ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 OR, 
 
 FIRST LESSONS IN THE KNOWLEDGE 
 
 MIND 
 
 INCLUDING FAMILIAR EXPLANATIONS OF THE TERMS EM- 
 PLOYED ON SUBJECTS RELATING TO THE 
 INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 
 
 BY ISAAC TAYLOR, JUNIOR. 
 
 Nee manus nuda, nee Intellectus sibi 
 permissus, multiim valet:— Bacon. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PUBLISHED BY B. J. HOLDSWORTH, 
 
 18, st. Paul's church-yard. 
 
 1822. 
 
 

 £»+£*« 
 
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 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Preface v 
 
 PART I, 
 
 Chap. I. On the use of familiar comparisons and 
 colloquial phrases in explaining the 
 nature and operations of the Mind.... 1 
 II. On the three chief excellencies of 
 
 Human Nature 12 
 
 III. On different States of the Mind to 
 
 which the word Thinking' is com- 
 monly applied.... 19 
 
 IV. On the formation of General Notions, 
 
 aud the use of General Words 31 
 
 V. On the meaning of the words Genus, 
 
 Species, and Generalization 37 
 
 VI. On the origin and nature of Abstract 
 
 Notions..., 44 
 
 VII. On different kinds of Abstract Notions.. 47 
 VIII. On the difference between Simple Ab- 
 stract Notions, and Complex Abstract 
 
 Notions , 54 
 
 a2 
 
 
IV CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Chap. IX. On Analysis, Classification, and Ar- 
 rangement 57 
 
 X. On the Analysis of Complex Abstract 
 
 Notions 64 
 
 XI. On Efforts of Abstraction of different 
 
 kinds 69 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Containing, in Alphabetical order, brief and 
 familiar explanations of the principal terms 
 employed on subjects relating to the nature 
 and operations of the Intellectual Powers 77 
 
 A Summary, exhibiting the mutual relation of 
 the Words explained in the Vocabulary 201 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 »$&■•« 
 
 The design of this volume is to impart, in a 
 famine* form, elementary explanations and instruc- 
 tions on subjects connected with the intellectual 
 faculties, — to afford gradual and easy exercises to 
 the powers of abstraction, — and thus, to conduct 
 the young reader, not perhaps by the most direct, 
 i*HHby the most accessible path into that region 
 of thought where the mind best acquires force, 
 accuracy, and comprehension. 
 
 A writer who invites the attention of young per- 
 sons to subjects which demand a continued effort 
 of thought, is strongly tempted to win that atten- 
 tion by some promise of amusement; or to profess 
 that he has the art of communicating knowledge 
 without the cost of labour on the part of those who 
 receive it. No such promise or profession will be 
 offered in the present instance. The author believes 
 that when the professed object is to give tone and 
 vigour to the understanding by exertion, trivial 
 digressions, and gaieties of style should be avoided. 
 a3 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 of occasional reference. The correlative terms are 
 mentioned at the end of each article, in order that 
 the explanations of connected subjects may be 
 readily compared. A Summary at the end of the 
 volume exhibits all the terms in their mutual 
 dependance. 
 
 While it has been attempted to adapt the phrase- 
 ology to the comprehension of intelligent and well- 
 informed children, the volume is especially dedicated 
 to the service of that numerous class of young per- 
 sons who, having received only a common education, 
 eagerly desire, as far as their engagements in active 
 life will permit, to supply the defects consequent 
 upon the partial and unconnected culture of the 
 mind. 
 
 Ongar, 
 April, 1822. 
 
PART I. 
 
 CHAP I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 On the use of familiar comparisons and colloquial 
 
 phrases in explaining the nature and 
 
 operations of the Mind. 
 
 When it is said that the Sun rises in the 
 East, and sets in the West, every one knows 
 that this manner of speaking does not truly 
 describe the cause of the Sun's apparent motion 
 through the heavens : it is a mode of expression 
 which corresponds with what we see ; not with 
 what we learn by more accurate observation 
 and reflection. 
 
 But although this mode of speaking is not 
 correct, yet it may serve the purposes of 
 
 B 
 
2 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 common conversation better than scientific 
 phrases would do. And we may often reason 
 very justly when the literal sense of the words 
 we use is wholly incorrect : as for example ; 
 when it is said that a Navigator who sails 
 round the world, taking his course from 
 Europe to the straits of Magellan, and from 
 thence home by the Cape of Good Hope, will 
 lose a day in his reckoning, because, as the 
 Sun travels from East to West, every day 
 will be a little lengthened as he proceeds. 
 
 This reasoning would not be more just, if, 
 instead of saying that the Sun travels from 
 East to West, we were to speak of the diurnal 
 motion of. the Earth in astronomical terms. 
 
 A familiar style of expression, in which 
 things are spoken as they appear to be, and 
 not exactly as they are, is often to be preferred 
 to a more scientific style ; because it is easily 
 understood, and, generally, it is more concise. 
 
 This is the case, especially, when we have to 
 speak of the powers, or operations, or notions 
 of the mind ; because, as these subjects are in 
 themselves rather difficult to be understood, it 
 is necessary that they should be first introduced 
 into the mind in the most familiar manner. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.. 3 
 
 In this little volume, therefore, forms of ex- 
 pression will often be employed, "which repre- 
 sent the common imperfect notions that are 
 formed concerning the operations of the mind, 
 rather than those more accurate notions which 
 we may adopt when we are able to think more 
 patiently and clearly on the subject : we must 
 at present speak of the mind in the same 
 familiar style that we employ when we say of 
 the Sun, that it rises and sets; or that it 
 travels through the heavens. 
 
 As the young reader gradually becomes 
 familiar with subjects of this kind, which re- 
 quire some effort of the understanding, he will 
 be able to think of them more easily ; to com- 
 prehend them more perfectly ; and to speak of 
 them more correctly. 
 
 There are three different styles, or modes of 
 expression, in which the same idea may be 
 conveyed. 
 
 The first is the Colloquial style, or the 
 style of common conversation. 
 
 The second is the Figurative style. 
 
 The third is the Philosophical style. 
 
 I. The colloquial style. It has already 
 been said that in common conversation we speak 
 b2 
 
4 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 of things as they appear to us at a first glance, 
 and not according to those more accurate 
 notions concerning them which are acquired 
 by careful examination and reflection. As, in 
 the instance just mentioned, we are used to 
 say that the Sun rises and sets, or that it 
 travels from East to West ; because it appears 
 to move, while the Earth stands still ; yet we 
 know, while we employ these expressions, that 
 the very reverse of this is true. 
 
 The piston of a pump is said to suck the 
 water into the barrel : this is a coiloqual ex- 
 pression. In truth, it is the weight of the 
 external air which lifts, or drives the water 
 into the vacant space left in the barrel when 
 the piston rises. 
 
 We say vermillion is red, though the red- 
 ness is not in the substance itself, but in that 
 part of the light which is thrown off from a 
 body which perfectly imbibes the yellow and 
 blue rays. 
 
 Many instances of this sort might be men- 
 tioned, in which we speak of things as they 
 seem to be ; not as they are ; and yet, though 
 the mode of expression is incorrect, or false, 
 what is affirmed may be perfectly true : for 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 5 
 
 example: The piston as was just before said, 
 will raise water in a pump to the height of 
 three and thirty feet : this is true, although it 
 is not really the piston which raises the water, 
 but the weight of the external air. What is 
 meant is, that water in a pipe, where it is 
 freed from the pressure of the atmosphere on 
 its upper surface, will rise to the height of 
 three and thirty feet. 
 
 In treating of subjects relating to the mind, 
 a great number of colloquial expressions are 
 employed, which are useful, and sufficient on 
 common occasions, though they are very far 
 from being strictly correct : for example : — 
 
 It is usual to describe the mind of man 
 as consisting of several separate parts, or 
 faculties,— as the imagination, — the under- 
 standing, — the memory, — the will, — the faculty 
 of attention, — the power of abstraction, &c. 
 We feel that we have several different kinds of 
 thoughts, or states of mind ; and hence it is 
 natural to us to fancy that the mind, like the 
 body, consists of separate parts, or members, 
 or organs. When we have learned to think 
 patiently and accurately we may perhaps find 
 that these colloquial expressions are not more 
 b3 
 
6 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 correct than those which speak of the Sun's 
 rising or travelling ; or of a piston sucking up 
 water. But in the mean time it should be re- 
 membered, that what is affirmed concerning 
 the mind may be useful and true, so far as 
 practical instruction is concerned, although the 
 mode of expression is false or inaccurate. It 
 appears then, that the colloquial style is that 
 mode of speaking which corresponds with 
 those inaccurate notions of things that are 
 formed without careful examination or re- 
 flection ; but that yet it is true enough for 
 the ordinary purposes of conversation, or 
 instruction. 
 
 II. The figurative style is that manner of 
 expressing our ideas in which we compare 
 one thing to another. If, instead of saying 
 colloquially, the Sun rises and sets, we say 
 the Sun pursues his course through the 
 heavens ; — this is a figurative expression ; 
 because we compare the Sun to a man who 
 runs a race; — as David beautifully says " he 
 rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race." A 
 great proportion of all conversation, as well as 
 of public speaking and writing, consists of 
 figurative expressions. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 7 
 
 There are three reasons for using the figura- 
 tive style. 
 
 1st. Because it is often the shortest and 
 simplest way of expressing our meaning ; 
 especially when we are describing the qualities, 
 or feelings, or operations of the mind. If we 
 say, such a man has a brilliant genius ; we 
 convey a general notion of what we mean in 
 two words ; whereas if the same notion were 
 expressed without the aid of a comparison, 
 perhaps fifty words must be used ; and a 
 greater effort of the mind would be needed to 
 comprehend what was meant. The mind of 
 the person to whom this expression is applied, 
 is compared to a lamp, burning with a clear 
 and sparkling flame. Such a lamp sheds an 
 agreeable splendour upon every object around 
 it ; and it is more useful, as well as more 
 agreeable than a dull lamp : therefore it attracts 
 attention, while dull lamps about it are not 
 regarded. On these accounts it may serve as 
 a fit comparison when we wish to describe the 
 mind of a man whose ideas follow each other 
 rapidly ; who expresses them clearly, and in 
 a manner that gives pleasure as well as infor- 
 mation, to those who hear him. 
 b 4 
 
8 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Common phrases, such as the following, — a 
 tender spirit, a warm heart, a solid judgement, 
 an enlightened understanding, a pure con- 
 science, an elevated mind, — are all figurative 
 expressions, in which a quality, or feeling, 
 or operation of the mind is compared to some 
 sensible object, for the sake of expressing in 
 two words a notion which would require several 
 sentences to describe it at length. 
 
 It is a useful exercise of the understanding 
 to take such figurative phrases, and find out, — 
 1st. What the object is which is employed as 
 a comparison : 2nd. What the notion is to 
 which this object is compared : — and 3rd. In 
 what respects the two things resemble each 
 other. 
 
 Many figurative expressions of this kind will 
 be employed in the following chapters. It 
 must, however, always be remembered, that a 
 figurative phrase can never perfectly convey 
 the notion which it is used to represent : 
 therefore, after a comparison has conveyed a 
 general, or indistinct notion to the young 
 reader's mind, he ought to examine the notion 
 more carefully while he disregards the com- 
 parison. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 9 
 
 2nd. The figurative style is often employed 
 because it is the only way in which we can 
 express some very imperfect notion ; or some 
 fact which we scarcely understand at all. 
 
 For example : an idea is often said to be 
 deeply impressed on the memory. This figu- 
 rative expression is used because we do not 
 know in what way a thought which has once 
 been in the mind, is apt frequently to return^ 
 or so to remain that we can, as often as we 
 please, bring it back : all this we do not under- 
 stand ; but we fancy it takes place in a way 
 that may be compared to figures or letters 
 being impressed upon wax, by a seal ; we use 
 this comparison therefore, because it is the 
 only way of expressing the incomplete notion 
 we have of memory. 
 
 3rd. The figurative style is often employed 
 merely because comparisons give pleasure to 
 the mind : comparisons employed for the sake 
 of the pleasure they offered to the imagination^ 
 make up a great part of all poetry. When our 
 object is to enquire after truth, or to teach what 
 we know to others, we should avoid poetical 
 comparisons ; because they divert the attention ; 
 and because we are apt to fancy that we under- 
 b5 
 
10 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 stand a subject, -when we are merely pleased 
 with the beauty or aptness of a similitude. 
 
 III. The Philosophical Style. 
 
 After we have examined any object with close 
 and patient attention ; and have made our- 
 selves as perfectly acquainted with its nature 
 as possible ; we endeavour to express all that 
 we know concerning it, and nothing more, in 
 the plainest and simplest words we can find. 
 This is the Philosophical style. 
 
 To say that the Sun rises in the East, and 
 sets in the West, is to speak colloquially. 
 
 To say that the Sun pursues his course 
 through the heavens like a charioteer, is to 
 speak figuratively. 
 
 To say that the apparent motion of the Sun 
 from East to West is occasioned by the diurnal 
 revolution of the Earth on its axis, is to speak 
 philosophically. 
 
 Or if, instead of using the words diurnal and 
 revolution, and axis, which are derived from 
 the latin and greek languages, we were simply 
 to say — the Earth turns round once every day 
 like a wheel ; this more familiar mode of 
 expression would be as philosophical as the 
 other ; because it represents the fact with 
 equal exactness. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 11 
 
 Now, as the designof this volume is to afford 
 easy exercises to the understanding upon sub- 
 jects relating to the mind, the colloquial and 
 figurative styles will chiefly be employed, in 
 order to render this introduction to such subjects 
 as familiar and comprehensible as possible. In 
 proportion as the young reader's power of 
 thinking is strengthened by instruction and 
 exertion, he will be able to comprehend abstract 
 propositions without the aid of comparisons, 
 examples, and colloquial phrases : thus his 
 notions will become gradually more philoso- 
 phical ; by which is merely meant that they 
 will be more exactly true* 
 
 b& 
 
12 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 On the three chief excellencies of Human Nature, 
 
 If a person were shut up in a corner of some 
 great machine, where there was only a glim- 
 mering of light; and if the machine were 
 constantly in swift motion, and a hundred 
 wheels were whirling round, while hammers 
 and rollers and chains were making an incessant 
 din, he would scarcely be able to gain a perfect 
 and comprehensive knowledge of the construc- 
 tion and movements of the machine after many 
 months of close attention. 
 
 But a person placed in such a situation would 
 derive one great advantage from his peculiar 
 circumstances, — namely, that he must acquire 
 a habit of quick and accurate observation, and 
 of close and patient attention : after some time, 
 he would learn to distinguish obscure objects, 
 and to comprehend intricate forms and move- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 13 
 
 merits, which, to others, would appear a mass 
 of unintelligible confusion. 
 
 Now when we endeavour to comprehend the 
 nature and the operations of our own minds we 
 are like the person who is shut up within the 
 machine while it continues in motion. It will 
 be found more difficult to understand our own 
 minds, than to comprehend the nature of ex- 
 ternal objects, which may be seen and handled. 
 But, for this very reason, there is a peculiar 
 advantage belonging to studies of this sort — 
 namely, that those who accustom themselves 
 to reflect upon the operations of their own 
 minds, and to study the construction and the 
 various changes of the rational principle, 
 acquire the habit of thinking more patiently 
 and more accurately than those who employ 
 their thoughts only upon sensible objects. 
 
 A principal use, therefore, of such pursuits 
 is, that they give more exercise to the powers 
 of the mind than any other subjects ; so that 
 even if they seemed to be in themselves of less 
 practical importance than other studies they 
 would still be indispensible to a complete 
 education. The time to pay attention to 
 them is that period of life when the under- 
 
14 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT, 
 
 standing expands, and while it is most capable 
 of improvement. 
 
 There are many persons who appear to think 
 little ; or whose manner of thinking is always 
 inaccurate and confused although their under- 
 standings are naturally strong. The reason 
 often is that they have never learned to direct 
 the course of their thoughts ; nor have the 
 notions which fill their minds ever been set in 
 order : they have not acquired the power of 
 attending separately to single ideas, or of 
 distinguishing clearly one from another. The 
 greater the effort they make to think, the more 
 confusion there seems to be among their ideas ; 
 hence it happens that they are soon discouraged, 
 and are willing to receive all their opinions 
 from other men ; or perhaps they become posi- 
 tive in affirming what they are conscious that 
 they do not understand. If such persons had 
 early learned to think with ease and correctness 
 they might have been less servile, or less 
 dogmatical. 
 
 But besides this confusion of thought which 
 discourages men from employing the natural 
 powers of their understanding, the mind, like 
 the body, has a constant tendency to sink into 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 15 
 
 a state of inactivity. If a man indulges habits 
 of bodily indolence, the natural powers of the 
 constitution are impaired; and exertion be- 
 comes every year he lives more and more irk- 
 some. This wretched condition is, however, 
 so painful in itself, so injurious to worldly 
 interests, and so disgraceful, that it is com- 
 paratively but a few individuals who suffer 
 themselves to sink into it. 
 
 • But the indolence of the mind is less apparent 
 than the indolence of the body ; and those who 
 are the most subject to it may scarcely themselves 
 be aware of their real condition. Persons may 
 converse as they hear others converse ; and do 
 what they see others do : they may repeat what 
 has been fixed in the memory, and believe what 
 they have been taught, or what best pleases 
 their particular tempers ; while their minds 
 may be as completely inactive, and as in- 
 capable of exertion, as the body is during 
 sleep. This, we must acknowledge, to be a 
 very degraded state for a being whose mind 
 is, by nature, capable of much more activity 
 than his body : but yet r it is certain* that the 
 minds of the greater part of mankind are in 
 this inactive state. 
 
16 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 It is, in great measure, owing to this general 
 and habitual indolence of the human mind, that 
 millions of men, from one generation to another, 
 continue to be deluded by childish and wicked 
 superstitions. 
 
 It is owing to this mental indolence in the mass 
 of mankind, that one man, whose mind is active, 
 often finds it easy to persuade thousands of his 
 fellow-men to receive some fanciful opinions of 
 his own : or to induce them to follow him in 
 absurd and mischievous enterprises, which 
 must bring miseries upon themselves and their 
 neighbours. 
 
 It is, in part, owing to the indolence of the 
 mind, that men, who have heard that there is 
 a future life, which will be happy or wretched 
 according to their conduct and the state of 
 their minds in the present life; yet make them- 
 selves tranquil while they pay no sufficient 
 regard to the means of securing happiness in 
 the life to come. 
 
 The indolence of the mind prevents men 
 from feeling themselves degraded while they 
 are seeking chiefly the gratifications of the 
 body, or those gratifications of the mind which 
 are more foolish and useless than the painted 
 toys of children. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 17 
 
 111 the common affairs of life it may be 
 observed, that men appear to be more in- 
 fluenced in their conduct by little motives, 
 which they would be ashamed to confess, than 
 by important and reasonable considerations : 
 hence it is that the affairs of men are often 
 turned about in a way that cannot be accounted 
 for ; because the real motives of their actions 
 are too small to be known or noticed. This 
 also is chiefly owing to the habitual indolence 
 of the mind which lessens the force of reason. 
 
 Men are often pleased with false opinions, 
 even while they secretly suspect them to be 
 false : and they are glad to be deceived when 
 they wish to do what they know to be foolish 
 or wicked. But if they thought more it would 
 not be possible for them to deceive themselves 
 so easily. 
 
 We must not imagine, however, that if the 
 minds of men were more active, — if they 
 thought oftener, and if they thought more 
 justly, they would always believe what is true, 
 and do what is right. It is not activity of 
 mind alone, that is necessary to our well being ; 
 for there are three things in which the true 
 excellency of human nature consists :— * 
 
18 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 The first and chief of them is Goodness, or 
 virtue; which consists in loving God supremely, 
 and in loving others as we love ourselves. 
 
 The second is Knowledge. 
 
 The third is the habit of thinking much, and 
 the power of thinking justly. 
 
 Now we enter upon life without Goodness, 
 without Knowledge, and without the active 
 power of Thinking. These excellencies must 
 be obtained by our own endeavours,, in the use 
 of certain means. 
 
 Goodness is the gift of God, to, those who 
 ask him for it, through our Saviour, Jesus 
 Christ. 
 
 Knowledge is acquired by attention to what 
 we see, hear, and read. 
 
 The power of Thinking is acquired and im- 
 proved by the early cultivation and the constant 
 exercise of the understanding. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 19 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 On different States of the Mind to ivhich the word 
 Thinking, is commonly applied. 
 
 The word Thinking is commonly applied to 
 several very different states of the mind. We 
 must learn to distinguish them. 
 
 I. There is one state of the mind in which 
 the thoughts, or the images of objects that have 
 been seen, or recollections of what has been 
 heard, or felt, follow each other, without any 
 action of the Will, in making a choice among 
 them, or in exercising command over them. 
 Ideas flow on before the fancy, like straws, 
 sticks, and leaves, floating on the surface of 
 a rapid stream. The mind in this state may 
 be compared to a person sitting at a window, 
 who idly stares at the crowd which passes before 
 him : he has no kind of influence over those who 
 are passing and repassing, standing or moving, 
 in the Street. This state of the mind is called 
 
20 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 dreaming when the body sleeps ; and musing 
 when the body is awake : but it is also very 
 usual for persons to say that they have been 
 thinking, when their minds have been in this 
 state. 
 
 II. There is another state of the mind in 
 which it is entirely occupied with the objects 
 perceived by the senses ; it sees, hears, feels, 
 tastes, smells ; or it has some internal sensation ; 
 as hunger, thirst, pain. These perceptions or 
 sensations excite emotions of desire, or fear ? 
 or satisfaction, or uneasiness, according to the 
 nature of the objects which affect the senses, 
 or the internal feelings. The particular state 
 of the mind is the effect of some cause which 
 operates upon it : as sealing wax becomes soft, 
 when it is placed near the fire ; or brittle, when 
 exposed to cold : it takes this shape, or that 
 shape, according to the figure which is im- 
 pressed upon it. 
 
 III. There is another state of the mind in 
 which it exercises command over its thoughts : 
 it chooses what particular state it will be in. 
 It either attends to some external object ; or it 
 disregards all external objects ; though perhaps 
 they may be making strong impression upon 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 2t 
 
 the senses, while it attends to its own operations. 
 It commands one thought to stay ; or calls it 
 back after it has passed by ; it brings several 
 ideas together, and compares them ; or it 
 separates ideas that come into the mind closely 
 joined together. The mind in this state is not 
 like the man who stares idly at a passing 
 crowd ; but like the General of an army, who, 
 not only perceives the objects before him ; but 
 who directs, at his pleasure, all the movements 
 that take place. 
 
 The two first are Passive states of the 
 mind. 
 
 The third is the Active state of the Mind, 
 and it is this only which is properly called 
 Thinking. 
 
 It is important to perceive perfectly the dis- 
 tinction between the active and the passive 
 states of the mind ; because the very wide 
 differences which are observable in the cha- 
 racter and condition of men greatly depend 
 upon the degree in which their minds are? 
 habitually, in an active or in a passive state. 
 
 Some examples will show what is meant by 
 the words active and passive. 
 
22 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 A thing is said to he passive when a change 
 takes place in its state or in its situation from 
 the operation of some external cause. 
 
 A cannon ball is passive, when it is thrown 
 through the air by the combustion of gun- 
 powder: the tower against which the ball 
 strikes is passive, when it is overthrown by the 
 blow : The Sea is passive, when it is tossed 
 into billows by the wind. 
 
 A thing is said to be active, when it changes 
 its own state or situation, or the state or 
 situation of some other thing. (See the word 
 cause, Part II.) 
 
 It might be said that the gunpowder which 
 propels the ball is active ; or that the ball is 
 active when it batters down the tower ; but 
 more strictly speaking, the ball is as passive 
 w r hen its progress is interrupted by the tower, 
 as when it is thrown from the cannon : the 
 gunpowder, also, is passive, when it is changed 
 from a solid to a gaseous state by the action 
 of fire. 
 
 Those things are most properly called active, 
 which begin to act of themselves, without 
 being influenced by any external cause. Now, 
 the only things which begin to act of them- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 23 
 
 selves are those which hare thought $ as 
 animals, men, and other intelligent beings* 
 All creatures, however, are passive as well as 
 active. God alone is entirely active, because 
 his state cannot be changed by any external 
 cause ; and he is the beginning, or first 
 cause of all the action which takes place in 
 the universe. He has, however, granted to 
 animals, to men, and to other intelligent 
 creatures some degrees of active power. Dif- 
 ferent creatures possess active power in 
 different degrees : the lowest degree of active 
 power is that which makes a creature able to 
 move its own body : the highest degree of 
 active power is that which makes a creature 
 able to command its own thoughts, or to 
 change the state of its mind by Will. This 
 will appear more plainly in some examples. 
 We begin by mentioning things which are 
 entirely passive. 
 
 1. A pebble which we gather from the sea 
 shore is not in the same state in which it always 
 has been : that which we now see is, probably, 
 all that remains of what, a thousand years ago, 
 was a large rough fragment of rock : it has 
 been worn small, round, and smooth, by con- 
 
24 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 tinual friction against other stones, during the 
 ebbing and flowing of the tide. This pebble, 
 therefore, is entirely passive, because the 
 changes it has undergone have been wholly 
 produced by external causes. 
 
 2. If we break a flint which has been dug 
 from a chalk pit, we perceive the appearance 
 of its having been formed gradually; there are 
 faint granulations or laminae in it : it has shot 
 out into irregular shapes ; and it has become 
 surrounded with a thin white crust. In this 
 gradual formation of the flint there is some 
 slight resemblance to the kind of action which 
 is called growth in vegetables and animals. 
 Yet it is merely a resemblance ; for the silice- 
 ous matter has merely been deposited where 
 space was left for it in the chalk. The flint 
 that has gradually increased in size, is as 
 passive as the pebble which has been gradually 
 diminished. 
 
