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 THE 
 
 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY 
 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO; 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF 
 
 GENERAL BARON DE "jOMINI, 
 
 BY CAPT. S. V. BENET, 
 
 ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 SECOND EDITION, 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 D. VAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY. 
 
 1862. 
 

 \%& &S 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year eighteen hundred 
 and fiftv-three. by J. S. KEDFIELD, in the Clerk's Office of the 
 District Court or the United States, tor the Southern District of New 
 York. 
 
1 
 
 TO THE GRADUATES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNITED STATES MILITAEY ACADEMY 
 
 OF 1849 
 THIS TRANSLATION IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED 
 
 BY THEIR CLASSMATE. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 This volume* was the last of a work, published some twelve years 
 since ; but as the manuscript of this campaign had unfortunately been 
 mislaid, the editor was compelled to supply its place hastily and 
 Bomewhat incompletely. Having, by an unforeseen event, recovered 
 the original manuscript, I hasten to restore it in its integrity, with 
 this difference, that I present it in my name, instead of causing the 
 recital to be made by Napoleon. A powerful motive has induced me 
 to act thus, and change the form employed in the rest of the work : it 
 is, that the rapidity of the emperor's fall, and his exile, preventing 
 him from procuring accurate information of what had occurred, not 
 only in his army, but also in that of his adversaries, he had at St. 
 Helena composed narratives, with which a disinterested historian could 
 not entirely concur, so that it would have been necessary to make him 
 utter things, of which he had judged altogether differently. 
 
 The censures that Napoleon has cast on Ney and Grouchy, and which 
 these have returned with interest, have all, more or less, something 
 specious in them. I have sought to be impartial in presenting them. 
 Napoleon did not always give his orders in an irreproachable manner ; 
 these orders were not always well executed or properly interpreted, 
 and his lieutenants knew not how to supply the deficiency in what 
 they had received incompletely and vaguely. If I reproach Napoleon 
 for any faults on the mornings of the 16th and 17th June, no one would 
 
 * General Jomini calls this, the 22d chapter of his great work enti- 
 tled " Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon," though it is an unit in 
 itself, and forms a complete summary of the campaign of 1815. — Tub 
 Translator. 
 
O PKEFAGE. 
 
 suspect me, of wishing to cast the slightest cloud over his immense 
 genius and glor y, which, more loudly than any other, I have proclaimed 
 in all my works. But the more laurels he has gathered, the less should 
 his brow be adorned at the expense of his lieutenants. 
 
 As regards his political course, it is not so easy to judge between 
 his system and that of his detractors ; in the first rank of these, figured 
 all the ultra-liberal utopianists, professing the strange doctrine that 
 power in a government and despotism are the same thing, and that, 
 under pretence of producing liberalism, it was necessary, at any price, 
 to curb the authority charged with directing the destinies of a nation. 
 It is evident that Napoleon thought otherwise, and the belief is admis- 
 sible, that in principle he was right ; "perhaps he erred in exaggerating 
 his doctrine of power ; but it is very difficult to establish the just me- 
 dium between nullity of power and the slightly arbitrary. The future 
 will undoubtedly prove, that between two dangers, the emperor de- 
 sired to choose the lesser, because the abasement of executive power, 
 will always be the least equivocal signal of the decay of a nation ; 
 this decay, indeed, may not always be sudden, and sensible to the eyes 
 of the vulgar, but will be the work of time, unless a powerful hand 
 applies a prompt remedy in seizing the helm. As for the rest, my task 
 is not to condemn or absolve : posterity will decide. 
 
 I will close by observing, that the ideas which prevail in this little 
 work, being those recognized in all the acts of Napoleon, the Author 
 found himself under the double necessity of adopting them and writing 
 on the side of his interests, that is to say, by placing himself at the 
 head-quarters of the hero of this history, and not at that of his 
 antagonists. J. 
 
 1838. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 
 
 Condition of France after the departure of Napoleon for the Island of 
 Elba ; he decides on returning ; descends to Cannes with a thousand 
 men, marches in triumph to Paris, and remounts the throne. Gen- 
 eral coalition of Europe against him. Campaign of 1815. Battles of 
 Ligny and Waterloo. Second abdication. End of Napoleon's career. 
 
 Filled for twenty years with the victories and 
 gigantic enterprises of Napoleon, all Europe still 
 gazed with astonishment at the sudden fall of an em- 
 pire, whose power, till recently, menaced universal 
 independence. It could not be conceived that six 
 months had sufficed, for leading the allies from the 
 Elbe to the Seine, and dictating to France the terri- 
 ble treaties of Paris. The congress of all the powers, 
 assembled at Yienna, was endeavoring to conciliate 
 the numerous claims arriving from all parts, for shares 
 of the spoils of this audacious conqueror who, two 
 years previously, had dared to place one foot on Cadiz, 
 the other on Moscow. The task was a difficult one, 
 because this grand diplomatic act should accomplish 
 the double purpose, of establishing the political equi- 
 librium so severely shaken, and regulating for the 
 
8 POLITICAL AOT> MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 future the European public right, utterly overthrown, 
 by the storms of the revolution. 
 
 Fallen from the throne of the most powerful em- 
 pire to the ridiculous sovereignty of the Isle of Elba, 
 by reason of his abdication at Fontainbleau ; separated 
 from his wife and son in an almost humiliating manner, 
 and for which history will one day justly reproach his 
 enemies ; Napoleon retired to Porto-Ferrajo, like Sci- 
 pio in his retreat at Liternum, to some degree exiled, 
 and more discontented at the desertion of his compa- 
 triots than the persecution of his adversaries. 
 
 Condemned by destiny to be but a passive spectator 
 of the grand affairs of the world, which for fifteen 
 years, he had directed by the ascendency of his genius, 
 he yet bore within himself the secret presentiment of 
 being called, soon or late, to reappear on the scene. 
 He was too familiar with men and affairs, to feign ig- 
 norance of the full extent of the difficulties that would 
 harass the Bourbons, in the governing of a country that 
 had become changed since their departure, and felt 
 profoundly humiliated by the disastrous circumstances 
 that had brought them back. Napoleon was then well 
 aware that, after the first infatuation occasioned by the 
 general'peace, immense interests and violent passions 
 would come in conflict, so that the most energetic por- 
 tion of the French nation would soon regret the ter- 
 mination of his reign and desire his return. 
 
 However, the uncertainty as to the time when this 
 would take place, and his inability to give birth to the 
 occasion, preventing him from forming his plans, the 
 ex-emperor found comfort in the occupation of tracing 
 the history of his life, and feeding the sacred flame in 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO* 9 
 
 the bosoms of his partisans; while the progress of 
 events was precipitated to such a point, that he was 
 torn from his retreat much earlier than he anticipated. 
 
 Independent of the special advices he received from 
 Queen Ilortense and some faithful friends, the jour- 
 nals would have sufficiently instructed him in the state 
 of affairs ; for, notwithstanding the censure that weigh- 
 ed upon them, and notwithstanding their falsehoods, 
 the divers passions they interpreted were visible to the 
 least clear-sighted, and exposed the agitation that 
 reigned throughout the kingdom. 
 
 Indeed, Louis XVIII. seemed at first to have per- 
 fectly appreciated the spirit of the age, in the convic- 
 tion, that the majority of France desired to consolidate 
 the results of the revolution. After twenty years of 
 experience, this prince had concluded, that his party 
 was too weak to resist the wishes of the immense ma- 
 jority of the middle classes, who, in a country stripped 
 of aristocratic institutions, always finally dictated the 
 law.* He felt that to maintain himself on the throne, 
 it was necessary to reign with this majority, that is, 
 with the interests of the revolution. Henry IV. had 
 
 * The opinion here expressed appears to have suggested to Napoleon 
 Lis famous decrees from Lyons ; but throughout the rest of his career, he 
 seems to have labored under the conviction, that if it be always well to act 
 on the spirit of the masses, it is no less true, that majorities, or masses 
 are rather disposed to be constrained and led, than to influence the direc- 
 tion of affairs. On great political questions votes should be weighed, not 
 counted ; because we know how ignorant the masses are upon such sub- 
 jects, even among people who pretend to the highest civilization. 
 
 What can be expected from the political ability of the multitude, when 
 in an assembly of four or five hundred deputies representing the notables 
 of a country, it is nigh impossible to find fifty statesmen worthy the name 
 — happy, indeed, if among them there be two or three politicians of the 
 first order. 
 
 i* 
 
10 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 said that Paris was well worth a mass, — Louis XVIII. 
 thought that the crown of France was well worth a 
 constitution. 
 
 It was evident he could not govern through the an- 
 cient magistracy of the kingdom, of which not a ves- 
 tige remained ; nor was it with the deceased states of 
 Brittany, nor with those of Languedoc and Burgundy, 
 that it would be possible to lead the France of 1814. 
 It w r as necessary then, to re-create the entire machine 
 on new base&, and in order not to submit to the revo- 
 lutionary principles, it behooved the king to revive the 
 work of the revolution by virtue of the divine right, 
 upon which he founded his own ; he, therefore, grant- 
 ed a charter.* 
 
 Many publicists have blamed Louis XVIII. for 
 this important measure ; and in judging it by the 
 results it produced, we are constrained to admit that 
 it accomplished its end badly. If it had been possible 
 to seize the dictatorship with a vigorous hand, and 
 govern through royal ordinances, it is incontestable 
 that this had been the surest plan ; but we are led 
 to the belief that it was impracticable ; the king had 
 then but to decide, what governmental machine would 
 
 * Many writers have affirmed that Louis XVIII. only concluded on giving 
 a charter, at the reiterated instances of the Emperor Alexander. We are 
 certain that theEussian Monarch did, indeed, give this advice to the French 
 King at Compiegne ; but it is not very probable that the charter of 1814 
 was the improvisation of a few days ; every thing leads to the presumption, 
 that the opinions of the two sovereigns accorded on this occasion, and 
 that the king had meditated on his course while in exile. 
 
 However, his declaration from St. Ouen of the 2d May, was followed 
 by a compact, the provisions of which, agreed upon by Ferrand, Montes- 
 quieu and Dambray, were drawn up by Beugnot, and afterwards discussed 
 with. a commission taken from among the authorities established by the 
 Empire. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 11 
 
 be a proper substitute for that, which had just sunk 
 under the blows of the allied powers. To reestablish 
 the Assemblies or the states of the provinces, had 
 been impossible, as we have just remarked; this had, 
 moreover, clashed with too many long-lived interests 
 and opinions to make the attempt possible. To sub- 
 stitute for the glorious and energetic empire of 
 Napoleon, the absolute power of a camarilla of emi- 
 grants, was the dream of a visionary : if acted upon, 
 the restoration had not lasted six months. 
 
 A woman, endowed with a superior mind when she 
 spoke not of politics, has pretended, that the Bourbons 
 ought to have taken the empire as they found it: — 
 " The bed was so well made" she said, " that they had 
 but to lie in it" This phrase of Madame de Stael, 
 that met with so much success in the frivolous saloons 
 of Paris, was but nonsense. How would the brother 
 and successor of Louis XVI. have been able to recog- 
 nize a Senate, that no people in Europe had acknowl- 
 edged, after the conduct it had held towards its founder, 
 and which, twice in ten years, had disposed of the 
 throne ? 
 
 As to the mute legislative body which has subjected 
 the Emperor to so much censure, which had not dared 
 to raise its voice, but at the moment when a million of 
 enemies were on the point of invading France, that 
 is to say, at the moment when it was necessary to be 
 silent and rally around the Chief of the State, and 
 which had thus forced Napoleon to dissolve it ; — it is 
 certain, that it would have favored the recstablishment 
 of the royal authority better than the public tribune, 
 which is ever ready to serve as an arena for the pas- 
 
12 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 sions. But it is doubtful whether it would have been 
 welcome to France. Moreover, the imperial institu- 
 tions favored the opinions of liberalism so little, that 
 the leading doctrinaires of the senate, who had over- 
 thrown Napoleon, were eager to frame a charter to 
 please themselves and to be imposed on the Bourbons ; 
 but Louis XVIII., decided in repelling this illegal act, 
 should, according to the prevailing opinion, have pro- 
 mulgated another, reassuring the threatened interests. 
 
 The kins; had then but the choice of two courses : 
 the first was to grant a charter, as he did ; the second 
 was to govern provisionally as dictator, while convok- 
 ing a constitutional assembly to w T ork in concert with 
 his ministers, in the framing of a national compact 
 which, sanctioned by the notables of France, would 
 become irrevocable, and thus offer the double advan- 
 tage of guaranteeing the interests of the throne, as 
 well as those of the nation. 
 
 The first of these appeared to him the most pru- 
 dent : first, because it was a voluntary concession, and 
 did not implicate the recognition of the principle of 
 national sovereignty, as the second would have done : 
 Louis XYIII. should, therefore oppose all his power 
 to this principle, so specious in theory, as it might 
 easily degenerate into a system of elective monarchy. 
 Then, it was at least doubtful whether a well finished, 
 well matured and very solid compact, could emanate 
 from a constituent assembly, however restricted might 
 be the number of its members. And if instead of 
 an elective assembly, they were satisfied with a com- 
 mission of forty or fifty members appointed by the 
 provisional government, to which would be given the 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 13 
 
 initiative in all the combinations of the compact, as 
 was done after the 18th Brumaire, what guaranty- 
 had such authority presented ? What power would 
 a compact thus fabricated have had ? A king has 
 always the right to establish institutions where none 
 exist ; but by what right would an assembly of fifty 
 counsellors stripped of all legitimate power, impose 
 a contract on royalty on the one side, and on the 
 entire nation on the other, without submitting it, if 
 not to the primary assemblies, at least to those of the 
 notables specially nominated for this purpose by the 
 country ? But these two means were equally incom- 
 patible with the antecedents of the monarch and the 
 true interests of his crown.* 
 
 The formality of submitting constitutions to the so- 
 called popular voice, had actually become, since the re- 
 volution, a veritable comedy ; for, from the famous 
 ochlocratical constitution of Heraut de Sechelles in 
 1793, to the vote on the hereditary empire of 1815, 
 every compact, however worthless, had received from 
 two to three millions of votes : — all know of what 
 value are the suffrages of the multitude in such mat- 
 ters, which the loftiest minds have such difficulty in 
 understanding. The institutions of a great country 
 should emanate from her chiefs, or, in their failing, 
 from her notables; and if these are not capable of 
 digesting them properly, the masses, far from im- 
 proving them, would be incompetent to judge of 
 
 * I should state in this place, once for al' , that the principles put forth 
 in this volume, apply only to France and other so called constitutional mon- 
 archies ; these forms of government would not suit all countries — no more 
 imit the United States of America than Kussia or Austria. 
 
14 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 their merits ; as a consequence, would not be qualified 
 to approve or reject them. If Napoleon had often re- 
 course to it himself, it was because he held all his 
 power by election, and was unable to give it any 
 other basis. 
 
 Finally, the most important of all problems of high 
 internal politics will always be, the proper determina- 
 tion of the kind and limits of a national intervention 
 in monarchical institutions : the intervention of the 
 country in the administration of ordinary affairs, is a 
 point which it would be unreasonable to contest, 
 though to render it useful, it must be wisely regulated ; 
 but with respect to fundamental laws above all, the 
 initiative should not appertain to it ; for if ever the 
 deputies have the right to patch up charters and elect 
 kings, then the monarchy becomes purely elective, 
 and the fate of all states governed by this deplorable 
 system, is sufficiently well known. 
 
 Louis XYIII. was too well convinced of these truths, 
 not to deem a charter carefully drawn up by the coun- 
 sellors of the throne as the wisest course, since he 
 would equally avoid the danger to which he would be 
 exposed in wishing to govern through royal ordinances, 
 and the still more serious one, of abandoning the forma- 
 tion of this compact to an assembly of legislators, ani- 
 mated with the most hostile passions and doctrines. 
 
 Placed thus with the alternative, of disregarding all 
 the traditions of a monarchy of fourteen centuries, by 
 renouncing all the rights which constituted at once the 
 splendor and the solidity of the throne, and in per- 
 mitting troublesome laws to be imposed upon him, or 
 • of displeasing the nation, by acting according to his 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 15 
 
 own good pleasure without consulting the country, 
 Louis XVIII. sought to conciliate as much as possible 
 the rights of the past and the opinions of the present, 
 with a proper foresight to the future. He flattered 
 himself to attain this end, by having his compact sanc- 
 tioned by a commission, composed of an equal number 
 of senators and members of the legislative body, 
 chosen from those who had acquired an ephemeral 
 popularity, by the loudest declamations against the 
 imperial power. This measure with its good intention, 
 served, however, but to introduce two or three deplor- 
 able amendments in the royal project, and did not 
 prevent the Utopianists of all shades from proclaim- 
 ing the scandal, because, said they, the fundamental 
 law being the work of a small number of the prince's 
 favorites, can only be an act outrageous to the sov- 
 ereignty of the people or the nation. 
 
 As the personal position of Napoleon placed him 
 under the necessity of making frequent allusions to 
 this sovereignty, which was really the only founda- 
 tion of his right to exercise the supreme authority, it 
 will not be out of place here to expose the manner in 
 which all wise statesmen should regard it, and in 
 which without doubt he also viewed it.* 
 
 Now-a-days, speculative politics have produced a 
 veritable confusion of tongues, and to make myself 
 properly understood, I feel the necessity of renewing 
 here a species of profession of faith. In internal poli- 
 
 * There are contradictions between these principles and many acts of 
 Napoleon ; but it must not be forgotten, that his position imposed upon him 
 many deviations from his true principles, which otherwise, manifest them- 
 selves in all the grand measures of his government. 
 
16 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 tics there are four things essentially different : theory 
 and practice, men and systems. I will forbear from 
 speaking of the different species of men thinking 
 themselves political, and I will treat only of things, 
 that is to say, of systems and doctrines. I will only 
 observe, in passing, that the men called on to govern 
 a state, are often under the necessity of adopting sys- 
 tems, which are not according to their principles : a 
 legislator and a publicist are, on this account, in a 
 more independent situation ; but a prince, a chief of 
 state, a prime minister, being obliged to put into opera- 
 tion the elements they have at their disposal, find 
 themselves thus acting according to certain dogmas 
 not their own; and this was especially Napoleon's 
 case in 1815. 
 
 Some very ingenuous publicists have imagined in 
 good faith, that in point of political combinations, 
 all was new under the sun since 1789. However, 
 to my knowledge, there are but five forms of gov- 
 ernment that ever existed, and to which little has been 
 added in our day ; these are : absolute hereditary 
 monarchy ; hereditary monarchy limited by institu- 
 tions ; elective monarchy; aristocratic republic or 
 oligarchy ; lastly, democratic republic. I have been 
 explicit on these different forms of government (chap. 
 YIL, vol. II). Some have many advantages, mixed 
 with some defects ; others have grave defects, tem- 
 pered by feeble advantages. I have described both. 
 
 When we attempt to give a government to a coun- 
 try, that finds itself momentarily deprived of the same 
 through certain catastrophes, it is necessary to choose 
 aright one of the five forms indicated. "Whichever 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 17 
 
 be our choice, we should be deeply impressed with 
 the fact — that no nation is strong, puissant and formida- 
 ble, without a government that is vigorous and re- 
 spected at home. — That no government is capable of 
 leading a people to high destinies, when the authority 
 is humiliated by those, who should make it their duty 
 to elevate it to the highest degree of consideration. — - 
 Finally, that liberty and order are impossible, without 
 due respect for the princes, the chiefs, or the magis- 
 trates. 
 
 If it be acknowledged that in our day, republican- 
 ism would be an absurdity in a great European state, 
 with old communities scarcely free from the swaddling 
 clothes of feudalism ; if monarchy be the only form 
 that can be proposed, then a choice must be had be- 
 tween the elective and the hereditary, between the 
 absolute and the limited. 
 
 Though I have already commented on the dangers 
 of all elective governments, especially when applied 
 to monarchy, I must recall here what I have said con- 
 cerning it. In consulting appearances only, this sys- 
 tem would undoubtedly seem the most founded in 
 reason ; still nothing is more opposed to the solidity, 
 grandeur, and even the preservation of states, for it is 
 little else than anarchy and civil war legally intro- 
 duced into the country at the death of each king. The 
 visionaries who extol it unceasingly, are unaware, that 
 no elective monarchy would exist a century in the 
 midst of powerful neighbors, jealous and interested in 
 intervening at each succession to the throne, in order 
 to excite a civil war, or cause the election of a kin<r 
 suited to their wishes. They forget that Poland per- 
 
18 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 ished, solely because she was an elective monarchy, 
 endowed with citizen-Icings • that Hungary and Bohe- 
 mia have been swallowed up for the same reason. 
 We know what ruptures the federative and elective 
 empire has produced in Germany. The Grand-dukes 
 of Moscow, and the Arch-dukes of Austria, heredi- 
 tary possessors of feeble provinces, have, on the con- 
 trary, founded the two most powerful monarchies of 
 modern times, at the expense of the republics and 
 elective monarchies by which they were surrounded. 
 If France, when tired of the despotism of Louis XI., 
 (which nevertheless gained her so much power,) had 
 thought of seeking for a remedy in an elective govern- 
 ment, she would have long ago been effaced from the 
 map of Europe as a political power. The greatest 
 service Napoleon has rendered her, is most certainly 
 that of having abolished her elective government, to 
 lead her back to wiser institutions. 
 
 It was after having recognized these incontestible 
 facts, that all wise legislators adopted, from age to 
 age, the principle of legitimacy, or the order of he- 
 reditary succession, as the true safeguard of monarchi- 
 cal states.* But, one fact that has been too much 
 forgotten by our modern Solons is, that the principle 
 was established much more for the interest of the state 
 than for that of any one dynasty whatever ; and that 
 consequently, the slightest blow given to its funda- 
 mental laws would lead to great future disorders. 
 
 * The good is often confounded with the bad, legitimacy with absolute 
 government ; the liberals honor them with one and the same anathema, 
 and nothing is more absurd, because, since the law of the country estab- 
 lishes hereditary monarchy, each one should be a legitimist as a matter of 
 duty, which does not at all prevent his being a constitutionalist. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 19 
 
 An elective monarchy not being then more suita- 
 ble than a republic, there remains but to choose 
 between an absolute hereditary monarchy and one 
 limited by institutions : each has its good features as 
 well as its inconveniences. If the prince was always 
 a just, firm man, and a great statesman, or if deficient 
 in either of these qualities, was always surrounded 
 by honest and able ministers, an absolute monarchy 
 would certainly be the government par excellence. 
 If the chambers of a constitutional country were all 
 composed of true statesmen, incorruptible and impar- 
 tial, without vanity or ambition, without spirit of 
 party or association, dreaming but of the country's 
 grandeur and of respect for the dynasty ; in one 
 word, sacrificing but to one divinity, the public good, 
 they might perhaps be able to dispute the palm with 
 a wise absolute royalty, and offer the perfection of 
 social institutions. But it is impossible to find such 
 chambers in any country. Thus, every system having 
 its inconveniences and its dangers, the aim and end 
 of all fundamental law should be to diminish them 
 as much as possible, and the institutions that will 
 permit the least to exist, will evidently be the best. 
 
 In order to compensate for the dangerous acci- 
 dents which the exclusive principle of legitimacy 
 and inheritance offers in sometimes leading bad 
 princes to the throne, some have imagined a constitu- 
 tional government, others the principle of national 
 sovereignty ; high-sounding terms, that often conceal 
 many deceptions, and the meaning and application of 
 which are not often well defined or well established. 
 To this system some legislators of great foresight have 
 
20 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 preferred the divine right, seeing that all power hav- 
 ing necessarily a source and origin, it was very neces- 
 sary to ascribe one to royalty ; but, if national sov- 
 ereignty is cast aside as evidently dangerous, nothing 
 is more rational than the recognition of royalty as 
 coming from God, since his providence guides the 
 destinies of nations as well as of individuals. 
 
 Between these two systems that appear reciprocally 
 to exclude each other, there perhaps exists a middle 
 course "; undoubtedly sought for but not yet found, or 
 at least it still remains unfixed. Little has resulted 
 from this attempt, but an unconnected system, with 
 which they have thought to reconcile the elective 
 principle to the hereditary, by uniting them under 
 the head of national sovereignty, a kind of bastard 
 legitimacy, consisting of an order of succession without 
 strength, as it would be actually revocable by a vote 
 of the country more or less properly ascertained. 
 Others, more bold, or less satisfied with this vague 
 sovereignty, have believed it possible to appeal to that 
 of the people as the most positive and most powerful. 
 
 These terms, sovereignty of the people and national 
 sovereignty, have unfortunately been very often con- 
 founded, though they signify very different things. 
 The sovereignty of the people or of the multitude, is 
 an absurdity that no reasonable man can sustain, un- 
 less a totally different signification is given to it from 
 that which it is generally supposed to have. If it is 
 imagined that the multitude reigns because it nomi- 
 nates delegates direct, as it was pretended to establish 
 under the natipnal convention, a great mistake is com- 
 mitted, because the people never were less the sover- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 21 
 
 eign than under this deplorable system. If classes 
 of notables are created, and the right of choosing 
 delegates conferred upon them, the people, no longer 
 nominating their proxy, are then no longer the sover- 
 eign. Besides, did there ever exist a people truly 
 capable of exercising even the most indirect sover- 
 eignty ? This has never occurred even in the small 
 cantons of Switzerland. 
 
 Under all constitutional monarchies, national sover- 
 eignty expresses, according to all reasonable statesmen, 
 the sovereignty of three powers, that have authority to 
 govern the affairs of the country : one only of these 
 powers, then, is never but a fraction of the sovereignty. 
 Now, a nation delegating but one of these powers, is 
 not, properly speaking, sovereign, because if so, the 
 power of its delegates would rule alone, and would 
 annihilate the other two. 
 
 "We see by this expose, that national sovereignty has 
 not yet been generally well defined nor well understood. 
 The intervention of a nation iri the administration of 
 public affairs, is not only a desirable fact, as has been al- 
 ready stated, but is a universal fact that exists even 
 in absolute monarchies, as the sovereign cannot govern 
 without being surrounded with men of merit designated 
 by public opinion, and who, under some title or other, 
 frame into ordinances the wishes of the nation, indi- 
 cated by the provincial states or the municipal admin- 
 istrations. This intervention of the country in the 
 management of affairs, is naturally clearer and stronger 
 under a constitutional government, where there exists 
 an elective chamber called to discuss and approve the 
 laws: bid there is an immense distance between this 
 
22 POLITICAL A]*TD MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 intervention in affairs, and the sovereignty. And it is 
 very necessary that it should be so, for it would be a 
 strange play upon words, to pretend to establish an 
 hereditary monarchy side by side with a national sov- 
 ereignty, so understood, that the nation being sovereign, 
 her delegates would have the right to make and to 
 destroy the government. 
 
 It is true, that after the grand political deluges that 
 have occasionally engulfed some old, rotten, and 
 powerless governments, or after the total extinction 
 of some dynasty, it has been very necessary that the 
 notables of a nation should provide for the rebuilding 
 of the state, by confiding the reins to the prince judged 
 most worthy and apt, or to him who had the most di- 
 rect right. But this act of election being an exception 
 to the fundamental principles of inheritance, and not 
 being justifiable but under imperious circumstances, 
 is far from constituting a sovereign right ; it should be 
 considered only as a revolution, and the compact re- 
 sulting from it proclaiming the heirship to the throne, 
 becomes by this fact a distinct reparation of the vio- 
 lation of the principle, and a positive abdication of this 
 pretended right of national sovereignty. If it were 
 otherwise, a monarchy would be only elective, as has 
 been already stated. 
 
 It results from this, that in a hereditary monarchy, 
 not absolute, but limited by fundamental laws, the 
 throne is the legitimate property of the dynasty, the same 
 as that the portion of sovereignty that consists in taking 
 part in the framing of laws, is the imprescriptible 
 property of the nation. The nation should then be 
 powerless in disposing of the throne as long as there 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATEELOO. 23 
 
 is an heir direct or indirect to it, as the throne cannot 
 deprive the nation from participating in the adminis- 
 tration of affairs ; a concurrence that it exercises not 
 only through an elective chamber, but also through a 
 chamber of peers or senate chosen from the notabilites 
 of the country, and which, although nominated by the 
 king, would not the less represent an active and power- 
 ful fraction of the general interest^ of the country. 
 
 The equilibrium of, and the putting in practice these 
 two portions of sovereignty, is the delicate problem 
 that all wise statesmen should seek to reduce to a fun- 
 damental law. There are but few of our modern legis- 
 lators who have properly comprehended this problem, 
 or at least, who have given it a satisfactory solution. 
 
 If they have not perfectly understood national sov- 
 ereignty, neither have they properly appreciated and 
 defined divine right. The most ardent innovators have 
 endeavored to exhibit it as a right at once obscure and 
 arbitrary, which in distant times, some sovereign fami- 
 lies had arrogated to themselves, over the property of 
 a country. Louis XIV. especially, in his strange in- 
 structions to his grandson, had in some manner given 
 the weight of authority to this erroneous opinion. But 
 far from its being an abuse sanctioned by time, the 
 divine right had a more noble and more solemn origin, 
 because it was indisputably the most sublime institution 
 that legislators could devise, for giving to a state the 
 stability which constitutes strength, power, and pros- 
 perity, and delivering it from civil discord, by having 
 the throne protected from ambitious individuals. 
 
 It thus became an article of faith, among learned men 
 through profound reasoning, and among the masses 
 
24 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 through tradition, not for the interest of one family, 
 but for the very safety of the state and the greatest 
 advantage to national power. Happy the people who 
 are sufficiently wise to know how to enjoy the benefits 
 of an advanced civilization, by appreciating the ad- 
 vantages of such an institution, and seeking to fulfil 
 the duties it imposes. 
 
 After the English and French revolutions, the di- 
 vine right was exposed to the attacks of that multitude 
 of writers who thought themselves born to shape the 
 destiny of nations. Even among statesmen of sufficient 
 learning to discern all its merits, there were found some 
 who considered its action insufficient for a society 
 shaken to its foundation, and in which religious belief 
 had given place to a spirit of skepticism and contro- 
 versy that pretended to make every thing pass through 
 the crucible of philosophy. These bold writers thought 
 that a right which latitudinarians and even all the in- 
 telligent classes called a precedent, a right, according 
 to them, that lost itself 'mid the clouds of fanaticism, 
 could not have as solid an origin as one proclaimed 
 and consecrated by the interests of all, one, in a word, 
 founded on the institutions judged to be indispensable 
 by the most eminent men, and upheld by the experi- 
 ence of fifty centuries. In their opinion, the question, 
 in point, was to draw up the fundamental law in such 
 a manner as to place legitimacy under protection 
 from all storms. 
 
 To this reasoning, not devoid of some justice, the 
 defenders of the divine right answer, that human in- 
 stitutions being unstable by their nature, and sanc- 
 tioned by men only, can of course be revoked by men, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 25 
 
 so that they would be necessarily subjected to all the 
 storms of an elective monarchy, from which the di- 
 vine right alone could entirely exempt them. 
 
 We have not decided here between the two systems 
 of legitimacy, which will be equally indispensable ac- 
 cording to the country where they are to be applied, 
 and which at bottom rest on the same thought, be- 
 cause in either, the throne and the supreme power 
 properly appertains by right to the family in the es- 
 tablished order of succession ; the only difference ex- 
 isting between them is, that in the latter the necessity 
 of this order, that cannot be at all assailed, is recog- 
 nized by human laws, which can be applied equally 
 to an absolute as to a limited monarchy. 
 
 This human institution of legitimacy is the more 
 admirable, as it has been necessarily sanctioned in its 
 origin by the proudest families of a country, by those 
 even who, having the chance of reaching the throne 
 in their turn, would be supposed inimical to a stable 
 institution that interdicted their ever having access to 
 it. Well, by a very extraordinary conversion, those 
 who have shown the greatest attachment to legiti- 
 macy, are the haughtiest families of England and 
 France, while it has been the object of the sarcasm 
 and hate of all demagogues who have nothing to gaii 
 by an elective system of monarchy. 
 
 Be that as it may, Louis XVIII. and his ministers, 
 could with difficulty change of their own free will, 
 the essence of this right, placed above mortal combi- 
 nations, which had given fourteen centuries of con- 
 tinued existence to the monarchy of the Franks ; they 
 
 should naturally have made it the lever of the new 
 
 2 
 
26 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 public right, that dating from 1814, was to constitute 
 for the future, that of the throne and of France, by 
 binding them together in an indissoluble manner. All 
 that could be demanded of them was, to establish for 
 ever, this alliance of divine inheritance with human 
 institutions : the one deciding on the ownership of the 
 crown, the other admitting and limiting at the same 
 time, the rights of the nation, thus rendering this 
 double basis unassailable, as well on the part of the 
 throne as of its adversaries. 
 
 If the entire ancient nobility and all the members 
 of the royal family had shared these sentiments, that 
 were certainly entertained by the King personally, and 
 his ministers, we must admit that the charter would 
 have given satisfaction ; because, if it imposed some 
 slight trammels on monarchy, it shackled anarchy so 
 much the more ; but we should not ignore the fact 
 that the successors of Louis XYIII. did not consider 
 themselves at all bound by this contract, and claimed 
 the divine right to the fullest extent, under the idea 
 that it was attributed to them of old, especially under 
 Louis XIY. Moreover, if the intimate counsellors of 
 the King, Ferrand, Dambray, Montesquieu, Beugnot, 
 had exhibited an enlarged sagacity in the framing 
 and the discussion of this charter, the first two es- 
 pecially would have abolished from emigration, the 
 exaggerated prejudices on the means of applying 
 their doctrines to the French nation, usually little dis- 
 posed to comprehend their abstractions ; besides, the 
 reactionary passions of some of these ministers and of 
 other confidants of the monarch, were more dreadful 
 even than their dogmas. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 27 
 
 Their task was the more difficult from having to 
 struggle against the Utopias of Benjamin Constant, 
 Lanjuinais and Lafayette, and there was none, even to 
 Beige Lanbrechts, appointed senator by Napoleon, 
 who did not consider himself as well qualified as Louis 
 XVIII. to give France a charter of his own fashioning. 
 lie deigned his consent to call this prince and his 
 dynasty to the throne they had occupied for ten cen- 
 turies, on condition that he should resume all the 
 chains imposed by the National Assembly on Louis 
 XVI. This flaming legist pushed his monomania so 
 far, as to insert an article in his compact, prohibiting 
 the king from making propositions under the form of 
 laws, permitting him solely to pray the chambers for 
 the passage of a law on a subject, upon which the 
 prince would be satisfied in submitting an abstract. 
 What perfect folly to put the base of the edifice at 
 the summit, and the summit at the base, and which 
 gave ample reason, why the King should refuse to 
 such minds, the initiative of the compact. 
 
 After having demonstrated that the granted charter 
 had a double necessity, I should remark that its 
 arrangements were not faultless. As it was a sort of 
 indissoluble contract, binding at the same time the 
 throne and the nation, it should have been as brief as 
 possible, and should have contained but one species 
 of declaration of rights. Exception then can be 
 taken, to its extending with too much complaisance 
 over certain details of legislation, which it had been 
 more proper to deliberate upon and modify afterwards 
 with the aid of the chambers and the sanction of ex- 
 perience ; the prerogatives conferred on the elective 
 
28 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 chamber were not so stipulated, that the equilibrium 
 of the three powers so much desired, could never be 
 broken by this last, and not become a vain word 
 through its encroachments ; by permitting an absolute 
 liberty to the press, it left an opening to its misrule. 
 I am ever ready to avow, that this last fault was the 
 work of the legislative commission associated in the 
 discussion of the charter, and not an act of the king, 
 who had wisely stipulated, that the laws upon this sub- 
 ject should have the power to prevent the often dan- 
 gerous errors of the journals, which by exciting the 
 worse passions would be itself capable of shaking the 
 most strongly constituted governments. Finally, the 
 most grave fault with which it can be charged is, that 
 it was accompanied by circumstances and restrictions 
 that caused its sincerity, and, consequently, its duration, 
 to be doubted. 
 
 If Louis XVIII. had not, with some reason, feared 
 to establish grievous precedents in admitting dogmas, 
 that might insensibly lead to the elective system, it is 
 certain that he would have given more stability to his 
 new edifice, by securing it at least the sanction of the 
 new chambers if not of the country. It would have 
 sufficed for this to have ordered a royal sitting, at 
 which he had declared the compact obligatory on 
 himself and his descendants, as well as on the nation 
 and its deputies, each within the limits fixed by the 
 charter. After which declaration, himself and all the 
 members of his family, as well as all the deputies and 
 peers, should have sworn to maintain in its integrity, a 
 charter that was henceforth a contract binding on all, 
 and the basis of an entirely new public right. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 29 
 
 Far from acting with this frankness and this pro- 
 found consciousness of the general interest of parties, 
 they affected to permit the belief that they submitted 
 to a necessity, but that this course would not be long 
 followed. To this error the restoration added the no 
 less grave one of changing the flag, and proscribing 
 that which had been, during twenty years of triumphs, 
 the pride of the present generation, instead of unre- 
 servedly adopting the national colors, which Louis 
 XYI. and Louis XVIII. himself, had borne for two 
 years. The white flag not only humiliated the army, 
 but also became the emblem of a reactionary will that 
 alarmed the best minds. Even Count Montlosier, 
 whose pure royalty was well tested, protested, by his 
 wise counsels, against an imprudence that placed the 
 throne at the mercy of a banner. The king yielded 
 to the excitations of his orthodox advisers, and be- 
 lieved he had accomplished sufficient in giving such 
 liberal institutions, the principles of which, were far 
 from obtaining the assent of the ultra-royalist party 
 that surrounded him. 
 
 Be that as it may, Louis XVIII. hoped to be able, 
 through this grand act, to bring together the Bour- 
 bons and the party that repulsed them, and render the 
 revolutionists partisans of royalty, by maintaining their 
 interests and admitting a portion of their system. 
 
 They imagined then, that there was but one heart 
 and one mind in the entire nation ; they affected to 
 repeat it, but this was not true. There was, however, 
 so much felicity in this combination, that under this 
 regime France would have flourished in a few years, 
 if parties would have reasoned : if pride, interest and 
 
30 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the passions could have been annulled by some statute : 
 lastly, if the errors we have just pointed out had not 
 rekindled all the most opposite political passions. The 
 king, by a dash of his pen, should have solved the 
 problem struggled for, for twenty years, since he had 
 established the new political doctrine in France, and 
 caused it to be recognized without dispute by entire 
 Europe. To succeed, it was only necessary for him 
 to know how to be master at home ; but this was the 
 difficult point. 
 
 In fact, no chief magistrate was ever placed in a 
 more vexatious position. Surrounded by twenty 
 thousand emigrants who wanted situations, old impe- 
 rial employes who wished to preserve theirs, Jacobins 
 who also demanded a share of them, theorists who 
 pretended to be alone capable of conducting a consti- 
 tutional state, ancient royalists and a haughty clergy, 
 who wished neither a constitution nor those charged 
 with executing its requirements ; Louis XVIII. had 
 been an angel, a genius, to have succeeded in uniting 
 the parties. This truth once acknowledged, he should, 
 at least, have striven to fix insuperable bounds, and 
 walked through these dangers with a free and firm 
 step. 
 
 A prince who disposes of a thousand millions a year, 
 besides all the employments in the administration and 
 the army, eventually succeeds in every thing, when he 
 has exclusively the initiative of the laws, and knows 
 how to employ wisdom and vigor by turns. To place 
 the moderate royalists side by side with the constitu- 
 tionalists and the statesmen moulded under the empire, 
 to reject the ultras of all classes, to express his 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 31 
 
 wishes haughtily and frankly, was the only course to 
 be pursued ; perhaps it had not sufficed to consolidate 
 a- restoration, following immediately a foreign invasion 
 and the military humiliation of the country ; but at 
 last, this was the only means of maintaining his posi- 
 tion ; vigor founded on justice, is the best subtlety 
 of kings. 
 
 Louis XVIII. wished it too well done ; he flattered 
 the two factions too much, hoping to attach their 
 chiefs to himself ; he favored Carnot and Fouche 
 while protecting those who treated them as brigands ; 
 at the instigation of his counsellors, he promised the 
 emigrants what the charter never allowed them. In- 
 stead of being the sole and vigorous chief of the state, 
 he seemed but as the victim offered as a sacrifice to 
 the animosity of both parties ; a secret power protected 
 by his brother, and which pretended to more royalism 
 than the king, had established itself at his very side in 
 the palace of the Tuileries. To increase his misfor- 
 tune, authority was given to disreputable ministers, 
 who were influenced by the coteries that disquieted 
 the court. From that time there was nothing but in- 
 consistency and contradiction in the system of govern- 
 ment ; words were never followed by deeds, as at 
 heart they desired something different from what was 
 promised in writing. 
 
 Louis XVIII. had given the charter to prevent any 
 other from being thrust upon him ; but it was evident 
 that, the first moment passed, the orthodox royalists 
 expected it t<> be withdrawn piece-meal, as the com- 
 pacl did not suitthem. They openly proclaimed that 
 this was but an act of transition between the revolu- 
 
32 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 tion and legitimacy. The emigrants wanted an easy- 
 master, as was asked by the Spanish priest, one who 
 would permit them to govern without contradiction. 
 They saw in the return of the Bourbons, but a means 
 of indemnifying themselves for their losses and recov- 
 ering their privileges. They had caused their own 
 ruin, and presented themselves as victims of their de- 
 votion to the royal family. They boldly asked if 
 there was but one legitimacy, and if the rights of the 
 nobility were not as sacred as those of the house of 
 Bourbon. 
 
 To calm these pretensions, they promised to satisfy 
 them in the course of time ; but the charter was far 
 from furnishing the means. In fact, the nobility was 
 established, but it had neither prerogative nor power ; 
 it was not democratic, as it had exclusive pretensions ; 
 it was not aristocratic, as it did not constitute a body 
 in the state, and to which the peerage itself was not 
 exclusively reserved. 
 
 The clergy also preached against the charter, be- 
 cause they expected to reclaim their property and re- 
 sume their ancient influence, which was positively 
 impossible under the empire of the constitution. Rome 
 also urged them in this course through an interest 
 that had nothing in common with christian morals, or 
 with the well-being of the French church. 
 
 It was then evident that the entire structure reposed 
 on insecure foundations. To consolidate it, required 
 the strong will of Richelieu, joined to the principles 
 of Henry IV. to put in practice what had been so 
 wisely promised : Union and oblivion. Everything 
 leads to the belief that this was the design of the princes ; 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 33 
 
 but as each one arrives, after protracted discords, 
 nothing is thought of till interest and self-love have 
 been extinguished or satisfied. 
 
 Instead of proceeding with this end in view, they 
 did as in 1780, placed their self-love and interest at 
 variance ; those who had delivered Toulon to the Eng- 
 lish, appeared at the Tuileries side by side with those 
 who had retaken it, and even dared to brave them with 
 their raileries. The king should have sent them en 
 sv/rvi iliance, a hundred leagues from the capital.* To 
 gain the general confidence, it was indispensable to 
 expose, in a solemn proclamation, the principles of his 
 government, and to assure their triumph in spite of all 
 petty resistance. 
 
 Far from strengthening ail acquired rights, and 
 crushing all pretensions, the reverse was done, preten- 
 sions were caressed, and interests were injured. Al- 
 ready alarming reports, threatened all purchasers of 
 national property with j^rojects of restitution ; pamph- 
 lets attributed to Chancellor Dambray, attacked the 
 legality of the sales, and demonstrated the justice of 
 restitution. 
 
 The soldiers of the empire were kept because feared, 
 or rather because there were none others ; and in re- 
 viewing them they affected to enhance the glory of 
 their enemies. Crowds of emigrant or Vendean offi- 
 cers claimed, with perhaps some justice, the confir- 
 mation of their grades, thus encumbering the rolls 
 of the army and stall", and depriving the officers, 
 
 * We do not here mean that the king should prove ungrateful 
 bis faithful servitors. He oughl to provide for and employ tho.se who 
 were moderate and wise; and exile from the court the over-excited and 
 tin; firebrands who preached hut. reaction. 
 
