Class Book COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS BY JUSTIN H. SMITH alithor of the troubadours at home, our struggle for the fourteenth colony, Arnold's march from Cambridge to Quebec, etc.; recently professor of modern history in dartmouth college NEW YORK THE BAKER AND TAYLOR CO. 1911 Copyright, 1911 By Justin H. Smith Press of The New Era Printing Company Lancaster. Pa TO THE MEMORY OF DR. GEORGE PIERCE GARRISON AND TO ALL THOSE OTHER SCHOLARS WHOSE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE THROWN LIGHT UPON THE HISTORY OF TEXAS THIS VOLUME IS WITH GREAT RESPECT INSCRIBED PREFACE. The annexation of Texas, it can justly be said, was a very inter- esting, important, complicated and critical afifair. It involved issues and consequences of no little moment in our domestic politics. It gave us an area greater than England and France together, with a jx)rt that ranks very near the head of our list, and paved the way for the acquisition of San Francisco and our far Southwest. It led to our greatest and most brilliant foreign war. It extinguished a nation that might have become a strong and unfriendly rival and might have caused the disruption of the Union. It removed an excellent opportunity for certain leading European powers to inter- pose in the afifairs of this continent and in particular to embarrass the development of the United States. It presented a field of battle on which our diplomats and those of England, France, Mexico and Texas waged a long and intricate struggle with all their skill and with a full determination to succeed ; and it brought these five na- tions to the verge of war. Such an episode would appear to merit a detailed study, especially since very dififerent opinions regarding it still prevail ; and as the author, while gathering data for a history of our ^Mexican War, found many essential materials for a thorough treatment of the subject, he has felt under obligation to complete and present them. As the footnotes indicate, the monograph is based almost ex- clusively (with the exception of certain preliminary matters) on first-hand sources, though all previous works of any importance on the subject have been fully examined. Use has been made of sub- stantially all the diplomatic papers — American, British, French, Mexican and Texan — bearing upon the question, and also, as may be seen by the account of the Sources in the Appendix, a rather large amount of other valuable material both manuscript and printed, such as executive and legislative documents, letters, speeches, diaries and periodicals. All discoverable sources of information, indeed, have been examined. In this way a closer approach to complete- ness has been attainable, and at the same time it has been possible to avoid errors into which a writer depending upon a portion of the data would not infrequently fall without even suspecting danger. VI PREFACE. Secondly, by making a painstaking study of public opinion in the countries chiefly concerned it has been feasible to ascertain the causes which controlled or influenced oflicial action in certain impor- tant cases. Thirdly, attention has been paid to a number of sub- sidiary topics which throw a strong light upon the subject. Such are the British designs with reference to slavery in Texas and the United States, the political condition of northern Mexico at this period, the possibilities before Texas as an independent nation, the danger to the United States involved in her permanent nationality, the scheme of a new confederacy, the status and influence of the annexation issue in the politics of this country, and several others. Fourthly, the desire has been to avoid leaving the matter, as it is easy to do when using first-hand sources, in such a condition that the reader could not see the forest for the trees. And finally a strong and long-continued effort has been made to secure not only complete- ness but accuracy. Of course perfection has not been reached, however, and it is hoped that all mistakes may be pointed out. The truth of history is surely more important than a writer's dream of an impossible inerrancy, and serious criticism, based upon knowledge, is co-operation of a most useful kind. Those who were pleased to commend the style of the author's latest work. Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony, may feel sur- prised that the present volume is so different. It seems to him clear, however, that one's manner of writing should depend on one's subject and object. In the former case his dominant theme was. the early, impulsive stage of a popular revolution in the name of Liberty, and his principal business was to recount the out-door proceedings — often peculiarly dramatic and exciting — of ardent and f reciuently somewhat crude young men ; whereas at present his concern is with diplomats and statesmen pursuing with dignity and deliberation their profoundly studied lines of policy. The earlier book, in order to make the extraordinary facts entirely compre- hensible to minds quite unfamiliar with such a state of things, en- deavored to place its readers in the thick of events and impart in some degree a sense of the agitation and enthusiasm of the time, to which end a vivid and rather highly colored style, answering to the character of the persons and events presented, seemed appro- priate and even necessary ; but now one is occupied with complicated intellectual efforts of a high order, which are best viewed from an PREFACE. Vll elevation and a distance; and these require only to be made known as clearly, calmly and unobtrusively as possible. The footnotes cover all the statements of the text except a few matters of common knowledge, but of course a fact once proved is not proved again. To some readers the number of references will seem unnecessarily great, and so they appear to the author himself. But as almost every foot of the ground is controversial, the per- centage that could safely be omitted is rather small, and the saving would hardly justify the abandonment of a complete and logical system for one of the opposite character. In order not to fill the page with annoying figures, the references — standing in the order of the statements they support — are grouped by paragraphs, and an indication of the bearing of the reference is given when this is not obvious. Naturally in some cases a citation confirms more than a single sentence, and it should be remembered, too, that for reasons of convenience the first page of a document is the one specified unless there is a particular occasion for doing otherwise. To carry such a body of figures with perfect accuracy through the processes of compiling, revising, copying and printing is extremely difficult, especially as the author's attention is liable to be diverted momen- tarily from the mathematics to the meaning of the citation ; but it can be said that unsparing pains have been taken to ensure correct- ness, and that a trained historical worker has gone over the entire work of verification independently. While engaged on this investigation at the Public Record Office, London, the author was so fortunate as to have for neighbor Dr. Ephraim Douglass Adams, the fruit of whose researches, covering to a small extent the same ground as this volume, has recently been offered to the public. As it fell to the present writer in another place to view that monograph, British Interests and Activities in Texas, in the manner which it invited by describing itself as " purely technical," he will only say here — though it does not need to be said — that anything coming from such a source deserves very care- ful attention, and express the hope that all concerned with Texan history will read the l)ook. One cannot help wishing that Professor Adams's investigations had extended to the Texan, Mexican and American archives. Mention must also be made of an interesting and valuable work by Dr. Jesse S. Reeves, entitled American Diplo- macy imder Tyler and Polk, based largely on documents which he as well as the present writer was permitted to examine at the State Vlll PREFACE. Department, Washington. Neither of these volumes, it is proper to add, was read by the author of The Annexation of Texas until after the completion of his Own manuscript. In this place, too, the important investigations conducted by a number of Texan scholars and made known to the public in various learned periodicals, notably the Quarterly of their State Historical Association, are entitled to a grateful and very respectful recognition. Finally the author desires to acknowledge with the highest appre- ciation the indispensable assistance of President Roosevelt. Presi- dent Diaz, Secretary of State Root, Minister of Foreign Relations Mariscal, Senator Lodge, and Ambassadors Reid at London, White at Paris and Clayton at Mexico; and to express a warm sense of obligation to his distinguished friends Dr. J. Franklin Jameson, Mr. Worthington C. Ford and Mr. Gaillard Hunt for aid in his search for documents. To the man}- others who have kindly co-operated in minor yet important ways, particularly by granting permission to examine the MSS. in their custody, his thanks are likewise very cordiallv tendered. J. H. S. Boston, July 26, 191 1. CONTENTS. I. The Beginnings of the Annexation Question ... i II. Texas and Mexico, 1836-1843 34 III. Texas and the United States, 1836-1843 52 IV. Texas and Europe, 1836-1843 76. V. Tyler Desires to Effect Annexation loi VL Tyler Proposes Annexation 116 VII. Foreshadowings of the Annexation Struggle .... 130 VIII. The Annexation Treaty is Negotiated 147 IX. The Annexation Issue is Placed before the Country 180 X. The Administration Changes Front 194 XI. The Negotiations are Made Public 221 XII. The Annexation Question is Thrown into Politics 234 XIII. The Fate of the Treaty 258 XIV. The Issue is Re-shaped 281 XV. The Annexation Question in the Presidential Campaign 297 XVI. Annexation is Offered to Texas 322 XVII. The Attitude of Rejected Texas 356 XVIII. The Policy of England and France in Reference to the Annexation of Texas 382 XIX. The Annexation Question before Mexico 414 XX. The Crisis 432 XXI. Annexation is Consummated 462 IX THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS I. The Beginnings of the Annexation Question First of all, in approaching our difficult subject, it will be useful to refresh the memory regarding certain main facts of Mexican history. The outbreak of the revolt against Spain took place in 1810; and in September, 1821, Iturbide, the brilliant leader of the revolutionary forces, entered the capital in triumph. Eight months later, after much political wrangling, he was proclaimed Emperor by some of his troops, and this usurpation was grudgingly, but of necessity, ratified by the Constituent Congress then in session. Before long, however, a military officer at Vera Cruz named Santa Anna, who had fallen out with Iturbide and understood how much hostility against the Emperor there was, revolted in favor of a republican system ; and, as the insurrection proved successful, Itur- bide soon resigned the throne and left the country. In October, 1824, a federal constitution, based in a considerable measure upon that of the United States, was proclaimed; and Victoria, elected President under this organic law, served his term without inter- ruption.^ ' General Note, — The text is based mainly on diplomatic correspondence, and when nothing to the contrary is indicated in the footnotes, it may be understood that a despatch to a minister or consul proceeded from the foreign affairs depart- ment of his government, and that a despatch from such an official was addressed to that department. Thus "To Butler, Sept. 28, 1833," means a despatch from the American department of State to Butler, and " Butler, Jan. 10, 1832," means a despatch from him to the department. Also, if nothing to the contrary is indi- cated, it may be assumed that the documents are to be found as follows : Amer- ican despatches in the archives of the State department at Washington ; British at the Public Record Office, London, in the Foreign Office volumes ; Mexican in the archives of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City ; and Texan in two volumes entitled Texan Diplomatic Correspondence published by the Amer- ican Historical Association. The French archives for the annexation period are not accessible ; but all the essential documents have, it is believed, been discovered. Some were printed in French periodicals ; some exist in the American or Mexican archives ; and since England and France co-operated in the Texas affair, a much larger number are filed in the British records. As a rule the printed version of a document is cited, if it has been published in full and with substantial accuracy ; and in these cases the reader is of course informed where to look for it. In a few cases, it will be seen, no numbers are attached to despatches, but any one who looks up the references given will easily find them. 2 I 2 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS In 1828 Pedraza was chosen in his place, but a revolution forced Congress to annul the election and give the office of chief magistrate to the popular soldier, Guerrero. During the summer of 1829 a Spanish expedition, designed to bring Mexico back to her allegiance, landed on the coast, but from a variety of causes, among which was incompetence and perhaps was treachery, finally surrendered ; and Santa Anna, the Mexican leader, became a popular hero. In the following December Bustamante, though he occupied the second place in the government, organized a revolution; and Guerrero, after a brief struggle, took flight, was treacherously captured and was shot. Three years later an uprising engineered by Santa Anna overthrew Bustamante in turn, and the victor was soon afterwards elected President. Before long he nullified acts of Congress, forbade that body to assemble, changed State and city administrations at his will, and sanctioned a revolutionary Plan that pointed to him as the one The American Secretaries of State principally concerned were Forsyth, Webster, Upshur, Calhoun and Buchanan. The American ministers most frequently men- tioned were Everett at London, King and Martin (charge) at Paris, Ellis, Thomp- son and Green (charge) at Mexico, and in Texas the charges La Branche, Eve, Murphy, Howard and Donelson. The British foreign minister chiefly concerned was Lord Aberdeen ; and the principal British representatives abroad were Cowley at Paris, Fox and then Pakenham at Washington, Pakenham and then Bankhead (and Doyle, charge) at Mexico, and Elliot and Kennedy (consul) in Texas. The leading Mexican Ministers of Foreign Relations during the period were Bocanegra, Rejon and Cuevas ; and the principal representatives abroad, Almonte at Washing- ton, Arrangoiz (consul) at New Orleans, Murphy at London and Garro at Paris. The Texan Secretaries of State requiring mention here were Jones, Ashbel Smith and Allen ; and the chief representatives in foreign parts Reily, Van Zandt, Hender- son and Raymond (charge) at Washington, and Henderson, Ashbel Smith and Terrell in England and France. The French minister of foreign affairs was Guizot ; and the most important foreign representatives in the field of this history were Sainte Aulaire at London, Pageot at Washington, Cyprey at Mexico, and Saligny in Texas. In the case of all officials not named above, the needed indi- cations are given in the footnotes. To avoid marring the text with innumerable figures, the references, standing in the order of the statements they support, are grouped by paragraphs, and when it has seemed necessary, a catch-word has been introduced to indicate the bearing of the citation. As a rule a document is cited only once, even though used more than once, in the notes of a paragraph, but if used in the next paragraph it is again cited. The following abbreviations, besides a few that require no explanation, have been used in the footnotes: Adv., Advertiser; arch., archives; Bank., Bankhead ; Buch., Buchanan; Bull., Bulletin; Com., Commercial; conf., confidential; con., consular; Const., Constitutionnel ; corn, correspondence ; Crit., Crittenden ; Debats, Journal des Debats; desp., despatch; Diario, Diario del Gobierno Mexicano ; dipl., diplomatic; Don., Donelson; Enq., Enquirer; F. O., Foreign Office (British); Hend., Henderson ; Intell., Intelligencer ; Journ., Journal; leg., legation; Lib., Liberator; Madis., Madisonian ; Memor., Memoranda; min., minister; Nat., National; Niles, Niles' Register; Pap., Papers; Penn., Pennsylvanian; Pub. Rec. Off., Public Record Office; Relac, Relaciones ; Remin., Reminiscences ; Repub., Republican; res., reservada ; Spect., Spectator; Sria., Secretaria ; Van B., Van Buren ; Van Z., Van Zandt. In the List of Sources will be found full titles, dates of editions, etc., of the publications cited. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 3 source of authority. In effect he thus became dictator; and a new Congress, elected under these auspices, was ready of course to accept his acts. A centraHzed form of government was now adopted in place of the federal system, and in October, 1835, the State legislatures were replaced with Departmental councils.- April 28, 1836, Spain acknowledged the independence of Mexico. The following year, Santa Anna having been defeated and cap- tured by the Texans, Bustamante came again to the head of afifairs ; but at one time a revolt at the capital — finally quelled — succeeded in taking possession of the palace and making him a prisoner. The French war of 1838 cost Santa Anna a leg but made him once more the idol of the nation; and in 1841 a fresh revolution gave him a virtual dictatorship. It was proposed, however, to draw up a legal constitution later, and the following year a Congress met for this purpose ; but it was forcibly dissolved. Early in 1844 Santa Anna exchanged his dictatorship for a constitutional presidency, but in December, having exhausted the patience of the nation, he was overthrown by a truly popular outbreak and Herrera succeeded him. A closer examination of the history would show many instances "in which, no less truly than by force of arms, the constitution and the laws were nullified in high official action ; but this bare cata- logue of essential facts is enough to prove that in reality that interest- ing but " unfortunate " country, as its public men of all shades con- curred for many years in styling it, possessed at this time neither law nor constitution, and that its government was conducted in a manner to which no American could possibly have felt reconciled. Next in order comes naturally a recapitulation of the principal incidents of early .Texan history. This brings us at once to the cauldron of anti-slavery agitation ; and, in order to understand the subject, we must endeavor to realize the two points of view in that controversy. In both cases this is done with difficulty. On the one side it shocks us to find men of intellect and station laboring de- liberately in the cause of human slavery, and many of us can hardly view anything done by them without a sense of distrust. We are ourselves, however, in somewhat the same situation as were they. Our competitive social system admittedly inflicts much sufifering and many wrongs, while it rewards with honors and wealth not a few who rank low if judged by the moral and intellectual standards we - So much of the early part of this chapter concerns matters of common knowl- edge that few references are needed. (Overthrow of the constitution, etc.) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 143 ; Yoakum, Texas, i., 366 ; Mexico a traves, iv., 340-345- 4 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS profess to believe in. With more or less justice pictures of life about us rivalling in blackness any from Uncle Tom's Cabin can be drawn, and the victims are often of a far more sensitive quality than were the slaves. Yet we do nothing about the matter, disclaiming responsibility for a regime thrust upon us, and honestly believing that its destruction would do vastly more harm than good. Just so the slaveholder defended himself; and in addition he pointed to the recognition of his system, not only by thinkers like Plato, but by the New Testament and the American constitution, his loftiest standards of moral and political wisdom. Doubtless we can detect the fallacies in his argument, but there are persons who ofifer to do as much for ours; and this thought may reasonably help us to view with some charity the Southern practices of a former day. On the other side, we are staggered to find men of pure char- acter and noble aims asserting mere suspicions as positive facts, trampling rough-shod on the dearest sentiments and interests of fellow-countrymen, exerting their utmost efforts to discredit their lawful rulers, and in some cases espousing the side of any nation that seemed ready to attack their own. But here again harsh criticism would of course be an error. These individuals, looking at things with the singleness of vision common among reformers, viewed slavery with such horror that upholders of it appeared to them capable of almost any crime. As many inner facts of our politics and diplomacy could not at the time be fully revealed, they were very much in the dark. It therefore seemed entirely justifiable to place the worst construction upon all mysterious doings of the other party, and quite proper to secure the aid of their sleepy neigh- bors by shouting " Fire ! " at the first sign of a spark. In particular, they believed that the annexation of Texas meant the infernal con- secration of the United States to a blood-stained and ruinous career of aggression in the interest of slavery. Dr. William E. Channing, a noted clergyman of Boston, said, " Our Eagle will whet, not gorge, his appetite on his first victim, and will snuff a more tempting quarry, more alluring food, in every new region which opens south- ward " ; John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary : " The annexation of Texas to this Union is the first step to the conquest of all Mexico, of the West Indies, of a maritime, colonizing, slave-tainted mon- archy, and of extinguished freedom " ; and one can hardly be surprised that in such a mood patriots and philanthropists could not wait for the slow investigation and careful balancing of facts, even THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 5 SO far as the evidence was at that time accessible. For us, how- ever, the institution of slavery is neither an interest to be defended nor an outrage to be denounced, but merely a bygone state of things, through which — as through many another unfortunate con- dition of society — the evolution of the human race has carried it ; and we can therefore devote ourselves to an investigation of our subject with no prejudice except in favor of historic truth.^ Near the close of the seventeenth century, a Canadian seigneur named La Salle planted a colony on the Texas coast near the mouth of the Colorado river; and this achievement gave France a claim to a broad but vaguely defined region in that quarter, included under the name Louisiana. The United States asserted for many years that the title extended to the next large stream, the Rio Grande, and there are indications that France held the same view. Here, however, it need only be said that in such cases the right from discovery has a wide yet not unlimited reach, and that the claims of the United States are now generally regarded as too broad. In 1763 Louisiana was transferred to Spain, in 1801 was retroceded, and finally in 1803 was purchased by the United States. Article IIL of the treaty by which we secured it read as follows : " The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible accord- ing to the principles of the Federal Constitution to the enjoymtnt of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States. ..." Texas, however, had been and continued to be under Spanish jurisdiction; and it shared to some extent in the Mexican revolution.* In 1819 the United States surrendered, as part of the considera- tion for Florida, whatever territory we possessed beyond the Sabine, the language of the treaty being as follows : " The United States hereby cede to His Catholic Majesty, and renounce forever, all their rights, claims, and pretensions to the Territories lying West and South of the above described Line ; and, in like manner, His Catholic Majesty cedes to the said United States all his rights, claims, and pretensions, to any Territories, East and North of the said Line, ' (Channing) Jay, Mexican War, io6. Adams, Memoirs, xii., 49. It is rather curious to note that the denunciations of the annexation project uttered by eloquent men like Channing and Adams continue to exert their influence, both directly and by reflection in the works of other writers, although time has shown how far astray were the apprehensions upon which they were based. * (La Salle) Garrison, Texas, 21. (Claim based upon La Salle's expedition) Winsor, America, vii., 551. Treaties in Force, 176. Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 4, 17. 6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS and for himself, his heirs, and successors, renounces all claim to the said Territories forever."^ Now there appears at once to be something wrong here. This language implies that the United States had extended west of the Sabine, and if they had, the territory owned there was a part of Louisiana ; so that, as we had promised to admit to the Union all the inhabitants of Louisiana, we had no right to make the cession of 1819. In reply, it has been argued that in reality no cession took place ; that such phaseology was employed to make it look as if Spain were getting something in that quarter and so reconcile her to the surrender of Florida. But in fact she seems to have admitted that we had a valid claim to territory beyond the Sabine, so that a real surrender of ownership would appear to have taken place on the part of the United States." At any rate, these two treaties gave rise later to certain views which were so interwoven with the issue of annexation that it is well to explain them on the threshold. The wording of 1819 seemed to many a proof, confirmed by the arguments put forth on our part in the preceding discussions with Spain, that Texas had formerly belonged to the United States ; and the point that at most Spain conceded our claim to but a part of the region covered by that name was easily overlooked. Hence arose the term " re- annexation," which became very popular with the advocates of the measure, because it seemed to imply that were Texas acquired, we should only be recovering our own, and also because it appeared to ease the constitutional difficulty of introducing a foreign state into the LTnion. The additional fact that Spain was probably willing in 1819 to let us have certain territory beyond the Sabine made men feel that the United States had somehow been defrauded ; and the evidence, including a letter from President Monroe himself, that so great a sacrifice was deliberately made to please New England, naturally intensified this feeling in the Southwest. Further it was often argued that since the L'nited States were bound to admit the people of Louisiana to the L'nion, the cession of 1819 was void, and Texas (all of it, so men assumed) continued to be ours. If this was the correct view, the revolution of 1836 was an insurrection against the United States, which our government could not possibly ^ Treaties in Force. 594. ' Onis, the Spanish representative, claimed credit for having obtained a more valuable territory in exchange for Florida : Woodbury, Works, i., 362 ; Onis. Memoria. 1820. (See also For-um. July, 1901, p. 537.) THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 7 recognize ; but no one observed this. Moreover, if the treaty was invalid, Florida still belonged to Spain ; but nobody thought of returning Florida, and in fact that could not be done. Technically, then, a wrong had perhaps been inflicted upon a very small number of persons residing in northeastern Texas ; but far more harm would have been caused by upsetting the treaty of 1819, and the only practicable course was to abide by that agreement. The United States, therefore, could no longer assert the slightest claim to any territory beyond the Sabine.'^ To complicate matters, however, certain Americans who had crept into Texas and remained there unmolested, rebelled soon after this treaty was made, because — as they alleged — their expecta- tion of being incorporated in the United States had been frustrated by the agreement with Spain, and the only resource left them was to become independent. It is by no means clear that such newcomers could fairly appeal to the promise of 1803, but it was easy and perhaps natural to describe their action as a protest on the part of Texas against the cession to Spain ; and thus was reinforced con- siderably the feeling that the territory still belonged of right to the United States. Another view also grew out of these facts. It was held by some that, as the United States did not admit Texas to the Union yet possessed no power to surrender it, the region became dc facto independent, simply because no nation could maintain a claim to it. In reality this and all the other theories are to be brushed aside. Texas belonged to Spain ; it recognized the Spanish government; and the application of Moses Austin for permission to plant a colony there was made to and granted by the Spanish author- ities. Yet it is useful to see how easily many honest and fairly intelligent men could lose themselves, especially when influenced by feeling, in these convenient and somewhat plausible ideas.* As Mexico succeeded to the authority of Spain, Texas became inevitably Mexican, and this connection was further proved by her sharing in the rebellion against the mother covmtry and by her send- ing a representative to the Constituent Congress of 1824. When the federal constitution was adopted, not having enough population to stand by herself, she was made a part of the compound State Coahuila-Texas (Coahuila y Tejas), with a distinct intimation that later she was to be given a constitution of her own. Now all the 'Monroe to Jefferson, May, 1820: Wash. Globe. Feb. 17, 1845 (see also Madis., April 15, 1844). ' Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 47, 48, 60. 8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS States of the confederation, Coahuila-Texas like the rest, were termed sovereign and independent; and hence it came to be urged sometimes in discussing annexation that Texas, even under Mexican rule, was really independent. This view, however, arose from a misconception. During the rule of Spain these States — such of them as had at that time a distinct existence and a name — were merely provinces, with no pretensions to mutual independence. Their position was, therefore, very different from that of the British-American colonies. But when the federal constitution was drawn up, it became necessary to assume that there were separate political entities to combine, for otherwise a confederation was im- possible, and hence they were called forth into a theoretical exist- ence. In reality the States, despite their high-sounding titles, were still neither sovereign nor independent. Some of them, notably Yucatan, undertook to apply the theory under the form of seces- sion ; but such a step was the signal for war. In a word, then, Texas, while she remained a part of Mexico, had no real title to sovereignty ; and this was the more true because she was not an actual but only a prospective State. ^ In 1825 President Adams and Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, undertook to acquire the whole or a large part of Texas by negotiation with Mexico, and the desire of our government to obtain the territory was enough to cause alarm. Moreover Ward, the British representative at Mexico, now began to warn the authorities against the danger of permitting Americans to settle beyond the Sabine; and Tornel, one of the most active and ingenious of the Mexican public men and peculiarly unfriendly toward the United States, who was now a Deputy in Congress and private secretary of the President, may safely be presumed to have supported that view. The following year a small rebellion of American settlers took place in Texas, as a result of the arbitrary and illegal action of the authorities, and this was distinctly ominous. Orders were therefore issued in 1827 and 1828 for the purpose of preventing or hindering 'Yoakum, Texas, i., 301, note. (Const. Cong.) Sedgwick, Thoughts, 5, note. (Intimation) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 131. (Urged) Richardson, Messages, iv., 479 ; Woodbury, Works, i., 363. The character of local popular sovereignty in Mexico is illustrated by the constitution of Coahuila-Texas, which after declaring that the political sovereignty resided in the people added: "but they shall not of themselves exercise any other acts of sovereignty than those indicated in this con- stitution, and in the form which it prescribes" (Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 85). See Mayer, War between Mexico and the U. S., 2-}. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 9 the immigration of our citizens, but the execution of them was not at all efficient. ^° Up to the year 1829 negro slavery existed in Mexico. It was not prevalent, however, for a more profitable system occupied the ground. The Indians were kept in a state of virtual serfdom known as peonage, which was about as convenient and did not require the master to care for his laborers in sickness and old age. In Texas, on the other hand, this resource was not available. Consequently, since proprietors could not develop large estates without assistance and the free helpers were naturally few, the country could have been improved but very tardily without slaves. Besides, most of the settlers came from the southern States, and were accustomed to no other kind of labor. For these reasons slavery was carried into Texas. President Guerrero, emphatically a scion of the common people, appears to have thought that a decree of emancipation would be an easy device to please the masses, win glory abroad, gratify his own liberal instincts, and prevent or greatly discourage the immigration of Americans into Texas. As he felt somewhat com- promised by his intimacy with the American minister, Tornel prob- ably urged that he could silence in this way the tongue of calumny, and possibly still other considerations pointed in the same direction. In 1829, therefore, in accordance with a policy initiated five years before, the abolition of slavery was proclaimed. North of the Rio Grande, however, this measure excited strong opposition. Stephen F. Austin, the political chief of the Department and the Governor of the State, all protested ; and after a time the Texans were ex- empted from the efifects of the edict.^^ In 1829 Jackson and his Secretary of State, Van Buren, undertook to purchase Texas, and the efifort was continued for several years with great secrecy. Very naturally this renewed attempt to obtain the territory excited fresh apprehensions ; and early in 1830 Alaman, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, took hold of the situa- tion somewhat vigorously. In consequence of his initiative, a decree was enacted in April forbidding entrance from the north without a Mexican passport, forbidding the introduction of slaves, and prac- ' ^'Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 88. Ward to F. O., Sept. 22, 1825: F. O., Mexico, xiv. (Tornel) Pak., No. 6, May 7, 1827. (Rebellion, orders) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 103-110, 113. See also Tornel, Reseiia, 85. "Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 90-92. Poinsett's reports, passim: State Dept. Garrison, Texas, 158, 172, 173. Niles, xxxviii., 291. Frederic Leclerc (Revue des Deux Mondes, April 15, 1840, p. 220) said that Guerrero's decree " certainly broke one of the conditions " which had drawrr the Americans to Texas. 10 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS tically forbidding — so far as valid outstanding contracts permitted — all American colonization in Texas. It was also resolved to send up convicts with a view to their becoming residents at the end of their term ; and still other measures were decided upon in the hope of confirming the grip of Mexico upon that region. General Teran was despatched with troops to enforce the law; military posts were established ; and garrisons, chiefly composed of felons, occupied them. Some recently arrived immigrants were expelled ; some intending settlers were stopped at the border ; and only three colonies were permitted from that time on to receive Americans.^- The term of years during which various articles needed by the colonists could be imported free of duty had just expired, and the customs were now collected in a tyrannical manner. Indeed Teran interfered arbitrarily in civil affairs, and the soldiery perpetrated many outrages. To render the situation even worse the State, in which Texas formed only one of several Departments, was entirely governed by the Mexican element. In various ways Texan interests, being very different from those of Coahuila, were sacrificed to gratify the majority; and in 1832 the legislature passed a law em- bodying the harsh spirit of the national decree of 1830. On all these grounds the settlers felt discontented, and at times they ex- pressed their dissatisfaction in ways that were violent and illegal. This was undoubtedly wrong; but in a country where the supreme law was the law of strength, it would have been astonishing indeed had the bold, enterprising Americans been always tame and punctil- ious. The greater fault was undoubtedly that of Mexico, which had suddenly changed a policy of neglect into one of outrage and oppression. ^^ Santa Anna, probably in order to keep the Texans quiet while he was establishing his autocratic power, showed a conciliatory spirit, however ; and some influential Mexicans favored the adoption of a liberal policy towards the settlers, because — as the British minister reported — they owned large grants which they desired an opportunity to sell at a good price. In 1833 the prohibition against '* According to J. Q. Adams (Memoirs, ix., 377). Forsyth told him that no proposition to purchase Texas was ever made by the U. S. ; but the Mexican gov- ernment must have known what we had in view. Butler to Jackson, July 28, 1843 : Jackson Pap. Alaman, Mexico, v., 663. Garrison, Texas, 170, 173-174. The exemption of the Texans from Indian attacks, really due to their prowess, excited suspicion in Mexico: Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 90. (Felons) Visit to Texas, 112; Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 115. "Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 114-116, 118, 132 ct scq. Garrison, Texas, 176 et seq. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION II the entry of Americans was repealed, and the State authorities were urged to deal more fairly with the minority. At one time Austin, who visited the city of Mexico that year as delegate to obtain a separate organization for Texas, felt hopeful regarding the inten- tions of the national government ; while on the other hand he and other Texans assured the British minister that on general principles — though determined to have no more Mexican troops among them and to maintain the titles of those Americans who had come into the country since the passage of the prohibitory law — the settlers had no desire to assert their independence.^"* But after a time Santa Anna's purposes ripened, and the federal system was doomed. The great State of Zacatecas, which dared to oppose him, was brutally crushed. Coahuila-Texas also claimed the rights given by the old constitution ; and in consequence of this attitude her lawful authorities were deposed, members of the legislature who remained within reach were arrested and banished, and a new Governor was appointed. The feeling in other parts of Mexico as well, against the destruction of the organic law, was strong. The State of Tamaulipas in particular would no doubt have been glad to resist, as may easily be inferred from the later conduct of the people ; but a considerable force of Mexican troops, main- tained at Matamoros, overawed it. Federalist leaders and Federalist manifiestos commonly spoke of annexation to the United States as preferable to an acceptance of Santa Anna's tyrannical rule ; and even in the dictator's own State the change of system produced an outbreak. To expect the American settlers to accept it willingly would have been absurd. Not only was the overthrow of the liberal regime by a military chieftain every way ominous, but one of the new laws justified the worst anticipations. It was decreed that the militia should be reduced to one man for every five hundred of the population, and that all citizens not enrolled in it must surrender their arms. Obedience to this order would have left the colonists almost helpless against the outrages of Mexico's convict soldiery and the bloody forays of the Indians. Under the circumstances their acceptance of such a decree was practically unthinkable.^^ At first the advocates of resistance in Texas, though clamorous, "Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 137. Pak., No. 60, Oct. 5, 1833. In 1833 the Texan " Consultation " voted by more than two to one for the constitution of 1824 in preference to independence. "Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 153, 152, 155. (At Matamoros) Crawford to F. O., April 4, 1837: F. O., Mexico, cvi. Pak., No. 47, July 26, 1834; No. 95, Dec. 21, 1836. (Militia, etc.) Mexico a traves, iv., 353, 340-345. 12 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS were but few, while a party equally determined, which sided with the mother-country, opposed them, and the mass of the population desired to stand aloof from all political troubles. No doubt the American settlers had little sympathy with the Mexicans — particularly the kind of Mexicans near them — and felt drawn toward their kindred in the United States. It seems very possible, indeed, that many and perhaps most of them looked forward to an eventual reunion with their native country as desirable. In talking with Butler, the American repre- sentative at Mexico, Austin was naturally more frank than in con- versation with the British minister ; and Butler reported him as saying that all anticipated a separation from Mexico at some future day. A common view appears to have been that a permanent union between races differing so radically was impossible, and that in time, when the American element had become strong, secession could be effected with little or no bloodshed. But this condition of things had not yet arrived. General Wavell, an Englishman in the service of Mexico, visited Texas in 1832, and he became satisfied that the principal settlers did not wish to sever their connection with the metropolis. Morfit, sent down by the American State department in 1836 to investigate the situation, reported that since they had declared their independence the feelings of the Texans had " entirely changed," and they had now come to " look for no affiliation but with the United States," which implies that previously their senti- ment had been favorable to a continuance of Mexican rule. In 1835 the Texans pledged themselves most solemnly to support the old constitution, and the Declaration of Independence that soon followed might no doubt have been prevented by taking them at their word. In fact, the immortal heroes of the Alamo died under the Mexican flag, fighting for the organic law of 1824. Whatever, then, were the dreams of many settlers and even the purposes of a few, some of whom may have crossed the Sabine with the deliberate aim of endeavoring to bring their new home under their old flag, it seems clear that an overwhelming majority of the people had no desire for the breach that actually occurred. ^'^ '" An examination of the documents relating to the Texan revolution appears to show that the people had no predetermined aim in view and slowly felt their way (So. Hist. Soc. Assoc, vii., viii.). (Three parties) So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v., 451. Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 155. Butler to Jackson, Oct. 2, 1833: Jackson Pap. (View) Foote, Texas, ii., 10. Yoakum, Texas, i., 312. Wavell, Memoir: F. O., Texas, xi. Morfit to Forsyth, No. 7, Sept. 6, 1836: State Dept., Desps. from Mins.. Texas, i. (1835) Garrison, Texas, 196, 197. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION I3 But, as was almost unavoidable, the friction increased. The course of things was somewhat like that in the American colonies during the years preceding our revolution, but here the mutual dis- trust was aggravated by profound differences of race, ideas and customs. As Frederic Leclerc explained in the Revue des Deux Mondes, " The most hostile acts and the most compromising deci- sions, sometimes not intended on either side but resulting inevitably from the situation, followed one another, blow for blow." More and more of the Texans joined in the opposition to the new regime. More and more it became evident that no support in the stand for the old constitution could be expected from other parts of the country. And finally, when it became known that Santa Anna's bloody troops were coming from Zacatecas and that orders had been issued to seize the leaders of the Texan opposition, it was felt that nothing remained save a choice between destruction and resistance. March 2, 1836, the settlers therefore declared themselves independent; and their catalogue of grievances, though naturally marred by exaggera- tions, gives reasons enough for the step. Morfit wrote to the American Executive as follows: "The question is then asked by the Texans : is a nation, which is incapable of protecting any form of government from overthrow by a few military leaders, entitled to hold the peaceable citizens of a distant part of her country forever subject to all the evils of anarchy?" Naturally Morfit saw things largely through the eyes of the Americans about him, but he was a man of judgment and evidently counseled mainly or altogether with the old, responsible and quiet colonists. An article in the Edinburgh Reznew spoke in these terms: "To this new home they [the Ameri- cans of Texas] had wedded themselves for better and for worse; and though it was their duty to submit to the laws of their adopted country, and to bow to the will of the majority, soberly expressed by its constitutional organs, no law of God or man ever bade free and intelligent men to obey every power that might spring from civil war, or submit to every successful violation of the law and the constitution." From such an opinion few Americans will dissent. The revolt of Texas, then, was not so much revolution as resistance to revolution.^" ^'' Revne des Deux Mondes, April 15, 1840, p. 222,. It is worth noting that the No. Amer. Review (July, 1836, p. 250) pronounced it " a matter of amaze- ment " that the Texans did not prepare for the contest with Mexico, and so it must appear if we believe they deliberately planned to revolt at this time. (Choice) Garrison, Texas, 190-191 ; So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v., 469. Morfit to Forsyth^ Aug. 22 \ Sept. 14, 1836: Ex. Doc. 35, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 6, 28. Edinb. Rev., April, 1841. 14 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS This brief sketch of the circumstances leading up to that move- ment is perhaps enough for the present purpose ; but in order that our view of the whole subject of annexation may be freed from certain traditional misconceptions, it seems desirable to consider the subject a little further. Many Americans denounced the revolution bitterly; and Dr. Channing, evidently moved by an intense detesta- tion of slavery, addressed an open letter on the subject to Henry Clay, which — as it exerted a wonderful influence in the United States, Europe and Mexico and still echoes in current books and in public sentiment — is entitled to particular attention. Channing denounced the Texan revolt as positively criminal. He said that the colonists had agreed to conform to the religious and civil institutions of Mexico and knew what the regime was likely to be; that had they submitted in good faith to the laws, it was a fair question whether they would have suffered at all from Mexican rule ; that in swearing allegiance to the nation they promised to take their chances ; that in so unsettled a state of society there could not have been such a fixed purpose in the mind of the government to spoil them of their rights as to justify a violation of their allegiance; that the change from the federal system was sanctioned by the people ; that in fact the experience of Mexico had shown the need of adopting a centralized regime; that the Texans, like the inhabi- tants of a Massachusetts county, were too few to set themselves up as a nation ; and that the baselessness of the revolution was indicated by the course of the older and wealthier settlers, who opposed it.^^ Every one of these opinions, however, in the light of the evidence now within reach can be seen to be incorrect. While the newcomers agreed to accept the institutions of Mexico, they did not promise to welcome violations of the law and the destruction of the constitu- tion. They could not have known what the regime was to be, for Channing's letter shows that he — a man of superior intelligence who had studied the subject — possessed a very inadequate conception of the reality. Submission to the laws did not save the Mexicans them- selves from being plundered, outraged and oppressed by their rulers. No heir of the American revolution can hold that the duty of allegiance requires freemen to accept blindly the will of those in power as mere baggage takes the chances of its conveyance. A settled purpose did certainly exist in Santa Anna's mind to rob the citizens of their political rights and to a greater or less extent of "Channing, Works, ii., 183. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 1 5 their property ; a plan was legally adopted to reduce Texas to that worst of conditions, the status of a penal colony ; and most of the soldiers sent there to overawe the people were wretches not only able but sure to perpetrate outrages upon them. Sound evidence — for example the testimony of the British minister at Mexico — proves clearly enough that the overthrow of the federal system was due, not to the choice of the nation, but to the machinations of Santa Anna. The centralized regime was not, as Channing argued, better adapted to the requirements of the situation, and it lasted but a short while. Texas was far indeed from being, like a Massachusetts county, an integral part of an orderly and efficient political system. Its history shows that it was not too weak to declare its independence ; and noth- ing is proved regarding the merits of the case by the fact that many of the older and wealthier citizens, like not a few Americans of that class in 1775, leaned to the conservative side.^^ After thus clearing the grovmd, as he supposed, Channing went on to explain what in his opinion really caused the Texan revolt : to wit, a land speculation. Grantees (emprcsarios) , he said, or the companies to which their titles were transferred, sold in the United States great amounts of illegal scrip said to be exchangeable for lands ; more scrip was issued upon lands fraudulently granted ; still other titles were manufactured with no basis whatever; and so a great number of persons held claims which could only be made good through the separation of Texas from Mexico. In this representa- tion an element of truth certainly existed, and it is likely enough that some of the grantees and some of the settlers were consciously dishonest in the business ; but this is very far from covering the whole ground. It seems highly improbable that large numbers of poor men expended money for titles which they knew to be worth- less. Had it been their intention to occupy lands to which they had no right and then make their holdings good by overturning the government, they would not have cared to buy titles. It would therefore appear likely that the purchasers of defective claims, to whom Channing attributed the revolt, bought in good faith, and discovered the fraud perpetrated upon them only after they reached the distant plains of Texas. Indeed we read as follows in a book written by one of these unfortunates : " I had some conversation with Mr. Austin [at Brazoria, Texas] on the purchase of land I ^° (Penal colony) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 113-115; Wooten, Texas, i., 808. (Troops) Garrison, Texas, 174. Pak., No. 4, June 25, 1835. The general desire of the Mexicans was to have the federal system amended, not destroyed. I6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS had made at New York. ... he regarded the certificate I held, and the scrip which it represented, as of no value whatever." Before long this immigrant discovered that " numbers had already come out to Texas under impressions [regarding their titles] as erroneous as " his own. Yet he and probably they, on account of the difficulty, expense and mortification of going home, remained still in the country.-'* How stood the case then? Mexico had little ground for com- plaint. She had eagerly desired colonists. As late as 1845 -^^ Sigh XIX., the most intelligent of her journals, remarked, " One of the great needs of this country ... is no doubt the colonization of her vast uncultivated areas (baldios)" ; and this was peculiarly true of the northern parts, where fierce Indians harried the border unceasingly. Recognizing her need, Mexico had passed an inviting law to bring colonists in, and here were now the most efficient of settlers. Contrary to her intention they were mostly non-Catholic, to be sure ; but their religious quality, which was by no means a striking characteristic, signified little in comparison with the racial and political dififerences to which she had felt reconciled, and the technical defects of their titles did not impair their muscle or their brain. Moreover their coming with such papers was largely the fault of Mexico herself. Long before Teran crossed the Rio Grande the government should have exposed the frauds effectually. Had this been done, the American newspapers would have pub- lished the facts, and people would have investigated the properties offered them. The many honest immigrants with bad titles had, therefore, a substantial grievance against Mexico, reinforced by the maladministration of public affairs in Texas, while her complaint against them was only technical, and was more than offset by their ^" Contractor" would be in one respect a more accurate term than "grantee." for there was an obligation to introduce colonists. Visit to Texas, 26, 45, 46. See also No. Amer. Rev., July, 1836, p. 245. Since the text was written, the author has read an excellent article on the land speculations by Dr. E. C. Barker (Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly., x., 76), which brings out among other points the follow- ing: I, Certain speculators in land, who went to Mexico, "had a keener sense of the danger " from Santa Anna's plan of Centralism than their stay-at-home neigh- bors, and hence sounded an alarm ; 2, while that promoted agitation it seriously hindered the revolutionary movement, since many looked upon this as a speculators' plan; 3, the wastefulness of the Mexican authorities in granting lands disgusted many Texans and thus had some, but not much, effect in bringing on the crisis ; 4, there is no evidence to support the charge that interest in land speculations was the motive which brought a large number of Americans to the aid of Texas. Ref- erence should also be made to a pamphlet by G. L. H., "A Texian," who not only denied that the revolution was effected by Americans for speculative reasons, but offered grounds for his assertion that it did much to counteract the frauds of the speculators. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 1 7 potential value as colonists. Had they been governed efficiently and well, she would have had ample reason to be glad they came.^^ Akin to Channing's accusation there was, however, a more seri- ous charge. The Mexican government never wearied of declaring that multitudes of Americans crossed the frontier in open defiance of laws expressly enacted to keep them out ; and the inference naturally follows that such men, having no right whatever to be within the country, were disposed to establish their position by excit- ing a revolution. To a certain extent this view was just. But there were two elements in the matter: enactment and enforcement. Laws to which obedience is not required are soon regarded as of no significance. Such may be found in many statute books, and they are cheerfully ignored. So a landowner who had permitted the neighbors to cross a field of his for ten years, would not be allowed by public opinion suddenly to exact damages from every one that had technically trespassed. Until well on in 1830 nothing effectual was done by the Mexican government to bar out Americans. The feeling by that time prevalent in the public mind could not be cor- rected in a moment, and in about two years a complete cessation of efforts to enforce the restriction on immigration made it seem once more a meaningless form. Such were notoriously the enactments regarding slavery and the religion of the immigrants, and why might not this be like them? In Mexico, wrote Frederic Leclerc, laws were " nothing but the merest fictions," and " therefore it would be very astonishing if . . . the Anglo-Americans of Louisiana, Arkansas and the other adjacent States had regarded Texas as a sacred land and religiously refrained from entering it." The very fact that so many crossed the boundary leaves Mexico, according to her own statement, in much the same position as a country that pro- claims a blockade but does not enforce it, and soon finds the world ignoring its proclamation.^- Just what percentage of the Texans belonged to these two classes — those with defective titles and those with no right at all to be in the country — it is probably impossible to say ; and pre- cisely how much influence they exerted in promoting trouble and bringing on the crisis can only be surmised. They had it in their power to increase the irritation by their own acts and by arousing the sympathy of others ; and their presence doubtless led the Mexi- '^ Sigh XIX., Sept. 13, 1845. (Mexico invited) Von Hoist, U. S., ii., 552. ^ (Cessation) Alaman, Mexico, v., 875 ; Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 128. Revue des Deux Mondes, March i, 1840, p. 638. 3 1 8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS cans to make unpleasant remarks and to feel that by expelling them on the technically good grounds available they could greatly weaken the American element. Here are four causes of friction conceivably traceable to them. But in view of the suggestions that have been offered regarding the equities of the situation one cannot think them very culpable, especially when judged by the principles that have usually guided men under like circumstances, if they refused to be expelled from the land which their own labor had redeemed. In the next place it must be remembered that three colonies — one of which constituted the predominant factor in Texas down to the time of the revolution — were admittedly lawful, so that, as all of these joined in the movement, the main body of its adherents was irre- proachable from this point of view. And, finally, when Santa Anna, wholly without reference to any American interlopers in Texas, pursued a course that justified resistance, it was well that the settlers of unquestioned legitimacy were encouraged by the presence of allies to stand their ground; and the latter, as the supporters of a just revolution, acquired then, if not before, good standing in the country. The matter of land titles, therefore, had no essential significance; and we return to the conclusion already formed, that the revolution, although — like all such movements — not without its objectionable features, was in reality a legitimate measure of self- defence.-^ We now come to another point of Channing's : that a further cause of the rebellion in Texas was a desire to prevent the abolition of slavery there. On this view it seems fair to remark that, after Mexico had continued to maintain in its full vigor the system of peonage and had made Texas an exception to the edict of emancipa- tion, there would have been good reason to protest against an anti- slavery crusade proclaimed by that government under the guise of philanthropy for the purpose of injuring Texas, and against the sudden and violent uprooting of an institution which had developed under Mexican assent until the property, industries and commerce of the settlers depended almost wholly upon it. In England, for example, such a destruction of vested rights would produce an out- break at once. But as a matter of fact, however possible may have been this cause of trouble, there was no controversy on the subject between the Texans and Mexico when the rebellion occurred, and therefore no occasion for the colonists to act. On the other hand, ^ (Lawful) Garrison, Texas, 174, 157. (Predom.) lb., 157. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION I9 the principal slaveholders obviously belonged to that wealthier por- tion of the community which was said by Channing himself to oppose the revolution.-* Finally, it has been urged, particularly by the Mexicans, that the people of Texas had been treated with such kindness and liberality that besides being traitors they were ingrates ; and one or two state- ments from American sources, bearing on the premise, have often been cjuoted in support of the conclusion. Nor is the representa- tion wholly without a basis. While there had been some oppression and much more was intended, indolence, deep ignorance of the state of things in the north, and constant preoccupation with home politics had caused Mexican statesmen — as the impartial reports of the British representatives in their country show — to let the Texans manage their own affairs as a rule, which was the greatest possible kindness ; and the belief that a colonization of her waste lands was for the interest of the nation led to the suspension of certain customs duties in that quarter which has already been mentioned. But past good fortune, even had the cause been deliberate benevolence, could have bound no one to welcome intentional tyranny. It was the right as well as the duty of Mexico to rule Texas, but she had no au- thority to outrage and crush it. It was her right and duty to make good laws and enforce them, but she was not excusable for legislat- ing unjustly nor for executing her decrees unfairly.^^ We may now proceed with the narrative. After declaring their independence the Texans asserted a boundary line, which followed on the southwest the Rio Grande river. This gave rise to an im- mense deal of discussion, particularly as regarded the claim to the region between that stream and the Nueces ; but for our present purpose it is only necessary to observe that the limits claimed were inadmissible, since they included a large portion of New Mexico to which no shadow of a title could be found. The boundary was probably asserted partly in the hope of making it good, and partly with the idea of having a liberal basis for compromise in the final settlement with Mexico. Santa Anna now invaded the country, and the butchery of nearly four hundred prisoners in cold blood at Goliad by his express orders, flanked with similar atrocities enacted ^ Alaman's report to Congress, March 30, 1830, which was the basis of the policy soon adopted with reference to Texas, expressly recommended that slavery should be permitted to continue there (Ho. Ex. Doc. 351, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 319). (Attitude of large slaveholders) Mag. Amer, Hist., March, 1882, p. 161. ^ (Amer. support) Child, Naboth's Vineyard, 6. 20 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS at the Alamo and elsewhere, appeared to justify very fully the appre- hensions of the Texan people and the revolutionary course adopted by them for self-protection. In April, 1836, however, he was routed at the battle of San Jacinto and made a prisoner, and by his direction the Mexican forces remaining in the field withdrew beyond the Rio Grande. Thus ended the campaign.-*' The next month David Burnet became the first President of Texas, and soon commissioners were despatched to the United States with instructions to broach the subject of annexation as well as to urge that of recognition. In the following July these gentle- men proposed the incorporation of their country in the United States in a letter addressed to the American Secretary of State. This was an informal proposition, for the credentials of the Texan representatives were imperfect, and — even had there been no diffi- culty on that score — our government could not officially receive envoys from an unrecognized country ; but the authorities of that nation had now taken a stand in the matter, and when the people pronounced in favor of annexation two months later by an almost unanimous vote, it was plain enough — especially in view of the declared sympathies of many American citizens — that a great ques- tion, the question of Texas, had placed itself before our country.^^ To clear the way for an unprejudiced view of that subject, it seems well now to inquire how far the United States were respon- sible for the revolution just described, since the judgment of many persons on the annexation problem has been deeply colored by their opinion on this point. The facts already discovered — that a cruel and unprincipled schemer transformed Mexico in effect from a re- public modeled largely on the United States into a despotism ; that a large portion of the country, though with far less reason than ^ (No title) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 313. After he was a prisoner, Santa Anna signed a treaty with Texas, recognizing its independence. Though made under duress, this treaty was binding if the President had authority to bind the nation (Woolsey, Internat. Law, 175)- As Mexico possessed no constitution at this pre- cise time, it is not easy to decide this point; but (i) the Congress had previously been and did afterwards constitute a part of the treaty-making power, and (2), on learning that Santa Anna had been captured, the Congress declared that any agreement with the enemy made by him would be void. It was sometimes argued, in the annexation debates, that Mexico enjoyed the fruits of the treaty and there- fore was morally bound by it. But they were enjoyed very unwillingly, and were rejected so far as the Congress was able to reject them. See Mex. a traves, iv., 375. 376 ; Sen. Doc. i, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 37. ^Yoakum, Texas, ii., 13. Burnet to Collinsworth and Grayson, May 26, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 89. C. and G. to Forsyth, July 16 [14], 1836: Jackson Pap. Grayson to Burnet, Aug. 2, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 117. (Earlier efforts of the Texans to establish relations with the Amer, govt.) Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 19. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 21 Texas, opposed the change and one State resisted in arms ; that the Texans, whatever aspirations to join the Union eventually many of them may have entertained or whatever deliberately treasonable designs may have actuated a few, did not desire the revolution that actually occurred ; and that they were forced by Mexico to revolt or else feel upon their necks the foot of the most irresponsible, ignorant, vicious and brutal of soldiery, led by one of the most greedy and unscrupulous of chiefs, alien in race, language, customs and every social, political and religious conception — these bare facts indicate plainly enough that an adequate inspiration to rebel came from the south ; but certain charges have been made against the United States, and it is our duty to consider them. In the first place, it has often been asserted that the American government instigated the revolt or at least fomented it. The Lon- don Times, for example, declared that it " was known, watched and encouraged by the Cabinet of the day at Washington." The Mexicans clung tenaciously to this view ; and thirteen members of the American Congress united in alleging that the failure of the mother-country to recover Texas was partly due to " the direct and indirect co-operation of our own Government " with the rebels.-^ The charge of instigation, however, is entirely without support. Daniel Webster denied it squarely, and a single despatch from the State department seems almost conclusive in the negative. In March, 1833, Livingston wrote to our diplomatic agent at Mexico, who was endeavoring to buy Texas, " The Situation of afifairs in the State of Texas y Coahuila makes it important that your negotia- tion on that subject should be brought to a speedy conclusion. It is at least doubtful whether in a few weeks any stipulation could he carried into effect." In other words, the American government looked upon a Texan revolt as something distinctly contrary to their wishes and inconsistent with their aims. In December, 1835, the provisional Governor of Texas directed Austin, Archer and Whar- ton, commissioners to the United States, to ascertain whether — should the colonists declare for independence — they would imme- diately be recognized by this country ; and the first two of these gentlemen replied from Louisville, Kentucky, in the following March that they could not be received by the authorities at Washington, and it had appeared unwise to go there. Here a total absence of collusion seems to be shown ; and that state of things is indicated ^Times, May 15, 1844. (Congressmen) Detroit Adv., May 15, 1843, 22 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS also by the fact that scarcely had the banner of the new republic been unfurled, when its representatives at Washington, D. C, were instructed to enter a "solemn protest . . . against the right of Mexico to sell or the U S. to purchase [Texas], Setting forth in full the declaration of Independence." The head of the American government at this time was Jackson, and when his personal attitude comes to be studied, still further light will be thrown upon this point.-^ The hypothesis that our national authorities fomented the Texan revolt is, to say the least of it, superfluous. Ward, the British representative in Mexico, who was notably suspicious of our govern- ment, expressed the belief in one of his reports that no interference, even secret, on the part of the American Executive was needed, so warm and so general a sympathy with Texas was felt in the southern States. As for evidence none can be offered, save the undeniable fact that our citizens were not prevented from aiding the colonists. Men, money and supplies actively crossed the border, and perhaps nobody was punished for violating the neutrality laws. This aid, however, has been exaggerated, and the rights of neutrals have been underrated. It has often been asserted, for instance, that the battle of San Jacinto was mainly won by Americans visiting Texas to fight the Mexicans ; but it has been found to be almost certain that ninety- eight per cent, of the little patriot army were men already settled there or men who became permanent residents. With regard to the Americans who crossed the Sabine as genuine colonists Mexico could not complain, for Monasterio, Minister of Foreign Relations, used this language in reference to such persons : " they neither are nor can be viewed otherwise than as Mexicans, having voluntarily ceased to be what they previously were " ; and his own government went so far as to decree that a foreigner who merely enlisted in their military or naval service should be considered a citizen. Contribu- ^ Webster to Thompson, July 8, 1842: Ho. Ex. Doc. 266, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 7. To Butler, No. 27, March 20, 1833. It has been argued that this despatch indicated an improperly intimate knowledge of the plans of the revolutionary party in Texas ; but (i) it was the duty of the American government to know what was in the wind there, (2) so many Americans were in Texas that it was not difficult to do this, (3) Sam Houston was there in Feb., 1883, as an American agent to deal with certain Indian matters, and he reported on the political situation (Williams, Houston, 79), and (4) the opinion expressed by Livingston was by no means sus- piciously correct, for the convention of April i, 1833, pronounced only for separation from Coahuila, and years instead of weeks passed before the Texans repudiated the authority of Mexico. Smith to A., A. and W., Dec. 8, 1835: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 52. A. and A. to Smith, March 3, 1836: ib., 72. To Childress and Hamilton. April I, 1836 : ib., 76. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 23 tions to the Texan cause were pronounced lawful by a United States court; and, as Webster pointed out, the President had no power to prevent an American from emigrating. We could not stop the adventurers without assuming to stop emigration altogether, further explained the Arkansas Secretary of State; and a gun on the shoulder of a man going to settle near the Indians was only a neces- sary precaution. Merchants could legally sell to the belligerents, and Webster stated in 1842 that during the preceding six years the United States had done more business in contraband with Mexico than with Texas. The English government declared officially that there was no prohibition against the purchase or export of arms by private individuals. In Great Britain two war steamers were built for Mexico expressly to operate against Texas ; their arms, officers and crews were obtained there ; and when these vessels actually engaged in a fight with the Texan fleet, the men serving their guns were mostly Spanish or English. On the other hand the Texan ships, though built in the United States, did not take their fighting crews from this country ; and when the commodore en- deavored to enlist men at New York, not only were legal proceed- ings begun against him, but our Secretary of State notified the Texan envoy that any repetition of the ofifence by officers of his country would cause the exclusion of their vessels from all American waters.^" The only plausible grounds for complaint against our govern- ment have reference to certain expeditions of considerable magni- tude notoriously intended for the aid of the Texans. These were no doubt substantial violations of the neutrality law. But the lapse cannot be shown to have been the fault of our national authori- ties. The government announced a firm intention to be strictly im- partial ; they issued positive orders to their subordinates ; and in general, said Lord Palmerston, they showed " a strong disposition " to fulfill their obligations. The truth is that a democratic system has its limitations. In our country men cannot be punished for ^^ Ward to F. O., No. 75, Nov. 19, 1835 : F. O., Mexico, xciii. (S. Jacinto) Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Quart., v., 29, note ; ix., 260. Monasterio to [Forsyth], Nov. 19, 1835: Ex. Doc. 256. 24 Cong., i sess., 10. (Decree) Pak., No. 83, Sept. 10, 1842. (Contributions) Niles, xlix., 205. Webster to Thompson, July 8, 1842: Ho. Ex. Doc. 266, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 7. Fulton to Jackson, Jan. 26, 1839 : Jackson Pap. (Officially) Aberdeen to Murphy, May 31, 1842: F. O., Mexico, clvii. (Steamers) Smith's memo., June 29, 1842 : Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 990. Smith, Remin., 39. Doyle, No. 59, Aug. 29, 1843. (Crews) Smith to Aberdeen, [Dec. 12, 1842] : Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 1075. Forsyth to Dunlap, Jan. 15, 1840 : Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 437. Chapter iii. will present other facts showing the coolness of the American government toward the Texan cause. 24 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS crime without legal proof of the offence charged, and in these cases public sentiment did not permit such proof to be given. Once at least — at New Orleans — the matter was thoroughly tested, and no proper evidence could be obtained. One infers from the affidavits that some, if not all, of the witnesses were afraid to tell what they really knew ; but so far as the prosecution was concerned, it was the same as if they had been truly in the dark. The District Attorney even asked the Mexican consul to put him on the track of legal evidence, and the consul admitted his inability to do so. Another form of the difficulty is shown in the case of Captain Grundy, a Tennessee District Attorney, who organized a band of seventy men. Grundy, reported the Texan agent at Nashville, " has formal orders to arrest and prosecute every man who may take up arms in the cause of Texas or in any way Violate the Neutrality of the U. S. He says he will prosecute any man under his command who will take up arms here and he will accompany them to the boundary line of the U S. to see that they shall not violate her Neutrality and when there, if the boys think proper to step over the line as peaceable Emigrants his authority [over them] in this Govt will cease and he thinks it highly probable that he will take a peepe at Texas himself." In such a case what could orders from Washing- ton effect ?^^ Crawford, the British consul at Matamoros, visited Texas in 1837 and reported that after making "all and every inquiry" during his stay, he was convinced that no assistance had been given or connived at by the American government. He added : " Whenever there was a suspicion attached to expeditions, there has been a prosecution of the Parties by the United States, though generally such prosecutions have failed, because of the difficulty of obtaining sufficient evidence, owing to the sympathies of this People of America being roused by the Attrocities of the Campaign of 1836 and their interests also being deeply engaged in the success of the struggle of their Sons and other relatives, the Colonists of Texas." The British minister at Mexico was instructed to represent to that government " the impossibility of preventing the interference of the People of the United States " ; and, writing to the same official in "* (Announced) To Butler, Nov. 9, 1835. (Orders) Ho. Ex. Docs. 256, 24 Cong., I sess. ; 74, 25 Cong., 2 sess. (Palmerston) Stevenson to Forsyth, No. 9, Oct. 29, 1836: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., England, xliv. (N. Orl.) Ho. Ex. Doc. 74, 25 Cong., 2 sess. Carlton to Consul, Nov. 14, 1835 : Sria. Relac. Carson to Burnet, June i, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Com, i., 92. See also Sen. Doc. i, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 41, 42, 53, 67. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 2$ 1842, Lord Aberdeen expressly disclaimed any intention to criticize the American administration in this matter. The minister for his part informed Santa Anna plainly that he believed our authorities had done all that was to be expected or that lay in their power; and Santa Anna did not venture to challenge this opinion. To sum up, Daniel Webster, who was neither a slaveholder nor a " friend of Texas," declared at about the same time: "The conduct of the government of the United States in regard to the war between Mexico and Texas, having been always hitherto governed by a strict and impartial regard to its neutral obligations, will not be changed or altered, in any respect, or in any degree. "^^ In the next place, it has been charged that Andrew Jackson caused the Texan revolution. Under this head there are really two accusations, which it has not been customary to distinguish clearly. The first is that Houston, relying on Jackson's connivance, planned to seize the country beyond the Sabine with a force raised in the United States. Some such scheme may in fact have germi- nated in his fertile imagination and may have been set forth by his drink-loosened tongue ; but certainly recruiting officers could not have been active in the eastern cities, thousands of volunteers could not have been enrolled, and the implied accumulation of funds could not have existed, as Mayo and Child wished the public to believe they did, without attracting the least public notice. No sign of such an expedition could be discovered on the frontier ; and as a matter of fact Houston went to Texas quite unattended. Equally certain is it that Jackson, though his faith in the tale was justly feeble, wrote urgently to Houston himself, to the Governor of Arkansas and afterwards to the Secretary of that Territory, express- ing emphatic opposition to the rumored enterprise and manifesting the clearest intention to prevent it. So far, at least, his conduct appears irreproachable.^^ ^-Crawford to Pak., May 26, 1837: F. O., Mexico, cxxxvii. To Pak., Nos. 26, 34, July I, IS, 1842. (Pak. and S. Anna) Thompson, No. 3, June 20, 1842. To Thompson, No. 11, July 13, 1842. It has often been urged that the U. S. govern- ment showed more zeal for neutrality in the case of the Canadian rebellion of 1837 than it had done in the Texas affair. On this point the Democ. Rcviezv said (May, 184S, p. 427) that in 1837 the difficulty occurred in a section where it was more feasible to act with effect, and larger powers had by that time been conferred upon the government. Of course, too, no atrocities occurred in Canada to excite the sympathy of the Americans. ^ It has even been argued that Jackson, regarding the cession of Texas in 1819 as void, considered himself bound by his oath of office to recover it as best he could ; but if this was the case his oath bound him to put down the Texas revolu- tion, as an insurrection against the U. S. (The charge) Child (Mayo), Naboth's 26 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS The second count is that later he sent the ex-Governor of Ten- nessee to Texas for the purpose of exciting a revolution against Mexico. To prove this theory a recent biographer of Houston proceeds thus: first he quotes the following words from Parton, — "When "we consider the relations. existing between General Jackson and General Houston, it is difficult to believe that the President was ignorant of Houston's designs [to organize the expedition just men- tioned]. His office, however, compelled him to assume an attitude of hostility toward them " ; and then the biographer continues, " There is also in the Clay Correspondence a reference, which I have lost, to Houston's being once discovered in a gathering of midnight conspirators about a failing fire. This is about all that can be learned. Yet, among probable things, there are few more certain than that, at the end of 1832, after the Stanberry affair, Houston went forth to Texas with a conditional authorization from Jackson." This is airy proof indeed. Another biographer gives additional evidence, however. Finding from an English traveller that Houston — then a notorious drunkard and gambler — was said to keep him- self out of sight all day at Nacogdoches in February, 1833, and to pass his nights at play, and finding also that strangers were in town just then for the alleged purpose of buying land, he surmised that our closeted reveller " was undoubtedly busy in consultation with the men who were scheming for the acquisition of Texas from Mexico." Now it is true that Houston, who had lived with the savages and understood them, held at this time a commission from Jackson to negotiate with certain Indian tribes in Texas. But only gross partisanship can find proof in this mere collocation of circumstances and guesses that the President of the United States was a hypocrite, a liar and virtually an oath-breaker.^* Undoubtedly Jackson desired to acquire Texas ; but a wide gulf yawns between wishing to purchase an article and conspiring to steal it, and no good evidence has been unearthed in support of the highly improbably theory that he crossed the gulf. Moreover, he was not a coward or dissembler, and the language used by him at the time was perfectly clear. Writing to the American minister at Vineyard, 6. (No sign) Fulton to State Dept., Feb. 13, 1838: Miscel. Letters. (Unattended) Fulton to Jackson, Jan. 26, 1839: Jackson Pap. Jackson to Houston, June 21, 1829: Yoakum, Texas, i., 307. Id. to Gov. Pope, 1829: Amer. Hist. Rev., xii., 802. Id. to Secy. Fulton, Dec. 10, 1830 (cut from Wash. Globe) : Jackson Pap. (of, David Fulton to Jackson, Feb. 18, 1839: ib.). ** The biographers need not be named. (Houston's mission) Williams, Hous- ton, 77. Some of the Indians belonged in the United States. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 27 Mexico, he said that a revolt in Texas was probable and added these words, "This our Govt will be charged with fomenting; altho all our constitutional powers will be exercised to prevent." Living- ston's despatch mentioned above closely followed a memorandum from the President, and Jackson gave notice personally to the Mexi- can minister that a convention was to meet in Texas on the first of April, 1833, ^^ furtherance of a scheme of secession. After the rebellion began, he informed the Texan envoy that the United States must observe " strict neutrality," saying further, " it is our boast that we conform strictly with all our national engagements & keep inviolate our national faith." To Governor Cannon of Tennessee and to General Gaines, commanding in the Southwest, he used similar language. Just before the battle of San Jacinto Austin made a very touching appeal for assistance, and on the back of his letter Jackson endorsed these sentences : " The writer does not reflect that we have a treaty with Mexico, and our national faith is pledged to support it . . . [The rebellion] was a rash & premature act, our neutrality must be faithfully maintained." To suppose that he sacrificed his honor to incite a revolution yet was too honorable or too cowardly to aid it at the critical moment is hardly possible. The truth of the matter probably is that he thought the essential characteristics of the Americans made the permanence of Mexican rule in Texas highly improbable, and in fact on this very ground he believed that Mexico should sell the territory ; but as regards the rebellion that actually occurred, he deemed it ill-advised and un- favorable to his plans. In a letter to W. B. Lewis he clearly stated that only in consequence of failing to purchase Texas, and only after the battle of San Jacinto, did he take up the idea of recogniz- ing Texan independence and eventually securing the country by an- nexation.^^ ^^ Jackson to Butler, Oct. 19, 1829: Jackson Pap. Jackson's memo, on Butler's despatch of Feb. 10, 1833 : State Dept., Desps. from Mins. Montoya to Relac, April II, 1833: Sria. Relac. The convention referred to was that of April i, 1833, in view of which Livingston wrote the despatch mentioned above: see note 29, (4). Jackson to Dunlap, July 30, 1836: Jackson Pap. Id. to Cannon, Aug. 5, 1836: ib. Id. to Gaines, Sept. 4, 1836: ib. Jackson, Memo., April, 1836: ib. About a year after Texas declared its independence, Jackson still entertained the idea of pur- chasing that territory of Mexico (Wharton to Rusk: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 187), which looks little as if he had originated or encouraged a plot — thus far successful — to get it for nothing. Jackson to Lewis, Sept. 18. 1843: N. Y. Pub. Lib. (Lenox). It is noticeable that Von Hoist (U. S., ii., 565), though in general he follows the anti-slavery leaders regarding annexation, holds that what occurred in Texas up to Nov., 183s, revived Jackson's desire to purchase Texas — a view rather incon- sistent with the theory that he was inciting a rebellion there. (Believed) Jackson to Butler, Oct. 19, 1829 : Jackson Pap. 28 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Let US look now at Houston. He first became prominent in Texan affairs at the head of a committee appointed to draw a State constitution, the acceptance of which by Mexico would have prevented the rebellion that soon occurred. In October, 1835, he wrote, "Our principles are to support the Constitution [of 1824] and dozi'u with the usurper!!" Not he, but Anson Jones, appears to have set the ball of independence rolling. In fact, no trace of him is to be discovered for more than two years during the critical stage of the budding revolution, and when he reappears, it is not at the principal seat of the movement. Hundreds of Texan and Mexican documents bearing on the genesis of the rebellion have been searched for his name without success ; and when the Mexican authorities made a demand for the chiefs of the war party, he was not mentioned. Finally, he spoke on the subject at a barbecue near Nashville in 1845. Addressing former constituents and friends, he might have been excused for straining the truth a little in order to make them believe that a great purpose had underlain his terrible plunge from their statehouse to a Cherokee wigwam, and that he could claim the credit for a revolution which was now adding an empire to their country. But what he said was this : " To the principles of our provisional government of 1835, by which we pledged our fortunes and our sacred honor to the maintenance of the Constitution of 1824, we had adhered with a tenacity little short of religious devotion " ; and he attributed the revolution simply to the necessity of self-defence against the Mexican invasion. If, then, any understanding existed between Jackson and Houston with reference to a Texan uprising, it would seem to have been that the colonists had not strength enovigh to justify such a step, and — particularly as the United States desired still to buy the territory — ought to be deterred from taking it. In other words, both appear to have been against, instead of for, the revolt that actually occurred.^'' We have now to consider the view that the Texan revolution was caused by the American slavocracy for the purpose of adding slave territory to the United States. Here again certain facts, when placed side by side, look suspicious. An extension of the slave area was needed to offset the western growth of the free North ; citizens '* Yoakum, Texas, i., 311. (Houston) Nilcs, xlix., 144. Jones, Memor., 13, 23, 547. (No trace, etc.) Amer. Hist. Rev., xii., 802. (Speech) Nash. Union, July 12, 1845. When Houston found that a revolution was inevitable, of course he supported it. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 29 of the southern States migrated to Texas taking their negroes with them ; when abohtion was decreed by Guerrero they protested ; after becoming strong they revolted ; they were aided by slaveholders in the United States ; and finally Texas was carried into the Union as slave territory. A mind inflamed with a passionate hostility to human bondage and gifted with a talent for special pleading could build on such facts a mountain of confirmatory hints and circum- stances. Lundy spoke in these terms : " It is susceptible of the clearest demonstration, that the immediate cause and the leading object of this contest [in Texas] originated in a settled design, among the slave holders of this country, (with land speculators and slave traders,) to wrest the large and valuable territory of Texas from the Mexican Republic." Instead of demonstration his book presented suggestions only ; but it had a great efifect in spreading this idea, which — like the feeling against Jackson, Houston and our government — still influences public opinion.^" Great events, however, do not often come to pass in so delight- fully simple a manner, and the Texas revolution was no exception to the rule. Propinquity and similarity of climate caused that region to be settled mainly from our southern States, and the introduction of slavery was practically inevitable. Why the colonists opposed abolition and why they revolted we have seen. The reasons for a special interest in their affairs on the part of the Southern people could be detected from afar. Grimblot, for instance, pointed them out in the Revue Independante. Texas was nearer to the States of that section ; many of their citizens had gone there ; frequent reports made it familiar and revealed its resources ; and the opportunities for traffic, particularly in negroes, were fine. The need of getting more slave territory was not generally realized when the coloniza- tion of that region began. The penetration of settlers beyond the Sabine was a part of the general expansive movement that peopled the whole area west of the Alleghenies ; and it was impossible, as Grimblot said, for the people in the neighboring States to neglect such an opportunity. Instead of finding the South organizing to pour settlers into Texas, we find Texas taking deliberate steps to obtain them ; and in September, 1836, $30,000 were ordered to be taken from her meagre treasury for that purpose. The poverty and disorganized condition of the republic during a long term of years and its threatening approach to collapse, are inconsistent with the ''Lundy, War in Texas, 3 ; Greeley, Amer. Conflict, i., 149. 30 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS theory that an organzation of rich and farseeing American planters was behind it. Had such a body been at work, it would have sent leaders to preside over its interests, and such leaders are not found. Burnet came from New Jersey. Lamar, the second head of the nation, was not one likely to be selected by practical men to manage such an enterprise. Houston we have studied somewhat ; and Anson Jones, the last President, was from Massachusetts. Morfit appears to have discovered no sign of such an organization. Some of the people, he said, had come from the United States to avenge rela- tives butchered by the Mexicans, some to profit by the salubrity of the climate and the prospect held out by a new country, and some on account of the fertility and easy cultivation of the soil; and he expressed the opinion that should the independence of Texas be acknowledged, that region would " afford a great Haven for the planters of our Southern States," which implies that up to that date — August, 1836 — it had not been so regarded.^® Some signs of a colonization enterprise we do, to be sure, unearth; but we discover them at New York. In 1845 the New York Herald remarked that the movement which had ended in the acquisition of Texas began on Manhattan Island probably ten or twelve years before ; and this may be accepted as evidence that such a movement existed, though it is very far from proving that Texan independence resulted from that cause. In 1834, a gentleman wrote from New York to Van Buren that Texas was fast filling up, because no exertions were spared at that point; that in spite of the bad season three schooners full of emigrants had left within four weeks ; and that two more were preparing. At the end of April, 1836, books for a Texas loan were opened in that city, and $100,000 were subscribed in a single day. On the other hand Forsyth and McDuffie, the former our Secretary of State and the latter serving as Governor of South Carolina, were southern men; yet they strongly stood out against Texas.^^ Finally, we are met by the charge that the separation of Texas from Mexico was due to the United States as a nation, — to the ^ Rev. Ind., Aug. 25, 1844. (Need of more slave territory not felt) Von Hoist, U. S., ii., 550. ($30,000) Morfit to Forsyth, No. 8, Sept. 9, 1836: State Dept, Desps. from Mins., Texas, i. (see also Garrison, Texas, 195). (Lamar repudiated) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 187. Morfit to Forsyth, Aug. 27, 1836: Ho. Ex. Doc. 35, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 11. Id. to Id., Aug. 27, 1836: State Dept., Desps, from Mins., Texas, i. ^'Herald: London Spectator, Oct. 25, 1845. Gutierrez to Van B., May 29, 1834: Van B. Pap. (Loan) Richmond Eni?.. May 3, 1836. Even Von Hoist admits the untenability of Lundy's view (U. S., ii., 553). The facts about Forsyth and McDuffie will appear later. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 3I American people. This assertion has more to stand upon. There can be little doubt that she would have failed to maintain her inde- pendence without the men, funds and moral support given her by citizens of the United States. But it is essential to discriminate. In all probability there were persons at New York, New Orleans, Nashville and other places in our country who were willing, for pecuniary gain, to disregard the laws of Congress and the laws of conscience, and to trade upon the unselfish enthusiasm of their neighbors. These deserved of course the sternest reprobation. But such characters are peculiar to no period and to no country; and they compel us to blush, not for the United States, but for mankind. The cohort of schemers and speculators formed, however, but a small company among the friends of Texas. What roused the American public was the belief that a small people were bravely struggling against the tyranny of a much greater one. The fact that the " patriots " were next-door neighbors and blood-relatives powerfully reinforced this impression ; and the stupid atrocities of the ]\Iexicans, perpetrated — according to newspaper reports — against unarmed immigrants as well as prisoners of war. set all these ideas aflame. Shortly before the battle of San Jacinto the New Orleans Courier said : " We feel confident that the American people will not look on [as] silent spectators, when the lives and liberties of their countrymen are in such imminent danger;" and the same journal remarked a little later : " The people of the southern States have become alarmed, dismayed, disgusted ; not at the success of Mexico, for in that they take no particular interest ; but at the rapid strides with which fiendish and horrid barbarity, cruel and unmerciful treatment towards human beings, are advancing almost on our borders." Said the Daily Georgian: " It will not, we opine, redound much to the credit of our country, if we permit an indis- criminate slaughter, on our borders, of all the Texians, even to their women and children, without some efifort to arrest the relentless arm of the Mexicans." In May, 1836, a meeting at Washington, D. C, went on record thus : " Be it resohrd, that Santa Anna, in waging a contest, on his part, of indiscriminate massacre against the freemen of Texas, has, in the name of zvar, set an example of wide-spread, unsparing, multifarious murder, at which humanity stands aghast, and upon which civilized nations are not bound to look with indifference." " I shall never forget the deep, the heart- rending sensations of sorrow and of indignation which pervaded 32 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS this body when we first heard " of Santa Anna's " inhuman butch- eries," said Buchanan later on the floor of the United States Senate. The New York correspondent of the London Times, who called himself Genevese, declared that a desire for vengeance had deeply stirred not only the relatives of the persons massacred, but the com- munities from which they had gone. At Philadelphia, about the middle of April. 1836, a Texas meeting at the Tontine was attended by such crowds that many could not gain admittance. The Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court wrote thus : " The savage babarities of murdering Fanning and his core, after a Capitulation, has so enraged the people of this Country, that they were raising men openly to fight St. Anna. . . . The men under 35, and all the women, are for having St. Anna shot, and the Texas Eagle planted on his capitol." Here we have the essential causes of the assistance given Texas by the Americans ; and our conclusion as to its dis- interestedness is confirmed by finding, as the agent of the United States reported, that a suspicion of land-speculating as an ele- ment in the revolution, greatly and at once abated the enthusiasm of the American volunteers.'**' The action of our citizens was quite in accordance wnth our principles and practice. Help had been given to Greece, to Poland and to Mexico herself; and the Canadian revolt of 1837, though infinitely less deserving of sympathy, was encouraged by Americans. Moreover the course of our people was essentially right. Those who enjoy the blessings of freedom not only have an interest in sustaining the cause of liberty but are under a certain obligation to do so, and in this instance another duty also required attention. The atrocities perpetrated in the name of Mexico called for retri- bution ; there were no tribunals to take cognizance of them; and it fell to the Americans, both as nearest neighbors and as next of kin, to act. Allowing for the absence of these special circumstances. other countries went as far. The British government declared that the babarities had stained the character of the Mexican nation with *° N. Orl. Courier, April ii, 25 (immigrants), 29, 1836. Daily Georgian, April 21, 1836. (Washington meeting) Sen. Doc. 384, 24 Cong., i sess. (Buch.) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 723. London Times, June 27, 1836. Pennsyh'dtiiau, April 19, 1836. Catron to Jackson, June 8, 1836: Jackson Pap. (Volunteers) Morfit to Forsyth, Sept. 9, 1836: Ho. Ex. Doc. 35, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 18. The popular and disinterested character of American aid was further illustrated by the remark of the New Orleans Bee in 1843: "Many of the people of these states have im- poverished themselves in raising supplies for Texas" (Nilcs. Ixiv., 175). though probably some of the losers were simply unsuccessful speculators. With reference to the atrocities it should be remarked that when not excited the Mexicans are as a people kind and even tender-hearted. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANNEXATION QUESTION 33 " deep disgrace " ; and the British and French ministers at Mexico called upon the President to urge that less severity be shown. " All political communities," observed Canning to the Spanish government, " are responsible to other political communities for their conduct." Another consideration, too, may be worthy of mention. In a sense, and that perhaps a very important one, the unchecked action of American citizens in leaving their homes to aid the Texans may have been fortunate for Mexico herself. The New York corre- spondent of the London Times declared that the South and South- west were eager for war with that country on account of Santa Anna's cruelties ; and, had the feeling in the United States been somehow dammed up, it is very possible that an outbreak highly injurious to her as well as to this nation would have resulted.*^ We conclude therefore, on a broad view of the matter, that while in this as in every such case improper factors can be discovered, the government and people of the United States appear to stand acquitted of serious blame. *^ N, Y. Evening Post, April 11, 1836. (Aid to Mexico) To Thompson, July 8, 1842: Ho. Ex. Doc. 266. 27 Cong., 2 sess., 7. To Pak., No. 19, Aug. 15, 1836. Pak., No. 32, April 21, 1836. Times, June 29, 1836. Canning, March 25, 1825: Arch. French Foreign Office. One cannot view without pain the falsehoods and the disregard of law chargeable to some Americans in this affair, but they were explained as excusable because under the circumstances unavoidable. This is a dangerous principle, and yet it must be admitted that the common sense of man- kind has fully recognized it, punishing severely those who are thought to have applied it unnecessarily. Washington, for example, sent out spies with the expecta- tion that they would lie, and he was accessory before the fact to the killing of many persons ; yet no one censures him. II. Texas and Mexico, 1836-1843. The people of Texas were in certain ways peculiar and notable. Walt Whitman, who knew the type, depicted them in striking words : " They were the glory of the race of rangers. Matchless with horse, rifle, song, supper, courtship, Large, turbulent, generous, handsome, proud and affectionate, Bearded, sunburnt, dressed in the free costume of the hunters ; " and General Wavell, in a memoir submitted to the British Foreign Office, completed the picture in the following terms : " To as much if not more natural Talent, and energy to call it into play, and knowledge of all which is practically useful under every Emergency of the most Civilized Nations, they add a reckless hardihood, a restless Spirit of Adventure, resources and confidence in themselves, keen perception, coolness, contempt of other men, usages, and Laws, and of Death, equal to the Wild Indian."^ This description did not apply primarily, of course, to the townsmen ; but the towns were few and small in Texas at that day, and all partook in a greater or less degree of these characteristics. Every colonist had ventured, from choice or necessity, into a strange and undeveloped country in the face of peril from the Indian and the uncertainties, if nothing worse, of alien rule. Most of the settlers, one must believe, were genuine pioneers of the sort Ameri- cans are proud to remember; but some had left their homes because of crimes, due in many instances to the heat of passion rather than to any vicious disposition, or because of financial misfortunes, result- ing often from bad luck, imprudence or hard times and not from any moral shortcomings ; while a smaller number, though very likely endowed with manly qualities, had to be classed as desperadoes. Such men were no weaklings, and their necks bent readily to no yoke. They were strong, free, independent, inclined to be insur- bordinate, and in frequent instances very determined in pushing their individual fortunes.- For a few months Burnet stood at the head of the republic, ' See General Note, p. i. Wavell, Memoir, Nov., 1844: F. O., Texas, xi. ^No doubt the American panic of 1837 drove many good men to Texas. 34 TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 35 but in October, 1836, Sam Houston became President. Here was a man suited to his environment. He had been bad enough to command the admiration of the worst, while his efforts to redeem himself won the respect of the best. As a soldier he had been able to gain the esteem of Andrew Jackson and to overthrow the dictator of the JMexican republic ; and as a politician he had reached while still young the gubernatorial chair of Tennessee. A domestic tragedy had exiled him to the forest, and Chief Bowles of the Cherokees had there served him as preceptor. From this training he emerged with his great natural powers curiously developed but in no sense destroyed. In his conceptions one felt a certain bigness well suited to the vast plains of Texas ; his intellectual processes were somewhat meandering like the rivers of the Gulf slope, but like them flowed onward to the sea ; and his language was often marked with a humor and an eloquence very appropriate to the Lone Star Republic. Though vain, selfish and domineering, bitter in his personal animosi- ties, and much given to stirring up strife, he could be a genial, hail- fellow-well-met with the commonest of his fellow-citizens; and his apparent violence of passion was mainly, if not wholly, the cloak of deliberate calculation. He was fond of alluding to himself as " Old Sam " ; but he could wrap himself at will in the dignity of one able to rule his country and even to rule himself. Probably nothing in ordinary human nature escaped his observation ; he was perfectly willing to veer and turn in his apparent attitude as the pre- judices and feelings of the people required; and he showed himself extremely dexterous in making the faults as well as the abilities of others — and of himself also — contribute to further his designs. According to the British representative in Texas he was perfectly pure-handed and mainly actuated — not by a small desire for office or a smaller greed for money — but by a grand ambition to associate his name with a nation's rise. His administration, however, did not prosper very well. In the existing state of dissension growing out of public difficulties and private aims full success was doubtless unattainable, and at the close of his term in December, 1838, he retired from office a distinctly unpopular man.^ His successor was Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, brother of Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar of the United States Supreme Court. As the Christian names of the two suggest, there was a ' This estimate of Houston is based to a considerable extent on the despatches of the British charge in Texas, who was well qualified to form a sound judgment regarding him and had every motive for expressing his true opinion. 26 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS peculiar strain in the blood,— something soaring and impractical. No doubt the President was brave, able, chivalrous, of high inte- grity and of disinterested patriotism; but Anson Jones appears to have come somewhere near the mark in characterizing him as " a sort of political Troubadour and Crusader." His ideas, though in many respects admirable, mounted too high for the situation. In planning for the future he overlooked the time being. Texas was overburdened with officials, for example, and their salaries were extravagant. During the year ending September 30, 1839, the revenue was less than $188,000, while the expenses rose to over $900,000 ; and this disparity was permitted at a time when promis- sory notes to the amount of more than $1,800,000 were already out. In June, 1840, these notes were worth about 17 per cent. ; and at the end of the year 14 per cent. Their effect upon real money was the same as elsewhere ; and while almost every other method to main- tain credit was considered, the simple one of reducing expenses to a safe basis appeared to be overlooked. About the middle of 1841, the captain of a French corvette reported that Texas possessed no coin, and had no trade except in rum, gin and brandy, while the cost of living was exorbitant.* During Lamar's term the Federalists of northern Mexico were trying to make head against the government, and in the autumn of 1839 one of their leaders visited Texas, asking for her co-operation and promising the recognition of her independence in case of suc- cess. This proposal was no doubt a strong temptation to the Executive. The colonists themselves had taken up arms against Mexican Centralism in the name of the constitution ; and, as Gen- eral Hamilton showed in a letter to Lord Palmerston the following year, the idea was entertained of securing an increase of territory by helping the malcontents of northern Mexico to revolutionize that region. But the Texan authorities were endeavoring at this time to secure recognition from the mother-country by negotiation, and were rather confident that with foreign aid this covild be brought about. Naturally, therefore, it was felt that co-operation with the enemies of the government would be impolitic, and there were even hopes that Mexico would be disposed to reward Texas for standing aloof. It was also desired to raise a foreign loan, and a conserva- tive policy seemed necessary to inspire confidence abroad. In ac- cordance with these ideas Lamar issued a proclamation in 1839 * Smith, Remin., 32. Jones, Memor., 34. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 281-286. (Cap- tain) Pak., No. 68, July 8, 1841. TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 37 against engaging in hostilities beyond the Rio Grande. In fact, the Texas Congress passed secret resolutions almost unanimously, promising to support the Executive in making a pacific settlement with Mexico, and in the course of 1840 and 1841 a secret agent and two plenipotentiaries were sent to that country. The President's authority, however, was not sufficiently respected to secure obedi- ence, and in 1839 Texans joined with Canales in his campaign against the Centralists. At the beginning of the next year, the Republic of Rio Grande was proclaimed by this general at Laredo, on the northern side of the river, with a constitution based on that of 1824; and Texans fought with him until, despite the treachery of their allies, they gained a victory at Saltillo the following October. This insubordination tended little to strengthen Texas or enhance the prestige of her government ; and the envoys sent to Mexico failed entirely.^ Another event of Lamar's administration that had a bad efifect was an ill-starred expedition to Santa Fe. It was believed that many — perhaps most — of the people of New Mexico would welcome amalgamation with Texas, and in fact report had it that the expedi- tion was invited. Success would materially have increased the wealth and strength of the nation and enabled it to assert practically its claim to this portion of its boundary. There was, however, another reason for the experiment. A large and profitable trade was carried on between the United States and Chihuahua by way of St. Louis and Santa Fe ; and it was believed that the shorter and easier rout from Galveston, if once opened up, would soon monopolize the business. The Congress refused to appropriate money for this enterprise, but Lamar ordered the expenses of fitting it out paid from the treasury. Through a series of mis- fortunes, however, the costly expedition totally failed, and the mem- bers of it were captured by the Mexican authorities. In short, at the end of this administration it was substantially true, as Anson Jones affirmed, that Texas was " brought to the extremest point of exhaustion consistent with the ability of being resuscitated."" ° Docs, in Tex. Arch. La Branche to State Dept., No. 29, Oct. 25, 1839 : State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, i. Webb to Dunlap, March 14, 1839: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 372. Gordon to Pak., April 29, 1839: F. O., Mexico, cxxiii. Hamilton to Palmerston, Oct. 14, 1840: ib., Texas, i. Minutes of meeting held Sept. 21-23, 1839: Tex. Arch. (Hopes) Webb to Pak., June 16, 1841 : F. O., Mexico, cxlv. (Loan) Burnley to H. Smith, Nov. 10, 1838: private coll. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 288, 274, 289, 293. (Congress) Hamilton to Pak., Jan, 2, 1840: Tex. Arch. (Agents) Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. 15, 1848. ® Yoakum, Texas, ii., 321-323. (Invited) N. Orl. Com, Bull.: Boston Adv., July 22, 1841. (Trade route) Kennedy, Jan. 10, 1842. Jones, Memor., 23. 28 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS At the beginning of December, 1841, Houston was recalled to the helm of state. In his inaugural Message he declared that there was not a dollar in the treasury, that the debt amounted to ten or fifteen millions and that the nation had no credit. He was charged with exaggerating the badness of the situation for effect; but, as he was obliged to inform Congress about six months later that want of money had entirely stopped the transportation of the mails, the case must have been hard indeed. At about the time of his inauguration, the Galveston Advertiser stated that the entire revenue was not enough to pay the interest on the national debt, and that in many counties nearly half of the lands were under seizure for taxes.^ Houston's programme was simple but wise, and admirably cal- culated to inspire confidence abroad. Toward the Indians, with whom he was naturally able to maintain more friendly personal relations than most white men could have done, he advocated a humane and kindly attitude; toward Mexico he insisted upon a pacific role, arguing that it would exasperate that country and weaken Texas to take part in the disputes of her political parties ; and so far as home affairs were concerned, he enforced a system of rigid economy. None of these policies was acceptable to every- body, but with commendable courage he persevered.^ Up to 1842 Mexico had been so busy with revolutions and her treasury had been so empty, that she could not disturb Texas or even seriously threaten it. In 1837, a handful of troops went as far north as the Nueces, and in July, 1841, a small band captured a few Texans near Corpus Christi ; but these were. trivial raids. In 1842, however, probably in order to refute the conviction rapidly gaining ground abroad that the war had ended, Mexico bestirred herself somewhat. In March her forces took San Antonio and two other points, retiring before they could be attacked. In July there was a skirmish on the Nueces ; and in September San Antonio was again captured.® The effect of these incursions upon the welfare of Texas was extremely serious. In the first place they produced a sense of in- security and uncertainty, which depressed the inhabitants and dis- couraged immigration. In the second, calling the able-bodied men * Yoakum, Texas, ii., 337. (Charged) Kennedy, Jan. 10, 1842. (Mails) Yoakum. Texas, ii., 359, Adv.: N. Orl. Courier, Dec, 10, 1841. 'Elliot to Doyle, private, June 21, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Yoakum, Texas, ii.. 332, 337. Garrison, Texas, 236. "Yoakum, Texas, ii., 241, 319, 349, 350, 361, 363. TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 39 from home, they placed the women and children in many instances at the mercy of the Indians and the slaves. In the third place, interrupting every sort of peaceful occupation, they not only put a stop temporarily to agriculture and trade, but caused embarrass- ment for some time to come ; and finally they laid a very heavy financial burden upon the struggling community. In March, 1842, at least 3,500 Texans had to take the field, and in September they were called out again ; and all this was to attack an enemy that fled as rapidly as he came. Even more disturbing than such in- vasions was the fact that Mexico had ordered two war steamers built in England, for — were Galveston to be occupied — nearly all the commerce and public revenue of the nation would cease ; and in March, 1842, every citizen of that town who did not go to the army was called upon to labor in constructing batteries.^** On the other side a deep sentiment in favor of invading Mexico naturally existed. In April, 1842, a meeting at Galveston declared hotly for this policy, and Houston found it necessary to promise that he would do all in his power to promote the design at the first opportunity. He even addressed a minatory epistle to Santa Anna, threatening that the flag of Texas should float as far south as the Isthmus of Darien ; and the Congress passed a bill authorizing offensive operations. Houston did not, however, desire to revive the war. As there were no funds for any army, Colonel Dainger- field visited New Orleans to raise a loan of $1,000,000; but, in all likelihood not without the President's assent, he returned with an empty wallet. The opposition of the United States to an outbreak of hostilities no doubt had a good deal of influence on Houston; Jackson and Justice Catron of the United States Supreme Court ex- postulated with him ; and finally he vetoed the bill. The Texan forces, however, advanced to the Rio Grande ; and then, as the commander showed no enthusiasm for proceeding farther, a large part of his army seceded, crossed the river, and eventually, after performing most courageous deeds, were overpowered and captured at Mier by greatly superior numbers. This misfortune consider- ably impaired both the fighting strength of the nation and the prestige of the government.^^ The condition of Texas at this time was indeed serious. In "Yoakum, Texas, ii., 351, 364. Eve, No. 15, March ig, 1842. "Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. i, 1848, p. 281. N. Orl. Com. Bull., May 7, 1842. Boston Adv., April 11. 1841. (H.'s desire) Elliot to Pak., April 14, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 360, 362, 368-372. Catron to Jackson, March 9, 1845 : Jackson Pap. (Vetoed) Nat. Intel!., Aug. 10, 1842. Garrison, Texas, 247. 40 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS January, 1842, the Congress passed a law which brought the treasury notes down to only two per cent, of par, — virtual bankruptcy. The New Orleans Courier described the country at this time as without money, credit, a regular army or an able and popular general, threatened by Mexico and harassed by the Indians; and the same month Eve, the American representative, informed Webster that not a regular soldier was in the field ; that the public resources were exhausted ; that the population amounted to only seventy or seventy- five thousand ; that great danger was to be apprehended from Santa Anna, now all powerful at Mexico ; and in brief that Texas could not maintain her independence. On learning of the capture of San Antonio two months later, he added that the administration was " in a most deplorable condition," and that excitement against the Presi- dent for supposed military negligence ran high. In August he re- ported that the American volunteers, who had marched in to assist the feeble republic, had become dissatisfied with Houston and had left for home ; and in November the London Times quoted an American paper as adding to this picture that such vessels as the Texas navy possessed were lying idle at New Orleans from lack of funds. About the same time the British minister stated that no adequate organization existed and no resources ; that the govern- ment were not respected ; and that, should the Mexicans really come as they were reported to intend, bad roads would be their principal difficulty. The Mobile Advertiser printed a Galveston letter dated November 3, which said, "We have a bankrupt Treas- ury, a feeble and imbecile Executive, and disunion and confusion everywhere existing. A crisis seems to be approaching, and, unless foreign aid should interpose in our behalf, we cannot but anticipate the most disastrous consequences. ... It would be difficult to imagine a more critical and inauspicious state of things." In De- cember Houston's ]\Iessage to Congress admitted that the nation had neither currency nor public resources, nor even jails for its criminals ; and Eve confided to Governor Letcher of Kentucky that all in western Texas were intensely hostile to the President, charg- ing him with having left that whole region exposed to the enemy, and threatening to take his life should they be driven from their homes. January 15, 1843, a letter from Galveston, published at New Orleans, informed the world that distrust pervaded all classes, that there was no more money in trade than in the national treasury, that credit was equally wanting, that in case of serious invasion TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 4I assistance could be obtained nowhere, and that not a few were leav- ing the country in despair. The next month Eve reported that many accused Houston publicly of co-operating with the national enemy in order to become the dictator of Texas under Mexican authority, and added that Galveston did not possess enough ammuni- tion to defend the city fifteen minutes against a respectable force. As for the navy, its commander disobeyed orders and was pro- claimed an outlaw. ^- San xA.ntonio, much the largest and richest city, lay on the very frontier with not even a screen of population to protect it. Gal- veston was described a little later by a friendly visitor as containing about 300 buildings " which a bold person would or might call houses." Generally these were made of planks nailed on like clap- boards, with a block about two feet high under each corner. Only one brick chimney could be found in the city. Even the dry-goods stores were usually in water or mud, and almost every house was surrounded with oozy prairie ; while pigs, in most cases cropped of ears and tails by the dogs, roamed at will in the haphazard streets. In December, 1842, Eve found the President at the seat of govern- ment in a house of three small rooms without a single glass window ; and the ministers of the United States and England, with four strangers, lodged at the tavern in one small room, which had no window at all. Indeed, Houston himself, though accustomed to a wigwam, described things at the capital as " rather raw."^^ To sum up the situation, Van Zandt, the Texan charge at Washington, explaining in March, 1843, why the commercial treaty which he had negotiated with the United States had not been ac- cepted by our government, represented the Senators as saying in the debate upon it : " Texas is rent and torn by her own internal discords ; she is without a dollar in her treasury ; her numbers are small ; her laws are set at defiance by her citizens ; her officers, both civil and military, cannot have their orders executed or obeyed ; Mexico is now threatening to invade her with a large land and naval force ; she cannot long stand under such circumstances ; the chances are against her. She will either have to submit to Mexico, ^^ (Bankruptcy) Von Hoist, U. S., ii.. 608. Courier. Jan. 22, 1842. Eve, Jan. 6 ; March 10; Aug. 22 (No. 23), 1842. Times, Nov. i, 1842. Elliot, No. 11, Oct. 17, 1842. Adv.: Nat. Intell., Nov. 18, 1842. (Message) Niles, Ixvi.. 18, 19. Eve to Letcher, Dec. 22, 1842: Crit. Pap. N. Orl. Com. Bull.. Jan. 21, 1843. Eve, No. Z7, Feb. 10, 1843. (Navy) N. Orl. Courier, May 24, 1843. " (S. Ant.) Smith, Remin., 29. (Galv.) Houstoun, Texas, i,, 255 et seq. Eve, No. 31, Dec. 10, 1842. Elliot, private, Nov. 15, 1842. 42 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS or come under some other power." Then the situation improved somewhat ; but in the following October the secretary of the Texas legation at Washington proposed to resign in order to spare the national treasury the expense of his salary. ' In a word, as Anson Jones once remarked: "Texas was then a rich jewel lying derelict by the way."" Santa Anna, now the master of whatever strength his country possessed, understood the condition of her lost province. During 1842 the Mexican consul at New Orleans forwarded to the ministry of foreign relations a steady stream of newspaper clippings, rich in details. In September Pakenham, the British representative at Mexico, reported that according to the general impression there entertained poverty and dissension had made Texas helpless. In February, 1843, he said the exulting government were so thor- oughly satisfied of this fact that it would be useless to offer media- tion ; and at about the same time Almonte, the Mexican minister to the United States, informed a member of our Congress that at last his nation had strong hopes of reconquering its province. Un- fortunately for Santa Anna, however, a war with rebellious Yucatan still dragged on, sapping the military and financial strength of the country ; and evidently his best policy was to press that, conclude it as soon as possible, and improve the interim by adopting some plan to divide the Texans and to make his own people feel that he was not overlooking the matter.^^ Circumstances now came to his aid. With other prisoners from Texas in the fortress of Perote lay Judge Robinson, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of that country. He found the confinement irksome ; and, probably with no view save to escape from it, he ad- dressed a letter to the dictator, proposing that Texas acknowledge the sovereignty of Mexico on certain terms; that an armistice be " (Van Z.) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 394. Van Z., No. 109, Oct. 16, 1843. Smith, Remin., 46 (Smith states that in 1843 Texas was harmonious and prosperous, but of course he means that it was comparatively so). Jones, Memor., 80. The question arises whether, such being her condition, Texas had really established herself as a nation. But she had adequate potential strength to maintain her independence against Mexico, — to wit : the sympathy of great numbers in the United States and the pos- sibility of making such terms with England regarding slavery and free trade as to secure effectual British aid. It may, however, be answered that nationality existing only by the aid of foreigners is not independence. But we date our national exist- ence from 1776, yet only French assistance at a later date saved it; and Holland, Belgium and Denmark would soon be absorbed but for foreign support. "Mexican Consul, N. Orl., passim: Sria. Relac. Pak., No. 89, Sept. 10, 1842; No. 8, Feb. 24, 1843. (Almonte) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 406. (S. Anna's aims) Thompson, Oct. 2, 1843; Smith, Remin., 59; to Smith, May 8, 1843; N. Orl. Picayune, April 27, 1843. TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 43 granted in order to facilitate a discussion of the plan in his country, — a discussion which he declared would lead to the unanimous acceptance of it ; and that he and one or two of his comrades be made commissioners to present the case. Santa Anna sent for Robinson, satisfied himself that he would prove a good envoy — so very good, apparently, that the release of one or two of his com- rades would be superfluous — and in February, 1843, despatched him to Texas with a proposition definitely drawn up and officially signed. In substance it included six points : Texas was to acknowl- edge the sovereignty of Mexico, become a Department, be repre- sented in the national Congress, originate all her local laws and rules, be granted a general amnesty, and be exempt from the pres- ence of Mexican troops. One other point of no less importance was involved but not stated. An acceptance of Mexican sovereignty meant the abolition of slavery, first, because the law of the land made slavery illegal, and secondly — according to the dictator — because an agreement with England forbade the toleration of it in any part of the country.^*^ Santa Anna admitted at this time, the American minister re- ported, that he had no expectation of favorable results from the negotiations thus initiated, — that is to say, direct results ; but he counted so much on his proposition as the means of accomplishing what he had in view, that he invoked the good offices of England in its behalf. He also tried to recommend his terms to the Texan people by menacing that country. In April his Secretary of Foreign Relations notified the British charge in efifect that soon it was to be attacked in the most ruthless manner, and the charge was sufficiently impressed to warn the British representative in Texas ; and two months later a Mexican decree that recalled the atrocities of Goliad and the Alamo was issued, threatening im- mediate death to all foreigners taken in arms there. ^^ Houston, seeing a way to gain time, dictated now a confidential letter to Santa Anna — ostensibly written by the Judge — in which he represented himself as noncommittal regarding the proposed settlement, denied the existence of those factions in Texas upon " (Robinson Lieut. -Gov. in 1835) Bancroft, Pac. States, xi., 372. Robinson to S. Anna, Jan. 9, 1843 : State Dept., Arch. Tex. Legation, Yoakum, Texas, ii., 387. (Terms) Robinson to Galv. Times, March 27, 1843: Nat. Intell., April 11, 1843. (Agreement) Thompson to Green, March 27, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Mexico, xii. " (S. Anna) Thompson: previous note. (Invoked) Pak„ No. 21, March 23, 1843. Doyle to Elliot, April 20, 1843 : F. O., Texas, xxiii. Decree, June 17, 1843 : ib., Mexico, clxii. 44 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS which the dictator had counted, and plausibly repeated the sug- gestion of an armistice. He also gave notice through the British representatives that he was disposed, in view of the Robinson terms, to send commissioners to Mexico, but that calm deliberation on the subject would be impossible while the danger of invasion con- tinued ; and then through the same channel the dictator signified his willingness to grant a truce. As the result, Houston proclaimed a suspension of hostilities on the fifteenth of June, setting a trap for Mexico by announcing that it should " continue during the pendency of negotiations between the two countries for peace." Santa Anna took a similar step regarding hostilities ; but he would not accept Houston's language in reference to the duration of the truce, for obviously that would have enabled Texas to continue it at will by merely protracting the discussions, and he proposed to leave this matter to the military officers charged with arranging the details. Steps were then taken to perfect the armistice. Tornel, the Minister of War, gave his orders to General Woll on the seventh of July ; before long commissioners were duly appointed on both sides ; and those of Texas — Hockley and Williams — set out for Matamoros about the middle of October. ^^ But all this was a comedy. Not only did Santa Anna expect nothing as a direct result of the peace negotiations, but the other party were quite of the same mind. When the Robinson terms were made known, a paper of English proclivities — the Galveston Ck'Uian — spoke favorably of them, but its voice could scarcely be heard amid the chorus of denunciation. Said its neighbor, the Times, "They will be, by every reflecting Texian, consigned to the contempt which alone they merit." Anson Jones, the Secretary of State, notified his minister at Washington that they were rejected by " one unanimous response from the whole country," saying further, "Yoakum, Texas, ii., 388. Elliot to Pak., April 14, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. It fell to Doyle to act for Pak. Doyle, No. 24, May 25, 1843. Id. to Elliot, May 27, 1843: F. O., Texas, xxiii. Elliot to Jones, June 10, 1843: ib., vi. Jones to Elliot, June 15, 1843: ib. Doyle, No. 51. July 30, 1843. Elliot to JTones, July 24, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. (Tornel) Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 84. (Set out) Elliot, private. Oct. 10, 1843. It should be noted that there was a suspension of hostilities (which, to avoid confusion, will be termed the "truce") but that the formal armistice proposed did not come into effect because Texas would not accept the terms arranged by the commissioners. It should be noted also that a cessation of hostilities, suggested by Robinson, and demanded by Houston as a sine qua noii of considering the Robinson proposition, was granted by Santa Anna because he was anxious to have that proposition considered, and not because England requested him to grant it. Doyle's despatch of May 25 shows that when he presented to Santa Anna Houston's view that a truce was an " indispensably necessary " pre- liminary, Santa Anna replied at once that such was his own opinion. TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 45 " Mexico must restore us our murdered thousands before we can ever entertain the proposition of being re-incorporated with that Government " ; and Murphy, the American representative, reported that people and press ahtiost without exception scorned the pro- posals. To all appearances, then, Judge Robinson's move signified nothing regarding a final settlement between the two countries. The danger of hostilities was merely suspended.^" Meanwhile Santa Anna continued to labor with Yucatan. In July negotiations began, and in December that Department returned to the Union on a basis of semi-independence analogous to the condition offered Texas. Evidently the Lone Star republic was now in a most critical situation. She had as good a title to inde- pendence as Mexico herself had possessed from 1821 to 1836, during which interval she had been treated as a sovereign power by all countries except Spain. Indeed Pakenham had said four years earlier: "The state of the question between this Country [Mexico] and Texas is precisely the same as was for a long time that of the question between Spain and this Country. . . . Reconquest is ad- mitted to be impossible and yet a feeling of mistaken pride, foolishly called regard for the National Honour, deters the Government " from ending the war. It was evident that Mexico did not intend to recog- nize Texas, and did propose to distress and impoverish her citizens for an indefinite period by harassing raids, menaces of a formidable attack and, if possible, serious invasions. Such a state of things was almost intolerable. In March, 1843, Pakenham felt satisfied that all of the Texans who had anything to lose were tired of the alarms and uncertainties ; and about the first of November Houston himself stated that the citizens were getting weary of their political condition, and were ready for almost any change, — almost any, he meant, except a return to Mexican domination.-*^ One conceivable resource was oflftcial American aid ; but the door of annexation, as we shall find, had been closed ; our settled rule to avoid entangling alliances precluded any other method of assistance ; and the two countries appeared to be growing less and less friendly. Another possibility was the purchase of European support ; and Texas appeared to be increasingly intimate with France "Galveston Civilian and Times: Nat. IntelL, April ii, 1843. To Van Zandt, May 8, 1843. Murphy, No. 3, July 6, 1843. =" Mexico a traves. iv., 507. Pak. No. 45, June 3, 1839: No. 21, March 23, 1843. (Houston) Murphy, No. 11, Nov. 7, 1843. Von Hoist (U. S., ii., 62^) admits that if matters went on as they were, Texas " would soon have to cast itself into the arms of the first power which opened them to it." 46 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS and England, particularly England, as presently will be discovered. There existed, however, a third alternative — quite compatible with the second — and this it is in place to consider here. Paradoxical though it may sound, the struggling republic, while very weak for defence, had great latent possibilities for aggression, and the condi- tion of northern Mexico was extremely tempting. Already we have seen the strong Federalist sentiment which existed in that region and manifested itself in civil \var; but that was only one phase of the matter. In spite of two decrees of expulsion many old Spaniards had remained in this part of the country, and they showed a persistent unfriendliness toward the national authorities, while the debility and badness of the administration were in some respects peculiarly felt at so great a distance from the capital. Behind these facts, moreover, lay a strong centrifugal tendency inherent in the political character of the Spanish ; and the logical consequences followed. Not long after the fall of Iturbide there was a movement for inde- pendence in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and Texas, and these districts formed a Junta at Monterey to promote the design. In 1829 Pakenham, a keen observer, discovered that the great State of Jalisco had invited four other members of the confederation to form a league with it, and he believed this combination would be made with secession from the Union as one of its aims. Three years later he reported that should the civil war then raging con- tinue, it was not improbable that Durango, Jalisco, Zacatecas, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and San Luis Potosi would unite as an independent nation. In 1836 the New Orleans Bee published a letter written at Zacatecas in July, which stated that the northern parts of Mexico, including New Mexico and California, appeared to be in favor of forming a republic in alliance with Texas. The next year Pakenham expressed the opinion that an unsuccessful at- tempt to reconquer Texas would hasten the defection of other districts, and said the army should remain on guard at Matamoros in order to preserve the territory still held by Mexico. The wisdom of this judgment seemed to be proved by the fact that revolts of a serious nature broke out that year in San Luis Potosi and Sonora, —the latter having at its head the Comandante General, — followed during 1838 by similar outbreaks in various quarters. In Novem- ber, 1838, Tampico began a rebellion which lasted for eight months; and in 1840 the British consul at that point represented the people TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 47 about him as likely to declare again for secession. In 1839, as we saw, the Federalists of northern Mexico endeavored to establish cordial relations with Texas, and certain of them soon afterwards proclaimed the Republic of Rio Grande. At about this time the British minister informed his government that the insurrection in Coahuila and Nuevo Leon had not yet been extinguished, remarking in explanation that the remote Departments obtained no advantage, but only harm, from their connection with Mexico, since they had to pay the troops employed to oppress them, even when there was no money to support courts of justice or repel the savages. Leclerc, who had visited Texas recently, stated in 1840 that without doubt a large part of the people in five Mexican Departments were dis- posed to unite with that country or form a new republic under her protection. In April, 1841, the New Orleans Courier said the news from Tampico and Matamoros indicated that all northern Mexico was going to secede ; and, about the middle of the year, the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin remarked : " It would not be surprising if in a short while the Texas league included all the States between the Del Xorte and the California Gulf." In Tamaulipas the war against the central power continued nearly three years, and although Arista, the government general, succeeded in beating the Federalist leader, it was charged against him later that he himself thought it possible to create a new republic out of the Departments bordering on the Rio Grande ; while the editors of the New Orleans Picayune stated positively that he had corresponded with influential Texans regarding the accession of northeastern Mexico to their country, and anxiously desired to effect this. Moreover it should not be forgotten that intimate business relations were constantly drawing the two sides of the Rio Grande together. In August, 1844, it was estimated that about 16,500 Mexicans were interested more or less directly in this trade. -^ "Ward to F. O., No. 15, Jan. 29, 1827: F. O., Mexico, xxxi. Mexico a traves, iv., 98. Pak., No. 83, Sept. 18, 1829; private, Aug. 30, 1832. Bee, Sept, 3, 1836. Pak., No. 30, July 26, 1837. Ashburnham to F. O., No. 9, May i, 1837; No, 58, Nov. 7, 1837 ; No. 7, Jan. 31, 1838 ; No, 70, Sept. 13, 1838 ; No, iii, Dec. 31, 1838 : F. O., Mexico, cvi,, cviii., cxiii., cxv., cxvi. Pak., No, 52, June 22, 1839. Craw- ford to Pak., April 3, 1840: F. O., Mexico, cxxxv, (Rep. of Rio Gr.) N, Orl, Com. Bull.. March 12, 1840, Pak., No. 21, Feb. 9, 1840. Revue des Deux Mondes, April 15, 1840, p. 253. Courier, April 3, 1841. Com. Bull.: Boston Adv., July 22, 1841, The Rio Grande was also called the Rio Bravo del Norte and, for short, the Bravo and the Del Norte. Pak., No, 100, Oct. 26, 1840. (Arista) Bank., No, 56, April 29, 1846 : Picayune, Aug, i, 1845 '. Polk, Diary, i., 230, A recent book says the people of northern Mexico desired to maintain a state of things on the border that would permit them to plunder the Texans, But the fact that parties of rancheros accom- 48 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS New Mexico, as the supposed attitude of not a few toward the Santa Fe expedition suggested, was discontented, even though the insurrection of 1837 had been quelled. The Californians maintained a state of chronic revolt. In 1837 Pakenham concluded that an understanding existed between them and Texas; and seven years later the British consul at Monterey, California, commenting upon " that spirit of hatred and antipathy toward Mexico and the Mexi- can Government," which he said had " always existed in the breasts of the Californians," declared that he found "but one universal sentiment of unqualified aversion to the continuance of Mexican Authority " there. In fact, the people rebelled that very year, drove out the national troops, and estabhshed a revolutionary g6vernment of their own. All northern Mexico was thus evidently in a state of disintegration ; and the British consul at Tepic, after a long period of observation, formally expressed the judgment that the nation, if left to itself, was destined to break up into small tribes like those of Asia. The indications were, however, that matters would not be allowed to drift.-^ In April, 1844, the American charge at Mexico informed Cal- houn that a ]Mr. Hastings of Ohio, who had led a party to Oregon some two years before and had been in Mexico about the first of January, admitted that a well digested plan to follow the example of Texas existed in California, and that its promoters were only waiting for him to return with more settlers. Sonora was expected to join in the movement, and it was understood that for some time New Mexico had been on the eve of a revolution. It is hardly conceivable that all this was going on at their door without the knowledge of the Texan authorities ; and in fact, when the success of the annexation project rendered a longer silence unnecessary, the National Register let it be known that a plan had been matured by many leading men in Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sonora and California to form a union with Texas. According to the New Orleans Picayune, this representation was stated to emanate from " the best authority."" panied the Mexican troops on their raids across the line and occasionally did a little marauding on their own responsibility signifies practically nothing in view of the political sympathies, military co-operation and profitable commercial inter- course between the two sections. Reliable accounts agree, too, that what the great body of Mexicans on the Rio Grande principally desired was to enjoy peace under a settled government. (Estimated) Galveston Civilian, Aug. 31, 1844. ^'Pak., Xo. 13, Feb. 14, 1837. Forbes to Barron, Sept. s, 1844: F. O., Mexico, clxxix. Id. to Bank., July 2, 1846; ib., cxcviii. *• Green to Calhoun, April 11, 1844: Jameson. Calh. Corr., 945. Nat. Register: Nat. Inlell.. Nov. 14, 1845. Picayutte, Oct. 25, 1845. TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 49 So far, to be sure, the governmenf of Texas had been very unwilHng to attack IVIexico, largely because she desired to legalize her existence by obtaining recognition from the mother-country ; but whether the coveted boon were granted or persistently withheld, the deterrent power of this consideration was sure to disappear. There would then be left a crumbling political organization in a rich land, face to face with a people of extraordinary vitality and enterprise. In April, 1842, Henry A. Wise held up before the American House of Representatives a picture of Texas, guided by her own bright star, marching on to her enemy's capital. Webster looked upon such utterances as mere vain and senseless bravado; but in 1836 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee had written to Jackson that, should the war in the Southwest continue for a twelve- month, forces from the Mississippi valley would take possession of Mexico City. With money, said the representative of Texas at Washington the same year, " we can muster an army of any size that may be necessary"; and until after our war with Mexico this con- tinued to seem feasible. In 1842 the Commercial Bulletin of New Orleans advised Texas " to call to her standard the thousands of impatient, daring, and ambitious spirits in the South West, by whom a march to the city of Montezuma would be embraced as an adven- ture full of fun and frolic, and holding forth the rewards of opu- lence and glory." The British minister in Texas, who knew the South quite well, expressed the opinion that the men of that section, increasing in numbers and " almost entirely without steady occupa- tion," were " unscrupulous, fearless and enterprising," and had " exaggerated notions of the wealth of Mexico." He believed that the project of a raid into the land of the Montezumas was extremely popular there, and that a little success, leading to a great eruption, might result in the permanent occupation of at least the northeastern parts ; and he assured Pakenham that should Houston raise his voice for war, he would be followed in less than six months by twenty thousand riflemen from the States. Any one who has read the diaries and letters of the volunteers who marched into Mexico in 1846 and 1847, knows how large a place in their thoughts was held by sheer love of daring and a belief in the riches of that country. Precisely the same motives that impelled such men to join the armies of the United States in those years would have carried them across the Sabine in 1843, ^^^d the crusade of adventure, plunder, and revenge for Goliad and the Alamo been preached; and Houston, 5 50 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS instead of fearing that recruits would fall short in the event of hostilities, feared that his country would be overwhelmed by them. With such a backing and the support of the provinces willing to join her, Texas could probably— or at least very possibly — have forced Mexico to accept her terms.-* What could have stopped such a war? A policy of self-aggran- dizement on the part of our youthful neighbor would have dis- pleased the American government and many of our people ; but it is not easy to see on what grounds we could have interfered consis- tently. From England the danger of interposition was perhaps greater. But England, though her interests prompted her to main- tain good relations with Mexico, was continually obliged to complain of its government, and would have had reason to welcome even the conquest of that country by an allied and not too powerful nation. It would not have been difficult for Texas to give most satisfactory assurances regarding British interests there, hold out the induce- ment of free trade — with possibly that of abolition also — and offer her merchants a new route to the coast of Asia; and, with such arguments in favor of the crusade, England would not have been likely to check it.-^ In short, then, Mexico — especially the remoter portions of it — had been falling steadily into chaos from the time of its first Presi- dent ; Santa Anna, the one man after Iturbide who seemed able to unite and upbuild the nation, had now — from essential defects of character, intellect and training — become an almost insurmountabte stumbling-block in its path ; and the country appeared to be swiftly going to ruin ; while close at hand stood a people not only qualified to conquer and rule, but able to draw to their standard countless ambitious and enterprising young men from Europe and the southern States. Naturally it seemed to many that destiny called upon Texas to reach out for the sceptre. The opinion that a great -* (Wise) Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 2 sess., 422. (Webster) Adams, Memoirs, xi., 347. Catron to Jackson, June 8, 1836: Jackson Pap. Wharton to Austin, Dec. 11, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 151. Com. Bull., March 17, 1842. Elliot, No. 4, Jan. 28, 1843. Id. to Pak., April 14, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Houston to Jackson, Feb. 16, 1844: Williams, Houston, 280. Lord Ashburton told Henry Clay that England would sooner expect Texas to conquer Mexico than Mexico Texas (Reily, No. 83, April 14, 1842). In waging such a war no doubt the Texans would have encoun- tered serious financial difficulties, but it would have been conducted in a very different manner from that of 1846-8. Money and provisions would have been taken from the enemy with an unsparing hand, and immense districts available for agriculture or mining could have been offered as pay for the troops or security for loans. There was a powder mill at Zacatecas, the author thinks, and Mexican mines produced large quantities of lead. ' (Complain) Pak. and Bank., Despatches, passim. TEXAS AND MEXICO, 1836-1843. 