k 
 
 ^^^H^A Critical Examination [in 
 
 HHPk- part] of Pennypacker^s Life 
 
 
 of General George G. 
 
 ■ ■ ■ 
 
 Meade 
 
 
 BY 
 
 
 HENRY H. HUMPHREYS, 
 
 
 A. dc C. 
 
 : 
 
 HIGHLAND PARK, 
 
 
 Lake County, - - Illinois. 
 
 ' 
 
 TIVOLI, N. Y., 
 
 ■ 
 
 FRANK 0. GREEN, 
 
 r 
 
 1901. 
 
Dana on Meade and Humphreys. 
 
 •The Niiitli Corps was moved by rail to Annapolis, where it was reoruited 
 up to about twenty-five thousand men. As the time for action neared it was 
 set in motion, and bj' easy marches reached and re-enforced the Army of the 
 Potomac on the morning of. the 6th of May, in the midst of the battle of the 
 Wilderness. It was not formally incorporated with that army imtil later, but, 
 by a sort of Action, it was held to be a distinct army, Burnside acting in concert 
 with Meade, and receiving Iiis orders directly from Grant, as did Meade. These 
 two armies were the exruse for- CIraiit's jx'rsonil ]trespnne. wiMimit ;i(>f imllv 
 superseding Meade. 
 
 '•In my opinion tiie great soldier of the Army of the Putoindv <ii lui.-. ihm.- >. .t> 
 General Humiihreys. He was the chief of staff to General Meade and was a 
 strategist, a tactician, and an engineer. Humphreys was a fighter, too, and in 
 this an exception to most engineers. He was a very interesting figure. He 
 used to ride about in a black felt hat. tlie brim of which was turned down 
 all around, making him look like a (Quaker. He was very pleasing to deal with, 
 unless you were fighting against him, and then he was not so pleasant. [He 
 was a Quaker by descent.] * * * * •* * * * * Hum- 
 phreys was a very charming m^n, quite destitute of vanity. I think he had 
 consented to go and serve with Meade as chief of staff out of pure patriotism. 
 He preferred an active command, and eventually on the eve of the end, succeeded 
 to the command of the [combined] Second [Tliird] Corps, and bore a conspicuous 
 part in the Appomatox campaign. — Cliarles A. Dana's Recollections page 191-2. 
 
 ■Before the army had recovei'ed from its long march from Cold Harbor and the 
 failure to cajiture [Petersburg] there was an unusual amount of controversy going 
 on among the officers. Meade and Warren were so at loggerheads that Meade 
 notified Warren that he must eitlier ask to be relieved as corps-commander or 
 he (Meade) wouhl i)refer charges against him. It seemed as if Meade grew more 
 unpopular every day. Finally the difficulties between him and his subordinates 
 became so serious that a cliange in the commander of tlie Army of the Potomac 
 seemed iirobable. *•;«■** Page 220 
 
 •'The Fiftii Corps having pre]mred the way. tiie whole army left the line.s about 
 Cold Harbor on schedule tinte, just as soon after nightfall on the 12tli [June 
 18G4] as its movements could be concealed from the olxservation of the enemy. 
 It was in drawing orders for such complicated movements as these, along dif- 
 ferent roads and by different crossings, that the ability of General Humplireys. 
 the chief of staff,' was displayed. Everything went perfectly from the start". 
 Page 218 
 
 "I had long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible tamper, especially 
 toward his subordinates. I think lie liad not a friend m tlie vvliole army. No 
 man, no matter what his business or his .service, approached him without being 
 insulted in one way or another, and his own staff officers did not dare to speak 
 to him unless first spoken to. for fear of either sneers or curses. Tlie latter 
 however. I had never heard him indulge in very violently, but he was said to 
 apply them often without occasion, and without reason. At the same lime, as 
 far as I was able to ascertain, his generals had lost their confideiKie in him as a 
 commander. His orders for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in wliich 
 we lost ten thousand men without gaining any decisive ailvantage, were greatly 
 (n-itici.sed. They were, in effect, tiiat he had found it impractible to secure tlie 
 co-operation of corps-commanders, and that, therefore, each one was to attack 
 on his own account and do the best he could by himself. The < onsequence \\ a 
 
 f'oiif/iiit('<f ov Fiimili of T.itil: ('(tri'r. 
 
 f 
 
A Critical Examination [in 
 part] of Pennypacker^s Life 
 of General George G. 
 Meade 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY H. HUMPHREYS, 
 A. de C 
 
 HIGHLAND PARK, 
 Lake County, - - Illinois. 
 
 TIVOLI, N. Y., 
 FRANK O. GREEN, 
 
 1901. 
 
have sent them flying irom tlie field, converting the retreat into a {lis-organized 
 mass of flying fugitives. Had a force been sent to tlie Cashtown Pass, that of 
 Fairfield would have been opened at once, we sliould have liad some rear guard 
 actions, and would have arrived upon the grouiul at Willianisport just as soon as 
 Lee. 
 
 How often this has been performed in past ages it is needless to point out, 
 and we are of tlie belief sucli were the views of the Chief of Staff, though he 
 records this affair in cautious language. See '"Gettysburg to the Rapidan'*, p. 3 
 & 7. The Nation held and still holds Gen'l Meade responsible for this failure, 
 and no glossing over it, or meretricious treatment, can or will absolve him from 
 that glaring error. 
 
 Gettysburg, the reconnaissance to the Fairfield Pass, the flank movement or 
 march to Willianisport, Md., had by that time determined the personal equation 
 of each of the several Corps commanders; of this fact the Commanding General 
 must have been aware; still, in deference to the opinion of all (except two com- 
 manders), tiie attack was put off until a better oi)inion could he formed of the 
 strength of the enemy's works. 
 
 "Councils of War never fight"; the personal e(iuation is also a prominent fac- 
 tor; it remained with but one man to say whether the army should fight or not; 
 neither do we find the views of his Chief of Staff expressed at that meeting, 
 though we are of the opinion that he was not averse to a trial of strength. 
 
 Both armies occupied good positions; that of the Confederates covered ground 
 of about ten miles naturally strong. Their flanks could not be turned; the ground 
 from their left to near their right centre presented difficult topographical feat- 
 ures to an attacking force; towards their right and right centre the ground wa*^ 
 more open: though strong, it was more favorable for attacking: we should have 
 lost many men in so doing, but had the attack been successful our enemy would 
 have been cut in two, both roads leading to the fords of the Potomac would have 
 been in our possession, also their army. 
 