 3. A vegetable undergoes many great 
 changes from the first bursting of the seed in 
 the earth, to the time when the branches and the 
 stem wither and decay. These changes are 
 produced by the action of the sun, the air, the 
 rain, the soil; along with that principle of 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 25 
 
 life, of the nature of which we know nothing. 
 A vegetable, therefore, may be said to be pas- 
 sive in the changes it undergoes ; yet vegetable 
 life much more nearly resembles action pro- 
 ceeding from itself, than the growth of stones 
 does. 
 
 4. There is one circumstance which is the 
 occasion of most of the differences between 
 Animals and Vegetables. It is this ; — the 
 preservation of the life of a vegetable de- 
 pends entirely upon what happens to it from 
 without : its food, — air, water, and the juices 
 of the soil, come to it : if they cease to come 
 to it, it dies. 
 
 But although the preservation of the life of 
 an animal depends, in part, like that of the 
 vegetable, upon what happens to it from 
 without, it depends also upon its own move- 
 ments or actions. An animal moves to its 
 food; its food does not come to it. Now a 
 being whose preservation depends upon its own 
 movements, must be able to guide those move- 
 ments not by chance, or only in certain direc- 
 tions, as the planets move ; but according to 
 its knowledge of things around it : such a 
 being, therefore, must have thought: it must 
 c 
 
20 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 perceive the difference between one thing and 
 another : it must be conscious of pleasure, in 
 receiving that which tends to preserve its life ; 
 and of pain, when any thing happens to it 
 which tends to destroy its life : it must desire 
 what will give it pleasure; and fear what will 
 give it pain : it must have power to reach what 
 it desires, and to shun what it fears. An 
 animal, therefore, must haVe Perception, and 
 Will, and Power ; because its life depends 
 constantly upon the agreement of its actions 
 with the particular circumstances in which it 
 is every moment placed. 
 
 When, therefore, we compare the meanest 
 animal with the noblest plant or tree, we must 
 acknowledge that the animal is of a higher 
 order than the vegetable ; because it has within 
 itself a power to move, and a knowledge of 
 things around it, by which to direct its move- 
 ments : an animal, then, is an active being. 
 
 An animal moves ; and it moves from 
 thought : this is what distinguishes it from a 
 vegetable. But what is it which distinguishes 
 inferior animals from man ? 
 
 The thoughts of animals seem, (so far as 
 we are able to judge,) to be entirely caused, 
 
 i 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 27 
 
 or influenced, either by the objects which 
 they perceive through the senses ; or by their 
 internal sensations, such as hunger, thirst, 
 fatigue, &c. They do indeed act according to 
 thought, or knowledge ; but their thoughts are 
 constantly the effects of what they perceive or 
 feel. It is only perhaps, in some small degree, 
 if at all, that animals choose what they will 
 think. Animals command their bodies as they 
 wiU, but Man commands his mind, as he 
 wills. 
 
 5. This is what is meant when it is said that 
 Man is endowed with reason ; he has power 
 over his thoughts. He can suffer them to flow on 
 without direction ; or he can leave them to be 
 influenced by external objects ; or he can with- 
 draw his mind entirely from the objects which 
 he sees, hears, feels, tastes, smells : he can 
 attend to one object, and put away others ; he 
 can bring together thoughts that are similar; 
 he can look at them together, and perceive 
 wherein they are alike, and wherein they differ : 
 he can frame complete notions, or disjoin 
 them ; and he can imagine what he has 
 never actually seen. This power over his 
 thoughts enables man to improve his condition to 
 c2 
 
28 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 a great extent ; because he can combine ideas 
 in various forms ; and he can learn how to 
 produce what he has imagined. Animals, left 
 to themselves, continue always in the same 
 state : But when men once begin to think, 
 they soon improve their condition - 
 
 Man, therefore, is a more active being than 
 other animals ; because the changes which take 
 place in his thoughts, often begin from himself, 
 without the operation of any external cause, or 
 any internal bodily feeling. 
 
 When we say that man is an active being, 
 we mean, that he is by nature capable of be- 
 coming active ; for in fact, the minds of a great 
 proportion of mankind continue always in 
 a more passive state than those of Dogs ? 
 Monkeys, or Elephants. 
 
 Now, this vast difference between one man 
 and another, is, perhaps, the most remarkable 
 circumstance belonging to human nature: it 
 deserves therefore, to be particularly attended 
 to, in order that we may be excited to acquire 
 that Active Power in the mind which, next 
 to Goodness, is the chief excellency of human 
 nature. 
 
 We must now mention again the three states 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 29 
 
 of the mind, described at the beginning of this 
 chapter. — 
 
 The first is the state of musing or dreaming. 
 
 The second is that in which the thoughts are 
 caused by external objects, or by internal bodily 
 sensations. 
 
 The third is that in which the mind is itself 
 the cause of its own thoughts. 
 
 .The first two states are passive ; the third is 
 active. 
 
 The minds of persons whose bodies are in- 
 dolent, feeble, or diseased, are most liable to 
 be in the first state. 
 
 The minds of children, of uneducated per- 
 sons, of savages, of persons whose sensations 
 are peculiarly lively, or whose bodies are more 
 vigorous than their minds, are most liable to be 
 in the second state. 
 
 The third is the state — 1st. of those whose 
 understandings have been early cultivated, and 
 constantly exercised : 2d. of those who have 
 been placed in peculiar circumstances, which 
 have forced them to think ; and, 3d. of persons 
 whose minds are naturally vigorous. 
 
 Now the object of the following chapters is 
 to describe two or three of the simplest opera- 
 c3 
 
SO ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 tions of the Mind, when it is in the active state; 
 that is to say, when it thinks. 
 
 It will, however, first, be necessary to de- 
 scribe some things which take place in the 
 Mind with little, or no effort of thought. 
 
ELExMENTS OF THOUGHT. 31 
 
 CHAP IV. 
 
 On the formation of General Notions, and the use 
 of General Words, 
 
 After a number of objects nearly alike in 
 their general appearance have been seen, a 
 notion is formed in the mind which is different 
 from the recollection we may have of any one 
 of those particular objects. This sort of notion 
 is less distinct and perfect than the recollection 
 of one particular object ; but it passes in and 
 out of the mind more readily and quickly than 
 such a particular recollection. 
 
 An indistinct remembrance formed by several 
 similar objects, is called a General Notion. 
 
 When a General notion has thus been formed 
 in the mind, we employ some one word to 
 signify the notion ; which word serves as the 
 name of every particular object that is found to 
 agree with the notion. A word which belongs 
 to a General notion, and which serves as the 
 c4 
 
32 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 name of many similar things, is called a 
 General, or Common Term. 
 
 The words Man, Horse, Star, Book, are 
 General terms : They signify the General 
 notions which have been formed in the mind by 
 seeing many men, many horses, many stars, 
 many books. 
 
 When we have been long used to apply some 
 General name to a number of similar things, 
 we are apt to think of them as if they were 
 really connected together in some way ; though 
 the only real connection between them is that 
 which has taken place in our own minds. 
 
 Another circumstance follows from the use 
 of General terms ; and as it is the occasion of 
 many mistakes in thinking and speaking, it 
 is necessary to be aware of it. 
 
 It is this, — That we gradually fall into the 
 habit of using General names without having in 
 the miad any image of the particular things to 
 which the name belongs ; or even any Genera' 
 notion of them. It is thus that we learn to think 
 of words more than of the things of which they 
 are the names ; and unless an effort is made to 
 counteract this habit the mind becomes almost 
 incapable of thinking without using words ; or 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 33 
 
 of thinking of ihings at all. Children think 
 more of things than of words ; but most adults 
 think more of words than of things. 
 
 When we hear or repeat such sentences as 
 the following, the words commonly pass through 
 the mind without raising any image of the 
 things spoken of : — 
 
 ( Man is born to labour.' 
 
 f The Dog is an animal which renders im- 
 portant services to man.' 
 
 * A man who possesses lands, houses, furni- 
 ture, and cattle, is rich ; but perhaps not 
 happy/ 
 
 * I met a man yesterday who begged alms of 
 me.' 
 
 We do not stay to think of the objects, unless 
 there is something unusual belonging to them 
 which rouses attention ; as for instance ; — 
 
 ' The crocodile haunts the banks of the 
 Nile/ 
 
 c I once saw an Eagle carry off a lamb from 
 the flock.' 
 
 ? A great comet appeared in the year 1769.' 
 
 Thus it happens that in proportion as objects 
 are familiar to us, we forget them, when we use 
 the words which represent them, and hence the 
 c5 
 
34 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 mind acquires the habit of carrying on its oper- 
 ations by the means of words without regard to 
 things.. 
 
 Those therefore who do not make frequent 
 efforts to think of things when they use words, 
 must think inaccurately though they may speak 
 with propriety ; because their thoughts and 
 opinions are liable to all the indistinctness and 
 uncertainty which belong to words. For the 
 sense of words depends upon the use which 
 men happen to make of them : it is therefore 
 continually changing by time and accident. 
 The same word is often understood by different 
 persons in very different senses ; and many 
 words have several senses. Disputes often 
 arise entirely from this cause ; — men have 
 forgotten to think of things, and as words are 
 uncertain there will always be room for disagree- 
 ment and misapprehension in the use of them. 
 
 It is true that we may very safely use the 
 General terms which belong to the various 
 natural objects around us ; because there is 
 little danger of mistake in regard to things 
 which are frequently before our eyes, and which 
 are easily examined. Besides ; — the various- 
 kinds of animals and vegetables, and other 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 35 
 
 natural objects, continue always nearly the 
 same. We may therefore safely use such 
 words oak, lion, star T cloud, stone, fish, 
 copper, snow ; without stopping to recollect 
 the image of the things themselves. 
 
 But when we are speaking of things which 
 cannot be perceived by the senses ; such as the 
 qualities, or feelings, or abstract notions of the 
 mind, we are liable to perpetual mistakes, if 
 we have fallen into the habit of using words 
 with little regard to the things they signify. 
 
 Abstract terms especially, such as the fol- 
 lowing, are very apt to slip through the mind 
 without bringing any distinct notion along with 
 them : — Reason, Instinct, Wisdom, Genius, 
 Justice, Partiality, Pride, Liberty, Power, 
 Truth, Virtue, Religion. But those who wish 
 to acquire the power and the habit of thinking 
 well, must not allow themselves indolently to 
 fancy that they know what they mean when 
 they use words of this sort ; or imagine that 
 they could, if it were necessary, describe their 
 meaning. They must, on the contrary, often 
 think of such notions apart from words ; 
 and they must learn to analyse them, in the 
 way that will be explained in a following chapter, 
 eft 
 
36 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 They must labour to make them more and more 
 correct and distinct, by continually comparing 
 them with whatever they learn from books, 
 from the study of their own minds, or from 
 observation. 
 
 The sum of what has been said in this 
 chapter is this ; — 
 
 The mind does not remember separately all 
 the individual things which it has ever per- 
 ceived ; but it retains one general and indistinct 
 recollection of many similar things ; and to 
 each general notion of this sort, one word is 
 applied, which serves as the name of each of 
 those similar things. 
 
 Now, as it is more easy to think of one thing, 
 than of many, we are apt to think more of the 
 one name of a general notion, than of the 
 things themselves ; especially in things which 
 relate to the mind, and which require some 
 eifort of thought to conceive of them distinctly. 
 
 It is unavoidable that this habit should be 
 formed ; but it is the business of a good educa- 
 tion to form a contrary habit, — namely, — that 
 of comparing General notions with the things 
 which they ought to represent ; and of examin- 
 ing things without regard to the words that 
 have been connected with them in the mind. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 37 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 On the meaning of the words Genus, Species, - 
 and Generalization. 
 
 It has been shewn that one General notion is 
 formed of many particular objects ; and that 
 one name is employed to signify all the objects 
 which are sufficiently alike to be comprehended 
 in the same general notion. But very often the 
 particular objects to which one name is given, 
 are found to differ in many respects, when more 
 attentively compared with each other. For 
 example : — 
 
 The word tree belongs to a general notion 
 which we have formed of a thing growing from 
 the ground, with root, stem, branches, and 
 leaves. Whenever we see a thing growing 
 from the ground, and having a stem, branches, 
 and leaves, we call it a Tree ; although it may 
 differ from other trees in all respects, except 
 these which have been mentioned. 
 
38 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 When we perceive some object very different 
 from any thing which we have hitherto seen, the 
 first act of the mind is to think what it is most 
 like ; and if we can see, or fancy any resem- 
 blance to some thing already known, we im- 
 mediately apply the name of it to the strange 
 object. 
 
 If a child is shown foreign animals, without 
 having been told their names, he will probably 
 call the Lion, a great Dog ; the Tiger, a great 
 Cat ; the Elephant, a Cow with a long nose ;. 
 an Ostrich he may call a Swan ;, and a Croco- 
 dile, a Lizard: his mind is uneasy till he has 
 placed the new objects along with some of the 
 general notions he has already acquired, and 
 given to them the names of these notions. 
 
 The same thing has often been observed in 
 Savages, when first visited by Europeans : a 
 Ship they call a house upon the water ; or a 
 great canoe: and each utensil, or article of 
 furniture, they quickly compare with some- 
 thing already known to them. In such in- 
 stances two appellations are usually employed : 
 the first of them expresses the resemblance 
 of the new object to something known : the 
 second, expresses the difference which is per- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 39 
 
 ceived between the strange and the familiar 
 object : as in the instance just mentioned, a 
 child will, probably, call an Elephant, a Cow, — 
 with a long nose. 
 
 Thus it appears that the first act of the mind 
 is to observe the resemblance of one thing to 
 others : this is the origin of General notions 
 comprehending many similar things. 
 
 The second act of the mind is to take notice 
 of the difference between similar things. 
 
 We discover that the similar objects of which 
 we have formed one General notion are un- 
 like in many respects. We begin then to sort 
 the whole into smaller parcels, by observing, 
 first, the resemblances, and then the differences, 
 which are found among them. 
 
 Now a multitude of things which we have 
 observed to be similar in some respects, is called 
 a Genus ; and the smaller parcels into which 
 we afterwards divide the whole, are called 
 Species : 
 
 For Example : — * 
 
 * It may be necessary here to remark, that, in this and 
 other instances, the writer has not drawn his examples from 
 scientific classifications ; believing that more obvious and 
 familiar distinctions are much better adapted to the imme- 
 diate purposes of logical elucidation. 
 
40 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 We form a General notion of things which 
 have life, which grow, and die ; which move 
 from place to place ; and which preserve their 
 lives by their own efforts. The word Animal 
 is the name affixed in the mind to this General 
 notion ; and all the particular things to which 
 the above description may be applied are said 
 to belong to the Genus, — Animal, Having 
 this notion, and the name of it,- — animal, in 
 the mind, if we were transported to the moon, 
 and were there to see objects entirely different 
 from any thing found upon the Earth, except 
 that they moved about, apparently according 
 to their own will, we should immediately call 
 them animals ; although unlike any creatures 
 to which we had hitherto given that name ; we 
 should also call them all by this one name, — 
 animal ; although we perceived them to differ 
 widely from each other. 
 
 So, in fact, we call all things animals which 
 agree with the general notion that has been 
 described. We perceive, however, that there 
 are parcels of them which differ in some 
 respects from other parcels. Some animals, 
 for instance, move upon the Earth ; others live 
 in the water; others traverse the air. W T e 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 41 
 
 therefore divide the multitude of animals into 
 three Species ; — Beasts, Birds, and Fishes. 
 Now these three words are the names of 
 General notions ; but they are all compre- 
 hended in the larger notion signified by the 
 name Animal. Animal, then, is the Genus ; 
 Beast, — Bird, — Fish, — are the Species. 
 
 When a Genus has been thus divided into 
 Species, any one of these species may be taken 
 and divided into smaller parcels, by observing 
 some further circumstances in which the things 
 included in it differ. 
 
 The parcel which was called a species, in 
 relation to the large collection, or Genus, is 
 now itself considered as a Genus, in relation 
 to the smaller parcels, or species, into which 
 it is divided :— For example : — 
 
 Birds are a species of animal : but we per- 
 ceive that some birds prey upon other animals ; 
 while some subsist upon grain. Birds, there- 
 fore, may be divided into two species, — Carni- 
 vorous, and Granivorous. These two species 
 may be again divided into smaller parcels, ac- 
 cording to still smaller differences observable in 
 their size, or shape, or colour, or mode of life : 
 we may go on dividing and dividing, till we 
 
42 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 can no longer discover any certain and constant 
 differences by which to distinguish one bird 
 from another. After this, if we have occasion 
 to speak of some one bird, we either point to 
 it, and say, that Peacock, or this Linnet ; or 
 we give to it a name which belongs to itself 
 alone ; as is done to some domestic animals. 
 
 It is plain then, that the notice we take of 
 the resemblances of things gives us General 
 notions, and that our observation of the dif- 
 ferences of things leads us to separate the mul- 
 titude of things comprehended in a General 
 notion into smaller parcels, — the large col- 
 lection called a Genus, the smaller, Species. 
 
 When we wish to make some particular 
 thing known, so that what we intend cannot be 
 mistaken, we first mention the Genus in which 
 it is comprehended, and then, we either simply 
 name the particular Species to which it belongs, 
 or, if that is not sufficient, we describe exactly 
 the particular circumstance in which it differs 
 from the other things contained in the same 
 Genus; — this is called a Definition. A Defi- 
 nition is made by naming the Genus, and 
 describing the difference between it and the 
 other species :-— For example : — 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 43 
 
 A Whale is a fish, which suckles its young. 
 
 A Bat is a quadruped, which flies through 
 the air. 
 
 A snake is a reptile, having no feet. 
 
 Platina is a metal, heavier than any other. 
 
 (Seethe word Definition, Part II.) 
 
 The word Generalization, is used some- 
 times, to express the act of the mind while it 
 is employed in the way that has now been 
 described, in distributing a multitude of things 
 into Genera* and species. 
 
 Sometimes it is employed to signify the act 
 of the mind in taking notice of some one object, 
 in order to discover what genus, and what 
 species it belongs to. 
 
 Genera is the plural of the latin word Genus. 
 
44 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 On the origin and nature of Abstract Notions. 
 
 If several marbles are before us, we merely 
 observe their perfect resemblance to each other. 
 But if we see together a marble, a bullet, a 
 ball, a glass bubble, and an apple, we are led 
 to take notice of their similarity in one respect, 
 namely, — shape ; and at the same time to 
 observe their unlikeness in all other respects. 
 We think of them as different things alike in 
 shape. The mind forms a distinct and separate 
 notion of this likeness in shape ; and then 
 seeks for a word to represent the notion. The 
 word roundness is used. This is not the name 
 of any one sort of thing, like the word marble ; 
 but it is the name of a notion that has been 
 formed after we have taken notice of some one 
 respect in which different objects are alike. 
 
 With the help of the name which we have 
 given to this separate notion, we can con- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 45 
 
 veniently think and speak of a particular shape, 
 while we entirely forget the other qualities or 
 appearances of the various objects to which it 
 may belong. 
 
 This act of the mind, when it thinks of 
 some one quality or circumstance apart from 
 all the other qualities or appearances of the 
 things in which that quality is found, is called 
 Abstraction. 
 
 Another example may be taken : — 
 There are before us a square piece of ivory, 
 and an egg, and a sheet of paper, and a piece 
 of ermine, and a quantity of snow. These 
 things are very unlike in all respects but one, 
 namely, colour. This resemblance attracts 
 attention : we think of it apart from the shape, 
 hardness, smoothness, size, or use of the 
 several objects ; and we call this resemblance 
 whiteness. Whenever we hear the word We 
 have a notion of this one quality, without any 
 recollection of particular objects which are 
 white. Such a notion is called an Abstract 
 Notion, or idea ; and the name of it is called 
 an Abstract Term. 
 
 If all the qualities of all the things which we 
 perceive by the senses were exactly the same, 
 
46 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 it is probable that we should never form any 
 such abstract notions ; but should constantly 
 think of all the qualities and appearances of 
 things together ; and should perhaps be unable 
 to separate them in thought one from another. 
 
 The difference between General notions and 
 Abstract notions will now be plain. 
 
 Objects alike in many, or in most respects, 
 cause the mind to form General notions, com- 
 prehending a multitude of particular things. 
 
 Dissimilar things, alike in some one respect, 
 cause the mind to form Abstract notions of 
 single qualities, 
 
 Man, animal, oak, gold; are the names of 
 General notions: 
 
 Redness, swiftness, hardness, beauty; are 
 the names of single qualities considered ab- 
 stractedly, or apart from the objects in which 
 they are found. 
 
 A general term represents the whole of our 
 notion of a thing, as hawk, tree. 
 
 An abstract term expresses only one part 
 of our notion of a thing ; as voraciousness, 
 durability. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 47 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 On different kinds of Abstract Notions. 
 
 It has been shown in the last chapter that an 
 abstract idea is the separate notion we form of 
 some single quality, property, or circumstance, 
 which has been observed in several dissimilar 
 things. 
 
 Snow and paper agree in whiteness: Iron 
 and Stone resemble each other in hardness : 
 Gold and Copper agree in ductility, and mal- 
 leability ; which means that the shape of a mass 
 of either of those metals may be changed by 
 force, without breaking it into parts. A mass 
 of Water or of oil is much more easily put into 
 a new shape: this quality is called fluidity. 
 After we have observed this quality in several 
 things, we can think of fluidity without 
 having in the mind any image of water, or of 
 air, or of oil, or of melted metal. When we 
 see a strange substance, if we find that some 
 
48 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 force is required to put a mass of it into a new 
 shape ; but that yet it is not broken by the 
 application of force, we remember the abstract 
 notion we have before formed of ductility, and 
 we say that this new substance is ductile. Or 
 if a substance moves into the shape of the 
 vessel which contains it, merely by its own 
 weight, we are reminded of the notion which 
 we have called fluidity. 
 
 The simplest sort of abstract notions are 
 those which we form of the qualities of objects 
 known to us by the senses ; such as colour, 
 hardness, shape, roughness, smoothness, loud- 
 ness, sweetness, bitterness, &c. There are 
 other abstract notions which are formed by 
 reflection, and by the joining of several simple 
 notions together. For example : — The word 
 virtue represents an abstract notion, formed by 
 the joining together of several ideas in the 
 mind. When an intelligent being freely con- 
 forms his actions and his thoughts to the will 
 of God, he is said to be virtuous, or to act 
 virtuously. The abstract term virtue repre- 
 sents the notion we form, not of some particular 
 action or feeling ; but of that quality of any 
 action or feeling performed or felt by an 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 49 
 
 intelligent being which renders it agreeable to 
 the will of God. Virtue is not a thing that can 
 be seen, heard, or felt ; but it is a quality of 
 actions or feelings ; in the same way that 
 fluidity is a quality of water, or of oil, or of 
 any other substance which falls into a level 
 surface merely by its own weight. 
 
 Whenever we perceive that there is some 
 property, or quality, or circumstance in dis- 
 similar things, which, when we see or think 
 of one of them, may put us in mind of the 
 other, we may be sure an abstract notion has 
 been formed in the mind ; although, perhaps, 
 we may not be able to describe it in words. 
 When we are searching for such a notion, or 
 trying to express it in words, we are making 
 an effort of abstraction ; that is,— we are* 
 endeavouring to form in our minds a description 
 of a particular circumstance belonging to 
 several different things which shall suit all of 
 them with exactly equal propriety. A person 
 who is able to form such descriptions with 
 readiness and correctness, is said to have a 
 talent for abstraction ; or to be an abstract 
 thinker. An example will show how such 
 descriptions are formed. — When we think of a 
 
 D 
 
50 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 watch, a plant, and an animal, do we hot per* 
 ceive that there is some circumstance in which 
 they are alike ? 
 
 Let us then inquire what it is in which a 
 plant, an animal, and a watch agree. We 
 may take any one of these three things, and 
 endeavour to form such a description of it, as 
 shall suit the other two with equal correctness. 
 Let us then take the last of them, and describe 
 it thus, — A watch is a machine, so constructed 
 as to measure time by the regulation of a 
 pendulum. This, however, is a description of 
 the watch which will suit neither the plant nor 
 the animal. We take, then, the plant. A 
 plant is a thing which grows from the ground ; 
 gradually increases in size, lasts a certain time, 
 and then decays : this description will suit 
 neither the watch nor the animal. Let us try 
 then to describe the animal. An Animal is a 
 being which grows, and which moves by its 
 own will ; and which, after it has for some time 
 preserved its state, decays, or is destroyed. 
 But this description of an animal will not suit 
 the plant or the watch. We have not, there- 
 fore, yet described that abstract notion which 
 may cause us to think of these three things 
 together, as having some resemblance. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 51 
 
 Let us then describe a watch thus ; — It is a 
 body, consisting* of various parts, so related to 
 each other, as to produce certain constant 
 movements and changes, with a view to some 
 end or design. Now any thing to which this 
 description may be applied is called an orga- 
 nized body ; and the name of this abstract 
 notion, formed in the mind by comparing 
 such bodies is ^organization. Organization 
 is that in which a plant, and an animal, and 
 a watch agree ; for we may say of one of 
 them with as much propriety as of another, 
 that it is a body, consisting of various parts, 
 so adjusted as to produce certain changes and 
 movements, all having a tendency to some 
 one end or design. 
 
 There is, however, another abstract notion 
 in which the plant and the animal agree ; but 
 which does not belong to the watch. 
 
