 to 2.0 meters in 
 height; with the (JOO-meter sight and witli targets 0.85 
 meters, 1.20 meters, and 1.70 motors in height th<' dangerous 
 spaces are 48, 72, and 111 meters; with the 800 motor sight 
 and the same height of target those spaces are 25, .'58, and 54 
 meters, reH])octively. 
 
 When the arm is properly managed, every shot may be 
 expected to hit : all objects within 250 meters; single kneel- 
 ing enemies np to .'>50 motors; a kneeling file (men close 
 alongside each other) uj> to 500 motors; a standing file (men 
 close alongside each other) ajid single njountod men up 
 to COO motors. 
 
 With regard to distances, it is stated that up to 000 
 motors they are short, thence U]) to 1000 medium, and beyond 
 1000 motors long ranges. 
 
 The point-l»lank range of the Itxed sight is 250 motors; 
 of tlie small loaf, ;?50 meters. 
 
 Moreover it is roijuired that the men should be export 
 in judging distances u]) to 000 nutters, and otlicers, non- 
 commissioned oHicors, and bi-ighl men up to H)00 meters. 
 
Tfuiical DeAv/iionH. 27'J 
 
 "L()(t\n'j\ at pur*.'Jy from 1h<' point of th<; theory of bal- 
 IJHticM," Kay Hid Firiiij^ l/iKtruotiouK, "colurnriK will he rriuoh 
 jnof; vulnerable at diHtanccH of more than 1000 UK'Xarn than 
 tr^XipH of ^Hjual Htrenj^th forrnr^iJ irj line." 
 
 It would he inHuJTicient to consider the (-A^t-jX of the rifle 
 alone, Hi'nee the effeet of the artillery projectile ha« likewiHe 
 attained an efjual augmentation, under certain circum- 
 Kfancen. We will not jro into detailK here; a ^"neral refer- 
 ence in KufTicient to reniove any douht in that r^^Kpect when 
 taking into account the improvement in the effr^rt of the 
 Khrapnel. While the cone of dii«fK;rKion of the hurKting 
 Khrapnel HpreadH the hulletK forward and Kideward only, 
 Htill the cone Ih of Kuch dirnennionK that, if the range in eHti- 
 mated with apf^roximate accuracy, it partak^^ of the char- 
 ar;teriHticH of the former can inter even at the Umi^ant ranges. 
 On that m:(:(tuiii it ha« become the principal projectile of the 
 (idntian field artillery, which may h<' naid to have fought the 
 War of 1870-71 with the common Hhell only. Tiie efTwt of 
 common nh^'ll han alHO been much iri*rt'Hii(ti] at all rang^^^, 
 and then th'-re Ik the effc^;t of high-exploKive KhellH to be con- 
 Hidered, but in the cane of the latter it in necr^Hary to deter- 
 mine the time and height of burnt with gn^at accuracy. 
 Ifigh-exploHive KhellK Hcaiicr their fragments, not only to 
 the front, but in all directionn — i. e., forward, laterally, to the 
 rear, and downward ThiH Hhould be kept in mind in con- 
 nection with poKitionn in r^^r of wallB and similar cover. 
 The high-exploKivr* nhell ban thuK to a certain degrf:;^^ Holved 
 the fjucKtion which pr^ticnted great difTJculti<-K in act- 
 ive field operation H and could not bf Holved except by 
 Indirect fire. Hut an the exact CKtimation of the range 
 \h difficult, and a« the fragmentH of the high-explo«ive 
 «hell up to date are Ux* many and too ineffective, the 
 hopew at fi rnt ba>ied on the torpedo nhell have not been 
 
280 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 completely fulfilled; this question of projectile mar not be 
 considered as closed. The defender's first endeavor will be to 
 beat down the enemy's artillery, and the attacker will pursue 
 the same object with regard to the defender's artillery. In 
 this endeavor artillery alone may not always succeed and 
 the cooperation of infantry may be required. It is also quite 
 plain that modern field artillery should possess a very high 
 degree of mobility. Field artillery is not to destroy forti- 
 fications, its effect is to be produced by the large number 
 of its fragments; it is therefore possible to make it light and 
 mobile. It should be capable of covering long distances at 
 a trot in large bodies, of passing marching columns, and 
 of deploying en masse. We do not propose to inquire as to how 
 far the German field gun meets these requirements. What 
 has been stated of the German field artillery applies equally 
 to the French; the state of the Russian field artillery cannot 
 be fully determined at this time; but the Austrian and Ital- 
 ian field artilleries may be assumed to be on a level with 
 the German. 
 
 The sum total of these expositions is that the armaments 
 of infantry and artillery are everywhere on about the same 
 level. No one is likely to possess a notable superiority of 
 armament, and superiority of power nmy be gained only by 
 training and leading. 
 
 III. SmoTceless Powder. 
 Of all the inventions made since that of gunpowder, 
 none probably has exercised such great influence on tactics 
 as has that of smokeless powder. Aside from other ballistic 
 properties, the new powder imparts to the projectile a much 
 higher velocity, which should be fully appreciated in tactics; 
 it is not necessary here to go into details, because the prac- 
 tical results are alreadv laid down in the Firing Regulations 
 
Tactical Deductions. 281 
 
 for Infantry and Artillery. It is requisite, however, to briefly 
 review the optical and tactical sides of the question for 
 all arms. 
 
 AVhile the use of smokeless powder has not done away 
 with all smoke, either in the case of the rifle or of the gun, 
 still smoke has been so much diminished that it is alivays 
 transparent; it may be discerned b}^ a close observation, and in 
 S. clear, humid, and calm atmosphere the smoke is greater 
 than in a warm, dry, and agitated atmosphere. No matter 
 how lively the fire, the smoke never obstructs the view of 
 the rifleman or gunner; they can follow the projectile with 
 the eye, as it were, and the rifleman and gun are themselves 
 exposed to view unless otherwise concealed. Before they 
 can be seen by the enemy, the latter is delayed by enterprises 
 necessary to gain a first glimpse of the outlines of the 
 position. This would seem to render reconnaissance more 
 difficult and to facilitate the execution of the combat. The 
 former is generally admitted; the latter cannot be suffi- 
 ciently determined in peace. 
 
 Unobstructed \iew in combination with the great range 
 of the small-caliber rifle gives a much greater importance 
 to infantry fire. To-day infantry is always able to see and 
 sometimes to see far, and to take advantage of both by the 
 lo7iij range, fat trajectory and great peneiration of its arms. It 
 will be able to observe the movements of large bodies of 
 cavalry from their inception and to take them under fire at 
 such ranges as to diminish the value of that arm as against 
 infantry, because in human judgment surprise must be pre- 
 sumed to be possible only in very exceptional cases. Cavalry 
 patrols will rarely be able to discover individual riflemen 
 promptly. The reconnoitering powers of cavalry are there- 
 by much impaired. 
 
 The new powder and the new arm likewise confer a 
 
282 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 great advantage on infantiy, when opposed to artillery, 
 unless the latter has reconnoitered the gi*ound in front and 
 has protected itself from effective infantry fire by skirmish- 
 ers in its front. In such a case artillery might be suddenly 
 subjected to so great a loss of horses and men that part of 
 it may be unable to come into action and that another part 
 may not get the range as quickly as it should when opposed 
 to artillery. In 1870-71 our artillerymen feared the enemy's 
 (long-range) chassepot fire more than that of his artillery, 
 and the German artillery suffered in fact much more from the 
 former than from the latter, which, however, is to be attrib- 
 uted in part to the inferiority of the opponent's gun. Since 
 guns and their effects are now approximately on the same 
 level everywhere, and since the opponent possesses a rifle 
 more perfect than that of 1870, it is to be inferred that in 
 future our artillery will encounter much greater difficulties 
 than in 1870-71, while our infantry will oppose to the 
 enemy an equally good arm and is now better off in that 
 respect. I believe, therefore, that (1) before coming into 
 action artillery should make a more thorough reconnais- 
 sance than formerly, and (2) that it should make it a rule to 
 protect its flanks and front by considerable skirmish lines 
 thrown out in front. If either or both are omitted, artillery 
 may at first find itself in much more serious difficulties than 
 was the case, for instance, with the artillery of the IX. and 
 VII. Army Corps at Gravelotte. Both instances enjoin cau- 
 tion in this respect. 
 
 On the other hand, when artillery has made a thorough 
 reconnaissance and has protected itself against hostile in- 
 fantry fire by infantry skirmish lines thrown not less than 
 500 meters to the front — things which have ever been re- 
 quired by tactics — then the artillery can draw extraordinary 
 advantages from the absence of smoke, and, when skillfully 
 
Tactical Deductions. 283 
 
 handled, its action may become decisive, provided it knows 
 how to shoot, provided it comes into position with as little 
 exposure to the enemy's fire as possible, and provided it 
 anticipates the enemy in getting the range by means of 
 correct observation and direction. Instruction in firing is 
 imparted in peace, and it may be expected that in future our 
 artillery will know how to shoot. Against this it may be 
 stated, with much truth, that the firing in action is not equal 
 to that on the firing-ground, and that dead gunners cannot 
 be replaced, or not without difficulty; that, however, should 
 not be allowed to divert us from what is rational — i. e., from 
 getting the range quickly. That accomplished, the artillery 
 at once gains great power, since the absence of smoke 
 makes laying and observation always possible, while, on 
 the other hand, the diminished recoil permits of greater 
 rapidity of fire, and all these causes combine to dispropor- 
 tionately increase the effect of the improved projectiles. Not 
 only that: up to this time the so-called concentration of fire 
 against the decisive points was more a theoretical idea than 
 a tactical possibility. The great amount of smoke soon 
 enveloped long lines of artillery, so that laying, observation, 
 and control of large bodies of artillery were impossible; the 
 effect was correspondingly diminished. That has been 
 changed. Moreover, the masses of artillery may now be 
 posted closer together or in tiers, and can always develop 
 their full fire power. That may not always be advisable, 
 still it may offer advantages in certain circumstances; for 
 instance, after gaining the superiority of fire. If the artil- 
 lery has been well trained in peace, if it has learned how to 
 shoot and how to observe, it cannot be denied that the effect 
 of artillery will be increased to an extraordinary degree. It 
 is but necessary to realize that to-day 36 guns emit 3000 frag- 
 ments per minute! When artillery possessing such efficiency 
 
2S4 Inquirits Into the l^aciics of the Future. 
 
 jrains tho raiijro iiioiv quioUlv than tho oiiponont. tlio oxist- 
 oiuv of tho latter Nvill bo liiuitod to a vory briof spaoo of time 
 and one main part of the work has boon aooom]>Hshod for the 
 assaihtnt ! To bo snio, artiUiM-v w ill not bo ablo to dispose of 
 j::ood infantry onsoonotHi in skirmish lim^s in the folds of the 
 jrronnd. and it is and will bo the duty of infantry to drive 
 them aA\ay. Neither will oovtM- niuhM' oiM-tain conditions be 
 of any avail to the eitemy's infantry, eavalry. or artillery, 
 sinee tield artilUMv is now ablo to attat'k any kind of troops 
 under oover. thoni^h this (|nestion eannot as yet be considered 
 as clost.Hl. The artillery pt>ssesses the additional irrt^at 
 advantage of being able to di>termine the distance by means 
 of its appliances, which the infantry is unable to do at 
 lone: range: it has to depend on getting the ranges from the 
 artillery. 
 
 It may be conclndtHl that well trained and well-led 
 artillery has btvome ///(• lon(]-niiu;c iirni jhir rxcelJencc and muter 
 all cireumstance^^. and that according to theory the (/jtjVio/j will 
 be brought about more quickly than formerly. if artillery and 
 infantry concentrate their action on the same object, which 
 was impossible before the introdn«'tion of smokeless ])Owder. 
 
 !Sn\okeless powder has S(nne disadvantages, inastnnch 
 as it will be more ditVicult to make otit the position of the 
 hostile infantry, but the disadvajitages are common to both 
 sides and may be greatly diminislntl by the use of gomi 
 glasses. Against this it may be nuMitioned as an advantage 
 that the cor>p(M'ation of infantry and artilhMy. the hading, 
 is facilitated. the more as thesonnd. though it has not become 
 weakiM". has beconu^ shorter. Since stUMng and nndi^rstanding 
 are the prerequisites for all intelligent hnnian action, it must 
 be admitted on the whole that the advantages of smokeless 
 powder far outweigh its disadvantages, and that it is only 
 now thai tlu' two principal arms possess the prtM-eqnisit<>s for 
 
Taxlicoi UfAwAxona. 285 
 
 powerfully prepanng an attack in a brief v>\)?iu(At of time. 
 Heretofore exiKtinf^ taetleal rulen are not abolinhed by thiK 
 invention; on tlir? contrary, it is only now tijat they become 
 ajiplicable in tii'-ir fiill extent. 
 
 In an oiJtflani<in^ attack, even a^ainHt a prej^ared pOHl- 
 tion,ri j the defender will HufTer much more from the comhined 
 fire of artillery and infantry than heretofore; (2) breaHtworku 
 'and trencheH do not by any meanH afford the requiHite cover; 
 hence i'A) the inventionH more than ever eall for outflanking, 
 and (i) outflanking iH bound to be more prrxiuctive of rf^ultH. 
 The concluHion, therefore, would be that the pro8j»ect« for the 
 HucceHH of an attaz-k are rather increawed than diminished. 
 ThiH iH from the theoretical Htandpoint! 
 
 If J be permitted to reeall here the example of ProblnH, 
 wherr' on one side the wood of I'ofiovvitz enabled large b^xliea 
 to be brought to within 000 meters, and where on the other 
 side LVieder J'rim) a covererl approach to within 200 — 'iOO 
 meters was pra/:ticable, and if we imagine thf^HC positions to 
 be held by troops with uuxlcrn annarnent, we might conclude 
 that the role of the attacker has not become so very much 
 worse, since battle-fields of like character will rather be the 
 rule than the exception in the future. More stress would in 
 future be laid on outflanking by taking more ground by way 
 of Nieder I'rim, but even against the front, the space Pro- 
 bluH — Xieder J'rim, strong skirmish lines could be brought 
 up unobserved to a similar distance through the fields of rye as 
 tall as a man, so that the Jtoslik artillery could not see these skir- 
 mishers or ohserve their progress no longer hetrayed hy smoke, and 
 that, approadiing thus under cover, the skirmishers vjould render the 
 position of the artillery nntenahU hy their fire at a range of J 000 
 meters or less. The conditions will not always be similar; 
 still the example shows that they did exist, and why should 
 they not recur? It follows that in similar situations the 
 
2SG Itiquirii's inlo the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 defondor >vouI(l have io burn (lio no lu'ld to a dislanci' of 
 2000 motors; ovon simple liodjios and ssliiiht folds of tho 
 jiTonnd may booomo voi y troublosomo to artillory. 
 
 Tn any ovont tlioro aro two roasons why the tactical om- 
 jtloyuuMit of artillery should bo modified: the first lies in the 
 improved rillo; tho second, in the incroai^od fire elToct of 
 artillory. lioth become noticeable in tactics, in the first 
 place, by the greater range of the }>rojoctilos. The German 
 Infantry Drill Eegulations state \ery correctly: "In action 
 against artillory it should bo observed that that arm has the 
 superiority of tiro at ranges greater than 1000 meters, and 
 that the chances only become etpial at ranges of less than 
 1000 meters. Cases may be imagined, however, where the 
 action of infantry may be effective against artillery at greater 
 ranges, but it will I'all for tho oxptMidituro of a considerable 
 amount of ammunition." 
 
 T a.ju inclined to believe that in many cases it will be pos- 
 sible for infantry to direct such a fire against artillery ex- 
 posed to view, at ranges greater than 1000 meters, that it will 
 be impossible for tho latter to rcMuain in action, provided tho 
 exact rang(^ is found ami the fire is t'ontrollod. This advan- 
 tage will i'hietly accrue to tho infantry of the defender, be- 
 cause it may bo assununi that in most cases it will be able to 
 lie in wait for tho artillery. The defender's artillery will 
 also probably prepare to greet that of tho attacker with 
 mass fire at known ranges. From both of those suppositions 
 I conclude that tho artilleries of tho attacker and defender 
 will try to fight it out at long ranges, but will find a natural 
 limit imposed on themselves by the optical conditions of the 
 battle-field. At any rate, artillery should learn in peace how 
 to deliver an otYoctivo fire at long range, and bo traiiuni in 
 one kind of mass fire that can bo controlled. In combating 
 the dj'fondor tho artillerv of tho attacker will tluM'oforo 
 
Tactical Deductions. 287 
 
 strive to develop as many guns as possible, to gain a favora- 
 ble position, and to take it up without exposing itself ; during 
 the action it should make as few changes of position as pos- 
 sible. In most cases 1 deem it neither useful nor advisable 
 that artillery accompany the infantry attack. The positions 
 of the artillery will vary between 3500 — 1200 meters;the prin- 
 -cipal distance will probably be 2500 meters, the fire of shrap- 
 nel at these distances being efiective — nay, annihilating, 
 if the artillery promptly gets the range. It may therefore be 
 assumed that the artillery battle will under certain circum- 
 stances be of brief duration and of increased severity, and 
 that there will be pauses in the artillery fire; at any rate, it 
 seems to me tliat such would follow theoretically from the 
 endeavor to promptly get the range and to develop masses 
 of artillery, in combination with the greater effect of fire. 
 
 Artillery, however, is a rather complicated arm, and at 
 equal distances will be more endangered by the enemy's 
 proximity than infantry. It becomes the duty of the infantry 
 to keep the hostile infantry as far away as possible. 
 
 It is thus necessary for artillery to be protected by infan- 
 try in front, and to take as good cover as possible. At any 
 rate, smokeless powder calls for much greater proficiency in 
 firing than black powder, and for greater circumspection and 
 prudence on the part of the leaders, in order to select a posi- 
 tion so close and so effective that the fewest possible changes 
 of position may become necessary. 
 
 The greatest change in tactics has beyond doubt been 
 brought about by the element of uncertainty resulting from 
 the use of smokeless powder. It enables infantry to conceal 
 its weakness and to mislead the enemy to enterprises that 
 require much time. The defender in particular will strive 
 to conceal his real position as much as possible and to 
 
288 liKjiiirirs iiilti the Tdrlics of (he Fulurc. 
 
 iMiiitlov his jirtillt'i'V iiccordiiifilv. I'^or liis :irl illci'V one*' 
 r('\ cjilcd. Ills I'cnl |»(>si(i()n is (liscloscd, wliicli would iiuilc- 
 rijillv riitililnlc llic (iisk of llic Mtliickcr. .Iudj;in}i,- li-oin 
 ]»(»;u'(' (>x|)('ri(Mi<'('S. I believe il \vv\ iiii|trol>;il)l(' lliiii cnvMlry 
 pMlfois :ind rccomioilcriiiu olliccrs will evei- he iible It) 
 lU'onipl Iv ascci'lnin I lie eiieiiiv's position. Tliese iiieium 
 may help (o hx-ale the enemy's Hanks, and 1 place no j^reat 
 expeclalions on (he caidiNc lialloon in Held operalions. 
 lOvei'v (hin^- else will hav<> lo be I'onnd onl by li.uhlinj^', and 
 tliis is the new leature, parlicnlaily tor artillery. 
 
 II is my opinion that this arm is bonnd to become a 
 "i-econnoiterin^- arm" lo a hiuh dejii'ee; that instead of 
 (lepi'ivinu- the ad\ance .<;nai(l of artillery, the same slionld 
 b<> made very stronj; in that arm; and that, as previously 
 (Mn|»hasi/.e(l. artillery should j)ossess ijreat m»)bility. The 
 mounted soldier can no longer approach sutVicienlly near for 
 correct and sutlicient observation. Should he attempt it, 
 the chances ai-(^ 100 to I that he will not return, and his 
 obser\ aliens, if any, will be lost. The deploynuMit of strong 
 infantry, in order to ^ain information by nu>ans of its action, 
 reijuires much time, and there is nothing left for that pur- 
 ])ose but a skillful and viii'orous employment of artillery. 
 In such a cas(> the defender, when his main position is 
 involved, must show his hand, if he do(>s not wish to suc- 
 cumb at once; if it is uuM-ely an advanced j)ositiou, he will be 
 unable lo hold il and will betray the main ])osilion by his 
 withdrawal. Tlu' place of the artillery in the marchinii- col- 
 umn should thereftu-e fnllill two renuirennMits: 1, vi^-oious 
 reconuaissam(>; L', to advance* from the preliminary deploy- 
 uu'ut with the ^realest possibl(> snpeiiorily in point of liuns 
 to tlu» pi'incipal deployment fm- subduins;' the enemy's main 
 ])ositiou, II is uum>cessary lo state that tii'eat ditlu'iilties 
 will ha\ (> to be overctune in doinu' so. 
 
Tactical Deduclions. 280 
 
 liijl it will no u\()V<' ]>(' possiblo for ar-tillery to effect the 
 reconnaJKHaricr' alone than it would be adviBable for it to 
 lake up itH priri'-ipal firirifi station without having infantry 
 thrown out in ilK front. It Ik unable by itself to do either; 
 it reipjirr-H in either case the protection of infantry against 
 the enemy's infantry. 
 
 It thus follows from smokeless powder, as a general 
 result, that infantry and artillery are tactically rendered 
 more interdependent, and that tactical reconnaissance will 
 have to b«^ effected chiefly by these two arms. Smokeless 
 powder does not facilitate that kind of work in any way; it 
 rather makes it more difficult in many particulars through 
 ihf element of uncertainty. 
 
 Every discharge of the field-j)iece shows a very bright 
 flash, and if the gun is on loose ground, the flash is accom- 
 panied by a very conspicuous cloud of dust. If the gun 
 stands on sod, grass, etc., or along the edge of a wood, the 
 dust is replaced by vapor plainly visible against the green 
 ground. Artillery will thus betray its position in a very 
 conspicuous manner. Its fire will not only betray the 
 general location of the battery, but will make it possible to 
 count approximately the number of guns, which was never 
 the case heretofore. Artillery should therefore more than 
 ever be bent on concealing its position from the two firing 
 branches of the enemy, and indirect fire should not be con- 
 demned outright as an artifice. 
 
 The absence of smoke has made artillery an arm whose 
 total victory or destruction lies close together; its fate may 
 depend on a moment, on a single steji, but chiefly on the 
 action of the opposing artillery. It became thus necessary 
 for artillery' to adopt an entirely different tactical spirit, 
 which, as we have stated, it has done. It was reserved 
 for smokeless powder to make artillery an arm capable of 
 
ii5H) Inquiries into the l\jclics of the Future. 
 
 doalinji' ;jbsolulo destruction; but, tlu)n};h tho technical 
 arraufivnu'iits are complete, much remains to be done to 
 derive from them the ultimate tactical advanta}»es. It is 
 not opportune to enter into these details. 
 
 Mass etl'ect ilirout;h individual elVect is to-day the tacti- 
 cal huv of artilUM'v as \vi>ll as of infantry. The latter knows 
 noAV only the action of masses of skirmishers, and all it had 
 to do was to modify its principles. Smokeless i)t)wd(U- has 
 not detracted from the vaJue of cavalry, but has relejjated 
 its action to other phases and modified the form of the 
 action. If cavalry knows how to utilize these moments, 
 it may enhance the value of the victory enormously, but it 
 will no Kui«;er decide battles! 
 
 The moments of "tactical doubt" will increase in num- 
 ber and duration, caused by the element of uncertainty 
 imparted to tactics by smokeless powder. 
 
 /v. Tactkal Deductions Rvi/anlint/ the Attach-, from the Expori- 
 mcnts of Bruns, from the Ballistic Properties of Small- 
 Calihcr Fifles, and from the Properties of Smokeless Powder. 
 
 The stated experiments of Professor Bruns, of Dr. I. Ha- 
 bart, of Professors lUisch, Kocher, Kejjer, von liillroth, and 
 von Bardeleben, and of iheFrenchmen D«.^horme,Cha.uvel,Ni- 
 mier, Breton, a.nd Pesme.*and the prescriptions of the Infan- 
 try and Artillery Firing Regulations are not only of surgical 
 and ballistic, but of high tactical importance in several w^ays. 
 The fact that one and the same projectile pierces 3 — A ranks 
 at 400 meters, 2—3 ranks at 800—1200 meters— the distance 
 of 100 meters, at which 4 — 5 ranks are iiierced, is disregarded 
 because I believe that the attacker will rarelv reach that 
 
 ♦"Recherches expi'rimontjiles sur los effets des arms nouvelles 
 et des balles de petit calibi'e a eoiveloppe n^sistante." Ardiir (ji^nt^ral 
 <f-«> HI ('(/.. Octobre. 1888. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 291 
 
 range before the enemy ha8 abandoned his position — simply 
 signifies when translated into tactir;s that formations four 
 ranks deep at 400 meters and three deep at 1200 meters 
 would receive 4 or .'J times as many hits as a single-rank for- 
 mation. These results were obtained on level ground, but 
 that does not diminisli their value, and it would be foolish to 
 contend that such level ground will not be encountere<l in 
 fact, and that firing on the battle-field differs in result from 
 that of the firing-grounds. 
 
 With respect to level ground, an inspection of the 
 maps of Problus, Mars-la-Tour, Kt. Privat, and particularly 
 Loigny, will show that battle-fields 15 kilometers and more 
 in extent do show extensive j.lains, and it would not be dif- 
 ficult to multiply the number of examples if it were intended 
 to do HO in this book. Military history shows that excep- 
 tional features of ground are not so uncommon, and it is 
 quite natural that he who remains on the tactical defensive 
 on account of his numerical inferiority, or who perhaps 
 intends to remain on the defensive at the beginning for 
 
 other even purely tactical— reasons, or for other reri^sons 
 
 springing from the general situation, will select positions 
 with an open field of fire in order to make the task of the 
 attacker difficult and to take full advantage of the proper- 
 ties of his own fire-arms. It may also be expecte<l that at 
 points which may be approached to within 000 meters or 
 less, the defender will construct entrenchments enabling 
 him to increase the effect of his fire against such points by 
 a concentration of fire at short range; nor will he disdain 
 entrenchments on his flanks and fronts where there is a 
 wide field of fire, (1) to break as much as possible the force 
 of the cross-fire of an outflanking enemy, and (2) as protec- 
 tion against artillery, the true representative of long-range 
 fire. Incidentally it may be remarked that modern shrap- 
 
292 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 iiel fire makes this indispensable for the defender. Antici- 
 pating somewhat, I will state that the width of front covered 
 by a shrapnel is about GO meters. The distribution of the 
 hits is almost in accordance with the law of dispersion — t. e., 
 counting from the center, it amounts to 25, 16, 7, and 2 per 
 cent. This pro])ortion is the same at all ranges. After 
 regulating its lire, a battery will make 78 hits with every 
 shrapnel — i. e., it will score that number of hits against 
 a detachment of infantry with a front of (JO meters. It fol- 
 lows that between 2500 — 1200 meters the subordinate 
 leaders of infantry should be at liberty to diminish the front 
 by every possible means while crossing that space. I am 
 here following the statements of the Journal des sciences mili- 
 taires and abstain for obvious reasons from making other 
 statements. At any rate, between 2500 and 1200 meters the 
 advance should be regulated by ditfereut considerations 
 from what it is at shorter ranges. 
 
 In all cases where tactical reasons demand the advance 
 of infantry on an extended plain, 800 — 600 meters from the 
 enemy may be assumed as the nearest distance, and in no 
 case should it be less than 400 meters. The 3Sth Brigade 
 has demonstrated, at ]\Iars-la-Tour, that with good troops 
 and poor formations it is possible to rush forward over open 
 ground until intermingling with the enemy and under a fire 
 which cannot be much exceeded by the small-caliber rifle, 
 though I do not by any means recommend this exhibition of 
 bravery as a standard example in tactics. The 1st and 3d 
 Infantry l>rigades of the Guard have demonstrated, at St. 
 Privat, that it is possible for the attacker, if sufficiently 
 strong, to hold out for hours on open ground and under 
 extraordinary losses notwithstanding the use of antiquated 
 forms that should long have been discarded. Both exam- 
 pies are to be condemned from the tactical ])oint of view. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 293 
 
 but are worth takin}^ to heart, though that resistance, when 
 closely examined, does not seem to constitute such a great 
 feat of bravery. The 'M Infantry l^rigade of the Guard 
 possessed sufficient fighting power to repulse about six vig- 
 orous counter-attacks, and both brigades took part in the 
 last acts of the victory, right on top of an action which was 
 not quite in the ordinary, to be sure, and which had con- 
 sumed almost all their fighting power. Therein is where 
 the extraordinary lies! Where the open plain cannot be 
 avoided, there is but one form of movement and combat under 
 the enemy's fire, the single-ranl- skirmish line. The leaders 
 should endeavor to continue the forward movement as long as 
 possible, because every halt takes from the vigor of the move- 
 ment. To deny this is to deny human nature. In view of 
 the ballistic xjroperties stated in the Firing Regulations, 
 infantry may in such cases be expected to do what can rea- 
 sonably be expected from it at ranges from 1000 to 000 
 meters — namely, to keep the enemy under an uninterrupted 
 skirmish fire. If broad columns or closed lines were used 
 between 2500 and 1200 meters, the losses would amount to 
 annihilation according to the figures quoted. The Regula- 
 tions should therefore indicate the best formations for 
 advancing under infantry and artillery fire, because the 
 zones of fire differ considerably. It will be rare indeed that 
 shrapnel fire will have to be feared at 1200 meters. This 
 difference in the method of advancing again calls for 
 control. 
 
