E U R O P AT WAR GRKATFST WAR Ol IIISIORY PVith more than zoo illustrations WHY AND HOW FUROPF WENT TO I lEN, GUNS, FOR 1 . Mi .AND AIRCRAR Ol IMF WAR- RING COUNTRIF^ <)On SUPPLY, FIN m: KAISER a: i 1 IFR GREAT PERSONALITIES- STORIES OF ALSA( i LOR- RAINE. KIAU-GHAU, KIEL CANAL- MAPS -EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE UNITED Si AThS. iUO BIG PAGto 200 MAGNIFICENT PHOTOGRAPHS 75 SUBJECTS COMFLh i L iviAr.> ^^v^ EUROPE AT WAR >. UBBBVIVfi ^_ 5^- SWITZERLAND I THE ADVANCE OF THE GERMAN FORCES INTO FRANCE The curved arrows show the general direction of the march of the German armies and the points where hostile country was entered. The heavy black line shows the high-water mark reached by the German forces, before their retreat began. The Kaiser's forces are, in order from west to east: i, Gen. von Kluck's army; 2, Gen von Billow's army; 3, Gen. von Hausen's army; 4, army under Grand Duke Albrecht of Wurtemburg; 5, Crown Prince Wilhelm's army; 6, army under Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria; 7, Gen. von Heeringen's army. EUROPE AT WAR A ''Red Book'' of the Greatest War of History WHY AND HOW EUROPE WENT TO BATTLE — MEN GUNS, FORTS, SHIPS, AND AIRCRAFT OF THE WAR- ' RING COUNTRIES — FOOD SUPPLY, FINANCES — THE KAISER AND OTHER GREAT PER- SONALITIES—STORIES OF ALSACE- LORRAINE, KIAU-CHAU, KIEL CANAL — MAPS — EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES With more than 200 illustrations PUBLISHED BY DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY FOR THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS COMPANY 1914 ^5^^ <« Copyright, 1914, by DOUBLEDAY, PaGE & CoMPANY OCT 23 1914 ©C1.A3S8247 F o Page CONTENTS Europe at War Introductory Survey By Albert Shaw 3 Mainsprings and Backgrounds of the Struggle .... By Louis E. Van Norman 12 Why the Nations Fight By Albert Bushnell Hart 17 Teuton vs. Slav By William Milligan Sloane 30 The Two Germanys By Oswald Garrison Villard 36 Germany's Fight for Power By Frederick C. Penfield 39 How THE Nations are Lined up 46 The Armies and Navies of Europe The Armies of Europe By Frederic Louis Huidekopcr 47 The Navies of the Great Powers at War 57 How Europe Takes the Field: Mobilization By T. Lothrop Stoddard Si The Land and Naval Forces at War 88 The Air Fleets 89 The Resources and Staying Powers of the Nations Europe's Food Supply in War Time By James Middleton 91 Europe's Financial Preparation . By Charles F. Speare 95 Financial Statistics 99 Personages in the War The Kaiser — a Self-drawTi Portrait 100 The Kaiser and the Mailed Fist 117 Other Personages 121 Royal Relatives of Europe By George H. Merritt 132 Places Important to German Strategy Kiao Chau: Why Japan Went to War with Germany . . . By Dr. T. lyenaga 138 The Story of Alsace-Lorraine 144 The Kiel Canal and Its Signiiicance 145 The German Colonies 146 The United States as Affected by the War The Effect on the United States By Frederick Carter 164 Our Rights and Duties as a Neutral By Charles Cheney Hyde 167 American Finances By Charles A. Conant 170 War and Our Ocean Trade By Winthrop L. Marvin 174 A Chance for American Shipping By Sylvester Thompson 179 CONTENTS The Commissariat — the Red Cross — The Hague Court Caring for the Soldier's Health 183 The Red Cross By Arm Dosch 188 The World's Court of Arbitration at The Hague 191 The Onlooking World The Last of the War Correspondent 193 The Socialist Explanation By Joshua Wanhope 194 The Documents in the Case The British "White Paper" 215 The German "White Paper" 251 A New British "White Paper" 258 "How the Franco-German Conflict Could Have Been Avoided" 275 Miscellaneous Views Probable Causes of the European War By Dr. Charles W. Eliot 277 The European Debacle By Herman Ridder 280 A Vision of Armageddon By H. G. Wells 282 Give Germany Fair Play By Hugo Miinskrberg 284 Annotated List of Helpful Books 286 Index 291 ILLUSTRATIONS WORLD BATTLES BEING FOUGHT AGAIN PAGE The Bavarians Before Paris, 1870 . . 19 "The Conquerors," by Pierre Fritel . . 20 The Death of Nelson 21 The Retreat from Waterloo 22 Koniggratz 23 The Defense of Champigny .... 24 The Fatal Charge of the French at Reichs- hoSen 25 ■'The Piece in Danger" 26 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE French Troops off for the German Border French Algerian Troops (Turcos) French Infantry MobOizing French Soldiers Resting . Field Guns of French Artillery French Infantry in Action . English Field Baggage Train British Cavalry .... British Field Artillery . . The Coldstream Guards . English Infantry .... German Infantry in the Field "An Army That Runs Like Clockwork" German Cavalrymen Armed with Lances News Gatherers for the General Staff German Artillery in Action "A Caravan Loaded with Death" German OflGicers Mining a Bridge . German Sappers Setting Torpedoes The German Emperor on the Field Conscription in Russia .... Russian Cavalry on the March "The Bear That Walks Like a Man' Russian Field Artillery . Russian Sappers .... Belgian Chasseurs at Louvain Belgian Troops in Liege Types of Austrian OflScers . Austrian Cavalry .... Austrian Mountain Artillery Italian Infantry Crossing a Dangerous Pass 59 60 60 60 61 61 62 62 62 63 63 64 65 66 66 67 67 68 68 68 69 69 70 70 70 71 71 72 72 73 73 PAGE New Equipment of the Austrian Infantry 73 Montenegrin Troops 74 Servian Guns on the March .... 74 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE Britain's Stronghold in Asia: Hong-Kong 107 Gibraltar, The Key to the Mediterranean 107 "The Mastery of the Seas" .... 108 The Mollke, A German Dreadnought . . 108 The British Home Fleet 109 One of France's Big Battleships: The Dreadnought Coubert 109 British Coast Guard Manoeuvres . . . no Closing a Port to Foreign Warships . . no Night View of the British Home Fleet . . in Armored Train for Defence of English Coast in The German Fleet 112 German Submarines in Port at Wilhelms- hafen 113 Flotilla of German Destroyers . . . 113 Germany's Foes on the Water .... 114 An Airship on a Sea Ship 114 THE KAISER Portrait of the Kaiser 147 One Year Old 148 Eight Years Old 148 Ten Years Old 148 Fourteen Years Old 148 At Twenty 149 At Twenty-Two 149 In His Coronation Year, 1888 .... 149 After Four Years of Rule 149 For Ten Years, "The Kaiser" . . . 149 In Summer Garb at Corfu 15a With the Duke of Connaught . . . 150 With the Kaiserin 150 The Sea Lord 150 With King George of England . . . . 151 With King Albert of Belgium . . . . 151 With the Czar 151 Three Kaisers and the Crown Prince . 152 Three Generations 152 ILLUSTRATIONS The Kaiser and His Six Sons .... The Crown Prince The Kaiser's Daughter The Kaiser and the Kaiserm .... As a Highlander As Frederick the Great Out of Uniform In Undress Uniform The Bag The Withered Arm Stolzenfels Imperial Palace in Berlin Throne Room in Berlin Italian Palace in Corfu Hoch! der Kaiser The Kaiser with His Generals .... The Kaiser and Colonel Roosevelt The Kaiser, King Edward VII, and King Alphonso The Kaiser Greeting Franz Joseph . . The Kaiser at a Review Dropping the Pilot The New Pilot A Sermon on the Hohenzollern ... "Our Future is on the Sea" . . . . A Recent Picture The Kaiser with His Chief of Stall . . The Kaiser in Uhlan Uniform . . . . The Kaiser in Hunting Costume . PERSONAGES PAGE 152 153 153 153 154 154 154 154 iSS 155 156 156 156 156 157 157 158 158 159 159 160 160 160 160 161 161 162 162 19s Prime Minister Pashitch of Servia General Putnik, Chief of the Servian Gen- eral Staff 19s King Peter of Servia igS Kaiser William II of Germany. . . . 196 The " Iron Chancellor " and the Kaiser . . 197 General Field Marshal Von der Goltz . 197 Admiral Von Tirpitz, Chief of the German Admiralty 198 The Imperial Chancellor, Von Bethmann- Hollweg . 198 General Von Moltke, Chief of Staff . . 19S Minister of War, General Von Falkenhayn 198 Emperor Francis Joseph 199 Count Berchtold, Austrian Premier . . 200 Count Von Hotzendorf, Head of Austrian Army 200 Archduke Charles Francis, Heir to Austrian Throne 200 Emperor Francis Joseph and the Murdered Archduke, Francis Ferdinand . . . 201 The Arrest of the Assassin in Serajevo . . 201 General Joffre, Commander of the French Armies 202 M. Delcasse, Father of the Entente Cordiale 202 Premier Viviani of France 202 M. Raymond Poincare, President of France 203 Sir Edward Grey and Premier Ascjuith . . 204 Earl Kitchener and Sir John D. P. French 205 The Directors of England's Destiny at Sea 206 An Unnatural Alliance — The Czar and King George V 207 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador to Germany . 208 Grand Duke Nikolas Nikolaivitch . . 208 General Sukhomlinoff 209 The Czar and President Poincare . . . 209 The King of "The Cockpit of Europe" . 210 The Marquis of San GiuUano and Victor Emmanuel III 210 WAR NEWS PICTURES Germans in the Trenches 227 Belgians in Open Order 227 German Motor Battery 228 Off for the Front 228 In Camp in Brussels 228 German Transport Wagons 228 German Infantry Entering Brussels . . 22S Effect of Zeppelin Bombs Dropped Into the Streets of Antwerp 229 Belgians Awaiting Uhlans 230 A Fighting Belgian 230 General Leman, Defender of Liege . . 230 Defenders of Liege, Resting .... 230 The Result of German Fire .... 231 Belgians Burning Cottages 231 Belgian People Fleeing from Louvain . 231 The Women Left Behind 232 Tj-pes of Soldiers Fightmg Under the French Flag 233 British Light Infantry 234 Prince of Wales With His Regiment . . . 234 British Troops Commandeering Horses 234 King George Inspecting the Veterans . 235 Britain's Call to Arms 235 British Highlanders Landing at Boulogne 235 Russian Reservists 236 Czar Sampling Soldiers' Food .... 236 ILLUSTRATIONS Russian Artillery on the Way to the Front 236 Singing and Shouting Crowds in Brussels and Belgrade 237 Railway Destroyed by Belgians . . . 238 Reaping Grain and Digging Trenches in Belgium 23S Sortie by Belgian Cavalry 238 Brussels Women Waiting for Weekly Al- lowance 239 Women and Children Waiting Money Al- lowed by French Government . . . 239 Defenders of Liege 240 The French in Action 240 French Army in Camp 240 Belgian Battery on the March . . . 240 Wounded German Cared for by Belgians 241 American Red Cross Nurses . . . .241 Germans Carrying Wounded .... 241 The Florence Nightingale of Servia . . 241 French Water Supply Motors .... 242 British Maxim Gun 242 Belgian Light Artillery 242 FORTIFICATIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS French Field Telegraph 259 English Field Telephone 259 Belgian Armored Automobile .... 260 French Automobile Artillery Train . . 260 Transporting Artillery Across a Stream 260 English, French, and German Dirigibles 261 Armored Biplane with Rapid-Fire Gun . 262 Bomb Dropping Apparatus on Aeroplane . 262 Armored Monoplane with Rapid-Fire Gun 262 Cities in the Thick of War; Belgrade, Namur, Antwerp 263 King Albert of Belgium 264 Brussels 264 Count Okuma, Premier of Japan . . . 265 Count Oka, Japan's War JNIinister . . 265 Vice-Admiral Kuroi, Commanding Japan- ese Home Fleet 265 Japanese Cruiser "Kongo" 265 Kiao-Chau 265 Servian Soldiers, the Finished Product . 266 The Stuff the Servian Army is Made of 266 Servians in the Trenches 266 French Armored Train 267 French Cavalry Soldier 267 French ArtLUery 267 French Infantry on the March. . . . 267 German Infantry on the March . . . 268 German Uhlans on Parade 268 German Infantry with Camp Kitchen . 268 French Monoplane in Flight .... 269 French Aeroplane Packed for Transport . 269 Russian Mounted Troops 270 Russian Troops, Resting 270 Russian Troops, Marching 270 A Russian Advance 271 Russian Artillery in Action 271 Why the Germans Went Through Bel- gium (Map) 272-3 Servian ArtDlery 274 Servians in Camp 274 EUROPE AT WAR EUROPE AT WAR AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY BY ALBERT SHAW NO LARGE bodies of men in any European country could have wished for war, any more than they could have wished to have their own cities or provinces swept by Asiatic cholera or devastated by earthquake, fire, or flood. They have been led into the war by the mismanagement of governments. It would not be just to say that the civil and military powers of the great countries of Europe have intentionally brought harm to their people. But they are not fitted for their responsibilities. Modern humanity demands appropriate public ideals in government policy and action. The real enemies of the European millions are not the peace-loving farmers and industrial workers of neighbor countries, but the false views and methods of their own governments and dominat- ing classes. It had been hoped by real statesmen, as well as by humanitarians, that such opportuni- ties for discussion as might be afforded by recur- ring peace conferences at The Hague would help to postpone the outbreak of a general war until means for fully averting it could be devised and agreed upon. But the situation for a number of years had been going steadily from bad to worse, until now the costly armaments that nations have built up with the supposed object of protecting them in their hour of need, have been brought into action for reasons that are indirect rather than obvious, and for causes and purposes that no two men can state exactly alike, because they are not definite. While this great war is without real provoca- tion or excuse, there are historical ex-planations of it that involve nearly everything that has happened in Europe for a hundred years. The immediate clash came in the Balkans, and was precipitated by Austria. A long train of evil consequences has followed upon the interference of the other European powers in the settlement of affairs between Russia and Turkey after the war of 1877, in which the Russians were victorious. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 was dominated by Prince Bismarck, representing the new Ger- man Empire; Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield), rep- resenting Great Britain; and Count Andrassy, representing Austria. The arrangements that Russia and Turkey had agreed upon in March, by the treaty of San Ste- fano, were far wiser than those imposed in June by the other powers. It was Austria that had taken the initiative in the calling of the Berlin Congress. Russia and Turkey had agreed upon a large Bul- garia and upon an enlarged and independent Servia. Austria wished to have as much as pos- sible of this Christian territory of Southeastern Europe kept under the nominal authority of Turkey, for two manifest reasons. First, Austria feared Russia's influence with the new countries of Servia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Roumania. Second, Austria wished to have as much as pos- sible of all this territory remain Turkish, in order that she herself might wait for future opportuni- ties to obtain parts if not the whole of it for herself. One of the articles of the agreement adopted by the Berlin Congress of 187S turned Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Austria for purposes of temporary occupation and management. While it is to be conceded that Austria managed Bosnia very well, no one can deny that her position in Bosnia was that of a trustee and not that of an owner. The people of Bosnia are very closely related by blood, language, and sympathy to those of Servia. Bosnia, also, lies between Servia and the sea. It was natural that the Servians should look forward to a future union with Bosnia, and to an outlet on the Adriatic. But after Rus- sia's humiliation and defeat at the hands of the Japanese, which had lessened her prestige in Europe, and after the successes of the Young Turks in reforming the government of their country and the prospect that they might demand the evacuation of Bosnia by Austria, the govern- ment at Vienna decided that the time had come to announce annexation. Accordingly, in October, 1908, the powers that had engaged in the Berlin treaty were informed by the Austrian Emperor that Austria had de- cided, for her own reasons, to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Servians were intensely embittered, because this stood in the way of their ambitions, for Servia was entirely landlocked. In the two recent Balkan wars, Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and EUROPE AT WAR Montenegro joined forces to drive the Turks out of Europe. Austria and others of the larger powers tried to prevent action but the little states made their notable fight. They had agreed in advance upon the division of the territory they had determined to win. But after they had con- quered the territory, the great powers, again led by Austria, interfered to deprive the victors of the fruits of their success. The Turkish province of Albania, on the Adriatic, was to have furnished Servia with a large part of her share. This would have compensated her in great measure for having been deprived of her Bosnian hopes. At Austria's instigation, the foohsh scheme was devised of creating an independent Albania with a German prince to rule over it. PROVOKING THE LAST BALKAN WAR The bitterness of the Servians knew no bounds. Both Servia and Greece demanded of Bulgaria that, in view of changed circumstances, she should give them portions of what had been originally assigned to her. Bulgaria stood on technical rights, and found herself at war with her recent allies, greatly to her loss and disadvantage. This second httle war of last year, in which the small Powers, amply entitled to the world's sympathy, were pitted harmfully against each other, was due to Austria's policy, which to many of us seems malign and wrong, while to the most charitable mind it must seem at least to have been mistaken and unwise. Although Servia almost doubled her area by gains to the southward, she remained a landlocked country, with Bosnia, Montenegro, and Albania stretching between her and the Adriatic Sea. In June came a crisis in the situation between Austria and Servia. The world realized that great events were likely to follow the assassination in Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the imperial throne of Austria- Hungary, who had gradually become actual joint ruler with the aged Emperor Franz Joseph (who was nearly eighty-four years old at the time of the death of the Archduke). The Archduke was murdered by a young Ser- vian fanatic. Austria, for reasons of her own, determined to hold the government and people of Servia responsible for the murder, and on July 23 an ultimatum was presented by the Vienna government to the government at Belgrade, with demand of immediate acceptance. The Servians acceded to most of the Austrian demands, but asked either further discussion or else arbitration on some points that could not be admitted with- out question. Austria made this Servian answer the pretext for an immediate declaration of war and a move upon Belgrade. There seems to be sufficient reason for stating the belief that Ger- many had been informed, both in general and in detail, of the Austrian demands, and had approved of them, although fully aware that this must mean a protest from Russia, which, if disregarded, would compel Russia to come to the aid of a small state with which her relations were close, and which she could not permit to be destroyed. CRIMES AGAINST THE BALKAN CHRISTIANS Thus it seems reasonable to hold that if there had been a decent respect for the commendable desire of the Christian peoples in European Tur- key to throw off the Turkish yoke and become self-governing states, there could have been no cause of the great war in so far as the Servian question precipitated it. If the great powers of Europe had been sincere and imselfish in their attitude toward the Balkan question, during the past two generations, there could have been developed a series of peaceful and progressive countries as harmless and non-military in their instincts as Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark. And the proper development of Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece would have been in every way advan- tageous to all the great powers of Europe and detrimental to the welfare of none. Out of this terrible war, therefore, let us earnestly hope there may come an adjustment of the affairs of South- eastern Europe that will be permanent and non- military. The imperial agglomeration of Austria- Hungary seems to serve no good purpose. A re- arrangement of provinces and regions, based largely upon race and language, might create in Southeastern Europe almost a dozen small countries of fixed territory, bound together in a league of peace and arbitration and of general friendship, but not forming a military factor for further aggressions. THE UNHEALED TROUBLE BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE A wise treatment of the Balkan problem would have averted the war. But it would not have HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ended the overweening curse of militarism, nor removed the distrust and fear upon which mih- tarism feeds and which it naturally promotes. The beginning of the end of European militarism should have come about with a good under- standing between Germany and France. Such an understanding would have been arrived at many years ago, if Germany had been wise enough to reopen the Alsace-Lorraine question in the spirit of generosity and at the same time of simple common sense. Everybody who is wise has known this; but pride and arrogance too often blind nations, even as they blind individuals, so that they miss the plain path of wisdom and safety. Almost twenty years ago (in the issue for De- cember, 1894), the Review of Reviews published a remarkable article entitled: "On the Threshold of Universal Peace — An American Answer to the Question How to Reconcile France and Germany." It discussed this topic of the "lost provinces." The article was printed anonymously, but it may be stated that the author was a native of Germany though a naturalized American citizen. A peace congress had been held at Antwerp in August, 1894, just twenty years before the begin- ning of the war. There was much enthusiasm. Germany and Russia had negotiated the very im- portant commercial treaty which after twenty years of growing value to Germany, — the Rus- sians in 1914 refused to extend. At that moment the young German Emperor had shown marked courtesies toward France, and these had met with appreciation. There had just been favorable action by the United States Senate and the British authorities on a treaty of arbitration. This conference, meeting on the neutral soil of Belgium, was in a hopeful mood, rightly expressed by the mayor of Antwerp, who declared: "Peace is in the hearts of all men in civilized countries." A number of proposals were made at the con- ference, having to do with reduction of term of military service, limitation of armaments, cur- tailment of war expenditure, and so on. The writer of the article in question, however, demon- strated brilliantly and convincingly that universal peace could at that time be assured only in one way, — namely, by an offer on the part of the German Emperor to rearrange the boundary line in Alsace-Lorraine in such a manner that the French-speaking communities should be ceded back to France. He declared, and with good reason, that such a proposal, if properly set before the German people, would have been accepted by them with enthusiasm. The details of the adjustment would naturally have been made by a joint commission. Both sides could have afforded to be wholly gener- ous in such details, because the large point to be gained, — that of permanent good-will between two great nations, — was of incomparable impor- tance, while the mere details of the boundary line were in themselves of little significance. Assuredly, a settlement of this question would have made it possible and reasonable to dismantle every fortification along the frontier between France and Germany, and to enter upon a permanent arbitration treaty, such as England and the United States were at that time negotiat- ing. At the time of this Antwerp peace confer- ence, Germany had held the conquered strip of territory about twenty-three years. Twenty years more have elapsed since then. If anything, the French sentiment has grown stronger rather than weaker in the French part of Alsace-Lorraine, and the whole French nation has unitedly, and without wavering, clung to the purpose at some time to rectify that frontier. It is said that Bismarck never desired to annex more than the parts that were German-speaking. But the German generals desired Metz for what they called strategic purposes. Unfortunately, professional soldiers never seem to understand that in the permanent sense friendship is the only strategical system that can be supported. The settlement of this vexed question some years ago would have redounded to the fame, glory, security, and prosperity of modern Germany. It would have made friends of Germany and France, would have promoted all the finer things of industry, commerce, art, science, and culture, and would have made military alliances unnecessary. France could have disarmed in large measure; and the sentiment of western and middle Europe could have laid down the law to Russia and Aus- tria in regard to the right settlement of the pro- blems of southeastern Europe. It is needless to expatiate at great length upon what might have been. Yet it must be said that there have been many occasions, since the favorable moment of 1894, when Germany might have taken up this question with France in an open-minded way, and so adjusted it as to save the peace of Europe EUROPE AT WAR for generations to come. In neglecting it, Ger- many has chiefly wronged herself. WHAT GERMANY HAS HAD TO ENDURE The cost of maintaining the feud over Alsace- Lorraine has been almost unbearable for both countries. It has been greatly to the credit of Germany that, with all this economic and moral burden of militarism, she has made such notable progress in the arts of peace during the period since the formation of the present empire, after the victory over France. In spite of a large migra- tion of German people to the United States and other countries, the home population has steadily increased, until it is now 65,000,000, whereas it was about 40,000,000 at the time of the Franco- Prussian War. France at that time had about the same population, and it has remained virtually at a standstill. The condition of the plain German people has much improved. They are better educated and have better opportunities to make a living. From having little manufacturing, Ger- many has developed vast industries, based largely upon superior scientific and technical training. The cities and towns are beautiful and well gov- erned. Through public savings-banks, and careful systems for giving aid to the sick and the poor, and for pensioning the injured and the aged, Germany has led the world in deaHng with the problem of caring for all the people in our new industrial age. Science and philosophy, literature and art, have flourished in Germany, even as industry and com- merce have made giant strides. All honor to German brains and effort. It is possible, however to draw a clear distinc- tion between imperial and military Germany, on the one hand, and the Germany of science and in- dustry on the other. America has much in com- mon with the great German nation, but has little in common with the military caste and the im- perial attitude. The German peasant is doubt- less in many ways improved by the training of his compulsory two years of service (beginning at the age of twenty). But he goes back to spend his life as a peaceable citizen and worker, though he remains for years afterward a member of the reserves. THE MILITARY CASTE It is not this universal training to defend the country that creates German militarism. It is the enormous body of officers, with whom the army is a life profession, and whose ideals and attitude toward the nation are not those that are in keeping with the intelligent aims of human so- ciety in the twentieth century. These officers constitute a military caste that is associated with the surviving institutions of autocracy and feudalism that have come down from bygone centuries. The profession of a trained soldier is not dishonorable; and if men are to be led there must be those prepared to command. But it is a calamity when civil society is so overridden by the insolence of a military guild as that of Germany has been for a long time past. If Germany and France could have settled their differences, and become firm friends, both countries could have proceeded rapidly to throw off the incubus of this offensive and evil militarism. DID GERMANY INTEND THIS WAR? It may be a long time before we shall know, as a matter of historical certainty, whether or not Ger- many brought on the war at this time with definite purpose and intention. We once supposed that Louis Napoleon, rather than Bismarck, brought on the war of 1870. It seems incredible that the German Emperor and those in his councils had deliberately sought war rather than peace. But the minds of men often become obsessed through the constant dwelling upon a subject of fear or dread, with the element of suspense involved. The strain between Germany and Russia had been growing greater for a good while. The Ger- man authorities had felt that a war with Russia was inevitable at some time. The assassination of a great Teutonic monarch (for the Austrian Archduke was virtually a sharer of the throne) seemed to create an occasion that gave Germany the opportunity to fight, without having herself directly precipitated the conflict. Austria's at- tack upon Servia was sure to involve Russia. Germany was bound by her alliance to come to Austria's aid. This, the Germans thought, would of necessity bring Italy into the combat as the third member of the Triple Alliance. For Ger- many seemed to suppose that the world would regard her action as defensive, in view of Russia's alleged movements of aggression. Italy's unforeseen halt Italy, however, refused to take this view, and declined to aid Austria in an aggressive Balkan HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT campaign, regarding herself as justified in re- maining neutral under the terms of the alliance. The truth, of course, is that Italy had never been very happy in this association, and had gone into it through a supposed necessity that, if it ever really existed has now for some time been outlived. Italy, as a purely Mediterranean power, has no sympathy with Austria's ambition, and has every need of being on good terms with England and France, which are the great naval powers of the Mediterranean, and which could readily destroy Italy in the maritime sense. Thus Germany mis- calculated as respects Italian cooperation. It is well known that Germany made overtures to England, and did not suppose that the British Government would be drawn into the conflict. But for a number of years the interests of Great Britain and France have been harmonious, and the good understanding had developed into some- thing like a Hmited alliance. England might, in- deed, have kept out of the war on certain condi- tions. One of these conditions was the promise not to attack the coasts of France that lie near England. Germany was prepared to respect this demand. Without consulting England, however, Germany proceeded with a plan to invade France by way of Belgium. As long ago as 1S31 the sta- tus of Belgium was fixed in an international con- ference which resulted in the guaranteeing of that country's independence and neutrality. Germany's violation of Belgium's position was not only wicked and ruthless, but it was an act of blind folly. The German Government seems to have supposed that a Liberal government in England, with the Ulster question on its hands, could not be provoked to join in a European war. But there are qualities in British character with which it is dangerous to trifle. Under the lead of the Premier, Mr. Asquith, and the Foreign Secre- tary, Sir Edward Grey, England notified Ger- many that she must cease to violate Belgian neutrality. Germany would not yield, and Eng- land declared war. Belgium's position and rights Germany had nothing to gain by choosing the Belgian route that could have compensated her for the attack of the great British navy upon her maritime resources. Nor was there anything in the German excuse that France would have marched across Belgium if Germany had ab- stained. The wickedness of Germany's action lay in the fact that her movement into Belgium, even if acquiesced in by the Belgian Government, would have necessitated a corresponding move- ment from the French side, thus making Belgium the theatre of war between two great powers. Nor was Germany well advised in supposing the Belgians could not or would not resist. The heroic resistance of the Belgians, even though un- equal and only temporarily successful, added one more to the list of Germany's enemies and gained time for the allies. Germany's plan had been to move very swiftly and strike at Paris before Rus- sia's slow-moving forces could be brought into action on Germany's eastern frontier. AMERICA AND THE GERMANS The Franco-Prussian War occurred only five years after the colossal struggle between our American sections had come to an end. Within a few years preceding our war we had received an enormous influx of new population from Ger- many. Many of these immigrants had received military training before they came. Immigration at that time did not enter the South, and these newcomers were all in the North, St. Louis being the farthest point southward to which they had gone in considerable numbers. Many Germans entered the United States armies and fought valiantly. The head of the French Government in that period was the Emperor Louis Napoleon, who was not well disposed toward the United States, who had been ready to join other powers in thwarting us, and whose conduct in Mexico was regarded as adverse to our interests. When, therefore, the war came on between France and Prussia, opinion upon the whole re- garded Napoleon as the aggressor, and sym- pathized with the Germans. Our Government was correct in its neutrality, but popular sym- pathy was unmistakable in its trend. We have since that time received many more people from Germany. Our total population at the time of the Franco-Prussian War was less than 40,000,000. It is now 100,000,000. Considerably more than a third of our population is made up of people themselves born in Europe or of European-born parentage. And fully twenty-five per cent, of all these people are of German origin. Next come the Irish, who are only about half as many as the Germans. We are using the classification of the 8, EUROPE AT WAR United States census, which goes back no farther than the parents in its reckoning of foreign stocks and elements. These people from Germany are now our Ameri- can fellow-citizens. Hundreds of thousands of them, if not milhons, have friends or relatives in the old country directly affected by the present terrible war. They are loyal to the United States, but their feelings are deeply affected. Very many of them beheve that the German Emperor and those in authority have made a great mistake. It is not for us Americans to argue with any of our fellow-citizens of foreign origin whose senti- ments are profoundly agitated. On theother hand, it is incumbent upon them, as adopted American citizens, to put restraint upon their words and acts, and to respect American neutrality. Ger- many is so great and noble a country that its future eminence in the civilized world is assured in any case. AMERICAN DOCTRINES NOT OUTWORN It is time, however, for all Americans to have a new baptism of faith in the old American creed of liberty and popular self-government. Until re- cently it was not the fashion in this country to approve of the institutions of royalty or of priv- ileged aristocracy. But along with the growth of great fortunes in America there has been evolved a kind of snobbery that has sadJy infected some American men and a great number of American women. There has been a shameless and dis- graceful readiness to transfer American women plus money to the support of titles and hereditary privilege in Europe. The greatest and best things of England, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy have been won in spite of the heavy handicap of aristocracy and privilege in association with the military caste. The evils of aristocratic systems must not be ignored merely because many in- dividual members of the aristocracy are virtuous, cultured, and worthy members of society. Even the German Emperor, despite his medieval fana- ticism and assertion of divine authority, is a most interesting and attractive figure in his great versatility; and he stands out unquestionably, in American opinion, as the most popular of all hereditary rulers. But the systems that he represents do not make for the welfare of modem peoples, nor for their security and peace. WESTERN LIBERALISM The French are safer as a republic than they were as an empire, and they would be still safer if neighboring peoples were also self-governing. If there are "two Germanys," there are also two Englands, and the struggle between them has been almost continuous for many centuries. It had begun long before Cromwell's time, and it has had intense manifestations in our own day. The fight that has taken away from the House of Lords a great part of its power has been a chapter in this long conflict. The attempt to make taxation just, as against the landed proprietors, is another chap- ter. The Irish struggle for Home Rule grew funda- mentally out of the evils of landlordism and aris- tocracy, and the recent defiance of Ulster, how- ever locally sincere, found its real strength in the age-long war of the British classes against the masses. The liberalizing of British institutions has, how- ever, gone very far; and the people have ample leverage to carry it farther if they so ordain. Germany's lack of political equality and freedom has not much interfered with social progress and efficiency in many directions; but the time has come for political freedom in Germany, and this war will advance that great cause. There are in- dications, also, that out of the necessities of the situation there may come about in Russia a series of reforms which the whole civilized world would rejoice to see. Out of one period of struggle came the emancipation of the Russian serfs. Out of another came the Duma and the beginning of parliamentary government. Now has come the announcement that Russia means to give Poland a large measure of freedom, and this must be fol- lowed by the restoration to Finland of the liberties recently crushed out. It is hoped also that there will follow a complete reform, on Russia's part, in the treatment of her great body of Jewish people; and beyond that there must be a new kind of free- dom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of coming and going, of domicile, and of personality. The Government and the people of the United States desire to maintain cordial and good rela- tions with all the countries unfortunately involved in the great war. President Wilson's statements and proclamations have been admirable in spirit and in phrase. Our Government was prompt in offering its services in the cause of mediation and HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT peace. Our diplomatic service has been extended in the capitals of belligerents to the guardianship of the interests of nations whose own representa- tives have been obliged to wthdraw. Americans visit Europe in such vast numbers every year that it is not strange that the sudden outbreak of almost universal war should have caused much embarrassment and some hardship. In view of the magnitude of the crisis, these American tourists have fared well at the hands of all governments and peoples. WILL THE WAS BE LONG OR SHORT It is probably true that the German leaders expected to find American sympathy definitely on their side. But America wishes peace and har- mony, and most Americans believe that the checkmating of Germany would be the quickest and most efficacious way to bring about a lasting peace. Americans feel that England's mainte- nance of Belgian neutrahty was necessary and right. Small powers and homogeneous race elements must be strengthened. German diplo- macy seems to have been greatly at fault, while that of England seems to have been more just and praiseworthy. Everyone is asking whether the war will be short or long. It is to be devoutly hoped that it will be brief; but it has borne little likeness to an old-fashioned war of concentrated pitched battles, and its duration might be long. The superiority on the sea of England and the allies will at once have paralyzed German com- merce. Germany's colonial empire will be at the mercy of her enemies. Belgium's resistance has shown how even a small power can fight on the defensive. It would seem hardly possible now for the armies of one great European power easily to reach the capital of another. The more quickly mediation and an armistice can be brought into effect, the better it will be for the peoples of all countries and for the cause of future peace. The Franco-Prussian War lasted about sLx months. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 continued for about sixteen months. But nothing like the present struggle has ever occurred, and predic- tions are useless. japan's aggressive steps Japan's ultimatum to Germany would have seemed to make for a shortening of the war, through a multiplication of the obstacles that might lead the Germans to seek an armistice and a settlement before their resources were too much exhausted in a contest v(jith the odds greatly against them. Germany seems to have relied on superior preparation, the rapid prostration of France, the slow movement of Russia, the full assistance of Italy, the neutrality of England, a holiday victory of Austria over the little Servian nation, strong American sympathy, and the total unwillingness of Japan to be lined up on the same side with Russia. But it seems that Japan had not only her treaty with England, but had also entered into a more extensive agreement with France and a more definite understanding with Russia than was commonly supposed. Furthermore, Germany's occupation of the Chinese port of Kiao-Chau and a portion of the province of Shantung, opposite Port Arthur, had always been offensive to Japan. Germany had engineered the combination of powers which or- dered Japan out of Port Arthur after her victory over the Chinese in 1895 (ten years before her war with Russia). Subsequently, on the pretext of compensation for the murder of two mis- sionaries, Germany had compelled China to give her Kiao-Chau on a long lease. On August 16, Japan issued an ultimatum, de- manding withdrawal from Kiao-Chau and giving a week for reply. Japan was admittedly acting after full consultation with the British Govern- ment. She had assured the American Govern- ment that her plans and intentions were in no way detrimental to the interests of the United States. Japan declared the purpose of seeing that Kiao- Chau was eventually returned to China. AMERICAN interests IN THE PACIFIC The authorities at Washington were reticent, but showed no displeasure. One Congressman flared up about Japan, on the floor of the House but he was sidetracked; and nobody else made public criticism. The diplomatic arrangement by which the United States divided up the Sa- moan group in the Pacific with Germany, if not particularly brilliant, has at least worked peacea- bly for a good many years. If Germany is not to remain in the Pacific, her Samoan interests ought to be ceded to the United States. But Japan gave definite assurances that she would not go farther than to expel Germany from the mainland of China and to protect her own lO EUROPE AT WAR trade and commerce from attack by German cruisers. Since Germany has practically no naval strength in the Pacific, while Japan, England, and Russia have together a vast naval power, it was at once evident that Germany could not hold Kiau- chau. A question, however, arose as to China's action, for it seemed likely enough that if the German lease were to be terminated, China would resume possession and not accept the pro- gramme of Japan. Some newspaper writers have expressed fear lest the United States should be- come involved in difficulties in the Far East be- cause of its sovereignty over the PhiHppines. Although we are in control of those islands, we are giving them self-government quite as rapidly as it is possible for them to exercise it. When the time comes for intelUgent and re- sponsible action on their part, the PhOippines will be free to become an independent republic; and every wise man knows that such a position could never have been attained by them without our tutelage and assistance. If anybody supposes that the people of the United States would involve themselves in a great war for the sake of keeping the American flag flying in the Philippine Islands, they are not good judges of sentiment. The people of this country have moral courage enough not to resort to war when such action would be of no service either to themselves or to the world. Japan has no intention whatever of interfering with our useful exercise of respon- sibility for the order and progress of the Philip- pines. We need not be embroiled in war, and we must pursue courses that will not only insure our own immunity but will also help to dehver the world from the hideous obsession of militarism. As for Japanese action and policy, let us hope that there will be wisdom and moderation. If, as the Japanese and others believe, Germany was prone to grasp advantages ruthlessly wherever she could get them in the development of her ambitious projects of empire, it would be most unfortunate if Japan should fall into the same er- ror and give the world the impression of an undue readiness to seize what can be had in a time of some other power's misfortune. Canada's position The sympathy and loyalty of the great self- governing British dominions are completely with the mother country. The Canadian Parliament assembled on August i8, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Borden, was eloquently seconded by the oppo- sition leader. Sir WOfrid Laurier, in the entire pro- gramme of support. Canada not only had money to offer and ships for transport, but prepared to send about 20,000 soldiers. There are ques- tions touching Canada's participation in European wars that bear profoundly upon the policy of the United States. It would not accord with Ameri- can views to have the theatre of war shifted to this continent, or to have Canada's security in any way molested. But at the present moment these are academic rather than practical questions, because the sea power of the British Empire, to- gether with that of her alUes, renders it wholly improbable that Germany could attack either of Canada's ocean seaboards. We have cause to rejoice that there are no forti- fications along the thousands of miles of frontier between the United States and Canada. Nor does European war render us less thankful for the hundred years of peace that have followed the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. An ad- mirable and timely pamphlet by Dr. Charles H. Levermore tells the story of "The Anglo-Amer- ican Agreement of 1817 for Disarmament on the Great Lakes." The pamphlet is issued by the World Peace Foundation, of Boston, and it brings the subject up to date. We have happily avoided a war with Mexico, and have no fortifications along our southern boundary line. CAN WE GAIN BY EUROPE'S CALAMITY? While nothing has been said in the United States that would indicate a desire to obtain any territorial or "imperial" advantages for this country, very much has been said about the oppor- tunity to gain economic prosperity. Broadly speaking, other people's impoverishment can- not contribute to our wealth. Prosperity can be diffused, while, on the other hand, great disaster and loss cannot be localized. The paralysis of industry and commerce in Europe wiU cause much poverty and suffering in the United States. Neither American capital nor American labor will be benefited by the annihila- tion of European capital and the diversion of labor to the destructive business of war. We will have to bear it as well as we can, pray- ing that the war may be short and less devastating than has seemed probable. The newspaper talk HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT II about the opportunity of wealth through the crea- tion of a vast American merchant marine has been palpably erroneous. American capital has been occupied in enterprises more profitable than the carrying of ocean freight. If, in order to get our surplus commodities to Europe, and to bring back things needful, such as coffee, hides, sugar, and so on, from South America and elsewhere, we are obliged to take our capital out of other enterprises and put it into ocean freighting, it will mean ac- tual loss rather than gain, because we cannot afford to do that business as cheaply as Europe has been doing it for us. AS TO OUR MERCHANT MARINE The temporary paralysis of ocean trade, due to a state of war between England and Germany, is very embarrassing, and necessitates emergency action of some kind. That Congress should re- vise our navigation laws, and make it easier for American-owned ships to fly the American flag, was obviously necessary. It was in mitigation of disaster, rather than in seizure of opportunity. Secretary Lane was justified in calling attention to certain mineral resources, particularly potashes and phosphates needed for fertilizers, that might be opened up through action of Congress, in view of the cutting off of foreign supplies. In incidental and special ways, America may develop new sources of prosperity; and she may in many ways be able to help Europe tide over the period of financial and business trouble. But we must pre- pare soberly for our own less heavy burden of loss, rather than indulge in hopes of gain that are not only fallacious but also unbecoming. We can even operate government ships but only to meet emergencies. CONGRESS BECOMES RECONCILED Trouble, after all, is a relative thing; and the law-makers at Washington were not so disturbed as they had been over the prospect of Httle or no recess. Comparing their own favorable situation at Washington with the stress and an.xiety to which governments and parliaments were sub- jected in every European capital, they became patriotic, grateful, and amenable. Partisanship ceased to be obtrusive, and there was intel- ligent and prompt cooperation. Changes in the Aldrich-Vreeland law were made which gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to support the banks to an almost unlimited extent, after the European crisis and panic at the end of July. Measures were taken by virtue of which the United States was ready to meet any possible emergency in the financial world. Congress also acted in a statesmanlike spirit with respect to the relief of American foreign trade. Despite the discomforts of a Washington sum- mer, there was no adjournment because of the danger of unforeseen contingencies. PRESIDENT WILSON IN CRITICAL TIMES President Wilson's unflinching devotion to pub- licduty,and his wise attitude in the midstof strange and perilous times, did not faD to win admiration and respect. Upon August 6 a great personal bereavement befell him in the death of Mrs. Wilson. The President was sustained in his affliction by the compelling force of his public duties at a moment of unprecedented seriousness in the history of modern nations. Like most of his predecessors, Mr. Wilson has not failed to rise high when great emergencies have afforded a test of character, wisdom, and moral power. BACKGROUNDS AND MAINSPRINGS OF THE STRUGGLE BY LOUIS E. VAN NORMAN FOR the causes of the titanic struggle moving Europe, it is necessary to go back a little into history. Europe's political development, during the past four or five centuries, has been largely con- ditioned by what international law writers term the "continental conception." The Holy Roman Empire, with its claim for the dominance of the Emperor and the subordination of the other states, was followed by the independent sovereignty doc- trine. This maintained that every nation was not only free and sovereign, but that it was equal to every other nation in the councils of the con- tinent. This conception was succeeded, in the middle of the past century, by the idea of the "concert of Europe." It came to be believed that an agreement of the Great Powers, — which, since 1870, have been Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, and Italy, — should de- termine the policies of the continent and keep the peace. Every dispute between nations, little or big, was considered as a continental matter by this "concert," or general council, which unitedly im- posed its will. THE BALANCE OF POWER DOCTRINE At the same time there was growing up the condition and doctrine known as the "balance of power." After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which liquidated the Napoleonic conquests and settled the large lines of the map of Europe for more than half a century, the European nations assumed the point of view that any acquisition of power, territory, or population by any one of them entitled all the others to compensation, so that the relative strength and importance might not be disturbed. Hence we find, after every im- portant war since Napoleon's time, the prac- tise of the European "concert" to take part in the settlement of the terms of peace and so adjust the gains of the victor and the losses of the vanquished that the much-discussed "bal- ance" might not be upset. Any threatened dis- turbance of this balance has always had in it the seeds of a general conflict. The balance-of-power fetish has been one of the four great moving causes of the present war. The other three may be briefly set forth as mili- tarism, with its attendant jealousy and the ob- stacles it presents to many needed social and economic reforms; the age-long world rivalry between Teuton and Slav; and the struggle of Europe's swarming industrial and commercial nations for the markets of Asia. The preponderance acquired by Prussia through her victory over France in 1870-71 and its in- crease by the alliance of the German Empire with Austria and Italy has resulted in those European alliances which have made the aUgnment in the present conflict. HOW THE ALLIANCES CAME TO BE Bismarck's fear of France and his hatred of the Napoleonic tradition as exemplified in Louis Napoleon was the underlying cause. In order to maintain a strong front against the Republic, he brought about the Dual Alliance between Ger- many and Austria in 1879. This agreement, which was not known to the world until nine years later, marks the beginning of the division of Europe into two hostile camps. In 1882 the Iron Chancellor was able to convince the Italians that they should cast in their lot with the powers of the centre of the continent, and the Triple Alliance, or Dreibund, was born. In pursuance of his ideal of a friendless France, Bismarck, be- fore approaching Italy, had attempted, unsuccess- fully, to get Russian adhesion to a Dreikaiserhund (League of the Three Emperors). England could not be tempted by either side. In 1890 Bismarck fell from power, and France came to an understanding with Russia. The next year the Treaty of Alliance was signed, which, however, was not made public imtil 1894. 