Qass. 
 Book 
 
 COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 
 
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 Publications of the 
 
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
 
 Division of International Law 
 
 Washington 
 
THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 The European Background of the 
 Monroe Doctrine 
 
 BY 
 
 W: P. CRESSON, Ph. D. 
 
 Formerly Secretary of the American Embassy in Petrograd 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 AMERICAN BRANCH, 35 WEST 32D STREET 
 LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY 
 
 1922 
 

 ^ 
 
 COPYRIGHT 1922 
 
 BY THE 
 
 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
 
 -8 IS22 
 
 GIBSON BROS., INC., PRINTERS WASHINGTON 
 
 ©JI.AB8JL6 98 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine, which in a few months will celebrate 
 its hundredth anniversary, is one of the few foreign policies 
 advanced by any one of the nations taking part in the World 
 War which bids fair to survive that great catastrophe. While 
 the American and British phases of the Monroe Doctrine are 
 familiar to students of diplomatic history, the materials have 
 hitherto been lacking for an adequate appreciation of the rela- 
 tions between President Monroe and John Quincy Adams, on the 
 one hand, and the Tsar, Alexander, on the other, against whose 
 Holy Alliance President Monroe's message of 1823 was chiefly 
 directed. 
 
 Mr. Cresson has laid students of history, and more especially 
 of international organization, under a deep and abiding obliga- 
 tion by his researches in the archives of the Russian Foreign 
 Office immediately following the Revolution of March, 1917. 
 He was Secretary of the American Embassy at Petrograd at 
 the time when Professor F. A. Golder was preparing his inval- 
 uable list of documents in the Imperial archives relating to Amer- 
 ica, and, knowing Mr. Cresson's interest in the history of Russian- 
 American relations, the authorities of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment invited him also to examine the Imperial archives. Mr. 
 Cresson's work more especially related to the personal dispatches 
 of the Tsar, Alexander, and the memoranda in his private 
 diplomatic papers, which had never before been open to stu- 
 dents. 
 
 In the midst of these labors, Mr. Cresson put aside the more 
 leisurely task of writing history for the more arduous task of 
 observing history in the making. He resigned from the diplo- 
 matic service, entered the army, served with the American Expe- 
 ditionary Forces, and ended the war as Chief of the American 
 Military Mission at Belgian Headquarters in Flanders. Upon 
 his demobilization he resumed his interrupted task, and he has 
 recently been able to bring his work to a conclusion by researches 
 in the archives of the Department of State. While Mr. Cres- 
 son's work is complementary to the labors of others in the same 
 field, it covers — as its title implies — negotiations carried on in St. 
 
vi THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Petersburg and Washington, which form the European back- 
 ground of this American doctrine. 
 
 The value of the little work is out of all proportion to its size. 
 It makes clear the aim and purpose of the Tsar, Alexander, in 
 forcing the Holy Alliance upon his unwilling confederates, it 
 shows the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Holy Alliance, 
 and it enables the unprejudiced reader of the Old as well as the 
 New World the better to understand both. 
 
 It is to the credit of our common humanity that at the end of 
 the greatest of wars attempts have been made to devise some 
 scheme whereby a recourse to arms might be less likely to occur, 
 if it could not be wholly avoided. The Thirty Years' War is 
 responsible for the Nouveait Cynee of Emeric Cruce. the Law of 
 War and Peace of Hugo Grotius, not to speak of the Great De- 
 sign which Sully foisted upon his master, the good King Henry 
 IV. The wars of Europe culminating in the wars of the Spanish 
 Succession and ended by the Treaties of Utrecht (1713-14) and 
 of Rastadt (1714) produced the Project of Perpetual Peace of 
 the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. The wars of the French Revolution 
 following these at the space of a century gave birth to the Holy 
 Alliance. The World War, a hundred years later, has brought 
 forth a League of Nations, conceived in the same generous spirit. 
 
 Will history repeat itself? History alone can tell. 
 
 James Brown Scott, 
 
 Director. 
 Washington, D. C, 
 July 14, 1922. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 The author desires to express his thanks to the following gen- 
 tlemen for their aid and criticism: Professor John Bassett Moore 
 and Doctor Julius Goebel of Columbia University; Professor 
 F. A. Golder, under whose expert guidance he carried on his re- 
 searches at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Doctor 
 James Brown Scott, Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for 
 International Peace; and Mr. Raymond Buell of Princeton Uni- 
 versity. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Chapter I.— The Reception of the Holy Alliance 37 
 
 Chapter IL— The Early Policy of the Holy Alliance: The 
 
 American Monarchy 55 
 
 Chapter III.— The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle 69 
 
 Chapter IV.— The United States and the Political Recon- 
 struction of Europe, 1815-1820 83 
 
 Chapter V. — The Era of International Congress 95 
 
 Chapter VI. — Europe and the Monroe Doctrine 113 
 
 Appendix I. — Territorial Guarantees at the Congress of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, 1818 133 
 
 Appendix II.— World Revolution after the Napoleonic Wars: 
 
 Troppau *■" 
 
 Bibliography 139 
 
 Index *^o 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Within a few months will occur the one hundredth anniversary 
 of the reading of President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message 
 to Congress. The three great Continental Powers to which its 
 warnings were chiefly directed are today prostrate as the result 
 of the World War. Yet the principles it defined have continued 
 to furnish the basis of the foreign policy of the United States. 
 Morever, the eclipse of Russia, Prussia and Austria has but re- 
 sulted in a renewal of the fundamental problem which confronted 
 the diplomatists and statesmen of the Republic in 1823 — a prob- 
 lem which in the words of Monroe regards essentially "the condi- 
 tion of the civilized world and its bearing on us." 
 
 The international questions which the trained diplomacy of 
 Monroe and Adams was called upon to meet and decide a cen- 
 tury ago were similar in a remarkable degree to those of the pres- 
 ent day. Again the measure to be arrived at is : How far the con- 
 ditions of the international situation justify the United States in 
 departing from a system of isolation imposed by geographical 
 conditions and a generally accepted, time-honored policy? How 
 far may we abandon the restraints of this safeguarding principle, 
 and at the earnest solicitation of friendly nations bear a part in 
 agreements intended to maintain the general peace? At such a 
 moment as the present one, to use once more the language of 
 Monroe, "a precise knowledge of our relations with foreign 
 powers as respects our negotiations and transactions with each" 
 is indeed "particularly necessary." 
 
 The trend of American diplomacy towards a return to the 
 "traditional prejudice" in favor of an American system apart 
 from the affairs of Europe, has offered one of the chief problems 
 confronting the statesmen of the Allied Powers since the close of 
 the War. It is the author's belief that in the light of a renewed 
 study of the events which led to the declarations of the Monroe 
 manifesto, the motives underlying recent policy tend to justify 
 themselves as the continuing result of historical experience. Ex- 
 amination of the archives of the Department of State and docu- 
 ments which have but recently become available in the Imperial 
 Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prove the 
 
2 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 similarity of earlier negotiations to those of the present day. 
 Yet the story of the attempts made by the statesmen of Europe to 
 detach the United States from their traditional policy (notably 
 the efforts of the Tsar Idealist, Alexander I, to induce the govern- 
 ment in Washington to accede to the pact of the Holy Alliance) 
 forms an almost forgotten chapter of American diplomatic his- 
 tory. 
 
 A misunderstanding of the policies in opposition to which the 
 Monroe Doctrine was formulated has frequently arisen from a 
 failure to apprehend the nature of the strange pact known as the 
 "Holy Alliance" or to establish its true relation to the series of 
 treaties known as the "System of 1815." The latter formed 
 the basis of the diplomatic reconstruction of Europe after the 
 Napoleonic wars. The "Holy Alliance," or "Holy League," 
 was, in its inception, an expression of the highly idealistic personal 
 policy of a single powerful sovereign, the Tsar Alexander I of 
 Russia. Of its three signers the Tsar, and the Tsar alone, affixed 
 his seal without mental reservations concerning the principles it 
 invoked. The System, of 1815 resulted from a long series of 
 debated agreements, beginning with the politico-military pacts 
 of Toeplitz, Reichenbach and Chaumont, continued by the two 
 Treaties of Paris and the Acts of the Congress of Vienna. The 
 Tsar's "League of Peace" was suddenly imposed upon his allies 
 at a time when the prestige of his military power was essential 
 to their cause; when to do otherwise than humor his doctrinaire 
 theories of international solidarity might have resulted in a seri- 
 ous breach in the ranks of the Grand Alliance. 
 
 In the perspective of history, the internationalist aspirations 
 and purposes of the Russian autocrat may be viewed in their true 
 sense and value. His contemporaries, however, may well be par- 
 doned for considering his policies as contradictory and irrecon- 
 cilable. Metternich and the reactionary statesmen of his school 
 saw in Alexander a dangerous dreamer, a "crowned Jacobin" at 
 almost the same time that Canning and Monroe were uniting the 
 policies of the "Constitutional Powers" to protect the principles 
 of free government from the interventions he set on foot in the 
 interests of monarchical legitimacy ab antiquo. But in order to 
 understand the Tsar's conception of his own diplomacy, a brief 
 biographical study of the varied personal influences and relation- 
 
INTRODUCTION j 
 
 ships which accompanied the changing phases of his political 
 beliefs becomes essential. 
 
 Alexander was born in St. Petersburg on December 12, 1777. 
 His celebrated grandmother, the Empress Catherine, undertook 
 the entire direction of his early education, to the exclusion of his 
 father, the morose and unpopular Tsarevitch Paul. With his 
 brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, his studies were regulated 
 by an elaborate plan, drawn up by the great Tsarina herself after 
 a long correspondence with the philosophers Grimm and Diderot 
 in Paris. It seems to have been the deliberate intention of this 
 remarkable woman to make the young heir of the Romanovs — if 
 not a prodigy of learning 1 — at least a well educated man, an 
 attainment far above the level of the court circles surrounding 
 him! That this intention was even in a measure carried out 
 was largely due to her fortunate choice of a tutor for the little 
 princes in the person of a French Swiss scholar, Frederick Cesar 
 Laharpe, whom she found was occupying a subordinate position 
 in the household of a brother of the reigning favorite, Count 
 Landskoi. 2 
 
 Laharpe was at this time thirty years old. He was an avowed 
 republican, strongly influenced by Voltaire in his youth, and later 
 an enthusiastic disciple of Rousseau. Strangely enough, none of 
 these qualities were likely at this time to injure his prestige in the 
 eyes of the autocratic Catherine. When, at a later date, the 
 excesses of the French Revolution had disillusioned the Empress, 
 her fashionable approval of liberalism (which she shared with 
 the aristocratic salons of Paris) changed to a violent hatred of 
 all that recalled the doctrines of Jacobinism. Until 1789, how- 
 ever, she saw no contradiction in choosing, for the important 
 position of tutor to the heir of the absolute Tsars, a man of 
 Laharpe's ultra-liberal convictions. 3 
 
 From the beginning of their intimate relationship, the young 
 master and his pupils appear to have been charmed with each 
 
 1 Rain, Un Tsar ideologue Alexandre l<*, pp. 7 et seq. 
 
 1 For a vivid picture of the dissolute court which surrounded the youth of Alex- 
 ander, notably the regime of Catherine's ignoble "favorites," see The Diaries and 
 Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury. 
 
 3 Rain, op. cit., pp. 16-19. Laharpe must not be confused with the critic Jean Fran- 
 cois de Le Harpe (1739-1803), whose Correspondence with the Grand Duke of Rus- 
 sia, noiv Emperor (the Emperor Paul), was published in five tedious volumes in 
 1801. This work, generally concerned with the petty jealousies of the French 
 literary world, was probably addressed to Paul in a spirit of pure snobisme. 
 
THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 other. Laharpe, filled with youthful enthusiasm for his task, 
 recognized its importance and the responsibility it entailed. In 
 order to fulfil his mission to the best advantage, he soon obtained 
 entire direction of all matters touching the education of the young 
 Grand Dukes. History and a philosophical interpretation of the 
 events it records was a favorite method of study for both the 
 republican teacher and his imperial charges. 
 
 Besides Laharpe, several other foreign "governors" and teach- 
 ers were attached to their household. Kraft taught them experi- 
 mental physics and "science." Pallas taught them botany and 
 took them on long excursions near Pavlovsk. Masson taught 
 them mathematics. But regarding matters essentially Russian, 
 Catherine wisely insisted that her grandchildren should remain 
 under the control of their own compatriots. Muraviev taught 
 them Russian history and "moral philosophy," while their reli- 
 gious education was placed in the hands of their confessor, Father 
 Andrew Samborski. Alexander's devotion as a pupil foreshad- 
 owed the generally "suggestionable" character which he devel- 
 oped in after life. His teachers not only found him a diligent 
 student — a great contrast to his brother Constantine — but he 
 also appears to have become ardently attached to all those who 
 could satisfy his precocious curiosity. 1 
 
 In 1791, when Alexander was barely fourteen, the Empress 
 Catherine decided upon his marriage. Besides the importance 
 of assuring the succession in direct line, she impatiently awaited 
 the moment when it would be possible to give the Grand Duke 
 a separate court and household, thus increasing his prestige at the 
 expense of the Tsarevitch, his father. Catherine's choice fell 
 upon the Princess Louisa Augusta, the third daughter of the 
 reigning Grand Duke of Baden. The princess and her sister 
 were subsequently invited to visit the Court of St. Petersburg, 
 where the docile Alexander promptly fell in love, with a sincerity 
 which at least did honor to his grandmother's perspicacity. 2 
 
 Alexander's marriage, which took place September 25, 1793, 
 at first scarcely interrupted Laharpe's philosophic discourses. 3 
 
 1 Bogdanovitch, Alexander I, p. 16. 
 
 2 The story of this imperial idyl is charmingly told in Elizabeth's own letters. 
 See Les Lettres de I'lmperatrice Elizabeth, published with an introduction by Grand 
 Due Nicolas Mikhaiilowitch. 
 
 3 Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. I, p. S3. 
 
INTRODUCTION b 
 
 But in 1794, the year of Thermidor, the young teacher's Jaco- 
 binism began to offend the Tsarina, and his dismissal was suddenly 
 signified to him "without rank or cross" * or any of the distinc- 
 tions usually accorded a royal tutor who had completed his task. 
 Probably, through the intervention of his pupil, he obtained a 
 postponement of his enforced departure. He used the oppor- 
 tunity which this unexpected delay afforded him to complete his 
 work, impressing upon the receptive mind of Alexander the les- 
 sons of democracy and liberalism which had already fired the 
 imagination of the future autocrat. The Grand Duke had now 
 become a disciple rather than a pupil. Laharpe alone could in- 
 fluence the curious blending of gentleness and stubborn determi- 
 nation which, even at this early age, formed the basis of Alexan- 
 der's character. 
 
 The moment of separation arrived May 9, 1795. Alexander's 
 grief and resentment at the departure of his friend and preceptor 
 was manifested publicly and without reserve. Czartoryski in his 
 Memoires records that "he was heard to declare himself with un- 
 measured harshness respecting his grandmother's actions, using 
 terms of almost inconceivable abuse." 2 The sincerity and con- 
 stancy of this ideal friendship was only proved by time. Laharpe 
 left behind him directions for the guidance of his pupil, which 
 specified in detail remedies for the faults which his interrupted 
 education might develop. In these instructions he advised Alex- 
 ander to overcome his natural timidity and to mingle as often as 
 possible with his future subjects. Only thus, he declared, could 
 the Grand Duke hope to win their love and devotion. That his 
 misgivings were not without cause is shown by the sequel. 
 
 Catherine died suddenly in 1796, and was succeeded by the 
 Tsarevitch, whose chief ambition was to make the heir of the 
 Romanovs a soldier. In the company of the young garrison 
 blades who now surrounded him, Alexander lost sight not only'of 
 his earlier ideals, but also of all that could remind him of the 
 teachings of Laharpe. His friend Czartoryski recounts the ef- 
 forts he made at this time to surround the Grand Duke with more 
 sympathetic and profitable influences. With this unselfish end in 
 
 1 Rain, op. cit., p. 42, quoting the proceedings of the Societe Imperiale de VHistoire 
 Russe, vol. V, remarks on Laharpe's unrepublican indignation at this slight. 
 2 Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. I, p. 111. 
 
6 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 view, he asked leave to present to his patron two young men, 
 Novosiltzov and Count Stroganov. In this fashion the nucleus 
 of what became known as the "Young Liberal Circle" was intro- 
 duced to the Tsarevitch during the Emperor Paul's coronation 
 at Moscow. These new friendships deserve more than passing 
 notice in considering the development of Alexander's character. 
 
 Novosiltzov, somewhat pedantic and overconscious of the 
 advantages of this new connection, soon "prepared in Russian the 
 translation of a French work filled with good advice for a young 
 Prince about to mount the throne." This was read by Alexan- 
 der with characteristic "attention and satisfaction." Under 
 these new influences, Czartoryski l notes with approval that "the 
 philosophic and idealistic side of the Tsarevitch's character 
 quickly recovered its ascendancy." These new friendships 
 brought him into renewed contact with the political philosophy 
 of the French Revolution. Stroganov, a pupil of the philosopher 
 Rom and a disciple of Rousseau, had visited Paris during the 
 Terror and listened to the dangerous eloquence of the Jacobin 
 clubs. Novosiltzov, sent to Paris by the elder Count Stroganov 
 to rescue the aristocratic young liberal from this dangerous at- 
 mosphere, had himself become infected with the doctrine of 
 "liberty and equality." He returned to Russia almost as great a 
 revolutionary as his ward. Thus, in the company of these more 
 traveled compatriots, Alexander heard reechoed the lessons of 
 Laharpe — and the voice of the spirit of liberty. 
 
 The influence of these friendships was to become the determin- 
 ing factor of the "liberal phase" which marked Alexander's early 
 career. The Young Liberal Circle, as they were called, planned 
 a campaign of propaganda to educate public opinion. Suitable 
 books were to be translated into Russian, but at first only those 
 for which official approval could be obtained. It was hoped 
 that the minds of Alexander's future subjects would thus, by slow 
 degrees, be prepared for the measures of reform to which he 
 already looked forward as the glory of his coming reign. "How 
 happy I could be were you only by my side at this moment," he 
 writes to his old master. And Laharpe, filled with honest pride 
 at his own part in the education of so generous a prince, wrote in 
 
 1 Czartoryski, op. cit., vol. l, pp. 156-157. 
 
INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 reply long letters from his quiet retreat in Switzerland. But the 
 classical maxims and sage advice of a confirmed doctrinaire of 
 the republican era were unequal to the task of guiding his disciple 
 through the fast approaching crisis of his father's reign. 
 
 While the Tsarevitch and his companions were busying them- 
 selves with their philosophical program of internal reform, im- 
 pending events were to bring him face to face with the stern 
 realities that beset a ruler. A palace revolution — a sudden, 
 fierce reversion to the customs of the Byzantine court on which 
 the early Tsars had modeled their own — was suddenly to clear 
 the way to Alexander's throne and to place him face to face with 
 problems whose theoretical solution had amused his leisure. 
 The part which he played in the preparation of the plot which 
 ended in his father's assassination has been the subject of long 
 and bitter controversy. Of a guilty foreknowledge of this tragic 
 event, history has, on the whole, absolved him. 1 
 
 The impression which Paul's character and the circumstances 
 of his death left upon Alexander during the brief period of their 
 relationship as sovereign and subject must be noted in consider- 
 ing the development of the character of the future author of the 
 "Holy Alliance." 2 In spite of a striking physical dissimilarity, 
 there was a curious resemblance between the two autocrats, father 
 and son. 3 In both Tsars we find the same tendency to generous 
 impulse marred by an almost morbid egotism; the same restless 
 zeal for governmental reform accompanied by an equal disre- 
 gard of the prejudices of those most likely to profit by their acts. 
 Finally, a wholly false conception of the historical task of a 
 
 1 Joyneville, in his Life and Times of Alexander I, analyzes Alexander's responsi- 
 bility for his father's death in the light of the Memoirs of Mme. Svetchine, Bulau's 
 Narrative, etc. According to the former, the appeal made to Alexander by the 
 conspirators was merely for aid in "constituting the Emperor a state prisoner," 
 (conversation between Count Pahlen and General Svetchine, quoted in Joyneville, 
 op. cit., vol. i, p. 118). It must also be remembered that at that time Portugal and 
 Denmark were both ruled by regents in the name of imbecile sovereigns. Joyneville 
 (p. 142) also recounts that Pahlen revealed to Alexander that Paul had ordered 
 his arrest, together with the Empress Marie and the Grand Duke Constantine. 
 "The business," according to the British Attache, Ross, "took more than three- 
 quarters of an hour." Joyneville believes this to be a direct proof that the murder 
 of Paul was not decided upon in advance (pp. 147 and 152). See also Waliszewski, 
 Le fils de la grande Catherine: Paul I er . 
 
 2 Czartoryski, op. cit., p. 253. 
 
 3 Joyneville, quoting Rostopchine, says that Paul, during his first campaign 
 against the French, desired to form a permanent league for the "suppression of 
 anarchy and democratic principles," a forerunner of the "Holy Alliance" in its 
 later phase. 
 
8 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 "benevolent despot" and an unwavering belief in the high-minded- 
 ness of their own motives led them both to perform the most 
 astounding and contradictory acts and to adopt policies which 
 were often carried through with ruthless conviction rather than 
 statesmanlike foresight. 
 
 Alexander was but twenty-three years old when he succeeded 
 to the throne of the Romanovs. Prince Czartoryski was sum- 
 moned to the capital to assume the role — but not the office — of 
 Prime Minister, which the Tsar had promised him in their youth- 
 ful conversations. The new ruler soon found himself surrounded 
 with the friends upon whom he might most naturally depend for 
 encouragement and support. The members of the "Young 
 Liberal Circle," the intimates of his boyhood, returned to St. 
 Petersburg from the four quarters of Europe, where the desire 
 of the Emperor Paul to separate the Heir-Apparent from their 
 liberal influences had dispersed them in semi-official exile. From 
 England came Novosiltzov, filled with renewed admiration for 
 the constitution and political life of the British commonwealth. 
 Stroganov, the aristocratic admirer of the French Revolution, 
 returned from the interrupted "grand tour" upon which his over- 
 democratic ideas had embarked him. Perhaps most welcome of 
 all these unofficial advisers was Alexander's old tutor, Laharpe, 
 who hastened from Switzerland at the new Tsar's summons. 1 
 
 International questions, however, rather than policies of inter- 
 nal reform, so dear to the "Young Liberals," now forced them- 
 selves on the attention of the new government. Just before the 
 Tsar Paul's assassination, that monarch had formed an ill-con- 
 sidered alliance with Napoleon, reversing Russia's former policy. 
 This had resulted in a renewal of the "Armed Neutrality," and 
 an embargo was placed upon all Russian, Swedish and Danish 
 vessels in the harbors of Great Britain. 2 Orders were also 
 given to the West India fleet to attack the Danish possessions in 
 
 1 Laharpe was now somewhat disabused of many of his youthful enthusiasms for 
 unrestricted "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity." On his return to Switzerland he 
 had taken a prominent part in inviting the French Revolutionary government to 
 interfere in the civil quarrels of his native cantons. But the victories of the French 
 troops over the armies of the Bernese oligarchy had been marked by such scenes 
 of pillage and disorder as to trouble even the "pure" republicanism of Rousseau's 
 pupil. Moreover, his fellow countrymen had, not unnaturally, held him responsi- 
 ble for his share in bringing about their predicament. 
 
 2 For a full account of this revival of Catherine's policy of the "Armed Neutrality," see 
 Garden, Histoire generate des traites de paix, vol. v, pp. 347 and 361. 
 
INTRODUCTION y 
 
 the Gulf of Mexico, while another squadron, under Nelson and 
 Parker, set sail for the Baltic (February, 1801). On April 2, 
 after a heroic defense by the Danish Admiral Fischer, the 
 British fleet won a crushing victory at Copenhagen. After offer- 
 ing terms tending to separate Denmark from Russia, which were 
 loyally rejected, the victorious expeditions proceeded up the Bal- 
 tic with the avowed intention of capturing Kronstad and St. 
 Petersburg. 
 
 Thus, during the first days of his reign, the Emperor Alexan- 
 der found himself faced with an international crisis of the first 
 magnitude. Little time remained to weigh in the balance ab- 
 stract problems concerning "the rights of neutral nations," which 
 the "Powers of the North" had sworn to defend. The first duty 
 was to find some immediate remedy which might safeguard Rus- 
 sia's national interests and his too accessible capital. 
 
 In considering the somewhat inglorious settlement to which 
 Alexander now gave his consent, several factors must be taken 
 into account. His desire was to obtain a respite during which he 
 might devote himself to the task of securing essential internal 
 reforms. 1 He was constitutionally averse to war (though af- 
 fected by what his courtiers called "paradomania") and was 
 under the peaceful influence of Czartoryski's idealism. 2 
 
 It was a cruel irony of fate which during the first weeks of his 
 reign placed the Tsar in the dilemma of choosing between a forced 
 abandonment of cherished principles of "international action" 
 and an undignified flight from his royal residence ! Yet the prin- 
 ciple embodied in the "League of Neutrals" was one of the few 
 results of the Empress Catherine's foreign policy which his ideal- 
 istic conceptions could approve. He, therefore, caught eagerly 
 at the suggestion of the British Government for a "conference." 
 This was a form of negotiation which Alexander seems gen- 
 
 1 Nevertheless, Alexander's first impulse was to defend "the rights of neutrals" from 
 respect "for the opinions of his august father." It was Vorontzov, his Ambassador in 
 London, who urged upon him the necessity of an Anglo-Russian alliance to meet the 
 situation. See an article by F. de Martens, in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, vol. 
 vin, 1894. 
 
 2 In considering Czartoryski's influence at this time it must be remembered that he was 
 above all else a patriotic Pole, and that all his hopes of renewing the early, generous 
 enthusiasm that Alexander had shown for that much wronged nation lay in stressing the 
 duties of an unselfish international viewpoint. This powerful personal influence was to 
 be exerted during the whole period of the Tsar's "liberal phase," the period covered by the 
 later "Instructions to Novosiltzov." See Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. I, p. 101. 
 
10 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 erally to have found irresistible. All the powers interested were 
 invited to send representatives in order to arrange the differences 
 concerning the "rights of neutrals," and in response to this over- 
 ture Admiral Hyde Parker was notified by the Russian authori- 
 ties of the new Emperor's disposition for peace. To his own con- 
 ception, Alexander's "ideals" were actually to offer a convenient 
 solution to his difficulties! The Prussian King was desired to 
 evacuate Hanover for reasons which were "a distinct advance 
 upon the international morality of the day," and, while costing 
 the Tsar nothing, enabled him to meet the views of Great Britain. 
 Alexander wrote that he was not only "desirous of pacifying the 
 North," but also of establishing a "continuing world peace." He 
 ended with the pious hope that in view of the high object to be 
 accomplished, Frederick. William "would place no difficulties in 
 the way." 1 
 
 On June 17, 1801, a Congress of the "Powers of the North," 
 viz., Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia, assembled in St. 
 Petersburg. The protocol agreed upon, with the exception of a 
 clause forbidding paper blockades, was wholly favorable to the 
 contentions of Great Britain. The parties agreed: (1) That a 
 neutral flag should not cover enemy goods, and (2) that visit and 
 search were permissible even when vessels were under the con- 
 voy of a vessel of war. 
 
 If the Scandinavian allies of Russia, one of whom had glori- 
 ously suffered the loss of her fleet in defending the rights of neu- 
 trals, could see in this arrangement little else than a base betrayal 
 of the principles which the "Armed Neutrality" had sworn to 
 defend, Czartoryski might at least console the Tsar with the 
 thought that he had given an example of philosophic devotion 
 to the cause of international peace and had saved his capital from 
 invasion. 
 
 Soon after this rather inglorious settlement of Russia's dif- 
 ficulties, in 1803, Alexander appointed Czartoryski, whose in- 
 fluence becomes more and more traceable in ensuing events, as his 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs. In spite of the clouds gathering 
 on the horizon, notably an estrangement with France, the new 
 Minister announced a program of peace and a foreign policy 
 that eminently suited Alexander's ambitions. Said Czartoryski : 
 
 'See Garden, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 376. 
 
INTRODUCTION 11 
 
 I firmly believed that it might be possible for me to reconcile the tenden- 
 cies of the Russian nation with the generous ideas of its ruler, and to make 
 use of the Russian craving for glory and supremacy for the general benefit 
 of mankind. The object was a great but a remote one, to be pursued con- 
 sistently and with perseverance, and to be executed with patience and skill. 
 I thought it was worthy of the national pride of the Russian people. I 
 would have wished Alexander to become a sort of arbiter of peace for the 
 civilized world, to be the protector of the weak and the oppressed, and that 
 his reign should inaugurate a new era of justice and right in European poli- 
 tics. 1 
 
 Soon after Czartoryski's appointment, in 1804, the Duke of 
 Enghien, grandson of the Great Conde, was treacherously seized 
 by Napoleon's orders, within the territory of the Grand Duchy of 
 Baden, and dragged across the French frontiers. After the 
 mockery of a court martial, he was shot to death in the moat of 
 the fortress of Vincennes. The disregard for international 
 rights shown by this violation of neutral territory and its accom- 
 panying judicial murder aroused all Europe to a fury of protest. 
 Two months later, Bonaparte notified the Powers, still aghast 
 at this unnecessary tragedy, of his formal assumption of the Im- 
 perial title. The new Emperor of France could hardly have 
 chosen a more unfavorable moment for entering the ranks of the 
 sovereigns of Europe. Although in practical effect the aboli- 
 tion of the Consular title was a mere matter of form, Russia 
 refused to recognize Napoleon's usurpation. Only Austria and 
 the subservient Hohenzollern dynasty, both of whom had felt 
 the weight of his displeasure, acquiesced in the monarchical preten- 
 sions of the ex-revolutionary general. The way was prepared 
 for a fresh coalition of the Powers of Europe, in which the Tsar 
 of Russia was to play the role of mediator which Czartoryski so 
 ardently desired him to assume. Their ideals and dreams of 
 international polity were, moreover, about to receive definite 
 form through the medium of the "Instructions to Novosiltzov." 2 
 The instructions follow the policy of a carefully written 
 opinion dated April 5, 1804, in which Czartoryski sought to de- 
 fine the Tsar's attitude towards a government which "tramples 
 under foot the most generally accepted principles of international 
 law." The duty of Russia and the Powers "to decry and avenge" 
 
 Czartoryski, op. cit., vol. I, p. 370. 
 
 2 These instructions are too well known through the studies of Sorel and Phillips to be 
 quoted in extenso. 
 
12 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 such action was discussed at length. 1 In the opinion both of Czar- 
 toryski and the Emperor a preliminary understanding between 
 Great Britain and Russia promised the surest guarantee for the 
 success of their international program and the proposed alliance 
 against the hegemony of France. In September, 1804, Alexan- 
 der was prepared to lay before the British Cabinet a scheme not 
 only for immediate military action, but also for an eventual 
 rational settlement of the entire diplomatic situation. The un- 
 derstanding between these Powers was to form the basis of a 
 wider coalition. Such, indeed, was the only means which might 
 conceivably place a limit upon Napoleon's ambitions. 
 
 "Novosiltzov's Instructions" outline the plan which Alexander 
 now proposed to the British Cabinet. Long buried in the 
 archives of the Russian Foreign Office, these were first made 
 public in their complete form through the publication of Czar- 
 toryski's Memoires. They had previously been known only 
 through a partial quotation by Tatistcheff and notably through 
 Pitt's reply couched, doubtless from reasons of policy, in a 
 language similar to the Emperor's own. 2 
 
 The opening paragraph of Novosiltzov's Instructions con- 
 tains an eloquent recognition of the growing force of public 
 opinion in international affairs: 
 
 The most effectual weapon which France now wields — one with which 
 the French continue to menace their neighbors — is their ability to persuade 
 public opinion that their cause is that of the liberty and prosperity of all 
 nations. 
 
 As a condition preceding the "moral union" he sought with 
 Great Britain, he next asks the latter's adhesion to a "New Or- 
 der," which must be brought about. The "New Order" was a 
 highly practical program of "self-determination," the outlines of 
 a reconstruction of Europe on "national" lines. The King of 
 
 1 Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. II, p. 2. 
 
 2 The Instructions to Novosiltzov are given in full in Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. II, 
 p. 27, and Appendix. In reading them, the truth of Czartoryski's contention, that history 
 has neglected both their importance and significance becomes apparent. Modern writers 
 have in a measure repaired this error, recognizing that they laid the foundations upon 
 which, ten years later, rested the program of intervention and reconstruction contained in 
 the Treaties of Kalisch and Chaumont. "Compare this language," says Sorel, speaking 
 of Novosiltzov's Instructions, "with that which Koutousov addressed to the Germans in 
 1813, and with that which Alexander addressed to the French liberals in 1814. It will be 
 seen that all forms part of the same program. The same may even be said of the measures 
 planned in 1804 and 1814 for the reconstruction of continental Europe." Sorel, U Europe 
 et la Revolution Franqaise, part vi, p. 39. 
 
INTRODUCTION 13 
 
 Sardinia, who had been unjustly deprived by Napoleon of his 
 throne, was to be reestablished, but not until he had promised to 
 give his people the benefits of "a wise and free constitution." The 
 importance of maintaining Swiss neutrality was also recognized 
 "as an essential factor in the peace of Europe." In restoring 
 Holland to national existence the modern theory of self-determi- 
 nation is recognized: "The character of the national desires 
 must be considered before deciding upon the form of government 
 to be established." 
 
 A paragraph respecting the attitude to be adopted by the 
 Anglo-Russian Alliance towards France herself is equally sig- 
 nificant at the present day: 
 
 I now come to the language which, in my opinion, it will be necessary to 
 hold with respect to France herself. After having imposed our will upon 
 her, and after, through just, benevolent and liberal principles, having mani- 
 fested our intentions (giving her confidence that she can count upon the 
 promises made by our Alliance), we should declare that it is not upon 
 France that we make war, but only upon a government as tyrannical towards 
 France as towards the rest of Europe. 1 
 
 There is no suggestion in the Tsar's plan of a superstate (the 
 favorite remedy of the eighteenth century philosophers for all 
 international ills) nor any hint of the doctrine of intervention 
 in the internal affairs of neighboring states (the policy which was 
 later to render the pretensions of the Holy Alliance most hateful 
 in the eyes of the "Constitutional Powers"). 2 
 
 Perhaps the most important paragraph of Novosiltzov's In- 
 structions is the one in which the Tsar, after a brief historical 
 notice of former proposals to organize humanity, finds the 
 guarantee of future peace in a pact binding the nations of Europe 
 by means of a general treaty or confederacy — a League of 
 Nations — whose guiding principles would be those of interna- I 
 tional law and wherein mediation would be substituted for war : 
 
 1 The Tsar's insistence that the Allies war only against Napoleon and not against the 
 French people finds a parallel in President Wilson's declarations that "the real enemy is 
 not the German people so much as the military masters who enchain them as well as the 
 foreign territories they have conquered." 
 
 2 "It seems evident that this great aim can only be considered as attained when we shall 
 have succeeded in reconciling the nations with their governments, and in making the latter 
 capable of action tending to the best interests of their people. We must also fix the rela- 
 tions of the states among themselves by means of well-defined rules, which it will be in the 
 interest of all to respect. Profound examination of these matters and the lessons of 
 history will prove that these two results can only be obtained when the interior order of all 
 states is based upon free institutions, protected against the passions and ambitions of the 
 individuals who may be placed at their head." 
 
14 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 I can see no reason why, after peace has been declared, we should not 
 undertake to negotiate a general treaty which might become the basis of 
 the reciprocal relations between the States of Europe. This indeed will 
 almost inevitably suggest itself at the moment of a general pacification, 
 especially if no incomplete and partial peace be allowed to interfere, an end 
 to which both powers are equally interested in devoting all their efforts 
 and designs. 
 
 When the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, a similar proposal was 
 entertained. But the degree of political development and other circum- 
 stances paramount at the time would not allow the consummation of this 
 great work, in spite of the fact that for a long time this pact formed the 
 basis of foreign relations. Modern diplomacy should be adequate to meet 
 the situation which presents itself. Impossible though the attainment of 
 a state of eternal peace would appear to be, nevertheless in many ways this 
 end might be forwarded if the treaty, which should conclude the present 
 general war, will embody clear and precise principles and prescriptions with 
 respect to international law. Why should not a law of nations be evolved 
 assuring the privileges of neutrality and consecrating as an obligation never 
 to commence war without having exhausted all the means of mediation by 
 a third party? — a mediator who, having through the proper means examined 
 the respective wrongs of the litigants, will seek to compound them? It is 
 by applying such principles that a true and lasting pacification of the world 
 might be obtained. 
 
 It is, moreover, interesting to note that membership in the pro- 
 posed League of Peace was based upon a voluntary decision by 
 its members. Alexander evidently believed that the advantages 
 to be obtained through becoming a party to this general treaty 
 would be patent to all the civilized states of Europe : 
 
 After having experienced the drawbacks and inconveniences of a com- 
 plete — though precarious and illusory — independent existence, the majority 
 of all Powers would probably desire to belong to such a League. This 
 would not only guarantee as far as possible their external tranquillity and 
 safety, but also (especially in the case of states of a secondary order) would 
 offer them internal guarantees of protection. 
 
 Nor does the Tsar avoid consideration of the practical details 
 
 of his problem. An interesting paragraph in the "Instructions" 
 
 has reference to questions of political geography and of strategic 
 
 and — even of economic — frontiers : 
 
 In order to secure our ends, it would be necessary to fix the frontiers 
 which properly belong to each separate state. It would thus appear 
 especially desirable to follow the boundaries which nature herself has laid 
 down, i. e., mountain chains, seas, etc. Finally, the proper means of ac- 
 cess should be assured to each nation for the interchange of the products 
 of their soil and industry. It might also be advisable if possible to obtain 
 that each state should consist of homogeneous people in agreement among 
 themselves and with the government that rules them. 
 
INTRODUCTION 15 
 
 Finally, with respect to the old principle of "the balance of 
 power" and the ever-present questions of the lesser nationalities, 
 Alexander offers a striking solution — the grouping of the smaller 
 states into federations which would place them more nearly on a 
 par with their neighbors: 
 
 The disturbances which have shaken Europe almost continually for so 
 many centuries have only taken place because so little attention has been 
 paid to any system of natural equilibrium. Just how far this principle 
 could be made to govern the new arrangement which should follow the 
 general pacification it would be difficult for the present to decide. It would 
 depend largely upon what powers would be admitted to these councils and 
 the logical outcome of events. Nevertheless, it is even now possible to 
 recognize the necessity of strengthening as far as possible the secondary 
 powers in order that these may be capable of self-protection, at least until 
 the protecting powers and the other members of the League can come to 
 their assistance. For the same reason it is evident that the existence of 
 very small states would not be in accord with the ends desired. Since these 
 are without the necessary powers of resistance, they can only serve as tempta- 
 tions to the ambitions of larger states without contributing in any way to 
 the general good. A means of remedying this inconvenience might be found 
 by uniting them to larger states, or in grouping them in small federative 
 unions. 
 
 Although the defeat of the Allies at Austerlitz was to postpone 
 for nearly ten years the possibility of any practical application of 
 the principles contained in Novosiltzov's Instructions, Alexander 
 had every reason to believe that they had formed the basis of the 
 proposed general European settlement which was the avowed 
 object of the Third Coalition. The British attitude was, in sub- 
 stance, a cordial acceptance of Alexander's proposals. 
 
 Pitt's reply to Novosiltzov (made public on May 15, 1805), 
 read as follows: 
 
 It would seem from the views advanced by H. I. M., views to which 
 H. M. adheres, that three principal purposes are to be sought: (1) to free 
 from the dominion of France the countries conquered by her since the out- 
 break of the revolution, and to restrict her to her former frontiers; (2) to 
 ensure to the countries released from the French yoke not only their con- 
 tinued peace and happiness, but also to erect them into a barrier against 
 further French aggression; (3) to establish (with the renewal of peace) 
 a convention and guarantee for the protection and mutual safety of the 
 Powers, and to establish in Europe a general system of public law. . . . 
 His Majesty would consider this noble plan as incomplete if the restoration 
 of peace were not at the same time accompanied by measures tending to 
 secure the system thus brought into existence. It would appear desirable 
 when the general pacification occurs that a treaty be concluded to which 
 all the great powers of Europe might become parties. Through this means 
 
16 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 the possession of their respective territory, as now established, would be 
 fixed and recognized. To secure this end the powers must engage them- 
 selves reciprocally to maintain and support each other against all efforts to 
 disturb and infringe upon their rights. Such a treaty would endow Europe 
 with a common law and tend as much as possible to repress all enterprises 
 troubling the general peace. 1 
 
 The diplomatic history of the epic struggle between Alexan- 
 der and Napoleon, which, except for the precarious duration of 
 the Tilsit Alliance, was to continue for more than a decade after 
 the date of Novosiltzov's Mission, has been studied in detail by 
 Sorel 2 and Vandal. 3 Their scholarly interpretation of new mate- 
 rial and the examination of archives not available to earlier stu- 
 dents have revealed the story of these momentous years, probably 
 in a form approaching finality. Yet everywhere in the pages of 
 these historical masterpieces the glory of the vanquished out- 
 shines that of the victor. In their revived enthusiasm for the 
 Empire, the authors have done but scant justice to what may 
 well appear at the present day the most significant feature of the 
 campaigns that ended in the downfall of the French Emperor: 
 the Tsar's determination, again and again apparent, to dedicate 
 the victories of the Alliance to securing an organized peace and 
 the establishment of a European System. In the negotiations to 
 induce the Courts of Vienna, Stockholm and Berlin to join in a 
 levee en masse of Europe against the pretensions of Napoleon 
 there was no question of the sweeping plans of international re- 
 construction which had preceded the signing of the "Treaty of 
 Concert" between the Tsar and the King of England. Neverthe- 
 less, "the young monarch firmly believed that he was fulfilling an 
 international mission in becoming the military Champion of 
 Humanity." 4 Even when the Third Coalition went down in de- 
 feat (1805) at Austerlitz — and the Tsar instead of maintaining 
 the rights he had championed in Novosiltzov's Instructions found 
 
 1 See Garden, Histoire g'en'erale des traites de paix, vol. vm, p. 317. Until the publi- 
 cation of Czartoryski's Memoires, Pitt's reply was the only public document with respect 
 to this important negotiation except for a brief notice by Tatichev. Novosiltzov's nego- 
 tiations in London during January, 1805, were continued throughout February by the 
 British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The result was the Alliance or "Treaty of Concert" 
 of April 11. For a full account of the diplomatic negotiations preceding the Third Coali- 
 tion against France, see Garden, op. cit., vol. vm, pp. 302 et seq. 
 
