as ■ fi ass* ' ■ 5# K I ' mimmm i» *BKKKffiP3SS dES*3BhU$ SRWSMKWB? -,r, ,\\' * -f< . - *. ^ Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/philosophyofhumeOOhume Series of fl&ooern pbilosopbers Edited by E. Hershey Sneath, Ph.D. Philosophy of Hume AS CONTAINED IN EXTRACTS FROM THE FIRST BOOK AND THE FIRST AND SECOND SECTIONS OF THE THIRD PART OF THE SECOND BOOK TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE SELECTED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, HERBERT AUSTIN AIKINS, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy in Trinity College, N. C, and Honorary Fellow of Clark University LiH *«y NEW YORK HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 1893 Copyright, 1893 BY HENRY HOLT & CO. ROBERT DRUMMOND, ELECTROTYPER AND PRINTER, NEW YOKK. PREFACE. It is unfortunate that most students of philosophy, both in Germany and in Great Britain and America, should gain their knowledge of Hume's philosophy from the Enquiry Concerning Human Understand- ing ; for in this work Hume sacrificed the thorough- going philosophical scepticism of the Treatise of Human Nature in order to carry out a system of religious scepticism which finds its culmination and best expression in the sections on " Miracles " and a " Particular Providence and a Future State." When these sections are quietly omitted the Enquiry rep- resents neither Hume's philosophy nor his theology ; and yet the length and difficulty of the Treatise have made it necessary for college and university instruc- tors to put editions of the Enquiry thus mutilated into the hands of their students. To remedy this diffi- culty I have taken the following selections from the first book of the Treatise, in the hope that the main doctrines of this great work will be no less intelligible when much confusing detail is omitted. Selections from the sections of Book II. on Liberty and Necessity have been incorporated with the ex- tracts from Book I. because Hume's doctrine of the will is merely a special application of his doctrine of causation and cannot be understood apart from it. H. A. A. iii CONTENTS. PAGE Bibliography i Biographical Sketch 13 Sources of Hume's Sceptical Philosophy .... 21 Brief Exposition of Hume's Philosophy 25 The System in Outline 25 Causation , 36 The Conception of Reality 42 The Belief in Reality 45 Confidence in Reason 46 Inference 47 The Treatise and the Enquiry 49 Hume's Influence upon Subsequent Thought ... 55 THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUME. Introduction 59 Part I. — Of Ideas 61 Part II. — Of the Ideas of Space and Time and Existence 78 Part III. — Of Knowledge and Probability .... 86 Part IV. — Of the Sceptical Philosophy 143 Index , 175 BIBLIOGRAPHY. HUME'S WRITINGS. THE EARLIER EDITIONS. Authorities : Edition of 1S54 ; Mr. Grose in edition of 1886 ; Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought, vol. i.,chapvi ; ; Ueberweg, § 119; Lowndes' Bibliographer's Manual; Brunet's Manuel du Libraire. Treatise of Human Nature. Vols. I. and II., London, 1739; Vol. III., 1740. Two vols., 8vo., Lon- don, 181 7. German translation by Jacob, Halle, 1 790-1. French translation of Book I. by Renouvier and Pillon, Paris, 1878. Essays, Moral and Political. One Volume, Edinb., 1 741 ; Second Edition, corrected, 1742 ; A Second Volume, 1742; (Lowndes identifies this with the Phil. Essays.) Third Edition, corrected, with additions, London and Edinb., 1748. Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understand- ing. London, 1748 ; Second Edition, with additions and corrections, London, 1751. (Dr. Campbell speaks of an edition "printed at London, in duodecimo, 1750.") German translation by Sulzer, Hamburg and Leipzig, 1775; by Tennemann, Jena, 1793; by Kirch- mann, Berlin, 1869. (Fourth edition in 1888.) French translation by Merian (published with Re- nouvier and Pillon's translation of Book I. of the Treatise under the title " Psychologie de Hume," with an introduction by F. Pillon), Paris, 1878, 8vo, 581 pages. 2 BIBLIOGRAPHY. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. London, 1751. German translation by Masaryk., Vienna, 1883. Political Discourses. Edinb., 1752. (To this edition there is sometimes added "A List of Scotticisms.") Reprinted in the same year. Italian translation, Venezia, 1774; French translation, Amsterd., 1754, 1 761, Paris, 1847. Essays and Treatises on several Subjects. London and Edinb., 1753-4. Four vols., fourth volume contain- ing the Political Discourses, with additions and cor- rections. New editions in 1756 (Lowndes), 1758, 1760, 1764, 1768, 1770, 1777, 1784, and frequently afterwards. German translation of ' The Four Phi- losophers,' Glogau, 1768. History of England. Vol. I., 1754; Vol. II., 1756; Vol. III., 1760; Vol. IV., 1762. Four Dissertations : The Natural History of Re- ligion, Of the Passions, Of Tragedy, Of the Standard of Taste, London, 1757. Les ceuvres philosophique de Hume. Traduites en franc, (par J. -Bern, de Merian et Robinet), Amst., 1759-64, 5 vol. in-12, ou Londres (Paris), 1788, 7 vol. in-12. [This is from Brunet. Lowndes says 1783, instead of 1788.] Expose' succinct de la Contest ion .... entre M. Hume et M. Rousseau. London, 1766. English translation soon afterwards. German translation, Leipzig, 1797- Two Essays (on Suicide and the Inwwrtality of the Soul, originally prepared for the volume of Disserta- tions but suppressed). London, 1767, anonymously. Essays on Suicide and the Inwwrtality of the Soul, ascribed to the late David Hume. London, 1783, 1789; Basel, 1799 (in English). German translation, Han- nover, 1781. The Life of David Hume, Esq., Written by Himself. Written in 1776, and published by Adam Smith in 1777 together with his own letter to Wm. Strahan ; also in edition of Essays, 1777. French translation, Leipzig, 1777; Latin translation, 1787. The Auto- biography is found in most editions of the History BIBLIOGRAPHY. 3 and of the Philosophical Works. It can also be had separately. Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. London, 1779. (Published by his nephew ; written in 1751.) German translation by Schreiter, Leipzig, 1781. Philosophical Essays on Morals, Literature, and Poli- tics; by David Hume. To which is added, the Answer to his Objections to Christianity, by Dr. Campbell. Also, an Account of Mr. Hume's Life, an Original Essay, and a few notes; by Thomas Ewell, M.D., of Virginia. In two volumes. First American edition. Philadelphia : published for the editor by Edward Earle, 1817. 8vo. 561 -+- 616 pp. Dedication to President Monroe. The Philosophical Works of David Hume. Four volumes, octavo. Edinburgh and London, 1826. " The philosophical writings of Mr. Hume are here for the first time collected in a uniform edition." Other editions, Edinburgh. 1836 ; Edinburgh and Boston, 1854 ; London, 1856. The editions of 1826 and 1854, now out of print, contain Hume's portrait, his autobiography, his will, his account of his controversy with Rousseau, and a list of the editions. The best edition of Hume's Philosophical works now in print is that in four octavo volumes edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, Longmans, 1874 and 1886. Two volumes, which can be had separately, contain the ' Treatise of Human Nature,' the ' Dia- logues concerning Natural Religion,' and two critical ' Introductions ' to the ' Treatise ' by Professor Green, which cover in all 370 pp., and which are generally admitted to be by far the best criticisms of Hume in English. The two volumes of ' Essays, Moral, Politi- cal, and Literary,' contain all the rest of Hume's philo- sophical works. The first of these volumes also con- tains Hume's Autobiography as well as an elaborate ' History of the Editions ' and a ' List of Editions' by Mr. Grose. A cheaper edition of the ' Treatise ' is that published in one volume at the Clarendon Press in 4 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1888, with a carefully-prepared index of nearly seventy pages by Mr. L. A. Selby-Bigge. The edition of Hume's ' Essays ' published by Ward, Lock & Co. is not com- plete, but is cheap and good enough for most pur- poses. In this edition the sections of the ' Enquiry ' on ' Miracles ' and a ' Particular Providence and a Future State ' are placed at the back of the volume. ON THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF HUME. The literature is very abundant. For English readers the following are perhaps the best and most accessible. On his Life : — Hume's Autobiography, with Adam Smith's letters to Strahan; John H. Burton's ' Life and Correspondence of David Hume,' Edinb., 1846, 2 vols., 8vo, containing portrait and fac-similes. New edition, 1850. On his Life and Philosophy : — Prof. Knight's ' Hume,' Edinb. and Phila., 1886, sm. 8vo, x -f- 239 pp., portrait; Prof. Huxley's 'Hume,' Lon., 1879, 1887; N. Y., 1879, i2mo, vi -j- 206 pp.; French translation, 1880. On his Philosophy : — Prof. Green's Introduction to his edition of the ' Treatise ' ; Leslie Stephen's ■ His- tory of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,' Lon. and N. Y., 1876, vol. 1., chaps, i. and vi. Cardinal Newman's 'Grammar of Assent,' N. Y., 1870, 479 pp., is an excellent work to read in connection with Hume's doctrine of belief, since from almost ex- actly the same premises it arrives at diametrically op- posite conclusions. It is impossible to give a complete list of what has been written about Hume ; for all the histories of philosophy, the philosophical journals, and the great writers, from Reid, Kant, and Jacobi to Lotze and Spencer, have something to say about him. The fol- lowing bibliography, however, may be useful. 4 The History of the Works of the Learned' for BIBLIOGRAPHY. 5 Nov. 1739 contains a review of the Treatise which greatly annoyed Hume. Adams, Wm. An Essay on Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles. London, 1752. 8vo, 134 pages. Second edi- tion, London, 1754, 8vo. Leland, John. A View of the Principal Deistical Writers of the Last and Present Century. Lon., 1755. 8vo, 2 vols. Vol. II., pp. 1-135: Mr. Hume. Campbell, George. A Dissertation on Miracles. With a Correspondence by Hume, Campbell, and Blair. Edinb., 1797. 2 vols., 8vo. Same, 1823, viii + 560 pp. Campbell's Dissertation is also found in the first Am. Ed. of Hume's Essays, 181 7. This crit- icism of Hume was first published in 1761. Hume considered its author the ablest as well as the most courteous of all his critics. Re id, Thos. 'Inquiry,' 1764 (Index in Sneath's edition, 1892); Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1785. 'The London Review' for 1776 contains an article on Hume written immediately after his death and fre- quently referred to. [Home, Bishop George.] A Letter to A. Smith on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend D. Hume. By one of the people called Christians. London, 1777, 1799. The same in his works, 1818, 8vo, Vol. IV., pages 331-348. [Pratt, S. /.] An Apology for the Life and Writ- ings of David Hume. With a Parallel between him and the late Lord Chesterfield : to which is added an Address to One of the People called Christians. By way of Reply to his Letter to A. Smith. London, 1777. i6mo. xv + 167 pp. Kant, Im. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781, 1787; Prolegomena, 1783, — especially pp. 3-10, 20-23, I2 3 °f the Mahaffy translation, Lon., 1889. The Beauties of Hume and Bolingbroke. Second edition. London, Kearsly, 1782. i2mo, xxxii -f- 262 pp. Jacobi, F. H. David Hume ueber den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Breslau, 1787. 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY. Boswell, James. Life of Johnson, 1791. N. Y. ed., 1884, 4 vols. I. 355, 369, 375, 406, 439; II. 183; in. 192, 335. Me'rian, J. B. Sur le phenomenalisme de Hume. 21 pp. Berlin. Academie royale des sciences. Nou- veaux Memoires. 1792-93. p. 417. Walpole, Horace. Works. Lon., 1798. 4to. Vol. IV., pp. 247-269: an account of the controversy be- tween Hume and Rousseau, and correspondence be- tween Hume and Walpole regarding it. See also ' Walpoliana,' Lon., 1799. Two small volumes. Smellie, Wm. Literary and Characteristical Lives. Edinb., 1800. Pages 149-209. Contains some ex- tremely interesting personal reminiscences. Kirwin, R. Remarks on some sceptical positions in Hume's Enquiry concerning the Human Under- standing. Royal Irish Acad. Trans. Vol. VIII., 1802, pp. 157-203. _ Memoir of the Life and Writings of the Hon. Henry Home of Karnes. 1807. 2 vols., 4to. Contains "a very long account of the publication and reception of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature." Ritchie, Thomas Edward. Account of the Life and Writings of David Hume, Esq. London, 1807. 8vo, vii + 52opp. Contains also eight of Hume's 'Es- says not inserted in his miscellaneous works,' and the Expose succinct. Foster, John. Critical Essays. Bonn's Library, 1856, pages 95-110. A review of Ritchie's biography of Hume. Reprinted from 'The Eclectic Review,' Jan. 1808. Vince, Samuel. The Credibility of the Scripture Miracles vindicated in Answer to Mr. Hume. Cam- bridge, 1809. 8vo, 78 pp. Hardy, Francis. Life of the Earl of Charlemont. Lon., 1810, 4to. Most of the stories about Hume are taken from this book. Several pages are quoted in the preface to the first Am. edition of Hume's ' Essays.' Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. III., 1818, pp. 653— 657: David Hume charged by Mr. Coleridge with plagiarism from St. Thomas Aquinas. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 7 Private Correspondence of David Hume with sev- eral Distinguished Persons between the years 1761 and 1776, now first published from the originals. London, 1820. 4to. xix + 285 pp. Stewart, Dugald. Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. Part II. 1821. In Vol. VI. of his Works, 1829. Also in Encyc. Brit., 8th ed., Vol. I., pp. 206- 218. See also pp. 268-274 for account of Hume's Ethics by Mackintosh. Mason, J. M. Writings. 1832. Vol. III. Contrast between the death of Hume and Finley. De Quincey, Thos. On Hume's Argument against Miracles. 'Blackwood' for July, 1839, pp. 91-99. Reprinted with other writings, Boston, 1854 and 1858 ; Edinb., 1890. Erdmann, J. E. Versuch einer wiss. Gesch. der neuern Philosophic Leipzig, 1840. Vol. II., Part I., pp. 162-192: Leben und Philosophic des Hume. Lechler, G. V. Geschichte des englischen Deis- mus. Stuttgart und Tubingen, 1841. 8vo. Pages 425-436: Die Skepsis Hume's. Murray, Thos. (Editor). Letters of David Hume and extracts from letters referring to him. Edinb., 1841. 8vo, 80 pp. Also Lon., 1842. New Englander, Vol. I., 1843, pp. 169-183: Hume, Voltaire, and Rousseau. " A concise, impartial, and authentic account of their lives and their assaults upon Christianity." Schlosser, F. C. Geschichte des i8ten und i9ten Jahrhunderts. Heidelberg, 1843-49. 7 vols., 8vo. English translation, Lon., 1843-44. Vols. L, II. Quarterly Rev., Vol. LXX1IL, 1844, pp. 536-593: Hume and his influence upon history. Contains some interesting stories of Hume. Brougham, Lord Henry. Lives of Men of Letters and Science. 1845. 8vo. Chapter on Hume, pages 126- 166. The same in his ' Lives of Men of Letters of the Time of George III.' London and Glasgow, 1885, 8vo, pages 168-230. Largely biographical and sometimes interesting. North Brit. Rev., Vol. VII., 1847, pp. 539-560 : 8 BIBLIOGRAPHY. Life and correspondence of Hume. A review of Burton's book. Burton, J. H. (Editor). Letters of Eminent Per- sons addressed to David Hume. Edinb. and Lon., 1849. 8vo, xxxi + 334 PP- "These letters, though interesting in themselves, are not illustrative of the life and character of Hume." Rogers, Henry. David Hume. Encyc. Brit., 8th edition, 1852. Reprinted in 'New Biographies of Il- lustrious Men,' Boston, 1857, pages 379-408. Very largely biographical. Walker, J. Hume's Philosophical Writings. Chris- tian Examiner, Nov., 1854, pp. 421-439. An excel- lent article. Edgar, John G. Footprints of Famous Men. N. Y., 1854. Small 8vo. Pages 180-199: David Hume. Gives some account of Hume's ancestry. Villemain, A. F. CEuvres. Nouv. ed., Paris, 1854-5. 10 vols., 8vo. Vol. VI. Cucheval-Clarigny, Narcisse. David Hume, sa vie et ses ecrits, d'apres sa correspondance publie a Edim- bourg. Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 nov. 1856, Vol. VI., pp. 107-141. Fischer, Kuno. Bacon und Nachfolger. Eng. trans., Lon., 1857. Pages 468-496. Feuerlein. Hume's Leben und Wirken. Der Ge- danke, Vols. IV. and V. Berlin, 1863-64. Jlfasson, David. Recent British Philosophy. Lon. and Camb., 1865. Small 8vo. viii -j- 414 pp. Gives some account of Hume's influence, but does not say much about it. Papillon, F. David Hume, precurseur d'Auguste Comte. Versailles, 1868. Oliphant, Mrs. M. O. Historical Sketches of the Reign of George II. Edinb., 1869. Chapter on Hume reprinted from 'Blackwood,' Vol. CV., 1869. Also in ' Littell's Living Age,' Boston, 1869, 8vo, pp. 202-221. Interesting. Baumann, J. J. Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik in der neueren Philosophic Berlin, 1869. 2 vols., 8vo. Vol. II., pages 481-671. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 9 Hunt, John. David Hume. Contemp. Rev., Vol. XL, 1869, pp. 79-100. Contains some stories of Hume and historical matter concerning Hume's re- ligious writings. Schultze, W. F. Hume und Kant uber den Causal- begriff. Rostock, 1870. 8vo, 39 pp. Jodl, Friedrich. Leben und Philosophic David Hume's. Halle, 1872. 8vo, 202 pp. Only 17 pages devoted to his life. Southern Review, Vol. XL, 1872, pp. 92-120, 309- 336: Hume's Philosophy. "The analogy between Hume and Kant is as marked in their deviation from their own principles as in the resemblance of the principles themselves." "The reign of Hume will at length be ended, and we may hope that the sover- eignty of Providence will be acknowledged in its stead." Compayre, Gabriel. La philosophic de David Hume. Paris, 1873. 8vo, 514 pp. Thornton, W. T. Old-fashioned Ethics and Com- mon-sense Metaphysics. London, 1873. 8vo, vii -f- 298 pp. Pages 1 13-157 : David Hume as a metaphy- sician. Pfleiderer, Edmund. Empirismus und Skepsis in David Hume's Philosophic als abschliessender Zer- setzung der englischen Erkenntnisslehre, Moral und Religionswissenschaft. Berlin, 1874. 8vo, 540 pp. "Containing good matter, but too much spun out." Sinclair, John. Sketches of Old Times and Distant Places. London, 1875. 8vo, viii + 296 pp. Pages 165-196. Spicker, Gideon. Kant, Hume, und Berkeley. Eine Kritik der Erkenntnisstheorie. Berlin, 1875. 8vo. Wirth, J. U. Pfleiderer: Empirismus und Skepsis in D. Hume's Philosophic 8 pp. Zeits. f. Philos., Vol. LXVL, 1875, p. 102. Watson, J. Kant's reply to Hume. Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. X., 1876, pp. 1 13-134. Riehl, A. Der philosophische Kriticismus. Vol. I., Leipzig, 1876. 8vo. Pages 63-161: Hume's skep- tischer Kriticismus. IO BIBLIOGRAPHY. Meinong, Alexius. Hume-Studien. I. Zur Ge- schichte und Kritik des modernen Nominalismus. Wien, 1877. 8vo, 78 pp. From " Sitzungsber. d. k. Akad. d. Wiss." " A very careful study of Hume's nominalism." Gizycki, G. v. Die Ethik David Hume's in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung. Breslau, 1878. 8vo, xvri H~ 357 PP- " 1 ne most thorough exposition of Hume's utilitarianism." Ritter, Christian. Kant und Hume. Halle, 1878. 8vo, 55 pp. Thompson, J. P. Final Cause : a Critique of the Failure of Paley and the Fallacy of Hume. With an appendix on Huxley's Hume. London, 1879. &vo, ii + 22 pages. Also in his 'American Comments on European Questions,' Boston, 1884, pp. 300-330. Compayre, G. Du pretendu scepticisme de Hume. Revue Philos., Tome VIII. , 1879, pp. 449-468. Morris, George S. British Thought and Thinkers. Chicago, 1880. 8vo. Pages 234-264. Pfleiderer, E. Meinong's Hume-Studien. Zeits. f. Philos., Vol. LXXVII, 1880, pp. 248-263. Quarterly Rev., Vol. CIL , 1880, pp. 287-330. Runze, Max. Kant's Kritik an Hume's Skepti- cismus: Greifswalder Inaugural-Dissertation, t88o. The Hundred Greatest Men. London, 1880. Folio. Contains portrait and brief biographical sketch. Koenig, Edmund. Ueber den Substanzbegriff bei Locke und Hume. Leipzig, 1881. 8vo, 75 pp. Adamson, Robert. Hume. Encyc. Brit., 9th ed., 1881, pp. 346-355. Espinas, A. La philosophic en Ecosse au XVIIP siecle et les origines de la philosophic anglaise con- temporaine. Revue Phil., Tome XL, 1881, pp. 113- 132; XIL, 119-150. Correspondance litteraire, philosophique et critique par Grimm, Diderot, Raynal, Meister, etc. Paris, 1882. 16 vols., 8vo. Index in Vol. XVI. Sayous, Edouard. Les Deistes anglais et le Chris- tianisme. Paris, 1882. 8vo., 211 pp. Chap. VIII.: La decadence du deisme. ' The death-warrant of the BIBLIOGRAPHY. II rationalistic school was signed by Hume as well as by Wesley.' Howison, Geo. H. Hume and Kant. Outline of four lectures delivered at Concord School of Philoso- phy, July, 1883. [Concord, 1883.] i6mo, 7 pp. Same in German, San Francisco, 1884, 8vo, 7 pp. McCosh, James. Agnosticism of Hume and Hux- ley, with a notice of the Scottish School. New York, 1884. 8vo, 10 + 70 pp. (Philosophical Series, VI.) Stirling, J. H. Kant has not answered Hume. Mind, Vol. IX., 1884, pp. 531-547; Vol. X., pp. 45- 72. See also The Secret of Hegel, Lon., 1865, In- troduction: " Hume is our Politics, Hume is our Trade, Hume is our Philosophy, Hume is our Re- ligion." Gordy, John P. Hume as Sceptic. Leipzig, 1885. 8vo, 69 pp. Webb, T. E. Veil of Isis. Dublin and London, T885. 8vo, xiii + 365 pp. Pages 67-124: Problem- atical Idealism or Hume. Seth, Andrew. Scottish Philosophy : a comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume. Edinb., 1885. 8vo, xii -f- 218 pp. Stuckenberg, J. If. W. Grundprobleme in Hume. Vortrag [gehalten in der philosophischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin am 28 Februar, 1885] nebst der dabei statt- gehabten Diskussion. Halle a S., 1887. 8vo., 35 pp. Tarantino, G. (Docent in the University of Naples). Saggio sul criticismo e sull' associazionismo di Davide Hume. Napoli, 1887. 8vo, 75 pp. Carrau, Ludovic. Philosophie religieuse en An- gleterre depuis Locke jusqu'a nos jours. Paris* 1888. 8vo, 295 pp. Pages 92-157. G. B. Hill (Editor). Letters of David Hume to William Strahan, now first edited. Oxford, 1888. 8vo, xlvi + 386 pp. Fac-simile. Case, Thomas. Physical Realism. London, 1888. 