34 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 already too numerous for the army, reduced three- 
 fourths, of all hopes of advancement. As a conse- 
 quence, many military conspiracies had burst forth in 
 the army through dissatisfaction. 
 
 Under the sway of circumstances such as these, no 
 one could feel a confidence in the existing state of 
 things, as they saw no point of support anywhere, 
 and, at the head of affairs, neither power or will. 
 Carnot, whose rough character w r as ever consistent, 
 dared to weigh the weakness of this government in 
 addressing the king ; he afterwards published a me- 
 moir, in which, amid many truths, he feared not to 
 apologize for the regicides, as well as for the sover- 
 eignty of the people. By the side of this memoir, the 
 emigrants published pamphlets no less threatening. 
 
 They had not delayed till then, their conviction, that 
 the establishment of a rostrum and the liberty of the 
 press, were sad means for operating the fusion of par- 
 ties, as these institutions would be more effectual in 
 dividing the most united nation, than in rallying those 
 who were divided and irritated by the most violent 
 revolution recorded in history. In fact, interest and 
 self-love, wounded by the discourses from the tribune, 
 as by the virulent polemics and personal attacks of 
 the journals, revived all the passions, excited the hate 
 that time and forgetfulness might have extinguished, 
 and thus succeeded in creating factions even where 
 none existed. It was indeed with this object — to al- 
 lay all party feeling of resentment, and to merge all 
 in the same interest for his empire, and not for the 
 interest of his personal power, that Napoleon had 
 established a censorship, whose unsatisfactory results 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 35 
 
 were caused by deficient regulations. As the ministry 
 of Louis XVIII. had felt, from the beginning, the ne- 
 cessity of establishing it over all works under twenty 
 printed sheets, and especially over daily and periodi- 
 cal journals : this was one of the first laws submitted 
 to the newly instituted chambers; and as it appeared 
 to be contrary to the promises of the declaration of 
 Saint Ouen and to the spirit of the modified charter, 
 the liberals, republicans and doctrinaires raised inces- 
 sant clamors : they shouted despotism ! deception !* 
 
 To these general causes of agitation, it is necessary 
 still to add, the dissatisfaction which the onerous 
 treaties entered into with foreigners had produced. 
 All who bore a true French heart, all who had a spark 
 of national pride and patriotism, were indignant at 
 
 * In the project of the charter emanating from the king's council, free- 
 dom of the press was declared, in conforming to the laws which would be 
 restored for 'preventing or restraining its abase ; the legislative commission 
 had objected to the word preventing and had obtained its erasure; the 
 ministers afterwards decided that for restraining this abuse, it was neces- 
 sary not to wait until the evil was without remedy and all its bad effects 
 produced. Besides, all former censorship had been more or less illy-con- 
 trived. That of the empire confided solely to two or three mercenary 
 censors, and extending to the most voluminous scientific works, was 
 abused ; years would be required to cull from the manuscripts accumula- 
 ted there : the works in one volume, even the periodical reviews and 
 pamphlets of ten sheets, should never be subjected but to good repressive 
 laws clearly expressed. As regards the daily press, whose action is such 
 as to be able to subvert the best constituted state, it should be subjected 
 to a previous censorship, but instead of confiding this to complaisant 
 clerks, it would be necessary, as 1 have stated in a previous volume, to in- 
 Btitute a special tribunal <>/ irremovable judges, that would both decide on 
 offences committed by uncensured works and regulate the censorship of 
 the daily }>rc>+. This was the only mode; admissible in France, where 
 the press has become a power sufficiently formidable to require particular 
 judges, impartial by their position and capable of appreciating the i, r "<>l 
 AS well us the bad. 
 
36 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the ease with which the Count d'Artois had signed 
 the order for restoring a hundred fortified places still 
 occupied by French troops, before having even stipu- 
 lated for any of the conditions for peace. The trea- 
 ties of Paris traced out at the point of the sword with 
 a rigor, undoubtedly justifiable as reprisals, but per- 
 haps imprudent for the interest even of some of the 
 powers that imposed them, — these treaties, I say, had 
 left a deep-seated rancor in the hearts of all the par- 
 tisans of the empire and revolution. Each one per- 
 suaded himself, right or wrong, that the Bourbons 
 could have preserved at least a portion of Belgium 
 and the line of the Rhine as far as Coblentz, as well 
 as Savoy, if they had not been so eager to occupy 
 the Tuileries. We do not intend to discuss here the 
 validity of these censures, nor the possibility there 
 may have existed on the part of the ministry of Louis 
 XVIII. to obtain less harsh conditions; we only state 
 the moral effect their eagerness had produced. 
 
 The result of so much conflict could not be long 
 awaited. An absurd discourse of the minister Fer- 
 rand increased the irritation to the utmost, by classing 
 all the French people in two categories : those who 
 had followed the right line * that is to say, who had 
 struggled in connection with the Bourbons or in la 
 Vendee ; and those who had pursued the crooked line, 
 or who had admitted the Revolution and the Empire. 
 A strange apostrophe to the entire nation, and a sin- 
 gular means of supporting a projected law, tending to 
 the restitution of all the property of emigrants, not dis- 
 posed of. Henceforth the parties, daily, appeared 
 more hostile, and this shock might yet render Napo 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 37 
 
 leon once more the arbiter of the destinies of 
 France. 
 
 If the state of affairs in this country were of a na- 
 ture to inspire him with the hope and the desire of 
 returning, he was not the less stimulated by the intelli- 
 gence of what was being enacted at the Congress of 
 Vienna, where the division of the spoils had led to great 
 dissensions. Already, were Austria, France and Eng- 
 land bound by eventual treaties, to guarantee Saxony 
 against the pretensions of Prussia backed by Russia, so 
 that the not-over-satisfied sovereigns of these two coun- 
 tries, spoke of returning to their capitals that demanded 
 their presence. Their reported departure was fixed 
 for the 5th March. 
 
 As a compensation for the support that the Bour- 
 bons promised to Austria and England, they demanded 
 the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, to 
 be replaced by that branch of their family that for- 
 merly reigned there ; a very natural step, truly, as it 
 was a means of leading the peninsular to the interest 
 of France. Besides, the venal and interested heart of 
 Talleyrand attached a double importance to this pro- 
 ject ; since, to secure the preservation of his princi- 
 pality of Benevento and the revenues attached thereto, 
 it behooved him to have it recognized by the legiti- 
 mate government of the two Sicilies, to the restoration 
 of which he inserted this condition. The Bourbons 
 proposed to take upon themselves the expulsion of 
 Murat, and with this object the assembling of troops 
 in Dauphiny was taking place. 
 
 From anot hoi" quarter Napoleon was timely informed 
 that the ministers of Louis XVIII. wore proposing to 
 the Congress his removal from Elba, to exile hiin to 
 
38 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 another hemisphere ; this was a gratuitous violation 
 of the treaty of Fontainbleau, as up to this time he 
 was chargeable with nothing that could provoke the 
 anger of the sovereigns.* 
 
 Unable to resist such an attempt, because of his 
 limited means of defence, and determined not to await 
 the event, Napoleon conceived the audacious design 
 of re-mounting the French throne. Though his forces 
 consisted but of a thousand soldiers, they were, never- 
 theless, superior to those of the Bourbons, allied, as 
 he was, to the honor of the country, which some- 
 times slumbers, but never dies in the heart of a war- 
 like nation. Full of confidence in this support, he 
 passed in review the small band, which w r as to second 
 him in so hazardous an enterprise. These soldiers 
 were ill equipped, but their martial forms denoted in- 
 trepid spirits. The preparations were not long, as these 
 brave men carried nothing but their swords. Favored 
 by the fortuitous absence of the English commissioner 
 and the vessels that watched over the Island of Elba, 
 the small flotilla that bore them, met with no accident, 
 and crossed over in three days. Napoleon again beheld 
 the coast of France at Cannes on the 1st of March, 
 near the very shore of Frejus where he had landed 
 fifteen years before, on his return from Egypt. For- 
 tune seemed as then to smile upon him, as he returned 
 to this land, again to unfurl her standards, and restore 
 her independence. 
 
 * The French government did not pay the two millions granted annu- 
 ally by the treaty of Fontainbleau, and, it is said, inserted the condition 
 that Bonaparte should be exiled out of Europe. Napoleon was informed 
 of this fact by the Empress Maria-Louisa"; and this circumstance, together 
 with the false report of the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna, decided 
 his return. « 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 39 
 
 The landing was effected without opposition, but in 
 finding himself once more on the soil of France, Na- 
 poleon must have experienced the liveliest emotions, 
 for the nature of this enterprise might hold in reserve 
 for him a most deplorable end. It appeared difficult 
 to form a well digested plan, because of the want of 
 information sufficiently detailed on the state of affairs 
 in the south, all knowledge being gathered from the 
 reports of prejudiced agents; he must have been 
 satisfied with deciding on a course answering to the 
 most probable case. 
 
 One of the first steps taken, to secure Antibe, failed 
 completely, as General Corsin, who commanded, refu- 
 sed to receive the imperial troops. This first check 
 seemed to augur badly, and it was the more grievous, 
 being the act of a captain of the guard, who had taken 
 the responsibility of trying this plan without orders. 
 On the other hand, Toulon and Marseilles were not too 
 well disposed. However, as it was important to strike 
 with promptness, Napoleon was not long doubtful as 
 to the course to be pursued, because a point d'appui 
 in the interior was indispensable, and Grenoble was 
 the nearest stronghold. He therefore inarched upon 
 tliis city as speedily as possible, the success of the en- 
 terprise depending on its occupation. The slender 
 column that he called his army, arrived after having 
 travelled eighty-four leagues in six days. 
 
 The welcome received from the population on the 
 route, responded to his wishes, and doubled his chances 
 of success, as he was satisfied that the portion of the 
 people who were not corrupted by passion or interest, 
 preserved a manly character, that the national huniili- 
 
40 POLITICAL, A^D MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 ation had wounded. Reaching Vizille on the 6th of 
 March, Napoleon at last met the first body of troops 
 sent to oppose him, and who refused to parley with his 
 officers. Aware that everything depended on the first 
 rencontre, and accustomed to resolve with rapidity and 
 decision, he fearlessly advanced to meet them, his 
 breast laid bare, confident that they would not fire 
 upon him. They were deeply affected by this act of 
 recklessness and confidence ; far from seeing in him 
 an audacious promoter of civil w T ar, as he was described, 
 they recognized but their emperor marching at the 
 head of his old warriors, who had so often led them on 
 the road to victory ; their hesitation was not of long 
 duration. This was a detachment of the fifth regi- 
 ment of infantry, soon followed by the entire seventh, 
 under Labedoyfere, who voluntarily hurried to Siis 
 presence. The people and the soldiers having received 
 him with similar exclamations of joy, Grenoble open- 
 ed her gates, and he advanced upon Lyons with five 
 thousand men. 
 
 At the news of his landing, the Bourbons, though 
 struck with astonishment, yet flattered themselves 
 with resistance. They put a price upon his head, and 
 ordered him to be hunted down as an adventurer who, 
 by force of arms, was attempting the well-being of the 
 State. The Count d'Artois departed for Lyons with 
 .Macdonald ; the Duke d'AngoulSme, who was at 
 Bordeaux, hastened into Languedoc, to establish the 
 centre of a royal authority at Toulouse ; Ney, summon- 
 ed to Paris, was sent to the East ; finally, an extra ses- 
 sion of the chambers was called in all haste. Some 
 have even pretended that the most fiery of the minis- 
 
TJIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 41 
 
 ters of the restoration, M. de Blacas, wished to have 
 recourse to a surer means than that of the sword, and 
 charged a man named B " :: * * * to assassinate the em- 
 peror.* Though an individual of this name has 
 boasted, in a pamphlet, of having accepted this mis- 
 sion, we prefer suspecting this miserable man of mad- 
 ness, to giving credit to such an assertion. However, 
 Napoleon affected the greatest tranquillity, feeling 
 that he had glory and France on his side. 
 
 ( )n the loth March, and at the gates of Lyons, the 
 royal troops were no sooner in the presence of his 
 own, than they mingled with and embraced each 
 other with cries of Vive VEmpereur. Macdonald 
 barely escaped, and the Count d'Artois had just time 
 to take post and return to Paris. 
 
 The Lyonese received the happy conqueror with 
 still more enthusiasm than on his return from Ma- 
 rengo. This welcome, that deeply moved him, was 
 an apology for his enterprise, and at once redou- 
 bled his courage and confidence in the future. 
 
 Although quite certain of the reception awaiting 
 him at the capital, Napoleon issued many decrees at 
 Lyons tending to affect public opinion. The greatest 
 censures cast upon him by the ambitious party of the 
 tiers-etat, were for having re-established the nobility, 
 enchained the press, and rendered the tribune mute. 
 Notwithstanding he had acted only for the interest of 
 public tranquillity, and in consequence of the grave 
 circumstances under which an unexampled revolution 
 had placed the country, he did not hesitate in retra- 
 
 * Sec the pamphlel published by Moronval, quai des Auguntins, in 1S1G, 
 in v. bich til is ]> * * * gives an account of his exploits. 
 
42 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOKY OF 
 
 cing his steps, proclaiming the abolition of all privi- 
 leged nobility, promising to govern conjointly with 
 the deputies of the nation, and decreeing the re-esta- 
 blishment of the liberty of the press.* 
 
 The two chambers which Louis XVIII. had con- 
 ferred on France, found generally more partisans than 
 the mute legislative body instituted in the year VIII. 
 Athenians in more than one point of resemblance, the 
 French wished, at any price, to shine in the tribune, 
 not dreaming that Demosthenes' are rare, and that 
 for one statesman, a hundred ambitious, indifferent 
 as well as interested declaimers, are found. Napoleon 
 appreciated the advantages of the tribune, but w r as 
 always aware of its disadvantages and dangers, and 
 must have had at heart that France should enjoy the 
 one without falling into the other. He however sac- 
 rificed his principles to the spirit of the age, well 
 convinced that after the storm, they would feel the 
 necessity of modifying anew, institutions that suited 
 neither every circumstance nor every people ; but the 
 elements of which it is, however, proper that an en- 
 lightened nation should preserve, to be put into 
 action, when a weak and incapable government 
 or a dangerous minority set adrift the vessel of 
 state.f 
 
 * The re-establishment of the unlimited liberty of the daily press was 
 an error of which Napoleon became the first victim. The periodical press 
 and works, may be exempt from censure, but the daily journals cannot be 
 with impunity, at least during political storms. 
 
 + This phrase will perhaps be thought ambiguous and little conclusive. 
 It should be thus interpreted. Napoleon was convinced that the govern- 
 ment with two chambers and a public tribune, offered real advantages in 
 peaceable times, when the wheels of government are well established by wise 
 fundamental laws, and ^especially when there exists but one interest, that 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. ±6 
 
 It would have been very remarkable, bad Napoleon 
 been able to forget the unheard of advantages that 
 legitimacy gives, and the extreme facility with which 
 Louis XVIII. had installed himself in his place in 
 1814 ; but being unable to invoke this principle in favor 
 of his return, lie was forced to oppose it with the prin- 
 ciple of national sovereignty through its whole extent, 
 as the best means of flattering the opinion. Persua- 
 ded, also, that in order to act sensibly on the impres- 
 sible spirit of the French, it was necessary to refrain 
 from following in the usual routine of the assemblies, 
 with which the country had been disgusted, under 
 every denomination, from that of the notables to the 
 factious Senate he had dethroned, Napoleon conceived 
 the idea of re-uniting all the electors, not in their de- 
 partments for the election of deputies, but at Paris, to 
 form, under the solemn title of the Assembly of the 
 champ de Mai, an actual re-union of all the national 
 notabiliteS) who would nominate commissioners to 
 consult with him in the reconstruction of the State on 
 future immovable bases. This august assembly, which 
 would recall to mind the epoch when the Franks 
 themselves raised their kings on the shield, also re- 
 called the first federation of 1790, which, from its 
 
 of the state, closely bound to that of its chief, or, as well, under a feeble 
 government whose chief is himself little capable of piloting the vessel of 
 state. But ho, thought that after a revolution that lias divided the nation 
 into two hostile masses, when great interests, both injured and acquired, 
 arc atixprises, when there exists one government de facto and another de 
 jure supported by foreigners, to deliver elements s<> combustible to public 
 discussion, was to expose himself to inevitable troubles. This opinion 
 can be Bhared with him without, a9 a consequence, being an apostle of 
 despotism. 1 say farther, no one can think otherwise and be a statesman. 
 
44 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 having been followed by the bloodiest catastrophies, 
 was not the less one of the most imposing ceremonies 
 to which history points. This Assembly of the Champ 
 de Mai would charm, because of ancient and illustrious 
 souvenirs ; it would offer, he thought, a striking con- 
 trast to the manner in which the Bourbons had im- 
 posed a charter on the French, wounding the pride of 
 the constitutional party, while the emperor strove to 
 flatter the nation by affecting to render homage to her 
 rights and her notables, with whom he was to confer 
 respecting the new institutions to be given to the em- 
 pire, for securing her internal happiness, consolidating 
 her glory, and protecting her institutions from fac- 
 tions. 
 
 Napoleon did not entirely conceal from himself the 
 danger that might some day result from such a pre- 
 cedent and the embarrassments under which his suc- 
 cessors would labor, to whom he would bequeath all 
 the vicissitudes of an elective monarchy. But having 
 nothing upon which to act but the elective principle, 
 it behooved him to make use of it for drawing to- 
 gether the greatest possible party, against the legiti- 
 macy of his enemies and the foolish pretensions of the 
 Jacobins. Besides, he understood very well how, in 
 time, to render all possible aid to the principle of he- 
 reditary succession ; because this principle forming 
 in fact the basis of the new public right, to secure its 
 maintenance would be included in his duties. 
 
 Preceded by these memorable decrees, Napoleon 
 continued his advance upon Chalons, where he was 
 joined by the troops that Ney had at first assembled 
 with the intention to combat him. This marshal was 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 45 
 
 no statesman, and the sum of his political creed con- 
 sisted in not causing civil war for • private interests. 
 This was the motive that guided him at Fontainbleau, 
 when he contributed to promoting the first abdication. 
 " Nothing for one man — all for France" was his 
 motto ; a very respectable dogma, apparently, but 
 which, when pushed too far, might cause the commis- 
 sion of grave errors, and lead to the forgetfulness of 
 the most sacred duties. 
 
 At the report of the Emperor's return, Ney at first 
 only saw the injury he had done him at Fontainbleau, 
 and the dangers of a civil war with which his return 
 menaced the country. He accepted in good faith the 
 mission to repulse him by force of arms, and even 
 gave vent to imprudent and improper threats against 
 his ancient chief. But soon convinced, in his journey 
 through Burgundy and Franche-Comte, of the una- 
 nimity of feeling among the people, and his very 
 soldiers, who raised the national colors in his presence, 
 and influenced by two officers who had been secretly 
 sent him from Lyons, to guaranty to him oblivion of 
 the past, the marshal repented of his first reso- 
 lution, and trembled at the idea of giving the signal 
 for civil war which he detested. 
 
 Placed in the same alternative as Marlborough be- 
 tween James II. and "William, he did not hesitate to 
 throw himself in the ranks he had rendered illustrious 
 by so many brilliant feats of arms. lie acted by im- 
 pulse, and yielded to the idea that governed him, 
 without reflecting that he offended against sacred 
 propriety, which he could have easily avoided by re- 
 
46 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 tiring to Besan<jon until the entrance of Napoleon 
 into the capital. 
 
 The contrast between his proclamation from Lonsle- 
 Saulnier, and his promises to Louis XYIIL, will re- 
 main an unfortunate stain in the history of his glorious 
 career, because it gives a false idea of his character, 
 by offering all the appearances of premeditated trea- 
 son, of which he was incapable. 
 
 After his junction, nothing could arrest the happy 
 conqueror, who pursued his triumphal march at the 
 head of ten thousand men. He left to his adversaries 
 but the resource of a camp, hastily assembled at Me- 
 lun ; but the soldiers of this camp, brothers to those of 
 Grenoble, Lyons and Chalons, were more disposed to 
 join their eagles than oppose them. 
 
 Stupefied by the rapidity of his progress, the royal 
 government knew not where to show front ; it would 
 be difficult to picture the agitation and confusion that 
 reigned at the palace of the Tuileries, as well as in 
 Paris. Louis XYIIL had alone preserved that calm 
 and that resignation that had never abandoned him. 
 Yielding however to the unreasonableness of those 
 around him, he permitted himself to adopt the most 
 opposite resolutions. On the one side, he threw himself 
 into the arms of publicistes doctrinaires, and confided 
 to Benjamin Constant the drafting of proclamations 
 that were to gain him the confidence and love of the 
 French. He placed himself under the segis of the 
 national guards, and of the partisans of revolutions, 
 while on the other hand he appealed to all the loyal 
 royalists, and to the fidelity of the military, whom he 
 had so seriously injured. Fouche was at one time at 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 47 
 
 the point of being sent for at the palace and consulted, 
 then they decided to arrest him; but the crafty syco- 
 phant decamped from his hotel in time, and found 
 refuge in that of Queen Hortense, which he reached 
 through a garden. 
 
 A few changes in the ministry ; the police entrusted 
 to Bourienne, who, from being Napoleon's confidential 
 secretary and his friend from infancy, had become his 
 open enemy ; caresses and promises to all parties ; ap- 
 peals to the national guards and the royal volunteers; 
 such were the sad measures with which Messrs. de 
 Blacas, Ferrand, and Dambray counted upon fright- 
 ening or capturing the conqueror of so many nations. 
 
 The chambers that had been so suddenly convoked, 
 succeeded only in giving to the world the spectacle of 
 nought from a deliberative assembly in presence of a 
 real danger, and proved to entire Europe that the time 
 when senators awaited death in their seats, had passed 
 away forever. Moreover, this meeting resulted but 
 in allowing some orators the pleasure of repeating the 
 declamations inserted by Benjamin Constant in the 
 Journal des Debats against the imperial despotism, in 
 furnishing the ministry a pretext for avowing that 
 errors had been committed ; lastly, in giving the king 
 an opportunity for appearing with solemnity before 
 the chambers, accompanied by his brother and nephew, 
 in order to take the oath of fidelity to the charter, 
 which had been in better taste at the time of its pro- 
 mulgation ; an oath, which on the part of the Count 
 d'Artois, was ever suspected of little sincerity. Two 
 days after this sentimental but tardy homily, the troops 
 of the camp of Melun went over en masse t<> those 
 
48 POLITICAL A1STD MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 of the Emperor, who the next day, March 20th, made 
 his entree at the Tuileries. The Bourbons had but 
 time to take shelter in Belgium ; the Duke d'Angou- 
 leme alone, skirmished a few days in the South. Never 
 had such an apparently reckless enterprise cost less in 
 its execution. As an explanation, some have pretend- 
 ed that it was conformable to general opinion, which 
 renders all things easy when floating with it. If the 
 principle is true, its application in this case is at least 
 doubtful ; because, if we reflect on the state of opinion 
 at the time of Napoleon's first abdication, the belief 
 is permissible, that France # was much divided in feeling 
 towards him, and that the number of his enemies 
 equalled that of his partisans. In fact the former 
 composed the most energetic portion of the nation. 
 Besides, if it is certain that popular opinion be the 
 most powerful of levers and supports, it is also neces- 
 sary to keep in mind that it is no less fickle in its na- 
 ture than difficult to establish, and that it is much more 
 profitable to be its arbiter and director than be led a 
 slave in its train ; finally, if it be prudent at times to 
 submit to its demands, it is well at a later period to 
 get the mastery of it. 
 
 Be that as it may, this astounding revolution was 
 terminated in twenty days without costing a single 
 drop of blood ; France had changed her aspect, the 
 nation restored to herself, recovered her pride ; she was 
 free from the yoke imposed by strangers, having 
 accomplished the greatest act of free-will of which a 
 people are susceptible. The grandeur of the enterprise 
 effaced the recollection of defeat, and Napoleon was 
 again the man of her choice. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 49 
 
 While awaiting the definitive institutions he had 
 promised the country, the Emperor's first care was 
 naturally to organize a temporary administration, and 
 to place capable men in charge of the different offi- 
 ces. — That of war was given to Davoust, of the navy 
 to Deserts, of finance to Gaudin : the port-folio of 
 foreign affairs was restored to Caulincourt, whose 
 pacific dispositions were known to the allies ; Camba- 
 ceres accepted the seals after reiterated instances; 
 Fouche took the ministry of the police, which was his 
 element. Lastly, Napoleon confided that of the in- 
 terior to that haughty republican, Carnot, who had re- 
 fused to award him the Empire, in 1804, and who ac- 
 cepted the title of Count from that very Empire in 1811. 
 
 The choice of these two old adepts of Jacobinism, 
 was at once, a pledge the Emperor intended giving 
 to the public, against the errors of his so-called des- 
 potism, and a means of uniting in his defence that 
 energetic portion of the people who served under their 
 banners. He thoroughly appreciated the compass of 
 Carnot's military genius, who, after having by instinct 
 ordered certain passable operations in 1793 and 1794, 
 had ordered very defective ones in 1796. But he had 
 an energetic will and supported popular Utopias ; he 
 might be very useful in the ministry of the in- 
 terior, to which appertained the duty of exciting 
 the masses for the national defence, and organ- 
 izing them accordingly. His character though much 
 extolled, was impressed with a kind of probity 
 and uprightness that had survived the revolution- 
 ary turmoils ; this character, joined to talents for 
 defending the country, we will admit, had made 
 
50 POLITICAL ASTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 him a modern Cato in the eyes of the multitude : they 
 thought, and with truth, that he would never be a 
 servile agent of the imperial will ; but they knew not 
 how much good his inflexibility and his inclination to 
 opposition might prevent. 
 
 As to Fouche, his character for intrigue is so well 
 known that I can dispense with enlarging upon it. 
 This man, who had a vast mind, though often false, con- 
 sidered cunning and actions of a roue, as the true 
 genius for affairs. His great experience, while de- 
 monstrating to him the emptiness of the Utopias of dem- 
 agogues, had not however succeeded in eradicating 
 his doctrinaire ideas of 1791. He wanted strength in 
 the administrative measures of the government, with- 
 out comprehending that before every thing else, this 
 was necessary in the institutions. 
 
 Napoleon knew Fouche too well to confide in him ; 
 but if the latter treasured any resentment for the hon- 
 orable exile the Emperor had imposed upon him in 
 1810, he had also to dread the Bourbons, who wished 
 him arrested four days previous to his entrance into 
 Paris, and who had great wrongs to complain of 
 against him. A man of such a stamp, who had been 
 stranger to no plot since 1792, who had planned, pro- 
 tected, or baffled them, could not stand with folded 
 arms 'midst the grand conflict that was brewing. 
 They had to resolve on using him by flattering his 
 ambition, or placing him where he could do no injury. 
 To confine him at Yincennes, or exile him without trial, 
 would have caused much scandal at a time when they 
 loudly exclaimed against arbitrary power. Napoleon 
 preferred to employ him at all hazards, and paid dearly 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 51 
 
 for this error. The numerous and audacious depend- 
 ants who were grouped about these two ex-conven- 
 tionals, and those ranged under the banners of La- 
 fayette, Lanjuinais, and Benjamin Constant, signalized 
 but too well the rude assaults which the new chief of 
 the government would have to sustain unless he bound 
 them to his cause. Experience had not as yet shown 
 that they were no less dangerous as friends than as 
 enemies. 
 
 Having thus attended to the formation of his cabinet, 
 Napoleon felt it incumbent upon him to turn his at- 
 tention towards Europe : the great Captain had refu- 
 sed the peace offered him at Chatillon, with the boun- 
 daries of 1792, because he then found himself on the 
 throne of France, and it would have been too much 
 condescension ; but nothing prevented him from ac- 
 cepting the one imposed on the Bourbons, because he 
 came from the Isle of Elba, and the responsibility did 
 not weigh much upon him, neither in the eyes of 
 France, nor in the eyes of posterity. While fore- 
 warning Murat of his departure, the Emperor had 
 charged him to dispatch a courier to Vienna, bearing 
 his pledge to adhere to the treaties of Paris, with the 
 promise to confine his exertions to the internal happi- 
 ness of France. Unfortunately he had not a man of 
 sufficient skill about him whom he might send to the 
 Emperor Alexander, to demonstrate to this prince how 
 much English rivalry would one day bear upon him, 
 and how much value Eussia should attach to the fact 
 that France had a strong and national government, 
 inimical to England. As his ancient projects on the 
 Vistula could not again recur, and as from this time 
 
52 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 no rivalry ought to exist between the two countries, it 
 would be very difficult to affirm what effect such a 
 mission would have produced on the mind of this 
 monarch ; but unfortunately this attempt could not 
 be made. 
 
 In either case it was natural to believe that the posi- 
 tive assurances given by Napoleon to the sovereigns, 
 would have had their due effect ; because Europe, as- 
 tounded by his return, and by the energy of the French 
 people, must have dreaded the repetition of the scenes 
 of the revolution, by provoking the display of all the 
 resources of propagandism. The success of this step 
 would not have been doubtful, if the Congress had 
 been dissolved, as was assured him, and if the Em- 
 peror had treated with the cabinets singly.* 
 
 But the sovereigns being present, their pride was 
 roused ; their interests, divided since the fall of the 
 Empire, to a degree difficult to reconcile through ne- 
 gotiations, could in twenty-four hours be rallied with 
 a common object, that of consolidating the division 
 of the rich spoils which Napoleon's return had. ren- 
 dered problematical. It was useless to protest his ad- 
 hesion to the treaties, they wished to believe nothing ; 
 the coalition was renewed even before his protesta- 
 tions reached Vienna. All the governments that had 
 placed arms in the hands of their people, only saw in 
 his return a military revolt, capable of reviving the 
 deplorable epochs when the Roman legions disposed 
 
 * This was written in 1828, and the conduct of Europe in 1830, proves 
 the truth of the assertion. Napoleon departed, believing in the truth of 
 the articles written from Vienna by Latour Dupin, and inserted in the 
 Journal dies Debats. They announced the departure of the king of Prussia 
 and the Emperor Alexander as certain. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 53 
 
 of the Empire at the will of their ambitious com- 
 manders; each of the sovereigns was fearful then, 
 right or wrong, of seeing his throne exposed to the 
 same dangers. Moreover, Austria trembled lest Italy 
 should be snatched from her, forgetting altogether the 
 ties which the events of 1814 had broken asunder. 
 Russia, convinced that she could not preserve Warsaw, 
 but in allying with her most natural rivals, sacrificed 
 everything to this end. Prussia, that solicited at "Vi- 
 enna for the dependency of Saxony, accepted the 
 other enlargements that were assured her, fearful of 
 not getting either. England, led by inferior men, 
 thought she foresaw a second time the imperial eagles 
 floating at Boulogne, at Antwerp, and in Egypt, and 
 lavished her subsidies to escape an imaginary danger, 
 or at least, one very exaggerated. 
 
 Thus were all interests at variance with the existence 
 of Napoleon. The declaration of the 13th March, 
 which placed him in a certain manner without the 
 pale of the laws of nations, sufficiently proves the 
 fears he inspired. If to all these motives, we add the 
 dread felt by Talleyrand of this return, the result of 
 which was to sequestrate the ten millions of bernois 
 funds he had in England, at the same time that his 
 fortune would be compromised in France through his 
 banishment, the violence of this famous declaration 
 will be easily understood, as the wording of the same 
 has been generally attributed to him. 
 
 In order to appease the powers, it would have been 
 necessary for the Emperor to have time to ensure 
 the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia, and the cession of 
 Italy to Austria. It would perhaps have been attended 
 
54 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 with success, had the negotiations been transl erred 
 singly to St. Petersburg and Vienna. But the decla- 
 ration of the 13 March, made at an European Congress, 
 left but little hope of success to these propositions for 
 preserving peace. 
 
 However, Napoleon at first thought that this decla- 
 ration had been prompted by the desire to second the 
 resistance which the Bourbons might oppose to him, 
 as well as by an exaggerated distrust of his ulterior 
 projects towards Europe. Nothing was more natural 
 than that the monarchs whose victories had reseated 
 Louis XYIII. upon his throne, should seek to maintain 
 him there ; but when the prince had been so easily 
 forced to another emigration, the question changed 
 its aspect. The Emperor had then reason to flatter 
 himself that the cabinets would retrace their steps, 
 when informed of the rapidity of his triumph, and of 
 the unheard of success of his enterprise, as well as of* 
 his pacific intentions. Unfortunately, the treaty of 
 alliance, offensive and defensive, signed the 25th March 
 between the great powers, very soon destroyed this 
 illusion.* 
 
 We are not certain that this resolution of the sov- 
 ereigns was really suggested by the general interest 
 of thrones, and that under this supposition it was best 
 because more expedient. The dynasty of Napoleon 
 had been gloriously inaugurated by victory, into the 
 
 * Some rather credulous publicists have attributed an essential part in 
 these important resolutions of Congress, to the intrigues of Fauche Borel, 
 a secret agent of the Bourbons ; it requires an astonishing quantity of 
 simplicity to believe that the cabinets of the great powers could listen to 
 the insinuations of such agents, in order to regulate their conduct under 
 such grave and important circumstances. 
 
TTIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 55 
 
 number of those who reigned in Europe, and his 
 alliance with the (laughter of the Caesars had doubly 
 enfeoffed him. Besides, it had perhaps been wiser to 
 have left him on the throne, than have him re- 
 placed by a government which being imposed through 
 violence, could with difficulty secure the repose of 
 France and of Europe. 
 
 It can scarcely be credited, that the fear of behold- 
 ing in this country the triumph of the elective prin- 
 ciple and that of national sovereignty, a sufficient 
 motive for so extraordinary a coalition; because this 
 solutive principle could not gain ground in Europe 
 through its partial application in any one country 
 whatever ; and if the ambition of France was dreaded, 
 nothing better could be done, than endowing her with 
 future ruptures by permitting her this elective gov- 
 ernment. Besides, when a principle is considered 
 fatal to states, it should not be resisted with cannon, 
 but by sage discussions, with experience and in time. 
 Napoleon, by accepting the treaties of Paris, and 
 maintained on his throne, would have strengthened 
 the governments generally, suppressed revolutionary 
 ideas and averted the crisis which has well nigh over* 
 thrown Europe two or three times since his fall ; the 
 volcano that still smokes more threateningly than we 
 imagine, had been extinct or smothered for an indefi- 
 nite period, and the European equilibrium had been 
 more firmly reestablished. 
 
 In fact, it was difficult to suppose that Napoleon 
 Would long maintain the stipulations of the treaties of 
 Paris ; the indignation excited throughout the country 
 bv these treaties had been one of the causes of the ex- 
 
56 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 pulsion of the Bourbons. Would lie have dared to 
 regard them as an eternal engagement ? The nation, 
 above all the army, whose strength placed on a war 
 footing had roused ambition, would they not have 
 impelled the Chief of State to seize the first occasion 
 to recover, at least, the line of the Rhine and the 
 Alps? 
 
 In weighing these divers considerations we can 
 easily conceive the double perplexity in which his 
 return had plunged the coalesced pow T ers, and the res- 
 olutions that were the natural consequences of it. The 
 conviction that the army alone had caused this revolu- 
 tion, and the fear of seeing the thrones at the mercy 
 of military chieftains, joined to a desire of consolida- 
 ting the shares of the conquests made from the 
 empire ; such were certainly the true incentives of 
 the monarchs ; either was sufficiently powerful to 
 determine them ; but it appeared very difficult to 
 decide, whether the danger of substituting for Napo- 
 leon a government feeble in itself, and imposed upon 
 them, w^as not greater than the ill effects of his return 
 in assuring new revolutions. 
 
 The external embarrassments resulting from the 
 acts of the Congress of Vienna, were not the only ones 
 felt by Napoleon, because the Duke d'Angouleme 
 being at Bordeaux at the time of his landing, had 
 taken immediate measures for disputing the empire 
 with him. Louis XVIII. had ordered this prince to 
 establish at Toulouse the seat of a royal govern- 
 ment, and had appointed him his Lieutenant in the 
 south of France. From Toulouse, where he had 
 rapidly organized resistance in concert with M. de Vi- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 57 
 
 trolles and the Count de Damas, the Duke had repair- 
 ed to Marseilles, where he had met with similar ova- 
 tions on the part of this parasitical population, whose 
 first wishes are mercantile wealth and substantial in- 
 terest. Through the aid of a few regiments that 
 remained faithful, and especially of the fanatical in- 
 habitants of Languedoc, where religious dissensions 
 were blended with the political quarrels, the Duke 
 organized three columns with which he ascended the 
 Rhone to retake Lyons and Grenoble ; but defection 
 also began in this body ; two regiments declared for 
 Napoleon, and the 10th of the line alone preserved a 
 thousand soldiers for the prince, who here joined from 
 six to seven thousands national guards. After having 
 beaten General Debelle at Loriol on the Drome, he 
 advanced on Yalence ; but the imperial officers sent 
 to Toulouse and Montpelier, had succeeded in having 
 the tri-colored flag displayed in these two cities, and 
 their garrisons, to declare for the Emperor. Mean- 
 while, Dauphiny also pronounced against the Bour- 
 bons, and Grouchy, ordered to Lyons, was preparing 
 the means for smothering this feeble spark of civil 
 war, by sending many small columns on Valence. 
 The prince, closely pressed by General Gilley, and 
 learning that the departments in his rear had recog- 
 nized the imperial government, signed on the 9th 
 April, at Pont-Saint-Esprit, a convention by which he 
 consented to evacuate France and embark. Grouchy, 
 in obedience to his orders, refused at first to rat- 
 ify this act, which Napoleon however hastened to 
 sanction. 
 
 Meanwhile, vexatious troubles breaking out in 
 
 3* 
 
58 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOBY OF 
 
 la Vendee, had forced fifteen thousand veterans to be 
 detached thither under General Lamarque ; this offi- 
 cer, previously distinguished for his activity, together 
 with that of General Fravot, had suppressed the fire 
 of civil war, the more formidable in this section of the 
 country than in the rest of France, as much because 
 of its locality as of the obstinate and devoted charac- 
 ter of the inhabitants. Notwithstanding, however, 
 the death of Larochejacquelin, killed in the battle of 
 Mathes, and the successes obtained at Saint-Giles and 
 Roche-Servieres, hostilities did not actually cease till 
 after the battle of Waterloo. 
 
 While these things were happening in France, and 
 at the Congress of Yienna, Murat still chanced to 
 complicate his brother-in-law's position, by rising in 
 arms in a way well w T orthy his eccentric and adven- 
 turous character. Informed of the negotiations that 
 had taken place betw r een France and Austria to depose 
 him, he demanded of the latter a passage into Italy to 
 reap vengeance for the threats of the ministry of Louis 
 XVIII. : he might have well known that this w^ould 
 be refused him. At the news of Napoleon's landing, 
 Murat at once hoped to make amends for his defection 
 in 1814. He was persuaded that the time had arriv- 
 ed for him to play a grand part, and that in promising 
 the people of Italy a national insurrection, he might 
 yet render himself the arbiter of great events. On the 
 22d of March, he debouched from Ancona with forty 
 thousand men, drove the Austrians from Ces&ne, and 
 favored by the population of Bologna and Modena, 
 rapidly invaded the states situated on the Po, up to 
 the gates of Placentia, while another column invaded 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 59 
 
 the Eoman states and Tuscany. He everywhere circu- 
 lated proclamations announcing that his object was to 
 reunite the Italians under one banner, and in its name 
 to take possession of the provinces he traversed : he even 
 meditated the invasion of Lombardy through Pied- 
 mont, when his progress was arrested by the declarations 
 of the English minister who menaced him with war. 
 The Austrians soon reassembled and hurled against 
 him General Bianchi, with twenty-five or thirty thou- 
 sand men. Leaving Florence with a majority of his 
 forces, this general marched by Foligno, so as to cut 
 off Murat's retreat, while Neipperg threatened him by 
 the route of Ancona. The king of Naples was obliged 
 to retire precipitately to avoid this untoward result ; 
 the decisive rencontre took place at Tolentino, on the 
 2d of May ; the Neapolitans, completely routed, dis- 
 persed in all directions. Murat, who has regained his 
 capital with a slender escort, abandoned even by his 
 warmest partisans, is constrained to fly from Naples 
 and seek refuge in France ; he lands at Toulon. A 
 compact signed at Capua, by his Lieutenants, on the 
 20th of May, leads back Ferdinand IV. to the throne 
 of the two Sicilies. 
 
 Nothing was ever more ill-timed than this affray. 
 If Austria had had the least inclination to retrace her 
 steps regarding the declarations of the 13th of March, 
 this rendered it impossible ; and in even supposing 
 that the cabinet of Vienna was resolved to persist, 
 everything should be avoided that tended to bind 
 closer the ties of the coalition. In a military point of 
 view, this was taking the initiative much too soon, 
 because hostilities were commenced even before 
 
60 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Napoleon's entree into Paris was known, so that lie 
 was far from being able to second him. As a diver- 
 sion, the king of Naples could do much, but the desire 
 to act a principal part in the war was an absurdity. *' 
 
 Thus, on two occasions did Murat compromise the 
 Empire, the first by declaring for its enemies ; the 
 second in arming himself mal a propos. He expiated 
 by a chivalric death, the two faults that had precipi- 
 tated him from his throne ; as a soldier, his will be a 
 glorious memory. 
 
 Meanwhile, the sad result of this strange attempt, 
 the success of the Austrians, and the advices that 
 reached France of what was happening at "Vi- 
 enna, and in all the rest of Europe, was of a 
 nature to inspire just fears in the least prejudiced 
 minds. A formidable war threatened anew the na- 
 tional existence, and all hope of diverting the storm 
 by concessions had vanished ; Napoleon had to decide 
 either to brave it, or to shun it most cowardly : be- 
 tween two such resolutions could a man of his charac- 
 ter hesitate ? If his personal honor had alone been at 
 stake, he had had the power to sacrifice it to the fu- 
 ture of France ; but was not the honor of the nation 
 more involved even than his own ? A population of 
 thirty millions, who had just elevated the greatest 
 citizen to the throne, could not, because of a diplomatic 
 declaration emanating from a foreign congress, drive 
 
 * Many persons think that Murat was prompted by Napoleon to invade 
 Italy, thus facilitating his enterprise by giving occupation to the Austrians. 
 This had been well after he saw the impossibility of maintaining peace ; 
 but if he nourished a hope, this was most imprudent, and in either case the 
 time was very ill chosen. It is then more than probable, that he was ex- 
 ceedingly annoyed by it. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 6l 
 
 away tins adopted chief, and submit to the yoke they 
 wished to impose ! 
 
 Some mighty voices have however been raised, re- 
 proaching Napoleon for having continued on the 
 throne after the reception of these declarations from 
 Vienna. According to their views, he should have 
 frankly exposed to the French people the position he 
 held in the eyes of Europe, now alarmed and in arms 
 against him, then have proposed to the nation the 
 three following propositions for its decision : 
 
 1st, To place itself without delay at the mercy of 
 Louis XYIII. 
 
 2d, To proclaim on the contrary Napoleon II., with 
 a regency, or any other government that seemed 
 preferable. 
 
 3d or lastly, To declare the nullity of the abdication 
 at Fontainbleau, in again awarding the Empire to Na- 
 poleon himself. 
 
 If the nation had adopted this last, then the fate of 
 France had been irrevocably bound to his own, and 
 any abandonment^had been cowardice and felony. 
 