 2 A. Sorel, L Europe et la Revolution Franraise. 
 
 3 A. Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I er . 
 
 * Tatistcheff, Alexandre I cr et Napoleon, p. 86. 
 
INTRODUCTION 17 
 
 himself defending the frontiers of his own Empire against the 
 victorious armies of the greatest political "realist" of all times — 
 Alexander still clung to his ideals of European solidarity. The 
 Russian disaster at Friedland (1807) was the result of his 
 chivalrous devotion to Frederick William III of Prussia, an 
 effort to save him from the consequences of his belated adhesion 
 to the Third Coalition. 
 
 When a way was opened for the conquerors to the heart of 
 Russia, the peace which Napoleon imposed upon the Tsar at Tilsit 
 ' was offered in the form of an Alliance, and the methods used 
 by the French Emperor to attach Alexander to his "Continental 
 System" recall the irresistible appeal he had made to the morbid 
 » vanity of his father the Tsar Paul. 1 Tilsit was the negation of 
 every policy and principle that Alexander had heretofore pro- 
 fessed. 2 The treaty laid down a program of opportunism : a 
 "free hand" granted to Russia in Finland and a rectification of 
 the Turkish-Russian frontiers were little more than an Imperial 
 bribe. In the moment of the Tsar's greatest military peril he 
 was thus offered an opportunity to resume the imperialistic poli- 
 cies of Catherine the Great, 3 which the reactionary advisers of 
 his court had accused him of abandoning. But Tilsit was from 
 the beginning an alliance merely in name. Beneath the surface,' 
 in spite of the assurances and compliments exchanged between the 
 Emperors, French and Russian diplomacy continued a struggle 
 without truce or common advantage. Neither sovereign could 
 obtain the fulfilment of the essential features of a pact which only 
 joined their real interests for a few brief months. The meeting 
 at Erfurt, scarcely a year after the historic interview on the Nie- 
 men, showed Alexander ready to plot the destruction of his Im- 
 perial "ally" with the latter's most treacherous foes. 4 After 
 more than three years of deceit and diplomatic evasion, it was 
 almost joyously that the Tsar abandoned the plan of sharing the 
 dominion of the universe with Napoleon. Resuming the dialectic 
 
 1 Sorel, op. cit., vol. VI, p. 73. 
 
 2 Paul at least was persuaded that his alliance with the "Corsican tempter" was 
 to "ensure the Peace of Europe." Ibid. 
 
 3 Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I*'. 
 
 *Ibid. At Erfurt Alexander had a famous interview with Talleyrand, who more than 
 hinted his willingness to betray Napoleon. See Dupuis, Le Ministere de Talleyrand en 
 1814, vol. i, p. 27. 
 
18 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 of his earlier negotiation with Pitt — the language of Novosilt- 
 zov's Instructions — we find him (1812) assuring his new ally, 
 Bernadotte (the former Napoleonic General, elected Crown 
 Prince of Sweden) that their common task is "to revive in Europe 
 the regime of liberal ideas and to save her from the abyss of bar- 
 barism to which she seems hurrying." * 
 
 Into the details of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, the burn- 
 ing of Moscow on the approach of winter, which made a with- 
 drawal, if not a retreat, inevitable, and the loss of the Grande 
 Arm'ee^ it is unnecessary to enter for the purposes of this intro- 
 duction. Suffice it to say that Alexander's mind was busied with 
 far-reaching schemes long since prepared, which were to make of 
 the victories gained but the starting point for a second interna- 
 tional crusade. He brushed aside governments, and appealed 
 directly to the people, 2 and warned their rulers that if they re- 
 mained abjectly persistent in their system of federation, it was 
 the voice of the people which must be heard. It was with the 
 peoples of Germany, rather than with their rulers, that the Treaty 
 of Kalisch, uniting Russia and Prussia, was signed. 
 
 Through a series of agreements anticipating both political and 
 military action, the links of the Grand Alliance were one by one 
 solidly forged. The Treaties of Reichenbach, the second link in 
 the great system which was to control the destinies of Europe 
 during the ensuing years, were signed on June 14 and 15, 1813. 
 These constituted a formal treaty of alliance between Great 
 Britain, Russia and Prussia, by the terms of which a new coalition 
 came into being. At Reichenbach (June 15), England also 
 renewed her continental policy, strengthening the bonds of the 
 alliance with her generous subsidies. Pitt promised to pay the 
 enormous costs of the armies of Russia and Prussia, but at the 
 same time insisted upon a renewal of Alexander's earlier pro- 
 posals, that none of the Powers were to permit themselves to 
 enter into any separate negotiations with the enemy. In Articles 
 
 1 Alexander to Bernadotte, quoted by Rain, vol. I, p. 208. 
 
 2 " We now appeal to the people through this manifesto in the same terms that 
 our envoy will use toward their rulers. If these latter remain abjectly persistent 
 in their system of federation it is the voice of the people which must be heard. 
 The rulers who have plunged their subjects in oppression and disaster must be 
 forced to embrace the cause of vengeance and glory. Let Germany but recall her 
 ancient valor and the tyrant will cease to exist." Garden, vol. xiv, p. 181. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 19 
 
 I and II of the Treaty of Reichenbach the return of the "lands 
 in Germany held by the French Princes was declared to be the 
 object of the common efforts." Toeplitz (September 9, 1813), 
 the third link in the chain of alliances, ranged Austria on the side 
 of the Allies. The "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (October, 
 1813) sealed the military fate of Napoleon. The era of diplo- 
 macy was about to begin. 1 
 
 After Leipzig, even Schwartzenberg, the Austrian military 
 commander, believed the greatest obtainable military results to 
 be achieved. "All . . . are of this opinion," he wrote, "but 
 the Emperor Alexander ... !" Words failed the horrified 
 Austrian tactician on his attempts to describe the determination 
 with which the Tsar continued the pursuit of his enemy. With- 
 out a complete military victory the international peace he aimed 
 at was impossible. The advance towards Paris continued, "the 
 army dragging forward, the diplomats murmuring and conspir- 
 ing." 2 At Chatillon, where Napoleon was negotiating for peace, 
 the conflict of selfish interests broke out afresh. 3 It was already 
 becoming manifest that to find a common ground of agreement 
 among the victors would be a task almost as difficult as Napo- 
 leon's overthrow. The French success of Montmiriel and Cha- 
 teau-Thierry caused these differences to be momentarily forgot- 
 ten. But the battles of Arcis-sur-Aube and La Feree-Cham- 
 peniose, while restoring the military equilibrium of the coalition, 
 renewed the dissensions of their councils. 
 
 The conference at Chatillon was in fact little else than a 
 poorly staged diplomatic comedy which deceived neither antago- 
 nist. Napoleon's ear , mess to negotiate rose and fell with 
 the varying fortunes of his military campaign. The Allied 
 proposals — purposely made more and more unacceptable to 
 France — were not even presented until February 17. Badly 
 beaten at the engagement of La Rothiere, Napoleon had author- 
 ized his representative to make "the broadest concessions." It 
 
 ^he text of the Treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach and Toeplitz are to be found in 
 Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traites de Paix, vol. Ill, p. 234; vol. I, pp. 568, 571. 
 
 2 Sorel, op. cit., part VIII, p. 257. 
 
 3 These discussions turned upon Napoleon's successor, the question of the "natural 
 limits," the plan of campaign, etc. The Tsar only consented to take part on "the basis 
 of Frankfort," communicating his reservations in a memoir to Metternich. See Sorel, 
 op. cit., part vm, pp. 250-255. 
 
20 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 required but a few slight successes, however, to encourage him 
 again to resist the Allies' demands. 1 
 
 One ominous fact must have convinced Napoleon's envoy, 
 Caulaincourt, that his mission was more difficult than ever be- 
 fore; the negotiations of Chatillon were carried out "under a 
 general instruction" wherein the Allies "considered themselves 
 as maintaining one and the same interest." 2 
 
 This was the policy to be formally adopted by the important 
 Treaty of Chaumont, an event of the deepest significance to the 
 inauguration of a new political system for Europe, which occurred 
 on March 10. The signatures of all the Allied Powers had been 
 affixed to the same document after Leipzig. But no formal 
 League of the Allies as yet existed, except such as arose from a 
 complicated system of politico-military protocols and treaties, 
 notably those of Reichenbach and Toeplitz. These mainly con- 
 templated military action against the "Enemy of Europe," and 
 only hinted at political arrangements. When the negotiation of 
 a final peace became imminent, the necessity of consolidating the 
 basis of some future common policy binding on all the Allies be- 
 came apparent. 3 
 
 It was to secure this important end that the Treaty of Chau- 
 mont (bearing the date of March 1 ) had been proposed. In the 
 preamble it was declared that the high contracting parties, 
 
 having offered to the French government terms for the conclusion of a 
 general peace (in case of the refusal by France of these conditions) desire 
 to strengthen the bonds which unite them in the vigorous prosecution of a 
 war undertaken with the intention of bringing a close to the misfortunes of 
 Europe. 4 
 
 Having thus clearly stated its main objects, the Treaty sets 
 forth its intention "to insure the future tranquillity of Europe by 
 reestablishing a just equilibrium of the powers." 
 
 After fixing the subsidies to be advanced by Great Britain, 
 Article V continues : 
 
 'See Talleyrand, Memoires, vol. II, p. 151, and A. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de 
 I 'Europe, vol. I, pp. 6-7. Napoleon always believed himself on the eve of a Marengo or 
 Austerlitz. After a theatrical tirade, he had pronounced for a peace at any price on 
 January 4th. Caulaincourt was somewhat disconcerted at the extent of these powers and 
 hampered by ignorance of the military situation. See Sorel, op. cit., part vii, pp. 259-262. 
 
 2 Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, pp. 72-79. 
 
 3 Metternich was even believed to be negotiating separately with France. Sorel, op. 
 cit., part vni, p. 289. 
 
 4 This treaty is given in Martens, op. cit., vol. ir, p. 48. 
 
INTRODUCTION 21 
 
 The contracting parties will agree after the conclusion of the peace with 
 France ... to take defensive measures for the protection of their respec- 
 tive territories in Europe against all attempts on the part of France to 
 trouble the results of this pacification. 
 
 This was nothing less than the "mutual guarantee" which the 
 Tsar had long advocated. But in order not to raise premature 
 differences between the Allies, the "order of things which shall 
 be the happy outcome of their efforts " was purposely left vague. 
 
 Certain broad lines of policy were, however, laid down. It was 
 determined that Switzerland should be raised to the rank of an 
 independent state, that Spain should be restored to the Bourbons, 
 and that Germany should form a federal union. In order to carry 
 out these provisions the means to be used were further set forth 
 as "amicable intervention" (Article VI) and, this failing (Article 
 VII), an international army might be raised, each party furnish- 
 ing a contingent of 60,000 men. 
 
 The Treaty of Chaumont thus became an elaboration of the 
 policy determined upon at Toeplitz. While directed against 
 France, it also furnished a treaty basis for future concerted 
 action. Formally renewed at Paris in 1.815, and at Aix-la- 
 Chapelle in 1818, it may be said to constitute the foundation of 
 the "system" which formed the groundwork of European diplo- 
 macy until the year 1848. 
 
 A great change is observable, however, in the language of this 
 document when it is compared with the generous sentiments 
 embodied in Alexander's Kalisch pronunciamento, or with the 
 liberal ideas contained in his tocsin appeal to the "peoples of 
 Europe." The diplomats of Europe could find no place in a formal 
 agreement for a league to maintain European peace "based on a 
 new conception of public law," which Novosiltzov had discussed 
 with Pitt. The Treaty of Chaumont was the resultant of con- 
 tending forces and drew its future strength and usefulness from the 
 purposely vague language of the articles dealing with matters 
 which were a subject of controversy between the Powers. The 
 future of Poland was ignored, as well as the question of Napoleon's 
 successor; on the other hand a " balance of Europe " was definitely 
 guaranteed (Article XVI) for a period — which might be ex- 
 tended — of at least twenty years. Although France was the 
 power ostensibly aimed at as a possible disturber of this highly 
 
22 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 desirable equilibrium, the terms were general enough to raise the 
 issue to the rank of a great European principle. 
 
 With this general affirmation of the solidarity of the great 
 Powers, a principle which he was to affirm with increasing enthu- 
 siasm during the ensuing period of diplomatic reconstruction, 
 the Tsar was obliged to be content. Castlereagh, however, had 
 been the controlling influence of the debates and the attitude 
 which he adopted from the beginning had been guided by the terms 
 of definite instructions, which clearly show the limitations England 
 was about to place upon her Continental policy. "The Treaty of 
 Alliance," he declared, "is not to terminate with the war, but is 
 to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations to 
 support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of 
 stipulated succours. The casus foederis is to be an attack by France 
 on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties." l 
 It was the development of this policy of "reservations" which in 
 the end was to wreck the whole framework of the Tsar's idealistic 
 proposals for a European confederation. To offset Great Britain's 
 determination to remain aloof from the internal quarrels of Con- 
 tinental Europe, Alexander was soon to propose a plan of action 
 having for its basis a definite recognition of the duty of inter- 
 national solidarity. This policy, "consecrated" in the mystical 
 pact of the Holy Alliance, was to serve ends wholly foreign to the 
 Tsar's earlier ideals. 
 
 Accompanied by the King of Prussia, Alexander entered Paris 
 in triumph on March 30, 1814, and Napoleon's abdication was 
 signed a few days later. 2 The first Treaty of Paris followed the 
 signing of a convention, dated April 23, 1814. The article forming 
 the basis of both the convention of April 23 and the ensuing 
 Treaty 3 guaranteed to France "the frontiers as they actually 
 existed on January 1, 1792." This deprived the restored mon- 
 archy of all the conquests made by the Republic and the Empire, 
 with the exception of certain territories belonging to the Con- 
 federation of the Rhine. 
 
 1 These instructions, quoted by Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, p. 66, from the 
 Foreign Office Records, are contained in a Cabinet Memorandum, dated December 26, 
 1813. 
 
 2 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhallowitch, L' Empereur Alexandre I^r, vol. I, p. 134. 
 
 3 The details of the negotiation of this treaty are given in full in Talleyrand, Memoires, 
 vol. II, pp. 172 et seq. 
 
INTRODUCTION 23 
 
 The keynote of Bourbon diplomacy was to ignore past events. 
 When Alexander visited the Paris mint, a medal was struck in 
 his honor which bore on one side the inscription: "To the restorer 
 of peace in Europe"; on the reverse was emblazoned the arms of 
 France, with the words: "In the month of April, 1814, France 
 joined the Grand Confederation of the Powers of Europe." 1 
 Many months, however, were to elapse before these words had 
 any real significance. The real terms which defined the allied 
 policy toward France were contained in secret articles annexed 
 to the Treaty of Paris. 2 These stipulated: 
 
 The disposal of the territories which his Very Christian Majesty has 
 renounced by the terms of Article III of the Treaty (of Paris), an arrange- 
 ment from which a real and durable European equilibrium must arise, 
 will be decided at the Congress along lines which shall be determined 
 among themselves by the Allied Powers. 
 
 Although the intention of the Treaty of Paris was several times 
 declared to be that of "effacing all traces of the recent unfortunate 
 events," 3 it was in fact little else than the enumeration of the 
 terms imposed by victorious conquerors upon a fallen enemy. 
 
 In addition to the Allies of Toeplitz and Chaumont, Spain, 
 Portugal, and Sweden were invited to accede to the Treaty, 
 although — a derogation from the Tsar's favorite principle of "united 
 action" — identical treaties were signed separately with France by 
 each of these Powers. By the terms of these treaties eight of the 
 principal Powers of Europe found themselves parties to a general 
 agreement. Their alliance was still chiefly aimed at keeping a 
 ninth great Power in a state of military inferiority, yet the Tsar 
 might well feel that the foundations of his confederation of Europe 
 had been well and truly laid. With the exchange of the ratifica- 
 tions the sovereigns and their representatives dispersed. An era 
 of good feeling, recalling the atmosphere of international solidarity 
 which had reigned during the earlier conferences of the war, once 
 more united the Allies. But as Sorel significantly remarks: "All 
 important matters were but adjourned until the Congress." 4 
 
 1 Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, Memoirs, p. 177. This incident is significant as show- 
 ing the quick apprehension by the restored government of Alexander's favorite "inter- 
 national" policy. 
 
 2 Martens, Nouveaux SuppUmens, vol. i, p. 329. 
 
 3 Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. II, p. 197. 
 
 4 See Sorel's important appreciations, op. cit., part via, p. 346. 
 
24 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Vienna at the opening of the Congress presented an impressive 
 spectacle. Besides two hundred and sixteen chiefs of diplo- 
 matic missions, representing with few exceptions all the Christian 
 Powers of Europe, 1 this great "international parliament" was 
 attended in person by four kings and two emperors. While the 
 civilized world awaited, with a natural anxiety, the result of the 
 deliberations of the assembled statesmen, a series of balls, carnivals 
 and tournaments varied the monotony of these debates and fur- 
 nished entertainment for the host of courtiers and their ladies 
 who surrounded the assembled monarchs. 2 
 
 No one had awaited the formal opening of the great Congress 
 with more eager anticipations than the idealistic Tsar of Russia. 
 His brief stay in St. Petersburg had convinced him that he was 
 once more autocrat, not only by right of law, but also in the hearts 
 of his subjects. 3 It was fortified by the knowledge that his acts 
 were approved by the people of his whole vast Empire that the 
 Tsar had proceeded to Vienna. He was, moreover, confident 
 that the debt which Europe owed him for Russia's powerful inter- 
 vention in the late wars would make him the natural arbiter of 
 the debates which were to organize a permanent peace. 4 
 
 Alexander was accompanied on his journey by a complete diplo- 
 matic staff. Gentz in his letters criticizes the Tsar's intention 
 to negotiate in person rather than to depend upon the training 
 and experience of his entourage. His determination to do away 
 with intermediaries had resulted in a quarrel between the Tsar 
 and his Grand Marshal, Count Tolstoy. "Persuaded that his 
 kindness towards him could have no bounds, Tolstoy opposed 
 Alexander's appearance at the Congress. His idea was that the 
 Emperor could only play an undignified role. Worn out by these 
 representations, his Majesty . . . decided to part with his 
 Grand Marshal." 5 He had early reason to regret his neglect of 
 their excellent advice. The necessity of making rapid decisions 
 amidst the heated debates of the council chamber deprived him 
 of the advantage always maintained by a deputy acting ad referen- 
 
 1 Talleyrand, vol. II, pp. 275 et seq. 
 
 2 For an account of these festivities, see La Garde, Fetes et Souvenirs du Congres de 
 Vienne. 
 
 3 His natural modesty prevented the Holy Synod from conferring upon him, according 
 to the ancient Russian fashion, the title of "Blessed of God" in recognition of his victories. 
 See Rain, op. cit., p. 245. 
 
 4 Sorel, op. cit., part VIII, p. 384. 
 6 La Garde, op. cit., vol. I, p. 197. 
 
INTRODUCTION 25 
 
 dum. This egotistical pretension to override the accepted customs 
 of diplomacy was to place the Tsar, on more than one occasion, 
 in a position of inferiority. Equally disquieting was his depend- 
 ence on individuals like Czartoryski, Capo DTstria and Laharpe, 
 personally sympathetic advisers rather than sources of information 
 and counsel to which the traditional policy of the Empire required 
 him to give weight. 1 
 
 The deliberations of the Congress of Vienna may be studied in 
 detail in the memoirs of the French and Austrian representatives, 
 Talleyrand and Metternich. For the purposes of our subject 
 they need only be considered in so far as they concern the ensuing 
 era of the international congress and the upbuilding of the "Sys- 
 tem of 1815." The members of the Grand Alliance were loath 
 to admit new influences to their debates. They preferred to 
 consider the Congress as a council of the Allies. As late as Novem- 
 ber 1, one month after the assembly of the delegates, Metternich 
 still maintained that "the Congress is not a Congress; its com- 
 missions are not commissions." Indeed the only advantage which 
 he consented to accord to the Vienna gathering was that "it 
 seems an opportunity to remove the physical distances that 
 divide Europe." 2 
 
 A few days later he declared that the "very word of Congress 
 terrified the Prussians" and that it would be preferable to call the 
 conference together only after some agreement had been reached 
 with respect to the principal questions involved. 3 In other words 
 he proposed that this great "European" gathering should only be 
 allowed the power of ratification after a division of the spoils of 
 Napoleon's Empire had been made by the victorious Allies. 
 
 The Tsar's intentions were from the beginning distrusted by 
 many. There was indeed in his policy a curious blending of inter- 
 national idealism and practical advantage to Russia. Behind all his 
 fine phrases a determination was evident to draw profit from the 
 military situation. "The only reward which I ask," he repeated 
 with somewhat affected enthusiasm, "is to be allowed to repair in a 
 measure the great crime committed by Catherine II." By uniting 
 the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, endowed with a liberal constitution, 
 to his own autocratic domain, he planned to restore the ancient 
 
 x Cf. Lansing, The Big Four, p. 38. 
 2 Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. II, p. 420. 
 'Ibid., p. 431. 
 
26 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Kingdom of Poland. 1 England and Austria, however, were un- 
 alterably determined not to permit any change of frontier which 
 might allow a Russo-Prussian entente to become a preponderant 
 force in Europe. Poland according to their plans was again to be 
 called upon to play her historic part as a buffer state. 
 
 Thus when the Tsar, strengthened by his own conceptions of the 
 debt which Europe owed in return for his sacrifices in the cause 
 of the Alliance, formulated his demands, he found himself faced 
 by a firm coalition determined upon refusal. A series of stormy 
 personal interviews ensued; horrified rumor affirmed that in his 
 conversations with Metternich strong personalities were indulged 
 in on the part of the Tsar 2 and that the Austrian envoy's rejoin- 
 ders had been made in a tone of respectful but ill-disguised con- 
 tempt. On October 1, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the Tsar, 
 setting forth at length his opposition to the latter's views with 
 respect to the Duchy. This resulted in a sharp interchange of 
 "extra-official notes," wherein Czartoryski was called upon to 
 defend "the right of Poland to nationality," a contention in con- 
 venient accord with one of the principal "points" of Novosiltzov's 
 Instructions. This extraordinary debate, carried on by private 
 correspondence, finally exasperated the Emperor, who refused 
 to continue further negotiations by this means. 3 Tolstoy's 
 prophecies respecting the "personal negotiation" of his sovereign 
 were being fulfilled. 
 
 Above the clamor of contending ambitions and particularistic 
 interests now sounded a new rallying cry, Talleyrand's famous 
 formula of "legitimacy." This principle indeed appeared the 
 only one generally applicable to a situation complicated by 
 so many contending interests. One cause which had restrained 
 Castlereagh from openly opposing the military power wielded by 
 the Tsar was the fact that Great Britain was still embarrassed by 
 the long-drawn-out war with the United States. With the sign- 
 ing of the Peace of Ghent (December 24, 1814), full liberty of 
 action was restored to England's forces. Castlereagh immediately 
 declared himself ready to adhere to Talleyrand's plans, and the 
 latter had the satisfaction of concluding the secret alliance which 
 
 1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. i, p. 22. 
 
 2 Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. II, p. 509. 
 
 3 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhailowitch, op. cit., vol. I, p. 147. 
 
INTRODUCTION 27 
 
 he had so long desired to form between France, Austria and Eng- 
 land (January 3,181s). 1 
 
 Thus a few weeks after France had been dragged to the bar to 
 hear the sentence of Europe passed upon her misdeeds, she found 
 herself, through the surprising diplomatic abilities of her chief 
 representative, party to a secret treaty wherein two of her 
 principal opponents formally engaged themselves to act with her 
 in common against "the pretensions recently manifested" by the 
 two remaining members of the great coalition. "In case certain 
 circumstances shall arise," read this document, "from which 
 may God preserve us, Great Britain, Austria and France agree to 
 unite their strength in order to maintain the principles formulated 
 in the Treaty of Paris." 2 
 
 Only the return of Napoleon from the Island of Elba restored a 
 semblance of harmony to the debates. The alliance and princi- 
 ples of Chaumont were reaffirmed and all the Powers joined in a 
 manifesto decrying the Emperor's treason to the cause of Europe. 3 
 The end of Napoleon's great adventure of "The Hundred Days" 
 left the Allies in an awkward and ill-defined relationship toward 
 France. A tendency was manifested to hold the twice-restored 
 Bourbons responsible for their failure to prove the blessings of 
 "legitimacy." Moreover, the rivalries and differences which had 
 arisen at Vienna seriously separated the Allies. The secret 
 Treaty of Alliance between France, Great Britain and Austria — 
 forgotten by Louis XVIII in his hasty flight — was known to 
 Alexander. The Tsar, in spite of this proof of Bourbon duplicity, 
 was still disposed to be lenient towards France. Motives of altru- 
 ism, judged by his allies to be wholly exaggerated, and a kind of 
 mystical piety (which, as we shall later see, resulted in the negotia- 
 tions leading to the pact of the Holy Alliance), now guided his 
 policy. But the Russian troops had taken only a minor part in 
 the Waterloo campaign and the Tsar found his prestige sensibly 
 diminished. 
 
 The Prussians now demanded an indemnity of 1,200,000,000 
 francs, but compromised on a permission to occupy Luxembourg. 
 The situation was also improved by the dismissal of Talleyrand. 
 
 1 See Talleyrand, op. cit., p. 550, and Debidour, op. cit., p. 36. Debidour recognizes the 
 full importance of the influence exercised by the War of 1812 upon European affairs during 
 this period. 
 
 2 See Talleyrand, op. cit., appendix, p. 561. z Ibid., p. 134. 
 
28 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 The latter, informed by Royal decision that his services were no 
 longer needed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disappeared 
 from the scene. A new minister, the Duke of Richelieu, acceptable 
 both to Russia and the Allies, was installed in his place. It was on 
 these terms that the second Treaty of Paris was signed on Novem- 
 ber 20, 1815. 1 
 
 On the same day, another treaty of the utmost significance in 
 the development of the System of 1815 was signed between 
 Austria, Russia and Great Britain. This was known as the Treaty 
 of Alliance and contained the following important clause: 
 
 Article VI. In order to consolidate the intimate ties which unite the 
 four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting 
 Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under their own 
 auspices or by their representative ministers, meetings consecrated to 
 great common objects and the examination of such measures as shall be 
 judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of Europe. 2 
 
 The above article (which was a substitute for one proposed by the 
 Tsar calling upon the Allies to give proofs of the "permanency and 
 intimacy of their union") had been modified by Castlereagh to 
 suit the reluctance of the English Cabinet to ally themselves 
 definitely to any system of "European action" indefinitely pro- 
 longed or even to indorse permanently "the principles consecrated 
 by the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna." 3 
 
 No reference whatsoever was made in the highly practical 
 I terms of the articles of either the "Treaty of Alliance" or the 
 » Treaty of Paris to a treaty signed on September 26 by the sover- 
 eigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia, a pact subsequently known as 
 the "Holy Alliance." It now remains for us to consider the sig- 
 nificance of this manifesto and its relation to the System of 1815. 
 , Had Alexander rested upon his military laurels as the con- 
 queror of Napoleon, his fame would have been safe for all time. 
 His experiences during the debates of Vienna were in many ways 
 a bitter disillusion to the Tsar-Idealist. As Rain remarks: 
 
 The aureole of triumph that had long hovered about the head of the 
 Emperor of Russia grew pale during the Congress. He had arrived in 
 Vienna like a conqueror, expecting to play the role of arbiter of Europe 
 in the old capital of the Holy Roman Empire — and to hold the position 
 he had assumed since the beginning of the coalition. He had, however, 
 only triumphed among the ladies and in the salons. In the conference 
 
 1 Martens, op. cit., vol. u, p. 682. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 737. _ 
 
 8 Phillips, op. cit., pp. 134 et seq. 
 
INTRODUCTION 29 
 
 he had been tricked — bamboozled 1 — and his diplomacy mastered by 
 that of Metternich. He found his life-long dreams opposed and mis- 
 understood by his closest advisers, and even under the most favorable 
 conditions impossible of realization. 2 
 
 It appears certain that Alexander had planned to bring to the 
 attention of the assembled sovereigns the generous schemes for 
 international organization and "concerted" action which he had 
 first proposed in his Instructions to Novosiltzov and embodied in \ 
 the military treaties preceding the signing of the Treaty of 
 Chaumont. But at Vienna the inopportune return of Napoleon, 
 coinciding with his diplomatic struggles to revive Polish nation- 
 ality, prevented any elaboration of these plans. Moreover, 
 Alexander was absent with his armies at the time most appropriate 
 for the consideration of such matters, during the closing days of 
 the conference, and the "Final Act" of the Congress, drawn up 
 by Gentz and edited by Metternich, was a triumph of their cold- 
 blooded system of "real politics." 
 
 Concerning the period of Vienna, Alexander later wrote to his 
 friend Golytzine. From this letter we learn of his desire to secure 
 from the representatives of the Powers assembled in the old capital 
 of the Holy Roman Empire some definite recognition of the 
 principles to which he believed himself committed. He felt — not 
 without reason — that so favorable an opportunity might never 
 again recur to lay the foundations for a general treaty of peace. 
 This letter (dated February 15, 1822) is also highly interesting 
 because it contains Alexander's own version of the origin of the 
 Treaty of the "Holy Alliance: " 
 
 . . . You tell me to return to my policy and ways of thinking such 
 as these existed between the year 1812 until my departure for Vienna. 
 You appear to suppose that in some way I have changed my manner of 
 thinking since that time. What stay in Vienna have you in mind? 
 (Do you refer to that which I made during the congress of 1814?) 
 . . . You seem to forget that the plan of the "Holy Alliance" came 
 into my mind at that time. I have frequently told you it was to crown 
 all my work there. It was only the return of Napoleon from Elba 
 which, by bringing our stay in Vienna to a close, forced me to postpone 
 the execution of this plan until after a new period of struggle which was 
 happily ended through the aid of Providence. At Paris, when Napoleon, 
 through the grace of God, was overthrown for the second time, the Most 
 High enabled me to realize the plan which I had cherished since the 
 Congress, and permitted me to trace upon paper the Act of which you 
 
 1 Rain, writing in 1910, here uses the word bafoue. 
 
 2 Rain, op. cit., p. 259. 
 
30 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 have knowledge. As soon as I returned to Petersburg I composed my 
 manifesto, by which the act of the "Holy Alliance" was made public, and 
 which a little later, on January 1, 1816, I published to the world . . . l 
 
 In the first days of September, 1815 — not without intention of 
 restoring the prestige which the Russian armies had lost by their 
 absence from the glorious field of Waterloo — Alexander decided 
 to display their well-trained strength as a diplomatic reminder 
 to his allies. 2 A great review of the entire Russian force was 
 held upon the Plain of Vertus, near Chalons. This spectacle the 
 Tsar also determined was to be the dramatic prelude to what he now 
 considered the most important political act of his career, the mani- 
 festo of a Holy Alliance of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace. 
 
 On September 10 the magnificent troops of Alexander's guard 
 and line (drilled even in war to a state of precision, for which the 
 Emperor Paul's "paradomania" was largely responsible) passed 
 before the Russian sovereign and his guests, the Emperor of 
 Austria and the King of Prussia. Following the straight files 
 of the grenadiers came the turbulent ranks of the Cossacks, the 
 wild cavalry of the steppes, whose exploits during Napoleon's 
 retreat had given them a wide reputation throughout Europe. 
 The religious ceremony was perhaps the most remarkable part of 
 the spectacle. On the broad plain seven altars had been erected, 
 where the imposing ritual of the Greek service was celebrated in 
 the presence of this reverent host. Their thundering responses 
 to the chanting of the priests showed them ready to die with 
 fanatical zeal at the word of their Autocrat. 
 
 Still under the powerful influence of this significant military 
 pageant, 3 the sovereigns present at the review were invited by 
 Alexander to affix their signatures to the famous document sub- 
 sequently known to history as the "Holy Alliance." 4 On Sep- 
 tember 14/26 the Tsar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of 
 Prussia formally declared that henceforth their united policy had 
 but a single object: 
 
 1 Given in full by the Grand Due Nicolas Mikhaiilowitch, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 221 et seq. 
 
 2 This great review is considered by Pasquier to have been held with the generous object 
 of "bringing the Allies to adopt a more moderate conduct towards France." Memoires, vol. 
 iv, p. 22. See also Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, Memoirs, p. 202. 
 
 3 See note, Rain, op. cit., p. 280. 
 
 4 While detailed to the French Fourth Army, in 1917, the author came across a monu- 
 ment — shattered by German shell fire — which was erected near Chalons to commemorate 
 the Tsar Alexander's dream of perpetual peace. 
 
INTRODUCTION 31 
 
 To manifest before the whole universe their unshakable determination 
 to take as their sole guide, both in the administration of their respective 
 states and in their political relations with other governments, the pre- 
 cepts of religion, namely, the rules of Justice, Christian Charity and 
 Peace. 
 
 These precepts, far from being applicable only to private life, should, 
 on the contrary, govern the decisions of Princes, and direct them in all 
 their negotiations, forming, as they must, the only means of giving 
 permanence to human institutions and remedying their imperfections. 
 
 Following this unusual preamble came the terms of a diplomatic 
 agreement, no less extraordinary in the eyes of contemporary 
 statesmen: 
 
 Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all 
 men to consider each other as brethren, the three contracting Monarchs 
 will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity. 
 Considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions 
 and in all places lend each other aid and assistance; towards their sub- 
 jects and armies, they will extend a fatherly care and protection, leading 
 them (in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are themselves 
 animated) to protect Religion, Peace and Justice. [Article I.] 
 
 In consequence, the sole principle in force, whether as between the 
 said Governments or as between their subjects, shall be that of doing 
 each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by an unalterable good- 
 will the mutual affection with which they should be animated. They 
 will consider themselves as members of one and the same Christian 
 nation; the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely dele- 
 gated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family. The 
 rulers of Austria, Prussia and Russia thus confess that the Christian 
 world of which they and their people form a part has in reality no other 
 sovereign than Him to Whom alone power rightfully belongs . . . Their 
 Majesties consequently recommend to their people with the most tender 
 solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which arises from a 
 good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves 
 every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties 
 which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind. [Article II.] 
 
 All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles 
 which have dictated the present Act — and shall acknowledge how im- 
 portant it is for the happiness of nations . . . that these truths 
 should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence 
 which belongs to them — will be received with equal ardor and affection 
 into this Holy Alliance. [Article III.] 1 
 
 The language of the pact thus suddenly presented by the Tsar 
 to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia for their signa- 
 tures had no parallel in the archives of diplomacy. In adhering 
 to the Holy Alliance these sovereigns bound themselves to nothing 
 
 1 This version is made from the French original in Martens, vol. II, pp. 656-658. 
 Cf. also, British State Papers, vol. in, pp. 211-212. 
 
32 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 more than a promise to observe in their foreign and domestic 
 policy "the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to man- 
 kind"; yet, as Gentz reports, they were "amazed and terrified" 1 
 by the possible consequences of their act. Reliance upon moral 
 principles so general and widesweeping were indeed to lead to 
 policies and events unforeseen at the time by their author. 
 
 But in order to understand aright the meaning which the mysti- 
 cal invocation of the Holy Alliance connoted in the mind of Alex- 
 ander, it now becomes necessary briefly to consider some of the 
 later inspirations of the Tsar's internationalism. Alexander's 
 early training under Laharpe, a follower of that Rousseau who had 
 summarized and put in his own persuasive language the princi- 
 ples of the Abbe de St. Pierre's project for perpetual peace, 
 accounts for the clear and lucid argumentation of the secret 
 Instructions to Novosiltzov. His letter to Golytzine (1822), 
 which recounts, in retrospect, the origins of the Holy League, 
 is also significant. Golytzine's mystical and religious influence 
 began during the days of the invasion of Russia by Napo- 
 leon's Grand Army. It is beyond the purpose of this study to 
 consider, at length, Alexander's later relations to the Baroness de 
 Krudener and the French reactionary philosopher, Bergasse, in 
 whom contemporary historians saw the direct inspiration of the 
 Act of September 14/26, 1815. 2 These relations, of great interest 
 in themselves, belong rather to an intimate and personal biography 
 of Alexander. To the student of psychology — especially the psy- 
 chology of the reformer — they have a value which it would be 
 difficult to overestimate. But in a study of the real influences of 
 the Holy Alliance upon the organization of Europe, they need 
 only to be mentioned in passing. 
 
 It was shortly after the return of Napoleon from Elba, while 
 the Tsar was hastening through Germany to join his armies in 
 France, that he first met this extraordinary woman who was to 
 be so strangely associated with his preparation and promulgation 
 of the Holy Alliance. It was by a combination of circumstances, 
 probably not wholly fortuitous, that the "sibyl" found herself 
 for the first time face to face with her sovereign and future pupil. 3 
 
 1 Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. I, p. 216. 
 
 2 See Metternich's statement in the following chapter; also Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 23. 
 
 3 Madame de Krudener's life has been written in two volumes by Eynard. An 
 entertaining biography largely drawn from the above, Life and Letters of Madame de 
 Krudener, has appeared in English by C. Ford. She was also the subject of two of St. 
 
INTRODUCTION 33 
 
 Following this first brief interview, during which the Tsar seems 
 to have been much impressed by Madame de Kriidener's per- 
 sonality, he invited her to join him in Paris when her prophecies 
 concerning the overthrow of Napoleon should be fulfilled. On 
 July 14, 1815, she appeared in that capital, her arrival almost 
 coinciding with that of the victorious Tsar. She was lodged in 
 quarters in convenient proximity to those occupied by Alexander 
 himself. Her salons soon became the scene of an almost continual 
 "prayer meeting." While Madame de Kriidener still assisted 
 publicly at the elaborate services of the Greek rite, celebrated in 
 the Tsar's chapel at the Elysee, the private reunions in her own 
 home were modeled on the simple gathering of the early Chris- 
 tians. 1 Whenever the Tsar honored her gatherings with his 
 presence, Madame de Kriidener, falling on her knees, would com- 
 mence a long prayer, generally reciting the triumphs of religion 
 as exemplified in Alexander's victories, together with pressing 
 demands for the general repentance and conversion of mankind. 
 Her aims seem to have included a general reconciliation of all the 
 churches of Europe. It was to aid her in this work that she 
 appealed especially to the repentant Tsar, a task he may well 
 have believed related to his own international aims. 
 
 Mystified by the strange relationship between Madame de 
 Kriidener and her Imperial "disciple," contemporary writers have 
 undoubtedly exaggerated her influence. Extravagant stories 
 were told concering the mystical ceremonies that attended their 
 interviews. The language used by the "initiated" was in itself 
 calculated to excite suspicion and ridicule. The vocabulary of 
 Madame de Kriidener finds an echo in Alexander's letters and even 
 in his official documents — a fact which probably gave rise to the 
 rumor that she either wrote with her own hand or inspired many 
 of his political acts. That she was responsible, however, for any 
 of the Tsar's political theories is not only denied by contemporary 
 
 Beuves' literary "portraits." Barbara Julie de Weitinghov was born in Riga in the year 
 1764. When their first meeting took place, she was therefore considerably older than 
 Alexander (born 1777) and certainly well past the bloom of her former beauty. (Ford, 
 op. cit., p. 4.) Her father was a Senator of the Empire, sincerely pro-Russian in spite of 
 his Baltic ancestry. Her early religious environment was that of the Greek Orthodox 
 Church. She was married at an early age to Baron de Kriidener — and after a youth of 
 pleasure and frivolity became a mystical religieuse and devoted to good works. 
 
 1 These were attended, however, principally by members of the highest society. Among 
 her congregation were the Duchess of Bourbon and Duras, Mme. Recamier (who was 
 asked to make herself "as ugly as possible so as not to trouble souls"), Chateaubriand and 
 Benjamin Constant. Eynard, Vie de Madame de Kriidener, vol. II, p. 30. 
 
34 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 writers, 1 but is also rendered highly improbable from all that is 
 known of her teachings. It is difficult, moreover, to conceive that 
 an experienced statesman like the Tsar should have been more 
 than superficially influenced by such a source of political advice. 
 Recent evidence tends to prove that another member of Madame 
 de Kriidener's circle was infinitely more influential than the Baro- 
 ness in this respect. 
 