8vo, 387 pp. Pages 256-318. Koenig, Edmund. Die Entwickelung des Causalpro- blems vonCartesius bis Kant. Leipzig, 1888. Pages 205-246. 12 BIBLIOGRAPHY. Fraser, Alex. Visualization as a Chief Source of the Psychology of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Am. Jour. Psych., Vol. IV., 1891-92, pp. 230-247. Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames. Horse Sabbaticae : reprint of articles contributed to the Saturday Review. Second Series. London and New York, 1892. Sra. 8vo. Pages 367-385. Hyslop, Ja)nes H. Hume's Treatise of Morals and Selections from the Treatise of the Passions. Con- tains an introduction of 66 pages and a bibliography. Boston, 1893. i2mo, 275 pp. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. In his Autobiography, dated April 18, 1776, Hume says : "I was born the twenty-sixth of April 1711, old style, at Edinburgh. I was of a good family, both by father and mother. My family, however, was not rich ; and being myself a younger brother, my patri- mony, according to the mode of my country, was of course very slender. My father, who passed for a man of parts, died when I was an infant. I passed through the ordinary course of education with success, and was seized very early with a passion for literature, which had been the ruling passion of my life, and the great source of my enjoyments. My studious disposition, my sobriety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that the law was a proper profession for me ; but I found an unsurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning. " In 1734 I went to Bristol, with some recommenda- tions to eminent merchants ; but in a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat. During my retreat in France, first at Rheims, but chiefly at La Fleche, in Anjou, I composed my ' Treatise of Human Nature.' In the end of 1738 I published my treatise. Never literary 13 14 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots. But, being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardor my studies in the country. In 1742 I printed at Edinburgh the first part of my Essays ; the work was favorably re- ceived, and soon made me entirely forget my former disappointment." After an extremely unpleasant year spent as tutor and guardian of the weak-minded young Marquis of Annandale, Hume accepted in 1746 the invitation of General St. Clair to act as secretary to the expedition which afterwards attacked the French coast, and the following year he attended him in the same station in his military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin. "These two years were almost the only in- terruptions which my studies have received during the course of my life." " I had always entertained a notion that my want of success in publishing the Treatise of Human Nature had proceeded more from the manner than the matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too early. I therefore cast the first part of that work anew in the ' Enquiry concern- ing Human Understanding,' which was published while I was at Turin. But this piece was at first little more successful than the Treatise of Human Nature. " Such is the force of natural temper, that these dis- appointments made little or no impression on me. I Went down in 1749, and lived two years with my BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 15 brother at his country house, for my mother was now dead. I there composed t lie second part of my essay, which I called ' Political Discourses,' and also my ' Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,' which is another part of my treatise that I cast anew. "In 1 75 1 I removed from the country to the town. In 1752 the Faculty of Advocates chose me their librarian ; an office from which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me the command of a large library. I then formed the plan of writing the ' History of England.' I was, I own, sanguine in my expectations of the success of this work. I thought that I was the only historian that had at once neglected present power, interest, and authority, and the cry of popular prejudices ; and, as the subject was suited to every capacity, I expected proportional applause. But miserable was my disappointment : I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even de- testation : English, Scotch, and Irish, whig and tory, churchman and sectary, freethinker and religionist, patriot and courtier, united in their rage against the man who had presumed to shed a generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford ; and, after the first ebullitions of their fury were over, what was still more mortifying, the book seemed to sink into ob- livion." Yet some time later " the copy-money given me by the booksellers much exceeded anything formerly known in England." In 1763 Hume accepted the Earl of Hertford's in- vitation to join the British embassy at Paris, and was shortly afterwards appointed secretary to the embassy. l6 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. He was much pleased with his reception in the French capital ; but left in 1766 for Edinburgh, with the pur- pose " of burying himself in a philosophical retreat." After two years in London as under-secretary to General Conway, Hume returned to Edinburgh in 1769 u very opulent (for I possessed a revenue of one thou- sand pounds a year), healthy, and, though somewhat stricken in years, with the prospect of enjoying long my ease, and of seeing the increase of my reputation. " In spring 1775 I was struck with a disorder in my bowels, which at first gave me no alarm, but has since, as I apprehend it, become mortal and incurable. I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. " To conclude historically with my own character. I am, or rather was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments) ; I was, I say, a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, social, and cheerful humor, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great modera- tion in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper, notwith- standing my frequent disappointments. My company was not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the studious and literary ; and, as I took a particular pleasure in the company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men, anywise eminent, have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was touched, or even attacked, by her baleful tooth ; and, though I wantonly exposed my- self to the rage of both civil and religious factions, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 17 they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted fury. My friends never had occasion to vindi- cate any one circumstance of my character and con- duct ; not but that the zealots, we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate any story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which they thought would wear the face of proba- bility. I cannot say there is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself ; but I hope it is not a mis- placed one ; and this is a matter of fact which is easily cleared and ascertained." Hume's conviction that he had not long to live turned out to be correct ; for on Sunday, Aug. 25, 1776, "he died in such a happy composure of mind that nothing could exceed it." On Nov. 9 of the same year Adam Smith wrote to Wm. Strahan " some account of the behavior of our late excellent friend, Mr. Hume, during his last illness," and in concluding he said : " Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as ap- proaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit." That a professed sceptic should be described as wise and virtuous, and that he could die peacefully and cheerfully, seemed to most Christians of Hume's time scandalous and incredible. No sooner, there- fore, had Dr. Smith's account of Hume's happy end been published in 1777 than it became the subject of horrified comment and violent controversy. Bosvvell ' mentioned to Dr. Johnson that David Hume's per- sisting in his infidelity when he was dying shocked 15 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. him much,' and Dr. Johnson replied that "he had a vanity in being thought easy;" Bishop Home wrote his anonymous " Letter to A. Smith on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend D. Hume," and Pratt replied to it; while John Wesley, in a sermon preached some time after Hume's death, alluded to his last days as described by Smith, and called upon the dead man to say whether he had not learned that 'it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.' Nevertheless, Adam Smith's estimate of Hume's personal character is confirmed by the fact that Campbell and Blair, both clergymen, and both skilful opponents of his anti-theological arguments, were among his personal friends, and by the testimony of Francis Hardy, who says in his " Life of the Earl of Charlemont": " Of all the philosophers of his sect, none, I believe, ever joined more real benevolence than my friend Hume. His love to mankind was universal and vehement ; and there was no service he would not cheerfully have done to his fellow-crea- tures, excepting only that of suffering them to save their souls in their own way." Neither the Autobiography nor Adam Smith's letter contains any reference to the celebrated ' quarrel ' with Rousseau ; for Hume wished it forgotten, though it did him no discredit. The story can be briefly told. When the erratic and morbid author of the ' Emile ' was in trouble on the Continent, Hume invited him to England, found him a pleasant home, and got him the offer of a pension. But one day Rousseau received a letter inviting him to the court of King Frederick of Prussia and promising that if he would go there he BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. IQ would be given no opportunity to pose as a martyr. Rousseau became much excited, remembered that he had once heard Hume say in his sleep " I have Jean Jacques Rousseau," and publicly accused him, not only of writing the letter, but of bringing him to England to betray him to his enemies. Hume was persuaded to answer his accusations ; and thus the controversy began. As a matter of fact the offending letter was written by Horace Walpole, who despised Rousseau. Of Hume himself Walpole wrote : " I am no admirer of Hume. In conversation he was very thick ; and I do believe hardly understood a subject till he had written upon it." Hume is buried on the outskirts of Edinburgh, and his tombstone bears this inscription : David Hume Born 1711 Died 1776 Leaving it to Posterity to add the Rest. SOURCES OF HUME'S SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY. The ' Treatise of Human Nature,' Hume's first and greatest work, is connected in the closest pos- sible way with the systems of Locke and Berkeley. (i) Locke, in trying to show that all knowledge depends upon experience, had thought it necessary to prove that all ideas, the elements of knowledge, are derived from experience. He succeeded in doing this to his own satisfaction, but only because he failed to distinguish