 The proportion of killed and wounded of the .^8th Bri- 
 gade on the loth of August, 1870, was 3:4. This singular 
 fact, which has heretofore not been closely examined, may be 
 explained in this way, that the brigade moved within the 
 zone of explosive effecl of the T'liassepot until intermingling 
 
294 Inquiries inlo iltc I'adics of the Future. 
 
 with the enemy aiul back again — i. e., 400 -f 400 = 800 
 meters.* 
 
 Still another i)oint is to be mentioned hero: the experi- 
 ments of Beckf and of Bruns (pages 4;)-52)havedenu)nstrated 
 that down to 300 meters the wounds inflicted by the small- 
 caliber rilie will be relatively less dangerous, because the 
 penetrative force and hardness of the bullet make clean 
 wounds without dangerous splintering of bones. Men hit 
 elsewhere than in the head, heart, throat, bladder, etc., may 
 in most cases count on recovery. The man is merely placed 
 hors-dc-comhat, and crippling and mutilation are not to be 
 feared so much as with the former infantry bullet. The 
 action of the many, but small, fragments and balls of the 
 artillery projectile is similar. But wounds inflicted at 
 ranges between 300 meters and the muzzle of the rifle are of 
 very severe character on account of the explosive effect, and 
 here the proportion is reversed. All clases of the army 
 should be familiar with these things, especially the officers, 
 as salvation or destruction may depend on whether they take 
 them in account or not. In view of the modern method of 
 fighting with swarms of skirmishers, the scientific and moral 
 forces, particularly of the common soldier, should under all 
 circumstances be strengthened in the first place. In addi- 
 tion to other things, the modern officer should be expert in 
 physics and psychology; otherwise he is nothing but a cor- 
 
 *Billroth and Bardeleben are of the opinion that the proportion 
 of killed to wounded on the battle-field will in the future probably 
 be rather increased than diminished. The mortality among the 
 wounded may, on the other hand, be expected to diminish consider- 
 ably. It was almost 26 per cent among the Russians in 1877-78, 
 12 per cent among the Germans in 1870-71, 6.6 per cent among the 
 Austrians in 1878; in 1888 it rose to 9.5 per cent, and fell in 1885-86 
 to 2 per cent. The latter flgiu'e closely approximates the experiences 
 in Chili. 
 
 IB. von Beck, "Ueber die Wirkung moderner Gewehrprojektile" 
 ("The Effect of Modern Rifle Projectiles"), Leipzig, 1885. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 295 
 
 l>oralora tradesman. None wants to be that; his pride would 
 rebel against it. The moral strength of the ordinary man— 
 and the great majority are ordinary men — is increased in the 
 same deyree as he knows that the dangerous character of wounds 
 from infantry bullets is dirtvinishal. Men knowing themselves 
 exposed only to temporary injury will act with more dash 
 than if they expect death from every bullet with more or 
 less certainty. This is the state of affairs, and what the 
 above named scientists have ascertained should be dissem- 
 inated throughout the army. It is not merely a surgical mat- 
 ter; it is also a tactical one, for the simple reason that the 
 efficacy of the small-caliber rifle is such between 000 and 400 
 meters that it is not necessary to go nearer unless it can be 
 done under cover, or to enter that zone where the wounds 
 from the small-caliber rifle are of terrible severity — i. e., 
 from oOO meters on. 
 
 If it is possible to avoid that zone without sensibly im- 
 pairing the efficacy of our own fire, then it should be made a 
 law in tactics which should be ingrained in every one, leav- 
 ing the matter of human nature entirely out of considera- 
 tion. For mere selfishness and the motive not to destroy 
 our material fighting forces ourselves senselessly through 
 ignorance and want of judgment and not to render ourselves 
 incapable of fighting demand that these matters be made 
 known, that they be thoroughly weighed and taken into 
 account. War cannot be attractive except as an art; art 
 alone will carry us over its vexations and will lead us to vic- 
 tory. If it degenerates into senseless butchery, it becomes 
 repulsive and loses everything noble that science and art 
 may impart to it. It sinks to the level of a brutal trade; 
 brutality stifles all that is beautiful in any art. Unfortu- 
 nately, great artists are not always found in the [jlaces they 
 ought to fill, in consequence of the fact that officers are 
 
296 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 almost systematically trained to contemn the sciences. 
 When war breaks out after a peace which, though affording 
 many leisure hours for study, has been idled away, many 
 "leaders" find themselves as unfamiliar with their own 
 branch as though in a strange world I Some do not know 
 how to act, others lose their heads; they have not learned to 
 understand what intellectual power may accomplish, and their 
 ignorance and lack of tactical skill put thousands iu the 
 grave and rob the fatherland of them. 
 
 In the Firing Instructions ranges up to 600 meters are 
 called close. It follows that at that point there occurs a 
 palpable restriction to the ballistic properties; that up to 
 that point the effect is fairly even (though increasing up to 
 300 meters so as to amount almost to annihilation); hence 
 we are justified in demanding that, as a rule, the zone of the 
 explosive effect (less than .300 meters) be only entered when 
 there is cover, when the enemy is shaken, when his strength 
 is gone, and when he is ready to withdraw. As regards 
 results, it makes no difference in the conduct of the fire 
 action, assuming, of course, a good field of fire, whether the 
 fire is delivered at 400, 500, or 600 meters; on the other hand, 
 the explosive effect, the power of penetration, and the flat 
 trajectory make it well worth while considering whether 
 the increased losses and the increased severity of the 
 wounds should not, as a rule, forbid an approach to within 
 300 meters and over. In my opinion it is impracticable In 
 the pitched battle on purely tactical grounds. 
 
 People warning others against orthodoxy ought them- 
 selves to be the first to fight shy of it. The explosive effect 
 of the old Chassepot extended over a distance greater by 
 25 per cent than that of the modern Lebel and Mannlicher 
 rifles — i. e., 400 against the present 300 meters (Bruns, page 
 51); yet I witnessed a case myself where we advanced over 
 
Tactical Deductions. 297 
 
 a free field of fire (Mars-la-Tour) until we in part inter- 
 mingled with the enemy and the rest reached an average 
 distance from the enemy of 100 meters. Other cases I wit- 
 nessed in the January actions at Chateau Renault, where 
 I succeeded in an early morning action (January 6th), not- 
 withstanding the apparently level characterof the ground, in 
 conducting a half-battalion divided into two company col- 
 umns, under cover, to within 250 meters of the enemy's skir- 
 mish line, after showing the same road to a horse battery 
 and to a squadron of the 3d Cuirassiers, all of which used 
 it on their advance and on their return without notable 
 losses, although the hostile bullets rattled like peas against 
 the tile roofs of the village of Vilthion, which was one kilo- 
 meter in length and ran parallel to this road for some 
 distance. Lieutenant de R^ge and I never dismounted in 
 traversing that distance under a very severe rifle fire, and 
 neither was hurt. Subsequent to our retreat, in hunting up 
 a company, 12th — 57th (Lieutenant von Kehler), which had 
 been forgotten, at the southwest exit of this uncanny village 
 defile, I again galloped throughout the length of the village, 
 whose southern side had meanwhile been occupied by the 
 enemy, and pointed out to that company a road around the 
 north of the village by which it effected its retreat, likewise 
 without much loss. On meeting Mr. von Kehler (now com- 
 mander of the 71st Regiment), at Berlin, in 1889, he again 
 expressed his thanks to me. On the morning of January 7th 
 I witnessed an assault on the village of La Garionni^re by F. 
 and II. — 57th, where the attack movement was elegantly car- 
 ried out in close formation by two companies of the II. Bat- 
 talion, notwithstanding the good field of fire and the firm- 
 ness of the enemy, while the major part of the fusiliers, who 
 were fighting in skirmish lines, did not gain ground as 
 rapidly as those two companies. It should be stated, how- 
 
298 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ever, that the fusiliers had borne the brunt of the action in 
 front, and that the II. Battalion was able to approach from 
 the flank under fair cover; the enemy defended himself from 
 house to house. I purposely cite these offensive actions 
 from the pitched battle as representing actions with suc- 
 cessful and unsuccessful issue, and simple village fights, 
 because they show the possibility of advancing in the face 
 of Chassepot fire, provided the ground was utilized. I 
 abstain from other quotations. The Chassep6t possessed the 
 properties of the present small-caliber rifles, though not to 
 the same extent. It approximated them in range, but was 
 considerably Inferior in power of penetration and flatness 
 of trajectory. According to the present state of research, 
 the wounds it inflicted at ranges from the muzzle up to 400 
 meters exhibited the severe effects of the small-caliber rifle 
 without the corresponding beneficial effects which the lat- 
 ter possesses from that range to 2000 meters — i. e., the 
 wounds inflicted by it both at short and long range were 
 severe, because it fired a lead bullet, which on striking the 
 bone became much deformed and caused most severe splin- 
 tering of bones and laceration and contusion of soft tissues. 
 The fact that these things have been considerably remedied 
 by the modern small-caliber rifle is due- to the use of bullets 
 cased in hard steel or nickel, which up-set but very little.* 
 It thus was the hard lot of the Germans to fight against the 
 (from the humane point of view) most detestable rifle that 
 ever was used in war — a perfect fiend of a rifle, particularly 
 at the ranges from 100 — 400 meters. They had a thorough 
 taste of all kinds of its fire, and having preserved and 
 handed down their experiences, the Germans would, in case 
 of war, suffer far less surprise at the hands of the Lebel 
 
 *The latest projectile, the so-called "hollow hiillet," besides 
 other things, shows these same attributes. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 299 
 
 rifle than may be in store for the French (knowing the effect 
 of the needle-gun only) if they were confronted by an equal 
 or superior rifle; for instance, our rifle model '88. This is an- 
 other moral point with which officers and men should be 
 made acquainted in the course of their instruction. 
 
 From what has been said, it may be assumed that,partic- 
 jilarly in independent actions, it will be found possible to 
 advance to close range (GOO meters), in order to bring about 
 the decision, and still closer by taking advantage of the 
 ground, fog, or darkness. For meeting such conditions the 
 troops should be well trained in those formations which are 
 requisite and whose front and depth ever depend on the 
 ground. At any rate, the difference between Chassepot and 
 Lebel is not so great for us as is that between needle-gun 
 and rifle model '88 for the French. What the Germans 
 accomplished against the Chassepot is known; what the 
 French are going to accomplish against the rifle model '88 
 remains to be seen. 
 
 The power of penetration of the small-caliber rifles is so 
 great that trees no longer constitute good cover, unless they 
 are very big, which is the exception, and in many respects 
 it is the same with masonry. There is really not much left 
 for the attacker to use as cover, and all the men should know 
 that, not to mention the officers. The fire action will fre- 
 quently take place between 1000 and 500 meters, and in 
 view of the data given in theFiring Instructions, the greatest 
 skill in the use of the spade becomes indispensable for in- 
 fantry. In many cases the enemy's fire may make such work 
 impossible, but, on the other hand, it may succeed, particu- 
 larly in the frontal action. A bank of earth of 35 and 50 centi- 
 meters does not require much work where it is at all practi- 
 cable. Trenches of that cross-section, extending for many 
 kilometers, were "scraped" out by the Americans with great 
 
300 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 rapidity. I use the term "scrape/' for they were not sup- 
 plied with our spade, but did the work with their hands, 
 using their side-arms, their cooking utensils, etc., for, being 
 practical soldiers, they knew how to help themselves. But 
 the stupid "Michael"* nowhere becomes more conspicuous 
 than when called upon for such work. To compel an active 
 person to watch the clumsiness, slowness, indifference, and 
 laziness of some German tribes in such work amounts to pun- 
 ishment, and, unless energetic steps are taken in these mat- 
 ters, they will exact heavy penalties. Nor would it do any 
 harm if the o£0cers would look upon this "scratching" with 
 less sovereign contempt, and if they would learn more and 
 accomplish more in that field — but, great heavens! every- 
 thing that bears the slightest reference to that "unmilitary, 
 plebeian work" is hateful, as though it were to be considered 
 more military to be killed on a level plain than to save one's 
 fighting power by "scratching." 
 
 The Instructions for Field Entrenchments of April 6, 
 1893, are based on similar grounds. It is laid down there in 
 Section 1: "In the attack the entrenching tool may also be 
 used to advantage for holding and strengthening conquered 
 ground"; and in Section 45: "If the work has to be done 
 under the enemy's fire, those men of the skirmish line who 
 carry spades put down the rifle, construct cover for them- 
 selves, and then pass their spades." Not much could be 
 gained by that procedure in an attack, yet enough "to pre- 
 serve sufficient strength to repulse any counter-attack"; it 
 may be possible later on, under favorable circumstances, 
 to push these trenches to the front and thus to gain a much 
 more effective firing-station. To be sure, military history 
 
 *"The German Michael" is a term used by the Germans them- 
 selves to characterize their own apathy and conservatism. "Michael" 
 is supposed to be sleepinn^ most of the time with a nightcap pulled 
 over his ears. — Translator. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 301 
 
 does not furnish an example of attacking infantry succeed- 
 ing in entrenching itself under fire at close range, in holding 
 out in that artificial firing-station, and in taking part in the 
 subsequent assault. The most effective work in that respect 
 was done by General Skobeleff on the ''Green Hills"; but 
 the work was difficult, owing to the stony character of the 
 ground; the infantry was not skilled in the work, and there 
 "was a deficiency of tools ; the work required much time, the 
 troops suffered great losses, were not supported, and had 
 to withdraw. None of these difficulties is likely to be 
 encountered in future, but it will nevertheless be difficult 
 for the attacker to entrench himself under the enemy's fire. 
 In the first place, there should be a strong second line in rear 
 of the entrenching troops to prevent any interference with 
 the work. I am nevertheless of the opinion that with suffi- 
 cient skill and preparation and with good judgment an 
 entrenched firing-line might have been established at the 
 Mance ravine about GOO meters from the enemy, and the 
 effect of such a line garnished with modern rifles would 
 have been no small one, even if the attacking infantry were 
 compelled to keep at a distance of 800 meters. Under such 
 conditions the fire may be very effective against the skir- 
 mishers as well as against the enemy's artillery and reserves. 
 Much, of course, will depend on the relative elevation of the 
 opposing lines. It would be foolish to reject entrenching 
 and long-range fire under such circumstances. The letter 
 should not be permitted to kill the spirit, and I have stated 
 above that it would be foolish to possess a long-range fire- 
 arm without using it in that sense. 
 
 It is not my intention to give here detailed data on the 
 results obtained from long-range fire, in so far as they might 
 be established from German firing experiments. One fact 
 I will mention. In France the question of long-range or 
 
302 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 short-range fire is much more hotly debated than in Ger- 
 many, where the maxim of long-range and short-range 
 fire, according to circumstances, has been adopted long ago. 
 In the summer of 1893, in an experimental firing at Grenoble, 
 50 hits were scored out of 300 shots at 2000 meters. Though 
 but one-tenth of that result may be expected in war, still, if 
 the fire were continued for some time, it might demonstrate 
 how dangerous infantry may become to artillery at very 
 great distances; the more as the above results cannot be 
 called very good shooting. If this be accepted as indis- 
 putable, it constitutes one more proof of the soundness of 
 my opinion, that the deployment of skirmishers along the 
 entire front is necessary from the beginning in order to use 
 our rifles against every suitable target, however briefly it 
 may be visible. Whether or not fire should be opened at 
 long ranges depends to a great extent on the manner in 
 which the targets present themselves to the attacking in- 
 fantry. The difficulty of firing with high sights is somewhat 
 of an obstacle, to be sure, but in this direction the tactician 
 may expect great improvements before long. 
 
 It is further laid down in the Firing Regulations that 
 every shot may be expected to hit any target at 250 meters, 
 a kneeling man at 350 meters, a kneeling file at 500 meters, 
 and a standing file at 600 meters. This, in connection with 
 the power of penetration and explosive effect of the bullet, 
 both of which we have elucidated, seems to me to fix the lim- 
 its (namely, 600 meters) to which it will ordinarily be possi- 
 ble to approach. We should remember that the ballistic 
 qualities of our model '88 rifle surpass those of the needle- 
 gun three or four times in every respect, and that the zone 
 of destructive fire extends now to 600 meters, while that 
 of the needle-gun was 200 meters. 
 
 The men are also expected to be proficient in estimat- 
 
Tactical Deductions. 303 
 
 ing ranges up to 600 meters; greater stress is laid on the 
 training in field firing, and the accuracy of the model '88 
 rifle has also been greatly increased, all of which seems to 
 indicate that the fire-action will ordinarily be restricted to 
 between 600 and 300 meters. Surgical investigations and 
 ballistic experiments with small-caliber rifles — all, without 
 a single exception — lead to the same conclusion, which is 
 confirmed in every particular by the smokeless powder. 
 
 The Firing Regulations also say "that, looked at from 
 the purely theoretical standpoint of ballistics, columns 
 would be much more exposed at ranges greater than 1,000 
 meters" (than UneB.— Author.). The Regulations do not draw 
 that conclusion from the greater penetration of the bullet, 
 but from the form of its trajectory, the angle of incidence, 
 and from the dispersion. It would certainly be foolish to 
 leave that question open in future and to say that these 
 are peace experiments, are not results gained in war, and 
 are of no, or of little, value. In 1870 the army did not have 
 the benefit of all these private and official researches which 
 we now have, and it is not to be expected that the authori- 
 ties are making them known, and in the same breath 
 renouncing their observance and consideration ; nor do they 
 do so, as appears from the spirit of the Firing and Drill 
 Regulations! Moreover, these things are not mere "peace\ 
 experiments"; on the contrary, the researches with the 
 new rifle made in a scientifically empirical way have con- 
 firmed to a high degree what we experienced in 1870 at the 
 hands of the Chassepot, without at the time recognizing the 
 causes, or gaining a satisfactory insight into the true inward- 
 ness of the ballistics of that rifle. It is thus the ground of 
 war experience on which the present state of science, and 
 consequently of tactics, has grown up ''post hdlum." This 
 is the state of things! For the study of small-arm ballistics 
 
304 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 was not generally taken up until after 1870; it was based 
 on the phenomena of that war, and the information thus 
 gained has since been accruing to the benefit of tactics; it 
 would be plain stupidity to possess information and to dis- 
 regard it; it is on account of that very information that 
 training, leading, and all scientific moral forces retain their 
 value in applying the results of research to the tactics of 
 the battle-field. 
 
 If, on the one hand, experiments (Firing Regulations, 
 Kegenspursky) ascertain that, at ranges greater than 1000 
 meters, columns will be more exposed; and if, on the other 
 hand (Bruns., etc.), the same bullet will pierce two or three 
 ranks at a range of 1200 meters, we can but draw the con- 
 clusion that, for this double reason, columns should not be 
 used at smaller ranges than 1000 meters at any point where 
 the enemy hjis a field of fire of that extent. Moreover, if the 
 researches, on the one hand (FiringRegulations), teach that at 
 600 meters every shot may be expected to hit a standing 
 file, and if, on the other hand (Bruns., etc.), it is shown that at 
 ranges of 300 to 400 meters the same bullet will penetrate 
 3 to 4 ranks, and that at about 300 meters the wounds begin 
 to be very severe, we may conclude from both conditions that 
 coluransare inapplicable at these rangesbecause trebling and 
 quadrupling the losses. No data are available in this respect 
 for ranges between 600 and 1000 meters, but it is safe to 
 assume that they are similar, and that movements of columns 
 and closed lines are things of the past at all ranges, and the 
 better we take that to heart the less will be our disappoint- 
 ment. Within 1200 meters but one formation remains ap- 
 propriate for movement, the single-rank, ojien lines; and it 
 should also be the endeavor not to incur the disadvantages 
 of the open column, since open lines, unless they fol- 
 low each other opposite the intervals, are in fact nothing 
 
Tactical Deductions. 305 
 
 but open columns with a considerable distance between 
 ranks. It is not expected that these things can be done in 
 war just as is demanded here; but every officer should be 
 fully informed about them before going to war, and then 
 he will at least try to help himself with sensible means as 
 best he can. All difficulties cannot be removed in this way, 
 nor should the military man strive for that, as it would no 
 longer be war, but a mechanical arrangement governed by 
 Regulations. 
 
 V. Of the Extent of Ground in Battle, of Control, and of the 
 
 "Treffen." 
 
 No maxim established by experience is so much sinned 
 against in peace as that applying to the extent of front of the 
 various units. The peace exercises with units of compara- 
 tively low strength, and our detachment tactics assisted by 
 the task system, minister to this evil, which, however, is 
 common to all armies. This evil harbors grave dangers, since 
 we do in war what we have practiced in peace, and if every 
 leader, from that of the division down to that of the com- 
 pany, were accustomed in time of peace to extend his front 
 according to circumstances — i. e., ''at pleasure" — to use the 
 terrain as he pleases in order to escape a frontal action by 
 means of turning movements, overlapping and outflank- 
 ing, we could not be certain that the prescribed limits of 
 front would be observed in pitched battle, that the troops 
 would be at the spot where the leader wants to have them. 
 The resulting conditions would be much like those at Grave- 
 lotte (right wing and center, etc.) — i. e., there would be no 
 development of front. But, in the pitched battle, the allotted 
 spaces are the only conspicuous bounded posts for all 
 troop-leading of the higher and lower kind; they should be 
 strictly maintained in order that tactics may not be at the 
 
306 Itiqtiiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 mercy of boundless license. It follows as a simple logically 
 tactical and juditial sequence that in such an event no 
 leader caji be held responsible for the accomplishment of 
 his task. 
 
 Task, space, ground, and strength of troops are closely 
 connected — /. c, a battle order should invariably harmonize 
 >Ni(h the three last i)oints; and leaders and troops should 
 be practiced in lighting itfraight to the front within the 
 assigned space, and in fully utilizing all existing cover. 
 Lateral displacements may be made, but only within 
 the limit of front of each unit, not within the space 
 allotteil to the whole fon-e, or beyond. The evil resembles 
 a disease; and the disease has si>rung from fear of the 
 frontal action. We must relearn, in the lirst place, how to 
 tight the frontal action with masses; which is impossible 
 unless the proper extent of front is observed, as otherwise all 
 tactical landmarks, as regards space, distribution of troops, 
 and tlie direction within that space, are wiped out. 
 
 The front of the brigade should never exceed 1400 
 meters except under urgent necessity — i. e., when it is in- 
 tended to outtlank the enemy or nuike a turning move- 
 ment; and since we are here concerned only with the pitche<l 
 battle, such cases will be exceptional. It is not necessary 
 to sjHH'ify the maximum depth of the formation, because 
 that depends chietly on the ground, which varies greatly. 
 Assuming a maximum distance of 250 meters between the 
 supporting lines, the average depth of the formation of a 
 brigade will be about 1200 meters; under certain circum- 
 stances it may be much less; all battle tactics have to 
 reckon with that amount of front and depth. 
 
 The modern task system leads to non-observance of the 
 limits of front and depth; the troops are thrown into the 
 fight in driblets, the tactical object is placed in jeopardy. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 307 
 
 hence also the control of the action; the combination of 
 these diHadvantagcH may render the task system fatal, and, 
 in the absence of prompt readiness for action, the system 
 may be instrumental in preventing the desired tactical bene- 
 fit from being derived from the initiative of the subordinate 
 leaders. It will not always be practicable to evade all dan- 
 ger, but the most effective remedy no doubt \\c^ in the con- 
 trol of brigade action. 
 
 In the formation by wings the regiment has a front of 
 700 meters, the battalion of 'ioO meters, 4 battalions being 
 required from the beginning for the firing lines and sup- 
 ports, and two in reserve. This nee<l not necessarily 
 yxt BO, however; it is merely one of the possible cases, 
 but may be recommended for all frontal actions. Circum- 
 stances due to the ground, the object of the action, or 
 the tactical object, may make a departure from the rule 
 advisable, though it will probably be rare in serious frontal 
 actions. A battalion may find it advisable to deploy at once 
 an entire company as skirmishers covering its front, though 
 it probably would ordinarily deploy a full platoon each from 
 two or three companies; never from all four companif^, 
 because, aside from other obje<;tions, the initiative of the 
 subordinates, which up to the assault manifests itself chiefly 
 in the skillful use of the ground, would thereby be consid- 
 erably restricted, if not renderft<l wholly impossible. Two 
 or three comi>anies will ordinarily be best, each company 
 thus having a fighting front of 175 and 115 meters respect- 
 ively. This space is somewhat large, but, for the sake of 
 the initiative of the subordinate leaders, it is expressly 
 insisted upon in the controlled system. With three com- 
 panies we would have three open lines; the second and third 
 lines would not be restricted as to distance Cmaximurn, 2.50 
 metersj, nor as to formation (^open lines, small, closed, dou- 
 
308 Inquiries inio the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ble-rank column of files or soetions), nor as to pace (walk, 
 double time, rushes, stoopinjx, creeping). In all of these 
 things the subordinate leaders should be given full freedom 
 and the bfittalion commaiidei*s should chiefly look to the 
 observance of the allotted spaces and to the unity of action 
 — not uniformity of means employed by their companies — 
 and see that their companies do not transgress the limits 
 assigned to the brigade. It is not necessary to state that 
 there will be a limit even to these arrangements. 
 
 The means to be adopted for maintaining unity of 
 action and for gaining the object of the action will vary 
 with the ground. How the 4th company of each battalio^n 
 is to be employed, whether in open line or in two or three 
 lines with full distances, depends on circumstances and 
 the question as to where the company is needed. The 
 same may be said of the battalions in reserve, for the employ- 
 ment of which the tactical object is chiefly decisive. To give 
 them the right start and to lead them is more difficult than 
 under former tactics, but the steady forward movement is 
 still characteristic of the attack; to be sure, not an uninter- 
 rupted advance, as formerly, for the final assault, but by 
 many stages, successively, as illustrated by the beautiful 
 example of Colonel von Wechmar (see Kunz, "The Action 
 of Nuits"). However difficult it may be to combine an 
 early development of a strong firing line, sufficient freedom 
 for the subordinate leaders in utilizing the terrain, the sub- 
 jection of the enemy to fire along his entire front, unity 
 of action within the limits of the allotted space, and the sup- 
 port of the firing line from the rear by detachments suitably 
 formed for delivering their fire and escaping that of the 
 enemy (open line), still, this method would guarantee at 
 least some degree of consideration for all these points. We 
 thus would preserve the initiative of the subordinate lead- 
 
Tactical Deductions. 309 
 
 ers and unity in the actual battle within the brigade; the 
 control would lie with the sui>orior leaders up to the moment 
 of the final rush, and would not pass to the subordinate 
 leaders until then. 
 
 I consider the mixing of platoons within the company, 
 of comjianies within the battalion, and of battalions within 
 the regiment, so self-evident and (to-day) so unimportant 
 a matter that, although some attention must be paid to it, 
 it can never be decisive. All men of the regiment should 
 know how to fight within these limits, no matter where they 
 stand or who commands them. In frontal actions it may 
 happen that the brigades of one and perhaps of two divi- 
 sions will have to fight on about the same ground; even then 
 the mixing of several regiments should not interfere with 
 unity of action. The chief consideration in every attack 
 is a prompt development of the heaviest possible fire, or. 
 in other words, the greater part of the unit should from 
 the beginning be properly proportioned for that purpose, 
 thrown into the fight, and kept in sufficient numerical 
 strength for completing the action. To-day the firing line 
 of the infantry is much in the same position as the first line 
 of the cavalry. What the first line fails to accomj)lish 
 will hardly be accomplished by the second or third; ITence 
 the first line should be made as strong as possible; for 
 the decision of the infantry action rests to-day to a cer- 
 tain degree with the firing line; the stronger the latter, the 
 better. Kifles not actively employed are useless; and the 
 small-caliber rifle calls for a tactical use differing from 
 that of the flintlock. 
 
 The statement that it is wrong and impracticable to 
 assign to a company a front of 175 or 115 meters, because 
 it would not admit of observation and control by one man, 
 may be met by the reply, that since the introduction of 
 
310 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 smokeless powder it does admit of sufficient observation, 
 the ground also permitting, which was not the case for- 
 merly. In that respect, therefore, the small-caliber rifle is 
 instrumental in enlarging the extent of ground for suh- 
 ordinate leading. As regards leading under fire, we should 
 rather place our expectations too low than too high. Ac- 
 cording to my war experience, the term "leading" is justified 
 only for the group; in so far as the latter is to do what is best 
 at the time. Every larger unit will naturally get beyond the 
 pale of its leader; he has no influence beyond his immediate 
 vicinity. Cooperation of groups is practicable only through 
 the cooperation of their leaders with platoon leaders; coop- 
 eration of the platoons is practicable only through cooper- 
 ation of their leaders with the company leader; beyond 
 which nothing is to be expected in the firing line. Every 
 attack movement therefore requires in the first place effi- 
 cient group and platoon leaders. It is not impossible that 
 several platoons, abreast, may move together, if they have 
 learned in peace how to do it and if front and direction are 
 fixed for the particular case, which is not a difficult matter. 
 
 I believe, however, that these tactics will make it nec- 
 essary to increase the extent of ground allowed for a bri- 
 gade, and I have therefore assumed a front of 1400 meters, 
 and that the ground allowed to a division will be somewhat 
 diminished, while that of the army corps will remain as 
 it now is — i. e., 1400, 2100, 4000 meters. It is simply due to 
 the absolute necessity of fighting in deep formation, to the 
 great losses of the firing line, and to the endeavor to pre- 
 serve the strongest possible frontal firing line. 
 