 The part played by the reactionary philosopher Bergasse in 
 the preparation of the Holy Alliance is defined by another con- 
 temporary writer, Leopold de Gaillard. 2 Bergasse was a political 
 writer of some note under the first Bourbon restoration. However 
 reactionary his theories may have been, they were at any rate the 
 result of scientific inquiry, not of mystical inspiration. From 
 Gaillard's account, it becomes evident that Bergasse furnished 
 the "political" theories, while Madame de Kriidener furnished the 
 language and inspiration of the Tsar's manifesto. Bergasse seems 
 to have dreamed of a system of theocracy, vicariously asserting 
 itself through the institution of legitimate monarchy. The reign 
 of universal peace he believed might be secured through an 
 active cooperation between the Kings of Christendom, the "Lord's 
 anointed" on earth. The rights of man with difficulty found a 
 place in this new order of ideas, although their rulers were bound 
 by higher laws to respect them. However mystical and impracti- 
 cable such a doctrine might appear to the statesmen of Europe, 
 it was, nevertheless, to be the principle he besought Alexander to 
 apply to the adjustment of international differences. 
 
 The influence of Bergasse long outlasted that of the "Letton- 
 ian sibyl." Even during the Congress of Verona he continued in 
 correspondence with the Tsar, urging that he use the might of 
 the "Holy League" to stamp out the power of the revolutionary 
 "sects." There is also evidence of somewhat stilted and formal 
 
 1 "I do not know upon what foundations the authors of the two histories of Alexander 
 have been pleased to attribute to the exalted imagination of Madame de Kriidener the idea 
 of the Holy Alliance and the League of universal peace, — a noble project, which could only 
 have had birth in the mind of Alexander himself. Neither at that time nor afterwards, 
 when on several occasions he conversed with me, did the Emperor pronounce the name of 
 the author of Valerie, although he often spoke of the celebrated literary men of past times 
 and of the present, and even of women distinguished for their wit and intelligence, such as 
 Madame de Stael, whose great talents he admired." Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, p. 153. 
 
 2 Quoted in Bergasse: A Defender of Old Tradition under the Revolution. This interest- 
 ing collection of family papers has a valuable introduction by M. Etienne Lamy, mem- 
 ber of the French Academy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 35 
 
 requests on Alexander's part for further light upon the subject. 1 
 It soon becomes evident, however, that the Tsar was tired of the 
 torrent of advice poured out by this loquacious valetudinarian. 
 The influence of Nicholas Bergasse — an influence which has per- 
 haps not been sufficiently reckoned with in judging of the re- 
 actionary phase of Alexander's policy — appears to have ended 
 in much the same way as other momentarily preponderating in- 
 fluences in the life of the great idealist. Like Czartoryski, 
 Speranski, Madame de Kriidener and other lesser oracles, Bergasse 
 "became a bore" and was somewhat brutally discarded in conse- 
 quence. The Tsar possessed to a finished degree the faculty of 
 taking advice when he needed it to support his own faltering 
 judgment. But once his course was decided upon, he became 
 suspicious and intolerant of anything that savored of direction. 
 Like all convinced doctrinaires, he abhorred sermons unless he 
 himself occupied the pulpit. 
 
 *The "sects" in this correspondence seem to have played the role of the "reds" in our 
 own time. Alexander's note of acknowledgment dated 4/16 August, 1822, admits that 
 he has "only been able to consider these matters hastily." Bergasse, p. 383. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 "A Congress of Kings was to be held at Cambray. It was to consist of 
 Maximilian the Emperor, Francis the First king of France, Henry the Eighth 
 of England, and Charles, the sovereign of the low countries. They were to 
 enter, in the most solemn manner, into mutual and indissoluble engage- 
 ments to preserve Peace with each other, and consequently, Peace through- 
 out Europe . . . But certain persons, who get nothing by Peace and a 
 great deal by War, threw obstacles in the way, which prevented this truly 
 kingly purpose from being carried into execution." Erasmus, The Complaint 
 of Peace (1517). 
 
 Through their adhesion to the "Act of September 14, 1815," 
 on the Plain of Vertus, the chief Continental Powers had reluc- 
 tantly signed the acknowledgment of an obligation to "com- 
 mon action." 1 If the mystical language of the "Holy Alliance" 
 contained any practical meaning this lay in its affirmation that the 
 sovereigns of Europe should "on all occasions and in all places 
 lend each other aid and assistance." Nor was this to be a "partial 
 and exclusive alliance." All Powers who should choose solemnly 
 to avow its "sacred principles" were to be received in its bonds 
 "with equal ardor and affection." Before noting the effect of 
 this invitation upon the non-signatory Powers, it would be well 
 to consider certain evidence concerning the attitude of the signers 
 themselves toward the vague program to which they found them- 
 selves pledged. 
 
 The spirit in which Alexander's cherished scheme for a Christian 
 League of Peace was received by his allies is perhaps best shown 
 in Metternich's own account of the events just preceding the signa- 
 ture of the manifesto: 
 
 During the course of the negotiations which brought about the signa- 
 ture of the second Peace of Paris, the Emperor Alexander asked me for an 
 interview. He then informed me that he was busy with a great enter- 
 prise concerning which he especially desired to consult the Emperor 
 Francis. "There are certain matters," said the Tsar, "which can only 
 be considered in the light of intimate beliefs. Moreover, such beliefs 
 are entirely subject to influences and considerations of a personal char- 
 acter. If this matter were purely an affair of state, I would immediately 
 have asked for your advice. The subject, however, is one of such a 
 
 ir The name of Holy "Alliance" or "League" was a popular designation. With refer- 
 ence to the much discussed adhesion of the Prince Regent of Great Britain, Gentz observes: 
 "The Prince Regent, either carelessly or to be agreeable — or even to make fun of his 
 August Ally (the latter is very possible in view of the fact that his signature had no value 
 without a countersign) answered with an autograph letter adhering to the pact." Gentz, 
 Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. I, p. 217. 
 
 37 
 
38 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 nature that the council of official advisers can be of no use. It is one 
 requiring the decisions of sovereigns themselves . . ." Several days 
 afterwards, the Emperor Francis sent for me and informed me that he 
 had just returned from a visit to the Tsar, who had asked him to come 
 alone to discuss matters of high importance. "The subject of our con- 
 versation," said the Emperor, "you will understand, after reading the 
 document the Tsar has submitted to me with the request I give it my 
 earnest attention . . . For my own part, I have no sympathies with 
 the ideas it contains, which have given me food for great unrest." 
 
 It did not require any very serious study to convince me the document 
 had no other value or sense except considered as a philanthropic aspira- 
 tion cloaked in religious phraseology. I was convinced it could in no 
 way be considered the subject of a treaty between sovereigns, and that 
 it might even give rise to grave misinterpretations of a religious character. 1 
 
 Metternich found the King of Prussia, who had also been con- 
 sulted by Alexander, averse to thwarting the desire of his powerful 
 ally, but equally doubtful as to the propriety of signing the 
 manifesto in its original form. It was only after Metternich had, 
 not without difficulty, secured the Tsar's consent to a number of 
 changes that the promised signatures of the Emperor of Austria 
 and the King of Prussia were finally obtained. In the case of 
 Emperor Francis this act was executed (as Metternich states) 
 "in spite of a natural antipathy with which the whole project 
 inspired him." In closing his account of the above transaction, 
 Metternich adds the following significant, though somewhat dis- 
 ingenuous, paragraph: 
 
 The irrefutable proof of what I have detailed above is found in the 
 fact that subsequently there never was any question among the Cabinets 
 of Europe of a "Holy Alliance"; that no such questions indeed could 
 arise. It was only those hostile to the monarchical party who sought to 
 exploit this act and use it as a weapon of calumny against its authors. 
 The Holy Alliance was never founded to restrain the liberties of the 
 people, nor to advance the cause of absolutism. It was solely the expres- 
 sion of the mystical beliefs of the Emperor Alexander; the application of 
 the principles of Christianity to public policy. It is from this strange 
 mixture of religious and political theories that the conception of the Holy 
 Alliance arose. It was developed under the influence of Madame de 
 Krudener and Monsieur Bergasse. No one knows better than myself 
 the true meaning of this empty and sonorous document. 2 
 
 Metternich (who at a later date was to turn to the purposes of 
 Austrian diplomacy the bond of indiscriminate solidarity which 
 Alexander believed to be the essence of the Holy Alliance) always 
 insisted upon the essential difFerence between the League of Sover- 
 
 'Metternich, Memoires, vol. i, pp. 209-210. 
 2 Ibid., pp. 211-212. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 39 
 
 eigns and the "conventional" agreements of the System of 1815. 
 Posterity, he believed, would ascribe to his "system" — rather 
 than to the Tsar's manifesto — the credit for the long peace 
 enjoyed by Europe from the downfall of Napoleon to the outbreak 
 of the Crimean War. ^Perhaps the truest conception of this much- 
 misunderstood document may be obtained from the writings of 
 the two philosophers to whom Alexander was chiefly indebted for 
 his political theories — Bergasse and Laharpe. 
 
 Two fundamental ideas (wrote Bergasse) appear as the basis of the 
 Treaty of the Holy Alliance: The Sovereignty of God, the Brotherhood 
 of Mankind. 
 
 The spectacle offered by the events of the Revolution has afforded a 
 terrible lesson both to the nations and their rulers. The catastrophes 
 which have shaken the foundations of Europe had one fundamental 
 cause: the weakening of the bonds of religion and the resulting corruption 
 of both peoples and princes. This corruption of public morals brought 
 with it inevitable disorder and anarchy. The systematic repudiation of 
 all Divine Law — and the pretensions advanced by those who believed 
 only in the sovereign rights of man — were the fundamentals of revolu- 
 tionary doctrine. According to these theories (had such a result been 
 possible) organized disorder would have been permanently established, 
 thus inaugurating a period of fresh disasters. 
 
 In the presence of such a possibility it became a great and solemn 
 necessity to proclaim as a guiding principle the sovereignty of the 
 Divine Will — and the essential doctrine that nations as well as indi- 
 viduals must obey His laws if they desire to continue in a state of peace 
 and prosperity.*/" 
 
 In the face of the general criticism which the mystical language 
 of Alexander's manifesto aroused, even his old teacher Laharpe 
 was moved to defend the good intentions — and good sense — of his 
 Imperial pupil. There was little in common, however, between 
 the theories of the Holy Alliance and his own philosophical pre- 
 cepts. His half-hearted explanations are chiefly interesting 
 because of his early relations to the Tsar. 
 
 In answer to an article on "Alexander of Russia," by Impeytany, 
 Laharpe wrote: 
 
 Although intrepid in the midst of danger, Alexander had a horror of 
 war. Thoroughly aware of the abuses that excite the discontent of 
 nations, he hoped that during a lengthened peace, the want of which 
 was generally felt, the governments of Europe, recognizing the impor- 
 tance of undertaking such reforms as the necessities of the age called for, 
 would seriously apply themselves to that work. To this end a state of 
 profound tranquillity was indispensable; and as the confusion of the 
 
 1 Bergasse: A Defender of Old Tradition under the Revolution, pp. 261-262. 
 
40 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 past thirty years appeared to have greatly weakened the old ideas of 
 order and subordination, he thought to offer a remedy by making a 
 solemn appeal to religion. So far at least as this monarch is concerned, 
 no doubt such an appeal was an emanation proceeding from his own 
 noble heart; but the genius of evil soon took possession of these philan- 
 thropic conceptions, and turned them against himself. The assem- 
 blage in the "Plaine de Vertus" (14 September, 1815) of a Russian 
 army of 160,000 men ready for the field, struck with amazement the 
 diplomatic corps of Europe, who were present at the imposing spectacle; 
 but such an exhibition of the military strength of a vast empire alarmed 
 them much less than the invisible power and perfect moral influence 
 which the greatness of soul and well-known principles of the monarch 
 who now reviewed his troops had created. At this period, indeed, from 
 north to south, from east to west, the eyes of the oppressed were turned 
 towards Alexander I; but from this moment also is to be dated the con- 
 spiracy which secretly plotted to strip him of that formidable moral 
 power, which gave him for auxiliaries every friend of enlightenment and 
 humanity — the universal cooperation of honest men. Disposed by the 
 native moderation of his character to consent to anything which might 
 remove fears of his preponderating influence, and willing at any price 
 to dissipate the alarm that was feigned or felt, he consented to the 
 establishment of a court of Areopagus, where a majority of votes should 
 decide the measures to be taken in common for the maintenance of the 
 general tranquillity. The genius of evil quickly caught a glimpse of the 
 advantage he might reap from so generous an abrogation of this pre- 
 ponderating influence. Thanks to the troublesome and vexatious turn 
 the members managed to give to the progress of ordinary affairs, the 
 confidence of the nations was impaired, and the magnanimous monarch 
 who had so well deserved it saw it lost, amid the impious acclamations 
 of the enemies to his glory, who did not hesitate to impute to his obstinate 
 and absolute will, measures the most unpopular which they dictated in 
 their Areopagus. 1 
 
 The suspicions and distrust with which his declaration of peace 
 and good will was received by the Powers of Europe 2 caused 
 Alexander to take decisive measures to correct the impression 
 that his "Great Enterprise" was intended to hide a policy of 
 self-interest. On March 18, 1816 (following an Imperial ukase 
 ordering that a manifesto summarizing the treaty of the Holy 
 Alliance be read in all the churches of the Empire), Alexander 
 wrote a long letter to his Ambassador in London, Count 
 Lieven, disclaiming any intention of hostile action "against 
 non-Christian nations." He protested with pathetic vehemence 
 
 1 Schnitzler, Secret History of the Court and Government of Russia, vol. i, pp. 70-72. 
 
 2 Writing under date of October, 1815, de Maistre describes the effect produced in St. 
 Petersburg by the signing of the Holy Alliance: "This document has not yet been printed, 
 but has been read at Gastchina in the presence of the Empress . . . Its author is Alex- 
 ander himself, who writes with great facility and elegance." Joseph de Maistre, Lettres, 
 vol. i, p. 360. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 41 
 
 against the calumny which persisted in considering this act of 
 Christian love and fraternity as masking a plan for further con- 
 quest. 1 
 
 In this declaration, written by Alexander's own hand, we may 
 recognize not only the spirit of mystical ardor which lay at the 
 root of the "Holy Treaty," but also the very style and dialect of 
 this extraordinary document. 
 
 The letter to Lieven was, moreover, a renewed appeal to Great 
 Britain to join the chief Powers of Europe in their Pact of Peace. 
 At the time the Holy Alliance was promulgated the Prince Regent 
 had refused to become a party to this supplemental treaty, "not 
 because of the principles set forth," but because (as he declared 
 in a letter of October 6, 1816) "the Act of September 26, 1815, was 
 personally concluded by the signatory sovereigns while the British 
 Constitution demanded that treaties should be signed by the 
 responsible Ministers." 2 
 
 Liberal opinion in Great Britain had shown itself immediately 
 suspicious of this Brotherhood of Sovereigns, and indeed of the 
 whole language and tone of the "Holy Pact." Partisan spirit and 
 a desire to embarrass the government were undoubtedly at the 
 bottom of many of the fiery speeches made by the Liberals in 
 
 ^he letter is given in full in Grand Due Nicolas Mikhailowitch, V Empereur Alex- 
 andre I?', vol. I, pp. 171-172: 
 
 St. Petersburg, March i8th. 
 To my Ambassador, Count Lieven, Sir: 
 
 Having considered it advisable to give wide currency to the Act of Fraternal and 
 Christian Alliance concluded the 14th of September last (old style) with my Allies, H. M. 
 the Emperor of Austria and H. M. the King of Prussia, I have decided to expose both its 
 spirit and true meaning to the persons who, like yourself, are charged with interpreting my 
 intentions, at the courts allied with Russia. The explanations which I will now give, will 
 allow of no further misconceptions with respect to the act itself, nor of the manifesto 
 announcing it to my people. 
 
 The mass of rumors which have reached me respecting the false interpretations given to 
 this guarantee of union and harmony show the high importance of some more precise 
 explanation regarding the motives upon which it is based. The Genius of Evil, over- 
 thrown by the hand of a Providence which disposes as it wills of both sovereigns and their 
 people, now makes a final effort to besmirch the terms of this Declaration by suggesting 
 political motives as incompatible with the intentions which have inspired it as they are 
 contrary to the salutary end it is destined to fulfil. My allies and myself, moved by the 
 same noble purposes which inspired the last great European struggle, have had no other end 
 in view than the means of applying more efficaciously to both the civil polity and external 
 relations of States the principles of Peace, Concord and Love, which are the fruit of the 
 Christian Religion. 
 
 It has been our pleasure to consider this act a means of associating ourselves with the 
 very essence of these saving precepts — rules of conduct which have been too long confined 
 to the sphere of private relationships. 
 
 2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, p. 22. Except for this obvious and informal approval of 
 the Christian principles affirmed in the Holy Alliance there is no other ground for the 
 statement that Great Britain ever adhered to this pact. 
 
42 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Parliament and the denunciations that soon appeared in the 
 newspapers of the day. During the two brief sessions of Parlia- 
 ment which considered the question of the new treaty it is doubt- 
 ful whether the opposition fully realized the importance of the 
 subject upon which they poured forth their critical eloquence. 
 This was particularly true in the case of Brougham. It was the 
 old grievance of "secret diplomacy" and the "clique" directing 
 the policy of the Foreign Office which excited his wrath. 
 
 In the session of the House of Commons held February 8, 1816, 
 Mr. Brougham stated that he 
 
 would now move for the production of two papers which, though he 
 had reason to believe they existed, were not to be found in the great mass 
 laid before the House. The first he considered with great jealousy and 
 alarm, coupled with the speech made from the Throne and the declara- 
 tions of the Noble Lord. It was a treaty (dated September 25, 1815) * 
 between Austria, Russia and Prussia, a treaty to which this country was 
 not a party, nor yet France. It was ratified the 25th of December, a 
 day ostentatiously mentioned as the Birthday of our Saviour. The 
 treaty was of a very general nature and seemed to have no definite prac- 
 tical or secular object but professed to relate to the interests of the Chris- 
 tian nations. He suspected more was meant by this than met the eye. 2 
 
 Formally answering the above statement, Lord Castlereagh 
 merely stated : "I believe the treaty had no evil views whatsoever." 
 
 Referring to a treaty alleged to have been signed between 
 France and Austria and some other Power "to which Mr. Brougham 
 had referred in an earlier part of his speech," Lord Castlereagh 
 somewhat superciliously declared "he could not understand to 
 what paper the former referred." He closed his formal acknowl- 
 edgment of Brougham's interpellation by declaring that the 
 treaties as he understood them were "concluded in the mildest 
 spirit of Christian tolerance," although he admitted "that they 
 were drawn up in a manner rather unusual." 
 
 During the session of the House of Commons held on February 
 9, 3 Brougham renewed his attack upon the treaty, which, it is 
 to be noted, still remained unnamed. "The sovereigns," he began, 
 "have merely bound themselves to observe their mutual engage- 
 ments and to promote the Christian faith." "What engagements," 
 he asked, "are these, and why is it necessary to protect the Chris- 
 tian faith?" 
 
 1 The "Noble Lord" was Castlereagh — the treaty, that of September 14/26, 1815. 
 2 London Times, February 9, 1816, p. 2, col. 2. 
 'Ibid., February 10, 1816, p. 2, cols. 3-4. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 43 
 
 "Something in the very language adopted, though it professed 
 no practical or secular object, bears in itself a character of sus- 
 picion." Continuing in the same tone of biting sarcasm he re- 
 ferred with telling effect to the fact that the very Powers which 
 had become a party to the League were those which had joined in 
 the great international infamy of the partition of Poland. "Even 
 the language of diplomacy," he declared, "can not disguise the 
 fact that a similar intention is probably maintained at the present 
 moment." Here the speaker was interrupted by loud Liberal 
 cheering. When this had died away, Brougham moved an address 
 to the Prince Regent, asking both for the production of the treaties 
 and of another treaty dated January 26, 1815, concerning "guar- 
 antees against Russia." 
 
 Castlereagh's reply was a model of moderation and debating 
 skill. "If the sovereigns had not coalesced," he advanced, 
 "Europe would never have been relieved." The success of the 
 Confederation was due "entirely to the present conferences of the 
 sovereigns. At Chaumont the sovereigns had expressly reserved 
 the right to make separate engagements not contrary to the 
 general objects of the war." Castlereagh felt he could even admit 
 that the Emperor of Russia had shown him a rough draft of the 
 agreement referred to, before it was submitted to the other sover- 
 eigns, and at the same time had requested him to invite the Prince 
 Regent to accede to the treaty. His answer to this request had 
 been that it was not usual for the British Government to be a 
 party to treaties concluded in such a form. At the same time he 
 added his assurances that every good disposition was felt toward 
 the object of the arrangement, which was not directed against "an 
 un-Christian Power," as was very generally believed. 
 
 Mr. Bennett, another prominent leader of the Liberal opposi- 
 tion, now took up the line of attack where Brougham had left off. 
 "Lord Castlereagh's arrogant tone," he declared, "seems to con- 
 sider independent states at his disposal so that he decides their 
 fate according to his will; one to be weakened, the third divided, 
 etc." He then censured the Noble Lord for the tone of eulogy 
 which he had used in connection with the Alliance which Mr. 
 Brougham had brought to his attention. He characterized it as a 
 compact "conspicuously against the freedom and rights of the 
 subjects of the sovereigns concerned." 
 
44 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 This brief outburst of Liberal hostility to the first announce- 
 ment of the Holy Alliance appears to have been without imme- 
 diate result. For many weeks all further discussion of the 
 matter was avoided in Parliament. By a party vote of 30 against 
 104 (a division along party lines), Brougham's motion was 
 defeated. The deep waters of the ministerial majority closed 
 silently over the whole matter. A brief editorial appeared in the 
 Times of February 9, generally unfavorable in its tone to the 
 principles of the Holy Alliance. But even the Thunderer kept 
 silence in the face of the governmental policy which counseled 
 Great Britain to consolidate a necessary friendship between 
 Great Britain and the Tsar of Russia. 
 
 Just one hundred years ago the young philosopher Emerson 
 wrote concerning the states of Europe in his Concord Diaries: 
 
 Aloof from contagion during the long progress of their decline, America 
 hath ample interval to lay deep and solid foundations for the great- 
 ness of the New World. 1 
 
 Let the young American withdraw his eyes from all but his own coun- 
 try, and try, if he can, to find employment there ... In this age 
 the despots of Europe are engaged in the common cause of tightening 
 the bonds of monarchy about the thriving liberties and the laws of men; 
 and the unprivileged orders, the bulk of human society, gasping for 
 breath beneath their chains, and darting impatient glances towards the 
 free institution of other countries. To America, therefore, monarchs 
 look with apprehension, and the people with hope. 2 
 
 During the great crisis of reconstruction following the Napo- 
 leonic Wars, Emerson in voicing the liberal opinion of New 
 England but repeated the warnings of Washington. Yet many 
 reasons insistently urged a "moral participation" in European 
 affairs. Moreover, the invitation extended to the United States 
 to share in the councils of Europe, as we shall have cause to note 
 in the present chapter, was no less insistent than at the present 
 day. 
 
 The decision which the statesmen of the Washington Cabinet 
 were called upon to take with respect to American participation in 
 the affairs of Europe during the period from 1815 to 1818 recalls 
 the no less momentous problems of the present time. 
 
 During the period of reconstruction preceding the Congress of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Alexander was apparently convinced that in 
 
 1 Emerson, Journals, vol. 1820-1824, p. 201. *Ibid., pp. 246-247. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 45 
 
 order to obtain the "universality" which he desired for his system, 
 the "Holy League" must include not only the Christian Powers 
 of the continent, but also Great Britain and the United States. 
 His efforts to persuade the two English-speaking nations to adhere 
 to his pact of "Justice, Christian Charity and Peace" form an 
 interesting chapter in the development of internationalism. It 
 soon became evident that, in spite of the duties laid upon her by 
 the Treaties of Chaumont, Paris and Vienna, England was de- 
 termined to return as quickly as possible to her policy of inde- 
 pendent action — and as Canning subsequently announced, to v-/ 
 "resume her isolation." 
 
 Conservative opinion in England may have leaned to the side of 
 the Powers of the Holy Alliance when these concerted their meas- 
 ures against revolution. 1 So far as revolution against the Bour- 
 bons in France was concerned they were indeed bound to con- 
 certed action by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance. 2 It was 
 not until after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle that the British 
 Cabinet were called upon to draw fine distinctions between what 
 a constitutional government might or might not do to assist 
 a group of reactionary allies in applying broad measures of 
 repression in every corner of Europe. But from the beginning 
 Alexander seems to have been suspicious of the spirit shown by the 
 opposition in Parliament 3 towards his League, and to have sought 
 to exploit the differences between Great Britain and the United 
 States in a sense favorable to his own policy of an "unalterable" 
 union among the Great Powers. 
 
 In the United States the policy debated by the Monroe 
 Cabinet and the conclusions arrived at were to fix the course of 
 American foreign affairs until our own day. When the repeated 
 appeals of the Tsar's envoys had failed to obtain results which 
 their master so ardently desired, Alexander's sensitive pride caused 
 
 1 But even Lord Castlereagh was early "obliged to pretend to disapprove of the conti- 
 nental system of the Holy Alliance." Greville, Memoirs, vol. I, p. 105. See also 
 Hansard's Debates, vol. n, p. 359. 
 
 2 Article II of the Treaty of Alliance bound the signatory Powers to common action 
 against the "same revolutionary principles that caused the recent usurpation in France." 
 Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traites dePaix, vol. n, pp. 735-736. 
 
 3 The confusion of modern writers with respect to British policy towards the Quadruple 
 Alliance which she signed and the Holy Alliance which she diplomatically opposed is 
 scarcely understandable. Often, however, in writings of the time "the expressions 
 Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance are used synonymously." Cf. Boyce, The Diplomatic 
 Relations of England with the Quadruple Alliance, 1815-1830, University of Iowa Studies, 
 vol. vii, no. 1. 
 
46 
 
 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 him to bury in the limbo of his secret official dossiers all traces of 
 these negotiations. But in the archives of the Russian Foreign 
 Office proofs are not lacking of the long and patient efforts made 
 between the years 1816 and 1819 to induce the great American 
 Republic to abandon her policy of "isolation" and to play a part 
 in an "international" system. 
 
 At a time when the fear of Napoleon had united the powers of 
 Europe in common measures of political and military action, 
 the United States were already separated and estranged from the 
 victorious Powers of the Grand Alliance by reasons arising from 
 the great war itself. The neutrality of the principal American 
 state, maintained with the greatest difficulty, had ended in a 
 quarrel with both antagonists. The problems which arose from 
 the enforcement of the British Orders in Council (May, 1806) 
 and of Napoleon's retaliatory Berlin Decrees (November, 1806) 
 had found a poor solution in Jefferson's Non-Intercourse Act 
 (1809). Yet in 1810 Napoleon's ready diplomacy had success- 
 fully committed the United States to a course favorable to the 
 French view of this doubly declared "blockade." Although in 
 practice the Emperor had relaxed none of the severity of the 
 Rambouillet Decrees under which American shipmasters groaned, 
 the wrongs of the "quasi-war" with France were forgotten in an 
 open breach between the United States and Great Britain. Dur- 
 ing the War of 1812 the ports of Havre and Brest became the 
 home stations whence American privateers sailed forth to prey 
 upon British commerce. 1 When two years later the treaties of 
 Kalisch, Toeplitz and Chaumont had gathered the Powers of 
 Europe in progressively strengthening bonds of international 
 solidarity, the young American Republic found itself inter- 
 nationally "suspect" — bound by an unsatisfactory and informal 
 truce to the tottering Napoleonic colossus and at open war with 
 one of the principal members of the coalition. 
 
 It was, however, Great Britain's desire to sit with her allies at 
 the council table of Vienna, backed by the full force of her land 
 and sea power. This desire, indeed, was a chief factor in bringing 
 to a close the indecisive quarrel of 1812. Lord Castlereagh, on 
 
 ^Cambridge Modern History, vol. vn, pp. 324-332. An interesting proof of the care 
 with which the development of Anglo-American relations was followed by the Tsar is 
 afforded by the long report drawn up by the diplomatic free lance Gentz for Nesselrode, in 
 April, 1812, re the Orders in Council. Nesselrode, Letters and Papers, 1760-1850, vol. iv, " 
 p. 223. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 47 
 
 his way to attend the Great Council at Vienna, had stopped at 
 Ghent (in August, 1814) to hasten the British negotiations toward 
 the signing of a treaty. 1 In view of his own friendly efforts to 
 bring about an earlier reconciliation 2 between his ally and the 
 young republic, Alexander may readily have believed that it 
 would be no difficult task to persuade the American Government 
 to adhere to a wider system of world peace. 
 
 The general invitation addressed to "all Powers who shall 
 choose to avow its sacred principles" contained in the final 
 articles of the Holy Treaty had now been accepted by an im- 
 posing number of "minor Powers." The first among these was the 
 liberal-minded King of Wiirttemberg (August 17, 1816). The King 
 of Saxony adhered to the declarations (in May, 1817), as well as the 
 Kings of Sardinia and the Netherlands. Soon the Free Hanseatic 
 cities and the Republic of Switzerland — precedents of interest to 
 the United States — followed their example. 3 Moreover, one of 
 the chief objections made in England to the terms of the Holy 
 Alliance lacked force in America. This was the reference to 
 "Christian Powers" so often repeated in its phraseology — a refer- 
 ence which was believed by the diplomatic circles of the Tsar's 
 capital to contain some secret menace against the Ottoman 
 Empire. Yet even this threat gave no apprehension to the 
 Government at Washington, where Russian support of our policy 
 in the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates was not for- 
 gotten. The personal popularity of Alexander and the aureole of 
 liberalism which, though growing fainter, still hovered about the 
 head of the pupil of the Republican philosopher Laharpe, probably 
 caused phrases and expressions of his manifesto, considered omi- 
 nous by liberal opinion abroad, to pass unnoticed. 
 
 The Holy Alliance was formally made public through the 
 Imperial ukase of January 1, 1816. Although its obscure inten- 
 tions caused a stir all over Europe, several months elapsed before 
 the matter was noticed in the American newspapers of the day. 
 On August 26, 1816, the New York Evening Post announced that 
 "the King of the Netherlands has acceded to the Holy League, 
 considering that it will have a beneficial effect on the state 
 
 1 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p. 9. 
 
 2 For the details of this negotiation, see Golder, "The Russian Offer of Mediation 
 in the War of 1812," in Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxxi, No. 3. 
 
 3 Martens, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 659. The Pope from reasons of religious policy still 
 refused to join the "Pact." 
 
48 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 of society and the reciprocal relations between nations." On 
 September 4 of the same year a meeting of the sovereigns of the 
 Holy Alliance is reported by the same paper "as likely to take 
 place at Carlsbad." To this notice was added the following 
 comment — certainly far from hostile in tone: "No doubt matters 
 of great importance will be discussed at this assembly, and ifdis- 
 cussions run upon the means of consolidating the peace of the 
 world . . . ajid^ removing the burden of taxes and unwieldy 
 military establishments which press at this moment upon every 
 country, the members of the Holy League will establish an im- 
 perishable claim on the gratitude of mankind." 1 
 
 In Niles Register, a gazette published in Baltimore, may be 
 found (April 6, 1816) definite expression of the generous approval 
 which public opinion in America seems always ready to accord to 
 schemes promising an increment of international solidarity and 
 good will. The Massachusetts Peace Society, writing to the 
 ' Emperor Alexander under date of April 9, "recalls to the attention 
 / of His Imperial Majesty that the Society was founded in the very 
 week in which the Holy League of the three sovereigns was 
 announced in Russia," and has as its object "to disseminate the 
 very principles avowed in the wonderful Alliance." In the same 
 issue appears an announcement that the American Minister at 
 St. Petersburg "is treated with great distinction. It is thought 
 important negotiations are in progress." 1 
 
 The not unfavorable impression which the Tsar's project 
 made in American diplomatic circles is shown in the correspond- 
 ence of Levett Harris, the American charge d'affaires at the 
 Court of St. Petersburg: 
 
 The Treaty of triple alliance concluded at Paris will, before this comes 
 to hand, be already known to you . . . This treaty, which originated 
 with the Emperor Alexander, and which does equal honor to his head and 
 heart, I fear will not answer the magnanimous purposes for which it 
 was designed. If such were the case we should behold Europe ready 
 to embrace the arts of peace, and see dissolving at once those monstrous 
 combinations which have already lifted the world from its axis and now 
 threaten to consummate the work of human woe. 2 
 
 Levett Harris was one of the body of trained and experienced 
 
 1 Files, New York Public Library. 
 
 2 Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American 
 Embassy, Petrograd. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 49 
 
 diplomats who founded on a solid basis of good sense and good 
 will the early foreign relations of the United States. He was too 
 well aware of the deep rivalry separating the Allied Powers to 
 believe in the cementing power of fine phrases — but he neverthe- 
 less seems to share the hopes entertained by a large number of 
 his countrymen that Alexander's League might result in some 
 permanent guarantee of European tranquillity. Harris, however, 
 did not fail to note in his dispatches the commonly credited rumors 
 that the six hundred thousand Russian troops still under arms 
 "proved that the Tsar was meditating offensives in the Danubian 
 provinces, if not elsewhere." 1 
 
 The task of maintaining the friendly relations which already 
 existed between Russia and the United States and of obtaining 
 their accession to the League was actively pursued by Alexander 
 during the summer of 1816. On July 24/August 5, 1816, Mr. 
 Levett Harris further reported to Secretary Monroe the following 
 interesting conversation held the day before with one of the Tsar's 
 principal advisers: 
 
 The Count Capo D'Istria, who engaged me at this interview in a 
 conversation of an hour and a half's length, closed it by acquainting me 
 that he had been preparing a communication to me relative to the Tri- 
 partite Treaty of the Sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia (the 
 treaty called the "Holy Treaty") with a view to know the sentiments of 
 the American Government on the subject. That if the United States 
 chose to yield their assent to this treaty the Emperor Would receive it 
 with deference. That notwithstanding many opinions had gone abroad, 
 on the subject of this League, it was none the less a solemn compact 
 formed to preserve the peace of Europe, and that whilst Russia con- 
 tinued to hold her present power this peace would not be troubled. I 
 observed that it was notorious that peace had been a leading feature of 
 our policy, and that we had reason to hope that we should not again 
 be soon forced to depart from this policy. As Mr. Pinkney, I trusted, 
 would soon feel himself justified to repair here — I begged that any 
 communication of the nature now suggested might be reserved for the 
 period of his arrival. 2 
 
 From his correspondence with Dashkov, the Russian envoy to 
 the United States (1817), the Tsar appears to have had every 
 reason to suppose that his overtures were meeting with a friendly 
 reception in Washington. "It is assured," wrote Dashkov to 
 
 x Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American 
 Embassy, Petrograd. 
 
 2 Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, July 24/August 5, 1816. MS. Dispatches, Amer- 
 ican Embassy, Petrograd. 
 
50 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Lieven, the Russian Ambassador at London, in an important 
 dispatch, "that the American Government intends asking to be 
 associated with the Holy League." 1 
 
 Dashkov, a diplomat of mediocre intelligence, was perhaps 
 unduly impressed by the expressions of approval with which 
 American idealists welcomed his master's policy. A pact which 
 in its actual form merely obligated its signers to render each 
 other vague "reciprocal service" and to cooperate "in accordance 
 with the direction of the Holy Scriptures" for the attainment of 
 the better practice of "religion, peace and justice," would naturally 
 appeal to the generous sentimentality so often controlling public 
 opinion in the United States with respect to foreign affairs. The 
 absurdity of being treated as "brothers" by the three most re- 
 actionary sovereigns of Europe would probably have deterred 
 but few among the kindly majority of the Massachusetts 
 Peace Society from expressing their sympathy for the Tsar's 
 "League of Peace." The vague and impracticable language in 
 which this manifesto was couched might appear ominous to 
 diplomats, but uninformed public opinion could hardly foresee the 
 true meaning and inner significance of a pact apparently so gen- 
 erous, or that the future policy of the Holy Alliance, as applied 
 during Alexander's later reactionary "phase," was destined to 
 become an unqualified support of "legitimist principles" abhor- 
 rent to American ideals. 
 
 Dashkov neglected the fact that public opinion in the Repub- 
 lic during the existing internal "Era of Good Feeling" had 
 little time to worry about foreign affairs. With respect to such 
 matters the Tsar's envoy complains to Lieven that "they do not 
 worry any more about me than if I were the Emperor of Japan." 2 
 He also complains that his opportunities for negotiations were 
 nearly nil. 
 
 In the same connection he noted in an earlier dispatch his own 
 version of the attention with which the cautious diplomacy of 
 Adams and Monroe was following the development of the Euro- 
 pean situation. "It would seem that the government is not 
 without anxiety concerning the effect that some of its actions will 
 
 1 February 22/March 6, 1817. MS. United States, Russian Foreign Office. Many o 
 the MS. documents quoted relating to the United States have been listed in Golder's Guid 
 to Materials in American History in Russian Archives. 
 
 1 Dashkov to Lieven, MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 51 
 
 have upon Europe, and the way in which their aggressive projects 
 will be considered. However, a certain cunning and great ability 
 characterizes the present administration." 1 He also noted the 
 significant fact that "an increase of the naval forces and a more 
 direct interest in the commerce of the American continent forms 
 the basis of the President's policy with respect to the other 
 nations." 1 
 
 In spite of the apathy and lack of interest in European affairs 
 which Dashkov had reported, the Tsar now decided to recall the 
 young Republic to a sense of international obligations. In the 
 instruction addressed to Baron De Tuyll, the Russian Minister, 
 whom he intended to send to the United States, in May, 1817, 2 
 to succeed the unpopular Dashkov, the following minute directions 
 were given to guide him in his policy with respect to this matter: 
 
 The relations existing between the United States and Russia are 
 commercial rather than political. The only exception occurs through 
 the proposed mediation which the Emperor has been asked to undertake 
 as between Great Britain and the United States. 3 America is geo- 
 graphically out of the European system. Her only political bonds are 
 with England, the Spanish Colonies and France. 4 
 
 Referring to the latter historical bond, Tuyll was directed to 
 proceed to his post by way of Paris. If the occasion permitted 
 he was to see Richelieu, "and to obtain some notion from him of 
 his ideas respecting the desirability and utility of renewing rela- 
 tions between the Cabinet of the Tuileries and the United 
 States." 5 With respect to Spanish relations, Tuyll was also to 
 use the utmost circumspection. The Emperor's interest con- 
 cerning this matter is to be expressed, but "the Envoy of H. M. 
 must not allow himself any direct intervention unless especially 
 authorized." 6 With respect to Anglo-American policy the in- 
 structions are equally specific, if obviously less sincere. Baron 
 De Tuyll is to confine himself to expressing His Majesty's "pleas- 
 ure" should any improvement occur in the relations existing 
 between Great Britain and the United States. 
 
 1 Dashkov, MS. United States, 1816, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 2 Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia, p. 110. 
 
 3 As regards certain clauses of the Treaty of Ghent. 
 
 4 MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 5 See later Richelieu's invitation to the United States to send a representative to 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. 
 
 6 MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
52 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 The instructions quoted now enter at length into an interesting 
 discussion of the policy which the Tsar's Minister should follow 
 in order to reconcile the Russian and American views concerning 
 the "Holy Alliance": 
 
 In respect to the policy set forth in this agreement, which was entered 
 upon in a spirit of Christian and fraternal alliance between the states who 
 were signatory to the Acts of Vienna and Paris, a difference is apparent 
 between the latter and other states, who by their isolated positions or on 
 account of the desire of their government, have abstained from this act. 
 It is scarcely necessary to observe that the United States belongs to this 
 second category. Nevertheless, as the United States is to be considered 
 a Christian Power, they should necessarily accede to the Act of 14th/26th 
 September. On the other hand, however, such adherence should be 
 characterized by a purely spontaneous desire, and should arise from a 
 wish inspired by a sincere conviction that the spirit of this agreement is 
 not only salutary for the powers of the world but also in no ways 
 coercive. As the Emperor has not had any opportunity of judging of 
 the true disposition of the American Government, and is also ignorant 
 of the obstacles which the Constitution of that country might oppose to 
 an agreement of this character, His Majesty has not extended any formal 
 invitation to the United States. Nevertheless, the Envoys of His 
 Majesty are now authorized to make a careful inquiry concerning the 
 opinions of the American Government. In treating of this matter, he 
 should bear in mind that a similar invitation might be extended along 
 the line of the overtures made to the Swiss Diet. Before taking any 
 final steps he will, of course, enter into negotiations with the Secretary of 
 State. In these negotiations he will advance the fact of the desire 
 manifested by several of the Cantons to be admitted to take part in the 
 Act of 14th/26th September and of the enthusiasm with which they have 
 signed — fully convinced of its utility. Following the above routine, 
 (in case the proposal should appear acceptable to the American Secre- 
 tary), the Minister will develop more at length the purposes of the 
 Treaty of Brotherly and Christian Alliance, pointing out the motives 
 which lay at the bottom of this Pact and especially indicating that its 
 main purpose is to preserve peace. In this exposition he may make use 
 of His Majesty's circular dated March 22, 1816, and the considerations 
 contained in the document dated May 4, 1817. He will accompany his 
 explanation by the assurance that the Emperor would receive with 
 great pleasure the adherence of the United States to the act mentioned. 
 
 He must, however, take no steps without first assuring himself that 
 the adherence of the United States will not be opposed by public opinion 
 in that country ... In a word, it is important that he should be con- 
 vinced of the success of his mission before entering into any long dis- 
 cussions concerning the matter, a discussion which would be unworthy 
 of the united spirit and purity of intentions which have dictated the Act 
 of 14th/26th September, 1815. * 
 
 While Baron De Tuyll's mission to the United States was inter- 
 rupted by the unfortunate diplomatic situation arising from the 
 
 'MS. Instructions, United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 53 
 
 imprisonment of the Russian Consul Koslov in Philadelphia by a 
 local judge, his instructions show the interest felt by his Imperial 
 master in securing the adherence of the United States to the 
 Holy Alliance. Dashkov's efforts to win the approval of the young 
 Republic not proving satisfactory, he was replaced by the Cheva- 
 lier Poletica (June, 1819), l whose instructions, as we shall later 
 observe, were even more urgent in their appeal to the Washington 
 Government to join the European "League 6f Peace." 
 
 Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 3, 1819. MS. Instructions, Russia. 
 

CHAPTER II 
 
 THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE: 
 THE AMERICAN MONARCHY 
 
 In ancient times among the more civilized peoples it was held to be the 
 greatest of all crimes to make war upon those who were willing to submit 
 to arbitration the settlement of their difficulties; but against those who de- 
 clined so fair an offer all others turned, and with their combined resources 
 overwhelmed them, not as enemies of any one nation, but as enemies of 
 them all alike. So for this very object we see that treaties are made and 
 arbiters appointed. Grotius, Mare Liberum, 1608. 
 
 Although no formal declaration of policy accompanied the sign- 
 ing of the Holy Alliance, this very reticence had aroused general 
 distrust in the liberal circles of Europe and the United States. 
 The growing suspicion that the "Act of September 14, 1815," 
 was but the credo of a revived dogma of legitimacy was proved 
 by subsequent events to be well founded in fact. Metternich, 
 even while turning to his own devious and complicated diplomatic 
 purposes the bond of indiscriminate solidarity which bound 
 the signers of this Pact of Kings, feigned to distrust the Tsar's 
 "Jacobinism," yet he alone among the statesmen of Europe 
 appears to have held this belief. He was, moreover, confident of 
 his ability to control the Autocrat's liberal vagaries. 1 
 
 Alexander's early liberalism had in fact given place to a new 
 concept: the "Divine Right" of rulers "placed in the same relation 
 to their people as a father to his family." 2 Moreover, in a clause 
 of the Quadruple Treaty of Alliance, the Tsar saw a means 
 to make effective this paternal spirit through "reunions devoted 
 to the great common interests." 3 He now urged that the sover- 
 eigns of Europe and their representatives should continue the 
 practice developed by the politico-military conclaves which had 
 followed the wars of the coalition. In following out this inter- 
 national policy, Alexander was the first to show an exam- 
 ple to his fellow monarchs by his constant willingness to make 
 
 1 During a long journey from Frankfort to Paris (July 1/12, 1815) upon which the Tsar 
 and the Austrian statesmen were traveling companions, Alexander, "talking about the 
 matter for hours at a stretch," had developed his new theories with all the enthusiasm of a 
 convert. He now believed "that a sacred bond should join the sovereigns of Europe to the 
 exclusion of all other influences." Conversation with Metternich quoted by Baron 
 Josika in his "Memoires" in Revue de Hongrie, vol. n, Aug.-Dec, 1908, p. 542. 
 
 2 Regarding the Tsar's "liberalism," Levett Harris reported at that time from St. 
 Petersburg: "There appear no responsible Ministers. He now acts by the exclusive 
 influence of his own judgment and opinions." Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, 
 December 13, 1816, MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
 3 The Treaty of Alliance, Art. VI, Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traites, vol. II, p. 737. 
 
 55 
 
56 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 the journey from his distant capital whenever the needs of 
 Europe seemed to require the assembling of a Congress. And 
 Europe, following the great meeting at Vienna, seemed likely to 
 profit by these ministrations. 
 
 With the disappearance of the Napoleonic danger the motive 
 of mutual defense had disappeared. But another international 
 peril soon presented itself. Like the so-called "wave of Bol- 
 shevism" which followed the recent World War, Europe after 
 the Napoleonic struggle believed itself menaced by the workings 
 of an occult and world-wide conspiracy fomented by the "Sects" 
 and other revolutionary societies. The monarchs of Europe 
 were again to be united in the face of revolution. 
 
 Metternich's criticisms — that Alexander's policy during this 
 period was contradictory if not opportunistic — were to a great 
 degree justified. In Spain the Tsar tolerated the political follies 
 of Ferdinand VII, even when that reactionary monarch restored 
 the prerogatives of absolutism and reestablished the Inquisition. 
 Again, in France, where Louis XVIII was attempting, honestly 
 enough, to restore the prestige of "legitimacy" and to govern 
 under the limitations of the "Charter," his growing fear of 
 revolution caused him to interfere with Richelieu's electoral 
 reforms in an "aristocratic sense." In Poland, where the mandate 
 of the Congress of Vienna had given him full right to indulge his 
 earlier ideals for reform, he adopted a contrary policy. In the 
 latter country, moreover, Metternich felt that the Tsar's liberal 
 "expansions" were directly opposed to the interests of the neigh- 
 boring Austrian Empire. 
 
 He did not fail to point out that Alexander's example in Poland 
 furnished renewed support to the fast-reviving liberal spirit in 
 Germany. Without great difficulty the Austrian statesman had 
 succeeded in bringing the wavering policy of Frederick William III 
 entirely within his own control. The Prussian monarch had 
 solemnly promised a constitution to his people (on May 22, 1815, 
 just before Waterloo), but under Metternich's influence he indefi- 
 nitely postponed the fulfilment of his pledge. 1 The Liberal group 
 which surrounded him during the heroic days of the Napoleonic 
 struggle — Stein, Hardenberg and Humboldt — saw their influence 
 rapidly give place to that of more reactionary Ministers. The 
 
 1 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de I' Europe, vol. r, p. 114. 
 
THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 57 
 
 first Federal Diet, which was held on November 5, 1816, was, 
 in fact, a mere diplomatic gathering of the Princes of Germany. 
 In all the minor German states a profound irritation was felt 
 throughout all classes of society with respect to the Austro- 
 Prussian policy of repression. 
 
 The Sultan Mahmoud of Turkey (who, judged even by Euro- 
 pean standards, might well have considered himself a "reformer") l 
 could not contemplate without natural anxiety the Emperor 
 Alexander's appeal through a Holy Alliance to the "Christian" 
 nations of Europe. This was considered by the Sublime Porte, 
 and also by the nations interested in the integrity of the Turkish 
 dominions, as hiding a secret menace toward the Caliph of the 
 Mussulmans. 2 
 
 Aside from the traditional Oriental policy pursued by the Tsars 
 of Russia, there was additional cause for anxiety to the supporters 
 of the status quo in the East from the natural sympathy openly 
 expressed by the Russian Orthodox Church in the fate of their 
 coreligionists of Serbia, now openly struggling for liberty against 
 the Turkish Government. Capo dTstria, Alexander's favorite 
 adviser with respect to Eastern affairs, was already forming the 
 Pan Grecian Association of the Hetairie in St. Petersburg, 
 whose agents and propaganda were active in all the countries 
 bordering the Aegean. The Sultan's growing anxiety regarding 
 a possible Orthodox crusade was shared by Metternich and Castle- 
 reagh, who were determined that questions of sentiment must be 
 rigidly excluded from their policy towards the Ottoman dominion. 
 
 The traditional policy of the English Cabinet since the days of 
 Pitt had considered the integrity of the Turkish Empire as the 
 cornerstone of England's colonial hegemony in the East. Even 
 the action of the Congress of Vienna respecting the pirates of the 
 Barbary Coast — who acknowledged the Sultan as their suzerain — 
 was opposed by Great Britain on the ground that such a step 
 would menace her self-appointed guardianship of the Mediter- 
 ranean. 3 In the pretensions now advanced by Alexander (Decem- 
 ber, 1816) that the "Great Family of Christian nations" should 
 
 1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. I, p. 101. 
 
 2 The armies which the Russian Emperor maintained upon a war footing, long after the 
 other nations of Europe had demobilized their forces, with the exception of the armies of 
 occupation in France, amounted in all to nearly 600,000 men. Mr. Harris to the Secre- 
 tary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American Embassy, Petrograd. 
 
 3 See Schuyler, American Diplomacy, p. 226. 
 
58 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 take their part in repressing these piratical outrages upon the 
 world's commerce, England saw another attack upon her 
 jealously guarded supremacy. 1 
 
 As the first united action to be taken by the Powers of the Holy 
 Alliance and the European Directorate, Alexander formally pro- 
 posed that unless the Sultan was prepared to give immediate 
 guarantees for the good behavior of his vassals, the Beys of Tunis 
 and Algiers, the European Powers should proceed, without further 
 formalities, to destroy their fleets and "remove all means whereby 
 they might reconstruct the same." 
 
 The opposition of Great Britain and Austria caused the Tsar 
 to withdraw this proposal, but during the month of March, 1817, 
 rumors spread among the Courts of Europe that a secret treaty 
 had bound the King of Spain to cede Port Mahon to Russia, and 
 possibly other naval bases in the Mediterranean. It was, indeed, 
 only by some such tangible advantage to Russian policy that the 
 growing intimacy between the Courts of St. Petersburg and 
 Madrid could be explained. 2 Tatistcheff, the Russian Ambassa- 
 dor to the Court of Ferdinand VII, had been instructed (in spite of 
 Alexander's scarcely concealed personal antipathy to this narrow- 
 minded and reactionary Monarch) to cultivate Ferdinand's good 
 graces even to the extent of approving his stupid and brutal 
 administration in interior affairs. Another reason for this intimacy 
 soon became apparent. 
 
 During the early revolt of the juntas of South America in 1810 
 "to preserve the rights of King Ferdinand" against the power of 
 King Jerome, Great Britain had profited by the state of practical 
 autonomy existing in the Spanish colonies to break down in favor 
 of her own commerce the profitable trade monopoly which the 
 Spanish Crown had always rigorously maintained. 3 In this 
 matter the Tsar saw a fresh cause of future difference between 
 Great Britain and the United States. It was especially as an ally 
 against the preponderating influence of Great Britain in the 
 councils of the nations that he desired the Government at Wash- 
 ington to join his new League of Peace. Besides appealing to the 
 
 1 See the report of an interview between Levett Harris and Capo d'Istria contained in 
 the former's dispatch No. 19 of July 24, 1816, American Embassy, Petrograd, the 
 Russian Minister expressing his indignation that "Lord Exmouth had neglected noth- 
 ing at Algiers to have the American treaties changed." 
 
 2 Debidour, op. cit., vol. I, p. 100. 
 
 3 Shepherd, Latin America, pp. 72-74. 
 
THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 59 
 
 hostile feelings that persisted after the Peace of Ghent, and to the 
 ready jealousy between the mother country and her former colo- 
 nies (a sentiment whose depth and nature has always been 
 misunderstood by outside Powers), Alexander probably believed 
 that he could count on this new cause of difference to secure the 
 acquiescence of the Washington Cabinet in an antirevolutionary 
 program in the Spanish colonies. 
 
 Following the Congress of Vienna the particularistic views and 
 "traditional interests" of the Great Powers had further postponed 
 the consideration of the Turkish question and the affairs of 
 the German Confederation. Intervention in America doubtless 
 appeared to Alexander a less dangerous source of possible inter- 
 national friction. Indeed, as we shall later see, American affairs 
 became not only a convenient issue but also the first matter with 
 which the newly constituted "Confederation" was to concern 
 itself during the three years preceding the Congress of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle and throughout the succeeding Era of International 
 Conferences. The policy favored by the Tsar led to the formal 
 mediation which the European monarchs now undertook with 
 respect to South American affairs. 
 
 Spain, Russia and Great Britain were all at this time great 
 American Powers. The King of Spain was nominally (actually, 
 in the eyes of legitimist Europe) the ruler of a territory geo- 
 graphically the most important in the New World. His title of 
 Emperor of the Indies represented a claim which, although 
 disputed by a vigorous minority, was still respected by a large 
 part of the population of South America. In the beginning of 
 this struggle, hardly a fraction of the population was interested 
 in throwing off the Spanish allegiance. The dominant classes, 
 including an all-powerful clergy, were generally hostile or indif- 
 ferent to a revolution which, in its natural course,would eventually 
 attack their own privileges. The Indians and half-castes forming 
 the bulk of the population were neutral or inclined to favor the 
 home government. 1 
 
 On the northern continent of America the Tsar of Russia was 
 the ruler of vast possessions whose vague frontiers stretched 
 from Alaska far down the coast to California. In 1812, Baronov, 
 the Russian governor whose aggressive policy had earned for him 
 the name of the "Little Tsar," succeeded in establishing a colony 
 
 1 Shepherd, op. cit., p. 70. 
 
60 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 not far from Bodega Bay, but 30 miles to the north of San Fran- 
 cisco. 1 The Russian-American company (instituted by the ukase 
 of July 8, 1799) had been granted exclusive jurisdiction of the 
 American coast north of the 55th degree of north latitude. These 
 claims had been the basis for Russian diplomatic protests in 1808 
 and 1810 against the encroachment of traders from the United 
 States, 2 which had received respectful attention in Washington. 
 
 While the Government at Washington was prepared to treat 
 with consideration the claims of Powers long established on the 
 American Continent, this toleration had no application to Powers 
 like Austria, Germany and France, who now began to consider 
 Ferdinand's plight with sympathy. The influence of all Europe — 
 except a negligible minority — was to be exercised to counteract 
 the growing triumph of the republican spirit. 
 
 The unavowed principle underlying the attitude of the Powers 
 of the Holy Alliance towards the revolutionaries of Venezuela 
 and La Plata was their interest in maintaining the monarchical 
 principle. 3 
 
 In this connection it should be borne in mind that long after 
 the tyranny of Ferdinand VII had rendered his further rule 
 odious and impossible, a strong sentiment persisted throughout 
 South America for a monarchical form of government. Even 
 Bolivar, the Liberator, was far from being a convinced republican: 
 
 Would to God (he exclaimed in a letter which foreshadows an American 
 "League of Peace") that some day we might enjoy the happiness of 
 having there an august congress of representatives of the republics, 
 kingdoms and empires of America to deal with the high interests of 
 peace and of war, not only between the American nations but between 
 them and the rest of the globe. 4 
 
 In a work entitled La Monarquia en America, Sefior C. A. 
 de Villanueva has considered at length the early history of this 
 movement. The first separatist movement "to preserve the throne 
 of the Indies for Ferdinand VII" found itself without a leader 
 
 1 Cleland, "The Early Sentiment for the Annexation of California." Reprint from 
 The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, xvm, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (1914-1915), p. 7. 
 
 2 Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia, p. 47. 
 
 3 Writing at a somewhat later period, Chateaubriand, the French Ambassador in 
 London (May, 1821), voiced their policy as follows: "If Europe is obliged to recognize the 
 de facto governments of America, its whole policy should be aimed toward the encouraging 
 of the establishment of monarchies instead of republics, whose principal exports would be 
 their principles." Chateaubriand, Memoiresd' outre tombe, vol. vn, pp. 400-401. 
 
 4 Moore, "Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism," Columbia University Quarterly, Sep- 
 tember, 1915, p. 347. 
 
THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 61 
 
 after the abdication of Bayonne and the assumption of the royal 
 authority by Joseph Bonaparte. A strong desire was, however, 
 manifested all over South America to replace the dethroned 
 Bourbons by monarchs of the same dynasty. 1 The monarchical 
 movement was, however, defeated by the partisans of the Junta 
 of Cadiz in Buenos Aires; while in Caracas (December, 1811), 
 acting under the advice of the American Consul Lowry, the revolu- 
 tionists adopted a republican form of constitution. 2 According 
 to the same author, the Congress of Tucuman (1816) "was openly 
 monarchical," 3 although it eventually decided for a republican 
 form of government. 
 
 At a later date Hyde de Neuville, Louis XVIII's Minister at 
 Washington, filled his dispatches to Richelieu with plans for 
 founding one or more monarchies in South America — thrones 
 which should be occupied by princes of the House of Bourbon. He 
 even entertained hopes of securing the acquiescence of the United 
 States in this plan in exchange for the good offices of France with 
 respect to the cession of Florida. 4 
 
 Until the real situation was revealed after the opening of the 
 debates at Aix-la-Chapelle, the policy followed by Russia with 
 respect to South America (rather than that pursued by their 
 commercial rival Great Britain) was believed in the United States 
 to be most favorable to the cause of "Liberty." This was largely 
 due to a persistent belief in the Tsar's liberalism. Instructions 
 from the Department of State to John Quincy Adams in London 
 (December 10, 1815) report with apprehension the rumor that 
 "Spain had ceded Florida to Great Britain," and that a British 
 expedition was on its way to that quarter. 5 
 
 Referring to the revolution already "making rapid progress in 
 South America," Mr. Adams is directed to inquire: "What are the 
 views and intentions of Great Britain regarding this important 
 subject? Is it not to the interest of Great Britain that the 
 
 1 A strong royalist faction in Buenos Aires entered into negotiations with the court of 
 Portugal (which had found refuge in Rio de Janeiro,) seeking to come to an understanding 
 with the Prince Regent which would enable his Consort, Carlotta (sister of the dethroned 
 Spanish monarch), to assume the government "pending the return of Ferdinand." In 
 Venezuela the patriots sought "to erect the old Captain-Generalcy into an independent 
 province with a king of its own — choosing preferably a prince of the old Spanish dynasty." 
 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin {La Monarquia en America, vol. i), p. 10. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 18. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 45. 
 
 4 Hyde de Neuville, Memoires, vol. i, pp. 267-279. 
 6 MS. Instructions, Department of State. 
 
62 
 
 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Spanish provinces become independent? . . . In case of a rupture 
 between the United States and Spain at any future time what 
 part will Great Britain take in the contest, it being understood 
 that we shall ask in regard to the Spanish provinces no privileges 
 in trade which shall not be common to all nations?" l The Secre- 
 tary of State soon after informed the American charge that "a 
 strong suspicion is entertained here by many that the Spanish 
 Government relies on the support of the British." 2 
 
 Instructions of the same date direct Levett Harris in St. Peters- 
 burg to confirm the views that he had previously expressed of the 
 Tsar's disposition regarding the independence of the Spanish 
 provinces, viz., that he was "believed to favor it." At the close 
 of the year 1816 Harris reported from St. Petersburg that the Tsar 
 was more interested in preserving the tranquillity of Europe than 
 in inviting the hostility of the Government of the United States 
 by representations concerning the conduct of private individuals 
 and the depredations of the so-called revolutionary privateers. 3 
 
 Thus in 1817 the Tsar's dilemma lay between his desire to 
 secure the support of the United States against Great Britain 
 and his fear that both with respect to Florida and in their conduct 
 towards the South American insurgents the American Government 
 might act in a fashion to contravene the monarchical"mediation." 4 
 Dashkov, the Russian representative at Washington, reported 
 to his government through Count Lieven (February 22/March 6, 
 1817) that "Monroe is proclaimed President and is resolving to 
 seize Florida by fair means or foul. The fleet will be employed in 
 the Mediterranean before Spain can expect it." 
 
 1 MS. Instructions, Department of State. 
 
 2 Secretary of State to Mr. Adams in London, February 2, 1816. MS. Instructions. 
 
 3 "The only object of high interest that has recently attracted attention here is the dif- 
 ference which at present exists between Spain and Portugal. The Emperor showed great 
 solicitude on this occasion, and at the last circle spoke to the Envoys of those Courts, 
 especially the Portuguese, in a tone to lead to the impression that any attempt made to 
 disturb the tranquillity (sic) of Europe would not be overlooked by His Majesty. Each of 
 these ministers have made official communication to the Russian Ministry of the views and 
 pretensions of their respective courts." Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, December 
 14/26, 1816. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
 4 Re the Tsar's foreign policy. In a rare anonymous pamphlet entitled A Sketch of 
 the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817, published in New York by Kirk 
 and Mercein (1817), a copy of which is preserved in the files of the Library at West Point 
 Military Academy, occurs an interesting contemporary appreciation of the role played by 
 Alexander during this period: "Alexander now wields the huge sceptre of Russia, and dis- 
 plays an ability equal to the task. His philosophical views have indeed been enfeebled 
 by pernicious advisers, but those who have known him in other days still cling to the hope 
 that he will not substitute an unfeeling policy, of which the pillars are tyranny, ignorance 
 and fanaticism. 
 
THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 63 
 
 In September, 1817, the newly-appointed Minister Pinkney 
 
 wrote from St. Petersburg as follows: 
 
 Very friendly relations (displayed occasionally with some parade) 
 exist between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and although it might 
 naturally be expected that out of Europe the Emperor would leave him 
 to manage his own affairs as he could, this case of resistance by subjects 
 to the King's rule, and of an effort to multiply republics may be thought 
 to call for a general combination in Europe to discourage and repress 
 it. . • . If it is true that a New Congress or rather interview of 
 sovereigns is to take place next summer at Aix-la-Chapelle (as I con- 
 fidently said and as I believe) the affairs of South America will, I presume, 
 be talked of on that occasion. 1 
 
 Both countries were anxiously alert to each other's moves. 
 In May, 1817, Dashkov had again written to Lieven: 
 
 Certainly the moral effect which America can exercise upon the whole 
 world merits more attention than Europe appears disposed to give 
 . . . Pernambuco has declared its independency as a republic. This is 
 certainly no sudden commotion, but a well prepared revolution which 
 should give cause for apprehension to the Portuguese Government and 
 all of Brazil. 
 
 And again on September 24/26, 1817, he notes: 
 
 The Americans continue to send help to the Spanish insurgents, lend- 
 ing them privateers and helping them in various ways. 2 
 
 The anxiety of the State Department with respect to the Tsar's 
 rumored intentions to intervene in America's affairs now became 
 more marked. Mr. Pinkney, instructed to study the policy of 
 Russia, reported the following ominous event: "There is no doubt 
 a Russian fleet will very soon proceed to Cadiz." 3 This refers to 
 a none too creditable transaction through which Tatistcheff had 
 sold (not without profit to his own purse) five unseaworthy ships 
 of the line to Ferdinand to be used to transport troops to South 
 America. 4 His subsequent dispatch was more reassuring: 
 
 The sale of the fleet mentioned in my last . . . can scarcely be 
 termed a perfectly neutral proceeding with respect to the Colonies, but, 
 if it be a sale, it seems to show that the Emperor does not mean to 
 embark as a party in the contest. 5 
 
 x Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 13/25, 1817. MS. Dispatches, 
 Russia. 
 
 2 Dashkov to Lieven, MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 3 Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 25/October, 7 1817. MS. Dis- 
 patches, Russia. 
 
 4 Cambridge Modern History, vol. x, p. 210. 
 
 6 Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 29/October 11, 1817. MS. Dis- 
 patches, Russia. 
 
64 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 In the beginning of the year 1818 the situation had become fur- 
 ther complicated by General Jackson's invasion of the Spanish 
 territory of Florida and his capture of St. Mark and Pensacola. 
 Growing popular sentiment in the United States, under the leader- 
 ship of Henry Clay, soon demanded recognition by the United 
 States Government of the independence of the South American 
 colonies. 1 It appeared that the United States was prepared to 
 challenge not only the power of Spain but also the monarchical 
 combinations of Europe. 
 
 Meanwhile the "mediation" by the great Powers with respect 
 to Ferdinand's differences with his revolted subjects in South 
 America — whose possible consequences were not unnaturally 
 feared in Washington — was actually taking place. The mediators 
 were the Council of the Ministers of the Allied Powers in Paris — 
 now virtually forming a European Directorate. These represented 
 the Cabinets of the Powers who had signed the "Treaty of Alliance." 
 Ferdinand VII, at the instigation of Tatistcheff, had formally 
 asked for their aid in bringing about a forced reconciliation between 
 his throne and the revolted colonies. 2 In proposing this course 
 the King of Spain also demanded that military measures against 
 Portugal should be taken by the European Powers. 3 In these 
 pretensions Alexander and his protege found themselves checked 
 by the policy of Great Britain. The English Cabinet from the 
 beginning were unalterably opposed to any form of "eventual 
 action" tending to armed intervention. The Tsar chose to con- 
 sider this policy as deliberately opposing his schemes for inter- 
 national action in the interest of world peace. 4 
 
 During the early part of the Spanish mediation the British 
 envoy was none other than the redoubtable Duke of Wellington, 
 
 1 Hildt, p. 119. 
 
 2 Debidour, vol. i, pp. 108-109. 
 
 3 The revolt of the South American colonies was complicated by the Portuguese sup- 
 port of the revolutionaries in the Banda Oriental. 
 
 4 Under the date of June 30/July 12, 1818, Pozzo di Borgo, protesting against Great 
 Britain's attitude, writes to Count Nesselrode: "Jealous of the interest that our August 
 Master has shown in the cause of justice and of the Spanish interest, England has en- 
 deavored for two years to prove to the Cabinet of Madrid that further deference to the 
 Councils of Russia would react against their own interest. The plan of the English 
 Minister has been, first, to tire out the Spanish negotiators, using for that purpose the 
 talents of the Portuguese plenipotentiary; then to oblige both parties to have recourse to 
 the arbitration of Great Britain (alone), thus enabling her to control the measures taken 
 to reconcile the two powers of the Peninsula, and for the pacification of America." Pozzo 
 di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, in Polovstov, Correspondence diplomatique des ambassadeurs 
 et ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 a 1830, vol. 1818, No. 387, 
 
THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 65 
 
 who, in spite of the presence of the British Ambassador, personally 
 conducted the negotiations. Pozzo di Borgo somewhat queru- 
 lously complains of his "colleagues of Austria and Prussia, whose 
 conduct leads me to suppose that their instructions are but 
 directions to adhere to the opinions advanced by Great Britain." l 
 
 The unfortunate Russian envoy during this first essay of the 
 great principles of "International Administration," found his 
 path beset with difficulties. Alexander now believed — and acted 
 as though — these principles legally obtained through the signature 
 of the Treaty of Alliance, "consecrated" by the "Holy League." 
 Pozzo di Borgo was manfully striving in the face of formidable 
 opposition to direct the debates in a sense that would not only 
 satisfy the ends of Russian policy but also his own ideas of the 
 preponderating deference due to the "internationalist" theories 
 of his August Master. In comparing the Russian contentions 
 with those of Great Britain, he declares : "Those emanating from 
 our Cabinet appear simple, easy and intelligible, and offer a means 
 to attain their end, frank, mutual and friendly. I hope I shall 
 not be accused of prejudice in admitting that those of our allies 
 appear to me to be equivocal, filled with the marks of jealousy and 
 tending to desire ends impossible to reconcile." 2 
 
 He also complains that "the whole policy pursued by the Allied 
 Powers seems to tend towards maintaining the principle of a 
 quadruple alliance, excluding France and Spain, an arrangement 
 whereby Russia would be reduced to a minority of one against 
 three." With frank satisfaction he now noted that in the face 
 of Great Britain's support of the Portuguese demands, M. Pizarro, 
 the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, had communicated to the 
 mediators that he had found it necessary to consider an arrange- 
 ment with the United States with regard to Florida, "allowing it 
 to be understood that this not impossible transaction could not 
 but react contrary to the interests of Great Britain's systematic 
 policy in the New World." 3 
 
 At this juncture, "with the prospect of a close to this tedious 
 negotiation," the Duke of Wellington, in a fit of impatience, 
 hastened off to London, leaving Sir Charles Stuart in his place. 
 Freed from his Jove-like presence, a lively squabble immediately 
 
 l Ibid. 
 
 2 Pozzo di Borgo to Count Capo d'Istria, in Ibid., No. 663. 
 
 3 Capo d'Istria to Nesselrode, in Ibid. (June 30/July 12), No. 752. 
 
66 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 arose between the envoys of Spain and Portugal, wherein, by 
 the use of subtle dialect and the transparent arts of intrigue 
 proper to a diplomacy already passing out of date, each sought to 
 gain some slight advantage over his adversary. "Despairing of 
 any issue from this labyrinth of duplicity, ineptitude and extrava- 
 gance," writes Pozzo, "the mediators (at least those whose 
 dynamic was the spirit of Justice and Right) wishing to carry 
 out the mandates of their respective courts *'ancf rather with the 
 end of complying with their instructions than with any hope of 
 satisfying the parties interested) . . . applied themselves to the 
 elaboration of a treaty and convention the terms of which 
 appeared to them the most likely to conciliate the rights with the 
 interests of the two Peninsular Sovereigns in the New World." 1 
 Shortly after, Pozzo di Borgo writes to Nesselrode concerning 
 the progress of the mediators: 
 
 The mediation to put an end to the differences existing between 
 Spain and Portugal has until the present brought forth only voluminous 
 notes and sophistical and dilatory arguments. The plenipotentiaries 
 of Spain and Portugal had at last agreed to exchange confidential 
 notes to be reciprocally signed, by the terms of which Brazil bound 
 herself not to recognize the insurgents of Buenos Aires, and to cooperate 
 by every means short of war to determine them to submit to the mother 
 country. The representative of Spain at the same time gave assurances 
 that in view of the services offered by his Very Faithful Majesty to 
 His Catholic Majesty, the latter was willing to make certain territorial 
 concessions which would rectify the frontiers of the two countries in 
 America. 1 
 
 The dispatch closes with a long account of a personal quarrel 
 which had unfortunately arisen between TatistchefF and the 
 Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the following eloquent 
 lament concering the spectacle offered to the mediators by the two 
 Peninsular Kingdoms, once the greatest colonizing empires of the 
 world, now reduced to undignified impotency. "The Cabinet of 
 Madrid assisting like a mere spectator at the demolition of its 
 own greatness, wastes its time combating phantoms in the midst 
 of the deluge which is sweeping it away, while the Court of Brazil 
 busily sets up for itself a terrible neighborhood of 'demagogy and 
 disorder.' " 1 
 
 In September, Pozzo communicated to St. Petersburg the import- 
 ant news that "after three weeks of delay the British Government 
 
 1 Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, in Polovstov, op. cit., vol. 1818 (July 25/August 6), 
 No. 698. 
 
THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 67 
 
 has finally pronounced an absolute negative with respect to the 
 Spanish proposition." This refers to Ferdinand's desire to be 
 present at a Congress where the Tsar wished to submit the 
 Spanish case to a solemn conclave of the Powers assembled. 
 The Spanish envoy, with a curious misunderstanding of the 
 situation, had even "made his demand for the participation 
 of his Master at Aix-la-Chapelle conditional upon another, viz., 
 'that Great Britain should promise to declare itself openly against 
 the insurgents in case these latter should refuse to accept the 
 means of conciliation offered them.' " * Pozzo closes his dis- 
 patch with a prophetic warning regarding the influence of the 
 United States on European affairs : 
 
 The result of these misunderstandings is, on the one hand, the progress 
 of the insurrection, on the other, the advantages which accrue therefrom 
 to the United States. For a long time I have had the honor to announce 
 to the Imperial Ministry that the dismemberment of the Spanish- 
 American Continent would result to the advantage of the Federal 
 Government. There is no longer doubt that the Floridas will be ceded 
 to them, and that the Union will extend its possessions along the Gulf 
 of Mexico, until it has developed and dominated through the possession 
 of the neighboring positions the whole extent of that vast body of water 
 which is destined to become its absolute property. 1 
 
 The European debates regarding the mediation between Ferdi- 
 nand and the Portuguese Government (together with their differ- 
 ences in the Banda Oriental) and the "pacification" asked for by 
 Ferdinand with respect to the revolted Spanish colonies were to 
 be continued at Aix-la-Chapelle. The Tsar, with increasing 
 obstinacy, persisted in his view that the Spanish King's troubles 
 in South America offered an opportunity for the Powers of Europe 
 to apply and assert the principles of "concerted action" a view 
 which he had been the first to advance in his Instructions to 
 Novosiltzov and now believed to be binding upon the signa- 
 tories of the Holy Alliance. The whole question of a European 
 Directorate and the "mutual guarantee" it might afford to the 
 status quo was about to be formally raised. Alexander was deter- 
 mined that his "Great Idea" — which through the force of events 
 he had seen thrust aside at Vienna — should receive the considera- 
 tion it deserved. To "organize Europe" was, in his conception, 
 the first step towards securing the reign of "Justice, Christian 
 Charity and Peace." 
 
 1 Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, in Polovstov, op. cit., vol. 1818 (August 27/ 
 September 8), No. 713, p. 812. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 
 
 If it were allowable for the Allies freely to separate themselves from the 
 Alliance there could be no permanent Society of Nations. But no ally, in this 
 case, may hope to separate himself . . . and not be considered the common 
 enemy of all the Allies. Abbe de St. Pierre, Projet pour Rendre la Paix 
 Perpetuelle en Europe, 1713. 
 
 In April, 1818, a circular was prepared by the Russian Foreign 
 Office, under the Tsar's direction, setting forth at length the 
 beneficent ends already attained through the recognition of the 
 principle of international solidarity. The Powers were exhorted 
 not only to continue an unalterable devotion to the system set up 
 by existing treaties, but also to unite in closer bonds. In the form 
 of a "Confidential Memoir," l this document was communicated 
 to the Cabinets of Europe. As proof of the reactionary spirit 
 already prevailing in the councils of the Russian Emperor, and 
 as a credo of his intimate beliefs, the following extract is of the 
 highest interest, especially when compared with the declarations 
 that subsequently completed the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle: 
 
 During this memorable epoch, a united Europe has been able to 
 smother the spirit of revolution and to create a riew order of things 
 safeguarding the general interest, under the aegis of Universal Justice. 
 The means by which this end has been accomplished are: (a) The alliance 
 of the Powers, unalterable in its principles, yet conformable to the prog- 
 ress of events, so that it may develop into a great confederation of all 
 the states, (b) The restoration of the legitimate government in France 
 fortified by institutions 2 which unite indissolubly the rights of the Bour- 
 bon dynasty with those of the people, (c) The declarations following 
 the Congress of Vienna, (d) The subsequent declarations made at 
 Paris during the year 1815. 3 
 
 Two of Alexander's favorite ideas, grouped in the following 
 
 sentence, find a prominent place in the "Memoir": 
 
 The wrongs under which all humanity groaned during the revolutionary 
 struggle were the inevitable consequence of the errors of the past, viz., 
 individualism and partial or exclusive political combinations* 
 
 The conservative nature of the bond which formed the basis of 
 the European system is shown in the concluding paragraph. 
 
 1 This "Confidential Memoir" is given in full by Polovstov, Correspondence Diplomatique 
 des Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 a 1830, 
 vol. 1818, p. 832. 
 
 2 The Charter imposed upon Louis XVIII. 
 
 3 Polovstov, op. cit., p. 833. 
 
 69 
 
70 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 This was intended only for the perusal of the diplomatic chancel- 
 leries of the Allied Powers: 
 
 This association of states has assured the inestimable advantages of 
 civil order and the inviolability of persons and institutions. It has 
 consecrated and guaranteed everywhere legitimacy, 1 ab antiquo, and 
 recognized by the treaties now in force, the territorial possessions of 
 every state. In order to maintain this end, the principle of a General 
 Coalition must be established and developed by further eventual action. 2 
 
 Alexander's conversion from republican liberalism to a philoso- 
 phy of monarchical paternalism was now complete. Yet a private 
 letter from Count Capo dTstria to General Pozzo di Borgo, the 
 Russian Minister in Paris, written just before the Congress now 
 proposed, proves the Tsar's high-minded intentions towards his 
 allies. In connection with the Memoir it shows Alexander's real 
 aspirations regarding a concert of Europe at this critical time. 
 Quoting the Tsar's own words, Capo d'Istria wrote: 
 
 I desire the prosperity of the French Monarchy and the progressive 
 strengthening of its influence, not for myself, nor for Russia, but in the 
 interest of the entire universe. It is Europe that has suffered from the 
 loss and misfortunes of France, and Europe is therefore greatly interested 
 in the future happiness of France and the maintenance of the order there 
 established. All the Powers, consequently, should cooperate to this 
 end, at the same time respecting the plighted faith of treaties. This is 
 the chief aim to which the efforts of each one of the Foreign Ministries 
 should be directed, and aside from it, there is no hope either for France 
 or for Europe. 
 
 While General Pozzo endeavors to follow these principles, so often 
 impressed upon him, he feels otherwise. Read his dispatches. They 
 are written in the language of a devoted and zealous servant of the Crown 
 who seeks by his foresight to profit by every possible combination the 
 future may hold. He knows that Austria, England and Prussia have 
 always disputed our right to share in affairs of general interest. In 
 anticipation of the condition of affairs which may arise after France is 
 wholly restored, he prepared to oppose them by winning to our side the 
 support of French diplomacy, and if necessary that of Spain as well. 
 With these auxiliaries, he looks confidently upon the future. 
 
 This fashion of judging of men and affairs can not but impede the 
 progress of the general system, and is not consistent with the purity of 
 its guiding sentiments. Once known to the other Ministries, such con- 
 duct will infallibly engender jealousy and suspicion. In adopting such 
 a line, we should be drawn in spite of ourselves into a by-road. Instead 
 of working towards eminently disinterested ends, and by legal and 
 avowed means maintaining concord and union between the Great Powers, 
 our efforts would become devoted to a line of conduct entirely selfish, 
 veiled in mystery and moving by devious ways. We should inevitably 
 
 1 For an interesting discussion of the principle of Legitimate Monarchy, see Goebel, 
 
 The Recognition Policy of the United States. 
 2 Polovstov, op. cit., p. 834. 
 
THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 71 
 
 be driven to aim at Power, in order to make the other chancelleries dance 
 to our tune. We should begin by thinking that all this was to preserve 
 Europe in the way of Peace. But where would such a path lead us? l 
 
 It must be borne in mind, in judging these utterances, that they 
 were not part of a public manifesto. They are, indeed, but the 
 report of a private conversation between the Tsar and the 
 writer. They were addressed to one who, from the nature of the 
 rebuke they implied, would probably be the last person to publish 
 them abroad. As such, they offer valuable evidence of Alexander's 
 good faith and sincerity of purpose at a time when his motives 
 were — and still are — most frequently called into question. They 
 explain why, even in the face of a policy they could not but deplore 
 and oppose, the Tsar maintained the respect and admiration of 
 such men as Monroe and Adams. They lead us to understand 
 the verdict of Chateaubriand, whose faculties of criticism, at 
 least, no one can deny, that Alexander of Russia, after Napoleon, 
 was the greatest man of his time. 
 
 The difficulties of continuing a common direction to the foreign 
 policy of a group of states differing widely in political development 
 and civilization became every day more apparent. From the very 
 beginning, the Tsar's conception of a fraternal pact general in 
 its terms — such as that uniting the monarchs of the Holy Alli- 
 ance — was opposed by the decision of the British Cabinet to base 
 its whole course of action on the actual text of the agreements 
 signed at Chaumont, Vienna and Paris. Castlereagh, at first far 
 from hostile to the Holy Alliance, was soon convinced that in 
 following such a course lay the only means of remedying the 
 defects of a system largely based on "eventual" decisions. Great 
 Britain from the first found it hard to reconcile parliamentary 
 principles and a traditional foreign policy with the Tsar's ideals 
 of "European action." 2 
 
 It was the Tsar's contention that the Treaty of Alliance of 
 November 20, 1815, had provided (Article VI) the machinery for 
 a real European government. In a series of congresses — wherein 
 the representatives of the Powers might deliberate in common 
 upon all matters concerning the general welfare — he saw the 
 inception of a European legislature. In spite of the example 
 afforded by the Congress of Vienna, he would apparently set no 
 
 1 Letter from Count Capo d'Istria to Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, July 10/22, 1818, quoted by 
 Polovstov, op. cit., vol. 1818, p. 774. 
 
 2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, pp. 254-255. 
 
72 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 limits to the usefulness of international debate. But in the appli- 
 cation of this policy he found himself opposed not only by Great 
 Britain but even by Austria and Prussia. 1 Both of these Powers 
 believed that a Congress such as the Tsar proposed — one including 
 Spain and the lesser Powers — might readily lead to embarrassing 
 complications with respect to the participation of France. Per- 
 sistent rumors emanating from St. Petersburg even affirmed 
 that the Tsar, dissatisfied with the conduct of his allies, was 
 meditating an alliance with the restored dynasty of the Bour- 
 bons. 2 The outcome of this situation was a compromise: Alexan- 
 der obtained the Congress he so ardently desired, set for Septem- 
 ber 30, at Aix-la-Chapelle. But in spite of Spanish protests and 
 Ferdinand's complaints that Russia had abandoned him, it was 
 decided to restrict this gathering to the representatives of the 
 four great Powers. Before this tribunal Richelieu, the French 
 Prime Minister, was invited to appear to give an account of the 
 state of affairs existing under the restored monarchy. 
 
 Although the conduct of the Bonapartists and other "revolu- 
 tionaries" still gave cause for serious anxiety to all the signatories 
 of the Treaty of Paris, 2 Richelieu by this time had gained the 
 entire confidence of the Tsar. This was the end aimed at when 
 the former Russian official was chosen by the politic Louis XVIII 
 to replace Talleyrand. 3 For nearly a year Richelieu had flattered 
 Alexander's favorite theories by pointing out that on all occasions 
 the federal system of Europe which must grow out of the present 
 state of things could always force France to be just in case she 
 sought to be unjust. He insisted, however, that to secure this 
 end, France must form part of this system. 4 
 
 /I The growing intimacy between the courts of France and Russia 
 was viewed by the Powers with some apprehension. But after 
 an interview with the Tsar at Aix, Castlereagh reported with 
 some relief the fact that Alexander had declared to Wellington as 
 well as to Metternich and himself: "My army, as well as myself, 
 is at the disposal of Europe." 5 
 
 1 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de V Europe, vol. I, p. 118. 
 
 2 Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. I, 
 pp. 398^00. 
 
 3 Richelieu had for some time been Governor of Odessa, while an emigre in Russia. 
 
 * For the details of this negotiation, see Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 254—255. 
 