5I future was possible for her as an independent power had existed there from the first, it will be discovered. As conservative a man as Austin had advised that her territory be left undefined, with a view to the extension of it beyond the Rio Grande. From 1838 through 1841, said Anson Jones, a "vast majority" of the people were for offensive war, and in 1842, as we have observed, the sentiment favorable to such a policy was hotter yet. At that time, said the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, the country was full of the idea of conquering Mexico, and her Congress actually voted to extend the national boundaries to the Pacific. Nor were the hopes of future greatness a mere dream of local pride. Leclerc, writing in the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1840, dwelt upon " the grandeur of the role" which he believed Texas was "destined" to play; and the British government predicted two years later that she was fated to be populous and powerful.-'^ ^ (Austin) Kennedy, Texas, ii., 170. Jones, Letter: Niles. Jan. i, 1848. Com. Bull., April 26, 1842. (Pacific) Nat. IntclL, March 3, 1842. Houston vetoed this bill. Revile des Deux Mondes, March i, 1840, p. 606. To Pak., No. 26, July i, 1842. III. Texas and the United States, 1836-1843. The relations of the United States and Texas that principally concern us are under five heads: the questions of recognition and annexation, official American action with reference to the Texan war of independence, and public sentiment in each country regarding the other. In June, 1836, Joseph N. Bryan, writing from Nashville in the central State of Tennessee to Martin Van Buren, said that the sym- pathies of the public had been so roused by the cruelties of the Mexicans that the joy over the victory of San Jacinto was perhaps extravagant, and that all classes of the people there, " old and young, all," were for " a speedy acknowledgment of the Independence of Texas." This state of mind was obviously a logical corollary of the popular enthusiasm for Houston and his fellow-citizens ; and at first it was manifested strongly by the people north as well as by those south of Tennessee.^ Only five days after the defeat of the Mexicans, Morris of Ohio presented in the Senate of the United States the suggestion of a meeting held at Cincinnati that Texas should be recognized, upon which King of Alabama expressed the opinion that such action would be premature. Senator Walker from Mississippi protested that the sun was not more certain to set than she to maintain her independence, and that Santa Anna's party, having overthrown the constitution and established a military despotism, were the true rebels ; but finally, as King proposed and Morris consented, the request of the Cincinnati meeting was laid upon the table.- Two weeks later Preston of South Carolina brought in a memo- rial from citizens of Pennsylvania making a similar request; but, while exhibiting deep sympathy with the Texans, he took the ground that Congress could not act upon the petition, and proposed to treat it in the same way. Webster and Buchanan, though evidently they shared the popular sentiment regarding the two parties in the ' See General Note, p. i. Of course the history of the acquisition of Texas would begin with Adams's effort to buy it in 1825. Bryan, June 6, 1836: Van B. Pap. ''Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 331. 52 TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 53 Struggle, agreed that the Senate must be firm for neutrality ; and the memorial was disposed of as Preston desired.^ A week later, resolutions to the same efifect from citizens of North Carolina were offered, and again Preston objected. Before voting for recognition, he said, he must be sure that Texas had a de facto government, and he deemed " a short waiting of events " necessary. When another week had passed. Walker presented the same request from residents of Mississippi. By this time news of Santa Anna's overthrow had arrived ; and the Senator urged that in case it was true and a dc facto government existed, the United States were bound on the principles followed before in such cases to recognize the new republic at once. Webster admitted that if Texas possessed such a government, it was " undoubtedly " the duty of this country to recognize it. Calhoun, while declaring for the measure, advised that official accounts of the Mexican defeat should be awaited. Brown objected that the effort to secure recog- nition for Texas was an effort to change radically the neutral and pacific character of the American government. Rives, urging the necessity of caution, asked that the resolutions go to the committee on foreign relations in order that the Senate might have the benefit of its views ; and though Calhoun said his own mind had been made up "long ago" and he desired the opinion of no one else, it was so ordered. Memorials of the same tenor from New York, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Kentucky and Connecticut were pre- sented on that and succeeding days.* Just at this time the Chief Justice of the supreme court of Tennessee, writing to Jackson, predicted that in case the war should continue, great numbers of American volunteers would carry the banner of the Lone Star into the enemy's country; then Mexico would appeal to England ; and England, pursuing somewhat the same policy as in India, would gain control of Mexico, the Gulf and the mouth of the Mississippi. On the other hand, he argued, "If the Independence of Texas is recognized by our Government, then Texas can be controlled by us. This alone will end the war. We can coerce both sides to peace. Say to the Mexicans — Stand off! to the Texians — Hold in!" To this he added the remark, "If any member of Congress should vote against Texas Independence his ' (May 9) Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 359. * Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 378, 393, 395, 396, 435, 438. As the Conn, resols. were not passed until May 27, it is a mistake to say — as has been said more than once — that they originated the movement for recognition. Other similar memorials came in later. 54 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS political prospects would be ruined." It can readily be supposed that Catron's last sentence throws light upon the course of the American Congress; and one can easily believe that his other ideas also may have presented themselves to the Senate committee on foreign relations.^ At all events, on June i8 Clay reported for that committee as follows : " The independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States, whenever satisfactory information shall be received that it has, in successful operation, a civil Government, capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power." About a week later, in response to a resolu- tion of Preston's asking information regarding the condition of that country, President Jackson informed the Senate that measures to ascertain the facts had already been taken by the Executive, and at the same time submitted certain correspondence that had passed between him and its representatives.** On the first day of July Clay's report was taken up. Webster, Buchanan and Niles expressed the opinion that the time for recog- nition had not yet arrived ; Southard doubted whether the war had really come to an end ; Benton — though anxious not to deprive New Orleans of business by incurring the ill-will of Mexico — declared that Mexico and Texas could not possibly live together, and that he was prepared to recognize " the contingent and expected inde- pendence " of the revolting state ; and finally the resolution was unanimously adopted. The object of the Senate in going so far yet stopping short of actual recognition was, according to the National Intelligencer, to prevent the matter from " being pressed upon Congress in a more imperative form." In other words, one may understand, it aimed to diminish the urgency of public sentiment without incurring the risk of taking imprudent action.^ Jackson was represented by the Secretary of State in a conver- sation with the Texan envoys as desiring to recognize their country, but not until the step could be taken " with propriety," and a memo- randum of his that may be found among the Van Buren papers indicates that anxious thought was given by him to the merits of the question. He felt, as did others, that her vote in favor of joining the United States had complicated a matter already difficult enough ; ° Catron to Jackson, June 8, 1836 : Jackson Pap. ° Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 453. Richardson, Messages, iii., 230. ' Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 479, and Benton's Abr. Debates for the day. Benton, Letter: Wash. Globe, May 2, 1844. Nat. IntelL, July 16, 1836. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 55 and when the next session of Congress opened, he expressed him- self in a Message substantially as follows : Our conduct regarding this war is to be governed by the same principles as guided us during the struggle of Spain with Mexico; it is natural that our citizens should feel a preference between the contending parties, and this fact must teach us great caution, lest our policy should be governed by partiality or prejudice; "our character requires that we should neither anticipate events nor attempt to control them," and this is the more necessary because " The known desire of the Texans to become a part of our system, although its gratification depends upon the reconcilement of various and conflicting interests, necessarily a work of time and uncertain in itself, is calculated to expose our conduct to misconstruction in the eyes of the world. "^ On the twenty-first of December came another Message. No steps towards recognizing Texas have been taken by the Executive, stated the President. Our custom has been to regard these matters as questions of fact, and " our predecessors have cautiously abstained from deciding upon them until the clearest evidence was in their possession to enable them not only to decide correctly, but to shield their decisions from every unworthy imputation." In the case of the Spanish-American colonies we waited until the danger of re-subjugation "had entirely passed away." Unquestionably it is true that the Mexicans have been driven from Texas, but there is a great disparity of physical force in favor of their country, and consequently the issue is still in suspense. Recognition at this time, therefore, "could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have heretofore held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions," Moreover, special reasons for caution exist in the present instance, for Texas has been claimed as ours, and some of our citizens, reluctant to give up the claim, are anxious for reunion. A large proportion of the civilized inhabitants went from the United States, and the nation, after establishing a government like ours, has proposed to join us. Under these circum- stances premature action might subject us to the imputation "of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves ;" and " Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and main- tain our present attitude ... at least until the lapse of time or the * Envoys to Burnet, July 15, 1836: Tex. Dipl, Com, i.. no. The memo, is printed in Tex. State Hist, Assoc, Qtrly,, Jan., 1910, p. 248. Richardson, Messages, iii., 237. f \ 55 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the Government constituted by them." In such terms spoke the President, and his language was by no means intended merely for effect. The day after this Message was dated, the Texan envoy reported that Jackson was unwilling to grant recognition until some European power should have done so, feeling that there might appear to be a preconceived scheme to make her "a Competent contracting party" for the express purpose of then taking her ; and the President would unbend only so far as to say that the preamble of a resolution passed by the House of Repre- sentatives intimated that the power to recognize a new state belonged to Congress, and that he was disposed to concur in this view.^ Naturally the agitators for the measure felt a good deal sobered, especially since Jackson was known to be a friend of the cause. January 11, 1837, however, the indefatigable Walker offered a resolution to the effect that, as Texas possessed a competent civil organization and there was no " reasonable prospect " of Mexico's prosecuting the war with success, it was " expedient and proper, and in perfect conformity with the laws of nations, and the practice of this Government in like cases, that the independent political exist- ence of said State be acknowledged by the Government of the United States." Jackson had intimated that the fate of that country might be considered as depending on the outcome of a projected Mexican expedition under General Bravo ; and Walker announced that according to advices from Vera Cruz this expedition had proved abortive. A more serious cause of delay, however, as the Texan envoy felt satisfied, was the fear of the Van Buren party that, should the independence of Texas be acknowledged, the subject of annexa- tion would immediately be pressed, the Democrats would divide sectionally upon it in the approaching elections, and their leader — compelled to lose one wing or the other — would find his friends a minority in the next Congress. On this difficulty the abandonment of Bravo's enterprise had no bearing, and Walker's resolution was merely permitted to slumber on the table. ^"^ About the middle of February he called it up and urged that immediate action be taken; but the Senate gave the preference to an " Richardson, Messages, iii., 266. Wharton to Austin, Dec. 22, 1836 : Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 157. '"Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 83. Wharton to Houston, Feb. 2, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 179. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 57 army bill. Two weeks later he repeated his attempt, but again the subject was postponed. On the Kalencls of March, however, he \/ returned once more to the charge ; and this time, despite the opposi- tion of Buchanan, he carried his resolution by a vote of 23 to 19. As the figures indicate, the Senate was by no means full. According to the Alexican minister the advocates of the motion had entertained little or no hope of securing a victory; but at the evening session, observing that eight or nine of their opponents were absent — at a banquet, it was said — they exerted themselves to the utmost and triumphed. Silas Wright of New York then reported a bill making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the govern- ment, and he himself moved to amend it by providing for a Secre- tary of Legation in Texas. This was agreed to; but when Walker proposed as a further amendment that a minister be actually sent to that country as soon as the President should receive satisfactory evidence of her independence, his motion failed by a vote of 16 to 21. The next day Wright's bill, as amended by himself, passed the Senate.^^ In the House a move toward recognition was made at the end of April, 1836, and was voted down. During the last week of June Bell of Tennessee brought up the matter of providing a salary and outfit for an agent in Texas, whenever the President should deem it proper to send such a representative, and asked for a suspension of the rules in order that his proposition might be considered ; but the subject was laid on the table by a vote of 135 to 56. July 2, however, notice was given by the committee on foreign affairs of an intention to report on the great question ; and two days later it pre- sented the resolution that had been offered by Clay's committee and adopted by the Senate. Adams moved to lay the matter on the table, but was defeated by a vote of 40 to 108. On the ground that no time to discuss the subject remained, the previous question was then ordered, and the resolution passed by a vote of more than six to one.^- In the next session of this Congress, the President's Message of December 21 was referred without opposition to the House committee on foreign affairs. About three weeks later Pickens inquired on the floor when a report concerning the Texas affair " Castillo to Relac, No. 37, March 9, 1837: Sria. Relac. Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 175, 210, 214, 216. The vote on Walker's resolution was given in the Cong. Globe as 23-19, but only 22 names appear in the Affirmative list. Six of these were from the North, and four of the Noes came from the South. ^^ Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 338, 469, 483, 486. 58 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS would be ready, and Colonel Howard of Maryland, the chairman, replied that "almost undivided attention" had been given to the subject but as yet no conclusion had been reached. Near the end of January an attempt was made to instruct the committee to bring in a resolution acknowledging the independence of Texas, but this was blocked by adjourning. About a fortnight later, Waddy Thompson of South Carolina undertook to lay the matter before the full House sitting as a committee of the whole on the state of the Union ; but a technicality tripped him. Finally on the eighteenth of February the committee reported, first, that the independence of Texas '' ought to be recognised," and secondly, that a salary and outfit should be provided for " such public agent " as the President might " determine to send " there. ^^ Three days later this matter was reached in due order. Thomp- son and Pickens expressed great eagerness for the immediate con- sideration of it; but on the plea that other committees wished to report, it was laid upon the table. February 2^, however, the bill for the civil and diplomatic expenses came up, and this Thompson moved to amend by inserting a provison for the salary and outfit of a diplomatic agent to be sent to the " independent republic of Texas." In supporting his proposition, Thompson said it was not his fault that so little time remained for discussing it, the attention of the House having been squandered on personal or local matters. Why has this question been so long postponed ? he demanded ; " Are gentlemen afraid of the argument? Are they afraid that a spon- taneous burst of popular enthusiasm will force them to do that to which the cold, selfish, and sectional feelings of politicians are opposed?" Mason of Ohio replied that Texas was unable to maintain her national position without aid from the United States and did not really wish to be independent; that she had desired from the first to enter the Union; that her chief offices were filled by Americans ; and that, at all events, the United States ought to confer with Mexico before recognizing her; and Thompson's amendment was lost by a vote of two to one. The next day, how- ever, he renewed his attempt; but he then consented to omit the word "independent" and to add the qualification, "whenever the President of the United States may receive satisfactory evidence that Texas is an independent power, and shall deem it expedient to appoint such minister," and in this form his motion passed.^* "Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 45, 96, 129, 181, 194. "Cong. Globe. 24 Cong., 2 sess., 196, 211, 213. Benton, Abr. Debates, xiii., 325. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 59 Both Houses of Congress had now acted in a sense rather in- consistent with the judicious pohcy recommended by the President within three months, and it is highly interesting — particularly in view of the hue-and-cry raised by the anti-slavery men — to inquire what reasons there were for such a course. Apparently it was quite open to censure. Very good reasons existed. Toward the close of 1836 the Mexican minister had called for his passports, and before leaving the country had circulated among the diplomatic corps a pamphlet criticising in such a manner the government to which he had been accredited that it became a serious issue between the United States and his nation. Of course there was very great anxiety to know whether his action would be endorsed by his superiors ; and about the middle of January, 1837, it was learned at Washington that ac- cording to the official Diario his conduct in this country had been approved. December 28, 1836, Ellis, our minister at Mexico, unable to obtain any satisfaction regarding the American claims, withdrew the legation, and therefore our government felt deeply injured not only in their dignity but in their interests. War appeared to be the only recourse, and a tender regard for the susceptibilities of Mexico seemed quite uncalled for. This, however, was but one element of the changed situation. A secret reason for postponing the recognition of Texas had been the hope of arranging matters through a treaty with Santa Anna, and that hope vanished in Jan- uary or February, 1837. Ellis arrived at Washington bringing what seemed to be conclusive evidence that another invasion of Texas was not possible ; while Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, made a virtual recognition of Texan independence — the only recognition that could be expected from that proud country for many years to come — by freely confessing before Jackson and the cabinet that his nation could not hold the rebellious province were they to conquer it in the field, and even announced that he strongly desired, as one step toward a definitive settlement with Texas, that the United States recognize her.^^ ^^Niles, Nov. ig, 1836. (Pamphlet) Ex. Doc. 190, 25 Cong., 2 sess. Forsyth characterized the pamphlet as " defamatory." (Issue) Ex. Doc. 252, 25 Cong,, 3 sess., pp. 15, 16. (Diario) Ellis, Dec. 9, 1836: Sen. Doc, 160, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 157. (Withdrew) Id., Jan. 12, 1837: ib., 169. Id. to Monasterio, Dec. 7, 1836: Ex. Doc. 139, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 60, etc. Id., No. 41, Dec. 14, 1836. (Reason) Wharton to Austin, Dec. 31, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 166. S. Anna was in Washington near the end of Jan., 1837 (Niles, Jan. 21, 1837). (Conclusive) Wharton to Hous- ton, Feb. 2, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 179. (S. Anna) Wharton to Rusk, No. 9, 6o THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS It was brought home to Jackson after his two Messages were sent in, that for want of American acknowledgment before the world Texan lands worth fully a dollar an acre could hardly be sold for half that price; and he, regretting the injury done that country by his action, however necessary the action might have been, intimated that he should take no offense were Congress to move now in the opposite direction. Moreover the President saw a new light — or rather a new darkness — in another quarter also; and, as he made it known to the House of Representatives, he prob- ably did not conceal it from the Senate. " There is no doubt," he v/rote to Howard, " if the Independence of Texas be not acknowl- edged by the U. States, an effort will be made by Texas to Great Britain to have the Independence of Texas acknowledged by her, giving & securing to Great Britain as a consideration, exclusive com- mercial benefits."^" Further still, Jackson asked for an interview with Howard, which suggests that he imparted something even more special. What this was, can only be surmised ; but we know that an anti- slavery New Englander, Daniel Webster, had forewarned the gov- ernment of European attempts to purchase Texas ; we know that in July, 1836, Pakenham had notified the British Foreign Office of Mexico's desire to have Great Britain own that territory ; we know that a move to effect the transfer was undertaken in the Mexican Congress during March, 1837, and almost certainly must have been preceded by a rather long period of talk ; we know that the American consul in Mexico was soon writing about the matter ; and we know that Ellis, quite sure to be informed of it earlier than the consul, had arrived at Washington by the date on which Jackson asked for this interview. Now if there was thought to be even a possibility of such a transfer, the immediate acknowledgment of Texan inde- pendence was a natural and proper counterstroke.^^ At all events, whether England was bargaining for the territory undated: ib., 187 (193). In Feb., 1837, the President formally recommended reprisals against Mexico, and a little later the House of Representatives expressed the opinion that amicable relations with that country did not exist and could not, without a sacrifice of the national honor, be restored by sending a minister to it (Ho. Report 1056, 25 Cong., 2 sess.). '"(No offense) Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837: Tex, Dipl. Corr., i., 168. Jackson to Howard, Feb. 2, 1837: Jackson Pap. "Jackson to Howard (note 16). (Webster^ Abr. Debates, xii., 763. Pak., No. 48, July I, 1836. (Congress) Parrott to State Dept., July 29, 1837: Con. Letters, Mexico, ix. (Consul) Jones to State Dept., March 28, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 212. (Arrived) cf. Jackson to Howard with Ellis to State Dept., Jan. 12, 1837 (Note is). TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 6I or not, Texas was evidently in sore straits ; and the danger was ap- parently real and pressing that if coldly repulsed by the United States, she would not only buy European assistance with commercial arrangements injurious to American business interests, but would so entangle herself in foreign relations as to render her annexation to our country extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, at any future time. Besides, Van Buren had been told in plain terms that since it rested with him to ensure or prevent recognition at the session of Congress then proceeding, should the measure be defeated he would lose the support of the entire South ; and in all probability he exerted himself at the White House and at the Capitol to avert so dire a calamity. Such, then, were the circumstances, and it is not at all surprising that Congress acted as it did. The sole condition of acknowledgment regarded as necessary by Webster and Clay, by the Senate committee on foreign relations and by the Senate as a body, was evidence that a competent government existed in Texas ; in the opinion of many persons — justified by later history — such evidence was at hand ; and revolutionary governments have usually, or at least often, been recognized before absolute proof of this fact could be given. The claim of Mexico was virtually relinquished by her President. Disregard of her feelings appeared to be made excusable by her course toward the United States ; and certain ele- ments of the situation seemed not only to authorize but really to demand immediate action. Finally, it should be remembered that while Mexico was recognized about seven months after her revo- lutionary troops entered the capital, our acknowledgment of Texan independence was deferred until more than ten months had elapsed after the power of the mother-country in the province had been demolished and her President captured. ^^ According to Anson Jones, a little later Texan minister to the United States, the President was " very reluctant " to recognize Texas at this time, and no doubt he did shrink from appearing to change his attitude so soon. To the last he positively refused to " (Van B.) Wharton to Rusk, Feb. 12, 1837: Tex, Dipl. Corr., i., 184. Webster (to Thompson, July 8, 1842: Ex. Doc. 266, 2y Cong., 2 sess., 7) declared that the independence of Texas was recognized " only when that independence was an apparent and an ascertained fact." The point has been made that Jackson had no time to " receive satisfactory evidence " of the condition of Texas between Feb. 28 and the night of March 3. To this it may be answered (i) that he had time for confere:ice with numerous persons well informed on the matter, and it was for him to decide whether their testimony was "satisfactory evidence"; and (2) that the rtal requirement was that he should he in possession of such evidence before acting. Iturbide entered Mexico Sept. 27, 1821. Monroe declared for recognition, March 8, 1822; the House, March 28; the Senate, April 30. 62 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS send in a Message embodying his new convictions, but he admitted that his opinion regarding the propriety of action had changed, and on the final day of his term he addressed the Senate. Both Houses, he said, have inserted in the general appropriation laws (as the result of repeated discussions regarding Texas) a provision for the salary and outfit of a diplomatic agent, who is to be sent to that country whenever the Executive is satisfied of her independence and deems it expedient to appoint such a minister; and the Senate, the constitutional advisers of the President, have expressed the opinion that it is now expedient and proper to acknowledge the independence of this young republic. " Regarding these proceedings as a virtual decision of the question submitted by me to Congress, I think it my duty to acquiesce therein, and therefore I nomxinate Alcee La Branche of Louisiana, to be Charge d'Afifaires to the Republic of Texas." Having thus committed himself, at a little before mid- night he completed the work by sending for the Texan envoys to have a glass of wine with him, and by causing them — reported the Mexican minister — to be invited like other members of the diplo- matic body to the ceremonies of inauguration day.^° These are the facts. In consequence, all the violent denuncia- tions of Jackson as insincere and crafty, based upon his change of attitude between December 21 and March 3, seem quite unfounded; and, in view of the repeated efforts of the friends of Texas in both Senate and House to bring up the question of acknowledging her independence for full discussion and a deliberate verdict, one is surprised to find thirteen members of Mir national legislature de- claring that she had been recognized "by a snap vote, at the heel of a session of Congress," as if that body had fallen victim to a conspiracy and a trick. No doubt Walker took advantage of his opponents' blunder ; but that is customary in legislative bodies, and the manner in which they had endeavored — it would seem — to pre- vent the matter from receiving fair consideration, justifi J him still further. Besides, his proposition had been before the Senate a long "Jones, Memor., 79. (Refused) Wharton and Hunt to Rusk, Feb. 20, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Com, i., 197 ; and the fact that he sent no such message. Richardson, Messages, iii., 281. Wharton to Hend., March 5, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 201. (Inv.) Castillo to Relac, No. 37, March 9, 1837 : Sria. Relac. The Senate adjourned without acting on the nomination of La Branche, but he was confirmed later. His instructions were of the conventional sort. It has been objected (Von Hoist,. U. S., ii., 591) that at this time it was not yet certain that Texas would be able to perform the duties of an independent state ; but the same was true of the U. S. in 1778 and of the Spanish-American republics when we recognized them, and evidently must often be true in such cases. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 63 time, and the debate on it began in the afternoon, so that every one had a full warning.-" Recognition, however, in the minds of many was only a prelude to annexation. In November, 1836, after Texas had voted in favor of joining the United States, Wharton, her minister at Washington, was directed to make an effort in behalf of that project. The next month Henderson, acting for the time as Texan Secretary of State, wrote that unless the Union would accept the oft'er, commercial arrangements with England or some other European power might be made, " which would forever and entirely preclude the people of the United States " — particularly those of the North — from finding any profit in Texan business ; while also, by suggesting that a joint resolution of the American Congress could admit his country, he pointed the way to the method finally adopted. Accordingly, Wharton and Hunt addressed to Jackson an affecting appeal in favor of the project. But in addition to embarrassments caused by sectional differences in Congress, Forsyth, our Secretary of State, believed that annexation ought to be the work of " a Northern Presi- dent," and nothing beyond recognition could be gained at that time. Possibly in consequence of this failure. Hunt then suggested that an acknowledgment of their country be purchased from England with commercial concessions, expressing the opinion that success in this manoeuvre, added to the ardent interest of the South, would ensure acceptance by the United States ; and Henderson was ap- pointed envoy to England and France in the following June. The next month Hunt was able to report that this movement had aroused fresh ardor among the friends of Texas, and to intimate that Presi- dent Van Buren himself was likely to favor the cause. Probably, too, he believed that in view of the Southern disposition to secure the coveted territory even at the cost of disunion the administra- tion would hardly venture, whatever might be its preference, to stand in the way ; and finally, thus' encouraged, he presented to our Secretary of State on the fourth of August, 1837, a formal proposi- tion for the adoption of his country.-^ ^ (Thirteen) Detroit Daily Adv., May 15, 1843, and other newspapers. ^'Austin to Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 127. Hend. to Hunt, Dec. 31, 1836: ib., 161. Wharton and Hunt to Jackson, March 3. 1837: Jackson Pap. (Forsyth) Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 168. Hunt to Hend., April 15, 1837: ib., 208. (Apptd.) Irion to Hend., June 25, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 808. Hunt to Tex. Sec. State, July 11 ; (disunion) Aug. 4, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 235, 245. Id. to Forsyth, Aug. 4, 1837: Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., I sess., 2. 64 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Meantime the subject made its appearance in the American Con- gress. One day after the battle of San Jacinto was fought, Walker set the ball in motion by suggesting that the rebellious province be purchased. A month later Calhoun announced that he stood for annexation as well as recognition, declaring that the slave States were greatly interested to prevent Texas from having the power to annoy them, and that for the shipping and manufacturing in- terests of the East the acquisition of that country was no less desirable. In July, on the other hand, Benton took the position that to consider as yet the admission of Texas would be "to treat her with disrespect, to embroil ourselves with Mexico, to compromise the disinterestedness of our motives in the eyes of Europe, and to start among ourselves prematurely, and wthout reason, a question, which, whenever it should come, could not be without its own in- trinsic difficulties and perplexities " ; and, up to the time when an- nexation was formally proposed by the Texan representative, no definite move was made in either House ; while President Jackson, though doubtless keenly desirous of acquiring the territory, would not lift a hand.^- In his application. Hunt gave a brief history of Texan affairs from the first stages of American colonization, and asked for an- nexation on the grounds that his fellow-countrymen were of the same blood as the citizens of the United States, possessed the same liberties, entertained the same devout reverence for the constitution, were quite worthy to become a part of the American people, and could add to our national power and wealth resources of immense value. As a member of the Union, Texas could also aid to protect the western frontier of the United States and assure us the control of the Gulf ; while, were she to remain independent, she would become a formidable rival, and on account of tariffs and the very similarity of the two peoples and their institutions, would very possibly come to be involved in difficulties and collisions with the neighboring States.-^ To this argument Forsyth replied three weeks later that the President had read Hunt's paper with " just sensibility " but with- out assenting to his proposal. With the historical aspects of the matter the American government could not properly concern them- selves, he remarked, since acknowledgment had reference only to an ^Cotig. Globe, 24 Cong., i sess., 378, 394, 479. For Benton's remarks see his Abr. Debates, July i. 1836. (Jackson) Wise, Decades, 152; Jones, Memor., 81. ==■ Hunt to Forsyth, Aug. 4, 1837 : Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., 2. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 65 issue of fact, not to one of right; while as regarded the incorporation of Texas in the United States,_ the President deemed it inexpedient to raise the questions whether the organic law contemplated the annexation of an independent state, and if so "in what manner" it should be accomplished. Furthermore, this country was bound to ]\Iexico by a treaty of amity, which would be " scrupulously ob- served " so long as hope remained that the other party would pursue a similar course ; and the government might be suspected of a disregard of the friendly purposes of this compact, " if the over- tures of General Hunt were to be even reserved for future considera- tion, as this would imply a disposition on our part to espouse the quarrel of Texas with Mexico, a disposition wholly at variance with the spirit of the treaty, with the uniform policy and obvious welfare of the United States." Hunt rejoined by urging that, if the United States could rightfully have bought Texas, as they had endeavored to do, from a revolutionary government not yet acknowledged by the parent nation, they could now rightfully annex it, intimating that the commercial policy of his country would become unfavor- able to the United States, and hinting that she might find England and France deeply interested in her fortunes ; but his arguments appeared to produce no effect whatever.-'* Precisely what considerations actuated Van Buren's adminis- tration were clearly and no doubt with substantial accuracy ex- plained by Hunt. The American government, including the Presi- dent himself, desire to receive Texas, he wrote ; " But hampered as they are by their party trammels on the one hand, and their treaty obligations with Mexico on the other, by the furious opposi- tion of all the free States, by the fear of incurring the charge of false dealings and injustice, and of involving this country in a war, in which they are now doubtful whether they would even be sup- ported by a majority of their own citizens, and which would be at once branded by their enemies at home and abroad as an unjust war, instigated for the very purpose of gaining possession of Texas and for no other, they dare not and will not come out openly for the measure, so long as the relative position of the three parties [the United States, Mexico and Texas] continues the same as it is at present " ; while many, even among the friends of annexation, dread to bring on — by raising this issue — a life-and-death struggle between North and South, involving as it would " the probability of "Forsyth to Hunt, Aug. 25, 1837: Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., 11. Reply, Sept. 12, 1837 : ib., 14. 6 66 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS a dissolution " of the Union. It was therefore useless, Hunt con- cluded, and it would be derogatory to his country, to urge the proposition further. By February, 1838, however, a flurry of hope sprang up. The prospect of a treaty between Texas and England, which might create international relations incompatible with annexa- tion, alarmed Van Buren, and Calhoun thought the measure might pass at once. But the hope soon faded, and Forsyth evidently took the ground that, as he stated a few months later, the Texan proposi- tion had been " disposed of.""^ The executive department, however, was not the only one con- cerned in this matter, and the twenty-fifth Congress was kept very warm by it. Calhoun threw down the gauntlet in December, 1837, by offering a resolution which affirmed the just and constitutional right of the South and West to extend their limits or increase their population without regard to the effect of that course upon slavery ; but Preston succeeded in laying this resolution upon the table in order to clear a way for a more direct issue presented by himself (January 4, 1838), which was a definite resolution in favor of re- annexing Texas whenever that could be done " consistently with the public faith and treaty stipulations of the United States " and with- out disturbing the harmony subsisting between this country and Mexico.-** But by this time the general enthusiasm for the brave freemen struggling against a horde of cruel oppressors had greatly abated here. One illustration will suffice. President Burnet was from Newark, New Jersey, and in April and May, 1836, the Daily Ad- vertiser of that city expressed much sympathy for his nation ; but in October it permitted its readers to see that great disorder and confusion reigned beyond the Sabine, and a few weeks later it referred to Texas as a " Quasi Republic." Nor was there merely a subsidence of feeling. In view of the certainty that annexation would be urged, people had to think ; and even in South Carolina the Executive and House agreed that until the war should end, this question ought not even to be entertained by the American Con- gress. In the North Governor McDuffie's arguments had no less weight than at home, and they were supplemented by others not inferior in strength. As early as September, 1836, the cor- respondent of the London Times reported that the eastern and =* Hunt to Irion, Jan. 31 ; Feb. 3, 1838: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 284, 290. Forsyth to Van B., May 30, 1838: Ex. Doc. 409, 25 Cong., 2 sess. ■"Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 55, 76, 96, 98; App., 108, 555, 556. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 67 middle States were " warmly opposed " to the idea of annexation because it involved the slavery issue ; and the Advertiser of Albany, New York, declared that the project would raise a storm in the North, of which " murmurings were already heard." This feeling was no doubt much intensified by the imprudent course of many newspapers — even leading ones — in the South. A dissolution of the Union was boldly threatened as the alternative of accepting Texas ; and boasts were made that Northern domination would come to an end, were that extension of the national area secured. Language like this, as the Texan minister himself pointed out, was calculated to drive the free States into an inveterate hostility to the admission of his country ; and probably the average common sense of moderate and conservative Northerners, while avoiding that extreme, settled down to about the opinion expressed by the National Intelligencer, that annexation was perhaps inevitable but would certainly be an evil. Such a mood was by no means favorable.-'^ Aloreover many in that section were not satisfied with passive resistance, and not a few bestirred themselves mightily. In June, 1837, the American Anti-Slavery Society circulated petitions and invited signatures with great activity. Texas, it protested, would make six or eight States as large as Kentucky ; the annexation of it would therefore enable the South to dominate the nation and take away the rights of petition, free speech and the like ; the North would probably not submit; and a dissolution of the federal bond might be the consequence. Philanthropy, Anglo-Saxon devotion to liberty and American love of the Union were supplemented, too, by the fact that Southern domination might result in the overthrow of the protective tariff, the crippling of Northern manufacturers, and serious injury to the Northern shipping business. A combination like this — the slavery question, the rights of petition and free speech, the tariff and the rest — was a mighty force. Petitions, memorials and resolutions poured in upon Congress in such numbers that the chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs described those in his own keeping as measurable " by cubic feet." Garrison's Liberator declared that at a single session of Congress more than 600,000 signatures appeared, " it was said," in the adverse papers. Eight States presented themselves in formal protest. Vermont ^ Daily Adv., Oct. i ; Nov. 14, 1836. (McDuffie) Boston Daily Adv., Dec. 10, 1836. (House) Amer. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1904, p. 84. Times, Oct. 13; Dec. 20 (Alb. Adz'.), 1836. Wharton to Austin, Dec. 11, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 151. Nat. Intel!., July 16, 1836. 68 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS feared that the proposed annexation would give the slaveholding interest such weight that probably soon the Union would be dis- solved or the free section degraded. Rhode Island said that a new compact would be necessary for the incorporation of Texas, and that any attempt to bring in this alien territory would be looked upon by the freemen of the country as manifesting a willingness to destroy the constitution. Massachusetts insisted that only the people themselves could admit a foreign nation, and that any action taken by the government for such a purpose would be null and void. When Alabama passed resolutions in the opposite sense, Ohio and Michigan protested against them. Meanwhile those newspapers in the North which adopted similar views kept up a fierce clamor. " The whole nation," said a prominent member of Congress, " was in a state of agitation, working like a troubled sea." Under such circumstances and with such dangers threatening to follow the enactment of an annexation law, nothing in that direction could be accomplished. Preston's resolution was laid on the table about the middle of June by a vote of 24 to 14; and a similar one offered in the House by Waddy Thompson was smothered by John Quincy Adams, who consumed the morning hour from June 16 until the close of the session was near at hand with a three-weeks address. Doubtless many of the friends of annexation, astonished and dismayed by the strength of the enemy, now gave up in despair. Even the abolitionists felt satisfied that a final victory had been won ; and in a few months Texas formally withdrew from the door of the United States (October 12, 1838).-^ This rebuff, on the one hand official and on the other popular, could not fail to awaken her resentment, and there were circum- stances tending to magnify its efifect. Probably every thoughtful Texan could see advantages in remaining independent. As their dread of another Mexican attack wore ofif, the people began to realize — the British consul at Matamoros learned — that they and the Americans were naturally competitors, and began to calculate the profits of a direct commerce, impeded by no high tariff, with '^ Daily Georgian, Sept. 5, 1840. (Chairman) Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 453- Lib., March 7, 1845. Ex, Docs., 25 Cong., 2 sess., Nos. 55, 182, 196, 211, 373, etc. (Protest) Lib., March 14, 1845. Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 443. See also Ho. Journal. (Satisfied) Lib., March 7, 1845. Jones to Vail, Oct. 12, 1838: State Dept., Notes from Tex. Legation, i. (cf. Irion to Hunt, May 19, 1838: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 329). The reason for the withdrawal was that the pendency of the propo- sition had an unfavorable effect upon negotiations with other powers, and placed Texas in an undignified posture before the world. (See Jones, Memor., 65 ; Nilcs, xlix., 161.) TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 69 foreign nations. Only two months after they declared for annexa- tion by an overwhelming majority, their Secretary of State informed Wharton, the envoy to the United States, in certain " Private and Special instructions,'' that many were thought to have voted in that sense on account of sentimental considerations and " the peculiar circumstances of the times," rather than " mature reflection, on the future glory, interest and prosperity of Texas." " Should our affairs," continued the Secretary, " assume a more favorable aspect by a termination of the war, and a treaty with Mexico, and by the manifestation of a friendly disposition towards us by England and France, it will have a powerful influence on public opinion ; and in all probability decide it in favor of remaining independent." That such a course would be expedient many friends of Texas in the United States felt sure, and they strongly advised her, instead of coming into the Union and suffering from the protective tariff and the anti-slavery agitation, to stay outside, acquire the best parts of Mexico and become a great nation. At the end of 1837 the Texan Secretary of State expressed the opinion that probably, were the question of annexation to be laid before the people at the next election, a majority would vote in the negative. Frederic Leclerc, who seems to have obtained his information on the ground, attri- buted a part of Houston's unpopularity at this period to his wish — resulting doubtless from the apparent impossibility of maintaining a national position — to join the United States ; and a test of public sentiment in the autumn of 1838 tended to confirm this opinion, for Lamar, who desired that his country enjoy an unrestricted trade with all quarters, was chosen President. In his inaugural address the new chief magistrate declared strongly against annexation ; a nearly unanimous vote of the Congress appeared to sustain him ; and the nation as a whole seemed willing to acquiesce. The next year a prominent Englishman, who visited New Orleans and talked with a number of persons from Texas, reported that Mexico was no longer feared there, and that " all desire of admission into the American Union " had " ceased."-" "^ (Consul) Crawford to Pak., May 26, 1837 : F. O., Mexico, cvi. Austin to Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 135. (Friends) Wharton to Austin, Dec. II, 1836: ib., 151. Irion to Hunt, Dec. 31, 1837: ib., 2yT. (This expression of opinion may have been made for effect upon the U. S. government, hut there is no reason to doubt its substantial sincerity.) (Leclerc) Rev. dcs Deux. Mondcs, April IS, 1840, p. 246. (Lamar's policy) Public letter, Galveston News, Nov. 22, 1845. Lamar, Inaug. Address. (Congress, nation) Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. i, 1848, p. 281. Buckingham, Slave States, i., i, 378, 379, 70 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Little by little, however, filial sentiment revived in the country as the people forgot how their overture had been received; and when Texas found herself, early in 1842, weak and disorganized at home and threatened by the consolidated power of Mexico, she turned again toward the United States. In January the charge at Washington was instructed to study the sentiment of Congress and the people, and to ascertain what probability existed that our government would favor annexation. When Van Zandt succeeded Reily, he was referred in this matter to the instructions of his pre- decessor and carefully followed them. But nothing came of these moves, nor was any step taken upon the American side. In Novem- ber, 1 84 1, the Natchez Free Trader said it had reason to believe that a proposition would be brought forward at the next session of Congress by a distinguished gentleman, presumably Senator Walker; and the New York Courier and Enquirer revealed at about the same time " the cloven foot of the devil ... in all its hideous deformity," as the Liberator announced, by uttering a similar hint ; but apparently the distinguished gentleman received no encourage- ment, and certainly nothing was done. Texas then began to revive in strength and hope, and probably, finding that so little was to be gained by courting our favor, her government decided to resume the system of exciting our jealousy. In February, 1843, Secretary of State Jones informed the charge at Washington that the United States must " take some step in the matter, of so decided a char- acter as would open wide the door," before Texas could authorize a treaty of annexation ; and on the sixth of the following July Van Zandt was instructed to pursue the subject no farther.^'^ In other respects as well as in regard to this question the Ameri- can government appeared rather less than kind. We did indeed maintain stoutly, in opposition to the arguments of Mexico, that Texas was an independent nation, but in a sense consistency required this after we had recognized the country ; and we protested vigorously against predatory and barbarous operations on the part of her enemy, but the same remonstrance was delivered to herself. So far as concerned mediation we stood perfectly aloof. In *" (Revived) Sheridan to Ganaway, July 12, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. To Reily, Jan. 20, 1842 (printed) : ib., xiv. Jones (Memor., 8i) says that Reily was author- ized at the beginning of 1842 to inform Tyler verbally that Houston favored annexation. To Van Z., July 26, 1842. Van Z., No. 93, Dec. 23, 1842. (See also Houston's account in his letter to citizens, Oct., 1845: F. O., Texas, xiv.) Free Trader, Nov. 6, 1841. Lib., Dec. 31, 1841. To Van Zandt, Feb. 10, 1843 (printed) : F. O., Texas, xiv. To Id., July 6, 1843. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 71 September, 1836, replying to a letter from Santa Anna, President Jackson said that the United States would not interfere in the con- flict unless Mexico should signify her willingness to accept our good offices ; and this position was restated several times in succeed- ing years. So scrupulous was our impartiality, that our minister at Mexico was rebuked for advancing money to needy Texan prisoners in that capital; and we declined to join in a proposed triple media- tion between the contending parties. After much urgency on the part of Texas, a commercial treaty with that country was negotiated in 1842; but the Senate of the United States rejected it, and accord- ing to Webster the chief cause of this action was a very unpleasant feeling against our neighbors growing out of their alleged failure to be honest. Furthermore it was believed on the other side of the line that Americans who had committed an outrage upon a Texan custom-house were protected by an officer of the United States ; and a party of Texan soldiers occupying ground that was claimed by their country were disarmed by troops of ours.^^ Public sentiment in the United States, as the years passed on, seemed little kinder than the government. In Mississippi the proj- ect of bringing the long desired territory within the pale was never lost sight of ; but elsewhere the matter appeared to be forgotten, and — with the further exception of New Orleans, the commercial centre of Texas — that country wellnigh ceased to be heard of among us. Astonishing indeed seem the evidences of this neglect as one studies, day by day and column by column, the newspapers of all political tones and in all the States for 1840, 1841 and 1842. The Savannah Republican of 1841, for instance, in a file lacking but six numbers, contains only half-a-dozen news items touching that portion of the earth's crust. The Charleston Courier for 1840 hardly alluded to Texas, and mentioned it but very little in 1841 and 1842. The Richmond Enquirer, afterwards noted as perhaps the foremost advocate of annexation among the newspapers, was almost silent about the trans-Sabine territory during 1840 and 1841. The Advertiser of Newark, New Jersey, contained four pieces relating ^^To Thompson-, July 8, 1842 (note 18). To Eve. No. 24, March 17, 1843: State Dept., Instrs. to Mins., Texas, i. (Remonstrance) Eve to Jones. April 13, 1843 : Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 163, Jackson to Santa Anna, Sept. 4, 1836: Doc. 84, 24 Cong., 2 sess. ; Forsyth to Dunlap, July 17, 1839: State Dept., Notes to Texas Leg., vi. ; Id. to Bee, May 4. 1840: ib. ; to Thompson, No. 9, June 22, 1842. (Money) F. Webster to Thompson, No. 17, Sept. 5, 1842. (Mediation) Van Z. to Webster, Jan. 24, 1843 : State Dept., Notes from Tex. Leg., i. ; to Thompson, No. 26. Jan. 31, 1843. (Treaty) Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 576, 614 (Webster). (Outrages) Sen. Doc. I, 28 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 92, 93, 97, loi, 104, 109. 72 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to it in 1840, and thirteen in 1841. A complete file of the Boston Advertiser for 1841, minus a single issue, shows four mentions, and that for 1842 shows eighteen, mainly referring to the Sante Fe and Mier expeditions and the threatened Mexican invasion ; while the Boston Atlas of 1843, equally complete, alluded to Texas only six more times than it alluded to Yucatan and Campeche. Nor should it be forgotten that two of the three principal matters which caused the country to be mentioned were not such as to enhance its reputa- tion. " The first step that led to the injury of the fame of Texas," wrote Jackson, " was that foolish campaign to Santa Fe ; the next the foolish attempt to invade Mexico, without means and men sufficient for the occasion. "^- In 1842, as the file of the Boston Advertiser suggests, interest revived somewhat, for Mexico seemed about to overwhelm the struggling republic with a powerful army. Again meetings were held; again funds were subscribed; and again the "emigrant," lifting his rifle from the wall, hurried to Galveston. But this excite- ment was by no means wholly due to sympathy with Texas. As the jMexican consul at New Orleans reported to his government, the belief was " general all over the United States " that the invasion had been instigated by England, and that English money was to pay the cost of it; and the real object was supposed to be the abolition of slavery, the development of Texas as a rival cotton-growing country, and the execution of British designs against the prosperity of the United States. The negroes of the Southwest would find a refuge on the farther bank of the Sabine, it was thought ; war would follow; the Indians and the blacks would be armed by the enemy; and a servile insurrection in the slave States might ensue. Again arguments for annexation began to he heard; and Tennessee and Louisiana took a formal stand on that side.^^ Yet even now the New York Tribune declared that a move in such a direction would arouse the bitterest hostility throughout the civilized world; and that, if the Texans wished to live under the American government, they could come back far more easily than ^Miss. Hist. Soc. Pub., ix., igi. Jackson to Houston, Aug. 31, 1843: Yoakum, Texas, ii., 406. The Snively expedition was calculated to have a similar effect, but was less conspicuous and perhaps more debatable. '"(Seemed) Nat. hxtcll, Oct. 20, 1842. Consul, No. 79, April i, 1842: Sria. Relac. Crescent City, June 20, 1842, N. Orl. Adv.: Sav. Repub., April 2, 1842. (Stand) Mex. Consul, N, Orl., No. 95, April 11, 1843: Sria. Relac. In connection with this excitement, the British government again warned Mexico that the U, S. authorities had no power to prevent citizens from going to the aid of Texas (To Pak., No. 34, July 15, 1842). TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 73 remain where they were ; while the radical abolitionist sentiment of the time was shown by the comment of the Liberator when the New York Journal of Couuncrcc hoped that Texas might "be found equal " to the crisis. " It is thus," wrote Garrison, *' that, in a single sentence, may be comprehended and expressed all conceivable prof- ligacy of spirit and inhumanity of heart. ... It is impossible for any honest man to wish success to Texas. All who sympathize with that pseudo republic hate liberty, and would dethrone God." More painful still, perhaps, was the crown of ridicule. Early in 1842 a New York paper announced a meeting of the Friends of Texas, and the next morning some two hundred persons came to- gether in front of the city hall. The announcement proved a hoax ; but a loaferish fellow talked for ten minutes from the steps, exhort- ing his listeners to march for the Southwest, and then a ragged urchin of twelve took his place and cried, " Friends of Texas, I propose myself for the ofifice of Brigadier General."^* Remoteness counted for much in this neglect of an important region. Probably, too, the tariff that went into effect there in February, 1842, and bore hard upon American products and manu- factures, had an influence. But no doubt the supposed character of the population signified a great deal more. Every now and then some bad or unfortunate man hurried to that refuge; and of course one absconding debtor or escaping criminal made more noise than fifty sober and industrious emigrants. Annexation, protested the New York Sun in 1838, would merely give us land and some "un- profitable members of society." In 1842 a correspondent of the Salem, Massachusetts, Observer exclaimed, " We have territory enough, and bad morals enough, and public debt enough, and slavery enough, without adding thereunto by such a union." " To all intents and purposes," lamented the Savannah Republican in 1844, "Texas has been the Botany Bay of the United States for the last eight years." About the same time Dr. Everitt, a citizen of that country, returned home from a trip to New York and the Northeast, and he summed up his observations in these words : " Texas, in the Northern States, stands as low in the grade of nations as it is possible a Nation can be and exist." Charles J. Ingersoll, a promi- nent member of Congress from Pennsylvania, remarked that at this ^* Tribune, Nov. 14, 1842. Lib., Oct. 14, 1842. N. Y. Journ. Com.: Savannah Rcpub., April 6, 1842. 74 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS period our next neighbor on the south was little known by the greater part of us and was less liked.^^ In short, after the early attempts at annexation had failed, one discovers in the United States no general wish to bring her within the pale, no zeal to draw closer the mutual ties, and only the faintest public interest in her existence. No pressing need of lands could, indeed, be felt in so big and so undeveloped a country as ours then was. Individuals crossed the frontier as they were moved by the spirit or the sherifif, and in that way the process of expansion was going on there as elsewhere in the West, aided in this instance by immunity from the effect of American laws. But that, is all one can safely assert; and the ignorance, indifference and disesteem that prevailed in reference to the Lone Star republic became im- portant factors when the annexation issue finally appeared at the front.^^ On the other side Murphy, our charge in Texas, reported privately to the Secretary of State in July, 1843, that he observed ill-feeling and sometimes resentment against his country among all parties and in every quarter. The basis, too, of the feeling was in part no less disquieting than the fact. Not only had the wish of the nation to join us been coldly received, not only had the American government extended no aid to that country in her struggle to obtain recognition from Mexico, not only had there been other general and particular causes of dissatisfaction, but the archives of our legation had been so carelessly guarded that certain despatches had become public, and these were freely cited as evidence that the United States could not be counted upon as a friend. In an emergency, therefore, assistance was to be expected only from Eng- land or France. Indeed an administration organ, the National Vindicator, of which the charge sent a specimen, v>'ent so far as to declare that our government had not even kept their promises ; and this assertion. Murphy added, expressed " the avowed sentiments of the administration."^^ The disposition of Texas to remain independent and extend had * (Tariff) Nat. Intell, March 2, 1842 (flour. $1.00 per bbl, ; most grain, 20 cents per bushel ; pork, $3.00 per bbl. ; hats, shoes and boots, 25 per cent. ; clothing, furniture and tinware, 30 per cent.; etc.). Sun, Jan. 24, 1838. Observer: Lib., March 4, 1842. Repub., May 11, 1844. (Everitt) Jones, Memor., 270. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 84. *' It is confirmatory of this view that Tyler's annexation treaty was fiercely condemned for the alleged reason that it presented a new issue, upon which the people of the day had not reflected. " Murphy to Legare, July 8, 1843, private: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 72. TEXAS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1836-1843. 75 therefore a profound meaning for the United States. It suggested the appearance on our flank of an ambitious, aggressive and un- friendly state, owning the mineral wealth of Mexico and California, possessing the finest port on the western shore of North America and what is now the most valuable harbor on the Gulf, threatening to outdo us in the production of a staple that was at once our most important export and our strongest lever on the Old World, likely for many years to injure not a little our commerce, manufactures and national revenue by wholesale smuggling, and almost certain to make us trouble with one or more of the great European powers. Nor had the government of the Union any excuse for ignoring this disagreeable prospect. In December, 1837, the Texan Secretary of State wrote to the charge at Washington, evidently for effect upon our Executive, that should Texas retain her sovereignty she would pursue the destiny suggested by her emblem, " the evening star," " embrace the shores of the Pacific as well as those of the Gulf," and become " an immense cotton and sugar growing nation in intimate connection with England, and other commercial and manufacturing countries of Europe."^* ** In 1844 the smuggling on Red River was said to be notorious (Galv. Civilian in Houston Telegraph, June 26. 1844). Irion to Hunt, Dec. 31, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 277. Hunt's correspondence with Forsyth also was very suggestive. J Texas and Europe, 1836-1843. France acknowledged the independence of Texas in 1839; and when Mexico protested, the President of the Council replied that the government, having made a "mature and impartial study of the situation'" and satisfied themselves " that the existence of Texas was an accomplished fact, against which all the efforts of Mexico would be unable to prevail (iie saiiraient prcvaloir) ," had felt compelled to consult the interests of their country and sign a treaty with the new nation. From this time on France wore a decidedly cordial face, and her minister to Mexico was instructed in 1842 to bring about, if he could, an amicable settlement between the belligerents. Not only her support but her example also was valuable, and in 1840 Texas was recognized by Holland and by Belgium. The influence of Prance in Texan affairs during the period of this chapter was, however, but slight. In the first place her policy had no ends in view except a natural development of trade in what seemed like a promis- ing quarter; in the second her chief representative, the Comte de Saligny, had a strong preference for New Orleans as a place of sojourn; and in the third that gentleman quarrelled with the govern- ment of the nation to which he was accredited in a way that added nothing to either his popularity or his prestige. '^ By all odds the most important European relations of Texas were with England. Obviously her first step was to secure from that power an acknowledgment of her independence ; and as early as 1836 the Texan envoy to the United States was instructed to talk with the British minister, point out the benefits that could be derived from his country, and endeavor to obtain the much desired recognition. In June, 1837, as we have seen, Henderson was appointed envoy to England and France, and by him the formal advances were made. At the following Christmas, however, he learned from Palmerston that the British cabinet not only declined to recognize the new repub- lic then, but would not promise to do so should her national position * See General Note, page i. Garro, No. lo, Oct. 13, 1839. Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 1103. (Sojourn) Newark Adv.. April 30, 1845. (Quarrel) Garrison, Texas, 252; London Times, July 13, 1841; Ainory to Mayfield, May 20, 1841 : Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 495. 76 TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 77 be maintained for a certain length of time ; and the years 1838 and 1839 passed by with equal ill-success.- These facts, however, did not signify that England felt the country had no title to recognition. In July, 1836, Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, reported that in his belief the men in power there saw they could not regain the lost province. Two years later Ashburnham, then charge at the same capital, wrote that he hoped no insuperable obstacle stood in the way of recognizing Texas and added : " The re-conquest of that Country by the Mexican Gov- ernment is highly problematical ; its power to retain it, if re-con- quered, scarcely within the bounds of possibility;" and the delusion of attempting to reassert its former sovereignty, very injurious to the mother-country. By April, 1839, the British Foreign Office was convinced that a war to put down the colonists would probably fail, and that in any event Mexico could not hold the territory; and soon it was confirmed in this opinion by learning that the Mexican Minis- ter of Foreign Relations entertained the same view. Meantime Pakenham was insistently pointing out the prospect that Texas would rapidly grow and the importance of securing her friendship. Yet still she was not recognized by Great Britain.^ Nor did this inaction signify indifference. As early as 1830 Hus- kisson declared publicly that the United States could not be suffered " to bring under their dominion a greater portion of the shores of the Gulf of Mexico" than already belonged to them; and from his connection with Canning it may be supposed that the Foreign Office felt apprehensive of the annexation of Texas to this country and had resolved to oppose it. Naturally, then. Great Britain watched with great interest the revolution of 1836 and in particular everything suggestive of American interference. All the articles in our news- papers bearing upon these subjects, reported our minister, were " eagerly " republished by the British journals ; and he said that England, already looking to the probability that Texas would enter the Union, was "preparing" to stand in the way. In August, 1836, the subject came before the House of Commons. It was protested that we could not be allowed to " pursue a system of aggrandise- ment " ; and Palmerston himself went so far as to say, that any = Austin to Wharton, Nov. i8, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 135. Irion to Hend., June 25, 1837: ib., ii., 808. Hend. to Irion, No. 4, Jan. s, 1838: ib., 839. *Pak., No. 48, July i, 1836. Ashburnham to F. O., No. 47, June 24, 1838: F. O., Mexico, cxiv. To Pak., No. 9, April 25, 1839. Pak., No. 45, June 3, 1839. See Adams, British Interests, 29. yg THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS danger of the annexation of the territory in question to the United States "would be a subject which ought seriously to engage the attention of that House and of the British public."* For certain reasons, moreover, it was distinctly advisable to recog- nize Texas. Obviously England, having large investments in Mex- ican mines and other properties and enjoying the lion's share of the foreign trade of that country, wished her to prosper and therefore wished her to be at peace. At first, as Palmerston afterwards ad- mitted in the House of Commons, it was hoped that she would recover the province, but that prospect soon faded ; and then it was clearly seen to be desirable that she accept the situation and refrain from wasteful efforts, which a British acknowledgment of the col- onists, tending strongly to show the futility of all attempts at recon- quest, would help to make her do. England also wished to sell as many goods as possible to the Texans, and for that reason had an interest in promoting their success. Unless outdone in sagacity by the London Colonial Gazette, she perceived that so long as the American protective tarifif remained in force, there was a feasible way to escape the duties by sending merchandise to the United States via Galveston instead of via New York. Certainly, too, she desired Texas to become an independent cotton-growing state and relieve her from an embarrassing dependence upon the American planters ; and in fact Palmerston said this in the House of Commons. The London Times considered it important that the new republic become both a barrier and a rival to the United States, and probably no tuition from a newspaper was necessary to suggest such ideas to the government. In view of all these inducements it is not surpris- ing that in October, 1838, the British minister to Mexico was in- structed to press upon the authorities of that country the wisdom of recognizing their former subjects as independent. Why, then, did not England herself take the step that she recommended?^ It has been suspected that she feared lest her taking it should facilitate annexation ; but the course thus urged upon Mexico was calculated to work far more strongly that way, and moreover the United States had refused to receive Texas in 1837. A certain delay was doubtless necessary for the watching of events and calculating * (Huskisson) Ant. Hist. Rev., x'u, 795, note, Stevenson to State Dept., No. 4, Aug. 6, 1&36: State Dept., Desps, from Mins., England, xliv. (Commons, Aug. 5) Hansard. 3 ser., xxxv., 928-942. '(Palmerston) London Times, March 2, 1848. Col. Gas.: Phila. No. Ainer., Jan. 6, 1 84 1. London Times, Nov. 27, 1840. Pak., No. 45, June 3, 1839, refers to the verbal instructions. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 79 of chances; but by the time she was ready to advise another nation what pohcy to adopt she must have had a pohcy herself. No doubt there was a reluctance to offend the mother-country by recognizing her rebellious daughter; but England was not afraid of Mexico and had less need of her than had she of England. Much more fruitful is a different line of thought. The British government ardently desired at this time to bring about the abolition of slavery in Texas. Palmerston admitted publicly at a later day that they would have been " most delighted " to obtain this concession. Evidently they tried to carry the point, for he said, " We could not obtain it " ; and the Texan envoy, in announcing his total failure to win recognition, placed slavery in the first position among the obstacles encountered. The colonial secretary of Barbadoes, who had visited Texas, reported that in his opinion she would give up the peculiar institution to secure from Great Britain an acknowledgment of her independence; the British government had no doubt been able to suspect as much from her eagerness to gain that favor ; and it seems reasonable to suppose that they deferred recognition in the hope of obtaining sooner or later in exchange for it the concession they desired.® In 1840, however, the acknowledgment was granted. Weighty considerations now required the step to be taken. In the first place Texas was at this time clearly entitled to what she asked. In the second British interests demanded that a commercial treaty should be made with her. Thirdly, England wanted to deprive the United States of support on the great question of the right of search, and Texas was willing to concede that sine qua non of acknowledgment. Again, England wished her to remain free from the restrictions of the American tariff both as an open market for British manufac- tures and as the means of attacking that tariff by smuggling, wished her still to be an independent producer of cotton, and wished her to stand permanently as a barrier against possible encroachments on Mexico; and while there was danger even yet that recognition might facilitate her incorporation in the United States, there was also a hope now that admittance into the family of nations and a swelling tide of prosperity might render her strong enough and proud enough to maintain her nationality. To prevent her from falling a prey to the American Eagle, English advice could be very helpful, and ob- viously the British could not expect to wield much influence in her " (Palmerston) : note 5. Hend. to Irion, No. 4, Jan. 5, 1838. Sheridan to Ganaway, July 12, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. 8o THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS counsels unless they consented to recognize her, especially as the United States and France had already taken this step. Finally the British government may have believed, as an envoy of Texas had urged, that an acknowledgment of her independence would tend to bring about peace between her and Mexico, and thus would render British interests in the latter country considerably less precarious. Accordingly in November, 1840, a treaty of amity and commerce, a treaty providing for mediation, and a treaty aimed at the suppression of the slave trade were concluded ; and Palmerston, in reply to the protest of JMexico, frankly described her hopes of recovering Texas as " visionary." There occurred, however, a delay in carrying these treaties into effect. For some reason the slave trade agreement did not reach Texas promptly, and from this and other causes it failed to be ratified immediately by that government. Very possibly the British ministry became suspicious that a scheme to evade it existed, and they declined to exchange the ratifications of the other instru- ments until the whole business could be completed. But finally on the twenty-eighth of June, 1842, this was done and the republic of Texas thereby recognized.'^ In consequence of the conclusion of these treaties in 1840 Cap- tain Charles Elliot of the royal navy was appointed consul general for that country, and the intention was announced of making him charge d'affaires also on the exchange of the ratifications. In May, 1842, he was directed to proceed to his post " with as little delay as possible," and, besides acting as consul, to collect and transmit polit- ical information; and on the twenty-eighth of the following June he was duly invested with a diplomatic character. Evidently the British government felt a desire to understand the situation in the new re- public, and the natural inference is that the possibility of effecting something advantageous there seemed worth considering. The addi- tional fact that before Elliot could be placed in position a semi- official agent visited the ground, gathered facts and smoothed the way to full diplomatic intercourse tends to confirm this inference.^ Elliot was described while in Texas as appearing like " a frank, 'Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Note i. Hamilton to Palmerston, Oct. 14, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. To Smith, March 9, 1842. Palmerston to Murphy, Nov. 25, 1840: F. O., Mexico, cxl. (Delay, etc.) Worley : Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly., ix., 4, 13, 14. (Declined) Everett, No. 13, May 6, 1842. (Done) Nat. Intell., July 25, 1842. "To Elliot, Aug. 4, 1841 ; May 24, May 27, No. 3, May 31 ; No. 6, June 28, 1842. Kennedy, author of a valuable book on Texas, was sent there in 1841 (see also Adams, British Interests, 74-78). He was made consul at Galveston in Sept., 1842, so that Elliot's consular duties were nominal. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 8I bold, honest-hearted Englishman," and also as being an " accom- plished gentleman." He had represented his country at Canton; and, in the exceedingly difficult circumstances which led to the first " opium war " between England and China, had failed to give uni- versal satisfaction at home. Apparently he was not quite anxious enough to save the great stocks of the illicit drug owned by British merchants. After a while he was recalled ; and the London Times, voicing the mercantile sentiment of the metropolis, declared that he was " notoriously unfit to manage a respectable apple-stall," — that is to say, an apple-stall selling gin without a license, — that while acting in China he had betrayed an outrageous lack of judgment, and that he was a person " utterly regardless of British property, or wholly unacquainted with the proper means of protecting it," all of which could be regarded under the circumstances, like many other thun- derings from the same source, as on the whole a compliment. He has also been described as an abolition enthusiast and a political dreamer. But he was no more hostile to slavery, so far as we are aware, than his nation had shown itself, and the British have usually been thought fairly hard-headed ; and though he, like many an able statesman, failed to see his plans realized, he was no more visionary than Sam Houston. Indeed a careful study of his ideas with full knowdedge of the conditions appears to show that however bold they may have been they were nearly all sagacious, and the one or two of which perhaps that can hardly be said at present were based upon views held at the time by many highly intelligent men. Sir Robert Peel testified in Parliament that he exhibited ability and integrity in Texas, while the Texan Secretary of State, writing to the Texan minister at London, spoke warmly of his " great capacity and intelli- gence, his high character, [and his] enlarged and liberal views of national policy " ; and from an examination of his correspondence and proceedings one concludes that until ill-health, disappointment, "private distresses" and the sense of struggling against heavy odds imparted a touch of desperation to his planning, he displayed a very creditable degree of judgment, insight and tact.® The mediation treaty provided that if, within thirty days after it was made known to the government of Mexico by the British repre- " Daingerfield to Jones, Feb. 4, 1843: Jones, Memor.. 207. Smith, Remin., 22. Times, Nov. 22, 1841 ; (Peel) May 25, 1842. To Smith, Sept. 30, 1843. As will bo mentioned in Chapter xviii., a most competent judge of men, acquainted rather closely with Elliot, described him as '"shrewd and cunning." Elliot to Bank., private, June 11, 1845: F. O., Texas, xiii. 82 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS sentative, an unlimited truce should be established between her and Texas, and if within six months from the same date she should conclude a treaty of peace with Texas, then the latter country would assume a million pounds sterling of the Mexican foreign debt. But with a view, it may be supposed, to her general interests Eng- land had undertaken the office of mediator long before agreeing to do so. In the spring of 1839, in accordance with the instructions received the previous autumn, Pakenham urged upon the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations the wisdom of recognizing Texas, dwelling upon the advantage of having a barrier state on the north. At this time Santa Anna occupied the Presidential chair ad interim, while Bustamante was commanding in the field, and it could hardly have been expected that the prisoner of San Jacinto would cordially accept such a recommendation. Some months later Bustamante resumed his functions, and Pakenham then brought the matter to his attention. The President favored the idea of a settlement, and Cahedo, the Minister of Foreign Relations, felt willing to take the lead in that direction provided his colleagues would support him ; but Cafiedo added that more pressing affairs were in the way, and it would be some time before he could move. Pakenham followed the matter up and had several talks with the minister ; but after a time the latter receded somewhat from his position, shrinking like all other Mexicans from the contemplation of Texan independence, and near the close of the year Pakenham found that the attacks of the opposition — particularly those of a newspaper controlled by Santa Anna — had frightened the government from their own conclusion. Then came a swing the other way; and in April, 1840, there were negotiations with Treat, a confidential agent of Texas. ^"^ Finally, after procrastinating in the hope of evading responsi- bility, the administration decided to ask for powers to adjust the con- troversy; but on proposing to the Council of State a policy looking toward a cessation of hostilities, Caiiedo was beaten by Gorostiza. The debate was then made known — probably by the latter — to an opposition paper, and Congress demanded to be informed of every- thing done regarding the affair. The government now found them- selves involved in very serious difficulties ; retired still farther from their conciliatory attitude in order to court popularity ; apathetically '" (Treaty) Tex. Arch. To Pak., No. 9, April 25, 1839. Pak.. Nos. 45, 56. 74, 82, 96; June 3; Aug, i ; Sept. 12; Oct. 5; Nov. 24, 1839. Id. to Hamilton, Dec! 12, 1839: F. O.. Mexico, cxxxiv. Id., Nos. 42, 25, April 30; March 3, 1840, TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 83 permitted Treat to withdraw from the country in disgust ; showed themselves more and more determined, whatever might be the real interest of the country, to " save their responsibility with the public " ; eventually took the ground that the Texans were ungrateful beggars whom Mexico could not think of recognizing (June, 1841) ; and soon afterwards, in spite of all their truckling to the sentiments of the people, were overthrown by Santa Anna.^^ Early in 1842 Ashbel Smith was appointed Texan charge to Eng- land and France and instructed to press the subject of mediation. In May he presented himself to Everett, then our representative at London, with a letter of introduction from Houston, and by Everett he was introduced to Lord Aberdeen, the British minister of foreign afifairs. Somewhat unfortunately perhaps for his mission Kennedy, the British consul at Galveston, had written to the Foreign Office a few months before that while the President of the United States desired to obtain Texas, in his own opinion the country inclined toward a Mexican connection, — in other words toward a return to Mexican allegiance in some form, the first choice of the British government. No doubt Aberdeen had this possibility in mind when he talked with Ashbel Smith ; and apparently he was not at all sorry to express, as he did, the " decided opinion " that British mediation would be unsuccessful.^- After having thus discouraged the Texan hope of obtaining recognition from Mexico, he found it necessary to go through the form at least of doing something, since the mediation treaty was very soon consummated; and in July, 1842, he instructed Pakenham to bring before the Mexican government the desirability of settling the tedious controversy. Santa Anna, however, who was now in supreme power, valued the afifair as a convenient pretext for the large army that he needed, and the government replied sternly that the war would go on. With apparent justice, therefore, the Foreign Office reiterated to Smith in October that mediation was utterly hopeless; yet probably, as Elliot suggested a little later to his chief, it was " only necessary for Lord Aberdeen to say to Santa Anna, ' Sir, Mexico must recognise the independence of Texas,' " for per- haps the dictator might on the whole have welcomed, as Elliot " Pak., Nos. 54, 63, 82, 89, 107; May 18; July 5; Aug. 22; Oct. 7; Dec. 19, 1840. Id., Nos. 25, 56; Feb. 26; June 10, 1841. "To Smith, March 9, 1842. Smith to Everett, May 12, 1842: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 979. Id., No. 4, May 17, 1842. Kennedy, Jan. 10, 1842. Smith, No. 6, June 3, 1842. 84 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS thought he would, a good excuse for taking this very step, so as to end the Texas difficuhy and leave himself free to establish his dynasty on the throne of Mexico, and certainly he could not have faced the possibility of a war with Great Britain at a time when there were fair prospects of a conflict with the United States and a con- flict with France. Why, then, did not England reply to the dictator in this decided manner? It seems more than possible that now, ob- serving how little talk of annexation had been caused by Santa Anna's threats of crossing the Rio Grande, she thought it well to have the Texans hang in suspense for a time. At any rate Ashbel Smith suspected that her aim was to let them be worried and harassed until they would " yield the point of slavery " in exchange for a British guaranty of their independence and " some commercial and financial advantages " ; and there was also the chance that when sufficiently weary of the struggle they would accept some form of Mexican allegiance with abolition as its corollary. ^^ After Aberdeen informed Smith in May, 1842, that British medi- ation could not succeed, Texas formed the idea of a triple interposi- tion by England, France and the United States, and in August this was proposed to both of the European powers. The French govern- ment acceded to the request, but Aberdeen refused to do so. He ex- plained the decision of the cabinet by saying that the efforts already made by England had not met with encouragement, and that still less satisfaction could be expected from an offer to mediate in con- junction with the United States, a country towards which Mexico felt angry on account of alleged offences against neutrality. It is easy, however, to surmise that other reasons existed. England had far more influence in Mexico than the United States and France combined ; yet were the three powers to act in concert there, she would receive but about one third of the credit for anything accom- plished. It seemed, no doubt, much better to have Texas, who well understood her important position at Mexico, look to her alone as a friend to be relied upon. If she desired to control events in the "To Elliot, No. 3, July i, 1842. To Pak., Nos, 26, 34, July i, 15, 1842. Pak., No. 80, Aug. 29, 1842. Bocanegra to Pak., Sept. 23, 1842: F. O., Mexico, civ. Smith, No. 23, Oct. 17, 1842. Elliot, secret, Feb. 5, 1843. Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1103. Apparently the British government were inconsistent if they advised Mexico to recognize Texas while discouraging the Texans' hopes of recognition. But their policy, as explained by Palmerston, was to have Mexico recover the province if possible, and if not. make a friendly settlement ; and as she could not be expected to act promptly on their advice, there was a possibility that Texas would yield meanwhile. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 85 Struggling republic, that was clearly the shrewder policy ; and since she adopted it, one infers that very likely such was her aim.^* Among the men to whom tracts of land north of the Rio Grande had been conceded under the Alexican regime was an Englishman named Beales, whose patent covered almost half a million acres. In September, 1842, Croskey, who represented the claimants under this grant, addressed a letter to the British Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs requesting that the government present the claim to the Texan authorities. In point of fact there was no basis at all for urging it, since Beales had not fulfilled the conditions ; but Croskey cheerfully overlooked this point, and endeavored to recommend his cause with arguments a little outside the legal view. The coloniza- tion of these lands by Englishmen, he wrote, would perhaps render Great Britain entirely independent of American cotton. This of itself would be an immense advantage, and another advantage would follow. The loss of the British market would lessen the value of slaves on the southern plantations of the United States. That value would be diminished still further by a prohibition of their introduc- tion into Texas resulting naturally from British colonization and the settlement of free laborers there; and in the course of time slavery in the United States would come to an end. Thus argued the claim was taken up by the British government, and in February, 1843, Elliot presented to the Texan Secretary of State a long plea in its behalf.^2 It is thus clear that England felt much interested in Texan slavery and strongly desired to uproot it ; the indications apparently suggest that other ideas than pure philanthropy had a place in her calculations ; and we come now to facts of a still more interesting character. In July, 1840, the colonial secretary of Barbadoes sent home the account of Texas, probably fuller than anything the gov- ernment possessed at that time, to which a reference has already been made. It was an argument for acknowledging the independence of the republic; and — after giving a somewhat lurid account of the wild characters taking refuge beyond the Sabine, and vividly picturing the Sheffield bowie-knives eighteen inches long, warranted in beauti- ful tracery on the blade to be " the genuine Arkansas toothpick " — "Smith to Guizot, Aug. 15, 1842: F. O., Texas, xviii. Id. to Aberdeen, Aug. 19, 1842: ib. To Cowley, Oct. 15. 1842. (Understood) Smith, No. 41, July 2, 1843. The action of England in regard to triple mediation could hardly fail to excite sus- picion in the U. S. so far as it was known. " Elliot to Jones, Feb. 4, 1843 : F. O., Texas, vi. Jones to Elliot, Sept. 19, 1843: ib., xxii. Croskey to Addington, Sept. 15, 1842: ib., v. 86 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS he recommended that his government insist upon the ultimate aboH- tion of slavery there, adding, "I really believe that twenty years would not pass away, before England (if necessary) might exclude every Bail of Cotton made in the States." Certain advantages to accrue from such a result have just been indicated by Croskey, but the subject had still other phases. In June, 1842, Sir Robert Peel remarked in the House of Commons that he had grave doubts whether the British West India colonies, in which the negroes had been emancipated, could compete with regions using slave labor — which meant of course that he felt sure they could not; and some- what later the London Mercantile Journal remarked that freeing the blacks had ruined those islands, and that an adoption of the same policy by the United States would greatly reduce our production of cotton. Evidently the idea was familiar in high British quarters as early as 1842 that an effacement of slavery here would tip or tend to tip the scale of competition in favor of the British empire ; and as that government, in the opinion of the Texan representative at Lon- don, concluded before the end of January, 1843, that annexation to the American Union was " extremely improbable," they very likely began to feel that a quiet move in this direction by the way of gentle pressure upon Texas could now be safely made.^® According to the terms of accommodation proposed in the spring of 1843 through Judge Robinson, Texas was to accept Mexican sovereignty while retaining control of her own internal affairs. Such an arrangement, as we have remarked, would necessarily havt put an end to negro servitude, and it is evident that England did as much as prudently she could to secure the acceptance of the proposi- tion. In discussing the plan with Ashbel Smith, Under Secretary Addington expressed the belief that as soon as Santa Anna had dis- posed of Yucatan he would proceed to subjugate Texas, — clearly a recommendation to gain shelter in time. Neither Addington nor Aberdeen would give any encouragement at this juncture with refer- ence to such a settlement as the Texans desired; and Smith, in reporting these facts, described the minister's attitude as distinctly cool. He was even informed that for some time past the British representative at Mexico had ceased to urge the subject upon the attention of the Mexican government, which plainly signified that Texas must look out for herself ; and the British Foreign Office went "Sheridan to Ganaway, July 12, 1840: F. O., Texas, i. (Peel) Hansard. 3 ser., Ixiii., Col. 1227. Merc. Journal, Dec. 16, 1844. Smith, No. 34, Jan. 28, 1843. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 87 SO far as to give the opinion that peace on the terms desired by that country could not be obtained through the mediation of any or all of the friendly powers. Elliot himself ventured farther and counselled Houston to accept the Robinson terms, saying that it was " not at all probable " Santa Anna would concede full independence, that he hoped " these advances would end in an honourable and durable pacification between the two Republics," that no friendly effort would be wanting " on the part of Her Majesty's Government to secure that result," and that, were the "nominal concession" of sovereignty made, the peace and prosperity for which — as he told the Foreign Office — Texas was gasping would come at once. Moreover he did not hesitate to insist that most likely, if Santa Anna would recognize the country at all, he would do so only upon the basis of abolition. ^'^ All conceded that the destruction of Texan slavery would have a great effect upon the same institution in the United States. As the Journal dcs Dcbats pointed out, the example and the loss of the market for young negroes would have counted for much ; the oppor- tunity afforded runaways from the southwestern States by a bound- ary line described as two hundred leagues in length, might have signified a great deal; and preventing that diffusion which the ex- travagant agricultural methods of slavery made necessary would per- haps have meant still more. And now we not only find the British cabinet and its agent endeavoring to draw Texas into a position where her slaves would be freed, but find the Texan Executive say- ing in response that " concurring in the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government," he would " accede to the proposition [re- garding a truce] made by Gen. Santa Anna."^® Everett, while acting as American minister at London, stated offi- cially that Ashbel Smith was " a person of more than ordinary talent and capacity for affairs " and " exceedingly well respected " at the British court ; and it goes without saying that his opportunities for acquiring information there and his zeal to understand whatever concerned the interests of his country were exceptional. Now in January, 1843, Smith wrote as follows to Van Zandt, the Texan charge at Washington : ''Smith, No, — , June 16; No. 41, July 2, 1843. Elliot to Doyle, June 21, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Id. to Jones, June 10; July 24, 1843: ib. (Gasping) Id., private, Dec. 16, 1842. (Insist) Galveston letter to Upshur, Nov. 20, 1843: N. Orl. Repnb., July 27, 1844. ^^ Dcbats, May 20, 1844. (Boundary) N. Orl. Repub., July 3, 1843. Jones to Elliot, July 30, 1843: Tex. Arch. 88 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS "It is the purpose of some persons in England to procure the aboli- tion of Slavery in Texas. They propose to accomplish this end by friendly negotiation and by the concession of what will be deemed equiv- alents. I beleive the equivalents contemplated are a guarantee by Great Britain of the Independence of Texas — discriminating duties in favor of Texian products and perhaps the negotiation of a loan, or some means by which the finances of Texas can be readjusted. They estimate the number of Slaves in Texas at 12,000 and would consider the payment for them in full, as a small sum for the advantages they anticipate from the establishment of a free State on the Southern borders of the slave hold- ing States of the American Union. "In July last in London, two matters were submitted to me in con- versation by a person then and now having relations with the British Govt. One was, whether the people of Texas would listen to and con- sider a proposition from the English Government to abolish Slavery in consideration of concessions and equivalent advantages to be offered by that Govt. The second matter was, whether Texas would not be induced to divide itself into two States, one slave-holding the other nonslave- holding. It was argued that but few slaves would probably be introduced into Western Texas by reason of its proximity to Mexico, and that therefore, it would be conceding but little to establish " a free state " on this frontier : and the Colorado was proposed as a dividing line. I do not know to whom is due the initiative of these matters : but I was informed that the propositions in question, had been a subject of con- versation with Lord Aberdeen. And I am aware that in another con- versation in which Lord Aberdeen took part, it was maintained that the population which would flock into this " free state " from Europe would be enabled to vote down the Slave holders, and thus the Texians would of themselves establish an entire non-slaveholding country. . . . " I may be mistaken in regard to the equivalents to be offered by England as they were not dwelt upon in detail. But in regard to the two propositions, one to abolish slavery throughout the entire territory, the other to establish a nonslave holding state in Western Texas; and in regard to the personal standing and relations with the Govt, of the Gentleman making the propositions, I cannot be in error. . . . " The independence of Texas and the existence of Slavery in Texas is a question of life or death to the slave holding states of the American Union. Hemmed in between the free states on their northern border, and a free Anglo Saxon State on their southern border and sustained by England, their history would soon be written The establishment of a free state on the territory of Texas is a darling wish of England for which scarcely any price would be regarded as to great. The bargain once struck what remedy remains to the South? "^^ "Everett. No. 317, May 15, 1845- Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Tex. Dipl. Com, ii., 1103. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 89 At the beginning of July, 1843, Smith wrote as follows to the Texan Secretary of State: "... About a fortnight since I saw Mr. S. P. Andrews at a meeting of the " General Anti Slavery Convention " in this town. The abolition of Slavery in Texas was among the objects of his visit to Europe, and I have had several full conferences with him on this subject. He has been and continues to be actively engaged with some parties in London in devising means to effect abolition. He has had interviews on the subject in question with Lords Aberdeen, Brougham and Morpeth and with other persons, all of whom are extremely eager to accomplish this purpose. Lord Aberdeen said "Her Majesty's Government would employ all legitimate means to attain so great and desirable an object as the abolition of slavery in Texas,'' and he used other expressions of the same purport. These observations were made to Mr Andrews and the Com- mittee of the Anti Slavery Convention which waited on his Lordship. The Anti Slavery Convention gave the subject of abolition in Texas a very full consideration, deem it of great importance, will spare no efforts to accomplish it, and count confidently on the cooperation of the British Government. . . . " Different plans or ways of effecting and carrying out abolition have been proposed here. Among the principal is, first, a Loan to Texas to enable the Government to purchase the slaves and emancipate them, on the condition that the introduction of slaves hereafter be prohibited. Lord Aberdeen said the British Govt, would guarantee the interest of a Loan raised and applied for this purpose but no other Loan whatever. A second plan is the raising of a sum of money to buy large quantities of land in Texas on the same condition, namely the abolition of slavery ; but according to the latter plan no credit is to stand open against Texas: the monies proposed to be paid for lands are to enable Texas to abolish slavery, and the lands are to become the bona fide property of those who furnish the money and to be held by them in fee simple. A plan similar to the second, is recommended by Mr Andrews. The plan at one time contemplated of encouraging an emigration to Texas which should " vote down" slavery, has been wholly abandoned as tedious, expensive, uncertain and inconsistent with the views of England zvhich wishes to direct all its emigration to its ozvn colonics. . . . " The abolition of slavery in Texas by itself considered, is not re- garded in England as of any great importance, but it is ardently desired as preliminary to its abolition in the United States and for the purpose of placing Texas in a rival if not unfriendly attitude towards that country. Besides motives of philanthropy, the British people wish the abolition of slavery in America in reference to the culture of sugar and cotton, in which there exists a rivalry with their colonies, and in refer- ence to the advantages which the production of cotton in America gives 90 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to its manufacturers and the employment which these staples afford to American shipping. You will not hence be surprised to learn that on several occasions indeed generally, where the abolition of slavery has been discussed I hear it mainly advocated for its anticipated effects on slavery in the Southern U. States and eventually on the agriculture, manufactures and commerce of that country. . . . Their [the British government's] policy in relation to slavery in all other countries is avowed, and they will cooperate by all legitimate means with any parties in their own country having for their object the abolition of slavery in Texas."-*' On the last day of the same month the Texan charge reported in these words : "... In my interview with Lord Aberdeen on the 20th Instant, . . . His Lordship replied in effect, that it is the well known policy and wish of the British Government to abolish slavery every where ; that its aboli- tion in Texas is deemed very desirable and he spoke to this point at some little length, as connected with British policy and British interests and in reference to the United States. . . . The British Government greatly desire the abolition of slavery in Texas as a part of their gen- eral policy in reference to their colonial and commercial interests and mainly in reference to its future influence on slavery in the United States."2x As a gloss upon this despatch, which passes over certain points very lightly, it is worth while to bring forward also the testimony of the London Morning Herald, given at a later date when frankness appeared safe. Said the Herald, which was regarded by the Revue de Paris and other well informed periodicals as the voice of the British ministry : " Mr. Calhoun says that Great Britain, having in some degree crippled her tropical commerce, by the substitution of free labour for slave labour, is interested in causing the suppression of slavery. No Englishman dis- putes the proposition. . . . Great Britain, says Mr. Calhoun, would obstruct the annexation of Texas as a means of promoting the abolition of slavery, first in Texas, afterwards in the United States. We confess the whole charge. . . . We do wish to see slavery abolished in the United States, not merely upon moral but upon commercial grounds also. These commercial grounds . . . are as much political as commercial. While the United States shall have the monopoly of the supply of raw cotton, they will hold in their hands the means of disturbing the social state of all the manufacturing countries of Europe, . . . but the mon- =» Smith, No. 41, July 2, 1843. -'Smith, No. 43, July 31, 1843. Smith added that Aberdeen mentioned the instructions to Doyle dated July i, 1843: note 28. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 9I opoly of the production of raw cotton cannot be very speedily taken from the States while these States retain the advantage of slave labour. "-- The next day after sending off his despatch of July 31, Smith wrote to Aberdeen that the persons who were endeavoring to enlist the British government in the cause of emancipation in Texas were in no manner recognized and their proceedings were not at all endorsed by the constituted authorities of his nation. To this note His Lordship replied six weeks later that the British cabinet dis- claimed all purpose to interfere " improperly " in the domestic affairs of Texas, but were anxious to see slavery disappear everywhere, and felt no surprise that private individuals, entertaining the same feel- ing, "should exert every effort in their power to attain an object so desirable." This qualified assurance told, of course, very little so far as the ministry's operations were concerned, and it showed very distinctly an intention to smile upon any unofficial agency work- ing in so laudable a cause.-^ Of course the principles and aims that shaped the policy of the British government in this matter had been worked out before Elliot sailed for Galveston ; but the reports of that gentleman must have tended to confirm and extend them. In November, 1842, after hav- ing been at his post long enough to study the situation fairly well, he wrote that he had a plan for bringing about the abolition of slavery and the adoption of free trade. The present slaveholders, he sug- gested, could be compensated by a loan raised in England ; and one of the effects of the new system, in his opinion, would be to draw Europeans to Texas and thus balance the power of the United States.24 The next month he pursued the subject farther. The best course for England, he thought, would be to obtain peace for Texas on the condition that she place herself in a position of real nationality by immediately and thoroughly organizing her social, political and com- mercial institutions and policy on a sound and independent basis, — by which he doubtless meant an abandonment of slavery and an adoption of free trade. The policy he recommended was, in brief, to establish that nation firmly between the United States and Mexico '^Herald, Jan. 8, 1845. Revue de Paris, April i, 1845. ^ Smith to Aberdeen, Aug. i, 1843: Tex. Arch. Aberdeen to Smith, Sept. 11, 1843 : ib. *• Elliot, private, Nov. 15, 1842. Sept, 11, 1841, the London Times remarked, with reference to Texas : " An independent state with no tariff at all would be the most formidable check possible against the demands by a neighbour for a high tariff." 92 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS as " the best barrier " available, " with a considerable coloured popu- lation perfectly free of political disabilities, and a commercial policy of the most liberal description." Money expended to emancipate the negroes and give to the black race a position and a voice in that quarter would, he suggested, '' render as profitable returns as money spent for fortresses and military works on the Northern frontier of the United States," for those men's hearts would be with England "beyond the third and fourth generation," and Texas would be separated effectually from the neighboring States; while the adop- tion of a free trade system would detach it no less completely from the northeastern section of the great republic. In his judgment, he added later, it was an "object of considerable moment" to England that the Texas question should be " firmly and speedily settled."-^ Though naturally compelled to be exceedingly circumspect in the matter^ Elliot even ventured to take up the delicate issue with the Texan government. In June, 1843, he said to Houston that in his opinion the existence of slavery in Texas was greatly to be regretted ; to which the President replied that he thought the same, and that unless the settlement with Mexico should somehow eliminate this element of the situation, his country would become, to its incalculable injury, the "impound" — the receptacle, he doubtless meant — of the colored population of the United States. In October the charge went a step farther. He reminded Houston of the "settled feeling" of England regarding slavery, and stated that he expected instructions to " press that topic." England, he intimated, would " dwell upon . . . the deplorable error " of founding the nation on a wrongful, decadent institution, acknowledged wherever it existed to be a cancer. To this Houston answered that without going into details he could promise that the views of Great Britain would always receive the most attentive consideration from the government and people of Texas. Elliot's moves had every look of what is called " breaking ground," and the ground, so far as the President was concerned, had the appearance of being notably mellow.-'' In February, 1844, James Love of Galveston wrote to Judge Nicholas of Louisville, Kentucky, a letter that seemed worthy to be placed in the hands of Senator Crittenden. The writer said : ^Elliot, private, Dec. i6, 28, 1842. The plan of giving the negroes all civil rights was particularly in view when a doubt of Elliot's full wisdom was expressed above ; but, as the slaves were not very numerous, it might have worked well. =" Elliot, secret, June 8 and Oct. 31, 1843. It seems impossible to believe that without some prompting from his government Elliot would have dared to speak as he did in October. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 93 "If Texas could be tempted to abolish slavery by the adoption of organic laws, her best and most generous patron and friend would be England. The abolition Society there, backed by her Majesty's ministers, are ready to pay us their full value and apprentice them for a term of years, at nominal wages only, and to take our public lands at U. States prices in payment of money advanced, added to this the guarantee of our independence by Mexico, and the certainty of an immense European emigration to purchase those lands already appropriated. In making this statement to you, I do not wish you to believe that I indulge in the idle rumors of the day, but that it is made on authority yoti would not question, were I at liberty to give you all the information I have." From this it would appear that the plans proposed in London and encouraged by Elliot's despatches became tangible enough and prom- ising enough to be a practical subject of discussion among leading citizens of Texas. -'^ While cautiously endeavoring to edge that country into an accept- ance of the Robinson terms and also encouraging unofficial plans to end slavery there, the British government decided in June, 1843, to proceed by still another method, and they wrote to Doyle, the charge at Mexico, that by offering those terms Santa Anna had " virtually " conceded the point of recognition, and it would be best now to do so formally. The despatch then added : " By adopting such a course, the Mexican Government would be enabled to enter with great advantage on Negotiations with Texas, since by offering so great a boon as the complete independence of Texas, the main point in fact for which the Texians have been contending for years past, the Mexican Government would have it in their power to insist with greater effect on any Terms which they might wish to pro- pose as the condition on which that boon would be conceded. It may deserve consideration whether the abolition of Slavery in Texas would not be a greater triumph, and more honourable to Mexico, than the reten- tion of any Sovereignty merely nominal." In other words, Doyle was to recommend officially that Texas be recognized on the condition that she emancipate her negroes.-^ Elliot was duly notified of this communication, and in reply he offered some interesting remarks upon it. He believed that if Mexico would allow the Texan government a sufficient period for delibera- ^ Love to Nicholas, Feb. i, 1844: Crit. Pap. This letter was not written to further the cause of annexation in the U. S., for the writer said that under the existing circumstances annexation was impossible. Probably in line 7 he intended to write " England " instead of " Mexico." ^ To Doyle, No. 10. July i, 1843. Here and in a very few other cases, where such words as " honorable " were written in British despatches without the letter m. the author has made the spelling conform to the usual English method. 94 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS tion and a liberal boundary, the project could be carried through. Moreover, with a prospect before them that either emancipation or hostilities with Mexico would almost certainly occur, slaveholders would hesitate to come in from the United States. Were the system of free labor thus to be established west of the Sabine, " there would very soon be an end of the remunerative production of Cotton by Slave labour in the United States " ; and should peace be obtained on the proposed basis, within ten years Texas would be producing a million bales annually. British goods would come over in exchange for them; and either the American and Mexican tarififs would be reduced or Texas would " rapidly come to be the seat of a consider- able trade," — that is to say, wholesale smuggling. In corresponding with Doyle, Elliot made further remarks. Should Mexico simply let it be understood that abolition was to be an essential preliminary of a settlement, " The tide of immigration from the Slave States would be at once arrested " ; laborers would come in from the northern section of the Union and from Europe ; and the tie connecting Texas with the southwestern States would be severed. One may fairly assume that the British Foreign Office was at least equal in sagacity to a mere charge. Unfortunately, however, for this line of work, Doyle broke off diplomatic relations with Mexico at the end of Sep- tember on account of a small British flag displayed among the trophies of the Texas campaign, and Mexico began to think of war with England. The British government condemned the action of their representative, but naturally that did not make him persona grata again at the Mexican capital ; and as Bankhead, the new minis- ter, did not reach his post until the following March, negotiations on delicate matters like this were now impracticable for about six months.-'' Near the end of 1842 the policy of England bore fruit in an ex- plicit admission from Houston that he felt " an intense anxiety for peace with Mexico," and in a direct request for the assistance of the British representative to obtain it. Six months more, and the Presi- dent went so far as to intimate that in return for effectual aid Texas would side with England, should that power find herself at war with =* Elliot, No. 28, Sept. 30, 1843. Id. to Doyle, Oct. 10, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Id., No. 32, Nov. 29, 1843. Doyle to Elliot, Oct. 5, 1843: F. O., Texas, xxviii. Id., No. 79, Oct. 30, 1843. Thompson, Oct. 3, 1843. To Doyle, No. 34, Nov. 29, 1843. Bank., No. i, March 31, 1844. The interim was really longer than the text states, for of course the new minister had to proceed very slowly at first, removing hard feelings and establishing confidential relations. As will be seen, an abolition movement of some strength developed in Texas itself during the spring of 1843. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 95 the United States, as he suggested that she was hkely soon to do ; upon which ElHot wrote after due dehberation to the British repre- sentative at Mexico that the government of Texas had no bias towards the United States, and that Santa Anna by acknowledging her independence in a prompt, hberal way could " pretty rapidly " de- tach her from " the people and things East of the Sabine," make her a rival and enemy of her great neighbor, and not only "roll back" the threatening American tide, but have an ally in case of trouble with the United States and signally increase "the just and power- ful influence of his own Country on this Continent." An argu- ment more interesting to the dictator of Mexico or more danger- ous to the Union could hardly have been devised ; and it does not appear that Elliot's ideas and action in this regard were frowned upon in any way by his government.^'' The circumstances of the truce were evidence of a friendly con- nection between Houston's government and the cabinet of Great Britain, but not the only evidence. In the summer and autumn of 1843 it was noted in the United States that several newspapers of Texas,, commonly regarded as administration organs, were insisting that any wish of the American Executive to interpose for the benefit of that country would be thwarted by Congress, whereas Great Britain had both the will and the ability to render aid. The National Vindicator, a journal which probably had closer relations with the government than any other, hinted that the United States were dis- posed to sacrifice the interests of Texas for their own advantage, and were trying to create among her people a feeling hostile to Great Britain in order to prevent that power from successfully mediating. On the eighth of November Houston delivered an address in which he said : " There is a constant efifort made to prejudice Texas against England. Why? Because England ha^ done us service." Had she acted toward us, continued the President, as our neighbors have, what would have been the clamor ! The United States have dis- armed our troops a hundred miles within our boundaries ; they de- nounce us as bandits and pirates ; and they threaten to send convoys across our territory to the Rio Grande. We cannot fight so great a ^Houston to Elliot, Nov. 5, 1842; May 13, 1843 (private): F. O., Texas, iv., vi. In the latter he said : " If England produces a pacification between this country and Mexico, s|[ie will thereby secure a friend on the gulf whose contiguity to the United States, in the event of a war, would not be desirable to that country. All movement on the part of the U. States would seem to indicate that they have an eye to a rupture at some period not remote." Elliot to Doyle, private, June 21, 1843; ib., vi. 96 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS power; " but we will maintain our just attitude by a moral appeal to the nations." And then he made his climax by declaring, " It is the beginning of the end. What the end will be, is known only to Heaven." How could all this be understood except as meaning that Texan affairs were soon to be settled in one way or another, that the American republic was an enemy and England a friend, and that the nation should look to the latter power for advice, guidance and protection ?^^ By this time Houston's influence in Texas had become over- whelming. The government newspapers wielded of course a special authority with the public. As the trading vessels were almost ex- clusively English and nearly all of the money was in British hands, most of the business men were of that nationality or necessarily affiliated with Great Britain; and the Galveston Civilian acted as a spokesman for that side. Not many years had passed since the citizens had chosen an anti-annexation champion as their chief magistrate ; they felt offended with the United States on several grounds ; and it is not surprising if at this time they swung toward the British party. They appreciated the disposition of England to assist them, said Ashbel Smith later. For a long while at this period, wrote Anson Jones, European intervention would have been welcomed by an almost unanimous voice. Elliot is all powerful and Texas appears likely to become as obedient to British interests as Jamaica, the New Orleans Tropic had declared some months before, and the prediction seemed to be coming true.^- There was, moreover, an influence at work that appeared sure to strengthen the tendency. This was the swelling tide of immigration from overseas. In the matter of attracting European settlers Texas had a distinct advantage. Between the shores of the Old World and her vacant lands direct water communication was available, whereas the colonist disembarking at New York found himself still far from ^^ Madisonian, Nov. 20. 1843. Vindicator, July i, 1843. Citizen, Houston, Texas, Nov. 18, 1843. Murphy to Upshur, No. 15, Dec. 25, 1843. In 1842 there was a prospect of friction between Great Britain and Texas in consequence of the inefifective Texas declaration of a blockade of the Mexican ports, but in Oc- tober Houston ended the nominal blockade. ^ Houston had many bitter enemies, there were sectional animosities against him, and his policy or supposed policy in regard to slavery and the foreign rela- tions of Texas was deeply distrusted by some; yet his hold on the nation was very strong. (Money) Yell to Polk, March 26, 1845: Polk Pap. (Civilian) Murphy, No. 26, May 24, 1844. Smith, Remin., 47. Jones, Memor.. 95. Tropic- Wash. Globe, May 22, 1843. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 97 his opportunity. A British periodical of high standing, the Edin- burgh Reviczij, had already called attention to this new territory, declaring that " a country more inviting to the settler of the English race" it was "impossible to conceive." About the middle of 1843 the advertisement of a Texas colony stated that a large number of immigrants were expected from England. French colonists, also, seemed likely to come in great numbers. In June, 1842, it was an- nounced by the New York Journal of Commerce that a contract for 1,700 settlers of that nationality had been made.^^ It is thus clear that England aimed to encourage the develop- ment of Texas as a cotton-growing country so as to be independent of the United States, and apparently had in view a flank movement against the American tariff. We have seen placed before her govern- ment the self-evident proposition that a falling off in the demand for our great staple would cause the planters to value their negroes less highly and so would pave the way for emancipation. We have seen also that she endeavored to effect the destruction of slavery in Texas, — trying to gain the point first as the price of recognition, then by discouraging the Texans' hope of peace with the mother-country on the basis of independence, next as the equivalent for the cessation of hostilities according to the Robinson terms, and finally as the condi- tion of full Mexican recognition ; and we have seen that she chiefly desired abolition in Texas with a view to this country. In such attempts there was of course nothing improper on the part of the British cabinet. England not only had a right to advance her own interests, but in this matter she was entitled to credit for wishing to promote along with them the success of a great moral cause ; and so far as the United States were concerned, it was for them to detect and circumvent any foreign aims likely to prove injurious. But the facts are incontestable that her designs in regard to Texas were deep and persevering; that they were believed by herself, by the Texan representative at her court and by her own representative in Texas to be very unfavorable to American interests ; and that her relations with President Houston were most intimate and cordial ; whereas in the United States the Texas question had been treated as a mere issue of party and sectional policy checkered at the North with philanthropy, the new republic — which Great Britain felt had a ^Review, April, 1841, p. 249. Nat. IntelL, Aug. 19, 1843. Journ. Com., June 24, 1842. q8 the annexation of TEXAS truly important role to play — was generally regarded as a bagatelle, to be picked up at any convenient moment or never be picked up at all, and the pronounced development of anti-American, pro-British sentiment in that quarter seemed of no particular importance to the public mind.^* The outlook for Texas appeared therefore to be a rapidly grow- ing population of a European cast, an early absorption of most valuable portions of Mexico, and a predominantly British tone due to past obligations and existing interests. To have thus, not only a strong and unfriendly rival, but one controlled by the nation we most feared and most suspected planted on our flank was clearly undesir- able for the American Union, and the seriousness of the case was deeply emphasized by the existence of slavery. How the United States might be affected by the abolition of that system in Texas and what Great Britain desired to accomplish in this regard, the previous pages have indicated. On the other hand were the institu- tion to survive there, a powerful community of interest — slavery at bay — would tend to draw Texas and our southern States together and disrupt the Union. The possibilities involved in this idea had already been suggested officially to her government, for in April, 1837, her minister to the United States had written that a combina- tion with our slave section and a conquest of Mexico would build up " the greatest nation upon earth. "^^ What, now, was the real aim of Texas? That is to say, what was the real aim of Sam Houston, who — though he may have derived much assistance from Anson Jones and others — appears to have been decidedly the moulder of her policy? Unfortunately, though about all the evidence in the case is most likely before us, a positive answer to this question cannot even yet be given. Endowed with a remarkably fertile and crafty mind, trained successfully as an American politician, finished in the school of Indian cunning, a gambler of long experience, a genius in the art of political histrionics, a diplomatist whose only idea of method was to triumph and not be found out, and a statesman able and determined to keep his own counsel, Houston worked in a situation beautifully adapted to facili- tate the concealment of his aims, and had powerful motives for ■■'* It follows that the suspicions regarding British designs then entertained in the United States were warranted. ^ Hunt, April 15, 1837. Slavery existed of course to some extent elsewhere. TEXAS AND EUROPE, 1836-1843. 99 making the utmost use of this advantage. To catch him is hardly easier than it was to fix Proteus. Yet a working hypothesis may be framed, and each may carry this on through the intricate diplomacy of the Texan administration to be verified or disproved. Mexican rule, then, he was fully determined of course never to accept. Annexation to the United States he regarded as tolerable if no better arrangement could be made, growing warmer or colder toward that plan according to circumstances. But his real desire was to obtain recognition from Mexico as the legal certificate of sovereignty, ensure an opportunity for growth by winning a guar- anty — more or less formal — of Texan independence from the United States, England or both, lead his people forward then, unhindered, in the path of development, and gain a lofty place in history as the founder of a nation. To compass these ends, he designed to play off England and the United States against each other, exciting this country by dwelling publicly on the assistance received from across the ocean and letting it be felt that his relations yonder were danger- ously intimate, and stimulating Great Britain at the same time by keeping the annexation issue alive and prominent. Finally the human element must not be overlooked. Though a patriot, Houston was no idealist. It was far from his intention to sacrifice his per- sonal fortunes for the halo of martyrdom ; and no doubt he proposed so to manage that whatever wind should blow, the vessel bearing his pennant should reach a port. Early in 1844 he outlined in a letter the possible future of his country. Texas, he wrote, were she to stand forth permanently by herself, could hold aloof from all international quarrels, be the universal friend, and derive profit as a neutral from every conflict. The overflowing population from Europe would rapidly supply her with settlers. Admitting British goods at a low rate of duties, she could place them in the markets of northern Mexico and the southern States at prices to defy competition. European nations would eagerly protect her existence and promote her growth in order to counterbalance the American Union in the only possible way. Cali- fornia and other portions of Mexico would be glad to join the rising state for the sake of good government and protection against the Indians. Oregon, not separated from Texas as it was from the United States by tremendous mountains, could easily be acquired ; 100 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS and before long the republic would be able to vie — if necessary, cope • — with the greatest of powers. Such was Houston's forecast, and it seems every way probable that he drew it up in his mind long before putting it on record.^^ ^"Houston to Murphy, May 6, 1844: Crane, Houston, 366. Doubtless the idea of a possible combination with the southern States was in Houston's mind, but in this letter— addressed to a representative of the Union — he could not mention it. Likewise Houston believed or at least professed to believe that Texas could wage a profitable war against Mexico, but he did not wish to have this done, since it would draw adventurers into the country, and so he does not mention that possibility here. It is worth nothing that at the beginning of the civil war Houston was sus- pected of desiring that Texas in leaving the Union should become a sovereign nation and of working with that in view (Williams, Houston, 361). With refer- ence to this letter see Chapter viii., note 42. V. Tyler Desires to effect Annexation. It is now time to place ourselves at a distinctively American point of view and unravel the genesis of the annexation " conspiracy," if we can. Certain facts already presented will necessarily appear again here ; but these will be few, and they will show themselves at a new angle. John Tyler had the rare misfortune of descending into history cursed by one political party yet without a benediction from the other ; and it is very difficult for a person condemned by his country- men with such apparent unanimity and impartiality to regain stand- ing. Yet until his accession to the highest dignity within the reach of an American citizen precipitated him to the lowest depth into which an American public man can fall, he seemed to be very highly favored both by the people and by the stars. For ten years he had served in the General Assembly of Virginia, for five in the national House of Representatives, for one term and a part of another as Governor of the commonwealth, and for nine years in the United States Senate ; and then he had been elected by the country at large to the Vice-Presidency. So long and so brilliant a career of honors could hardly fall to a contemptible or incompetent person, and in truth he seems to have been neither. Though not a giant, intuitive rather than logical in his judgments, and more tenacious than masterful in his determina- tions, he possessed insight, eloquence, courage and address. No doubt he was a politician, a State-rights man and a believer in slavery ; but others as well as he have been moulded by their environment ; all the leading public men of his day schemed; and he gave a proof of devotion to principle, such as few of his contemporaries equaled, by resigning the high office of Senator rather than please his con- stituents at a sacrifice of principles. Capable of holding his eye firmly upon the point he would gain but without the nervous power for downright combat, he necessarily pursued a course which may have seemed to men of less acumen and more force than him- self rather insincere ; but he could hardly be expected to let opponents dictate his plan of campaign. Very human frailties were his. He 102 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS could scarcely say "No" to a friend; more than a due share of van- ity had fallen to him ; and no doubt he was ambitious. But ambition is a trait of almost all public men; few had the excuse for vanity that he could offer; and loyalty to friends was not only a part of his constitution but a part of the social code in which he was reared. Most Americans have regarded him as worse than a failure ; yet it was much to carry on the government at all under the circumstances ; it was much to leave his notable record for honest and economical administration; it was much to remain genial, graceful and kindly under a cataract of the most violent abuse; it was much to retire with untarnished equanimity to the life of a Virginia farmer; and it was much also to bring about the settlement of the northeastern boundary dispute and the annexation of Texas. To discuss his political difficulties at length is no part of the present undertaking, but something must be said of them. Though he was known to have been a steady opponent of a national bank all his life, he was nominated in 1840 by the free choice of the Whigs for the Vice-Presidency. His acceptance of the honor required no change of view, for the convention made no platform; and if the party expected him to forswear his principles for the sake of an office, it counted upon the leopard's giving up his spots and convicted itself of choosing a candidate whom it believed to be grossly unfit. Clay, however, after the victory was gained, used his power over Congress to have a bank bill enacted. This placed the President — for Harrison's death had now promoted Tyler to the first office — in a dilemma. Either he must prove himself cowardly and unprincipled by forsaking his colors at the bidding of a political chief, or he must satisfy his conscience at the risk of disappointing and offending the party. Each alternative threatened ruin ; and probably Clay was not unwilling to sweep from his path in this easy manner one who seemed likely to prove a dangerous competitor for the next Presi- dential nomination. In so hard a situation Tyler doubtless tried anxiously to find a way of escape from both horns, and perhaps he employed some hesitating and equivocal language ; but in the end he proved faithful to his convictions. Upon that he was duly read out of the party and abandoned by nearly all of his cabinet; and then, because he turned toward the Democrats for the support essential to the conduct of the government, he was denounced as a traitor again. At one and the same time, said Webster, the National Intelligencer would "have the Whigs be against the President " and " have the TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. I03 President be for the Whigs." Many Democrats, on the other hand, entertained a deep grudge against him for joining in the opposition to Jacksonism ; and for several reasons the Van Buren wing in particular found it more than hard to accept him. Between two horses, therefore, he fell to the ground, and hence the project of acquiring Texas, espoused and urged by him, was tarred with an extra, accidental and partisan opprobrium, against which — clearly recognizable now — it is a plain duty to maintain our guard. ^ Scarcely had Tyler seated himself in the White House, when Henry A. Wise, his most intimate political friend, advised him to obtain Texas as soon as possible. The new President concurred in the advice ; and a few months later he wrote as follows to Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State: " I gave you a hint as to the possibility of acquiring Texas by treaty — I verily believe it could be done — Could the north be reconciled to it would anything throw so bright a lustre around us ? It seems to me that the great interests of the north would be incalculably advanced by such an acquisition — How deeply interested is the shipping interest? Slavery — I know that is the objection — and it would be well founded if it did not already exist among us — but my belief is that a rigid enforcement of the laws against the slave trade, would make in time as many free States, south, as the acquisition of Texas would add of slave States — and then the future (distant it might be) would present wonderful results. ''- Tyler's primary motive at this time in desiring to make the acqui- sition was apparently an ambition to do something brilliant for the country and gain fame in its history. His letter to Webster shows how the idea of glory occupied his thoughts. The execution of this design would throw a bright " lustre " around him. By encouraging a tone of fraternity in the cabinet, he said he should best promote his own fame and advance the public good. " I shall truly rejoice in all that shall advance your fame," was his assurance to the Secre- tary of State. Moreover such an achievement, he doubtless hoped, would give him that personal following in the nation which he desired to acquire. Though unable to please either Democrats or Whigs as party men, he thought he could please them all as Amer- icans by identifying himself with something of non-partisan value. " Our course is too plainly before us to be mistaken," he wrote to ^ See General Note, p. i. Standard Histories. Tyler, Tyler, ii., passim. Webster, Writings, xv., 185. ^Wise, Decades, 182. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 254. Tyler to Webster: note 3. Oct. II, It was alleged after the trouble began that Tyler let it be understood before he was nominated that his views regarding the bank had changed or would change, but this is emphatically one of the cases in which we are not to believe all that we hear. 104 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Webster; "We must look to the whole country and to the whole people."^ That the step he proposed would give him strong friends in one part of the nation seemed almost certain. The mere fact that Henry A. Wise suggested it implied that the project was regarded by shrewd politicians as favorable to the South. In November, 1841, the New Orleans Courier remarked that it would add much to the President's popularity to obtain Texas, and a year later his partisans in Congress believed that it would make him omnipotent in the South and Southwest. Indeed any one could see why it might. The slave States were plainly falling behind politically. According to the chairman of a Congressional committee appointed a year or so later, in order to have about the same relative strength in the House of Representatives as in 1790 that section needed to send loi of the members instead of the 87 that it did send. These figures meant that in one branch of Congress it was permanently the weaker side, and therefore that it must reinforce its position in the other. To do this was of course ardently desired by the politicians who repre- sented it, and for the President's assistance they were certain to be grateful.'* To be sure, reasons could easily be seen why the accession of Texas would not promote the financial interests of the Southerners, for its rich soil would very likely draw planters from the older States and the value of land in these would be diminished, while the competition of its abundant crops would reduce the prices of what the less fertile areas could produce ; and it was possible that in many minds these unpleasant probabilities might outweigh the remoter gains of political power and the consequent strengthening of slavery. Some no doubt, like the Natchez Free Trader, declared that Eng- land was aiming to bring about abolition in Texas, and if this could be proved, the South might entirely ignore mere economic argu- ments; but the only known indications of such a design were the British recognition of Texas and the making of a treaty with that 'Tyler to Webster. Oct. 11. 1841 : Webster Pap. * N. Orl. Courier, Nov. 4, 1841. Van Z., No. 93, Dec. 23, 1842. Report by Zadok Pratt: Wash. Globe, Dec. 18, 1844. To be fair, one must admit that had the conditions been reversed, the North would have endeavored to safeguard its position in the national government. In view of the doubt which has existed as to the paternity of the annexation project, the following words, written by Murphy (U. S. charge in Texas) to Tyler, April 25, 1844, may be pertinent: "The measure is all your own ... I hold the evidence of the fact in the sacred archives of this Legation " (Arch. Tex. Leg., State Dept.). See also Tyler's letter: Tyler, Tyler, IL, 278. TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. 105 country intended to facilitate the suppression of the slave trade, and the United States themselves had both acknowledged Texan inde- pendence and smitten that iniquitous traffic. Others thought Eng- land was scheming to become independent of American cotton ; but it was answered that Texas would probably never, and certainly could not soon, be a serious competitor. It was therefore as yet a debatable question for the business men of the South ; but, all things considered, that section was practically certain to prefer the acqui- sition of Texas. '^ At the same time Tyler believed he could offer great benefits to the North also, and therefore " the whole country " and " the whole people " would be grateful to him for proposing and effecting annex- ation, while his own affections and interests, bound up with the slave section, would be safeguarded. Nor were these things all. In addi- tion to the calculations of personal advantage, however legitimate, it must in fairness be supposed that the President wished for patriotic reasons to promote what he considered the welfare of the nation; and further still, as a knowledge of the Texan scheme of expansion doubtless existed in the State department, one may reasonably con- clude — especially as Henry A. Wise pictured certain phases of that danger in startling colors — that our chief magistrate felt it his duty to suggest a precautionary measure.*^ Thus early, perhaps, came also the idea that Van Buren and Clay might be embarrassed by the appearance of the annexation issue, since their followers would almost certainly be more or less divided upon it, and nobody could foretell precisely how. As for these leaders themselves, Tyler appears to have figured that neither of them could oppose the plan. Both seemed to be committed in its favor. Both had tried to obtain Texas : Clay as Adams's Secretary of State and Van Buren as Jackson's. Clay, besides, was a Southerner ; and it had been thought " more than probable " by well-informed men in 1837 that should the administration fear to espouse the cause of annexation, the Kentucky orator would step forth as its cham- pion ; while Van Buren not only had taken no positive stand against this measure but was a disciple of Jackson, long so eager to gain the territory, and — as we have observed — had been thought by the Texan envoy to favor the acquisition of it himself after he became President. Jackson said that he and all Van Buren's other friends ^ Free Trader; N. Orl. Courier, Aug. 14, 1841. * (Wise) Chapter ii., last paragraph but two and p. 131. I06 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS expected him to support the project in 1844, and it was not unrea- sonable on Tyler's part to anticipate as much. Adams, Forsyth and Livingston, too, had concurred in efforts to obtain Texas. Thus all sections of the country, statesmen of many stripes, the politicians and the non-politicians, appeared in a way to be favorably disposed ; and in particular the advantages that could be offered to the North seemed enough to placate, partially at least, not only the anti-slavery feeling, but that general opposition to southern and western ex- tension which Monroe had found himself unable to resist. So the plan presented itself, one may suppose, in the President's more san- guine hours.'^ The other side of the shield had its turn, however. Anti-slavery sentiment had shown itself terribly active and terribly stubborn in this Texas affair; and against it could be urged only financial con- siderations, which — appealing mainly to capitalists — might fail to reach the great body of citizens. Besides, the President could never forget that no party marched at his back. His only solid support now was a section of the Whigs; and Webster, standing at their head and at the head of the cabinet, was opposed to slavery and Southern domination. In regard to Texas indeed the great Secretary appeared friendly, though he considered the port of San Francisco worth twenty times the whole of it ; but against annexation he had long been committed, and now in the opinion of the Texan envoy he feared the abolitionists among his constituents. Consequently he exhibited, to quote Houston, an " utter disinclination ... to take any action upon the subject." Spencer also opposed the project ; and so the President saw that in working for' it he would lack not only popular strength, but even that support in his official family which he particularly desired to have in all important affairs. Still further to embarrass him, the question of Texan independence appeared less firmly settled than it had been supposed to be, for that country was now more seriously threatened by the Mexicans than at any other time since the battle of San Jacinto; and finally she herself had apparently put an end to the plan of annexation by withdrawing * The Madisonian of April 16, 1844, stated "upon advisement" that annex- ation was not intended to operate against either party, but did not say the same with reference to the leaders. (Clay) Grayson to Houston, Oct. 21, 1837: Tex. Dipl. Corr., i., 264. (Van B.) Hunt to Tex. Sec, State, July 11, 1837: ib.. 240. When Clay and Van B. came out against immediate annexation, the Democratic Central Committee of Virginia said they did so " to the astonishment of all " (Rich. Enq., May 10, 1844). Jackson to Blair, Sept. 19, 1844: Jackson Pap. Many others also believed that Van B. would favor annexation, — re. g.. Detroit Adv., April 3, 1844. Madis., April 12, 15, 1844. TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. 107 her overture. Under such circumstances Tyler could only wait and feel about for elements of support ; but he was flexible and tenacious, and considerable time lay before him.^ In January, 1842, the American charge in Texas cast a beam of light by writing that he had been desired again to lay the subject before his government; and in expressing the opinion that the country would be compelled to unite her destiny with some foreign nation, he pointed out how greatly she could add to the resources and the trade of the American Union ; but this despatch, aside from showing that an earnest wish to be sheltered under the old flag existed still around its author, added little to the arguments which Tyler had already been prepared to give. Not long afterwards Texas herself, as we have seen, tentatively suggested annexation; but the President had to reply that while he was anxious to bring it about, he feared the Senate would not consent. In addition to this difficulty, the business connected with the Webster-Ashburton treaty was now making very large demands upon the attention of the gov- ernment ; and our relations with Mexico had become so unpleasant that were steps taken toward annexation, it was liable to look, when- ever they should be made known, as if we had purposely increased the tension in order to acquire Texas by means of a war, should that method prove necessary. In the latter part of the year Van Zandt brought the matter up once more, and he found the President and most of the cabinet decidedly favorable to it so far as language went ; but apparently the thing seemed to be too impracticable at that time for serious consideration, and the Texan government received an impression that ''weak and blind indifference" on the subject pre- vailed at Washington. In Houston's language. Van Zandt's advances were met by the American authorities with " habitual apathy," — good evidence that Tyler, notwithstanding his eagerness for annexa- tion, did not forget the dignity of his office.