Book ' W SJ issr CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH HINDU PHILOSOPHY, CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH HINDU PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY, IN FIVE BOOKS, SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH: WITH PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TENDERED TO THE MISSIONARY AMONG THE HINDUS. JAMES R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. AND PRINCIPAL OF THE GOVERNMENT COLLEGE AT BENARES. LONDON: JAMES MADDEN, LEADENHALL STREET. 9 61b 3 '05 ff^9ER eOLLECT/OH. STEPHEN AUSTIN, PRINTER, TIEKTFORD. Sfo the Pernors JOHN RUSSELL. COLVIN, LATE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES OF INDIA, TO WHOSE CORDIAL APPRECIATION OE HIS EDUCATIONAL AIMS THE WRITER OWED IT THAT THE DEATH OF THE LAMENTED THOMASON DID NOT CRIPPLE THE RESOURCES OE THE BENARES COLLEGE. THIS ESSAY IS INSCRIBED, AYITH SORROWING GRATITUDE, JAMES ROBERT BALLANTYNE. SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE ADVERTISEMENT i PREFACE iii INTRODUCTION vii Interference in matters of Religion requires Delicacy and Address ib. The importance of the End derogates not from the import- ance of the Means ib. Rude attacks on False Religions, why unadvisable viii The Propagation of Christianity, how to be Hoped from the Dissemination of Knowledge ib. Desirableness of Converting the Learned ix How it is Reasonable to suppose that Christianity should be Propagated otherwise now than at its First Introduction ib. Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Religion furnished by the Contrariety between the First and the Subsequent Order of its Propagation x How St. Paul dealt with the Learned ib. Hindu Philosophy to be mastered not merely for itself; and why xi The Subject, notwithstanding the Depth of the Interests Involved, why to be treated here with Scientific Unim- passionedness ib. We can most safely venture on Conciliation, where we best know the Errors which we must Avoid seeming to Countenance xii Prejudices not Needlessly to be Awakened ib. The Confutation of Hinduism not the Primary indispensable xiii An example of Lord Bacon' s to be followed ib. P>acon's example not to be Misinterpreted ib. vi CONTENTS. PAGE GENERAL VIEW OF THE HINDU SYSTEMS OE PHILOSOPHY xv The Hindu Systems of Philosophy ib. Fundamental Agreement of the Three Great Systems ib. Howthey Differ xvi The Nyaya Stand-point xvii The Sankhya Stand-point ib. Precise Difference between the Nyaya and the Sankhya Stand-point ib. The Vedanta Stand-point ib. Respective Subordination of the Systems xviii Corresponding Distribution of the Present Work ib. Summary of the Nyaya Philosophy xix General Character of the Nyaya System ib. Meaning of the Name ib. The Nyaya Text-book , ib. Summary of the Topics xx Beatitude the Result of Knowledge ib. The Means of Right Knowledge xxi A Caution to the Missionary xxii Objects regarding which we are to have Right Knowledge xxiii Soul xxiv Mind ib. Activity xxv What the Nyaya reckons a Fault xxvi Transmigration ib. Pain and Final Emancipation xxvii Summary of the Sankhya Philosophy ib. General Character of the System ib. Meaning of the Name xxviii The Sankhya Text-book , ib. The Chief End of Man ib. Nature, What xxix Liberation, What and When xxx Annihilation not Sought ib. Summary of the Vedanta System xxxi Its Great Tenet ■ ib. CONTENTS. vn TAGE The One Reality, how Designated xxxi Possible Course of the Vedantin's Speculations ib. Why " Ignorance" must be Admitted xxxii How " Ignorance" may have got its Various Synonymes... xxxiii ' ' Ignorance, ' ' how defined in the Vedanta xxxiv Why " Ignorance" is held to Consist of Three Qualities... xxxv The Operation of the Qualities Illustrated xxxvi Means of Emancipation according to the Vedanta xxxvii CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED with HINDU PHILOSOPHY 1 Book I. — A Partial Exposition of Christian Doctrine ib. The Enquiry What 2 Man's Chief End ib. The Rule for Man's Direction to his Chief End 5 What the Scriptures Principally Teach 9 What we are to Believe concerning God ib. The Unity of God 13 The Trinity in Unity 14 Creation 15 Book II. — The Evidences of Christianity 20 Miracles the Credentials of a Religion 21 The Christian Miracles worthy of Credit 22 Sufferings of the First Christian Martyrs 26 Unlikeliness that a Story so Attested should be False 28 No Evidence of the Veracity of the Veda producible 29 The Veda, how the result of Speculation, not of Revelation 33 The Vedantic Tenet does not justify the Vedantic In- ference - 38 The Eternity of Human Souls, of What Kind 52 Evidence of Christianity furnished by Prophecy 54 That the Prophecies were really such 55 Book III. — Natural Theology 60 Evidence of a Designer ib. The Sankhya Theory of Unintelligent Design redargued ... 61 The Criterion of the Intelligent ,. 65 The Self-contradictory not Receivable on any Authority ... 66 The Argument from Design Illustrated 68 viii CONTENTS. PAGE Book IV. — Of the Mysterious Points in Christianity 72 Mystery of the Trinity in Unity ib. The rule of " Excluded Middle" 75 Mystery Explicable were no Mystery 78 Mystery of the Incarnation 79 Mystery of the Atonement * 80 The Freedom of the Will 83 Abortive Attempt of Hinduism to clear up the Mystery of Evil 86 Mystery not Distinctive of Christianity 91 Book V. — The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature 92 Origen's Statement of the Argument , ib. Analogy Described 94 Practical Value of Analogy 96 In default of Certainty, Probability not to be Despised 98 Belief may be the Reward of Obedience 100 Belief may have Degrees of Assurance 101 What the Divine Government of both Worlds implies, according to the Christian Doctrine 103 Concluding Advice to the Inquirer , 112 APPENDIX OE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS 113 A. — On the term " Matter" and its possible correspondents in the Hindu Dialects (a Dialogue) 114 B. — On the Hindu employment of the terms "Soul" and "Mind" 138 C. — On " Logic" and " Rhetoric" as regarded by the Hindus (being a Remonstrance to Sir William Hamilton on his Injustice to the Hindu Logic) 140 D.— On the "Vedas" 161 E. — On " the Eternity of Sound " (a Dogma of the Mimansa) 1 76 F. — On "Translation into the Languages of India" * 195 ADVEETISEMENT. m -n— „ ^i^^-u+i^ ^-.^/Kfi^q aiiKoectupjillTz; was submitted The reader is requested to make the following corrections with his pen. Page xxvi., line 8 of note 1, for « adverting it to," read « adverting to." ,i 26, „ 28, for "that they were established," read "that tney were so is established." » 31, „ 8, dele the b. » 47, „ 31, «tf, as a note, i « Without eyes he sees." -Mahab/msh^a, p. 1. 