 How many of their own men did the company com- 
 manders have with them at the final rush on Froschweiler, 
 St. Privat, Loigny, notwithstanding the tactics then pre- 
 vailing? Perhaps 10 or 12! All the rest belonged to other 
 
Tactical Deductions. 311 
 
 companies. Why should we strive for something which 
 exi)erienee has proven to be impracticable? Cohesion and 
 cooperation are two different things. Organization by divi- 
 sion, brigade, regiment, battalion, and company is needed 
 for the deployment and forming for action; for the actual 
 conflict we only need groups that can be led. They are 
 restricted to the space of the regiment; their unit is the 
 regiment; no formalities are required for closing them 
 together, the sole consideration being the faculty to gain 
 and exert suflScient power for the assault. This is regu- 
 lated by the distribution of the leaders; the soldier obeys 
 the nearest leader, no matter whether he knows him or not. 
 
 It is not necessary to point out the difficulty of preserv- 
 ing unity of action, because every case will require a 
 particular method. The difficulty and difference lie chiefly 
 in the variety of ground of a battle-field, and here lies 
 the strongest objection to the so-called "normal attack." It 
 will indeed be the exception when the leaders have acquired 
 sufficient information of the ground, about to be entered 
 upon by their units, by personal observations; still the infor- 
 mation will enable the leaders to form a general idea and to 
 give sufficiently clear orders to their subordinates. The 
 enemy's action also increases the difficulties of unity of 
 action, for it may bring surprises, as the conformation of the 
 ground on which the action is to be fought sometimes does. 
 The "finer work" in preserving unity of action therefore rests 
 on the leaders of all grades below the brigade commander. 
 
 We are thus using a combination of the task system 
 and of the unity-of-action system and fixing the maximum 
 limits alone, in order to have the conditions requisite for 
 the initiative within a space which is still quite considera- 
 ble. Between the mere ditch and the steeply sloping hill, 
 between the hedge and the dense wood, there may be a great 
 
312 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 variance that will naturally affect the advance. The differ- 
 ences of elevation may be very great and the heights may be 
 near together or far apart; obstacles and concealment of the 
 most various kinds and unknown to the brigade com- 
 mander will be found on the ground, and yet under the 
 unity-of -action system it is one of the foremost duties of the 
 initiative of the subordinate leaders to seize and utilize 
 them. The formations for the movement which are to 
 secure unity of action will therefore vary greatly, and in 
 that respect absolute freedom should be conceded to the tac- 
 tical judgment of the subordinate leaders. It is immate- 
 rial whether it will look well and whether it will result in 
 a precise geometrical figure or not, so long as the irregular- 
 ity of formation is adapted to the momentary tactical im- 
 portance of the terrain, I use the term "momentary" inten- 
 tionally, in order to make it understood, that for the various, 
 sometimes very prolonged moments, corresponding meas- 
 ures are required from the same troops. Every tactician 
 should ask himself, in the first place: Can I see? — i. e., see 
 a piece of ground as it ought to be seen by the tactician. A 
 clever critic once characterized the art of painting of some 
 great nation as defective, because the nation no longer knew 
 how to see. The antagonism against unity of action springs 
 perhaps from the fact that the terrain is too much looked 
 upon as uniform and its level parts only are considered. 
 
 But the unity-of-action system should never go so far 
 as to demand uniformity of formation. According to my 
 observation, this uniformity has been developed by the 
 task system to a degree that is inharmonious and was not 
 contemplated by its former advocates, of which I am one. 
 There are no definite prescriptions laid down; it is perhaps 
 for that very reason that a normal svstem has been formu- 
 
Tactical Deductions. 313 
 
 lated. I conclude therefrom that the subordinates are either 
 not conceded the freedom required in the skirmish fight of 
 masses, or that they do not know how to use it. Tac- 
 tical individualization of the men is not suflScient; indi- 
 vidualization of the leaders, particularly of the subordinate 
 leaders, should be more cultivated than heretofore. It is 
 ^Iso clear that when the brigade is formed by wings, as laid 
 down in the Regulations, the wing should in turn be given 
 that tactical freedom within the suggested maximum limits 
 of space which the circumstances demand; never, however, 
 neglecting to strive for the best cooperation permitted by the 
 terrain. The movement will therefore take place in many 
 different forms. 
 
 I am aware that my ideas on the extent of front will 
 provoke a dispute, since therein lie-s the germ of everything 
 that is of importance for the infantry attack. Some will 
 say that the front is too extended and will reject the result- 
 ing "thin" skirmish line; the advantages and disadvan- 
 tages of "thin" and "thick" skirmish lines will be further dis- 
 cussed; some will say that my suggestion promotes the mix- 
 ing of units and that the celebrated "closing together" (Zu- 
 sammenschliessen) is impracticable. I reply: That is theory 
 grown gray, and I appeal to the judgment of men with war 
 experience who have witnessed stubborn fire-actions. 
 
 In carrying out the action — i. e., in all stages from the 
 opening of fire to the final rush — none but line formations 
 are practicable, except in case of the reserve: there we do 
 not reckon either with platoons, companies, or battalions; 
 knowing that mixing of units is unavoidable, we should from 
 the first make every preparation for fighting with mixed 
 units, and by carrying this rule to its logical conclusion we 
 shall learn how to control the disorder when everything is 
 intermingled. This is the character of the horde system. 
 
 21 
 
314 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 It calls, in the first place, for space — space for keeping the 
 enemy's front busy and for concealment of the lines in 
 rear; space for the freedom of subordinate leaders in utiliz- 
 ing the ground; space for passing from a'^thin" to the ''thick" 
 skirmish line; in one word, for bringing up the supports 
 before the final rush to the principal firing point. 
 
 This is best accomplished by using from the first de- 
 ployed companies abreast of each other. To permit proper 
 freedom in the attack, the companies should from the begin- 
 ning have that extent of front which is assigned them in 
 the subdivision of the brigade space. After that, we may 
 take up the consideration of initiative in the method of 
 advancing (creeping, rushing, double time, accelerated pace) 
 and of the use of the ground; space is the prerequisite for 
 the indispensable freedom of the subordinate leaders. If a 
 different method be adopted or the front be diminished, the 
 use of the ground will under certain circumstances be 
 reduced to zero. How could utilization of the ground be 
 expected, if there were no room for permissible lateral dis- 
 placements? I have conceded that a company deployed as 
 skirmishers cannot be controlled by one man. But all men 
 and all leaders may be assigned a preliminary objective of 
 attack toward which to w^ork. The idea of having the skir- 
 mishers advance in a well-dressed line should be scouted. 
 To enable the subordinate leaders to utilize the ground and 
 the situation, there must be a difference of level in every line 
 throughout the depth of the brigade; and some portions of it 
 will be able to advance more rapidly than others. Nor will 
 it be possible for one man to lead a whole platoon as by a 
 string; its front is too extended for that; but it may be done 
 with groups of not exceeding ten men, particularly when it 
 is practiced rigorously in time of peace and when the leaders, 
 from that of the company down to that of the group, keep 
 
Tactical Deductions. 3 1 5 
 
 up some alignment on each other — like markers, as it were. 
 More than this cannot be implied in the term "controlled" 
 advance. It is necessary, however, that in peace exercises 
 the flanks of the brigade be conspicuously marked. 
 
 The same freedom which I claim for the first (open) line 
 must likewise be conceded to every line in rear. The latter 
 may find it proper to change from the open line when cir- 
 cumstances make it advisable. Within certain limits it 
 should also be permissible to accelerate the movement tem- 
 porarily and to make the line denser in order to quicklj^ seize 
 favorable points in front, without regard to the alignment of 
 the whole line; I am convinced that every maneuver offers 
 opportunities for demonstrating the practicability of this 
 method of attack. 
 
 Assuming the front of a brigade formed by wings (i. e., 
 the two regiments side by side. — Tr.) as 1400 meters in round 
 numbers, and limiting the maximum distances between lines 
 to 250 meters, the depth of the formation would be 750 
 meters. Adding to this 600 meters as the distance from the 
 enem}', the total depth of ground would be 1350 meters, 
 which is not too great for the brigade commander to keep 
 under observation. 
 
 Again, we should have the right idea of the so-called 
 leading on the ijart of subordinate leaders. What we see 
 in time of peace will in most cases be found impracticable in 
 war. When black powder was in use, it sometimes hap- 
 pened that the influence of the subordinate leaders was re- 
 stricted to the men in their immediate neighborhood; smoke- 
 less powder has brought an improvement in that respect, 
 but the best guarantee for the leading is not to be found in 
 the mechanical delimitation of the distances; it rests in the 
 tactical education and training of the subordinate leaders 
 and of the men ; and particularly in a courageous though pru- 
 
310 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 dent advaiu'o with strict imitual attonlion of loaders and 
 men. In the fii'st place, (he develoinnont of stronj*- skir- 
 mish lines from the start makes it possible to lake the 
 defender's entire front under fire, and not only will the 
 assailant ])roduce a jjreater elTect from the bejiinninj;-, but 
 when companies and battalions become mixed, a certain 
 degree of evenness in the distribution of the leaders along 
 the entire firinjij line can be arranjjjed from the rear. With- 
 out such a. distribution of the leaders — not according to 
 units, to which they belong, but according to tactical require- 
 ments — no superiority of fire will ever be gained. We can- 
 not dispense witli this disposition of the subordinate lead- 
 ers, and it cannot be arranged except from the rear and with 
 the help of an advance of fresh troops. 
 
 The ease will indeed be rare when all four brigades of 
 the army corps will be ranged side by side with a front of 
 1400 meters for each. These limits become somewhat dimin- 
 ished inasmuch as the divisional command becomes to a 
 certain degree a regulator within the army corps. As a 
 general rule, 2100 meters would be assumed for the division, 
 including its artillery; on the flanks the front will probably 
 become extended, but we cannot give figures here; the force 
 of circumstances decides all that; but the extension of the 
 front should be a limited one, and an army corps should not 
 occupy more than 4000 meters. 
 
 In fixing the space for it, a company is assumed 
 to number 200 rifles in round numbers. It will thus find 
 numy o]>portunities for exercising a freedom in the use 
 of ground, but above all, the relatively large front makes 
 it possible for the supports to follow opposite the gaps 
 Avhere they are later on to come into action; this is very 
 important. 
 
 We recommend 250 meters as the maximum distance 
 
Tactical Deductions. 317 
 
 for the 8uj>porting lines; it may be possible, however, to 
 shorten the distance, which would be the duty of the leaders 
 of the lines, and to relinquish the sinj^le-rank, o[>en line, 
 where the ground permits. Kince the distances for close- 
 range fire between the opponents has become much greater, 
 and lies ordinarily between 000 and 300 meters, and since, on 
 the other hand, the firing line has derived increased powers 
 of resistance from the improvements of arms and the greater 
 effcH:t of artillery, the maximum limit of 250 meters can- 
 not endanger the promptness of SJipport from the lines in 
 rear. Good troops are not going to run when a counter- 
 attack develops; by the time the counter-attack does take 
 place, we may be sure the foremost supporting lines will be 
 up before the distance between the hostile yjarties has been 
 r(:^luced to 300 meters; in most cases the second line of sup- 
 ports would arrive in good time, and sometimes the third. 
 
 The real difficulties begin at GOO meters from the ene- 
 my's skirmish line. The principal work will then have to 
 be left to the subordinate leaders, the superior leaders at- 
 tending chiefly to the employment of the reserve. The lat- 
 ter may be held as far as .oOO meters in rear of the rearmost 
 line of supports. In the course of the action it may be 
 brought up closer, but only by order of the brigade com- 
 mander, and when advancing to the decisive assault it 
 should traverse the distance witiiout halt and in suita- 
 ble formation, as did Htarkloff's Wiirtemberg Brigade at 
 Froschweiler. 
 
 The demand for such development is basf^d on three 
 grounds: 1, in order to have the enemy's entire front under 
 fire from the beginning; 2, in order to fix the direction of the 
 attack beyond doubt; 3, in order to bring up supports, insert 
 them in the front, and redistributethe leaders in thf-most nat- 
 ural way. which will, as a rule, be straight to the front. The 
 
318 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 open formation and great distances are necessary on account 
 of the low trajector}^ and great penetration of the bullets. 
 It may not always be possible to prevent two men from being 
 directly in rear of each other somewhere in the space of 1350 
 meters, but in most places there will be but one man as a tar- 
 get. - On large battle-fields and within the depth of formation 
 assumed, much cover will befound that will have to be utilized, 
 although it will not guard the lines in rear from all loss; but 
 who would expect that? This fighting with great depth of 
 formation has the further great advantage, that the indi- 
 vidual lines may be developed for action, undisturbed, be- 
 yond the great danger zone and in the order best suited for 
 their subsequent employment. No other method permits 
 of this, least of all the ravine theory. Unless the fire-front 
 is from the beginning equal in extent to that of the enemy, 
 a successful opening of fire and promoting it to superior- 
 ity of fire are impossible. These reasons combined call 
 imperatively for a full development of front from the begin- 
 ning. This method, moreover, safeguards to the brigade 
 commander an indispensable control in action without 
 depriving the subordinate leaders of the freedom to take 
 their detachments farther to the front under certain circum- 
 stances — i. e., without depriving them of their initiative. 
 It is unavoidable that the firing line when halted should 
 be more open in some places than in others, but by no other 
 means than those stated can the entire front of the enemy be 
 continuously and early brought under fire. The single-rank, 
 open line is therefore to be the formation for movement as 
 well as for fire, whenever other forms are inapplicable. 
 Unity of action would thus be preserved, and it should be 
 preserved, at least until the several subordinate leaders 
 make their initiative more and more felt from the first firing- 
 X»oint, which will ordinarily be 600 meters from the enemv, 
 
Tactical Deductions. Bid 
 
 and until the brigade commander in turn makes preparation 
 for the decisive moment by correctly timing the advance of 
 the reserve. 
 
 It is not to be denied that advancing in such open lines 
 has its disadvantages, but thej may be minimized by mak- 
 ing the swarms within each platoon as small as possible, not 
 to exceed 10 men, and by training subordinate leaders and 
 men to advance straight to the front without stop, so as to 
 preserve the general direction by means of unremitting 
 attention and mutual intelligent cooperation. The further 
 disadvantage of the mixing of units of different battalions 
 (reserve included) should not deter us. It may be somewhat 
 diminished by a suitable deployment, depending on circum- 
 stances, but beyond that the men of the same regiment should 
 have lio difficulty in fighting although completely mixed from 
 the first firing-station to the princii)al station. Every man 
 is to obey the nearest leader ; these leaders are not restricted 
 to certain places or troops; they should distribute themselves 
 around, should mutually observe one another, and see to it 
 that the thread between the men and their leaders does not 
 break. Such training will moreover lay the foundation for 
 the subsequently indispensable spontaneous action of the 
 subordinate leaders. 
 
 There would be some danger in this method of advanc- 
 ing over long distances, if the advance were made by rushes. 
 The number of skulkers — i. e., of rifles lost — might become 
 considerable; hence it is sound to remain as long in motion 
 as possible, and not to make the first halt farther than 600 
 meters from the enemy as a rule. 
 
 What has been stated suffices to show that the pre- 
 ponderance gained by the defense from a previously occu- 
 pied, selected, and specially prepared position vindicates 
 Clausewitz, who has been subject to much attack on that 
 
320 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 point. It is nevertheless necessary to add the tactical fo 
 the strategical offensive in order to conquer the enemy. 
 
 "An attack pushed home with determination will 
 always succeed," say the Regulations. 
 
 This cannot mean the attacks of single isolated com- 
 panies and battalions under favorable circumstances; such, 
 for instance, as covered approach as far as the enemy's 
 position or concealment by fog, II. and F.— 57th at La 
 Garionni^re January 7, 1871; I., II. — 57th at Reaune on 
 the afternoon of November 28th; II. — 56th at La Tuil^rie 
 on the evening,* or the numerous attacks on advanced posts; 
 the context indicates that the attack of large units — i. e., 
 of brigades — in the pitched battle is meant. In that case 
 control is all the more necessary, because without it an 
 attack cannot be "carried forward with determination." 
 Since we were unacquainted with any "suitable method of 
 control" in 1870-71, many attacks failed (Worth, front; 
 Mance ravine). 
 
 At Spicheren the attack was carried to the enemy's 
 
 line at several points by companies and platoons, which 
 
 were fighting a kind of soldiers' battle; they labored for 
 
 hours through the cut-up ground with great perseverance 
 
 and disregard, and gained the victory by their superior 
 
 morale. Nor is this controverted by General Francois' 
 
 attack, because, after it once started, it also degenerated 
 
 gradually into a soldiers' battle, the general succeeding in 
 
 getting but one battalion to the spot where he wanted his 
 
 whole brigade. We might also quote some very fine attacks 
 
 of fresh brigades in the pitched battle; for instance, the 
 
 attack of Starkloff's Wiirtemburg Brigade on Froschweiler 
 
 ♦The prevailing account of the capture of La Tuil^rie is 
 Incorrect. The position was actually captured by 3d and 4th — 17th. 
 It was only after its capture that Captain Montbard arrived with 
 II. — 56th and informed the leaders of 3d and 4th — 17th. First Lieu- 
 tenant Casimir and Captain von Reichenau, that "his orders were 
 to relieve these troops." 
 
Tactical Deductions. 321 
 
 (Worth, August Gth), that of the 33d Brigade on Loigny, etc. 
 (December 2, 1870), and of the Saxons against Ste. Marie and 
 St. Privat (north) on the 18th of August. Here also belongs 
 the attack of the 3d Division on the second day of Villiers, of 
 the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour, and that of Colonel von 
 Wechmar at Nuits. 
 
 The statement is therefore fully justified, since any 
 troops may be called on for such service; hence the will to 
 close with the enemy should be developed in every indi- 
 vidual soldier by peace training, and the same thing is nec- 
 essary for various onslaughts in the course of a battle. 
 Wherever the attack succeeded, the brigades had developed 
 their full fronts from the beginning (Worth, XI. Army 
 Corps, Starkloff's Brigade; Ste. Marie, St. Privat (north), 
 Loignj). Wherever the attack failed the ravine theory 
 (VIII., VII., II. Army Corps) prevented deployment or the 
 troops were employed on the modern task system (IX. 
 Corps). It may be assumed that in future as many attacks 
 will be unsuccessful as have been in the past; hence the fol- 
 lowing should also be demanded: ''When the attack fails 
 to reach the enemy at once, it is the duty of leaders and 
 men to hold the ground gained, and as long as the troops 
 have ammunition they should, in such situations, success- 
 fully repulse the enemy's attacks." Unless the attack is 
 made contrary to tactical requirements as regards time, 
 objective, and strength, the foregoing may justly be required 
 of all troops, as illustrated by many of the examples 
 from 1870. 
 
 In Sections 96 and 130, Part I. of the Reprint of 1889,* 
 it is stated that at ranges of 900 and 1000 meters fire may be 
 opened on columns and on artillery; and in Section 130: 
 "At long distances it may happen that the objective will be 
 
 ♦Infantry Drill Regulations. — Translator. 
 
322 I iKiiiirIrs liilo llir Tdclics of llic Fill lire. 
 
 viHibIc oiilv by Hie use of ^liisscs, .-uhI not ;il :ill lo (he skir- 
 luislicrs lliciiisclves. TIm' IjiI(<m' slioiild in lli:il case be 
 (Urcch'd (() :iini ;i( ccrlMin points of llio lerriiin." 
 
 II is riiiMicr sI;i((mI in SccHon i:>."{: "In liu' conrsc of 
 the ju'lion a. lull diicclion of (he lire will fr('(iiH'nll.v be iin- 
 poHsiblc. To mcol (iuil condUion skinnislicrs should have 
 i\w I'ulc iuiprcsscd <vii (Iumu in their jmsk'c Ifjiininjjj, (hat in 
 tlu» absence of lire (liicclion ail objecis williin (JOO inelers 
 iiui.v be (ired a(, belvveen (»()() and 1000 nu'leis only hij^h and 
 broa.d larj^els, and thai, as a rule, lirin<; beyond 1000 nielers 
 is in'oliibitod." 
 
 The nolions of close ran<jjes have been much modified of 
 lale. Willi the needle-}»un shoi-l ranjje was 250 paces; with 
 the Mauser 71, 84 — 400 meters; and wilh I he rille model 
 '88 — as wilh all sniall-calibei- rilles il is (JOO melers. None 
 will deny the (>tTects of lon^- i'an};-e lire; on the other ha.nd, 
 every (Uie will be fully juslilied in ever ])ointin}i lo the dis- 
 a.dvanta.}?es of lonj;' ranj^c lire (over 1000 melers), which «'on- 
 sist in this, that the visual ])ower is too small lo ]>ermit ^ood 
 aim, and that the lonfi-ranjic lire, parlicniarly wilh the mod- 
 ern multiloaxhM-, ^^^ll lead to waste of ammunition; a}j;ainst 
 the latlel" none of the nice expedients ado])te<l in peace is 
 of avail. In connection with the flattcM' trajectoi*y it nuiy 
 Im' mentioned that th<> swejd /one is diminished if the eleva- 
 tion of tlu^ lirer and that of the !j:round he is lo sweeji is not 
 the same.* 
 
 On tluil account it is i^erfectly correct foi- tlu' lvep;ula- 
 tiona to prescribe "that in the course of the action a. full 
 direction of tlu» flro will frequently be imi)ossiblo, and that 
 the soldi(M' is not to fire over 1000 meters." 
 
 The conlroversv over lou<;:-ran}j:e and shoi-t ran<j;e fire, 
 
 •For details, see "Lottrcs d'un cavalier," FobruaiT. March, 
 April. 1893, of the Ifvnie de Oarahrh: 
 
Tactical Deductions. ':i23 
 
 hovvovep, will nevor ccMm, nor will theomploymerit of oitluT 
 rrif^Uiod of firo. Mijr;b rnij^lit bo jHlvancofl /vro anr] on. In 
 conKorjur-ncf; of u\y itxpcrutnci'M in war I am an advfx;ato of 
 Hhort-raiige fire, and there are i>robably not many who have 
 had more experience in uetion. In the ca«e of well-trained 
 and wr-ll-diHoipline<l troopH I would invariably — and 7>ar- 
 ticularly on the df-fennive — decide for whort-range fire; an 
 opponent who Ih compelled to retreat under Hhort-range fire 
 iH no longer to be feared. It in Hnre death for him. I ha/1 
 to undergo that trial niynelf. Jf any one were to Heek for an 
 InHtance of Hhor-t-range fire, he conid find a perfect type at 
 lieaune la Kolande,* and I doubt whether the Imperial 
 French v\rmy could hIiow anything HUperior in the way of 
 long range fire. Today troopH Hhould be able to fight and 
 to fire in all zones of fire. Any one who will reflect and 
 aHcertain by actual trial what it meanH to deHignate certain 
 pointH in the terrain will find, in 90 caw^ out of 100, that 
 unlcHH thewe pointH in the terrain are farmnteads or Home- 
 thing Himilar, they cannot be found or Huccewnfully taken 
 under fire. 
 
 The cauH^j of the ob.stinacy obHervable on both Hides in 
 all actions in 1870-71 lay in the method of fighting, itself 
 the rcHult of improved fire-armH, and no material change in 
 this renpect will result from nmokeleHH powder and nmall- 
 caliber armH. An attack can no longer be made as formerly 
 by flinging the brigades into the fight in order to rapidly 
 win the deciHion at the point of the bayonet. The small- 
 caliber rifles make swarm tactics with nkirmish fire the uni- 
 versal method of fighting. The proficiency of the indi- 
 vidual soldier in skinriishing thus gains in imy»ortance and 
 the course of a battle will consist of a series of swarm 
 
 •Compare H?>nlg'8 "The National War on the Loire," II , Chap 
 ter V. 
 
324 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 attacks more frequently than in 1870-71. On that account 
 the control of the action should firmly rest in the hand of 
 the brigade commander. These attacks admit of ready 
 explanation. Both opponents fire at each other; the one 
 believing himself in the superiority advances, and either 
 succeeds or fails. In the former case the repulsed party 
 redoubles its efiforts, for that onslaught is not decisive; it 
 merely confers a tactical advantage. When the repulsed 
 party feels itself strong enough to push the enemy back, it 
 advances and perhaps drives the opposing swarms back. 
 The latter fall back until assisted, either by the ground or 
 by troops in rear, or by both, to put a stop to the enemy's suc- 
 cessful onslaught. The enemy is now brought to a stop at 
 least; sometimes he may face about, for he will not always 
 be able to hold out under greatly superior fire. At that 
 moment the party which so far has been driven back re- 
 sumes the offensive and regains the tactical superiority. 
 This is the course of the modern action, this is the "surg- 
 ing to and fro,'' which is so apt to confuse the heads of those 
 who have never beheld it. The number of such rushes made 
 on either side may vary greatly, and will depend chiefly on 
 the use made of the troops in rear and on how frequently the 
 swarm line gains new strength from the accession of fresh 
 troops. Hence the importance of the disposition of the rear- 
 ward lines, their distance, number, and employment, and the 
 necessity of great care in dividing them, holding them in read- 
 iness, and bringing them to the front. That problem cannot 
 be eliminated by smokeless powder, but it may be modified, 
 and in manj' cases it may be made more difficult. The 
 future action will be a skirmish fight consisting of rushes; it 
 will show a certain variableness, acontinuousdisplacementof 
 the opposing lines, and the variableness will be characterized 
 by great persistence, it has its cause in human nature, 
 
Tactical Deductions. 325 
 
 which is excited by the fire so that men feel inclined to with- 
 draw themselves from its effect. There will ever be cases 
 where a strong and determined rush will secure permanent 
 possession of the captured position from the beginning to 
 the end of the battle and against which the enemy's attacks 
 are shattered; but, as a rule, the decision will be brought 
 about gradually by a number of rushes, by gain and loss of 
 ground, and that side will be best assured of success which 
 provides a superiority of force for these rushes. The supe- 
 rior leader alone can see, observe, judge, and calculate all 
 this. This character of the action will not be denied, how- 
 ever unsympathetic it may be to some, and if we keep it 
 before our mind, we shall make few or no mistakes in the 
 choice of our tactical means. This fighting method, insep- 
 arable as it is from the small-caliber rifle, should not be 
 inveighed against because it "is not decisive," is "difficult 
 to watch," and "still more difficult to control." To be sure, 
 the rush of a swarm decides nothing, but what enormous 
 fighting power did we not repeatedly observe in swarms of 
 skirmishers, which, though for six or eight hours engaged 
 in the materially and morally destructive fire action of high- 
 est tension, yet ultimately rushed the key of the enemy's 
 position! Where has there ever been in tactics such a 
 fighting power! These are some additional reasons why I 
 remain opposed to any normal attack! 
 
 In connection with the character of the conflict and its 
 duration I wish to recur to the question of ammunition. 
 The more rapidly the man fires, the more quickly will he 
 expend his ammunition. This rapid fire, which has been 
 reintroduced by the Reprint of 1889 in place of maga- 
 zine fire, disturbs me, and, in view of the properties of the 
 modern rifie, I deem it necessary to definitely discard it. 
 That word should not be given space in the Regulations; on 
 
326 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the contrary, on every page we should find the words ^'econo- 
 mize your fire." When the man is trained in rapid firing, 
 there is danger of his making freer use of it than if he had 
 never known it. Rapid fire was proper with a rifle where 
 the time for accurate firing was limited to about one minute ; 
 but to-day, when the fire is such that its accuracy is perma- 
 nent within 600 meters it does more harm than good, be- 
 cause leading to a waste of ammunition. Experience has 
 moreover taught me that the greater the danger, the more 
 unsteady will the soldier become and the more rapid his fire. 
 Why then have rapid fire laid down in the Regulations? 
 Instead of rapidity of fire, I want economy of fire. 
 
 A few words about 'Tre^m." In discussing the execution 
 of the combat I have declared myself against their retention 
 and mentioned open lines alone in that connection. Still we 
 cannot dispense with '^Trejfen'^ for the deployment, for form- 
 ing for attack, and in all tactical problems where a surprise, 
 a sudden attack under cover of fog, of favorable ground, and 
 of darkness is contemplated. We should therefore know 
 how to move in "Treffcn'^ and, if necessary, to fight in them. 
 On level ground 1200 meters from the enemy the swai*m 
 should be the usual and only formation of the "Treffen,'^ 
 though, depending on circumstances of terrain and battle, 
 line and column may also be used. This matter and the 
 distances between lines are the most important questions 
 and have therefore been thoroughly discussed. Maximum 
 distances and maximum fronts alone should be laid down; 
 never normal distances and normal fronts. 
 
 Any fear lest the rearward lines be too late for the 
 attack or for the rescue in case of defeat should be obviated 
 by a strong firing line; the distances are not so much deter- 
 mined by the element of time as by the range and flat tra- 
 jectory of the rifle. At the time when the latter had the 
 
Tactical Deductions. 327 
 
 same effect at 200 meters that they now have at 600 metere^ 
 the lines were ranged at correspondingly closer distances. 
 It follows logically that to-day they should follow farther 
 apart. 
 
 As regards number and strength of the lines, it may be 
 stated that they should be so constituted as to be able (a) to 
 gain the superiority of fire at the range of about 600 to 
 300 meters, and, (h) reinforced by fresh troops, to deliver 
 their blow, which owing to the considerable distance, is 
 likely to take the form of a threat rather than of actual 
 assault. Here lies the problem in the assault. It will, as 
 a rule, be impossible for the firing line to aj)proach closer; 
 and, on the other hand, muscles and lungs are unequal to 
 crossing the space in one rush; hence the position will be 
 found evaluated by the enemy and the act of its capture 
 will merely consist in stepping into it. In this connection I 
 would again refer to Elsasshansen and Froschweiler, as 
 instructive examples, and also in part to St. Privat. They 
 may be taken as types for the future in so far as we may 
 speak of types. 
 