 * The term organization is frequently restricted to vege- 
 table and animal bodies ; but as, in its logical sense, it is 
 susceptible of a wider application, the mechanical structure 
 is here included for the sake of a more diversified exem- 
 plification. 
 
 d2 
 
52 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 This is Life : we cannot tell in what life 
 consists, hut we see that it is something more 
 than man is able to communicate to any 
 machine. We can only describe it by the 
 effects which we observe : these effects are,, a 
 constant movement among the parts of the 
 body ; a gradual increase in size, for a certain 
 time; and a regular succession of changes 
 ending in the dissolution of the whole This 
 principle of Life might be compared to the 
 action of the spring of a watch : but it would 
 be a foolish misapplication of words to call 
 the spring, the life of a watch ; as though 
 the elasticity of the spring, and the principle 
 of life in a plant or animal, were nearly the 
 same things. 
 
 Life is something which we do not under- 
 stand ; but the effects of life which we observe 
 are joined together by the mind, and form an 
 abstract notion : and whenever we see these 
 effects we remember the notion, and the name 
 of it ; and we say such a thing has Life ; — 
 either vegetable life, or animal life. 
 
 It appears then, that the mind not only 
 forms abstract notions of simple qualities, 
 such as redness, sweetness, roughness, but 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 53 
 
 also, that it has abstract notions in which a 
 number of circumstances or qualities are 
 joined together ; such as those signified by 
 the words, ductility, fluidity, virtue, orga- 
 nization. 
 
 b3 
 
54 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 On the difference between Simple Abstract Notions, 
 and Complex Abstract Notions. 
 
 The notions expressed by the words Life, 
 Organization, Virtue, may be described, as 
 was shown in the last chapter. But some 
 abstract notions cannot be described by words : 
 we can only give them single names. It is 
 necessary to understand the difference between 
 these two kinds of abstract notions. 
 
 The notions signified by the words Redness, 
 Sweetness, Existence, Pain, Pleasure, and 
 many others, cannot be described : the reason 
 of this is, that these notions consist of one 
 idea received immediately, either from ex- 
 ternal objects, by the senses ; or from our 
 internal feelings, or consciousness. 
 
 If it is necessary to make another person 
 know more certainly what notion we are 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 55 
 
 speaking of, we may employ some other word, 
 nearly of the same meaning ; but we cannot 
 convey to his mind by words any more of this 
 notion than what he receives at once, as soon 
 as he hears and understands the word we use. 
 
 For example : — if the person to whom we 
 speak does not happen to be acquainted with 
 the meaning of the word Existence, we may 
 use the synonymous word Being ; or we may 
 vary the form of expression, by saying, — 
 Whatever is, exists ; or has existence : but 
 these several words or phrases are not descrip- 
 tions of the notion ; they are merely different 
 names of it. 
 
 When no perfectly synonymous word can be 
 found by which to express one of these simple 
 notions, we may mention some object to which 
 it belongs ; or some cause which produces it : 
 Thus we may say redness is the colour of a 
 rose : Pain is the state of the mind while the 
 nerves are violently pressed, or torn, or cut. 
 But this does not describe pain ; it only 
 makes known what feeling it is to which we 
 apply the word. 
 
 Notions of this sort, which cannot be de- 
 scribed may be called Simple Abstractions. 
 p4 
 
5G ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Notions which may be described, because, 
 they consist of several simple notions joined 
 together, may be called Complex Abstrac- 
 tions. 
 
 If we attentively examine the notions sug- 
 gested by the words Place, Distance, Equality, 
 Proportion, Hardness, Softness, Fluidity, In- 
 telligence, Viptue, Perfection, Design ; Utility, 
 Organization, Truth, Liberty, Necessity, Re- 
 sponsibility, Obligation, Equity, Reward, Pu- 
 nishment, Merit,* we shall find, that they may 
 be described. That is to say, we may mention 
 the several simple notions which are included in 
 them, and explain the manner in which they 
 are connected together : some examples of what 
 is meant have already been given in the last 
 Chapter, where the notions expressed by the 
 words Fluidity, Ductility, Organization, 
 Virtue, are described, or analysed. 
 
 It is now necessary to explain the meaning 
 of the word — Analysis. 
 
 # Some of these notions are often called Relative Notions ; 
 Because they are formed by perceiving the Relation which 
 one idea bears to another. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 57 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 On Analysis, Classification, and Arrangement, 
 
 To open a parcel, and to examine each 
 article it contains separately, is Analysis. 
 
 The word Analysis is often misunderstood, 
 or used as if synonymous with Classification, 
 or Arrangement, or Distribution, or Divi- 
 sion : persons who have a happy talent for 
 arranging their thoughts in a neat and per- 
 spicuous manner, are apt to imagine that they 
 have analysed a subject, when, in fact, they 
 have done nothing more than put their original 
 stock of ideas into some convenient and intel- 
 ligible order. 
 
 The difference between Analysis, Classifi- 
 cation, and Arrangement, may be shewn by 
 the following example : — 
 
 A person who receives a parcel, containing 
 a multitude of various articles, analyses it in 
 order to know what each article is. 
 d5 
 
58 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 
 
 A tradesman who has to make up a parcel, 
 which is to consist of various articles, if he is ac- 
 customed to method in the dispatch of business, 
 does not pass round his Warehouse and take by 
 chance the articles which are contained in his 
 customer's order ; but he first makes some kind 
 of classification of them in his mind ; and then 
 he proceeds to look out all the articles of a 
 similar kind ; — then those of another kind ; &c. 
 
 The person whose business it is to pack such 
 a parcel, does not huddle them together at 
 random ; but he makes an arrangement of 
 them in the way which he thinks best for the 
 compactness of the parcel, and the safety of 
 the commodities. He classifies them, indeed, 
 but not according to the real nature of the 
 several articles ; it is merely with a view to his 
 present object; which is to dispose them so 
 that they may occupy the smallest possible 
 space, with the least hazard of injury to any 
 of the goods. Now if we attend to this ex- 
 ample we shall perceive, that, — 
 
 1. An analysis is made by observing the 
 differences of things ; in order that, by se- 
 parating things that differ, we may become 
 perfectly acquainted with each ; and so with 
 the whole. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 59 
 
 2. A classification is made by regarding the 
 resemblances of things ; in order that, by 
 bringing together things that are alike, we 
 may have a few kinds of things to think of, 
 and remember, instead of a confused multi- 
 tude of things. 
 
 3. An arrangement is made by remarking 
 particular circumstances which make it Jit that 
 one thing should be placed along with another ; 
 and that other things should be kept apart. 
 
 1. We analyse in order to become acquainted 
 with things of which hitherto we have been 
 ignorant. 
 
 2. We classify in order to have a just and 
 comprehensive view of a multitude of ideas 
 already acquired. 
 
 3. We arrange in order to adapt a multitude 
 of things to some particular purpose. 
 
 1 . An analysis, therefore, must be perfect. 
 
 2. A classification ought to be natural, and 
 perspicuous. 
 
 3. An arrangement ought to be simple, and 
 Jit. 
 
 1. There can be but one true analysis of any 
 one collection of things. 
 
 d6 
 
CO ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 2. There is always one classification which 
 is best ; and that is the one which corresponds 
 with a true analysis ; but there may be several 
 classifications that are good. 
 
 3. Several arrangements may be equally 
 good ; because the fitness of an arrangement 
 is often accidental and arbitrary. 
 
 1. It may be observed that Persons who 
 have the power of accurate discrimination 
 among abstract notions, habits of patient 
 thought, and, perhaps, a defective memory in 
 regard to words, succeed best in analysis. 
 
 2. That Persons who excel in the powers of 
 observation, and who are more occupied with 
 General notions than with Abstract notions, 
 frame the best classifications. 
 
 3. That the best arrangements are formed 
 by persons whose apprehensions are the most 
 rapid and distinct. 
 
 There can be but one true analysis of any 
 one collection of things ; because, in an 
 analysis, we are not at liberty to divide 
 things according to our pleasure, or according 
 to the notions we may have formed of them 
 beforehand ; but our business is simply, to 
 learn by careful examination, how many dif- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 61 
 
 f event things there are in the collection which 
 we analyse. 
 
 Suppose, for example, we designed to analyse 
 some book, in order to form an index in which 
 every paragraph should he referred to under a 
 general head, according to the subject of which 
 it treats : we might begin by taking half a 
 dozen sheets of paper, — writing, as a title, 
 upon the first, — Religion; upon the second, 
 Morals; upon the third, Politics; upon the 
 fourth, Natural Philosophy ; upon the fifth, 
 Belles Letters ; and upon the sixth, Miscel- 
 lanies. We might then proceed to read the 
 book, and at the close of each paragraph con- 
 sider on which of these six sheets we ought to 
 put down the reference to it. There would be 
 many paragraphs concerning which we should 
 have no doubt under what head to place them ; 
 but there would, probably, be some that could 
 not with propriety be placed on any one of the 
 first five sheets ; we should therefore put the 
 reference to such paragraphs among the mis- 
 cellanies : now the sheet of miscellanies, 
 would, probably, be sooner filled than any 
 one of the others ; but it would be a sheet full 
 of confusion, — a mere heap of particulars^ 
 which had not been analysed at alL 
 
62 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 The proper method of performing the task 
 would be to have before us several sheets of 
 blank paper ; we then read the first para- 
 graph, — consider what is the subject to which 
 it relates, — suppose, Politics . we make this 
 word the title to one of the sheets, and put 
 down the first reference upon it t in this way 
 we proceed, — considering the subject of each 
 paragraph separately ; and taking a fresh 
 sheet of paper for every different subject, how 
 many soever there may be ; probably we shall 
 find that, instead of arranging the index under 
 six heads, we must make twenty, or perhaps 
 fifty. 
 
 In making an analysis there are two opposite 
 errors, often fallen into, both which proceed 
 from the want of patient and accurate exami- 
 nation. 
 
 The first error is indolently to imagine that 
 a multitude of things may be reduced to a very 
 few different kinds. Thus, it was formerly 
 supposed that there were but four Elements^ 
 or different kinds of matter of which all things 
 are composed ; — namely, — Fire, Air, Earth, 
 and Water. Since men of science have ana- 
 lysed matter with greater care, they have found 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 63 
 
 that these are not Elements, but that there is a 
 considerable number of simple substances. 
 
 The second error happens when a number 
 of things are supposed to be of different kinds, 
 which more examination would show to be only 
 different in appearance. Thus, for example, 
 some modern chemists have said that there are 
 more than twenty elements, or simple sub 
 stances. Perhaps further examination will 
 prove that several of these are the same sub- 
 stance under a different form. 
 
 We are liable to both these mistakes in 
 analysing the notions or feelings of the mind ; 
 and a great proportion of all false reasoning 
 springs from one or the other of them. The 
 manner in which complex abstract notions may 
 be analysed remains now to be explained. 
 
64 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 On the Analysis of Complex Abstract Notions. 
 
 In Chapters VII. and VIII. the nature of 
 abstract notions, and the difference between 
 simple abstractions and complex abstractions 
 were explained. 
 
 Complex abstractions, it was said, are 
 notions which consist of several simple ab- 
 stractions joined together in the mind, or per- 
 ceived to have some relation to each other. 
 
 The notion of Liberty, for example, is a 
 complex abstraction ^ because it is formed by 
 perceiving the connection or relation of several 
 simple notions, as, — 
 
 1. The notion of Will or choice. 
 
 2. The notion of action according to Will. 
 
 3. The notion of some external force, op- 
 posing this will, or action. 
 
 And, 4th. these simple notions related to 
 each other negatively, by the recollection that 
 such force is absent from Will or action. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 65 
 
 It is plain then that the notion of Liberty is 
 a complex abstraction ; because we can men- 
 tion the several notions which belong to it, and 
 the relation in which they stand to each other. 
 We can describe what we mean by the word 
 without being obliged to find some other name 
 for it : — Liberty, we may say, is the absence 
 of external force or constraint, upon action or 
 choice. 
 
 But in order to describe this notion, we must 
 first analyse it, or discover all the simple ideas 
 of which it consists, and the manner of their 
 being joined together. Now, in the cultivation 
 of the understanding, nothing is more im- 
 portant than to acquire the habit of analysing 
 all complex abstract notions. 
 
 It is this habit which is the chief distinction 
 of an accurate, profound, and cultivated mind. 
 A person who has not acquired this habit, when 
 he is asked what he means when he uses a 
 word which signifies a complex abstract notion, 
 immediately hunts for some nearly synonymous 
 term ; or if he cannot find one, he mentions 
 some instance in which the word would com- 
 monly be employed. If, for example, he is 
 asked, — 6 what is Liberty ? ' he replies, per- 
 
66 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 haps, — e Liberty is freedom :' or he might say, 
 c a man who is not in prison, has liberty*. Thus, 
 because he is not able to analyse the notion 
 expressed by this word, he is obliged to make 
 the same sort of reply which he must have 
 made if the question had related to some 
 simple abstraction *, — he merely finds another 
 name for the notion ; or he mentions where it 
 is to be found. 
 
 If we are asked what is redness, we can 
 only say, it is crimson, or scarlet; or it is the 
 colour of a rose, or of blood. Bat if the 
 question relates to a complex abstraction, such 
 as those mentioned page 56 we ought to 
 analyse it, and then enumerate all the simple 
 ideas of which it consists, and say how they 
 are connected or related, so as to form one 
 notion. 
 
 Tf we attend to the way in which different 
 men speak or write on philosophical, moral, or 
 religious subjects, we shall perceive that there 
 are three sorts of minds. 
 
 The first class is the largest, by far, of the 
 three ; it consists of those persons who, either 
 have not naturally the power, or who have 
 not acquired the habit of analysing complex 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 67 
 
 notions. Such persons content themselves 
 with using customary words, to which they 
 attach confused, imperfect, or false notions. 
 The acting of their minds in thinking is the 
 mere recollection of words, phrases, and sen- 
 tences, which they put together in various 
 forms. 
 
 The second class is much smaller than the 
 first, but, perhaps, larger than the third. It 
 consists of persons who, having more vivacity 
 than clearness or strength of mind, are per- 
 petually endeavouring to analyse simple ab- 
 stract notions, such as those expressed by the 
 words space, existence, thought, matter, 
 pain, pleasure, power, wiU, fyc. This hap- 
 pens because they do not perceive the difference 
 between what is simple and what is complex : 
 they imagine, therefore, that every thing is 
 complex, and that all notions may be analysed. 
 Such persons are best pleased with subjects 
 which are most obscure : and they commonly 
 seem unwilling to assent to any simple and 
 perspicuous proposition : they amuse them- 
 selves with useless, endless, and unintelligible 
 disputes. They frequently invent new names 
 for common ideas ; and often fancy that they 
 
68 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 have made wonderful discoveries, which, how- 
 ever, nobody can understand : and sometimes 
 they write books to prove, either, what really 
 has no meaning at all, or what no one denies. 
 
 The third Class consists of those who not 
 only possess that activity of mind which incites 
 them to think much, but also, that strength 
 and accuracy of mind which enables them to 
 perceive clearly what notions are simple, and 
 what complex : they therefore, neither waste 
 their time in trying to analyse notions that are 
 simple ; nor rest satisfied till they have per- 
 fectly analysed every notion that is complex. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 On Efforts of Abstraction of different kinds. 
 
 It is commonly called an effort of abstraction 
 by which the mind forcibly withdraws itself 
 from the sensations occasioned by external 
 objects ; while it attends to its own thoughts. 
 It is also called an effort of abstraction when 
 we attend to the objects perceived by one of 
 the senses, while we cease to regard the objects 
 perceived by the other senses : we may, for 
 instance, so attend to what is before the eyes 
 that we are scarcely conscious of sounds 
 striking the ear at the same time. 
 
 It is also by an effort of abstraction that the 
 mind attends to one part of its sensations in 
 the same organ, while it disregards the other 
 parts. For example : — a Fainter acquires the 
 habit of attending separately to the different 
 sorts of sensations which are produced upon 
 the retina at the same moment. He can at- 
 
70 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 tend to the nice differences of colours, — their 
 agreements and disagreements, without any 
 regard to shadow, or to shape : or he per- 
 ceives the varieties of shade, without regard to 
 colour, or shape : or he measures the relations 
 of shape, without regard to colour, or shade. 
 It is upon the perfection of this power of ab- 
 straction in the organ of sight that the talent 
 of the Painter greatly depends. 
 
 In like manner, the musician acquires the 
 power of attending separately to any one of a 
 multitude of sounds, which strike the ear at 
 the same moment : he can listen to one part of 
 the music, — the bass, the tenor, the treble ; or 
 to one particular instrument^ or voice, among 
 a hundred. 
 
 The confectioner distinguishes by taste or 
 smell the various ingredients which he has 
 compounded ; and he can judge of the quality 
 of some one ingredient although it is mingled 
 upon the palate with five or six other ingre- 
 dients. A good cook, or a great epicure, is 
 able, when he tastes a made-dish, to discover 
 all the ingredients of which it is composed : 
 of one ingredient he may think there is not 
 enough ; of another too much : another in- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 71 
 
 gredient, he perceives, was not prepared with 
 sufficient care ; of some other ingredient he 
 will tell, whether it was produced in the West 
 Indies or in China: now all these differences 
 he perceives while one mixed taste is upon 
 the palate. But, by an effort of abstraction, 
 he attends to the various flavours separately 
 and when he has attended thus to each, he 
 has analysed the Dish. 
 
 A good Painter, then, is able readily and 
 certainly to analyse the complex sensations of 
 sight. 
 
 A good Musician can do the same with re- 
 gard to the complex sensations of hearing, and 
 a good cook analyses the complex sensations 
 of taste. 
 
 Now a good thinker is one who is able 
 readily and certainly to analyse the complex 
 abstract notions of the mind. 
 
 All opinions on subjects connected with Mo- 
 rals, Religion, Politics, or the Philosophy of 
 Human Nature, consist of complex abstract 
 notions, variously combined, and variously 
 expressed in words. Opinions are formed by 
 that operation of the mind which is called 
 Reasoning. But before the mind is com- 
 
72 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 petent to Reason justly, it must have acquired 
 habits of Abstraction and Analysis. Opinions 
 which enter the mind in any other way are 
 adopted, not formed; and they are little 
 more than certain forms of expression, joined 
 with feelings of complacency towards those 
 who hold the same opinions, and of contempt 
 or malevolence towards those who think, or 
 rather, who speak differently. 
 
 There is, however, one important exception 
 to this general observation, very necessary to 
 be remembered. This exception relates to 
 those religious opinions which are indis- 
 pensible to a holy state of mind — or, in other 
 words to true virtue. Now these indispensible 
 opinions, relative to the character of God — 
 the moral condition of man, and the way in 
 which he may be restored to virtue and happi- 
 ness, are communicated to all who humbly and 
 diligently seek for the guidance of God's Holy 
 Spirit, in the perusal of his word, and the use 
 of other means of instruction. This inesti- 
 mable and necessary benefit is expressly pro- 
 mised, in many parts of the Scriptures, to all 
 who ask for it : and it is continually bestowed 
 upon the most ignorant and uncultivated 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 73 
 
 minds. Indeed, while such persons, being 
 ' taught of God,' receive the great principles of 
 Christianity, those who proudly trust to the 
 unaided powers of their understandings often 
 reject or overlook the plainest doctrines of 
 Scripture, and frame religious systems of their 
 own, even though they profess to believe that 
 the Bible is a Divine Revelation. 
 
 It is not proposed in this volume to do more 
 than explain the nature of those preparatory 
 operations of the mind from which may result 
 intelligent opinions, a sound judgement in 
 conducting the common affairs of life, or a 
 successful prosecution of philosophical in- 
 quiries. Some brief hints, however, relating 
 to the practical employment of the Intellectual 
 Powers will be found in the following Part, 
 under the words — Analogy, Argument, Be- 
 lief, Contingency, Demonstration, Doubt, 
 Experiment, Hypothesis, Induction, Infer- 
 ence, Necessity, Probability, Reasoning, 
 Suggestion, Testimony, Truth. 
 
 END OF PART I. 
 
PART II. 
 
 CONTAINING, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER, BRIEF AND FAMILIAR 
 EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL TERMS EMPLOYED ON 
 SUBJECTS RELATING TO THE NATURE AND OPERATIONS OF 
 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 
 
 e2 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 77 
 
 PART II. 
 
 &c. 
 
 Abstract, — Abstraction : from abstraho, 
 to draw apart ; or to separate one thing 
 from another. 
 
 Abstraction is the action of the mind 
 in thinking of some one quality or cir- 
 cumstance belonging to several different 
 things, while it pays no regard to the 
 things themselves, or their other qualities : 
 thus we think of length, without thinking 
 of a road, or a wall, or a rope ; we can 
 think of weight, apart from the idea of gold, 
 or lead, or stone -, we may think of inno- 
 cence, without recollecting any particular 
 person, or thinking of any particular actions 
 or course of conduct. 
 e3 
 
78 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 A bstract terms are the names of qualities 
 belonging to things which may, perhaps, be 
 unlike each other in all respects, except this 
 one quality : as a plum and a planet are 
 unlike in all respects, except roundness : 
 but General terms are the names of many 
 individuals, alike in many, or in all their 
 qualities and appearances : for example : — 
 Speed is a quality which is found in a horse, 
 an eagle, and a greyhound : the word speed, 
 therefore, is an abstract term. But the word 
 Lion is a General term ; because it is a 
 name applied to all the individual animals 
 of one sort. The word we use when we 
 think of a quality, together with the parti- 
 cular thing to which it belongs, is called a 
 concrete term : blue, square, good, swift, 
 are concrete terms ; because they require to 
 be joined to the name of something, as the 
 blue sky, a square building, a good man, a 
 swift horse. 
 
 See Chap. VI. and Common Terms — 
 General Terms. 
 Abstruse, from Abstrudo, to hide, or thrust 
 out of sight ; or to shut up a thing. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 79 
 
 Subjects that require a patient effort of the 
 mind to understand them are called abstruse 
 subjects ; they may be compared to metals, 
 which lie hid in the bowels of the earth, and 
 which must be dug thence with much labour. 
 It is an inaccuracy frequent in conversa- 
 tion, to use the words abstract and abstruse, 
 as though they had the same meaning. 
 
 Accident, from accido, to fall close by ; or to 
 happen. 
 
 An accident is a quality of a thing which is 
 not found constantly to belong to it : as 
 red heat, to iron ; fragrance, to a flower ; 
 learning, to a man. 
 
 Active and Passive. That which causes a 
 change is Active. That which is changed 
 by a cause is Passive. See page 22, and 
 Cause. 
 
 Adjunct, from adjunctum, joined to. 
 
 The binding is an adjunct of a book : 
 praise is an adjunct of virtue, or genius. An 
 adjunct is a thing joined to some other thing : 
 an accident is a quality of a thing. 
 
 Affection, from affectio, which word is derived 
 from officio, — to produce an effect upon 
 something. 
 
 e 4 
 
80 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 It is a general name applied to the 
 qualities of things ; or the particular man- 
 ner in which they exist; or the relations 
 in which they stand to each other. The 
 way in which we think makes it natural to 
 us to imagine that all the properties or 
 qualities of things are, as it were, fastened 
 on to something to which they belong : we 
 use the word substance therefore when we 
 wish to express this indistinct notion ; and 
 then all the qualities of that substance are 
 called its affections or modes, A stick of 
 sealing wax is smooth, hard, red, fragrant, 
 and capable of being softened by heat. It 
 has, also, a certain shape, size, and weight : 
 besides these qualities with which we become 
 acquainted by the senses of sight, touch, 
 and smell ; we always imagine that there is 
 a something which is the thing itself ; which 
 possesses all these qualities ; and which we 
 call substance ; while all that we actually 
 know of it, is regarded as being only the 
 qualities or affections of this Substance. 
 See Substance. Mode. Being. Essence. 
 Aggregate, from aggrego, to gather together 
 as a flock of sheep. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. SI 
 
 The word is used to denote a number of 
 x things which may be thought of, as if they 
 made but one thing ; though they are 
 really distinct, and often found separate. 
 This notion may serve as an example of an 
 abstract relation, which corresponds with 
 nothing that is to be found in things them- 
 selves, but which results entirely from our 
 manner of thinking of them. When we 
 speak of a flock of sheep, the words repre- 
 sent nothing but our notion of a number of 
 things, which, on some account, we imagine 
 to form one thing. 
 Agreement. When we compare two or more 
 things and perceive them to be alike in some 
 respect, we use the word agreement : when 
 things are perfectly alike, we express the 
 comparison by the word sameness. These 
 are both complex abstract notions of relation. 
 Analogy, from avuhoyiu — proportion: When 
 some course of events seems to follow the 
 same order with another; so that we may 
 imagine them to be influenced by similar 
 causes ; we say there is an analogy between 
 them. And when we infer that a certain 
 event will take place in one case, which we 
 e5 
 
82 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 have observed to take place in some other 
 case, of a similar nature, we are said tb 
 reason from analogy. For example : — 
 when it was observed that rice nourishes in 
 the hot and humid plains of Egypt, it was by 
 reasoning from analogy that it was supposed 
 it would be advantageously cultivated in the 
 sultry marshes of Carolina. We reason 
 from analogy, when we suppose that the 
 Stars, like the Sun are surrounded with 
 Planets, which derive from them light and 
 heat. When we see that every part of the 
 Earth's surface, and every drop of water is 
 crowded with animated beings, we reason 
 from analogy, when we suppose that God, 
 who has thus filled one part of his Universe 
 with creatures, has done the same in other 
 parts ; and that therefore the Planets and 
 the more distant systems are filled with 
 living creatures. 
 Analysis, from uvaxvoo to untie, unloose, or 
 separate one part of a thing from another. 
 Almost every thing with which we are ac- 
 quainted consists of different parts or 
 qualities, united together : in most cases 
 we do not distinguish these different parts or 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 83 
 
 qualities of things without some degree of 
 attention or examination : thus, when we 
 look at water it appears to be one simple 
 substance; but when it is examined by a 
 chemical process, it is found to be formed 
 by the union of two sorts of air. In like 
 manner atmospheric air is found to be com- 
 posed of three sorts of air. This kind of 
 examination which discovers what any sub- 
 stance is composed of, is called an analysis. 
 We may analyse our thoughts, or the feelings 
 of our minds, as well as material substances. 
 Suppose, for example, the idea of some 
 building which we have formerly seen is pre- 
 sent to our minds : if we analyse our 
 thoughts, we shall find that, besides the 
 image of the building, we have a feeling or 
 conviction along with it of having actually 
 seen the object at some former time. When 
 an image in the mind is joined with this 
 feeling, we call it memory. The image 
 which is before our minds is joined also with 
 some feeling of pleasure, or displeasure, 
 according to the circumstances we might be 
 in when we saw the building. Now all these 
 sensations are so closely joined together in 
 e6 
 
84 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 the mind, that they seem to form one simple 
 notion, or remembrance, till we examine our 
 thoughts more accurately, and distinguish 
 one feeling and one image from another. 
 