127, „ 18,/or"Colebrook's," read "Colebrooke's." ,, 145, „ 25, for « affirmation or negation," raw* « assent or dissent." >, 156, „ 14, f r " the inductive," raw* " an induction." »' 16f) > » 3 and 6, /or « odor," rwtf " odour." in the (Sanskrit language, treating oi tnose systems ; lugemer with a demonstration (supported by such, arguments, and con- veyed in such a form and manner as may be most likely to prove convincing to learned Hindus imbued with those errors), of the following fundamental principles of Christian Theism, viz. : — " First. — Of the real, and not merely apparent or illusory, distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from matter ; and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all other spirits, and of matter, by God, in opposition to the Yedanta. viii CONTENTS. PAGE Book IV. — Of the Mysterious Points in Christianity 72 Mystery of the Trinity in Unity ib. The rule of " Excluded Middle " 75 Mystery Explicable were no Mystery 78 Mystery of the Incarnation 79 Mystery of the Atonement 80 The Freedom of the Will 83 Abortive Attempt of Hinduism to clear up the Mystery of Evil 86 Mystery not Distinctive of Christianity 91 Book V. — The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and JllXiiilXUXl. V^JL J.IUX. A. — On the term " Matter" and its possible correspondents in the Hindu Dialects (a Dialogue) 114 B. — On the Hindu employment of the terms "Soul" and "Mind" 138 C. — On " Logic" and " Rhetoric" as regarded by the Hindus (being a Remonstrance to Sir William Hamilton on his Injustice to the Hindu Logic) 1 40 D.— On the "Vedas" 161 E. — On " the Eternity of Sound" (a Dogma of the Mimansa) 176 F. — On "Translation into the Languages of India" » 195 ADVERTISEMENT. This Essay, slightly modified subsequently, was submitted in competition for a prize of £300, offered by a member of the Bengal Civil Service. The prize was divided, and a moiety was adjudged to this Essay, the judges being gentle- men appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishops of London and Oxford. In the terms of the pros- pectus, the prize was offered "for the best statement and refutation, in English, of the fundamental errors (opposed to Christian Theism) of the Yedanta, Nyaya, and Sankhya Philosophies, as set forth in the standard native authorities, in the Sanskrit language, treating of those systems; together with a demonstration (supported by such arguments, and con- veyed in such a form and manner as may be most likely to prove convincing to learned Hindus imbued with those errors), of the following fundamental principles of Christian Theism, viz. :— " First. — Of the real, and not merely apparent or illusory, distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from matter ; and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all other spirits, and of matter, by God, in opposition to the Yedanta. ii ADVERTISEMENT. " Second. — Of the non-eternity of separate souls, and their creation by God, in opposition to the Nyaya and Sankhya. " Third. — Of the creation of matter, in opposition to the tenet of its eternity in the shape of atoms (as maintained in the Nyaya and Yaiseshika Schools), or in the shape of Prakriti (as maintained by the Sankhya). " Fourth. — Of the moral character and moral government of Grod ; and of the reality and perpetuity of the difference between moral good and evil with reference to such dogmas of the above systems as are opposed to these doctrines." PREFACE. This Essay, in its present shape, is but an imper- fect sketch of what the writer would wish to offer as a help to the missionary among the learned Hindus. Many topics, which might advantageously receive full treatment, are here scarcely more than indicated. With life and health, the writer will continuously prosecute his task towards its completion. The five books " On Christianity as contrasted with Hindu Philosophy,' ' which form the kernel of the fol- lowing Essay, are given also in Sanskrit, with the omission of such incidental discussions as have reference exclusively to the missionary, and not to those whom the missionary has to teach. There are some Sanskrit works, yet untranslated, which the writer must study before deciding upon his theological terminology for India. Among these works is the Aphorisms of Sandilya. Sandilya rejects the Hindu (gnostic) theory that knowledge is the one thing needful, and contends that knowledge is only the hand- iv PREFACE. maid of faith. Hence, however defective his views may be in other respects, his work seems to promise phraseology of which a Christian missionary may ad- vantageously avail himself. This remark might form the text for an extended dissertation on the Chris- tian's right to the theological language and the theo- logical conceptions of his opponents. If the present work were completed to the writer's mind, he would next desire to be enabled to devote himself to the translation and commentation of the Bible in Sanskrit; taking book by book, not perhaps in the order of the canon — for the completion of such a work as is here intended is not to be looked for in a lifetime — but in the order in which it might seem most advisable to solicit the attention of inquirers, from whom it would scarcely be advisable to with- hold the New Testament till they should have threaded all the historical details of the Old. An occasional watchword of Protestants, and a good one in its proper place, is " The Bible without note or comment." This is right, when the design is to exclude such notes and comments as those of the Douay version, and to make appeal to the unbiassed judgment of Europeans, as to the Eomish and the reformed interpretations of Scripture language. But when, as in the case of the Hindu inquirer, the question is not, which (of two or PREFACE. v more) is the meaning, but simply what is the mean- ing, — notes and comments become the helps or the substitutes of a Hying teacher. English clergymen have commentaries to refer to, and if we may ever look forward to an efficient native Christian clergy, these native clergymen also ought to be similarly supplied. In speaking of a translation of the Bible in Sans- krit as a desideratum, the writer is very far indeed from ignoring the Sanskrit version of the Baptist mis- sionaries; but his own investigations have shown him that this version — valuable as, in many respects, it is — was made at a time when Sanskrit literature had not been sufficiently examined to make a correct ver- sion possible. The mere mastery of the Grammar and the Dictionary does not give one the command of a language. As well might it be expected that the study of a mineral ogical cabinet should make a geolo- gist. "Words, as well as rocks, to be rightly compre- hended, must be studied in situ, A single example of our meaning will suffice, and we need go no further for it than the first verse of the first chapter of the .Book of Genesis in the Sanskrit version of the Bap- tist missionaries. The Hindu is there told that, in the beginning, God created akasa l and prithivl. 