 VI. Of the Defense. 
 
 There is a saying that troops who know how to attack 
 will also defend themselves well. This is confirmed in many 
 respects by history; but it does not show many instances 
 where troops good in defense w^ere also good in attack. For 
 this reason our previous expositions have treated of the 
 attack alone, but it seems necessary to me to point out some 
 features as regards leading, which will inure to the benefit 
 of the defense more than heretofore. 
 
 In the first place, in regard to the leading of armies, it is 
 quite likely that in future several armies simultaneously 
 operating on difierent theaters will have to accomplish dif- 
 
328 Inquiries info the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ferent objects. Situations may ociiir whero tho temporary 
 and permanent strategic and tactical defensive r61e may 
 have to be assumed. In the war against the republic in 
 1870 the Germans took the strategic and tactical offensive 
 within certain limits: yet thei*e were two cases where the 
 armies were forced on the strategic and tactical defensive, 
 and fought resolutely in both. 
 
 I mean the II. Army with the Army Detachment (army 
 of the Grand Duke of IMecklenburg. — Tr.) on the Loire at 
 the end of November 1870, and Werder on the Lisaine in the 
 middle of January, as his corps is to be considered an army 
 for our purposes. 
 
 In both cases the defender passed subsequently to the 
 strategical and tactical offensive in the sense of combined 
 operations of two armies; and notwithstanding certain errors 
 in the execution, the defender successfully solved on each of 
 two theaters, and in widely different ways, a problem which 
 is rightly considered most difficult, and in each case with 
 great results, in one case even destroying the hostile army. 
 
 I believe that such things will recur in a more marked 
 degree; I believe that the war of the future will closely 
 approach the "position war" with all its peculiarities and 
 drawbacks. To this we have to reconcile ourselves, whether 
 we are pleased or not; for it lies in the nature of future 
 war, in consequence of the remai'kable rdle which technique 
 — and under that heading the improved arms are to be 
 classed — is destined to play. Hence both the general and 
 his troops should be familiar with all means of defense. 
 
 Cases are likely to happen where the general, though 
 recognizing the general direction of the operations (end of 
 November, 1870), will have great difficulty in ascertaining 
 Xiromptly where the attacker's main body is and where the 
 attacker means to deliver his main blow. There is but one 
 
Tactical Deductions. 329 
 
 means for meeting him prompth' — namely, concentration 
 and prepared positions on the line of the probable direction 
 of the operations. The II. Ar-my recognized the latter some- 
 what late, prompt but insufficient measures were taken jfor 
 concentration, and nothing whatever was done to make 
 a good selection for the jjrobable battle-ground and to 
 strengthen the same promptly. 
 
 General von Werder, although rather taken unawares 
 by the enemy's operations, suceeded in concentrating every- 
 thing for the defense, in promj)tly occupying the position 
 (selection of the battle-fieldj, and in preparing the same in 
 so far as permitted by the xavy troublesome winter season. 
 
 It certaiul}' would have been in keeping with both these 
 defensive tasks to devote particular attention to the left 
 flank on the Loire and to the right flank on the Lisaine; it 
 was neglected in both cases, though the strategic situation 
 plainly showed the necessity therefor. It follows that cor- 
 rect strategical understanding is requisite for the selection 
 of the space and of the points within that space where the 
 defender means to accept battle — i. e., strategic laws deter- 
 mine the selection of the ground and the extent of the posi- 
 tion (product of trooi)S and distance). 
 
 The leader of the army will also be cognizant of the 
 line to the rear of which he must not permit the operations 
 to pass. That line depends on the object to be covered by 
 his operations and on the distance of his general line of 
 reconnaissance from that of the enemy, who may withdrav? 
 his line sooner or later. A proper selection of the position 
 should not, as a rule, be difficult, provided the connection of 
 the strategy in the particular case with the general situation 
 is properly understood; it will thus be possible to determine 
 in a general way the points where works should be promptly 
 planned and constructed. 
 
330 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 The worst thing, for instance, that could have happened 
 to General von Werder was to be pushed back in the angle 
 Belfort — Switzerland. That strategic consideration should 
 have overruled all others; hence the right flank should have 
 been made strongest and the reserve should have been 
 posted as near it as possible. 
 
 The worst thing that could have happened to the X. 
 Corps at Beaune was to be cut off from the II. Army 
 and to be pushed in a northeasterly direction. The 
 maintenance of the touch with the II. Army should have 
 been the decisive consideration in the selection and forti- 
 fication of the position, and hence the right wing should 
 have been made specially strong. These are but two situa- 
 tions, but the defender will, as a rule, be able to determine 
 the point where he means to meet the attacker long in ad- 
 vance, and to begin the preparation of the position accord- 
 ing to strategic considerations alone. The rest — the com- 
 pletion of the position — can be done later. It is not neces- 
 sary to construct a regular fortress; it is only necessary 
 to securely hold important points with small numbers, in 
 order to have sufficient forces available for other points 
 and objects which might be of an offensive character. In 
 most cases it will be possible to have a skeleton promptly 
 designed and constructed which in itself may confer a tacti- 
 cal advantage, as at Gravelotte and on the Lisaine. 
 
 In order to promptly reach the position (occupation of 
 the position and setting apart a force for other service), the 
 troops should be kept assembled at their stations, which 
 may be done without danger if the cavalry, in combination 
 with other arms attached to it, reconnoiters and guards the 
 front and flanks. 
 
 To enable him to see ahead and to follow the events 
 from their beginning, the defender should be especially 
 
Tactical Deductions. 331 
 
 strong in enterprising and suitably armed cavalry with artil- 
 lefy. Without it any defensive undertaking will in future 
 be highly jeopardized. 
 
 It is therefore the function of the army leader to deter- 
 mine the general outline of the position. He is best in> 
 formed, has familiarized himself with the task before him, 
 is best able to fix upon the points of support on which the 
 framework is to be erected, but he should know the ground 
 not merely from the map, but from inspection. The lat- 
 ter may not always be possible. As the matter passes from 
 the army commander to his inferiors of the several grades, 
 the details of construction gain more and more in precision, 
 dependent on subsequent information received; the road 
 leads from the whole to the details, from large considera- 
 tions to smaller ones. 
 
 It follows that the authorities of the various grades and 
 arms, particularly the officers charged with the trace of 
 the works, should have a full understanding of the strat- 
 egic aspect of the problem— t. e., that they should be aware 
 of the object and grasp it in all its details; and that 
 within the outlines determined by the superiors all tac- 
 tical advantages should be turned into account. Barring 
 some exceptions, marked feats in both of the foregoing 
 respects have been rare, but instead of complaining and 
 instead of anticipating nothing better in future, the insep- 
 arability of strategy and tactics should be kept in mind, 
 which, considered from the ideal point of view, blend on the 
 battle-field (position) in every essential aspect. When we 
 are accustomed thus to think, to reflect, to observe, then the 
 works will rarely be constructed at the wrong points and 
 the prejudice against them will vanish because no one can 
 deny their effect. We had not learned to think thus; imag- 
 ination was lacking; the fault was that the education of the 
 young does not address itself to the nerve of all intelligent 
 
332 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 mental work; it fails tiist to formulate an idea, a conception 
 of what is to be accomplished. We cannot dispense with 
 book knowledge, but not every one need be a scientist. 
 
 The defender sometimes succeeds in deceiving the 
 enemy, as evidenccni by the great exami)les of Konig- 
 grjitz, Gravelotte^ — St. Privat, and the Lisaine. In the last 
 two named cases the extent of the front was greatly under- 
 estimated, and in the first case a proper idea of the strength 
 of the defender and the trace of his position was lacking. 
 In the execution of the same idea, Frenchmen, Germans, 
 Austrians, unintentionally, caused the enemy a good deal 
 of uncertainty; success followed in but one case, that of the 
 Germans on the Lisaine. The Austrians ultimately fought 
 in front of their position, and succumbed chiefly on that 
 account and because the position was not occupied and did 
 not remain occupied as ordered. We also note there the 
 harmful inlluence that may be exercised by an advanced 
 position (Maslowed wood). Although the Germans were 
 greatly mistaken as to the extent of the position, the French 
 were nevertheless defeated, because the strategic tlank was 
 in the air and was crushed — crushed all the more easily be- 
 cause not artificially strengthened, thus rendering all the 
 other works which should have begun at St. Privat of no 
 value. The facts show, however, that the defense was 
 not complete, because at Koniggriitz. as well as at Grave- 
 lotte, a great leader was lacking. In both cases we observe 
 the same objectionable feature. At Koniggriitz the left is 
 posted at Popowitz; at Gravelotte, the right at Verneville. 
 Both were the strategic flanks, and it was only due to the 
 efforts of the corps commanders that the better positions 
 of Problus and St. Privat were occupied! 
 
 Thus, even before the introduction of smokeless powder, 
 the defense was in possession of certain features difficult 
 
Tactical Deductions. 333 
 
 to r(Monnoiter and greatly embarrassing the assailant, ahd 
 it may be admitted that they constituted part of the strength 
 of the defense. I advocate the offensive, notwithstanding 
 the fact that smokeless powder brings the effect of that 
 strength of the defensive — i. e., the uncertainty in which 
 it is able to keep the asKuilant — home to the latter much 
 more severely; but the favorable aspects of the defense 
 should not on that account be undervalued. 
 
 The defender can determine the general trace of his 
 position by the map,and the assailant may likewise itifer that 
 trace or the range in a general way from strategic consid- 
 erations. Events may happen, however, which are contrary 
 to the sjurit of strategy, as, for instance, Bazaine's with- 
 drawal into the position of August 18th, which had first been 
 selected by mai> and was given its real shape subsequently 
 after an inspection of the ground. 
 
 The assailant's uncertainty could even in those days be 
 very great, depending on whether right or wrong strategic 
 conceptions prevailed in both camps; smokeless powder, 
 however, renders it much more difficult for the assailant to 
 promptly make out the defender's position even in case he 
 has hit upon the enemy's strategic line of retreat. 
 
 The great range of modern rifles and artillery projec- 
 tiles, taken in connection with the absence of smoke, 
 makf>s it diflicult to lof-ale the enemy. Tlie weaker oppo- 
 nent will usually be compelled to resort to the defensive and 
 entrench himself; but the defender is able to-day to greatly 
 increase the assailant's uncertainty, to force him to delay 
 while employing means to deceive him, and to employ his 
 own countf;r-measures in such a way as to swure the numer- 
 ical superioritj' at a certain point notwithstanding his gen- 
 eral numerical inferioritv. 
 
334 Inquirifs into Ihc Tactici< of the Fulurr. 
 
 AdvanoiHl positions aro uood moans to (liis v\u\, ami a 
 (.'ousiilorntion of tho battlo of (^iravolotto will show what 
 groat ailvantaiios tlu\varo apt to oonfoi- on iho dofonso t«> dav, 
 and whioh wo will loavo \o tlu> roadiM- io dolormino. boianso 
 militaiv history is iisod by dilToriMit poople to provo dilVoront 
 things. It is my opinion that it is sniokoK'ss poAvdoi* alono 
 that in great battlos will onablo tho oommandor-in ohiof of 
 tho dof(Miso to promptly tako his moasuros whiU> his id»>as 
 aro still of bnt agonoral I'haraoti^r.booanso smokoloss powdor 
 givos him an amonnt of timo not formerly possessed, should 
 he oontemplate a taotioal oountor-otVensive. In that ease 
 time is gained by tho nse of advanoed positions, and it may 
 be asoertained by raUiilating tho ratio of the breadth and 
 depth of the line of defense to the depth of ground oom- 
 luanded by the advaneed positions up to the line of defense. 
 This, eonibineil with rei'onnaissanee. 1 doom the prineipal 
 moditioation introduoed in grand tactics by smokoh ss 
 powder, and also the chief advantage which the conunandei^ 
 in-chief of the defense may dori\ o i'voin it. 
 
 Lack of space and other reasons prevent nie from going 
 into details of results to both defender and assailant. I wish 
 to point out. however, the opinion of tlu» French Colonel Lan- 
 glois. who approves of tho advancetl positiorsT — SkiUmieters 
 in front of the main position, ajid refer the reader to Nos. 17, 
 18. 28, 58. :>«>, and (JO of the M Hi far WochniMatf of 18!);?. 
 While I coueur in general in the ideas expressed in the last 
 three numbers of that periodical, I think that a vigorous 
 counter-otTonsive should be the first consideration in select- 
 ing tho main position, and that advanced positions cannot 
 then be dispensed with. Skill is roipiired in selecting and 
 utilizing advaJictHl positions and in promptly rendering 
 them harnUess bv a vigorous method of attack. Tho strug- 
 
TacUcal Uedudions. 336 
 
 j^lf for iIkiii uiiiy ut. llio Harno tirru; HufTioifjnf.ly din^rhjHe 
 tlif tiijiin pohilion, if tlioy are about 1000 mcXc.Yn in front 
 of Ihf lalt<-f; tlio farttjf-r Ih^fy aye to th(; front tho more arc 
 th«-y aj^f to iriiHU^ad tlio jisKailant, and the g^reater wouUl 
 he the FifjK'fit deriver] from ifi'-rn hy tfie commander-in-cbief 
 of the defence. It is unnec<'8Hary herr- to quote unfavorable 
 inntanrteH from Korum^ri'iiz, ete., or to point out that the 
 French derived little advantage from their advanced pOKi- 
 tionH on the l^th of AuguHt. We are simply face to face 
 with an important qneHtion, which it iw nece-WHary to <lft<UU' 
 before committing onrH^iveH to battle; and I believe that 
 maneiJverH might be ho arranged as to be of great benefit 
 in thiH rcHpect, In this way we would ]><■ more apt to select 
 the right means for defense and attack ; which must he found, 
 for I do not believe that any defender harboring great de- 
 signs would relinfjuish the advantages offered by advanced 
 j)OHitions. 
 
 Tiie main circumstance of benefit to the defender and 
 deceiving the assailant is the latter's uncertainty, which will 
 cause him much delay. On that account it is not unlikely 
 that several deployments of the army and of the battle units 
 of the assailant may become necessary; for grand tactics to- 
 day confer on the dffr-nder the power to keep his ar^nies sepa- 
 rated at distances and in combinations suitable for the 
 oflFensive employment of one of the armies, depending on the 
 amount rjf information and time gained by the strnggbfS. etc., 
 for the advanced positions. Xot only should the s'-h-ction of 
 the main position be considere<l from tliaf [joint r,f view, 
 but also the relation of the advancer] jK>8itions to the main 
 position and the strengthening of the latter; if it results 
 in a I'levna, it will have to be invested; if in a Gravelotte, 
 it will have to be attacked, as heretofore. The only 
 technical-tactical point to be consid^Tcd is that the advanced 
 
336 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 positions should no longer consist of farmsteads and villages, 
 but should be located in the general terrain and as -incon- 
 spicuous as possible; woods may prove very useful for that 
 purpose. When deciding on the use of advanced positions, 
 it will be necessary to extend the front as much as possible 
 and to give it an irregular shape, wherein the improved 
 arms will be found of great assistance and will much en- 
 hance the effect. 
 
 Section 13 of the Field Entrenchment Regulations 
 states: "The preparation and occupation of advanced posi- 
 tions is not to be recommended as a rule, because it may easily 
 lead to the defeat of the advanced troops and mask the fire 
 from the main position. It is therefore better to concen- 
 trate all available means for the fortification of a single 
 line." I might concur in the preparation, but not in the 
 occupation. To be sure I am assuming here that the army 
 will be boldly led and that small technical-tactical consid- 
 erations and inconveniences will have to give way. 
 
 It may generally be said that the defensive is the 
 stronger; but it rarely matures great results, unless they are 
 brought about by other means (Manteuffel-Werder); for so 
 has it ever been and will ever be. Worth, Gravelotte (we 
 purposely quote only field battles where both sides had full 
 room for development), Beaune, Loigny, Lisaine, St. Quen- 
 tin, etc., all point to the strength of the defensive. In case 
 of an equality of arms the relations between attack and 
 defense may at best be slightly shifted, and it is advisable 
 to adhere to the attack, not, however, without always striving 
 for early and strong development of fire and for the greatest 
 possible numerical superiority. The long-range arms con- 
 fer many advantages on the assailant; he has greater free- 
 dom of movement than the defender; he can develop a 
 greater fire effect, though at first by progressive stages only; 
 
Tactical Deductions. 337 
 
 to-day he can take the rearward positions of the enemy 
 bj' fire action much sooner than formerly, because the arms 
 carry farther. He has, above all things, greater freedom of 
 decision. The attack will be more, difficult to initiate and 
 to carry through; it will require more time; and, in some 
 places, it will entail greater losses, which result must be 
 accepted; but when crowned by success, it will mature 
 results never before dreamed of. 
 
 It will not be often that the defender's position will ful- 
 fill all requirements; he will have to concentrate his troops 
 at various points; if the defender wishes to escape sensible 
 losses from artiller^^ fire from the beginning, his position 
 to-day should be like a great artificial enclosure protecting 
 the trooxjs, which would never accord with simplicity and 
 rarely with troop-leading. The defender will be compelled 
 to remain much longer in a condition of readiness, which is 
 not calculated to increase the morale; and in order to pro- 
 tect his artillery he will have to deploy a large part of his 
 infantry on the slope toward the enemy, in most cases 
 without cover. He will concentrate the full force of his fire 
 on certain points, but at the point or points of attack the 
 assailant will be able to develop a superior fire, particularly 
 if he succeeds in promptly locating the enemy's flanks. The 
 defender will, in many cases, have to shun farmsteads and 
 villages, and construct trenches in a comparatively short 
 time, which, while useful for purposes of concealment, per- 
 mit at the same time of greater fire-effect. Kecently the 
 plow has been the subject of frequent experiments in the 
 construction of hasty entrenchments ; and in France, in 1898, 
 Genera] Morin, in particular, is said to have been very 
 successful with it. I have omitted technical details, as 
 to-day there is no appreciable difference to be found in the 
 French, German, Austrian, and Russian regulations regard- 
 
338 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ing the value, design and construction of field entrench- 
 ments; and it could not be otherwise; the same ballistic quali- 
 ties of the arms were bound to lead to the same conclusions 
 in field fortification. On that account heavy calibers will 
 be brought in the field by both sides. Thus it was stated in 
 the French Instructions of March 23, 1878 : ''Field entrench- 
 ments have at all times been of great importance; since the 
 introduction of the rapid-firing arms they have become a 
 power and an expedient on the battle-field which is always 
 useful and frequently indispensable. They permit the de- 
 fender to make up for his numerical inferiority at certain 
 points, and enable the assailant to destroy the former's de- 
 fensive positions or to turn them against him. They also 
 enable one to entrench on captured ground and thus to 
 hold it." 
 
 All investigations, in whatever direction made, point 
 toward position warfare, though, on account of the great 
 warlike energy of the spirit of the times, its course will be 
 different from what, it was in the past. Rifle and spade, 
 regulations for fire and field entrenchments (field pioneer 
 regulations for the infantry), to-day form the component 
 parts of one and the same means, the greatest possible 
 development of fire. It is in fact the culmination of the 
 entire fighting act I I deem it probable that the selec- 
 tion of suitable covered positions of the local and general 
 reserves will prove one of the most difficult problems of 
 the defender, especially if he intends to pass from the 
 defensive to the offensive. In future the reserves will una- 
 voidably be more exposed to danger than formerly. They 
 will sometimes suffer very much from echelon shrapnel fire, 
 and it may be accepted that the former manner of massing 
 reserves and of bringing them up to the main position are no 
 longer applicable. But to be able to pass to the offensive in 
 
Tactical Deductions. 339 
 
 order to gain the victory, it is necessary to hold masses in 
 readiness in the vicinity of the line of direction the offensive 
 is to take; and the undoubtedly impending great expenditure 
 of ammunition, not to mention losses, will compel the de- 
 fender to have local reserves all along the rear of his line of 
 battle if he wishes to exert his full fire power. In pre- 
 pared positions both requirements may be more or less met 
 by artificial cover; in other cases not at all, or but rarely. 
 We concede that, particularly at the opening of the battle, 
 the defender will usually be able to develop a greater fire 
 power than the assailant, but whatever may be the extent of 
 ground covered by his movements and measures, the defender 
 will be cramped by the law imposed on him b}^ the assailant, 
 who, having more freedom, can paralyze the fire and ulti- 
 mately exceed it, though it may require more time and entail 
 greater losses at some points; but the ultimate prize of vic- 
 tory will be all the greater. 
 
 VII. Of Beconnaissarice and of Preparation hy Artillery. 
 It is odd that so much should have been written about 
 losses suffered and to be suffered in future, and how they 
 might be avoided, without ever getting at the root of the 
 evil. For two decades w'e have been on the wrong trail; we 
 have been circling around the "guiding motive" at greater 
 or less distances; we have done much that is bound to lead 
 to effeminate ideas; we have looked for the causes where 
 they do not exist, and we have not looked for them where they 
 are. In this way we have deceived ourselves in order to 
 spare others, and we have likewise deceived those who do 
 not know w^ar from personal experience^ and those whose 
 positions forbid them to see anything outside of their own 
 troops, for the same purpose of sparing others! Instead of 
 admitting outright that 90 per cent of the causes of our 
 losses in 1870-71 are to be found in the perfunctory character 
 
340 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 of the drill-ground in time of jjeace; in our defective training 
 and in our lack of knowledge of the enemy's army; in the 
 tactics and in the incapacity of numerous leaders of various 
 grades; and instead of making a thorough investigation of 
 the causes, we have attributed the losses to the positions, to 
 the terrain, to the ballistics of the rifle, etc.; we have failed, 
 however, to convince a single thinking mind, because those 
 were not the causes. If we review the series of peace errors 
 between 1871-88, we find that the true cause was probably 
 concealed because we did not wish to probe our own ideas. 
 It has ultimately brought us to the point that we are seri- 
 ously thinking of transferring the battle to the night, in 
 order not to be seen — i. e.,in order not to be shot at or hit. If 
 it had all been a mere waste of labor, it would not be so bad; 
 but that a whole generation has had an opportunity to imbibe 
 wrong ideas is unfortunate and cannot be remedied at once, 
 smce the men thus affected remain among the living! In all 
 the great powers of Europe, re-armament called forth new 
 regulations for the various arms, new firing regulations, 
 new regulations for field entrenchments and field ser- 
 vice, in all of which Germany led the way, and by 1889 
 France, Austria, England, Russia, and Italy had followed 
 suit. The year of 1888 gave to Germany the small-caliber 
 rifle, and the following year the smokeless powder, things 
 which in 1881, when this book was fii-st published, were in 
 part matters of aspiration, and in part had not been given 
 any consideration whatever. These technical improve- 
 ments have made the defensive the stronger, but success- 
 ful defense does not ensure a successful issue of the war; 
 the attack is required. The defensive being the stronger, 
 it follows that the attack is necessarily more diflScult and, 
 at the decisive points, bloodier. This is the reason why 
 
Tactical Deductions. 341 
 
 tactical rules and forms are being sought for the attack 
 which would tend to diminish the assailant's losses. 
 
 In reviewing the battles, etc., of the War of 1870-71, we 
 find that, throughout, two main rules were ignored, and 
 that these neglects were the causes of our "great" losses, 
 one of them is the total neglect of or insufficiency of recon- 
 naissance on the part of the commander-in-chief, and of all 
 leaders down to the division and even brigade commanders, 
 whenever they had a separate task; the other is the lack of 
 preparation by artillery before the main forces of infantry 
 were thrust into battle. 
 
 There is, for instance, the defective reconnaissance on 
 the IGth of August, notwithstanding that the German cav- 
 alry was on the battle-field that was to be, before the arrival 
 of the X. Corps, and had been for hours in close touch with 
 the enemy. Closely connected with it was the further 
 shortcoming, in that the system of reporting was not suita- 
 bly organized, so that reports were late in arriving, or 
 inaccurate, or were not rendered at all to that leader who 
 on account of the situation should have been first informed. 
 On the 17th and 18th of August we are met by the 
 equally surprising fact, that the large forces of our cavalry 
 failed to promptly locate the extent of the French right, 
 notwithstanding our intention to give decisive battle. 
 
 On the 1st of December Bernhardi's brigade acted even 
 more unskillfully than the 5th Cavalry Division at noon on 
 the lOth of August. Reconnaissance and the organization 
 of the system of reporting must go hand in hand. 
 
 In both of these respects Napoleon 1. still remains our 
 never-attained ideal, and however much he may have served 
 the Germans as an instructor, they have learned little from 
 him in that respect. Any one loth to believe this should 
 
342 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 inform himself of Napoleon's mobility before battle, his 
 reconnaissances on horseback, his exertions and bodily 
 fatigue (at Jena, Dresden, Borodino) in order to gain all im 
 portant information of the enemy by personal inspection, 
 before committing himself to battle. Having acted in this 
 manner before the arrival of the reports, and having on 
 these rides familiarized his staff with the situation, he made 
 his last dispositions, which never failed of their effect I 
 must here state in vindication of the Germans in 1870, 
 that of the most important battles fought against Imperial 
 France, but three were fought with the sanction of the 
 commander-in-chief — Gravelotte, Beaumont, and Sedan; all 
 the others, as regards time, object, and forces, were without 
 that sanction. However imposing may be Moltke's feat of 
 assembling 9 army corps and 6 cavalry divisions on the 
 evening of August 17th, ye,t it is not to be imagined that 
 Napoleon would have issued the order of attack on the 17th 
 without being approximately sure of the enemy's position 
 and of the extent of his right ; that information was, in fact, 
 only gained after the battle had begun, and we found to our 
 sorrow that the enemy's line was twice as long as had been 
 supposed. To obtain better results, there is need not only 
 of a proper employment of the cavalry, but also of a nimble, 
 mobile commander-in-chief, who makes a personal inspection 
 before the dice are cast and after the cavalry has sent in 
 its reports. Little of that kind is to be found throughout 
 the war. We learn that the positions were visited on horse- 
 back after the battle, but never before that event; and as it 
 was in great things, so it was in small affairs. As a conse- 
 quence we were always in doubt, and as soon as the subordi- 
 nate leaders encountered the enemy, they flung themselves 
 against him, though ignorant of his position and strength, 
 and without taking time to reflect how he might be attacked 
 to best advantage. There is but one general who in 
 
Tactical Deductions. 343 
 
 this particular acted like Napoleon; it was General von 
 Herwarth, at Koniggratz. Hence also his splendid suc- 
 cess without appreciable losses! All events which I wit- 
 nessed took such a course as to firmly convince me that the 
 species of men who know how to reconnoiter in Napoleon's 
 way no longer exist, just as the species of cavalry leaders 
 a la Seidlitz seem to have vanished from the earth. Will 
 either ever return? 
 
 An evil must first be located; the proper remedy for it 
 is selected afterward. The chief cause of our losses is to 
 be sought in the lack of reconnaissance preceding the col- 
 lisions, in connection with the brave but unplanned rush of 
 infantry in insufficient numbers. Keconnaissance should 
 extend to the ground, to the strength and position of the 
 enemy; with the information thus gained his intentions may 
 be inferred with fair accuracy, and the ways and means for 
 carrying out our own intentions are thus pointed out at the 
 same time. All officers down to the field officer should be in- 
 formed in a few words of the intentions in each particular 
 case (it is now required by Regulations), so that they 
 may know what is expected of them; and if it be objected 
 that there is no time for it, I reply that in the principal 
 case (Gravelotte) there was time, and that it was easy to do 
 it, owing to the enemy's complete inactivity, the like of whicli 
 is hardly of record, had only the superior leaders realized and 
 taken to heart that time-saving measure. But what was the 
 rule? Brigades and divisions arrived and were thrust into 
 the fight: it was "Forward!" without deploying them in the 
 direction of the action. This was all the information vouch- 
 safed their commanders; in some cases the objective of the 
 attack Was pointed out. •'Forward!" That was all that the 
 officers, down to the field-officers, learned, and it was even 
 frequently communicated by signal. That was the actual 
 
344 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 rule. The troops attacked from the point where they stood, 
 straight to the front, though adjacent ground offered plenty 
 of opportunity for a covered approach. Thus it was in 
 many cases at Worth, and along the entire line of battle 
 at Gravelotte, with the exception of the XII. Army Corps; 
 in the latter battle the consequences of the omission of 
 reconnaissance and artillery preparation pile up mountain 
 high. Neither suitable formations, nor suitable methods, 
 nor control in so far as practicable, are to be found there. 
 What is spent, is spent! The imprudent and precipitate 
 rush of columns over open ground was one of the chief 
 causes of our losses! Had the action suited the circum- 
 stances, military history would know nothing of a Mance 
 ravine, St. Privat, etc., as they are; our literature on losses 
 would not have existed. We can record but few attacks of 
 large bodies which were satisfactory in preparation and 
 execution. Either they were not made, or failed, or barely 
 succeeded, as at St. Privat and Worth, etc. The conceal- 
 ment of the true evil became the further cause of our many 
 tactical errors in peace, of the entire confused literature on 
 losses, and who knows whether the controversy over long- 
 and short-range fire would ever have arisen, if our troops had 
 been properly led, if we had had tacticians and tactics? 
 Whenever the evil is looked for at the wrong place, it will 
 invariably result that the historical tactical truth is buried 
 under a legion of errors, that erudite sophism obscures the 
 simple demands of reason. Sophism was the prevailing 
 disease from 1871 to 1888; sophism as regards toying with 
 forms, the kinds of fire, direction of fire, short- and long- 
 range fire and fire effect, fire with counted cartridges, 
 swarm volleys, suspension of fire, supply of ammunition, 
 etc., although the whole business could have been set- 
 
Tactical Deductions. 34-5 
 
 tied with few words, if the truth had been disclosed. 
 We have not always adopted the right ways since 1888, but 
 the purification of the atmosphere since that year has had 
 a refreshing effect. 
 