 6 Dispatch, Castlereagh to Bathrust, October 3, No. 2, quoted in Phillips, The Con- 
 federation of Europe, p. 168. 
 
 
THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 73 
 
 Since the signing of the treaty of November 20, France had 
 shown every disposition exactly to fulfil the terms of the financial 
 arrangement imposed upon her by the Allies. Not only had the 
 scheduled payment of the indemnities — considered enormous at 
 the time — been rigorously fulfilled, but internationally her finan- 
 cial position was even sounder than before. By the end of 
 April, 1818, her debt to the Allies (500,000,000 francs) was com- 
 pletely liquidated. 1 Through the reorganization of the army, 
 the government of Louis XVIII was firmly established upon the 
 throne. No real excuse could now be invoked for maintaining 
 the great Army of Occupation within the borders of France. 
 Moreover, signs were becoming apparent of a dangerous Liberal 
 disaffection among the foreign troops long quartered in France — 
 in not unfriendly contact with the people who had led the revolu- 
 tionary movement throughout Europe. 2 
 
 But before finally relinquishing their hold upon the French 
 Government, the Allied Powers desired to exact from Richelieu 
 some guarantee of future good conduct. The first sessions of the 
 Congress were, therefore, almost entirely devoted to securing 
 this end. 
 
 The discussions with respect to the evacuation of French terri- 
 tory by the Allied armies were brief and to the point. Nearly 
 all the requirements determining this action had been carried out. 
 A protocol, dated October 2, informed Louis XVIII that the 
 foreign garrisons would leave not later than November 30. This 
 news was received with joy throughout the whole country. 3 
 
 The question now arose upon what terms the representatives of 
 Louis XVIII might be admitted to take actual part in the council. 
 To make France a party to the treaty of Chaumont would asso- 
 ciate her as an ally in an agreement aimed chiefly against her own 
 interests — and her own possible military rehabilitation. On 
 October 3, Castlereagh made a formal proposal "that France 
 be admitted under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty of 
 Alliance," which had established "a deliberating system for the 
 purpose of consulting at fixed periods and upon common inter- 
 ests." 4 
 
 1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. I, p. 117. 
 
 2 Cretenau-Joly, Histoire des Traites de 1815, preface. 
 
 3 Debidour, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 120. 
 
 4 Martens, Nouveau Recueildes Traites de Paix, vol. n, p. 737. 
 
74 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 On October 8 a Russian memorandum, drafted by Pozzo di 
 Borgo, was presented to the Allies, and on November 1 a protocol 
 openly concluded with Richelieu declared that France was 
 "admitted under the terms of Article VI of the treaty of Novem- 
 ber, 1815." 
 
 In the eyes of Europe, Louis XVIII was thus allowed, through 
 his representatives, to take a full share in the ensuing debates. 
 After Richelieu had formally accepted the Allied terms (Novem- 
 ber 12), a further protocol, dated November 15, establishing the 
 mutual relations of the Five Great Powers, was considered secret. 1 
 
 Pasquier, referring to Richelieu's answer of November 1 2 and 
 
 of the protocol of November 15, says: 
 
 These two remarkable documents should be studied by all who desire 
 to form an exact opinion of the affairs of this period. They are filled 
 with the principles of the Holy Alliance. 2 
 
 The terms of this protocol, wholly in accord with the Tsar's 
 theories of concerted action, were, however, accompanied by cer- 
 tain significant reservations on the part of the British representa- 
 tive. Castlereagh presented a Memorandum to the Congress 
 setting forth the views of his Cabinet. After recalling the terms 
 of the previous agreements that bound the Allies, he declared that 
 Great Britain could only consider as a casus foederis the return of 
 Bonaparte or an attempt to restore his dynasty. In every other 
 situation that might arise she would be guided by circumstances. 3 
 The Island Empire was already tending towards the policy which 
 V Canning afterwards characterized as "resuming Jierisolation.'' 
 In Castlereagh's opinion it was time to call a halt on Concerted 
 Action. The Tsar was already planning an Allied General Staff. 
 In this idea he was warmly supported by the Prussians, and was 
 only dissuaded by Wellington. 4 In the eyes of all the Allies of 
 Chaumont, however, except the Tsar, the return of France to the 
 European system was contingent on her good behavior. As Gentz 
 
 1 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, p. 501. This document, described by Gentz, as a "protocol 
 reserve" {Depeches inedites, vol. I, p. 410), is quoted in full in Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, 
 pp. 501-502 : "The five Powers have decided not to depart, either in their relations with each 
 other or with other states from the principles of intimate union which until now have 
 presided over the common interests, a union become more Scfong and indissoluble from the 
 bonds of Christian Brotherhood which join them." Article 2 states, " that this union is only 
 more real and durable because it has in view no particularistic interests or temporary 
 combination." 
 
 2 Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 262. 
 
 3 Gentz, Depeches inedites, vol. I, p. 409. 
 
 4 Gentz, Ibid., vol. I, p. 413. 
 
 4 
 
THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 75 
 
 remarks in his account of the proceeding, "it was not a Quintuple 
 Alliance. Indeed the idea came to no one's mind." l 
 
 It soon became evident that Great Britain also desired a definite 
 understanding with respect to the limits of her future policy con- 
 cerning the mediation the Powers had undertaken in South Amer- 
 ica. American affairs were indeed inevitably to become the chief 
 concern of this formal gathering of European Powers. On 
 October 27, "Lord Castlereagh first brought to the attention of 
 the Congress the question of the mediation desired by Ferdinand 
 between Spain and its revolted colonies." 2 
 
 In the report of the proceedings of the Congress addressed to 
 Alexander we read of the difficulties encountered in the course 
 of this mediation, the progress of which was closely followed by 
 the Tsar: 
 
 The long statement of the British Plenipotentiary made all present 
 feel that the British Government would consult only its own interests in 
 the matter. His point of view was echoed by the Plenipotentiaries of 
 Austria and Prussia . . . Richelieu remained silent, but the Russian 
 Plenipotentiaries now made the following statement: 'At a moment when 
 the eyes of all Europe and the interest of two hemispheres are fixed upon 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Spain again asks the Courts of Austria, France, Great 
 Britain, Prussia and Russia to consider her case. She has proposed a 
 general basis of settlement and asks to participate in their councils. 
 Russia has not taken any attitude in this matter, but is nevertheless 
 desirous of supporting the King of Spain. Great Britain has sought to 
 develop the same ends through negotiations with the Duke of San 
 Carlos. If a plan can be agreed upon, Spain appears willing to forward 
 its execution through friendly negotiations with her colonies. It is 
 only in case that these offers of mediation should be refused that Spain 
 
 1 Gentz, Depeches in'edit'es, vol. I, p. 408. 
 
 2 See MS. Russian Foreign Office, Archives d'Etat, 1818. The following unpublished docu- 
 ments referring to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle are contained in a Folio marked Precis 
 du Travail de la Conference d' Aix-la-Chapelle . The report to the Emperor, quoted above, 
 is contained in Cartons 2 and 3 of this Folio. The Tsar's misgivings with respect to 
 English support of his plan for a "Confederation of States" is shown by the terms of 
 an interesting document presented by the Russian plenipotentiary to the Ministers of 
 Austria, France, Great Britain and Prussia (dated November 11/23, 1818). In this 
 document Alexander reiterated with doctrinaire persistency the ideals of solidarity and 
 "brotherhood" of nations and sovereigns contained in the manifesto of the Holy Alliance. 
 He once more expressed his belief that "reciprocal guarantees" alone could insure the 
 status quo of Europe. At the same time he suggested as the surest basis for future peace 
 a "Territorial Guarantee" of the respective possessions of the Allied Powers and the fol- 
 lowing significant clause with respect to British participation was added: "They agree to 
 notify the Government of Great Britain of the above clause, inviting H. B. M.'s Gov- 
 ernment to use its good offices to obtain the results desired if necessary without requiring 
 its active cooperation or full adhesion." This treaty draft, which does not appear to have 
 been seriously debated by the Congress, is highly interesting not only as showing the 
 Tsar's persistent devotion to the principles set forth in Novosiltzov's Instructions but also 
 as a serious attempt to make a territorial guarantee the basis of a general treaty. (Com- 
 pare Article X of the Treaty of Versailles.) See Appendix. 
 
 / 
 
76 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 will desire the intervening powers to furnish more effectual and impera- 
 tive cooperation. 1 
 
 Spain, as a party to the proceedings, continued to insist on 
 being admitted to the Congress. To such a step — and to the 
 "intervention" hinted at in the Russian statement — the British 
 representative strongly objected. "Castlereagh explained that 
 \y Great Britain would onlyjintg rvene' wid TTgood^orKces, and refused 
 
 to consent to the Spanish envoy being admitted to the de- 
 bates." * The Russian representatives were to continue, to the 
 end of the Congress, their attempts to draw the English Foreign 
 Minister into the Tsar's plan of a European Directorate. But 
 besides their objections to vague "eventual action," the British 
 Cabinet felt, not without reason, that the solidarity between the 
 Russian Court and the Courts of France and Spain would but 
 set up a condition of "equilibrium" wholly to the Tsar's advan- 
 tage. Alexander's efforts to force Ferdinand on the Congress 
 defeated his own ends. 2 
 
 At the second conference, held on October 24, consideration of 
 these important questions was continued. "No one cared to 
 open the discussion" — or to oppose the Tsar's desires. France 
 and Russia were alone in favor of making an "international 
 question" of Ferdinand's domestic troubles. It was Castlereagh 
 who finally proposed a solution. "Let us," he said, "decide 
 collectively that the role of Mediator be accepted by the Five 
 Courts, at the same time announcing to Spain that only good- 
 offices are possible; let us propose that she begin by granting to the 
 colonies still under her sceptre the advantages she is disposed to 
 offer, and make similar offers to those which are in a state of 
 insurrection." 3 Greatly to Alexander's chagrin, Austria and 
 Prussia seconded Castlereagh in the above proposal. 
 
 Richelieu, inspired by the Tsar's interest in Spain, now 
 made a last attempt to include Ferdinand in the debates. He 
 
 1 "Report to the Emperor," Carton 2, loc. cit. 
 
 2 Pasquier is careful to point out that this meeting in which sovereigns and their 
 plenipotentiaries took part remained in reality a reunion. It had been "positively 
 announced that it was not the intention of the sovereigns to hold a Congress." "In 
 London it was feared that Russian influence in a Congress would be preponderant." 
 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, pp. 254-255. The Tsar's doctrinaire efforts (renewed at Lay- 
 bach) to give a formal, legislative tone to the debates but aroused opposition on the part 
 of Great Britain and Austria. This was perhaps the chief cause that made Aix-la-Chapelle 
 the closing chapter of the "coalition" rather than the opening of a new era. 
 
 3 "Report to the Emperor," Carton 2, loc. cit. 
 
THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 77 
 
 opposed the British plan for the following reason: "In using such 
 language to Spain she will be forced to refuse the mediation." 
 His closing reason — in view of subsequent events — is also signifi- 
 cant: He objected to Castlereagh's attitude because "this will 
 be serving the purposes of the growing democracy of the other 
 hemisphere." 1 
 
 The discussions "now became general and vague." The 
 Russian envoy (Capo dTstria) fell back on a classic strategem of 
 diplomacy. After speaking at length in support of Richelieu's 
 motion, he desired "an adjournment pending further instructions 
 from the Emperor." * The latter evidently still pinned his faith 
 to the form which the "mediation" should assume. Indeed, from 
 the very beginning the real interest of the sovereigns grouped 
 in the "Holy Alliance" was evident. Their anxiety for Ferdinand 
 was dependent on preserving the institution of European mon- 
 archy in the New World. 
 
 Capo d'Istria now proposed as a substitute for the English 
 scheme a collective note asking Madrid to "suggest remedies in 
 detail," adding, in a burst of frankness: "It is realized that no 
 one knows the real situation in America or the circumstances of 
 the insurrection well enough to judge whether the remedies pro- 
 posed would be effectual." 1 
 
 The indispensable Gentz — who was considered an authority on 
 American affairs — was charged with drawing up a full "report" 
 for the Congress. This High Priest of Legitimacy 2 was, there- 
 fore, to frame the solution by which Europe might crush the 
 growing Constitutional movement — based on the example of the 
 United States — which was threatening all South America! 
 
 The French proposal regarding the form which the mediation 
 should assume (contained in the instructions given to Richelieu) 
 but continued the monarchical thesis. It laid down the following 
 propositions: 
 
 1 "Report to the Emperor," loc cit. 
 
 2 Gentz in his youth had written a remarkable thesis on "The Effect of the Discovery 
 of America on Europe." See de Clery, Un diplomate d'il y a cent ans: Frederick de 
 Gentr, p. 27. See also a pamphlet in the Congressional Library in Washington concern- 
 ing The Origin and Principles of the American Revolution compared with the Origin and Prin- 
 ciples of the French Revolution, written by Gentz and translated by J. Q. Adams. Gentz' 
 later anti-Americanism is shown in his reports to the Russian Foreign Office. See 
 Nesselrode, Letters and Papers, 1760-1850, vol. v, p. 39. 
 
78 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 (1) The recognition of the independence of Buenos Aires, on condition 
 that a constitutional monarchy be established with a Spanish Prince 
 occupying the throne, and of certain concessions being granted, favorable 
 to Spanish trade. 
 
 (2) Political and commercial concessions to be granted to Caracas, 
 Venezuela and the provinces of Grenada which have achieved inde- 
 pendence from Spain. 
 
 (3) The immediate adoption towards Peru and Mexico of a more 
 liberal system of commerce, and especially the apppointment of native 
 Americans to public office. 
 
 Commenting on the above "points," King Louis made the fol- 
 lowing admissions: 
 
 His Majesty believes that these are the three means of preventing 
 the general conflagration by which America is menaced, a disaster 
 whose reactions on Europe would be terrible. Thus the progressive 
 emancipation of this great continent, because it is in line with the 
 inevitable order of things, will be restrained and rendered less dangerous 
 to the European system by conserving the forms of monarchical govern- 
 ment. 1 The important matter is to have (the above) adopted as the basis 
 of Aix-la-Chapelle. The details of the plan can only be elaborated in 
 accord with Spanish views, and at a reunion where, in order to secure the 
 widest discussion, not only the envoys of Brazil, but also those of the 
 United States, should be invited to attend. The King is persuaded that 
 by admitting the latter Powers to a conference when this important 
 question will be treated, measures best calculated to insure its success 
 will have been taken. 
 
 The concluding paragraph of the instructions was wholly in 
 accord with the desire of Alexander to open these debates directed 
 by the spirit of the "Holy Alliance" to the Christian and civilized 
 nations of the world. Richelieu, as Castlereagh had foreseen, 
 was working "in combination" with the Russian delegation. The 
 French instructions show that Alexander still hoped to obtain not 
 only the adherence of the United States to the "Holy Alliance" 
 but also their participation in the "World Congress," where they 
 might act as a counterpoise to British policy. 
 
 As will be seen from the above instructions, Franco-Russian policy 
 was not opposed to including the principal American Powers — 
 notably the United States — in the European debates concerning 
 the Spanish insurgents. Sound as this policy appears upon the 
 surface, there were reasons which caused it to be viewed with 
 
 1 "Instructions de Louis XVIII au Due de Richelieu, Plenipotentiare Francais au Con- 
 gres l'Aix-la-Chapelle," Polovstov, Correspondence Diplomatique des Ambassadeurs et 
 I Ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 a 1830, vol. 1818, No. 
 y 1367, p. 820. 
 
THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 79 
 
 suspicion by the Washington Cabinet. We may now consider 
 some hitherto unpublished evidence of the dangers which con- 
 fronted the young Republic in formulating a policy with respect 
 to European affairs. The secret dossiers of the Russian Foreign 
 Office offer proofs that the trained diplomacy of Adams and 
 Monroe, in clinging to the policy of isolation set forth by Wash- 
 ington and refusing their adhesion to this earlier League of Peace, 
 adopted a course in accord with the best interests of the whole 
 American Continent. 
 
 The Russian plan of mediation (complementary to the above) 
 is a highly interesting document. It brings to the attention of the 
 European Powers the importance of a new factor in international 
 affairs: the growing power of the young American Republic. The 
 original is marked "Confidential," and "Submitted by the Pleni- 
 potentiaries of France and Russia to their colleagues as wholly 
 confidential and reserved for their own information." It was also 
 further stated that this document is "in no case to be inserted in 
 the Protocols of the Conference." 1 
 
 A cautious preamble set forth the Tsar's views of the attitude 
 to be adopted by the Powers of Europe towards America. The 
 general line of policy thus laid down was probably no secret to 
 the Washington Cabinet. It was a policy which, as the Russian 
 Memorandum admits, was more suitable for "verbal communica- 
 tion" than for written notes: 
 
 Spain's confidence must be gained, not forced. This is indispensable 
 because she alone has the power to act directly . . . An event which 
 would cause irremediable differences in the development of the situation 
 would be the recognition by any power of the government set up by the 
 insurgents. Unfortunately, this is not an improbable event. The 
 popular party in the United States, much strengthened of late, is pre- 
 paring to make a strong effort to secure the recognition of the indepen- 
 dence of Buenos Aires during the next session of Congress. Considera- 
 tion of their actions reveal their ambitions to make of the American 
 Continent one Grand Confederated Republic at the head of which will 
 be found the United States. In the actual state of affairs, the United 
 States centralizes all its efforts in developing its resources and population. 
 It is directed by a moderate policy and does not offer a menace to 
 Europe. This would not continue to be the case should a large portion 
 of South America adopt its institutions. A whole republican world, 
 young, ardent and enriched by the production of every climate, will then 
 set itself up in opposition to an old monarchical Europe, overpopulated 
 and shaken by thirty years of revolution. This is a perspective worthy 
 
 1 MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. 
 
80 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 of the earnest consideration of all European statesmen. The conse- 
 quences of all this might be incalculable. ' 
 
 The Russian Memorandum then proceeds to prove with what 
 care Europe should seek to prevent, or at least retard, the growing 
 relations between North America and the new states formed in 
 the south: 
 
 The essential point is to gain time; a united representation by the 
 Powers of Europe would undoubtedly have a great effect on the American 
 Government . . . It is believed that the Plenipotentiaries of the Five 
 Powers at Washington should take the steps necessary to persuade public 
 opinion in the United States, as well as the Executive, to adopt their 
 point of view. This delicate negotiation should be conducted with 
 much care. Verbal communication would be preferable to written 
 notes — in order to avoid giving ammunition to the opposition, who 
 would seize upon the idea of foreign influence as contrary to American 
 institutions ... 
 
 The closing paragraph of this extraordinary diplomatic docu- 
 ment is not without a certain enduring significance: 
 
 It would be advisable that these overtures be made only with the 
 intention of examining more carefully — before taking action — the 
 results which might follow an intervention in America. These results 
 would probably be obtained most easily should the United States finally 
 be invited' to send a Plenipotentiary to confer with the other Powers. 
 They could be told they were themselves a European people, Christians, 
 and, therefore, like Europe, interested in questions of a general nature. l 
 
 As will later appear, the terms of the Russian secret "Memoran- 
 dum" present a startling contrast to the tone subsequently 
 adopted by Poletica in his renewed negotiations to induce the 
 Government at Washington to accede to the "Holy Alliance." 
 Had the invitation to form part of the European system (already 
 conveyed through Capo dTstria at St. Petersburg 2 and Dashkov 
 at Washington) been accepted, the envoys of the United States 
 would have found themselves at Aix-la-Chapelle either in a 
 minority with Great Britain, opposing the mediation asked for by 
 Ferdinand, or else (as Alexander hoped) throwing the weight 
 of their influence in support of the Russian proposals. To accede 
 to the latter would have ended in limiting the action of the United 
 States in America, while the Powers of the Holy Alliance imposed 
 their own policy through "concerted action." 
 
 ^S. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. 
 2 See supra. 
 
THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 81 
 
 Early in the sessions of the Congress (October 24) Castlereagh 
 had cleverly annexed to the Spanish colonial questions (by a 
 reference to Ferdinand's promise to end the traffic in negroes 
 in the year 1820) the whole matter of the slave trade. This 
 was placing the negotiations on a new footing, wherein sentiment 
 rather than expediency determined the issue. Realizing the dan- 
 ger of this line of conduct, the Russian envoys attempted to have 
 the slave trade made the object of a "Special Association," in 
 which all the states would have a part. In this connection they 
 suggested a central international rendezvous for an Allied fleet 
 on the African coast. This proposal for forming an International 
 Maritime Police naturally brought up the matter of the general 
 safety of the seas, and notably the vexed question of the Barbary 
 pirates. In view of the English policy in the Mediterranean, there 
 was a return to debatable ground. The European Powers found 
 it convenient to overlook their own particularistic interests and 
 to join once more with cheerful unanimity in renewed admonitions 
 to the United States. 
 
 In the meeting of November 11 the conference took cogni- 
 zance of a Memoir drawn up by Count Palmella, the Portuguese 
 envoy, concerning "the piratry's exercise by a band of scoundrels 
 navigating under unrecognized flags." * By this term was in- 
 tended not only the insurgents of South America but also alleged 
 privateers fitted out in North American ports to aid the revolu- 
 tionists. Palmella proposed "that the Ministers of the Five 
 Powers in Washington should be instructed to act in accord with 
 the Ministers of His Most Faithful Majesty (the King of Portugal) 
 in order to obtain the renewal of the Act of August 3, 1793, by 
 which the arming of corsairs in the United States was forbidden, 
 and that such clauses necessary to secure the execution of this 
 act should be added." He also proposed "that all colonial powers 
 of America should take steps to forbid the equipment of corsairs 
 in their ports, the sale of prizes illegally detained," etc. On 
 November 13 the Duke of Richelieu, to whom Palmella's memoir 
 had been referred, reported that the "United States shou'd be 
 included in the proposed League of International Maritime 
 
 a MS. Aix-la-Chapellf, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. 
 
82 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Police." "But such an invitation," he continued, "could not be 
 well extended until Spanish America was pacified." 1 
 
 On November 14 the League to Suppress Piracy was considered 
 a proper subject "for a general treaty of alliance, which should 
 determine the ports to which each contingent should be assigned." 
 The latter, it was proposed, should each have a separate cruising 
 ground, which was to be changed at frequent intervals. As a 
 measure of precaution "the whole strength of the squadron should 
 never be united unless necessary for action against the Barbary 
 States." l 
 
 Great Britain's reluctance to lend the support of her sea power 
 to these "international" naval measures ended in their abandon- 
 ment. Upon her jealously guarded "hegemony" turned, moreover, 
 the whole success or failure of an armed intervention in South 
 American affairs. The "League to Suppress Piracy" was indeed 
 but the Armada of Legitimacy and monarchical solidarity. Had 
 Britain not curtailed the theoretical "freedom of the seas," 
 there can be little doubt that the fleets of the Holy Alliance 
 would have sailed unhampered upon a crusade chiefly aimed at 
 upholding the "European principle" and extending its benefits 
 to the Latin-American Continent. 2 
 
 1 MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. As part of the same 
 debates, Metternich now proposed to restore their island fortresses to the Order of the 
 Knights of Malta as a nucleus of the international fleet operating against the Barbary 
 States. "Such an institution of permanent police," he maintained, "is preferable to a 
 political and military combination." The Emperor of Austria offered the port of Lissa 
 as a base of operations for the Order. Under Metternich's scheme, the old order of 
 Knighthood was to be accessible, not alone to members of the nobility, but also to 
 "youths of good family." It would thus become a school for young sailors and a place 
 where veteran seamen could be usefully employed. "Placed under the protection of a 
 permanent neutrality, the flag of the Order would be respected by all of the other fleets." 
 
 2 See supra, p. 91, Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, April 21/May 3, 1819. 
 Disappointed in his efforts to challenge and control Great Britain upon an element she 
 had made her own, the Tsar nevertheless pursued his intention to open the debates of the 
 Congress to all matters of international concern. The meeting of November 21 was entirely 
 devoted to another question of abiding interest at the present day. This was a communica- 
 tion of a report by Mr. Way "On the wrongs and political disabilities of the Jews in the 
 different nations of Europe." Here again particularistic interests interfered and no prac- 
 tical steps to ameliorate the postion of this unfortunate people appear to have been 
 proposed. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICAL 
 RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE, 1815-1820 
 
 "Some days before he left Paris he said to us: 'I am about to quit France, 
 but I wish, before I go, to render by a public act the homage which we 
 owe to God . . . and to invite the nations to devote themselves to the 
 obedience of the Gospel. I have brought with me the outline of this act, 
 and I wish you would examine it attentively . . . You will join with me a 
 prayer to God that my Allies may be disposed to sign it.' " Tsar Alexander 
 to Empaytaz, 1815. 
 
 The Tsar's gratification with respect to the accomplishments 
 of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was complete and openly 
 expressed. A document preserved in the files of the Russian 
 Foreign Office contains the following summary of the results 
 obtained: 
 
 The conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle have beyond the power of any 
 denial added to the progress of the European system. This system is 
 now based upon existing common transactions, and the Cabinets of 
 Europe have been able to recognize and appreciate its governing 
 principles. In the future no questions of a general nature can be too difficult 
 or complicated for its application. Precedents for the treatment of such 
 questions will be found in the Acts and Transactions of the Congress of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. 
 
 The Grand Alliance, therefore, has gained in two ways: First, a fresh 
 proof has been given of its solidarity, and, secondly, new rules of conduct 
 applicable to the future have been deduced, ensuring the maintenance 
 of peace and union between the Allied Powers. 1 
 
 It is doubtful, however, whether even at this time Alexander's 
 optimism was wholly justifiable. Once the question of readmit- 
 ting France to the councils of Europe had been decided, the 
 arguments of the Tsar's representatives had aimed to secure 
 from their reluctant colleagues of Prussia, Austria and Great 
 Britain some formal recognition of the principle of international 
 duty and solidarity. This policy was viewed with suspicion by 
 the other signatories of the treaties forming the System of 1815. 
 Castlereagh's "reservations" held England obstinately apart 
 from any Alliance Solidaire. Metternich's grudging recognition 
 of the advantages of such a pact were of little practical value. 
 Aplatonic "mediation," not an "intervention," had been the only 
 form of "concerted action" approved by the Powers in the ques- 
 
 1 Contained in the "Report to the Emperor," MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, Russian 
 Foreign Office, Petrograd. 
 
 83 
 
84 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 tion of the Spanish Colonies. 1 A brief review of the diplomatic 
 policy of the United States preceding Aix-la-Chapelle throws 
 much light upon the European situation. 
 
 Although Castlereagh had intimated that an American rep- 
 resentative would not be unwelcome at the Congress and the 
 same proposal had been made in Richelieu's instructions, the 
 United States had held resolutely aloof from all participation in 
 the "Acts and Transactions" of Europe. The foreign policy of 
 the Washington Cabinet was one of extreme complication. While 
 public opinion was pressing for some open expression of sympathy 
 with the South American insurgents, the American Minister in 
 Madrid was doing all in his power to secure from Ferdinand some 
 practical settlement of the Florida question. 
 
 An interesting contemporary judgment on the conduct of the 
 United States at this time is to be found in the Abbe de Pradt's 2 
 UEurope apres le Congres a" Aix-la-Chapelle . To oppose the 
 European system the author welcomes an American system 
 based on a liberal conception of diplomacy and government. 
 He seems to have been the first European writer to realize the 
 benefits that might accrue to the Old World by the desire of the 
 United States to remain apart from combinations principally 
 concerned with particularistic interests in which it had no share. 
 He summed up this policy as follows: 
 
 To remain apart from European affairs; to oppose any intervention of 
 Europe in the affairs of America; and to build up a universal American 
 system. 
 
 Pradt's works on foreign policy were widely read and doubtless 
 led liberal opinion abroad to a better understanding of the policy 
 of the Washington Cabinet. But in the opinion of the chief 
 protagonist of "concerted action" the absence of an American 
 representative from the Congress of 181 8 was a regrettable neglect 
 of international duty. The Tsar was determined to renew the 
 
 Nevertheless the American Minister in St. Petersburg was informed by his British 
 colleague "that an adjustment of the quarrels between Spain and her colonies would 
 doubtless be attempted under the auspices of the Allied Powers." Mr. Campbell to the 
 Secretary of State, September 25, 1819. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
 2 L'Abbe de Pradt (Archbishop of Malines) wrote (with truly astonishing prolixity) 
 concerning the relations of Europe and America. His best known works are L' Europe 
 apres le Congres d Aix-la-Chapelle (published in 1819), UEurope et I'Amerique en 1821 
 (published in 1821, with a second enlarged edition in 1822). These studies were quickly 
 followed by another concerning Le Vrai Systeme de l' Europe relativement d'Amerique et la 
 Grece (published in 1825). 
 
THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 85 
 
 negotiations unsuccessfully carried on by Dashkov to secure the 
 adherence of the United States to the Holy Alliance. Early in 
 the year 1818 he chose the Chevalier de Poletica for the difficult 
 task of again urging the Washington Government to form some 
 more intimate connection with the European system. Poletica 
 was impressed with the importance of his task. His correspond- 
 ence, preserved in the Archives of the Russian Foreign Office, 
 shows that before leaving Europe he made a careful study of the 
 American situation in all its bearings; for unlike Dashkov — a 
 careless petty official — Poletica had been trained in the most 
 subtle traditions of European diplomacy. 
 
 He wisely considered that the key to the mediation regarding 
 the Spanish colonies lay in the hands of the Cabinet in Washing- 
 ton rather than in Europe. Any formal recognition of the insur- 
 gents would be fatal to the cause of Ferdinand — and indirectly 
 to the system of "concerted action" regarding South American 
 affairs desired by the Tsar. To. persuade the Government at 
 Washington that their duty as members of the great family of 
 nations required them to respect the decisions reached by the 
 common deliberations of the Powers became his chief end. 
 
 Before leaving for his post Poletica was directed to attend the 
 meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle. The fate of the mediation at this 
 conference was disappointing. But the Tsar was still hopeful of 
 the results that might be obtained by opposing the United States 
 to British policy, not only in the New World but in the councils 
 of Europe. The above aim is developed at length in Poletica's 
 instructions: 
 
 At your own desire you have been able to assist at the Congress just 
 ended at Aix-la-Chapelle so that you can judge of the results of these dis- 
 cussions. You will thus be able to use this knowledge in your relations 
 with the Government of the United States. . . . You understand the 
 general system of Europe, both in its details and its general policy. 
 It is a policy of preserving peaceful relations adapted to all civilized 
 states, no matter what their political institutions may be, or the place 
 which they may occupy among the nations. The United States are 
 called upon by their own interest to adhere to this sytem. The Imperial 
 Chancellor, counting on your zeal, does not hide its appreciation of the 
 difficulties arising from popular prejudices which confront you. The 
 Chancellor knows of the opinion generally held in the United States 
 that it is better not to associate that country with the political systems of 
 Europe. Indeed, it has even been said that the misfortunes of Europe 
 are the cause of American commercial prosperity. 
 
86 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 The last war between England and America must be considered as 
 resulting from this system of isolation. That this has ended more 
 happily for the United States than could be expected is, however, due 
 rather to the presumption and mistakes of their adversaries than to any 
 other cause. It seems clear to us that even if the United States should 
 persist in her present system of isolation from the European system, 
 they will inevitably, sooner or later, be drawn within its influence. 
 Thus the state of things which led to the War of 1812 will undoubtedly 
 recur. Upon what does the United States then hope to base her future 
 policy, and what Power will intervene in her behalf? 1 
 
 The above instructions were in line with the course already 
 recommended by Poletica himself. Proof of the care with which 
 this diplomat had prepared the work of his mission is offered by 
 his earlier personal correspondence with Capo dTstria, which 
 contains an interesting appreciation of the entire situation: 
 
 During my passage through Paris, Mr. Gallatin touched upon this 
 delicate question. 2 I have every reason to believe that on my arrival in 
 Washington it will be the first subject concerning which I shall have to 
 negotiate with the United States Government. ... I am aware 
 that the Emperor's political system — as simple in conception as equitable 
 in its motives — desires nothing except the general interest of Europe and 
 hopes to gain this end by a strict observance of the Pacts which form the 
 basis of the European system. The American Government, however, 
 finds itself outside of this center of political action. Like all new states 
 of a democratic character which have succeeded in proving their youth- 
 ful strength, the United States seems to have arrived at a period of 
 development wherein they find themselves impatient of all peaceful 
 restraint. 
 
 The Powers most directly interested feel that both a spirit of justice 
 and their own public interest require that a strict neutrality be observed 
 in the struggle between Spain and her colonies. But public opinion, all 
 powerful in a republic, is always ambitious. The people of the United 
 States demand of their government that it should extend its already 
 immense territory and should, therefore, support the insurgents. It is 
 without doubt a veritable catastrophe that the imprudent conduct of 
 the reactionary Court of Madrid, in the Colon affair and in its general 
 colonial system, should have been the cause of so much exasperation. 
 This furnishes fuel for England's mercantile cupidity and the dema- 
 gogues of the American Congress. 
 
 In the actual state of affairs, it is sufficient to point out that the un- 
 conditional return of these colonies to Spanish tyranny has become 
 impossible and that their partition emanating even in absolute inde- 
 pendence has become nearly certain. All hypothesis with respect to 
 the future of Spanish America must lead to this end. 
 
 1 The above document forms part of a series transmitted through the Imperial Russian 
 Ambassador, Mr. George Bakhmietiev, published in American Historical Review, vol. xviii, 
 p- 315. The above project is endorsed: "Signed 9th/21st November, 1818. " s MS. Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 2 The question of the Spanish colonies. 
 
THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 87 
 
 Will Your Excellency give me instructions how, without departing 
 from His Majesty's intentions, I can adjust my own language to these 
 probabilities? It is only the more essential to give a precise and direct 
 statement of our policy, in view of my knowledge of the Spanish envoy 
 in Washington. This leads me to believe that he will make every effort 
 upon my arrival to have it publicly known that a complete conformity 
 of views exists between the Court of Madrid and the Court of His 
 Majesty the Emperor, at least so far as the policy to be followed in the 
 struggle between Spain and her Colonies. The Chevalier d'Onis will 
 presume upon the intimacy of the two Courts (which has been the 
 motive of so many diplomatic explanations). I will not hide from 
 Your Excellency that if the Spanish envoy succeeds in establishing 
 this opinion, our popularity in the United States, where the honored name 
 of the Emperor is so generally respected and venerated, would suffer, in 
 a sense it would be wise to avoid. 1 
 
 In a personal letter annexed to the above, Poletica states even 
 more explicitly his opinion with respect to European and American 
 affairs. After expressing his conviction that England's policy 
 turns upon (1) the fear of a new general war, and (2) the fear of 
 Russia (shown by her intrigues with Austria, Prussia and even 
 France), he concludes: 
 
 England will always be found opposed to Russia and in league with 
 Austria, seeking to isolate us so that we may be without allies. With 
 respect to the conduct of America, they have no expression strong 
 enough to condemn it. The occupation of Florida has a parallel only 
 in the partition of Poland! They die of rage here over it, but these 
 feelings they will control until the day of reckoning. The relations 
 between England and the United States should make our future 
 relations with North America more and more interesting. 2 
 
 This letter is an interesting confirmation of the view that it 
 was principally with the intention of securing a diplomatic ally 
 opposed in policy to Great Britain that the Tsar continued his 
 efforts to bring the North American Republic into closer relations 
 with the European Powers. Aside from the probability that such 
 a participation might forestall the recognition of the insurgents — 
 an event possibly fatal to the success of the European "mediation" 
 desired by Ferdinand — Alexander at first based great hopes on the 
 mutual opposition of American and British policy in the New 
 World. 
 
 1 MS. United States, Carton 8 (1818), No. 13. Diplomatic Archives, dated Moscow, 
 February 27, 1818. 
 
 2 Poletica to Capo d'Istria, London, August 1/13, 1818. MS. United States, Russian 
 Foreign Office. 
 
88 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 While no actual invitation had been extended to the United 
 States to join in the debates at Aix-la-Chapelle, 1 it is probable 
 that Alexander would have eagerly welcomed an expression of 
 such a desire by the Washington Government. As shown by 
 Richelieu's action at Aix-la-Chapelle, the Tsar seems to have 
 considered, logically enough, that to legislate with respect to 
 American affairs without the presence pro forma of the principal 
 American Power was to invalidate the measures thus determined. 2 
 
 The situation as viewed in Washington may be gathered from 
 the instructions issued by the State Department to the new 
 Minister, Mr. George W. Campbell, who was sent in April, 1818, 
 to St. Petersburg to replace Mr. Pinkney. In spite of the 
 good feeling in the United States towards Russia, there were 
 reasons to suspect that Alexander's American policy was not 
 wholly disinterested. In May, 1818, Correa, the Portuguese 
 Minister, had hinted to Adams not only that the European Alli- 
 ance was preparing to take a hand in settling the disordered affairs 
 in South America, but also that Russia was seeking to establish 
 her own power more firmly on the American Continent. Correa's 
 "indiscretion" may have been intended to enlist the support of 
 the United States in favor of the Portuguese in the Banda Oriental. 
 
 1 Castlereagh in February, 1819, told Minister Rush "that, during the discussions at 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, he had found France and Prussia laboring under a belief that the United 
 States desired to be associated in the mediation" . . . until undeceived by Rush's com- 
 munications. Rush, A Residence at the Court of London, vol. I, p. 5. 
 
 2 It is interesting that a direct appeal to be represented at the Congress had been 
 received by the Tsar from the South American insurgents themselves. While the United 
 States had consistently refused — from reasons of traditional policy — to associate them- 
 selves with Alexander's plan of a World Confederation consecrated by a Holy Alliance, 
 Rivadavia, the representative in Europe of the Junta of Buenos Aires, addressed himself 
 to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in terms that could only be gratifying to the 
 Tsar's notions of the role reserved for the "August Sovereigns of Europe": 
 
 "When the Congress of the United Provinces of South America learned of the principles 
 solemnly recognized in the act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, and perceived 
 with joy that its own procedure was in conformity with the doctrines advanced by the 
 August Sovereigns of Europe, they could not but congratulate themselves on the prosperity 
 they were bound to enjoy through the application of these beneficent maxims. The news 
 of the forthcoming Congress [Aix-la-Chapelle] gives reasons to hope that no object would 
 be considered so worthy of the attention of the August Sovereigns as that of uniting 
 America and Europe by bonds other than those of a colonial system. The Powers will 
 not judge a quarrel upon which depends the happiness of twenty million inhabitants 
 without first learning the circumstances." 
 
 Rivadavia then desires Nesselrode to make known to his august master: "I am authorized 
 by the Government of the United Provinces of South America to manifest its sincere 
 desires to establish relations between the Old and New Worlds which will guarantee a 
 sound basis for future peace." 
 
 Rivadavia to Nesselrode, Paris, October 14, 1818. MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign 
 Office. In view of the subsequent development of the policy of the United States under 
 the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, the above direct appeal by the South American repre- 
 sentatives to the assembled Powers of Europe is not without present significance. 
 
THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 89 
 
 It is remarkable (Adams wrote to Campbell) that the European 
 Allies have hitherto withheld from the United States all their proceedings 
 on this intended mediation between Spain and her colonies. 1 
 
 Campbell was therefore instructed not only carefully to watch 
 the development of Russian policy towards America, but also 
 to assure the Tsar's Government that the policy of the United 
 States had been neutral between Spain and her colonies and that 
 the United States wished to pursue a course for the future in 
 harmony with that of the Allies. The following significant 
 warning, foreshadowing Monroe's Message, formed part of these 
 instructions : 
 
 We can not participate in, and can not approve of, any interposition 
 of other Powers unless it be to promote the total independence, political 
 and commercial, of the colonies. 1 
 
 After the Congress of the Powers at Aix-la-Chapelle the all- 
 important question in Washington became: How far the Tsar 
 might be prepared to go in the support of his favorite theories, 
 and whether an active intervention by Europe in American affairs 
 might not result from his determination to impose respect for the 
 conclusions arrived at during this conclave? In December, 1818, 
 Mr. Campbell reported at length with respect to Alexander's prob- 
 able attitude. It was his reassuring conviction that "he would not 
 separately unite with Spain in war against the United States." 2 
 
 In considering the probable effect of the influence of the system 
 of congresses inaugurated at Aix-la-Chapelle upon the interna- 
 tional situation — and more particularly upon American affairs and 
 the spread of republican principles in the New World — Mr. Camp- 
 bell also reported at length under date of December 10/22, 1818: 
 
 The new quintuple alliance in which the late conference at Aix-la- 
 Chapelle resulted may, and, it is believed, will for some time greatly 
 influence if not entirely control the conduct of all the Powers of Europe, 
 whether parties thereto or not. . . . 3 
 
 1 Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 28, 1818. MS. Instructions, Russia. 
 
 2 Campbell added: "It is therefore most probable he will use his great personal influence 
 (for his manner is said to be very prepossessing) as well as that derived from the immense 
 physical force he could command to accomplish his ends by overawing the councils of 
 Europe without hazarding his present high standing. That the views of this great and 
 certainly powerful coalition of crowned heads in relation to the pending contest between 
 Spain and her colonies will soon develop themselves there can be little doubt, and the 
 importance of their being known to our Government previous to its becoming a party to 
 the contest would seem entitled to serious consideration." Mr. Campbell to the Secretary 
 of State, December 10/22, 1818. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
 3 What follows is in cipher. 
 
90 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 The diffusion of principles having a tendency to endanger or in any 
 degree weaken the cause of legitimacy — in which the source of that 
 alliance is to be sought for — will be viewed by the parties thereto with 
 jealousy. 1 
 
 The same communication refers to Alexander as "the great 
 arbiter of the politics of Europe," and with respect to his inten- 
 tions continues: 
 
 It is my present opinion that the Emperor of Russia will use his 
 influence to reconcile the Spanish Colonies to the parent state, and that 
 he would view in an unfavorable light an acknowledgment of the inde- 
 pendence of these colonies by our Government and would in such an 
 event be inclined to induce the Allied Powers to interpose if there was a 
 prospect of success to prevent the establishment of such extensive 
 independent states and consequent spread of republican principles. 1 
 
 It is, moreover, in a tone of considerable relief that this perspica- 
 cious observer reported the substance of a long and cordial 
 interview with which the Tsar favored him on his return to St. 
 Petersburg. Alexander spoke in English, in which language, Mr. 
 Campbell reports, "he expresses himself quite intelligibly." 
 