2 Now in the dictionary, akasa will, no doubt, be found oppo- 1 WSfiTO! II 2 Tjfvft II vi PREFACE. site the word " heaven," and prithivl opposite the word " earth;" but if the books of the Nyaya philosophy be looked into, it will be found that akasa is to be regarded as one of the five elements (the five hypo- thetical substrata of the five diverse qualities cognised by the five senses severally), and that prithivl is another of the five. Consequently, when the next verse pro- ceeds to speak of the waters — a third one among the five — the learned Hindu reader is staggered by the doubt whether it is to be understood that the waters were uncreated, or whether the sacred penman had made an oversight. A Pandit once propounded this dilemma, in great triumph, to myself; and he was much surprised at finding that the perplexity could be cleared up. But it is obvious what powers of mis- chief we may place in the hands of unscrupulous oppo- nents, by leaving our versions of Scripture thus need- lessly open to cavil. INTRODUCTION, I cannot better prepare the reader to apprehend the design of this work than by submitting for his considera- tion the following remarks of the Eev. John Penrose, in his Bampton Lecture of the year 1808 : — 1 " There is nothing which demands not only interference in so much delicacy and address, but also so iust So "requires " jo delicacy and and liberal a. knowledge of human nature, as address - interference in matters of religion. It is manifest, how- ever, from past history, and I know not that the experience of present times tends in any degree to invalidate the observation, that those persons who devote themselves to the missionary office, though often men of the most heroic disinterestedness, and sometimes of an acute and active genius, yet are rarely possessed of an enlarged and comprehensive intellect. In the immediate obiect which they are desirous of attaining — an The import- fi *f c anceoftheend object, indeed, of the highest worth and great- S^tiS im- - , , . , portance of the ness — they appear somewhat too exclusively means. to concentrate all the faculties of their minds ; and, from want of an extended contemplation of human nature, to mistake the means by which that very object may be best 1 Entitled, — "An attempt to prove the truth of Christianity from the wisdom displayed in its original establishment, and from the history of false and corrupted systems of religion." viii INTRODUCTION. attained. Eager to multiply conversions, they seem naturally to fall into those imprudences which attend an unenlightened spirit of proselytism. In some cases \e.g n that of the Jesuits], as we have seen, they accom- modate Christianity to the idolatries of those to whom they preach. In others, they forget that the same causes on^Msf^eS which make religion necessary to mankind, adviskbie. attach men to the religion in which they have been bred, and that every rude attack serves only to bind them to it more closely. These errors seem not to imply any particular imputation of blame to individual missionaries, but naturally to result from the constitu- tional imperfection of mankind. Throughout India, and other unconverted countries, they probably will extend to all teachers of Christianity, whether of native or European extraction. We rarely can find accuracy of judgment united with that warmth of character which is necessary to induce men to undertake the difficult and dangerous office of promulgating Christianity to idolaters; however useful they may esteem that office to be, how- ever sublime. Those varied studies which discipline and correct the mind lessen the intensity of its application to any one pursuit. To improve reason has a tendency to diminish zeal. I speak only of what usually is the tend- ency of such improvement, without examining whether it is capable of being, or ought to be, counteracted. Thepropaga- " Should these observations be admitted, wK-howto they probably may lead us to infer that it is be hoped from J x J J tio c n d oTTnowI n °t so much to the exertions of missionaries that we must look for the future propagation of Christianity, as to the general dissemination of know- INTRODUCTION. ix ledge. The indiscretions which it can scarcely, perhaps, be hoped that missionaries will be able to avoid, im- pede the end which they propose ; but when those per- sons to whom our religion is offered shall be enabled to determine for themselves, concerning its records and evidences, they will learn to admit its truth on rational principles. When they shall add to the possession of our Scriptures, the sagacity to understand their mean- ing, and the judgment to appreciate their value, they will believe the doctrines which are taught in them. This belief, we may expect, will naturally Desirableness descend from the more intelligent to the com- iLSSu 11 * paratively ignorant. Sound learning and just argument will triumph over fanaticism or error ; will first con- vince the reason of the wise, and, by this means, will, in due time, overcome the prejudices of the vulgar ; and thus Christianity will eventually be established by a progress contrary, indeed, to that which it experienced at its origin, but probably not less aptly suited to the altered circumstances of mankind. " If this, in truth, be likely to be the case, how it is reasonable to so extraordinary a revolution in the manner of cE°tianity hat . . , . . ■, . sbould be pro- propagatmg our religion deserves serious con- pagated other- x x ° u i - } wise now tban sideration. It is an historical fact, entirely SoiucloS in " independent of the miraculous means by which it is said to have been effected, that Christianity was introduced into the world by low and uneducated men, and that men of rank and learning were afterwards, by degrees, converted to it. This fact appears, manifestly, to be an inversion in the ordinary progress of opinions, which are usually communicated from the wise to the ignorant, x INTRODUCTION. instead of being adopted from the ignorant by the wise. It accordingly has been considered by Christians as an important argument for the belief of a Divine interfer- ence in the original establishment of the Church. And Evidence of if it appears that things have now reverted to the truth of the ., . . n , . n -, . christian reii- their natural order, even in the advancement gion furnished ' S4 he betwe r en of that very religion, in the foundation of the subsequent which this order was interrupted; if it is to order of its •*■ ' propagation, abilities and learning that we must now look for the extension and support of a religion which was first propagated by a few unlettered fishermen of Galilee ; we have the stronger reason to admire the peculiarity of its origin, and to conclude that none but God could ever have enabled 'the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty.' " Howst.paui In another place Mr. Penrose says: — dealt with the *■ J learned. u o nce? a £ i eas t 7 in the course of his ministry, St. Paul addressed himself to a learned, to an Athenian tribunal. He wisely adapted to local circumstances the mode in which he declared the existence of the Supreme. He alluded to a received theology : he quoted a philo- sophical poet." I borrow these passages from Mr. Penrose instead of attempting to convey the same sentiments in my own words, the more readily, because the testimony thus borne to the importance of certain branches of learning, as subservient to the spread of Christianity, is not so liable as my own testimony, in respect of Hindu philo- sophy, might perhaps seem, to the suspicion of a bias received from a favourite pursuit. It is not on the INTRODUCTION. xi ground of its intrinsic value (though I may Hindu p mio- have my own private opinion of its value), SiyioiMt- that I recommend the Hindu philosophy to the missionary among the Hindus, as a thing to be mastered, not merely to be dipped into. It is in order that he may be under no temptation splenetically to turn his back upon the learned of the land, and to act as if only the uneducated had souls to be saved. I should wish that when the Missionary has occasion to address the