between pure sensations and their revived images in memory and imagination on the one hand, and these sense-images together with the closely associated intellectual factors which enter into the simplest act of knowledge on the other. For example, he said that the idea of impenetrability is' derived from the sense of touch, and that if any one desires to ascertain the content of this idea he may "put a flint or a football between his hands and then en- deavor to join them, and he will know." Here Locke did not distinguish from the mere muscular and tactual sensations involved, the additional com- plex thought that in spite of the effort made it is im- possible to bring the hands together, because there 21 22 SOURCES OF HUMES SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY. is something between them that resists extinction. Yet it is clear that this thought is not a part of the sensations involved, and that without it we could have no idea of impenetrability. (2) Berkeley accepted Locke's conclusion that all the elements of knowledge are derived from sense- experience, but he saw as Locke did not that sensa- tions and their fainter reproductions consist simply of images presented to some sense or other — of visual, auditory, or tactual pictures, as it were. Berkeley therefore supposed that all thought consists of nothing but a series of simple or complex images. (3) But every image "is an image, not of a so-called general idea, but of some particular thing, more or less definitely conceived. We cannot, for example, picture a triangle which is not either equilateral, isos- celes, or scalene, nor imagine a taste which is neither sweet, sour, saline, or the like. There are, therefore, no abstract ideas, or ideas of things or qualities in general. (4) One idea especially, of which Locke spoke, Berkeley could not picture : that, namely, of an inert, senseless something called substance, which has all the qualities perceived by the senses but is not any of them. So he concluded that the only possible idea of substance is the complex of ideas of the individual qualities of a particular object as they present them- selves to the human mind through the organs of sense; and that, as the mind knows only these ideas, it is illogical, unnecessary, and even absurd to assert the existence of an absolutely unknown something called substance, or matter, to account for these sensations. SOURCES Of HUME S SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 2% These four conclusions reached by Locke and Berkeley — that all ideas are derived from experience, that experience is only of individual mental images, and that therefore there can be no abstract ideas, and no idea of a substance which underlies the perceptible qualities of things — these are the whole basis on which Hume's system rests. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY. THE SYSTEM IN OUTLINE. The First Part of the Treatise is concerned largely with the four principles just enunciated. The omis- sion of all reference to external reality from the defi- nition of Impressions and Ideas is in accordance with Berkeley's rejection of a material world ; and Sections VI. and VII. are devoted to a reaffirmation of Berke- ley's doctrines that there can be no idea of an under- lying substance, and no abstract idea of anything. In Part II. the principle that every idea is a definite mental image is applied to the conceptions of space, time, and existence. It is absurd to say that space is infinitely divisible ; for we can picture neither an in- finitesimal portion of space nor an infinite process of division. The ideas of empty space and empty time are equally impossible ; for experience always presents space as a relation between the parts of visual or tac- tual images, and time as a relation between successive impressions and ideas; and it is impossible to form an idea of the relation apart from that which is related. In like manner, since there is no impression of exist- ence or of external existence apart from that of the 25 26 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUMe's PHILOSOPHY* object or qualities existing, the idea of the one cannot be abstracted from that of the other. Indeed, if by- external existence is meant something specifically dif- ferent from impressions and ideas themselves, no real conception of it can be formed at all ; for all thought is confined to impressions and ideas, that is, to more or less vivid mental images. In Part III. two topics are treated together: infer- ence and the idea of causation. By separating them we can perhaps make Hume's conception of each a little clearer than is otherwise possible. First of all, inference. — Of Hume's seven Philosoph- ical Relations or categories, of resembla7ice, proportions in quantity and number, degrees of any quality, contra- riety, identity, situation in time or place, a?id causation, the first four — corresponding to Kant's mathematical relations — are concerned with mental images as mere images, and are always the same for the same images. They are therefore the objects of intuitive and de- monstrative knowledge. The three others, however, correspond to Kant's dynamical relations and are con- cerned with facts and events considered as really existing or happening, not merely with the inner rela- tions of any set of mental pictures. And as we can- not predict the order of nature by merely analyzing our conceptions, these relations are not the objects of either intuitive or demonstrative knowledge, i.e., of knowledge proper. Nevertheless, through one of them, namely, through the relation of causation, something can be inferred about events that are not directly perceived through any sense. And the ques- tion is : How is this possible ? BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUMe's PHILOSOPHY. 2? To infer is to pass in thought from some object or fact perceived or remembered to some other object or fact not experienced, and on the basis of the former to believe in the existence of the latter. It has been shown already that there is no idea of existence apart from the idea or image of the object existing. A little introspection will show just as clearly that the belief in an object's existence adds no new image to that of the object already formed. And certainly belief does not change the outline or color of that image ; for then the image would repre- sent, not the same, but some other object. The only possible difference, therefore, between the mental image of something believed and the image of the same thing not believed must be a difference of vivac- ity or intensity. And beyond the image with its out- line, color, and vivacity, thought there is none. Be- lief therefore consists merely in the vivacity of a mental image. There are three Natural Relations, or principles of association, between objects, which tend to convey the thought from the impression or idea of the one to the idea of the other. And, moreover, when the thought is conveyed by any of these principles from an impression of sense or a vivid image in the mem- ory to an idea, the preceding vivid image of sense or memory imparts some of its vivacity to the suggested idea ; so that this idea is much more vividly pictured than if it had been called up by some idea of the im- agination only. These natural relations are Resemblance, Contiguity, and Causation. But Causation is much more effective 28 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY. than either of the others, and imparts a much greater degree of vivacity to the associated idea. This is because objects which we recognize as causes and effects are not only always successive and contiguous to each other in space and time, but they have been constantly conjoined in our experience, so that the association between them is very fixed and unerring. Indeed the association is so strong that all the vi- vacity of belief is conveyed to the suggested image. And thus it is that through causation an inference is drawn to something beyond present experience. Conclusions regarded as merely probable are reached either when one's experience of the cause and its ef- fect has been too limited to produce a well-established association between them, or when the same cause has been connected in one's experience with various ef- fects. In the latter case the impression of the cause tends to suggest the ideas of all the effects; but only one of the images can be present at a time; there is therefore a conflict between them; and when finally the strongest has crowded out the others, it has lost much of its vivacity; so the belief attached to it is but faint, and the conclusion is said to be only probable. Another kind of probability is attained by analogy. In this case the present impression is not a perfect re- production of the cause which has always been expe- rienced in connection with a certain effect, though it resembles it more or less; and the lack of a perfect resemblance diminishes the vivacity of the suggested image, as did the lack of a perfect experience in the other kind of merely probable inferences. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. 29 As the strength of an association can vary indefi- nitely, and as there can also be any degree of resem- blance between the present impression and a cause given in past experience, it is evident that an inference from a present impression to its anticipated effect may involve any degree of belief, from the merest proba- bility to the fullest conviction. But in every case the inference is a matter of imagination, and not of rea- soning. For, did the inference from past to future depend upon reasoning, the uniformity of nature would have to be the major premise. And what rea- soning could ever prove this premise? It cannot be demonstrated, for there is no contradiction in suppos- ing the course of nature to change; and in every at- tempt to prove it by induction it is merely assumed. Since the causal relation is so important for infer- ence as to matters of fact, its nature should be deter- mined a little more accurately. Causes and effects are not only successive and contiguous and constantly conjoined in our experience, but we suppose a certain necessary connection to exist between them; and the idea of this necessary connection is much more ob- scure than that of succession, of contiguity, or of con- stant conjunction. To clear it up it is necessary to find the impression from which it is derived; for, since there are no innate ideas, there must be such an impression, and impressions are intenser than their ideas, and their outlines are therefore clearer. Though contiguity and succession between external objects can be perceived, none of the senses present any image of their connection. The impression is therefore not gained from a contemplation of nature, 30 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME's PHILOSOPHY. as Locke said in his chapter on Power. Much less can it be derived from the ' substantial forms ' or other unintelligible properties of matter, or even from the Divine activity; for none of these are objects of per- ception, and none of them therefore can afford an im- pression. Nor can it be gained from the known influence of volition upon the organs of the body; for we are no- where directly conscious of this influence, as is proved by the fact that it is generally supposed to be direct, while in reality it is exerted only through the nerves and muscles. Nor, again, is the idea of necessary connection obtained by observing the control of the will over the course of one's own ideas; for the greatest voluntary effort is often accompanied with the least control. Finally, it is of no avail to say that the idea is ab- stract; for abstract ideas are but particular aspects of ordinary ideas, and must therefore have been pre- ceded by impressions like the rest. The impression is obtained, however, from the mu- tual relations of associated ideas when one suggests another; for, like the relations of resemblance, pro- portion, degree, and contrariety, the connection be- tween ideas becomes present to consciousness with the ideas themselves, and can be obtained by a simple inspection or 'comparison ' of them. The impression of necessary connection or power is therefore the impression of a certain relation between ideas, namely, of connected ideas suggesting each other. And the idea of necessary connection also must be the idea of such a relation between ideas; for BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUMES PHILOSOPHY. 