Glass. Book. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/philosophicalpra01upha PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL TREATISE THE WILL FORMINC THE THIRD VOLUME OF A SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. BY THOMAS C. UPHAM, Profpssor of Moral and Mental Philosophy in Bowdoin College. NEW-YORK: HARPER & BROTHERS, 82 CLIFF- STREET. 1841. ^ <6& ^ ^ Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 18-10, by Thomas C. Upham, in the Clerk's office of the District Court of Maine. / PREFACE. In offering to the public the following Treatise on the Will, I am obliged to presume, in no small degree, on its forbearance and candour. It is a subject which, in some of its applications, has been so long connected with Theological controversies, that it is almost impossible to write upon it without exciting the suspicion that the dis- cussion will assume a party character. I hope the reader will do me the justice, in the outset, to believe that my ob- ject is not a party one, and that the ascertainment of truth is my only aim. If he will take the trouble carefully to read the Treatise through, as I hope he will before pro- nouncing an opinion upon it, I anticipate the pleasure of standing fair in his estimation, as a candid inquirer after the truth, whether I have been successful in my efforts or not. I presume the reader, and the public generally, will agree with me in the admission that the subject of the "Will is one of great importance, both theoretically and practically. And yet there can be no hesitation in say- ing, that it has never received that attention from mental Xll PREFACE. philosophers which is due to it. In those various Schools of philosophy, which from time to time sprung up among the ancient Greeks and Romans, it seems almost wholly to have escaped notice ; their speculations, so far as they related to the nature of the mind, being principally taken up with inquiries into the origin of knowledge and the nature of virtue. From the earlier English writers on the mind, Hobbes, Cudworth, Butler, Baxter, and others, although it was not wholly passed by, it received no at- tention worthy of particular notice at the present time, and in the present advanced state of mental science. Mr. Locke, however, who has treated of this subject in- cidentally in his chapter on Power, entered upon its in- vestigation with his accustomed ability ; and as his views were given in the later editions of his Essay on the Hu- man Understanding, they were greatly in advance of anything that had been written before. There are also some valuable remarks on the Will in Dr. Reid's wri- tings; but he takes, on the whole, but a limited view of it. Mr. Stewart throws his observations, which are not numerous, and which consist rather of criticisms on the opinions of others than of a decided and sj^stematic ex- pression of his own, into an Appendix. The learned and able Inquiry into the Will of President Edwards does not profess to go over the whole ground, and to exhaust the whole subject ; but, on the contrary, as appears from the very titlepage, is limited to a particular aspect or view of it, viz., that Freedom of the Will which is sup- PREFACE. XU1 posed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. But I would not be understood to make these remarks in the way of complaint. It could hardly be expected to be otherwise. An examination into the will naturally comes last in order in all inquiries into the mind. The questions relative to the origin of knowledge and the in- tellectual part of our constitution come first in order; and these are questions wdiich are not settled without much care and labour. The natural order of inquiry then brings us to the Sensibilities or sentient states of the mind, in distinction from the intellectual, viz., the various forms of emotion, and desire, and feelings of moral obli- gation. These must be examined and understood also, as well as the intellectual part. Until mental philosophy is in some degree satisfactorily established in these great departments, the doctrine of the will, although it may be a matter of conjecture, cannot be fully and correctly as- certained. But this period has arrived, and there is no longer any excuse for permitting this important inquiry to remain neglected. The subject is one of wide extent, perhaps more so than has sometimes been imagined ; and one, too, which admits of various and important practical applications. My examination of it may be imperfect, (and, in truth, considering the variety of topics embraced in it, cannot well be otherwise,) and yet I cannot but in- dulge the hope, that some obscurities have been cleared up, that some leading principles have been established, B2 XIV PREFACE. and that the subject is placed in various respects in a satisfactory light. But of this the candid reader, who will take the trouble to examine with suitable care what has been written, will be able to form a more accurate judgment for himself. Thomas C. Upham. Bowdoin College, May, 1840. CONTENTS. PART I. GENERAL NATURE OF THE WILL. CHAPTER I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL POWEKS. Section Page 1. Of the method of inquiry proper to be pursued . . . .25 2. The Will should be examined in connexion with other parts of the mind .28 3. The states of the mind may be regarded in a threefold view . ib. 4. Evidence of the general arrangement from Consciousness . . 29 5. Evidence of the same from terms found in different languages . 31 6. Evidence from incidental remarks in writers . . . .32 7. Further proof from various writers on the mind . . . .35 8. A knowledge of the Will implies a preliminary knowledge of the Intellect 37 9. Implies a preliminary knowledge also of the Sensibilities . . 38 CHAPTER II. RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE WILL. 10. A connexion existing among all the parts and powers of the mind 40 11. The intellectual part the foundation or basis of the action of the other parts of the mind ........ 41 12. The connexion of the understanding with the will . . .42 13. The connexion of the understanding with the will shown from its connexion with action 43 14. Further proof from an observation of the conduct of men . . 45 15. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section . . . 46 16. Of the nature of the connexion between the understanding and will 48 17. Of the opinions of Mr. Locke on this point . .... 49 18. Opinions of Sir James Mackintosh on the same subject . . 51 19. The understanding reaches the will through the sensibilities . 53 20. The acts of the intellect the direct antecedents to emotions . 54 21. Emotions change with changes in the intellectual perceptions . 55 22. The powers of the will not perfectly correspondent to those of the intellect 56 23. An energetic will sometimes found in connexion with limited powers of intellect 58 CHAPTER III. RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES TO THE WILL. 24. General statement in explanation of the term sensibilities . . 60 25. Of what are strictly included under the sensibilities . . ..61 26. Acts of the intellect in immediate proximity with emotions . 64 27. Emotions not in proximity with volitions 66 28. Emotions followed by desires and feelings of obligation . . 67 XVI CONTENTS. Section Page 29. Desires in proximity with the will 67 30. Obligatory feelings also in proximity with the will . . .68 31. Further remarks and illustrations on this subject . . .70 32. Opinions of metaphysical writers on the foregoing statements . 71 33. Of the strength of the desires 72 34. Of the strength of feelings of obligation . . . . .75 35. Of the influence of the sensibilities on the understanding . . 76 CHAPTER IV. VOLITIONS, OK VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 36. The necessity of that controlling power which exists in the will 78 37. Remarks on the nature of ihe will ...... 80 38. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions . . . .81 39. Volition never exists without some object 82 40. It exists only in reference to what we believe to be in our power 83 41. Volition relates to our own action and to whatever else may be dependent upon us 84 42. Volitions involve a prospective element 87 43. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength . . .88 44. Causes of the variation of the strength of the voluntary exercise 89 45. Further illustrations of the same subject 90 46. Of preference or indifference as applicable to the will . . . 91 CHAPTER V. DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 47. Of an objection sometimes made to the general arrangement . 94 48. Probable cause of desires and. volitions being confounded . . 95 49. The distinction of desires and volitions asserted by consciousness 96 50. Desires differ from volitions in fixedness and permanency . . 98 51. Further proof of this distinction from language . . . .99 52. Sentiments of esteem and honour often imply this distinction . 100 53. Of some strictures on the foregoing remarks of Reid . . . 101 54. Volition may exist in respect to those complex acts which the mind can embrace as one 103 55. If the distinction in question do not exist, the foundation of morals becomes unsettled 105 56. Instances iu illustration of the distinction in question . . . 107 57. Other instances in illustration of proof 108 58. Proofs drawn from some facts in the constitution of the mind . 109 59. Of the chastisements of the Supreme Being inflicted on those he loves Ill 60. Objected that these views lead to contradictions .... 113 61. Opinions of Mr. Locke and others on this subject . . . 115 PART II. LAWS OF THE "WILL. CHAPTER I. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 62. The preceding chapters preparatory to what follows . . . 119 63. Of the importance of the topics now entered upon . . . 120 64. The inquiry, whether the will has its laws preliminary to that of its freedom 122 CONTENTS. XV11 Section Pa;e 65. Everything throughout nature has its laws ..... 123 66. Reference to remarks of Cicero on the universality of law . . 124 67. Reference to remarks of Hooker on the universality of law . . 125 68. The universality of law implied in the belief of a Divine existence 127 69. A presumption thus furnished in favour of the subjection of the will to law . 129 CHAPTER II. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. 70. Of the existence of a moral government 130 71. Laws of the will dedncible from the first principles of moral gov- ernment 131 72. Laws of the will inferred from that supremacy or paramount au- thority which is implied in a moral government . . . 132 73. Inferred also from the fact, that the subjects of a moral government must be endued with adequate powers of obedience . . 133 74. Laws of the will inferred from that rationality which is essential to -the subjects of a moral government 134 75. Laws of the will inferred from the fact that in the administration of a moral government motives are employed .... 136 76. Inferred also from the application of rewards and punishments . 137 77. The same inferred from the fact that the moral government of the present, life is in its nature disciplinary 138 78. That the will has laws implied in the existence of virtue and vice 139 CHAPTER III. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF THE DEITY. 79. The notion which men naturally form of the Deity implies fore- knowledge 142 80. The prescience of God involved and implied in his omniscience . 143 81. The prescience of God directly taught in the Scriptures . . 145 82. The foreknowledge of events implies the foreknowledge of voli- tions 146 83. Of the reasonableness of the foregoing views .... 148 84. Application of these views to the will ib. 85. The views of this chapter in harmony with the doctrine of the in- fluences of the Holy Spirit 149 CHAPTER IV. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 86. Man as well as Deity susceptible of foresight .... 150 87. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own situation and conduct 151 88. Foresight of men in respect to the conduct of others . . . 153 89. Other familiar instances of this foresight ..... 154 90. The fact of laws of the will shown from the regularity of volun- tary contributions and of deposit.es 155 91. Of sagncity in the estimate of individual character . . . 157 92 Foresight of the conduct of masses of men and nations ._ . 159 93. Proof from the regularity observable in the commission of crime 161 XV1U CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. LAWS OF THE WILL INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE. Section Faga 94. The doctrine of the will's subjection to law confirmed by con- sciousness 163 95. The same confirmed by the fact of the will's not being a subject, but an attribute 164 96. The same confirmed by the fact, that every exercise of the will implies an object . 165 97. Confirmed also by the fact, that every exercise of the will implies a motive ; 166 98. Confirmed also by the fact, that every exercise of the will implies belief 168 99. Statement of other laws that are involved in the constitution or nature of the will itself 169 100. Proof on the subject before us from instances of predominant emotion and passion 170 101. Of the sense in which the proposition under consideration is to be understood 172 CHAPTER VI. THE LAW OF CAUSALITY AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 102. Of certain laws or principles which extend to all classes of objects 174 103. A belief in the law of causality founded in the peculiar structure of the human mind 175 176 178 179 180 183 184 187 188 104. Of the universality of belief in the law of causality 105. Of the classification into Preparative and Effective causes 106. Nature of Preparative and Effective causes . 107. Opinions of various philosophers on this subject . 108. Opinions of Pi esident Edwards on this subject 109. Results of a denial of the law of causality 110. Application of the views of this chapter to the will 111. Of the common and practical application of these views CHAPTER VII. THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 112. Belief of men in the continued uniformity of nature's operations . 190 113. This belief exists in reference to mind as well as matter . . 192 114. Circumstances under which this belief arises .... 193 115. Of the true idea of chance, in distinction from uniformity . . 194 116. Grounds or foundation of this belief 196 1 17. Reference to the opinions of Reid and Abercrombie . , . 197 118. Application of these views to the will 199 119. Application of these views to sciences having relation to human conduct 200 120. On the practical tendency of the general doctrine of law in its ap- plication to the will 202 CHAPTER VIII. NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 121. Of motives and their bearing upon the general doctrine of the will's subjection to law 203 122. Of the division of motives into Internal and External . . . 204 123. External motives derive their efficacy from the mind . . . 205 CONTENTS. XIX Section Page 124. The character of motives depends in part on the constitutional traits of the individual 207 125. Their character depends in part on temporary influences . . 208 126. Further division of motives into Natural or Personal, and Moral 209 127. Further statements illustrative of the distinction between natural and moral motives 210 128. Motives coextensive with volitions 212 129. Nature of the influence of motives 214 130. Of the will's being governed by the strongest motive . . . 215 131. Of the elements of the contest within 218 PART III. FREEDOM OF THE WILL. CHAPTER I. NATURE OF MENTAL FREEDOM. 132. Of bodily in distinction from mental freedom .... 223 133. Of unsuccessful attempts to explain the nature of freedom . . 224 134. Freedom, considered as an element of thought rather than as a thing in actual realization, is the name of a simple abstract idea 225 135. Occasions of the origin of the abstract idea of liberty . . .227 136. Of the undehnableness of the term freedom 228 137.' Supposed definitions of freedom are either mere synonyms, or em- brace some element which itself requires explanations . . ib. 138. Distinction between the idea and reality of liberty . . . 230 139. Of the source of our knowledge of liberty itself in distinction from the abstract idea of liberty 231 140. Of the precise import of the phrase moral liberty . . . 232 CHAPTER II. MENTAL HARMONY THE BASIS OR OCCASION OF MENTAL FREEDOM. 141. Statement of the inquiry in this chapter ..... 233 142. Occasions on which liberty exists 235 143. Of the circumstances under which this mental harmony may he expected to exist 236 144. Opinions of Bishop Butler on conscience 237 145. Objected that perfect harmony of the mind is not realized in the present life 239 146. Perfection of mental harmony and consequent mental liberty il- lustrated from the character of the Saviour .... 240 147. Objected that the foregoing views are necessarily , and in their very terms, inconsistent with liberty 242 CHAPTER III. FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 148. Remarks on the nature of the freedom of the will . . .244 149.. Of the relation of the freedom of the will to the fact of its subjec- tion to law 245 150. Circumstances or occasions under which freedom of the will exists 247 151. Evidence of the freedom of the will from consciousness . .249 152. Of an objection to the argument from consciousness . . .250 153. Illustration of the will's freedom, drawn from the nature of motives 252 154.. Remarks in continuation of this subject 253 155. Objected that the will is necessarily governed by the strongest motive . 256 XX CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE. Section Page 156. Remarks on the nature or mode of the argument . . .257 157. Of the elements of man's moral nature 258 158. Evidence of freedom of the will from feelings of approval and dis- approval 259 159. Proof of freedom from feelings of remorse 260 160. Without the possession of liberty of will man could never have framed the abstract notions of right and wrong . . . 261 161. Proof from feelings of moral obligation 263 162. Evidence from men's views of crimes and punishments . .264 163. Prevalent opinions of mankind on this subject .... 266 CHAPTER V. OTHER PROOFS OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 164. Evidence of the freedom of the will from languages . . . 267 165. Evidence from the occasional suspension of the will's acts . . 268 166. Evidence of the freedom of the will from the control which every man has over his own motives of action 269 167. The freedom of the will further shown from the attempts of men to influence the conduct of their fellow-men .... 271 168. Further evidence from the observation of men's conduct . . ib. 169. Argued further from the view taken in the Scriptures . . 273 170. Practical importance of the doctrine of liberty .... 274 CHAPTER VI. CONSISTENCY OF LAW AND FREEDOM. 171. Objected that the views maintained are contradictory . . 277 . 278 . 280 . 281 . 283 . 284 . 285 . 286 287 172. Answered that they result necessarily from the evidence 173. Denial of the alleged contradiction .... 174. Admission of inexplicableness or mystery 175. Of the limited powers of the human mind 176. We find things which cannot be explained everywhere 177. Illustrated from the influence of one man over another 178. The opposite supposition attended with equal difficulty 179. Both views are to be fully received 180. The doctrine of the will's freedom equally important with that of its subjection to law 288 CHAPTER VII. ENTHRALMENT OR SLAVERY OF THE WILL. 181. Of the occasions of mental enthralment 289 182. Inability to define enthralment or slavery 291 183. The nature of mental enthralment illustrated by a reference to extorted promises 292 184. Illustration of the same subject from cases of torture . . . 293 185. Historical illustrations of the subject 295 186. The will enthralled by the indulgence of the appetites . . 297 187. Enthralment of the will occasioned by predominant and overru- ling propensities 298 188. The will enthralled by inordinate ambition 300 189. The will enslaved by the indulgence of the passions . . . 301 190. Inordinate intensity of the domestic affections . . . 302 191. Of the slavery of the will in connexion with moral accountability 304 CONTENTS. XXI PART IV. POWER OF THE WILL. CHAPTER I. NATURE OF MENTAL POWER. Section Page 192. Of the distinction between liberty and power . . . .309 193. Proof of the distinction between liberty and power . . .310 194. The distinction of power and liberty involved in the fact of our being able to form the abstract ideas of power and liberty .311 195. Distinction of power and liberty shown from language . . 312 196. Further shown from the fact of our possessing a moral nature . 313 197. Origin of the idea of power in Original Suggestion . . . 314 198. Occasions of the origin of the idea of power .... 315 199. The idea of power involves the reality of power .... 316 200. Things exist which are not made known by the senses . . 317 201. Of power as an attribute of the human mind .... 318 202. Further shown by a reference to the Divine Mind . . . 320 CHAPTER II. POWER OF THE WILL. 203. Proof of power in the will from the analogy of the mind . . 322 204. The power of the will restricted and subordinate . . . 323 205. Proof of power in the will from internal experience . . . 324 206. Proved from the ability which we have to direct our attention to particular subjects 325 207. Proof of power in the will from observation .... 326 208. Of power of the will as exhibited in patience under suffering . 328 209. Illustration of the subject from the command of temper . . 329 210. Further illustrations of this subject 330 211. Proved from the concealment of the passions on sudden and try- ing occasions 331 212. Further instances of concealment and repression of the passions 333 213. Illustrated from the prosecution of some general plan . . . 334 214. The subject illustrated from the course of the first settlers of New-England 336 215. Illustrated by the fortitude exhibited by Savages . . . 337 CHAPTER III. SELF-DETERMINING POWER OF THE WILL. 216. General remarks on a self-determining power .... 338 217. Of a self-determining power of the mind 339 218. Of the objective or outward sphere of the mind's activity . . 340 219. Of a self-determining power of the will 341 220. Of such a self-determining power of the will as involves the de- pendence of the present volition on a former one . . . 343 221. Opinions of President Edwards on this subject . . . .344 CHAPTER IV. DIFFERENCES OF VOLUNTARY POWER. 222. Differences in voluntary power seldom noticed .... 345 223. Remarks on constitutional weakness of the will .... 346 XXU CONTENTS. Section Page 224. Of comparative or relative weakness of the will . . . .347 225. Instances of want of energy of the will 226. Remarks on great strength of the will 227. Energy of the will as displayed under bodily suffering 228. Energy of the will as shown in imminent danger 229. Energy of the will as shown in martyrdoms 230. Subject illustrated from two classes of public speakers 231. Power of the will requisite in the military and other arts 232. Energy of the will requisite in the men of revolutions 233. Practical application of these views .... 348 350 351 353 354 356 358 359 362 CHAPTER V. CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER. 234. Connexion of the philosophy of the will with consistency of char- acter 363 235. Illustrations of the inconsistent character 365 236. Illustrations of the consistent character 366 237. Of individuals remarkable for consistency of character . .367 238. Of the value of consistency in the religious character . . . 368 239. Of the foundation or basis of consistency and inconsistency of character 371 240. Of inconsistency of belief in connexion with inconsistency of conduct and character . 372 241. Self-possession an element of consistency of character / . . 374 242. Consistency implies perseverance under changes of ciroc instances 375 243. Consistency implies a control over the passions .... 376 CHAPTER VI. DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL. 244. Importance of a due discipline of the voluntary power . . 378 245. A due balance of all the powers the most favourable state of things to the just exercise of the will 380 246. Of the culture of the appetites, propensities, and passions, as aux- iliary to the discipline of the will 382 247. Some instances and proofs of the foregoing statements . . 384 248. Importance of repressing the outward signs of the passions . . 387 249. Of enlightening the intellect in connexion with the discipline of the will 390 250. Further remarks on the same subject 392 251. Of aiding the will by a reference to the regard of others . . 394 252. Of aiding the will by a reference to the conscience . . . 396 253. Of the aids furnished by the principle of imitation . . . 397 254. Of aiding the will by placing ourselves in circumstances which do not admit of a retreat 399 255. Of the effects of habit in giving strength to the will . . . 400 256. Of strengthening the will by religious considerations . . . 401 PART L GENERAL NATURE OF THE WILL ife^BmBgaaBga«gBwnMMagreawBagiMBiM»mwpiggg *wwi^ ^ ^ THE WILL. CHAPTER I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL POWERS. § 1. Of the method of inquiry proper to he pursued. We now begin to approach the termination of these diversified and protracted inquiries. Having explored, so far as seemed to be necessary, the Intellect and the Sensibilities in their various forms of action, it now only remains to attempt to give a Philosophy of the Will. In entering upon a discussion of the various questions connected with the Will, it is perhaps proper to make a few observations upon the course which we deem it ex- pedient to pursue. And here we remark particularly, that it will be our desire to rest mainly upon facts, and the obvious deductions from them ; and to avoid, as much as possible, mere speculation. The indulgence of specu- lation, the giving loose to discursive flights, is often flat- tering to pride of intellect, and is perhaps indicative of the consciousness of mental power ; but it is not on all subjects, unless controlled and mitigated by a frequent re- currence to facts, favourable to the ascertainment of truth. C 26 CLASSIFICATION OF The inquiries before us, so far at least as the mode of conducting them is concerned, ought to be prosecuted in essentially the same manner as our inquiries into the phys- ical world. What we wish to know are the simple facts that exist, and the general laws which these facts obvi- ously develope and clearly prove, in distinction from mere conjectures, however ingenious they may be. We appre- hend, that this course, if we promise ourselves a favourable issue, is necessary in all discussions in respect to the mind, to whatever aspects of mind and to whatever powers they may relate. Especially is this true in respect to the Philosophy of the Will, not only on account of the peculiar nature of the Will's operations, but also for another obvious reason. There must be evidently some point in the men- tal constitution, which connects man with his Maker. Ready as we are to grant, that men have liberty and power in their appropriate sphere of action, it is never- theless true, that they are not in the strict sense of the term independent. All created beings, however great their powers may be, form but so many links in the im- mense chain of existence, that extends from the throne of God down to the humble forms of life, that approach nearest to inanimate matter. All, therefore, must, in some way, be connected with that great Source of exist- ence, without whom, considered as the origin of being, there evidently could be existence nowhere. And ac- cordingly, it is in the Will, in the volitive or voluntary part of our mental constitution, that we find the point of union, the position of contact with the Divine Mind ; for the Divine Mind, it should never be forgotten, runs through and connects itself with the whole range of created exist- ences, holding them in their allotted spheres, and main- THE MENTAL POWERS. 27 taming, even in the remotest parts of the universe, the unity of place and of subordination. Accordingly, in the ex- amination of the Will we must expect to meet with the apparently inconsistent attributes of freedom, dependence, and power, existing and uniting harmoniously in the same being. It is here, of course, that we meet with much, not only to perplex our judgment and to try our faith, but to encourage an irregular and unrestrained spec- ulation. How necessary, then, to be on our guard, to proceed w T ith caution, to keep our powers of investigation strictly within the legitimate limits of their action, and to be governed by those sentiments of modesty which are suitable to fallible beings ! We are aware that this proposed course is not altogether in accordance with what is termed the spirit of the age, which seems to call constantly for exaggeration ; for what is novel, strange, and unprecedented ; for something that will arouse and astonish, rather than convince. But this diseased and inordinate appetite for novelty and excite- ment ought to be rebuked rather than encouraged ; and least of all should it be permitted to find nourishment and support in the calm regions of philosophy. Let us then proceed to the interesting and difficult inquiry before us, (a subject which almost from the beginning of time has occupied the strongest minds and furnished the theatre for unremitting contests,) with those chastened feelings of moderation and caution which have been recommended, and relying chiefly upon facts and the legitimate inferen- ces which they furnish, and indulging as little as possible in speculation, be content with what we may be able to establish on a firm foundation, without complaining that our limited and imperfect powers require some things to be left in obscurity. 28 CLASSIFICATION OF § 2. The Will should be examined in connexion with other parts of the mind. It must constantly strike the observer, who carefully contemplates the facts which the universe everywhere ex- hibits, that no object which exists is wholly disconnect- ed from other objects. Accordingly, in attempting to ex- amine the nature of the Will, and in considering it in the various aspects in which it presents itself to our notice, it is obvious that we must not regard it as standing alone, and apart from everything else. It is true that we speak of the Philosophy of the Will, in distinction from that of the Intellect and the Sensibilities, but it is certainly not the less true that the Will participates in the general nature of the mind, and that it has a close connexion and sympa- thy with all its various modes of action. The general nature of the soul could not be altered, nor greatly affect- ed in any way, without at the same time affecting the Will. Nor could a single susceptibility, even one of minor importance, be either struck out from the list of its attributes, or be greatly changed, without being attended with the same result. In the present discussion, therefore, we are naturally and urgently led to take a concise re- view of the general structure of the mind, for the purpose of more fully comprehending the relation which the Will sustains to the other parts. § 3. The states of the mind may be regarded in a threefold view. Although we properly ascribe to the human soul the attribute of oneness or indivisibility, and it is very impor- THE MENTAL POWERS. 29 tant that we should keep this leading truth in mind, still there is abundant reason for saying that its nature can never be fully understood by contemplating it solely and exclusively under one aspect. There are, accordingly, three prominent and well-defined points of view, in which the mind may be contemplated, viz., the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the "Will ; otherwise expressed by the phrases intellective, sensitive, and voluntary or voli- tive states of the mind. * Accordingly, as we have had occasion to remark in another place, whatever truly and appropriately belongs to the intellect, has something pecu- liar and characteristic of it, which shuts it out from the domain of the sensibilities ; and whatever has the nature of a volition has a position apart both from the intellect- ual and the sensitive. And we repeat here, that this is a fundamental arrangement, which, when properly and fully carried out and applied, includes the whole soul ; and that to the one or the other of these general heads everything involved in our mental existence may appro- priately be referred. § 4. Evidence of the general arrangement from Consciousness. In the introductoiy chapters to the volume on the In- tellect, it was assmned, as a sort of preliminary principle, that the mind, in order to our being enabled to give a sat- isfactory analysis of it, must be contemplated in this threefold view. Accordingly, we thought it proper to bring forward some proofs on the subject, to such an ex- tent and in such a way as seemed to be necessary. And if we could be certain, that every one who reads this volume, had read or would be likely to read the passages C 2 30 CLASSIFICATION OF referred to, it might not be necessary to delay upon this topic here. But as this may not be the case, and as there are some reasons why the Philosophy of the Will should stand in a considerable degree complete in itself, we shall take the liberty to repeat here, with some modifications of expression and of illustration, the arguments already ad- duced in support of the General Division in question. And in the first place, the general arrangement which has been spoken of, viz., into the Intellective, Sensitive, and Voluntary or Volitive states of the mind, appears to be confirmed by the facts of our Consciousness. Mental philosophers very correctly assure us, that our knowledge of the human mind depends in a very great degree upon Consciousness ; and that by means of it we are enabled to ascertain what thought and feeling are in themselves, and to distinguish them from each other. Certain it is, if we reject the authority of Consciousness, we shall be involved in great difficulty, and cannot rea- sonably expect to make much progress in this kind of in- quiry. But if it be true that the existence and distinctive character of the mental acts is made known, in a good degree at least, by consciousness, and that we may justly and confidently rely on its testimony, we naturally inquire, What does it teach in the present case 1 And in answer- ing this question, we may safely appeal to any person's recollections, and ask, Whether he has ever been in dan- ger of confounding a mere perception, a mere thought, either with emotions and desires on the one hand, or with volitions on the other ? Does not his consciousness assure him, that the mental states, which we thus distinguish by these different terms, are not identical ; that the one class is not the other ; that they as actually differ from each other as association does from belief, or imagination from memory 1 THE MENTAL POWERS. 31 It would seem, therefore, that we may rest in this in- quiry upon men's consciousness ; not of one merely, but of any and all men. The universal testimony from this source is unquestionably the same. And the announce- ment which it makes is, that the leading departments of the mental nature are in some important sense separated from each other. The understanding, standing apart and distinguishable from the rest, may be regarded as holding the incipient or preparatory position. The Sensibilities also, in their two leading forms of the Natural and the Moral Sensibility, have their appropriate place. And the same may be said with equal confidence of the other great department of the mind. § 5. Evidence of the same from terms found in different languages. It was further maintained in the volume on the Intel- lect, that we are enabled to throw some light on this sub- ject from a consideration of the terms which are found in various languages. The train of thought was to this effect. Every language is, to some extent and in some important sense, a mirror of the mind. Something, con- sequently, may be learned of the tendency of the mental operations, not only from the form or structure of language in general, but even from the import of particular terms. There can be no hesitation in saying, that every language has its distinct terms, expressive of the threefold view of the mind under consideration, and which are constantly used with a distinct and appropriate meaning, and with- out being interchanged with each other as if they were synonymous. In other words, there are terms in all those languages which are spoken by nations considerably ad- 32 CLASSIFICATION OF vanced in mental culture, which correspond to the Eng- lish terms, intellect, sensibilities, will. If such terms are generally found in languages, differing from each other in form and in meaning, it is certainly a strong cir- cumstance in proof, that the distinction, which we propose to establish, actually exists. On the supposition of its having no existence, it seems impossible to explain the fact, that men should so universally agree in making it. If, on the other hand, it does exist, it is reasonable to sup- pose that it exists for some purpose ; and existing for some purpose, it must of course become known; and being known, it is naturally expressed in language, the same as any other object of knowledge. And this is what we find to be the case. So that we may consider the expression to be an evidence of the fact ; the sign, an intimation and evidence of the reality of the thing sig- nified. § 6. Evidence from incidental remarks in writers. And it appeared further in our former examination of this subject, that there are yet other sources of evidence which have a bearing upon it. No small amount of men- tal knowledge, it was there intimated, may be gathered from the incidental remarks of writers of careful observa- tion and good sense. And accordingly, if we find re- marks expressive of mental distinctions, repeatedly made by such men, when they are not formally and professedly treating of the mind, it furnishes a strong presumption that such distinctions actually exist. Their testimony is given under circumstances the most favourable to an un- biased opinion ; and ought to be received into the vast THE MENTAL POWERS. 33 amount of evidence, drawn from a great variety of sour- ces, which goes to illustrate the true nature of the soul. We shall accordingly introduce here a few passages of the kind which has been mentioned, w T hich, in connexion with the passages formerly introduced in the chapter on the subject now before us, will help to confirm the pro- priety of the proposed general division. — " Loyalty," says Junius in his First Letter, " in the heart and understand- ing of an Englishman, is a natural attachment to the guardian of the laws." — Bishop Burnet, in speaking of Archbishop Tillotson, says, " He was a man of the truest judgment and the best temper I had ever known. He had a clear head, with a most tender and compassionate heart."* In some comments which Boswell, in his Life of Dr. Johnson, makes on the writings and character of Rousseau, he has the following remark: "His absurd preference of savage to civilized life, and other singulari- ties, are proofs rather of a defect in his understanding, than of any depravity in his heart."! These passages, and others like them, although they do not go to the full extent of the proposed General Division, evidently involve the distinction between the Understand- ing and the Sensibilities, or the intellective and sensitive states of the mind. Passages of this kind, which inci- dentally involve the distinction between the Intellect and the Sensibilities, and also others which involve the dis- tinction between the Intellect and the Will, or between the Sensibilities and the Will, may be found so very fre- quently, that it must be quite unnecessary to repeat them. There are other passages, less frequent indeed, and yet abundantly numerous for our present purpose, which in a * Burnet's History of his Own Time, Reign of William and Mary. t Life of Johnson, vol. i., p. 431. 34 CLASSIFICATION OF single sentence, and apparently with entire unconscious- ness on the part of the writer, imply the distinction under consideration in its whole extent. Such is the passage which was quoted in the volume on the Intellect from Lord Chesterfield, who, in giving directions to his son as to the manner of conducting negotiations with foreign ministers, makes use of the following language : " If you engage his heart, you have a fair chance of imposing upon his understanding, and determining his will."* — Such is the remark also, introduced in the same place, of Drake, the author of the Literary Hours, that the deficien- cies of Sir Richard Steele, formerly well known as one of the popular writers of England, were neither of the head nor of the heart, but of the volition.! We do not propose, however, after what has already been said in the Introductory Chapters of the volume on the Intellect, to multiply extracts here. One or two instances more will suffice. The author of a recently published Inquiry concerning the Indications of Insanity, in describing the condition of a person whose mind is disordered, expresses himself as follows : " His will is no longer restrained by his judg- ment, but is driven madly onward by his passions."J Nor are the passages, which incidentally involve the distinction in question, to be found in the more modern writers merely. Francis Davison, who wrote some po- etical pieces as long ago as 1602, has the following stanza : * Chesterfield, London ed., vol. iii., p. 137. t Drake's Essays, illustrative of the Tattler, Spectator, and Guardian, vol. i., p. 50. J Conolly's Inquiries concerning the Indications of Insanity, &c, London ed., p. 261. THE MENTAL POWERS. 35 " "Where wit. is overruled by Will, And will is led by fond Desire, There Reason were as good be still, As speaking, kindle greater fire." In the first Book of the Novum Organum (Aphorism 49th), Lord Bacon, no mean authority in mental as well as in physical inquiries, makes the remark, as if it were a common and well-known fact, that the Intellect is sus- ceptible of influences from the Will and the Affections. " Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est ; sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et affectibus." § 7. Further proof from various writers on the mind. The distinction in question has also been fully recog- nised, sometimes incidentally, and sometimes in a more formal manner, by various distinguished writers on the mind. In the volume on the Intellect, and in connexion with the same general subject which is now before us, we had occasion to quote the following somewhat striking passage from Mr. Locke : " Thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued. For good, though ap- pearing, and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills."* Here it must be obvi- ous to every one that the threefold division in question is distinctly recognised. The due consideration and exam- ining, which are spoken of, imply an act of the intellect ; the desires, which are subsequently raised, are appropri- * Essay on the Understanding, book ii., ch. xxi., § 46. 36 CLASSIFICATION OF ately ascribed to the sensibilities ; and these last are fol- lowed by an act of the other part of our nature, viz., the will. Omitting the other passages, which were introduced in the former discussion of the subject from Hume, Mackin- tosh, Thery, and some others, it will perhaps tend to strengthen the general argument, if we give in the present place a few extracts from other distinguished writers, all obviously looking in the same direction and of the same import. — In the valuable writings of Dr. Reid, we have the following statement : " The distinction between Will and Desire has been well explained by Mr. Locke ; yet many later writers have overlooked it, and represented Desire as a modification of Will. — Desire and Will agree in this, that both must have an object, of which we must have some conception ; and therefore both must be ac- companied with some degree of understanding. But they differ in several things."