learned of India, he should, like St. Paul, be able " wisely to adapt to local circumstances'' the mode in which he declares his message. I should wish that here his " allusions to a received theology" should be such as tend to facilitate apprehension rather than such as are calculated to offend prejudice without alter- ing conviction. I should wish his quotations from the philosophers to be more frequently, like St. Paul's, the winning advances of conciliation. If the reader should glance at random over any part of the following work, it may perhaps seem to him that my practice differs from my precepts ; for, instead of showing always how to conciliate, I have done my best to expose the errors of Hinduism, and, moreover, I have dealt with these in the dry dispas- sionate manner of a writer on Pathology. Let us attend first to the latter branch of this remark. The feelingless character appropriate to a patho- nJE&taffif logical treatise is not proposed as a model S^^toSS ,,.... . . involved, why to the physician m his practice ; and just {^VtKi- as little is it intended that the soul-slaying r asSLX"S" errors, here treated barely as if matters of scientific xii INTRODUCTION. examination, are to be regarded by the missionary in the calm spirit of speculation when he comes to deal with practical cases. In the fashioning and the tem- pering of a sword-blade, military ardour is not called for ; nor even when we are studying the way to wield the weapon. But as nobody would suppose that we undervalued military ardour in the field of battle, be- cause we employed caution and calmness in the pre- vious tempering and exercising of our weapon, so nobody who reflects will probably fail to see that the consistent exclusion of passionate declamation through- out the following work implies no disparagement of passionate declamation in its proper place. Then, again, we can most as to my having applied myself to the ex- safely venture f , . wherewfbest P osm g the errors of Hinduism, while at the wSwrSuS same time I urge the missionary more par- avoid seeming v to countenance, ticularly to cast about for points of agree- ment, with a view to conciliation, there is here no real inconsistency ; because he that best understands both the errors of his opponent and the means of refuting them, is the man who can most safely ven- ture on making advances in the way of conciliation. I would have the missionary know well the errors of Hinduism, and also the means of their refutation, and yet I would have him reserve this knowledge till it is unmistakeably called for ; lest, by provoking a con- prcjudiccsnot test on ground where he flatters himself he be awakened. i s certain of a victory, he should only need- lessly awaken prejudices which had better, where pos- sible, be left sleeping till they die. There appears to be a growing conviction — in our INTRODUCTION. xiii opinion a right one — that the confutation of T heconfuta- Hinduism is not the first step, nor even the ism not the * ' pnmary lndis- necessary preliminary, to the Christianization p ensable - of India. This impression is akin to that nnder which Lord Bacon wrote the 35th aphorism of his Novum Organum, where, through a historical allusion to the expedition of Charles the Eighth into Italy, he ex- plains how he seeks not contention, but a friendly hearing. " Borgia said, regarding the expe- An example & & J & & r ofLordB acon's dition of the French into Italy, that they to De Miowed. came with chalk in their hands, that they might mark the inns, not with arms to break through. Such, in like manner, is our plan, that our doctrine may enter into fit and capacious minds ; for there is no use of confutations when we differ about principles and notions themselves, and even about the forms of proof." But some of those who entertain this just impression, are apt to draw a wrong conclusion by coupling it with another premiss, which is by no means equally just. Bacon, as his readers are aware, did not ignore J^ 011 ^. 6 *;; the opinions of those who differed from him. pretedT smter " He was thoroughly versed in the opinions of those others ; and this, while it enabled him, in pursuance of the conciliatory line of operations here adverted to, to avoid contention where contention would have been unprofitable, enabled him also to appropriate to the service of sound philosophy all the recognised truth which was not the less truth for having been embedded among the errors of an imperfect philosophy. The fact of Hinduism's not calling for confutation, does not imply that it may be safely neglected. Though xiv INTRODUCTION. not called upon to volunteer the confutation of Hindu errors, the missionary will do well to prepare himself to accomplish that task effectively when occasion im- poses it upon him. The following work aspires to aid him in this preparation. As invited by the suggester of this essay, we aim at refuting " the fundamental errors (opposed to Chris- tian theism) of the Yedanta, Nyaya, and Sankhya philosophies, as set forth in the standard native autho- rities in the Sanskrit language," etc. Let us com- mence with a general view of these Hindu systems of philosophy. A GENEKAL VIEW OF THE HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. The Hindus have six systems of philo- The Hindu ^ * systems of phi- sophy, named the Nydya, Vaiseshika, Sdnkhya, loso ^y- Yoga, Veddnta, and Mimdnsd. 1 The Vaiseshika being in some sort supplementary to the Nydya, the two are familiarly spoken of as one collective system, under the name of the Nydya ; and as the case is somewhat similar with the two other pairs, it is customary to speak of Hindu philosophy as being divisible into the Nydya, the Sdnkhya, and the Veddnta. These three systems, if we follow the com- Fundamental " ' agreement of mentators, differ more in appearance than in sj4ems. egreat reality ; and hence they are, each in its degree, viewed with a certain amount of favour by orthodox Hindus. The partisans of one system may and do impugn the dogmas of another ; but, although every one in such a contest nerves his arm to the uttermost, and fights as if his character were staked upon the issue, yet the lances are lances of courtesy, and the blows are loving ones. It is a very different affair when the denier of the Vedas is dealt with. With the Buddhist, xvi . A GENERAL VIEW OF THE for example— though his notion of the chief end of man differs in no respect from" that of the others — the battle is a Voutrance. The common bond of the others is their implicit acceptance of the Yedas, which they explain differently. According to the epigrammatic remark, that theological dislikes are inversely as the amount of disagreement, some might expect that these dissentient accepters of the Yeda should be more bitter against one another than against the common enemy. But epigrams are not always to be trusted. As Domi- nican and Franciscan are brothers in asserting the in- fallibility of Eome ; so are the Nyaya, the Sankhya, and the Vedanta, in asserting the infallibility of the Yeda against the Buddhist. how they differ. Assuming, each of them implicitly, the truth of the Yedas, and proceeding to give, on that foundation, a comprehensive view of the totality of things, the three systems differ in their point of view. To illustrate