 The strength of both armies was nearly equal. On the supposition that at 
 that time it required about five thousand men to hold a front of one mile of rifle- 
 pits, the Confederates had but very few men for a reserve force: that foice could 
 not have been larger than ten thousand. On our part, our line of rifle-pits being 
 less in length than those of the enemy, we could have spared for the assault at 
 least twenty-five thousand men. 
 
 The only ground which ^sas at all favorable for an attack was opposite our 
 left; though some features of it were unfavorable, thev were not insurmount- 
 able. We refer to that portion which is crossed by the Willianisport road, not 
 the pike. 
 
 This ground could not have escaped the eyes of the Commanding General, and 
 did not escape those of his Chief of Staff; and very likely it had been selected as 
 the point to deliver the assault on the morning of July 14th, 1803. when moving- 
 forward that morning we found the enemy liad crossed the Potomac. 
 
 The Administration was anxious the invaders should be driven from Northern 
 soil, was in fact willing to stand sponsor for failure should it take place, and our 
 people would have supported the attempt, and submitted without a murmur had 
 we suffered a defeat. 
 
 We are compelled to record our opinion tliat the Commanding General of 
 Willianisport is not the one of Gettysburg. 
 
 When Gen. Humphreys gave testimony before the Committee on the Conduct 
 
of the War, his evidence was the consensus of that of the Army; a direct question 
 would have elicited the answer sought; ordinarily more was kept back than 
 was uttered. 
 
 Those who have read "The Life" understand the movements of both armies 
 after Marj'^land was evacuated; but we have something to say regarding the 
 movements of the 3rd Corps when before and in Manassas Gap, backed by two 
 other Corps of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Had such dilatory movements, (those of tlie 3rd Corps of the Union Army) 
 occurred in an European force, the Commander of that unit which had been 
 guilt}' of such an action would have been brought before a court, tried, found 
 guilty aiid shot. 
 
 Though the actions of the Commander of the 3rd (Jorps ruined the carefully 
 planned projects of the chief of Staff for striking Lee with the units of his armj' 
 disjointed, the generosity of the Commander of the Army of the Potomac inter- 
 ferred with the meting out to him of his just rewards, due to his incompetency, 
 and he was still permitted to command his Corps. 
 
 At that time the Gap (Manassas) was filled with blackberi-ies, which were par- 
 taken of by the troops left by Lee to hold the Gap until his army had passed, 
 without their giving any attention to the Union troops, and when their bellies 
 could hold no more of that fruit they withdrew, leaving to our forces such of 
 the berries as they could not carry away. 
 
 We are compelled to remark again, that with this exiiibition of generosity on 
 the part of the (Commanding General, he must assume the whole responsibility of 
 the failure to strike Lee while in march, and the onus cannot be put on anyone 
 else's shoulders. He had his remedy, but failed to use it. 
 
 Light may be thrown upon the relations which existed between tne Command- 
 ing General and the 3rd Corp Commander, wherein the latter advises the former 
 how to obtain information of the enemy. See Serial No. 45, p. 6G7, "Official Re- 
 cords of the Rebellion". 
 
 Tliere was at the Hd. Qrs. of the Army of the Potomac a Provost Marshal 
 General whose duties were to find out just this information, while other Corps 
 Commanders could have given some, but so far as the Official Records go they fail 
 to show it. 
 
 There were other means of obtaining information, such as forcing our enemy 
 to display his line of battle by a show of force on our part suflficient to cause 
 him to display his strength, etc. 
 
 We also perceive the magnanimous treatment of this officer's conduct by the 
 author of '-Gettysburg to the Rapidan", in his failui-e to comprehend what 
 was required of liim to produce results, rendering abortive those peerless 
 projects in Logistics and Strategy of the Chief of Staff of the Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 Regarding the curious facts that both Commanding Generals had submitted 
 their resignations to their respective governments, and the remarks of General 
 Fitzhugh Lee upon tiiat of Lee's "that the removal of Meade would have been an 
 act of kindness to the Confederates"', we agree with him, for had Meade's request 
 been granted, his eminent Chief of Staff would have also been relieved, and the 
 Confederate Army would then have had no difficulty in understanding the 
 mov^ements of the Army of the Potomac. See pages 5 and 222 of the ''Life". 
 
 By adopting "the unfortunate misapprehension" of his rear-guard commanders 
 as to the presence of Lee's army at Culpepper Court House, Meade placed his 
 
whole armj' in a clisadvantag;eous position so far as fighting was concerned, and 
 jeopardized Washington, and this in the face of tlie advice of liis Chief of Staff, 
 who saw clearly what was the purport of the niovonient on the i)art of Lee. 
 
 Just here we must admit upon the scene an aside which has more or less bear- 
 ing upon the subject. 
 
 During the disc^ussion as to what the movement of Lee meant, the Chief of 
 Staff in a very lucid manner explained the whole movement to the Commanding 
 General of tlie Army of the Potomac who, carried away in his belief that Lee 
 intended to give him battle at Culpepper, endeavored to bully the Chief of Staff 
 into the same belief; some words were said bv iMeade, to which no reply was 
 made, the Chief of Staff simply rising from ids seat on the opposite side of tlie 
 table and looking his Chief steadily in the eyes when he abruptly left the tent. 
 
 This was the first and only attempt at bullying his Chief of Staff, and IMeade 
 ever afterwards listened and heeded the advice given him. 
 
 We have furthermore to add that the advice given and not heeded by Meade was 
 confirmed that night by advices received from the cavalry, who had failed to 
 transmit as required by orders information of the crossing of the Confederate 
 Army on the upper Rappahannock near Sulphur Springs. 
 
 Our cavalry were not placed there for fighting, but for the purpose of observ- 
 ing and giving information of the presence of Lee as soon as possible: this officer 
 violated his instructions, placing our army in a dangerous position; he should 
 have been arrested, brought before a Drum Head Court Martial, tried and shot. 
 
 Had the Chief of Staff' the command of that armv. such would have been his 
 fate. 
 
 News of the presence of Confederates at the Sulphur Springs, was brought to 
 Hd. Qrs. by Lieut. Nicolas Nolan of the Gth U. S. Cavalry, who was shot in the arm 
 whilst cutting his way through a party of the enemy's cavalry, which endeavoreil 
 to capture him, but escaped, thajiks to the speed of his horse. 
 
 Fortune favored us there; had her face been turned away, another story would 
 have been told, and the sun for Meade would have set forever. 
 