12 BACKGROUNDS AND MAINSPRINGS 13 For a decade the Dual Alliance of France and Russia faced the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, with the odds in favor of the Dreibund. During the first years of the twentieth century, however, there came about a shifting of the balance. Italy, estranged from France over the occupation of Tunis in 18S1, and because of a vexatious tariff war, became reconciled to her Latin sister in 1901. In May, 1903, King Ed- ward VII paid his memorable visit to Paris. Thanks to the diplomatic exchanges begun by this monarch, Britain and France, in April, 1904, signed an omnibus treaty settling all their differ- ences in Africa. Shortly afterward a secret understanding was arrived at between the two countries which, despite ofiicial denials, is now understood to have provided for British aid to France in case of an attack by Germany. This was the famous Entente Cordiale, or Cordial Understanding. In 1907 Great Britain and Russia, long at odds over their respective spheres of influence in Persia and other parts of the Near East, made up their difierences in a treaty. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE Meanwhile, the French had begun their pacific penetration of Morocco, and the German Kaiser had made his spectacular visit to Tangier (1905) and demanded that Germany's rights in North Africa be safeguarded. The Moroccan question was supposed to have been settled by the famous conference of Algeciras (1906). This conference, which brought out the support of England to France, proved that the Entente Cordiale, which had grown out of the treaty of 1904, approximated the strength of an alliance. When, as has already been said, Russia and England agreed over their Near Eastern interests, the Dual Alliance had expanded into the Triple Entente. Startling events soon drew the world's atten- tion to eastern Europe. The Turkish revolution, in 1908, found echoes in several of the provinces formerly under Ottoman suzerainty. In Feb- ruary, 1908, Europe was startled by the news that Bulgaria had thrown off the over-lordship of Turkey, and that Austria-Hungary had formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. These pro- vinces had been given to her "for military occu- pation and administration" by the Congress of Berlin, which followed the Turco-Russian war of 1877. All Europe was expecting a continental war. The tension was ended in March, 1909, however, by a peremptory intimation from the German Kaiser to the Russian Czar that if his support of Servia's protest against Austria's ab- sorption of the Bosniaks should lead to war with the Dual Monarchy, Germany would "appear in shining armor at the side of her ally." Russia never forgot this check. The two Balkan wars which amazed and frightened the continent in 1912 and 1913 were regarded by Aus- tria and Germany as having been instigated by Russia in revenge. The Czar, however, has appar- parently seen these in the light of additional Slavonic checks by the Teuton. Meanwhile, Germany again challenged France in Morocco by her dramatic stroke at Agadir (191 1). Bri- tain supported France vigorously, and it was seen that the Triple Entente had solidified into what was virtually an alliance. THE POLITICAL CHESS BOARD OF EUROPE The continent is now divided into four groups of nations: (i) The close alliance of the middle European powers, — Germany, Austria, and Italy, — into the Triple Alliance, or Driebund; (2) the Triple Entente, or understanding ap- proaching an alliance, between Great Britain, France, and Russia (France and Russia being formally allied); (3) the small group of buffer nations whose neutrality and integrity have been recognized or guaranteed, — Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, front- ing on France, Belgium, and Germany, whose neutrality was guaranteed in 1867, and Switzer- land; (4) the other countries, more or less iso- lated, some of them, however, having regional problems of their own. These include the Balkan nations, — Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Greece, Turkey, and Roumania, — formerly a sort of Bal- kan extension of the Triple Alliance, but within the past year drawn within the orbit of Russia; the Scandinavian nations, — Norway, Sweden and Denmark (the latter, although neutral, still in- volved in the general fate of Scandinavia), — and the Iberian nations, Spain and Portugal. Any increase of the power of any one of these groups would alone have been sufficient to bring about a European war. This alignment constituted the balance of power. 14 EUROPE AT WAR SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE DREIBUND Each of the two great alliances now locked in the giant struggle for mastery presents some coherence and consistency and yet a good deal of diversity and internal antagonism. The two bureaucratic, highly centralized, powerful military nations of the centre of the continent, Germany and Austria, are dominated by German-speaking tria has the problem of Slavs on the south as well as to the east and within her own borders. Meanwhile a suspicious, unfriendly Italian neighbor and assumed ally, hungering to re- claim Italia Irredenta, begrudges her an outlet on the Adriatic. The Austro-Italian question arises from the fact that Austria still possesses the only lands on the European continent in- habited by Italian-speaking people not under the J&^BB^*^^ £ \m 2«tPLE ENTENTE ^^^H BALKANS THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND GROUPS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR men. Their interests are largely similar. Even the problems of each arise chiefly out of the fact that their governments are more dynastic than national. The Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs are faced by racial questions of a similar nature, although Austria has them more intensely and to a greater degree than Germany. Both find the Slav within their borders and on their boundaries their chief enemy. Germany has, in addition, British commercial and naval rivalry to the north and French desire for revenge on the west. Aus- Italian flag. All ancient Italy, from the Alps to the end of the toe of the boot, has been brought under one sceptre, except south Tyrol, Trieste, and the rest of that shore line of the northern Adriatic which Italians call Italia Irredenta — Italy unredeemed. To the loss of Corsica to France and Malta to Great Britain the Italian seems reconciled. The government at Rome, however, and the Italian people cannot forget that Austria holds all of continental Italy which is not subject to King Victor Emmanuel, and, BACKGROUNDS AND MAINSPRINGS IS moreover, that she has kept up a constant and vexatious campaign of Austrianization against those portions of Venetia and Lombardy which the Italians regard as their own. While Germany's and Austria's problems are acute largely within their own borders (Ger- many's colonies have never been regarded as profitable), Italy's concern for her international position has been intensified by the acquisition of Tripoli. Italians have been very thoughtfully weighing the advantages accruing to them from their alliance with Germany and Austria, such as military assistance, financial promotion, etc., against their traditional friendship with England, their historic love for France, and the ease with which British and French battleships, if un- friendly, might cut off Tripoli and close in the peninsula upon the political, economic, and social revolution which King Victor Emmanuel is re- ported to have recently said is likely to make Italy the ne.xt repubhc. All of which goes toward explaining why Italy tries her best to remain neutral. DIVERGENCE IN THE ENTENTE There is more diversity than agreement in the Triple Entente. Hostility to the Dreibund and fear of its tremendous military power have been the main actuating motives. Government, institutions, and traditions tend to unite the cen- tral European powers. But it is exactly govern- ment, institutions, and tradition that put the members of the Triple Entente as far apart as the poles. Constitutional, republican England (a monarchy only in name), with her widely extended empire and her unmilitary people, is practically allied to republican, highly centralized France, which has not yet lost her memory of the great Napoleon. France also has a colonial empire, and a navy which is claimed to be second only to that of England. Britain befriends France both because she sympathizes with western liberalism and because she has long feared and suspected the German. Moreover, the German has been crowding her in the race for the world's trade and has built a powerful navy to protect what German merchants have won. It is the German contention that one of the chief causes of the war is jealousy of the commercial success which the subjects of the Kaiser have achieved. This friendship with the republic across the chaimel and a desire to protect her Asiatic depen- dencies bring Britain into a strange semi- partnership with the autocratic Russian Empire, with which she has naturally nothing in common, with which she is at enmity along many frontiers of the world, and with which she wiU inevitably have to dispute the prizes of the war, should the Triple Entente be victorious. But France wants back Alsace-Lorraine from Germany, and French bankers hold almost all the huge Russian national debt. To protect her investments in Russia, and to consummate her revenge on Germany for the humiliation of 1870, France cannot break with the Muscovite. Britain needs France for her own protection against Germany. A Ger- many triumphant over France would mean a Germany within striking distance of English shores. France needs Britain for her national safety. Therefore, French and Russian armies have menaced the German frontiers, and British warships have for years been awaiting the orders, "Find and sink the Germans." FORCES AND STAYING POWERS OF EACH CAMP In staying qualities the two great groups, if each maintains its strength undiminished, are about equal. The Dreibund commands better equipped, better trained and more easily handled armies. On the water, however, the Entente has a great advantage. Naval experts are wont to measure sea strength by tonnage, number of guns, and weight of projectiles. Measured by this test, the central European powers are only half as powerful as the combination against them. The figures given for the Entente are, in round num- bers, tonnage, 2,000,000; guns, 800; projectile weight, 550,000; those for the Dreibund are: tonnage, 600,000; guns, 280; projectile weight, 200,000. The countries of the Triple Alliance are more compact and will find it easier to supply and move their fighting forces. Both Germany and Austria, however, depend very largely for food supplies upon importation. The government at Berlin announced at the beginning of the war that it could hold out, with blockaded ports, for a year. The bulk of the land fighting forces of the En- tente, — the Russians, — are less highly trained and less efficient than the Germans. Britain, moreover, it is said, cannot live more than two months on the food she has within her borders at any one time. On the other hand, France pro- i6 EUROPE AT WAR duces surplus food-stuffs, chiefly wheat, and Russia is a limitless granary. England maintains her mighty fleet to keep her doors open for food. If her ships should destroy the German na\^ and blockade German ports, the Kaiser's armies may be expected to take their attention from France and devote all their energies to seizing the grain lands of Russia. THE BLIGHT OF MILITARISM The blight of militarism has been on Europe since the Franco-Prussian war. More than 16,000,000 trained soldiers in the first lines and in the reserves have wasted the substance of the continent and lowered its productive capacity. The Triple Alliance in times of peace has a million and a half men under arms. In times of war this may be quickly increased to 8,000,000. For pur- poses of calculation in the present war, Italy is uncertain. Her -quarter miUion soldiers in peace and 1,500,000 in war will not probably be placed with the Dreibund, which can, however, muster for war si.x million without her. On a peace foot- ing, the Entente counts 2,000,000 men; in war it can muster upwards of 10,000,000. The very pre- sence of these armies in times of peace is an incite- ment to war. Officers look forward to a conflict as their chance of advancement, and the peoples are accustomed to the sight of the paraphernalia of battle. Besides the economic burden of sup- porting them, these armaments have bred jealousy and have fostered a spirit of caste and autocracy that has kept the peoples of the continent from many of the economic, social, and political re- forms of which they are in sore need. In every one of the si.x major powers, revolution of varying degrees of seriousness was the seeming alternative to war. In the aggressive powers, those that took the initiative,— Austria, Russia, and Germany, — miUtary oligarchies have for years been facing a social-democratic revolution. Russia is still struggling out of Asiatic barbarism. Germany, with all her civilization, remains a feudalistic autocracy, with a "debating society" for a parliament. Austria is a polyglot bureau- cracy, which has held together mainly by desire for protection against Russia and personal loyalty to the Hapsburg family. In none of the three are franchise rights fully recognized. In all of them industry is taxed to the breaking point. Britain, France, and Italy also have their ques- tions of land, and labor, and Britain has Ireland. Through all of them the "disintegrating ferment" of Socialism is preparing for the fall of monarchy and special privilege. It was inevitable that mili- tarism should force a general war or fall of its own weight. Moreover, militarism has expected this war for twenty years. During the past decade this e.x-pectation has been so widespread that one of the aims of taxation in Germany and Austria has been that of providing funds for the contest. THE STRUGGLE OF TEUTON AGAINST SLAV Pan-Germanism has baited Pan-Slavism, and Pan-Slavism has challenged Pan-Germanism for half a century. Pan-Germanism, represented by Germany, is a well-defined movement which seeks the common welfare of the Germanic peoples of Europe and the advance of Teutonic culture. Pan-Slavism, championed by Russia, is less clearly formulated, but it, for its part, seeks a union of all Slavonic folk for common welfare. These two aims are irreconcilable and the two propaganda have become the incitement to war. There are in Europe approximately 80,000,000 German- speaking people, of whom 68,000,000 are in the German Empire, and the other 12,000,000 in Austria and Hungary. But there are 140,000,000 Slavs on European soil, — in Russia, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and in the Polish provinces of Austria and Germany, in Bohemia and the other Slavonic parts of the Dual Monarchy. Russia has always regarded herself as the protec- tress of the Slav peoples and any attempt to bring Slavs under Teutonic domination is looked upon as a direct challenge to her. From Lapland to the Black Sea the contact between these two virile races, the Teuton and the Slav, is always seething, and there has seemed to be no solution but an appeal to the sword. This bitterness has been intensified by the unnatural poHtical geo- graphy which the Berlin Congress, — maker of nations on the map, — forced on Europe. The right of almost every small nation to rule itself has been ignored. A FIGHT FOR THE MARKETS OF THE EAST In the last analysis, Europe's fight is a fight for markets. The German Kaiser has been called the best living drummer for German goods. The Teuton's "Drang nach Osten" has been respon- sible for most of the Kaiser's weUpolilik. In the WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 17 Near East are the grain fields of Mesopotamia, where the race began, and in the Far East are the vast markets of India and China. The great finan- cial interests of Europe, the powerful bankers and the immense industrial establishments, have been seeking the commercial conquest of Asia for a quarter of a century. This has been behind the Eastern question, with the elimination of the Turk as a factor. Whatever great power possesses Constantinople attains enormous advantages for the domination of Asia and holds the highways of trade to the Near and Middle East. Britain controls the Suez Canal. But German capital has built railroads through Asia Minor. Russia, by patient intrigue, has welded the little Balkan States until a Slavonic wedge from the Black Sea to the Adriatic now bars the German's way to the Orient. Berlin and Vienna have replied by keep- ing the Balkans at war, by establishing the "open sore" of Albania, and preventing the Serbs, whether Servian or Montenegrin, from being Russia's advance guard on the Adriatic. German finance must have more lands and people to ex- ploit. England threatens the Kaiser's expansion on the sea, while Russia, the largest military em- pire of Europe, and France, her strongest military repubhc, close the Germans in on both land sides. Therefore, at any cost must the power of the Balkan league be broken. Therefore, the little Sanjak of Novibazar between Servia and Mon- tenegro (given to the latter at the end of the Balkan wars) is frantically clung to by the Aus- trians as the gateway to Salonica and Asia. HOW THE CRISIS CAME ON The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, in the last days of June, was the first link in the chain of events which have brought on the great war play for which Europe has been preparing fearfully for a gener- ation. Swiftly sketched, the drama moved this way. Austria claimed that Servia, as a nation, was re- sponsible for the assassination. She sent an ultimatum to Belgrade, making demands that the Servians, as a people, determined to maintain their independence, could not admit. She de- clared war on Servia and moved an army across the Danube. Austria's attack on Servia, in the first place disturbed the delicate balance of power, secondly, it meant the drawing of another people from the Slavonic into the Teutonic system; third, it let loose the flood of militarism which the dikes of reason and civilization had found it so difficult to restrain; fourth, it showed the con- tinent that Germany and Austria still meant to keep open the way to the East, and that German and Austrian goods and German and Austrian capital were henceforth to dominate in the Near East rather than that of Britain, France, and Russia. Austria felt she must chastise the Serbs for assassinating the heir apparent to her throne; Russia could not see one of her Slavonic wards crushed; France, which holds the Russian national debt and regards the Moscovite as her only hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, prepared to sup- port Russia. Germany, threatened on both sides, felt she must strike quickly. In so doing, the Kaiser's strategy ignored the rights of small neutral states, and, invading Belgium, brought his armies within menacing distance of England. And so we have the British fleet and the British troops as the last great factor in the tremendous conflict. Whatever happens, — whichever side or nations be victorious, — it seems inevitable that, as a result, there will be a radical change in the whole social and economic, as well as political and geographical structure of Europe. WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART (professor of history, harvard untversity) FOR the wreck of this conflict which will increase from day to day, is there any good, clear, inevitable reason? No Napoleon has forced his neighbors to war. No Bismarck has racked Prussia in order to make Germany. No Agadir incident has set off the match. No invincible horde is advancing out of Asia. Europe got through two Balkan con- flicts without general war. It is no explanation to say that this king or that emperor wants war. No monarch now- adays can go against the spirit of his people. Every country included is united in what is considered a natural war. It is not a war of EUROPE AT WAR dynasties or statesmen. It is not a war of revenge for Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Questions of trade and markets play a large part in the drama — but it is not the love of money which leads great navies to spend 5,000 million dollars, in order to secure a trade in which the profit cannot be more than 200 mil- lions a year. This is a war of peoples and not of interests. The military spirit, commercial expansion, de- sire for territory, and the self assertion of great RUSSIA {J^l^iH^^ This outline will aid the reader to see how Austria has restricted Servia, first by absorbing Bosnia and Herze- govina, then by creating the New Kingdom of Albania. The map shows the Balkan States as they were before the recent wars, and as they are now with the Terri- tories that have been acquired and added to Servia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania. nations are things that in the long run may over- come all the checks of Parliaments and states- men and The Hague conferences. But none of them could have brought about the fearful con- ditions of the year 1914. The strongest and determining reason for war is the growth of race antipathies. The world has at last realized that the political boundaries of Eastern Europe cut across older and more persistent divisions of race, language and religion, and thus bring conflicts with nations and between them. Europe is a mosaic of races. In most countries the race elements have amalgamated or have ceased to conflict with each other. In this crisis, the Irish in Great Britain and the Walloons in Belgium have sunk their consciousness of race in their consciousness of nationality. Eastern Europe still bears the marks of the successive waves of barbarian invasion out of the heart of Asia. The Hungarians and the Bulgarians are both races that forced their way into Europe where they found the Slavs, the Germans, and the Latins. Then the Slavs received the fearful weight of the Turkish invasion and for centuries lost independence and vitality. Yet till recently there was no strong race an- tipathy between Germans and Slavs. Germany and Russia have not been at war with each other since the Czar Peter the Third saved Frederick the Great in 1762. Till forty years ago the Bohemians and Germans got on tolerably well side by side. The race strains which are pulling Europe to pieces at last have showed themselves by rousing country against country; and inside Austria. There the antipathy between Germans and Slavs has grown so bitter that, in the judg- ment of the Austrian statesmen, the Germans must fight Slavs either outside of Austria or inside of Austria. They have preferred to make the issue perfectly clear by declaring war on the one markedly successful and independent Slav state outside of Russia. The challenge aroused Russia, but did not directly concern other Powers farther west. Most of them, to judge from the proclamations and official communications, are fighting only in self- defense. In the midst of the appalling misery of the time, there shines out a comic gleam in the exchange of discourtesies about mobiliza- tion. As soon as the trouble began, every one of the four Central European Powers began to move troops with all possible speed toward its threatened frontiers, at the same time calling the world to witness that they were not "mob- ilizing." Every nation threatened every other, hoping thus to frighten its neighbor into giving way without war. The responsibility for the war rests upon no individual and upon no one nation, but upon the interlocking of Europe, commercially, territorially, and racially, so that one Power after another was drawn in the mael- strom. Perhaps statesmen felt that the cleaning time had come at last; and that the rival claims TIIK LiA\ AlOiVNS BEFORE I'AIUS, 1S70 I'lMtuijraiili.L CoiiiiMiiy WORLD BATTLES BEING FOUGHT AGAIN TRAFALGAR 1805 IN WHICH ENGLAND DEMONSTRATED THE TWO-POWER STANDARD OF HER NAVY AND KEPT THE SUPREMACY OF THE SEA WATERLOO 1815 ENGLAND HAS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE WATERLOO SENT TROOPS TO WESTERN EUROPE, LANDING THEM IN BELGIUM TO KEEP THE KAISER OUT OF ANTWERP AS THEY KEPT NAPOLEON OUT BEFORE KONIGGRATZ 1866 THE BATTLE THAT ENDED THE WAR WHICH PRUSSIA BEGAN TO UNIFY GERMANY JUST AS AUSTRIA-HUNGARY ATTACKED SERVIA TO UNIFY ITS DOMINIONS BATTLES OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR TO BE FOUGHT AGAIN ON THE SAME GROUNDS FOR THE SAME STAKE, WHICH IS ALSACE-LORRAINE AND THE DOMINANT POSITION IN EUROPE EUROPE AT WAR O W o < a St; Hi -^ O .. Q- :■ z o IT " — P4 H O y. c o w J ■r -J OS ^ < u c/: w uT r^ z o ^ c/i a Ba ;j H p^ l_] M O H ai ti( t> U! 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ENGLAND HAS THE SAME PROBLEM Nor EUROPE AT WAR OLD BATTLES REFOUGHT 23 EUROPE AT WAR OLD BATTLES REFOUCxHT EUROPE AT WAR THE PIECE IN DANGER' Copyright, 19^.7. by Braun. clement o o o 'rtH O O O o o o o o o o o o o o" o" o o o o o o' o o o o o o o o" o' CO o UO (M O CO (M CO 0000 o o o o o o o o_^ o"" o~ '^'" '^ O o <^^ "^ TjH Q o o Id O a. 8 S, CO 000 000 000 d~ o" o" 000 o_^ 10 10^ t- CO 0000 0000 0000 o" 0"^ 0"^ o" 0000 CO 10 o o CO 10 00000 00000 00000 o'" o" o~ o^ o' 00000 CO O O >^ iC 00000 00000 00000 o~ o^ o" o" o' 00000 O CD t-- -*l 10 UO-— iTtHt>'TiiOC0(M(M>O CO (M o l-H < z o X << [-1 HH > en 1/3 • ■< I— t Oii ta^ P^ o o til H o H 0^ < 2^ < o < C/3 o o o o" o o o o o o" o a C3 o u a. o o o o" o o CO < o o o o" o o 0*^ ^ r^ • • • 55 • • • d es: S t^ J h C ^ (2^ ^ 2 ^ 0^ o u) s ^ t^ 9 ^ E h o oi cQ ;z; c/3 Q Iz; en 1. ^, ' •M d U> ■*-> Xi Ci •iM «4H 1 rt -0 C3 Wi "0J3 TS d ^M a> ^ VM D ■M Lj '^i^lHBWi9Hi l»^ ^LLK^^MMisKf^P^ffrivTE!^ ' J^«fefc.^Kj|j||&^iiMfc£«yic s^^S^ffifll ^^^flK^y^H|j^^E|lbi||wur '^ rf' T \Ww^U^^^^BU^KB^F 'fllH ^^^■^^^^■^Jj^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B*- '^^^H^^H^^^^HRe?^^'^^? i^H ^^^^^^W ti^n^H ,1 BRITISH CAVALRY liRIIiMl llhAA) AKlll.LERY THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 63 ENGLISH INFANTRY THE BRITISH REGULAR ARMV CAN BE COUNTED ON, BUT THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TERRITORIALS, WHICH CORRESPOND TO AMERICAN MILITIA, IS PROBLEMATICAL. 64 EUROPE AT WAR GERMAN INFANTRY IN THE FIELD EVERY DETAIL OF EQUIPMENT AND OF CARRIAGE, FROM THE MARTIAL LOOKIXG HELMET TO THE ARTIFICIAL "GOOSE STEP " GAIT USED ON PAR-^UJE, EMPHASIZES THE STUDIED UNIFORMITY AND PAINSTAKING PRECISION OF GERMAN MILITARY SCLENCE THE ARMIES OF EUROPE % B^^HHfi^^tar' ' ■ 4# JH "iS^M^^A, !lt«r'-' ' < "AN ARMY THAT RUNS LIKE CLOCKWORK" THE GERMAN ARMY IS THE MOST THOROUGHLY DRILLED OF ALL ARMIES, AND ITS COMMANDERS TUT THLIR FAITH IN ITS MASS EFFICIENCY DIRECTED BY THE GENERAL STAFF ALONG MINUTELY AND CAREFULLY PLANNED LINES 66 EUROPE AT WAR ALL GERMAN CAVALRYMEN ARE ARIHED WITH LANCES AN AMERICAN MILITARY AUTHORITY HAS CRITICIZED THESE WEAPONS AS OBSOLETE, BUT ADMITS THAT THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE AT CLOSE QUARTERS NEWS GATHERERS FOR THE GENERAL STAFF BICYCLE, MOUNTED, AND AEROPLANE SCOUTS BRING NEWS TO THE GERMAN STAFF, WHICH IS THE MOST THOROUGH ORGANI- ZATION OF ITS KIND IN THE WORLD THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 67 GERMAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION ''°''^">'" "^ U"'''-™-'' «■■ ""denvood. n. y. THE GERMANS BELIEVE THE KRUPP GUNS TAILED IN THE BALKANS ONLY BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PROPERLY HANDLED '■A CARAVAN LOADED WITH DEATH" GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY MARCHING THROUGH A MOUNTAIN VILLAGE. A PART OF THE KAISEr's 4 MILLION MEN EUROPE AT WAR Copyright by Unclenvood & Undenvond, N. Y. GERMiW OFFICERS MINING A BRIDGE Cop}'right by UndenvofiH ,S: Underwood, N. Y. GERMAN SAPPERS SETTING TORPEDOES THE GERJVIAN EMPEROR WITH HIS MILITARY STAFF IN IHE FIELD THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 69 RUSSIAN CAVALRY ON THE MARCH Copyri^iit liy tlie Ainericin Press Assuciati'.n CONSCRIPTION IN RUSSIA. DRAWING LOTS FOR MILITARY SERVICE 70 EUROPE AT WAR "THE BEAR THAT WALKS LIKE A MAN" A FAMOUS DESCRIPTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER, THAT SUGGESTS HIS MERITS AND HIS DEFECTS. RUSSIAN FIELD ARTILLERY THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 71 Copyright by the American Press Association FIRST KI-dlMKXT BELGIAN CHASSEURS AT LOUVAIN Cf.'iiyriyht by the Aiiieritaii Fress Association BELGIAN TROOPS LINED UP IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE IN LIEGE EUROPE AT WAR TYPES OF AUSTRIAN SOLDIERS SHOWING THE VARIETY 01- RACES MAKING UP THE AHLITARY FORCES OF THE DUAL EMPIRE UHLAN (lANDWEHR); AUSTRIAN (lANDWEHR); BOSNIA RIFLE-MAN; AUSTRIAN RIFLE-MAN; HUNGARIAN INFANTRY- MAN; TYROLESE SHARP-SHOOTER; BOSNIAN INFANTRY; HUNGARIAN INFANTRY; HUNGARIAN HUSSAR; HUSSAR (LAND- WEHR) ; HUNGARIAN RIFLE-MAN; MOUNTED RIFLE-MAN; BOSNIAN DRAGOON; MARINE. NOT ALL OF THE FIFTEEN UNI- FORMS ARE PICTURED HERE BUT ENOUGH ARE SHOWN TO INDICATE THE GREAT VARIETY IN SERVICE AUSTRIAN FIELD ARTILLERY AND AUSTRIAN CAVALRY THE AUSTRIAN ARMY HAS NOT BEEN THOROUGHLY TESTED SINCE ITS DEFEAT BY PRUSSIA IN 1866; THEORETICALLY ITS EFFICIENCY IS HIGH THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 73 ITALIAN INFANTRY CROSSING A DANGEROUS PASS Pliotoyraph by James F j. Archibald \ AUSTRIAN INFANTRY AND MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY 74 EUROPE AT WAR SERVIAN GUNS ON THE MARCH— THE REALITY WTTHUUT THE POMP OE WAR THE NAVIES 75 Elizabeth. These last eight ships will not be ready until next year. Great Britain thus has afloat and ready for service sLxty battleships, twenty of which are of the Dreadnought or big gun type. In addi- tion to these there are ten battle-cruisers, equal to taking their place in the line of battle, of which nine are now ready and the other nearly so. They are the Inflexible, Indomitable, Invincible, of 17,250 tons displacement and 41,000 horse power (turbine), the Indefatigable, of 18,750 tons displacement and 43,000 horse-power (turbine): the New Zealand, of 18,800 tons, and the Aus- tralia, with 19,200 tons displacement, both with 44,000 horse-power developed by turbine-engines. All these ships have a speed of 25 knots, 8 inches of armor belt, 10 inches big gun protection, and a coal capacity of 2,500 tons. Their armament is 8 12-inch, 16 4-inch quick fire, 5 machine guns and 5 torpedo tubes. The Lion and the Princess Royal, launched in 191 2, and the Queen Mary, of 1913, are alike, ex- cept that the Queen Mary has 27,000 tons dis- placement and 75,000 horse-power. The other two have 26,350 tons displacement, 70,000 horse-power, and 3,500 tons coal capac- ity. They have a speed of 28 knots, 9.75 inches of armor belt, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 8 12-inch, 12 4-inch quick fire and 5 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. This year's battle-cruiser, the Tiger, has 28,000 tons displacement, her turbines develop 110,000 horse-power, she has a speed of 30 knots, 10.75-inch armor belt, and ii-inch protection for the big guns. Her coal capacity is 4,000 tons. She has 8 13.5-inch, 12 6-inch quick fire, and 5 machine guns. Following these are thirty-four armored cruisers of high speed, which may be called general serv- ice ships, to be used for scouting or fighting as the case may be. They have neither the arma- ment nor protection to enable them to take a place in the line-of-battle, but their speed is sufficient to evade action with all battleships now in actual service. The list is as follows : Completed between the years 1901 and 1904 are the Cressy, Sutley, Aboukir, Hague, Bacchante, and Euryalus. They are of 12,000 tons displacement, 21,000 horse-power, and 1,600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 6 inches of side armor, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 12 3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. In 1902-3 the Drake, Good Hope, Leviathan, and King Alfred were launched. They are of 14,100 tons displacement, 30,000 horse-power, and 2,500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of side armor, and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 16 6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch rapid fire, 3 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. In 1903-4 were launched Kent, Essex, Mon- mouth, Berwick, Donegal, Lancaster, Cornwall, Cumberland, and Suffolk. They are of 9,800 tons displacement, 2,200 horse-power, and 1,600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 4 inches of side armor, and 5 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 14 6-inch rapid fire, 8 3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid fire, and 8 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. In 1905 the Antrim, Carnarvon, Hampshire, Da'onshire, Roxburgh, and in 1906, the Argyle were launched. They are of 10,850 tons displacement, 21,000 horse-power, and 1,800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22.3 knots, 6 inches of side belt, and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 7.5-inch, 6 6-inch rapid fire, 24 small rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. The Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh, Cochratie, and Natal were launched in 1906, and the Achilles and Warrior in 1907. They are of 13,550 tons displacement, 23,500 horse-power, and 2,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22.3 knots, 6 inches of armor belt, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 6 9.2-inch, 10 6-inch rapid fire, 22 small rapid fire, and 8 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes. In 1908 came the Shannon, Minotaur and Defence. They are of 14,600 tons displacement, 27,000 horse-power, and 2,250 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of armor belt, and 8 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 16 6-inch rapid fire, 12 76 EUROPE AT WAR 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes. The details of the actual fighting ships of im- portance are completed with the following seven- teen heavily protected cruisers: Edgar (1893), Endymion (1893), Hawke (1893), Grafton (1894), Theseus (1894), of 7,350 tons dis- placement. They have 12,000 horse-power and 1,250 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19.5 knots, 5 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protec- tion for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 10 6-inch rapid fire, 17 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine gi;r.s. They have 2 torpedo tubes. The Gibrallar, Crescait, and Royal Arthur, of 7,700 tons, have the same speed, armor, and coal capacity. Their armament, however, is 1 9.2-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 19 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns, and 2 torpedo tubes. The Terrible in 1898 was in a class by itself. She is 14,460 tons displacement, 25,000 horse- power, and 3,000 tons coal capacity. She has a speed of 22 knots, 6 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 16 6-inch rapid fire, 16 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. Between 1899 and 1902 twelve heavily pro- tected cruisers were built, all of 11,000 tons dis- placement. The Diadem, Europe, Niobe, and Andromeda had 16,500 horse-power, the Amphi- trite, Argonaut, Ariadne, and Spartiate, 18,000 horse-power. Each has 2,000 tons coal capacity; a speed of 20.5 knots, 4 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The arma- ment consists of 16 6-inch rapid fire, 12 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. The first eight of these ships are comparable to our Saratoga and Brooklyn. The others are larger, but have not higher speed than these two. They could not stand for a moment before any of the classes preceding them. Following these are eight of 3,600 tons dis- placement which should be ready this year. They were designed for scouts. They have 37,000 horse-power turbines, and a designed speed of 30 knots. They carry only the light armament of 2 6-inch rapid fire, 6 4-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. Eight more of 8,740 tons of 40,000 horse-power, and 30 knots, with the same armament, the same fuel capacity (of 750 tons of oU) will not be ready until next year. AU have a belt of 3-inch steel and 4-inch protection for the guns. They are, of course, in no sense fight- ing ships, but their role is of the utmost import- ance; that of supplying information regarding the whereabouts of an enemy. Of the seventy protected light cruisers now ready (twenty-eight of which antedate 1900), varying from 2,135 to 5,880 tons, there are twenty- six with a speed of 25 knots. None carry heavier than 6-inch guns and can be reckoned, for war, chiefly as scouts. No one of them has more than 1,225 tons fuel capacity, and most of them much less. Their radius of action is thus moderate. One hundred and thirty-four of the 232 com- pleted destroyers are of ocean-going type, and nearly all these are oil-bumers and of from 30 to 35 knots. All e.xceed 700 tons displacement; 70 exceed 800 tons; 40 are about 1,000 and 16 are from 1,200 to 1,350 tons. One, the Swift, launched so long ago as 1907, has a displacement of 2,170 tons, 30,000 horse-power, and a speed of 36 knots. All are armed usually with 4-inch guns not exceeding four in number, and the majority carry 21-inch torpedo tubes. Such torpedoes of the best type have a range of more than five sea miles (say six land mUes) at an average speed of 24 knots. Great Britain has 75 destroyers and 22 building. In addition to the ships mentioned, England has at command 3 merchant steamers of more than 25 knots; 4 of from 22 to 25; 11 from 20 to 22, and 29 from 18 to 20. These can all be utilized for cruising, but they can play no real part in the present war except as against Like vessels of Germany, which latter is almost equally well off in this respect. FRANCE The French navy, though fourth in rank of naval Powers, naturally comes after that of England as an ally. There are on the list eight- een battleships of the older types which can be considered serviceable, ranging in dates of launch- ing from 1894 to 1909. As generally in France not less than four, and often five, years passed from the time of "laying down" to completion, it will be seen that most of these eighteen are by THE NAVIES 77 no means modem. Four up-to-date modem ships are, however, completed and are ready for service. The Carnot was launched in 1896. Her dis- placement is 11,954 tons, her horse-power 15,000 and her coal capacity 700 tons. Her speed is 18 knots, her side armor 17.75 inches, and her big gun protection 13.75 inches. Her armament, like that of the Massena, launched in 1898, is 2 12- inch, 2 io.8-inch, 8 5.5-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns, and 2 torpedo tubes above water, and 2 below. The Massena's displacement is 11,735 tons, her horse-power 13,500, and her coal capacity 800 tons. Her speed is iS knots, her side armor is 17.75 inches, and the big gun pro- tection from 8.5 to 16 inches. In 1898 France also launched the Charlemagne, and Gaidois, and in 1900 the St. Louis. They are of about 11,000 tons displacement, 14,500 horse- power, and 1,100 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 14 inches of side armor, and from 8 to 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 12 5. 5-inch rapid fire, 8 3.9-lnch rapid fire, 20 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes. The Bouvet (1898) of 12,000 tons, has 14,000 horse-power, and 800 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 16 inches side armor, and 8 to 14.75 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 212- inch, 2 io.8-mch rapid fire 8 5.5-inch rapid fire, and 19 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below water. The Suffren (1903), of 12,527 tons, has 16,200 horse-power, and 1,820 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 11 inches side armor, and 9 to 13 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch, 10 6.4-inch rapid fire, 8 3.9-inch rapid fire, and 30 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below. The Republique (1906) and Patrie (1907), of 14,635 tons has 18,000 horse-power, and 1,825 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 11 inches side armor, and 9 to 13 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch, 18 6.4-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller gims. She has 2 torpedo tubes under water. The Democratie, the Justice, and the Veriti were launched in 1908. They are of 14,640 tons displacement, 18,000 horse-power, and 1,825 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 11 inches of side armor. and from 9 to 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 10 7.6-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. In 191 1 came the Danton, Mirabeau, Diderot, Condorcet, Voltaire, and in 191 2 the Vergniaud. They are of 18,027 tons displacement, 22,500 horse-power (turbine) and 2,100 tons coal capac- ity. They have a speed of 19.25 knots, 10 inches of side armor and from 9 to 1 2 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 12 9.4-inch rapid fire, 16 3-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. The Jean Bart and the Courhet were launched in 1913, and the France and Paris in 1914. They are of 23,095 tons displacement, 28,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3,000 tons coal capac- ity. They have a speed of 20 knots, io| inches of side armor, and from 9 to 1 2 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 12-inch, 22 5.5-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. There are building, to be completed in the next two years, eight more ships of about the same dis- placement as the last four, six of which are to have one knot more of speed with 11 and i2f inches of side armor and the last five with 9 to 17 inches of big-gun protection. Three of these ships are to carry 10 13.4-inch guns, and the others 12. None are now ready. France has no battle-cruisers but has nineteen armored cruisers, one of which, the Pothuau, is of but 5,374 tons; one the Jeanne d'Arc of 1 1 ,092 ; three, the Gueydon, Montcalm, and Dupetit Thouars of 9,367; three (completed in 1903), the Dupleix, Desaix, and Kleber of 7,578 tons four the Marseillaise, Gloire, Aube, and Conde of 9,856 tons; three (completed in 1904- 1906), the Leon Gambetla, Jules Ferry, and Victor Hugo of 12,351 tons; two (1908 and 1909) the Jules Michelet, and Ernest Renan of 12,370 and 13,427 tons; and two (1910 and 191 1), the Edgar Quinet and Waldeck Rousseau of 13,780 tons. The heavier of these ships has a designed speed of 23 to 23^ knots, 6 to 6; inches side armor, and 8-inch protection to their larger guns. They carry from 2,100 to 2,300 tons of coal. Their main batteries are generally of 2 7.6-inch rapid fire, and 8 6.4-inch rapid fire. The Gambetla class, however, carries 4 7.6-inch with 16 6.4-inch, both rapid fire. The 78 EUROPE AT WAR Edgar Quinel and Waldeck Rousseau carry 14 7.6-inch rapid fire. Two protected cruisers, the D'Entrecasteaux and Guichen, and 10 Hght cruisers of no fighting importance complete the list of French ships. France is, however, strong, so far as numbers go, in destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines, having ready 84 of the first with displacements from 276 to 804 tons and speeds of 28 and 31 knots. She has 135 torpedo boats and 78 sub- marines, but many of these are of small size. One hundred and one of her torpedo boats are of but about 95 tons, and 20 of the submarines have a displacement of but 67 tons. They can hardly cut any figure except for purely local defence. Thirty- three of the submarines, however, have a surface displacement of 390 tons; 2 of 410; 6 of about 550; 2 of 785, and 7 of 830. The surface displacement is usually (roughly) about 70 per cent, of the submerged. These larger submarines carry from 6 to 8 torpedo tubes. Twelve now building of 520 (surface) tons displacement have Diesel motors of 2,000 horse-power. They are expected to have a surface speed of 1 75 knots and a speed of 8 knots submerged. This last class will carry four small guns. There are attached to the fleet 16 auxiliaries as mine layers, submarine destroyers, and aero- plane mother ships, of from 300 to 7,898 tons; half, however, are under i ,000 tons. RUSSIA Russia, since her fateful struggle with Japan, has diligently labored to reestablish her fleet, but she has not as yet made any great actual headway. But three of her old battleships were left from the wreck of the war, the Tri Sviatit- elia, the PanleleUnon, and Czarevitch. The Tri Sviatitelia, of 1896 (in the Black Sea), has a displacement of 13,318 tons, 10,600 horse- power, a speed of 17 knots, and coal capacity of 1,000 tons. Her side armor is 16 inches and the big gun protection from 12 to 16 inches. She has 4 12-inch, 10 6-inch rapid fire, and 4 4.7-inch rapid fire guns and 2 torpedo tubes above water. In the Black Sea also is the Panleleimon (1902), of 12,480 tons, has 10,600 horse-power, and 1,250 coal capacity, 1 7 knots speed, 7 to 9 inches of side armor, and 10 to 12 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch, 16 6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch and 28 smaller guns. She has 5 torpedo tubes under water. The Czarevitch (1902), of 12,912 tons has 16,300 horse-power and 1,360 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 10 inches side armor, and 8 to 11 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch rapid fire, 1 2 6-inch rapid fire, 20 3-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes under water. The Slava (1906), of 13,516 tons, has 16,000 horse-power and 1,250 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 10 inches side armor, and 8 to 11 inches of protection for the big guns. Her arma- ment is the same as that of the Czarevitch. The Ivan Zlatoust (1910) and the Elstafi (1911) are both in the Black Sea. They are 12,733 tons displacement, 10,600 horse-power, and 1,400 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 16 knots, 7 to 9 inches of armor belt, and from 10 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 4 8-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes. In 1911 the Andreas Pervozvanni and the Im- perator Pavel I were launched. They are of 17,200 tons displacement, 17,600 horse-power, and 3,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 11 inches of side armor, and from 10 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 14 8-inch, 20 4.7-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes. There are altogether six armored cruisers, none of which are in the Black Sea. The Rossia (189S), of 12,130 tons has 18,000 horse-power and 2,500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 5 to 10 inches side armor, and 2 inches of protection for the big guns. She car- ries 4 8-inch, 22 6-inch rapid fire, 12 3-inch rapid fire, and 36 smaller guns. She has 5 torpedo tubes above water. The Gromoboi (1901), of 12,336 tons, has 18,000 horse-power and 2,500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 6 inches side armor, and 2 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 8- inch, 22 6-inch, 20 3-inch, and 31 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below. The Rurik (1907), of 15,170 tons, has 19,700 horse-power, and 2,000 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 6 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 10- J THE NAVIES 79 inch, 8 8-inch, 20 4.7-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. Slie has 2 torpedo tubes under water. The Admiral Makharof was launched in 1907, and the Pallada and Bay an in 191 1. They are of 7,900 tons displacement, 16,500 horse-power, and 1,020 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 4 to 8 inches of side armor, and from 3 to 7 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 8-inch, 8 6-inch rapid fire, 20 3-inch rapid fire, and 7 smaller guns. There are eight cruisers, of from 3,100 to 6,700 tons, of no fighting value however. These are the Askold (at Vladivostolc), Diana, Aurora, Kagiil (Black Sea), Oleg, Pamyal Merkurya (Black Sea), Zemtchug (Vladivostok), and Almaz (Black Sea). Russia has but 14 torpedo boats, all small and of little value. She is, however, fairly well off as to destroyers and submarines. She has 91 of the former, 34 of which exceed 500 tons in dis- placement, and ten are more than i ,000. About thirty of these destroyers are in the Black Sea and six at Vladivostok. Of the 55 submarines built or building, 37 are completed. Twenty- two, however, are under 135 tons surface dis- placement; twelve are of 360 tons or more, rising to 500. GERMANY Turning to the three Powers of the other alliance (though Italy at the moment of writing is not yet involved in the war), Germany of course has easily the lead, with 36 battleships, 5 battle- cruisers, 9 armored cruisers and 43 cruisers, as her sea fleet. She also has, complete, 130 destroj'ers and 27 submarines. Her 16 torpedo boats are too small to be of value, her attention being given, very wisely, to the destroyer instead. The following is the list of her battle fleet: The Kaiser Friedrich III (1898), Kaiser Wil- helni II, (1900), Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse (1901), Kaiser Karl der Grosser (1901), Kaiser Barbarossa (1901) form the first type. They are of 10,614 tons displacement, 13,000 horse-power, and 1,050 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 12 inches of side armor, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 9.4-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes. The second type- includes the Wittelshach, Weliin, Zdhringen, launched in 1902, and the Schwaben and Mecklenburg of 1903. They are of 11,643 tons displacement, 14,000 horse-power, and 1,450 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 9 inches of side armor, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 9.4-inch, 18 5.9-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have i torpedo tube above water, and 5 under water. In 1904 the Braunschweig was launched, the Elsass, Hessen, and Preussen in 1905, and the Loihringen in 1906. They are of 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000 horse-power, and 1,800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 9.75 inches of side armor, and 1 1 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 ii-inch, 14 6.7-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have i torpedo tube above water and 2 below. In 1906, 1907, and 1908 Germany built the Deutschland, Hannover, Pommern, Schlesien, and Schleswig-Holsiein. They are of 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000 horse-power, and 1,800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of iS knots, 9.75 inches of side armor, and 1 1 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 ii-inch, 14 6.7-inch rapid fire, 22 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller machine guns. They have 6 toq^edo tubes. In 1909 and 19 10 Germany built two ships a 3'ear, the Nassau and Westfalen in 1909 and the Rheinland and Posen in 1910. They are of iS,6oo tons displacement, 20,000 horse-power, and 2,700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19.5 knots, 9.75 inches of side armor, and 1 1 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 ii-inch, 12 5.9-inch rapid fire, 16 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes. In 191 1 three ships were launched, the Ost- friesland, the Helgoland, and the Thuringen. In 191 2 there was but one, the Oldenburg. They are of 22,440 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 3,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20.5 knots, 11 inches of side armor belt and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 12-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 14 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes. 8o EUROPE AT WAR In 1913 there were five battleships: the Fried- rick der Crosse, Kaiser, Kaiser in, Konig Albert, Prinz Regent Luitpold. They are of 24,310 tons displacement, 28,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3,600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 13 inches of side armor, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 1 2-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 1 2 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes. For 1914 there are the Markgraf, the Grosser KurjUrsl, and the Konig. They are of 26,575 tons displacement, 35,000 horse-power (turbine). They have a speed of 22 knots, 13 inches of side armor, and 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 14-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes. The Von der Tann (1910), of 19,400 tons, has 43,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2,800 tons coal capacity; 25 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 8 ii-inch, 10 5. 