* " Our actions," says the ingenious author of the Light of Nature Pursued, " being constantly determined either by the decisions of our Judgment, or solicitations of our Desires, we mistake them for the Will itself."f Bockshammer, speaking of the Desires and Passions, while he regards them of inestimable worth in their prop- er place, says, that they are subordinate powers, " and should, therefore, never be released from the guardianship and guidance of the Understanding and Will." J " Whatever classification of the mental powers we may think proper to adopt," says President Day, " it is of the * Reid on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Essay I. t Tucker's Light of Nature Pursued, Art. Freewill, § 8. t Bockshammer on the Freedom of the Human Will, Kaufman's Translation, p. 36. THE MENTAL POWERS. 37 first importance to bear steadily in mind, that distinct fac- ulties are not distinct agents. They are different powers of one and the same agent. It is the man that perceives, and loves, and hates, and acts ; not his Understanding, or his Heart, or his Will, distinct from himself."* Passages similar to these, sometimes incidentally and sometimes more formally introduced in their writings, are not unfrequently found in the works of men, who are fa- vourably known as mental philosophers ; and whose opin- ions are justly entitled to great weight on any matter con- nected with mental operations. The extracts, which have now been made, are too easy and obvious in their appli- cation to the subject under consideration to require any comment. § 8. A knowledge of the Will implies a preliminary knowledge of the Intellect. Undoubtedly illustrations and proofs might be carried to a much greater extent. But probably enough has been said, in other parts of these inquiries if not here, to explain precisely the views which we entertain on this subject, to intimate and partially unfold the various sources of proof, and to shield us from the imputation of asserting what cannot be maintained. Supported by consciousness, the structure of languages, the incidental remarks of writers on a multitude of occasions, and by the opinions of many able metaphysicians, we felt ourselves justified in going forward in our inquiries, and we now feel justified in continuing them, with the distinction in question as their basis. And now we have further to remark, if there * Day's Inquiry respecting the self-determining Power of the Will, p. 40. D 38 CLASSIFICATION OF be that threefold distinction in the mind which has been contended for, then each of these prominent parts may with great propriety be treated of separately ; that is to say, the Will may be made a subject of examination in distinction from the Understanding, and both in distinction from the Affections, or more properly from the Sensibili- ties, which is the more general and appropriate term. But in the order of inquiry the Understanding naturally comes first, and then the Sensibilities, and the Will last. And hence we are led to observe, that a thorough knowl- edge of the Will necessarily implies a knowledge of the Understanding. We are compelled, therefore, to presume, that the read- er is already acquainted with what has been variously termed the intellective, perceptive, or cognitive part of our nature; that he knows something of the nature of sensation and perception, and of the conceptive power, which in its external action is based upon them ; that he has some acquaintance with the power of original sugges- tion, with the judgment or relative suggestion, the memo- ry, reasoning, imagination, and the like, which are prop- erly included under the general head of the understand- ing or intellect. We indulge the hope that this presump- tion will prove well-founded. Certain it is, that no man is entitled to pronounce with confidence on any dis- cussion having relation to the Will, without possessing the elements and outlines, at least, of such preliminary knowledge. § 9. Implies a preliminary knowledge also of the Sensibilities. It seems proper to observe further, that similar remarks THE MENTAL POWERS. 39 will apply to the Sensibilities. To a correct knowledge of the Will, a knowledge of the Sentient or Sensitive states of the mind cannot be considered less necessary than of the Intellective. And who that has given but even a slight attention to mental inquiries, can be suppo- sed ignorant of that interesting part of our nature 1 It is there we find the emotions which invest the various forms of nature with beauty and grandeur. It is there we are to seek for a knowledge of the propensities and passions, which bind men together in society ; the sources at once of their activity, their joy, and their sorrow. And there also we discover the elements of accountability, the feel- ings that approve and disapprove, the evidences and sig- natures of the law written within, which no one either obeys or violates without the appropriate reward or con- demnation. "With this preparatory knowledge, we are ready to advance with some hope of a successful issue. The natural course of inquiry is through the Understand- ing, and the Heart or Sensibilities, upward to the Will. The latter sustains the relation of a higher and more au- thoritative power ; a point of view in which we shall more fully consider it in some following chapters. With- out this, all the rest, left without the supervision and con- trol of the master's hand, would be comparatively use- less. So that, in considering the position which the Will maintains, we are naturally reminded of the passage which Home Tooke has made so celebrated : " 'Tis the last keystone That makes the arch ; the rest, that there were put, Are nothing, till that comes to bind and shut." 40 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT CHAPTER H. RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE WILL. § 10. A connexion existing among all the parts and powers of the mind. In the preceding Chapter we have insisted on a three- fold view of the mind as fundamental ; and we may add here our conviction, that the recognition of this distinc- tion is not only fundamental in respect to a knowledge of the mind in general, but is particularly necessary to a mil understanding of the doctrine of the Will. In truth, if there is not such a distinction, and if, on the contrary, the Voluntary part of our nature is truly identical Avith the Sensitive, as some philosophical lucubrations seem to maintain, it is very obvious that there can be no such thing as a Philosophy of the Will. But to assert and even to prove the existence of the important distinction which we have been contemplating, is not enough. It seems proper to say something further in illustration of the precise relation which the three lead- ing Departments of the mind sustain to each other. And as preliminary to this, we shall occupy a few moments in considering the connexion, which seems to exist among all the various powers of the mind, both those of a more general and those of a subordinate character. A very slight observation, it is believed, will suffice to teach us the general fact, that there is some bond of union, some principle of connexion pervading every variety of TO THE WILL. 41 the mental action. And the further this observation is carried on, the more obvious and indispensable will this connexion appear. If, for instance, we examine those subordinate powers, which are properly arranged together under the general head of the Intellect, we shall readily find this to be the case. There is no perception without the antecedent sensation ; there is no memory without at- tention ; no reasoning without both memory and associa- tion ; and neither reasoning nor imagination without the power of perceiving relations or relative suggestion. But in all these cases and in others, they stand, if we may be allowed the expression, side by side, ready to lend each other an assisting hand, and comparatively powerless and fruitless without this mutual aid. And if such be the state of things in the instances which have been particularized, then analogy would lead us to suppose, that there is a like principle of union running through and connecting together the more general departments of the mind ; and this too is abundantly obvious on even a slight examina- tion. § 11. Tlie intellectual fart the foundation or basis of the action of the other parts of the mind. Of the Understanding in particular, it may be said with some appearance of reason, that we find in it the founda- tion, the basis of the existence and of the action both of the Sensitive and of the Voluntary nature. Let us ex- amine this point, in the first place, in reference to the Sensibilities. When that part of our nature is in action, we find ourselves, according to the circumstances of the case, pleased or displeased ; we are filled with admiration or disgust ; we love or hate ; we approve or disapprove ; D2 42 RELATION OF THE EMTELLECT and exercise other emotions, desires, and passions. But the slightest examination will teach us that this could not be the case ; that these states of mind could not exist, without the acquisition of knowledge, which of course implies the exercise of the intellect. If we approve or disapprove a thing, it is very evident that we must have a knowledge of some object of approval or disapproval ; that there must be something upon which these emotions can fasten. And again, if we exercise love or hatred, the intellect must have been previously employed in making- known the existence and qualities of those objects, towards which the passions of love and hatred are directed. § 12. The connexion of the understanding with the will. And these views will be found equally applicable to the Will. There can no more be an act of the will with- out some object of knowledge before the mind, than there can be remembrance "without a thing remembered, or as- sociation without an object, to which the principle of as- sociation attaches itself. Hence, if we could find a man, in whom the intellect is entirely destroyed in fact, or is virtually destroyed by being entirely dormant, we should find at the same time an extinction both of the passions and the will. Happily the records of the human race, with the excep- tion of cases of idiocy and mental malformation, furnish but a solitary instance of that extreme extinction of the intellect which we now have in view ; we refer to the case of the unfortunate Caspar Hauser, whose melancholy history is so well known. As the intellect cannot be brought into action and made to develope itself, except by first coming into contact with the material world, the TO THE WILL. 43 result of this young man's confinement from childhood in one place, and of his entire seclusion from everything ex- ternal to his horrid prison, was, as would naturally be expected, the utter prostration of his Understanding. Scarcely a ray of knowledge illuminated the intellective region. The feeble perceptions of early infancy, such as we find in those that have scarcely explored the bounda- ries of the cradle that rocks them, were in his case com- bined with a body that had nearly expanded itself to the fulness of manhood. Such imbecility and vacuity of the Intellect of course furnished no foundation for the devel- opement of the Sensibilities. If we may rely upon the accounts that are given of him, there was in general an unruffled and placid surface, a great calm of the mind. And as there was no excitement, no tossing to and fro of the sensibilities, but everything there was wrapped up in slumber and inactivity ; so there was no developement of self-determination, no firmness of resolve, no inward vig- our and promptness of the voluntary power. The slightest impulse from the minds of others was followed by the consentaneous and unresisting movement of his own ; and his Will, so far from indicating any elements of decision and stability, could be likened only to the flexible reed of the desert, w T hich, without knowing the power that presses it, is shaken and bent by every changing breeze. § 13. The connexion of the understanding with the will shown from its connexion with action. As it is the object of this chapter to consider particu- larly the connexion existing between the Understanding and the Will, and the relation they sustain to each other, we may remark further, that the connexion of the intel- 44 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT lectual with the voluntary constitution is apparent from the connexion of the intellectual part or understanding with action. — Whatever difference of opinion there may be in other respects, there is a general agreement in this, that the mind, both in its internal constitution and in its adaptation to outward objects, is evidently framed for movement. It was never meant to be essentially dormant, either in a state of unconsciousness or of mere contempla- tion and emotion ; but was rather, when we consider its connexion with other states and modes of existence, de- signed to be an attendant and ministering angel to the great Being who made it, performing His errands of ob- servation and mercy, in whatever sphere of activity He might see fit to designate. — And it seems to be further assented to, not only that the various parts of man's na- ture conspire to action, but also that the immediate and proximate seat and source of action is in the Will ; in other words, that the Will emphatically sustains the part of the directing, controlling, and executive power of the mind. The Will, in particular, leads to outward action. It must be obvious to every one that there can be no bod- ily action, excepting what is termed involuntary, without a concurrent act of the will ; and it is equally obvious that action, in its various forms, embraces the multiplied duties, and is the foundation of the usefulness of man. Now if these views be correct, and if we wholly dis- sever the understanding from action, where is its utility 1 If the highest exertions of the intellect can lead to no possible results, except the mere accumulation of an inop- erative and lifeless mass of knowledge, what, are the ben- efits connected with it ? If we are assured on the highest authority, that knowledge without charity is no better than sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal, it is certainly TO THE WILL. 45 of no more worth without practical results, without cor- respondent action. But if we are not prepared to admit, that the intellect, which is so often and so justly pronoun- ced the glory of man's nature, is without worth, it seems to follow, that its value depends upon its connexion with the Will. Action, as we have seen, was undoubtedly one of the principal objects that was had in view in the crea- tion of the human mind ; but it is evident, that the Under- standing can have no connexion with action exterior to itself, and independently of its own accumulative processes, except in the direction and with the concurrent move- ment of the voluntary power. And on these grounds, among others, we may assert the relationship and the intimate connexion of these two great dep ailments of the mind. § 14. Further proof from an observation of the conduct of men. In addition to the considerations which have already been brought forward, we may find further proofs of the connexion which is alleged to exist, in our manner of addressing men when we wish them to pursue a certain course. We do not address the Will directly and alone ; nor do we directly address ourselves to the emotions and passions of men ; but we commonly lay the basis of our efforts in a movement on the Understanding. We make this statement with a good degree of confidence ; and we appeal to every one's recollection, whether it be not true. A person, for instance, wishes another person to join with him in some enterprise ; and perhaps it is one of an exciting and difficult nature. But where does he begin ? Does he immediately lay a requisition upon the will, com- 46 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT manding and requiring the individual to enter upon the proposed course at once ? Every one must see that this would certainly defeat his own purpose. If, therefore, he would indulge the hope of succeeding, he must act upon the Will, by taking advantage of the relations which it sustains to other parts of our mental nature. According- ly, he commences his attempts by an appeal to the under- standing, endeavouring to show, by plain and incontro- vertible statements, the practicability, propriety, and ben- efits of his propositions; and he knows perfectly well, that, unless he succeeds in convincing the understanding, he has no prospect of rousing the will to action, and that the probability of a favourable movement on the part of the voluntary power will be in proportion, or nearly so, to the favourable position of the intellect. § 15. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section. On the death of Julius Caesar, Antony is represented by Shakspeare, who well knew what process was requi- site in effecting such an object, as endeavouring to stir up a " sudden flood of mutiny." But he does not command the multitude, who, in their state of want and ignorance, are ready for almost any purpose, whether good or evil, to go forth at once, and consummate his projects of fire and slaughter. Too shrewd an observer of human na- ture for this, it is worthy of notice, that he addresses neither the will nor the passions, till he had first made a lodgment in the understanding. After saying, in excuse of his coming to speak at Caesar's funeral, that Caesar was a just and faithful friend to himself, he goes on to state, (what probably were the plain and undoubted facts in the case,) that Caesar had brought to Rome many cap- TO THE WILL. 47 tives ; that by their ransom-money he had filled the pub- lic coffers ; that he had wept over the sufferings of the poor ; that he had refused a kingly crown at the Luper- cal, &c. These statements, which were mere facts ad- dressed to the understanding, and some of them at least, and probably all of them, were incontrovertible, of course laid the foundation for a change in the passions, as they were designed to do. And the people, who just before had called Caesar a tyrant, and were glad that Rome was rid of him, now began to admit, under the influence of a nascent leniency of feeling, that there was much reason in Antony's sayings, and that Caesar had suffered wrong. Having thus prepared the way by removing the hostile feelings that antecedently existed, he now began to ply them in another direction. He told them of the greatness of Cassar ; of the power which he had once exercised ; of his ability to stand against not one nation merely, but the whole world, though now so low that none would do him reverence. And when, still continuing to approach the feelings by facts first addressed to the perceptive powers, he further proceeded to show them the bloody mantle, and to speak of the Testament which bequeathed to them his bountiful legacies, the passions, which had already begun to quicken in Caesar's favour, were kindled to a flame. It was then that the object of the speaker was accomplished, as he foresaw it would be. There was no want of motives, no hesitancy of the will, no slowness to action. The fickle multitude, driven about like the bil- lows that are agitated by the wind, were no longer the friends of Brutus; nor were they indifferent and idle spectators. But rushing from street to street, and seizing such weapons as their purposes required, they called for revenge, slaughters, and burnings. 48 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT § 16. Of the nature of the connexion between the under- standing and will. Presuming enough has been said, at least for the pres- ent, in support of the actual existence of the connexion we are inquiring into, we are now prepared to say some- thing of its nature. Although the connexion really exists, and is of very prominent importance, it is not meant to be said that it is a direct one. In other words, the Under- standing, whatever opinions may have formerly prevailed on the subject, is, in no case, in direct contact with the Will. When, therefore, we speak of the operation of the intellect upon the will, we mean an indirect or circuitous operation ; that is to say, one which is carried on through the mediation of the sensibilities, under which term we include the various forms of emotion and desire, together with feelings of obligation. The appropriate and distinctive object of the Under- standing is knowledge. But we confidently venture the assertion, that knowledge alone has no tendency to con- trol volition. It is possible for a person in the exercise of his intellectual powers to possess unlimited knowledge, to explore and exhaust every field of inquiry ; and yet, if his knowledge be unattended with feeling, if it be follow- ed by no form of emotion or desire, or obligatory senti- ment, it will leave the Will perfectly indifferent and mo- tionless. Any other supposition is at variance with every day's experience. A certain person, for example, comes to the conclusion, after a long train of reasoning, that the possession of a definite amount of property would be beneficial to himself and family. This conclusion is of course the result of a TO THE WILL. 49 purely intellectual process. But if it be utterly passion- less ; if it be unattended with a single emotion or desire, it will altogether fail to arouse the will to activity or to secure a single effort. In the constitution of the human mind, everywhere so full of wisdom and of mystery, the Sensibilities, which are as different from the will as from the understanding, are located between the two. They form the connecting link which binds them together. Strike out the sensibilities, therefore, and you necessarily excavate a gulf of separation between the intellect and the will, which is forever impassable. There is from that moment no medium of communication, no bond of union, no reciprocal action. § 17. Of the opinions of Mr. Locke on this point. Here is one point, as those who are acquainted with the history of philosophical opinions wall probably recol- lect, on which writers on the Will have sometimes fallen into great error, viz., in placing the intellectual in juxtaposi- tion with the voluntary or volitive power, and supposing the latter to be under the direct operation of the former. Mr. Locke himself seems to have been of this opinion at first, and to have published to the world his belief, that the understanding, forming an estimate of what is the greatest good, is the direct and immediate means of con- trolling the Will. But he afterward, on more mature examination, announced, with the honesty and love of truth for which he is so celebrated, his decided change of opinion. — " It seems, (says he,) so established and set- tled a maxim, by the general consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder, that, when I first published my thoughts on E 50 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT this subject, I took it for granted ; and I imagine that by a great many I shall be thought more excusable for hav- ing done so, than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an opinion. But yet, upon a stricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. Convince a man ever so much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him see and own, that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury ; yet, as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneasi- ness in it, he moves not ; his loill is never determined to any action that shall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims in this w r orld, or hopes in the next, as food to life ; yet, till he hungers and thirsts after righteousness, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be deter- mined to any action in pursuit of this greater good." — " For good," he says in another passage, " though appear- ing and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised de- sires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, reaches not our willsy* He was satisfied, on repeated examination and on the most mature reflection which he could give to the subject, that the mere intellectual conviction of what might tend to the greatest good, has no effect upon the Will, till it has first excited within us desires after that good. * Essay concerning the Human Understanding, book ii., ch. xxi., $ 35, 46. TO THE WILL. 51 § 18. Opinions of Sir James Mackintosh on the same subject. The same view is taken by other profound metaphysi- cians, so that, independently of its own obvious reasona- bleness, there is no want of authority in its favour. The following expressions of Sir James Mackintosh show what were his own convictions on the subject. — " Through whatever length of reasoning the mind may pass in its advances towards action, there is placed at the end of any avenue, through which it can advance, some principle wholly unlike mere reason, some emotion or sentiment which must be touched before the springs of will and action can be set in motion." And in another passage, a part of which follows, he maintains the assertions here made at considerable length. — " We can easily imagine a percipient and think- ing being without a capacity of receiving pleasure or pain. Such a being might perceive what we do ; if we could conceive him to reason, he might reason justly ; and if he were to judge at all, there seems no reason why he should not judge truly. But what could induce such a being to will or to act ? It seems evident that his ex- istence could only be a state of passive contemplation. Reason, as reason, can never be a motive to action. It is only when we superadd to such a being sensibility, or the capacity of emotion or sentiment, (or what in corpo- real cases is called sensation,) of desire and aversion, that we introduce him into the world of action. We then clearly discern, that, when the conclusion of a pro- cess of reasoning presents to his mind an object of de- sire, or the means of obtaining it, a motive of action 52 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT begins to operate ; and reason may then, but not till then, have a powerful though indirect influence on conduct. Let any argument to dissuade a man from immorality be employed, and the issue of it 'will always appear to be an appeal to a feeling. You prove that drunkenness will probably ruin health. No position founded on experience is more certain. Most persons with whom you reason must be as much convinced of it as you are. But your hope of success depends on the drunkard's fear of ill health ; and he may always silence your argument by tell- ing you that he loves wine more than he dreads sickness. You speak in vain of the infamy of an act to one who disregards the opinion of others ; or of its imprudence to a man of little feeling for his own future condition. You may truly, but vainly, tell of the pleasures of friendship to one who has little affection. If you display the de- lights of liberality to a miser, he may always shut your mouth by answering, ' the spendthrift may prefer such pleasure ; I love money more.' If you even appeal to a man's conscience, he may answer you, that you have clearly proved the immorality of the act, and that he himself knew it before ; but that now, when you had re- newed and freshened his conviction, he was obliged to own, that his love of virtue, even aided by the fear of dishonour, remorse, and punishment, was not so powerful as the desire which hurried him into vice."* — He con- cludes with remarking, that it is thus apparent that the influence of reason on the vrill is indirect, and arises only from its being one of the channels by which the objects of desire or aversion are brought near to these springs of voluntary action. * View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, section v. TO THE WILL. 53 § 19. The understanding reaches the will through the sensibilities. While, therefore, we may be assured that there is an established and fixed connexion between the understand- ing and the will, and that they are, by the constitution of our nature, reciprocally indispensable to each other, this connexion is not to be regarded as direct and immediate ; but the understanding affects the will through the me- dium of the Sensibilities. The direct connexion, there- fore, of the understanding is with the sensibilities ; and with that portion of them which are appropriately, and by way of distinction from the other sentient states of the mind, termed the Emotions. It is true, there is no resem- blance between an emotion and a mere perception or thought ; in their nature they are entirely different from each other. " An emotion of pleasure or pain," in the language of Mackintosh, " differs much more from a mere perception, than the perceptions of one sense do from those of another. The perceptions of all the senses have some qualities in common. But an emotion has not ne- cessarily anything in common with a perception, but that they are both states of the mind." But these two classes of mental states, although they differ so entirely in their nature, are placed in juxtaposi- tion to each other ; by which we mean, that one is immedi- ately successive to the other, or, in other words, that they hold the relation of antecedence and sequence. And it is here that the understanding makes its approaches upon the voluntary power, and contributes to its being called into action, as will be seen more distinctly in some remarks of the following chapter. E2 54 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT § 20. The acts of the intellect the direct antecedents to emotions. Let us delay here a moment, and notice that marked and interesting fact in our mental economy, that knowl- edge is the foundation of emotion. All the knowledge which men have, with the exception of the mere relations of things, has reference either to matter or mind ; to the outward and external, or to the invisible and spiritual world. But in both its great forms, and under whatever possible aspect it may exist, we find it to be attended with emotion. No man walks the earth, and contemplates its variegated features, its mingled yet harmonizing exhibi- tions of wood and water, of hill and vale, and tree and flower, and sun and cloud, without experiencing the origin of a feeling within him additional to the mere perception of these objects. There is a gush of pleasure, a flow of emotive sensibility, which is better known by the experi- ence than by any description. The emotion, however, is not always of the same kind. There are times and places where nature puts on her more awful and frown- ing aspects, where she appears in storm and power and gloom. And then the emotion ascends from the merely beautiful to the grand and sublime. And there are also other objects of knowledge than mere natural objects ; all the various and wonderful attri- butes of mind ; the patience and the fortitude, and the joy and the sorrow, and the magnanimity, and the crime, and the justice, which diversify the history of the human race. The knowledge of these, too, (for everything is dormant until the intellect has put itself in exercise and has explored the objects which come within its sphere,) TO THE WILL. 55 arouses the Sensibility, and calls forth the strongest emo- tions ; not only emotions of the beautiful and sublime, of joy and sorrow, but of approval and disapproval, accord- ing to the nature and character of the thing which is pre- sented before us. § 21. Emotions change with changes in the intellectual perceptions. We may not. only lay down the general truth, that emotions depend for their existence on the antecedent acts of the intellect, but also that the character of the emotion will vary as a general thing, with changes in the intellectual perceptions. We have already noticed this fact in the volume on the Sensibilities ; but it seems to be necessary, in order to have a precise and full view of the doctrine of the Will, to recur to it again. Accordingly, we proceed to say here, that all objects become more or less interesting to us, more or less radiant in the view of the mental perception, in proportion as we know more or less about them. That scenery of nature, which seemed to us exceedingly beautiful at first, will at once appear less so on the discovery of some new object, which is judged by us discordant with its general character. That exquisite picture, which charms us at the first glance, will excite still stronger emotions of pleasure, when we ex- amine it carefully in all its parts, and discover new sources of beauty. That man of riches, who beholds his grana- ries and coffers with so much joy, when he sits down to reason coolly upon the true value of the wealth he pos- sesses ', when he considers that it will corrupt the morals and prove the destruction of his children, and that, in con- nexion with the means of its acquisition, it will arouse the 56 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT endless upbraidings of his own conscience, will be like- ly to find the feeling of joy withering within him, and those of sorrow and remorse taking its place. How many cases there are of moral conduct, which, on first being made known to us, have called forth the most decisive ap- probation ; but which, on a further examination of the motives of the actors, have changed their character, and lost all their moral glory ! How many friends have glad- dened us by their countenance, which seemed to beam with a heavenly excellence, but have afterward filled us with loathing and abhorrence, when we have found that their pretended friendship was merely assumed to cloak their private views and to carry their selfish ends ! And thus it is with all objects of knowledge, as they become more fully explored either in themselves or in their relations. According as they change their aspect under the inspection of the intellect, they are invested with a new character from the emotions. But if all emotion depends essentially upon intellect, and all change of emotion depends essentially upon change of intellect, we shall hereafter have occasion to see, even more fully than has yet been pointed out, how close and indispen- sable the bond is which unites the intellectual to the voluntary power. § 22. The -powers of the will not perfectly correspondent to those of the Intellect. But, although the Intellect thus lays the original found- ation of the acts of the Will, we are not necessarily to infer, that there is an exact correspondence and proportion between them. In other words, we are not to infer, that the vigour of the will is always in exact proportion to TO THE WILL. 57 the expansion and vigour of the intellect. It was a sa- gacious remark of the distinguished painter Fuseli, which we venture to assert a careful observation will fully con- firm, that nature does not always "proportion the will to our powers /" meaning by the last expression our percep- tive or intellective powers. " It sometimes," he adds, " assigns a copious proportion of will to minds, whose faculties are very contracted, and frequently associates with the greatest faculties a will feeble and impotent."* — The Will appears to require, as the basis of its action in any given case, only a certain sphere of knowledge ; and any amount of knowledge beyond that sphere will not necessarily affect the energy of the volitive action either one way or the other. Some instances will explain more clearly what w T e mean. In Dr. Goldsmith, so justly celebrated for his various literary productions, we may notice no inconsiderable grasp of Intellect, combined with a will not fully propor- tioned to it. Distinguished as a poet, a comic writer, and a novelist, his conduct through life was marked with an ex- ceeding infirmity of purpose. With a perfect understand- ing of the impositions of which he was made the subject, he still had not promptness and decision enough to coun- teract them. His biographer asserts, that he could not give a refusal ; and being thus cheated with his eyes open, no man could be a surer and easier dupe to the im- postors, whose arts he could so well describe.f May we not also adduce the mental traits of a man still more distinguished 1 The intellect of Sir Isaac Newton seemed capacious enough to embrace the whole circle of knowledge ; nothing among men could well exceed the * Cunningham's Lives of Painters, art. Fuseli. t Scott's Lives of the Novelists, art. Goldsmith. 58 RELATION OF THE INTELLECT grasp of his understanding ; but, if we carefully compare the statements given by his biographers, we shall probably be convinced, that there was not a perfect correspondence and proportion between his intellectual and his voluntary power ; that he often exhibited no small infirmity and in- decision of purpose ; a gigantic strength of thought, uni- ted with a childlike uncertainty and flexibility of action. After he had completed his great work, the Principia, and had placed the new philosophical creed on an immovable basis, we are told he was unwilling to give it to the world, probably through fear of the controversies it might occa- sion, and that he was induced to do so through the urgent importunity of some of his intimate friends.* — In the case of Newton, however, it may not be necessary to as- sert positively, as in that of Goldsmith and many others, that there was a natural deficiency or weakness of the will, since we are at liberty to attempt another explana- tion. The Will, like the other mental powers, strengthens by exercise, and grows languid and weak by disuse. But this great philosopher was almost constantly employed in inquiries beyond the ordinary sphere of the world's motives and actions ; and as he consequently had but little occasion for calling the voluntary power into exer- cise, we may well suppose that it lost in some degree its natural vigour. § 23. An energetic will sometimes found in connexion with limited powers of intellect. And if, on the one hand, a great grasp of intellect is not always attended with a voluntary energy correspond- * Brewster's Life of Newton, chap. xi. — Cumberland's Memoirs, p. 9. — D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, vol. ii., p. 165. TO THE WILL. 59 ing to it, we find, on the other, that inferiority of intellect (we do not speak now of extreme cases, but of such as are of every day's occurrence) is not necessarily accom- panied with diminished power of the Will. The sphere of the will's action is of course diminished in such in- stances ; but it is possible for it to exhibit great vigour within that limited sphere. It has but a small field to work in, (not an empire, but a small enclosure which a man can cast his eye over,) but it does its duty faithfully, promptly, and sternly in the restricted limits allotted it. It has been remarked of the renowned Marshal Ney, that he was scarcely capable of putting two ideas togeth- er. Although this is an exaggeration, it is very certain that his great celebrity does not rest upon his comprehen- sive views and powers of reasoning, but almost solely on his surprising promptness and resolution in action; in other words, on the promptness and force of the will. And it is well known that the Emperor Napoleon was ac- customed to speak of some of his generals, (Murat, as well as Ney, was an instance,) as men of limited intellect but of great energy ; as weak and microscopic, if we may be allowed the expressions, in all matters of perceptivity and reflection, but great and terrible in their volition. — But it will be necessary to resume this subject again. All that we wish to say now is, that, although there is a connexion between the understanding and the will, and the one is the basis of the life and activity of the other, there is not a perfect correspondence between the two ; and that the mere power and activity of the one, since there are other things to be taken into consideration, does not furnish a perfect measure of the ability and promptness of the other* 60 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES CHAPTER m. RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES TO THE WILL. § 24. General statement in explanation of the term sensibilities. Having proceeded thus far, in considering the relation which the Understanding sustains to the Will, we advance a step further into the interior of the mental nature, and consider more particularly the relation which the Sensibil- ities sustain to it. We have already had occasion to re- mark, that the doctrine formerly prevalent of the Will's being controlled by the last dictate of the Understanding is untenable, and that the Understanding is in no case in direct contact with the voluntary power. As to any direct and immediate connexion, we have no hesitancy in say- ing, that they are entirely separated from each other. The space between them, however, is not left vacant, but is occupied by another portion of the mind of the greatest interest and importance, viz., its sentient or sensitive states. It is this portion of the mind, and not the percipient or intellective, which sustains a direct connexion with the Will. But, before attempting to illustrate the nature of this connexion, it is necessary to state in a few words, although at the expense of some repetition, what is prop- erly included imder the term Sensibilities. It may be said in general terms, without professing to be specific and exact, that everything is to be included under the word Sensibilities which properly and truly in> TO THE WILL. 61 plies feeling. We suppose, moreover, that the term Sen- sibilities may be regarded, in its general and indefinite sense, as meaning essentially the same as the word heart does, in those numerous passages of English writers, some of which have already been quoted, where the heart is spoken of in distinction from the head or the understand- ing. When w T e say of an individual, that he has a vigor- ous intellect but a perverted heart, or, on the other hand, characterize him as possessed of a just and generous heart in combination with a weak intellect, we not only have a meaning, but we rightly count on such expressions being easily and readily apprehended. We never mistake. We not only know that a part of our spiritual nature is meant, but we know what that part is. We say, there- fore, in general terms, that we employ the word Sensibil- ities as meaning essentially the same with the word heart. But this statement of what is meant by the term in ques- tion, it must be admitted, is so general and indefinite, that it seems necessary to designate more particularly what is included under it. § 25. Of what are strictly included under the sensibilities. It is true, that the general nature of the Sensibilities, including the subordinate divisions and the relations of those divisions, has been explained at some length in the volume on that subject. But as we approach the termi- nation of our inquiries, and come nearer to that Depart- ment, to which is assigned the high office, not only of a general control of the mental action, but of realizing and sustaining the mind's unity, so that we can truly speak of ourselves as one mind or as one person, it seems neces- sary, in order to a full and clear understanding of our F 62 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES position, to take a concise view of the other parts of the mind, and to point out their relations to that which is he- fore us. This, therefore, so far as it has not been done in the remarks already made, we proceed now to do. Ac- cordingly, we proceed to remark, that the states of mind coming under the general head of the Sensibilities may be arranged under the three subordinate classes of Emotions, Desires, and feelings of Obligation ; including under the class of the Desires certain complex states of mind, of which desire makes a prominent part, such as the appe- tites, PROPENSITIES, and AFFECTIONS. I. Emotions. — These feelings are very various in kind, such as the emotions of cheerfulness and joy, of melan- choly and sorrow, of surprise, astonishment, and wonder; the emotions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity; the emotions of the ludicrous, and the emotions of approval and disapproval. As the emotions are simple states of the mind, it would be of no avail to attempt to define them ; but the knowledge of them must be left to the tes- timony of each one's consciousness. But it is