 In order to become acquainted with the na- 
 ture of any object, we must first think of it 
 with a wish to know more of its nature than 
 we can perceive at the first glance ; this is 
 Curiosity. This wish to know, makes us 
 forcibly keep our thoughts upon the object 
 for some length of time : this is Attention. 
 We then endeavour to think of the different 
 parts, properties, or qualities of the object 
 singly, and apart from the idea we have of 
 the whole : this is Abstraction. When we 
 have considered all the parts, properties, or 
 qualities of the object, one after another, 
 so that we can think of them separately and 
 distinctly, we have then analysed the object : 
 that is to say, we have separated from each 
 other all the tilings in which we can perceive 
 any difference. 
 
 See Synthesis, Complex; and Chap. IX. 
 
 Argument. A proposition which may be 
 
 proved to be certainly true ; so that no one 
 
 who understands what is affirmed, can doubt 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 85 
 
 it, is said to be demonstrable : and the way 
 of showing such a proposition to be true, is 
 called a demonstration. But when a pro- 
 position is of such a nature that the truth of 
 it cannot be made to appear absolutely 
 certain, then the reasons that are given to 
 prove it true are called arguments. Argu- 
 ments may be balanced one against another ; 
 and when we have considered all of them, 
 we believe that proposition to be true which 
 is supported by the best arguments : and we 
 ought to believe it more or less confidently 
 in proportion to the strength of the argu 
 ments. Arguments make a proposition pro- 
 bable ; and we believe what is probable : 
 but demonstration makes a proposition cer- 
 tain ; and we are said to know, not merely 
 to believe what is proved by demonstration. 
 It may be demonstrated that the three angles 
 of every triangle are equal to two right 
 angles. This is a truth We know, as soon 
 as we understand what is meant by the words. 
 It may be proved by good arguments that 
 there is a city called Pekin in China: and it 
 would be foolish to doubt this, although, 
 strictly speaking, it cannot be demonstrated 
 
86 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 to be true to those who have never visited 
 China. It may be proved to be probable 
 that there is a north West Passage from the 
 Atlantic to the Pacific ocean ; but this is not 
 yet so certainly proved, as that it would be 
 foolish to doubt it : a year hence, perhaps, 
 the question may be determined : But what 
 is once known by demonstration cannot be 
 made more certain by any new proofs : while 
 what is proved by arguments may be more 
 or less certain. Many things, however, are 
 so well proved by arguments, that no reason- 
 able person will doubt them. 
 
 This is the meaning of the word argu- 
 ments it respects the different ways in which 
 a proposition may be proved to be true. In 
 common use the word is often intended to 
 express, besides the mere reasons that may 
 be brought to prove what is affirmed, those 
 earnest endeavours which one person makes 
 to persuade others to be of his opinion, by 
 exciting his feelings on the subject ; and so 
 biasing his Judgement. 
 
 In subjects which do not admit of Demon- 
 stration, such as those which afford the 
 most usual topics of conversation, almost any 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 87 
 
 proposition may appear to be proved by 
 arguments. This is, in part, owing to the 
 uncertainty of language, which conceals the 
 fallacies of bad reasoning. It is also, in 
 great measure, owing to the confused and 
 careless habits of thinking, with which most 
 people are satisfied. In those discussions 
 which frequently arise in conversation, it 
 very commonly happens that the several 
 parties adduce various arguments without 
 having any clear or fixed apprehension of 
 the notions contained in the propositions they 
 maintain. From such debates little ad- 
 vantage is likely to result. He who is most 
 fluent, or most crafty, or most dogmatical, 
 may put his opponent to silence ; and may 
 appear to have overthrown his arguments : 
 but, in fact, all that the victor has gained is 
 a sort of triumphant confidence in the affir- 
 mation of some half dozen empty sentences ; 
 while all that the conquered party has lost is 
 his present persuasion of the truth of some 
 other half dozen of empty sentences. In 
 most cases, if both parties were constrained 
 to analyse every complex notion connected 
 with the disputed question, (see Chap. X.) 
 
88 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 they would either find that there was no real 
 or important disagreement in their opinions ; 
 or the true nature of the point in dispute 
 would become so apparent that no further 
 argument would be needed ; or, very pro- 
 bably, it would become manifest that neither 
 party possessed a twentieth part of the know- 
 ledge which could qualify them to form any 
 opinion on the subject. 
 
 See Reasoning. Probability. Demon- 
 stration. 
 Arrangement. To arrange things, is not to 
 separate and place them in order according 
 to their true nature ; but in such a way as 
 will best suit some particular purpose. Thus, 
 if we place the books in a library, not accord- 
 ing to the subjects of which they treat, but 
 merely with a view to our convenience in 
 reaching those which we most often want to 
 use, this is an arrangement, not a classifi- 
 cation. Thus also, it may often be useful 
 to arrange our thoughts, not according to a 
 just method of thinking; but in that order 
 which may seem most likely to produce the 
 particular effect which we wish upon the 
 minds of those to whom we speak. See 
 
elements of thought. b\) 
 
 Disposition. Classification. Method. 
 Order, and Chap. IX. 
 Art, is the knowledge of what must be done 
 to produce some particular effect. The word 
 is only applied to those cases where con- 
 siderable application of the mind is required 
 to learn what is to be done* We do not use 
 the word when we speak of the most com- 
 mon occupations ; because, all that is neces- 
 sary to be known in order to produce the 
 required effect is easily learnt : Science 
 is that sort of knowledge which does 
 not immediately relate to practice : for 
 example : — The knowledge of the different 
 elements of all bodies, and the effects they 
 produce upon each other, constitutes the 
 Science of Chemistry. The same sort of 
 knowledge, when it is applied to any prac- 
 tical purpose is called an Art ; as, for in- 
 stance, the art of Dying ; the art of Brewing ; 
 the art of preparing Drugs for medical uses ; 
 &c. Men first learn Arts ; because they are 
 obliged to provide for the various wants of 
 animal life. When nations are so far civilized 
 that many individuals have leisure, then 
 curiosity impels them to seek for knowledge, 
 
90 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 merely for the pleasure which it yields. The 
 knowledge which such persons acquire for 
 their own pleasure, is soon after applied to 
 the discovery of better methods of producing 
 or preparing the different necessaries and 
 conveniences of life. Thus it is that the 
 practice of the Arts improves the condition 
 of men so far that many are left at leisure to 
 think; and then, those who think become 
 qualified to direct and improve the practice 
 of those who labour. Thus the Arts produce 
 the Sciences ; and then Science improves 
 the Arts. See Theory. 
 Artificial ; that which is produced by art. 
 There are some of the operations of nature 
 which are so far within the power of man 
 that he can regulate or alter the effects pro- 
 duced by natural causes : the effects that are 
 thus produced are called artificial. By 
 grafting one sort of fruit tree upon another, 
 a better kind of fruit is produced than either 
 of the trees would have yielded if left to 
 itself : this is an artificial process. The 
 word artificial is not applied to those things 
 which are produced entirely by the skill and 
 labour of men ; as, for instance, a house, 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 91 
 
 or a watch : these are called works of art. 
 It is only properly employed when the usual 
 course of nature is altered by skill or labour. 
 The word is often improperly applied to 
 things that are mere imitations of the works 
 of nature, as artificial flowers, or fruit. 
 
 Association. If several thoughts, or ideas, 
 or feelings have been in the mind at the 
 same time, afterwards, if one of these 
 thoughts return to the mind, some, or all 
 of the others will frequently return with it : 
 this is called the association of ideas. 
 
 Attention. When we see, hear, or think of 
 any thing, and feel a desire to know more of 
 it, we keep the mind fixt upon the object : 
 this effort of the mind, produced by the 
 desire of knowledge, is called Attention. 
 Ideas or feelings are constantly moving 
 through the mind without our will : (see 
 page 19) : but when we will, we have the 
 power to stop them, and choose which shall 
 stay in the mind. Now a sluggish mind is 
 one in which the desire of knowledge is not 
 great enough to rouse attention on ordinary 
 occasions. A weak mind is one in which, 
 though there may be much desire of know- 
 
92 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ledge — or curiosity, there is not force enough 
 to fix or command the thoughts. The vigour 
 of the mind greatly depends upon the just 
 balance between the desire of knowledge and 
 that force in which consists the power of 
 attention. Whether the mind be naturally 
 strong, or weak, or sluggish, education 
 tends to increase the power of attention ; or, 
 in other words, to give it more command of 
 its thoughts — more active Power, than it 
 would otherwise have. See page 21. 
 
 Attribute, from attribuo, to give to, or im- 
 pute. When one thing or quality is said to 
 belong to or make part of another, that 
 thing or quality is called an attribute. — See 
 Subject. 
 
 Axiom, from «fiwjtt«, a sentence, or affirmation, 
 worthy to be received. 
 
 This word is applied to simple propositions 
 so evidently true that they do not need to be 
 proved ; such, for instance, as — That the 
 whole of any thing is greater than any part 
 of it. 
 
 Being. This is the name of a simple abstract 
 notion, resulting from our consciousness, 
 which cannot therefore be denned. Consi- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 93 
 
 dered as a General term, it is the most com- 
 prehensive of all General terms : whatever 
 is, or exists, is called a Being. It may 
 therefore be applied to God in common "with 
 his creatures : God is : or God exists; He 
 is emphatically called the Supreme Being ; 
 or the Divine Being. 
 Belief. The state of mind produced by 
 arguments or reasons which appear to be 
 good or sufficient, is called Belief, See the 
 word Argument. 
 
 Belief is a state of mind between Know- 
 ledge and Doubt, in relation to the truth of 
 some proposition. Although what we believe 
 is not to us so absolutely certain as what we 
 know, yet it is as truly unreasonable not to 
 believe what is proved in the highest degree 
 probable, as it would be absurd to pretend to 
 doubt propositions that have been demon- 
 strated. For example : We should think a 
 person deficient in common sense, or ex- 
 tremely ignorant, who should profess not to 
 believe that Paradise Lost was written by 
 John Milton* It would be scarcely less ab- 
 surd not to believe that the CEneid was 
 written by Virgil, in the reign of Augustus : 
 
94 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 yet neither of these propositions can be de- 
 monstrated to be true; therefore, although 
 it would be extremely absurd to doubt them, 
 we must not say that we know them to be 
 true. But if we will not believe these his- 
 torical propositions, we must, in order to 
 account for the facts on which the common 
 opinion is founded, 'pretend to believe that 
 of which no reasonable and well-informed 
 person could actually convince himself if he 
 were to try. 
 
 If it is affirmed that the Moon is inhabited 
 by animals and intelligent creatures, we 
 may doubt this ; because we have no direct 
 proof that it is so : there is, therefore, no- 
 thing absurd in supposing that the Moon is 
 uninhabited ; although an argument from 
 analogy is strongly in favour of the supposi- 
 tion. But if it were said that the island of 
 Madagascar is uninhabited, we could not 
 believe this without admitting the most 
 absurd suppositions :— we must believe that 
 thousands of persons, of different nations, 
 during four hundred years, who have visited 
 the island, have all agreed to tell the same 
 falsehood; and that without any reason for 
 doing so : this is incredible. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 95 
 
 There is one difference between what we 
 know and what we believe, which it is impor- 
 tant to understand. Propositions which we 
 know to be true, we entirely understand ; or 
 at least, so far as we may be said really to 
 know them, we also understand them. But 
 we must believe many things of which we 
 scarcely understand any thing. For ex- 
 ample : — Three taken three times amounts 
 to nine. We know that this is true : — by 
 one glance of the mind we can, as it were, 
 see that it is true ; we, therefore, perfectly 
 understand what is meant by the words, 
 when we say that three times three are nine. 
 But let us suppose that a person who is 
 acquainted only with the common rules of 
 arithmetic, wants to resolve some problem 
 belonging to the higher branches of the 
 mathematics : he reads the rules which relate 
 to the problem ; and he carefully follows the 
 directions which are given. First he mul- 
 tiplies ; — then he divides ; — then he sub- 
 stracts ; — then he multiplies again ; and so 
 on : but he has not the least notion of the 
 reason of all these operations which he is 
 -directed to perform : he cannot, therefore, 
 
) ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 know that what he does is right, nor can he 
 trace the method by which a true result is 
 produced ; yet, as he believes that the Rules 
 he has followed are right, he believes, also, 
 that the sum which these calculations produce 
 is the true answer to the problem. 
 
 The greater part of all the Sciences is be- 
 lieved, and not known, by those who learn 
 them from books or teachers. And in the 
 most important concerns of life, men are ob- 
 liged to act upon what they believe, not upon 
 what they know : as, for example ; when a 
 merchant sends a cargo of goods to a distant 
 country, he does not know that there is any 
 such country as that to which the Captain 
 undertakes to conduct the Ship. He does 
 not know that there is any such person as 
 the merchant to whom the cargo is to be 
 delivered ; much less does he know that this 
 merchant is able to pay for the goods, and 
 honest enough to do so ; and yet, as he has 
 reason to believe all these things, he does 
 not scruple to venture half his fortune upon 
 the truth of them. 
 
 In the same way, we cannot, in the present 
 state, know that there is a judgement to come, 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 97 
 
 and a future life. But yet, if so momentous 
 a truth may be compared to one of small im- 
 portance, it is as absurd to doubt of this, as it 
 would be not to believe that there is such 
 an Island as Madagascar, and that it is 
 inhabited. And it is as truly irrational not 
 to regulate all our conduct in the present 
 life by a regard to our welfare in the future 
 world, as it would be in a merchant, to send 
 a ship to sea laden with a precious cargo, 
 without provisions, without charts, and 
 without a compass. 
 
 The things which we may know, are 
 generally of much less importance to our 
 welfare, either in the present life, or in the 
 life to come, than the things which are 
 believed. 
 Cause. We are conscious of being able to 
 change the thoughts in our own minds, as we 
 will , and also to change the position or state 
 of our bodies, and in some degree, the posi- 
 tion or state of things about us, as we will. 
 This feeling of being able to change the 
 state of things, according to our will, gives 
 us a notion which we call Power : now any 
 thing which has really, or which seems to 
 
 F 
 
98 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 have power to change the state of other 
 things, is called a Cause : the change that 
 takes place is called an Effect. 
 
 When we have observed that one event 
 constantly takes place immediately, or soon 
 after some other event, we cannot avoid be- 
 lieving that the first event has produced that 
 which follows : therefore we commonly call 
 the first event a cause, and the second, an 
 effect. For example : when we see that, 
 soon after the rising of the Sun, the hoar 
 frost dissolves ; or that the petals of flowers 
 expand, we say that the Sun is the Cause, — 
 and that the melting of the frost, or the 
 opening of the flowers is the Effect of this 
 cause. 
 
 If we were to observe that a clock had 
 stopped at sun -set, we should take no par- 
 ticular notice of the circumstance ; but if it 
 were constantly to stop at sun-set, we 
 should suppose that the setting of the sun 
 was the cause of the stopping of the clock : 
 and if all clocks always stopped at sun-set, 
 we should not be able to doubt that the light 
 of the Sun was, in some way, the cause of 
 the motion of clocks ; although we could not 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 find out how the sun acted upon the wheels, 
 so as to produce this effect. 
 
 We see therefore that it is natural to us, 
 whenever we see any change take place in 
 the state of things, to believe that there is 
 something which has the Power to produce 
 this change, and which we call the cause of 
 it. It is also equally natural to us to believe 
 that, when two events constantly takes place, 
 one immediately after the other, the first 
 of them is the cause of the second. 
 See Effect, and page 22. 
 Classification. The mind feels burdened 
 and confused when it attempts to think of a 
 multitude of things : but when we can put 
 a multitude of things into a few parcels or 
 bundles, we can then make ourselves ac- 
 quainted with them all more easily, and more 
 perfectly, and remember them with greater 
 facility. The sorting a multitude of things 
 into parcels, for the sake of knowing them 
 better, and remembering them more easily, 
 is classification. 
 
 When we attempt to classify a multitude 
 of things, we observe some respects in which 
 they differ from each other ; — for we could 
 f2 
 
100 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 not classify things that are entirely alike ; as 
 a bushel of peas, for instance : we then 
 separate the things that are unlike, and 
 bring together the things that are similar. 
 
 The same things may be classified in dif- 
 ferent ways : for example : — A collection of 
 Books may be classified according to the 
 subjects of which they treat, — Theology, 
 History, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, 
 &c. or they may be classified alphabetically, 
 according to the names of their Authors : or 
 they may be classified according to their 
 size, — as Folios, Quartos, Octavos, &c. 
 
 See Analysis. Arrangement. Disposi- 
 tion. Method, and Chap IX. 
 
 Common terms, or names, are words which 
 are applied to all the things which are alike 
 in certain respects. Triangle is the name 
 of every figure that is formed by the joining 
 of three lines. See Abstract Terms. 
 General Terms ; and Chap. IV. 
 
 Complex. That which consists of several 
 different things, so put together as to form 
 a whole, is called complex. Complex things 
 are the subjects of analysis. The analysis 
 of complex notions is one of the first and 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 101 
 
 most important exercises of the understand- 
 ing. See Analysis, and Chap. X. 
 
 Conception, is the forming or bringing an 
 image or idea into the mind, by an effort 
 of the will. It is distinguished from Sen- 
 sation and Perception — produced by an 
 object present to the senses : and from 
 Imagination, which is the joining together 
 of ideas in new ways : it is distinguished 
 from Memory by not having the feeling of 
 past time connected with the idea. 
 
 Conclusion. When something is simply 
 affirmed to be true, it is called a Propo- 
 sition ; after it has been proved to be true, 
 by several reasons or arguments, it is called 
 a Conclusion. — < Sloth and prodigality will 
 bring a man to want :' — this is aProposition : 
 after all the arguments have been mentioned 
 which prove this to be true, we say, ' there- 
 fore sloth and prodigality will bring a man 
 to want :' this is now the Conclusion. See 
 Reasoning. Inference. 
 
 Concrete, from concresco, to be formed into 
 
 one mass. When a quality is spoken of as 
 
 joined to the thing to which it belongs, the 
 
 word used is called a concrete term, as 
 
 f3 
 
102 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 white paper, equitable conduct. White- 
 ness, Equity, are abstract terms. 
 See Abstract. 
 
 Consciousness. This is a general name for 
 all our feelings taken together ; or it signifies 
 the feeling we have when we look inwards 
 upon our own minds : it is as if the mind 
 looked in a mirror and saw itself. The 
 mind is constantly occupied with some sen- 
 sation, or some image, or some feeling ; and 
 generally, it is engaged only with the sen- 
 sation, or image, or feeling ; but sometimes 
 there is also a notion of itself, haying such a 
 feeling, or sensation, or thought ; this is 
 called consciousness. 
 
 Contingent, from contingo, to touch ; to hit; 
 to happen. 
 
 When any event takes place which seems 
 to us to have no cause, why it should happen 
 in one way, rather than another, it is called 
 a contingent event : as, for example ; the 
 falling of a leaf on a certain spot; or the 
 turning up of any particular number, when 
 the dice are thrown. In reality, nothing 
 happens by chance : or, to speak more pro- 
 perly, chance is a word which has no real 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 103 
 
 meaning, except it be taken as a convenient 
 name for our ignorance of the cause of some 
 effect. If we see a leaden bullet fall to the 
 ground, we know beforehand that it will 
 fall on the spot perpendicularly under it ; 
 because we know it to be influenced only by 
 the attraction of gravity ; and therefore, 
 when it actually falls where we had expected 
 it to fall, we do not say that it fell there by 
 chance ; for we think that it could not have 
 fallen any where else. But when we see a 
 leaf fall, we cannot tell beforehand where it 
 will alight upon the ground ; because it is 
 influenced by changing currents of air, as well 
 as by the attraction of gravity ; therefore we 
 imagine that it falls where it does by chance : 
 and its falling on one spot, or on another, 
 is called a contingent event. But this way 
 of speaking only means that we cannot tell 
 beforehand how the thing will happen. 
 Nothing comes to pass without a cause. 
 
 The rising of the Sun to-morrow is not 
 called a contingent event ; because we con- 
 sider it as certain. The fineness of the day 
 we think contingent ; because we cannot 
 foretel tlxe state of the weather ; but if we 
 f4 
 
104 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 knew all the causes which influence the state 
 of the atmosphere, and how they follow each 
 other, so as to produce rain, or drought ; then 
 we should no longer speak of a fine day as an 
 accidental or contingent event; because it 
 would always take place according to our 
 expectation. See Necessity. 
 
 Data, the plural of datum, — a thing given, 
 or granted. Those facts from which an 
 inference is drawn, are called data : for 
 example : — it has always been found that 
 the inhabitants of temperate climates have 
 excelled those of very hot or very cold 
 climates, in Stature, Strength, and Intelli- 
 gence : these facts are the data, from which 
 it is inferred, that excellence of Body and of 
 Mind depend, in some measure, upon the 
 temperature of the climate. See Inference. 
 
 Definition. To define a thing is to mention 
 something which marks or distinguishes it 
 infallibly from things that are similar to it. 
 
 One mark or difference is enough for a 
 definition, if it makes it impossible to mistake 
 what is meant. In making a definition, we 
 first mention the name which belongs to all 
 the things that are nearly like the object to 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 105 
 
 be defined ; and then we mention that par- 
 ticular circumstance in which it is unlike 
 those other things that are called by the 
 same general name. Sometimes several 
 definitions, more and more particular, are 
 required to make a thing known. Thus ; 
 an Elephant is an Animal having four legs. 
 The word animal belongs to all things that 
 grow and move from place to place : we 
 then distinguish it from other animals, by 
 saying, that it has four legs : this shows that 
 it is not a Fish, a Bird, or a Reptile. But 
 there are many animals besides Elephants, 
 that have four legs ; therefore we must find 
 another more particular definition : we say, 
 then, that an Elephant is a quadruped — 
 having a long and pliable trunk projecting 
 from its nose : — this is a mark or distinction 
 which will make it known from all other 
 quadrupeds. A definition does not represent 
 a thing to the mind, as a picture does to the 
 eye : such a representation made by words 
 is called a description. See page 42. 
 
 The definition of words is different from 
 the definition of things. Certain words 
 come to signify certain things by use or 
 f5 
 
106 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 custom ; but use or custom, in language, as 
 in all other things, is liable to be changed by 
 time and accident. Besides : few men speak 
 accurately, and fewer still think clearly ; 
 Hence, there is much confusion and mistake 
 in the signification of many words. When, 
 therefore, we wish to avoid mistake, as far as 
 it is possible in conveying our meaning to 
 other men's minds, it is necessary to inform 
 them in what sense we use words. That is 
 to say, — we give definitions of words by 
 giving descriptions of the things which we 
 intend to signify by them. The definition of 
 words is most necessary where words are 
 employed by different persons in very dif- 
 ferent senses. For example : — the word 
 virtue, is used, sometimes to signify courage 
 and fortitude ; sometimes, a freedom from 
 gross offences against temperance, or justice ; 
 sometimes, real goodness ; which consists in 
 the love of God, and of our fellow-creatures. 
 If then, we think it probable that those to 
 whom we speak will understand the word 
 virtue, in one sense, while we use it in 
 another, it will be necessary to define the 
 word, which is done by describing the thing 
 we intend to signify by it. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 107 
 
 Demonstration. To demonstrate, is to show, 
 or to make evident. 
 
 When we have a perfect view, or a perfect 
 understanding of two objects, — so that their 
 likeness or the difference between them 
 appears at once, we feel sure that we cannot 
 mistake in what we say concerning them. 
 If it is said that twice three are six, we can, 
 as it were, see that this is true ; we know it 
 to be true ; or if it be said, that twice three 
 are seven, we know that this is not true, 
 Propositions that are absolutely certain and 
 evident at once, are usually called Axioms. 
 Propositions that are absolutely certain, but 
 which comprise too many particulars to be 
 evident at once, are said to be proved by 
 demonstration. We are obliged, on account 
 of the imperfection of our minds, to attend 
 to all the particulars contained in the pro- 
 position, one by one : and each of these 
 particulars is some axiom that we perceive 
 to be true at once. For example : if it is 
 affirmed that 438 times 541, are equal to 
 236958, — this is a proposition that is abso- 
 lutely certain ; but it is not evident at once j 
 because it contains more particulars than 
 f6 
 
108 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 the mind can comprehend in a moment; 
 therefore we are obliged to make it evident 
 to ourselves, by attending to each particular 
 singly : we aid our narrow powers of thought 
 by what is called a series of demonstrations. 
 When we have paid sufficient attention to 
 each particular in such a process, we feel 
 as sure of the truth of this complex pro- 
 position as we do of the truth of the 
 simplest axiom. It makes no difference in 
 the certainty of a proposition, whether the 
 process necessary to demonstrate it be long 
 or short. It may require a long process 
 to demonstrate that an Eclipse of the Moon 
 will take place at such, or such an instant, 
 a hundred years hence ; yet this may be 
 proved as certainly as that 3 times 9 are 27 ; 
 because, though there are many particulars, 
 following each other, every one is absolutely 
 certain, and the connexion between them is 
 also certain. See Belief. Reasoning. 
 