 The fervent and thoughtless apostles of national 
 sovereignty might find something specious in these 
 ideas, but at bottom they were devoid of all wisdom. 
 In the first place, Napoleon did not immediately des- 
 pair of leading Austria, and perhaps Russia, to more 
 favorable views of his cause ; he renewed his attempts, 
 and even sent General Flahaut to A r ienna with this 
 intention. Subsequently, he had too much pride to 
 submitthus to a sorl of proscription that would have 
 wounded a prince leasl capableof reigning, and which 
 must have seemed doubly humiliating to a Captain as 
 
62 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 illustrious as himself. Finally, it is probable that he 
 still loved power too much, to follow the example of 
 Charles V. and Victor Armedee, and seek repose in a 
 cloister. Besides, could he entertain the idea of flying 
 from France as proscribed; where Louis XVIII. had 
 not failed to return, accompanied by a portion of the 
 coalition ? "Would this not be delivering all those who 
 were devoted to his cause, to the fury of a re-action? 
 
 Moreover, in abdicating early in April, to whom 
 would he have intrusted his power, there being 
 then no constituted authority % A beautiful conception 
 truly, that of leaving France for three months without 
 a government, at a time when eight hundred thousand 
 men were bursting in upon her ! There was no choice 
 in the case ; he had to fly while supplicating Louis 
 XVIII. to re-enter his capital, or he had to fight. The 
 alternative was a painful one, the chances wxre fright- 
 ful, but alas! he had none other: and if well seconded, 
 Napoleon felt the deep conviction of triumphing over 
 his enemies. 
 
 Other Aristarchus', as reckless as those were timid, 
 have pretended that far from yielding to the storm, 
 the Emperor should have anticipated it, and at once 
 availing himself of the first enthusiasm of the people, 
 had shown to what extent he was yet formidable, by 
 invading Belgium, and proclaiming liberty throughout 
 Europe ; whereas his pacific attitude lulled the nation 
 into fancied security. Pitiable declamation ! A people 
 in blouses, and armed with pikes, cannot be hurled 
 against the warlike legions of entire Europe. A grand 
 army was necessary, and to obtain one, it was all im- 
 portant sacredly to preserve the nucleus that existed, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 63 
 
 to be increased by means of this very population that 
 was being levied and organized. To this end, nothing 
 had been effected, and the pacific attitude charged to 
 Napoleon, consisted in sixteen hours daily labor for 
 three months, to create this army. He increased the 
 regiments of the line from two to five battalions, and 
 reinforced those of cavalry with two squadrons ; he 
 ordered the organizing of 200 battalions of national 
 gardes mobiles, 40 battalions of the old and new guard, 
 and 20 regiments of marines. The old disbanded sol- 
 diers were all recalled to their standards, the con- 
 scriptions of 1814 and 1815 were levied ; even the re- 
 tired officers and soldiers were induced to join. By 
 the 1st of June, that is, in two months, the effective 
 strength of the French army had been augmented 
 from 200,000 to 414,000 : by the month of September, 
 he could have counted on 700,000 men, but time failed 
 him. 
 
 It would be absurd to believe that in the midst of 
 these preparations Napoleon had not thought of the 
 invasion of Belgium, to secure the defensive line of 
 the Rhine. From the day after his arrival at Paris, 
 this question had been debated, but more than one 
 obstacle had to be surmounted. 
 
 At first, there were in hand but 40,000 men, la Yen- 
 dee had revolted, the Duke of Angouleme was march- 
 ing on Lyons, and the Marseillese on Grenoble. It 
 behoved him to be master at home before wishing to 
 be master abroad. A still stronger reason hindered this 
 invasion. How was such a step to be reconciled to 
 the letter, in which the Emperor offered the sovereigns 
 a sincere and durable peace ? If he had been rash in 
 
64 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 calculating on the friendliness of all, there were still 
 some motives for relying on the good- will of his father- 
 in-law. The Emperor of Austria had sought to pre- 
 vent his dethronement in 1814 ; at the time of his re- 
 turn, the discussion with Russia grew warm respecting 
 the division of Gallicia, and the fate of Saxony. There 
 was every reason to hope that the cabinet of Yienna 
 would consent in 1815, to what its negotiator had 
 himself proposed in 1811: to uphold the Emperor on 
 the throne, if he consented to abandon Italy. Napoleon 
 made this proposition, and notwithstanding the famous 
 declaration of the 13th March, they still hoped to see 
 the father of Maria Louisa returu to his first views. 
 Nevertheless, the French have censured Napoleon 
 with an inclination for war ; public opinion having 
 declared for peace, repelled all idea of aggression^ be- 
 fore knowing whether the maintenance of this peace 
 was possible. 
 
 Even admitting that it was easy to foresee the issue 
 of these pacific measures, little could be gained by 
 hastening to Brussels, yet guarded by an army of occu- 
 pation of the Germanic Confederation : Luxemburg 
 and Mentz no longer belonged to France, and these 
 places, as well as Holland, giving the allies many de- 
 bouches on the left of the Rhine, it is not certain that 
 any benefit had accrued from this invasion ; the fight- 
 ing would have commenced on the Meuse and Moselle, 
 instead of on the Sambre, that is all. Taking the least 
 probable supposition, their succeeding in subjecting 
 Antwerp and Luxemburg without a siege, it would be 
 necessary to throw into them strong garrisons, and the 
 French were not at all in condition to do so. If, on 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 65 
 
 the contrary, these important places continued in the 
 power of the enemy, of what use was Brussels, sur- 
 rounded by Maestricht, Luxemburg, Bergen-on-Zoom, 
 and Antwerp ? Was it not wiser to hold the skeletons 
 of the old regi :nents in hand, in order to double the 
 number of effectives by a new organization^ than to 
 scatter them through Belgium ? 
 
 It has been said that it would have been necessary 
 for him to commence anew a complete revolution, ta- 
 king advantage of all the arbitrary resources d cre- 
 ates, and to rouse all the passions, profiting by their 
 blind devotion, as without it France could not be 
 saved. This was Fouche's advice, and especially Car- 
 not's, who remained a thorough Jacobin under the 
 cloak of Count. Many causes prevented Napoleon 
 from having recourse to these means ; the first was 
 that he dreaded popular commotions, and with reason 
 too, as he had no rein by which to guide them, and 
 they consume those by whom excited ; the second was 
 that he was not at all convinced that anarchy and the 
 overthrow of all social order were infallible means of 
 saving a nation : these succeeded in 1793, through a 
 concurrence of unexampled circumstances, that will 
 probably never again recur. 
 
 Besides, whatever fear the Emperor had of these 
 popular storms, he believed it necessary to excite 
 the masses to a certain degree, not however without 
 fixing it within certain limits ; the task is difficult 
 and the path a slippery one. To unchain the revo- 
 lutionary tiger with a deliberate purpose, comes 
 within the province only of such madmen as Marat 
 and Robespierre, or of extravagant men devoid of 
 
66 POLITICAL AOT MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 all experience. After having authorized federated 
 societies, destined to rouse the public mind for the 
 defence of the country, he was active in preventing 
 them from extending their action to affect the so- 
 cial order ; to accomplish this, a suitable strength in 
 the administration, and forecast in the institutions, were 
 requisite; but it was very difficult to sustain this 
 double-faced performance. 
 
 Because of the new elections, Napoleon was actu- 
 ally to find himself in presence of republicans con- 
 quered the 18th Brumaire, of royalists who did not 
 desire his empire, and of anarchists who wanted no 
 government at all. But by flattering the hopes of the 
 first two, and the follies of the last, he counted on 
 their influence and patriotic declamations to excite 
 the people to arms. While setting at work these 
 revolutionary elements, the chief of State hoped to 
 direct the employment of a power sufficiently firm to 
 repress anarchy. Unfortunately, those over-excited 
 soon perceived that the reign of clubs had passed 
 forever, and held forth his caution as a proof of his 
 thirst for power, while they constituted the sole guar- 
 anty for social order and for those who were to guide 
 the vessel of State amidst the frightful tempests by 
 which it was threatened. 
 
 The assembly of the Champ de Mai was at hand ; 
 it was necessary at once, to explain frankly the 
 changes that should be made in the institutions of the 
 empire. Napoleon had announced his intention of 
 concerting these changes with the deputies of the na- 
 tion which would be delegated for this purpose ; but 
 the declarations of the Congress of Vienna, and the 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 67 
 
 preparations of the new coalition leaving little doubt 
 of an impending war, he had to choose between the 
 necessity of sending the electors back to their homes, 
 so as to seize an indefinite dictatorial power, or to 
 present, himself, the modifications which he was dis- 
 posed to make in the exercise of this power, knowing 
 that it would be imprudent to depart for the army, 
 leaving France without a legal government, a prey 
 to dogmatical disputes, and to the shocks of factions. 
 It is probable, however, that Napoleon was not sorry 
 in having this plausible pretext for consolidating his 
 power ; because, if dogmatical discussions on consti- 
 tutions are always stormy in an assembly of four or 
 five hundred persons, and usually result in the tri- 
 umph of doctrines the least calculated for securing 
 the necessary strength and stability to the govern- 
 ment, how could such a discussion be carried on, even 
 through delegates, in the presence of a hundred thou- 
 sand electors ? 
 
 The emperor judged it, then, indispensable to take 
 the initiative, in the modifications necessary for 
 blending harmoniously the ancient institutions of the 
 empire, with the liberal opinions with which they 
 had clashed. These modifications were discussed in 
 a council composed of ministers and the council of 
 state, to which was invited Benjamin Constant, the 
 most influential of those theoretical publicists, who 
 were so noisy in the tribune and such poor actors 
 when governing. 
 
 Desirous of gaining over the ex-tribune, who was 
 constantly at the head of all the doctrinaires opposi- 
 tion, Napoleon had him called the 14th April, for 
 
68 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 particular consultation on these important measures, 
 before submitting them to the council. He exposed 
 his views with & frankness, a coolness, and an impar- 
 tiality, for w T hich Benjamin Constant had the kind- 
 ness seriously to reproach him after his fall ; as if 
 such questions should ever be treated w^ith passion, 
 impulse or dissimulation. His letters on the hundred 
 days in which he gives an account of this interview, 
 are not the least curious among the writings published 
 by Napoleon's adversaries for their own justification ! 
 
 " The nation," said he to him, " has reposed free 
 from all political agitation for twelve years ; the past 
 year she has been without war ; this double repose 
 has rendered her in need of activity. She wishes or 
 believes she wishes a public tribune and assemblies : 
 she has not always wanted them / she cast herself at 
 my feet when I reached the capital. You, who at- 
 tempted an opposition, should remember it : where 
 was your support, your strength ? Nowhere. I have 
 taken less authority than I have been invited to as- 
 sume. 
 
 u Now, everything is changed ; the taste for consti- 
 tutions, debates and harangues appear to have re- 
 turned. Nevertheless, be not deceived, it is but the 
 minority who wish it. The people only want me : 
 have you not seen them, pressing upon my steps, pre- 
 cipitating themselves from the mountains, seeking 
 me, saluting me But a signal from me is ne- 
 cessary, for them to fall upon the royalists and nobles. 
 .... But I do not wish to be the king of a Jacquerie. 
 
 ... If there be a means of governing with a con- 
 stitution, at the proper time I demand nothing better, 
 
TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 69 
 
 though this be not so easy as it is thought I 
 
 have desired the empire of the world, and to secure 
 it unlimited power was necessary; solely to govern 
 
 France, a constitution may do better Although 
 
 this is still a problem, it can be tried. I have wished 
 the empire of the world : who, in my place, had not 
 
 wished it ? The world invited me to govern it 
 
 people and governors, in emulation of each other, 
 cast themselves under my sceptre. . . Let me then see 
 the system that will seem to you possible ; give me 
 your thoughts. Public discussions, free elections, re- 
 sponsible ministers, liberty of the press — I am willing 
 for all this ; I am convinced on this subject.* 
 
 " I am the man of the people : if they really wish 
 liberty, I owe it to them I have never dream- 
 ed of oppressing them to please myself I had 
 
 grand designs, fate has decided upon them. I am no 
 
 longer a conqueror, I can no longer be one I 
 
 have but one mission, that of lifting up France and 
 giving her a suitable government. I am not willing 
 to raise false hopes. I permit it to be said that nego- 
 tiations are pending, there are none. I foresee a diffi- 
 cult struggle, a protracted war ; though I desire peace 
 I will be unable to obtain it but by force of victories ; 
 the nation must support me. In exchange she will 
 want liberty : she has as much of it as it is possible to 
 give her without falling into anarchy. The situation 
 is a new one ; I demand but to be enlightened. I am 
 
 * Napoleon might have told tho truth when he expressed this idea; 
 but he was soon convinced that he had erred, or at least that he inter dod 
 this liberty with all the means for repressing license. 
 
70 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 growing old ; the repose of a constitutional king 
 might suit me ; it will suit my son still better." 
 
 We perceive from these words, that Napoleon felt 
 the delicacy of the task imposed on him. Those, in- 
 imical to all power, who have accused him of dupli- 
 city during this short reign of a hundred days, because 
 he did not wish a return of the regime of 1793 or 
 1799, can rest assured on the very assertions of Benj. 
 Constant, that he frankly adopted the deliberative 
 assemblies and the public tribune, as a necessity of 
 the epoch, while far from partaking of the universal 
 infatuation on the subject. Nevertheless, they sus- 
 pect and accuse him, as they did Louis XVIII., of in- 
 sincerity in this species of political conversion. If the 
 principles that were in full force at the establishment 
 of the empire, proved that experience in affairs had 
 very much modified the liberal ideas he had professed 
 during the first years of the revolution, everything 
 bears us out in the belief that he would have respect- 
 ed the new institutions promised, had the other estab- 
 lished powers sincerely desired to remain within their 
 limits, and been well satisfied that their true constitu- 
 tional mission is to second the government and not to 
 restrain or annul its action. 
 
 We have already stated, that Napoleon did not fail 
 to recognize the advantages that might be expected 
 from assemblies ; but he also appreciated the immense 
 dangers they present, when prudent and strong insti- 
 tutions do not sufficiently regulate their influence and 
 procedure : he thought that modern charters and 
 the political education of the French had not as yet 
 reached this point. Experience will prove if he was 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 71 
 
 wrong : meanwhile, I will be permitted to present 
 some observations drawn from more recent events, 
 and which, on the contrary, bear us out in believing 
 that he was perfectly right. 
 
 The dogmas on liberty that have created so much 
 sensation in our day, and which he, with many others, 
 had professed in good faith, are certainly of the most 
 alluring nature if applied to man individually ; but 
 when, applied collectively, to societies called nations, 
 and to governmental ideas, we acknowledge that this 
 term is often greatly abused. The result is a sort of 
 confusion in constitutional language, an obscure meta- 
 physics that have produced the strangest political 
 creeds. 
 
 Men of weight and learning have laid down as a 
 principle, that authority, that is to say government, 
 being an encroacher by nature, finds itself as a conse- 
 quence the natural enemy of liberty. With such a 
 beautiful system as a starting point, it is very plain 
 that all men calling themselves friends of liberty, must 
 be regarded as born enemies to authority, whether 
 it emanates from a consul, a prefect, an emperor, or a 
 king. Thus has it resulted that administrations, 
 whether public, royal, imperial, or otherwise, estab- 
 lished for the protection of public interests and private 
 rights ; functionaries who should administer justice, 
 protect the lives and property of the citizens, organize 
 fleets and armies, promote and regulate public instruc- 
 tion, conduct wars, deliberate upon and conclude 
 alliances, negotiate treaties, dig canals, construct for- 
 tresses, prepare and develop the national strength : 
 these authorities in a word, who should be the pride 
 
72 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 of every well-organized nation, have been transformed 
 by these strange doctrines into public enemies . . . . , 
 into objects of suspicion and hate. 
 
 Let me not be accused of exaggeration : I appeal to 
 all those who have occupied a position of any emi- 
 nence in France ; there is not one of them who does 
 not to-day include a good portion of those he govern- 
 ed, among the number of his adversaries or detractors. 
 It is necessary to state that the apostles of these sin- 
 gular maxims, have not always been hair-brained 
 youths just from college, or proletarians without name, 
 and without existence. The most ardent have been 
 found among the writers who have acquired celebrity 
 or popularity ; among grave magistrates; in the high- 
 est grades of the army ; finally, among the legislators 
 who have reechoed them from the tribune, amid the 
 acclamations of all the adepts ; so that a good number 
 of deputies, led by these utopianists, were persuaded 
 that the chambers also were in duty bound to enchain 
 and obstruct authority, whenever an occasion offered. 
 
 With such ideas a nation becomes ungovernable 
 and rushes to inevitable ruin, unless a violent catas- 
 trophe, or a great man gives renewed vigor to social 
 order by placing it on surer bases ; the bloody lessons 
 of experience are the sole remedies lot an evil so 
 deeply rooted. Struck with these inconveniences, 
 Napoleon was convinced that to govern well with 
 such elements, there was no institution that could give 
 too much strength to the public administration, and it 
 should be acknowledged to his glory that all he did 
 in a contrary sense w r as forced upon him by circum- 
 stances. It should also be acknowledged that he 
 
TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 73 
 
 always rendered justice to those estimable men, free 
 from all feeling of personal ambition, who in good 
 faith professed these exaggerated doctrines of liberty, 
 such as Lanjuinais, Benj. Constant, Lafayette, &c, &c. 
 As private individuals, or as philosophers, civic crowns 
 perhaps should be awarded them ; but as politicians 
 and founders of fundamental institutions, they were 
 in his eyes, but apostles of crude theories, more fatal 
 than useful ; because, by substituting unceasingly 
 declamations and phrases in place of true genius and 
 the art of governing, they will always put a nation at 
 the mercy of the most rash and most crafty rhetori- 
 cian, and lead to eternal conflicts between the execu- 
 tive power and those by whom it is so much coveted. 
 Undoubtedly, what is called public liberty, — consti- 
 tutional government, — equilibrium of the three powers 
 are very beautiful things, seductive theories, perhaps 
 very good with the counterpoise of a powerful aristo- 
 cracy.* I think, too, that they might agree with 
 absolute democracy in a new and isolated nation like 
 the United States of America, in the midst of a vast 
 continent, with no neighbors but settlements of sav- 
 ages without power, or without ambition, because in 
 such a case internal commotions would be devoid of 
 danger to the political powers of the country ; but 
 with a nation surrounded by formidable and jealous 
 neighbors, with a nation whose old social body is 
 composed of ancient feudal nobility, young war-like 
 
 * If by public liberty, we understand individual liberty, equality in the 
 eye of the law, and the concurrence of the nation, to a rational extent, in 
 the framing of laws, nothing mdoubtedly is more desirable. Even the 
 liberty of the press confined within just bounds, may also be added. 
 Everything beyond this, leads to license and anarchy. 
 
 4 
 
74 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 nobility, proud and turbulent tiers etat and inflamma- 
 ble minds, it is altogether otherwise, or it would at 
 least be necessary to rest the institutions on more solid 
 bases than our modern charters have done. 
 
 So far, we will be permitted to believe with Napo- 
 leon, that positively the institution of three powers in 
 equilibrio, has been but a beautiful fiction, the appli- 
 cation of which does not correspond with the seductive 
 theory. To be as admirable as it is thought, this polit- 
 ical trinity should have that unity of faith and action 
 belonging to the religious trinity ; for say and do what 
 we may, the action of a government should never be 
 but one and indivisible. "Whether it represents the 
 nation among strangers, or dispenses justice at home, 
 or organizes and disposes of the land and naval forces, 
 which are the symbols of national power, its system 
 and its progress should be uniform ; there cannot be 
 two in one state. Now, if three independent powers, 
 ever jealous of their influence and authority, are 
 established, what means will you have of establishing 
 this unity, indispensable in the direction of the grand 
 affairs of the country ? All assemblies in the world 
 when adorned, right or wrong, with the title of repre- 
 sentatives of the nation,* will be cavilling and usurp- 
 ing by their nature, especially if they have the initia- 
 tive in the laws ; because with this initiative they will 
 be able to guide the vessel of state if they will, and 
 they will wish it whenever they can. The evil would 
 be without danger, if it were possible for an assembly, 
 
 * Elective chambers are far from being always the faithful representa- 
 tions of the interests and wishes of the country : they often represent but 
 a small fraction, perhaps, the most selfish and the least national. 
 
TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. T5 
 
 composed of small specialties meeting now and then, 
 to be qualified of itself to rule a great nation ; but as 
 the impossibility of it is acknowledged, it forcibly 
 results therefrom, that by according the initiative to 
 this assembly, you give it all the means of perplexing 
 the administration and rendering the same impossible, 
 without giving it the means of governing, 
 
 Nothing could flow from such a state of things but 
 endless uncertainty, an unheard-of distress in the 
 direction of affairs, and the impossibility of the gov- 
 ernment's determining on a stable system of foreign 
 policy, that which is always the most decisive for the 
 maintenance of a country's greatness. To this impos- 
 sibility should be added that of fixing on a good sys- 
 tem of military organization, from nothing previously 
 prepared, for the contingent events that menaced the 
 most important future interests of the state. 
 
 This perpetual clashing of the government and the 
 elective chambers, deprived of an aristocratic counter- 
 poise, will be not only difficult to avoid or modify, — a 
 dreadful instability in the personnel of the ministry will 
 also result as a consequence ; an inconsistency not the 
 less hurtful to a state than the most threatening inva- 
 sion, in producing but a phantasmagorical magistracy, 
 to which might be applied the famous verse of Cor- 
 neille : 
 
 " Ces petits souverains qu'oh fait pour une annee, 
 Voyant d'un temps si court leur puissance bornee, 
 Des plus heureux desseins font avorter le fruit, 
 De peur de le iaisser a celui qui les suit: 
 Comme ile out peu de part au bien dont ils ordonnent, 
 Dans le champ du public largemerjt ils moissonnent, 
 Assures que chacun leur pardonne aisement, 
 Esperant a bod tour un pareil traitement." — China. 
 
76 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 In fact, what country could prosper, at home or 
 abroad, with apprenticed ministers, succeeding each 
 other every six months, and who are superseded before 
 concluding their novitiate ? 
 
 A man may be endowed with brilliant genius, and 
 still require time in which to learn the duties of his 
 department, and reflect on systems that might ame- 
 liorate its progress ; and in foreign policy especially, 
 what confidence can be inspired in her neighbors, — 
 her natural allies, — by such instability ? It were bet- 
 ter if each minister were allowed a permanent under- 
 secretary of state, who would at least preserve the 
 tradition of all that would be beneficial and useful to 
 the department ; but far from recurring to these wise 
 means, these innovators have labored to abolish a por- 
 tion of those that existed. Such a state of things, 
 deplorable under an able king, would become mortal 
 under a feeble prince or during a minority. 
 
 It will be said that the enmity of one of the three 
 powers could be counterbalanced by the united will 
 of the other two. This would be true, if we enter- 
 tained at least the thought of establishing, in the 
 fundamental law, that the union of two of these pow- 
 ers, twice ascertained, and in two different sessions, 
 would suffice to sanction a law or any act whatever, 
 notwithstanding the opposition of the third ; but it 
 has never been done ; and this may perchance be un- 
 wise, because, since you desire an equilibrium between 
 three authorities, it would be well to admit that two 
 of them represent the majority, and that it is absurd 
 to desire that one alone have the power of annihilating 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 77 
 
 the wishes of the other two : in such a case, the mi- 
 nority makes the law. 
 
 It will be answered that the charter might provide 
 for this, in giving royalty the right of dissolution, and 
 that of nominating new peers, and giving the cham- 
 bers the right of rejecting proposed laws and refusing 
 taxation. These means are at once violent and in- 
 efficacious remedies, because, in order that the disso- 
 lution of the chambers be of any service, it would be 
 necessary to admit that all the electors were consum- 
 mate politicians, and capable of deciding on the dif- 
 ferences that had caused it. But such electors will 
 never exist. In fact, if it be true that this measure is 
 often the result of miserable personal intrigues and 
 of a deplorable party spirit, on the merits of which 
 an elector would be much perplexed to pass any judg- 
 ment whatever, how can a favorable result be ex- 
 pected? How would a new election condemn an 
 intrigue, the plot of which had been contrived by the 
 very men who declare themselves the directors of 
 public opinion ? 
 
 Let us even take things like true optimists, and 
 suppose, as these things should be, that the dissolution 
 was only the result of a serious struggle between two 
 systems of politics strongly opposed to each other, 
 and not that of ambitious individuals. In this case, 
 is it not evident that the electors would be unable to 
 decide which of the two systems would best suit the 
 country ? Questions present themselves, not only in 
 internal politics, but still more in foreign policy, which, 
 though enveloped in appearances the most seductive, 
 contain elements of life and death to the power of a 
 
78 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 state. Will these questions be wisely settled by the 
 licensed dealers and small land-holders, when the 
 greatest intellects of the nation are perplexed and di- 
 vided as to the system to be followed ? And then, is 
 it not known how electors choose their local deputies, 
 who perhaps represent very well their arrondisse- 
 ments, but often ill-understand the general interests of 
 France? Is it not known, what part intrigue and 
 camaraderie play in this choice ? Are we ignortat of 
 the influence exercised by the journals at the capital, 
 and of the spirit in which they are edited ; what their 
 candor, their impartiality, their wisdom, the profun- 
 dity of their views, their pretended patriotism ? With 
 such elements, what can be the result of a dissolution ? 
 Will they dare say that the re-election will present 
 the real wishes of France, when twenty or thirty votes, 
 perhaps the most indifferent in the country, exacted 
 through intrigue and party spirit, will have been ac- 
 quired by the opposition and secured its triumph ? 
 Is it not frightful to think, that^by the aid of a facti- 
 tious majority, certain ambitious men, without pru- 
 dence or depth of thought, will be able to secure the 
 adoption of a principle anarchical in its character 
 and destructive of all national greatness ; a principle 
 which would not only disturb the state internally, 
 but would remove the means of waging war at once 
 useful and of a result almost certain, to be followed 
 by foolish and desperate struggles, to sustain Utopian 
 ideas and flatter popular passions ? A singular equi- 
 librium this, that will give to twenty deputies the 
 power of annulling a good system, adopted by the 
 king, the ministers, the chamber of peers, the council 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 79 
 
 of state, and even half of the elective chamber, less 
 these twenty votes ! And such institutions will be 
 called the perfectibility of the human mind, the 
 chef-d'oeuvre of a progressive age ! ! 
 
 The appointment of the new peers, conceded to roy- 
 alty, has not, perhaps, the same inconveniences as the 
 dissolution, but it has some others. When made in 
 small numbers, the spirit of the chamber may not be 
 changed ; made inconsiderately, and in larger num- 
 bers, it debases this precious institution, the sole bar- 
 rier against levelling demagogism. A wise govern- 
 ment should not have recourse to such measures 
 merely to maintain a ministry, but only when the ves- 
 sel of state is in imminent danger. 
 
 We thus see that the trinitarian system actually of- 
 fers more chances of rupture, than of efficacious 
 means for securing a useful and advantageous equili- 
 brium ; since royalty, in striking the elective cham- 
 bers, strikes falsely, and nothing usually remains but 
 wounds. 
 
 The means possessed by the elective chambers for 
 opposing a project or a system approved by royalty 
 and the peers, are still worse, because the refusal of 
 any particular law would be insignificant if it was 
 not at times a question of existence ; the refusal of 
 the budget alone, could overthrow the ministry. This 
 presents the gravest of constitutional questions. To 
 what extent would an assembly actually in a minority 
 in the trinitarian government, have the right to disor- 
 ganize the state throughout, by refusing to levy the 
 necessary taxes for settling the accounts of the army 
 and navy, and securing the payment of magistrates 
 
80 POLITICAL AOT MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 and the public debt ? And this, perhaps, to gratify 
 a miserable party rancor, a rancor actually arising 
 from the fact, that the monarch or the ministry enjoy 
 a transcendent capacity of which the proud medioc- 
 rity are jealous.* No, such a charter is not perfec- 
 tion ; as it gives all power for evil without giving an 
 equal measure of power for good. 
 
 I do not pretend to deduce from this that all consti- 
 tutional charters are deceptions, and that all govern- 
 ments with chambers are impossible ; I only wish to 
 say, that the combinations adopted up to this time 
 have not fulfilled the object for which they were in- 
 tended, and that to be successful, recourse to other 
 methods is necessary. 
 
 The proposition is a simple one ; for a representa- 
 tive government to be a good one, and able to proceed 
 successfully, the constitution must be a good one : 
 when the institutions are perverted, the representative 
 government is the most deplorable of all. Now, to 
 base a constitutional monarchy on proper foundations 
 and to frame a good charter, it is necessary, above all 
 things, firmly to establish the fundamental truths upon 
 which it should rest, namely : 
 
 1st. That the popular masses are, by their nature, 
 called upon to be governed, not to govern ; that it is 
 the province of the middle classes to represent the 
 democratic interests of the country, and to discharge 
 
 * If a refusal of the budget was voted by a majority of twenty votes, the 
 consequence would be, that twenty deputies would have had a power su- 
 perior to that of the king, peers, ministers, and two hundred deputies 
 who voted with the government. These twenty men would proclaim 
 themselves the voice of France, and would, through self-love or ambition, 
 disorganize the country. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 81 
 
 the duties appertaining thereto in a just and equita- 
 ble manner. 
 
 2d. That the chamber of peers should represent the 
 national notabilites of all kinds that exist, and the in- 
 terests connected with them. 
 
 3d. That the executive power, that is, the throne, 
 represents the nation and all its interests among for- 
 eign powers ; it also represents the interests of all 
 classes of citizens among each other, since it is by na- 
 ture, as it is its duty to conciliate the interests of all, 
 not desiring the good of one to the detriment of 
 others, except in a very few cases where the general 
 interest of the country imperiously demands this ex- 
 ception. 
 
 4th. That the democratic elective chamber, not 
 representing the entire nation, but only a portion of 
 the middle classes, will be powerless in any case to 
 arrogate to itself the sovereignty, without committing 
 a signal and criminal usurpation. 
 
 These are grand and incontestible truths, — though 
 sad prejudices, bad passions, and sometimes bad gov- 
 ernments, appear at times to have given them the lie. 
 
 When perfectly convinced of these truths, which 
 will not be the less real for having remained unac- 
 knowledged by the present generation, then you may 
 perhaps be able to establish good institutions ; but as 
 long as you proclaim popular sovereignty, the sover- 
 eignty of an elective chamber; as long as you boldly 
 profess dogmas tending to treat as an enemy this exe- 
 cutive power, designed to conciliate, defend, and unite 
 into one, these interests of your different classes and 
 different localities ; finally, as long as your laws and 
 
82 POLITICAL ASTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 your discourses tend to debase and annul this power 
 which is the true guaranty of national greatness, then 
 you may attempt a thousand theories, establish a thou- 
 sand charters : they will always prove to be works of 
 deception, without consistency, and fatal to the 
 country. 
 
 If a purely democratic elective chamber without an 
 aristocratic counterpoise, and in session only during 
 certain months of the year, wishes to rule the state, 
 anarchy is inevitable ; because, in order that the 
 wheels of government possess the necessary action, it 
 is indispensable that the elective chamber be an in- 
 strument and not an obstacle. In a word, it is neces- 
 sary in a monarchy that the king be king and the 
 deputies be his best counsellors. ... If you insist on 
 being governed by chambers, or by one chamber, then 
 have a senate for life, which is recruited through its 
 own proper choice, and not by department elections, 
 — an aristocratic senate, like that of Rome and Berne ; 
 otherwise, every act will be of short duration, and 
 the state becoming the prey of intrigue, will be con- 
 sumed or fall into endless revolutions. 
 
 We can conclude from the preceding : — 
 
 1st. That if the equilibrium of the constitutional 
 powers is the most important and most desirable end 
 to which a fundamental charter can aspire, this equi- 
 librium must be real and perfectly poised, or the 
 entire governmental edifice will be found falsified and 
 compromised. 
 
 2d. That it is dangerous to accord the initiative of 
 the laws to the chambers, it being sufficient to give 
 them the right of demanding from the ministry, a 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 83 
 
 law on a determined object that these may have lost 
 sight of. 
 
 3d. That the pure and simple dissolution of the 
 elective chambers is a work of deception, of which 
 intrigue will generally gather all the fruits, if an 
 appeal can be had to the electors themselves, or if 
 the law does not interdict the re-election of the 
 same deputies ; because, to make a true appeal to 
 the French nation, it would be necessary to appoint 
 beforehand a certain number of extra deputies, or 
 require the election of an entirely new deputation, 
 to ascertain the opinion of the electoral body on the 
 system that may have led to the dissolution.* 
 
 4th. That the usual budget should be voted at 
 least for three or four years, and that extraordinary 
 expenses or additional taxes should alone be voted 
 annually. 
 
 5th. Lastly, that it would be necessary to find 
 means for preventing party intrigues from paralyzing 
 two of the powers, and a large portion of the third, 
 otherwise, the equilibrium of the powers and the 
 government of the majority will be a double illusion. 
 
 Without these precautions, the governing of a great 
 nation through elective assemblies, meeting tempora- 
 rily, and composed of purely democratic elements, will 
 be as painful a task as that of rolling the rock of 
 Sisyphus. If examples from the Romans be cited in 
 opposition, I will answer those who understand the 
 
 * The extra deputies could be appointed beforehand, bo that in case 
 of a dissolution, there would be a new vote more generally authenticated. 
 This is merely indicating a delect in the equilibrium of the powers, with- 
 out pretending to state the means of correcting it. 
 
84 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 institutions of this great people so superficially, that 
 their government was not an elective democracy, 
 and that the aristocratic senate appointed for life, or 
 hereditary patricians, are the only assemblies that 
 have ever properly directed the policy of a country ; 
 again, those which history recalls, were always forced 
 to recognize the supremacy of an executive power, 
 either under the name of consul or under the title of 
 Doge and the council of ten, whose powers were any- 
 thing but liberal. Not that I prefer aristocratic or 
 patrician republics, they are the most exclusive and 
 most tyrannical governments. I have already given 
 my views in a previous volume,— where I have proved 
 that hereditary monarchy ', tempered by wise laws, and 
 not a debased and impotent monarchy, was the most 
 rational form for a great civilized nation. 
 
 I perceive that I am led away by my theme, and 
 that it is time to return to Napoleon, whose views 
 rather than mine own must be explained. Whatever 
 might be his maxims on the inconveniences of assem- 
 blies, the circumstances under which he found him- 
 self were still of a nature to double his fears, and the 
 following passage that we borrow from one of his 
 addresses, leaves no doubt as to his views on this sub- 
 ject : " In time of war, if you succeed in electrifying 
 deliberative assemblies, they may become centres of en- 
 thusiasm and of devotion to the country, but they 
 have also more than one dangerous aspect. If a divi- 
 sion takes place between them and the executive 
 power, then the government is impossible, there is no 
 longer strength in the conduct of affairs ; victory is 
 necessary to them at any cost ; because, at the least 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 85 
 
 reverse, terror takes possession of the timid and mod- 
 erate, who ordinarily constitute the greatest number ; 
 we do not always find assemblies as furious as the 
 convention, placed by the regicide between victory 
 and the scaffold, and forced to conquer or display a 
 frightful energy. These examples are exceptions. 
 Under ordinary circumstances, and especially in as- 
 semblies of peaceable proprietors, the least reverse 
 strikes the timid with fear of perils, and awakens all 
 pretensions in the breast of the ambitious. Those 
 eager for celebrity, popularity and domination, set 
 themselves up from their proper sphere into counsel- 
 lors to the prince ; they pretend to know and decide 
 all things ; if their advice is rejected, from counsellors 
 they become factious ; then, finally, after having un- 
 dermined all the elements of confidence and power, 
 they preach a revolt in the name of a public good of 
 their own fashioning, the source of which is entirely 
 in their imaginations. Then the prince must submit 
 to their yoke or break it ; and in either case, he is 
 obliged to peril the government and the state, at a 
 moment when he should triple his force to resist the 
 foreigner." 
 
 Napoleon performed, then, a great act of self-de- 
 nial, in deciding to proclaim the establishment of two 
 chambers, with public tribunes ; still he preferred 
 this course to the chance of a single constituent as- 
 sembly, that had raised controversies in the presence 
 of formidable enemies, and whose powers being al- 
 most unlimited, had entirely annulled his own. More- 
 over, by reserving to himself the initiative of the 
 laws, after the example of Louis XVIII., he calculated 
 
86 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 on confining their action within just bounds. Such 
 was the dominant idea while drawing up the addi- 
 tional act. 
 
 Benjamin Constant was charged with draughting 
 the imperial thoughts, modified by some of his own ; 
 this work, submitted to the council composed of the 
 ministers and the council of state, did not fail to find 
 censors; the majority of the members would have 
 preferred an entirely new constitution, deliberated 
 upon by a national assembly, not only because for- 
 mally announced in the decrees of Lyons, but it being 
 important not to expose it to the same reflections that 
 had destroyed the granted charter. 
 
 Fouche himself raised many other objections to 
 the debated project. This political Proteus, ever ready 
 to embrace the opinion he judged to be in the ascen- 
 dant, wished to give the chambers the initiative of 
 the laws, and to make Napoleon a veto hmg like that 
 0/1791.* 
 
 He also wished the different statutes of the empire, 
 that would remain in the new fundamental law, to be 
 discussed by the chambers, and disposed of according 
 to their good pleasure. Lastly, he demanded a new 
 assembly of the Champ de Mai for the following year, 
 that the same deputies might return to discuss the 
 proposed compact, and again surrender everything in 
 question. 
 
 * We are aware that the populace gave no other name to Louis XVI. 
 than Monsieur Veto, because he was only invested with the power of op- 
 posing everything, while the first attribute of the administration that 
 knows the wants of the country, is to prepare and contrive everything and 
 submit the same to the chambers. This was reversing the governmental 
 edifice. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 87 
 
 From the principles I have frequently exposed, it 
 was difficult for the objections of the members of the 
 council to shake the emperor's convictions ; on the 
 contrary, he depicted his fears so eloquently, that he 
 succeeded in pursuading them that the supreme law 
 of threatened public safety, and the possibility of 
 modifying the institutions at a later period, with the 
 legal concurrence of the two chambers, militated 
 strongly in favor of his project. 
 
 He consequently proclaimed, on the 22d April, an 
 additional act to the constitutions of the empire. This 
 act established a chamber of hereditary peers, a cham- 
 ber of elective deputies of six hundred and twenty- 
 nine members ; granted a special deputation to com- 
 merce and industry ; proclaimed the liberty of the 
 press, the responsibility of ministers, the independence 
 and irremovability of judges, trial by jury, even for 
 offences by the press, and personal and religious 
 liberty.* 
 
 However, to relieve this act from the semblance of 
 illegality that might be alleged against it, it should 
 have been sent to the departments, as well as to the 
 army and navy, for the sanction of a national vote, 
 the result of which would be proclaimed to the as- 
 sembly of the Champ de Mai, whose meeting was ad- 
 journed for this purpose, to the 1st June. 
 
 Such institutions were certainly more than sufficient 
 
 * Each arrondissement had a deputy direct, but in addition, the depart- 
 ments had also their deputies ; so that there were 238 deputies of depart- 
 ments, 3G8 of arrondissements, and 23 of manufactures and commerce. In 
 1830, the department deputies were suppressed, leaving but those of the 
 irrondissements, and this is the greatest error that has been committed. 
 
88 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 for governing a nation the most sensitive on the sub- 
 ject of its liberties, especially after the decree of 
 Lyons abolishing the feudal and privileged nobility. 
 And, in fact, liberty was so enlarged, that Chateau- 
 briand, with a correctness of judgment that was not 
 always his most characteristic trait, thus wrote to 
 Louis XVIII. : " Napoleon is caught in his own net ; 
 the additional act will be fatal to him ; if observed, 
 there is in the main sufficient liberty to overthrow 
 the usurper." And Benjamin Constant himself boast- 
 ed of this decision, to prove the excellence of the 
 doctrines introduced by himself and friends ! Sin- 
 gular eulogy to deliver on these doctrines, that of 
 proving that they could destroy the political edifice, 
 whose stability and solidity should have been their 
 work ! 
 
 However, though this compact was adopted by two 
 millions of voters, it became the subject of all criti- 
 cism — all parties judged it most unmercifully through 
 the medium of their passions and interests. The in- 
 corrigible speculators of republican theories censured 
 Napoleon for not having been satisfied with the con- 
 sulate for life, and attributed to a miserable spirit of 
 nepotism, the wise foresight which had decided him 
 in re-establishing hereditary succession in the supreme 
 magistracy, as being theonly safeguard for the exist- 
 ence of great nations. 
 
 Other ideologists, less insane, however, than the re- 
 publicans, wished to accord the initiative of the laws 
 to the chambers, a dogma incompatible with the 
 interests of the state, and with the regular functions 
 of the wheels of government. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 89 
 
 Demagogues wanted the regime of the forum or of 
 popular societies. The royalists were dissatisfied with 
 the abolition of feudal distinctions ; the levellers, with 
 their having preserved the titles given under the em- 
 pire as a recompense for signal services, and more 
 so with their having maintained a chamber of he- 
 reditary peers that wounded their pride or their fool- 
 ish pretensions, and which Napoleon wished to up- 
 hold, precisely with the hope of leading, in time, to 
 a non-feudal aristocracy, sufficiently powerful to serve 
 as an equilibrium to royalty, on the one hand, and 
 the multitude on the other. 
 
 Finally, a last class of opponents to the additional 
 act, without blaming its source, presented it as a 
 capital blunder, an act of deception the more deplora- 
 ble, as it would offend all the electors of the nation 
 and the deputies of the land and naval forces, con- 
 voked at Paris to effect, through their delegates, these 
 very changes, in which Napoleon had singly taken 
 the initiative. They pretended, moreover, that the 
 time was not opportune for such a measure, when 
 even the institutions promulgated were indispensa- 
 ble for preserving to the throne the strength that 
 constituted its eclat as well as its guaranty, or giving 
 the state that vigor, without which it could not attain 
 its highest destiny. But none of these critics wished 
 to take into consideration, the imperious circumstances 
 under which France was to be thrown, by reason of 
 the general league that menaced her, and this act, 
 far from having been violent, was actually justified 
 by the necessities of the times. 
 
 Fouche himself did not spare him his censure: 
 
90 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 covetous of power and influence, lie was prompted 
 on one side by what remained him of revolutionary 
 doctrines, on the other by the desire of fixing bounds 
 to the imperial power, either to render his own more 
 necessary or prevent the emperor from ordering him 
 into a species of exile, as in 1810, as soon as he could 
 dispense with his services. At the news of the de 
 claration of the 13th March, he judged, from all ap- 
 pearances, that the new throne was not the most 
 stable, and with his habitual cunning, he in a measure 
 intrigued at Vienna, to secure a reconciliation with 
 the allies, and render himself useful to the govern- 
 ment that would succeed Napoleon, should he be 
 overcome.'* 
 
 The services that this minister of police had ren- 
 
 * There are different versions of this subject. The memoirs of General 
 Lamarque, and the History of the Restoration, by C. . . have formally 
 accused Fouehe of having betrayed Napoleon. . . . Lucien Bonaparte 
 seeks to justify him, at least as to his connexion with Austria. It seems 
 certain that the declaration of the Congress of Vienna unsettled Fouche" 
 exceedingly, and that he conceived, from that time, that the emperor's 
 power was unsteady ; he judged, that he would either be forced to recur 
 to the revolutionary propaganda of 1793, or would fall. Anxious to ac- 
 quire sufficient influence on the future of France, to prevent the return of 
 the Bourbons, or at least to render himself necessary to a second con- 
 ditional restoration, he was no longer a devoted minister, and while 
 rendering to Napoleon an account of his relations with Metternich, he 
 could very well give them a clandestine turn that would eventually 
 serve other ends. 
 
 The additional act displeased him the more as Napoleon took no no- 
 tice of his objections : hence everything bears us out in the belief that 
 he served him indifferently, and we are even assured that he corres- 
 ponded with Wellington before the battle of Waterloo. However, it is 
 certain, that immediately after this battle, he assumed an attitude for 
 throwing off Napoleon, if not by a crime, at least by a forced abdica- 
 tion, and even by an exile concerted with the allies. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 91 
 
 dered Metternicli in 1809, facilitated tlie establish- 
 ment of these clandestine connexions, of which he 
 was too crafty to make a mystery, firmly convinced, 
 moreover, of giving them the direction that would 
 best answer his views. Now, these views consisted 
 either in restraining the emperor's authority by means 
 of powerful assemblies, influenced by himself and 
 friends, or even in replacing his government by that 
 of his son, the regency to be directed by himself; 
 finally, as a last resource, he hoped to become the in- 
 strument and arbiter of a second restoration. Napo- 
 leon was on the eve of discovering these plots, when 
 Fouche adroitly submitted to him the communications 
 he had just received from the allies through the me- 
 diation of the Austrian minister, and the answer he 
 thought of returning. 
 