to be pre- sumed, that no one is ignorant of what is meant when we speak of cheerfulness, of wonder, of melancholy, of beau- ty, grandeur, and the like. II. The Desires. — Originating in the Natural in dis- tinction from the Moral emotions, we have also the sub- ordinate class of Desires included under the general head of the Sentient states of the mind or the Sensibilities. The knowledge of the Desires as well as of the Emotions, must be had chiefly from consciousness. No mere form of words can illustrate their nature as distinguished from that of emotions, independently of that internal experience which is implied in an act of consciousness. There are, however, some accessory or incidental circumstances, TO THE WILL. 63 which are in some degree characteristic of them, and which have been enumerated in the volume on the Sensi- bilities. For instance, the circumstance that emotions are generally evanescent, while there is a greater fixed- ness and permanency in the desires. — Under the ciass of Desires may be included, as has already been stated, the appetites, such as hunger and thirst; the propensities, such as curiosity or the desire of knowledge, the innate desire of esteem, the principle of imitation, sociality or the desire of society, ambition or the desire of power, and the like; and the affections, both the malevolent and those of a beneficent tendency III, Feelings of Obligation. — To these may also be added, as belonging to and as forming a distinct portion of the Sensitive constitution, the feelings of Obligation, originating, in contrast with the desires, in the Moral in distinction from the Natural emotions, It would be in- consistent with the plan which we propose to pursue, to go very fully into the nature of Obligative or Obligatory sentiments. The difference existing between them and the Desires, will probably be obvious to every one on even a slight internal examination. Nor is there, in gen- eral, any danger of their being confounded with the Emo- tions, excepting those which are also of a moral nature, viz., of approval and disapproval. But here also the dis- tinction is not an imperfect or obscure one. The emotions of approval and disapproval have reference to the charac- ter of objects and actions that are either past or present ; to things that have existed in time past, or that have an actual existence at the present time, or are conceived to exist at the present time. The states of mind, on the contrary, which involve obligation and duty, have refer- ence to the future; to something which is either to be 64 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES performed or the performance of which is to be avoided. They bind us entirely to what is to come. — There is also this additional ground of distinction between the two, that the feelings of obligation are always subsequent in point of time to the approving or disapproving emotions, and cannot possibly exist unless preceded by them. Ac- cordingly, it is a common thing for a person to say, that he feels no moral obligation to do a thing, because he does not approve it, or, on the contrary, that, approving any proposed course, he feels under obligation to pursue it; language, which undoubtedly means something, and which implies a distinction between the mere moral emo- tion and the feeling of obligation ; and which tends to prove the prevalence of the common belief, that the feel- ing of obligation is subsequent to, and dependant on that of approval or disapproval. These statements, though necessarily brief, will help to show what are strictly in- cluded under the term sensibilities. § 26. Acts of the intellect in immediate proximity with emotions. In considering those states of mind which are termed sentient or sensitive, in distinction from the intellective, we have to remark further, that of the various classes of feeling named in the preceding section, the Emotions come first in order. That is to say, in proceeding from the Intellect to the Will through the Sensibilities, which is obviously the road that nature has laid out and estab- lished to the exclusion of every other, we find the intel- lections in contact, or, more properly speaking, in imme- diate proximity, with the emotions. The first step taken from the understanding to the heart is into the region of TO THE WILL. 65 the Emotions, and not into that of the Desires, or of the feelings of Obligation. And here it is proper again to observe, as we had oc- casion to notice in the preceding chapter, that the original and sole foundation of emotions is knowledge, which im- plies, of course, the action of the intellect. This is an ulti- mate fact in our constitution, which therefore we cannot resolve into anything else. Whenever an object of knowledge is presented before us, of whatever kind, we are so constituted that we necessarily have a correspond- ent emotion, either pleasing or displeasing; though in many cases, it must be acknowledged, the emotion is so very slight as to give the object the appearance of being perfectly indifferent. And even if we should admit that there may be some objects of knowledge (or, in other words, some intellectual perceptions, which amounts to the same thing) that are perfectly indifferent, being wholly unattended with emotions, it will still remain true, on the other hand, that there can be no emotions without some object of knowledge, without some preceding intel- lectual act. The natural progress of the mind, therefore, in bringing the Will into action, is from intellections to emotions. Furthermore, whenever there is a clear and just per- ception of an object, the corresponding emotion will not only necessarily arise, but there will generally be an entire correspondence between the two. That is to say, the emotion will be the true and precise measure of the natu- ral and moral beauty of objects, and of their deformity, and the true measure of all other qualities which are fitted to excite emotions. We say, where there is a clear and just perception, for it is undeniable that the perception is often perplexed and clouded by inexcusable carelessness, F2 66 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES by inordinate passion, by strong casual associations, and for other reasons ; and that, in consequence of this, the correspondence which ought to exist between the emo- tion and the true nature of the object before the mind frequently fails. But in all those cases where there is no erroneous and unnatural influence operating on the understanding, we may reasonably expect to find a due adaptation and harmony between these two parts of our nature. § 27. Emotions not in proximity with volitions. Acts of the understanding or intellections are, by the constitution of our nature, antecedent to emotions. But while it is thus obvious that emotions stand between in- tellections and volitions we are not to suppose that Emo- tions, although they are one step nearer the Will than the mere acts of the Understanding, are in direct contact with it, or have of themselves alone any power over it. It may be asserted with perfect confidence, if we had these feelings alone, the Will would never be brought into action. They have no more natural tendency to cause volition than mere thought, than the most unimpassioned and abstract speculations of the intellect. Let us take some illustration. A person contemplates some picture of excellent workmanship, which appears to him beautiful or sublime, and excites within him emotions of that character ; but the existence of these emotions merely never calls forth any act of volition. He stands, and gazes, and the tide of emotion swells in upon him, and he is overwhelmed with it. But while this portion of his Sensibilities alone is awakened and called into ex- ercise he will remain as inactive as if he had been TO THE WILL. 67 formed of intellect merely. He will take no measures to possess the painting, or to do anything else in respect to it, until he is under the influence of another portion of the Sensibilities entirely distinct from emotions. § 28. Emotions followed by desires and feelings of obligation. We behold here the admirable economy of the mind, a decisive and striking proof of that wisdom which per- vades its wonderful structure. Intellectual perceptions lay the foundation of emotions, and if these last cannot reach and influence the higher and more authoritative power of the Will, it is so ordered in the mental constitution, that they lay the foundation of other mental states, which can. The classes of feelings, of which the emotions may be regarded as the basis, appear to be two in number, name- ly, the Desires, founded on the various Natural emotions, or those which give pleasure or pain ; and Feelings of obligation, founded on the Moral emotions, viz., of ap- proval and disapproval. § 29. Desires in proximity with the will. And, in the first place, a word or two may be said on the position and relations of the Desires. It has been seen, that intellections are not in direct connexion with the Desires, but that Emotions intervene. The acts of the understanding alone can never raise a single desire. In no case whatever does a man assert his desire of a thing, unless he is pleased with it either in itself, or in its relations and applications. But if there be no desire without the intervention of some emotion, then it is evi- 68 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES dent that the mere knowledge of the thing, towards which the desire is directed, is not sufficient to excite it ; but, on the contrary, without something more than the mere acts of the understanding, it could never exist. The process of the mind, therefore, is from intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires. The intel- lectual perceptions lay the foundation for the various emotions both pleasant and painful ; and the desires are attendant upon these. We desire a house and its furni- ture ; we desire a picture or a statue, or other objects of convenience, utility, and beauty ; because they excite emotions and give us pleasure, but not otherwise. And if we are here asked why the emotions should lay the foundation of desires, we can only say, (as also in respect to the general fact that intellections lay the found- ation of emotions,) it is the constitution of our nature. The same creative power that requires emotions to follow the perceptions of the understanding, has instituted the succession of the desires to emotions. And it is in Desires that we find a class of immediate antecedents to the acts of the Will. They present to it a powerful motive. They furnish to it one of its broadest grounds of action. § 30. Obligatory feelings also in proximity with the will. We may also approach the Will in another direction. The class of mental states, which are termed emotions, are followed not merely by Desires, but also by another class, distinct from Desires, and yet sustaining the same re- lation of proximity to the will, which, for want of a single term, we have been obliged to denominate Feelings of ob- ligation. Desires are founded on the Natural emotions, TO THE WILL. 69 or those which involve what is pleasurable or painful, while Obligatory feelings are exclusively based on emo- tions of a different kind, viz., Moral emotions, or emotions of moral approval and disapproval The Obligative states of mind, although they are easily distinguished by our consciousness from Desires or the Desirive states of mind, agree with the latter in being in direct contact with the voluntary power, and not unfrequently these two classes of mental states stand before the Will in direct and fierce opposition to each other. We are aware that the representation has sometimes been given by writers, that the moral emotions of ap- proval and disapproval are in direct proximity with the Will, and exert a direct control over it. But this is not true of any emotions whatever, those of approval and dis- approval as well as others. They all stop short of the Will, and require the intervention of some other state of the mind. We put forth emotions in approval or disapproval of a certain action or of a certain course of conduct, but they will never lead us to exert any effort of our own until they are followed by the distinct feelings of obliga- tion. Hence the common remark, that we feel an obliga- tion to pursue a certain course, because we approve it ; which implies, that, while the feeling of approval is the antecedent to that of obligation, the latter or obligative feeling is the direct and effective antecedent to volition. A view of this portion of the mind, which, we are per- suaded, will bear the strictest internal examination, and will not fail to be found true. 70 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES § 31. Further remarks and illustrations on this subject. We are now able, looking at the mind in its great out- lines, to understand the precise relation which its promi- nent parts hold to the Will. Volition is the great result, to which they all, in their appropriate position, contribute ; and with which they all, therefore, sustain an established connexion, though not with the same degree of nearness. The Sensibilities, which intervene between the Under- standing and the Will, divide themselves, as was seen more particularly in the volume on that subject, into two great portions, the Natural on the one hand, and the Moral on the other. Furthermore, in accordance with this view, they approach and reach the Will, as we have just seen, in different directions and in different forms of feeling, viz., in the form of Desires or Desirive states of mind on the one side, and in the form of Obligations or Obligative states of mind on the other. They furnish, therefore, a basis for the operations of the Will, sufficient- ly extensive not only for the purposes of action, but of accountability. We accordingly see, that, in the exercise of volition, men are not shut up to one form of action ; but are ena- bled and required, in all cases where such a distinction actually exists, to discriminate between the utile and the honestum, between the desirable and the just, between what is merely profitable or prudential, and what is vir- tuous. And it is undoubtedly important that these views should be borne in mind, for they have a direct and close bearing upon man's accountability, and also upon the question of his freedom. And a due degree of attention should be given to all considerations which have a ten- dency to settle these interesting questions. TO THE WILL. 71 § 32. Opinions of metaphysical writers on the fore- going statements. The doctrines, thus far advanced in this chapter, find support, in their essential and most important respects, in various writers. It is true that the distinction between desires and feelings of obligation has not been so clearly drawn and so much insisted on as it should be, although almost all writers, either more formally or incidentally, seem to acknowledge that the moral nature presents direct and powerful motives to the will, as well as those parts of our constitution which involve mere pleasure and desire. In respect to the relation sustained by desires to the will, there is more explicitness. Mr. Locke, in par- ticular, repeatedly and clearly asserts their proximity to volition. He does indeed say, that uneasiness determines the will, (§ 31 of the Chapter on Power,) but we need not mistake how this is to be interpreted, when we remem- ber he expressly adds, besides giving his reasons for the remark, " this uneasiness we may call, as it is, Desire." And in accordance with this, we find him remarking as follows, in a subsequent section of the same chapter : " I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the uneasiness of desire, as that which determines the will, because that is the chief and most sensible, and the will seldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action performed, without some desire accompanying it ; which, I think, is the reason why the will and desire are so often confound- ed. But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up, or at least accompanies most of the other passions, as wholly excluded in the case. Aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, &c, have each their uneasiness too, 12 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES and thereby influence the will. These passions are scarce any of them in life and practice simple and alone, and wholly unmixed with others ; though usually in discourse and contemplation, that carries the name which operates strongest, and appears most in the present state of the mind : nay, there is, I think, scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it. I am sure, where- ever there is uneasiness, there is desire ; for we constantly desire happiness ; and whatever we feel of uneasiness, so much it is certain we want of happiness, even in our own opinion, let our state and condition otherwise be what it will. Besides, the present moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and desire goes with our foresight, and that still carries the will with it. So that even in joy itself, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the desire to continue it, and fear to lose it : and when- ever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will presently is by that determined to some new action, and the present delight neglected."* § 33. Of the strength of the desires. While we are upon this part of the general subject, we may properly remark, as it may be found to have some connexion with what will be said hereafter, on the strength of the desires. The intensity of the desires, and also of the emotions on which they are founded, will not unfrequently vary in different individuals, even when they are acting together in reference to the same object, and nearly under the same circumstances. — The cause of this variation may be found, in the first place, in the Intellect * Essay concerning Human Understanding, book ii., ch. xxi., § 39. TO THE WILL. 73 or Understanding. The relation existing between the understanding and the sensibilities has already been, in some measure, explained. And those explanations will throw a ready and clear light upon the present topic. We are so constituted, as it would seem from the remarks now referred to, that the emotions we have, whether pleasant or painful, will vary, as a general thing, with our knowledge. If we happen on some occasion to be pleased with any natural or artificial object, we shall find that the pleasurable emotion will be increased or dimin- ished by our further knowledge, either of its excellences or its defects. And as the natural progress of the mind is from the emotions to the desires, it will also happen that the strength of the desires will vary in accordance with the variation in the intensity of the emotions. We will illustrate this by a single instance. We may assume, (and, indeed, have abundant reason to believe it to be the fact,) that the celebrated Clarkson, who was the instrument of effecting so much for suffering Africa, was naturally a person of a kindly and amiable disposi- tion, and easily moved by exhibitions of human wo. But how did it happen, that this individual felt and effected so much in opposition to the Slave Trade, while others of equal amiability neither felt nor acted 1 The explanation is an easy one, and it throws light upon the operations of the human mind. In the year 1785, the vice-chancellor of the University of Cambridge, with which Mr. Clarkson was at that time connected, gave out as the subject of a prize essay, " Anne liceat invitos in servitutem dare ? Is it right to enslave others against their will V He wrote uoon this subject, and gained the prize. And it was the knowledge which he acquired in writing this Essay that affected his heart ; he became acquainted with facts G 74 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES "which were before unknown to him, and his sensibilities were moved ; he knew, and then he felt ; he wept over the mass of human suffering that was displayed before him, not because he was actually of a more benevolent disposition than he was the year before, or of a more be- nevolent temperament than a hundred others in Great Britain, but because he had become acquainted with it. And when he had known, and when he had felt new de- sires and new feelings of obligation enkindling within him, he saw there was nothing remaining for him but to will and to do, to resolve and to act. And from that time he devoted his useful life to Africa. (2.) But it is necessary to add, that the mere amount of knowledge does not seem sufficient of itself to explain fully the differences of sensibility which we notice in dif- ferent persons. Whatever may have sometimes been said to the contrary, there can hardly be a doubt, that the minds of men, though compacted of the same essential elements, differ from each other in the modification and exhibition of those elements, as much as the general form of their bodies and their looks differ. And if we find that there is a constitutional difference in the powers of perception, memory, reasoning, and the like, we may ex- pect to find that there is naturally and constitutionally a greater quickness and strength of emotions and of conse- quent desires in some than in others. And this is con- firmed by constant observation. It would certainly be deemed a very reasonable assertion, and fully confirmed by the whole course of his life, that the benevolent How- ard was possessed of greater quickness and power of sensibility than many others. We do not mean to say that all he did was owing solely to the natural quickness of his sensibilities. It was undoubtedly the fact, that the TO THE WILL. 75 food which he furnished to the understanding nourished the sensibilities also; but it was equally true, that the sensibilities were naturally and strongly predisposed to receive such nourishment. If these views be correct, then in endeavouring to in- fluence a person to pursue a certain course of conduct, we must consider not only the character and value of the object which is presented before him, but the tempera- ment of the man. The object that will bring one prompt- ly into action, may approach heavily and weakly the more sluggish and indurated heart of another. § 34. Of the strength of feelings of obligation. Essentially the same views will apply to feelings of Obligation. Like the desires, their degree of strength will vary, in the first place, with the amount of knowl- edge. In other words, the more fully and completely we understand a moral action in itself and in its relations, the stronger, we may reasonably expect, will be our feelings of approval or disapproval. But it has been seen, that the mere feelings of approval and disapproval never of themselves excite the Will, and lead us to action. They must be followed by Obligative states of mind or feelings of Obligation ; and the strength of these last will corre- spond very nearly with that of the antecedent moral emo- tions. If the emotions be strong, and there is an opening in the matter for any personal action, the feelings of obli- gation, which necessarily follow them, will be proportion- ately strong. But here also, as in the case of the desires, there may be a constitutional difference in individuals. As some persons appear to inherit from nature a quicker sensibility 76 RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES to the beauty or deformity of natural objects than others, so in regard to things of a moral character, the emotions of some persons are found to be faint, while those of others, though there is precisely the same amount of knowledge in both cases, are distinct and vivid. And if nature may thus lay a foundation for a difference in the emotions, it necessarily lays a foundation for a difference in those feelings of obligation, of which moral emotions are the basis. Did not nature do more for the moral con- stitution of Aristides than for that of Alcibiades 1 And was Regulus, who sacrificed his life to preserve his honour, on an equality in this respect with Csesar, who sacrificed both his honour and his country to his ambition 1 § 35. Of the influence of the sensibilities on the under, standing. Before quitting the subject of the relations sustained by the sensibilities, we have a remark further to make. The sensibilities have not only an influence onward, that is to say, upon the Will, but backward upon the Understand- ing. The power of the heart over the intellect has been often noticed by theological writers; nor can it have escaped the knowledge of any one, who has made the opinions and conduct of men a subject of careful obser- vation. It is not unfrequently the case, that we anticipate, with a great degree of confidence, the decisions of a person on a purely speculative subject, from a knowledge of his desires, prejudices, and predominant passions. But the fact is so obvious and so generally acknowledged, that we have nothing to do but to say something in ex- planation of it. In the first place, a knowledge of the constitution of TO THE WILL. 77 the human mind would lead us to expect, that the action of the intellect will not be free and unembarrassed when the sensibilities are in a state of great excitement. It has been made sufficiently clear, in this and the preceding chapters, that the tendency of the mind, in its great de- partments of the cognitive, sensitive, and voluntary, is towards consecutive rather than simultaneous action ; that its acts follow each other in a certain order in time ; that there is no feeling without antecedent cognition, and no voluntary or volitive action without the antecedent action of the sensibilities. A simultaneous action, therefore, of the intellect and of the sensibilities, in an equal degree, seems to be inconsistent with those general principles of movement, which pervade the mental constitution. Ac- cordingly, when the intellect is at the highest point of action, the passions will be likely, at the precise moment of such high intellective or cognitive action, to be quieted and subordinate ; and when, on the other hand, the pas- sions are highly excited, the operations of the intellect will be perplexed, and will probably be feeble and ob- scure. Hence it is, that every man, when he is about entering upon an investigation of an abstract and diffi- cult nature, is desirous of freeing himself from the dis- turbing forces of the heart, and of commencing his task with perfect coolness. (2.) But there is another point of view in which this subject may be contemplated. It is not merely of the occasional predominance of the passions that the intellect may complain ; there is often a secret influence of the sensibilities, which attracts less notice, but is hardly less powerful ; which does not absolutely interrupt the exer- cise of the understanding, but perverts it. For instance, we often find it difficult to form a correct judgment, where G2 78 VOLITIONS, OR our own personal interests are concerned, or those of our family or political party. Our love has woven itself so closely around those partial interests, that even the keen eye of the understanding can scarcely penetrate its folds. And when it does, it beholds everything under a false medium ; all that is excellent, magnified and made prom- inent ; and all that is evil, diminished and kept out of sight And what love has done for our own interests, jealousy and ill will and hatred have done for interests adverse to our own. These last, as well as the more amiable passions, hinder the approach of the searchings of the intellect ; and when this is no longer possible, they distort the objects of its examination. CHAPTER IV. VOLITIONS, OR VOLUNTARY STATES OF MINDo § 36. The necessity of that controlling power which exists in the will. In the remarks hitherto made, although enough has been said to evince clearly the distinct existence of the Will, very little has been said in illustration of its appro- priate nature. This will now be made a distinct subject of consideration. But, before entering directly upon its examination, we take this opportunity to say something of the great necessity of that regulative and controlling power, of which the will is justly deemed to be the depository. Destitute of the power of willing, is it not evident that VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 79 man would be an inefficient and useless being ? He would indeed be possessed of the Intellect and the Sensibilities ; but it is well understood, and has already been remarked in respect to the intellect, that the value of these depends, in a great degree, upon action ; in other words, upon the practical results to which they lead. But the doctrine, that man can bring himself into action, without the power of willing, seems incomprehensible. And if we could suppose it to be otherwise, and if it were possible to try the experiment of basing human action directly upon the emotions and passions instead of the Will, it would soon show itself to be a species of action of the most perplexed and desultory kind. Like the passions themselves, it would be addicted to unforeseen obliquities, and would everywhere be characterized by indications of violence and change. No language could fully express its unfixedness, its versatility, its movements hither and thither, in various and contradictory directions. Unre- strained by any superintendent influence, the whole out- ward life and activity of man would be impelled blindly forward, like ships driven in storms without a rudder, or the heavenly bodies, urged onward in all their rapidity of motion, without an observance of the principles of gravi- tation. It follows, therefore, necessarily, that there must be somewhere in the mind a power, which, amid the com- plicated variety of mental impulses, exerts a regulative and controlling sway. The question then arises, what the internal regulative power is. And we point at once to the volitive or vol- untary principle. In other words, it is the authoritative voice of the Will, which, seeing the conflict within, and calmly contemplating the claims of interest and passion 80 VOLITIONS, OR on the one hand, and of conscience on the other, pro- nounces the decisive and final arbitrement. The Will, therefore, may be spoken of with some de- gree of propriety as the culminating point in man's spir- itual nature. It sits the witness and the arbitress over all the rest. It is essential alike to action and accounta- bility, to freedom and order and virtue. Without this, all else is comparatively nothing. It is in reference to this that all other susceptibilities keep their station and perform their functions. They revolve around it as a common centre, attracted by its power, and controlled by its ascendency. § 37. Remarks on the nature of the will. Having seen that the mind is to be contemplated under the threefold aspect of intellectual, sensitive, and vol- untary, and having considered the relation which the In- tellect and the Sensibilities bear to the Will, we are now prepared to pass to the consideration of the precise nature of the last-named power. And here let us interpose a word of caution. It is not to be inferred, when we speak of one part of the mind in distinction from another, and of passing from one part or power to another, that the mind is a congeries of distinct existences, or that it is, in any literal and material sense of the terms, susceptible of division. Varieties of action do not necessarily imply a want of unity in the principle from which they originate. The mental principle, there- fore, is indivisible. In itself it is truly and essentially a unity, though multiplied, in a manner calculated to excite the greatest astonishment, in its modes of application. It is merely one of these modes of its application, or, rather, VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 81 one of these modes of its exercise, which is indicated by the term Will. Accordingly, the term Will is not meant to express anything separate from the mind ; but merely embodies and expresses the fact of the mind's operating in a particular way. And hence the Will may properly enough be denned the MENTAL POWER OR SUSCEPTIBILITY BY WHICH WE PUT forth volitions. — And in accordance with this definition, if we wish to understand more fully what the nature of the power is, we must look at its results, and examine the nature of those states of mind which it gives rise to. — " It is necessary," says Mr. Stewart very justly, " to form a distinct notion of what is meant by the word volition, in order to understand the import of the word will ; for this last word properly expresses that power of the mind, of which volition is the act, and it is only by attending to what we experience while we are conscious of the act, that we can understand anything concerning the nature of the power."* § 38. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions. Of volitions, which are the results of the existence and exercise of the voluntary power, we are unable to give any definition in words, which will of itself make them clearly understood. They are simple states of the mind, and that circumstance alone precludes the possibility of a definition, in any strict and proper sense of the term. It is true, we may call them determinations or decisions of the mind, or resolutions of the mind, or acts of choice, and the like, but this is only the substitution of other terms, which themselves need explanation ; and, of course, ♦Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., $ 1. 82 VOLITIONS, OR it throws no light upon the subject of inquiry. And hence we are thrown back upon our consciousness, as we are in all cases where the nature of the simple states of mind is the matter of investigation. And whenever we have made this appeal to the internal experience, and have received its testimony, we are then placed in the possession of all that knowledge which the nature of the case seems to admit of. And we must suppose that every one has, in some degree, done this. It is not presumable, at least it is not at all probable, that men who are con- stantly in action, pursuing one course and avoiding an- other, adopting one plan and rejecting another, accepting and refusing, befriending and opposing, all which things, and many others, imply volitive action, are still ignorant of what an act of the Will is.* § 39. Volition never exists without some object. Although we are obliged to depend chiefly upon con- sciousness for a knowledge of the nature of volitions, it is still true that we can make some statements in respect to them which may aid us in forming our opinions. Among other things, it is an obvious remark, that every act of the will must have an object. A very slight reflection on the subject will evince this. It is the same here as in respect to the act of thought, of memory, and of association, all of which imply some object, in reference to which the mental act is called forth. * Note. — It seems desirable, on some accounts, to retain the old English epithet Volitive, in its application to the Will. It is rather more definite than the epithet Voluntary. A volitive act is simply an act of the Will, and nothing more. A voluntary act may mean, accord- ing to the connexion in which it is found, either an act of the Will, or some act which is performed in consequence of an act of the Will. VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 83 " Every act of the will," says Dr. Reid, " must have an object. He that wills must will something ; and that which he wills is called the object of his volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of something, nor re- member without remembering something, so neither can he will without willing something. Every act of will, therefore, must have an object ; and the person who wills must have some conception, more or less distinct, of what he wills."* § 40. It exists only in reference to what we believe to be in our power. Another circumstance may be pointed out in illustration of volitions, viz., that they never exist in respect to those things which we believe to be wholly beyond our reach. As no man believes that it is in his power to fly in the air like a bird, so we never find a person putting forth a volition to do so. As no man believes that he can origi- nate what never had a being before ; in other words, that he can create a new existence out of nothing, so we never find a man determining, resolving, or willing to that effect. Indeed, we are obviously so constituted, that, whenever we believe an object to be wholly and abso- lutely beyond our power, volition does not and cannot exist in respect to it. The farmer, for instance, in a time of severe drought, desires rain, but he does not will it. He is conscious of a desire, but he is not conscious of a volition. The very nature of the mind interposes in such a case, and effectually obstructs the origination of the vol- itive act. And this is so promptly and decisively done, and done too in all cases without exception, that we find * Reid's Essays on the Active Powers., Essay ii., ch. i. 84 VOLITIONS, OR it very difficult even to conceive of anything which we are certain is wholly beyond our power, as being an object of the will's action. There may be a desire in such cases, but there is no volition. And the usage of language will be found to throw light on this distinction, making the term desire applica- ble both to what is within our reach and what is not; and the term volition applicable only to the former. In some cases we speak of willing or determining to do a thing, while in others we invariably limit ourselves to the lSeve expression of a wish or desire. Accordingly, it would comport with and be required by the usage of language, if our thoughts and conversation were directed to those matters, to say, that we determine or will to walk, but desire to fly ; that we will to build a house, but desire to create a world. As has already been intimated, the structure of the mind itself seems to require the appli- cation of terms in this way. While nothing is more com- mon than to speak of determining or willing to sail from New- York, New-Orleans, or some other mercantile place to London, no one is ever heard to speak of willing, but of only desiring or wishing, if such a fancy should enter his mind, to sail from those places to the Peak of Chim- borazo, or to some remote planet. § 41. Volition relates to our own action and to whatever else may be dependent upon us. Although the statements thus far made tend to throw some light upon the nature of the Will's acts, something further remains to be remarked. It does not seem defi- nite enough merely to assert, that volitions relate solely to those things which are in our power, or are believed to be VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 85 so. We may inquire further what is meant by being in our power, and how far the import of the phrase may justly extend itself. — And hence it is necessary to add, that volitions relate, in the first place, to our own action, either some bodily movement or some act of the mind. In saying this, however, we do not mean to say that vo- lition is necessarily limited to the present action. We may will to perform something of the simplest kind, which will exact, in its execution, merely the present moment, or something of a more complicated nature, which will require no inconsiderable time. Any series of actions, intellectual or bodily, capable of being performed by us, which the understanding can embrace as one, and by means of any relations existing among them can consoli- date into one, the will can resolve upon as one. So that the action, dependent upon volition, may be the mere movement of the foot or finger ; or, it may be the contin- uous labours of a day, a week, or a year, or some long and perilous expedition by land or sea. It is just as proper to say that a man wills to take a voyage to Eng- land, as to say that he wills to put one foot before the other in stepping from his door to the street. Volition may exist, in the second place, in respect to anything and everything which is truly dependent upon us, however circuitous and remote that dependence may be. It is proper to say that a merchant has determined or willed to fit a vessel or a number of vessels for sea, and to send them to different parts of the world, although his own direct and personal agency in the thing is hardly known. The effect of his volition, extending far beyond his own direct and personal capabilities, controls the acts of a multitude of individuals who are dependent on him. Previous to the commencement of his celebrated expedi- H 86 VOLITIONS, OR tion into Russia, the Emperor Napoleon undoubtedly brought all the objects relative to the intended expedi- tion distinctly before his understanding ; the number and the kinds of troops, the arms and ammunition with which they were to be furnished, the means of subsistence in the various countries through which they were to pass, and the expenses incident to the arming and support of a body so numerous. The action of the intellect enabled him to assimilate and combine this vast complexity of objects into one. Although numberless in its parts and details, it assumed, as it passed before the rapid glances of his understanding, an identity and oneness, which, for all the purposes of volition and action, constituted it one thing. And, accordingly, it is altogether proper to say, that Napoleon purposed, determined, or willed the expe- dition into Russia, although the agencies requisite to carry it into effect were not lodged directly in himself, but in millions of subordinate instruments, that were more or less remotely dependent upon him. Certain it is, if he had not put forth his volition, the subordinate instrumen- talities, however numerous and powerful in themselves, would never have united in and secured the result in question. " It is not necessary," says a recent writer in remarking upon this very subject, " to consider volition as directing merely our own physical powers. Any power, of which wealth, rank, or character gives us the command, is as truly the instrument of our will as a hand or a foot. The despot, who leads forth his armies of obsequious slaves to overthrow cities and desolate empires, as truly vyills these events as to move a finger or change an attitude."* * Essay on Moral Freedom, by Thomas T. Crybbace, sect. ii. VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 87 § 42. Volitions involve a prospective element. Another mark or characteristic of volitions, by which they are distinguished from some, though not from all states of the mind, is, that they have exclusive relation to the future, to something which is to be done. — A volition is "futuritive" in its very nature ; it involves in itself, and as a part of its own essentiality, a prospective element; it has no capacity of turning its eye backward, but always looks forward. An intellective or perceptive act rests in itself. As soon as it assumes the form of a cognition or knowledge, it accomplishes, so far as its own nature is concerned, the mission for which it was sent. It takes its position, and there it stands ; furnishing an occasion, it is true, for other feelings to exist and to operate, but in itself remaining not only complete, but satisfied and quiescent. But it is not so with a volition, which, from its very nature, cannot rest satisfied with the mere fact of its own existence. If we may be allowed the expressions, it con- tinually reaches forth its hand to grasp objects which have not as yet a being. In other words, it always has in view something which is to take place hereafter ; something which is to be done, the completion of which is, there- fore, necessarily future. This trait is an element of its nature, or, rather, is naturally and necessarily involved in its nature, and may be regarded as one of the character- istics which help to distinguish it from the perceptive and emotive states of the mind at least, if not from others. VOLITIONS, OR § 43. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength. There is one additional characteristic of volitions worthy of some notice, viz., that the volition does not always exist with the same degree of force. Undoubtedly every one must have been conscious, that the exercise of the voluntary power is more prompt and energetic at some times than others. We are aware that it is liable to be objected to this statement, that if we will to do a thing, there can be nothing less than the volition ; and that it is necessarily the same under all circumstances. And it is undoubtedly true, that we never will to do an act with anything less than a volition ; and that, if there be any act of the will at all, it is one truly and fully so. That is to say, the act is in all cases the same, as far as its in- trinsic nature is concerned. And yet we may confidently urge, there is no inconsistency in saying that it may exist with different degrees of force. The existence of a mental state, which is always the same in its nature, in different degrees, is not peculiar to volition. The same trait is characteristic of the mental act in all cases where we yield our assent or belief. The state of mind which we denominate belief is undoubt- edly always the same in its nature, but admitting of vari- ous degrees. We determine these differences of strength in the feeling by means of that same internal conscious- ness which assures us of the existence of the mere feel- ing itself. In other words, we are conscious of, or feel our belief to be sometimes weaker and at other times stronger, which we express by various terms, such as pre- sumption, probability, high probability, and certainty. And by appealing in the same way to our consciousness VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 89 of what takes place within, we shall probably come to the conclusion that we put forth the act of volition with much greater strength at some times than others ; that at some times it is so feeble as hardly to be distinguished from a mere desire or wish, and is scarcely recognised as a volition, while at other times it is exceedingly marked and energetic. § 44. Causes of the variation of the strength of the voluntary exercise. It may tend to throw some light on the nature of the varieties or degrees in the energy of the voluntary act, if we make a remark or two in explanation of the causes of them. We do not, however, intend to say anything here of original or constitutional differences of the volun- tary power. We set that topic aside for the present, be- cause we shall find hereafter a more suitable opportunity, where we can pursue it at length. The degree of strength in the voluntary act, considered independently of any con- stitutional differences which may perhaps exist, will be found to depend on various causes, two of which are particularly worthy of notice. — In the first place, as voli- tions cannot exist except in respect to those things which we believe to be in our power, the strength of the volition will naturally be in proportion to the strength of such be- lief. It has already been seen, that, where there is no belief of an object's being attainable, there can be no voli- tion; and we should, therefore, conclude a priori, that the natural tendency of a diminution of belief would be to operate a correspondent diminution of the voluntary energy. Accordingly, we find it to be generally the fact, that, whenever the possibility of securing any object in H2 90 VOLITIONS, OR view is decidedly doubtful, the voluntary act, imbibing a sort of contagious hesitancy, becomes wavering and weak. We may, accordingly, lay it down as a general truth, that the strength of volitions will depend, in part at least, on the probability of securing the object placed before us. We do not mean to say that there is necessarily no energy of volition where one's path is hedged up with doubts and difficulties, for it is not unfrequently otherwise ; but merely to assert, that the tendency of such doubts and difficulties is, all other things being equal, to infuse into such energy a mixture of vacillancy and lassitude. And hence it is a common artifice, if a man wishes to shake another's resolution, to represent to him the difficulties in the way of his success, and to insist on the improbability of his securing the object before him. And if we notice care- fully, we shall find it to be generally true, although it may not always be the case, that a person's efforts will become enfeebled and less energetic in proportion as he yields credence to such discouraging statements. And a diminution of active efforts, of course, implies a diminu- tion of voluntary power. § 45. Further illustrations of the same subject. (2.) The strength of the volition will depend, further- more, upon the state of the Sensibilities. If, for instance, our desires are strongly directed towards a particular object, and if there be no antagonist feeling arising up to obstruct and counteract them, it may be expected that the volition will be proportionably strong. And if it happen in any given case that these strong desires are approved and aided by the feelings of obligation, the motive to ac- tion will thus be greatly increased, and the force of the VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 91 voluntary determination or resolve will be likely to be in- creased in proportion. And if it be the case that there is not only a concurrence of the Obligatory feelings with the Desires, but that the feelings of obligation as well as the desires are intense and energetic, it may reasonably be anticipated that the energy of the voluntary act will still further be augmented. In regard to the Sensibilities, it is enough briefly to add here, that the degree of their intensity will vary from va- rious circumstances. Those differences of vividness and strength which we notice from time to time, may be owing to some constitutional difference in persons, as we have already, in the preceding chapter, had occasion to see. Sometimes the acuteness and vigour of the sensi- bilities is found to vary also from accidental causes, which cannot be easily explained. And, in particular, they will generally vary, in the intensity of their action, with the amount and character of our knowledge, conforming themselves in a great measure to the precise position, whatever it may be, of the intellect. § 46. Of preference or indifference as applicable to the will. In some treatises on the Will, much is said of the will's being in a state of preference or of indifference. But it is questionable whether the terms preference and indif- ference are properly applicable to the Will at all. The prominent characteristic of the Will is movement, deter- mination, or action, and not feeling. There is no more of feeling, no more of sensibility in the Will than in the Intellect. But every one knows that we do not apply the terms preference and indifference to the intellect ; to VOLITIONS, OR the acts of judgment and reasoning ; to the mere process of comparison and deduction. So far as these acts are purely intellectual, and without any tincture from the sensibilities, they are perfectly cool and unimpassioned. And one is not more so than another ; but all are unim- passioned alike. The emotion, desire, and passion, which are sometimes plausibly ascribed to them, are not to be regarded as, in any case, the components or constituents of the intellectual acts, but merely the attendants. No man says that he has a preference, or that he is indiffer- ent, whether he shall believe the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right ones. This is a matter where both preference and indifference, choice and refusal, are alike inadmissible. He is impelled, by the very con- stitution of his nature, to believe if there is evidence ; and, on the other hand, he is utterly unable to believe if evi- dence is wanting ; and in all cases his belief necessarily corresponds with the evidence, being greater or less in accordance with it. But indifference and preference are equally inapplica- ble to the Will, although it may not be so obvious at first. A careful examination will hardly fail to convince one, that these terms are properly and emphatically applica- ble to the heart or sensibilities; to that portion of our nature which is the appropriate seat of the emotions and ■desires, of the various forms of delight and sorrow, of love and hatred. It would naturally be expected, there- fore, since the Intellect has nothing in its distinctive nature in common with the Will, and neither of them have any- thing in their distinctive nature in common with the Sen- sibilities, if indifference and preference are properly and peculiarly applicable to the Sensibilities, that they would not be properly and strictly applicable to the Will and VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND. 93 the Intellect. It belongs to the Heart to prefer, desire, or love ; or to be indifferent, to be averse from, to contemn, or hate. But the appropriate business of the Will is merely to decide, to determine, to act ; expressions which, together with many others, are applied to the voluntary power, but all with the same import. It ought, perhaps, to be added, that these statements are made in reference to the common and well-understood meaning of the terms in question. If it could be shown that indifference implies merely a negation of action ; in other words, if it merely expresses the fact of not acting in any given emergency, then indeed we might admit that the term is applicable to the Will. But it will proba- bly be conceded that the term is not commonly, although it is sometimes, used to express mere absence or want of action, but rather the absence or want of emotion and desire. And it is in this sense, and not in that of a mere negation of action, that we assert its inapplicability to an exercise of the Will. 94 DISTINCTION BETWEEN CHAPTER V. DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. § 47. Of an objection sometimes made to the general arrangement. In making the general classification of Intellective, Sensitive, and Voluntary states of the mind, it is necessa- rily involved that we separate Volitions, which constitute the third class, from Desires, which are included in and make a part of the second. Of the correctness of this general arrangement, in its great features, we cannot per- mit ourselves to doubt, with the various proofs in its sup- port which present themselves from all sides. But it cannot be denied, that, in one respect, which we now pro- ceed to notice, it has not been perfectly satisfactory. We refer to the objection sometimes made and urged with con- fidence, that, although volitions may clearly be distinguish- ed from intellections and also from emotions, they are not so easily distinguished from that portion of the Sensibili- ties which are denominated the desires. Indeed, by some writers, and writers too of no small note and influ- ence, they have been considered the same as desires ; and their claim to a distinct and independent nature has been wholly rejected. As the general arrangement which has been proposed is a fundamental one, and is absolutely essential and in- dispensable to a true knowledge of the Will, it is proper to attempt, not only to establish it by direct proofs in its favour, but to meet and obviate any objections which may have been made against it, whether those objections relate DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 95 to the arrangement as a whole or to any of its parts. The objection which has been referred to is one of spe- cial importance ; and we shall proceed to bestow that notice upon it which its prominence claims for it. We speak of it as important, because it is undoubtedly true, that much of the obscurity which has rested upon the whole subject of our Voluntary nature has been owing to a mistake here. And obscurity will exist as long as the mistake continues. We may even assert with confidence, that the greatest minds will fail of bringing the important inquiries involved in this discussion to a satisfactory con- clusion, without first fully and correctly settling this point, viz., that the state of mind which we term, volition, is en- tirely distinct from that which we term deske. § 48. Probable cause of desires and volitions being confounded. Before proceeding to propose our comments on the ob- jection before us, we may properly make the remark, that it is, on the whole, not extraordinary, that this tendency to confound Volitions with the Desires should exist. We always find it difficult to separate and discriminate those things which have been long and strongly associated. Now it is well known that volitions and desires are in fact very closely imited together, as antecedences and se- quences. By the very constitution of our minds they go together, and are the sequents and precursors of each other. We do not mean to say or to intimate that the acts of the Will are based upon the desires alone, exclusive of every other possible motive or ground of its exercise. But it is undoubtedly true, that the desires constitute the sole antecedent causes of volition, (by which we mean 96 DISTINCTION BETWEEN the sole grounds or occasions of volition,) in a multitude and perhaps a majority of cases. In the discharge of the common duties of life, in those every-day matters which concern what we shall eat and wdth what w T e shall he clothed, it is undeniable that we generally choose those things and pursue that course of conduct which are most pleasing and which most strongly excite our desires. In other words, our desires and our volitions go together. The one precedes, and the other follows. And, in conse- quence of this regular consecution, which is also for the most part very quick or rapid, (so much so, in fact, as hard- ly to furnish any basis for remembrance,) we gradually fall into the habit of confounding the two together, and at last come to believe that there is, in truth, no difference between them. § 49. The distinction of desires and volitions asserted by consciousness. With the single further remark, that the tendency mentioned in the preceding section, to confound together these two states of mind, ought to be carefully guarded against, we proceed to the consideration of some things, clearly evincing the distinction between them which we maintain to exist. And the inquiry naturally presents it- self here, as in respect to every other mental state, How do we obtain a knowledge of either of them 1 If we con- sult our consciousness, which is an original and authorita- tive source of knowledge, we find it decisively ascribing to the desires a distinct existence, and a distinct and spe- cific character. If we consult it again, we find it return- ing an answer with equal decision and clearness, that volitions too have an existence and a character equally BESIKES AND VOLITIONS. 97 distinct and specific. But if consciousness asserts, in both cases, the reality of an existence stamped with a specific and distinctive character, it does not and cannot, in those same cases, assert a oneness or identity. On the contrary, it must be considered as decisively pronouncing an entire separation of the two things, however nearly they may sometimes approach each other. And it seems proper, when we consider the difficulties that have attended these inquiries, to insist upon this tes- timony from within. It is exceedingly desirable that every one should reflect carefully and patiently upon the nature of Desire and the nature of Volition, as they pre- sent themselves to our internal notice in those various cir- cumstances of enticement, and temptation, and action in which we daily find ourselves placed. Those cases, in particular, deserve notice, which not unfrequently occur where the volitions exist, and where we resolve to carry our plans into effect, in disregard of certain opposing de- sires which have been overruled and baffled. Has not every man had this experience 1 When under the influ- ence of high moral sentiments, has he not sometimes de- termined to pursue a course to the disappointment of many fond wishes, of many lingering and cherished de- sires 1 Now let him recall the mental feelings and acts at such times ; let him carefully reflect upon them, and will not consciousness not only clearly indicate a distinction, but even assert the impossibility of an identity in the case under consideration 1 We cannot entertain a doubt that it will. I 98 DISTINCTION BETWEEN § 50 Desires differ from volitions in fixedness and permanency. There is one particular, on which our consciousness gives its testimony, which it is thought may be easily and clearly pointed out. Every one must have felt that our desires possess a considerable degree of fixedness or per- manency ; and that they are distinguished and separated from volitions by this trait. We are able to change our volitions with great rapidity ; if we may so express it, in the twinkling of an eye. We may alter them a thousand times a day. We find them exhibiting within their allot- ted sphere of operation an astonishing quickness, flexibil- ity, and variety in their movements. We make this as a general statement, without pretending that there are no exceptions. But, while this is obviously true of the volitions, there does not appear to be the same flexibility, the same facil- ity of movement in our desires. We may, indeed, change them after a time, and ultimately secure a greater or less degree of conformity to what we conceive they ought to be. But they are so slow in movement, so heavy and re- fractory in the mutations they undergo, that they remind us rather of a burden to be borne than of a living and self-operating principle. We believe that this statement will be easily and clearly understood. Can the man who is in prison suppress in a moment and without an effort his desires to see his belov- ed family ? Can he who is an exile and a wanderer in a distant land easily cease to remember, and to long for the woods, and the green fields, and the mountain airs of his childhood ? Every one must know, when a desire is DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 99 once deeply implanted in the heart, how long it lingers, how hard it is to be overcome. But a fixedness of the desires in a particular direction does not necessarily imply a fixedness of the volition in the same direction. The will may be active when certain desires are immovable, because there may be other objects of desire laying the foundation of its various decisions, or there may be ob- jects of a moral nature presenting a still higher and no- bler motive. When the heart is sick, and heavy, and burdened, the purpose and high resolve may be elastic and full of energy. We feel at liberty, therefore, to as- sert, as a general statement, that we are not conscious of that immovableness of the voluntary power, and that want of elasticity which often attend the desires. But these statements, which, we presume to say, are founded on the common experience, cannot be true if desires and volitions are identical. §51. Further proof of this distinction from language. May it not also be said with a good degree of confi- dence, that, in the use of language, we have a further proof of the distinction between Desire and Volition ? It is certainly the fact, that men commonly speak, both in their ordinary conversation and in writing, in such a man- ner as to imply their conviction of a distinction between mere desires or wishes on the one hand, and purposes, re- solves, or determinations on the other. As this distinc- tion, so easily and frequently observed, may be found prevalent, not in one only, but in all languages, it may well be regarded as a strong evidence of the universal consciousness on the subject. This fact has been noticed, and set in a strong light by Dr. Reid. — " Desire and Will 100 DISTINCTION BETWEEN agree in this, that both must have an object of which we must have some conception ; and, therefore, both must be accompanied with some degree of understanding. But they differ in several things. The object of desire may be anything which appetite, passion, or affection leads us to pursue ; it may be any event which we think good for us, or for those to whom we are well affected. I may desire meat, or drink, or ease from pain ; but to say that I will meat, or will drink, or will ease from pain, is not English. There is, therefore, a distinction in common language between desire and will." § 52. Sentiments of esteem and honour often imply this distinction. It will farther be seen, on a little reflection, that the distinction under consideration is implied in the sentiments of esteem and honour which, on various occasions, we en- tertain in respect to others. It seems to be the fact, that we often bestow esteem and honour on a person, because he has resisted and withstood the obvious tendency of his own inclinations or desires. We will take a very com- mon instance, that of the confirmed drunkard. The wine sparkles before him ; his tongue and throat are parched, and the strongest desires arise. But conscience at the same time urges upon him the claims of his family, his country, and his God. After enduring this inward con- flict for a season, he resolves, he wills, he acts, and dashes the alluring bowl to the ground. Every one rejoices at, and honours the deed. But it cannot be because the desire has been gratified, but because the person has will- ed and acted against desire; because, in the opposing array and contest of the powers of his inferior nature, de- DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 101 sire has been beaten, and the sense of obligation and duty has triumphed by the award of the only possible umpire, viz., the Will. We evidently make a distinction, in all such cases, between the cravings of a man's appetite, which necessarily involve desire, and the act of volition, by which the tendency of such desire is counteracted. This illustration reminds us of an additional statement of Dr. Reid on this subject. — " With regard to our actions," he remarks, " we may desire what we do not will, and will what we do not desire ; nay, what we have a great aversion to. A man athirst has a strong desire to drink, but, for some particular reason, he determines not to grat- ify his desire. A judge, from regard to justice and the duty of his office, dooms a criminal to die, while from humanity or particular affection, he desires that he should live. A man for health may take a nauseous draught, for which he has no desire, but a great aversion. Desire, therefore, even when its object is some action of our own, is only an excitement to the will, but is not volition. The determination of the mind may be not to do what we desire to."* § 53. Of some strictures on the foregoing remarks of Reid. We are not ignorant that this very passage of Dr. Reid has called forth some strictures, the object of which is to show, that its statements are in some respects defect- ive. It has been contended, that, in the instances above adduced by Dr. Reid, the volition has reference to the muscular motion, and to that alone. In respect to the judge who pronounces the doom of his prisoner, it is * Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Essay ii., chap. i. 12 102 DISTINCTION BETWEEN maintained by the objector that the judicial announce- ment is the result of volition, so far and so far only as volition puts certain muscles in motion ; and that all such acts of volition are identical in their nature with desires. And a like view is maintained to hold good of all similar cases, viz., that no volition exists except in respect to the muscular action which immediately follows, and that such volition is not different from desire. Upon view's of this kind we have two remarks to make. In the first place, if we were to admit the correctness of limiting the application of volition to the production of mere muscular motion, still it w r ould not follow that volition and desire are identical. But, on the contrary, in regard to muscular motion, as in all other cases, w r e may confidently assert, that they are entirely distinct from each other, although we are ready to admit, as a general thing, that they do not stand in opposition. It is undoubtedly true, that we are sometimes liable to confound with the desires those volitions, which have no higher office than the mere regulation of the muscles, in consequence of their generally being in the same direction, and the voli- tion being in immediate succession to the desire, and both existing perhaps in a very slight degree. Still we may safely appeal to every one's consciousness, whenever he bestows a suitable examination on the subject, whether he is not able, even in very slight instances of muscular movement, to draw a distinction between the desire and the volition. The desire to move the muscles of the foot, or hand, or throat, may have existed for minutes or hours ; but, till the volition came, there was no motion ; nor had the desire the least possible tendency to secure the motion, except through the medium of volition. A man goes from his house to his counting-room \ and it is readily ad- DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 103 mitted that he puts forth various acts of volition, that he mills to arise from his chair, that he wills to open the door of his house, to set one foot before another, and that all his muscular movements are preceded by volitions. And we may admit also that he had a desire to put forth these successive acts ; but it does not at all follow, that the volitions were identical with the desires, any more than that they were identical with the various sensations and perceptions which existed at the same time. On the contrary, in all instances whatever, the distinction between the two exists, although it may be less obvious at some times than others. The desire (the same as in other analogous cases of a higher kind) is merely the forerun- ner and preparative of whatever is to be done ; the dis- tinct act of volition is necessary to the execution of it. § 54. Voliti&n may exist in respect to those complex acts which the mind can embrace as one. But we remark, in the second place, as we had occa- sion to show in the preceding chapter, that there may be volition in respect to combined action and plans of action, as well as in respect to single acts. He, who supposes that volition is exercised solely and exclusively in refer- ence to the motion of the muscles, must have a very in- adequate notion of the sphere in which this part of the mind is called to operate. This view will seem the more admissible when we consider that we have it in our power to give a mental unity to actions, which, as they are successively brought to their fulfilment, are many, and are distinct from each other. It is presumed that the ex- istence of this ability will not be denied. Dr. Brown himself, in whose writings the strictures on the views of 104 DISTINCTION BETWEEN Dr. Reid are found, acknowledges that we can give a unity in our conception to things w r hich are complex. " In considering," he remarks, " the physical changes which come under our view, it is impossible for us, in many cases, not to give a sort of unity, in our conception, to phenomena which are in their nature complex. We consider them as in some measure one ; because, however complex they may truly be, they exhibit to us one great general character."* And we may add, that we are ca- pable of giving a unity to moral objects of whatever land, as well as to physical, if there be any possible rela- tion of time, or place, or resemblance, or effect, or cause, which the mind can detect and employ as a ligament for this purpose. We repeat, that this capability of combi- ning, by a mere mental act, many into one, of converting multiplicity into unity, is not less true of intellectual and moral objects and facts than of physical ; and in many cases both are included. A man, for instance, contemplates going a journey; he examines all the circumstances which may have a bear- ing on his proposed expedition ; and combines, by the various operations of the intellect, the whole into one view. This complex object is addressed, not in its parts, but as a whole, to the sensibilities. It excites the various forms of desire, and the feelings of obligation ; and these are followed by volition. In all cases of this kind the mind is capable of acting, and, in point of fact, it general- ly does act, in reference to the whole object. The voli- tion may be in accordance with the desire or not ; it may be in accordance with the moral feelings, and wholly at variance with the desires ; but in both alike the desires and volitions are distinct. And these views hold good * Relation of Cause and Effect, part i., § 3, pt. ii., § 3. DESIKES AND VOLITIONS. 105 not only in the case just now remarked upon, of the man who dashes from him the intoxicating bowl, but of the judge who is called, in the discharge of his duties, to pass sentence of death on an accused person. He un- doubtedly takes into view the action in its whole extent, in all its results. As it exists in the view of his intellect, it is one action, though made up of various subordinate parts ; and the question, placed distinctly before him and subject to his own dispensation, is one of life and death. And we may assert with confidence, the true state of his mind in ordinary cases is, that he desires the accused per- son to live, but wills him to die ; and that the desire and volition are not only distinct from each other, but are op- posed to each other. The fact is, there are two conflict- ing principles within him, the desires on the one hand, and the feelings of moral obligation on the other. These both are in immediate contact with the will ; that is to say, have a direct influence upon it. In acting in con- formity with the moral motive, he acts against the desire ; and an act which is against desire, whether that action be mental or bodily, cannot with any propriety of terms be said to be identical with it. § 55. If the distinction in question do not exist, the found- ation of morals becomes unsettled. There is another and important point of view in which this subject may be considered. — It is presumed that the reader will be disposed to admit the existence and the great practical utility of that department of our nature, which we variously denominate either the moral sense or the conscience. But if conscience is of any value, it is because the feelings of obligation resulting from it furnish 106 DISTINCTION BETWEEN a motive to volition, and become, at times, its antecedent and necessary, or, rather, its prerequisite condition ; and because the motive thus furnished is different from that presented by the appetites, propensities, and passions. But if volition is always and invariably identical with some form of desire, then it is obvious that conscience is exclu- ded, and that nothing can be more unmeaning, and use- less, and delusory than the apparatus of moral emotions and of feelings of obligation, which so evidently exists. They furnish, on that supposition, a mere show of author- ity, without any actual good results. So that we have great reason to assert, that the doctrine, which makes vo- lition always and necessarily identical with the highest desire, tends to annihilate our moral nature. If we are not erroneous in our construction of it, it places man, in a moral point of view, on the same footing with brute ani- mals. "We never condemn a brute that yields to its desires as guilty of a crime. And why not 1 Because it has no conscience, no moral sense ; and, of course, there is no basis of its actions except in its desires ; and therefore, in acting in accordance with its desires, it acts in con- formity with its nature, and fulfils the destiny allotted it. But certainly it is not so with man, however it may be with the lower animals. Man has within him not only desires, but feelings of moral obligation ; he appreciates not only what is good, but what is right ; and if ever, in any assignable case, he wills and acts in accordance with his moral feelings, and in opposition to his desires, then his volitions and desires are not the same. DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 107 § 56. Instances in illustration of the distinction in question. We think we might bring many instances of a practi- cal kind to illustrate the distinction under consideration, and which not only illustrate, but tend to prove its exist- ence. The parental relation will furnish to those, at least, who have experienced the strength of affection incident to it, an illustration of the matter before us. The tenderly beloved child commits some fault or crime, under such circumstances as to render him inexcusable, and the father punishes him. Every father knows that the infliction of punishment in such cases is attended with a war in his own bosom ; the strong feeling of obligation, which an enlightened conscience has laid the foundation of, draw- ing him one way, and the yearnings of parental affection enticing him another ; and it does not appear that any- thing can still this commotion, and secure the supremacy of his moral nature, but the energetic and authoritative effort of the will. Let us apply these views to the case of the patriarch Abraham, when he was called, in the administration of the Divine Providence, to offer up his son Isaac amid the forests of Mount Moriah. Will any one presume to say that, when the aged father stood with his knife extended over the bared bosom of his only son, there was no con- test within him, no earnest and almost overpowering long- ing for his rescue ? Did not his affection kindle with tenfold ardour when his beloved boy asked him, with the simplicity of untaught and confiding childhood, Where is the lamb for the burnt offering 1 While desire for the child's safety existed at the highest point of intensity, there were other high and sacred principles of action ; 108 DISTINCTION BETWEEN and, in view of them, the power of volition, collecting all its strength, smote through the tumultuous torrents of affection, as the rod of Moses divided the troubled waters of the sea. § 57. Other instances in illustration of proof. Such instances abound in all periods of history, profane as well as sacred; and particularly in Roman history. The reader of Roman history will recollect, that when the sons of Lucius Junius Brutus conspired against the Roman republic, and the conspiracy was discovered, they were condemned to die. It became the duty of the fa- ther, who was at that time at the head of the Common- wealth, to see the punishment enforced. Can any one doubt that there was a strife, a contest, in the soul of the patriotic Roman? The historian informs us that this struggle was visible in his countenance, {eminente animo patrio inter pvblicce pcence ministerium,) as he stood at the dreadful scene of the execution. But if desire and volition are the same thing, where was the foundation for such inward contest 1 If the desire was coincident with the volition ; if the latter was lost and absorbed in the former; and if his conscience approved of the transac- tion as it did, then there must necessarily have been a calm within and without ; there could not possibly have been an agitation, dissidence, and rending asunder of the interior nature. There is another instance in Roman history not less af- fecting than this. During the fatal period of the Roman decemvirship, certain transactions took place, which, while they agitated the whole city of Rome with sentiments of grief and indignation, infused the deepest horror and de- DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 109 spair into the heart of a worthy father. His affections were bound up in a beloved daughter, who was insidious- ly assailed by one of the most powerful magistrates, in a manner which left no hope of deliverance. In this situa- tion, seeing his daughter exposed to unavoidable and un- speakable infamy, he seized the knife of a butcher, and plunged it into her bosom. And is it possible for us to say, with any propriety of language, that Virginius desired the death of his daughter 1 The whole history of the trans- action shows that he doted upon her with all the depth and sacredness of parental love. The assertion, therefore, is incredible. He could not have desired it; human nature spurns the thought as an impossibility ; and yet he too fatally willed it. He considered her life as but dust in the balance in comparison with the loathsome degrada- tion which was so cruelly threatened by one whom he had no power to resist ; and in putting her to death, not from desire, but from the sentiment of duty, he willed and executed what at the same time he lamented and ab- horred as in itself a most terrible and overwhelming calamity. § 58. Proofs drawn from some facts in the constitution of the mind. At this point in the argument we proceed to remark, that there is one interesting psychological or mental fact, which has probably never been brought into the discussion, but which seems to us decisive of the point at issue. We refer to the fact that, whenever the object of a morally obligative feeling on the one hand, or of a desire on the other, is secured, there is always, by the very constitution of our nature, an attendant emotion of pleasure j in other K 110 DISTINCTION BETWEEN words, an internal realization of happiness. When in any given case one of these impulsive mental elements, viz., desires and obligative sentiments, is gratified, and the other is not gratified, it is true, that the accompanying sense of pain on the disappointed part may counterbal- ance, and more than counterbalance, the attendant pleas- ure on the other. So much so, that we may not always have a distinct perception of the pleasure. Nevertheless, the great psychological fact, which is involved in the very constitution of our nature, will be found, on examination, to remain sure. Now let us apply this view to some of the cases which have been introduced, to the judge who has sentenced a prisoner to death ; to Abraham when he was about to offer up Isaac ; to Brutus when he presided at the execution of his children ; to Virginius when he plunged the dagger into his daughter's bosom, and any other similar instances. We are to notice, in the first place, that the moral sen- timent or conscience approved what they did. So far all was right ; and they undoubtedly had the satisfaction which always and necessarily attends the doing of a conscientious action. Now if you make desire and voli- tion the same thing, it will follow that they not only did what they felt they ought to do, but that they did also what they desired to do. The desirive feeling, as well as the moral or obligative feeling, was gratified. Consequently, you must add to the degree of happi- ness already existing that additional degree of happiness which naturally arises from the gratification of desires. Not only this ; every source of sorrow (for obviously there can be no sorrow where the doing of right coin- cides with our desires) must have been shut up, so far as these particular transactions were concerned, and entirely DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. Ill excluded. These persons, therefore, instead of beino- bowed down with grief, and the objects of the deepest compassion, must have been not only entirely calm, but happy in the very highest degree. To have inflicted a dagger upon a beloved child must have been, under these circumstances, a sort of holyday amusement. No tear could have started from their eyes, no shade of sorrow could have dimmed their brows ; but, on the contrary, they must have been as happy as virtue, combined with the fulfilment of their own desires, could have made them. But it is unnecessary to say, that this view is wholly at variance with the facts. And this is not all. Human na- ture itself revolts at the mere statement. And we do not hesitate to assert, in view of the facts which have been given and others like them, that the philosophy which makes desire and volition identical, never has explained and never can explan the exhibitions which human na- ture constantly presents. § 59. Of the chastisements of the Supreme Being inflicted on those he loves. There is one consideration more. — May we not draw light down upon this subject from an observation of the course which our adorable Creator takes in his dealings with his creatures'? Throughout the Holy Scriptures we find expressions which indicate the strongest love towards them, when, at the same time, he is compelled to inflict his chastisements. The Old Testament is full of expressions of kindness and tenderness towards his an- cient people. "He nourished and brought them up as children ;" " he led them about, instructed them, and kept them as the apple of his eye." In their rebellions 112 DISTINCTION BETWEEN he calls after them with unspeakable affection. " How shall I give thee up, Ephraim 1 How shall I deliver thee, Israel 1 How shall I make thee as Admah 1 How shall I set thee as Zeboim ? Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together !" But, although he loved them with all the intensity of a father's affection, still the eternal principles of his nature compelled him to exercise his benevolence in subordination to the senti- ments of justice. When his people rebelled, and did not listen to his warnings, he gave them over to dreadful punishments. He poured upon Israel the fury of his anger, the strength of battle, and set him on fire round about. But, although he willed the wasting, and desolation, and sufferings of his people, (for he says, " who gave Jacob for a spoil, and Israel to the robbers ? Did not the Lord ?") we do not feel at liberty to say that he desired it, for everything in the Old Testament shows that it greatly grieved him. And who does not recollect the affecting language of the Saviour, uttered over the Holy City 1 " Oh Jerusa- lem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee !" And yet soon afterward the sign of the Son of man appeared in heaven : the sun and the moon were darkened ; the earth mourned ; there was famine, pestilence, and earthquake ; of the beloved and beautiful Temple not one stone was left upon another ; and all Jerusalem, that delight of the whole earth, was bathed in blood and wrapped in fire. — Not because the Saviour had ceased to love it, and to desire its good, but because the measure of its iniquity was full, and the dic- tates of eternal justice compelled him to ivill and to in- flict a punishment which a being so infinitely benevolent could never have desired to see. — And does he not, at DESIRES AJSfD VOLITIONS. 113 this moment, truly desire the return and salvation of every sinner ? Does he not earnestly entreat them 1 And when he shall inflict on these same sinners unutterable chastise- ments on account of their obduracy, will it be because he ceases to love, or because immutable justice requires it ? On this subject we cannot refrain from adding, in un- feigned sincerity, that sound philosophy requires the Bible to be understood as it stands, in its obvious import, and as it would be interpreted by an unlettered reader. In the great outlines of his mental constitution, it is strictly and emphatically true, as Scripture informs us, that man is formed in the image of his Maker. And it is as true of God as of man, that there are elements in his nature which lead him to determine or will that which He does not desire. It neither is nor can be true of God, that He ever desires the infliction of punishment, though the obdu- racy of transgressors often leads him to will it. To desire the infliction of misery in any way whatever, in the strict and original sense of the word desire, is the characteristic of an evil, and not of a good being. It is the height of impiety to attempt to pervert the often repeated and ear- nest expressions of the Supreme Being on this subject " As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his ways and live." § 60. Objected that these views lead to contradictions. If it were deemed of consequence enough, we might stop here to consider some objections, chiefly of a verbal kind, of which it will, perhaps, answer all purpose to no- tice one that may serve as a specimen of others. It being assumed that every act of desire implies a preference or K2 114 DISTINCTION BETWEEN choice, and it being further said, in way of definition, that volition is the act of choosing, we are then confront- ed with the obvious contradiction, that, if the volition is ever actually opposed to the desire, we choose what we do not choose, &c. This objection, perhaps a plausible one in the minds of some, wtII be found, on examination, to resolve itself into a verbal fallacy, and naturally van- ishes as soon as that fallacy is detected. It is w T ell known that, owing to the imperfection of language, we not unfrequently apply the same term to things which, both in their nature and relations, are dif- ferent from each other. Now it is undoubtedly true that the common usage of language authorizes us to apply the terms choice and choosing indiscriminately to either the desire or the volition ; but it does not follow, and is not true, that we apply them to these different parts of our nature in precisely the same sense. We sometimes use the word choice when it obviously implies and expresses desire ; and the desire in this case differs from desire in other cases, not in its nature, but only in the circumstance that it is a desire which predominates over other desires existing in reference to other conflicting objects brought before the mind at the same time. That is to say, when the word choice implies desire at all, it has reference to a number of desirable objects brought before the mind at once, and implies and expresses the ascendant or pre- dominant desire. It is that particular desire, in distinc- tion from others, which we denominate our choice. At other times we use the term choice or choosing in application to the will ; but, when we do so use it, we are to regard it as modified by the nature of the subject to which it is applied. The choice of the will is the same as the decision of the will j and the decision of the will DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. 