 With respect to the recent Congress, Alexander declared that — 
 
 he was happy to say that things went on smoothly . . . that every- 
 thing depended on the Powers acting up to their engagements. This 
 he expected they would do, with the possible exception of France. With 
 respect to Spain, the Powers had contented themselves with advice. 
 They had proposed the appointment of Wellington as mediator . . . 
 but no answer to that proposal had yet been received. 
 
 Campbell concludes: 
 
 From what he said there can be no doubt that the dispute between 
 Spain and her colonies was made the subject of formal deliberation . . . 
 that Spain is not inclined to offer such terms for adjusting the dispute 
 as will be likely to induce the Powers to embark in the contest for the 
 purpose of enforcing their acceptance on the part of the colonies. ^It 
 is, however, still my opinion that this Government would view in [an 
 unfavorable light the acknowledgment of the independence of the colo- 
 nies, at this time, by the United States, and although it would not, in 
 such an event, engage alone on the side of Spain, its influence would be 
 exerted conjointly with that of the other Powers to maintain the cause 
 of legitimacy and prevent the establishment of such powerful independ- 
 ent states. 2 
 
 In a final dispatch resuming the above matter (written in 
 April, 1819), the Secretary of State was informed of the lengths to 
 
 1 Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, December 10/22, 1818. MS. Dispatches, 
 Russia. 
 
 2 Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, February 6/18, 1819. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 91 
 
 which the Tsar had been prepared to go in his enthusiasm for a 
 universal peace based upon international action: 
 
 There is reason to believe (wrote Campbell from St. Petersburg), 
 that about the close of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle instructions were 
 given on the part of this Government to put into a state of preparation 
 for active service at the opening of spring, twelve ships of the line, 
 besides other vessels. This step was taken with the view of being 
 prepared to cooperate with Spain, should it become necessary in impos- 
 ing measures relating to her revolted colonies as might be adopted in 
 accordance with the recommendations of the Allied Sovereigns, and 
 under an impression that she would acquiesce in the course proposed by 
 them of mediation, as stated in my last. Not long after the return of the 
 Emperor, however, to this capital, the foregoing instructions were, it is 
 said, countermanded and the usual number of vessels directed to be 
 prepared, in consequence, it is believed, of information received by this 
 Court that Spain was not disposed to pursue the course suggested to 
 her by the crowned heads at Aix-la-Chapelle. 1 
 
 There had been every indication that ample grounds existed for 
 the misgivings of the American Cabinet concerning the inten- 
 tions of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle to "legislate" with respect 
 to American affairs in a sense favorable to a European "system" 
 — rather than in the interests of the colonies. The opposition of 
 Great Britain had been the principal obstacle to such a course. 2 
 
 The outcome of the Congress had inevitably ranged the United 
 States in line with British policy as opposed to the Tsar's designs 
 of "concerted action." 
 
 As Poletica had foreseen, it was only by sowing distrust 
 between Great Britain and the United States that plans for an 
 all-controlling World System could be pursued after the failure 
 of the "mediation" proposed at Aix-la-Chapelle. The new 
 Minister reached the United States in April, 1819 — and imme- 
 diately laid his program before Adams 3 (May 24, 1819). 
 
 1 Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, April 21/May 3, 1819. MS. Dispatches, 
 Russia. 
 
 2 But Castlereagh's attiude was dictated by other motives than solicitude for "con- 
 stitutional" liberty. The commercial advantages arising from the existing situation largely 
 influenced British policy. A Tory Cabinet was not unwilling to see the power of a legiti- 
 mate monarch restored, if these advantages could be maintained. On the other hand, as 
 early as June, 1818, Campbell had been instructed clearly to express the desire of the 
 United States to "promote the total independence, political and commercial, of the colo- 
 nies," while maintaining "that the policy of the United States, like that of the European 
 Powers, had been neutral." 
 
 3 Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 3/19, 1819. MS. Instructions, Russia, 
 Dashkov did not wait for Poletica's arrival, and presented his letters of recall March 6. 
 1819. 
 
92 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 The diplomacy of Monroe had meanwhile profited by the em- 
 barrassments of the King of Spain to secure what appeared to be a 
 settlement of the long-standing difficulty with respect to the pur- 
 chase of the Floridas. 1 Poletica, on his arrival in Washington, 
 found a treaty between Spain and the United States already 
 signed, and Spanish affairs, as Adams expressed it, standing under 
 a very different aspect from that which it wore when his instruc- 
 tions were drawn. Said Adams: 
 
 The differences between the United States and Spain were assuming a 
 character which threatened the peace of the world. They had reached 
 a crisis which it was scarcely possible could terminate but by a peace or 
 rupture. When Mr. Poletica received his instructions they were at the 
 most dangerous and menacing period. When he arrived here, they were 
 all amicably adjusted. 2 
 
 Almost daily interviews now took place between Adams and 
 Poletica, chiefly concerning Spanish affairs. Poletica — while 
 assuming a tone of utmost frankness — at first adopted a course 
 curiously at variance (as we may now see) with his instructions. 
 He declared that he had been instructed to prevent the United 
 States from associating themselves with the European Alliance — 
 and at the same time to suggest that they must necessarily follow 
 a course in accord with the general policy of Europe. 3 
 
 Poletica's somewhat coercive tone was accepted in good part 
 by the Secretary of State. Adams declared that it was the earnest 
 desire of his Government not to be associated with the European 
 Alliance, but to follow a policy wholly in unison with it, and that 
 they were deeply impressed with the importance of preserving the 
 general tranquillity of the world. He seems fully to have 
 recognized the fact that so long as Spain, Russia and Great 
 Britain remained American Powers, any real isolation was im- 
 possible. Moreover, during the recent Napoleonic struggle, 
 America had become the great "carrying nation," and, in spite of a 
 scrupulous respect for neutrality, had become involved in a war 
 with Great Britain, and in the "quasi-war" with the latter's great 
 opponent. Yet even faced with the active displeasure of the 
 
 1 The Treaty of Washington was signed February 22, 1819, but its ratification was 
 delayed by Spain till February, 1821. Before ceding Eastern Florida to the United States, 
 Ferdinand desired a guarantee that the independence of the revolted colonies would not 
 be recognized. Cf. McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, vol. iv, pp. 
 474 et seq. 
 
 2 Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell. MS. Instructions, Russia, 1819. 
 
 3 Adams, Memoirs, vol. iv, pp. 379-381. 
 
THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 93 
 
 Continental Powers, Adams persisted in remaining aloof from 
 their combinations. In answer to Poletica's intimations with 
 respect to possible European action, the Secretary of State 
 ventured, as a private opinion, that if the King of Spain should 
 still decline to ratify the Treaty of Washington, the next Congress 
 would probably authorize the forcible occupation of the Floridas 
 and a recognition of the Government of Buenos Aires. The only 
 way for the Powers to avoid such a course was in forbearing to use 
 force in a sense contrary to the liberties of the insurgents. 1 
 
 The weakness of Poletica's contentions was becoming more and 
 more apparent. He suggested that Great Britain's breaches of 
 maritime law (notably Castlereagh's proposal of a mutual right 
 of search for the suppression of the slave trade) must range the 
 United States upon the side of the Tsar. 2 It was intimated that 
 if any questions should arise between the United States and the 
 governments of Europe, the Emperor Alexander, desirous of using 
 his influence in their favor, would have a substantial motive and 
 justification for interposing if he could regard them as allies, which, 
 as parties to the Holy Alliance, he would. 
 
 A natural community of interest, however, and the converging 
 policy of Great Britain and the United States with respect to 
 South America were inevitably closing the breach caused by the 
 War of 1812. Poletica found that to base his diplomatic policy 
 upon this "ancient grudge" was a matter of increasing difficulty. 
 Not only had the differences arising from the summary execution 
 of two British subjects (Ambrister and Arbuthnot) by the United 
 States forces in Florida been amicably settled, but the British 
 Minister in Madrid had even offered to use his good offices to 
 secure the ratification of the Treaty of Washington. 
 
 Poletica felt his negotiation losing ground. With respect to any 
 combined action of Russia and Spain against the colonies, Poletica 
 said that by selling ships to Spain, Russia had not intended to take 
 sides with her against the colonies. Falling back on Alexander's 
 well-known desire for international action, he also declared that 
 the Tsar was utterly averse to all "exclusive or partial alliances." 3 
 
 1 Ibid., p. 381. 
 
 2 Secretary of State to Mr. Middleton, July 5, 1820. MS. Instructions, American 
 Embassy, Petrograd. Quoted in full in Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, 
 p. 376. 
 
 3 Adams, Memoirs, vol. IV, pp. 380-381. 
 
94 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 His previous attitude with respect to the United States and the 
 "European" Alliance was suddenly changed. A proposal was now 
 renewed that the United States should join the "Holy League." 
 
 On June 17, 1819, he mentioned "inofficially and confiden- 
 tially" the Emperor's desire that the United States should 
 accede to the Pact of September 26, 1815; Adams stated that 
 the same reasons which had caused Great Britain to withhold her 
 signature to this pact governed the policy of the United States; 
 that the agreement was a personal one between sovereigns and 
 therefore not appropriate for the consideration of a constitutional 
 state. 1 
 
 Finally when Poletica urged that "the treaty was nothing in 
 specific engagement," and that the Holy Alliance was a "league of 
 peace" and had hitherto preserved a universal peace in Europe," 
 Adams — a sound constitutionalist — replied that before taking 
 any further steps in the matter it would be "advisable to ascertain 
 what were the dispositions of the members of the Senate." 2 
 
 1 Adams, Memoirs, vol. IV, p. 394. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 394-395. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 
 
 "To a world gone mad must be opposed a new order, a new system inspired 
 by wisdom, reason, justice and correction." (Unpublished letter from 
 Metternich to Alexander, written at Troppau, December IS, 1820. From 
 the Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) 
 
 In July, 1820, Adams, in instructions to Middleton, resumed 
 the policy of the United States in their relation with the Powers 
 of Europe; and their attitude towards the Tsar's League of Peace: 
 
 The political system of the United States is . . . essentially extra- 
 European. To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entangle- 
 ments in the European system has been a cardinal point of their policy 
 from the peace of 1783 to this day . . . 
 
 Yet in proportion as the importance of the United States as one of the 
 members of the general society of civilized nations increases in the eyes 
 of the others, the difficulties of maintaining this system and the temp- 
 tations to depart from it increase and multiply . . . 
 
 Should renewed overtures on this subject l be made, Russia would be 
 answered that the organization of our government is such as not to 
 admit of our acceding formally to that compact. But it may be added 
 that the President, while approving of its final principles and thoroughly 
 convinced of the benevolent and virtuous motives which led to the con- 
 ception and presided at the formation of this system, by the Emperor 
 Alexander, believes that the United States will more efFectually contrib- 
 ute to the great and sublime objects for which it was concluded by 
 abstaining from formal participation in it. As a general declaration 
 of principles, the United States not only give their hearty assent to the 
 articles of the Holy Alliance, but they will be among the most earnest 
 and conscientious in observing them. 2 
 
 Even this qualified approval of Alexander's pact — a diplomatic 
 evasion of Poletica's renewed proposals — would hardly have 
 been made a few months later. The Powers of the Holy Alliance 
 were already entering upon a policy of reactionary repression 
 which was to estrange them from all more liberal states. Taking 
 as his excuse the necessity for prompt and decisive action against 
 the forces of revolution, Metternich had undertaken a campaign 
 of propaganda among all the principal courts of Europe, arguing 
 the necessity of taking common measures to crush out the fast- 
 reviving spirit of "Jacobinism" and the pernicious doctrines of the 
 "Sects." His artful diplomacy was ably seconded by the pen of 
 Frederick Gentz. This living arsenal of gossip, epigram and 
 satirical observations, was a political philosopher of no mean 
 
 1 Poletica's overtures to induce the United States to join the Holy Alliance set forth in 
 the preceding chapter. 
 
 2 Secretary of State to Mr. Middleton, July 5, 1820. MS. Instructions, Russia. 
 
 95 
 
96 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 attainments. He possessed an extraordinary talent for the tech- 
 nique of diplomacy, and, had he been able to win the respect of 
 his fellow statesmen, might have filled a much more important 
 place than history has accorded him. It is as Metternich's 
 alter ego and familiar that he is best known. 1 
 
 Metternich's first idea had been to allow the newly formed 
 Federal Diet created at Vienna to take action against the "perils'' 
 which, he believed, confronted the German Federation. Gentz, 
 however, realized the danger of allowing the voice of Liberalism 
 an opportunity to be heard in public places. His own plan in- 
 volved a diplomatic solution in line with the Tsar's international 
 programs. Two private reunions of the interested Powers were to 
 be held. In the first of these, the Conference of Carlsbad, only 
 Austria and Prussia were to take part, together with the repre- 
 sentatives of four or five minor German states, without influence 
 or voice in the chapter. A second conference, he suggested, might 
 then safely be held in Vienna, formed of chosen delegates from all 
 the member states of the Confederation. This would in turn 
 modify the fundamental laws sufficiently to enable the recom- 
 mendations of the Carlsbad Conference to be carried out. 
 
 Gentz's program was carried out almost to the letter. Metter- 
 nich's first step was to warn Frederick William that unless he 
 adopted without reserve the plans of the Emperor Francis, the 
 latter would retire from the German Confederation. 
 
 Events in Germany again helped to forward this policy. At 
 Toeplitz, the King of Prussia heard that enthusiastic meetings 
 were being held all over Prussia in favor of Liberal reforms, 
 and as a protest against the rumored measures taken by the Prus- 
 sian Government. In three days Metternich imposed upon the 
 now terrified and repentant Hohenzollern not only the program 
 he had drawn up, but even exacted a promise that he would perma- 
 nently renounce all plans of granting constitutional representa- 
 tion to his people. The vacillating monarch promised his help 
 to extend these principles of reaction to the whole of Germany. 
 The celebrated "Decrees of Carlsbad" were the fruits of these 
 interviews. 2 
 
 While the Tsar (together with the Cabinets of Great Britain 
 
 1 De Clery, Un Diplomate d'il y a Cent Arts: Frederic de Gentz, pp. 219 et seq. 
 
 2 In France, Metternich's reactionary program was forwarded by the political assassi- 
 nation of Kotzebue in Germany and that of the Duke of Berry, heir to the French throne 
 (February 13, 1820). 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 97 
 
 and France) viewed with growing alarm the preponderating power 
 exercised by Austria and Prussia over the newly "united" states 
 of Germany, their concerted action was nevertheless inevitably 
 forced to follow the reactionary lines laid down by Metternich 
 and Gentz. 1 
 
 Alexander still clung firmly to the illusion that he was the 
 champion of international "rights." When his brother-in-law, the 
 King of Wurttemberg, maintained his determination to grant a 
 constitution in the face of the protests of Austria and Prussia, 
 the Tsar found that his policy needed a new formula. Insurrec- 
 tion and revolution on the part of subjects against their Kings 
 were inadmissible. On the other hand, the voluntary concession 
 of liberal institutions by Kings to their subjects, he held, must be 
 regarded as a sacred privilege. In this connection, it must be 
 noted that the King of Wurttemberg had addressed his appeal to 
 Alexander "in the name of Liberty and the free exercise of the 
 monarchical principles guaranteed by the 'Holy Alliance.' ' This 
 was the last occasion when the principles of this mystical pact 
 were to be invoked in the cause of liberal reform. 2 
 
 Reactionary fears were justified by the series of revolutions 
 which followed the popular uprising of January 1, 1820, led by 
 Riego in Spain. This constitutional 3 movement soon spread over 
 the whole southern part of Europe, and its repression through 
 "intervention" became the chief concern of the Powers con- 
 federated by the "System of 1815." 4 
 
 The King of Spain, after his unsuccessful attempt to obtain 
 the intervention of the Powers assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, 
 had found himself almost powerless to stem the tide of victorious 
 Liberalism in his American colonies. All the resources of his 
 Kingdom had been expended in preparing a great military 
 expedition, which during the year 1819 vainly awaited the 
 necessary transports on the Island of Leon, near Cadiz. The 
 
 1 Alexander now asked the Court of London "what steps were to be taken regarding 
 Germany" and that Cabinet replied there was no motive to interfere. Gentz, Depeches 
 inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. II, p. 17. 
 
 2 The Tsar declared "that it was unfortunate when a monarch did not know the proper 
 time to give a constitution to his people." Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, 
 April 10, 1820. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
 3 The Constitution forced on Ferdinand was the same which Alexander had applauded in 
 1812! Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, p. 498. 
 
 4 Metternich declared he "was able to inform the Princes of Germany" that no dif- 
 ferences separated the sovereigns of Europe, whose inviolable intention was to keep the 
 peace. Gentz, Depeches inedites, vol. II, p. 127. 
 
98 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 revolution had its origin among these troops. 1 The harsh con- 
 ditions of military service was the fault alleged. But the mis- 
 government of Ferdinand throughout the peninsula and the 
 liberal ideas left in the wake of Napoleon's armies caused dis- 
 turbances to break out with startling rapidity all over Spain. 
 Troops stationed at Coruna in the far north and Barcelona in 
 the south joined the mutineers. Within two short months the 
 revolutionaries obtained their ends. The army proclaimed the 
 readoption of the Constitution of 1812, and the ignoble Ferdinand 
 hastened to accept the situation — pretending to accede as gra- 
 ciously as possible to the popular wishes. 
 
 As Metternich had prophesied at Aix-la-Chapelle, Constitu- 
 tional government now became the question of the day. A few 
 months later, a revolution similar in its aims to that in Spain 
 broke out in Sicily, 2 where on the 6th of July the Spanish Con- 
 stitution was accepted by the King. A third Constitutional 
 revolution took place in Portugal, where the same document was 
 again proclaimed (on August 23). 
 
 Any interference of the Powers in Portugal, however, was a 
 direct challenge to England's traditional policy to act as sole 
 protector with respect to that state. 3 
 
 The Tsar now sought an opportunity to propose an intervention 
 between the King of the two Sicilies and his subjects, thus making 
 the Neapolitan revolution a matter of European rather than of 
 exclusively Austrian concern. Metternich, from reasons of policy, 
 at last agreed to Alexander's favorite plan — a European Con- 
 gress. 4 This solution once decided upon, the opening of the 
 debates was set for October 20, 1820, at Troppau. 5 
 
 But from the beginning the differences separating the Powers 
 represented were even less likely to result in unity of action 
 than at Aix-la-Chapelle. 6 Castlereagh refused to join the Congress, 
 as desired by the Tsar, and sent Lord Stewart instead. Troppau 
 thus became little more than a reunion of the three monarchs 
 
 1 "The army, which was ill clothed, ill fed and worse paid, mutinied to prevent being 
 embarked for Spanish America, on board a fleet composed of vessels that were esteemed 
 not seaworthy for so long a voyage." Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, 
 vol. i, p. 33. 
 
 2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, pp. 515-516. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 514. 4 Ibid., pp. 526 et seq. 5 Gentz, Depeches inedites, vol. II, p. 81. 
 6 The invitation to Troppau came at an awkward moment for Castlereagh. "We know 
 
 to what point the Tsar wishes to push the principle of Alliance," he said. "The five powers 
 would soon be a sort of European Government. It would be universal monarchy, the 
 dream of the Abbe St. Pierre!" Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 539. 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 99 
 
 allied under the terms of the "Holy Alliance." The British (and 
 the French) representatives were frankly present, not to take 
 part in the "European" deliberations but merely to furnish their 
 respective courts with an accurate account of the debates. 1 
 
 Alexander saw in the reunion of Troppau a new opportunity 
 to proclaim to the world some of his favorite theories: the fraternal 
 solidarity of the great Powers, and their devotion to the principles 
 of concerted action. The right to exercise powers of supernational 
 police among the countries of Europe was, he believed, to be 
 vindicated at last. From the beginning of the conference, how- 
 ever, he favored a policy which was directly opposed to the wishes 
 of Metternich. He renewed his contention that while a constitu- 
 tion which was the result of a revolutionary movement could not 
 properly be recognized by the Allied Powers, it could nevertheless 
 be granted by a sovereign to his people. The right of Ferdinand — 
 if he so desired — to maintain the constitution already granted 
 was therefore upheld. In view of Alexander's own recently 
 avowed intentions with respect to granting a constitution to 
 Russia, and always haunted by the determination to be "con- 
 sistent," no other course appeared open to him. 
 
 A declaration signed on November 13 by the plenipotentiaries 
 of Austria, Russia and Prussia — the signatories of the "Holy 
 Alliance" — formally announced to Europe a decision which seemed 
 to respect the prejudices of Alexander while in fact affirming the 
 most reactionary features of Metternich's policies. 
 
 This declaration created a tremendous sensation throughout 
 
 Continental liberal circles. It read as follows: 
 
 Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change 
 its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which 
 might thus become a menace to other states, will automatically cease to 
 form a part of the Alliance, and will remain excluded from its councils 
 until its situation gives every guarantee of order and stability. 2 
 
 1 Castlereagh declared to Decaze "he was sick of military revolution." But a strong 
 liberal reaction had resulted in England from the accession of the unpopular George IV. 
 This made it advisable to disassociate English policy from any direct attack on consti- 
 tutionalism, whether in Naples, Spain or Portugal. Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 526. 
 
 2 The second article read: "The Allied Powers not only formally declare the above to be 
 their unalterable policy, but, faithful to the principles which they have proclaimed con- 
 cerning the authority of legitimate governments, they further agree to refuse to recognize 
 any changes brought about by other than legal means. In the case of states where such 
 changes have already taken place and such action has thereby given cause for apprehension 
 to neighboring states (if it lies within the ability of the powers to take such useful and 
 beneficent action) they will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within 
 the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and 
 if this fails, coercion will be employed, should this be necessary." Quoted in Debidour, 
 Histoire Diplomatique de I' Europe, vol. I, p. 152. 
 
100 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Although the Powers of the "Holy Alliance" alone signed this 
 document, the wording of the manifesto seemed to dedicate the 
 whole power of the European Confederation to the suppression 
 of liberal reform. 1 Not only Castlereagh found himself obliged 
 to disassociate his government from the conclusions reached by the 
 Congress (in two notes, dated December 19 and January 16), but 
 even the Government of Louis XVIII followed suit. Fear of 
 popular and parliamentary disapproval had united Great Britain 
 and France in opposition to the Troppau Declaration. 2 
 
 The Liverpool Cabinet, however, was far from unsympathetic 
 with any movement that tended to stamp out the "Red" menace of 
 revolution. In France, Richelieu's Ministry, once more in power, 
 was wholly subservient to Russian views. Alexander now sought, 
 in a measure, to placate liberal opinion. In explanation of the 
 manifesto, he again attempted to reaffirm the benevolent principles 
 underlying his conception of a Confederated Europe. The means 
 chosen was a memoir, 3 addressed to the Russian representatives 
 in the principal courts of Europe. This document was especially 
 intended to counteract the impression already prevalent "that 
 the Triple Alliance is opposed by another formed of the Con- 
 stitutional States," the latter group including "besides England 
 and France, the two Americas." After complimenting Austria 
 and Prussia for their firmness "in the great task of reconcilia- 
 tion," the Tsar gave free rein to his resentment against England 
 as the obstacle in the path of concerted action. 4 
 
 In its main results, Troppau definitely ranged the Tsar on the 
 side of obscurantism and reaction. Whatever may have been 
 his personal antipathy to Metternich and his plans, Alexander, by 
 signing the manifesto, entered the group dominated by the genius 
 of the Viennese statesman. While still proclaiming his Liberalism, 
 he now adopted Metternich's formula, to the effect that "to a 
 
 1 The Tsar "wished an act of guarantee of the internal peace of states in the sense that 
 the transactions of 1814, 1815 and 1818 had assured the political peace of Europe." 
 Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. II, p. 97. 
 
 2 The preliminary Troppau protocol was signed November 19. "It was the first step 
 along the road followed by this Triple Alliance, which was soon to be substituted for the 
 quintuple." Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, pp. 33-34. 
 
 3 MS. Troppau, 1820, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 4 In the following phrases: "The British Empire, now at the zenith of riches and civili- 
 zation, appears for the moment to be engulfed by its own prosperity." 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 101 
 
 world gone mad must be opposed a new order, a new system 
 inspired by wisdom, reason, justice and correction." * 
 
 The Tsar's attitude at Troppau was but confirmed during the 
 adjourned sessions of the Congress held at Laybach (a spot chosen 
 as convenient for the attendance of the King of the two Sicilies). 
 To give the proceedings a tone of formality becoming to an 
 occasion which the Tsar chose to believe an important continua- 
 tion of the "System of Congress," the Russian plenipotentiaries 
 presented at the first meeting (held January 11, 1821) their 
 "opinion concerning the forms and precedence to be followed 
 during the deliberations of Laybach." 2 "Far from having in 
 view new political combinations," the Memoir concludes, "this 
 reunion is especially called to reaffirm the system which has given 
 to Europe the blessing of peace by restoring independence to the 
 nations." Instead of the "journal" of the proceedings kept at 
 Troppau, the Tsar now desired to substitute formal "protocols" 
 of the daily proceedings — signed by all the plenipotentiaries 
 present. 
 
 It was only when the representatives of the other Powers 
 pointed out that under the terms of such an arrangement the 
 British plenipotentiary (Gordon) would be excluded from the 
 debates by the terms of his instructions that the Russian repre- 
 sentatives consented to continue the system of informal con- 
 ferences which had been followed at Troppau. In the Conferences 
 of Laybach "veritable discussions were replaced in the minutes 
 by convenient debates arranged by Mr. Gentz, who even com- 
 posed the opposing arguments." 3 
 
 At the second Conference, held on January 12, the comedy 
 wherein the King of Naples was to play the part of mediator be- 
 tween the Powers and his revolted subjects was carefully staged. 
 
 1 M etternich to Alexander, Troppau, December 15, 1820. MS. Troppau, Russian Foreign 
 Office. Whole paragraphs in the above, which include long tirades against anarchy, etc., 
 are heavily underlined in pencil and annotated by Alexander himself. 
 
 2 This was endorsed by the Emperor himself. In this document, the Russian envoy 
 proposes a set of rules to govern the deliberations of the Powers: While the con- 
 ferences of Troppau, he maintained, were only preliminary and preparatory (and, the 
 Powers, therefore, necessarily prevented from deliberating "in due form"), the meeting 
 at Laybach formed a European legislature. At Troppau the plenipotentiaries of the 
 intervening Powers had not all received "precise and positive instructions concerning the 
 limits of their policy." Now that these preliminary questions had been discussed and the 
 scope of the debates clearly set fortn, the plenipotentiaries should now, he believed, declare 
 themselves part of a "formal system." MS. Minutes, Laybach, 1820, Russian Foreign 
 Office. This contains, besides the minutes, a "Report to the Emperor." 
 
 3 Pasquier, op. cit., vol. v, p. 134. 
 
102 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Metternich read a communication from Ferdinand to the Allied 
 sovereigns, asking them to define the intentions of the Conference 
 with respect to his kingdom and to communicate their disposi- 
 tions to his representative, who would wait upon them at Laybach. 
 In drafting their reply, the plenipotentiaries were careful to annex 
 a stern rebuke to the revolutionary government of Naples, joined 
 to a refusal to deal with any member of the de facto government. 
 On the other hand, they "consented" to receive a personal repre- 
 sentative of the King in the person of Chevalier de Rufo. 1 
 
 The King of Naples continued the role which had been assigned 
 him by Metternich, expressing his appreciation of the action 
 taken by the Powers. He begged them with feigned benevolence 
 "not to proceed to extreme measures until all means of concilia- 
 tion had been exhausted. The just anger of the sovereigns of the 
 "Holy Alliance" having thus been appeased, Metternich next 
 obtained the "approval" of Ferdinand to proceed to more active 
 measures of coercion, which were communicated to Naples. 
 The King, "now convinced of the futility of changing the disposi- 
 tion taken by the united sovereigns," summoned the Duke of 
 Calabria, Regent of the Kingdom, "to require his people to re- 
 nounce all adherence to the political changes brought about by 
 the revolution of July 2. 2 
 
 The "small fry" of the Italian Princes were now admitted 
 (January 26), to take cognizance of the proceedings and to justify 
 the principle of "concerted action," by signing Gentz's Minutes. 3 
 
 King Ferdinand himself had arrived on January 8. 4 This mon- 
 arch, after binding himself by every conceivable oath to support 
 the Constitution, had reluctantly been permitted by the de facto 
 government to leave his kingdom. Once beyond the frontier, 
 he cast aside the insignia of the Carbonari which decorated 
 
 1 MS. Minutes, Laybach, 1820, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 2 Ibid., Third Conference, Minutes. 
 
 3 Among these were Prince Corsini, representing the Arch-Duke of Tuscany, Count 
 Daglio, representing the King of Sardinia, and Cardinal Spina, representing the Pope. 
 With a single notable exception these lesser Powers approved the measures taken by the 
 Conference. In answer to Metternich's somewhat complacent assumption "that the 
 sovereigns of Italy would approve the resolutions," Spina said that the Pope felt obliged 
 to insert in the protocol a clause to the efFect that: "As it now appears that measures 
 which might bring on hostilities are contemplated, the Envoy of His Holiness is not 
 authorized to take any part in the conference or to give any advice." Ibid. See Minutes 
 for January 28. 
 
 4 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, p. 59. 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 103 
 
 his person and placed himself under the personal protection of 
 Metternich. At Laybach, Ferdinand soon recovered all his 
 legitimist pretensions. He listened with unkingly glee while 
 the Triple Alliance planned the destruction of the Constitutional 
 regime he had sworn to defend. From Pasquier's Memoires 
 we learn it was only with difficulty that the King was persuaded 
 to employ decent diplomatic forms in addressing the provisional 
 government of his kingdom, at the head of which his son, the 
 Duke of Calabria, still posed as Regent. 1 
 
 The harmony of the proceedings was now marred by Gordon, 
 the English plenipotentiary. He announced 2 that "in spite of 
 the presence of a British Minister at Laybach, this envoy finds 
 himself unauthorized to take part directly in the proceedings of 
 the Conference." 2 The French plenipotentiary also ventured to 
 ask Metternich whether Ferdinand on his return might not be 
 allowed to modify the disposition taken by the Powers. 
 
 The Austrian diplomat replied that "the Italian Powers" 
 could under no circumstances "allow the establishment of insti- 
 tutions incompatible with their tranquillity." Thus even the 
 "liberal" formula just adopted by the Tsar — that reforms were 
 justifiable if granted by a sovereign — was denied all authority. 
 The tide of reaction was at its flood! 
 
 At both Laybach and Troppau the Tsar's illusion that these 
 gatherings were an administrative directorate of Europe was 
 carefully respected by Metternich. "Of all the children I have 
 met with," he writes in his Memoires concerning the author of 
 the Holy Alliance, "the Emperor of Russia is the greatest child 
 of all." 3 During long interviews, which the informal relations 
 established by the gathering of the sovereigns facilitated, Metter- 
 nich urged upon Alexander the necessity of further reactionary 
 measures. In proving this thesis, he was again singularly helped 
 by the course of events. The activities of the secret societies in 
 Russia were now at their height. The Tsar's own life was threat- 
 ened by men formerly associated in the movement for reform he 
 had himself initiated. He even offered Metternich the support 
 of Russian troops to restore Ferdinand to his throne. 4 Besides 
 
 1 Ibid., p. 54. 
 
 2 Session of January 25. MS. Minutes, Laybach, 1820, Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 3 Metternich, Memoires, vol. m, p. 531. 
 4 Gentz, Depeckes inedites, vol. II, p. 127. 
 
104 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 the news of continued revolutionary successes in South America, 
 a revolution broke out beneath the very noses of the assembled 
 monarchs in the neighboring state of Piedmont. Here the Liberal 
 Party (profiting by the departure of the Austrian Expeditionary 
 Forces, which were to restore Ferdinand's authority) declared 
 for a constitution similar to those successively adopted in Spain, 
 Portugal and Naples. 
 
 It required but a few weeks for the well-drilled armies of Austria 
 to overcome the resistance of the Liberals in both Naples and 
 Piedmont. But the lesson had not been lost upon Alexander. 
 "The period of Troppau and Laybach" (writes Grand Duke 
 Nicolas) was a crisis in the life and experiences of the Emperor. 
 The impression made upon him was so strong that it lasted until 
 the day of his death." x 
 
 The spectacle afforded by the European Congress held at Aix, 
 Troppau and Laybach was calculated to confirm the Washington 
 Cabinet in their determination to remain aloof from the "Holy 
 League." In this policy they were doubtless strengthened by the 
 objections of the British Cabinet — and the reports of the 
 speeches made by the Liberal leaders in Parliament. 2 American 
 public opinion, in spite of an earlier belief in the high-mindedness 
 of Alexander, could hardly fail to be disillusioned by the trans- 
 formation brought about in his character through contact with 
 the reactionary statesmen who formed the majority at these 
 "international" gatherings. A strong sympathy with the "revo- 
 lutionaries" in Spain, Naples and Greece was naturally felt 
 throughout North and South America. The author of "Novo- 
 siltzov's Instructions" was about to abandon, in this atmosphere 
 of "practical statesmanship," nearly all the Liberal "points" of 
 the program which had insured him so much hearty sympathy 
 in the New World. 3 
 
 The sincerity of Alexander's devotion to the principles of inter- 
 national solidarity, and of his conversion to Metternich's policy 
 
 1 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhaflowitch, L'Empereur Alexandre Ier, yol. I, p. 231. 
 
 2 In France and Great Britain Liberal opinion was aroused against the proceedings at 
 Laybach. In Parliament, Mr. Mackintosh expressed the opinion that the liberty of states 
 was at an end. In the House of Lords, Lord Holland bitterly attacked both the Holy 
 Alliance and the Tsar. Pasquier, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 146-148. See also a dispatch from 
 Poletica to Nesselrode, published in American Historical Review, vol. xvm, p. 328. 
 
 3 A document whose language is curiously typical of the Laybach Conference will be 
 found in Appendix II. It also offers a remarkable parallel if considered in connection 
 with the "Red Peril" of anarchy in Russia at the present time. 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 105 
 
 of reaction, was soon to be put to a supreme test. In the measures 
 taken against the secret societies of Russia an exception had 
 always been made in favor of the Hetairie, an association whose 
 object was to foster the growing spirit of resistance among the 
 Greek patriots to the oppression of the Turkish Government. 
 A natural sympathy was felt by the Russians with their coreligion- 
 aries. Moreover, a large party in Russia were convinced that the 
 Empire's destiny lay in the Orient, considering Alexander's 
 European adventures and his departure from Catherine's plan 
 of Eastern conquest as a fatal step. The news that open revolt 
 had broken out in the Moldo-Wallachian principalities, the 
 autonomy of which were the fruits of Catherine's Turkish wars, 
 reached Laybach shortly after the outbreak of the revolution at 
 Turin. The leader of the Greek revolution was an ex-officer of 
 the Russian Army, the son of a former hospodar, Alexander 
 Ypsilanti. 1 Since the beginning of July, 1820, this rebel leader 
 had made his headquarters at Kichenev, within Russian territory, 
 where his open campaign against the Sultan had received every 
 encouragement from the Tsar's officials. In his proclamation 
 addressed to the Greek patriots, Ypsilanti had even ventured the 
 following significant phrases: 
 
 Should the Turks in their desperation venture to make an incursion 
 upon your territory, you have nothing to fear: a great power stands 
 ready to punish their insolence. 2 
 
 Between his duty to his countrymen and their wishes and 
 his devotion to his new international ideals Alexander did not 
 long hesitate. He felt that the moral obligation to maintain the 
 bond of the Holy Alliance outweighed any doctrine of national 
 or religious solidarity. Ypsilanti was degraded from his rank 
 in the Russian Army. The Russian Ambassador at the Porte, 
 Baron Stroganov, was instructed to inform the Sultan that the 
 Russian forces would remain strictly neutral, and that the Tsar 
 wished to be considered as wholly disapproving the movement. 
 To La Ferronnays, representing the Government of Louis XVIII 
 at Laybach, Alexander expressed himself with all the one- 
 sidedness of a doctrinaire: 
 
 This outbreak has occurred when, as the revolutionaries believe, the 
 sovereigns were occupied elsewhere. Moreover, they seem to have 
 
 1 Pasquier, vol. v, p. 191. 
 
 2 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de V Europe, vol. I, p. 156. 
 
106 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 thought they had my approval to their course. Without paying any 
 attention to what public opinion in Russia may desire, I have published 
 to the whole world my disapproval of the insurrectionary movement. 
 
 So far had Metternich's pupil traveled along the paths of re- 
 action that in the outbreak of a Christian population against the 
 secular tyranny of a Mussulman Sultan he now saw only the 
 machinations of a group of secret societies. He could even 
 stretch the mystical language of his Holy Alliance to describe 
 them as "anti-Christian"! 1 
 
 Alexander reached St. Petersburg on his return from Laybach 
 on June 7, 1821. Hardly had he lost contact with the "spirit" of 
 the Congress when doubts began to assail him as to the wisdom of 
 his course in the Orient. From the moment he crossed his own 
 frontiers he had been greeted everywhere with loud demonstra- 
 tions in favor of the Greeks. Half-veiled threats and mutterings 
 of dissatisfaction concerning the measures taken with respect 
 to the late revolution reached him from every side. 2 In St. 
 Petersburg he found Stroganov awaiting him. The Russian 
 Ambassador at the Porte had been an eye witness of terrible 
 scenes in Constantinople: Sultan Mahmoud had chosen Easter 
 Day to perpetrate a crime peculiarly revolting to the Orthodox 
 Russians. The Patriarch of the Greek Church — the leader of the 
 Christian faith, which the Tsar had sworn to protect and cherish — 
 had been arrested at the altar during mass. Clad in his sacred 
 vestments, he had been hung by Turkish soldiers at the door of 
 the profaned shrine. 
 
 On February 28, 1822, the Porte threatened once more to inter- 
 rupt the peaceful development of the diplomatic negotiations 
 which Alexander (through Metternich's influence) had con- 
 sented to initiate. An insolent note addressed to the Tsar 
 required among other things the extradition of all Turkish sub- 
 jects who had taken refuge within the Russian Empire. In order 
 
 1 In a letter of March 10, 1821, to his confidant Golytzine in Russia he wrote in even 
 stronger terms "Ypsilanti is mad. His act will not only cause his own undoing, but will 
 probably drag down in his fall a great number of victims. His compatriots have no 
 cannons nor military material, and it is probable that the Turks will easily crush them. 
 Moreover, there is no doubt in my own mind that the first suggestion for this insurrection 
 came from the Central Committee in Paris. They evidently desire to create a diversion in 
 favor of Naples, and thereby to prevent us from destroying one of the chief synagogues of 
 Satan, established with the single intention of propagating his anti-Christian doctrine." 
 Quoted by Rain, Un Tsar ideologue, Alexandre I er , p. 403. 
 
 2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, p. 331. 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 107 
 
 to calm Alexander's renewed hostility, Metternich resorted to a 
 plan which he knew would appeal to the Tsar's favorite doctrines. 
 During January-February, 1822, he proposed that the whole 
 question of Greek independence should be regulated by a new 
 Congress of the Great Powers. This was to be held in Vienna. 
 
 It was necessary, however, first to obtain the assent of the 
 British Cabinet to a gathering wherein the question of the exist- 
 ence of the Turkish Empire might be decided in accordance with 
 the system "consecrated" by the "Holy Alliance." Metternich 
 craftily pointed out to Castlereagh that in their exhausting 
 struggle with the Turks — marked by terrible atrocities on both 
 sides — the Greeks would necessarily come to a decision of their 
 quarrel before its merits could be submitted to the ponderous 
 judgment of Alexander's world tribunal. In the meanwhile, 
 Lord Strangford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was 
 given a free hand by both Metternich and Castlereagh to hasten 
 an arrangement which would guarantee an early peace. 
 
 Metternich had succeeded once more in making Vienna the 
 center of world negotiations. The Russian troops, which to the 
 joy of all Russian patriots had already advanced as far as Witespk, 
 received orders to return to their garrisons, and a Russian envoy, 
 Tatistcheff, preceded his master to the Austrian capital in order to 
 commence negotiations along new lines. As a final guarantee of 
 his determination to submit Russian differences with the Porte to 
 the concerted action of the Powers, Alexander even consented to 
 dismiss from his councils both Capo d'Istria and Stroganov, the 
 principal promoters of the war movement in Russia. 
 
 Thus while Byron sang the heroic deeds of Marco Bozzaris, 
 and embarked upon the "Modern Crusade" which so moved the 
 "classicists" of the early nineteenth century, while the passes of 
 Thermopylae once more saw the hordes of Asia stopped and beaten 
 back by Greek defenders, the diplomats of the "Holy Alliance" 
 continued their negotiations. The Tsar's faith was renewed 
 that an application of the formulas of his "League of Christian 
 Charity and Peace" would enforce order in a distracted world. 
 The enactments of another Congress were about to test once more 
 the practical workings of his "sublime idea." * 
 
 1 "Alexander loved these reunions which recalled his preponderant position in 1814 
 and 1815." Ibid., p. 443. 
 