9-inch rapid fire, and 16 3 .4-inch rapid fire guns. She had 4 torpedo tubes. The Moltke (1911) and Goeben (1912), of 22,640 tons, have 52,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3,100 tons coal capacity; 25.5 knots speed, 4 to 8 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry 10 ii-inch, 12 5.9- inch rapid fire, and 12 3.4-inch rapid fire guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes. The Seydlitz (1913) is the same as the Moltke, except its displacement is 24,610 tons and its horse-power 63,000. The Derflinger (1914) of 28,000 tons has 100,000 horse-power (turbine), and 30 knots speed; gf inches of side armor. Her armament is unknown except that she has 6 torpedo tubes. The Fiirst Bismarck (1900) of 10,570 tons, has 14,000 horse-power and 1,250 tons coal capacity 19 knots speed, 4 to 8 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She car- ries 4 9.4-inch, 12 5.9-inch rapid fire, 10 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. She has i tor- pedo tube above water and 2 below. Prinz Heinrich (1902) of 8,759 tons, has 15,000 horse-power, and 1,500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 2 to 4 inches side armor, and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 2 9.4-inch, 10 5.9-inch rapid fire, 10 3.4- inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. She has i torpedo tube above water and 2 below. The Prinz Adalbert (1903) and Friedrick Karl (1904) of 8,858 tons, have 18,500 horse-power, and 1,500 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 3 to 4 inches side armor, and 4 to 6 inches of protec- tion for the big guns. They carry 4 8.2-inch, 10 5.9-inch rapid fire, 10 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have i torpedo tube above water and 3 below. The Roon and the Yorck (1905), of 9,350 tons have 19,000 horse-power, and 1,600 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 3 to 4 inches side armor, and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry 4 8.2-inch, 10 s.g-inch rapid fire, 16 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes. The Scharnhorst (1907) and Gneisenau (1908) of 11,420 tons, have 26,000 horse-power, 22.5 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armor, and 6 to 6.75 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry 8 8.2-inch, 6 5.9-inch rapid fire, 20 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes. The Blilcher (1909), of 15,550 tons, has 32,000 horse-power, 24 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armor, and 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 12 8.2-inch rapid fire, 8 5.9- inch rapid fire, 16 3.4-inch rapid fire. She has 4 torpedo tubes. The Magdeburg, Breslau, Strassburg, and Stral- sund were launched in 191 2. They are of 4,478 tons displacement, 22,300 to 25,000 horse-power (turbine), and 1,200 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 26.75 knots, 4 inches of side armor, and 3 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 4.1-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. The Karlsruhe and Rostock were launched in 1913. They are of 4,820 tons displacement, 30,000 horse-power (turbine), and 1,300 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 26.75 knots, 4 inches of side armor, and 3 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 1 2 4. i- inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. Though these are reckoned by an English authority as armored cniisers, their armor, and particularly their gun protection, is too slight to bring them properly in the category. They MOBILIZATION 8i are really scouts and of a high quality, as on their trial they were nearly a knot to two knots above their designed speed, the Strassburg show- ing 28.8. Some of the next class, the protected cruisers, 39 in number, have practically equal value as scouts, the Kolberg, Mainz, Koln, and Augsburg, of 4,281 tons, with turbines of 19,600 horse-power, showing on trial from 26.32 to 27.23 knots, and 28 of them from 21 to 24. Germany is unusually strong in destroyers, of which she has 143. Forty- two of these are from 350 to 413 tons; 5 of 480; 13 from 530 to 560; 47 of about 650; 36 of 840 and 900 tons. Along with these are 27 submarines, 16 of which have a surface speed of 18 knots and 12 under water. What is known as the type U21, one of which passed into service last year, has a length of 213 feet 8 inches, and 20 feet beam. AUSTRIA Austria, Germany's supporter, has nine battle- ships ready, all which have been completed since 1905, as follows: In 1906 the Erzherzog Karl and Erzlierzog Friedrich were launched, and in 1907 the Erzher- zog Ferdinand Max. They are of 10,433 tons displacement, 14,000 horse-power, and 1,315 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19.25 knots, 6 to 8.25 inches of side armor, and 9.5-inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 9.4-inch, 12 7.6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch rapid fire, and 16 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes. In 1910 came the Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, and in 191 1 the Radetzky and Zrinyi. They are of 14,268 tons displacement, 20,000 horse-power, and 1,200 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 9 inches of side armor, and 9.75 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 8 9-inch, 20 3.9-inch rapid fire, 6 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes. In 1912, the Viribus Unitis was launched, in 1913 the Teggethof and the Prinz Eugen. They are of 20,000 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 2,500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 11 inches of side armor^ and II inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 12-inch, 12 5.9-inch rapid fire, 18 14-pounder rapid fire, and 4 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes. The Kaiserin Maria Theresa (1895), of 5,187 tons, has 9,000 horse-power and 740 tons coal capacity; 19 knots speed, 4 inches side armor, and 4 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 2 7.6-inch rapid fire, 8 6-inch rapid fire, and 22 smaller guns. She has 4 torpedo tubes above water. The Kaiser Karl VI (1900), of 6,151 tons, has 12,000 horse-power and 820 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 8.5 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big gims. She carries 2 9.4- inch, 8 6-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water. The St. Georg (1906), of 7,185 tons, has 12,300 horse-power and 1,000 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 6.5 inches side armor, and 5 to 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She car- ries 2 9.4-inch, 5 7.6-inch rapid fire, 4 6-inch rapid fire, and 17 smaller gims. She has 2 tor- pedo tubes. The ten light cruisers of Austria, varying in size from 1,506 tons to 3,966, call for no par- ticular remark excepting the two last completed: the Admiral Spaun, of 3,500 tons, 20,000 horse- power, and 27 knots, and the Saida, of the same tonnage, but of 25,000 horse-power and (proba- bly) 28 knots. Both have turbine engines. Their chief value in war could be only as scouts. There are 18 destroyers; 12 of 384 tons with 285 knots. These latter carry 4 12-pounders and two 21-inch torpedo tubes. They have oil fuel. The six submarines are of but moderate size, ranging from 216 to 235 tons at the surface. HOW EUROPE TAKES THE FIELD: MOBILIZATION BY T. LOTHROP STODDARD THE idea underlying all modern Continental armies is universal military service, — that compulsory instruction of every able- bodied citizen which has resulted in the "Nation in Arms." In itself this idea is very old. It pre- vailed in the city-states of Ancient Greece and in the Roman Republic. B ut throughout the Middle Ages it almost dropped out of sight, while the 82 EUROPE AT WAR subsequent rise of despotic monarchies apparently gave in its death-blow. At the close of the Eigh- teenth Century' European armies were invariably small bodies of highly trained professional soldiers (largely foreign mercenaries), officered by noble- men inspired by feudal loyalty to their royal over-lord, the king. Such an army was pre- eminently the "King's Own"; it was quite out of touch with the nation at large whose chief military contribution in peace or war was the payment of taxes for the support of the king's army. The French Revolution gave this military sys- tem its death-blow and laid the foundation for the existing order of things. With the overthrow of the French crown the old "king's army" went to pieces, but since France was assailed by all Europe she was forced to improvise an army or die. The army was found through the new principle of the "levee en masse," — the rising of the na- tion to resist the in\'ader. The levee en masse produced enormous masses of men, entirely un- trained, of course, but full of fanatical courage, and since their opponents were small armies of professional soldiers too valuable to be rashly risked by generals possessing no adequate reserve forces, the French succeeded in beating off their enemies, and when a campaign or two had turned these raw le\'ies into veteran soldiers the vast French armies overran all Europe. True, the levee en masse had to be supplemented bj' the "conscription" (the taking of a certain percentage of available men by lot), yet even under the First Empire the French armies were more "national" than the old "king's armies" had ever been. Prussia's system, — "the nation in arms" However, neither the levee en masse nor the conscription produced the "nation in arms" of the present day. The volunteer or conscript of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire became in his turn a professional soldier and the exempted majority of the nation remained as untrained and unmiUtary as before. The next step toward the modern system was taken by Prussia. In the Eighteenth Century Prussia had been Europe's military teacher and possessed the most perfect "king's army" of the day. But the war with Napoleon in 1806 revealed the helpless- ness of the old order in face of the new French system. Once beaten at Jena, there were no reser\'es to reform the shattered army and resis- tance absolutely collapsed. However, in the ver>- depth of her humiliation Prussia found her salva- tion. Napoleon had limited the Prussian army to a merely nominal figure, but the Prussians cleverly turned the difficulty by making this small force consist largely of officers and under-officers, passing the entire youth of the country through the ranks in quick relays of intensive training, while at the same time possessing in the abnor- mally large number of officers and subalterns the permanent framework of a large army whenever the trained privates should be recalled from civil life to the colors. Here at last was the germ of that short-term, universal military service which has produced the modern "nation in arms." Nevertheless, nearly half a century was to elapse before the new system came into general use. The importance of the Prussian innovation was not realized by other nations, while in tmlitarj^ matters as in everything else the poHtical reaction following Napoleon's overthrow brought about a partial return to Eighteenth Century conditions. The "nation in arms" had a very uncongenial sound to absolute monarchs menaced by popular discontent; accordingly, long-service professional armies again became the rule, even Prussia show- ing no signs of militar}' progress for some time. But the troubled period after 1848 and the cry for German unity spurred Prussia to action, and under the guidance of that brilliant gala.xy of mili- tarj^ talent personified by Von Roon and Moltke Prussia perfected the system which in essence prevails to the present hour. The proposition of the "nation in arms" once assumed as a theoretical necessity, three problems were bound up with its successful reaUzation. These were: (i) Classification for future military service of the trained citizens returned to civil life; (2) their rapid assemblage at the required moment (3) their effective handling upon the theatre of hostiHties. These three problems are best summed up in the words "Reserve," "Mobiliza- tion," and " General Staff." THE "three-line" RESERVE SYSTEM The Reserve problem is clearly the first for solution. Here is the entire able-bodied citizen- ship of a large state Uable to miUtary service dur- ing a long period of years, — generally between the ages of twenty and forty-five. How does this MOBILIZATION 83 work out in practice? The first step is self-evident. Every year all the able-bodied young men of twenty are called to the colors and pass a certain length of time (generally two or three years), in acquiring their military training. Thereafter they return to civil life. It is obvious that in course of time milHons of trained men may be available in case of war. But it is equally obvious that they should be recalled for war-service not en masse but by degrees, with due regard for maximum military fitness and minimum disorgani- zation of the social and economic fabric of society. All this was worked out by the Prussians in their generally adopted "three-line" system of "Active Reserve," "Landwehr" and "Land- sturm." The Active Reserve is composed of those citizens only two or three years out of their mili- tary service. In wartime these join their old regiments of the peace-army at once, and since these regiments always possess an abnormally large proportion of officers and under-officers, the army which takes the field immediately after the outbreak of war is automatically doubled without being diluted, since the framework is fully equal to the increase in the ranks, while the reservists have not had time to lose the knack of their mili- tary duties. The next step is the calling out of the "Landwehr," or second Une, — citizens in the prime of life, generally about equal in numbers to the field army. These second-line reservists have already been enrolled in separate Landwehr regi- ments, with their own framework of officers and under-officers. They are at first used exclusively for garrison duty, guarding communications, etc., although after they have gotten back into shape many of them are sent to the front to repair the wastage of the field army. The third line, or "Landsturm," is not called out except as a last resort. It is obvious that these men of middle life, with settled positions and large families, will be relatively incapable of performing good mili- tary service, while their call to the colors will produce the greatest hardship and disorganization in the civil life of the nation. In any event they are used only for home duty. REGIONAL MOBILIZATION Having thus organized and classified a nation's trained citizenship, the next step is to assemble it in the hour of peril. This process is known as "mobilization." Applying as it does to millions of individuals scattered over a whole country, mobilization is naturally an extremely complex and dehcate affair, yet rapid mobilization is abso- lutely necessary, for since modern warfare has be- come more and more a matter of initial crushing blows followed up relentlessly to the end, it is quite plain that the nation which mobiUzes more quickly and smoothly than its opponent is already half assured of victory. The key to the riddle was found by the Prussians in their "regional army-corps" system, whereby the army is divided into army corps, each corps permanently located in a certain region and recruiting therefrom. This works well in both peace and war. The youth does his military service near home, mobilization generally finds the reservist within call of his barracks, and everyone goes to war surrounded by comrades of ids own kind. The chief military objection to regional mobilization is the possibility of a smaller but long-service professional army smaslung suddenly into the midst of the process, but as all the continental states to-day have the same system, this objection is of no practical im- portance. After mobilization comes "concentra- tion," or the transport of the assembled army corps to the theatre of hostilities|and their junction therein as an articulated lighting machine. To- day this is largely a railroad problem, and strate- gic railway Unes cover the map of Europe. THE GENERAL STAFF The third problem solved by the Prussian theor- ists of the mid-Nineteenth Century was raised by the enormous size of modem armies and by the extensive area of battlefields consequent upon the introduction of long-range rifles and artillery. Only a century ago the commander-in-chief, seated upon an adjacent hiU, could overlook and direct the whole course of a battle. This has now become impossible. Accordingly, to ensure smooth coordination, the directinggroupof officers must be previously trained, not merely to think, but to fed aUke, so that a few broad general orders win ensure harmonious development of a major operation extending over a wide theatre of action. This has been effected by the "General Staff," the keystone of the modern edifice of war. Such are the three solutions which enabled the Prussians to crush the old long-service, professional armies of Austria and France in 1866 and 1870, together with the French "levee en masse" of 84 EUROPE AT WAR 187 1. Prussia thereupon became the military of so many lambs to the slaughter. And since schoolmaster of Europe, exactly as she had done this is an experts' war, such blunders will assuredly a century before, after the victories of Frederick not take place. With these preliminary remarks the Great. All the continenUl armies are to- in mind, let us begin with the common archetype, day patterned on the Prussian model, albeit they — the German army, differ sufficiently in numbers, composition, and ^^„,,„ > ^ , . r . GERMANY 'S EFFECTIVE MILITARY STRENGTH organization to warrant a brief comparative . analysis During the last few years the German army has ARMY STATISTICS ^^^^ greatly strengthened, but not to such an ex- Before proceeding to our detailed examination ^'"\^' ^^ °'^''^ *^^ theoretical universal miUtary of the various European military estabhshments, ^""^^^^ ^ "^"^'" °^ ^^^^^^ P-'^^tice. Germany's one word of explanation seems necessary. The g^eat population of nearly 70,000,000 gives her a press just now is full of statistics giving the im- ^uperfuity of men, and only half the able-bodied pression that nearly 20,000,000 soldiers are en- ^""f^ °^ ^^^ ^'"P^''^ ^^^ually do service with the gaged in the present struggle. Now the true ^^ f--^' fhe other half being assigned to the so- figures are tremendous enough, but they are ^^f. Ersatz-Reserve," where they get a Ught certainly far below the current "estimates." "^^'^ trammg. In war time, however, these There is no doubt that the contending nations ^'"^t^" reservists are caUed up, the younger possess 20,000,000 able-bodied men, aU of whom f° *^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ regimental depots to be drilled might ultimately see service should the war prove ^'^^ ordmary recrmts for service in the field, the to be of long duration. But the frightful, econo- ^^'* apportioned according to age among the mic strain mvolved in the present conflict, to- Landwehr regiments or m the Landsturm. This gether with the very nature of modern warfare ^''^^^ Germany a plentiful supply of recruits in itself, combine to make a European war extending *^^ ^'''■^'"^^ P^"°^ two or three months after the over two or three years a highly improbable con- begmnmg of war without the disorganization of tingency. Everything points to the conclusion ^^^ Landwehr units by drafts for decimated field that this struggle will be decided in one or, at regiments. The peace strength of the German most, two campaigns. It has, therefore, seemed ^^^^ ^""my (deducting permanent garrison units, advisable to give only the net figures of trained '^^P"* ^'^^P'' ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ 800,000 with 650,000 troops avaUable for field service during this period. ^^^"-^^ reservists called to the colors at once and We must never forget that modem warfare is a "^^^ 400,000 young, able-bodied Ersatz reservists highly technical science demanding expert knowl- training m the regimental depots and fit for service edge of those engaged m its pursuit. Its very "^ ^ ^^°rt time. The Landwehr is subdivided instruments are useless m unskiUed hands. To "^^o two " bans," according to age, each ban num- train even a private soldier is a process of months, ^^"ng about 600,000. The trained portion of the especially in the cavalry and artUlery branches, Landsturm, some 400,000 strong, consisting of while the production of capable officers and under- "'^ between thirty-nine and forty-five years of officers requires years. Furthermore, modem age, would be fau-ly efiective for home-guard and warfare has become to such an extent a matter of gamson duty. The untramed portion, slightly artUlery practice and the consumption of these °'°''^ numerous, would probably not be caUed out slowly produced objects is so rapid that the size "^ ^"^ ^^^"t. Here, then, m round numbers, is of an army is practicaUy restricted by its quota of the effective mihtary strength of Germany m the gun batteries and reserve material. When we Present crisis: add the complications of transport, for the feeding ^^'^^, ^ '"'^ ^Pf ^^<= strength and active reserves) i ,430,000 , . . ., t- ' o t.rsatz Kecnats (available for active service in and supply of these vast masses of men, we can a short time) 400,000 readily see the practical limitations imposed upon ^'!<'«"^^/ ('^^ ban) (fit for field work after a , .-^ , - , J . „ .,. ^ time if necessary) 600,000 the Size of field armies. Every mihtary expert Total effective field forces 2,450,000 knows that to send hosts of half-trained infantry laiidmhr (2nd ban) (for garrison and covering commanded by virtually xmtrained officers and duty) 600,000 • ■v. , . 1 i- r 1 i'li Laiidsturm (trained) (for garrison and home without the proper proportion of cavalry, artillery, ju^y ^^y] 400,000 and allied technical branches, would be sending Grand total effective forces 3,450,000 MOBILIZATION 85 Austria's three-fold organization Turning next to Germany's ally, Austria- Hungary, we find a state of things very different from the highly unified German military machine. The peculiar constitution of the Dual Monarchy is reflected in its army. Austria-Hungary has, in fact, three separate military estabhshments : the common Imperial-Royal army (" KaiserUche Koenigliche"), the Austrian "Landwehr," and the Hungarian "Honved." These last two terms must not be confused with the German Landwehr, or 2nd reserves. In the Dual Monarchy the annual classes coming up for military training are apportioned among the three establishments and ever after remain subject to service only in the particular establishment to which they have been originally assigned, each establishment having its own reserve organization. The result of all this is a highly complex system which makes mobili- zation both slow and difficult. Fortunately for the strikuig power of Austria-Hungary, the Im- perial-Royal army is far stronger than the other two establishments put together, its peacestrength being 340,000 effectives, whereas the "Landwehr' and "Honved" number only 48,000 and 36,000, respectively. As no official figures of reserves or Landsturm are published, the war strength of Austria-Hungary is somewhat problematical- The best estimates of the effective field army are somewhat as follows: Imperial-Royal Army (with reserves) 600,000 ^'Landwehr " and " Honved " (with reserves) .... 230,000 Ersatz Reserves, etc. (available for active service later) 220,000 Total effective field forces 1,050,000 UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN FRANCE Having thus considered the fighting power of Germany and Austria-Hungary, let us now exam- ine the military strength of their opponents. First of all, France. The stationary population of the RepubUc (to-day only 39,600,000) has made France the classic example of absolutely universal military service. France's desperate efforts to maintain a field army as large as that of her Ger- man neighbor have resulted in the enrolment of every Frenchman not positively unfit for mili- tary service. Indeed, even men with slight physi- cal defects are required to serve in the non- combatant branches of the army. In principle the German three-line reserve system is in force. though with a different classification. The Land- wehr and Landsturm are here combined into the so-caUed "Territorial Army," with a complete organization of its own, the Landwehr classes com- posing the Territorial first-line, the Landsturm classes forming the Territorial reserve. Another point to be noted is that since France possesses a large colonial empire, she maintains a distinct colonial army of the old professional type, it being composed of long-service troops, obtained mainly through voluntary enlistment and consisting of vigorous men in the prime of life. These "regulars," seasoned by actual foreign service, should prove of high fighting power, since the long-service regular, man for man, is normally superior to the ordinary short-term citizen soldier. Again, in addition to this white colonial force. France possesses a considerable native army recruited among the Arab-Berbers of Algeria and the warlike blacks of Senegal. The white colonial army numbers 47,000, the native troops 93,000, but it is evident that not much more than half these forces could be spared from the colonies for European service. The effective fighting strength of France is therefore as follows: Peace Establishment (metropolitan army) 800,000 Reserves (active, available at once) 500,000 Colonial and Native Troops (for European serv- ice) 80,000 Total field army immediately available . .. 1,380,000 Reserves (2nd line) (fit for field work if necessary) 600,000 Total effective field forces 1,980,000 Territorial Army (active) (for garrison and cover- ing duty) 500,000 Territorial Reserves (trained) (for home duty only) 300,000 Grand total effective forces 2,780,000 RUSSIA'S SLOW MOBILIZATION From France let us turn to Russia. Certainly, at first sight, the eastern member of the Triple Entente looks formidable enough to meet both Germany and Austria-Hungary single-handed. Russia's vast population of nearly 180,000,000 together with her huge size, covering one-sLxth of the entire land surface of the globe, apparently imply overwhelming armies of soldiers. How- ever, as a matter of fact, the very vastness of the Russian Empire involves such problems of dis- tance and multiplicity of interests that much of its strength can never be brought to bear on any 86 EUROPE one given point, while its \vretched roads and inad- equate railway system prevent the eiTective devel- opment of all the forces possessed by even the European portion. These drawbacks become most apparent during the Russian mobiUzation, which is far slower than that of any other great power. Reservists often have to walk great dis- tances to arrive at their mihtary depots, and the inadequate train service correspondingly hinders the concentration of the mobilized army corps. So keenly has Russia felt her handicaps in this respect that she to-day makes no serious effort to hold Russian Poland, stretching so temptingly between East Prussia and Austrian Galicia, but is mobilizing far to the eastward, which will mean a very long-delayed advance. The Russian peace estabUshment is certainly enormous, numbering, as it does, about 1,200,000, but of these 200,000 are m Asia (Siberia, Turkestan, and Manchuria), while 100,000 are in Transcaucasia, and neither of these armies can be safely denuded for the European theatre of war. Also, the huge population of European Russia can be drawn upon only to a certain point, since Russia possesses neither the artillery nor the permanent framework of ofBcers and subalterns required for the effective employment of such vast masses of men. The actual strength of the Rus- sian field army which will be employed against Germany and Austria-Hungary will probably be about as follows: Peace Establishment (European army) 900,000 Reserves (active) (immediately available) 600,000 Second Reserves (available after some time) .... 1,1 00,000 Total effective field forces 2,600,000 Italy's military establishment Before discussing the peculiar military estab- Ushment of the British Empire, the third member of the Triple Entente, it may be as well to cast a glance at the one great European power still holding aloof from the present struggle, — Italy. The first thing that strikes one's attention is the fact that despite Italy's large population of 36,000,000 its army is smaller than might be anticipated. Italy's poverty does not permit it to train even half the annual quota of its able- bodied youth, the majority thus relieved from serv- ice with the colors receiving either a brief militia training or no military education at all. Further- more, mobilization is handicapped by three un- AT WAR favorable factors. In the first place Italy's penin- sular shape makes a strict regional distribution of its army corps a strategical impossibility; the bulk of the army must be kept at all times in the e.xtreme north in close proximity to the land fron- tiers. Also the still imperfect fusion of Italy's diverse populations has led the government to mi.\ men from every province of the country in the same regimental units, in order to hasten the break-up of local particularism and further Italian Unity. In war-time, however, these combined factors spell a slow and complex mobilization, many reser- vists having to travel great distances in order to rejoin their regiments. Another unfavorable mihtary factor is the extensive Italian emigration, which deprives the country in a sudden emergency of hundreds of thousands of its most vigorous reservists and entirely disorganizes many mihtar>' units. As nearly as can be estimated the actual effective strength of the Italian army is as follows: Peace EstabUshment 270,000 Reserves (active) (immediately available) 250,000 Mobile Militia (available for field duly after some time) 300,000 Total effective field army 820,000 Territorial Militia (trained) (for garrison and home duty) 700,000 Grand total effective forces i ,s 20,000 THE BRITISH ARMY — A SURVIVAL Looked at from the Continental point of view the British army is in every respect a "pecuhar institution." Unlike any of the great European military establishments, it is in fact a survival of the old Eighteenth Century system. A small army of long-service professional soldiers, officered by aristocrats, the British regular army has owed its continued e.xistence to England's insular posi- tion and to the fact that until the recent rise of German sea-power the Enghsh fleet afforded an absolute guarantee against any possible invasion by a Continental "nation in arms." The British regular army estabhshment on a peace footing numbers only 156,000 effectives, partly stationed abroad, and though many of the time-e.xpired soldiers are enrolled in a reserve organization, the British army on a war footing is numerically less imposing than that of several minor European states. True, the last few years have seen the formation of the "Territorial Army," a volunteer organization now numbering about 250,000, but MOBILIZATION 87 military experts everywhere have been a unit in declaring that such militia could not stand the shock of anything like an equal number of disci- plined Continental troops. Of course the British regulars, as might be expected of long-service professionals, are undoubtedly better than any other large body of European soldiers, but the "Territorials," with their imperfect equipment and their glaring lack of trained officers and under- officers, will long be incapable of standing in a Continental line-of-battle. The same is true of the various contingents now being offered by the various Dominions of the British Empire. The native Indian Army is of course of high fighting quality, but its remoteness from the European theatre of war and the danger- ous ferment of discontent in India would seem to preclude the drafting of any considerable portion of it for European service. The so-called "E.x- peditionary Force" which England has reckoned upon sending to the Continent in the event of what is now actually taking place has never been placed higher than 160,000 men, and some writers have maintained that even this would strip the home defense of the British Isles in dangerous fashion so long as the enemy's fleet remained unde- stroyed. The following table shows England's present effective military strength. No mention is made of the Indian Army for reasons above stated, and the Dominion contingents have likewise been omitted, since so many months must pass before these volunteer organizations can be equipped, trained, shipped and fitted for European battlefields that it is unlikely that they can figure much in the present campaign; and since modern wars tend to be of brief duration, the first cam- paign of the present struggle will very likely prove to be the last as well. Regular Army (peace footi jg; partly stationed abroad) 156,000 Regular Reserve (available at once) 146,000 Special Reserve (rapidly available) 63,000 Total Regular Establishment 365,000 Territorial Army 251,000 Grand total effective forces 616,000 BELGIUM, HOLLAND, SWITZERLAND Since the present war is nothing short of a general conflagration which may ultimately in- volve every European state, it will not be amiss to devote some space to a brief survey of the military estabUshments of the minor powers. First and foremost, a few words about that Bel- gian army that has shown prowess. Belgium has never adopted the principle of universal military service, but retains the older system of conscrip- tion. Her regular army on a peace-footing num- bers about 45,000, the trained reserves giving a total of 1 70,000 effectives in time of war. Along- side this regular establishment there is a local militia, the "Garde Civique," numbering some 45,000. A few of its elite corps rank as high-grade militia, but most of its units are without serious military value. The neighboring state of Holland, though main- taining a good-sized Colonial Army, has little more than a militia organization for home defense, relying as Holland does upon its dikes to drown the invader's path. A knot of 20,000 regulars forms the nucleus about which would gather the Dutch militia to the number of perhaps 150,000. The third "neutral" state of Western Europe, Switzerland, is much better prepared to maintain its neutrality and would prove a formidable an- tagonist for the most powerful in\-aders. Switzer- land has long adopted the principle of universal military service; not hi the sense of a large stand- ing army fitted for instant attack, but with an entire population of well-trained and organized militiamen, ready for stubborn defense. The warlike nature of its hardy people and the strong barriers of its mountains would make an invasion of Switzerland a dangerous undertaking. In a supreme emergency Switzerland could place nearly 500,000 men in the field. THE BALKAN STATES Lastly, there remains a brief consideration of the military strength possessed by the several Balkan peoples. The recent Balkan wars were so destructive of both men and materiel that the efi'ective fighting power of these countries (Rou- m^nia excepted), must be largely a matter of conjecture. According to latest estimates, Servia and Montenegro together can put 300,000 men in the field, Greece another 300,000. The Turkish and Bulgarian materiel captured by these states in the late Balkan wars should have largely solved the problem of equipment for the present struggle. Bulgaria is in bad shape, disorganized by defeat, semi-bankrupt and very deficient in artillery. She could probably not put more than 250,000 88 EUROPE AT WAR effective troops in line of battle. Roumania, with her untouched resources of men, equipment and supply, is to-day the strongest of all the Balkan powers. She could put about 350,000 effectives into the field. Turkey, hke Bulgaria, is still under the shadow of defeat, and cannot have yet repaired her enormous losses of war materiel nor reformed that shattered framework of trained officers and under-officers so vital to the modem army. Since Turkey's entry into the present struggle would necessarily entaU a war with Greece, she would be obhged to station large forces in Western Asia Minor to guard against a Greek invasion and a rising of the dense Hellenic population of the ^gean shore. It is therefore doubtful whether Turkey, despite her new strategic railways, could ever throw more than 400,000 men on European soil, and even these might be of questionable value. LAND AND NAVAL FORCES AT WAR LAND FORCES Com p. Service Standing Army Infantry Cavalry Artillery Other First Reserve Second Reserve Total Germany Yes 790,000 505,000 86,000 126,000 73,000 460,000 2,600,000 3,850,000 Austria-Hungary Yes 424,000 197,000 47,000 37,000 143,000 396,000 1 ,400,000 2,220.000 Russia Yes 949,000 627,000 116,000 138,000 68,000 1,838,000 2,488,000 5,400,000 France Yes 750,000 361,000 73>ooo 97,000 219,000 700,000 700,000 2,150,000 Servia Yes 24,000 246,000 80,000 *3So,ooo Great Britain No 254,000 96,000 15,000 33-000 1 10,000 206,000 463,000 898,000 Belgium Yes 58,000 27,000 6,000 10,000 15,000 112,000 170,000 *34,ooo Japan a Yes 250,000 250,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 Portugal i Yes 30,000 90,000 140,000 * 260,000 Montenegro Yes 4,000 41,000 45,000 a Service compulsory in either army or navy b Exemption may be purchased by paying ta ♦Doubtful Kaiser's Forces (Germany and Austria) . Allies Standing .\rmies .1,214,000 .2,319,000 3,S33.ooo Total Strength on Land 6,070,000 10,637,000 16,707,000 NAVAL FORCES 3 a S. a a, 3 ■si 2 S a 1 - Si 2R "2 ■^ 1 a £ •3 & a j2 c s m S=a U05 00a U.L> Q H t^ H Germany 19 7 20 9 45 7 141 47 30 325 67,000 Austria-Hungary 4 9 3 9 3 18 53 IS 114 i8,ooo 1 Forces Ships 439 Men 85,000 23 7 29 12 54 10 159 100 45 439 85,000 Russia 9 4 8 6 8 105 23 48 220 52,000 Navies at War France 17 IS 18 13 6 87 173 90 419 61,000 Ships 1,876 Servia [ Men 393.000 Great Britain 29 10 .S8 42 70 10 227 58 8s 569 138,000 Belgium The Allies Japan 9 ■^ 1.^ 12 19 5 60 54 15 192 51,000 Ships 1,437 Portugal I 6 19 2 7 2 37 6,000 Men 308,000 Montengro 64 19 75 78 117 48 481 315 240 1437 308,000 AIR FLEETS OF THE NATIONS [ Reprinted, by permission, from the New FOR the first time warfare on a large scale may be expected in the air. With air fleets varying in size from the huge diri- gible establishment of Germany and the well- manned aeroplane squadrons of France and Great Britain to the tiny equipment of such a state as Servia, which has one or two imreported lighter- than-air machines, the nations are ready to embark in a new region of conflict. What wUl be accomplished in return for the vast sums expended in preparation for battles in the air is necessarily a matter of conjecture. Both dirigible and aeroplane have yet to be tried out under the severe conditions imposed by modern warfare, not the least of which is the type of gun devised to cope with flying objects high overhead. That much is expected from their air strength by the Powers of Europe is evidenced by the fact that they are said upon good authority to have expended collectively within the last six years something Hke $117,000,000 upon this arm of their service. Of this huge outlay, in round numbers, Germany has spent $28,000,000; France, $22,000,000; Russia, $1 2,000,000 ;Italy, $8,000,000; Austria, $5,000,000, and England, $3,000,000. Popular support of national funds added $3,500,000 to Germany, $2,500,000 to France, $1,000,000 to Italy, and $100,000 to Russia. Furthermore, appropriations of the Govern- ments for 1913 were: France, $7,400,000; Ger- many, $5,000,000; Russia, $5,000,000; England, $3,000,000; Italy, $2,100,000; Japan, $1,000,000, and Mexico, $400,000, as against $125,000 by the United States, making additional expenditures of $24,025,000 during the current year. It is now believed that the appropriation made by Germany of $37,000,000 to be expended during 1914-18 may be drawn upon for immediate war emergencies. France has a far smaller equipment of dirigibles than her enemy, Germany, but the disadvantage is believed to be ofl'set in part by the formidable array of aeroplanes in the French service. All told, France, is believed to have an air force of nearly 800 aeroplanes and i , 200 airmen . She has an aeronautical corps organized in 3 territorial groups. Each group consists of from 2 to 4 companies, with from 2 to 5 detached sections with troops. York Evening Post's "War Gazetteer."] There are 27 sections, each having 8 aeroplanes; 10 cavalry sections, each with 3 aeroplanes; 11 fortress sections, with 8 aeroplanes each — a com- plete establishment of 334 aeroplanes. The aeronautical corps is also in charge of 14 dirigibles. Most of the French air fleet is said to be assem- bled atthe great flying camps of Rheims, Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort, where they are of in- valuable use as scouts against the army of inva- sion. They are also looked upon to increase greatly the power of artillery by careful recon- naissance. In general the aeroplanes are without guns, although some are known to carry Ught machine guns, and therefore suffer by comparison with the big air battleships, which are well armed. The smaller craft can, however, carry something like 200 poimds of explosives in the shape of bombs, and can be counted upon to use their cargo with considerable effect in the case of sustained sieges. International usage, with so little prece- dent as to the regulation of air fighting, leaves much to be desired. Undoubtedly some sort of code will develop from present hostUities. No prohibition attaches to firing upon aircraft, nor upon the return of the attack from above. The airman is prohibited, however, by a Hague con- vention against bombarding undefended towns and villages where no army is quartered. On his side he is similarly protected from being treated as a spy should he be captured in the performance of his air duties. German dirigibles are all well housed, most of them in the revolving airship sheds specially designed. Their distribution is governed by the needs of German boimdary defence. Friederichs- hafen, Strassburg, Metz, and Cologne are pro- vided with dirigibles. Others are stationed at Frankfort, Gotha, Thorn, Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and on the Island of Helgoland. These will be especially useful in resisting British advances on the North Sea coast. Still others at Konigsberg, Posen, and Breslau will assist in the defence of the Russian and Austrian frontier. Under the law of 19 13, Germany set about forming 5 aeroplane battalions, 17 companies in all. Her establishment last year was 173 officers, 4,446 other ranks, with 24 dirigibles in military charge. 9° EUROPE AT WAR Great Britain has given enthusiastic support to her aviation department under the leadership of Winston Churchill, since the whole air service of army and navy airship sections is under the Admiralty. At certain places on the coast the air servace has replaced the coast guard. In the army wing the Royal Fhdng Corps is about com- pleted to the number of 8 aeroplane squadrons, making nearlj^ 300 officer fliers. There are four sea-plane stations in England — at Calshot, near Portsmouth, Grain Island, FelLxstowe, and Yar- mouth. Two more are about completed in Scot- land at Dundee and at Fort George, near Crom- arty. Four more are contemplated to carry the line northward, and Dover and Plymouth, to the south, are to be equipped. The naval flying school and headquarters are at Eastchurch, and the army wing at Salisbury Plain and Farns- borough. With airships good progress has also been made. Three ships of fifteen tons have been ordered, but as yet the country is without a suita- ble shed for a ship as large as twelve tons. Austria-Hungary has been wthout the means to go in extensively for airships. She has three small sheds, and it has been reported that the German Government gave the Zeppelin Company permission before the war to sell six ships to Austria. Austria-Hungary has a small naval service of hydro-aeroplanes, the station being at Pola. The two types of aeroplanes constructed in Austria, Etrich-Taube and the Lohner-Daimler, are both good machines. Russia is without completed battle airships as yet; some are building, and she has thirteen of the smaller scouting class. She is credited with having eight airship sheds of good size. There are seaplane stations at Petrograd, Reval, Se- vastopol, and Cronstadt. The Curtiss type is largely used. Russia's most important element of strength in heavier-than-air machines is the machine designed by the Russian designer Sikor- sky. This machine is driven by four independent loo-horsepower motors, and has carried as many as sixteen passengers. The Russian Admiralty was said to have ordered five some time ago to be fitted as seaplanes, and the army has likewise arranged to secure some machines of the Sikorsky type- Italy's aeronautical service consists of a "spec- ialist" battalion of 5 companies and an experi- mental section; a flying battalion of 2 companies, and about 30 field squadrons of 7 aeroplanes each. She has besides some small airships. Belgium recently formed an aeronautical com- pany, consisting of the aeronautical school and a number of sections of 4 aeroplanes each. RESOURCES AND STAYING POWERS OF THE NATIONS EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY IN WAR TIME BY JAMES MIDDLETON READERS of history are fond of detecting a resemblance between the present Euro- pean situation and that which prevailed a century ago. Then the greatest European Powers were united in a struggle against one country — France; now they seem united against another common enemy, Germany. Now, as in 1814, all the forces of Europe are determined to humiliate one overweening personality. In one respect, however, and this is a fundamental one, the situation is entirely different. A hundred years ago practically every great European Power was an economic entity. Each one could have built a Chinese Wall about itself and lived in- definitely. Each one, that is, raised on its own soil enough of the essential foodstuffs to support itself. Even England, in the Napoleonic wars, was largely an agricultural community. It raised both cereals and meat in sufficient quantities to stand an indefinite siege. Even as late as the Crimean War,ini853, England could go cheerfully to war with no fear of national starvation. If, as some one has said, an army travels upon its stomach, the same statement may be made of a nation itself at war. Clearly, any people that has its supply of food cut off would im- mediately have to submit to any humiliating terms proposed. Its position would be that of a huge beleaguered fortress. And there is at least one of the nations engaged in the present struggle, England, that faces this contingency; and another, Germany, that certainly has reasons for apprehension. A remarkable development of the present international situation is the de- pendence of one nation upon others for its food supply. There is no country of importance that does not import large amounts of food from almost every other. The United States, huge as are its foodstuffs, adds millions of dollars' worth to its supply from other sources. Even China, content, as we have supposed, with its staple rice, pur- chases immense quantities of American canned goods, especially salmon. Looking over the statistics, one is forced to conclude that there is no longer any such thing as a national taste in foods; each nation is rapidly picking up all the good things of another. The extent to which almost the entire world depends upon one or two countries for its coffee and tea — foods which, in the Middle Ages, were practically unknown in Europe — sufficiently illustrates the growth of this international taste. In the present conflict, however, these special foods will cut no particular figure; the great staples of life are the important considerations in an international war. In this struggle, wheat, not cotton, promises to be king. What, then, is the situation of the several nations in this res- pect? How are they to feed not only the huge armies in the field, but their own peoples? Un- questionably this is the first time in history when war has presented precisely this problem to the peoples involved. THE NATIONS THAT CAN SUPPORT THEMSELVES Beside little Montenegro, there are seven nations, at this writing, immediately involved. These are England, Germany, France, Russia, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, and Servia. We can immediately clarify the situation by arranging these countries in two classes: those that raise the essential food materials in sufficient quan- tities to support themselves, at least in time of peace, and those that do not. This division, as accurately as can be determined from available statistics, is as follows: )UNTREES SELF- COUNTRIES NOT SELF- SUPPORTING SUPPORTING Russia France Austria-Hungary Servia England Belgium DOUBTFUL Germany 91 92 EUROPE AT WAR Of these Russia, next to the United States, is the largest wheat growing country in the world. Seven eighths of all the peasants are tillers of the soil. Two thirds of all the lands are sown with cereals. The nation raises not only enough to support its own enormous population, but exports large quantities. France, most investiga- tors are surprised to learn, ranks third — next to Russia and the United States — as a wheat growing land. The thrifty French farmers, with their comparatively small acreage, raise more wheat than the Argentine, British India, or Canada — all of them usually regarded as huge granaries. They produce 100,000,000 more bushels than the whole of South America. France grows about 315,000,000 bushels a year — almost half as much as does the United States in normal years; it imports about 22,000,000 bushels. Clearly, with strict economy enforced by war conditions, France can easOy furnish its own wheat supply without calling on outside nations. Austria-Hungary and Servia are similarly sit- uated. When we come to England, Germany, and Belgium, however, the conditions are differ- ent. The United Kingdom raises about 65,000,000 bushels of wheat every year and imports 217,000,000. Belgium raises 14,000,000 bushels and imports 49,000,000. The situation in Ger- many is not so acute as this, but still, with importations shut down, the wheat situation might become embarrassing. The empire raises 149,000,000 bushels a year and imports 67,000,000 Clearly the sudden wiping out of these importa- tions, while they might not produce an actual wheat famine, would so considerably reduce the food supply as to amount to a distinct military dis- advantage. Germany's situation is considerably better than that of England, but inferior to that of France and Russia. Russia raises all of its wheat and more; France raises ninety per cent.; Germany raises sixty per cent. On the other hand Great Britain and Belgium raise only about twenty per cent. each. On the theory that a nation that raises only sixty per cent, of its most important article of food can hardly be regarded as entirely self-supporting, Germany is included, in the classification given above, as in a more or less precarious position. The Germans are not rich enough to be guilty of much over-feeding and if two fifths of their ration were to be taken away their efficiency would be greatly impaired. ENGLAND ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE SOURCES From the standpoint of food supply in case of war, England, of course, presents the most interesting problem. There was a time when English statesmen worried Uttle over this situa- tion. The supremacy of England's sea power was regarded as a fixed, determined fact. The fleet was so immeasurably superior to other navies, and, indeed, to all of them combined, that England went on serenely developing a huge industrial state within, and depending upon other nations for its food. About fifteen years ago, however, Englishmen began to be nervous on this point; since then there have been periodical scares. The building of other formidable navies, espjecially that of Germany, began to cause general alarm. The last of these great searchings-of-heart was in 1903. Parliament then appointed a Royal Com- mission, of which the Prince of Wales, the present king, served as chairman, to investigate the ques- tion. This Commission collected a large array of facts, most of them alarming. It found that the precariousness of England's food supply was about as black as it had been described. England imports four fifths of all its food. Most of it comes from far distant countries — from North and South America, British India, and Australia. It gets large quantities of butter, eggs, bacon, poultry, fruit, and potatoes, and other vegetables from France, Denmark, and the Baltic ports. A certain amount of grain comes also from Russian-Baltic ports — and from the Black Sea region. For the larger staples, however, like wheat and meat, England has to go several thou- sand miles. It always has a comparatively small supply of food on hand. The swiftness of the modern steam vessel has made any large storage system unnecessary. Of butter it has normally only a seven or ten days' supply; of cheese only a month's supply; of eggs — England consumes 80,000,000 a week — only four or five weeks' supply. Its resources in wheat vary through the year; it has the highest supply in September, when it has enough for seventeen weeks, and the lowest in August, when it has enough for only sLx and one half weeks. England has a larger supply, however, than that stored up in its own larder. There is always an immense amount floating in ships — in thousands of English vessels, crowding EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 93 the trade routes in all parts of the world. This granaries that would hold a large reserve supply, usually amounts to from three to seven weeks' There are many practical objections to this pro- supply. An interesting fact herein disclosed is position and it has never enlisted popular approval that England's lowest stock on hand is reached in Most Englishmen who have had the courage to August — the very month in which she has gone face the situation have reached the same conclu- to war. The whole food situation was well sion: that there is only one way of protecting the summed up in a formal declaration made to the food supply, and that is the navy. Even with Royal Commission by the most influential mem- England in command of the sea, there would be bers of the wheat trade in London : "We, theun- certain difficulties in feeding the nation; without dersigned, concur in the opinion that, if Great this control, most people agree that the game Britain should become involved in a European would be fairly up. With a hostile navy blockad- war, the country must be prepared to see bread ing the important ports and so shutting out at practically famine prices." the foodships, England could undoubtedly be starved into submission in a few weeks. The THE UNITED STATES SENDS LITTLE WHEAT TO j^^ j Commission, which investigated this sub- ENGLAND . ^ . .u- i • %u ject, came to this conclusion. Ihe enormous From 1870 until 1902, the United States did navy which England maintains in the North Sea, the larger part in feeding the British Isles. We therefore, has ample justification. not only had a large surplus of food stuffs, but England will probably control the sea in the the shortness of the voyage gave us an advantage present conflict; there are other problems, how- over competitors. The enormous mcrease m our ever, that she wUl have to solve. Many ships population forces us now to keep the larger part are drawn from the mercantUe marme for the of our food, especially wheat, to feed our own use of the admiralty; inasmuch as there are stomachs. Although we are still the world's thousands of English ships, however, this prob- largest wheat producer, we send comparatively ably will not seriously interfere with transporta- little of it abroad. England now draws its sup- tion facilities. Nor does there seem much danger ply from Russia, Canada, the Argentine, British that the German and Austrian navies will prey India, and Australia. The figures for 1 911 are as to any extent upon English shipping. The days follows : of the privateer are over ; the steamship, involving PKESENT SOURCE OF ENGLAND'S WHEAT SUPPLY the difficulty of coaling, has practically made im- (Hundredweights) possible this old fashioned roving of the sea. British India 20,161,518 Nor is Germany likely to send any of her rapid Russia 18,106,100 cruisers to prey upon English trade; she wOl Argentine 14,748,600 weaken her fleet, already considerably over- ^^^^<^^ 14,373.700 matched, by doing so. Neutrals ought not to ,, .