115 is the same as the act of the will. The word in question, then, when it is applied to that power, expresses the mere act of the will, and nothing more, with the exception, as in the other case, that more than one object of volition was present in the view of the mind before the putting forth of the voluntary act. In fact, it is the circumstance that two or more objects are present which suggests the use of the word choice or choosing in both cases ; but we are not at all to suppose that the use of the word implies or involves a change in the nature, but only in the condi- tion or circumstances of the mental act. The acts are entirely different in their nature, although, under certain circumstances, the same name is applied to them. When they are both called choice or acts of choice, they are indeed verbally, but not really, identical. If these views are correct, (and we believe they be,) then the contradic- tion spoken of, whenever it takes place, is not a real, but merely a verbal one. If we ever choose against choosing, it will be found to be merely that choice which is volition, placed in opposition to that choice which is desire; a state of things which, as we have already seen, not un- frequently exists, and in which there is no incompatibility. § 61. Opinions of Mr. Locke and others on this subject. "We shall close this chapter with remarking, that the distinction in question is more or less clearly recognised and sustained by a considerable number of writers, whose opinions, as they were given on mature deliberation, are entitled to great weight, particularly Mackintosh, Reid, Good, Stewart, and Bockshammer among others. At an earlier period Mr. Locke also took the same ground in the following passage, which we commend to the consid- 116 DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. eration of the reader. — " I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other ; and that by men who would not will- ingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have written very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inward upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is con- versant about nothing but that particular determination of the mind whereby, barely by a thought, the mind en- deavours to give rise, continuation, or stop to any action which it takes to be in its power. This, well considered, plainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire, which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon."* Mr. Stewart, as has already been intimated, takes similar views. Such is the characteristic and almost extreme caution of this distinguished writer, that any opinion which he deliberately hazards is entitled to great consid- eration. Upon the subject now under discussion, he has the following remark : " There is a state of mind, per- fectly distinct both from the power and the act of willing, with which they have been frequently confounded, and of which it may, therefore, be proper to mention the char- acteristical marks. The state I refer to is properly called desire." * Essay concerning Human Understanding, book ii., ch. xxL PART II. LAWS OF THE WILL. CHAPTER I. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF LAW, § 62. The preceding chapters preparatory to what follows. The remarks that have been made in the First Part of this Work relate to the General Nature of the Will. It seemed important to take this general view. It was ob- viously necessary, before entering into the examination of the long-contested topics that are to follow, to review and settle the subject, although at the expense of repeating some things said in another place, of the great outlines of the mind in its departments of the intellective, sensitive, and volitive. It seemed especially necessary, when we consider the mistakes that have prevailed upon that point, to assert and maintain the distinction existing between Desire and Volition. Nor was it enough to inquire into those things which distinguish the Will from the other great mental departments. It seemed to be requisite also to indicate briefly some particulars which are especially characteristic of it, and which contribute to constitute its essential and distinctive nature. In looking back upon what has been brought forward, we indulge the hope, perhaps, however, without sufficient foundation, that some doubts have been cleared up, and some principles satis- factorily established. The remarks thus necessarily made may indeed appear to have been protracted to an inor- dinate length ; and we can only say in reply, if such is thought to be the case, that they were rendered as concise 120 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE as seemed consistent with any adequate notice of the nu- merous topics that have come under review. And it seems to come in place to add here, that in everything which has been said there has been an object. Every part of this Treatise will be found to be more or less connected with other parts ; and, perhaps, more close- ly than would at first seem probable. And accordingly, the doctrines and principles which have been brought for- ward, and more or less elucidated and established, are introductory to three distinct series of views of great in- terest in themselves, as well as of great practical impor- tance, having relation respectively to the Laws, the Free- dom, and the Power of the Will. These leading topics will be successively considered. § 63. Of the importance of the topics now entered upon. In examining the matters of inquiry which are to fol- low, particularly the Laws and the Freedom of the will, we presume to say that we have a claim on the strict and candid attention of the reader. While few questions pre- sent themselves to one's notice of greater interest than these, a regard to historical truth requires it to be added, that on few has there been a greater difference of opinion. These inquiries, moreover, which lie so closely at the root of human accountability, are as important as they are in- teresting, not only in a speculative point of view, and as presenting complicated and difficult problems for solution, but also on account of their practical results. If a man, for instance, adopts the opinion that there is no such thing as freedom of the will, and that men are the subjects of an irresistible fatality, it will generally follow that his practice will be correspondent to such a belief. Placing UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 121 an erroneous interpretation on the words of Solomon, that " time and chance happen to all men," such persons throw themselves upon the wave of their destiny, and are floated onward with an utter disregard of the issue, wheth- er it be good or evil, shameful or glorious. No matter what takes place, say they ; it is all from a higher power ; and it would be wholly ineffectual and presumptuous in mere insects to prescribe plans for the Deity. The great- est circumspection, the most arduous labours, the most invincible determination, will effect nothing against the allotted and predestined course of events. Philosophers may speculate, and political cabinets may lay their plans ; but, after all, the fate of Europe may depend, as it has once depended, upon a dispute about a pair of gloves, or some other trivial circumstance which happens to form a link in the unalterable chain of destiny.* On the other hand, if a person fully believes that all things are in his own power, in the sense of excluding a wise and efficient superintendency, it leads to a presump- tuous self-confidence altogether unsuitable and dangerous. Puffed up with an unwarrantable self-conceit, he does not feel the need of asking aid from on high ; he does not conform his conduct to the indications of Divine Prov- idence ; but lays his plans, and attempts their execution, wholly in his own strength. These respective systems, when adopted to the exclu- sion of other views which might control and modify them, may justly be pronounced false and dangerous ; as incon- sistent with sound philosophy as they are with private duty and the general good ; although it is undoubtedly true, that in all ages of the world they have been made the governing principle of multitudes. We are authorized, * See the Prince of Machiavel, ch. xxv., and Examen du Prince. L 122 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE therefore, in saying, that the particular subjects on which we now propose to enter are very important, in a practical point of view. It will be our desire to examine them with that care and candour which their practical impor- tance demands ; and, wnthout any undue expression of confidence, we would indulge the hope of placing them in a light at once consistent with the claims of God and the responsibilities of man. i § 64. The inquiry, whether the will has its laws prelim- inary to that of its freedom. In order to approximate the true notion of the Freedom of the will, an inquiry which will receive particular atten- tion in its place, it seems proper to attempt the settlement of a preliminary question, viz., whether the will is subject to laws. If it be true, as we shall introduce some consid- erations to show, that the Will has its laws, then the free- dom of the Will, whatever may be its nature, must ac- commodate itself to this preliminary fact. We will assume here that the W T ill is free ; we have no disposition to dis- pute the correctness of that view ; undoubtedly its free- dom is susceptible of ample demonstration ; but if there be other mental facts equally demonstrable, then it follows that the freedom of the Will must exist in accommodation to such other facts, and can be such a freedom, and such only, as is consistent with them. This, it would seem, is a very obvious view ; and hence it is exceedingly impor- tant that this point should be settled first. It will, accord- ingly, now be our object to propose certain considerations to show that the wrLL has its laws. UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 123 §65. Everything throughout nature has its laws. In entering upon the question whether the Will has its laws, may w r e not reason, in the first place, from the gen- eral analogy of nature 1 If the universe is everywhere legibly inscribed and written over with the great truth, that all things are subject to law, are we not furnished with a strong presumption that we shall not discover an exception in any part of man's mental nature? As to the alleged fact on w T hich we base this presumption, there can be no doubt of it. — Let us look, in the first place, at material things. The parts of the earth are kept in their relative position by the operation of some fixed law ; the various immense bodies, composing the system to which the earth belongs, are made to revolve in obedience to some unalterable principle ; there is not even a plant, or a stone, or a falling leaf, or a grain of sand, which can claim an exemption from regulation and control. And what is true in these few instances, is true in all. No certain and undoubted exception can be found. And this great truth holds good also of things which have life and intelligence. Objects of a spiritual or mental nature (if not in precisely the same sense in which the assertion is applicable to matter, yet in some true and important meaning of the expressions) have their appropriate and determinate principles of being and action. There may, indeed, be some things which are as yet unexplainable by man ; there may be some objects of knowledge, to the full understanding of whose nature limited human reason cannot as yet reach ; but still the vast majority of objects, coming within the ordinary range 124 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE of our inspection, obviously tend to found and to foster the general conviction, that there are laws wherever there are existences, whatever the kind or nature of the exist- ence. — There is, therefore, undoubted truth in the remark of Montesquieu, with which he introduces his great work on the Spirit of Laws, where he says, after some sugges- tions on the meaning of the term, " all beings have their laws, the Deity his law r s, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws." § 66. Reference to remarks of Cicero on the universality of law. The mention of Montesquieu, a name equally dear to literature and to liberty, naturally suggests the recollec- tion of some men of a kindred genius. The idea of the universality of law has ever been familiar to minds that were particularly distinguished for expansiveness of thought and for philosophical sagacity. They seem to have seized upon this great truth intuitively ; not by the slow deductions of reasoning, but by a sort of instinct of intellect. The illustrious orator of Rome, among others, asserts the existence of a law which has its foundation in nature, and which is universal, uniform, and eternal. He declares God to be the author of it ; and adds, that no man can exempt himself from its control without fleeing from himself, and without putting off and alienating his own nature. It is of this law and in connexion with these statements that he employs those celebrated express sions, " nee erit alia lex Roma?, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit, unusque erit commu- UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. L25 nis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus."* No person who examines the whole of this remarkable pas- sage with care, will fail to perceive, that its author had in his conceptions the idea of a great central Power, pos- sessed of perfect wisdom and justice, from whom emanates a paramount and controlling influence, which is binding upon nations as well as individuals, which extends to all parts of his dominions, making one of many, and har- monizing them all by requiring them to act in subjection to himself. § 67. Reference to remarks of Hooker on the universality of law. We cannot forbear introducing here, as in accordance with the sentiments of this chapter, the memorable ex- pressions of Hooker, although at the risk of repeating what may already be familiar to the reader. " Of law, no less can be said than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world ; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feel- ing her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different spheres and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."f We cannot agree with those, if such there are, who may be disposed to set down this sublime passage as a species of rhetorical exaggeration, an instance of well-se- lected and sounding language, rather than of well-adjust- ed thought ; but would rather regard it as the expression * Cicero, De Republica, lib. iii. t Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, book L L2 126 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE of a reality, uttered on the most sober consideration ; a reality perhaps not perfectly visible and obvious to minds of very limited expansion, but of which undoubtedly the learned and eloquent writer had a clear and impressive perception. The train of thought which pervades the passage is obviously identical with that of Cicero. It involves and indicates the sublime truth, that law, the great bond of the Universe, finds its origin and support in the bosom of the Deity, and is, in its basis or elements, co-substantial with his nature ; and going forth from that primitive and prolific centre in every possible direction, like rays from the sun, embraces, harmonizes, and con- trols every form and modification of being, whether intel- ligent or unintelligent. And how full of grandeur and of consolation is the thought ! If we could suppose that even a single unintelligent atom had broken loose from the infinite ramifications of the great principle of unity, which is only another name for that law which binds one existence to another, and both to a third, and all to the great central and superintendent Power, it would not fail to fill us with misgivings and anguish. The doctrine of the universality of law, which is the same as the univer- sality of power under the guidance of fixed principles, recommends itself to the heart as well as the understand- ing, and dispenses happiness while it controls conviction. Is any one prepared to say that he is not rendered happy in the recollection that God is around us and in us ? Is it not a source of consolation, that his paternal eye rests for ever upon our path ; that he knoweth our lying down and rising up, our going out and coming in 1 And that, while he superintends the minutest actions and events per- taining to ourselves, He extends abroad, arnid the num- UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 127 berless varieties of existence, the watchfulness of his per- vading control, " And fills, and bounds, connects and equals all 1" § 68. The universality of law implied in the belief of a Divine existence. The idea of a God necessarily embraces and implies the notion of the universality of law. Many of those nations, that have not been favoured with the light of Revelation, have maintained the doctrine of a Supreme Power. The human mind is so constituted, and is loca- ted under such a variety of influences favourable to such a result, that the idea of a God, though sometimes wholly obstructed by peculiarly untoward circumstances, natural- ly developes itself with a greater or less degree of strength. The most savage nations, if it be too true that they are apt to forget Him in their prosperity, seek to propitiate Him in the day of sorrow. They generally have a con- viction, indistinct indeed, but not the less real, that a Deity is present ; that there is some possible mode of com- munication between Him and men ; that the virtuous are the objects of his favour, and the vicious of his displeas- ure; "pro se quisque, Deos tandem esse, et non negligere humana, fremunt"* But with him who enjoys the com- munications of the Divine Word, the conjectures, which are furnished by the light of nature, are exchanged for a cheering certainty which can never be shaken. This high and inscrutable Being made all things ; he not only framed the world and all things therein, and ordained the moon and the stars, but he also holds in his hands the hearts of the children of men, and turns them whitherso- * Livy, lib. iii., cap. Ivi. 128 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE ever he will. He is not only unlimited in power, but whol- ly unrestricted and boundless in knowledge, and supreme in the administration of his government. To deny either the one or the other, either his omniscience, or his almightiness, or the supremacy of his administration, would be nothing less than to dethrone Him from his place in the universe, and virtually to deny his existence as Deity. As has been remarked, the idea of a God, possessed of such transcendent attributes, (an idea which is not only pro- posed and fostered by Revelation, but is the natural and necessary product of the human mind, except in those few cases where it is repressed and annulled by peculiar circumstances,) necessarily embraces and implies the notion of the universality of law. The doctrine that there is anything whatever which is truly and entirely exempt from every species of oversight and control, is altogether inconsistent with the recognition of the existence of a Supreme Being. If there is a God, there is a universal law. Can that power properly be called omnipotent, within the sphere of whose operations there are objects which are entirely exempt from its su- pervision and control? Can that wisdom properly be called omniscient, which knows not what will be the de- terminations and acts of men in all assignable circumstan- ces, in all time and place 1 Can that government be, with any propriety of language, denominated a Supreme gov- ernment, within whose limits there are agents who are not reached and bound by any of those ties, even the feeblest of them, which operate to unite the circumference to the centre, and to combine and assimilate the multiplied parts under one common head 1 We must repeat it, therefore, if there is a God, there must be a law, which is, in the strict sense of the word, universal. UNIVERSALITY OF LAW. 129 § 69. A 'presumption thus furnished in favour of the subjection of the ivill to law. It is not necessary to pursue this subject, when contem- plated under this general form, at much length. What has been said will answer our present purpose. If the doctrine of the universality of law be tenable, what shall we say of the Will 1 Does not the position, that the Will is not subject to laws, imply an anomaly in the universe 1 Whatever is not under some sort of control, but is entirely irregular, contingent, and exempt from all conditions, is necessarily irresponsible to the supervision of anything, even God himself. We have, then, an exceedingly strong presumption, when we look at the subject in the most general light, in favour of the proposition that the Will has its laws. Especially when we consider the relation which the Will sustains to the other powers ; that its ac- tion constitutes the great result to which the operation of the other parts of our nature tends ; in other words, that, in all cases of movement or exertion, the volition is the consummation of all the other mental acts, and, in effect, represents the whole mind. If the Will acts contingently, then the man acts contingently ; and while he retains this alleged specific character of acting in this way, he is not only free from all law, thus destroying that peace and joy of which Hooker asserts her to be the mother, but he cannot be controlled even by the Deity. He has suffered a revulsion from the parent stock ; he has gone off and set up for himself; he has established an empire of his own, where even the Most High must not enter ; a state of things which certainly finds no parallel among the other existences, powers, and intelligences of the universe, 130 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN and which is rebuked alike by the conclusions of reason- ing and by the suggestions of virtue. CHAPTER H. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. § 70. Of the existence of a moral government. Now let us turn our attention from these interesting but general considerations, which have especial relation, it will be noticed, to what may be called natural law and the natural authority of the Supreme Being, to those leading principles which we suppose to pervade his moral government. And which not only pervade and are es- sential to the Divine government, but to all moral gov- ernment, by whatever superintendence it may be admin- istered. Accordingly, it is our design, in the present chapter, to bring reasons to show, that the doctrine of the Will's sub- jection to law is necessarily implied in the fact of moral government. And the argument will apply equally well, as has been intimated, whether the Moral Government under consideration be regarded as divine or human. We, of course, assume in the argument, that we are rea- soning with those who fully believe and admit that Moral Government exists, and that men are subjects of it. Cer- tainly there is ample evidence that such is the case, in- dependently of what is taught on the subject in Revela- tion. The light of nature clearly and strikingly indicates MORAL GOVERNMENT. 131 that a moral government, extending its authority over the human race in particular, has an existence. " Mankind," says Bishop Butler, who has investigated this subject with his acknowledged ability and candour, " find themselves placed by God in such circumstances as that they are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, and are often punished, and sometimes rewarded under his government, in the view of their being mischievous or eminently ben- eficial to society."* Revelation, whatever may be the clearness or obscurity of the indications of unaided nature, places the existence of such a moral government beyond all doubt. We suppose, therefore, the fact of such a gov- ernment to be admitted. § 71. Laws of the will deducible from the Jirst principles of moral government. If a moral government exists, as is assumed to be the fact, and is known to be so, then it has its first principles or elements. It must, of course, have its predominant traits, its distinctive characteristics, some admitted and es- sential truths. If these traits or principles are assented to, they must obviously be assented to with such conse- quences as may fairly attach to them, whatever those con- sequences may be. And hence the mode of our reason- ing. In conducting the argument drawn from this source, we shall attempt to point out some of those things which are universally understood to be implied in, and to be es- sential to, a moral government ; and as these elementary principles are successively pointed out, shall briefly exam- * Butler's Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature, pt. i., ch. iii. 132 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED L\ ine their application to the subject under inquiry. And in this way we propose to make it appear, that the doc- trine of the subjection of the volitive power to laws is implied in the existence of moral government. And if such a government exists, which is conceded to be the fact, then the doctrine in question is true. § 72. Laws of the will inferred from that supremacy or paramount authority which is implied in a moral gov- ernment. Every moral government implies, in the first place, a ruler, a governor, some species of supreme authority. The term government itself, separate from any qualifying epithet, obviously expresses the fact that there are some beings governed, which is inconceivable without the cor- relative of a higher and governing power. And what is true of all other government, is certainly not less so of that species of government which is denominated moral government. In all moral government, therefore, there must undoubtedly be some supreme authority, to which those who are governed are amenable. Now if men are under government, they are under law. To be governed is obviously to be regulated, guided, or controlled, in a greater or less degree. To say that men are governed, and are, at the same time, exempt from law, is but little short of a verbal contradiction, and is certain- ly a real one. But when we speak of men as being under laws, we do not mean to assert a mere abstraction. We mean to express something actually existing ; in oth- er words, we intend to assert the fact, that the actions of men, whatever may be true of their freedom, are in some way or other reached by an effective (that is to say, by a MORAL GOVERNMENT. 133 true or real) supervision. But when we consider the un- denied and undoubted dependence of the outward act on the inward volition, we very naturally and properly conclude that the supervision of the outward act is the result of the antecedent supervision of the inward princi- ple of the Will j in other words, the will has its laws. § 73. Inferred also from the fact, that the subjects of a moral government must be endued urith adequate powers of obedience. Moral government implies, in the second place, that there is not only a higher or ruling power, but an inferior one, which may be held accountable to such higher power. And consequently, as all moral government has the right, within certain limits, of exacting obedience from those that are properly under its control, it follows necessarily that the inferiors or subjects of such government must possess the requisite powers of obedience; not a mere transitory obedience yielded for a moment, but one which is accordant to a prescribed course, and yielded for a length of time. But if the Will, which is the governing power over men's actions, be not subject to laws, it is self- evident that such a continued or protracted course of obedience cannot be rendered, even with the most favour- able dispositions on the part of those from whom it is due. Man is, in this case, not under the control of him- self; he can never tell at one moment what he may do or be the next ; and it is altogether inadmissible, therefore, to suppose that he can, by his own act, conform himself to the control of another. There may indeed be an occasional and momentary coincidence between his actions and the requisitions laid upon him ; but, whenever this is M 134 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN the case, it is merely a matter of accident, and neither in fact nor in spirit comes up to the idea of that obedience which is due to a moral governor. In a word, if the acts of the Will are not based, as the occasions, at least, of their being called forth, upon any conditions whatever, and are truly contingent, man has no power to obey. And if he has no power of obedience, (using the term to mean a continued or protracted, as well as momentary obedience,) then he is under no obligation so to do. And moral government under such circumstances can never exist in respect to the human race. § 74. Laws of the will inferred from that rationality which is essential to the subjects of a moral government. In the third place, if we look further into the element- ary principles of moral government, we shall find that this sort of administration diners from all natural or physical government in this respect, that its subjects are not only agents, but are necessarily rational agents. The attribute of rationality is absolutely essential to them, as accounta- ble and moral beings. That is to say, their actions, so far as they are of a moral nature, are ultimately based upon the perceptions of our intellectual part or under- standing. We can undoubtedly conceive of a purely sentient being, formed wholly of instincts, appetites, desires, and passions, without the intellectual endowments (at least to any extent worthy of especial notice) of perceiving, com- paring, abstracting, and reasoning. Nor is the possibility of such a being left wholly to imagination, since we have abundant instances in the brute creation around us. But such beings, wherever they may be found, and whatever MORAL GOVERNMENT. 135 purposes, more or less important, they may answer in the arrangements of the universe, are not the subjects of moral emotions and of feelings of obligation, nor are they mor- ally accountable. A sort of instinctive perception at once adjudges them incapable of that higher destiny. Rationality, therefore, is an incident, or, rather, prerequi- site of a moral nature. If man, therefore, is a rational being, which must be conceded as indispensable to the fact of his being in sub- jection to a moral government, then his actions, as has been stated, are ultimately based upon the perceptions of the understanding. And if his actions are susceptible of being thus based and regulated, then the operations of the Will may be regulated (and must be regulated to the extent that the outward actions are) in the same way, since the outward actions have their origin in the decis- ions of the voluntary power. But if it be true that the operations of the Will are in this way connected, indi- rectly and ultimately at least, with the antecedent per- ceptions of the intellect, then they are subject to laws. There may indeed be, and there certainly are, emotions, and desires, and feelings of obligation intervening between the perceptions of the intellect and the acts of the Will. But still the latter, in all cases, strike their roots, if we may be allowed the expression, through the intervening mental elements, and thrust themselves into the intellect as their original basis and support. Without this, man could not, with propriety, be denominated a rational being ; and vnth this, he cannot, with propriety, be deemed a being, the acts of whose Will are in any real sense accidental or contingent. 136 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN § 75. Laws of the will inferred from the fact that in the administration of a moral government motives are em- ployed, Let it further be remembered, as a fixed principle in moral government, that it is sustained in its character of a moral government, not by the application of physical power, but by the presentation of motives. The fact that men are influenced and directed by the motives set before them, is an encouragement in the making of moral efforts, and in the use of such means as are adapted to reclaim the vicious, or to strengthen habits of virtue. When men go astray, what can we do more in our attempts at re- claiming them, than apply promises, threatenings, and exhortations ? We address these to them as motives, ex- pecting that they will be received and have their influ- ence as such. These are the means which we employ, and we find that they meet with success. But liberate the Will from all particular tendencies and law ; show that we are utterly unable to predict the nature of its acts, under all circumstances whatever, and then there is no encouragement to apply means for the attainment of moral ends ; there is no encouragement to moral efforts of any kind. When this is the case, we can never tell what is suitable to be addressed to men, in order to in- duce them to change their course of conduct. And moral government, under such circumstances, cannot exist. MORAL GOVERNMENT. 137 § 76, Inferred also from the application of rewards and punishments. There is another point of view in which the subject may be contemplated. — Accountability, it will of course be admitted, is essentially and fundamentally involved in the idea of a moral government. But accountability implies that the person or persons who are subject to it may be called to an account ; and this, of course, implies that the being who has the right of calling them to such account may inflict punishment in case of delinquency. In other words, wherever there is accountability on the one part, there is the correlative right of enforcing it on the other ; that is to say, of punishing, if necessary. But if volitions are independent of motives, and are entirely contingent, no man can tell, as has already been intima- ted, at one hour or one moment what he will do the next ; he cannot possibly have any foresight, even of his own actions, and cannot take measures to prevent those which are evil. In the estimation of a right conscience, there would be no more propriety in punishing such a man's actions, than in punishing a stone or a billet of wood which may have accidentally been the occasion of some injury to us. As his Will is beyond the reach of all laws, there are no principles by means of which its exercises can be subjected, (we do not say to the power of others merely,) but even to his own power. He is the sport of an unfathomable fortuity, a sort of football, impelled in every possible contrariety of direction; the ceaseless but imbecile plaything of inexplicable chance. Such a man certainly is not the proper subject of punishment. And, for like reasons, he is not the proper subject of rewards. M2 138 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN § 77. The same inferred from the fact that the moral government of the 'present life is in its nature disci- plinary. And there is yet another and distinct view of that moral government under which men are placed, which is especially worthy of notice in connexion with the sub- ject under consideration. The moral administration to which men are subject in the present life, is in its nature disciplinary. As far as man is concerned, it is not to be denied that the present state of being is incipient and preparatory to another and ampler field of existence. It is here, on the field of action where we are now placed in the present life, that it is proposed to train up men for glory, honour, and immortality. The present is a state of probation preparatory to this end. And it will be kept in mind, that it is proposed to secure this result by trial, exposure, exercise, training, discipline. But a moral regimen of this kind implies that there are evils to be encountered; that there are duties to be performed ; that there are obstacles to be overcome ; that there are temptations to be resisted ; and that men are not only to sustain their souls in patience, meekness, and fortitude, but to purify them in the pros- pect of an ultimate triumph. But if the Will be not subject to laws, all this is words without meaning. It must be obvious, that there can be no moral trial or discipline of man without tempta- tion. And it is no less clear, that temptations must be ulti- mately addressed to the Will, or they are nothing. My understanding, for instance, tells me that the attainment of a certain object will be promotive of my present good ; MORAL GOVERNMENT. 139 my desires are strongly enkindled in view of that object ; my conscience condemns it ; and here undoubtedly is the basis, the preparatory conditions of the temptation. But still there must be some internal object upon which the temptation presses ; some principle of the mental nature upon which it is brought to bear. And where is this prin- ciple or power to be discovered around which the strength of the temptation thus gathers and enters into contest, if it be not the Will ? — But if moral discipline (at least that of the present life) implies temptation; and if temptation, as it obviously does, implies a pressure upon the Will, then the Will must be subject to laws. For if it be not subject to laws, there seems to be no possible way in which the temptation can approach it or exert any influence upon it That which is without law either in mind or matter, is necessarily unapproachable except by mere accident. § 78. That the will has laws implied in the existence of virtue and vice. Finally, if the Will is truly contingent in its action and entirely without laws, it cannot fail to follow that there is no tenable foundation of virtue and vice. — It is a common maxim, founded on the general experience, and universally held to be true, that actions are reprehen- sible or otherwise, according to the designs, intentions, or motives with which they originated. But if the acts of the Will are perfectly contingent, (that is to say, are put forth without a regard to anything else whatever,) then it is obvious that designs or motives, considered in ref- erence to such acts, are entirely excluded, and have no existence. It is evident that a man in that case can 140 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN justly say of any action he performs, which is deemed by the community either virtuous or vicious, that it happen- ed merely because it did happen ; that it came to pass without any forethought, or intention, or design on his part ; that he knows of no rational cause of its origin ; and, in a word, that it is truly and wholly accidental. And is such a man, of whose actions these statements are undeniably true, to be either blamed or commended 1 Where is the basis, in his actions or his character, of either morality or immorality 1 Is he not beyond the reach, in every respect, of virtue and vice 1 No one can be ignorant that, when a man is arraigned on any accusation, one of the first inquiries is in respect to his designs or motives in perpetrating the alleged crimi- nal act. By the law of the land, if a man has put another to death with malice aforethought, (that is, with an evil design, or intention of so doing,) it is murder ; if the deed is committed in the violence of momentary passion, without any premeditated purpose, it becomes the diminished crime of manslaughter ; if it be what is called accidental, or, in other words, without any hostile feeling, and without in the least intending or expecting the result which followed, then it is no crime at all. And so, on the other hand, if a man performs a highly beneficial action, with the view and the intention of doing good, all men agree in pronouncing it virtuous and praiseworthy ; but if they discover the action to be wholly accidental, they equally agree in denying to its author any claims to moral merit and commendation. In a word, the circumstance of an action's being accidental is understood to destroy its moral character. But w r hat is the true idea or characteristic of an accident? It is evidently that which has no cause, no reason, no refer- MORAL GOVERNMENT. 141 ence to any fixed principle. And every voluntary act, on the supposition of the Will's not being subjected to law, is precisely conformed to this view. Every such volition is truly an accident. And, as such, the common consent of mankind would deny to it, both in itself and its results, the possession of any moral character what- ever. It would not be difficult to point out passages in wri- ters of acknowledged value, going to confirm the various views of this chapter. On the subject of the present section, President Edwards expresses himself in the fol- lowing decided language. — " If it should be allowed that there are some instances wherein the soul chooses with- out any motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice 1 I am sure there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no good end ; for it is for no end at all. If it were for any end, the view gf the end would be the motive exciting to the act ; and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it : and therefore, accord- ing to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke which is driven to and fro by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor why and wherefore, it is moved."* * Edwards's Inquiry into the Will, part iii., § vii. 142 LAWS OP THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE CHAPTER m. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORE- SIGHT OF THE DEITY. § 79. The notion which men naturally form of the Deity implies foreknowledge. In proof of the general proposition, that the Will has its laws, we now enter upon a distinct train of thought. In the present chapter we propose to bring forward in its support the Prescience of the Deity. And, accordingly, it will be necessary to say something in support of the fact, that there is such prescience, or, in other words, that God foreknows whatever comes to pass. We do not, however, propose to enter at length into this specific topic ; for the general acquiescence in the proposition of God's foreknowledge renders it unnecessary ; but merely to suggest in relation to it one or two considerations. And we naturally remark, in the first place, that the idea which all men agree in forming of the Deity im- plies foreknowledge. We say nothing here of the light which Revelation throws upon this subject; but refer merely to the notion of the Deity which men form them- selves. The basis of this paramount idea is abundantly laid in the human constitution. We do not undertake to say it is innate, in the sense in which that term has been commonly understood ; but merely assert that the human mind is so constituted, and is operated upon by such in- fluences, that the idea of God arises in it naturally and PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 143 certainly, unless there are some peculiar circumstances counteracting this tendency. Hence we find, in all coun- tries and among all classes of men ; in the cheerless hut of the Esquimaux ; in the rude dwellings of the uncivilized tribes inhabiting the islands of the Pacific ; in the tent of the vagrant Arab, as well as among those who are refined by the arts and enlightened by science, the notion of a God. The conception may indeed be a feeble and im- perfect one, compared with that developed in the Scrip- tures ; but, feeble as it is, it always includes the idea of prescience or foresight in a much higher degree than is possessed by men. The very heathen would scoff at the idea of a God, whose knowledge is limited to the present moment. § 80. The prescience of God involved and implied in his omniscience. But we are not left, in the consideration of this sub- ject, to the suggestions which are furnished by an exam- ination of the opinions of men, however naturally they may have arisen, or however widely prevailed. God has seen fit, in the exercise of his great mercy, to speak by his Revealed Word, and to pour the light of inspiration on the dim and uncertain light of human reason. He has declared himself to possess all knowledge, He who is familiar with the Bible cannot fail to recollect many pas- sages where this great truth appears. The hundred and thirty-ninth Psalm, one of the most striking and beauti- ful in that exceedingly interesting collection of sacred poetry, turns almost exclusively upon the great and won- derful knowledge of God. " Thou knowest my down- sitting and mine uprising ; thou understandest my thoughts 144 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE afar off. Thou compassest my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways." The Psalmist in another place, after asserting the greatness of the Lord and of his power, immediately adds, that " his under- standing is infinite." In another passage of the Psalms of great sublimity, God is introduced as saying, " I know all the fowls of the mountains, and the wild beasts of the field are mine ;" expressions which convey a sentiment parallel to that of the New Testament, in the passages where it is asserted that not a sparrow falls without the notice of God, and that the hairs of our head are num- bered. " Neither is there any creature," says the Apos- tle, " that is not manifest in His sight ; but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of Him with whom we have to do." The beloved disciple says, " God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things."* But if God is omniscient, which is clearly implied or asserted in these and many other passages, it follows, of course, that he is able to foresee events, whatever they may be, which shall come to pass in future times. And let it be remembered here, that God does not have a knowledge of things in precisely the same way as men have, viz., in succession, or as they arise before the mind's eye one after another ; but, on the contrary, it seems rather to be the fact, that all the knowledge He possesses, whether more or less, exists in the perception of his mind simultaneously ; it is all taken in and con- templated at one view. With Him there is neither be- ginning of days nor end of years ; no present, past, nor future. . And hence, if we strike off from the great circle of his knowledge that part or section which we, in con- sequence of our limited views, denominate the future, his * Ps. cxlvii., 5 ; 1., 10. Heb. iv., 13. First Epis. of John, iii., 20. PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 145 omniscience is at once shorn of the attribute of perfec- tion, and is presented before us in a state of deformity and mutilation. And, accordingly, we assert that the omniscience of God, a truth so obvious to reason and so abundantly taught in the Scriptures, implies the doctrine of prescience, (or, at least, what men, adopting their lan- guage to their own modes of perception, call prescience,) and that he has a clear knowledge of all future events. § 81. The 'prescience of God directly taught in the Scriptures. The divine prescience or foresight is not only implied in the omniscience of God, as that attribute is made known in the Scriptures, but is itself separately and dis- tinctly made known in a multitude of passages. The Supreme Being himself, in the language ascribed to Him by the prophet Isaiah, asserts, " I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done." " Known unto God," says the Apostle James, " are all his works, from the beginning of the world"*' Nor does the doctrine of God's foreknowledge rest upon general statements alone ; but we have instances, again and again, of predictions, uttered long before the events came to pass, which were strictly fulfilled. The deluge was predicted one hundred and twenty years be- fore it came on the face of the earth. It was foretold that the children of Israel should be in bondage four hundred years. The cruel conduct of the Syrian Hazael, and the deliverance wrought out by the hand of the Per- sian Cyrus, are matters of precise and specific prediction. * Isaiah xlvi., 9, 10. Acts xv., 18. N 146 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE The destruction of Babylon and of Nineveh, with many of the circumstances attending their overthrow, was pre- dicted also. The coming and the preaching of Jesus Christ, and particularly his humiliation, trials, and death, were foretold by the mouths of holy men many years, and even ages, before the events themselves took place. The destruction of Jerusalem (not to mention other in- stances equally decisive in their bearing on this subject) was depicted long before it happened, and with a won- derful particularity and vividness. — In view of these facts, and others like them, we have only to make the remark, and we do it with full confidence in its correctness, that predictions so numerous and specific, and so exactly ful- filled, could not have been uttered without the possession of foreknowledge or prescience on the part of their author. § 82. The foreknowledge of events implies the foreknowl- edge of volitions. And it is further to be noticed, in regard to many, if not all, the events which have taken place in accordance with such predictions as those referred to in the last sec- tion, that they were dependent on the volitions of men. The voluntary actions of men necessarily imply the ante- cedent exercise of volitions ; and it is impossible that any being whatever should foresee the actions without a fore- sight, at the same time, of their volitions. As an illus- tration, it was foretold to Abraham that his descendants should go into Egypt, and should take up their residence there ; but such a prediction evidently implies a knowl- edge of all the circumstances under which this event should take place, including, in particular, every motive PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 147 and every volition connected with it. Such a prediction implies a knowledge, not only of the volitions and acts of the immediate agents in the events foretold, but of those persons also who were concerned in them incident- ally and collaterally. In the present case, it implies a knowledge of the jealousies of Joseph's brethren, and of their perverse and wicked conduct in selling him to the Ishmaelites ; it implies a knowledge of the wants, inter- ests, and motives of the Ishmaelites themselves ; not to mention the situation and motives of other individuals and bodies of men, which were undoubtedly among the preparatory steps and means to the wonderful events which followed. Every one knows, that events of the greatest magni- tude are dependent upon circumstances apparently the most trivial. It is a remark of Dr. Dwight, that the " motions of a fly are capable of terminating the most important human life, or of changing all the future de- signs of a man, and altering the character, circumstances, and destiny of his descendants throughout time and eter- nity."* Now, if these things are so, it cannot for a mo- ment be conceded that God foreknows and predicts events without a knowledge of all those circumstances, even the most trivial, upon which those events may, by any possibility, be dependent. In particular, and above all, He must be minutely and fully acquainted with the volitive acts or volitions of the immediate agents in them. In foreseeing events in which men are concerned, He must, of course, foresee what men will do ; but it is incon- ceivable that he should know this without knowing what volitions they will put forth. * Dwight's Theology, Sermon vi. 148 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE § 83. Of the reasonableness of the foregoing views. These views, in regard to the extent and particularity of God's foreknowledge, commend themselves at once to the common sense and feelings of men. It would be of but little avail to extol God as the Creator of all worlds and all beings, if he could not foresee what w T ould be the result of their creation ; if he could not tell whether their existence would be beneficial or injurious to themselves or others. Existence is known, not only from what it is in itself, but from its issues. And if God has no foresight of the results of his works, He creates he knows not what ; and if He is ignorant of his own works, no other being can be supposed to have knowledge of them. Would such a God, supposing him to be truly and fully the Crea- tor of all things, be able to hold the reins of government over the things He had made 1 Would he not be contin- ually perplexed, and compelled, at every turn in the af- fairs of the Universe, to alter his plans ? Certain it is, that the doctrine which denies the full and perfect pres- cience of the Deity greatly degrades Him. It leaves Him at the mercy, as it were, of the most trifling circum- stances. The movement of a single atom (as it is possi- ble, even for a matter so trivial as that, to alter the des- tiny of a world) might perplex His wisest purposes and defeat his most benevolent plans. § 84. Application of these views to the will. But if it satisfactorily appears that God foreknows all things, particularly the volitions of men, then it clearly follows that the volitive power or Will has its laws. The PRESCIENCE OF THE DEITY. 149 opposite of a subjection to law, as has already been re- marked, is perfect contingency ; and the very idea of contingency or of contingent action implies that it is something which cannot possibly be foreknown. What- ever is foreknown must be foreknown to exist at a partic- ular time or place, or under some particular circumstances ; but that action or event, which it is ascertained and cer- tain will exist at a particular time or place, or under any particular and definite circumstances, cannot, with any propriety of language, be deemed a contingent one. Since, therefore, nothing which is foreknown is contin- gent, and since the volitions of men are obviously the sub- jects of foreknowledge, it follows that there must be some definite laws or principles by which the action of the voluntary or volitive power is regulated. § 85. The views of this chapter in harmony with tlie doctrine of the influences of the Holy Spirit. As in some respects closely connected with the views of this chapter, we may here, with propriety, refer to the Scripture doctrine that God, through the influences of the Holy Spirit, has the power, and, when in his providence he sees fit, exerts the power, of enlightening, sanctifying, and guiding the minds of men. The reader of the Bible will naturally be reminded here of the Saviour's interest- ing expressions on this subject, which are found in the concluding chapters of the Gospel of John. — " I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever-." " And the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, He shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto N2 150 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE you." John xiv., 16, 26. — " So they, being sent forth by the Holy Ghost, departed unto Seleucia." — " Then Saul, who is also called Paul, filled with the Holy Ghost, set his eyes upon him, and said, Oh full of all subtlety," &c. — " And were forbidden of the Holy Ghost to preach the word in Asia." Acts xiii., 4, 9; xvi., 6. — " Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." 1 Cor. ii., 13. — " Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." 2 Pet. i., 21. All these passages, and others like them, necessarily and clearly imply, although there is no doubt of the fact of man's moral and religious rebellion, that the human mind, nevertheless, is circumscribed and overruled in its operations to some extent, and is still held in subordina- tion to the all-pervading and transcendent control of the Supreme Intelligence. CHAPTER IV. LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORE- SIGHT OF MEN. § 86. Man as well as Deity susceptible of foresight. It may, perhaps, be objected by some, that the argu- ment drawn from the prescience of the Deity is less sat- isfactory than it would otherwise be, in consequence of the unspeakable elevation and incomprehensibleness of the Divine Mind. That the divine mind is, in some re- PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 151 spects, incomprehensible by man, is true ; but it does not follow that an argument, founded upon what we know and can understand of the divine nature, is therefore in- comprehensible or even obscure. But whatever weight, whether more or less, may be conceded to this objection, we come to another view of the subject, analogous indeed to that of the last chapter, but drawn from a different source, and level to every one's comprehension. Man himself, restricted and dimmed as his conceptions un- doubtedly are, has a prescience of the future, a foresight of what is to come to pass, as well as the adorable Being who made him. Not in an equal degree indeed, but still in some degree. And this fact also goes to confirm the position which we are now examining in regard to the Will. § 87. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own situation and conduct. In the first place, man can foretell (we do not say with perfect certainty, nor is that at all essential to our argu- ment) his own situation, actions, and success at some fu- ture time. Take a very simple illustration. A man proposes to go to Boston or New- York, or to some place of common resort, no matter where it is, for the purpose of transact- ing business there. The execution of a design of this nature, although it is difficult to mention one more com- mon and simple, implies the putting forth of hundreds and thousands of volitions. And it is undoubtedly the fact, that the object in view cannot be effected without this great number of volitions. And yet we perceive that this person goes forward with confidence, and that he A 152 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE makes his calculations without fear, and with a feeling of certainty that he will be able to execute them. He evi- dently proceeds upon the supposition (although he may not be fully conscious of it at the time, and may never have made it a matter of distinct reflection) that the operations of the Will exist in reference to some fixed principles ; and particularly in connexion with motives in their various kinds and degrees. And looking at his pro- posed undertaking with care, and understanding well the claims, both of interest and duty, which are involved in it, he determines or wills in reference to the general plan before him, whatever it may be, without even doubt- ing that all the future acts of the voluntary power will be accordant with its requisite details ; and that, in due sea- son, it will be brought to a fulfilment in all its parts. But we may assert w r ith confidence, that this could never be done if volitions were entirely contingent ; in other words, if they were without laws. For if this last were the case, he would be just as likely to go to Providence as Boston, to Albany as New-York, or to any other place what- ever, as to that where he first determined to go; and would be just as likely to do the direct opposite as that particular business which he designed to accomplish at his first setting out. — And the views, applicable in this particular case, will apply to the multiplied occurrences and duties of every week and day. And they furnish of themselves, and independently of every other argument which may be brought up, but little short of a demonstra- tion of what we are attempting to establish. PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 153 § 88. Foresight of men in respect to the conduct of others. In the second place, men are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of certainty, the situation, actions, and success of others at some future time. This is so no- torious as not unfrequently to have elicited the remark, that there is a certain regular order in the conduct of men, in some degree analogous to the regular course of things, which we never fail to observe in the physical world. Men may everywhere be found who would no more hesitate to predict the precise conduct of their neigh- bours in certain assignable circumstances, than they would to predict that trees of a certain kind would grow in a given situation. Some instances will illustrate what we mean. — A poor man goes to a rich man in the same neighbourhood, who is a confirmed and inexorable miser, for the purpose of borrowing a sum of money, but without being willing to give the customary interest of twenty per cent., and un- able at the same time to furnish adequate security for the principal. Everybody knows that the miser will refuse his money at once. They expect and predict it with hardly less confidence than they predict, that a stone thrown into the air will immediately fall to the earth's surface. " A prisoner," says Mr. Hume, " who has nei- ther money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of es- cape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of his guards as the walls and bars with which he is surround- ed; and in all his attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other." This remark of Mr. Hume is an important one, and, without question, is 154 LAWS OF THE "WILL IMPLIED IN THE essentially correct. Undoubtedly it is sometimes the case, that prisoners endeavour to effect their escape by working upon the passions and will of their guards ; but in a vast majority of cases they consider their chance of escape much better by means of attempts made upon the stone and iron that enclose them. They understand so well the connex- ion between motive and volition, between interest and duty on the one hand and the resolves of the will on the other, that, with the knowledge they possess of the char- acters and situation of those who are appointed to act as their guards, they consider their escape by means of any collusion with them, or any assistance from that source, as an utter impossibility.* § 89. Other familiar instances of this foresight. But we will now proceed to give some instances which are less remote from common observation. The reader may perhaps recollect some remarks of Dr. Paley, relative to our constant dependence on our fellow-men. " Every hour of our lives we trust and depend upon others ; and it is impossible to stir a step, or, wdiat is worse, to sit still a moment, without such trust and dependence. I am now writing at my ease, not doubting (or, rather, never distrust- ing, and, therefore, never thinking about it) but that the butcher will send in the joint of meat which I ordered ; * Expressions very similar to those of Mr. Hume, and certainly not less strong in their import, are found in a Treatise of Lord Kames, (Princi- ples of Morality, pt. i., Essay iii.,) and also in the recent work of Dr. Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings, part ii. — "We can foretell," says the last-mentioned writer, " the respective effects which a tale of distress will have upon a cold-hearted miser and a man of active benevolence, with the same confidence with which we can predict the different ac- tions of acid upon an alkali and upon a metal." PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 155 that his servant will bring it ; that my cook will dress it ; that my footman will serve it up ; and that I shall find it on the table at one o'clock."* — And this is a state of things which is constantly occurring, not only in the mat- ter of the daily food necessary for the support of our lives, but in a thousand other instances. The merchant de- pends upon his clerks ; the manufacturer upon his numer- ous operatives of all classes and conditions ; the farmer, who works upon a large scale, depends upon the hands of others as much as he does upon the labour of his own hands ; the commander of a vessel constantly reckons upon the efficient co-operation of his sailors; the leader of armies relies upon the movements of vast bodies of men made with the utmost precision in the most trying circumstances. And it is the same in all situations, and among all classes of men, as any one, who will in the least trouble himself to exercise his recollection, will be abundantly satisfied. But if all these persons operated by mere accident, and without regard to any fixed princi- ples ; if it were a matter of entire contingency whether they should perform their engagements or not, it is easy to see that all the sources of enjoyment and even of exist- ence would be destroyed, and the foundations of society speedily broken up. § 90. The fact of laws of the will shown from the regu- larity of voluntary contributions and of deposites. In connexion with the topic now before us, viz., that we are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of cer- tainty, the situation and actions of others at some future time, we request the attention of the reader to a class of * Moral Philosophy, book iii., chap. v. 156 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE facts which are somewhat peculiar. It cannot have escaped the notice of any one as in some degree a char- acteristic of modern times, that there are a multitude of benevolent associations, whose receipts depend wholly upon voluntary contributions. But, notwithstanding the fact of their income being wholly voluntary, which, if ex- perience had not show r n to the contrary, would be exceed- ingly discouraging, they proceed in their affairs with nearly or quite the same confidence as if they had a fixed capital to operate with. They send out missionaries, establish schools, translate the Scriptures, explore un- known and barbarous countries, plant colonies, erect churches, and engage in other important and expensive undertakings, without a cent of money except what comes from voluntary gifts. They make their calculations be- forehand as to w T hat they can accomplish in a given time ; and not unfrequently incur heavy expenses in anticipation of their receipts. Their true capital is a knowledge of the operations of the human mind under certain assigna- ble circumstances. These circumstances they are in a good degree acquainted with ; and hence are enabled to anticipate the amount of their receipts for a given time with almost as much accuracy as the merchant or farmer, who has an actual capital already in his possession to operate with. Does not this circumstance go, with others, to show that the Will has its laws ? Without enlarging further upon this topic, we merely observe, that it reminds us of another interesting fact somewhat analogous to this. It is, that banks issue bills and lend money upon their deposites, and often to a great amount. They take this course as they believe, and as they have undoubted reason to believe, with almost entire safety. By observation, they ascertain that their custom- PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 157 ers, (although the ability of their customers to do it evi- dently depends on a thousand apparent contingencies,) deposite a certain amount, or nearly so, within a given time. They find, as a general thing, that the variation in the amount received in specified times is not greater than the variation of the receipts of an individual who is largely engaged in business. And they consider this state of things basis enough for very extended transac- tions. But could this, or anything else of the same kind, possibly be, if the Will were wholly exempt from every- thing having the nature of definite or fixed principles of action 1 § 91. Of sagacity in the estimate of individual character. We now proceed to introduce to the consideration of the reader another view of the subject of this chapter, which is exceedingly interesting in itself, besides furnish- ing an argument deserving of some attention. It is not uncommon to find men who exhibit a sort of quickness or sagacity in the estimate of individual character, which is sometimes described by the phrase, a knowledge of the world, or of human nature. This knowledge is undoubt- edly possessed by all persons to some extent ; but not un- frequently individuals are found who possess it in a re- markably high degree. In some men it may be said not only to assume the appearance, but even to approximate the nature of a prophetic anticipation or foresight ; and when this is the case, it is an acquisition, as no one can be ignorant, of great power and value. The late Mr. Du- mont, of Geneva, in his Recollections of Mirabeau, has noticed this ability in one of its more striking forms. — Speaking of the political life of that celebrated man, O 158 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE especially in its connexion with his knowledge of men and his political foresight, he goes on to say, " It was by the same instinctive penetration that Mirabeau so easily detected the feelings of the Assembly, and so often embarrassed his opponents by revealing their secret mo- tives, and laying open that which they were most anxious to conceal. There seemed to exist no political enigma which he could not solve. He came at once to the most intimate secrets, and his sagacity alone was of more use to him than a multitude of spies in the enemy's camp. I used sometimes to attribute the severity of his judgments to hatred or jealousy, but it has been justified by succeed- ing events, and there was not a man of any consequence in the Assembly, the sum of whose conduct did not cor- respond with the opinion which Mirabeau had formed of him. " Independently of this natural gift, this intellect of penetration, his life had been so agitated, he had been so tossed upon the sea of human existence, as he used to say, that he had acquired vast experience of the world and of men. He detected, in a moment, every shade of charac- ter ; and, to express the result of his observations, he had invented a language scarcely intelligible to any but him- self; had terms to indicate fractions of talents, qualities, virtues, or vices — halves and quarters — and, at a glance, he could perceive every real or apparent contradiction. No form of vanity, disguised ambition, or tortuous pro- ceedings could escape his penetration ; but he could also perceive good qualities, and no man had a higher esteem for energetic and virtuous characters."* It cannot be necessary to add anything to show how this instance, and others like it, (for the political history * Dumcmt's Recollections of Mirabeau, chap. xiv. PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 159 of every age brings to light some men of this stamp,) connects itself with and illustrates our subject. § 92. Foresight of the conduct of masses of men and nations. It is not too much to say that we are able, not only to predict with a considerable degree of certainty the con- duct of individuals in any given circumstances, but we may do the same of whole classes of men, and even na- tions. Hence the remark which Lord Bacon has some- where made, and which is strikingly characterized by its poetical as well as its philosophical spirit. " The shep- herds of the people," he says, " should understand the prognostics of state tempests ; hollow blasts of wind seem- ingly at a distance, and secret swellings of the sea, often precede a storm." But we may carry this view into some particulars which are deserving of notice. The results, for instance, of a popular election, if certain data are ascertained, are often considered as settled, even before the day of voting has arrived ; although the conclusions thus formed are based in part upon opinions relative to whole classes of men, who differ from each other in their callings, inter- ests, and prejudices. Again, the speculations in the public or national stocks are very frequently prompted by the opinions, which those who are engaged in such speculations are able to form of the course which states and nations will take in some future time. One of the most striking facts, involving the foresight or prescience of the conduct of large masses of men, is the financial estimate which is annually made by govern- 160 LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE ments. It is well known that the amount of property invested in commerce, with the annual returns of revenue to the government, is every year estimated in advance, and with very considerable accuracy, by the treasury de- partments of all civilized nations. Reasoning from what has taken place in times past, we may predict, with a good degree of accuracy, what number of letters will be written and circulated through a nation at any future time. The number of letters is indicated by the amount of postage ; and this is a matter which the governments of nations have thought it impor- tant to them to ascertain. If a person will take the pains to examine the total receipts of the Postoffice Department of the United States, in the successive years from 1790 to 1830, he will notice, with but few exceptions, and those easily explained, a gradual and very regular increase in the amount ; the increase being such as would naturally be expected from the augmentation of the wealth and population of the country. It would seem, in looking at the statistical tables for this purpose, that in the year 1815 there was an increase decidedly greater than would be naturally expected in ordinary circumstances. But this was probably owing (and equally satisfactory reasons will be found for other equally marked variations) to the recent return of peace with Great Britain, which at once gave a new and ex- panded impulse to the business transactions of the coun- try. We presume it will be found also on inquiry, that the number of letters not taken from the subordinate offices, and returned from time to time to the General Postoffice, or dead letters so called, is nearly the same from year to year, or varying so as to correspond to the variation in PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN. 161 the number of letters received. It is stated by Laplace, that the number of dead letters remaining at and return- ed from other offices to the Postoffice at Paris is, in or- dinary times, nearly the same from one year to another. The same thing has been stated of the Dead Letter Office, as it is called, in London.* — All these things conclusively evince that the actions of men, whether considered indi- vidually or in masses, are not left to chance or mere ac- cident. § 93. Proof from the regularity observable in the com- mission of crime. The Statistics of crime, (a painful but very interesting and important view of human nature,) as well as all other statistical views which are based upon the occupa- tions and conduct of men, throw light upon this subject. The reader will find valuable information on this matter, besides other sources of information which are constantly multiplying, in the Annual Reports of the American Dis- cipline Society, in the article on the Statistics of Crime in the Encyclopaedia Americana, in the Report of Messrs. Beaumont and Toqueville on the Penitentiary System in the United States, and particularly in the valuable work of M. Guerry, entitled, Essai sur la Statistique Morale de la France. It appears from the class of works which have now been specified, that, under certain circumstances, there is in human nature an unquestionable disposition or tenden- cy to crime, to a certain extent. And this tendency is found, by a comparison of the facts which are furnished us in the statistical tables of crime, to be so definite and * Edinburgh Review, vol. xxiii. 02 162 LAWS OF THE WELL certain in its results, that one may predict at the begin- ning of each year what number will be brought before the criminal tribunals ; what number will be acquitted ; what number will be condemned to death ; the number condemned to hard labour for life or for a term of years ; the number condemned to solitary imprisonment; and many things of this kind. And this can be done with a great degree of accuracy and certainty; probably with greater certainty than the Treasury Departments of na- tions can make their annual estimate of the national in- come and expenditure. From the statistical tables of crime in France, it ap- pears that about one in every four thousand and four hundred of the inhabitants is arraigned at a criminal tri- bunal. Of the persons thus arraigned, one out of every four, or very nearly in that proportion, is accused of a crime against persons ; the others of crimes against prop- erty. Out of one hundred accused, about sixty-one will be regularly found guilty. The number of murders and manslaughters in France (and a similar statement would undoubtedly, on examination, be found true of other countries) will be found to be nearly the same from year to year. In 1826, it was 610 ; in 1827, it was 556 ; in 1828, it amounted to 520 ; in 1829, to 528 ; in the years 1830, 1831, and 1832 respectively, to 469, 605, and 641. It will appear also from these inquiries, that not only the murders and manslaughters will be nearly the same every year during a number of successive years, but also that the particular methods and instruments of crime, such as the musket, the knife, or poisoning, will be nearly the same from year to year. Thus the number of deaths in France by poisoning in the year 1826, was 26 ; in the year 1827, it was 34 ; in 1828, the number amounted to INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE. 163 43 ; in 1829, to 47; in the years 1830, 1831, and 1832 respectively, it amounted to 37, 36, and 27. If statistical tables should be made of every art, de- partment, and calling in life of farmers, shoemakers, tai- lors, merchants, blacksmiths, students, preachers, and all other classes, similar results would be exhibited. That is to say, we could very nearly tell, scores of years, or even centuries beforehand, in a given place and under certain given circumstances, what number would till the ground, or smite the anvil, or practise the arts of commerce, or pursue other occupations. — It will be noticed that this view of the subject in particular cannot be charged with being merely speculative or conjectural. And the bear- ing of it upon the structure of the human mind, particu- larly upon that department of the mind wdiich is now under consideration, will readily suggest itself to the reader. CHAPTER V. LAWS OF THE WILL INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE. § 94. The doctrine of the will's subjection to law con- firmed by consciousness. We proceed now to other views of this interesting sub- ject, which place it in a new and somewhat more defi- nite and specific aspect. If we examine with suitable caution, we shall find that laws of the Will are clearly involved in its own nature. — But, before proceeding to explain the import and to show the truth of this proposi- 164 LAWS OF THE WILL tion, we have one remark to make here, viz., that the doctrine of the will's being subject to law is, as seems to us, confirmed by our Consciousness. Certain it is, we all of us have the testimony of our inward experience, that there is a relation, whatever may be its nature, and how- ever difficult of explanation, between volition and mo- tives. As a general statement, (for we do not here speak of those actions which, in consequence of being frequently repeated, have become almost mechanical, nor of those which are entirely trifling and insignificant,) no man is conscious of a volition who is not also conscious of a knowledge of some antecedent which constitutes the occasion, motive, or cause of the subsequent volition. And if so, then the testimony of consciousness may prop- erly be adduced in support of the general position which we are endeavouring to maintain. § 95. The same confirmed by the fact of the -will's not being a subject, but an attribute. But returning to the specific subject of this chapter, viz., that laws of the will are involved in its own nature, we proceed to remark, that the faculty of the Will is not a distinct entity by itself, but rather an incident to, or an appurtenance of, something else ; in other words, it is not the subject, which might more reasonably put forth claims of independence, but sustains the subordinate relation of an attribute. As the Will is evidently only one of the many attributes of that distinct and organized existence which we denominate the soul or mind, it is necessarily subjected to all the conditions implied in that relation. If the Will, in its ordinary conditions, is not only free, (a truth which is readily and fully conceded,) but is capable INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE. 165 also of a perfectly contingent action ; if it be not only independent of compulsion, but independent also of all regulative oversight and control ; if no principles what- ever pervade its varieties of action, and secure to them something like symmetry and order ; then, so far as we have an understanding in the matter, it is obviously not merely an attribute or part of that whole which we vari- ously denominate the mind or soul, but must be regarded as a distinct existence by itself. But if it be otherwise, and the Will is truly an attribute, as it undoubtedly is, then, like every other attribute, it is necessarily subordi- nate to the fundamental conditions of that existence or entity to which it belongs ; and, from the nature of the case, cannot sustain the claims which have sometimes been set up for it, to a wholly irresponsible and indepen- dent action. § 96. The same confirmed by the fact, that every exercise of the Will implies an object. We may further argue the matter under consideration by a reference to the nature of the exercises of the will or volitions. If we rightly understand the subject, the very idea of volition implies some antecedent object. In other words, it is a condition or law of the Will's action, that it cannot put forth a volition except in reference to some object. It is perfectly obvious, in any given case, that there can be no determining upon it without some- thing which is determined ; no resolving without some- thing resolved on; but as these are only other names for willing or volition, it is equally obvious that there can be no volition without an object towards which the act of the Will is directed. It is the same here as it is with 166 LAWS OF THE WILL the memory, desire, association, and the like. There can be no act of the memory without something which is re- membered; no act of the desire without something which is desired; no act of association without some subject or object to which the principle of association at- taches itself. But if, by universal admission, it would be altogether absurd to speak of remembrance, desire, and association without some object towards which they are directed or upon which they can operate, it would seem clearly to follow that volition without an object is no less an absurdity. It is something impossible ; something not admitted by the nature of the mind itself. But if volition has in all cases an object, it cannot well be denied that its action is in all cases subjected to some law. This object, without which volition cannot exist, is, of course, a condition of its existence. And it is evident that everything which is a condition of action, is in some sense (and, we may add, in a true and very im- portant sense) a law to that being or power which puts forth such action. The will, therefore, is, in its very na- ture, subject to law. § 97. Confirmed also by the fact, that every exercise of the will implies a motive. Furthermore, such is the nature of the will, that it must in its exercise not only have an object, in reference to which it acts, but, what is not less important, it must have a m.otive to action. Sometimes the outward object is called a motive. But we speak now of the internal or subjective, in distinction from the external or objective motive. In this sense we say, there must be a motive as well as an object. Both of these conditions of volitive EVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE. 167 action are indispensable. In the absence of either of them, it does not appear how any movement of the Will can possibly take place. Place any object whatever before the mind ; make ii a distinct inquiry whether such object shall be obtained ; reflect upon it for any length of time, and in view of any multitude of considerations ; and, unless there exists in the mind that peculiar mental state which we denominate a motive, viz., some form of Desire or some sentiment of Obligation, the voluntary power will remain immutably and forever motionless. It is, therefore, another law of the Will, resulting from its own constitution or nature, THAT IT ACTS, AND ACTS ONLY, IN CONNEXION WITH MOTIVES. The subject of Motives, in connexion with the doc- trine of the Will, is a very interesting and important one. But we make scarcely more than a mere allusion to it here, because it will be necessary hereafter to resume it, and to examine it more particularly. We cannot forbear saying, however, that the outward or objective motive (more simply and precisely the object) is presented before the Will by the Intellect. The internal or subjective mo- tive, which, in philosophic strictness, is the true motive, is presented before the Will by the Sensibilities. The for- mer indicates the direction in which the movement of the Will is to be made; the latter furnishes the proximate cause or ground of the movement. Both, as has been stated, are indispensable to the Will's action ; but the cir- cumstance, that the one is Intellective and the other Sen- sitive in its origin, forever distinguishes them from each other. 