 With the news that our right flank had been turned, that Lee was nearer to 
 Washington than we. with our army partly on the right bank of the Rappahannock 
 and distant some miles from the other portion, thougli witiiin supporting dis- 
 tance, the momentous question for Meade was how to extricate himself from this 
 unfortunate blunder. 
 
 The matter was handed to his Chief of Staff, who looking over carefully the 
 situation, devised the scheme whereby the army was rescued from its tlien peril- 
 ous position. Ceaseless marching was of first importance, day as well as night; 
 this the army yielded to, knowing well the situation, and legs won; with(mt tiiem 
 we should have lost. 
 
 During this extraordinary march of over :;() hours, the Corps Commanders rode 
 in rear of their commands, ready to crush any force which might try to iini)ede 
 their progress; close communications were kept between them, (the Corjis 
 which was ahead and the Corps which followed); in one instance only was this 
 close union between tliein broken, which will now be related. 
 
 "An army crawls upon its belly;"" but in this case, legs were used in addition 
 to the belly; most of our army had passed Bristoe Station, and over Broad Run. 
 and were well on their way to Centreville, Va., leaving behind three corps and 
 the Cavalry. These Corps were from the rear— the Cavalry, then the second Corps, 
 mustering 8000 men: this force formed the rear guard: but in the action i'ought 
 
at or near Bristoe but 3000 men were engaged, tlie balance having been detached 
 as an escort to the train: beyond Broad Run and on the road to Centreville, was 
 the 5th Corps, then the Brd Corps. 
 
 It was surmised that some force of tlie enemy would make its appearance at 
 Bristoe; for this reason, the 5th Corps was directed not to move until the 2nd 
 Corps came up, the 3rd not to march until the 5th began to move. 
 
 By this arrangement it v/as expected to have three Corps ready to meet and 
 crush any body of the enemy which should make its appearance at that place. 
 
 Gen'l Warren was informed of these oiders, and direc;ted to move as rapidly as 
 as possible, and also of the probability of a force of the enemy coming down 
 from tlie Warrenton Road to Bristoe. 
 
 As soon as the head of the ^nd Corps came in sight the 5th began to niarch, and 
 upon its moving forward the 3rd mai-ched, abandoning the 2nd to its fate. 
 
 To the soldier the booming of cannon and the sharp rattle of musketry is his 
 very life and inspiration, but here we find two Corps marching from the field of 
 battle, disobeying their orders and committing an offense which for a soldier 
 merits the severest punishment under the Articles of War. 
 
 The Commanding General, upon learning that these Corps were not in con- 
 nection witii the 2nd, ordered them back, the head of the 5th reaching the 2nd at 
 dusk; the Commander of that Corps having sometime before requested assistance. 
 
 It was however too late to concentrate our army for a general engagement. 
 The 2nd Corps had been attacked by an overwhelming force, but held its ground, 
 and when night fell withdrew, not de^'eated, but victorious. Lee had not moved 
 as quickly as we. 
 
 Had these orders been obeyed by the Commanders of the 5th and 3rd Corps, 
 we should and must have smashed in detail not only Hill's Corps but Ewell's 
 also, as it was sometime before the latter arrived upon the ground, and after Hill 
 had been engaged w-ith the 2nd. Neither would it have been necessary to put in 
 that foot note which is found at the bottom of pages 20 and 21 of "Gettysburg 
 to the Rapidan," and the remarks comprised in the last part on page 36. 
 
 Thus was ruined an excellent plan which would have caught Lee when he was 
 not expecting a fight. Fortune favored us, but we declined to partake of her 
 favors; rebuffed as she had been, she continued to show us the way, but un- 
 fortunately we had \vitli us men who were worse than nothing, and the Com- 
 manding General, so far as we have been able to discover, did not take steps to rid 
 himself of incubuses who could not comprehend that which was plainly written 
 for their guidance: he is therefor to blame, and more than his agents, for not 
 assuming that responsibilitj' which it was his plain duty to exercise. 
 
 Why was not the Gettysburg order applied to these Commanders? The cause 
 of the Union was imperilled by their retention. We do not perceive any differ- 
 ence in the cases. See foot note on page 148 of the "Life''. 
 
 And how must the Chief of Staff have felt when he saw the results of his 
 careful work set aside as so much waste paper, work which caused much 
 thought and care! Did he repine? No, not at all. but set to work with the same 
 vigor, and devised other plans which were ruined by men intrusted with large 
 commands. Is it any wonder that Lee was puzzled by the movements of Meade? 
 No not his, but those of his Chief of Staff? 
 
 The putting together of a complicated machine, all its parts turned to a nicety, 
 involves a thorough knowledge of what it shall accomplish: smoothness of work- 
 ing is essential to complete success. As the operations above described required 
 
nicety of adjustment to prevent friction, it lias been with us a matter of wonder 
 wh}' representatives of the Commanding General were not present with the 5th 
 and 3rd Corps, armed with authority to compel compliance with the orders, 
 which would have insured harmonious working. 
 
 One of these Corps Commanders had previously developed a weakness which 
 had ruined one project, and here is another one afflicted with the same disease. 
 
 Tonics are administered to give strength to a weak memi)er of tiie machine, 
 and the symptoms of a break down aie recognized long before its appearance: 
 hence we fail to apjjreciate the "shaking objects of a rage so magnilicent that it 
 seemed capable of moving mountains."' 
 
 The collapse has occurred; tonics are now of no avail, their administration but 
 aggravating instead of strengthening, 
 
 Lee retires to the Rappahannock, and takes up a position upon tiie west bank 
 of that river, his right resting at Kelly's ford, his left at Bealton. holdinga bridge 
 head upon the left bank and constructing cantonments for his ai'my. The army of 
 the Potomac advances; the 5th and 6th Corps form the right of our army, the 1st, 
 2nd and iJrd Corps the left, numbering about ;W,000 men. Opposing them were 
 two divisions of Confederate troops of about 10.000 all told. At this ford (Kelly's) 
 was an intrenched picket post held l)v some oOO men; we ford, attack this post 
 with one brigade of troops and capture it. killing, wounding, and taking prison- 
 ers 800 in all, but fail to capture the high ground in rear, and move forward and 
 towards Brandy Station as directed in the orders. 
 
 Oh that we had there some Roman or Napoleonic Commander to show our Gen- 
 erals how to ford a river, not by a brigade but by divisions, and once across how 
 to push forv.aid and engage our foe. not allowing him to slip through our fingers 
 as Lee of did that night! "Ye Gods and little fishes!" what a pother about the 
 capture 300 men by oO, 000, when more could have l)een gathered in by a more 
 skillful fisher! 
 