^ * (Friendly) Van Z., April 19, 1843. (San Frans.) Curtis, Webster, ii., 249. (Committed) Adams, Memoirs, xi., 347. (Feared) Van Z. to Jones, March 15, 1843: Jones, Memor., 211. Houston's letter to citizens, October, 1845: F. O., Texas, xiv. Spencer, Letter, Sept. 12, 1847: Niles, October 2, 1847, p. 69. It has been suggested, as one reason why Tyler made no move for annexation in 1842, that the United States were trying to secure an amicable settlement of our claims against Mexico. But this business would not have prevented a secret negotiation with Texas, and still less have required a delay of eight months after a settlement with Mexico was effected. ° Eve, Jan. 6, 1842. Reily, No. 83, April 14; No. 89, June [July] 11, 1842. (Unpleasant) To Thompson, July 13, 1842. Van Z., No. 93, Dec. 23, 1842. (Indifference) Jones. Memor., 81. Houston to Texas Banner, July 18, 1847: Niles, Sept. 4, 1847. I08 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Then, however, the outlook began to brighten. Early in the winter of 1842-3 A. V. Brown, a member of the House of Repre- sentatives from Tennessee, feeling deeply interested in the subject and afraid that Tyler's want of party strength would make him hesi- tate about proposing so important a measure, wrote to the Hermitage explaining the situation, and asking for something with which to stimulate the President. This was setting the match to gunpowder. It has been customary to think of the zeal for obtaining Texas as distinctively a Southern prod«rtt, but in reality it was more natively Western. As early as the beginning of 1831, William Carroll of Nashville wrote to Van Buren, " There is no subject upon which the government may be called to act, about which the whole Western States feel so deeply interested as the acquisition of the Province of Texas " ; and Jackson, who resided close to Nashville, replied promptly to Brown in the line of Carroll's ideas. England, he rep- resented, could now make an alliance with the feeble nation at our gate, place twenty or thirty thousand men on her border, organize them before the design had become known in the United States, gain a lodgment on the Mississippi, master the navigation of that stream, and excite a servile insurrection in the southern States ; whereas were that region in our hands, the militia would harass an invading army until a competent force could be led to the field. This letter encouraged the President, Brown stated afterwards ; and such an effect was very natural, for it showed that a strong leverage could be brought to bear on the Southwest and indeed on the entire coun- try, and he knew that Jackson's attitude would do a vast deal towards placing the Democrats behind the measure as a party. Besides, the letter was shown about at the Capitol, said Benton; and the con- currence which no doubt it evoked must have enhanced its influence upon Tyler considerably. ^° The head of the United States bank had been Nicholas Biddle; and although that institution was now defunct, Biddle's prestige had not yet vanished. He was a Northern man, too, so that his influence was greatest where the President most needed it ; and Biddle further stimulated the President by pointing out as a matter of great impor- tance that the acquisition of Texas would give the United States a '"The results of the Congressional elections of 1842 may have encouraged Tyler. (Brown's statement) Benton, Abr. Debates, xv., 145. Benton's own account of the origin and intended use of this letter seems baseless. Carroll. Feb. 6, 1831 : Van B. Pap. Jackson to Brown, Feb. 12, 1843: ib. Brown to Polk, Dec. 20, 1848: Polk Pap., Chicago. Benton, View, ii., 584. TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. 109 substantial monopoly of cotton, which — as any one could see — meant not only a guaranty of Southern prosperity, but a rope constantly round the neck of the foreign nation most to be feared, Great Britain. This consideration, the monopoly of cotton, Tyler afterwards repre- sented as in his mind the most important of all. No doubt it counted for much with him, and so it must have counted with all thoughtful men, north as well as south. ^^ To overcome one great difficulty it was proposed to place the sovereignty of Texas on firm ground, and for this purpose Tyler planned to negotiate a tripartite agreement, by which Mexico should acknowledge Texan independence and cede northern California — including San Francisco — to the United States, while England should induce her to yield the point of recognition, should help pay for the cession, and should accept as an equivalent for this assistance the undisputed possession of Oregon as far south as the Columbia. Lord Ashburton encouraged the scheme by saying that he did not think his government would object to our obtaining the California territory; and it was proposed to settle these points and remove another difficulty at the same time by sending Webster to England as a special envoy to negotiate the tripartite arrangement. Unfor- tunately, however, for these plans Mexico did not acquiesce. Indeed she could not, for the government of that country had no power to cede any portion of her territory, and the people not the least dis- position in the world to mortify their pride in such a way; nor did the American Congress prove willing to appropriate money for the special mission. It was then planned that Webster should take Everett's place as minister to Great Britain ; but Everett showed no desire to give up that comfortable office in exchange for a journey to China and back.^- Tyler's readiness to have Webster leave the country suggested plainly enough, although the President was cordial and friendly in his manner, that a change in the headship of the cabinet seemed to the Executive rather desirable. In fact the course of politics had made this change almost imperative. Massachusetts had nominated Henry Clay for the Presidency ; and the fact that Webster and his friends could not swing even their own State in Tyler's interest, "Tyler, Tyler, ii., 431. Tyler to his son, 1850: Mag. Anier. Hist., June, 1882, p. 387. "Tyler, Tyler, ii., 256, 260, 262, 263. Tyler to his son, Dec. 11, 1845: ib., 448. Adams, Memoirs, xi., 327, 347. Schouler, U. S., iv., 447, note, 436. Tyler to Webster, undated: Webster Pap. Id. to Id., Feb. 26, 1843: ib. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 102. no THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS made it evident that he could expect no effectual aid from them in conducting the government, and compelled him to strike out on a new line. On the other hand a longer stay in the cabinet would probably have compromised Webster seriously with his Whig asso- ciates. Moreover he doubtless understood that annexation was in view and felt that it would be indelicate on his part to stand in the way of his chief's design by insisting upon the retention of \ii^ portfolio. He believed — probably because he foresaw that a strong move in this direction would follow his retirement — that he ought to remain ; but under the circumstances resignation seemed the better course, and in May, 1843, he took leave of the administration. In all probability a successor had already been chosen. Logic and the President's desire to be supported by his entire cabinet pointed clearly toward the selection of a strong annexationist for his place ; and Judge Upshur of Virginia, one of Tyler's group of intimates and at the same time a friend of Calhoun's, had been described by Van Zandt the previous month as one of the best men for the inter- ests of Texas that could be appointed. Upshur, said the Texan envoy, had the nerve to take responsibility and act with decision ; and Webster himself admitted that no better choice was possible. Accordingly the energetic V^irginian was soon invited to the post of honor.^^ Now in March, 1843, England's design to effect emancipation in Texas if she could, and in that way strike at American slavery and our agricultural and shipping interests, was made known to the President through Ashbel Smith's letter of January 25, which has already been placed in evidence. Whether the letter was shown or read as a whole to any member of the administration cannot be known, but that seems more than possible ; and at all events Van Zandt, according to his own report, used in his conversation with Tyler not only ideas but phraseology derived from the charge at London. Moreover Smith has stated in his Reminiscences that his letters on the subject went to Calhoun and from Calhoun to Upshur, so that his revelations of January 25 may have reached the Execu- tive by this route also. " I received," said the President later, "Curtis, Webster, ii., 211. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 248, 263. Wise (Decades, 203) says that Webster retired " magnanimously " to make way for an annexationist. (Believed) Webster to [Ketchum], May i, 1843: Seventy-second Anniv. of Webster's Birthday, 20. It has been charged that Tyler kept Webster in ignorance of the Texas " conspiracy," but in fact nothing was done in the matter during his incumbency. Van Z., April 19, 1843. Webster, Writings, xviii., 173. There was a brief interregnum under Legare. TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. Ill "authentic information" of foreign designs "at war, as I firmly believed with the permanent interests of the United States." It now appeared, therefore, that more reasons existed than he had previ- ously supposed for acquiring Texas, since evidently the annexation of that country would eliminate all such dangers. As a Southern man and a slaveholder he naturally desired to protect the cherished institution of his section, and as an American citizen he doubtless resented foreign meddling, — especially meddling intended to injure us. Besides, he could not fail to see that as the British designs threatened what was a powerful interest in one half of this country, a bold and successful antagonist of them would no doubt be amply rewarded with political favor ; while it was equally evident that such interference would be opposed by the North with no less vigor than by the South, and consequently that a new method of arousing annexation sentiment in the free States had been discovered.^* The effect upon him was such that Van Zandt said, in reporting on the matter, that both Tyler and the cabinet appeared to desire annexation heartily, and that in his own judgment it would be neces- sary to rouse the feeling of the American government against Eng- land only a little more to make them act. The evidence derived fjom Smith was, however, confidential. Even if the President saw the actual letter, he could make no public use of it; and perhaps the exact source of information was not revealed. Tyler knew, then, what was going on, but had no proofs with which to rouse the country. Moreover the Senate's rejection of Wise, nominated as minister to France, and of Gushing, selected as head of the Treasury department — both of them committed to the plan of annexation — embarrassed the Executive not a little at this time.^^ But now something very suggestive occurred. In the spring of 1843 an abolition movement suddenly made its appearance in Texas. The New Orleans papers were alarmed by it, and the news went rapidly north. In May the New York Journal of Commerce took the matter up in a leader. According to private advices, announced "Van Z., No. 97, March 13, 1843. Smith, Remin., 54. It is of course un- certain at what date Smith's letters reached Calhoun. Tyler Tyler, ii., 425. Tyler said " other nations," probably to avoid naming England. Tyler's account of the sources of his information regarding English designs (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 428: letter to Rich. Enq.. Sept. i, 1847) is shown by the documents to be inaccu- rate. This is not surprising. He no doubt left the details to the Secretary of State; his mind at the time was much agitated; and several years had elapsed when he wrote. But he states clearly that he received information from Ashbel Smith, and on such a point he was not likely to be mistaken. '^ Van Z., No. 97, March 13, 1843. 112 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS the editors, measures were already " in progress " to secure the emancipation of the negroes, the total value of whom was believed to be only about $5,000,000. We think, said they, that a loan for this amount could be obtained in England, and if so "we are strong in the belief " that slavery will be abolished, for it is supposed that this change would stimulate immigration and help England to make peace between Mexico and Texas, and cotton is now so cheap that no great reason for holding slaves exists ; besides which the Texans may feel it would be better not to found the nation on a system that is bound to disappear before long. Evidently the editors regarded the movement as serious, and they deemed it of particular interest as perhaps foreshadowing a similar one in the United States. Still further reasons for abolishing slavery in Texas were suggested by other pens. The negroes were said to escape so frequently across the Rio Grande as hardly to be worth owning ; and it was urged that such a measure would appeal to the sympathy and admiration of the people in England and the northern States, from whom no little aid could then be expected. Many leading men were said to support the new departure, and some of the Texas papers appeared to sub- stantiate this assertion. In short, the movement was believed to be important; and the New Orleans Tropic, for example, denounced poor Texas as ungrateful for Southern assistance, its government as " utterly contemptible," most of the people as " not fit to be free," and the nation in sum as bringing ridicule upon the name " republic."^« Foremost among the advocates of the reform was S. P. Andrews, and his character and ability aided much to give the matter impor- tance. Some time before he became prominent in this light, the Galveston Advertiser described him as possessing "talents of the first order " and as standing " confessedly at the head of the bar " in Texas, where he had been practising law some three years. His place of residence was Houston ; but about the middle of March, 1843, ^""e proceeded with a Mr. League to Galveston, and began cautiously to unfold the project of emancipation. Some of the people soon compelled him to leave the island. But the editor of the New York Journal of Commerce stated that a citizen of Texas, "N. Orl. Bee. April 22, 1843; N. Orl. Com. Bull., April 26, 1843. N. Y. Journal of Com., May 19, 1843. N. Orl. Tropic: Wash. Globe, May 22, 1842. Bait. Amer.: Sav. Repub., May 12, 1843. Boston Daily Mail, May 2t„ 1844. Tropic: Detroit Adv., June 27, 1843. TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. II3 not an abolitionist himself, reported that the scheme of discarding slavery still met with a good deal of favor in that country. ^^ By many Americans England was believed to be behind the move- ment. British influence was thought by not a few to be dominant in the nation, and as we have seen, reasons for this opinion could easily be discovered in the attitude of the administration newspapers and in the public utterances of the President. The New Orleans Tropic, which was not a Tyler sheet, said in May that as we had neglected Texas, the English now had a preponderant voice there, while popular sentiment — particularly on account of the American tariff — was indifferent or sometimes hostile to the United States. The public prints, doubtless under British influence, lean toward abolition, it added. The important Picayune of the same city announced that the English were reported to be aiming at the de- struction of slavery in Texas ; and a Galveston communication in the London Times mentioned that the emancipation scheme was attrib- uted to Elliot. More significant still the New Orleans Republican, like many other papers in the United States, printed a letter from A. J. Yates to a Mr. Converse dated at Galveston in ]\Iarch, 1843, which stated that the writer had had " several conversations " with the British representative, and had learned from him that abolition would ensure Texas the warmest support of England in the struggle with Mexico and adequate financial means to effect the reform. Yates added that within sixty days the people would be ready to consider the subject in a convention, and that — particularly should free trade be adopted — the results would be most important ; and he even declared that reports of Elliot's, despatched from Galveston at that very time, fully confirmed all this. Later he explained that his letter was hastily written, and that his remarks about the English minister were based upon "the substance of impressions received from conversation with him," together with his own " knowledge of the feelings and opinions of the British nation." But the obvious reasons for making some kind of an explanation and the character of the explanation itself left so wide a gap for suspicion as to what Elliot had really said, that probably the earlier communication was discounted but little; and this was the more natural because the "Adv.: Nat. Intel!., June 12, 1844. Kennedy, Sept. 6, 1843: Pub. Rec. Off., "Slave Trade" reports, xxxii. N. Y. Journ. Com., May 25, 1843 (edit, and Galv. letter). 114 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS British minister had gained the reputation of being an avowed abohtionist.^^ Further it was alleged, as Elliot himself reported, that England had insisted upon the surrender of slavery as the condition of mediating between two South American republics, and it was then inferred that "the same concession" had been "required" of the Texans, for whom it was fully understood in the United States that she had agreed to interpose her good offices. Said the New Orleans Republican, " England is about procuring a settlement of the dispute between Mexico and Texas, and there is too much reason to fear that the reward for her interference will be the control of Texian affairs, for many years to come," which would involve, as the editor proceeded to explain, the disappearance of slavery; and the Texas Times gave in detail the story about English mediation in South America, and the resulting emancipation of the blacks in Uruguay. In short, said the Baltimore American, an able and conservative newspaper, there was little reason to doubt the active interposition of Great Britain in Texas on the side of abolition.^'' In addition to all this it was stated by the American charge that Andrews was known to be a close associate of Houston's and to have been with him at this period. It was a fact also, as we have discovered, that Houston favored emancipation ; and as one holding so decided an opinion could hardly fail to let it appear occasionally, one is not surprised that the Bee of New Orleans attributed to him editorially a share in the design of making Texas " an abolition empire." Furthermore the Robinson terms had become known to the public, and though the people had expressed a decided sentiment against them, they had been made the basis of formal negotiations ; and any thoughtful person could see that they implied the extinction of slavery. Thus there appeared to be a wide-reaching though mysterious tangle of England and the English with Houston's administration, Mexico and the abolitionists; and it was very pos- sible to conclude, as did ex-President Lamar, that slavery in Texas was threatened by Great Britain in collusion with the Texan govern- ment. Public sentiment in the United States began to be aroused, and the results of all this began to be pointed out. The Baltimore "rro/itc; Wash. Globe, May 22, 1843. Picayune: Newark Adv.. July 11, 1843. Times, Oct. 19, 1843. Repnb., July 3, 1843. (Later) Galv. Civilian, Aug. 9, 1843. Smith, Remin., 75. "Elliot, secret, June 8, 1843. (Understood) Nat. Intell., July 25, 1842. Repub., July 3, 1843. Times, March 18, 1843. Amer.: Sav, Repnb., May 12, 1843. TYLER DESIRES TO EFFECT ANNEXATION. II5 American, for example, declared that should the scheme be carried through, the inhabitants of Texas would become alienated from those of the slave States ; and, as she would naturally drift into British control, England could use her effectively against us in time of war.-" Our investigation of the matter has shown us that all these cur- rent suspicions had a substantial basis. Yet after all there was no very definite and tangible evidence of a public nature ; nothing the masses could fasten upon; nothing Tyler himself could offer as fully satisfactory proof. June 24 the Madisonian burst out in this wise : " If Great Britain, as her philanthropists and blustering presses intimate, entertains a design to possess Mexico or Texas, or to inter- fere in any manner with the slaves of the Southern States, but a few weeks we fancy, at any time, will sufffce to rouse the whole Ame- rican People to arms like one vast nest of hornets. The great Western States, at the call of ' Captain Tyler,' would pour their noble sons down the Mississippi Valley by Millions." This utter- ance, described later by the National Intelligencer as the first note of the Presidential organ in the cause of annexation, seems to reflect the attitude of the administration at that date. Tyler felt well enough satisfied that English designs were afoot in the Southwest, though he knew his information was incomplete and could not lay before the public even what he possessed ; and he was trying to rouse popular sentiment in the United States in favor of securing Texas by appeal- ing to the natural jealousy of foreign interference, exciting the prev- alent distrust and fear of that old enemy, England, and touching in a suggestive way on the vague but general suspicion that somehow she was trying to undermine American slavery.-^ -"Murphy, No. 7, Sept. 24, 1843. N. Orl. Bee, April 22, 1843. Lamar, Letter, Nov. 18, 1845: Galv. Nen's, Nov. 22, 1845. Aiiier.: Sav. Repiib., May 12, 1843- ^ Madis., June 24, 1843. Nat, IntclL. March 23, 1844. VI Tyler Proposes Annexation Presently events occurred which gave an open and undeniable sign that slavery in Texas was receiving close attention in England, and suggested plainly enough a great deal more. In June, 1843, ^s the concluding scene of a World's Convention on the same subject, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society held its annual meet- ing at London. Lord Morpeth presided, and his principal speech began to be known in the United States before the twenty-fifth of July. According to the London Times he said he rejoiced to hear that there was a prospect of the abolition of slavery in Texas ; while other accounts represented his language as much more pronounced. A letter published in the Richmond Enquirer said the address was as fiendish as ever came from the lips of a professing Christian. Another speaker observed, " I take this meeting as an indication that Great Britain is prepared to use every weapon she can wield to put an end to slavery " ; and the logical connection between this remark and Texas could easily be made out. Resolutions were adopted by the Society expressing their " trust " that the abolition movement in that country would be " encouraged and strengthened by the due exertion of the influence of the Government and people " of England ; and a letter from an American in London, published soon at New York, not only stated that the British cabinet had promised for its own share to comply with this desire, but affirmed that the promoters of the scheme felt sure of succeeding. Texas would then become, inferred the writer, an asylum for runaways and a perpetual incitement to murder, insurrection and outrage by the slaves of the southern States.^ Lewis Tappan was present at the convention. He went there, at the urgent request of John Quincy Adams, expressly to urge this subject upon the anti-slavery men and the government of England, — at least so a London letter printed by William Lloyd Garrison stated ; and Tappan thrilled the convention by relating, if we may believe 'See General Note, p. i. Rich. Enq., July 25, 1843. London Times, June 22, 1843. Enq., Aug. 11, 1843. (Resolutions) London Times, Aug. 11, 1843. (Letter) N. Orl. Repub., Aug. 2, 1843. 116 TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. II7 Duff Green, how Adams had said to him that Great Britain ought as a Christian nation to require the abohtion of slavery in Texas. Moreover Stacy pubHcly informed the Society that a number of the delegates had called upon Aberdeen, and that His Lordship — besides hearing attentively all they chose to say — had " promised that no legitimate means should be spared to effect the great object "of eliminating slavery from that republic. Thus could be seen the organized abolition sentiment of Great Britain, undoubtedly a tre- mendous force, concentrating its attention on this part of the world, reaching out with one hand to the advocates of freedom in the northern American States, and grasping with the other the foreign policy of the British government. So much was publicly known. - The American Executive had also private advices ; and since Everett was out of touch with the administration as a New Eng- lander, as a Whig, and as an official whom Tyler had tried to shelve, they naturally received attention in spite of the minister's ignoring the matter. One source of news was probably the Texan envoy at the Court of St. James, whose despatch of July 2 has already been presented. Smith recognized the importance of having his colleague in the United States well informed as to matters of importance in Europe, and it seems very likely that he sent a copy of that docu- ment to him. If he did, its contents were in all probability imparted more or less fully to Upshur, with whom Van Zandt was having most satisfactory interviews at about this time; and it may also have reached the secretary by way of Calhoun. Moreover Tyler's biog- rapher states that Smith wrote directly to the President, and we find Tyler saying under the date of August 28, 1843, that information had been received from the Texan representative at London.^ With reference to another avenue of communication from that capital we can speak still more positively. Duff Green was in Lon- don at this time on a semi-official errand ; and as a Southern poli- tician closely connected with Calhoun he had strong claims to the - (Tappan) Lib.. July 28, 1843. (Green) N. Y. Weekly Herald, Oct. 14, 1843. (Stacy) London Times, June 21, 1843 (the words are those of the Times). Stacy's report of Aberdeen's promise was given in Niles' Register, July 22, 1843. (A report of the meeting) Madis., Aug. 4, 1843. ^ Smith, No. 41, July 2, 1843: see p. 89. (Informed) Reily, No. 89, June [July] II, 1842; Smith to Van Z., conf., Jan. 25, 1843: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1 1 03. Smith wrote to Everett, Oct. 31, 1843. that he would send full information to Van Z. (Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1145). but this does not prove that he had not already sent a brief account. (Interviews) Van Z.. No. 104, Aug. 10, 1843. Among Calhoun's papers we find a letter from Smith to Jones dated July 31, 1843 (Jameson, Calh. Corr., 866), and others may have gone to Upshur and not have been returned. Tyler, Tyler, iii., n8, 121. Il8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS confidence of Smith. Probably he, and certainly some person vouched for by Upshur as " a man of great intelligence, and well versed in public affairs," now sent over a mixed but sufficiently alarm- ing report of the British designs, and soon this document reached the State department. As the writer mentioned that confidential information on the subject had been furnished him by Smith, one may fairly suppose — though we have only a passage of the letter — • that all the important points known to the Texan envoy were more or less fully given in this communication ; and so it is clear that by the end of the first week in August the American Executive was notified that fairly definite plans, countenanced by the English government, had been devised to bring about abolition in Texas, and thus to gain important advantages at the expense of the United States.* The effect of this was doubtless considerably enhanced by a ruse of Houston's. Just how the truce with Mexico came about we have taken pains to ascertain, and we are aware that it was not due, except in a very minor sense, to the good offices of England; but the Texan Executive in proclaiming it contrived to give the matter a flamingly red color, and shook it broadly at the United States. " Whereas," he began, " an official communication has been received at the department of state, from Her Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires near this government, founded upon a despatch he had received from Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Mexico, announc- ing to this government the fact that the president of Mexico would order a cessation of hostilities on his part " ; and any intimation that the truce was not entirely attributable to the interposition of Great Britain was successfully avoided. " England," wrote Murphy with reference to the affair, " England may at this time be, setting on foot a negotiation, of vast consequence to the United States — and in all probability such is the case." Upshur doubtless had the same idea. Early in August Van Zandt found that he was " fully alive to the important bearing" which Texan slavery had upon that institution in the South, and very apprehensive that Great Britain was endeav- oring to secure undue influence in the counsels of the junior republic; and, with a view doubtless to earn good-will in that quarter, our government decided at about this time to remonstrate against the sanguinary threats of Mexico.'' * (Green's mission) Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 125. Letter: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., I sess., 18. " Aberdeen told Smith he did not think the Robinson plan had any connection TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 119 Upshur now communicated some of his ideas on the Texan question to Murphy for the general guidance of the charge. First he quoted a passage from the letter probably written by Duff Green, unraveling its tangled account of the British plans with an ease that was almost Solomonic unless he had been given the benefit of Ashbel Smith's clear statement, and concluding that England had no doubt offered to co-operate in one way or another in favor of emancipating the Texan bondmen. He then proceeded to argue that probably this move was part of a general abolition scheme intended to develop " new markets for the products of her home industry, and at the same time to destroy all competition with the industry of her colonies." Continuing, he pointed out the value of the Texas market, the natural desire of Great Britain to sell goods and buy cotton there, the impossibility of preventing smugglers from bring- ing her manufactures into the United States by way of the Louisiana rivers, the weakness of Texas and the advantages that England could gain by controlling her, and the consequent injury threatened against the agriculture, the manufacturing, the shipping business and the public revenue of the United States. In the Secretary's opinion, however, the most serious danger lay elsewhere. For several rea- sons a " free " Texas would prove much worse than Canada or the non-slave States as an asylum for runaway negroes ; friction would arise between it and the South ; collisions would follow ; the Ame- rican government would have to choose between waging war upon its neighbor and attempting to coerce one-half of the Union; and in any event discord and injury would be certain to result. The scheme of a predominant British influence and the abolition of slavery in Texas, therefore, could "not be permitted to succeed without the most strenuous efforts " on the part of the United States to de- feat it.« This despatch has been condemned on several grounds. In the first place, it has been said to look toward interference in the con- cerns of an independent state. But no one would maintain, for ex- ample, that France ought to refrain from influencing the policy of Russia, Italy, Holland and Belgium, and permit Germany to combine those powers against her. All civilized nations interfere now in the with English mediation (Smith, June 16, 1843). (Proclamation) A^iles, Ixvi., 251. Murphy, No. 3, July 6, 1843. Van Z., to Jones, Aug. 12, 1843: Jones, Memor., 243. Van Z., No. 104, Aug. 10, 1843. (Remonstrate) To Thompson, No. 43, July 27, 1843. "To Murphy, No. 6, Aug. 8, 1845: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 18. 120 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS affairs of their neighbors. Only the kind of interference is open to question ; and in this instance what Upshur had in mind — though not yet ready to announce the fact — was the admission of Texas with the free assent of her people to an equal share in what he regarded as a most beneficent political system. The indictment may, however, be amended, and it may be said that we meddled with a domestic affair of a foreign country. But as it happened, Texan slavery had international bearings just then, and the Secretary's action was taken altogether for that very reason. In the next place, the attitude of the American government has been condemned as looking toward national interposition in behalf of a local institution, slavery. But mackerel fishing is a local affair, yet the federal authorities would have been called upon without hesitation by New England, had any defence of the fisheries been necessary. Again, the President and the Secretary have been severely handled for proposing to commit the nation in the cause of a detestable institution. But this line of thought merely carries us back to the two points of view discussed in an earlier chapter. To those who regarded the support of slavery as an inexcusable crime the despatch could only appear heinous, but it must always be borne in mind that Upshur and Tyler considered slaves a form of property quite as legitimate as a mackerel fleet. To protect it seemed to such men a right and a duty; and it should certainly occasion no surprise that Southerners, finding themselves in possession of the government, used the power frankly in defense of their interests, just as Webster would no doubt have employed it in support of the tariff, which multitudes of good citizens re- garded as merely highway robbery legalized. By others the despatch has been thought exaggerated and alarm- ist; but in reality it made no mention of several points that keen eyes had in view. Nothing was said of the possible expanding of Texas with British support until she should become a rival of the United States, nothing of her obtaining the coveted port of San Francisco and even Oregon, nothing of her filling with monarchical Europeans wholly out of sympathy with the United States, nothing of her becoming the ally of England in a war against the Union, nothing of naval supremacy in the Gulf, nothing of her serving as a barrier and check to this country ; and it is interesting to note that tlie Rc7'iic dc Paris and other able journals of France expressed substantially the same opinions as the Secretary. No less worthy of remark as a comment upon the despatch is the view of Governor TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 121 Troup of Georgia. Should Texas abolish slavery, he wrote, her freedmen would cross the line and incite the American negroes to cut the throats of the white women and children, and against this danger the southern States would have a right "to protect them- selves by all means in their power, as a case of imminent peril, and one not admitting of delay." With such a spirit at work friction and collisions could very safely be predicted.^ One popular criticism of the despatch, however, seems at first sight very just. How astonishing the disproportion between premise and conclusion ! Apparently Upshur was ready to set the world afire on account of a rather vague and incoherent letter from a private citizen roaming in foreign parts. But this view of his course is impossible. He was a man of intellect, occupying a post of the gravest responsibility; and it is entirely probable that his letter received the sanction of the President and nearly or quite all of the cabinet of the United States. There must, then, have been some respectable basis for it, and this consideration tends very strongly to confirm the idea that in one way and another the sub- stance of the information sent across the ocean by Ashbel Smith had been imparted to our Executive. So obvious is this inference, that one is surprised to find no conception of such a possibility cool- ing the imaginations of Upshur's critics ; and one is the more sur- prised, because Tyler himself stated afterwards that alarming intelli- gence received from [Duff Green then in] London was confirmed by the representative of Texas at that post.® Scarcely had the despatch to Murphy left Washington, when another red cloak was flaunted before the government's eyes. July 6 the Texan Secretary of State had notified Van Zandt that Houston deemed it inadvisable to pursue the subject of annexation farther at that time, preferring to occupy himself exclusively in settling affairs with Mexico ; and the charge, after waiting until he felt sure that Upshur had addressed the promised remonstrance to Mexico, communicated this decision verbally to him. Later Houston repre- sented his action as intended to stimulate the annexation sentiment of the United States, and perhaps that was the true reason for it. But one ignorant of this purpose and in full view of the truce proclama- tion might only perceive that such a policy chimed most happily with ''Revue de Paris, Feb. 15, 1843; Le Corrcspondant, June, 1844. Harden, Troup, 526. "Tyler to Eds. Rich. Enq., Sept. i, 1847: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 428. 122 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS the British designs in general and the great aboHtion scheme in par- ticular.^ Some time afterwards Jones wrote that his instructions to Van Zandt under the date of July 6 "aroused all the dormant jealousies and fears " of the American government, and caused them to shake off " the apathy of seven years sleep over the question." Here one sees the author's partiality for his own work. Upshur's despatch to Murphy was by no means apathetic. But without a doubt Van Zandt's communication had the stimulating effect of a cold plunge, and the charge proceeded to heighten the afterglow by studiously parrying all Upshur's inquiries on the subject. Then, to continue the sensation, the American newspapers announced early in Sep- tember that Beales's huge claim had been presented to the Texan government ; and, as Henderson thought the British Queen appeared to have in view " some other object than a desire of securing the rights of her subjects " in pressing their land claims at this time, so natural an idea may well have occurred to Upshur also.^° On the eighteenth of September Van Zandt wrote to Jones sub- stantially this: The announcement that my instructions regarding annexation had been suspended has seemed to fire Upshur's zeal. In every interview he has spoken of the project; and he has assured me several times that it was the great measure of the present ad- ministration, that under directions from the President he was actively preparing the minds of the people for it, and that as soon as it should be thought safe, the proposition would be renewed by the United States. Today he told me that early action was con- templated, and he desired the Executive of Texas to be so informed immediately, in order that our representative here, should a treaty be favored by us, might be given power to act on the proposition in case it should be made — as Upshur thought would be the fact — before the assembling of Congress. He said that he could not make the overture now, and probably not in time to receive an answer before Congress would convene; but he believed the next Senate would favor the measure, and he explained in detail the grounds of his opinion, such as reports from correspondents in various parts of the country. In all this I consider him serious, but the state of •To Van Z., July 6, 1843. Van Z., No. 104, Aug. 10, 1843. Houston to citizens, Oct., 1845 : F. O., Texas, xiv. "Jones, Letter: Miles, Jan. i, 1848, p. 281. (Parried) Van Z. to Jones, Aug. 12, 1843: Jones, Memor., 243. (Beales) E. g., Baltimore Clipper, Sept. 7, 1843. Hend. to Jones, Oct. i, 1843: Jones, Memor., 257. TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 123 things here is such that nothing can be considered certain until it is done. There would be a fierce fight in the Senate, yet in the end I think the cause of annexation would triumph. ^^ The next day the packet-ship Victoria arrived at New York with fresh oil for Tyler's fire. In the House of Lords on August i8 Brougham had spoken in effect as follows : Were Texas to abolish slavery a demand for free labor would ensue, and that would be of importance to all countries having a surplus population. This makes me " irrepressibly anxious " to have the negroes unshackled there. When the United States, losing the Texas market, find they can no longer *' be a breeding country, you will have solved that great problem of the human race — they must emancipate their slaves." Now there is " a very great chance " that Texas would adopt this reform if Mexico should make it a condition of recognizing her, and therefore I have " the greatest hopes " that if through our good offices this recognition is given, an end will be put to " the hideous crime " of breeding negroes in the United States for sale beyond the Sabine, and consequently to the existence of slavery in that great country. What, then, is the state of negotiations with Texas? To this Lord Aberdeen replied that England had done all she could to obtain recognition for the young republic, and that he scarcely needed to say that " every effort would be made " by the British government " to effect the result which was contemplated by the noble and learned lord who had just addressed the house." Said the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin with reference to this colloquy, " The distinct- ness and boldness of these announcements indicate that the plot is nearly ripe " ; and apparently the remark was not without some justice. ^^ Three days after the Victoria came in Upshur wrote confidentially to Murphy. I am sorry, he said, that any in Texas misconstrue the friendly sentiments of the United States. We have every motive " of interest as well as feeling" to sympathize with, encourage and aid that country, and we are anxious to have this understood, for the " policy and measures " of England in that quarter have given us good cause for alarm. Already she claims to exercise control there, and men in Parliament speak of maintaining her " ascendancy." Unfortunately for us it is " somewhat doubtful " how far the Execu- " Van Z., No. 107, Sept. 18, 1843. A distinct intimation will be noted here that Tyler desired to lay the subject before Congress in his annual Message. ^'^ Nat. Intell., Sept. 2Z, 1843. London Times. Aug. 19, 1843. Dull.: Madis., Oct. 9, 1843. 124 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS tive would be supported by the people in giving Texas prompt and effectual aid, as he would be glad to do. In the slaveholding section, however, no difference of opinion in this matter exists, and many in the other States are " sufficiently liberal to embrace a policy abso- lutely necessary to the salvation of the South, although in some respects objectionable to themselves." In reality the annexation of Texas would mainly benefit the North. The other section would only gain security at the expense of raising up a powerful agricul- tural competitor, but the North would obtain new markets, cheaper cotton, and more employment for its vessels. "No effort will be spared to lay the truth" before the people in that quarter. If we succeed in convincing them, the cause of Texas will be bright; and if not, it will be no worse than now. Hence that country has every reason to await patiently the result of our exertions. If she accepts British protection, she will be the lamb in the embrace of the wolf. You cannot be authorized to say these things officially, because it is not certain how far Congress will sustain the Executive ; but you should know our views and feelings, and you are to use your own discretion in giving informal expression to them. Do not allow Texas to favor England with the idea that the American government or people are hostile or even cold. Watch Great Britain closely. Her policy threatens to endanger the peace of the world. ^^ After revolving the subject in his mind about a week more Up- shur addressed Everett, calling his particular attention to the remarks of Brougham and Aberdeen in the House of Lords. Brougham undoubtedly knew, observed the Secretary, that England had contem- plated negotiations with Texas for the abolition of slavery there, and that probably such negotiations were already in progress. But he had in mind as more important the emancipation of the negroes in the United States ; and as he declared that Aber- deen's reply would be " received with joy " by all who favor the ob- jects of the anti-slavery societies — that is to say, favor universal emancipation — it may be inferred that Aberdeen also had our coun- try in mind. This appears the more probable because the minister said nothing, in answering Brougham, to show that he had been misunderstood ; and he would not in so serious a matter have per- mitted a misapprehension to pass. It is therefore fair "to under- stand his language as an avowal of designs which, whether so intended or not, threaten very serious consequences to the United "To Murphy, Sept, 22, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 25. TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 125 States " ; and " information received from other sources " points to the same conckision. Now foreign governments must not inter- fere with our institutions, and so we must " know distinctly, and with- out doubt, how far our just apprehensions upon this point are well founded." Even v/ere the designs of Great Britain limited to Texas, we could not be indifferent. Abolition there would be " highly in- jurious to us " ; and while we could not complain, were Texas of her own free will to give up that system of labor, we can rightfully object if she is constrained to adopt such a policy. What then is the truth? Is England aiming to bring about the emancipation of the negroes in Texas ? Does she design to destroy or affect slavery as it exists in the United States? What measures has she adopted to accomplish both or either of these ends? Obtain information from all sources, particularly from the Texan representative and by direct application to Lord Aberdeen, and send us full and frequent reports.^* These instructions were supplemented with a confidential letter, for a Massachusetts man like Everett could not be expected to take a Southerner's view of the matter without assistance. England, he pointed out, desires to bring about universal emancipation in order to build up her colonies, in order to gain control of Texas with a view of monopolizing that market for her manufactures, and in order to embarrass a formidable rival by destroying slavery in the United States ; and then he took up his third point in detail. Should the negroes of the southern States be emancipated, he said, they could not remain as equals where they have existed as slaves and they would stream rapidly away, ruining Southern agriculture by depriving that section of laborers, cutting off therefore a very large part indeed of our exports, reducing in the same propor- tion our ability to purchase abroad, breaking down our public revenue by greatly diminishing the volume of imports, com- pelling the government to gall the people with hateful and embar- rassing direct taxes, crippling the mills, railroads and canals by taking away in large measure all branches of the cotton business, and filling the North with a horde of ignorant paupers, who could not fail to be clamorous for civil and social rights, mortally harmful to the prosperity of the white laborers, and productive only of dis- cord and misfortune. To avert such evils the door would be shut "To Everett, No. 6i. Sept. 28. 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 2T. Evidently Upshur expected nothing very important in answer to his letter, for he proceeded in the annexation business without awaiting a reply. 126 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS against the freedman everywhere, and his extermination would be the consequence. After this exposition Upshur touched upon the dangers of smuggHng, of colHsions between the slave States and Texas, and of the ill-will between South and North that would soon follow, were Texas to come under British control and abandon slavery ; and finally he suggested that England might next proceed to secure a firm grip on the trade of the Gulf by bringing emancipation about in Cuba and gaining possession of what would then be an un- profitable island. Whether for weal or for woe, he concluded, slavery is fastened upon us ; it has become so closely interwoven with the life of the South, fibre with fibre, that no wise statesman would risk the experiment of attempting to eradicate it ; and no for- eign government can be permitted to interfere in the matter upon any pretext. ^^ By this time Calhoun had probably received the copy of the despatch written by Ashbel Smith to his government on the last day of July, which we find among his papers. In this, it will be recalled, the Texan envoy stated that in answer to a direct inquiry Aberdeen had referred to the extinction of slavery in Texas as very desirable, insisting upon this point not only as connected with British interests but also " in reference to the United States," and admitting that Doyle had been instructed to ofifer British mediation at Mexico on the basis of Texan independence conjoined with Texan abolition. England, remarked Smith, desires to effect this change in our coun- try with some regard to her own colonial and commercial interests, but " mainly in reference to its future influence on slavery in the United States." Such was his direct report of Aberdeen's admis- sions. Now Calhoun mentions that he sent the despatch to Upshur with a long letter urging him to adopt " some decided measure " to defeat the scheme ; and one may assume that he sent it promptly. By the middle of October, then, it was very likely in the Secretary's hands.i« ]\Ieanwhile, however, domestic trouble seems to have created complications. The newspapers had a good deal to say at this time about dissensions in the President's official family. They were de- scribed as serious, and Texas was mentioned as the cause. Indeed Upshur admitted that one or two of his colleagues might not be "Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 31. '" Page 90. it seems far more probable that Calhoun received this copy from Smith or Van Z. than that Jones or Houston sent it to him. TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 127 favorable to the grand project; and as Spencer had not yet retired, it is clear that such was the case. Another reason for delay was the desirability of ascertaining the opinion of the Senate, and Upshur informed Van Zandt that he was personally engaged in this investi- gation. Early in 1844 the Madisonian printed a letter signed by " William Penn," apparently a well informed person, who said the Secretary "communicated very fully and freely his purposes and his wishes in regard to this great measure" to Senators of both parties; and numerous indications tend to confirm the statement. Among his papers there was found after his death a list of Senators, and the names were marked " Certain for " or " Certain against." The former included two-thirds of the number, and the analysis was be- lieved to have reference to annexation. At Upshur's request Gilmer assisted in the work of inquiry, and not only were sentiments investi- gated but efforts were made to influence them. As an illustration of what could be done in this way, it was for the sake of mollifying Benton — or at least partly with that end in view — that Fremont had been appointed to lead the exploring expedition of 1843. Apparently the prospect was favorable. In fact the President himself stated later that before the proffer of annexation was formally made to Texas he received " assurances from the only reliable quarter that the treaty, when negotiated, would be ratified by a constitutional majority of the Senate"; and according to the editor of the Madi- sonian Upshur was led to expect that even Webster would not oppose the plan.^^ The question of method also had to be considered. A treaty seemed the most natural and proper avenue to annexation, though it was believed that Texas could be admitted as a State by an act of Congress. Besides, the treaty method was particularly favorable to secrecy ; and while it had a disadvantage as regarded the less im- portant party, since the treaty-making power could only admit her to the Union as a Territory, it presented an advantage with reference to ratification, for the great battle over slavery in that region would naturally be deferred until the question of statehood should arrive. Moreover the instructions of the Texan government to their representative in 1836 had required that a treaty should be "N. Y. Herald, Nov. lo, 1843. N. Orl. Courier, Nov. 20, 1843. Van Z., No. 107, Sept, 18, 1843. (Spencer) Niles, Oct. 2, 1847, p. 69. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 278, 284, 283, 348, 276, 396. Madis., April 25 ; March 30, 1844. Upshur was killed Feb. 28, 1844. 128 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS made, to be submitted to the Senate of that country for approval. It was therefore decided to adopt this method.^* On the sixteenth day of October, then, Upshur addressed a note to Van Zandt. The government and many people of the United States, he said, have been giving "serious attention" to the subject of a treaty annexing your country. Recent occurrences in Europe have presented this matter in " new and important aspects," and " unless the views of the administration shall undergo a very great and unexpected change, I shall be prepared to make a proposition to that effect, whenever you shall be prepared with proper powers to meet it." Obviously no positive assurance can be given that all branches of the government would accept the measure; but our desire is " to present it, in the strongest manner, to the consideration of Congress." In other words, as far as the American Executive was concerned the door of the Union stood at last unbarred. ^^ At this point one is tempted to offer a few reflections, — not as historian but merely as observer. Evidently there was no collusion between the American and the Texan governments and no conspiracy anywhere. Houston was playing his own game as best he could, and probably he intended to disappoint the United States ; and on the other side few politicians experienced enough and shrewd enough to reach the American Senate could have been sounded so delicately on the momentous issue of annexation as to prevent them from discov- ering what was in the wind, and of course they talked about it more or less confidentially with colleagues and friends, — that is to say, conveyed to a rather large circle, all told, some intimation of the matter. In the next place, Tyler's personal motives were entirely justifiable, as the world goes, and both he and Upshur did their plain duty as public men in their environment were sure to see it. One only need ask, as to this, what would be the verdict of history upon them as the executive officers of a people deeply engaged in the strife of international competition, had they closed their ears to the distinct intimations of danger that reached them, and permitted affairs to move on as we have found they were headed. Thirdly, '*W. D. Miller, special secretary of the Texan legation, stated to Jones, April 28, 1844 (Jones, Memor., 345) that annexation by act of Congress would be deemed unconstitutional " or at least irregular " ; and this probably repre- sented Tyler's apprehensions in that regard. N. Y. Jouni. Com., April 16, 1844. Austin to Wharton, Nov. 18, 1836: Tex. Dipl. Corn, i., 127. "Upshur to Van Z., Oct. 16, 1843: State Dept., Notes to Tex. Leg., vi., 59. Tyler's account written some years later (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 428) is in- accurate as to some details, as one would expect. TYLER PROPOSES ANNEXATION. 129 the method adopted to avert the peril was the most available and very likely the only effectual one that could have been devised ; and, finally, that plan involved no bloodshed or violence but rested on the anticipated assent of the countries principally concerned, was ex- pected to confer great benefits upon both of them, and probably would not be undone to-day by one sane individual out of our ninety millions. To require more than all this of statesmen would be exacting indeed. VII FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE Tyler did not wait very long after becoming President before letting it be seen that he had a kindly eye upon Texas. In his first annual Message, December, 1841, he said: "The United States can not but take a deep interest in whatever relates to this young but growing Republic. Settled principally by emigrants from the United States, we have the happiness to know that the great principles of civil liberty are there destined to flourish under wise institutions and wholesome laws, and that through its example another evidence is to be afforded of the capacity of popular institutions to advance the prosperity, happiness, and permanent glory of the human race." This warm eulogium, which represented the Lone Star republic in a considerably more rosy light than many had seen around it and was also rather dragged into the Message, had for the thoughtful a very significant look. Presidential newspapers, too, spoke so cordially of Texas that in the opinion of John Quincy Adams, as he noted in his diary, their utterances amounted to a " formal notice " of the annex- ation issue, served upon the public. As if to confirm this impression Henry A. Wise, the President's friend, was soon heard arguing in the House of Representatives for the acquisition of that country. One section, he urged, had a boundless outlook towards the west ; must its rival, at the bidding of the English party of the North, stop forever at the Sabine?^ Like others, a Washington correspondent of the Boston Courier invited public attention both to the President's eulogium and to Wise's speech ; and he mentioned also that the principal Tyler papers, which had steadily favored the incorporation of Texas, had been teeming for months past with news from that quarter and with tirades against Mexico, after the fashion of the old annexation cam- paign. The South is alarmed about losing the control of Congress, argued the correspondent ; Thompson, a prominent advocate of annexation, is appointed minister to Mexico; claims against that ' See General Note, p. i. Richardson, Messages, iv., 70. Adams, Me- moirs, xi., 29. (Wise) Ho. Rep., Jan. 26, 1842: Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 2 sess,, 174. 130 FORESH ADO WINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 131 country are revived ; and the attempts to arouse a war fever over the imprisonment of the Santa Fe raiders are most persevering. Garri- son's Liberator copied this letter, and soon the Boston Liberty party adopted a resohition against receiving Texas or joining her in war upon Mexico. In some less impressionable quarters, also, attention was awakened. The South wants that region, concluded the Phila- delphia Gazette, for example. Generally, however, Wise's speech — an incidental and perhaps accidental outburst — appears to have been taken rather lightly. He was a friend of the President no doubt, but with equal certainty he was erratic and hot-headed ; and on a sharp sectional issue he was very liable to speak without full deliberation. But in April he returned to the charge. Why not annex Texas ? he demanded ; slavery is there already, and annexation instead of ex- tending the system would enable us to mitigate its evils. In fact we must annex that country, he insisted, or else allow her to conquer Mexico, plant slavery there, and become our most dangerous and formidable competitor.^ In September of the same year (1842) John Quincy Adams, addressing his constituents at Braintree, endeavored in a very elaborate manner to prove that a great conspiracy was afoot — and had been from the time of Jackson — to obtain territory at the expense of Mexico. The positions that he took were in several instances extreme, for probably his object was not so much to instruct as to excite sluggish and preoccupied minds ; and it must be conceded that a number of his statements are now seen to be incorrect. Jackson had gone so far, he asserted, as to offer the governorship of Texas Territory to Burton ; Houston had been " expatriated for the pur- pose" of creating a revolution there; and the Texan revolt had been "precipitated if not chiefly caused by the abolition of Slavery by the Mexican Government." It is not, however, necessary to examine this eloquent speech in detail. It must have produced a thrill, but its lasting results appear to have been very slight, for the people in gen- eral believed that no annexation project would now have a chance of success. Even the New York Tribune remarked that it had received letters for and against the acquisition of Texas, but had " no room to waste on fighting shadows."^ Soon, however, this particular shadow became substantial. In January, 1843, ex-Governor Gilmer of Virginia published a letter in -Courier: Lib., March ii ; April 15, 1842. Gazette: Lib., May 6. 1842. Niles, Ixiv.. 174. ^ (Adams) Boston Atlas, Oct. 17, 1842. Tribune, Nov. 14, 1842. 132 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS favor of annexation. The only interest in the country which could be injured by adopting the measure, he reasoned, was that of the cotton and sugar planters ; while the free States would reap great commercial advantages. As for slavery, he believed that the North desired the Union to continue and would be ready to confirm it by welcoming Texas, thus recognizing the mutual rights upon which the national compact rested. If we do not receive her promptly, con- tinued the Governor, England will " either possess or control " her, discord between the two republics will ensue, and the present incli- nation of the Texans to join us will disappear; consequently the opportunity now presented should be seized without delay. Such a letter was wholly unexpected, and it made its appearance quite un- heralded. Benton described it as " a clap of thunder in a clear sky." Very differently it sounded from remarks dropped in the heat of debate by the fiery Wise, and Gilmer's close political connections with Tyler and Calhoun naturally added to the weight of his utter- ance. Somehow the opening gun of a battle seemed to have been fired. In two weeks the Baltimore American observed: The subject of the annexation of Texas " begins to attract much attention " ; and D. L. Child, writing from Washington, said that Gilmer's act had revived the old question. Yet some of the leading journals totally ignored it, and presently like so many sensations it faded from sight.* John Quincy Adams and other anti-slavery members of Congress read the letter, however. They became alarmed, and early in March he and twelve of his colleagues issued a circular. It is proposed, they said, that " the undue ascendancy of the slave-holding power in the Government should be secured and riveted beyond all redemp- tion." With a view to this end, settlements have been made in Texas, difficulties with Mexico fomented, a revolt brought about, and an independent government established. The failure of the mother- country to recover her province has been due to the unlawful aid of American citizens and the co-operation of the American Executive. In a very improper fashion Texas has been recognized, and now it is intended to consummate the scheme. But " no act of Congress or treaty for annexation, could impose the least obligation upon the several States of this Union, to submit to such an unwarrantable act, or to receive into their family and fraternity such misbegotten and illegitimate progeny." The introduction of Texas, therefore, * (Gilmer) Madis., Jan. 23, 1843. Benton, View, ii., 581. Amer.: Rich. Enq., Jan. 26, 1843. Lib., Feb. 3, 1843. It was Gilmer's letter that gave A. V. Brown an excuse for writing to Jackson as we have seen that he did. FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 133 would fully justify a dissolution of the Union. Indeed, it "would BE IDENTICAL WITH DISSOLUTION " ; and all should co-operate for the defeat of " this nefarious project."^ In line with the circular, resolutions were passed the same month by the ^Massachusetts legislature, declaring that annexation would be dangerous to the continuance of the Union " in peace, in pros- perity, and in the enjoyment of those blessings which it is the object of a free Government to secure"; and the New York Tribune soon protested that the adoption of Texas for the sake of strengthening slavery there and in the United States would " convulse all Christen- dom with indignation and alarm." In general, however, the circular met with little favor. The Baltimore Clipper, for instance, remarked that it had no wish for annexation but could not endorse the violent language of Adams and his associates; while the American of the same city went so far as to say that unless Texas could be bound to the United States in some way as a friend, she would inevitably become hostile. Little regard has been paid to Adams's warnings, admitted the New York Tribune in September; and the Detroit Advertiser confessed at about the same time that a general lethargy on the subject prevailed, attributing this condition of the public mind to the fact that the question of bringing Texas within the pale had been before the country a long time, yet its advocates had been able to accomplish nothing.^ ]\Ieantime the administration, far from desiring to "spring" an annexation treaty upon the nation, began systematically to prepare the public mind for that subject. In August, for example, the Republican of New Orleans, which bore the words, " Official Gazette of the General Government," published a discussion of it; and the British consul at Galveston reported to his government that accord- ing to a person whose trustworthiness he had " long known," the materials for this and other articles in a similar vein had been received from a " qualified " source at Washington. From the same quarter came advice also. " This journalist was counselled to avoid political extremes, so that, by appealing to the interests of all sec- tions, unanimity of action might be secured " ; to stimulate the South by expatiating on the danger of emancipating 15,000 Texan slaves, ° Detroit Adv., May 15, 1843. Nat. hitell., May 4, 1843. "(Mass.) Sen. Doc. 61, 28 Cong., i sess. Tribune, May 16; Clipper, May 9; Amer.: N. Orl. Courier, May 15; Tribune, Sept. 20; Adv., Sept. 7, 1843. Von Hoist has expressed the opinion that the circular of Adams et al. made " a terribly forcible impression on hundreds of thousands " (U. S., ii., 620), but the evidence does not seem to support this view. 134 "^^^ ANNEXATION OF TEXAS as well as on " the loss, by Texan rivalry, in the Cotton Market of England " ; while " to the North, independent Texas was to be held up as a sort of British Colony, whose smuggling operations would defeat any Tariff, and whose Anti-American prejudices would be fostered by British capital and emigration." Needless to say, the Republican followed up the campaign, though perhaps with more local color than the instructions from Washington had contemplated/ According to the National Intelligencer, the New York Aurora best represented the views of the Executive, and a series of articles on this subject began to appear in its columns during the latter part of August. The first of these dwelt upon the identity of American and Texan interests, the kinship of the settlers beyond the Sabine, — who loved the Union all the more because just then away from home, — and the proposition to abolish slavery in their country on the under- standing that England would become a " foster-mother " to them ; and the second pointed out that abolition in Texas would cause the negroes of the Southwest to run away by the wholesale, produce irritation and armed collisions, fomented by England, between their masters and the Texans, lead to servile insurrection in the South, and finally bring about a dissolution of the Union. The Madisoman on the other hand kept itself discreetly in the background for a while, merely quoting from the Aurora and other papers ; but the remarks of Brougham and Aberdeen were too strong for its equa- nimity, and it revealed one side of Tyler's mind by declaring that whoever should contribute most efifectively to carry through the measure of annexation, so important for the United States and so ardently desired by Texas, would " receive the plaudits of the coun- try both present and future."^ To trace the consequences of the administration's promptings at length is unnecessary, but it is worth while to mention an editorial that appeared in the Old School Democrat, a distinctively Tyler paper of St. Louis. Its argument in this particular issue was, that in ' (Prepare) Van Z., No. 107, Sept. 18, 1843. N. Orl. Repub., Aug. 29, 1843. Kennedy, Sept. 6, 1843: Pub. Rec. Ofif., Slave Trade, xxxii. Clippings from N. Orl. Repub. sent by Arrangoiz, No. 96, Sept. 14, 1843. With reference to the famous accusation that Tyler intended to spring the Texan affair just before the Democratic convention in May, 1844, it is worth noting that accord- ing to Consul Kennedy the New Orleans journalist was notified from Wash- ington that the President would present the subject in his next Message (see also Chapter vi., note 11). ''Nat. IntelL, May i, 1844. Aurora. Aug. 23, 24, 1843. Madis., Sept. 27; Nov. 3, 1843. According to Scott (to Sen. Crit., Oct. 14, 1843: Coleman, Crit., i., 204), Upshur himself was the author of certain bellicose articles on British designs regarding Texas that appeared in the Madis. FORESHADO WINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 1 35 order to balance the sections in Congress and protect an important southern interest recognized by the constitution, Texas ought to be annexed; and that were she to come under the influence of England, slavery in the United States would be imperilled. In other words, from the special Southern point of view the acquisition of that coun- try was desirable for two reasons : first, to strengthen slavery against domestic enemies by obtaining more political power in the United States government, which was important ; and secondly, to prevent England from undermining its very existence, which was essential.* These foreshadowings led many to conclude that a scheme of annexation was soon to be brought forward by the administration. The Cincinnati Herald, an abolitionist paper, began to predict this in August, 1843 > ^^^^ the Philanthropist and the Liberator followed suit. In October, the New York Tribune and the Milwaukee Democrat said that a strong push to secure Texas might be expected ; other journals pointed in the same direction ; and, on the last day but one of that month, the Vermont legislature protested that the annexation of the coveted area would be " unconstitutional, and dangerous to the stability of the Union itself."^** So pronounced, indeed, were the indications that the Mexican minister, Almonte, addressed our Secretary of State at the beginning of November, asserting that the American Congress was soon to consider the advisability of appropriating a valuable portion of the Mexican territory, and that, should the Executive sanction this aggression, he should consider his mission at an end, since his government were " resolved to declare war " on receiving notice of such action. To this a reply was made in the tone of aggrieved innocence ; upon which Almonte remarked that Adams's circular and the articles in the Madisonian seemed amply to justify his protest, and suggested that Upshur make a formal declaration denying all knowledge of plans to acquire the territory in question. This required the Secretary to come out of the shadow a little more ; and he answered that Mexico, before denouncing and threatening, should have inquired through the proper channel whether a scheme to annex Texas existed, and therefore in view of the course actually pursued a disavowal was not due from the President. Under no circum- stances, he continued, could the Executive undertake to speak for ^ Old School Dem., Nov. 27, 1843. ^"Herald, March 22, 1844. Philanthropist : Lib., Oct. 6, 1843. Lib., Nov. 3, 1843. Democrat, Oct. 14, 1843. Tribune, Oct. 11, 1843. (Vt.) Sen. Doc. 166, 28 Cong., I sess. 136 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Congress ; but certainly the United States had good reason to regard Texas as an independent country, and they " would not consider it necessary to consult with any other nation " in their transactions with her government. This correspondence, while in no way conclusive, amounted to a strong hint that something was in agitation. Doubt- less, though veiled in diplomatic privacy, it became somewhat known and tended to make the public think; and at this time the Texan envoy reported that the interest in annexation was increasing daily. " It is the leading matter of inquiry by almost every prominent man I meet," he said. Those favorable to the measure assured him that no previous outlook had been so auspicious ; and the evident alarm of Adams was perhaps not less encouraging.^^ Precisely on the date of Almonte's protest the Madisonian took a fresh start. ]\Iurphy, the American charge in Texas, had obtained the correspondence between Elliot and Jones regarding the truce with Mexico ; and a very inaccurate version of it, sent by a Galveston correspondent to the New Orleans Tropic, had now reached Wash- ington. According to this account the Texan commissioners were to accept the nominal sovereignty of Mexico, Houston would become Governor General for life, and Texas would be transferred to Eng- land, with abolition and free trade as inevitable corollaries. The Tropic vouched for the information as " derived from the very highest and most undoubted source " ; and from this time on the alleged abolition negotiations of Houston with the British govern- ment became a burning topic not only with the Madisonian, but with journals in many sections and even as far north as Massachusetts. The Boston Advertiser, for example, expressed the opinion that " without doubt " such negotiations were going on ; and annexation, the natural panacea for all this, could not fail to receive more atten- tion in consequence of these alarms.^- As the sheets favorable to the administration pursued the subject and Congress was soon to meet, it seemed to many quite probable that something would be said about the great issue in the President's annual Message. Very likely, too, the confidential instructions ad- dressed to the New Orleans Republican and presumably to the Aurora and other journals, intimating that such would be the case, "Almonte to Upshur, Nov. 3, 1843: Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., i sess., 38. Up- shur to Almonte, Nov. 8, 1843: ib., 41. Id. to Id., Dec. i, 1843: ib., 45, Van Z,, No. no, Nov. 4, 1843. "Letter to Tropic, Oct. 3. 1843: Madis., Nov. 3, 1843. Galv. News, Oct. 10, 1843. Madis., Nov. 20, 22. 23, 1843. Adv., Nov. 7, 1843. FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 137 leaked out. A considerable number of papers expressed the belief that something of the sort might be done, and the Madisonian fanned th< lame by replying with the query, " Who kuozi'S that the Prcsi- deni zvill say one zvord about Texas f"'^^ When the Message appeared, however, no recommendation on the subject was found there. Yet Texas did occupy a prominent place. Almonte's protest was mentioned with the comment that neither Congress nor the Executive would be influenced in its action by a fear of consequences. Quite significant seemed also the em- phatic declaration that war between Mexico and Texas ought now to cease. The effect of continuing hostilities, Tyler explained, might be to weaken Texas and enable foreign powers to interpose there in a manner injurious to American interests; and he further announced that we could not be expected to suffer patiently from a resumption of military operations after so long an interval of peace. What was more, said the President, " The high obligations of public duty may enforce from the constituted authorities of the United States a policy which the course persevered in by Mexico will have mainly contributed to produce, and the Executive in such a contingency will with confidence throw itself upon the patriotism of the people to sustain the Government in its course of action." Evidently this meant a good deal, but precisely what could not be told ; and Tyler made no efforts to enlighten the public. The President says little about Texas, wrote Webster; and almost the same day the National Intelligencer, pronouncing annexation " a mere dream " and ridicul- ing the talk of English anti-slavery designs in Texas, professed to believe that Tyler did not share the opinions emitted by the Madi- sonian on those topics. The Whigs, wrote A. V. Brown to Polk, decided that the President had nothing more to offer on Texan affairs, and suspected that his intention had been merely to cause trouble between North and South, hoping to profit by the confusion. Such, however, was not Brown's own belief, and three days later he confided to a correspondent that within a few weeks a treaty provid- ing for annexation would " most probably " be concluded.^'' " N. Y. Herald, Nov. 10; Newark Adv., Nov. 25; N. Y, Evening Post, Nov. 15; Columbia (Pa.) Spy: Madis., Nov. 17; Boston Adv., Nov. 16; Phil. No. Amer., Nov. 24; Madis., Nov. 2Z, 1843. " Richardson, Messages, iv., 257. Tyler said (p. 260) : If the Mexican threat was designed to prevent Congress from considering annexation, " the Executive has no reason to doubt that it will entirely fail of its object," and the Executive will not " fail for any such cause to discharge its whole duty to the country." The British and French charges in Texas endeavored to make this Message seem 138 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS The day Congress met, Brown spoke to Benton as they went down the Capitol steps, referred to the incorporation of Texas as imminent, and remarked that as the Missouri Senator not only had opposed the surrender of that region but had favored regaining it, he would be a proper person to take a leading part now in its recov- ery. Benton was evidently no stranger to the topic, and he replied hotly that on the part of some the project was an intrigue for the Presidency and a plot to dissolve the Union, while with others it was a scrip and land speculation, and that he himself was against it. This was rather discouraging; yet for a time the Madisonian kept up the fire vigorously, and during a large part of December articles on the subject appeared almost daily in its columns. English induce- ments offered to the leading men of Texas, the selfish interests of Britain, and the growth of abolition sentiment in the Northeast were favorite themes; and when the Commercial Advertiser of New York declared that the precious humbug of annexation was about done for, it retorted, " Humbug or not — • Texas will be Annexed to the United States." jMeanwhile the continued vitality of the question was suggested by the presentation of adverse resolutions and peti- tions in Congress ; and Black of Georgia made a similar suggestion by giving notice in the House (January 15, 1844) that he proposed to move the provisional incorporation of Texas. Somehow neither the favorable nor the unfavorable occurrences at the Capitol excited much remark there, but this did not mean that no one felt concerned about the matter. Annexation is the question of the day, reported the Texan charge, though both friends and enemies are careful to avoid mentioning it in the national legislature.^^ Gradually an impression became general, however, that for some reason the prospect of a campaign on this issue had grown fainter; and Horace Greeley, writing from Washington on the twentieth of December, said there was no need of an anti-Texas agitation, for that country did not ask for annexation ; England opposed it ; Mexico threatened war against it ; three-fourths of the Americans did not wish it; and even the South, having nothing to gain from it and favoring a strict construction of the constitution, stood on the same ground. What contributed largely, or perhaps mainly, to give to the Texans offensive (Yoakum, Texas, ii., 419). Webster to Allen, Dec. 3, 1843: Webster, Writings, xvi., 417. Nat. IntelL, Dec. 2, 1843. Brown to Polk, Dec. 9, 1843; Polk Pap. Id. to Armstrong. Dec. 12, 1843: Jackson Pap. "Benton, View, ii., 582. Madis., Dec. 4, 12, 19, 1843. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., I sess., 55. 56, (Black) 147, 168, 174, 175, 243, 291, 337. 346. Van Z,, No. 112, Jan. 2, 1844. FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 139 such an impression was the settHng now of the claims controversy with Mexico. A convention which accompHshed this was signed on November 20 and submitted to Congress about five weeks later ; and even the Madisonian, during January and February of 1844, had much less to say on its favorite theme than previously, confining itself chiefly to news items and citations from other journals. ^*^ This, however, was only the lull before the real tempest. On the twenty-third of January Daniel Webster addressed a letter to citizens of Worcester county, Massachusetts. It was written in answer to one from them — dated a month earlier — which expressed the fear that a proposition for the acquisition of Texas might be submitted to Congress at the session recently begun, and asked the ex-Senator's opinion on the issue. When this letter arrived, said Webster, he had " indulged a strong hope " that no such move would be made, but " an intention had recently been manifested" of bringing the subject before the national legislature. He then proceeded to deprecate the intrusion of this exciting topic and to argue against the proposition. The cases of Louisiana and Florida, he urged, were not precedents, because in those instances an overruling necessity compelled the United States to act. The constitution does not contemplate the ad- mission of new States formed from the territory of foreign nations, and the Texas project goes even beyond that, — proposing the ad- mission of a foreign country as a whole. A republic, not being held together by the military power of a master, needs the bonds of national sympathy and interest in a special degree, and therefore cannot extend itself unduly without peril. Already we have a vast area, and we should devote ourselves to developing, improving and strengthening it. " ' You have a Sparta,' — such was the admonition of ancient prudence, — ' embellish it.' " This in brief was the great orator's line of argument ; and ample quotations from his Niblo's Garden speech of 1837 were added to show that no change of opinion had taken place on his part. The letter was not printed at the time ; yet, written by Webster and addressed to a number of prominent citizens, it could not wholly escape publicity. By a coincidence, if nothing more, the day it was penned resolutions of the Massachusetts legislature against annexation were presented in the national Senate.^^ It was time now for the other side, and notable indeed was its '^^ Tribune, Dec. 22, 1843. Richardson, Messages, iv., 274. Madis., Jan. -Feb., i844._ ''Webster to citizens, Jan. 23, 1844: Writings, xvi., 418. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., I sess., 175. 140 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS deliverance. At the beginning of February, 1844, the Washington Globe printed a letter from Senator Walker, written to citizens of Kentucky about four weeks earlier, which proceeded substantially as follows : — In 1836 Texas voted to enter this Union, so that on her side the question is settled. As for ourselves annexation can be effected by treaty, by act of Congress under the power to admit new States (for the constitution cannot have intended to forbid our acquiring territory) or by the action of a single State with the sanc- tion of Congress. Each State had a right before the adoption of the constitution to extend its territory, and may now with the consent of Congress make an agreement or compact with another State " or with a foreign power." Texas was once ours, and therefore to refuse to re-annex it would be to deny the wisdom of the original purchase. Our claim to it was demonstrated by Jefferson, Madison, JMonroe and John Quincy Adams. Clay has always taken the same position. No doubt we appeared to give the region to Spain in 1819, but that we could not and did not do, for by the treaty of 1803 we had bound ourselves to keep Louisiana and admit the inhabitants thereof to the Union. Hence the cession of 1819 was in violation of the treaty, and we should rectify that error. The efforts that have been made to purchase Texas by Jackson and others prove the territory is worth having, and as a sovereign nation now holds it nothing stands in the way. Le us examine the reasons for taking this step. At present our boundary on the Southwest is as bad as it could be, for the Sabine runs within about one hundred miles of the ^Mississippi. The Arkansas and Red Rivers with all their tributaries ought to be in our possession. Texas is in close contact with many United States Indians and has many Indians of her own, and she could stir up all of them against the Mississippi valley. The Texans could descend Red River, isolate New Orleans and fall upon it. No harbor exists between the Mississippi and the Sabine, but there are good ones farther on. Texas extends within twenty miles of the pass through the Rockies which forms the door to Oregon. All these evils can be remedied by annexing that country, and at the same time we can secure access to the trade of northern Mexico and " a very large portion of the western coast of America." Clay stated publicly in 1820 that the value of Florida was " incomparably less " than that of Texas, and lauded highly the physical features of the latter region. Brougham observed recently in Parliament that " the importance of FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 141 Texas could not be overrated." Should the project in question be executed, your State for example would have a great market for her meats, flour and corn, hemp, bagging and the like. To refuse an- nexation is therefore to reject a great benefit. Nay, it is more. It is to re-dismember the " mutilated " West. " It is to lower the flag of the Union before the red cross of St. George," and surrender both Texas and the mouth of the Mississippi to England. Kentucky cannot refuse to welcome her sons who have gone to Texas and in the case of war would use their unerring rifles for our defence. The case of re-annexation is therefore strong, and it is much stronger than would be a proposal to acquire new territory, especially since the people there are of our own stock. The objections are that our dimensions would be too large and that Texas has slavery. But Louisiana doubled the area of the Union, whereas Texas would add only one-seventh. England has more square miles in this continent than we should have with both Texas and California. *' Is it an American doctrine that monarchies or despotisms are alone fitted for the government of extensive terri- tories?" On the other hand, of all forms of government a con- federacy like ours is the one best fitted for extension ; yet the British Empire possesses 8,100,000 square miles, Russia 7,500,000, Brazil 3,000,000, and the United States with Texas would have only 2,318,- 000. The advance from thirteen to twenty-six States has not endang- ered but has strengthened the Union. A wide territory secures power and hence peace, and on account of the variety of soils, climates and productions it gives a home market. The acquisition of Texas would increase the prosperity of almost every American interest, and would thus have a tendency to bind the country together. Besides, it should be noticed that in effect the United States plus / all we propose to add would be much smaller now than were the ; United States of 1787, and also that this objection, if valid against Texas, is still more so against Oregon, which is both larger and more • remote. The only other obstacle is slavery. But is this question to be permitted to cripple our development and endanger our very ex- istence? *'Is anti-slavery to do all this?" If so, no eflforts of man can save the Union. The abolitionists are allies of England and enemies of their own country. If the negroes are emancipated, the South will no longer be able to buy the productions of the North. " and North and South will be involved in one common ruin." Three 142 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS million freedmen will fly at once to the opposite quarter for protec- tion, filling it with crime and poverty. The census of 1840 proves that the blacks of the free States are in a worse condition than our slaves, and the number of freedmen is rapidly increasing at a vast ex- pense to the community. Annexing Texas would very materially hinder this increase, for the slaves would largely be drained away from the border commonwealths and therefore the number emanci- pated would be smaller. It is said that annexation would fortify an objectionable institu- tion, but in reality it would only change the abode of the blacks, not add to their number. The location and not the existence of slavery is therefore the question involved, and shall Texas be lost for that ? A transfer from the middle tier of States to the warm climate of the new areas would benefit the negroes. Moreover a great and increas- ing number of them would gradually slip away into Mexico, Central America and South America, mix with the natives (who are not despised as our blacks are), and thus rise in the social scale while relieving us of their presence. Indeed unless Texas is brought into the Union, we never shall be rid of that unfortunate class. By the time free labor shall be plentiful and therefore cheap, the slaves will be so numerous that they could not safely be emancipated, and the cost of supporting the great number of destitute, infirm and criminal negroes that would result from abolition would likewise prohibit freeing them. To refuse Texas would produce a hostile feeling there, and she would go over to our old enemy. A mutually advantageous arrange- ment between her and England would be the consequence. All told, her cotton planters would have an advantage of twenty per cent, over ours. The staple would cease to be raised on our plantations, and the North and the West would lose their market. " ]\Iust we," then, demanded the Senator, " Must we behold Texas every day selling her cotton to England free of duty, whilst our cotton is sub- jected to a heavy impost? And must we also perceive Texas receiv- ing in exchange the manufactures of England free of duty, whilst here they are excluded by a prohibitory tariff? Can the tariff itself stand such an issue; or, if it does, can the Union sustain the mighty shock? Daily and hourly, to the South and the Southwest, would be presented the strong inducement to tiuite Zinth Texas, and secure the same markets free of duty for their cotton, and receive the same cheap manufactures, free of duty, in exchange." Moreover the FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 143 slaves States, if thus associated, would be building up cities of their own, whereas now they are building up New York. Should the proposed measure be defeated, " The South and Southwest, whilst they would perceive the advancing prosperity of Texas, and their own decline, would also feel that the region with which they were united had placed them in this position, and subjected them to these disasters by the refusal of re-annexation." One of three results would therefore be certain : i. The South and Southwest might unite with Texas ; 2, the tariff might be abolished ; or 3, vast smuggling operations might virtually nullify the tariff, destroy our revenue, demoralize our people, and make direct taxation inevitable. England now has the right to examine Texan vessels in the Gulf on a suspicion of their being engaged in the slave trade. This enables her to station cruisers off the Mississippi, search our vessels under the pretense that they belong to our neighbor, and seize our property and sailors. As a dependency of Great Britain, Texas would side with her in case of war and help her to take New Orleans or at least close the Mississippi against our western cotton, thus ob- taining a practical monopoly of that invaluable production. Even if Texas desired to remain neutral, she could not force her neutrality to be respected. Her people and the Indians would surely be used against us. We must prevent this, and in all probability now is our last chance to do so. But there is even more to apprehend. So far has the influence of England in Texas been pushed already that Houston in his mes- sage of December, 1843, speaks of Great Britain as a friend and of the United States as an enemy. What, then, would be the feeling of that country were she to be rejected by us? She would become not only a British dependency but in effect a British colony. In the north England already hems us in. She would then do the same in the South, control the Gulf, and be within two days' march of the Mississippi. She is no friend of ours. Her press and her books reek with abuse of this country, intended to render it odious to the world. England, moreover, is governed by aristocrats, the avowed enemies of our free system; and she is advancing rapidly toward universal dominion. Whoever does not wish to save Texas and the Gulf from her is himself a monarchist and a Briton, and would reduce the United States to their old condition as British colonies. Nor is this all. The West contributes freely for the defences of the East, and now it demands something as a defence to itself. Gen- 144 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS eral Jackson says annexation is " essential." Is patriotism only a name, or will the whole country join in protecting the Mississippi valley ? To these arguments Walker added impressive tables of statistics and a detailed investigation of the American trade with Texas, pur- porting to show besides other points that in 1839 she had taken nearly one-third of all the domestic manufactures exported by the United States ; that in consequence of arrangements with foreign nations she had purchased less and less of our goods, until in 1843 she bought less than one-eighth as much as in 1839, whereas had she been annexed, the trade would greatly have increased; and further that many sections and many interests had shared in the profits of the Texas business. Finally Walker referred again to the danger that free trade would be established in that country, pointing out that her government could be supported by sales of the public lands and the customs duties be absolutely cancelled, and arguing that enough illicit introduction of merchandise into the United States to destroy our tarifif would be the consequence. In short, he concluded, "This great measure is essential to the security of the South, the defence of the West, and highly conducive to the welfare and per- petuity of the whole Union. "^^ A wonderfully clever production was this letter. Besides argu- ments there was plenty of luscious rhetoric skillfully adapted to the imaginations and prejudices of the American public, and every ember of suspicion and ill-will toward England was deftly fanned. A New York Tribune leader called it a " long array of sophistry," and the special correspondent of that paper at Washington declared that its author's intellectual stature was like his physical, — that he was " the smallest mental edition of a man." The Boston Courier re- marked that it would not believe Texas was to become a dependency of England until it saw her slaves emancipated; that the manufac- turers of the North could not be benefited by strengthening the hands of the anti-tarifiF South Carolinians ; that if England could make favorable treaties with a nation, so could we; and that the inde- pendence of Texas was expedient for the slaveholders themselves — to prevent their negroes from escaping to Mexico. By the True Sun it was urged that markets could be made in Texas only by the migra- tion of Americans, who could buy more were they to remain at "Letter of R. J. Walker to Sanders and others, Jan. 8, 1844:. Wash. Globe, Feb. 3. 1844. FORESHADOWINGS OF THE ANNEXATION STRUGGLE. 145 home ; and that markets in that quarter would be of no vahie anyhow should our admission of the country enable the South to destroy our tariff. The Baltimore Clipper pronounced Walker's idea that annex- ation would lead to the disappearance of slavery " too absurd to be entertained by any man of common sense"; and various other state- ments of the letter could be and were attacked with varying degrees of success. ^^ Nevertheless the paper had no little influence, as Van Zandt reported to his government. Great numbers of people accepted it as gospel. In particular it was undoubtedly believed by not a few that the acquisition of Texas would draw slaves away from the States of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee to cultivate her more fertile soil, and thus would " enlarge the area of freedom." Many felt persuaded also that it would then — and under no other circum- stances likely to arise — become possible to eradicate slavery from the entire South, whenever changed conditions should render that sort of labor unprofitable as it had been found to be at the North, since the freedmen could be pushed off into Alexico, instead of remaining in the States as a heavy burden and a fearful menace. In many ways, therefore. Walker's argument was attractive. After more than two months had passed, the Washington correspondent of the Rich- mond Enquirer said that it continued to be " the theme, the talk, the fashion, the very rage " ; and by the middle of April it was stated that 50,000 copies of it had been circulated, and 2,253 letters received by its author in commendation of his views. Here, certainly, could be found proof that the annexation question was alive. -° It is thus evident that the Texas issue, like a rising wind, stirred the atmosphere of the United States more and more from the close of 1841 to the early months of 1844. Tyler, Gilmer, Adams and his " N. Y. Tribune, March 19 ; Boston Courier: Nat. Intell., April 2^ ; True Sun: N. Y, Tribune. March 2t,\ Clipper, April 23; N. Y. Tribune, March 19; Cincin- nati Herald. Feb. 29, 1844. What is rather surprising, no one seems to have seen that Walker had misrepresented Madison's position regarding the boimdary of Louisiana. His error was probably unintentional. Madison's letter of March 31, 1804, to Livingston, taken without his earlier one in the same month, is am- biguous (Writings, Hunt's ed., vii., 123). ^ Van Z., No. 114, Feb. 1844. Lib., April 19, 1844. (Effects on slavery) E. g., Democ. Review, July, 1845, p. 7. Waddy Thompson (ib., Sept., 1844, p. 259) approved of annexation partly on the ground that the northern slave States would become free. Jefferson and Madison had believed that the way to end slavery lay through the diffusion of it: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 255. Tuscaloosa (Ala.) Flag: Nashville Union, April 20, 1844. Speaking at Natchez in 1844, S. S. Pren- tiss exhibited what he described as two editions of Walker's letter, one written for the North and the other for the South (Memoir, ii.. 336.) 146 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS associates, the legislatures of States, the administration journals, Almonte, Webster and Walker, all concurred in giving notice that a move in the cause of annexation was likely soon to be made ; and however inattentive were the mass of the nation, it is clear enough that a large number of the reflecting and influential men perceived the indications. If any did not, the fault was their own. VIII The Annexation Treaty is Negotiated On the sixteenth of October, 1843, Van Zandt wrote to Jones, the Texan Secretary of State, substantially as follows, and sent the despatch by a special messenger : Herewith is Upshur's note, which places the question of annexation in a tangible shape. As regards the American Senate, I think there has never before been a time so favorable. To the southern States Aberdeen's reply to Brougham makes the subject one of vital importance. At the same time the possibility of England's obtaining (as many believe she may) an undue influence in Texas and monopolizing the carrying trade, " seems to have touched the secret springs of interest " among the Northern manufacturers, and presented the matter in a light hitherto unseen in that quarter ; while as the Westerners are intent upon securing Oregon, it is believed that we can combine the two ques- tions, winning for them the Southern and Southeastern vote, and for ourselves Western and some Northern support. Thus far the newspapers have treated the subject as non-partisan, and this also is auspicious, for the measure has not strength enough in either party to carry it. Should the treaty be concluded, provision would necessarily be made for the liabilities of the Texan government, and this would bring to our aid the holders of them. The influence of the United States Bank agents, though the Bank is dead, " would prove a host in itself;" and some of the creditors of Texas have interested in a pecuniary way a certain Northern Whig Senator. If we reject this opportunity we are not likely to have another so good.^ At about this time the charge's letter of September 18, convey- ing the intelligence that Upshur had informally proposed annexa- tion, reached his government, and on October 30 it was made known to Captain Elliot. Elliot inquired how the administration intended to reply, and Houston answered that Van Zandt would be instructed ^ See General Note, p. i. Van Z., No. 109, Oct. 16, 1843. Evidently Van Zandt felt strongly in favor of making a treaty, and one can easily believe what Tyler stated afterwards, that had the charge been then empowered to negotiate, the treaty would have been made in a week (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 415). 147 148 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to say verbally that it was not considered necessary or desirable to entertain such a proposition until, by adopting some resolution, the American Senate had shown that it was ready to treat on the sub- ject. The Captain then examined his instructions carefully, and the next day, at a formal conference with the President and the Secre- tary of State, he desired to know the views and intentions of the Executive for transmission to the Foreign Office, intimating that Great Britain might leave Texas to rely upon the United States in her efforts to secure recognition from the mother-country, and sug- gesting that Mexico would not be likely to facilitate annexation by yielding to American mediation in that afifair. Houston replied that he was grateful for the past exertions of England and wished them to continue ; that the Texan government had no reason to sup- pose the professions of the United States were based upon anything except their own convenience, could place no reliance on their heartily interposing to secure recognition from Mexico, and, how- ever this might be, would not be so thankless as to prefer other assistance to England's ; that England " might rest assured that with the Independence of Texas recognised by Mexico, He would never consent to any treaty or other project of annexation to the United States, and He had a conviction that the people would sus- tain him in that determination." Formerly, it was true, such a plan had gained his approval, but the American Union had rejected the offer made by the Texans in a time of difficulty, and its later conduct had not been calculated to make them " sacrifice their true and lasting advantage to the policy of party in that Country." The United States had been appealed to for help at the same time as England and France, but the latter countries alone had earned a title to gratitude by taking an active and decided part. Just now, in consequence of the truce and the withdrawal of the annexation proposal formerly made by Texas, more interest prevailed at the north ; but so far her Executive had not been favored with a word in writing as to the purposes and proceedings of that cabinet. " They were no doubt kind, but what they were he could not posi- tively say."- In this interview Elliot was the recipient, but the British minister fully understood the still greater blessedness of giving. He believed and had assured Houston that the American government felt no confidence "in their own power to carry out a project of annexa- ■ Elliot, secret. Oct. 31, 1843. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 149 tion," and aimed chiefly to prevent the affairs of Texas from being settled in any manner not agreeable to them. He believed also — and no doubt had said as much to the President — that the United States did not wish the war to end, since its continuance furnished the means of rendering Mexico amenable to their demands and increased the chances of obtaining the long coveted territory. Such views of the American policy, if correct, would have justified Houston in looking elsewhere for aid, and apparently they were entertained by him as well as by the British minister. Relying perhaps on such considerations, Elliot felt satisfied that Houston's sincerity could be depended upon implicitly, and the President proceeded to confirm this opinion by making no reply whatever to Van Zandt.^ On the third of November Upshur received five despatches from Murphy. One informed him that no American vessels of any con- sequence were then engaged in the Gulf trade, which meant an increase of British prestige and influence in that quarter. Another stated that Elliot had urged the Beales claim " with great earnist- ness." A third accompanied a newspaper which, in Murphy's opin- ion, showed that an effort was making " to turn the affections of the People of Texas from the U States to England " ; and a fourth had a good deal to say about the abolition designs of the British government in concert with Andrews and the British Anti-Slavery Society, and urged that the United States compel Mexico to end the war by recognizing her one-time subjects, because its continu- ance injured American commerce in the Gulf and encouraged for- eign intrigues in Texas. Much more important, however, was a fifth despatch, for it covered a transcript of the correspondence that had passed between Elliot and Jones with reference to the truce with Alexico. The gist of this, Murphy angrily suggested, could be summarized in three points : ( i ) Santa Anna proposes a suspension of hostilities, and is willing to make a settlement if Texas will acknowledge the sovereignty of his country; (2) Elliot urges that his terms be assented to as the only method of obtaining peace ; and (3) the government of Texas, concurring in Elliot's opinion and acceding to Santa Anna's wishes, agrees to send commissioners to end the war ; and the charge further pointed out that an accept- ance of the Mexican proposals, destroying slavery between the Sabine and the Rio Grande and closing the market for American 'Elliot, secret, Oct. 31, 1843. Id. to Doyle, June 21, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. 150 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS negroes there, would injure Southern interests and consequently be detrimental to the Union as a whole.* On receiving this despatch, Upshur doubtless felt concerned lest Murphy's indignation should cause him to act offensively towards the Texan administration, and he replied soothingly that Houston's apparent willingness to accept the Mexican terms might be only for the purpose of gaining time, so as to obtain the protection of the United States or of Great Britain ; but he admitted that the corre- spondence revealed " a remarkably good understanding with Eng- land, and an obvious leaning towards that power," and he believed, as he soon expressed himself to the American minister in Alexico, that England was " exerting herself to cause Texas to acknowl- edge the sovereignty of Mexico." He recognized, too, that the tone of the administration newspapers was " by no means kind towards the United States " ; and that many recent events indicated " a dis- position on the part of the Executive to alienate the affections of the people, from our country." Yet nothing could be gained, he urged upon Murphy, by " revolution or violence of any kind " ; and he therefore instructed him to avoid every sign of distrust, " culti- vate a good understanding with the President," and leave him to be " constrained by the popular opinion." At the same time, however, "in order that the attention of the people might be brought di- rectly " to the subject of annexation, he authorized the charge to " express, in private conversations, the views and wishes of this government," provided he could do it in such a manner as not to " appear to take part . . . with the people against their Executive, in case of a difference between them."^ The next day after writing this Upshur received an answer from London. Everett had had an interview with Aberdeen, and the British minister had spoken as follows : The annexation of * Murphy, No. lo, Oct. 3; No. 6, Sept. 23; No. 7, Sept. 24, 1843. Id.. Sept. 24, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 23. Id., No. 4, Sept. 23, 1843. Murphy explained that he and Jones, being "sick together," had become very intimate, and, on his expressing a strong desire to see the correspondence, Jones had caused a copy of it to be made for him during Houston's absence. "To Murphy, No. 11, Nov. 21, 1843. To Thompson, Nov. 18, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., I sess., 42. Upshur does not seem to have surmised that the papers were given to Murphy in order to play upon the American jealousy of England. Perhaps, like the editor of the Madisonian, he feared the purpose was to divert suspicion from something not shown (Madis., Dec. i, 1843) ; but at all events he can hardly have accepted as adequate Murphy's childlike explanation. In the opinion of Anson Jones (Niles, January i, 1848, p. 281), alarm over the fact that apparently Texas obtained an armistice with Mexico through British and French influence, had a great effect in rousing pro-annexation sentiment in the United States. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 15I Texas, were that step to be taken, would be " wholly without provo- cation " on the part of his government. No doubt England desired slavery to cease, but she had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, had not made and did not intend to make abolition " the condition of any treaty arrangement " with Texas, and had never alluded to the subject " in that connexion." During the summer a deputation of American abolitionists had waited upon him and proposed that a loan be made with a view to the emanci- pation of the negroes in that country, but the suggestion had been rejected at once; though he had, indeed, "informed them that, by every proper means of influence, he would encourage the abolition of slavery, and that he had recommended the Mexican Government to interest itself in the matter," — a recommendation, by the way, that had been received with no favor. Brougham's remarks in the House of Lords could only have referred to " the negotiations with IMexico for the recognition of the independence of Texas, and the earnest hope that the abolition of slavery might be effected by such an arrangement." Besides, the debates in Parliament were not always reported accurately, and too much importance should not be attached to them. In short Everett " might be perfectly satisfied that England had nothing in view in reference to Texas, which ought in the slightest degree to cause uneasiness in the United States."^ Undeniably the general tone of Aberdeen's remarks was grati- fying, but his statements were highly diplomatic. He showed that he had been disturbed by seeing the incorporation of Texas recom- mended in American newspapers as the means of defeating British designs against slavery, and evidently his assurances were framed with a view to prevent annexation. The declaration that England had no wish to interfere in the aft'airs of other countries was hardly equivalent to a promise that she would not interfere. True, aboli- tion had not been made the condition of a treaty with Texas, but that was only because England had found such a condition unac- ceptable, — as it was easy to do without plainly connecting the two subjects; and it was solely for this reason, one may infer, that of late she had had no intention of proposing it. The statement that Aberdeen had promptly rejected the suggestion of a loan as pre- ' Everett, No. 62, Nov. 3, 1843 (Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 38). Eng- land seems to have given Henderson to understand that slavery stood in the way of her recognizing Texas, but to have avoided bringing abolition and recognition explicitly together. 152 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS sented by a deputation of Americans could not disprove the fact that a similar idea coming from another source had been counte- nanced. The assurance that England had nothing in view with reference to Texas that should cause the slightest uneasiness in the United States was at that moment true, one must suppose, in Aberdeen's belief ; but this was because her efforts had thus far been unsuccessful; it was soon to be true no longer; and further- more this was a matter of opinion, on which our authorities might not agree with His Lordship. By no means all the facts, of course, were known to Upshur, but he possessed enough of them to guard him against implicit reliance, even had he been disposed as a general rule to place it, on the assurances of a foreign diplomat; and, finally, Aberdeen himself not only asserted the strong abolition policy of the Bnitish government, but admitted that a move to destroy slavery in Texas by means of an agreement with Alexico had been attempted, — a fact which tallied ominously with the proof, revealed in the Elliot-Jones correspondence, that negotiations be- tween the two countries had now been arranged for, and had been arranged for through British agency.'^ December lo Upshur received a second despatch from Everett in reference to the same subject. It was here mentioned that in writing to Ashbel Smith with reference to slavery in his country, Aberdeen had disclaimed all intention to interfere improperly in her internal affairs, and a report of another interview with the British minister was given. At this time His Lordship had said that he realized the delicacy and importance of the abolition matter, and should certainly not think it right to give just cause of com- plaint to the United States. England had, it was true, connected the subject of emancipation in Texas with a proposal that Mexico acknowledge her independence ; but the idea had not been favorably received. Upshur could readily see, however, that the suggestion might yet bear fruit ; and Aberdeen's assurances, taken as a whole, did not and could not satisfy the American government. He him- self, while denying that he wished to interfere unduly in the af- ' The statements not already proved will be proved later. Cralle, who was Chief Clerk of the State department under Calhoun, says (Calhoun, Works, v., 313, 314) that two deputations waited on Aberdeen; and Everett mentions in his despatch of Nov. 3 a deputation of " American abolitionists " and in that of Nov. 16 one of " British subjects and others." As Aberdeen admitted to Ashbel Smith on July 20 that perhaps the British government would in some way compensate the Texan owners of slaves, should these be emancipated, it is evident that his as- surance to Everett did not cover the whole ground. See also Smith's letters printed in Chapter iv. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 153 fairs of Texas or had given any cause for uneasiness to the United States, admitted that an attempt had been made to destroy a domes- tic institution of the first country and thereby to affect seriously — according to the general view of that matter — the home interests of the second ; and this was quite enough to show how liberally he could interpret words. In brief, the very best that could be said by the British diplomat for the express purpose of soothing the United States, and the rosiest complexion that could be given to his language by an American minister more in sympathy with him than with his own Executive in this regard, were such as inevitably to alarm Tyler; and in 1848 the President himself stated that Aber- deen's remarks had a decisive effect upon his mind and Upshur's in favor of pressing the measure of annexation. Placing side by side the weakness of Mexico and Texas, the close intimacy of England with both of those governments, her avowed anti-slavery policy, and the fact that she had already tried to work that policy in Texas, not to mention her agency in actually bringing about negotiations between the belligerents, they felt sure that in one way or another she would eventually, unless prevented, succeed in freeing the Texan slaves.^ All the more trying then, was the non-arrival of an answer to the overtures of September and October. Upshur felt suspicious of Houston, and feared that Van Zandt might not be given power to negotiate a treaty, though he trusted that in such a case the charge would take the responsibility of acting and appeal to the public for support. By this time strong political considerations had presented themselves, as will be seen ; and both Tyler and Upshur were de- termined to have a treaty if they possibly could. Another line of thought also may have stimulated them in the prosecution of their policy. The occasion of the break between the British representa- tive at Alexico and the government to which he was accredited — that affair of the little English flag — appeared altogether too trivial a cause for such an effect, as indeed it was, and the public were 'Everett, No. 64, Nov. 16, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 40. Smith Aug., i; Aberdeen, Sept. 11, 1843: Tex. Arch. Tyler to Calhoun, June 5, 1848: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 11 72. Tyler added that the British aim to abolish slavery in Texas might be carried out by a treaty between those countries ; that then there would be a constant border war between us and Texas over fugitive slaves from the southern States ; that ultimately therefore formal war would occur between the United States and Texas, Mexico and England ; that a commercial treaty would give England absolute control over the Texas trade, and that Eng- land would not be dependent upon us for cotton. 154 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS not aware that Great Britain disapproved of her charge's course. Consequently many suspected in the United States that some deep game was afoot and the incident of the flag a mere pretext, — a ruse, as the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin for example termed it. Then came word that a British fleet was on its way to Mexico; and as good an observer as Trist, then our consul at Havana and later Assistant Secretary of State, concluded that the English gov- ernment were using the ostensible quarrel as an excuse for assem- bling a naval force near the scene of operations, and intended to employ these vessels in one way or another against the policy of the United States.® Meanwhile, on the other hand, a little encouragement was re- ceived from Texas. With a view to the brightening of American prestige a small warship, the Flirt, was ordered to Galveston, where she arrived about the middle of October. Houston visited her with Murphy, and seemed much pleased with the attentions paid him. The American charge represented the sending of the vessel as evi- dence that the friendship of the United States was more than a profession ; and this idea, together with what he described as " the curtecy & noble bearing " of the Flirt's officers, tended greatly in his opinion to conciliate national sentiment. Doubtless the visit did have some influence in that direction, and still more was exerted by the strong suspicion of the public that England had been en- deavoring to emancipate their slaves. In Murphy's biased judg- ment, indeed, the people were so much incensed about the abolition movements occurring in Great Britain and the part which they supposed Elliot had taken in the Texan anti-slavery campaign, that *' a little, yea very little more " would have resulted in violence against the government of their own country.^'* A few days later fresh stimulus was imparted by a Galveston letter addressed to Upshur. "A train has been laid," said the writer, through English diplomacy and the " weakness, or wicked- ness " of Houston to prevent annexation. England's first step was to require all treating with the United States for a union of the countries to be suspended. The British minister in Mexico then applied for an armistice. Santa Anna agreed to grant this on the condition that Mexican supremacy be acknowledged and negotia- " Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. lo, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 900. Com. Bulletin: Houston Telegraph, Dec. 27, 1843. (Fleet, Trist) John L. Chauncey (of U. S. Ship Vandalia), Havana, Jan. 9, 1844: Markoe and Maxcy Papers. '"Elliot, secret, Oct. 31, 1843. Murphy, No. 11, Nov. 7; No. 12, Nov. 13, 1843. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED J 55 tions be opened on the Robinson basis. Doyle and Elliot recom- mended the acceptance of these terms, and it was agreed that a commission should be sent by the Texan government with an implied recognition of Alexican sovereignty. When annexation shall have been defeated, continued the letter, we shall be offered peace on the condition of accepting emancipation and the Nueces boundary, — our slaves to be paid for, held for life, or apprenticed for a term at nominal wages. " I know " that Houston has had Elliot's advice in all his moves ; I believe that England wishes to occupy the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande [the seat of the Beales grant] so as to prosecute designs against California; and I am " sure " that the first wish on the part of the British min- istry is " to strike a deadly blow at slave labor," since only that system enables you to compete with her. Elliot has said to me " more than once " that we shall never be recognized by the mother- country except on the basis of abolition, and he and Houston agree that the United States could not obtain peace for us without going to war with Alexico.^^ At last, three months after Van Zandt had written of the Amer- ican overture, eight weeks after he had sent a special messenger with Upshur's formal announcement, and forty-three days after Houston had informed the British representative what kind of an answer would be returned, the Texan Executive made reply. The interposition of European governments, wrote Secretary Jones, to which we owe the truce and our prospect of ending the war, has been given chiefly with a view to our remaining independent ; and it would not be good policy to exchange the expectation of obtaining — by the aid of those foreign powers — the peace now apparently near at hand for the very uncertain hope of entering the Union, however desirable that might be. Should Texas make an annexa- tion treaty, it is believed the powers would immediately withdraw their good offices ; and then were the treaty to fail, she would be in a worse case than at present, yet could not ask help of England and France ; while the United States, finding their weak neighbor wholly dependent upon them, might become indifferent again, and so she would be left entirely without friends. Until, therefore, the success of the annexation plan can be considered certain, the pro- posal to make a treaty should be declined; but if the American "James Low to Upshur, Nov. 20, 1843: State Dept., Misc. Letters. (Beales grant) Yoakum, Texas, i., 317. 1^6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Congress or Senate adopt a resolution authorizing the President to offer such an arrangement, the proposition will immediately be sub- mitted to the legislative authorities here and promptly be responded to by the Executive. It was a cold reply; and Houston's annual Message, published at about the same date, made it seem worse than cold, for in that paper he gratefully commemorated the friend- ship and helpfulness of England, and dwelt at length on certain American proceedings that he regarded as outrages. Van Zandt felt shocked by the tenor of his instructions; and although he infor- mally indicated their character to the American Secretary of State, he refrained from communicating their terms and boldly resub- mitted the case to the home authorities. ^- Upshur also was for persevering, and the ideas now expressed by the Texan envoy to his government, after ascertaining the views of " many Senators," help us to understand why. First, the charge pointed out insurmountable objections to such a resolution as Jones desired the American Senate or Congress to adopt. It was not customary, he remarked, to authorize the President of the United States to open negotiations, unless he had neglected or declined to do so ; and in this instance it was known to many leading Congress- men at both ends of the Capitol that annexation had been offered to Texas. Justice Catron of the American Supreme Court and all others consulted on the point agreed that it would not be well to instruct the Executive to do what he had already done. Besides, were such a move to be proposed, those unfriendly to Texas would urge that any steps taken by the American Congress before that country had signified her willingness to join the Union would be improper ; while those favorable to annexation but anxious to defer the matter would concur in voting against the desired resolution. In the second place Van Zandt explained that a treaty, even should it fail to be ratified, would promote the cause. It would indicate precisely and formally the terms that would be accepted by Texas, '-To Van Zandt, Dec. 13, 1843. At this time there were pending certain complaints of Texas against the United States for alleged trespasses upon her territory, and Van Z. notified Upshur (To Jones, No. 112, Jan. 2, 1844) that these must be satisfied before Texas could consider annexation. But, as the United States manifested the best disposition to adjust the diiificulties fairly, these claims really had no bearing on the question. Jones was technically truthful in saying the truce was due to foreign aid, in the sense that British agents were the organs of communication. Upshur's letter of Jan. 16 to Murphy shows that he knew of Jones's despatch declining the American overture ; but Van Zandt made no written communication to the State department on the subject (Calhoun to Tyler, May 2, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 68). Message: Journ. Ho. Repres., 8th Tex. Cong., 13. Van Z., No. 113, Jan. 20, 1844. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I57 and these — incorporated in a bill — could then be voted by a simple majority of the two Houses, whereas without such a preliminary agreement on terms this method would not be feasible. Next he argued that now was just the time to carry the great measure through. Being supported by Whigs as well as Democrats, he said, it will not be a party question. The opinion prevalent here that Texas must be annexed or become dependent on England seems to me a strong ground for hope. Even Senators from the North — and many of them — are influenced by this view. It is believed that undue British influence there, commercial or other, would be dan- gerous to the prosperity and to the institutions of the United States ; that England is employing all possible means to carry out her pur- poses ; and that annexation is the only remedy. Many feel sure that Henry Clay will be the next President, and some of his par- ticular friends wish the step to be postponed so that he may have the credit of it; but even these men will support a treaty, if a treaty be made now. We can count on every one from the South and West, all the Democrats from the North, and perhaps Tallmadge of the New York Whigs. A treaty, then, is the proper mode ; public sentiment is ready for it ; and such a state of feeling ought not to be wasted. Should the treaty fail and an act of Congress be deemed constitutional, that plan can then be brought forward and the suc- cess of the measure " be placed beyond a shadow of a doubt." Finally Van Zandt attacked the corner-stone of Jones's despatch. Whatever happens, we shall lose nothing, he urged; England may perhaps abandon us for agreeing to join the United States; but the making of an annexation treaty would create a party here that would never cease to defend us until we should be incorporated in the Union. ^^ Aside, however, from the ideas thus expressed, Upshur doubt- less felt, in view of Houston's proclamation, his Message, his reply to Van Zandt, the Brougham-Aberdeen colloquy and Everett's despatches, that positive action must be taken at once in order to forestall England ; and accordingly on the sixteenth of January, 1844, he sent a long communication to Murphy, intimating that Mur- phy should lay it before Houston. Our proposition to annex Texas, he announced, has been *' for the present " declined. This, how- ever, is not surprising. Although the United States have sym- pathized entirely with that country, " want of power " has prevented '*Van Z., No. 113, Jan. 20, 1844. 158 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS the Executive from assisting her in any effectual manner, and in a way she has been compelled to look elsewhere for aid. Probably her administration has thus become committed to England in some degree, and, regarding the ratification of an annexation treaty as not absolutely certain, it shrinks from hazarding the friendship of other powers by making a move in this direction. It should not, however, be discouraged by the failure to secure union with the United States at an earlier period. At that time the subject was not understood. Then and always a vast majority of our people have believed that at some day Texas must be annexed. The failure can have involved nothing more than the national self-respect of her people, and to set things right in that particular the American gov- ernment have taken the initiative in bringing the matter up again. In his recent Message, to be sure, the President of the United States was silent regarding the subject; but this was merely because he thought it best to wait until a treaty could be submitted. The Message clearly proved his friendship for Texas. He said it was time for the war between her and Mexico to end, thus announcing in effect " his own purpose to put an end to it " by any means which he can constitutionally command. His only means is the power to make treaties, and this power he now offers. England has no disinterested friendship for our neighbor, con- tinued the Secretary. Her purpose is to monopolize the commerce of the world. She aims to obtain concessions from Texas ; and that country, once in her control, will not be able to refuse them. The United States — particularly the North — would feel greatly irritated were they to find the adjacent republic aiding England to cripple our trade and industry, and we should make reprisals; so that if our overtures are rejected, " it is inevitable that we shall become the bitterest foes." Moreover if Texas remain independent, the " ex- tensive preparations " already carried out will fill the land with settlers from Europe, and these people will bring with them all their old ideas and feelings. Immigration from the United States on the other hand will cease, particularly as the Southern people would not go with their slaves to a country governed by abolitionists. Texas will thus become European ; sympathy between her and us will end ; slavery will be uprooted ; clashes and then war will follow ; England will have to take part, and other nations will not look idly on. What, now, could Texas hope to gain from all this ? She would find herself between the upper and the nether mill-stones. A quasi THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I59 alliance with England she might no doubt have, but " the lamb can make no contract with the wolf, which will protect him from being devoured." So long as she continues to be independent, she must in fact rely on a country not bound to her by sympathies and always actuated by mere self-interest. Would it not be better to join a nation hardly second to any, a nation rapidly growing, a nation whose power in war she could scarcely hope to resist, were it an enemy? That she may now do. "There is not, in my opinion, the slightest doubt of the ratification of the treaty of annexation, should Texas agree to make one." The Senators have been sounded, and "a clear constitutional majority of tzvo-thirds are in favor of the measure." The negotiations with Mexico need cause no embarrass- ment. If that country acknowledge Texas, Texas can do with her- self as she pleases; if not, she will need the protection of the United States all the more. So wrote Upshur. In September he had sug- gested ; in October he had proposed ; and now in January he insisted. In truth, portions of this final appeal sounded menacing, and it was denounced as a conjuring up of phantoms to bully Texas into acqui- escence. But in reality the Secretary was merely predicting what any thoughtful man could see was probable, if not certain, should the two nations pursue independent courses. Only a few months passed before Houston himself wrote that unless his country were annexed, the revenues of the American Union would be diminished and its very existence endangered ; that a European influence un- favorable to the United States would become dominant in Texas; that the bond of common origin would lose its power; and that instead of friendship there might come to be the "most active and powerful animosity " between the two republics.^* "To Murphy, No. 14, Jan. 16, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 43. A copy of the confidential despatch to Everett was made a part of this communica- tion. Houston to Murphy, May 6. 1844: Crane, Houston, 366. Upshur has been charged with falsehood for his statements regarding the strength of annexation in the Senate at this time; but McDuffie wrote to Calhoun, March 5. 1844, " from poor Upshur's count 40 Senators would vote " for the treaty (Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 934), and between these three men there can have been no intentional misrepresentation in the matter. Besides, as we have seen, the evidence appears to warrant Upshur's estimate. In Jan., 1845, the chairman of the House com- mittee on foreign affairs stated on the floor that at this time many more than two-thirds of the Senate favored the acquisition of Texas by treaty (Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 84) ; and there is much other evidence of such a state of things. Jan. 23 Upshur supplemented this despatch with a private and con- fidential note to Murphy, in which he argued that since the motive of England was self-interest, she would be all the more willing to treat commercially with Texas were the project of annexation to be tried and defeated, for then she could feel that it would not come up again ; hence Texas need not hesitate on account of her relations with that power to make the proposed treaty. Upshur added that ratification might " now be regarded as certain " (State Dept., Arch, of Tex. Leg.). l60 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Elliot was at this time in New Orleans, and there Henry Clay- stated most positively in his presence, two or three times over, that no scheme of annexation would be accepted by the Senate of the United States. This, coming from the acknowledged ruler of the dominant political party in this country, was an important and in fact a decisive utterance, and in view of Elliot's anxiety on the sub- ject one cannot doubt that it was communicated unofficially to the Texan authorities. Some weeks later, indeed, Alurphy was in- formed that the charge had written to Jones from New Orleans assuring him that the Senate would not vote for Tyler's project. At about the same time he represented to Aberdeen that the United States, having concluded the new convention with Mexico for the adjustment of American claims, would be less interested in Texas ; and it seems more than possible that he expressed the same idea unofficially to Jones. Did he also receive unofficial replies? It would appear so, for he assured his government in February that Houston was " steadily determined " to maintain the independence of his country.^^ Meanwhile, however, the problem of annexation assumed a new phase in Texas. Murphy suggested to a member of Congress the idea of initiating a move in that body ; and during the latter part of December, 1843, several prominent figures in the national legislature did propose, on the basis of the popular vote for annexation in 1836, to introduce bills for the purpose. On the nineteenth such a project after being read a second time was duly referred, so that the matter was now formally up before the committee on foreign rela- tions. At this time Raymond, the secretary of the Texan legation in the United States, who had been sent home to obtain instructions on the subject and was on his return journey, intimated that the despatch conveyed by him was unfavorable to annexation. At once the Senate requested Houston to recall the messenger and postpone his departure until the matter could be laid before the Congress and action be taken by that body ; but Houston denied the legality of this demand. Three days later, feeling — as Murphy understood — that the President had been trying to mislead Tyler as to the sentiment or will of the nation, the Senate called upon him to throw light on the negotiations with England, France and the United States regarding the independence of the country and her relations to Mexico ; but this he positively and brusquely refused to "Elliot, private, Dec. 31, 1843. Murphy, private, Feb. 22, 1844. Elliot, No. 4, Jan. 15; No. 6, Feb. 17, 1844. See note 33. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED l6l do. The already great excitement then rose yet higher; people talked fiercely about the " veil of mystery so artfully thrown around" the international policy of the government; and five mem- bers of the House committee on foreign relations requested Murphy to inform them, so far as he was at liberty to do, in reference to the state of things existing between Texas, Mexico and his own country, explaining that in no other way could the facts required for the dis- charge of their duties be obtained. Murphy prudently evaded the demand, but he was careful to inform Houston about it. More positive still, to counteract any misleading representation that might have been made by the Executive, a substantially unanimous declar- ation affirming that nine-tenths of the people of Texas desired to join the American Union was drawn up by the Congress, and was forwarded to Gilmer for the corresponding body of the United States. Apparently nothing was needed to stimulate the desire for American protection, but now came news that the negotiations with Mexico were likely to end in disappointment, and the frail nation to be cast adrift once more in the tumult of waters.^'' However stubborn he might appear to be, the President was not really so. He perceived (as Captain Elliot reported after an interview with him) that his Congress were disposed to take from him all con- trol over the matter of annexation, and as he himself stated a few months later to the British consul at Galveston, that he could not maintain his ground against the majority. Had Elliot and Saligny been at hand to sustain him by their presence, the Attorney Gen- eral told the consul, Houston would have been able to hold his own ; but without their support he found it necessary to put in play a deeper and subtler policy than mere inaction." Accordingly he laid a secret Message before Congress on the twentieth of January, in which — giving no personal opinion on the advisability of annexation — he pointed out that an unsuccessful endeavor to gain that end would mortify the national pride, would ^* Murphy, conf., [Dec, 1843]. Houston Telegraph, Dec. 27, 1843; Jan. 3, 24; March 20, 1844. Raymond set out Dec. 18. Nat. Intell., Feb. 10; April 12, 1844. Murphy, No. 16, Jan. 3, 1844. Members to Murphy, Jan. 13, 1844: State Dept., Arch, of Tex. Leg. Murphy to members, Jan. 18, 1844: ib. Id. to Houston, Jan. 18, 1844: ib. Houston said later that, but for this declaration, he would have frightened the United States into ratifying the treaty (Phila. No. Ainer. June II, 1845)! Murphy, No. 17, Jan. 15, 1844. "Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. Kennedy, private. May 31, 1844. According to Cralle, Chief Clerk of the State Dept. under Calhoun, Van Z. intimated that a treaty would probably be signed and — if necessary — submitted directly to the people (Calhoun, Works, v., 319). In view of public sentiment this threat, if made, must have had great effect on Houston. l62 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS diminish the claims of Texas to the confidence of other powers, and might affect very unfavorably the attitude of England and France, and therefore urged the necessity of observing " the utmost caution and secrecy" in the affair. He then suggested that if annexation could not immediately be effected, an alliance with the United States would secure the country against Mexico; and finally he proposed that Congress appropriate $5,000 for a coadjutor to assist Van Zandt in dealing with the American government. This was done ; and the members of that body, feeling reassured as to the policy of the Executive, scattered to their homes, leaving him to carry out the programme suggested. Accordingly the charge was instructed to open negotiations for a treaty of annexation, should he become satis- fied that it could be carried in the Senate. Little enough, however, signified this mere permission to begin pourparlers — especially as the Secretary of State added that it was proposed to send on a partner in the work — though it was something to which Houston could refer in self-defence, if charged again with trying to thwart the popular will ; but another point in the letter signified much, for, pursuing the plan suggested in the secret Message, Jones directed the charge to approach the subject of an alliance. Now an alliance was some- thing for which the American government had shown no wish. It was in fact well known to be inconsistent with the established policy of the nation. The sole reason for proposing it must therefore have been that it was strongly desired by Houston ; and in fact the Presi- dent himself began a despatch to Van Zandt that was entirely similar in this regard to the one drawn up by Jones.^^ About this time important letters arrived from the United States. Catron was deeply interested in the annexation issue, and worked with Van Zandt all winter. When the latter found himself checked by his instructions, he laid the matter before the Justice ; and Catron, after spending a day in making inquiries, wrote to the Hermitage that a treaty could be ratified, hoping thus to bring Jackson's influ- ence to bear upon Houston. Walker also sent a letter to the ex- President, stating that he believed the measure would receive the vote of nearly every Democratic Senator and many Whigs, thirty- '* Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. Houston's Mess, and action of Cong. Laws of 8th Tex. Cong., 86. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 426. To Van Z., Jan. 2T, 1844. Houston to Van Z., Jan. 29, 1844: F. O., Texas, xiv. Jones (Memor., 590) states that personally he was opposed to the whole policy of negotiating an annexation treaty at this time, but that he yielded to public sentiment and " the earnest wishes of the Executive." This tends to prove, not that Houston really favored annexation, but that under the circumstances he deemed it best to negotiate on the subject. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 163 six members in all, and conjuring Jackson to communicate with the Texan Executive by the first mail. Jackson acted with extreme promptness, conveying these assurances to the President and en- closing two of the confidential letters received from Washington. In fact during the month of January, 1844, he addressed Houston several times on the subject. Undoubtedly these communications appealed strongly to their recipient ; but apparently they had not the decisive efirect longed for by their author, for in April Elliot reported to his government that Houston had adhered to his own policy in spite of " private instances from persons of great weight " in the United States, to whom he was " warmly attached. "^'^ Moreover other advices were very different from Jackson's. The Texan consul at New York wrote that while a strong party favored annexation, he had no idea that the measure could be carried, since partisan advantage — not the public good — was always the question in the United States. On the last day of January letters from Senator Choate of Massachusetts and Senator Barrow of Louisiana were forwarded to a member of the Texan cabinet. Their contents are not precisely known ; but the gentleman to whom they had been addressed informed Anson Jones that he would be convinced by them of the impossibility of effecting annexation, at least during the current year, and such was the conclusion actually formed by the Secretary of State.-° But now came something of a decisive character. Upshur's despatch of January i6, which was laid before Houston about the twelfth day of February, produced a sensation and justly so, for — even though it was a prediction rather than a menace — it almost amounted to an ultimatum. Practically it threw the sword into the scales to outweigh the President's policy, while by declaring the ratification of a treaty certain, it appeared to annihilate his defence against the American overture. Apparently nothing was left him except surrender. But the pupil of Cherokee Bowles could not easily be outplayed at the game of diplomacy. Two days later his Secretary of State wrote to Murphy that the protraction or failure of the annexation negotiations might cause Texas very serious diffi- culties with Mexico, France and England; yet if he would give an '° Catron to Polk, June 8, 1844: Polk Pap. Id. to Jackson, March 9, 1845: Jackson Pap. Walker to Jackson, Jan. 10, 1844: ib. Jackson to Blair, Sept. 19; July 26, 1844: ib. Houston to Jackson, Feb. 16, 1844: Galv. Civilian, Sept. 21, 1844. Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. '■" Brower to Reily, Jan, 4, 1844 : Jones, Memor., 303. Reily to Jones, Feb. I, 1844; ib., 306. Jones, Letter: Niles, Jan. i, 1848, p. 281. l64 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS assurance in the name of his government that the United States would " assume the attitude of a defensive ally of Texas against Mexico " and send adequate military and naval forces to the vicin- ity, Houston would appoint a minister to co-operate with Van Zandt in negotiating for the project. And then, as if in a casual way, Jones remarked : " In the event of a failure of the treaty of annexa- tion, it is also necessary that this Government should have assur- ance or guaranty of its independence by the United States. "^^ At first sight the Secretary's demand to be protected may seem reasonable, but after a thought one realizes that Houston under- stood how impossible it was for the administration of the United States to give such a pledge constitutionally. Even Captain Elliot was well aware of this fact, and the ex-Governor of Tennessee can hardly have been less familiar than he with our organic law. The President cannot legally employ armed forces against a nation with which we are at peace, and therefore he cannot engage to do so. Moreover Upshur had stated explicitly in his despatch of January i6 that the Executive had " no means " of aiding Texas except such as he derived " from the treaty-making power." Elliot be- lieved Houston understood quite well that the United States " could not act upon " the condition proposed, and it seems impossible to think otherwise. The inference naturally follows that the demand for an illegal pledge of protection was put forward in the expecta- tion that it would be refused, or in other words was made — as Tyler suspected — to obtain a plausible ground for rejecting the American overture.-- This view does not seem, however, to be quite correct, for the plan of joining the United States was worth conserving both as a possible last resort and as a lever upon England meantime. Hous- ton appears to have calculated in this way : H Murphy declines to grant my apparently reasonable demand, I shall have not only an adequate excuse in the eyes of all for any pro-British policy that may be adopted but also the means of exciting deep resentment against the United States among my countrymen. Probably, how- ever, he will not assume the responsibility of thus closing the door *' Murphy, conf., Feb. 15 ; priv. and conf., Feb. 19, 1844. Houston to Van Z., Feb. 15, 1844: F. O., Texas, xiv. Jones to Murphy, Feb. 14, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., I sess., 4. The possibly near end of the truce made a guaranty of protection peculiarly desirable. It is interesting to note that Jones wrote as if the Congress had not made an appropriation for the coadjutor and thus virtually rendered the appointment obligatory. "Elliot, secret. April 7, 1844. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 428. Of course the conclu- sion of the treaty of annexation changed the situation. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 165 upon what he and his government so fondly desire. He will pre- fer to risk a step beyond his powers, knowing that his act can be dis- avowed if necessary. If his pledge is then repudiated by the American authorities, I shall have the same excuse and the same means of exciting resentment, together with the added effect of what many would regard as bad faith — or something like it — on the part of that government. Tyler and Upshur will see this ; and a majority of their nation, anxious about England's designs and in- tensely jealous lest she win the day against them here, will be so apprehensive lest our indignation at their conduct should throw us into her arms, that they will be ready for a long step. They will say, "If we cannot possess Texas, let us at least be the ones to protect and dominate her ; so let us make the alliance that she offers." These calculations were not without sagacity, and Murphy at once justified them as far as they concerned him, not only giving a pledge of protection in broad terms, but — while he declined to offer explic- itly the further assurance demanded by Jones — giving a promise that Houston could have made equal to such an assurance for a long time to come. " The United States," he wrote, " having invited that negotiation will be a guaranty of their honor that no evil shall result to Texas from accepting the invitation."