 The word demonstration, ought only to 
 
 be used where it signifies the showing of 
 
 things which may be known certainly. 
 
 Design. What is done, neither by accident, 
 
 nor simply for its own sake, but with a view 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 109 
 
 to some effect that is to follow, is said to be 
 the result of design. None but intelligent 
 beings act with design ; because it requires 
 knowledge, and the power of comparing 
 ideas, to conceive of some end or object to 
 be produced, and to devise the means pro- 
 per to produce the effect. Therefore, when- 
 ever we see a thing which not only may be 
 .applied to some use, but which is evidently 
 made for the sake of the effect which it pro- 
 duces, we feel sure that it is the work of a 
 being capable of thought. If, in travelling 
 through an uninhabited country, we were to 
 find a tree lying across a deep and rapid 
 stream, in such a way that we could pass 
 across upon it, we should merely think that, 
 having formerly grown on the bank, it had 
 been blown down by the wind : but if we 
 were to find two trees laid across the stream, 
 and tied together, we should feel sure that 
 this must be the effect of thought, not of 
 accident. In the same way, when we per- 
 ceive in every natural ubject, all the parts 
 fitted in the best way to produce certain 
 effects, we feel sure that what we see is the 
 work of an intelligent Being. 
 
110 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Disposition. To dispose things, is to plaee 
 them in some order, for the sake of conveni- 
 ence. A good disposition of our thoughts, 
 upon any subject, is such a manner of placing 
 them as will make them most readily under- 
 stood by others, or most easily retained in 
 the memory. It is a common mistake for 
 persons to suppose that, to arrange, or 
 dispose their thoughts, is the same as to 
 analyse them. 
 
 See Analysis. Arrangement. Classi- 
 fication. 
 
 Distinction. A distinction is the expressing 
 in words, some difference which has been 
 perceived between two or more things. 
 
 Distribution, is the placing particular things 
 in the places or compartments which have 
 been already prepared to receive them. 
 When we have arranged or disposed our 
 thoughts in a certain order, and afterwards 
 other thoughts occur to us, we distribute 
 them according to the same plan. 
 See Arrangement. Disposition. 
 
 Division, is the separating things of the same 
 kind into parcels : analysis is the separation 
 of things that are of different kinds ; we 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. Ill 
 
 divide a stick by cutting it into two, or into 
 twenty pieces : we analyse it, by separating 
 the bark, the wood, and the pith — a Divi- 
 sion may be made at pleasure, an analysis 
 may not. 
 
 See Analysis. 
 Doubt, is some degree of belief, along with 
 the consciousness of ignorance, in regard to 
 a proposition. Absolute disbelief implies 
 Knowledge : — It is the knowledge that such 
 or such a thing is not true. If the mind 
 admits a proposition without any desire for 
 knowledge concerning it, this is credulity. 
 If it is open to receive the proposition, 
 but feels ignorance concerning it, this is 
 doubt. In proportion as knowledge in- 
 creases, doubt diminishes, and belief, or 
 disbelief, strengthens. 
 
 No one ought to profess to disbelieve any 
 proposition, unless he is sure that he per- 
 fectly understands the subject to which it 
 relates. To do so is the most absurd pre- 
 sumption. Those who profess to doubt the 
 truth of important propositions, thereby 
 acknowledge their ignorance ; they ought, 
 therefore, not to rest till they have sought 
 information by every possible means. 
 
112 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Duration. When any thought, or feeling", 
 or image, ceases to engage the principal 
 attention of the mind, we do not part with 
 it instantaneously, and entirely ; but it 
 seems, like the objects on the road side when 
 we are travelling, to keep in sight, while 
 other objects are immediately before us i 
 thus we acquire the notion of succession. 
 After some thought has entirely disappeared 
 from the mind, it will often return, joined 
 with the feeling that it has been in the mind 
 before: this feeling is what is called Memory. 
 Memory gives us the notion signified by the 
 word duration. Time is duration measured 
 into equal parts. 
 
 Effect, is some change produced by a being 
 that has Power. That which exerts power 
 is called a Cause. See Cause. 
 
 Essence. All the properties or qualities with- 
 out which a thing could not exist, or without 
 which it would be entirely altered, make up 
 what is called the essence of a thing. Three 
 lines joining, make the essence of a triangle : 
 if one is removed, what remains is no longer 
 triangle. A living body, joined to a reason- 
 able soul, make the essence of a human 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 113 
 
 being. Sheets of paper, covered with 
 writing, or printing, and fastened together, 
 are the essence of a book. Besides the 
 qualities that make a thing what it is, there 
 are other qualities which may be added or 
 taken away, without changing or destroying 
 the essence of it; as, for example, the 
 binding to a book ; or health, learning, 
 goodness, to a man ; these qualities are 
 called Adjuncts. See Nature. 
 
 Evidence. When facts which are already 
 known or believed to be true, are mentioned 
 in order to prove some other fact to be true, 
 such facts are called evidence. 
 
 Existence, means the same as Being. 
 That which is, is said to be, or to have 
 existence. See Being. 
 
 Experiment. If we attend to what takes 
 place around us, with a view to gain know- 
 ledge, we are said to learn by observation. 
 When we put causes in operation with 
 design to try what effect will follow, we 
 learn by experiment. It is natural to us to 
 believe that every change we see in the state 
 of things is produced by some cause : it is 
 also natural to us to desire to know the 
 
114 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 causes of all the effects which we observe. 
 Now there are two ways of learning the 
 causes of things ; one is by watching effects 
 carefully, and often : the other is by first 
 guessing what the cause of an effect may be, 
 and then trying whether it is really so : this 
 last method is called experiment. The 
 guess, or supposition which we make before 
 we try experiments, is called an hypothesis. 
 It has been observed that thunder storms 
 usually follow dry and hot weather ; we 
 believe, therefore, that the dryness and 
 heat of the atmosphere are, in some way, 
 the cause of thunder and lightning : this 
 we learn by observation. Dr. Franklin 
 guessed that lightning is the same fluid 
 which is produced by rubbing amber, called 
 the electric fluid : this was his hypothesis ; 
 in order to find if his hypothesis were true, 
 he flew a kite in a thunder storm, having a 
 small wire along with the string. When the 
 thunder cloud passed over the kite, he drew 
 sparks from the lower end of the wire, which 
 had all the appearances and properties of 
 those produced by an electrical machine : 
 this was an experiment ; and it proved that 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 115 
 
 his hypothesis was true. See Hypothesis. 
 Induction. 
 
 Extension. The notions acquired by the 
 sense of touch, and by the movement of the 
 body, compared with what is learnt by the 
 eye, make up the idea expressed by the 
 word extension. When we think of many 
 feelings, — one coming as the other goes, we 
 have the notion of Duration : When we 
 think of many feelings in the senses of touch 
 or sight, existing at the same moment, we 
 have the notion of Extension. 
 
 Fact. If we speak of the changes which 
 take place in the state of things, with a view 
 to inquire into the causes which produce 
 them, we call them facts : after we suppose 
 that we have discovered their causes, we 
 call them Effects. 
 
 General Terms, express the notions which 
 are formed in the mind after having per- 
 ceived a number of objects, nearly resembling 
 each other. It is commonly only a faint or 
 confused idea which passes through the 
 mind when we employ General terms. 
 
 See Abstraction. Common names ; and 
 Chapter IV. 
 
116 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Genus and Species. See Chapter V. 
 Hypothesis, from wroQsws, — a supposition. 
 
 See Experiment. 
 
 Experiments made with the intention of 
 discovering the causes of effects would be 
 endless, and, for the most part, fruitless, 
 unless they were directed by probable sup- 
 positions, or hypotheses. An hypothesis is 
 formed upon some degree of knowledge 
 acquired by observation, or experience, or 
 former experiments. Every advance in 
 knowledge affords ground for further 
 hypotheses, to be followed by new ex- 
 periments. 
 
 We observe that one spot in a meadow 
 produces much stronger and better grass 
 than the rest of the field : we remember that 
 a heap of rubbish and litter, consisting of 
 various matters, had lain for some time upon 
 that spot. Now, supposing that we were 
 entirely ignorant of the nature and use of 
 manures, our first guess, or hypothesis, 
 perhaps, would be, that the cause of the 
 productiveness of this spot was merely its 
 having been covered up from the air for 
 some time : on this supposition, therefore^ 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 117 
 
 we try an experiment, by covering another 
 spot with rubbish, for the same time : but we 
 find that the same effect is not produced in 
 this case. We next imagine that it must 
 have been the qualities of some article in 
 the first heap, which was the cause of the 
 fertility of the spot. We examine the heap, 
 and find that it consisted of ashes, sea weed, 
 and rotten vegetables : we therefore lay a 
 parcel of each of the ingredients, separately, 
 upon different spots : and if we afterwards 
 observe that the spot on which the sea weed 
 had been placed, was the most fertile, we 
 conclude that that was the true or principal 
 cause of the effect we had noticed. This is 
 the way in which all useful knowledge of the 
 laws of nature is acquired ; First, we notice 
 facts ; then we guess what may be the 
 causes of these facts : then we try experi- 
 ments, or make observations, in order to 
 prove whether our hypothesis be true : when 
 we have proved it true, we have learned, 
 what is called a general law : that is to say, 
 we have discovered that such or such a 
 thing will always be followed by such or 
 such an effect : or, in other words, that 
 
118 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 two things, — one called cause, and the other 
 effect, always happen together. 
 
 Idea. This word is often employed to signify 
 any kind of thought. Its more proper 
 meaning is a thought of some object which 
 we have before perceived ; — such a thought 
 as may be called an image of an object in 
 the mind. The mind is able to join together 
 ideas, so as to form images of things which 
 it has never actually seen : this joining of 
 ideas is called Imagination. Thus we can 
 imagine a silvery tree, bearing golden 
 fruit : or a horse, flying with wings through 
 the air. When these joined ideas are of a 
 kind to give pleasure to the mind, they are 
 called poetical images. 
 
 Identity, means sameness. What is called 
 Personal Identity, is our being the same 
 persons from the commencement to the end 
 of life ; while the matter of the body, the 
 dispositions, habits, and thoughts of the 
 mind, are continually changing. We feel 
 and know that we are the same : this notion 
 or persuasion of Identity, results from 
 memory. But our being actually the same 
 does not depend upon memory. If a man 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 119 
 
 loses all recollection of his early life, he 
 continues, nevertheless, actually the same 
 person. 
 
 Imagination. See Idea. When it is said 
 that the mind possesses the faculty of 
 imagination, all that is meant is, that, as 
 often as we will, we can join together, in 
 different ways, the ideas of things which we 
 have before seen, heard, or felt. When we 
 know that we are forming these images at 
 our pleasure, we are said to imagine : when 
 they come into the mind along with the 
 feeling of having actually perceived them at 
 some former time, we are said to remember, 
 or to exercise memory. 
 
 Induction, is the observing as many facts as 
 we can, or the trying as many experiments as 
 we can, in order to discover the real nature 
 or causes of things. 
 
 For example: — Suppose a person recovers 
 from a fever, after taking some new medi- 
 cine, we naturally suppose that this medi- 
 cine was the cause of his recovery ; but it is 
 not certain that it was so ; because he might 
 have recovered as soon, if he had not taken 
 it : we must try this medicine in many cases, 
 
120 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 
 
 carefully observing all the effects it produces 
 in different patients, before we ought to con- 
 clude that it is a remedy for this particular 
 kind of fever : and after we have thus proved 
 by induction, that it will cure one kind of 
 fever, we must not conclude that it will also 
 cure a similar kind of fever, till after we 
 have tried it in many cases. 
 
 Lord Bacon first taught the true way of 
 gaining substantial and useful knowledge by 
 Induction, Men have always been fond of 
 fancying that they understood the nature of 
 things, without taking the pains to observe 
 facts and try experiments. See Experi- 
 ment. Hypothesis. Inference. 
 Inference. An Inference is some proposition 
 which is perceived to be true, because of 
 its connexion with some known fact. There 
 are many things which are always found 
 together; or which certainly follow each 
 other : therefore, when we observe one of 
 these things, we infer that the other also 
 exists, or has existed, or will soon take place. 
 If we see the print of human feet on the 
 sands of an unknown coast, we infer that 
 the country is inhabited : if these prints are 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 121 
 
 fresh, and below the level of high water, we 
 infer that the inhabitants are at no great 
 distance : if the prints are those of naked 
 feet, we infer that these inhabitants are 
 probably savages : if they are the prints of 
 shoes, we infer certainly, that they are, in 
 some degree, civilized. 
 
 The confidence with which we rely upon 
 the truth of an inference, results from a per- 
 suasion natural to the human mind — That 
 every effect has a cause ; and — That the 
 connexion of certain causes with certain 
 effects is constant : or, in other words, — 
 That events which we observe uniformly to 
 succeed each other, have always succeeded 
 each other in the same order ; and that they 
 will continue so to do. To refer to the 
 instance just mentioned ; when we observe 
 the print of human feet upon the sand, how 
 do we know that men have lately been upon 
 the spot ? Why do we believe a fact which 
 we did not see and which no one has re- 
 ported to us ? The manner in which the 
 conviction takes in the mind is this : — Here 
 is a fact before us, namely, impressions upon 
 the sand : we think of these impressions as 
 
 G 
 
122 ELEMENTS OE THOUGHT. 
 
 Effects produced by a Cause : — a change in 
 the surface of the sand has taken place, and 
 we cannot think of any change taking place 
 in the state of things without a cause. The 
 nature of the effect then guides us in 
 searching for the cause : — a hollow in the 
 sand, having the size and shape of the 
 human foot, must have been caused by the 
 pressure of the human foot. 
 
 But when these prints, though below the 
 level of high water, are yet well denned, 
 why do we infer that men must be at no 
 great distance ? This inference rests upon 
 the persuasion that the course of natural 
 causes remains constant. These prints, we 
 say, have been made within the space of six 
 hours, because the interval between high and 
 low water is constantly about six hours, and 
 because the flowing of the tide would have 
 obliterated such slight impressions if they 
 had been made before the last flow. If, 
 therefore, men have trode upon these sands 
 since the last tide, they cannot now be at a 
 great distance ; because men do not remove 
 from place to place with the swiftness of 
 birds. In all this reasoning we rely upon 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 123 
 
 the persuasion that every effect has a cause, 
 and that the succession of causes and effects 
 is uniform or constant. 
 
 In fact, this sort of reasoning", and this 
 reference of the mind to the uniformity of 
 causes and effects, does not deliberately take 
 place on every common occasion. Many 
 inferences are made in the course of every 
 day, by an instantaneous action of thought. 
 Effects suggest their causes to the mind, 
 without a formal process of reasoning". 
 Reasoning and a reference to the uniformity 
 of causes and effects take place only when 
 some doubt arises relative to the true cause 
 of an effect. 
 
 Inferences are liable to be erroneous, 
 chiefly from two causes : — 
 
 1st. We may too hastily suppose certain 
 events to be constantly connected, as cause 
 and effect, which really have been only occa- 
 sionally or accidentally connected. Many 
 superstitious opinions, held by uneducated 
 persons, are founded upon false inferences of 
 this sort. Some particular domestic acci- 
 dent has been observed to occur before the 
 death of an individual of the family. The 
 g2 
 
124 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 next time this accident occurs, it is supposed 
 to be the prognostic of another death. This 
 is a false inference, because there was no 
 connexion of cause and effect between the 
 accident and the death. 
 
 2dly. Inferences are often false, because 
 we fix upon the cause of an effect incon- 
 siderately, either not knowing', or not duly 
 regarding the many other causes which may 
 have been in operation to produce the Effect. 
 False inferences of this sort are of very fre- 
 quent occurrence in common life. It is the 
 part of a sound and calm judgement, to hold 
 the mind in suspense, rather than to draw 
 hasty inferences where there is reason to sus- 
 pect that we are not acquainted with all the 
 causes that may have produced the effect 
 which we wish to account for : for ex- 
 ample; — A person receives a letter pro- 
 fessing to contain a bank note ; but the note 
 is not in it. The seal has some appearance 
 of having been broken and repaired : the 
 letter was delivered to him by a servant 
 whose integrity he has some reason to 
 suspect. The inference which is immediately 
 suggested by these facts is that this servant 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 125 
 
 has withdrawn the note from the letter. But 
 to make this inference without proof would 
 be unjustifiable. A person of sound judge- 
 ment will remember that this is a case in 
 which many causes beside the one mentioned 
 might be supposed to have produced 
 the effect. He therefore suspends his 
 opinion, till he has made further inquiry. 
 In a few days he learns from his corres- 
 pondent that after he had sealed the letter, 
 he re-opened it to add a postscript, and that, 
 in so doing, the note fell out, and was not 
 perceived until the letter was dispatched. 
 
 Nothing is more important in the conduct 
 of life than the habit of abstaining from 
 unwarrantable inferences. A wise man 
 suspends his inferences upon the modest 
 recollection of his ignorance, and the falli- 
 billity of his judgement. On the contrary, 
 both weak minds, and ardent minds, — the 
 former from fear, the latter from presump- 
 tion, fix upon the first inference which the 
 nature of an effect may suggest. 
 
 In philosophical inquiries, inferences 
 should follow the most complete and satis- 
 factory induction; (see Induction;) and 
 
 63 
 
126 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 where, from the nature of the case, this 
 complete and satisfactory induction cannot 
 take place, we should ingenuously confess 
 our ignorance. (See Truth.) 
 
 The chief source of false systems of 
 natural philosophy has been, that probable 
 or plausible conjectures have been admitted 
 in the place of just inferences: such con- 
 jectures, how plausible soever they may 
 seem, ought merely to be employed hypo- 
 thetically, to suggest and guide Experi- 
 ments. 
 
 See Reasoning; Induction; Experi- 
 ment; Hypothesis. 
 Infinite, — that which has no bounds, or end : 
 things, also, are called infinite of which we 
 do not know, or do not notice the boundaries ; 
 thus, if a line be drawn without regarding 
 the length of it, it is called an infinite line ; 
 though it may not actually be longer than 
 another line beside it, which is called 
 finite ; because we mark, measure, or notice 
 the boundaries of it. 
 
 It is very common to use the word infinite 
 improperly, instead of absolute^ or perfect. 
 When we speak of qualities which cannot be 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 127 
 
 numbered or measured, it is more correct to 
 call them perfect, or imperfect, than finite, 
 or infinite. Snow is not infinitely white ; 
 but perfectly white : we may, indeed, use 
 the word infinite in relation to the Divine 
 Attributes ; because we wish to express in 
 a general way, that every thing which 
 relates to God is beyond our comprehension : 
 thus we say that God is infinitely holy, and 
 infinitely good, and wise : though, if we 
 designed to speak more accurately, we 
 should say that God is perfectly, or abso- 
 lutely holy, good, and wise. 
 Intellectual, from Intelligo, to understand, 
 or know. All the operations of the mind in 
 receiving new ideas, or in remembering 
 those formerly received ; in joining them 
 together, or in separating and comparing 
 them, belong to what are usually called 
 the intellectual powers. The Intellectual 
 powers are commonly distinguished from the 
 Moral powers, the objects of which are, 
 whatever excites feelings or emotions of 
 pleasure, or pain ; things beautiful, or 
 Ugly ; — things good, or evil. 
 
 g4 
 
128 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Intuition, from Intueor, to look upon. What 
 we know or comprehend as soon as we 
 perceive or attend to it, we are said to know 
 by intuition : things which we know by 
 intuition, cannot be made more certain by 
 arguments, than they are at first. We 
 know by intuition that all the parts of a 
 thing together, are equal to the whole of it. 
 Axioms are propositions known by intuition. 
 Invention. There are two very different 
 operations of the mind to which the word 
 Invention is commonly applied. 
 
 Poetical Invention is the collection, selec- 
 tion, and combination of images or senti- 
 ments, which are perceived to agree in pro- 
 ducing some particular effect upon the ima- 
 gination or the feelings. Poetical invention, 
 therefore, results from the perception and 
 recollection of resemblances or analogies. 
 
 Mechanical Invention results from efforts 
 of abstraction. It is founded upon the 
 perception of the relation of means to an 
 end ; or the knowledge of the connexion 
 between causes and effects. Some effect is 
 proposed or imagined. The effect suggests 
 various causes by which it might be pro- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 129 
 
 duced : the qualities of these causes are 
 compared by an effort of abstraction ; and 
 that particular cause is adopted, which is 
 supposed to be the most fit to produce the 
 desired effect. There are two things in 
 which, chiefly, the talent of mechanical 
 invention consists : the first is the ready and 
 copious suggestion of analogous ideas ; 
 herein it resembles poetical invention, and 
 wit. The second is the habit of considering 
 abstractedly the mathematical properties and 
 relations of bodies. 
 
 Men and beasts alike betake themselves 
 to the shelter of trees or rocks during a 
 pelting storm : they both seek to accom- 
 plish an end by the use of the means. The 
 animal, however, proceeds no further than 
 to recollect the connexion between the tree 
 or rock, and the feeling of protection from 
 cold and wet, which it has before afforded. 
 But Man, not only remembers this con- 
 nexion, he thinks abstractedly of Shelter or 
 protection ; and the abstract notion suggests 
 other things which might afford it in a 
 better or more certain manner. What then 
 does he do ? does he seek to construct some- 
 g5 
 
130 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 thing as similar as possible to the rock or 
 the tree which have hitherto afforded him 
 shelter ? He would do this if he simply 
 followed the suggestions of memory : but 
 he aims to realize the abstract notion he 
 has formed of Shelter, The rock affords 
 shelter only from one quarter : the tree is 
 pervious to the wind and rain : but the hut 
 which he builds is a shelter on all sides, 
 impervious to the weather. The rock, the 
 tree, the hut, agree in one abstract pro- 
 perty ; they afford shelter ; and the artificial 
 product of this abstract notion unites the 
 protecting properties of the various objects 
 from which the notion was first formed. 
 
 The use of Instruments, distinguishes 
 man from inferior animals, and gives him 
 power over them, and over many of the 
 operations of nature* Now every instru- 
 ment, or tool, or weapon, every machine, — 
 every production of skill and labour, by 
 man supplies his wants, defends himself 
 from injuries, or abridges manual labour, is 
 the embodying of some complex abstract 
 notion. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 131 
 
 Invention is distinguished from Dis- 
 covery. Invention is the creation or con- 
 struction of some thing which has not before 
 existed. Discovery is the making manifest 
 some thing which hitherto has been unknown. 
 The art of navigation has been improved by 
 a signal discovery, namely, the polarity of 
 the magnet : and also by a signal invention — 
 the time-piece : by the discovery of the 
 polarity of the magnet, the direction of the 
 ship's course is known : by the invention of 
 the chronometer, the ship's place — east or 
 west, is determined. 
 Judgement. When we perceive or think of 
 two objects, we do not merely think of them 
 separately; but most often, we compare 
 them together, and determine that they are 
 like or unlike ; equal or unequal ; &c. 
 Judgement is this act of the mind in com- 
 paring together two or more objects or 
 notions, and in forming some kind of pro- 
 position expressive of the relation which has 
 been perceived . 
 
 Judgement is often spoken of as a separate 
 power or faculty of the soul, in distinction 
 from Imagination, Memory, &c. All that 
 g6 
 
132 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 is really meant by these modes of expres- 
 sion is, that the mind sometimes compares 
 objects or notions ; — sometimes joins together 
 images ; sometimes has the feeling of past 
 time with an idea now present, &c. When 
 it is said that such a one has much Imagin- 
 ation, but that he has little Judgement ; 
 or of another, that he has an acute Judge- 
 ment, but no Imagination ; — it is intended 
 to say, that one mind is most apt to perceive 
 differences among objects or notions ; while 
 another is occupied by resemblances and 
 analogies, and attracted by what is beautiful 
 and sublime. 
 
 When the particular character of different 
 minds is spoken of, there are several epithets 
 usually connected with the word Judgement. 
 The Judgement is said to be calm, or cool, 
 or dispassionate : it is said to be clear* 
 or acute, or profound, or comprehensive. 
 Most of these epithets express the freedom 
 of the intellectual faculty from some one of 
 those influences which are apt to disturb the 
 mind in the operation of comparing objects 
 or notions. It must be remembered that 
 the mind never acts without some motive : 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 133 
 
 now the only motive which should influence 
 the mind in canyhn on any purely intellec- 
 tual operation is—TTie desire to arrive at 
 a true result. If x person is employed in 
 determining which is the greater number — 
 twice four, or three times three, he is incited 
 to carry on the necessary process of reason- 
 ing, simply by the wish to obtain a true 
 solution of the problem: but if it were 
 possible to be deceived in resolving such 
 a problem ; and if, at the same time, the 
 person had some motive for wishing to prove 
 that twice four are more than three times 
 three, the intellectual process would be in- 
 terrupted, or obscured by this wish, and an 
 erroneous solution would probably be the 
 consequence. There is, however, little 
 room for indirect motives in mathematical 
 reasoning, but in the conduct of common 
 affairs, or in the formation of opinions, 
 there are almost always some motives beside 
 the desire of truth, which ? more or less, 
 strongly influence the Judgement. A good 
 Judgement, therefore, is one in which the 
 desire of truth is always the predominant 
 motive. But there is some diversity in the 
 
134 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 excellence of the Judgement : or, in other 
 words, one mind is most free from one kind 
 of improper motive, another, from another 
 kind ; for example : — 
 
 A person is said to have a calm Judge- 
 ment who is able to carry on the intellectual 
 process of comparing objects or notions 
 without being intimidated by circumstances 
 of danger in which he may be placed, or 
 agitated by the passion or violence of those 
 about him : he is not disturbed by motives 
 of fear or resentment, &c. Such a person 
 may be an able General, or a good Arbiter 
 in angry disputes. A calm Judgement 
 united to benevolence, constitutes the cha- 
 racter of the peace-maker. 
 