 A "tool" which has lost its edge is sent to the repair shop and inspected: if 
 worth the trouble it is honed, if not it is thrown aside as worthless. Of such a 
 character was the (Commander of the 3rd Corps that no ai^iount of honing could 
 make his edge hold for any length of time, though possibly a re}n-esentative of the 
 Commanding General sent to him and i-emaming there, when the o])erations of 
 the Campaign began, might have produced better re.su Its by constant association 
 with the oil stone; but this does not appear to have been done. 
 
 He had failed in two important operations of the army and ruined combina- 
 tions of a profound character, was still with the army, held command of one 
 unit which was composed of as good material as any in the army, and he should 
 not have been permitted to nullify its character. 
 
 Officers of high rank are assigned to the command of C(n-})s by order of the 
 President of the United States, and he alone can relieve them of that command. 
 unless they are entirely unfitted for it. Politicians sometimes prevent such a 
 relief; but if the facts are represented forcibly without malice, the order of the 
 Commanding General will hold, and the ofilcer"s connection with Ihe army is 
 severed, forever. The good of the country is sought, not revenge. 
 
 Such drastic measures had once been applied to certain officers of o\tr army, 
 and the action of the General approved by the highest authority in our land. 
 The same action could have been applied in this case but was rot Tiie question 
 will arise in the minds of all candid readers who was most to blame in the cam- 
 l)aign of '-Mine Run", the General, or one of his agents. The "love" of his Corps 
 
 8 
 
Commander in tliis ease ruined tlie General. 
 
 Time and space are the two elements which enter into the calciilalions of the 
 marches of an armj\ These must be known to the utmost nicety. Topographical 
 features must be grasped — whether the country is hilly or flat, the nature of the 
 soil, ravines, water courses, width of roads, bridges, good condition or not, 
 .streams, wood, water, and grass, fords, depth of same, velocity of streams, 
 nature of bottom, whether sandy, muddy, or rocky, height of banks of the 
 streams. 
 
 This being acquired, then comes the depth which each of the several arms of 
 the service will occupy, from the head of column to the rear. 
 
 In an army there are but very, very few men who, knowing all of the above, 
 are miable to work out correctly just how long it will take an army to reach 
 a certain place, starting from a given point and moving a certain number of miles 
 an hour including halts. 
 
 Let there be taken for the sake of illustration the space which is occupied by 
 a footman, a mounted man; and a gun horsed bj' six horses. 
 
 When in line, a footman occupies a frontage of 30 inches, and a pace is equal 
 to 30 inches. A Company of infantry is now 104 strong; wlien in double rank 
 it pre.sents a front of 52 men; therefore the frontage occupied by a company will 
 be 52 multiplied by 30, and will equal 1560 inches. 
 I Tw^cmaXi^ a Battalion is composed of four companies, with intervals of 90 inches between 
 companies, of which there are three, equal to 270 inches, therefore the frontage 
 will be 1560 multiplied by 4. plus 270 inches; equal to 6510 inches. 
 U~(jik„JUk ^ Regiment is composed of three battalions of four companies each, with intervals 
 of 24 paces between battalions, of wiiieh there are two, equal to 1440 inches. The 
 Sergt Major is posted on the left of the regt, at an interval of six paces, equal 
 to 180 inches: the Band is posted 24 paces from the right of the regt. and oc- 
 cupies a front of 34 paces; 24 paces standing to its right is the Colonel; color 
 IMrty, 4 men multiplied by 30 inches, equals 120 inches.; therefore the frontage 
 of a regt wall be 6510 multiplied by 3, plus 1440, plus 180, plus 720, plus 720. plus 
 720, plus 120, which equals 23,430 inches or 651 yds. 
 
 With brigades composed of 3 Regts. of 3 batts. each, with intervals of 60 paces 
 between regts. of which there are two. the frontage will be 651 yds. multipliedby 3 
 plus 100 yds. which equals 2053 yds. 
 
 With divisions composed of 3 brigades, of 3 regts. each, with intervals of 100 yds. 
 between brigades, the frontage, 2053, multiplied by 3, plus 200 yds. equals 6259 yds. 
 
 Corps composed of three divisions of 3 brigades each with two intervals of 100 
 yds. each, givesa frontage 6259, which multiplied bv 3 plus 200 yds. equals 18977 
 yds. 
 
 In ths Artillery for a Corps, composed of 6 batteries of six guns each with cais- 
 sons, battery wagons and forges, each gun horsed by six horses, each gun, caisson, 
 battery wagon and forge is allowed 15 yds in depth; between muzzle of gun and 
 horses following 4 yds. are allowed; therefore the frontage of a battery will be 
 14 multiplied by 15 yds. plus 13 intervals of 4 yds., which equals 276 yds ; and six 
 batteries will occupy a distance of 276 yds. multiplied by 6, plus 5 intervals of 28 
 anil one-half yds., plus 28 and one half yards between the head and rear of the 
 different arms of the service, equal to 1855 and one half yds. 
 
 In a Regiment of Cavalry composed of 3 squadrons of 4 troops each, each troop 
 consisting of 80 men, the intervals between troops are 6 yds., and between squad- 
 rons of »-hi^'' there are two. 12 yds., giving a frontage of 320 yds. multiplieil by 3 
 
plus m yds. plus 24 yds. which equals 105(1 yds. 
 
 The depth of a Corps composed of tlie three arms of the service is equal to 18977 
 yds. for infantry, plus 1855/ yds. for artdlery, plus 1050 yds. for cavalry, with in- 
 tervals of 28 and one half yds. between infantry and cavalry, agrand total of 21989 
 yds., or 12 and 46 one-hundredth miles, while with an advance guard. 3000 yds. 
 must be added. 
 
 To the foregoing must be added a pontoon train, ambulances and medical wag- 
 ons with the necessary stores to alleviate the sufferings of the many woimded, 
 and ammunition carts whicli carry some of the reserve supply. 
 
 An army, to compete witli its enemy, must and probably will consist of more 
 tlian one Corps; when we grasp tlie vast number of the men wlio compose it, and of 
 its impedimenta, whicli must accompany it, carrying forage, food, tents, medical 
 supplies, and anununition, we can comprehend tlie magnitude of the operation, 
 and wonder how such a machine does its work witliout hitches. 
 
 On the 4th of May, 1864, tlie Army of the Potomac, over 100.000 strong, built 
 over and crossed the Rapidan by five bridges, and marched a distance of over 20 
 miles the same day, and this in the face of an active, well appointed, and ably 
 commanded army. 
 