-^ The wheels then began to turn. Murphy was informed that in view of his pledges the President had decided to despatch Hender- son with full powers, to co-operate with Van Zandt in concluding a treaty of annexation. Houston completed his letter to the charge at Washington begun on January 29. It was determined that his private secretary and confidential friend. Miller, should go north to act as secretary of the special legation, — for the purpose, one can but infer, of making sure that his personal views would be regarded by the negotiators and all their proceedings be made known to him. And finally Henderson was given instructions. In these he was directed to follow until further advised the orders previously conveyed to the Texan ministers at the same post, and in particular ^Murphy to Jones, Feb. 14, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 4. Very likely Murphy knew that his pledge did not bind the government, and gave it simply because he felt that otherwise the negotiations could not proceed, trusting his government to handle the matter as they should see fit (Murphy to Tyler, Feb. 17, 1844: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 287). Murphy does not appear to have observed how his promise (being unlimited as to time) could be used, for he referred Jones to the Washington authorities as regarded the proposed guaranty of independence. Houston could have held, with an appearance and much reality of justice, that any later Mexican attack (for a long time) would grow out of resentment at the annexation negotiations. l66 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to obtain from the United States before beginning negotiations " as full a guarantee as possible " touching the demands just made upon the American representative. This meant that before entering upon the discussion of a treaty the Texan minister was to require the explicit assurance asked of Murphy: that to say, a pledge that should negotiations be opened and the project fail, the United states would guarantee the independence of Texas or join with her in a defensive alliance against Mexico ; and the President informed Elliot that his orders to Henderson were precise and imperative to decline all negotiations until he should receive such a promise. In other words, Houston returned once more — and this time with superlative decision — to that idea of safeguarding Texas as an independent nation which had been expressed repeatedly of late by Jones and himself.-* Here seems to have lain, exactly where one should look for it, the very pith of the Texan policy, and one is reminded of the Pres- ident's attempt to obtain a truce from Santa Anna on such terms that it could have been prolonged indefinitely by the weaker party. ^ Jones to Murphy, Feb. 15, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 6. Hous- ton to Van. Z., Feb. 15, 1844: F, O., Texas, xiv. Jones to Hend., Feb, 15, 1844, Feb. 25 further instructions were given him : Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 259. Houston, Letter, July 18, 1847: Niles, Sept. 4, 1847. Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844. It is from Houston himself that we learn of the special instructions given Henderson (Letter, July 18, 1847: Niles, Sept. 4, 1847). Houston says in this letter that the contingency contemplated was a failure of the American government to carry annexation through, but there are ample reasons to believe that the contingency specified was the failure of the annexation project from whatever cause, (i) Jones's demand upon Murphy, the one precise, official and contemporary state- ment of the condition insisted upon by the Texan government, indicates this clearly, and Murphy's compliant course was such as to strengthen rather than weaken insistence on this point. (2) Murphy wrote to Upshur, Feb. 15, 1844 (Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 6), that Houston would not negotiate regarding annexation unless the United States would undertake to guard Texas from " all the evils " likely to assail her in consequence of " complying with the wishes " of this country by entering into a treaty ; and even had the treaty been rejected by the Senate of Texas on the ground, say. of illiberal terms, her willingness to make it would have been likely, by incensing Mexico and weakening the friendship of England and France, to bring most serious " evils " upon Texas, and render American protection of her independence necessary. In other words, Houston's demand, as reported by Murphy, was equivalent to Jones's. (3) Houston's language in the letter of 1847 is not really inconsistent with this view, for had the treaty been rejected by the Texan Senate on the ground of illiberal terms, this failure could have been construed as chargeable to the American govern- ment. (4) As Houston's letter was written in self-defence and after the two countries had become one, he may well have desired to shade the instructions given to Henderson. (5) He was not a precise man and he wrote from memory, (6) Elliot (secret, April 7, 1844), reporting an interview with Houston, said that the President ordered Henderson to require, before beginning to negotiate, " that the Government of the United States should distinctly guarantee to Texas the acknowledgment of it's Independence by Mexico, if the project of annexation failed [from any cause] of success." This matter becomes of importance only in connection with paragraph 26, though the discussion of it is in place here. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 167 In this affair of annexation, said he to Jones, " We shall have to be as sharp-sighted as lynxes, and wary as foxes," and in seeking the reason for his peculiar course at this juncture one must cultivate a somewhat similar state of mind. Apparently he argued much as before, though of course with a broader scope. Various facts and in particular the statements of Clay, Choate and Barrow indicate, he said to himself, that no annexation treaty can pass the Amer- ican Senate at present. Tyler and Upshur, however, believe the opposite. Consequently there is a chance of their making the agreement I demand, regarding it as a " merry bond " which they would never have to pay. Of course they would be extremely re- luctant thus to overstep their authority, but jealousy of England, fear of Texan resentment and eagerness for annexation might bring them to it ; and the same reasons plus a regard for the national honor would probably ensure the keeping of the agreement in some form, however unconstitutional the President's action might be con- sidered by the people. In the meantime England, eager to have the annexation scheme fail, will at last adopt a decided policy on the condition of our remaining independent, and will not only obtain peace with Mexico for us but grant the commercial advantages we desire. The treaty will then fail in 'the American Senate; our recognition by Mexico, our alliance with the United States and our arrangements with England will stand ; the future of Texas will be secure ; and I shall be remembered forever as the founder of a nation.-^ There was to be sure, a chance that an annexation treaty would be accepted by the American Senate, but even in that view Houston's grand ambition may have seemed not unreasonable. Ratification by the Senate of Texas also would have been essential; and had this been refused, it would have been incumbent upon the United States to defend her nationality for an indefinite period. Now undoubt- edly her Congress and people desired security for themselves and their property — particularly their slave property — and were willing to join the Union in order to obtain it; but with a guaranty of their independence in hand they could have taken time to meditate again on the advantages of free commercial relations with Europe. There were also, it is true, sentimental influences drawing them strongly "Houston to Jones, July 8, 1844: Jones, Memor., 371. Jones (JLetter: Niles, Jan. 1, 1848) avowed that he did not believe an annexation treaty would be ratified by the American Senate, and Elliot (secret. April 7, 1844) thought Hous- ton entertained the same opinion. The evidence before them seemed to prove this. l68 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS toward the States; but Houston had recently shown how deftly he could turn even an angry Senate at his will, and now — had it been placed within his power to ensure the realization of the brilliant future that he foresaw for Texas and the splendid fame that he appears to have coveted for himself by merely bringing about the rejection of the treaty — one can hardly doubt how strenuously he would have exerted himself. Both lines of thought as regarded the American Senate, however bold they be deemed, were shrewd, and Houston's proceedings at this time, the supreme crisis of his life, appear to support such a view of his policy. Had merely a fore- ordained treaty been contemplated, he could have awaited calmly the reports of his agents. But in fact he was so intensely anxious that he took the matter out of Jones's hands and planted himself at the town which bears his name, so as to receive early intelligence from the diplomatic seat of war.^*' He found time, however, to sit down and compose a reply to Jackson's letters. In this he represented annexation as highly advan- tageous for the United States but not for Texas ; yet he added that he favored the measure as "wisdom growing out of necessity," since at his advanced age he desired to live in an orderly commun- ity, and war would bring adt^enturers who might gain control of the nation at any annual election. " Now, my venerated friend," he concluded, " you will perceive that Texas is presented to the United States as a bride adorned for her espousals ;" but this is the third attempt at annexation, and it is now or never. If the project fail ' again, we shall seek protection elsewhere.-^ A genial, friendly, open-hearted epistle this appeared to be, and possibly so it was ; but one remembers the lynx and the fox, and on a second look one discovers something below the surface here. The " necessity " seems to have been hardly the result of a craving on Houston's part for a quiet existence, for neither his character nor his later career supports that theory, and he was too large a man to decide a great national question on a selfish and paltry basis. On -* See remarks in note 24. Any one who chooses may, however, disregard this paragraph, since it appears clear that Houston did not expect the treaty to pass the American Senate. (Took) Houston to Hend. and Van Z., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 274 (cf. Jones, Memor., 55). ^Houston to Jackson, Feb. 16, 1844: F. O., Texas, x. Houston's feeling toward Jackson was undoubtedly warm. Jan. 31, 1843, he wrote to him of " your many acts of affectionate kindness to me, under all circumstances, and in every vicissitude of life, in which you have known me " : and signed the letter, '' Thy Devoted Friend" (Jackson Pap.). This letter of Feb. 16 was forwarded by Jackson to lien. Walker (Jackson t) 1-ewis, March 11, 1844: N. Y. Pub. Lib. (Lenox)). THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 1 69 the Other hand the " necessity " suggested by Upshur in his despatch of January 16 was highly important, and we know from Hender- son and Van Zandt that Houston so regarded it. The letter, then, appears to mean substantially this : Although it is for the interest of Texas to remain independent, we have had to consider the danger that the United States will be disposed to make us trouble if we adopt such a course ; but, as we have now seemed to accept annexa- tion in deference to their urgency, if the present movement in that sense fails they can say nothing hereafter against our pursuing our own policy, and, that no unpleasantness may arise, I hereby give due notice both of that fact and of the line we shall follow. To this it is necessary to add that when Houston said, Now or never, he almost certainly believed it would not be Now. Such a missive, directed to Jackson, was in efifect a state paper, and thus we seem to find the President making another shrewd move to ensure and safeguard Texan independence. Of course Murphy was quite unable to fathom a mind of that depth, but he did perceive a cool- ness on Jones's part and suspected that he hoped annexation would not come to pass.-^ All this while Van Zandt continued to be sanguine and urgent, and the treaty progressed so far that in half a day it could have been completed. With reference to the suggested substitute for incor- poration in the great republic, he pointed out to his government that an alliance, besides being contrary to the settled policy of the United States, would give this country every disadvantage and none of the benefits to be expected from annexation, and therefore — especially after a rejection of the American overture- — -would be very unlikely to meet with favor, while the course of Texas in making such an arrangement would offend England and France as much as a will- ingness to join the Union. Besides, he had been officially informed that no such alliance was feasible. Then on the twenty-eighth of February the explosion of a new cannon on the Princeton suddenly put an end to Upshur's career ; but after a brief delay Nelson stepped into the vacant place as temporary incumbent, and as Tyler desired to have the treaty finished by him rather than by the proposed new Secretary, the completion of the task appeared to be near at hand.-" ^ Van Z. and Hend. to Calhoun. April 15, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., I sess., 13. Houston may also have had in mind his policy of excitinp; American jealousy of England to the pitch of making an alliance -with Texas. Murphy, No. 21, Feb. 22, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 7. ^ It has been inferred from Tyler's letter to Calhoun (Jameson, Calh. Corr., 939) that the negotiation -was not substantially completed -when the Secretaryship was offered to Calhoun, but the letter does not really indicate this. Van Z. No. 114, Feb. 22; No. 115, March 5, 1844. I70 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS So far, although special efforts were made to prepare the nation for the great issue, the actual negotiations had proceeded with great privacy. This was entirely proper, and the first Chief Justice of our Supreme Court had expressly recommended the constitution because it provided for secrecy in such business. Under the present circumstances reserve was for several reasons peculiarly desirable : first, in order to forestall an apprehended protest from England and France; secondly, to prevent the Mexicans from retorting with an invasion of Texas ; in the third place to save that nation, if possible, from losing the good-will of its European friends in case the nego- tiations should lead to nothing; fourthly, to lessen the danger that American politicians would make the annexation project a party question ; and finally to avoid giving the abolitionists time enough to organize a grand agitation against it. On the side of Texas Houston enjoined strictly upon his agents to keep the proceedings from the public; and on the other side Jackson recommended that course earnestly to Tyler.^° March 20, however, Van Zandt reported that Henderson's ap- pointment had become known, and that the opposition press in the United States was daily pouring vials of wrath upon the idea of such a treaty. Further, he was anxious because he heard nothing from Jones and received no news from his colleague except that he was coming. The friends of Texas at Washington were urging that early action, if any, should be taken. The overwhelming defeat of Winthrop's attempt to bring before the House a resolution against annexing that country was regarded by many as a test, and it seemed highly important that so promising an opportunity should not be missed. Two days later he announced the receipt of Jones's letter of February 25, showing that less than four weeks were needed to go from one Washington to the other, yet he could give no further news of Henderson; and perhaps he suspected, as we may, that some intentional delay had occurred on the part of Texas in the hope of favorable news from the commissioners treating with Mexico.^^ '" (Jay) Federalist (Dawson), 449. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 278, 287. (Abolsts.) Lewis to Jackson, Dec. 4, 1843; Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll. (Houston) To Hend., Feb. 15, 1844. (Jackson) Yoakum, Texas, ii., 425, note. *'Van Z., Nos. 116, 117, March 20, 22, 1844. (Winthrop) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., I sess., 392 (March 15). Van Z. naturally expressed surprise that infor- mation regarding so secret an affair had leaked out in Texas. Now one can see, on the hypothesis of the text, that Houston may have desired to give notice of what was afoot so as to ensure a strong opposition in the American Senate ; and both the fact of the leakage and the snapping way in which Jones intimated that Van Z. accused the administration of it are perhaps worthy to he remembered. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I7I As will be discovered, the outcry against the rumored project was indeed fierce in the United States, but this did not put a stop to the negotiations. March 25 Van Zandt announced that all of Jones's points had been satisfactorily arranged, and that a treaty was now ready for Henderson to sign. He was still eager for action, fearing that a loss of time would ensure success to the great effort already under way in favor of laying the matter over to the next session of Congress. Disguises, he felt, were now useless, for even the secret law of Texas had been published. The outlook was still encouraging, too. " This Texas question will ride down and ride over every other," Tyler was reported as saying to Con- gressmen, and the opinion seemed reasonable. It appeared impos- sible that the Democrats would repudiate Jackson, and many of the Whigs seemed likely to join them on this question. On the last day of Alarch Senator Fulton wrote to Van Buren that the other party were in confusion over the matter, and that it would be " death for any Southern man to vote against the Treaty ". Accord- ing to a letter in the United States Gazette, both sides were now disposed to accept the treaty promptly in order to prevent the dreaded question from getting into American politics. Apparently the measure could and should be rushed through, and the administra- tion was for immediate action.^- Elliot, meanwhile, had been dangerously ill at New Orleans ; but by the middle of March he knew that Henderson and Miller had been sent North, and also that the relations between Texas and her enemy had taken a turn for the worse. Naturally he inferred that she was looking towards the United States ; and on the twenty- second of the month he wrote pointedly to Jones, informing him that England and France were still at work in the interest of his country, but that in view of the recent action of her government he desired for his own a full and frank explanation of her policy. The two European powers, he said, could not continue to urge upon Mexico a settlement upon one basis, while there was any reason to surmise that negotiations were " either in actual existence, or in contemplation, proposing a combination of a totally different nature."?^ ^'Van Z., No. ii8, March 25, 1844. (Tyler) Lib.. March 29, 1844, Fulton to Van B., March 31, 1844: Van B. Pap. U. S. Gazette: Madis., April 25, 1844. (Immediate) Sen. Archer: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 693. "Elliot, private, March 7; No. 8, March 15, 1844. Id. to Jones, March 22, 1844: F. O., Texas, ix. According to Yoakum (Texas, ii., 427), Elliot wrote to Houston on March 8 and 22 and was answered. 172 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS At the same time another danger, feared for some time past, assumed a definite shape. Hockley and Wilhams, the commissioners appointed to negotiate with Mexico, had begun their discussions at Sabinas about the first of December, and at Christmas they reported an encouraging outlook; but the Mexican representatives, learning that annexation schemes were afoot, withdrew the plan of an armistice favorable to Texas. This may have been done from spite, or because they did not wish to facilitate negotiations with the United States by granting a long truce ; but whatever the cause, its result was equally unfortunate. What then followed is rather mysterious. But it is certain that Hockley was intensely opposed to the sacrifice of nationality ; that the armistice finally agreed upon by the commissioners cut away the essential preliminary to incor- poration in the United States by referring to Texas as a Department of Mexico ; that Hockley and Williams returned to Galveston in fine spirits as if pleased with their work; and that they were sup- posed by many to have consented to this unpatriotic blow at their country for the express purpose of damaging the cause of annexa- tion. Of course Houston could not accept an armistice that de- scribed Texas in such a way ; the hope of securing undisturbed peace and legal independence through recognition by the mother-country vanished therefore from the horizon; and the fear of invasion took its place.^* To meet these difficulties the government resorted once more to finesse. Jones replied to Elliot by explaining the critical circum- stances of the country, pointing out the apparent inability of Great Britain to contribute effectual aid, stating that — should the United States give the demanded pledges of protection — annexation would seem the best policy, and blandly hoping that this explanation would prove "entirely satisfactory" to England; and he then directed Van Zandt and Henderson to make the treaty as soon as they con- ^^Memoria de Guerra, read Jan., 1844. Nat. Intell.. Feb. 7, 1844. Texian Democrat, May 15, 1844. (Withdrew) Jones to Elliot, March 18, 1844: Jones, Memor., 327. (Favorable to Texas) Texian Democrat, May 15, 1844. (Spite, etc.) Elliot, No. 8, March 15, 1844- (Hostile) Hockley to Jones. Feb. 28. 1844: Jones, Memor., 324. N, Orl. Courier, April i, 1844. Norton to Calhoun, April 29, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 949. Houston said the commissioners were ex- cusable for signing because otherwise they might not have been permitted to return home (To Van Z. and Hend., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 274). This seems hardly reasonable. It is noticeable, too, that Houston had no condem- nation for the apparent willingness of the commrs. to discredit their country and block annexation, and one suspects that his astute mind may have been at work. The commrs. reached Galveston March 26: Nat. lutcIL, April 8. To Van Z., July 13, 1844. Houston to Van Z. and Hend., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 274. To A. Smith, March 26, 1844. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 1 73 veniently could on the best terms to be obtained, should they deem these " admissible." Apparently the Texan administration had now decided finally, in consequence of the break with Mexico, to join the United States if possible. A moment's reflection, however, leads one to a very different conclusion. It cannot be supposed that Houston intended to accept and recommend to the nation whatever sort of a treaty his envoys, one of whom had shown himself dis- tinctly pro- American, should choose to sign, for he was by no means the man to abdicate in favor of subordinates. Besides, the conclu- sion of a treaty, it must be remembered, was in his mind a long way short of effecting annexation. One perceives, too, that Jones's letter to Elliot was well calculated to bring before the English gov- ernment the strongest possible inducements to act vigorously with Mexico. Two prime motives, then, can be seen for giving these instructions, neither of which signified a wish to enter the gate of the Union. One of them was in line with Van Zandt's argument that by signing the proposed treaty a strong party determined to defend Texas could be created in the United States ; and the other was a desire to make effectual, by keenly exciting Elliot's fears of annexation, the lever applied to him. This view is perhaps confirmed by what ensued, for both of these results followed. The American administration resolved to employ all its powers in defence of the Texans, and Jones was soon boasting confidentially that European guaranties were ready to be offered. At the same time a domestic reason for the instructions to Henderson and Van Zandt existed. It was essential to have evidence — especially should Mexico begin hostilities in earnest — that the Executive had obeyed the will of the nation with reference to this affair, and one recalls that similar orders, given to Van Zandt immediately after the appropriation of the $5,000, had no real significance.^^ ^° Jones to Elliot, March 25, 1844: F. O., Texas, ix. To Van Z., March 26, 1844. April 3 Elliot replied, arguing against the course pursued by Texas. An interview between Houston and Elliot then took place. Houston explained that his secret Message and its consequences had been due to the disposition of Congress to take out of his hands the question of annexation. Elliot urged him to notify Upshur that an armistice — an armistice, it should be remembered, which recog- nized Mexican sovereignty — had been made, and that while Texas continued to treat with Mexico all negotiations with the United States not actually concluded must cease. The interview was unofficial ; both men appear to have talked freely ; and Elliot received the impression that Houston neither believed that annexation could be carried through nor personally desired that it should be (Elliot, secret, April 7, 1844). To Van Z., March 26, 1844. These instructions could not reach Washington in time to have any effect. Van Z., No. 113, Jan. 20, 1844. Jones to Miller, May 3, 1844: Miller Pap. 174 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS ]\Iarcli 2^ or 28 Henderson reached Washington and explained that he had been delayed at least ten days by the boats, which was apparently a rather lame excuse for being two weeks or more slower than a letter at such a juncture. He found the situation somewhat different from what he expected. Not only was Upshur no more, but Henry A. Wise, in order to ensure — as he believed it would do — the success of the annexation project, had urged that the Secretaryship be offered to Calhoun. This was by no means agreeable to Tyler. He felt more or less at odds with the powerful South Carolinian in consequence of what had occurred in 1840. He probably dreaded him as a radical, perhaps feared him as one stronger than himself,, and possibly suspected him of a willingness to appropriate the credit of gaining Texas. Certainly he understood well the feud between him and Jackson, whose assistance in this business was essential ; and he knew how the Van Buren and Adams factions detested him. By sharp practice, however, Wise extorted the President's assent, — the prospect that a treaty would be signed by the acting Secretary of State before Calhoun could arrive doubt- less helping Tyler to make the appointment.^*^ The new incumbent, fully determined to obtain Texas if pos- sible, reached Washington on the twenty-ninth of March. In De- cember, Maxcy had informed him thai an annexation treaty had been substantially completed ; and McDufQe, in offering him — at Wise's unauthorized request but in the President's name — the post of Secretary, had said that within ten days after appearing at the capital he could sign this treaty, that forty Senators would support it, and that Tyler expressed hopes of securing Mexico's assent. Later, indeed, Calhoun stated that on taking up his work he found nothing to sustain him, and carried the project through by his own " bold unhesitating course," and Miller wrote to Jackson on the seventh of April that the prospect in the Senate was rather unfavor- able, that the Whig members were inclined to postpone the matter lest it should affect Clay's prospects and a majority of the Whig ^ Wash. Sped., March 29, 1844. Hend. to Jones, March 30, 1844: Jones, Memor., 333. N. Y. Jouni. Com., April 2, 1844. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 291-294, 392. Wise. Decades, 221 et seq. (By Nelson) Van Z., No. 115, March 5. 1844; Tyler, Tyler, ii., 415. Tyler made the offer March 6, and sent Calhoun's name to the Senate at once. He was confirmed unanimously; and, while the Madisonian was of course mistaken in holding that its action committed that body to the support of annexation, yet — as it knew the treaty was under way and also, according to Senator Haywood, that Calhoun favored it — this unanimous welcome appears to indicate a strong leaning in that direction (Tyler, Tyler, ii,, 290. Madis., May 2, 1844. Haywood to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap.). THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED I75 editors opposed the measure, that Van Buren's friends in general openly favored it but no one could yet be sure what course that leader himself would take, and that some of both parties might " fear to approach " the matter. But Calhoun may have been in- fluenced by an unconscious desire to do himself justice, and Miller by a conscious one to stimulate Jackson's exertions for the cause.^^ At all events Henderson thought the outlook warranted proceed- ing, and he reported to Jones that although all the leading Whigs favored delay and a part of the Democrats — feeling that success in this important affair would better the Presidential chances of Tyler or Calhoun — leaned the same way, he felt satisfied that some would vote for the measure, should it be forced upon them at once, who would give it the " go-by " later. He felt sure also that every Demo- crat was at that time ready to support it, while the " most knowing friends " of Texas on the ground believed that enough Clay men would do the same to carry it ; and for such reasons it was decided to go forward. In consequence perhaps of this bold stand, the well informed representative of the Philadelphia Ledger reported on the eighth of April that both parties were now anxious to settle the business immediately, so as to get it out of the way and prevent Tyler from making it an issue, and that while a few Democrats and the Webster Whigs would oppose the treaty, one of these groups would balance the other, and consequently the relations of the parties would not be affected.^^ According to the President, Calhoun accepted the treaty sub- stantially as it. had been drawn, contributing only a few new ideas, whereas the correspondent of the New York Journal of Commerce wrote, and after further investigation repeated, that he remodelled the whole document; and it seems likely enough that he did recast the form of it, though not that radical changes were made. This cost a little time of course, but it raised no important problem. Another difficulty, however, proved serious. The American Execu- tive, instead of confirming Alurphy's pledges, disavowed them as *' (Determined) Calhoun to McDuffie, Dec. 4, 1843 : Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 552; Id. to Gilmer, Dec. 25, 1843: ib., 539. The British minister, who soon had an interview with Calhoun, represented him as " determined at all hazards " to effect annexation (Pak.. No, 22, April 14, 1844). Madis.. March 30, 1844. Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 10, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 903. Wise, Decades, 222. McDuffie to Calhoun, March 5, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 934. Cal- houn to Mrs. Clemson, May 22. 1845: ib., 656. Miller to Jackson, April 7, 1844: Jackson Pap. *■* Hend. to Jones. March 30, 1844: Jones, Memon, 333, Ledger, April 9, 1844. X 176 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS going beyond his authority, and therefore a deadlock seemed inevi- table. Much discussion took place, no doubt. One may be sure that all the considerations presented in Upshur's despatch of Janu- ary 16 were strongly urged; and finally the Texan envoys, deciding to consult the near and urgent interests of their country in prefer- ence to those of a grander but uncertain character, disregarded the special instructions given to Henderson, carried the negotiations on and through, and then satisfied themselves with a letter written by Calhoun on the eleventh of April, which merely promised that a strong naval force and all the disposable troops should be concen- trated near the frontier to " meet any emergency," and that " during the pendency of the treaty " the President would " use all the means placed within his power by the Constitution to protect Texas from all foreign invasion ". Within a week Houston had suggested to Jones that should the American Executive fail to confirm Murphy's pledge, it would be easy to tell Henderson that his mission was at an end; but on the very day, April 12, when Murphy announced officially the disavowal of that pledge, the treaty of annexation was signed at Washington, and thus like a house of cards fell Houston's elaborate scheme. The United States neither wholly refused to defend Texas nor gave an illegal and entangling promise ; and the action of the Texan representatives made it practically impossible to raise an outcry against the American government.^'' The terms of the treaty were described by Van Zandt as the best for his country that the Senate could be expected to ratify, though less liberal than Tyler, the cabinet and the Southern mem- ^ Tyler, Tyler, ii., 297. Journal Com., April 17, 1844. Nelson to Murphy, March 11, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 10. Nelson expressed the belief that Texas was in no immediate danger from Mexico. The substance of this despatch was communicated to the Texas government by Murphy on April 12 (Murphy to Jones, April 12, 1844: ib., 12). Calhoun to Van Z. and Hend., April II, 1844: ib., II. Calhoun's pledge differed from Murphy's in that it ex- pressly limited the President's promise not only to the pendency of the treaty but to his constitutional authority. Moreover it was of course to be interpreted in the light of Upshur's despatch of Jan. 16 and Nelson's of March 11 regarding the bounds of that authority. Murphy's successor defined them in these words : " Mr. Calhoun . . . gives the assurance that, should the exigency arise during the pendency of the treaty of annexation, the President would deem it his duty to use all the means placed within his power by the Constitution to protect Texas from invasion" (Howard to Jones, Aug. 6, 1844: Sen. Doc. 1, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 28) ; and Calhoun stated that this definition was regarded as correct by the President himself (To Howard, Sept. 10, 1844: ib., 38). How, then, the promise could be described (to quote an eminent historian) as " a directly unconstitu- tional usurpation" it is hard to see. Houston to Jones, April 6, 1844: Jones, Memor., 336. When they find what Henderson's instructions are, said the Presi- dent in this letter, they will " see that the game is to be a two-handed one." All through this affair one must remember that Houston was a veteran gamester. THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 1 77 bers would have been willing to give; and even so he thought the prospect of ratification had now become doubtful. On the other hand, the Ledger's correspondent, writing on the tenth, represented favorable action at that session of Congress as every day more prob- able. The vote that he predicted was one each from Maine, Con- necticut, New York and Michigan, and two each from New Hamp- shire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio, Illinois and the twelve slave States, — thirty-eight in all, — with New Jersey and Indiana doubtful. Indeed he believed that the benefits to be derived from annexation by New England would appear in such a light that even the Senators of Massachusetts might vote " Yea." " I confine myself strictly to facts as they have come to my knowledge, from sources to be relied upon," he concluded. Calhoun wrote to Murphy within twenty-four hours after the treaty was signed : " I entertain little doubt of its approval" by the Senate; "the voice of the country, so far as it can be heard, is so decidedly in favor of annexation, that any hesitancy on the part of the doubtful will probably give way to it " ; and he said in particular the next month that opposition from Clay and Van Buren had not been anticipated. A little later the Madisonian stated that when the treaty was concluded intelli- gent and disinterested men believed that within a few weeks the administration would be supported by a clear majority of the people, and that nobody was able to see how men really in favor of annexa- tion could neglect this golden opportunity to win a triumph over both foreign and domestic foes. Two days after the signing of the treaty the British minister, who was in close touch with a number of Senators, admitted that he felt "less sanguine" than previously of its rejection. In short, when the agreement was consummated, although a two-thirds vote of the Senate was necessary, it seemed to have a good fighting chance of success. Yet it was very plain that the measure labored under three very serious disadvantages. The most urgent grounds for it, those supplied by the Texan envoy at London, could not be made public ; at any moment it was liable to become a party issue ; and not only politics but the relations of certain leading public men were so tense, that only by the extra- ordinary good fortune of practically unanimous consent could it hope to succeed. *° ^'Van Z. and Hend., April 12. 1844. Phil. Ledger, April 12, 1844. To Murphy, No. 17, April 13. 1844. Calhoun to Wharton, May 28, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 592. Madis., June 10, 1844. Pak., No. 22, April 14, 1844. 13 178 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS The treaty was forwarded to Texas by messenger, and Murphy went up with the bearer to lay it before Houston. At the interview which followed the President expressed " his hearty approbation of every part " of the agreement, reported the charge. Murphy then communicated to him the substance of a despatch just re- ceived from his government with reference to protecting Texas during the pendency of the treaty, which amounted of course to no more than Calhoun had promised her envoys at Washington; and upon this Houston " rose to his feet and gave utterance to his feel- ings of gratitude . . . for this distinguished manifestation of the generous and noble policy, which ruled in the Councils " of the Union. *^ Apparently it was a beautiful and ideal scene, marked by a simple but lofty spirit and a noble frankness of expression. Yet Houston had written to Henderson and Van Zandt within a fortnight that he believed England and France would offer to guarantee independence and peace if Texas would agree never to join the United States, and that " in such an event " they could " not fail to discover what would be the proper course of Texas " ; Jones informed Elliot that the conclusion of the treaty " was a source of great mortification and disappointment to General Houston and himself " ; and before long the President "expressed great dissatisfaction" to Murphy's successor in strong, passionate and even menacing language with reference to that same " generous and noble policy " of the United States. If one could feel that perhaps too artful a look has been given to his course in this account of it, here could be found suffi- cient reassurance ; and if his real attitude in regard to the treaty needs explanation, it may probably be found in what he wrote at this time to Henderson and Van Zandt : " We cannot go back, and *' Murphy to Calhoun, April 29, 1844: State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. To Murphy, No. 17, April 13, 1844. ^-Houston to Hand, and Van Z., April 16, 1844: Record Book 44, p. 206, Tex. State Dept. (Jones) Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844. Howard, conf., Aug. 7, 1844. Houston to Hend. and Van Z., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 274. May I, 1844, the Telegraph and Texas Register of Houston stated, as news from the United States, that Clay desired to have the question of annexation submitted to the people, which meant that he did not wish any action on the subject taken by the Congress then in session. Of course this news arrived some hours at least before it appeared in print, and apparently it could have reached Jones by May 2 or 3. May 3 Jones wrote to Miller, secretary of the special legation at Wash- ington, D. C, that he believed the Whigs would have to vote for the treaty, but that postponement would be rejection ; and in that case European guaranties of Texan independence could easily be obtained (Miller Pap.). Was this written to promote the ratification of the treaty? The United States Senate had voted on March 25 to adjourn on May 27, and Jones could not have supposed his letter THE ANNEXATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED 179 therefore we must march forward with decisive steps." The agree- ment had been signed; nothing could be gained by taking offence; and the only question to consider at present was how to make the best of the situation thus created. *- would arrive in time to exert any influence, even if he could possibly do so in opposition to Clay. Does it prove that he believed the treaty would be ratified ? No, for we have a direct statement from him that he never entertained such a belief. The object of the letter seems to have been to say: We have made the treaty ; we demand that it be ratified at this session of Congress ; we tell you that if it is not, we shall turn to Europe ; and now if this come to pass you cannot blame us. It was obviously of great importance to prevent the United States from having a ground of complaint should Texas pursue an anti-American policy. May 6, Houston wrote to Murphy dwelling on the vast possibilities of inde- pendent Texas backed by European nations ; and announcing that, should the treaty fail, he would require any further negotiations on the subject to take place in Texas (Crane, Houston, 366). Upon this letter light is thrown (i) by what Jones said regarding European guaranties', and (2) by Murphy's report (dated May 8) that the Texan administration had opened the negotiations reluctantly and would promptly seize " the first occasion to change its policy," and that Houston showed so little faith in the success of the treaty that it was necessary " to keep near him " constantly. The remarks made above regarding the purpose of Jones's letter seem to apply to Houston's also. Both appear to have been written in pur- suance of a deliberate intention to follow an anti-American line of policy yet make it impossible for the United States to take offence ; and evidence of this design has been seen before. Cf. paragraphs 23-28 of this Chapter. IX The Annexation Issue is Placed Before the Country The opponents of the administration were very fond of assert- ing that the annexation issue had been " sprung " upon the country. To a considerable extent this was true; but it was owing mainly to their own course. Many influential editors would not recognize the foreshadowings that we have easily discovered, and kept their readers quite in ignorance of the prospect that soon the Texas ques- tion might come up again. As early as the first of December, 1843, the Madisonian complained sharply that the two great party organs at the capital, the National Intelligencer of the Whigs and the Globe of the Democrats, were ignoring the subject. Why such a course was pursued it is not hard to divine. There was a strong desire to fight the impending Presidential contest on issues already before the public, because the bearings of these and their influence upon the electorate could fairly well be gauged, while Texas — more than anything else — was liable to upset all the calculations of the political managers. If, as seemed likely, Tyler desired to excite an agitation on that subject, a cold silence, implying that such madness was quite incredible, was evidently the policy best calculated to discourage him ; and this course, as an additional merit, would make it possible to cry out, " A Dark Plot ! " should he persist. On the tenth of February, 1844, the National Intelligencer took from the Houston Telegraph an item of news to the eft'ect that Upshur had proposed some weeks before to negotiate regarding annexation, and on the twenty-sixth it quoted the New Orleans Republican as stating that a substantially unanimous resolution of the Texan Congress in favor of that project, passed early in Janu- ary, had been laid before the American Senate in a secret session, that a vote of forty to nine in the same sense was cast by this body, and that a treaty, drawn for the purpose without delay, had been forwarded south. About the same time the Philadelphia North American cited the Telegraph as announcing that thirty-five United States Senators were disposed to ratify such an agreement, and the Galveston Civilian as declaring this statement " well founded " ; 180 THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY l8l and no doubt the editors of the Intelligencer were accustomed to inspect the North American, whose Washington correspondent one of them was said to be. At any rate they saw a letter from the capital, published in New York on February 23 and subsequently mentioned by themselves, which asserted that Tyler and Upshur, believing that thirty-eight Senators would vote for annexation, were about to conclude a treaty. As will appear in a later chapter. Clay wrote from New Orleans to Senator Crittenden about the middle of February that such an agreement was under way, and it can hardly be doubted that information so thrilling reached the editors of the Intelligencer. " For months " before April came to an end, said the Democratic Central Committee of Virginia in a formal address, " it had been known to the whole country, that the Execu- tive of the United States was in treaty with the government of Texas, for the purpose of affecting the re-annexation of that country to our Union ". But all the rather definite assertions of the press, added to all the previous foreshadowings and all that a journal so near the heart of affairs could readily ascertain, drew no editorial comment from the great Whig newspaper except — with reference to the item in the Republican — that it was devised for " wanton mischief or interested speculation." The influential Bee of New Orleans treated all the talk as idle; the New York Tribune, which had recently printed a communication describing the annexa- tion plan as " most undeniably dead," did not correct this impres- sion; and the Atlas of Boston, which had professed at the very end of February to observe no signs of " any serious or well concerted efforts " in that direction to be made at the coming session of Con- gress, appeared to hold the same opinion still. ^ Daniel Webster, however, was for some reason on the alert. While in Washington during the winter of 1843-44 he inferred from a remark of Upshur's that something was on foot in regard to Texas, and on investigating the matter became satisfied of this. He proceeded then to write a couple of papers on the subject and offer them to the Intelligencer. On his way north he stopped at New York and left similar articles with King. ]\Iarch 13 he rc- ' See General Note, p. i. Telegraph, Jan. 24: Nat. IntclL, Feb. 10, 1844. N. Orl. Repub., Feb. 15: Nat. Intell.. Feb. 26, 1844. No. Aiiier.. Feb. 19, 1844. (Wash, letter) Nat. Intell., March 18, 1844. See also (e. g.) N. Orl. Picayune. Feb. 14, and N. Y. Courier and Eiiq., March 5, 1844. See Chapter xii. (Cent. Comm.) Rich. Eiiq.. May lo. 1844. Bee: N. Orl. Courier, March 25, 1844. Tribune. March 2, 1844. Atlas, Feb. 28, 1844. l82 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS quested Charles Allen of Worcester to have his January letter, addressed to citizens of that county, published at once if it had not already appeared, dictating what should be said by the editor in placing it before his readers and adding, " It is high time to alarm the country." And then he went on to Boston, eager to arouse the nation against what he termed "an abominable project."^ Even that mighty voice, however, was not potent enough to break the spell. Gales and Seaton of the Intelligencer were unwilling — though finally they consented — to bring out his papers, and the Boston Atlas opposed him. Webster's purpose, asserted the Wash- ington correspondent of the Philadelphia Ledger, was to gain an advantage over Clay, and, added his colleague of the New York Herald, secure the Whig nomination for the Presidency himself. It was from friends of Clay, states Webster's biographer, that the opposition to the anti-annexation crusade proceeded ; and so, what- ever be true as to the motives of the great New England statesman, 'we seem to reach fairly clear evidence regarding those who stood for silence in his party. Among the Democrats like causes pro- duced like effects. What Van Buren's attitude on the question would be was unknown ; and the Globe, doubtless anxious to cause him no embarrassment, remained as dumb as its neighbor.^ But at last silence became impossible. On the fourteenth of March the North American gave notice that an annexation treaty had been signed. This was improbable, for Henderson had not yet reached Washington; but it appears that statements about the sub- stantial completion of an agreement were given out by a relative — a son, it was intimated — of the President himself. Accordingly two days later the Intelligencer published an editorial, in which not a few assumed at once to discover Webster's hand, declaring that under the existing circumstances the scheme of annexing Texas was opposed by a " host of considerations " based upon good faith and expedi- ency, and that the " unauthorized and almost clandestine manner " in which our government had " gone a-wooing" to Texas humiliated the nation.* ^Curtis, Webster, ii., 231. Webster to Allen, March 13, 1844: Writings, xvi., 417. Webster, Letter, Jan. 23: No. Amer., March 19, 1844. For some reason, however, Webster did not come out boldly and openly. 'Curtis, Webster, ii., 231. Ledger, April 4, 1844; the Madis., March 17, 1845. said the same. Herald, April 6, 1844. {Globe) Benton, View, ii., 587. *No. Amer., March 14, 1814. N. Y. Tribune, March 18, 19, 1844. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 305, says that after the negotiations were substantially completed no particular secrecy was enjoined or observed. Nat. IntelL, March 16, 1844. THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 183 The secret — so long an open one — was now suddenly discovered by the opposition press, and its guns awoke. As a frigid silence had not discouraged the President, the game was now to frighten him from his purpose by raising a tremendous clamor, as devils are driven away in certain parts of the globe with shouts and tom- toms. Such a proceeding on the part of the " Accident," the " De- plorable Accident," the " Shocking Accident " then occupying the White House, a mere " President for the time being," was an un- paralleled atrocity. The " secrecy and haste " of the negotiations were said to prove that Tyler knew the people did not favor his plan. So great an extension of territory might be fatal to the Union, it was protested. The annexation of Texas would lead to war and a bloody career of conquest. The next step would be to seize Mexico, and the third to invade Canada. Even should not these consequences follow, it would be a dishonest and treacherous attack on a friendly neighbor and violate the compact on which the Union reposed. It meant disunion or more slavery ; or at least it would result in a Southern preponderance that would smother the free States. The value of all lands in the Southwest would fall. A huge Texan debt would be saddled upon the country. Moreover that "pauper republic," that "wilderness," was not worth having, and could not give us a title if we wanted it. Shrillest of all per- haps rose the voice of the Boston Atlas, denouncing the measure as a "mad project," "irrational," "preposterous," "manifestly against the provisions of the Constitution," " diametrically at vari- ance with the most obvious interests of the Country," the con- temptible scheme of a " poor miserable traitor " temporarily acting as President, and a scheme, too, that was liable to end in ruin, blood- shed, the downfall of the American government and the overthrow of Republican principles, " We will resist it," exclaimed the edi- tor, " with pen, with tongue, with every nerve and muscle of our body . . . with the last drop of our blood." A phalanx of twenty newspapers was marshalled by the Intelligencer against the propo- sition, upon which, however, the Washington Spectator commented that fifteen of the editors were of Yankee birth, two of English and the rest of unknown extraction. Full attention was given to the political aspects of the subject, and a purpose in Tyler's mind to embarrass the parties and embroil the sections, hoping desperately to snatch some personal advantage out of the general turmoil, was readily discovered. In particular, said the New York Tribune, the 184 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS objects were to make Clay unpopular with North or with South, place the Acting President '' at the head of a local feeling if not of a party," increase the strength of the abolitionists by rousing anti- slavery sentiment, and thus draw far more votes from the Whigs than from the Democrats. ° One is a little inclined to suspect a touch of Mexican influence in the outcry, especially on finding the measure described as the " game of a set of self-exiled adventurers, many of whom would not dare to re-enter the territory of the Union, and a cabal of gam- blers in Texan loans, who had risked little and who had counted upon princely fortunes " in case of success ; and perhaps the sus- picion is not wholly destitute of basis. In October, 1842, the Mexican minister to the United States reported to his government that in order to guide public opinion he had established useful relations with the editors of the best periodicals in Boston, New York, Phila- delphia, Baltimore and other cities. At New Orleans as late as September, 1844, the ^Mexican consul was subsidizing a certain paper, and it does not seem extremely difficult to trace the effects in its columns. At least seven times during 1844 the Madisonian asserted that the Intelligencer was in the pay of Mexico, alleging that Thompson, a bearer of despatches to our minister in that country, had discovered the fact while on his mission ; and a corre- spondent of James K. Polk informed him that Thompson had the proofs in his possession. No doubt, however, the passions and interests involved in the question of annexation, viewed as a purely American affair, were strong enough to explain a vast deal of excitement.^ Day by day the Madisonian endeavored to make head against the storm, though obviously its arguments and appeals were not likely to reach any large percentage of the partisan voters. When the Intelligencer first announced that annexation was on foot it merely replied, " Time will disclose " ; but in a few days it boldly predicted that within a month all would stand united for the meas- ure, since it appealed alike " to the interests and honor of all." At one time it repeated the facts and views of Walker's letter, declar- ^Nat. IntcU., March 25, 26; April 4, 6, 12, 16, 22, 1844, quotes from many newspapers; Detroit Adv., March 28; April 10. 22, 27, 1844; Atlas. March 19, 21, 30, 1844; Sped., March 25. 1844. Trihune. March 19, 1844. See also the Bait. Clipper, March 25; April 15; No. Aiiicr., March 27, 30. 1844. "No. Amcr., April 5, 1844. Almonte, No. 26, Oct. 12, 1842. (Mex. Consul) Arrangoiz, No. 321, Oct. 25, 1842; No. 99, Sept. 12, 1844. Madis.. July 29; Aug. 3, 10; Sept. 25, etc., 1844. Davis to Polk. July 25. 1844: Polk Pap. THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 1 85 ing that the evils apprehended from annexation were " future and contingent," while the promised advantages were '' immediate, im- portant and certain " for every section. At another, referring to the emphatic action of the Democratic House of New York in favor of receiving the petitions against slavery offered in Congress, it called upon the "insulted and injured" South to stand united against a " great and alarming danger." Again, it asserted that annexation would have little effect upon slavery except to trans- fer negroes from one part of the country to another, and would cause the representation of that interest in Congress to lose strength. In one issue it pointed out quite plainly enough for the wayfaring man that annexation was an administration measure, and that its friends had both the will and the power to reward or punish, whereas its enemies would feel no indebtedness to those who joined the opposition ; and in another it argued elaborately that should Texas be acquired and cotton be raised there by emigrants from the United States, the total amount produced would remain about the same as before, and the old American plantations could be devoted to corn ; whereas were the Texan crop, stimulated by British capital, to reach the English manufacturers free of duty, and the American crop, dear on account of the exhaustion of our soil, to be the exclusive reliance of the American spinner, British cottons would be able to pay our tariff and still undersell our own goods." No less interesting perhaps were certain points of a more special kind. "Upon advisement" the Madisonian assured the public that Tyler's project was not intended to operate for or against either party, explaining that at one period Adams and Clay, at another Jackson and Van Buren, had labored to acquire that selfsame territory, and thus both sides had committed themselves to the plan. "Every man," urged the editor, "may support it, and still maintain his position in the ranks of any party " ; and surely no one can deny the wisdom of a measure on which, for a long term of years, all political creeds have been as one while differing upon everything else. No State would change from Clay to Van Buren or vice versa, should a treaty be made and ratified ; and certainly Clay, the champion of protective duties, would not be thrown over by the tariff men for simply espousing the side of Texas. If such ^ Madis., March 12. 16, 23, 28; April 11, 18, 1844. Of course it is un- necessary to present all the arguments, good or bad, employed. Any one desiring to examine them will wish to read the documents himself at length. 1 86 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS an increase of area was not dangerous when for a considerable period unwearied efforts were made to buy this territory, it cer- tainly cannot be dangerous now. If Tyler's plan is opposed lest he gain credit from it, are not his opponents likely to earn discredit? If the leaders of both parties have tried to obtain Texas, should Texas be refused simply because offered by him? If the President's motive is to arouse a whirlwind of popularity, as his enemies allege, and be carried into the White House by it, can he be accused also of keeping these negotiations secret because in fear of public opinion? Peculiarly cheerful was Mr. Jones, the devoted editor of the Madisonian, with reference to the charge of negotiating " in the dark " and " springing " the issue upon the nation. The question has been up, he pointed out, from the period of Madison's adminis- tration; eight years have passed since the subject of annexation came before the people and their representatives ; Jackson favored the measure and was re-elected President ; all the previous efforts to obtain that territory were made in secret, and nothing prevented the " springing " of a treaty in those days except the failure of the negotiations ; Washington and Jefferson negotiated " in the dark " ; Webster endeavored to secure a great accession of territory [north- ern California] by diplomacy so " clandestine " that probably not a thousand persons ever heard of it, and his negotiations leading up to the Ashburton treaty were equally kept from the public ; as a matter of fact the Texas affair has been so well understood that Mexico has openly taken umbrage; and finally no one can deny that the Senators are quite familiar with the matter. It is no doubt the " honest hope of the President," added the Madisonian, " that the country will award his Administration due praise for accomplish- ing this most beneficial measure," but can that be termed unpa- triotic? Surely not. On the other hand, to work against such a manifest national advantage is "hideously" anti-American, and fully in line with the still fiercer hostility exhibited in its day against the purchase of Louisiana.* Between the extremes, a considerable number of journalists — particularly on the Democratic side — undertook to pursue a moder- ate course. The great objection here in the North, said the New York Journal of Commerce, is based upon slavery; but at present that institution is legal in the whole of Texas, and in the case of annexation we could eliminate it from half of the territory. Should * Madis., March 30; April 4, 5, 6, ii, 12, 15, 16, 23, etc., 1844. THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 187 the incorporatioii of that country lead to war with England, sug- gested the New York Herald, we can look to France for aid. " We would infinitely rather Texas would remain as she is — an indepen- dent nation," remarked the Boston Post, but she is not strong enough to stand alone, and even if the arguments against annexation seem at the North almost insuperable, all the talk about an " infernal plot " is clearly for political effect. The Pcnnsylvanian summed up its impressions thus : " That the territory of Texas once formed part of the domain of the Union, from which it was severed by a most erroneous policy; that its present inhabitants, by a large major- ity, indeed almost unanimously, desire to form part of it again ; that they are Americans in language, habits, government, institu- tutions, and nearly altogether by birth ; that foreign European powers, and England especially, are striving by every art to which nations secretly and openly resort, to obtain influences and priv- ileges there which must be adverse to the United States, and deeply injurious to their interests and commerce — these are facts which are too palpable to admit of contradiction."'' Particularly interesting was the course of the Philadelphia Ledger. On the twenty-sixth of March it pronounced the acquisi- tion of Texas entirely impracticable for the time being; but three days later it conceded that should a European power undertake to acquire the country as a colony, " its annexation to the Union would be our duty." " Let us suppose," it continued, " that Britain seeks a colonization, or offensive and defensive alliance with Texas, and then ask what, in such a contingency, is our duty? Our reply is annexation ; with the consent of Mexico, if it can be obtained, and without such consent, if it be not obtainable." Great Britain, argued the editor, desires Texas as a market, as a depot for smug- gling goods into the United States and Mexico, as a station for naval operations against New Orleans, as a base for working upon our slave population, and as a step towards the China trade by way of Oregon ; and moreover, having abolished slavery in her colonies in order to develop markets there for her manufactures, she now desires to protect her colonics against competition by abol- ishing slavery everywhere. This was a marked advance, and within three weeks the journal was dwelling on the injury to Northern manufacturers that would result from a British monopoly of Texas, ^Journal Com., March 30, 1844. Herald, March 23, 1844. Post, March 25, 1844. Pcnnsylvanian, March 9, 1844. 1 88 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS and the losses that would be suffered by Northern ship-owners were European goods to be carried to Galveston in English vessels and then be smuggled into the United States, instead of coming to American ports in American bottoms.^" All this while the Washington Globe remained passive. Blair, the editor, was ill ; but he saw visitors and could of course have dic- tated a line of action. Apparently he did not know what line to adopt, though Van Zandt had been assured by a member of Con- gress that he would favor the President's policy in this affair. Benton, who was in a position to know, states that Walker asked Blair to ascertain Van Buren's opinion on the subject, and that Blair, not suspecting a trap, wrote to the ex-President but received no reply. At length, however, Jackson grew impatient, and on the twelfth of April he urgently requested the editor to take up his pen in the cause, for which reason or for some other on the evening of the fifteenth the Globe spoke. A painful illness, Blair explained, has compelled us to be silent up to this time, but we earnestly favor the recovery of what was once ours. If IMexico ever had a title to Texas, her citizens have won it by successful rebellion. Yet it is proper to gain the consent of the former owner of the territory, if possible, and to pay her an equivalent. Pakenham has been sent to Washington to prevent annexation ; the British press and party in the United States are against the measure ; and it is evident that England is aiming to distract and divide us. These facts of them- selves are enough to point out our path. It is said that Tyler has brought up the question for his own political advantage and the benefit of the scrip-holders. If so, it does not matter, for every great measure designed for the public good is accompanied with private and selfish schemes. We feel, however, that a secret treaty will not answer. The representatives of both countries must approve of the measure ; but if that be done, we see no objection to immediate annexation. ^^ Doubtless many of the persons interested in Texas lands, bonds and scrip exerted themselves to mould public opinion, but it seems impossible to form any accurate or even approximate notion as to the extent or the eff'ect of such influences. The Washington corre- ^^ Ledger, March 26, 29, and in the Wash. Globe of April 20, 1844. "Van Z., No. iii, Nov. 30, 1843. Benton, View, ii., 588. Jackson to Blair, April 12, 1844: Jackson Pap. Wash. Globe, April 15, 1844. Raymond (to Jones, April 24. 1844) understood Blair as advocating delay; and certainly the execu- tion of his plan would have required time. THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 189 spondent of the North American pointed out Mercer, at one time President of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, Mason, an ex-Governor of Michigan, Duff Green and Senator Walker as financially inter- ested in such properties ; but Walker promptly denied the allegation, — though he did not deny that his father-in-law had settled in the Lone Star republic, — and possibly the others were mentioned with no more justice than he. The bond-holders and land-scrip-holders have great influence, said John P. Kennedy, a Maryland Congress- man, in a public letter ; but a statement like that helps us little. " I have no doubt," wrote Thomas Clayton from Washington, " that great corruption is at the bottom [of the Texas excitement]. The lands of Texas are a fine fund of corruption, and the Bonds are here, I understand, in considerable amount, and at present worth about ten cents in the dollar, but if the admission takes place, will be worth one hundred cents for the dollar, for it is admitted that the general government is to assume the debts of Texas, and to take her public lands encumbered with fraudulent grants for the whole of it." Considerable effect should be attributed to such interests, but financial motives far more widely distributed weighed on the other side; and after all, in a case where the actions of a public man were sure to be so closely watched, private considerations of a paltry sort could exert but little influence either way," Equally intangible but much more easily estimated was the influence of Jackson, the Mohammed of the Democratic party, March 22 the Richmond Enquirer published his letter of February, 1843, ^^d it was very widely copied of course. About the same time he issued another. This is the golden moment, he insisted ; and if Texas be not accepted now, she will necessarily go over to England. The opinions of the ex-President, a popular hero and prophet, were on a far higher plane than mere editorial dicta however clever or emphatic, and the sentiment of the people could not fail to be affected.^" On the other side as well, efforts were made to rise above the style of newspaper polemics. In April Theodore Sedgwick con- ^-No. Amer.: Newark Adz'., April i, 1844. N. Y. Journal Com., April 13, 1844. Nat. IntelL, May 21, 1844. T, Clayton to J, M. Clayton. March 25, 1844: Clayton Pap. (Motives) Tyler. Tyler, ii., 323. The tariff interest, the fear of the migration of planters and slaves to Texas, the fear of the depreciation of lands, etc., counted. '^ Tyler, Tyler, ii., 305. Benton (View, ii., 587) says the letter was offered to Blair, but — from a feeling of good-will towards Van Buren — declined. The date was changed, apparently by accident, from 1843 to 1844. l"-'t was soon cor- rected. Jackson, March 11, 1844: Madis., April 3, 1844. 190 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS tributed a series of articles to the New York Evening Post, issued later as a pamphlet, in which he replied to Walker's famous Letter. Unfortunately he began by proving over-much, — to wit, that under the constitution Texas could not legally be acquired by any method whatsoever, a conclusion that was very likely to strike the average sensible man as a reductio ad absurdum of his argument. Then he went on to prove what was not a fact, namely, that secret negotiating with foreign powers was a novel and dangerous proceeding; and after this achievement he undertook to prove what only a select portion of the community were able to believe, — viz., that his authority was higher than General Jackson's on the question of defending New Orleans against the British. With equal skill, how- ever, and better omens numerous other points were urged : the moral obligation to observe a treaty, the seriousness of a war, the sound- ness of Washington's advice to avoid foreign complications, the dishonor of wronging a weak nation, the difficulty of defending Texas itself in case of a war with England, the impossibility of appropriating all the Gulf territory that could furnish cotton and sugar to Great Britain in exchange for her manufactures, and the danger of increasing sectional interests and therefore sectional dis- sensions by incorporating remote and dissimilar people, — though in every case room was left for some difference of opinion as to the applicability of the principle. The fact that for six and a half years England had not attempted to form even a close alliance with Texas was appealed to as proof that she entertained no designs inimical to Texan independence or American interests, and the fact that in- domitable freemen from our own West had settled beyond the Sabine was cited as good evidence that she would never be permitted to colonize there. Walker, maintained Sedgwick with truth, had greatly exaggerated the value of the markets that annexation would throw open to the North, and the harm that smuggling might do should not that measure be accepted. Gross errors in the Senator's defense of slavery were exposed ; and finally, reaching the heart of his message, the writer asserted that as the real aim was to enlist all the energies of the national government for the perpetuation of slavery, the true issue was upon that question. It was an able, ele- vated and forcible presentation of the case, about as correct on the whole as the argument it undertook to refute though far less win- ning, and no doubt it had effect ; but as a broad and statesmanlike THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY IQI view of the international issues involved it was made very lame by the author's unavoidable want of knowledge.^* Effective, too, was another demonstration on the same side. On the evening of April 24 three thousand persons assembled at the Tabernacle in New York City, listened attentively to the venerable Albert Gallatin, who presided over the meeting, and to other note- worthy speakers, and passed certain resolutions brought in by David Dudley Field. The gist of these was that since the United States had recognized Texas as a part of Mexico and Texas had recently described herself as a ^Mexican province, the annexation of that territory would flagrantly violate our treaties with a neighboring country and would even be equivalent to a declaration of war, — a war that would dishonor the nation and launch it upon a career of aggrandizement in order to make a worthless acquisition and extend the curse of slavery. No one observed that we had formerly recog- nized Mexico as a part of Spain yet afterwards acknowledged her independence, nor that the recent description of Texas as a Mexican Department had proceeded from two men destitute of authority to do such an act. The logic of the resolutions appeared unanswerable, and they were cordially adopted. ^^ Many looked very naturally to Congress for light on the perplex- ing subject, but what occured in that body served on the whole to excite rather than guide public opinion. Beginning to be numerous during the latter part of ]\Iarch, petitions, memorials and resolutions against annexation appeared frequently in the House and still more often in the Senate. Prompted by Webster, Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts attempted on the fifteenth of that month to introduce a resolution in the lower chamber to the effect that " no proposition for the annexation of Texas to the United States ought to be made, or assented to, by this government " ; but a hundred and twenty-two votes against forty refused to suspend the rules in order to admit it. Ten days later, when Hughes of Missouri oft'ered a resolution calling for the occupation of Oregon, Black of Georgia proposed, an amend- ment looking to the re-annexation of Texas, and the amendment was accepted by Hughes ; but the resolution was laid on the table by a strong majority. Little guidance could be derived from a com- parison of these votes. ^° " Sedgwick, Thoughts. "N. Y. Tribune, April 25, 1844. " See the published Journals from day to day. Curtis, Webster, ii., 231. Winthrop : Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 392. Hughes : ib., 434. Pakenham (No. 4 192 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS One note, however, seemed to rise clear above the confusion, especially in the popular branch of the national legislature, — the note of protest against all British interference in the affair. The signers of an Illinois petition against Tyler's supposed project ex- plained through one of their number that after all they would rather take Texas than let England have it; while Ingersoll, chairman of the committee on foreign affairs, declared with reference to annexa- tion that it was a question between the United States and Great Britain, and said in the House : " I would give Great Britain to un- derstand that that is exclusively an American question, . . . with which England has nothing to do, and with which we would not suffer her to have anything to do." But however clear sounded this note, it was by no means cooling.^'' For some time after the annexation issue came thus before the country it did not wear a partisan aspect. It was commonly repre- sented as a scheme of Tyler, the man without a party, to advance his personal interests. " Tyler and Texas," cried the New York Tribune, is the slogan that is expected to rout both Clay and Van Buren and continue the reigning dynasty. But about the middle of April Botts, a brilliant though erratic Virginia politician, attempted in a public address to make capital for the Whig party by identifying it with the opposition to Texas. This was ominous, for such an idea was like the letting out of waters. Besides threatening ruin to the treaty, which could only hope to pass the Senate as a non- partisan measure designed for the general good, it foretokened the full measure of political arts, prejudices and passions. ^^ Some tried to remain cool amid the rising excitement. The Charleston Courier for example urged that the question was " one of grave interest and important results," and that "its happy adjust- ment would need the best minds and hearts of the country " ; but only the few listened to such counsels. Reason, statesmanship and regard for the common weal were generally forgotten, while prej- udice, partisanship, sectionalism, elevated but short-sighted philan- thropy, financial self-interest, hatred of Tyler, well founded but un- reasoning distrust of England, and everything else that could 16, March 28, 1844) reported that the vote on Hughes's resolution was due to the combined opposition of those who objected to the substance of it and those who objected to the time and manner of bringing it forward ; and that really a ma- jority of the House favored annexation. " (Illinois) House, Jan. 20. (Ingersoll) Wash. Globe, May i, 1844; in House, March 18. '^Tribune: Nat. Itttcll., April 19. 1844. N. Orl. Com. Dull.. Dec. 28, 1844. THE ISSUE IS PLACED BEFORE THE COUNTRY 193 rouse feeling were keenly remembered. Even a Webster could stoop to excite public sentiment against the acquisition of Texas, at a time when the railroad and the telegraph were evidently to annihilate distance, by arguing that it would be perilous to enlarge the area of the Union. The situation was well characterized by the Rich- mond Enquirer in the boding remark, The Texas question is " coming with rapid strides upon us " ; and for one reason or another, as it drew near and still nearer, all sections, all parties, all factions and almost all public men felt a vague but profound sense of danger like that voiced by Whittier on observing its approach : " Up the hillside, down the glen, Rouse the sleeping citizen. Summon out the might of men. Like a lion growling low, Like a night-storm rising slow, Like the tread of unseen foe; It is coming, it is nigh, Stand your homes and altars by, On your own free threshold die."" ^° Charleston Courier, March 20, 1844. Enq., April 6, 1844. 14 X The Administration Changes Front After the treaty of annexation was signed Tyler withheld it from the Senate for ten days, and in the meantime the government appeared to make a striking change of front on two extremely im- portant aspects of the subject. All along they had regarded the assent of Mexico as unessential. Even the urgency of Senator Archer, chairman of the committee on foreign relations, had not been able to modify their attitude on this point. Upshur said emphatically that the United States consid- ered it unnecessary to consult any other nation in dealing with Texas; and even Webster took the ground that Mexico, having acquiesced practically in the American recognition of that country and made no serious efforts to reconquer her, could scarcely claim that her incorporation in this republic would create a new state of things. What was more, to ask the assent of Mexico would have affronted Texas and would have convicted the United States of in- sincerity or something more, since that step would have implied that we knew Texas was not independent ; and, even could these embarrassments have been evaded through the arts of diplomacy, it would have been perilous to open negotiations with Mexico on the subject. Had she refused to assent, the treaty would have been far more offensive to her than if she had not been consulted ; while had she not refused, endless discussions and delays and countless chances for international complications would have been sure to result.^ Very possibly it was believed that on finding annexation had been determined upon, she would yield a tacit if not a formal con- sent. In February, 1844, Upshur had a conversation on the subject with Almonte. He stated that the question would almost certainly come before the American government, and would have to be set- tled; that in all probability Mexico could not defeat the Texans on the field, and that unquestionably she could not regain control of ' See General Note, p. i. (Archer) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 693. Upsluir to Almonte, Dec. i, 1843: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 99. Webster to F. Webster, March 11, 1845: Curtis, Webster, ii., 249. 194 THE ADMINISTR.\TION CHANGES FRONT I95 them. Almonte acknowledged the force of these remarks, but inti- mated that a point of honor was involved which would determine the policy of his nation. Upshur, observing that knight-errantry had now been laid aside, urged in reply that Texas would either join the Union or achieve her independence under the guaranty and protection of England; that for this reason, if for no other, the United States would be " under a species of necessity to receive her " ; that it would be infinitely better for Mexico to have her form a part of this country than to let her become, as otherwise she would, " a mere commercial dependency of England," — a view in which Almonte fully concurred; that for any injury suffered by Mexico as the consequence of annexation the United States would be willing to make reparation, he felt sure ; that as we should never be an aggressive power, this extension of our territory should excite no alarm; and that any increase of American strength in the Gulf would really be advantageous to all of the smaller maritime nations, since it would tend to promote the freedom of the seas. To these opinions also Almonte assented. The conversation, he further said, had been very satisfactory to him ; so far as he was concerned, he would suffer no useless punctilio to stand in the way of the sub- stantial weal of the two countries ; the nations of America ought to have a policy of their own, and a good understanding between them was necessary for this ; and he would take great pleasure in communicating the substance of the conversation to his govern- ment, if authorized to do so. This authorization Upshur gave. Up to the time the treaty was signed no answer from the Mexican au- thorities could have been expected, and Upshur may reasonably have inferred from the minister's expressions that a satisfactory arrange- ment with his country was by no means out of the question. The new Secretary also conferred with Almonte. In April the corre- spondent of the New York Journal of Commerce wrote : " I know " that the Mexican minister has had " free interviews " with Cal- houn, " has been made acquainted with all that has been done," and instead of protesting against it, "has expressed a favorable disposi- tion towards the wishes of this Government " ; and a despatch of the British minister strongly tends to confirm this account. Cer- tain related facts also are to be remembered. Our representative at Mexico had reported at the beginning of February that he believed Santa Anna would like to have the United States compel him to end the war with Texas, and that Mexico would rather see her old 196 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS province connected with any other power on earth than with Eng- land, whether pohtically or commercially. It was true also that Tornel, who probably had more influence with Santa Anna than any one else, recognized that Texas was forever lost ; and, that being admitted, it would naturally seem better to let us have it for a liberal sum than virtually to give it away to England, and let all northern Mexico be flooded with cheap British goods smuggled across the border. - Finally, a conviction prevailed in the United States that Mexico had repeatedly violated the treaty of amity. There had been a series of individual " outrages " against American citizens in that country; and although she had eventually yielded to the positive demands of the American government for redress, the Madisonian was not far wrong in maintaining that a tardy and forced recogni- tion of our claims was not a fulfillment of the treaty. There had also been general "outrages." In violation of the agreement between the nations, American merchants residing in Mexico had been for- bidden to engage in retail trade. Our citizens had been prohibited from crossing the common boundary without special permission. Peaceable Americans residing in California had been seized and deported, and the promise to indemnify them had not been fulfilled. A secret order had even been issued to expel every one of their nationality from the northern Departments. Under a military decree all of our people captured with arms in their hands on the soil of Texas were liable to be shot ; and the profitable trade of American merchants with northern Mexico by way of St. Louis and Santa Fe had been arbitrarily stopped. Mexico had denounced our national authorities before the world in very offensive language for misdeeds of which they had not been guilty, and had even gone so far as to threaten war through her accredited representative before she could bring forward any proof that the subject of receiving Texas was so much as to be considered by our government. Under all these circumstances, to ask her consent before negotiating a treaty with that country would have been an extraordinary course, especially as we had not requested the permission of the mother-country to =* Notes of a Conversation, Feb. 16, 1844: State Dept., Communications from Mexican Leg., i. Journal Com., April 17, 1844. Pak., No. 22, April 14, 1844. Thompson, No. 40, Feb. 2, 1844 (for his precise words see p. 418). Id. to Green, March 27, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Mexico, xii. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT I97 deal with IMexico herself before Spain had acknowledged her inde- pendence.^ But a day came, said Archer to the Senate, when the administra- tion " renounced or began to falter in the confidence of a present annexation, from the obstruction of those who demanded the con- currence of ^Mexico, or [at least] reasonable endeavors to obtain that concurrence, and the defeat of these endeavors." Probably, too, there was a particular cause for discouragement which Archer, a Whig, did not consider it necessary to mention in his speech. Be- hind the objections of those who manifested such tenderness for the feelings of another country something more substantial appears to have been detected. According to Tyler's son, the reason why the Senator was taken into the confidence of the Executive was that a whisper, intimating that Clay would oppose annexation, began to be heard at this time.* The whisper represented a voice. Early in the preceding De- cember the head of the Whig party had written to Senator Critten- den as follows : It is not right that for selfish reasons Tyler should add another to the exciting topics already before the country. Con- gress could no more annex Texas than it could annex any other in- dependent nation, — in fact less, because Mexico asserts a claim against her and is endeavoring to enforce it. We could not obtain her without a war, and " I suppose nobody would think it wise or proper to engage in war with Mexico " for that purpose. Every one knows the Senate would not ratify an annexation treaty. The only aim, therefore, in presenting one would be to excite discord; and should Tyler make such a recommendation, it would be best " to pass it over, if it can be done, in absolute silence." " I shall regret very much," continued Clay, " should the proposition come to a formal question, if the Whig party should, in a body, vote in the affirmative," for such a vote would be " utterly destructive of it." To these remarks was joined a series of arguments against the project of annexation. As the document was marked private and confidential, Crittenden of course kept it very much in the closet ; but letters received from the same source in February and ^ Madis., May 7, 1844. The author intends to deal with the Mexican "out- rages" in a volume on the causes of our war against Mexico; see e, g.. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 336. * Tyler is said to have believed until after the treaty was signed that Clay and Van Buren would favor it (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 306). Cong. Globe. 28 Cong., I sess., App., 693. Archer's statement is confirmed by Pakenham's report of what Senators said to him (No. 22, April 14, 1844). Tyler, Tyler, ii.. 298. 198 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS March indicated that Clay was distinctly anxious on the subject, and Crittenden himself became so before the latter month ended. It is natural, therefore, to suppose that the wishes of the chief were made known to his partisans at about this time ; and no doubt Henderson, a Whig Senator from Mississippi, shared in the councils of the party. March 29 a Clay organ in Boston, the Atlas, an- nounced in a leader that it had reason to believe the Senators of the party had combined against annexation, — an announcement confirmed substantially in succeeding issues, — and Henderson must have been equally well informed. As his vote on the question, when it came before the Senate, showed that he was more loyal to Texas than to his party, it is very likely that he gave his colleague. Walker, a hint of the situation; and if he did so, the information soon reached the President. Now Clay's opposition and a combination of the Whig Senators in furtherance of his desire, should nothing occur to mollify them, evidently meant the rejection of the agreement with Texas; and the administration found it necessary to plan ac- cordingly.^ Were the treaty to fail, it was highly important not to have it knocked unceremoniously and ignominiously on the head at once as Clay wished. It was also very expedient to hold the subject before the country for some time in order to make the people think about it and realize, as the administration believed they would realize, the benefits of acquiring this additional territory; and no doubt it seemed extremely desirable to Tyler to keep himself in view as the champion of the annexation cause until after the Democratic convention should nominate a candidate for the Presidency. Under these circumstances, apparently, Archer's advice was asked, and he recommended afresh to secure the assent of Mexico. Tyler, how- ever, did not change his mind on that point. The assent of ]\Iexico he would not and could not ask. But still here was a way to gain time, for he could send a messenger south and endeavor to make some arrangement with that country. This move, then, was de- cided upon at once; and in consideration of it the chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations promised that he would try to delay action in that body for the probable time required to obtain an answer from Santa Anna, which was estimated as about forty- five days. Moreover, by adopting this plan a number of undecided "Clay to Crit., Dec. s. 1843; Feb. 15; March 24, 1844: Crit. Pap. Crit. to Ewing, March 30, 1844: ib. Atlas, March 29; April 6, 16, 1844. THE ADMINISTR.\TION CHANGES FRONT I99 Senators were doubtless conciliated by the administration, and per- haps became its friends, not only against the immediate rejection of the treaty, but with reference to the subject of annexation in general. Possibly, too, in view of the Mexican threats, it was thought that a message from the United States on this subject might produce an ebullition of anti-American feeling that would rouse the public here. It is absurd to summon a nation to answer at the word, exclaimed the Washington Globe; but perhaps the editor had not considered all the aspects of the affair.^ A messenger was therefore despatched to Mexico with instruc- tions to the American representative at that capital, and also, it would seem, with orders to conduct certain negotiations himself, — all of which will appear later. The newspapers had it that the United States proposed to pay Mexico six million dollars for recog- nizing Texas — a step which would have removed all ground for asking her assent to the treaty of annexation — and ceding to the United States the port of San Francisco ; and Raymond, secretary of the Texan legation, considered this report of sufficient authen- ticity to be made known to his government. For some reason a good deal of mystery clouded the departure of Thompson, the mes- senger. The correspondent of the New York Journal of Commerce asserted positively that he set out the fourteenth of April. Benton said he went on the nineteenth ; while Raymond stated that he left on the twenty-second, as he understood. Evidently it was well to have it appear that Tyler did not wait to' be driven into this action, yet the later Thompson's departure from Washington, the later also would be his return to that point. '^ But there was another and more striking change of front. Tyler, Upshur and their organs had recommended annexation as a measure calculated to promote the general welfare of the United "Clay to Crit., Dec. s, 1843; April 21, 1844: Crit. Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., I sess., App., 693. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 298. A letter from B. F. Butler to Van Buren, April 29, 1844, (Van B. Pap.) seems to indicate that Jackson was among those who deemed the assent of Mexico essential, but his letter to Moore, June 25, 1844, (Wash. Globe, July 20, 1844) expresses the opposite view. He may have been converted by Judge Bibb meanwhile. Pakenham (No. 22, April 14, 1844) wrote: "a great deal is said by the advocates of the measure about granting satisfaction to Mexico, for the sake no doubt of gaining over the votes of those Senators with whom a regard, whether real or pretended, for the rights of Mexico, forms a principal objection to the project." Nat. In tell.. May 21, 1844. Wash. Globe, May 2, 1844. 'Phil. Ledger, April 24, 1844. Raymond to Jones. April 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 343. Journal Com., April 17, 1844. (Benton) Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 1844. 200 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS States. A near connection of the President's wrote a little later to Mrs. Tyler that in conversing at this period, the President "con- stantly dwelt upon the subject as of pervading national importance." Senator Walker, his chief ally, had devoted himself very notably to proving that the North would reap great advantages from this acquisition, should it be made. One would therefore have expected the President to request his new Secretary of State, whatever might be that gentleman's personal inclinations, to adopt the same policy; his biographer states that he did so; and Tyler himself intimated as much three years later. Yet we find Calhoun striking out, dur- ing this interval between the signing and the presentation of the treaty, along a widely divergent path.^ Near the end of December, 1843, Aberdeen had sent a despatch to Pakenham, in which he said that since no little agitation appeared to have prevailed of late in the United States respecting the sup- posed designs of Great Britain with reference to Texas, Her Majesty's government deemed it expedient to take measures for stopping at once the misrepresentations which had been circulated and the errors into which the administration of the Union appeared to have fallen in this regard ; that England had no selfish interest in that quarter except such as attached to the normal extension of her commercial dealings abroad ; that she had urged Mexico to recognize Texas from the belief that such action would benefit both countries; that she desired and was "constantly exerting herself to procure, the general abolition of slavery throughout the world," and wished therefore to see it discarded by Texas ; but that she proceeded in the matter only by open means and should not " inter- fere unduly, or with an improper assumption of authority," in order to ensure the adoption of such a course, — would counsel, but should not " seek to compel, or unduly control, either party." " So far as Great Britain is concerned," His Lordship continued, " provided other States act with equal forbearance, those Governments will be fully at liberty to make their own unfettered arrangements with each other, both in regard to the abolition of slavery and to all other points." England has " no thought or intention of seeking to act directly or indirectly, in a political sense, on the United States through Texas " ; and " we shall neither openly nor secretly resort to any measures which can tend to disturb their internal tranquility, or thereby to affect the prosperity of the American Union." Just * Tyler, Tyler, ii., 299, 421, 422, 426. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 201 how Aberdeen reached the conckision that such a statement would satisfy the American government of British harmlessness, unless on the principle of throwing a bone to a dog, is not easy to see ; but he sent it over to Pakenham, and the minister, after a delay which did honor to his good sense, placed a copy of it in Upshur's hands two days before the latter's tragic death. ^ Calhoun found the despatch on his desk. It required no answer except an acknowledgment, but he proceeded to reply at length, devoting to the task his intellectual lights and his intellectual shadows with impartial zeal. The President, he said, " regards with deep concern the avowal, for the first time made to this Govern- ment," that England desires and is laboring for universal emancipa- tion. By so doing, " she makes it the duty of all other countries, whose prosperity or safety may be endangered by her policy, to adopt such measures as they may deem necessary for their pro- tection." With still deeper concern, he continued, the President notes the desire of England to see slavery uprooted in Texas, and the efifort which he infers she is exerting through her diplomacy to have this change made " one of the conditions on which Mexico should acknowledge " that country. He has therefore examined the question, and is convinced that it will be difficult for the Tcxans to resist the desire of England, even if she does no more than Lord Aberdeen suggests, and that consent on their part would endanger the prosperity and safety of the United States. The abolition of slavery in Texas would produce friction between that country and this, and consequently, by compelling her to seek a protector, would place her under the control of England. This would expose our weakest frontier to inroads, and would give Great Britain " the most efficient means" of bringing about in the adjacent States that emancipation of the blacks which she desires to efifect everywhere. Against such evils it is the President's duty to provide. Hence an annexation treaty has been negotiated with Texas as " the most effectual, if not the only means of guarding against the threatened danger," and securing the permanent peace and welfare of the United States. Calhoun then proceeded, though Aberdeen's letter gave him no good reason for so doing, to discuss the question of slavery. That institution he defended at considerable length as wise and humane, and therefore one which ought not to be attacked ; and he declared it the duty of the federal government of the United ° To Pak., No, 9, Dec. 26, 1843: Sen, Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess,, 48. Pak, to Upshur, Feb. 26, 1844: ib. 202 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS States to protect each member of the Union in whatever policy it might adopt with reference to the matter.^° The general impression given by the tone as well as the sub- stance of this communication was, that our Executive desired to annex Texas mainly for the preservation of slavery and the Southern political power based largely upon it, and believed that the country as a whole was bound to take up arms in this cause ; and the fact that for such a purpose Texas was to be acquired, appeared to indicate that the President was ready to go beyond our bound- aries and incur the risk of a war in furtherance of the object. Such a representation was admirably adapted to cast a dark and sinister hue upon the project of annexation in the mind of every stalwart Northern man, and make the benefits which it had been said to promise that section appear to him like a very dangerous and even dishonest bait. Calhoun's letter seemed to many, there- fore, like an effort to intensify sectionalism, repel those Northern votes without which Texas could never become a part of the Union, and promote some deep, ulterior design. Suspicion regarding the letter was encouraged by its evident art- fulness. The fact that the abolition views of the British had now been announced for the first time to the American government, which Calhoun made the basis of his entire paper, was of no sig- nificance, for those views had long been known to the world, and indeed had been officially reported by Everett in November; and Calhoun's evident purpose to convey an impression that only now had the United States become aware of them was plainly disin- genuous. To intimate that the treaty with Texas had resulted from this announcement was a real misrepresentation, for Upshur had proposed annexation several months before Aberdeen's declaration reached our State department ; and the surprise at such a misrep- resentation was deepened by the fact that as early as 1836 Calhoun himself had maintained that Texas must be annexed for the sake of the slave States. Then, too, the census reports upon which the Sec- retary unreservedly based his defense of slavery were pronounced by George Bancroft and by many others " fictitious." It was hard to believe that a paper so far from straightforward had been framed for an honest purpose. ^^ '"Calhoun to Pak., April 18, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 50. Pak. replied on April 19 (ib.), and Calhoun rejoined on April 27 (ib.) ; but these letters added nothing material. Pak. merely acknowledged Calhoun's of April 2T. Meaning of C.'s letter; Webster, Writings, iii., 291. "Bancroft to Van B., May 2, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 3 sen, ii., 425. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 2O3 Still Other facts counted. In the first place, Calhoun offered no explanation of his policy that appeared satisfactory. Indeed the explanation that he did give was not at all credible. He in- formed Wharton that his letter was intended as the beginning of a long correspondence with England covering her entire course towards the United States regarding slavery, and that he felt disap- pointed because her minister did not follow up the matter. But Pakenham did reply; and Calhoun's rejoinder, facing towards the past instead of the future, seems designed to clinch what had already been said by him and so close the debate. Moreover how could the Secretary of State suppose for a moment that a foreign official accredited to this government would be so wanting in the sense of propriety and so extremely foolish as to engage in a dis- cussion with him of the delicate and embittered subject of slavery in the United States, about which he could not possibly think him- self as well informed as his antagonist, knowing perfectly that de- feat in the controversy would disgrace him, while victory might render him persona noii grata to the American Executive and thus compromise his professional career? It would have been absurd for the head of the cabinet to make a move of such importance, relying for the success of it upon an event so improbable as the British minister's falling into that sort of a trap; and it would have been the more absurd because Pakenham had endeavored, only a few days before, to discourage the Secretary from making any written communication at all to him on the subject. Furthermore, Calhoun's presenting this letter to the Senate before the corre- spondence had come to an end suggests plainly that it was written for immediate use, and not merely for some eventual effect upon the public opinion of the w^rld ; and finally it included weighty matters not germane to such a discussion as he mentioned to Wharton. Jackson explained the puzzle by exclaiming, " How many men of talents want good common sense," and expressed the opinion that the letter, introducing non-pertinent subjects and well calculated to set the eastern States against annexation, was the product of weak- ness and folly. No doubt there was some basis for this opinion, since evidently Calhoun did not fully anticipate the impression his course was to make. Yet Jackson's explanation does not cover the ground. The Secretary was doubtless unwise sometimes, but he 204 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS was not weak. He must have had reasons for his action, and it be- comes our duty to look for them.^- There was a strong movement in the South at this period which took for its watchword, " Texas or Disunion." James Love of Galveston, viewing the matter dispassionately as an outsider, ex- pressed the opinion to Judge Nicholas of Louisville that annexation could occur only in case of a disruption of the United States, and that slavery could not be saved except by dissolving the Union ; and it was natural enough that men in the southern States, heated by controversy and pecuniarily interested to a large extent, should have held equally radical views. Many doubtless reasoned as fol- lows: If Texas is now rejected and falls — as in that case no doubt she will — under the control of England, the extension of our slave territory will be impossible, and the inevitable development of the non-slaveholding section will undeniably give that side of the ques- tion a great preponderance. The failure of the annexation project would have been caused by hostility against our peculiar institu- tion; and therefore an increase of the anti-slavery strength would signify an increase of danger to the labor system of the South. Indeed abolition sentiment is evidently growing fast ; and some day, should it find in its hands the power to do so, the North would almost certainly hamper and perhaps would undertake to destroy our fundamental institution. In that case the only way to save it would be to leave the Union; and it will be much better — if Texas be re- jected and so the intention of the North declared — to go now, while we can add to our new confederacy the vast resources of that re- public and, by securing a monopoly of the production of cotton, force England to be our friend, than to wait until Texas shall not only be lost by us but shall come under the control of an anti- slavery nation, and very likely be used by Great Britain as the means of bringing about abolition here in the United States. In such an event we should find ourselves between the upper and the "Calhoun to Wharton, Nov. 20, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 629 (see also Id. to Hammond. May 17, 1844: ib., 588). Pak., No. 22, April 14. 1844. Pakenham received the impression that Calhoun desired to have a correspondence with him for the sake of making an advantageous reply (for effect upon the people) to the British objections against the annexation of Texas, — quite a dif- ferent matter from the design mentioned by Calhoun to Wharton. Jackson to Blair, May 11, 1844: Jackson Pap. W. B. Lewis thought Calhoun's course showed a great want of tact and judgment (to Jackson, April 26, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll.). May 15, 1844, Calhoun wrote a letter declining to defend him- self against the charge of injecting slavery into the affair in order to defeat the treaty (Wash. Globe, June 5, 1845). THE ADMINISTR.\TION CHANGES FRONT 205 nether millstones, — between an anti-slavery North and an anti-slavery Texas dominated by England. Let us therefore settle the matter now ; and if we must go, let us go at once.^^ Of this movement Calhoun's high-spirited commonwealth was the centre. To our section, declared the South Carolinian, the pres- ent issue is a question "of absolute self-preservation; so much so, that it were infinitely better for us to abandon the Union than to give up Texas to become a colony of Great Britain." In the course of the spring and the summer of 1844 several counties and districts of the State passed resolutions of the same tenor. At the Fourth of July celebrations a considerable number of the toasts, hailed with repeated cheers, expressed the idea in pointed language. The forty- third regiment declared that it would be for the interest of the southern and southwestern States to " stand out of the Union with Texas " rather than in it without her ; and the Charleston Mercury affirmed that in the other regiments the feeling on the subject was equally strong. General Hamilton, a well-known citizen, wrote that if Texan slaveholders were not fit for admission into the Union, he and his fellow-citizens were " not fit to be there." Holmes, a prom- inent Representative in Congress, intimated plainly that he was prepared for a civil war even, and was re-elected without opposi- tion. Another South Carolina member of the House was Rhett. Rhett addressed Calhoun as " my political father." He was con- nected editorially with the Washington Spectator, which was chosen as the " Central Organ of the Calhoun portion of the Democratic party " ; and the Spectator declared, " In the Union, or out of the Union, Texas shall be ours." Senator IMcDuffie used more caution ; but a speech of his was described by the Richmond Whig as an endeavor to show, while pretending to desire the con- tinuance of the Union, that none but slaves could wish it to last for a single moment longer. Pickens inferred from the indications that he favored secession, and Botts of Virginia stated that he had declared on the floor of the Senate for a division of the country." "Love to Nicholas, Feb. i, 1844: Crit. Pap. "Disunion as a consequence of non-annexation was proclaimed in hundreds of resolutions," — Benton (Wash. Globe, Aug. 28, 1844). ^* South Carolinian: Wash, Sped., April g, 1844. N. Y. Express. June 19, 1844. Nat. IntelL. June 20; Aug. 15. 1844. Southron. July 24, 1844. Ga. Chronicle: Nat. IntelL. July 24, 1844. Mercury: Savannah Rcpub., June 14, 1844. (Hamilton) Wash. Globe, May 4, 1844. Charleston Patriot, July 26. 1844. Nat. IntelL, Jan. 15, 1845. Rhett to Calhoun, Dec. 8; [Oct. 7], 1843: Jameson, Cal- houn Corn, 898, 885. (Selected) Confidential Circular: Markoe and M'axcy Pap. Spect.: Wash. Globe. May 16, 1844. (Caution) Wash. Globe. Aug. 28. 1844. Whig: Bait. Amer., July i, 1844. Pickens to Calhoun, Nov. 6, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 990. (Botts) Nat. IntelL, Jan. 15, 1845. 206 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS In Georgia the feeling was less pronounced, but it existed. At a Democratic meeting held at the capital in August, 1844, one of the speakers asserted that the party were " determined upon the imme- diate annexation of Texas regardless of all consequences." A gath- ering at Eatonton applauded enthusiastically the sentiment that either that country must be acquired or the Union dissolved. Wilson Lumpkin wrote to his " old friend," James K. Polk, that Texas and the slave States must be " one & indivisable." Colquitt, speaking in the national Senate on the subject of annexation, said: "When political martyrdom and sacrifice are the reward " for the fidelity of her champions, "then will the whole South with multiplied wrongs sitting heavy on her heart, take the necessary steps for safety and defence ;" and Governor Troup, addressing the people of the State, declared that if the American government failed to confirm the an- nexation treaty — which on the whole he thought it was better to accept than to occupy Texas by force — the failure would be " vir- tually an alliance with England in her crusade " against the South, — perhaps the strongest plea for withdrawal that could have been framed. ^^ Lewis, a Representative from Alabama, wrote to Calhoun that should the treaty be rejected, he should "consider the Union at an end," and then went on to say that "the interests and sympathies of a large portion " of the country " must be stronger in favour of an Union with Texas, than with a confederacy, which in the midst of unceasing plunder by Taxation, was waging a relentless war against their Institutions." David Hubbard, a Presidential Elector from the same State, said he was " fully prepared to see this Union rent asunder unless the Northern portion of the Confederacy would consent" to let the South have Texas. A resolution adopted in Lawrence county described the possession of that territory as " in- finitely more important " to the slaveholding section than " a longer connexion or friendship with the Northeastern States." The citi- zens of Russell county passed unanimously a series of resolutions, the preamble of which took the stand that the unwillingness to annex that country "must be principally traced to an innate and uncontrollable hostility to the South and her institutions, — where- fore a Southern Convention should be held"; and the object of the "Augusta Chronicle, Aug. 7. 1844. Savannah Rcpub.. June 22, 1844. Lumpkin to Polk, Sept. 22,, 1844: Polk Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., App., 256. Charleston Mercury. June 21, 1844. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 207 proposal, as explained by a meeting at St. Helena, South Carolina, was to make sure of Texas regardless of the North,^^ In conservative North Carolina this crusade moved more slowly ; yet a convention in Lawrence county adopted the view that annexa- tion was " infinitely more important " to that section than a longer association with the New England States. If we must give up either, said the Resolution, it " shall not be Texas." Likewise in Virginia the Union sentiment, as in i86i, was strong. An examina- tion of the proceedings of thirty-four Democratic meetings and political banquets held during the summer of 1844, reveals a strong vv'ish to acquire Texas yet no disunion language. But the Demo- cratic Legislative Convention, sitting at Richmond early in Febru- ary, 1845, asserted that the South had a " right to require " the admission of that country " as due to its own protection and the pres- ervation of the Union." The Richmond Enquirer said repeatedly that a final defeat of annexation would produce an excitement in the South dangerous to the republic. The Madisonian, practically a Virginia paper, took the ground in December, 1843, that the defense of slavery required either secession or the incorporation of Texas. Governor Gilmer implied distinctly in his letter of January, 1843, that only by consenting to the measure of annexation could the free States ensure the continuance of the government; and Judge Upshur, a very prominent son of the Old Dominion, with all the responsibility of premiership in the American cabinet upon him, said in the strictest confidence : " The salvation of our Union depends on its success," — an assurance not at all required by any lack of zeal for annexation on the part of his correspondent, Charge Murphy.i^ In the Southwest Jackson boasted that no danger of secession existed. " We in the South & West will attend to the Federal Union, it must be preserved," said the hero of the Nullification epi- sode ; but Rhett's paper furnished a comment on this declaration. No call for dissolution has yet been heard in the Southwest, it said, but if the interests of that quarter are sacrificed, the cry will be raised, " In the Union, or out of Union, Texas shall be ours." Senator Walker stated in his famous Letter that unless Texas were ''Lewis to Calhoun, March 6, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 935. Southron, July 24, 1844. Charleston Mercury, July 3, 1844. " Savannah Repub., Aug. 6, 1844. Richmond Enq., Feb. i. 1845, etc. Madis., Dec. 22, 1843. (Convention) Madis., Feb. 28, 1845. Rich. Enq.. Jan. 26, 1843. Upshur to [Murphy], private and conf., Jan. 23, 1844: State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. 208 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS obtained, one of three events was certain to occur, and the first of these was that the South and Southwest would unite with that country. Even in Tennessee a Presidential Elector announced that were trouble over the Texas question to arise, he would be found fighting against the Union. When one considers how small a per- centage of the utterances of such a nature is likely to be found by an investigator who can give but a fraction of his labor to that particular line of inquiry, and how many men who shared in the sentiments thought it advisable not to express them at the time, these indications are decidedly significant; and finally Jackson him- self wrote that if Texas could not be acquired by negotiation, the people of the Mississippi valley would take it by force, — a proceed- ing that would have split the Union. "Mark this," he added to show how seriously he believed his prediction ; and now one recalls Upshur's mysterious remark to Murphy that men in Congress, " im- patient to move " for the acquisition of Texas, were " with difficulty restrained, in expectation that the object would be effected by nego- tiation."^^ But were not all these intimations, like most of the Massachu- setts talk about considering the Union at an end should the obnox- ious measure be carried, intended mainly for effect? Such was the opinion of some at the time. It is all for the purpose of intimidation, maintained the Cincinnati Herald, an abolition journal ; and it seems very possible, indeed probable, that some of it sprang from that motive. But it should be borne in mind that not many years passed before the south did secede, and a terrible war occurred. One would not expect such a movement to come to pass without prelimi- naries, and the preliminaries are found. In 1850 a newspaper called The Southern Press was established at Washington. Its basis was an Address representing 63 Southern members of Congress, who said their section must secure its rights, and should do so " if pos- sible " constitutionally. A disunion convention held at Nashville proposed a sectional Congress. South Carolina and Mississippi passed laws to carry this proposition into effect ; and it has been thought that only the coolness of Georgia prevented the execution of the scheme. Georgia herself declared that year in a State conven- tion that she would resist, even to secession, such enactments as the "Jackson to Blair, July 26; Sept. 19, 1844: Jackson Pap. Sped., April 3, 1844. Nash. Banner, Aug, 20, 1844. Jackson to W. B. Lewis, Dec. 15, 1843: N. Y. Pub. Lib. (Lenox). Upshur to Murphy, No. 14, Jan. 16, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., I sess., 43. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 209 abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia or the Territories, or the extinction of the interstate slave trade. After an incubation of two years, a strong movement showed itself in Mississippi in 185 1 to have the State pronounce for secession. In 1849 Calhoun, waiting to Judge Tarpley of that State, showed plainly that a dissolu- tion of the Union would please him better than " submission " to the adverse policy of the North ; and even two years earlier he en- deavored to have a Southern convention called for the purpose of excluding Northern vessels from the ports of the South and pro- hibiting railroad commerce with the offending section, — a practical severing of the very cord which had brought the States together in 1787. In 1847, too, the Virginia legislature declared unanimously that if the national government should pursue an unfriendly policy with reference to slave property in the Territories, it should be " resisted at every hazard." Finding secession at the door so soon in spite of the South's victory in the Texas affair, why should one doubt that it was ready to present itself in 1844, should so vital an issue turn the other way? In June of that year the Mexican min- ister to the United States felt satisfied that the slave section was de- termined to get possession of Texas even if the North W'Ould not support the step.^^ In the next place, Calhoun's attitude toward the disunion talk appears to indicate that it was serious. Had it been intended merely for effect, as a counterstroke to the Northern menaces of dissolu- tion, he would probably have thought it a harmless and possibly a useful retort. On the other hand he repressed it, — not as wrong, however, but as premature. Our people are like a " stifled volcano," testified James Gadsden of Charleston, but Calhoun wishes things kept quiet until after the results of the election are known : that is to say, until the country should have rendered its decision concerning the annexation of Texas. McDuftie pursued a similar course. According to the correspondent of the Charleston Mercury, he said publicly at Edgefield that he regretted the noise made by Rhett though he approved of his principles most cordially. " She is ready to act," said Calhoun of his fiery State with apparent satisfaction. And there is more than inference regarding Calhoun's real attitude. Annexation, he wrote, is the most important question for the South ^^ Herald, July 29, 1844. So. Press, June 18, 1850. Alex. Johnston in Lalor's Cyclop., iii., 697, 11 16. Miss. Hist. Soc. Pub., iv., 90, 102. Calhoun to Tarpley, July 9. 1849 : South. Hist. Soc. Pub., vi., 416. Foote (Remin., 79) says that long before Calhoun died he " ceased to feel the least confidence in the perma- nency of our Federal Union." Almonte, No. 72, priv., June 19, 1844. IS 210 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS " and the Union " ever agitated since the adoption of the constitu- tion.-« When it was proposed to have a Southern convention, Richmond was the city first considered as the place of meeting; and then, as the suggestion proved distinctly unacceptable to the Virginians, Nashville was pitched upon. No cordiality was manifested there, however; and Benton was probably right in saying that these suc- cessive repulses paralyzed the leaders of the disunion movement for a time. But the very fact that the assembling of such a body was dreaded, is evidence that something serious was believed to be in the wind, for an innocent gathering of notables would undoubted- ly have been regarded as complimentary and profitable. This sub- ject, wrote Senator Silas Wright to Van Buren three weeks before Tyler presented the treaty to the Senate, "begins to assume an importance beyond excitement . . . and to point at the Union rather than at the Presidential election " ; and a fortnight later he added that he understood the Calhoun clique said the nation could not stand, should the treaty be rejected. Wright belonged of course to the northern wing of the Democratic party, but he was distin- guished for judgment and fairness. It was noted, too, at this time that many Southerners, previously much interested in the new tariff bill, cheerfully saw it laid upon the table, as if not anxious to lessen the resentment felt by their section against the North.-^ Moreover the plan of establishing a new confederacy, to include the slave States and Texas, had long been under consideration. In 1 83 1 the Mexican minister reported from Washington that some public men in the southern part of the United States, feeling they ought not to be united with the North, reasoned that by getting a portion of INIexico they could form a powerful nation. In June, 1836, a public dinner was given to the Sumpter Volunteers, just returned from the Florida campaign, at Swimming Penns, South Carolina ; and the two following toasts were given and drunk with marked approbation : " The Western, South Atlantic States and Texas combined (independent of the Northern States) would form -"Gadsden to Jackson, Aug. i, 1844: Jackson Pap. Nat. IntelL, Oct. 3, 1844. Calhoun to Clemson, Dec. 13, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 633. Id. to Mrs. Clemson, May 10, 1844: ib., 585. (The context seems to make it clear that Calhoun was thinking of the permanence, not of the greater or less prosperity, of the Union.) ^Niles. Ixvi., 346, 391, 406. Bait. Amer., July 17, 1844. Benton, View, ii., 616. Wright to Van B., April i, 14, 1844: Van B. Pap. Wash. Globe. May 10, 1844. The treaty was rejected and the South made no move; but the circum- stances were such as to give hope of an early victory. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 211 the most splendid and flourishing repubhc the world ever saw " ; "The Republic of Texas, the South Atlantic, and Southwestern States — may John C. Calhoun be the first President." The next year the Texan envoy to the United States informed his chief that such a confederacy, taking possession of Mexico, could in his opin- ion become a very great nation ; and a few months later he predicted that should the project of annexation fail, the slave States would secede and " instantly annex themselves to Texas," which clearly implied that such a scheme had been somewhat thoroughly canvassed. In 1841 the New Orleans Courier mentioned editorially the plan " to erect a Southern Confederacy of States between the Roanoke and the Rio Del Norte " ; and now it was only necessary to take up this long cherished plan and carry it into execution. — Indeed, as facts already made known have prepared us to expect, such a confederation was now distinctly talked of. The Beaufort preamble, according to Rhett's paper, " presented the aspect in which this great question was destined to work on the Southern mind, with power and effect," and what it proposed was to call a Southern convention in case the treaty should be rejected, indicating that union with Texas would be its object. In the middle of April, 1844, the Washington Globe argued that should the project of annexation be defeated, the Lone Star republic might form the nucleus of such a confederacy, and charged Calhoun explicitly with entertaining that design. Governor Hammond of South Carolina wrote to the Secretary : " With Texas the slave states would form a territory large enough for a first rate pozver and one that under a free trade system would flourish beyond any on the Globe^ — -imme- diately and forever. . . . The North and the South cannot exist united " ; in reply to which Calhoun said nothing to discourage these views, but a good deal to stimulate them. McDuffie appeared, while professing great solicitude for the adoption of the Texans, to urge them not to accept our overture. " For himself," he said, according to the report of a speech given in the Baltimore American, "if he were a citizen of Texas he would not come into the Union at all " ; and apparently his aim was to promote the cause of a new nation including Texas but not the free States. Benton and the Bentonites accused their opponents loudly of entertaining this design, and they convinced many. Said the St. Louis Nezv Era : " We suspect that ^ Pizarro to Relac, No. 152, Oct. 17, 1831 : Arch. Relac. N. Orl, Courier, Aug. 18, 1836; May 18, 1841. Hunt to Hend., No. i, April 15, 1837; Tex. Dipl. Com, i., 208. Id. to Irion, No, 24, Aug. 4, 1837: ib., 245. 212 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS . . . preparations are making to form a new Southern Confederacy." But perhaps the most striking sign was the fact that Jarnagin of Tennessee made a formal argument in the Senate of the United States against the expediency of breaking up the Union and estab- hshing such a republic.-^ Another fact was perhaps more than a sign. In September, 1844, Duff Green was appointed American Consul at Galveston. Green was not a genius ; but he had cut a rather large figure in Amer- ican affairs, was a person of activity and had an extensive acquaint- ance with men and things. No salary attached to this office, and the amount of business done there was insignificant. His official corre- spondence, filed in the archives of the government, consists of an announcement after a service of three months that he was about to resign, and later an account of the fees received. He was closely united with Calhoun not only by personal friendship but by marriage, a son of one having wedded a daughter of the other. Calhoun was head of the State department when he was appointed ; and for some reason this man of affairs and citizen of the world consented to be exiled by his relative and friend to the wilderness of Texas, without the comfort of salary, substantial fees or important official occupa- tion, — with nothing, in short, except a certain stamp of Executive endorsement.-'* He appeared at the capital of that country early in December, 1844, and addressed himself to the members of Congress and the President. One of his projects was to obtain a charter for the '' Del Norte Company ", which had in view as part of its mission the conquest and occupation of the Californias and other portions of northern Mexico in behalf of Texas. So much in earnest was he in pursuit of his aims that when President Jones refused to enter ^Spect., June 19, 1844. The Beaufort programme was to unite with Texas and leave the North to do as it pleased about remaining in the new Union. See also the Nat. In tell., June 19, 1844. Globe. April 15; May 2, 1844. Ham- mond to Calhoun, May 10, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 953. Calhoun to Hammond, May 17, 1844: ib., 588. Blair to Jackson, July 7, 1844: Jackson Pap. Amer.: Wash. Globe, July 6, 1844. Benton, View, ii., 590. New Era: Nat. Intell., June 7, 1844. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 682. The Texan authorities understood well the scheme of the new confederacy. May 20. 1838, the Secretary of State, Irion, wrote to the charge in Europe that the annexation proposition would never be brought up again by that country unless the United States should break apart and an opportunity be thus offered to join the slave States alone (Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 860). -* Green had been editor of the U. S. Telegraph and official printer to Cong- ress (Kendall, Autobiog., 373). Calhoun to Tyler, Feb. 6, 1845 : Sen. Doc. 83, 28 Cong., 2 sess. D. Green to State Dept., Jan. 21; Apr. 16, 1845: Letters from Consuls, Galveston, ii. From Oct. 20 to Dec. 31, 1844, the total tonnage with which he had to do was 3,053 : ib. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 213 into them he threatened to revolutionize the country, and it was intimated both by Jones and the American minister that his designs were somehow connected with annexation. Now it seems hardly probable that such an interest would have been felt by Southern politicians in extending the area of Texas unless they were deter- mined to get her, whatever might be the attitude of the North in that matter ; this extraordinary eagerness to widen her boundaries and in particular to obtain San Francisco harbor, upon which Cal- houn was dpubtless aware that the United States had fixed their eyes, suggested the plan of establishing a new confederacy, anxious to outdo its rival ; and the scheme to absorb other portions of Mexico, which there was good reason to believe the free States would be stubbornly unwilling to annex, points obviously toward the long since proposed method of building up that confederacy, and by no means toward the incorporation of Texas in the existing Union.-^ Benton, Blair and many others, then, pursuing this line though not acquainted with all of the facts, accused the Secretary of writ- ing to Pakenham for the express purpose of defeating the treaty, rendering secession inevitable, and ensuring the formation of the projected new republic ; and Blair informed Jackson that some of the most impartial members of the House of Representatives considered it perfectly evident that Calhoun's friends desired to promote this scheme by causing the failure of the new tariff bill. Even Silas Wright believed that the Secretary's Pakenham letters were designed to prevent Northern men from supporting the treaty. There is, however, an insurmountable objection to this theory. Calhoun's correspondence at the time and various other circumstances that have come to the reader's notice, afford satisfactory evidence that he desired earnestly to carry the measure in the Senate. He even went so far as to discuss the subject with members of the opposite party, and exert himself to prevent the Whig leader from taking a hostile stand. ^^ ^ Don., No. 4, Dec. 5, 1844. Jones to Don., Jan. 4. 1844 [1845]: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. (Green's operations) Elliot, No. 15, Dec. 10, 1844. Don. to Calhoun. Jan. 27, 1845: Jameson, Calhoun Com, 1019. D. Green's explanation of the affair (Facts and Suggestions, 85) is vitiated by the fact that he attributes his defeat to action of Elliot's which occurred months later and had no connection with it. It may be objected that Green did not begin his operations imtil after Polk's election; but (i) his appointment was considerably earlier, (2) Polk's election did not ensure annexation, and (3) he probably began before he knew of that election. ^ Wash. Globe, May 4; Aug. 28, 1844. Blair to Jackson, July 7; May 2, 1844: Jackson Pap. Writing to Van Buren, March 18, 1844, Blair suggested that Calhoun might introduce some treaty features calculated to make it a distinctively 214 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Calhoun wished the United States to continue. This very year he exclaimed to a correspondent : " The charge of being unfriendly to the Union is so utterly unfounded, and so obviously circulated for mere electioneering purposes, that I cannot think it worthy of serious refutation on my part. The whole tenor of my long public life contradicts it;" and almost all concede that in making such statements he was sincere. The sincerity was full, however, of the sophistication and self-deception that belonged to his character. Calhoun loved the Union, but not the Union as it then was, and still less the Union as apparently it was to be. In October, 1844, he declared that no State was more devoted to it than was South Caro- lina, — ■" I mean," he explained, " the Federal Union, as it came from the hands of its f ramers ; " and in a similar way must be under- stood his own devotion. He desired its continuance, but only on his own terms. As we have observed, he could and did contemplate secession as what he called the " extreme remedy." Besides, he was more faithful to slavery than to the constitution. Surely language could not be more explicit than this : " We love and cherish the Union ; we remember with the kindest feelings our common origin, with pride our common achievements, and fondly anticipate the common greatness and glory that seem to await us : but origin, achievements, and anticipation of common greatness are to us as nothing, compared with this question [of slavery]." Under such circumstances he doubtless wished, as had been his desire in 1835 and was again his desire when David Wilmot offered his proviso, " to force the issue on the North," as he remarked in addressing a member of the Alabama legislature. He hoped and probably felt nearly convinced that the North would yield rather than have the nation break apart. Still, it might not ; and in that case action would be necessary. As he said confidentially, he believed that were Texas rejected the South would be "lost, if some prompt and decisive measure" were not adopted. What that action, what that measure would have to be one can easily infer. To Francis Wharton he wrote at this time that now, when the very safety of the slave-hold- ing section was at stake, most of the enlightened portions of the North held back or opposed, which was " not a little ominous to the duration of our system." It was necessary to prepare for such a contingency, and Southern unity was therefore the first thing to Southern measure, useful to unite the South upon and to employ four years later (Van B. Pap.). Wright to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Calhoun, Letter, May IS, 1845: Wash. Globe, June 5, 1845. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 215 achieve. Another faikire Hke that of NulHfication he did not desire.- ' Now annexation seemed to him a subject capable not only of rousing the South against the North but of obliterating divisions at home, for he regarded it as "a question of life and death" to that section. In December, 1843, Virgil JMaxcy had written to him that the immediate bringing up of the Texas issue might unite the slave States, and later in the month had reported that in Upshur's opinion this was " the only matter that would take sufficient hold of the feelings of the South, to rally it [as a whole] on a southern candi- date " for the Presidency ; and all Calhoun's friends, added Maxcy, held a similar view. Dixon H. Lewis wrote to Calhoun's disciple, Cralle, that the annexation campaign would " unite the hitherto divided South." When the treaty was about to be submitted, the Nashville Union expressed the opinion that should it not be ratified at the session of Congress then proceeding, it would become an issue before the country, and that " as soon as the question was made, so soon would the South and West stand united to a man." The idea was natural and was commonly entertained ; and apparently, in framing his letter to Pakenham, Calhoun proposed to make use of the subject with this end in view. At the same time he undertook to bring the North to what he considered its constitutional duty by pointing out that the " rights and duties " of the general govern- ment, so far as slavery was concerned, were " limited to protecting, under the guarantees of the Constitution, each member of this Union in whatever policy it might adopt," and that abolition in Texas — only to be prevented by annexation — would be a menace to the peculiar institution. At any rate he hoped to secure Northern co-operation by holding up the danger of a British attack on the southwestern frontier, should Texas remain independent and therefore fall under the control of England; and very possibly — since the abolitionists opposed annexation — he believed that he could in this way, to quote Lewis's phraseology, " Make Abolition (t Treason synonymous & thus destroy it in the North." In brief, Calhoun thought he now saw how by one magnificent stroke to render the South perfectly secure within the Union, yet at the same time prepare her to with- draw triumphantly from it, should that calculation be disappointed, into a new and more promising connection. Substantially this ^Calhoun to Reynolds, Aug. i, 1844: Madis.. Aug. 7, 1844. Id. to Houk, Oct. 14, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 624. (Secession) Calhoun. Letter: Von Hoist, Calhoun, 303. (Slavery) ib., 131 ; (issue) 301. (Lost) Id. to Mrs. Clemson, May 10, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 585. Id. to Wharton, May 28, 1844: ib., 592. 2i6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS appears to be one real object of his extraordinary reply to Pakenham.'^® From the course he pursued there were also further advantages to be derived. The administration, while it seems to have expected and hoped that Van Buren's record would prevent him from oppos- ing the acquisition of Texas, had been troubled of late by a fear that he might come out strongly in favor of that measure and so endeavor to steal Tyler's capital. Blair of the Washington Globe stated that he was daily importuned early in April by persons in the confidence of Calhoun to announce the position of his journal on the subject, which — particularly as he was known to have con- sulted Van Buren — it was supposed by many would represent that leader's view. On the twelfth he was informed that the treaty would go to the Senate the next day, and was advised that his paper should immediately take a stand, so as not to appear sub- servient to Tyler in case it should support annexation. On the fifteenth a positive assurance was given him that the treaty would be laid before the Senate that very day ; and though nothing had in fact been received from Kinderhook, he at once printed the edi- torial favorable to the project of absorbing Texas. Shortly after this Rives, his partner, heard members of Congress not friendly to Van Buren remark, that something had been or would be appended to the treaty which would prevent Northern men from supporting it. At this time Calhoun's letter to Pakenham had not been published ; and Blair seems fully to have believed that it was written in order to prevent Van Buren from declaring for annexa- tion. Indeed, in view of it the New York statesman might well be apprehensive of alienating Northern support should he take that position ; and a certain strength is given to Blair's apparently some- what imaginative and somewhat conceited idea by the fact that as soon as the Globe announced its views, the Madisonian threatened that it would denounce any attempt of the Locofocos to appropriate the administration measure in order to influence the convention or the voters. In short it may safely be presumed that Calhoun thought of this bearing of his letter as a minor yet important consideration. On the other hand should Van Buren fail to endorse annexation, his nomination or at all events his election would now be prevented ^Calhoun to Hammond, May 17, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 588. Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 3, 10, 1843: ib., 896, 900. Lewis to Cralle. March 19, 1844: Campbell Pap. Union, April 6, 1844. Calhoun to Pak., April 18, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 50. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 217 by a solidified South, and Calhoun was determined, as will be seen, that he should not become President. From this point of view it is noticeable that in reply to the Globe's charge that the Secretary of State wrote as he did in order to embarrass the New York leader, the Madisonian offered but a very ineffective answer.-" By making annexation a sectional affair the Whig chief also could be placed in a difficult position. Indeed in the opinion of Clay himself, as he plainly intimated to Captain Elliot, the entire object of bringing up the issue was to disrupt his party, and he regarded Calhoun's letters to Pakenham as a part of the campaign. Nor was the purpose in this regard merely destructive. During the previous December Maxcy had written to Calhoun that should the Texas cjuestion be revived and Clay be weakened by this means, a distinctively Southern candidate might obtain enough votes to pre- vent a popular election, and would then stand with Clay and Van Buren before the House of Representatives, where — it was thought — the influence of the administration, exerting all its power of patronage, might decide the issue. These considerations also lay, no doubt, in Calhoun's mind.^" And there were still others, one may believe. Calhoun had re- tired from the Presidential race of 1844, but had retired unwillingly. In fact his name was not withdrawn by himself, as is commonly said, but by the Central Committee of South Carolina, to whose action he yielded an unavoidable yet reluctant consent. Even if his Presidential aspirations had been struck a staggering blow by this disappointment, they probably had not expired; and the year 1848 lay well in view. If Benton could plan for that, as all believed he was doing, so could others ; and Calhoun in particular prided himself on his long range of political vision. At all events he was supposed to be scheming for the next campaign, and in that the support of a solid South would be a most valuable asset. In truth, so would it be in any case. By making himself, then, the acknowledged leader and champion of the united slave States he could gain immensely in power and prestige. ^^ ^ Tyler to Mrs. Jones, April 20, 1844: Probably Clay will oppose annexa- tion ; then V. B. " will seek to come in on Texas and my vetoes " (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 307). Globe, May 6, 27. 1844. Blair to Jackson, May 2, 1844: Jackson Pap. Madis.. April i6; May 20, 1844. ^Elliot, July 10, 1844. Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 3. 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 896. ^'Calhoun to J. E. Calhoun. Feb. 7, 1844: Jameson. Calhoun Corr., 566. (Not expired) Hunt, Calhoun, 278. (Supposed) Preston to Crit., May 4, 1844: Crit. Pap.; Blair to Jackson, Sept. 9, 1844: Jackson Pap. 2l8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Finally — and of all the considerations that seem to have been present in Calhoun's mind this is perhaps the most certain — a solidi- fication of the South, such as his Pakenhani letter was calculated to produce, would gain the undivided support of that section, he doubtless hoped, for the treaty. In November, 1843. the Richmond Compiler remarked that nothing had yet shown that the great ma- joritv. still less that all, of the slaveholders favored early annexa- tion : and private letters and the newspapers clearly reveal the truth of this assertion. Clay was probably mistaken in his estimate of the feeling, yet his opinion shows that people were not by any means decidedly pronounced everywhere in the South for the prompt acquisition of Texas ; and even the returns of the election the fol- lowing November proved as much. Now this division of sentiment boded no good to the treaty. On the eighteenth day of April Tyler admitted that the action of the Senate could not be foretold. This probably meant that as matters were shaping themselves, he fore- saw defeat. Something positive needed to be done ; and on that day the Secretary's first and principal letter to Pakenham was dated.s- But why did the President permit so marked a change of front? In answer to this question several reasons present themselves. Cal- houn possessed of course the stronger personality ; and moreover the Executive, already entirely out with the Whigs and the northern wing of the Democrats, could ill afford to break with that gentle- man's following. It is easy to believe that he was influenced by the promised advantages to the cause of annexation and in par- ticular to the cause of the treaty : and there was probably, too, a strong personal argument. Calhoun denied that he had any under- standing with him about the Presidency, and one can readily believe that no desire to further his aspirations existed in the Secretary's mind. Tyler, however, could think for himself, and he could readily perceive that a solidification of the slave States would perhaps be greatly to his advantage. Maxcy, in explaining that Upshur thought the Texas issue might rally the South on a sectional candidate, added that Tyler entertained hopes of being the fortunate indi- vidual ; and after that his chances had theoretically improved not a little, since Calhoun, the only other prominent competitor for the ^Compiler: Wash. Globe. Nov. 24. 1843. Clay to Crit., March 24, 1844: Crit. Pap. Tyler to Jackson. April 18. 1844: Jackson Pap. In this letter Tyler gave reasons why the transmission of the treaty to the Senate was delayed, the first of which was that it was necessary to reply to Pakenham. THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES FRONT 219 honor, had retired from the field. At this very time an influential journal, the Savannah Republican, was preparing to say that should the Virginian be run by the South and the New Yorker by the North, the former might receive the support of all the Southern Demo- crats, and find himself one of three before the House of Repre- sentatives."'' In the previous August the formation of a Tyler Central Com- mittee had been announced by the Madisonian; and precisely now, during the interval between the signing and the transmission of the treaty, this body published an address. The President, it was argued, has tendered "to the South the only security which can be offered against the torch and knife of the fanatic, the re-annexa- tion OF TEXAS, of which his predecessors had suffered us to be despoiled. . . . Do they [the Democrats] not owe it to themselves, to their principles, to the cause of justice, to continue him in a sta- tion, the power of which has been employed solely for the glory and welfare of the people, the vindication and re-establishment of the Republican faith?" In this tone could the appeal be urged, should Calhoun's plan bring victory in the Senate.^* On the other hand, should the plan work badly so far as the treaty was concerned, it could still be made. to count for Tyler. When the prospects grew dark, the editor of the Madisonian de- manded : If ratification be refused, will the friends of annexation permit England to carry her point ? They will have to " rally round the standard of John Tyler or all may be lost." " What power has any other to deal with that question, after the treaty shall have been rejected by the Senate? . . . Who can counteract the move- ments of other countries upon Texas, but the President? . . . Who can open new negotiations, or in any manner keep the subject before the country ? " Finally, Tyler may have been keen enough to per- ceive that the Pakenham correspondence, if it should stimulate the abolitionists, — which was far more probable than the contrary effect, — would take many more votes from the Whigs than from his own party. A temporary change of front — for which the Secretary would have to bear the main responsibility — seemed, then, a shrewd manoeuvre, and the change was made.'' ^ That this change of front was due to Calhoun is shown not only by the circumstances but by the fact that he claimed the credit for it in his speech of Feb. 12, 1847 (Works, iv., 334). Calhoun to Wharton, May 28, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 592. Maxcy to Calhoun, Dec. 10, 1843: ib., 900. Repub., May 8, 1844. ^ Madis., Aug. 2, 1843; April 13, 1844. Wash. Globe, May 21, 1844. ^ Madis., May 14, 20, 1844. 220 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS The next day after Calhoun replied to Pakenham Tyler received a " private & confidential " letter from Murphy, in which the charge, writing immediately after an interview with Houston, said he was informed that the British minister in Mdxico was to arrange a " New Policy " with that country, that the affairs of Texas were to have " a conspicuous part " in the scheme, and that as one result of this plan the negotiations which had led to the abortive armistice were to be resumed. Calhoun read the letter, of course. Then he probably reflected contemptuously once more on Tyler's weak and simple-minded programme, — the programme of merely pointing out how the acquisition of Texas would block the designs of Great Britain and promote the general welfare of the country and then expecting the Senators to ratify his treaty in an equally weak and simple-minded fashion ; and no doubt he congratulated himself earnestly that at last something effective had been done for the cause of annexation.