168 LAWS OF THE WILL § 98. Confirmed also by the fact, that every exercise of the will implies belief In introducing those considerations which are now pre- sented to the reader's notice, we are aware that we are repeating, to some extent, what has already been said in a former chapter of this volume. We shall, therefore, state them much more concisely than we might otherwise feel at liberty to do. Another law of the Will involved in its own nature, and which we have already had occasion to notice, is, that faith is a condition of volition. In other words, we cannot put forth an exercise of the Will or volition in re- spect to any given thing, without some degree of faith or belief in the practicability or attainableness of that thing. We do not suppose that this law of the Will's action can be a matter of dispute. Whoever will make the experi- ment ; whoever will endeavour to put forth a volition in reference to any object which he fully believes and know T s to be beyond his power, (for instance, in reference to fly- ing in the air, or the creation of a tree or stone,) will assu- redly satisfy himself of the impracticability of the attempt. In every case of this kind, there is an utter destitution or negation of belief. The person does not believe, even in the slightest degree, in the practicability of the thing. And, therefore, he not only does not, but he cannot will it. Such is his nature. Furthermore, it seems to be a subordinate law of the Will, allied to, and growing out of, that which has just been mentioned, although there is perhaps a little more uncertainty attending it, that the degree of the voluntary or volitive energy, in cases where belief actually exists, INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE. 169 will be in proportion, or nearly so, to the intensity or measure of belief. In other words, if our belief in the practicability of a thing is full and strong, the voluntary effort which we shall make will be likely, if other things do not concur to prevent this result, to partake of the en- ergy of our faith. And, on the other hand, if our belief be vacillating and weak, the natural result will be, that the volition, the effort of the voluntary faculty, will be proportionately vacillating and powerless. — (See on this subject, part i., chap, iv.) § 98. Statement of other lavjs that are involved in the constitution or nature of the will itself. Another law of the Will, involved in its own nature as that nature is ascertained by consciousness and general observation, is, that in its exercise it has exclusive relation to our own actions, and to whatever may he truly depen- dent upon us, but not to anything beyond this limit. — This law of the Will's action has been already (part i., chap, iv.) so fully explained and illustrated by examples, that it is unnecessary to delay upon it here. We may refer here also to the law of the Will, that its action is always prospective ; always looks forward to the future. It is not like the feelings of regret and remorse, for instance, that are always looking backward ; it is not like the memory, which is continually diving after and bringing up images from the abyss of things that are gone by ; but, although present in itself, it continually contemplates results that are in futurity. And such is its nature, that it cannot act otherwise. — We may add to this enumeration of the ascertained and determinate principles of the Will's action the fact, that the degree or strength P 170 LAWS OF THE WILL of the volitive effort or volition will depend not only upon our belief in the practicability of the thing before us, but also upon the particular state of the sensibilities at the time. If, for instance, our desires are strong, the voli- tions to which they give rise will possess a correspond- ing degree of strength, unless there is a counteracting cause in the opposition of the moral feelings. And if both the Natural and the Moral sensibility, the feelings of moral obligation as well as the desires, happen to be in the same direction, the voluntary energy will be propor- tionately increased. — The reader will, without difficulty, apply these statements to the general subject under con- sideration. § 100. Proof on the subject before us from instances of -predominant emotion and passion. There is another train of thought, which naturally presents itself to notice in the present chapter. We refer to instances of predominant emotion and passion, and the effect of such predominance in its relation to the acts of the Will. He who has made human nature a study, either in the past annals of the human race or within the range of his own personal observation, must have frequently noticed individuals in whom the passions have become so strong as to encroach upon the domain of the voluntary power, and to bring it into subjection. No matter what the passion is, (whether attachment to one's intimate friends, or attachment to one's country and the place of his birth, or the love of pleasure, or the desire of acquiring property, or jealousy, or party zeal, or ha- tred, or ambition,) instances are everywhere found in so- ciety of the existence of the particular passion, whatever INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATUKE. 171 it may be, in such overwhelming strength as to make the man a slave to it. We might bring forward instances, and show more dis- tinctly what we mean, were it not that they will find a more appropriate place in another chapter in a subsequent part of the work, where we shall endeavour to explain what we understand by Enthralment or Slavery of the Will. But we may probably assume here, without hesi- tation, as a fact well known and readily admitted, that such instances exist ; that men, submitting to the influ- ence of a predominant passion, lose in a great degree that voluntary power which characterizes and ennobles human nature. In respect to certain persons, places, and objects, the Will, which, in its connexion with other persons, and places, and objects, was operative and effective, has lost its power, is entirely quiescent and subdued ; and if it makes at times w r hat may be called an appreciable effort, it certainly fails to make an available one, and oftentimes this is a permanent state of things. It is fre- quently the case, that no lapse of time, no completeness of seclusion, no advice and consolation of friends, can weaken the controlling and inordinate influence, what- ever it is ; and thus, by liberating the Will, restore the parts of the mind to their true and appropriate position. But it certainly seems very obvious, if the Will is thus sometimes made captive to the passions, that there must be a real and operative connexion between the Will and the passions. In other words, there must be some fixed relations existing between the different parts of the mind, and a reciprocal influence propagated from one part to another. And it seems to be a natural consequence of this, that the Will must be regarded as being, in some true and real sense, subject to laws. 172 LAWS OF THE WILL § 101. Of the sense in which the proposition under con- sideration is to be understood. We wish to pause here in the discussion for the purpose of making a single remark. We have laid down and endeavoured to prove, by what may be called a cumula- tive process of argument, the general proposition, that the will has its laws. And, in doing tins, we have had occasion to point out some of them. But what we wish to remark now is this. — In predicating laws of the Will, we do not mean to assert (and perhaps the reader suffi- ciently understands this already) that the Will has laws in the same sense in which a piece of wood, or a tree, or a pendulum, or a clock, or a watch, or any other pure- ly material object, has laws. When we assert that the Will is subject to law, the terms of the proposition must of course be modified by the nature of the subject, and be explained in conformity with that nature. Nor are we to suppose that any practical mystery or difficulty necessarily attends this modification. We speak, for instance, of the power of the human mind ; and we also speak of the power of the steam-engine ; but there is evidently no difficulty in making the requisite modifica- tion of the import of the term power in these two cases. And so in the case before us. We apply the term laws to the mind as well as to matter; but obviously with some modification of meaning, resulting from the nature of the subject. Nor does the necessity of this modifica- tion perplex the proper apprehension or understanding of the terms which we thus use. Numberless propositions, having a relation to mind, and which, in their mental ap- plication, are somewhat modified in meaning, are as well INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE. 173 understood as other propositions which have exclusive re- lation to material things. Furthermore, it is well understood and acknowledged, that we can very properly, and with a clear apprehension of the import of the terms, predicate laws of the other parts of the mind, of the perceptive pow r er, of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, and other powers. And if we can predicate law r s of spiritual existence, or spiritual attributes, or spiritual action in any case whatever, we do not see why we cannot equally well predicate them, with the modification which has just been mentioned, of the human Will. The proposition, therefore, which we have been consid- ering, has a distinct and substantive meaning. And, as having such, it admits of the application of inquiry and argument, and is susceptible of being either affirmed or denied; and we leave it to the reader to determine whether the facts and circumstances which have been brought up in reference to it admit of any possible ex- planation, except on the ground of its undoubted truth. P2 174 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY CHAPTER VI. THE LAW OF CAUSALITY AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. § 102. Of certain laws or principles which extend to all classes of objects. There yet remain some particulars, in respect to which we may perhaps find it profitable to pursue this general subject a little further. It is well known that there are certain laws which do not originate in the nature of the Will, nor is it easy to say where they do originate, except it be in the Divine Mind itself; but which, nevertheless, we suppose to be applicable to the Will's exercises. The laws to which we now have reference are of a high and peculiar character, and on various accounts are wor- thy of particular attention. They are understood to ap- ply, unless any should undertake to find an exception in the Will, to all objects and all classes of objects whatever. The first law of this kind which we propose to con- sider, may be denominated the law of Causation or Caus- ality. Expressed in the more common form, the princi- ple of law which we now refer to is simply this. Every effect has a cause. But, stated in language more ex- plicit, and less liable, as we apprehend, to misconception, it may be given as follows. There is no beginning or CHANGE OF EXISTENCE WITHOUT A CAUSE. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 175 § 103. A belief in the law of causality founded in the peculiar structure of the human mind. If the principle, (or primary truth, as it may well be denominated,) that there is no beginning or change of ex- istence without a cause, were examined in all its bearings, and with much minuteness of detail, the examination would spread itself over the pages of a volume. With- out proposing, however, to enter into the subject at much length, which would be inconsistent with our limits, we shall proceed to offer a few remarks which may tend to its illustration. In explanation of the great law of Causality, our first remark is, that the human mind is so constituted, that all events and all objects of knowledge whatever are made known to it in time. And, in connexion with this remark, we may add, there is no apprehension or knowledge of time, (we speak now of the human, and not of the di- vine intellect,) except by means of succession. It seems to be universally admitted by those who have given spe- cial attention to the inquiry, that the occasion on which we have the idea of duration suggested or called forth within us, is succession ; particularly that succession of thought and feeling, of which we are conscious as taking place internally. Hence the structure of the human mind requires, (what, indeed, a constant experience also teaches us,) that all those objects of knowledge, which in the view of the mind have a distinct and separate exist- ence, should be contemplated as successive to each other ; in other words, all the distinct objects of knowledge, of whatever kind, arrange themselves as antecedents and se- quents. Hence it happens that we are led, at a very 176 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY early period, to frame the ideas of antecedence and se- quence, since nature from the very first is necessarily (that is to say, by virtue of our mental constitution) pre- sented to us and pressed upon our notice under this as- pect. It is different with the intellectual perception, the mind of the Supreme Being, who is not necessitated to become acquainted with objects in this peculiar form or mode ; but perceives all events and all objects of knowl- edge simultaneously, and spread out before Him, as it were, on a map. It seems obvious, therefore, that the basis of the belief which is accorded to the great law of Causality is deep- ly laid in the peculiar structure of the human soul. The law not only exists, (that is to say, it is not only a great principle in nature, that all facts and events arrange themselves as antecedents and sequences, and sustain the relation of cause and effect,) but the structure of the mind itself is such that it naturally, and, as it were, with its earliest breath, imbibes a knowledge of it. § 104. Of the universality of belief in the law of causality. Accordingly, from the earliest period of our lives, we are naturally led, by the inherent and permanent tenden- cies of our mental constitution, to contemplate objects in this way. All objects which are both distinct and separ- ate in themselves, and are contemplated separately from each other by the mind, necessarily pass before the intel- lectual view in succession. They appear and disappear, one after another, in a sort of perennial movement, ari- sing in the course of the mind's action from darkness to light, and then again waning into evanescence, and wrapping themselves in clouds. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 177 It is in this way we are made acquainted with the gen- eral idea of succession. But this is not all. By a care- ful observation of what takes place both within and around us, we are soon enabled to distinguish one succes- sion from another ; that succession, for instance, which is unfixed and variable, from that which is always the same. In other words, we soon ascertain from our experience that certain facts and events are preceded by other fixed and invariable facts and events, and that the former never take place without the antecedent existence of the latter. This is the universal experience in regard to a great num- ber of facts and events, viz., that they are thus invariably connected together. And it is this form of our experi- ence in particular, from which no one is exempt, which furnishes the occasion of the universal and unalterable belief, arising naturally and necessarily in the human mind, and existing in all ages and places in the w T orld, that every effect, meaning by the term whatever takes place or begins to exist, has a cause. We say, existing in all ages and places of the world, for this undoubtedly is found to be the simple and real fact, so far as any in- quiry has been made on the subject ; and which is ascer- tained so extensively as to warrant the further extension of it by analogy to every human being. This proposi- tion, which may be termed the law of causality, is one of those transcendental or primary truths which lay at the foundation of all knowledge. The belief which is involved in it is unprompted, spontaneous, and original ; it is the necessary growth of the mind's action, in the cir- cumstances in which we are placed; and so far from being the result of reasoning, which is the foundation of so large a portion of our knowledge, it is entirely ante- cedent to it, and is to be regarded as one of those things 178 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY on which the reasoning power itself essentially depends, as one of its primitive and indispensable bases. § 105. Of the classification into Preparative and Effective causes. It is true that men, after a time, learn to comment on this fundamental proposition, and to make distinctions. After their increased experience has enabled them to draw the line between the things animate and inanimate, material and immaterial, and especially after they have learned more fully the nature and the appropriate resi- dence of that great element of mind which we denomi- nate Power, they begin to make a distinction, which, un- doubtedly, is a well-founded one, between efficient or ef- fective causes, which imply the exercise of power, and other causes, which furnish merely the preparation or oc- casion of what follows. — These two classes of causes, therefore, might not improperly be denominated and char- acterized, in order to aid in distinguishing them from each other, respectively as Preparative and Effective causes. Certain it is, that such a distinction is to be made ; and that without it the fundamental principle of the universality of causation does not hold true. Both of these classes of causes imply the notion of invariable antecedence ; but they differ in this. Preparative causes (if, for the want of a better term, we may be permitted so to call them) furnish merely the ground or occasion of what is to follow ; while Effective causes imply not only the ground or occasion of what follows, but the actual efficiency or power which brings it to pass. Effective causes have power in themselves; while Preparative causes only furnish the appropriate and necessary occa- AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 179 sions, on which the power, that is lodged somewhere else, exercises itself. Both classes are prerequisite and neces- sary to their appropriate results or effects ; but the one class, having efficiency in itself, is strictly operative, and may be considered as actually making or bringing to pass the effect, whatever it may be ; but the other class, which is destitute of efficiency in itself, is merely the preparato- ry circumstance, occasion, or condition, on which what is called the effect, either in virtue of its own power or some attendant power extraneous to itself, invariably takes place. § 106. Mature of Preparative and Effective causes. It might, perhaps, be proper, in this place, to illustrate briefly the distinction between the two classes of causes which have been mentioned. — We proceed to say, there- fore, that all natural or physical causes are, in themselves, and considered in their own nature, merely Preparative, and not Effective. That which is Effective implies pow- er ; and power is an attribute of mind, but not of matter. The rain, for instance, is a Preparative cause of the growth of corn. The corn will not grow without it. But the Efficient or Effective cause is the power of God, exerted, in accordance with his own instituted order of things, to render the rain available in the product and growth of the plant. — So the ploughing of the ground and the sow- ing of the seed are Preparative causes ; and without them the product, whatever it is, does not make its appearance. Nevertheless, the Effective cause, which is always an at- tribute of mind, must attend them. Both classes of causes are found to exist in the human mind. We propose, for instance, to go to a certain place ; 180 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY and not only this, we have a desire to go. The desire, in this case, is the Motive or Preparative cause to the vo- lition ; which volition, in its turn, is the Effective cause to the act of going forth. So that volition is so placed, in the economy of things, as to sustain, not only the twofold relation of antecedence and sequence, but to involve in itself, and that, too, in entire consistency with the unity of its nature, the twofold element of dependence and power, of subordination and control. This is a very remarkable trait in volition ; and there have been a multitude of dis- putes in consequence of not understanding it. We desire to say further, it is important to keep in mind the distinction which has been made between these two classes of causes, the Preparative and Effective. It is with this distinction in view, and not otherwise, that we assert the universality of causation ; in other words, that every effect has a cause. And accordingly, we repeat, that it is the universal belief of men, evinced alike by their words and their conduct, that without a cause there is neither any beginning nor any change of existence. § 107. Opinions of various philosophers on this subject. Probably on no topic whatever can we find a greater agreement and a more decided concurrence of testimony, than in respect to the fundamental proposition now before us. We shall here introduce to the notice of the reader some passages which will show that this remark is not unadvisedly made. Archbishop King. — In the celebrated Treatise of this learned and acute writer on the Origin of Evil, we find it maintained in a number of passages, that, although there is a great First Cause or original and uncreated Active AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 181 Principle, all other things whatever, whether material or immaterial, are dependent upon, and are connected with, that original Active Power, in the unbroken chain and succession of effects and causes, however remote that de- pendence and connexion may be. " We are certain," he remarks in his inquiries concerning the First Cause or God, " that all other things come from this Active Prin- ciple. For nothing else, as we have shown before, con- tains in itself necessary existence or active power, entirely independent of any other. As, therefore, itself is from none, so all others are from, it. For from hence we con- clude that this Principle does exist, because, after consid- ering the rest of the things which do exist, we perceive that they could neither be nor act, if that had not existed and excited motion in them."* Dr. Clakke. — In the Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, we find the subject under examination referred to by this distinguished writer in the following terms. — "It is absolutely and undeniably certain, that something has existed from all eternity. This is so evi- dent and undeniable a proposition, that no atheist in any age has ever presumed to assert the contrary ; and, there- fore, there is little need of being particular in the proof of it. For, since something now is, it is evident that something always was : otherwise the things that now are must have been produced out of nothing, absolutely and without a cause ; which is a plain contradiction in terms. For to say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no cause at all of that production, is to say that something is effected, when it is effected by nothing ; that is, at the same time when it is not effected at all. What- ever exists has a cause, a reason, a ground of its exist- * Essay concerning the Origin of Evil, ch. i., § iii. Q 182 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY ence ; (a foundation on which its existence relies ; a ground or reason why it doth exist rather than not exist ;) either in the necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal ; or in the will of some other being, and then that other being must, at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed before it"* Lord Kames. — " That nothing can happen without a cause, is a principle embraced by all men, the illiterate and ignorant as well as the learned. Nothing that hap- pens is conceived as happening of itself, but as an effect produced by some other thing. However ignorant of the cause, we notwithstanding conclude that every event must have a cause. We should, perhaps, be at a loss to deduce this principle from any premises by a chain of reasoning. But perception affords conviction, where rea- son leaves us in the dark. We perceive the proposition to be true. And, indeed, a sentiment common to all must be founded on the common nature of all"f Mr. Stewart. — " It may be safely pronounced to be impossible for a person to bring himself for a moment to believe, that any change may take place in the material universe without a cause. I can conceive very easily that the volition in my mind is not the efficient cause of the motions of my hand ; but can I conceive that my hand moves without any cause whatever 1 In the case of every change around us, without exception, we have an irresist- ible conviction of the operation of some cause." J Dr. Dwight. — "The mind cannot realize the fact, that existence or change can take place without a cause. * Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. i. t Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, Lond., 2d ed., Essay iii. X Stewart's Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, book iii., ch. ii., § i. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 183 This is, at least, true with respect to my own mind. I have very often made the attempt, and with no small painstaking, but never been able to succeed at all. Sup- posing other minds to have the same general nature with my own, I conclude that all others will find the same want of success. If nothing had originally existed, I cannot possibly realize that anything could ever have ex- isted."* § 108. Opinions of President Edwards on this subject. In addition to these respectable testimonies, without re- ferring to a multitude of others not less explicit, we may adduce that of President Edwards, as it is found in his able Inquiry into the Will ; and which is the more valu- able, as it comes from a writer not only of the most dis- tinguished ability, but who had given particular attention to this very subject. — " Having thus explained," says President Edwards, " what I mean by cause, I assert, that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchange- able. But as to all things that begin to be, they are not . self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves. — That whatsoever be- gins to be, which before was not, must have a cause why it begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate of the com- mon and natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or to come. "And this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes, or things and the manner and cir- * Dwight's Theology, Sermon L, on the Existence of God. 184 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY cumstances of things. Thus, if we see a body, which has hitherto been at rest, start out of a state of rest and begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so, if a body which had hitherto moved in a certain direction should suddenly change the direction of its motion ; or if it should put off its old figure and take a new one, or change its colour, the beginning of these new modes is a new event, and the mind of mankind ne- cessarily supposes that there is some cause or reason of them."* § 109. Results of a denial of the law of causality. One or two remarks remain to be made, showing the importance of the doctrine we have been considering. — First. Our belief in an external, material world is, in some degree, founded upon it. We have, for instance, the various sensations of taste, smell, sound, touch, and sight ; but it will be noticed that, in themselves consider- ed, they are purely internal, and are as much attributes of the soul as the emotions of cheerfulness, and joy, and sorrow, and wonder. It is to be noticed further, that, as matters of consciousness, we take cognizance of their mere existence, and of nothing more than their mere existence, * Edwards's Inquiry into the Will, part ii., § iii. — A number of other American writers, of less celebrity undoubtedly than Presidents Edwards and Dwight, but still of great weight, have maintained the principle un- der discussion. See, among other works, Dr. Stephen West's Essay on Moral Agency, part i., § v., vi. ; and Dr. Burton's Essays on some of the First Principles of Metaphysics, &c, Essay xiii. — See also, in con- nexion with this subject, a recent English Work of Dr. Abercrombie, entitled, Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, part ii., § ii. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 185 till the great law of Causality, which has established itself in our convictions from the first dawning of the intellect, and which constantly presses itself on our notice, leads us to inquire, Whence come these sensations 1 What is it that fills us with sensations of sound, and developes in the soul these visions of visible form and beauty 1 It is thus we are led to seek the grounds of these inward sensations in outward objects, and to recognise and admit the exist- ence of a world of matter. So that if men could be made to believe that there may be effects without causes, and could thus disconnect their inward sensations from all outward antecedents, they might consistently regard all other existences as identified and imbodied in their own, and pronounce everything which seemed not to be in themselves mere unsubstantial images, chimeras, and illu- sory appearances. Second. If we deny and reject the law of Causality, it does not appear how we can prove, in that case, the ex- istence of the Supreme Being. The Apostle assures us, that the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and Godhead, are made known from the things which are created. And who, it may be asked, is able to cast his eye over the expanded face of nature, decorated with countless forms of life and beauty, without everywhere reading the stamp and signatures of a higher Power? We reason upward, from the things which are made to the Maker. But the process of reasoning which we thus employ in proof of a Divine existence from the works of nature, must evidently have some foundation, something to rest upon. Nature presents the facts, and the facts merely, and not the fundamental principle, that is neces- sary to render them available in a process of reasoning. And what is this fundamental principle 1 WTiat is it that Q2 186 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY sustains the reasoning process ? — In answer to this inquiry, all w T e can say is, that its basis is in this very proposition which we have made the subject of our consideration ; in the great and fundamental truth of causation. And with- out that truth, the argument has not an inch of ground on which it can support itself. But if, on the other hand, it be true, that every effect has its cause, then may the universe of effects around us, bound together as it is by the evidences of a pervading unity as well as expansive ttnd pervading wisdom, justly claim for itself, in its crea- tion, the agency of a Supreme Being, and thus lead our belief upward from the things that are made to the con- ception and belief of the great author of them. Third. If we deny and reject the doctrine of Causality, we are not only unable to prove the existence of the Deity, but there is, in fact, no Deity whose existence is to be proved. — The term Deity, in the sense commonly at- tached to it, includes particularly the ideas of Omniscience and Superintendence. But obviously, if the doctrine of Causality be not true, there is no basis whatever either for the one or the other of these attributes of the Supreme Being. If effects can take place without causes ; if events can happen without being connected in any way with anything antecedent, then there is evidently no tie which can effectually unite them, either with the Divine mind or with any other mind. They stand insulated and apart from everythin else ; they come and go, through the great and universal ordering and arrangement of things, like strangers from an unknown land, whose advent and departure are alike beyond all anticipation and knowl- edge, The vast and boundless empire, of which God stands at the head, would be flooded by events in which he would have no agency, and of which he could have AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 187 had no antecedent conception. Instead of the harmony and unity, which now everywhere exist and -everywhere diffuse happiness, there would be the return of chaos ; a universal breaking-up of the established system of things ; the reign of chance and tumult, of confusion and discord. But the law of Causality hushes the confusion, arranges the discordant materials, and brings everything into order. § 110. Application of the views of this chapter to the will. Our object in introducing the views of this chapter, although they are interesting topics of consideration in other respects, must be obvious. They apply directly to the will ; and, if we do not misapprehend their bearing, they decisively support the doctrine, that the Voluntary power, whatever may be true in respect to its freedom, is still not exempt fkom law. If there be any primary ele- ment of human reason whatever, any undoubted and fun- damental truth evolved from the very structure of the mind and exacting a universal assent, it is the one imder consid- eration. But if the Will is exempt from the superintend- ence of all law, if its acts have respect to no antecedent, and are regulated by no conditions, then this fundament- al proposition is not true, and has no existence. But if, on the other hand, in compliance with the dictates of our nature, and the indispensable requirements of our situa- tion, we adhere to this truth in all that unlimited length and breadth which constitutes its value, we shall, of course, assign to every act of the will a Cause. Let it be noticed, however, that we do not specify here the precise nature of the cause. We use the term cause here, as we have done in all that has been said, in its broadest sense, as meaning, according to the nature of 188 THE LAW OF CAUSALITY the subject spoken of, either the mere antecedent occasion, or the antecedent combined with power ; as expressing either the Effective cause, which truly makes the sequence, or the Preparative cause, which is merely a condition of the existence of such sequence. In the language of Pres- ident Edwards, who endeavoured to prevent his being misunderstood, by taking particular precautions in respect to this term, we employ it " to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on wdiich an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstances of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is, rather than not, or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise."* In this com- prehensive sense of the term, we hold it to be undeniably true, that there is no act of the will, no volition without a cause. And this being the case, it is, of course, implied that the Will itself, from which the act or volition origi- nates, is subject to some principles of regulation ; in other words, HAS ITS LAWS. § 111. Of the common and practical application of these views. That the law of Causality is applicable to the Will, is a dictate of common experience and of common sense, as well as the result of philosophical analysis. Accord- ingly, it will be found, that in all our estimates of human character, as it has developed itself at any former time, we take this law for granted. And this, too, not only in its more general application to all things which begin to exist, but in its application to the human Will. If, in any case whatever, we ascribe merit to a man, or charge him * Edwards's Inquiry into the Will, part ii., § iii. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 189 with crime, we necessarily involve that his conduct, which is the basis of our judgment, was not accidental, but had its antecedent, its cause, its motive. This is particularly true of History. All history may be considered under two points of view, viz., Statistical and Philosophical. So far as it is statistical, it is merely a collection of facts, and does not involve the application of the law of Causality to the Will ; but, so far as it is philosophical, which is the higher and nobler aspect in which it presents itself, it involves it continually. To know how men acted may indeed be a matter of interest ; but to know why they acted as they did rather than other- wise, is, to the sober and philosophic inquirer, a matter of still greater interest. But whenever we put the question why they acted in any given manner rather than another, we necessarily imply that there are principles of action, and that every action has its cause. And this, of course, involves the application of the law of Causality to the human Will. Hence the propriety and philosophic good sense of Mr. Hume's remarks. — " Would you know," says this writer, " the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans 1 Study well the temper and ac- tions of the French and English. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the obser- vations which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular 190 THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY springs of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by w r hich the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science ; in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by Apjstotle and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie under our observ a- tion, than the men, described by Polybius and Tacitus, are to those w T ho now govern the world."* CHAPTER Vn. THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. § 112. Belief of men in the continued uniformity of nature's operations. Another principle, or law of practically universal appli- cation, one which, like the preceding, is considered funda- mental to the due exercise of the reasoning power in the ordinary occasions of its exercise, and the truth of which seems to be universally admitted, is this, that there is a 'permanency and uniformity in the operations of nature. When we assert, as we cannot hesitate to do, that this principle is accordant with the common belief of mankind, and that it is universally admitted, we are not aware of * Hume's Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding, Essay viii. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 191 asserting anything more than what is obvious every hour in the ordinary conversation and conduct of men. Is not such the case 1 Does not the slightest observation show it 1 All men believe that the setting sun will arise again at the appointed hour; that the rains will descend and the winds blow, and that the frosts and the snows will cover the earth, essentially the same as they have done heretofore ; that the decaying plants of autumn will revive in the spring ; that the tides of the ocean will continue to heave as in times past ; and that there will be the return and the alternation of heat and cold ; and that the streams and rivers will continue to flow in their courses. Their conduct clearly proves, in all these cases, and in all in- stances analogous to them, the existence of a belief in the principle of uniformity above mentioned, which seems deeply founded, constant, and unwavering in the very highest degree. If they doubted, they certainly would not live, and would not act, and would not feel, as they are now seen to do. It is with this belief that they lie down amid the evening shadows and sleep in quietness ; it is with this belief they arise in the light of the morning, and till the reluctant earth in the sweat of their brow ; it is with this belief that they store their minds with knowl- edge which, without the belief, they could never imagine to be at all available to them ; it is under the control of the same immoveable conviction that they rear their habi- tations, and provide, in various ways, for the good and the evil, the joys and the sufferings of the future. We are desirous of not being misunderstood in the statement of this great practical and fundamental princi- ple. This principle, although it is an elementary and fundamental one, seems to be, in some sense, subordinate to the law or principle of causality. The latter partakes 192 THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY more of a transcendental nature. We not only fully be- lieve it, but it is impossible not to believe. It is as im- possible for us to believe that existences can be brought into being without a cause, or, in other words, that no- thing can produce something, as to believe that the part is greater than the whole. But in respect to the other principle, although we are so constituted as fully to be- lieve the affirmative, we do not necessarily believe the absolute impossibility of the negative. In other words, while, by our very constitution, we believe in the uni- formity of nature in all its relations and bearings upon ourselves, we do not necessarily preclude the possible in- terposition of that Being on whom all nature depends. Our belief is undoubtedly subject to that limitation. § 113. This belief exists in reference to mind as well as matter. But while the statements now made are assented to, in relation to the material world and outward objects in general, it may be supposed that they do not hold good in relation to the mind of man, and spiritual or mental ob- jects. But this is an erroneous supposition. There are no sufficient grounds for maintaining that men intend to limit the application of the principle in question to mere material things ; but, on the contrary, they undoubtedly regard it as extending to mind, so far as comes within the reach of their observation, and by analogy to all minds in all parts of the universe. In other words, they believe there is a uniformity in mental as well as in material ac- tion. Certainly it must have come within the observa- tion of every one, that men act precisely as if this were the case. It is admitted on all sides that men plant their AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 193 grounds in the spring, with the full expectation and con- fidence that the operations of nature will be essentially the same as they have been, and that vernal labours will be enriched with autumnal rewards. But do they not exhibit a similar confident expectation in their intercourse with each other 1 Does not the parent till the mind of his child, in the full expectation of a mental harvest ? Do not men make promises, and form covenants, and incur responsibilities to an extent and with an assurance which can be explained only on the ground that they regard the law of uniformity as being applicable to mental as well as physical nature 1 Without this belief, no contracts be- tween man and man would be formed ; no business trans- actions, involving future liabilities and duties, would be carried on ; no domestic relationships would be establish- ed ; but everything would be thrown into utter confusion and perplexity ; and even the bonds of society, without which man can hardly exist and certainly cannot be hap- py, would be loosened and torn asunder. So that the situation and conduct of men may, in this case, be regard- ed as proofs of what they believe. And, being so regard- ed, they clearly indicate and prove the general and decided conviction among them, that there is an established and uniform order in the mental operations of mankind, which, if not perfectly analogous, is as much so as the different natures of matter and mind will permit, to the regular course of things which we constantly observe in the phys- ical world. § 114. Circumstances under which this belief arises. It ought, perhaps, to be added, in explanation of this belief in the permanency and uniformity, both of material R 194 THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY and mental nature, that it does not appear to arise and exist in its full strength at once. It seems to have its birth at first in some particular instance ; and then again is called into existence in another instance; and then subsequently in another and another ; till ultimately we are led to regard that permanency and uniformity to which it relates as of universal application, with the sin- gle exception already referred to, viz., the possible inter- position of that great Being on whom all nature depends. As the belief arises in this gradual way, we may well suppose, that, in the early periods of its origin and growth, it is comparatively weak ; but it soon acquires great strength ; so much so, that every day and hour we do not hesitate to make it the basis of our conduct. Even in our childhood and youth, it had become in our minds a fixed principle, which, in ordinary cases, we no more thought of questioning, than we did the facts of our per- sonality and personal identity. We always looked upon nature, even at that early period, as firm, unshaken, im- moveable ; as going forth, in all the varieties of her ac- tion, to the undoubted attainment of certain definite ends, and as announcing, in the facts of the past, a most perfect pledge of what was to come. § 115. Of the true idea of chance, in distinction from uniformity. We cannot hesitate to assert, that the belief in ques- tion is accordant with fact. The mind in this respect, as in others, corresponds with the operations and course of things around it. They are mutually adapted to each other. But if others have less confidence in these asser- tions, we would propose to them to consider a moment AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 195 the opposite of the uniformity contended for, viz., contin- gency or chance. We must either take law, which im- plies a uniformity of operations, or chance, which implies none. There is no other alternative. But what is chance 1 Does it express any fact or position in knowl- edge ; or have relation merely to the existence of human ignorance 1 Evidently the latter. And hence it hap- pens, that what is considered and called chance by one, is far from being so considered by another, who has a deeper insight into it. And in all cases whatever, the in- crease of knowledge will diminish what are considered the domains of chance by those who are incapable of fully exploring them. Some person says, for instance, it is a mere chance whether the American Congress or the English Parliament will pass such or such an act in their coming session. But if this person could fully penetrate the hearts of all the members, their convictions, interests, prejudices, and moral sentiments, it w r ould no longer be chance, but become certainty. Accordingly, when men assert the occurrence of a thing by chance, it cannot be supposed that they truly mean to assert (for a voice within them, an original im- pulse of their own nature, assures them of the contrary) that the thing in question happens without any occasion or reason, and wholly independent of the law of uniform- ity. Their notions will perhaps be indistinct, and it is possible they may entertain some such idea at first ; but if they will only analyze their thoughts, they will be con- vinced they cannot, with any sort of propriety, intend to express by it anything more than their own want of knowledge. In other words, when a thing happens by chance, it happens by chance in respect to them. That is to say, they are not able to comprehend and explain how it happens ; it comes in a way they know not how ; 196 THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY and as they can attach to it no law, it has the appearance to them of being without law. And it is this appearance undoubtedly, rather than the reality of the absence of causation and of uniformity, which they intend to express when they use the word in question. § 1 16. Grounds or foundation of this belief It will perhaps be inquired, what is the foundation of the deep belief which so universally attaches itself to the great principle of a permanency and uniformity in nature 1 To what part of our constitution is it to be referred ? — It would, perhaps, be a natural explanation to suggest, that it is founded upon acts of reasoning. But, on examina- tion, this does not appear to be the case. We do indeed sometimes speak, as we had occasion to remark on a former occasion, in some such manner as follows : The sun rose to-day, therefore it will do the same to-morrow ; Food nourished us to-day, therefore it will do the same to-morrow, &c. ; a mode of expression which seems to imply, that the uniformity of the future is inferred or de- duced from the facts of the past by a train of reasoning. But certainly it is not difficult to see that something is here wanting ; that a link in the chain of reasoning must be supplied in order to make it cohere ; and that, conse- quently, there is merely the appearance or form of rea- soning without the reality. The mere naked fact that the sun rose to-day, without anything else being connect- ed with it, affords not the least ground for the inference that it will rise again ; and the same may be said of all similar instances. We cannot, therefore, prove the uni- formity in question in this way.