this, suppose that three men in succession take up a cylindrical ruler : the one, viewing it with its end towards his eye, sees a circle ; the second, viewing it upright before his eye, sees a parallelo- gram; the third, viewing it in a direction slanting away in front of his eye, sees a frustum of a cone. These three views are different, but nowise irrecon- cilable. So far are they from being irreconcileable, that it might be argued that all of them must be accepted in succession, before any adequate concep- tion of the form of the ruler can be arrived at. Now, in somewhat such a way the three Hindu systems differ mainly in their severally regarding the universe HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xvii from different points of view, — viz., as it stands in relation severally to sensation, emotion, and intellection. The Naiyayilca, founding on the fact that The N we have various sensations, enquires what and stand ~ pomt - how many are the channels through which such varied knowledge flows in. Finding that there are five very different channels, he imagines five different externals adapted to these. Hence his theory of the five elements, the aggregate of what the Nyaya regards as the causes of affliction. The SanMya, struck with the fact that we s X_g5* ya have emotions, — with an eye to the question whence our impressions come, — enquires their quality. Are they pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent ? These three quali- ties constitute, for him, the external ; and to their aggre- gate he gives the name of Nature. With the Naiydyika he agrees in wishing that he were well rid of all three ; holding that things pleasing, and things indifferent, are not less incompatible with man's chief end than things positively displeasing. Thus while the Nyaya allows to the ex- Precise distinc- tion between ternal a substantial existence, the SdnJchya the N> s a £Tkh5 admits its existence only as an aggregate of stan " pomt * qualities; while both allow that it really (eternally and necessarily) exists. The Veddntin, rising above the question as sta T nd e - P ^t nta to what is pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks simply, what is, and what is not. The categories are here reduced to two — the Eeal and the Unreal. The categories of the Nyaya and the Sdnkkya were merely scaffolding for reaching this pinnacle of philosophy. The xviii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE implied foundation was everywhere the same, — viz., the Veda ; and this, therefore, we shall find is the field on which the battle with Hindu philosophy must ultimately be fought. Respective The Nyaya, it may be gathered from what subordination ° ° ' J ° of the systems, j^g k eeil sa ^ ? { g conveniently introductory to the SanMya, and the Sanhhya to the Vedanta. Accordingly in Hindu schools, where all three are taught, it is in this order that the learner, who learns all three, takes them up. The Nyaya is the exoteric doctrine, the Sanlchya a step nearer what is held as the truth, and the Vedanta the esoteric doctrine, or the naked truth. correspond- This view of the matter suggests the distri- ing distribu- "^ pr e n sent of work! e bution of the following work. A separate account of each of the three systems is first given ; and then a summary of Christian doctrine is propounded, in the shape of aphorisms, after the fashion of the Hindu philosophers, with a commentary, on each aphorism, com- bating whatever in any of the three Hindu systems is opposed to the reception of the Christian doctrine therein propounded. A systematic exposition of the dogmas of Christianity seems to furnish the likeliest means of inviting the discussion of the essential points of difference, — any points of difference in philosophy that do not emerge in the course of such an exposition being, we may reasonably assume, comparatively unim- portant to the Christian argument. HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. x ix SUMMAEY OF THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY. The Nyaya. as already remarked, offers the General cha- J u 7 J ; racter of the sensational aspect of Hindu philosophy. In Nya ya system. saying this, it is not meant that the Nyaya confines itself to sensation, excluding emotion and intellection ; nor, that the other two systems ignore the fact of sen- sation ; but that the arrangement of this system of philosophy has a more pointed regard to the fact of the five senses than either of the others has, and treats the external more frankly as a solid reality. The word Nyaya means " propriety or fit- th^SSf of ness." The system undertakes to declare the proper method of arriving at that knowledge of the truth, the fruit of which, it promises, is the chief end of man. The name is also used, in a more limited application, to denominate the proper method of setting forth an argument. This has led to the practice of calling the Nyaya the " Hindu Logic," — a name which suggests a very inadequate conception of the scope of the system. The Nyaya system was delivered by Gau- t eSbook Nyaya tama in a set of aphorisms so very concise that they must from the first have been accompanied by a com- mentary, oral or written. The aphorisms of the several Hindu systems, in fact, appear designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular schools as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are in general admi- xx A GENERAL VIEW OF THE rably adapted. The sixty aphorisms, for example, which constitute the first of Gautama's Five Lectures, present a methodical summary of the whole system ; while the first aphorism, again, of the sixty, presents a summary summar of °^ these sixty. The first aphorism is as fol- the topics. i ows: _« From knowledge of the truth in regard to evidence, the ascertainable, doubt, motive, example, dogma, confutation, ascertainment, * disquisi- tion, controversy, cavil, fallacy, perversion, futility, and occasion for rebuke, there is the attainment of the summum bonum." 1 Beatitudethe In the next aphorism it is declared how result of know- ledge. knowledge operates mediately in producing this result. " Pain, birth, activity, fault, false notions, — since on the successive departure of these in turn there is the departure of the antecedent one, there is Beatitude." 2 That is to say, — when knowledge of the truth is attained to, false notions depart; on their departure, the fault of concerning one's-self about any external object ceases ; thereupon the enlightened sage ceases to act ; then, there being no actions that call for either reward or punishment, there is no occasion, after his death, for his being born again to receive reward or punishment; then, not being born again, so as to be liable to pain, there is no room for pain; — and the absence of pain is the Nydya conception of the summum bonum. ^r* h * ii HINDU SYSTEMS OF I'HILOSOPHY. xxi Well, have we instruments adapted to the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth ? He tells us : — The means ° of right know- " Proofs [i.e., instruments of right knowledge], Iedge * are the senses, the recognition of signs, the recognition of likeness, and speech [or testimony]." l As the present work is concerned with those errors only which are opposed to Christian Theism, it would be irrelevant here to discuss, at any length, the question whether the Nyaya is justified in asserting, or the other systems in denying, that the determining of something by "the recognition of a likeness," is specifically different from the determining of something by the recognition of a sign ; but it may be worth while to explain the nature of the dispute, because it suggests a caution which is practically important. Let the example be the stock one of the Nyaya books. " Some one unacquainted with the meaning of the term Bos Gavaens is told by a forester that the Bos Gavaeus is an animal like a cow. Going thereafter to the forest, and remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees an animal like a cow. Thereupon arises the c cognition from likeness ' that this is what is meant by the term Bos Gavaeus." 