 To the principal fault, lack of reconnaissance with its 
 flood of resulting evils, there is to be added the second one, 
 insufficiency or total lack of artillery preparation. It is 
 odd that the artillery finds so little sympathy in the German 
 Army, has so little popularity, and finds so little under- 
 standing of its employment. Prince Hohenlohe himself has 
 not hesitated to attack the honor of the artillery. What 
 could there be worse than to raise and spread against one's 
 own arm the charge of cowardice and laxity in its sense of 
 honor?* 
 
 Before Sedan the effect of artillery was not, or but lit- 
 tle, appreciated by the generals; after that event opinions 
 changed. In not a single one of all the August battles can 
 we speak of a preparation by artillery, and if at Amanvil- 
 liers and St. Privat we had taken the time to subject the 
 points d'appui to the fire of available artillery, I am con- 
 vinced that both places wonld have fallen sooner than they 
 did, and with much less loss, notwithstanding the faulty 
 attack formations of the infantry. Moreover, had we had 
 tacticians to take acount of the inviting conformation of the 
 ground and to promptly drop closed formations, the capture 
 of St. Privat-Amanvilliers would not have been difficult, or 
 costly in time and blood; as regards tactics, we should have 
 gained clear conceptions and ideas, while, on the other hand, 
 the false conclusions drawn from faulty measures have 
 spoiled the tactical views. Thus the art decayed through 
 the fault of the artists! 
 
 ♦Compare "Die Feldartillerie in ihrer Unterstellung unter die 
 Generalkommandos," Berlin, E. S. Mittler, 1889. 
 
 23 
 
346 Inquiries into tlic Tactics of the Future. 
 
 l.ac'k of i-t'coimaissaiu'c and of pi'oparatioii by artil- 
 lery are the two roots of our discoinlitures and of our "scien- 
 tific" errors. The second result in i)art from the first; 
 Avhen ^Ye do not even approximately know where the enemy 
 is and what his position and strength are, the first requisite 
 for an intellijient and retTsonable preparation by artillery 
 is. of course, lackinri:. The best of artillery is then unable 
 to fulfill its task; it is hauled here and there. ]>articularly if 
 the system of transmission of orders is faulty or not used at 
 all, or it is assigned too many objectiACS and has neither suf- 
 ficient time nor power against any one of them and accom- 
 plishes nothing, because groping in the dark. Unless these 
 evils are rigorously counteracted, we shall be subject to 
 further numerous disappointments, which will produce fur- 
 ther tactical evils of secondary character, and because that 
 should by all means be prevented, we have here called the 
 child by the right name without ''giving names." Neglect 
 of the siiui>lest tactical rules, faulty measures in many 
 forms, neglect of the ground, ainilessness and lack of in- 
 sight in attenij)ting the same impossible thing by the same 
 impossible method until disgusted, the employment of anti- 
 quated forms, ignorance of the ballistics of the enemy's wea- 
 pon, all of these are some of the points that ])roduced our 
 losses and our subsequent tactical errors, and the appear- 
 ance of the ''Summer-night's Dream" was ])erfectly intelligi- 
 ble, although I find much in it to disapprove and consider 
 as downright incorrect and harmful. Troops do not con- 
 (pier unless they are led. The war artist (tactician) is not 
 served with a scheme. The pu]nls distort the master's 
 good ideas into the radical: the radicals, declaiming against 
 the one-sidedness of others, are themselves preaching one- 
 sidedness in all its polypic forms, until the reality of war 
 
Tactical Deductions. 347 
 
 applies the correction that can not be made in peace. 
 Unfortunately, the same is, as a rule, of a trist character. 
 
 If the enemy is thoroughly reconnoitered, if the leaders 
 know what they are fo do, if, in a word, there is tactical lead- 
 ing, if the moral and destructive effects of artillery are util- 
 ized, then frontal attacks are practicable after infantry and 
 artillery have gained the superiority of fire. 
 
 The faulty lessons frequently drawn from attacks ruth- 
 lessly undertaken, have found their generic term and expres- 
 sion in the word "Schneid" (smartness, keenness.— Tr.) ; it 
 is to be feared, however, that the term may lead to overesti- 
 mation of one's self and to underestimation of the enemy. 
 Without stoutness of heart, courage, and determination, 
 nothing can be accomplished in a perilous situation, but the 
 advocates of "»S'c/meir/," which is now so prevailing, are 
 moving on false ground because they are nearer to the drill- 
 ground than to the battle-field. We may rest content if in 
 war 20 per cent of the "Schneid" observable in peace, par 
 ticularly with the cavalry, materialize. I only fear that 
 the first great action will prove a considerable corrective. 
 The "Schneid," that may spring from erroneous ideas of war. 
 that is based on mechanical forms, and seeks to force a deci- 
 sion by a ruthless rushing in, represents an unthinking ten- 
 dency which is bound to lead to bloody defeat if put into 
 I)ractice; it is like the mad rule of brute force, which has 
 never accomplished anything. The "Schneid'' that we need 
 should be the result of careful education and training, the 
 intelligent guidance and framing of moral qualities, intelli- 
 gence, and knowledge, in reasonable tactical rules and ideas 
 of battle. It should have its seat in the man's breast; other- 
 wise we shall constantly relapse into lifeless and inefficient 
 mechanics. The "Schneid" of the First Infantry Brigade of 
 the fJuard convevs a terrible lesson. Not until the attack had 
 
348 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 failed was it remembered that the artillery should prepare 
 the attack, and what should have been done long before was 
 done only then. In this one example insufficient reconnais- 
 sance and insufficient preparation by artillery exacted cruel 
 penalties; such instances occurred repeatedly afterward, 
 though not to the same degree. Le Bourget, on the other 
 hand, shows how we had profited by experience; there recon- 
 naissance was sufficient and the "Schneid-^ manifested was 
 of the right kind, because resting on a rational basis and 
 directed into a. proper system for the particular circum- 
 stances, etc. Reconnaissance has been rendered much 
 more difficult by smokeless powder, a cogent reason for 
 devoting particular care to it, in order not to fare worse in 
 future. As a result the preparations for the action will per- 
 haps take up much time. It being probable that an army 
 may have to make several deployments, it follows, in the 
 first place, that the independent cavalry should gain supe- 
 riority over that of the enemy by its strength — i. e., by bat- 
 tle. It is employed, as it were, only as an element of grand 
 tactics — i. e., it is its duty always to locate the enemy's flanks 
 as soon as possible and to maintain uninterrupted communi- 
 cation with army headquarters by means of a well-organized 
 system of reporting, and to send direct reports to the nearest 
 corps commanders also. Unless the enemy's flanks are 
 promptly located, cavalry fails of its task and adds to the 
 difficulty of the superior command in devising its further 
 steps. Reports may be transmitted by good riders, by tele- 
 graph, or by cyclists. In the maneuvers at Beauvais and at 
 Oiins in 1893 the brigades had communication with the 
 divisions within two hours after the cavalry reached its posi- 
 tions. In applying modern practice to Gravelotte we may 
 say that the laying of the field telegraph could easily keep 
 step with the advance of the II. Army, and that there 
 
Tactical Deductions. 349 
 
 should never have been any sensible interruption of com- 
 munication between it and grand headquarters. 
 
 Though the flanks may have been ascertained, much 
 remains to be done, before the pitched battle, that does not 
 appear at once from the map with respect to the flanks. 
 The practice of riding boldly up to, and through, the enemy's 
 advanced troops, as we see it in peace, is impossible in war, 
 and the results of the reports from patrols will be insuffi- 
 cient; the captive balloon may under certain circumstances 
 be of great service, but is not a reliable means of reconnais- 
 sance in field operations, though nearly 100 years (since 
 Fleurus) old; it should therefore not be looked upon as a 
 remedy for the uncertainty caused by smokeless powder. 
 The captive balloon in all its trials has disappointed its 
 most ardent advocates. Fastened to the ground it is sub- 
 ject to sudden, troublesome, and dangerous jolts, when 
 there is the least wind; complete calmness of the atmos- 
 phere is very rare, many times the soaked ground may make 
 it difficult or impossible for the wagon to follow, and thick 
 atmosphere may prevent any great range of vision. 
 
 The observation ladders also are mere palliatives. 
 
 From a favorable point an army commander armed with 
 good glasses may have a good view for 8 kilometers on 
 either side — i. e., in all directions; but such points are rare, 
 and points permitting sufficient view to the front are still 
 rarer. 
 
 The onl}' other remaining means of tactical reconnais- 
 sance is to engage the enemy in such a way as to compel him 
 to develop his forces to an extent that will allow inferences 
 to be drawn. The very best, and best led, bodies of cav- 
 alry no longer possess the fighting power necessary for that 
 purpose. Infantiy may not be able to deploy and produce 
 effect fat long range) as quickly as may be desirable, an3 
 
850 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 thus the artillery, protected by cavalry, alone remains for 
 long-range fire for these purposes. The assailant will then 
 experience the disadvantages advanced positions may 
 entail on him to-day; they cannot be taken without fight- 
 ing, and the final reconnaissance cannot be made until they 
 are taken. It is therefore not improbable that in a case 
 like that of Gravelotte an entire daj^ will be spent in recon- 
 noitering actions. 
 
 Intimately connected therewith are the questions of or- 
 ganization of the system of transmitting orders, and of the 
 distribution and emploj-ment of artillery. The former we 
 have suflQciently discussed; about the latter a few more 
 words are necessary. Experiments have been made in the 
 maneuvers of recent years in not attaching any artillery to 
 the advance guard so as to avoid the danger of being prema- 
 turely forced to deploy in an undesirable direction. That 
 fear implies a prior commission of errors. Full information 
 cannot always be promptly gained by the use of patrols, offi- 
 cers, and other means that have been referred to, but enough 
 may be ascertained for forming a general idea. What infor- 
 mation is lacking will have to be supplied by fighting on the 
 part of artillery and infantry'. At this stage infantry will 
 hardly be able to compel the enemy to show his artillery; 
 artillery is needed for that purpose, and in considerable 
 strength. It is not easy to skillfully lead artillery without 
 information beyond the general result of previous recon- 
 naissance, but we have to learn it; the artillerist should 
 therefore be a far-seeing man and competent to judge the 
 situation. Provided the advance guard cavalry does its 
 duty, I can reach no other conclusion than that an "Ahthei- 
 Jung"* of artillery should be attached to every advance 
 guard of a division, and that the remainder of the divisional 
 
 *A battalion of two or more batteries. — Translator. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 35 L 
 
 artillery be inserted in the column of the main body. By 
 means of a good eye, of sudden appearance in force, quick 
 ranging, and continued accurate observation, artillery 
 will in the future be able to accomplish feats that could 
 not heretofore be expected from that arm. Nothing should 
 be left undone to develop the tactical judgment of artillery 
 officers. 
 
 Moreover the commanders will frequently have to make 
 the reconnaissance for their own work in person, or, depend- 
 ing on the strength of their command, they may despatch 
 officers of judgment on fast horses, who, accompanied by 
 3 or 4 well-mounted despatch riders, will approach the ene- 
 my as much under cover as possible to gain an insight in the 
 state of affairs from elevated points by the use of good 
 glasses, or to survey portions of the enemy's position from 
 a flank. What I emphasize in this connection is judgment, 
 excellence in horsemanship, and delight in daring. Without 
 that combination of qualities these officers will never be 
 able to accomplish their task in a satisfactory manner. 
 
 As a type in this respect I have in mind the present 
 commanding general of the XVI. Army Corps, Count von 
 Haseler, and I know all will agree with me who know what 
 that one officer accomplished in peace and war by just such 
 a combination of qualities. Well, Haselers are no common- 
 place men, and should for that reason be emulated; without 
 such men an army will be poorly advised where the variable 
 situation on the enemy's side is concerned. That leads me 
 back to the statement I made in the Introduction, and which 
 I meant to elucidate and vindicate in this chapter — namely, 
 that great care should be taken not to employ general staff 
 officers too much in duties of a bureaucratic tendency, and 
 too little in active, practical employment. The two, as a rule, 
 do not go well together; those who incline to the former 
 
352 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 as the aim of their lives will dislike the bodily exertion 
 required for practical work. I acknowledge that it may be 
 difiScult always to find the right road, but the latter should 
 never be lost sight of, because too much depends on it that 
 would not follow as a natural result in time of war. Field- 
 marshal Moltke demanded good horsemanship and daily 
 reading of good newspapers. It may perhaps not be out 
 of place to point out that newspaper reading, as handled by 
 Moltke, does not seem to prevail to-day, and I would also 
 like to point out that there is no better means of preparing 
 for the general work of the general staff officer than the crit- 
 ical reading of newspapers. The news contained therein 
 is in a sense reports and accounts of doubtful matters, and 
 is frequently contradictory. It offers a fine opportunity for 
 the officers to constantly exercise and test their powers of 
 conjecture, to distinguish the correct from that which is in- 
 correct, and to discover by their own judgment the "true 
 inwardness" in the labyrinth of inaccurate statements. In 
 this respect there is no position that so much resembles the 
 work of the general staff officer in peace and war as does 
 that of an able editor.and the great Moltkeknewexactlyhow 
 to point out everywhere the means that lead up to the great 
 aim of the general staff officer — namely, to gain by personal 
 examination and judgment a more or less correct conception 
 of the truth and of the facts from a mass of inaccurate 
 and uncertain statements, inferences, and paraphrase. All 
 cannot accomplish it by mere work — much depends on nat- 
 ural gifts — nor is it possible in every case to point out the 
 methods; the proverb ''Practice makes perfect" applies 
 here; nay, daily discipline in such matters is the bread of 
 the general staff officer, because it requires all the powers 
 of the mind to be concentrated on one point, which psychic- 
 ally, bureaucratically, and tactically, is the vocation of the 
 
Toxtical Deductions. 353 
 
 general staff officer. These things enlarge and sharpen the 
 judgment; they are to him daily mental and moral gym- 
 nastics, not only in the military, but still more, in peace, in 
 the political field. The general staff officer should there- 
 fore be master of the latter; it will save him from false, 
 bureaucratic bias, since in tactics variation alone is con- 
 stant, while war and politics are one in character, insep- 
 arable and indivisible. The change in the direction of 
 the mai'ch toward Sedan shows how difficult it is to discern 
 the truth among contradictory newspaper statements or 
 reports that seem improbable. We here have the same 
 requirement again in the strictly military field; reconnais- 
 sances (in the strategic sense) are frequently made in conse- 
 quence of newspaper and other reports; the character of 
 reconnaissance is always the same and should always be 
 most extensively practiced in doubtful situations of large or 
 small import. It may be said that the general staff officer 
 is not always available for such duties; I do not insist on it; 
 care should, however, be taken that reconnaissance be dealt 
 with in a way befitting its present and future importance, 
 and that nothing be undertaken without thorough reconnais- 
 sance in order that we may not again witness such a 
 lamentable occurrence as at Gravelotte, not to mention 
 other things not quite so bad. General staff officers will, as 
 a rule, be the only ones sufficiently familiar with the ideas of 
 the superior commanders to carry out a reconnaissance with 
 skill.* Every action entered upon without thorough recon- 
 naissance is a game of chance; every attack undertaken 
 without proper artillery preparation, an indiscretion. 
 
 ♦Compare the role of Captain Seebeck in "Die Gefechte von Bois- 
 comiinm nnd Lorcey am 24ste nnd 2<iste Xnvembor, 1870" ("The 
 Actions of Boiscommun and Lorcey on the 24th and 26th of Novem- 
 ber, 1870"), Berlin, 1893, R. Felix, military publisher. 
 
354 Inquiries into ike Tactics of the Future. 
 
 VIII. Of Turning Movements.* 
 
 Turning movements are as old as war, tactically as well 
 as strategically, and many great leaders, conscious of their 
 superiority, have so planned their operations that the tac- 
 tical turning movement followed as a natural sequence from 
 the continuation of the strategical movement. Thus, for 
 instance, Cromwell acted at Worcester, Napoleon I. at 
 Ulm. in 1805, and at Jena in 1800, and the Allies did the 
 same at Leipsic; on the part of the Prussians, we find it in 
 1866 at Koniggratz, and in 1870-71 at Worth, Gravelotte, and 
 Sedan; on the part of the French at Coulmiers, Beaune la 
 Eolande, Loigny-Poupry, Bapaume, on the Lisaine; again, on 
 the part of the Germans, at St. Quentin, and in Manteuflfel's 
 operations against Bourbaki, etc. 
 
 In all these cases the initiatory measures are of strate- 
 gic origin; in their highest development they result in a 
 complete surrounding, of which Ulm. Metz, and Sedan are 
 good examples. 
 
 In order to study military history and apply its lessons, 
 it is necessary to thoroughly investigate the causes in each 
 case, which in turn requires full knowledge of the meaning 
 of terms, of strategy and tactics as a whole, and of their 
 details. A certain tendency unfortunately seems to be 
 formulating, which, if prevailing, should be counteracted by 
 every available means, because bej-ond doubt leading to con- 
 fusion and to a decay of the art of war; it is the tendency no 
 longer to respect any boundary between strategy and tac- 
 tics. Judging by what comes to our ears, that tendency has 
 many adherents, but we fear it would merely furnish us 
 with ^'routiniers'' lacking in appreciation of the finer aspects 
 of the art, and who would ever remain superficial imitators 
 
 *The term here used by the author is "Vrnfassung," a general 
 term for overlapping, outflanking, and turning movements. — Tr. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 355 
 
 and who can never lay claim to a thorough understanding of 
 the nature of things. I have no intention to write a dis- 
 course on strategy or tactics, in order to convert men mis- 
 led in their intellectual conceptions. Those who have 
 preached such doctrines have burdened themselves with a 
 heavy responsibility. I will briefly say that a person, for 
 instance, who is incapable of appreciating the difference 
 between one of Beethoven's symphonies and a rhapsody by 
 Brahms is to be pitied, because Nature has denied him the 
 faculty of recognizing, discerning, enjoying, and of survey- 
 ing the vast field lying between the two in all its gradations 
 and of understanding all its fine distinguishing shades. To 
 such men it is all simply music, to such soldiers strategy and 
 tactics are simply war, and war merely tactics. Their place 
 is in the barracks. Because the spirit, mind, and emotions 
 of such men are insensible to all the finer shades, these fine 
 distinctions, which are a source of real enjoyment to supe- 
 rior minds, do not therefore disappear, nor do the gradations 
 of art; art is simply beyond the comprehension of those piti- 
 able men and soldiers in whom an understanding of it has not 
 been cultivated. Though some people may be unable to dis- 
 tinguish between bright and faint red, and though they 
 may deny any difference in them because they do not per- 
 ceive it, that difference of shade nevertheless remains, it 
 is simply beyond the grasp of their uncultivated eye; it is 
 the same in the science of war with those who deny a differ- 
 ence betwen strategy and tactics! Whoever fails to com- 
 prehend that the measures resulting in the closing of the 
 ring at Sedan are of strategic origin should keep at a long 
 distance from the art, for to him the art of war is a closed 
 book. 
 
 However foolish it would be to deny the fundamental dif- 
 ference between strategj^and tactics,it would be equally fool- 
 
356 Inquiries into the Tactics of tli^ Future. 
 
 isli to keep them ever pedantically, schematicallY separated. 
 Just as in the highest product of art of any kind the sum 
 total of artistic effect is brought out so that it is impossible 
 to say this line stops here, that one begins there, so in the 
 highest product of military art, in battle, the strategic lines 
 merge into the tactical, and then to go to work and seek for 
 a difference would be to betray the instincts of the artisan. 
 It is a perfectly logical phenomenon in military history that 
 all great generals, of whatever nation, have been men of 
 aesthetic tastes, with a love for the fine arts, men of fine sen- 
 sibilities, of sharp discernment, of bright and powerful 
 mind; they all had the make-up of artists, if I may express 
 it in this way, and in our military education nothing is more 
 to be deplored than the total lack of everything that tends 
 to develop and refine the taste for art, the {esthetic taste, and 
 all finer sensibilities. For that reason many do not strive 
 for the highest, their conception of their vocation is super- 
 ficial, they never reflect on its artistic aspect. Their intro. 
 duction to a:»sthetics, particularly in connection with ra- 
 tional lectures on philosophy, would be of a thousandfold 
 more benefit than many other things to which half a lifetime 
 is devoted, which merely touch the outlines, and which ai-e 
 matters of course! With such a system of education, tactics 
 and strategy would never have been thrown in the same pot 
 and there Avould be more of spontaneous effort to become an 
 artist. It ma}- not be inopportune to say so, since it appears, 
 from what has been stated, that the bounding lines between 
 strategy and tactics have been somewhat displaced by re- 
 cent inventions, and that in the position warfare, which will 
 certainly ensue, the position-battle will be a normal feature. 
 A decision can hardly be expected in such cases without 
 turning movements. 
 
 It is natural that the numerically superior should use 
 
Tactical Deductions. 357 
 
 his superiority for turning movements, but up to within 
 recent times those who employed turning movements did 
 not invariably possess a great superiority, nor has their vic- 
 tory been due in every case to the turning of the enemy and 
 to the tactics of the superior number of combatants em- 
 ployed. Other important causes are therefore bound to 
 exist which bring about the real decision after the material 
 object has been accomplished. Moreover, there can be no 
 doubt that if anything at all were normal in tactics, turn- 
 ing tactics might be said to have been the rule; in modern 
 times, on every occasion, in the insignificant action as in 
 the great battle, there must be some reason for it. On the 
 other hand, generals have made turning movements with 
 inferior forces even before the introduction of the present 
 improved arms, and have conijuered whenever that minor- 
 ity was conscious of superior fighting power. It is plain 
 that we should not, either here or anywhere, content our- 
 selves with reducing such phenomena to rule, with explain- 
 ing them in a purely mechanical way, and with measuring 
 them with the dividers, which seems to be the favorite occu- 
 pation of our peace war-artists; military history is useful 
 only when the causes in each case are investigated and 
 understood. 
 
 Notwithstanding his considerable inferiority. General 
 Davout flanked the Duke of Brunswick at Auerstadt, and 
 could do so without danger, because the fighting power of 
 the Trench Army was much greater than that of the Prus- 
 sian Army, or because the French tactics were better, to 
 express it differently. Davout did not at all act as the 
 "lucky soldier," but as a man fully cognizant of the supe- 
 riority of the French tactics on account of the superior lead- 
 ing and greater effect inherent in them, and what to the 
 uninitiated did, and does, appear as very hazardous, is in 
 
368 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 fact something very natural, something intended and well 
 considered, I do wish to call Davout's resolve something 
 extraordinary, but I desire to point out that, particularly in 
 view of Davout's unfavorable strategical (the "collectors" 
 will, of course, insist on calling it tactical) situation, the 
 example furnishes a standard for all times of what a gen- 
 eral may risk without speculating,if he knows both sides and 
 is thus aware when he may deviate from those rules which 
 "tacticians" are wont to consider inviolable. To be a tacti- 
 cian is not to cling to rules, but to adapt reasonable means 
 to the circumstances in order that all the fighting power 
 there is in the troops may be utilized. Davout acted thus, 
 and is entitled to one of the first places among tacticians on 
 account of his intelligent action. I know of no other exam- 
 ple of flanking at all comparable with this one, considering 
 the great inferiority of numbers and the victory gained de- 
 spite that inferiority; the firing power of the French infantry 
 and artillery was certainly not superior to that of the Prus- 
 sians. The example goes to show that given two opponents 
 armed with like weapons, they will by no means produce 
 the same effect with them, and that the effect depends on 
 the use made of the weapons. It is exactly so to-day! 
 Fighting power and firing powder are two different things, 
 and we should not only declaim against those who would 
 recognize but one tactical example as regards forms, but 
 also combat those doctrines which rely solely on firing 
 power. Firing is but a part — the material part — of the 
 fighting power, of which the other components are to be 
 sought in the field of morale, of intelligence, and of disci- 
 jjline, all of which qualities should be subordinate to it. If 
 firing power had been the decisive factor in Davout's resolve, 
 he would have been guilty of a piece of stupidity, as it is 
 plain that 40,000 muskets can project more bullets than 
 
Tactical Deductions. 359' 
 
 25,000, provided the qualities of the arms are the same on 
 both sides. 
 
 Auerstadt furnishes proof that, notwithstanding great 
 numerical inferiority, and with equally good fire-anns on 
 both sides, flanking may produce great results, if the flank- 
 ing opponent employs superior tactics. 
 
 While it cannot be denied that the ballistic qualities of 
 all arms are incomparably superior to-day, still, when look- 
 ing at both opponents, we have to acknowledge that they are 
 about on the same level as regards armament. Hence there 
 has been no change in the essential chracteristics; the im- 
 proved arms simply extend the limits of movement and 
 of fire more or less, thus rendering the dispositions for, and 
 the execution of, turning movements, and the success of any 
 kind of enterprise, much more difficult. I shall endeavo^ 
 to prove this. 
 
 When, after the establishment of the republic, the 
 French had gained superiority of numbers, it was the 
 rule with them, not the exception, to seek strategic turning 
 movements, and the resulting tactical flanking, in the same 
 way as did the Germans in 1800 and 1870-71, not only when 
 the numbers were equal, but also when they were inferior or 
 superior (compare Trautenau June 28th, Gitschin June 29th, 
 Koniggratz July 3d, Blumenau July 24th, with equal or 
 inferior numbers; Worth August 0th, Gravelotte August 
 18th, Sedan September 1st. with superior numbers ; Le Mans 
 January 10th and 11th, St. Quentin January 19, 1871, with 
 Inferior forces). The very first action fought by the republic 
 against the Germans at Coulmiers on November 9th was 
 planned strategically as a turning movement and tactically 
 as "Umfassung,'' as was Beaune la Rolande on November 
 28th, Loigny-Poupry on December 2d, Bapaume January 2d 
 and 3d, 1871, Lisaine 15th, IGth, 17th of January, 1871, Le 
 
360 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 Mans on and after Januai'y 5th; all of these instances are 
 taken from field operations. As regards position warfare, 
 Noisseville (first day), Le Bourget, December 21, 1870, were 
 planned as "Umfassungs" battles, but Coulmiers was the 
 only one where some success was gained, chiefly because the 
 German cavalry, which should have acted decisively on the 
 right flank, failed in its task. In all of these cases it must 
 be admitted that the French plan for each battle provided 
 for an effective strategic turning movement, that in every 
 case the French had a considerable numerical superiority, 
 and that on account of their superior armament they should 
 also have possessed a great superiority of fire power. That 
 they nevertheless failed was due to the fact, 1, that battles 
 vvith turning movements are very diflScult to direct; 2, that 
 they require an excellent system of transmission of orders; 
 3, clear judgment and initiative on the part of the leaders; 
 and 4, a high degree of mobility ; in brief, a higher degree of 
 training and efficiency on the part of the troops than is pos- 
 sessed by the enemy. Armies devoid of that combination 
 of qualities ai*e unsuccessful, as is strikingly illustrated by 
 the battle on the Lisaine. There the French commander-in- 
 chief, in planning the turning movement, was as much mis- 
 taken with regard to the extent of the German line as 
 were the Germans on August 18, 1870, about the French 
 position. It is well known that in both cases the front of 
 the position proved to be twice as long as was anticipated. 
 In both cases the turning movements were planned on 
 wrong premises, and in both cases the error was only found 
 out when the turning movement was under way. By dint of 
 the higher efficiency of their armies the Germans repaired 
 their error, in the main, within three hours, and gained the 
 decision and victory on the 18th of August by means of 
 the turning movement as planned, whereas the French 
 
Tactical Deductions. 361 
 
 East Army, whose corps were closely concentrated on 
 the right, accomplished no more in three days than to 
 disentangle them! The turning movement ultimately as- 
 sumed the right direction, but by that time the fighting 
 power of the entire army was broken, and instead of conquer- 
 ing, the army suffered a defeat which culminated in a 
 catastrophe. 
 
 A turning movement therefore requires, in the first 
 place, an eflBeient army with efficient infantry of superior 
 fighting power. Wherever these requisites were combined, 
 there the turning movement with equal numbers, and even 
 with inferior numbers (Auerstadt, St Quentin, and lastly Le 
 Mans) led to success; where that combination is lacking, 
 neither superior number of combatants, nor the greater num- 
 ber of rifles, nor superior fire power will ensure success, 
 for a stout opponent is not driven off by fire; even in the 
 "Umfassungs" battle the tactical point has to be carried by 
 assault, and after a protracted fire action the infantry must 
 still possess sufficient fighting power for the final onslaught. 
 Such was the case on the part of the Germans at Worth, 
 Gravelotte, and St. Quentin, while Sedan is less entitled to 
 mention in this connection. Chanzy's operations against 
 Vendome (January 5, 1871), where he meant to turn the Ger- 
 mans, show, on the other hand, that of the two opponents 
 meeting on the offensive the numerically weaker Germans, 
 who were to be turned, themselves turned the French as the 
 operations progressed, and that on accomplishing the turn 
 ing movement (La Tuil^rie) the battle was decided by the 
 bold action of a few companies. I do not believe that modern 
 arms and the new powder greatly change the nature of the 
 "Umfassvngs^' battle; that the decision on the turned flank 
 for flanks) requires an assault as the last act ; that the latter 
 cannot be much more difficult than it was in 1870, against 
 
 24 
 
362 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the Imperial Army witli the Chassepot, since the fire power 
 cannot become much greater than it was at St. Prlvat, 
 for instance; that the side undertaking turning movements 
 is better able to solve the tactical part of the problem than 
 was the case then ; and that, on account of the unobstructed 
 view, the turning movement can be much better directed 
 than formerly. The decisive blow will be equally required 
 in future; it may even be delivered by swarms intermixed 
 with small and more solid bodies, the swarm being of neces- 
 sity the prevailing formation as heretofore. 
 