3I the idea is a copy of the impression, and it is impossi- ble to abstract the idea of the relation from that of the ideas related. In other words, the idea of neces- sary connection is a pair of associated mental images considered in reference to their connection with each other. This being so, it is absurd to speak of a connection between external objects; and causation therefore consists of contiguity, succession, and constant con- junction in nature, together with a pair of connected ideas (and therefore the idea of connection) in the mind of the observer. So the causal relation is a mixed one, partly independent of mind and partly dependent upon it. The common belief that there is a necessity in things themselves is the result of the mind's anthropo- morphic tendency to ' spread itself ' over inanimate objects and attribute to them its own ideas and emotions. It is the same kind of confusion that leads us to attribute to and at the same time deny of change- less things the changes that really take place in our own thought, and so to say that these things endure. This doctrine of Causation can be applied as well to our fellow-men as to nature. The sequence and constant conjunction of motive and act is in them ; the idea of their connection, in us. It has thus been explained " why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such par- ticular effects, and why we form an inference from one to the other." As for the other question (Sec- tions III. and IV.), " For what reason we pronounce it necessary that everything whose existence has a be- 32 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. ginning should also have a cause ? " — no such neces- sity exists, and every attempt to prove it has failed ; for necessity is to be found only when objects have been experienced in close conjunction and succes- sion and their ideas have been associated. But we pronounce it necessary because we draw a hasty in- duction from those cases in which a necessity really is involved. In Part III. Hume tried to show that inference concerning matters of fact not yet observed was a matter of imagination, not of reasoning. In Part IV. he attempts to do the same thing for demonstration concerning the relations of ideas. In all the demonstrative sciences occasional mis- takes are made. In even a simple arithmetical addi- tion oui faculties sometimes play us false. Knowing this, we ought to add to any reasoning of this sort a second judgment pronouncing upon the probable correctness of the first. But this judgment itself may be erroneous ; so it also should be corrected by a third ; and so on ad infinitum, when none of the orig- inal assurance will be left. This is the result that Reason would reach were it to determine our belief. It is avoided only because the Imagination is too sluggish to call up the appropriate images when the train of ideas gets more than a very few steps from the impression that started it. So, by keeping the thought closely confined to present impressions and the ideas most immediately associated with them, imagination gives an assurance which reason, if al- lowed its way, would utterly destroy. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. 33 Thus all belief is a matter of sense and imagina- tion and not of reasoning. The next topic is Real Being, and it can be consid- ered under two heads : I. Things external or bodies, and II. Things internal or souls. I. Body. — To ask whether external things exist or not is useless ; for believe in them we must ; and the only question is, why ? As it is impossible to form a mental image of anything specifically different from impressions and ideas, the conception of external things can be noth- ing more than that of certain perceptions possessed of a continuous existence independent of any per- ceiving mind. To account for the belief in such things it is necessary to consider the continuity and the independence separately. A. The continued existence which the imagination attributes to certain perceptions is due to their pe- culiar (1) coherence and (2) constancy. (1) The Coherence of Impressions. — When there is an established relation of contiguity and succession between dissimilar impressions, the presence of the one leads to the idea and expectation of the other, and we get into the way of looking for this uniform se- quence even when we have no impression of it. But in order to find it we have sometimes to suppose that a perception exists when not present to con- sciousness. Thus when we perceive wood in the fire- place before leaving a room and return to find only ashes, the force of habit compels us to imagine the burning fire as intervening. This necessity never 34 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. arises, however, in the case of the passions ; for their effects never appear unless they themselves have been present to consciousness. (2) The Constancy of certain impressions leads to the same result. For when similar impressions con- stantly recur the shock of surprise finally disappears, and the passage from one such impression to another is felt scarcely more than the passage from one moment of a continuous perception to the next. Both kinds of experience therefore give rise to the same easy feeling ; and or. this account they become confused, and we tend to regard the recurring impres- sions as really continuous and identical. B. This leads to the belief in an existence of per- ceptions independent of the mind. For, in spite of this tendency of the imagination to regard recurring impressions as continuous and identical, Reason still insists that they are interrupted and different. To reconcile the contradiction we therefore suppose two sets of perceptions, the one interrupted and depend- ent upon the mind that perceives them, the other continuous and independent. The latter we now distinguish by the name Objects, reserving the term Perceptions for the former. Thus the idea of an external world of objects and the belief in it rest upon unjustifiable yet unavoidable confusions and contradictions of imagination. II. Souls. — To speak of perceptions apart from a preceiving mind is not self-contradictory. For as an external object is nothing more than an aggregate of qualities, so a mind is nothing more than an aggregate v^T^V of perceptions ; and a perception can be said to be BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. 35 present in a mind only in the sense that it is at the moment associated with the special group of per- ceptions of which that particular mind is made up. This is why all discussions about the materiality or immateriality of the soul are so meaningless. They are attempts to describe the nature of an assumed substance underlying all perceptions. But of such a substance we can have neither impression nor idea. It is therefore nonsense to attempt to describe it or even to affirm its existence. Though some specially favored metaphysicians may be continually conscious of a perfectly identical and simple Self, the rest of mankind, when they enter most intimately into what they call themselves, can find only a collection of rapidly-varying perceptions, which, however, are bound together so firmly by association that they are often supposed to be a unity, simple and identical. As to the relation between matter and mind, it is through experience alone that any knowledge or idea of the causal relation is gained ; and so it cannot be maintained a priori, as the followers of Descartes main- tain, that motion cannot cause perceptions, nor per- ceptions motion. The investigation of Human Nature was under- taken in the hope that through a knowledge of its principles a foundation for all the sciences could be laid. But these principles have been found to lead to such absurdities and contradictions that no conclu- sions reached by their aid can be relied upon ; and yet without them there can be no knowledge at all. 36 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY. Total scepticism is therefore the only resort — and that is impossible. CAUSATION. Hume's doctrine of causation is the most im- portant and at the same time the most difficult part of his whole philosophy. It has been often said that Hume denied that any idea of necessary connec- tion is possible, and that he reduced causation to mere uniform sequence. But Hume himself in the chapter devoted to the subject expressly stated, and emphasized the statement, that the idea of necessary connection does enter into the conception of causa- tion, and that it must be accounted for. All that he denied was that the idea can be accounted for in the way in which he believed various authors had attempted to account for it, and that it can be applied as these writers would apply it. " Necessity is nothing but an internal impression of the mind or a determination to pass from one object to its usual attendant,"* and a necessary connection between anything but thoughts cannot be conceived : this is the whole burden of the most difficult section in the Treatise. But here a difficulty presents itself : how can Hume treat the mind's necessity to pass from one idea to another as identical with the impression or obser- vation of that necessity ? Certainly the two are not identical ; but unless they be regarded as such the one can no more explain the other than the connec- * Pp. 126, 1. 1; 125, 1. 23. See also 112, 1. 28. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. 