108 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 The Congresses of Laybach and Troppau had estranged Eng- 
 lish policy from that of the "Holy Alliance." In the English 
 House of Commons frequent representations were made to 
 Castlereagh that the policy pursued by Great Britain in the 
 Councils of the great Powers was not consistent with the ends 
 pursued by a great liberal democracy. As the orators of the oppo- 
 sition were ready to recall, he had "panegyrized" the objects 
 of the Holy League when the news of this strange agreement had 
 first been brought to the attention of Parliament, nor had his 
 subsequent conduct gone far to reassure the more radical members 
 of that body. 1 
 
 The avowed policy of this League of Sovereigns was believed 
 to be no less dangerous from the respectable motives alleged on 
 their behalf. 2 
 
 A contemporary writer thus summarizes the situation: 
 
 A new era had commenced in the history of the World — a system of 
 governing Europe by Congresses, instead of by separate and independent 
 Governments, was established. A scheme was formed, and actually 
 begun to be put in operation, to destroy throughout the globe the just 
 freedom of the people. And while all this mighty machinery was being 
 put in movement, England was, if not a willing, at least a passive 
 spectator. 5 
 
 It was in the midst of this "complication of affairs and jarring 
 of opposite principles" that the nations learned that the three 
 sovereigns of the "Holy Alliance" and the representatives of 
 France and England were about to meet once more in a Congress 
 at Verona, 4 at a time when these international gatherings were 
 most suspicious to Liberal opinions. 
 
 The tragic death of the Marquis of Londonderry — to which 
 title Lord Castlereagh had succeeded on the death of his father — 
 now brought about a fundamental change in English foreign policy. 
 George Canning, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, was in no 
 sense a radical. He had even been considered one of the decided 
 
 1 Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, vol. I, p. 18. 
 
 2 "The desire to maintain peace, and to free Europe from the 'scourge of revolution,' 
 determined the three powers forthwith to proceed to destroy by force of arms the free insti- 
 tutions which the Neapolitan nation had asked and obtained from their Sovereign. But 
 in assigning the reasons for the selection of Naples in preference to either Spain or Portugal, 
 as the object of their interference, the intention to act in the same way, as soon as possible, 
 towards those two countries, was clearly manifested. . . ." Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 62. 
 
 4 Verona was chosen rather than Vienna because the affairs of Italy were supposed to 
 be the object of the gathering. Pasquier, Memoires, vol. V, p. 446. 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 109 
 
 enemies of reform — but his attitude with respect to English 
 interests abroad had always been approved by the lovers of con- 
 stitutional liberty. 1 
 
 Canning received the seals of the Foreign Office from the King 
 on September 16, 1822. In inaugurating his policy he was 
 determined not to lend the prestige of his new office either to the 
 Congress in Vienna or to the subsequent gathering in Verona. 
 It is, indeed, probable that Canning would have avoided, if 
 possible, sending any English representative whatsoever to the 
 latter gathering. 2 
 
 The Duke of Wellington, the envoy chosen by Castlereagh, 
 had been delayed on his journey to Vienna, so that his arrival 
 almost coincided with the departure of the Allied sovereigns 
 for Verona. 3 It, therefore, appeared advisable that this great 
 man, who embodied England's prestige both at home and abroad, 
 should be permitted to accompany the leaders of Europe. Wel- 
 lington's instructions, moreover, were precise and complete, and 
 his character gave every guarantee to Canning that they would be 
 loyally carried out. He was to decline in the name of his govern- 
 ment all participation, either direct or indirect, in the military 
 operations in Spain, for which the Tsar Alexander now sought a 
 mandate, and to forbid all access to Portugal to the armies of the 
 "Holy Alliance" in the name of the ancient treaties which had so 
 long united that country to Great Britain. 
 
 The matters to be considered at the Congress of Verona 
 (October-November, 1822) were arranged by Metternich accord- 
 ing to a well-considered agenda. 4 The question of Greek inde- 
 pendence (involving the quarrel — so dangerous for Europe's peace 
 
 1 It was not without some hesitation that Canning had accepted the Foreign Secretary- 
 ship. In the Cabinet he was about to join, certain members held principles far different 
 from his own, — nor was he supported by the personal views of his Sovereign. The Duke 
 of Wellington had been one of Castlereagh's supporters and was, therefore, believed to be 
 strongly "predisposed towards the policy of the Continental School." In Lord Liverpool, 
 however, the head of the Cabinet, Canning had a warm personal friend and admirer, and 
 a "cordial approver of his system of foreign policy." Stapleton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 125-129. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 143. 
 
 3 Pasquier, of. cit., vol. v, p. 446. 
 
 4 This agenda included: 
 
 1. The slave trade. 
 
 2. The piratries exercised in American waters, and the question of Spanish 
 
 colonies. 
 
 3. The Grecian question. 
 
 4. The Italian question. 
 
 5. The Spanish question. 
 
 See Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, vol. I, p. 74. 
 
110 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 — between the Governments of Russia, Austria and the Sublime 
 Porte) was the first discussed. 
 
 The differences between Turkey and Russia continued in the 
 hands of Austria and England, as mediating Powers. The Greeks 
 were, however, sternly denied the assistance — or even the moral 
 support — of the new Congress. The Tsar in his distrust of 
 all revolutionary movements declared them wholly unworthy 
 of sympathy, and even refused to allow the delegates (waiting 
 the pleasure of the Powers at Ancona) a hearing before that 
 body. 1 In spite of an eloquent appeal which Andrew Mataxis 
 addressed to the Pope, their delegates were finally ordered to 
 return to their distracted country. 
 
 In respect to Italian affairs, the decisions of the Congress of 
 Verona were also in accord with the policy of the Holy Alliance. 
 The mandate of Europe seemed permanently accorded to Austria 
 to carry out the anti-revolutionary campaign proposed by Metter- 
 nich, although the Pope still courageously protested against this 
 tyranny. 2 Alexander, however, was careful to intimate to Aus- 
 tria (with the support of the French delegation) that the exercise 
 of this mandate in no way involved the permanent recognition 
 of Austria's rights to the hegemony of Italy. 
 
 With the exception of the above definite successes for the policy 
 of the "Triple Alliance," — events which were in the main unop- 
 posed by England or France — the course of the debates at the 
 Congress of Verona now tended undeniably toward a disintegra- 
 tion of the "European system." 3 
 
 1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. !, p. 187. 
 
 2 The astute diplomacy of the Vatican had distrusted from the beginning the "quietist" 
 language of the Act of September, 1815. The King of Naples, lost to every sense of 
 patriotism or personal dignity, begged that the Austrian Army of Occupation be allowed 
 to remain in his dominions. 
 
 3 Nevertheless, the Tsar's optimism remained insensible to every reproof. In a conver- 
 sation with Chateaubriand, Alexander triumphantly declared himself as follows: "Can 
 you now believe, as our enemies declare, that the Alliance is a vain word which only serves 
 to cover private ambitions? This was perhaps true in the beginning of our system, but 
 now that the civilized world is in peril, particularistic interests must be forgotten. There 
 can no longer be any question of English, French, Russian, Prussian or Austrian policy; 
 there only remains a general political system, which should, in the interest of all, be fol- 
 lowed in common by all peoples and their rulers. I must be the first to exhibit my belief 
 in these principles — convictions on which I had founded the Alliance. An occasion to 
 prove this presented itself in connection with the Grecian revolt. Nothing was less in 
 accord with public opinion in my country than my acts at that time. I saw, however, in the 
 troubles of the Peloponnesus the signs of a revolutionary plot, and I immediately desisted 
 from further action on their behalf." Quoted in Chateaubriand, Congres de V'erone, vol. I, 
 pp. 221-222. 
 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 111 
 
 Wellington maintained that Great Britain regarded as wholly 
 pernicious and dangerous the policy — approved by the Congress — 
 of addressing common notes of protest to the Spanish Constitu- 
 tional Cabinet. His government, he declared, had adopted as a 
 basic principle of foreign policy the principle of non-intervention 
 in the internal affairs of other states. The English representative 
 would be ordered to remain in Madrid, whether or not the repre- 
 sentatives of the other Powers were ordered to withdraw. 1 
 
 In view of the imminent intervention of France in Spanish 
 affairs, Wellington, moreover, now saw fit officially to bring to 
 the attention of the Congress Great Britain's intention of recog- 
 nizing the Spanish-American Colonies. This action, so important 
 to the common policy which the two Anglo-Saxon Powers were 
 about to develop, had long been pending: 
 
 The relations which existed between His Majesty's subjects and 
 certain other parts of the world for a long time have placed His Majesty 
 in a position where it will be necessary to recognize the de facto existence 
 of governments formed by the different Spanish provinces in order to 
 enter into relations with the latter. The relaxation of Spanish authority 
 has given rise to an increase of piratry and filibustering. It is impossible 
 for England to put a stop to this intolerable affliction without the 
 cooperation of the local authorities along these coasts. The necessity 
 of cooperation in this respect, therefore, can hardly help but lead to new 
 acts recognizing the de facto existence of one or another of these self- 
 constituted governments. 2 
 
 By basing this action on commercial rather than political 
 grounds, the British Cabinet sought through a policy of expediency 
 to avoid raising the time-worn issue of "legitimacy" in connection 
 with the Spanish colonies. But, as Wellington was well aware, 
 in addition to the commercial aspects of the case, a large party in 
 the English Parliament supported the constitutional pretensions 
 of the South American republics in the spirit of liberal sympathy 
 long upheld by the Congress of the United States. 3 
 
 1 This note is given in ibid., p. 123. 
 
 2 Quoted in ibid., pp. 89-90. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 94. 
 

CHAPTER VI 
 EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 "It ought to be the aim of American statesmanship to prevent and frustrate 
 for all time European interference with the development of the states, and 
 even with the destinies of the whole Northern Continent." Hamilton's 
 policy in 1781, as outlined in Oliver's Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on 
 American Union. 
 
 While the closing debates of the Congress of Verona were 
 taking place, and the language of the platitudinous manifesto, 
 which was to crown its labors, was in course of elaboration by the 
 delegates of the "Holy Alliance," negotiations were being carried 
 on in Paris with respect to the proposed French intervention in 
 Spain. Chateaubriand had a final long interview with Alexander, 
 whose personal influence and charm were never exerted to better 
 purpose than in his negotiations with the two principal French 
 envoys at Verona. Montmorency, who was almost as visionary 
 and mystical as the Tsar himself, fell a ready victim to his per- 
 suasions respecting an intervention in the interests of Ferdinand. 
 Chateaubriand, who had been chosen by Villele to counteract 
 his colleague's legitimist enthusiasm, fell a victim to his own 
 childish vanity. The Tsar's flattery and a little personal attention 
 from the Autocrat seem to have convinced him that the Spanish 
 campaign was the surest way of restoring French prestige. Al- 
 though no Russian interests were directly served, the Tsar found 
 satisfaction in giving actuality to the anti-revolutionary program 
 of international administration laid down at Troppau and Lay- 
 bach. 
 
 Chateaubriand now accepted the plan of an intervention in 
 Spain with all the enthusiasm of an author compiling a historical 
 scene. In the situation he was contriving he already saw himself 
 the central figure. Only the monumental conceit of the creator 
 of "Atala" could have penned the dispatches he has assembled 
 in two volumes dealing with this episode — so closely connected 
 with the history of Spain in South America and the promulgation 
 of the Monroe Doctrine. 1 
 
 It was in vain that public opinion in France protested against 
 an enterprise to a great extent imposed upon the French envoys 
 at Verona by the Tsar's conception of international duty. In 
 
 1 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone. 
 
 113 
 
114 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 vain the opposition called attention to the impropriety of the 
 Constitutional King of France using his superior strength to 
 crush the power of a constitutional government and to reestablish 
 absolutism in a liberal state. The supporters of the Charter — 
 upon which rested the restored Government of France — saw in 
 the policy of intervention the first steps towards the denunciation 
 of this pact. But Villele, persuaded by Chateaubriand and the 
 growing influence of the Ultra-Royalists, now wavered in his 
 wise determination to neglect the Tsar's advice. Only Canning's 
 appeals — made through a direct correspondence with Chateau- 
 briand — delayed for a time the march of the Royalist troops. 1 
 
 The ensuing months were nevertheless to be filled with a series 
 of bitter disappointments for the Tsar, and of rebufFs to his 
 schemes of concerted action. Far from the center of European 
 events, he followed with an anxious eye the development of the 
 French intervention in Spain and the struggle of the Greeks for 
 the liberty which he had denied them in the interests of a doc- 
 trinaire devotion to the tenets of the Holy Alliance. Austrian 
 jealousy — and the French Ministry's desire to reserve for the 
 Bourbon dynasty all the laurels to be gained in the Spanish 
 War — kept him from taking an active part in these events. 
 Nevertheless he intimated to the Allied Powers that the nucleus 
 of a Russian Army, which he pompously called "The Army of the 
 Alliance," was already mobilizing in Poland. 2 Every success of 
 the campaign to restore Ferdinand to his throne was followed 
 by a shower of Russian decorations conferred upon all those who 
 had shown the slightest deference for his advice and "policies." 
 
 The military details of the campaign of 1823 do not fall within 
 the province of this study. 3 A Bourbon prince carried the white 
 standard of "Old" France across the frontier, and the numerical 
 superiority of the French troops, aided by the guerrilla bands of 
 the "Apostolicos," soon brought the Duke of Angouleme to the 
 walls of Cadiz. Within this city the Constitutional Government 
 had taken refuge, carrying with them the unwilling Ferdinand, 
 
 1 "Negotiate at least before you invade," was Canning's common sense rejoinder to the 
 elegantly phrased arguments of the author of the Memoires d 'outre tombe. "Leave the 
 Spanish revolution to burn itself out within its own crater; you have nothing to apprehend 
 from the eruption, if you do not open a channel for the lava through the Pyrenees. Such 
 are my opinions honestly and sincerely given. Such, Lord Liverpool tells me, he believed 
 to be yours before you left this country." Chateaubriand, vol. I, p. 473. 
 
 2 See Rain, Un ideologue Alexandre I e r, p. 425. 
 
 3 See Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, pp. 497-499. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 115 
 
 now a political prisoner rather than a king of Spain. In spite of 
 the support platonically extended the Constitutional cause by 
 public opinion in both England and the United States, it became 
 evident at the end of September that further resistance was 
 useless. Ferdinand VII was allowed his liberty after taking the 
 most solemn oaths to refrain from reprisals toward the Constitu- 
 tionalists. Scarcely had the King found safety behind the French 
 lines when he gave the signal for an outbreak of reactionary 
 terrorism, which has made his name execrated throughout the 
 peninsula to the present day. Riego, the patriotic leader, was 
 hanged at Madrid. A Royalist Government, composed of Apos- 
 tolicos, carried out the whims of a maniac monarch, in face of the 
 protests of the Duke of Angouleme, who returned to France in 
 disgust, leaving behind him a discontented Army of Occupation. 1 
 
 The Conservative Party in Portugal now sought to imitate the 
 reactionary deeds of Ferdinand. Here, however, Canning firmly 
 intervened. By the terms of a note dated March 31, Canning 
 intimated to the French Government that if their troops should 
 further approach the Portuguese frontier, it would be considered 
 by Great Britain as a "hostile act." The Absolutist Party never- 
 theless once more took up their arms against the Constitutional 
 Government in spite of Canning's effort to isolate Portugal from 
 the quarrels of legitimacy and liberalism. 2 
 
 While the brief triumph of the Bourbon intervention in Spain 
 was wholly gratifying to the reactionary Powers of the "Holy 
 Alliance," the course of events in Spanish America was soon to 
 give them cause for serious alarm. Every success of the policy 
 pursued by France in Spain caused Canning to seek a counter- 
 poise which might add to the influence of Great Britain in the 
 affairs of the Spanish Colonies. Yet even at this time Canning 
 retained hopes of preserving the monarchical system in South 
 America. This is shown by the special favors he extended to the 
 
 l Ibid., pp. 517-521. 
 
 2 In September, 1824, the monarchs forming the Holy Alliance received a new recruit 
 wholly in accord with their most obscurantist doctrines. By the death of the prudent 
 Louis XVIII, his brother, the Count d'Artois, became King (Charles X) of France. 
 During the years 1823-1824 the tide of reaction — which now characterized the Tsar's 
 internationalism — was at its height. Metternich was wholly occupied in applying the 
 repressive measures of 1820 to the German Confederation. It was time — he informed his 
 master — to oblige the sovereigns of South Germany, if not to abolish their constitution, at 
 least to modify them to an extent which would suppress public debates. Such was the 
 strange outcome of the policies now championed by the author of the Instructions to 
 Novosiltzov! 
 
116 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Empire founded by Iturbide in Mexico. In that continent he was 
 now, however, confronted with the growing republican influences 
 of the United States. In the month of July, 1823, it was learned 
 in London that Iturbide's scheme to found a vast Central American 
 state had ended in failure. Mexico under the influences of the 
 United States was about to declare itself a federal republic. 1 
 
 A new factor reconciling the British Cabinet to this plan was 
 the ominous program of monarchical intervention urged by the 
 diplomatic impresario, Chateaubriand. 2 This imaginative states- 
 man now dreamed of extending the French intervention in Spain — 
 where it appeared firmly established — to the colonies overseas. 
 To Ferdinand VII he hinted a compromise, by the terms of which 
 the colonies of South America would be transformed into a league 
 of separate principalities. At the head of each of these would be 
 placed a prince of the House of Bourbon, chosen from the French, 
 Spanish and Italian branches. The whole of this gigantic scheme 
 of reaction was to be underwritten and guaranteed by the Powers 
 of the "Holy Alliance." It was at this moment, so fateful to both 
 American Continents — that the British Foreign Minister made the 
 first overtures for a coordination of the liberal policies pursued in 
 both Great Britain and the United States. 3 
 
 On March 31, 1823, Rush, the American Minister at the Court 
 of St. James, had an important interview with Canning concerning 
 the Spanish Colonies. Referring to the British note which had 
 immediately preceded the invasion of Spain by the French Armies, 
 he asked whether its meaning was that England would not 
 remain passive under any attempt by France to bring any of the 
 American Colonies "under her dominion either by conquest or by 
 cession from Spain." Canning replied by asking Rush what 
 he thought his Government would say to going "hand in hand 
 
 1 See Villanueva's interesting study based upon the archives of the French Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs, La Santa Alianza {La Monarquia en America, vol. in), p. 81. 
 
 2 Ibid., 73. Chateaubriand ordered the French Minister at Madrid to advise sending 
 a Bourbon Prince to Mexico. 
 
 3 The determination with which Chateaubriand had carried out his policy, and the 
 confidence he expressed in the ability of France to carry out the mandates of the "Holy 
 Alliance," were proofs of the constant and unwavering support he had obtained from the 
 Emperor of Russia. In the debates of Parliament concerning South America, Brougham, 
 the great champion of South American freedom, had stated as an undisputed fact "that 
 Ferdinand had been promised by the Emperor Alexander, that if the King of Spain would 
 throw off the Constitutional fetters by which he was trammelled, he would assist him in 
 recovering his Transatlantick Dominions." Stapleton, The Political Life of George 
 Canning, vol. II, p. 46. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 117 
 
 with England in such a policy?" The Minister expressly added 
 that "he did not think that concert of action would become nec- 
 essary." 1 
 
 Canning received no direct answer from Rush, who now sought 
 instructions from his government. The matter was indeed not 
 formally resumed until August 22. On that date Canning set 
 forth the British position as follows: 2 
 
 1. She conceived the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless. 
 
 2. That the question of their recognition as independent states was 
 one of time and circumstances. 
 
 3. That England was not disposed, however, to throw any impediment 
 in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and mother country 
 by amicable negotiation. 
 
 4. That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for 
 herself. 
 
 5. That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any 
 other Power with indifference. 
 
 At the same time Rush was told by Canning that if the United 
 States "acceded to such views, a declaration to that effect on 
 their part concurrently with England" would be the most effectual 
 mode of warning France and of persuading Spain that neither of the 
 Anglo-Saxon countries cherished territorial ambitions in South 
 America. 2 
 
 On August 23, Rush replied categorically to Canning's ques- 
 tions, 3 assuming an identical position except with regard to recog- 
 nition (which had already been made by the United States). In 
 reporting the matter to his government he was careful to point 
 out that while he had thought it proper to meet the spirit of the 
 British proposals as far as he could, he had at the same time 
 avoided any act which might be construed as pledging his govern- 
 ment or to "implicate it in the federative system of Europe." 4 
 This appeared the more necessary from the fact, that as Canning 
 informed him on the 26th, the affairs of Spanish America were 
 to form the subject of a new European Congress as soon as France 
 had terminated her military operations in Spain. 
 
 On the 28th, Rush informed Adams of the quandary in which 
 he was placed by the rapid development of the situation, and of his 
 
 1 Rush, Residence at the Court of London, vol. n, p. 11. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 25. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 26. 
 * Ibid., p. 29. 
 
118 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 intention on his own responsibility "to make a declaration, in 
 the name of my government, that it will not remain inactive under 
 an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy 
 Alliance." This declaration, however, he made contingent upon 
 "recognition by Great Britain without delay." It will thus be 
 seen that if Canning had not judged it inopportune to afford the 
 recognition urged by Rush (which he accorded the following year), 
 that courageous diplomat would have associated the policies of his 
 country and that of Great Britain on his own responsibility, sub- 
 ject to the disavowal of the Department of State. 1 
 
 On November 26 Canning informed Rush that their last inter- 
 view on the subject, just a month before, had led him to conclude 
 that nothing could be done between them in view of the latter's 
 insistence regarding recognition. He had therefore decided that 
 "Great Britain should herself, without any concert with the United 
 States, come to an explanation with France," and had already had 
 several conferences with the French Ambassador, 2 Prince Polig- 
 nac, and had afterwards recorded them as an official Memorandum 
 embodying England's "irreductible demands." This was coupled 
 with a notification of the British Cabinet's unchangeable de- 
 termination to withdraw from the Congressional system of the 
 Holy Alliance. "England could not go into a joint deliberation 
 upon the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with 
 other Powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question, 
 and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it." 3 
 
 In answer to Canning's contentions, Polignac was instructed 
 to present a note modifying Chateaubriand's previous attitude. 
 He now admitted in substance the whole of the British demands: 
 
 That his Government believed it to be utterly hopeless to reduce 
 Spanish America to the state of its former relation to Spain; 
 
 That France disclaimed, on her part, any intention or desire to avail 
 herself of the present state of the Colonies, or of the present situation 
 of France towards Spain, to appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish 
 possessions in America, or to obtain for herself any exclusive advantages; 
 
 And that, like England, she would willingly see the mother country, 
 in possession of superior commercial advantages, by amicable arrange- 
 
 1 Rush, Residence at the Court of London, vol. II, pp. 32-33. 
 
 2 Respecting these negotiations, Canning informed Rush, very properly "that he would 
 willingly furnish . . . that part which embodied the views of England, but that where those 
 of France were at stake he did not feel that he had the same discretion." Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
 The version of Canning's official biographer, Stapleton, treats the subsequent negotia- 
 tions more fully. 
 
 3 Stapleton, op. cit., vol. n, p. 29. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 119 
 
 ments; and would be contented like her, to rank after the mother 
 country, among the most favored nations: 
 
 Lastly, that she abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the 
 Colonies by force of arms. 
 
 That as to what might be the best arrangement between Spain and 
 her Colonies, the French Government could not give, nor venture to 
 form, an opinion until the King of Spain should be at liberty. 1 
 
 While acquiescing in the principal points of Canning's memo- 
 randum, Polignac was not, however, prepared to abandon the 
 principles of intervention. Referring to the conference which 
 France now desired, he declared: 
 
 That he saw no difficulty which should prevent England from taking 
 part in the Conference, however she might now announce the difference, 
 in the view which she took of the question from that taken by the Allies. 2 
 
 He, moreover, made the acquiescence of France in the British 
 program in South America — and by implication that of the Powers 
 of the Holy Alliance — depend upon a "principle of union in govern- 
 ment, whether monarchical or aristocratical," at the same time 
 referring to the principles of the Spanish-American revolution as 
 "absurd and dangerous theories." 3 
 
 True, however, to his policy of reducing the Spanish-Ameri- 
 can question to one of an opportunistic and commercial character, 
 Canning now replied: 
 
 That, however desirable the establishment of a monarchical form of 
 government, in any of those provinces, might be, on the one hand, or 
 whatever might be the difficulties in the way of it, on the other hand, 
 his government could not take upon itself to put it forward as a con- 
 dition of their recognition. 4 
 
 While from the above declarations it will be seen that the aims 
 of the reactionary government in France were not wholly aban- 
 doned, the phrase "that it was utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish 
 America to the state of its former relations to Spain" was the 
 outstanding result the "logic of events" recognized by both par- 
 ties. England now followed the example of the United States in 
 
 * Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 31. "The refusal of England to cooperate in the work of reconciliation 
 might afford reason to think, either that she did not really wish for that reconciliation, 
 or that she had some ulterior object in contemplation; two suppositions equally injurious 
 to the honor and good faith of the British Cabinet." Ibid. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 32. 
 
 4 Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, vol. n, p. 32. Gentz at this time 
 nevertheless believed that Canning realized the necessity of supporting the monarchical 
 principle. See Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, 
 vol. ii, p. 282. 
 
120 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 accrediting Consuls to the principal "provinces" of South America. 
 Commissioners — a term by which the diplomatic rank of Minister 
 was thinly veiled — were sent to both Colombia and Mexico. 
 
 Canning realized that in all these transactions France repre- 
 sented the policy of the Holy Alliance. But in view of the com- 
 plicated negotiations which were being simultaneously carried 
 on involving the integrity of the Turkish Empire, he believed it 
 unwise to risk an open break with Russia and Austria. More- 
 over, the interior situation in England, and the reactionary 
 tendencies of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Liverpool, pre- 
 vented any avowed opposition towards the Continental Powers 
 with respect to the monarchical principles of "conservation" and 
 "legitimacy." x 
 
 A last attempt was now made by King Ferdinand himself to 
 obtain the intervention of the three Powers. He proposed that — 
 
 the several Powers, the Allies of His Catholic Majesty . . . establish 
 a Conference at Paris; in order that their Plenipotentiaries, together 
 with those of His Catholic Majesty, might aid Spain in adjusting the 
 affairs of the revolted colonies. 2 
 
 This invitation, communicated by the Spanish Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs to the Diplomatic Agents of the Courts of Paris, St. 
 Petersburg and Vienna, was couched in the most conciliatory 
 language. The King of Spain even promised "to consider of the 
 alterations which events had produced in his American prov- 
 inces. 3 
 
 In order to persuade England to overlook the indiscretions of 
 Ferdinand VII, and to consent once more to enter into a con- 
 ference with respect to Spanish-American affairs, Chateaubriand 
 
 1 The key of Canning's policy towards the "Holy League," as set forth by biographer 
 Stapleton, was as follows: 
 
 "Still it was not by any violent transition from a practice of support to a system of 
 active opposition to that Alliance, that he could have safely brought about any salutary 
 results. A sudden change from one side to the other, would infallibly, by raising the hopes 
 of the democratical party, have excited them to outrage, and have thus produced the 
 very evil which it was intended to prevent. But, no: the dissolution of the Alliance was to 
 be effected, gradually, by the withdrawal from it of the countenance of England; and the 
 balance was to be held 'not only between contending nations, but between conflicting 
 principles,' giving the preponderance to neither, but aiding rather the liberal side." 
 Stapleton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 134-135. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 34. 
 
 3 Ibid. At the same time, however, a decree was issued by the Council of the Indies 
 which showed the determination of this infatuated Monarch to replace the administration 
 of the Colonies upon the same basis as they had existed before the Revolution of 1820. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 121 
 
 memorialized Canning in a series of notes, which only succeeded 
 in drawing from the British Foreign Minister a more definite 
 statement of England's views with respect to all forms of inter- 
 national intervention. 
 
 It was not by perpetually creating occasions (Canning stated); it 
 was not by incessant meddling with petty interests, and domestic 
 squabbles in other countries, that the influence of Great Britain was to 
 be maintained. On the contrary, it was more likely to be frittered away 
 by such restless exertion, and to be found exhausted, or disabled from 
 acting, when real occasion should arise. 1 
 
 His disgust with the principles of the European Confederation 
 was summed up in a final scathing inquiry: 
 
 What was the influence which we had had in the Counsels of the 
 Alliance? We protested at Laybach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our 
 protest was treated as waste paper; our remonstrances mingled with 
 the air. 1 
 
 Meanwhile, the Republics of South America, through the force 
 of arms, were assuring for themselves the right to an independent 
 choice of their own form of government, the end so ardently 
 desired by the Liberals in both England and the United States. 
 
 Following the victories of Bolivar and Sucre, the former had 
 been proclaimed dictator of a federation of republics, which 
 included Peru, Venezuela and Greater Colombia. After the 
 Battle of Ayacucho (December 8, 1824), the Spanish forces were 
 shut up in the fortresses of Callao, which became the last remain- 
 ing vestige of Spain's great Colonial Empire on the South Ameri- 
 can Continent. There could no longer be any question of con- 
 trolling the destinies of the New World through policies of inter- 
 national action such as those pursued by the Emperor Alexander 
 and Chateaubriand. The latter, indeed, now disappeared from 
 the scene, unregretted even by the Ultra-Royalists. 2 
 
 But the Washington Government was still ignorant of Polig- 
 nac's declaration. The Monroe Cabinet were now earnestly con- 
 sidering to what lengths they were prepared to go in single opposi- 
 tion to the European System. 3 
 
 1 Ibid. t p. 37. 
 
 2 In the future he employed his undoubted talents as a writer in a prolonged opposition 
 to the Villele Cabinet. 
 
 3 Russia was now isolated in her pretensions — and Russia, as Canning held, "could 
 hardly act alone." With the fall of Cadiz, Monroe and Calhoun had believed that the Holy 
 Alliance would restore South America to Spain. Only the sturdy Adams maintained his 
 determined composure. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 50 etseq. 
 
122 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 On November 19 (during an interview with Addington), 
 Adams, while suggesting the difficulties that Great Britain might 
 find in breaking her former close relations with her allies, declared 
 that the United States would decline to attend any conference on 
 South America, unless the new republics were also invited to be 
 present. No Congress, he maintained, could give Europe a right 
 "to stretch the arm of power across the Atlantic." In the strong- 
 est terms he reflected upon the pretensions of the "Congressional 
 System": "The very atmosphere of such an assembly must be 
 considered by this government as infected — and unfit for their 
 plenipotentiary to breathe in." "The ground I wish to take," 
 wrote Adams in his Diary, "is that of earnest remonstrance against 
 the interference of the European Powers by force in South 
 America — but to disclaim all interference on our part with 
 Europe." 
 
 "As the Holy Alliance has come to edify and instruct us with 
 their principles," he wrote in reference to Poletica's Mission of 
 Exhortation, "it is due in candor to them and in justice to our- 
 selves to return the compliment." 
 
 It was Adams's temperate views that triumphed in the Cabi- 
 net and the final Presidential Message of December reflected 
 his desires. Moreover, as subsequent events readily proved, this 
 limited association with British policy was wholly satisfactory 
 to the friends of the liberal cause in Parliament. l The Monroe 
 Message of December 2, 1823, was chiefly directed against the 
 principles of intervention by the Powers of Europe with respect to 
 matters of purely American interest. In affirming their detach- 
 ment from European affairs, Monroe and Adams also placed them- 
 selves in direct opposition to the system of World Congress which 
 Alexander had sought to establish under the auspices of his 
 League of Peace. The unanimity with which these gatherings 
 of the Powers had avoided the thorny dangers of European policy 
 — always complicated by particularistic interests — to join in corn- 
 minatory notes and admonitions to the United States, had doubt- 
 less not escaped their attention. Moreover, a question of purely 
 
 1 "The question with regard to South America," said Mr. Brougham, "was now, he 
 believed, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event had recently happened, than which no 
 event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the Freemen of 
 Europe; that event, which was decisive on the subject, was the language held with respect 
 to Spanish America in the speech . . . of the President of the United States." Stapleton, 
 vol. II, p. 46. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 123 
 
 North American policy was still pending — the immediate cause 
 of the "non-colonization clause" of the message. 
 
 The Tsar had shown no intention of invoking the fraternal bond 
 of the Holy Alliance as against the territorial expansion of the 
 United States in the northern continent of America. In spite of 
 his attempts at Aix-la-Chapelle to annex a territorial guarantee to 
 the program of the Powers, no attempt was ever made to coerce 
 the Washington Cabinet by "concerted action" in the latter's 
 somewhat arbitrary treatment of the Florida question. But the 
 objections which the young Republic addressed to the Conti- 
 nental Powers with respect to "extending their system" to South 
 America or of "controlling the destinies" of that quarter of the 
 globe was accompanied by a territorial declaration which at the 
 time applied chiefly to their own northern Continent. This had 
 immediately in view the Tsar's famous ukase of 1821. 1 
 
 By the terms of this decree, which had been taken as fore- 
 shadowing a policy of Russian expansion on the North Pacific 
 coast, the "pursuit of commerce, whaling and fishing was exclu- 
 sively reserved to Russian subjects from the Behring Straits to 
 51° north latitude." At the same time all foreign vessels were 
 forbidden to approach "within less than one hundred Italian miles 
 of the Russian settlements on that coast" under pain of confis- 
 cation. 2 
 
 When Middleton, the American Minister, stated his objections 
 to Speranski, Governor of Siberia, regarding these pretensions of 
 the ukase, the latter did his best to reassure him with respect to 
 the policy it indicated. The Tsar, he said, had abandoned his 
 original intention to make of these northern waters a mare 
 clausum out of respect to the United States. Middleton, who 
 was without instructions, contented himself with somewhat 
 sarcastically referring to the Papal Bulls of 1493 "dividing the 
 oceans between Spain and Portugal." 3 
 
 Middleton soon observed, however, "that the conditions of the 
 ukase were not insisted upon." He also learned that "they were 
 signed by the Emperor without examination," and that "it was 
 
 1 MS. Dispatches, Russia, 1822, contains a printed copy of the ukase forwarded in Mid- 
 dleton's dispatch of January 9, 1822. Middleton reports the Tsar much occupied by his 
 duties as the arbitrator between Great Britain and the United States in the question arising 
 from Article I of the Treaty of Ghent. 
 
 2 Bancroft, History of the Pacific States, vol. xxm, pp. 348-351. 
 
 3 Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1822. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
124 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 possible that his signature had been surreptitiously obtained" by 
 persons interested in the trade of the Northwest coast. In short, 
 while Capo d'Istria maintained, "We will not revoke or retract," 
 the American envoy was at the same time informed "that 
 no orders have been issued in the sense that you fear." 1 There 
 is every proof that the subsequent negotitations were marked by 
 the Tsar's desire to retire with dignity from the position which he 
 had assumed, and the principal importance of the entire incident 
 turns on the important declaration of American policy which it 
 provoked and the non-colonization clause of the Monroe Message. 
 
 The terms of the ukase had been communicated to the Secretary 
 of State by Poletica in February, 1822, and caused an immediate 
 protest. When Monroe inquired why the boundary, as yet 
 undefined by treaty, had thus been arbitrarily settled, the 
 Russian Minister replied that 51° north latitude had been chosen 
 as lying half way between the Russian settlement at Novo 
 Archenglsk and the most northern American settlement at the 
 mouth of the Columbia River. Mention was made of the matter 
 in the Presidential Message of December, 1822, but it was not 
 until the new Envoy Baron de Tuyll arrived in April, 1823, that 
 the matter was resumed. Under instructions from the Tsar he 
 asked that the American Minister in St. Petersburg be given 
 power to negotiate a settlement. This was agreed to by Adams 
 and resulted in instructions to Mr. Middleton being drawn up. 
 
 In July, 1823, de Tuyll was called to the State Department and 
 told that the question had been altered by the determination of the 
 United States Government to consider the whole territory of 
 both North and South America "as closed in future to European 
 colonization." Adams now based his case on the newly signed 
 treaty with Spain which had ceded to the United States all the 
 rights formerly held by that country up to the 41st degree of 
 latitude north, upon the discoveries of Captain Grey and of the 
 Lewis and Clarke Expedition, and doubtless upon Middleton's 
 report of his negotiations in St. Petersburg. 2 
 
 A large part of the territory affected by the ukase of 1821 was, 
 pending a settlement of the boundary between Great Britain and 
 the United States, held in common by these two countries. Their 
 
 1 Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1822. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 2 These negotiations were reported by Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, April 
 19, 1824. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 125 
 
 interest in curbing the Tsar's pretensions was thus a mutual one, 
 and, until the enunciation of the "non-colonization" principle 
 in the Monroe Message, seemed likely again to give to their 
 policies a similar direction. On January 5, 1824, however, 
 Rush had an important interview with Canning in London. 
 The former told the American Minister "that he was still embar- 
 rassed in the preparation of his instructions to Sir Charles Bagot 
 in consequence of the non-colonization principle laid down in the 
 President's message." 1 He also asked Rush to allow the negotia- 
 tions in St. Petersburg to progress separately and not conjointly, 
 as previously proposed by the United States. 1 It now became 
 the task of the American Minister to obtain support or at least 
 toleration for "non-colonization" by enlisting the ready jealousies 
 of the Powers. At a dinner at Prince Polignac's he expressed a 
 hope that France would not intervene on such a principle as he had 
 to meet the "known opposition of the whole British Cabinet." 
 By such means the antipathies of the European Powers were 
 stayed until the important principle became established by time. 2 
 Meanwhile, an amicable negotiation had settled the matter of the 
 ukase. Middleton signed an agreement with Russia, fixing the 
 boundary at 55° north latitude in April, 1824, four months after 
 the bold stand taken in Monroe's Message. 3 
 
 Having traced the evolution of the two cardinal principles of 
 the foreign policy of the United States published to the world by 
 the Monroe Message, i.e. the paragraph forbidding the powers of 
 Europe to extend their system to the American Continent or to 
 control the destines of its inhabitants 4 and the equally important 
 warning concerning any future attempts at colonization, 6 it now 
 
 1 Rush, Residence at the Court of London, vol. II, p. 87. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 103. 
 
 3 McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, vol. v, pp. 20-22. 
 
 4 "We owe it therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the 
 United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their 
 part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
 safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power, we have not 
 interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their 
 independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration 
 and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
 oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European 
 Power, in any other light than the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
 United States." Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. n, p. 218. 
 
 6 "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by 
 which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle 
 in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American 
 continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and main- 
 tain, are henceforth not to be considered as subject;) for future colonization by any Euro- 
 pean Powers." Ibid., p. 209. 
 
126 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 becomes necessary to consider the corresponding obligation re- 
 affirmed by the American Cabinet as part of this same declara- 
 tion: the renewed engagement not to interfere in matters of 
 purely European concern. 1 
 
 The sincerity of the intentions thus declared was to be tested 
 almost immediately by the course of European events. The 
 struggle carried on by the Greek insurgents had been followed 
 with sympathetic interest in the United States. Monroe had 
 been inclined to empower Rush to act in concert with the British 
 Government to end the horrors of their situation and even wished 
 to propose an appropriation for a Minister to Greece. In his 
 Message of December 3, 1822, he had declared it natural that 
 "the reappearance of those people in their original character, 
 contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great 
 excitement and sympathy in their favor which have been so 
 signally displayed throughout the United States." At the same 
 time he expressed a strong hope "that these people will recover 
 their independence and resume their equal station among the 
 nations of the earth." 2 Largely due to the influence of Adams, 
 however, and his determination to avoid all interference on 
 our part with Europe, the President's generous impulses were 
 restrained. The Greeks were again noticed in the message of a 
 year later, but the challenge it contained to Alexander's favorite 
 internationalist policies had little or no application to the Gre- 
 cian situation, and was indeed wholly ignored in St. Petersburg. 3 
 
 The final settlement of the fate of these revolutionists was to 
 offer the last occasion upon which the Tsar sought to apply the 
 later formulas of his internationalism, and only concerns our study 
 in this respect. 
 
 To Alexander — brooding over his own misunderstanding of the 
 Turkish situation — the reports of Canning's able negotiations in 
 the interest both of Great Britain and of the Grecian patriots 
 
 1 "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars 
 which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, 
 which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers." Richardson, Mes- 
 sages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. n, pp. 218-219. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 193. 
 
 3 A curious example of the point to which the prejudice has developed in America 
 against entanglement in European affairs is shown in a recent Life of Clara Barton, by 
 William E. Barton. The author points out that the first refusal by the United States 
 to join the International Red Cross was largely the result of the popular belief that such 
 an act would be contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 127 
 
 came as a bitter disillusion. This able statesman, in whom he 
 recognized the arch enemy of the "Holy Alliance," had now 
 induced even the wily Metternich to serve his own aims. While 
 Lord Byron led another expedition of volunteers in active military 
 support of the Greeks, Canning skilfully held the balance between 
 the sympathies of the Liberals and the time-honored British policy 
 of maintaining the prestige of the Sublime Porte. 
 
 When, however, the French intervention in Spain had brought 
 the Spanish War to a favorable conclusion, Alexander determined 
 once more to appeal to his allies in support of his favorite policy 
 of a "European intervention" to insure the pacification of Greece. 
 With this end in view, he sought an interview with the Emperor 
 of Austria at Czernowitz in October, 1823. Nesselrode was also 
 sent to consult with Metternich, who was detained by illness at 
 Lemberg. 
 
 These pourparlers resulted in a compromise. While Austria 
 and England were allowed to continue their negotiations at Con- 
 stantinople, it was agreed that the five great Powers should at 
 the same time be invited to a series of conferences at St. Peters- 
 burg, where the Emperor of Russia would be afforded an oppor- 
 tunity to develop his views with respect to revolution. This 
 gathering was but to reveal the growing weakness of the bonds 
 uniting the Holy League. 
 