^ , c/ 1 suffer, especially as the Declaration of London United States 12,939,229 > t- j has settled the fact that food, unless intended England likewise imports two thirds of all its for military purposes — such as the feeding of meat. It gets a small supply fresh killed from armies and fortresses — is not contraband. Some Holland and Denmark and a far greater amount English ships unquestionably will be captured; in the shape of Uve animals from Canada and but there will be few in comparison with the de- the United States. Its frozen carcasses come predations that seem likely to be made on Ger- mainly from the Argentine and Australia. It man commerce. One consideration that especially usually has about one month's supply of all kinds protects England's food supply is the fact that it of meat on hand. is not drawn from any one country, but from five — the United States, Canada, Argentine, Russia, SEA POWER ENGLAND'S ONE SALVATION ^^^ g^j^j^j^ j,^^^ j^ ^^^^^ ^^,^^ ^^rce great trade The practical question that has agitated Eng- routes — the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic, land for many years has been: How are we to and the Mediterranean. The first has its most protect our food supply in case of war? Some important port in New York, the second in Buenos authorities have advocated the building of huge Ayres, while the third leads to Bombay and Aus- 94 EUROPE tralian depots. There seems no likelihood that Germany can control these three transportation routes, or any one of them. When the Royal Commission made its investigation, the Mediter- ranean route was the one that gave the greatest anxiety. The entente cordiale was then not a factor in European politics; and war with France was not an impossibUitj'. The Republic's naval strength in the Mediterranean, in that event, would have endangered such of England's food supply as came by way of Suez. The present European alignment makes this same Mediter- ranean route perhaps better protected than either of the other two routes. UNITED STATES AS A FOOD SOURCE IN WAR TIME With an English fleet victorious on the sea, therefore, the English food supply seems abund- antly safeguarded. In all probability, if the war lasts any time, the United States will largely in- crease its exports. Our natural position should make us the largest storehouse of the English- man's food. The route to the river Plata is 6,500 miles; that to Bombay is 6,250 miles by the Suez Canal, and 10,500 bj' the Cape. New Zealand and Australia are 10,000 mOes away; the distance to American ports, however, is only 3,500 miles. Moreover the ships coming this short distance can carry more than those sailing on the other routes. The longer the voyage, the more coal the ship has to carry, and, proportionately, the smaller is its cargo. Inasmuch as England will naturally import from the places whence the food will come quickest and in the largest amount, it should naturally draw first of all upon the resources of the United States. It will do this particularly this year, as our grain crop is un- usually large and that of the other agricultural nations imusually small. When we look to Germany, however, the op- portunities for food importations do not seem so reassuring. In all probability German ships will not be able to use the North Sea. With both the French and the British fleets in the Mediterranean, there is apparently no hope of obtaining supplies from that source. It is even probable that the larger part of the mercantile marine which Germany has been building up at such enormous cost will be swept from the sea. That scurrying to friendly ports that marked AT WAR the first days of war will probably develop into little less than a stampede. Moreover, while the blockading of the English coast is a difficult problem, owing to its character and extent, the blockading of the German North Sea sealine presents comparatively few problems to a vic- torious fleet. Germany will find some embar- rassment also in the fact that she has gone to war with the country that furnishes the larger part of her additional food. This is Russia. She takes from the Czar's empire large quantities of wheat, barley, oats, and corn every year. In fact she imports foodstuffs from about the same countries as England herself. The following table, showing her importations of wheat, illustrates this point: Germany's importations of wheat (Tons) 19 1 2 Russia 558,422 Argentine 546,439 Canada 269,530 United States 446,512 Australia 3 2 2,590 The Germans, therefore, use the same trade routes as the English ships. With the English and French commanding the sea, however, the Germans can not draw much wheat from these sources. Germany's large supplies of meat The cutting off of these foreign supplies would not affect Germany to the same extent that a similar scarcity would embarrass England. In the British Isles such a calamity would mean starvation; in Germany it would mean a severe scarcity of food. For Germany still produces the larger part of what it eats. Although in the last forty years the empire, like England, has become a great industrial state, with the conse- quent shifting of the population from town to city, the imperial policy has still promoted agriculture. Agrarianism has long been a political issue. As part of its monarchical system, the ruling forces have used the powers of government to sustain the landlord class. The junker aristo- cracy has been the mainstay of the throne and the prevailing social system. The govern- ment has, therefore, protected its interests by placing high tariff duties upon agricultiu-al and meat products. As far as food is concerned the EUROPE'S FINANCIAL PREPARATION 95 empire has been in about the same position as England before the passage of the corn laws; it does not raise food enough for its own purposes, and has difficulties m importing it. Especial re- strictions have been placed upon the importation of meats. As a result, large supplies are grown in the empire itself. Germany produces almost one third as many cattle as does the United States — about 20,000,000 to our 70,000,000 — and stands second to the United States in the growth of hogs. In times of peace this protective policy has great disadvantages. As one result meat famines have become almost chronic. In recent years to supply the need, the municipalities have themselves erected slaughter houses and swineries. The in- creased cost of living has been an even more acute problem in Germany than here, and has figured largely in politics. All popular appeals for the removal of restrictions, however, have failed. And in times like these the policy has cer- tain compensations. For it has furnished Ger- many a large supply of meat; in all likelihood it can worry along for an indefinite time without any imports. A crisis of the most serious character for the German farmer arose in the "four years of gloom" from 1S96 to igoo. The competition of agricultural exportmg countries, such as the United States, Argentina, and Uruguay caused a drop of more than 25 per cent, in prices. Mort- gages increased, market value of land decreased, and in those four years alone the indebtedness of the farms increased by hundreds of millions of dollars. Irretrievable ruin faced the German agricul- turists and immediate steps were taken to save the situation. The protectionist policy was made more rigid, railroad rates were lowered on behalf of the home producer to enable him to meet foreign competition more successfully, govern- ment education of advanced agricultural methods was widely used, and a widespread system of credit in the agricultural department was or- ganized. The other three great countries, as already said ^France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia — are practically self-supporting, so that their provisionmg will involve no particular problem. Their embarrassment will come only from the destruction to crops that is incident to war, and to the removal of large masses of cultivators to face the cannon. No one can estimate, of course, to what extent these circumstances will affect the food situation. EUROPE'S FINANCIAL PREPARATION BY CHARLES F. SPEARE THREE incidents in European financial history since 191 1 illustrate how definitely the Powers have been preparing for war. As we look back at them we wonder why the world has been overwhelmed with surprise and terrorized by the sudden oncoming of the conflict. In 1905 Germany was all but mobilized against France. The money lords m London, Paris, and Vienna stepped between the rival nations and the Algeciras conference patched up their differences. Again in 191 1 Morocco was the sore point between Germany and France, and the Kaiser upset Europe by his "sword-rattling" speech. The affair of the Panther caused the British lion to growl. Germany was then much over-extended in all of the international money markets. It has been estimated that she was conductmg 90 per cent, of her commercial affairs on borrowed money. This figure is probably much exaggerated. But certainly she owed several hundred millions to Paris and nearly as much to London. New York was then, too, a large creditor and so was Russia. HEAVY PERSONAL TAXES IN GERMANY Quietly Paris began drawing down her bal- ances in Berlin. London and New York followed. German bankers were startled and made protest but their loans were called from all directions. Then they tried to borrow in those countries politically hostile to them and offered high rates of interest to attract the American market. But the lenders were in concert on this one point that no funds would be advanced without the per- sonal guarantee of the Kaiser that they would be used for "legitimate purposes"; that is, not against the lenders. A little later when the Ger- man bankers were asked by Emperor William 96 EUROPE AT WAR if they were in a condition to meet the chances of war they were obliged to respond in the nega- tive. Then came the famous command: "Gen- tlemen, when I next call on you I shall expect you to be ready." This is the first suggestion that war was brewing. Two years later rumors of war loans in Ger- many began to filter through the money markets of the Continent and Prussian bonds began to decline. In the midst of a congestion of invest- ments unparalleled in recent times, and with government securities in every part of the world lower than during this generation a huge Prussian loan was precipitated and it failed. The proceeds of this loan were, in large part, to meet the cost of the new military programme that had recently been promulgated. Subsequent to this fiasco there was proposed a tax on capital and incomes for the expenses of the army so onerous that only an impending war could have justified it. This laid an impost on all incomes of both sexes as low as $250 per aimum and on all fortunes from $2,500 upward. Kings and princes were taxed in the same ratio as clerks and small storekeepers. The Kaiser on his personal fortune of $35,000,000 had to pay a tax of $500,000, and on his income of $3,500,000, an 8 per cent, tax of $440,000. So his contribution to the war chest was nearly $1,000,000. The Krupps are said to have been assessed $3,000,000. Economists agree that a tax on capital is a dangerous financial expedient and only war- ranted by extreme conditions. France, Spain, and Austria have all tried it in revolutionary times. That Germany should have come to it as recently as last January, when the law went into effect, was the second incident plainly show- ing that one portion of Europe, at least, was man- euvering for war. THE FRENCH BOND ISStJE The third suggestion of war came from Paris. The new military service laws in France were favorably reported in July, 1913, about a week after similar enactments had been made in Ger- many. The French Cabinet was at its wit's end how to finance the tremendous new military budget, as investment markets were sluggish and the portfolios of Paris bankers were filled with the I. O. U's of the Balkan states and with rapidly depreciating securitier of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. The utter inability of Paris to float a government loan of $200,000,000 to $250,000,000 was ob'vious. Economic conditions ruling then were sufficient without the Socialists' opposition to defeat such a flotation. Pending at that time in Europe were loans aggregating $1,500,000,000. Of those assigned to Paris alone 50 per cent, or $350,000,000, were to repair the ravages of war in the Balkans or to augment armaments on the Continent. It was only when in her desperation Paris, by government order, closed her doors to all foreign loans, thus throwing away her proud title of "bankers of the nations" held since the Boer war, that she was able to meet her pressing do- mestic needs. The Viviani Ministry practically duplicated the plan of its predecessor in proposing an issue of $360,000,000 3I per cent, bonds, re- deemable in twenty-five years in distinction to the perpetual 3 per cent, rentes, and subject to a 4 per cent, income tax. I was in Paris when preparations for this loan were going on and found there none of the enthusiasm for it that I had witnessed before the "wickets" of the great credit banks of France when other government loans were being offered. It has since been an- nounced that the loan was many times o\'ersub- scribed; but it appears likely that the government gave strong underwriting support. The French public was not keen to pay additional war taxes. EXPEDIENTS OF OTHER NATIONS While Germany and France have been pre- paring against the day when ambassadors should be peremptorily dismissed, other members of European alliances have not failed to see the trend of events and be forehanded. In June, a year ago, we read what seemed then to be bluster- ing words from the Belgian Premier, but which were instead prophetic. In announcing the gov- ernment's intention to raise $62,800,000 for mil- itary expenses he said : " We do not intend meekly to supply again a battleground for Europe. In the event of the breaking out of war Antwerp will be found an impregnable fortress." Onlya fortnight before the Archduke of Austria- Hungary was assassinated, the Russian Minister of Finance had informed the Budget Committee of the Duma that his country in the next five years must spend $3,700,000,000 for the army and na\y. This year's budget for military and naval EUROPE'S FINANCIAL PREPARATIONS 97 defense was $500,000,000. In the period since 1908 approximately $2,600,000,000 has been ex- pended for similar purposes. This does not include the cost of those strategic railroads to the German frontier, of which Russia is so much in need, to meet the capacity of the Germans who have three times as many railway lines available for mobilization purposes as has the Czar. Aus- tria has a mobilization capacity at the Russian frontier twice as great as that of her adversary. As we know, Great Britain has been building dreadnoughts and maintaining her balance of naval power, out of the pockets of the British tax-payers who have been squeezed a little harder each year and have cursed a little louder at the unfairness of imposts on income. Not so palpable a war measure as the loans described has been the bolstering up of the gold reserves of the great European banks in the last three years. There was some cause for this apart from financial strategy working with mil- itarism. When it was explained as an economic necessity to meet the new competition for gold by India, China, and South America the world at large let it go at that. There were times even then when it was difficult to understand why Paris was paying such a price for American gold when she had the largest hoard of it in the Bank of France's history, or why the yellow bars took such circuitous routes as they did in going from New York to Berlin. In consonance, therefore, with loans for war has been the addition to the gold reserves of Continental Europe. These are now $500,000,000 greater than in 191 1 when the Kaiser commanded his bankers to prepare. A large percentage of this gain has taken place in the past eighteen months. So far as is known Germany is the only one of the nations at war that has a specific war fund. The famous fortress at Spandau is said to contain $30,000,000 in gold to be employed solely for war's needs. This would not finance the routine requirements of an army such as the German Empire can put in the field for more than a fort- night; but its instant availability in case of un- expected attack would make it of double value. EMERGENCY MEASURES Governments, like corporations and indi- viduals, have a way of anticipating loans and of creating floating debts against them so the pro- ceeds are absorbed in paying off old bills and not in estabhshing reserves against future require- ments. Undoubtedly a large portion of the capital secured by Europe in recent years for naval and military purposes has by this time been translated into the fixed forms of battleships, fortresses, cannon, guns, aeroplanes and a multitude of minor agencies through which troops are mobilized and cared for when in active service. Even before England declared war on Germany the House of Commons had voted her $525,000,000 for "emergency purposes," and two days later $500,000,000 more was granted by the British Parliament. These two items increased the national debt by about 28 per cent. The first of seventy-seven emergency bills authorized by the Reichstag, — immediately after war on Russia, France, and England was declared, — was for a loan of $1,325,000,000, an amount which, in itself exceeded by 10 per cent, the existing debt of Germany and added 30 per cent, to the outstanding debt of the German Empire. France would Uke to borrow $200,000,000 in this country, but the State Department has indicated that it would not be good politics to encourage this desire. A credit of $540,000,000 as a war fund has been authorized by the French State Council. WHO WILL BEAE THE BURDENS Obviously the costs of war must be borne by the man with property or a going business and by the wage-earner. The latter can adjust his month-to-month expenses so that the tax on him will be relatively small as war chests in war time are usuall)' lined by receipts from taxes on spirits, beer, tobacco, tea, coffee, and other non-essentials, as well as on documents and contracts with which the man with small income has little to do. Ger- many is already proposing a severe tax on all property in excess of $7,500,000. Another unique German scheme which can hardly be credited is to commandeer the savings-bank deposits of the Empire, estimated to be worth $4,000,000,000, and use them as a war fund, giving depositors government interest-bearing script in payment. This would obviate the necessity of a loan, but it might be found difficult for the banks to produce that amount of currency on demand. In order to do so they would have to liquidate their se- curities. This is impossible in these times of 98 EUROPE "moratoria" and closed stock exchanges. The savings-bank and postal deposits of the fighting nations are about $9,cx50,ooo,ooo. To fight the Boers, England issued $1,000,000,000 in consols. She has recently been buying back at 70 some of the bonds which she placed at a premium. Even this huge sum was not sufficient and extra taxes had to be imposed. In the Russo-Japanese war Japan, between March and November, 1905, issued $425,000,000 in war loans, of which London took $157,500,000; New York, $141,500,000; Berlin $66,000,000 and Paris $60,000,000. It is an interesting fact that Japan was able to float a loan at a lower interest rate at the end of the war which had enormously Increased her national debt and placed a mort- gage on her remunerative government tobacco monopoly, than when she first started to fight Russia. In the same war Russian attempts at loans were failures as they always seemed un- happily to coincide with some reverse in Man- churia or on the seas. The Balkan AlUes and Turkey have so far failed to pay the indebtedness they incurred in the bloody wars of 191 2-13. Before Austria gave her ultimatum to Servia both countries were prostrated industrially and financially. War always brings out the fact that the re- sources of individuals are far greater than sus- pected and that wonderful vitality underlies what may seem impoverished surfaces. Witness Mexico in the past two years, ridden by revolu- tion, 60 per cent, of her transportation system out of comnaission, all but one of her eastern ports and gateways for commerce closed, and agriculture and mining abandoned in the northern states, and still supporting a great army with every money market of the world opposed to her. Bismarck never believed that France could pay the $1,000,000,000 indemnity in 1870; but from every stocking in the empire came a tithe and the debt was Uquidated in a few months. If the figures presented by the American Society for Thrift are approximately correct, the people of this country spend each year for mtoxicants, soft drinks, tobacco, candy, chewing gum, auto- mobiles, theatres, moving pictures and other extravagances the sum of $4,000,000,000. This is about what diSerent economists have reckoned to be the total cost of the present European war. Europeans are not so careless of their money as AT WAR Americans, but they are not 50 per cent, more thrifty than we. The population of the nations en- gaged in war is four times that of the United States. So, if we estimate that 25 per cent, of all males may be drawn into the struggle and the earning capacity of another 25 per cent, be affected by it we can see where enforced economy would supply the reserves for many war bflls. The cost of war does not stop with the countries waging it. There is now before the Congress at Washington a series of taxation measures to re- lieve the United States from embarrassment due to the sudden stop to customs revenues. Of our import trade of $1,850,000,000 as much as $500,000,000 is with nations directly or closely invoh'ed in the war. A large part of this com- merce is in the highest tariff-yielding articles. It is beHeved, therefore, that taxes wiU have to be imposed on American tax-payers to the amount of $100,000,000 as a minimum to help defray the cost of the war abroad. The public debt of the countries at war and the debt per capita follows: Public debt. Debt per capita. France $6,283,000,000 $157 United Kingdom 3,500,000,000 80 Russia 4,550,000,000 30 Belgium 760,000,000 100 Germany, including Prussia 5,000,000,000 75 Austria-Hungary 3,750,000,000 80 The wealth of these same countries, to be drawn on to meet the cost of war, according to latest figures, is: National Wealth per wealth. capita. France $65,000,000,000 $1,625 United Kingdom 80,000,000,000 1,800 Russia 40,000,000,000 250 Belgium 9,000,000,000 1,23s Germany, including Prussia 60,500,000,000 930 Austria-Hungary 25,000,000,000 500 The nations of the Triple Entente have an aggregate wealth of $194,000,000,000 to which may be added the moral support of Italy and Port- ugal with a combined wealth of $22,500,000,000. The members of the Triple Alliance, or Dual Alliance, as it turns out to be, have a national reserve wealth behind them of $85,500,000,000. But, as money power has, in this instance, failed to prevent war, so it may be ineffective in bringing war's successes. 99 FINANCIAL STATISTICS A FINANCIAL COMPARISON OF THE POWERS AT WAR IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS Germany Austria-Hungary Russia France Servia Great Britain Belgium Japan Portugal Montenegro Wealth 60,500 25,000 40,000 65,000 80,000 9,000 2,500 National Debt 1,200 3.972 4,423 6,510 132 3,S8I 742 1,247 637 a2 Annual Revenue Army Budgets 1,027 1,085 1,779 1,07s 26 972 161 293 8S 26s 125 389 287 1 141 20 so II Navy Budgets 115 30 121 104 49 Exports Imports 2,132 SSS 735 1,281 22?, 2.371 753 261 39 2,545 722 533 1,535 22g 3,624 899 308 75 a Figures of igi2 PERSONAGES IN THE WAR THE KAISER — A SELF DRAWN PORTRAIT AS A result of my reading of history, I have pledged myself never to strive after an empty world-rule. For what has become of the so-called world-empires? Alexander the Great, Napoleon, all the great heroes of war swam in blood, and left behind them subjugated nations which rose on the first opportunity and brought their empires to ruin. The world-empire that I have dreamed of would consist in this: that, above all, the newly- created German Empire should on every side enjoy the most absolute confidence as a tranquil, honorable, peaceful neighbor, and that if history should one day tell of a German world-empire, or of a Hohenzollem world-rule, it should not have been based on conquests with the sword, but on the mutual trust of nations striving toward the same goal." Despite the fact that he pointed out the futility of the great conquerors, the Kaiser made it plain that Germany's world-power aspirations were not to be balked by a peace-at-any-price policy. At the laimching of the warship Wiltelsbach, he an- nounced: "The ocean teaches us that on its waves and on its most distant shores no great decision can any longer be taken without Germany and •without the German Emperor. I do not think that it was in order to allow themselves to be excluded from big foreign affairs that, thirty years ago, our people, led by their princes, conquered and shed their blood. Were the German people to let themselves be treated thus, it would be, and forever, the end of their world-power; and I do not mean that that shall ever cease. To employ, in order to prevent it, the suitable means, if need be extreme means, is my duty and my highest privilege." Throughout his speeches three ideas appear consistently and continuously: the ambition for world-power, for ships and a navy to defend them; the belief in the German army by its preponder- ance and preparedness as the guarantor of Europe's peace; and the divine right and the in- fallibility of the Hohenzollerns. WORLD-POWER Soon after ascending the throne the Kaiser said: "The ancestor for whom I have the most liking, and who always shone before me as an example in my youth, was the Great Elector." He so admired this particular ancestor because the Great Elector was the first Hohenzollern who saw the importance of promoting trade and industry, acquiring colon- ies, shipping by which to trade with them, and a navy to defend the shipping. This poUcy, which languished for a long time, has been thoroughly revised and enlarged by William II. As far back as 1896 the Kaiser himself said at Berhn: "The German Empire becomes a world-empire. Everywhere in the farthest parts of the earth live thousands of our fellow-countrymen. German subjects, German knowledge, German industry cross the ocean. The value of German goods on the seas amounts to thousands of millions of marks. On you, gentlemen, devolves the serious duty of helping me to knit firmly this greater German Empire to the Empire at home." At Aix, in 1902, in comparing the Holy Roman Empire with the present German Empire, he said: " Now another Empire has arisen. The German people has once more an Emperor of its own choice, with the sword on the field of battle has the crown been won, and the imperial flag flutters high in the breeze. But the tasks of the new Empire are different: confined within its borders, it has to steel itself anew for the work it has to do, and which it could not achieve in the Middle Ages. We have to live so that the Empire, still young, becomes from year to year stronger in itself, while confidence in it strengthens on all sides. The powerful German army guarantees the peace of Europe. In accord with the German character we confine ourselves externally in order to be uncon- fined internally. Far stretches our speech over the ocean, far the flight of our science and exploration; no work in the domain of new discovery, no scien- tific idea but is first tested by us and then adopted THE KAISER lOI by other nations. This is the world-rule the Ger- man spirit strives for." Despite the guarantee of peace which the power of the German army offered, William II did not neglect to warn his own people and others that peace might be disturbed. He said to the chief burgomaster of Karlsruhe in 1904, when Japan and Russia were at war: "I hope our peace will not be disturbed and that the events that are now happening will open our eyes, steel our courage, and find us united, if it should be necessary for us to intervene in world- policy." "Imperial power means sea power and sea pow- er and imperial power are dependent on each other." . . . "Our future lies on the water." . . . "The trident should be in our hand." . . . "We stand under the star of com- merce." "We demand our place in the sun." These phrases contain the essence of the doc- trine which the Emperor enlarged in many places as, for example, at Hamburg in 1899: "A strong German fleet," he said, "is a thing of which we stand in bitter need." And he con- tinued: "In Hamburg especially one can under- stand how necessary is a powerful protection for German interests abroad. If we look around us we see how greatly the aspect of the world has altered in recent years. Old-world empires pass away and new ones begin to arise. Nations suddenly appear before the peoples and compete with them, nations of whom a little before the ordinary man had been hardly aware. Products which bring about radical changes in the domain of international relations as well as in the political economy of the people, and which in old times took hundreds of years to ripen, come to maturity in a few months. The result is that the tasks of our German Empire and people have grown to enormous proportions and demand of me and my Government unusual and great efforts, which can then only be crowned with success when, united and decided, without respect to party, Germans stand behind us. Our people, moreover, must re- solve to make some sacrifice. Above all they must put aside their endeavor to seek the excellent through the ever more sharply contrasted party factions. They must cease to put party above the welfare of the whole. They must put a curb on their ancient and inherited weakness — to subject everything to the most unlicensed criticism; and they must stop at the point where their most vital interests become concerned. For it is precisely these political sins which revenge themselves so deeply on our sea interests and our fleet. Had the strengthening of the fleet not been refused me during the past eight years of my government, notwithstanding all appeals and warnings — and not without contumely and abuse for my person — how differently could we not have promoted our growing trade and our interests beyond the sea!" When the Kaiser ascended the throne the Ger- man fleet amounted to practically nothing. De- spite the Kaiser's ever active advocacy, the Reichstag would not vote large naval appropria- tions. The present navy really began with the appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz as Minister of Marine in 1899. Now the German .Navy is second only to that of Great Britain. Its crea- tion has been the main bone of contention between the English and German people. These relations the Kaiser discussed in 1908, in his famous Daily Mail interview, as follows: "You English," he said, "are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the em- phasis at my command, in my speech at Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of terms with England. Have I ever been false to my world? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my na- ture. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you listen not to them but to those who misin- terpret and distort them. That is a personal insult which I feel and resent. To be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friend- ship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mis- trustful eyes, taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your Press — or at least a considerable section of it — bids the people of England refuse my proffered hand, and insinuates that the other holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?" "I repeat," continued His Majesty, "that I am the friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. My task is not of the easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is I02 EUROPE AT WAR not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements, just as it is in Eng- land with respect to Germany. That is another reason why I resent your refusal to accept my pledged word that I am the friend of England. I strive without ceasing to improve relations, and you retort that I am your arch-enemy. You make it very hard for me. Why is it?" Thereupon the interviewer ventured to remind His Majesty that not England alone but the whole of Europe had viewed with disapproval the action of Germany in allowing the German consul to return from Tangier to Fez, and in anticipating the joint action of France and Spain by suggesting to the Powers that the time had come for Europe to recognize Mulai Hafid as the new Sultan of Morocco. His Majesty made a gesture of impatience. "Yes," he said, "that is an excellent ex- ample of the way in which German action is misrepresented. Fir'st, then, as regards the jour- ney of Dr. Vassel. The German Government, in sending Dr. Vassel back to his post at Fez, was only guided by the wish that he should look after the private interests of German subjects in that city, who cried for help and protection after the long absence of a consular representative. And why not send him? Are those who charge Germany with having stolen a march on the other Powers aware that the French consular representative had already been in Fez for several months when Dr. Vassel set out? Then, as to the recognition of Mulai Hafid. The Press of Europe has complain- ed with much acerbity that Germany ought not to have suggested his recognition until he had notified to Europe his full acceptance of the Act of Algeciras, as being binding upon him as Sultan of Morocco and successor of his brother. My answer is that Mulai Hafid notified the Powers to that effect weeks agb, before the decisive battle was fought. He sent, as far back as the middle of last July, an identical communication to the govern- ments of Germany, France, and Great Britain, containing an expUcit acknowledgment that he was prepared to recognize all the obligations toward Europe which were incurred by Abdul Aziz during his Sultanate. The German Govern- ment interpreted that communication as a final and authoritative expression of Mulai Hafid's intentions, and therefore it considered that there was no reason to wait until he had sent a second communication before recognizing him as the de facto Sultan of Morocco, who had succeeded to his brother's throne by right of victory in the field." The interviewer suggested to His Majesty that an important and influential section of the Ger- man Press had placed a very different interpreta tion upon the action of the German Government, and, in fact, had given it their effusive appro- bation precisely because they saw in it a strong act instead of mere words, and a decisive indica- tion that Germany was once more about to intervene in the shaping of events in Morocco. " There are mischief makers, " repUed the Emperor "in both countries. I will not attempt to weigh their relative capacity for misrepresentation. But the facts are as I have stated. There has been nothing in Germany's recent action with regard to Morocco which runs contrary to the explicit declaration of my love of peace which I made both at Guildhall and in my latest speech at Strassburg. His Majesty then reverted to the subject uppermost in his mind — his proved friendship for England. "I have referred," he said, "to the speeches in which I have done all that a sov- ereign can to proclaim my good will. But as actions speak louder than words, let me also refer to my acts. It is commonly believed in England that throughout the South African War Germany was hostile to her. German opinion undoubtedly was hostile — bitterly hostile. The Press was hostile; private opinion was hostile. But what of official Germany? Let my critics ask themselves what brought to a sudden stop, and, indeed, to absolute coUapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates who were striving to obtain European intervention? They were feted in HoUand; France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers. But when they asked me to receive them — I refused. The agitation immediately died away, and the delegation returned, empty-handed. Was that, I ask, the action of a secret enemy? "Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German Government wUs invited by the governments of France and Russia to join with them m calling upon England to put an end to the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I THE KAISER 103 said that so far from Germany joining in anj' concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England. Posterity vA]l one day read the exact terms of the telegram — now in the archives of Windsor Castle — in which I informed the Sover- eign of England of the answer I had returned to the Powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their adversity. "Nor was that all. Just at the time of your Black Week, in the December of i8gg, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria^ my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and afHiction, and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. Nay, I did more. I bade one of my oflScers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the num- ber of combatants in South Africa on both sides, and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With the figures before me, I worked out what I considered to be the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then I dis- patched it to England, and that document, like- wise, is among the state papers at Windsor Castle, awaiting the serenely impartial verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coincidence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts and carried by him into successful operation. Was that, I repeat, the act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say! "But, you will say, what of the German Navy? Surely that is a menace to England! Against whom but England are my squadrons being pre- pared? If England is not in the minds of those Germans whojare bent on creating a powerful fleet, why is Germany asked to consent to such new and heavy burdens of taxation? My answer is clear. Germany is a young and growing Empire. She has a world-wide commerce, which is rapidly ex- panding, and to which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have a powerful fleet to protect that commerce and her manifold interests in even the most distant seas. She expects those interests to go on growing, and she must be able to champ- ion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Germany looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared for any eventuali- ties in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take place in the Pacific in the days to come — days not so distant as some believe, but days, at any rate, for which all European Powers with Far Eastern interests ought steadily to prepare? Look at the accomplished rise of Japan; think of the possible national awakening of China; and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only those Powers which have great navies will be listened to with respect when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved; and if for that reason only Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak together on the same side in the great debates of the future." The Chancellor von Biilow admitted in the Reichstag that the Kaiser's version of the war plan was not quite accurate, but there is no doubt that the German people were bitterly hostile to England, a hostility which was not at all lessened when English warships seized German sliips along the African coast. England apologized for the act, but that did not satisfy German feeling and when Admiral von Tirpitz presented a bigger naval programme in 1900 than had ever been presented before, the hitherto parsimonious Reichstag suddenly became generous toward the navy. The new law provided for the first time a high-seas battle fleet, and the accompanying memorandum stated: "To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances, there is only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would in- volve such dangers as to imperil its position in the world." As much as the Kaiser loves his navy, the army is still more dear to him. "The soldier and the army," he said, in 1891, paraphrasing Bismarck's famous "blood and iron" epigram, "not parlia- mentary majorities and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army — as my grandfather said at Coblenz: 'These are the gentlemen on whom I can rely.' " I04 EUROPE AT WAR At the completion of the first ten years of his reign he addressed his bodyguards: "The most important legacy left me by my grandfather and father is the army, and with joy and pride have I accepted it. To the army my first decree was issued on ascending the throne. To the army I now again address myself on en- tering upon the second decennium of my reign. "Rarely, I believe, has so trying a time passed over the head of a ruler as over mine during these last ten years — I, who saw my grandfather and father die, to my deep sorrow, within so short a space of time. With grave anxiety I placed the crown upon my head. Everywhere I met doubt, and the whole world misjudged me. But one had confidence in me; but one believed in me — that was the army. And relying upon the army, and trusting in God, I began my reign, knowing well that the army is the main tower of strength for my country, the main pillar supporting the Prussian throne, to which Godin His wisdom had called me. " On January i, igoo, the Kaiser addressed the assembled corps of officers: "The first day of the new century sees our army — that is, our nation in arms— grouped around their banners, bending the knee to the Lord of hosts. And truly, if anybody have special cause to bend down before God, it is our army. "A glance at our flags here suffices for ex- planation, for they embody our history. How did the dawn of the past century find our army? "The glorious soldiers of Frederick the Great had fallen asleep on their laurels, ossified in the trivial details of a senseless, antiquated drill ; led by superannuated, unready, and unwarlike gen- erals; their officers no longer used to serious work, and degenerated by luxury, sloth, and blind self- glorification. In a word, the army no longer sufficed for its task. It had forgotten it. Severe was the punishment meted out to it by Heaven, a punishment which likewise chastised our people. Thrown into the dust were we. Frederick's fame paled, and his glorious banners were broken. In the seven long years of our hard servitude God taught our people to gather new strength. Under the iron pressure of the insolent conqueror's heel, our people in bitter travail of spirit conceived the high thought that it is the greatest honor to de- vote life and property in military service to the fatherland. "My great-grandfather gave form and sub- stance to this conception. New laurels crowned the new-born army and its banners. But it was through my grandfather, our great, our dead Emperor, that general military service became a full, a living reality. In quiet, persistent labor he drafted his system of reorganization, out of which, despite all opposition which misapprehen- sion caused, grew our army of to-day. Victorious campaigns, however, crowned his labors in un- expected fulness. "His spirit pervaded the rank and file of his armies, and his trust in God led them on to matchless victories. With this, his own creation, he at length drew together again the tribes of Ger- many, and he gave us back longed-for German unity. To him we owe it that through this army the German Empire, honored by all, once more occupies its destined and appropriate position in the council of nations. It is your part, gentle- men, to manifest during the new century the old qualities by which our sires have made the army great and invincible — simplicity and plainness in your style of li\ing, absolute devotion to the service of the King, fullest utilization of all your strength and gifts, both of body and soul, in ceaseless toil for the development and drilling of our troops. "And as my grandfather did for the army, so, too, I mean to continue for my navy, in spite of all discouragement and misconceptions, the work of development, in order that the navy shall be, side by side vdtii mj^ army, of equal power and strength, and thus achieve for the German Em- pire at home and abroad that position which we as yet have not attained. "Jointly with both I hope to be one day in con- dition, trusting fully in the aid of God, to realize the saying of Frederick William I : ' H one wishes to decide something in thisnvorld, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword. ' " Even on his many peace trips from capital to capital, the Kaiser almost always gives as an example of the friendliness between Germany and the country in which he is visiting, some joint accion of their armies. In England, for example, he reminds his hearers: "At Malplaquet and Waterloo, Prussian and British blood has been spilled in a common cause." In Russia: THE KAISER loS "We are carried back to the days when my grandfather, now resting in God, but then a young oificer, received before the enemy, on the battle- field, the Order of St. George, and won in the rain of bullets the chieftaincy of the Kalnga Regiment (conferred by Czar Alexander I on William I of Prussia). I remind you of these facts in order to drink to the glorious and joint reminiscences and traditions of the Russian and the Prussian armies. I drink to those who, in patriotic and heroic defence of their country, fought at Boro- dino, who with us bled at the victorious battles of Areis-sur-Aube and Brienne. I drink to the brave defenders of Sebastopol and the dauntless fighters of Plevna." On the Kaiser's famous visit to Palestine in 1898 he made a speech at the tomb of the Sultan Saladin in which appeared some sentences which caused much comment then, and may be well remembered now. "Deeply moved by this imposing spectacle and likewise by the consciousness of standing on the spot where held sway one of the most chival- rous rulers of all times, the great Sultan Saladin, a knight sans peur el sans reproche, who often taught his adversaries the right conception of knighthood, I seize with joy the opportunity to render thanks, above all, to the Sultan Abdul Hamid for his hospitaUty. May the Sultan rest assured, and also the three hundred million Mohammedans scattered over the globe and revering him, their caliph, that the Ger- man Emperor will be and remain at all times their friend." At another time in Austria he said: "My people and my army keep steadfast and true to the federated compact concluded between us, and the army is fully conscious of the fact that to preserve the peace and its blessings for our countries it must maintain it and would fight, shoulder to shoulder, with the brave Austro- Hungarian army, if that should be the will of Providence." And again, in 1910, the Kaiser referred to his action two years previous in sustaining Austria- Hungary in its annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina, against Russia's protest, as "the action of an ally in taking his stand in shining armor at a grave moment by the side of your most gracious sovereign." At his silver wedding anniversary, in 1906, he said again: "My first and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea." DIVINE RIGHT In March, 1890, in a speech of the Kaiser's to the men at Brandenburg, occurred this passage: "I look upon the people and nation handed on to me as a responsibility conferred upon me by God, and that it is, as is written in the Bible, my duty to increase this heritage, for which one day I shall be called upon to give an account; those who try to interfere with my task I shall crush." A few months later he voiced the same senti- ments in these words: "It is a tradition of our House, that we, the Hohenzollerns, regard ourselves as appointed by God to govern and to lead the people, whom it is given us to rule, for their well-being and the ad- vancement of their material and intellectual interests." Four years later, at Konigsberg, the ancient crowning place of the Prussian kings, William II said: "The successor (referring to himself) of him who of his own right was sovereign prince in Prus- sia will follow the same path as his great ancestor; as formerly the first King (of Prussia) said, 'My crown is born with me,' and as his greater son (the Great Elector) gave his authority the stabili- ty of a rock of bronze, so I, too, like my imperial grandfather, represent the kingship by God's grace." Again, in 1897, the same idea crops up in his speech about his grandfather at Coblenz: "He left Coblenz to ascend the throne as the selected instrument of the Lord he always regarded himself to be. For us all, and above all for us princes, he raised once more aloft and lent lustrous beams to a jewel which we should hold high and holy — that is the kingship by God's grace, the kingship with its onerous duties, its never-ending, ever-continuing trouble and labor, with its fear- ful responsibility to the Creator alone, from which no human being, no minister, no parliament, no people can release the prince." Again within the last few years at Konigsberg he reiterated his belief: "Here my grandfather," he said, "placed, by his own right, the crown of the Kings of Prussia on his head, once again laying stress upon the fact that it was conferred upon him by the grace io6 EUROPE AT WAR of God alone, not by Parliament, by meetings of the people, or by popular decisions; and that he considered himself the chosen instrument of Heaven and as such performed his duties as regent and as ruler. Considering myself as an instrument of the Lord, without being misled by the \dews and opinions of the day, I go my way which is devoted solely and alone to the prosperity and peaceful development of our Fatherland." The Kaiser is a very devout Christian. He of- ten impresses it on his army that without Chris- tianity no man can be a good soldier. Whenever he is on board his yacht, the Eohenzollern, on Sunday he conducts services himself. In 1899, when his troops were in China at the time of the Boxer uprising, he preached the following sermon : "Text: 2 Mos. 17th chapt. nth verse: But as long as Moses held up his hands, praying, Israel prevailed; but when he lowered his hands, Amalek prevailed. Amen." "An imposing picture it is which to-day's text presents to our souls. There is Israel, making its way through the desert, coming from the Red Sea and on toward Mount Sinai. But of a sudden the heathen Amalekite people stop their progress, and a battle ensues. Joshua leads the young men of Israel into the fray; swords rattle and meet, anda hotly contested, bloody struggle sets in, down in the vale of Rephidim. But see, while the battle moves hither and thither, those devout men of God, Moses, Aaron, and Hur, climb up the moun- tain-side and stretch out their hands toward Heaven; they pray. Below in the valley the warring throng; up on the mountain the praying three. That is the warlike picture of our text. "And who to-day does not understand what lesson it conveys? For again the pagan spirit of Amalek has stirred in far Asia, and with great cunning and power, with fire and murder, they seek to hinder the triumphal march of Christian morals, of Christian faith, of European commerce and education. And again God has ordered: ' Choose men ; go forth and fight against Amalek ! ' A grim, a terrible struggle has begun. Already many of our brothers there are in the combat; many more are now on their way to the hostile coasts. You have seen them, those thousands who, answering the call, 'Volunteers to the front! Who win protect the Empire? ' are now gathering, and who will soon join in the fight with flying banners. "But we, remaining behind here at home, re- stricted by other and sacred duties — do we not hear the words of God, spoken to us, saying: ' Go up on the mountain-side ! Lift up thine hands to the Most High!' The prayer of the just ac- complishes much if it be but said with all our strength and faith! "Well, then. Far away the ranks of warriors, and here at home the ranks of the praying — let that also be the holy battle-picture for to-day! Let this peaceful morning hour remind us of the sacreddutyof prayer, of the sacred power of prayer. "The sacred duty of prayer. "Certainly it is an inspiriting moment when a ship heaves anchor with a youthful crew on board ! Have you not seen the eyes of the young warriors shining? Have you not heard their thousand- voiced hurrah? "But when the coasts of our native land dwindle and vanish, when the ship enters the torrid heat of the Red Sea, or when she plunges into the mighty waves of the ocean, how often does enthusiasm vanish, too, and how often does strength depart! " Certainly an inspiriting moment when, alter a long journey, are seen, far in the distance, the straight lines of the German forts, and the black- white-red flag of the German colony becomes visible, and when brothers-in-arms are awaiting your arrival ashore, shouting welcome in the mother-tongue! But later on, when begin endless marches under a fiery sun, and interminable m'ghts, camping out in the rain, how easily then joy and courage ooze away! "Certainly a longed-for moment, that in which the drum beats to storm and the trumpets shriek to attack, when the order is shouted, 'On upon the enemy!' " But when, in the midst of thundering cannon and in the midst of sputtering, screaming shells your comrades are mowed down to right and left, and when the enemy's batteries will not be silenc- ed, how often even a brave heart begins to tremble ! ' ' Christians ! To enable yoiu" brothers out there to remain of joj^ul heart, to persist in their duty even when it is hardest, not to lose courage even in the greatest danger, it needs more than am- munition and good weapons, more than bravery and enthusiasm — it needs approval and en- couragement from on high, else they cannot achieve victory. And this heavenly world can be THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 107 BRITAIN'S STRONGHOLD IN ASIA HONG-KONG, CHINA, V\'HERE THE BRITISH FORCES IN THE EAST MOBILIZED TO PROTECT THEIR POSSESSIONS GIBRALTAR, THE KEY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA Britain's most important fortress, the famous rock-chamber batteries appear in the picture io8 EUROPE AT WAR THE MASTERY OF THE SEAS" Britain's n.wal strength is nearly twice that of Germany, her nt;arest rival THE "MOLTKE," A GERMAN DREADNOUGHT OF ABOUT THE SAME CLASS AS THE FRENCH "COUBERT," AND ONE OF THE FASTEST BATTLESHIPS AFLOAT, BEING CAPABLE OF MAKING 28 KNOTS THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 109 THE BRITISH HOME FLEET STEAIMING THROUGH THE SOLENT FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, THE "KING GEORGE," "THUNDERER," "MONARCH," AND "CONQUEROR" ONE OF FR/VNCE'S BIG BATTLESHIPS THE DREADNOUGHT "COUBERT," VVHICH HAS A DISPLACEMENT OF 23,400 TONS AND CARRIES TWELVE 12-INCH GUNS AND TWENTY-TWO sf-INCH GUNS no EUROPE AT WAR BRITISH COAST GUARD MANOEUVRES TRAINING THE DEFENCE FORCE WHOSE DUTY IT IS TO REPEL INVASION CLOSING A BRITISH PORT TO FOREIGN WARSHIPS THESE HUGE BOOMS, MADE OF HEAVY TIMBERS ABOUT THIRTY FEET LONG, LASHED TOGETHER WITH STEEL CABLES, KEF.P OUT DESTROYERS AND OTHER SMALL HOSTILE CRAFT THE NAVIES OF EUROPE III ■ ^H ■| ■ p n 1 1 1 ^^^1 I |H| B^ff W!!p p- V ^ ^^^1 w ■SS525 ^ ii mH ^Ci^M. . -SI,. ife 1 1 yjpj lyrii^^^i H 1 1 E BHtfl^-' ""' ^.'