 The phrase a cool Judgement is commonly 
 used nearly in the same sense. The calm- 
 ness of the Judgement consists in the power 
 of the mind to resist external disturbances. 
 The coolness of the Judgment results from 
 the absence of internal disturbance. Such 
 internal disturbance may proceed from 
 nervous irritability,— or from the liveliness 
 of the imagination, — or from the sensibility 
 of the moral feelings, — or from sensual or 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 135 
 
 malignant passions. Persons who have this 
 coolness of Judgement are likely to be suc- 
 cessful in trade ; because the desire of gain 
 is a tranquil passion ; and it serves to give 
 vigour to the desire to obtain a true result 
 on every occasion when the Judgement is to 
 be exercised. A person of cool Judgement 
 will have an advantage over many of those 
 with whom he deals ; because, while the 
 intellectual action of most men's minds is 
 impeded or perverted by a variety of motives, 
 his are free from such influence ; and there- 
 fore the probability of forming just estimates 
 of things will always be in his favour. It 
 may be observed, however, that persons 
 who have this coolness of Judgement, owing 
 to their frequent success in the conduct of 
 affairs, are peculiarly liable to self-conceit ; 
 this vanity becomes at length an indirect 
 motive, which tends to pervert or disturb 
 the understanding. Such men, in order to 
 obtain the immediate gratification of their 
 intellectual vanity, often confine their views 
 to the present moment, and to small advan- 
 tages, while they become blind to great 
 and distant objects. The common terms — 
 
136 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 c cunning, fraud, worldly -wisdom,' &c* 
 express different degrees of that sort of 
 short sightedness which is produced by 
 self conceit on a cool Judgement. Coolness 
 of Judgement is truly admirable when it 
 results, not from the want of imagination 
 and moral sensibility, but from strength of 
 Will, which is able, whenever it is neces- 
 sary, to keep all emotions in subjection. 
 
 The epithets acute, profound, and com- 
 prehensive, applied to the Judgement, ex- 
 press different degrees or kinds of activity 
 and of force in the intellect. Next to the 
 various perverting motives which have just 
 been referred to, the principal source of 
 errors in judgement is the inertia, or ten- 
 dency to rest, which belongs to mind as well 
 as to matter. Intellectual action ceases 
 before the process of comparing objects or 
 notions is completed ; these unfinished com- 
 parisons are, of course, false judgements. 
 Now activity or force of mind which opposes 
 this inertia, shows itself in different ways ; 
 for example : — a mind capable of a short 
 and vigorous effort, will complete a single 
 process of thought, and produce a perfect 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 137 
 
 comparison of two or three objects. This 
 sort of faculty forms what is called an acute 
 Judgement. A mind capable of long con- 
 tinued, but not very rapid action, will com- 
 plete the comparisons it makes, and will 
 pursue one pair or set of comparisons after 
 another, as long as it can perceive any con- 
 nexion between sets of objects or notions. 
 This sort of faculty constitutes a profound 
 Judgement. 
 
 Where a vivid desire of truth or know- 
 ledge is united with great modesty, or diffi- 
 dence, or, perhaps, with some feebleness in 
 the constitution, there will be an intermitted 
 or reiterated action in the mind, in relation 
 to the same subject : this will leave the mind 
 open to the occurrence of new objects or 
 ideas, which ought to be included in the 
 comparisons that are carrying on : the 
 frequent correction of comparisons or judge- 
 ments will induce the habit of suspending 
 the judgement, and of viewing every subject 
 in different lights. These habits produce a 
 comprehensive Judgement. 
 
 Acute minds often err from the want of 
 reiterated action : Profound minds often 
 err from the want of intermitted action. 
 
138 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Comprehensiveness is the highest excellence 
 of the Judgement. Acuteness, profound- 
 ness, or comprehensiveness, are often found 
 without calmness, or coolness. In such 
 eases the excellence of the judgement is 
 liable to be entirely obscured, and only 
 appears under favourable circumstances. 
 Hence it is, that some persons are able to 
 conduct other men's affairs with the most 
 admirable judgement, who always mis- 
 manage their own : in their own affairs they 
 cannot be calm or cool. Hence too, it often 
 happens that studious men, whose minds are 
 in the highest degree acute, profound, or 
 comprehensive, while occupied with literary 
 or philosophical subjects, act like children 
 when occasionally exposed to the agitations 
 of public life. 
 Logic, is the art of thinking well. The mind, 
 like the body, requires to be trained before 
 it can use its powers in the most advan- 
 tageous way. A man may be strong and 
 brave without having learnt the military 
 exercise; but he will be able to exert his 
 natural strength and courage to much 
 more advantage, after he has been trained 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 139 
 
 as a soldier : and so, a man whose under- 
 standing has been regularly taught and 
 exercised in the art of Thinking, will be able 
 to employ his natural powers more quickly, 
 easily, and certainly, than he could otherwise 
 have done. 
 
 A multiplicity of unmeaning or unim- 
 portant distinctions were formerly made, 
 and much idle labour was spent in logical 
 studies. The good sense of modern times 
 has brought these useless pursuits into 
 disesteem ; but this revolution in the plan 
 of education has perhaps been carried too 
 far : the artificial training and exercise of 
 the intellectual powers is, at present, too 
 little regarded. A modern education stores 
 the memory with a great and various mass 
 of well- ascertained and important facts ; 
 but it leaves the powers of abstraction and 
 reasoning uncultivated, and only accidentally 
 exercised. In consequence of this system, 
 while extensive information on all those 
 branches of knowledge which consist in 
 mere collections of facts is widely diffused, 
 very few individuals are found who are com- 
 petent to a continued effort of thought : and 
 
140 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 very few books are published which require 
 in the reader more than the lightest exercise 
 of the intellectual faculties. 
 
 Logic is distinguished from Metaphysics : 
 the former is an art, the design of which is 
 to exercise the mind in abstraction, general- 
 ization, and reasoning; the latter is a 
 science, which professes to explain all facts 
 relating to the nature of the mind. 
 
 Matter, is that which occupies Space ; and 
 with which we become acquainted by its 
 obstructing or preventing the movements of 
 the body. Every thing of which we have 
 any knowledge, js either Mind, or Matter. 
 Mind is that which feels : — matter is that 
 which makes itself felt by the mind, through 
 the sense of touch. 
 
 Memory, is the having an idea or notion along 
 with some thought of past time. Memory 
 gives us the notion of continued existence, 
 or duration ; and also the persuasion of 
 personal Identity, during all the changes 
 which may take place in the temper, and 
 habits, and external circumstances, and the 
 condition of the body. Memory gives us 
 this persuasion ; but our actually being the 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 141 
 
 same does not depend upon our recollection 
 of our past lives, for if we were entirely to 
 lose all memory, we should as truly be the 
 same persons as before. 
 Method, is the putting our thoughts in a 
 certain order, for the convenience of our 
 own minds, or the minds of those whom 
 we wish to teach. Methodical habits of 
 thought are often mistaken for Analytical 
 habits of Thought. See Chap. IX. and 
 Analysis. 
 Mind. That which perceives, feels, thinks, 
 
 and wills. 
 Mode. The manner in which a thing exists 
 is called a mode, or affection : Shape and 
 Colour are modes of matter : Memory and 
 joy are modes of mind. See Affection. 
 Essence. 
 Nature. All the properties or qualities which 
 make a thing what it is, are signified by 
 the word nature, or essence. It is a con- 
 venient word by which we express at once 
 all that belongs to our notion of any thing. 
 Necessity, is opposed to contingency : future 
 events, of which we do not know the causes 
 that may influence them, are called con- 
 
142 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 tingent ; but events of which we know the 
 causes, so that we are able certainly to 
 foretel what will happen, are called neces- 
 sary. The only difference between what we 
 call contingent, and what we call necessary 
 exists in our own minds, and depends upon 
 different degrees of knowledge. Every 
 event has a cause ; and every cause produces 
 its effect certainly, in connection with other 
 causes. 
 
 The very same event may be considered 
 as contingent by one man and as coming 
 to pass necessarily by another. A bowing 
 wall is observed by two persons : if the 
 first is asked whether it will stand a year 
 longer, he replies, — ( It may fall, probably ; 
 but it is possible that it may stand a year : 
 its falling is a contingent event.' The other 
 person, who is a builder, has examined the 
 state of the wall ; he perceives that it is con- 
 stantly declining from the perpendicular : he 
 sees that it must fall in a few days : he, 
 therefore, considers the event, not as con- 
 tingent, but as necessary. The difference 
 in the opinion of these two persons results 
 from their different degrees of knowledge. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 143 
 
 Whoever knows perfectly all the causes 
 which will influence an event, views that 
 event, not as contingent, but as necessary. 
 
 Necessity is often opposed to Liberty, 
 when the actings of the mind are spoken of. 
 A being who has liberty, or, who, as it is 
 termed, is a free agent, is one who wills ; 
 and who does what he wills. We speak of 
 the future actions of men as contingent ; 
 because we cannot know the motives or cir- 
 cumstances which will be the causes of their 
 actions. But we do not so often speak of 
 our own future actions as contingent; be- 
 cause we commonly suppose ourselves to 
 know the motives by which our actions will 
 be determined. Yet it is plain that one 
 man's actions are not really more contingent 
 than those of another. We can imagine our- 
 selves to be placed in circumstances, wherein 
 we could foretel certainly what our conduct 
 would be ; — (supposing no other causes than 
 those we are aware of, will be present to 
 influence us.) And yet, while we thus think 
 of our future conduct as certain, or neces- 
 sary, we still feel ourselves perfectly free. 
 We are sure that we are free agents, when- 
 
144 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ever we can choose, and follow our choice. 
 The future actions of men are known to 
 God ; because he knows all the causes that 
 will influence their actions. 
 
 Negative, is opposed to Positive, if the 
 absence of some active quality is spoken of : 
 for instance : — harmlessness may be called 
 a negative virtue : beneficence is a positive 
 virtue. Harmlessness is negative, as it 
 implies the absence of a disposition to com- 
 mit inquiries : it is also negative, if con- 
 trasted with the active disposition to do 
 good. 
 
 Negative is opposed to affirmative, when 
 the words are applied to propositions. 
 
 c Riches are not sufficient to make a man 
 happy.' This is a negative proposition ; 
 because two things are brought together, 
 and it is declared that they do not agree. 
 
 * True happiness results from the favour 
 of God.' This is an affirmative proposi- 
 tion : two things are compared which are 
 found to agree, or to be connected together. 
 
 Notion. Any thought may be called a notion. 
 The word Idea properly means an image in 
 the mind of something that has been per- 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 145 
 
 ceived by the senses : a notion is also dis- 
 tinguished from a feeling, or emotion, in 
 which the mind is conscious of pleasure or 
 pain. 
 
 Order. Many things considered indefinitely, 
 or without regard to how many, constitute 
 a multitude : many things considered defi- 
 nitely, as so many, make a number. Order 
 is the following of one thing after another, 
 in a fixed way. In using the word number 
 we think of the whole together, — making, — 
 20, — 50, &c. But in using the word order 
 we think of one among a number ; and of 
 the place where it stands in relation to the 
 whole number ; as the twentieth, or the 
 fiftieth. The word order is used, generally, 
 to signify, that many things are placed 
 together in a fixed way, to answer some 
 end or design : in this sense Method pro- 
 duces Order, 
 
 Opinion. Any proposition which we believe, 
 but do not absolutely know to be true, is 
 called an Opinion. The word is most com- 
 monly applied to propositions which are 
 believed by some persons, and doubted, or 
 disbelieved by others ; and which are, there- 
 
 H 
 
 i 
 
146 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 fore, often disputed : it is most especially 
 applied to questions in which men feel a 
 lively interest : we speak of ' religious 
 opinions,' and of e political opinions ;' but 
 not so usually of scientific opinions ; because 
 it is but a few individuals who feel a lively 
 interest in scientific disputes. 
 
 The opinions of men, with the exception 
 of a few individuals, are, like their manners 
 and the fashion of their dress, received from 
 education, and influenced by the particular 
 society in which they move. It must be 
 remembered that in subjects which do not 
 admit of demonstration, there is always 
 some appearance of truth to support even 
 the least probable opinion : and if the mind 
 is accustomed to attend only, or chiefly to 
 this appearance of reason, on one side, while 
 from indolence or prejudice, it never com- 
 pletes any process of thought in relation to 
 the other side of the question, it may hold 
 its opinion without insincerity, and without 
 being chargeable with an entire want of 
 thought in regard to the disputed point. 
 The mind acts, but its action ceases before 
 the comparison of notions is perfected. 
 
*- ^~- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 147 
 
 That smaller number of persons, who at 
 an adult age, change their opinions, or 
 whose opinions can, with propriety, be 
 called their own, may be arranged under 
 four classes. 
 
 The First Class consists of those who 
 change their opinions, simply because they 
 cannot retain any opinion long : this may 
 arise from several causes : — 1st. From a 
 sort of feeble activity in the intellectual 
 powers : in such minds, there is constant 
 movement ; but no exertion : no com 
 parisons of notions are actually completed : 
 the mind never touches the truth of a pro- 
 position. 2d. From levity or frivolity of 
 temper, and a childish love of novelty. 
 3d. From that vanity which is gratified by 
 the show of liberality and freedom from 
 prejudice. 4th. From melancholic timidity 
 which creates a distrust of all evidence : 
 such persons change their opinions merely 
 from the fear of having been deceived in 
 those which they last held. 
 
 The Second Class consists of those who 
 adopt opinions which gratify some strong 
 peculiarity in their tempers. For example : — 
 H 2 
 
148 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 The strenuous advocates of particular poli- 
 tical opinions, very rarely are such from 
 calm conviction, or from a philosophical 
 study of human nature, and an extensive 
 acquaintance with history ; but from some 
 very evident asperity, or malignity, or arro- 
 gance in their tempers. He whose temper 
 is, at once, timid and arrogant, will, pro- 
 bably, adopt opinions favourable to arbitrary 
 government : he will have little sympathy 
 for the privations, or regard to the rights of 
 the many ; while he will approve of the 
 force, and justify the corruption by which 
 the exclusive privileges of the few are 
 maintained. On the other hand, he whose 
 pride is more courageous, and more mali- 
 cious, will adopt opinions which give the 
 best colour to an acrid, turbulent, and 
 malignant animosity towards the particular 
 persons who may administer the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Under this head may be included (though 
 they might well form a class by themselves) 
 those persons in whom what is commonly 
 called the spirit of contradiction, or the love 
 of controversy and contention, is the ruling 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 149 
 
 motive. Such persons may be driven into 
 the profession of any opinion by opposition. 
 To secure themselves from the danger of 
 meeting with individuals who may think en- 
 tirely as they do, they often adopt and profess 
 some odd notion, or system of notions, so 
 absurd as to be quite beyond the reach of 
 reason and argument. 
 
 The Third Class consists of those who 
 adopt or change their opinions in conse- 
 quence of rational conviction, produced by 
 inquiry and reflection. 
 
 This intelligent formation or change of 
 opinions is not rare on literary and scientific 
 questions ; because on these subjects there is 
 little room for motives of interest, or of party 
 spirit ; and because it is chiefly persons of a 
 calm and intellectual character, who addict 
 themselves to pursuits of this sort. A man 
 who, from ostentation or perversity of 
 temper, may choose to maintain some ex- 
 travagant scientific system, is, at the present 
 day, rarely able to make a party large enough 
 to give permanent support to his absurdities : 
 he is therefore presently abandoned to ridi- 
 cule ; and forgotten. 
 h3 
 
150 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 A purely rational change of political or 
 religious opinions may take place after 
 inquiry and reflection, either from peculiar 
 calmness and ingenuousness of temper ; or 
 from the force and superiority of the under- 
 standing : in minds of a high order the 
 pleasure of knowledge, or, the love of 
 truth, furnishes a motive which is always 
 stronger than any other. 
 
 The Fourth Class consists of those who 
 form or change their opinions (chiefly re- 
 ligious opinions,) in consequence of a change 
 in thpir moral dispositions- 
 
 For example; — When young persons who 
 have been religiously educated become de- 
 praved in their moral feelings, and licentious 
 in their conduct, the vitiation of the imagi- 
 nation and the social affections tends to 
 obscure that internal evidence of the truth 
 of Christianity, which, to a mind not de- 
 praved or perverted, is alone sufficient to 
 command belief. And as the injunctions 
 and the awful sanctions of the Bible are the 
 principal restraints upon the passions, there 
 is a strong motive for wishing to invalidate 
 its authority : this motive may so far divert 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 151 
 
 the attention from the direct evidence of* 
 Revelation, and so fix it upon objections 
 and difficulties, that, at length, a very 
 sincere kind of infidelity may be produced, 
 which may continue to infatuate the under- 
 standing to the last moment of life. 
 
 A happier change of opinions takes place 
 when the mind, from a state of moral and 
 religious indifference, or insensibility, or 
 depravation, becomes alive to its account- 
 ability to God, and to the vast interests of 
 the future life. A change of this sort will 
 ijot fail to be accompanied by a diligent 
 perusal of the Scriptures, with that earnest 
 and humble prayer for the promised guidance 
 of the Holy Spirit which is the first and 
 principal sign of religious sincerity. In this 
 state of mind the plain sense of Scripture, 
 on those few points in which a right belief is 
 indispensible to true virtue, will be admitted 
 without refinements or perversions. If the 
 same nominal opinions have previously been 
 held, they will now become the objects of a 
 moral, as well as of a merely rational assent : 
 or if different opinions have before been 
 entertained, they will, as it were, wither, 
 h4 
 
152 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 and fall away from the mind, or be instan- 
 taneously cast off, as having no congruity 
 with the new state of the feelings. 
 
 See Judgement. Prejudice. 
 Passion, is opposed to Action, A passive 
 state is the state of a thing while it is 
 operated upon by some cause : a thing is 
 passive in which some effect is produced : 
 the word Passion has been applied to the 
 strong feelings of the mind; because in 
 such a state, the mind is influenced by some 
 object which is the cause of the feeling : the 
 passion of fear is the feeling caused in the 
 mind by some object which is supposed 
 likely to injure us. 
 
 The mind even while under the most vio- 
 lent agitation, whether from emotions of 
 resentment or desire, is still in a passive, 
 not in an active state : it is moved by ex- 
 ternal objects, or by animal sensations ; 
 and the more movement there is, the less 
 ability is there in the mind to resume its 
 active state. It was the constant aim of the 
 ancient ethical philosophy to render the mind 
 less liable to passive movements by culti- 
 vating the habit of intellectual activity. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 153 
 
 But, with the exception of a few individuals, 
 whose constitutions maybe peculiarly sedate, 
 and whose tastes are at the same time wholly 
 intellectual, this plan has always been found 
 utterly inefficient. The aim of the Christian 
 Religion is, neither to render the mind in- 
 sensible to natural emotions, nor to quell 
 emotion by simple reasoning ; but to oppose 
 motive to motive, by gradually withdrawing 
 the mind from the sphere of those which are 
 sensual and malignant, and inducing the 
 habitual operation of those which are pure, 
 elevated, and benevolent. These calmer 
 motives are always compatible with the 
 active state of the mind : they do not shake 
 or disturb its perfect command of itself : 
 the emotions which spring from them are 
 rational, but the agitation of the sensual 
 or malignant passions produces a sort of 
 temporary insanity. 
 Perception, is distinguished from sensation. 
 The mere feeling in the organs of sense, 
 occasioned by an external object, is called 
 sensation : when this feeling gives the mind 
 the notion of some external object, which is 
 the cause of the sensation, we are said to 
 h5 
 
154 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 perceive ; or to have perception. If we 
 had but one sense ; the sense of smell, 
 for instance, we should never imagine that 
 there was any external cause which produced 
 the sensation ; but it is by comparing what 
 we see, with what we touch, or hear, or 
 smell, or taste, that we learn to think of the 
 causes of our sensations : and thus have 
 perceptions of things without us. 
 
 Phenomenon, from Qouvopem — something which 
 makes its appearance. The word is most 
 properly applied to some fact in the course 
 of nature, which has either not been before 
 observed ; or which is not yet perfectly 
 understood. 
 
 Positive. See Negative. 
 
 Power. It has already been said (see Cause,) 
 that the notion of Power is a simple Abstrac- 
 tion, derived from our consciousness when, 
 by an act of the Will, we produce a change, 
 either in the mind itself, or in the position 
 of the body, by the action of the muscles. 
 The mind naturally and involuntarily con- 
 nects this notion of Power with whatever 
 seems to produce an Effect. Hence it is 
 common to say, that every Cause has in 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 155 
 
 it the power to produce its proper Effect. 
 We speak of the Powers of Nature, 
 generally; or, in particular instances, of 
 the Power of the Sun to produce the 
 evaporation of fluids, and the ripening of 
 fruits ; — of the elastic Power of the Atmos- 
 phere ; — the expansive Power of Steam, &c. 
 This mode of speaking ought to be under- 
 stood simply as expressing the antecedence 
 of one event, and the uniform sequence of 
 another event ;— the first called a Cause, 
 the second an Effect. Our inquires into the 
 laws of Nature, carry us no further than to 
 ascertain what events are uniformly conse- 
 quent, the one to the other. We know of 
 no Power but that which belongs to the 
 Mind. It is an old definition of Mind and 
 Matter, agreeable to this explanation of 
 Power, — Mind is that which moves ; Matter 
 is that which is moved. 
 Prejudice. An opinion received or maintained 
 without proper regard to the arguments 
 which may prove it true, is a Prejudice ; 
 whether the opinion be true or false. In 
 most cases, Prejudices are opinions which, 
 on some account, men are pleased with, 
 h6 
 
156 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 independently of any conviction of their 
 truth ; and which, therefore, they are afraid 
 to examine, lest they should find them to be 
 false. 
 
 A Prejudice is an unreasonable judge- 
 ment, formed or held under the influence of 
 some other motive than the love of truth. 
 Prejudices therefore, may be classed ac- 
 cording, to the nature of the motives from 
 which they result. These motives are either 
 pleasurable, innocent, and social ; or they 
 are malignant. 
 
 Among the Prejudices of the First Class 
 are to be enumerated — 1st. The false judge- 
 ments which result from personal vanity. 
 When our own endowments, or qualifi- 
 cations, or external advantages, or per- 
 formances, are placed in comparison with 
 those of others, the pleasurable sensation 
 of self-love, either entirely prevents the 
 process of comparison, or so disturbs and 
 perverts it, that we often acquiesce, without 
 suspicion, in the most egregious mistakes. 
 2d. Those false judgements which result 
 from the social affections. The fondness of 
 parents towards their children, and what is 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 157 
 
 usually called the love of Country, generally 
 include some prejudices of this kind. There 
 is a third species of pleasurable prejudices 
 which are more indefinite, though they might 
 perhaps, all be traced to some modification 
 of self-love ; such are those by which capri- 
 cious minds are fixed, for a while, upon some 
 object of an accidental preference, with 
 a blind and exclusive satisfaction: more 
 tenacious tempers are often permanently 
 infatuated in their attachment to an object 
 which has once been connected with a 
 pleasurable sensation. Prejudices of this 
 kind often govern the minds, and command 
 all the energies of unoccupied persons in 
 the prosecution of some frivolous pursuit or 
 study. The eager collectors of worthless 
 rarities and relics, — and indeed most of 
 those who are ardent in the pursuit of the 
 minor branches of science or literature, are 
 commonly so wrapped up in agreeable pre- 
 judices, that they are incapable of forming 
 an estimate of the relative importance of the 
 objects which engross their attention. The 
 human mind is perhaps liable to no preju- 
 dices more inveterate and more infatuating, 
 
158 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 than those, which, in ardent but contracted 
 minds, confer a grave and vast importance 
 upon the acquisition of shells, or feathers, 
 or coins, or antique pot-sherds, or scarce 
 editions of worthless books. 
 
 Prejudices of this third kind may be in- 
 nocent, those of the second kind are amiable 
 and beneficial : those of the first kind are 
 always disadvantageous. It is the aim of 
 an enlarged and cultivated mind to. found 
 right feelings upon true judgements. 
 
 Prejudices of the Second Class, re- 
 sulting from malignant feelings, are always 
 injurious, as they are always odious. Such 
 are those produced by the Pride of rank 
 or of intellect ; by capricious antipathies 
 against individuals, — by personal animo- 
 sities, in consequence of real, or supposed 
 injuries ; — by party spirit in matters of 
 religion, or politics ; by national, or pro- 
 vincial, or municipal jealousies ; — by cor- 
 porate interests, as those of station, rank, 
 and profession, &c. 
 
 Candour is the willingness to form a true 
 judgement in some instance where we are 
 conscious of a malignant motive for forming 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 159 
 
 or holding a false judgement. He who has 
 no need to exercise candour, has a better 
 chance of forming a correct opinion than 
 even the most candid temper. False candour 
 is a willingness to relinquish a malignant 
 prejudice from indolence, indifference, or, 
 perhaps, from some stronger opposing 
 prejudice. 
 