 Excited by the astonishing success of the new revo- 
 lution that had just taken place, and by the prepara- 
 tions ordered for arming the nation, the sovereigns 
 had no doubt purposely decided to separate the cause 
 of Napoleon from that of France, so as to effect a di- 
 vision between the nation and his partisans, or even 
 to obtain his voluntary retirement, by allowing him 
 to conceive the possibility of placing his son on the 
 throne with a regency. They consequently declared 
 that they did not desire to interfere in the internal 
 affairs of France, provided she procured another 
 chief. They left to the nation the choice of a form 
 of government, even a republic ; but did not wish the 
 emperor at any price. Either he had provoked these 
 measures by his first overtures, or Metternicli had 
 himself taken the initiative. Fouche had not dared to 
 
92 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 conceal such an incident. He knew that to quiet Na- 
 poleon, it was easy for him to make an ostensible 
 answer, so disposed by devious ways, as to be the 
 means of entering into other combinations. 
 
 This ostensible answer, given the 8th May, could 
 not be doubted. " In endeavoring to review all the 
 expedients upon which the country could rest, Fouche 
 sought to demonstrate that the maintenance of the 
 emperer offered the greatest security to Europe. The 
 restoration of Louis XVIII. would be an act of hu- 
 miliation to France, and would never be upheld even 
 with the aid of foreign bayonets. His being replaced 
 by the younger branch of the family presented but 
 little more stability, because the Duke d'Orleans would 
 always have arrayed against him the royalists, repub- 
 licans, and the party still more to be dreaded, the Bo- 
 napartists.* The prince offering a guaranty only to 
 the doctrinaires of the revolution, would be forced to 
 submit to their laws, which would insensibly lead to 
 anarchy, confusion, and finally another revolution. 
 The regency of Maria-Louisa with Napoleon II. would 
 have the inconvenience of being influenced by Napo- 
 leon in the important foreign policy, without having 
 those elements of internal strength which his single 
 name would have secured against demagogues. The 
 maintenance of his authority, tempered by constitu- 
 tions that would prevent wars of ambition, and those 
 gigantic levies of men that had rendered him so terri- 
 ble to his neighbors, was then the sole means of se- 
 
 * It must not be forgotten that Fouche wrote this in 1815, Napoleon 
 being not only alive but in power. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 93 
 
 curing to Europe the repose of which she stood so 
 much in need." 
 
 Moreover, Fouche was right, in pointing out the 
 unusual manner of proclaiming the intention not to 
 dictate laws to France, while imposing upon her the 
 formal exclusion of the chief of her choice. He de- 
 monstrated that the independence of a great nation 
 is one and indivisible, that it exists absolute and intact 
 or does not exist at all ; in a word, that it was no 
 more a disgrace to have a government imposed than 
 permitting a prohibition in the choice determined on. 
 
 In fact, the recent publication of the additional 
 act, did no longer permit either France or Napoleon 
 to return a different answer to the course of the cabi- 
 net at Vienna and of the allies; if this course had 
 been taken at the place and time of the famous decla- 
 ration of the 13th March, the emperor might have 
 decided in favor of his son and of France, a sacrifice 
 claimed by the sovereigns ; it would have given it 
 the appearance of a voluntary and spontaneous initia- 
 tive in a generous action ;* but after this solemn 
 declaration, and after the additional act, nothing was 
 left him but to reign and fight, or seek a coward's 
 safety in flight. Convinced that the national honor 
 was closely bound to his own, he redoubled his prepa- 
 rations to wage the war thrust upon him to the death, 
 and all his efforts were exerted in exciting 'the same 
 devotion and energy in the new authorities who were 
 
 * This sacrifice was not at all to his character, and we doubt if h€ 
 would have submitted to it; but after all, this was only feasible pre- 
 vious to the declaration. But in the month of May, after the addi 
 tional act, it was impossible. 
 
94 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 to sfrare with him the burden of the government, and 
 among the deputies of the Champ de Mai, convoked 
 for the end of this month : perfectly persuaded that 
 if he found this support, the legions of Europe would 
 be crushed in their attacks upon France. 
 
 It must be acknowledged that the nation was too 
 divided in opinion to permit Napoleon to rally it, en 
 tire ; it was broken up into four portions of very dif- 
 ferent strengths : 
 
 1st. The partisans of fallen royalty, who were still 
 numerous, and counted in their ranks the greater por- 
 tion of the constitutional doctrinaires. 
 
 2d. The revolutionists, more formidable through 
 their audacity and passions than by their numbers. 
 
 3d. The imperialists or Bonapartists, numbering all 
 those who had borne arms or held offices during 
 twenty years. 
 
 4th. The indifferent, who asked but for peace, and 
 formed the great mass of the middle classes ; these 
 constitute the most considerable portion of the nation. 
 
 The facility of Napoleon's triumph arose from the 
 fact, that the last three classes had declared in his fa- 
 vor ; but the masses only act through passion or inter- 
 est : as soon as it was evident that the sole fact of his 
 presence was to lead to a general war, the numerous 
 classes of the indifferent rose up against him, while 
 political acts cooled the energetic party of the revolu- 
 tion : henceforward the chances were not the same. 
 He did every thing in his power in the position where 
 fate had placed him. Convinced that a Cincinnatus 
 or a Washington could not conduct France, and fully 
 decided on reconstituting a strong and durable gov- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 95 
 
 ernment, he displeased the aspirants for the tribune 
 and the clubs, and through them the revolutionary 
 masses. The royalist party, increased by many of the 
 partisans for peace at any price ; and his, diminished 
 daily by these defections. 
 
 The only resource left to the emperor, was to per- 
 suade the patriots and authorities that their cause was 
 inseparable from his own. He could boldly tell them 
 so, for if the nation had thought otherwise, she should 
 have rejected the new institutions awarding him the 
 empire, and have openly treated with Europe for the 
 recognition of his son, or for any other government. 
 This was the end he struggled to attain at the Champ 
 de Mai. The solemn acts published at this epoch, 
 and at the opening of the chambers, are effectively 
 the best answers that his partisans can make to his 
 detractors : and although details of this nature enter 
 but little in the course of this summary, we will give 
 a few words. 
 
 The convocation of the Champ de Mai, awaited 
 with so much impatience, had certainly lost a portion 
 of the charm with which imagination clothed it, since 
 the additional act had provided, in rather an unex- 
 pected manner, for the most important object of this 
 reunion. Up to that time, a semi-mythologic cere- 
 mony was anticipated, the result of which would be 
 a return of the golden age. The multitude undoubt- 
 edly thought, that each one would have the power to 
 furnish his article to the compact thus fabricated in 
 open air, within this new forum. 
 
 What would be done at this assembly ? was asked 
 upon all sides : some said that the emperor would 
 
96 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 present the empress and her son, as a pledge of his 
 reconciliation with Europe and of the duration of his 
 dynasty ; others expected wonders, at the expense of 
 their imagination. At last, the first of June, so anx- 
 iously awaited, arrived : the ceremony took place with 
 all possible pomp in the Champ de Mars. Napoleon, 
 clothed in the imperial mantle, and surrounded by his 
 dethroned brothers, and the doctrinaire Lucien, by 
 grand functionaries, marshals, and many prelates, was 
 seated on a superb throne erected near the military 
 school. Twenty thousand electors seated on benches, 
 forming an amphitheatre, constituted the first circle ; 
 farther oft", were the deputies from the army : then 
 fifty thousand soldiers, in full dress, placed behind 
 them, and an immense population of the curious, gave 
 a magnificent aspect to this solemnity. Divine ser- 
 vice having been performed, M. Dubois d' Angers 
 pronounced an elegant address in the name of the 
 electors of France, and proclaimed the acceptance of 
 the additional act. Napoleon, having responded to 
 this discourse in a firm and energetic tone, took the 
 oath of fidelity to this charter for himself and his 
 own ; and Cambaceres, on the part of the electors, 
 swore, in the name of France, fidelity of the French 
 people to his new government. This oath was repeat- 
 ed spontaneously by all the electors and army depu- 
 ties, in which even a large portion of the spectators 
 joined ; then followed a distribution of flags to the 
 deputations from the army, to the troops present, and 
 to the national guard. 
 
 However imposing this ceremony, the ideologists, 
 political adversaries of Napoleon, saw in it but the- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 97 
 
 atrical pomp ; they demanded if this was the national 
 Congress, announced with so much emphasis to give 
 laws to the country, and if this formal preparation 
 was necessary, in order to attend a mass, deliver a 
 discourse, take an oath, and distribute flags. So fash- 
 ionable had the spirit of defamation become, that 
 they even ventured to say that France, tired of coups 
 de theatre, demanded things of a more serious nature. 
 
 Napoleon had however given in his address, the 
 explanation of his conduct, in these words : " Em- 
 peror, consul, soldier, I hold all from the French peo- 
 ple. In prosperity, in adversity, on the battle-field, 
 in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the 
 sole and constant object of my thoughts and my ac- 
 tions. Like the king of Athens,* I sacrificed myself 
 at Fontainbleau for my people, in the hope of seeing 
 the realization of the promise given, to preserve to 
 France the natural integrity of her territory, her 
 honor and her rights. The indignation at seeing these 
 sacred rights, acquired by twenty-five years of victo- 
 ries, disregarded and lost for ever ; the cry of French 
 honor tarnished ; the wishes of the nation have recalled 
 me to the throne, which is dear to me as being the 
 palladium of the independence, the honor, and the 
 rights of the people. 
 
 " Frenchmen ! in traversing the provinces of the 
 empire through the midst of public rejoicing, I had 
 
 * Codrus Baved Athens from Heraclides, not by relinquishing his 
 crown, but by throwing himself disguised in the midst of the enemy, 
 in order to accomplish the sacrifice demanded by an oracle. An exile 
 on the Isle of Elba was a sacrifice quite equivalent to an honorable 
 death, but it was not voluntary. 
 
98 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 reason to calculate on a long peace, because nations 
 are bound by the treaties concluded by their govern- 
 ments. My thoughts were then entirely bent on the 
 means of establishing our liberties, through a consti- 
 tution conformable to the will and interest of the na- 
 tion. With this object, I have convoked the Champ 
 de Mai. I soon learned, however, that the kings, so 
 often combined against us, desired to make war upon 
 us ; they think of augmenting the kingdom of the 
 Netherlands and giving it as barriers, all our northern 
 strong-holds ; and to conciliate the differences that 
 still exist, they speak of sharing Lorraine and Alsace 
 among themselves: it is then necessary to prepare 
 for war. 
 
 " Before personally encountering the dangers of the 
 battle-field, my first solicitude has been to give formal 
 existence to the nation. The people have accepted the 
 act with which I have presented them. 
 
 " When we have repelled these unjust aggressions, 
 and Europe shall be convinced of what is due to the 
 rights of twenty-eight millions of Frenchmen, then a 
 solemn law, drawn up according to the forms required 
 by the constitutional act, will unite the different dispo- 
 sitions of our constitutions, at present dispersed.* 
 
 * This speech of Napoleon was wise and noble ; it nevertheless dis- 
 pleased on account of this reticence ; it held out, on the one side, the 
 revision of the constitution as necessary, and on the other, that this re- 
 vision would be in fact but a union of dispositions already existing, 
 though scattered among many acts. Thereafter, the emperor's sincere 
 conversion was not credited, although his language was, notwithstand- 
 ing, that of a statesman, who knows how to appreciate good institutions, 
 but who is also aware of the demands exacted by emergencies, in which 
 a nation may be placed. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 99 
 
 u You are about returning to your departments : say 
 to the citizens that circumstances are of a serious na 
 ture, but that with union, energy and perseverance, 
 we will issue victorious, from this struggle of a great 
 people Tell them that the kings who hereto- 
 fore sought my alliance, are now directing all their 
 blows against my person. If I did not see that they 
 aim at injuring the country, I would place at their 
 mercy, this existence, against which they are so exas- 
 perated. But say to them also, that as long as they 
 entertain for me sentiments of love, of which they 
 have given me so many proofs, this hate of our ene- 
 mies will be impotent. 
 
 " Frenchmen ! my will is that of the nation, my 
 rights are hers ; my honor, my glory, my happiness, 
 cannot be but the honor, the glory, and the happiness 
 of France." 
 
 This discourse, delivered in a firm and animated 
 voice, excited the liveliest enthusiasm. 
 
 A few days afterwards, the electors left for their 
 departments, after having proclaimed the acceptance 
 of the additional act, and nominated deputies to the 
 new assembly. 
 
 On the 7th June, the emperor convened the two 
 chambers with the following address : 
 
 " Three months ago, circumstances and the confi- 
 dence of the French people clothed me with unlimited 
 power. The most urgent desire of my heart is accom- 
 plished to-day ; I perform the first act of the consti- 
 tutional monarchy. Men are too powerless to secure 
 the future, institutions alone fix the destinies of na- 
 tions. Monarchy is necessary in France, to guaranty 
 
100 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the liberty, the independence, and the rights of the 
 people. 
 
 " Our constitutions are dispersed : one of our most 
 important occupations will be to reunite them in one 
 body, and to arrange them with one mind. This work 
 will recommend the present epoch to future genera- 
 tions. I am ambitious to see France in the enjoyment 
 of all possible liberty: I say possible, because it is 
 necessary to avoid anarchy, leading, as it ever does, 
 to absolute power. 
 
 "A formidable coalition of kings have a design 
 upon our independence, her armies are on our fron- 
 tier. Our enemies count on our intestine divisions. . . 
 Some legislative measures are indispensable for the 
 future. I confide unreservedly in your intelligence, 
 patriotism, and attachment. The liberty of the press 
 is inherent in our present constitution, nothing there 
 can be altered without changing our political system ; 
 but good laws for restraining it are necessary, espe- 
 cially in the present condition of the nation : I recom- 
 mend this important object to your consideration. 
 
 " The first duty of a prince will soon call me to 
 
 head the children of France The army and 
 
 myself will do our duty. Do you, peers and repre- 
 sentatives, give the nation an example of confidence, 
 energy and patriotism. Like the senate of the great 
 people of antiquity, resolve to die rather than sur- 
 vive the dishonor and the degradation of France : 
 the holy cause of the country will be triumphant." 
 
 The chambers voted separate addresses : both 
 dwelt on the necessity of subjecting absolute power 
 to constitutional forms and rules. They moreover 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 101 
 
 promised, in the event of a reverse, to exhibit perse- 
 verance, and redouble their attachment to the impe- 
 rial cause, which was the cause of France. The 
 peers assured Europe, that with the new institutions, 
 the allurements of victory would not lead the chief 
 of state beyond the bounds of prudence. This was 
 a recrimination on the past, to which Napoleon an- 
 swered : 
 
 " The struggle in which we are engaged is a serious 
 one ; the temptation of prosperity is not the danger 
 which now threatens us ; foreigners wish to force us 
 under the Caudine forks. The justice of our cause, 
 the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the 
 army, are powerful reasons for our hoping success. 
 But if we experience reverses, it is then especially 
 that I should love to see all the energy of this great 
 people displayed. Then it is that I should find in the 
 chamber of peers, proofs of attachment to the country 
 and her chief. It is in trying times that great nations, 
 like great individuals, show forth all the energy of 
 their character, and become objects of admiration to 
 posterity." 
 
 This posterity will acknowledge, while perusing 
 these words, that the emperor neglected nothing in 
 his power, to raise France to a level with the dan- 
 gers that threatened her, and all of which he had 
 foreseen. His answer to the chamber of deputies 
 proves it still more conclusively. 
 
 This chamber, resting on the promise of properly 
 arranging the constitutional laws, did not dissimulate 
 its impatience to leap at once into this slippery arena. 
 " Faithful to its mission, it will fulfil (it said) the task 
 
102 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 devolved upon it in this noble work : it demands that, 
 in order to satisfy the public wishes, the national de- 
 liberation shall rectify, without delay, what the 
 urgency of our situation has produced defective or 
 left imperfect in the ensemble of our institutions. 
 And while your majesty opposes the honor of our na- 
 tional arms and the power of your genius to this most 
 unjust aggression, the chamber of representatives will 
 endeavor to attain the same end, by laboring without 
 relaxation on the compact, the perfection of which 
 should continue to cement the union of the people and 
 the throne, and by the amelioration of our institutions, 
 strengthen in the eyes of Europe the guaranty of our 
 engagements." 
 
 This plainly announced the idea of taking advan- 
 tage of the emperor's absence, for publicly establish- 
 ing constitutional controversies, without awaiting the 
 initiative of the government, which, nevertheless, 
 constituted the fundamental basis of the national ex- 
 istence. This was going back to the constituent assem- 
 bly of 1789, under still more dangerous circumstances^: 
 this was, in a word, a revolutionary act, since by one 
 single stroke it changed the face of the government. 
 
 These discourses attest, on the one side, that the 
 additional act was not considered the last say of Na- 
 poleon ; but they also proved that he would undoubt- 
 edly have to sustain more than one assault from these 
 men, who persisted in viewing the government as a 
 public enemy, unceasingly thinking on the means of 
 chaining its authority, so as to reduce its sphere ot 
 action to the most perfect nullity possible. A fright- 
 ful misconception, which will forever be a certain 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 103 
 
 index of the decay of a state, or the signal of an- 
 archy. 
 
 Though Napoleon appreciated these phrases to their 
 just value, he exhibited moderation in applauding 
 the intentions of doctrinaires, and limiting himself to 
 calling their attention to the dangers of untimely con- 
 troversies. His answer should find a place here, as it 
 completes the picture of his position and that of his 
 antagonists. " Under these painful circumstances, 
 my mind is absorbed by the imminent war, to the suc- 
 cess of which are attached the honor and independ- 
 ence of France. To-night I will depart to place my- 
 self at the head of my armies. . . . . During my 
 absence, I will take pleasure in seeing a commission, 
 appointed by each chamber, maturely deliberating on 
 our institutions : the constitution is our rallying point, 
 it should be our polar star in these stormy times. But 
 all possible discussion, tending to diminish, directly or 
 .indirectly, the confidence that should be reposed in 
 the government and its dispositions, would be a mis- 
 fortune to the state : we would find ourselves in the 
 midst of dangers, without guide and without direc- 
 tion. The crisis at which we have arrived is a peril- 
 ous one : let us not imitate the example of the Lower 
 Empire, which, when pressed on all sides by the bar- 
 barians, rendered herself the laughing-stock of pos- 
 terity, by attending to abstract discussions, at the very 
 moment the enemy's battering-ram burst open the 
 gates of the capital." 
 
 Prophetic words, and well calculated to confound 
 all those declaimers who, forgetful of the emperor's 
 
104 
 
 POLITICAL AJSTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 principles at this memorable epoch, have levelled so 
 many blows against him. 
 
 Napoleon thus plainly perceived, that the measures 
 to which he had to a certain extent been compelled to 
 have recourse, so as to satisfy public opinion, were 
 producing a deplorable effect: they soon aimed at 
 words instead of things, at stormy discussions instead 
 of calm and quiet administration, and at a later pe- 
 riod, led to divisions in the state, through authority 
 arrogated to themselves by the chambers. It was al- 
 ready perceived that the concessions, however ex- 
 tended, still found detractors. At a moment, when 
 the liberty of the press should have been deferred till 
 the country was free from danger, the emperor was 
 obliged to solicit restraining laws for diminishing its 
 abuse, and even this step was presented as a tendency 
 to despotism. Pamphlets of every hue, written by 
 demagogues, others by emigrants, attacked all the 
 measures of government, and impaired that confi- 
 dence by which it was more than ever necessary it 
 should be encircled. License was Carried to such ex- 
 cess, that sheets recommending the attempt and 
 promising deification to those who would, by any 
 means whatever, deliver France from the yoke of 
 Napoleon, did not find juries to condemn them. 
 
 Scarcely was he seated on the throne, when he was 
 forced to regret not having simply seized a discre- 
 tionary power, by proclaiming himself dictator of the 
 French empire, and abolishing all organic laws as 
 well as the new investiture of the imperial title, until 
 peace had been restored. 
 
 Nevertheless, if these concessions, far from satisfy- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 105 
 
 ing the factions, clothed them with more importance, 
 we must own that the enthusiasm excited by his 
 promises to the party of the revolution, was not with- 
 out its advantages ; for, besides the national guards, 
 whose levying it facilitated, it gave means for arming 
 the people of the principal cities. Those of Paris 
 alone formed twenty battalions of tirailleurs federes, 
 troops undoubtedly not very formidable in an open 
 field, but which, when distributed in garrisons, might 
 in case of need serve as a lever for the government in 
 the execution of great national measures, and also 
 contribute in the defence of cities. Fouche and 
 Carnot, who in concert directed all the affairs of the 
 interior, exhibited, perhaps with a different object, 
 great ardor in the organization of these patriotic fed- 
 erations ; both saw in them a means of counteracting 
 the influence of the army, and consequently th^ au- 
 thority of its chief. With the power of disposing of 
 all the interior forces, they would be more powerful 
 than he during the war, and would not much fear 
 him after the peace. The first especially, who had 
 more address and greater grasp of mind, saw in these 
 elements a means of getting rid of Napoleon without 
 welcoming the Bourbons, as little as the success of the 
 struggle with Europe seemed doubtful. 
 
 Napoleon was too clear-sighted and distrustful not 
 to suspect these projects; but he was obliged to sub- 
 mit to the best circumstances. 
 
 While these cares of internal policy painfully oc- 
 cupied his thoughts, he had redoubled his activity in 
 his military preparations, so as to place himself in a 
 condition to resist all Europe, should the nation, 
 
 5* 
 
106 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 seriously appreciating her position, desire to make 
 every sacrifice for the maintenance of her independ- 
 ence. The armories, abandoned under his predecessor, 
 resumed such activity, that they succeeded in fabri- 
 cating four thousand muskets per day. The national 
 guards mobile were organized throughout the empire, 
 at the same time that the conscription was levied. I 
 have already stated that the line of the army had been 
 doubled in two months, (from 1st April to the 1st 
 June), and that a vast system of defence would per- 
 mit its increase to 700,000 men by the 1st September. 
 
 The problem of French independence depended, 
 then, on the possibility of delaying hostilities till the 
 beginning of August. Far from allowing him this 
 time, the allies, profiting by his example, hastened 
 with all speed towards the Rhine and the Meuse. The 
 English and Prussians showed unheard of activity in 
 their preparations, and the Russians reached the 
 banks of the Rhine from the depths of Poland, in 
 two months. The allies who were contending for 
 Saxony and Cracow, had remained under arms with a 
 war complement, they had lighted matches, and 
 twenty minutes' time, with four orders for the march 
 dispatched from Vienna the same day, were only 
 necessary to place the whole of Europe in motion. 
 
 France was far from presenting the formidable atti- 
 tude that Europe ^ad preserved ; every thing was in 
 confusion ; on the arrival of Napoleon, she was with- 
 out arms and without soldiers. They have tried to 
 establish a parallel between her efforts in 1793 and 
 those in 1815 : in less time, Napoleon had accom- 
 plished as much as the committee of public safety, 
 / 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 107 
 
 without having recourse to the revolutionary army, 
 nor to a dozen guillotines that followed : but the 
 members of the coalition of 1815 acted very differently 
 from those of the first invasion ; they did not spend 
 three months in besieging Valenciennes, as Mack and 
 Cobourg did ; times were very much changed. The 
 sea was covered with English convoys bearing troops 
 and siege equipages. The riches of Hindostan, se- 
 conded by proficiency in the arts and manufactures, 
 had transformed England into an immense arsenal, 
 that fabricated, with terrible activity, the artillery, 
 munitions and trains necessary to the armies of the 
 coalition. Nothing in the most distant times resem- 
 bled this epoch. 
 
 Since the last of May, Wellington and Blucher had 
 assembled 220,000 English, Prussians, Belgians, Hano- 
 verians and Brunswickers, between Li£ge and Cour- 
 tray. The troops of Bavaria, Wirtemburg and Baden 
 assembled in the Black Forest and in the Palatinate. 
 The Austrians hastened to join them : their army of 
 Italy was re-united at Sardes, on the Alps. The Rus- 
 sians, by forced marches, were already traversing 
 Franconia and Saxony. A million of men, in short, 
 were preparing to rush upon France : it may be said, 
 that the coalition had the secret of Cadmus, for 
 making soldiers spring forth from the bowels of the 
 earth. 
 
 Whatever might be the activity employed in re-or- 
 ganizing the army, and in the defence of the frontier, 
 Napoleon must have feared that the armies of Europe 
 would be much greater than his own, should hostilities 
 commence before the month of August. It was then 
 
108 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 under the walls of Paris and Lyons, that the destinies 
 of the empire were to be decided. 
 
 More than once he had had the idea of fortifying 
 the heights of Paris ; but was prevented by the fear 
 of alarming the country and by the emergencies that 
 were thickening around him. There were two me- 
 thods of effecting this ; the first was by constructing 
 seven or eight large forts on the principal points of 
 this enceinte ; if these forts did not absolutely prevent 
 their penetrating to the walls, and even forcing an en- 
 trance into the city, it would require a very consider- 
 able force to make the attempt, for fear there still 
 existed a nucleus of a French army that might take 
 part in the defence. Besides this, by commanding 
 the navigation of the Seine and closing the principal 
 avenues, they would render the provisioning of Paris 
 by the enemy who dared to hold it, a very difficult 
 matter. Lastly, these forts might be connected by 
 communicating intrenchments. 
 
 The other method was to place the entire enceinte 
 under protection from a coup de main, by means of 
 field works. The emperor gave this the preference 
 because it required less time. He thought " that a 
 great capital contains the elite of the nation, that it 
 is the centre of opinion, the depot of every thing, and 
 that it is the greatest inconsistency to leave so im- 
 portant a point without immediate defence. In times 
 of misfortunes and great calamities, states are often 
 in want of actual soldiers, but never in want of men 
 for the defence of their walls. Fifty thousand na- 
 tional guards with two or three thousand cannoniers, 
 will defend a fortified capital against an army of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 109 
 
 200,000 men. These 50,000 men in an open field, if 
 not disciplined soldiers and commanded by experi- 
 enced officers, will be routed by a charge of a few thou- 
 sand horse. Paris has often owed her safety to her 
 walls ; if in 1814 she had been in condition to resist 
 but for eight days, what influence would this not have 
 had on the events of the world? If in 1805, Vienna 
 had been well armed and better defended, the battle 
 of Ulm had not decided the war; Austerlitz had 
 never been fought. If in 1806, Berlin had been for- 
 tified, the army beaten at Jena had rallied, and the 
 Russian army would have joined it. If in 1808, 
 Madrid had been fortified, the French army after the 
 victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo- 
 Sierra, had not dared to march on this capital, leaving 
 the English and Spanish armies behind them, towards 
 Salamanca and Valladolid. Lastly, it was the fortifi- 
 cations of Vienna, that on two occasions saved Europe 
 from the sabre of the Mussulman. 
 
 General Haxo was consequently charged with for- 
 tifying Paris. This skillful engineer, intrenched the 
 heights situated on the north from Montmartre to 
 Charonne, and completed the Ourcq canal, so as to 
 cover the plain between La-Villette and St. Denis. 
 This village was to be intrenched and protected by 
 the inundations of the Rouillon and the Crou. From 
 the western foot of Montmartre ran a line of intrench - 
 ments that rested on the Seine above Clichy : at the 
 eastern extremity, the Bercy park and the space be- 
 tween Vincennes and Charonne were equally covered. 
 The works were armed with 700 pieces of ordnance. 
 On the south, the faubourgs between the upper Seine 
 
110 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 and la Bi&vre and between la Bi&vre and the lower 
 Seine, were not to remain without defence ; their en- 
 ceinte had been already traced out when the enemy 
 appeared before Paris. 
 
 General Lery presided over the defensive works at 
 Lyons ; they were pushed with vigor : 450 iron pieces 
 of heavy calibre brought from Toulon, and 250 bronze 
 pieces, armed the ramparts or were kept in reserve. 
 Every thing led to the belief that the inhabitants of 
 this city, whose patriotism equals their courage, sup- 
 ported by a corps (Parmee, would give the enemy a task. 
 
 While these great works were being executed, re- 
 cruiting was carried on with all the possible activity 
 that circumstances would permit. It will be remem- 
 bered that by the 1st June the effectives of the line of 
 the army had been increased from 200,000 to 400,000 
 men ; but in this number must be included the sol- 
 diers who were still at the regimental depots, as well 
 as the forces required in the west, on the southern 
 frontier, and in the most important fortresses of the 
 empire. Napoleon had then 180,000 disposable men 
 for the campaign on the Rhine and in Belgium. By 
 the middle of July, he would have had 300,000 ; all 
 the forts would, moreover, have had garrisons of 
 national guards, depots for the line, and -some good 
 regiments.* 
 
 * The troops of the line had been augmented in two months, from 
 200,000 to 360,000 men ; but 150,000 were not yet disposable, being in 
 depots. Besides these, there were 200,000 complete, comprising the na- 
 tional guard mobile, which would not be fit for service before the end of 
 July, though by the middle of June they might be already assembled in 
 the fortresses. By the end of August Napoleon expected to have from 
 seven to eight hundred thousand defenders at his disposal. Immonse 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. Ill 
 
 All the efforts to enter upon negotiations having 
 Deen vain, Napoleon had the option to pursue one of 
 two courses ; the first, to meet the Anglo-Prussians at 
 Brussels or Nainur, about the middle of June ; the 
 second, to await the allies at Paris and Lyons. The 
 latter had the inconvenience of delivering half of 
 France to the ravages of the enemy ; but it offered the 
 advantage of gaining until the month of August to 
 finish recruiting and complete the preparations, then 
 of fighting with all his means combined while the 
 allies were weakened by many corps of observation. 
 On the contrary, by transporting the theatre of hostili- 
 ties into Belgium, France was perhaps saved from 
 invasion ; but in case of reverse the allien would be 
 drawn on by the 1st July, six weeks earlier than 
 they would have come of their own accord.* The 
 armee cVelite, shaken by a reverse, would no longer be 
 able to sustain so unequal a struggle, and the recruiting 
 might not be completed. On the other hand, this 
 course offered the hope of taking the enemy unawares ; 
 it was more conformable with the spirit of the nation 
 that does not comprehend Fabius. This method can 
 be acted upon by an emperor of Russia, with an end- 
 less empire ; or by a Wellington on the territory of 
 another beyond the sea ; but in a country like France 
 
 works were ordered for putting in order all the frontier places, for a long 
 time neglected, and especially to fortify Paris, Lyons, Laone, Soissons, 
 and the mountain passes. 
 
 * This calculation, that might very naturally enter into Napoleon's 
 thoughts, being based on the march of the Russian armies, the farthest 
 ati* of all, was not exact, as to time, because the coalesced power had 
 taken measures for entering France at all points on the 1st July. This 
 was, besides, an additional motive for anticipating them in Belgium, if in 
 condition to do so. 
 
112 POLITICAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 whose capital is seventy leagues from the Belgian 
 frontier, and in the position which the emperor was 
 personally placed, the idea of permitting Europe in 
 arms to reach the base of Montmartre, would have 
 terrified the most determined. Undoubtedly, if France 
 had had but one feeling and one will, that of rallying 
 around the chief of state and conquering with him, it 
 would perhaps have been better to await the enemy. 
 But with existing divisions in political interests, opin- 
 ions, and passions, everything was to be dreaded while 
 awaiting an invasion ; because with the impossibility of 
 making head at all points at once, he would have been 
 constrained to deliver half of the provinces to the rav- 
 ages of war, and the chamber of deputies, already so 
 hostile to his power, would not have spared him. A 
 victory beyond, would procure him the necessary time, 
 and would impose silence on his political enemies in the 
 interior : it would thus suit him in every respect ; for 
 in beating Wellington and Blucher separately, he 
 delivered himself from the dangers he foresaw on 
 the part of Fouche and Carnot. Moreover, he has 
 unevasively avowed that he believed himself certain 
 of this victory, while perceiving the enthusiasm of the 
 soldiers and recurring to the souvenirs of the past. 
 
 All these motives determined him then to take the 
 initiative, not to occupy Brussels, but to destroy the 
 opposing masses in succession. If he succeeded, the 
 defeat of Wellington and Blucher ought to be followed 
 by important consequences ; this great blow struck 
 a propos at the opening of the campaign, might dissolve 
 the coalition. Meanwhile, it was impossible to garri- 
 son the other points of the frontier : it was necessary 
 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 113 
 
 to leave small bodies at Bordeaux, Toulouse, on the 
 Var, in Savoy, at Befort, and Strasbourg. These 
 bodies, too feeble to resist in front of an enemy, were 
 to serve at least for awing and harassing him on the 
 march : moreover these were points d' appui, valuable 
 for levying the national guards, and for the rising of 
 the country which they were to organize. 
 
 To increase the misfortune, la Vendee was not 
 quieted, notwithstanding the success of the movable 
 columns. Civil w^ar is a political cancer which should 
 be destroyed in its germ, under pain of compromising 
 the safety of the state ; even a portion of the young 
 guard had to be sent to re-enforce the corps of General 
 Lamarque. All these detachments reduced thcstrength 
 of the main army to 120,000 combatants, which were 
 to assemble between the Meuse and the Sambre, from 
 Philippeville to Maubeuge. 
 
 Although the enemy had at least 200,000 men in 
 Belgium, Napoleon did not hesitate ; it was important 
 not to lose time, so as to avoid having on his hands all 
 the hostile armies at once. Leaving Paris on the 
 12th June, he inspected the armament of Soissons and 
 Laon the next day, and on the 14th removed his 
 head-quarters to Beaumont. 
 
 The organization of the army underwent great 
 modifications : the emperor gave the command of corps 
 to young generals who, called upon to win their 
 marshal's baton on the battle-field, would exhibit 
 more enthusiasm for the triumph of his cause. This 
 baton was conferred on Grouchy, who had shown 
 talent and vigor in the campaign of 1814, and in his 
 expedition against the Duke d'Angouleme. Soult 
 
114 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 was appointed major-general in place of Berthier, who 
 had forsaken his flag to follow the Bourbons, and who 
 it is said, threw himself from the casement of the 
 palace of Bamberg, ashamed of finding himself in the 
 midst of the enemy's columns that defiled before him 
 en route for the frontier of France.* Davoust re- 
 mained as minister of war, Mortier was to command 
 the guard ; but his health did not permit it. Ney and 
 Grouchy were to conduct the wings of the main army, 
 in the quality of lieutenants. Suchet commanded the 
 army of Italy, Rapp on the Rhine, Brune on the Yar, 
 Clausel and Decaen watched the Pyrenees. 
 
 Napoleon had four lines of operation from which to 
 choose ; he could reunite his masses on the left towards 
 Valenciennes, pounce by Mons, on Brussels, fall upon 
 the English army and overthrow it on Antwerp. By 
 the centre he could act on Charleroi, through Mau- 
 beuge, between the Sambre and the Meuse, and fall 
 on the point of function of the two armies of Blucher 
 and Wellington. On. the right he could descend the 
 Meuse towards Namur, fall on the left of the Prussians, 
 cutting them off from Coblentz and Cologne. Lastly, 
 it- was possible to make a descent between the Meuse 
 and the Moselle, or between the Meuse and the Rhine, 
 fall on the corps of Kleist that covered the Ardennes, 
 and the communications of the Prussians with the 
 Rhine. 
 
 * Berthier's death is still covered by a veil of mystery ; the fact is, he 
 foil from the balcony on to the pavement. Some say he was thrown by the 
 son of a bookseller of Nuremberg, who had been condemned to death 
 under the empire ; others think, that the spectacle of the Eussian army 
 defiling on their way to enter France> made him regret his having 
 emigrated. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 115 
 
 This last course led only to threatenings, that would 
 have resulted in nothing with a man of Blucher's cha- 
 racter. Besides, it led too far from the end intended. 
 An attack on the Meuse was most wise, but it would 
 have thrown Blucher on Wellington, and effected the 
 junction that should be prevented. The inverse 
 manoeuvre by Mons against "Wellington's army, might 
 have produced in an opposite manner the same 
 dreaded junction, by throwing the right of the allies 
 upon the left. The emperor at last determined on 
 falling upon the central point, where he might take 
 Blucher en flagrant delit, and defeat him before he 
 could receive the support of Wellington. 
 
 In order properly to appreciate its merit, it must be 
 remembered that Napoleon had not to oppose only 
 one army, under the same chief, and having but one 
 interest, but on the contrary, two armies independent 
 of each other, having two bases of operations entirely 
 diverging : that of the English being based on Ostend, 
 or Antwerp, and that of the Prussians on the Rhine 
 and Cologne ; decisive circumstances, and which 
 secured great success to all central operations, tending 
 to separate them and fight them successively. 
 
 ' Napoleon's taking the field, and his first plan, may 
 be regarded as among the most remarkable operations 
 of his life : nine corps of infantry or cavalry cantoned 
 from Lille to Metz, were, by marches skillfully con- 
 cealed, to concentrate in front of Charleroi, at the 
 same moment with the guard's arrival there from Paris. 
 These movements were combined with so much pre- 
 cision, that 120,000 men were assembled on the 
 ' ambre, as by enchantment, on the 14th June. Wei- 
 
116 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 lington, occupied in giving fetes at Brussels, believed 
 Napoleon still in Paris, when his columns presented 
 themselves on the morning of the 15th to cross this 
 river. The French troops occupied over night the 
 following positions : — the right, 16,000 strong, under 
 Count Gerard, at Philippe ville ; the centre, nearly 
 60,000 strong, under Napoleon, towards Beaumont ; 
 and the left, 45,000 strong, at Ham-sur-Eur and 
 Solre-sur-Sambre. 
 
 The enemy had such slight idea of these movements 
 that their armies were not concentrated. Blucher had 
 the first of his corps at Charleroi, the second at 
 Namur, the third at Dinant, and the fourth under 
 Bulow, at Li&ge ; the fifth under Kleist, covered 
 Luxembourg. Meanwhile, Napoleon learned on join- 
 ing his army, that General Bourmont had deserted on 
 the 14th, from Philippeville, to join Louis XVIII. and 
 the allies. However censurable this step might be, it 
 may be believed, that it was not aggravated, by giving 
 the enemy such information as a soldier should con- 
 ceal even in such a case. At all events, under the 
 circumstances, w T hen endeavoring to surprise them in 
 their cantonments, the mere knowledge of the em- 
 peror's arrival and the assembling of his army, was a 
 serious matter ; this information sufficed for Blucher 
 to order the concentration of his corps, and thus 
 counteracting all plans for a surprise. We are, how- 
 ever, assured that he had already ordered this as- 
 sembling, on previous advices received through a 
 drummer of the old guard who had deserted that 
 night ; the presence of the old guard was a certain 
 index, and sufficient to warn the enemy. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 117 
 
 As to Wellington's army, it had not yet stirred 
 from the cantonments it occupied from Oudinarde, on 
 l'Escaut to Nivelle : but it had been apprised and 
 was ready to do so at the first signal. 
 
 The events were so important and so hurried in this 
 campaign of four days, that I will be obliged to enter 
 into details to have it understood, and to insert in this 
 place, a table of the situations of the respective armies 
 on the morning of the 15th, to accomplish the same 
 object. If Napoleon did not then know precisely the 
 composition and position of all the enemy's corps, he 
 at least knew that in general terms, the Prussians 
 cantoned from Charleroi to Li&ge, and that the Anglo- 
 Belgians were distributed between Ath and Brussels, 
 with advanced guards towards Mons and Tournay. 
 The point of junction of these two armies, was then 
 on the causeway leading from Charleroi to Brussels, 
 and it was there also that he directed his blows, with 
 the greater hope of being able to profit thus by the 
 dissemination of the enemy's forces, and overthrow 
 them separately. 
 
 As success depended on celerity, the French army 
 crossed the frontier on the 15th at dawn, and took the 
 direction of Charleroi. The corps of General Beille, 
 that bivouacked at ITam-sur-Eur, being nearest the 
 enemy, was to cross the Sambre at Marchiennes, and 
 march on Gosselies : that of d'Erlon which was farther 
 to the rear at Solre-sur-Sambre, was to follow the 
 same direction. The centre or main body, with the 
 cavalry reserves under Grouchy,* marched from 
 
 * Under this first organization, Grouchy commanded all the cavalry ; it 
 was only on the morrow, the 16th June, that the army was organized into 
 two wings, and that he took command of the right. 
 
118 
 
 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
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120 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Beaumont on Charleroi, and the right from Philijope- 
 ville upon Catelet, where it was to cross the Sambre, 
 cutting off the Prussian division that held Charleroi, 
 from its retreat on Namur. 
 
 These movements though partly unforeseen by the 
 enemy, did not entirely attain their object. Reille's 
 corps actually crossed the Sambre successfully, and 
 gained the route to Gosselies, preceded by the light 
 cavalry of the guard ; but Gerard's leaving Philippe- 
 ville, having a much longer march to execute, and 
 over detestable roads, arrived at Catelet too late to 
 gain the road to Gilly, and fulfil its destination. 
 
 The centre had, also, very execrable roads to 
 traverse, in running over from Beaumont to Charleroi, 
 and Vandamme, who should have formed the head of 
 this column, was rather late in leaving his camp.* 
 The Prussian generals, whose divisions were parceled 
 out on the line, had thus more leisure in assembling 
 them and evacuating Charleroi, this being in their 
 plan of concentration ; only two or three battalions 
 w T ere cut to pieces in the partial combats. The first 
 division of Ziethen's corps, wishing to retreat from 
 Pieton through Gosselies, and finding this point al- 
 ready occupied by Reille's advanced guard, had to 
 force its way in order to reach Heppignies. The 
 second division re-assembled at Gilly on the Namur 
 road. Reille's corps having driven the Prussian divi- 
 sion from Gosselies, and perceiving it continuing the 
 
 * General Gonrgaud will have it thus ; but we have reason to believe that 
 an error was committed in transmitting the orders, for Vandamme was 
 not one of those men whose activity must be stimulated ; he was but 
 too ardent, unless some personal jealousy had excited his displeasure. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 121 
 
 retreat by Heppignies upon Fleurus, Girard's division 
 was ordered to follow, while the other three divisions 
 continued their march upon Frasne. The light 
 cavalry of the guard that preceded it, drove from this 
 borough the advanced guard of Prince Weimar, who 
 concentrated his brigade on Quatre-Bras. 
 
 Grouchy's light cavalry having debouched from 
 Charleroi upon Gilly, found there Ziethen's two divi- 
 sions, and was obliged to halt and await Yandamme's 
 infantry, who were advancing with difficulty by the 
 bridge of this city. In this position the two parties 
 exchanged a few cannon shot. 
 
 While these French columns debouched by the 
 bridges on the Sambre and sought the enemy, 
 Napoleon established himself in front of Charleroi at 
 the fork of the roads leading to Gosselies and Fleurus, 
 where he awaited reports, and meditated on the 
 employment to be given to the masses he had assem- 
 bled with so much skill, and on the direction necessary 
 to assign them. 
 
 Before proceeding further, it will be well to cast a 
 coup d'oeil on the preventive measures the allies had 
 taken against the storm that was bursting upon them. 
 If their generals were caught at fault at the instant 
 of the irruption, it must be acknowledged that they 
 were actually well prepared for whatever might 
 happen. The Anglo-Prussians desired to assume the 
 offensive on the 1st July; during the interval they 
 had adopted all the precautions necessary, in case 
 they were anticipated. All the partial and general 
 concentrations were properly indicated. They under- 
 stood Napoleon's system of piercing divided centres 
 
 6 
 
122 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 too well, not to foresee that lie would manoeuvre in 
 order to separate the two armies. Under this hypo- 
 thesis, Blucher had chosen the position in rear of 
 Ligny for assembling on his right, and Wellington 
 had selected Quartre-Bras for concentrating on his 
 left ; meanwhile he had reconnoitred the position be- 
 tween Hall and Mont-Saint-Jean (or Waterloo,) for 
 covering Brussels, and there to accept battle, if the 
 French either debouched by Yalenciennes and Mons, 
 or arrived by Charleroi. 
 