 In that connection we cannot dispense with successive 
 lines (Treff en), and they should not be condemned on general 
 principles because wrongly used heretofore; it is only neces- 
 sary that they be properly used in certain situations and 
 phases, the formations to be employed in each case being left 
 to the judgment of the leaders. Owing to the unobstructed 
 view, great skill is indispensable in bringing the troops for- 
 ward — i. e., in utilizing the ground for the approach, which is 
 a prime requisite in such matters. It goes to show that suc- 
 cess requires the cooperation of many essentials, and that 
 turning movements to-day make higher demands on the 
 superior leaders than on the troops. The leader should 
 therefore make a thorough personal reconnaissance and so 
 inform himself of all important matters as to gain a clear 
 insight into the situation while the troops are on the march, 
 and to be able to instruct and dispose them intelligently on 
 their arrival. It requires great mobility, personal observa- 
 tion, and a tactical eye on the part of the leaders. 
 
 Turning movements having gained in favor since the 
 notable increase of fire effect in 1866, it is to be expected, 
 and it is unavoidable, that they should gain still more in 
 future. As regards any fear for the front entertained by 
 the opponents of turning movements and the swarm tactics 
 
Tactical Deductions. 363 
 
 inseparable therefrom, we believe that our expositions from 
 military history show that what is usually called a weak 
 front, because of the relativeh' small number of infantry,has 
 invariably proven sufficiently strong to guard the front, pro- 
 vided the infantry was good, i)rovided its tactical employ- 
 ment on the part of the leaders was correct, and provided 
 it was supported by a numerous artillery, A good infantry 
 is what is specially needed to-day for a turning movement, 
 and it will be well to keep a few battalions in hand for emer- 
 gencies. If their morale is good, the troops, armed as they 
 are with 'modern rifles, may be expected to develop suffi- 
 cient jjowers of resistance if superior forces should turn 
 on them; and with greater probability, as it is only since 
 the introduction of smokeless powder that leaders are able 
 to lead in a manner approximating the ideal in so far as con- 
 cerns the employment of large bodies and their common 
 object. Again, in the turning movement, infantry and 
 artillery are now able to concentrate their fire on the most 
 important point and just about treble the effect as compared 
 with the past, firing from various points, perhaps from the 
 front and flank, which neither infantry nor artillery could 
 formerly do on account of the smoke. This possibility of 
 common fire direction of infantry and artillery against the 
 decisive point, and the fact that the long-range rifle and the 
 shrapnel echelon fire are bound to reach the enemy's re- 
 serves from the front and flank, will, in my opinion, make 
 the attack and the habitual use of "Umfassungs'^ more expe- 
 dient than ever. This should not provoke the friends of the 
 defensive; facts Mall prove it as surely as it is better to have 
 eyes than to have none. 
 
 In the future attack we have to distinguish between 
 two cases: the assailant can either approach under cover, or 
 he can not. It is unnecessarv to state that in the latter case 
 
364 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the assailant labors under a great disadvantage, but it should 
 be pointed out that, in consequence of the absence of smoke, 
 it will be much more difficult to subdue him than formerly 
 whenever he is able to open the action from covered 
 positions. 
 
 Stupid measures on the part of the '^sub-tacticians" may 
 cause the best planned turning movement to fail in the exe- 
 cution; St.Quentin is an instructive example in that respect. 
 Although inferior in numbers, Goben intended to turn the 
 enemy's right, to push him away from his line of retreat, and 
 to destroy him. It resembles the case of Davout at Auer- 
 stadt. The stupid action of the IGth Division and the delay 
 of the 15th Division in coming into action destroyed Goben's 
 l)lan, and the decision was brought about in the front, ex- 
 actly the point where he did not want it! But even while the 
 decision was being made, and after it was enacted, the mass 
 of cavalry on the German left remained inactive, though its 
 leading troops had the enemy's line of retreat within their 
 grasp and their opponents were troops of inferior quality. 
 In order that harmony might not be lacking, the cavalry on 
 the right flank acted in like manner, though confronting a 
 shaken and defeated enemy. Coulmiers, Beaune, Loigny, 
 and St. Quentin utterly condemn the German cavalry lead- 
 ers. In the first case the enemy's turning movement suc- 
 ceeded on account of the inactivity of our cavalry; in the 
 other cases we failecj of our object for the same reason. 
 
 Prussia's and Germany's opponents in 1866 and 1870-71 
 never succeeded in piercing the German front while the lat- 
 ter were turning their opponent's flank. At Gravelotte, 
 where there was a splendid opportunity between noon and 
 o p. m. for breaking through our IX. Corps in the direction 
 of Verneville, the enemy failed to perceive his advantage; 
 while it would not have been impossible after 4 p. m. to 
 
Tactical Deductions. 365 
 
 break the German front at some point there, it would not 
 have amounted to more than a temporary success, because 
 at that hour a secoud line (III., X., and II. Army Corps) was 
 forming in rear of the first. The various frontal attacks of 
 the French at Worth brought but transient advantages and 
 ultimately shivered against our artillery. The six attacks 
 against the 3d Infantry Brigade of the Guard at Amanvil- 
 liers were repulsed, but they were intended as mere forward 
 movements, and not meant to break our front. On the other 
 hand, there are two very instructive cases where the supe- 
 rior enemy, who undertook to turn his opponent, was not 
 only not able to defeat the latter, but was himself defeated 
 and had his line of battle pierced. They are the remarkable 
 battles of Beaune la Rolande on the 28th of November, and 
 of Loigny-Poupry on the 2d of December. In both battles 
 the situation bears a certain resemblance; at Beaune the 
 enemy meant to turn the three brigades of the X. Army 
 Corps with his XX. and XVIII. Army Corps, while portions 
 of his XV. Corps were to support the French left and reap 
 the fruits of the expected victory; at Loigny-Poupry the 
 enemy intended to do the same thing with his XVI. and XV. 
 Corps supported by the XVII. In either case two separate 
 battles resulted: 1, Beaune and Juranville; 2, Loigny and 
 Poupry. In the first case the 38th Brigade was very suc- 
 cessfully turned on three sides, but the turning movement 
 of the XVIII. Army Corps failed against the 37th and 39th 
 Brigades at Juranville, both of which maintained them- 
 selves between the two hostile corps in such a way that 
 the latter could not join hands effectively until very late. 
 The very much inferior Germans held out in that situa- 
 tion, and finally, at 3 p. m., when supported by the 
 heads of the III. Corps, they turned the enemy them- 
 selves, notwithstanding their numerical inferiority. There 
 
366 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 was no intention on our part to break through the enemy's 
 turning movement; yet, looked at from the tactical point, 
 the offensive taken at Juranville practically had that effect. 
 At Loigny-Poupry the French meant to turn the Germans 
 on the East, but a promx^t change of front on the part of 
 the 22d Division made the movement impossible, while at 
 the same time the capture of Loigny by the 17th Division 
 pierced the enemy's main position in front. The French 
 center was successfully pierced in this manner. We have 
 dwelt on these two instances at some length because the 
 latter particularly is almost unique in military annals on 
 account of the numerical inferiority. It is one of the cases 
 that mark the culmination of the tactics of the Germans as 
 regards the leading, as well as the endurance and fighting 
 power of the troops. In both battles (at Beaune and Loigny) 
 the swarm intermixed with small bodies in close order was 
 usually employed on the offensive. That the lines of the 
 French, who were making a turning movement, were pierced 
 is chiefly due to the high degree of offensive spirit still 
 extant in the German troops after the heavy losses of the 
 war (I. Bavarian Army Corps and 22d Division), and to the 
 clumsiness of the French leading and of the French troops. 
 No army should make the "Umfassungs^' battle its rule, 
 unless its leaders and troops are fully equal to the task; 
 where such is not the case, it is all the more necessary that 
 the army corps be so formed and disposed before the begin- 
 ning of the turning movement that the resulting line of 
 battle will show no gaps, where the enemy may penetrate, 
 maintain himself, and pierce the hostile front. The French 
 invariably endeavored to dispose their troops in this man- 
 ner before the movement, but did not succeed even in that. 
 It need therefore not be specially stated that they would 
 never have been successful in launching a turning move- 
 
Tactical Deductions. 367 
 
 ment direct from the march. Xor did they ever attempt it. 
 The diversity of ^^Umfassungs" battles and actions as 
 fought by the Germans — notwithstanding a number of 
 errors — thus constitutes the most eloquent proof that a 
 highly efficient army alone can develop such diversity and 
 gain success, while the French, on the other hand, never suc- 
 ceeded in carrying out a grand turning movement — notwith- 
 standing their great numerical superiority, not even at 
 Coulmiers and Bapaume, both places being evacuated by 
 the Germans of their own accord after repulsing the enemy. 
 All turning movements partake more or less of the char- 
 acter of great "combined movements," which are very diffi- 
 cult; an army not thoroughly efficient had better avoid 
 them. The fact that certain tactical fanatics declaim 
 against the "Umfassungs'' battles of the Germans simply 
 goes to expose their inferiority as "tacticians," and if one 
 side is invariably successful and the other invariably unsuc- 
 cessful in the same thing, the proof that superior efficiency 
 won, in spite of our opponent's superior fire power, is so con- 
 vincing that it is superfluous to say anything about it. It 
 follows with certainty that, in consequence of the superior 
 fire power (small-caliber arms, increased fire effect of artil- 
 lery, absence of smoke), the Germans will more than ever be 
 partial to turning movements ; and that in doing so they will 
 be the more protected from the danger of having their line 
 pierced because our fire power has been at least trebled since 
 1870-71, while that of the French, in comparison with that 
 of the Chassepot, has merely gained in strength. We should 
 therefore preserve our composure, base our calculations on 
 facts, and give no more room to the play of imagination than 
 is rational ; then, not only shall we be able in the future to 
 carry out the same things as deliberate designs, but we shall 
 <;arry them out much better, because we can give more empha- 
 
368 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 sis to our intentions; and, for the latter purpose, a proper use 
 of the artillery is requisite above all other things. That done^ 
 there is no reason why, after the superiority of fire is at- 
 tained, the final onslaught should not be made with hurrah 
 and beating of drums just as in 1870-71; at that stage the 
 enemy's fire will not be as dangerous as at the beginning, 
 and formations may then be used which would have been 
 inapplicable for purposes of fire action up to the attainment 
 of the superiority of fire. I can only repeat that there 
 should be legitimate freedom and no orthodoxy, either in 
 favor of or against any particular method. One considera- 
 tion, however, it is well to point out — namely, that the side 
 making a turning movement will probably never have suf- 
 ficient artillery (i. e., efflcient artillery) to batter the ene- 
 my's front. Where the enemy selects wide, open plains 
 for the battle, the artillery question becomes the main ques- 
 tion, and that arm will never be pressed for space. Two 
 instances of defense remain to be mentioned where, in conse- 
 quence of the conformation of the ground, the Germans, 
 though on the defensive, flanked the enemy — namely, at 
 Villiers on November 30th and December 2d, and in the bat- 
 tle of Mont Val^rien on January 19, 1871. In both cases 
 the enemy had a considerable numerical superiority and his 
 intention was to turn us; but all attempts to gain any 
 imj)ortant advantage by combined front and flank attacks 
 failed because outflanked by the defensive position of the 
 Germans and of the manner in which the Germans turned 
 their advantage to tactical account. 
 
 A few words about the "Umfassuiu/s'' action at Le 
 Bourget on October 30th. The three columns assailing the 
 village from the north, east, and south had about one-half 
 of their troops formed in close order, the other half in 
 swarms. All three columns advanced simultaneously and 
 
Tactical Deductions. 369 
 
 resolutely in that formation by companies, and for tlie most 
 part without halt; it was about 8 o'clock in the morning, and 
 the enemy's infantry could fire 1000 to 1500 meters, in three 
 directions. It was not a real surprise of the enemy, since 
 all three columns were still 800 to 900 meters from the vil- 
 lage when our artillery fire called the enemy to his lines of 
 defense.* None of the columns suffered itself to be em- 
 broiled in a fire action; all accelerated their advance. The 
 loss of 450 men suffered here by nine battalions can surely 
 not be called excessive in view of the Chassepdt fire, and the 
 hostile garrison, which numbered about four battalions. 
 Le Bourget was an advanced post, but the action is never- 
 theless instructive, and what could be done there will be 
 possible in the future, though the columns would not be so 
 disposed in the north and south as here, because, on account 
 of the long range and power of penetration of modern rifles, 
 they would inflict losses on each other. In other respects 
 Le Bourget remains the standard for similar cases, of which 
 there are bound to be more in the future than there were in 
 the past. 
 
 The unobstructed view, the long range, and the in- 
 creased effect of infantry and artilery fire make it necessary 
 to begin all preparatory measures for a turning movement, 
 either against an advanced post or in the pitched battle, at 
 a greater distance. In this respect the consideration of 
 unobstructed view will affect us more thaa the range of the 
 enemy's rifle, wMch, in comparison with that of the Chasse- 
 p6t, has not so very much increased since 1870-71, It fol- 
 lows that the superior leaders should precede their troops 
 in order to divert them from the column at the proper time. 
 
 *For details, see Von Kries and Von Besser. History of the 
 Empress Augusta Hrenadier Regiment and of the Rifle Battalion of 
 the Guard. 
 
370 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 This is an important duty for the division and brigade com- 
 manders and still more for the commanding generals, as it 
 is the only way to avoid crowding, crossing, and delays. It 
 is the more indispensable, as the improved fire-arms will 
 naturally impel the fighting troops to exert their fire power 
 — i. e., to extend toward the flanks. At this point supe- 
 rior leading encounters diflSculties which cannot be deter- 
 mined in advance and which can be overcome only by early 
 reconnaissance, by the prompt diversion of the troops as- 
 signed to the turning movement, by circumspection and un- 
 derstanding, by good organization of the system for the 
 transmission of orders, and by a sufficiency of means 
 for the same, etc.; to avoid and overcome them all will, 
 of course, be impossible. That these difficulties will be 
 very great is evident from what was intended and 
 what was accomplished at Gravelotte, and what had 
 to be done to gain success at all. In forming a concep- 
 tion of what the course of the battle of the future will 
 be like, Gravelotte is and remains tacticallj' the most 
 instructive example on account of what the tacticians 
 failed to do, and on account of the many critical tac- 
 tical situations they thus invited. In all military history 
 there is hardly a battle where not only the subordinate but 
 also the superior leaders made so many tactical blunders 
 as did the Germans at Gravelotte. In my opinion, the con- 
 centration of the .armies before the battle was the greatest 
 strategic feat accomplished, while in tactics the Germans 
 did their very worst; tactically Gravelotte is a perfect night- 
 mare. Considering the excellence of the generals present, 
 we can hardly expect to have better ones in the future. As 
 the best are apt to commit errors, it is the more reason why 
 we should learn to see things in the right way; we note but 
 two exceptions at Gravelotte — namely, the commanding 
 
Tactical Deductions. 371 
 
 generals of the XII. and VIII. Army Corps, since the short- 
 comings of the latter corps cannot be charged against 
 General Goben. 
 
 Cases will probably be more rare in future where, as at 
 Worth and Koniggratz, the last march before the battle 
 "converts the more or less intentional turning movement 
 into tactical flanking. I also believe that, as regards con- 
 centration before the battle, Gravelotte is also the strategic 
 standard of the future battle in so far as it is at all proper 
 to speak of standards — i. e., marching and concentrating on 
 the first day, and fighting on the second. The second day 
 may perhaps be lengthened out into two. As regards infor- 
 mation of the enemy gained after the concentration, Grave- 
 lotte is not a good example, to be sure; and in view of the 
 present nature of the employment of cavalry w^e may 
 assume that there will be no repetition of such things ; also, 
 that it will be the rule to concentrate the armies before the 
 battle, as was Napoleon's method, and that the assailant will 
 not issue his orders, particularly for turning movements, 
 until after the concentration. The opposing lines of battle 
 will probably not often be closer to each other than the two 
 opposing armies at Gravelotte on the morning of August 
 18th were in the center, on the line from Montigny la Grange 
 to Verneville and to our IX. Corps. It may thus be further 
 stated that, assuming information of the exact position of 
 the enemy to have been gained, the turning movement will 
 have to be initiated 5 to 6 kilometers and more from the ene- 
 my. It entails great difficulties for the direction of the 
 concentrated army. The Germans overcame the difficulties 
 at Gravelotte, and since turning and flanking will be the 
 rule in large and small actions, we should study the disturb- 
 ing elements in the course of that battle. In that way our 
 modern "war scientists," who no longer acknowledge any 
 
372 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 difference between tactics and strategy, may perhaps be 
 brought back into the right path; it will show them how in 
 the dispositions for, and in the execution of the pitched bat- 
 tle, the strategic consideration prevails and is decisive, and 
 that on that very account the task of the tacticians from the 
 beginning and through all the phases of the battle has be- 
 come one of graver responsibility. If they do not know, or if 
 they fail to understand, the strategic motive, the troubles 
 of Gravelotte will be repeated in an aggravated form ; owing 
 to the necessary extensive measures, it will result, not in a 
 Gravelotte such as it turned out after all, notwithstanding 
 all the blunders, but in a Lisaine battle, such as it was fought 
 by the French — i. e., there will be no turning or flanking, 
 and the result will be defeat. In such a case the Napoleonic 
 method of piercing the opponent's line will have as much 
 prospect of success as in the days of Napoleon himself. If 
 the tacticians know the strategic motive, if they assist in 
 its execution, then Sedan shows what skillful turning move- 
 ments, resulting in a complete envelopment, may accom- 
 plish; if the strategists have "lost the thread," the battles 
 of Beaugency-Cravant (8th, 9th, and 10th of December) ex- 
 hibit the anomaly of a frontal battle, which certainly has 
 nothing in it to invite its repetition: firing on both sides for 
 three days, without other result than expenditure of much 
 lead, is not indeed an elevating spectacle for an anny whose 
 successes had heretofore been chiefly due to turning move- 
 ments and flanking. Flanking may sometimes not have the 
 expected result; a frontal battle may have none at all! 
 Frontal battles should be altogether expunged from the 
 military dictionary ;it is not fire alore that gains theobject,it 
 is the flanking combined with proper direction of fire. When 
 the opposing forces are equal, modern arms remove any dan- 
 ger there may be in outflanking the enemy; the assailant will 
 
Tactical Deductions. 373 
 
 therefore make it a rule to turn his opponent, and all tacticians 
 should be fully imbued with that rule. The many instances 
 quoted of far superior opponents on various theaters of war: 
 Noisseville, first day; Bapaume, North Army; Le Bourget, 
 December 21st, Army of Paris; Lisaine, East Army; Baune 
 la Rolande and Loigny-Poupry, Loire Army, etc., all under 
 the most varying conditions prove the same truth, that turn- 
 ing the enemy calls for more than ''a good plan" — namely, 
 jsuflScient reconnaissance, proper disposition of the troops, 
 careful regulation of the system of orders and reports, and, 
 above all, an army equally good in all its parts, and excel- 
 lent infantry. That militia armies are unequal to outflank- 
 ing operations is strikingly show n by the campaign against 
 the republic, and as the "Umfassungs^^ battle will be the 
 rule in future, wise army leaders will more than ever insist 
 on good infantry. What Davout demonstrated at Auer- 
 stadt was repeated in 1870-1871 in various ways — namely, 
 that superior tactics proffer the greatest safety in outflank- 
 ing; superior tactics are impossible without superior edu- 
 cation and training — i. e., without an army of superior 
 quality, superiority of numbers being of less importance. 
 Armies without training (republic, 1870-71), and armies mis- 
 guided by drill-ground fancies (1806), are equally impotent! 
 As regards the forces to be concentrated for battle, the 
 approximate limits are also indicated at Gravelotte; other- 
 wise direction would become more difficult than it is al- 
 ready. The latter should not be misunderstood, and impos- 
 sible things should not be expected from it, so far as the 
 commander-in-chief is concerned; for, as regards leading, he is 
 merely a strategist ; he cannot do much more than assign to 
 battle units their directions and objectives, and keep in hand 
 a reserve; everything else is the business of the tacticians 
 — i. e., of the commanders of battle units. In that respect 
 
374 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the conduct of battle bas been much modified as compared 
 with Napoleon's methods; divisions and army corps once 
 engaged can no longer be diverted at pleasure, but, from the 
 strategic point of view, Napoleon I. is and remains never- 
 theless the great master in conducting a battle, and whom 
 the Germans have equalled but once, at Sedan. As com- 
 pared with Napoleon, they failed above all in reconnais- 
 sance, in the use of artillery with its sequences, and in pur- 
 suit. Koniggratz and Gravelotte approximate the Ulm 
 and Jena of Napoleon. If the outflanking opponent is 
 equal or slightly superior in strength, he may outflank on 
 one flank; if superior, as at Worth and Sedan, he may turn 
 both flanks, and in the latter case the battle should invaria- 
 bly result, and has resulted, in a catastrophe. While the 
 commander-in-chief can do no more in the way of leading 
 after the battle is opened, than expend his battle units as 
 he intended, he is compensated for this shortcoming by the 
 fact that he is able to prepare from the beginning for out- 
 flanking the enemy in the most effective (strategic) direc- 
 tion, and by the fact that he is at the same time able to take 
 care that the cavalry shall be on hand for pursuit after the 
 turned flank or flanks have been defeated. The practica- 
 bility of turning both flanks will depend on the character 
 of the enemy's position (negative at Gravelotte, positive at 
 Worth). The foregoing goes to show the extraordinary 
 preponderance of strategy over tactics, because, according 
 to human judgment, outflanking tactics must be the rule in 
 battle for any one who wishes to attack at all. 
 
 I have frequently cautioned against any kind of ortho- 
 doxy, and desire to do so again at the end of this chapter, as 
 regards leading in battle. As there is no rule without 
 exception, so the exception of Loigny-Poupry teaches that 
 
Tactical Deductions. 375 
 
 under certain circumstances a battle may yet be directed 
 as were those of Austerlitz and Liitzen by Napoleon. 
 
 IX. Of the Frontal Action. 
 Various events of 1870-71 go to prove the soundness of 
 my opinion that with proper dispositions, when the enemy 
 has been subdued by the fire action of infantry and artil- 
 lery, the attack of a brigade is not only practicable to-day, 
 but also successful. I call to mind the determined assault 
 -of the 33d Infantry Brigade under General von Kottwitz on 
 Loigny with part of the troops in close order. Three bat- 
 talions of the Seventy-sixth and one battalion of the 
 Seventy-fifth shared in the assault, and not until they had 
 penetrated the town from the northeast and east — i. e., 
 from the flank — did the swarms of the Bavarians enter from 
 the front. I am convinced that without the assistance of 
 the former the skirmishers of the latter would never have 
 succeeded in getting into the town. When the attack is 
 preceded by the proper tactical preparation, as in this in- 
 stance, the defender's fire power will be so reduced in the 
 end that the controlled attack is the quickest and least 
 bloody way of deciding the conflict. An indispensable 
 prerequisite is, of course, that there be tacticians and that 
 the several arms be logically employed, for there is such a 
 thing as logic even in tactics; another prerequisite is that 
 the ground be utilized during the advance, which, in that 
 case, should be resolute. Our large attacks failed almost 
 without exception on account of their inopportunity, of the 
 selection of the wrong tactical moment, of the disregard of 
 the situation of the battle and of the ground, and because 
 the troops were flung into the fight by driblets. After the 
 capture of Loigny, General von Kottwitz brought up his 
 two fresh battalions of the Seventy-fifth, which drove the 
 
376 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 enemy from Villours at the point of the bayonet, captured 
 the village, and thus decided the battle. Such instructive 
 examples are rare, Fate is chary of them; but when we do 
 have a few, we should turn them to good account. 
 
 It may not be out of place here to state that where the 
 terrain affords points of direction as at Chilteau Goury, 
 Loigny, Villours, there is no difficulty in announcing them 
 to the troops beforehand; they can direct themselves by 
 them without further misunderstanding. In spite of this 
 precaution, part of Kottwitz's brigade swept past Loigny 
 toward Fougeu. When on a perfectly open plain, or when 
 emerging on open ground from a defile, it is easier to select 
 a point of direction in the terrain some distance in front, 
 than among the troops themselves, which, under such cir- 
 cumstances are availing themselves of cover. 
 
 A nice parallel to Kottwitz's brigade at Loigny is Stark- 
 loff's Wiirtemberg brigade at Worth. It reached the 
 battle-field after the enemy had been shaken; crossed the 
 Hauer by the bridge at the Bruchmiihle, took the direction 
 of Elsasshausen and then of Froschweiler, passed the line 
 of battle of the V. Army Corps after a brief fire action, and 
 was the first to get into Froschweiler, its troops at that 
 instant being chiefl}^ in close formation. The advance of the 
 three groups of the brigade with flying colors exercised an 
 animating effect over the other troops, part of whom joined 
 the Wiirtembergers, Daring the march requests for 
 assistance reached the brigade from Elsasshausen as well as 
 from Froschweiler; it approached Froschweiler under Gen- 
 eral Starkloff in the following order: Third Rifle Battalion, 
 in its rear the First Battalion of the Fifth Regiment west of 
 Froschweiler; First Battalion of the Second Regiment, 
 south ; and on the east of the village Second Battalion of the 
 Fifth Regiment, and the Fifth and Sixth Companies of the 
 
Tactical Deductions. 377 
 
 Second Regiment. The advance having been skillfully con- 
 ducted and proper preparations having been made, the con- 
 trolled assault was as successful asat Loigny,and it is really 
 the simplest, shortest, and least bloody way to success under 
 such conditions; nor is it any different if the preparations are 
 made in the early morning, as at Le Bourget. How about the 
 losses? The four battalions (minus one companj^) of the 
 Twenty-eighth Brigade lost at Koniggriitz 10 officers, 190 
 men; the 9 battalions of the Second Division of the Guard at 
 Le Bourget lost about 450 men; the U battalions of Stark- 
 loff's brigade at Worth, 17 officers and 3^9 men; and Kott- 
 witz's brigade at Loigny, 21 officers and 423 men. Are the 
 conditions of rationally conducted attacks so very much dif- 
 ferent now? I should say, no! Of course, when the prere- 
 quisites we have named are not there, there will be no such 
 success; I refer to Maire's brigade at Worth, to the assault on 
 Loigny led by General de Sonis, and to the various attacks 
 by the brigades of Vivenot, Brissac, and Durochat at Beaune. 
 Outflanking, or turning without engaging in front, 
 is inconceivable, and, however frequently I have warned 
 against orthodoxy in this or that direction, I must do so 
 again. I have frequently stated that it is really the supe- 
 rior command, not the man, the company, or the battalion, 
 that fights an "Umfassungen^' action, since these units al- 
 ways fight a frontal action. It follows that the conflict will 
 always be along the tactical front, since there is nothing that 
 could take its place; its execution, however, should be suit- 
 able and tactically correct. Conflict along the tactical front 
 being inseparable from the conduct of battle and from the 
 decision, it would be foolish and anomalous to banish every 
 frontal attack from the battle-field; the faulty ones should 
 be banished and the good ones retained. Military history 
 teaches, in the first place, that in case of a very strong front 
 
378 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the frontal attack promises no success against the muzzle- 
 loader. The frontal action of the I. Army at Koniggratz is 
 a case in point ; the same thing recurred at the Mance ravine 
 at Gravelotte. In the first case the "tacticians" did not seek 
 the decision in the front, and it was well they did not; in 
 the second case the ''tacticians" did want it and piled blun- 
 der on blunder without notable result. But at Koniggratz 
 the result of the frontal action of the I. Army was neverthe- 
 less enormous, and so was that of the frontal action of the 
 V. Army Corps at Worth. The attacks on both sides were 
 frontal, and most of them netted more or less success. Thus 
 will it also be in future. I call to mind the counter-attacks 
 of the Austrians in the wood of Maslowed, the counter- 
 attacks of the French at Worth and against the Mance 
 ravine, etc. In all these cases both opponents fought purely 
 frontal actions, yet the enemy's lines were completely 
 driven back. On the other hand, a number of frontal 
 attacks of Prussians and Germans, quitting the defensive 
 position to assail the enemy, were successful, even that of 
 the II. Army Corps on the second day of Villiers, and of the 
 Wiirtemburgers on the first day of the same battle, and that 
 brings me to the salient point. Wherever the ground is in 
 any way favorable, good infantry should keep on charging 
 the enemy in front; fire alone does not suffice to subdue 
 him, and from this resulted the typical character of the 
 offensive battle in the front at Worth distinguished by the 
 surging to and fro of the various charges. Who will deny 
 that the charges of the Germans did not net a great result, 
 notwithstanding many defects which will in future be reme- 
 died by greater unity of action? It is the vigorous charges 
 alone, in connection with fire, that enhance the severity of 
 the action to the maximum limit of endurance on both 
 sides. This should invaviablv be the course along the tac- 
 
Tactical Deductions. 379 
 
 tical front, so as to enable the flanking troops to deliver the 
 decisive blow. To neglect it and to engage in a frontal fire 
 action at long range would be to suppress the offensive 
 spirit of our infantry, to diminish its tactical value, and to 
 lose the battle! Frontal attacks should not be discarded, 
 but they should be better organized and undertaken with 
 larger bodies under single control. They may entail losses, 
 disorder, and indecisive surging of the troops, but they are 
 highly instrumental in preparing the decision. 
 