 Beside these two principal classes there 
 are many prejudices which flow from some 
 mistaken maxim, or habit of thought ; or an 
 unfounded deference to established opinions : 
 but such false judgements, when they chiefly 
 regard the reasoning faculty, are, for the sake 
 of distinction, better called simply errors, 
 than prejudices. 
 See Opinion. 
 
 Principle, from JPrincipium ; a beginning. 
 That from which many other things arise, 
 or proceed : the first or most important 
 parts or properties of a thing are called its 
 Principles. The Principles of a science, 
 are those few propositions which are most 
 evident, most simple, and most important. 
 
 Primary, is opposed to Secondary. Those 
 qualities, or properties, without which we 
 
160 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 cannot even imagine a thing to exist, are 
 called primary qualities. Extension and 
 Solidity are called primary qualities of 
 matter. Colour, Smell, Taste, — are called 
 secondary qualities of matter. This dis- 
 tinction is a mere notion of the mind, re- 
 sulting from our imperfect knowledge of 
 things. 
 Probability. This word, often joined with 
 some qualifying term, expresses the degree 
 of our ignorance in relation to some past 
 fact, or future event. It does not relate to 
 the fact or event itself, as being more or 
 less certain. 
 
 6 It is probable that Babylon was founded 
 on the site of the Tower of Babel.' 
 
 6 It is probable that Plato had perused 
 some parts of the Jewish Scriptures.' 
 
 ' There is some probability in the sup- 
 position that the Egyptian Pyramids were 
 built by the Israelites, during their bondage.' 
 
 ' It is highly probable that the planets 
 are inhabited.' 
 
 f It is highly probable that a spark falling 
 upon gunpowder will cause its combustion.' 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 161 
 
 ' It is probable that the Eastern and 
 Western States of North America, will, at 
 some future time, form separate Govern- 
 ments.' 
 
 c It is probable that a communication 
 may, one day, be made between the Medi- 
 terranean Sea and the Red Sea, through the 
 Isthmus of Suez.' 
 
 • 4 It is probable that a person in health 
 will live a year.' 
 
 All these propositions are as certainly 
 true, or as certainly false, as that twice 
 two are four : or, that three times two are 
 seven. We are obliged to speak of them as 
 probable on account of our ignorance : and 
 we speak of them as more or less probable 
 in proportion to our ignorance. 
 
 See Contingent. Necessity. 
 Proposition. Any judgement of the mind 
 concerning two or more things, expressed 
 in words, and declaring that they agree, or 
 disagree ; that they are alike, or unlike ; 
 that one belongs to the other, or that it does 
 not belong to it ; is called a Proposition. 
 The thing of which we principally think in 
 making a proposition, is called the Subject : 
 
162 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 what we affirm or deny concerning it, is 
 called the Predicate, or the Attribute : the 
 predicate means that which is declared ; the 
 attribute, that which is rendered or given to 
 a thing : for example : — 
 
 'The Earth is round.' 
 
 In this proposition the Earth, is the 
 subject : round, is the predicate. 
 
 Propositions which the mind can at once 
 comprehend, so as to perceive that they are 
 true, are called axioms : as, — c two and two 
 are four.' Propositions which are not 
 evident at once, require to be proved by 
 reasoning : the proposition that the Earth 
 is round, is not evident at once ; on the 
 contrary, without reflection, we might sup- 
 pose it flat. But after we have made several 
 unquestionable inferences from known facts, 
 we prove, certainly that it is round. 
 
 Propositions are commonly arranged un- 
 der several heads, — as, for example ; — 
 
 Some are Affirmative ; — as, ' Temperance 
 conduces to health.' 
 
 Some Negative ; as ' Temperance does 
 not ensure health' : or they may be divided 
 into those which are Universal ; as, — ( All 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 103 
 
 men must die:' — and those which are Parti- 
 cular ; as, — ' Some men reach the age of 
 an hundred years.' 
 
 These artificial distinctions are of little 
 utility or importance. 
 
 Every perfect sentence contains one, or 
 more propositions. 
 
 Every verb, with its nominative case, is 
 a proposition, or affirmation: — as, — I am; 
 he runs. The infinitive mood is the mere 
 name of the action, expressed abstractedly ; 
 and therefore it contains no affirmation or 
 proposition. 
 Reason. All the operations of the mind when 
 it thinks of the qualities of things separately 
 from the things to which they belong ; — or 
 when it forms general notions, and employs 
 general terms ; or when it judges of the 
 agreement or disagreement of different 
 things ; — or when it draws inferences ; — 
 are comprehended under the term Meason, 
 Reason seems chiefly to consist in the 
 power to keep such or such thoughts in the 
 mind ; and to change them at pleasure ; 
 instead of their flowing through the mind 
 as in dreams ; also in the power to see the 
 
164 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 difference between one thought and another, 
 and so to compare, separate, or join them 
 together afresh. Though animals seem to 
 have some little power to perform these 
 operations, Man has so much more of it, 
 that he, alone, is said to be endowed with 
 Reason. 
 Reasoning. What is called a chain of rea- 
 soning, is the slow process carried on by the 
 help of words or other signs which our 
 narrow and feeble minds are obliged to pass 
 through, before we can perceive the con- 
 nexion between two things which are said to 
 agree, or to disagree, in some way. Com- 
 prehensive and vigorous minds have need of 
 less of what is called reasoning, than un- 
 cultivated and feeble minds. Much know- 
 ledge, with great force and activity in the 
 mind, supercedes the necessity of trains 
 of reasoning. When it is said that three 
 times three are nine, every adult, by an 
 instantaneous act of the mind, perceives the 
 truth of the proposition ; but a child, com- 
 mencing the study of arithmetic, does not 
 perceive that three threes are as many 
 as nine : it is, therefore, necessary to show 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 165 
 
 him that they are so, by making hiin count 
 three parcels of three counters. It is not 
 without some such process of reasoning, 
 that his feeble and unexercised mind can 
 comprehend the connexion affirmed in this 
 proposition. 
 
 The nature of the case is precisely the 
 same, when an adult is told that the 
 figures 4- bear the same proportion to each 
 other as the figures ~ ; or that these are two 
 forms of expressing the same fraction : 
 unless he be expert in calculation, he will 
 not instantaneously perceive the truth of 
 this proposition ; and it will be necessary 
 for him to attend to the arithmetical rea- 
 soning by which it is proved to be true. 
 If he had more readiness and greater com- 
 prehension of mind, he would know this 
 proposition, as he knows that twice two are 
 four. See Belief, and Demonstration. 
 
 That operation of the mind by which pro- 
 positions are proved to be certainly true is 
 called Demonstrative Reasoning. 
 
 The operation of the mind is the same in 
 reasoning upon subjects that do not admit of 
 absolute demonstration. In order to com- 
 
166 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 prehend the connexion between two facts 
 which are affirmed to depend one upon the 
 other, it is necessary to attend to all the par- 
 ticulars, — one by one, which lie between the 
 two facts : as, for example ; — 
 
 If it is affirmed that the cutting a canal 
 will facilitate communication between the 
 towns near which it passes, the connexion 
 between the two facts is easily perceived, 
 and no reasoning is necessary to prove the 
 truth of the proposition. 
 
 But if it is said that the cutting of this 
 canal will occasion the loss of many vessels 
 on a part of the coast which is three hundred 
 miles distant, we do not at once see the con- 
 nection between the two facts here affirmed 
 to depend, one upon the other : the con- 
 nection must be shown in some such way as 
 the following. 
 
 1. Hitherto the copper works at A, have 
 been supplied with coal from a distant mari- 
 time county. 
 
 2. This new canal will afford a safer and 
 cheaper conveyance for coal from the pits 
 atD. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 167 
 
 3. A hundred sail of vessels will therefore 
 cease to be employed. 
 
 4. But these vessels have given employ- 
 ment to a great number of pilots, in a 
 dangerous channel, through which they had 
 to pass. 
 
 o. These pilots, losing the principal part 
 of their employment, will gradually abandon 
 the station ; and seek their livelihood else- 
 where : the few who remain will be the aged 
 or unskilful. 
 
 6. Hence will follow what was at first 
 affirmed, — that if the canal be cut, vessels 
 which pass through this channel will often 
 be exposed to shipwreck, from the want 
 of a sufficient number of able and skilful 
 pilots. 
 
 After all these circumstances have been 
 mentioned, in regular succession, and the 
 connection between them perceived, we are 
 convinced that the proposition first stated is, 
 at least, probably true. 
 
 Every train of Reasoning is an operation 
 similar to what is exhibited in this instance. 
 
 See Inference. 
 
168 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Reasoning is false when some of the par- 
 ticular facts are not truly represented, or, 
 are not really connected in the way that is 
 affirmed ; — Or when some facts which are 
 really connected with what is affirmed have 
 been omitted. 
 Relation. Any sort of connexion which is 
 perceived or imagined, between two or 
 more things ; or any comparison which is 
 made by the mind, is called a Relation. 
 When we look at these two lines, 
 
 we do not merely think of them separately, — 
 as, this straight line, and that straight line ; 
 but they are immediately connected together 
 in the mind by a comparison which takes place 
 as soon as they meet the eye. We first think 
 of them as being alike ; because they are 
 both straight ; and we call the notion that is 
 formed — the relation of sameness. We then 
 think of them as the same in length ; — this 
 is the relation of equality. We think of 
 them, again, as equally distant from each 
 other, from end to end ; and then we say 
 they are parallel lines : this word parallel 
 represents nothing in the lines themselves ; 
 but only the notion formed by measuring the 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 169 
 
 distance between them. All these notions 
 spring up in the mind from the comparison 
 of the two objects : they belong entirely to 
 the mind, and do not exist in the things 
 themselves. 
 
 A great number of our notions are formed 
 by perceiving the Relation between two or 
 more things or ideas. The notion of Truth 
 is formed by perceiving the relation between 
 an affirmation, and the thing spoken of; 
 or between a notion and the thing to which 
 it belongs : Truth, then, is a relation of 
 sameness or agreement. Sin is a relation 
 of disagreement, between an action and a 
 rule, or law. Notions so formed are com- 
 plex : they require, therefore, to be analysed, 
 before we can think or reason correctly con- 
 cerning them. See Chap. X. 
 Sensation. The mere effect that is produced 
 in the mind when some external object acts 
 upon the nerves of the eye, the ear, the 
 nose, the palate, or the skin or muscles, is 
 called Sensation. (See Perception.) All 
 our knowledge of external things arises 
 from the comparisons which we make be- 
 tween sensations of different kinds : we 
 
170 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 compare the sensations of sight, with those 
 of touch ; and so become acquainted with 
 the distances and shapes of bodies. 
 Signs. Any sound, mark, figure, or image, 
 which has been connected with some idea, 
 and is employed to recall it to the mind, is 
 called a Sign* 
 
 There are two kinds of signs ; Those 
 which are Arbitrary, and those which are 
 Natural and Representative. 
 
 Arbitrary signs, are certain sounds or 
 marks which become joined to particular 
 ideas in the minds of men, merely by use, 
 and common consent : words spoken and 
 written are arbitrary signs : they are called 
 arbitrary, because there is no reason why 
 such or such sounds or marks should sig- 
 nify such or such ideas, except the will 
 and agreement of those who use them ; 
 hence it has happened that men in diiferent 
 a^es and countries have fixed upon very dif- 
 ferent sounds and marks to signify the same 
 thing. Five men may look at the same 
 object : one, when he sees it, will utter the 
 sound omot ; another, damns ; another, casa ; 
 another, maison ; another, house. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 171 
 
 Sounds are the signs of ideas; and 
 marks, or letters, are the signs of sounds. 
 There are some few words in all languages 
 which are not entirely arbitrary ; hut are in 
 some degree natural or representative ; such, 
 for instance, as the words which signify the 
 voices of animals ; and also some inter- 
 jections, expressive of joy and pain. These 
 words being similar in all languages, may be 
 considered as the natural signs of such 
 emotions. All other words are arbitrary 
 signs. 
 
 Natural and Representative signs are 
 gestures of the body, or expressions of the 
 countenance, or such figures or images as 
 have some kind of likeness to, or natural 
 connexion with, the things they signify. 
 
 Gestures of the body are employed by 
 men who do not understand each other's 
 language. A great part of the thoughts 
 that are excited in the mind in familiar 
 conversation is communicated by the various 
 expressions of the countenance ; and, such 
 expressions being nearly the same in all 
 human beings, they may be considered as 
 natural signs of ideas 
 i 2 
 
172 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Symbols are rude pictures, or images of 
 objects, from which it is intended that in- 
 ferences should be drawn, in order to dis- 
 cover the meaning of them. Pictures are 
 addressed to the eye ; and are intended to be 
 understood at a first glance ; but symbols 
 are addressed to the understanding \ A 
 Wheat sheaf may be employed as a symbol 
 of plenty ; a sword, of war ; scales, of 
 justice ; a plough, of industry ; an anchor, 
 of security ; an eye, of knowledge ; a heart, 
 of affection, %c. All that is necessary in 
 symbols, is, that each figure should so 
 nearly resemble the things represented, that 
 it may be known what object is meant ; and 
 also that they should be so put together, that 
 it may be possible to discover what is in- 
 tended to be understood by the whole. A 
 Symbol, more carefully represented, and 
 intended to communicate some moral truth, 
 is called an Emblem. 
 
 The ancient Egyptians employed symbols 
 to represent the principles of their religion ; 
 or, perhaps, to record the histories of events, 
 or persons : these were called by the Greeks, 
 Hieroglyphicks, from ispo$ — sacred, and 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 173 
 
 yxu^co — to carve ; because they were symbols, 
 relating to religion, carved upon obelisks. 
 Sophism, from <ro<f>io"jxa — a false argument. 
 The word is not usually applied to mere 
 errors in reasoning ; but to those errors in 
 reasoning of which the persons who main- 
 tain them are, in some degree, conscious ; 
 and which they endeavour to conceal from 
 examination by subtilty, and by some am- 
 biguity, or other unfairness in the use of 
 words. 
 
 In books of Logic are to be found artifi- 
 cial classifications of the various kinds of 
 Sophisms, with rules for detecting the fal- 
 lacies on which they rest. But it requires 
 much attention, and some acuteness, as well 
 as frequent exercise in disputation, to be able 
 to make a ready or immediate use of these 
 abstract rules and distinctions. There are, 
 however, two or three plain considerations 
 and directions which may tend to secure the 
 mind from the danger of having important 
 principles shaken or overthrown by sophis- 
 tical reasonings. 
 
 I. There are some characteristics of so- 
 phistical reasoning, by observing which it 
 i3 
 
174 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 may often be suspected, and its influence 
 destroyed, when we are not able to detect 
 and expose the fallacy. 
 
 1st. Sophistical reasoning is commonly 
 subtile in its style ; and the force of the argu- 
 ment is made to depend upon niceties and 
 refinements in the use of words. A sophis- 
 tical reasoner will rarely consent to state his 
 argument in any other than the precise terms 
 which he has artfully selected. On the con- 
 trary, Truth, as it is independent of words, 
 may, generally, be stated, with nearly equal 
 advantage, in several forms of expression. 
 He who defends what he understands, and 
 what he honestly believes, is generally less 
 solicitous about particular phrases, than he 
 who is conscious of reasoning sophistically. 
 
 2d. When sophistical reasoning is not 
 crafty and circuitous, it is often abrupt and 
 offensive : there is an attempt to force assent 
 by some seeming demonstration, which will 
 leave no room for reply ; and this, even in 
 subjects plainly beyond the reach of demon- 
 stration. Now, it should constantly be 
 borne in mind, when questions are discussed 
 which have long been debated in the world, 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 175 
 
 that, if these pretended demonstrations 
 were as sound and good as, to those who 
 hear them for the first time, they may seem 
 to be, they would, long ago, have settled 
 the controversy in question. Demonstrative 
 reasoning either supersedes all controversy ; 
 or it is utterly useless : — it is good for every 
 thing ; or it is good for nothing. Truth 
 leads the mind : Sophistry drives it. 
 
 3d. Sophistical reasoning is very com- 
 monly advanced in the smart, flippant style 
 of a repartee, or an epigram. Indeed, it 
 will be generally found that those who are 
 habitually sophistical reasoners, are, in their 
 natural tempers, either crafty, disingenuous, 
 and cold ; or self-complacent, flashy, and 
 ironical. Dogmatism must not be reckoned 
 among the symptoms of sophistry ; because 
 it very often results from the full and serious 
 conviction of truth in a strong understand- 
 ing, joined to an arrogant or irritable temper. 
 
 II. We should never estirctate the sound- 
 ness of principles by our own ability to 
 defend them ; or consider an objection as 
 unanswerable, to which we can find no 
 reply. It is an absurd self-confidence, es- 
 i4 
 
176 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 pecially in a young" person, to abandon his 
 principles as soon as he may find himself 
 worsted in argument. There is no defence 
 against flippant sophistry so effectual as an 
 intelligent modesty. Indeed, genuine firm- 
 ness of mind consists greatly in an habitual 
 recollection of our own moderate powers and 
 acquirements. Let us suppose the case 
 of a person who has a common knowledge 
 of astronomy : he has learned that the great 
 law of planetary motion is, that the squares 
 of the periodical times of the Planets, are 
 as the cubes of their distances from the 
 centres of their orbits. He understands 
 this doctrine, and the manner in which it 
 is proved in a general way, and he knows 
 that is the received opinion among men of 
 science. Now he happens to meet with a 
 sophist, whose mathematical acquirements, 
 and whose readiness in calculation are 
 considerably greater than his own. This 
 sophist undertakes to prove that the estab- 
 lished doctrine is unfounded ; and he pre- 
 tends, by some short and unanswerable 
 process, to detect a capital error in the 
 calculations by which it is usually proved. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 177 
 
 What then does this person do? — does he 
 say — ' Yes, I see we have all been mistaken ; 
 your reasoning is unanswerable ; I there- 
 fore candidly confess my former error ?' — 
 ,No one who has a common measure of good 
 sense would act thus in the case supposed. 
 If he found a difficulty in reconciling the 
 sophist's apparent demonstrations with es- 
 tablished principles, he would put that diffi- 
 culty wholly to the account of his own 
 ignorance and incompetency ; and would 
 refer it to those who may be able to explain 
 to him the fallacy by which he has been 
 embarrassed. The same conduct, influenced 
 by the same modesty, would, in most cases, 
 be the best, as it is in fact the most reason- 
 able manner of treating crafty or sarcastic 
 sophistry. 
 
 III. Sophistical reasoning is very com- 
 monly founded upon an ambiguous use of 
 those words which signify complex abstract 
 notions ; such, for example, as some of those 
 mentioned page 56. The highly important 
 habit, therefore, of regarding things and 
 notions apart from words, and of analysing 
 all complex abstract notions, affords the 
 i5 
 
178 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 best intellectual security against the im- 
 pression of fallacious reasoning. When a 
 sophistical argument is proposed to a person 
 accustomed to think abstractedly and ana- 
 lytically, he will, in the first place, examine 
 each principal term employed, and, in so 
 doing, he will rarely fail to discover that one 
 of them is used in two senses, or in a sense 
 altogether improper, or inapplicable to the 
 subject. 
 
 Sophisms may consist in proving some 
 thing which is beside the question ; or in 
 artfully changing the real point in dispute. 
 Thus, if it be affirmed that the tendency 
 of Christianity is much more favourable to 
 public and private virtue, than that of any 
 other religious system, or than Atheism ; an 
 opponent may change the point in dispute, 
 by proving that many professors of Christi- 
 anity have been worthless and licentious men ; 
 or by proving that some Idolaters and some 
 Atheists have been blameless in their exter- 
 nal conduct. The real points to be deter- 
 mined are these : — whether Nations, taken 
 at large, in which Christianity has prevailed, 
 or in which the Bible has been actually read 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 179 
 
 and regarded by the mass of the people, 
 have not greatly surpassed in morality those 
 Nations to whom it has been wholly un- 
 known, or by whom it has been little re- 
 garded : And then, — whether, if any number 
 of the most apparently sincere Christians is 
 compared with an equal number of the best 
 heathens or deists, they will not be found to 
 possess a sort of virtue much more complete, 
 more pure, and more beneficent. 
 
 Many Sophisms consist in taking for 
 granted the very point to be proved. Thus, 
 if it be argued that a man who is just and 
 temperate need not concern himself with 
 matters of faith, or forms of religion, because 
 a just and temperate man is virtuous, and 
 therefore must always be the object of the 
 Divine favour. The thing to be proved, — 
 namely, whether justice and temperance, 
 without piety, constitute that virtue which 
 will be approved by God, is taken for 
 granted, by calling the merely just and 
 temperate man, virtuous. 
 
 Sophisms are sometimes framed by as- 
 signing a wrong cause to some effect. 
 There is a sophism of this kind when it is 
 16 
 
180 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 said that Christianity has caused many 
 bloody wars, cruel persecutions, and bar- 
 barous massacres. While in fact, it has been 
 the ferocious passions of men, made more 
 ferocious by the rebuke they have received 
 from the pure and peaceful spirit of Christi- 
 anity, which have been the real causes of 
 these wars and persecutions. 
 
 Sophisms often arise from drawing in- 
 ferences on insufficient grounds : (See In- 
 duction. Inference); or when some effect 
 is supposed to be constant, which is only 
 accidental : or when some law of nature, or 
 rule is stated to be universally true, which, 
 in fact, is liable to many exceptions. Per- 
 sons who guide their conduct by maxims 
 are very liable to deceive themselves by 
 sophisms of this sort. There is, perhaps, 
 some general truth contained in their 
 favourite sayings : but when such maxims 
 are made the rules of conduct, they require 
 a careful observation of the particular cir- 
 cumstances to which they are applied. A 
 large proportion of the pointed proverbs 
 which tickle the ears of the vulgar, are mere 
 sophisms of this class. It may be observed 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 181 
 
 that wide and various information is apt to 
 render cultivated minds over cautious in 
 calculating upon the exceptions to general 
 laws ; while uncultivated minds, almost 
 always, make a rude and blind use of 
 general rules, without regard to exceptions. 
 Whatever may be the nature of a sophism 
 it is always disguised by some indistinctness, 
 ambiguity, or impropriety in one or more 
 of the words by which it is expressed. A 
 general rule therefore for detecting the fallacy 
 of sophistical reasoning is, to oblige those 
 who advance it to define every principal 
 word employed, to analyse every complex 
 abstract notion, and to use words constantly 
 in the same sense. 
 
 See Judgement. Reasoning. 
 Space. We obtain the notion of Extension 
 by comparing what is seen, with what is felt : 
 after we have gained this notion, we are 
 able, in thought, to take from it what we 
 learn by touch,— -or the notion of some thing 
 which resists our movements. Space, then, 
 is the word we employ to signify the notion 
 of Extension, after we have taken from it 
 the notion of Solidity. The way in which 
 
182 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 this notion is acquired may thus be described, 
 but as it is a simple abstract notion, it cannot 
 be analysed. 
 
 Species, and Genus. See Ghap. V. 
 
 Subject; that concerning which something is 
 affirmed ; or that to which some quality 
 belongs. See Proposition. Essence. 
 Adjunct. 
 
 Substance. It is natural to us to imagine 
 that there is some thing to which all the 
 qualities of things belong ; therefore we 
 speak of solidity, and extension, and shape, 
 and colour, as the qualities of a something, 
 — we know not what, which we call matter ; 
 and then we say that matter is an extended 
 and solid Substance. The mind is called 
 a thinking Substance. Whatever there may 
 be in things, we know nothing further than 
 what we perceive of their various sensible 
 qualities. The word Substance, if used in 
 distinction from all the qualities of things, 
 only expresses our supposition of somewhat 
 of which we know nothing. See Affection. 
 Succession. The consciousness of one 
 thought following another perpetually, gives 
 us the notion of duration. The estimate 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 183 
 
 which we form of the length of any portion 
 of time depends, partly, upon the number 
 of thoughts which has passed through the 
 mind ; and partly, upon the liveliness with 
 which we remember them : a long day is one 
 in which a multitude of agreeable thoughts 
 has passed through the mind. A year seems 
 longer in youth than in more advanced life ; 
 . because, in youth, the attention is less 
 fixed upon single objects ; and the course 
 of the thoughts is more rapid, and more 
 often diverted into new directions. See 
 Duration. 
 Suggestion. Our minds are so formed, that 
 thoughts which have once been brought to- 
 gether, are afterwards apt to return to the 
 mind together. The course of the thoughts, 
 when they are left to flow on without any 
 direction from the Will, seems to be governed 
 by the connexions which have been ac- 
 cidentally formed among them. If we 
 attempt to trace back the wanderings of 
 our thoughts, we shall generally be able 
 to discover some connexion between ideas, 
 which has led the mind, in the course of a 
 few minutes, to be occupied with the most 
 
184 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 widely different things. Often it is merely 
 some likeness in the sound of words which 
 ties thoughts together : often it is some 
 similarity in the feeling of pleasure, or 
 displeasure, towards two different objects : 
 often, the sight of an object will bring into 
 the mind the thoughts which happened to 
 engage us when we last saw it. 
 
 Even when we endeavour to direct our 
 thoughts by an act of the Will, we still, more 
 or less, follow the natural or the accidental 
 connexions which have been formed among 
 them ; and the difference observable in men's 
 way of thinking, when they direct their 
 minds to the same objects, depends, greatly, 
 upon what it is which usually suggests their 
 thoughts. One man's thoughts are sug- 
 gested, chiefly, by words, and forms of 
 expression, which have been stored in the 
 memory : such a person will think rapidly, 
 and speak fluently, and with much pro- 
 priety ; but he will not often bring forward 
 what is new. Another man's thoughts are 
 suggested, chiefly, by the feelings he is 
 most subject to, — such as benevolence, or 
 anger, or contempt, or the love of freedom, 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 185 
 
 or the sense of religion. Such a man will 
 bring forward thoughts that are so proper to 
 the occasion on which he writes, or speaks, 
 that he will easily lead other men into the 
 same feelings ; but he will not be able to 
 think well, except when his feelings are 
 excited. 
 