 These dispositions were incontestably wise, but with 
 the impetuosity and ordinary vivacity of the enter- 
 prises and the movements of the emperor of the 
 French, they might yet fail in accomplishing their 
 object and be separated. 
 
 After what had been agreed upon, as soon as 
 Blucher heard at Namur of the approach of the impe- 
 rial army, he dispatched at midnight of the 14th, 
 orders to Ziethen to fall back, fighting on Fleurus ; 
 prescribed at the same time the assembling of Pirch's 
 corps at Sombref ; ordered Thielmann to march in all 
 haste from Dinant to Namur, while Bulow should 
 concentrate on Hanut. These measures, evidently 
 suggested by the reports of deserters, denoted how- 
 ever that Blucher calculated on a hasty crossing of the 
 Sambre, and on a decisive battle for the morrow. 
 
 Napoleon could not as yet understand all these cir- 
 cumstances ; but after the varied information he had 
 received, and from the direction of the retreat of the 
 Prussian forces, he perceived that their army sought to 
 assemble between Namur and the causeway leading 
 from Charleroi to Brussels, as it was by this route that 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 123 
 
 the English would come to their assistance : now, under 
 this supposition the emperor had but one wise course to 
 follow ; the most simple glance at the map would suffi- 
 ciently indicate, that it was essential to seize upon Som- 
 bref on the one side, and the central point of Quatre- 
 Bras on the other. (A village that took its name from 
 the intersection of two roads, forming four branches, 
 leading to Namur, Charleroi, Brussels and Nivelles.) 
 Because, once master of these two points, he was in po- 
 sition to act at will on either of the opposing armies, and 
 prevent their junction. Consequently, Napoleon gave 
 Grouchy a verbal order, to push as far as Sombref 
 that very evening, if possible : Marshal Ney, who had 
 just arrived by post from Paris, was ordered to assume 
 command of the left wing, composed of Reille's and 
 Erlon's corps, to take at once the Brussels road, in the 
 direction of Quatre-Bras, and push forward advanced 
 guards on the three branches that parted from that 
 point, to gather every information.* 
 
 Having learned at that moment, that Grouchy's* 
 cavalry had been arrested near Gilly by a portion of 
 Ziethen's corps, Napoleon hastened there to order an at- 
 
 * This fact, asserted in Gourgaud's account, is contested by Ney's defen- 
 ders. It is certain that in the orders written by Soult, no trace of tin's 
 movement is found till the morning of the 16th ; but it is also certain that 
 Napoleon gave Ney, on the night of the 15th, all the instructions verbalhj, 
 as well as to Grouchy, whom he ordered to push on as far as Sombref if 
 possible. It is then more than probable that he gave Ney, by word of 
 mouth, the order cited by Gourgaud with circumstances that do not per- 
 mit a doubt. How, in fact, would he have pushed his right as far as Som- 
 bref, leaving his left in rear at Gosselies, when this wing had less distance 
 to traverse, even if it had advanced as far as Quatre-Bras? Besides, if 
 the execution of the movement seemed difficult on the night of the loth, 
 it is evident that it was indispensable to march on this important point at 
 6 the next morning. 
 
124 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 tack ; the enemy observing the arrival of Vandamme's 
 infantry, retired, fighting, and after quite a brisk can- 
 nonade, Excelmans and Yandamme dislodged him from 
 the woods of Soleilmont and Lambusart, where Zie- 
 then's third division had collected. 
 
 While this was taking place, Marshal Ney arrived 
 between Gosselies and Frasne, and hearing the boom- 
 ing of cannon in the direction of Gilly during the at- 
 tack of Ziethen's second division by Vandamme and 
 Grouchy, believed that this engagement niight modify 
 the emperor's designs, and therefore, instead of briskly 
 pushing forward as far as Quatre-Bras, he established 
 himself in front of Gosselies. This contre-temps was 
 the more grievous, as in admitting that Ney had not 
 received a formal order, he should have felt the impor- 
 tance of this occupation. It has been said in his jus- 
 tification, that his troops, especially those of d'Erlon's 
 corps that had advanced from Solre over frightful 
 roads, were still scattered between Gosselies and Mar- 
 chiennes ; it has been added that the roar of artillery 
 in rear of his right flank, induced the belief that his 
 recall might become necessary, and that his march 
 should not be continued for fear of having too much 
 road to travel in retracing his steps'* : Bachelu's divi- 
 
 *We should observe, once for all, that without wishing to prejudice in 
 the slightest degree, the faults imputed to his lieutenants, by Napoleon, we 
 should recall his exact words used at the very moment of the catastrophe. 
 Ney was less active and less impetuous during the loth and 16th June than 
 he had been at Elchingen, Jena and Friedland ; but we must take into 
 consideration the circumstances of the case. He arrived at Charleroi by 
 post from Paris, without equipage and even without horses, when he was 
 immediately ordered to take command of eight divisions of infantry he 
 had never seen, of which he scarcely knew any of the chiefs, and the po- 
 sitions of which were a mystery to him. Had Ney's wing have been un- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 125 
 
 Bion, that had been thrown forward as far as Frasne, 
 was even ordered to fall back. 
 
 Be this as it may, night having set 'in before the 
 right could reach Sombref, as he had desired, Napo- 
 leon probably attached less importance to the delays 
 experienced by his left, and returned to Charleroi 
 about 10 o'clock that night, where Ney repaired at a 
 later hour, undoubtedly by invitation, to determine on 
 the operations for the morrow. The troops of the 
 main body and the cavalry, bivouacked between the 
 woods of Lambusart and the village of Heppignies, 
 now held by Girard's division of Eeille's corps : the 
 guard and Lobau's corps, in reserve, about Charleroi, 
 where were fixed the imperial quarters. The corps 
 of Count Gerard remained in the vicinity of Catelet : 
 that of d'Erlon did not go beyond Jumet. 
 
 From all that has been stated, we see that Napoleon 
 had to renounce the idea of pushing, on the 15th, as 
 far as Sombref and Quatre-Bras, which were to be the 
 pivots of all his after movements. But to secure the 
 success of his wisely combined plan, it behooved him 
 to repair with activity and promptness, at day-break 
 on the 16th, what had been left incomplete the night 
 previous ; unfortunately for him, this was not execu- 
 ted with that uncommon activity that ordinarily dis- 
 tinguished him. We are forced to avow that the man- 
 ner in which he employed this morning of the 16th. 
 will ever remain a problem for those who best under- , 
 stand it : did he calculate that Ney and Grouchy 
 
 der his orders a few days, and had their anterior movements been directed 
 by him, it is probable that he would have reached Quatre-Bras on the 
 night of the 15th. 
 
126 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 would themselves execute at sunrise, the verbal orders 
 received, to advance upon Sombref and Quatre-Bras, 
 and did he believe in his power of employing this 
 time, in arranging the numberless affairs that besieged 
 him at his head-quarters ? We can suppose so, as the 
 emperor that morning resolved on the definite organi- 
 zation of his army into two principal masses and a 
 reserve : Grouchy had the command of the right wing, 
 composed of Vanda-mme's and Gerard's corps, with 
 Pajol's, Excelmans 5 and Milhaud's corps of cavalry. 
 Ney commanded the left wing, composed of Reille's 
 and d'Erlon's corps, with the cavalry of Count de Yalmy 
 and Lefebre Desnouettes. Lobau's corps and the guards 
 formed a reserve of nearly 28,000 men.* 
 
 We can also suppose, that on hearing of Blucher's 
 presence at ISTamur, where he had spent the 15th, the 
 emperor concluded that he would concentrate his dif- 
 ferent corps about that city, as it was the central point 
 of their cantonments. He could then naturally infer, 
 that but a portion of this army would oppose him on 
 the 16th, and that it would suffice to take an earnest 
 step after mid-day : all the measures prescribed evi- 
 dently prove it ; for he informed Ney in the morning 
 
 *This organization has had its critics, because, in truth, the army had no 
 centre ; they have thought that it had been preferable to draw the fourth 
 division of the two corps of Reille and d'Erlon, and join them to Lobau's 
 corps, thus forming a centre and two wings independently of the reserves ; 
 this would have facilitated the movements, and perhaps avoided the false 
 employment of too great detachments during the 16th and 18th June. 
 Napoleon was undoubtedly determined by the reason, that having to en- 
 counter two armies quite distinct, it behooved him to have a certain mass 
 ready to oppose to each of *them, besides the reserve to reinforce the point 
 where he would desire to strike a blow ; a result he would have attained 
 better, by having had three masses beside the reserve. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 127 
 
 that he would not resolve on a definite course till three 
 o'clock that afternoon.* 
 
 Nevertheless, Napoleon resolved about 8 A. M., on 
 sending his aid-de-camp, Flahaut, to Marshal Ney, to 
 reiterate the formal order for him to march hastily on 
 Quatre-Bras, to take up a strong position there, to re- 
 connoitre the three roads, and to detach from thence 
 a strong infantry division with the light cavalry of 
 the guard, on Marbais ; lastly, to form a connection 
 with Grouchy, who, with the right wing, was advanc- 
 ing to take possession of Sombref. This dispatch, 
 written by Flahaut himself under Napoleon's dictation, 
 left by 9 o'clock, and should have been preceded by 
 a like order given by the Major General : these orders 
 reached Gosselies only towards 11 o'clock, and as the 
 Marshal had already left to join the advance guard of 
 Reille's corps, near Frasne, he did not immediately 
 receive them. 
 
 While these things were happening at the imperial 
 quarters, Grouchy's troops advanced to drive Ziethen's 
 rear-guard from Fleurus. The latter made no opposi- 
 tion, but assembled on the main body, formed on the 
 heights between Ligny and Saint Amand, in presence 
 of which the French found themselves about eleven 
 o'clock. 
 
 *This circumstance is so much the more surprising, as Grouchy had 
 transmitted a report, at 6 A. M., announcing that the Prussians were de- 
 bouching from Sombref on St. Amand in considerable forces. As this did 
 not at all accord with the information received of Blucher's presence at 
 Namur, Napoleon seems not to have credited it; besides, he was pained 
 and much disturbed at the turn taken at Paris by the Chambers and Jaco- 
 bins. It was not till three o'clock that he determined on a course then 
 inexecutable. 
 
128 POLITICAL AJSTD MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 A few moments afterwards Napoleon arrived on the 
 spot, proceeded to reconnoitre the position,when he was 
 informed that Ney still thought it his duty to slacken 
 his march on Quatre-Bras, for many reasons : first, 
 d'Erlon's corps was still very far to the rear ; second, 
 false reports that the junction of the enemy's armies 
 had already taken place, and that therefore, the move- 
 ment prescribed, far from being useful, would only 
 prove adventurous : the marshal, therefore, awaited 
 the emperor's decision after the receipt of this infor- 
 mation, before seriously engaging."^ 
 
 While this remissness threatened the success of this 
 beautiful plan of Napoleon, the allies displayed an 
 uncommon activity, and the Prussians especially, re- 
 assembled with rare celerity. Being informed at Na- 
 mur, at 10 A. M. of the 15th, of the passage of the 
 Sambre and the danger that menaced Ziethen, Blucher 
 had ordered Thielmann and Bulow to march immedi- 
 ately on Sombref. Pirch's corps had left Namur on 
 the 15th for this destination, and marched part of the 
 night ; Thielmann's, on their way from Dinant, had 
 made but one halt of three hours, at jSTamur, to rest 
 the troops, and had filed off the entire night towards 
 Sombref, where the rear battalions arrived between 
 nine and ten in the morning. Bulow, coming from 
 Liege, could not reach Gembloux before the night of 
 
 *These delays are contested by Ney's vindicators, who wish to prove 
 that the order borne by Flahaut, not reaching Gosselies before 11 o'clock 
 and Frasne towards noon, could not be executed before two, and that much 
 he did. But the orders given verbally on the 15th and 16th at 1 A. M., 
 cannot be doubted, without accusing Napoleon of incapacity. Besides, 
 how could Ney excuse himself at nine in the morning for not having yet 
 advanced on Quatre-Bras, if he had not previously received verbal orders. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 129 
 
 the 16th and 17th. The main body of the Prussian 
 
 army (three corps, together 90,000 men) thus found 
 itself in position between Bry and Tongrines, at ten 
 o'clock on the morning of the 16th. 
 
 Wellington, who believed Napoleon still at Paris, 
 was not aware of his army's approach, until the news 
 of the passage of the Sambre received at 5 P. M., on 
 the 15th at Brussels, while at a dinner; but the duke 
 had forewarned his troops to hold themselves in readi- 
 ness for the first signal, and he sent officers in all 
 directions to put them in motion. His left under the 
 Prince of Orange, w r as in cantonments between Mons 
 and JSfivelles, and with its head-quarters at Braine le 
 Comte ; his right under General Hill, extended to- 
 wards Ath. It was then only by a prodigy of activity 
 that this extended line could be concentrated on his 
 left by the evening of the 16th or the morning of the 
 17th, and it was evident that a connection with the 
 Prussians could be effected by the road from Nivelles 
 to Quatre-Bras. After having dispatched these orders, 
 Wellington repaired to Quatre-Bras, where on the 
 morning of the 16th he found a portion of Per- 
 poucher's Belgian division just from JNTivelles, and the 
 brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar. While await- 
 ing the columns from Brussels and Braine, the duke 
 galloped over to Bry, wmere, about noon, he held an 
 interview with Blucher; finding the Prussian army 
 disposed to give battle, he promised to collect thirty 
 or thirty-five thousand men during the night, to sup- 
 port his right, and with this object returned to Quatre- 
 Bras, where he arrived after two o'clock. 
 
 To conquer an enemy that made such wise disposi- 
 
 6* 
 
130 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 tions, it would have required the ancient impetuosity 
 of the conqueror of Italy, Ulm, Jena, and Ratisbonne ; 
 but his warmest admirers would not recognize it here. 
 As we have already observed, he undoubtedly trusted 
 to the alacrity of his lieutenants themselves, to recover 
 the time lost, and to execute in the morning the verbal 
 orders he had given them the previous evening, for 
 the occupation of two points, without which he could 
 not reckon on the success of his project. Neverthe- 
 less this hope did not suffice, and the emperor of 1809 
 would not have failed being in person at Fleurus by 
 8 o'clock in the morning, to judge of the state of 
 things, and to verify the report Grouchy had sent him 
 at 6 o'clock, announcing the presence of strong 
 Prussian columns that were debouching from Sombref 
 on St. Amand. 
 
 Be that as it may, as we have seen above, Napoleon 
 arrived near Fleurus at 11 o'clock, and there received 
 information of the new delay caused in the movement 
 on Quatre-Bras. To counteract this deplorable inci- 
 dent, the emperor reiterated the order to Ney, to push 
 vigorously on Quatre-Bras, with the understanding 
 that 8,000 men should be detached on Marbais, as 
 soon as he received the command through General 
 Flahaut. This new order at the same time informed 
 him that as Grouchy was to occupy Sombref, he 
 w T ould certainly have to oppose but the troops hasten- 
 ing from Brussels. Waleski, a polish officer, was the 
 bearer of this letter. 
 
 While the latter proceeded at a gallop on the 
 Gosselies road, Napoleon about noon ascended the 
 mills at Fleurus, to reconnoitre the Prussian corps 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 131 
 
 whose presence had been signaled. On his front, the 
 position was covered with difficulties that bordered 
 the rivulet of Ligny ; the left extended to the environs 
 of Sombref and Tongrines, the centre about Ligny ; 
 the right in rear of St. Amand. This large borough, 
 formed of three distinct villages (that bear the names 
 of St. Amand le Chateau, St. Amand la Haie, and 
 St. Amand le Hameau,) protected the right wing 
 whose flank rested on Wagn&le. The second line and 
 the reserves were between Sombref and Bry. Thus 
 six large villages, four of which were difficult of 
 access on account of the rivulet, covered the line of 
 the enemy, like so many bastions ; his reserves and 
 his second line posted in columns of attack by bat- 
 talions between Sombref and Bry, could support all 
 points of it.* 
 
 After this reconnoissance, it became still more 
 manifest that Napoleon's heaviest blow should be 
 struck at Blucher's right ; because this wing was 
 already turned by Ney's march, and it was the only 
 point of junction with Wellington. It is said that the 
 emperor felt some surprise in seeing this position ; all 
 reports agreed in stating that Blucher had passed the 
 15th at Namur, where his army was not as yet con- 
 centrated. Though Napoleon was aware of all the 
 interest the allies had in effecting a junction, he did 
 not think that Blucher would thus abandon his com- 
 
 * The four divisions of Ziethen's corps formed in the front line defended 
 Ligny and St. Amand ; those of Pirch's corps forming the second line, 
 came into line successively. The left under Thielmann, only arrived at 9 
 A.M., were towards Tongrines. Gourgaud's narrative states that Napo- 
 leon made this reconnoissance at 10 o'clock, while Soult, no earlier than 2 
 P.M., informs Ney that a Prussian corps has just been discovered. 
 
132 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 munications with Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle, as lie 
 believed his army to be less numerous, and would 
 have moreover expected to find it in the beautiful 
 defensive position between Sombref and Tongrines, at 
 the fork on the causeway from Namur. The line he 
 had selected suited the French perfectly, but it was 
 necessary to profit by it without delay, and too much 
 time had already been lost. 
 
 Although this procrastination in the design on 
 Quatre-Bras appeared vexatious, since the occupation 
 of this point in the morning had been an important 
 matter, we must acknowledge that after the reconnois- 
 sance just made, the emperor had cause for gratula- 
 tion, as it resulted that Ney would be yet disposable 
 in seconding his attack of the Prussians. 
 
 This reconnoissance having been completed in an 
 hour, Napoleon had actually one of three courses to 
 pursue : 
 
 1st. To arrest the march of Ney's column at once ; 
 order Kellermann's cavalry to take up position at 
 Frasne, to cover the route from Charleroi, this being 
 the line of retreat ; then to throw the seven divisions of 
 Reille's and d'Erlon's corps on Mablais, by the Roman 
 causeway, in order to turn Blucher's right and fall 
 upon his rear, while Napoleon attacked him in front. 
 
 2d. To prescribe this movement for d'Erlon's corps 
 alone, leaving Reille's corps with Kellermann's cavalry 
 on the defensive, towards Frasne and Quatre-Bras, to 
 watch the enemy and cover the road to Charleroi. 
 
 3d. To direct Ney, on the contrary, to fall impetu- 
 ously on all forces at Quatre-Bras, force them on 
 Genape, in the direction of Brussels, then immediately 
 
THE CVMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 133 
 
 to turn towards Bry, in the direction of Namur, and 
 co-operate in the attack on Blucher. 
 
 In a tactical point of view, the rirst of these, incon- 
 testable offered the greatest results ; but Napoleon had 
 actually pushed Ney on Quatre-Bras, as much to 
 prevent the Anglo-Belgian troops from taking the 
 Namur road to support the Prussian army, as to 
 cover his natural line of retreat by the road to 
 Charleroi, and by leaving it to the protection of the 
 cavalry alone, he relinquished this double advantage, 
 by delivering this important route to the mercy of the 
 enemy. Under this supposition he might have adopted 
 the second, which had the advantage of sufficiently 
 covering the retreat, while allowing forces sufficient 
 to outflank Blucher's right. Napoleon preferred the 
 third, undoubtedly with the hope that the order sent 
 by Flahaut before 9 o'clock, would be executed at 
 the moment this reconnoissance had been completed, 
 and that Ney, once master of Quatre-Bras, could with 
 so much greater security, assist in the defeat of 
 Blucher, after having beaten the Anglo-Belgians that 
 opposed him. However, it is probable there was 
 some uncertainty in the emperor's resolutions, as it 
 was not until two o'clock that the following order was 
 sent to Ney : — 
 
 " In bivouac in front of Fleurus, 2 P. M. 
 " Marshal : — The emperor instructs me to inform 
 you, that the enemy has concentrated a corps of troops 
 between Sombref and Bry, and that at half past two, 
 Marshal Grouchy with the third and fourth corps will 
 attack it. His majesty's intention is, that you also 
 
134 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 attack those in your front ; that after having pressed 
 them vigorously, yon turn in this direction, and aid in 
 enveloping the corps of which I. have just spoken. 
 If this corps is first routed, his majesty will then 
 manoeuvre in your direction, to facilitate in a like 
 manner your operations. You will immediately inform 
 the emperor of your dispositions, and of what is 
 happening in your front." 
 
 All the expressions of this dispatch seem to attest, 
 that Napoleon was but imperfectly aware of the 
 Prussian force, as he speaks but of one corps, and 
 supposes he might be overthrown without the aid of 
 the left wing: this last circumstance naturally ex- 
 plains the double interest, the French general had 
 attached to the previous occupation of Quatre-Bras, 
 so that Ney should not be withdrawn until free from 
 all anxiety on that point. 
 
 While these resolutions, rather tardy and based on 
 incomplete information, were borne to the left wing, 
 Napoleon was making his preparations for attacking 
 the Prussians. The corps of Count Lobau, left at first, 
 at too great a distance towards Charleroi, was ordered 
 to hasten to Fleurus. The left of the corps de hataille 
 under Yandamme, was drawn up fronting the village 
 of St. Amand ; the centre under Count Gerard, took 
 up its ground facing Ligny ; the guard was posted in 
 rear of these. two attacking portions ; Grouchy 's cavalry 
 was deployed on the right, to keep in check the 
 Prussian left, that had just been reinforced by the 
 arrival of Thielmann's entire corps. 
 
 The attack commenced between two and three 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 135 
 
 o'clock at St. Amand, which was at first seized by Yan- 
 damme, notwithstanding a vigorous resistance ; but the 
 Prussians, favored by the village of La Haie, and by the 
 heights that command it, having advancd their second 
 line, soon retook it. Count Gerard met with similar op- 
 position at Ligny,only a portion of which he was able 
 to hold. 
 
 This resistance proving that the enemy mustered 
 stronger than was supposed, Napoleon, at a quarter 
 past three, unfortunately rather late, caused a formal 
 order to be dispatched to Marshal Ney, ordering him 
 to manoeuvre with his forces on Bry and St. Amand ;* 
 fearing that even this order might suffer some hin- 
 drance, and knowing that d'Erlon's corps had not 
 reached beyond Frasne, General Labedoyere was sent 
 to communicate to this general the order given to 
 Marshal Ney, with instructions at once to commence 
 its execution. 
 
 While this was taking place, the engagement along 
 the whole line continued raging. A second attack by 
 
 * The following are the very words of this last order, which had been 
 decisive atone o'clock, but which, it will be seen, was productive of more 
 harm than good : 
 
 " In bivouac at Fleurus, 
 
 between 3i and 31 o'clock. 
 To Marshal Net. 
 
 I wrote you an hour ago, that the emperor would attack 
 the enemy in the position he has taken up, between the villages of St. 
 Amand and Bry ; at this moment the engagement is most decisive. His 
 majesty instructs me to say, that you should at once manoeuvre in such a 
 manner as to envelope the enemy's right, and fall with might and main on 
 his rear ; if you act with vigor this army is lost. The fate of France is 
 in your hands ; so do not hesitate in executing the movement ordered by 
 the emperor, and move forward upon the heights of Bry and St. Amand, 
 to concur in perhaps a decisive victory : the enemy is taken en flagrant 
 delit, at the moment he seeks to join the English. 
 
 The Duke of Dalmatia." 
 
136 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Vandamme on St. Amand, favored by Girard's divi- 
 sion, that had crossed the ravine and out-flanked the 
 enemy, placed the French in possession of that village ; 
 "but the brave Girard paid with his life, for a success 
 of short duration ; because Blucher, having thrown 
 forward a portion of his reserves, the village of St. 
 Amand was retaken and disputed with desperation. 
 
 The battle raged more furiously still at Ligny, which 
 Gerard had frequently seized, without the power of 
 preserving : forced to leave Hulot's division in obser- 
 vation on his right, and thus reduced to 10,000 com- 
 batants, he maintained his position with the most bril- 
 liant valor against more than 25,000 Prussians, in the 
 lower portion of the village, even up to the rivulet 
 that cuts it in two. 
 
 The guard, posted in the centre, in rear of these 
 two attacking portions, was prepared to sustain either. 
 On the extreme right, Excelmans manoeuvered skill- 
 fully to prevent the left of the Prussians from debouch- 
 ing from Tongrenelle, while Pajol watched Boignee, 
 and Milhaud's cuirassiers supported Gerard's right. 
 
 Things were in this state about half past five, and 
 Napoleon awaited with a just impatience, to learn 
 what was to be hoped from the movement prescribed 
 for Ney, as the wind and the roar of a violent cannon- 
 ade prevented his hearing the attack at Quatre 
 Bras. The emperor was preparing to bring forward 
 his guard, when a report from General Yandamme 
 xnformed him, it is said, that a strong column was 
 visible in the direction of Wagnele, and that Girard's 
 division, deprived of its general and attacked at the 
 same time by superior forces, had been forced to retire 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 137 
 
 towards St. Amand-le-Hameau. General Yandamme 
 announced, that he had at first taken this column for 
 the detachment that Ney was to send on Marbaix ; 
 but as it was much too considerable, and as the scouts 
 had recognized it as of the enemy, it threatened to 
 drive him back if not promptly supported. 
 
 Though difficult to comprehend how a column could 
 glide between ISTey and Napoleon, this might, how- 
 ever, be a reinforcement sent to Blucher from Quatre- 
 Bras, or probably, a corps of his own army that, hav- 
 ing executed a movement by the ancient Roman 
 causeway beyond Wagnele, was in the act of turning 
 Yandamme's left.* Prior to any farther action, Na- 
 poleon thought it his duty to be sure of it. The nar- 
 rative from St. Helena, in exposing these facts, affirms 
 that the emperor suspended his grand attack on this 
 account, and sent his aid-decamp, Dejean, to recon- 
 noitre and discover who they were.f We are assured 
 that this officer, at the expiration of only one hour, re- 
 ported that this was Count Erlon's corps, who, instead 
 of marching in a northerly direction towards Bry or 
 Marbaix, had turned too much to the south, towards 
 Yillers-Peruin, attracted, undoubtedly, by the roar of 
 two or three hundred pieces of ordnance, that thun- 
 dered in the direction of St. Amand. These assertions 
 have been somewhat contested, and as an impartial 
 historian, I must avow, that respecting this matter, 
 
 * This Roman causeway, that intersects the two from Brussels and Na- 
 mur, leaves the latter between Bry and Marbaix, passes half a league to the 
 north of Wagnele, and attains the former between Frasne and Gosselies. 
 
 t In a letter addressed to Marshal Ney's family, General Dejean denies 
 having had such a mission ; perhaps it was confided to some other aid-de- 
 camp, though this it is impossible to confirm. 
 
138 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 there is nothing but doubt and confusion. As Napo- 
 leon had ordered a movement turning his left wing 
 from the Brussels road into the direction of Bry, it 
 was evident that this column should have been the 
 one expected : the surprise manifested on this subject 
 should then appear rather extraordinary. However, 
 if it be true that Yandamme actually took this column 
 for the enemy's, it was at least prudent to be made 
 certain of it, and therefore the contested mission of 
 General Dejean would have been the most natural 
 one ; but it is necessary at least to add, that no posi- 
 tive order directing these troops on Bry had been 
 given. This forgetfulness, though it might be alleged, 
 was a manifest fault. It will be said, that Napoleon 
 might have seen in the presence of Erlon's corps, a 
 sufficient indication of the near arrival of Marshal 
 Ney, to whom he undoubtedly desired to leave the 
 task of directing his own columns : this, if admitted, 
 does not entirely justify him ; because the false direc- 
 tion just taken by these forces, demanded of the em- 
 peror, in every case, to state precisely what should be 
 done to accomplish his views. We will see farther 
 on, the sad part played by these four fine divisions. 
 However, about half-past six, Napoleon advanced 
 upon Ligny with his guard, to strike the Prussians a 
 vigorous blow, which, three hours previously, would 
 have had more chances of success. The great confi- 
 dence with which he made this splendid attack, au- 
 thorizes us, moreover, in believing, that in ordering 
 it, he firmly expected that a concurrence of a large 
 portion of Ney's troops would not fail him, and that 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OP WATERLOO. 139 
 
 the column that had given Yandamme so much uneasi 
 ness was soon to cause Blucher greater anxiety. 
 
 After seven o'clock in the evening, Napoleon de- 
 bouched with impetuosity through the village of Lig- 
 ny with a division of the guard, seconded by Gerard's 
 infantry, the mounted guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers : 
 the enemy's centre was broken and thrown partly on 
 Sombref, and partly on Bry. 
 
 The Prussians fought excellently well during the 
 whole day ; but Blucher, deprived of a general re- 
 serve of cavalry, had but his infantry with which to 
 oppose this torrent : because, seeing the guard leave 
 the environs of St. Amand, and taking this movement 
 as the commencement of the retreat, he had advanced 
 with the few that yet remained on St. Amand, with 
 the hope of pursuing the French. Very soon unde- 
 ceived, he hurried back with the few cavalry he could 
 hastily collect. But of what service is courage to a 
 general-in-chief, in such a mel£e ? His horse, killed 
 by a shot, fell upon him at the instant of the disorder ; 
 the marshal remained ten minutes in the power of 
 the French cuirassiers without their suspecting it, and 
 succeeded, through the presence of mind of JSTostitz, 
 his aid-de-camp, in regaining Bry on a lancer's horse. 
 It was unfortunate for some, and fortunate for others, 
 that he was not recognized ; his capture might, per- 
 haps, have influenced the battles that followed. 
 
 Besides, this brilliant blow, struck, unfortunately, 
 rather late, was partially arrested by the approaching 
 night, partially by the movement which Blucher's 
 entire left executed about Sombref, and lastly by the 
 
140 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 excellent stand made by the remains of Ziethen's and 
 Pirch's forces between Sombref and Bry. 
 
 While the imperial troops issued so gloriously from 
 a difficult and perilous attack, Ney proved less fortu- 
 nate at Quatre-Bras. Arriving in front of this posi- 
 tion, at two o'clock, with the three feeble divisions of 
 Reille's corps, Pire's light cavalry division and a bri- 
 gade of cuirassiers led by Kellermann, the marshal 
 skirmished with the enemy until three o'clock, when 
 the sound of the cannonade at St. Amand resolved 
 him, boldly to attack the allies. But the state of 
 things had greatly changed since the morning. Gen- 
 eral Perponcher, perceiving the great importance of 
 Quartre-Bras, in securing the concentration of the 
 different corps of the Anglo-Netherlanders, and after- 
 wards in facilitating their junction w T ith the Prussians, 
 had taken up a position there with his own division 
 and the brigade of the Prince of Weimar — in all, 
 9,000 men. These forces, the command of which 
 was assumed by the Prince of Orange, might have 
 been very easily overthrown, if attacked in the morn- 
 ing, by two corps d'armee. Wellington, on reaching 
 this spot at eleven o'clock, had ordered that the ad- 
 vanced posts engaged with those of Ney towards 
 Frasne, should be recalled, so as not to be drawn into 
 an unequal combat, previous to the arrival of rein- 
 forcements that were hurrying in from every quarter. 
 The duke then repaired to Bry, to have an interview 
 with Blucher, and returned between two and three 
 o'clock. At the moment that Ney launched Reille's 
 divisions on the enemy, Picton's English division ar- 
 rived on the field of battle, and was soon followed by 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 141 
 
 that under the Duke of Brunswick. Nevertheless, 
 Ney fell upon the allies with his accustomed vigor. 
 Foy's division, on the left, advanced on Quatre-Bras 
 and Germioncourt, while Bachelu's attacked the vil- 
 lage of Piermont. Prince Jerome's entered later into 
 action, by attacking the woods of Bossut on the ex- 
 treme left. The French troops vigorously pressed the 
 enemy at all points. 
 
 Certain of the near arrival of his reinforcements, 
 Wellington received these attacks with his usual sang- 
 froid, which did not prevent the troops of the Prince 
 of Orange and of Picton, from yielding their posi- 
 tions after considerable loss. The arrival of Bruns- 
 wick's corps soon restored the balance ; the battle- 
 field was disputed with fury, and the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick himself fell, pierced with balls, in the midst of 
 his efforts to preserve it. 
 
 Things were in this condition, when Ney received 
 the major-general's order, and the intelligence, that 
 d'Erlon's corps was advancing directly on Bry. The 
 marshal had not a single infantry soldier in reserve ; 
 he saw the masses of the enemy incessantly augment- 
 ing ; nothing was left him but to charge with his 
 cuirassiers, and the greater portion of them had been 
 left with d'Erlon's, near Frasne. The marshal hastening 
 however to the Duke de Valmy, exclaimed : " My 
 dear general, the safety of France is in danger ; an 
 extraordinary effort must be made ; break into the 
 English army with your cavalry ; I will order Pirc to 
 support you." Without hesitation, Kellermann at 
 once charged at the head of this brigade of brave 
 men, overthrew the 69th regiment, captured the bat- 
 
142 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOKY OF 
 
 teries, and pierced through two lines up to the farm 
 of Quatre-Bras, where the reserve of English, Hano- 
 verian and Belgian infantry welcomed him with such 
 a murderous fire, that his men were forced to make a 
 large circuit in seeking to withdraw from this danger- 
 ous place. Kellermann, having had his horse killed 
 under him, remained dismounted in the midst of the 
 English, and with great difficulty regained his com- 
 mand. 
 
 Excited by this splendid charge, the French infantry 
 renewed its efforts on Quatre-Bras and the woods of 
 Bossut, the greater portion of which last had been 
 occupied by Prince Jerome's division. But at this 
 critical moment, the division of English guards and 
 that of General Alten, coming into action after a 
 forced march, gave Wellington such superiority, 
 that he had nothing more to hope for. Ney had 
 in fact sent d'Erlon imperative orders, to hasten to 
 his succor instead of bearing on Bry : but this corps 
 that had well nigh reached St. Amand, was too far 
 off to arrive in time, so that the marshal was obliged 
 to fall back on Frasne to meet him, after having 
 lost 4,000 men hors de combat: the allies having 
 entered the action successively, had lost 5,000. Wel- 
 lington at first ordered a vigorous pursuit, but the 
 retreat was protected by Eoussel's division of cui- 
 rassiers. 
 
 In following attentively the successive train of 
 movements that I have just pointed out, the reader 
 will judge with what fatality d'Erlon's corps paraded 
 uselessly along the whole line, neither reaching Bry, 
 where it would have rendered the victory complete, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 143 
 
 nor Quatre-Bras, where it would have prevented 
 Ney's defeat. 
 
 It will also be noticed, what strange destiny pre- 
 sided over all the operations of this left wing, whose 
 inarch was by turns too slow or too hasty. If it 
 had advanced on Quatre-Bras, on the evening of the 
 15th, or at least at dawn of the 16th, it would 
 have arrived in time to crush Perponcher's division, 
 then isolated, and to detach two divisions on Mar- 
 baix and Bry, in order to accomplish Blucher's de- 
 feat. But when, three hours later, Marshal Ney 
 was instructed to march towards Bry himself, in 
 order to envelop the Prussians, the thing was im- 
 possible, as he was an hour afterwards engaged 
 at Quatre-Bras: so that it had been preferable for 
 these two corps to have remained at Frasne, in- 
 stead of pushing on so far. Much fatality and 
 loss of time was occasioned by the faults of every 
 one.* 
 
 Before passing to the events that followed, I 
 should here observe that though Erlon had already 
 reached beyond Yillers-Peruin, yet at the earnest re- 
 call of Ney, he marched to join him with three di- 
 visions and the light cavalry of the guard, leaving 
 Durutte's division between Villers-Peruin and St. 
 
 * Napoleon could have pushed as far as Fleurus on the 15th, or have 
 taken possession of it at 6 A.M., on the 16th; he would have thus dis- 
 covered Blucher's position before sending Flahaut to Marshal Ney. To 
 obtain a complete victory on the 16th, it would have been necessary to 
 have had the concurrence of Lobau and d'Erlon's corps, and to have led 
 but one corps of infantry and ono of cavalry on Quatre-Bras. To accom- 
 plish this, the recooiioissanoe made by the emperor at mid-day, should 
 have been made at 8 o'clock. 
 
144 POLITICAL AKD MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Amand, in case Napoleon required anew a co-opera- 
 tion on Bry. This division remained there all night 
 perfectly inactive, on the flank of the rear-guard 
 left by Blucher in this village, which it occupied 
 until one o'clock in the morning, while Ziethen's 
 corps retired under cover of the night on Gilly, 
 Pirch's on Gentinne, and the left under Thielmann's 
 orders took the direction of Gembloux. 
 
 At day-break, Blucher's rear-guard had disappeared 
 from Bry ; Thielmann's was seen by the scouts, on 
 the road from Sombref to Corroy le Chateau, towards 
 Gembloux, intermediate between the road from Na- 
 mur and that from Brussels by Wavre. Blucher, who 
 had perhaps been wrong in accepting battle when 
 isolated, after three o'clock, instead of then retiring 
 beyond the Dyle by Bousseval and Cour-St.-Guibert, 
 in order to place himself in a line with the English 
 forces that were concentrating at Genape, felt that it 
 was necessary promptly to repair the misfortune in 
 the partial defeat of his army, and no longer hoping 
 to gain Bousseval direct, resolved to rally his forces 
 on Bulow's entire corps, which must have arrived at 
 Gembloux during the night, and proceed by Wavre 
 to join the English. Consequently, Thielmann was 
 ordered to proceed to Gembloux and assemble on 
 Bulow ; the corps of Ziethen and Pirch fell back by 
 Mont-St.-Guibert on Bierge and Aisemont. 
 
 On the 17th, the Prussian Marshal dispatched the 
 chief of his staff to the Duke of Wellington, to con- 
 cert measures for securing the junction so much de- 
 sired, either in front or in rear of the forest of Soignes. 
 
 The victory just gained by the French at Ligny 
 
TIIE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 1^5 
 
 was a glorious one, as they had fought 60,000 men 
 against 90,000. This success was, however, due in 
 part to two incidents, of which the emperor was not 
 aware : the first was, that the presence of Grouchy's 
 cavalry on his right towards Boignee, had paralyzed 
 Thielmann's 25,000 men posted near Tongrines and 
 Mont-Potriaux, who were no doubt fearful of his 
 seizing the road to Namur, thus cutting off Bulow's 
 corps from the army, and this from its natural line of 
 operations. The second incident was, as I have al- 
 ready stated, the movement of the guard, executed 
 from St. Ainand towards Ligny, at the moment when 
 Blucher had nearly forty battalions engaged at St. 
 Amand, causing this general to suppose that Napo- 
 leon, disheartened at not being able to force any 
 point of his position, had commenced to beat a, re- 
 treat. With this idea, the Prussian marshal resolved 
 to advance in person, with what remained of his re- 
 serves, in order to penetrate between St. Amand and 
 "Wagn&le, at the very instant when the imperial vor 
 serves were hurled on Ligny ; so that his centre was 
 found stripped of all support, at the moment the 
 storm burst upon him. A chasse croise was the re- 
 sult, bearing the main portion of the Prussian forces 
 on St. Amand, at the decisive moment when the em- 
 peror launched his own upon Ligny, and which 
 Becured him the victory. 
 
 The French army had just obtained an advantage 
 which, under any other circumstances, would have 
 proved a signal one ; the enemy had had, in the two 
 battles, from eighteen to twenty thousand men killed, 
 wounded and made prisoners ; had lost forty pieces 
 
146 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 of cannon ; and notwithstanding the check at Quatre- 
 Bras, the army, full of enthusiasm and confidence, 
 would have rushed on to new victories. They should 
 have profited by this success, and actively pursued 
 the enemy. Napoleon had been ignorant of Durutte's 
 passing the night on the flank of their line of retreat, 
 and that his advance posts might have heard, very 
 distinctly, the uproar which such an unforeseen retreat 
 occasioned, by the march of an immense materiel and 
 the confusion of the columns ; otherwise it is pre- 
 sumable that he would have taken measures for press- 
 ing them closer. Yet, if the darkness contributed in 
 arresting the pursuit that very night, it ought to have 
 contributed also in augmenting the disorder in the 
 retreat of the enemy's right wing, and had they acted 
 on this occasion as the Prussians did two days after- 
 wards at Waterloo, we rest assured that the trophies 
 would have been greater, and that the blunders com- 
 mitted on the two following days would have been 
 avoided.* Napoleon had, during his career, given 
 them many lessons ; but they, in their turn, taught 
 him, that a night pursuit, notwithstanding its incon- 
 veniences, might have great advantages. 
 
 Ou the morning of the 17th, Napoleon awaited with 
 equal anxiety, the detailed reports of what Ney had 
 accomplished at Quatre-Bras, and the news from 
 Paris, where the hostile disposition of the chambers 
 did not cause him less concern, than the revolutionary 
 
 * The Prussian troops that held Bry on their right and Sombref on 
 their left were in good order, and sufficient to arrest too bold a pursuit ; 
 nevertheless, it would have been wise to have attempted a slight attack at 
 nightfall ; no risk could be run. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 147 
 
 ardor of the federated societies. While waiting for 
 exact information on what was happening on the 
 English side, he ordered Pajol's cavalry to follow the 
 Prussians on the Namur causeway, which was their 
 natural line of operations, at the same time that Ex- 
 celmans made a reconnoissance of the road to Gem- 
 bloux. The narrative from St. Helena adds, that 
 General Monthion was charged with the pursuit on 
 the left, that is, in the direction of Tilly and Mont- 
 St.-Guibert. The emperor then turned his attention 
 to the administration, reviewed the troops and the 
 field of battle, in order to administer to the comfort 
 of the multitude of wounded, of both parties, with 
 which it was strewed, and who were the more in need, 
 as the ambulances had not been able to follow the ar- 
 my in its forced marches. 
 
 To those who can recall the astonishing activity 
 that presided over the events of Eatisbonne in 1809, 
 of Dresden in 1813, and of Champ- Aubert and Mont- 
 mirail in 1814, this time lost, will always remain 
 inexplicable on the part of Napoleon. After a suc- 
 cess, such as he had just achieved, it seems that, at 
 six in the morning, he should have placed himself on 
 the heels of the Prussians, or, as well, have fallen, 
 with all his forces, upon Wellington, whose cavalry 
 reserve, artillery and portion of his infantry, had only 
 arrived that night, excessively fatigued. The neces- 
 sity for not leaving his line of retreat on Charleroi to 
 the mercy of the English general, was an imperative 
 reason why he should have proceeded against him in 
 preference. 
 
 It should not be supposed, that the emperor was 
 
148 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 entirely unaware of the check experienced by Ney 
 at Quatre-Bras ; because if the marshal had not had 
 time to make a detailed report of it, he had not surely 
 forgotten his duty, so far as to permit him to be igno- 
 rant of the fact. This was, moreover, a greater rea- 
 son for marching there without delay. However, it 
 was well known that Ney could not obtain a great 
 success, nor experience a great reverse, on account of 
 the dispersed state of the Anglo-Netherland army, 
 and of the double movement of d'Erlon's corps. Giving 
 "Wellington the morning of the 17th, in which to re- 
 cover himself, was then a fault more real, perhaps, 
 than allowing that of the 16th to Blucher. We will 
 state further on what was the result of it. Undoubt- 
 edly the emperor had powerful motives for resigning 
 himself to such inactivity; but these motives have 
 never reached us. 
 
 Napoleon, having at last received, through his aid- 
 de-camp Flahaut, the details of the unfortunate com- 
 bat at Quatre-Bras, at the same time that Pajol re- 
 ported the capture of some Prussian artillery at Mazy 
 on the Namur road, resolved, about eleven o'clock, to 
 march against the English with his reserve and Ney's 
 command, while Grouchy, with his seven infantry di- 
 visions and his two cavalry corps, should vigorously 
 pursue the Prussians. This presents one of the most 
 serious circumstances of this campaign, and which it 
 is my duty to expose, with all the frankness and im- 
 partiality professed by a conscientious historian. 
 