37 tion between an act of will and its result can explain the knowledge of the connection. A similar difficulty is found in Hume's account of the cause of the association from which this idea of necessity is derived. Does the association of ideas result from the mere fact that similar combinations of objects frequently recur, or from the observation of the fact ? There are at least half a dozen passages in which he says, " the observation of this resemblance " * between several instances causes the association ; while in others he speaks only of the resemblance itself. It is true that in ordinary experience it is the observation of a constant conjunction between phe- nomena which leads to the supposition of a causal connection between them. But for Hume's ' infer- ence ' this observation is not necessary ; for a repeated experience of conjoined phenomena is sufficient to es- tablish an association between them whether the fact of the repeated conjunction has been observed or not. Another question which arises in this connection is whether Hume regarded the internal necessity to which repeated experience gives rise as a " determina- tion of the mind " by an impression or idea, or simply as a determination of one idea by another. To explain these difficulties it is necessary to con- sider Hume's doctrines in their historical connection. The plain people regard not only things, but the rela- tions between them, as perceived immediately, and from this natural realism of common-sense thought passes but slowly. It may be discovered, for example, * Pp. 125-127. 3D BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. that no causal connection can be observed between things, while it is still taken for granted that the things themselves and their other relations are im- mediately known. Or it may be discovered that thought is not a copy of things, while it is still as- sumed that it is caused by them ; and then the con- ception of a Ding an sick or an unknowable arises. And even when such ways of thinking are declared to be erroneous there is a continual tendency to revert to them. In the age in which Hume lived this influence of avowedly abandoned modes of thought was ex- emplified in the conception of ideas. That things cannot be immediately known was recognized, be- cause it had been found that there is no direct causal relation between extra-bodily objects and the mind. The problem was to restore this immediate relation between the mind and the object known ; and since the mind did not go out to things, it was assumed that things came in to the mind, — not themselves, how^ ever, but through their representatives, called ideas, which were supposed to be conveyed in some way or other by the senses to the mind. Thus, something was got into the immediate presence of the mind ; and perception was explained. How these ideas could be perceived when brought 1 into ' or ' before ' the mind no one asked ; but it was taken for granted that the mind could perceive ideas and their relations just as easily and just as completely as the most naive realist supposed he could perceive things. Except that ideas had been substituted for things, the standpoint of the philosophers was essen< tially that of the plain people. The only problem was Brief exposition of hume s philosophy. 39 to account for the presence of the ideas ; and this came to be regarded as a very grave problem indeed, for the philosophers were still influenced a good deal by the common forms of speech, and were only too apt to regard both ideas and the physical motion that causes them as shadowy entities which could 'inhere ' in mind or in matter, and be ' imparted,' ' communi- cated,' or ' conveyed ' from one thing capable of ' pos- sessing ' them to another. Now when the Cartesians discovered that the essence of the mind is thought and the essence of matter extension, and that ideas cannot exist in things, nor motion in minds ; how is it possible, they asked, for any communication to take place between matter and mind, unless in passing from the one to the other motion becomes thought, and Vice versa ? And this seemed to them equally impos- sible, for "matter and motion are still matter and mo- tion, and 'tis absurd to imagine that the shocking of two globular particles should become a sensation of pain and that the meeting of two triangular ones should afford a pleasure." * When they had avoided this difficulty and accounted for the presence of ideas in the mind by the Occasion- alistic hypothesis, the Cartesians supposed they had explained perception, just as Berkeley thought he had explained it by his similar supposition that ideas are given by God. Hume, with his conception of causa- tion, was able to avoid the Cartesian puzzle, about the interaction of mind and matter ; and yet, like his predecessors, he failed to see the real difficulty con- * Treatise, Part IV., Sec. V. 40 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. nected with the ordinary conception of perception, and took it for granted that he had accounted for ideas of color and extension when he had supposed that there were colored and extended ideas before the mind, and that when he had shown how ideas are related he had explained the idea of their relation. With this point of view, it was as natural that Hume should fail to distinguish between the connection of ideas and the impression of their connection, and between their repetition and the observation of the repetition, as it was that Locke should overlook the distinction between the fact that observed qualities and substances receive their existence from the ap- plication and operation of some other observed being, and the knowledge of that fact.* And to make this part of his doctrine consistent it must be supposed that the 'determination ' Hume spoke of was a deter- mination of ideas, and that he used the word ' mind ' only loosely and provisionally. Thus it was that Hume reduced necessary connec- tion, the most objective of all dynamical relations, to a mere relation of ideas, perceived immediately with the ideas themselves. But, notwithstanding the fact that he had accepted the philosophical explanation of perception through ideas, throughout his whole ac- count of causation he took it for granted that things with their contiguity, succession, and constant con- junction can be perceived directly; and from this strange combination of half-critical and wholly non- critical thought there resulted the mixture of phenom- * Essay, Book II., Chap. XXVI., Sec. I. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUMES PHILOSOPHY. 41 enalism and naive realism which is found in his second defininition of a cause. Though Hume professed to have no idea of cau- sation but that of two objects frequently perceived in close succession and the idea of one of them sug- gesting that of the other, to account for this sug- gestion of one idea by another it was necessary for him to assume causal relations independent of it. Such was the relation between things contiguous and successive and the perceptions they produce; such was that between repeated perceptions and the ' habit ' of mind which accounts for individual suggestions; such was the ' natural ' relation of causation, if Hume meant to distinguish it from contiguity as a cause of association; and such must be the relation between any 'hidden cause' and its effect. It is this kind of causation which he quietly assumed, rather than that which he defined, that corresponds to the ordinary conception of a cause. But Hume had said that the ordinary conception is really impossible. What he accomplished, therefore, was this: by repeatedly as- suming a causation of which he said it was impossible to conceive, he accounted for a conception of a cause that no one ever really held. The nature of the connection involved is not the only respect in which the causes Hume assumed to exist are different from those he defined. His whole account of the idea of causation depended upon the 'observation ' that causes and effects are always closely conjoined in time; and yet when he said that every idea is caused by a previous perception resem- bling it, he assumed that causes and effects are sim- 42 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. ilar, rather than that they are always to be found together. Certainly it is impossible that 'ideas of the imagination ' can be constantly conjoined with their corresponding impressions, when they occur, as Hume says, in an entirely different order.* How far Hume's rules by which to judge of causes and effects are consistent with the doctrine that " any- thing may produce anything" ; how many of them are the logical consequences of his conception of a cause; and how many of them would actually result from the principles of the imagination that Hume supposed to explain the idea of a cause, cannot be discussed here. Hume's theory of causation is no more satisfactory when applied to the will than when applied to things; for the real problem is, not whether the spectator feels any inner necessity to pass from one idea to another, but whether the agent is under any neces- sity to pass from his idea to his act. THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY. . Hume's account of the idea of causation would have been less plausible if his conception of reality had been less pliable. At the beginning of the Treatise he assumed that impressions 'arise in the soul originally from unknown and perfectly inexplicable causes.' f As he advanced towards his chapter on the idea of necessary connec- tion he substituted for this unknowable thing in itself *Part I., Sees. I., II., and III. f Part I., Sec. II., and Part III., Sec. V. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. 43 4 objects ' which could be observed to be frequently conjoined in time and place, but which could not be observed or even thought to be connected. And be- fore the chapter was ended he found it necessary to join the plain people and assume the knowledge of a 'nature ' full of connections. Having accounted for the idea of necessary con- nection by means of this assumption and arrived at his semi-realistic and semi-idealistic conception of a cause, as " an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other," etc., Hume remembered that causation was a relation, and that according to his definition rela- tions exist between ideas, not things, and so he iden- tified his objects with ideas by adding that a cause may be considered " either as a comparison of two ideas or as an association betwixt them." This over- turned his account of the idea of connection ; but it enabled him to return to the idealism which he formally recognized, and it prepared the way for his forthcoming account of the idea of real external things. Real things can act and be acted upon ; while mental images are mere transient states of a perceiv- ing subject and can do or suffer nothing. Such images are the perceptions with which the Treatise opened. But when Hume remembered that his ' objects ' were perceptions he still regarded them as possessed of all the properties of real things ; though, of course, they were immediately present to consciousness, since they were perceptions. This made it seem easy to account 44 BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME S PHILOSOPHY. for the idea of a set of permanent perceptions, called things. But it is not, as Hume said, the perceptions them- selves that the vulgar believe to have a continued existence, but rather the efficient things of which Hume's perceptions were after all but lifeless models. And the philosophers believe, not in a second set of perceptions, but in the same things as the vulgar. But the philosophers realize that they know these things only through their own mental images, and so they suppose there are three facts : the thing, the image of it, and the mind knowing the thing by per- ceiving the image ; while the vulgar are so busily con- cerned with the things themselves that it never occurs to them that any image intervenes between the things and their knowledge of them. For them, therefore, there are but two facts : the thing and the mind knowing it. For Hume also there were two facts ; and this is why he identified his 'objects' with those of the vulgar. But Hume's facts were the image and the mind knowing it; and an image is not a thing. Both Hume and Kant started with the assumption that perceptions are caused by a thing in itself, pos- sessed of all the extra-mental reality that the plain people believe things to have ; and when they came to account for the conception of reality, what they both explained was not the idea of the transcenden- tal things which they and the plain people had alike assumed to exist ; but it was the idea of some phe- nomenal 'permanent in perception,' the conception of which had been developed in the course of their philosophy. BRIEF EXPOSITION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY. 4 79. 