 Its train of over 4000 wagons, if placed one behind the other, would cover over 
 3G miles. 
 
 Such work requires a brain of no ordinary character, and this was that of the 
 Chief of Staff. We make no comment, but ask those who read to reflect upon 
 this matter, which has been compressed in a few lines. 
 
 To show the immensity of such an undertaking we submit the following to 
 prove what length of time must elapse before the last man moves, when a small 
 command consisting of a battalion of infantry, one battery of artillery, one squad- 
 ron of cavalry, is leaving its barracks, at the rate of march of 8 miles an hour 
 including halts. 
 
 A Batt. of Infantry equals 180 yds., a Battery of Artillery equals 276 yds., and a 
 Squadron of Cavalry equals 338 yds., a total of 794 yds. At 3 miles an hour, each 
 mile will take 20 minutes, each yd. will take 20 divided by 1760 yds. in a mile, 
 equal to one eighty-eighth of a minute; 794 yds. divided by 88. gives 9 for an ans- 
 wer; therefore 9 minutes must elapse before the last man leaves the barracks. 
 
 Suppose this column deploys for action, the infantry forming on the left of the 
 road, the artillery coming into action on the right of the road and in line with the 
 infantry, the cavalry forming on the right of the artillery, the last two to move 
 at a trot, after the infantry have left the road. 
 
 The infantry before its last man has left the road must move ISO yds., which 
 will take 2 and one twenty-tvi-o sixtieths of a minute. 
 
 Now Cavalry in addition to moving over its own length must move over the 
 distance occupied by the artillery in column of march, plus the interval 
 between these arms, plus the frontage of the artillery in action, which distance 
 will be as follows : — 
 
 Length of battery in column 276 yds, interval between infantry and artillery 
 28 and one half yds., frontage of battery in action 19 yds. multiplied by 5, which 
 equals 95 yds. Interval between cavalry and artillery 28 and one half yds. Space oc- 
 cupied by cavalry in march 338 yds., a total of 776 yds. before the last man is in 
 line of battle. 
 
 At a trot a horse covers 235 yds in a minute; therefore it will take the cavalry 
 2 and twenty-six .sixtieths of a minute before they are in line of battle; re- 
 
 10 
 
diicing fractions, we find tliat it Avill take tliis small force to march, and form 
 line of battle, roughly about 14 and one half minutes. 
 
 How accurate must be the calculation for an army, so that there shall be no 
 interference one witii another! 
 
 Tlie above computations were called forth by "The Life'", quoting from "Swin- 
 ton's" remarks on this operation. "Mine Run'". See page 244. 245 of the "Life'". 
 
 After the "Mine Run" affair, Lee disposed his army as follows: Hill's Corps 
 near, and guarding the fords of the Rapidan, Ewell's at Orange Court House, 
 Longstreet at Gordonsville, each of them a little more than a day's march from 
 each other, thus presenting a fine opportunity for engaging each of thein sepa- 
 rately wlien the weather was favorable. 
 
 Durirg a winter some days present themselves when the weather is severe, 
 freezing the roads and streams. Plans anticipating such conditions had been 
 drawn up by tiie Chief of Staff, when this chance so eagerly w^aited for was 
 ruined by the receipt of a telegram from Gen'l Butler at Fortress Monroe, asking 
 the cooperation of the Army of the Potomac in futherance of his plan for the 
 release of the prisoners of war held at Richmond, Va., Washington directing 
 cooperation. Accordingly Sedgwick, then in command, made a demonstration in 
 his front, all flank movements being impracticable by reason of weather and the 
 roads, though before doing so a telegram was written by the Chief of Staff, and 
 signed by Sedgwdck, which stated that "the demonstration might spoil the chan- 
 ces for the future". See page 72, Gettysburg to the Rapidan. 
 
 The demonstration at Morton's Ford proved that had the roads and weather 
 been suitable for moving tlie army, a well arranged i^lan for surprising them at 
 tlie ford and throwing a large force quickly over the river would have been suc- 
 cessful; their intrenchments taken at this point and at Raccoon's Ford, would 
 have been turned, and their army encountered in detail. See same authority p 74. 
 
 Had the weather been freezing, the demonstration w-ould have been converted 
 into a real one, and the Confederate Army beaten; but the query arises to whom 
 should the credit of this victory belong: not to Sedgwick, for he was only tempo- 
 rarily in command, and could have had no plans, for such are not made in a 
 short time, and the permanent Commander was at that time absent. Would it be 
 given to the Clnef of Staff, whose plans they were? And would the "Life" have 
 devoted more than two lines to describing t!>is operation? 
 
 Lee saw the point and corrected his position at once; the oppoitunity passed, 
 and never presented itself again. 
 
 We fail to see in what manner the Army of the Potomac gained in the "superi- 
 ority of numbers." unless it be by the addition of the 9th Corps, whose strength 
 was made up mostly by men who had just entered the service; old soldiers well 
 know how much reliance can be placed in such troops. The mobility of the Army 
 was lessened by the breaking up of two Corps, distributing them amongst the 
 other three; for in the country (wooded) in which the army was then moving 
 retarded marching resulted from the excessive strength of the Corps. 
 
 Corps of less strength would have answered the purpo.se better, would have 
 been more directly under the eyes of their Commanding Officers, and time w^ould 
 havebeen gained in tlie receipt of orders, while the time in making connection, 
 each with the other, would have been shortened. 
 
 The Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac was in favor of small units, and 
 gives his reasons for such preference. See page 3 of the Virginia campaign of 
 18G4 and fif). 
 
 11 
 
As to the Corps cominander who "uinvittingly twice rohl)e(l Meade of victories 
 through incompetence", and the '-advancement of Grant", we have this to say. 
 Meade liad with liim not only the opportunity but the means to rid himself of 
 tools which could not hold their edge, and failing to use them, cannot complain 
 of the presence of tlie T.ieut. Gen'l in the field with the army which he, Meade, 
 commanded. S-c«,yb«*-j*-i4o C| lA- "iC^ 
 
 It is one of tlie J rinciplesof law, that no man can take advantage of his own 
 wrong. Stfe pago :>(; ) of tho "Life ". 
 