^" At this point let us halt for a moment, and let us recall the three general ways in which Texas has been found a menace to the United States. Had she remained independent and acquired north- ern Mexico, including California, she would have been a serious rival and probably the cause of numerous complications. Had she remained independent and fallen in line with the designs of England, as apparently she would almost certainly have done, she would not only have exerted in these directions all the power she herself possessed, but would have been supported and guided by a great nation that had aims believed to be inconsistent with the prosperous development of the United States. While, had the project of annexation been definitively rejected by the votes of the North, she would perhaps have caused the dismemberment of the American Union and the formation of a new confederacy, including herself, the southern States and a large portion of Mexico, that might not only have rivalled but have overshadowed the wreck of the old republic. ^^ Murphy to Tyler, April 8, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. XI The Negotiations are made Public On the twenty-second of April, 1844, John Onincy Adams made this note in his diary: "The treaty for the annexation of Texas to this Union was this day sent in to the Senate; and with it went the freedom of the human race." " Clear the track for Tyler and Texas! " was the outburst of the Madisonian on the same date. The President's Message accompanying the treaty was a digni- fied paper. In substance he spoke as follows : It is believed that Texas was a part of Louisiana, and therefore belonged at one time to the United States. As a member of the Union, having been settled principally by people from this country, it would be devoted to our system and to our principles of civil liberty. From the agri- cultural and commercial points of view the territory is of incalculable value. By acquiring it a new impulse would be given to our ship- ping business, whicl\, would be chiefly beneficial to the people of the eastern and middle States. Their carrying trade, thus extended, would become at no distant day greater than could easily be com- puted, and the expansion of the home markets resulting from annexation would give great opportunities to their skill and industry in mining, manufacturing and the mechanical arts. The West would obtain a great sale for its beef, pork, horses, mules and breadstufTs. The southern States would gain security against domestic and for- eign efforts to disturb them, and the Union as a whole would there- fore acquire new solidity. But these are secondary considerations. Texas is depressed and is looking for support. Years ago without the exertion of any sinister influence on our part her citizens voted to join us, and such is her will at present. Should we close the door against her, she would seek aid elsewhere, and perhaps in order to obtain it she would establish duties unfavorable to us. The result would be a loss of the carrying trade and the markets, and also — as the consequence of smuggling — a diminution of our revenue. The illicit importation of merchandise would also lead to frequent col- lisions between the two republics, in which the Indians would be likely to take part. The military forces of the United States would 222 ■> THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS have to be increased at a heavy expense in order to guard the frontier; and foreign nations, reaping a profit from the unlawful trade, would take the side of Texas in any conflict with us. The United States are already almost surrounded by the possessions of European states, and that country, falling under their control, "would complete the circle." Texas, continued the President, is independent. We have a per- fect right to accept her, and should a threat of foreign interference be made, we ought not to be influenced , by it. Both interest and honor forbid; and there is in fact no excuse for such interposition. With equal or even greater propriety might we demand that other nations surrender the acquisitions of territory they have made. Toward Mexico the United States are disposed to pursue a concilia- tory course. We are actuated by no "spirit of unjust aggrandize- ment," but look merely to our own security ; and we shall be ready to settle any fair claims on the most liberal terms. Mexico, how- ever, cannot ask us to neglect our vital interests. Though certainly Texas could not be reconquered, we know that she has been ex- hausted by the long war. We know that other powers have been anxious to bring about a reconciliation between the belligerents on terms that would affect the domestic institutions of Texas, " would operate most injuriously" on those of our own people, and "might most seriously threaten " the very existence of the Union. We know that the principal nation of Europe has openly declared its hostility to the most important feature of our interstate relations, and admitted its purpose to secure the obliteration of it in Texas by means of negotiations between that country and Mexico ; and we are perfectly well aware that " formidable associations of persons, the subjects of foreign powers," are "directing their utmost efforts to the accomplishment of this object." Documents laid before the Senate establish ah these points. In brief, then, continued the Message, " the Executive saw Texas in a state of almost hopeless exhaustion, and the question was narrowed down to the simple proposition whether the United States should accept the boon of annexation upon fair and even liberal terms, or, by refusing to do so, force Texas to seek refuge in the arms of some other power, either through a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, or the adoption of some other expedient which might virtually make her tributary to such power and de- pendent upon it for all future time. The Executive has full reason THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 223 to believe that such would have been the result without its inter- position, and that such will be the result in the event cither of unnecessary delay in the ratification or of the rejection of the pro- posed treaty." No nation would be injured by our acquiring that country, and the resulting development of commerce would make the whole world richer. As for ourselves, the enlargement of our territory would not involve danger. No one would relinquish Oregon, and Texas is immensely nearer, — even " at our very doors."^ The treaty itself declared in the preamble that the Texans had expressed by an almost unanimous vote, at the time of adopting their constitution, a desire to be welded into the American Union, and still entertained that desire with similar unanimity ; while the United States were actuated in the matter solely by a wish to pro- mote their own security and welfare, and to meet the views of the government and citizens of the sister republic. By the terms of the agreement, Texas made herself over to the United States with her sovereignty and all her public property, and became annexed to this country as a Territory, under the agreement that her citizens should be " incorporated into the Union," maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and possessions, and admitted, as soon as should be consistent with the principles of the federal con- stitution, "to the enjoyment of all the rights, privileges, and im- munities of citizens of the United States." Such titles and claims to real estate as were valid under her own laws were to be so regarded by the American courts ; and the unsettled land claims were speedily to be adjusted. The United States on their part assumed the public debts and liabilities, estimated not to exceed $10,000,000, of the republic, against which they were to receive the public lands and about $350,000 in Texan securities ; and provisions were made for carrying out in detail the general agreements of the compact.- Henderson and Van Zandt, in sending the treaty to their govern- ment, explained that on the whole it seemed advisable to come into the Union as a Territory, — very likely because that method of ap- proach would make the anti-slavery issue less acute. They conceded that neither boundaries nor the peculiar institution had been men- tioned; but they stated that it was impossible to bring them in. and ' See General Note, p. i. Richardson, Messages, iv., 307. ^ Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 10. 224 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS called attention to the fact that the Texans would be entitled to demand the preservation of all their property as secured to them by their own laws — that is to say, slaves — and eventually to claim admission to the Union as a State. The language of the treaty, they said, had followed as far as possible the phraseology of the Florida and Louisiana agreements in order to gain the advantage of those precedents, and they admitted that concessions had been necessary in order to conciliate the feeling of the Senate. The time allowed for ratification was six months. This, explained the envoys, would make it impossible to put the treaty over until the winter session, as many of the Senators would have been glad to do. A shorter period would have been no less effective, one might say; but possibly, as the New Orleans Courier suggested, that stipula- tion was adopted with a view also to having a protracted educa- tional discussion on the subject in the United States, and so keep- ing it before the people till it should be understood.^ Certain documents accompanied the Message and treaty. Promi- nent among them of course was Upshur's letter of August 8, which based the desire to annex Texas upon information contained in a private letter from a citizen of Maryland sojourning in London. Murphy's reports of September 23 and 24 were presented, though not entire. The correspondence between Upshur and Everett in the autumn of 1843, '^^ which the Secretary pointed out in great detail the suspected designs of Great Britain, came next in order. The American overture of October 16 was given, and, still more im- portant, Upshur's despatch of January 16, 1844; and Aberdeen's declaration, Calhoun's first letter to Pakenham and the instructions carried to our charge in Mexico by Thompson concluded the series. In general, the documents appeared to aim primarily to show that annexation was necessary in order to prevent Great Britain from extinguishing slavery in Texas, and from thus endangering the peculiar institution in the United States. On the whole it must be recognized that they made rather a sorry appearance, as — without the information sent over by Ashbel Smith — was inevitable. The corner-stone of the whole affair was a mud- dled allegation of British designs contributed by a private and anonymous correspondent of Upshur's. The American proposal of annexation seemed therefore precipitate and uncalled for, and the despatch of January 16 considerably worse. With Calhoun's letter ^ Hend. and Van Z., April 12, 1844. Courier, April 22. 1844. THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 225 to Pakenham for a capstone, the edifice had indeed a certain con- sistency; but it seemed too much the consistency of schemers aiming to prop a baleful institution and secure fresh power for the slave States, not only by taking disputed territory, but by extending to it the system of Congressional representation which galled and scan- dalized the North, Well informed members of the Senate and House doubtless knew much that was not presented in the docu- ments, but it was easy to see how selfish ends could be promoted by ignoring whatever could not be stated publicly. Cave Johnson of Tennessee, one of the leaders in the lower branch of Congress, expressed the opinion that while the treaty was well enough in itself, the papers that accompanied it were "horrible — beg[g]ing, entreating, coaxing, threatening, lying as all say here — & placing the ground for annexation on the slavery ques- tion.'' Benton, Van Buren's friend, maintained on the other hand that the treaty, when carefully examined, appeared even more damnable than the correspondence ; and Crittenden, the confidant of Clay, rendered this verdict : " Whatever we may think of annexa- tion when properly presented, under the circumstances I think when this Treaty & documents are read & understood there will be felt a general sense of condemnation and shame at the proceedings of our executive Government." In order to hold up the papers to public indignation. Senator Tappan violated the confidence of the august body to which he belonged, and forwarded them to the New York Evening Post; and they appeared in the columns of that journal only five days after the Senate had received them. It can hardly be said that such action or such comments indicated a disposition to view the subject in a fair and statesmanlike manner; but the " renegade " Tyler, suspected of trying to blow up with one bomb the two political headmen of the country, should have expected nothing better.* Of course the newspapers were greatly exercised over the Mes- sage and its accompanying literature, and the language of the oppo- sition journals can be inferred readily enough from that employed when the negotiations were merely suspected. The New York Evening Post described the affair as presenting all the appearances of a "plot," To the Tribune of that city it appeared to be an " un- * Johnson to Polk, May 3, s (Benton), 1844: Polk Pap, Crit. to Coleman, May 16, 1844: Crit. Pap. Post, April 27, 1844, Tappan was severely censured by his colleagues and narrowly escaped expulsion {Cong. Globe, 28 Cong,, i sess,, 619; Sen, Ex. Journal, vi., 272, 273). 16 226 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS precedented and unwarrantable outrage," a cheap, selfish specula- tion growing out of bonds and scrip, and out of land claims which would be " dubloons or dimes " according to the result. The Balti- more Clipper declared that it was merely a question whether we should violate a solemn treaty and embark on a career of aggres- sion that would bring us into conflict with other powers. The National Intelligencer expressed a similar view, professing to be " amazed " at the opening of negotiations with nothing to base them upon, and assuring the people that four-fifths, if not nine-tenths, of them were opposed to annexation as now presented. The Glohe urged the view that the purpose of all the correspondence, as well as of Calhoun's letter to Pakenham, was to arouse a fatal opposi- tion in the Senate ; while the Liberator not only pronounced the treaty "impudent, hypocritical, mendacious, and infernal," but dis- covered in the accompanying letters " an amount of hypocrisy and villainy, of treachery and oppression, unexampled in the criminal history of any nation, either in ancient or modern times." " Truly, monsters rule over us," was Garrison's conclusion. On the other hand the Madisonian retorted by saying: Here we have the British minister, the abolitionists, Benton, Clay, Van Buren and Webster, all agreeing to oppose annexation while differing on everything else ; it is another coalition ; but four-fifths of each House are firm for the treaty ; that agreement will be ratified ; and " No Southern or West- ern Whig will dare risk his presence at home who votes against it " ; while the Boston Post, a moderate Democratic journal, took the middle ground that the Message and treaty were good, but the correspondence weak ; that slavery, a local matter, should not have been dragged in ; that England had nothing to do with the affair ; and that people should separate the question itself from the manner in which it had been brought up, annexation being desired by a great number of persons and likely to become practicable ere long without war, dishonor or internal strife.^ In the information submitted to the Senate there was no refer- ence to the defense of Texas; but the Senators were decidedly in an inquisitive mood, and the New York Aurora mentioned that troops had been ordered to the Southwest. This hint was enough ; ^ Eve. Post, May 8; Tribune, April 29, May 11 ; Clipper, May 7; Nat. Intell., May 16, 20; Globe, May i; Lib., May 3; Madis.. May 4; Post. May 3, 1844. Tyler denied emphatically that the speculators in Texas securities had any in- fluence on his course or even knew — until a late stage of the negotiations — what he was aliout ; and there seems to be no evidence to the contrary (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 423). THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 227 and as soon as the treaty came up for consideration, Crittenden submitted a resolution demanding a full account of all preparations for war, and all movements of military or naval forces " made or ordered " with a view to hostilities, since the negotiations had be- gun. Here there seemed to be a chance of proving that Texas was not really an independent, self-sustaining power, and also perhaps that the President had been exceeding his constitutional authority.* But Tyler was ready with an answer. In consequence of Mexico's threat, he explained, that the annexation of her ancient province would be equivalent to a declaration of war and the ex- pectation of the Executive that the treaty would speedily be rati- fied, it had seemed a duty to concentrate vessels and troops in the Southwest by way of precaution. By the treaty, it was added, the United States " acquired a title to Texas " which needed " only the action of the Senate to perfect it " ; and therefore " no other Power could be permitted to invade, and, by force of arms, to possess itself of any portion " of her territory pending the deliberations upon the treaty. Annexation, however, concluded the President, would give Mexico no just cause for war, and he did not believe that hostilities would ensue. With the Message were copies of the orders issued to the commanders of the military and naval forces, from which it appeared that General Taylor was not authorized to cross the frontier — even should the danger of a Alexican advance appear to be immi- nent — without further instructions, and that Commodore Conner, should an armed force threaten Texas during the pendency of the treaty, was to remonstrate with the commanding ofificer, and assure him that the President would regard invasion under the existing circumstances as " evincing a most unfriendly spirit against the United States," which "in the event of the treaty's ratification, must lead to actual hostilities." Both Taylor and Conner were to transmit to the American government full information regarding any danger that might appear to threaten the neighboring republic ; and the Commodore was expressly informed that the purpose was to communicate this information to Congress. In view of these orders IMcDufiie found no difficulty in maintaining that the Execu- tive, knowing the character of the Mexicans, had only done his precise duty in sending forces to the Southwest with orders to ob- ^ Aurora: Nat. InieU., May i, 1844. Sen. Ex. Journ., vi.. 274. Crittenden's resolution was offered May 10 and adopted May 13. 228 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS serve their proceedings and report these to the President for the information of the legislative branch.' Much more difficult would it have been to explain how the unratified treaty gave the United States a claim of any description to Texas, and how the concurrence of the American Senate could have perfected the title. The corresponding body in the other country would still have had to act, and several further steps — mainly or entirely formal to be sure, yet essential — to be taken, before that consummation would be reached. Substantially of course the President was right. The Texan Congress had recently declared most emphatically for annexation. No one could deny that a ratification of the treaty by the American Senate would be followed in all probability by every needful act on the part of that nation. Its imperilled situation was a powerful assurance of this. Now the law has its fictions, — bold " short cuts " through difficulties to substantial justice, — and perhaps Tyler looked upon the view expounded in his Message as of such a character. But whether it was wise to embarrass a troublesome question by asserting what could be described as palpably contrary to the facts may well be doubted. Van Buren's champion was no less alert than Clay's. Three days after the treaty came up for consideration, Benton moved to call upon the President for information whether a messenger had been ordered to Mexico for the purpose of obtaining her assent to the treaty; if so, what despatches and instructions had been given to him; and within what time he was expected to return. Archer proposed to add the words, " if not incompatible with the public interest"; but the Senate showed its temper by rejecting the sug- gested qualification, and Benton's resolution was adopted. Doubt- less the intention was to prove that the President did not really consider Texas independent, but he was not so easily to be caught. No messenger has been ordered to Mexico to obtain her assent, he 'Sen. Doc, 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 74. Jones to Taylor, April 2^, 1844; Mason to Conner, April 15, 1844: Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., j(>, 78. (Mc- Duffie) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 451. McDuffie, however, repre- sented these forces as sent to protect American citizens, whereas in reality no doubt they went principally in order to defend Texas by the moral effect of their presence. The communication that Commodore Conner was to make to the Mexican commander, it will be noted, would hardly have given the latter any new information. It seems likely that this feature of the instructions was mainly designed for effect upon the Texan athorities, to whom it appears to have been communicated (Murphy to Calhoun, April 29, 1844: State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg.). The information from Taylor was to be for the benefit of the general-in-chief and " the higher authorities." THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 229 replied, for the Executive does not regard the assent of any third party as necessary ; but a despatch, already laid before the Senate, has been forwarded to our representative there, and the purpose of it was " to preserve the peace of the two countries by denying to Mexico all pretext for assuming a belligerent attitude to the United States, as she had threatened to do in the event of the annexation of Texas to the United States." The messenger, he added, was expected back before the fifteenth of June.^ The Senate now took an unusual step, — apparently in order to discredit the President and the treaty, and perhaps with a direct look toward the Democratic national convention shortly to assemble. Almost as soon as it was known that the treaty and documents had been printed at New York City, Crittenden had moved that they be made public by the Senate itself; but this motion had dragged along, receiving consideration from time to time, yet not passing. After these Messages came in, however, the proposition, amended by its author so as to include the later papers that have now been men- tioned, was adopted, — the extraordinary character of this action being indicated by an express provision that it should not be con- sidered a precedent. In consequence the country was made aware of the President's military and naval orders ; and, as was doubtless foreseen by his enemies in the Senate, a great commotion arose. By some it was held that his course amounted to declaring war upon Mexico. The Baltimore Clipper insisted that he merited the severest rebuke, if not impeachment; the New York Tribune stood firmly for the latter alternative ; and Chancellor Kent pronounced it "an imperative duty." The stalwart Boston Atlas described the course of the Executive as " presumptuous and high-handed vil- lainy " and " treason " ; while the Philadelphia North American demanded that the *' presumptuous demagogue " should be impeached " instantly." Even as far away as France, the Revue de Paris de- clared it a new principle of international law, that because the United States had proposed annexation, Mexico must not wage war upon her revolted province. Jackson, on the other hand, believed that as soon as the treaty was laid before the Senate, the United States would be bound in honor to defend that country; many agreed with him ; and certainly it would have been a most extra- ordinary and shameful proceeding, had this country drawn upon Texas knowingly the bitterest resentment of a passionate nation by * Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 276. Sen. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 82. 230 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS obtaining her signature to tlie treaty, and then left her, without so much as an appearance of protection, to bear the burden and pay the penalty alone. Tyler's action, if illegal at all, was illegal only in the sense that nothing in the constitution bore upon the matter. As the framers of that instrument had not dreamed of such a case, the oracle was silent. Example also was lacking. The duty of the Executive was therefore to create, not follow, a precedent; and the acquiescence of both parties in the course of a President whom neither loved, is proof enough that his action — whether technically authorized or not — was essentially just and wise.® Tyler now sent in a Message that had not been called for. This was intended to support the view expressed in his first communica- tion to the Senate, that probably Texas would be lost — and worse than lost — if not annexed immediately; and it was accompanied with several documents calculated to justify that opinion. One of these, to which the President invited particular attention, was Hous- ton's letter of February i6 to Jackson, which has already been cited. Another was from Jackson himself who, said Tyler, after having an opportunity to confer in the fullest and freest manner with Hous- ton's private secretary. Miller, declared that Texas must be received now or could never be acquired. Most of the other communications were anonymous, but Calhoun vouched for the writers as persons " of high respectability," whose statements were " believed to be fully entitled to credit ;" and these documents, like one that had a signature, were calculated to show that a rejection of the treaty would cause Texas to side with England, and to make a free trade arrangement with that country in return for a guaranty of her in- dependence. One of the letters pointed out also that extensive British colonization would follow, presumably with a view to the execution of designs upon California; and the danger of smuggling was repeatedly mentioned. The shame of another rejection would render the people "bitterly hostile" to the United States, it was urged, and British influence would be everywhere dominant. In spite, however, of Calhoun's assurance that all this came from highly trustworthy persons, and the President's remark that in such a case reference must be had to private sources of information, since the Texan government could not be expected under the existing "Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 264, 267, 268, 270, 277, 281. Phil. A^o. Aincr., May 17, 1844. Clipper, May 17, 1844, Tribune, May 18, 1844. (Kent) Nilcs, Ixvi., 226. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 322. Atlas, May 20, 1844, with quotation from No. Anier. Revue, Jan. 9, 1845. Jackson to Blair, April 12, 1844: Jackson Pap. THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 23 1 circumstances to announce publicly their ulterior line of policy, the rather small number of these communications, their anonymity, and the ease with which statements of that sort could be manufactured, were their manufacture necessary, rendered the correspondence — except a few of the letters — rather unsatisfactory, no doubt; yet the Senate appears to have dreaded the effect of these documents upon the public, and it adopted the ungenerous policy of attempting to prevent their publication. ^° Though Tyler had replied to the inquiry about military and naval operations, Benton did not feel satisfied ; and after pondering on the Message for a week, he moved to call upon the Executive for full information regarding any engagement between him and the President of Texas with reference to aiding the latter country in the event of her agreeing to annex herself to the United States. This motion was agreed to by the Senate but drew no immediate response from the White House; and on the first day of June Benton himself proceeded to supply the information. Tyler has kept out of sight, he asserted truthfully, that the use of the military and naval forces of the United States was a sine qua noii insisted upon by Texas before making the treaty ; he had no right to expect that agreement to be ratified speedily, since to do so was to prejudge the decision of the Senate ; he did not in reality so expect, for he desired no action taken until his messenger should return from Mexico ; he had no ground for saying that only the concurrence of the Senate was necessary to give the United States a sound title to Texas ; in short, the army and navy were loaned to Houston because there was no other way to obtain the Texas bombshell for the Balti- more convention, and blow up the other Presidential candidates. At this point the orator was interrupted by a Message from the President in response to his resolution. " Enough," he exclaimed after listening to that and the accompanying documents ; " Enough, I say no more. The devil is now pulled from under the blanket." For at last, by what Benton described as " a perfect tooth-pulling business," the negotiations between Jones and Murphy, Calhoun, '"Richardson, Messages, iv., 318. The Message was dated May 16. Docu- ments and Calhoun to Tyler, May 16, 1844: Madis., July 17, 1844. The Senate's "injunction of secrecy" was not removed from these papers until June 12. two days after Tyler had sent them to the House of Representatives. Tyler said he had " strong reasons to believe " that the Texan government had given instruc- tions to propose to England, on the failure of the annexation treaty, a com- mercial treaty and an offensive and defensive alliance. These documents are referred to in at least one history as accompanying the treaty, which is not quite correct. 232 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Van Zandt and Henderson regarding the protection of Texas had been extorted. Benton was perhaps not aware how strongly Tyler had wished to conclude the negotiations months earlier. Very possibly he did not know that when the promise to defend Texas was given, a speedy ratification of the treaty was desired and probably was expected by the President. Perhaps he did not observe how far Nelson's despatch to Murphy and Calhoun's pledge to the Texan envoys fell short of Houston's demand ; and he neither saw nor cared to see the justice of the pledge actually given by the Executive or the propriety of any action that might result from it. In short, as was usual in the Texas affair, his address was the clever stump speech of a partisan and imperfectly informed orator, occupying a position where a statesman should have been.^^ On the fifth of June came another Message that had not been called for. In itself it was of no importance, but it covered a de- spatch from Everett describing a conversation that had occurred in the House of Lords about the middle of May. Brougham had said at this time that his colloquy with Aberdeen in the same high place during the preceding August had not been intended to counsel any interference with slavery as it existed in the United States, to which Aberdeen had replied in a " very reserved " manner that the proposed annexation of Texas raised an unexampled question, which would receive the earliest and most serious attention of the British government ; that he hoped and believed the treaty would not be ratified ; but that he could not speak with confidence on such a point. This report Everett supplemented by mentioning that the London Times of the morning after had contained a hostile and acrimonious deliverance on the subject. From all these facts Tyler doubtless intended to have it inferred that Great Britain was greatly disturbed over the prospect of the annexation of Texas, because that step would upset her plans. ^- The Senate had thus obtained from the Executive a large amount of information besides that originally vouchsafed by him ; but on one matter it was unsuccessful. Benton felt sure that Dufif Green counted for much in the affair, and in particular that he was the author of the anonymous letter used by Upshur in his despatch of " Sen. Ex. Journ.. vi.. 291, Benton's motion was offered and adopted on May 22. He forgot or did not know that the despatch of the messenger was no part of Tyler's original design. (June i) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 497. Richardson, Messages, iv., 321. Benton, St. Louis speech: Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 1844. "^Everett, May 18, 1844: Sen. Doc. 367, 28 Cong., i sess., i. THE NEGOTIATIONS MADE PUBLIC 233 August 8 ; and he was determined to " smoke him out." For nearly four weeks he kept at this task but without success. It was only learned that the files of the State department contained no such document as that from which Upshur made his citation, no evidence that it had ever reposed there, and no data indicating the name of the writer; that apparently it was a private letter; and that probably it was lying now among the other personal papers of the late Secretary.^^ ^^ Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 276, 294, 310. Richardson, Messages, iv., 322. Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 289, 290, 264, 312. Certain other Messages were sent in by the President in response to calls by the Senate : e. g., April 26 (the boundaries of Texas ; April 29 and May i (conclusion of the Calhoun-Pakenham corr.) ; May 3 (previous corr. with the U. S. agents in Mexico and Texas with reference to the relations between those countries) ; May 17 (the alleged armistice between Mexico and Texas) ; May 2;^ (expenses incurred for sending military and naval forces to the vicinity of Texas). May 18 Benton asked that the injunction of secrecy be removed from his own speech on the treaty as far as delivered. Two days later this measure was adopted with reference to all speeches on the sub- ject as soon as made and to all resolutions ; and, when the treaty had been voted upon, publicity was given — as Allen had tried five weeks earlier to have it given — to the proceedings of the Senate in the matter. The whole subject was then openly before the country. XII The Annexation Question is Thrown into Politics In the Whig party there was but one voice regarding their Pres- idential candidate for the campaign of 1844: the eloquent, the winning, the imperious Henry Clay must be their standard-bearer. Very different was the situation of the Democrats. They had been greatly surprised as well as greatly chagrined by the election of 1840; they could not view it as the sober decision of the people; and they were eager to try the issue again. Almost immediately after Harrison's victory preparations for the next campaign had begun; and Van Buren had very soon, though informally, been set up as the candidate. During the three years that followed, conventions in twenty- four of the twenty-six States pronounced for him ; and more than three-quarters of them instructed the delegations to vote that way at the coming national convention of the party. This apparent unanimity, however, was far from being real.^ Tyler, finding that even the Massachusetts Whigs were against him despite Webster's great influence, turned necessarily towards the Democrats for support in conducting the government, as we have seen ; but the Northern wing of that party, often termed Locofocos, feared that his return to it would injure Van Buren's prospects, and showed a particular coolness toward him. Moreover, as a dyed-in- the-wool State-rights man, upholder of slavery and foe of the tariff, he stood naturally opposed to the New York leader; and the bitter opposition of the Washington Globe, which had been keenly felt by him, was doubtless charged, like Benton's unfriendly course, to an influence from that direction. For these and perhaps for some other reasons, the head of the government felt decidedly opposed to the ex-President, and Governor Letcher assured Crittenden that he was "as deadly hostile to Van Buren as any man could be."^ This meant, according to close though prejudiced observers that the appointing power of the Executive was used to injure Inm. So the Washington Globe complained. Cave Johnson, a rather fair- minded Representative, declared that the whole patronage of the ' See General Note, p. i. Stanwood, Presidency, 206. * (Locofocos) Tyler, Tyler, ii., 303. Letcher to Crit., Jan. 6, 1844: Crit. Pap. 234 THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 235 government was being thrown in favor of annexation and against Van Buren. Senator Silas Wright behaved that the process had begun as far back as the last session of the twenty-seventh Congress, and had been diligently and shrewdly continued through all grades of the public service, until the smaller men took courage from the example of greater ones in yielding to this influence, and all became bold against the Locofoco chief. Blair wrote to Jackson that the Executive had promised everything in his efforts to prevent the ex- President's nomination ; and after making all allowances for the bias of these witnesses it is impossible not to believe — especially in view of Tyler's obvious motives for doing as they charged — that much alleged by them was true.^ Calhoun had reasons no less powerful than his for working in the same line, and a temper far more aggressive and determined. He, too, believed in State-rights and slavery, and he hated the tariff with a bitterness of which Tyler was incapable. The Locofocos he looked upon as worse than Whigs, and he wrote in December, 1843, that he considered them more hostile to his faction than to the opposite party. To increase the strength of these convictions, a long-standing feud existed between him and the New York states- man. He had suspected Van Buren of causing the fatal enmity of Jackson against him for the purpose of supplanting him in the President's favor ; and in return he had cast the deciding vote in the negative when the nomination of his fortunate rival as minister to England came before the Senate. As early as December, 1842, Dixon H. Lewis wrote that Van Buren's partisans, beginning to fear and hate Calhoun, were straining every nerve against him. The object of this unfriendly notice was well aware of their opposi- tion, and admitted that he reciprocated it with vigor. Near the close of 1843 ^^^ declared that his section of the country had nothing to hope from the New Yorker ; and he maintained that " a run between Mr. Clay and Mr. V. B., on the issue which would be made up between them, would utterly demoralize the South, to be followed by the final loss of the good old State rights doctrines." An added reason for taking this position was the intense personal antagonism between himself and Benton, for it was felt that the ambitious Mis- sourian would receive a large portion of the benefit, should Van Buren become President again ; and so bitter was the feeling between ^ Globe, May 6, 1844. Johnson to Polk, May s, 1844: Polk Pap. Wright to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Blair to Jackson, May 19, 1844: Jack- son Pap. 236 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS these rivals that in the opinion of Cave Johnson and many others it nearly produced a split in the party. Calhoun even determined not to recognize the Democratic national convention of 1844. His excuse for so doing was, that as the delegates were elected by State conventions, which consisted in many cases — particularly at the North — of the representatives of a few political leaders, they could not be expected to express the will of the people; but his real reason for taking this stand was probably not so much devotion to the ab- stract principles of pure democracy as a much more practical con- sideration. The method of constituting the convention insisted on by Van Buren's friends, he wrote to McDufifie, was intended to give and would give the control of both convention and government to the central States. He was thus at swords' points with the former President and his supporters all along the line.* Besides Tyler and Calhoun, Cass, R. M. Johnson and — up to a certain stage — Buchanan were Presidential aspirants, and as such had a keen eye upon the leading candidate. Benton has given us a highly effective picture of a secret committee toiling at Washington by day and still more after dark to undermine the accepted chief of their party. Great allowances must of course be made for his imagination and his prejudices; but undoubtedly there was consider- able basis for the representation. Each of the aspirants labored in his own interest, but all labored against Van Buren. As early as May, 1843, Clay compared the process then going on in the Demo- cratic party with that which had prevented his own nomination in 1840. All the other candidates, he said, were " pushing " against the man who seemed to block their way ; and he suspected already that Van Buren's only chance of success would lie in the difficulty of agreeing upon any one else. Even then, he found, Calhoun men in the South and Southwest were avowing that they would vote for the Whig candidate rather than for him ; and all through the winter of 1843-44, Cave Johnson reported, the friends of the South Caro- linian toiled " like moles " to prevent the approaching convention from uniting upon his New York rival. Moreover the competitors not only worked singly for this common end, but worked in concert. No later than October, 1843, Niles wrote that Tyler's friends were deliberately co-operating with those of Calhoun, Cass and Johnson * Calhoun to Armistead, Dec. 23, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 557. (Sus- pected, etc.) Young, Amer. Statesman, 539, 553. Lewis to Cralle, Dec. 28, 1842: Campbell Pap. Calhoun to Wharton, May 28, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 592. Id. to Hunter, Dec. 22, 1843: ib., 555. Johnson to Polk, May 5. 8, 1844: Polk Pap. Calhoun to McDuffie, Dec, 4, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 552. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 237 " in their efforts to save the country from the countless evils of a restoration," and he stated with great satisfaction, ' We are rapidly bringing public opinion here [in New York] to see the folly of attempting to run ]\Ir. Van Buren."^ The main thing alleged against the ex-President was that he could not be elected. For instance a correspondent of W. B. Lewis, after surveying the situation in Pennsylvania for a month and a half, wrote that he was "doomed to inevitable defeat" in that quarter. On this point his enemies never wearied of enlarging. In 1840, it was urged, he had opposed a Whig party that had become rather out of tune in consequence of Clay's failure to obtain the nomination, and had had on his side all the influence and prestige of the government, whereas now these conditions would be reversed. Experienced politicians might understand the temporary causes that had produced the upheaval of that year, and they had formed certain associations, direct and indirect, with the former head of the government which influenced them ; but the rank and file were not so much affected by these considerations, and they did not relish the idea of following a beaten leader. Governor Letcher, for exam- ple, wrote that while Van Buren was the choice of the party leaders in Kentucky, he would never regain his original strength anywhere in the West. The real managers, whatever their personal prefer- ences, could not fail to see this condition of things ; and besides, as Alexander Johnston has pointed out, the defeat of 1840 led them to prefer as a settled policy that minor figures, rather than their foremost men, should be nominated for the Presidency. Such a feeling, as far as it now existed, counted of course against Van Buren." There were other arguments, too. His partisans were charged with desiring to monopolize the ofiices. R. M. T. Hunter com- plained in December, 1843, that they had the Speaker, the clerk, the printer and even the doorkeeper of the House of Representatives. They were also accused, and justly so, of an overbearing attitude. Amos Kendall, whose political judgment was certainly of value, wrote later to Jackson that Van Buren was defeated by a com- bination of the smaller interests ; that his friends, instead of treat- " Tyler, Tyler, ii., 303. Benton, View, ii., 584-585. Clay to Clayton. May 27, 1843: Clayton Pap. Johnson to Polk, May 3, 1844: Polk Pap. Niles to Markoe, Oct. 28, 1843: Markoe and Maxcy Pap. "Reynolds to Lewis, April 24, 1844: Jackson Pap.. Knoxville Coll. Madis., Dec. 19, 1843. Letcher to Webster, Feb. 13, 1843: Webster Pap. Lalor's Cyclop., i., 777' 238 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS ing these with courtesy and forbearance, had pursued the opposite policy; and that his enemies, though not strong enough to accom- pHsh very much individually, had been able "through numberless channels" to weaken him, and create "extensive distrust in refer- ence to his political strength," whereas a mild course, particularly towards Calhoun and Tyler, would have rendered the mischief- makers powerless. Justice Catron of the Supreme Court declared that most of the party loathed the brutal assaults made by the Globe upon the other factions during the winter of 1843. Benton was so haughty, supercilious and morose at times that even his friends hesitated to approach him. Under such circumstances men were glad to take up very weak pretexts against that side. For instance, the New York Assembly passed resolutions unfavorable to slavery; and as Van Buren happened to be in Albany at the time, it was immediately charged by the Madisonian that he was in league with the abolitionists.'^ Another point also, a very important one, has to be considered. There were many ambitious young men among the Democrats, and they wanted their chance. Duff Green voiced their sentiments when he insisted that the old party leaders must be thrown overboard. In June, 1844, Catron stated that for two sessions the Democrats in the House of Representatives had ardently and almost unanimously desired to clear the quarter-deck in such a manner. According to Buchanan this feeling thoroughly pervaded the Democratic ranks. Van Buren does not own the party, why should he strive to main- tain a hold upon it forever? demanded the Madisonian; why not permit the Democrats " to enjoy the novelty, the freshness, the en- thusiasm of a new leader?" A plea like this could not be loudly proclaimed in public, but it counted powerfully ; and all the other arguments that could be employed, there is good reason to believe, were studiously used as well. According to the Globe a systematic plan was adopted of sending letters throughout the country to stir up opposition, for the express purpose of having that opposition make itself felt at Washington on Congressmen who were to be members of the nominating convention; and nothing improbable can be seen in the allegation. Putting all these influences together, one realizes that their force was immense. Penn, editor of the St. Louis Reporter, concluded while at the capital during the winter that 'Hunter to Calhoun, Dec. 19, 1843: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 906. Kendall to Jackson, Aug. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844]: Polk Pap. Johnson to Id., April 28; May 5, 1844: ib. Madis., March 21, 1844. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 239 Van Bnren would have to be dropped ; and the same causes must have produced the same effect in many other cases.^ Henry Clay watched the emergence of the annexation issue with very close attention. Believing, as we have observed, that Tyler's object in bringing up the question was to disrupt the Whig party, he was very much on his guard. His letter to Crittenden written early in December, 1843, shows how carefully he had already studied the matter. Later he made a journey through the South; and at New Orleans he learned about the middle of February that negotiations had been opened with Texas, and that a treaty was likely to be the result soon. No doubt he talked on the subject with many of his political friends in that section ; and partly perhaps because they looked upon him as committed to the cause of Texas by his previous efforts to acquire the territory and thought it unnecessary to express any urgency, and partly, one may presume, because many of the southern Whigs — particularly in Louisiana — opposed or at any rate did not strongly favor annexation, he concluded that the Texas feeling in that quarter had been exaggerated. Near the end of March he wrote from Savannah : " There is no such anxiety for the annexation here at the South as you might have been disposed to imagine." L^ndoubtedly he was asking himself all the while how to shape the matter so that the party could stand together. In all probability, also, the course of a rival made some action upon his part seem highly desirable. Webster, he must have had some ink- ling, had been stirring up sentiment against annexation all the way from the office of the National Intelligencer to his own chambers in Boston ; and in all probability he thought, as others were saying, that the New England statesman was actuated in so doing by a desire to win the party's nomination for the Presidency. He knew, too, that should the nomination be given to himself there was still an election to consider, and that a great number of Whigs in the North had shown themselves intensely hostile to the incorporation of Texas. Putting together, then, the indifference which he thought he discovered at the South, the inevitable opposition at the North, Webster's apparent aim and Tyler's imputed purpose, and adding to all these considerations opinions of his own regarding the expediency * Green to Cralle, Dec. 30. 1843: South. Hist. Ass, Pub., vii., 419. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844]: Polk Pap. Buchanan to Polk, Nov. 4, 1844: Polk Pap., Chicago. Madis.. Dec. 10, 1843. Wash. Globe. May 6, 1844. The nominating convention was largely composed of members of Congress. Penn to Jackson, Sept. 10, 1844: Jackson Pap. Jackson (to Blair, May 11. 1844: ib.) said that, but for Van B.'s position regarding Texas, no one else would have been thought of by the Democrats for the Presidency, but this was plainly incorrect. 240 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS of the measure, he made up his mind what position to take; and at Raleigh, North CaroHna, on the seventeenth of April, he put his hand to a statement upon the subject, forwarding it at once to Crit- tenden for publication. Two days later he wrote from Petersburg that he felt " perfectly confident in the ground " therein taken, and could not " consent to suppress or unnecessarily delay " the appear- ance of his letter. Two days more, and he sent word from Norfolk that his declaration must be issued at once. " I am perfectly sure," he added, " that the degree of favor which prevails at the South towards annexation is far less than is believed at Washington ;" and then he gave a particular reason for urgency. Van Buren, he said, is against the measure, so that we stand on common ground, " and his present attitude renders it necessary that I should break silence " ; if he then comes out on the other side, " so much the worse for him." In this way he believed the matter would be entirely disposed of, deeming the interest in the Presidential question so strong that Texas could not get much notice.'^ At Washington, meanwhile, when it had become known that a letter from Henry Clay on the deep and burning subject might soon appear, his deliverance, as a correspondent of the Richmond Enquirer phrased it, was " anticipated with all the eagerness with which the children of Israel awaited the coming of a Messiah"; and at length on the morning of April 27 the National Intelligencer issued his communication. In substance it ran as follows : I did not think it proper to introduce a new and exciting question in the pres- ent campaign. At New Orleans I heard that the government had made overtures for the annexation of Texas, and that between thirty-five and forty-two senators were said to be ready to sanction a treaty, and I knew that the holders of and speculators in Texan lands and scrip were active in that cause; but I did not beheve that the Executive would move without any general public expression in favor of the plan, and even against vigorous manifestations of the people's desire. He has done so, however, and therefore I feel bound to speak. By the treaty of 1803, continued Clay, the United States obtained a title covering all the territory to the Rio Grande; but in 1819 we gave up the region beyond the Sabine. In the House of Represen- tatives I expressed the opinion that by this agreement we sacrificed 'Elliot, priv., July 10, 1844. Clay to Crit., Dec. 5, 1843: Crit. Pap. Id. to Id., Feb. is; March 24; April 17, 19, 21, 1844: ib. On the effect of Webster's course: Madis., April 27, 1844. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 24I Texas for the sake of Florida ; but the treaty was ratified, and at present it is idle, if not dishonorable, to lay claim to what we sur- rendered. Our recognition of Texas did not afifect her relations to the mother-country, and the latter still asserts her ownership of the territory. Consequently, " annexation and war with Mexico are identical." Now a conflict with that republic for an extension of area would be discreditable to us, and her privateers and alliances might do us great harm. We are already looked upon abroad as ambitious and encroaching, and France or England might be ready to help check us. Moreover it is not certain that the treaty-making power has authority to plunge us into war ; and what is more, even should Mexico assent to our acquiring Texas, a large portion of the American people would be unwilling to do so, and that fact of itself should settle the matter. Far better can we exert ourselves to promote the harmony and welfare of the population we now have. To demand annexation as a means of balancing the two sections of the United States is extremely dangerous, for the same principle might be urged tomorrow as an argument for the acquisition of Canada, and the world would see in it the proclamation of " an in- satiable thirst " for what is not ours. It would also tend toward a dissolution of the Union, for the part now weakest would find itself growing still weaker in comparison. Nor would annexation strengthen slavery. The territory it is proposed to gain would make five States, and only two of those would be adapted to negro labor, since the western and northern portions are merely fit for grazing. If we do absorb Texas we must necessarily, whatever the treaty stipulates, become responsible for her debt, which I understand is at / least $13,000,000. No doubt, should any Efiropean nation try to get possession of that country, the United States ought to oppose its design even to the extent of declaring war ; but it remains for the President, if he is aware of such aims, to make them known. So far as Great Britain is concerned, she has formally disavowed the intention to interfere, and says that she desires our neighbor to remain independent. In short, " I consider the annexation of Texas, at this time, without the assent of Mexico, as a measure compromis- ing the national character; involving us certainly in war with Alexico, probably with other foreign Powers ; dangerous to the integrity of the Union ; inexpedient in the present financial condition of the country ; and not called for by any general expression of public opinion." 17 242 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS This letter was distinctly opposed to immediate annexation, and therefore could not fail to be denounced. Clay was charged with sacrificing the interests of the South to gain votes in the opposite quarter. He was attacked for apparently going back on his past as regarded the acquisition of Texas. He was accused of pro- British sentiment, a partiality for Mexico and a fear of European arms; and any one could see that from these points of view his position appeared rather weak, and was not likely to suit the popular taste. But Henry Clay was a privileged character, said the corre- spondent of the Philadelphia Ledger. He was a Southern man, too, and therefore his attitude could be the more easily pardoned by those whom it was likely to ofifend. Besides, he arrived in Wash- ington just before his letter appeared, and there he stood at the centre of political radiation with all his commanding presence, all his gift of persuasion and all his extraordinary personal magnetism, to meet and quench opposition.^** Van Buren also had been studying the new issue. In fact it had been forced upon his attention. Repeated warnings had come to his ear that he must speak out and speak for Texas. In October, 1843, a correspondent expressed the opinion to him that the Cal- hounites were intending to make a profit out of that question. In March, 1844, Blair sent him a copy of Jackson's famous letter to Brown, informed him that Tyler had made a treaty with a view to its influence in the Presidential contest, and pointed out that Jack- son's opinion would have " mighty weight " with the party ; and George Bancroft wrote that the current of Democratic opinion was favorable to annexation. During April several very pointed admoni- tions arrived at Kinderhook, and he was told plainly by influential persons at Washington and elsewhere that the annexation issue was to be used against him at Baltimore. Cave Johnson went so far as to assure him that no person opposed to the acquisition of Texas could get votes in the South for any office connected with the execution of the treaty, and expressed the belief that this question would override all others. However strongly Van Buren had relied upon the endorsements of the State conventions, he was fully sagacious enough to see that here was a new factor which made his grip on the party uncertain. ^^ '"Richmond Enq.^ May 7, 1844. Madis., April 29, 1844. Nat. Intel!., April 27, 1844. Rich. Enq.: Madis., May i, 1844. Curtis, Webster, ii., 242. Ledger, April 29, 30, 1844. J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, xii., 19. "Roane to Van B.. Oct. 17, 1843: Van B. Pap. Blair to Van B., March 18, 1844: ib. Bancroft to Id., March 28, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., 3 ser., THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 243 He decided to speak out, and the Washington Globe printed his letter in the evening of the same day on which Clay's appeared. It was a very long document and extremely involved in style; but the main points of it can be summarized within tolerable limits. First, said he, I hold that the treaty-making power may acquire foreign territory, for precedents and the acquiescence of the people have so decided; and Congress has authority to admit new States from such territory, since the language of the constitution is ex- plicit, and a proposition to limit this authority to the area within the original limits of the United States was rejected by the con- vention of 1787. The question of expediency, however, is another affair. When I was President the subject came up, the administra- tion decided adversely, its attitude proved satisfactory to the people, and both Houses of Congress laid the matter on the table. Our recognition of Texas had no bearing upon her relations to Mexico. We merely recognized the de facto government, as was necessary in order to have diplomatic or commercial dealings with that coun- try ; and her revolutionary war still continues. Mexico has declared that our incorporation of her former province would be regarded as a hostile act. It is not expedient to incur the evils of a war and all the possible entanglements with European powers for the sake of acquiring that territory, and — what is far more important — honor requires us to remain neutral. Time and circumstances might obviate the necessity of formal recognition by Mexico, but as yet they have not done so. I do not believe that if we fail to receive Texas now, her people will sell their liberties to a European power ; nor do I believe that a European power which had not already resolved upon war with the United States would try to make her virtually its colony. Should such a thing be attempted, we could rightfully adopt measures for our defence. Indeed, were the alternative that our neighbor should become a British dependency, the American people would be substantially a unit for taking her. A precipitate incorporation of that country, therefore, must be regarded as both unnecessary and inexpedient. It is, however, my view that " the present condition of the relations between Mexico and Texas may ii., 421. Quinn to Id., April 9, 1844: Van B. Pap. Tucker to Id., April 12, 1844: ib. Selden to Id., April 13, 1844: ib. Johnson to Id., April 13. 20, 1844: ib. The Van B. papers include other warnings also, from Oct., 1843, on. It hardly seems correct to say that Van B. felt so confident of winning the nomination that he did not hesitate to speak out ; and the extreme carefulness with which he wrote shows that he realized the danger. 244 ^'^^ ANNEXATION OF TEXAS soon be so far changed as to weaken, and perhaps obviate entirely, the objections against the immediate annexation of the latter to the United States, which I have here set forth, and to place the question on different grounds. . . . Mexico may carry her per- sistence in refusing to acknowledge the independence of Texas, and in destructive but fruitless efforts to re-conquer that State, so far as to produce, in connection with other circumstances, a decided conviction on the part of a majority of the people of the United States, that the permanent welfare, if not absolute safety of all, makes it necessary that the proposed annexation should be effected, be the consequences what they may." Were a move for annexation to be inaugurated under such circumstances, I should be guided by the will of the people as expressed in Congress, a " large portion " of the Senate and all the Representatives having been chosen after the question had been brought before the people for mature con- sideration. ^- The original draft of this paper — full of interlineations and erasures — proves that its wording had been very carefully studied. Its tone was statesmanlike, and in fairness one must suppose that in part it sprang from principle and a sense of duty. On the other hand it cannot be doubted that its author had in full view the North- ern opposition to the Texas project. Jackson felt sure that ex- pediency had been at the bottom of his mind, and that his muse had been Thomas H. Benton. In the opinion of the British minister the real purpose was merely to postpone the matter. The Balti- more American like many other papers declared that the writer said to the North, I always have been and still am opposed to an- nexation ; and to the South, This plan of Tyler's is undigested and inexpedient and I am against it, but if I become President and the people really desire Texas, the matter can be arranged. The United States Gazette compared the letter to certain street signs that bore various readings according to the point of view, but all for the benefit of the advertiser. This was harsh ; and probably the cir- cumlocutions of the writer — which made it very difficult for plain men to be sure they understood him, and therefore gave a certain impression of an unmanly fear of consequences and a design to conceal his real opinions — were in large part at least caused by a '^Van B. sent the letter (in reply to one from Hammett) to Silas Wright, who read it and then submitted it to Benton and other friends. All approved of it, and it was put in type without delay (Wright to Van B.. April 29, 1844: Van B. Pap.). THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 245 desire to treat a very difficult subject with prudent guardedness. The American's digest seems fairly near the truth; and a position of readiness to carry out the deliberately expressed will of the nation, even against a personal preference, was one becoming to the chief magistrate of a free people. Certainly Van Buren took no positive stand against annexation; and the Globe declared in view of his letter that while he refused to support the treaty, since that would mean war, his plan ensured the acquisition of Texas within two years. The moderate friends of the cause had therefore little to complain of ; the eager friends, while they might think the letter cool, could hardly blame a Presidential candidate for reserve or for wishing to defer so great a step until a majority of the people should evidently desire it ; and the reasonable enemies could not deny that the deliberate will of the nation ought to be obeyed by its Execu- tive. In a word, said Amos Kendall, those who censured the paper could not exactly say why.^^ This fact, however, did not prevent the censure. Naturally all who were passionately bent upon the immediate acquisition of Texas — particularly those expecting financial profits from it — objected to the dangers and uncertainties of delay; and of course, as Cave John- son observed, the letter was promptly found of assistance by Van Buren's political opponents. Every covert enemy of yours is coming out, Kendall reported to him within two days. All the Presidential aspirants laid on the shelf by the Locofoco statesman, said the Advocate of Charlottesville, Virginia, hope now to reach the White House on the Texas hobby. The House of Representatives was soon too hot for comfort; and after eight days had passed Silas Wright described the state of things at Washington as so bad it could not have been worse. Some were eager to destroy Van Buren, some to push themselves ahead of him, some to do both. The letter, said Calhoun, has " completely prostrated him " and brought forward a host of candidates in his place ; while the Southern men, as was natural, abused him without stint, and showed more openly and more positively than before their determination to drop him. Probably, as Wright explained, there was a deliberate scheme to create an excitement about the paper before it could be read and understood. Somewhat by design, therefore, and somewhat from causes beyond their control, the Democratic politicians seemed "(Draft) Van B. Pap. Jackson to Blair, June 7, 25, 1844: Jackson Pap. Pak., No. 36, April 28, 1844. Amcr.. May 2, 1844. Gazette: Nat. IntclL, May 8, 1844. Globe, May 6, 1844. Kendall to Van B., April 29, 1844: Van B. Pap. 246 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS almost beside themselves. " They are all going mad, and are setting all others mad," exclaimed the New York Herald. Passion rules the hour, reported Kendall. " The Seething of the Caldron," was the National Intelligencer's heading of an article on the situation, published the seventh of May.^* In the midst of the storm B. F. Butler of New York set out for the Hermitage. The Philadelphia Ledger announced that his mis- sion was to bring Jackson round to Van Buren's position on the great subject; and about the middle of May the Old Hero addressed a communication to the Nashville Union. This, however, said much for annexation and little for the ex-President. His letter, Jackson explained, was quite sound on the basis of circumstances as they had existed at the close of his administration ; but this excuse amounted to the damaging charge that he had not kept up with the times. Moreover, in an indirect way it injured him still more seriously. Van Buren's popularity in the South — such as he had enjoyed there — had mainly been due to the understanding that Jackson backed him, and now the effect of his unpalatable views was powerfully reinforced by this unmistakable evidence that a radical divergence of opinion on a vital issue existed between them. Nor did it appear that Van Buren's arguments, any more than Clay's, were to exert any great influence on public opinion. The simultaneousness of their letters and the similarity of their views readily prompted the insinuation that they had written by a pre- concerted arrangement for the purpose of eliminating an ugly sub- ject from the impending canvass. They "run and hunt in couples," exclaimed the Madisonian; and whatever be thought of this accusa- tion, it is clear that they fared alike in the poor success of the chase. At Harrodsburg, Kentucky, a large meeting of both parties, which had the two letters before it, pronounced almost solidly for an- nexation.^' The national convention of the Whig party met at Baltimore on the first day of May. The delegates went unitedly to their task, and quickly they performed it. Henry Clay was unanimously nominated "Johnson to Polk, April 28, 1844: Polk Pap. Kendall to Van B. April 29, 1844: Van B. Pap. Advocate: Nat. Intel!., May 23, 1844. Wright to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Calhoun to Mrs. Clemson, May 10, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 585. W. Smith to Polk, April 29, 1844: Polk Pap. Ledger, May I, 1844. Herald, May 18, 1844. Kendall to Van B., May 13, 1844 : Van B. Pap. "^Ledger, May 2, 1844. Jackson to Nash. Union, May 13, 1844: Van B. Pap. Madis.. April 29, 1844. (Harrodsburg) Kendall to Van B., May 13, 1844: Van B. Pap. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 247 for the Presidency, and in accordance with his wish — not to say order — no declaration at all was made regarding Texas. Annexa- tion sentiment there must have been ; but it was not powerful enough to override loyalty to the chief and the desire for Whig harmony; and a Texan official present on the occasion cried out bitterly, that in all the immense concourse of people " not one " person would raise his voice for that country. Indeed, by nominating the author of the Raleigh letter the delegates gave a kind of party sanction to its views. ^"^ JMay 27 a Tyler convention met in the same city. The Presi- dent had done everything in his power, it would seem, to obtain the Democratic nomination. A week before, the Madisonian had con- jured the Texas men among the delegates to "pause." Only Tyler can deal with the annexation question if the treaty is rejected, it urged once more, and " is it not too much to ask of any man that he shall incur the greatest responsibilities for the benefit of some other ? " In the next issue it declared that he alone could save the party, and two days later an urgent final appeal was uttered. But all this was in vain. The state of public sentiment was indicated by the action of a meeting held in the very city of Baltimore less than a week before the assembling of the convention. Friends of the President had originated the gathering. It was intended as a demonstration in his favor; resolutions endorsing him had been drawn ; yet his partisans were not allowed to offer the resolutions, and everything like Tylerism was rigidly excluded. It became very clear that nothing could be expected of the Democrats' convention, and so the Madisonian admitted a few days later.^'^ Full preparations, however, had been made for this contingency. Soon after the letters of Clay and Van Buren appeared, the Tyler Central Committee addressed a call to those who would listen : " We appeal then to the true friends of the United States, of Texas, and of Mexico, to rally. We recommend to them at once to come — come one, come all — from all parts of the nation — North, South, East and West — come up to Baltimore on the 27th inst. ; there, in the Monu- mental city — high as the statue of Washington stands, to erect the liberty pole of American freedom and independence, and from its pinnacle unfurl the banner of our country, inscribed with the motto " It is worthy of remark that the Whig convention said nothing about a national bank, for opposing which Tyler had been read out of the party. W. J. Brown to Van B., April 29, 1844: Van B. Pap. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 430. " Madis., May 20, 21, 23, 27, 1844. Bait. Clipper, May 27, 1844. 248 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS of ' Tyler and Texas ' ! ! ! " Later the President explained that as he could not accept the risk of Van Buren's nomination and the consequent failure of his great project, he called a convention of his own so as to leave to the Democrats merely an option between a Texas man and defeat, — in other words, forced them to see that unless they should nominate an annexationist, enough partisans of that cause would vote for Tyler to ensure the defeat of their candi- date; but one cannot doubt that he had hopes of either compelling the Democrats to make him their choice or gaining enough support to become one of three in the House of Representatives.^® By his reckoning a thousand delegates, representing every State in the Union, answered the call of his committee, while according to others there were some two hundred on the floor. At all events there was no lack of harmony or of enthusiasm. At the top of the hall two banners were displayed. One bore the words, " Tyler and Texas " ; the other " Re-Annexation of Texas, — Postponement is Rejection"; and in the spirit of these mottoes the convention soon did its work. With no less alacrity Tyler accepted its invitation, " I do not feel myself at liberty," he said in his letter, " to decline the nomination tendered me under such circumstances. There is much in the present condition of the country which would forbid my doing so. My name has been inseparably connected with the great question of the annexation of Texas to the Union. In orig- inating and concluding that negotiation, I had anticipated the cordial co-operation of two gentlemen, both of whom were most prominent in the public mind as candidates for the Presidency. That co- operation would have been attended with the immediate withdrawal of my name from the question of the succession." But now I am attacked for my action regarding Texas, and annexation is " sternly ". opposed by the very men whose support I had expected. For these reasons " I can waive no responsibility."^^ On the same day as Tyler's convention the Democratic host as- sembled at Baltimore, but a long battle instead of a brief love-feast lay before it. Van Buren was strong there of course, because so large a number of the delegates had been instructed to vote for him, but that argument was met in two ways : by saying that his delegates had been chosen in such a manner that they did not represent the ^^ Madis., May 6, 1844. Tyler to Wise (no date): Tyler, Tyler, ii., 317. "Tyler, Tyler, ii., 317. N. Y. Evening Post, June i, 1844. (Tyler's letter) Nat. Intell., May 31, 1844. Tyler stated that Calhoun had nothing to do with his convention (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 414). THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 249 people; and by insisting that since their instructions had been given, the situation had been radically changed by the publication of his letter. The first of these replies must have fallen on many deaf ears, however just it may have been, for the gentlemen could hardly be expected to undermine their own position ; but the second, whether sound or not, could be made to appear plausible, and in particular could be accepted as conclusive by men who desired for some other reason to break away. New instructions, formal or informal, had been given in some instances ; and any one who chose could assert that his own constituents, were they to assemble now, would lay upon him different commands. -° From another point of view, also, Van Buren was strong. Butler wrote to Jackson that should the New York leader be rejected, no new man could carry a single northern State ; so that it would ensure the election of Clay to put up another candidate, and with Clay the South would have a national bank, besides many other things it abominated, with no Texas ; whereas Van Buren, should he be made President, would both effect annexation and avert the threat- ened ills. In reply to this view it was urged, no doubt, that the nomination of Van Buren would certainly be followed by the ap- pearance of a Southern candidate and the disruption of the party ; and the Northerners were asked whether they cared to accept that responsibility, and what their favorite would gain. The attitude of the Tyler men, too, probably injured Van Buren, for they ap- peared to wish that he should be nominated ; and it was inferred that they desired a chance to run their man against him, on a platform of " Tyler and Texas," in the expectation of capturing the South.-^ The preliminary yet decisive battle was fought on the question of adopting the rule of earlier conventions that a two-thirds vote, and not a bare majority, should be requisite for a choice. Here again lay a convenient opportunity for those who desired Van Buren's defeat to oppose him without appearing openly to be his enemies, while his friends dared not confess weakness by shrinking from a principle which had previously been used in his favor, and his out-and-out opponents threatened flatly to secede should the precedents be ignored. A vote of 148 to 118 adopted the rule, nearly all of the Southern delegates voting for it and nearly all ^ (New) Stanwood, Presidency, 211. ^Butler to Jackson, May 10, 1844: Jackson Pap. (So. Cand.) Lewis to Jackson, May 22, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll. Johnson to Polk, May 8, 12, 2T, 1844: Polk Pap. 250 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS from the other section against it. On the first ballot for a candi- date Van Buren had a majority of twenty-six, but not the required two-thirds. Of 105 Southerners only twelve stood by him, while out of 151 northerners only seventeen failed to do so. Then his strength gradually declined, until on the seventh ballot he had but 99 out of the 266 delegates, while Cass rose from 83 to 123. Cass, however, it was felt by many, could not possibly be elected. In par- ticular, said one of Polk's chief supporters, the Van Buren men were determined not to have him; and therefore a dire prospect seemed to await the party. As an earnest of it, reported the same delegate, the convention itself " well-nigh got into a general pel- mell fight."" But meanwhile Gideon J. Pillow had been at work day and night, and others had assisted him. While Van Buren, like the proverbial great tree with a hollow trunk, had an imposing appearance of strength without the reality, James K. Polk, almost unthought of as a Presidential candidate, possessed many elements of a " dark horse." He had been Governor of Tennessee in 1839, but had since been defeated twice as a candidate for that office ; and he now limited his aspirations to the Vice-Presidency. The party leaders had been very much afraid that should he gain some national suc- cess, he would wish to " set up for chief " ; but all winter Justice Catron had been working for him at Washington, traversing the city night after night, and pledging himself " to the contrary of this opinion." Polk had written a letter pronouncing for the immediate acquisition of Texas under its peculiarly captivating aspect of " re- annexation." He was a Southern man, and his canvass for the Vice- Presidency had shown great strength in the South and Southwest. To those sections Pillow turned, but he took pains at the same time not to offend the Van Buren men, who were full of resentment against all the principal aspirants because the friends of these rival candidates had defeated their favorite by combining for the two-thirds rule; and the mood of the ex-President's partisans not only disposed them to look with favor on the inoffensive and con- ciliatory Polk, but aided him immensely by rendering the selec- tion of a new man as the standard-bearer practically unavoidable. To point out the logic of the situation. Cave Johnson had repeatedly •^ Stanwood, Presidency, 212. Blaine. Twenty Years, i., 32. (Threatened) G. Bancroft to Van B., May 24, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 3 sen, ii,, 430. (Cass) Schouler, U. S., iv., 468, note. (Van B. men) Pillow to Polk, May 28, 1844: Polk Pap. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 25I argued since the publication of Van Buren's letter that perhaps, as the Calhounites were much concerned over the possibility that he might be nominated after all, the Locofocos had better save their party and their principles by accepting a compromise candidate. Finally — to bring the matter to the point of crystallization — Pillow discovered before the convention opened that Polk's friends were quite willing to support him for the higher office, came to the con- clusion that he should be the compromise candidate, and perceived that the move in this direction must appear to come from the North. He then studied zealously how to make the best use of the circum- stances ; and at length, working almost all night in the midst of the crisis, he found an opportunity to strike, as he said, a fatal though secret blow.-^ Precisely what this was he did not explain in his report; but another of Polk's friends gave a more definite account of himself. R. M. Johnson's delegates and the doubtful men were ready to join Cass on the next ballot. This would have made his vote 157, only 21 short of the required number, and after that it would have seemed factious to resist. The idea then " flashed " into the mind of George Bancroft, — so he informed Polk without mentioning whether or no the flash came from Pillow's direction, — of rallying upon the ex-Governor of Tennessee. He suggested this to Carroll of New Hampshire, and found him cordially sympathetic. Governor Hub- bard of the same State concurred heartily, and so that delegation was fixed. Next Bancroft opened the matter to Governor Morton, a leading Massachusetts member, and he also agreed to the plan. Pillow and A. J. Donelson, Jackson's nephew and former secretary, were then consulted; and they said that if New England would lead off, a number of southern States would follow ; so with fresh cheer Polk's friends worked on. When the Granite State was called in the next ballot, her vote went that way; and this example was fol- lowed by Tennessee, Alabama, seven of the Massachusetts men and certain others. The consequence was that Cass fell off instead of gaining, and the " dark horse," with a vote of 44, appeared at last in the running.-* ^Pillow to Polk May 25, 1844: Polk Pap. (Defeated) Garrison, Extension, 131. Johnson to Polk, Dec. 30, 1843: Polk Pap. Catron to Id., June 8, [1844]: ib. Polk to Chase and Heaton, April, [1844]: ib. Nat. IiitclL, Nov. 22, 1844. Johnson to Polk, May 8, 1844: Polk Pap. Pillow to Id., May 28, 30, 1844: ib. =" Bancroft to Polk, July 6, 1844: Bancroft Pap. In McMaster, U. S., vii., 354, is given information written by Bancroft in 1887. which differs somewhat from this account, but of course the preference belongs to the contemporary 252 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Naturally much depended upon the men from New York. Don- elson had brought a letter addressed by his uncle to B. F. Butler, chairman of that delegation, in which Jackson said : " You might as well, it appears to me, attempt to turn the current of the Mississippi as to turn the democracy from the annexation of Texas to the United States. Had Mr. V. B. & Benton taken a view of the population of Texas, where from, and the places of the birth of the Texan prisoner [s] at perote in Mexico, the[y] might have judged of the feelings of the south & west. If they had taken into view the ex- posed situation of New Orleans, with Texas in the hands of Great Britain, added to the danger of British influence upon our Western Indians, on the event of war, & the dreadful scenes apprehended from a servile war, with the Indians combined upon our south & west, the feel- ings of the west might have been well judged upon this subject." I have it from the highest authority in Texas, continued Jack- son, that if her offer is now rejected she is lost to us forever; and why should we hesitate to annex that country, when we negotiated with Mexico without the consent of Spain for the purchase of it? This was effective, and it was clinched by a most appealing personal touch : I am so feeble, said the Old Hero, that I can scarcely wield the pen. In the next ballot, when New York was reached Butler asked leave to retire for consultation ; and one can scarcely doubt that this epistle was read aloud in the committee-room and deeply pondered. There was also present the consideration that evidently Van Buren could not be nominated by a united Democracy, that a break in the party would almost certainly mean his defeat, and that by taking a stand for some new man he and his friends could not only prevent his enemies from dictating the candidate, but retain a large measure of influence. At all events, on returning to the convention hall Butler withdrew Van Buren's name, reading a letter from Kinderhook, written before the assembling of the delegates, which authorized this move to be made if it would conduce to har- mony. Then ensued a stampede. Delegation after delegation changed its vote, and Polk was given a unanimous nomination.-^ In view of all these circumstances, it seems clearly an error to letter. Bancroft added in 1887 that he labored with the N. Y. delegates, which it is easy to believe, and intimated that he was the first to bring the idea of nominating Polk for President before the delegation from Tenn., which seems highly improbable. That his memory was not perfect after the lapse of forty- three years is far from surprising. Stanwood, Presidency, 213. == Jackson to Butler, May 14, 1844: Van B. Pap. A considerable number of delegates had asked to be passed over when called upon to vote and now came out for Polk : McMaster, vii., 354. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 253 hold that Van Buren was defeated and Poh-c accepted merely or even mainly because the former opposed, and the latter favored, the immediate acquisition of Texas. Pillow himself explained the mat- ter far more truly. I held you up, he reported, as the " Olive Branch of peace," and all parties ran to you as to " an ark of safety." Polk was selected because, aspiring only to the second place, he had been able to win support without exciting enmity ; because he was not Van Buren nor allied with Benton, and therefore the Calhounites did not object to him ; because he was on good terms with the Loco- focos, and therefore the Northerners were willing to give him their votes ; because he was a friend of Texas, and therefore the annexa- tionists felt satisfied ; because it was believed he could be elected ; and because, as he was a new man, all thought they would get a fair chance at the spoils, whereas each of the other candidates had his group of retainers, among whom the fruits of victory would be divided. Under these circumstances it was possible to unite upon him. Besides, his case had been most adroitly managed, while the other side had grossly blundered ; and finally, as Catron wrote ex- ultantly to him, " ]\Ir. Van Buren was out of luck — we again have it." The annexation matter, though more convenient than anything else as a handle, was only one of the factors.-*' It even seems clear that the cry for Texas had been made so prominent, after the publication of Van Buren's letter, mainly as a pretext. The circumstances already mentioned in connection with the appearance of that paper suggest this opinion distinctly, and many other facts tend strongly to confirm it. As early as December, 1843, Cave Johnson had predicted that the Texas and the tariff issues would be used against Van Buren if possible. Benton and the Globe maintained persistently that such was the game. Their chief journalistic opponent, the National Intelligencer, declared in a thoughtful article upon the proceedings at Baltimore that the annexation question was used there as a mere device to beat the ex-President. The Baltimore American, a sober and well informed paper, concurred in that view. Journals farther from the ^Pillow to Polk, May 29, 1844: Polk Pap., Chicago. Benton, View, ii., 594. (New man) Byrdsall to Calhoun, Aug. 25, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 965. (Spoils) Nat. Intell., Nov. 22. 1844. Van Buren's prospects were greatly injured by the defection of Ritchie (Richmond Eiiq.). probably the leading editor of the party. As one consequence of the election of Polk, Ritchie and Heiss (of the Nashville Union) became the printers of Congress. Ritchie could easily foresee that should Van B. be elected, Blair and Rives would probably continue to hold that lucrative appointment (see Mackenzie, Van B., 292). This is a single illustra- tion. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844] : Polk Pap. 254 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS scene of strife and looking upon events with more coolness perhaps, like the Detroit Advertiser, expressed the same opinion. Silas Wright, a man of excellent judgment and fully informed, believed that the Texas matter was " a mere pretense " for setting aside one whom it was desired to overthrow. Amos Kendall informed Jack- son that Van Buren's course regarding annexation only " furnished an opportunity to give him a finishing blow " ; and Pillow wrote in the thick of it at Washington, two days before the convention opened, that the annexation measure had been used, by men who cared little about Texas, to kill the New York leader and to kill Benton as the heir apparent. Shortly before the delegates met, a compromise plan by which Wright — who concurred entirely with Van Buren on the subject — was to be the Presidential candidate, received considerable favor. Nor should it be forgotten that many joined heartily in accepting Polk who certainly had not committed themselves to the project of immediate annexation nor even — in all probability — studied the subject.-^ No doubt the delegates went wild over the nominee; but this was due to their intense anxiety regarding the situation and the tremendous excitement of the struggle. Francis Wharton explained the matter clearly to Calhoun, when he said that at first the con- vention was delighted with the result, not because Polk was nomi- nated, but " that any nomination was made at all." It was over- joyed to find that party chaos and party destruction had been averted ; and at Washington, a little out of the whirl, when the news arrived by wire, it was received with " speechless amazement." So it was received in many other places. And yet even Silas Wright desired to have the world understand that Van Buren had been defeated because of his expressions on the Texas question. The refusal of the South to support him, he explained, should its true reasons become public at the North, would be so damaging to har- mony and the party prospects, that it was necessary to offer some excuse which would not appear so much like treacherous defection, and therefore would cause less resentment. It was also important that such a view prevail in order to ensure for the ticket what Catron ^Johnson to Polk, Dec. 30. 1843: Polk Pap. Nat. Intell., May 7; Nov. 22, 1844. Benton to Van Antwerp: Nat. Intell., July i, 1844. Globe, passim. Bait. Amer.: Savannah Repiib., June 5, 1844. Adv., May 15, 1844. Wright to Polk, June 2, 1844: Polk Pap. Kendall to Jackson, Aug. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. Pillow to Polk, May 25, 1844: Polk Pap. (Concurred) Wright to Polk, June 2, 1844: ib. (Compromise plan) Johnson to Polk, May 25, 1844: ib. No doubt Van B.'s letter was most genuinely offensive to many in the South : e. g., Turner Essays, 218. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 255 termed the " vast & controlling power " of the Calhoun faction in the slave States ; and thus the policy of Van Buren's friends joined hands with the policy of his enemies to obscure the truth of the matter.^* This view is confirmed to a certain extent by the action of the convention regarding the Vice-Presidency. After pretending to reject Van Buren because of his Texas opinions, the delegates nominated Wright for the second office by an almost unanimous vote. Wright's prompt declination of the honor was partly due, it must be supposed, to a sense of personal loyalty to his defeated friend ; but privately he gave as the reason for his course the opinion that his presence on the ticket would have proved the falsity of the theory that Van Buren had been rejected on account of his position regarding annexation ; and this of itself is a sufficient reply, if we are told that his nomination did not discredit in any way the as- sumed annexation zeal of the majority, — since as a matter of fact he was actually put up. After he declined, the convention chose Dallas in his place. Dallas was certainly for annexation, and no doubt his views on that subject pleased many of the delegates; but he came from Pennsylvania, a State that it was highly important to secure, and Mcllvaine, a Pennsylvanian, asserted on the floor of the House of Representatives later that he was nominated on ac- count of his supposed local influence.-'' It may be argued, however, that the convention adopted a plank strongly favorable to annexation ; and this it did adopt in the follow- ing terms : "Resolved, that our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon is clear and unquestionable ; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any other power; and that the re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period are great American measures, which this convention recommends to the cordial support of the Democracy of the Union." ^Wharton to Calhoun, May 31, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 962. Nat, Intel!., May 30, 1844. The DcDiocratic Review (June, 1844) threatened that should Van B. be defeated at Baltimore, the northern wing of the party would abjure all connection with the southern. Wright to Polk, June 2, 1844: Polk Pap. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844] : ib. ■■^ The qualification " to a certain extent " is used because, as Von Hoist argues (U. S., ii., 671), the Vice-Presidency was considered unimportant and Wright's views were thought likely to help the ticket in New York ; but if prompt annexation was so conspicuously a Democratic measure that Van B.'s opposition to it disqualified him for the ticket, Wright also was a heretic and therefore unfit to represent the party as candidate for the second place in the nation, ^^'right to Polk, June 2, 1844: Polk Pap. Stanwood, Presidency, 214, Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 190. 256 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS But tlTe Baltimore convention felt no more compunction than other such bodies have felt about professing what it did not believe. Another resolution of the platform asserted that the delegates came together " in a spirit of concord." There were grounds enough aside from zeal for the pronouncement regarding Texas. For a variety of reasons Polk had been nominated, and Polk had com- mitted himxself to that cause. Jackson, the idol of the party, was ardent for immediate annexation. The fact that coolness on the subject had been made the excuse for discarding \'an Buren, drove the party logically to the position announced. It was highly de- sirable to " head off " Tyler and bring his followers to the Demo- cratic standard, and Texas was the rallying-cry to which they had been trained to respond. All had to admit that a very large por- tion of the party were zealously and insistently for prompt annexa- tion. It was clear that the arguments in favor of the measure had already considerable influence in the country, and were admirably suited to catch the masses ; and it was doubtless observed that the Whigs, by their silence as a party and through the utterances of their chief, had rendered it possible to make this promising issue a Democratic asset. ^"^ There were also inducements of other kinds. The convention coupled Texas with Oregon, and this suggests that the resolution was carried by a combination of forces. In February the Wash- ington correspondent of the New York Herald had written : The West is determined to get Oregon and the South to get Texas ; neither can succeed alone ; " Now, then, suppose they harmonise — vulgatim, log-roll?" According to the New York Tribune, the idea was taken up and the Calhounites enforced this ultimatum: No Texas, no Oregon. This assertion, of course, was journalistic, — more or less correct; but the probability and the assertion accord so well with the language of the plank, that one believes almost inevitably it was largely true. Finally, Pillow stated to Polk that the Northern delegates conceded the point regarding Texas because they were alarmed by the clamor of the South. So then we have the genesis of this declaration: The South demanded it; the North acquiesced in order to preserve harmony ; the West concurred to get support for Oregon ; and all recognized certain strong reasons for adopting such a position. In conclusion, it should be observed that the plank declared only for annexation '' at the earliest practicable "^ (Resolution) Stanwood, Presidency, 215. THE QUESTION IS THROWN INTO POLITICS 257 period." Between this and "immediate" annexation there ^ight seem to exist only a distinction ; but so loud and urgent was the demand of many in the convention for instant action, that the adop- tion of a phraseology implying some deliberation, some delay, really signified much more than it said.^^ It is thus fairly evident how one of the great parties came to present itself in the campaign of 1844 with a candidate outspoken for the immediate acquisition of Texas and a platform calling for the acquisition of that country at the earliest practicable period, though the genuine strength of sentiment in that sense was far less controlling than would be inferred from the action of its national delegates, and indeed was perhaps not very much greater than among the representatives of the opposing party, which took no stand at all upon the subject. In other words, annexation became an issue between Whigs and Democrats (so far as it did become an issue) in consequence of circumstances rather than owing to a fundamental difference of opinion ; and we must form a lower estimate than has been accepted by many regarding the force of the Texas feeling behind the nomination of Polk. As yet, so far as great numbers of the Democrats were concerned, this question had not profoundly stirred the political consciousness. Texas was Botany Bay still. It was still remote and superfluous ; and to many the designs of England looked rather unsubstantial after all. ^Herald, Feb. 17, 1844. Tribune: Detroit Adv., March 13, 1844. Pillow to Polk, May 29, 1844: Polk Pap. 18 XIII The Fate of the Treaty April 22 the annexation treaty was read twice, ordered printed in confidence for the use of the Senators, and referred to the com- mittee on foreign relations. In the room of this committee it then Hngered for nearly three weeks; but finally on May 10 it was re- ported. Three days later Benton offered certain resolutions upon the subject: that the annexation of Texas would be an assumption of the war between that country and Mexico ; that the treaty-making power has no right to create a war " either by declaration or adop- tion"; and that the territory abandoned in 1819 "ought to be reunited with the American Union as soon as it can be done with the consent of the majority of the people of the United States and of Texas, and when Alexico shall either consent to the same or acknowledge the independence of Texas, or cease to prosecute the war against her (the armistice having expired) on a scale com- mensurate with the conquest of the country." On the following day the Senators felt prepared to attack their arduous problem ; and although Buchanan wished the subject postponed until the first of June, they voted to discuss it daily, beginning on May 16. Allen of Ohio moved that a departure be made from the course usual in such cases and the matter be considered with open doors, but this proposition was not adopted.^ A number of circumstances besides the confidential nature of the main evidence regarding British designs were unfavorable to the ratification of the treaty. One of these was the extraordinary predicament in which Benton found himself. As a Southerner, a Westerner, a Jacksonian and an old-time friend of Texas, he had seemed predestined to lead on the affirmative side of the contest. But his close affiliations with Van Buren, his imputed ambition to succeed that gentleman four years later in the Presidency, his detestation of Tyler — the prime leader in the annexation movement, and his hatred of Calhoun — its principal agent, drove him to the other side. Embarrassed by previous action, by present convictions ' See General Note, p. i. Sen. Ex. Journ,, vi., 257, 262, 271, 277 (Ben- ton's resols.), 278, 310 (Benton's resols, tabled, j'une 8), 279, 264 (Allen). 258 THE FATE OF THE TREATY 259 and by party bonds his opposition was necessarily doomed to be awkward and inconsistent, but he assumed the role of antagonist with abounding energy and abounding passion. To deepen his feeling on the subject he believed, as Blair informed Jackson, that the Whig majority of the Senate would certainly defeat the treaty, and that its failure would not only injure the cause of annexation but bring war upon Texas ; and to embitter it still more, he saw in the opposing ranks men who had intentionally blasted the hopes of Van Buren and himself by helping to bring up the issue at this period. In this resentment the ex-President must have shared; and no doubt he exerted all his influence from the first against the ratification of a treaty that not only ran counter to his expressed opinion and preference, but was the darling project — and, if con- firmed, might become the high stepping-stone — of his ancient enemy, Calhoun. - Raymond, secretary of the regular Texan legation at Washington, reported that Calhoun's letter to Pakenham had a strongly unfavor- able influence at the North, and even drove the Ohio Senators over to the opposition. It also repelled those from the South who did not think it wise to make slavery a national question ; and his despatch to the American charge at Mexico caused further embar- assment, since it appeared to some like a quasi acknowledgment of the ^Mexican claim upon Texas, and therefore cast a doubt upon her independence. Raymond felt also that Tyler himself had greatly injured the cause by hoisting the motto "Tyler and Texas" as a Presidential candidate, since now ratification could not fail to appear more or less like an endorsement of him and his political aspirations.^ The prejudicial effect of Clay's and Van Buren's letters was of course immense. An address of the Democratic Central Committee of Virginia stated that before they came out the people seemed unan- imous for annexation, and that after the treaty was laid before the Senate rumors were current for a time that it would be ratified without dissent ; but " to the astonishment of the whole nation " the two foremost party leaders of the country declared against the measure, and then politicians who had been loud for it held public meetings to demand its rejection, and the Senators cancelled their pledges of support. Clay's letter will kill the treaty, announced the Spectator as soon as it appeared, and his control of the Senate ^ Blair to Jackson. Sept. 9, 1844: Jackson Pap. Phil. Ledger, May 13, 1844. 'Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 343. 260 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS majority evidently warranted the opinion. Until that voice was heard, said a Georgia Representative on the floor of the House, only Adams and a few others dared avow hostility to annexation. The Democrats, indeed, took a firm stand at Baltimore for the acquisi- tion of Texas ; but as they said nothing for a treaty which every delegate knew was pending at the time, Van Buren seemed in this regard to have the support of his party.* A great number of adverse resolutions, petitions and memorials poured into the Senate and House, and the strength — or at least the number of these — could not fail to have some effect. The Connecticut legislature, for example, resolved that annexation would violate our treaty with Mexico and virtually declare war upon her; while the legislature of Massachusetts protested that the State would " submit to undelegated powers in no body of men on earth," and that "the project of the annexation of Texas, unless arrested on the threshold, might tend to drive " that and other commonwealths " into a dissolution of the Union." The Houston Telegraph understood that the Massachusetts Senators had been expected to vote for ratification, but were prevented from doing so by these resolutions."' Several other influences counted on the same side. Uncertainty as to the future political complexion of Texas must have had some weight. Her envoys probably endeavored to create the impression in each party that it would be given her vote, for we know that Henderson was awake to the importance of " cultivating " the Whigs ; but both of these men were labeled as " determined Demo- crats ", and no doubt the Whig politicians could think for them- selves on the subject. Disconcerting news arrived from Mexico. It became known that the official journal of that city represented the government as determined to recover the lost province, and a * (Committee) Richmond Enq.. May lo, 1844. See also the address of the Miss. Dem, Cent. Com. : Mississippian, Aug. 9, 1844. Sped., April 27, 1844. (Haralson) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 180. "Sen. Docs. 402, 219, 61, 28 Cong., i sess. Senate: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., I sess., 17s, 346, 428, 450, 457, etc. House: ib., 55, 56, 168, 174, 243, 291, 337, 415, 467, 538, etc. Telegraph, March 20, 1844. C. J. Ingersoll. chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs, stated on the first day of May, 1844, that the protests and petitions relating to the subject of annexation which had been referred to his committee during the session numbered over ninety. Me., N. H., R. Id., N. J., Del.. Md., Va., No. Car., Ga., Ala., Ark., Mo., Tenn., and Ky. were not represented among them, and Pa. and Mich, to but a small extent. Thirty- five of the petitions were presented by one member of the house, and ten by an- other. Half of them were little or nothing more than a protest against slavery. Many were signed by women. The most general and earnest opposition to an- nexation (according to Ingersoll, a friend of Texas, the only such opposition) showed itself in Massachusetts. THE FATE OF THE TREATY 26l man who set out for New York near the end of April said that a disposition to resist annexation uncompromisingly was evident there. Still more harm was done by the truce and proposed armis- tice between the belligerents. The New York Tribune and other journals took the view — though its inaccuracy must have been understood — that Texas had actually acknowledged herself to be a Mexican Department, and Van Zandt recognized the efifect of Hockley and Williams's act as damaging. Henderson felt satisfied that the Whigs had consulted with Pakenham in reference to the treaty; Raymond understood that the British minister had used his influence with Senators against ratification ; and the reports of this gentleman to the Foreign Office confirmed both of these opinions; while the French minister, so the Washington correspondent of the Philadelphia Ledger stated, though he dared not protest formally against annexation lest such a proceeding should react and injure Guizot's cabinet, stopped important gentlemen on the street, and gravely though politely intimated that France might have some- thing to say about the matter. In fact we have Pakenham's word for it, that Pageot co-operated with him by " making known in influ- ential quarters, the dissatisfaction with which His Government would in common with Her Majesty's Government view any attempt on the part of the United States to carry the proposed annexation into efifect ;" and Almonte assisted by withdrawing from Washington, so as to counteract the impression that he was negotiating on the subject, and strengthen the apprehension that Mexico would not accept peaceably the incorporation of what had been hers in the American Union.^ On the other hand certain outside influences co-operated more or less with the arguments and sentiments now familiar to us. A desire to obtain the Texas trade had recently shown itself in Con- gress, and in February citizens of New York had begged the Senators to ratify the treaty of navigation and commerce which had been arranged with that country. In truth it seemed high time to do something about this matter, for a letter from the Texan consul at New York, accompanying their memorial, stated that the exports to Texas, which had been $1,687,082 in 1839, had diminished by 1843 to $190,604. A petition from ]\laine, signed by members " Hend. to Jones, March 30, 1844: Jones, Memor., 333. Reily to Jones, Feb. 19, 1844: ib,, 318. Newark Adv.. May 21, 1844. Tribune, April 22. 1844. Van Z., No. 120, May 11, 1844. Hend. to Miller, June 12, 1844: Miller Pap. Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones. Memor., 343. Ledger. May 10, 1844. (Pak., Pageot and Almonte) Pak., Nos. 16, 22, 36, March 28; April 14, 28, 1844. 262 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS of both parties, argued that the extension of Texas as an indepen- dent nation would be troublesome if not dangerous; that in time she might become unfriendly and even ally herself with countries at war against the United States; that in peace our interests would suffer from her unequal competition and the diversion of her trade to other channels ; and that annexation, improving our boundaries, adding to our security and strength in the case of war, increasing our commerce and shipping business in times of peace, enlarging the market for our manufactures, promoting our internal trade, and opening a general field for the enterprise of our citizens, would confer benefits like those derived from the acquisition of Louisiana, which no one had ever regretted. Still more emphatic though less argumentative were the resolutions of the Mississippi legislature, which urged the immediate incorporation of the territory in ques- tion, and maintained that any attempt of a foreign power to obtain it or to establish " a commanding influence " there, should be con- sidered by the United States a " sufficient cause for war."^ Benton asserted that during the debates on the treaty the State department, the White House, the lobbies of the Senate, and all other public places were crowded with speculators in Texas land and scrip and in claims against Mexico, all working for ratification ;.. but a broad allowance must be made for his vivid imagination, inflamed now by his incandescent feelings. It is very improbable that such speculators wore badges, or could be distinguished in any other way from ordinary politicians, office-hunters and the like ; and it is difficult to see why speculators in claims against Mexico should have favored annexation, an event likely to make her far less willing than before to settle the American demands. Tyler and Calhoun themselves, it was admitted, were not interested in Texas lands or scrip. ^ Letters from Murphy, dwelling upon the vital importance of the measure and the danger of delay, were probably shown to Senators. Especially useful may have been a despatch dated on Washington's birthday. Elliot, he understood, had written to Jones that an annexation treaty could not be ratified ; and he re- (juestcd that the Senators be informed of this fresh interference of the British envoy. The almost unanimous declaration of the 'Sen. Doc. 138, 28 Cong., i sess. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 542, 408. * Benton, View, ii., 623, 631. The point has been urged that it was no worse to speculate in Texas properties with an eye to annexation than to manipulate the tariff, river and harbor bills, etc. for private advantage as did some of the Northerners (Tyler, Tyler, ii., 323). THE FATE OF THE TREATY 263 Texan Congress in favor of joining the United States proved injurious perhaps, for it suggested that Texas could be had at any time; but Alurphy provided certain antidotes. One of these gave an account of a pubHc meeting convened at Houston on the fourth of Alarch, which demanded that the government reach a speedy un- derstanding with the United States, and, should annexation be found impossible, secure at once the protection of England on some such "basis of mutual benefit" as that country had recently proposed. Another represented it as likely that recognition could be obtained from Mexico by surrendering the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande to England. A third told how British agents and British gold were producing a " sudden and extraordinary " change of sentiment among the people; and another, an editorial in the Houston Telegraph, pointed out that should the country remain independent, the tariff ought to discriminate severely against Amer- ican manufactures and favor the British, for then the Texans would be able to purchase wares at a low price, and, since their cotton would be admitted by England on good terms, the American planters, unable to compete with them, would soon be flocking across the Sabine." On the Democratic side of the Chamber great influence was exerted in favor of the treaty by Jackson. Several of his letters have already been mentioned-, and certainly they were strong; but in April he wrote one that sounded to politicians of his party like the last trump. " Men who would endanger, by a postponement, such great benefits to our country, for political objects," he thun- dered. " have no patriotism or love of country, and ought to be publicly exposed — ^the people of the South and West will withdraw all confidence from them, and send them to their own native dung- hills, there to rest forever." Tell Walker, he commanded, to " have this matter pushed — let the Treaty be made and laid before the Senate. H the Senate will not pass it this session, it can be laid upon the table until the next — This will prevent Mexico from invading Texas, and be a barrier against the intrigues of Great Britain. . . . Say to him from me, and if you choose to the Pres- ident, that delays are dangerous. Houston and the people of Texas are now united in favor of annexation — the next President may not be so. British influence may reach him, and what may ° Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 7. Murphy, conf., March 4, 1844. Baker to Murphy, March 15, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. Murphy to Tyler, March 16, 1844: ib. Murphy, Jan. 25, 1844. Telegraph, Jan. 17, 1844. 264 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS now be got from Texas freely and peacably, may evade our grasp and cost us oceans of blood and millions of money to obtain — and obtain it the U. States must — peacably if we can, but forcibly if we must." We have placed our Indians on the Southwestern border, continued Jackson. New Orleans is vulnerable. The frontier is weak. Were British influence to control Texas, the slaves of the Mississippi valley would be worthless, for they could cross the line and be free. If the treaty is put before the Senate, the Senators will not dare to vote against it. Three-fourths of "all the people" are for the measure. "The subject has carried me on," concluded the broken but unflinching warrior, " until I am gasping for breath whilst using my pen. . . . The perpetuation of our republican system, and of our glorious Union" is involved. This letter, said Cave Johnson, made a sensation; and its echoes doubtless haunted the Democratic wing of the Senate Chamber as long as the subject was under consideration.^" The speeches on the treaty are rather tedious reading. Aluch said by the statesmen was really addressed, one infers, to their con- stituents, and much was for partisan effect upon the country at large. Many errors of fact, many exploded fallacies, and many fallacies that deserved to be exploded were solemnly exhibited. No Httle ability, however, of one kind or another found vent, and some of the addresses were distinctly striking. Benton made one of these. With great force, though reckless in the use of history and logic and altogether too much in his characteristic vein of Big Bully Bottom, he attacked the arguments brought forward to sup- port annexation, and maintained that Tyler's real purpose was to destroy the other aspirants for the chief magistracy, bring on a war with Mexico, and so — in imitation of Jackson — appear before the nation as a " Texas candidate anointed with gunpowder, for the presidential chair."^^ In reply to him McDuffie contended '"Jackson to Lewis, April 8, 1844: Jackson Pap. Johnson to Polk. May 16, 1844: Polk Pap. " Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 474. Benton spoke promptly, calling up his three resolutions as the basis of his argument. By this treaty, he said, it is proposed to annex all the territory claimed by Texas, including portions of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Tamaulipas and New Mexico. — the last of which is un- questionably under Mexican jurisdiction. This means war ; and so the Secre- tary of State virtually admits in his letter to our charge at Mexico, written seven days after the treaty was signed. Aside from this feature, however, that instru- ment as a whole — if we ratify it — means war, for war now exists between Mexico and Texas. Tyler in his last annual Message recognizes the existence of the war, and other recent official documents both American and Texan have done the same. The fact of war is also proved by the armistice ; and, finally, Mexico THE FATE OF THE TREATY 265 frankly that slavery in the United States was threatened, that the Southerners had a constitutional right to demand protection, and holds 2,000 miles of the frontier claimed by Texas, so that a conflict could not well be avoided. Moreover, it is the design of our President to force the United States into a war with Mexico. His Message of April 22 announces the purpose of protect- ing Texas by receiving her into the Union and thereby adopting her war because she is in need of defence and seeks it from us. Upshur's letter despatched to Murphy Jan. 16, 1844, reveals a determination to use the treaty-making power to adopt her war with Mexico. Calhoun's letter of April 19 to the American charge at Mexico declares that the United States desired to maintain peace but had signed the treaty in full view of all possible consequences, — that is to say, were ready for war ; and Almonte had already given us notice that a conflict would be the result of annexation. In reality the war has actually begun, for an " army of observation " has been dispatched to the Mexican frontier, and what is that but an army " in the field for war " ? Such a war would be unconstitutional, for hostilities cannot be declared by the treaty-making power. It would be an unjust war, too, upon a peaceable nation in violation of our neutrality and our treaties, in violation of the armistice between Mexico and Texas, to the instant injury of our commerce, and on a weak and groundless pretext. Some allege, no doubt, that Mexico would not dare to fight us. Were this true, the case would still be bad in morals ; and it would still be bad in policy to offend without excuse an amicable neighbor with whom we have a large trade. But the ratification would not merely be a cause of war, leading possibly to no conflict ; it would be war itself, abrogating our treaties with Mexico. And all this we are asked to bring upon the country instead of obtaining the consent of Mexico or waiting " a few months for the events which would supersede the necessity of Mexican consent." For thus injuring and then insulting our neighbor the " imaginary designs " of a third power are no excuse. The unreality of these alleged schemes is shown in the very documents laid before us by the President, for when the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Everett he obtained from Lord Aberdeen assur- ances which entirely dissipated all grounds of apprehension. Further confirma- tion was contained in Aberdeen's " noble despatch " of Dec. 26. Yet the govern- ment instead of accepting, refuting or taking time to investigate these disavowals signs the treaty, submits it to us, and hurries a messenger off to Mexico. Why was this course adopted ? Because the time necessary for the messenger to return would be long enough " for the ' Texas bomb ' to burst and scatter its fragments all over the Union, blowing up candidates for the presidency, blowing up the tongue-tied senate itself for not ratifying the treaty, and furnishing a new Texas candidate, anointed with gunpowder, for the presidential chair." England simply desires to see the Texan slaves, like all others, emancipated, and is ready to offer counsel to that end if it will be acceptable. This is all ; and we — especi- ally as we have joined with England to suppress the slave trade — cannot fight her for entertaining such a wish. That nation errs by arrogance, not duplicity, and I accept her assurances. The simple fact is that Tyler aspires to be Presi- dent ; therefore he wishes to play the part of Jackson ; and to that end he de- sires a war. But, we are assured, it is norv or never. At first it was England that had designs on Texas ; but now that " razv-head and bloody-bones " has been dropped, and it is Texas that has designs upon England. Repulsed by us she will throw herself into the arms of Great Britain. But this is a libel, for the Texans are Americans and republicans. It is represented, too, that Santa Anna would welcome annexation as a way of escape from his embarrassing situation. But Mexico has threatened to declare war in the case of annexation ; her minister withdrew from our seat of government as soon as he knew the treaty had been signed ; we have thought it necessary to send a messenger to Mexico in order to prevent her from assuming a belligerent attitude ; and we have despatched soldiers to protect our citizens. No doubt, indeed, the wise men of Mexico have long since perceived that the loss of Texas was inevitable, and by treating that 266 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS that it was the constitutional duty of the federal government to extend it.^- Jarnagin, a Tenessee Whig, was especially truculent, perhaps because — living so near the Hermitage — he was sinning against great light. The whole annexation business was described country with respect we could have arranged the matter amicably; but the Texas bomb was thought more valuable than honor, justice and the acquisition of the region beyond the Sabine. In spite of everything that country will yet be ours. The question is na- tional, — more western than southern and as much free as slave, for only half of Texas is adapted to slave labor. The mass of our people wish that acquisition made, though in no great haste to see it done. The few who from selfish and sectional motives clamor for it are really the only enemies of annexation, and in spite of them this great measure will be carried. Personally I favor it now, as I have always favored it, and I consider this the most important question upon which I have ever been called to vote ; but I could not support the treaty even though opposing it were to end my political career. [Benton tried, by a highly original view of the facts, to show that (without the knowledge of either country concerned, the United States or the powers of Europe) Spain recognized Mexico in 1821, and that the Mexican revolution was a civil war. His purpose in this was to destroy the analogy between Mexico's situation from 1821 to 1836 and that of Texas in 1844. Equally curious was his idea that sending the troops to the frontier produced a state of war. He asserted, what Archer denied and the facts disproved, that Archer had promised not to let the treaty be considered for forty days. As Pak. (No. 53, May 29, 1844) reminded the British government, Benton had previously been " distinguished for the intensity of His anti-English feelings," and the minister explained his extraordinary change as due to a wish " to make out the strongest possible case " against Tyler, Calhoun and the treaty and in justification of Van B.'s course.] '^^Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 451. McDuffie said in substance: It was the right and duty of the President to make this treaty, and it is the right and duty of the Senate to confirm it. There is nothing in Benton's argu- ment that in annexing Texas we should be annexing parts of Mexico, for the treaty conveys to us only the territory that really belongs to Texas. Indeed the whole question of boundary is left open to be adjusted with Mexico. It is as- serted that by carrying out this measure we should be violating our engage- ments with Mexico; but no one questions the right of France to aid us in 1778. Only in case we had guaranteed the territory of Mexico would the annexation of Texas be a violation of good faith. After admitting that country to the family of nations by recognizing her, can we pretend that she lacks the most essential ele- ment of sovereignty ? Is she a star shorn of its beams ? No. Her sovereignty has been acknowledged by five powers, and her stability as a nation is firmer than that of Mexico. She is therefore the owner of her territory, and ownership involves the power to sell. In 1836 I believed that the adoption of Texas would be the adoption of a war ; but time has passed, and that is no longer true. Webster has correctly said that " the foot of an invader has not rested on the soil of Texas since the battle of San Jacinto." When Adams and Clay proposed to buy the province, Mexico was at war with Spain, and four years later Spain was to drive the commerce of Mexico from the seas and land an army on her coast, yet Adams and Clay did not think it necessary to consult the mother- country. More noteworthy still, when Jackson and Van Buren tried to effect the purchase, that Spanish army was actually on Mexican soil. What, then, is our duty in the premises? Is Great Britain to be permitted to " obtain the control of Texas " by a treaty guaranteeing her independence and stipulating for exclusive commercial privileges, without an effort on our part to prevent it? If she succeeds, she will injure the interests of every section of the United States, and she will be able to throw her whole military force into our rear. So far as cotton is concerned, it is Massachusetts — not South Carolina — that would profit from the annexation of Texas ; but my section has at stake its entire property and its political existence. Benton thinks that England's dis- THE FATE OF THE TREATY 267 by him as a ridiculous " fraud," with which John Tyler intended if he could to *' bamboozle the American people in the approaching Presidential election. "^^ Buchanan spoke on the other side, and claimers ought to satisfy us ; but all that she denies is the employment of " im- proper " means to secure the abolition of slavery in Texas ; and it is not her armed forces, but her influence, her counsels, her diplomacy, which are best cal- culated to produce the results we dread, and against which our government is bound to exert itself. W'ere Aberdeen's wishes fulfilled in South Carolina, I would rather leave my native State for the most barren mountain of Switzerland than remain there among the emancipated negroes ; and the South and South- west are convinced that British control in Texas would menace the institution of slavery in the United States. The responsibility for the existence of that institution rests upon those very states, old and New England, which are now engaged in a crusade against us for having it, and the South merely demands protection for a system that was forced upon her and has now become ineradicable. To demand it is our consti- tutional right, and the constitutional duty of the federal government is to extend it to us. Jackson, who is in the confidence of Houston, tells us that annexation must come now or not at all, and so I fully believe. Even Van Buren declares that if a foreign power gains a foothold on the Gulf, a war to expel it will be worth while. How much better to prevent the mischief, as now we can, without a war. ^* Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 682. Jarunagin pursued this line of thought : There is no power in the constitution to annex Texas, for that instru- ment is a compact and a change of the parties would terminate the agreement. The whole affair is outrageous. At one time we are told that Texas is independent and sovereign, at another that she is ready to fall a prey to the first comer ; now that she is at peace with Mexico, and now that she urgently needs our protection. The treaty itself is a humbug. Made without authority, it conveys to us a war under the pretence of ceding territory ; and the Senate is asked to undertake hostilities which the treaty-making power has no right to declare. Of what is Texas in danger? Nothing worse on the side of England than a free trade treaty, and nothing worse at home than abolition. But where only one man in seven owns slaves, emancipation could do no great harm, and in reality the Texans themselves appear to be quite calm ; while as regards the other peril, England cannot expect to reduce Texas to vassalage by a commercial agreement. If she attempted to oppress that people — or to impose monarchical institutions upon them — by virtue of such a treaty, how long would the treaty stand? Even in the best of Americans England has no confidence; and how then must she feel about placing her trust on those offscourings ? And would she im- peril her trade with these United States to get the trade of less than 200,000 Texans? "The truth is, this whole business is a fraud, a plan with which John Tyler intends, if he can, to bamboozle the American people in the approaching Presidential election." The government of Texas had no more power to hand that country over to us than our government has to hand the United States over to Texas. If that government can sell the sovereignty of the nation, each of our States could do the same ; and the central government, buying them up, could totally change the nature of this confederation. An examination of the treaty, article by article, clearly shows its false, delusive and ridiculous character. '■ Its moving cause was a desperate Presidential speculation ; " and " its main agents were the gamblers and brokers of the bankrupt finances and fraudulent land grants of Texas." The documents are like it, and the President's Message itself is no lietter. His talk about the independence and sovereignty of that country is refuted by the mere continuance of the war, by his own argument that unless we accept her she will have to throw herself into the arms of England, and finally by Upshur's despatch of August 8, which represents her as entirely unable to defend herself against Mexico. The London story of English abolition designs was so inconsistent that Upshur himself confessed he could not believe it ; yet instead of rejecting or 268 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS from the Northern point of view made a more effective argument than any one else. John Quincy Adams described him once as "the shadow of a shade," and few of us are inchned to protest; but the nature of his intellect, compelling him to take rather simple views of things, kept him fairly near the plane of common sense except when some exigency of the case required him to urge a worse against a better reason. It was bootless, he said, to discuss Tyler's motives, his Message, or even the documents, for the real question was on the treaty itself; and he then proceeded to argue that it was proper, expedient and in fact needful to ratify the agreement, that no injustice would be done to Mexico or the Texans, and that eventually this measure would work to the disadvantage of slavery.^* The debate was closed by Archer with a speech in even investigating it, he made it the corner-stone of this whole business. The entire official history of the reasons for this affair was intended to mislead. Its real origin was explained by Professor Beverly Tucker of William and Mary College at a recent meeting in Williamsburg. Tucker said he had a large tract of land in Texas and a joint interest in about sixty slaves. In 1843 his partner in Texas wrote to him, proposing the annexation of that country. Tucker seized upon the idea and communicated it to his intimate friend, Upshur, who im- mediately took it up. saying that he believed he could win over the Yankees by appealing to their self-interest but would go in for it anyway, and that he was ready to bring North and South to a direct issue at the next session of Congress. In a word, then, " the entire plan is a complication of rapine, of impolicy, and of imposture." The time may come when we can annex Texas without danger and without disgrace ; but vote for this present treaty I cannot. "J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, xi., 352. Buchanan; Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 720. Silas Wright said that Buchanan was brought over to Tyler's side by his passionate desire for the vacant place in the Supreme Court (to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap.). He spoke substantially as follows: It is needless to discuss Tyler's motives or the character of the Message and documents, for the subject before the Senate is the treaty itself. Texas became ours by the purchase of Louisiana in 1803. In 1819 we dismembered the Mississippi valley, and brought a foreign nation close to our weakest frontier. Now that territory, no longer a wilderness, is offered to us. Are we to refuse it? That is the question, The people of Texas have voted to join the United States and are known to be substantially unanimous for annexation at present, and there- fore it is bootless to argue that under their constitution the treaty-making power had no authority to make this agreement or that the agreement was obtained from them under false pretences [as to the probability of our ratifying it]. As General Jackson has shown, we need that country for our military security. Annexa- tion is expedient, also, because it would certainly extend the markets for our manufactures, promote our internal commerce and bind the Union more closely together; whereas if we reject it, England will secure the finest cotton country in the world, and our interests will permanently suffer. With Texas in our possession, the slave States will enjoy greater security and the Northeast receive immense pecuniary benefits. The latter section opposed the acquisition of Louisi- ana, but what would they be now without it? Sugar and iron are the interests that most need tariff protection ; hence by admitting Texas we strengthen the tariff ; while if we reject Texas, she will form a commercial alliance with Eng- land as dangerous and injurious to us as if she were to become a British colony. Cotton is essential to England, and if we take Texas, we shall keep England permanently dependent upon us, which will be a greater defence than a hundred thousand soldiers. Let Texas remain independent, and it will be for mutual interest that she send her cotton to England and purchase English manufactures. THE FATE OF THE TREATY 269 opposition. He endeavored to show that it lay beyond the power of either Executive to make such a treaty, and that endorsement of it Bear in mind also that Texas extends north to 42 degrees and can produce the staples of the middle and western States. As a separate nation therefore she would be our jealous and hostile rival all along the line. She would adopt free trade or impose a very low tariff on English goods, cutting down our revenue and injuring our manufacturers by extensive smuggling into this country. Those hostile to slavery should not oppose this treaty. Annexation would draw the negroes from the northern slave States because they would be more profitable in Texas ; and eventually slavery might pass the Del Norte for good and all. Annexation would not increase the power of the slave section in our government, for more than half of Texas is not fitted for negro labor. It is, however, necessary to draw a line there beyond which slavery shall not go, else we shall have another Missouri question. The history of the constitutional convention of 1787, the purchase of Lou- isiana and Florida, and the admissions from beyond the Mississippi prove that States may be formed from territory not belonging originally to the United States. It is absurd to argue that because Texas is a sovereign nation we can- not accept a deed of it given by the people themselves, though we could accept a cession of Louisiana made without the consent of the people. Vattel recognizes that a nation has power to incorporate itself with another by treaty. The main objection to the proposed measure is that it would involve the viola- tion of a treaty and cause an unjust war, since Mexico is now on terms of hos- tility with Texas. As for the treaty of amity with Mexico, nearly all modern wars have occurred between nations bound together by such agreements. Self-preser- vation is an adequate ground for disregarding obligations of that nature. One who believes that Texas will become a dependency of England unless we take it, and that through English influence a servile war in our southern States would result, would be justified in voting for annexation even had we guaranteed the integrity of Mexican territory. So says Vattel. Nay more ; Vattel and other authorities deem it commendable to succor the weak when they are oppressed by the strong (Book iii., chap. 7, sect. 83); and therefore it is not only our right but our duty to take the part of Texas. Nor is this all. Texas has never owed allegiance to the present government of Mexico. From the moment Santa Anna overthrew the constitution under which the colonists went to Texas, that state became free and sovereign. Were a President of the United States to set himself up as a despot, annul the federal and State constitutions, drive out the legis- latures by armed force and win the support of a subservient Congress, would the States resisting him owe allegiance to his government ? Waiving, however, this consideration, even had we espoused the cause of Texas in 1835, we should only have been in the position that France took in 1778; and who will maintain that France violated her faith with England by coming to our rescue? The treaty of 1763, then in force between those countries, contained a stronger stipulation of peace and friendship than does our treaty with Mexico. The idea of broken faith in the present case is therefore a mere " phantom." It is said that annexation would be unjust to Texas. — would be like the parti- tion of Poland ; but we know that the people of that country desire ardently to join us. E(iually fallacious is the argument that the war still continues and we ought to wait longer, for a war sufficient to bar annexation must be a war com- mensurate with the task of subjugating the country, and that does not exist. Next we are adjured to obtain first the consent of Mexico. But that is impossible, for England has influence enough to prevent it ; and if we decide to wait for that consent, we allow England to interfere and practically encroach upon our inde- pendence without being able to hold her responsible for so doing. Much is heard, too, of the good faith and kindness of Mexico towards us, as an additional reason for treating her with tender consideration ; but the record shows that we have had many occasions to make complaint. Then the alleged armistice is held up as proof that a war exists ; and it is urged that Mexico should be allowed a reason- able time after the expiration of the armistice to subjugate her revolted province. But there is no armistice. Each side tried to obtain one on its own terms ; each 270 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS by the Senate, in addition to being constitutionally improper, would wrong Mexico, involve the United States in a war, and stamp us in the eyes of the world as an aggressive and faith-breaking nation ; and his argument, while not convincing, was undoubtedly strong.^^ failed ; and Mexico has done nothing since towards invading Texas. But what if a war does exist ? We made repeated attempts to purchase Texas — without the consent of the inhabitants — before Mexico had been acknowledged by Spain, yet nobody took the ground that we violated our faith with the latter nation. Why, then, object now to the acquisition of the same territory, especially since now we have the consent of the population ? It is objected that Texas does not own to the Rio Grande. But we could not expect her to proclaim to the world that the boundaries solemnly asserted by her were fictitious. We must receive her as she is or not at all ; and when we have acquired the territory, we can adjust the boundary with Mexico ourselves. Objection is made also to our assuming the debt of Texas. But we could not take her lands without so doing. With the exception of $350,000 the debt will be paid from the sale of her lands ; but were this not so, the value of the acquisi- tion is far greater than the total burden. It is further represented that the power to declare war belongs to Congress, and that the President and Senate have no right to adopt a war by making this treaty. The answer is easy. The friends of the measure do not expect it to be executed without " a previous act of Cong- ress for this purpose." It is for the interest of Mexico herself that we annex Texas. The Ameri- cans of Texas would never accept the political institutions and methods of Mexico. She never can subdue them, and an attempt to do so, drawing thousands of our citizens to the standard of the Lone Star, might end in another battle of San Jacinto under the walls of the Mexican capital. Ratify the treaty we must. Our refusal to do so would irritate the Texans ; they might take counsel of their interests instead of their inclinations ; and that course might lead to a commercial alliance with England. There is the more danger of resentment because the Senate, adopting the unusual course of publishing the correspondence, has be- trayed the policy and desires of their country. The denunciations of the treaty in this Chamber and the attempts to excite indignation against its authors will apparently authorize Mexico and England to exert their full strength against the project of annexation, and the danger of losing Texas is so much the greater. If we let this treaty slip, the advantage of a favorable opportunity will be lost forever. By making the agreement we arrested British success in Texas ; but if we reject it, England will renew her efforts there with higher hopes than before. ^^ Sen. Ex. Journ., vi., 310. (Archer) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App., 693. His argument ran as follows : The desirability of securing Texas for political, commercial and social reasons is no doubt very great, but that fact has no more place in the present dis- cussion than the value of Belgium. The most important question is whether a valid transfer of Texas to the United States can be made. Our recognition of that country did not affirm her sovereignty, but was rather a refusal to pass judg- ment upon that point. It was merely an acknowledgment of the fact of pos- session — to last no longer than possession should continue — in order that inter- course and trade might be carried on meanwhile. That such was the character of our action is shown by the obvious fact that should Mexico reconquer the country, it would be unnecessary to rescind the recognition. Aside, however, from this the government of Texas, no matter what its basis, had no power to dissolve the institutions it was elected to administer, and trans- fer the territory and population to another power. The people alone could do or authorize this. Buchanan, it is true, has maintained that the Texans have already given authority for such a transfer ; but that was seven or eight years ago, when they numbered only 7,000 or 8,000 persons. They may — I believe they do — desire to join us; but it is indispensable that they give a formal expression of their will. As for our own part, the treaty-making power cannot acquire THE FATE OF THE TREATY 27 1 The prospects of the treaty, though brightening occasionally, went on the whole from bad to worse. April 24 Raymond ex- pressed the opinion that Calhoun's placing annexation on the sole ground of protecting slavery, Tyler's coming out for the Presidency as the apostle of the measure, and the course of the Washington Globe in opposing immediate action and belittling Tyler's claims to credit would probably be fatal. By April 2j the correspondent of the Philadelphia Ledger thought the treaty might succeed when all the circumstances — particularly the designs of England, which were to Texas, for instead of being mere territory it is a sovereign state, acknowledged as such by ourselves. Nor can the territory be transferred in any way at present ; for though a nation at war may make a valid cession to a neutral, it cannot cede the very subject of dispute. Otherwise, just claims on the eve of enforcement might be eluded. Besides, our treaty of amity with Mexico forbids us to annex Texas. We are told, indeed, that France broke a treaty of amity with England and came to our aid. But the cases are not parallel, for France did not appro- priate the colonies which she helped to wrest from England. France aimed to nourish the independence of a weak nation, while we aim to destroy it. The ■' storm of debate," however, has raged around Benton's proposition that annexation would be the adoption of a war, and it has been maintained that Mexico has made only incursions into Texas since April, 1836. But does the magnitude of military operation determine their character? The momentous battle of Trenton was merely an incursion ; and were the Texas war to become active now, the incursions of the past years, which have kept the flame of hos- tilities alight, would be recognized at once as parts of it. The real question is the public state or condition between Mexico and Texas, and that is un- questionably one of hostilities, as our proper sources of information on such a subject — the President and the Secretary of State — have officially informed us, supported officially by the representatives of Mexico and Texas. All recognize that the existence of war ought to be decisive regarding our action on the treaty, and a person demanding better evidence than this would not be convinced though one rose from the dead to testify. The state of war, then, exists, and nothing prevents active operations except the knowledge on the part of Mexico that an invasion of Texas would be the signal for a rush of Americans to meet her armies. Abstractly the treaty-making power is legally competent to make a treaty which would result in hostilities, for we might deem it wise' to ally ourselves with a nation already in a conflict. But it was the plain intent of the constitution to confer upon Congress the general authority to declare war, and we are bound to recognize that intent. Moreover, even had we the full right to adopt the war and even were there no war to adopt, the annexation of Texas would seem an unwarranted act of aggrandizement, and would injure us in the eyes of the world. And what reasons are alleged to justify such a move ? A mere anonymous charge of abolition designs on the part of England, which England has officially denied. If under such circumstances we still believe .in the alleged designs and act upon that belief, how can we have intercourse with the other nations of the world,- — intercourse implying, as it does, confidence? Besides, the Texans are peculiarly wedded to slavery, and slavery is in their national constitution. No danger of their discarding it exists. Yet Calhoun would have us do precisely what he protests against England's doing [interfere abroad], or rather have us carry our views into effect in order to offset a mere expression of hers. Finally, the treaty is objectionable also because it was not willingly conceded by Texas. She repelled the proposition, and a wholly unauthorized surrender of our military and naval forces to her finally became necessary to win her consent. She will not in any event go over to England ; but were the choice truly, as it is alleged to be, now or never, I would say never, rather than secure this territory at the expense of violated faith and the just imputation of self-aggrandizement. 272 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS be proved by clear documentary evidence — had been made know^n. Only the next day, however, the special secretary of the Texan legation expressed the opinion to Jones that both parties were against the treaty, and it would not receive ten votes/*^ May 3 the National Intelligencer declared that 'the annexation measure, if not already dead, was past praying for, and in two days Cave Johnson informed Polk that it was not only past praying for but defunct. On the eleventh Van Zandt reported that the excite- ment in the United States on the subject was great, and public sen- timent might sweep away the opposition. A week later Calhoun wrote that probably the treaty would be rejected; but he still hoped not, especially because "perfectly conclusive" evidence had been given to the Senate that Texas would be lost if not received at once. Another week, and the New York Tribune headed an editor- ial with these words, " The Texas Treaty Dead." One chance remained, however. After the Democrats made their declaration at Baltimore, there was a possibility that Clay would endeavor to take the wind out of their sails by directing his majority in the Senate to ratify the treaty. Jackson believed he would so do. But Justice Catron understood that his partisans in that body, having committed themselves the other way as their leader had wished, were unwilling to stultify themselves unless he would recant first. That Lord Harry would not, and the treaty was now unmistakably dead." The question of burial, however, remained, and it caused no little perplexity. Only one day before final action was taken Hen- derson informed his government that the Senators did not know what to do; and he said further to Miller that no one could tell whether they would " reject, postpone or propose some amendments to the Treaty to give themselves an excuse for delay." Rives intro- duced a resolution to lay it on the table and advise the President to obtain an extension of the time allowed for ratification, so as to let the people have an opportunity to express their views and afford an interval for agreeing with IMexico about the boundary. This resolution was submitted to Henderson, who remarked that he doubted whether Tyler would assent to it and that certainly Houston "Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 343. Ledger, April 29, 1844. Miller to Jones, April 28, 1844: Jones, Memor., 345. "Nat. IntelL, May 3, 1844. Johnson to Polk, May 5, 1844: Polk Pap. Van Z., No. 120, May 11, 1844. Calhoun to Hammond, May 17, 1844: Jameson, Cal- houn Corn, 588. Tribune, May 25, 1844. Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844] : Polk Pap. THE FATE OF THE TREATY 273 would regard it as no better than rejection; and in consequence of this opinion or for some other reason it was laid on the table. Finally, on the eighth of June, a decision was reached. Every Senator except Hannegan of Indiana, who was supposed to favor the measure, went on record. Fifteen States threw their entire strength against the treaty; while Alabama, Arkansas, Illinjois, Pennsylvania, Mississippi and South Carolina were solid in its favor; New Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia and Missouri divided their vote; and the one representative of Indiana stood for the negative. The affirmative strength consisted of fifteen Demo- crats and one Whig, Henderson of Mississippi, and the negative of twenty-eight Whigs and seven Democrats. Woodbury of New Hampshire was the only New Englander who voted for ratification.^^ In looking for the causes of this result, we seem to discover in the foreground a very handsome desire to be fair and kindly towards Mexico and loyal to that spirit of friendship which the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation, made with her in 1831, expressed so laudably. Governor Hammond, for example, in a Message to the legislature of South Carolina, said that the excuse given for rejecting Texas was that she could not be received without a viola- tion of the treaty. This view he pronounced " romantic, if not ridiculous ;" and one must admit, bearing in mind the slight signifi- cance usually given to the terms of friendship in international agree- ments and the rather conventional meaning which, as nations are related to one another at present, they necessarily must convey, that his adjectives were not wholly vmreasonable. This is the more obvious because the treaty, instead of requiring an eternal con- dition of brotherly love to exist between the two nations, expressly contemplated even a state of war. Evidently the words " amity " and " friendship " were employed there merely in their customary international and conventional sense; and the course pursued by Mexico toward citizens of the United States had appeared to show clearly, that either she regarded the stipulation of a firm friend- ship as virtually abrogated — in which case it could not bind the other party to the contract — or believed that it did not require any special tenderness. In other words, the United States were under no obligation to consider the mere susceptibilities of Mexico, par- ^^ Hend. to Jones, June 7, 1844: Jones, Memor., 364. Id. to Miller, June 7, 1844: Miller Pap. Sen. Ex. Journal, vi., 311, 312. Rives offered his resolution on June 8. Evidently it had been shown to Henderson previously. Boston Atlas, June 12, 1844. Nat. IntelL, June 10, 1844. Van Z.. [No. 122], June 10, 1844. Garrison, Extension, 120-121. 