2 Now it has been asked, what is there here different from the recognition of a sign ? What is here recognised, is the likeness to a cow, and this is the sign by means of which we infer that the animal is the Bos Gavaeus. The Naiya- yika replies, that there is the following difference. In the xxii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE case of knowledge arrived at by means of a sign, we must, he contends, have inductively ascertained that so and so is a sign ; and in the present instance there has been no induction. So much for this disputed a caution to P ^ > an d we advert to it in order to caution the missionary. ^ Q missionary not to attribute too great im- portance to this and similar real or seeming discrepancies between the several systems, when he meets with any such mutually conflicting views. The dispute is fre- quently verbal only, as in the present instance, where the dispute turns on the question whether an indicated " likeness" is or is not entitled to be called by the name of sign. And even where the difference is real, the Hindus have long ago reconciled all the discrepancies to their own entire satisfaction, so that he who warmly in- sists upon the existence of the discrepancy gains credit only for being ignorant of the recognised means of har- monious reconcilement. He is regarded very much as the confident supporter of some stale sceptical objection to Christianity is regarded in a company of orthodox Chris- tians. Whether the founders of the Hindu systems attributed no more importance to their mutual discre- pancies than is attributed to them by their modern followers, may be open to question ; but the practical caution here suggested is not the less worthy of atten- tion. Opportunities, no doubt, may occur, where the discrepancies between the several systems may be urged with effect ; and here the missionary must use his dis- cretion, always bearing in mind the general caution not to lay too much stress on what will in most cases prac- tically go for nothing as an argument. HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxiii To return to Gautama : if we have instruments for the obtaining of right knowledge, what are the objects in regard to which we have to obtain right knowledge by means of the appropriate instruments? These he enumerates as follows: — "Soul, body, sense, objects re- sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, we^may^have fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beati- ledge# tude, — are that regarding which we are to have right knowledge." 1 Here it is to be carefully observed that the soul (atman) is spoken of as an entirely different entity from the mind (inana-s). The neglect of this distinction may bring a debate with a Hindu into inex- tricable confusion. The English reader who is accus- tomed to hear the words soul and mind (anima and mens — ^ V XV and pv v ) employed interchangeably, must not carry this laxness of phraseology into any Indian dialect, if he desires to be understood, and if he desires to avoid such misconceptions as that of Kitter, who makes the Naiyayika call the soul an atom, whereas the Naiyayika calls the soul all-pervading, and the mind an atom, 2 — -or that of Cousin, who makes out the Sdnkhya to be a materialist, as if he derived soul from Nature, whereas the Sdnkhya only derives the soul's organs — external and internal — from something other than soul. 3 In the 1 -*! I i(rtUlO ^ mfj l T^TpTcSPeT — J while of the Mind it is declared that "it is in the form of an atom, and eternal"— mXUlT^t f^irtl^ II Sitter (at p. 376, vol. iv. of his History of Ancient Philosophy, as rendered hy Mr. Morrison,) assumes that it is a " principle of the Nyaya, that the soul is an atom." 3 M. Cousin (Cours tie Vllist. de la Philosophic, vol. ii., p. 125), speaking- of the "principles" of the Sanlchya, says correctly, "II y en vingt-cinq." These he xxiv A GENEKAL VIEW OF THE Hindu systems, the soul is the self, and the mind is the organ or faculty, which, standing between the self and the deliverances of sense, prevents those deliverances from crowding in pell-mell ; just as a minister stands between the monarch and the thousand simultaneous claims upon his attention, and hands up for his con- sideration one thing at a time. We offer here no opinion on this theory of the Hindus ; we only put the reader on his guard in respect of an established phrase- ology, the misconception of which has so egregiously misled Eitter and Cousin. "What Gautama under- soui. ' stands by soul, he tells us as follows : — " Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and know- ledge, are that whereby we recognise soul (dtman)" 1 Mind. Of the mind he speaks as follows: — "The sign [whereby we infer the existence] of the mind (manas) is the not arising of cognitions [in the soul] simultaneously." 2 Grant that our cognitions are con- secutive and not simultaneous. To account for this, enumerates in a note, giving, as the Sankhya philosophers do, " 1' intelligence, bouddhi," as the second in the list; "manas, mens" as the eleventh; and soul, " l'ame," as the twenty-fifth. All of these three, unlike the Sankhya philosophers, he derives from one and the same source; for he says, "voici quel est le principe premier des choses, duquel derivent tous les autres principes : c'est prakriti on moula prakriti, la nature, ' la matiere eternelle sans formes, sans parties, la cause materielle, univer- selle, qu'on peut induire de ses effets, qui produit et n'est pas produite.'" Now of this radical Nature, " l'intelligence, bouddhi," as well as the soul's internal organ, " manas, mens," is reckoned by the Sankhya to be a product ; but the notion that the soul is either identical with, or anywise akin to, this or any other product, is positively the one notion which the Sankhya labours to eradicate. In the words of the third of the Sankhya Karikas, " Soul is neither a production nor productive," — «T Hlrf?rS ftfffin ms^* ll That liberation is held by the Sankhya to ensue solely on the discriminating of Soul from Nature and the products of Nature, see Aphorism 105, quoted infra, p. xxx. 1 ^rrefaM 4|(f| ^ en d °f man. His first aphorism is as fol- lows : — "Well, the complete cessation of pain, of three kinds, is the complete end of man." x By the three kinds of pain are meant — 1, diseases and griefs, etc., which are intrinsic, or inherent in the sufferer ; 2, injuries from ordinary external things ; and, 3, injuries