 We dissent from the views as expressed on page 2G2 of the "Life", of Meade 
 surprising Lee on four different occasions: it was not he. but the admirable 
 Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, who surprised Lee on these occasions; 
 his eyes saw farther into those matters tiian Meade's. The evidence exists in 
 serial nos. 45, 48, 49, war of the Rebellion, official i-ecrQ^>-. and his dispatch i+h+ luuh. 
 on file at the War Dept. U. S. A. ^ccu/v^ 
 
 We now notice that for the first time the Chief of Staff's name is mentioned on 
 page 260 of the "Life"; previous to this naming, any reader would have derived the 
 impression that such an office was useless to the Commatider of the Army of tlie 
 I'otomac, for on all the pages which have preceded no. 2G6 there is no mention 
 oftliat name in that capacity. Tliis could not have been an oversight cm the 
 part of the Biographer, but has arisen from his desire to put forward tlie claims 
 of his man in stronger light, but as we have said above 'it being determined to 
 move by Lee's right flank. Humphreys. Meade's Chief of Staff was requested by 
 Meade to prepare a project for the movement. Humphreys sketched two plans, 
 one of them turning Lee's right by the Catharpin and Pamunkey roads which 
 was adopted, and in conformity with it Humphreys prepared the order". 
 
 At this stage of this review of the "Life" we make this statement: all of those 
 able movements previous to the arrival of the Lieut. Gen'l and his accompanying 
 the Army of the Potomac in the field, were not the results of the biain of Meade 
 but v.ere due to the brain of his Chief of Staff, and it was due to him 
 that "during this whole period the Union army met with not a single reverse 
 or disaster, althougli Lee tried against Meade's armor (not Meade's but Hum- 
 phrey's) every si)ear tiiat he knew how to wield". See the Desi)atch Book. 
 
 The writer of this review believes that when the history of that war is written. 
 Humphreys' name will appear in letters of gold, and his great services in that 
 great struggle will receive their reward. 
 
 As to the battle of the Wilderness, we have this to say: Lee moved quicker 
 than he did at Mine Run, and endeavored to strike us in flank, whilst in march 
 his movement forced us to halt and fight. 
 
 The orders from Ud. Qrs. of the Army of tlie Potomac dated May Ttn. lS(i4. at :{ 
 P. M. for the Cavalry were as follows: '^13. Major General Sheridan commanding 
 Cavalry Corps will have sufficient force on the approaches from the right to keep 
 the Corps commanders advised in time of the approach of the enemy". See p. 42.'). 
 appendix G, of the Virginia campaign 1SC4 and "(i.'j. 
 
 Upon arrival at Todd's Tavern at midnight of the 7th of May. \>*fA, two divisions 
 of Cavalry were found encamped there, and not where they should have been 
 under the above quoted order. 
 
 Duplicating the orders "with his own hand" were of no avail to us. for th.en 
 the roads to Spottsylvania from our right were in tlie hands of the enemy, and 
 this fact was known to the Chief of Staff, at the date of their lieing written and 
 sent. 
 
 12 
 
The "intelligent use" of the cavalry at that time was useless. We are not criti- 
 cising an3'one in this reply but the writer of the "Life". Acknowledging that 
 Cold Harbor was an itnportant point to the army "and on its extension on 
 the left", it was of more importance to us for the contemplated crossing of the 
 James River, as from that place roads lead, down to the points whicli had been 
 selected for the crossing, and that was the reason why it was of such vast 
 importance to ihe army. See page 307 of the "Life". 
 
 On page 333 of the "Life" we are informed: "The details of the movement 
 upon Petersburg from Cold Harbor had been elaborated by Meade and Hum- 
 phreys, the two great masters of logistics m the Union armj^ with a cai'e that 
 left notliing unprovided for". Now turn to page 201 of the Virginia Campaign 
 of 1864 and 6o. and see what the Chief of Staff has to say upon this same subject. 
 
 "In preparing the programme of tlie movement, it appeared to me (eqviivalent 
 to the pronoun I) important that Gen'l Warren should move out the Long 
 Bridge road, not onlj' far enough to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy by 
 the army, but so far as to hold the bridge over the White Oak Swamp, and to look 
 towards the three roads to Richmond already mentioned, which substantially 
 met at Riddle's shop, about a mile in advance of the position General Warren 
 was directed to take. 
 
 "He could not well advance to Riddle's shop, since that would have exposed him 
 to an attack in rear from White Oak Bridge. It was expected that such 
 a movement by General Warren would deceive Lee, and give him the impres- 
 sion tliat the Army of the Potomac was advancing upon Richmond, or if in- 
 tending to cross the James, that it would do so near Malvern Hill, at City Point, 
 or above. The movement made the desired impression upon him, and to a 
 greater extent than was contemplated, for as we shall see farther on, he was 
 uncertain what the Army of the Potomac was doing until tlie afternoon of the 
 17th of June". 
 
 At that time (the 17th of June, 1864) three Corps were at Petersburg, Va., and 
 again on page 214, of tlie same work, we find the facts stated as follows for the 
 16th of Jnue, same year: "At half past ten A. M. he (Lee)telegraphed Beauregard 
 that he did not know the position of Grant's army, and coula not strip the north 
 bank. At 3 P. M. he telegraphed he ha.l not heard of Grant's crossing James 
 River. At that hour only the Sixth Corps and Wilson's cavalry remained on the 
 north bank". 
 
 We have convicted the writer of the "Life" of appropriating for his hero that 
 which does not belong to him. But further, we find in Mc Clure's Magazine for 
 the month of May, 1898, some reminiscences of (vliarles A. Dana, Ass't. Sec- 
 retary of War who was witli Gen'l Grant. On page 35 of this magazine appears 
 the following: 
 
 "Tlie Fifth Corps having prepared the way, the whole army left the lines about 
 Cold Harbor on schedule time, just as soon after nightfall on the 12th as its 
 movements would be concealed from the observation of the enemy. It was in 
 drawing orders for such complicated movements as these, along different roads 
 and by diffei-ent crossings, that the ability of Gen'l Humphreys, the Chief of 
 Staff was displayed. Everything went perfectly from the start". 
 
 We again assert that it was the Chief of Staff's projects wliich were responsi- 
 ble for the surprise of Lee on four occasions, viz. "Manassas Gap. Rappahannock 
 Station. Mine Run, and the winter reconnoissance under Sedgewick'', and in 
 this we are supported by the unanimous voices of all officers of the Army of the 
 
 13 
 
Potomac, to wlioiu Humplire.vs was well known. 
 