83, 101, 148, 158, 163. Experience, 21, 98. Exposition of Hume, 25. Extension, 79. See Space. Faith, 163. See Scepticism. Fancy. See Imagination. Force, 114, 116. Freedom. See Liberty. Green, T. H., 56. Habit, 4T, 75. Hobbes, 92. Huxley, 56. Ideas, 61, 123; abstract ideas, 22, 30, 72 ff., 120; innate ideas, 29, 118. Identity, 68, 87, 154, 155, 1^7, 169 ff. Imagination, 29, 32, 33. 34, 46, 47, 65, 78, qg, 14S, 157, 162, 169, 171, 173. Impressions, 61, 64, 96, 123, 126. Immateriality, 35, 164. Independent existence, 33, 34, 130, 148, 160. Inference, 26 ff., 31, 37, 47, 90, 97 ff., 126, 131, 138. Infinite divisibility, 7S. 175 i 7 6 INDEX. Influence of Hume, 54. Instinct, 161. Judgment. See Reasoning. Kant, 26, 44, 55, 56. Knowledge, 86, 106, 143. Liberty and Necessity, 138. Locke, 21, 30, 40, 55, 93, 114. Malebranche, 115. Materialism, 55, 164. Matter, 22, 117, 135, 165, 167. See Substance. Memory, 65, 96, 173. Mind, 34, 40, 45, 60, 158, 170. See Soul. Mode, 67, 70. Natural realism, 37, 44, 45. Natural relations. See Asso- ciation. Nature, 43, 130, 174. Necessity, necessary connec- tion, 29 ff., 36, 40, 55, 89, 90, 91 ff., 99, 105, m-135, 138, 141, 168. Number, 69, 87. Object, 34, 43, 45, 85, 155, I59,_ 162. Occasionalism, 39. Perception, 38; perceptions, 34, 44,48, 62, 155, 159, 162, 167, 170. Place. See Space. Possibility, 79, 169. Power, 113, 114, 121, 125, 127. 129, 134. Principium individuationis, 154- Piobability, 28, S6, 100, 105, 106 ff., 143. Production, 89. Proofs, 106. Quality, 69, 87. Quantity, 69, 87. Reality, 25, 33, 42, 45, 48, 101. Reason, reasoning, 29, 32, 33, 34, 46, 99, 103, 143, 146, 148, 162, 173. Reflection, 64. Reid, 55. Relations, 43, 67; philosophi- cal, 26, 68, 86, 101, 131. Resemblance, 27, 66, 68, S7, 109, 125, 156. Rules for cause and effect, 42, ' 135- Scepticism, 36, 46, 55, 143, 146, 147, 163, 173. Science, 35, 59. Self, 35, 169. Sensation, 64. Senses, 147, 163, 173. Simple and complex percep- tions, 62. Simplicity of the mind, 172. Soul, 33, 34, 35, 164. See Mind. Sources of Hume's philoso- phy, 21. Space and time, 25, 69, 78, 80, 87. Spinoza, 55. Substance, 22, 67, 70, 135, 164 ff., 172. Succession, 29, 88, 112, 125, 130, 157- "Treatise" and "Enquiry," 49- Understanding. See Reason. Uniformity of nature, 29, 48, Unknowable, 38. Volition. See Will. Will, 30, 31, 42, 43, 119, 138. PSYCHOLOGY ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY REFERENCE AND TEXT-BOOKS PUBLISHED BY HENRY HOLT & CO., NEW YORK. Books marked* are chiefly for reference and supplementary use, and to be found in Henry Holt & Co.'s Miscellaneous List. For prices and further particulars about books not so marked see Henry Holt & Co.'s Descriptive Educational Catalogue. Either list free on application. *Bain's John Stuart Mill. A Criticism with Personal Recollections. By Prof. Alexander Bain of Aberdeen. 12mo. 214 pp. * James Mill. A Biography. With portrait. 12mo. 498 pp. Baldwin's Handbook of Psychology. By Prof. James Makk Baldwin of Toronto. 2 vols, (sold separately). 8vo. Vol. I. Senses aud Intellect. 357 pp. Vol. II. Feeling and Will. 406 pp. Elements of Psychology. 12mo. Falckenberg's Modern Philosophy from Nicolas of Cusa to the Pres- ent Time. By Prof. Richard Falckenberg of Erlangen. Translated with the author's co-operation by Prof. A. C. Arm- strong, Jr., of Wesleyau. 8vo. (About 650 pp. In preparation.) *Hillebrand's German Thought. From the Seven Years' War to Goethe's Death. Six Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain. By Karl Hillebrand. 12mo. 306 pp. ^Holland's Rise of Intellectual Liberty, from Thales to Copernicus. A History. By Frederick May Holland. 8vo. 458 pp. Hyde's Practical Ethics. By Pres. Wm. De Witt Hyde of Bowdoin. 12mo. 219 pp. James' Principles of Psychology — Advanced Course. By Prof. Wm. James of Harvard. 2 vols. 8vo. 701 -J- 710 pp. Psychology— Briefer Course. 12mo. 491 pp. Jastrow's Chapters in Modern Psychology. By Prof. Joseph Jastrow of the University of Wisconsin. {Ln preparation.) i HENRY HOLT & CO.'S WORKS ON PSYCHOLOGY, ETC. *Martineau's Essays, Philosophical and Theological. By James Mar- tineau. 2 vols. 8vo. 428 + 438 pp. *Maude's The Foundation of Ethics. By John Edward Maude, M.A. Edited by Prof. Wm. James of Harvard. l2mo. 224 pp. *Mill's Three Essays on Religion, and Berkeley. By John Stuart Mill. 8vo. 313 pp. * The Autobiography. 8vo. 319 pp. Dissertations and Discussions 5 vols. 8vo. 433 -j- 415 -J- 391 -4- 407 + 294 pp. * Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. 8vo. 354 pp. * Comte's Positive Philosophy. 8vo. 182 pp. *Mill, John Stuart : His Life and Works. Twelve sketches by Herbert Spkncer, Henry Fawcett, Frederic Harrison, and other distinguished authors. 16mo. 96 pp. Modern Philosophers. Verbatim extracts from their works (translated when necessary) with introductions, lives, bibliographies, and notes. Under the general editorship of Dr. E. Hershey Sneath of Yale. 12mo. Descartes. By Prof. H. A. P. Torrey of the University of Vt. 357 pp. Spinoza. By Prof. Geo. S. Fullerton of the University of Pa. 210 pp. Locke. By Prof.'JoHN E. Russell of Williams. 160 pp. Reid. By Dr. E. Hershey Sneath of Yale. 375 pp. Kant. By Prof. John Watson of Queen's College, Canada. 366 pp. Hume. By Prof. H. A. Aikin, of Trinity (N. C). (In press.) Hegel. By Prof . Josiah Royce of Harvard. {In press.) *Nicholls' The Psychology of Time. By Herbert Nicholls, Fellow of Clark. 8vo. 140 pp. Zeller's Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. By Dr. Edward Zeller. Translated with the author's sanction by Sarah F, Alleyne and Evelyn Abbott. 12mo. 377 pp. 2 HISTORY, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY (REFERENCE AND TEXT-BOOKS PUBLISHED BY HENRY HOLT & CO., NEW YORK. Books marked * are cliiefly for reference or supplementary use, and may he found in Henry Holt & Co.' s Miscellaneous List. For prices and further particulars about books not so marked see Henry Holt & Go. 's Descriptive Educational Catalogue. Either list free on applica- tion. *Champlin's Young Folks' History of the War for the Union. By John P. Champlin, Jr. Illustrated. 8vo. 606 pp. *Coofc's Extracts from the Anglo-Saxon Laws. Edited by Prof. Albert S. Cook of Yale. 8vo. Paper. 25 pp. *Cory's Guide to Modern English History. By Wm. Cory. Part I. 1815-1830. 8vo. 276 pp. Part II. 1830-1835. 8vo. 576 pp. *Cox's Introduction to the Science of Comparative Mythology and Folk- lore. By Sir Geo. W. Cox, M.A., Bart. 12ino. 396 pp. *Creasy's History of the Ottoman Turks. By Sir Edw. S. Creasy. 12mo. 568 pp. *Dabney's Causes of the French Revolution. By Prof. R. H. Dabney of the University of Virginia. 12mo. 307 pp. *Doyle's English Colonies in America. By J. A. Doyle, Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford. 8vo. Vol. I. Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas. 420 pp. Vols. II. & III. The Puritan Colonies. 333 + 416 pp. *Durand's New Materials for the History of the American Revolution. Translated from documents in the French archives and edited by John Durand. 12mo. 317 pp. Duruy's Middle Ages. By Victor Durtjy. Translated by E. II. and M. D. Whitney. Edited by Prof. Geo. B. Adams of Yale, With thirteen neio colored maps. 12mo. 603 pp. HENRY HOLT 6- CO. 'S WORKS ON HISTORY, ETC. *Escott's England : Her People, Polity, and Pursuits. By T. H. S. Escott. 8vo. 625 pp. *Falke's Greece and Rome : Their Life and Art. Translated from the German of Jacob von Falke by Prof. Wm. Hand Browne of Johns Hopkins. With over 400 illustrations. Quarto. 365 pp. Fleury's Ancient History, Told to Children. From the French of M. Lame Fleury. Arranged with notes for the use of schools as an exercise for translating from English into French by Susan M. Lane. 12mo. 118 pp. Freeman's Historical Course. Under the general editorship of Prof. Edward A. Freeman of Oxford. 1. General Sketch of History. By Prof. Edward A. Freeman. Adapted for American students. New edition, revised, with chronological table, maps, and index. 16mo. 432 pp. 2. History of England. By Edith Thompson. Edition adapted for American students. 16mo. 400 pp. 3. History of Scotland. By Margaret .Macarthur. Edition adapted for American students. 16mo. 213 pp. 4. History of Italy. By "William Hunt, M.A., Vicar of Congres- bury, Somerset. Edition adapted for American students. 16mo. 285 pp. 5. History of Germany. By James Sime, M.A. Edition adapted for American readers. lCmo. 282 pp. 6. History of the United States. By J. A. Doyle. With maps, illustrative of the acquisition of territory and the increase of population, by Pres. Francis A. Walker of the Mass. Institute of Technology. 18mo. 424 pp. 7. History of France. By Charlotte M. Yonge. 16mo. 267 pp. Fyffe's Modern Europe. By C. A. Fyfpe, M.A., Barrister-at-Law ; Fellow of University College, Oxford ; Vice-President of the Eoyal Historical Society. Vol. I. From the Outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1792 to the Accession of Louis XVIII. in 1814. With two maps. 8vo. 549 pp. Vol. II. From 1814 to 1848. 8vo. 525 pp. Vol. III. From 1848 to 1878. (With general index.) 8vo. 580 pp. Gallaudet's International Law. A Manual. By Pres. Edward M. Gallaudet of College for Deaf -Mutes, Washington, D. C. 12mo. 358 pp. Gardiner's English History for Schools. B.C. 55-a.d. 1880. By Prof. S. It. Gardiner of King's College, London. Edition revised for American students. 16mo. 497 pp. Introduction to English History. By Prof. S. R. Gardiner. 12mo. 209 pp. 2 HENRY HOLT &> CO.'S IVORA'S ON HISTORY, ETC. Gardiner's English History for Students. Being the Introduction to English History by Prof. IS. R. Gardiner. With a Critical and Biographical Account of the Authorities, by J. Bass Mul- linger, M.A., St. John's College, Cambridge. 