19 274 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS ticularly in a case that involved very serious interests of our own; and as we had offered to pay Hberally for any real damage inflicted upon her by receiving Texas, the treaty in question was adequately observed.^* There was, however, a second agreement between the two coun- tries, for which Senators manifested a delicate regard. This was a treaty of limits, by which the United States recognized the Sabine as the boundary between our territory and that of Mexico. But men who took this line of march soon found themselves in a verit- able thicket of difficulties. At once the question arose whether this instrument had not been rendered obsolete, like many a previous treaty, by the coming into existence of a new state of things. Mexico had permitted an apparently independent nation to spring up between herself and us; and the treaty, antedating that event, could not be cited as proof regarding its character. Then, too, it was a manifest absurdity to hold that the United States, whose own existence was based on the right of revolution, were com- pelled to deny that right to the citizens of every part of every nation with which a boundary agreement might happen to be made. More- over, if the treaty of limits with Mexico placed us under an obliga- tion to recognize all territory beyond the Sabine as forever hers, then the treaty made with Spain in 1819 compelled us to regard that very region and all other lands down to Central America as for- ever Spanish, so that in the eyes of the United States Mexico could not legally exist, and this treaty of limits itself was null and void. A still longer shadow was cast in the Senate by the war between Texas and Mexico. It was urged with great force that the rati- fication of the annexation treaty would make this country a party to the conflict, and — since the authority to declare war belongs to Congress — would be an act of usurpation on the part of the treaty- making power. This was one of Benton's tall stalking horses ; but Archer, though he opposed the treaty, could not let it pass. He pointed out with entire clearness that it might be for the interest of the nation to ally itself with a power engaged in war, and that the necessary agreement — which would at once involve us in hostilities — would have to be effected by the treaty-making power. It was also contended that such a war, unprovoked by our neighbor, would be unjust and shameful. This was a point of capital importance with the opponents of the treaty, and no one can '" (Hammond) N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 2, 1844. Treaties in Force, 389. THE FATE OF THE TREATY 275 deny that it carried very great weight. In reply it was explained that in the event of annexation Texas would unquestionably share in our foreign relations. Were the United States to have a war with England, for example, that part of the country would be exposed to invasion. But it would be absurd to hold that two sets of foreign relations — those of the annexing nation and those of the nation annexed — could co-exist, since they might be inconsistent. Therefore it could only be supposed that the second and very minor set lapsed. The United States would not, then, become logically and necessarily a party to the war. Mexico could merely claim damages for an alleged injury; and as this country offered to meet any such claim generously, a conflict — should it follow — could only be due to an unreasonable attitude on her part, and consequently she would be the real aggressor.-- Another point, also, had a bearing upon this aspect of the matter. It was argued often that as annexation is the strongest kind of alliance, the United States would be dragged into the war by accept- ing the treaty even more surely and rightfully than if we formed an alliance with Texas. -^ But here again something was overlooked. An alliance entered into with a belligerent is fundamentally different from an act of annexation. Not being of an essentially permanent character, it appears to be made with direct reference to the exist- ing state of hostilities, and we therefore regard it properly as in- volving a participation in the war. The acquisition of territory, on the other hand, is primarily a domestic affair of a commercial and political nature. It contemplates, not a temporary state of things, but a future of indefinite duration ; and war is implied only as an incidental consequence. To a certain extent the one case is that of a man who retains a court lawyer, and the other that of a man who enters into a partnership with some person. In the first instance a legal contest is directly and primarily in view ; but in the latter, while trouble of that nature may some day follow, it is by no means the end contemplated. ^Treaties in Force, 389. Wash. Globe, April 7,1844. See also Deiiioc. Reviezv, May, 1845. As will appear later, when the prospect of annexation seemed to have become a certainty, England and France notified Texas that they should expect her treaties with them to be observed. Such a notification would have been uncalled for had it been certain that by law she would carry her foreign relations with her into the Union ; and the evident purpose was to make sure, if possible, by a sug- gestion of opposing annexation otherwise, that such should be the case in these specific instances. Texas merely replied that the matter in question would rest with the United States, which would no doubt be disposed to pursue an accept- able course ; and England and France did not question this view of the case. '^ E. g., Jay, Mexican War, 105. 276 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Akin to these arguments against the treaty was the demand that Mexico's assent be obtained. Insurmountable objections to asking her concurrence have ah'eady been pointed out, and Buchanan suggested still another difficulty. England is opposed to our pos- sessing Texas, he^said, and her influence with the IMexican govern- ment is very powerful. Therefore that government, even were they disposed to acquiesce, would be prevented from doing so; and to request their assent would be to invite Great Britain not only to interfere in our affairs, but to interfere in such a manner that we could not hold her responsible. Aside from the danger of English influence, however, every man could see for himself that Mexican consent could not be obtained, if at all, without long bargaining and many sorts of complications. In reality there was one complete and simple reply to all the objections growing out of the relations then existing between Texas and Mexico. Theoretically the state of hostilities continued still; and to be free from the danger of costly annoyances as well as obtain a legal title to her possessions, Texas was intensely anxious to have it in due form terminated. But actually that country was independent, and her revolutionary struggle had ended. Pin- pricking is not war, and for eight years nothing that could be called by the latter name had been waged on her soil. Not only the Amer- ican, but the English, French and Mexican governments had long since become satisfied that she would never be a part of the mother- country again. No thoughtful man anywhere dreamed of such an event. Every one could perceiye that even if her own strength seemed comparatively small, the apparent superiority of her enemies was unsubstantial, that she had friends who would not idly see her crushed, and that she possessed the means of purchasing — at a heavy cost perhaps — whatever aid might be needful. She occupied essentially the same position as Mexico had occupied for a period of fifteen years, during which she had been regarded by herself and by all other nations except Spain as sovereign. So far as the war continued, it did so merely because the Mexi- cans refused to accept formally the patent facts ; and logically, since they declared over and over again with full sincerity that never, never should the ungrateful rebels be acknowledged, Texas could not possibly obtain peace except by annihilating Mexico, in which case there would be the absurdity of a non-existent nation destroying one that existed, and the still more ludicrous corollary that now, THE FATE OF THE TREATY 277 having extinguished the only possible source of an indispensable recognition, Texas never could become a nation. Such was the destination of those who preferred theory to fact. Benton and others, to be sure, who argued that a war still existed, endeavored to escape by admitting that a period might come before long when it could be said — regardless of formalities — to have ended. But if eight years of actual independence, the concurrent opinion of the best informed cabinets, and the unanimous judgment of impartial observers could prove nothing, what could a few more months or even a couple of years demonstrate? Benton's and Van Buren's view that although such a time might soon come, it had not yet arrived, was evidently dictated by the necessities of their position ; and it was the duty of the American Senate to hold, as the courts hold, that even rights can be outlawed, and that when this stage has been reached, assertions cannot revive a claim ; and then to conclude that as Texas was now evidently independent, her revo- lutionary war must have come to an end in law as it had in fact.-- Doubtless it is just, as well as charitable, to believe that many of the Senators failed to perceive the strong points they denied or ignored ; but some considerations were too plain to be overlooked. In both parties reigned a marked unwillingness to allow John Tyler — especially John Tyler as a Presidential candidate — to have the credit of acquiring Texas ; and his term had so nearly elapsed that his power of patronage counted but feebly on the other side. The treaty was technically Calhoun's, and the Whigs and Van Buren men feared that a ratification of it might give its ostensible author a dangerous prestige. Northern anti-slavery sentiment, which Cal- houn's Pakenham letter made specially potent, signified a great deal, and it was represented by Governor Hammond and many others as the real cause of the adverse decision. Closely allied to this feeling was a dread of increasing the political power of the South, and enabling that section to control the government, enjoy the offices and destroy the tarifif. The treaty had, moreover, become a strictly party question, owing primarily — as Henderson reported and as we have observed — to the attitude of the Whigs. In June Clay would — To this line of argument it was objected that the independence of Texas, resting largely upon foreign support, was not real. But England would not have acknowledged the United States in 1783 had we not been supported by France and Spain. The same thing has been true in numerous instances ; and perhaps Belgium, Holland, and Denmark are nations only because any attempt to absorb them would be resisted by other couutries as well as by themselves. Of course only the principal points of the debate can be taken up here. Many tedious pages would be required merely to state all of them. ^78 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS not have penned his Raleigh letter, Henderson believed; but that letter had been written, the Whig convention had been silent on the topic, the Democratic platform had been strong for Texas, and it was impossible — politically speaking — for the Whig Senators to disavow their captain and follow the banner of the opposing party. Doubts existed also as to the expediency of extending the area of the United States, increasing the national debt and incorporating such people as the Texans were by many thought to be. In the opinion of not a few, the fact that a disputed region was claimed by Texas made the danger of trouble with Mexico peculiarly real ; and there was some practical fear that war might result from an- nexation. It cannot be doubted that a very natural objection existed in the Northeast, as in the case of buying Louisiana, against an extension of territory that would lessen the importance and political influence of that section. There was a general distaste for Tyler's method of bringing about the treaty, — mainly due to his unpopu- larity; there was a repugnance to his use of the military and naval forces of the United States in the interest of Texas ; and some objections to the terms of the treaty were felt. Cave Johnson wrote about the middle of May that he understood the Democratic Sena- tors favored annexation, but for substantially these last reasons opposed the treaty ; and Ingersoll, chairman of the committee on foreign affairs, stated in the House of Representatives that in the way it was brought about lay the true cause of its rejection. Alex- ander H. Stephens and six other Congressmen from his section exerted themselves against it on the ground that it did not secure the right of all States formed in Texas below the Missouri Compro- mise line to enter the Union with slavery. Finally, in the opinion of the British minister at Washington, " One thing that greatly con- tributed " to its failure was " the absence of all interference, at least open interference, in opposition to it on the part of England and France." Had ratification been seen to be possible, no doubt many friends of annexation would have given up their objections; but with a practical certainty on the other side they allowed their likes and their dislikes to have full sway.-^ ^Calhoun, speaking in the Senate on Feb. 12, 1847, said that the treaty " shared the fate that might almost have been expected from the weakness of the administration" (Works, iv., 334). (Feared) Jackson to Lewis, April 8, 1844 (conveying information received from Walker) : Ford Coll. (Hammond) N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 2, 1844. (Party question) Van Z., [No. 122], June 10, 1844. Hend. to Jones, June 2, 1844: Jones, Memor., 356. Johnson to Polk, May 16, 1844: Polk Pap. Ingersoll, Jan. 3, 1845: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 84. (Stephens) THE FATE OF THE TREATY 279 In the above analysis, it will be noted, real opposition to the ac- ceptance of Texas makes but a very small showing. The concomi- tants rather than the essentials of the treaty caused its rejection. This was highly significant. Van Zandt reported to his government two days after the Senate voted, that a majority of those in the negative desired to see the step taken at some future day; while the [Mexican consul at New Orleans, who had excellent means of informing himself as to the situation at Washington and kept a very close watch upon the matter, assured his chief that both parties really favored annexation, each of them desiring the credit of effecting it. Indeed, on learning the treaty had failed, he pre- dicted that it would be submitted to Congress and be ratified; and Pakenham concurred with his Mexican colleague in believing that the action of the Senate had not settled the question.-^ For Texas the result was on the whole rather fortunate. The treaty accepted her merely as a Territory, and appeared, since the American people did not seem to have decided in favor of annexa- tion, to receive her, as it were, through a back door. Moreover under it this country might have partitioned her area at its will, and perhaps have made the abolition of slavery a prerequisite for admis- sion to statehood. So far as the American Union was concerned, however, there was less opportunity for congratulation. Some of the reasons for the Senate's action were certainly far enough from patriotic, and it is not easy to see how any of them could stand against the value of that territory, the dangers arising from British and French exertions, and the likelihood — or at least the strong possibility — that if not annexed at this time Texas would remain permanently independent, and prove a cause of serious injury to us. It was not hard, perhaps, to believe the United States would be able to protect themselves against all mischances, and to hold that our weak neighbor could be brought within the pale at any Amer. Hist. Rev., viii., 93. Pak., No. 76, June 2T, 1844. A well-known historian says the Senators felt that Tyler and Calhoun had shown a lack of consideration for them by presenting the treaty as a jait accompli. If so, they were unreason- able, for (i) the administration had taken pains to prepare the public for the treaty, (2) the Senators knew well enough some time in advance what was afoot, (3) an avoidance of publicity was highly important, and (4) the administration had full authority under the constitution to negotiate in secret (which the critic admits). The same author says that the Executive put pressure upon the Senate by saying, " Now or never " ; but if such was the President's opinion (as no doubt it was), growing out of circumstances known to him, be owed it to the country to state as much. "Van Z., [No. 122], June 10, 1844. Mex. consul, N. Orl., No. 36, May 23; No. 58, June 11, 1844. Pak., No. 76, June 27, 1844. 280 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS moment, and one must hope that such views partially explained the course of Clay and most of those on his side of the question ; but considerations of this order were fitter for the platform and the daily press than for the Senate, and they could not excuse public men for playing party and personal games with a great issue. In all probability had Clay and Calhoun, Benton, Van Buren and Web- ster acted as patriots and statesmen, the treaty could have been amended until fairly satisfactory to the North and then promptly ratified, without giving Tyler an undue political advantage or seri- ously affecting the balance of the parties ; and the conscientious anti-slavery men, for their part, might have seen that the absorption of Texas was not only just and expedient but inevitable, and after making the best fight possible for their convictions, might have arranged on good terms with the eager annexationists. The rejection of the treaty, it cannot bc'denied, assisted those Texans who desired to pursue a career of national independence, gave England and France an opportunity for deeper intrigues with Texas and Mexico, and exposed the United States, as we shall see, to a very imminent danger of having to choose between humilia- tion and misfortune on the one hand and a conflict with those powers and Mexico on the other. It also favored the Democratic party and the South, since it made annexation a prominent and somewhat influential issue and a terrible stumbling-block to Henry Clay in the Presidential campaign; and perhaps the opposition that caused the failure of the treaty was responsible for the war that soon came upon us, — first, because it encouraged Mexico to refuse our offer of accommodation ; and secondly, because the action of the Senate postponed a settlement of the difficulty with her until she had far more reason than at this time to count on the support of England against us. But for a while, at least, the victors felt highly pleased, and John Quincy Adams remarked in his diary that the repudiation of the treaty had delivered the United States, " by the special interposition of Almighty God," from " a conspiracy comparable to that of Lucius Sergius Catalina.'"-^ ^ Adams, Memoirs, xii., 49. Mexico lost heavily, perhaps, for W. B. Lewis, after conferring with Tyler, understood that the intention was to leave her the Santa Fe valley and her settlements on the Rio Grande (to Jackson. April 18, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll.). From this point of view the rejection of the treaty benefited the United States, though at the expense of a war. (Offer of accom.) Chapter xiv. XIV The Issue is Re-shaped One of the first things reported by Henderson after his arrival at Washington was an assurance on the part of the American gov- ernment that, in case of necessity, the project of annexation could and would be carried through — Texas assenting — by a legislative act. On the day the treaty was signed Van Zandt wrote that the President had promised, should it not be ratified, to urge imme- diately upon Congress the passage of an equivalent law, based upon that provision of the constitution which empowers the two Houses jointly to admit new States. The prospect of such action on the part of the Executive was made known in the daily papers, possibly with a hope of influencing the Senate, in the interval between the signing of the treaty and its presentation to that body, and after its rejection was virtually certain the Madisonian put forth a defi- nite announcement of the same nature. Blair, while in great distress over the censures that greeted Van Buren's letter, thought its effect might be counteracted by having the ex-President's friends offer an annexation bill in Congress, and endeavored to bring this about. Thus the expedient of acquiring Texas by a joint resolution, al- though opponents of annexation asserted it had never been dreamed of until the one method which they considered proper had been rejected by the Senate, was unquestionably in reserve all the time. During the first fortnight of May, Van Zandt became afraid that should the treaty fail, not enough of the session would be left for the passage of a bill on the subject; but by the middle of the month the Philadelphia Ledger represented the advocates of annexation as full of spirit, expecting to hear by the tenth of June that Mexico had assented and the cession of San Francisco was probable, and count- ing upon this news as forcible enough to drive a joint resolution through Congress during the remaining week.^ Tyler for his part, though perhaps temporarily depressed by the ^ See General Note, p. i. Hend. to Jones, March 30. 1844: Jones. Memor., 333. Hend. and Van Z., April 12, 1844. Nat. InteU., April 19, 1844. Phil. Ledger, April 20, 1844. Madis.. May 24, 1844, Blair to Jackson, Sept. 28 1S44: Jackson Pap. Van Z., No. 120, May 11, 1844. Ledger, May 15, 1844. 282 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS fate of the treaty, did not lose faith in the project. It appeared to him, as he told Jackson, " so mighty a question as ultimately to look down all opposition." In other language, he doubtless believed that enough Whigs to ensure success would sooner or later be compelled by the popular sentiment of their States, as had been the case with Henderson, to support it. Accordingly, two days after the Senate rejected the fruit of his negotiations, he sent a Message to the House of Representatives, together with the treaty and all the docu- ments relating to it that had been transmitted to the Senate. - While this matter was before the other branch of the national legislature, he explained, I did not think it proper to consult you regarding it. But Congress has power by " some other form of proceeding to accomplish everything that a formal ratification of the treaty could have accomplished " ; and I feel it my duty to lay before you all the facts in my possession that would assist you " to act with full light," if you desire to take any steps. In my judg- ment the question is one of "vast magnitude" and "enduring char- acter." Within no long period Texas is capable of almost or quite doubling the exports of this country, thereby making an " almost incalculable " addition to our carrying-trade, and giving " a new impulse of immense importance to the commercial, manufacturing, agricultural, and shipping interests of the Union." At the same time, the acquisition of that country would afford protection to an exposed frontier, and place the United States as a whole " in a condition of security and repose." The matter is therefore in no way sectional or local, but has " addressed itself to the interests of every part of the country and made its appeal to the glory of the American name." " I have carefully reconsidered the objections which have been urged to immediate action upon the subject," continued the Presi- dent, " without in any degree having been struck by their force." We could not have asked the assent of Mexico, for such a course not only might have failed but might have been regarded as " oft'en- sive " to her and " insulting " to Texas ; and a negotiation to that end would have implied that our recognition of the latter country " was fraudulent, delusive, or void." Only after acquiring the terri- tory could we have any discussion with Mexico as to its boundary ; = Tyler to Jackson, April i8, 1844: Jackson Pap. Richardson, Messages, iv.,* 323. The accompanying documents included those which the Senate had seemed determined to suppress. The Message was dated June 10 and received in Congress June II. THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 283 and the question of. limits was purposely left open, with a view to securing a friendly and pacific settlement with that power. As for our treaty with her, it is merely commercial ; and it would no more be violated by our receiving Texas than would our compacts with most of the nations of the earth. The argument against the exten- sion of our territory was urged with great zeal against the purchase of Louisiana, and its futility was long since " fully demonstrated." Moreover since that day the use of the steam-engine has brought the region beyond the Sabine, for all practical purposes, much nearer to the seat of government than was Louisiana in 1803. After discussing these objections Tyler brought up certain points of special urgency. Annexation, he said, " is to encounter a great, if not certain, hazard of final defeat if something be not nozv done to prevent it." Upon this point your serious attention is invited to my Message of ]\Iay i6 and the accompanying documents, not yet made public by the Senate. The letters bearing no signature are from " persons of the first respectability and citizens of Texas," who have " such means of obtaining information as to entitle their statements to full credit." Nor has anything occurred to weaken, but on the contrary much has occurred to support, my confidence in the belief of General Jackson and in my own belief, expressed at the close of that Message, '"that instructions have already been given by the Texan Government to propose to the Government of Great Britain, forthwith on the failure [of the treaty], to enter into a treaty of commerce and an alliance offensive and defensive.' " Particular attention is also invited to the recent conversation between Brougham and Aberdeen in the House of Lords on the subject of annexation. " That a Kingdom which is made what it is now by repeated acts of annexation . . . should perceive any principle either novel or serious in the late proceedings of the American Executive in regard to Texas is well calculated to excite surprise." It may be presumed that Great Britain would be the last power in the world to maintain that a nation has no right to part with its sovereignty. Certainly " the commercial and political relations of many of the countries of Europe have undergone repeated changes by voluntary treaties, by conquest, and by partitions of their terri- tories without any question as to the right under the public law " ; and it cannot be pretended that the agreements which Texas has made abroad forbid her to join the American Union. We leave the European powers exclusive control over matters affecting their conti- 284 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS nent, and we expect a like exemption from interference. If annexa- tion occur, it will result from the " free and unfettered action of the people of the two countries ; and it seems altogether becoming in me to say that the honor of the country, the dignity of the American name, and the permanent interests of the United States would for- bid acquiescence " in any foreign interposition. The great issue now is not as to the manner of accomplishing annexation, con- cluded the President, but " whether it shall be accomplished or not " ; and " the responsibility of deciding this question is now devolved upon you." The Message was characterized by the New York Herald as " a very clear, forcible, and manly exposition " of the matter ; and it would be hard indeed to give a different verdict.^ On the same day Benton asked leave of the Senate to bring in a bill providing for the annexation of Texas, and spoke in substance as follows : I have had this matter in mind for a quarter of a cen- tury. Now that the treaty is out of the way, it is proper for the true friends of the cause, of whom I am the eldest, to resume their task. The consent of Congress is necessary for the admission of new States, and this consent — when there is time to obtain it — should precede the negotiations, for otherwise how can the treaty- making power promise admission to the Union? Individual opin- ions are not an adequate basis for such a pledge ; and besides how could they be solicited by the President without compromising the independence of Congressmen, and opening the door to collusion between the executive and the legislative departments? The con- sent of Mexico is necessary at present, but may cease to be so ; and it is for Congress to decide regarding that point. To break off the subsisting armistice and thus frustrate the efforts of Texas to ob- tain peace would be a " hideous crime " ; hence we must await its expiration. Further, it is good policy for us to remain on friendly terms with Mexico, so as to conserve our trade there ; and it is for her interest to give her assent. If on the other hand she affects to contemplate re-conquest and keeps up a desultory war. Congress will determine what course to take. Should its decision involve a conflict, this would at any rate have been brought about in a con- stitutional manner. Such was Benton's argument. The bill itself provided that the boundaries of Texas, as annexed, should not in- clude the territory to which her claim was disputed; that a majority of her people should give their consent to the surrender of sover- ^ Herald. June 15, 1844. THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 285 eignty ; that a " State of Texas," of a size to be fixed by itself but not larger than the largest existing member of the Union, should be admitted ; that the rest of the acquired area should form the " South- west Territory"; that slavery should be prohibited in one-half of this Territory; and that the assent of Mexico should be obtained, but could be " dispensed with when the Congress of the United States might deem said assent to be unnecessary."* It hardly needs to be said that such a bill could not please the ultra friends of Texas. The New York Aurora called it a " stupid, anti-republican project." In the eyes of the Richmond Enquirer it was a " disgraceful trick and humbug." Jackson declared that its provision for asking the consent of Mexico was degrading to our national character, which, after our official assertions that Texas had become an independent nation, it really seemed to be. As the Globe admitted later, the bill contained elements that precluded its passage ; but it was taken up and argued again by its author on the thirteenth, and then by a strict party vote of twenty-five to twenty — except that one Whig and one Democrat changed sides — was laid on the table.^ Meanwhile a joint resolution, moved by McDuffie about three weeks earlier in an executive session, had come before the Senate in due course on June 11. This provided in substance that the treaty of annexation should be ratified by Congress, as "a. fundamental law entered into between the United States and Texas." as soon as the supreme executive and legislative departments of the latter country should accept and confirm the compact ; and four days later AIcDuffie rose to advocate his plan. A joint resolution passed by the whole Congress and signed by the President, he said, would be a legitimate act and still more solemn than a treaty. The Execu- tive was guilty of no disrespect to the Senate, as some have charged, in proposing such a measure after our vote on the subject, for this body has no exclusive authority in public affairs. The question of annexation has not been disposed of by our action. We have killed the treatv, but " a ghost is sometimes more terrible than a living man." Murdered Caesar appeared to the leading conspirator against him and said, "I will meet you, again, at Philippi." If the ghost of this treaty — if the ghost of Texas — should present itself here *Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 653 ; Benton, Abr. Debates, xv., 142. Properly speaking, there was of course no " armistice." '^Aurora and Rich. Enq. : Nat. Intell.. Jan. 17, 1844. Jackson to Blair, June 7, 1844: Jackson Pap. Globe, March 26, 1845. 286 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to haunt the midnight couch of any Senator, to whom could it exclaim with more propriety than to the gentleman from Missouri, "Et tu, Brute?" Benton's assumption that he is the true friend of Texas would be offensive, could it be taken seriously. He thinks that all the rest of us should go to school to him in statesmanship ; but the truth is that he occupies a very awkward position, and is going to find himself in very strange company, for he opposes the candidate of his own party on this question. He denounces the President for making public certain documents [accompanying his message of May i6] from which the Senate had not removed the injunction of secrecy; but the Executive had a perfect right to prevent the suppression of papers which the people are entitled to see. He denounces Texas for negotiating with the United States during the armistice; but an armistice is merely an agreement not to make war for a specified time. He thinks it absurd to suppose that Great Britain would enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with a small nation like Texas ; but while it would of course be ridiculous for her to expect aid from that republic in her Euro- pean conflicts, it would be very natural to make such a treaty for the purpose of guaranteeing the independence of Texas in return for commercial and other advantages. He inveighs against the plan of annexing that country without the concurrence of Mexico ; but his own bill proposes to do this whenever Congress shall see fit.*' Yes, retorted Benton, but my bill refers the question of war to Congress, where it belongs, whereas the negotiators of the treaty made war themselves — unconstitutionally, perfidiously, clandestinely and piratically — upon a friendly nation. My bill gives Mexico an opportunity to do what it is for her interest to do, — that is, to assent. The President's Message to the House of Representatives, like Genet's proclamation, is an attempt to excite insurrection against a part of the government. McDuffie pretends to answer me; but re- garding the vital objections to the treaty he says nothing. He charges me with making anti-annexation speeches, but what I have done is to make anti-treaty speeches ; and the treaty was not drawn for the purpose of obtaining Texas, but, by bringing that country in as a Territory with a view to laying it out in slave States, to prepare openly for another Missouri question, and pave the way for a disso- lution of the Union. Troops have been concentrated in the South on an unconstitutional pretext ; our ships and soldiers have been ' Co)ig. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 661. 688; App., 588. THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 287 placed under the authority of a foreign President; and an excuse is found in a letter of Aberdeen's for an agreement previously made. The slavery correspondence with Pakenham was designed to pre- vent annexation and thus ensure disunion. It is against these things — not against the acquisition of Texas — that I have spoken. Mc- Duffie thinks I shall find myself in strange company. Well, so will he. He will find himself in the company of Jackson; and when the Old Hero discovers his treasonable intentions, let him beware ! "The tiger will not be toothless." And here, Mr. President, I must speak out. The country is in danger. Disunion is at the bottom of this long concealed Texas machination. Political intrigue and financial speculation co-operate, but disunion lies at the bottom of it ; and " I denounce it to the American people." A new con- federacy, stretching from the Atlantic to California, is " the cherished vision of disappointed ambition." The Senator threatens me with a ghost (upon' this Benton approached McDuffie and ad- dressed him personally) ; but let me tell him that if I find myself at Philippi, I shall not, like Brutus, fall upon my sword, but I shall save it for another purpose, — " for the hearts of the traitors who appear in arms against their country." At this he struck a heavy blow on McDufiie's desk ; but the latter, now sick and emaciated, though he met the gaze of his powerful antagonist with a flashing look, made no answer to the charge of treason.'^ jNIcDufiie's joint resolution represented of course the wishes of the administration, since it merely embodied a new method of carry- ing the old treaty ; but for that very reason it entered the lists under unfavorable auspices. Moreover it conceded nothing to the opposition. They were invited to accept under another name the particular thing which they had just rejected. At first it was said that Benton had intimated an intention to endorse the plan ; but this was a little before the meeting of the Democratic convention, and many suspected that his design was to mislead the annexationists as to the attitude of Van Buren and himself. At all events he did not support the measure, and it was laid on the table by a vote of twenty-seven to nineteen, — certainly a verdict sufficiently unfavor- able, but noticeably less emphatic than the treaty had just received.^ ' Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., App.. 607. It will be noted that Benton offers a new theory here as to the disunion plan of his opponents. His assertion that our troops had been placed under Houston was only a figure of speech. Blair to Jackson, July 7, 1844: Jackson Pap. Rich. Whig, June 18, 1844. Nilcs, Ixvi., 295. *Van Z. and Hend., No. 121. May 25, 1844. Cong. Globe. 28 Cong., i sess., 661. McDuffie's bill was laid on the table June 11, but was taken up again on the iSth in order to give him an opportunity to reply to Benton. 288 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS The session of Congress was now almost at an end. Not only the friends but the enemies of annexation felt anxious. The Wash- ington correspondent of the New York Evening Post had written some time before that according to the general opinion the President would occupy Texas after the adjournment of the legislative branch, and so bring on a war. Louisiana talked of making a treaty of her own with that country. Tyler was thinking, it was commonly sup- posed, of having an extra session of Congress in September, and recommending the passage of a joint annexation resolution. The friends of Texas felt determined to press the subject unless she herself should decline, believing that a very large majority of both Houses favored the measure, but finally, counting probably on the election of Polk, they thought it better to wait for the next regular session; and some enemies of the cause, particularly those repre- sented by the Evening Post, expected or pretended to expect, that the matter " would all quietly evaporate in talking and scribbling." So ended the first session of the Twenty-eighth Congress.** Meanwhile Thompson had proceeded on his way to Mexico, bearing with him a despatch from Calhoun to Duff Green's son, who was now acting as charge at that post. In this document, dated April 19, the Secretary of State announced that the treaty for annexation would be laid before the Senate without delay, and directed Green, in making this fact known to the Mexican govern- ment, to give " the strongest assurance " that we had no feeling of " disrespect or indifference to the honor or dignity "of that country, and should greatly regret it were our action to be interpreted other- wise; that our step was a measure of self-defence, forced upon us by the policy of England regarding abolition in Texas ; that Eng- land had the power to carry her point there, and not only the neighboring States but the Union as a whole would thus be endan- gered ; that as the only way to fend off this peril the American administration had negotiated the treaty, acting thus " in full view of all possible consequences, but not without a desire and hope that a full and fair disclosure of the causes which induced it to do so would prevent the disturbance of the harmony subsisting between the two countries," which the American government were truly anxious to preserve ; that the President wished to " settle all ques- tions between the two countries which might grow out of this treaty, "Post: Nat. liitclL, May 24, 1844. Nat. IntclL. May 22. 1844. (Thinking) Raymond to Jones, June 5. 1844: Jones, Memor., 359. Van Z., No. 123, June 13, 1844. Post: Nat. IntclL, June 17, 1844. THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 289 or any other cause, on the most hberal and satisfactory terms, in- cluding that of boundary;" that the United States would have been glad to proceed in the matter with the concurrence of Mexico, but with all their respect for her and an " anxious desire that the two countries should continue on friendly terms," they could not make what they " believed might involve the safety of the Union itself depend on the contingency of obtaining the previous consent " of a foreign power; and that they had done all they could to render the terms of the treaty " as little objectionable to Mexico as possible," — for instance, had left the boundary question open, " to be fairly and fully discussed and settled according to the rights of each [nation], and the mutual interest and security of the two countries." To support the despatch, Calhoun enclosed copies of Aberdeen's letter and his own reply to Pakenham.^" Thompson, however, did not proceed at once to his destination. Though studiously described by the American government as a bearer of despatches, he was not simply a messenger, for his letter of introduction to Green directed the latter to take him into consul- tation; and the British minister in Mexico reported that as soon as possible, after landing at Vera Cruz on the fourteenth of May, he turned his steps toward Santa Anna's country-house at the National Bridge, not very far from the coast. The truth appears to be that Almonte, while declining to negotiate on the subject himself, had encouraged Calhoun to believe that his government, looking upon Texas as irretrievably lost, would accept a pecuniary consideration from the American Union in order to lessen the misfortune, and had actually transmitted to them a suggestion of this kind. His pur- pose, the British minister concluded after talking with him more than once, was " to gain time, and perhaps to obtain some advan- tage for His Government, in the acknowledgment which such an offer on the part of the United States would convey, of a still exist- ing right in Mexico over Texas." Thompson was therefore directed — according to the best information Pakenham could obtain — to offer ]\Iexico $6,000,000 or even, if California could be had. $10,- 000.000 for her complaisance. This amount, however, was not to be paid in cash, but was to be an offset against the pending American claims ; and any one acquainted with Santa Anna's fondness for the ring of solid gold and the confidence that he felt in his own ability "*To Green, No. i, April 19, 1844: Sen, Doc. 341, 28 Cong., i sess., 53. As Mexico stood for the abolition of slavery, Calhoun's line of thought was peculiarly infelicitous ; but this was a very subordinate matter and unavoidable. 20 290 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to evade obligations, could easily predict how such a proposal would strike him.^^ • Definite information on the point is contained in a letter which that personage addressed without delay to the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations. According to him, Thompson informed the Comandante General of Vera Cruz that he had been particularly instructed to obtain a personal interview with Santa Anna, and on arriving at the country-house with his interpreter spoke sub- stantially in these terms : The President of the United States recently made a treaty with commissioners on the part of Texas for the annexation of that territory to the Union, and submitted the treaty to the Senate; but when the subject came to be considered in that body, it was regarded as indispensably due to the most rigorous justice to make no final decision without first having opened negotiations with Mexico, as required by the relations of amity existing between the two nations. The American govern- ment were impelled to sign the treaty by the law of self-preserva- tion, in view of the intrigues set on foot by England to acquire a preponderance in Texas. They were further impelled to do so by the commercial interests of the United States, which have suffered enormously in consequence of the illicit introduction of European g jods across the southwestern frontier, amounting the past year — according to definite information — to at least $2,000,000. But it is net the intention of the President, nor does the Senate purpose, to act definitively upon a subject of such grave importance without first asking the consent of this Republic [sin, como se ha indicado, contar con la voluntad de esta Reptiblica], and in case it be obtained indemnifying her amply for the territory acquired [y en tal caso ofreccrle etc.]. Indeed under the circumstances all friends of justice and all persons of foresight and judgment agree, that the first step to be taken is to secure the consent of ^Mexico; and although, for the reasons already suggested and for others, public sentiment in the United States is strongly favorable to annexation, — so strongly that even the opposition have felt compelled to give way, — yet this is not the case in such a degree as to render the government unmindful of what is required by the national honor and by equity. It is thought to be for the interest of Mexico herself, as well as the United States, to proceed at once to determine the common boundaries, even though in so doing she should be obliged " Madis., July 23, 1844. Green, No. 5, May 30, 1844. Bankhead, Xo. 34, May 30, 1844. Pak., Nos. 22, 36, 46, April 14, 28; May 13, 1844. THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 29I to give up a portion of the territory over which she possesses rights of ownership [tcrritorio sobrc cl cual ticne dcrcchos por scr dc su pcrtoicncia], in which case a corresponding indemnity would cer- tainly be paid to her; and the boundary thus finally adjusted would be placed under the guaranty of the United States, or even (should it be thought necessary) under that of some of the European powers, so that there might be established a settled state of things, free from all foreign influence and from the pernicious eiTects of the smug- gling already mentioned, to promote which there is reason to fear that all the chief seaports of Texas will eventually — should she remain independent — be declared free cities, in order that the vessels of every nation may enter without the least hindrance. The population of Texas, continued Thompson in Santa Anna's narrative, has undergone a remarkable change, so that for one North American it now contains five natives of other countries. The rights of Mexico over that territory cannot possibly be denied, — an important basis for the proposed negotiation. In this view of the subject, it would be highly important to lay aside, as though it had never existed, the immediate Texas question, properly so called, and proceed at once to the settlement of boundaries without regard to the character of the population. In conclusion, for all these reasons combined the Executive of the United States has thought this a favorable juncture to bring the matter before the authorities of Mexico, and to arrange the preliminaries of a con- vention wdiich, with all due regard to equity and justice, might smooth over the difficulties found in their way by the American government, consulting at the same time the mutual and reciprocal interests of both republics, and having always in view one great object common to both, — to wit, the interests of this hemisphere, which ought to be maintained by the firmest union and most incor- ruptible good faith against the machinations, arts and ambitious views of every European power to which these may be attributed.^^ To all this reasoning Santa Anna represented himself in his letter as replying in the following manner: If the clandestine traffic carried on through Texas is prejudicial to the interests of the United States, they have only themselves to blame, since they af- forded protection to the adventurers gathered in that quarter, even to the point of recognizing them as an independent nation. The " Calhoun told W. B. Lewis that S. An. received Thompson " rather kindly " (Lewis to Jackson, July 19, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll.). S. An. to Bo- canegra, May 17, 1844: Diario, June 8, 1844. 292 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS President of the United States, in my opinion, has not acted very discreetly in negotiating for the annexation of the territory with those who are just now in possession of it, since — being mostly a portion of the American people, though they have assumed the name of Texans — they had no authority to treat for the disposal of a country not belonging to them. As Mexico, deeming her rights unquestionable, has resolved to maintain and never to relinquish them, she deems inadmissible the proposition of the United States, as well as every other idea of ceding territory to them. In fact she is determined to undertake afresh, and to prosecute with vigor, the war against Texas. ... If, then, the American government desire in good faith to put an end to the disorders which reign there and cause the United States so much concern, the best method would be to induce that rebellious province to recognize the suprem- acy of the mother-country. In the maintenance of her rights Mex- ico will wage war to the last ; and since nations never die, the right of re-conquering Texas will be transmitted to posterity. Such is the sentiment of her government and of her people. As for a settle- ment of the boundaries of the two countries, they have been dis- tinctly ascertained and established on former occasions . . . ; and Mexico will never consent to the annexation of the territory in question to the United States. Just how much of this account should be accepted is of course an interesting question. The mere fact that Santa Anna made such a statement counts practically for nothing. One familiar with his methods, with the state of politics in Mexico down to that moment, and with the lines of thought on the subject followed by public men there, finds clear enough evidence that a considerable portion of the ideas attributed to his visitor emanated from a Mexican rather than from an American mind. On the other hand, a person who has read the correspondence between our State department and our representatives in that country from the beginning until June, 1844, readily detects a number of familiar considerations. Thomp- son's report of the interview seems to have been entirely verbal. He did, however, in consequence of the publication of this narra- tive, address a letter to the National Intelligencer, declaring that Santa Anna's account of the affair was erroneous in many particu- lars; that he did not represent himself as a diplomatic agent; that when asked whether he had any specific instructions, he referred the inquirer to his despatches; that he said "nothing inconsistent THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 293 with the contents of the despatch addressed to Mr. Green . . . and nothing but what was consistent with the message of the President of the United States, in reply to the resolution of the Senate of the thirteenth of Alay last," in which Tyler had stated that no one had been sent off to secure the assent of Mexico to the annexation treaty. In commenting on this statement, the editors of the paper observed that by implication Thompson admitted the substantial accuracy of Santa Anna's account. This is probably going too far ; but it seems quite likely that the bearer of despatches made propositions regarding the surrender of Texas — and probably the surrender of northern California also — in consideration of certain financial off- sets and a certain linking of United States and Mexican policies for mutual advantage against the old world, while it is practically incredible that the claims of ]\Iexico were acknowledged in such a manner as Santa Anna described. Farther than this it would not be safe to go. To accept the Mexican President's version of the matter, one would have to believe that Calhoun sent a message by Thompson astonishingly at variance with his despatch to the charge, with his attitude before the American people, and with his position regarding Texas, — a message that would have given aid to his enemies at home and abroad, thrown confusion among his friends, and mortally offended the Texans ; while on the other hand it was plainly for the interest of Santa Anna to represent Thompson's language as he did, and he was perfectly capable of invention.^^ The bearer of despatches reached the city of Mexico on the twenty-second of May. The next day Green had an interview with Bocanegra, the Minister of Foreign Relations, and proposed that the Mexican representative at Washington should be authorized to receive proposals and open negotiations regarding the boundary between the two countries. Out of this grew a conference between the Acting President on the one side and Green, supported by Thompson, on the other. The full account of this interview was made orally by the latter on his return to the United States ; but the charge transmitted a brief protocol, from which it would appear that each man attempted to grapple his opponent advantageously ; " The account reads as if Santa Anna had first written down what Thompson said and then had inserted changes and interpolations. Thompson to Gales and Seaton, Aug. 7, 1844: Nat. Intell., Aug. 12, 1844. According to Van Zandt (No. 125, June 18, 1844) Thompson stated that he submitted no definite proposition to the Mexican government ; and it is easy to believe that Santa Anna's attitude gave him no encouragement to do so. Of course the subject of ceding territory could be disguised under that of adjusting the boundary. 294 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS that is to say, Green endeavored to commit the other side to the idea of negotiation, and the Acting President undertook to force Green to either recognize the existing treaty of Hmits or distinctly repudiate it. Mexico undoubtedly had not the least intention of acceding to the wishes of the United States, and under such circum- stances the interview was inevitably fruitless.^* The course of the Mexican government, our charge said, was " entirely owing to the fact " that they believed the treaty for the annexation of Texas would be rejected by the Senate, and counted on " our internal dissension growing out of the question of slavery." There were, however, concurrent motives of a domestic sort. Santa Anna still needed a strong army to support him, still found the Texas difficulty an opportune excuse for the necessary expenditures and convenient peculations of the war department, and had good reason to think that any step of his toward favoring the wishes of the American government would be seized upon by his enemies as the pretext for a revolution. Evading responsibility, he left the min- isters to say how the American proposition should be met, but ad- monished them to settle the matter without delay ; and they, what- ever their opinion as to the true interests of the country and what- ever their hesitation about incurring unpopular expenses, doubtless understood the will of their master and saw as well as he the danger of "truckling" to the United States. In view of Santa Anna's order and an official communication from our charge trans- mitting the substance of Calhoun's despatch the cabinet met, and its decision of course was to reject the American overture. ^^ In reply to Green, the IMinister of Foreign Relations now drew up a letter which declared that in taking steps to annex Texas the United States had not followed the principles of " reason, polit- ical truth, and justice " ; and that Mexico had been injured in her rights and outraged in her honor and dignity. Further he asserted that the language used by Calhoun and Green expressly recognized the claims of his country; and instead of consenting to cede any- thing belonging to her, he repeated the protest of August 23, 1843, that the incorporation of Texas in the American Union would be regarded as equivalent to a declaration of war. Before sending his letter, Bocanegra asked the British representative whether Mexico " Green to Calhoun, No. 5. May 30, 1844. '"Green to Calhoun, No. 5, May 30, 1844. (S. An.'s action) Bank., No. 34, May 30, 1844. Green to Bocanegra, May 23, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 52. Bank., No. 85, Sept. 29, 1844. D. Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 975. THE ISSUE IS RE-SHAPED 295 would have to stand alone in this position. Bankhead replied that he thought she could count upon the sympathy of England, but that he had no authority to answer the question. Not discouraged, however, by this rather cold comfort, Bocanegra took the plunge and then laid the matter otificially before the foreign diplomatic corps, evidently to gain support. About the same time the newspapers, which had been maintaining some reserve in reference to the United States, took their cue from an article that appeared in a journal under Santa Anna's direct influence, and broke forth — to quote Bankhead — " in the most violent strain of invective against the con- templated annexation"; while Green and Bocanegra increased the tension by engaging in a duel of correspondence, each endeavoring to gain points for his country and himself. During the progress of the fight, Santa Anna came up to the capital and assumed the reins of government, thus associating himself with Bocanegra's policy; and he soon proceeded to call upon Congress for 30,000 more soldiers and four millions of money." Thompson had been expected to be in Washington again within forty or at most forty-five days from the time of his departure. This was perhaps impossible; but at all events, whether it was possible or not, he only reached the capital on the seventeenth of June. That was the day when Congress adjourned, and by accident or design he did not present himself until after the hour of dispersal. Rumors were afloat very soon that Mexico had gladly given her assent, but through one of Calhoun's confidential friends a hint of opposition leaked out. From Vera Cruz information rather more substantial than hints to that efifect arrived almost immediately; and it was evident enough before long that the special mission had been a failure. Indeed a Spanish newspaper in New York soon published a despatch from the Mexican government to Almonte, dated May 30, 1844, directing him to "persist" in his protests against annexation, "and especially in that of the twenty-third of August, 1843." In two significant respects, then, the annexation question had now been re-shaped. It was no longer a diplomatic subject in the keeping of the treaty-making power, but had been placed formally ^'Bocanegra to Green, May 30, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 53, Bank., No. 35, May 30, 1844. Bocanegra, circular, May 31, 1844: Sria. Relac. Bank., No. 34, May 30, 1844. Green to Calhoun, June 7, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 57. Corr. of Green and Bocanegra: ib., 58 et seq. Bank., Nos. 39, 41, 43, June 29, 1844. 296 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS by the President before the popular branch of Congress and thus indirectly before the people. At the same time it had become clear that opposition and not concurrence on the part of Mexico was to be expected. ^^ "Nat. Intell., June 19, 1844. Niles, June 22, 1844. Wash. Globe, June 18, 1844. (From V. Cr.) N. Orl. Picayune, June 11, 1844. Pak., No. 74, June 27, 1844, with the despatch to Almonte. XV The Annexation Question in the Presidential Campaign It now becomes necessary to study the question of annexation as it presented itself to the people, so far as one can judge of that from the indications of a Presidential contest. Under any circum- stances the wide induction which an inquiry like this requires would be very difificult ; and in the present case it is peculiarly so, because the obtainable information is very incomplete and more or less prejudiced; but some conclusions can probably be drawn with a fair degree of accuracy. In spite of the way in which it came about and in spite also of much confusing talk, a rather definite issue regarding annexation existed between the two great parties. " It is either Polk and Texas or neither Polk nor Texas," declared Webster. Among the reasons given by the Massachusetts Whig convention for support- ing the party candidate was this: "If Clay is elected President, Texas never will be annexed to the United States — whilst if Polk is elected, it will be annexed immediately." Cassius >M. Clay defined the issues of the day as, " On one side, Polk, slavery, and Texas, and on the other, Clay, Union and liberty." These were campaign distortions; but any intelligent person could see that the Whigs represented more or less delay, with all the uncertainties it involved, while the Democrats represented active pressure toward annexation, with a reasonable prospect of soon reaching it should they be given control of the government. And the question was not only an issue but a prominent one. According to Greeley's paper, the New York Tribune, Polk's claims were distinctly urged, not only in the South but as a rule in the North, on this ground, and in processions and meetings the flag of the Lone Star was " blazoned on high " beside the Stars and Stripes. "If there is any one question which is more popular than the rest with the united democracy, south and north," said the Register of New Haven, Connecticut, with natural exaggeration yet considerable truth, " it is the annexation of Texas ' at the earliest practicable period ' " ; while at the same time, in the North at least, the Whigs also devoted nmcli altention to it and, 207 298 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS said the Portland American, "made their most constant and inflam- matory appeals on this question."^ Probably, however, annexation was somewhat more prominent than important in men's thoughts. There were particular reasons for making it conspicuous. The Texas question should not be over- looked, wrote a campaigner to Polk ; the battles, murders and the like excite the people, and I never before handled a subject so valu- able for the purpose. The banner of the single star doubled the amount of bunting that could properly be displayed at the head of a column. In the State of New York and perhaps elsewhere Texas was represented in the Whig processions by a flag draped in black and a girl dressed in mourning, and the orators of the day painted sable pictures of the evils that would result from annexation, while in the Democratic parades the fairest maiden of the village, decked out in white and flowers, personated the Sister Republic, and the topic of uniting the two nations was discussed in glowing periods; and precisely because the matter was novel and could be treated so picturesquely, it was sure to be put forward. Fervid appeals to the love of liberty, the hatred of mercenary troops, the distrust of England and the inborn predilection for humanity, benevolence and brotherhood could be made on this theme to almost any extent. Less thrilling but no less effective allusions to the sale of Northern manufactures in Texas and the employment of Northern vessels to transport them were equally available. All capable of reflecting, however, saw that very different and very important matters were also at stake. The Nashville Whig, for instance, declared that a majority of the people of Tennessee did not think Tyler's pet scheme should absorb all other issues. The real themes of the campaign, said the New York Herald, are the National Bank and annexation, putting Texas in the second place. The Democratic Central Com- mittee of Virginia in making an appeal to the voters in behalf of annexation added, " We do not desire, much less design to sink the other great questions of Bank, Tariff, and Distribution, for the sake even of acquiring Texas " ; and Webster, who stumped New York and Pennsylvania, devoted little or no attention to this matter in his speeches.^ ^ See General Note, p. i. Webster, Speech at Boston, Sept. 19, 1844: N. Y. Joiirn. Com., Sept. 21, 1844. (Mass. Com.) Mobile Com. Reg., Nov. 5. 1844. (C. M. C.) Wash. Globe, Sept. 6, 1844. Tribune, Nov. 18, 1844. Reg-: Wash. Globe, Aug. 3, 1844. Amer,, Dec. 9, 1844. "Fitzgerald to Polk (in substance), June 8, 1844: Polk Pap. (N. Y.) Dickin- son: Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., App., 321. Whig: Nat. Intell., June 17, 1844. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 299 No doubt there was much real sentiment in favor of the meas- ure. The New York Evening Post was said to be about the only- journal of its party that did not support it. "The South is up; the cause of Texas is flying like wild-fire over that whole region," exclaimed the Richmond Enquirer in June. Yet one must surely doubt, not only the accuracy of such a campaign outburst as this, but the genuineness, in some cases, of the zeal that really could be observed. Not only did party needs call for it, but special ma- chinery for exciting enthusiasm existed and was deliberately set in motion. About the time Congress adjourned a paper was signed by members of the House of Representatives from eighteen States, including three in New England, in which they promised to go home and " use the most active means to bring the question directly before the people to elicit an expression of their opinions in its favour." In view of this, Tyler felt confident that the Democrats of all the States would " cause their voices plainly to be heard upon the question " ; and one such piece of machinery, driven by the influence of the executive department, was quite able to produce a noise. The Louisville Journal asserted that great efforts were put forth to get up meetings, and characterized the movement as entirely artificial. ]\Iuch of the talk on this issue at the South, said the New York Evening Post, was due to ofiice-holders who desired to please the President or to the speculators in Texas properties. About the middle of May, reported the National Intelligencer, an annexation meeting was held at Augusta, Georgia, which — though it had been called a week in advance — only seventy persons by actual count attended. In Alabama also there was coolness regarding the great Southern issue, and the Mobile Advertiser of July 23 even an- nounced a reaction. Louisiana, as we shall discover, was by no means eager. Mississippi on the other hand appeared to be strongly for the cause, and the fact that no duels occurred would seem to imply that only one opinion existed ; yet the eloquent Prentiss lifted his voice in opposition, and multitudes crowded to hear him. Al- monte thought in September that " even the most ignorant classes " were beginning to turn away from the policy of the government ; and within a week the London Times informed its readers that the subject had now only " some little interest " in the United States.^ Herald. Aug. 31, 1844. (Va. Com.) Richmond Enq., May 10, 1844. Webster, Writings, iii., 217, 253. ^ (Post) Boston Atlas, March 21, 1845. Enq., June 4. 1844. Tyler to Howard, June 18, 1844: State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. Journal: Nat. Inlell., June 300 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS In general, of course, the arguments employed in the press and on the platform were those already well known to us ; but they did not always count with the masses precisely as they counted with persons of superior intelligence and wider experience. The cock- sure opinion of a popular orator was likely to have more influence than the hesitating judgment of a thinker. Legal considerations did not weigh very much, while the kinship of the Texans probably signified a great deal. The fact that not very long since the United States had been in much the same position as Texas — fighting against " oppressors " — affected the heart of the people mightily, and it blinded many eyes to certain points of a more abstract sort. Our recognition of that country, no matter how often the real sig- nificance of it was explained by statesmen, appeared to the common mind as fairly good proof that she was a sovereign state ; and the plausible term " re-annexation " had no little efifect. " It is a con- stant fact in acoustics, that if a given sound be repeated many times with a sharp percussion, the effect on the tympanum will be such as to obliterate all previous impressions," remarked the Newark Advertiser, and then it continued, " Let the experiment be tried with the word rc-anncxation. In a short time it will be the universal belief, that the whole of what is to be re-annexed once belonged to us." A nation founded on revolution was inclined to regard the assertion that the Texan revolt had been a robbery of Mexico as "mere twaddle," to use the language of the Poinsylvanian; and not a few were quick to ask like that journal, " Are the United States less independent because we had the aid of foreign citizens?"* As the immense demand for Walker's letter North as well as South indicated, the material advantages of possessing Texas were highly appreciated. The British consul at Galveston thought it im- possible that the people of the United States would not realize the advantages of acquiring that country, and he was a sensible man. Here is an extraordinary spectacle, exclaimed the Washington Spectator: a rich province, once lost, may now be had for nothing, yet some are unwilling to take it ; and such an appeal seemed almost irresistible to many a thrifty, acquisitive person. It is in line with the instincts of human nature, remarked the New York Herald, to favor the acquisition of any country, by which the power, splendor 7, 1844. Post: ib., July 25, 1844. (Augusta) lb., May 24, 1844. Adv.. July 23, 1844. Miss. Hist. Soc. Pub., ix., 180, 191, 193, 195, Almonte, No. 123, priv., Sept. 20. 1844. Times, Sept. 16, 1844. * Newark (N. J.) Adv., May 27, 1844. Pciin., Aug. 5, 1845. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3OI and wealth of the Union could be increased ; and even a rough sort of piety was called upon to sanction the feeling. " Nature has given it to us, and we must have it," remarked a young American to John Ouincy Adams with reference to the St. Lawrence River; and the same principle was often applied to Texas.' Interests of a more special sort also had a voice. Long-headed business men in various quarters could see that personal or local advantages would result from adding Texas to the national domain. Not a few in the Pine Tree State, for example, welcomed the offer of a promising market for lumber and farm products, and it was realized that her ships could find work to do between New Orleans and Galveston and between Galveston and Europe, especially in winter when nothing could be done at home. In Maryland, on the other hand, many felt that a very brisk demand for negroes would spring up in the event of annexation, the planters would sell them or migrate themselves, population would decrease, and the value of land would suffer; and these fears weighed more or less not only in the other States of the middle tier but even farther South. All through the slave section a great number continued to believe that annexation would stimulate very much the production of cotton in Texas, that cotton would tend to become unprofitable on the old plantations, that negro labor would cease to pay, that slavery would be discarded as it had been in the North, and that in consequence the South would become financially and politically weaker. During the campaign Waddy Thompson of South Carolina, formerly our min- ister at Mexico, stated this view of the matter with remarkable clearness and force." Anti-foreign — 'that is to say, anti-British — sentiment was much in evidence. This was by no means a merely journalistic point of view. At every stage of elevation the atmosphere was full of it. How Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee on for- eign affairs, talked on the floor of the national House we have seen. In April, 1844, Belser declared in the same place that Great Britain might use Texas against the United States, and that he was ready to vote for taking it in order to protect the rights, property and lives of the Southern citizens and the interests of all. Early in May "(Demand) Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844: Polk Pap. Kennedy, May 31, 1844. Sped., May 7, 1844. Herald, June 15, 1844. Adams. Speech: N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 27, 1845. 'Portland Amer.. Nov. 13, 1844. Augusta Age, May 23, 1844. Bait. Clipper, May 18, 1844. Columbia (S. C.) Chronicle: Charleston Conner. May 28, 1844. Thompson, Letter (pamphlet). 302 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Thomasson of Kentucky stated that he had opposed annexation, and would continue to do so if that step would lead to a conflict with Mexico; but if the question were to be with any nation besides Mexico, he was for it even at the cost of war. Other declarations of similar import from men in high official positions will be recalled. Winthrop retorted that like the painter who could do nothing well except a red lion and therefore was always dragging that into his pictures, the Democrats were forever bringing up Great Britain to alarm the nation ; but the sentiment against the country with which the United States had had two wars, and which seemed to insist contemptuously that we should take from her our manufactures, commercial facilities, manners, literature and ideas, was very much too deep to be quenched with a sarcasm.'^ It was in the press, however, that this feeling chiefly manifested itself, and there it assumed all forms. In every quarter of the land sounded a continuous drumbeat of resentment and defiance against foreign interposition. Sometimes the popular notions were quite in error. When news came that Santa Anna threatened to invade Texas, England was accused of providing him with funds for that enterprise, though in reality she counselled Mexico em- phatically against this " wild undertaking " and this " deliberate challenge " to the United States. The New York correspondent of the London Times described the people as in such a mood that should Great Britain be really caught intriguing for the abolition of slavery in Texas, "the project of annexation would be promptly carried into execution by an overwhelming majority," and if neces- sary supported by " an appeal to arms." " Every native-born Amer- ican who drives a cart," he continued, believes the object would be to break up the Union ; and every man, young and old, would rally to defend the constitution. " Be not mistaken," he warned the British public ; " I tell you solemn truths " ; and in substance this representation was officially confirmed by Pakenham and Pageot. To a very large number of editors and their subscribers the Texas question was primarily an issue between the United States and Great Britain, arising out of England's jealousy of a powerful and grow- ing republic that had once been her colony.® ''Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i sess., 401, 539, 575, 402. * A few citations would be of little value, and there is not space for an ade- quate number. Rich. Euq., Sept. 15, 1844. To Bank,, No. 30, Sept. 30, 1844. Times, Oct. 17, 1844. Pak., No. 76, June 27, 1844. N. Orl. Com. Bull., Aug. 5, 1844. N. Y. Bull.: London Times, July 15, 1844. N. Y. Herald, July 6, 1844. IN THE PRESIDENTI.\L CAMPAIGN 3O3 This mood of the American press and pubhc was powerfully stimulated by the language of English journalists. "John Bull will now toss his horns grandly, or we are no prophet," exclaimed the Boston Post soon after the treaty of annexation became public; and so it proved. Little indeed in American life and character escaped the sweep of those redoubtable weapons. For Webster the London Titiics professed to entertain more respect perhaps than for any other living statesman of this country ; yet it pronounced a letter from his pen " a string of intolerable prose," going on " with about the meaning and variety of a mill wheel," through " an unrelieved series of platitudes, ... a harangue of the most commonplace con- ceivable kind, . . . trash." '' Human nature itself has been lowered by the depravity of the American people," this journal lamented; and it described the Democratic leaders as " reduced to simulate political crimes which they had not the resolution to attempt." In its eyes "the extraordinary injustice" of annexation was "if pos- sible " surpassed by " the matchless impudence of the arguments used in defence of it." It was " the vanity which in America sup- plies the place of pride," that had prompted Tyler to stretch out for Texas and so crown his reign " with notoriety if not with fame " before returning to " the herd " from which he had sprung. Should the Senate ratify the treaty, threatened the Times, the President and Secretary of State would " probably find their embarrassments rather increased than diminished by the execution of it," for as the country it was proposed to annex had been acknowledged by foreign powers, she possessed no right to join the United States.^ What made such language particularly exciting was the fact that some authority greater than an editor's appeared to be dictating it. In April, for example, the Britannia of London observed with reference to Texas that England " would neither suffer nor gain, whether the swampy shores of the Gulf of Florida belonged to Indians or Yankees, or whether man or mosquitoes drove the travel- ler from the unfriendly shore " ; but only five weeks later this peri- odical described the proposed absorption of that region as " one of the most flagrant offences ever committed by a nation professing a respect for human rights." What except a strong hint from the government, one could well ask, had force enough to change an important journal so completely within so short a space of time? That the cabinet had their eyes upon the matter seemed evident also "Post, May 9, 1844. Times, Feb. 27; May 15, 18; June 10, 1844. 304 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS from Lord Aberdeen's remark on Alay ly when Brougham took up the subject of annexation. Should the American Senate ratify the treaty, he said, " he should be prepared to state his opinion to the House, and to do that which was consistent with his duty as a Min- ister of the Crown, and what the public service might require," — a scarcely veiled threat. And the tone of the English press was even more insulting than its language, pointing already to what the Atlas of London put into words a year later: "America, in all the length and breadth of its continent, the LTnited States inclusive, must be content to submit to British surveillance, and, when neces- sary, to British controul."^'' Just here the great influence of Jackson exerted all its force. Danger from England was his tocsin, and he rang it with an activity equal to the strength of his convictions. Within four months and a half Blair received twenty long communications from him on the subject of obtaining Texas; and there is no reason to suppose that Blair alone was favored in this way. A number of letters from his pen were spread broadcast by the newspapers. In particular, he dwelt as before upon the strategic need of ensuring the southwestern frontier against a British attack. It was replied that in 1820 he had represented the acquisition of Elorida as enough to make that part of the country invulnerable; but this was met by pointing out how the situation had changed, and that now there were several roads from Texas where formerly impassable swamxps and forests had cut ofif all approach. The Tribune argued that it would be easier to concentrate half a million men, armed and provisioned, at New Orleans than a hundred thousand at Austin or Nacogdoches ; but the public were much better satisfied to rely upon the opinion of the man who had routed the British in 181 5 than upon the dictum of an anonymous newspaper fellow in a New York attic. Besides, Jackson's opinion was supported by English writers. One of these frankly remarked in the Liverpool Mercury that the possession of Texas was " almost indispensable " to the United States as a cover to their Southern frontier in the event of a war with any European power; and when it was urged that England already had a better base of operations in Canada, it was easy to show from articles in the British press than many in England itself thought the hardest blow possible against this country would be to attack the South and ^"Britannia, April 13; May 18, 1844. London Times, May 18, 1844. Atlas, Dec. 27, 1845. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3O5 arm the slaves. It would be very easy, said the .-Itlas, to excite a servile insurrection there. Yet after all, despite the fuming, as British designs and intrigues in Texas had not publicly been proved, no call for immediate action was clearly seen, and the Whigs could believe their programme quite as likely to prevent foreign inter- ference as the other.^^ "Blair to Van B., Sept. 13, 1844: Van B. Pap. Jackson to Nashville Union, May 13, 1844: Wash. Globe. May 23, 1844. Id. to Moore, June 25, 1844: ib., July 20, 1844. Id. to Dawson, Aug. 28, 1844: N. Y. Herald, Sept. 17, 1844. Tribune, May 21, 1844. Mercury, April 19, 1844. E. g., London Atlas. Jan. 4, 1845. In two thoughtful articles on the subject (May and June, 1844, pp. 324, 383) the Southern Literary Messenger reached the conclusion that annexing Texas would give the South military security and prevent slavery from being placed between two fires. Senator Barrow of La., however, who opposed annexation, asserted {Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., App,, 390) that a desire for greater political power was really the main argument with the South, and one can easily believe that this idea had more weight than it seemed wise to avow. The Newark (N. J.) Adz'., May 27. 1844, thus summed up the arguments against annexation : It is unconstitutional to acquire new territory, especially when so doing would involve war ; to take Texas, which is now in conflict with Mexico, would violate our treaty obligations, which is wrong and dishonorable, and would involve us in a war which, — being unjust — could not be waged with union, spirit and success ; the scheme is now urged for personal and sectional aims; the subject has not been fully considered and passed upon by the people; the whole course of the negotiation has been undignified and degrading ; the covmtry has just emerged from troubles over currency and commerce and is not ready for fresh agitations ; annexing Texas would weaken our position against the acquiring of Cuba by England ; it would be an act of cowardice and oppres- sion against a weak nation, Mexico ; we have more land already than can be properly cultivated ; annexation would extend slavery and give it undue preponder- ance in the Union ; in a sparsely settled country with a shifting population, patrio- tism is weak, education difficult, agriculture backward, and improvement in all ways tardy, and therefore we should not extend our bounds ; the United States would have to assume — for the benefit of foreigners — a debt of $10,000,000 or $20,000,000 which we would not do for one of our own States ; the increase in the area of the public lands would diminish the value of those we now hold ; our government is already unwieldy enough, and sectional difficulties are already sufficiently bad, and annexation would add to both embarrassments, lead to dissensions, and per- haps sow the seed of civil war ; the Sabine was fixed as the boundary, in prefer- ence to the Rio Grande, by Crawford, Calhoun, Wirt and Monroe for reasons deemed sufficient, and therefore it should continue to mark the frontier. Over against this may be placed the answer of the St. Clairsville (Ala.) Gazette to the question. Why annex Texas ? " Because the Father of Democracy, the patriotic Jefferson, bought it of France and paid the money of the nation for it. Because, in the treaty of 1803, we forever guaranteed the civil, social, political, and religious rights of the Texans. Because, Clay said we had no right to transfer it to Spain in 1819. Because Mexico never had a title to it; but she violated the Constitution of 1824, and left Texas free to act for herself. Because Texas de- feated the army of the murderer, Santa Anna, and he, when taken prisoner, solemnly signed a treaty for the independence of Texas. Because Texas has been recognized by us as free and sovereign, and desires us to fulfil our pledges to her. Because Clay says it is a better country than Florida, having a delicious climate, fertile soil, live oak for our navy, and the finest harbors on the Globe. Because it makes the slave trade, now privately carried on, piracy, and annexation would suppress it. Because it will protect Texas from the rapacity of Mexico, which is aided by England. Because it will make a home market for our fabrics and produce, and prevent smuggling on our frontiers. Because it will prevent British invasion by land, save us Oregon, and protect our commerce in the Gulf. Be- 306 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Circumstances as well as arguments had a share in the cam- paign, and under this head the Liberty party must probably be given the first place. That organization, composed of the less radical abolitionists, had held a national convention in August, 1843. O"^ hundred and forty-eight delegates representing tweive States were present; and they nominated Birney of New York as their candi- date for the Presidency. At the date of the convention there seemed to be no occasion for taking a stand regarding Texas ; but the exten- sion of slave territory was denounced, and the platform as a whole could be summed up in a word, as it was by the Cincinnati Herald: " Slavery is the paramount issue." In some respects the Liberty men had more in common with the Whigs than with the Democrats ; but for this very reason they drew more strength from the former than from the latter, and therefore the Whigs were peculiarly hostile to them. The Liberty Standard said that while Polk's followers merely let them alone, the other party tried to destroy their organi- zation, and therefore it had to be fought; and that as the Whigs endeavored to seduce abolitionists by pretending their own candi- date opposed slavery, it was indispensable to prove he did not. The advocates of the perpetuation of that curse in the United States, said the New York Tribune, " have no truer, more devoted or more efficient friends than the Political Abolitionists of New York and the New England States " ; and such language was bitterly resented by those to whom it applied. Garrison printed a series of extracts from the Liberty journals, which revealed a deep hatred against the Whigs and scarcely any ill-will toward the other great party. ^- Throughout the northern States, except Rhode Island and New Jersey, the Liberty strength was now very large in comparison with 1840, but in most cases it had no decisive influence. Alichigan, however, would have cast her electoral vote for Clay, had the abo- cause it will give us the trade of all the great rivers of the far West, that run to the Mississippi and Gulf. Because it gives us a hundred and thirty-six million acres of land, for which England would pay ten times the sum and then destroy our commerce, manufactures, planting and mechanic interests. Because it would extend our free institutions, the principles of human rights, and the glad tidings of salvation. Because Clay and Adams wanted to buy it in 1827, and Gen. Jackson in 1829 to prevent foreign nations from destroying our peace and prosperity. Because Gt. Britain '.vants Texas, as she does all creation, to enslave the millions. Because our British-Whig-ahettors aid England and Mexico and oppose ' Union and Liberty.' Because annexation will prevent consolidation and perpetuate State Rights." Such a jumble of right and wrong, truth and error, sense and folly probably represented the Texas opinions of half a million voters. " The extreme abolitionists would have nothing to do with politics or the government. Stanwood, Presidency, 215. Gin. Herald, July 27, 1844. Standard: Madis., Nov. 20, 1844. Tribune, Oct. 11, 1844. Lib., Nov. 22, 1844. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 307 litionists concluded to support him. In Ohio, on the other hand, enough of them appear to have done so to carry the State. There the Whigs made special efforts to win them over; and at Cincin- nati, for instance, they held an anti-annexation meeting for that express purpose. Harris, one of Polk's correspondents, reported after visiting the ground that he thought the Liberty men numbered 15,000 or 20,000 and, should they stand firmly by their ticket, the State would go Democratic. Their actual vote was 8,000, and the Whigs had a margin of about 6,000, substantially all of whom, if Harris was right, would seem to have come from the ranks of the anti-slavery party.^^ After the letters of Clay and Van Burcn had been read, the New York Herald predicted that both men would occupy the same posi- tion on the subject of annexation: "That is to say, they will now be a little on this side and now a little on the other side of the Sa- bine — sometimes Texas, and sometimes anti-Texas — balancing and re-balancing, until after the Ides of November " ; but this prophecy did not entirely come true. When an attempt was made to draw from Van Buren some modification of his views, he informed Amos Kendall that his position had been taken deliberately and could not be changed. Very differently acted Henry Clay. At the time he drafted his Raleigh letter he expected to be opposed by a candidate occupying substantially the same ground as himself on the new issue; and the nomination of an avowed annexationist by the Demo- crats changed the situation essentially. In comparison with Polk he appeared cold, timid and anti-Southern. To aggravate the diffi- culty, his argument that the opposition of a large number of the American people against annexation ought to be decisive, was viewed by many as referring, not to the free States in general, but to the abolitionists. "Lash Clay on his rejecting Texas for the abolition votes severely," wrote Jackson to Polk, and the idea took. Signs of disaffection appeared in his ranks, and his friends entreated him to save the cause. Not adapted by nature or experience for a defensive campaign he felt annoyed, became excited, lost his head, yielded to the pressure — not exactly like the cock that runs away but like the one on the housetop that turns round — and modified his attitude without considering all the probable effects of so doing. " Stanwood, Presidency, 203, 223. Parry to Van B., March 29, 1844: Van B. Pap. Harris to Polk, July 18, 1844: Polk Pap. The Wash. Globe, Nov. 18, 1844, charged that the Whigs carried the State because many of the abolitionists — mainly in consequence of a well-known forged letter — deserted their leader. 308 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Even now he did not come out squarely in favor of immediate annexation or indeed of annexation at any time; but he discovered by the first of July that he had no personal objection to the acqui- sition of Texas, and by the twenty-seventh that he " should be glad to see it, without dishonor, without war, w^ith the common consent of the Union, and upon just and fair terms." In fact he now thought it " would be unwise to refuse a permanent acquisition, which will exist as long as the globe remains, on account of a tem- porary institution " like slavery, which really ought not to " affect the question, one way or the other " ; and he intimated that should he win the Presidential chair, he would be governed by public opinion and the state of the facts. ^'^ " You would be amazed," wrote F. B. Stevenson of Cincinnati to Senator Crittenden, " at the extent of the resentment felt in Whig quarters towards Mr. Clay, for his Texas letters written after they had taken position under his Raleigh letter." Cramer, editor of the Albany Argus, expressed the opinion to Polk that for this reason Webster, Choate, Seward, Granger, Fillmore and Corwin felt deeply indignant in their hearts, adding that the Whig papers were thrown upon the defensive, and had to spend half the time in explaining what their candidate really meant. In particular, the view that the slavery issue ought not to be considered in reference to the question of annexation shocked most profoundly those to whom that issue was a matter of conscience; and they concluded, said Greeley, that Clay's opposition to the Texas project, having no root in principle, could not be relied upon. Then came Birney, preaching that the Whig candidate was actually more dangerous than the Democratic, because he was abler ; and finally Clay's Northern enemies, pitching upon the unlucky words " glad to see it " in his letter, stripped them of their context, and bandied the phrase about as a fatal admission. Clay also disavowed the sentiments of his relative, Cassius M. Clay, who had been trying to convey the impression that Henry was op- posed to slavery, which in Cramer's judgment put an impassable gulf between him and the abolitionists. All this was done of course to placate the South; yet many of those who favored annexation there and considered it the vital issue of the campaign on account of its bearing upon the security of Southern interests, felt entirely ^* Herald, May 4, 1844. Van B. to Kendall, June 12, 1844: Van B. Pap. Blaine, Twenty Years, i., 34-37. (Abolsts.) Tuscaloosa (Ala.) Monitor in N. Orl. Com. Bull., July 25, 1844. Jackson to Polk, July 23, 1844: Polk Pap., Chicago. (Letters) Schurz, Clay, ii,, 260: Madis., Aug. 29, 1844. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3O9 dissatisfied still, since the Whig leader seemed to be only passively favorable to their cause. " What a perfect devill Clay has made of himself in his different letters," exclaimed Old Hickory.^" The Democrats as well, however, had an enfant terrible. This was Benton, who attacked the administration furiously in his cam- paign speeches for its Texas proceedings, denounced the treaty, denied the reality of English intrigues against the peculiar institu- tion, opposed with all his vigor the programme of the radical annexa- tionists, and maintained that had a different course been pursued Texas would have been sure to enter the Union " as naturally as the ripe pear falls to the earth and without dissension at home or abroad." Energetic in tone, piquant in phraseology, plausible in argument. Benton's addresses had notable elements of popularity. One of Polk's correspondents expressed the opinion that he had deprived the party of 100,000 votes ; and Jackson felt that his speeches had done more harm than all the Whigs put together. Such estimates, however, were clearly the fruit of irritation. Tyler and Calhoun, not Polk, were the targets of Benton's wrath; and if he could still support the Democratic ticket, so could his followers.^'' The President remained for some time a disturbing factor ; but it became evident before very long that he was not likely to receive the Southern vote. Party allegiance counted heavily against him of course ; and no doubt many believed, as James Gadsen did, that a majority in that section looked upon him as not equal to the crisis. It was clear, too, that his remaining in the field would divide the pro-annexation vote. Consequently, whether or not entirely sincere in stating that he organized a party in order to throw its weight for the public good in the election, the President had now an opportunity to exhibit altruism, and he was given assistance in that matter. Walker, for example, discussed the subject with him; and then the Senator notified Polk that Tyler, not expecting to be elected, desired the success of the Democrats, and that if his followers, who con- sidered themselves proscribed in consequence of the attacks of the Globe and other papers, could be assured of a reception as brothers and equals, he would withdraw from the canvass, and they would merge themselves in the Democratic party. Walker then intimated ''Stevenson to Crit., undated: Crit. Pap. Cramer to Polk, Sept. 17. 18^44: Polk Pap. Greeley. Amer. Conflict, i.. 166-168. Weed. Autobiog., 585. (Bandied^ Schouler, U. S., iv., 477. Clay to Wickliffe. Sept. 2, 1844: Wash. Globe, Sept. 10, 1844. Jackson to Blair, Oct. 17, 1844: Jackson Pap. '" (Benton's St. Louis speech) Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 1844. Yoakum to Polk, Nov. 22. 1844: Polk Pap. Jackson to Blair, Aug. 15, 1844: Jackson Pap. 3IO THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to Polk that some one in a position to do it should write a letter signifying the acceptance of Tyler's conditions. Here is something, added the Senator, that may decide the election.^^ This was on the tenth of July. On the twenty-third Polk sent General Pillow to Jackson, and suggested that Blair be induced to stop attacking the President; and three days later Jackson was saying to the editor of the Globe, " Support the cause of Polk & Dallas & let Tiler alone — leave Calhoun to himself." This was fol- lowed up on the first day of August with a letter to Major Lewis, in which Jackson expressed his views as to the proper course for the President, arguing that unless he should withdraw, he would be charged with taking up the annexation issue merely to obtain a re-election and with remaining in the field in order to defeat Polk; and Tyler soon wrote back to him that this advice had determined him to retire. He claimed to have a controlling power in Pennsyl- vania, Virginia and New Jersey, and to hold in his hand 40,000 Ohio votes, — in all 150,000; and he only demanded in return for his withdrawal an immediate change in the attitude of Benton and the Globe towards himself, and a fully open door for all of his follow- ers who should wish to join the Democrats. As he added that most of those who had followed him in 1840 had previously voted for Jackson, this appeal was calculated to be particularly effective ; and again Jackson gave orders to Blair in accordance with the Presi- dent's wishes, adding that his withdrawal would ensure victory. Doubtless other communications passed, for according to Tyler him- self the Democratic leaders promised that his friends should be theirs ; and on the twentieth of August his letter of withdrawal was written. How many votes this arrangement carried to Polk it is of course impossible to say. No doubt the President over-estimated his strength ; but had no olive branch been held out to his followers, they could hardly have been expected to assist the Democrats. Re- sentment and desperation, as well as hope, are recognized motives of action.^® Another disturbing factor was Nativism. In November, 1843, '^Gadsden to Calhoun, May 3, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 952. Tyler to Gardiner, July 11, 1846: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 341. Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844: Polk Pap. "Polk to Jackson, July 23, 1844: Jackson Pap. Jackson to Blair, July 26, 1844: ib. Id. to Lewis, Aug. i. 1844: Ford Coll. Tyler to Jackson, Aug. 18, 1844: Jackson Pap. (150,000) Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844: Polk Pap. Jackson to Blair, Aug. 29, 1844: Jackson Pap. Tyler to Gardiner, July 11, 1846: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 341. (Letter) Wash. Globe, Aug. 21, 1844. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3II at the election of a State Senator in New Yorl< City, dislike and distrust of the foreign-born citizens, particularly as ofifice-holders, manifested themselves in a large vote for the American Republican candidate, and in the following April a Native administration was given control of the city. Soon the movement spread to New Jersey and Pennsylvania ; and in Philadelphia serious riots occurred. This diversion operated against the Whigs in two ways. The new party drew its converts mainly from them ; and the foreign-born, feeling themselves menaced, naturally gathered on the Democratic side, where the majority of them belonged. Such a result was promoted by the fact that most of these voters were Catholic, since the Whigs had been unfriendly to that sect ; and although the movement was of no general consequence at this period, it appeared at such a time and in such a place as to do Clay considerable harm.^^ Personal factors also had an influence. On the one hand Clay was extremely popular with many persons ; but on the other he was denounced as a toper, duellist, gambler and supporter of slavery. How the two sides of the account balanced no one can say; but it seems probable that outside of Kentucky and its vicinage the per- sonal element was less likely to seduce Democrats from their party allegiance than to discourage conscientious Whigs from giving him their votes, — especially as the stories told against him could reach immensely farther, and in many cases could strike much deeper, than his own influence. Even at home, indeed, his popularity had no such effect as might have been expected. In Kentucky the Whigs cast about 3,000 more votes than in 1840; but in Tennessee they lost some of their former strength, and the Democrats gained nearly 20,000 and 12,000 in the two States respectively. Clay's partner on the ticket also was opposed for personal reasons. According to the Albany Cithen, Catholics were urged to vote against Frelinghuysen on the ground that he belonged to some of the leading religious societies of the Protestants; and the Citizen stated that many good churchmen gave ear to the appeal.-'' New York, Pennsylvania and Louisiana deserve particular men- tion. In the Empire State the situation was very peculiar. The Democrats were at a disadvantage in the manufacturing districts on the tariff question, and in the lake cities because their creed opposed the improvement of harbors; and the anti-slavery sentiment among "• Lalor, Cyclopaedia, i., 85. Von Hoist, U. S., ii., 522. The author has made no thorough investigation of this matter, since it is quite incidental. ^ Stanwood, Presidency, 203, 223. Citizen: Phila. No. Amcr., Nov. 16, 1844. 312 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS them was very strong. A legislature in which that party controlled the lower House by a two-thirds majority had pronounced firmly, as we have seen, for the reception in Congress of petitions against ne- gro bondage. " To devote their energies for the extension of Slavery must be odious to a free People," said the editor of a leading Demo- cratic paper; and this was the issue which the Whigs of the State endeavored to fasten upon the voters. Nor did the party like to be " sunk five fathoms deep," as Cramer phrased it, by the cry of Texas or Disunion, or enjoy being stabbed under the fifth rib, as they said at Albany, by AIcDuffie's description of the tariff States as pirates and robbers. Another feature of the canvass that occasioned them great uneasiness was the publication by the Central Committee at Washington of Walker's pamphlet entitled, " The South in Danger," which recommended annexation exclusively on the ground of ex- tending and perpetuating the peculiar institution. " This in a free State is a sharp sword," remarked the editor of the Argus. Cassius M. Clay's " terrible." denunciations of slavery and his ingenious pictures of breeding negroes for Texas also caused a good deal of annoyance. From all these troubles, however, the Democratic lead- ers found a way of escape, — rather narrow, to be sure, but far better than none. Silas Wright was nominated for Governor, and he was pointed to as proof that the Democratic party did not stand com- mitted to the extreme annexation views of certain members of it, prominent though they might be, and still less to Calhoun's advocacy of African servitude. In other words, men were asked to vote for the representative of a national programme they detested, on the ground that an opponent of that programme was the party candi- date for a local office ; and many did so.-^ Bryant's paper, the scrupulous New York Evening Post, found itself in a particularly difficult position, opposed to annexation yet anxious to preserve its Democratic standing. A confidential circu- lar was issued over the signatures of George P. Barker, William Cullen Bryant, David Dudley Field, Theodore Sedgwick and others, which argued that the Texas resolution adopted at Baltimore was obnoxious to a great majority of the Northern freemen; that since the delegates had not been instructed on the subject, they pos- sessed no authority to incorporate such a plank in the platform; =» (Disadvantage) Cramer to Polk, Nov. 13, 1844: Polk Pap. Modis.. March 12, 1844. Cramer to Polk, Oct. 4, 1844: Polk Pap. Madis., Nov. 18, 1844. Cramer to Polk, July 21, 1844: Polk Pap. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3I3 that it would be well to publish a joint letter, proclaiming an in- tention to support the nominees but reject the resolution ; and that efforts ought to be made to elect Congressmen on that basis. Before long the circular became known to the public, and the Post then maintained openly that only this policy could save the party from defeat in the State, since annexation could not safely be made an issue there. The editors endeavored also to evade the diffi- culty by dividing the question. It has two parts, they said ; first, is annexation intrinsically desirable? and secondly, should the measure be adopted without regard to the circumstances? In other words if annexation would mean a rupture with Mexico, assumption of the Texan debt, the extension and perpetuation of slavery, and an increase of the power of the South in the national government, these incidental questions might be so important as to require settle- ment before the essential issue could be considered ; and such a course of procedure, too, would be quite proper, for while the party felt satisfied that Texas must be received, it had not decided that she must come in " without terms or conditions." In these ways the Post endeavored to help its conscientious readers vote for Polk yet still consider themselves highly moral as regarded slavery and the inviolability of treaties.-- - (Circular) Madis.. June 25, 1844. Post: Bait. Amer., July 2-j, 1844. Post, June 26, 1844. Whether defections among the anti-slavery readers of the Post were thus prevented, observers did not agree. Cramer wrote to Polk (Nov. 13, 1844: Polk Pap.) that his majority was as large as Van Buren's would have been, though it was about 5,000 less than Wright's; and Wright (to Polk, Dec. 20, 1844: Polk Pap., Chicago) maintained that Polk received even more Democratic votes than he, explaining that he was aided by the ballots of personal friends and by those of many wealthy Whigs who desired to have the State's financial system continue as it was. But William C. Bouck of Albany (to Polk, Nov. 15, 1844: Polk Pap.) expressed the opinion that the voters represented by the Post, while they supported the ticket, were willing that Polk should fall behind Wright, and the Mcidisonian (Dec. 18, 1844) did what it could to confirm this view, pointing out that Wright was given only 208 more votes than the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, who enjoyed no special popularity, and therefore, since Polk received about 5,000 less votes than the regular Democratic majority, the difTerence must have been due to defections. A letter from western New York (Bait. Amcr.. July 27, 1844) stated that substantial Democrats in that section would vote for Birney or not vote at all ; and this, so far as it went, pointed in the same direction. Indeed it is hard to believe that theories like those of the Post could wholly overcome the strong repugnance of many New York Democrats to everything that savored strongly of slavery and Southern domination. Before the election (Sept. 24) the Tribune was jubilant in view of the prospect which it held up that, whereas previously the Liberty party in New York had always borne wholly against the Whigs, it would this year take votes from the other side as well; and after the election the Albany Argus (Wash. Globe, Nov. 18, 1844) maintained that "the great body of the abolitionists" who adhered to their party organization had been "originally Democrats." According to Greeley {Tribune, Dec. 2^, 1844) the Democrats paid abolitionist speakers, however, as if expecting their converts would be mainly from the Whigs. At all events the Liberty 314 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Pennsylvania was normally Democratic. In July Buchanan stated privately that the party led there " by at least 20,000." Even in 1840, he added, it had been defeated by only 343 votes, and since that time it had carried the State elections "by large majorities." Not satisfied with such an advantage, however. Walker took pains to secure another. "You must not destroy us," he wrote to Polk; we need Pennsylvania, and you must go as far as your principles will permit for incidental protection. If we can only steer clear of the tariff, remarked the Senator, the election is safe. In the judgment of competent observers, Walker was not mistaken in laying so much stress upon this point. Cramer of Albany and Henry Horn of Philadelphia agreed that it was the decisive question in Pennsylvania, and Polk himself doubtless held the same opinion. In a letter on the subject he made the flexible announcement that he stood for " reasonable incidental protection," and the Sunbury American stated after the election that the people, who were almost unanimous for a tariff that would help the manufacturing establish- ments, had voted for him " with a firm belief that he would foster these interests, as they had been assured by himself and his friends." This assertion appears to be correct. " We have succeeded in fixing the belief that you ' are as good a tariff man as Clay,' " the wily Simon Cameron informed the candidate himself. On the other hand, the Pennsyhmiian stated that in Philadelphia the abolitionists voted almost unanimously as Whigs.^^ LxDuisiana also presented an interesting situation. In July the National Intelligencer published a letter, said to have been written by a distinguished citizen of the State, which asserted that " a com- plete intermission of the Texas fever " could be observed there ; and the Whigs triumphed in the summer election. This condition of things was largely due to the fact that the sugar planters opposed annexation almost solidly, believing that should Texas become a part of the Union, their business would be ruined by her competi- tion, and the value of their lands greatly diminished. At New Orleans, however, the sentiment was different. The local corre- orators were represented as urging that Clay favored the annexation of Texas no less really than Polk and adjuring their listeners to keep their souls unstained from the guilt of slavery by voting for neither. Birney stumped the State and there declared his preference for Polk (Nat. IntelL, Nov. 19, 1844). ^Buchanan to Letcher, July 27, 1844: Coleman, Crit., i., 221. Walker to Polk, May 20, 1844: Polk Pap. Cramer to Id., Oct. 4, 1844: ib. Horn to Id., Nov. 2, 1844: ib. Polk to Kane, June 19, 1844: Niles, Ixvi., 295. Amer.: Nat. IntelL, Nov. 21, 1844. Cameron to Polk, Oct. 18, 1844: Polk Pap., Chicago. Penn., Nov. 18, 1844. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3I5 spondent of the New York Commercial Advertiser divided the population of the city into three classes: first, a very few, holding Texan bonds and scrip, who favored annexation under any circum- stances, and made a great deal of noise; secondly, a small number thoroughly opposed to the measure ; and thirdly, the mass of the people, who wished the acquisition to be effected in case this could be done honorably and economically. Obviously the third class was often in the position of silent partner to the first. Calhoun had many adherents in the town, though Felix Connolly, who built the mint, described them as nearly all holders of Texan lands or bonds or else engaged in business as brokers or note-shavers ; and a popular meeting went so far in May as to threaten that Louisiana would resume possession of Texas, if the treaty should not be ratified; yet the Democrats won the State by a majority of only 700, and that margin seems to have been largely if not wholly due to fraudulent or at least irregular balloting.^* Polk was elected ; but in the popular vote, with which a study of public sentiment is concerned, he ran only some 38,000 ahead of his competitor. This is quite surprising. A Democratic victory seemed probable before the Texas issue came up. The Whig suc- cess of 1840 appeared to have been merely a temporary break, largely due to the recent financial panic and its consequences ; and with the exceptions of that year and 1824 the people had been Democratic for nearly half a century. The national House of Rep- resentatives that met in 1843 ^^'^•'' o^ the same complexion by a large majority; and from 1800 to 1876 the party able to choose a Speaker in the even-numbered Congresses elected its President in the next campaign. At the beginning of May, 1844, George Bancroft pre- dicted that Clay's majority in Massachusetts would be " vastly " smaller than Harrison's of 1840. The promising indications in Penn- sylvania have already been mentioned ; and other favorable omens were observed. The results, however, did not correspond. The abolition vote of 1844, substantially all of which must be counted as against annexation, ran up to 62,300. That of Michigan was larger than Polk's plurality in the State; and that of New York was three times as great as his plurality there. Had the party '^ Nat. InfelL. July 24, 1844. N. Orl. Courier, Dec, 21, 1844. Com. Adv.: London Times, June 10, 1844. Connolly to Van B., May 10, 1844: Van B. Pap. (Meeting) Mex. Consul, N. Orl., No. 32, May 11, 1844. In January, 1845, the Louisiana House of Representatives declared by a vote of 36 to 16 that a majority of the citizens favored immediate annexation, and later the Senate concurred {Nat. IntelL, Jan. 28, 1845). 3i6 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS broken up in the latter commonwealth and even three-fourths of its members joined the Whigs, Clay would have carried New York. The losses of the Whigs in the four northern States of New Eng- land, in comparison with the returns of 1840, almost equalled Polk's national margin, and apparently these missing voters merely stayed at home, for the Democratic strength also declined. On the other hand some allowance is to be made for Clay's personal popularity, but it could hardly offset these figures. So in spite of the antecedent probability Polk did not have the voters with him, and annexation " at the earliest practicable period " was really defeated.^^ When we look beyond the returns these facts are emphasized. The effect of tariff misrepresentations on the vote of Pennsylvania has already been suggested. In the State of New York, said the Tribune, 10,000 illegal ballots were cast against Clay and not 2,000 for him. The New York Express alleged that during the last fort- night of the campaign not less than 2,500 voters were naturalized by the Democrats. The Poughkeepsie Journal asserted that within three or four months upwards of 10,000 Irishmen were put at work on the canals under the pretence of making repairs ; that more than 2,000 of them had been naturalized within a recent period ; and that perjuries by the thousand had been committed to make them citizens. According to the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser the result in the State was due to the naturalization of aliens in that city and New York during the preceding two years. The New York Courier and Enquirer declared that thousands of voters had been manufac- tured expressly to cast their ballots for Polk, and that more than 2,500 foreigners, who had previously stood for the other party, were persuaded that a Whig victory would deprive them of their rights. In all, so Greeley estimated, more than 100,000 foreign-born Whigs were driven over to the Den)ocrats by the threatening ap- pearance of Nativism, and it was pointed out that the Liberty men, besides coming mainly from the same side, made thousands of others believe that Clay was really an annexationist.-" Webster attributed the defeat of his party to the fraudulent voting of foreigners in New York and Pennsylvania. Thurlow " Had South Carolina chosen her Presidential Electors by a popular vote, Polk's plurality would have been larger. Of course the remarks of the text are based upon the vote actually cast. Lalor, Cyclopaedia, i., 777. Stanwood, Presi- dency, 222. Bancroft to Van B.. May 2, 1844: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 3 ser., ii,, 425. -" N. Y. Tribune: Nat. IntcU.. Nov. 12, 1844. Express. Journal. Com. Adv.: ib., Nov. 13, 1844. Courier and Enq.: ib., Nov. 19, 1844. Greeley, Amer. Con- flict, i., 168. IN THE PRESIDENTIxVL CAMPAIGN 3I7 Weed, no mean judge in such matters, believed that until Clay wrote the letters modifying his attitude on the annexation question, he was "certain" to become President. Frelinghuysen gave the credit to the abolitionists and the foreign-born voters ; and Fillmore, the Whig candidate for the Governorship of New York, to the abolitionists and foreign-born Catholics. Colton, Clay's biographer, held that the most powerful argument against the Whigs was the popular name of the other party ; but he figured out in detail that New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia and Louisiana were carried by the Democrats fraudulently, and pointed to Nativism, the patronage of the national government, the faulty organization of the Whigs and their ineffec- tive campaign methods as important factors ; while the unsuccessful candidate himself explained the wreck of his cause as due to " a most extraordinary combination of adverse circumstances." " If there had been no Native party," he wrote, "or if all its members had been truer to its own principles; or if the recent foreigners had not been all united against us ; or if the foreign Catholics had not been arrayed on the other side; or if the Abolitionists had been true to their avowed principles; or if there had been no frauds, we should have triumphed." Of course the defeated party is always inclined to protest that it was beaten unfairly ; but a review of all the charges preferred on both sides confirms the impression made by the face of the returns that Polk had no real popular majority and that his annexation policy did not win the day.'^^ Very significant also were the opinions expressed, after the smoke had rolled away, as to the issues actually involved in the contest. The American of Portland said that in this campaign the battle was plainly between the principles of Adams and Hamilton and those of Jefferson, and that the victory meant there would be no National Bank, no new distribution of public lands money, no high tariff' and no coalition with Federalism. The Alexandria Gazette of \'irginia, a Whig sheet, thought the election had turned mainly upon abolitionism at the North, protection in Pennsylvania, free trade in Alabama, religious prejudices in Maine, Mormonism in Illinois, foreigners everywhere, and most of all upon an appeal to the poor against the rich. In the eyes of the Charleston Mercury the election had overthrown Clay and Adams, rebuked encroach- " Webster. Speech, Nov. 8, 1844: Nat. IntclL. Nov. 13, 1844. Weed, Auto- li'og., 572. (Ful., Fill., Colton) Clay, Works (Colton), v., 495, 497: ii., 428-443. Clay to J. M. Clayton, Dec. 2, 1844: Clayton Pap. One suspects that it was chagrin over his own blundering that caused Clay to ignore annexation in this summary. 31 8 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS ments on the constitution, forbidden a National Bank, prohibited an alHance between the national treasury and the stock-jobbers, and prevented the assumption of State debts, the imposition of unneces- sary taxes, the passage of a bankrupt law, the promotion of the anti-slavery crusade by means of a tariff that would enrich the North at the expense of the South, and the surrender of Texas to Mexican barbarity and British domination. The New York Herald maintained that Polk was carried into power by the cry " Texas and Oregon " ; while in the opinion of Anson Jones, recently chosen to succeed Houston, the anti-foreign feeling was decisive. Schenck, a Whig Congressman from Ohio, expressed the belief that Clay was beaten on the simple issue of " democracy " ; Brinkerhoff, a col- league of the opposite party, said that Polk triumphed there be- cause he opposed a National Bank, a protective tariff and a dis- tribution of the proceeds from the sales of the public lands; and McClernand, a Representative from Illinois, stated that the people of the West believed the question of reducing the price of these lands had been an issue in the campaign. Such are fair specimens of opinions given out by well qualified observers.-^ It is true, to be sure, that by many the result of the election was hailed as a victory of the Texas cause. The New York Evening Journal, for instance, put the case in this way : The Baltimore con- vention chose Polk because he was for immediate annexation ; it pre- sented that matter as a great party issue, and the Whigs were every- where against it; "if then, any question can be said to have been settled by the recent election, it is that of Texas." This view of the matter was natural. In reality the situation was very complicated ; mental training and a mental effort were necessary to explain or understand it ; mental training was not universal, and a mental effort required labor. The subject had been conspicuous, and it is in- stinctive with Americans to " star " the most prominent " feature " of any affair. The mass of men will not, and many of them cannot, discriminate. In the popular conception, the patriot never works for his own advantage, and the "scheming politician" never lifts his finger for the common welfare ; the good man is perfect, and the bad man is a wretch. Besides all of which, a large section of the public was eager to convince the world that annexation had carried the day. But all such bold assertions may be brushed aside. Leav- ^ Amer., Nov. 13, 18, 1844. Gazette: Not. Intel!.. Nov. 16, 1844. Mercury: ib., Nov. 23, 1844. Herald, April 26, 1845. Jones, Memor., 79. Coiig. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 56, 131, 72. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 3I9 ing out of account altogether our analysis of the result, we can see at a glance how carelessly they were made. The major premise of the Evening Journal was unsound. It would have surprised Benton a good deal to be told that his voting for the party's candidate showed that he favored its annexation policy, and probably a num- ber of Democrats larger than Polk's plurality agreed with him on this issue: for instance those, led by the New York Evening Post, who openly rejected the Texas plank while declaring for the man who stood upon it. Maine went strongly against the Whigs ; yet the State Senate, which contained only three of them, condemned certain pro-Texas resolutions by twenty-four votes to seven.'^® It is not even possible to trace any line of cleavage on this ques- tion. How the anti-annexation Democrats of New York were assisted to support Polk we have seen, and with equal skill multi- tudes of Southern Whigs wdio wanted Texas were held in the Clay ranks. In Georgia their convention spiked the enemy's gun with this deliverance: "Resolved, that we are in favor of the annexation of Texas to the United States at the earliest practicable period con- sistent with the honor and good faith of the nation " ; and the Demo- crats were challenged to reject the qualification if they dared. The Memphis Eagle argued that the efforts of the opposite party to use the question for their own political advantage would merely delay a consummation which the Whigs intended — in the proper way and at the proper time — to bring about. In reality, contended the Balti- more American, Clay was a better man for the annexationists than his competitor, for Mexico would treat with him more readily and more liberally than with a President representing the spoilers' cry of " Immediate Annexation " ; and it was often urged that he had re- peatedly shown a patriotic willingness to accept the will of the people in lieu of his personal desires. By such methods what difference between the two parties on this issue really existed was to a very large extent obscured.^** No doubt annexation sentiment helped the Democrats more or less, but the same could be said of many other factors. " Who elected James K. Polk?" asked the New York Express, and then it proceeded to give the answers : " ' I,' says the free trade man of South Carolina, ' I did it ; hurrah for free trade ! ' ' No,' says the '"Eve. Jouni.: Nat. Intell., Nov. 27, 1844. (Me.) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 141 (Severance). ^^ (Ga.) Charleston Courier, July 9, 1844. Eagle, May 18, 21 ; June 19, 1844. Amer., July 17, 1844. 320 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Annexationist of Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, ' It was I that did it ; I went for the enlargement of the territory of slavery.' ' Not so fast,' respond the Annexationists of the North, ' It was we who did it — we who went for getting rid of slavery by taking Texas and thus enlarging the bounds of freedom.' ' No, no ' ; declare the tariff men of Pennsylvania, ' we did it, and did it by shouting for the tariff of 1842 ' . . . ' Don't boast too much,' say the Tyler men, ' we did it ; the post-office and custom house did it ; we did it by giving you public offices and public money ' ; and these are not all who say they did it. The friends of Silas Wright and Mr. Van Buren in New York declare that it was their work. The Irish say they did it — the Germans that they did it; and the Aboli- tionists of the locofoco creed exult by proclaiming, 'We did it.'" Even this catalogue was not complete, however. The Bank, the tariff, slavery, Texas, Oregon, Clay's personal character, the sus- picion that if elected he would promote annexation, the sentiment against foreign interference, the military argument, Nativism, Cath- olic influence, public land matters, patronage, fraud, Silas Wright, Jackson, — every one of these drew voters to Polk. " The Ques- tion of annexation," remarked the Globe, ''was doubtless blended with a variety of other issues in the late canvass^ which it would puzzle a Washington editor to disentangle." The struggle was thus made complex by a rather large number of circumstances, among which figured Texas ; but after all it was essentially a party contest on the established lines of principle, prejudice and habit that divided the mass of the nation into Democrats and Whigs. There was there- fore no clear-cut issue between annexation and anti-annexation, and still less was there a " tidal wave " for immediately crossing the Sabine. ^^ It is clear, however, that a pronounced if not startling drift of sentiment toward annexation could be seen. Ingersoll estimated that out of 2,700,000 voters, at least 2,000,000 favored that idea. This was a guess, of course, and a guess colored by the prejudices and purposes of the speaker ; yet it seems plain enough that a large majority of the people, could every other issue have been swept away, would have recorded a preference in favor of accepting Texas at an early date. The most powerful consideration that led this way was probably a spontaneous desire to regain a valuable piece of property that had been surrendered imprudently and could now ^'Express: Nat. InlclL, Nov. 27, 1844. Wash. Globe. Dec. 5, 1844. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 321 be had at a bargain. This was not exactly the impulse of expansion ; it was rather a natural spirit of thrift plus an equally natural dis- position to correct a disastrous blunder. The second, perhaps the first, motive was a determination to prevent foreign interference in American affairs, and especially an interference liable to cripple the South and injure the whole Union. Third in general effect, though with many persons first or second, stood the wish to protect the de- clining political influence of the slave section. With these prime factors co-operated a variety of now familiar considerations, partly sectional and partly national. The resulting tide of annexation sen- timent, largely non-partisan, and not the mere success of the Demo- crats, is the significant fact about the campaign so far as the present subject is concerned.^- While, however, the result of the struggle was not specially the consequence, it was most really the cause, of annexation feeling. For this a number of good reasons can be pointed out. Perceiving the drift of sentiment, which in the public mind was represented by Polk's victory, both politicians and people, desiring to be found on the triumphant side, marched the same way. However it had come about, a President strongly in favor of annexation had been elected, and this event, rendering the success of the measure highly prob- able, reinforced that natural tendency. All who desired Executive favors, direct or indirect, were especially affected, and many en- deavored now to make themselves conspicuous by propagandism in the official cause. The ease of explaining the recent election by supposing this one issue had decided it brought still others over; and finally the mental economy of settling the very difficult annexa- tion aft'air itself, with all its puzzling questions of constitutionality, justice and expediency, by crying J'ox Popiili, vox Dei was a power- ful inducement for multitudes of men. ■''- The opinion that a strong drift in favor of annexation existed rests mainly on the following bases: i, the arguments and sentiments in favor of that measure were so strong that they were sure to affect the people when fully brought to bear upon them; 2, Competent on-lookers (one of them Ingersoll) reported si:ch a drift ; 3. editorials, articles and speeches, particularly the Congressional debates of January and February, 1845, and certain public acts (e. g., at New York and Augusta) indicate as much; 4, the prompt and general acquiescence of the country when annexation had been voted shows that public sentiment was ready for it ; 5, such opposition as survived was to a large extent forced and for the sake of appearances. (Ingersoll) Boston Post, Jan. 15. 1845. It is important to dis- tinguish between the expansive impulse which was mainly responsible for the settlement of Texas and the causes which led us to annex that country. XVI Annexation is Offered to Texas At first, after the rejection of the treaty, Calhoun felt very despondent and advised that the Texas problem be laid aside for Polk; but he soon rallied and took the matter up again. The plan of calling an extra session of Congress was relinquished, because Tyler felt it might injure the Presidential chances of the Democrats. No course was left then except to wait until December ; but at that time the President was ready to act. His annual Message referred to the subject of annexation with vigor and at length, presenting once more the national view of it and not the sectional view adopted by Calhoun ; and again he marshalled arguments in favor of his cherished project. One of the principal objections urged against the treaty, he then proceeded to say, having been the fact that the question had riot been submitted to the nation, I laid it before Con- gress as the people's representatives. In the Presidential campaign the issue came before the public, and a decision has been made in favor of annexing Texas " promptly and immediately." The will of the country should of course be executed, and in so doing all collateral issues ought to be avoided. The United States and Texas desire to unite ; Mexico will accept that action amicably ; and no serious complaint will come from any quarter. The passage of a joint resolution embodying the terms agreed upon by the two gov- ernments is therefore recommended.^ On the eighteenth of December Tyler sent another Message. This covered the bitter correspondence which had recently passed between our minister to Mexico and the administration of that country in reference to the war with Texas, the merciless manner in which it was proposed by Santa Anna to conduct it, and the expos- tulation of the American government against the threatened bar- barities. Mexico, said the President with a good deal of truth, has violated her agreements with us, and now besides insulting us ' See General Note, p. i. (Calhoun) Tyler, Tyler, ii,, 331. (Extra session) Raymond to Jones, Aug. 29, 1844: Jones, Memor., 379. Richardson. Messages, iv.. 340. Tyler said that annexation was presented " nakedly " to the people. But this appears to mean, not that it was the only issue before the public, but that no questions as to the terms, etc., of annexation obscured the main issue. 322 ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 323 endeavors to set one part of our people against the other by foment- ing our differences of opinion regarding slavery and the incorporation of Texas. He then went on to argue anew that annexation was not a sectional issue at all, and urged that as a reply to the outrages and misrepresentations of our truculent neighbor the best course would be to act promptly in that very business.- By this time public opinion was setting more and more strongly in favor of his wishes. How the prospect that success was to attend that measure affected the people, two illustrations will sug- gest. A little later, at a meeting held in New York City, Mike Walsh stated that only a few months before, when he had asked Silas Wright publicly why he did not vote for the acquisition of Texas, the question had been denounced as impertinent and treason- able, but since the people had been seen to favor the project, Wright had been hissed at Tammany Hall for recreancy in that very cause. In Augusta, Alaine, the county court-house had been large enough to accommodate all the friends of Texas; but no sooner did the absorption of that country become highly probable than crowds overflowed the capitol, eager to show themselves on the popular side. Prompt annexation was decidedly " in the air " ; and the fact that coolness toward the measure was no longer required of any one by party loyalty, the election being over, helped in many cases to bring forward recruits. In the Ohio legislature, which was decidedly Whig, a prominent member of that party moved that the delegation in Congress be instructed to oppose the project, but his motion was laid on the table. The New York Courier and Enquirer showed the set of the wind by going over to the administration side. The Pcnnsylvanian remarked: "We are just beginning to awake to the vitality of the Texas question," — that is to say, the loss of a market for Northern manufactures which the possession or control of that country by England would entail. At the same time, many still un- friendly to the measure, perceiving that it was almost certain to be carried through, allowed themselves to be borne along passively by the rising tide.^ "Richardson, Messages, iv., 353. (Shannon-Rejon Correspondence) Ho. Ex. Doc. 19, 28 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 8-31. Rejon lauded the North, and denounced the South as shamelessly dishonorable. The language of Shannon, the America*! minister, was tactless and rasping yet in line with Calhoun's instructions to him ; and it was suspected that Calhoun's purpose was to draw from Mexico something that would assist the annexationists by exciting the public. ^Nat. IntclL, Feb. 25; March 18, 1845. (Ohio) Pratt to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844: Polk Pap. Melville to Id., Dec. 17, 1844: ib. Penn.: Wash. Globe, Dec. 12, 1844. 324 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS This does not mean, however, that all opposition ceased. The Boston Atlas for example exclaimed : " Massachusetts cannot — she must not — she will not submit to the annexation of Texas." The National Intelligencer ridiculed the arguments put forward in its favor. According to the Richmond Enquirer most of the " Whig scribblers" at Washington sat in the seats of the scornful, and undeniably the New York Evening Post could be found there. " ' Now or never ' was the cry last winter," it sneered ; " ' Now or never ' will be the cry this winter ; and, if the matter be postponed, * Now or never ' will be the cry next winter " ; and it reminded its readers how Dr. Wallcott soothed his impatient country cousins by remarking, " Don't be afraid ; St. Paul's can't run away." Finally in January, 1845, the anti-annexation sentiment in Massachusetts rose to the pitch of a convention, and a strong address was issued, the first part of which came from Webster's pen.'* Meanwhile the Democrats themselves, though confident of pop- ular support in the Texas movement, felt by no means sure of carry- ing it through at once. Calhoun thought the prospect " pretty fair " in the House, and could hardly believe that should the measure pass there, it would be thrown out by the Senate. Apparently, so the Newark Advertiser's Washington correspondent wrote, it was planned that the Southern Democrats should relax their opposition to the tariff, and the Northern wing relax theirs to the absorption of Texas ; but the friends of Van Buren had neither forgotten nor for- given the Baltimore convention, the lack of cordiality between the two branches of the party often seemed too great to be bridged, and Calhoun's urging the measure in the interest of slavery threatened to prevent Northern men from supporting it so long as he remained in power. Near the close of December a conference was held, and it then appeared that many differences of opinion as to the method of effecting annexation existed ; while Giddings assured John Quincy Adams that forty Democrats in the House would vote against every proposition, and that he did not believe the measure could pass. On the latter point Crittenden held the same opinion. Raymond of Texas wrote to his government that the action of the Congress now in session was entirely uncertain so far as this issue was con- cerned ; and Almonte, watching afifairs closely in the interest of * Atlas, Dec. 26, 1844. Nat. Intel!.. Dec. 21, 1844. Eiiq., Jan. 7, 1845. Ere. Post, Jan. 13, 1845. Webster, Writings, xii., 192. ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 325 Mexico, believed a little before Congress met tbat nothing would be done in the matter until after the inauguration of Polk.''^ Foreign utterances continued to exert an influence, and it counted on the side of annexation. The .Ulas of London printed an editorial on the military aspect of the affair, saying that were Texas under the guaranty of a power able to cope with the United States at sea, we should be permanently checked in that direction as we were already in the north, and that in case of war her separate existence would place our Southern cities " with their inflammable population within the reach of an enemy, and, in fact, open up an easy march to the heart of the Republic." The London Times declared that it could "find no expressions too strong" to convey its opinion of " the enormous misstatements, the excessive bad faith, and the de- plorable impolicy " of the annexationists. It described Polk's elec- tion as " the triumph of everything that was worst " in American life; and it intimated that England, "in common" with the other states of Europe, was "prepared to resist" the extension of the United States in the Southwest as an act of rapine, calculated to deprive her of a useful ally, to perpetuate slavery, and to create a rival maritime power in the Gulf of Alexico. The London Morning Post characterized the designs of this country upon Texas as " merely a development of the savage instinct of the strong to tyran- nize over the weak," and announced that " some day the republican monster must be checked."" To make such talk appear the more insulting, because the more groundless, the Atlas confessed that "it would be madness to con- tend that England, in concert with other European powers, had a right to interfere and mediatise Texas " ; and predicted that the Americans would " never submit to a principle, to which, if once introduced, no limitation could be assigned," since unless all the countries of the western hemisphere were entitled to manage their own political affairs, none were, and the United States themselves had not that right. Nor was this the only admission. "If Amer- ica," asked the .Itlas, " i)roclaimed her right to mediatise Ireland, to help her to set up for herself, or to unite to France instead of "Calhoun to Clemson, Dec. 27, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 634. Newark Adv., Dec. 9, 1844. (Van B. men) N. Y. Herald, Jan. 18, 1845. Lewis to Jackson, Dec. 21, 1844: Jackson Pap,, Knoxville Coll. (Conference) Newark Adz:,' Dec. 31, 1844. Adams, Memoirs, xii., 133. Crit. to Barnley, Dec. 28. 1844: Crit. Pap. Raymond, No. 135, Dec. 4, 1844. Almonte, No. 135, Nov.- 9, 1844. "London Atlas, Oct. 26, 1844. Times, Oct, 23; Nov. 15, 29, 1844. Morning Post, Jan. I, 1845. 326 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to England, how long would England endure the insolent assump- tion?" At the same time King, our minister to France, was urging his government not to disgrace themselves in the eyes of Europe by faltering in the Texan business from a dread of British opposi- tion. France, he felt sure, had no wish to engage in hostilities against the United States; while England herself, he believed, would never fight in this cause, and — even if disposed to do so — could not secure the co-operation of France. " Upon the whole," he said at the end of December, 1844, " I apprehend nothing from European influence upon American questions, if we have the firmness to de- spise the brutum fulmen of mere diplomatic remonstrance." Such stimuli tended to inflame still further the sentiment already hot in this country. The issue is, exclaimed the chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs, " Shall Great Britain advance another step in political power on this continent ? " The New Hampshire legislature passed a series of resolutions by a large majority, de- claring that if necessary as against foreign nations, Texas ought to be occupied with an armed force. Even William Cullen Bryant's paper took the ground that whatever might be the claims of Mexico upon that country, she certainly had none that should prevent the United States from annexing it in case of a threat from England." It was naturally, then, amid a strife of currents and counter- currents that the subject of annexation came into the House in December, 1844. Some positively asserted, and others as posi- tively denied, that the election had settled the question. It was urged that the representatives of the people should make haste and do their bidding; and it was also urged that the legislators of the nation should ponder and deliberate. Many petitions and resolu- tions from States, organizations, meetings, and groups of individu- als, mostly against incorporating Texas but sometimes in the oppo- site sense, were presented. Tyler's later Message fanned the flame. Shannon's obvious blundering made one anxious to ignore his pro- ceedings, but the language addressed to our representative by the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations was so exasperating and insulting that it could not possibly be forgotten at once.^ 'London Atlas, Dec. 3, 1844. King, No. 4, Oct. 6; No. 6. Nov. 15; No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. King's despatches were not published but his opinions were prob- ably made known in Congress. Id. to Calhoun, private, Dec. 28, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 1013. (Ingersoll) Boston Post, Jan. 15, 1845. (N. H.) Wash. Globe, Jan. 4, 1845. Eve. Post (semi-weekly), Jan. 22, 1845. * Cotig. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 25, 61, 78, 89, 92, 98, 100, 120, 127, etc. ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 327 In about a week after the session began, IngersoU moved a joint resolution embodying the substance of the treaty. This proposition had one great advantage, since it was known officially that Texas would accept the terms, but it suffered from a counterbalancing weakness, for the treaty had been despised and repudiated. Besides, the terms themselves did not meet all the difficulties that rose up in the minds of the legislators. These were mainly of four kinds. The first concerned the boundaries of Texas. It was known by all that a part of the territory claimed by her certainly belonged to Alexico still, and that another portion of her asserted frontier was overshadowed with grave doubt ; and there was a fear that so im- mense a State, should it remain intact, would eventually have a dangerous number of Representatives in Congress. The second difficulty had reference to slavery. It was felt by not a few that something definite ought to be determined about that in order to forestall another Missouri agitation, and yet many shrank from the subject. In the third place the question of assuming the Texan debt provoked great differences of opinion, for while many advo- cated that course, others denied its constitutionality and the wisdom of establishing such a precedent. Finally, there was disagreement on the question whether Texas ought to be received as a State or as a Territory. Consequently IngersoU's measure, though it repre- sented the Executive and the committee on foreign affairs and had been mediated upon for some time by Calhoun, failed to satisfy, and other propositions were brought forward." The first of these came from Weller, a Democratic Representa- tive from Ohio, on the nineteenth of December. His plan provided that Texas should become a Territory, that her public lands should be used to pay her debt and that a commission should determine the boundary ; and the scheme met with considerable favor, one reason for which was its avoidance of the dreaded slavery issue. Four days later Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois offered a joint resolution. This was similar in substance, though it rested frankly upon the alleged obligation of the United States, under the treaty of 1803, to receive the inhabitants of Texas ; and many on the Democratic side of the House found it satisfactory. Tibbatts, a Kentucky Democrat, followed with a resolution based on the same treaty, which contemplated the admission of Texas as a State no larger ^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 26. Calhoun to Howard, Sept. 12, 1844: State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. 328 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS than the largest member of the Union, her debt (with the exception of a specified small amount) to be paid with the proceeds of the sales of her public lands, and her territory to be " free " north of the ]\Iissouri Compromise line. Numerous other plans were proposed, ringing the changes on the points of dispute ; but the only one of these requiring our attention was the concise and simple proposition introduced by Milton Brown, a Tennessee Whig, which provided that the territory rightfully belonging to the republic of Texas might become a State, referred the adjustment of her boundary to the government of the Union, assumed neither her debt nor her public lands, left the question of slavery south of the Missouri Compro- mise line optional with the people, and prohibited involuntary servi- tide in the insignificant northern portion.^" Before the end of December was reached, the advocates of an- nexation felt manifestly impatient. " Let not procrastination be the thief of Texas " ; let no time be given to foreign nations for intrigues and machinations, was Ingersoll's exhortation. Two caucuses were held by the Democrats, and finally they decided that the best method would be to try the chances of debate, letting every plan have its opportunity on the floor and adopting the one that should prove most likely to satisfy a majority of the House. Accordingly, on the third day of January, 1845, the matter was placed before the Rep- resentatives by moving to take up the joint resolution of the com- mittee on foreign affairs; and a flood of argument ensued." "•Raymond, No. 136, Dec, 30, 1844. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 49, 65. A. V. Brown to Polk, Jan. i, 1843 [1845] : Polk Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 76, 84, 97, 107, 129, 165, 173, 192. Brown's resolution was drawn after consultation with Alex. H. Stephens (Am. Hist. Rev., viii., 93). It was pre- sented Jan. 13, 1845. ^^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 68, 84, 87. (Caucuses) Nat. Intell., Jan. 6, 1845. Very little was now said about the danger of enlarging the area of the United States. Severance of Maine took the position that if Texas was really independent, annexation was needless, and if not, it was wrong. Reference was made to the argument that annexation would be an act of bad faith and produce war ; but Ingersoll declared that he was authorized to pronounce hostilities with Mexico improbable, whatever this country should do, and the prevalent opinion appeared to be that as Santa Anna had been overthrown by a revolution and succeeded by a government too feeble to hold Texas even had she been restored to them, there was no longer any occasion to consider that country in the matter ; and some insisted still on the view that she had nothing to do with it anyhow, since Texas had always been free sovereign and independent. Even J. Q. Adams felt (Mem., xii„ 171) that the recent Mexican revolution had destroyed the only insurmountable objection against annexation. The military argument came up of course. Some asserted that Texas was of more strategic value to the United States while independent than she would be if annexed ; and a Western man de- clared that New Orleans would be defended by the people of the Mississippi valley without help. The authority of Jackson was urged in reply. The other side retorted by pronouncing him a brave soldier but no strategist ; and they ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 329 More and more clearly it came to be seen, as the days passed, that a substantial majority desired the annexation of Texas, yet that differences of opinion, sectional disagreements, the rivalries of leading politicians, and the hostilities of cliques threatened failure. were then assured that at all events the country would prefer his opinion to theirs. It was argued strongly that the acquisition of Texas would give the United States a monopoly of cotton ; but it was answered with equal positive- ness that a monopoly of cotton was impossible, since it would grow anywhere under certain climatic conditions. Annexation was described as a sectional measure for the benefit of the South, In reply some demanded why that was objectionable, pointing out that the Northeastern boundary was a Maine issue yet the country had stood together upon it. Any acquisition of territory, it was urged, must necessarily be more or less sectional, and as for the officials of the government, it was natural and proper enough that Southern sympathies should be exhibited by Southerners. Others declared that annexation was more a Western than a Southern issue. Douglas asserted this, maintaining that Texas must be secured in order to have control of the navigation of the Mississippi and the Gulf. The enormous value of Texas was dwelt upon by the annexationists and ridiculed by their opponents. J. R. Ingersoll was reported as declaring that it consisted of nothing but marshes, hummocks, tadpoles and terrapins. Such was not Lord Brougham's opinion, retorted Hammett of Mississippi. The standard argument of the Texas '" markets " appeared more than once, and it was answered that all the purchasers would be people from the North, who would need more goods if they remained in the colder climate and would have more money with which to purchase. The aim of the measure was to increase the anti-tariff forces, it was suggested ; and Stone of Ohio asserted that here lay the source of the opposition against annexation. But an answer was ready : If Texas is not incorporated she will adopt free trade ; and the smuggling will injure the New England manufacturers. It was also argued that the South would be driven from the business of raising cotton by Texas competition, and would have to sow grain instead ; and that the West, suffering from this invasion of its field, would have to take up manufacturing, and so New England would be injured again. Annexation, it was said, will develop the coast tratie and create a school for the navy. This argument was not answered ; but the House was assured that the United States, whatver the law might be, could not avoid lia- bility for the Texas debt, and that no one on earth could tell the amount of it. The advocates of annexation aim at disunion, it was again charged. That can- not be, was the ready answer, for Jackson favors the measure. One argument even J. Q. Adams confessed could not be refuted, — the argument that nature meant the region for us and therefore we must have it ! and in one sentiment all appeared to concur, — that foreign interference must not be tolerated. Once — once only perhaps and then but faintly — the note of expansion was heard, Brinkerhoff of Ohio suggesting among other things that Texas would be needed as a home for later generations. The question of slavery continued to make great trouble. C. J. Ingersoll maintained that except for unfounded fears lest the acquisition of Texas should extend that institution, the American people were more united on this measure than upon any other question ; but all recognized this exception as a very serious one. Over and over again Northern men charged that annexation was a scheme to extend and perpetuate the system of human bondage. The replies to the charge were various. Some declared that slavery was guaranteed to the South by the constitution, and the government were bound to protect it. No, retorted anti-slavery men indignantly, slavery is merely tolerated by the constitution and is not a national affair. Others declared that the annexation of Texas, instead of promoting slavery, would prove a serious Ijlow to it; and some, like Alexander H. Stephens, protested vigorously that no national interference in behalf of that institution was desired or desirable. It was also pointed out that were Texas to remain independent, the whole of that vast area would be slave territory, and slavery might be carried some day into Mexico and Central America. Walker's 330 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS To blaze a trail, Rhett suggested that a vote be taken on the first part of Douglas's resolution, which was the abstract proposition that Texas be admitted to the Union ; but this idea was not received with much favor. It seemed necessary to eliminate in some way theory came out that she would draw slaves from the middle States ; but this was met with the question, Why then have not Louisiana and Arkansas done so ? It was urged that the acquisition of Texas was necessary to provide the freed- men with a passage out of United States territory into Mexico, or, even should slavery continue to exist in this country, to prevent the rapid increase of the blacks in our southern States from leading to a war of extermination there. Why should not Texas be acquired for the express purpose of extending slavery, demanded some ; the North is growing towards the West and the abolitionists are becoming dangerous. But they were met with the reply, No responsible person thinks of interfering with slavery where it is ; it needs no defence ; and the attempt to extend it will help the abolitionists. Of course, too, all the strong objections to the institution bore upon the same point. The negroes of Texas would be better off under American laws, it was also urged. Amid all this variety of opinions one feeling appeared to gain steadily in strength : the neces- sity of doing something deiinite on the subject in the act of receiving Texas. Some upheld the view that unless such a provision were made, the South would claim the whole territory later. Stephens said it would be better to forego the acquisition than bring into the Union a subject of discord. Hale of New Hamp- shire proposed that any bill for annexation should contain a proviso dividing Texas into two parts, one slave and one free. This showed the Northern desire, but was evidently more than the South could be expected to concede. A kindred difficulty was the charge that in urging annexation the Southerners aimed to increase the power of their section in the national government. Some replied to this assertion that the South had a right to her share of the control, but was not trying to dictate, for, said Rhett, the North is evidently destined to dominate the nation, and it would be useless for the South to struggle against fate. Others went farther, retorting that it was the North which was determined to rule, and that the purpose of its domination was to oppress the South with a protective tariff and an anti-slavery crusade. The question of constitutionality also came up. Winthrop of Massachusetts paid particular attention to this ph^se of the subject. To admit a foreign nation as a State would be to admit a new partner into the Union ; this would require a new compact ; and a new compact could be drawn by the people alone, it was argued. The power given Congress to admit new States had sole reference, the speakers often urged, to the territory already belonging to the United States, — particularly to Colonies that might not at once accept the constitution ; the terri- tory of Texas must therefore first be acquired ; it can be acquired only by agreement; any agreement with a foreign state is a treaty; the business of making treaties belongs to the President and Senate ; and so those who favor the annexation of Texas by an act of Congress would destroy the constitution by too broad a construction of it. In reply it was maintained that the old time Federa- lists were making themselves ridiculous by insisting now upon an absurdly nar- row view of the organic law ; that in fact the language of the constitution was perfectly clear and precise: "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union." Jefferson thought otherwise, it was retorted ; but even this did not check the march of the annexationists. Not all agreements with foreign nations are treaties, it was pointed out. The name of Marshall was cited in behalf of this view ; and the power to admit new States, expressly given to Congress, was pointed to as full and adequate authority to accept a new partner. Vermont and North Carolina were foreign nations when admitted to the Union, it was even insisted ; but attention was called in reply to the fact that both had fought in our Revolutionary war, and both were included in the territory over which the treaty of 1783 gave the United States jurisdiction. The proceedings of the con- vention of 1787, one side maintained, proved that it was the intention to admit States arising from foreign territory, and one aim of the constitution was said ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 33 1 all but the most popular of the plans, and so force an agreement upon that. Kennedy of Maryland, to do something in this way, declared that Ingersoll's was a scheme to confirm a treaty rejected by the Senate; Weller's a scheme to extend the jurisdiction of the United States over a foreign nation ; and Douglas's a scheme to revive a dead treaty by strangling three live ones. Dromgoole of Virginia, who was regarded as in some respects the Democratic leader in the House, rose on the twenty-fourth of January and spoke as follows : It is time to be practical and definite ; Texas is inde- pendent, and we need not go behind that fact ; propositions based upon the treaty of 1803 are not becoming, for we have recognized her as a sovereign nation ; the plan of the committee on foreign afifairs is the expiring effort of Tylerism, the recrudescence of a hastily drawn treaty already rejected by the Senate, and I will not vote for it ; propositions to receive Texas as a Territory are unsuit- able, for the bare acquisition of foreign soil would require a treaty, and it is too late now to open negotiations, besides which, if she come to us in that guise, we must necessarily assume her debt ; to have been the prevention of adjacent confederacies ; but these assertions were denied. On one point the opponents of the measure were rather neatly caught. Texas, it was reasonably argued, can certainly be acquired somehow by the American government ; the enemies of the treaty said last winter that such an acquisition could not be effected by the treaty-making power ; hence Congress must possess the necessary authority. In reply, some admitted that they had been in error ; some took the ground that the power belonged solely to the people ; and some retorted that the great number of annexation plans proved that the friends of that scheme understood very well the constitution would have to be circum- vented in one way or another. The purpose of the constitution, others argued, was to defend the weak parts of the Union ; the South, endangered by English designs, was now the weak part ; therefore the intent of the constitution would be fullfilled by protecting her. One speaker took still bolder ground, declaring that since it was the will of the people to acquire certain territory, the method of doing so was a point of no great importance ; but it was easy to meet him by emphasizing the duty of Congress to obey the organic law. Then there were certain minor constitutional points. The Texas Senators and Representatives, it was objected, would not have lived in the United States the required number of years. This difficulty it was proposed to meet by in- serting a permissive clause in the annexation law, by holding that Texas had been a part of the United States ever since 1803, or by inferring from her absolute equality with the other States after her admission that her Representatives would necessarily enjoy a full right in the national legislature. It was also argued that the incorporation of that territory would be in effect an importation of slaves, which had been illegal since 1808 ; but this was regarded as a far- fetched objection, and those who made it were reminded that Adams and Van Buren had not been deterred by this consideration from endeavoring to purchase the territory in question. Complaint was made that in entering the American Union Texas would have to surrender her sovereignty, which only the people had the power to do ; but this was answered on the one hand by replying that she would surrender her sovereignty no more than did the thirteen colonies in form- ing this Union, and on the other by proposing that the people of Texas, in con- vention assembled, should consent to the absorption of their country. 332 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS both the history and the wording of the constitution prove that Congress has power to admit her at once as a State ; the only real difficulty is slavery; and in my opinion the proper course as to that is to apply the Missouri Compromise line.^- The plan which had seemed most likely to succeed was the one offered by Boyd of Kentucky. The Democratic caucus preferred it, and Douglas finally accepted it in lieu of his own. But this was substantially the same as Brown's ; and so, as it was desirable to have the votes of a group to which the Tennesseean belonged, the party decided to adopt the latter proposition. In the evening of January 23 a caucus was held. It was now believed that 105 Demo- crats and 8 Whigs — a safe majority — could be counted upon ; and on the twenty-fifth discussion ended at two o'clock in the afternoon. After several propositions had been brushed aside, Brown's came before the House. At the request of Douglas, the mover added an explicit declaration that — as the language already implied — slavery should not exist north of the Compromise line ; and at length, after various parliamentary formalities had been complied with, the reso- lution passed by a vote of 120 to 98.^^ "Wash. Glohe, Jan. 6, 1845. Herald, Jan. 15, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., (Rhett) 89, (Kennedy) 124, (Dromgoole) 186. (Leader) N. Y, Tribune, Jan. 25, 1845. "^^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 171. Wash. Globe. Feb. 14; March 22, 1845. A. V. Brown to Polk (Polk Pap., Chicago) : " The Tennessee Whigs voted with us but we had to take it on Milton Brown's resolutions." Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 171, (Collamer) 181. N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 25, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 190-194. The anti-slavery men were particularly angered by the " derisive " provision about States formed north of 36° 30', for they did not believe Texas owned any land above that line. The resolution was as follows (in the form finally adopted by Congress the words here italicized were dropped, and the words bracketed were added: Sen. Doc. I, 29 Cong., I sess.): "Joint Resolution. Declaring the Terms on which Congress will admit Texas into the Union as a State. Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress doth consent that the territory properly included within, and rightfully belonging to the republic of Texas, may be erected into a new State, to be called the State of Texas, with a republican form of government, to be adopted by the people of said republic, by deputies in con^#lon assembled with the consent of the existing government, in order that We. same may be admitted as one of the States of this Union. Section 2. And be it further resolved, That the foregoing consent of Congress is given upon the following conditions, and with the following guaranties, to wit : First. Said State to be formed, subject to the adjustment by this government of all questions of bound- ary that may arise with other governments ; and the constitution thereof, with the proper evidence of its adoption by the people of said republic of Texas, shall be transmitted to the President of the United States, to be laid before Congress for its final action, on or before the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty six. Second. Said State, when admitted into the Union, after ceding to the United States all mines, minerals, salt lakes, and springs; and also all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy yards, docks, magazines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means pertaining ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 333 Eight Whigs supported it, four of whom came from Tennessee, two from Georgia, one from Alabama, and one from Virginia. Fifty-three Democrats from free States and fifty-nine from the South did the same, while Gidding's forty irreconcilables proved to be only twenty-eight. Out of 133 men classed as North- erners eighty stood for the negative. According to the Washington Globe, some twenty-seven went against the resolution merely be- cause the compromise line was not what they had given their con- stituents reason to expect ; and ten New York Democrats placed themselves on the same side to conciliate the abolitionists in their districts. Four of that party from Maine explained their negative votes afterwards by saying that Texas should have been divided into equal or nearly equal free and slave sections ; and Raymond informed his government that as a rule the adverse Northern Demo- crats expressed themselves as friendly to annexation provided fur- ther restrictions touching slavery could be imposed. From this it would appear that the sentiment in favor of the measure was much stronger than the verdict. On the other hand, the National Intelli- gencer maintained that had both parties represented strictly the to the public defence belonging to said republic of Texas, shall retain all the public funds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind, which may belong to or be due or owing said republic : and shall also retain all the vacant and unappro- priated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the debts and liabilities of said republic of Texas ; and the residue of said lands, after dis- charging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said State may direct ; but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the govern- ment of the United States. Third. New States, of convenient size, [not exceed- ing four in number, in addition to said State of Texas,] and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution. And such States as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission may desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said territory, north of said Missouri compromise line, slavery, or involuntary servitude, (except for crime,) shall be prohibited (Wash. Globe, Feb. 28, 1845)." At first s^Hl^it appears impossible that the advocates of annexation should cordially have a^fepted a bill which did not provide for the assumption of the, Texan debt. The New York correspondent of the London Times (in the Times of April 15, 1845) was astonished that the holders of Texas bonds were willing to accept the resolutions : and he said that intelligent, well-informed people did not believe that for fifty years the sales of lands would much more than pay the interest on the debt, yet the Louisville Journal (Mat. Iiitell., Aug. 6. 1845) as- serted that the holders of scrip were not only willing but anxious that the public lands and the debt should not be transferred to the United States. The New York Moniiug News, an annexation journal, provided an exjilanation of the mystery, saying (Nat. IntelL. Aug. 6, 1845): "Texas will no doubt drive a hard bargain with us for her lands. To allow them to lie outside of our general land system, under-selling all the rest of the West, will never do." 334 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS popular feeling of their States, there would have been an adverse majority of twenty; and the Springfield Republican asserted later that out of sixteen Northern men — by whom it seems to have meant Representatives from New England, New York and New Jersey — who voted for the resolution, thirteen were appointed to offices within a few months.^* While these events were occurring in the House, the Senate was neither unmindful nor inactive. This body, according to the London Times, was the only American institution commanding respect abroad ; and here at least the cause of right, whatever that might be, was expected to triumph. A torrent of petitions and resolutions against annexation poured in like that which inundated the House, together with a smaller number in favor of the measure ; and also a slender stream of propositions to annex Canada made its appear- ance, obviously intended to suggest the career of aggression and foreign difficulties in which the friends of Texas might involve the nation, and so operate as a flank movement against them.^^ Only a week after the session began ]\IcDuffie re-introduced his joint resolution. This embodied the treaty, as Ingersoll's plan had done; and it was recognized as the administration measure. Evi- dently, however, the proposition had no chance of success. Clay suggested that it be amended by asking the consent of Mexico, refusing to assume the Texan debt, excluding slavery, and the like, which showed that unless the leopard would change his spots, the Whigs were not likely to receive him; while Blair of the Globe did what he could to rouse the Northern annexationists against the proposition by insisting that the object of presenting the treaty in this new form to the very men who had rejected it originally, was to defeat the project once more. At the same time many understood that the resolution was in reality a thrust aimed at Benton and Wright. Cave Johnson said they would be forced to accept the treaty or appear before the country as hostile to Texas. Calhoun, he explained, thought he had the advantage of his enemy on this issue, and intended to " drive him home upon it." Calhoun's friends therefore, inferred Johnson, would accept nothing else; and the "Boston Atlas, Jan. 28, 1845. (133) Tyler, Tyler, ii.. 360. Wash. Globe, Feb. 7, 1845. Portland Amer., Jan. 29, 1845. (N. Y.) C. Johnson to Polk, Feb. 3, 1844 [1845]: Polk Pap., Chicago. Raymond, No. 140, Jan. 27, 1845. Nat. IittclL, March 25, 1845. Springfield Repub., Aug. 2, 1845. ^'' Times, Jan. 10, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 73, 75, 92, 98, 113, 128, 154, 171, 232, 237, 266, 295, etc. ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 335 friends of Wright and Benton would certainly not accept that. Consequently the chance of passing ]\IcDuffie's resolution, or in fact any annexation measure, appeared extremely small. ^^ The Missouri Senator, greatly excited by this renewal of what Johnson termed " the great battle " between him and the Secretary, stalked about in a rage ; but he did not shrink from the contest. At heart he was in a much softer mood regarding the immediate acceptance of Texas than previously he had been, and about the middle of September Blair had felt sure that he would go " the wdiole length " with the Sage of the Hermitage to effect annexation, even at the cost of a war with England, France and Mexico. But the Senator would not be driven by Calhoun even in the direction of Nashville. Accordingly, the next day after McDuffie's resolu- tion was offered, he introduced his former bill, plus an amendment intended to partition the territory, as equally as possible, into a free half and a slave half. His real purpose, the ^Mexican consul at New Orleans was assured by a Washington correspondent, was to divide the Senate so that no action could be taken during that session, and John Slidell, a Louisiana Representative, expressed the opinion that his bill would have such an effect. " Annexation at present is dead," wrote Cave Johnson three days after this move was made, unless the situation should change in some improbable fashion. Sternly, point to point, the two champions faced each other. Benton asserted that his rival's aim was to involve the country in a war with Alexico, so that the North — refusing to sup- port it — would give the South an excuse for dissolving the Union ; and McDuffie retorted that Benton, after assuring Mexico that it would be an outrage to annex Texas without her consent, now pro- posed to do exactly that.^'^ About the middle of January Senator Archer of Virginia an- nounced for the committee on foreign relations that owing to the number of plans already submitted, the action of the House of Rep- resentatives would be awaited. When the passage of Brown's reso- lution by that body was officially made known to the Senate on the twenty-seventh and its concurrence invited, the resolution was re- "CoMg. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 16. C. Johnson to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844: Polk Pap. Clay to Crit., Dec. 16, 1844: Crit. Pap. Blair to Jackson, Jan. 3, 1845: Jackson Pap. Johnson to Polk. Dec. 18, 1844: Polk Pap. "Johnson to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844: Polk Pap. Blair to Jackson, Sept. 9, 1844: Jackson Pap. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 19. Arrangoiz. No. 142 (res.), Dec. 21, 1844, Slidell to Jackson, Dec. 15, 1844: Jackson Pap. Johnson to Polk, Dec. 14, 1844: Polk Pap. (McDuffie) Tyler, Tyler, ii., zzz- 336 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS ferred in due order to Archer's committee, and silence then resumed her sway. Two days later a Senator observed that it was hoped Lazarus would come forth some time the following week, and at length on the fourth of February the stone was rolled away. At that time a report was presented ; and this was found to recommend the rejection of the House resolution, and to propose laying on the table everything now before the committee that had reference to the subject of annexation. January 9 Clay had written to Crittenden endorsing the determination of the Whig Senators to leave the sub- ject to the next administration; and this report was evidently de- signed to carry out the scheme. The document itself, whether purposely or not, had a tendency in the same direction, for it was extremely long, abstract, circumlocutory and involved. According to the Globe it required some ten days to make out what was meant. " We have read this document through and through," proudly an- nounced the editor of the New York Morning Ncivs; " Yes, we are the person who has read it through." The ostensible objects of the committee were to prove that the passage of the House reso- lution would be unconstitutional, and also that its terms were open to serious criticism. In these aims they did not appear to succeed, but they indicated plainly enough that a strong Whig element in the Senate could be reckoned upon still as opposed to immediate annexation. ^^ Meanwhile sentiment was changing somewhat on the Democratic side. Under Benton's turbulent will and bitter animosities, observed Catron, lay a " conservative and conciliatory spirit," and softening influences were at work upon him. He did not wish to prevent the acquisition of Texas, and he did wish to please Jackson and to regain good standing in the party, as Jackson urged him to do. Donelson wrote to him that he was injuring his friends and his country by pursuing such a course, and indicated frankly the objec- tionable features of his bill ; and this candid expostulation doubtless had weight. By the first of January he reached the point of say- ing that he would obey cheerfully at the session of Congress then '"Wash, Globe, Jan. 14, 1845. N. Y. Joiirn. Com., Jan. 16, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong. 2 sess., 194. Wash. Globe, Jan. 29, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 240. Report : Sen. Doc. 79, 28 Cong., 2 sess. Clay to Crit., Jan. 9, 1845: Coleman, Crit., i., 226. Wash. Globe, Feb. 13, 1845. Nezcs: ib. Nat. In tell., Feb. 10, 1845. The report argued that a foreign nation, in order to be admitted to the Union, must first be resolved somehow " into its component ele- ments of population and territory," and then " pass through the ordeal sieve of the treaty-making power." ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 337 proceeding; and before the month was out, in response to a mes- sage from Jackson that " brightened " his face, he rcpHed that he intended to accomphsh something for the cause of Texas. The IMissouri legislature had now declared that annexation was demanded "at the earliest practicable period" by a majority of the people of the State, and requested their representatives in Congress to exert themselves in that direction, expressing at the same time a prefer- ence that the territory should not be divided into slave and free. This resolution was not intended in a sense unfriendly to the Sena- tor ; liut it indicated a state of feeling that might easily become antagonistic if stubbornly resisted.^" ]Moved by these influences, Benton decided to modify his belli- cose attitude, and on the fifth of February he introduced a new bill. In this nothing was said about obtaining the consent of Mexico, and no precise terms of annexation were specified ; but it was pro- vided that a State, " to be formed out of the present republic of Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries," should be admitted to the Union " as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission, and the cession of the remaining Texan territory to the United States " should be agreed upon by the two governments ; and $100,000 were to be appropriated for the expenses of negotiating. This proposal, Blair stated, was designed to meet as nearly as pos- sible Jackson's views; and he added that Raymond was perfectly satisfied with the plan ; that Polk's brother-in-law considered it the best yet offered, and that all except the Calhounites preferred it to the House resolution. Certainly much could be said in its favor.-" Benton's biographer has expressed the opinion that the purpose of the bill was probably to head off the rising opposition in Mis- souri ; but it did not prevent opposition elsewhere. Again the moun- tain has brought forth a mouse, exclaimed the Madisoniaii, — the same mouse, only minus its tail ; and it proceeded to pour vitriol upon " this amputated vermin, this spawn of a conglomeration of defec- tion and treachery," as expressly designed to preclude the immediate "Catron to Polk, Feb. 5, 1845: Polk Pap., Chicago. Jackson to Blair, Sept. 19, 1844: Jackson Pap. Blair to Jackson, Dec. 25, 1844: Jackson Pap. Don. to Calhoun, private, Dec. 26, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., loii. Id. to Jackson, Dec. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. Brown to Polk, Jan. i, 1843 [1845]: Polk Pap. Blair to Jackson, Jan. 30, 1845: Jackson Pap. Nat. Intcll., Jan. 3, 1845. J. C. Edwards "to Polk, Dec. 6, 1844; Polk Pap. ^' Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 244. Blair to Jackson, Feb. 9, 1845: Jack- son Pap. Benton explained that terms were not specified because it was difficult to agree upon them, and because it was more natural, practicable and respectful to Texas to settle them by negotiating. 23 338 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS acquisition of Texas, and intended ultimately to " ignite a political volcano " that would place Polk's administration at the mercy of its author. The bill, said Calhoun later, would have killed annexation, for the result must have been a treaty, should Texas have been willing to make one, and that would certainly have been defeated in the Senate. The Secretary was now confined to his rooms with a dangerous congestive fever that left him hectic and emaciated, with a glazed eye, a hacking cough and a feeble walk ; but he took, as he said, " a most decided stand " against the measure ; while Texas protested in the National Register that the bill was designed merely to keep the annexation issue aUve for Benton's political profit, that such a plan settled nothing but unsettled everything, and that it would be " better at once to extinguish the nation than to doom it to a state of wasting, lingering decay." " We can neither beg, give, sell nor purchase ourselves into the Union. The boon of independence seems forced upon us even against our will," exclaimed the Register with genuine or well simulated bitterness.-^ McDufifie and Benton, however, did not monopolize the creative power of the Senate. Niles of Connecticut proposed that Texas be ad- mitted as a State not larger than the largest already in the Union, and that the rest of her area — excluding all over which Mexico had actual jurisdiction — should be ceded to the United States as a Territory; and Ashley of Arkansas offered a resolution which provided for reducing her extent by authorizing its partition into not more than five parts, each to become a State. The only plan requiring notice, however, besides Benton's was that of Foster, a Whig from Tennessee, which was a duplicate of Brown's. Foster's motive was seriously -'Meigs, Benton, 351. Meigs adds that Benton hoped this bill would prevent action before March 4. Madis., Feb. 6, 1845. Calhoun to Don., May 2Z, 1845: Jameson, Calhoun Corn, 658. Wharton, Feb. 18, 1845 : ib., 644. Texas National Register, March i, 1845. Another circumstance perhaps assisted in causing Ben- ton to offer his second bill. A proposition embodying Jackson's views, and there- fore supported by his influence, had been introduced on Jan. 14 by Haywood of North Carolina {Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 134; App., 155. Wash. Globe, March 26, 1845). This plan was drawn up at the request of Blair and directly in consequence of suggestions coming from the Hermitage, and it met with not a little favor (Blair to Jackson. Jan. 3, 1845: Jackson Pap.) In presenting the bill its author said that he desired to separate the principle of annexation from the method of acquiring the territory; to dispose of the slavery difficulty, which alone prevented annexation from being the most popular question ever sub- mitted to the nation and made it impossible to secure a majority for the measure in the Senate, and to reach in a manly way, if that were possible, an agreement regarding the terms upon which Texas would be accepted. Until the resolutions of Brown were passed by the House, the chances for Haywood's bill seemed quite favorable ; but, having to avoid so many difficulties, it was a long, tedious and exceedingly involved piece of legal composition. ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 339 called in question. The Nashville Union stated positively that he said he did not expect the Democrats to accept his resolution, but thought it would take from them their " sweetest bone " ; and Blair, explaining that the bone was Texas, charged him with aiming to cause division in the ranks in order to prevent annexation.-- Alany friends of that cause felt disturbed to see time passing and nothing accomplished, but the Madiso)iiaii was more philosophical. Now that the House has adopted the resolution it is safe, remarked the editor ; no Senator " will dare attempt to murder it in any of the gloomy Gothic cells of the Capitol," and the period of delay will give time for the sentiment of certain States to reach their representa- tives. Even the patience of the Madisoniaii, however, had been thoroughly tried when, on the thirteenth of February, the recom- mendations of the committee on foreign relations were brought up for action, and Archer formally moved the indefinite postponement of the House resolution ; and its patience was then still further exer- cised, for a long debate began. Ten days before, Senator Bagby had protested that the time for discussion was past, but evidently noth- ing could prevent the flow of oratory.-^ Probably a few of the members followed the speeches with attention, but the real character of the greater part of the debate was perhaps indicated by the fact that eighteen were eager to speak when only twelve would consent to listen. Men talked largely for effect upon their own political fortunes. Certain Senators, however, were listened to with intense interest, for their course was uncertain. Alerrick, a Whig from Alaryland, was one of these. The New York Tribune asserted that he was purchased; but he himself attributed his action to " the sublime light of reason." The South needs more ^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 99, 278, 127. Union, etc.: Wash. Globe, April 8, 1845. ^ Madis.. Jan. 31, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 278, 247. In this debate many of the old points were simply repeated ; but the fear of a Mexican war seemed, in view of the distracted condition of that country, too absurd to press ; the need of Mexican consent, now that — for the same reason — Texas appeared to be safe from attack, was thought equally so ; the desirability of possessing that territory seemed to have been placed by public opinion beyond the pale of discussion ; and the existence of British designs looked, in consequence of the lack of proof and the assurances and apparent inactivity of that power, much less certain that it had previously been supposed by many to be. The questions of slavery and Southern domination, though not lessened of late in importance, seemed to have been pretty well threshed out. The bearings of annexation upon the great question of the tariff were too well understood to require much comment, though Upham of Vermont took occasion to state frankly that phase of the matter as his constituents viewed it. The danger of extending the national area had well nigh ceased to alarm, though Webster clung to that objection firmly still. 340 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS protection for its rights and institutions against the North, he argued before the Senate, and by giving it we shall fulfill the intent of the constitution, while the welfare of the Union will be promoted. His course was harshly criticised in his own State and elsewhere ; but he replied that although he had voted against the treaty, he was justified in supporting the resolution, since in many respects the With a certain novelty of form some of the old arguments were restated ; and a few new points of minor value came out. The creditors of Texas, it was asserted, had a right to demand that she preserve her sovereignty in order to ensure the payment of her debts ; power to acquire territory belonged clearly to the treaty-making power, and precisely the same authority would not have been given to Congress also ; the very fact that Texas was a nation and not m.ere territory made an act of Congress — as distinguished from action by the treaty- making power — essential ; to admit the principle of legislating for a section would destroy the constitution. If Texas remain independent, urged Henderson of Mississippi, our discontented will go there from all quarters, and in twenty years that country will have a population of half a million brave, excitable people, producing half a million bales of cotton, who — in alliance with England or France — could do us very great harm. Besides Great Britain must not have two com- peting sources of cotton. Texas competition is bound to come, argued Colquitt of Georgia, and the only question is whether we or a foreign nation shall have the benefit of those vast resources. Barrow of Louisiana declared that the great reasons — neither of them good' — for annexation sentiment in the South were a desire to gain more political power and a fear that England wished to get pos- session of Texas, The best way to protect New Orleans, he urged, was to com- plete Fort Livingston, as he had vainly urged more than once already. The New England enemies of annexation are injuring the business interests of their own section to benefit Great Britain, said Allen of Ohio ; two-thirds of the American commerce passes through the Gulf of Mexico and there the rivalry of England and the United States must be settled. Upham took the ground that Brown's resolution was the result of Tyler's appeal from the Senate to the House of Representatives, evidently thinking that his colleagues would not care to endorse that appeal. What if this measure be chiefly for the benefit of the South ? demanded Woodbury of New Hampshire ; the purchase of Louisiana gave eighteen degrees of latitude to the North and only five to the other section. It is mon- strous, protested Senator Barrow, to hold that the people decided for annexation in the recent campaign and therefore this body must abdicate its duty to de- liberate and decide. We have no right, argued another, to concern ourselves with slavery or republicanism outside of our own country ; and England will not try to get possession of Texas at the risk of forfeiting our trade, having a war with us, and so losing Canada. When it was suggested that the Senate had committed itself already by rejecting the treaty, a friend of Texas replied that no precedent had thus been made, for the treaty had proposed to take that country as mere territory. England is laughing at us, exclaimed McDuffie ; while she is exerting herself to prevent our annexing Texas, she sees us trying to find reasons for not accepting it. The vital issue in the Senate, however, was on the question of constitution- ality. On the one hand it was urged : It has been clearly settled that the authority of Congress is exclusively domestic ; it would be absurd to hold that while the concurrence of the President and two-thirds of the Senate is necessary merely to purchase a bit of foreign territory, a simple majority of Congress can admit a foreign nation to the Union as one of our equal States : such a doctrine is dangerous, for a margin of one member in each branch could introduce any number of alien countries and thus totally change the character of the Union ; it is an unwarrantable stretch of the constitution to attribute such a power to Congress, for it evidently belongs to the people alone. The other side, however, was maintained with no less vigor, particularly by Woodbury. The power of Congress is not exclusively domestic, it was urged, since it has authority to deal ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 34! circumstances and the terms of the proposition had now changed.-* Bagby, an Alabama Democrat, was a no less interesting figure. For some reason he appears to have entertained a personal hostility against the idea of receiving Texas, and his " bar-room tirades " at Washington during the summer of 1844 were ranked with Benton's oratory as injurious to the cause. As a party man and a Southerner he was none the less expected to stand with the Democrats, though the other side also had strong hopes of him. In an evening session, when the crisis had become fearfully acute, he took the floor. Around him crowded the Whigs as if to give support, while his with foreign nations by declaring war, taking action with reference to loans, and regulating commerce ; the treaty-making power was given to the President and Senate merely for convenience in doing that work; a two-thirds majority of the Senate meant originally only a margin of four votes, and certainly that was no safer than a clear majority of both Houses; foreign nations would not be admitted to the Union, for an acceptance of the United States constitution would be necessary and only a similar people, like the Texans, would consent to that ; no stretch of the constitution is contemplated, for its language is perfectly clear, precise and unlimited. Both sides appealed with more or less effect to the proceedings of the constitutional convention and the opinions of the Fathers ; and in reality each side could make an argument that appeared unanswerable. Naturally a good deal of fire was concentrated upon the House resolution. Benton pronounced it a mere proposal, limited as to terms and as to time ; and he pointed out that should the other party reject it, everything would have to be begun anew. It admitted Texas, he objected too, with no provision for reduc- ing her dangerous preponderance of size without her own consent, and therefore the difficult and expensive adjustments that had been made with Virginia, Con- necticut and Georgia would have to be paralleled at a still greater disadvantage. Indeed Texas would not accept the House resolution '' except for the purpose of prescribing her own terms " for reducing her limits, and all kinds of confusion, quarrels and even hostilities might result, at her option, in the process. The House resolution, too, he objected, should have provided for the naturalization of the aliens residing in Texas. In short, his own plan was more proper, more respectful, more flexible, more certain to bring about annexation within a short period of time ; and it left the execution of the measure to a President " just elected by the people with a view to this subject." By the House resokition, protested Colquitt, we admit Texas to the Union but do not acquire her territory. Dayton pronounced the arrangement regarding slavery delusive, since all the States made from Texas would be sure to retain that institution. The resolution is dishonorable to that country, argued Berrien, for it proposes to force her upon us by a bare majority vote, and it is highly undesirable to place this affront upon a sister State. Archer held that the United States had no right to require of Texas that she should do so and so, this and that. Most if not all of the Whig Senators, Barrow announced, op- posed the House resolution on constitutional grounds. The resistance in the Senate was reinforced by support outside. The Massa- chusetts legislature, for example, voted at this time that, as the constitution gave no authority to admit foreign territory or a foreign state by a legislative act, such a proceeding " would have no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts" (Nat. Intel!., Feb. 17, 1845). But even the most violent expres- sions counted little against the now patent fact that the country desired Texas and the still more evident one that the divergent views of the friends of annexa- tion in the House had at last been combined in a simple and sensible plan. -* Cong. Globe. 28 Cong. 2 sess., 315, 320, 321. N. Y. Tribune, March i, 1845. Lib., March 7, 1845. Wash. Globe, March 19, 1845. 342 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS party associates fixed their eyes upon him with every look of anxious concern from pleading to covert menace. The news that he was up flew to the other House, and in a few moments the Senate chamber was thronged with tense faces. Then amid the excitement he passionately defined his position, and plainly declared that on constitutional grounds he could not accept Brown's resolution, at this time the one hope of the annexationists. "A mine sprung!" exclaimed The Madisonian; if he had scruples, why did he not say so a month ago ; " Why did he glide along like a hidden snake ? '" The name of Bagby became at once a hissing and a reproach, but none the less his attitude had to be reckoned with ; and it was claimed in his behalf that by awakening the friends of annexation from their dreams, he compelled the adoption of a policy fitted to succeed.^^ February 24 Archer withdrew his motion of indefinite postpone- ment in order that the issue might come squarely before the Senate and amendments to the House resolution be offered. Though the friends of Texas now hoped and aspired, it was difficult still for them to figure. In reality the Senate was badly split. On the thirteenth of February Webster had thought nothing would be done except to provide for negotiations. Five days later Senator Dix of New York had written that the issue was doubtful ; that a few Calhounites would not only refuse to vote for Benton's plan, but would insist upon the Missouri Compromise line, which some of the Northerners would certainly not accept ; and that he believed certain pretended friends of annexation were determined to defeat the measure in order to keep up the agitation. On the twenty-fourth H. D, Gilpin said that he had never witnessed more anxiety in Washington than over the Texas question, and that most reckless and desperate attempts were making to fix upon those who would not accept Calhoun's view of the matter the odium of a defeat which some desired for that very purpose. Bagby's vote was found to be indispensable, and he like some nine other Senators " felt a decisive preference " for Benton's bill. This, however, could not be sub- stituted for the House resolution, since the Calhounites, besides detesting its author, believed that his plan of opening negotiations might produce a fatal delay. On the other hand Benton was now "(Tirades) Williams to Armstrong, Nov, 26, 1844: Polk Pap. Boston Post, March 6, 1844. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 351. Wash. Globe, Feb. 26, 1845. Bagby spoke Feb, 26. Madis., Feb, 27, 1845. Mobile Com. Reg., March II, 1845, ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 343 undoubtedly anxious to conciliate. Dix described him as very dis- creet and cool, and said he had already made many concessions ; and it was understood that letters from Silas Wright and Van Buren in favor of immediate annexation had been received. It seemed therefore, on all accounts, a time for compromise.-'' And the way to compromise was near at hand. Senator Walker had been well disposed toward his Missouri colleague in this affair. It had been his hope that Benton's first proposition could be modi- fied so as to pass ; and when the bill of February 5 was brought in, he said that he would support it, should the House resolution fail. For an active mind like his it was therefore no hard task to con- struct the idea of combining the two plans as alternatives, and about the eighth of February he drafted an amendment providing for this. On the twentieth Horace Greeley wrote from Washington that Ben- ton's bill, he heard, was to be piled upon Brown's resolution in order to give that Senator "an excuse for retreat," and make a "juggle" with the New Yorkers; while, as the same journalist asserted years afterward, Bagby was induced to favor compromise by intimations that he could not safely return to Alabama or even remain at Wash- ington, should his vote prevent annexation. All this n^vs was hear- say, probably; but from Blair and Walker we learn something au- thentic. First, Walker proposed to Allen to combine the two propo- sitions, Benton's plan to become operative should Texas refuse to accept the House method; and Allen obtained a pledge of Benton's concurrence. Dix, Haywood, Bagby and others refused, however, to give a foreign country this control over the matter. Haywood then proposed that in order to gain the support of Benton and his friends the discretionary power should be vested in the President of the United States ; and to this Walker not only gave his own assent, but obtained that of all the annexationists opposed to Benton's bill. Accordingly, during the session of February 2^, this bill was ofifered as an alternative to the House resolution. Calhoun scented danger, and tried hard to prevent the adoption of the plan. Foster also denounced it. Perhaps he saw that his purpose of blocking annexa- tion was liable to fail; but his contention was that the slavery issue involved in this affair must be settled at once in order to "^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 333. Webster to Harvey, Feb. 13, 1845: Van Tyne, Letters, 295. Dix to Van B., Feb. 18, 1845: Van B. Pap. Gilpin to Id., Feb. 24, 1845: ib. Wash. Globe, March 26, 1845. (Letters) Raymond, No. 143, Feb. 21, 1845. 344 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS safeguard the interests of the South, and that Walker's amendment sacrificed his own section for the sake of Northern votes. As for the Whigs, taken by surprise they demanded time to consider this new aspect of the case, and some even threatened to prevent action by talking out the session.^^ Just here lay a real peril evidently. As the Congress would necessarily end in a few days, the temptation to conquer by obstruc- tion was great, and there had appeared to be signs that it would not be resisted. The course of Archer and the committee on for- eign relations, which had postponed the consideration of the subject until the middle of February, had suggested as much. Barrow had appealed for a delay until the next Congress, in order that the rep- resentatives of the people chosen since the measure was broached might have a voice upon it. Huntington of Connecticut had urged that more time for consideration was needed. Crittenden had re- fused flatly to agree upon the twenty-sixth of February for the deciding vote. " The annexation of Texas is ordained,'' pleaded Archer, and there is a constitutional method of bringing this about, as my report indicated ; why not then wait a little and adopt it ? A disposition to waste time by employing dilatory tactics had shown itself of late, and the friends of the measure felt no little anxiety. But the will of the nation was understood, and Archer now took the magnanimous ground that no good could be done by stubborn oppo- sition.-* ="Wash. Globe, March 26, 1845. Walker to Polk, Nov. 6, 1848: Polk Pap., Chicago. N. Y. Tribune. Feb. 22, 1845. Greeley, Amer. Conflict, i., 174. (Foster, etc.) Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 359. Calhoun to Don., May 2z, 1845: Jameson, Calhoun, Corr., 658. Rich. Enq., Aug. 29, 1845. Nash. Union, March II, 1845. (Whigs) C. Johnson to Polk, Oct. 6, 1848: Polk Pap., Chicago. Polk appointed Bagby minister to Russia in 1848. The wording of the amendment was as follows: "Section 3. And be it further resolved, That if the President of the United States shall, in his judgment and discretion, deem it most advisable, instead of proceeding to submit the foregoing resolution to the republic of Texas, as an overture on the part of the United States for admission, to nego- tiate with that republic — then, Be it resolved. That a State, to be formed out of the present republic of Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries, and with two representatives in Congress until the next apportionment of representation, shall be admitted into the Union by virtue of this act, on an equal footing with the existing States, as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission, and the cession of the remaining Texan territory to the United States, shall be agreed upon by the governments of Texas and the United States ; and that the sum of $100,000 be, and the same is hereby, appropriated to defray the expenses of mis- sions and negotiations, to agree upon the terms of said admission and cession, either by treaty to be submitted to the Senate, or by articles to be submitted to the two Houses of Congress, as the President may direct " (Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., I sess.). '■* Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 328, 330, 353, 359, 362 ; App., 390. ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 345 After pausing for a recess in the afternoon of February 27, the Senate convened again in the evening. The galleries overflowed vi^ith eager spectators, and the lobbies were thronged with Con- gressmen still more deeply interested. All the learned and the beau- tiful seemed to be present; every lamp was ablaze; and a subdued bustle and murmur kept the air in a quiver. In spite of the pro- found excitement, however, perfect order and dignity prevailed. The spectacle, said A. Y. Brown, was sublime, and the issue to be decided was felt to be vast and momentous. Archer offered a substi- tute bill proposing to open negotiations for the transfer of the terri- tory of Texas, with the assent of the people thereof, to the United States. On this question Foster of Tennessee and Johnson of Lou- isiana voted affirmatively, and the result was a tie. Johnson how- ever, though a Whig, then went over to the Democrats, and Walker's amendment was adopted in Committee of the Whole by a vote of 27 to 25. In due order the Committee reported the amended resolution to the Senate, and at length after other attempts to defeat it had failed, jMiller of New Jersey proposed Benton's original bill as a substitute. But that gentleman was to be caught in no such trap. After in- dulging to the full his animosity against Calhoun, Tyler and the rest of A^an Buren's triumphant enemies, he had found a way to regain the party column, please Jackson and satisfy his constituents, and to do this with a high head instead of the prodigal's bended neck; and the opportunity was by no means to be thrown away. " The Senator from Missouri will vote against it," he was heard to say. I hope, observed his New Jersey colleague, that the gentleman will not destroy his own child. " I'll kill it stone dead," was the reply, and Miller's proposition failed. Amid a deep silence the reso- lutions were now read — by title — a third time. It seemed unneces- sary to call for the Yeas and Nays, since every man's position had evidently been taken ; and at about nine o'clock, by a vote of 2y to 25, the business was finished. The Senate then adjourned, and soon the guns on Capitol Hill were booming a salute.-" The affirmative vote consisted of the Democratic Senators and three* Whigs, — J\Ierrick, Johnson and Henderson. Thirteen of these men came from free and fourteen from slave States, while in the negative there were fifteen and ten respectively. Of fourteen free States, five voted " Yea," six " Nay," and three stood half-and-half. ^ (Brown) Nash. Union, April 12, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 359. Nat. Intel!., Feb. 28, 1845. 346 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Of twelve slave States, five voted " Yea " and three " Nay," while IMaryland, North Carolina, Georgia and Louisiana were divided. Attempts were made to show that the affirmative represented a decided majority of the whole people; but it was figured out in reply that had all in the Senate been true to the popular feeling of their States, a tie would have been the consequence, while the Washington Globe maintained that if the members from Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Louisiana, Kentucky, Indiana, Maine and Alichigan had acted in accordance with the wishes of those com- monwealths, the result would have been forty to twelve in favor of the measure. It was surprising to find among the majority Senator Tappan, whose fierce opposition to the treaty had led him to give that document out in violation of his duty. He also, the New York Tribune alleged, had received a price; but the fact was that the Ohio delegation had been instructed by their legislature to vote for annexation. Even in spite of that he caused great anxiety ; but as Senator Mangum said, two Presidents and the whole party were upon him, and such a combination of forces could not be withstood. According to the Mexican consul at New Orleans the result was due to treachery on the part of Johnson, Merrick and others, for whom he said the offer of a ministry, a consulate, or a custom-house had great attractions. Some of the Southern Senators, wrote Webster, found it necessary to sacrifice their own preferences to the wish of their States. " It passed by chance," was the comment of the National Intelligencer.^^ " That chance can hardly again occur," added the Intelligencer; but the friends of annexation in the House intended to exclude all contingencies. Many believed that the Representatives, with half the business of the session still untouched, would hardly be able to resume the subject, or if they should, could not find time to dispose of the amended resolution; but when the matter came back to that *° N. Orl. Picayune: Rich. Enq., March 21, 1845. N. Y. Morning Nezvs: Nat. Intel!., March 25, 1845. Wash. Globe, Feb. 27, 1845. Conn.. Me., and Ind. were divided. Tribune, March i, 1845. (Ohio) Nat. IntelL, May 17, 1845. Mangum to Graham, Feb. 21, 1845: Mangum Pap. It is doubtful, however, tvhether Corwin — who had now been chosen Senator but had not taken his seat — -would have obeyed such instructions ; and without his vote, had he been acting, the measure would have failed. Arrangoiz, No. 47 (res.), March 8, 1845. Webster, Writings, xviii., 201. Nat. IntclL, Feb. 28, 1845. According to a state- ment made many years later by Hannibal Hamlin, at this time a Representative from Maine, Hannegan of Indiana, who cast a ballot in the affirmative, owed his election to the deciding vote of a member of the legislature named Kelso, and Kelso owed his own election to the vote of a young man whose acquittal on the charge of murder — which a quarrel over a girl had caused him to commit — was secured by Kelso (Curtis, in Wash. Star, Feb, 21, 1909). ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 347 body, the Speaker ruled out all dilatory points of order and refused to entertain appeals ; efforts to bring up appropriation bills were unsuccessful; debate in the Committee of the Whole was limited to five minutes ; and repeated attempts to amend the resolution failed. When the Committee had reported, the previous question was moved, the Senate amendment adopted, and a motion to reconsider the action of the House defeated. The sun was then just going down; but a national salute fired on Capitol Hill illumined the sky, and the glad faces of the Democrats lighted up the chamber. A different view could, hov/ever, be taken of the circumstances, and it was. " The deed was done in darkness, as was meet," exclaimed the New York Tribuiie.^^ The endorsement of the measure in the House was more em- phatic this time than before; for the vote stood 132 against 76. Every Wliig was firm for the negative except Dellet of Alabama, and every Democrat for the affirmative except Hale of New Hamp- shire and Davis of New York. Like Foster in the Senate, Milton Brown turned against his own resolution. The opponents of the measure were stubborn enough to make a long fight, no doubt ; but with so strong and so determined a majority on the other side they could accomplish nothing. In due order the acceptance of the amendment by the House was now reported to the Senate. There too the spirit of opposition still survived; and when the formal announcement had been made, Bates of Alassachusetts called out, " Woe, woe, woe !" But protest was again futile, and the resolu- tion passed on to the Executive. " Diabolism Triumphant : Over- throw of the government and Dissolution of the Union ... a deed of perfidy, black as that Egyptian darkness which could be felt," cried Garrison's paper ; but it cried in vain.^- In bringing this result about the President elect undoubtedly had an important share. During the previous November a politician in Philadelphia had written to him that as the admission of Texas would anger the anti-slavery Democrats, the matter should be dis- posed of before the fourth of INIarch. The next month Cave John- son assured Calhoun that Polk and his friends desired to have this done. Crittenden believed that if the incoming President should ^'^ Nat. Intell., Feb. 28, 1845. Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 372. Harris to Jackson, Feb. 28, 1845: Jackson Pap. Boston Post, March 6, 1845. Tribune, March i, 1845. '^ Seven Democrats and six Whigs were absent. Mobile Com. Reg., March 10, 1845. Wash, Globe, Feb. 28, 1845, Boston Post, March 6, 1845. Lib., March 7, 1845- 248 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS really adopt the annexation measure as his own, he could carry it, and the announcement to Calhoun showed that such was his purpose. The Richmond Enquirer also stated quite plainly that he desired to have the question settled before assuming the responsibilities of office, and that none who did not contribute to that end could expect anything from him ; and this was a warning specially applicable to the many Locofocos who had opposed the programme of immediate annexation, yet realized the importance of standing well with the new administration.^^ February 21, 1845, the Madisoiiian announced that the President- elect, "calm and affable-as a balmy morning in June," was then in Washington, " receiving and reciprocating the smiles and congratu- lations of his confiding countrymen." Donelson, at this time the American charge in Texas, had expressed the opinion to President Jones not long before that the new Executive would be able to remove all the difficulties in the way of agreement upon a plan of annexation, and apparently his personal influence was now exerted. Before Polk arrived, said the Washington correspondent of the New- York Commercial Advertiser, Texas had no chance; but he, by holding out offices as inducements to the northern Democrats, was able to make terms. The Tribune — a prejudiced witness to be sure — asserted that the President-elect obtained at least four votes for the measure by " nothing better than flagrant bribery " ; and Greeley was observing things in Washington at the time. In particular, it was charged that he agreed to drop Calhoun from the cabinet in order to win over the New York delegation, wliich, remarked the National Intelligencer, explained the " hitherto impenetrable mys- tery " of the Senate's favorable action. All such charges, however, are to be taken with due allowance. Mangum, a prominent Whig from North Carolina, writing to a friend about the matter, only represented Polk as constantly urging that any Democrat who should stand out would incur a fearful responsibility.^* '•''Horn to Polk, Nov. 23, 1844: Polk Pap. Johnson to Id.. Dec. 9, 1844: ib. Crit. to Burnley, Dec. 28. 1844: Crit. Pap. Nat. Intel!., Jan. 29, 1845. Tyler, Tyler, ii., 361. ^* Madis., Feb. 21, 1845. Don. to Jones, Jan. 23, 1845: Jones, Memor., 418. Boston Atlas, March 15, 1845. N. Y. Tribune: Lib., March 7, 1845. (Dropping Calhoun) N, Y. Jourii. Com., Jan. 6, 1845 ; Memphis Eagle, March 21. 1845 (from Charleston Mercury). Nat. Intel!., March 10, 1845. Mangum to Graham, Feb. 21, 1845: Mangum Pap. It was charged a few years afterwards that Polk actually tricked certain. Senators. Tappan asserted in 1848 that Haywood brought him word from Polk to the effect that should the amended resolution be passed, he would submit the amendment (Benton's bill) to Texas as the sole proposition, — a declaration sup- ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 349 Another influence that had an effect on Congress was the interest in Oregon. The natural eft'ect of Hnking the two issues together in the Democratic platform was no doubt considerable, for it tended plemented by McDuffie's assurance that Tyler would not have the " audacity " to take the matter away from Polk by acting upon it himself (N. Y. Evening Post (weekly). Aug. 3. 1848). Tappan's statement was reinforced by one from Blair to the effect that Polk gave him an equivalent assurance, and that Dix and Haywood were similarly favored. In short, said Benton (View, ii., 636). at least five Senators would have voted Nay, had they not believed that Polk would be the one to act and would choose his bill. Polk emphatically denied this charge (Diary, iv., 38-47, 49, 51, 52). Writ- ing to George Bancroft with reference to the letters of Blair and Tappan (Sept. 9. 1848: Bancroft Pap.), he said he had not the "slightest recollection of ever having held a conversation " with either of them on the subject ; that he was anxious Congress should settle the matter at its then session ; that he expressed his opinions on the subject fully and publicly at the hotel where he was stopping, but that he did not even examine the form of the different propositions pending in Congress. In confirmation of his assertions he called attention to the fact that no complaint of a violated pledge was made at the time by Senators or others: that in August, 1846, Blair stated that all of Polk's principal measures had his approval (Polk. Diary, ii., 84) : and that when the matter came before his cabinet on the tenth of March, 1845, he was not aware and gave his advisers no reason to suppose that he had committed himself in any way. Polk then asked Bancroft, as he did the other members of his cabinet, to express his views privately on the subject. Bancroft (Oct. 13, 1848: Bancroft Pap.) wrote in reply that he had lodged at the same place with Polk and was very often with him during the interval in question, but never heard him discuss the two forms of procedure, did not know which he preferred, and never had heard of his express- ing a preference. Marcy (Nov. 20, 1848: Polk Pap.) wrote that he recalled no conversation with Polk on the subject, and that Polk submitted the matter to the cabinet without indicating any preference, adding that until the two letters appeared he had never heard it suggested that the President had given reason to expect that he would select the third section. The other Secretaries also ex- pressed entire disbelief in the charge brought against Polk (Mason to Polk. Nov. 12, 1848: Polk Pap.. Chicago; Buchanan to Id., Nov. 9, 1848: ib. (see Polk, Diary, iv.. 185-187): Johnson to Polk. Oct. 6. 1848: ib. : Walker to Id., Nov, 6, 1848: ib.). The following suggestions may be deemed pertinent: I. It is improbable that Polk would inaugurate his administration by a gross breach of faith on a matter of prime importance. 2. It is improbaljle that he would promise to pursue a course that most of his friends opposed. 3. It is peculiarly improbable that he would do so without consulting any one of the competent advisers selected by him for his cabinet. 4. It is improbable that those aware of such a breach of trust would have remained silent about it for years. Bagby did, it is true, state in the Mobile Register in the fall of 1845 that he voted as he did because he was informed that Polk had promised to adopt the amendment (Cave Johnson to Polk, Aug. 27, 1848 : Polk Pap., Chicago) ; but this is vague and at second hand, and the question remains, why was nothing said at \\'ashington and by those who could have spoken of personal knowledge, if a deception had been practised? 5. It is particularly improbable that Blair would have remained silent had he known of such an affair, since Polk proceeded to put him out of business. 6. It is not likely Haywood, represented by Tappan as having given pledges in Polk's name that Polk did not keep, would have said nothing on finding himself thus compromised and would have been on confidential terms with Polk later, as we see from Polk's papers that he was. 7. It is highly improbable that Tappan would have written, as he did on May 11. 1847, that he regarded Polk as an honest man and supported him for precisely that reason (Polk Pap.. Chicago). 8. It would have been very improper for Senators to bargain with the President and arrange secretly with him to cheat their colleagues into thinking there was an alternative where no alternative really existed. 9. It is not probable that Polk would have made a confidant of Blair in so delicate a 350 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS to make the friends of each proposition favor the other; and ob- viously there was a fine opportunity as well as a strong inducement for "log-rolling." In June, 1843, the Cincinnati Morning Herald, an abolitionist paper, said: "The Southern delegation which has hitherto opposed any measure looking to the possession of Oregon will [at the next session of Congress] withdraw opposition if the supporters of the Oregon proposition will aid them in the annexa- tion of Texas." This may, however, have been one of those easy conjectures which the partisan press is always ready to throw out as facts. The Charleston Mercury printed during the following autumn a letter dated " Maine, October 12, 1843," which said that Texas would be conceded to the South in return for assistance in the other matter. Van Zandt, as we recall, informed his govern- ment at this time, that it was believed the two questions could be combined, so as to gain for Oregon the Southern and South- eastern vote and for annexation the support of the West and to some extent that of the North. Two months later Duff Green wrote to Cralle : " We can secure the co-operation of the North West. . . . The Texas, the Oregon and the Tariff are all questions cementing the South & North West." In January, 1844, the Houston Telegraph remarked that Atchison's bill to encourage the settlement of Oregon could not pass without votes from the slave section, and that a com- bination of the Southern and Western members of Congress would be able to carry both of the measures. Not long afterwards the Detroit Advertiser called attention to the fact that the ^Michigan Senate had requested the Congressmen of that State to vote for the immediate occupation of Oregon, and had refused, though com- posed entirely of Locofocos, to say a word against annexation. In March D. L. Child wrote from Washington to the Liberator that there had been " a constant billing and cooing between Southern matter, for Blair had made a public onslaught upon him before the Baltimore Convention met and Polk was about to discard him as the mouthpiece of the administration. lo. After Polk's choice was known, Blair was eager to be the champion of the administration, and that he could not honorably have been had he known that Polk had broken a pledge (Cave Johnson to Polk, Oct. 6, 1848: Polk Pap., Chicago.) As a hint of the possible incorrectness of late statements it may be noted that, according to Benton (View, ii., 636) Tappan talked with Polk, whereas Tappan himself did not pretend to have done so ; and as an illustration of the way in which the President could be misunderstood it is interesting to note instances in his diary (iii., 121 ; iv., 343). Probably, in the excitement and hurry of the time and his eagerness to have the annexation matter disposed of, he intentionally or unintentionally used ambiguous language intended to smooth the road, but it is not likely that he gave a pledge of the kind described later by Tappan, Blair and Benton. ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 35 1 and Western members [of Congress], on the principle of mutual support in taking possession of the two territories and breaking down the tariff," and that after the defeat of a resolution looking toward an armed occupation of Oregon, Hannegan had said he would be damned if he would vote for annexation ; but Child, like some other persons, was not always critical in making statements. At about the same time, as will be remembered. Black of Georgia offered in the House, as an amendment to a motion for occupying Oregon, a resolution for the re-annexation of Texas, and his amend- ment was accepted by the original mover /''^ In January, 1845, ^s a sequel to the adoption of Brown's resolu- tion by the lower branch of Congress, Black announced that after this glorious event he would go cheerfully for the occupation of Oregon, and that he hoped every member wdio had voted for annexa- tion would follow his example. Wentworth of Illinois spoke soon afterwards, and had much to oft'er with reference to Texas in con- nection with the far Northwest ; but it was noticeable that he made no intimation of a bargain between the two interests. In January, 1846, Hunter of Virginia said that the South appeared to be regarded as ungrateful, because it did not support Western views regarding Oregon ; and this language implied a certain basis for expecting assistance. About the same time McDowell of Ohio, on a motion to terminate the joint occupancy of the territory in dispute, reminded the southern Representatives very pointedly that his section had stood by them in their struggle for extension ; and Wentworth of Illinois complained that the South, after having " used the West to get Texas," was thought unreliable regarding the other aft'air. Upon this, Yancey of Alabama demanded squarely whether a bargain between the sections had existed, and Wentworth replied that he had made no such charge. Houston of Alabama denied that any one had been authorized to say what the South would do on the Oregon question, and Chapman of the same State said he had " never heard " of " an understanding or bargain " in reference to the matter. In the Senate Hannegan, a rough sort of a man, was very outspoken and bitter. He intimated clearly that when the Texas issue was up, reasons had been given him " why he should not distrust the South on the question of Oregon " ; but even he, and he raging, did not assert that an agreement had existed. William Lloyd Garrison, ^'^ Morning Herald, June 21, 1843. Mercury. Oct. 28, 1843: ib. Van Z., No. 109, Oct. 16, 1843. Green to Cralle, Dec. 30, 1843: South. Hist. Ass. Pub., vii., 419. Telegraph, Jan. 24, 1844. Adv., March 13, 1844. Lib., March 27, 1845. 352 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS in reviewing the progress of the Texas movement through its various stages and tracing out the causes of its triumph, made no reference to Oregon ; and though he and his friends were not wanting in alert- ness or keenness of vision, an examination of nearly one hundred and forty articles, original or contributed, that dealt with the annexa- tion affair in his paper between November, 1843, ^^^d October, 1845, discovers no charge of " log-rolling " on these issues. It seems probable enough, therefore, that sympathies and a more or less explicit understanding existed but no bargain.^** As Tyler admitted afterwards, it was "by inadvertence on the part of those who controlled the action of the Senate," that he was given an opportunity to execute the annexation resolution, though JMcDuffie — it was said — expressed the opinion that the President would not have the " audacity " to act in the matter. Very possibly, too, had the outgoing Executive been left to himself, he would have been guided by the evident expectation of Congress that the new administration would be the one to carry its decision into effect. But Calhoun, as he proudly declared later in the Senate and as Tyler admitted, assured the President that he had a constitutional right to act, and advised him to do so at once ; and the cabinet, which met the next day after the resolution became a law, agreed that the Executive ought to exert himself effectually to ensure the success of a great measure which had originated with his administration. That the House plan was the one to adopt, the President and the Secretary agreed perfectly. Both of them believed also that Walker's amend- ment did not express the real sense of Congress, and had been adopted chiefly to prevent Benton and a few others from greatly em- barrassing, if not preventing, the passage of Brown's resolution. Probably, too, it was understood that should Tyler choose the third section — Benton's bill — and nominate commissioners, they would not be confirmed ; and finally, of course, detestation of the ^lissouri Senator counted for something.^' The President felt, however, a certain delicacy as regarded Polk. To be sure he did not think this ought to weigh overmuch, since he believed that his successor's preference would be like his own. and thought it evident that Texas, discouraged by the defeat of the former treaty and the small majority that had carried the resolution ^'^ Cong. Globe, 28 Cong.. 2 sess., 199; 29 Cong., i sess., 206, 460; App., 92, 74. Lib., March 7, 1845, etc. "Tyler, Tyler, ii., 396. (Calhoun") Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess.. 498. Tyler to Wilkins, Nov. 29, 1848: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 364. Calhoun to Don., May 23, 1845: Jameson. Calhoun Corn, 658. (Commrs.) Wash. Globe. March 4, 1845. ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 353 in the Senate, might prefer to obtain recognition from Alexico through Enghsh and French influence, rather than to negotiate fur- ther with the United States; yet he hesitated to take the final step. Calhoun felt sure that the necessity for immediate action was such as to override the point of delicacy, and all the rest of the cabinet concurred in that view ; but finally Tyler requested the Secretary of State to call upon the President-elect and make known the situation. This was done, but Polk declined to express an opinion ; and accord- ingly instructions were sent off to Donelson in the night of March 3.^^ These explained that sections one and two of the resolution had been adopted by the Executive as embodying the simpler plan, and more especially because Benton's method contemplated not only ex- pensive and difficult negotiations but a treaty, wdiich in view of the recent vote one could hardly expect to see ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. The President, Calhoun went on, desires the terms of the United States to be accepted precisely as they stand, so that all the dangers incident to delay may be avoided. Should that prove to be impossible, then let Texas frame propositions — not amend- ments — expressing her views. Finally, should this plan also be unsatisfactory, let her draw up formal amendments, to be binding on both governments if adopted, — even this being a better method than to negotiate through agents. Foreign powers, he added, would spare no exertions to bring about the defeat of the resolution, and therefore the American charge should proceed to the Texan capital and urge prompt action.^^ Polk's course after his inauguration was peculiar. On the seventh of March he wrote privately to Donelson, advising him not to act on Calhoun's orders until further instructed, and thus he called a halt in what he himself regarded as a most important matter ; and no official action was taken until the tenth. On that date his cabinet assembled. Buchanan read aloud Calhoun's despatch of March 3, and every one present — though Polk did not endorse all of the late Secretary's reasoning — concurred without hesitation in preferring the House resolution. The President then ^* Tyler to Wilkins, Nov. 29, 1848: Tyler, Tyler, ii., 364. (Calhoun) Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 498. Tyler to Calhoun, Oct. 7, 1845: Jameson, Calhoun Com, 1058. Madis., March 6, 3, 1845. It is interesting to note that Terrell, then a Texan representative in Europe, anticipated that Houston would reject sections one and two, and, should the United States propose to negotiate accord- ing to section three, would give England and France time to act by letting the matter go over to the next session of the Texan Congress (No. 7, May 9. 1845). '"To Don., No. 4, March 3, 184s: Sen. Ex. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., z^- 24 354 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS said he thought instructions ought to be sent immediately to the American charge confirming Tyler's choice. Buchanan withdrew to prepare them; that evening his draft was accepted by Polk; and the instructions were then entrusted to Governor Yell of Arkansas for delivery. The reasons why the cabinet approved of Tyler's action, as stated by Bancroft, who had just been confirmed as Secretary of the Navy and now entered the room, were as fol- lows: I, a choice had been made, and any change might produce confusion; 2, Donelson was regarded as remarkably prudent and quite capable of conducting the affair, under the direction of Buch- anan, quietly, amicably, and successfully; 3, sections one and two were looked upon as more favorable to the preservation of peace with Mexico than section three, since they expressly gave the government of the United States authority to adjust the boundary with her; 4, as Almonte had demanded his passports, immediate action seemed necessary; 5, the tedious method of a commission would give the Mexican government time to inflame the public mind; 6, the delay would be almost an invitation to England and France to interpose with the hope of preventing annexation; and, finally, the appointment of commissioners would tempt the Texans to make exorbitant demands, which the administration — being pledged to bring about the incorporation of their country — would find it peculiarly difficult to resist.^" The President, said Buchanan in his despatch of Alarch 10, does not believe that an agreement under section 3 would necessarily be a treaty, as Calhoun understood the matter ; but he is aware that many friends of Texas hold such a view, and that members of Congress favorable to annexation might be unable to vote for mere Articles of Union. Sections one and two follow as far as the present circumstances permit, the usual course for the admission of *'Don. to Polk, March 19, 1845: Polk Pap., Chicago (see also Tyler to Cal- houn. Jan. 2, 1849: Jameson, Calhoun ^orr., 1187). Polk's letter of March 7 may have been due simply to his disapproval of some of Calhoun's reasoning. Bu- chanan to Polk, Nov. 9, 1848: ib. feancroft to Polk, Oct. 13, 1848: Bancroft Pap. Polk to Haywood, conf., Aug. 9. 1845: Polk Pap. Blair wrote to Van B., Feb. 29, 1848, that it was fear of making Benton a dangerous rival (by adopting his plan for annexing Texas) that led Polk to choose the other alterna- tive (Van B. Pap.) ; but this appears fanciful. Polk's course suggests that some- thing lay out of sight, and partly for this reason the text intimates' above that, even if he had not given the pledge described by Tappan, he had perhaps used language implying something of the sort. According to Blair's letter, Polk gave Dix to understand that he intended to revoke Tyler's instructions to Donelson. In the executive session of the Senate on March 10, Berrien endeavored to have that body advise Polk to elect section 3 (Benton's bill) of the Resolution; but his motion was laid on the table by a vote of 23 to 20 (Madis., March 20, 1845). ANNEXATION IS OFFERED TO TEXAS 355 new States; and if Texas accept them, Congress will be bound to receive her. Indeed, nothing can prevent this from coming to pass early in the next session except some action on her own part affect- ing the conditions. Should any of the terms appear to be unreason- able, she may confidently rely " upon the well-known justice and liberality of her sister States to change or modify them after she shall have been restored to the bosom of our republican family. The great object now to be accomplished — that which far transcends all other objects in importance — is her prompt admission into the Union." Should she refuse her assent or insist upon proposing new conditions, " we are then again at sea." Negotiations would be necessary ; long and angry debates might arise ; the advocates of admission might become divided in sentiment, " and thus the great work of union might be almost indefinitely postponed." As it is desirable that our land system and " indispensable"' that our Indian policy be extended to Texas, let her propose to cede her lands and Indian jurisdiction to the United States for a sum to be determined by future agreement. The President v/ill " strongly " recommend this plan to Congress ; and, as a distinct proposition not directly connected with admission, he has no doubt that Congress would approve of it. Were it thus associated, however, it might be opposed by some for the very purpose of defeating annexation.*^ ■"To Don., No. 5, March 10, 1845 '■ Sen. Doc. i, 29 Cong., i sess., 35. The sop for the holders of the Texas debt, already alluded to, appears in the concluding sentences of this paragraph. XVII The Attitude of Rejected Texas Houston had many reasons to feel anxious about the resuU of his negotiations with the United States. His official dignity and personal interests, the relations of his country to Mexico, England and France, and the welfare of her citizens during a long future, all seemed to be involved in the fate of the treaty. But his feeling was by no means that of a shipwrecked mariner clinging to a plank. It was in May, 1844, that he put on paper his great ideas about the possible career of an independent Texas. At about the same date Murphy, immediately after conferring with him, reported that the government had treated with the United States reluctantly and would be glad to have the negotiations come to naught. Two weeks before the President knew the treaty had been signed, he informed Jones that he had instructed the envoys at Washington, D. C, to call upon the English and French ministers — in case no annexation measure should be adopted by Congress before adjourning and the American government should decline to make the proposed alliance — and ascertain whether a guaranty against being molested by Mexico could be obtained from those powers. Two days later he repeated these instructions, and while so doing he not only expressed the opinion that England and France would be responsible for the security of Texas, if she would bind herself never to join the United States, but indicated a distinct preference for that arrange- ment. Despite the appreciation expressed by him on receiving the treaty, he so evidently had little faith in its ratification that Murphy thought it necessary to stay constantly by his side. Van Zandt's unfavorable report concerning the chances no doubt strengthened his expectation of its failure; and when his confidential agent. Miller, confirmed that report, he probably looked upon the matter as vir- tually out of the way. We must consider ourselves " a nation to remain forever separate," he assured the envoys on the twenty- seventh of May with noticeable cheerfulness. Henderson was re- called and Van Zandt was soon permitted to resign; and if Houston, instead of refusing to consider the subject of annexation longer, 356 THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 357 merely said that any further negotiations would have to be con- ducted in his own country, one infers that his object was only to remain on fairly good terms with the American Union, and in par- ticular to preserve a certain claim upon it for protection. As the question of joining the United States was taken up by Texas at their request, he sent word to Tyler, they were bound to protect her against all the consequences ; and he could see that such a demand would have tenfold efifect if he allowed it to be supposed that a chance of annexation still remained. In short, as Murphy had an- ticipated, he seized the earliest opportunity to move away from a negotiation that popular clamor had forced him to open and the disobedience of his envoys had brought successfully to a conclusion, and he resumed his old policy of guarding the independence of Texas and ensuring her safety by playing America and Europe against each other, and getting all he could from both.^ The people also felt deeply interested in the negotiations ; and when it became known that a treaty had been concluded, their anxiety was described by the American charge as " extremely pain- ful." The predominant wish was doubtless in some way to obtain peace and the consequent prosperity, and the saying, " Any port in a storm," if we prefix the word " almost," represented the funda- mental sentiment. On this point Anson Jones and Ashbel Smith agree emphatically with each other and with the natural proba- bility ; and Houston said, " Nine-tenths of those who converse with me are in favor of the measure [annexation], on the ground that it zi'ill give its peace." Afifection for kindred and the old home drew the hearts of many towards the United States, but a former French colonist wrote to the Revue de Paris that the Texans among whom he had lived had forgotten their origin, and were too self-reliant to desire annexation. There was doubtless a determined and aggres- sive American element ; but so far as the masses were concerned, the zeal for absorption in the Union sprang mainly from a longing to escape the perils, hardships and uncertainties of a precarious 'See General Note, p. i. (Ideas) Houston to Murphy, May 6, 1844: Crane, Houston. 366. Murphy, No. 23, May 8, 1844. Houston to Jones, April 14, 1844: Jones, Memor., 340. Id. to Hend. and Van Z., April 16, 1844: Tex. State Dept.. Record Book 44, p. 206. Hend. and Van Z., April 12, 1844. Miller to Jones, April 28, 1844: Jones, Memor., 345. Houston to Hend. and Van Z.. May 17, 1844: Tex. Dipl, Corr., ii., 281. To Van Z., July 13, 1844. Jones (Memor., 590) said in 1857 that when the failure of the treaty appeared pretty certain. Houston determined on a new policy. The novelty seems to have been the idea of promis- ing that- Texas would never join the U. S. 258 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS national position, though partly, according to Elliot, from " a belief that the agitation of such a project would dispose the Government of Mexico to acknowledge their Independence." Behind it throbbed a real Texan patriotism. Young though it was, the nation had fascinating traditions ; and men loved the flag for which their blood had been shed. There was also and had been from the first, as we have seen, a haunting belief that it would be for the advantage of the citizens to maintain their national existence. The Houston Democrat said that most of the people would prefer that policy, if recognition could be secured without unreasonable delay. The Gal- veston Gazette agreed that a majority entertained this view; and the British charge informed his government confidently as late as May, 1844, that under such a condition " Texas would reject annexa- tion." Early in the same month the New Orleans Picayune, though a supporter of Tyler's project, felt obliged to print a letter from the city of Houston, which said, " What Texas desires most is a permanent peace and independence. . . . The people are determined to have peace at all hazards." Here in all probability the real senti- ment of the intelligent and thoughtful is correctly indicated: nation- ality if attainable, but at any rate safety. One special factor, it should be remembered, too, worked with particular force against the United States. Many of the citizens were not American in blood or in feeling. Nearly all the best of these, reported the British consul at Galveston, felt strongly opposed to the surrender of inde- pendence ; and as probably more than an average share of wealth and knowledge of the world belonged to them, they doubtless pos- sessed an influence out of proportion to their numbers. Murphy evidently found them troublesome, for he described the British party at Galveston as " Proud, overbearing, impudent and fero- cious." Such a body of men could effect a great deal; and if given a leverage, they were evidently capable of doing no little mischief to the cause of annexation.- It was under these circumstances that news of the failure of the treaty arrived. The first response of the high-spirited Texans was ''Murphy, No. 23, May 8, 1844. Jones, Memor.. 42. Smith, Remin., 63. Houston to Elliot, Jan. 24, 1843: F. O.. Texas, vi. Letter in Revue de Paris, March 18, 1845. Elliot, No. 11, May 10. 1844. Democrat: Nat. Intell., March 4, 1844. Gazette: Rich. Enq., July 2, 1844. N. Orl. Picayune, May 3, 1844. Consul Kennedy to Elliot, May 6, 1844: F. O., Texas, x. Donelson wrote (Nov. II, 1844) that the trade was "passing rapidly into European channels" and that the merchants not uncommonly opposed annexation. Murphy. No. 26, May 24, 1844. For Texan sentiment see also pp. 68, 69, 74, 96, 99. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 359 probably a sense of rebuff, of rejection. Next they realized that a long contemplated hope of finding shelter had been disappointed ; and then they reflected that their standing in the world had suf- fered. How can Texas be compensated, asked Senator Haywood of \'an Buren, for being induced to forfeit her position with other countries by discussing annexation with the United States? A dis- appointment with reference to the treaty, predicted INIurphy, would cause a revulsion of feeling; and now the revulsion came. "There were few men in the Republic," says Yoakum, who did not at the moment resolve to " banish forever all affection " for the land of their birth, " and seek among strangers and foreign nations a more congenial friendship and protection." In about a month the bonds of Texas were quoted at twelve cents on the dollar, and her treasury notes at seven and a half; and the blow to credit and prosperity implied by these figures deepened the resentment. The Chnlian of Galveston said that in the judgment of the annexationists themselves at that place the question had been closed forever; and the Gazette declared it was glad the treaty had failed, since independence was the better policy. Of still greater significance was a decisive edi- torial, commonly attributed to Anson Jones, that appeared in what was regarded as the principal administration organ, the National J 'indicator. Texas has "no alternative" now, said the writer, "but boldly to resolve on her own course of policy, and perseveringly prosecute the determination." " From the United States as a nation we have nothing to expect." The British fleets and arms, however, are to be found everywhere ; her administration is prompt and de- cided; and her influence with Mexico "is almost, if not entirely, unbounded." Let us then offer her a reduction of our tariff in exchange for Mexican recognition or an armistice. A proposition of that sort coming from us would be favorably received, for it would enable the British merchants to undersell all competitors here, and would make it possible for England to bind Texas to herself in a short while so firmly " by the strong ties of interest, that fearful indeed must be that shock which could disturb or sever them " ; and in accordance with this recommendation Jones instructed Ashbel Smith, the national representative at London and Paris, to ascertain what propositions those governments would make on the basis of lasting Texan independence.^ 'Haywood to Van B., May 6, 1844: Van B. Pap. Murphy, No. 23, May 8, 1844. Yoakum, Texas, ii., 432. (Bonds) Petersburg Repiib.: Nat. Intell., July 36o THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS In view of the situation, Donelson expressed the fear that Hous- ton, even if in favor of joining the United States, " might not De able to stand up before his own people if the guarantee promised by England & France were accompanied by terms otherwise very favorable to Texas." While Jones's despatch to the European charge was travelling towards its destination, two letters from Smith were coming the other way. Both told of England's anxiety to prevent annexation, and both expressed the opinion that commer- cial advantages could now be obtained in return for a pledge of permanent independence. Evidently, therefore, the temptation dreaded by Donelson was soon to be offered, with Houston less disposed than any one else to resist it; and before long an English- man occupying a seat in the Texan House of Representatives in- formed the London Times that no danger of absorption remained, unless a Mexican attack should absolutely compel Texas to enter the American Union for the sake of safety.* Some influences, however, tended to mollify the nation. When Van Zandt resigned and took his leave of Tyler, the President assured him of his fondly cherished hope that annexation had been defeated " only for a time " ; and Jackson wrote to Houston that he saw " every reason now to believe that discussion and reflection " were strengthening the views of the public men who favored the project, and was anxious that the Texan Executive should adopt no course " which might create new embarrassment in the negotia- tion or legislation which would be necessary to carry into effect the measure of annexation." But bland assurances and pressing exhor- tations were now an old story, and month after month passed at the Hermitage without seeing a reply from Houston arrive. Less conspicuous but probably far more effective, letters from friends and relatives in the United States doubtless crossed the line by hundreds. A great number of the people had connections in this country, and the opinion must have been expressed a thousand times that the rejection of the treaty was not the final word on the subject. ° IS, 1844. (Civilian) Kennedy, private, July 8, 1844. Gazette: Nat. Intell.. July 20, 1844. Vindicator: N. Orl. Com. Bull., Aug. 19, 1844. To Smith, July 14, 1844. * Don. to Calhoun, July 29, 1844: Jameson, Calh. Corr., 964. Smith to Jones, July I, 1844: Jones, Memor., 369. Smith, No. 58, July 31, 1844. London Times, Jan. 17, 1845. ^ Madis., Sept. 13, 1844. Jackson to Houston, July 19, 1844: Yoakum, Texas, ii., 432. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 36I Something helpful was done by the American government in changing their representative. Alurphy, who was described as a " silly old man," had been acting for nine months by the President's appointment; but now, coming before the Senate for confirmation, he was rejected. "The tail goes with the hide," he remarked of this event when reporting the failure of the treaty to the Texan government, and so pleasant a turn induces one to forgive him for sometimes permitting a "whirlwind of emotion" to invade his " bosom " ; but really the time had come for an abler and cooler man. Tilghman A. Howard was immediately appointed and confirmed in his place. The new charge was not only a friend of Jackson's, but had formerly served upon the staff of the Governor of Tennessee when Houston bore that title, and evidently he was selected with these facts in view.*^ His instructions were promptly given him. "The recent rejec- tion of the Treaty of Annexation by the Senate," wrote Calhoun, "has placed these relations [between the United States and Texas] in a very delicate and hazardous state ; — and the great object of your mission is to prevent, by every exertion in your power, the dangerous consequences to which it may lead." As your initial step, satisfy the Texan government that " the loss of the Treaty does not neces- sarily involve the failure of the great object which it contemplated. It is now admitted that what was sought to be effected by the Treaty submitted to the Senate, may be secured by a joint resolution of the two houses of Congress incorporating all its provisions " ; and this will require only a majority in each. McDuffie's resolution was laid on the table by a vote of 27 to 19, many being absent, on the ground that there was not sufficient time to act upon it. As three of the absentees and three who voted in the affirmative support annexation, only two more votes are needed. The indications in the House are still more gratifying. On a motion to lay the Presi- dent's Message and documents, which accompanied the treaty, on the table, the vote was 66 to ii8; and on a motion to suspend the rules with a view to printing 15,000 extra copies of these papers, the vote was 108 to 79. In other words the majority are favorable. The sentiment of the people is even more satisfactory and is con- stantly growing better ; and it is believed that after meeting their "(Silly) Power to Jones, Feb. 12, 1844: Jones, Memor., 309. Nat. Intell., May 28, 1844. To Murphy, No. 20, June 12, 1844. Murphy to Houston, July 3, 1844: Yoakum, Texas, ii., 432. Tyler, Tyler ii., 335, 430. Houston to Jones, July 8, 1844: Jones, Memor., 371. 362 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS constituents — particularly in the South and West — a sufficient num- ber of Congressmen will come over to our side. We cannot suppose, continued the Secretary, that the govern- ment and people of Texas will abandon the idea of annexation " so long as there is any reasonable hope of its success," for that " would imply that they were not only insensible to the feelings and sym- pathies which belong to a common origin, but blind to their own safety and prosperity. The danger is that the revulsion of disap- pointed hopes highly excited, may be seized upon by an interested and wily diplomacy, and made the means of seducing them " into form- ing an alliance with England, which would eventually be disastrous to the United States, Texas and the American continent. Great Britain is purely selfish in desiring a close connection with that republic. " Whatever motive may be held out, the result, in the end, must be abject submission and degradation on the part of Texas," for it is always so with alliances between small and great nations. " Their interests would be opposite in many and important par- ticulars " ; and the East India possessions of England would be her principal care, should their welfare conflict with that of America. Houston has won too much fame to hazard it now by taking a step which his fellow-citizens would long deplore, while by carrying out the plan " with which he is so intimately identified, he would fill the measure of his country's glory and his own." The defeat of the treaty was due to " temporary causes," concluded the Secretary, and in reality the policy of annexation has " taken so deep and general a hold on the public mind that it must ultimately triumph, should it not be abandoned by the Government and People of Texas " ; in evidence of which Howard received a copy of the pledge, signed by Congressmen from eighteen States, to urge the cause actively at their homes, a sanguine letter from Tyler, and a pencil memorandum from Calhoun predicting that the new Senate committee on foreign relations would be favorable.'^ On arriving at his post, the charge found himself in a difficult situation. Not only had Texas been rejected again, not only had her relations with other countries been compromised, and not only were her people indignant, but she seemed at this time to be in im- minent peril as the direct consequence of Tyler's course. The Mexi- ' To Howard, No. i, June 18, 1844. Calhoun's purpose in representing Hous- ton as committed to annexation is obvious. (Pledge) State Dept., Arch. Tex. Leg. Tyler to Howard, June 18, 1844: ih. Calhoun, Memo.: ib. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 363 can Congress had voted an even greater increase of the army than Santa Anna demanded. Under date of June 20, 1844, one day after giving notice to Houston of the resumption of hostihties, General Woll had ordered all communications with Texas to cease, and announced a programme suggesting the most vindictive warfare. In August it was reported from Mexico that an army of 15,000 men was expected to reach Matamoros in November ; and Santa Anna did in fact propose to launch an attack in the autumn both by sea and by land. What made the situation appear the more alarming was the idea entertained by many that Great Britain stood behind the threatened invasion, preferring that Texas be Mexican rather than American. The consul of the anxious republic at New York, for example, felt little doubt of this ; and the American charge at ^Mexico reported that the British legation there, complaining that England had gained nothing from the independence of Texas, now desired that Santa Anna should 'subjugate that country.^ On the other hand it seemed as if the struggling nation, were she to abandon all thought of joining the United States, had a splendid opportunity just before her. In spite of her difficulties, immigration was pouring across her frontier from the north and east at an unprecedented rate. Not less than 5,000 persons were said to have passed through the single border town of Van Buren, Arkansas, during the summer and fall of 1844. The influx of Ger- mans during the summer was described by the Mississippian as " immense," and a new German colony of from 6,000 to 10,000 farmers was on foot in July. Bourgeois d'Orvanne was reported to be actually on the ground with the intention of planting a large French settlement there; and a stream of thrifty immigrants from the Low Countries had now been flowing in for some time. Hock- ley and Williams asserted that Mexico would acknowledge the independence of the Texans if they would merely agree to remain a nation and pay a suitable share of her debt. Ashbel Smith had an interview with her consul at New Orleans, who stood almost in the position of a minister, and felt " satisfied " that recognition was within reach. Texas, the London Mercantile Journal pointed out to her, would lose greatly by joining the United States, since by pursuing a national policy she could enjoy the advantage of supply- * (Army) Bank., No. 43, June 29, 1844. Woll to Houston, June 19. 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 27. Woll, Orders, June 20, 1844: ib., 34. Nat. lutclL, Aug. 13. 1844, (Propose) Bank., No. 54, July 31, 1844. Brower to Raymond, Aug. 16, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corn, ii., 307. Green, private, June 17, 1844. 364 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS ing all Europe with cotton, sugar and cattle. Behind and beyond all this lay the possibilities of expansion on which, as the American charge testified, Houston dwelt so fondly. Should Texas remain free to act, remarked the weighty Journal des Dchats a little later, she had a good chance to extend south and get possession of the silver mines ; and Jackson feared that a prospect of the absorption of Mexico, with an English guaranty of independence meanwhile and large British loans based on a treaty admitting British manu- factures free, was gaining a party in that country.'' In fact, England seemed ready now to aid her, and Love as- serted as a positive fact that such was the case. According to the postmaster at Houston, it was at length "certain" that she could form a commercial treaty with that country ensuring immediate recognition ; and Houston informed Henderson and Van Zandt that without compromising her national position, she could secure safety through the aid of European powers. It seems likely that much passed in conversation between the representatives of Texas and England which escaped the record, and it is by no means sure that everything put on paper is now where an investigator can examine it ; but certainly Pakenham said to the Texan secretary of legation at Washington that Great Britain, understanding the causes that had brought the annexation treaty into existence, would not allow it — should it be rejected — to affect her friendly attitude, and that during its pendency he believed the republic could make favorable terms with Mexico. The London Times gave a hint sufficiently broad regarding English sentiment. "If Texas wisely and reso- lutely proclaims the policy of free trade," it said, " she secures to her productions a natural preference in all markets ; she buys from all markets on equal terms; and, above all, she gives to all foreign countries an equal interest in maintaining her independence." From this point of view, it looked as if the coldness exhibited by certain British representatives in regard to Texas did not spring from a desire to see her conquered, but from a hope that Santa Anna's threats might induce her to accept the terms offered by England and by him at England's request. That was substantially Jackson's "Ark. Intel!.: Nat. IntelL, Dec. 5, 1844. Mississippian: Lib., Nov. 29, 1844. N. Orl. Cow. Bull., July 15, 1844. Nat. Intel!.. March 28; Nov. 29, 1844. (Hockley) A. M. Green to Upshur, No. 31, April 7, 1844: State Dept., Cons. Letters, Galveston, ii. Smith, Remin., 65. London Mercantile Journal, April 15, 1844. (Dwelt) Don. to Jackson, Dec. 28, 1844: Jackson Pap. Dcbats, April 29, 1845. Jackson to Blair, Jan. i, 1845: Jackson Pap. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 365 belief; and if one compare the unfriendly attitude of the British legation at Mexico, Pakenham's kindly hints, and Houston's remark to his envoys that independence could now be secured through European aid, one discovers a rational basis for his opinion.^'' Tyler and Calhoun, having preached and apparently having en- tirely believed the doctrine of " Now or never " with reference to annexation, were fully alive to the danger that Texas would swing quite away, and the President intimated to her envoys that as he wished to do all in his power for the security of their country, no important change would be made in the military and naval ar- rangements already ordered. This assurance, however, was not accepted by their government as satisfactory; and early in August Jones demanded aid, basing his request upon the assurances given by ]\Iurphy and by Calhoun, the first of which had been disavowed, while the second had contemplated only the pendency of the treaty. Now it appears surprising that the Texan Secretary of State should have adopted this course. If he was appealing seriously to the friendliness of the United States, it would have been better not to remind them that they had refused to extend their protection beyond a limit which had now been passed ; and therefore Jones's action, like his asking at an earlier stage for a pledge of assistance that he knew could not legally be given, suggests a wish to excite his fellow-citizens against the American Union, and incline them towards an acceptance of British protection. ^^ "All that Howard could do in response was to remind the Sec- retary that the term during which his government had offered pro- tection had expired, and to promise that he would lay the matter before them. Calhoun, however, saw a way to aid Texas without going beyond the constitutional powers of the Executive; and he wrote to Shannon, the recently appointed minister to Mexico, a rather surprising despatch, the substance of which was as follows : ^^ Love to Nicholas, Feb. :, 1844: Crit. Pap. Norton to Calhoun, April 29, 1844: Jameson, Calhoun Corr., 949. Houston to Hend. and Van Z., April 29, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 274. Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 343. Times, Aug. 15, 1844. Jackson to Blair, Aug. 15, 1844: Jackson Pap. "Van Z. and Hend., No. 124, June 15, 1844. Jones to Howard, Aug. 6, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 25. Calhoun to Van Z. and Hend., April 11, 1844: Sen. Doc. 349, 28 Cong., i sess., 11. When Howard first presented him- self to Houston, the latter satisfied him, in the course of a long conversation, that the Texan government would make no move to embarrass the annexation question (Howard, Memo., Aug. 2: Arch, Tex. Leg., State Dept.) ; but this appears to have been based upon no definite engagement on Houston's part and from such a diplomatist signified very little. 366 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Evidently Mexico intends to wage a serious and barbarous war against her lost province, the real aim of which is to defeat the project of annexation. As she is aware, that measure has only been deferred. Congress adjourned without finally disposing of it, and the plan will almost certainly be accepted by our country. Mexico therefore designs either to subjugate Texas or more probably to drive her by a ferocious attack into some foreign connection that would be prejudicial both to her and to us. Now the policy of acquiring this territory has long been pursued by the United States ; and are we at this late stage to let it be defeated, and see our neigh- bor — because she accepted the American overture — either laid waste or forced into an alliance that would produce hostilities between her and us ? " The President has fully and deliberately examined the subject," and has answered this question in the negative. Dur- ing the recess of Congress he will use all his constitutional powers to ward off such results ; and he would regard the invasion of Texas, " while the question of annexation is pending, as highly offensive to the United States." If Mexico has taken umbrage, we are the ones to attack, for the invitation to treat regarding annexation was given by us; and as for standing aloof and permitting another to " suffer in our place," we cannot. Humanity also, as well as honor and interest, calls upon us to intervene, for all nations desire the civilized usages of war to be respected, and we, being nearest the field of operations, have a duty to see that this is done in the present instance. For the same reason, too, our sympathies would have most to suffer, should those usages be violated. Mexico pretends that the Texans were intruders and usurpers ; but they were invited to settle in that region for the sake of Spain and herself, — to protect it against the Indians, cultivate the wilderness, and " make that valuable which was before worthless," and this they did. She pre- tends that they are to-day a lawless gang of adventurers; but they have established wise and free institutions, have obeyed the laws, have improved their beautiful country, and have maintained peace for years. They have prospered, too ; and there is no excuse for treating them as outcasts. Present these points to the Mexican government ; protest both against a renewal of the war while the subject of annexation is pending, and against the manner in which it is proposed to conduct the hostilities ; repeat that the measure of annexation was adopted in no spirit of hostility to that power, and THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 367 renew our assurances that if it be carried through, the United States will be ready to settle most liberally all resulting difficulties. ^- This was a very clever despatch. For pendency of the treaty Calhoun deftly substituted pendency of the question. On the one hand he again ofifered the olive branch to Mexico, and on the other he appeared to threaten a war which in reality the Executive had no power to declare. The tone of his letter and its general meaning were equally well calculated to please the Texans, and to either teach Mexico prudence or irritate that country into an explosion that would excite the people of the United States to the pitch of war. Yet after all it was fair and right in principle, for it would not have been just that a neighbor should suffer alone for a negotiation di- rectly chargeable to us, or be driven by our course to purchase for- eign protection. At the same time Calhoun authorized the charge in Texas to have American troops despatched to the frontier, or — should the government of that country so desire — placed on her soil, in order to prevent our Indians from making incursions there, as there was reason to believe that emissaries from beyond the Rio Grande were inciting them to do. This appeared to be a very reasonable and even obligatory step, since we were bound by a treaty with Mexico to hold our savages in leash ; but it is obvious that such a movement of troops would look to her like preparation on the part of our government to carry out the implied threat of war. Further, al- though Calhoun recognized that the charge's construction of his pledge of protection was correct, he directed Howard to notify the Texan authorities that the President felt under obligation to defend their country, so long as the question of annexation should be pending, against all attacks from Mexico caused by the American proposal to open negotiations; that his feelings on the subject had been expressed to that nation ; and that he would advise Congress on its re-assembling to provide effectual aid. Of course a transcript of the despatch to Shannon was forwarded to Howard, and he was instructed to furnish the Texan Executive with a copy of it ; and moreover the minister of that country at Washington was given reason to inform his government that he believed Tyler felt dis- posed to go even farther in her defence than he wished to make '* Howard to Jones, Aug. 6, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 28. Calhoun to Shannon, Sept. 10, 1844: ib., 29. 368 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS known. All this was sure to have a marked effect, so far as the facts were understood, upon the sentiment of Texas/^ About the middle of August Howard died of yellow fever, — the fourth out of five United States representatives to perish at his post during the short period since Texas had been recognized. At such a crisis this was decidedly unfortunate. The results, however, were not so serious as might have been anticipated, for neither Elliot nor Saligny saw fit to remain within reach of the scourge, and conse- quently our interests were as well represented there as were any. Indeed, it would appear that at this time Elliot was not even corre- sponding with the Texan authorities, for the American consul at Galveston reported that no one knew where he could be found, and Jones himself understood that he had resigned or been recalled. Probably, learning in the United States of the rejection of the treaty and well aware how that news would be likely to aft'ect Houston, the British representative deemed any interference on his part super- fluous, and so left the field open for his American rival." News of Howard's death was received by Tyler a month after it occurred, and the next day he informed Jackson that he had appointed Major Donelson to the vacant post. The President wrote that he would not consider even the possibility of a declination ; and the appointee's intimacy with both Jackson and Houston, as well as his personal qualifications for the difficult position off'ered him, did in fact make acceptance almost obligatory. The next morning a special messenger set out from Washington for Donelson's resi- dence. Within a month from the date of his appointment the new charge wound up his affairs and left home to catch a Galveston boat at New Orleans; and on the sixth of November, in high spirits over the Democratic victory in Louisiana and convinced that the question of annexation had been settled so far as the United States were concerned, he sailed for Texas without even waiting for his official papers. ^^ ''To Don., No. ii, Sept. 17, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 36. To Howard, Sept. 10, 1844: ib., 50. Orders to Taylor and Arbuckle, Sept. 17, 1844: Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 37, 38. Raymond, Sept. 13, 1844: Jones, Memor.. 382. "Kennedy, private, Aug. 24, 1844. Elliot (No. 12, May 20; No. 14, June 22, 1844) left the country in May and went as far north as Virginia. A. M. Green. No, 3, July 20, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. "Accounts differ here by a day. Tyler to Jackson, Sept. 17, 1844: Jackson Pap. (Intimacy) Yell to Polk, May 5, 1845: Polk Pap. Raymond, No. 132, Sept. 19, 1844. Jackson to Blair, Oct. 17, 1844: Jackson Pap. Easland to Polk, Nov. 5, 1844: Polk Pap. Kennedy, private, Nov. 12, 1844. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 369 Only four days before, Secretary Jones had written to the Brit- ish coni,ul at Galveston, " I am truly sorry your Government have not an accredited ^Minister here, at this time"; and JOnes had better reasons for this lament than he knew. He was now to deal, unsup- ported by Elliot for a time, with a man who had had much experi- ence among the strongest and most acute politicians of the United States, and under a "plain, unpretending" appearance possessed keen insight, uncommon shrewdness and unflinching courage, all dominated by cool good sense. Jackson's nephew, wrote V^an Buren, was "fit for anything in this Govnt.," and only his modesty had prevented him from occupying a seat in the cabinet. Combining in himself, too, the Tyler-Calhoun influence, wdiich Elliot had sus- pected of antagonizing somewhat the Jackson influence in Texas, with a most confidential intimacy at the Hermitage and perhaps as direct an access to Houston's heart as any man possessed, the new charge was probably the very best person for the task that could have been selected ; and the fact that he was reputed to be a par- ticular friend of Polk gave him additional strength. ^"^ On arriving, Donelson thought the signs unfavorable. Terrell, an avowed opponent of annexation, had been chosen minister to England and France ; all in the confidence of the administration expressed doubts as to the wisdom of joining the Union; and the officials in charge of the records, when questioned as to the future relations of Texas to England, France and the United States, mani- fested a signal reserve. There seemed to be an absence of excite- ment regarding the threatened invasion, which suggested to the charge a sense of confidence in European protection. Every day appeared to increase the strength of the British party, and the purposes of Great Britain could not well be opposed for they could not be made out.^' Donelson had an interview soon with Houston. The latter explained very blandly that he had wished to encourage England and ^lexico with a prospect of defeating the United States while at the same time alarming the latter country regarding British intrigues, and thus hold the afifair of annexation in such a way as to bring it about whenever he could, but that his hand had been forced and his policy defeated by over-ardent supporters of the '"Kennedy, private, Nov. 12, 1844. (Appearance) Terrell to Jones, Nov. 12, 1844: Jones, Memor., 398. Van B. to Bancroft, Feb. 15, 1845: Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 3 ser., ii., 437. Elliot, secret, Dec. 29, 1844. Kennedy, Dec. 5, 1844. " Don., No. 2, Nov. 23, 1844. 370 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS cause; and he said squarely that Henderson and Van Zandt ought not to have signed the treaty without receiving fuller pledges from the United States to defend Texas. Donelson replied that Tyler was disposed to give the desired protection but found himself limited by the constitution ; that the co-operation of Congress was essential to effect annexation; and that, had the President exceeded his authority, there would have been a disagreement between him. and the legislative branch, which would have proved an obstacle. The remedy, said the charge, was an appeal to the nation, and Polk's election would be a national endorsement of Tyler's project. To this Donelson added that he hoped nothing had been done to com- mit Texas to a policy inconsistent with that of the treaty, but from Terrell's language and the remarks of minor officials he feared such might have been the case. Houston answered that he was not in the habit of committing himself; and then, as the other callers retired from the room, he went on to remark that since the charge was familiar with his trials and sufferings and came from Jackson, noth- ing could be concealed from him.^^ To this Donelson responded with no little address. The ex-Pres- ident was most anxious, he said, to have his friend Houston prove that he comprehended the effects which annexation would have upon the fate of free institutions, yet feared that he might be influenced by the plausibility which could be given to the " tempting " prospect of " making Texas a nucleus for the formation of new states, ex- tending to the Pacific, affording a refuge for the oppressed of all nations, and rivalling the United States." "No — no — no!" was the reply ; Jackson might feel sure that his counsels were highly valued, that his words were prized as treasures ; the opposition of certain officials did not indicate the policy of the government; and as for Terrell, he had been sent abroad "to see what bids they would make," but with no power to commit the Executive. Houston then professed that he should be proud to have the union of the two countries brought about during the charge's connection with the government, and showed every appearance of being determined to support the measure in question so long as there was a hope of effecting it on terms honorable and fair to Texas. The idea of prominence in the United States, however, which Donelson sug- gested would be gained by pursuing this course, was repelled, "Don., No. 3, Nov. 24, 1844. It is noticeable that although Houston ex- claimed, " No-no-no ! " he did not disavow the ideas regarding the future of Texas that were attributed to him. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 37 1 and the President said that his purpose was to spend the remainder of his Hfe on his plantation. The charge's comment on the inter- view was interesting. He remarked that Houston must be able to see that annexation would greatly increase the value of his lands, and that consequently his plan to depend upon them for his future occupation and support was perhaps as important an indication of his policy as all his assurances of devotion to Jackson and the cause. In other words, these protestations failed to convince.^^ Donelson showed the President and the Secretary of State what Calhoun had written to Shannon and also a despatch from the same source to the American minister in Paris, which — taking advanced ground in favor of annexation — endeavored to prove that France, unlike England, had no reason to oppose this measure, but on the other hand a very strong motive for desiring to prevent Great Britain from obtainmg a monopoly of the production and distribution of tropical commodities. With these documents Hous- ton and Jones expressed themselves as satisfied ; but far more signifi- cant in their minds, no doubt, was the news of the election. If Polk wins, Texas can join the Union, Van Zandt had predicted when he announced the defeat of the treaty; and his government could readily perceive that such a forecast was very reasonable. ^^ No less interested in the outcome of the American Presidential campaign were the people of that country. It revived their hopes of securing protection and prosperity, and Donelson reported that their love for the United States appeared to re-awake, while the bitterness caused by the rejection of the treaty seemed to abate in a like degree. The sharp correspondence between Shannon and the Alexican minister which had followed the delivery of Calhoun's message would prove still further, he believed, the friendship and fidelity of the American government ; and he soon reached the con- clusion that in a brief time, should nothing unfavorable occur in the north, annexation sentiment in Texas would be as strong as ever, " so strong indeed that no leading men in the Republic would hazard an opposition to it." Yet he still considered the situation critical. After talking with prominent citizens, he became satisfied that with- out having to give up slavery Texas could obtain recognition from Mexico through British mediation whenever she would accept it ; and he felt that should unrestricted trade with England and France be ofifered in addition to the boon of acknowledgment, and should "To King, No. 14, Aug. 12, 1844: Ho. Ex. Doc. 2, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 38. Van Z., [No. 122], June 10, 1844. 372 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS the American Congress fail to act promptly and favorably, a satis- factory result could hardly be expected. His aim, therefore, was to hold the Texan government in a state of willingness until an invitation could be offered by the United States in a practical form.-'' At this time Houston's term as President expired, and a review of his course regarding annexation appears to be in order. Fortu- nately, after what has been said, this can be made very brief. Ashbel Smith, second only to him in ability among the statesmen of the republic and not his inferior in moral and intellectual straightfor- wardness, has stated that in 1836 Houston was for joining the United States because he did not think Texas capable of main- taining a national existence, but that his views changed, and his judgment favored the policy of independence ; and Smith has ex- pressed the opinion that judgment, not sentiment, was Houston's guide. The President himself wrote to Henderson and Van Zandt that his judgment had "never fully ratified" the popular desire for annexation ; and we know that he shrewdly figured out the debit and credit sides of that question in a way to leave a huge balance in favor of nationality. His personal preference appears to have leaned very decidedly the same way. To appear in history as the founder of a new state was precisely the ambition that could appeal with overwhelming force to him ; and in a private letter to Elliot, written in May, 1843, after pouring sarcasm, ridicule and invective upon the United States for their failure to appreciate his country as he felt she deserved, and after showing that her permanent independence would count against them and for the advantage of England, he continued : " It is not selfishness in me to say that I desire to see Texas occupy an independent position among the nations of the earth, to which she is justly entitled by her enter- prise, daring, sufferings and privations. The blood of her martyrs has been sufficient to give cement to the foundation of a great nation, and if her independence be speedily recognized by Mexico, heaven will direct and carry out her destiny to a glorious consummation." Elliot felt convinced that such was his preference; and Murphy wrote solemnly to our government as follows : " I desire to say to you, and to impress you with a belief of the fact, that President Houston and his cabinet, as well, as all his leading confidential friends are secretly oi)posed to annexation That He & they have apparently entered into the measure heartily, in consequence of the ^ Don., No. 4, Dec. 5, 1844. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 373 undivided & overwhelming sentiment of the People in its favor." Finally, the antecedent probability, various private expressions of Houston's that appear to have been sincere, and the opinions of those best qualified to judge in the matter, are confirmed by his adoption of a course that can fully be explained on no other hypo- thesis.-^ The President's valedictory address was a further indication of his real sentiments. " The attitude of Texas nov^, in my apprehen- sion," he said, " is one of peculiar interest. The United States have spurned her twice already. Let her, therefore, maintain her position firmly, as it is, and work out her own political salvation. ... If Texas goes begging again for admission into the United States, she will only degrade herself. They will spurn her again from their threshold, and other nations will look upon her with unmingled pity. ... If the United States shall open the door and ask her to come into her great family of States, you will then have other conductors, better than myself, to lead you into a union with the beloved land from which we have sprung — the land of the broad stripes and the bright stars." On the other hand, if we remain independent, the Pacific will be our boundary, and we can become " a nation distinguished for its wealth and power." Nor was his reply to the July letter from the Hermitage, which he sent four days later, much more promising, for he merely said that his country stood wholly untrammelled ; that he trusted her future course would be marked by a proper regard for her true interests; that his own decided opinion was, that she should maintain her present position and " act aside from every consideration but that of her own nationality " ; yet should the United States open the door wide, it " might be well " for her to accept the invitation. The gist of all this language appears to be that he desired Texas to remain inde- pendent, yet did not wish to lose the good-will of the Union or the leverage of the annexation project.-- On the ninth of December, 1844, Anson Jones was inaugurated as President. This gentleman, born at Great Barrington in 1798, -•Smith, Remin., 80, 69. Houston to Hend. and Van Z., May 17, 1844: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 281. (A huge balance) Houston to Murphy, May 6, 1844: Crane, Houston, 366. Houston to Elliot, private. May 13, 1843: F. O., Texas, vi. Elliot, secret. Feb. 5, 1843, Murphy to Tyler, March 16, 1844, conf. : State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. Of course the theory that the two govern- ments conspired to bring slave territory into the Union falls to the ground if we accept this interpretation of Houston's policy. The reader will know how to make a proper discount from Murphy's enthusiastic views of popular sentiment. '^ Tex. Nat. Reg., Dec. 14, 1844. Houston to Jackson, Dec. 13, 1844: Yoakum, Texas, ii., 433. 374 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS had been a country doctor in western Massachusetts. He was a person of medium height, medium weight and medium intellect ; a well meaning, good-hearted individual of much common sense, and a bearing that corresponded with his character. Elliot described him as worthy, friendly, plain in speech, simple in manner, sound in judgment, " remarkably cautious and reserved," and endowed with " a moderate degree q^ the skill and firmness of his predeces- sor " ; and this portrait was done by a good critic of men, somewhat prejudiced in favor of Jones's anti-annexation judgment. To Don- elson he appeared at the first interview " frank and cordial," and seemed to possess "in a high degree" the qualities needed by the chief magistrate of Texas. A careful study of his record shows that he was neither very able nor very straightforward; but one can see that his genial, open and sensible appearance, combined with his great caution and reserve, enabled him to make a decidedly favorable impression.-^ The relations between the outgoing and the incoming Executives were somewhat peculiar. Donelson spoke of Jones as ''the partic- ular friend " of Houston, and the British consul at Galveston stated that he owed his election almost entirely to the support of his pre- decessor; but Jones's book, written after the two had become open enemies, exhibits a very dififerent view. The opinion is there ex- pressed that Houston desired to have Burleson succeed him, and this desire is attributed to a hope that Burleson, like Lamar, would fail, and thus make Houston seem the more brilliant and indispen- sable. Jones further represents that his predecessor was intensely selfish and extremely cunning; that he had taken the credit of every- thing done by his Secretary of State, and wished to pursue the same policy regarding Jones's conduct as President ; and that only by making concessions to his vanity and letting him have the coveted glory could persecution be avoided ; but that after all Houston had " no agency " in the succeeding administration.^* In some of these remarks, however biased, there would seem to be a large element of truth. Houston was no doubt far stronger, deeper and shrewder than the other man. He found in Jones a use- ful clerk, — simple, steady, orderly, laborious, sensible and naturally sincere, — in a word, everything that he himself was not. Such a ** Jones, Memor., frontispiece. Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844. Don., No. 4, Dec. 5. 1844. "Don., No. 4, Dec. 5, 1844. Kennedy, Dec. s, 1844. Jones, Memor., 41, 26, 69. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 375 lieutenant was greatly needed by such a leader, and probably did not seem likely to become a dangerous rival. Jones, on the other hand, aware that he could do many things better than his chief and not fully conscious of his own limitations, aspired to be a sun instead of a moon ; yet he was too familiar with Houston's art and power and too well aware of his influence in the country to desire any- thing like an open rupture, and, as they believed in the same policy, it was easy enough to avoid a break. To take his Memoranda at face value, one would conclude that the annexation of Texas to the United States was due to his longing for that arrangement. But the book seems to have been written to clear him from the odium of having attempted to defeat the measure ; it was composed in a spirit of desperation which appears to have been the cause not long afterwards of his suicide ; on a close scrutiny it is found to contain inconsistencies and admissions which impair the author's credit as a witness ; and it cannot survive a comparison with Elliot's despatches, which w^ere written at the time and with every motive to be accurate in reporting events, conversations and impres- sions. Ashbel Smith said in his Reminiscences that he clearly be- lieved Jones preferred independence; and Le National of Paris suspected quite naturally, as did many others, that he felt no in- clination to exchange the headship of a nation for the Governorship of a State, — an exchange that must have seemed peculiarly hard, since the more exalted position was a bird in the hand and the other only a bird in the bush.-'' In his inaugural address the subject of annexation was not men- tioned ; but Elliot supplied the omission, so far as the British For- eign Office was concerned, by reporting soon after its delivery that no trouble about maintaining the nationality of Texas would exist, if the matter " depended in any considerable degree upon the dis- positions " of her government, and Donelson helped his uncle un- derstand Jones's silence by admitting before long that British influ- ence was beginning to tell. The Message to Congress was equally dumb on the subject; but in a few days the President sent in a recommendation that a free trade arrangement be made with such countries as would abolish their tolls on the chief products of Texas, — a definite advance towards England.-" Soon after his inauguration Jones made an evening call upon ''Smith, Remin., 8i. Le Nat., Feb. 21, 1845. "Elliot, No, IS, Dec. 10, 1844. (Don.) Jackson to Lewis. Jan. i, 1845: Ford Coll. Madis., Jan. 10, 1845. 376 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Elliot and announced his policy at length. After expressing the opinion that a majority of his intelligent fellow-citizens were aware that the best course would be to maintain a national position, pro- vided Mexico would recognize it, he said he did not doubt that if he could offer the people a prospect of securing this recognition on fair terms, " He and his friends would have strength enough to turn them aside from any further thought of annexation ;" and he desired that the British and French representatives be fully empowered to act on Texan questions, so that at any propitious moment these could be " irrevocably " settled before the United States could interfere. He then explained that the most determined support of the annexation measure proceeded from the sugar interest, and sug- gested a scheme to wean the planters from it by making the British tariff more favorable to them. This conversation, added to other indications of many kinds, appears to place the question of the Pres- ident's attitude entirely at rest.^'^ Ebenezer Allen, the acting Secretary of State, who had been for a time Houston's Attorney General, was described by Ashbel Smith as a man of extraordinary legal acumen, always firmly opposed to the surrender of nationality, and more relied upon than any one else by Jones ; while Elliot said he had " the best dispositions " on the question of joining the Union. Some two months before, he had gone so far as to assure the British consul that if he could defeat the annexation scheme, it would be " the proudest moment " of his life. Donelson, however, did not hesitate, and without delay he addressed the hostile Secretary. While the United States are exposing themselves to Mexican hostilities by their faithfulness to Texas, he wrote, they infer and expect that she will at least refrain from looking upon the plan of joining them as lost. The election of Polk has strengthened the hope of carrying that measure through ; the temporary causes which led to the defeat of the treaty have been removed ; and further study of the subject by the American public is rendering the idea more attractive. For these reasons, its early realization may be expected. No doubt the development of Texas has been retarded by the delay, but she can console herself by reflecting on the benefits annexation will eventually bring; and her magnanimity in rising above the resentment that was natural in view of the apparent insensibility of her kindred in the north, will give her a special claim to the gratitude of future millions. To ''Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844 (confirmed, c. g., by his No. 17, Dec, 21, 1844) ; No. 10, March 6, 1845. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 377 defend the policy of joining the American Union against those who describe it as exckisively beneficial to that nation, would be a reflec- tion upon the judgment of the people of Texas, who have so long preferred it. It is really a question of "mutual, equal, and vital, benefit and safety to both Republics." Texas has seen this more quickly than the United States, but that is merely because she has had better opportunities to judge.-* To this Allen replied that the relations of the two countries in regard to this matter would not be changed by any unfavorable action on the part of the Texan Executive, but they might depend upon causes over which he could exert little or no control ; the ardor of the people for annexation had no doubt been diminished by the apparent defeat of the measure, yet the President hoped that they would not become inflexibly opposed to it before its con- summation could be brought about. This was a little cool, and in reporting it Donelson felt able to be a good deal more optimistic than Allen regarding the attitude of the Texans. Without question the necessary suspension of commercial treaties, changes in the revenue laws and the like during the period of waiting was very inconvenient, and another disappointment might be fatal ; but should annexation be ofifered within a reasonable period, he believed it would be ratified in Texas " with great unanimity."-^ At this juncture Dufif Green arrived and began to develop his lofty plans. The result was a sharp clash with the Executive, in- tensified probably by the fact that a long-standing feud existed between him and Houston ; Jones recalled Green's cxcquator by proclamation ; and the representatives of England and France were said to be jubilant, declaring that annexation had become impossible for at least three years. Finally, however, Green disclaimed any intention to wound the feelings of the President or interfere with the independent discharge of his official duties ; the disclaimer was accepted by Jones ; and so, as Donelson reported, " this unpleasant afifair . . . passed away, producing no injury to the friendly rela- tions existing between the two countries."^'' ^ Smith, Remin., 81. Elliot, secret, April 2, 1845. Kennedy, private, Sept. 9, 1844. Don. to Allen, Dec. 10, 1844: Sen. Journ., 9th Tex. Cong., 191. ^ Allen to Don., Dec. 13, 1844: Sen. Journ.. gth Tex. Cong., 195. Don.. No. 8, Dec. 17, 1844. Donelson accepted Allen's pledge as satisfactory, but no doubt this was largely because he counted on the rising annexation tide among the people. ** (Plans) Chapter x. Jones to Don., Jan. 4, 1844: State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Texas, ii. Elliot, secret, Dec. 29, 31, 1844. (Jubilant, etc.) N. Orl. Picayune, Jan. 11, 1845. Don., No. 10, Jan. 25, 1845. 378 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS About the middle of January, 1845, the committee on foreign relations of the Texan Senate made a report. This admitted that the time for acting upon the subject of entering the American Union had not yet arrived, but added that it was proper to make an expres- sion of sentiment. Annexation, said the committee, was " already emphatically willed by the people of both countries " ; and now, when the citizens of the United States had shaken off the politicians who defeated the measure and the long cherished desire seemed to be at the point of realization, " would it not evince the greatest in- gratitude to our friends who espoused our cause, and staked their political hopes on the issue," to change? Moreover annexation is for the best interests of Texas, continued the report. The object of government, according to our constitution, is "to .establish just- ice, insure domestic tranquility, [and] provide for the common defence and general welfare." Beside these benefits " the imaginary glory" of independence fades into nothingness; and all of these ends would be better gained by joining the United States than by under- taking " the tardy, uncertain, and hazardous experiment of build- ing up a new government, burdened with a heavy debt, and possessed of peculiar domestic institutions which invite the improper inter- ference and misplaced philanthropy of the world ? " We need pro- tection against the predatory warfare of Mexico; we need to be defended against the Indians ; and we need a naval strength, with- out which we cannot send out merchant ships. With annexation would come peace, security, American capital and population, com- merce, manufacturing, increase of values, and the permanence of distinctively republican influences. Most of the Texans are from the United States and have relatives there ; and the two peoples are the same in language, customs and religion. Were a Euro- pean immigration, promoted by monarchical governments, to fill our territory, the republican character of our institutions would change, and irritation between us and our powerful neighbor would follow. The American Union itself might perish, and " the enemies of con- stitutional liberty triumph. "^^ This address indicates clearly the existence of a serious tendency in the contrary direction, and nine days later the committee on the state of the Republic reported in the House of Representatives as follows: "Resolved, That if the present Congress of the United States shall finally adjourn without the adoption of such measures " (Report) F. O., Texas, xiii. Wash. Globe, Feb. 22, 1845. THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 379 as shall leave our restoration to the Union beyond all reasonable doubt, it will be the duty of the Executive to enter into such negotia- tions for treaties with other powers, as will relieve our staple prod- ucts from duties in foreign Ports," and secure to those powers a similar advantage here. The resolution was defeated by a substan- tial majority; but this, Elliot understood, was because it seemed to put constraint upon the United States; and the fact that it was oflfered had considerable significance. On the other hand Ashbel Smith, now the Secretary of State, wrote to the Texan charge at Washington that the President wished him to use his " most strenuous exertions in every proper manner to accomplish the annexation of Texas to the American Union — a measure earnestly desired by " his government. But this injunction signified nothing regarding the intentions of the Executive, since Raymond could now wield no ap- preciable influence in the matter; and its apparent meaning is offset by Jones's distinct intimation to Elliot that no move towards the United States would be made by him. No doubt, like certain pre- vious instructions that have been mentioned, it was given for merely strategical reasons. ^- Very soon arrived the joint resolution passed by the American House of Representatives, but it received no cordial welcome. The British minister described the terms as " hard conditions," much less favorable than the friends of annexation had expected and a source of encouragement to the opposition. It was urged, he re- ported, that the proposition was entirely one-sided ; that a State government would cost as much as the existing regime ; that under the American fiscal system living would be dearer and trade less advantageous ; that the United States ought at least to have guaran- teed the possession of all the territory claimed by Texas, especially as they, having no responsibility for her debts, could afford to be liberal with Mexico about the boundary, and might negotiate away the land needed to pay those obligations with ; that under the con- stitution the sense of the people could not fairly be taken in time to have a new organic law ready for presentation to the American Congress by the first of January, 1846 ; and that no conditions regard- ing slavery ought to have been made. Besides, there was no assur- ance that even these terms would be adopted by the United States '^Resolution) Elliot, No. s, Feb. 8, 1845. To Raymond, Feb. 11, 1845. Elliot, secret, Dec. 28, 1844. Don. (to Calhoun. Jan. 30, 1845: Jameson, Cal- houn Corr., 1023) said Elliot and Saligny, though not in Texas, were exerting themselves actively against annexation. 