 The narrative from St. Helena affirms, that Grouchy, 
 in receiving verbally the order to pursue the Prus- 
 sians, without losing sight of them, received also that 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 149 
 
 of holding himself constantly between their army and 
 the route to Brussels ', which was to be taken by Napo- 
 leon — that is to say, in such a manner that the two 
 French masses might form between them, two interior 
 or central lines, that could assist each other, while 
 separating and dividing the two armies of the enemy. 
 Marshal Grouchy, in a pamphlet for his own justifica- 
 tion, declares, " that nothing of the kind was said to 
 him ; that on the contrary, he received, without other 
 comment, the order to direct his pursuit on Namur 
 and the Meuse : finally, that having indicated the de- 
 sire of not withdrawing to such a distance from the 
 main body of the army, Napoleon humorously asked 
 him, if he pretended to give him a lesson" The mar- 
 shal cites General Baudran, as a witness ready to 
 attest these facts. 
 
 It would be very difficult to decide between such 
 contradictory assertions ; all that I can add is, that 
 Major General Soult, writing on the morning of the 
 17th to Marshal Ney, informed him that Grouchy 
 was to pursue the Prussians on Namur and the Meuse. 
 Nevertheless, a little later, General Bertrand sent him 
 a positive order to march on Gembloux. Grouchy 
 exculpates himself equally, by reproaching the em- 
 peror for the long hours employed in reviewing the 
 battle-field, and pending which the traces of Blucher's 
 army were lost, and subsequently, only partially found. 
 He also observes that the emperor, having re- 
 served to himself the right of disposing of the 
 troops at all points, the marshal was unable, of his 
 own accord, to prescribe any disposition for this pur- 
 
150 POLITICAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 suit, and that lie frequently asked for orders which 
 were not given him.* 
 
 After having exposed all the facts alleged on both 
 sides, it is my duty to observe, without any pretence 
 to judging, that the order mentioned in the narrative 
 from St. Helena, was so conformable to the system of 
 interior lines, to which Napoleon owed so great a num- 
 ber of his victories, that his having really given it 
 should not be doubted ; but it must also be admitted, 
 that it would have been better, in every possible case, 
 to have positively assigned to Grouchy, the direction 
 intermediate between Liege and Brussels, as the one 
 he desired his right wing to follow. It was evident 
 that Blucher had one of three courses to pursue, 
 namely : to fall back on Liege, to gain Maastricht, or 
 seek to join Wellington and resume the offensive, to 
 avenge himself for the affront received at Ligny. The 
 last was certainly the most skillful, the most daring, 
 and the most conformable to the character of the 
 Prussian general ; but in order to execute it, it was 
 necessary to renounce, somewhat, his line of retreat 
 on the Rhine. Besides this, as Blucher had taken the 
 road to Wavre, he could not effect the junction at all, 
 but in rear of the forest of Soignes : because, by 
 marching in front of it, he would be compelled to 
 skirt its whole length, exposing his flank to the French. 
 Napoleon must have believed, that the enemy would 
 
 * It seems certain, that the orders given on the morning of the 17th to 
 the different corps of cavalry for the pursuit, were addressed by the em- 
 peror direct to Pajol, Excelmans and Monthion. This last was adjutant- 
 general, and made his reports directly to the emperor; he had reconnoi- 
 tred in the direction of Tii'ly and Mont-St.-Guibert. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 151 
 
 not dare undertake so hazardous a movement with 
 Grouchy in close pursuit ; he must have supposed, 
 then, that if Blucher sought not to gain Maas- 
 tricht or Liege, he would march from Wavre on 
 Brussels, a movement, that would force Wellington 
 also to fall back on this capital or fight alone at 
 Waterloo. 
 
 Under all these hypotheses, it was advisable to di- 
 rect Grouchy on Mont-St.-Guibert and Moustier, the 
 morning of the 17th, because the valley of the Dyle 
 being the most favorable line for covering Napoleon's 
 right flank, Grouchy could have crossed this river at 
 Moustier ; from thence it had been easy to draw him 
 on to Waterloo to take part in the battle, or cause 
 him to advance on Wavre, flanked towards St. Lam- 
 bert, by Excelmans' dragoons and an infantry divi- 
 sion. By this means, the emperor would have been 
 certain of his power to collect all his right wing 
 about him, if Wellington accepted battle on the 18th 
 in front of the forest of Soignes, and could have 
 counted on the impossibility of the Prussians' co- 
 operating. 
 
 Be that as it may, the two fractions of the impe- 
 rial army should have moved at the same time, in 
 proceeding to their respective destinations. The re- 
 serve, led by Napoleon, left however first, to join 
 Ney and the left wing at Quatre-Bras, in order to at- 
 tack the English if they stood their ground ; his ad- 
 vanced guard moved at ten o'clock ; the guard follow- 
 ing at eleven. The right wing moved later still; 
 Vandamme, who formed the advance, proceeded at 
 
152 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 first to Point-du-Jour (an inn situated at the fork of 
 the roads to Gembloux and Namur) ; Gerard's corps 
 did not leave Sombref till after three o'clock. Mar- 
 shal Grouchy, having received orders to march on 
 Gemblonx, of which we have spoken above, and the 
 intelligence that General Excelmans was in pre- 
 sence of the Prussians near this city, hastened there 
 in person, directing Vandamme and Gdrard on the same 
 point. Pajol alone patrolled with his hussars and 
 Teste's division, in the direction of Mazy and Tem- 
 ploux. We leave them there, in order to follow the 
 operations of the imperial army. 
 
 Napoleon, on arriving near Genape, met the Eng- 
 lish rear-guard. The weather was frightful, the win- 
 dows of heaven seemed to be opened, and yet the 
 troops did not the less exhibit an extreme ardor in 
 the pursuit of the enemy. The Duke of Wellington 
 did not hear, until eight o'clock on the morning of 
 the 17th, and that by accident, of Blucher's defeat 
 (the officer who was bearer of the news losing his way 
 in the dark, had been killed). We can judge what 
 would have been his embarrassment, had Napoleon 
 marched against him at day-break. The English 
 general hastened to place his impedimenta in retreat, 
 while his exhausted cavalry took some repose. At 
 ten o'clock, his columns were in march on the Brus- 
 sels' causeway, protected by all the cavalry concen- 
 trated under the orders of Lord TJxbridge, who took 
 position at Genape behind the Dyle, to allow the army 
 time to gain ground. This general officer displayed, 
 on this occasion, the same aplomb of which he had 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 153 
 
 given proof in Spain,* by charging with his English 
 guards, those who were rash enough to dare attempt 
 the passage of the defile in his presence. The French 
 followed him, step by step, as far as Maison du Hoi, 
 on the heights of Planchenois, where the army arrived 
 at night-fall. 
 
 The enemy manifested his intention to maintain 
 the position in front of the forest of Soignes. At 
 first, it was thought, that this was but a strong rear- 
 guard covering the march of columns through the 
 forest ; it was very soon perceived that the entire 
 army was present ; but as it was too late in the day 
 to commence an action, the different corps bivouacked 
 near Planchenois. The rain continued to fall in tor- 
 rents till the next morning. 
 
 At three o'clock in the morning, Napoleon went 
 the rounds of the posts, and assured himself that the 
 army had not stirred ; Wellington had then decided 
 on accepting battle ; he was delighted, regarding it 
 as a stroke of fortune that the two hostile armies thus 
 appeared in the lists, isolated, each in its turn. 
 
 Meanwhile, to profit by this happy chance with 
 security, it behooved him to be assured, that no junc- 
 tion of the two armies could however take place. To 
 this effect, it is affirmed that Napoleon had, about 
 dusk, sent a courier to Grouchy with orders to occupy 
 the defile of St. Lambert immediately, so that, if he 
 took no active part in the fete by falling on the Eng- 
 
 * Lord Uxbridge is the same personage, who rendered himself so illus- 
 trious in Spain under the name of Sir Arthur Paget, and who now bears 
 the title of Murquis d' Anglesey. He distinguished himself at Benevento, 
 and in many other rencontres. 
 
154: POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 lish left, lie could at least cover the right flank and 
 give them some uneasiness. This order, the existence 
 of which has been denied, was addressed to Wavre, 
 under the conviction that the marshal had reached 
 this city during the 17th, having but seven or eight 
 leagues to pass over from Sombref.* About mid- 
 night, the emperor received this marshal's report, 
 stating that he had reached Gembloux at five in the 
 afternoon, and would spend the night there, although 
 he had travelled but two leagues ; from this it was 
 evident that he would not receive the order directed 
 to Wavre. If we would credit the same narrative, 
 the confirmation w T as forwarded by the Gembloux 
 road, hoping that he would receive it in time. 
 
 The rain, bad roads, and forced marches had worn 
 out the French army. Napoleon might have found 
 it somewhat to his interest, to have given it repose, 
 and then to have dislodged Wellington by manceu- 
 
 * Some persons have been astonished at Napoleon's supposition, that 
 Grouchy had, on the 17th, already reached Wavre, as they had only sep- 
 arated towards mid-day, and two hours were necessary for the troops, 
 altogether unprepared, to set out on the march. There is something for 
 and against, in these statements ; Napoleon, departing from Ligny, push- 
 ed on as far as La Belle Alliance ; now, Grouchy, having but one league 
 more to pass over to gain Wavre, could, strictly speaking, very well have 
 accomplished it. What should be a matter of astonishment is, that of 
 supposing Grouchy at Wavre, if he had at first been directed on Namur, 
 as the major-general's correspondence would make us believe ; then af- 
 terwards on Gembloux, as General Bertrand's letter proves. Be that as it 
 may, the order cited is not found among the records of the staff; and be- 
 sides, it did not reach its destination, the officer having fallen at night in 
 the midst of the Prussian posts and been killed As to the con- 
 firmation of this order, no trace of it has been found, unless the question 
 in point be a letter of the major-general, written at 10 A. M., to Gros- 
 Caillou, and which Grouchy -eceived at four in the afternoon, in front of 
 Wavre. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 155 
 
 vring, but 300,000 of the enemy were on their way 
 to invade la Lorraine, and required the chief of state 
 with his principal forces on the Moselle ; on the other 
 hand, Blucher would soon rally and be re-inforced, 
 and thus every thing demanded that he should finish 
 with the English as soon as possible. 
 
 The emperor had reconnoitred their position ; they 
 occupied, in front of Mont-St.-Jean, a beautiful pla- 
 teau, the slope of whose sides was favorable for firing, 
 and from which all the movements of the French 
 could be discovered. The right extended to the rear 
 of Braine la Leud, and a corps of Netherlander of 
 15,000 men were besides detached as far as Hall, to 
 cover the causeway from Mons to Brussels. The po- 
 sition in itself had great defensive advantages, be- 
 cause the villages of Braine and de Merbes, the 
 chateau of Hougomont, la Haie Sainte, la Haie and 
 Frischermont formed so many advanced bastions, that 
 prevented any approach to the line ; but it rested 
 back against the vast forest of Soignes : now Napo- 
 leon thought, that if it be an advantage for a rear- 
 guard to be thus posted, considering that the defile 
 protects its retreat, it is not so for a large army with 
 its immense materiel and its numerous cavalry, having 
 as communications but a narrow causeway and two 
 cross-roads, encumbered with parks, the wounded, 
 etc. etc.* He therefore believed that all the chances 
 were in his favor. 
 
 The opportunity of giving battle being acknow- 
 
 * This is one of the gravest questions of the grand tactics of battles. 
 General Jomini has discussed it in his last Precis de V Art de la Gverre % 
 and inclines to Wellington's opinion in opposition to Napoleon's. 
 
156 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 ledged, it remained to decide what system would be 
 most expedient for attacking the English. To manoeu- 
 vre by the left, in order to overthrow their right, was 
 a difficult matter, and led to nothing decisive ; this 
 was not a good strategic direction, as it would be en- 
 tirely removed from the centre of operations, which 
 was naturally connected by the right, with Grouchy, 
 and with the road to Lorraine : besides this, the ene- 
 my's right wing was protected by the farm of Hougo- 
 mont, and by the two large boroughs of Braine la 
 Leud and Merbe-Braine. 
 
 To attack with the right, in order to crush the Eng- 
 lish left, was much more preferable, as this would 
 maintain a direct relation, ox an interior line with 
 Grouchy, and would prevent the junction of the two 
 hostile armies : but to gain, en masse, this extreme 
 left, it would be necessary to extend beyond Frischer- 
 mont, leaving open the line of retreat, and venturing 
 into the obstructed country of St. Lambert, where a 
 defeat had been without remedy. 
 
 It remained for Napoleon to take a middle course, 
 that of renewing the manoeuvre executed at Wagram 
 and Moscowa, (Borodino,) that is, to assail the left at 
 the same time that he drove in the centre. It was 
 the best plan of battle he could have adopted, and 
 with him, it had often proved successful. To force 
 the centre only is difficult and dangerous, unless it 
 happens to be a weak and unfurnished point, as at 
 Austerlitz, Bivoli, and Montenotte ; but we do not 
 always find an enemy sufficiently complaisant, as to 
 allow us such an advantage, and it would be absurd 
 to expect it from an army following a good system, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 157 
 
 or, rather, that understands the principles of war. 
 But to make an attack upon a wing, overthrow it, and 
 at the same time fall upon the point, where this wing 
 joins the centre, with a large force, is an operation 
 always advantageous when well executed. 
 
 Napoleon resolved, then, to attempt it. However, 
 instead of concentrating the bulk of his masses against 
 the -left, as at Borodino, he directed them on the cen- 
 tre ; the extreme left was not to be assailed, but by 
 the division forming the right of Erlon's corps, which 
 would attack Papelotte and la Haie ; Ney was to 
 lead the three other divisions on the right of la Haie 
 Sainte ;* Reille's corps would support this movement 
 on the left of the Mont-Si- Jean causeway ; Bachelu's 
 and Foy's divisions, between this causeway and the 
 farm of Hougomont ; Jerome's, led in fact by Guil- 
 leminot, was to attack this farm, the salient point of 
 the enemy's line, the chateau and park wall of which, 
 Wellington had crenelled, and where he had posted 
 the English guards. Count Lobau, with the 6th corps 
 and a mass of cavalry, would follow the centre in a 
 third and fourth line, on the right and left of the 
 causeway, to support Ney's attack on la Haie Sainte : 
 lastly, twenty-four battalions of guards and de Yalmy's 
 cuirassiers, were to second the decisive shock, wherever 
 needed, in a fifth and sixth line. 
 
 Such was the plan that many incidents deranged, 
 and which Napoleon can leave, without fear, to the 
 scrutiny of the masters of the art. It could not be 
 bettered, unless moving his reserves a little nearer 
 
 * It is necessary not to confound la Haie Sainte, on the centre, with la 
 Haie on the left wing of the allies. 
 
158 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 his right, thus giving more vigor to the effort between 
 Papelotte and the Charleroi causeway. 
 
 It would have signified much for the success of this 
 project, had a sudden attack been made in the morn- 
 ing, but torrents of rain had fallen all night ; the 
 weather was beginning to clear ; it required some 
 hours to give a little consistency to the soft ground, 
 and this time was employed in forming the army ir 
 position.* 
 
 The cannonade and musketry commenced, at 11 
 o'clock, against the farm of Hougomont, which Je- 
 rome sought to carry ; it pleased the emperor to open 
 the battle at this point. A few moments after, Ney's 
 light cavalry appeared towards Frischermont, at the 
 opposite extremity, where were exchanged a few 
 cannon shot. It was then found that the rivulet, 
 though narrow and slightly embanked, was very 
 miry, and that it would be necessary to turn it by 
 the west of Smouhen, as it would prove troublesome 
 to cross it lower down, in face of the enemy's bat- 
 teries. Compelled thus to turn a portion of his right 
 upon their centre, Ney succeeded finally in forming 
 his four divisions of d'Erlon's corps, and his artillery 
 only succeeded, after incredible efforts, in taking 
 
 * We cannot share this opinion, which has been set forth by Napoleon, 
 in Book IX. from St. Helena ; when, even had a splendid sun succeeded 
 the rain, four hours would not have sufficed to dry such a ground ; be- 
 sides, this sun did not appear ; misty weather followed the storm ; no- 
 thing then prevented him from making the new effort at 9 A. M. ; it could 
 have been done as well as at one, and the Prussians would have arrived 
 after the blow had been struck. In the then state of affairs, this delay 
 of four hours was a blunder ; but the arrival of Blnehex was not expected, 
 and the troops required rest. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 159 
 
 position in the muddy ground, with their pieces sunk 
 to the naves of their wheels. 
 
 The marshal immediately opened a heavy fire upon 
 the enemy's left, and only waited for the signal, to 
 burst upon it. Napoleon was about giving it, after 
 mid-day, when rather strong columns were discovered 
 on the right in the direction of Lasne and St. Lam- 
 bert ; this might be the enemy, or the detachment 
 demanded of Grouchy. The emperor immediately 
 pushed forward 3,000 horse under General d'Homond 
 towards Pajeau, at once to reconnoitre the state of 
 things ; cover the flank, if needed, were it the enemy, 
 or effect a junction with Grouchy, if he it was who 
 had arrived.* It behooved him to undertake nothing, 
 before receiving a report of this reconnoissance. 
 Very shortly afterwards, a Prussian hussar was 
 brought with an intercepted letter ; he announced 
 the approach of Bulow's corps, which he estimated 
 at 30,000 men. 
 
 Notwithstanding this serious contre-temps, nothing 
 seemed desperate. Under all other circumstances, it 
 had perhaps been better to have deferred the battle ; 
 but what could be done ? — shot had been exchanged ; 
 it was necessary to continue the fight, or shamefully 
 decamp before Wellington, with whom Napoleon 
 measured himself for the first time. Apart from the 
 
 * It was hard to believe that this was Grouchy, after the reports received 
 irom him during the night. However, had he taken, on the morning of 
 the 18th, the road to Moustier instead of that to Wavre, by Sart a Valain, 
 the case was not an impossible one. Besides, this column discovered 
 about twelve, was only Bulow's advance guard; the corps did not arrive 
 till four, on account of a violent conflagration that had pre\ented it from 
 dealing through Wavre. 
 
160 POLITICAL AKD MILITARY history of 
 
 point of honor, what moral effect would this retreat 
 produce, if he fled, without unsheathing his sword 
 against the English ? What could he hope for his 
 cause, when the Russians, Austrians and the whole 
 Germanic empire, should burst upon Lorraine, the 
 Austro-Sardinians upon Dauphiny, the Swiss upon 
 Franche-Comte, and the Spaniards upon Languedoc ? 
 If Bulow came with a score of thousands, the belief 
 should be that he was closely followed by Grouchy, 
 and in that case, the arrival of this new enemy would 
 not change the chances of the battle. 
 
 The emperor then ordered Ney to commence the 
 attack, and in order to secure the threatened flank, he 
 moved Count Lobau's two divisions, en potence, to- 
 wards Planchenois, where they could, if needed, serve 
 as reserves to Ney, or otherwise, in a measure, oppose 
 Bulow. If this latter was closely pursued by Grou- 
 chy, the Prussian corps would thus find itself be- 
 tween two fires, in a cut-throat position, and would 
 become an additional trophy for the conqueror. 
 
 Nearly one hundred pieces of ordnance open upon 
 the enemy's centre, to the right and left of la Haie 
 Sainte ; it is there that the great effort is to be made, 
 and if Ney, seconded by Lobau and the guard, suc- 
 ceeds in penetrating here, as he did at Friedland, they 
 will seize on the point where the causeway enters the 
 forest of Soignes, which is the sole retreat for the ene- 
 my. But Count Lobau's support is soon to fail him in 
 this vigorous effort, and render success doubtful. 
 
 About one o'clock, Ney marched forward at the 
 head of d'Erlon's corps, which was formed of the divi- 
 sions in separate columns, so as to cross with more 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 161 
 
 rapidity the space that separated it from the enemy.* 
 This movement, executed in very deep columns, closed 
 in mass, under a murderous fire, and through a terri- 
 ble mud, was accomplished without much wavering ; 
 a portion of his artillery remained in rear, and con- 
 tinued to counter-batter that of the enemy from a dis- 
 tance, while the infantry effected the passage of the 
 ravine. Though the formation in columns had left 
 between the divisions very considerable intervals, they 
 were not, however, sufficiently great for deploying 
 them. The different narratives heretofore published, 
 differ materially as to the manner in which this first 
 attack was executed : some have it, that the four divi- 
 sions of d'Erlon's corps, thus formed into as many 
 masses, in echelon, the left in front, were directed 
 against the position of the allies' left wing, slighting 
 the post of la Haie-Sainte, which was left behind 
 them. Others have the -2d division of d'Erlon's corps 
 marching on this post, and the 4th on that of Smou- 
 hen, nearly simultaneous with the attack of the po- 
 sition. 
 
 Nevertheless, I have every reason to believe, that, 
 in fact, these divisions, in deep columns, moved to- 
 gether to attack the position, the front line of which 
 was composed of General Perponcher's Belgians, on 
 the right of the Mont-St.-Jean causeway, while Du- 
 rutte's division advanced on Smouhen, or at least in 
 
 *It appears that each division formed a single mass of eight or ten 
 battalions, marching in rear of each other. It is uncertain, whether all 
 these battalions were formed in columns of attack, or deployed into 
 eight or ten lines, but they formed a very deep mass. It also appears 
 that Marcognet's division made a flank movement to draw nearer tho 
 centre, and that the English took advantage of its waverings. 
 
162 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTOET OF 
 
 conjunction with. Jaquinot's light cavalry, kept in 
 check the enemy's extreme left* 
 
 Braving all the difficulties, which the soft ground 
 offered to the movements of masses thus agglome- 
 rated, together with the fire of a formidable artillery, 
 the 1st and 3d divisions reach the front line of the 
 enemy at the point held by General Bylandt's Belgian 
 brigade, (Perponcher's division,) which they drive in 
 after a vigorous onset. But, far from having accom- 
 plished their task, they are suddenly assailed by Pic- 
 ton's English division, posted in a second line, and 
 lying behind a ridge that favors them. Here a fu- 
 rious combat takes place ; the English infantry de- 
 ployed in line, envelop with its concentrated fire the 
 head and flank of this heavy mass, which can oppose 
 but a few musket shots, more calculated to diminish 
 its enthusiasm than cause the enemy any loss. Gen- 
 eral Picton falls dead ; but his troops stand firm, and 
 the French column, arrested by their murderous fire, 
 turns and gives way. At this moment, Lord Uxbridge 
 lets loose General Ponsonby's English cavalry, to 
 
 * G-reat confusion reigns in all the narratives, published up to this time, 
 on the battle of Waterloo. Some have the left of the position attacked 
 by the four divisions farthest off ; others say that Durutte's advanced on 
 Smouhen, and Quiot's on la Haie Sainte. The Victoires et Conquetes 
 speak of a grand column formed of the 2d and 3d divisions, (Donzeiot's 
 and Marcognet's). This would then be Quiot's — the first that must have 
 attacked la Haie Sainte. Nevertheless, German authors have as many 
 columns as divisions ; they speak of a brigade of cuirassiers, Valmy's or 
 Milhaud's, seconding this first attack, and French narrators say not a 
 word about it. They state that the eagles of the 45th and 105th regiments 
 were captured in the grand column; but, one of these regiments belonged 
 to the 1st division and the other to the 3d. Lastly, other versions would 
 make us believe, that Durutte did not advance on Smouhen till 4 P. M. It 
 it is impossible to make out any thing from such a chaos. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 163 
 
 charge them in flank and spread the disorder : em- 
 boldened by this success, the English squadrons throw 
 themselves into the interval between the 2d and 3d 
 columns, where they gain the same advantage ; finally, 
 carried away by their ardor, these squadrons rush on 
 Ney's reserve artillery, a portion of which remained 
 in rear on account of the mire ; they sabre the sol- 
 diers of the train and the cannoniers, lead away the 
 horses, and thus deprive the infantry of part of its 
 ordnance. Napoleon launches Milhaud's cuirassiers, 
 supported by a brigade of lancers, against these reck- 
 less fellows ; in a few moments this cavalry of the 
 enemy is destroyed, and Ponsonby killed ; but the 
 French infantry has been shaken and a portion of the 
 artillery rendered immovable. Meanwhile, Ney has 
 ordered the attack of the farm of la Haie-Sainte by 
 a brigade of d'Erlon's corps, which at first experiences 
 an active resistance and serious loss. 
 
 While these things were taking place against the 
 left of the allies, and on the point where this wing 
 joined the centre, Jerome Bonaparte, seconded by 
 Foy, had with difficulty dislodged the enemy from 
 the park of Hougomont ; but all efforts proved fruit- 
 less against the chateau and the crenelated farm, 
 where Wellington himself led reinforcements to the 
 English guards, who defended this important post 
 with admirable valor. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington, certain of the near arrival 
 of Blucher's entire army, and too happy at having 
 gained half the day by the delay of the attack, had 
 determined to conquer or to die. Seeing that all 
 efforts were directed against his centre and left, he 
 
164 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 hastened to shorten his line, by withdrawing from 
 Braine-la-Leud and Merbes twenty battalions of Bel- 
 gians and Brunswickers, which he placed successively 
 in reserve, in rear of the right and centre. Then, he 
 in person, conducted reinforcements to the English 
 guards, now at the point of succumbing at Hougo- 
 mont, and re-animated their ardor. 
 
 General Foy, on his side, wishing to second the at- 
 tacks which Jerome's division (led by General Guille- 
 minot) was making on the chateau, sought to pass 
 this post and fall upon Lord Hill's line and the Bruns- 
 wickers, formed behind an excavated road that ran 
 along a great portion of the enemy's front, from the 
 chateau of Nivelle to the vicinity of Papelotte. But 
 struck by a ball in the shoulder, and seeing his troops 
 mowed down by a murderous fire, without hope of 
 dislodging the enemy, Foy had to give up this design ; 
 the combat at this point degenerated to # cannonade 
 and a scattering fire, without reciprocal advantages. 
 
 During this interval, Ney had put to the test all 
 his energy and presence of mind, in recovering from 
 the checks received in his first attacks ; his right in 
 possession of Smouhen, debouched on Papelotte, and 
 the marshal himself led a second assault on la Haie 
 Sainte. Donzelot's division, supported on the left of 
 the causeway by a brigade of the Duke de Yalmy's 
 cuirassiers, and on the right by a brigade of General 
 Quiot's infantry, succeeded finally in expelling the 
 Scotch and Hanoverian battalions from it : at four 
 o'clock these troops were masters of these two points, 
 after efforts the most glorious. 
 
 Pending this struggle, the emperor passed down 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 165 
 
 Key's line and that of Milhaud's cavalry, through a 
 storm of bullets ; General Devaux, commanding the 
 artillery of the guard and reserve, was killed at his 
 side ; a sad loss, at a moment when he was to be 
 called upon, to renew the splendid manoeuvre of Wa- 
 gram. 
 
 The simultaneous capture of la Haie Sainte and 
 Papelotte, about four o'clock, still continued all the 
 chances in favor of the assailants. But at the time 
 that Wellington was accumulating his forces on the 
 centre, Napoleon was compelled to withdraw his own, 
 because of the information that Bulow was at last 
 debouching from the woods of Frischermont on Plan- 
 chenois. If we would wish to follow exactly the 
 chronological order of the enemy's movements, we 
 would have to recall here the doings of the Prussian 
 army since the previous evening, but it seems more 
 advisable to narrate the events, in the same order in 
 which they came to Napoleon's knowledge. We will 
 then return, farther on, to Blucher's operations, limit- 
 ing ourselves to pointing out, here, the successive ar- 
 rivals of his corps. 
 
 At the moment of Ney's success in carrying la Haie 
 Sainte, Bulow, having debouched from the woods of 
 Frischermont, attacked the Count de Lobau, and, 
 thanks to his superiority, drove him on Planchenois, 
 by overthrowing his right. Napoleon then learned 
 with certainty, that Grouchy was not following this 
 Prussian column ; it was no longer possible to labor 
 under the slightest illusion ; all that could be done 
 was to dispute the honor of this fatal battle-field, in 
 wbich his line was out-flanked to such an extent, that 
 
166 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the Prussian bullets nearly reached the Charleroi 
 causeway in rear of his centre. Success was not at 
 all possible, but by dint of perseverance he might 
 force the enemy to retreat. lie resolved then, about 
 five o'clock, to get rid of Bulow by a vigorous coup 
 de main, in directing against him the young guard, 
 under the brave Duhesme, supported by General Mo- 
 rand with a portion of the old guard, then immedi- 
 ately to attempt a last effort against Wellington, with 
 his entire reserves. While awaiting the issue of this 
 manoeuvre, Ney should have been satisfied with hold- 
 ing la Haie Sainte and Papelotte. 
 
 Meanwhile, the marshal, finding himself isolated 
 by the direction of the attacks of Reille's corps, about 
 the chateau of Hougomont, earnestly asked for rein- 
 forcements. For want of infantry the emperor as- 
 signed him Milhaud's cuirassiers. Wellington, on his 
 part, encouraged by Bulow's attack, and strengthened 
 by the troops from his extreme right, had conceived 
 the hope of again taking possession of the park of 
 Hougomont and the farm of la Haie Sainte. With 
 this object, he had, at five o'clock, launched the Han- 
 overians, on this last post, simultaneously with Lord 
 Hill's English on the first. At this very instant, Ney, 
 whose troops suffered terribly from the enemy's fire, 
 seeing the light cavalry of his right driven back by 
 that of the English, sought to seize, at all hazards, 
 the plateau of Mont-St.-Jean, by casting his brave 
 cuirassiers upon the centre of the allies. Unfortu- 
 nately, his infantry was so shaken, that it could offer 
 but feeble succor. However, these squadrons meeting 
 the Hanoverians marching on la Haie Sainte, fell upon 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 167 
 
 them, sabring one regiment, carrying off the artillery 
 posted on the enemy's front, breaking a square of the 
 German legion, but attempting the same upon others 
 without success; the enemy formed in squares by 
 regiments, sheltered the cannoniers and artillery 
 horses, and by a well sustained fire baffled the efforts 
 of this heroic cavalry,* which, charged in its turn by 
 Lord Somerset's English cavalry, was forced to rally, 
 and effected it with audacity under the very fire of 
 the enemy's line. 
 
 Undoubtedly, it had been preferable had this charge 
 been executed a little earlier, in conjunction with d'Er- 
 lon's first attack, or had been deferred until the return 
 of the young guard from extricating Count Lobau, 
 so as to make a combined effort of the three arms 
 re-united. But the plateau was crowned, it was ne- 
 cessary to sustain what was already accomplished, or 
 look upon the loss of Key's troops. Napoleon then, 
 after six o'clock, orders Kellermann (Yalmy) to ad- 
 vance with his cuirassiers on the left of la Haie Sainte 
 causeway, and overthrow every thing in his path ; the 
 heavy cavalry of the guard follow this movement, 
 and engage the enemy, it is said, contrary to the 
 emperor's intentions, j- At the sight of all these rein- 
 forcements, Milhaud also renews his attacks. These 
 10,000 horse make terrible havoc in the enemy's line, 
 carrying off sixty pieces of cannon from the front of 
 
 * The Duke of Wellington himself assured me, at the Congress of Vero- 
 na, that he had never seen any thing more admirable in war, than the ten 
 or twelve reiterated charges of the French cuirassiers upon the troops of 
 all arms. 
 
 t Napoleon might have intended to preserve this precious nuoleus in 
 reserve, but assuredly he had placed it at Ney's disposal. 
 
168 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 their position, and breaking two squares ; but the 
 rest of the English infantry oppose an admirable 
 front; the fire of the 2d line, destroys the French 
 squadrons that have become scattered in their charges ; 
 lastly, the English, Belgian, Hanoverian and Bruns- 
 wickerian cavalry, led by Lord Uxbridge, form in 
 fine order to charge in their turn, — success cannot 
 fail them. To remain in such a situation is impossi- 
 ble ; it is then necessary to sound the rally at some 
 distance, abandon the captured artillery, in fact give 
 the English cannoniers the liberty of returning to 
 their guns and crush anew this body of cavalry. It 
 nevertheless turns about and drives back Lord Ux- 
 bridge's squadrons upon their infantry.* It would 
 be necessary to borrow the most poetic forms and 
 expressions of an epic, to depict with any truthful- 
 ness the glorious efforts of this cavalry, and the im- 
 passive perseverance of its adversaries. We can 
 besides judge, what would have been the result of 
 these brilliant charges, had Lobau's corps and the 
 young guard been able to follow the cuirassiers in 
 their course, instead of being engaged towards Plan- 
 chenois, making head against the Prussians. Eye- 
 witnesses have attested to the disorder that was appa- 
 rent among a portion of the allied troops, and to the 
 alarm that spread as far as Brussels, where the French 
 were momentarily expected. 
 
 Napoleon had greater hopes of obtaining the vic- 
 tory, as, in the interval, Bulow, attacked by Lobau 
 
 * Lord Uxbridge (Marquis d' Anglesey,) had his leg taken off by a 
 shot ; I am uncertain whether it happened at the instant of this attack, 
 or later. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 169 
 
 and Dushesme, supported by a detachment of the old 
 guard, under General Morand, had just been driven 
 on to the Pajeau road, and the booming of Grouchy 's 
 cannon being heard on the Dyle, it could be supposed 
 that he would at least hold in check the surplus of 
 Blucher's army. Undoubtedly this victory had not 
 led to immense results, but it was already more than 
 won : to decide it finally, the emperor, at half-past 
 seven o'clock, ordered the entire guard to be concen- 
 trated, in order to carry the position of Mont-St.- Jean. 
 
 The illusion was not of long duration ; the French 
 cavalry had scarcely rallied its victorious squadrons, 
 when new hostile columns from Ohain, were disco- 
 vered from the plateau: this was Blucher himself, 
 who arrived with Ziethen's corps in the direction of 
 Papelotte. At the same time, Pirch's corps having 
 debouched from Lasne, had already come into action, 
 to second Bulow at Planchenois. 
 
 Though difficult for Napoleon to estimate the 
 strength of all these forces, they were more than 
 sufficient to snatch victory from him. It is said, how- 
 ever, that he flattered himself with leading fortune 
 under his banner, by refusing his right threatened by 
 very strong forces, in order to bring all his efforts to 
 bear through his left on Hougomont and Mont-St.- 
 Jean ; a rash change of front, that necessarily aban- 
 doned the line of retreat to Charleroi, to follow a new 
 one on the Nivelle causeway, and ♦which, moreover, 
 destroyed all communication with Grouchy. Had 
 the success of this measure been in the least proble- 
 matical, its execution had become impossible ; even 
 the assembling of the entire guard could not be 
 
170 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 effected: disorder began to infect the cavalry, and 
 Durutte's division, menaced by three times their num- 
 ber on the plateau, between Smouhen and the cause- 
 way ; it was necessary to fly to d'Erlon's support, with- 
 out even waiting for the return of the guard com* 
 manded by Morand, as well as other detachments. 
 Napoleon placed himself at the head of Friant's di- 
 vision, the only disposable body, and conducted it to 
 la Haie Sainte, at the same time that he ordered Reille 
 to make dispositions for another attack on Hougomont. 
 This reinforcement, led by Napoleon, gave courage to 
 the French cavalry, and to the debris of d'Erlon's corps ; 
 if Morand's entire division had been there, an attack 
 might have been made with some chances of success ; 
 but forced to hold some battalions in hand towards 
 la Belle Alliance, Napoleon was unable to assemble 
 but four, on the summit of the plateau in front of la 
 Haie Sainte. Ney, sword in hand, led them against 
 the enemy. 
 
 Meanwhile, Wellington, certain of the near arrival 
 of Blucher on his left, thought of retaking the park 
 of Hougomont and la Haie Sainte ; he had drawn 
 Brunswick's division and a Belgian brigade on the lat- 
 ter point, at the moment when this handful of the 
 brave guard proceeded to attack, with levelled bayo- 
 nets, the broken line of the Anglo-Hanoverians. 
 
 Aware of the importance of this movement, the 
 Prince of Orange* quickly throws himself before them 
 at the head of a Nassau regiment, while Brunswick's 
 division attacks them from another quarter ; but the 
 Prince falls, wounded by a shot, while pointing out 
 to them the road to victory. The brave soldiers of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 171 
 
 the old guard, at first repel the shock, but, deprived 
 of support, in the midst of the enemy, which is being 
 reinforced by a Belgian brigade de chasse, surrounded 
 by a sheet of fire that consumes them, they feel the 
 moment is at hand when their cause will be lost for- 
 ever, and with difficulty retire to the foot of the pla- 
 teau, that had cost so much blood. Napoleon having, 
 meanwhile, re-assembled the six other battalions of 
 the old guard, that had been detached on different 
 points, is in the act of seconding these efforts on Mont- 
 St.-Jean, when the disorder which begins to be mani- 
 fest on the right of d'Erlon's corps, forces him to form 
 these battalions into squares, on the right of la Haie 
 Sainte. 
 
 While these things are passing on the front of the 
 French army, between eight and nine o'clock, the 
 young guard and Lobau struggle with rare bravery 
 against the constantly increasing forces of the Prus- 
 sians. Strengthened by the arrival of Pirch's corps, 
 Bulow finishes the overwhelming. of the remainder of 
 these braves, whose distress is redoubled by the de- 
 parture of the old . guard, and by the entrance into 
 action of Blucher and Ziethen on their left flank. On 
 the arrival of this last, the cavalry of Wellington's 
 left wing, (Vivian's and Vandeleur's brigades,) that 
 had suffered least of all, gallop to the centre to his 
 support. Ziethen, who, at eight o'clock, had de- 
 bouched at the vertex of the angle formed by the 
 French line towards Frischermont, easily overthrows 
 Durutte, at the same time that he out-flanks the left 
 of the crotchet formed by Lobau and the young 
 guard. Pirch turns Planchenois, which Bulow 
 
172 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 attacks in front. All this portion of the imperial ar- 
 my, crushed, overrun and surrounded by quadruple 
 numbers, crowd upon each other and seek safety in 
 flight. Duhesme and Barrois are severely wounded > 
 Lobau, in endeavoring to rally his men, falls into the 
 hands of the enemy ; Pelet shows front with a hand- 
 ful of heroes, about whom crowd a scattered few. 
 The very report of General Gnisenau on this cele- 
 brated battle, will ever remain the most splendid tes- 
 timony to the heroic defense of these twelve or fifteen 
 thousand French against sixty thousand Prussians, 
 favored, moreover, by the nature of the battle-field, 
 which, rising on their side into an amphitheatre, gave 
 to their numerous artillery a terrible ascendency over 
 that of their adversaries. 
 
 Judging from the continuance of the fire, that Blu- 
 cher and Bulow were giving the finishing stroke, Wel- 
 lington on his part assembles all the best troops possi- 
 ble, retakes the park of Hougomont, and about nine 
 o'clock bursts on the old guard with an overwhelming 
 superiority, at the same time that Blucher's Prussian 
 cavalry outflanks Durutte, and thus gets in rear of 
 the line. A furious combat takes places ; Generals 
 Friant and Michel are seriously wounded ; all that 
 remain of the cuirassiers and cavalry of the guard 
 perform wonders ; but their position is no longer ten- 
 able. Assailed by sixty thousand Prussians concen- 
 trated on "Wellington's left, the whole French right 
 flows back, in the greatest disorder, on la Belle Alli- 
 ance ; the guard that shows front to the English is 
 also forced to give way ; Wellington's cavalry profits 
 by the disorder, and introduces itself between Reille's 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 173 
 
 corps and the guard, formed into different squares, at 
 the same time that Blucher takes the line in reverse. 
 These masses of cavalry, render the rallying of d'Er- 
 lon's and Reille's corps impossible. 
 
 For a long time the Prussian artillery ploughs with 
 its shot the Charleroi causeway, quite far in rear of 
 the line, and contributes not a little in redoubling the 
 disorder, which night, in spreading her wings, succeeds 
 in completing. The infantry, cavalry and artillery 
 take, pell-mell, the road to Genape, and some even 
 endeavor to gain the Neville route, being less molested 
 than that to Charleroi. 
 
 Dragged far from the last gallant few, who, under 
 Cambronne, show front to the enemy, Napoleon finds 
 himself separated from them, and reduced to the al- 
 ternative of regaining the Genape route across the 
 country, accompanied by his staff, having no longer 
 in hand even a single battalion, at the head of which 
 he might seek death in the ranks of the foe. 
 
 Wellington, who with impetuosity has changed 
 from the defensive to the offensive, meets Blucher at 
 la Belle Alliance, (the name of a farm, to which the 
 events gave a whimsical pertinency). This meeting, 
 which many have wished to attribute to chance, had 
 been skilfully planned ; it is time to say by what con- 
 current circumstances it was effected. 
 
 We left Grouchy departing for Gembloux, at 
 noon of the 17th. We remember that Thielmann's 
 corps had withdrawn from Sombref in this very di- 
 rection, undoubtedly, in order to rally on Bulow, who 
 had just arrived after a forced march of twelve leagues, 
 while the right of Blucher's army, composed of Zie- 
 
174: POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 then's and Pirch's corps, retired by Mont-St.-Guibert 
 on Bierge and Aisemont. Be that as it may, Grouchy 
 reached Gembloux, and was informed during the 
 evening that Bulow and Thielmann had re-united 
 there in the morning, and had then taken the direction 
 of Wavre. These two corps formed a mass of 52,000 
 men. 
 
 Gerard's corps not arriving at Gembloux till eleven 
 o'clock at night, in consequence of a violent storm 
 that had destroyed the roads and jaded his troops, 
 Grouchy resolved to advance on Wavre the next 
 morning at six, with Vandamme's corps, Gerard to fol- 
 low alone at eight o'clock. This resolution, howsoever 
 much it seemed in conformity with the orders Napo- 
 leon had given him, to follow on the heels of the 
 Prussians, was an actual blunder. In fact, from the 
 time that Blucher relinquished the natural base of the 
 Meuse, it was evident that he thought only of uniting 
 with Wellington, retaking the offensive and revenge 
 himself for the affront he had just received: from 
 that moment, even admitting that Napoleon had at 
 first indicated the pursuit on Namur, Grouchy being 
 aware that this order could not possibly be executed, 
 became again master of his actions, according to his 
 own inspirations ; moreover, the order transmitted af- 
 terwards, through General Bertrand, to proceed on 
 Gembloux, had sufficiently indicated the end the mar- 
 shal was to attain. To pursue the Prussians was his 
 duty, but he had many ways of performing it. One 
 consisted in merely following the trail of the retreat- 
 ing columns, the other in alone harassing the rear- 
 guard by means of light bodies, directing his princi- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO, 175 
 
 pal forces on the flanks of the columns, to attack 
 them in earnest, as the Russians did in 1812 at 
 Wiasma, Krasnoe, and at the Beresina.* 
 
 Under the circumstances in which Grouchy was 
 placed, it was more than ever his duty to follow this 
 plan ; because his first mission was to prevent the 
 Prussians from turning back against Napoleon, and 
 the second point alone was to harass him in his retreat. 
 Now, by marching along the Prussian columns with 
 his infantry, while his light cavalry harassed his rear, 
 he would have had the double advantage of opposing 
 all attempts at a junction with the English, and avoid- 
 ing the battle in the defile, which otherwise he would 
 be constrained to give at Wavre. 
 
 Three principal roads were open to him : that on 
 the right by Sart a Yalain, which had been followed 
 by Bulow ; that on the left by Mont-St. Guibert, from 
 whence he could advance on Wavre, qither by follow- 
 ing the right bank of the Dyle, or crossing this river 
 at Moustier, and reaching Wavre by the left bank, 
 thus avoiding a horrible combat in a defile. All 
 were equally long, but that on the left approached 
 within two leagues of Napoleon's army, and on the 
 contrary, that on the right deviated as much farther 
 from it. Nearly a day's inarch was gained by the 
 first, without considering that he interposed between 
 the two allied armies. 
 