 Another man's thoughts are chiefly sug- 
 gested by the real resemblances or analogies 
 or differences of things ; without regard to 
 words, or other men's opinions. Such a man 
 will think philosophically. To have the 
 thoughts thus suggested by the real nature 
 of things, and not by words ; or by the 
 moral feelings; or by the pleasures of the 
 fancy, constitutes what is called the philoso- 
 phical spirit. It is often not difficult to dis- 
 cover from a man's conversation, what habit 
 or feeling it is which usually suggests his 
 thoughts ; and when we discover this, we 
 may see the reason of much that he says ; 
 and often anticipate what opinion he will ex- 
 press on a particular subject. 
 
 The actions of animals proceed imme- 
 diately from the suggestions which take 
 place in their minds ; and these suggestions 
 
186 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 are caused by their perceptions or sensations. 
 The actions of animals, therefore, in given 
 circumstances, may generally be antici- 
 pated with certainty. The words and 
 actions of children chiefly flow, also, from 
 the suggestions of the moment : they may, 
 therefore, often be anticipated, or, at least 
 their words and actions may afterwards be 
 accounted for, by our knowledge of the 
 suggestions from which they flow. In the 
 idle, continued, and multifarious chattering 
 of a child, it is often possible to perceive 
 chains of suggestions very similar to those 
 which take place in dreaming. In proportion 
 as the mind by habit becomes active, the 
 natural and accidental chains of suggestion 
 are interrupted, and words and actions are 
 directed by Reason. See Chap. III. 
 Syllogism, from cuxXoyia-fjiog — a collection of 
 reasons. An inference from what we 
 already know or believe to be true, when 
 it is put into three propositions is called a 
 Syllogism: for example : — 
 
 1. No one can be happy who lives in 
 continual fear : 
 
 2. A miser lives in continualfear ; 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 187 
 
 8. Therefore, a miser cannot be happy. 
 This is only a more formal way of de- 
 claring what must be granted as soon as it 
 is stated, — namely, — That a miser cannot 
 be happy; because he lives in continual 
 fear. 
 
 In a Syllogism, the first two propositions 
 are called the Premises ; because they are 
 'the things premised or put before ; they are 
 also called the Antecedents : the first of 
 them is called the Major, and the second 
 the Minor. The third proposition, which 
 contains the thing to be proved is called the 
 Conclusion. 
 
 Reasoning by Syllogism was once sup- 
 posed to be the only method of discovering 
 truth. It is, in fact, only a method of 
 stating formally and distinctly what we 
 already know or believe. 
 Synthesis, from trvvQsmg — a putting together- 
 Synthesis is opposed to Analysis : when the 
 parts or elements of any thing have been 
 discovered by analysis, we have then learnt 
 how to compound them again, so as to 
 produce the same complex body : this com- 
 pounding is called Synthesis. 
 
188 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Testimony, is the declaration of one who 
 professes to know the truth of that which he 
 affirms. By far the greater part of all which 
 we believe, and of all which, in a common 
 way of speaking 1 , we are said to know, 
 depends upon Testimony. Men rely con- 
 fidently upon Testimony in conducting their 
 most important concerns : and the human 
 mind is so formed that it is more natural to 
 us to trust to Testimony, than to doubt it. 
 We should believe it entirely, and con- 
 stantly, if we did not find that it is some- 
 times fallacious. 
 
 There are two ways in which Testimony 
 may be fallacious : — 1st. He who declares a 
 thing may be mistaken : or,— 2nd. He may 
 design to deceive those to whom he speaks. 
 In judging of the truth of Testimony, we 
 must, therefore, in the first place, consider, 
 whether it is possible, or likely, that the 
 Witness may have been himself deceived in 
 the thing which he affirms : for example ; — 
 If a Witness declares that he has been 
 robbed and beaten on the road ; we know 
 that this is a matter in which he cannot be 
 mistaken : but if he says that such, or such 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 189 
 
 a man, was the robber, it is possible that in 
 this, he may be mistaken ; and if the robbery 
 happened after sun-set, it is probable that he 
 may be mistaken. We here estimate the 
 value of the Testimony by considering the 
 nature of the case. 
 
 When it has been thus determined how far 
 we may be sure that the Witness is not him- 
 self mistaken ; we must next endeavour to 
 discover whether he designs to deceive us. 
 Now we may judge of the veracity of a 
 Witness, in four ways : — - 
 
 1st. By what may be known of his general 
 character. This is, indeed, the chief ground 
 of our confidence in Testimony. We be- 
 lieve a friend, of whose integrity we have 
 no doubt, even when he declares what may 
 seem highly improbable : while to a known 
 liar, we hardly give credit in the most com- 
 mon matters. The veracity of men who 
 have lived in distant ages may also be judged 
 of, where history has recorded the general 
 course of their lives ; or where they have 
 left writings, by which their principles and 
 tempers may be known ; because human 
 nature has been the same in all ages. 
 
190 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 2nd. We judge of the veracity of a Wit- 
 ness, by considering whether he is likely to 
 be influenced by any motive of interest 
 or passion, to give false Testimony, in this 
 particular case ; or whether, on the contrary, 
 it would not have been to his advantage, to 
 have given a very different Testimony. 
 When a Witness declares that which brings 
 upon himself losses, or dangers, or death, 
 his Testimony has the highest kind of con- 
 firmation. 
 
 3rd. We may, in general, very safely 
 judge of the veracity of a Witness by com- 
 paring one part of his narrative with another. 
 
 The several parts of any story which has 
 been invented to deceive, will, almost cer- 
 tainly, be fouud not to accord with each 
 other ; especially in lesser particulars : what 
 a false Witness says at one time, will not 
 agree with what he says at another : or what 
 he says from premeditation, will contradict 
 what he affirms when he answers an unex- 
 pected question. 
 
 4th The truth may, almost always, be 
 discovered, where there is an opportunity 
 of comparing the Testimony of different 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 191 
 
 witnesses of the same fact. A number of 
 false witnesses will be sure, in some circum- 
 stances, to contradict each other ; and 
 besides ; — as nothing but some strong 
 motive can induce many persons to agree 
 together to support the same untruth, it will 
 be evident where any such common interest 
 exists. But when many witnesses of dif- 
 ferent ranks in life, different ages, and 
 different private interests, agree in all the 
 principal points of a story, we feel confident 
 in the truth of the Testimony. 
 
 It is by such methods that the truth of 
 Testimony is determined in Courts of law : 
 and when a fact proved by Testimony, is 
 confirmed by these, or similar rules, no 
 reasonable person can honestly pretend to 
 doubt it : and, indeed, many criminals are 
 adjudged to death where the evidence is very 
 far from being satisfactory in all the respects 
 which have been mentioned. 
 
 Now, if we apply these four rules to ihe 
 Testimony which supports the histories 
 contained in the New Testament, we find 
 that it is confirmed by each of them. 
 
192 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 All the principal and most remarkable facts 
 in these histories are of such a kind, that it 
 is impossible the witnesses should have been 
 themselves deceived in what they relate : for 
 example, the instantaneous healing of the 
 sick ; the restoration of the blind ; the mak- 
 ing the maimed whole ; the raising of the 
 dead ; the feeding thousands from a few 
 loaves ; and all these things done in the pre- 
 sence of large assemblies, many of whom 
 viewed what was done with envy, and the 
 eager desire to find occasion of cavil. No 
 one witness in the possession of his faculties, 
 could be deceived in such matters ; much 
 less, hundreds or thousands of witnesses. 
 
 Then, if we come to judge of the vera- 
 city of these witnesses ; there is abundant 
 proof, — 
 
 In the first place — that they were honest 
 men : not only are the writings which record 
 these facts remarkably artless in their style ; 
 but their tendency is so plainly favourable to 
 virtue, and so strongly opposed to all vice, 
 that it is impossible to imagine that the 
 writers were themselves wicked men, and 
 impostors: such a supposition is far more 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 193 
 
 incredible than that the dead should come 
 from their graves ; because this, although it is 
 a fact different from what we have ourselves 
 ever seen ; yet, it is what we know God can 
 do when he pleases ; but the other is con- 
 trary to what we know of human nature. 
 Nothing can be imagined more strange or 
 incredible, than that the very first hook 
 that was ever published in the world, con- 
 taining a perfect system of morality, — and 
 the book which has, in fact, introduced more 
 virtue among men, than any other, should 
 have been written by impostors. 
 
 In the second place, — it appears, that 
 their Testimony constantly brought perse- 
 cution upon these Witnesses. We know 
 from the Roman Historians, as well as from 
 the Writers of the New Testament, that 
 many thousand persons, — men, women, 
 and children, suffered every misery, and 
 the most cruel deaths, solely because they 
 persisted in their Testimony. Now, what 
 they testified, was not their belief in some 
 opinion, in which they might have been 
 mistaken ; but they testified that they had 
 seen the eyes of the blind opened, the sick 
 healed, and the dead raised. Those, there- 
 
 K 
 
194 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 fore, who first witnessed to the truth of 
 Christianity, knowingly brought the worst 
 bodily evils upon themselves by so doing. 
 Even if it were possible to suppose that a 
 few men would act in this way, it is certain 
 that multitudes of all nations, many of whom 
 were feeble and timid women and children, 
 could never be induced to undergo torture 
 and death for the sake of affirming what 
 they knew to be false. 
 
 In the third place, it appears, that the 
 Testimony of the first Christians was 
 most sedulously examined. This was in- 
 cessantly done by the Jewish and Roman 
 Magistrates, who earnestly desired to prove 
 that Christianity was a mere delusion ; and 
 if there had indeed been any fraud, it would, 
 most certainly, have been soon detected and 
 brought into disgrace, by the frequent in- 
 stances in which the Christians would have 
 contradicted their own testimony, given at 
 different times, or that of their brethren. 
 But, in fact, the enemies of the Christians 
 found that it was useless to attempt to deny 
 the reality of the miracles wrought by them : 
 all they could do was, either to force them 
 by torture to renounce their faith, or to 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 195 
 
 put them to death. What has been observed 
 concerning the third rule, above mentioned, 
 applies also to the fourth. It may be added 
 that the truth of the Testimony of the 
 first Christians is confirmed by the many 
 thousands of idolaters, — the learned as well 
 as the ignorant, in every part of the Roman 
 Empire, who are known to have become 
 Christians in the first century, while miracles 
 continued to be wrought in all places, daily. 
 The Testimony of the first Christians is also 
 confirmed by what is recorded concerning 
 their numbers, their sufferings, and their 
 constancy, by the heathen historians ; espe- 
 cially by Tacitus, Suetonius and Pliny. 
 
 The sum, of what has been said, there- 
 fore, is this : — 
 
 I. That the Christian Religion, like all 
 the most important concerns of life, requires 
 men to rely upon Testimony. 
 
 II. That the Testimony which supports 
 the Christian Religion is so satisfactorily 
 confirmed, that it cannot be rejected, unless 
 we admit many suppositions which are con- 
 trary to every thing that we know of human 
 nature : whereas, that God should work 
 miracles to establish a holy religion, is not 
 
 k2 
 
196 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 contrary to what we might expect; but per- 
 fectly agreeable to our notions of the Divine 
 power, and goodness. 
 
 This Testimony of the Apostles and first 
 Christians, then, is worthy to be received ; — 
 
 1st. Because, from the nature and ten- 
 dency of their writings, the history of their 
 lives, and the confession of their enemies, it is 
 certain that they were honest and pious men. 
 
 2nd. Because their Testimony brought no 
 worldly advantage to themselves, but, on 
 the contrary, miseries and death. 
 
 3rd. Because the Jewish and Roman 
 Magistrates were unable to detect any con- 
 tradiction, fraud, or delusion, among the 
 thousands of witnesses whom they examined, 
 which they would certainly have done, if real 
 miracles had not been wrought. See Belief. 
 Theory, is distinguished from Practice : it 
 is thinking, not doing. Theory directs 
 Practice. 
 
 The word Theory is often used nearly in 
 the same sense as the word Hypothesis : 
 they may be distinguished thus ; — an Hypo- 
 thesis is a guess or supposition, made con- 
 cerning the cause of some particular fact, 
 with the view of trying experiments, or of 
 making observations to discover the truth. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 197 
 
 A Theory is a complete system of suppo- 
 sitions, put together for the purpose of 
 explaining all the facts that belong to some 
 one Science : For example: — 
 
 Astronomers have suggested many Hypo- 
 theses, in order to account for the luminous 
 stream which follows Comets. They have 
 also formed many Theories of the heavens ; 
 
 , or, in other words, — complete explanations 
 of all the appearances of the heavenly bodies, 
 and their movements. When a Theory has 
 been generally received by men of science, 
 it is called a System ; — as the Ptolomaic 
 System; the Copernican System; the New- 
 tonian System, 
 
 Time, is Duration measured into equal parts. 
 This measurement is made, either by obser- 
 vation of the motions of the heavenly bodies, 
 or by the movement of machines. We learn 
 to think of Duration chiefly, as it is measured; 
 therefore the word Time is more often used 
 than the word Duration. See Duration. 
 Succession. 
 
 Truth, is the agreement, either of words or 
 other signs with the thoughts which they are 
 employed to represent; or it is the agree- 
 ment of notions with the things to which 
 k3 
 
198 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 they belong. The word, Truth, therefore, 
 expresses nothing more than a relation of 
 agreement perceived by the mind. 
 
 The truth of Words or propositions de- 
 pends upon the use of words, or forms of 
 expression in the sense which they will convey 
 to the mind of him with whom we speak. 
 
 With respect to the truth of Notions, an 
 important distinction must be made : some 
 notions may be perfectly true : others can only 
 be imperfectly true : for example; — the notion 
 which we may have of a triangle, and all 
 its properties, may perfectly agree with that 
 mathematical figure. But the notions which 
 we have of the works and operations of 
 nature, or of our own minds, or of other 
 intelligent beings, and especially of the 
 Divine Being, can, at best, be only imper- 
 fectly true ; because we know scarcely more 
 than some few unconnected facts concerning 
 these things. The notion which a child has 
 of the Moon, who supposes that it is fastened 
 in the sky, like a lamp upon a wall, and that 
 it is the size of a plate, is altogether false. 
 An astronomer's notion of the Moon, is 
 true, — but it is imperfectly true : he knows 
 its shape, its size, its distance from the 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 199 
 
 Earth, and the laws of its motions ; but this 
 is not a thousandth part of what he might 
 know if he could he carried thither, and 
 remain there some years. Now the first 
 business of sound instruction is to free the 
 mind from those many false notions which, 
 like weeds, spring" up of themselves ; and 
 then to impart true notions in their stead. 
 The second part of instruction, is to make 
 the mind fully aware of the unavoidable 
 imperfection of the greater part of all our 
 notions. A presumptuous confidence in the 
 truth and sufficiency of our notions, is the 
 greatest hinderance to the acquirement of 
 real knowledge. 
 
 It is not enough to be free from positive 
 errors : we ought to know distinctly where 
 we are ignorant ; or where knowledge ends. 
 This is indispensible, in order that we may 
 be at once, humble, and disposed to receive 
 further information. The most important 
 part of wisdom, in regard to the state of the 
 understanding, consists in this knowledge of 
 our ignorance. It has been from the want 
 of it, that learned men have so often invented 
 the most absurd theories to account for the 
 appearances of nature, rather than modestly 
 k4 
 
200 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 confess their ignorance. And it is also from 
 the want of this sort of wisdom, in matters 
 of Religion, that men, who fancy themselves 
 wise, refuse to learn what God has been 
 pleased to reveal concerning his own nature, 
 or his conduct in governing the world : — 
 pretending to know, without the light of 
 Revelation, what God is, and how he ought 
 to act. They thus prove that they do not 
 know where they are ignorant: — 'professing 
 themselves to be wise, they become fools.' 
 However great may be the powers of their 
 minds, or their acquirements, they are, in this 
 respect, like uneducated persons, whose pre- 
 sumption, in matters of science, is worse than 
 their mere ignorance, and who generally 
 maintain, with the greatest obstinacy, their 
 most absurd errors. The proper state of 
 the mind, therefore, in regard to the truth of 
 its notions consists, — 1st. in not holding false 
 notions, when true notions are attainable ; 
 and 2nd. in knowing distinctly which of our 
 notions are perfectly true, and which are, 
 from the nature of the things to which they 
 relate, only imperfectly true. 
 
 END OF PART II. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 201 
 
 A SUMMARY, 
 
 EXHIBITING THE CONNEXION AND RELATION OF THE TERMS 
 EXPLAINED IN THE PRECEDING VOCABULARY. 
 
 One of the Primary Notions of the Mind, 
 resulting from the property which chiefly dis- 
 tinguishes Mind from Matter is that of Power. 
 
 The notion of Power suggests the corres- 
 pondent notions of Cause, and Effect: and 
 those of Liberty, or Contingency ; opposed 
 to Necessity. The words Active, and 
 Passive, express the state of things to which 
 the notions of Cause and Effect are attributed. 
 
 A change produced in the Mind by Material 
 causes, through the organs of sense, is called 
 Sensation. 
 
 Sensations immediately referred by the Mind 
 to external causes are called Perceptions. 
 
 The object of a Perception, recurring to the 
 Mind without the actual presence of the material 
 cause by which it was first produced, is called 
 an Idea. 
 
 The Mind by attributing its Sensations to 
 external causes, and by regarding its Percep- 
 
202 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 tions as proceeding from a source distinct from 
 the changes which take place within itself, learns 
 to distinguish between Matter, and Mind. 
 
 Matter occasions in the Mind the abstract 
 notions expressed by the words Extension, 
 Divisibility, Figure, Motion, Solidity, 
 (or Resistance, in the different degrees of 
 Hardness, Softness, Fluidity, &c.) 
 
 These are called the Primary qualities of 
 Matter; distinguished from its Secondary 
 qualities, such as Sound, Colour, Taste, 
 Smell, Heat ; &e. 
 
 From considering several different qualities 
 as united in one body, the Mind comes to make 
 the imaginary distinction between Substance, 
 and its Modes, or Affections : or, between 
 the Subject, and its Adjuncts, Attributes, 
 or Accidents. 
 
 And, from the belief that certain qualities 
 are constantly and indissolubly joined together, 
 results the notion of Essence, or Nature. 
 
 The act of the Mind in recalling Ideas is 
 named Conception, 
 
 Ideas are recalled and variously composed 
 by an exercise of Imagination. 
 
 The Imagination, when excited by emotions 
 of pleasure produces Poetical Invention. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 203 
 
 The natural or accidental connexions by 
 which Ideas are linked together in the Mind 
 are termed the Association of Ideas : and 
 these Associations, causing a connected and 
 continued flow of Ideas through the Mind, re- 
 gulate, or indirectly influence Suggestions. 
 
 Ideas occurring along with the notion of a 
 past state of the Mind, are said to be retained 
 by the faculty of Memory. From Memory re- 
 sult the notions of Succession, and Duration, 
 or Time. 
 
 The recollection furnished by Memory of a 
 continued succession of changes in the Mind 
 suggests the reflected notion of self ; called 
 Consciousness : the simple abstract notion of 
 Being or Existence : and the persuasion of 
 Personal Identity. 
 
 The multitude of Ideas which have been de- 
 posited in the Mind tend, without any conscious 
 effort to fall into sorts or parcels, according to 
 the resemblances which exist among them : 
 Thus are formed General Notions. General 
 Notions are marked and fixed by the use of ar- 
 bitrary Signs which are employed as General, 
 or Common Terms. 
 
 From this involuntary formation of General 
 
204 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Notions, and from the use of General Terms, 
 the Mind learns to relieve itself from perplexity 
 and confusion among the multiplicity of its 
 Ideas by Classification; founded upon the 
 observation of resemblances and differences : 
 hence results the sorting of individuals into 
 Genera and Species. 
 
 From the Distinctions upon which such 
 classifications are formed result Definitions. 
 
 These artificial operations are signified by the 
 word Method : which by Disposition, or Divi- 
 sion, and Distribution, produces Order. 
 
 Most Perceptions are multifarious, or com- 
 plex ; presenting distinct qualities, variously 
 combined, in different objects. Hence the Mind 
 is accustomed to regard qualities, either as at- 
 tached to some substance, when they are spoken 
 of as Concrete ; or separately and singly, by 
 an effort of Abstraction. 
 
 Efforts of Abstraction continued in relation 
 to a complex object as long as any differences 
 are perceived, produce an Analysis. This 
 Analysis may be followed by recomposition, 
 or Synthesis. 
 
 From the faculty of Abstraction proceeds 
 Mechanical Invention ; and from the faculty of 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 205 
 
 Abstraction originate most of those differences 
 between Man and inferior Animals which dis- 
 tinguish what is called Reason from Instinct. 
 
 Ideas or Notions combined according to the 
 connexions or relations which actually exist 
 among the objects of them, constitute what is 
 called Knowledge. Such combinations, ex- 
 pressed in words, and formed into Propositions, 
 when compared with the things to which they 
 relate, suggest the relative notion of Truth. 
 
 Knowledge, or the perception of the actual 
 connexions and relations of things, is accom- 
 panied with a pleasurable emotion. When an 
 occasion is presented to the Mind of acquiring 
 Knowledge, this pleasurable emotion produces 
 the state of Mind called Attention. 
 
 The act of the mind in receiving Knowledge 
 at the instant when attention begins is called 
 Intuition. 
 
 When a longer effort of attention is required, 
 in order deliberately to compare objects or 
 notions, so as to perceive the relation or con- 
 nexion between them, the mind is said to 
 exercise Judgement. 
 
 From such comparisons result abstract no- 
 tions of Relation, — as the Relations of 
 
206 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Sameness, or Difference ; of Agreement, or 
 Disagreement ; &c. &c. 
 
 A comparison, when perfected, and ex- 
 pressed in words, is called a Proposition. 
 Propositions are distinguished as Affirmative, 
 or Negative ; Universal, or Particular ; &c. 
 
 A Proposition expressing some relation or 
 connexion perceived by Intuition is called an 
 Axiom. 
 
 A Proposition perceived to result from, or to 
 depend upon some known fact, or some Pro- 
 position already proved, is called an Inference. 
 
 The connexion or relation between two facts 
 exhibited by a series of Inferences, each de- 
 pending upon the one which precedes it, is 
 called Reasoning. 
 
 When the connexion or relation between 
 facts may be known infallibly, the process of 
 Reasoning is called a Demonstration. 
 
 Where the connexion or relation affirmed to 
 exist between two facts can not be fully and 
 infallibly perceived, the Proposition expressing 
 such a connexion is called an Opinion : and the 
 intermediate Propositions by means of which 
 the connexion of the two facts is endeavoured to 
 be proved, are called Arguments; or Reasons. 
 
 Opinions are susceptible of different degrees 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 207 
 
 of Probability; according to the nature and 
 the amount of the Evidence on which they rest. 
 The state of the mind in admitting an opinion 
 diners according" to the estimate made of its 
 probability; and is either Belief, or Doubt. 
 
 When, (owing to the influence of some im- 
 proper motive) Belief is disproportion ed to the 
 evidence which has been adduced, such an 
 opinion is called a Prejudice. 
 
 A Proposition which affirms an apparent, 
 but not a real connexion is a Sophism. 
 
 Uncertain Inferences, deduced from a mere 
 resemblance, where the real connexion of facts 
 is not known, are said to rest upon Analogy. 
 
 The preceding terms belong chiefly to the 
 abstract branches of knowledge. When the 
 qualities and changes of material Substances 
 are the objects of inquiry, a different set of 
 terms is employed. 
 
 The first objects upon which attention is 
 fixed, with the view of acquiring knowledge, 
 are called Facts. Facts are known by Obser- 
 vation, or Testimony. 
 
 Facts from which Inferences are drawn, are 
 called Data : or, a Fact noticed with a view to 
 philosophical inquiry, is called a Phenomenon. 
 
208 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 The collecting of many similar or connected 
 Facts, from which some general Inference is 
 to be drawn, is called Induction. 
 
 The design of such inquiries is to discover, 
 among a multitude of Facts, which are uni- 
 formly consequent, the one upon the other, as 
 Cause and Effect. 
 
 In order to make these connexions of Cause 
 and Effect apparent, and to distinguish them 
 from inconstant or accidental connexions, a 
 supposition or Hypothesis must be made, 
 upon which is founded a trial or Experiment. 
 
 A collection of Hypothesis, relating to the 
 same subject is called a Theory. 
 
 A collection of Facts, sorted into pairs or 
 series of Causes and Effects, after Induction 
 and Experiment, constitutes a Science. 
 
 This knowledge of Causes and Effects, 
 when applied to some practical purpose, is 
 called an Art. 
 
 When the knowledge of Causes and Effects 
 is employed to give a new direction to the 
 operations of Nature, the results are said to 
 be Artificial. 
 
 the end. 
 
 Primed by Meggy and Chalk, Chelmsford. 
 
 NOV -1 \%k 
 
CORRECTIONS. 
 
 Page 9, line 12, read, they afford. 
 
 27, — 4, from the bottom, read, complex notions. 
 
 61, — 12, read, Belles Lettres. 
 
 93, — 2, from the bottom, read, ./Eneid. 
 144, — 11, read, commit injuries. 
 1 /2, last line, read, Upo$. 
 
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