380 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Senate; and Elliot wrote, "I certainly have no belief" that such will be the case. The Galveston Civilian, a pro-British and pro- Houston sheet, exclaimed: Texas is to give everything, receiving " nothing in return but the name of being a state in the American Union," and her labor system will be menaced by the growing anti- slavery sentiment of the North. The National Register, edited by a confidential friend of Houston's, after describing Brown's plan in lurid terms of indignation and contempt, which probably only the ex-President's vivid imagination was capable of supplying, declared that its picture was but " a dim and totally inadequate view of the actual pit and grave of insignificance and infamy " into which the American House of Representatives desired to plunge Texas, there to lie in " national abeyance and limbo " " in a state of imbecile and hopeless dependence " upon the United States, and never to be annexed until no more political capital could be manufactured from the issue. This was perhaps the angriest explosion, but the general attitude of the Texan editors on the subject was described by the New Orleans Picayune as both " unpleasant " and " unexpected." " K the tone of earnest indignation in which they speak is not sin- cere," admitted the New York Coniniercial Advertiser, "it is at least exceedingly well counterfeited." Another revulsion of feeling appeared to have set in. The New York Tribune pronounced the House resolution a failure ; and the Morning News of that city, like the Enquirer of Richmond, called upon Polk to begin afresh by sending a plenipotentiary to the offended republic. ^^ Meanwhile hints were appearing that an alternative would soon be placed before the anxious Texans. In December, 1844, the Civilian announced that the country would have an opportunity before long to choose between recognition by Alexico on the basis of permanent independence and a longer period of suspense on the mere chance of being accepted by the United States. Early in Feb- ruary, 1845, the National Register published another editorial that sounded like Houston, representing that England and France clearly perceived the great interest they had in the permanent nationality of Texas, were willing to place commercial intercourse with her on " the most liberal footing," would ask no concessions or equiva- ^'To Raymond, Jan. 27, 1845. Elliot, No. 7, Feb, 15, 1845. Galv. Civilian, Feb. 12, 1845. (Bias of Civilian) N. Orl. Courier, Nov. 27, 1845. Nat. Reg., Feb. 22, 1845. (Friend) Don., No. 21, April 29, 1845. N. Orl. Picayune: Wash. Globe. March 22, 1845. N. Y. Com. Adv.: London Times, April 14, 1845. N. Y. Tribune, March 25, 1845 (also News and Enq.). THE ATTITUDE OF REJECTED TEXAS 38 1 lents except resolute independence, and, should this condition be offered, would compel Mexico forthwith to lay aside her airs of hostility; and later that month the same journal printed a letter from " a gentleman of high position in Europe," which it described as giving an official assurance that should annexation to the United States be prevented, there remained " the certainty of peace and an immediate recognition " upon the " simple ground " of evincing due willingness to remain a nation.^'* Elliot about the same time had several talks with the Secretary of State, who by his own admission preferred that course, and he reported Smith and Jones as agreeing that the temper of the people was changing again, and that — should terms based on permanent independence be offered now by Mexico — they would be very gen- erally acceptable and would be steadfastly maintained. Recognition, it had no doubt been feared, would facilitate the absorption of Texas by the United States ; but Elliot pointed out to his government that a state of peace would bring in a population not at all inclined to join the American Union, — a prospect well calculated to reassure Great Britain and France and to soothe the pride of Mexico. The signs pointed then towards close commercial relations with England and through her assistance an early conclusion of the nominal war ; and in March the Mexican consul at New Orleans wrote home that according to the general opinion Texas would refuse to be annexed. ^^ =* Elliot, No. 7, Feb, 15, 1845. Galv. Civilian, Dec. 14, 1844. Nat. Reg., Feb. 8, 15, 1845. '-'Smith, Remin., 81, 82. Elliot, No. 10, March 6, 1845. Arrangoiz, No. 54 (res.), March 18, 1845. XVIII The Policy of England and France in Reference to the An- nexation OF Texas As early as April. 1830, ]\Iexico drew England's attention to Texas, and mentioned in particular the desire of the United States to obtain it. Gorostiza, her minister at London, had a formal inter- view with Aberdeen, declared that his country " would never volun- tarily consent " to the cession of the province, and expressed a wish to know the feeling of Great Britain on the subject. His Lordship, indeed, had already said that " the severing of a part of the Mexican territory would be of general significance, and could not suit the interests of England," but Mexico now desired something more ex- plicit. To this Aberdeen replied that Great Britain felt deeply con- cerned about the matter. He did not believe the United States, however anxious to possess this important region, entertained hostile intentions against the owners of it; but he asked Gorostiza to call at any hour when he should have cause to suspect the existence of such designs.^ As it has already been suggested, there were ample reasons why Great Britain should oppose our acquiring Texas. The area, wealth and population of the United States would be increased ; the danger of our absorbing also the Mexican republic, where England had large interests, would become more imminent ; and our hold upon the Gulf of Mexico would be strengthened. At the same time Great Britain would lose the priceless advantage of possessing a source of cotton supply outside of the United States and the profitable oppor- tunity to land merchandise at Galveston, under a low rate of duties, not only for the Texas market but for illicit introduction into the adjacent portions of two high tarifif countries. There was also another ground of objection probably. Besides extending American slavery, annexation would reinforce it; and both of these results were contrary to British policy.^ 'See General Note, p. i. Gorostiza to Relac., No. lo (res.), Aoril 22, 1830: Sria. Relac. ''According to the best English opinion, the annexation of Texas to the United States was quite liable to be followed by the annexation of Mexico. Pakenham, long minister to Mexico, wrote to the British Foreign Office (No. 22, April 14, 382 THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FR.\NCE 383 In October, 1843, Elliot was shown the despatch from Van Zandt which announced that the American government had informally but earnestly suggested union to Texas ; and in December Fox, the quiet but watchful British minister at Washington, called the attention of the Foreign Office to portions of Tyler's annual Message which he thought pointed in that direction. Lord Aberdeen, believing that Houston desired the maintenance of nationality seems to have been confident that no favor would be shown to such a proposal by his administration, and therefore had seen little danger; but the President's Message and the report from Elliot aroused him consid- erably, it is probable, for on the ninth of January, 1844, he addressed a note on the subject to Pakenham, who had now been transferred from Alexico to Washington. At about this time Ashbel Smith, the Texan charge, was in Paris. There he discussed with Guizot the interests of his nation ; and then, going to London, he conferred with Aberdeen. As a result of these interviews — if Guizot w^as right in what he stated to the Chamber of Deputies — His Lordship addressed a letter on the twelfth of January to the British ambassador at Paris. In this he said that it appeared "sufficiently evident [from Tyler's remarks] that the future annexation of Texas" to the United States was " contemplated by the President " ; that the government of Louis Philippe had recognized the new republic, and " the Interests of the two Countries [England and France] in that part of America were, in all respects, the same " ; and that consequently he presumed that France, like England, " would not . . . look with indifiference upon any measure, by which Texas should cease to exist as a, separate and independent State." He therefore instructed Cowley to ascer- tain whether the cabinet of His Majesty shared these views, and in that case to " propose that the Representatives of the two Govern- ments at Washington and in Texas, should be instructed to hold the same Language ; deprecating all interference on the part of the United States in the afifairs of Texas, or the adoption of any measure tending to the destruction of the separate existence of that State ; at the same time, warning the Texian Government not to furnish the United States with any just cause of Complaint, and encouraging them to look to the preservation of their independence, as the best security for their ultimate prosperity, both political and commercial."^ 1844: F. O., America, cdiv.) : "it may be feared that if the present project [the annexation of Texas] should unfortunately take effect, the Independence of Mexico will cease to be worth many years purchase." * Elliot, secret, Oct. 31, 1843. Fox, Dec. 13, 1843. (Believinp) Smith, No. 55, June 2, 1844. To Pak., No. i, Jan. 9, 1844. (Guizot) Le Nat,, Feb. 2, 1846 384 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Three days later Cowley replied that on a recent visit at the Tuileries, before these instructions had reached him, the King him- self had broached the subject, remarking that it appeared from the President's Message as if the United States- intended to bring about annexation, a point of no slight importance; that the scheme ought to be opposed ; and that Guizot had been desired to open negotiations on the matter with Her Majesty's government. It was therefore not surprising that when the despatch of January 12 was made known to Guizot, he entirely concurred in its views, replied that Sainte Aulaire, the French ambassador at London, would be in- structed at once to confer with Aberdeen, and Pageot, the minister at Washington, to act in strict concert with Pakenham, and re- marked further that he personally thought it of importance to oppose the designs of the United States in this matter. On the twenty-ninth of the month the instructions to Saint Aulaire were actually issued, and in them Guizot went so far as to say, " It would not suit us under any consideration to accept without protest such a change " as the absorption of Texas. The instructions to Pageot were dated February 10, and he was told to inform the government of the United States clearly that even should the people of that republic wish to be annexed, France " could not view such an event (fait) with indifference." Thus the concert of the two powers on the subject was inaugurated.* To understand why Louis Philippe embarked upon this course, it is necessary to study the matter somewhat carefully. In July, 1836, Cuevas, the Mexican minister at Paris, reporting that a war between Mexico and the American Union was generally believed there to have begun, said he did not doubt " for a moment " that his country would receive from France and England " all the support which their commerce with Mexico, their ardent desire to check the aggressive (iinxisora) policy of the United States and the justice of the Mexican cause demanded " ; and from this it may be inferred what ideas he was endeavoring to inculcate. Two months later the Mexican department of foreign relations instructed him " to secure by all possible means the rectification of public opinion " in France, which it was feared that accounts of the atrocities perpetrated in Texas would affect. Cuevas had anticipated this order. In July (This trip to London does not appear in Smith's reports). To Cowley, Ko. 16, Jan. 12, 1844. A copy of this despatch was sent to Elliot, Jan. 31, 1844. 'Cowley, Jan. 15, 1844. To Ste. Aulaire, Jan. 29, 1844: Le Const., Jan. 12, 1846. To Pageot, Feb. 10, 1844: ib. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 385 La Prcsse of Paris had contained an article, the basis of which had been furnished by him, declaring that the United States had " inher- ited the ancient Punic faith of England," and that in the eyes of the great American republic " all means were good." Cuevas had already enlisted the Journal dcs Dcbats also in his campaign, and in July that paper had printed an article on the United States especially designed to bring odium upon this country for tolerating slavery. After receiving his orders to influence public opinion it may be assumed that the minister did not relax his efforts ; and his successor brought out and distributed the following year large numbers of the pamphlet prepared by Gorostiza, which attributed to the United States an improper and encroaching policy in the Texas affair. Diplomats, journalists and government officials were the persons he endeavored to instruct in this way, and he believed that his exertions were not without success." By these methods very likely the French government were some- what stimulated to regard the aims of the United States as ambitious and aggressive ; and, in addition to such promptings, Louis Philippe had ample reasons for desiring to prevent the annexation of Texas. As a monarch, he could not look with favor upon the development of a powerful republic. Royalty was his trade. The time had gone by when he had thought it for his interest to flatter democrats, and now he feared and detested them. He was " every inch a King," said our representative at his court in suggesting this explanation of his conduct. Moreover, as a sovereign by the right of revolution he found himself isolated in Europe, his government, said the Amer- ican minister, having " never been viewed with a favorable eye by the great continental monarchies." It was England that had taken the lead in acknowledging him, and England, he felt, was still his " main stay." Threatened every moment, not only by this legitimist ill- will but by the strong revolutionary tendencies of France and Europe, it was upon British support that he counted to maintain that peace among the nations and the peoples which he deemed essential to the security of his dynasty and the prosperity of France; and, besides wishing to oblige his almost indispensable neighbor, he could see that the two countries, having somewhat similar interests in the Texas affair, would naturally be drawn together by joint action * Cuevas to Relac, No. 67, July 13, 1836: Sria. Relac. Relac. to Cuevas, No. 102, Sept. 12, 1836. La Presse, July 5, 1836. Dcbats, July 12, 1836. Mangino to Relac, No. 28, July 13, 1837: Sria. Relac. 26 386 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS regarding it. Moreover he desired in particular to earn the assent of England to the marriage of Montpensier and the Infanta.^ As a Latin, too, the King could not rejoice in the upbuilding of a great " Anglo-Saxon " power in America. As a Bourbon he was peculiarly tenacious of the family compact idea, and he well under- stood that in case of the failure of the direct line the French branch would inherit a claim to Spain and all Spanish America. As a mem- ber of the Orleans house, if Lc National of Paris was right, he had inherited the policy of favoring England. As a believer in the bal- ance of power, he felt opposed to the existence of any greatly pre- ponderant nation in the western hemisphere ; and in particular he was keenly alive to the danger that our neighbor on the south might suffer from American encroachments. Indeed, he told the Mexican minister explicitly in July, 1844, that the ambition of the United States would not be satisfied with Texas, but " would follow its aggressive system at the expense of Mexico unless a strong barrier were immediately established between the two countries " ; and he dwelt on the same point in his conversation with Cowley." Moreover, France had recognized Texas in the expectation of securing commercial benefits ; and while as yet almost nothing had been accomplished — two vessels carrying all the trade in 1845 — there were still opportunities and hopes, especially as a former French colonist in Texas felt able to say that the French-speaking element there was the strongest except the American, and that the tastes and habits of the people made them like French goods. It was, besides, a point of pride to save a power which His Majesty had acknowl- edged as independent from being swallowed up by another nation. In fact, after recognizing Texas the King had logically desired from the first that her nationality become real, and as early as May, 1841, the following curious dialogue had occurred between him and the Mexican representative at his court. " Have you news from Mexico?" inquired His Majesty. "I have recently received quite satisfactory news," replied Garro. "The country is at peace? You believe, Monsieur Garro, that there will be no war? " " That is my hope, Sire." " I am glad, for you know that I do not like war, which is a great evil." "King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844: No. 21, Jan. i, 1846. Martin, No. 17, Aug. 15, 1845. Bancroft to Polk, Nov. 3, 1846: Bancroft Pap. '(Claim) London Atlas. Aug. 16, 1845. Le Nat.. Jan. 27, 1845. Garro, No. IS (res.), July 4, 1844. Cowley, Jan. 15, 1844. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 387 " Certainly, Sire." " So there will be no war ? That is best. Still, you have not made a treaty of peace yet." " Sire, I misunderstood Your Majesty and thought you spoke of civil war. Our war with Texas the Republic is resolved to continue." " The Spanish pronounce the name Tccas and not Tccsas, do they not?" '■ Certainly."* Guizot shared most of these ideas more or less strongly, no doubt. The new republic, he said later in the Chamber of Deputies, had been recognized in order to obtain raw materials on better terms than the United States would give, to secure lower duties than the American rates, to acquire valuable markets, and to avoid the annoy- ance of sending French merchandise to Galveston by way of New York. Still more strongly he dwelt upon the idea of a balance of power in America, and his letter to Pageot urged the value of Texas as a barrier against us. In the same despatch he insisted that it was due to the dignity of France that the national standing of that coun- try be respected ; and for commercial as well as political interests he considered it an important principle that independent states remain separate.^ There were also other reasons. Naturally he was under an obligation to comply with His Majesty's wishes. He felt, said Edward Everett, that " without the good will of the present British Government his own would sink." In particular there was no little dissatisfaction in France on account of the right of search that had been conceded to English cruisers with a view to the suppression of the slave trade ; the minister desired to have the great credit of secur- ing a modification of the agreement, as he actually did in 1845 ^ and Everett, like many French politicians, believed that he was disposed to gratify his neighbor in the Texas matter in order to secure this favor in return. Indeed, Thiers asserted flatly in the Chamber of Deputies that France adopted the English policy in this business in order to buy back the right of visit. ^"^ It is very likely, too, that Guizot thought the matter a small one. 'King. No. I, July 13, 1844. (Vessels) Billault in Chamber of Deputies: Le Nat., Jan. 22, 1846. Revue dc Paris, March 18, 1845. Garro, No. 7 (res.), May 10, 1845. * Everett, No. 331, June 17, 1845. Dcbats. Jan. 23, 1846. To Pageot, Feb. 10, 1844: Le Const.. Jan. 12, 1846. '"Everett, private, Feb. 26, 1845. London Journ. Com., June 7, 1845. Revue de Paris, Feb. 15, 1845. (Thiers) Dcbats, Jan. 21. 1846. 388 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Pageot had written about it in at least three despatches during 1843, asserted Berryer, without rousing any particular interest in the French foreign office. Probably the chief minister did not imagine that anything more than diplomatic operations would be called for. His expectation was, our representative thought, that Clay would be elected President in 1844, and the question of annexation be dropped. The reports of his agents that the Texan people did not wish to be absorbed, drew him in the same direction ; and in his despatch to Pageot he stated that the opposition against the annexa- tion of that country was based primarily upon the supposed unwil- lingness of her citizens to join the United States. In short, for all these reasons he believed that no harm could result from meddling, that he could thus accumulate merit with England, that he could please his master, and that he could strengthen both his own admin- istration and the national interests. Accordingly, though the French government cared intrinsically much less about the matter than did the English, it was determined to protest formally against the absorption of Texas, and after some delay instructions to that effect were received by Pageot.^^ They arrived at about the time Calhoun signed the annexation treaty, and the ministers of England and France, who had already conferred on the subject, again took counsel together. Pakenham, though not authorized to go as far as his colleague, had already remonstrated against the project in plain terms, and he would have felt justified now in uniting with Pageot in a formal protest, had he thought such a step would have " the effect of arresting the progress of the mischief " ; but, he reported, " I agreed with M. Pageot in the opinion that a simple protest on our part, unsupported by an intimation of more decisive measures of resistance — and this intima- tion neither of us were authorized to make — would have been quite insufficient to arrest the evil intentions of this Government." On the other hand, by arousing a popular outcry it might weaken the anti-annexation strength in the Senate, and would certainly — should the measure be consummated — render the position of England and France as passive witnesses the more " unpleasant." Consequently it was agreed by the two diplomats that no protest should be made.^- " (Pageot) Berryer: Debafs, Jan. 31, 1846. King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. To Pageot: Note 9. King, No, 25, Jan. 30, 1846. Smith, No. 55. June 2, 1844. (Cared less) Id., July i, 1844: Jones, Memor., 369. (Instructions) Pak., No. 22, April 14, 1844. The truth about the protest was studiously concealed, and all kinds of assertions and conjectures in reference to it are to be met with. "Pak.. No. 22, April 14, 1844, THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 389 At the end of March Pakenham had reported from Washington that he beHeved an annexation treaty was to be concluded " as soon as a certain General Henderson supposed to be now on his way from Texas " should arrive ; and about the middle of the following month he sent word that he was " assured " the treaty had been signed. It then occurred to the British government that perhaps these pro- ceedings could be checked by an appeal to international law, and on May 13 the opinion of Her Majesty's Advocate General was re- quested. With startling promptness Mr. Dodson replied only two days later. A state recognized as independent has the right, he said, to " divest Itself " of sovereignty by a treaty of annexation although it has made treaties with other nations, unless it has engaged not to do so, and even in that case is at liberty to take such a step if constrained by " an over ruling necessity." Little comfort could be derived from this opinion. In diplomacy therefore appeared to lie the best hope; and three days afterwards Pakenham was informed that immediate and anxious attention would be given to the subject.^^ This bore fruit within a fortnight in an interview with Murphy, the Mexican representative at London, and in a Memorandum of the conversation drawn up by him in French and modified by Aber- deen in English, the essential part of which ran as follows, — italics representing the modifications : " Lord Aberdeen expressed a wish to see Mexico acknowledge the independence of Texas. 'If Mexico,' he said, 'will concede this point, England (and I have reason to believe that France will join with her in this determination) will oppose the annexation of Texas and moreover he would endeavour that France and England will unite in guaranteeing not only the independence of Texas, but also the boundary of Mexico. On the other hand should Mexico persist in declining to recognize Texas, the intentions of England to prevent the annexation of that country to the United States might not be put in execution.' Upon my remarking that it was not at all probable the American Government would be willing to drop the annexation affair, even should the Amer- ican Senate reject the Treaty for the present. Lord Aberdeen replied that provided that England and Franee zvere perfectly agreed, ' it would matter little to England whether the American, Government should be willing to drop this question or not, and that, should it be necessary, she would go to the last extremity [jusqu' aux dernieres cxtremites] in support of her opposition to the annexation ; but that for this purpose it was essential that Mexico be disposed to acknowledge the independence " Pak., No. 16, March 28; No. 22, April 14, 1844. Dodson to Aberdeen, May 15, 1844: F. O., Texas, xi. To Pak., No. 21, May 18, 1844. 390 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS of Texas,'" because otherwise an agreement in policy between her and England would be impossible. Such was the fully attested report of this interview. It indicated clearly that war with United States was contemplated, and Murphy was not only authorized but expected to place it before Santa Anna.^* A few days later a despatch was addressed to the British repre- sentative at Paris, and this was followed very shortly by one to Bankhead, accompanied by copies of the Murphy Memorandum and the despatch to Cowley. " You will therein see," wrote Aber- deen to his agent at Mexico, " that we have submitted a proposition to the French Government for a joint operation on the part of Great Britain and France in order to induce Mexico to acknowledge the independence of Texas, on a guarantee being jointly given by us that that independence shall be respected by other Nations, and that the Mexico-Texian boundary shall be secured from future encroach- ment. Should France assent to this proposal, we propose to send out forthwith a fit person to Texas, in the unavoidable absence of Captain Elliot," to ascertain whether on such a basis the people of that country would prefer independence to annexation, as it is be- lieved they would. In case our impression on this point is found to be correct, " we shall then take measures forthwith for operating directly and officially upon the Mexican Government," which we hope to find "amenable to our views. . . . Should they, however, refuse their assent, or still demur to the acknowledgment of Texas, it will be for England and France to take such further measures for attaining the desired object as they may deem expedient," — in other words, one may fairly understand His Lordship to mean, the purpose would not be abandoned.^^ Aberdeen learned from Pakenham, soon after the annexation treaty was presented to the Senate, that " the whole strength of Mr. Clay's party " would be thrown against it, and no doubt he perceived that its rejection was thus ensured ; but he felt surprised that Houston, after professing so earnestly to desire the maintenance of a national position, had suddenly taken up that project, and for this or some " Memo. : F. O., Mexico, clxxx. The interview was on May 28 or 29. To Bank., No. 16, conf., June 3, 1844. It should be noted that the Memo, zvithout the italicized words represents Aberdeen's ideas as Murphy understood them, and these words perhaps indicate merely the prudent reserve with which Aberdeen would naturally desire to speak to Mexico regarding the action of France. "To Cowley, May 31. 1844. To Bank., No. 16, conf., June 3, 1844. Aber- deen intimated to Smith (Smith, No. 55. June 2, 1844) that England and France were prepared to use force upon Mexico. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 39I other reason he showed considerable reserve in talking with Ashbel Smith, saying little for a time alx)ut his intentions or the moves of the powers, whereas Louis Phili])pe informed the Texan envoy plainly that France desired a joint and authoritative interposition of the two nations. On the first of June, however, Smith explained to him that public feeling had been too strong for the President, and said it was his own opinion that if Mexico would recognize his country and Spain would enable her to trade with Cuba by making a commercial treaty, her people might not care to join the United States. Partially reassured, Aberdeen intimated that perhaps the recognition could be brought about, but he still felt much anxiety regarding the attitude of Texas. ^"^ Three weeks later, however, he laid aside his reserve, and an- nounced that when the annexation treaty should have been rejected, England and France would be willing to unite with Texas, the United States and Mexico in a Diplomatic Act. This Act was to be equiva- lent to a perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition and peace, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory beyond the Rio Grande or joining the American Union. Mexico, he said, would be forced into acquiescence in case she should be unwilling to join, and it was not expected that the United States would take part. Later Ashbel Smith said of this plan: " The terms, effect and possible con- sequences to the several parties to it [including, of course, a possible war], were maturely considered, fully discussed and clearly under- stood between Lord Aberdeen and the minister of Texas." Both Louis Philippe and Guizot stated that France would join in the Act ; and President Houston, on learning of the proposition, not only directed Jones verbally several times to accept it, but finally wrote to him with his own hand this order : " Let our representatives be instructed to complete the proposed arrangement for the settle- ment of our Mexican difficulties, as soon as possible — giving the necessary pledges [that Texas would never consent to join the United States, explains Jones in a note], as suggested in the late dispatch of Dr. Smith on this subject."^" " Pak., No. 36, April 28, 1844. Smith, No. 55, June 2, 1844. " England and France dared make no move toward settling the Texan affair while the treaty was pending, lest it should become known and cause an in- flamed public sentiment in the United States to insist upon the ratification of the treaty Qones to Miller, May 3, 1844: Miller Pap.). Smith, Nos. 55, 57, June 2, 24, 1844. Id., Remin., 61, 62. The Act contemplated war not only with Mexico but with the United States, for a demand to bring Texas by force into the Union would certainly have arisen here, and it would have been incumbent upon England and France to protect her independence against us if force were 392 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Now it is quite certain that Great Britain desired to be on friendly terms with this country. As far back as 1828 her minister in :\Iexico had been expressly notified of this wish, and ordered to " entirely abstain from professing or inculcating a hostile feeling " toward us. In 1836, while Mexico was extremely angry with her neighbor on the north, care was taken by the British minister at that post, under instructions from his government, to avoid encouraging the idea that any aid against us could be expected from England, or that she **' might be induced from a feeling of good will towards Mexico to take any step of a nature to give umbrage to the Government of the United States"; and in June, 1842, referring to rumors that Great Britain was encouraging Mexico, Pakenham wrote that " So far from acting in a sense so little likely to be approved by Her Majesty's Govern- ment," he had urged the Mexican authorities to satisfy our just demands.^* In fact, England could not afford to fight this country, and she knew it. The amount of her capital engaged in commerce with *the United States was described by Aberdeen himself as "vast." The value of British exports to the American market can be seen from the fact that three years later, according to Lord Bentinck, twenty out of the twenty-eight million dollars of the United States customs revenue were derived from British goods; while an article in the Xew York Journal of Commerce showed that England pur- chased $16,000,000 worth of our products more than we received from her. Moreover, said the London Mercantile Journal in 1844, the only American import that England could do without was to- used. Note what Pakenham and Pageot said (paragraph 23) about the action that would be taken by the United States in case England and France should undertake to ensure the independence of Texas. (Verbally) Jones, Memor., 43. Houston to Jones. Sept. 23, 1844: Niles., Ixxiv., 413. Jones (Memor., 59) says that under the Diplomatic Act France would have been willing to fight in order to prevent annexation. By July 19, Calhoun received information, in which he placed the most implicit confidence, that England, aided (it was said) by France, intended to force Mexico to recognize Texas on the condition that Texas would remain independent (Lewis to Jackson, July 19, 1844: Jackson Pap., Knoxville Coll.). How Houston reconciled his order with his hopes of Texan expansion is a mystery. Possibly, feeling that he had better make sure of the essential, he decided to sacrifice those hopes ; but more probably he had some scheme in mind. It is noticeable that whereas England and France intended to prevent Texas from either joining the .U. S. or crossing the Rio Grande, his order con- templated (according to Jones) only the first of these limitations. The order as printed mentions Smith and Daingerfield as the Texas representatives, but the names may have been inserted by Jones as explanatory. '"To Pak., April 21, 1828. E. g.. Pak., Xo. 42, May 27, 1836; No. 49, June 2, 1842. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 393 bacco, and the others amounted to ahnost $65,000,000. According to that authority, the United States took about '?4,ooo,ooo in cotton manufactures alone, and nearly $6,000,000 in woolens. The London Economist well described the two countries as commercial comple- ments. Now not only would England lose her trade with us during the period of conflict but, as Le Correspondant of Paris remarked, we should be stimulated meanwhile to set up manufacturing estab- lishments of our own, and British mill-owners and merchants, ruined by the suspension of their trade, would be likely to cross the sea and conduct their business here. Early in 1844 the Liverpool Mercury declared that a war with the Ignited States, even if successful, " would be a calamity of a most fatal description." In March, 1845, when the danger of trouble over the Oregon question seemed real, the unsentimental Economist drew a most vivid and startling picture of the harm that would result ; and all of these considerations were equally forcible a little earlier. ^Moreover, an income tax to meet the deficit in revenue was already necessary. ^^ England was hampered also by the complications of her foreign policy in India, China, Africa and Oceanica, and she was even more, embarrassed by the condition of Ireland. In May, 1845, the London Examiner said, "The popular press [of that country] teems with the worst sort of treason ; . . . a treason ready to league with any foreign foe." The same month Peel himself intimated in Parlia- ment that in case of a conflict with the United States the Irish might cause serious difficulties; and the London Atlas remarked that some of their journals contemplated, " with a sort of savage satisfaction, not only the prospect of a war, but the probability of Ireland's uniting with the enemies " of Great Britain. Trouble was scented from another source also. The Atlas admitted that "the republi- cans of Canada " plainly indicated " an intention of throwing over- board their allegiance whenever an army of 50,000 repealers [of the union between Ireland and England] should choose to cross the Canadian borders." Moreover the continent was at this time a smouldering volcano preparing for the eruptions of 1848; and the L'nited States consul at Bremen wrote to Calhoun that the Roths- childs would not permit any European power to go to war in '"To Elliot, No. 10, July 3, 1845. (Bentinck) London Times, Nov. 25, 1847. N. Y. Jourti. Com.: Britannia, Oct. 19, 1844. Mercantile Journ., Aug. 26, 1844. Economist, Sept. 13, 1845. -^^ Correspondant , Jan. i, 1846. Mercury: Nat. Intell., May 9, 1844. Economist, March 28, 1845. 394 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS America, since the consequence would be a series of revolutions near home.-*' Still further, it would have been absurd to fight the United States on the Texas question, when England was pursuing a course of high- handed aggression abroad. In April, 1844, the Atlas protested against the policy of the government as follows : '■ It is somewhat far-fetched to ground our operations [against Gwalior] upon an old treaty for the maintenance of a prince, because his regent was obnoxious to us, when that very prince, and his whole army and people, not only declined the assistance of their soi-disant allies, but opposed them with their whole force. It is, in fact, the his- tory of all our Indian aggressions. We first enter into a treaty for the support of some particular family or dynasty, in the full certainty that, amidst the intrigues and revolutions which occur in oriental despotisms, we shall be called upon to interfere, and then we claim the whole heritage for ourselves." What looked yet worse, England had recently laid herself open to the charge of forcing opium upon the Chinese at the point of her sword. For a power conducting such operations to proclaim that the United States could not absorb a small independent nation quite willing to join us would have been laughable, — if not, as Lc Consti- tiitioinicl termed it, mad. Yet it is perfectly clear that Great Britain was so anxious to prevent annexation that she stood ready, if sup- ported as her minister indicated, to undertake a war in order to establish at the Sabine a perpetual barrier against us. That such was the meaning of the Murphy Memorandum and also of the Diplomatic Act is already evident enough, and the close concert between the two powers makes the French government a full acces- sory in this design ; but, as if to place the matter beyond question, the British representative in Mexico was instructed in December, 1844, to inform Santa Anna's cabinet that its course would " paralyse the exertions by which Great Britain and France were prepared to uphold the Independence of Texas against the encroachments of the United States, even at the risk of a collision with that Power."-^ The Diplomatic Act, however, although the French ambassador had full authority to sign it and everything could have been com- pleted at one sitting, never was passed. When Anson Jones received '^Examiner. May 17, 1845. (Peel) London Times, May 5, 1845. Atlas, Sept. 2, 1844; Jan. 4, 1845. Mann to Calhoun, Oct. 31, 1844: Jameson. Calhoun Corr., 982. ^^ Atlas. April 6, 1844. Le Const.. July 25, 1845. To Bank., No. 49, Dec. 31, 1844. For meaning of the Act see note 17. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 395 written instructions to conclude it, he was already President-elect of the republic ; and instead of obeying he sent the representative of Texas in France and England leave of absence to return home. Smith, who was quite friendly to Jones, fully believed that he did this because he thought the project of annexation had been killed or indefinitely postponed, and wished to reserve for his own admin- istration the glory of making peace ; and when Smith reached home Jones complacently said to him, " The negotiation shall take place here, and you as Secretary of State shall conduct it for Texas." Before anything was accomplished, however, the time for this meas- ure had entirely passed.-- No better fared the rest of the programme. The same docu- ments were sent to Pakenham as to Bankhead, and that minister promptly conferred again with Pageot. Little discussion was nec- essary, and on the twenty-seventh of June Pakenham replied to Aberdeen substantially as follows : The rejection of the late treaty does not settle the question of annexation, and the Presidential elec- tion will turn upon it. Should Clay be successful, the project would not be abandoned ; but " there would at least be a prospect of its being discussed with the calmness and dignity required by its impor- tance, and by the interest which other Powers are justly entitled to take in it." For this reason England and France should avoid doing anything that would injure Clay's chances, and the plan in view " should not be known in this Country until after the Election." He urged further that any arrangement adopted for such a purpose should allow the United States to be really a party to it; and he "Smith, Remin., 62-65. Jones's explanation was somewhat different (Memor., 43, 57, 44, 55, 56). He said that, by an understanding with the President, he had been already vested with " the actual discharge of the Executive functions " (the accuracy of which assertion is directly disproved by the fact that Houston gave him this order) and that obedience would have meant war. But as he stated that annexation itself would have meant war, had France lived up to her agreements, and asserted that he was the architect of annexation, his action does not seem to have been due to fear of a conflict between England and the United States. In another passage of his Memoranda he intimated that obedience to the order might have defeated or delayed annexation and he would have suffered blame in consequence ; but in view of his course, as it will appear in the next chapter, to say nothing of other aspects of it, this explanation appears entirely unsatisfactory. In still another place in his book he says, " I felt at liberty to suspend the execution of the order." This corresponds quite well with Ashbel Smith's very credible explanation, and is doubtless the truth. Jones's inaction per se, however, would probably not have prevented England and France from pursuing their policy. He himself has said that all they wanted was a pretext for interference, and that they would not have cared whether the people of Texas approved of the Diplomatic Act or not ; and if England was ready to coerce Mexico, whose good-will it was highly important to retain, it does not seem likely that the Texas Secretary of State could have barred the way. 7q6 the annexation of TEXAS warned his government that if their plan were executed, " that is to say, if England and France should unite in determining to secure the independence of Texas without the consent and concurrence of this Country previously obtained," that determination would probably be met by the immediate annexation and occupation of Texas, ''leaving it to the guaranteeing Powers to carry out the objects of the agreement as best they might " ; while should either England or France undertake to put the scheme through alone, " the announce- ment of such an intention would be met here by measures of the most extreme resistance." In the same sense wrote Pageot to the government of France.-^ England for her part felt the strength of this plea for delay; and on the eighteenth of July Aberdeen informed Cowley that Pakenham's despatch furnished " much ground for serious reflec- tion," and that in view of it England was disposed " to defer, at all events until a more fitting season," the execution of the projected measure. This in all probability, however, did not mean that it had at once been decided, upon hearing from Washington, to aban- don a plan so carefully weighed and repeatedly announced. No sub- stantial evidence of such a decision has been found ; there was no occasion to determine at this time upon anything more than post- ponement ; and it is practically impossible to believe that the British government, after deliberately adopting a policy that manifestly contemplated the chance of war and after officially stating that it mattered little what the United States might do so long as French support could be reckoned upon, would turn tail at the very first intimation of trouble with this country, and decide to leave the field before knowing what their ally would choose to do. Such ministers could neither demand respect nor respect themselves. " Reflection " was proper in such a case; postponement until after the American election was evidently expedient ; and naturally England wished in particular to see how fir she would be able to rely upon her asso- ciate after that power should have considered fully the advices from Washington.-* Nior can any evidence be discovered that France resolved at once to retire. For her also there was really no occasion as yet to make such a decision. A pause was suggested by the circumstances and ^To Pak., No. 24. June 3, 1844. Pak., No, 76, June 2T, 1844. "To Cowley, No. 202, July 18, 1844. From Aberdeen's language it would seem likely that the idea of a longer postponement occurred to him but was laid aside ; but his phraseology may have been used merely to avoid all appearance of applying pressure to France. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 397 recommended by her ally. She therefore replied that she too thought it would be well to make no move until after the close of our Presi- dential campaign, and then her charge in Texas was directed to employ all suitable arguments against the sacrifice of nationality. It is likely enough, however, that Guizot now began to think more seriously than before of the policy proposed by England.^^ \\'hen the course of the French cabinet in this matter finally came into public view, the outcry against it was furious. In the Chamber of Deputies its action was denounced by the eloquent Berryer as an undignified intrigue. Bad faith towards the United States was charged. How can America trust us? demanded Le Constitntionnel. It was entirely wrong, said many, to turn against an ancient comrade and valuable customer without the strongest of reasons. Not only was the American Union an ally and friend, but the mere existence of that republic, said Thiers, had prevented the nations of Europe from pointing to France as the only representative of the principles of the revolution ; and the development of the United States, causing England anxiety, had compelled her to treat France with more con- sideration than formerly. It was pronounced a fatal policy to alienate or weaken a people whose aid might any day be needed against Great Britain. " The United States are perhaps the only nation in the v^^orld besides France for which I desire greatness," exclaimed Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies with this last point in view.-'^ Above all, the government were attacked on the ground that Guizot, '' the man of England," was not only sacrificing the true interests of his country but promoting those of her ancient enemy. Texas must be either American or English, it was argued. The pre- ponderance that France has to fear is a preponderance on the ocean, not on the continent of America, said Billault in the Chamber. Bal- ance of power indeed! exclaimed La Revue Independante ; England already has half the world, and must we help her to maintain that sort of equilibrium? It is better for us, argued Thiers, that the small states b' long to the American Union, for if they remain inde- pendent, fear of England will turn them against us. Our trade with Texas, it was suggested, never can be large so long as her growth is checked by Mexican raids; but that country, if incorporated in the United States, would develop as Louisiana has done, and France "Cowley, July 22, 1844. To Saligny, Aug. i, 1844: Le Const., Jan. 12, 1846. "(Borryer, Thiers, Billault): Dcbats, Jan. 21-23, 3i. 1846. Le Const., Jan. 31, 1846. Jollivet, Nouveaux Docs. Amer., 9. 398 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS would have her share of the business. " Touching self-abnegation ! " sneered the sarcastic; we ofifend a traditional ally and labor for a traditional foe. Besides, answered the cautious, England is in such a situation at present that she could not fight ; and if we allow her to get us into trouble, we may get out of it as best we can." Guizot has well been described as largely a man of the closet. He was not very near to the people ; but he and his associates were far too shrewd not to foresee all these complaints and charges, when it was found that England and France could not carry the affair through high-handedly without serious opposition. Moreover these ideas, soon to be trumpeted in the newspapers and the tribune, were no doubt already circulating, in the summer of 1844, among the keen and well-informed public men of the country, and probably whisperings had begun to reach him. In fact some expressions of opinion had already been published. During May a writer in Le Constitiitionncl declared, " the Americans could not without madness allow Texas to become an independent and rival state." At about the same time Le National maintained that the struggle in that coun- try was one between Great Britain and the United States. England, though she endeavors to put " a moral sign on the shop door " by raising the slavery question, is trying to injure the United States and increase her own power in the Gulf of Mexico, said Le Correspon- dant. We are told that Guizot has protested against the annexation of Texas, remarked Le Constitiitionnel, and this does not surprise us : " It is much more in line with the policy of England than with that of France." It is unfortunate for us to be tied to the English cabinet, protested Le National about the middle of ]\Iay. Even the Journal dcs Debats, commonly regarded as an administration paper, felt compelled to say about the first of June : " We believe that France has no occasion to occupy herself with the annexation of Texas to the North American confederation." According to Wilmer and Smith's European Times, the agitation over the affair had now created a marked sensation at Paris, and had revived the talk of making common cause with the United States against Eng- land in order to throw off the insulting yoke of British supremacy.-® Louis Philippe and Guizot must have begun to understand that "^ Le Not., May 27, 1844. Le Const., June 13, 1845. Debats, Jan. 21-23, 1846. Revue hidependante, Jan. 25, 1846. Lettre d'un Citoyen de New York, 20-21. Le Const., June 13. 1845. Le Correspondant, Jan. i, 1846. ^King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. 1-e Const., May 26, 1844. Le Nat., May 20, 16, 1844. Le Correspondant, June, 1844. Debats: N. Orl. Courier, June 28, 1844. European Times, June 4, 1844. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 399 the consent of Parliament and the country to an Anglo-French war against the United States could not easily be obtained. " Every attempt to enlist France in a diplomatic — still more in an armed — resistance to the views of North America would meet death before the invincible repugnance of the country and the Chamber," de- clared La Revue de Paris a few months later, and this was already becoming probable if not certain. Guizot will blunder if he dare to transform his diplomatic hostility against the United States into real hostility, for the country would not follow him, was a warning from La Rci'ite Indcpcndaiitc that could easily be foreseen. Public opin- ion renders Guizot's position weak on account of his English pro- clivities, reported the American minister at Paris in December, 1844; and to a large extent the head of the cabinet must have understood this much earlier. Besides, the feeling of the nation towards Mexico was by no means cordial. Neither the causes, the events nor the unsatisfactory ending of the recent war had yet been forgotten. A little later Thiers remarked that France owed less deference to that republic than to any other American state. In June, 1844, Le Siecle of Paris said, " We wish Texas to be independent ... as a counter- poise or curb for Mexico." " The annexation of Texas presents the double advantage of augmenting the power of the United States, our natural allies beyond the Atlantic," observed La Rcvuc do Paris, " and of dealing a hard blow at that sad government of Mexico, against which we have so many grounds of complaint."-^ Meantime King, the American representative, had not been idle. Early in July he dined with Louis Philippe; and after dinner, bring- ing up the subject of Texas in a familiar conversation, His Majesty asked why the annexation treaty had been rejected. This afforded an opening, and the minister made all he could of it. He expressed his firm belief that a decided majority of the Americans favored the measure ; that although temporarily defeated on account of " polit- ical considerations of a domestic nature," it " would certainly be con- summated at no distant period " ; and that the interests of France, being purely commercial and quite distinct from those of England, would actually be promoted by such an arrangement ; upon which the King, while frankly admitting his desire to see the young republic remain independent, assured his guest that France " would not pro- ceed to the extent of acts hostile or unfriendly to the United States in reference to the Texas question." Probably, however, the assur- '^ Revue de Paris, Feb. 15, 1845. Revue htdependante, Jan. 25, 1846. King, No. 9, Dec. 31, 1844. (Thiers) Dcbats, Jan. 21, 1846, Le Sidcle, June 14, 1844. 400 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS ance thus reported by the American minister was couched in diplo- matic as well as gracious terms, and was expressed in a language which he cannot have used much, if at all, for nearly thirty years ; and in view of the concert with England it must be supposed that he was unduly impressed by its apparent cordiality. In real truth it can have indicated nothing more than a politic desire to avoid as far as possible offending the United States. The minister's representa- tions, on the other hand, seem to have been full and explicit. They were probably the earliest information the French government obtained with reference to the depth of feeling on the subject that prevailed in some parts, at least, of this country; and when rein- forced soon after by Pageot's and Pakenham's expostulations, they must have appeared well worthy of attention.^'' King then proceeded to discuss the matter with Guizot, telling him that intimations of a contemplated joint protest against the annexa- tion of Texas had been received from a source that could not wholly be disregarded. Guizot replied "with considerable animation if not some impatience " that no such step had been taken ; that France had acted in this matter for herself ; that her interests, being purely com- mercial, differed from those of England ; and that the rejection of the treaty had now banished the subject. King replied that he was gratified by Guizot's assurances ; that a movement such as that erro- neously imputed to France would have impaired seriously the friendly, indeed almost affectionate, feelings entertained for her by the American people ; that the United States would view with great distrust any proceeding calculated to place their weak neighbor under foreign and particularly under British influence ; that Texas must be absorbed in order to guard against the danger of England's controlling her ; that a conviction of this necessity, though more general in the Democratic party, pervaded a large majority of the American peo- ple; and that consequently the project of annexation was by no means dead. Just how much effect these representations had, it is of course impossible to say; but Ashbel Smith, who was well quali- fied and well situated to form an opinion, believed that King satisfied Guizot as to the umbrage that his proposed course would give in the United States.^^ Calhoun also endeavored to influence the French government. *° King, No. I, July 13, 1844. In early life King was secretary of legation at St. Petersburg. "King, No. 2, July 31, 1844. The interview took place on July 20, Smith to Jones, Dec. 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 411. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4OI About the first of September King received a despatch in which, after straining Louis PhiHppe's cordial assurances to the greatest possible extent and there nailing them with pointed marks of appre- ciation, the Secretary went on, in what the London Times called a magazine article, to argue substantially as follows : It is not for the real interests of France, England or even Mexico to oppose annexation if peace, the extension of commerce, and security "are objects of primarx' policy with them." The United States and Texas are destined at some day to become one nation, and it is for the general good that this union take place by common consent. Opposition would " not improbably " lead to a war between the United States and ^Mexico ; or, should another power temporarily prevent annexa- tion and an outbreak of hostilities, our people would feel deep resent- ment, and " be ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to effect " the design " by force." Meanwhile the general peace would be insecure, and Texas, uncertain what to do or expect, would lan- guish. France as well as England desires that country to be inde- pendent for commercial reasons ; but England hopes also that slavery ma}' be abolished there and, as a consequence, in the United States, and to this scheme the interests of the continental European powers are opposed. The experiment of emancipation has proved enor- mously costly and disastrous to Great Britain, while the nations that have avoided her example have increased in wealth and power. Therefore she wishes to recover her lost position by destroying or crippling the productivity of her rivals, and now seeks to reach her end b}' uprooting slavery in America. This would give her a mo- nopoly of tropical commodities, for not only would the output of the United States, Cuba and Brazil decrease like that of Jamaica, but there would be a race war as in San Domingo, — a war that would involve the Indian as well as the negro, " and make the whole one scene of blood and devastation." Is it not better for the continent of Europe, then, to obtain tropical productions at a low price from the American nations, than to be dependent for them upon " one great monopolizing Power" and pay a high price? And is it not for their interest to develop new regions that will become profitable markets for their goods, rather than to buy from old and distant countries, whose population has reached its limit? Here again it is impossible to calculate how much effect was produced. But there must have been some, for the ideas were forcible; and even if the administration rejected their logic, it could easily be seen that their 27 402 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS influence on public sentiment, should they be urged by the opposition, was likely to be considerable.^^ Louis Philippe's general preference was to avoid war. He was a " prudent " monarch, as our minister observed, " and ever solicitous to maintain peace and good will, both for his own sake, and that of France." His avowed policy was described by King as " peace, and non-intervention as the best means of securing peace." Early in November he dwelt upon these, his favorite themes, in an interview with the American minister, expressing opinions and sentiments, *' which though not uttered with reference to the United States, Mexico and Texas, were strikingly applicable to the existing rela- tions of the three republics." Recent difficulties between the govern- ment of Mexico and the French representative in that country prob- ably had some effect in the same direction, and both domestic uncer- tainties and the embarrassments growing out of the Algiers and Morocco questions assisted. There were thus a number of deter- rent influences at work upon the French cabinet ; and accordingly it showed signs of backwardness during the autumn in the matter of co-operating decisively with England.^^ The British administration could not fail to be influenced by this lukewarm disposition, since its policy leaned avowedly on the atti- tude of France. The New York correspondent of the London Times reported that the Locofocos actually desired a war with England, which naturally added to the gravity of the situation ; and then Santa Anna adopted a course that had no little effect. In order to score a point against the Mexican Congress he talked openly about Murphy's conversation with Lord Aberdeen, and instead of favor- ing the recognition of Texas he represented His Lordship's remarks as evidence that England would assist him to reconquer that country. Rankhead regarded this conduct as showing a " total want of good faith," and protested against the President's announced purpose of laying Murphy's Memorandum before the Congress ; and his course in so doing was approved by his government. On the twenty-third of October, therefore, Aberdeen instructed him to inform Mexico that since she would not consent to recognize Texas, the proposed concert between England and France " as set forth in the ]\Iemo- randum " fell to the ground. Great Britain still urged that the '"Times: Revue de Paris, Jan. 9, 1845. To King, No. 14. Aug. 12, 1844: Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 39. ^■' King, No. I, July 13; No. 4, Oct. 6; No. 6. Nov. 15, 1844. (Backward- ness) Smith to Jones, Dec. 24, 1844: Jones, Meinor., 411. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 403 annexation of Texas to the United States would be "an evil of the greatest magnitude " to the mothei-country, and that it could only be avoided by immediately recognizing the young republic ; but the despatch was a formal notice that England no longer held herself under any obligation to Mexico to help avert the evil at the risk of a collision with the United States. This did not signify by any means, however, that her own interests or her engagements elsewhere might not cause her to pursue much the same course as that outlined in the Memorandum, and there is no evidence that she had yet aban- doned this policy ; but the exasperating conduct of Mexico, the failure of Texas thus far to accept the proposed Diplomatic Act, and still more the lukewarmness exhibited on the other side of the Channel doubtless undermined her resolution, and caused her to show, as Ashbel Smith reported, a certain backwardness herself.-'''* ^ Smith to Jones, Dec, 24, 1844: Jones, Memor., 411. London Times, Oct. 17, 1844. Bank., No. 66, Aug. 29, 1844. To Bank., No. 34, Oct. 23. 1844. The despatch of Oct. 23 has been cited as " definite proof of English withdrawal from the project of joint action before the English government had any direct refusal from France to go on with that action " ; but the two powers did in fact main- tain their joint action in this matter so long as any hope of preventing annexa- tion remained (see Chapter xxi.). Probably, however, what the author of this passage had in mind was the project of acting jointly in the particular manner contemplated in June, 1844; but even this view does not seem correct, i. Eng- land could not fairly and honorably withdraw from a plan of joint action with France by sending a note to Mexico, and at this time she was peculiarly anxious to have the confidence and good-will of France. 2. Had England decided upon a new policy, notice of it would almost certainly have been given to Pakenham and Elliot as in other instances. 3. The proposition of the Diplomatic Act. which involved joint action with France on a basis really as positive as did the Murphy Memorandum, was not now cancelled by England as according to this theory it should have been. 4. In his No. i, May 17, 1845, Smith reported to his govern- ment from London that Aberdeen had informed Terrell (who had arrived in that city on Jan. 12, 1845, and was still there) that the British government were even then " willing on their part to enter into a Diplomatic Act embracing the stipu- lations and guarantees as set forth in the accounts of my interviews with Ld Aberdeen last year, particularly that of" the 24th June (I believe), but that the French Government were unwilling to enter into such obligations or to employ any other than moral means towards Mexico" (Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 1196). This appears virtually to prove that the despatch of Oct. 23, 1844, did not indicate an intention or even a desire to withdraw from the action in concert with France that had been proposed in June. 5. After France declined to incur the risk of war with United States, the British government took four weeks to formu- late a new and pacific programme, whereas on the theory discussed they would have been ready and eager to announce such a policy at once. 6. The despatch of Oct. 23 can be explained satisfactorily without encountering these difficulties : (o) England had a plan (Murphy Memorandum) for joint action with France in co-operation with Mexico, and also a plan (Diplomatic Act) for joint action with France and (if necessary) the coercion of Mexico. The former was the only one of which Mexico knew, and therefore the despatch of Oct. 22, intended for Mexico, should be understood as referring to it. Indeed that despatch said that ■' the proposition set forth in the Memorandum . . . was based entirely on the assumed recognition by Mexico of the independence of Texas," and also that 404 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS November 25 the result of the American election was announced by the London newspapers, and the time for England and France to 'prosecute or to abandon their plan had arrived. About a week later, at an interview with Aberdeen. Smith found the minister counting on Guizot for no decisive action against the United States and, as was inevitable in that situation, unwilling to give a just ground of offence to this country. That very day His Lordship's misgivings were fully justified. In a talk with Cowley the minister of Louis Philippe remarked, as Calhoun and King had urged, that the annexa- tion affair concerned Great Britain more than it did France. " As both Governments have recognised Texas," answered the British ambassador, " you would no doubt join with England in negotiations to secure recognition from Mexico." " Cndoubtedly " answered Guizot, " we will use our best efforts for that purpose, and will even refuse to recognise the annexation of Texas to the United States; but, as a Question of Peace or War, I am not prepared to say that its junction with the American States is of sufficient importance to us to justify us in having recourse to arms in order to prevent it." This was obviously a diplomatic but distinct negative. ^^ The British government then pondered anew on the subject, and at length after four weeks of deliberation they informed Elliot what was now their policy. " It is," wrote Aberdeen, " to urge Mexico by every available argument, and in every practicable manner, to recog- nise without delay the Independence of Texas, as the only rational course to be taken for securing the real Interests of Mexico, to which Country the annexation of Texas to the United States would be ruinous." At the same time a strong desire was manifested by His Lordship to avoid exciting public sentiment in this country. A pas- sive course, " or rather a course of observation," was therefore dic- tated as under the existing circumstances the most prudent policy ; it was the proposed concert between Great Britain and France " as set forth in the Memorandum " which fell to the ground. Evidently an announcement of the failure of the first plan did not abolish the second, and it should be re- called that the Memorandum itself, instead of saying that in case Mexico would not consent to recognize Texas the plans of England to oppose annexation would not be carried out, only said " might not." (b) Aberdeen may very reasonably have believed that such an announcement as that of Oct. 2Z was the best way to bring Santa Anna to the point of recognizing Texas, and it may have been made for that purpose, (c) It seemed quite clear that Santa Anna was trying to play fast and loose with England, and the despatch of Oct. 23 was a proper move to stop his game, (d) Under the wording of the Memorandum, self-respect de- manded of England such a move. See also Terrell: Tex. Dipl. Corr., ii., 11 72. "Smith, Dec. 24: note 34, Cowley, No. 568, Dec. 2, 1844. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE 4O5 and Elliot was directly forbidden to involve his government in any active campaign.^" Near the close of the year 1844, among the papers accompanying Tyler's annual Message, was published Calhoun's despatch to King which has already been cited, and in due course the document ap- peared in Europe. There it made a sensation, — " quite a sensation," reported the minister, — for Calhoun said that our Executive particu- larly appreciated " the declaration of the King, that, in no event would any steps be taken b}- his Government in the slightest degree hostile, or which would give to the United States just cause of com- plaint." This, as we have learned, was a liberal exaggeration of Louis Philippe's friendliness, yet — as Calhoun doubtless foresaw — the language imputed to him could not be disavowed. Not only was public sentiment in France very warm towards the United States and far from cordial towards Great Britain, but the election of officers in the Chamber of Deputies had lately revealed a serious break in the administration's forces; its majorities there were small and fluctuating ; its fate was uncertain ; and nearly all of the charges brought against it amounted to the one heinous offence of subser- viency to England. ^^ The London Times, though it demanded with the utmost emphasis to be informed " categorically " whether France had been giving such assurances to the United States while "affecting" to join with Eng- land, was therefore unable to extort a reply. Terrell, now the repre- sentative of Texas, concluded that France was entirely indifferent to the fate of his country ; and although the French ambassador soon made known to Aberdeen a despatch from Guizot which described Calhoun's remarks as misleading and expressed a willingness to unite with England, as had been proposed, in securing the recogni- tion of Texas and guaranteeing her against molestation on the side of Mexico, it was not easy to feel perfectly satisfied as to the atti- tude of His Majesty's government. In short, while Calhoun's clever — even sharp — course did not destroy the concert of the powers, it evidently had some effect in rendering that concert less harmonious and less reliable. At the same time the publication of the despatch revealed very clearly to Aberdeen, as he admitted, the jealousy of the American annexationists against all foreign interference, and the *'To Elliot, No. 13, Dec. 31. 1844. To Bank., No. 49, Dec. 31, 1844. Pakenham and Bankhead also were instructed. Naturally Aberdeen tried to make it appear that no change in British policy had occurred. ^^ To King, No. 14, Aug. 12, 1844: Sen. Doc. i, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 39. King, No. 10, Jan, 29, 1845. 406 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS danger that any occurrence justifying that state of mind would pre- cipitate the United States into "active measures." In particular, he concluded, a war with Mexico almost necessarily involving the destruction of Texan independence might very easily be kindled; and the importance of extreme caution was brought forcibly home to his mind.^^ Up to this time, owing to the peculiar situation already explained", neither an acceptance nor a rejection of the Diplomatic Act had been received from Texas ; and that idea, to be embodied in some plan consistent with the now pacific attitude of the two powers, had con- tinued to be entertained by them. Quite soon, however, after assur- ing England that she was still ready for joint action, France found an opportunity to eliminate that project also. This was in conse- quence of something which occurred in Mexico. All through the summer and early autumn Santa Anna had continued to talk of war against the Texans ; but, soon after November came in, a revolution in the great State of Jalisco produced a change in his language. General Wavell, an Englishman in the Mexican service, had believed all along that he desired to get rid of the Texas difficulty ; for some time fear of the designs of the United States had made him uneasy ; and now, in the revolutionary conflict forced upon him, he was nat- urally anxious to have the political support of Great Britain and the financial assistance of the British capitalists doing business in the country. Accordingly his minister, Rejon, stated that Mexico would listen to any propositions coming from England and France with reference to the recognition of Texas ; and finally at the end of November Santa Anna definitely proposed to acknowledge the inde- pendence of that nation on the basis of an indemnity, a boundary at the Colorado, and a guaranty of the northern frontier of Mexico from England and France. Apparently a step had now been taken toward a solution of the problem, and France made haste to pro- nounce the Diplomatic Act no longer necessary.^'' "^ Times, Jan. 2, 10, 1845. Terrell, Nos. i. 2, Jan. 21, 27, 1845. To Elliot, No. I, Jan. 23, 1845. Apparently Aberdeen took some step to soothe the United States, for about a month later Everett reported (private, Feb. 26, 1845) that, although the subject was not one on which it " could be expected " that he " should receive any official information," he had " good grounds for saying, that the annexation of Texas would not cause a breach of the existing relations between the United States and Great Britain." From the effect of Calhoun's despatch upon Aberdeen one can reasonably infer that it had had considerable influence at Paris. "After Jones became President, he expressed to the British government through Elliot a desire to have the proposition of the Diplomatic Act put in his hands. " duly prepareig. Globe, 29 Cong., I sess., 37, 39, 41, 43. 44, 51, 52, 60. Particular objection was made to giving Texas the advantage of slave representation and to allowing her two Repre- sentatives. 468 THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS Spoke against admission, basing his appeal mainly on the grounds of slavery and slave representation; but Berrien, a Southern Whig opponent of annexation, replied, " The pledge of this Government has been given, and it must be redeemed." No one felt able to refute that argument, and on the twenty-second the resolution passed by a vote of 31 to 14. Seven days later it was signed by the President, and so the long struggle ended. It remained, however, to bring Texas actually within the Union, and measures to this end were taken without unnecessary delay. The laws of the United States were formally extended over her territory, and a district court, equipped with judge, attorney, marshall and clerk was created. A collection district also was established ; and a bill providing for postal routes followed. ^^ Her admission to the American Union was duly made known to Texas, and in February, 1846, the inauguration of her State adminis- tration formally completed the momentous affair. " Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives," said President Jones in his valedictory, " The great measure of annexation, so earnestly desired by the people of Texas, is happily consummated. . . . The lone star of Texas, which ten years since arose amid clouds over fields of carnage and obscurely shone for a while, has culmi- nated, and, following an inscrutable destiny, has passed on and become fixed forever in that glorious constellation which all free- men and lovers of freedom in the world must reverence and adore — the American Union. . . . The final act in this great drama is now performed. The republic of Texas is no more." Tears crept uncon- sciously from the eyes of many a weatherbeaten listener, who had toiled, suffered and bled to win freedom and establish a government, as the broad blue flag with its one brilliant star was reverently lowered by the retiring President; but when the banner of the Union rose in its place and caught the breeze, a deep satisfaction warmed his heart, and even while the tears fell, his voice broke forth, almost through sobs, in loud and repeated cheers. ^- Froni the foregoing narrative certain conclusions appear to follow. Nothing in the revolution of 1836, in the claims of Mexico or in the recognition of Texas by the United States deprived these two countries of the legal and moral right to take up in the latter " Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., i sess.. 38, 45, 54, 60, 66. 75, 76, 87, 88. 89, 93, 94, 99. loi, 102, 107, 137, 282. Polk, Diary, i., 148. "Jones, Letters on the Hist, of Ann., 25. Texas Democrat. Extra, Feb. 20, 1845- Smithwick, Evolution, 283. ANNEXATION CONSUMMATED 469 part of 1843 tlie project of uniting. The continuance of our neigh- bor as an independent nation involved a number of serious dangers to us, while as one of the States she could add much to our power and resources. Strong tendencies opposed to annexation existed there, however; England, France and Mexico stood firmly against it; and when Tyler took hold of the matter in earnest it was for numer- ous reasons a delicate and pressing affair. The American President, though naturally he exhibited Southern prepossessions and aims, pursued an honorable course. In particular he engaged in no con- spiracy, though it is true that he was aware of much regarding the case which could not be published and proved. The situation of our government was hard. On the one hand a choice between great humiliation and misfortune and a great war was deliberately pre- pared for us abroad, and the moves of the opposition in Great Brit- ain, France, Mexico and Texas had to be defeated, while on the other certain American opinions, interests and political complica- tions threatened to block the project. The opponents of annexation in the United States, with numerous exceptions, appear to have been actuated by no peculiarly elevated motives, and too commonly they showed less patriotism and sagacity than its advocates. Among the leaders Tyler, the unpopular, comes out rather distinctly best, as so often occurs when conduct and principles are closely examined. Gradually the American people, though not extremely thoughtful, well-informed or high-minded on the subject, reached the sound con- clusion that it was for the national advantage to bring about annexa- tion with no further delay ; for various reasons, one of which was this growing sentiment, an administration pledged to such a course came into power; by clever management a majority in our Congress was secured for a definite proposition ; and the masses in Texas — perceiving that however well another destiny might suit the aims of certain public men, the plain people were likely to fare best under the Stars and Stripes — insisted upon accepting the American offer. By a combination of ability and good fortune all the remaining obstacles, by no means contemptible, were swept away; the will of the two nations was executed ; and before long it was generally recognized that their union was expedient, logical and practically inevitable. For a variety of reasons, however — chiefly natural preju- dices, an equally natural want of information and the fact that cer- tain gifted opponents of annexation enjoyed great prestige in quar- ters where much attention has been paid to historical writing — some inaccurate views regarding the matter have unavoidably prevailed. ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. I. ]\Ianuscripts. Archives du Ministere de? Affaires Etrangeres, Paris. ^ Archive de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico: De- spatches to and from Ministers and Consuls in the United States, Great Britain and France. Bancroft Collection, New York (Lenox) Public Library. Bancroft Papers, Mass. Historical Society. Campbell Papers, Library of Congress. Clayton Papers, Library of Congress. Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress. Ford Collection, New York (Lenox) Public Library. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress. Jackson Papers (Knoxville Collection), Library of Congress (par- tially available). Jackson Papers. New York (Lenox) Public Library. Lamar Papers, Texas State Library, Austin. Mangum Papers belonging to A. W. Graham, Esq. Markoe and Maxcy Papers, Library of Congress. Miller Papers, Texas State Library. Pierce Papery, Library of Congress. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. Polk Papers, Chicago Historical Society.- Public Record Office, London : Foreign Office Papers ; Slave Trade Papers ; Admiralty Records. Texas (National) Archives, Austin: Diplomatic Correspondence; Senate Journal (secret) ; Laws of Eighth Congress. United States Department of State : Archives of the Texas Lega- tion ; Circulars issued to Diplomatic and Consular Agents ; Con- fidential Report Books; Domestic Letter Books; Instructions to ' The documents bearing directly on the annexation of Texas were not. how- ever, seen in the French archives. This matter is explained in the General Note. p. I. Information from Mexico as late as 1833 was obtained. ' These have recently been transferred to the Library of Congress, but the author distinguishes between the two collections as a slight acknowledgment of the courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society. 471 472 ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. and Despatches from Ministers, Consuls, Special Agents and Confidential Agents; Miscellaneous Letters and Replies; Notes to and from Foreign Legations. Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress. Webster Papers, Library of Congress. IL Contemporary Periodicals (for details consult the footnotes).^ United States : So far as they could be obtained, one newspaper of each party in each State for 1836, 1840-1844, and less systematic- ally 1845.'* In most instances the papers were found ; in some of the others the gaps were partially filled. Li the cases of Wash- ington and several other important cities use was made of an exceptional number of journals. Many valuable clippings from American papers, sent home by foreign agents, were discovered in the State Department. Contemporary magazines also were studied. Great Britain : The British Museum collection of newspapers and magazines was examined for the years 1836, 1840-1845. France : The newspapers and magazines in the Bibliotheque Na- tional were examined for the years 1836, 1840-1845. ' The list of periodicals examined is a very long one. To print it would appear to some pedantic, and as the periodicals used appear in every instance in the footnotes, it seems unnecessary. * In making use of the newspapers two principal embarrassments have been experienced. In some cases the title of the journal included the name of the city or town where it was published, while in others it did not. • It would seem proper to follow the usage in each particular instance ; but sometimes the files are not themselves consistent, and a considerable number of papers have been found only through quotations in their contemporaries, which were not always accurate in this particular. To avoid confusion the name of the place is there- fore uniformly printed in Roman letters while the proper name of the paper is italicized. The other trouble arose from publication as dailies, tri-weeklies, semi- weeklies and weeklies. There were surprising irregularities in this regard. Cer- tain papers belonged now to one of these classes and now to another : some indicated their class in their titles, and in other cases (particularly when only extracts could be found) the author was unable to ascertain to which class the particular issues from which he quoted actually belonged. Again, to employ the word " Daily " in one case and not in another might lead the reader to suppose that the latter belonged to a different class, whereas perhaps it was merely not the practice in the second instance to make the adjective a part of the name; and still other difficulties under this head might be mentioned. It has therefore seemed best, since the authority of the paper and not the frequency of its issue is the essential point, to omit uniformly " Daily," etc., except in a few special cases. Most of the newspapers cited may be found in the Library of Congress, and nearly all of the others in the Public Libraries of Boston, Nashville and Memphis, or the collection in the City Hall at New Orleans. ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 473 Mexico: The collections of newspapers in the Secretaria de Haci- enda, Biblioteca Nacional, and Archivo del Ayuntamiento de la Ciudad de Mexico, and fragmentary collections in numerous State and municipal archives were examined for the period treated. Texas : The author's main reliance was on the many clippings sent home by the representatives of foreign nations in Texas and the United States, quotations in American and British journals, and newspapers preserved in the State Library of Texas. III. Later Periodicals (see the footnotes). The historical serials of the countries named above were searched for documents and for articles, and the same course was followed with many not specially historical. Whatever useful material was found is referred to in the footnotes. IV. Books and Pamphlets. [To make a critical bibliography would add too much to the bulk and cost of this volume, and, as little use has been made of printed materials (aside from the history of Texas before the revolution) except for the documents they contain (criticised in the text if necessary), it seems uncalled for. This list is included (i) to pre- sent fuller titles than it seemed desirable to give in the footnotes, and (2) to indicate useful sources of information.] Adams, C. F., Jr. Charles Francis Adams. Boston. 1900. Adams, E. D. British Interests and Activities in Texas. Baltimore. 1910. Adams, J. Q. Memoirs. 12 v. Phila. 1874-77. Alaman, L. Hist, de Mejico. 5 v. Mejico. 1849-52. Almonte, J. N. Noticia Estad. sobre Tejas. Mexico. 1835. Anti-Texas Legion. Albany. 1844. Benton, T. H. Abridgment of the Debates of Congress. 16 v. N. Y. 185/-60. Thirty Years' View. 2 v. N. Y. 1856. Blaine, J. G. Twenty Years in Congress. 2 v. Norwich. 1884. Bocanegra, J. M. Disertacion Apologetica del Sist. Fed. Mexico. 1825. Memorias para la Hist, de Mexico. 2 V. Mexico. 1892. Brown, J. H. History of Texas. St. Louis. Buchanan, James. Works (J. B. Moore, Ed.). 12 v. Phila. 190&-11. Buckingham, J. S. The Slave States of America. 2 v. London. 474 ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. Bustamante, C. M. de. El Gabinete Mexicano, etc. 2 v. Mexico. 1842. El Gobierno del Gen. A. L. de S. Anna. Mexico. 1845. Calboun, J. C. Correspondence. See Jameson. Works (ed. by Cralle). 6 v. N. Y. 1854. Channing, W. E. Works. 6 V. Boston. 1869. Child, D. L. The Taking of Naboth's Vineyard. N. Y. 1845. Clay, C. M. Autobiog. (V. i.) Cincinnati. 1886. Coleman, Chapman. Life of Crittenden. 2 v. Phila. 1871. Conninicaciones relat. a la Agreg. de Tejas, etc. Mexico. 1845. Cooper, T. V. Amer. Politics. Springfield. Crane, W. C. Sam Houston. Phila. 1884. Curtis, G. T. D. Webster. 2 v. N. Y. 1870. Dawson, H. B. (Ed.). The Federalist. N. Y. 1897. Federacion y Tejas. Mexico. 1845. Foote, H S. Reminiscences. Washington. 1874. Texas and the Texans. 2 v. Phila. 1841. Garrison, G. P. Texas. Boston. 1903. Texas Diplomatic Corresp. 2 v. Washington. 1907, 191 1. Westward Extension. N. Y. ujoO. Garrison, W. P. and F. J. Wm. Llovd Garrison. 4 v. N. Y. 1885. G. L. H.. A Texian. Brief Remarks on Dr. Clianning's Letter to Hon. Henry Clay. Boston. 1837. Greeley, Horace. American Conflict. 2 v. Hart- fortl. 1864. Recollections. N. Y. 1868. Slavery Extension. N. Y. 1856. Green, Duff. Facts and Suggestions. N. Y. 1866. Hansard, T. C. Parliamentary Debates. 15 v. London. 1832-89. Harden, E. J. George M. Troup. Savannah. 1859. Harvey, Peter. Reminiscences of Daniel Webster. Boston. 1877. Horton, R. G. James Buchanan. N. Y. 1856. Houstoun, Mrs. M. C. Texas and the Gulf of Mexico. 2 V. London. 1844. Hunt, Gaillard. John C. Calhoun. Phila. 1907. Jameson, J. F. Calhoun's Correspondence (Am. Hist. Assoc, Annual Report for 1899, Vol. ii.). Jay, William. Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War. Boston. 1849. Jenkins, J. S. James K. Polk. Auburn. 1850. Silas Wright. Auburn. 1847. Jollivet. Annexion du Texas. Paris. 1844. Nouveaux Docs. Amer. Paris. 1845. Jones, Anson. Letters Relating to the History of Annexation. 2 ed. Phila. 1852. Memoranda and Official Corre- spondence. N. Y. 1859. Kendall, Amos. Autobiography. Boston. 1872. Kendall, G. W. Texan Santa Fe Expedition. 2 v. N. Y. 1844. Kennedy, William. Texas. 2 ed. 2 v. London. 1841. La Camara de Repres. a la Nacion Mex. Mexico. 1845. ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. 475 Lalor, J. J. Cyclopaedia of Political Science, etc. 3 V. Chicago. iS86. Lamar, M. B. Inaugural Address. Houston. 1838. [Lester, C. E.] Sam Houston. Phila. 1866. Lettre d'un Citoyen de New- York. Paris. 1845. Lodge, H. C. Daniel Webster. Boston. 1899. Ludecus, Ed. Reise durch . . . Tumalipas, Co- ahuila und Texas, etc. Leipzig. 1837. Lundy, Benj. The War in Texas. 2 ed. Phila. 1837. Mackenzie, W. L. Van Buren. Boston. 1846. McLaughlin, A. C. Lewis Cass. Boston. 1899. McMaster, J. B. Hist, oi the U. S. 7 v. N. Y. Madison, James. Writings (Hunt, Ed.). 8 v. N. Y. 1908. Maillard, N. D. History of Texas. London. 1842. Mateos, J. A. Hist. Pari, de los Cong. Mex. 10 V. Mexico. 1877-86. Maza, F. F. de la. Codigo de Colonizacion y Terrcnos Baldios. Mexico. 1893. Meigs, W. M. Life of T. H. Benton. Phila. 1904. Memoria . . . de Relacioncs, etc. ^Mexico. 1845. Mexico a traves de los Siglos. 6 v. Mexico. Morse. J. T. J. Q. Adams. Boston. 1899. Onys, L. de. Memoria sobre los Negoc. cntre Espafia y los EE. UU., etc. Madrid. 1820. O So hace la Guerra de Tejas, etc. Mex. 1845. Otero, Mariano. •Cuestion Social y Politica. IMex. 1842. Peck, C. H. Jacksonian Epoch. N. Y. 1899. Polk, J. K. Diary. 4 v. Chicago. 1910. Pracht, Victor. Texas im Jahre 1848. Elberfeld. 1849. Prentiss, S. S. Memoir [ed. by his brother]. 2 v. N. Y. 1886. Quincy, Josiah. J. Q. Adams. Boston, i860. Raines, C. W. Bibliography of Texas. Austin. \^^ 1896. Reeves, J. S. Amer. Diplomacy ilnder Tyler and Polk. Baltimore. 1907. Revolutionary Officer. Considerations on the Propri. and Necess. of Annex. . . . Texas. N. Y. 1829. Richardson, J. D. Messages and Papers of the Presi- dents. 10 V. Washington. 1896. Roosevelt, Theodore. Thomas H. Benton. Boston. 1899- Sargent, Nathan. Public Men and Events. 2 v. Phila. 1875- Schouler, James. Hist, of the United States. 6 v. N. Y. Schurz, Carl. Henry Clay. 2 v. Boston. 1899. Sedgwick, Theodore. Thoughts, etc. N. Y. 1844. Seventy-second Anniv. of D. Web- ster's Birthday. 1854. Shepard, E. M. Martin Van Buren. Boston. 1899. Smith, Ashbel. Addresses. 1848 and 1875. Reminiscences. 1876. 476 ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES. Smithwick, Noah. The Evolution of a State. Austin. 1901. Stanwood, Edward. Hist, of the Presidency. Boston. 1898. Sumner, W. G. Andrew Jackson. Boston. 1899. Thompson, Waddy. Letter to National Intelligencer. 1844. Tornel, J. M. Breve Reseiia Hist. Mexico. 1852. Tejas y los EE. UU., etc. Mexico. 1837- Treaties in Force, Compilation of. Washington. 1899. Turner Essays in History. By various authors. 1910. Tyler, L. G. Letters and Times of the Tylers. Richmond. 3 v. 1884-96. United States Congressional Docu- ments, including the Journals of Senate and House and the Execu- tive Journal of the Senate. Urgente Necesidad de la Guerra de Tejas. Mexico. 1842. Visit to Texas. 2 ed. N. Y. 1836. Von Hoist, H. Const, and Polit. Hist, of the U. S. 8 V. Chicago. John C. Calhoun. Boston. 1899. Webster, Daniel. Letters (Van Tyne). N. Y. 1902. Writings and Speeches. 18 v. Boston. 1903. Weed, Thurlow. Autobiography (H. A. Weed, Ed.). Boston. 1833. Winsor, Justin (Ed.). Narr. and Crit. Hist, of America. 8 V. Boston. 1884-89, Woodbury, Levi. Writings. 3 v. Boston. 1852. Wooten, D. G. Hist, of Texas. Yoakum, H. K. Hist. Texas. 2 v. Redfield. 1856. Young, A. W. American Statesman. Rev. ed. N. Y. 1877. Zavala. L. de. Revoluciones de Mexico. 2 v. Mexico. INDEX. Abbreviations, 2, note. Aberdeen, Lord, exonerates United States, 25 ; his position on British mediation, 83, 86 ; on Texan slavery, 88, 89-91, 123, 124, 126; his inter- view with Everett, regarding inter- ference in Texas, 150, 151, 232; despatch to Pakenham on same sub- ject, 200; veiled threat against U S., 304; interview with Mexican minister in 1830, 382 ; instructions to British ambassador at Paris (1844), 383; interview with Mexi- can representative (Murphy), 389; proposed Diplomatic Act, 391, 394 ; instructs representative in Mexico that the plan of co-operation with Mexico is dropped, 402, 403, note; perceives need of caution in matters affecting the United States, 406; prepares new instructions for Elliot (Jan., 1845), 407; tries to make independence attractive, and reminds Texas of the existing treaties, 462. See also England. Adams, John Quincy, view of an- nexation, 4; his effort to acquire Texas, 8, 106; three-weeks address in House of Representatives, 68; attitude of, on slavery in Texas, 116, 117, 130; eloquent address, 131; circular (1843), 132; on an- nexation, 136, 221, 280; his descrip- tion of Buchanan, 268. Addington, H. U., British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, his attitude on Texan affairs, 86. Advertiser, Albany, 67. Advertiser, Boston, 136, 465. Advertiser, Detroit, 133, 254, 354. Advertiser, Galveston, 1841, 38, 112. Advertiser, Mobile, 40, 299. Advertiser, Newark, 66, 300, 324. Advocate, Charlottesville, Va., 245. Alabama, on annexation of Texas, 68, 299. Alaman, Lucas, his action in Texas matters, 9, 10; his Report, 1830, 19, note. Alamo, 12, 20, 43, 49. Allen, Charles, 182. Allen, Ebenezer, his course as acting Secretary of State in Texas, 376, 277; appointed Secretary, 412; his action regarding annexation, 436, 445; recalls Kaufman, 464. Alliance of Texas with the United States suggested by Houston, 162 ; United States requested to become a defensive ally, 163, 164; Van Zandt's opinion on this proposi- tion, 169. Almonte, J. N., 42 ; his threat to re- sign mission if the United States considers annexat'on, 135, 137 ; his conversation with Upshur, 194, 195; interviews with Calhoun, 195 ; with- draws from Washington, 261 ; quoted on annexation sentiment, 299, 324, 418; his note to the Amer- ican government, 423 ; hurries home, 430. American, Baltimore, 114, iiS, 132, 133, 244, 245. 253, 319; on Houston as a possible President of the United States, 439. American, Portland, 298. 317. American, Sunbury, Pa., 314. American Anti-Slavery Society, op- poses annexation of Texas, 67. Andrews, S. P., works for abolition of slavery in Texas, 89, 112, 114. Annexation, Texan vote in favor of (1836), 20; formal proposition for (1837), 63; proposition of Texas withdrawn, 68; arguments for and against, 63-66; the slavery issue, 67, 68; fluctuation of Texan feel- 477 478 INDEX. ing, 69, 70 ; Texan government ad- vances and recedes, 70; possibilities of Texas as an independent state, 68, 74, 75, 99; public sentiment in the United States, 71-74; annexa- tion desired by Tyler, 103-111; in- formally proposed by Upshur, 122 ; proposition made to Texas, 128; development of sentiment both for and against, 130-146; annexation treaty negotiated, 147-179; discus- sion of, in American press, 180- 193; Texas or disunion, 204-213; the project how received by the Senate, 221-233; Presidential con- ventions and campaign of 1844, as affecting, 234-257, 297-321 ; defeat of treaty, 258-273; causes of this result, 273-279; Tyler's Message to House, and bills for annexation, presented and tabled in Senate, 281-288; strength of anti-British feeling, 301-305 ; influence of the Liberty party, 306, 307 ; growth of annexation sentiment, 320, 323 ; public opinion more favorable, 323; discussion in House, and passage of bill for, 324-334, 347 ; discussion in Senate with same result, 334- 346; instructions embodying action of Congress sent American charge in Texas, 353-355 ; Texan feeling regarding terms proposed, 379, 437- 440 ; efforts of England and France to prevent annexation, 381-413; the question before Mexico, 414- 431; Donelson labors for, 432-461; Texan Congress convened to con- sider the proposals, 442, 455, 456; convention called, 444, 445 ; meets and votes for annexation, 456-459 ; the people concur, 460; annexation effected, 466-468. See also Texas, United States. Annexation Resolution adopted by U. S. House, 332; text of it, 332, note; with amendment (Benton's bill) adopted by Congress, 343-345; text of the amendment, 344, note. Anti-annexation convention in Mas- sachusetts, 324. Anti-slavery Convention, London, 1843, 89. Anti-slavery Standard, New York, 420. Appleton, Nathan, 465. Archer, William, 194; on relations with Mexico affecting annexation, 197, 198; his course in discussion of annexation, 268-270, 274, 335, 342, 344, 345- Archer, Branch T., 21. Argus, Albany, N. Y., 312. Arista, Mariano, 47, 441. Armistice, The proposed, between Mexico and Texas, 43, 44 (and note), 172. Arrangoiz, J. de, reports annexation as almost certain, 421 ; urges Mexico to negotiate with Texas, 430. Ashburnham, British Charge in Mexico, his attitude toward Texas, 77- Ashburton, Lord, encourages plan for tripartite agreement, 109. Ashley, U. S. Senator, offers resolu- tion on annexation, 338; remark on Texan immigration, 434. Atlas, Boston, 181, 182, 183, 198, 229, 324- Atlas, London, 304, 305, 325, 393, 394. Aurora, New York, 134, 226, 285. Aurora, La, Tabasco, 414. Austin, Moses, 7. Austin, Stephen F., his attitude on slavery in Texas, 9 ; on Texan in- dependence, II, 12; commissioner to the United States, 21 ; appeals for aid, 27. Bagby, A. P., on annexation, 341-343. Bancroft, George, 202, 242, 251, 315; on approval by cabinet of Tyler's action regarding terms of annexa- tion, 354. Bankhead, Charles, represents Great Britain in Mexico, 94, 402; will not promise Mexico British aid, 295; his influence in Texan affairs, 420- INDEX. 479 425, 427, 428, 430; instructed to urge that Texas be recognized at once, 462; counsels moderation in IMexico after action of Texan convention, 463. Barbadoes, colonial secretary of, visits Texas, 79; his report, 85, 86. Barker, E. C, article, 16, note. Barker, George P., 312. Barrow, Alexander, his letter on annexation, 163 ; appeals for delay, 344- Beales claim to lands in Texas, 85, 122, 149, 155. Bee, New Orleans, 46, 114, 181. Belgium, recognizes Texan independ- ence, 76. Belser, J. E., on annexation, 301. Bentinck, Lord, 392. Benton, Thomas H., on recognition of Texas, 54 ; on annexation, 64, 108, 138; on Gilmer's letter, 132; on disunion movement, 210, 211, 213 ; on annexation treaty, 225, 228, 258, 259, 262, 264, 274; on military protection of Texas, 231, 232; his attitude in Presidential campaign of 1844, 235, 236, 238, 244, 253 ; his speech on the treaty, 264, note ; his argument on relations between Texas and Alexico, 277 ; presents bill in Senate for annexation of Texas, 284, 285; his discussion with McDuffie, 286, 287; does not sup- port McDuffie's joint resolution, 287; attacks administration, 309; introduces former bill amended, 335; introduces new bill, 336, 337; this bill adopted as section three of the annexation resolution, 343-345. Berrien, J. M., on annexation, 468. Berryer, A. P., 388, 397. Biddle. Nicholas, 108. Billault, French Deputy, 397. Birney, James, 306, 308. Black, E. J., favors annexation, 138, 191. 351 : is willing to support occu- pation of Oregon, 351. Blair, F. P., editor of Washington Globe, on annexation, 188, 216; his attitude toward Calhoun, 213, 216; toward Tyler, 310; toward Mc- Duffie's joint resolution, 334; to- ward Benton's bill, t^t,"/. See also Globe, Washington. Hocanegra, J. M., 293-295. Holetin de Noticias, El, 426. Botts, J. M., 192, 205. Bowles, Cherokee chief, 35, 163. Boyd, Linn, offers plan for annexa- tion, 332. Bravo, Nicolas, 56. Britannia, London, 303. British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, its action regarding slavery in Texas, 116. Brougham, Lord, on Texan affairs, 123, 141, 232. Brown, A. V., his attitude on annex- ation, 108, 137, 138. Brown, Milton, introduces proposi- tion, in the House, for annexation, Z^^, 332, 347- Bryan, Joseph N., 52. Bryant, William Cullen, signs protest against Texas resolution at Balti- more convention, 312. Buchanan, James, quoted, ^2 ; his position on recognition of Texas, 52, 54, 57 ; Presidential aspirant in 1844, 236; favors annexation treaty, 267, 268; prepares instructions for American charge in Texas, 354 ; his remarks on the terms, 354, 355 ; his reply to Almonte's note, 423 ; instructions to Donelson. 439, 446, 448; to American minister at Lon- don on British attitude on Texan question, 466. Burnet, David, 20, 30, 34, 66. Bustamante, Anastasio, his career in Mexico, 2, 3, 82 ; quoted on Texan campaign, 414. Butler, Anthony, 12. Butler, B. F., of New York, 246, 249, 25-- Calhoun, John C, on recognition of Texas (1836), 53; on annexation (1836), 64, 66; urges opposition to British anti-slavery designs in 48o INDEX. Texas, 126; appointed Secretary of State, 174; works for annexation treat}^ 174-178; his interviews with Almonte, 195; reply to Paken- ham concerning Lord Aberdeen's despatch on the English position, 201-204, 213, 215, 216-218, 259, 287; his attitude regarding secession, 209, 211, 213-216; suggested for President of a Southern confeder- acy, 211; aspirations for Presidency of the United States, 217; rela- tions with Van Buren, 235 ; his opinion on prospects of the an- nexation treaty, 272 ; his despatch to charge at Mexico, 288; opposes Benton's bill, 338, 343 ; urges Tyler to act on annexation resolution, 352 ; his instructions to Donelson, 353 ; to Howard, 361, 362, 367 ; his despatch to Shannon, minister to Mexico, on Texan affairs, 365-367 ; his despatch to King, endeavoring to influence the French govern- ment, 400, 401, 405. California, revolt in, 48; Houston's belief that Texas might acquire, 99 ; Tyler's plan for obtaining, 109; England's alleged designs concern- ing, 155, 230, 417. Cameron, Simon, 314. Canada, propositions to annex, 334. Canales, Antonio, his campaign against Mexican Centralists, 37. Canedo, Juan de Dios, Mexican min- ister of Foreign Relations, his atti- tude on Texan independence, 82, 415, 416. Canning, Charles John, :i2, 77- Cannon, N., 27. Carroll, William, 108. Cass, Lewis, 236, 250, 251. Catholics in Presidential campaign of 1844, 311, 317. Catron, John, discourages invasion of Mexico, 39; references to, 156, 238; works for annexation, 162; for Polk. 250, quoted, 253, 254, 255, 336. Channing, William E., quoted, 4; his views on the Texan revolt, 14, 15, 18, 19. Chapman, Reuben, 351. Chihuahua, plan in, for union with Texas, 48. Child, D. L., 25, 132, 350. Choate, Rufus, 163. Cholera morbus epidemic, popular Mexican belief as to cause of, 419. Cincinnati, meeting in, suggests rec- ognition of Texas, 52. Citizen, Albany, 311. Civilian, Galveston, 44, 96, 180, 359, 380. Clay, Cassius M., 297, 308, 312. Clay, Henry, his efforts to acquire Texas, 8, 105, 140 ; report on rec- ognition of Texas, 54, 61 ; promotes bank bill, 102; nominated by Mas- sachusetts for Presidency, log, 157; his opinion on annexation, 160 ; his prospects for the Presidency and the annexation question 51s affect- ing each other, 174, 182, 184, 185, 192, 217; opposes annexation, 197, 198, 259, 272 ; his letter against it, 240-242; unanimous choice of Whig party in 1844, 234, 246; his change of attitude on annexation, 307-309 ; influences for and against in the Presidential campaign, 311- 321 ; his explanation of defeat, 317; letter urging delay on annexation question, 336. Clayton, Thomas, 189. Clipper, Baltimore, on annexation, ^33, i45j 226; censures Tyler, 229. Coahuila, discontent in, 47, 48. Coahuila-Texas, 7, 8, 10, 11. Colonial Gazette, London, 78. Colquitt, W. S., 206. Commerce between England and the United States, 392, 393. Commercial Advertiser, Buffalo, 316. Commercial Advertiser, New York, on annexation, 138, 315. 348; on Texan feeling, 380. Commercial Bulletin, New Orleans, quoted on prospects of Texas league, 47; its advice to Texas, 49; INDEX. 481 Statement regarding Texan ideas of extension, 51 ; quoted on English action, 123, 154: on possible occu- pation of Texas by the United States. 443- Commons, House of. See House of Commons. Compiler, Richmond, 218. Concert, international, against an- nexation, 383, 384, 390. 391, 395, 396, 400, 403, note. 404-406, 407. 413, 462, 463. Confederacy, Southern. See Seces- sion. Connecticut, 53, 260. Conner, David, instructions to, 227. Connolly, Felix, 315. Constituent Congress of Mexico, i, 7. Constitution, federal, proclaimed in Mexico, I ; abolished, 3. ConsHtutionnel, Le, 394, 397, 398. Convention, Texan, to consider an- nexation. 436, 444. 456-461. Corpus Christi, skirmish near, 38. Correspondant, Le, 393, 398. Corwin, Thomas, 346, note. Cotton industry, as affecting relations of England, Texas and United States, 85, 86, 89, 90, 94. 97, 109, 112. Courier, Boston, 130; on relations of Texas and England, 144. Courier, Charleston, 192. Courier, New Orleans. 31, 40, 47, 104. 211, 224, 453. Courier and Enquirer, New York. 70. 316, 32^, 466. Courrier, Franqais, Le, 426. Cowley, Lord, 383, 384, 386, 390, 396, 404. Crawford, J. T., 24. Crittenden. J. J.. 197, 198: his course in annexation proceedings. 225, 227, 229, 344. Croskey, J. R.. represents Beales claim to lands in Texas, 85, 86. Cuevas, L. G., represents Mexico in France, 384, 385; Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, 420; his pro- posals regarding Texas (Mentnria and /uiciiitiz'(i), 421. 424; consulta- tions with Bankhead, 420-422, 427; his condition of negotiation with Texas, 430; eager for English aid, 463- Cushing, Caleb, iii. Customs affairs on Texan liordcr, 10, 71, 73- Cyprey, Alleye de, 427, 428, 430. Daingerfield, \V. H., 39. Dallas, G. M., 255. Debate on Annexation, 1845, in the House of Representatives, 328, note ; in the Senate. 339, note. Del Norte Company, 212. Democrat, Houston, 358. Democrat, Milwaukee, 135. Democratic Central Committee of Va., 181, 298. Democratic party, 234, 238; attitude of, on annexation, 242, 255-257, 297; national convention of, 1844, 248-257 ; influences for and against in campaign, 309-315: analysis of result. 315-320. Diario, official Mexican newspaper, 59, 420; urges negotiation with Texas. 428, 429. Diplomatic Act, proposed by Eng- land, 391 (and note), 394, 403, 406. Diplomats, The principal, 2, note. Disunion. See Secession. Disunion convention, 208. Dix, John A.. 342. 343. Dodson, John, British Advocate General, 389. Donelson, A. J., 251, 252; expostulates with Benton, 336; American charge in Texas, 348. 368. 369 ; quoted on Houston's position, 360; discusses with Houston. 369-371 ; reports the situation critical. 371 ; Iiis view on English influence, 375 ; his letter to Allen, 376, :i77 ; visits the United States. 432 ; returns to find English and P'rench envoys at Texan capi- tal. 432, 433, 435 : discusses situa- tion with Jones, Smith and Allen. 436; visits Houston, 437-440; formally presents proposals of the United States to Texan govern- 32 482 INDEX. ment, 441 ; his skillful conduct of affairs, '444-446, 448-454, 456-461; his recall, 464. Douglas, Stephen A., offers joint resolution for annexation. 327; offers joint resolution declaring Texas a mem!)er of the Union, 467. Dromgoole, G. C. speaks on annexa- tion, 331. Doyle, Percy W., 93, 94, I5S- Eagle, Memphis, 319. Earthquake in Mexico, 422. Economist, London, 393. Edinbui-gh Review, 13, 97- Elect ra (ship), 412. Elliot, Charles, English consul and charge to Texas, 80; his character and abilities, 81 ; his opinion on Texan independence, 83, 87 ; pre- sents the Beales claim, 85 ; his plan for abolition of slavery and adop- tion of free trade, 91, 92 ; discussion with Houston, 92 ; remarks on the Texan situation (1843), 93-95; his influence in Texas, 96, 113, 114, 155, 160, 161, 262 ; meets Henry Clay, 160; his interview with Houston on Upshur's informal proposition of annexation, 147-149 ; his opinion of Houston's request for defensive arrangement with United States, 164; requests full explanation of Texan policy, 171 ; quoted, 358, 380; away from his post, 368, 369; his reports on temper of Texan people, 381, 451 ; his reply to Aberdeen's instructions of January, 1845, 407 ; his labors with Texan authorities to prevent annexation (March, 1845), 408-411, 462; his secret journey to Mexico, 411-413, 423, 428, 431 ; his opinion of annexation sentiment, 435 ; hurries to Texan capital to work against annexation, 449 : leaves Texas, 455 ; feeling in United States concerning his course, 466. Elliot. George. 413, 423. 451. Ellis, Powhatan. 59. 60. England, relations of, with Mexico, 23, /2 ; with Texas, 60, 63, 75-79 ; recognizes Texan independence, 79; treaties with Texas concluded, 80 ; attitude of, on mediation between Texas and Mexico, 81-84; deeply interested in Texan slavery. 79, 84- 94, 97, no. III, 1 13-126; fears of, in United States, 135-137, I43, I47, 150-155; disclaims intention to interfere improperly in Texas, 150- 153, 200; but continues to be regarded as a factor in the situa tion, 154, 158, 160, 161, 164, 165, 167, 170, 359: her representative requests full explanation of Texan poHcy, 171 ; opposes annexation treaty, 188, 304; readiness to give Texas aid, 364; view of England's policy. 382, 383, 388, 389. 413 ; Aber- deen's interview with Mexican re- presentative (Murphy), 389: plans for joint action with France to prevent annexation, 390; proposed Diplomatic Act, 391 ; England's de- sire and need for friendly terms with the United States, 392-394; yet now willing to fight U. S., 394; action delayed, 394-396; a passive course dictated, 404; new instruc- tions to Elliot, 407; his efforts for treaty of peace between Texas and Mexico, 410, 411; England's great anxiety to prevent annexation, 413, 418, 450, 453 ; her last efforts for Texan independence, 462, 463. See also Aberdeen, Elliot, Pakenham, Bankhead. Cowley, and Concert. Enquirer, Richmond, 71, 116, 145, 189, 193. 207, 240, 285, 299, 324, 348, 380. European concert against annexation. See Concert, international. pAtropean Times. Wilmer and Smith's, 398. Eurydice (ship), 412, 422, 423. Eve, Joseph, on Texan affairs in T842, 40, 41. Evening Journal, New York, 318. Evening Post, New York, ptiblishes Sedgwick's articles opposing annex- INDEX. 483 ation, 190, and documents accom- panying annexation treaty, 225 ; its predictions on Texan matters, 288; course in Presidential campaign of 1844, 299, 312, 313; later views re- garding annexation, 324, 326, 466. Everett, Edward, introduces Ashbel Smith, 83, 87 ; Tyler's plan to relieve, 109; reference to, 117; his instructions from Upshur, 124-126; interviews with Aberdeen, on Brit- ish intentions regarding Texas, 150-153; despatch from, 232; quoted on Louis Philippe's position, 387. Examiner, London, 393. Express, New York, 316, 319, 320. Federalists of northern Mexico seek aid from Texas, 36, 47 ; their schemes for independence or union with Texas, 47, 48. Field, David Dudley, 191, 312. Flirt (ship), 154. Florida, acquisition of, 5, 7. Foreign-born voters join Democrats, 311. 317- Forsyth, John, his attitude towards Texas, 30; views on annexation, 63-66, 106. Fort Jesup, 430. Foster, E. H., offers resolution on annexation, 338. France, claims of, to Louisiana, 5 ; acknowledges independence of Texas, 76 ; disapproves annexation treaty, 261 ; review of French policy regarding Texas, 383-388, 413 ; plans for joint action with England to prevent annexation, 391 ; indignation of people against this policy, 397-399; efforts of W. R. King and Calhoun to influ- ence course of government, 399- 401; delay, 402; refusal of France to take up arms, but willingness to aid in obtaining recognition from Mexico for Texas, 404, 405 ; pro- nounces Diplomatic Act unneces- sary. 406; retires from action con- cerning Texas, 463. Free trade and tariff problems as affecting the Texas question, 91, 94, 97, 136, 142, 144, 185, 230, 364, 375, Free Trader, Natchez, on annexation of Texas, 70 ; on English position, 104. , Frelinghuysen, Theodore, 311, 317. Fremont, John C, 127. Fulton, William, on annexation, 171. Gadsden, James, 209, 309. Gaines, Edmund P., 27. Gallatin, Albert, 191, 466. Galveston, description of, about 1843, 41. Garrison, William Lloyd, ~2„ 116; his attitude toward Whigs and Dem- ocrats, 306 ; does not refer to Oregon in connection with Texas affairs, 351, 352. See Liberator. Garro, Maximo, interviews with Louis Philippe, 386, 419; his final efforts for aid in Texan affairs. 463. Gazette, Alexandria, Va., 317. Gazette, Cincinnati, on movement for rescinding the annexation measure, 465- Gazette, Galveston, 358, 359. Gazette, Philadelphia, 131. Georgia, secession sentiment in, 206, 208; annexation meeting at Augus- ta slightly attended, 299 ; resolu- tion of Whigs on annexation, 319. Georgian, 31. Giddings, Joshua R., 324, 2,2>Z- Gilmer, T. W., favors annexation, 131, 207. Gilpin. H. D., 342. Globe, Washington, D. C, on annexa- tion, 140-144, 180, 182, 188, 216, 226, 439; on asking assent of Mexico, 199; on possible Southern confed- eracy, 211; on relations between Tyler and Van Buren, 234; its course in Presidential campaign of 1844, 238, 253. 310; opinion on vote of House, T,2,i. Goliad, 19, 43, 49. Gorostiza. M. E. de, offends and 484 INDEX. leaves United States, 59, 82; his interview with Lord Aberdeen con- cerning Texas (1830), 383. Great Britain. See England. Greeley, Horace, on annexation, 138; on Clay's course, 308; on Walker's amendment to Benton's bill, 343 ; on rescinding annexation measure, 464, 465. Green, Ben. E., 288, 293-295. Green, Duff, visits London semi-offi- cially, 117; report of British de- signs attributed to him, 117-119, 121, 232; said to be interested in Texan properties, 189; American Consul at Galveston. 212 ; his explanation, 213, note ; urges deser- tion of old party leaders, 238; quoted on attitude of the North- west, 350; his clash with President Jones, 2,77, 447- Grundy, U. S. Dist. Atty., 24. Guerrero, Vicente, made President of Mexico, 2; proclaims abolition of slavery, 9, 29. Guizot, F. P. G., his Texan policy, 383, 384, 387, 388; opposition to, among French people, 397-399; his interview with W. R. King, 400; finally refuses to join England in taking up arms to prevent annexa- tion, 404 ; his explanation of obsta- cles to decisive action, 463. See also France. Hamilton, James, 36, 205. Hammond, J. H., quoted on pros- pects of a Southern confederacy, 211; his opinion on failure of treaty, 273, 277. Hannegan, E. A., on Oregon ques- tion, 351. Hays, J. C, 441, 447, 448. Haywood, VV. H., Jr., 343, 359, 464. Henderson, John, of Mississippi, 198. Henderson, J. Pinckney, appointed Texan envoy to England and France, 63. 76; quoted on British intentions, 122; appointed to co-op- erate with Van Zandt in matter of annexation treaty, 165, 166, 172; arrives in Washington, 174; his report to Jones, 175; his comments on terms of treaty, 223 ; " culti- vates " Whigs, 260; mention of, 272, 281 ; his recall, 356; active for annexation, 441. Herald, Cincinnati, 135, 208, 306. Herald, New York, 30, 182, 187, 246, 256, 298, 300, 307, 318. Herrera, J. J. de, President of Mexico, 3, 409 ; his attitude towards the United States, 423, 424. Hockley, G. W., Texan commis- sioner to Mexico, 44, 172, 363. Holland, recognizes Texan independ- ence, 76. Holmes, L E., on southern conditions, 205. Horn, Henry, 314. House of Commons, considers Amer- ican relations with Texas, 77. House of Representatives of the United States, action of, on rec- ognition of Texas, 57, 58; bill passed in, for annexation, ;i24-232, 347 ; analysis of votes, 333, 334, 347. Houston, G. S., 351. Houston, Sam, his share in causing the Texas revolution, 25, 26, 28 ; his first Presidency, 35 ; his character, 35; re-elected President, 38; his general policies, 38, 39; secures a truce with ]\Iexico, 43, 44 : takes steps to obtain an armistice, 44: why opposed to war, 50; asks Brit- ish aid, 94 ; shows a leaning toward England, 95, 96; very influential in Texas, 96: his real aim, 98-100, 164-169: his view of American policy regarding annexation (1843). 106, 107: his position regarding slavery in Texas, 114; proclaims the truce, 118; declines to consider annexation (July, 1843), 121: his dealings with England misrepre- sented, 136; explains to Elliot his attitude towards the United States, 147-149; suspected by Upshur, 153; visits the Flirt, 154; reply to Amer- ican overture, 155; contrasts Eng- INDEX. 485 land advantageously with the United States, 156; predicts the consequence of non-annexation, 159; firm for independence, says Elliot, 160; fearing action of Con- gress sends in a secret message (Jan., 1844), 160-162; desires defen- sive arrangement with the United States, 162, 164, 166, 167 ; appoints Henderson to co-operate with Van Zandt, 165 ; Henderson's instruc- tions, 166; Houston's reasonings, 166-168: his letter to Jackson (Feb., 1844), 168, 169; his feeling toward Jackson, 168, note ; does not accept the proposed armistice, 172; finesse regarding annexation treaty, 1^2, 173. 176-179; real feeling about the treaty, 179 ; anxious but not worried regarding its fate. 356; prefers guaranteed independence, 356, 357 ; interview with Donelson, 369-371 ; review of his policy regarding annexation, 372; further indica- tions of his preference, 37s ; Jones's charges against, 374; opposes the American annexation proposal, 437-440; thinks of the American Presidency, 439, 443 ; yields to public sentiment, 442, 443. Howard, B. C, 58, 60. Howard, Tilghman A., appointed American charge in Texas, 361 ; Calhoun's instructions to, 361, 362, 367 ; his answer to Texan demands, 365; his death, 368. Hubbard, David, 206. Hubbard, Henry, of Xew Hampshire, 251. Hughes, J. M., offers resolution con- cerning Oregon, 191. Ilunt, Memucan, presents Texan annexation proposal (1837), 63-66; works for annexation (1845), 434. Hunt, Washington, opposes final vote for annexation, 467. Hunter, R. M. T., 237, 351. Huntington, J. W., 344. Huskisson, William, quoted on the attitude of Great Britain regarding annexation, 77. Immigration, Texan, 96, 97, 363, 434. See also Settlers. Impeachment of Tyler demanded, 229. Independence declared by Texas, 13; recognized by the United States, 62 ; by France, Holland, and Bel- gium, 76: by England. 80. Ingersoll, Charles J., on Texas, "73; on annexation treaty, 278; moves joint resolution for annexation, 327. Iniciaiiva presented by Cuevas. 424. International concert against annexa- tion. See Concert, international. Iturbide, Augustin dc, in Mexico, i, 50. Jackson, Andrew, his attempt to inir- chase Texas, 9, 22 ; his alleged complicity in the Texan revolution, 25-28 ; discourages Texan invasion of Mexico, 39; attitude on recogni- tion of Texas, 54-56, 60-62 ; on annexation, 105, 108, 144; writes to Houston on annexation, 163; recommends secrecy to Tyler, 170; reference to, 186; urges ratification of treaty, 189, 230, 263 ; quoted on Calhoun's action, 203 ; on disunion sentiment in the Southwest, 207, 208; on defending Texas, 229; on Van Buren's position, 246; letters from, on annexation, 252, 263, 304. 307 ; quoted regarding Clay, 309 ; gives advice in Presidential cam- paign, 310; writes to Houston, 360, 439 ; annexation convention votes tribute of mourning to, 459. Jalisciense, El, 425. Jalisco, revolution in, 406. Jarnagin, Spencer, speaks against disunion, 212; against annexation, 266, 267. Jefferson, Thomas, 140, 186. Johnson, Cave, on annexation treaty, 225, 235, 272, 278; on Presidential campaign of 1844. 236, 242, 245, 253 ; urges compromise candidate, 486 INDEX. 250, 251 ; on McDuffie's joint reso- lution, 334, 335. Johnson, R. M., 236, 251. Johnston, Alexander, 237. Jones, Anson, promotes Texan inde- pendence, 28, 30; quoted on Texan affairs, 36, y], 42, 44, 45, 51, 61, 70, 96, 122; extracts from and refer- ences to official correspondence, etc.. as Secretary of State, 149, 152, 155, 162-164, 172, 395; his attitude on annexation, 166, 169, 357; suc- ceeds Houston as President of Texas, 318, 373; his character and policy, 373-376; his negotiations with the English and French envoys (March, 1845), 409-412; interview with Donelson, 436; public feeling strong against, 441 ; forced to con- vene Congress, 442; issues proc- lamation for convention, 444 ; his proclamation concerning English and French offers of assistance and the Mexican attitude, 452, 453; submits question of annexa- tion to Congress, 456; his valedic- tory, 468. Journal, Poughkeepsie, 316. Journal, Louisville, 299. Journal des Debats, on slavery, 87, 385; on Texan prospects, 364; on French interference regarding an- nexation, 398. Journal of Commerce, New York, 73. 97, III, 112, 175, 186, 195, 199, 392. Kaufman, D. S., discussion concern- ing his appointment as Texan charge after vote for annexation, 464. Kendall, Amos, 237, 245, 254. Kennedy. William, in Texas, 80, note: his opinion on relations of Texas and Mexico, 83: Houston's and Alien's remarks to, 161 ; on annexation, 443. Kennedy, John P., 189, 331. Kent, James, demands impeachment of Tyler, 229. Kentucky, presents memorial for recognition of Texas, 53. King, William R., discourages imme- diate recognition of Texas (1836), 52 ; on European influence upon American questions, 326; remarks on Louis Philippe and" his policy, 385 ; his interviews with Louis Philippe and with Guizot on an- nexation, 399, 400, 402. La Branche, Alcee, appointed repre- sentative of the United States in Texas, 62. Lamar, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, 35- Lamar, Mirabeau Buonaparte, second President of Texas, 30, 35 ; his character and administra- tion, 36, 37; opposed to annexa- tion, 69; his opinion on the aboli- tion movement, 114: works for annexation, 447. Land troubles in Texas, 15, 16, 60. La Salle, Robert de, plants colony in Texas, 5. Leclerc. Frederic, quoted, 13, 17, 47, 51. 69. Ledger. Philadelphia, 175, 177, 182, 187, 188. 242, 246, 261, 271, 281. Letcher. R. P., 234, 237. Lewis, Dixon H., 206, 215, 235. Liberator, 67, 70. 73, 131, 135, 226, 347, 350. Liberty party, 131. 306, 307, 316. Liberty Standard, 306. Lipscomb, A. S., 441. Little Rock, stream of Texan immi- gration passing through, 434. Livingston, Edward, quoted on Texan affairs, 21, 27; favors acqui- sition of Texas, 106. Locofocos, 216, 234, 235, 251, 350, 402. " Lone Star." See Texas. Louis Philippe, his policy and course regarding Texas, 383-387, 391, 398, 399. 402, 405, 419, 463. See also France and Guizot. Louisiana, French claim to. transfer of, to Spain and purchase by INDEX. 487 United States, 5, 6; attitude of on annexation of Texas, '/2, 299; situation of, in Presidential cam- paign, 1844, 314, 315. Love. James, 92, 93, 204, 364. Lumpkin, Wilson, 206. Lundy, Benjamin, 29. McDowell, J. J., 351. McDuffie, George, on Texan affairs, 30, 66; his message to Calhoun, 174; on secession, 205, 209, 211; on sending forces to the South- west, 227; argues for annexation, to protect slavery, 264-266; moves joint resolution for annexation, 285, 286; his view on tariff, 312; reintroduces joint resolution, 334, 335- Mcllvaine, A. R., 255. IMadison, James, 140. Madisonian, quoted, on English atti- tude toward Texas, 115; on Up- shur's action, 127 ; on annexation, 134, 136, 137-139, 177, 180, 184-186, 221, 226, 339; on Mexican influ- ence, 184; on Mexico's treatment of the United States, 196 ; suggests secession, 207 ; attitude toward Locofocos, 216; on support of Tyler, 219; attitude towards Van Buren, 238, 246 ; towards Tyler, 247; announces probable legisla- tive action for annexation of Texas, 281 ; quoted on Benton's bill, 2,Z1 ; on Bagby's course, 342 ; on Polk, 348. Maine, annexation sentiment in, 261, 262, 301. Mangum, W. P., 348. Marmora (ship), 432. Maryland, annexation sentiment in, 301. Mason, Sampson, on conditions in Texas, 58. Massachusetts, opposes annexation of Texas, 68, 133, 139, 260. Maxcy, Virgil, 174, 215, 217, 218. Mayfield, J. S., contends for preser- vation of Texan boundary, 457, 458. Mayo, Robert, 25. Mcmoria presented by Cuevas, 421, 424. Mercantile Journal, London, 86, 363, 39-2. Mercury, Charleston, 205, 209, 317, 350. Mercury, Liverpool, 304, 393. Merrick, W. D., on annexation, 339. Mexican consul. New Orleans : see Arrangoiz. Mexico, outline of history of, 1-3, 8; abolition of slavery in, 9; action concerning American colonization in, 9, 10, 16-18; revolt of Texas from, 13-15 ; relations between the two states, 16-19; charges of inter- ference by the United States, 20- 2,^ ; fighting in Texas and capture of San Antonio, 38; Judge Robin- son's proposals and Santa Anna's action, 42, 43; truce granted, 44; troulile with Yucatan, 42, 45 ; re- volts in northern provinces of Mexico, 46; possibilities of their union with Texas as an indepen- dent state, 46-48; recall of minis- ter at Washington, 59; virtual rec- ognition of Texan independence, 59, 61 ; attitude toward Great Brit- ain regarding Texas, 60, 72 ; pro- tests against French recognition of Texan independence, 76 ; declares that war will go on, St, ; English suggestion that she recognize Texan independence, 94, 95 ; un- pleasant relations with United States, T07 ; circumstances of the truce, 95, 118, 149; continued claim of sovereignty, 154, 172; attitude after the signing of the / annexation treaty, 184, 260; rejects American overture regarding an- nexation and declares that it will be equivalent to declaration of ' war, 288-294 ; resumes hostile atti- tude toward Texas, 363 ; proposes terms of recognition, 406; review of Mexican feeling and policy re- garding Texas, 414-419; action of 488 IXDEX. United States stimulates Mexican government to seek settlement with Texas, 420-425 ; public feeling inflamed, 425-427: diiiculties, and reasons for procrastination, 427. 428; cabinet authorized to hear Texan propositions, 430; action following news of Texan annexa- tion convention, 463. See also Santa Anna, Cuevas, and Boca- negra. Michigan, on annexation of Texas, 68. Mier, Texan forces captured at. 39. Mier y Teran, Manuel de, 10. Miller, W. D., appointed secretary of Texan special legation at Wash- ington, 165; writes to Jackson, 174. Mississippi, citizens of, present re- quest for recognition of Texas, 53; legislature of, passes law for sectional Congress, 208; strong secession movement in, 209 ; favors annexation, 262, 299. Mhs'issippxan, 363. Missouri, annexation sentiment in, ZZl- Monasterio, J. M. O., 22. Monroe, James, 6, 106, 140. Morfit, Henry M., investigates Texan situation, 12, 13, 30. Moniiiig Herald, Cincinnati, 350. Morning Herald, London, on British policy regarding Texan and Amer- ican slavery, 90. Morning Nezvs, New York, 336, 3(^0. Morning Post, London, 325. Morpeth, Lord, his speech on slavery in Texas, 116. Morris, Thomas, of Ohio, suggests in U. S. Senate that Texas l)e recognized, 52. Morton, Marcus, 251. Murphy Memorandum, T,Sr), 394, 402, 403. Murphy, Tomas, as Mexican repre- sentative at London reports inter- view with Lord Aberdeen, 389 (see also 394, 402, 403). Murphy. \V. S.. .American represen- tative in Texas, 45 ; his reports of Texan conditions, 74, 118; obtains correspondence regarding truce with Mexico. 136; his despatches to Upshur (Nov., 1843), 149; his judgment of Texan feeling toward the EngUsh, 154; urges that United States Congress act on annexation, 160, 262, 263 ; pledges protection to Texas, 165 ; his pledges disavowed, 175, 176; his report of British minister's plan for " new policy " in Texas, 220; description of Brit- ish party at Galveston, 358; his recall, 361 ; quoted on Houston's course, SJ2. National Le, Paris, 375, 386, 398. National Bank, 108, 298, 317. National Intelligencer, quoted on recognition of Texas, 54; on an- nexation, 67, 137, 226, 324; its atti- tude towards President Tyler, 102, 115; discussion of its treatment of the annexation question, 180-184; publishes statement by Clay, 240 ; its opinion on Van Buren's defeat, 253 ; on prospects of annexation treaty, 272, 314; on vote of House, 333 ; on vote of Senate, 346 : on Polk's action, 348. National J 'indicator, on attitude of the United States on Texan affairs, 74, 95 ; on failure of treaty, 359. Nativism, a disturbing factor in the Presidential election of 1844, 310, 311, 316, 317. Nelson, John, succeeds Upshur tem- porarily as Secretary of State, 169. Neiv Era, St. Louis, 211. New Hampshire passes resolutions on Texan affairs. 326. New Mexico, discontent in, 48. New Orleans, in Texan affairs, 71. New York, presents memorial for recognition of Texas, 53 ; citizens of, urge ratification of commercial treaty with Texas, 261 : situation of, in Presidential campaign of 1844, 311-313. Ncxi's, Galveston. 443. INDEX. 489 Newspapers. See Press, the; and names of individual papers. See also the Appendix. Niles, John M., on recognition of Texas, 54; on annexation, 338. Norfh American, Philadelphia, 180, 181, 182, 189, 229,- 465. North Carolina, citizens of, offer resolutions for recognition of Texas, 53 ; secession sentiment in, 20;. Nueces, boundary of a disputed terri- tory-, 19; skirmish on, 38. Nuevo, Leon, insurrection in, 47. Observador, El, Zacatecas, 425. Observer, Salem, on annexation of Texas, 72,. Ochiltree, W. B., 435. Ohio, on annexation of Texas, 68. " Old Hickory." Sec Jackson, Andrew. '■ Old Sam." See Houston, Sam. Old School Democrat, St. Louis, 134. Onis, Luis de, 6, note. Opium war in China, 394. Oregon, Houston's belief that Texas might acquire, 99 ; Tyler's plan concerning, 109; desire for, in the West, 142 ; Democratic resolution concerning, 255, 256 ; influence of interest in, in Texan matters, 349-352, 428. Orvanne, Bourgeois d', 363. Pageot, French minister at Wash- ington, disapproves annexation treaty, 261 ; his view of anti-British feeling, 302; his instructions, 384, 388; his report to his government (June, 1844), 396. Pakenham, Richard, his opinions and advices on Mexican and Texan affairs, 42, 45, 46, 77, 82, 302, 392; his instructions from Lord Aber- deen, 83 ; sent to Washington, 188, 201, 203; his statement of English attitude toward Texas, 364; his reports from Washington, 389, 390, 395- Palmerston, Lord, quoted, 23 ; his statements of British attitude toward Texas, 76-79; on relations of Mexico and Texas, 80. Parton, James, 26. Pedraza, Manuel Gomez, chosen President of Mexico, 2. Peel, Sir Robert, his opinion of Charles Elliot, 8r ; on abolition of slave labor, 86 ; on prospect of war with the United States, 393. Pena y Pena, Manuel de la, 428. " Penn, William," pseudonym, 127. Pennsylvania, citizens of, present memorial for recognition of Texas, 52, 53 ; situation of, in Presidential campaign, 1844, 3I4- Pcnnsylvanian, 187, 300, 314, 2>^2>- Peonage, in Mexico, 9, 18. Pcrouse, La (ship), 431. Philanthropist. 135. Picayune, New Orleans, on Arista's policy, 47; on plans for revolt of Mexican states, 48 ; on English influence in Texas, 113; on Texan desire for peace, 358; on Texan feeling as to terms offered by the United States, 380; on possible interference Ijy the United States to end English and French control, 443- Pickens, F. W., 57, 58, 205. Pillow, Gideon J., works for Polk's nomination, 250, 254 ; visits Jack- son, 310. Pine Tree State. See Maine. Plato, 4. Polk, James K., 184: nominated for Presidency, 250-252 ; influences for and against in the campaign, 310- 314; elected, 315 ; analysis of result, 320 ; his influence in annexation question, 347, 348, 352 ; did he trick Senators?, 348, note; his course after inauguration, 353. 354; his stand for American claims in the Northwest, 428: his opinion on rec- ognition of Texan charge after vote for annexation, 464. Post, Boston. 187, 226, 303. Prentiss, S. S., 299. Presidential campaign of 1844 in hs 490 INDEX. relations to annexation, 234-257, 297-321. Press, American, on annexation, 71, 72, 130, 180-189, 302, 303, 323, 464, 465; English, 303, 304, 325, 466; French, 397-399; Mexican, 425, 426; Texan, 380. See also names of newspapers. Presse, La, Paris, 385. Preston, W. C, on recognition of Texas, 52, 53 ; on annexation, 66, 68. Princeton (ship), 169. Raymond, C. H., acts as messenger between United States and Texas, 160; his reports on conditions at Washington, 259, 261, 271, 324, 333, 337- " Re-annexation " of Texas, 6, 248, 300. See also Annexation. Recognition of Texas, memorials concerning, from various states, 52, 53 ; discussion of, in United States Senate, 52-57; in House of Representatives, 57-59; Pres. Jack- son's attitude, 54-56, 60-62 ; press- ing reasons for, 59-61 ; final deci- sion, 62. Register, New Haven, 297. Reily, James, 70. Rejon, M. C, 406; his letter to Shan- non, 416, 424. Republican, New Orleans, prints letter from A. J. Yates, 113; quo- tation from, 114; discusses annexa- tion, 133, 134, 180. Republican, Savannah, 72, 219. Republican, Springfield, 334. Revista Economica y Comercial de la Republica Mexicana, 415. Revolution of 1836, 6, 19, 20; causes, 10-13; discussed, 14-19; responsi- bility of the United States for, considered, 20-33. Revue de Paris, 90, 120, 229, 399. Revue des Deux Mondes, 13, 51. Revue Indepeudante, La, 29, 397, 399. Rhctt, R. B., 205, 207, 209, 211. Rhode Island, on annexation of Texas, 68. Richardson, Chauncey, 459. Right of search, 79, 387. Rio Grande, Republic of. proclaimed, 37, 47- Rives, W. C, on recognition of Texas, 53 ; on annexation treaty, 272. Robinson, Judge, his plan for Texas and Mexico, 42-45, 86, 93, 114. Rockwell, Julius, urges amendment prohibiting slavery in Texas, 467. Rusk, T. J., works for annexation, 441 ; elected President of annexa- tion convention, 459. Sabine River, as a boundary of the United States, 5-7. Sainte Aulaive, Comte de, 384. St. Lawrence River, 301. Saligny, Comte de, representative of France in Texas, 76, 161, 368; in- structed to work against annexa- tion, 408; his labors with the Texan authorities, 408-412, 462; his journey to New York, 413. Saltillo, battle at, 37. San Antonio, taken by Mexico, 38; condition of, in 1843, 41. San Francisco, Tyler's plan to obtain, 109; rumor of bargain with Mexico for, 199 ; probable offer for, through Thompson, 293. San Jacinto, battle of, 20, 22, 27, 52. San Luis Potosi, revolt in, 46. Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de, his career in Mexico, 1-3; treatment of Texas, 10, 13-15, 18, 19; conven- tion with the Texans, 20, note ; mention of, 25 ; resolution at Washington condemning action of, 31 ; Buchanan's and other remarks on, 32, 33 ; his negotiations with Judge Robinson, 42-45; action re- garding Yucatan, 45, 417; his power in Mexico, 50; his depotism, 52 ; hope in United States for treaty with, 59 ; virtually recognizes Texas, 59; his position on Texan independence, 82, 83, 84, 87, 149, 195, 415; his version of Thomp- son's proposition on behalf of the INDEX, 491 United States and statement of his reply, 289-292; his attitude toward American overture, 294; discusses Murphy's conversation with Lord Aberdeen, 402 ; proposes to ack- nowledge independence of Texas, 406; his fall and alleged scheming with England, 417. Santa Fe expedition, ^y, 48, 72. Secession, movement for, 204-214, 287; Mexican belief in probability of, 41^ Sedgwick, Theodore, on annexation, 189-191, 312. Senate of the United States, action of, on recognition of Texas, with citations of individual opinions of many members, 52-57, 61 ; pub- lishes proposed annexation treaty and accompanying documents, 229; discussion and defeat of treaty, 258-273 ; bills for annexation intro- duced, 284-286; continued discus- sion and various propositions, 334- 344; a bill passed, 345; analysis of the result, 345, 346 ; annexation consummated, 467, 468. Settlers in Texas from the United States, grievances of, 7-19; coloni- zation enterprise undertaken at New York, 30; character of the Texans, 34. See also Immigration. Shannon, Wilson, 323, note, 326, 416; diplomatic relations with, broken off, 422. Sherman, General, favors military campaign on Mexican frontier, 447, 448. Steele, Le, Paris, 399. Siglo XIX, El, on colonization in Mexico, 16; favors recognizing Texas (1845), 430, note. Slavery, as an issue in the annexa- tion of Texas, 3-5 ; its abolition proclaimed in Mexico, 9 ; but Texas exempted, 9, 18; proslavery influence in settlement of Texas and in revolution of 1836, consid- ered, 28-30; British attitude toward slavery in Texas, 79, 84-94, 97. no, III, 1 13-126, 200; British designs revealed by Smith, 88, 89; abolition movement in Texas, 111-115; various opinions on slavery as related to annexation, 132, 134-136, 141-145, 149, 201, 202. Slidell, John, 335. Smith, Ashbel, represents Texas in England, 83, 84, 86, 87, 383; his letter to Van Zandt, 87, 88, no; to Texan Secretary of State, 89; report from, 90; statement to Lord Aberdeen, 91 ; remark on Texan attitude to England, 96; transmits information on anti- slavery feeling in England, 117, 118, 121, 126, 224; his opinion on Texan desire for peace, 357 ; on Jones's purpose. 375 ; his instruc- tions, as Secretary of State, to Texan charge at Washington, 379; his conference with Guizot, 383; quoted on English plans, 391, 403 ; returns to Texas, 395 ; appointed Secretary of State, 409; his nego- tiations with the English and French envoys (March, 1845), 409, 410; opposed to annexation, 409, 410, 412, note; re-appointed repre- sentative to England and France, 412, 413 ; his report of public senti- ment in Texas (April, 1845), 435; interview with Donelson, 436; final efforts in England and his recall, 463. Smuggling, danger of, in Texas, 94, 134, 144, 230. 290, 291, 418, 421. Sonora, revolt in, 46, 48. Sources, The, i, note; appendix. " South, The, in Danger," Walker's pamphlet, 312. South, the political strength of, 104; sentiment of, regarding annexation of Texas, 104, 105, 301. See also Secession and Annexation. Southard, S. L., 54. South Carolina, secession sentiment in, 205 ; favors sectional Congress, 208. South Carolinian, 205. 492 INDEX. Soutlieni Press, Washington, 208. Southwest, secession movement in, 207. Southwest Territory, 285. Spain. Mexican revolt against, 1-3. Spectator, Washington. 183, 205, 259, 300. Spencer, J. C, opposes annexation, 106. Standard, London, 466. Stephens, Alexander H., opposes annexation treaty, 278. Stevenson, F. B., 308. Stockton, R. F., scheming of, 447, 448; cautioned, 448. Sumpter Volunteers, 210. Stin, New York, on annexation of Texas, 73. Tabernacle, New York, meeting in, opposing annexation, 191. Tamaulipas, State of, 11; war in. 47: plan to unite with Texas, 48. Tampico, rebellion at, 46. Tappan, Benjamin, publishes docu- ments accompanying treaty, 225 ; censured, 225, note. Tappan, Lewis, at anti-slavery con- vention, London, 116. Tariff, as a factor in the Texas ques- tion, 94, 97, 134, 142, 143, 144, 185, 350; an issue in the Presidential campaign of 1844, 298, 314, 316. 317- Taylor. Zachary, his orders for con- duct of troops on Mexican frontier. 227. Telegraph, Houston, 180, 260, 263. 350. 443, 459. Tennessee, favors annexation of Texas, 72. Tennessee Supreme Court. Chief Justice of, quoted. 32, 53. Teran. See Mier y Teran. Terrell, G. W., Texan minister to England and France, opposes an- nexation, 369, 370, 405, 433. Texas, outline of early history of. 3-13: declaration of independence from Mexico. 13-18; western boundary, 19; David Burnet, first President of, 20, 34 ; review of causes of the revolution, 20-33 '> Houston elected President, 35 ; Lamar elected President, 35 ; finan- cial conditions of Texas in 1839 and 1840. 36; relations with north- ern Mexico, 36 ; with New Mexico, 27; Houston re-elected, 38; Mexi- can hostilities, 38; futile attempt to invade Mexico, 39 ; condition of Texas in 1842, 39-42 ; Judge Robin- son's scheme, 42-45 ; truce and pro- posed armistice, 43, 44; possibili- ties of aid from the United States or Europe, and of union with re- volting provinces in northern Mexico, 45-51 ; recognition by the United States, 52-63; efforts for annexation, 63-66; fluctuations of feeling on both sides, 66-75 J Texas a menace to the United States, 75, 220 ; recognition by France, Hol- land, and Belgium, 76; by England. 79 ; discussion of English relations, 76-97 ; proposition for triple inter- position by England, France and United States. 84 ; outlook and aim of, 98-100 ; abolition movement in, 111-115; Houston declares subject of annexation dropped for time being, 121 ; conflict of English in- fluence and annexation sentiment, 122-155; reply to overture of United States, 155 ; declaration of desire to join the Union, 161 ; coadjutor to Van Zandt appointed, \/ 162 ; alliance with the United States suggested, 162 ; proposed armistice fails, 172, 173 ; apparent willingness to join United States, 173; annexa- tion treaty signed, 176; result for Texas of ^~~Tef3at, 279, 280; Texan sentiment, 338. 357-36o; influx of immigrants, 363 ; renewed Iiopes of English aid, 364 ; demands protection from United States, 365 ; Jones becomes President, 373 ; report of Senate committee on Foreign Relations regarding an- nexation, 378; resolution offered INDEX. 493 in the House, 378, 379; joint reso- lution disappointing- to Texans, 379. 380 ; sentiment inclines again to maintain independence, 381, 432 ; influences on other side, 433 ; tide of immigration, 434 ; intense feel- ing in favor of annexation, 435 ; lynching of Jones suggested if he opposes, 441 ; Congress called to consider proposals from the United States, 442 ; special convention called, 444 : military protection asked. 445 ; campaign on Mexican frontier proposed, 446-448; final contest with British and Mexican influence, 450-453 ; Congress meets and accepts American resolution, 456; rejects proposed treaty with Mexico, 456; convention meets and v.^votes for annexation, 456-461 ; the vote on annexation, 460, note ; final action of United States Congress admitting Texas as a State, 466- 468; inauguration of State admin- istration, 468. See also Houston, Annexation, Mexico, Great Brit- ain, and Truce. "Texas and Oregon," 318. Texas National Register, on condi- tions in northern Mexico, 48; on Texan feeling. 338 : on terms oft'ered by the United States. 380; on maintaining independence, 380, 381 : on annexation, 443. "Texas or Disunion," 204-213. Thiers, L. A., on policy of French caliinet regarding Texas. 387. 397, 399. Thomasson, W. P.. on aimexation, 302. Thompson. G. L., special mission to Mexico. 184, 189. 288. 289, 292. 293, 295- Thompson. Waddy, on recognition of Texas, 58; on annexation, 68, 301. Tibbatts, J. VV., offers resolution for annexation,. 327. Times, Galveston, 44. Times, London, slanders the Ameri- can cabinet, 21 ; opinions of its correspondent at New York, 32, 33, 66, 302, 402; on Texas fleet, 40; favors a barrier against the United States, 78; abuses Captain Elliot, 81; reports Morpeth's speech, 116; unfriendly toward United States, 232 ; annexation issue unimportant in United States, 299; reviles the Americans, 303; abuses and threatens the United States, 325, 334; advises Texas to refuse an- nexation, 364 ; ridicules Calhoun, 401 ; tries to browbeat France, 405 ; on the attitude of Mexico, 422 ; insults the United States, 466. Times, Texas, on English anti- slavery influence, 114. Tontine. Philadelphia, Texas meet- ing at, ^,2. Tornel, J. M., 8, 9, 44, 196; cries for war, 425. Treaties : concerning purchase of Louisiana, 5, 7; of Floriila, 5-7; commercial treaty with Texas rejected by Senate, 71 : treaties be- tween England and Texas, 80, 81, 83 : treaty of annexation between United States and Texas, prepara- tion of, 172-178; terms of, and documents accompanying, 223, 224; discussion of, 258-272; vote on, in Senate, 273 ; reasons for defeat of, 273-279 ; results for Texas and United States, 279, 280. Tribune, New York, 72, 131, 133, 135, 144, 181, 183, 225, 229, 256, 261, 272, 297, 304, 306, 316, 339, 346, 347, 348, 380, 464. Tripartite agreement planned between United States, Mexico, and Eng- land, 109. Triple interposition for Texas, J\, 84. Tropic. New Orleans, 96. 112. 113. 136. Troup, G. M., on abolition of slavery in Texas, 121 ; on annexation, 206. Truce, lietween Mexico and Texas. 43. 44 (and note") ; ended liy Mex- ico, 363. 494 INDEX. True Sun, 144. Tyler, John, his character, loi, 102; his political difficulties, 102; his attitude on annexation of Texas, 103-111, 115, 117, 118, 120-123, 126- 130, 199; receives private informa- tion of British designs, no, 117, 121 ; reference to Texas in his Messages, 130, 137, 158; his fear of English interference in Texas, 153; unfavorable to Calhoun's ap- pointment as Secretary of State, 174; clamor against his plans re- garding annexation, 183, 192; his attitude towards Mexico, 198; change of front on annexation matters, 199-220; prospects for re- election as President, 218, 219; his Message to Senate, accompanying annexation treaty, 221-223; further comments, 227-229; his impeach- ment demanded by several news- papers and persons, 229; presents additional Messages, 230, 232; his hostility to Van Buren, 234; his re-nomination, 247, 248; general unwillingness to allow him credit for acquiring Texas, 277 ; his Mes- sage to House of Representatives urging action on annexation, 281, 282 ; his confidence in the Demo- crats, 299; withdraws from cam- paign, 309, 310; Messages, Decem- ber, 1844, urging annexation, 322; further action, 352, 353; view of his course in the matter, 469. " Tyler and Texas," 192, 221, 248, 259- Tyler Central Committee, 219, 247. Uncle Tom's Cabin, 4. Union, Nashville, 215, 246. United States, surrenders territory beyond Sabine River, 5, 6; treaties with France and Spain, 5, 6; efforts for purchase of Texas, 8, 9; question of responsibility of the United States for Texan revolu- tion, 20-33; recognition of inde- pendence of Texas, 52-62; cool- ness toward Texas, 63-74; reject annexation plan, 68; menaced by Texas, 75, 220; English feeling towards, regarding cotton indus- try, etc., and slavery, 85-91 ; atti- tude of, towards Texas, compared with that of England, 95, 97; growth of annexation sentiment in, during Tyler's administration, ior-146; overtures to Texas re- garding annexation, 128, 147 ; diplo- matic discussion with England concerning Texas, I5i-i53; bill proposing annexation before Texas Congress, 160; negotiations pro- ceed with privacy, 170; strong feeling on both sides, 170, 171; annexation treaty signed, 176; prospects of ratification, 176, 177; action of the press, 180-188; charges of private financial inter- est, 188, 189; attitude of Congress, 191 ; feeling against British inter- ference, 192 ; attitude toward Mexico, 194-197; messenger des- patched to Mexico, 198, 199; dis- cussion of annexation as related to slavery, secession, etc., 202-219; resume of ways in which Texas was a menace to the United States, 220; continued discussion of treaty, 221-233; annexation ques- tion and Presidential campaign of 1844 as affecting each other, 234- 257; the condition of trade with Texas, 261 ; defeat of treaty, 258- 273 ; relations with Mexico contri- buting to this result, 273-277; des- patch to charge at Mexico, con- cerning annexation, 288, 289; offer of payment for just claims, 289; relations with England, 392; with France, 397-402; determina- tion to resent foreign dictation, 413 ; question of recognizing Texan charge appointed after vote for annexation, 464; talk of rescinding annexation measure, 464; but gen- eral acquiescence, 465, 466; action of Congress admitting the new State, 466-468; summary of the INDEX. 495 course of the United States, 468, 469. See also House of Represen- tatives, Senate, and Tyler. United States bank, 108, 147. United States Gazette, publishes letter on prospects of treat}-, 171 ; on Van Buren's position, 244. Upshur, A. P., appointed Secretary of State, no; his interviews with Van Zandt, Texan charge, 117, 118; his communications to Mur- phy regarding British plans, 119- 124; his instructions to Everett, in London, 124-126; his canvass of the Senate on annexation, 127 ; notice to Van Zandt of readiness to consider treaty of annexation, 128, 147; instructions to Murphy, 150. 157-159; his decisive despatch in Texas, 163, 164; his death, 169; references to his policy and opinions regarding Texas, 194, 207. 208 ; his conversation with Almonte, 194, 195. Van Buren, Martin, undertakes to purchase Texas. 9 ; his views on annexation, 63, 65. 105 : mention of, 185, 192, 216, 217; named by many State conventions as Presidential candidate. 1844. 234 : strong oppo- sition to, 234-239 ; declares against immediate annexation. 242-244 ; storm of criticism aroused, 246; fails of nomination in national convention, 248 : his influence . against annexation, 259; his view on relations of Texas and Mexico, 277; refuses to change his attitude on annexation. 307 ; influences Locofocos, 465. Van Zandt, Isaac, quoted. 41 ; instruc- tions as Texan charge at Washing- ton, 70; important letter to. from Ashbel Smith, 87, 88, no; presents subject of annexation, 107; de- sires appointment of Upshur as Secretary of State, no; his opin- ion on state* of feeling between United States and England, in; interviews with Upshur. 117, 118; letters to Jones on annexation, 122, 147 ; refrains from communicating terms of Texan reply to American overture and resubmits the case, 156, 157; possible intention to defy Houston, 161, note; continues san- guine, 169; his opinion on an alli- ance, 169; is directed to make an- nexation treaty with the United States, 172; his reports of its terms, 176, 223; of its chances, 272; of annexation sentiment notwith- standing its defeat, 279; of pros- pect of admission by action of Congress, 281 ; of combining the Oregon and Texas questions, 350; his resignation, 356, 360. J'eracrucaiio, EI, 425. Veracniaano Libre, El, 426. Vermont, protests against annexa- tion of Texas, 67, 135. Victoria, Guadalupe, President of Mexico, I, 417. Virginia, sentiment in, on annexa- tion, 207 ; on secession, 209. Voz del Pueblo, La, 426. Walker, R. J., on Texan prospects, 52 ; his resolution on recognition, 56. 57, 62, 63 ; suggests purchase of Texas, 64 ; reference to, 70 ; his Letter urging annexation, 140- 144; labors for annexation, 162, 184. 200, 207, 300; said to be inter- ested in Texan properties, 189 ; Sedgwick's reply to his arguments. 190; works for Tyler's withdrawal. 309; his pamphlet. "The South in Danger," 312; helps Polk in Penna., 1844, 314; has Benton's bill attached to Brown's annexa- tion resolution, 343, 345. Walsh, Mike, 323. Ward. H. G., his action in Texan afi'airs. 8. 22. Washington. George. 186. Wavell, General, visits Texas. 12; quoted, 34; his opinion of Santa Anna's real wish regarding Texan independence. 406. Webster, Daniel, on attitude of 496 INDEX. United States government in Texan revohition, 2i, 23, 25, S^, 53; on Texan prospects, 49; on recogni- tion of Texas, 52, 53, 54. 61 ; gives warning of European interference, 60; quoted on Tjler, 102; resigna- tion from Cabinet. 109, no; his position on annexation, 106, 127, 139, 181, 182, 193. ^39, 297, 298, 324, 468; his effort to secure Cali- fornia referred to, 186; his view that annexation would not give Mexico a casus belli, 194 ; his opin- ion on result of election of 1844, 316. Webster-Ashburton treatj', 107, 186. Weed. Thurlow, on Presidential election of 1844, 317. Weller, J. B., his proposition for an- nexation, s^/. Wentworth. John, 351. Wharton, Francis, 254. Wharton, William H., 21 ; as Texan agent at Washington, proposes annexation, 63. Whig, Nashville, 298. Whig party, 197, 234 ; national con- ventiorl of, 1844, 246; silence of, on annexation, 256 ; attitude toward abolitionists in Ohio, 307 ; influences for and against in cam- paign of 1844, 311-314; analj'sis of result, 315-320. Whitman, Walt, quoted, 34. Whittier, John G., quoted, 193. Wickliffe, C A., confidential agent in Texas to counteract the efforts of England and France against an- nexation, 447, 448, 453. Williams, S. AL, Texan commissioner to Mexico, 44, 172, 363. Wilmot, David, 214. Winthrop, Robert C, defeat of his resolution against annexation, 170, 191 ; on anti-British feeling, 302 ; acquiesces in decision for annexa- fion, 466. Wise, Henry A., on Texan possibili- ties, 49; advises annexation, 103- 105, 130, 131 ; nominated, but re- jected, as minister to France, iii; secures appointment of Calhoun as Secretary of State, 174. Woll, General, 44, 363. Wright, Silas, moves in Senate to provide for Secretary of Legation in Texas, 57 ; his opinion on dis- union movement, 210; on relations of Tyler and Van Buren, 235 ; on conditions at Washington, 245 ; on Van Buren's defeat, 254; named as possible Presidential candidate, 254; nominated for Vice-President, but declines, 255 ; for Governor of Xew York, 312. Yancey, W. L.. 351. Yates, A. J., his letter on abolition movement in Texas, 113. Yell, Archibald, 354, 434, 440, 441, 447, 451, 460. Yoakum, H. K., quoted, 359. Yucatan, secession of, from Mexico, 8. 42: returns to the Union, 45. Zacatecas, State of, 11. m. BY THE SAME AUTHOR The Troubadours at Home 2 vols., 8vo, fully illustrated, ^6.00 An attempt, based upon substantially all the scholarly literature of the sub- ject and a study of the local environment, to represent the world in which the mediaeval Provencal poets lived, reconstruct their fragmentary per- sonalities, and translate their songs in the original metres. 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