 These four examples just stated, the project for crossing the James River (elab- 
 orating), and the forcible impression made upon Lee just related, together with 
 the instructions prejiared for the assault upon Petersburg on the explosion of the 
 mine, to be related further on, form brilliant examples in the art of Strategy. Lo- 
 gistics and Tactic^:, stamping the author of them a consummate commander, and 
 it has been said of him. "If fortune had favored him with independent command, 
 it is certain that the country would have been the gainer"". See the memoir read 
 before the National Academy of Sciences. April 24. 1885. page IL 
 
 Respecting the mine at Petersburg, Va.. on page 880 of tiie "Life"" there is an en- 
 comium bestowed upon the Commander of the Army of the Potomac by the Com- 
 manding General of all the Armies of the United States. We quote it: "Meade's 
 preliminary' orders were so exact as to cause Grant to say, at the later investiga- 
 tion, that they could not be improved upon with all the light of subsequent results, 
 and that if they had been obeyed Petersburg would have been captured"". 
 
 Remembering what has been said of the Lieut. Gen'l by the writer of the "Life" 
 we are surprised that his testimony should be brought forward to the support of 
 Meade, but that our readers may know who was the author of the project for 
 the assault after the explosion of the mine, they are referred to Appendix, page K 
 429, of the Virginia Campaign of 1864 & (55. ^ 
 
 The office of Chief of Staff was not a clerkship for the recording of the orders 
 of the Coznmanding General of the Army of the Potomac, neither was it a fifth 
 wheel. That office was distinct and separate, as has been clearly defined in this 
 reph'. Were it clerical, that position would have been spurned by Gen'l 
 Humphreys, whose high spirits and just regard for the rights of the office were 
 well known to the army. 
 
 We notice in readingthe "Life"" that whenever the Commanding General of the 
 Army of the Potomac has need of assistance in maintaining his position, (accord- 
 ing to the ideas of his Biographer) the Chief of Staff is brought forward in sup- 
 port, thus proving his opinion as of great weight, though the readers of the "Life"' 
 would not suspect his presence with that army, and his assistance to it. in the 
 chapters which have preceded that numbered 18. 
 
 We gratefully acknowledge the intended compliment, but declare in the .same 
 breath that placing him merely upon the same platform cannot be entertained 
 for one moment, of one who possessed such commanding abilities, not only in 
 science and letters, but in that of the Art of War. 
 
 Of the disaster which befell the 2nd Corps at Ream"s Station in August. "(54, we 
 read on page 886 of the "Life"": "It was reported that the enemy was moving on 
 the Halifax road, and Wilcox was ordered to use the Jerusalem Plank road, thus 
 giving him a march of twelve miles"'. Now turn to page 280 of the Virginia 
 Campaign of 18G4 & 05 and see what the Chief of Statf says of this movement: 
 "But by the plank road his ( Wilcox"s) march was twelve miles long (about the 
 same length as that of Mott"s troops), whereas had he gone by the railroad, which 
 continued open until five o'clock, he would have had not more than five miles to 
 march and would have got to Hancock by half past four or five, and managing 
 his movement skillfully, might have taken a i)art of the enemy's force in Hank 
 or rear". 
 
 The Virgina Campaign of 1864 & 65 is the history of the labors of one man. re- 
 lated in such language that one does not ])erceive that the atithor is telling his 
 readers what part of the work he performed: but one who reads closely, can see 
 
 14 
 
what he did, — a duty not of a brilliant character, because the work was of the 
 closest character, but all the more arduous, in as much as each fact had to be 
 given its full value before action could be taken, and when it was weighed, results 
 followed of great benefit: nor was he absent from the field of battle in which he 
 gloried; his fingers were upon the pulse of each great strviggle; and when he gave 
 his opinion it was acted upon at once; never a mistake was made by him; we are 
 therefore surprised at the ingenious manner in which the historian of the "Life" 
 has turned this work to glorify tlie one man. 
 
 If it be true as related on page 3 of the "introductory" to the "Life ' that the 
 Commanding Gen'l could tell at any time of the night wlien firing occurred, ex- 
 actly what troops were engaged, "and if occasion required, he made the dispo- 
 sition of his army without needing to consult a map", then this acquirement, 
 must have resulted from his association with his perfectly "poised" Chief of Staff, 
 who possessed this peculiar gift to a degree remarkable, and this is the first time 
 we are made aware some one else had it. We should certainly have heard of it 
 from our connection with the Hd. Qrs. of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 We now return to page 5 of the "introductory" chapter which states as fol- 
 lows: "In his address before the Society of the Army of the Potomac, June 12th 
 1899, Courtlandt Parker quotes from a letter written by Gen"l Lee after the war 
 as follows: 'Meade in ray judgement, had the greatest ability. I feared him 
 more than any man I ever met upon the field of battle'. He also quotes Jeffer- 
 son Davis as saying; 'My idea is that Meade was tlie most skillful general in 
 the Fedei'al army. Gen'l Lee once said to me, that he could understand the 
 movements of all the generals in the Federal army easier than those of Gen'l 
 Meade'. In a letter to the present writer, dated January 31st, 1887, Mr. Davis 
 said: 'I had a high opinion of and sincere regard for General Meade, both of 
 which were manifested long before the war"'. 
 
 If that which has just been quoted be true, there was good reason for it on 
 the part of Lee, who might say it for the purpose of exalting his own ability, 
 but whilst so doing, it is very probable, he was praising some one else infer- 
 entially, the one we speak for. Alas he cannot do so now, but were he living the 
 author of the "Life" would be required to take back very, very many of "tlie 
 interpretations put upon such facts (for which) the autlior is alone responsible". 
 
 Mr. Davis and Gen'l Humphreys were friends long before the Civil War: the 
 former gentlemen liad the faculty of discovering men of ability, men who w^ould 
 be willing horses, wlio would work, and no matter what was the amount required 
 of them, would accept other matters equally as lieavy, requiring research, 
 and the consuming of that delicate substance called "grey matter"; nor was Mr. 
 Davis wrong in his selection of Gen'l Humphreys as such a man. 
 