* * See some remarks on the Law of Uniformity, and also on that of Causality, in the chapter on Primary Truths, in the first volume. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 197 But if reasoning is not the basis on which it rests, and if we can give no other satisfactory explanation of its origin, (and it does not appear that we can,) all we can say is, that the belief which men so universally have of such uniformity is the gift of nature ; that it is neither taught to them by a deduction from other principles, nor communicated by any other secondary process whatever 5 but is produced or arises naturally within them ; the ne- cessary and infallible growth and product of their mental constitution. In other words, the very structure of our minds requires us to assume as a certainty and truth, that there will be, in time to come as in time past, this alle- ged permanency and uniformity in the operations which are going on in the various departments of nature, both mental and material. Certain it is, no one appears to doubt that such will be the case, although no one can bring proof of the fact, except such as is furnished by the irresistible suggestions of his own internal being. So that the principle of uniformity, like that of causality, is something antecedent to reasoning, and not subsequent to it ; something beyond and above reasoning, and not de- pendent on it ; one of those original and substantial col- umns, implanted within us by the provident care of na- ture, which the reasoning power could never have placed there, but upon which that power, as it does upon the other great principle just referred to, subsequently erects its magnificent structures. § 117. Reference to the opinions of Reid and Ahercrombie. It is proper to remark, that we do not by any means pro- pose these views as novel ; nor, on the other hand, do our limits permit us to introduce passages at much length R2 198 THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY for the purpose of showing how often and how ably they have been maintained by distinguished writers. We feel at liberty to make but one or two references out of a mul- titude of others not less explicit. — " In the phenomena of nature," says Dr. Reid, " what is to be, will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances. We must have this conviction as soon as we are capable of learning anything from experience ; for all experience is grounded upon a belief that the future will be like the past. Take away this principle, and the experience of a hundred years makes us no wiser with regard to what is to come. "This is one of those principles which, when we grow up and observe the course of nature, we can confirm by reasoning. We perceive that nature is governed by fixed laws, and that, if it were not so, there could be no such thing as prudence in human conduct ; there would be no fitness in any means to promote an end ; and what on one occasion promoted it, might as probably, on another occasion, obstruct it. " But the principle is necessary for us before we are able to discover it by reasoning, and, therefore, is made a part of our constitution, and produces its effects before the use of reason."* Dr. Abercrombie, in a recent philosophical Work char- acterized by its sober and practical good sense, speaks of certain first truths, " which are not the result of any process of reasoning, but force themselves, with a convic- tion of infallible certainty, upon every sound understand- ing, without regard to its logical habits or powers of in- duction." Among these, he expressly and particularly includes " a confidence in the uniformity of nature ; or, * Reid's Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay v. AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 199 that the same substance will always exhibit the same characters ; and that the same cause, under the same cir- cumstances, will always be followed by the same effect. This, as a first truth, is a fundamental and instinctive con- viction."* § 118. Application of these views to the will. And now let us inquire how the law of Uniformity, which, in all its aspects, is a subject of interesting philo- sophical inquiry, will apply to the general topic under con- sideration. Does not the existence of this Law furnish an argument of much weight in respect to the regulation of the Will % It will be kept in mind, that the Law in question is understood to apply, without exception, to everything whatever, both mental and material, which has properties, attributes, or acts ; subject only, like the law of Causality, to the modification which the nature of the thing or ob- ject, to which it attaches itself, naturally implies. And, as thus stated and understood, it is received and maintain- ed by writers of great discernment, among whom Mr. Stewart, who is not apt to commit himself in favour of any position of doubtful strength, as well as Dr. Reid and Dr. Abercrombie, may be included. It applies, therefore, to the human Will. And this view is in entire accordance with the common sentiments and practices of mankind. — Men, for instance, are constantly operating upon each other, endeavouring, for some purpose or other, to regulate, influence, and con- trol the conduct of others. And what methods do they employ 1 It is evident that they cannot possibly control * Abercrombie's Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, part iii., $ iv. 200 THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY the conduct of their fellow-men, except by operating on the "Will. And the course which, in accordance with this view, we find them taking, is that of applying prom- ises, threatenings, encouragements, and exhortations. They address these, and other like considerations, to those whose conduct they desire to influence, as motives ; expecting, as they think they have abundant reason to, that they will be received and have their influence as such. These are the means they employ ; and no one is ignorant that in the employment of them they meet with a great degree of success. But if the action of the Will were not regulated by some permanent principles, and particularly if it were not reached and regulated by the law of uniformity, it is evident that this could not happen. § 119. Application of these views to sciences having rela- tion to human conduct. Looking at the constitution of the human mind in this point of view, we perceive a foundation for some remarks of D'Israeli. — " The aruspex," says this interesting wri- ter, " the augur, and the astrologer, have vanished with their own superstitions ; but the moral and the political predictor, proceeding on principles authorized by nature and experience, has become more skilful in his observa- tions on the phenomena of human history; and it has often happened that a tolerable philosopher has not made an indifferent prophet." Proceeding to apply this remark of D'Israeli, the im- port of which is, that, by means of a philosophic notice of phenomena in the past, we may gain a prophetic insight into the future, we may lay down the doctrine that all sciences, which have reference to the conduct of men AS APPLICABLE TO THE WILL. 201 prospectively, are based upon the doctrine that the Will is subject to law, particularly the law of uniformity. Such are the sciences of Moral Philosophy, Political Phi- losophy, Political Economy, and International Law ; the doctrine of Crimes and Punishments ; the laws of Com- merce and Exchange ; and, in general, all sciences and forms of knowledge which involve the prospective analy- sis and regulation of human conduct. It is the object of these sciences, not only to tell us what men have done in certain circumstances in times past, but what they are expected to do in time to come, what it is their duty to do, and what they will do. Political Philosophy, for instance, has exhibited almost every possible variety of phasis, and asserted and maintain- ed almost every possible variety of sentiment, according as the writers have been the subjects of free or despotic states, or have been the advocates or opposers of a particular course of policy. The reader will at once call to mind the Republic and other political treatises of Plato, the De Re- publica of Cicero, the Prince of Machiavel, the Oceana of Harrington, the Leviathan of Hobbes, the Social Contract of Rousseau, the Spirit of Laws of Montesquieu, the Dis- courses of Sidney, the Federalist ; not to mention a multi- tude of other treatises of greater or less celebrity. It may be the case, that not one of these various treatises fully agrees with another ; and it is very certain that in many things they are very variant and conflicting ; but still there is in all, at the bottom, this fundamental principle, that human conduct, in its almost endless variety of develope- ment, may be referred to principles inherent in the mental constitution and of universal application. In this particu- lar, and so far as has now been asserted, writers are in harmony who in other things are infinitely apart ; the sla- 202 THE LAW OF UNIFORMITY. vish Hobbes with the patriotic Sidney, and Machiave] and Necker with Montesquieu and Madison. § 120. On the practical tendency of the general doctrine of law in its application to the Will. We might carry the view of the subject which now presents itself to our notice into other particulars. We might illustrate it, for instance, from the science of Polit- ical Economy, wdiich deals as much, by implication at least, with the constitution of the human mind, as it does with lands, machinery, rents, manufactures, and capital. We might inquire, furthermore, on what principle it is, that the orator who addresses an assembled multitude foresees and estimates with almost entire certainty the re- sults of his efforts. And we should find everywhere very striking evidence of the fact, that the law of Uniformity embraces in its applications the human W T ill. Perhaps, however, enough has been said, both in respect to the more general doctrine that the will has its laws, and also in the specification and enumeration of them. There re- mains only a word or two more in respect to its practical applications. We are not to regard this truth as practically unimpor- tant. Far from it. In a moral and religious point of ■view particularly, it is one of great value. It is no dis- honour to it, that, while it does not deprive us of freedom, it nevertheless keeps us in subordination. It is in this simple proposition of the Will's subjection to law that we find the golden link which binds us to the throne of God. If my Will is not subject to Law, then God is not my master. And, what is more, he is not only not so in fact, but it is impossible that he should be so. — But, on the NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 203 other hand ,if my Will is not independent in the sense of being beyond the reach of law, then the hand of the Al- mighty is upon me, and I cannot escape even if I would. The searching eye of the great Author of all things ever attends my path; and whether I love or hate, obey or rebel, I never can annul his authority or evade his juris- diction. CHAPTER VIII. NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. § 121. Of motives and their bearing upon the general doctrine of the will's subjection to law. In what has been said hitherto in this part of our work, our efforts have been directed almost exclusively to the single matter of showing that the wdll has its laws. In connexion with the main subject, however, and in illustration of the principal topic of discussion, we have had occasion to point out specifically what some of the Will's laws are. We are aware that, in support of the leading doctrine which has been before us, we have given little more than the outlines of an argument, and that in its details it might have been prosecuted at much greater length. And yet we are unable to renounce the conviction, that it establishes the important position in question, even in the imperfect form in which it has been presented. Certainly, if we did not think so, we should not consider it worth while to advance any further in our investigations; for if we did not feel confident that our own Will is sub- 204 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. ject to laws, we could not for a moment indulge the ex- pectation of the accomplishment of any proposed purpose or plan whatever. In enumerating the laws of the Will, it will be recol- lected as one of the positions laid down, that the Will never acts, and volitions never exist, except in connexion with Motives. We must here recur to the subject of Mo- tives again, as presenting one of the most interesting and important matters of inquiry in mental philosophy, par- ticularly in the philosophy of the Will. The doctrine of Motives is very closely connected, in a number of re- spects, with the general doctrine of the Will's subjection to law. In fact, motives seem to be at the foundation of the laws of Causality and Uniformity, and to reveal very naturally their precise nature and extent. § 122. Of the division of motives into Internal and External. It is necessary, in order to have a thorough knowledge of Motives, to contemplate them in various points of view. Considered, in the first place, in reference to their origin, they are susceptible of being divided into the two classes of Internal and External. — By the internal we mean motives as they exist in the mind itself, the various forms of the appetites, those higher sentient principles which may be denominated the propensities, and the va- rious kinds and degrees of the affections, together with all motives within us of a moral nature. It is certain, that, in some important sense of the expressions, all mo- tives, at least before they can reach and effect the Will, must exist in the mind, although there are grounds for speaking of their antecedent and separate existence in NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 205 outward objects. — (2.) By external motives we mean all those which are placed external to the mind, and are lo- cated, if the expression may be allowed, in outward things. All external objects, which excite within us either appro- bation or disapprobation, joy or sorrow ; all such outward objects as are supposed to have a connexion either with our worldly prosperity or our duty, operate upon us as mo- tives.* It is true, they influence us through the medium of our mental nature, the emotions, passions, and moral powers ; but as the influence exercised may be traced to them as the ultimate subjects, there is a degree of propri- ety in designating them as motives. Outward motives, in the sense of the term as just explained, are innumera- ble, presenting themselves to our notice on all sides, in all the various aspects of creation, and in all the endless forms of human enterprise. § 123. External motives derive their efficacy from the mind. Although all objects without us, and all external ac- tions may, under different circumstances and in different degrees, exist as motives, still it is impossible for us to re- gard such external objects or actions as having a value to ourselves or a character of any kind, except it be in ref- erence to those feelings which the contemplation of them *Note. — External motives may also properly be called Objective mo- tives ; as, on the other hand, the Internal might perhaps be called Sub- jective. Objective motives are what we have in other places described as the objects of volition. And such is their precise nature. That is to say, they are in themselves mere objects, intellectually perceived, and nothing more. And it is only in connexion with, and in accommoda- tion to certain subsequent mental facts, that they are called motives. s 206 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. excites in our own minds. Abstracted from the internal feelings, of which they are the antecedents and cause, they are all equally indifferent. It is our own emotions and desires, therefore, reflected back upon all external objects and actions of whatever kind, which infuse into them their qualities of beauty or deformity, of unworthi- ness or excellence, and give them their power, whatever it may be, in relation to the will. It would not be a difficult task, it is presumed, to ad- duce instances illustrating and confirming these views. As an example, a war is announced in Europe, and the merchant winds up his accounts and detains his vessels at home. The war is Ms motive for so doing. Subsequent- ly there is a false report of war in Europe, which he be- lieves to be true, and he pursues the same course as be- fore. In both these cases, the internal belief, combined with his fears, gives to the motive, as the war would be considered, its whole effect In the latter case, it consti- tutes it entirely, as the reported war is only a fiction. Again, riches, whether in the form of lands or of gold and silver, or in any other form, constitute a powerful motive. But it is vain to presume that the common dust on which we tread, or even the brightest masses of ore it contains, inherit and possess in themselves a power to keep men constantly in action, to carry them from land to land, and from sea to sea. It is the mind itself which in- vests them with attributes that render them so effective, Men see in them the means of the enjoyments they covet; the means of influence among their fellows ; the source of honour and power. So that if riches are one of the most efficient motives that can be presented to the human Will, it is the heart, the soul, which makes them so. Since you have only to place the man, who desired them NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 207 so much, on his death-bed ; you have only to show him that his piles of treasure can no longer purchase honour, influence, enjoyment, not even an hour of life, not even exemption from a single pain, and then riches are no long- er a motive. He turns away from them with feelings of indifference, and possibly of disgust. § 124. The character of motives depends in part on the constitutional traits of the individual. Although all objects, which are presented to the mind in the shape and relation of External motives, undergo a modification in their progress towards the region of the Will, it may not be unimportant to remark, that this mod- ification will be very various in different individuals, ac- cording to their predominant mental traits. We will suppose, as an example, that the same object is presented to the notice of two individuals ; the one possessed of dull and restricted, the other of quick and comprehensive powers of reasoning. The object may appear diminutive and unimportant to the former, and probably will appear so, because his powers of reasoning are not expansive enough to embrace it in all its relations and consequen- ces ; while the same object will appear, for an opposite reason, exceedingly magnified and important to the latter. And again, select two other persons, whose reasoning powers closely resemble each other, and are, in fact, entire- ly the same, but whose sensibilities are constitutionally different ; the one, a person intensely susceptible of vivid and strong emotions and desires ; the other, on the con- trary, possessed of a sluggish and phlegmatic tempera- ment. Now we will suppose that the exciting object or motive, whatever it is, comes from the reasoning or in- 208 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. tellectual part of their constitution to the sentient or sen- sitive part with the same dimensions; in other words, as it exists in the understanding, and as it passes from the understanding to the heart, it appears to both of these persons precisely alike ; but in the former case, that of the man of vivid sensibilities, it at once becomes heated and expanded, as if placed in the focus of a powerful lens; while in the latter it remains cold and withered and torpid, as if under the blighting influences of a wintry frost. § 125. Their character depends in part on temporary in- fluences. And this is not all. Every one knows that we are subject to temporary influences, sometimes not easily ex- plicable. At one time we are animated by encouraging aspirations and joyous hopes, and everything is clothed in brightness ; and shortly after we are sad and depress- ed, and all objects appear to be invested with gloom. The motives, which call upon us to resolve and to act, appear very variously under such circumstances. In the season of our joyousness, the light of our minds attaches itself to the various outward objects that are presented before them, and they shine like illuminated points, like guiding stars. In the season of our despondency and sorrow, they fall from the zenith with dimmed or extin- guished beams, and we no longer heed them. And all these various circumstances, and the changes which are consequent upon them, ought to be taken into consideration. — Motives, as they exist outwardly and in- dependently of the understanding, are as different from what they are subsequently, when they have passed un- NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 209 der the notice and review of the intellect, as the rich and diversified colours, when they are refracted and separated by the prism, are from the pale and uniform light in which they were previously latent. There is even a greater difference than is implied in this comparison ; for they are not only, at their first appearance in the mind, subject to be altered by the intellect, as to their extent and relations, but in their further progress they seem to be penetrated and inspired with an actual vitality, a prin- ciple of life derived from the actual infusion and min- gling of the sensibilities. So that, if we may be permitted another illustration from material objects, motives in their modification are as different from what they are in their primitive, outward, or objective state, as the colours of a skilful painter, when they are laid on the canvass in form and proportion, and are made instinct with life and intel- ligence, are from the same colours when standing crude and massive in his paint vessels. — Such is the transforma- tion to which outward or External motives, as they are denominated, are subject in their progress through the mind ; but the amount and degree of this transformation will not only depend upon the general structure of the mind, but will be found to vary in different persons and under different situations. § 126. Further division of motives into Natural or Per- sonal, and Moral. Motives may not only be divided into the two classes of External and Internal, but are susceptible of the yet far- ther division into the Natural and Moral. Natural mo- tives (or Personal motives, as they might perhaps proper- ly be termed) are such, and such only, as are found in the S 2 210 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. Natural Sensibilities ; that portion of the mind which we have especial reference to when we use the term Heart. Moral motives are such as are found, and found only, in the Moral Sensibilities ; that portion of the mind which we have especial reference to when we use the term Con- science. Natural motives, therefore, as will be better un- derstood by referring to the distinctions which were made in the volume on the Sensibilities, appear in the general forms of the various Appetites, Propensities, and Af- fections. They involve, as an essential characteristic, the feeling of desire ; and aim exclusively, even in their most generous and benevolent tendencies, at some form of Natural good. Moral motives, on the contrary, always involve, as their characteristic, the feeling of moral obli- gation ; and the object at which they aim (irrespective of the claims of interest, either our own interest or that of others) is Moral good or Rectitude. So that, if we thought it necessary to be very specific in our nomencla- ture, we might call them respectively the Desirive and the Obligative motives. Psychologically, therefore, there is a real and deeply-drawn distinction between these two classes of motives. In other words, it is a constitutional, and not a mere artificial or factitious distinction, introdu- ced without a reference to the real developements and facts of nature. § 127. Further statements illustrative of the distinction between natural and moral motives. As this distinction of Motives into the Natural or Per- sonal, and the Moral, (or, more specifically and philo- sophically, into the Desirive and Obligative,) is evidently an important one, it may be proper to make a few general NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 211 statements further, with the hope of throwing some addi- tional light upon them.— We proceed to say, therefore, that Natural or Personal motives operate within a limited sphere appropriate to themselves, and, in general, easily ascertainable. Moral motives, on the contrary, acknowl- edge no limits short of the universe, eternity, and the boundless range of duties from the finite to the infinite. Personal motives go no farther than to include whatever relates, either in its origin or its results, to ourselves, to- gether with what relates to others, considered as the mere objects of our natural sympathy, affection, or aversion. Moral motives extend themselves to all cases and occa- sions of action whatever, whether relating to ourselves or others, to the present or the future, to time or eternity ; in a word, to every variety and possibility of human action, so far as the action is a voluntary one. Personal motives are in part implanted and constitutional, and of course are, to some extent, instinctive in their operation. Mor- al motives, on the contrary, removed at the farthest pos- sible distance from anything of an instinctive nature, are not capable of any operation or of any existence in- dependently of the reasoning power ; but always exist and act in connexion with that power. Personal motives, so far as they are not properly constitutional or instinct- ive, but are based upon the deductions of reasoning, al- ways prompt us to act for certain things, as has already been intimated, simply and exclusively because those things appear desirable, either for ourselves or others. Moral motives, on the other hand, always prompt us to act for certain things, simply because they are right, whatever personal bearing they may have either on our- selves or others. These two classes of motives are not only distinguished by a difference in the range of their 212 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. operations, and in the view which they take of objects, hut also in the particular of their comparative rank and authority. Personal motives, whether they are selfish or benevolent, whether they prompt us to act for the good of others or our own good, are obviously amenable to the higher authority and control of the moral class. Moral motives are analogous, to some extent at least, to the faith which Christianity exacts from us in the promises of God, since they require men, with an authoritative voice, to go forward in the fulfilment of certain proposed actions, whatever distresses and darkness may beset their path. Men, when called upon to act in view of motives of this kind, are not permitted to inquire whether it would be pleasing to their natural desires and affections, whether their love or hatred is concerned, whether the proposed course of conduct involves their benefit or their injury ; but are presented with the simple and only alternative of acquiescence or resistance, of obedience or disobedi- ence, without regard to the consequences in any shape whatever. § 128. Motives coextensive with volitions. In examining the subject of motives, it is one remark obvious to be made, that volitions never exist independ- ently of motives. Whenever there is that act of the mind which we term a volition, there is an antecedent state of the mind, constituting the cause (by which we mean the antecedent condition, preparative, or occasion) of the vo- lition, which we term the motive. By the constitution of the mind itself they go together, and are inseparably con- nected. In other words, volitions exist upon the occa- sions which the motives present. Be careful, however, NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 213 to remember that they are not made, not created by these occasions ; but that, in virtue of the power which God has seen fit to impart to the human Will, they exist in connexion with them, and never without them. But we have already had occasion to refer to this subject, and will not expend time upon a point on which there will probably be found no difference of opinion. Mr. Stewart mentions this as one of the principles on which the con- flicting parties on the subject of the Will are agreed. Some of his remarks are as follows. — " Every action is performed with some view, or, in other words, is per- formed with some motive. Dr. Reid, indeed, denies this with zeal, but I am doubtful if he has strengthened his cause by doing so ; for he confesses that the actions which are performed without motives are perfectly trifling and insignificant, and not such as lead to any general conclu- sion concerning the merit or demerit of moral agents. I should, therefore, rather be disposed to yield this point than to dispute a proposition not materially connected with the question at issue. One thing is clear and indis- putable, that it is only in so far as a man acts from mo- tives or intentions, that he is entitled to the character of a rational being."* This view, that motives are coexistent with volitions, tends to confirm the general doctrine that the Will is subject to laws, and is itself a law. If the existence of motives in some form or other, either personal or moral, either in the shape of our interest or our duty, is the in- dispensable condition of any action of the voluntary pow- er, it certainly cannot be said, with any degree of cor- rectness, that the action of the Will is wholly a contingent and unrestrained one. * Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., $ ii. 214 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. § 129. Nature of the influence of motives. In consequence of this fixed connexion between the vo- lition and the motive, involving the undeniable fact that the volition is, in some sense of the term, dependent on the antecedent motive, we find, in the use of language, certain expressions and modes of expression, which are deserving of notice, such as, " motives influence the will," " motives govern the will," " volitions are caused by mo- tives," " volitions are controlled by motives," &c. What we wish to observe in respect to these and other equiva- lent expressions is, that, although in common parlance they may often be convenient, they are to be received with some restriction in all inquiries into the will aiming at philosophical accuracy. If, for instance, it be asserted that motives cause voli- tions, as it not unfrequently is, we are undoubtedly requi- red, by all sound inquiry, to exclude from the expression the idea of direct efficiency. The causation spoken of is not, properly speaking, efficient. The word cause, in this case, (if we wish to announce the fact, and the fact only,) can mean nothing more than the preparatory condition, circumstance, or occasion ; a sort of antecedent incident to that which takes place. It is the more important to keep this remark in mind, since, without the qualification implied in it, it may be difficult to perceive how man can be regarded as a free and accountable agent. Accord- ingly, whenever we speak of motives as influencing, con- trolling, or causing volition, it is to be understood that we mean merely to express the simple and unquestioned fact of their being conditions preparatory and prerequisite to the will's action. With this import of the terms, we ob- NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 215 viously, in such cases, assert that which is true, and which, as a truth, is important to be known and to be realized ; and, at the same time, assert nothing which is inconsist- ent with moral liberty and accountability. § 130. Of the Witt's heing governed by the strongest motive. It is sometimes said that the will is governed by the strongest motive, and is necessarily so governed ; or sta- ted in another manner perhaps less exceptionable, that the will acts in view of the strongest motive, and necessa- rily so acts. Although this proposition, which has the appearance of being a self-evident one, and perhaps is so, has sometimes been adduced, with great confidence, in support of the general doctrine that the will has its laws ; it will be perceived that we have not availed ourselves, in the discussion of that subject, of the aid, more or less, which it may be supposed to furnish. We fully believed that there were arguments enough, and more than enough, without relying upon this proposition ; saying nothing of the probability that the proposition itself would be found, on examination, liable to some strictures and exceptions. The views we entertain in regard to it are briefly these. (1.) The epithet strong, and also its comparative forms stronger and strongest, imply something relative. They unquestionably indicate a comparison with something else which is weak or which is less strong. The proposition, therefore, that the will always and invariably acts in con- formity with the strongest motive, acknowledges the idea, and is based upon it, that motives are truly susceptible of a comparison with each other. And this is the fact. — (2.) Motives may be compared together in two ways, and 216 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. in only two ways, viz., either directly by themselves, or indirectly by means of their results. Accordingly, all motives of the same kind (for instance, all those which have been classed together and arranged under the one head of natural or personal motives, and which are characterized by desire, or, rather, when properly analy- zed, are nothing more nor less than DEsmEs themselves) are undoubtedly susceptible of a comparison with each other ; not remotely merely, but directly and immediately. The same consciousness, which assures us of the existence of the motives themselves, indicates clearly the difference of their intensity or strength ; and we can say with a de- gree of precision, and with a full understanding of what is meant, that one motive is deeper, or more intense, or stronger than another, when such motives are the sole, exclusive, and direct subjects of comparison. — This is a matter of consciousness. And if all the motives which exist and operate in the human breast were the same in kind, it would also be a matter of consciousness, and, as such, it would be a primary and undeniable truth that the acts of the Will are always in conformity with the strong- est motive. The proposition then would have meaning and be unanswerable ; and, to the full extent implied in these remarks, such is the case at present. But still it is not a universal one, and it therefore seems to us to be de- fective, when brought as an argument in illustration of the absolute and universal nature of the Will.- — (3.) Mo- tives which belong to different classes or kinds (for in- stance, the class of personal and the class of moral mo- tives) are not the subjects of direct comparison. They are radically and entirely distinct from each other ; and there is no more possibility of their being brought into direct juxtaposition and comparison, than there is of other NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 217 things entirely distinct from each other, such as associa- tion and belief, memory and perception, sympathy and hatred, or a circle and a square, red and white, &c. As natural motives can be analyzed into desires, so moral motives can be analyzed into feelings of moral obligation. And can anything be more different, not merely in de- gree, but kind, than mere desires and feelings of obliga- tion ? The way, then, and the only way, in which we can compare moral motives with natural or personal motives, (or, to speak more specifically and accurately, the Desirive motive with the Obligatory or Obligative,) which are entirely distinct from each other in kind, is through the medium of their bearing and results upon the Will. If the Will acts in conformity with the moral mo- tive, we say that the moral motive is the strongest ; if it acts in conformity with the personal motive, we assert the reverse. But if the result (that is to say, the volition) is the measure of the intensity, when motives, differing in kind, are compared together, then, in all cases of this de- scription, to say that the Will is governed by the strong- est motive, is an identical proposition, and imports the same as to say that the Will is governed by the motive by which it is governed. If we reflect carefully upon the foregoing statement, we shall undoubtedly find it to be so. When one motive is designated as the strongest, in comparison with another differing in kind, it is because the will acts in conformity with such motive. In all such cases, therefore, the strength of the motive is not a thing which is ascertained and measured in itself through the medium of our conscious- ness, but is relative to the fact of the Will's being gov- erned by the motive, as it is commonly expressed. But if the fact of the Will's being governed by a particular T 218 NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. motive, and that circumstance alone (which seems at least to be the case in respect to all motives differing in kind) ascertains such motive to be the strongest, then certainly the declaration that the Will is governed by the strongest motive, is, in effect, the same thing as to say that the will is governed by the motive by which it is governed. And it is self-evident that such a proposition, which may be resolved into one of still greater celebrity, viz., whatever is, is, can prove nothing in respect to the true and universal nature of the Will. § 131. Of the elements of the contest within. What has been said in this Chapter, opens, in various respects, an impressive and fruitful view of man's charac- ter. We find in the two classes of motives, the natural or personal on the one hand, and the moral on the other, in the strivings of Desire and the pressures of Obligation, the basis of an internal hostility, renewable every day and every hour. Every man's bosom may be regarded as a species of moral battle-field continually set in array. Here is the fountain of sweet and of bitter waters. Here is the theatre of that contest which the Apostle so feelingly de- scribes, " a law in the members warring against the law of the mind ;" and which, in its dark and trying mo- ments, compelled him to cry out in anguish, " Oh, wretch- ed man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death 1" Here is the seat of virtues, which assimi- late us to angels and prepare us for glory ; and of vices, which liken us to spirits of darkness, and are the forerun- ners of everlasting shame and contempt. Principles of eternal opposition, the Oromazes and Arimanius of the enigmatical philosophy of the Persians, are shut up to- NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES. 219 gether, destined to contend with a strife which cannot cease, till the one or the other is brought into subjection. This statement is not more philosophically than histori- cally true. The history of the human race, as well as the philosophy of the human mind, sustains it. And it is this view which is given more or less clearly in every part of the Bible, from the temptation and the sin of Eden, to the history of the Seven Churches of the Apocalypse. It must be obvious, even to the most casual observer, that men are everywhere represented in the Scriptures as en- dued with capacities of right and wrong, of moral good and evil; as placed in a state of probation and trial, which is preparatory to another state of existence ; and as ex- hibiting in their hearts and lives, at one time, the predom- inance of vice, and at another, the ascendency of virtue. And it is an interesting consideration, that the eye of God and the eye of angels (to say nothing of the watch- ful solicitude of the prince and the powers of darkness) is intently fixed on this belligerant attitude, this striving and concussion of the mental elements. And happy is he who fully understands the nature and the consequen- ces of this great contest; the duty and the rewards on the one hand, and the sin and the danger on the other ! And thrice happy if he carries on the contest, in all its vicissitudes, and in all its length and breadth, with a humble reliance for wisdom and strength on that Bright- ness of the Father's glory, who made himself of no rep- utation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men, and was tempted in ALL POINTS AS WE ARE, AND YET WITHOUT SIN. PART III. FREEDOM OF THE WILL. , 11 m i || i i> iI i pi» h