 The marshal should not, then, have hesitated ; he 
 should at day-break, on the 18th, have marched with 
 all speed on Moustier, with Excelmans, Vandamme and 
 
 * See what General Jomini says on the subject of lateral pursuits, in 
 his las Precis de VArt de la Guerre — 2 vol. ; published by Anseliu. 
 
176 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Gerard, directing Pajol's cavalry and Teste's division 
 on Wavre, in pursuit of the enemy's rear-guard.* 
 Being able to reach Moustier by ten o'clock, he could 
 have then forwarded his infantry on Wavre by Limale, 
 pushing Excelmans' dragoons on St. Lambert, or else 
 have marched to Lasne himself, from which place he 
 would have heard, at noon, the violent cannonade at 
 Waterloo. 
 
 Instead of taking this wise resolution, Grouchy, 
 undoubtedly desirous of following to the letter, on 
 the heels of the Prussians as ordered, and deceived 
 by reports that still signalled Prussian columns in the 
 direction of Pervez, directed his own on Sart k Yalain, 
 this being the route Bulow had taken. The marshal 
 decided thus, the more so as he was perfectly ignorant 
 that half the Prussian army had passed by Gentines 
 and Mont-St. Guibert, the reconnoissance made in this 
 direction on the 17th, having been reported to Napo- 
 leon and not to him. To this fault, that of starting 
 at too late an hour, can be added ; and as a conse- 
 quence, towards noon only Yandamme had«got beyond 
 Sart a Valain, and the head of Gerard's column had 
 but reached this village. 
 
 Grouchy had just been rejoined by this general, 
 when the sound of a cannonade, hollow and distant, 
 but lively and well sustained, announced an important 
 battle : Count Gerard then proposed to the marshal, 
 
 * This strategic movement would have been one of those, that build up 
 the reputation of a great captain. It is probable that Napoleon, placed at 
 Gembloux, in Grouchy' s situation, would have e cutedit; however, he 
 made no mention of it, and prescribed nothing o the kind ; he even ap- 
 proved the movement on Wavre : the fact is, he never believed in the 
 daring flank movement executed by Bluchen 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 177 
 
 to take that direction immediately, persuaded that in 
 marching au canon, as Ney did at Eylau, he might 
 decide the victory.* 
 
 However wise this advice might have been in itself, 
 we must avow that the same advantages would not 
 have accrued, as if this movement had been operated 
 from Gembloux at day-break, and that his arrival 
 would have been too late to prove decisive ; because, 
 supposing that Yandamme, whose corps was in advance, 
 could commence moving at one o'clock, and this on 
 the heights of St. Martin, it is probable he would not 
 have reached Moustier before four. Now the fright- 
 ful state of the roads, the bad condition of the bridges, 
 the boggy defiles of the Dyle, and above all, the pre- 
 sence of Thielmann's corps, which extended from the 
 heights of Bierge to Limale, opposing his crossing, 
 authorize us in believing, that Grouchy would not 
 have reached Lasne or St. Lambert before seven or 
 eight in the evening. Then, Thielmann's and Pirch's 
 corps, formed in rear of the rivulet of Lasne, pre- 
 venting him from pushing on farther, Bulow and Zie- 
 then would not the less have decided the battle of 
 Waterloo ; it certainly would have proved less dis- 
 astrous for the conquered, but there was not the 
 slightest possibility of gaining it. 
 
 Great controversy has arisen on this point ; each 
 one has interpreted in his own way and according to 
 
 * The maxim to march au canon is generally a very wise one, as it is at 
 bottom but a concentric manoeuvre, the effect of which is nearly always 
 certain ; under particular circumstances, there are exceptions ; the battle 
 of Bautzen is one of the most striking examples of it. (See a former 
 volume.) 
 
 8* 
 
178 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 his own views, the results that would have followed 
 this movement advised by Gerard. To judge properly 
 of the consequences that might have been expected 
 from it, it must not be forgotten, that Thielmann's 
 corps, posted on the heights of Bierge, with in- 
 formation as far as Limale, had orders to follow 
 that of Pirch on St. Lambert, in case Grouchy did 
 not make his appearance towards Wavre, and that 
 one of his divisions had already marched to this 
 effect. If it be true that Grouchy's troops, taking 
 at noon the Nil-St. Martin route on Moustier, would 
 have arrived there between three and four o'clock, 
 they would certainly have been immediately engaged 
 with Thielmann's 20,000 men, forcibly suspending, 
 and perhaps stopping his march. If they had wished 
 to debouch by Limale, this force of the enemy 
 would have been met earlier. On the other hand, 
 Pirch's columns, that at this moment were advancing 
 on Lasne, would have probably halted, seeing them- 
 selves thus menaced in reverse ; even admitting that 
 they had retrograded in order to support Thielmann ; 
 but then Bulow had already concentrated his four 
 divisions to attack Planchenois, and Ziethen was ad- 
 vancing with Blucher towards Ohain, along the vast 
 forest of Soignes, where there existed no possible 
 route, by which to turn on Brussels in case of a re- 
 verse. 
 
 What resolution would Blucher and his counsellors 
 have taken, if the alarming reports of Grouchy's ar- 
 tillery had, about five o'clock, thundered between 
 Moustier and St. Lambert? That is the question. 
 To halt and receive an attack, in a position at once 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 179 
 
 open and dangerous, would have been not only to 
 lose all the fruits of a skillful and bold manoeuvre, 
 but a piece of folly that would have compromitted 
 the Prussian army in a perfect cut-throat position. 
 Blucher had, then, but three courses to choose from : 
 1st. To retrogade without delay on the road that leads 
 from Wavre to Brussels ; 2d. To halt his columns and 
 at once direct them on the Dyle, to dispute Grouchy's 
 passage ; 3d. To precipitate his movement on Ohain 
 and Planchenois, so as to hasten the so much desired 
 junction with Wellington's army, a union that was 
 his first aim, and became his only safe course, when 
 once he found himself engaged in such a situation. 
 
 Notwithstanding the manifest advantages of this 
 last, it appears that Blucher, informed of the appear- 
 ance of the heads of Excelmans' and Yandamme's col- 
 umns on the heights of Corbaix, and fearing to see 
 them debouch by Moustier, decided on the second ; 
 as he suspended Pirch's march, and ordered Ziethen 
 to fall back on the Dyle. It is even asserted, that 
 these troops did not commence their movement till 
 after a report from Thielmann, announcing that tno 
 French columns were extending themselves towards 
 Wavre. 
 
 We will be permitted to believe, however, that in 
 either case, the Prussian marshal, after having recon- 
 noitred Grouchy's force, had judged the eight divi- 
 sions of Pirch and Thielmann sufficient to hold it in 
 check, while with the eight divisions of Ziethen and 
 Bulow he would aid Wellington in obtaining the 
 victory. 
 
 Be that as it may, it is evident, that the sole ap- 
 
180 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 pearance of Grouchy towards Moustier had placed 
 the Prussian generals in a really embarrassing posi- 
 tion, upon the consequences and gravity of which no 
 one can decide ; because all the reasoning that can 
 be brought to bear on this subject, is limited to 
 vague conjectures, for judging of the moral effect 
 which this event had produced on the Prussian gen- 
 erals and their troops. 
 
 We cannot deny, however, that if General Gerard's 
 advice was not entirely equivalent to the resolution 
 of advancing on Moustier at day-break, Marshal 
 Grouchy ought to regret his not deciding on follow- 
 ing it. He would have done at least all that it was 
 possible for man to do, to prevent a catastrophe 
 which has unhappily been imputed to him. His 
 bravery and zeal had been tested, he had often given 
 proofs of talent, but he here lost the opportunity of 
 placing his name among the number of most able 
 generals, by laboring to follow strictly the orders 
 that had been given him, it is said, with a little bit- 
 terness, and the letter of which he endeavored to 
 execute, instead of interpreting the spirit of it. In 
 fact, means for his justification are not wanting ; the 
 most important and the best established of all is, that 
 unable to diviiy? Blucher's intentions, and supposing 
 him concentralfa in front of Wavre towards Dion le 
 Mont, GroucM might fear to lay entirely open the 
 communications of the army, by thus throwing him- 
 self into the environs of St. Lambert, leaving all the 
 Prussian army behind him. The over-excited parti- 
 sans of Napoleon have judged his lieutenant with 
 extreme rigor, not dreaming that a portion of the 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 181 
 
 blame should fall on their hero, who had not given 
 him orders entirely satisfactory ; and it must be ad- 
 mitted, that there exist but few generals who would 
 have resolved to throw themselves thus on St. Lam- 
 bert, without knowing what Blucher's main force 
 would undertake. 
 
 While the French were committing these faults, 
 their adversaries executed one of the most wise and 
 daring manoeuvres. 
 
 The Prussian marshal, who had bivouacked with 
 all his forces about Wavre, on the night of the 17th, 
 had sent, as has been already stated, his chief of 
 staff, Gneisenau, to the Duke of Wellington, to con- 
 trive their ulterior operations. It was agreed, that if 
 Napoleon burst upon the English, these should give 
 him battle in front of Waterloo, in the position 
 which their general had reconnoitred eight days pre- 
 viously, in order to cover Brussels if necessary; in 
 this case, Blucher, favored by the Dyle and the di- 
 rection of its course, should join him and take part in 
 the battle, by falling on the French right ; under the 
 contrary supposition, that is to say, if Napoleon 
 marched on the Prussians to attack them at Wavre, 
 is was agreed that Wellington should act on the same 
 concentric principle, an<£ fall on their left. 
 
 Perceiving by the false* direction of Grouchy 's 
 march, and by the reports of his flankers, that Napo- 
 leon was bearing against the English, and that he 
 could without fear fly to his assistance, Blucher 
 caused the corps of Bulow and Pirch to depart for 
 St. Lambert at four o'clock on the morning of the 
 ISth, and himself with Xiethen's, marched on Ohain 
 
182 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 in order to join the left of the English general. Thiel- 
 maun was left with 25,000 men at Wavre to defend 
 the Dyle, with instructions to follow the other corps, 
 if Grouchy did not make his appearance. This plan 
 was very well conceived, and it is necessary to say, 
 in praise of the allied generals, that in these combi- 
 nations is recognized, all the progress they had made 
 in the art of war. 
 
 In conformity with these wise dispositions, Bulow 
 was proceeding through Wavre, between seven and 
 eight o'clock in the morning, when a violent confla- 
 gration burst forth in the principal street of this city, 
 which was the only passage-way; the advanced-guard 
 having already cleared this burning defile, continued 
 on its route ; but his artillery not being able to fol- 
 low, the column busied itself in extinguishing the 
 flames. About noon, the advanced-guard formed at 
 St. Lambert, and awaited the arrival of the corps, 
 that debouched between three and four o'clock from 
 the environs of Pijeau; Pirch's corps had reached 
 beyond Lasne, between five and six o'clock ; Blucher, 
 advancing with Ziethen, had made several counter- 
 marches, which prevented him from attaining Ohain 
 before seven o'clock in the evening. We are already 
 aware of the part which these 65,000 Prussians took 
 in the battle of Waterloo, while Thielmann's corps, 
 posted on the heights of Bierge, overlooking Wavre, 
 and the whole valley of the Dyle, was making his 
 dispositions for opposing Grouchy with a wall of 
 brass, when he should make his appearance. 
 
 Arriving in front of Wavre, at four o'clock, this 
 marshal formed his troops to attack the forces left to 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 1S3 
 
 dispute with him the crossing of the Dyle, which 
 presented a very difficult defile at this point. At five 
 o'clock, he received the orders directed to him that 
 morning at Gembloux ; Grouchy then sent Pajol with 
 8,000 men on Limale, attacked Thielmann's detach- 
 ment with the remainder of his forces, and debouched, 
 after a very brisk combat, which extended beyond 
 Wavre and the mills of Bierge. The details of this 
 combat, very honorable to both parties, and in which 
 Gerard was wounded, should not form part of our 
 summary. 
 
 What was taking place at M ont-St.-Jean rendered, 
 moreover, this success more hurtful than useful. The 
 debris of Napoleon's army regained Genape in hor- 
 rible disorder ; in vain did the staff strive to form it 
 into corps ; every thing was pell-mell. It would be 
 unjust to reproach the troops for this ; never had they 
 fought with more valor, and the cavalry especially 
 had surpassed itself; but, little habituated to seeing 
 themselves thus turned and nigh being enveloped ; 
 having exhausted all their munitions and forces, they 
 thought it their duty to seek safety in the most pre- 
 cipitous retreat. Each one wishing to retake the road 
 he had previously followed, they crossed each other 
 in different directions, some to reach the road to 
 Charleroi, others to secure that leading to Nivelle, and 
 escape from the enemy that already appeared on the 
 former ; the confusion was complete. The chief of 
 Blucher'8 staff, a man of head and heart, was, not- 
 withstanding the night, ordered in pursuit of this tu- 
 multuous crowd with the Prussian cavalry that had 
 been less engaged ; he appeared unexpectedly before 
 
184 POLITICAL A]ffD MTLITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 Genape, into which he threw a few shot and shell, 
 and this gave the finishing stroke to the rout. 
 The disorder w T as so much the greater, as the avenues 
 of this defile had been barricaded to cover the parks 
 that had remained there ; and this precaution, so often 
 neglected by the French, turned, under these circum- 
 stances, against them, by encumbering the only re- 
 maining passage-way ; this augmented the confusion 
 and doubled the loss of materiel. Grouchy, on his 
 part, being compromised beyond the Dyle, by the 
 very success he had just gained, had only time to 
 throw himself in all haste on Namur, in order to se- 
 cure the route to Givet and Mezi&res, and the Prus- 
 sians failed to prevent him. 
 
 The vanquished army had lost 200 pieces of ord- 
 nance, and 30,000 men hors de combat or prisoners ; 
 as many more remained, independently of Grouchy's 
 35,000 men ; but the difficulty was to rally them in 
 presence of an enemy, that had taken lessons in au- 
 dacity and activity from Napoleon himself. The loss 
 of the allies was not less considerable, but there re- 
 mained to them 150,000 men,* the confidence of vic- 
 tory, and the certainty of being seconded by 300,000 
 allies, who were crossing the Rhine from Mentz to 
 Bale. 
 
 Such was the issue of this struggle, commenced 
 under such happy auspices, and which resulted more 
 fatal to France than the battles of Poitiers and Azin- 
 
 * Besides the troops engaged at Waterloo, the allies had a splendid 
 English division advancing from Ostend, a division encamped at Hall, and 
 Kleist's Prussian corps, that had taken no part in the battle, without men- 
 tioning other armies. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 185 
 
 court. It must be admitted, that this disaster was 
 the work of a multitude of unheard-of circumstances : 
 if Napoleon can be reproached for certain faults, it 
 must be allowed that fortune dealt cruelly with him 
 in the lesser details, and that his enemies in return, 
 were as fortunate as they showed themselves skillful. 
 However unjust be the spirit of party, we are forced 
 to render homage to the merits of two generals, who, 
 unexpectedly attacked in their cantonments extending 
 from Dinant and Li&ge to Eenaix, near Tournay, had 
 taken such wise measures, as to be in condition next 
 morning for giving battle to equal forces, and for af- 
 terwards conquering by an able concentration of the 
 two armies. 
 
 As to Napoleon, we have already pointed out the 
 faults in execution, committed the 16th and 17th, as 
 well by himself as by his lieutenants. In the very 
 battle of Waterloo, the French might be censured for 
 having attempted the first attack in masses too deep. 
 This system was never successful against the murder- 
 ous fire of English infantry and artillery.* I have 
 already stated, on the subject of the battle of Esling, 
 (in a former volume,) all that can be said in this re- 
 spect ; but even supposing that this system be suitable 
 on a dry and an open field, easy of access, and with 
 equal artillery force, it is certain, that infantry masses, 
 hurled over muddy ground, from which it is difficult 
 
 * It is probable that this kind of formation had not been ordered by 
 Napoleon ; we have never learned, that lie concerned himself about pre- 
 scribing the manner in which his lieutenants should form their troops, to 
 Lead them to an attack. In 1818 alone, he prescribed the columns of bat- 
 talions by divisions in two ranks, very different from these heavy masses, 
 and such that General Jomini has proposed it in his different works. 
 
186 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY Off 
 
 to emerge, with an insufficient concurrence of other 
 arms,* attacking troops posted in excellent positions, 
 have many chances against them. Besides, they 
 might also be blamed for not having sufficiently sup- 
 ported this first effort, which, executed without the 
 assistance of the cavalry and reserves, became a par- 
 tial and isolated movement, and consequently without 
 result. 
 
 There were likewise extraordinary charges of cav- 
 alry, which being devoid of support, became heroic 
 but useless struggles. Notwithstanding all this, it is 
 almost certain that Napoleon would have remained 
 master of the field of battle, but for the arrival of 
 65,000 Prussians on his rear ; a decisive and disastrous 
 circumstance, that to prevent was not entirely in his 
 power. As soon as the enemy led 130,000 men on 
 the battle-field, with scarcely 50,000 to oppose them, 
 all was lost. 
 
 It is time, however, to quit the field of conjecture, 
 and return to the debris of Napoleon's army. 
 
 The appearance of the Prussian cavalry, and the 
 cannonade with which it opened on Genape, in the 
 middle of the night, was a circumstance altogether 
 novel in war, where night ordinarily puts a stop to 
 carnage and pursuit. General Gneisenau thought this 
 innovation without danger, against a disbanded army, 
 and was not mistaken, as all took the Charleroi road 
 
 * The French had numerous batteries on their front, but they battered 
 the enemy's lines from a distance, and vaguely, and could not easily follow 
 the assailing troops ; while the English artillery remaining in position 
 fired muzzle to muzzle, against the columns advancing upon them, and 
 which offered themselves victims to a concentric fire, directed on a single 
 point. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 187 
 
 in great disorder, without waiting for day ; and it was 
 only under the guns of Avesnes, that it became pos- 
 sible to rally the battalions and re-organize them a 
 little. 
 
 Napoleon had but one course left him, which was 
 to direct Grouchy through the Ardennes on Laon, to 
 collect at this point all that could be drawn from the 
 interior, from Metz and from Rapp's corps, leaving 
 but garrisons in Lorraine and Alsace. The imperial 
 cause was very much shaken, but not entirely lost ; 
 should all Frenchmen determine on opposing Europe 
 with the courage of the Spartans of Leonidas, the 
 energy of the Russians in 1812, or of the Spaniards 
 of Palafox. Unfortunately for them, as for Napoleon, 
 opinion was very much divided on this subject, and 
 the majority still believing that the struggle interested 
 only the power of the emperor and his family, the 
 fate of the country seemed of little consequence. 
 
 Prince Jerome had collected 25,000 men in rear of 
 Avesnes : he was ordered to lead them to Laon ; there 
 remained 200 pieces of artillery, beside those of 
 Grouchy. 
 
 It required eight days for this marshal to reach 
 Laon : the emperor repaired to that city to await 
 him, persuaded that Wellington, prudent as he had 
 been in Spain, would fear to involve himself, in the 
 midst of so many strong fortresses, and would advance 
 with caution on the Somme. 
 
 Napoleon did not admire what are called counsels 
 of war ; but under serious circumstances, he loved to 
 reason with some of his familiars for and against the 
 different plans he should follow, and after having 
 
188 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OP 
 
 listened to all their advice, usually formed his resolu- 
 tion, without even communicating it to those he had 
 called together. 
 
 Reaching Laon on the 19th, where he had at first 
 resolved to await the junction of Grouchy and Jerome, 
 the emperor discussed, with the small number of the 
 trustworthy who had followed him, the course he 
 should adopt after this frightful disaster. Should he 
 repair to Paris, and concert with the chambers and 
 his ministers, or else remain with the army, demand- 
 ing of the chambers to invest him with dictatorial 
 power and an unlimited confidence, under the convic- 
 tion, that he would obtain from them the most ener- 
 getic measures, for saving France and conquering her 
 independence, on heaps of ruins ? 
 
 As it always happens, his generals were divided in 
 opinion ; some wished him to proceed to Paris, and 
 deposit the crown into the hands of the nation's dele- 
 gates, or receive it from them a second time, with the 
 means of defending it. Others, with a better appre- 
 ciation of the views of the deputies, affirmed, that 
 far from sympathizing with Napoleon, and seconding 
 him, they would accuse him of having lost France, 
 and would endeavor to save the country by losing the 
 emperor. A grave circumstance gave weight to this 
 opinion ; it was, that on the very day when he tri- 
 umphed at Ligny, the elective chamber factiously 
 usurped the initiative right, by adopting a law, order- 
 ing the re-union of the institutions scattered through 
 the different constitutions of the consulate and em 
 pire. Lastly, the most prudent thought, that Napoleon 
 should not go to Paris, but remain at the head of the 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 189 
 
 army, in order to treat with the sovereigns himself, 
 by. offering to abdicate in favor of his son. 
 
 It is said, that Napoleon inclined to the idea of re- 
 maining at Laon with the army ; but the advice of 
 the greatest number determined him, and he departed 
 for Paris. In fact, this was certainly the most effica- 
 cious means for concerting with all the authorities, 
 ministers and administrations, on the prompt and vig- 
 orous measures necessary to be adopted, in order to 
 organize a grand national resistance ; because the Em- 
 peror could accomplish more in a few hours himself, 
 than by a hundred despatches. But to succeed, he 
 had to find more ability, disinterestedness and devo- 
 tion in the chambers than they had yet exhibited. 
 
 However, his departure being decided upon, Napo- 
 leon repaired to Paris during the night of the 21st 
 June. This, so natural a return, was ill-interpreted ; 
 his defeat had lessened him in the eyes of the multi- 
 tude, who so rarely view things in their true light : 
 they considered his departure from the army as an 
 act of weakness. He had proved, at Areola, Eylau, 
 Ratisbonne, Arcis, and also at Waterloo, that he was 
 not afraid of bullets ; and had he not believed in the 
 resources of France, he would have died at the head 
 of the remains of his army : he quitted them, because 
 he had not a general of his rear-guard who could not 
 lead them to Laon as well as himself, while no one 
 could replace him at the helm of the vessel of state, 
 which, for the instant, was not at his head-quarters, 
 but at the Tuileries. 
 
 In eight or ten days, he hoped to be on his return 
 to Laon, at the head of 100,000 men, with 400 pieces 
 
190 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 of artillery, and chastise the Anglo-Prussians for their 
 invasion. Undoubtedly this would not have rid him 
 of the grand armies, which the allied sovereigns were 
 leading by the Yosges : nevertheless, he would have 
 gained time ; and if 300,000 men were assembled on 
 the Loire during July, France might yet conquer her 
 independence, and preserve her glory, for many na- 
 tions have lifted themselves up from a lower depth. 
 The following picture of his situation, traced by Na- 
 poleon himself, proves that he was far from despair- 
 ing : " So far, PSris could finish her preparations for 
 defence, those at Lyons were completed. The prin- 
 cipal fortresses were commanded by chosen officers, 
 and guarded by faithful troops. All could be re- 
 trieved, but it required character, energy and absolute 
 devotion on the part of the government, the chambers 
 and the entire nation. It was necessary, that she 
 should be animated by the sole sentiment of national 
 honor, glory and independence ; she should fix her 
 eyes on Rome after the battle of Cannae, and not on 
 Carthage after that of Zama ! France once assuming 
 this lofty stand, is invincible." 
 
 Without recurring to the age of the Scipios, it 
 sufficed to recall the example of Spain in 1808, when 
 the French held her places and her capital, and that 
 of Russia setting Moscow on fire, to escape the con- 
 sequences of the bloody field of Borodino. It will 
 be asserted, undoubtedly, that the circumstances were 
 very different, and that France was too much ex- 
 hausted of men, to hope for such a result. Such 
 reasons merit no reply : pusillanimous souls never 
 lack pretexts for immediately submitting, when 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATEKL00. 191 
 
 placed under obligation to conquer or to die. It is 
 not allotted to every one to feel like the Spartans, and 
 sacrifice all to national glory. 
 
 Throwing aside thi%point of patriotic honor, it was 
 not difficult for the political adversaries of Napoleon 
 to prove, even to his partisans, that the cause of France 
 was for the first time separate from his own. To lis- 
 ten to them, " it would only be at the price of seas 
 of blood and of the most dreadful ravages, that you 
 could clear the soil invaded by 500,000 men, and se- 
 cure her independence. By submitting to the Bour- 
 bons, the same result could be obtained, in a manner 
 less Roman, truly, but more certain, and less cruel to 
 France, already worn out by so many wars." 
 
 This language was not heroic, but it was conclusive, 
 and calculated to lead all weak minds. The army 
 and the revolutionary party were inclined to resist- 
 ance, without being alarmed at the sacrifices it de- 
 manded ; but the party wished for resistance, for the 
 benefit of demagogism, and not for the interest of 
 the imperial authority. The leaders were deluded into 
 believing, that they could resist Europe by means of 
 decrees, as in 1793. Lafayette, especially, was of a 
 provoking good nature ; he flattered himself, that Eu- 
 rope made war only against the ambition of one man, 
 and that the arms of the sovereigns were harmless in 
 presence of his Gallo.American doctrines ; he did not 
 perceive that the days of Mack and Cobourg were in 
 the distant past, and that these were precisely the 
 doctrines upon which the sovereigns had designs. 
 
 Great disasters, like volcanoes, are announced by a 
 hollow noise which precedes the explosion. Paris 
 
192 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 had been agitated, since the 20th June, by most alarm- 
 ing reports that bewildered every one. At the first 
 news of the catastrophe, Fouche had his friends of 
 the two chambers assembled #t his house,* at the 
 same time that his secret agents noised it throughout 
 Paris, that the abdication of Napoleon could alone 
 save the country. 
 
 The leaders of the utopianist party dreaded, un- 
 doubtedly with reason, the dissolution of the chambers, 
 because, after the course which some of the deputies 
 had adopted, they felt that the emperor would regard 
 them more as obstacles, than as means of government. 
 It was then agreed, in this secret assembly, to forestall 
 the danger ; Lafayette was to bell the cat, by propos- 
 ing to the chamber, on the next day, to declare itself 
 permanent, and proclaim him a traitor to the country, 
 who would dare to order its dissolution. As a remu- 
 neration for this act, qualify it as you will, the great 
 citizen^ who had accompanied the people from Paris 
 to Versailles in 1789, would be newly honored with 
 his favorite title of Commanding General of the Na- 
 tional Guards of the Kingdom. 
 
 While Fouche and his friends were thus plotting 
 Napoleon's overthrow, he, at four o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of the 21st, arrived at the Elysee-Bourbon, where 
 Caulaincourt awaited him with just impatience. Far 
 from speaking of a dissolution, the first words uttered 
 by the emperor announced his idea of convening the 
 two chambers in extraordinary session, in order to 
 depict to them the misfortunes of Waterloo, and de- 
 
 * Lafayette, Manuel, Dupont de TEure, Flauguergues, Dupin the elder, 
 and Henry Lacoste. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 193 
 
 mand of tliem the means for saving France ; after 
 which he would hasten to rejoin the army. 
 
 It is said, that Caulaincourt expressed his regrets 
 on his leaving it, and his fears that the chambers were 
 little disposed to second him. The ministers, sum- 
 moned immediately after by the emperor, were invi- 
 ted to give their opinions on the measures to be taken. 
 Napoleon imparted to them his views, his resources, 
 and the need he had of the dictatorship in order to 
 save France ; he could seize upon it himself, or receive 
 it from the chambers ; this latter would be more legal 
 and more efficacious ; but was there a certainty of his 
 obtaining it ? The greater number of the ministers 
 thought, that every thing depended on the harmonious 
 action of the chambers. Caulaincourt cited the for- 
 lorn condition of the country in 1814, as a frightful 
 example of the consequences of a dissolution. Fouche 
 also rested all his hopes on an unreserved confidence 
 in these assemblies, in the bosom of which he wielded 
 an active influence. Decrfes thought, on the contrary, 
 that it was not necessary to depend upon them. 
 Regnaut de Saint-Jean d'Angely himself, this obse- 
 quious and complaisant orator, dared to add to the 
 opinion of the minister of marine, that the chambers 
 would undoubtedly exact a new abdication ; he even 
 carried his boldness so far as to insinuate, that if not 
 offered, they ought to exact it. Justly indignant at 
 this, and recalling to mind the 18th Brumaire, Lucien 
 demanded that the emperor should dispense with the 
 chambers, and save France by himself alone. Lastly, 
 and it should be said to his praise, Carnot entered 
 
 more largely into the views of a desperate defence, 
 
 9 
 
194: POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 and of the dictatorship that would furnish the means ; 
 he considered it necessary to redeem the soil of France 
 at any cost, and to renew, if needed, all the energy 
 of the committee of public safety of 1793. If he 
 never ranked as a great politician, he at least showed 
 the energy of a Roman. 
 
 While these grave questions were discussed at the 
 Elys^e, the resolutions, adopted the night before in 
 Fouche's secret assembly, bore their fruit in the cham- 
 bers ; the rumors of a dissolution, perfidiously spread 
 long before the subject had been agitated, and at the 
 very moment when, on the contrary, they were pro- 
 posing proper harmony with the chambers as the only 
 means of safety, had produced the effect intended by 
 the conspirators. Lafayette had just made the sortie 
 agreed upon with success, and had carried, either 
 through jealousy or the weakness of the deputies, the 
 decree declaring as traitors to the country all those 
 who would dare pronounce a dissolution, though this 
 act was nevertheless one of the constitutional rights 
 of the emperor. Singular mania of these pretended 
 apostles of legality, immolating the chief of state 
 for wishing to execute the law ! 
 
 This decree, that was, by itself alone, an entire re- 
 volution, was transmitted to the assembly of the min- 
 isters engaged with Napoleon : henceforth there was 
 nothing more to hope for ; in vain did Lucien, accom- 
 panied by the ministers, demand of the chambers, in 
 the name of the emperor, to appoint a commission to 
 contrive measures of public safety, indispensable un- 
 der the circumstances : his abdication was the sole 
 aim of the conspirators. The commission was in 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 195 
 
 truth appointed, but was composed of the warmest 
 enemies of the emperor, Laujuinais, Lafayette, Gre- 
 nier, Flauguergues, and Dupont de l'Eure ; the ma- 
 jority only proposed a foolish and vain negotiation 
 with the powers. At the reading of the report a 
 crowd of deputies, and Lafayette, especially, cried 
 out that this would be insufficient without the abdi- 
 cation ; that this abdication or its forfeiture, was neces- 
 sary within the hour. 
 
 While these vociferations of mediocrity and of ha- 
 tred, staggered moderate minds, Napoleon was at 
 the Ely see, a prey to the most violent agitation. The 
 people assembled about this palace, made the air re- 
 sound with cries of vive Vempereur ! and asked for 
 arms. Lucien urged his brother to profit by this en- 
 thusiasm, and enact an 18th Brumaire, more legal 
 than the first, because, in ordering the dissolution ac- 
 cording to the prescribed forms, he had a right to 
 require it and have it executed. 
 
 The idea of saving the country by arming the lower 
 classes against the highest magistracy, must have been 
 revolting to the judicious and lofty spirit of Napoleon. 
 Besides, discord, already so potent in France, would 
 not fail to redouble after a coup cPetat^ which would 
 recall rather that of May 31st, 1793, than that of the 
 18th Brumaire. The sacred union of the nation and 
 its chief, could alone repair the cruel effects of these 
 bloody disasters ; it was then by closing around the 
 celebrated conqueror, that France could still issue 
 gloriously from a gigantic struggle. From the mo- 
 ment the nation divided itself into three hostile camps, 
 and the authorities gave the example of defection, all 
 
196 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 was lost, because Napoleon could not himself alone, 
 save the independence of the country, as well as his 
 throne. The ideologists and the factious, who were 
 so senseless as to imagine, that Europe would be eager 
 to lay down her arms before their decrees, and who 
 thought of causing the triumph of their Utopias by 
 sacrificing a great man, will alone have to answer for 
 the humiliation they were preparing for themselves. 
 
 Repelling, then, the suggestions of his brother, Na- 
 poleon preferred to resign, and dictated to Lucien the 
 following abdication in favor of his son : 
 
 " Frenchmen ! in commencing the war for uphold- 
 ing the national independence, I calculated on the 
 union of all efforts, of all wills, and on the concur- 
 rence of all the national authorities ; I had reason to 
 hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of 
 the powers against me. Circumstances appear to me 
 changed. I offer myself a sacrifice to the hatred of 
 the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in 
 their declarations, and have really no design but upon 
 my person. My political life is ended, and I pro- 
 claim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., em- 
 peror of the French. The present ministers will 
 compose the council of the government. The interest 
 I take in my son induces me to invite the chambers, 
 immediately, to pass a law organizing the regency. 
 Let all unite for the public safety, and to continue an 
 independent nation !" 
 
 We are assured, that the emperor at first intended 
 to send a pure and simple abdication, but that Lucien 
 and Carnot determined him to stipulate in favor of 
 his son. Be that as it may, many have blamed him 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 197 
 
 for this resolution as a weakness. If he had only- 
 consulted his own character, he would have buried 
 himself beneath his country's ruins, sooner than have 
 so easily yielded ; the long series of combats sustained, 
 after his departure from Moscow, even to the very- 
 foot of Montmartre, sufficiently proves it. But how 
 could he share his sentiments with entire France, 
 when the very government had just declared that a 
 second abdication was necessary ? Without the con- 
 currence of the country, what could he do ? If Na- 
 poleon had made the sacrifice of his throne at Fon- 
 tainbleau, when he had greater titles to the devotion 
 of the nation, and when the enemy were less formi- 
 dable, could he refuse now, when himself and his 
 private interests were alone concerned? Could he 
 consent to a social subversion, and to France being 
 laid waste, in order to satisfy his military vanity? 
 No. . . . His resignation, far from being an act of 
 discouragement, was worthy the rest of his life. 
 
 Having decided on going to America, Napoleon 
 hoped that the allies would rest satisfied with the 
 hostage he placed at their discretion, and would leave 
 the crown on the head of the son of Maria Louisa. 
 He thought this was the best means, of effecting the 
 fusion of ancient interests with the new, and preventing 
 a civil war which might again run over the entire 
 circle from 1789 to 1801 : but the solemn enjxa^e- 
 ments entered into at Yienna, between the sovereigns 
 and Louis XVIIL, did little permit them to consent to 
 such a transaction, which at best had then been ex- 
 cusable, as their object was to prevent the grand 
 struggle that was expected, and the issue of which 
 
198 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 was not considered so certain or so speedy. Before 
 the war, the sovereigns might have hesitated in effect- 
 ing the triumph of the principle of legitimacy, by 
 the doubtful force of arms ; but once conquerors, how 
 were they to repel it ? By what right could they 
 prevent their ally, Louis XVIII., from entering the 
 capital, and resuming the crown ? Besides, Napo- 
 leon's precaution in stipulating for his son, remained 
 without result through the singular pre-occupation of 
 the leaders of the chamber, who flattered themselves, 
 with yet dictating laws to France, and having them 
 accepted by Europe. Not wishing to admit Napoleon 
 II., nor establish the regency, they hastened to form a 
 provisional government, in the hope of seizing the 
 helm of state, treating with the allied sovereigns for 
 their existence, and not resuming the government of 
 the Bourbons, but with conditions imposed by the 
 chambers. How absurd a dream in the actual state 
 of affairs! and which would suit neither Louis XVIIL, 
 nor the sovereigns armed in the cause of thrones. 
 
 Here the task of the historian, who attaches great 
 value to impartiality, becomes not less embarrassing 
 than painful. Indeed, how will he portion out to each 
 one, the meed of blame or praise that pertains to 
 him, in these great political conflicts ? Will he treat 
 all the adversaries of Napoleon as ' sycophants and 
 revolutionists ? Will he compare Fouche to Catiline, 
 and will he regard the utopianist deputies, on whom 
 he relied, as so many of the Gracchi ; or rather, fol- 
 lowing in the footsteps of the ignoble Abbe of Mont- 
 gaillard, will he treat Napoleon and all his partisans 
 as blood-thirsty ogres, dreaming but of devastation 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 199 
 
 and pillage ? Will he, like this pamphleteer, raise to 
 the rank of clemi-gods, all those who contributed to 
 the ruin of the imperial system ? 
 
 Without thus pushing things to extremes, it will 
 ever be a perplexing matter to qualify Fouche's in- 
 trigues ; some will state that they were the result of 
 a wise foresight of the ills that threatened France, 
 after the declarations of the Congress at Vienna, as 
 well as a worthy desire of preserving her from too 
 unequal a contest ; others will attribute them solely 
 to tae ambitious and seditious tendency of his mind, 
 as well as to his still somewhat revolutionary doc- 
 trines. Should a minister be stamped as a traitor or 
 receive commendations, who, while preserving his 
 official position towards the chief of state, corre- 
 sponded and treated clandestinely with his enemies, 
 without authority ? 
 
 Who will dare award civic crowns to the influential 
 members of the chambers, for their conduct, both be- 
 fore and after the news of the disaster at Waterloo ? 
 Will it be credited, that they preserved France from 
 utter ruin, by usurping an authority which the consti- 
 tution did not give them ; or else, will they be ac- 
 cused of having added to the military humiliation of 
 the country, by cowardly abandoning the only cap- 
 tain who was still able to heighten the brightness of 
 her standards, and preserve her independence ? 
 
 In recapitulating all the disasters that might befall 
 France, by prolonging a struggle d outrance, we can- 
 not deny that it was a frightful alternative, and that 
 the result of the course adopted would sufficiently 
 justify the conduct of the chambers, had they always 
 
200 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 been inspired solely by the interest of the country. 
 However, who can also say, that Napoleon would not 
 have cleared French soil of her enemies, had he been 
 powerfully and freely supported ? Who can affirm, 
 that the expenses of the occupation, and the two 
 thousand millions imposed by the allies or paid to the 
 emigrants, had not exceeded, by far, the monetary 
 and transient ravages, the consequences of a few 
 months' struggle ? Though, perhaps, despairing too 
 soon of the public safety, had the chambers at least 
 appreciated the only remedy for the evils that threat- 
 ened the country, and had boldly proclaimed the re- 
 call of the legitimate government, soliciting from the 
 king the proclamation of certain fundamental princi- 
 ples, requisite to re-assure minds against a violent 
 reaction, we would have been able to acknowledge 
 some political foresight on the part of their leaders ; 
 but all their measures, on the contrary, attest a mis- 
 erable spirit of mediocrity, of hatred towards the 
 powers of the government, and a liberalism ridicu- 
 lously vain, which destroyed even the garb of patri- 
 otism with which they clothed their declamations? 
 These are grave and immense questions, upon which 
 I do not feel myself called upon to pass judgment, 
 and which I hasten to leave, and return to the em- 
 peror. 
 
 Still full of the souvenirs of 1813 and 1814, Europe 
 did not at all comprehend the rapidity of this second 
 fall. The empire of Carthage, likewise crumbled at 
 Zama ; because the Carthagenian hero had, like Na- 
 poleon, lost his influence in the heart of the country. 
 The monarchy of Frederic the Great fell as rapidly 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 201 
 
 at Jena, but owed her existence to the principle of 
 legitimacy, so ill appreciated by declaimers ; Frederic 
 William, happier than Hannibal and Napoleon, had 
 left his nation in mourning and preserved the love of 
 his people. In this great wreck, Napoleon could, 
 nevertheless, exclaim, with Francis I. : All is lost, 
 save honor. 
 
 Napoleon did not quit France, till the enemy neared 
 his retreat at Malmaison. Informed of his abdication, 
 and of the anarchy that had succeeded him, and even 
 prompted, as it is asserted, by Fouche, the Anglo- 
 Prussians had advanced rapidly on Paris ; they could 
 have outstripped Grouchy, but they followed closely 
 on his steps. Wellington had carried Peronne and 
 Cambrai at the first onset, where pitiable citizens 
 ignominiously aided him. The rapidity of this inva- 
 sion fully proved, that Europe had not forgotten the 
 lessons given by Napoleon himself. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Prussians made a hazardous move- 
 ment, in seeking to turn the works erected to the 
 north of Paris ; they alone crossed the Seine near 
 Pecq, while Wellington remained on the right bank, 
 and, from Ids position, unable to support them. The 
 army, then commanded by Davoust, and encamped 
 in the vicinity, might have fallen upon them with 
 70,000 brave men, and annihilated them by tumbling 
 them into the Seine. Napoleon proposed to the pro- 
 visional government, to take command of the army, 
 and resign the same after having conquered. Vile 
 intrigues prevented him from washing out the stain 
 of Waterloo, and taking leave of France after a vic- 
 tory, that had permitted him to treat honorably with 
 
 9* 
 
202 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the allied sovereigns, instead of surrendering at dis- 
 cretion to an English general and a Prussian marshal, 
 as was done by the provisional government. Far 
 from accepting his proposition, Fouche, who was al- 
 ready corresponding with Wellington, had even 
 resolved, for fear he would of his own accord put 
 himself at the head of the army, to secure his person 
 and place him in a species of captivity, by confiding 
 him to the guard of General Becker. 
 
 Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the troops was still 
 so great, that this deplorable government had great 
 difficulty in causing a suspension of hostilities, and 
 General Excelmans even destroyed an entire brigade 
 near Ville-d'Avray, at the moment when they were 
 enchaining the courage of his comrades. 
 
 The emperor left for Rochefort immediately after- 
 wards. Decres the minister, proposed to him to leave 
 from Havre, on an American vessel ready to set sail ; 
 but this was too near the English coast, and he was 
 also rather late. He could also have embarked at 
 Bordeaux, on the one chartered by Joseph : the ob- 
 jections to a' disagreeable counsellor diverted him 
 from it ; fearing to fall into the hands of his enemies 
 in a commercial port, he determined to go aboard a 
 public ship, but some of the factious had time to 
 forewarn the English of the fact."^ Joseph embarked 
 alone at Bordeaux, and reached America without inter- 
 ruption, on the vessel which he had offered to his 
 brother. The latter was less fortunate : closely pressed 
 
 * The History of the Restoration asserts positively, that Fouche in- 
 formed Wellington of this embarkation, and so contrived it, that the em- 
 peror should not escape. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 203 
 
 by the English cruiser on his leaving Rochefort, and 
 seeing that it would be difficult to escape, he pushed 
 directly for her, hoping to place himself under the 
 safeguard of British honor and British laws. He 
 wrote the following letter to the prince regent : 
 
 " Your royal highness : exposed to the factions that 
 divide my country, and to the enmity of the greatest 
 European powers, I have terminated my political ca- 
 reer. Like Themistocles, I come to sit at the hearth 
 of the British people. I place myself under the pro- 
 tection of their laws, which I demand of your royal 
 highness, as from the most powerful, the most con- 
 stant, and the most generous of my adversaries." 
 
 This letter, remarkable for the simplicity of its 
 style, and for the just comparison established, between 
 the position of Napoleon and that of the illustrious 
 Athenian, could not disarm the hatred of his enemies. 
 His was a cruel disappointment. It has been thought, 
 that he would have been treated very differently, had he 
 presented himself at the head-quarters of the emperor 
 Alexander, trusting his fate to the magnanimity of 
 his sentiments. Had this monarch considered it 
 necessary, for the repose of Europe, to confine his 
 formidable antagonist in one of his palaces, he 
 would have treated him, at least, with all the con- 
 sideration that was due him, and not with the bar- 
 barity of the unworthy jailor, that England gave 
 him. 
 