from things supernatural or meteorological. In his 19 th aphorism he declares that the bondage (bandha) under which the soul (purusha) groans, is due to its conjunction with nature (prakriti) ; and this bondage is merely seem- ing, because soul is " ever essentially a pure and free intelligence." His words are, — " But not without the conjunction thereof [i.e. of nature] is there the connec- tion of that [i.e. of pain] with that [viz. with the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence." 2 In his 59th aphorism, he says again, of the soul's 1 ^rer f^f^rf:^fT(*i«df i ii^rTi<^«T(a^m^: ii <* a HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxix bondage, — " It is merely verbal, and not a reality, since it resides in [the soul's organ] the mind [and not in the soul or self]," 1 on which the commentator observes, — " That is to say, since bondage, etc., resides only in the mind (chitta), all this, as far as concerns the soul (purusha), is merely verbal, — i.e., it is 'vox et praeterea nihil,' be- cause it is merely a reflection, like the redness of [pel- lucid] crystal [when a China rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China rose itself." 2 Of nature, which, by its so-much-to-be- Nature, what. deprecated conjunction, makes the soul seem to be in bondage when it really is not, he gives in his 62nd aphorism the following account : — " Nature (prakriti) is the state of equipoise of goodness (sattwa), passion (rajas), and darkness (tamas)',- — from nature [proceeds] intel- lect (mahat), from intellect self-consciousness (ahankara), from self-consciousness the five subtile elements (tan- matra) and both sets [external and internal] of organs (indriya), and from the subtile elements the gross ele- ments (sthula-bhuta) ; [then besides there is] soul (puru- sha) ; — such is the class of twenty-five." 3 It might be interesting to probe the precise philoso- phic import of the successive development alleged in 1 ^TfjT^fg^mt^rf^m: 11 mq.ii x^fW^w h §\ II xxx A GENERAL VIEW OF THE the foregoing aphorism ; but the special aim of the present treatise (or of this treatise in its present shape) forbids whatever excursion can be safely dispensed with. Liberation, "We shall here, therefore, only add, that we what and , . when. are told, in aphorism 105, that " experience [whether of pleasure or pain, liberation from both of which is desiderated], ends with [the discrimination of] thought [i.e. soul, as contradistinguished from nature]"; 1 that a plurality of souls, in opposition to the Veddnta, is asserted in aphorism 150, " From the diverse allotment of birth, etc., the plurality of souls [is to be inferred] "; 2 and that the paradoxical conception of the soul in bond- age, whilst not really in bondage, may be illustrated by Don Quixote hanging in the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life till daybreak, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground. Annihilation Jt ma y be P ro P er to observe that the SdnTchya explicitly repudiates the charge of craving annihilation. In aphorism 47 we are told that, "In neither way [whether as a means or as an end] is this [viz., annihilation] the souPs aim." 3 We next advance to a survey of the Veddnta theory. 1 'fa^«mMV*ftT. II ^OM II That the word "thought" {chit) here means " soul" (atman) we are told by the commentator — PH<^lGHl II 2 »t«*nf<<=qci^H ; ip*m***HU W II 3 ^^m*M*jH*it»n ii 8^> ii HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. SIDOIABY OF THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. The Yedanta theory arrives at the limit of its great tenet. simplification, by deciding that nothing really exists besides one, and that this one real being is absolutely simple. This one simple being, according to the Vedanta, is Jcnoivledge (jnana\ — not the knowledge of anything, for this would imply a contradiction to the dogma that nothing exists except knowledge simply. This concep- tion, of the possible nature of knowledge, is quite at variance with the European view, which regards know- ledge as the synthesis of subject and object. According to the Vedanta there is no object, and hence it follows that the term subject is not strictly applicable, any more than is the term substance, 1 to the one reality. Both of these terms, being indicative of a relation, are inapplicable under a theory which, denying duality, does not admit the conditions of a relation. Soul, the one reality, Theonereai- ' v ' ity, howdesig- is accordingly spoken of in the Vedanta, not as nated - a substance (dravya) as it is reckoned in the Nyaya, but as the thing, or, literally, "that which abides'' (vastu). Let us enquire how this conception may have been arrived at, consistently with the seeming existence of the world. Suppose that God — omnipresent, omnis- x x Possible course cient, and omnipotent — exists. Suppose, &f\J££ further, that, at some time or other, God 1 At the opening of the Vedanta- Sara , indeed, the one is spoken of as the sub- stratum of all {akhiladhara) ; but the existence of aught else being subsequently denied, it remains ultimately the substratum of nothing, or no wi-stratum at all. xxxii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE exists and nothing else does. Suppose, in the next place, as held long in Europe and still in India, that nothing is made out of nothing {ex nihilo nihil fit)) and suppose, finally, that God wills to make a world. Being omnipotent, He can make it. The dogma " ex nihilo nihil fit " "being, by the hypothesis, an axiom, it follows that God, being able to make a world, can make it without making it out of nothing. The world so made must then consist of what previously existed, — i.e. of God. Now what do we understand by a world ? Let it be an aggregate of souls with limited capacities — and of what these souls (rightly or wrongly) regard as objects — the special or intermediate causes of various modes of consciousness. Taking this to be what is meant by a world, how is God to form it out of Him- self ? God is omniscient, — and, in virtue of his omni- presence, his omniscience is everywhere. "Where is the room for a limited intelligence ? Viewing the matter (if that were strictly possible) a priori, one would in- cline to say " nowhere." But the Yedantin, before he had got this length, was too painfully affected by the why igno- conviction, forced upon him, as on the rest of rancc must be . , • admitted. us? by a consciousness which will take no denial, that there are limited intelligences. "I am ignorant," he says ; and if he is wrong in saying so, then (as a Pandit once remarked to me) his ignorance is established just as well as if he were right in saying so. Holding, then, that the soul is God, and confronted with the inevitable fact that the soul does not spon- taneously recognize itself as God, there was nothing for it but to make the fact itself do duty as its own cause, HINDI' SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxxiii to say that the soul does not know itself to be God, just because it does not know it, — i.e. because it is ignorant, — i.e. because it is obstructed by ignorance (ajndna). 