 In the front, the action of infantry assumes the form of 
 a series of onslaughts while the commander should seek to 
 gain tlie decision by outflanking — i. e., pushing the attack 
 home. I am thus distinguishing between onslaughts for the 
 purpose of wearing the enemy out along the tactical front and 
 the attack for gaining the decision on the tactical flank; 
 neither should be made before the superiority of fire has been 
 gained. To be sure, we did not always take sufficient time 
 for it. This rule should never be deviated from ; otherwise we 
 are apt to return to the indecisive position warfare. The fact 
 that infantrj' — for instance, the Fiftieth Regiment at Worth 
 —after being engaged all day on the tactical front, retained 
 sufficient power to rush the key point, Froschweiler, should 
 silence those who deny the necessity of frontal action as a 
 general principle.* To malce concessions to human nature 
 in such questions would be to betray weakness and timid- 
 ity. It was fresh troops, as a rule, mostly closed squads or 
 companies, that carried the swarms with them in a charge 
 (Worth), and it was the closed bodies on which the worsted 
 swarms rallied; it is not expected that it will be the same in 
 
 *0n rallying in the wood near Elsasshausen, Captain von 
 Bnguslawski had about 20 men, and on entering Froschweiler about 
 25, of the Third, Sixth, and Twelfth Companies of the Fiftieth 
 Res:iinent. (Pages 243 and 248 of the History of the Fiftieth Regi- 
 ment, by Von Boguslawski.) 
 
380 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 the future. After a success or repulse, the leaders are 
 endeavoring (Boguslawski) to rally their men in order 
 to lead them forward again; that constitutes the true 
 ^'Schneid," because it is coupled with good sense and brings 
 about that high degree of resisting power and of stubborn- 
 ness in the modern fire fight. To relinquish one iota of 
 this would be the very worst thing we could do, for I repeat : 
 the action of the troops is always a frontal one. It should 
 be conducted rationally and in a manner in keeping with 
 modern arms. By beginning rushes at more than 1000 
 meters, I say we would deprive ourselves of the possibility 
 of making those successful, though bloody, onslaughts. 
 The advance by rushes in combination with long-range fire 
 paralyzes the offensive spirit. The advance should be made 
 without pause, with fully deployed front, and successive open 
 lines, depending on the terrain. Opportunities for long- 
 range fire should, of course, be taken advantage of, but it 
 should be left to the discretion of the leaders, as should the 
 choice of formation during the advance, and of the direction 
 of the advance within the sphere of the brigade. From what 
 has been stated it is plain that the difficult question is not 
 settled by the mere statement that the troops in rear should 
 be formed either in line or in column. The defender would 
 indeed be foolish not to select positions permitting of the 
 full efl^^ect of improved arms. In the case of such positions, 
 stretches of ground may be encountered where neither line 
 nor column can be maintained in close formation when the 
 assailant enters the medium range. Thus in the maneuvers 
 of 1893, for instance, the XVII. Army Corps employed open 
 lines, the VIII., XIV., XV., and XVI. Corps promptly devel- 
 oped strong skirmish lines, followed by closed bodies at a 
 distance of 300 to 400 meters. I consider the latter wrong, 
 for it is a normal attack. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 381 
 
 The assailant's troops invariably fight a frontal action, 
 whether they flank the enemy or not. The effect on the 
 enemy of this frontal action against his front and flank iS 
 best understood by a reference to Worth. In the same 
 degree as the French felt the clamps around them tighten- 
 ing, they sought to disembarrass themselves by frontal 
 charges of infantry and cavalry. The clamp was thus some- 
 times bent outward, but was immediately contracted by 
 the offensive spirit of our infantry. There was a constant 
 repetition of this at Worth until the end of the battle, when 
 the enveloping flanks came together in the center at Frosch- 
 weiler. Though the flanking troops are thus fighting a 
 frontal action, still, the unobstructed view, the great range 
 of the rifle, and the practicability of intelligent cooperation 
 of infantry and artillery combine in conveying to the indi- 
 vidual soldier the impression that he is fighting an envelop- 
 ing action, and that is a decisive consideration, because ad- 
 dressing itself to the individual! The flanked opponent, on 
 the other hand, has the impression that he is seen and fired 
 at from two or three directions, which is bound to lessen 
 his morale at the very time when that of the assailant is in- 
 creased by what he is seeing and effecting. The "Umfas- 
 sungs'' action should therefore become the normal form of 
 battle, as it were; but to make it feasible, the flanker must 
 undertake a series of frontal onslaughts, under whose pro- 
 tection alone, in combination with fire, the flanking move- 
 ment can be effectively carried out. The improved arms 
 cannot abolish the frontal attack. Frontal actions will be 
 indispensable for assailant and defender in the future as 
 they were in the past; it is by flanking the enemy that the 
 full effect of which the new arms are capable may be real- 
 ized; thus the sum total of moral and material effect is 
 accomplished! 
 
382 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 These expositions will explain the extent of mv concur- 
 rence in the suggestions of the book"Der gegenwartige Stand 
 der Gefechtslehre und die Ausbildung zum Gefechte" ('The 
 Present State of Tactics and Training for Battle").* 
 
 X. Of Village and Wood Fighting. 
 
 We frequently hear the statement that the role played 
 in battle by villages, farmsteads, and woods would in future 
 undergo many modifications. I have to be brief on this 
 point, because a thoroughly satisfactory inquiry would 
 take too much space. The reader will be able to form his 
 own opinion, and it will become plain whether and to what 
 extent these statements are justified. 
 
 It is assumed that the destructive power of modern 
 infantry and artillery fire in connection with unobstructed 
 view, and the practicability of concentrated mass-fire of 
 both arms, will make the obstinate defense of villages, 
 towns, and farmsteads impossible in future; that on this 
 account it is better not to undertake a direct defense of such 
 places, but to use them rather as protection against obser- 
 vation and fire of the enemy. It is further recommended to 
 employ infantry in front of these places, ensconced in 
 ditches and other natural and artificial cover. Such also 
 is the drift of the German Kegulations. 
 
 Three questions are evidently involved: 1, the loca- 
 tion of the village; 2, its extent; and 3, its construction. 
 It has already been explained that villages and farmsteads 
 will no longer be found useful as advanced posts, and in that 
 particular the conditions have actually undergone material 
 modifications. Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, for instance, and St, 
 Hubert would no longer play the same role as on August 
 18,1870; still less would an isolated advanced post, as Worth 
 
 *By Keim, Berlin, 1890, E. S. Mittler. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 383 
 
 and Le Bourget, even if of the dimensions of these two lat- 
 ter places. In that respect the question is settled and it 
 only remains to say something about villages and farm- 
 steads in the line of battle. I am well aware that Worth did 
 not gain its importance until the French decided to capture 
 that post in front of their position. 
 
 We have seen that on an Austrian target-range a rifle- 
 man posted behind an embankment of a cross-section of 
 140 centimeters was mortally wounded by a Mannlicher bul- 
 let at a range of 200 meters, but this point merely involves a 
 question of earth cover, of rifle-trenches. Villages do not 
 everywhere bear the same character; a French village and 
 one in Poland, for instance, are greatly different, and on ac- 
 count of their situation, construction, and extent, the former 
 may be, under certain circumstances, as suitable for defense 
 as formerly, though it was equally faulty in former days to 
 restrict the defense to the place itself. To defend Baaeille, 
 for instance, it would be necessary to include the adjacent 
 heights in the problem. 
 
 In future many villages and localities will be found 
 within the battle-field, and it is necessary to make up one's 
 mind whether or not their defense should be undertaken. 
 I believe that in France the answer will in many cases be in 
 the affirmative, because chateaus with extensive parks, sur- 
 rounded by walls half a meter and more in thickness, are 
 frequently situated in the vicinity of villages. The Ger- 
 mans did well to defend the castle of Montb^liard and those 
 of Villiers and Goury with their parks, and to convert them 
 into the chief points d'appui of their positions. I fail to see 
 why we should do otherwise in future. The French de- 
 fended Froschweiler and St. Privat with great stubborn- 
 ness; the Germans could not be driven from Beaune by the 
 enemy's fire, in spite of his ten-fold superiority, and notwith- 
 
384 Inquiries info the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 standing the fact that f requentl}- the attacks almost reached 
 the stage of a haud-to-hand conflict. The obstinacy of the 
 defense of Froschweiler and St. Privat was chiefly due to the 
 fact that much of the defending infantry was ensconced 
 under cover in front of the villages. Special advocacy of 
 that sort of defense to-day raises no new issue; it merely 
 tends to give the force of principle to a feature that has 
 proved effective. It would, nevertheless, be an error not to 
 make places having the location and extent of St. Privat 
 and Loigny the principal supporting points of the position, 
 either on the flanks or in the center. I have already pointed 
 out the solid construction of French villages, among which 
 some may be found that will give some protection even 
 against the destructive power of field artillery. We cannot 
 therefore, expect to simply reduce such places to ruins or to 
 destroy them completely by conflagration. They are too 
 extensive for that. Though a great part of Froschweiler, 
 St. Privat, Beaune, and T.oigny were in flames, they were 
 not abandoned on account of either the conflagration, or 
 the enemy's fire, or the hail of fragments of stone and 
 of projectiles. Froschweiler, St. Privat, and Loigny suc- 
 cumbed only to assault. We omit the singular street fight- 
 ing at Bazeilles, because not typical either for defense or 
 attack; but St. Privat, Froschweiler, and particularly Le 
 Bourget and Loigny, show how obstinately the defender may 
 hold on after the edge of the village has fallen into the 
 enemy's hands. The street fighting at Le Bourget and 
 Loigny, for instance, lasted several hours, and would have 
 given the French ample time for the arrival of considerable 
 reinforcements. This consideration alone should be suflS- 
 cient reason for not expunging village fighting from tactics. 
 The exterior reserves and the troops fighting on the 
 flanks have at all times been of prime importance, and a dis- 
 
Tactical Deductions. 385 
 
 cussion of tbe defense of a village in the main position is 
 inconceivable vvatliout giving them due consideration. 
 
 I believe it would be well to reckon in the future on 
 village fighting, chiefly on account of smokeless powder, 
 in all cases where the fire may be arranged in tiers as at 
 St. Privat and Loigny. If it was difficult formerly to see 
 the infantry posted under cover in front of the village and 
 to take it under fire (St. Privat, Froschweiler), it will be far 
 ^more difficult in future, which, particularly in the case of 
 extensive villages, will make the defense of villages more 
 feasible than formerly. We may be sure that the struggle 
 for the ground in front and for the edge will be more pro- 
 tracted and obstinate than formerly; which is due to the 
 character of smokeless powder when the defender has a wide 
 field of fire. Owing to the long range and sheaf-like form 
 of artillery fire, I should consider it an error to restrict the 
 use of villages chiefly to that of shelter for reserves and 
 large bodies of troops, because heavy losses are hard to bear 
 for inactive troops thus posted; on the other hand, I hardly 
 know of an instance of good troops being driven from any 
 defensive position by mere fire. It might rather be recom- 
 mended to post the reserves at points where the assailant's 
 means, usually known to the defense, will make him expect 
 them least. I do not desire to go further into details ; I be- 
 lieve, however, that the more conspicuous isolated farm- 
 steads are, the less their value. 
 
 The principal defense of villages will probably be made 
 in the foreground. The reserves will probably be posted 
 on one or both flanks; as their employment will be as hereto- 
 fore, for increasing the fire power, in counter-attacks, in en- 
 trenching and holding rearward positions and in covering the 
 retreat. All these duties are inseparable from village fight- 
 ing in battle. Since favorable localities offer such a variety 
 
386 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 of means to the defender for the defensive as well as for the 
 offensive, it follows that, owing to the attraction exerted by 
 such objectives, both sides will exert their full power when 
 struggling for these points. The superior destructive power 
 of modern fire, the greater range and fire effect will not 
 change this much. And in what way should the new 
 method of fighting — the result of new arms — change the 
 fighting in the interior of the village? Since it is not pos- 
 sible to remove objects like villages from the position, it is 
 better to utilize them for the battle; infantry should no more 
 think it impossible to victoriously hold a village than to 
 carry it by assault. It should be able to do both, and it is 
 able if it wants to, and if it possesses the tactical qualities. 
 
 Although we shall ever find extensive positions devoid 
 of localities and farmsteads, but few will be found devoid of 
 woods, which may be situated in the position, in front or in 
 rear of it, and at different points; they may vary much on 
 account of the character of the trees and of the ground, 
 their character depending on these features as much as 
 on their extent in width and depth, and on the shape of 
 their edge. In battle a wood may serve as cover for the 
 approach, it may be the objective of the struggle, or ft may 
 serve to cover the retreat, in all of which phases it is of first 
 importance to know whether the wood is practicable for 
 troops. We are dealing here mth tactical considerations. 
 
 I cannot go into the details of the many and great 
 differences of woods. The handling of a French wood 
 is based on different principles from that of a German 
 or Russian one, and it is necessary that the officer under- 
 stand the tactical differences springing therefrom. Every 
 officer should therefore be well informed on these subjects, 
 which are fundamental in tactical training. In general it 
 
Tactical Deductions. 387 
 
 may be stated that the French as well as the Russian (Pol- 
 ish) woods make higher demands on leaders and troops than 
 the German variety, and that smokeless powder has greatly 
 facilitated the direction of an action in them. All woods, 
 even small ones on dry ground, possess a considerable 
 degree of humidity. In combination with the moist air, 
 the smoke used to form an impenetrable stratum, which 
 obstructed the view and made control of the action impos- 
 sible. That is one of the reasons why woods used to be 
 avoided. The smoke is not in the way to-day, and the young 
 officer has no idea of the former difficulties. In the ab- 
 sence of other obstacles, the fighting in a wood may in- 
 deed be controlled to day, though the echoes of musketry 
 discharges and of words of command are even now very 
 troublesome in woods of small extent. The more extensive 
 the wood, the more difficult is the control, which in large 
 woods is, even to-day, only practicable to a certain degree at 
 particular and favorable spots. Aside from the fact that 
 artillery and cavalrj- cannot be used in them, woods have 
 grave disadvantages, since extensive woods frequently 
 obstruct the view of the commanding generals and other 
 leaders. Owing to the increased power of penetration of 
 infantry projectiles, trees will rarely prove effective as 
 shelter; the great dispersion of artillery projectiles also 
 deprives the wood of most of its character as cover from 
 artillery fire; moreover, woods, and particularly pine woods, 
 will be more apt to be set on fire. On the defensive it is 
 most important to hold the edge of the wood; when that is 
 lost, attackers and defenders are about on even terms, and 
 it is only at clearings that the defender again has the advan- 
 tage (wood of Maslowed, July 3, 1866); farmsteads may 
 serve to revive resistance, as strikingly illustrated by the 
 action at Ladon on November 24, 1870. ^^'oods are, as a 
 
388 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 rule, poor supports for the flanks, and are most useful when 
 of moderate extent and situated in the front line. Thus, 
 for instance, the little fir copse of Colombey on August 14, 
 1870, and the Bois de Tronville on the 16th of August, 1870. 
 
 After these general remarks, we have to discuss the role 
 of woods somewhat in detail, because they can hardly be 
 wholly avoided on the future battle-field; and it should 
 be remembered in this connection that it will be more diffi- 
 cult to ascertain the strength of the defenders, that by a 
 suitable distribution of his fire the defender may greatly 
 deceive the assailant, and that in the future the latter will 
 have to fight for the sake of reconnaissance, and cannot 
 make his principal dispositions until afterward. 
 
 Among the woods used as cover and traversed on the 
 advance we may mention the wood of Popowitz (July 3, 
 1866), the wood of Maslowed (Swiepwald), the Bois de Vaux 
 on August 18th, and the wood of Beaumont on August 30, 
 1870. The first and last of these woods were turned to 
 such excellent account by the Twenty-eighth Brigade and 
 by the IV. and XII. Army Corps respectively, that the subse- 
 quent successes may be ascribed to it. Deductions: After 
 sufficient reconnaissance has furnished a correct idea of the 
 wood, it should be entered unobserved, and traversed quietly 
 in close formation ; on reaching the farther edge, the deploy- 
 ment should be made simultaneously upon preconcerted 
 signal, in order to open the action from as many points as 
 possible. In the second case, the Swiepwald at once as- 
 sumed the character of extensive wood fighting; it became 
 an advanced post, and the advanced post became the main 
 position : ultimately two Austrian army corps were fighting 
 here against a Prussian division; they quitted their pre- 
 scribed main position, and thus rendered our victory at the 
 main position comparatively easy. Both the assailant and 
 
Tactical Deductions. 389 
 
 the defender suffered great losses in this wood fighting; 
 both lost their direction, especially the Prussians, so that 
 ultimately they in part faced to their original rear. The 
 direction is more easily lost in woods, especially when fight- 
 ing in extensive woods, than in villages. We find it every- 
 where to be the case more or less. Practice maj' somewhat 
 diminish the evil, but it is well to state right here that it 
 can never be entirely removed. In the third case, the pene- 
 trable wood furnished a means, though a difficult one, for 
 covering the approach, the deployment, and the develop- 
 ment; but all designs in this respect miscarried, owing to 
 lack of experience on the part of the leaders and troops, 
 and to lack of uniformity of design. But one condition 
 was here fulfilled: sheltering the repulsed troops, which, 
 however, could not be promptly rallied and re-formed. All 
 these lessons are contained in this sketch. All four exam- 
 ples are highly typical for the future, the success or miscar- 
 riage of the plans. 
 
 The Niederwald and the wood of Langensulzbach 
 (Worth, August 6th), and the Stiringwald (Spicheren, Aug- 
 ust 6th), play a different role, inasmuch as they could not he 
 traversed without fghting, and thus made still higher demands 
 on the leaders and troops. None of the three woods served 
 to cover the flank of the defender effectively. Owing to 
 various influences, the Second Bavarian Corps failed to 
 utilize the wood of Langensulzbach as intended; the XI. 
 Corps overcame all the difficulties of the Niederwald; of the 
 five battalions of the Twenty-seventh Brigade (at Stiring), 
 the battalion led by General von Woyna in person was the 
 only one to reach that point of the Stiring- Wendel wood 
 where he wanted them to be. 
 
 In traversing a wood while fighting, the considerations 
 of order, steadiness, maintenance of direction and com- 
 
390 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 munication, and of division into several columns, should 
 receive strict attention and be the subjects of frequent prac- 
 tice in peace.* 
 
 In addition to the previously mentioned fir copse of 
 Colombey (August 14, 1870), the park and wood of Goury 
 (December 2, 1870), the Bois de Tronville (August 16, 1870), 
 the Bois de G^nivaux (August 18, 1870), and above all the 
 group of woods of Poupry (December 2, 1870) played an 
 important role in the conduct of the battle in the main posi- 
 tion. The phenomena attaching to them, though varying 
 much, coincide in several particulars, particularly as re- 
 gards the stubbornness of the struggle for the edge of the 
 wood, the losing of the direction during the struggle (G^n- 
 ivaux and Poupry), the intermingling of troops, and the 
 impossibility of leading large bodies of intermixed troops 
 (Poupry). The latter case, where the wood consisted of sev- 
 eral separate, irregular groups, is one of the most instruct- 
 ive instances of wood fighting for the future, inasmuch as 
 the conflict was partly waged at dusk, and because the dis- 
 positions for the final French attack, very properly directed 
 against the northern angle (tactical point) because the 
 frontal attack did not promise success, decided the posses- 
 sion of the wood. We have the additional example here of 
 cavalry attacking successfully in one of the open spaces 
 under General von Colomb. 
 
 Skillful use of woods for the protection of the retreat 
 
 was made in the following cases: by the Saxons (wood of 
 
 Briz, July 3, 186G); by the French (Reichshofen, August 0, 
 
 1870), and again by the French (wood of Jaumont, August 
 
 28, 1870). 
 
 *To avoid repetition I refer the reader to "Die Kampfe una die 
 Steinbriiclie von Rozerieulles" and "Viorundzwanzig Stunden Molt- 
 ke'scher Strategic" ("The Struggle for tlie Qiianies of Rozerieulles" 
 and "Twenty-four Hours of Moltke's Strategy"), Berlin, R. Felix, 
 military publisher. Both l»y Fritz Honig. 
 
Tactical Deductions. 391 
 
 Lastly we come to the operative and tactical aspects of 
 large wooded districts, their possibilities for covering the 
 deploj'-ment, for traversing them, for battle, and for cover- 
 ing the retreat as exhibited by the typical instances of the 
 forest of Orleans and that of Marchenoir. 
 
 Unless large as well as small bodies in any kind of wood 
 scrupulously observe the simple laws of order, of keep- 
 ing direction, and of control, confusion is bound to quick- 
 ly ensue. In crossing a wood, painstaking care should be 
 exercised by sending men ahead to mark the direction, and 
 others to reconnoiter. If the edge is to be taken, the greater 
 part of the assailants should be at once re-formed upon its 
 capture, follow the skirmishers, and envelop the flanks of 
 the wooded district. The important rdles heretofore played 
 by woods are more apt to be enhanced in future than the 
 reverse, and it is interesting and useful to consider each case 
 in connection with the efl'ect of modern arms. In general we 
 are taught by military history that woods as well as locali- 
 ties gain their highest significance only from the quality of 
 the troops; it is particularly true of woods. Thus the forest 
 of Orleans was largely instrumental in the defeat of the 
 French, while the Germans remained masters of the varying 
 and often perilous situation, although they were themselves 
 unable to maintain the desired communication for some 
 time during the action. Under such conditions the struggle 
 assumed the character of march encounters. The latter 
 may in future, under similar circumstances, be expected to 
 be more obstinately contested, since wood fighting will in 
 such cases approximate that of defiles. 
 
 Village and wood fights render general control diffi- 
 cult, give rise to uncertainty, and easily lead to precipitate 
 steps and wrong movements. 
 
 The leading of troop units is difficult, the units are eas- 
 
392 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ily disrupted; hence the great number of dispersed men 
 in village and wood fights. The delivery of fire is restricted 
 to short range. Since the troops deployed in wood fighting 
 are usually beyond the control of the leaders, suitable 
 employment of the reserves is all the more important. 
 
 XI. Of Night Battles. 
 
 The philosophy that has been formulated on the sub- 
 ject of losses, half of which might have been avoided by 
 intelligent leadership, notwithstanding the employment of 
 wrong formations against the Imperial Army in 1870, has 
 been the cause of part of the "tacticians" desiring to trans- 
 fer to the darkness of night what they no longer dare to 
 undertake in broad daylight; and, as is usual in cases where 
 knowledge, experience, and reflection are called for, the 
 great majority, neither possessing the one nor liking anoth- 
 er, have accepted the preaching of these false prophets. If 
 one method is not suitable, another is; the example is easily 
 settled that way. While I consider the tendency repre- 
 sented by the "Summer-night's Dream" as an unhealthy 
 excrescence of a healthy idea, and criticize and reject the 
 same only in its consequences and forms, the tendency of the 
 "night tacticians" deserves the sharpest condemnation as 
 being the expression of an unhealthy idea. I say purposely 
 "darkness of night," not "night," for there are nights that 
 are not dark, and these tacticians wish for darkness, which 
 they think will protect them from being either seen or hit. 
 
 In order not to rest tactics on a wrong basis, we should 
 ever start from a consideration of man; a serious-minded 
 man can best study human weakness by making a serious 
 study of his own nature. In making the study of himself he 
 can easily ascertain that whatever he may be doing in the 
 dark, he is acting with less assurance, and consequently 
 
Tactical Deductions. 393 
 
 with less determination and effect, than in daylight. Any 
 kind of human, intelligent, ijractical work requires the sense 
 of sight; otherwise the Creator would not have given us 
 eyes. By their means we control the action of the other 
 senses and are enabled to make full use of them. The latter 
 purpose requires light; in choosing darkness we relinquish 
 one of the decisive means of action. Every tactical act is 
 based on movement; every movement of the individual in 
 ' the dark is unsteady, even walking, which is the simplest 
 requisite for every conflict. Every phenomenon perceptible 
 to the senses in the dark acts at first as a surprise, and 
 frightens; no one will gainsay this who remembers how fre- 
 quently one thing or another at night "made his heart beat." 
 I could cite hundreds of cases from my own recollection ; the 
 terrifying vision only disappears upon the return of the 
 mental faculties, usually styled presence of mind, which is 
 somewhat incorrect, since the "presence" is subsequent to 
 the vision and dependent on time and circumstances; nor 
 does the vision then invariably disappear at once. If the 
 use of his mental faculties enables man to recognize at once 
 all the causes of terror, he will, if possessing will-power, re- 
 main master of the situation. This "orientation by means of 
 intellect" presupposes certain conditions — above all, famil- 
 iarity with the surroundings; for, if such is not the case, the 
 intellectual powers do not triumph over the imagination <as 
 quickly as is desirable; and experience teachers that under 
 unfamiliar circumstances and in the dark the imagination 
 develops such power as to conjure up phantom after phan- 
 tom, and to fetter the intellect completely. Man then has 
 lost the equilibrium of his senses and powers, and is a being 
 whom his excited imagination leads to acts of the greatest 
 folly, precipitation, etc., which in tactics furnishes the most 
 fruitful soil for panics. These simple truths have kept all 
 
394 J^iqiiiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 generals of renown from night enterprises (we speak here of 
 great and decisive operations alone), and Cromwell is the 
 only general who acted differently, though under justifiable 
 circumstances. His first exploit was in the decisive battle of 
 Dunbar on September 3, 1650. Cromwell was thoroughly 
 familiar with the terrain and with the enemy's position, he 
 approached during darlcness, deployed at dau^n, and fought 
 and pursued in hroad daylight. The march did not, however, 
 exceed 2 kilometers, his forces did not exceed 12,000 men, 
 and the roads, crossings, direction — everything was well 
 known. His second example is the crossing of the Firth of 
 Forth, but here also the preparations had been made to 
 include the most minute detail, and with astounding care, 
 and there was no real darkness during the crossing (ap- 
 proach), as it was a starlight night. 
 
 That all generals have shunned the dark night for deci- 
 sive battle is due to the fact that they were acquainted with 
 the human heart, an indispensable requisite of a general. 
 It is unintelligible why ^'tacticians" who consider all close 
 formations inapplicable to battle in daylight, should recom- 
 mend night battles. Believing themselves unable to suffi- 
 ciently control the troops in swarm formation, they choose 
 the night so as to be able to use close formations and act 
 intelligently. We fail to see where the intellect comes in, 
 if the same men want to transfer the battle to the night, 
 which renders all acts and aims difficult or wholly impos- 
 sible, since they all require mutual vision and recognition. 
 The man is unable to see his leader in the dark or to follow 
 his example; at best he can hear his voice. If the night is 
 light, it gives no protection against fire, and protection is 
 what the "tacticians of darkness" want. That protec- 
 tion is the hobby of their theory. The splendid action of 
 Laon on March 9, 1814, took place at night under similar 
 
Tactical Deductions. 395 
 
 conditions as at Dunbar, at least in so far as familiarity with 
 the terrain is concerned; but the night was not dark; it was 
 so lit up by a clear starry sky and by the burning village of 
 A this as to afford fair marks by which to direct the move 
 ment; but in other respects surprise is an essential require- 
 ment of effective night battles, they bear the characteristics 
 of the unexpected attack. It follows from the foregoing: 
 (1) that under certain circumstances night battles may be 
 very effective if the state of discipline of the troops makes 
 such an undertaking feasible, if there is prospect of surpris- 
 ing the enemy, if terrain and enemy are well known so that 
 the troops do not miss their objectives and the task is a sim- 
 ple one; (2) that the body of troops should not be greater 
 than can be controlled on the march. In order to surprise 
 the enemy it is necessary to approach quickly, quietly, and 
 without fire; to march in battle formation and thus to 
 strike the enemy, as deployment takes up too much time and 
 diminishes the chances of surprise. Small units alone are 
 capable of rapid and surprising movements, the distances 
 to be traversed should be relatively short, and to assign dif- 
 ferent directions to the troops is to jeopardize combination 
 as at Chenebier. (3) An army needs many roads for its 
 march; it cannot move in the dark in battle formation; it 
 cannot traverse great distances in the dark, the army corps 
 cannot keep themselves mutually informed, they cannot be 
 controlled; hence it is unlikely that a decisive battle will be 
 fought in the dark. We should keep in mind the conditions 
 on the 17th and 18th of August before the battle of Grave- 
 lotte. It would have been easy to gather full information 
 of the terrain for the march, to start the troops in the right 
 direction, and to maintain them on the march. Next con- 
 sider the difficulties actually encountered in the movements 
 of the two armies, the march of the Saxons and of the 
 
396 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 X. Corps in battle formation, and then imagine sucb a task 
 in future accomplished in the dark by 8 or 9 army corps. 
 I believe that events would have been quite different from 
 those happening in daylight! Daylight will be needed for 
 the decisive battle in the future as it has been in the past, 
 night actions will be exceptional, night battles are out of the 
 question; night actions are therefore relegated to the domain 
 of minor operations and of position warfare, where they 
 have always been. 
 
 It is not unlikely that fine night actions like that of 
 Podol on the 27th of June, 1806, might be repeated under 
 similar circumstances, and it is even advisable to give lead- 
 ers and men some training in that direction; the situation, 
 however, was very simple: Assaulting a bridge and main* 
 taining the captured bridge against attacks on open ground 
 are very simple tactical problems, wiiich, on a bright June 
 night like this one, require nothing more than determina- 
 tion and discipline. When matters are more complicated, 
 as they were soon afterward at Gitschin on June 29th, the 
 disadvantages of night actions become at once apparent, 
 even after a victory and with relatively small bodies of 
 troops. 
 