 Posterity will judge of the treatment he suffered. 
 Prisoner in another hemisphere, nothing was left 
 him, but to defend the reputation that history was 
 preparing for him, and which was still being per- 
 
204 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 verted according to the passions of parties. Death 
 surprised him while writing his commentaries, which 
 have remained imperfect, and this was, no doubt, one 
 of his greatest regrets. However, he can repose in 
 peace ; pigmies cannot obscure his glory ; he has 
 gathered, in the victories of Montenotte, Castiglione, 
 Areola, Kivoli, the Pyramids, as well as in those of 
 Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Abens* 
 burg, Ratisbonne, Wagram, Borodino, Bautzen, Dres- 
 den, Champ- Aubert, Montmirail, and Ligny, laurels 
 sufficient to efface the disaster of Waterloo ; his five 
 codes will be titles not less honorable, to the suffrages 
 of posterity. The monuments erected in France and 
 in Italy, will attest his greatness to the remotest ages. 
 
 His adversaries have reproached him with a ten- 
 dency to an oriental despotism, and I shared this 
 opinion with them for a long time : only true states- 
 men should judge him in this respect ; what seemed 
 a crime to the eyes of utopianists, will some day be- 
 come, to the eyes of enlightened men, his most glo- 
 rious title to wisdom and foresight. With hollow and 
 abstract ideas, or a philanthropic sentimentality, a 
 great nation will never march on to high destinies, or 
 even, be able victoriously to defend herself, against 
 formidable neighbors. 
 
 The great European communities, whatever be said 
 by all the Don Quixottes of governmental metaphy- 
 sics, will never be but egotistical and rival communi- 
 ties.* Therefore, all well-ordered communities should 
 
 * This truth, which appears simple by being evident, has very singu- 
 larly been unrecognized in these latter times, because the celebrated 
 author of the Letters cm. the hundred days, in speaking of Napoleon's fall, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 205 
 
 invest their chiefs with all the power indispensable 
 for rendering them formidable abroad and respected 
 at home. Without these conditions, there will exist 
 in his government but anarchy, demagogism or weak- 
 ness. According to the Utopias of Lafayette, Lanjui- 
 nais, and B. Constant, we should only make citizen 
 kings, without dignity and without power, like those 
 of Poland or Hungary ; or else anarchical republics, 
 like those of the year IV. and the year V. All subtle 
 declamations could not weaken this great truth. — • 
 That with the license of the press and popular elec- 
 tions, no continental power would exist fifty years ; 
 and France less than any other, thanks to the passion- 
 ate and impetuous spirit of the nation. Experience 
 will finally prove who best understood his true inter- 
 ests, Napoleon or the doctrinaires who undermined 
 his power. 
 
 Some men, blinded by their Utopias, have pretended 
 " that he had alienated from himself the enlightened 
 classes of Frenchmen, by smothering thought ; that 
 he had, by striking it with a magic sceptre , arrested 
 the moral and political progress of the human species, 
 which was compressed under an enormous weight, and 
 retained in woeful immobility." These grand phrases 
 have fascinated little minds ; but the suffrages of sen- 
 sible men will remain to him, and the next generation 
 
 has attributed it to the hatred that commerce bore him, which, according 
 to the publicist, tends to efface rivalry between nations, and to draw to- 
 gether individuals as well as nations : strange doctrine, that denotes an 
 inconceivable ignorance of the history of all ages, as if the great strug- 
 gles of Carthage and Rome, as well as those between England, France, 
 and Holland, only sprung from the rivalry of merchants, more tenacious 
 even than feudal or national rivalry. 
 
20G POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 will justly appreciate, whether the shamelessness of 
 thought, and the press is not more to be dreaded, for 
 a nation like the French, than the bounds he wished 
 to place to their license ;* they will see whether the 
 public morals and the national character, will have 
 gained much by the rupture of all checks ; whether 
 the right to say every thing, print every thing, and 
 villify every thing, will form great men, and will 
 cause real progress in human reason, or rather, 
 whether the result of this pretended golden age be 
 not all the reverse. 
 
 As to the charge of unbridled and unbounded am- 
 bition, which we ourselves have not spared him, it 
 must be admitted that appearances at least con- 
 demned him : however, we have not sufficiently con- 
 sidered the necessities of his position, as well towards 
 England as towards the other European powers, and 
 especially towards the emigrant princes of the revolu- 
 tion. Many invasions and aggressions were dictated 
 by these necessities. 
 
 The idea of a grand European domination, in oppo- 
 sition to the English power, certainly led him beyond 
 all bounds of wisdom and moderation, and powerfully 
 contributed to his fall ; but if this idea was a lofty 
 one, and worthy of him, it is just to say that the 
 means he employed for accomplishing his ends, were 
 revolting to his allies, and did him more injury than 
 the projects themselves. 
 
 * We cannot too often repeat that the imperial censorship, absurd in 
 its regulating dispositions, would have been good in itself, if it had ex- 
 tended only over the periodical press, and had been confided to men more 
 independent by their position. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 207 
 
 Here ends our task ; this small work haying for its 
 object, but the completion of the life of Napoleon, 
 related by himself, we have not considered it our 
 duty to narrate the sequel of the invasion, which 
 followed the battle of Waterloo, and the depart- 
 ure of the emperor. Everybody is aware of the 
 convention concluded on the 3d July, by Davoust 
 and the delegates of the provisional government, for 
 the evacuation of Paris and the retreat of the army 
 behind the Loire. We cannot, however, refrain from 
 citing the heroic defence of Huningue, by General 
 Barbanegre with a handful of mutilated veterans, and 
 the glorious combat sustained in Savoy, by Colonel 
 Bujeaud, with his single regiment, against an entire 
 division of the Austrians, in which he made more 
 prisoners than he had soldiers ; an isolated feat of 
 arms, but which attested the spirit which animated 
 the army. 
 
 Lastly, we will also recall the fact, that the cham- 
 bers received the reward of their deplorable conduct. 
 The commissioners they sent to the sovereigns were 
 scarcely admitted at head-quarters, and after certain 
 conferences, were informed, that there was no occa- 
 sion for treating with them : finally, a picket of Prus- 
 sian landwehrs, posted one beautiful morning at the 
 door of their chamber to prevent their assembling, 
 taught the deputies the vanity and puerility of their 
 pretensions. 
 
 A few days subsequently, Louis XVIII. quietly 
 entered the Tuileries ; prompted by the most excited 
 royalists, he at first yielded to the most violent reac- 
 tionary ideas ; but France and Europe did not delay 
 
208 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 in raising their voices against the folly of this exag- 
 gerated course. JThe world knows what took place 
 after the death of this sage and paternal monarch, 
 and how the revolution of 1830 proved, that the re- 
 turn from Elba was not so extravagant as had been 
 imagined. In truth, the results to the country were 
 frightful ; the foreign occupation continued to 1818, 
 the loss of many important fortresses, the two thou- 
 sand millions paid to the allies and emigrants, the 
 military humiliation, worse, perhaps, than all these? 
 such were the sad results of a resolution which Na- 
 poleon would have abstained from taking, had he 
 been able to have foreseen the consequences. The 
 reports that the allied sovereigns had quitted Yienna, 
 little satisfied with the proceedings of the congress, — 
 the rumor of a project on foot for removing him from 
 Elba, and exiling him far from Europe, — lastly, the 
 famous discourse of Ferrand, of which we have spo- 
 ken, were the three grand motives that led him to 
 this bold attempt ; if the departure of the sovereigns 
 had been confirmed, every thing leads us to the belief 
 that he would have succeeded; because he would, 
 have had time to negotiate, on the one hand, and on 
 the other, to place the entire nation under arms. 
 
 Such: is the weakness of human calculations, that 
 the most astounding enterprise that has ever been 
 conceived, succeeded, at first, against all probabilities 
 and appearances, then miscarried in another which, 
 proving false, destroyed all chances of success. We 
 are undoubtedly authorized in believing, that victory 
 at the battle of Waterloo by Napoleon, would have 
 rendered the struggle still long and terrible ; but it 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 209 
 
 would require a great share of credulity to be per- 
 suaded, that he could have prevented the 350,000 
 allies that crossed the Rhine between Bale and Man- 
 heim, from pushing forward to Paris ; because Napo- 
 leon, being compelled to leave from sixty to eighty 
 thousand men in Belgium, against Blucher and Wel- 
 lington, could not have assembled 100,000 on the 
 Moselle or the Vosges. Now, Paris being occupied, 
 what course would France have pursued, thus divided 
 in opinion, and placed between two chiefs, dethroned 
 in fact ? Would she have imitated Spain, and con- 
 tinued a national war a outrance, as desired by Napo- 
 leon and Carnot? 
 
 If the coalition had had to open partial negotiations 
 between London, Berlin, Petersburg and Vienna, Na- 
 poleon would have had four months more in which to 
 arm, and without doubt would have succeeded in de- 
 taching one or other of the powers. This was then 
 his principal chance of success. 
 
 As to the chances of war, we have seen that Ney's 
 delay on the 15th and 16th June ; that caused by Na- 
 poleon in the reconnoissance made and in the mea- 
 sures adopted for attacking Blucher's army ; the 
 vague and tardy direction assigned to Grouchy ; 
 finally, the false route taken by the latter, on the 
 morning of the 18th, were the leading causes of the 
 disaster at Waterloo. Some military men have also 
 thought, that Napoleon would have succeeded better 
 by not throwing himself between the allied armies, 
 as this gave to each the possibility of assembling com- 
 pletely ; they believe that he should have fallen either 
 on Blucher's centre, by Namur, or on Wellington's, 
 
210 
 
 by Ath or Mons. It is certain that by this means, he 
 would have cut off one or other of these enemies ; if 
 he had beaten the centre and left of Wellington's 
 cantonments, the right would have retreated in the 
 direction of Ostend or Antwerp ; had he overthrown 
 the centre of Blucher's cantonments, the left would 
 have been forced on Liege, and hence the junction of 
 these disjointed parts had been quite impossible. But 
 both of these projects offered difficulties ; to fall by 
 Florette, between Charleroi and Namur, that is to 
 say, between the corps of Ziethen and Pirch, there 
 was the very difficult ground situated at the mouth of 
 the Sambre ; besides, the troops arriving from French 
 Flanders would have to defile during more than one 
 day, in front of the enemy's cantonments. By falling 
 on Braine, or Ath, the centre of the English can- 
 tonments, the corps of the Prince of Orange could 
 not be prevented from joining Blucher with all the 
 troops on the left ; now, 120,000 Prussians, increased 
 to 180,000 by the half of Wellington's army and a 
 portion of Kleist's corps, might still be in condition 
 to dispute the Meuse against 120,000 French. Chances 
 multiply ad infinitum, when we abandon ourselves to 
 gratuitous suppositions, in the field. The plan of 
 operations adopted was so much the most favorable, 
 that without the time lost, on the 16th and the morn- 
 ing of the 17th, he would have succeeded completely, 
 and that even this loss of time would have been re- 
 gained on the 18th, had the right wing taken the 
 direction of Moustier. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 The Duke of Elchingen, son of Marshal Ney, having made 
 certain observations on the faults imputed to his father, in this 
 campaign of Waterloo, the Author has replied in the following let- 
 ter, that throws a new light on these important events : 
 
 Monsieur le Due, — 
 
 I have carefully read and considered the obser- 
 vations you have done me the honor of addressing me, on my 
 political and military summary of the campaign of 1815, printed 
 two years since, but not yet published. 
 
 While I render full justice to the filial sentiments that prompt 
 you, to remove the reproaches heaped on your father, for the de- 
 lays in occupying Quatre-Bras, during the 15th and 16th June, I 
 ought also to render justice to the frankness and impartiality that 
 prevail in all your researches, and to the convictions that animate 
 you. 
 
 You must have noticed in my narrative, that I expressed real 
 doubts as to what occurred relative to Quatre-Bras, up to nine 
 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, the hour when, it is said, Gen- 
 eral Flahaut left Charleroi with written orders for him to take 
 possession of it. These doubts have not appeared entirely satis- 
 factory to you, and you would wish me to share all your convic- 
 tions, which, in view of the numerous contradictions that are 
 evident from the published documents, is not without difficulty. 
 
 Napoleon and General Gourgaud affirm, under circumstances, 
 
212 APPENDIX. 
 
 that seem by their nature to merit confidence, that a previous order 
 to occupy this important position, had been given verbally to the 
 commander of the left wing, on the night of the 15th. 
 
 To these assertions, you oppose : 
 
 1st. A letter from the major-general, that speaks of Gpsselies, 
 and not of Quatre-Bras ; 
 
 2d. The expressions and date of the letter dictated to General 
 Flahaut, on the 16th ; 
 
 3d. Your conversation with Marshal Soult in 1829 ; 
 
 4th. The declaration of General Heymes, an eye-witness ; 
 
 5th. A declaration of General Reille, setting forth, that at seven 
 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, Marshal Ney had said to him, 
 that he was awaiting orders ; from which you conclude that he 
 had not yet received any. 
 
 Your reasons are powerful, Monsieur le Due ; however, the last 
 one especially, might also be differently explained ; the marshal 
 could very well have received verbal orders during the night, and 
 yet say to General Reille that he still awaited them, because he 
 might suppose, that important modifications would occur in the 
 emperor's combination, in consequence of reports he had just made 
 him, according to his own statement. 
 
 My great familiarity with war operations and the duties of the 
 staff, induces me to give you a sketch of the manner in which, it 
 seems to me, these things must have happened, without pretending, 
 however, to set myself up as judge in this great debate, and with- 
 out renewing the recital of operations already to be found in my 
 volume. 
 
 Debouching from Charleroi, with his whole army, Napoleon had 
 before him, two causeways, forming nearly a right angle, th*t is 
 to say, going in directions entirely divergent, one to the nortfe on 
 Brussels, and the other to the east on Namur, Wellington beinf at 
 the former and Blucher at the latter. The route from Charlevoi 
 to Brussels, being at once on the extreme left of the cantonments 
 of the Anglo-Netherlanders, and on the extreme right of the Prus- 
 sian cantonments,, was evidently the point where the junction of 
 the two armies should take place. A cross-road that conne^s 
 these two causeways, runs directly from Namur to Brussels, and 
 
APPENDIX. 213 
 
 into Hainault ; it passes through Sombref, joins the Brussels' cause- 
 way at Quatre-Bras, and thus forms the base of a triangle, of 
 which Charleroi is the vertex. 
 
 With the slightest glance at the map, you perceive that in occu- 
 pying Sombref, the Prussians from Nam ur are prevented from 
 joining the English, the same as in occupying Quatre-Bras, you 
 prevent the English from Nivelles and Brussels from joining the 
 Prussians. This double combination could not escape the eagle 
 eye of Napoleon : it is also averred, that he gave Grouchy a ver- 
 bal order to push, if possible, as far as Sombref on the 15th. 
 ShoulcTwe not conclude from this, that he must also have made 
 known to the commander of the left wing, his desire that he should 
 push on to Quatre-Bras, this decisive point being nearer Reille's 
 corps than Sombref was to Grouchy's troops? 
 
 As for myself, I think I am too well aware of Napoleon's ge- 
 nius, to doubt his conceiving, on the 15th June, the idea of having 
 Quatre-Bras occupied, and even previous to the assertions from 
 St. Helena, I could not express the least thought to the contrary, 
 though the declaration of the Duke of Dalmatia, cited in your 
 pamphlet, has raised doubts in my mind.* 
 
 Admitting, then, the existence of this verbal order of the 15th, 
 the main point would still be to know, in what terms it was couched. 
 Did he prescribe to the marshal, to rush headlong upon all he 
 should find in this direction, as is affirmed in book IX. from St. 
 Helena'? or else, limit himself to recommending, as he did to 
 Grouchy, as rapid a march as possible on the route to Brussels, 
 taking care to throw forward his advance-guard on Quatre-Bras? 
 The order having been given verbally, it would be very difficult to 
 decide between these two hypotheses ; but all the information given 
 in your pamphlet, and all that took place on the 16th, authorize us 
 in admitting the second version. In that case, I believe we would 
 be justified in drawing from this fact, different conclusions from 
 
 * The Duke of Dalmatia declares, in this conversation, that the order 
 for the occupation of Quatre-Bras was not issued on the night of the 15th, 
 but only on the 16th, after the emperor had breakfasted. It could be, 
 however, possible, that a verbal order had been given on the 15th, with- 
 out the major-general's presence, and even without his knowledge. 
 
214 APPENDIX. 
 
 those that have been admitted heretofore ; the following are the 
 reasons : 
 
 Vandamme's and Gerard's infantry, having been retarded on the 
 15th, by incidents unnecessary to recall, and Grouchy having only 
 cavalry with him, was stopped towards Gilly by two divisions of 
 Prussian infantry, so that instead of advancing as far as Sombref, 
 he was not even able to occupy Fleurus, held by Ziethen's troops. 
 Marshal Ney, finding himself, then, with Reille's corps, beyond 
 Gosselies, ought, very naturally, to hesitate in throwing himself 
 on Quatre-Bras, with three divisions, before being joined by d'Er- 
 lon's corps, that was with difficulty debouching from Marchiennes ; 
 because the cannonade of the combat at Gilly, that thundered au- 
 dibly in his rear, might render this movement dangerous. In truth, 
 decisive circumstances sometimes present themselves in war, when 
 it is not necessary to be too much alarmed at what is passing in. 
 the rear, (witness the little importance attached by the French, to 
 Lusignan's column, debouching in their rear at the battle of Ri- 
 voli) ; but these eases are exceptions, and as a general rule, we 
 cannot devote too much attention to what the enemy may under- 
 take on our line of retreat. Moreover, Reille threw Girard's 
 division to the right on Heppignies, to cover himself in the direc- 
 tion of Fleurus, where Ziethen concentrated his four infantry divi- 
 sions, to await Pirch's four divisions, that were to arrive that 
 night. 
 
 Certainly, if Marshal Ney had had his seven divisions in hand, 
 he could very well have led four on Frasne, and three on Quatre- 
 Bras ; but knowing that he could not calculate on d'Erlon's corps 
 that day, and being absolutely ignorant of the position of Welling- 
 ton's forces, can he be blamed for having hesitated to execute this 
 partial and somewhat eccentric movement, in the midst of two ar- 
 mies, that numbered not less than 220,000 combatants ? For my 
 own part, I do not think so, unless the order to rush headlong on 
 Quatre-Bras ) had been expressed in a formal manner* I go far- 
 
 * Napoleon wrote at St. Helena from recollection, having no written 
 documents : his memory was a good one, it is true, but when verbal or- 
 ders, given amid the confusion of an operation such as the passage of the 
 Sambre, are at issue, he may, three years afterwards, have been deceived 
 as to the expressions employed. 
 
APPENDIX. 215 
 
 ther, I even believe that Napoleon, on his return to Charleroi, 
 after the combat at Gilly, ought to have congratulated himself, on 
 his left remaining d la hauteur of the rest of the army, that bivou- 
 acked about Lambusart ; because, thus situated, this wing ran no 
 risk, and could, at five o'clock in the morning, depart for Quatre- 
 Bras, while Grouchy rapidly advanced on Sombref. 
 
 This, so palpable a fact, bears me out in the belief, that in his 
 interview with Marshal Ney, the night of the 15th and 16th, Na- 
 poleon expressed himself to that effect.* It is at least quite cer- 
 tain, that among the first words they interchanged, the emperor 
 must have entertained the marshal with what had been done, and 
 what was necessary still to do ; now, if the former expressed more 
 or less regret that the left had halted between Frasne and Gosse- 
 lies, the right being towards Lambusart, he must necessarily have 
 added, either that this delay should be repaired next morning, or 
 that at day-break he should receive further instructions, such as 
 the reports of the night would demand. 
 
 In fact, if Marshal Ney had not again seen the emperor after 
 the receipt of the order of the 15th, it is clear, that it would have 
 been his duty, at day-break, to resume its execution, deferred the 
 previous night ; because, when operations are carried on at the 
 distance of a march from head-quarters, and when a prescribed 
 movement is delayed by certain incidents, it ought, as a matter of 
 course, to be executed as soon as possible, so long as it is not re- 
 voked. But as the generals had conferred a long time together, 
 the night subsequent to the non-execution of the order, it was alto- 
 gether otherwise, and the marshal could regard this anterior order 
 as null and void, if not formally confirmed. We see, then, that 
 the intention manifested by the emperor at this interview, consti- 
 tutes the knot in the enigma. Which of the two intentions above 
 mentioned, did he express ? There lies the whole question ; and, 
 if there was no witness to this conference, God alone can decide. 
 
 * This is so true, that in book IX. the emperor formally states, that on 
 the night of the 15th, every thing had succeeded to his wishes, and that 
 his operation promised a certain success; an unaffected avowal of the 
 little value he attached, to the partial and isolated occupation of Quatre- 
 Bras, for that day. 
 
216 APPENDIX. 
 
 For myself, I can only form an opinion from appearances, or on 
 conjectures : now notice what to my eyes are these appearances, 
 should I properly retrace the emperor's state of mind and the data 
 from which he judged. 
 
 Napoleon did not certainly calculate on surprising the allied ar- 
 mies, asleep in their cantonments, that extended from Liege to 
 Malines ; but he counted on taking the initiative, and beating them 
 separately, while endeavoring to concentrate. Rapidity was then 
 the first of the elements of victory, but the rapidity of Rivoli, Cas- 
 tiglioni, and especially of Abensburg and Dresden. 
 
 The Prussians were the first to be encountered, and their resist- 
 ance at Gilly intimated, that the main body of their forces was not 
 very distant. This might have determined the emperor not to re- 
 new the formal order to march on Quatre-Bras at day-break, be- 
 fore having received the morning reports. Grouchy wrote on the 
 16th, at six o'clock, that large Prussian columns arriving by the 
 Namur road, were forming towards Ligny ; his report, which I 
 have seen, could have arrived at seven ; but things do not always 
 move as rapidly as they should, and it is probable that this dispatch 
 did not arrive before nine o'clock. Napoleon had just dictated to 
 General Flahaut, the order to advance on Quatre-Bras, and he 
 stated in this communication, that a similar order had been previ- 
 ously sent by Marshal Soult, but that he dispatched his aid-de- 
 camp Flahaut, because he was better mounted than the staff offi- 
 cers, and would reach him sooner. 
 
 These precautions certainly attest, that at this moment, the em- 
 peror attached great value to the prompt execution of this move- 
 ment, and authorize the belief that he had conceived the idea at 
 day-light, because he had already prescribed to the Duke of Dal- 
 matia to expedite it, and dictated, at eight o'clock, the confirmation 
 of a previous order. But all this appears, also, to indicate, that 
 in the night conference no similar order had been given to Mar- 
 shal Ney ; if this had happened, so much care would not have 
 I been taken to send him a triple order, after eight o'clock in the 
 morning, when he could have already reached Quatre-Bras, had 
 the order been issued at midnight. 
 
 This reasoning leads me to the conclusion, that if a first order 
 
APPEETDIX 217 
 
 had actually been given him on the evening of the 15th, the 
 emperor had announced, in the night conference, that he would 
 issue him others the next day; the entire purport cf General 
 Flahaut's letter, as well as the saying of Reille, conduces to the 
 belief. 
 
 After having done all in my power to clear up the events of 
 the day and night of the 15th, it remains for me to penetrate the 
 mysteries of ihe morning of the 16th, and at the very outset, I 
 find myself ij presence of a very grave circumstance. 
 
 Book IX. from St. Helena pretends, that Marshal Ney re- 
 ceived during the night, the order to advance rapidly on Quatre- 
 Bras, and at the same time declares, that this order was carried 
 by the aid-de-camp, General Flahaut. Now, your pamphlet gives 
 a letter from this general, affirming, that the order in question 
 was dictated to him between eight and nine o'clock in the morning, 
 which, in the month of June, is some hours after dawn. In fact, 
 General Flahaut also says that this dictation occurred at an early 
 hour, an expression that astonishes me, as at this period of the 
 year, eight and nine o'clock are not early hours. 
 
 I have explained above, how the inference might be drawn, 
 from the very expressions of this dispatch, that it contained the 
 first formal order to occupy Quatre-Bras. One single circum- 
 stance, might cause a different interpretation of the facts I have 
 just cited ; it is thus stated in the writings from St. Helena, 
 (Book IX) : " Marshal Ney must have suspended his movement 
 on Quatre-Bras a second time, because he had learned that the 
 junction of the two armies was taking place, and thought this 
 might change the determinations of the emperor, from whom he 
 demanded orders." 
 
 We indeed find in your pamphlet, that General Reille called 
 on the marshal at seven in the morning, and that the latter in- 
 formed him, that he was awaiting the emperor's orders, to whom 
 he had reported his position. 
 
 It is probable that this fact is the same that is mentioned above ; 
 but it is expressed in such a manner, that we cannot conclude in 
 favor or against the marshal, as the report appears to have been 
 made verbally by an officer of the staff, long after the departure of 
 
 10 
 
218 APPENDIX. 
 
 General Flahaut. The orders, dictated first to Marshal Soult, ami 
 later to this general, were not then occasioned by this report ; and 
 the inferences you can draw from these reiterated dispatches, to 
 prove, that no confirmation of the verbal order of the 15th had 
 been given at night, remain in their full force. 
 
 After all, great obscurity prevails over this report of the mar- 
 shal, as over many other points ; book IX. speaks of the arrival 
 of this officer towards Fleurus, just as the Prussian army had been 
 reconnoitred, that is, about noon. Now, the marshal had already 
 stated to Reille, at Gosselies, about seven, that he had rendered an 
 account of his position, and had asked for orders. The officer 
 charged with it had been sent to Charleroi : how was it, that he 
 did not arrive before the emperor's departure 1 
 
 On the other hand, I find in General Reille's letter, that at nine 
 o'clock he received and expedited directly to the emperor, an officer 
 sent by General Girard, announcing that the entire Prussian army 
 was forming in rear of Fleurus. One hour afterwards, Marshal 
 Soult writes from Charleroi to the commander of the left wing, 
 that an officer of lancers has just reported, that large masses of 
 the enemy appear in the direction of Quatre-Bras. This last was 
 written at ten o'clock, and coincides with the sending of the officer 
 from Girard. This, perhaps, might be the suspending report, 
 mentioned in page 90. On the other hand, how could the emperor 
 confound Quatre-Bras and Fleurus, while answering the report of 
 the officer sent by Reille "?* And when he had inserted in the 
 same dispatch, that Blucher having passed the night at Namur, his 
 army could detach no portion on Quatre-Bras, was Napoleon igno- 
 rant of what Grouchy, Girard and Reille had reported, or else, 
 placed he more faith in his secret agents who gave him contrary 
 information? This is what the most skilful would be unable to 
 explain. Finally, it is unfortunate, that this report attributed to the 
 marshal, has not come down to us in manuscript ; it would 
 
 * This may seem strange, but is not at all impossible : pre-occupied 
 with the thought, that Eeille was advancing towards Quatre-Bras against 
 the English, Napoleon perhaps imagined, that the assembling of the army 
 reported by the officer sent by this general, was only a portion of the 
 English army, that was to cover Quatre-Bras. 
 
APPENDIX. 219 
 
 have cleared up many doubts respecting the orders previously 
 given. 
 
 But let us throw aside all the suppositions to which these divers 
 incidents would give rise, and return to facts. General Reille 
 writes from Gosselies, at a quarter after ten o'clock, that General 
 Flahaut has communicated to him the orders with which he was 
 charged for the marshal, which presupposes that these orders passed 
 Gosselies about ten, and reached Frasne about eleven, as Colonel 
 Heymes states. General Reille adds, " that in the absence of 
 Ney, he suspends his march on Quatre-Bras, because very recent 
 information, as to the arrival of great Prussian masses, appears to 
 him of a nature to change the emperor's dispositions ; he therefore 
 awaits a positive order from the marshal.'" 
 
 This incident, which was certainly a misfortune, occasioned a 
 new delay, but this was not a decisive event, after what had taken 
 place at Fleurus and Ligny. In fact, it is evident, that if the mar- 
 shal did not receive the order at Frasne, before eleven o'clock, and 
 if Reille awaited the result of it before placing himself in motion, 
 he could not well move before noon ; therefore, there was no pos- 
 sibility of commencing the attack at Quatre-Bras before two, as it 
 actually happened. Now, at noon, the Prussian army in rear of 
 Ligny had just been reconnoitred, and it was rather late to advance 
 on Genape, when it had become necessary to march on Bry : it 
 would have been better, to have established the half of the left in 
 position in front of the Prince of Orange, to mask this corps, and 
 disposed of the other half for completing the defeat of the Prus- 
 sians, a manoeuvre that the previous delays did not prevent them 
 from executing. 
 
 We indeed know, that if the first and most important of the 
 principles of war is, to concentrate the main body of the forces to 
 strike a decisive blow on a portion of the enemy's line, there is a 
 second which is the complement of it : it is, not to compromise 
 the weak wing, on the contrary, to refuse it in such a manner, that 
 it cannot engage in an unequal struggle. A serious engagement at 
 Quatre-Bras, was then a real misfortune at that hour. 
 
 For the rest, Monsieur le Due, I refer you to my work, where I 
 have frankly stated what I thought of this uncertainty, that has 
 
220 APPENDIX. 
 
 reigned throughout the morning of the 16th ; and as I perceive 
 that I have already written to too great a length, I will endeavor, 
 as well as in me lies, to recapitulate amid so many contradictions. 
 
 1st. It appears to me evident, that from the 15th, Napoleon ex- 
 pressed the desire that Quatre-Bras, as well as Sombref, should 
 be occupied. But as the right could not advance beyond Lambu- 
 sart, the night of the 15th, it is probable, that he was satisfied 
 with the left remaining between Frasne and Gosselies. 
 
 2d. In every state of the case, the delay caused to this occupa- 
 tion on the 15th, was of no consequence, as it sufficed that it should 
 take place on the 16th, towards eight or nine in the morning. If 
 the left was then required to move with this object at day-break, it 
 was necessary to reiterate the order during the night, as a verbal 
 order, the execution of which was annulled by the very events of 
 the previous night, could be very properly considered by the mar- 
 shal as not to be carried out, with the very probable idea that the 
 events would lead to new combinations the next day. Besides, to 
 concentrate the somewhat scattered troops of the left, it was very 
 necessary that d'Erlon's corps should receive orders before day. 
 Every thing, then, depends on knowing, what was said and done 
 at the night conference. 
 
 3d. As to the day of the 16th, the two orders expedited from 
 Charleroi, between seven and nine o'clock — one by Marshal Soult, 
 the other by Napoleon himself — appear to have been, in fact, the 
 first confirmation of the movement said to have been prescribed on 
 the evening of the 15th. Both of these dispatches, seem to have 
 preceded the reception of the information given by Grouchy, on 
 the arrival of grand Prussian masses towards Ligny. What seems 
 astonishing, is that an order, undoubtedly conceived by Napoleon 
 towards six in the morning, should not have reached Frasne before 
 eleven, and its execution not commenced till after mid-day.* 
 
 * In order to admit all the accounts from St. Helena, and properly un- 
 derstand them, it would be necessary, 1st. That Marshal Ney had received 
 the verbal order, urging him to advance on Quatre-Bras on the evening of 
 the 15th ; 2d. That he had received anew the formal order during the 
 night, that is, at the interview ; 3d. That he had at seven declared in his 
 report, that he had again suspended its execution because of the junction 
 
APPENDIX. 221 
 
 4th. It is then incontestable, that the whole time from five 
 o'clock in the morning until noon, was not profited by in any 
 suitable manner, and to my view, every one contributed somewhat 
 to this blunder ; because there was delay in the final resolution, 
 and slowness in the transmission of orders, as well as in their exe- 
 cution. 
 
 5th. Be that as it may, at noon, the question entirely changed 
 its aspect; he found himself in presence of 90,000 Prussians ; the 
 interest, wholly strategic, of the occupation of Quatre-Bras, then 
 became but of secondary importance, compared with the tactical 
 advantage of having Ney nearer to him, in hand, so as to have the 
 power of at once casting one of his two corps of infantry and his hea- 
 vy cavalry on the Prussians' right flank, which could be executed 
 from Frasne as well as from Quatre-Bras. Undoubtedly, it had 
 been desirable that this central point of Quatre-Bras, should be 
 previously occupied by Reille's corps, and the light cavalry of 
 Colbert and Lefebre-Desnouettes ; but this was no longer a 
 decisive question, because, definitively, the route from Brussels 
 could be covered by leaving these corps in front of Frasne, to 
 mask that of the Prince of Orange, and nothing opposed the 
 throwing of d'Erlon and Valmy on Bry, with 20,000 men, as 
 became necessary when too late. 
 
 6th. This truth, that no enlightened military man will contest, 
 proves that the non-occupation of Quatre-Bras on the 16th, 
 though unfortunate, would not have had, in fact, the consequences 
 attributed to it, had orders been issued in time for the best possi- 
 ble employment of the left, which was not done till three hours 
 after mid-day. 
 
 This is, Monsieur le Due, what seems to me to result, from 
 all the minute investigations in which I have indulged. Conse- 
 quently, I rest convinced, that if Marshal Ney received the verbal 
 order of the evening of the 15th, and took upon himself to defer 
 its execution, it was but a slight misfortune, very easily repaired 
 the next morning. As to this day of the 16th June, I also believe 
 
 of the two hostile armies ; but the contents of the letters borne by Fla- 
 haut, or sent by Marshal Soult, really accord but slightly with this sup- 
 position. 
 
222 APPENDIX. 
 
 that no blame should attach to him, provided the formal injunc- 
 tion to advance at day-break on Quatre-Bras, was not verbally 
 reiterated in the night conference at Charleroi, an uncertain 
 thing, quite impossible to establish, if it be true that Marshal Soult 
 was not present at the interview.* 
 
 Undoubtedly, Marshal Ney would have acted skilfully, by 
 marching at all hazards on this important point, on the morning 
 of the 16th; but a hesitation induced by a just prudence, and 
 the non-execution of orders formally received, differ widely ; 
 and to blame this prudence, it would be necessary still to know, 
 whether at the night conference, the emperor gave him to under- 
 stand that he would send him further instructions at day-break, a 
 circumstance that would have shackled the marshal's movements. 
 
 In all that has preceded, I have admitted the existence of the 
 verbal order of the evening of the 15th. If you succeed in de- 
 monstrating that the order written and borne by Flahaut, on the 
 morning of the 16th, was the first and only one prescribing the 
 occupation of Quatre-Bras, then the marshal would certainly be 
 acquitted of all blame, and sheltered from all criticism. This 
 frank and sincere expression will prove to you, to what extent I 
 am disposed to render justice to your father, while preserving my 
 impartiality as a historian. This impartiality is, I trust, suffi- 
 ciently well established, for any one to dream of reproaching me 
 with wishing to impair, in the slightest degree, the immense glory 
 of Napoleon, as no one has proclaimed it louder than myself. A 
 great captain may be induced, through false information, to make 
 incorrect suppositions concerning the intentions of the enemy, and 
 find himself led by it into committing actual faults, which would 
 not be such had his suppositions been well founded. The emperor 
 had, undoubtedly, powerful inducements for not taking a decisive 
 course before three o'clock ; and these were probably the same 
 that determined him not to dispatch Flahaut till nine, to pre- 
 
 * The declaration of Marshal Soult, mentioned in your pamphlet, states 
 that the emperor did not issue orders for the occupation of Quatre-Bras, 
 ill after breakfast on the 16th ; but it does not positively deny, what may 
 have been said verbally, and does not indicate that the major-general as- 
 sisted at the night conference. 
 
APPENDIX. 233 
 
 scribe a movement which at that hour should have been already 
 executed. 
 
 I have not considered it my duty to raise the charge made by 
 many military men, on the marshal's recalling d'Erlon on the 
 night of the 16th, though he perceived Reille's corps overwhelmed 
 by superior forces : this was indeed an unfortunate incident, but 
 most generals in his position would have undoubtedly acted in the 
 same manner. Appreciating the importance of the route from 
 Brussels to Charleroi, which was the line of the army's retreat, 
 the marshal judged it necessary not to counterbalance, by a disas- 
 ter at this point, the partial success the emperor might obtain at 
 Ligny ; such a resolution is of that number, that may not be op- 
 portune because of the turn of affairs, but which no enlightened 
 military man would condemn. Besides, on the next day — June 
 17th' — the emperor only blamed him for having divided the left ; 
 he must have then wished, either that the two corps had come to 
 Bry, or else had fought united at Quatre-Bras ; now, as they were 
 already engaged at the latter point, by his orders, how could Reille 
 be withdrawn from the fight, and sent with d'Erlon upon Bry % It 
 will, then, be objected, that it was not necessary to detach the latter 
 alone. But we are well aware that he received, through Labe- 
 doyere, a direct order to march on Bry ; a movement that would 
 have certainly obtained an immense victory, had it been car- 
 ried out. 
 
 I will terminate my long epistle with a few words on the battle 
 \)f Waterloo, in which your father displayed such brilliant valor. 
 
 What has been said or printed, relative to the premature em- 
 ployment of cavalry, has appeared to me a puerile excuse ; the 
 real misfortune was, in not having it properly supported by in- 
 fantry. 
 
 In my opinion, four principal causes led to this disaster: 
 
 The first, and most influential, was the arrival, skilfully com- 
 bined, of Blucher, and the false movement that favored this ar- 
 rival ; 
 
 The second, was the admirable firmness of the British infantry, 
 joined to the sang-froid and aplomb of its chiefs ; 
 
 The third, was the horrible weather, that had softened the 
 
224: APPENDIX. 
 
 ground, and rendered the offensive movements so toilsome, and re- 
 tarded till one o'clock the attack that should have been made in 
 the morning ; 
 
 The fourth, was the inconceivable formation of the first corps, 
 in masses very much too deep for the first grand attack. 
 
 The formation of masses, so unweildy and so exposed to the 
 
 ravages of the enemy's fire, was an incontestable error 
 
 To whom should it be imputed 1 This will remain a problem for 
 a long time to come. 
 
 Was it a mistake, caused by the double signification of the 
 term columns by divisions, which applies indiscriminately, to the 
 divisions of four regiments or to divisions of two platoons. A 
 fatal confusion of terms, of which no one has yet dreamt of purging 
 the military technology. 
 
 On the contrary, was it the intention of the chiefs of the French 
 army, to form the troops in such a manner, that the divisions of 
 four regiments should form but a single column? It would be in- 
 teresting to know this, but it will no doubt ever remain a mystery. 
 
 However, these causes, as I have stated, were only secondary, 
 and the most decisive was the arrival of Blucher with 65,000 
 Prussians, on the flank and rear of the French line ; it was one 
 of those events that human prudence cannot always avert. 
 
 You will perhaps find my letter full of repetitions, they were 
 indispensable to give more clearness to my reasoning : as to my 
 conclusions, if tney are but eventual, it is, that far from pretend- 
 ing to be the judge, I should be borne on the list of simple 
 reporters. 
 
 Accept the assurance of all my sentiments, 
 
 General J * * # * 
 Paris, September 1st, 1841. 
 
 P. S. I send you here annexed, a printed copy of the letter I 
 purpose adding, at the end of my Political and Military Summary 
 of 1815. In attentively re- perusing this letter, I perceive that 
 three essential observations have escaped me, and I think it my 
 duty to notice them. 
 
 The first, tends to fortify the opinion, that Napoleon should not 
 
APPENDIX. 225 
 
 have attached any value to the isolated occupation of Quatre- 
 Bras by the left wing, since the right could not press on as far 
 as Sombref. In fact, it is evident that if the two points were 
 occupied simultaneously, the position then offered the most bril- 
 liant advantages, united to perfect security, because the right 
 would be covered from the English, while the left remained with- 
 out the slightest uneasiness from the Prussians, who could no 
 longer reach it through Sombref. Thus the two masses of the 
 army not only reciprocally supported each other, but were free 
 from all anxiety of being taken in flank or in rear, and had, besides, 
 a reserve of 40,000 of the elite to march in the intermediate 
 space, and support both. 
 
 On the contrary, let us suppose the left of these masses pushed 
 alone on Quatre-Bras, Sombref not being strongly occupied ; then 
 this body would be in manifest danger, thus venturing between 
 two great armies, as it might be assailed on all sides ; from 
 Brussels by the English, from Nivelles by the Belgians, and from 
 Sombref by the whole Prussian army. 
 
 It would be the same with the right wing, if pushed, on the 
 evening of the 15th, as far as Sombref, the left not occupying 
 Quatre-Bras. It is thus incontestable, that the simultaneous oc- 
 cupation of the two points was necessary, in order to constitute a 
 skilful manoeuvre, and prove important in its results. 
 
 Another reflection has occurred to me, relative to the orders of 
 the 15th June : it is, that on that day, Marshal Grouchy com- 
 manded only the cavalry reserves, and had not an infantry soldier 
 at his disposal, as it was only on the morning of the 16th, that 
 the command of the right wing was conferred upon him. It could, 
 then, be very possible, that Napoleon had ordered the chief of his 
 cavalry to press forward with his numerous squadrons to Sombref, 
 not in order to take up a position for battle, but solely as a strong 
 reconnoitering party, with the double object of gathering reliable 
 information, and annoying the movements of the allies, while 
 concentrating their forces by this cross-road. Then on the morn- 
 ing of the 16th, the two masses of infantry should have been re- 
 quired to occupy, militarily and simultaneously, the two decisive 
 
 10* 
 
226 APPENDIX. 
 
 points of the whole operation, thus rendering the junction of the 
 enemy's armies impossible. 
 
 This circumstance of the cavalry command, to which I have 
 not given sufficient attention, would authorize us in believing, that 
 Napoleon might order Grouchy, during the 15th, to press forward 
 to Sombref, without dreaming of advancing infantry masses 
 separately on Quatre-Bras. The encumbrances existing at the 
 different bridges on the Sambre, and the delays experienced by 
 the infantry, still strengthen this opinion. Besides, I believe I 
 have demonstrated, that it was more prudent, and at the same time 
 sufficient, to take possession of Quatre-Bras on the morning of 
 the 16th. 
 
 The last observation I think it proper to make, relates to the 
 resolution taken by General Reille, not to put his corps on the 
 march at ten o'clock on the morning of the 16th, after General 
 Flahaut had communicated to him the orders he was bearing to 
 Marshal Ney. I do not think, that he is deserving of the least 
 censure on this account: we must not forget, that General Reille 
 had just sent — nine o'clock — the positive information of the pre- 
 sence of the entire Prussian army towards Ligny : he must nave 
 concluded from this, that the left would be called upon to take part 
 in the attack of this army, and that it would be unfortunate if, after 
 such information, he took the Genape route, when it would be ne- 
 cessary to turn to the right towards Bry. This reasoning was 
 more than logical, it was based on the laws of la grande tactique, 
 and the emperor himself, had he been present at Gosselies, at the 
 reception of the information given by General Girard, would not 
 have acted differently from Reille. We must also add, that the 
 emperor's orders were addressed to Marshal Ney, and that it was 
 from him that he should expect the final decision, as to the move- 
 ment to be made. 
 
 However, this delay had little influence on the course of affairs ; 
 nothing would have resulted from it, except at the commencement 
 of the battle of Quatre-Bras, between two and foun o'clock. If 
 Reille, followed later by d'Erlon had reached this point at mid- 
 day, it is probable that the Prince of Orange would have been dis- 
 lodged, before the arrival of Wellington, and of the English 
 
APPENDIX. 227 
 
 coming from Brussels and Nivelles : Marshal Ney, instead of being 
 repulsed and forced to retreat on Frasne, would have maintained 
 his position, but this was all that could be expected from him, as 
 towards evening he would have had over 40,000 men against him. 
 
 He could not have even held this post, but under the supposition 
 that d'Erlon had been with him ; so that this would not have given 
 one man the more, to fight the Prussians : the marshal would 
 have repulsed Wellington, instead of being repulsed by him — that 
 is all. 
 
 The battle of Ligny could not then have produced decisive re- 
 sults, but with the co-operation of the whole or half of the left 
 wing ; and to effect this, the surest means were to do what was 
 undoubtedly Reille's wish : to halt the left in rear of the rivulet 
 of Pont-a-Miqueloup, between Gosselies and Frasne, in order to 
 detach from it a strong portion upon Bry, on the Prussian flank. 
 
 I think, Monsieur le Due, that all learned military men will up- 
 hold me in my opinion. 
 
 Accept the renewed expressions of all my sentiments, 
 
 General J # * * # * 
 
 t/kRis, October 13//i, 1841. 
 
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