~ ■ ■ ■ ^1 A NIGHT VIEW OF THE BRITISH HOME FLEET AN ARMORED TRAIN FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE ENGLISH COAST IT2 EUROPE AT WAR THE NAVIES OF EUROPE "3 POSSIBLY THE DECISIVE WEAPONS OF THE WAR GERMAN SUBMARINES IN PORT AT WILHELMSHAVEN, THE GERMAN NAVAL BASE ON THE NORTH SEA. AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THAT SUBMARINES HAVE MADE BATTLESHIPS OBSOLETE SOME EMINENT A FLOTILLA OF GERMAN DESTROYERS IN PRACTICE MANtEUVRES IN A HEAVY SEA 114 i. u K u r i ^ Al W AK B^jji^Bj^ ', but suddenly came into prominence by the death of his elder bro- ther in 1892, Prince Albert, Duke of Clarence. In 1893 Princess Mary of Teck, who was to have married Prince Albert, was married to Prince George, and they have one daughter. Princess Mary, and five sons, — Edward, Prince of Wales, and Princes Albert, Henry, George, and John. Queen Mary is the daughter of Francis, late Duke of Teck, and Princess Mary-Adelaide of Cam- bridge, the first cousin of Queen Victoria. Francis was a son of the morganatic marriage of Duke Alexander of Wurtemburg with Claudia, Coun- tess of Rhedey, a daughter of a very old Hun- garian House, and therefore the children of King George V have new blood in them brought in from the noble families of Germany, Austria, and Hungary. Prince Arthur, Duke of Connaught and Strath- em and Count of Sussex, and now Governor General of Canada, is sixty-four years old. He is married to Princess Louise-Margaret of Prussia, the daughter of Prince Frederick- Charles of Prussia and Princess Marie-Arme of Anhalt. He has three children; Margaret, the oldest, is the Crown Princess of Sweden, Prince Arthur is married to his cousin. Princess Alexan- dra, Duchess of Fife, and Princess Victoria-Patri- cia, known as the " Princess Pat, " is unmarried. King George V, is uncle by blood to Olaf, Crown Prince of Norway, and by marriage with Queen Mary to three Princes and three Princesses of Teck. He is brother-in-law to King Haakon VII of Norway and Prince of Denmark, Duke Adolph of Teck, and Prince Ale.xander of Teck. He is first cousin on his father's side to Emperor William II of Germany, and his brothers and sisters, among whom, principally is the Queen of Greece; to Ernst-Louis, Grand Duke of Hesse, and his four sisters, one of whom is the wife of Prince Henry of Prussia and another is the Czarina Alice of Russia; to the Crown Princess Marie of Roumania and her three sisters, to Prince Albert of Schleswig-Holstein and his two sisters; to Crown Princess Margaret of Sweden and Prince Arthur and Princess Patricia of Connaught; to Charles-Edward, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and his sister. Princess Ale.xander of Teck; and to Queen Victoria- Ena of Spain and her brothers. Princes Alexander, Leopold, and Maurice of Battenberg. On his mother's side King George is first cousin to King Christian X of Denmark, King Haakon VII of Norway, Princes Harold and Gustav of Denmark, Ingeborg, Duchess of Ves- trogothia in Sweden, and Princesses Thyra and Dagmar of Denmark; to King Constantine I, of Greece and his four brothers and two sisters, who are Grand Duchesses of Russia, to Czar Nich- olas II of Russia and his brother the Grand Duke Michael and his two sisters, one of whom is a Duchess of Oldenburg; to Ernst-August, Duke of Brunswick and Liineburg, and his three sisters. Princess Marie-Louise of Baden, Alexandra, Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg-Schw'erin, and Princess Olga of Cumberland; and to Princes Aage, Axel, Eric, and Viggo of Denmark, and their sister, Princess Margaret. His oldest cousin is the Emperor William II, of Germany, age fifty- five, and his youngest cousin is Princess Margaret of Denmark, age nineteen. With all these blood relations, the number of his second cousins run well up into the hundreds. The Royal Families of the House of Holstein- Oldenburg. The kings of Denmark, Greece, and Norway, and the Emperor of Russia are all de- scended in direct line from the early German kings of Denmark and Norway. The Royal Family of Denmark: King Christian IX (1818-1906) and Queen Louise had three sons and three daughters who all became famous. The eldest son succeeded his father as 136 EUROPE AT WAR King Frederick VIII, and his eldest son in turn succeeded him as King Christian X of Denmark. The eldest daughter became the vnit of Edward, Prince of Wales, and is now the Queen-Mother of Great Britain. The second son, Prince William, was elected as King of Greece, and began his reign there in 1863, as King George I. His eldest son, Constantine, now reigns as King Constantine I of Greece. Constantine is married to Sophia, a sister of the Emperor of Germany. The second daughter of King Christian was the wife of the Czar Alex- ander III of Russia, and is, therefore, the Queen- Mother of that nation. The second son of Fred- crick VIII is Prince Charles, who was elected King of Norway, as Haakon VII. The Russian Royal Family: There has not been a Slavic Emperor in Russia since the bloody days of strife and intrigue following the death of Peter the Great. The male line of the House of Romanoff having died out, several Empresses with their consorts fought for suprem- acy in Russia, and there were several which held the throne for a short time. Finally Peter, who was the son of Charles-Frederick, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and of Anne, daughter of Peter the Great and Catherine I got possession of the throne. But only a short while did he reign; his wife, Sophia-Augusta, Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, a woman of strong mind and steel determination, became jealous of Peter's power, and putting him out of the way, seized the government herself. As Catherine II, she was a great ruler and govern- ed the Russians with an iron hand. Her death brought her son by Peter to the throne, and in the Czar, Paul, the new dynasty of Holstein-Olden- burg-Romanoff was founded. The present Czar, Nicholas II o//?Mi5/a, great-great-grandson of Czar Paul thus belongs to a wholly Germanic family. The Czar's mother is the Princess Dagmar of Denmark, and he is therefore, widely related through the Danish connections as well as his own. In the Russian royal family there are living twenty- four Grand Dukes and Princes, five of them the Czar's own first cousins. The famil}' is mainly allied by marriage with the families or Houses of Hesse, Wurtemburg, Greece, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, although the several marriages with each one of these Houses comprise only a small part of their widespread alliances. During the last century there have been forty marriages between the family and other European houses. Whole chapters might well be written on the extensive alliances and ramifications of this House. Beside being related, mostly in the same way as his first cousin George V of Great Britain to all of that King's cousins and kinsmen, he is even more closely allied in relationships, strong, if not entirely direct, with the Hohen- zollern House of Prussia. All of the sons and daughters of this family are Grand Dukes and Duchesses of Russia to the third generation, that is the sons and grandsons of Czars receive the Grand Ducal title, but the great-grandsons, unless in the direct royal line, become Princes of Russia; the same is true for the daughters of the family. The children are further named from their father, just as in Sweden and other northern countries. The word "vitch" means "the son of," so that the present Czar, who is Nicholas Alexandro\dtch, is, interpreting correctly, Nicholas the son of Alexander. Likewise the ending ' ' ovna ' ' means the " daughter of . " The title of the Czar is "Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, Czar of Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir, etc." with a string of lesser titles, which if put on a single line of type, would stretch out for se\-eral feet. The Royal Family of Belgium: Founded in 1831 by the election of King Leopold I to occupy the Belgian throne, the family has thus far pro- duced three kings. Beginning with the marriage of King Leopold I to Princess Louise of Orleans, practically all of the later marriages of the family have been with the Southern group of royal houses. In this way the family is kindred to the Royal Houses of the north only in the male blood line, but is closely allied to the Houses of Hapsburg Bourbon Orleans, and Bavaria. King Leopold I had three children. The eldest son succeeded him as King Leopold II. By the marriage of this King with Archduchess Marie Henriette of Austria he had one son who died when he was twenty-three, and three daughters, the eldest the wife of Prince Philip of Saxe-Coburg- Gotha, the second the widow of the Crown Prmce Rudolph of Austria-Hungary, which brought the family very near to the Austrain royal house, and the third daughter, Clementme, married a few years ago to Prince Napoleon Bonaparte. She recently gave birth to a male heir of the Bona- partes, the only young prince of this generation. ROYAL RELATIVES 137 The daughter of Leopold I is the ill-fated widow of the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico, executed there in 1867. She has long been insane and is now the inmate of a mad-house. The second son of Leopold I was Philip the Count of Flanders, married to Princess Marie of Hohenzollern, sister of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern and King Charles of Roumania. Of his three children, Henriette is the Duchess of Vendome — a Bourbon alliance, and Princess Josephine is the wife of Prince Charles of Hohen- zollern, younger brother of Prince William of Hohenzollern and of Crown Prince Ferdinand of Roumania, and aunt by marriage of King Manuel II of Portugal. The son is King Albert of Belgium, who succeeded his uncle Leopold II in 1909. The Queen of Belgium is Princess Elizabeth of the Ducal House of Bavaria. Through her, King Albert is allied to the Crown Prince of Bavaria, the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, the Duke of Parma, the late Franz Ferdinand of Austria, and the present heir-apparent, Archduke Charles Francis Joseph. The King and Queen have two sons, Leopold, thirteen years old, and Charles Theo- dore, two years younger. There is also a daughter, the Princess Marie- Josephine, born in 1906. King Peter I of Servia married Princess Zorka, the daughter of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro. She died in 1890. King Peter succeeded to the throne in 1903 on the murder of his predecessor, King Alexander. King Nicholas I of Montenegro married Milena Vucotitch. Of this marriage there are sLx daugh- ters and three sons: the third daughter is Queen Helen or Elena of Italy. The Royal House of Savoy: The illustrious House of Savoy begins far back in history with Humbert the White-handed Count of Savoy. Through many changes in history and war after war, the little county became a Principality and then a duchy. Finally the Dukes of Savoy became kings of Sardinia in 1720, and after a heroic war of independence all the Italian states became welde^*^1 ^^^^^BP 5 '^•^''^ HH ^^''^'i^^"'-^ ^^^* ^ WITH THE KAISERIN THE SEA LORD WILHELM 11 THE VERSATILE THE KAISER 151 Lt^^*:#) '^ i^'. T'"*-' ', >• ^ :0^^^r4'mti '« : ■-■ mm^ WITH KINT, GEORGE OF ENGLAND WITH KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM CopyrisHit by Brown Bros., N- Y. WITH THE CZAR THE KAISER WITH HIS FRIENDS THE ENEMY 1.5^ EUROPE AT WAR THE KAISER AND HIS SIX SONS THE KAISER 153 ^^^^^^^^^P' ^H ^H fl i>^ il kF'Jm Hj 1 THE CROWN PRINCE THE KAISER S DAUGHTER THE KAISER AND THE KAISERIN 154 EUROPE AT WAR AS A mL.IlLAMjLK ^TTT, T, . ^^ '^^ ™^ ANCESTOR, PREDERICK THE GREAT THE KAISER IN COSTUME THE KAISER 155 I'lii; i;a(; THE WITHERED ARM DESPITE WHICH THE KAISER SHOOTS, RIDES, SWIMS AND ROWS iS6 EUROPE AT WAR SIOLZENFELS ON THE RHINE ITALIAN PALACE IN CORFU THE KAISER'S PALACES THE KAISER 157 THE K.\ISER WITH HIS GENERALS AT DINNER 158 EUROPE AT WAR I THE KAISER AND COLONEL ROOSEVELT AT A MILITARY REVIEW I THE KAISER, HIS UNCLE, KING EDWARD VII AND KING ALPHONSO THE KAISER ISO Copyright by Underw' well for those who have grain to sell; but, unfortunately, we cannot have one price for foreign customers and another for the home market. There are more consumers than pro- ducers of cereals, so the great majority will find nothing agreeable in the increased cost of grain and flour. There is another consideration. Though our exports of foodstuffs for the year ending June 30, 1914, totalled $430,296,666, we imported $475,070,689 worth. In other words, we are unable to feed ourselves, but must go out into the world's markets and make up the shortage in provisions at the same increased prices that others pay. The tariff was taken off sugar for the benefit of the consumer. But an important part of the world's supply of sugar comes from beets grown in the countries now at war. It is uncertain whether the present crop can be harvested or not. On the prospect of a shortage sugar advanced a cent a pound to the consumer before the war was a week old. Meat, butter, eggs, cheese, and other articles of food also promptly started to climb. Steel advanced a dollar a ton. Many chemicals, drugs, and iimumerable other manufactured articles come almost wholly from the war zone. The opening of hostilities promptly cut off the supply. As it is extremely imcertain when this source of supph* will again be available, or when, or to what extent, American manufacturers will be in a position to supply the demand, the con- sumer may confidently count on paying fancy prices for all these articles or going without them. Germany supplied an important part of the fertilizers used on American farms. If this supply, now entirely cut off, is not forthcoming when needed, the result may be a decreased production next year which will offset any bene- fit the farmers affected may gam through in- creased prices for their crops. In short, there is no lack of ways in which to collect from America the penalty for Europe's crime. The penalty has been passed along to the average man everj-where in the form of a prompt increase in the cost of Uving, with the comforting assurance that the increase is likely to go on indefinitely. In all probabiUty there will be a temporary slowing up in all lines, which will make dollars scarcer for the average man at the same time that the purchasing power of the dollar is shrinldng. Another very serious result of the war will be to shut off the supply of foreign capital. Amer- ica has always been a heavy borrower, and could continue to borrow with profit to herself. The railroads alone need billions in the next few years if they are to be developed on a scale that will allow the country to grow. But after such a titanic struggle as is now going on Europe will be hopelessly bankrupt. No matter who wins the nominal victory all the nations involved will be the real losers, and their neighbors will suffer to a lesser degree. Countless billions in capital and property will be destroyed utterly, and the best lives of the countries will be wiped out by scores of thousands. It is, obviously, impossible to make any sort of guess at the number of lives to be lost, but perhaps past experience may serve as a guide in appreciating the awful cost in blood. The Japanese death rate in the Russian- Japanese war on the battlefield, from wounds and from disease, was 79 per thousand per year. Assuming that the nominal strength of all the nations, amounting to 17,000,000 men, is actually called out, and that the war lasts one year, the death roll would total, at the Japanese rate, 1,343,000. Whatever the nimiber of lives cut off before their time may be, the productive power and purchas- ing capacity of the nations will be reduced by just that much. To this must be added the i66 EUROPE AT WAR productive capacity of other scores of thousands doomed to drag out the rest of their Hves as hope- less cripples or invalids, unable to take care of them- selves, to say nothing of caring for others. Finally, the birth rate will be reduced by all these horrors, so that altogether the warrmg nations vnil be set back many years in the march of progress. Tak- ing all these things into consideration, it must be conceded that our trade with Europe is not likely to be what it has been for some time to come. All this is but the climax to a ruinous drain that had continued until the world was suffering from a famine of capital. The belhgerents had been spending upward of a billion dollars a year in preparation for war, which was the best possi- ble way to make war inevitable. This vast ex- penditure served no useful purpose, but, to- gether with the earning capacity of four million men withdrawn from useful labor to serve in the armies, was as utterly lost as if it had been sunk in the depths of the ocean. Besides this, financiers had just completed the task of raising considerably more than a billion dollars to foot the bill for the wars in the Balkans, added to which England was still paying interest on a debt of more than a bOlion dollars incurred in the Boer War. The economic convalescence of the na- tions must be slow, because they were fuiancially anemic before the war began. Still there is a streak of silver, even in this sombre cloud. The warring millions ^vill have to be fed and clothed somehow. At whatever sacri- fice, they will have to raise money with which to buy the necessaries of life, and to a large extent they will have to buy from us. They must find some means of getting provisions across the sea, if they have to send a whole fleet of battleships to convoy each freighter. Also, the rest of the world must turn to us now for the manufactured goods formerly purchased from the warring na- tions. A little more than half our foreign trade last year was with nations not directly concerned in the war. There is now a chance for us to ob- tain the bulk of the trade Europe formerly en- joj'ed with these nations. The prompt action of New York bankers in establishing a sort of international clearing house to offset the collapse of all ordinary foreign exchange indicates a disposition to take advantage of the oppor- tunity. Indeed, some of the ablest financiers now assert that the present situation is this Nation's great opportunity if we but have the wisdom to grasp it. We can become the leader of the world in in- dustry, commerce, and finance if we will, so these farseeing men aver. In order to do this we must economize. The rich have been economiz- ing in recent years, but the farmer and the work- ingman have been growing ever more profligate. As the second step toward world leadership they say we must enact the trust bills over which Con- gress has been deliberating all summer. Everj'^- body knows there are underlying evils that need to be cured, and which these bills are intended to cure. They may not be perfect measures, but at least they make a beginning and they can be improved later as experience may suggest. One effect of the present situation will be to compel us to finance our own ventures, since we can get no capital from Europe. The bankers say we can do it. Another effect of the war wOl be to cut off im- migration. Naturally, no man capable of bear- ing arms will be aUowed to leave any of the na- tions involved while hostilities last. After- ward they will be even more urgently needed than they are now. This vnll not be a serious drawback, because there is labor enough here now to meet the demand, though the restriction of cheap labor will check the wasteful development of natural resources and compel the conserva- tion of which so much has been said, but toward which so little has been done. Another effect will be to compel the United States to provide its own merchant marine so that we may no longer be dependent on foreign ship owners to get our products to market. The Administration has already perceived this, and has begim the task of modernizing our archaic shipping laws. Lest this remedy prove inade- quate or too slow in effect, the government itself also proposes to go into the shipping business. Another effect which will inure to out benefit is that we shall be compelled to manufacture our own cotton instead of sending so large a portion of it abroad to be manufactured. OUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES AS A NEUTRAL BY CHARLES CHENEY HYDE PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY UPON the outbreak of the European war the United States finds itself placed in a new relation to each belligerent Power, and suddenly subjected to a variety of duties, and possessed of certain rights that accrue only in such abnormal times. With a merchant marine shrunken to insignificance, and with a vast export trade threatened with paralysis by the lack of neutral bottoms, we nevertheless face a situation that Washington would have rejoiced to substi- tute for that which confronted him in 1793, for to-day the United States as a neutral enjoys rights that were not dreamed of at the close of the eighteenth century; and those rights are in large degree codified. To The Hague Conventions of 1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war, and the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, the United States is, happily, a party. It has also accepted the Declaration of London of 1909, concerning the laws of naval war. The purpose of that agree- ment was to make clear the law to be applied by the proposed International Prize Court, the arrangement for the establishment of which was formulated at The Hague in 1907. Though the powers have not established the Prize Court or accepted generally the Declaration of London, the United States has formally ratified both agree- ments. By so doing it has recorded its approval of the rules enunciated in the latter document. It cannot, therefore, complain of the conduct of any belligerent which may seek to conform to or rely upon them. Although the Parliament of Great Britain has acted adversely upon the Declaration of London, that country is, neverthe- less, free to change its position and to make that arrangement the guide of its own prize courts. Deriving their law from that source, their decis- ions cannot be denounced by us as unjust. For these several codifications the United States has had to pay a price the extent of which is hardly yet appreciated. However useful may be the knowledge at the very commencement of hostili- ties of what a neutral may reasonably expect, the rules themselves are in certain respects so adverse to interests of such a state that it is only through the grim experience of a general European war that the United States can fairly estimate how well it has conserved its vital interests in accepting as law principles that may now be relentlessly applied. According to The Hague Conventions the United States as a government is obliged to refrain from taking any part in the war. Im- partial participation does not suffice. We could not excuse the sale ofarms to Germany by pleading readiness to supply likewise France or Russia. The scope of the duty of abstention is broad. The Government must not furnish a belligerent with anything that will serve to increase its fight- ing power, such as ammunition or other war material, or warships. Incidental to this general duty to abstain from participation, the neutral finds itself burdened with a still more onerous duty to prevent its territory and resources from being employed to strengthen the military or naval power of a belligerent. The diligence re- quired of a neutral is measured by the "means at its disposal." Those means must be used to prevent the commission of warlike acts within its waters, or the passage of beUigerent troops over its territory. The neutral is obviously not respon- sible for what it is powerless to prevent. From the rules of the Treaty of Washington of 1871, which made possible the Geneva Arbitration of the so-called Alabama Claims, has been derived the well-known principle expressed in happier terms in 1907, that "a neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to be- lieve is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace." The same vigilance is required of a neutral to prevent the departure from its territory of a vessel there adapted entirely or partly for warlike use, and intended to cruise or engage in hostile operations. Pursuant to this obligation the United States has already taken extraordinary precautions to prevent the depart- ure from Atlantic ports of merchant vessels sailing under belligerent flags if equipped in such a way as to fight for their own countries, and under con- tract for public service in case of war. 167 i68 EUROPE AT WAR In sharp contrast to these obligations is the express understanding that a neutral is not bound to prevent the export or transit for the use of a belligerent of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet. Thus the United States is not required to prevent its citizens from selling or exporting arms or war material of any kind. Such transactions would, nevertheless, constitute direct participation in the war, and hence be re- garded as internationally wrongful, so as to sub- ject the participant to serious penalties in case of the capture of his property. Such conduct would also, moreover, disregard the spirit if not the letter of President Wilson's Proclamation of Neu- trality of August 4th, in which it is declared that "the statutes and the treaties of the United States alike require that no person within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States shall take part, directly or indirectly, in said wars." Whether war is waged on land or sea, neutral territory is deemed mviolable. As to this re- quirement The Hague Conventions are explicit. Acts of war in neutral waters are forbidden. Thus if the Kronprinussin Cecilie had been cap- tured by any enemy cruiser just as she entered Frenchman's Bay on August 4th, the United States would have had good cause to demand reparation from the government of the captor, and would also have found itself compelled to demand the release of the vessel. A prize court can not be set up on neutral territory or in neutral waters. Nor can belligerent warships make use of such waters for the purpose of increasing supplies of war material or of completing their crews, or as a base of operations against the enemy. For numerous purposes a belligerent warship may endeavor to make use of neutral waters. The Hague Convention of 1907 indicates the scope of the privileges that such a vessel may permitted to enjoy, and thereby enables the neutral to follow with certainty a course that shall not expose it to the charge of unneutral conduct. Let us consider a situation that might arise. A French cruiser, short of coal and provisions, and in an unseaworthy condition is pursued by the enemy, and puts into Portland harbor to es- cape capture and to rehabilitate herself generally. Just inside of Cushing's Island she finds herself in the unwelcome company of a German warship that made the same port a few hours earlier. The Hague Convention has marked out the gen- eral course which the United States should follow; and by his Proclamation of NeutraUty, President Wilson has indicated with precision what we would permit. Accordingly, the French ship would be allowed fuel sufficient to enable her to reach her nearest home port, or half of that amount if she were rigged to go under sail and also be propelled by steam. Although the United States could, without impropriety, if it had adopted that method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied, allow the vessel to fill its bunkers built to carry fuel, and thereby greatly increase her efficiency, the President has announced a rule that is consistent with our previous policy and in harmony with what was, prior to 1907, generally regarded as sound practice. The latitude ac- corded the neutral in 1907 was not sought by the United States, was vigorously opposed by Great Britain, and was the result of a compromise to satisfy the far-reaching demands of Germany. With respect to provisions, the French ship could supply herself with garlic and Aroostook County potatoes ad libitum, so long as the revictualing did not exceed the so-called "peace standard." It if were in a seaworthy condition the German cruiser would be obliged to depart within twenty- four hours after its arrival. The French vessel might, however, be allowed additional time if needed for recoaling or repairs. The latter might necessarily consume a few days. Repairs would not be permitted that would serve to do more than place the ship in a seaworthy condition, and even such repairs would not be allowed if they necessi- tated a long sojourn. If, as in the case of the Russian ship Lena, that entered San Francisco harbor in September, 1904, during the Russian- Japanese war, necessary repairs would require a stay of several weeks or months, the vessel would be promptly interned by the United States. By interning the ship the United States would be taking measures to render her incapable of putting to sea during the war. It was declared in 1907 that the citizens of a state which is not taking part in the war are con- sidered as neutrals. To the Americans that are now in belligerent European countries that status is precious. It enables the possessor to escape numerous burdens which the state that is engaged in war justly and of necessity imposes upon its own citizens. One cannot, however, avail him- self of his neutraUty if he commits acts against a UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL 169 belligerent, or if he voluntarily enlists in the ranks of a party to the conflict. There are, nevertheless services which the neutral citizen on beUigerent soil may render without losing his distinctive character. Americans in Paris or Berlin might, for example, organize for the purpose of assisting in matters of police or civil administration. They might also furnish loans (if their means permitted) to one of the belligerents in whose territory they did not reside. Neutrals on belligerent territory where martial law has been declared necessarily feel the rigor with which the government asserts its authority. It must be obvious that measures which, in seasons of peace, indicate abuse of power, in times of war lose their arbitrary aspect and, despite harsh aspects, cease to be regarded as wrongful. Thus the movement of neutrals on belligerent soil may be restrained, and they may be even temporarily prevented from leaving the country. Slight ground for suspicion that they are acting as spies justifies arrest and ample inquiry to determine the grounds for such a charge. To the people of the United States as a whole the war presents no graver aspect than in its bearing upon our right to export and transport to the belligerent countries food, clothing, fuel, and other things known as conditional contra- band. To make clear the problem now confront- ing us a brief explanation of the law is necessary. "Contraband" is the term employed to describe an article which is Uable to capture because of its use in the prosecution of the war, and because of its hostile destination. Contraband is subject to capture on a neutral vessel and is Liable to con- demnation. Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband and which are on board the same vessel are also liable to condemnation. Moreover, according to the Declaration of Lon- don, the vessel carrying such articles may be con- fiscated if the contraband forms "by value, by weight, by volume, or by freight, more than half the cargo." Maritime states have long been aware of the importance of the distinction between articles adapted solely for use in war, such as guns and projectiles, and those susceptible of use in the pursuit of peace as well as in that of war, such as food and coal. Articles of the former class have come to be known as absolute contra- band, those of the latter as conditional contra- band. The purpose of the distinction is to limit the right to capture articles of the latter kind to occasions when they are destined for an essentially hostile end, and to permit the capture of those of the former kind whenever they are bound for the territory of a state engaged in war. In order to protect neutral commerce from interference, the United States has struggled hard for recogni- tion of the principle that what is capable of feeding and clothing, and otherwise ministering to the sustenance of the people of a belligerent state, should not be subject to capture and con- demnation, unless shown to be not only capable of use in war, but also destined for that use. Though maritime states are not indisposed to accept this principle, there has been diversity of opinion respecting, first, what articles should be treated as conditional contraband, and secondly, under what circumstances articles recognized as such should be subject to capture. The Declara- tion of London appears to have solved the first difficulty by specifying in appropriate and careful lists certain articles as absolute, and others as conditional, contraband (and still others as not contraband at all). Thus arms of all kinds, gun- mountings, clothing, and harness of a distinctively military character, animals suitable for use in war, and armor-plate are among the articles placed in the first category. They are subject to capture if destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. This is true whether the carriage of the goods is direct, or entails transhipment or subsequent transport by land. What is decisive is the destination, not of the vessel but of the goods. Thus a consignment of uniforms, shipped from New York on an American vessel boimd for Naples or any other neutral European port, would be subject to capture, even within sight of Nan- tucket, if it were shown that the ultimate destina- tion of the goods was Trieste. Articles in the second category, and described by the Declaration of London as conditional con- traband, include foodstuffs, gold and silver, paper money, boots and shoes, vehicles, material for telephones and telegraph, fuel, lubricants, and harness. These articles furnish a substantial portion of the export trade of the United States. The second difficulty already noted — con- cerning when conditional contraband is subject to capture — is the all-important question before the United States to-day. In more concrete and simpler form the question is: When is such I70 EUROPE AT WAR contraband to be deemed to be intended for a hostile use so as to justify its capture? The vital significance of the answer that the belligerents may give is hardly yet appreciated. Thus far pop- ular attention in this country has been focussed on the lack of American and other neutral ships available for our foreign trade. Relying upon the assurance that "free ships make free goods," we have concerned ourselves about vehicles of transportation rather than with the safety of oui produce. It is important to note what assurance the Declaration of London affords. It is there provided that conditional contraband is liable to capture if shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces of a belligerent, or for a department of its Government unless, in the latter case, circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war. (This exception is not, however, applicable to a con- signment of gold or silver, or paper money.) It is further provided that a hostile destination is presumed to exist in case the goods are con- signed, not only to enemy authorities, but also to a contractor in the enemy country who as a matter of common knowledge supplies articles of the same kind to the enemy. Again, a similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or to another place serving as base for its forces. In the meantime American exporters must face the fact that, if propriety of conduct is to be tested by the Declaration of London, the belli- gerent Powers are in a position to capture and condemn foodstuffs, coal, and other articles witliin the same category, with an ease that renders shadowy and dangerously vague the distinction between what is conditional and what is absolute contraband. AMERICAN FINANCES BY CHARLES A. CONANT SINCE war was declared, American mar- kets have stood up under a tempest of a character never before encountered since the creation of the modern mechanism of finance. For a few days it looked as though the entire machinery of banking and credit built up in Europe during forty years of peace had been brought to a standstill, and as if the American market would be compelled also to suspend its activities. The New York Stock Exchange, under a torrent of orders from Europe to sell American securities held abroad, remained open until the close of business on Thursday, July 30, but was closed the next morning after a consultation be- tween the governing board and big banking in- terests. In the meantime, the usual mechanism of foreign exchange had broken down, partly be- cause shipping was threatened by the war and insurance rates for the shipment of gold had be come prohibitive. Even such credits as were possessed by American banks abroad were in a state of suspense and drafts on England which should have been sold at the highest at $4.90 to the pound sterling rose to $5.25 and even in some cases to $6. The seriousness of the situation abroad was manifested by almost every cable message which came from the great centres of finance, — Lon- don, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Petrograd. The French and Enghsh govern- ments promptly declared a moratorium, which means that the holder of documentary obUgations, like bills of exchange and promissory notes, can- not enforce payment according to the terms of the obhgation until the delay granted has expired. In France, the payment of specie at the Bank of France was promptly suspended; in Germany, gold was gotten only with difficulty and in trifling amounts from any of the banks; in Belgium, specie suspension occurred; and in Holland, similar action was accompanied by authority to the National Bank of the Netherlands to issue addi- tional notes to the amount of $200,000,000. In France, also, the limit of circulation of the Bank of France was increased at a jump from $1,300,000,000 to $2,300,000,000. Even the rock-ribbed Bank of England was subjected to a run for gold in exchange for its notes which cut down its reserve by more than $50,000,000 in less than a week and led ultimately to the suspension of the bank act of 1844, which limits the amount of notes that can be issued without gold. London has long prided herself AMERICAN FINANCES 171 on being the clearing house of the world, and on being the only market where obligations were al- ways payable promptly for their full value in gold. The very fact, however, that the London market was a clearing house for obligations from all over the European Continent and from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which could not be col- lected promptly, naturally deprived her of the means of making her usual settlements and made it necessary to allow a breathing spell in order to reconstruct the machinery of exchange. THE PREPARATION FOR A CRISIS This breakdown in European finance took place in spite of a long period of preparation for the stress of war on the part of farsighted statesmen and bankers in Europe. The fact was clearly recognized after the Morocco crisis of 1911, which brought France and Germany nearly to the verge of war, that the European banks were inadequately equipped for a great struggle in arms. At once, the Imperial Bank set to work to strengthen its gold reserve, with entire in- difference to the usual principles of political economy determining the free movement of gold. It appeared as a high bidder at the London auc- tions for the gold which arrived from South Africa every week; it husbanded all the gold which en- tered the bank in the course of ordinary opera- tions; and it greatly expanded the issue of notes for 50 marks ($11.90), and 20 marks ($4.76), which had never been issued prior to 1906. The bankers of France and Russia, witnessing this feverish activity in Germany to increase her gold resources, met her on the same ground. Within a year and a half, the three state banks of France, Germany, and Russia drew into their vaults an amount of gold equal to the entire pro- duction within that time which was available for monetary uses, exclusive of the amounts re- quired in the arts and for exportation to India. Their total increase in gold holdings in eighteen months was about $360,000,000, and shortly before Austria delivered her brutal ultimatum to Servia at the close of July, the gold holdings of the Bank of France had reached $792,160,000; of the State Bank of Russia, $819,700,000; of the Im- perial Bank of Germany, $336,000,000; and of the Bank of Austria-Hungary, $254,400,000. To these gold war funds, the United States contributed during the spring of the present year up to the end of June, about $84,000,000 in the form of gold exports. When the war clouds broke into storm, a new effort in Europe to turn other forms of wealth into gold caused gold exports from New York in three weeks of $46,000,000, and sales of securities on the New York Stock Exchange which would probably have called for $30,000,000 more. The American market had remained, up to the very eve of war, comparatively indifferent to the gathering storm clouds in Europe. With a gold monetary stock in the country estimated at about $1,700,000,000, the loss of $100,000,000, more or less, caused little alarm. If the same sit- uation had arisen in 1895, when the Treasury of the United States was on the brink of specie suspension, and it was necessarj' to make a con- tract with the Morgan and Rothschild houses to obtain $65,000,000 in gold and to protect it by a monopoly of the market for exchange, the results to American finance would have been appalling. Attempt to control the exchange market by fixing high rates would have been futile against the feverish thirst for the yellow metal in Europe, which would not have been slaked nor greatly restrained by a trifling difference in the cost of getting it. A STRONG POSITION Fortunately, the finances of the United States were never in a stronger position to meet such a strain than in the closing days of July, 1914. Even on the stock market, liquidation had been so long going on and speculation had been so dis- couraging in its results, that there were only a few margined accounts to be thrown over and only moderate loans outstanding on the part of the banks to commission-house brokers. In respect to its gold equipment, the United States was stronger in some senses than even Russia and France, with the mountains of the yellow metal at the command of their central banks. The amount in gold certificates outstanding at near their maximum point on AprO 30, 1914, was $1,158,997,000. These certificates represent simply deposits of gold on behalf of the owners in the custody of the Government and are only a part, although a large part, of gold resources of the country. The Treasury could afford to look on with comparative indifference while certificates were turned into coin and the coin went abroad; for 172 EUROPE AT WAR neither of these operations affected directly the legal tender reserve in gold, fixed by the gold standard law of 1900 at the sum of $150,000,000, nor did they affect directly the "free gold" in the Treasury cash, which stood on July 31st at a point above $130,000,000. Under the gold stand- ard law. United States notes are redeemable on demand from the legal tender reserve of $150,000,000, but when so redeemed may be exchanged for gold in the general cash of the Treasury, if gold is found there. Never since the enactment of the law in 1900, has the legal tender reserve fallen below the legal limit of $150,000,000; and this reserve was buttressed by a fund of $130,000,000 of free gold in the Treasury. .\CTION BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BANKS When it became apparent, however, that the demands of Europe for gold might be almost limitless, if she could throw upon the New York market the great mass of American securities in which she had invested, prompt and energetic action was taken by the banking interests of New York and of the Government to protect the situation. First, on Friday morning, July 31, came the closing of the Stock Exchange; at a meet- ing of the Clearing House Committee on Sunday August 2, it was decided to issue Clearing House certificates for use between the banks of New York in settling clearing-house balances; and on Saturday, August i , the Hon William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, arrived in New York and entered into earnest conferences with the banking interests, with the result that the Treas- ury arranged for the prompt issue of emergency bank notes to enable the banks to substitute notes for gold certificates in the circulation and thereby husband their gold and build up their reserves. These reserves had fallen from $466,577,000 for the week of July 25th to $444,436,000 on August I, and fell still further, un- der the pressure of gold exports, to 386,589,000 on August 8. If jealousies or distrust had existed between the big financial interests in New York and the administration at Washington, they were quickly forgotten under the pressure of the general peril. The Democratic leaders in Congress took prompt action to liberalize the Aldrich-Vreeland law of 1908, which would have expired by limitation on June 30, 1914, but for the forethought of Senator Owen, chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, and Chairman Carter Glass, of the House Committee, and an amendment received the approval of President Wilson on Tuesday, August 4, doing away with this limitation and extending the authorized aggregate of new note issues from $500,000,000 to 125 per cent, of the capital and surplus of the banks, or more than $2,000,000,000. It was probably fortunate for the country that the organization of the new system of Federal Reserve banks had been delayed up to the break- ing out of the crisis. The new system might have been very effective in protecting the situation if it had been in complete operation; but in a period of transition, which would have called for the shifting of considerable amounts of legal tender money from the old national banks to the new Federal Reserve banks, it would have proved a source of embarrassment without having any completed powers of relief. In preparing meas- ures, however, for meeting the difficulties of the situation, the Secretary of the Treasury had the assistance of those three members of the Federal Reserve Board, who had already been confirmed by the Senate, — Hon. Charles S. Hamlin, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. W. P. G. Harding, an Alabama banker, familiar with the conditions for moving the cotton crop; and Dr. Adolph C. Miller, a trained political economist. EASING THE STRAIN These gentlemen remained in New York during the period of acute pressure for currency and superintended the issue within a week of $46,514,980, in new notes, to New York banks alone. The peculiar value of these notes in reliev- ing monetary strain is that they can be paid out by the banks in response to calls for currency, whether from interior banks or from individuals, and thereby permit the banks to husband their gold certificates and build up their reserves. Inci- dentally also they equip the banks with increased lending power without dipping into their reserves. Sanity gradually returned to the financial markets in London as well as New York as soon as the efficiency of the steps taken in both countries began to be recognized by the financial commun- ity. The Bank of England, which lost in a week more than $50,000,000 in gold, gained gold rapidly during the second week in August. The AMERICAN FINANCES 173 rush for the redemption of bank notes in gold was brought to an end when the government author- ized the bank to issue notes in excess of the legal limitand put out notes for ten shillings ($2.44) and £1 ($4.88), which had not before been done since the recovery from the Napoleonic wars. The discount rate of the Bank of England, which was raised on Friday, July 31, to 8 per cent., and on the next day to 10 per cent., was reduced in the follow- ing week to 6 and then to 5 per cent., and accom- modation was extended as usual to solvent clients. The deadlock in exchange with the United States was partially broken by the same firm which had saved the United States Treasury from specie suspension in 1895. It was an- nounced on Thursday, August 6, that the govern- ment of France had deposited with the Paris ofhce of J. P. Morgan & Company, a sum of about $6,000,000, which was subject to drafts by the French Ambassador in Washington. By means of checks drawn upon this fund, but delivered to J. P. Morgan & Company in New York, the French Government would be able to purchase supphes in the United States and the drafts would release an equal amount of money in New York, which could be applied to obUgations of French bankers and importers to bankers and e.xporters in New York. A clever move in the same direction was announced by the Bank of England on August 11, by which the Canadian Treasury Department was made a branch of the bank and custodian of the gold due the bank in New York. By this means the gold held on this side of the water could be counted as a part of the reserve of the bank against its note issues and deposit liabilities in England. AMERICAN SECURITIES HELD IN EUROPE Perhaps the most serious feature of the war panic abroad, in its effect on American finance, is the sending back of American securities held in Europe, to be unloaded on the New York Stock Exchange at any price for cash. For many years, a portion of European savings has been applied to investment in the United States, until the amount thus invested has reached, according to the computations of Sir George Paish, editor of the London Statist, no less a sum than $6,000,000,000. In Canada, also, it is estimated that foreign capital is invested to the amount of more than $3,000,000,000. The amount invested in the United States, which is principally in the form of secauities, represents nearly the entire value of the annual production of the country, and more than half the aggregate assets of the national banks. Securities issued for railway-building and in- dustrial enterprises represent fixed capital which is the result of the savings of years and in modern times has come to exceed many times the amount of annual production. Obviously, it would be impossible for the United States to buy back, even at low prices, the entire mass of American securities which have been placed abroad. The problem, fortunately, cannot present itself in quite so crude and appaUing a form, but the necessity of taking back even one-fifth or one- tenth of this huge mass of obUgations would be sufficient to cause derangement in the money market and serious declines in stock exchange prices. It was for this reason that it was necess- ary to close the Stock Exchange on July 31, under the torrent of frightened European selhng, and it will be necessary to study the situation in this respect carefully before the American Stock Ex- changes can be again opened for business. DISTRIBUTION OF THE COSTS OF WAR Even if the war should come to an end in a few months, the echo of its disturbing effects would be felt in the market for capital, because of the considerable loans which it would be necessary for the governments involved to offer to the public. Experience in former wars has shown that the countries which prepare to absorb new issues of their national loans do so by quietly reducing their holdings of foreign securities. In time of peace, this would not be done with the precipitation and sacrifice of values which occur under the threat of war, but the effect would probably be to depress the price of other securities and make it difficult to obtain capital for new enterprises while the costs of war were being distributed over the world's money markets. America, therefore, whatever her temporary profits from an enhanced demand for certain products and the opening of new opportunities for her commerce and shipping, will be compelled to bear some share of the loss caused by the con- sumption of hundreds of milUons of the world's savings in supporting contending armies and keep- ing them supplied with the weapons of destruction. THE WAR AND OUR OCEAN TRADE BY WINTHROP L. MARVIN WITHOUT undertaking to consider the causes, the fact is that when Great Bri- tain, Germany, France, Russia, and Aus- tria plunged into war in the midsummer of 1914, their merchant ships and the ships of the few mari- time nations remaining neutral were carrying 92 per cent, of the overseas trade of the United States, ^a trade which in the latest fiscal year was valued at nearly four billions of dollars. Our principal carriers were Great Britain and Germany, and the ships of the latter's flag were at once removed from consideration, — bottled up at home or abroad by the superior naval power of the enemy. There ensued, of course, a paralysis of export and import commerce that struck at the pros- perity of every part of the nation. What hap- pened was precisely what Washington and Jeffer- son had foreseen in the last years of the Eighteenth Century. Then they aroused their countrymen to vigorous measures of self-defense, and in a few years the danger was averted, — the United States became a mercantile marine power of the first rank. If the same result follows upon the present acute emergency, the loss and suffering now inevitable will not have been entirely in vain. ONLY SIX TRANSATLANTIC STEAMSHIPS But this looks ahead, and present conditions demand immediate attention. At the outbreak of the war, the American flag was flying over only six steamships out of the two or three hundred liners regularly engaged in the great transatlantic trade between the ports of the United States and the ports of Europe. These six steamships, which have since proved so conspicuous and useful as the favored refuge of returning American tourists, are the St. Louis, St. Paul, New York, and Phila- delphia, of the American Line from New York to Cherbourg and Southampton, — 20-knot passen- ger, mail and express freight vessels of 11,000 and 10,000 tons, — and the Finland and Kroonland, i6-knot steamships of the Red Star Line from New York to Plymouth and Antwerp, — vessels of 12,000 tons, with excellent passenger accommo- dations and a considerable cargo capacity. Not one of the latest Atlantic leviathans has sailed under the Stars and Stripes. All of these six American steamships are in the service of the International Mercantile Marine Company. The four first named are the regularly subsidized transatlantic postal fleet of the United States, and the Finland and Krootiland were built in anticipation of a later subsidy measure which was not enacted. Occasionally an American steamer of the coastwise fleet, chartered for a particular purpose, makes a voyage to Europe, but these six steamers represent the entire shipping facilities available imder the American flag in the regular transat- lantic trade when the great war opened. Imme- diately the six ships were sought by all Americans in Europe who could secure passage by them and realized the safety that lay in the folds of their country's flag, and they have been and will continue to be sought for the same reason by the shippers of bullion and valuable cargo. Besides these six American steamers, the war at the outset left neutral a few small steamship lines under the colors of Spain, Portugal, and Scandinavia. The Holland-America steamers have been forced to traverse a danger zone, the Belgian steamers of the Red Star line went almost immediately into the belligerent class, and a hazard of eventual participation clings to the steamship lines of Italy. MORE SHIPS IN THE WEST INDIES This was a grave crisis from the standpoint of ocean transportation, for the United States lost at once the dependable use of its principal ocean carriers. Not only were the regular lines affected, but the slow freighters, the wheat and cotton ships, belonged chiefly to the belligerent nation. They were held at home or at distant ports, and with almost two-thirds of the cotton crop and many millions of bushels of the huge grain crop demanding markets overseas, the United States has been involved by the war in an incalculable misfortune. For it is only in Europe, convulsed by the war, that the great bulk of our surplus cotton and grain can be disposed of, — relatively small quantities having been sent to the ports of other continents. Though the war in its first effects crippled steamship communication on the transatlantic routes, it has had no such disastrous results on WAR AND OUR TRADE 175 the routes to the West Indies and the nearer ports of Atlantic South America. American shipping holds a respectable place in the trade of the Carib- bean region, and about one-half of the entire commerce of that region is and long has been with the United States. A strong American steam- ship service, — that of the Ward Line, — connects Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas with New York. This is a mail-subsidized service, and so is that of the Red D Line from New York to Venezuela via Porto Rico. Our West Indian colony is under the coastwise laws and possesses communication in ships of several American lines with New York and ports of the Gulf of Mexico. The Panama Railroad Steamship Line, another American serv- ice operated by the War Department, runs from New York to Colon. The Clyde Line runs to Santo Domingo, and the Southern Pacific Line from New Orleans to Cuba, which has steamship connections also with the Florida peninsula. Ships of the large fleet of the United Fruit Company, sailing imder British and other foreign colors (because of higher American wages and severer requirements of American law) but so securely American in ownership that they are not likely to be disturbed, ply between our At- lantic and Gulf ports and Jamaica, Cuba, Central America, and the Isthmus of Panama, and the Munson Line, also with American owned ships of foreign register, is an important factor in the Cuban trade. The United Fruit Company may come completely under the American flag. The Atlas Line of German steamers has been with- drawn from the New York-West Indian service, but otherwise our West India communications have not been and presumably will not be seriously reduced. Nor is there any hazard in the war to what is now the most important steamship service under the American flag, — the long- voyage coastwise service through the now-open Panama Canal, between the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard. In- telligent and active preparations for this trade have been made by American shipping men, and the list of available Panama coast-to-coast steam- ships under the American flag has been increased by new vessels and new companies. The Ameri- can-Hawaiian Company has completed its great fleet of twenty-six steamships of a total dead weight capacity of nearly 300,000 tons; the Emery Company, of Boston, has appeared upon the route, and the International Mercantile Marine Company has confirmed its purpose to offer a passenger service that will become available as soon as the war will permit. These Panama steamers are all of bona fide American ownership and register, the great present hope of our mer- chant marines. They are sufficient in number to provide a sailing from the Atlantic or the Pacific every business day throughout the year. On the Pacific, one American steamship of the Great Northern Company from Puget Sound, and four or five steamships of the Pacific Mail Company from San Francisco, run to Japan, China, and the Philippines. The Oceanic Steam- ship Company operates a reestabhshed postal subsidy line from San Francisco to Australasia. The Pacific Mail maintains a service from San Francisco toCentral America and Western Mexico. Thus, in spite of the general weakness of the American merchant marine in foreign trade, there are routes upon which the Stars and Stripes still hold a place of dignity and power. There is, however, no American steamship line to the greater countries of South America, with the exception of one freight line operated by the United States Steel Corporation with chartered ships of the American-Hawaiian Company from New York to Brazil. RIGHTS OF NEUTRAL CARRIERS The catastrophe of the war is heaviest in the vast, rich commerce of the North Atlantic. Both the grain and the cotton crops are coming forward. Where are the ships requisite to carry them? The important service of the two great German steamship companies, the Hamburg- American and North German Lloyd, has ceased to exist. A merchant ship of a belligerent, even laden with cargo that is in itself non-contraband and even bound to a neutral port, is a lawful prize of war. Great Britain and her allies dom- inate the sea, and German ships and Austrian ships are for the time being eliminated from inter- national commerce. Ships of neutral nations can nominally trade to all ports, even ports of belligerent nations that have not been formally blockaded, but in effect the widening of the definition of contraband to include conditionally even such articles as food stuffs very seriously circumscribes all practicable war-time commerce. Petroleum, another of our 176 EUROPE AT WAR most important exports, is absolutely under the ban as contraband, and even such harmless ar- ticles as cotton or woolen cloths are liable to seizure and confiscation if of the nature of miUtarj' uniforms. The truth is that in a great world-shaking war many settled principles of international law are sure to be denied or disregarded. Each belligerent on the ocean assumes to be a law unto himself. Theoretically, until formal blockade is proclaimed, as was done by our Government in the Civil War with the ports of the Confederacy, an American ship or any other neutral ship has a right to carry a clearly non-contraband cargo to Bremen or Hamburg or Trieste. But, as a matter of fact, no American or other neutral ship will dare to do this, except as a desperate speculation. The North Sea is already filled and the Adriatic may soon be with mines, fixed or floating, those dead- liest devices of twentieth century war. It is the misfortune both of Germany and of Austria that their coast lines are relatively short and readily closed by an enterprising enemy, and direct com- mimication with their ports even under a neutral flag can doubtless be regarded as an impossibility for the present. Whether or not a blockade is proclaimed, a blockade actually exists, and Ger- many and Austria must be dismissed from con- sideration as consumers of products of the United States, — save, indeed, for what small commerce may persist through the ports of Holland, Scan- dinavia, and Italy, so long as these remain neu- tral states. But the ports of Great Britain, except those on the northeast coast, and the ports of France ought to remain open to the neutral commerce of America. Already a large part of the service of British and French transatlantic steamship companies has been cautiously resumed, and the critical situation of crowds of American refugees in Europe is now a thing of the past. It must be expected, however, that the British and French steamship schedules will be liable to interruption throughout the war, because of imperative demands of the home government for ships for transport or other auxiUary service. These lines cannot be depended on in war as they could be in peace. It must not be forgotten that the German navy contains some of the swiftest and most formidable cruisers in existence. One or two of these ships, slipping out of the North Sea through the British blockade and falling on the transatlantic route, would create a panic and make insurance rates on British and French mer- chant ships prohibitive. This danger is liable to increase as the war continues and the situation of Germany, ringed in by foes, becomes more des- perate. Americans -mil remember that the Con- federate commerce destroyers were relatively harmless in the first year of the Civil War, and that their sharpest depredation occurred in the years 1863 and 1864, — indeed, one of these rovers, the Shenandoah, did her deadhest work after the war had ended. WHAT CAN BE DOfTE? Already freight rates to north European ports have doubled, and there has been an increase of 50 per cent, in the rates to countries outside of the war zone, to Africa and South America. Insur- ance rates also have attained excessive figures, though they are significantly low for ships flying the American flag, of unquestioned American ownership, on the American register before the war began. The United States, as the greatest and most powerful of neutrals, is in a position to command respect for its own ships and its own citizens. It is very fortunate for the country that the American naxy because of the quality of its ships, guns, and personnel is a factor which no belligerent would Ughtly draw into the scale against it. Our Government in this crisis should insist with firmness on full neutral rights for aU its ships and cargoes. If the nation possessed a great mer- cantile marine, or was rapidly creating such a marine, this would be an unexampled opportunity. Undoubtedly there will be additions to our over- seas tonnage from the larger vessels of the coast- wise trade. Some of these have already been chartered and others are being offered by their managers. The Clyde and Mallory lines and their allied companies have signified that eighteen steamers to carry grain or cotton are at the service of the Government. The American-Hawaiian Company has other and larger steamers ready. It so happens that because of the general depres- sion in domestic business many American coast- wise vessels have been lying idle in port awaiting an improvement in trade or the opening of the Panama Canal. Seventeen such vessels have been unemployed at Boston, thirty at New York, WAR AND OUR TRADE 177 and more than forty at San Francisco. Some are too small for profitable overseas voyaging, but some are larger vessels carrying from 5,000 to 10,000 tons. One factor, beyond the lack of ships, which has temporarily crippled the e.\-port trade is the breakdown of exchange. This is a financial and not a transportation difliculty and it can be remedied. Another factor of discouragement has been the heavily increased insurance rate, so high as to leave small profit to shipowners and owners of cargo. But this difiSculty is being lifted with the adoption by Congress of the plan recom- mended by President Wilson for the Government insurance of ships of American register. THE EMERGENCY SHIPPING MEASURE Vigorous insistence on the rights of neutrals, the use of coastwise vessels wherever practicable, and national insurance of American vessels will be straightforward and practical methods of relief of the war congestion of our export and import trade. Congress has already at this writing passed the emergency shipping measure in the form in which it was sought by the Administra- tion. This bill passed the House after a very brief debate. In the Senate, an unwise attempt was made to take advantage of the emergency in our overseas shipping business to force foreign- built ships into the coastwise trade, which had been reserved for more than a hundred years to American ships and American citizens. This ill-timed attempt would have destroyed the pros- perity of our coastwise shipping and would soon have destroyed ship-building in America. If it had been successful it would have defeated the purpose of the emergency shipping bill, which was to provide foreign-built ships for the carrying of oiu- overseas commerce. Such ships, if ad- mitted to American registry, would have pre- ferred the coast trade to the overseas trade, be- cause of the greater security in the domestic traffic from interference by belligerents. Fortunately, the prompt and vigorous opposi- tion of the merchants, shipowners, and ship- builders was heeded by the public men in Wash- ington and the attack on the coastwise trade which would have resulted so disastrously for the coun- try was defeated in the Senate by a vote of two to one. Then the original emergency shipping bill, as the House had framed and passed it was adopted. This provides for the admission to American registry of foreign-built steamships, without re- gard to age, owned by American citizens or by American corporations of which the president and managing directors are American citizens. Further to encourage the naturalization of foreign- built ships, the President is authorized in his dis- cretion to suspend the requirement of existing law that the ofiicers of American ships shall be American citizens. The President is also author- ized in his discretion to suspend the requirement that foreign-built ships shall comply with Ameri- can laws governing survey, inspection, and meas- urement. The new law in its terms actually grants a valuable preference to foreign-built ships over existing ships on the American register. It is an unmistakably liberal proposition, — an urgent invitation to the ships of the world to seek the American colors. Indeed, American ownership may be merely nominal for it can be secured by foreign capital through the simple expedient of organizing an American corporation in which only three or four ofiicers need be American citizens, holding the few shares of stock necessary to qualify. Unknown to many of the people of this country, a free-ship policy had been in effect here since the enactment of the Panama Canal act of August 24, igi2. This admitted to American registry for the foreign trade any foreign-built vessel, less than five years old, owned by American citizens or an American corporation and capable of being certified after inspection as fit to carry dry and fjerishable cargoes. Not one ship of any kind was actually admitted to American registry under the provisions of this law. It proved an absolute failure, because no compensation was offered for the higher wages of American officers, for the higher wages of crews if shipped from American ports, for the higher cost of food and general maintenance on ships under the American flag, and for the foreign subsidies and bounties that would have to be reUnquished by some foreign ships if transferred to American registr>'. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP DANGEROUS AND INEFFECTIVE Recognizing already that even the broader free-ship proposition will fail of adequate result, 178 EUROPE AT WAR President Wilson has brought forward a new and radical expedient, — Go\ernment ownership of steamship lines. The maximum of $30,000,000 which the President asks Congress to appropriate for the purchase and operation of foreign-built steamships in Government lines under the Amer- can flag is only a small fraction of the amount requisite to create an adequate fleet. The pro- posal is a makeshift, and a perilous makeshift, for the mere introduction of it has aroused resent- ment abroad and provoked warning that the American nationality of ships bought from belli- gerents in this belated and dubious way would not be accepted for a moment. Thus both the emergency shipping measure and this later plan of Government ownership involve grave risk of international complications. Though Great Bri- tain did not sign the London conference agreement of 1909, the following declaration is at least morally binding as the latest expression of inter- national opinion: The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after the opening of hostilities, is void unless it is proved that such a transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences which the enemy character of the vessel would involve. One steamship service is now owned by the Government, — that of the Panama Railroad Steamship Company, acquired from the French with other assets of the old canal. This line, though favored in the transportation of Govern- ment supplies, has incurred heavy deficits in some years when private-owned competing lines earned reasonable dividends. It is an unfortu- nate precedent; the experience of the United States in ocean trade with the one line which it controls is not encouraging. The great, unmistakable lesson of this war to the American people is that an adequate merchant marine can no more be improvised in an emer- gency than can an adequate fighting navy. The heavy cost of our lack of American ships will be borne throughout the war, not by the maritime States, but by the cotton-growing States of the South and the wheat and the grain-growing States of the Middle West, many of whose public men and pubUc Journals have for half a century shown themselves indifferent or hostile to every effort to create an American ocean shipping. It was these influences, from the interior of the country, that defeated the earnest efforts of President Roosevelt and of President Taft to secure national aid for the establishment of steam- ship lines to South America and across the Pacific Ocean. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft pointed out that the inland States needed a mer- chant shipping even more than the seaboard States. But inland statesmen caused the defeat of the shipping bill by narrow majorities in the House of Representatives. Their own people, their own agricultural constituents, are now pay- ing the penalty, and, in spite of all efforts to pre- vent it, that penalty will have been a heavy one before this war is ended. More than a century ago. President George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, his Secretary of State, warned their countrymen in a joint communication to Congress that dependence upon foreign nations as our sea carriers was a costly blunder, for aside from the disastrous effects upon our ship-building and seamanship which these two great Americans vividly pictured, "our products, carried in foreign bottoms, would be saddled with war freights and insurance in time of war." Congress listened, and passed one after another laws that brought the American tonnage regis- tered for overseas commerce up from 123,000 in 1789 to 667,000 in 1800 and to 981,000 in 1810. At the beginning of this period, American ships were carrying 23 per cent, of this country's im- ports and exports; and at the end of the period, they were carrying 91 per cent. Many of the admonitions of the founders of the republic have been remembered, with profit, by subsequent generations; this, quoted above, has been forgotten. Another great world-war, as vast and terrible as the Napoleonic struggle, has foimd the United States as unprepared and helpless to safeguard its overseas trade as it was in the first administration of Washington. That this is so is going to prove the shame and the loss of the American people. There are people, — thousands and tens of thousands of them, — on the continent of Europe who will go hungry in the autumn and the winter, if the war continues, because of the lack of Ameri- can carriers for our abundant foodstuffs. The warring soldiers have left the harvests standing in the fields. The havoc of march and battle over these fields will be tremendous. There will be a grave shortage of food this year in Europe. Great Britain may manage to provide ships to A CHANCE FOR AMERICAN SHIPPING 179 bring supplies for her own people, but she cannot do much more. An American merchant marine of unquestioned nationality, — not a merchant marine of suddenly "whitewashed" ships, — would now be a boon to the world, — to the people whom its safe neutral carriage could succor, as well as to the people whose products it would deliver and whose flag it would fly. A CHANCE FOR AMERICAN SHIPPING BY SYLVESTER THOMPSON MANY Americans have found one pious hope in the present European struggle: that it might stimulate the long deferred building of an American merchant marine. Ap- parently American enterprise has here a fairer opportunity than millions spent in subsidies could provide. The great carrying nations no longer sweep the seas. There are just about as many cargoes, however, to be carried; why should we not carry them? — carry them not only for the few months the war will probably last, but for all time? The United States apparently occupies the position of a commercial house whose chief rivals have suffered reverses that amount to a practical suspension; ordinary business sense would spur us to take over their business. Not only our business enterprise, but our position as a shipping country, should lead us to do this. The American who first glances at the figures of the world's shipping has something of a shocked surprise. He has heard so much about America's decline on the sea — about the possibility of sailing around the world and never seeing the American flag at a masthead — that he naturally regards himself as belonging to a nation of land- lubbers. In fact we are the second largest ship- ping nation in the world: England ranks first, and Germany makes not a particularly respectable third. The actual figures are 16,541,000 tons for England, 7,886,000 for the United States and 4,593,000 for Germany. But the disturbing fact about our large shipping industry is that it limits practically all its activities to the Great Lakes and our two great coast lines. Nearly all English and German shipping goes over seas ; nearly all of ours stays at home. Our shipping, therefore, helps us out little in the present crisis. Possibly a few of these lake and coast vessels might be transferred temporarily to the transatlantic lanes ; for the most part, however, they have plenty of employment in their accustomed waters. Ship- ping them to the high seas would cause a complete disorganization of coast and lake commerce; de- moralize it as completely as the present ocean traffic is demoralized. American maritime history discloses a series of ups and downs; accidental causes at times have built up our mercantile marine, at other times have destroyed iL We were not much of a seafaring people in colonial times; the policy of Britain always aimed at keeping this valuable business m the hands of Englishmen. But na- tional independence swept aside all these anti- quated navigation laws. The year 1790 saw the young United States with practically no mer- cantile marine; Englishmen were then our carriers, just the same as they are now. The first year of the century witnessed a change; we were then carrying 80 per cent, of our own products in American bottoms. By 1810 we were carrying 90 per cent. ; a few years afterward we were carry- ing not only our own, but a considerable part of the world's. And then followed one of the most splendid periods in American commercial history. As a maritime nation America led the world; we held the position as a carrier that England does now. What had caused the sudden rise of America as a great maritime power? This question has the utmost interest in view of the present situa- tion. For the conditions that faced Europe in the early part of the nineteenth century strongly resemble those which face it now. It was the era of the Napoleonic wars. These struggles had one effect, practically identical with that we are witnessing to-day — the utter demoralization of European commerce. England and France were constantly preying upon each other's mercantile marine, the result being that the ships of both nations no longer felt secure upon the high seas. Both, as great maritime people, suffered a tre- mendous decline. Herein was America's oppor- tunity, and splendidly she seized it. As a con- sequence — and here is another point that has a i8o EUROPE AT WAR present practical application — we retained this sea supremacy after the Napoleonic era closed. The years from 1830 until about 1855 represented the greatest glory of the American merchant marine. By the time the Civil War started, how- ever, the decline had set in; by the time the war was ended, the greatness of our shipping, al- though the famous American clippers still sailed the seven seas, had disappeared. Authorities differ as to the cause of this change. A consid- erable number attribute it to the Civil War itself. The fact is, however, that our shipping had begun to decline several years before the Civil War. By 1855, as already said, its greatness was a matter of history. A new material found use in the construction of vessels — iron. When this sub- stance supplanted wood in ship building the knell sounded for the American merchant marine. There was then practically no American iron or steel industry. England, on the other hand, had greatly developed its iron resources. There was only one way, in those days, in which we could still maintain a standing at sea: that was by purchasing the new fangled ships in Europe, mainly in England. But this the law forbade. No ship that was not constructed in the United States could fly the Stars and Stripes. However, this idea, and the many others used to explain the disappearance of American foreign shipping, are now purely academic. The one fact is that, although Americans have built up a large mer- cantile marine in their own waters, they have practically none on the high seas. We annually pay about $200,000,000 to foreign nations for the transportation of our products. It is not surprising, therefore, that many should see in the present European conflict a chance to regain our marine supremacy. We did this when Europe was convulsed with the Napoleonic struggle; why should we not repeat the per- formance now? One or two considerations at once come to mind that apparently discourage such an enter- prise. The Napoleonic wars, for example, lasted a long time — about fifteen years. This is long enough to permit pretty radical and permanent readjustments. It gives plenty of time for the creation of a mercantile marine, and for the es- tablishment of new trade relations. The present large shipping interest of Germany is Uttle more than a matter of twenty-five years; a generation ago Germany had to go to England for her war- ships. No one believes, however, that the present conflagration will last fifteen years, or anywhere near that long; if it lasts fifteen months, most observers will be siuprised. The creation of an independently constructed American marine fleet, therefore, is not likely. Before we could actually launch any new ships, the war would be ended. One fact, therefore, is at once apparent. The commerce of the world has got to use such ship- ping facilities as it now possesses. About 15,000 ships now furnish the world's marine transporta- tion. These ships will contrive to do so through- out the war, and probably for some time afterward. They may change their flags or their ownership; if they are kept off the high seas, however, the business of mankind will largely stop and many milhons of people will starve to death. One can imagine what would happen to the United States if all our railroads stopped nmnLng. That is precisely what is happening now, so far as mari- time commerce is concerned. Forces are already at work to put an end to this paralysis; and these efforts must succeed. An analysis of foreign shipping by nationaUty will simplify the situation. Take, for example, American exports last year, and the nations that carried them. We find that 60 per cent, were shipped in British vessels 15 per cent, were shipped in German vessels 9 per cent, were shipped in American vessels 4 per cent, were shipped in French vessels. These figures bring out, as do all other similar statistics, the tremendous leadership of British foreign shipping. It not only surpasses that of any other country; it is greater than that of all the other countries combined. If the American people are going to carry most of their own com- merce in this war they must get not only Great Britain's business but Great Britain's ships. EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON SEA POWER Before that happens, however, certain impor- tant preliminaries must be settled. From what- ever point of view we survey this war, we invari- ably come back to the same point. It all hinges upon one thing: the control of the sea. With the English navy dominating the situation, England probably cannot lose. With the English navy A CHANCE FOR AMERICAN SHIPPING i8i destroyed, England's surrender would come within a few weeks. And this question of sea supremacy has the most important bearing upon the question of the possible boom in American shipping. If England destroys or effectively bottles up the German fleet, there is no reason why she cannot resume the greater part of her shipping. Her vessels can carry nearly 60 per cent, of our com- merce this year, as they did last. The only possible danger is an occasional capture by Ger- man cruisers. This danger is so slight, however, that it can be practically disregarded. England has nearly 10,000 vessels engaged in commerce. Where can Germany get any warships to prey upon this enormous fleet? She cannot detach them from her main squadrons. After all, the chief business of warships is to destroy the enemy, not to destroy its commerce. Every cruiser that is taken from the battle line will weaken a force already enormously outclassed. Supposing there are a few German cnxisers prowling the ocean, what wiU happen to them? England's fleet is so large that she can easily set aside a few warships to destroy them. If she does not do so, where are they to get their coal? Where are they to take their prizes, in case they capture them? It is possible, again, that the English Govern- ment may press into the navy part of the mer- chant marine. But, with 10,000 ships, a good many can be used this way without materially decreasing its efficiency. Germany's shipping ottr opportunity Most naval authorities believe that England and France will secure the command of the seas. At the present writing the indications are that the great German high seas fleet is bottled up. Again the English Government has assumed the insurance risk on British shipping. It practically says to the shipowner: "Go to sea with your cargo; if you lose it, the Government will reim- burse you." These and other considerations ap- parently dispose of the idea that Americans can supersede England on the high seas as a result of this war. If these predicted events come to pass, how- ever, there still remains the question of German commerce. With the British fleet controlling the situation, Germany's mercantile marine, for all practical purposes, will cease to exist. Ger- many carried 15 per cent, of our commerce last year, against England's 60 per cent. Small as this seems in comparison with her great rival, this still represents a prize well worth striving for. Herein unquestionably lies the real American opportunity. Under normal conditions the sudden wiping out of Germany's mercantile marine would mean one thing; that England would capture it. But, with a tremendous war on her hands, England is not expanding her in- dustries in any direction. The war expenses have so strained her credit that she would have the utmost difficulty in financing any new shipping enterprises. The same statement applies to France, the only other nation that could possibly step into the breach. The opportimity, in all its aspects, therefore, seems made for the United States. Germany now has about 2,000 ships, most of them engaged in the foreign trade. The present likelihood is that most of these will stand useless at the docks during the war. They repre- sent a very large investment; how large there are no available statistics to show. Their loss of earning power will sadly inconvenience their owners, especially if the war is continued for any period. The companies will be so badly crippled that it will take them a long time to recover, when peace returns. In many cases offers to purchase would find a ready response. The ex- tent to which America profits from the promised stagnation in German shipping depends upon the extent to which our capitalists stand ready to purchase these vessels. Congress has already passed an emergency shipping measure. Foreign- bmlt ships, old or new, are now entitled to Ameri- can registry, provided they are owned by Ameri- can citizens or by corporations with an American president and American managing directors. And the President of the United States has been empowered to suspend the legal requirements for American officers on American ships, and for the comphance, on the part of foreign-built American ships, with American regulations as to survey, inspection and measurement. There seems little likelihood that friendly nations, like England, will refuse to recognize such transfers as are contemplated, so long as they are actual and represent a permanent o^vnership. The Adminis- tration, in its zeal to do everything possible to improve the situation, has also asked for a maxi- mum appropriation of $30,000,000 to enable the l82 EUROPE AT WAR Government to purchase and operate foreign-built ships under the American flag. But this radical measure has met with strong opposition. If the present aspirations materialize, it would be the beginning of the long hoped for American mercan- tile fleet on the high seas. It is true that the removal of this prohibition on the purchase of American ships would take away only one dis- ability that prevents our competing with Europe. The others are the higher cost of iron and steel and labor here and the higher cost of navigating. The first disqualification is rapidly disappearing. If we can make steel rails and compete with England in all the markets of the world, we can do the same thing with plates for steel ships. We still pay our workmen higher wages, but we have the compensation of an increased efiiciency. Only one difficulty still remains in the way of building up an American marine. Our sailors get about twice the pay of English sailors and demand a better maintenance. How that will affect the situation remains to be seen. THE COMMISSARIAT— THE RED CROSS -THE HAGUE COURT CARING FOR THE SOLDIER'S HEALTH SOLDIERS who escape death on the battle- field in the great conflict now going on will have a far better chance of returning home alive than any soldiers ever had before. It must be remembered that in all previous wars the real enemy was not the one with gun in hand under the opposing flag, but disease, which mowed down troops on both sides impartially. It has taken the world a long time to grasp so obvious a fact, but the lesson has been thoroughly learned at last, and it has been applied in all civilized armies. Sick soldiers of an earlier day received no at- tention whatever. If the wounded received any care it was from a comrade or from the women who followed in the wake of the army. Then the barber became the army surgeon, when there was any, to give way later to monks. Napoleon paid little or no attention to sick and wounded. In the Peninsular campaign about 60,000 French soldiers were killed in battle in Spain, and about 400,000 died of disease. In the Russian cam- paign of 1812, of 500,000 who crossed the Dnieper in June scarcely 20,000 returned in December. Bullets killed some, to be sure; the deadly cold claimed others; but the great majority perished of disease. The 1813 campaign after Leipzig was no less disastrous. Of an army of 100,000 that left Leipzig in October only a few fragmentary battalions followed the eagles across the Rhine in November. The total ruin of this army was due to sanitary neglect. Soldiers died of disease by thousands, scattered among the villages along the route from Germany, leaving pestilence in their wake. In the Crimean campaign 230 out of each 1,000 British soldiers died annually of typhoid fever, dysentery, and other infectious diseases. In the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, the annual death rate from disease among French troops was 140.8 per thousand; among the Ger- mans, 24.5. In the Boer War, lasting two years and eight months, 5,774 British soldiers, in a force having an average strength of 208,326, were killed in battle, and 2,108 died of wounds, a total of 7,882, or about 14 per thousand a year. Disease claimed 14,210, or 25.58 per thousand a year, which was almost double the number slain by Boer bullets. The total death rate was 39 per thousand a year, and the total wastage, including invalided, miss- ing, and prisoners, amounted to 40 per cent, of the total strength of the army annually. Nearly 3 per cent, of the total strength was constantly sick. In the Russian- Japanese War, which lasted twenty months, the number of Japanese alone in kDled and death from wounds, averaged 54 per thousand a year. Disease claimed 27,142, or 25 per thousand a year, a showing no better than that made by the Germans in the Franco- Prussian war. The foregoing figures serve to give an idea of the magnitude, as well as of the character, of the task confronting the medical staff of the modern army. All the world seems to have realized after the Russian- Japanese War the absolute necessity of caring for the health of troops in the field. Soldiers are no longer regarded merely as "food for cannon," but as valuable property belonging to the State, which it is good business policy to care for with at least as much pains as are be- stowed on other war material. In the last ten years the medical staff of every army has been completely reorganized and brought up to date. In every language elaborate treatises have been written on the proper methods for preserving the health of troops and for taking care of the wounded with a view to returning them to the ranks as soon as possible. Text books con- taining "problems" are prepared for the young military surgeon who aspires to promotion, so that he may become skilled in the art of providing for large numbers of wounded under various diffi- cult conditions, on paper at least. The most minute studies have been made of every detail in the daily life of the soldier in barracks, on the 183 i84 EUROPE AT WAR march, in battle, and after he has been wounded. The first department of the army with which the prospective soldier comes in contact is the medical staff, which examines all applicants for enlistment and decides whether they shall be accepted or rejected. In England, the only coun- try now at war in which military service is volun- tary', the physical examination is rigid and the percentage of rejections is high. Even in those countries in which military service is compulsory and universal the unfit are excluded from the ranks. The volunteer, or the unwdlling youth who reports for his compulsory tour of military duty, who is accepted as a recruit is never there- after free from the watchful care of the medical department untU he is discharged or dies and is buried under the direction of that department. The medical staff prescribes, or at least modi- fies, the exercises and setting-up drill for the raw recruit to make sure that he is not overworked; for in Europe the young recruit is likely to have been imderfed. The medical department makes a point of feeding up these weaklings while it begins their physical education. Hygiene is now all-important in the military world, for the fact is recognized that it is much cheaper to keep the soldier well than to cure him after he becomes ill. Besides, the commander wants a fighting force, not a hospital population. Thanks to vaccination, tjphoid fever is becom- ing a negligible element in the military organiza- tion. The United States Army leads the world in the extent to which this preventive is used, and France is foremost in this regard among European nations. 0\\ang to the great numbers in conti- nental armies, typhoid vaccination is proportion- ately less used than in this country; but American military surgeons predict that if the war is pro- longed all the troops will be inoculated against their deadliest foe. Vaccination against smallpox is practically universal. Besides these there are numerous infectious diseases for which vaccine therapy has, as yet, provided no remedy; and these cause the army medical officer no end of trouble. Soldiers seem prone to mumps, measles, and kindred ailments, which r\m through a camp or a garrison as through a boarding school. The medical staff is consulted about the sol- dier's clothing, and especially about his shoes; for if these are not properly made he becomes footsore on the march. England, like the United States, provides socks for her soldiers; but troops on the Continent, if they want such luxuries, must buy them themselves. Germany, by unanimous consent, is conceded to provide worse boots for her troops than any other nation, though im- proved footwear has recently been adopted. Extraordinary care has been bestowed upon the soldier's ration. Since the work men and steam engines can do depends upon the amount and quality of fuel fed to them, the Continental soldier is nourished as carefully as a locomotive is stoked by an e.xpert fireman. The army medical staff of each nation has made exhaustive experi- mental studies in order to arrive at the proper quantity of food required by the average individ- ual to do the average day's work for a soldier. This amount is measured in calories, which is the standard heat unit used by physicists, a calorie being the amount of heat required to raise the temperature of a kilogram of water from zero to one degree Centigrade. The Russian soldier either requires more food than other men, or else he is blessed with a more liberal government, for his daily field ration amounts to 4,929 calories. The French soldier is the next best fed, his daily field service ration providing him 3,340 calories. England ranks third with a field ration of 3,292 calories, and the Dual AlHance is at the bottom of the list, the German ration being 3,147 calories, and the Aus- trian only 2,620 calories, or but little more than half the Russian ration. From the military sur- geon's point of view this inferiority in rations bodes no good to the Dual Alliance. The British ration is not much different from that of the American soldier, consisting of a pound of bread and three quarters of a pound of fresh meat with bone, or seventeen ounces of preserved meat when in camp or abroad. In addition to these staples, he is allowed a messing allowance of twelve cents a day with which to purchase vegetables and the like. For service in the field, the French and Germans use to some extent tinned meats put up with vegetables and consomme. In some of their African campaigns the Germans found that contractors, with a view to economy, had filled the tins chiefly with water; so now the Government puts up its own tinned meats for army use. Food may contain proteins and carbohydrates in the proper proportions and be in good condition THE SOLDIER'S HEALTH i8s yet so unappetizing as to cause aversion, or even loathing; so the army medical ofEcer must see that the troops have the proper condiments to season their food and that it is well cooked. For this purpose they visit the men at meal time. Only last year the sanitary chief of the French army reported that the food of the soldier had been most carefully considered and regulated with proper regard to obtaining the highest efficiency from the individual fed on a scientific diet. Since 1905, when the doctors recommended a better cooked and more varied diet, a system of instruc- tion in cookery had been introduced in the army with gratifying results. One of the results is a death rate in time of peace of only 3.75 per thous- and as compared with a fraction more than 20 for the nation, and 8 per thousand for the civilian population between the ages of 20 and 22. The motor omnibuses, familiar to visitors to Paris, are now being used, with wire screens re- placing the windows, to convey fresh meat to the French troops in the field. One of these ve- hicles can haul a load of two and a half tons of frozen beef imported from Argentina, or fresh killed beef from the herd, about forty miles back from the front. To wash down his carefully measured dose of proteins and carbohydrates the English soldier is allowed twenty-two hundredths of an ounce of tea daily. On the Continent the average sol- dier prefers coffee. The French soldier is pro- vided with a coffee mill; but the Germans, at least in some of their African campaigns, had to use the butts of their rifles, which proved to be a very poor substitute for a coffee mill. From the military surgeon's point of view, water is even more important to the soldier than food. The classic example illustrating the con- sequences of a hard march without water is Napier's description of the march after Sauroren, when "many fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled leant on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time." It is an axiom among mountain climbers that "the more you drink the farther you go." The soldier is not allowed to drink whenever he pleases. On the contrary the medical staff insists that water discipline is as essential as firing discipline. They say a man is not allowed to expend a single round of ammunition without authority, and that he should not be allowed a drop of water without specific permission while on the march. Indeed, in some native regiments in India, the water bottle is carried so its owner cannot reach it while marching. He can get a drink only when halted for that purpose. The time for drinking and the quantity to be allowed have been carefully calculated on a scien- tific basis. It has been found that the evapora- tion of two grams of water abstracts one calorie from the body and that the average e.xpenditure of energy per man in marching is 90 calories per mile, which is equivalent to the evaporation of 180 grams of water. In six miles the evaporation amounts to onehtre, or if pints, or, say, one-for- tieth of the water in the body, which is about as much as should be lost without replacing, if full vigor is to be maintained. But as it takes a march of about three fourths of a mile to raise the temperature to the evaporating point, the military surgeon calculates that the men should be halted after marching the first seven miles, when they should be aUowed the contents of their water bottles, which hold one litre. After that they should be allowed one litre every six miles. In the German Army during manoeuvres mounted officers, or orderUes on bicycles are sent ahead of a marching column to warn the inhabitants of villages to turn out and have water ready on both sides of the road for the troops. If possible a short halt is made while the men refresh themselves; if time presses they must snatch a drink as they pass and if they can manage it, they also fill their water bottles. The medical staff is keenly interested in the equipment the soldier carries and the manner of its adjustment; for every pound added to his load means the expenditure of energy at the rate of 4.5 small calories a minute, and an awk- wardly placed load may interfere with his breath- ing, or do some other mischief. Foreign writers pay the American army the compliment of saying that it has the best selected and best managed equipment in the world. Something appears to be wrong with all other equipment and the way it is carried, according to medical writers on the subject. Here is what every soldier must carry about with him all the time while in the field; a rifle, weighing about 9 pounds, with bayonet, cleaning i86 EUROPE AT WAR materials for keeping his gun in order, ammunition, and an entrenching tool; his clothing, including coat, trousers, puttees, boots, neckcloth, hand- kerchief, a change of underwear, identification disk, and first-aid dressing; food, including one reserve or emergency ration, or, in the case of the Germans and Austrians, two reserve rations, and in the case of the Russians two and a half; water bottle, mess tin, knife, fork and spoon, though the Russians carry merely a wooden spoon stuck in the boot in lieu of these refinements; accoutrements, including knapsack, belt, and braces; a great coat, and half a shelter tent, 4x6 feet which, upon being buttoned or hooked to another half carried by another man, forms a shelter for the two; personal necessaries, including toilet articles and spare linen. In the case of the British soldier this totals 47 pounds; in the case of the Germans, 38 pounds, and the French, 44 pounds. These lighter weights are due to the fact that the French and Germans carry fewer rounds of ammunition than the British soldier, who never has less than 1 50 rounds. The Russian soldier has the hea\'iest load of all to carrj', 61 pounds; or, when he sets out with four days' rations and extra ammunition, 72 pounds. The medical department also prescribes rules for the sanitation of the camp, disposal of waste material, and sees that public as well as personal cleanliness is enforced. Though it finds its sphere of greatest useful- ness in maintaining the troops at the maximum of physical efficiency, thereby contributing di- rectly to their fighting effectiveness, the medical department has a second important function, and that is to relieve the field force of the incum- brance of sick and wounded. In this work the authority of the medical director, or chief surgeon, is supreme. In time of peace the medical de- partment has constantly imder its care from 3 to 4 per cent, of the entire force; in war, more than twice this proportion. The department must provide everything required for the well- being of the men, their medical and surgical treatment, food, clothing, and transportation, from the time they fall out of the ranks till they return. Every soldier carries, in a sealed tin box, a first-aid packet, consisting of a bandage, gauze, and adhesive plaster. If the wound is but slight and in an accessible place the soldier may apply the dressing himself; if more severe, a comrade may apply it for him. The importance of this first-aid may be better understood when it is said that infection is the most frequent cause of death from wounds not immediately fatal. This first-aid serves the double purpose of preventing infection to a large extent and of checking hemorrhage, which ranks third in causes of death from wounds, shock being second. Military surgeons say that the great majority would re- cover from gun shot woimds if infection could be prevented. The fate of the wounded is in the hands of the man who appUes first aid. The wounded soldier, with or without first-aid dressing, passes back to the rear by way of dress- ing stations beside an ambulance in a spot that is more or less sheltered from hostile fire to the field hospital. As soon as he can stand trans- portation, he is passed on to the general hospital, and thence in due time to the convalescent camp to recuperate. A large proportion of the wounded require transportation by litter and ambulance to the field hospital, which is located as near the firing line as prudence will permit. Though the medical staff of no two nations is identical, it may be said, in a general way, that equipment is provided on the theory that if the number engaged is 18,000, 20 per cent., or 3,600 will be dead on the field; 8 per cent., or 1,440, will be so severely wounded that it will be inad- visable to move them; 40 per cent., or 7,200, will be able to walk, one half of them to the station for the slightly wounded at the rear, the rest to the dressing station, and 32 per cent, will require transportation. In recent wars the mortality among the wounded collected and transported to the rear has averaged from 3 to 6 per cent. In the Manchurian campaign one third of the wounded Japanese returned to the ranks within a month. In deciding on his arrangements for a battle, the chief surgeon bears in mind that the wounded will be distributed in "zones of losses." The usual proportion of wounded is 20 per cent, up to 1,000 yards range; from 1,000 to 400 yards range, 60 per cent; in the final rush 10 per cent; in pur- suit, 10 per cent. The field hospital is not pitched till the tactical situation develops and the point where the main attack is to be made is known. Then a site is chosen beyond range of the enemy's fire, accessible to front and rear by road, yet off THE SOLDIER'S HEALTH 187 the route of march of advancing troops, convenient to wood and water and, if possible, near buildings which may be used for the overflow of wounded, for, of course, casualties in battle are not limited by rule, and the facilities provided may be over- whelmed. Conditions on the battlefield are all unfavorable for clean surgical work, and it is often impossible to reach many of the wounded for hours. The results achieved by modern military surgeons under the difficulties inherent in their work seem little less than miraculous. A pleasant fiction widely credited is that men have been studying for years to make war more humane — as if war could be humane ! For ex- ample, one of these "humane" devices is the small bullet at high velocity. Stories are told of men who, after being shot through the chest or head with a modern bullet, about the diameter of an ordinary lead pencil, have walked long dis- tances to the dressing station and have then re- covered in a miraculously short time. Military surgeons who have seen actual service tell a different tale. It is true that really slight wounds made by modern bullets heal more quickly and thoroughly than in former days. But severe wounds are no less severe and much more frequent. The Germans use a steel-jacketed bullet with a core of lead hardened with antimony. The steel jacket frequently comes off in jagged frag- ments which horribly lacerate the flesh. The French bullet, a mixture of copper and zinc, is not jacketed, but is longer and sharper than the German bullet. Bent by ricochetting, it often enters the body as a hook; sometimes it "tumbles" and enters broadside on, making a long, gaping wound. Up to a range of about eight hundred yards one horror is as bad as the other. These "humane" bullets have three general effects: up to a range of 500 yards they have an explosive effect, splintering the bone so thorouglJy as to explain the frequent accusation that explosive bullets have been used; at ranges of 500 to 1,500 yards the effect is comminutive, grinding the bone to powder, and not infrequently carrying with it into the wound fragments of soiled clothing, thus causing gangrene. The third effect is contusive. A bullet fired into an empty metal vessel enters and leaves by a small hole. Fill the vessel with water, and the bullet will still enter by a small hole, but will make a large, jagged wound in leaving. The bullet has exactly the same effect on the body or the head. In any case the bullet strikes a hea\'y blow as with a club. Modern bullets are "humane" only when compared with the effects of shells, and it must be remembered that a far greater proportion of casualties are due to shells than ever before. In the Franco-Prussian War, shell wounds were 91 per thousand; in the Manchurian campaign the ratio had increased to 176 per thousand, and in the Balkan War of 1912 the proportion was 364 per thousand. The Russians in Manchuria called shrapnel " the devil's watering-pots. " When they burst they scatter hundreds of round bullets as well as fragments of the shell itself. They are most deadly within a radius of ten to thirty yards, but even at a hundred yards the "dewdrops" are lively enough to penetrate six inches of pine. The common shell is still more terrible. The frag- ments, heated to a very high temperature by the explosion, burn the flesh so as to compel cries of agony that only morphine can quiet. The large shells of the navy not only cut like razors, but asphyxiate, amputate portions of the body, and crush. Altogether, the experienced military sur- geon is not unduly impressed with the "humane" aspects of war. The last service rendered to the soldier by the medical department is to see that he is promptly buried after the battle; for as he has now become rubbish, or waste matter, his disposal is properly a part of the sanitary work of the medical staff. The widow and orphans, waiting at home until anxiety deepens into dread, and dread into des- pair, may be able to form some estimate of the reverent care with which this last rite is performed for their loved one, " humanely " killed by modern methods, when they know that the chief surgeon, according to the standard authors, counts on a burial squad of five hundred men disposing of 140 bodies an hour, after the bodies have been collected. Of the many disastrous absurdities for which war is responsible, this matter of caring for the soldier's health furnishes its full share. Think of it : the soldier is trained and nourished like a race-horse, that he may be raised to the highest pitch of efficiency — before being exposed to an- nihilation; while the enemy's soldier is first torn into pieces by our guns, and then carefully patched