 The Tsar's last attempts to make a "European matter" of 
 the Greek situation were resisted by Villele, who retained the 
 Presidency of the Council under the reactionary Charles X. He 
 refused to risk any action that might cause a break in Anglo- 
 French relations. Even the Court of Berlin, under the domina- 
 tion of Metternich ventured to withhold its assent to any plan 
 for an intervention by the Powers. 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador again and again declared that his 
 master would in no case join in "coercive measures." Finally, 
 after six weeks of sterile debate, the Conference avoided the 
 appearance of failure by issuing a protocol (dated April 7, 1825), 
 which directly avoided reference to the principal matters at issue. 
 The Sublime Porte was requested to accord "spontaneously" 
 measures necessary to pacify the revolted provinces. In case of 
 refusal, a "mediation" was to be proposed by each of the Powers 
 acting separately, the latter phrase being a concession to England's 
 views. 
 
128 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 This complete breakdown of the principle of concerted action 
 was highly resented by Alexander. The Emperor complained, in 
 terms of reproachful bitterness, of the treatment which he had 
 met with from his allies. At the same time he threw out hints 
 that the Greek question was "not the only ground of difference" 
 between Russia and Turkey; and that if Russian grievances had 
 been for a time abandoned in favor of European interests, the 
 failure of the conference to support the latter principle would be 
 a reason for peremptorily insisting upon satisfaction regarding 
 the other points of dispute. 1 
 
 For a time it looked as though, in spite of all Metternich's 
 finesse, the Turko-Russian conflict feared by the Powers of 
 Europe was about to break out. The Russian Cabinet renewed 
 a diplomatic protest with respect to the whole series of its com- 
 plaints against the Porte. In addition to these demands, the 
 mobilization of Russian troops began along the River Pruth, 
 the old route of invasion from Russia to Turkey. The Tsar, 
 meanwhile, set out upon a journey toward the southern provinces, 
 which in the eyes of Europe took on a dangerous significance. 
 
 At this time, however, the aspect of Grecian affairs underwent 
 a sudden change. The Egyptian Army, which had energetically 
 aided the Turkish forces in reducing the Greek insurgents of the 
 Peloponnesus, suddenly suspended its victorious attack upon 
 Nauplia. In the month of July they reembarked for Tripoli and 
 Egypt. The explanation for such a merciful course of conduct 
 could only be found in an English intervention. The fleets of 
 Great Britain under Commodore Hamilton threatening the base 
 of the Turkish Army had brought about results which the united 
 protests of the Powers of the "Holy Alliance" had been unable 
 to obtain. As a result of this respite, the Greek Government offered 
 to Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg — the English candidate for the 
 Grecian throne — the crown which the French Ministry had 
 desired to confer upon a Bourbon prince. 
 
 Thanks to Canning's diplomacy and the might of Britain's 
 
 1 Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, vol. II, p. 436. Contemporary Liberal 
 opinion held that this was a complete and unregretted defeat of the Tsar's principles. 
 "The admission by one of the members of the Holy Alliance of that which this pro- 
 posal implies, that there 'were interests which would justify nations in taking their own 
 measures with regard to countries in a state of civil war,' was at once giving up one of 
 the principles to which that Alliance had most pertinaciously adhered, and consequently 
 was an acknowledgment that their principles (England having set them at defiance) were 
 no longer tenable in practice." Ibid., p. 437. 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 129 
 
 sea power, the Greek question seemed about to reach a settlement. 
 Alexander (through Mme. de Lieven, wife of his Ambassador in 
 London) sought a reconciliation with the British Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs. But before undertaking the mediation that the 
 Tsar now appeared willing to place solely in his hands, Canning 
 demanded that the Russian Armies be withdrawn from the 
 Pruth, and even threatened, if this were refused, to occupy the 
 Morea and the Islands of the Grecian Archipelago. 
 
 But a dramatic turn of affairs was about to follow this final 
 abdication by Alexander of his favorite principle of European 
 intervention. On September 1, 1825, he had left St. Petersburg 
 for the South. Failing health, not reasons of a military nature, 
 was the cause of this journey. In a little town on the Asiatic 
 borders of his vast Empire, the final act in the life drama 
 of the Tsar-Idealist was about to be played. Far from the scenes 
 of his triumphs and disappointments, the conqueror of Napo- 
 leon — the dreamer of a Holy Alliance which should unite the 
 nations of the world in bonds of "Justice, Christian Charity and 
 Peace" — was to end his full and eager life beneath the shadow of 
 disappointment and failure. 
 
 Sensitive to the opinion of his contemporaries, the Tsar suffered 
 acutely from the misunderstanding and suspicion that greeted 
 every new effort to give practical effect to his international poli- 
 cies. 1 Nor could he hide from himself the fact that in Russia 
 his popularity had fallen to the lowest ebb from his readiness to 
 sacrifice national interests to the welfare of the doctrinaire ideal 
 of European Federation. 
 
 A morbid detestation of revolution at home and abroad became 
 the guiding principle of his policy. He seems to have regarded the 
 growing danger of his own assassination with a certain fatalism — 
 whether arising from an increasing mental lethargy or from a kind 
 of heroic indifference, it is hard to say. But with respect to the 
 repressive policy of the Holy Alliance he remained adamant. 
 In July, 1825, but a few months before his death, he sermonized 
 the French Minister at length upon the dangers of coming to any 
 agreement with the insurgents of San Domingo. 2 "In the great 
 struggle we are carrying on the issue is between good and evil — 
 
 1 Rain, Un Tsar id'ealogue Alexandre I er , p. 425. 
 
 2 Dispatches of the French Minister to the Foreign Office, quoted in Grand Due 
 Nicolas Mikhailowitch, L'Empereur Alexandre I**, vol. II, p. 530. 
 
130 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 law against fact — order against license. The present unfortunate 
 example is both risky and dangerous . . . The recognition of 
 the independence of the United States led directly to the French 
 Revolution." 1 
 
 Yet now and again a bright ray of his old time liberalism came 
 to lighten the abyss of obscurantism into which he was plunged. 
 As the end approached he seems to have renewed the dreams and 
 visions of his younger days. To Karamzine, the great historian, 
 who urged upon him the fact that his "years are numbered" 
 while Russia still awaited fulfillment of the promise of his earlier 
 reign he replied: "I shall yet give my Empire her fundamental 
 rights!" 2 A promise made under the shadow of death yet as 
 vain as those which had preceded it! To all who surrounded him 
 Alexander remained to the last the "impenetrable sphinx." 3 
 
 It became evident to his entourage that following the failure of 
 his Grecian policy, the Tsar did not himself know what ends he 
 wished to pursue. He seems to have feared the accusation of 
 being under the influence of the liberal Canning as much as 
 he dreaded reminders of his subservience to the reactionary 
 Metternich. Much of this hesitancy was doubtless due to 
 illness. That Alexander's physical condition was now serious had 
 become evident to all who surrounded him. Recurrent attacks of 
 erysipelas frequently confined him to his bed. Morbid suspicions 
 preyed upon his mind. 4 
 
 Moreover, the conviction was daily growing clearer to the Tsar 
 that he was the center of a vast conspiracy aimed at his throne, and 
 
 1 Nevertheless, Alexander remained to the end popular in the United States. Under 
 date of July 2, 1825, Clay, acting in the name of the Cabinet, urged the intervention of the 
 Tsar to bring about a cessation of hostilities between the King of Spain and the insurgents 
 of Cuba and Porto Rico. Middleton in this connection wrote: "The proposition . . . 
 has been communicated to the Allied Cabinets and I am of the opinion that the majority 
 will agree." Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1825. MS. Dispatches, 
 Russia. 
 
 2 Rain, op. cit., p. 437. 
 
 3 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhailowitch, op. cit., vol. i, p. 309. "I do not believe," 
 wrote La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, "that it is possible to find anyone more convincingly 
 frank and loyal in his conversation. One always leaves him under the impression that here, 
 at last, is a Prince who unites to the qualities of a Christian knight all the attributes of a 
 great sovereign. He also gives the impression of a man of intelligence and energy. Well! 
 on the other hand, bitter experience and the whole story of his life teaches us that he can 
 not be trusted." Letter of May 19, 1823, La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, Archives 
 of the French Foreign Office, quoted by Rain, op. cit., p. 426. 
 
 4 He often asked the favorite Madame Narychkine — of whose fidelity he also had well 
 founded reasons to doubt — "to tell him frankly whether his conduct was not a source of 
 ridicule" to the courtiers of his entourage. He often talked of abdicating the throne 
 with an earnestness that recalled his youthful days. Comtesse de Boigne, Memoirs, 
 vol. in, pp. 156-157. 
 
 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 131 
 
 even at his life. The preparations for his eagerly anticipated 
 journey to South Russia (July, 1825) were interrupted by definite 
 reports of an alarming nature concerning the machinations of the 
 "Sects," a Russian officer of English origin named Sherwood 
 revealing to his master the plots of a revolutionary nature which 
 afterwards became fully known through the trials of the Decem- 
 brists. 
 
 After a tiresome journey lasting for more than two weeks 
 Alexander arrived at the little city of Taganrog near the shores 
 of the Black Sea, where he was shortly afterwards joined by the 
 Tsarina. Freed from the cumbersome etiquette of the court 
 and the grinding military routine which disturbed his leisure at 
 St. Petersburg, the Tsar appears to have rallied from his state of 
 nervous depression. A renewed period of friendship — even of 
 marital affection — reunited him to the much-tried Empress Eliza- 
 beth. But the nervous fever of activity which devoured him 
 soon drove him forth upon another journey. Against the advice 
 of his physician, he attempted a tour of inspection in the provinces 
 of the Crimea. Returning to Taganrog on November 17, he 
 immediately took to his bed with a burning fever. 
 
 In spite of his precarious condition, he refused the medicines of 
 his physicians, Wylie and Stofregen. It became apparent to all 
 that the will to survive his disillusions was lacking — and only his 
 splendid physique rebelled at the final surrender. On the 27th 
 a priest was sent for in haste to give him the last communion, of 
 which he partook with touching piety and devotion. He died 
 on December 1, 1825. x 
 
 1 In spite of the autopsy signed by five physicians, a strange tradition still current in 
 Russia declares that the Tsar lived for many years after the date ascribed to his death. 
 He is identified as the monk "Feodor Kousmitch," who lived as a hermit in the wilds of 
 Siberia. In Russia, the author was assured of this fact by the son of an official, who pre- 
 tended that his father had known the Tsar during this exile. 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 TERRITORIAL GUARANTEES AT THE CONGRESS OF 
 AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1818 1 
 
 The result of the protocol of November 15 — although expressing 
 the benevolent intention of the Allied Powers, as well as those of 
 the great Association of Europe — nevertheless leaves much to be 
 desired. Another agreement more positive in its terms and more 
 conservative in its principles will be needed in the future. The 
 best means to obtain the ends desired would be the signing of a 
 treaty to which the Powers signatory of the Recess of Vienna 2 
 and the subsequent Acts of Paris would adhere. This alone could 
 mutually guarantee the integrity of their rights and the inviola- 
 bility of their possessions as defined by the above-mentioned 
 Recess and Treaty of Paris of the year 1815. 
 
 Such a guarantee of solidarity ought to be explicit and contain 
 a definition of mutual obligations. His Imperial Majesty finds 
 the basic principles — and a definition of the meaning and tenor of 
 such a treaty — in the fraternal bond of September 14/26, 1815. 3 
 A proof of the immutability of these principles is to be found in 
 the imposing unanimity with which they were accepted by the 
 governments of Europe. 
 
 If the Allied Powers share this view and judge it opportune 
 and necessary to base their diplomatic acts and formulae on the 
 principles consecrated in the act mentioned (thereby ensuring 
 to the alliance the guarantees of peace and security which are 
 the fruit of this pact), the Emperor of Russia is ready to make any 
 sacrifice to accomplish this result. His Minister is ordered to 
 place himself in direct relation with the Allied Cabinets to discuss 
 projects of a treaty along this line 
 
 To the above was annexed the following: 
 
 PROJECT OF TREATY 
 
 The transactions which have taken place among the Powers since 
 the year 1814, and especially the measures taken at the Congresses of 
 Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, have had as their guiding principle the 
 desire to establish in Europe a system of durable peace founded on the 
 basis of a territorial guarantee among the Powers. The courts of 
 
 *MS. Treaty proposed by Alexander at Aix-la-Chapelle contained in a folio marked 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, in Archives of Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 2 The Final Act of Vienna. 
 
 3 The Holy Alliance. 
 
 J.OO 
 

 134 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Austria, France, Holland, Prussia and Russia have judged it expedient, 
 following the spirit of these general transactions, to make more definite 
 declarations concerning their reciprocal relations. The following dis- 
 positions have, therefore, been taken: 
 
 Reciprocal Guarantees 
 
 1st. The conduct of the nations will be guided by a rule binding upon 
 each and all; an engagement to remain within the present territorial 
 limits fixed in Europe by the last treaties, and an intention not to 
 attempt to expand these same, unless with the approval of the Alliance 
 or in the case of voluntary agreements. 
 
 2d. They mutually guarantee the respective territories as fixed by 
 these treaties and promise to make common cause against any state 
 seeking to trouble the general peace. This clause shall become imme- 
 diately effective. 1 
 
 3d. They agree to notify the Government of Great Britain of the 
 above clause, inviting H. B. M.'s government to use its good offices to 
 obtain the results desired if necessary without requiring its active co- 
 operation or full adhesion (the latter, however, they will always be ready 
 to receive). 
 
 4th. The German Confederation will be invited to form a part of the 
 present system. 
 
 5th. In view of the fact that a too wide extension of the system of 
 reciprocal guarantees mentioned above would only tend to weaken and 
 render more difficult the attainment of the ends desired, the Powers 
 agree not to make further similar propositions to the other powers. 2 
 
 1 Compare Article X of the Treaty of Versailles. 
 
 2 There is no record that the principles embodied in the above interesting document — 
 preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg — were ever formally- 
 debated by the delegates at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The not unnatural reluc- 
 tance of all the Powers — with the exception of France and Russia — to add to the already 
 complicated system of treaties uniting the Allies may have forestalled consideration of this 
 earlier "territorial guarantee." 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 WORLD REVOLUTION AFTER THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: 
 
 TROPPAU 1 
 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been directed to add 
 to the annexed account of the Conference of Troppau certain 
 explanations concerning the objects of the present reunion of the 
 Allied Cabinets. The first aim of these deliberations has had 
 for its object to save the world from the plague of revolutionary 
 anarchy. A union of the great Powers delivered Europe from the 
 military despotism which gave birth to the revolutions in France. 
 Their independence attained, the nations disarmed, and each 
 hoped to see its own population enjoying the blessings of a general 
 peace under the auspices of the great agreement which had assured 
 to the nations of Europe complete security, both within and 
 without. New manifestations of solidarity have surrounded with 
 fresh guarantees this happy state of affairs, and the nations 
 appeared during several years to obtain a breathing spell fol- 
 lowing the long-drawn period of their misfortunes . . . Neverthe- 
 less, the revolutionary struggle had left its mark upon the whole 
 of Europe — and in its trail more ideas perverted by the errors 
 and calamities of the century. These latter theories arose in 
 the midst of the events of the revolution, and, first raised to power 
 by its fatal influence, dropped to obscurity through the ensuing 
 peace. The sects have, therefore, neglected no means to prevent 
 the progress of a durable pacification. No artifice has been spared 
 to sow discord among the Allies. No effort has been overlooked 
 in their desire to drag down the nations or thrones by provoking 
 the people to revolt. This latter effort has been especially 
 directed against the countries wherein revolution has long exer- 
 cised its influence. In Spain, Naples and Portugal they were, 
 unfortunately, successful. In turn overwhelmed, the downfall 
 of these three states shows to the world the continued exist- 
 ence of that revolution from which it had thought itself forever 
 free. Thus scarcely reconstructed, the edifice of Europe finds 
 itself attacked at its very foundations: international law, religion 
 and Christian morality. At a time when each of the governments 
 is endeavoring to discover the real needs of its nationals and seek- 
 
 1 MS. Memoir dated November, 1820, from folio marked Troppau, 1820, in the Archives 
 of the Russian Foreign Office. 
 
 135 
 
136 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 ing to satisfy these aspirations by constructive measures, their 
 pure intentions are suddenly paralyzed. If Europe had merely 
 opposed silence to the enemy already triumphant throughout 
 the territory of the two peninsulas, the results of the obligations 
 contracted in 1814, 1815 and 1816 would have in turn been de- 
 feated. Isolated and without help, the states of Europe could 
 only have compromised with the revolutionary despotism . . . 
 
 The revolutionaries attempted to persuade the people that 
 absolute power is leagued against the rights of nationality. It 
 was, therefore, essential to convince them that true sovereign 
 power must prevent and punish crime and insurrection, and this 
 only in order to ensure the enjoyment of the peaceful rights of 
 its subjects. The enemies of government seek to represent the 
 reunion of Troppau as dominated by the three Courts of Austria, 
 Prussia and Russia. They maintain that the spirit of the Triple 
 Alliance is opposed by another formed of the Constitutional 
 states — England, France, Holland, Central Germany, Italy, 
 Spain and the two Americas. It is, therefore, indispensable to 
 demonstrate the contrary and to show them that at Troppau the 
 great Powers in Europe were gathered to deliberate with respect to 
 the stabilization of the European system. This was the fact that 
 rendered necessary the reunion of the five Cabinets. The first 
 problem to be considered was consequently the reconciliation of 
 the respective views of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia 
 and Russia so that the policy and system adopted by these Powers 
 toward the revolutionary party should be identical. This was a 
 difficult task, one rendered possible through energy inspired by 
 love of the right. 
 
 Austria by its position is called upon to assist the Powers 
 with its advice, and more actively, in Italy, where the situation is 
 only assured by a partial treaty concluded with H. M. of Sicily. 
 The Treaty of June 12, 1815, Austria contends, should, therefore, 
 disappear. Acting as a mandatory of the European Powers, 
 she should play the most important part in the great task of 
 reconciliating Naples, both to the King and to the laws of society. 
 France still forms the center of sects, whose ambition it is to 
 overthrow all monarchical government. She, therefore, can not 
 be expected to cooperate successfully at the present time. Act- 
 ing as a support to the general cause, she should hope for the 
 
APPENDIX II 137 
 
 assistance of the Powers . . . Great Britain, now at the zenith of 
 riches and civilization, appears for the moment to be engulfed by 
 her own prosperity. The proof of this is to be found in the 
 domestic troubles which menace the Royal family, its August 
 Chief and its most zealous servants. Under these circumstances, 
 the government can not be counted among the number of active 
 members of the European Alliance, and should be happy to keep 
 its rank as an Allied court. It can best aid by not holding forth 
 false hopes to the authors of the great catastrophe. Prussia, 
 fully occupied by internal relations to the federal states of Ger- 
 many and by new relations with Austria, has not been able to 
 consider in advance the difficult questions confronting the united 
 Cabinets. To Russia alone, therefore, thanks to its strong posi- 
 tion, this duty appears in harmony with the engagements already 
 taken, etc. 
 
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 Mikhailowitch, Grand Due Nicolas. L'Empereur Alexandre I<*. Essai d'etude 
 
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INDEX 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, 1, 50, 61, 71; position 
 with regard to Holy Alliance, 91 et seq.; 
 position with regard to European inter- 
 ference in America, 122. 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle: Treaty of, 21, 44-5, 59, 
 61, 67; Congress of, 69 et seq.; results of 
 Congress of, 83; territorial guarantees of 
 Congress of, 133-34. 
 
 Alliances: of Tsar Paul with Napoleon, 8; 
 Anglo-Russian, 12-3; of Tilsit, 16-7; 
 France, Austria and Great Britain, 27. 
 See also Treaties. 
 
 Allied General Staff, proposed, 74. 
 
 Anglo-Russian Alliance, attitude toward 
 France, 13. 
 
 Angouleme, Duke of, leader of French in- 
 vasion of Spain, 114-15. 
 
 Arcis-sur-Aube, battle at, 19. 
 
 "Armed Neutrality," 8, 10. 
 
 Austerlitz, defeat of Third Coalition at, 15- 
 6. 
 
 Austria, 1, 58, 97, 136; recognition of Na- 
 poleon by, 11; on side of Allies, 19; party 
 to Treaty of Alliance, 28; opposition of, to 
 international congresses, 72; negotiations 
 with Great Britain at Constantinople, 
 127. 
 
 Bagot, Sir Charles, 125. 
 
 Balance of power, Alexander's principle of, 
 15. 
 
 Bancroft, cited, 123. 
 
 Banda Oriental, 67, 88. 
 
 Baronov, Russian Governor of American 
 colonies, 59-60. 
 
 Barton, William E., cited, 126. 
 
 Bennett, member of Parliament, attack 
 upon Holy Alliance, 43-4. 
 
 Bergasse, Nicholas, influence of, on Alex- 
 ander, 32, 34-5, 38-9. 
 
 Berlin Decree, 46. 
 
 Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, 18. 
 
 Bey of Algiers, 58. 
 
 Bey of Tunis, 58. 
 
 Blockades, paper, forbidden by Congress of 
 Powers of the North, 10. 
 
 Bodega Bay, Russian colony at, 59-60. 
 
 Bogdanovitch, cited, 4. 
 
 Boigne, Comtesse de, cited, 130. 
 
 Bolivar: cited, 60; dictator of South 
 American republics, 121. 
 
 Bonaparte, Joseph, assumption of royal 
 authority by, 61. 
 
 Borgo, Pozzo di, Russian envoy, 65-6, 70. 
 
 Boyce, Myrna, cited, 45. 
 
 Brest, 46. 
 
 Brougham, member of Parliament, opposi- 
 tion to Holy Alliance, 42-3. 
 
 Buenos Aires, 61; independence of, 78. 
 
 Byron, Lord, expedition in support of 
 Greeks, 107, 127. 
 
 Campbell, George W., United States 
 minister to Russia, 88 et seq, 97. 
 
 Canning, George, 2, 74; Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, 108; foreign policy of, 109, 
 114; intervention in Portugal, 115; state- 
 ment in regard to colonies, \\7 et seq.; 
 negotiations with regard to Greece, 
 126-27. 
 
 Caracas, 61; political and commercial con- 
 cessions granted to, 78. 
 
 Carlsbad, 48; Congress of, 96. 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, 28, 47, 73, 107-8; in- 
 fluence of, at Chaumont negotiations, 22; 
 at Congress of Vienna, 26; support of 
 Holy Alliance, 42-3, 71, 74-5, 84; pro- 
 posal to admit France to Treaty of 
 Alliance, 73; reservations of, 83; opposi- 
 tion to Troppau Congress, 98, 100. 
 
 Catherine, Empress, grandmother of Alex- 
 ander, 3, 17, death of, 5. 
 
 Caulaincourt, Napoleon's envoy at Chatil- 
 lon, 20. 
 
 Chateaubriand: cited, 60, 71, 109 et seq.; 
 interview with Alexander, 113; plan of 
 French intervention in Spain, 116. 
 
 Chateau-Thierry, French victory at, 19. 
 
 Chatillon, Congress of, 19. 
 
 Chaumont, Treaty of, 2, 12, 20-1, 29, 45-6, 
 71, 73-4. 
 
 Choiseul-Gouflier, Mme. de, cited, 23, 30, 33 . 
 
 Clay, Henry, 64. 
 
 Cleland, R. G., cited, 60. 
 
 Clery, Robinet de, cited, 77, 96. 
 
 Colombia, independence of, 121. 
 
 Confederation of the Rhine, 22. 
 
 Congresses. See individual headings. 
 
 143 
 
144 
 
 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Constantine, Grand Duke, brother of 
 Alexander, 3. 
 
 Constantinople, negotiations between Aus- 
 tria and Great Britain at, 127. 
 
 Continental System, effort to attach 
 Alexander to, 17. 
 
 Copenhagen, British victory at, 9. 
 
 Correa, Portuguese Minister, 88. 
 
 Cretenau-Joly, Jacques, cited, 73. 
 
 Crimean War, outbreak of, 39. 
 
 Czartoryski, Prince, 26, 35; cited, 4-5, 
 7,12, 16; as Prime Minister, 8; influence of. 
 on Alexander, 9, 25; appointed Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, 10-1. 
 
 Dashkov, Russian envoy to the United 
 States, 49-50, 62-3, 80, 85. 
 
 Debidour, A.: cited, 20, 26-7, 56 et seq., 
 64,72-3,99, 105,110. 
 
 Denmark: attempt to separate, 9; at 
 Congress of Powers of the North, 10. 
 
 Diderot, 3. 
 
 Divine Right of rulers, 55. 
 
 Dunning, W. A., cited, 47. 
 
 Dupuis, Charles, cited, 17. 
 
 Elba, return of Napoleon from, 27, 32. 
 
 Elizabeth, Empress, 131. 
 
 Embargo, English, on vessels, 8. 
 
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, cited, 44. 
 
 Era of Good Feeling in the United 
 States, 50. 
 
 Erfurt, meeting of Alexander and Talley- 
 rand at, 17. 
 
 Eynard, Charles, cited, 32-3. 
 
 Federation, proposed, of small states, 15. 
 
 Feree-Champeniose, La, battle at, 19. 
 
 Ferdinand VII, Spanish King, 58, 67; 
 restoration of absolutism and the In- 
 quisition by, 56; tyranny of, 60; trouble 
 with South American colonies, 64; 
 attempt to restore, to the throne, 114-15; 
 proposal of international conference, by, 
 120-21. 
 
 Ferronnays, French representative at Lay- 
 bach Congress, 105. 
 
 Finland, "free hand" given Russia in, 17. 
 
 Fischer, Danish Admiral, 9. 
 
 Florida, 65; controversy over, 61-2; Amer- 
 ican invasion of, 64; cession of East, 
 to United States, 92. 
 
 Ford, C, cited, 32. 
 
 France: alliance with Great Britain and 
 
 Austria, 27; Alexander's policy toward, 
 56; payment of indemnity by, 73; ad- 
 mitted to Treaty of Alliance, 74; state- 
 ment of, in regard to Spain and colonies, 
 118-19; Sects in, 135. 
 
 Frankfort, 55. 
 
 Frederick William III, Prussian King, 10, 
 17, 56, 96. 
 
 Friedland, Russian defeat at, 17. 
 
 Garde, Le Comte A. de la, cited, 24. 
 
 Garden, cited, 8, 10, 16, 18. 
 
 Gentz, Frederick de: cited, 24, 31, 37, 
 72, 74-5, 77, 97 et seq., 119; at Vienna 
 Congress, 29; attacks upon Jacobinism, 
 95-6; at Laybach Congress, 101. 
 
 German Confederation, 59; action of 
 Metternich with regard to, 96. 
 
 Ghent, Peace of, 26, 59. 
 
 Goebel, Julius, cited, 70. 
 
 Golder, F. A., cited, 47, 50. 
 
 Golytzine; Alexander's letter to, 29; in- 
 fluence of, on Alexander, 32. 
 
 Gordon, English plenipotentiary at Lay- 
 bach Congress, 101, 103. 
 
 Grand Confederation of the Powers of 
 Europe, 23. 
 
 Great Britain, 136-37; agreement with 
 provisions of Congress of the Powers of 
 the North, 10; agreement with Russia, 
 12; attitude toward France, 15-6; party 
 to Treaty of Reichenbach, 18; subsidies 
 advanced by, 20; war with the United 
 States (War of 1812), 26, 93; party to 
 Treaty of Alliance, 28; attitude toward 
 Holy Alliance, 41 et seq.; opposition to 
 action regarding Barbary pirates, 57-8; 
 as an American power, 59; opposition to 
 international congresses, 72; at Aix-la- 
 Chapelle Congress, 75-6; opposition to 
 international naval measures, 82; recog- 
 nition of Spanish American colonies, 111; 
 attitude toward Spanish American col- 
 onies, 117; negotiations with Austria at 
 Constantinople, 127; settlement of Gre- 
 cian question, 128. 
 
 Greece, resistance to Turkish oppression, 
 105 et seq., 126 et seq. 
 
 Grenada, political and commercial con- 
 cessions granted to, 78. 
 
 Greville, Charles C. F., cited, 45. 
 
 Grimm, 3. 
 
INDEX 
 
 145 
 
 Hanover, Prussian evacuation of, 10. 
 Hanse Towns, acceptance of Holy Alliance 
 
 by, 47. 
 Hardenberg, Prussian Liberal Minister, 56. 
 Harris, Levett, American charge d'affaires 
 
 at St. Petersburg, 48-9, 55, 58, 62. 
 Havre, 46. 
 
 Hetairie, Pan Grecian Association, 57, 105. 
 Hildt, John C, cited, 51, 60, 64. 
 Holland, 136; proposed restoration of, 13; 
 
 acceptance of Holy Alliance by, 47. 
 Humboldt, Prussian Liberal Minister, 56. 
 Hyde de Neuville, French Minister to 
 
 United States, 61. 
 Impeytany, cited, 39. 
 Instructions to Novosiltzov, 9, 11 et seq., 
 
 26, 29, 32, 67, 104. 
 International Maritime Police, proposed, 81. 
 Istria, Capo d', 70; adviser to Alexander, 
 25, 49, 58; foundation of Hetairie by, 
 57; at Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 77, 80, 
 86; dismissal of, 107. 
 Italy, 109-10, 136. 
 Iturbide, attempt of, to found Empire in 
 
 Mexico, 115-16. 
 Jacobinism, 3, 95; of Laharpe, 5; of Alex- 
 ander, 55. 
 Josika, Baron, cited, 55. 
 Joyneville, C, cited, 7. 
 Juntas, 61; revolt of South American, 58. 
 Kalisch, Treaty of, 12, 18, 21, 46. 
 Kichenev, 105. 
 Koslov, Russian Consul in the United 
 
 States, 53. 
 Kraft, tutor of Alexander, 4. 
 Kronstad, English expedition against, 9. 
 Krudener, Baroness de, influence of, on 
 
 Alexander, 32-3, 35, 38. 
 Laharpe, Frederick Cesar, 25, 47; tutor of 
 Alexander, 3 et seq., 32; dismissal of, 
 5; return as adviser, 8; cited, 39. 
 Landskoi, Count, 3. 
 Lansing, Robert, cited, 25. 
 La Rothiere, French defeat at, 19. 
 Laybach, Congress at, 101; effect on 
 
 English policy of Congress at, 108. 
 League of Nations, proposed by Alexander, 
 
 13-4. 
 League of Neutrals, 9-10. 
 League of Sovereigns, 38-9; policy of, 108. 
 League to Suppress Piracy, 82. 
 
 Leipzig, Battle of Nations at, 19-20. 
 Leopold, of Saxe-Coburg, 128. 
 Lewis and Clarke Expedition, 124. 
 Liberalism; opposition to Holy Alliance, 
 41-2; of Alexander, 55; in Germany, 96; 
 in Spanish colonies, 97; in Piedmont, 104. 
 
 Lieven, Count, Russian Ambassador in 
 London, 40-1, 50, 62-3. 
 
 Liverpool, Lord, reactionary tendencies of, 
 120. 
 
 Londonderry, Marquis of, 108. 
 
 Louisa Augusta, Princess (Empress Eliza- 
 beth), 4. 
 
 Luxembourg, Prussian occupation of, 27. 
 
 McMaster, John B., cited, 92, 125. 
 
 Mahmoud, Sultan; opinion of Holy Alli- 
 ance, 57; atrocities of, against Russians, 
 106. 
 
 Maistre, Joseph de, cited, 40. 
 
 Martens, Georg F. de, cited, 9, 19-20, 23, 
 28, 31, 55, 73. 
 
 Masson, tutor of Alexander, 4. 
 
 Mataxis, Andrew, 110. 
 
 Mediation: plan of Ferdinand for, 75 et 
 seq., 83 et seq.; Russian plan of, 79. 
 
 Metternich, 20, 29, 82; criticism of Alex- 
 ander, 2, 55-6; cited, 25, 32, 37-8; 
 at Congress of Vienna, 25 et seq.; at 
 Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 83; action 
 against Sects and Jacobinism, 95-6; at 
 Troppau Congress, 99; at Laybach 
 Congress, 102-3; at second Vienna Con- 
 gress, 107; at Verona Congress, 109-10. 
 
 Mexico, attempt to found Empire in, 
 115-16. 
 
 Middleton, American Minister to Russia, 
 123-24. 
 
 Mikhailowitch, Grand Due Nicolas, cited, 
 4, 22, 26, 30, 41, 104, 130. 
 
 Monroe, President, 50, 71, 126. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, 1, 113, 122. 
 
 Montmiriel, French victory at, 19. 
 
 Montmorency, 113. 
 
 Moore, John Bassett, cited, 60, 93. 
 
 Moscow, burning of, 18. 
 
 Muraviev, tutor of Alexander, 4. 
 
 Naples, Kingdom of, 102; activities of 
 Sects in, 135. 
 
 Napoleon, 11; Tsar Paul's alliance with, 8; 
 Alexander's opposition to, 16-7; in- 
 vasion of Russia by, 18; abdication of, 22, 
 33; return from Elba, 27, 32. 
 
146 
 
 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 
 
 Nelson, English Admiral, 9. 
 
 Nesselrode, Comte de, cited, 46, 66, 77, 88. 
 
 "New Order," theory of self-determination, 
 
 12-3. 
 Non-colonization, principle of, 124—25. 
 Non-intercourse act, 46. 
 Novosiltzov, unofficial adviser of Alexander, 
 
 8; Instructions to, 9, 11 et seq., 26, 29, 32, 
 
 67, 104. 
 Orders in Council, 46. 
 Pallas, tutor of Alexander, 4. 
 Palmella, Count, Portuguese envoy to 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 81. 
 Paris, 3, 55; First Treaty of, 2, 21 et seq.; 
 
 Second, 28. 
 Parker, Hyde, English Admiral, 9-10. 
 Pasquier, Chancelier du, cited, 30, 32, 41, 
 
 71-2, 74, 76, 97 et seq. 
 Paul, Tsar, father of Alexander, 3; assassi- 
 nation of, 7-8; alliance with Napoleon, 8. 
 Pavlovsk, 4. 
 
 Pensacola, capture of, 64. 
 Peru, independence of, 121. 
 Phillips, Walter Alison, cited, 11, 20, 22, 
 
 28, 72. 
 Piedmont, revolution in, 104. 
 Pinkney, United States Minister to Russia, 
 
 49, 63. 
 Pitt, William, 57; reply to Novosiltzov, 12, 
 
 15-6; promise to support Russia and 
 
 Prussia, 18. 
 Pizarro, M., Spanish Minister of Affairs, 
 
 65. 
 Poland: proposed restoration of, 21, 26, 29; 
 
 Alexander's policy in, 56. 
 Poletica, Chevalier, successor to Dashkov, 
 
 53, 80; efforts to join United States to 
 
 Holy Alliance, 85 et seq., 91 et seq. 
 Polignac, Prince, French Ambassador, 
 
 statement of French demands, 118 et seq. 
 Polovstov, cited, 64 et seq., 78. 
 Port Mahon, proposed cession to Russia of, 
 
 58. 
 Portugal, 109; participation in Treaty of 
 
 Paris, 23; proposed military measures 
 
 against, 64; revolution in, 98; activities of 
 
 Sects in, 135. 
 Powers of the North, Congress of, 10. 
 Pradt, Abbe de, cited, 84. 
 Prussia, 1, 97, 136; participation in Con- 
 gress of Powers of the North, 10; recog- 
 
 nition of Napoleon, 11; party to Treaty 
 of Reichenbach, 18; formation of federal 
 union in, 21; occupation of Luxembourg, 
 27; opposed to international congresses, 
 72; Liberalism in, 96. 
 
 Rain, Pierre, cited, 3, 5, 18, 24, 28 et seq., 
 106, 114, 130. 
 
 Rambouillet Decree, 46. 
 
 Reddaway, William F., cited, 121. 
 
 Reichenbach, Treaty of, 2, 18-9. 
 
 Revolutions, 7; in Sicily and Spain, 97-8; 
 in Portugal, 98; in Piedmont, 104. 
 
 Richardson, James D., cited, 125-26. 
 
 Richelieu, Duke, of 51; French Minister at 
 Vienna Congress, 28, 61; at Aix-la- 
 Chapelle Congress, 72 et seq. 
 
 Riego, leader of uprising in Spain, 97; 
 execution of, 115. 
 
 Rivadavia, representative of junta of 
 Buenos Aires, 88. 
 
 Ross, British attache, 7. 
 
 Rousseau, 3. 
 
 Rufo, Chevalier de, representative of 
 Naples, 102. 
 
 Rush, Richard, American Ambassador to 
 Great Britain; cited, 88; negotiations 
 with Canning regarding colonies, 116 et 
 seq., 125. 
 
 St. Mark, capture of, 64. 
 
 Samborski, Father Andrew, religious tutor 
 of Alexander, 4. 
 
 Sardinia, proposed reestablishment of 
 Kingdom of, 12-3; acceptance of Holy 
 Alliance by, 47. 
 
 Saxony, acceptance of Holy Alliance by, 47. 
 
 Schnitzler, J. H., cited, 40. 
 
 Schuyler, Eugene, cited, 57. 
 
 Schwartzenberg, Austrian military com- 
 mander, 19. 
 
 Sects, revolutionary societies, 56, 95, 131, 
 135-36. 
 
 Serbia, 57. 
 
 Shepherd, William R., cited, 58. 
 
 Sicily, revolution in, 98. 
 
 Slave trade: move to abolish, 81, 93; dis- 
 cussed at Verona Congress, 109. 
 
 Sorel, Albert, cited, 11-2, 16-7, 19-20, 23^1. 
 
 Spain, 136; restored to Bourbons, 21; party 
 to Treaty of Paris, 23; Alexander's 
 policy toward, 56; as an American power, 
 59; mediation with colonies, 75 et seg.; 
 
INDEX 
 
 147 
 
 barred from Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 
 76; treaty with the United States, 92; 
 Liberalism and revolution in, 97-8; pro- 
 posed invasion by France, 113-14; ac- 
 tivities of Sects in, 135. 
 
 Speranski, Governor of Siberia, 35, 123. 
 
 Stapleton, Augustus G., cited, 98, 108-9, 
 116 et seq. 
 
 Stein, Prussian Liberal Minister, 56. 
 
 Stewart, Lord, representative of Great 
 Britain at Troppau Congress, 98. 
 
 Strangford, Lord, British Ambassador at 
 Constantinople, 107. 
 
 Stroganov, Count, 6; unofficial adviser of 
 Alexander, 8; Russian Ambassador to 
 Turkey, 105-6; dismissal of, 107. 
 
 Stuart, Sir Charles, 65. 
 
 Subsidies, advanced by Great Britain, 
 18, 20. 
 
 Sweden: at Congress of Powers of the 
 North, 10; party to Treaty of Paris, 23. 
 
 Switzerland, 7-8; as an independent state, 
 21 ; acceptance of Holy Alliance by, 47. 
 
 System of 1815, 2, 28, 39, 83, 97. 
 
 Talleyrand: interview with Alexander, 17; 
 cited, 20, 22 et seq.; formula of "legiti- 
 macy" of, 26; dismissal of, 27-8. 
 
 TatistchefF, Serge, cited, 12, 16; Russian 
 Ambassador to Spain, 58, 64, 66; sale 
 of ships to Spain by, 63; envoy to second 
 Vienna Congress, 107. 
 
 Third Coalition, 15; defeat of, 16. 
 
 Tilsit, alliance of, 16-17. 
 
 Toeplitz, Treaty of, 2, 19, 46, 96. 
 
 Tolstoy, Grand Marshal Count, 24. 
 
 Treaties: of Concert, 16; of Alliance, 28, 
 55, 64. See also individual headings. 
 
 Troppau, Congress at, 98 et seq., 135 et 
 seq.; effect of Congress of, on English 
 policy, 108. 
 
 Tucuman, Congress of, 61. 
 
 Turkey: Alexander's policy toward, 57; 
 oppression of Greeks, 105 et seq., 126 
 et seq. 
 
 Tuyll, Baron de, Russian Minister to the 
 United States: instructions to, 51-2; 
 
 negotiations of, regarding colonization, 
 124. 
 
 United States: foreign policy of, 1; war with 
 Great Britain, 26, 93; attempt to draw, 
 into European affairs, 44-5; attitude 
 toward Holy Alliance, 45 et seq., 84 et 
 seq., 104; Era of Good Feeling in, 50; 
 effort to bring, into Holy Alliance, 58, 
 78-9, 94; invasion of Florida, 64; in- 
 fluence of, on European affairs, 67; 
 proposed to membership in International 
 Maritime Police, 81-2; diplomatic policy 
 of, 84 et seq.; Treaty with Spain, 92. 
 
 Vandal, Albert, cited, 16-7. 
 
 Venezuela: political and commercial con- 
 cessions granted to, 78; independence of, 
 121. 
 
 Verona, Congress of, 34, 108 et seq. 
 
 Vertus, 37; review of Russian Army at, 30, 
 40. 
 
 Vienna, Congress of, 2, 23 et seq., 45, 57, 59, 
 71; second Congress of, 107. 
 
 Villanueva, C. A. de, cited, 60-1, 116. 
 
 Villele, 113-14, 127. 
 
 Voltaire, 3. 
 
 Vorontzov, Russian Ambassador to Great 
 Britain, 9. 
 
 Waliszewski, K., cited, 7. 
 
 Warsaw, Grand Duchy of, proposed union 
 with Russia, 25. 
 
 Washington, Treaty of, 92-3. 
 Waterloo, campaign of, 27, 30. 
 Wellington, Duke of, 64-5; opposition to 
 
 Allied General Staff, 74; envoy to second 
 
 Vienna Congress, 109, 111; reactionary 
 
 tendencies of, 120. 
 Westphalia, Treaty of, 14. 
 World War, 1. 
 Wurttemberg, Kingdom of, 97; acceptance 
 
 of Holy Alliance, 47. 
 Young Liberal Circle, object of, 6; return to 
 
 St. Petersburg of, 8. 
 Ypsilanti, Alexander, leader of Greek 
 
 revolution, 105. 
 
iOHVj 
 
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