 In the movement of an army corps a distinction is to 
 be made between the march on the roads, the deployment in 
 the terrain, and the continuation of the latter up to the col 
 lision with the enemy. The march of several army corps 
 at night on roads as good as those in France presents no 
 insurmountable difficulties for well-broken troops, and con- 
 trol and communication can easily exist and be maintained. 
 I have taken part in night marches in the heat of summer 
 and cold of winter. At the end of the first very long march, 
 lasting from 1 p. m. until H a. m., the troops, not yet broken 
 in, arrived with much straggling (4th and 5th of August, 
 
Tactical Deductions. 397 
 
 1870). At the second and third night march (August 10, 13, 
 1870) we were marching by brigade through night and day 
 with the same facility as in daylight; the night marches 
 from Blois to La Chapelle (December 31st), thence to Ven- 
 dome (Januai-y 1st), and from Chateau-Renault to Blois 
 (January 15th), were no trouble at all, notwithstanding that 
 the last named march was through country deeply covered 
 with snow. If the night is starlight and if the ground is 
 covered with snow, the only real disadvantage is the loss of 
 sleep on the part of the men. The difficulties for large 
 units only begin after the deployment, which would have 
 to take place not less than 5000 to 6000 meters from the 
 enemy, if w^e wished to escape observation as much as pos- 
 sible, and even that distance might prove too small when 
 opposed to a watchful enemy. It is unlikely that such 
 distances could be covered by several army corps in battle 
 formation in unknown ten'ain without confusion, with which 
 result night battles would fall to the ground. 
 
 So far we have onlj^ dealt with night actions begun and 
 ended or broken off in tlie dark, the approach being made 
 in the evening or at night. There are other actions, in 
 which the march to the battle-field was made in daytime, 
 which were arranged and carried out in daytime, and which 
 were not decided until dusk or dark. Foremost among such 
 actions is that on the 3d and 4th of December, 1870, in front 
 of Orleans; next is La Tuil^rie, and a number of other 
 instances from the battles of Le Mans, of lesser tactical and 
 strategic import; and here I come to a point which I deem 
 of the greatest importance. Night enterprises may fall to 
 the lot of any troops, which is sufficient reason why they 
 should be trained accordingly, in order that the leaders at 
 least may have an idea of their difficulties. It is moreover 
 to be expected that many actions, and even battles (Grave- 
 
398 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 lotte, Orleans, Le Mans, Beaune, Loigny, St. Quentin), v/ill 
 be continued until late in the eA'ening — i. e., until dark, and 
 it is there that sagacious tacticians and good troops may 
 gain success. If, for instance, after the French withdrawal 
 from St. Privat, the III. and X. Army Corps had been mar- 
 shaled to the assault on Amanvilliers, they might have 
 gained great results. If General von Goben had even been 
 slightly supported by his cavalry, or if he had had some 
 fresh infantry on the evening of January 19, 1871, the ene- 
 my's retreat would have been converted into a complete 
 route. A few companies, boldly led, decided the battle of 
 Le Mans by capturing La TuiMrie, for the possession of 
 which the battalions had been contending in vain since 
 noon; at dusk, single companies and small battalions daily 
 took the enemy's points cVappui at Le Mans, all of which 
 entailed but small losses, and even greater results could 
 have been gained with comparatively small losses. Such 
 tasks require strict discipline and an efficient corps of 
 officers; it should also be borne in mind that many of 
 these successful issues occurred in the last phase of the war, 
 when the troops had naturally lost much of their fresh- 
 ness and efficiency. Decisions which could not be gained in 
 daytime by swarms of skirmishers were thus gained by 
 close columns not only at the end of the battle, but at the 
 end of the war. They do not desert e to be styled "night 
 actions"; the situation became approximately known with 
 the assistance of snow, a starlight sky, conflagrations, and 
 the action just preceding. We should not cling to names, but 
 endeavor to understand the true inwardness of things, and 
 in doing so the moral power of the troops will regain its full 
 importance as a decisive factor. It is certain that im- 
 proved arms will make the attack in daytime more difficult; 
 and it is, on the other hand, not unlikely that by evening the 
 
Tactical Deductions. 399 
 
 defender's strength, though he may still hold his position, is 
 for the most part consumed by the exhausting struggle dur- 
 ing the day. This is naturally the moment for hurling 
 closed troops against the enemy's broken strength under the 
 cover of dusk or darkness, and in such cases these troops 
 must and should be expected to gain the position by their 
 onslaught. The charging pace is most suitable for the occa- 
 sion, and moral grounds will usually by themselves suflSce 
 to decide the success of a blow delivered with determination; 
 and if any one desires to call this a night action, well and 
 good, I do not cling to the letter; but I am convinced that 
 night actions are very proper here, because based on human 
 nature in tactics. Care should be taken that fresh troops be 
 on hand at the decisive point, that they have stout hearts, and 
 that the leaders have that "Schneid^^ which is indispensable in 
 such enterprises. It is thus not impossible that battles which 
 have remained undecided throughout the day may be de- 
 cided in the dark ; that, at any rate, is the import of the sins 
 of omission and commission in the battles of Gravelotte, Le 
 Mans, Loigny, St. Quentin, and even Villersexel. Thus, 
 though our roads may diverge, I join my opponents at the 
 goal. The future will show who is right, and if we cannot 
 have the best we should content ourselves with the good. 
 These decisions after dark, as recommended by me, have the 
 grave disadvantage that, as a rule, there can be no pursuit; 
 at least, with the exception of Waterloo, I know of none. 
 That is certainlj' bad, but the suggestions made by the other 
 side have the much graver disadvantage that in the dark 
 large bodies cannot be led with the requisite surety. In the 
 former case the decision will, at any rate, be gained ; in the 
 latter case we do not get as far as that. 
 
 In the Russian Army, General Kuropatkin is one of the 
 advocates of night attacks. His arguments are, however, 
 
400 [nquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 chiefly based on the Tekinzeu campaign and are inapplicable 
 to European armies. Yet the reference to the moral power, 
 which is so much emphasized both by Kuropatkin and 
 Dragomirow, should not be underestimated. The soldier 
 who knows only ''victory or death" may generally be con- 
 sidered a myth. ]}ut even if that were not so, night actions 
 would not lose their dangers, so far as the higher command 
 is concerned. 
 
 The French have also recently dropped night battles, 
 once 80 much recommended by Boulanger. The maneuvers 
 at ChA-lons-sur-Marne in 1891, as is well known, ended in a 
 grand attack at dawn, but it is doubtful whether in war an 
 army could be suitably concentrated and disposed for the 
 purpose. 
 
 Among the older French generals, Marshal Pelissier, 
 who took Sebastopol by assault, was greatly opposed to 
 night enterprises. He stated with emphasis that the chief 
 cause of the failure of his first assault (June 18, 1855) was 
 that it was made at night. This experienced soldier also 
 stated that at night the men are sleepy, that many lie down 
 and hide, and that confusion is unavoidable. If a general 
 of the French Army then existing expresses such an opinion, 
 what are we to expect from modern iroo]>s, who cannot lay 
 claim to the appellation of veterans? 
 
 In America, General Early expressed himself as follows 
 on the subject of night actions, in connection with Gen- 
 eral Jackson's death, who, as is well known, was mortally 
 wounded by his own men in a night action in the Wilderness: 
 "The fire directed on General Jackson's staff, however 
 lamentable in its results, was simply due to an accident, or 
 rather to the confusion Avhich is unavoidable in all cases 
 where troops have to be maneuvered in the dark. I have 
 perhaps been as often under fire as any living person, and 
 
Tactical Deductions. 401 
 
 my experience and observations lead me to believe that, if 
 the enemy is watchful, offensive movements at night, par- 
 ticularly at their inception, do more injury to one's own 
 troops, through mistakes and accidental meetings, than to 
 the enemy; I also believe that all experienced leaders agree 
 with me. The danger is increased if the movements have 
 to be made in a dense wood." (Wilderness.) 
 
 It is well known that it has never been determined at 
 the hand of what troops General Jackson received his mor- 
 tal wounds, and the battle of the Wilderness was won as 
 General Jackson was about to relieve Rhodes' Division by 
 that of A. P. Hill in order to pursue the enemy. Even under 
 such conditions, night operations are therefore not to be 
 recommended. 
 
 XII. Conclusion. 
 
 At the time of the introduction of the needle-gun it was 
 the general opinion that, owing to the greater rapidity of 
 fire of that rifle, a section of skirmishers could accomplish 
 as much as a platoon heretofore; and it was also believed 
 that by employing three or four times as many combatants 
 from the beginning, the battle would be proportionately 
 shortened. Though this was several times the case in 1866, 
 yet the wars of 1870-71 and of 1877-78 showed that when 
 both sides were armed with breech-loaders, battles were not 
 more quickly decided than formerly; that, on the contrary, 
 the struggle had become more obstinate; that the fighting 
 power of skirmishers armed with breech-loaders was extra- 
 ordinary and surprisingly great. In seeking for proofs 
 among the prominent examples, we cannot find better ones 
 than those of the V. Corps at Worth, and of the ITT. Corps 
 at Vionville, notwithstanding many checks in the battle. 
 
 Though the use of smokeless powder does away with all 
 obstructions to view from smoke, and though the efficacy 
 
402 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 of rifle and gun has been greatly increased as compared with 
 1870-71, it would be j^remature to conclude that a more 
 rapid course and (luicker decision will be the rule. That is 
 in itself sufficient to convince those who have studied the 
 operations preceding battle that an absolute shortening 
 of great battles cannot be expected. Masses of 8 or 9 army 
 corps are not killed off in a few hours. It is, moreover, 
 beyond doubt that skirmish tactics endow the soldier with 
 greater fighting power than any other tactics. It may, on 
 the other hand, be assumed as fairly certain that in future 
 the superiority of fire of one side over the other can in many 
 cases be gained more swiftly than heretofore. It will 
 chiefly depend on which of the opposing artilleries will first 
 shatter that of the enemy, and it seems to me beyond doubt 
 that superiority of training and leading may accomplish that 
 end with great swiftness. It may therefore happen that 
 shortly after the opening of the battle entire batteries Avill 
 be disabled, to a much greater extent than the foretaste we 
 had at Verneville (IX. Corps) and at St. Hubert (VII. Corps), 
 and it is not too much to say that on the 18th of August, 
 such as the situation w^as, the entire artillery of the 18th 
 Division should simply have been captured by the French 
 infantry advancing from both flanks, in the very first hour 
 of the battle. At Worth, on the other hand, before the at- 
 tack of the corps on the flanks, the massed artillery of the V. 
 Corps was the rock against which the billows of battle 
 were again and again broken, and constituted the firm sup- 
 port of our infantry. These two examples are simply 
 typical as regards the superiority of fire and the continua- 
 tion of the action, in a negative as well as a positive sense; 
 hence the artillery should be employed in large bodies 
 from the beginning and covered in front and flank by 
 infantry posted at some distance. The superiority of fire 
 
Tactical Deductions. 403 
 
 may thus be gained step by step, and when it is accom- 
 plished, we may perhaps read of whole lines of disabled 
 guns which a successful issue of the battle is bound to 
 deliver into the victor's hands. This all the more as the 
 concentration of the fire of artillery on one objective is now 
 perfectly feasible. 
 
 Superiority of fire and the decision can not be coinci- 
 dent in point of time; the latter cannot be gained until the 
 former is attained, and it also depends on whether the side 
 which has gained the superiority of fire will have sufficient 
 fighting power left to gain the decision. Until 4 p. m. the 
 French had undoubtedly the superiority of fire along the 
 whole line of battle at Gravelotte, but nevertheless failed 
 to gain decisive advantages at any point. It is also more 
 difficult to ascertain the superiority of fire than is popularly 
 assumed, which is demonstrated by the action of the French 
 left wing at Gravelotte. Artillery which is silent for some 
 time is not necessarily disabled; it may merely be held back 
 for the decisive moment. It follows that it would not 
 always do to hold the actual or supposed superiority of fire 
 equivalent to the decision; the latter requires a general 
 forward movement against the decisive points, of which 
 infantrj' alone is usually capable. (XII. and Guard Corps 
 at St. Privat, 33d Brigade at Loigny, etc.) Hence the new 
 arms do not change the roles of infantry and artillery; the 
 one cannot perform the duty of the other; the absence of 
 smoke, etc., strengthens their combination as fighting 
 branches; it is only now that all the requisite conditions for 
 battle tactics are at hand. 
 
 Artillery as well as infantry must be intelligently and 
 correctly disposed and led, and comparatively large forces 
 of either must be engaged in order to gain the superiority of 
 fire as soon as possible by their common effort. It is feasi- 
 
404: Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 ble in the case of either arm only after careful reconnais- 
 sance and through unity of action; hence all commanders, 
 down to those of regiments, should be well mounted and 
 far out in front to observe and guide the troops into the 
 proper direction at the requisite great distances from the 
 enemy. If artillery and infantry act from the beginning in 
 considerable force, the further course of the action, and ques- 
 tions as to the employment of the arrived and of the com- 
 posite bodies, need give no uneasiness. I again refer to 
 Problus and St. Privat as examples of tactical correctness 
 and errors; these matters have changed, not as regards prin- 
 ciples, but as regards distances at which the preparatory 
 measures have to be taken. They will therefore require 
 more time than formerly, but on that account I would not 
 jump to the conclusion, like some tacticians, that, the prep- 
 arations once completed, the course of the battle proper 
 would be swifter, for against it stand the undoubted in- 
 crease of fighting power which the individual soldier derives 
 from the much-improved arm, the greater supply of ammu- 
 nition, and more careful training. Nor should we attempt 
 to solve such questions in advance, because it is impossible 
 and is apt to lead to wrong conclusions and ideas. In tac- 
 tics we should invariably base ourselves on facts; they con- 
 tain plenty of lessons for study. 
 
 Correct disposition and apportionment of the forces is 
 impossible without the intelligent employment of forma- 
 tions suitable to the terrain. The only formation is that of 
 successive lines, which is the most suitable for developing 
 masses of skirmishers for the solution of the problem. I 
 again refer to Problus and St. Privat (north), to Frosch- 
 weiler, Loigny, and St. Quentin. For the deployment from 
 the marching column, "Treffeii^^ are indispensable. Close 
 
Tactical Deductions. 405 
 
 formations should therefore not be banished from the battle- 
 field; they should rather be used with judgment. 
 
 Since the employment of strong artillery and infantry 
 from the start is the best guarantee to gaining the superior- 
 ity of fire, such employment becomes a tactical law. If the 
 assailant, for instance, has gained the superiority of fire, the 
 danger for intelligently led close formations becomes less. 
 These formations may be applicable in many cases, and I re- 
 *peat that then a few closed companies or small battalions 
 will be best able to quickly decide the conflict. (Frosch- 
 weiler, Loigny, La TuiMrie.) The small-caliber arms, etc., do 
 not make such action impossible, since a superior arm will 
 be of small use to an enemy whose fire power is broken. Let 
 us calmly and coolly retain and use what is good, and not 
 stickle on rules. 
 
 It is the same way with long-range and short-range fire. 
 The danger of running short of ammunition seems some- 
 what diminished by the greater number of rounds carried by 
 the soldier, but it is at the same time increased by the maga- 
 zine system and by the great range of the rifle. At Loigny 3 
 battalions of the Fourth Bavarian Brigade expended all 
 their ammunition, and in the same battle the First Bava- 
 rian Division had expended so much of its ammunition by 
 noon — i. e., in an action of 4 to 5 hours — that General von der 
 Tann had to have it supplied with ammunition before it 
 could resume the action. Under circumstances such as here 
 and at Beaune, where the Sixteenth and Fifty-seventh had 
 to replenish their ammunition several times — i. e., on the 
 defensive — it will be practicable in the future also to bring 
 up fresh ammunition; but the danger of running out of 
 ammunition is very likely to exist in future as in the past, 
 and so is the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of replenish- 
 ing it. Both will best be guarded against by economizing 
 one's fire, and by opening fire as late as possible. Several 
 
406 Inquiries into the Tactics of ths Future. 
 
 instances occurring at Wortli, where troops of the Y. and 
 XI. Corps had expended nearly all their ammunition and 
 where any considerable supply of fresh ammunition was out 
 of the question, urgently enjoin us to delay the opening of 
 fire as long as possible. I do not think much of our peace 
 methods of replenishing ammunition during the attack. 
 For obvious reasons I abstain from going into details; the 
 first requirement is to supply the man before the action with 
 as much ammunition as he can carry without losing his 
 mobility. It should also be made a rule in battle to collect 
 the ammunition of the killed and wounded. 
 
 If infantr}' is capable of inflicting sensible losses on the 
 enemy (by controlled fire, if the range is 1000 meters and 
 over), it would be foolish not to do so. Mistakes and lack 
 of foresight are bound to occur, and every body of troops 
 should be formally trained in taking advantage of them. 
 But fire and movement cannot alwaye be so combined as 
 though the army consisted of automatons. Fire and move- 
 ment are antagonistic in their character; the antagonism 
 may be diminished, but not altogether removed; in general 
 the weakness of human nature inclines to making the fire a 
 welcome pretext for halting. No one will gainsay that. It 
 entails two disadvantages: 1, the offensive blow loses some 
 of its force; 2, the fire is delivered at less effective ranges 
 and encourages waste of ammunition. Every tactician 
 should therefore strive not to open fire until medium ranges 
 have been reached, because in point of leading there is the 
 additional reason, that troops not firing cau be more easily 
 led than those which are firing. 
 
 Though it may be assumed that efforts to direct and 
 lead will never be lacking, it is unlikely that this end will 
 always be accomplished. Fire enforces dispersion, and dis- 
 l)ersion places the colors in great danger. Keeping in mind 
 
Tactical Deductions. 407 
 
 the Sixteenth and Fifty-seventh, it should be made a I'ule 
 not to take the colors into action. Otherwise, in addition 
 to the disabled line of artillery, (juite a number of colors 
 might be fonnd and it would be impossible to tell how they 
 were lost. To be sure, the account of the loss of the colors 
 of the Sixteenth is not calculated to support that conclu- 
 sion; I am opposed to all legends, however fine they may 
 sound, because they prevent actual facts from being un- 
 ' derstood and rendered instructive. The Sixteenth did 
 lose the colors of the second battalion, and whoever 
 Avants to see them should go to the Dome of the Invalides 
 at Paris. The colore were not missed until the men were 
 re-formed after the attack; one or more bullets broke the 
 lance about the middle, presumably during the attack. On 
 reaching the point where the colors were lying, the French 
 carried off the upper part, the colors proper; the lower part 
 was left on the ground, and, as the French withdrew soon 
 afterward from this point, owing to the appearance of Rhein- 
 baben's cavalry division, it was found there by the Six- 
 teenth on the 17th of August. These are the simple facts, 
 which in my opinion contain nothing derogatory to the 
 troops. Still the loss of the colors is very apt to be consid- 
 ered disgraceful, and their capture is always considered 
 glorious. These are the reasons why the facts were prettily 
 decked out by the Sixteenth, and converted by the French 
 into an abominable lie. I do not care to go into details, bu.t 
 am curions to know how long a legend will stand in print, 
 which every experienced soldier feels is "prettily gotten up," 
 of which I have the proofs. The French Fifty-seventh, 
 which fought against the second battalion of the 16th Regi- 
 ment, caused a statement to be printed in the Petit Journal 
 in 1885, to the effect that the colors were"/;?-is en plein action.'' 
 I contradicted the statement in the Deutsche Heereszeitung, 
 
408 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 because reputable French military journals, like the Avenir 
 militaire and Progres militaire, also stated that the colors had 
 been captured. That is not so; they were picked up. 
 
 It should not be overlooked that outflanking tactics are 
 more theory than fact. In great battles the flanks alone are 
 capable of effective outflanking movements, and even in that 
 case it should be remembered that as soon as the enemy 
 extends his line to confront the outflanking movement 
 (which he is very apt to do), the soldier will be fighting a 
 frontal action, and that the commander alone is doing 
 the outflanking. But, owing to the great range of small- 
 caliber arms, the effect of the outflanking troops engaged in 
 a local frontal action cannot but be very severely felt in 
 rear of the defender's front, for tactical outflanking is eo ipso 
 favorable for a speedy attainment of the superiority of fire, 
 since the theoretically ideal concentration of fire is rendered 
 practicable only by delivering the same from two lines mak- 
 ing an angle one with the other, while the absence of smoke 
 in turn is favorable for concentrating the fire of both fronts, 
 and of infantry and of artillery, on the objective. Outflank- 
 ing the enemy — with all three arms — is the most effective 
 form of attack, and admits of great variety in execution. 
 
 This tactical law should not mislead us to hold the 
 frontal action in light esteem, which seems to be the case 
 more or less. The front must not only be kept busy in the 
 future as it was in the past, but should be attacked with 
 great energy; it would be wrong not to take full advantage 
 of the fire power and of the oiTensive power of infantry and 
 artillery. We should keep in mind the services rendered 
 by both arms at Worth, Vionville, and Loigny. No timid- 
 ity should be allowed to creep into our ideas. War demands 
 sacrifices, and every decision exacts blood; troops in the 
 front line will in the future, as they did in the past, take a 
 
Tactical Deductions. . 409 
 
 prominent part in the decision, otherwise the enemy is apt 
 to crush the weak front; mistakes and weakness render this 
 as possible to-day as it was in the days of Napoleon I., the 
 only difference being that such a man is not always present. 
 Hence we should not try to overdo the outflanking: where 
 the front is not sufficiently strong, outflanking is wrong. We 
 cannot give figures; numerical conditions in themselves 
 make the front neither strong nor weak — it is the manner in 
 which the figures are applied in the front. At any rate, we 
 insist that the soldier should know nothing but to be the 
 first in attack and the last in defense; and, in the future, as 
 in the past, battles will be decided by stout hearts and bright 
 minds who know how to use the improved arras. The lat- 
 ter may be overcome by the former, the former by the lat- 
 ter never! The most favorable case is, of course, if the stout 
 hearts and bright minds in combination have at their dis- 
 posal superior arms; yet all the advantages will rarely be 
 found on one side. 
 
 With well-disciplined troops, of good morale and in the 
 hands of determined leaders, the decisive blow, which many 
 reasons may combine in making unpromising of success in 
 daytime, will retain its full tactical value in the evening, 
 at dusk, and in the dark, not to mention foggy and misty 
 days. During the battles in front of Le Mans in 1871, all 
 points were simply assaulted at dusk with hurrah and beat- 
 ing of drums, and among many successful cases I know of 
 but one failure. This is another case where close forma- 
 tions are suitable; such things can, in fact, not be accom- 
 plished in any other way. 
 
 In general the future fire action may be said to take 
 place chiefly between 600 and 300 meters, and to reach its 
 culmination between 400 and 300 meters; there will be ex- 
 ceptions, of course. The leaders must be sufficiently famil- 
 
410 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 iar with the ballistic qualities of the small-caliber arms to 
 know how far in each case they may push their swarms for- 
 ward. Lack of such knowledge will cost much precious 
 blood. 
 
 It is idle to argue whether the infantry or artillery 
 derives greater advantage from smokeless powder; in my 
 opinion, both have enormously gained in tactical value from 
 this invention, and both at the expense of the cavalry ; and 
 however strenuously I have contended for the retention of 
 that arm on the battle-field,! consider its useful employment 
 there as extremely diflScult. But when the hostile army is 
 morally and physically broken by the exhaustive fire fight, 
 well-led cavalry may be upon the enemy before he has recov- 
 ered; battles will be preceded by great cavalry actions, since 
 it is necessary to defeat the enemy's cavalry before w'e can 
 observe, reconnoiter, and make our last dispositions. I con- 
 sider it so great and honorable a duty, that the cavalry 
 might well be content; in any event, in small or large bodies, 
 cavalry will have to do much fighting, and it consequently 
 continues to be a battle arm, since it makes no difference, 
 so far as the effect is concerned, whether it is produced at 
 the beginning or at the end of the battle, or ad interim. The 
 characteristic duties of cavalry can never be performed by 
 the other arms. 
 
 I have repeatedly stated that Gravelotte seems to be 
 about the typical battle of the future, but I am of the opin- 
 ion that when the position is of greater natural or artificial 
 strength, the decision may not arrive until the second day or 
 later. Perhaps we shall resort to battles of circumvalla- 
 tion. Belgrad, Mantua, Plevna may be repeated in more 
 or less similar form. For it is not impossible that the 
 assailant may not gain a victorious battle at all, that he 
 may enclose the defender by a circumvallation where he 
 
Tactical Deductions. 411 
 
 finds him, that attempts at relief may bring on several bat- 
 tles, etc., until hunger and exhaustion compel the invested 
 defender to surrendei', 
 
 I also believe that an offensive' of Moltke's kind will 
 hardly be seen again. Everything points to an obstinate 
 defense on the frontier and to the continuation of the 
 defense on a grand scale in fortified districts. The v^ar will 
 progress spasmodically. A protracted struggle will be waged 
 for positions, exacting much blood and other sacrifices, and 
 that side which possesses the greater endurance and gains 
 permanent superiority by means of a well-selected base, 
 etc., will gain the ultimate victory' and witness the complete 
 collapse of the material and moral force of the opi)onent. 
 It follows that greater enterprises will be launched against 
 the vital arteries of an army. The war will thus be carried 
 abruptly from stage to stage, with complete annihilation of 
 one side at each stage, and the stages themselves may be 
 much protracted. Metz, Paris, Belfort, Plevna, and Schipka 
 are cases in point. 
 
 Though smokeless powder does not introduce new prin- 
 ciples into tactics, still it greatly modifies existing ones, 
 and affects the conduct of the war where tactics and strategy 
 blend. When there is no smoke, one can of course see as 
 fai' as it is at all possible to see; hence the defender, or rather 
 both sides, will be able to watch the approach and deploy- 
 ment beyond the line of battle, which is important, particu- 
 larly in prepared positions; and we should not permit our- 
 selves to believe that it can be obviated by a skillful use of 
 the topographical conditions, since we shall have to take 
 the theater of operations as we find it. In some cases unob- 
 served approach and deployment may be possible, and im- 
 possible in others, and in the latter case the assailant will 
 encounter difficulties which he should not underestimate. 
 
412 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 When the weather is not quite clear (in fog, or rain), unob- 
 structed view no longer exists; in our climate, misty days are 
 not at all rare, particularly in the fall, spring, and winter. 
 What advantage would the new powder have conferred on 
 the Prussians at Jena, on the Austrians at Kouiggratz, on 
 the French at Sedan, on the latter in most of the battles and 
 actions during the winter? But, under conditions similar 
 to those obtaining at Kissingeu, neither party would derive 
 much advantage from the small-caliber rifle — i. e., the ter- 
 rain may remove all advantages. Hence topogi'aphy and 
 weather put a considerable curb on theory. 
 
 Another tactically important point is the color of the 
 uniforms. In order to make cavalry as inconspicuous as 
 possible, all glaring colors should be removed from its uni- 
 forms, especially white and red; in the infantry also the 
 bright helmet trimmings should be discarded and all metal 
 parts, particularly of the rifle, should be of dull color. It 
 has been my observation in the peace exercises that hostile 
 infantry ensconced and concealed at 300 to 400 meters be- 
 trayed itself by its helmets and by the motions of loading 
 and firing; even at more than 1000 meters the infantry was 
 only discovered by the movements of rifles — metal pai*ts glis- 
 tening in the sunlight — whereupon the artillery was able to 
 take it under fire. 
 
 Something else I want to mention: On the 18th of 
 August, 1870, I was able from near Remilly — i. e., more than 
 6 German miles (about 30 English miles. — Tr.) distant — to 
 make out the opposing lines of fire with the bare eye, which, 
 as I afterward learned, were hanging curtainlike in dense 
 white clouds over the battle-field of Gravelotte, and this 
 although not a sound could be heard. 
 
 The principal cause of the defeat of the Thirty-eighth 
 Brigade on the 16th of August was the fact that the French 
 
Tactical Deductions. 413 
 
 approached under the cover of smoke, and, without firing a 
 shot, attacked us suddenly at close quarters; the smoke pre- 
 vented us from seeing the danger. In the former case, the 
 smoke might have been of some advantage for the superior 
 leading in case of unsuitable arrangements for the march; 
 in the latter, the smoke conferred an advantage on the de- 
 fender and a disadvantage on the assailant. It is safe to 
 assume that the assailant would not have rushed to the front 
 without halting had he known that, without being aware 
 of it, as it were, he was intermingling with the enemy; he 
 would have been more cautious and would at least have 
 been able to fight an energetic, defensive fire action, for 
 which the surprise left him no time. When the view is 
 unobstructed, smokeless pow der acts as a safeguard against 
 any kind of surprise, which both sides should constantly 
 bear in mind. 
 
 Nor should we allow ourselves to be guided by the theo- 
 retical fancies hatched in the studio as regards unobstructed 
 view; but w^e should endeavor to gain a clear conception of 
 true warlike situations. At Gravelotte the French might 
 have observed all movements of the Germans from Mon- 
 tigny la Grange as far as Roncourt with the same facility 
 which is now theoretically claimed to be invariably the case 
 with smokeless powder. There was nothing to hinder it, 
 there was no smoke because the battle did not begin until 
 after the movement and deployment, the air was clear, and 
 yet the IX. Army Corps surprised the enemy; although the 
 battle was raging at that point, the enemy, who had an unob- 
 structed view from St. Privat of all our movements, did 
 nothing to check or disturb our turning movement. In such 
 cases, smokeless powder changes nothing, since before the 
 opening of the battle one could formerly see just as far as 
 to-day. The theorv of war should therefore not reckon 
 
414 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 
 
 without the shortcomings and failings of man; they are the 
 chief sources of victory for the opponent. He will ever be 
 the victor who makes the fewest mistakes! 
 
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HORSES, SADDLES, AND BRIDLES, by Major William H. Car- 
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