together again by our surgeons. And man is said to be a reasoning animal. THE RED CROSS BY ARNO DOSCH THE women of many nations wearing the Red Cross are following the armies on to the battlefields. The work of the Red Cross is more rapid and effective than ever be- fore. Hospital corps have trailed ammunition wagons and the wounded have often been moved to field hospitals before the first numbness of in- jury has given way to pain. This is modern war- fare, as unbelievably humanitarian as it is bar- barous. Every European nation in the war has an efiScient Red Cross of its own. In every one the Red Cross has a somewhat different standing. In Russia it stands higher than anywhere else. It is given great freedom and deserves it. At the same time it is more of a state affair than any- where in Europe. It is supported by special taxes and is given unusual privileges at all times. The nurses of the Red Cross form a sisterhood. They are, in a measure, consecrated to the cause. The Russians have come to a better understanding of the usefulness of women nurses on the battle- field than have the people of any other nation. At the outbreak of the Spanish War, the Rus- sian Red Cross, which was at the time almost the only effectively organized Red Cross in the world, offered its services to both the United States and Spain. The United States declined, but Spain accepted. The United States might have done better to accept. Lack of a modem Red Cross was responsible for much suffering and loss of life in Cuba and Porto Rico. Tampa and Chicka- mauga might have had other stories to tell if the Russian Red Cross had been there to help. Now of course, such conditions would be impossible. Our own Red Cross has learned how to handle the situation. The Russians divide the field work of the Red Cross into five divisions: Handling supply depots; taking the injured back from the firing Une, which means an emergency transportation system; as- sistance to the regular surgeons; direct rehef on the battlefield; and caring for the feeding stations in the rear of the army. In war time the Russian Red Cross does more than the Red Cross of any other nation. Russia began developing the Red Cross in the Crimean War. When the Russian- Japanese War came on, the "white trains" given by wealthy nobles were particularly conspicuous. Altogether, the Red Cross took to the front 3,000 carloads of material and food. The nurses were as eflScient at the front as the organization was in forwarding suppUes. At the fall of Port Arthur all stray ends of that ugly business were left to them. The Red Cross really did the evacuating. When Mukden was evacuated there were many hundreds of wounded whom it was impossible to move. Surgeons and nurses remained behind with them and were given every courtesy by the conquering Japanese. The Japanese themselves developed the Red Cross into the best possible field force in a very short time. Taking advantage of the patriotism, the women of all Japan were organized. The nurses and cooks formed one body and went to the front. Another body developed lunch and refreshment rooms, and women everywhere made bandages and helped prepare field outfits. Now the Red Cross operates hospitals throughout Japan, and one out of every forty persons in the empire belongs to the Red Cross organization. In contrast to Russia's attitude is Germany's limitation on all volunteer nursing. It is con- trary to the German character to leave matters of that kind to any chance. It is all worked out methodically by the army medical corps, and the volunteers are held in check. They are used to help expand the regular forces, but they have no such independence of action as they enjoy in Russia. The French Red Cross has more of the liberties of the Russian. It is a question of national tem- perament. The French in their nursing make up for lack of drill by the enthusiasm with which they enter into the work. The volunteer French Red Cross is composed, as in the United States, of the best trained nurses in France. They have no experience in that particular service, but they understand nursing and sanitation. They art organized according to army divisions and do better work perhaps because of their freedom from red tape. The Italian Red Cross is admittedly the best organized for war, and here again its effectiveness 188 THE RED CROSS 189 is due to the lack of restraint. The Austrian Red Cross has also been giving a good account of itself for several years. Its organization is much like the Italian. Almost every nation was represented in the Red Cross in the Balkans, but the absence of Red Cross organizations in the Balkan states themselves brought about in the first battles suffering to which only the battlefields of the Middle Ages could offer comparison. Stories that came to the outside world from the few nurses present roused the world and made the later battles less awful. The graphic account of twenty-four hours at an operating table in the rear of the Servian army, as told by the Countess Maggiolini, did more for humanitarianism in the Balkan wars than any other single influence. The Red Cross will probably be even more con- spicuous in this war than in any previous one. Where lines are so tightly drawn and the fighting is frequently in a comparatively small area, the crossing of lines and the invasion by hospital corps of hostile territory bring up fine points. It is a question how far the Red Cross may go toward reUeving the suffering of the noncombatants with- out interfering with the brutal purpose of war. There will be charges of violation of the Red Cross, and the extent to which the Red Cross will be permitted to go will depend largely upon the humanitarianism of the individual commanders. Despite its many other activities the Red Cross is always associated with the battlefield. There it has certain coveted rights in the name of human- ity, and it never yields any. If anything, it is inclined to stretch them. At its conventions war is always foremost, as there is a perennial discussion as to its rights. Part of the purpose of war is to lay waste the invaded country and make its inhabitants suffer want. The Red Cross stands for the alleviation of suffering wherever found. These two cross purposes constantly clash, and the needs of war generally win. The Red Cross can go no further than it is permitted. It can be only just so bold before it is interfered with. Besides trying to define and enlarge its rights on the battlefields, the Red Cross conventions bring out new inventions for giving better service. The Dowager Empress of Russia contributed a fimd of about $50,000 to stimulate the inventive ability. The first prize is of 6,000 rubles, about $3,000, the second of 3,000 rubles, and the third 1,000 rubles. These prizes, known as the Marie Feodorovna prizes, have been won for the inven- tion of a considerable list of handy contrivances — from stretchers which can be changed to meet almost any condition, to handy kits for the uses of nurses in war. They have been awarded for practical things, and the work of the Red Cross in the present war, as well as the work of the medical corps, will be greatly facilitated by the fact that those prizes were given. When the Geneva Convention was held in 1864 the world had been sickened with the smell of blood. The horrors of war were uppermost in the minds of people. It was possible to gain a wide appeal for the movement. But it was found out before long that work of the Red Cross was not always to the best interests of a conquering army, and this, added to the poor handling of the Red Cross, caused a reaction. In England's various campaigns, particularly in Egypt, the Red Cross met almost violent opposition from the English army officers. It was not vmtil army officers discovered in the Spanish War that the Red Cross could be effectively used for repairing broken men that it began to gain in standing. From the devoted labors of scattered volun- teer nurses, typified and ennobled in Clara Bar- ton and Florence Nightingale, the immediate care of the wounded has become a part of the modem fighting machine. It was found in the last war in the Balkans that it paid as a mere matter of repairing the injured men. Unless a man was mortally wounded or required a capital operation, he was usually back in the ranks fighting in two weeks. The Red Cross had become a repair shop. Efficiency has come in the Red Cross, as a matter of fact, only with the passing of the com- passionate women like Clara Barton. She was frequently alone on battlefields in the Civil War where hundreds lay wounded. She was nothing short of the "angel of the battlefield." The same was true of Florence Nightingale in the Crimea. Those two women made names for themselves that will outlast war. But the movement lan- guished. The American Association of the Red Cross, of which Clara Barton was president for twenty-two years, consisted chiefly of a dozen women. The American National Red Cross of to-day, incorporated in 1905, after Clara Barton's death, has 3,500 trained nurses, all with three igo EUROPE AT WAR years' hospital training, ready to mobilize as rapidly as the army. If the United States were to go to war the volunteer organization of the Red Cross would in fact be mobihzed with the army. This was made possible by an Act of Congress two years ago authorizing the spending of the money. Much the same thing happened when the Euro- pean armies mobilized. Not only the highly developed hospital corps were immediately behind the artillery, but the Red Cross came in behind as medical reserve fully as well equipped. In most of the armies, in fact, every soldier has had an emergency kit the existence of which was due to the Red Cross movement. The Red Cross has become what it is in this country to-day largely on account of the un- necessary sickness at Chickamauga during the Spanish War. The modem sanitation campaign carried on since by army surgeons, for that matter, also had its rise in the Spanish War. The clean- ing up of Havana led to the sanitation of the Canal Zone. The English learned their lesson in South Africa, although the peculiar unhealth- fulness of much of India had already forced some measures of care. Both the Japanese and Russian armies were followed in the Russian-Japanese War by very good Red Cross corps. They worked together sometimes, in sorting the wounded, and, through the French Red Cross, which was also very active in Manchuria, the names of the dead were listed to be sent back to friends and families. The French Red Cross served as a news agency. Although the International Red Cross was or- ganized at Geneva in 1864, it is only during the past fifteen years that it has become of great importance. This was almost simultaneous with the discovery in poverty of the man who was responsible for it. Jean Henri Dunant, the Swiss author, the founder of the Red Cross, who stirred Europe with the horrors of war and brought about the international convention at Geneva, was found in an old man's home in Switzerland, in 1897. It was at this time that the Spanish War showed how the development of the Red Cross had been neglected and Dunant began to assume the position he deserved in the world. Four years later, the Nobel Peace prize, given for the first time, went to him and to Frederick Passy. His share of that was 104,000 francs, about $20,000, which, with a small pension from the Dowager Empress of Russia, served him until he died in 1910. He, with his horrible description of Solferino, and Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, with their vivid experiences, launched the inter- national Red Cross with much more to go on than it took advantage of for many years. Clara Barton even foreshadowed the industrial activities of the American Red Cross by helping organize workshops in Paris and Strassburg to save the women left destitute by the Franco-Prussian War. The report of the Sanitary Commission of the Civil War, which raised by voluntary subscription $500,000, was largely responsible for the shaj^ing of the original Red Cross emblem. The Sanitary Commission used a Greek cross surrounded by an oval band. But the red cross has long become standard throughout the world except where the red crescent is used. Attempts have been made to protect the in- signia from indiscriminate use. It is frequently abused in war for scouting purposes and non- combatants adopt it as a shield. There is nothing to prevent it. Even at catastrophes where the red cross serves merely as a convenience in faci- litating progress it is usuaUy abused. At the San Francisco fire after three days every automo- bile displayed the red cross and it came to mean nothing at all. As a result, those who were en- titled to use the red cross changed suddenly to the use of a piece of red flannel, and the red cross insignia was not honored. The slowness of the Red Cross movement to get under way, in fact, was due to the misuse of it. In the Franco-Prussian war it fell into dis- repute. Ignorance of the rules laid down by the Geneva Convention was largely responsible. Though it had been carefully laid out just how far the Red Cross could go without being looked upon as succoring the enemy, the volunteer field workers paid no attention. There were also jealousies between the various Red Cross organi- zations. The Red Cross got such a bad name among military men in that one war that volun- teer nursing was discouraged up to the time of the Spanish War. There is hardly any chance that there will be any accidental complications of this kind in the present war. The Red Cross may be deliberately used to get information or to advance supplies, but the volunteer organizations are so completely THE HAGUE COURT 191 in hand now that they act under the orders of the miUtary surgeons. The Red Cross is to the armies of the world now what the volunteers are to the regular army. It is officered by army surgeons and becomes a part of the army sanitary body. A dispatch dated Washington, August 6th, said: "Committees of the American National Red Cross to-day were at work on plans to rush aid to the sick and wounded in the European war. Surgeon-General William C. Braisted and a party went in search of a ship to carry doctors, nurses andhospitalsuppliesacross the Atlantic, and others were receiving and disbursing funds for supplies. "The ship will be painted white with a red cross on the funnels, and will sail under the Red Cross flag. She wDl also be under the treaties of Geneva and The Hague, and will be able to enter any harbor." The American Red Cross has played a leading part in alleviating the suffering caused by every kind of catastrophe, except war, during the last ten years. Even in war it has done its part, especially in Turkey, feeding and clothing the noncombatants when the Bulgarians made their spectacular dash at Constantinople. From the plague in Manchuria to the Triangle Building fire in New York, the American Red Cross met the emergency. But when it came to general European warfare, every army had worked out a complete Red Cross system. The American Red Cross did not jump directly into the field in Europe because there was no place for it. It would not fit in. It could be useful only as an organization handling and for- warding supplies. But once the armies are dis- organized or the initial organization is broken up by defeat, the American Red Cross, or any body of foreign nurses, could do as good work as the nurses of the country. At present, however, the Red Cross societies of the warring nations, with the same sympathy and heroism that prompted Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, and with modern organization and effectiveness, are caring for the sick and wounded on the stricken fields of Europe. THE WORLD'S COURT OF ARBITRATION AT THE HAGUE AUSTRIA'S dispute with Servia was a judiciable one, a question quite within the proper jurisdiction of The Hague Ar- bitration Tribunal. The general Continental war, however, has not come about over a dispute, but because of a state of mind. Although this is not the sort of discussion that could be referred to a court of arbitration, nevertheless, in the final settlement of every war, the tribunal at The Hague is so constituted that its services may be enor- mously valuable in bringing about peace. A little about this permanent court of arbitration at the Dutch capital is, therefore, of permanent and legitimate interest in connection with the European war of 1914. Early in the year 1899, Czar Nicholas of Russia suggested a European conference, with the object of "a possible reduction of the excessive arma- ments which weigh upon all nations," to be effected by "putting a limit to the progressive develop- ment of the present armaments." It was not found practicable at the conference, which fol- lowed in July of that year, nor at the second one in 1907, to achieve anything permanent in this direction. Nevertheless, under an act of July 29, 1899, signed and subsequently ratified by twenty-four nations, a Permanent Court of Arbi- tration for the Settlement of International Dis- putes was set up at The Hague. Thus the con- ference of 1899 established a permanent judicial system to be called into action whenever two or more states desired to have a dispute settled. The second conference, June 1907, took in a number of new Powers. The court is competent, so the agreement says, for all arbitration cases, "unless the parties agree to constitute a special tribunal." When any of the powers who have agreed to the arbitration system wish to enlist the services of the court, the arbitrators called upon must be chosen from the permanent mem- bers of the court. This permanent court consists of persons "of known competency on questions of international law." Four, at the most, are se- lected by the signatory powers, and each ap- pointment is for six years and may be renewed. The first convention provided for the offer of 192 EUROPE AT WAR good oflBces and mediation, the establishment of a permanent court with an international office at The Hague, and the right of inqmry by com- missions into disputed matters of fact. One of these conventions of inquiry did very excellent service to the world in 1904, during the Russo- Japanese war, when the Russian Baltic Fleet opened fire by mistake on some British fishing boats. The second conference, in 1907, discussed many of the problems and customs of war, in- cluding the application to naval warfare of the principles of the Geneva conference. At the second conference the newcomers included the Repubhcs of South and Central America and the Empire of Japan. The membership of the court consists of repre- sentatives from the United States of America, Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bohvia, Brazil, Bulgaria, ChOe, China, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, German Empire, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pana- ma, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, Servia, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzer- land, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. THE ONLOOKING WORLD THE LAST OF THE WAR CORRESPONDENT THE degradation, nay, the elimination of the war correspondent is the subject of a vividly written article in the Contempor- ary Review, by Francis McCullagh, well known all over the world as a member of that now disap- pearing profession. Present events verify Mr. McCulIagh's prediction that correspondents may be allowed to write under a severe censorship from the capitals of the warring nations, "but the front they will never see again." In Mr. McCulIagh's opinion this changed state of aflairs is due partly to the invention of the tele- graph and other improvements in the means of communication, but primarily to the modern craze for sensation. Forbes, Kinglake, and Mac- Gahan wrote articles which could be republished with very little alteration as serious history. To-day, however, the demand is for "flaring sen- sationalism which is worthless for historical pur- poses." The public demand this sensationalism and enjoy the thrill which it gives them, but despise in their heart the people who provide the thrill, and when, in future wars, the thrillers are banished to a more quiet place hundreds of miles from the firing line, the public will say, "serves them right!" Primarily, of course, says Mr. McCullagh, the public themselves are to blame. A journalist sees a battle for a quarter of an hour, talks to a few officers, fugitives, military atlaches, wounded people and then makes off in his motor car to cable four lines of fact and four columns of cliches and padding. The padding consists of descriptions of cavalry charges which never took place. It tells how the enemy's guns got the range "with miraculous accuracy," how "our" batteries were silenced by those of the enemy. It presents us with all the stock pictures of brave men, their back to the wall, grim, silent, uncomplaining; men who show the world the way to die. Rivers run with blood. Soldiers on either side throw away their arms and jump at each other's throats with naked hands. Desperate cavalrymen, with the cry of " Allah-il- Allah " on their lips, charge thin brown hues of infantry. Wounded Turks stagger homeward followed by huge, sagacious vultures, which seem to have shrewdly calculated the moment at which the quarry will collapse. For eighty miles and a half "Our Own CorresfKindent" travels over roads littered with corpses, not ordinary, pro- saic corpses, but corpses stiffened in every conceivable at- titude of picturesque tragedy and theatrical despair. Some breathed out their souls to AUah while tr>'ing to assume the eastward position, and to pray with their faces turned toward Mecca. Some had evidently attempted to write with their own blood on the margin of a Turkish newspaper a last message to the dear ones at home. And so on, and so on. All the usual clap-trap is rammed in by the yard. The correspondent hates very often to indulge in this revel of mendacity (for it is nothing less), but the public want it. If he sends a true and restrained story, he finds it printed in small type on some obscure page, while the gory fantasies of some imaginative foreigner who "saw" the battle in the bar-room of some Sofia hotel stagger under a load of head- lines next the "leader" column. If he afterward tries to set the pubUc right, he will find that the public do not want to be set right. They will have forgotten all about the war, and have become interested in rag-time, Welsh Home Rule, or the Duke of Scrobia's divorce case. His voice will be drowned in cries of "professional jealousy," "an other- wise meritorious book marred by a disgraceful attack on a brother correspondent," etc. His only alternative, then, is to send a thrilling story himself. All he really sees at the front arc shells bursting at a distance of three or four miles, and, close at hand, a friendly battery which is firing these shells. He makes friend with the battery commandant, who is profane, pre- occupied, and quite ignorant of what is going on in other parts of the field. Besides, he does not speak any language with which the journalist is acquainted. In the night-time the battery suddenly moves backward, and he goes with it. The retreat is due to a flanking movement thirty miles off, but neither he nor the battery commandant knows any- thing of this. When our correspondent reaches a safe place and begins to write his "story" his mind is very much disturbed by two or three things. In the first place his paper has, so far, spent more than a thousand pounds on him, though there were several amateurs who offered to pay their own ex- penses. In the second place, that fool Boffins is sure to exaggerate as usual. This last argument is of tremendous importance, but to appreciate it at its full value one must be a journahst. The result is that the old woman lying drunk by the roadside becomes transformed into a pile of gory corpses, six feet high. The story of the tipsy attache goes down as if the correspondent had witnessed it himself, also the story told by the Greek widow, and a few columns of his own personal adventures, which had already befallen another correspondent (at least the other correspondent said so). The whole forms a thrilling tale with about one per cent, of truth in it. The sub-editor in Fleet Street in- dignantly knocks out the one per cent, of truth, expands the remainder to twice its length, and tacks on as part of the original a little gem of his own, a striking bit of descriptive stuff really paraphrased from a poem by Mrs. Hemans. 193 194 EUROPE AT WAR This writer accuses the average correspondent of bad faith. Many of them, he declares, have a "veritable cult of trickery and a total forgetful- ness of all promises and all engagements whenever this forgetfulness gives them a chance of making what they themselves call a scoop." He cites instances of this bad faith and trickery, and then proceeds to point out how the photographer and the moving-picture man have become so objec- tionable to the armies of civilized nations that the correspondent will hereafter be banished. It is all again a matter of the popular craze for what is technically termed "hot stuff." The military objection to war correspondents, beside that arising from that of their proneness to "give away to the enemy," is based on their enormous number. Forty years ago the war correspondents with an army might number half a dozen. If a government prepares to declare war at present, it suddenly finds itself besieged by hundreds of correspon- dents, most of them knowing nothing about war, and some of them very shady chai'acters indeed. In Tokio there were more than one hundred correspondents at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. In Sofia there were about one hundred at the outbreak of the Balkan troubles. There were only forty in Constantinople, but with their cooks, grooms, interpreters and assistants, they were so numerous that a special train had to take to the front them and their pro- visions, photographic outfits, tents, stores, cooking appa- ratus, horses, pack-animals, and fodder. The handling of such a large detachment of men necessitates the employ- ment of special and highly educated officers. Now, in a life-and-death struggle no nation will ever consent to put up with such a loss of officers, of time, and of trains. In the old style it is all over. But the press will be richer than ever, Mr. McCullagh believes, competition between newspapers wOl be keener than before. The public will be more an.\ious for information from the front than any public ever was in the past, for the military precautions taken to prevent information leaking out will only whet the popular appetite for news. Newspapers wiU consequently send secret agents to every war, and those secret agents may possibly be able to send out far more news than the recognized correspondents are able to send out at present. Such men would have to be sent to a likely theatre of war before a conflict actually broke out. In fact, that practice is followed to some extent even now. I my- self was sent to Port Arthur by an American paper six months before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, and in Port Arthur I met with a secret agent of another paper. If, before the outbreak of the Balkan troubles, men had been despatched by Fleet Street, to Adrianople, Kirk Kilisse, and Liile Burgas, they could either have left those places with the other refugees and brought to Con- stantinople a detailed account of the fighting, or else have sent on their news by messengers and remained behind to await developments. In a European war this would prob- ably lead to some correspondents getting shot as spies, but there will always be journalists ready to face even that risk. THE SOCIALIST EXPLANATION BY JOSHUA WANHOPE WHEN, as the poet says, old Caspar's grand-children, playing in the sun, rolled something hard and round to that ancientpeasant's feet,Casparat once recognized it. " 'Tis some poor fellow's skull," said he, "who fell in the great victory." But when the eager children wanted to know more about it, the poor old man was halted. "What they fought each for, I never could make out," he replied helplessly. There is an enormous multitude of Caspars who don't know what the present war is about either. They will, however, die by millions for their ig- norance. That is the age-long penalty. The wages of ignorance, for the workers, is death. We Socialist working men and women must know "what it is all about." While we do not, *Reprinted by permission from the New York Call. it will be impossible for us to stop war and keep our skulls on our shoulders. This simple article proposes to give, only in rough outline, a fairly accurate summary of the war in Europe and "what it is all about." THE "racial conflict" HUMBUG You, reader, will be deluged with apparently learned articles in the capitalist press and maga- zines, informing you that it is all a matter of racial antagonisms; that people of different races cannot live quietly beside each other, and you will hear this trouble referred to innumerable times as a "great racial conflict," the final death grip of Slav and Teuton, with many other compli- cations which will only confuse you, among them the utterly idiotic proposition that the assassina- MEN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE KING PETER OF SERVIA AND THE CROWN PRINCE 196 EUROPE AT WAR KAISER WILLIAM II OF GERMANY 'no great decision can any longer be taken without germany and without the german emperor* William's speech, july, 1900 MEN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE 197 THE "IRON CHANCELLOR" AND THE PRESENT GERMAN EMPEROR GENERAL EIELD MARSH.ALL COLJLVR BARON VON DER GOLTZ Germany's greatest war authority, now military governor of Belgium T08 EUROPE AT WAR GENERAL VON INIOLTKE, CHIEF OF STAFF A NEPHEW OF THE FAMOUS VON MOLTKE IN COMMAND IN 187O-71 MINISTER OF WAR, GEN- ERAL VON FALKENHAYN MEN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE 199 EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH A MUCH BELOVED RULER WHO HAS REIGNED O5 YEARS OVER A POLYGLOT DUAL MONARCHY WHICH MANY PEOPLE HAVE BELIEVED WOULD DISINTEGRATE UPON HIS DEATH 200 EUROPE AT WAR COUNT BKRCHTOLD, THIC AUSTRIAN PREMIER WHO PLANNED WAR AGAINST SERVIA TO SUBDUE SERB AGITATION IN HUNGARY. OTHER PICTURES: (aBOVE) COUNT VON HOTZENDORF, HEAD OF AUSTRIAN ARMY; (BELOW) ARCHDUKE CHARLES FRANCIS, HEIR TO THE AUSTRIAN THRONE MEN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE 201 Copyright by Umierwi.iod & UnJenvood EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH AND THE MURDERED ARCHDUKE, FR.\NCIS FERDINAND THE ARREST OF THE ASSASSIN IN THE STREETS OF SARAJEVO, BOSNIA THE ASSASSINATION WAS USED AS A CAUSE FOR WAR BY AUSTRIA 202 EUROPE AT WAR \ LEADERS OF FRANCE GENERAL JOFFRE (lEFT) SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE FRENCH ARMIES; M. DELCASSE ( UPPER; PREMIER IN iSgS, Jil£ FATHER OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE WITH ENGLAND; PREMIER VIVIANI (LOWER) MEN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE 203 ^^^^^^^^^^^P^nT' -'vs'^. ' ''I'-'fl ■P'' ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■K M^Z?^ ' S -^^^^H9P^^ > ' ^^^^1 K|L i ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^K^^ ' ^B ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^k ^^1 ^^^^^^^^^B? ■' - ^^^^^^ 1 ^^^^^^^^HFj- ^: ^^Bi^^„^K ^^B ^^^^^F^^^i- '' t^^^^^^^i ^^^^^HHk' ^^m ^^^^^K/ ■'''"-".' '' ^^^^B^'' ^B ^^1^^^ Hm ^^HlHl ^Hy^^^^'^'^' ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ■H^.i ^^■■k ^ L ^ft ^^^^t^^'o'.r ,, .-'i^'^^^l ^^HP^K. j ^^^^^^v^ "^ - ] ^^^^^^^B ^^t^*?'*^l ^^^^^■Uk-- s ^^^^^^^t^^!£BfB^^lHH^H|^| HHP^ WW i w^ ^^^^^r^^^?^iis& iS^fB ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bt^'- ' ' ^^^w' W' ^^1^ ^sit^- ^^^^P H^R ^^^^^^e' ^^^^i^^^i B '- ■. . ■: ■■ ^E' ' •-••ji-'^'i' ^^^uiittlHiK ^ JJ^^^^I ^^E '. '^' -i HHri I fl ^^B '^*^9* * ^^^^^HP^I^P ^^^^^1 ^^Vi ft A ■ ;';^'#'- ^^^^^^HB^^' j^^^^^^l ^^V4 1 fli B ■ „,o^^W 1.4 , ■1 ^^ ^^ri M. RAYMOND POINCARE, PRESIDENT OF FRANCE ' OUR WORDS OF PEACE AND HUMANITY WILL BE ALL THE MORE LIBCELY TO BE HEEDED IF WE ARE KNOWN TO BE MORE DETERMINED AND BETTER ARMED " — PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, FEB. 20, igij 204 EUROPE AT WAR SIR EDWARD GREY (LEFT) AND PREMIER ASQUITH THE GUIDIXG SPIRITS OF THE BRITISH CABINET IN THE WAR CRISIS. SIR EDWARD GREY HAS DIRECTED ENGLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE LAST NINE YEARS. MR. ASQUITH, PRIME MINISTER, AND FOR A TIME WAR SECRETARY MEN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE 205 EARL KITCHENER, OF KHARTOUM (LEFT), AND SIR JOHN D. P. FRENCH EARL KITCHENER IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THE ABLEST ACTIVE SOLDIER IN GREAT BRITAIN. SIR JOHN D. P. FRENCH WHO WAS ONE OF THE FEW ENGLISH OFFICERS WHO GAINED DISTINCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 2o6 EUROPE AT WAR ^ ^ mil i |M^ THE DIRECTORS OF ENGLAND'S DESTINY AT SEA c.„riBi,.Ly A,„eri.a„ vress Ass„daiiu„ SIR JOHN R, JELLICOE (uPPER LEFT), IN COMMAND OF ALL THE FLEETS; SIR GEORGE CALLAGHAN (rIGHT), COMMANDING IHE NORTH SEA FLEET: FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY WINSTON CHURCHILL (LOWER LEFT) M EN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE 207 AN UNNATURAL ALLIANCE -THE CZAR AND KING GEORGE V RULERS WITH A LONG-STANDING COLONIAL RIVALRY AND OPPOSING POLITICAL BELIEFS; AUTOCRAT AND C'-JNSTITUnONAL MONARCH, DRAWN TOGETHER, BY THE KAISER 'S AMBITIONS IN THE NEAR EAST AND ON THE OCEAN 2o8 EUROPE AT WAR THE RUSSL\N MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, M. SAZONOFF, AND (ON THE RIGHT) THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY GR.^ND DUKE NIKOLAS NIKOLAIVTTCH COMMANDER AT ST. PETERSBURG, AND, WITH GENERAL SUKHOMLINOFF, CHIEFLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY MEN WHO CONTROL THE DESTINY OF EUROPE 209 ^H HB^ ^^1 M ^^^H^^ttiHflBI ^B^ K^^QOH^K^ » ^^r '^- f^S^^m f i i /• GEXER.\L SUKHOMLINOFF THE EfSSIAN MIXISTEE OF WAR THE CZAR AND PRESIDENT POINCARE ON HIS VISIT TO RUSSIA IN JUI.V FROM WHICH HE HURRIEDLY RETURNED JUST BEFORE HOSTILITIES BEGAN 2IO EUROPE AT WAR ^v I n(<=Tiiiti<.inl Vi^n ^ <,.r. i bHOWlNG THE EFFECT OF THE ZEPPELLX BOMBS DROPPED INTO THE STREETS OF ANTWERP 230 EUROPE AT WAR BELGIANS AWAITING THE UHLANS Copyrieiht by International News Seirice m m w^ t w^ 1 Copyrij^ht by International New A FIGHTING BELGIAN s Service Copyright by Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. GENERAL LEMAN DEFENDER OF LIEGE fiT ^^^^Kl 1^ 1 . ' ^^B^*Bjij^^^JiB>. ^^H •'^i 1 k^ ' ~ % s ^S^Kv" II ^ k-S Copyriglit h\ American Press Association DEFENDERS OF LIEGE RESTING DURING A LULL IN THE FIGHTING FIGHTS, FIGHTERS, AND NON-COMBATANTS 231 *r^ «te" ^ *■ / lift 1 ^/ i J 1 >^ n ■ 1 ■"■■'■.^m^jf Li : 1 VI / F e-; - ■ fi- K ^- ^ -V ^te? 1 .//• mas^ Brf^ri'^^Mr^ THE RESULT OF GERMAN FIRE Copyright by Undenvood & Underwood, N. Y. BELGIANS BURNING COTTAGES BEFORE FORTS BELGIAN PEOPLE FLEELNG FROM LOUVAIN 232 EUROPE AT WAR 1 ^ k k^V \ '\ ^■^ ' f Copyright by N. Y. Sun Printing and Publishing Co. IN FRAJ^CE IN BELGIUM . . 1 Wi € B: ' -'^W.t fl ^^B^^ 'ii^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^P 1 '*'^' £ ■> . _^^' ^^^^^^B^S t ^^ g^^*- ^ ^^ ■ ^ ^l>>ri^l»rby Aiiiericau Press Assuciatiuii WAITING FOR FOOD IN BRUSSELS THE WOMEN LEFT BEHIND FIGHTS, FIGHTERS, AND NON-COMBATANTS i;. ri.Jii 1 \ Underwood A: Underwciod, N. Y. 51i' ■ H 1 ^^^^^^^^^V ^^ il 1 ^^^BHW'^^^^'^^^BK ^^^^^^^B4t'. ^i^^^^^^^HH ^^^^^^1 H L^i^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I H TYPES OF SOLIJIKRS FIGHTING UNDIiR THE FRENCH FLAG "tURCOS" from ALGERIA AND (aBUVE) MULE BATTERY 234 EUROPE AT WAR Copyright by American Press Associatiun BRITISH LIGHT INFANTRY ATOP A LONDON BUS Copyright by American Press Association PRINCE OF WALES WITH HIS REGIMENT Copyright by American Press Association BRITISH TROOPS COMMANDEERING HORSES IN LONDON FIGHTS, FIGHTERS, AND NON-COMBATANTS 235 Photograph by American I'res^ AssoLiati'm KING GEORGE INSPECTING THE VETERANS Copyright by American Press Association BRIT^UN'S call to .\RiIS Copyright by Uinlcrwouit i- I ndcr\ BRITISH HIGHLANDERS LANDING AT BOULOGNE, FRANCE 236 EUROPE AT WAR Lu(,:,ri^lit \jy Uiiderivou.l i rnjcrwooil. N. V RUSSIAN RESERVISTS Copyright by Uiiderwooti &' L Iulei-woo(l, N, V CZAR SAMPLING SOLDIER'S FOOD RUSSIAN ARTILLERY ON THE WAY TO THE IKONT FIGHTS. FIGHTERS. AND N ON COMBATANTS 237 I'li'iliTf^'raphs, copyright by American Press Associatiun IS THE WAR APPROVED IN BELGIUM ANU SERVIA? SINGINO, SHOUTING CROWDS IM BRUSSELS AND BELGRADE 238 EUROPE AT WAR Copyrisht by Uncienvood & Undenvood, N. Vt RAILWAY DESTROYED BY BELGIANS Ciiliyrij,'ht b>' iDternatioii.il .\.v, , jvi - i^i- REAPI-N'G OR_VE\ AND DH.GIXG TKEN'CIIES I.\ BELGIUM Copyright by I'nderwood A: Underwood. N. V. A SORTIE OF BELGIAN CAVALRY BEFORE HAELEN FIGHTS, FIGHTERS, AND NON-COMBATANTS 23Q Copyright by American Press Association BRUSSELS WOMEN WAITING FOR \\T.EKLY .VLLOWANCE OF 50 TO 65 CENTLMES Co|Mri^;IU by Underrtood & Underwood, N. V. WOMEN AND CHILDREN WAITING FOR MONEY ALLOWED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT 240 !•: u R o r E A r w a r DEFENDERS OF LIEGE Photo by American Press AssociaHon ^JCJBB|A|^^^^ .^- yi _^-^ '\.\* V. ^sl ^■■ivri^hl \:y Internatiunal News >ervi THE FRENCH IN ACTION , I'r.ss A^s..u.Hi.>l FRENCH ARMY IN CAMP BELGIAX BATTERY UN THE MARCH Copjrij^lit l)j American I'resi .VssociatiL FIGHTS, FlCiHTERS, AND N () N - C () M B AT A N T S 241 Coinriflit by irnilem 1 .V rii.lenraocl, N. V. WorXDED r.ERMW CARED FOR BV BELGIANS Copvriylit by Underwood A Underwood, N. V. AMERICAN RED CROSS NTJRSES Copyright by UnderAvood & Underwood. N. V. GERMANS CARRYING WOUNDED THE FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE OF SERVIA 242 EUROPE AT WAR Cop\Tii;ht by Underwood & Undenvood, X. Y. ^^^h&^Wa 1 Ml.. :^ , ^^^ ■ ^^ liatSA. : •• mm ^ i" '" EX — ' — ' — '■ — — ■ ^^l^ — >V:^..' ' — :__::l ■/- v: Lupynglii by American Press Association Copyright by American Press Association .\IDS TO EFFICIENT WARFARE FRENCH WATER SUPPLY MOTORS (TOp), BRITISH MAXIM GUN (CENTRE), BELGIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY (BOTTOM) BRITISH "WHITE PAPERS 243 No. 88 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the in- formation that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilization. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the in- terest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had sug- gested to the German Ambassador this morning, and pro- pose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended. . . . No. 89 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign OfBce, July 29, 1914. After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that . . . the sit- uation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of inter- fering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should stand aside. He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circum- stances intervene. I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use any- thing that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pres- sure by saying that, if things became worse, we should in- tervene. . . . No. 90 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. [A further conversation with the German Am- bassador.] . . . I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San GiuUano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. . . . The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humihation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Rus- sia. . . . No. 9 1 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, . . . which he said gave an ac- count of the conduct of Servia toward Austria, and an e.T- planation of how necessary the Austrian action was. I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an oppor- tunity, and European peace was at stake. Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobiUzing again and again, as she had been obUged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandizement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded. I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State. . . . No. 92 Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. The Itahan Ambassador made me to-day a communica- tion from the Marquis di San GiuUano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure. I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under wliich the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be appUed. No. 93 Telegr.4ms Communicated by Count Benckendorpf, July 30, 1914 (i) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof. Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914. [The Russian Ambassador at Vienna suggests to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Russian and Austrian Governments endeavor to reach some friendly understanding regarding Servia. Count Berchtold agreed in principle, but said that Austria could not recede "nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro- Hungarian note."] (2) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. [The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had given the Russian Foreign Minister assurances of Germany's continued efforts for peace at Vi- enna. The latter was inclined to be optimistic] . . . I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy. . . . (3) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff. St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914. At the time of my interview with the German Ambas- sador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Sch^b^ko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July. This telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government. 244 EUROPE AT WAR From now on nothing remains for us to do but to rely entire!)' on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advisable. No. 94 Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey Vienna, July 29, 1914. I learn that the mobilization of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realized, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. . . . Unless mediation which German Govern- ment declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately, interested in the Austro-Scrvian dispute be brought to bear forthwith, ir- revocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. . . . Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and ex- plained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favorable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she woilld probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptances by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers. . . . No. 95 Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey Vienna, July 30, 19 14. Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobiUzation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear inti- mation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia. . . . He says that Russia must have an as- surance that Servia will not be crushed. . . . Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeUng prevalent in Vienna that he is unhkely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity. . . . No. 96 Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey Vienna, July 30, 1914. The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, an ac- count of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilized, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of mili- tary precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. . . . Sir G. No. 97 Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that German Ambas- sador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Gov- ernment were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that tills might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal. . . . M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making mihtary and naval preparations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a. m., when former com- pletely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is a translation : "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all mihtary preparations." Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if tliis proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. . . . No. 98 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, July 30, 1914. [The German Secretary of State asserted that he was making continued efforts at Vienna, now suggesting a conference after the occupation of Belgrade. He was much disturbed by Russia's mobilization, however.] No. 99 Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, July 30, 1914. [In view of the reports regarding Germany's demand that Russia cease her mobilization, the President of France urged upon the British Am- bassador the desirability of England's announcing her stand by the side of France. Such a declara- tion would very Ukely restrain Germany and prevent war.] No. 100 Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey Rome, July 30, 19 14. German Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished. . . . No. 101 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment enter- tain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind them- thcmselves to neutrahty on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is un- acceptable, for France, mthout further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain v\ith Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bar- gain either. BRITISH "WHITE PAPER" 245 [Further than this he does not commit himself, but urges that Germany and England continue to work together for the peace of Europe. He liints at the possibility, at some future time, of an Anglo-German entente.] No. I02 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. No. 103 Sir Edward Grey to Sir'G. Buchanan London Foreign Office, July, 30, 19 14. German Ambassador informs me that German Govern- ment would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. . . . Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July [No. 97], and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serv'ia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. . . . It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Jlinister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs. No. 104 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. BERTrE London, Foreign OlTicc, July 30, 1914. You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day [No. 103], and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to pre- cipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg. No. los Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I inclose for con- venience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly, that we would in- tervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. [There are three enclosures with No. 105. The first is a letter from Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, dated November 22, 1912, in which he agreed that the danger of an attack by a third Power should serve as the basis of a conference and a discussion as to whether the two nations should stand together for the preservation of peace. The second enclosure, M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey, dated November 23rd, is a formal acknowledgment and agreement in this principle. The third enclosure is in the nature of evidence of the danger of attack. It is a dispatch from the French Foreign Minister to M. Cambon, dated July 31, 1914. It reports that the German army is on the French frontier and has even pene- trated French territory.] . . . but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government tliat in no case will France be the aggressor. . . . [Specific information follows as to the movement of German troops.] As you see, Germany has done it. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on wliich the Austrian note was handed in. . . . No. 106 Sir R. Rood to Sir Edward Grey Rome, July 30, 1914. I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the .Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most an.xious to avoid issue with us. He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form whicli Austria would con- sider acceptable. . . . [Two or three methods of procedure are sug- gested.] No. 107 SiK E. Goschen to Si« Edward Grey Berlin, July 30, 1914. [The German Government had taken no action regarding a conference of the four Powers. The German Secretary of State thought time would be saved by direct communication with Vienna. The Chancellor stated that everything possible was being done.] No. 108 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, July 31, 1914. Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more tlian was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. [Meanwhile, Russian mobilization was forcing Germany to act.] 246 EUROPE AT WAR No. 109 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, July 31, 1914. [He reports the delivery of No. loi, and states that the Chancellor, being much occupied, re- ceived it without comment.] No. no Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan London, Foreign OiEce, July 31, 1914. I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been in- structed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give e.xplanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss sug- gestions and any questions directly affecting Austro- Russian relations. . . . The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. . . . I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. No. Ill Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign OfSce, July 31, 1914. I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory re- sult. The stumbling block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of .Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, pro- vided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. . . . I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Ger- many could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the con- sequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in. . . . No. 112 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, July 31, 1914. [The German Chancellor reports that complete Russian mobilization is going forward and that Germany must follow suit, precautionary meas- ures having already been taken.] I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last propo- sal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter. No. 113 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. It has been decided to issue orders for general mobihza- tion. This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia. Russia has also reason to beUeve that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. No. 114 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany, it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. . . . No. IIS Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Vn-LiERS London, Foreign Ofhce, July 31, 1914. In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Gov- ernments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. You should say that I assume that the Belgian Govern- ment will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutral- ity, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. . . . No. 116 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. [Replying to No. 99, he believes no British treaty obligations are involved. He has repeated to the French Ambassador that England cannot consider intervention at present.] No. 117 Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, July 31, 1914. At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. . . . German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilization of Russian army and fleet, German Govern- ment have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilized. The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilization of the German Army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. . . . BRITISH "WHITE PAPER" 247 No. 118 Snt M. DE BuNSEN TO Snt Edward Grey Vienna, July 31, 1914. I am informed by Count Forgach, Under Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilization, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilization was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Am- bassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign 'Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobiUze, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As re- gards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria- Hungary found it difficult to recognize such a claim. . . . [He reports the Russian Ambassador in Vienna to be working for peace.] No. 119 Snt Edwaed Gkey to Snt F. Bertie London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914- [He has told M. Cambon that he has declined to say to Germany that England would remain neutral.] I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet to-day that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before ParUament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. . . . The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. . . . No. 120 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Am- bassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Gov- ernments subjoined formula as best calculated to amal- gamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July (No. 103], with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July [No. 97]. He trusted it would meet with your approval. "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute be- tween Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." . . . M. Sazonof said that imdoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favorable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this. . . . No. 121 Snt E. GoscHEN to Sis Edward Grey Berlin, July 31, 1914. I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal [See No. iii], and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war. He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to main- tain peace, but said it was Impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had re- ceived an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could in- form the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and .\ustria, Germany would be obUged on her side to mobilize at once. . . . [He insisted that Germany had not ceased to labor with Austria for peace, but that "Russia's mobilization has spoiled everything."] No. 122 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, July 31, 1914. Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie (No. 114]. I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. . . . It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been com- mitted by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. . . . No. 123 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, August I, 1914. I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply [No. 122] of the German Government with regard to the neutraUty of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutral- ity of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain pubUc feeling in this country. . . . He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obUged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. No. 124 Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, July 31, 1914. On the receipt at 8:30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon [No. 114], I sent a message to Minister for For- eign Affairs requesting to see him. . . . He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilization of her army if Russia do not demobilize at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circum- stances. . . . 