 We have the following from the lips of Gen'l Humphreys, who saw a letter 
 written by Mr. Davis to a friend, this friend showing tiiat letter to the Gen- 
 eral, who told of it to his very dear friend, Bvt. Major General John Watts De 
 Peyster, of Tivoli, Duchess County, New York, who in a notice of the death of 
 Gen'l Humphreys, published it amongst other matters pertaining to the General. 
 This particular phrase can be found on page 5 of the pamphlet and reads: "On 
 the other hand, one of the leaders of the Rebellion, in many respects its Arch 
 magus, after the four successive changes in the command of the Army of the 
 Potomac, observed: "They have not got the right man yet, and they never will 
 have him until they appoint Andrew^ Atkinson Humphreys'"; again same page. 
 "An officer in tlie Rebel Army, who occupied a very conspicuous position, a hard 
 
 15 
 
military student, and well versed in military operations, remarks in substance, 
 that 'while he looked upon Hancock as the best fighter in the Army of the 
 Potomac, Humphreys was best fitted to command it"". "Humphreys" leadership 
 and soldiership"', was the attest of a veteran observer, "were so unobtrusive that 
 tlie country was not aware of what an able man it possessed in him." A Major 
 General, himself very distinguished, experienced and esteemed, who occupied a 
 position which gave him the amplest opportunities of judging, said that he "con- 
 sidered Humphreys, take him all in all. the best General iu the Army of the Po- 
 tomac, or the best fitted to command it." Another ofticer, whose peculiar, va- 
 ried and constant service gave him vmusual advantages for judging and compar- 
 ing, said a verj^ handsome thing of Humphreys: "For general as well as inti- 
 mate acquaintance with the country in which he (Humphreys) was operating, 
 and the troops against whom he was engaged, in fact, the general relative situa- 
 ton of affairs. Humphreys was second to no other Union general."' Another 
 gallant soldier remarks, "Take him all in all, soldiership, culture, science, gen- 
 eralship, manners, lines of thought, social relations, dispositions, intention and 
 energy, friendship and affection, he realized the words of another unfortunate, 
 the poet, George Brookford. singing over the grave of a national hero. 
 'The noble heart, the master mind, 
 The chief that knew no fear. 
 And leaves no warrior peer beliind. 
 
 Lies sleeping soundly here. 
 When riding "mid the battle's blaze, 
 
 His eye with soul afire. 
 The traitor foe stood still to gaze. 
 And wonder and admire.'"" 
 General Humphreys, (we cannot find a better expression than that stated on 
 page 16 of the "Life") would have scorned "to have taken credit for another's 
 work"; that "wasimposible to him"' and "unworthy of a soldier and a gentleman". 
 It would have been far better had the curtain which has screened the lives of 
 Gen'ls Meade and Humphreys remained down, but taking up exultingly tlie gage 
 of battle wliicli has been cast before him, the writer performs a duty which is 
 considered sacred. 
 
 It is with deep regret that he is compelled to speak as he has done, for both 
 were members of the same Corps, and friends of long standing. 
 
 On November, 25th, 1864, Major General Humphreys was assigned to the com- 
 mand of the 2nd Corps, a duty which was far more pleasant than the thankle.ss 
 position of Chief of Staff to one who never did anything for him, yet relied 
 upon him to pull the Commanding General out of a bad position. 
 
 Henry H. Humphreys. 
 Highland Park, Lake County, 111. 
 July 3rd, 1901. 
 
 l« 
 
Dana on Meaili and llun\phrfys, CoiitiiiKid. 
 
 that each gained some advantage of position, but eacli exliausted liis own 
 strengtJi in so doing; while for the want of a general pvirpose and a general 
 commander to direct and concentrate the wliole, it all amounted to nothing 
 biit heavy loss to ourselves. General Wright remarked confidentially to a friend 
 that all of Meade's attacks had been made without brains and without general- 
 sliip". — ''Recollections of tiie Civil War, with the Leaders at Washington and in 
 the Field in the Sixties. By Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War from 
 18r.3 to t.%.1. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 189!t, (pp. 226-27.) 
 
 Aftermath. 
 
 In regard to Meade's failure to attack Lee at Williamsport and Falling Waters 
 there is one remarkable circumstance which does not seem to have ever appeared 
 in print. The writer was on the most Intimate possible terms with many of our 
 most notable Union generals, among tliese particularly with Major-Generals 
 James B. Fry, Frovost-Marshal-General, and Abner D6ubleday. toth at Wash- 
 ington after Gettysburg. They told him that when Meade was before Lee on 
 the Potomac, tliey knew tliat Lincoln telegraphed to Meade "to attack Lee, 
 liit or miss — that if he failed, to produce this telegram in extenuation of his failure 
 and throw the whole bhune upon him, the President, and that if he were victo- 
 rious to destroy the telegram and take all the glory to himself." That Lincoln 
 did so was corroborated by a remark which he made to another friend, another 
 Major-General, that "twice the Army of Northern Virginia had been delivered, 
 horse, foot and dragoons, into the hands of the Army of the Potomac, and that 
 lie was so disappointed, that if, he were tlie Disposer of Events, he did not know 
 if he would do it a third time."' Tliese were not his exact words, which were 
 so terse and emphatic, that it is most politic not to repeat them verbatim, 
 
 Major-General George W. Culhun declared that the writer's memory was so 
 trustworthy in his reports of conversations that the notes of a stenographer, 
 taken down at the time, could not be more correct. And General Fry averred 
 tliat the writer's report of a certain convex'sation was as perfect, some time 
 afterward, as if he had written it down while it was occurring. Major-General 
 A. A. Humphreys was tlie writer's dearest friend, and his criticisms are as 
 jiatent to memory as if they had been stereotyped. The record of Dana in regard 
 to Humphreys a)>peared in his published IMemoranda. In his published obitu- 
 aries of Humphrey and of Meade, the writer's views of Meade's irresolution 
 have been in print for many years, and therefore they cannot be charged as 
 opinions apres coup. He has been all over a large portion of the ground between 
 Jleade's headquarters and the Potomac, and considers that all the accidents of 
 the fields of operations were in favor of the Army of the Potomac. General 
 Doubleday declared that the River was "swimming" at the time — that is in 
 full flooil with rapid current: yet, nevertheless, Lee svas enabled to escape with 
 impunity. 
 
 The writer would have added his information in full to the preceding pages, 
 but he is far advanced in his 81st year, and broken with the consequences of 
 two painful attacks and one terrible attack of the grippe, and therefore does 
 not seek a controversy. But those who know him intimately will testify that 
 liis memory was never more tenacious, and that his mind is as clear if not clearer 
 than it ever was. These remarks are ijenned in justice to the memory/Tif 
 Humphreys, than whom he never met a .superior as a soldier and general 1/any 
 one respect, or a grander uTan: Plumphrey's only peer in his memory wa<^Iajor- 
 General George H. Thomas, while the latters peer as an imposing spflrimen of 
 mortality he never did meet in luiman form and magnanimity. i*-. ''^~^.. 
 
 ANCHOR. (J, W. deP.)* 
 
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LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 
 
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