1 At this point let us suppose that our speculator stopped, but that a disciple took up the matter and tried to make something more palpably definite out of the indefinite term ignorance, Were it not, he . argues, for this ajndna, of which my teacher jjXiKS speaks, the soul would know itself to be God, — there would be nothing but God, — there would be no world. It is this ajndna, then, that makes the world ; and, this being the case, it ought to have a name sug- gestive of the fact. Let it be called prakriti, the name by which the Sankhyas speak of their unconscious maker of worlds'. 2 Good, says another ; but recollect that this prakritij or " energy,' 7 can be nothing else than the power of the All-powerful, for we can admit the inde- pendent existence of God alone; so that the ajndna which you have shown to be entitled to the name of prakriti, will be even more accurately denoted by the word kakti* God's " power," by an exertion of which power alone the fact can be accounted for, that souls which are God do not know that they are so. The reasoning is accepted, and the term sakti is enrolled among the synonymes of ajndna. Lastly comes the my- thologist. You declare, says he, that this world would 1 ^WRII a See the Sankhya Aphorism, B. I. § 127 — R jjUj N fHg=H f< ^fr mR^II " Of both [nature, or ' the radical energy,' and her products] the fact that they consist of the three qualities, and that they are unthinking, etc. [is the common property]." 3 TTfiffH xxxiv A GENERAL VIEW OF THE not even appear to be real, were it not for ignorance. Its apparent reality, then, is an illusion ; and for the word ajndna you had better substitute the more expressive term mdyd, ] " deceit, illusion, jugglery." The addition of this to the list of synonymes being acquiesced in, the mythologist furnishes his mdyd with all the requi- sites of a goddess, and she takes her seat in his pan- theon as the wife of Brahma the Creator. ignorance, The definition of " ignorance," in the now defined in ° * thevedanta. Veddnta^ requires notice. Ignorance, we are informed, is " a somewhat that is not to be called posi- tively either real or unreal, — [not a mere negation, but] in the shape of an entity, the opponent of know- ledge, — consisting of the three fetters." 2 According to the Naiydyikas, ajndna is merely the privation (abhdva) oijndna. To exclude such a meaning here it is asserted to be "in the shape of an entity" (bhdva-rupa). The description of it as something " not to be called posi- tively either real or unreal" corresponds with Plato's 6v icai firj bv, as distinguished from the ovtcd? 6v, z The dis- tinction is that of the phenomenal and the real. The universe being held to be the joint result of soul and ignorance, and soul being the only substance, or " sub- stratum of all," it follows that ignorance is equivalent to and identical with the sum total of qualities. These, as in the Sdnkhya system, are held to be three ; so that ignorance, as we have just seen, is spoken of as " con- 3 See Sir Wm. Hamilton's note on Reid's works, p. 262. HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxxv sisting of the three qualities" (trigunatniaJca), or, as it may be also rendered, " consisting of the three fetter s^ the word for " quality" (viz., guna), meaning originally a "fetter,'' and these two senses, in Hindu philosophy, being closely related. 1 Let us see what can have led to the division of quality into three. The one reality — the universal substratum — being veiled by the garb of the phenomenal world, J£g£ffZ certain marked distinctions of character among quaiiSe°s! three the phenomena present themselves. We have pheno- mena of pure cognition, of lively emotion, and, finally, of inertness, or, in Shakspere's phrase, " cold obstruc- tion." To one or other of these three heads every phenomenon may, with a little ingenuity, be referred. The three heads are named respectively, in Sanskrit, sattwa, rajas, and tamas. 2 According to the com- mentators, the first of the qualities, whilst endlessly subdivisible into calmness, complacency, patience, re- joicing, etc., consists summarily of happiness. The second, on the other hand, consists summarily of pain. To these categories belong almost all the sensations and thoughts of thinking beings ; — scarcely any feeling, viewed strictly, being one of sheer indifference. This indifference, the third of the qualities, is exemplified in 1 See the SanJchya Pravachana Bhashya on Aphorism 62, Bk I., viz. : — ■ <*4^ || tainment of the chief end of man. (1) Next he states the den- I ^ I TO ^TTO^TW nition of the chief end of ^f^x^nf I man. APHOEISM II. e Man's chief Man > s chief end t^^T^S^N^^ U" is to glorify God, and enjoy ^{^^^^ -^ ^ Him for ever. ♦ c (1) What is God, will be l\l ^3 *T3W trg- stated in the fifth Aphorism. J{lgy( W^fTf I «T«T ^TIT- If it be said that it is impos- ^^^ ^ „^ ^- sible to glorify God because ^ ^ .. man cannot add in the slight- *^"* TO> 5t ^« est degree to the glory of g^ than one. For — APHOEISM VI. G The unity of There ig but Qne J^. ^^ ^ ^ ^ God, the living and true God. ^ (1) We say " living," in j ^ \ ^r\^ nWNt *TT- order to exclude idols; and ^^^^^^^ "true," in order to exclude imaginary gods. (2) If it be said that there is no proof that there is but ^TplSTO ^*5*W 1 fir 14 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH one such God as is here de- ffpJTRfrjf?! ^^ *3R*TT- signated "the Lord," we re- ^^^ WwTcTJ ply : Not so ; because both ^ '^ reasonmg and Scripture fur- ^ ^ nish proof of this. The reason- ^"g-Rt *fwf v^T^i idl- ing is this, that God is one, ^TfiW^4^Tf^n"firf?r I because a unity of design runs through all created things. (3) Now, in order to ob- \ ^ | «T«TTr^fic^£r ^j: viate the doubt how we ___ ^-^ -tt^^».«-^ are justified in saying that ^ ^ only one God is declared in ^ T ^ ^T^ T^ TCT Scripture, when, in the New ^3 ^TT*TW "Rfrro^rT TfH Testament, three persons are -gr^f f^Tf%(jraTW I spoken of under the name of God, we declare as follows : — APHOEISM VII. *%£"* There are three per- ^ ^ jfa^ftfo ^ sons in the Godhead, the Fa- -s -s Vn^ ^ ther, and the Son, and the Hely * ^«^ ^™ Ghost, and these three are one «TOT«lftftTnifa*ITWT " God, the same in substance, f^qrn ^f^rf II ^> II equal in power and glory. (1) This dogma will be dis- ,^, ^ ft^^iratf cussed in the Fourth Book. j^'^^ , (2) Having thus far de- , ^ , ^^ ^^p^.. scribed the nature of God, we proceed to describe the nature TO ^TOTO rift rf T^T' of what is other than He. W^tf fTOTOfft I HINDU PHILOSOPHY. \:> APHOKISM VIII. creation. God made all things of nothing, by his mere word, in the space of six days, and all very good. *m s 7n1*R *Hhn *TV^ 11^ II (1) But how is it possible , ^ , ^ ^ ^^ that God " made all things of c * nothing?" We retort: How **^ ^^^ ****' should it not be possible ? iftfr 1 1 ^ *^^f?T I *f T To explain,— We ask you in ^j T f% <^g TTfrPrgsr: g>- turn, how does fire bum fuel ? ^^.^^ ^ ^ If- you answer, from the na- ^ tureof things,— then we rejoin ^ ! W ^ ^V*" that it is the same in the case Iffi Spf cf§W I f^%3 before us [—God makes things rr^fq^T^T^R3rTTW - out of nothing « from the na- ^^ ^ ,p™- T ^ ture of things"]. If you ask, ^ ^^ how can this or that thing be **f^ftf?t ^ s S^WT produced without the aggre- *2nfT ^f% ^R^^cF^^- gate of its concurrent causes ? ^ -jj^j ♦ ^j-^ ^f& ™ we reply, that the doubt would ^ _ v , ^s. be a fitting one if we were * * ^ ^ speaking of men's works ; for *2fwTO