12mo. 448 pp. Johnston's History of the United States for Schools. With an Intro- ductory History of the Discovery and English Colonization of North America. With maps, plans, illustrations, and questions. By the late Prof. Alexander Johnston of Princeton. 12mo. 493 pp. Shorter History of the United States. With references to supple- mentary reading. l'Jmo. 356 pp. History of American Politics. Third edition, revised and en- larged by Prof. William M. Sloane of Princeton. 16mo. 3li(f pp. (Handbooks for Students and General Headers.) *Kapp's Life of John Kalb, a Major-General in the Revolutionary Army. By Friedrich Kapp. With portrait. 12mo. 346 pp. Lacombe's The Growth of a People. A translation of Paul Lacombe's "Petite Histoire du Peuple Fraucaise " by Lewis A. Stimson. 16mo. 232 pp. The same in French. *Lossing's Life and Times of Major-General Philip Schuyler. By Dr. Benson J. Lossing. 2 vols. 12mo. With portraits. 520 + 560 pp. *Maine's Ancient Law. Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas. By Sir Henry Sumner Maine. With an Introduction by Theo. W. D wight, LL.D. 8vo. 469 pp. * Lectures on the Early History of Institutions. A Sequel to "Ancient Law." 8vo. 420 pp. * Village Communities in the East and West. Six Oxford Lec- tures ; to which are added other lectures, addresses, and essays. 8vo. 425 pp. * Early Law and Custom. Taken chiefly from Oxford Lectures. 8vo. 408 pp. Popular Government. Four Essays. 8vo. 273 pp. * International Law. Cambridge Lectures, 1887. 8vo. 234 pp. Sir Henry Maine. A Brief Memoir of his Life by Sir M. E. Grant Duff, with some of his Indian Speeches and Minutes. Selected and edited by Whitley Stokes. With portrait, 8vo. 451 pp. *Mill's Considerations on Representative Government. By John Stuart Mill. 8vo. 371 pp. HENRY HOLT & CO.'S WORKS ON HISTORY, ETC. *Mill's On Liberty : The Subjection of Women. 8vo. 394 pp. *Morgan's Ancient Society ; or, Researches ou the Lines of Human Progress through Savagery and Barbarism to Civilization. By Lewis H. Morgan, LL.D., Member of the National Academy of Science. 8vo. 576 pp. Porter's Outlines of the Constitutional History of the United States. By Luther Henry Porter. 12mo. b26 pp. *Roscher's Principles of Political Economy. By Prof Wm. Roscher of Leipzig. With a preliminary essay by L. Wolowski. All translated by John J. Lalor. 2 vols. 8vo. 485 + 465 pp. *Stillman's Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8. By W. J. Stillman. 12mo. 204 pp. *Sumner's History of American Currency. By Prof. Wm. Graham Sumner. With Chapters on the English Bank Restriction and Austrian Paper Money. To which is appended "The Bullion Report." Large 12mo, with diagrams. 391 pp. * Collected Essays in Political and Social Science. 8vo. 176 pp. Protectionism. The "ism "which teaches that waste makes wealth. 16mo. 181 pp. Problems in Economics. Interleaved. 16mo. 137 pp. *Symonds' Renaissance in Italy. 8vo. Cheaper edition, dark red cloth. Part I. Age of Despots. 653 pp. Part II. The Revival of Learning. 561 pp. Part III. The Fine Arts. 548 pp. Part IV. Italian Literature. With portrait of author. 2 vols. 576 +653 pp. Part V. The Catholic Reaction. 2 vols. 445 4- 441 pp. * Italian Byways. By John Addington Symonds. 12mo. 318 pp. *Taine's Ancient Regime. By Hippolyte Adolphe Taine. Trans- lated by John Durand. Library edition. Large 12mo. 437 pp. * French Revolution. Translated by John Durand. 3 vols. 3157 + 370 + 523 pp. * The Modern Regime. Vol. I. 371 pp. *Tylor's Primitive Culture. Researches into the Development of Mythology. Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom. By Edward B. Tylor, LL.D., E.R.S. 2 vols. 8vo. 514 + 478 pp. * Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Develop- ment of Civilization. 8vo. 39:2 pp. 4 HENkY Holt & co.'s Wokits on history, etc. *Walker's Wages. A Treatise on Wages and the Wages Class. By Pres. Francis A. Walkeii. 8vo. 432 pp. * Money. 8vo. 560 pp. * Money in its Relations to Trade and Industry. 12mo. 343 pp. Political Economy — Advanced Course. 8vo. 545 pp. Political Economy — Briefer Course. 12mo. 423 pp. Political Economy — Elementary Course. 12mo. 333 pp. *Wallace's Russia. By D. Mackenzie Wallace. 8vo. With two maps. 633 pp. Yonge's Landmarks of History. By Miss C. M. Yonge. 12rao. Part I. Ancient History to the Mahometan Conquest. Revised and partly rewritten by Miss Edith M. Chase. 231 pp. Part II. Mediaeval History to the Reformation. Edited by Misc Chase. 258 pp. Part III. Modern History. Revised and enlarged. 486 pp. 5 English Language, standard literature, mythology, music, etc. REFERENCE AND TEXT-BOOKS PUBLISHED BY HENRY HOLT & CO., NEW YORK. Books marked * are chiefly for reference and supplementary use, and to be found in Henry Holt & Co.'s Miscellaneous List. For prices and further particulars about books not so marked see Henry Holt & Co. 's Descriptive Educational Catalogue. Either list free on application. Bain's Brief English Grammar, on a Logical Method. By Prof. Alexander Bain of Aberdeen. 16mo. Boards. 198 pp. Higher English Grammar. New edition, revised. 16mo. 382 pp. English Grammar as bearing upon Composition. 12mo. 382 pp. Banister's Music. By Prof. Henry C. Banister, of the Koyal Academy of Music, the Guildhall School of Music, and the Royal Normal College and Academy of Music for the Blind. 16mo. 345 pp. Beers' A Century of American Literature. 1776-1876. Seleclions from writers not liviug in 1876. Edited by Prof. Henry A. Beers of Yale. 16mo. 435 pp. *BosweH's Life of Dr. Samuel Johnson Abridged. 12mo. 689 pp. Bridgman (J. C.) and Davis' Brief Declamations. Some 200 three- minute declamations, mostly good examples of current public speaking. Selected and edited by Harry C. Davis, blaster in the Harry Hillman Academy, Wilkesbarre, Pa., and John C. Bkidg- man. 12mo. 381 pp. Bright's Anglo-Saxon Reader. Edited with notes and glossary by Prof. Jas. W. Bright of Johns Hopkins. 12mo. 393 pp. Ten Brink's History of English Literature. 12mo. Vol. I. To Wiclif. Translated from the German by H. M. Ken- nedy. Large 12mo. 409 pp. Vol. II. Wyclif, Chaucer, Earliest Drama, Renaissance. Translated by Dr. W. Clarke Kobinson, revised by the author. Large 12mo. 339 pp. I HEMR Y HOL T&CO.'SED UCA TIONA L WORKS— ENGLISH *Carlyle Anthology, The. Selected from the works of Thomas Car- lyle with the author's sanction by Edward Bakrett. 12mo. 395 pp. *Champlin's Young Folks' Cyclopaedia of Common Things. By John D. (Jhamplin, Jr. Profusely illustrated. 8vo. 690 pp. * Young Folks' Cyclopaedia of Persons and Places. Profusely illustrated. 8vo. 942 pp. * Young Folks' Cyclopaedia of Games and Sports. Profusely illus- trated. 8vo. 835 pp. Young Folks' Catechism of Common Things. 16mo. 295 pp. Clark's Practical Rhetoric. For instruction in English Composition and Revision in Colleges and Intermediate Schools. By Prof. J. Scott Clark of the Northwestern University. 12mo. 395 pp. The exercises for drill, in a separate volume, printed on one side of the paper only. Paper. Briefer Practical Rhetoric. 12mo. 318 pp. The Art of Reading Aloud. 16mo. 1 59 pp. Cook's Extracts from the Anglo-Saxon Laws. Ed. by Prof. A. S. Cook of Yale. Paper. 8vo. 25 pp. Corson's Handbook of Anglo Saxon and Early English. By Prof. Hiram Corson, M.A., of Cornell. New Edition, revised. With a supplementary glossary. Large 12mo. 600 pp. Cox's Manual of Mythology. In the form of question and answer. By the Rev. Sir George W. Cox, M.A. 16mo. 300 pp. Cox's Popular Romances of the Middle Ages. Large 12mo. pp. Educational Review (monthly excepting July and August). Edited by Nicholas Murray Butler, E. H. Cook, Wm. H. Maxwell, and Addison B. Poland. 8vo. 35c. per no.; $3.00 per year. Francke's German Literature in its Chief Epochs. By Prof. Kuno Francke of Harvard. Gostwick and Harrison's Outlines of German Literature. By Joseph Gostwick and Robert Harrison. Large 12mo. 600 pp. Hardy's Elementary Composition Exercises. By Irene Hardy of the Oakland (Cal.) High School. 16mo. 75 pp. (Teacher's Hand- books.) *Johnson's Our Familiar Songs and Those who Made Them. Edited by Helen Kendrick Johnson. Three Hundred Standard Songs of the English-Speaking Race, Arranged with Piano Accompa- niments, and Preceded by Sketches of the Writers and Histories of the Songs. Square 8vo. 673 pp. ^Johnson's Famous Single and Fugitive Poems. Collected and edited by Rossiter Johnson. New edition, revised and enlarged. 12mo. 374 pp. HEMR y HOL T if CO. ' S ED UCA TtONA L WORKS— ENGLISH Johnson's Chief Lives of the Poets. By Dr. Samuel Johnson. Be- ing those of Milton, Dryden, Swift, Addison, Pope, and Gray ; and Macaulay's " Life of Johnson." With a preface and notes by Matthew Arnold, to which are appended Macaulay's and Car- lyle's Essays on Boswell's " Life of Johnson." 12mo. 493 pp. Macaulay's and Carlyle's Essay separate. 12mo. Boards, 100 pp. Lounsbury's History of the English Language, including a brief ac- count of Anglo-Saxon and early English literature. By Prof. T. R. Lounsbury of Yale. 16mo. 381 pp. Nesbitt's Grammar-Land. Or, Grammar in Fun for the Children of Schoolroom-shire. By M. L. Nesbitt. With frontispiece and initials by F. Waddy. 16mo. 128 pp. Pancoast's Representative English Literature. Selections with His- torical Connections. By Henry S. Pancoast, University Ex- tension Lecturer. Large 12mo. 514 pp. *Perry's Greek Literature. By Thomas Sergeant Perry, author of "English Literature in the Eighteenth Century," etc. 8vo. 877 pp. Profusely illustrated. Sewell's Dictation Exercises. By E. M. Sewell, author of "A First History of Rome," " History of Greece for Young Persons," etc., and L. B. Urbino. Seventh edition, thoroughly revised. 16mo. Boards. 202 pp. Shaw's English Composition by Practice. By Prof. Edward R. Shaw of the University of the City of New York. Complete apparatus for High School work. On an Inductive Plan. 12ino. Illustrated. 215 pp. Siglar's Practical English Grammar. Based on Progressive Exercises in Analysis, Composition, and Spelling, by the use of Symbols. By Henry W. Siglar, A.M. (Yale), Principal of the Newburgh (N. Y.) Institute. 12mo. 192 pp. *Smith's Synonyms Discriminated. A Dictionary of Synonymous Words in the English Language, illustrated with Quotations from Standard Writers. By thelate Charles John Smith, M.A. New edition, with the author's latest corrections and additions, edited by the Rev. H. Percy Smith, M.A. 12mo. 787 pp. White's Classic Literature, principally Sanskrit, Greek, and Roman, with some accounts of the Persian, Chinese, and Japanese. By C. A. White. In the form of sketches of the authors and speci- mens from translations of their works. Large 12mo. 449 pp. *Williams' Our Dictionaries and other English Language Topics. With four plates. By R. O. AVilliams. 12mo. 174 pp. Witt's Classic Mythology A translation (with the author's sanction) of Prof. C. Witt's " Griechische Gotter- und Heldengeschichten," by Frances Younghusband. With a preface by Arthur Sidg- wick, MA. Supplemented with a glossary of etymologies and related myths. 12mo. 296 pp. i < . \ ' H j. V* 0° a