248 EUROPE AT WAR No. 125 Ser F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, July 31, 19 14. Political Director has brought me the reply of the IVIinis- ter of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neu- trality of Belgium. It is as follows: French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that ncutrahty that France might find her- self under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. No. 126 Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, August i, 1914. I have had convei-sation with the Political Director, who Btates that the German Ambassador was informed that it . . . seemed strange to the French Government that in view of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to con- verse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immedi- ate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Am- bassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the ne.xt day,intimating that he would have to break off relationsand leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactorj'. The Ambas- sador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceecUng. . . . No. 127 Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey Vienna, August i, 1914. General mobiUzation of army and fleet. No. 1 28 Sir F. Viliiers to Sir Edward Grey Brussels, August i, 1914. . . . Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrahty of their territory, they be- lieved that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. . . . No. 129 Minister op State, Litxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey Luxemburg, August 2, 19 14. The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-IIoUweg, to the effect that the miUtary measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a pos- sible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire. No. 130 Snt Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, .\ugust I, 1914. We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have for- cibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant ships. I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered. You should request German Government to send im- niechate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. . . . No. 131 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, August I, 1914. I stUl believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a httle respite in time can be gained before any great Power begins war. The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Gov- ernment may be able to make use of the Russian com- munications referred to above, in order to avoid ten- sion. . . . No. 132 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, August I, 1914. Following telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Bencken- dorff of the 31st July communicated to me to-day: [Same formula as in No. 120.] (.•\bove communicated to all the Powers.) No. 133 Sir Edv/ard Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, August I, 1914. M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, wlrich are as follows: "The .Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declares the readi- ness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by ex- pressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the partici- pation of the Great Powers. "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the chrection of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very im- portant that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provi- sionally to her mihtary action on Servian territory." (The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) No. 134 Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, August i, 1914. President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the re- sponsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilization had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobiUzation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilization, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilization will become necessarj' in self-defense, and that France is already forty- eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of ten kilo- meters so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of pro- vocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilizations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to con- tinue liis co;ive"sations with the German Ambassador with BRITISH "WHITE PAPER" 249 a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the pres- ervation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. No. 13s Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan London, Foreign 0£Bce, August I, 1914. Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobi- lization of Russia, they would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it ap- pears stUl to be possible to preserve peace. . . . No. 136 Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, August I, 1914. Minister of War informed Military .Attache this after- noon that orders had been given at 3:40 for a general mobi- lization of the French Army. . . . [Details of the German mobilization foUow.] . . . The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. . . . The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes. No. 137 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen London, Foreign Office, August I, 1914. I sav/ the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign .Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram His Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the .\ustro-Hungarian Government to im- pair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandizement. . . . Count Mensdorff informed me of a telegram sent yester- day to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Peters- burg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance. [It asserted that the conversations with Russia had not been broken off by Austria and repeated that Austria did not seek territorial acquisitions from Servia.] No. 138 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, August i, 1914. I have communicated the substance of your telegram [No. 131) to the Secretary of State for Foreign .Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobiUzed against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Ger- many's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobihze also. . . . The situation now was that, though the Imperial Govern- ment had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobihzation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Gov- ernment must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war. No. 139 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey St. Petersburg, Aug. i, 1914. [He reports diplomatic exchanges in St. Peters- burg which amounted to marking time. He also reports a conversation with M. Sazonof in which the latter sought to justify Russia's position, ac- cusing Austria of double dealing, and saying that "it was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death." He was "completely weary with the ceaseless endeavors he had made to avoid a war." Russia had been patient, but had been forced to act.] M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July [No. 120] had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first. I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be ob- tained to keep their armies mobilized on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has ex-pressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. No. 140 Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey Paris, August I, 1914. [He reports the French military situation as given by the Minister of War to the military attache, offering "proof of the French endeavors to commit no provocative act."] No. 141 Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey Vienna, August i, 1914. [He reports that the Russian Ambassador has informed him of Germany's ultimatum and says that "there seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than between Austria and Russia."] . . . I agree with His Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that 250 EUROPE AT WAR his strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first. ... I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro- Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany. No. 142 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, August i, 1914. Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of mobihzation to be 2nd Augxist. No. 143 Sis E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey BerUn, August i, 1914. Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg. . . Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay. No. 144 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, August 2, 1914. Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed the frontier, Ger- many and Russia are now in a state of war. No. 14s Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, August 2, 1914. Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favor to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken. No. 146 Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey Brussels, August 2, 1914. The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy Lu.xemburg has been oflicially confirmed to the Belgian Government. No. 147 Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914. [The notice of a formal protest to Germany, against the violation of neutrality is communi- cated to the Powers.] No. 148 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie London, Foreign OfBce, August 2, 1914. After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum: "I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the Ger- man fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give aU the protection in its power. "This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Govern- ment to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." [Sir Edward refrained from binding Great Britain to any agreement regarding war, but offered assurances that would enable France to know how to dispose her fleet. He said that Eng- land's position regarding the violation of Belgian neutrality was being considered.] No. 149 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Oflace, August 2, 1914. I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship Sappho at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of ist August [No. 130], I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships cover also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified. No. 150 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey Berlin, August 3, 1914. Detention of British ships at Hamburg. No information available. No. 151 Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey Brussels, August 3, 1914. French Government have offered through their MiUtary Attach^ the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. . . . [Belgium's reply of thanks is appended.] No. 152 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie London, Foreign Office, August 3. 1914. On the I St instant the French Ambassador made the following communication: "In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to tlie question as to what were the inten- tions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied: " 'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Am- bassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were there- fore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would re- main neutral.' " In making this communication, M. Cambon was in- structed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus Jmderis under the terms of the Triple AUiance did not arise. No. 153 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms: " Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." His Majesty's Government are also informed that the GERMAN "WHITE PAPER" 251 German Government has delivered to the Belgian Govern- ment a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free pas- sage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its pos- sessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. Wealsoimderstandthat Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be pro- ceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. . . . No. IS4 Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey Brussels, August 4, 1914. German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Govern- ment have declined the ; well-intentioned proposals sub- mitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if neces- sary by force of arms, the measures considered indispen- sable in view of the French menaces. No. iss Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers London, Foreign Ofiice, August 4, 1914. You shoiUd inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality. His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their indepen- dence and integrity in future years. No. 156 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign OfEce, August 4, 1914. I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cux- haven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the as- surances given to Your Excellency by the Imperial Chan- cellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given. No. 157 German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky (Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.) Berlin, August 4, 1914- Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. . . . Germany had to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of Ufe or death to prevent French advance. No. 158 Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey Brussels, August 4, 1914- MiUtary Attache has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Lifige has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. No. 159 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen London, Foreign Office, August 4, 19 14. We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian ^Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Govern- ment will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Ger- many declined to give the same assurance respecting Bel- gium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning [No. 153] be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. (< THE GERMAN WHITE PAPER' THIS document, which is offered here in an abridged form, was given out by the German Foreign Office on August 3rd, and appeared in the New York Times August 24th. It com- prises some 15,000 words in the original and is not merely a collection of correspondence like the British "White Paper," but is also an official revaew of the causes of the war. It presents Germany's version of the crisis and includes a portion of the correspondence between the German Government and its representatives in foreign capitals. It brings the history of German negotiations down to August 2nd. TEXT OF THE GERMAN "WHITE PAPER" On June 28 last the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by the revolver shots of a member of a Servian band of conspirators. An investiga- tion of the crime by Austro-Hungarian oflicials has revealed that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted in Belgrade with the cooperation of official Servian individuals, and was carried out with weapons from the Servian Government depot. This crime was bound to open the eyes of the whole civihzed world, not only with regard to the object of Ser- vian politics as relating to the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also with regard to the criminal means that the Pan-Servian propaganda did not 252 EUROPE AT WAR hesitate to employ in order to attain these ends. The ultimate object of these policies was to revolutionize gradu- dually and finally to bring about a separation of the south- western region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from that empire and unite it with Servia. The repeated and formal declarations of Servia to Aus- tria-Hungary to bring about good neighborly relations did not change this trend of Servian politics in the least. For the third time in the course of the last si.x years, Servia has brought Europe to the verge of a world war in this manner. She could only do this because she believed herself sup- ported by Russia in her endeavors. [Russia is accused of a secret alliance with the Balkan States.] . . . It was the idea of Russian statesmen that there should be formed a new Balkan League under Russian patronage, whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey, which had been driven from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. . . . [Details of Russia's alleged programme follow.] In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. . . . We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situa- tion and to assure her that any action that she might con- sider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that war-like moves on the part of Austria-?Iungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a com- pliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity nor could we deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened as a result of the continuous Servian agitation. If Servia, with the help of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the exist- ence of the neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Servia. Wc have taken no part in the preparations. . . [The story follows of the exchange of notes be- tween Austria and Servia and Austria's refusal to accept Servia's reply as satisfactory.] From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision with Servia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing the war and to convincing the other powers that .Austria-Hungary was compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. . . . [Austria, the statement goes on to say, explained her case to Russia while Germany sought the aid of France and England in an effort to localize the approacliing conflict. "These efforts did not suc- ceed in preventing Russia's interference in the Austro-Servian disagreement."] The Russian Government issued an official communique on July 24, according to which it would be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent in the Servian-Austrian con- flict. . . . [Austria-Hungary again disclaimed any desire to acquire territory, but on the 26th the news of Russian mobilization came and was communi- acted by Germany to the Powers.] . . . The same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following state- ment to the Russian Government: "The military preparatory measures of Russia will com- pel us to take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, in- dicates war. Inasmuch as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed simul- taneously against Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the con- tinuance of the Servian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. . . ." [In spite of denials at St. Petersburg, reports of Russian mobilization on a large scale continued to arrive in Berlin.] . . . On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The Fourteenth Corps dis- continued its manoeuvres and returned to garrison duty. In the meantime we continued to exert our most ener- getic influence on the Cabinets to insure the localization of the conflict. On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia be laid before a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not call upon Austria to appear before a Eu- ropean court in her controversy with Servia. France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof. [Germany, believing mediation out of the question between Austria and Servia, continued her efforts to keep the peace between Russia and Austria and further agreed to transmit to Vienna Sir Edward Grey's proposal that the Servian note serve as a basis for further conversations. Aus- tria replied that it was too late, hostilities having already begun.] . . . Unluckily all of these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the mihtary preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobihzed four army dis- tricts. At the same time additional reports reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Aflairs concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph: GERMAN "WHITE PAPER" 253 "The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands toucliing on tlie sovereignty of Servia. Wliile I agreed to a complete transmission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since Russia liad decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult for me to exchange any opinions on tliis subject. ... I said an opportunity should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with Servia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the subject of safeguarding Servian sov- ereignty when peace terms were to be concluded. "I added very earnestly that at the present moment the Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European conflagration, and I made every ellort to show the Minister the greatness of this danger. "It was impossible to change Sazonof's mind on the point that Russia could not desert Servia now." [On the 29th the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg reported that the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army had again de- nied that Russia was mobilizing. The same day Austria was urged to open direct conversations with M. Sazonof.] Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without cessation for mediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which we believed showed hope of the possibiUty of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungary after succeeding in marching into Servia, should dictate her terms there. We had to assume that Russia would accept this basis. [Meanwhile proofs of Russian mobilization measures became more convincing, and finally "Russia ordered a general mobilization."] On the same day an exchange of telegrams took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas, in which His Majesty called the Czar's attention to tlie threatening character of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity as mediator. [Annex 20 to 23.] On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty. " I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably. It is a technical impossibiUty for us to halt our military preparations which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue with Austria concern- ing Servia, my troops will not undertake any challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might and hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of oiu- comitries and for the peace of Europe. "Yours sincerely devoted, " Nicholas." To tliis His Majesty the Kaiser repUcd : " Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Govermnent and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation was under way your troops were mo- bilized against Austria-Hungary, which is alUed with me, as a consequence of which my mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in receipt of reliable re- ports of serious preparations for war on my eastern boun- dary also. Responsibihty for the safety of my empire compels me to take counter defensive measures. I have carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the utmost Umit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the calamity that now threatens the entire civiUzed world. Yet at this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threatens the honor and might of Russia, wliich might have awaited the result of my mediation . . . It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria- Hungary." Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of the entire Russian figliting force, wliich had been ordered in the forenoon of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's telegram however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. [On July 31st Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia, stating that she would be forced to mobil- ize her army if Russia did not cease mobUization within twelve hours, "and so advise Germany."] At the same time the Imperial Aml^assador at Paris was directed to request an e.xijlanation from the French Gov- ernment witliin eighteen hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would remain neutral. . . . . . . After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt of an answer to our inquiry. His Majesty the Emperor and King ordered the mobiliza- tion of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 5 p. M. on Aug. I. In the meantime the Imperial Ambas- sador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to hand a decla- ration of war to the Russian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expiration of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of Aug. i. By this move Russia began the war against us. In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P. M. on July 31. To this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply at i o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. I. ... A few hours later, at 5 in the afternoon the complete mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered. On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities. The Austro-Hdngarian Note to Servia (From the NorddeiUsche AUgemeiite Zcilung, July 25, 1914) Berlin, July 24. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade at 6 o'clock last night handed to the Servian Government a verbal note with the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. In the note the answer is requested by 6 p. M., July 25. [The note which follows is the same as that given in No. 4 of the English "White Paper" (q. V.,) with some slight variations in translation.] [There follows an article from the FremdenbhiU reviewing the Austro-Servian situation, comment- ing on the note, accusing the Sen,'ians of continued bad faith and trouble breeding, asserting Austria's desire to avoid war, and hoping that Servia will accept the terms of the note. Reference is made to other newspapers in Vienna which expressed similar hopes.] 254 EUROPE AT WAR AnSTRlA-HUNGAEY AND THE SERVIAN NOTE (From the Norddeutsche Allgememe Zeitung, July 29, 1914.) Vienna, July 27. The note of the Royal Servian Government of July 25, 1914, reads as follows: [There follows the text of the Servian note, sub- stantially as given in No. 39 of the British "White Paper" (q. v.), interspersed with the comments of the Austro-Himgarian Monarchy. Exception is taken to the opening paragraphs of the Servian reply on the ground that Servia had failed to keep her pledge of March iS, 1909, by promptly and decisively suppressing all anti-Austrian propagan- da. Austria accuses Servia of not officially in- specting her private press. Servia's pronounce- ment against anti-Austrian propaganda is con- demned as insincere. As to Servia's ten pledges, Austria comments as follows : (i) Servia's plan to suppress anti-Austrian publications is dilatory, evasive, and unsatisfactory; (2) the plan to dis- solve propagandist societies only partially answers the demand; (3) the promise to eliminate propa- ganda from education is incomplete and lacking in evidences of good faith; (4) the provision for the trial of offending officers does not satisfy Austria; (5) Servia's acceptance of the collabora- tion of Austrian agents is so vague as to offer in- surmountable difficulties; (6) Servia's reply to the Austrian policing proposition is tantamoimt to a refusal; (7) Servia's statement that Cigano- •vic could not be found is not believed; (S) and (9) not enough details offered to indicate Servia's good faith.] Annex ia From the Austro-Hungakian Material Vienna, July 27. The "dossier" mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian cir- cular note to the foreign Embassies concerning the Servian dispute is made public to-day. [The memorial reviews the history of the anti- Austrian movement in Servia, and accuses the Narodna Odbrana of being the central organiza- tion in the movement. The activities of this society, both before and after 1909, are outlined, including the distribution of propagandist litera- ture. "Appearing in the disguise of a culture association," its main object was to preach war against Austria-Hungary. An attempt, moreover, was discovered to affiliate with secret societies in the Dual Monarchy. Agitation was conducted in the schools where teachers were trained. A direct connection is established between the ac- tivities of the Narodna and the attack on the Crown Prince and his consort. Not only this, but the official programme of the Servian Govern- ment is held to be anti-Servian.] Annex ib The Chancellor of the German Empire to the Im- perial Ambassadors in Paius, London, St. Petersburg Berlin, July 23, 1914. The statements of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the conditions under which the attempt on the Ufe of the Austrian Crown Prince and his wife occurred make clear the aims of the Pan-Servian propaganda, and the means which it employs to accomplish its ends. . . . [The dispatch goes into the details of the pan- Servian movement and places the responsibility on the Servian Government. Austria's now un- compromising attitude is held to be justifiable.] . . . Unless the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes definitely to give up all claim to its position as a great Power, there is nothing for it to do but back up its demands on the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by recourse to military measures, in which case the choice of means must be left to it. I ask Your Excellency to express yourself in the above terms to the representative of (Mr. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Mr. Sazonof) and to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned. We strongly desire that the dis- pute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obUgations, would bring consequences impossible to measure. Annex 2 The Imperial Chancellor to the Confederated Governments of Germany Confidential! Kindly make the following announcement to the Gov- ernment to which you are accredited: In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment has made known in its note to the Servian Govern- ment, the last doubt must disappear that the plot to which the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and his wife were victims was hatched in Servia, with the connivance, at least, of officials of the SerN-ian Government. [The communication goes on to lay the blame for present difficulties on "pan-Servian Chauvin- ism" and Servian bad faith. Austria is credited with great forbearance. Servia's answer to Austrian demands shows that it does not intend to change its policies. An attempt is made to place on Russia the onus for any extension of trouble, since Russia is mistaken in her attitude in support of Servda.] The attitude of the Imperial German Government In this matter is clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has, as its prin- cipal aim, the dissolution or weakening of the Triple Al- liance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire, and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest interests, therefore, summon us to the GERMAN "WHITE PAPER' 255 side of Austria-Hungary. The duty to save Europe if pos- sible from a general war demands also that we support the efforts to localize the trouble, in accordance with the pohcy which we have successfully followed for the last forty-four years in the interests of the preservation of the peace of Europe. But if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neigh- boring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. . . . Annex 3 Telegram from the Imperial German Ambassador IN Vienna to the litPERiAL German Chanxellor July 24, 1914. Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Chargfi d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia. . . . He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to e.xact guarantees for the future friendly be- havior of Servia toward the monarchy; that he had no in- tention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. . . . Annex 4 Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperi.u, German Chancellor July 24, 1914. A long talk with Sasanow; the Minister made wild com- plaints against Austria-Hungars', and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia could not possibly permit the Ser^an-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parries concerned. Annex 5 The Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg TO the Imperial German Chancellor (Telegram) July 26, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had a long inter\new to-day with Sasanow. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary was planning no conquests and simply wished to secure quiet at last on her boundaries visibly calmed the Minister. Annex 6 Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador dj St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor July 25, 1914. To-day the drilling of the troops in the Krasnoe camp was suddenly interrupted and the regiments are to return at once to their garrison posts. The manceuvres have been given up. The military pupils were promoted to officers to-day instead of in the Autumn. Great excitement reigns in general headquarters as to Austria's proceedings. I have the idea that all preparations have been made for mobilization against Austria. Annex 7 Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor July 26, 1914. The Military Attache requests the transmission of the following report to the General Staff: I consider it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful whether this is the case at Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has prob- ably not been ordered. Annex 8 Telegram of the Head of the Imperial German Consulate in Kovno to the Imperial German Chancellor July 27, 1914, State of war declared in Kovno. Annex 9 Telegram of the Imperial German Envoy in Berne TO THE Imperial German Chancellor July 27, 1914. Have learned reliably that Fourteenth French Corps stopped manoeu%Tes. Annex 10 Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to THE Imperial German Ambassador in London July 26, 1914. Austria-Hungary has declared officially and solemnly in St. Petersburg that she contemplates no acquisition of territory in Servia, and that she will not endanger the con- tinuance of the kingdom, but wishes only to secure quiet. According to report reaching here, Russia is about to sum- mon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet it. To-day our efforts are still directed toward locaUzing the trouble and maintaining the peace in Europe. For this reason we ask that the strongest pos- sible pressure be brought to bear in St. Petersburg for achieving this end. Anne.x ioa Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to THE Imperial German Ambassador in Paris July 26, 1914. After .Austria-Hungary officially declared to Russia that she contemplated no acquisition of territory and would not tamper with the continuance of the Servian kingdom, the decision of the question as to whether there is to be a Euro- pean war Ues with Russia alone, who has to bear the full responsibihty. We trust that France, with whom we know we are agreed in the desire to maintain peace in Europe, will use her influence in St. Petersburg in a quieting man- ner. Annex iob Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to THE Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg July 26, 1914. [Similar to loA ] . . . We still trust that Russia will take no steps that may seriously endanger European peace. Annex ii Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor July 27, 1914. Military Attache reports concerning talk with Minister of War: "The Minister of War gave me his word of honor that as yet no mobilization order had gone forth, that for the time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross the Servian frontier, the mihtary districts in the direction of Austria — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan — would be mobilized, that those on the German front — Warsaw, Vihia, St. Petersburg — would not be under any circum- stances. ... I told the Minister that we appreciated 256 EUROPE AT WAR the friendly attitude toward ourselves but would look upon the mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing. Annex 12 Telegram or the Imperial German Chancellor to THE Imperial German Ambassador in London July 27, 1914. Nothing is known here as yet as to a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey to hold a four-sided conference in London. It is impossible for us to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Servia. Our mediatory activity must confine itself to the danger of a Russian- Austrian conflict. Annex 13 Telegram or the Imperial German Chancellor to THE Imperial German Ambassador in London July 25, 1914. The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite cor- rect. We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from in- tervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain from any active intervention. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as alhes, to cooperate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and Austria. Annex 14 Telegram of the Imperial German Ch/Vncellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg July 28, 1914. We are endeavoring continually to cause Vienna to make clear in St. Petersburg the purpose and scope of the Austrian action regarding Servia in an indisputable and, it is to be hoped, satisfying manner to Russia. The de- claration of war made in the meantime makes no differ- ence in this connection. Annex 15 Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London July 27, 1914. We have started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna immediately, in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey. Moreover, we have communicated to Count Berchtold the wish of Mr. Sasanow for a direct talk with Vienna. Annex i5 Telegram of the Imperial German Ambass/\dor in Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor July 28, 1914. Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excel- lency his deep gratitude for communicating to him the English mediation plan. He remarks, however, concerning it, that, after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the declaration of war made in the meantime, he must look upon England's step as belated. Annex 17 Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador IN Paris July 29, 1914. Reports to us of French preparations for war increase from hour to hour. I request that you talk on this matter with the French Government and make it clear to them that such measures would lead to precautionary measures on our part. We should be obliged to proclaim the danger of war, and even if this should not mean calling in reserves and mobilization, it would, nevertheless, increase the ten- sion. . . . Annex 18 Telegram of the German Military Envoy in St. Petersburg to His Majesty the Kaiser July 30, 1914. Yesterday Prince Troubetzki told me, after he had caused Your Majesty's telegram to Emperor Nicholas to be deliv- ered at once: "God be praised that a telegram from your Emperor has come." He told me a little while ago that the telegram had made a deep impression on the Emperor, but since mobilization against Austria had already been or- dered, and Sasonow had doubtless convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to recede. His Majesty unfortunately could do nothing to alter matters. . . . Annex 19 Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Rome July 31, 1914. We negotiated continually with a view to reconciliation between Russia and Austria-Hungary, both through direct exchange of telegrams from His Majesty the Kaiser to His Majesty the Czar, as well as in our relations with Sir Ed- ward Grey. But all our efforts are made much more difli- cult, if not impossible of reaUzation, by Russia's mobiUza- tion. . . . Annex 20 I. His Majesty to the Czar July 28, 10:4s P- M. With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria-Hungary's action against Servia is making in your empire. The unscrupulous agitation which has gone on for years in Serxda has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which allowed the Servians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that we two, you and I as well as all sover- eigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment. On the other hand I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long Ume, I am therefore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria- Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you wUl help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may }-et arise. Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin. (Signed.) Wilhelm. Annex 21 n. The Czar to His Majesty Peterhof Palace, July 29, i p. M. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignarion at this, which I fuUy share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far. (Signed) Nicholas. GERMAN "WHITE PAPER" 257 Annex 22 III. His Majesty to the Czar I have received your telegram and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless — as I said to you in my first telegram — I cannot consider Austria- Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by e.tperience that Servia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Servia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this \dew by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria- Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the e.xpcnse of Servia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain in the r61e of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which — as I already telegraphed you — my Government is en- deavoring .to help with all its power. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wsh to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, (Signed) Wilhelm. Annex 23 IV. His Majesty to the Czar July 30, I A. M. My .Embassador has been instructed to call your Govern- ment's attention to the dangers and serious consequences of mobihzation. Austria-Hungary mobilized only against Servia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobiUzing against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the de- cision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibiUty for war or peace. (Signed) Wilhelm. Annex 23 a The Czar to His Majesty Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1:20 P. M. I thank you from my heart for your prompt answer, I am scncUng Tatisheff this evening with instructions. The military measures now being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against .Austria's prepara- tions. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any way your position as mediator, which I highly esteem. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order that an understanding may be brought about with us. Nicholas. Annex 24 Telegram op the Imperial Gf.rman Chancellor TO tee Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg July 31, 1914. In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her en- tire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger of war threatens lis, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warUke measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to Mr. Sazonof. . . . Annex 25 Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor TO the Imperial German Ambassador IN Paris July 31, 1914. [Notice is given of the sending of the ultimatum contained in Annex 24, and its substance repeated.) . . . Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch. Annex 26 Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor TO the Imperial German Ambassador IN St. Petersburg Important! Aug. i, 1914. In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory answer to our demand, will Your E.xcellency. at s o'clock this afternoon (Central European time), kindly hand to it the following declaration : The Imperial Government has endeavored from the be- ginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. In accordance %vith a wish e.xpressed to him by His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Ger- many, in cooperation with England, applied himself to the accomplishment of a mediating role toward the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without await- ing the outcome, proceeded to mobilize her entire land and naval forces. Following this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself confronted by a serious and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had failed to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Govern- ment was obliged to address the Government of the Em- peror of all the Russias and insist upon the cessation of all these military measures. Russia having refused to accede to this demand, and having manifested by this refusal that her acts were directed against Germany, I have the honor, by order of my Government, to make known to Your Ex- cellency the following: His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, takes up the defiance, and considers himself in a state of war against Russia. . . . Kindly ask for your passports and hand over protection and business to the American Embassy. Annex 27 Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris to the Imperial German Chan- cellor Aug. I, 1:05 p. M. To my Repeated inquiry as to whether France, in case of a German-Russian war, would remain neutral, the Premier declared that France would do that wliich might be required of her by her interests. A NEW BRITISH "WHITE PAPER" ON SEPTEMBER i6, a second official "White Paper" was issued in London. This is intended to show that Austria and Servia were still in a fair way of adjusting their difficul- ties, when Germany's declarations of war against Russia and France precipitated the general catastrophe. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, then British Ambassador at Vienna, sets forth the situation in a despatch, dated September i, to Sir Edward Grey. He states that on August i Russia and Austria had almost come to terms, as Austria had consented to submit to mediation those points in her Servian note which seemed incompatible with Servian independence. Russia was satisfied with this, provided Austria would refrain from actually invading Servian territory. The Russian Ambassador in Vienna, M. Schebeko, was working hard for peace. [Sir Maurice proceeds:] He was holding most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been set- tled by negotiation, and ]\I. Schebeko repeatedly said he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Austria, in fact, had finally jielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by a communication made to you [Sir Edward Grey] on Aug. i by Count Mensdorft (Austrian Ambassador in London) to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door on compromise" nor cut oiT conversations. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous grounds of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany inter\'ened on July 31 by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer was possible and Germany declared war on Russia on Aug. I and on France on Aug. 3. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. [Sir Maurice states that neither the French, the Russian, nor the Italian Ambassador at Vienna had the least intimation in advance as to the harsh conditions of Austria's note to Servia.] As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on July 15 a forecast of what was about to happen. [The note was published in the newspapers of Vienna on July 24th. The Austrian people regarded it as an ultimatum, and had no wish or expectation that Servia would accept its terms. A false report that she had done so, uncondi- tionally, caused great disappointment, which gave way to joyful demonstrations when it was learned that Servia's reply had been rejected and the Austrian Minister at Belgrade had ceased to communicate with the Servian Government.] [Says Sir Maurice:] Now the floodgates were opened and the entire people and press clamored impatiently for the immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a great Power in the Bal- kans must inevitably call other great Powers into the field. The conviction had been e.xpressed to me by the German Ambassador on July 24 that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influ- enced, no doubt, the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian ag- gressions and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Goverrmient resolved upon war. The inevitable con- sequence ensued. Russia repUed to a partial Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobihzation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobiliza- tion, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. [On July 28 Sir Maurice urged upon Count Berchtold that Sir Edward Grey's plan of media- tion be accepted. The Count replied that he realized the potentialities of the issue, but that matters had already gone too far, as Austria on that very day was declaring war on Servia. He maintained that Russia would have no reason to intervene, as Austria had declared her intention of respecting Servia's territorial integrity.] [Sir Maurice proceeds:] The German Government claims to have persevered to the end in an endeavor to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirschky (the German Ambassador) abstained from inviting my cooperation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Sch6b6ko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Scheb6ko endeavored on July 28 to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful 258 MODERN INVENTIONS IN WAR 259 Copyright by Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. Pliotograph by Paul rhonipson FRENCH FIELD TELEGRAPH (TOP) AND ENGLISH FIELD TELEPHONE IN OPERATION 26o EUROPE AT WAR BELGIAN ARIMORED AUTOMOBILES Copyrifrht by Underwood ^V Underwood, N Y. TRANSPORTING ARTILLERY ACROSS A STREAM I'liotDgtaph by Brown Eros- WAR AIR CRAFT 261 ENGLISH (T.jp) FRENCH AND GERMAN DIRIGIBLES Photographs by PliuI Tliom;>son 262 EUROPE AT WAR ARMORED BIPLAXE \MTH RAPID-FIRE GUN Photojjraph by BrLnvn Bros. Copyright by Under\\ood & Underwood, N. V. BOMB DROPPING APPARATUS ATTACHED TO AEROPLANE FAST, ARMORED MONOPLANE WITH RAPID-FIRING GUN ATOP Phntojjraph by Brown Brus. CITIES IN THE THICK OF WAR 263 BELGRADE, SERVIA NAMUR, BELGIUM Photograph by Bain News Service CITY OF ANTWERP i'liotograph by Bain News Service 264 EUROPE AT W A R KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM HIS FORMliK CAPITAL. BRUSSELS JAPAN TAKES A HANI) 265 COUNT OKUMA PREMIER COUNT OKA MINISTER OF WAR VICE ADMIR.\L KUROI COMMANDING HOME FLEET JAPANESE CRUISER "KONGO" ■^ ji<~t^j» , ■ '^^nn^^^H^^^^^^^H^Z^flH^^^^k. B^HE^^^' f^^^^^^HHBi'^^.:^ 7ii!T' -^ . .-. .-■•*- ^. a. ..«^- ^^--***^«-u.- '""^ ^ It fT| k^t B Copyright by American Press Association KIAO-CHAU, GERMAN POSSESSION IN CHINA 266 EUROPE AT WAR Copyright by Underwood & Underwood. N. Y. SERVIAN SOLDIERS; THE FINISHED PRODUCT Photograph by American Press Association THE STUFF THE SERVL\N ARMY IS MADE OF Copyright by Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. SERVIANS IN THE TRENCHES THE FRENCH ARMY 267 A MODERN ARMORED TR.\IN, USED BY THE FRENCH ARMY ^SSrJ' ■alalia ^ X p , 1 '' ' ^'A ^ ' i i?/ ^«^^ ^- ^ 1 At •il '1^ ll?H \\k - « .W \' - . ^^- 1 PhotO[;rai>heil b\ James !•"- |. An,hibakl THE FRENCH CAVALRY AND FIELD ARTILLERY ARE PROBABLY THE BEST IN EUROPE Copyright by Underwood & Underwood, N. V. FRENCH INFANTRY ON THE MARCH FRENCH nJFANTRYMEN ARE CREDITED WITH BEING ABLE TO MARCH FARTHER THAN OTHER EUROPEAN SOLDIERS 268 EUROPE AT WAR GERMAN INFANTRY ON THE MARCH .l.KMAN UHLAXS U.\ PAR.\DK C;ERMA\ infantry with their camp KITCHEN FRENCH BATTALIONS OF THE AIR 269 FRENCH BATTALIONS OF THE AIR THE PRESENT VVAK IS THE FIRST \TTAL TEST OF AIRCRAFT. THE FRENCH, OF ALL THE NATIONS, HAVE THE LARGEST AND BEST EQUIPMENT OF AEROPLANES syo EUROPE AT WAR Copyright by I'luler^suucl .V L'l ENCAMPED AND MARCHING ik-r«.j..»l, \ 1 RUSSIAN COSSACKS AND INFANTRY, RUSSIAN SOLDIER DOES NOT THINK FOR HIMSELF AND THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN SHOWED THAT HIS OFFICERS DO NOT DO ENOUGH THINKING FOR HIM. DESPITE THIS HE HAS SHOWN THAT HE WILL STAND A TREMENDOUS PERCENTAGE OF LOSS WITHOUT BREAKING THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE 271 A RUSSIAN ADVANCE Photugraphed by Jaiiiei H. j. ArtliibaM TiUSSIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION 272 EUROPE AT WAR WHY THE FIRST GERMAN ATTACK ON THIS RELIEF MAP, ON WHICH THE LOWLANDS APPEAR IN WHITE, SHOWS GR.APHICALLV THAT THE EASIEST WAY FROM BRUSSELS ALMOST DIRECTLY SOUTH TOWARD PARIS. IT EXPLAINS ALSO WHY THE GERMANS WENT THROUGH BELGIUM 273 FRANCE WAS MADE THROUGH BELGIUM FOR THE GERMANS TO STRIKE TliE FIRST BLOW WAS BV A MARCH DUE WEST FROM COLOGNE TO BRUSSELS AND THE COMPARATIVE SLOWNESS OF OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN CENTRE AND LEFT 274 EUROPE AT WAR SERVIAN ARllLLliK\ SF.RVIA'S BATTLE-SEASONED VETERANS SERVIANS IN CAMP .iPTER THE BATTLE OF MONASTIR, FOUGHT DURING THE BALKAN WAR SOME ROYAL TELEGRAMS 275 conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonoff (Foreign Minister). Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (July 30) consented. In the meantime Russia had partially mobilized against Austria. He received M. Sch^b^ko again in a perfectly friendly manner and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. The dispatch goes on te say that thencefor- ward the situation between Russia and Germany became worse than that between Russia and Aus- tria, till Germany finally declared war. Sir Maurice concludes his dispatch by describ- ing the Ambassadors' departure from Vienna. As the French Ambassador left the city, the Chief Burgomaster was announcing to the crowd that a revolution was in progress at Paris and that President Poincare had already been assassinated! **HOW THE FRANCO-GERMAN CONFLICT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED" SOME ROYAL TELEGRAMS We give below in full the text of the official pamphlet with the above title recently issued in English from the German Government printing office in Berlin. — Tlie Editors. Note Preceding the Correspondence. "The following documents refer to the ex- change of views between Germany and England immediately before the war broke out. It will be perceived from these documents that Ger- many was prepared to spare France in case Eng- land should remain neutral and would guarantee the neutrality of France." Telegram of His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to H. M. the King of England of July soth, 1914. Am here since yesterday; have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday, who gratefully received your message. WilUam, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfill Nicky's appeal to him to work for maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic communication with Nicky, who to-day confirms news that military measures have been ordered by him equal to mobilization, measures which have been taken already five days ago. We are furthermore informed that France is making miUtary preparations, whereas we have taken no meas- ures, but may be forced to do so any moment, should our neighbors continue, which then would mean a European war. If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest your using your influence on France and also Russia to keep neutral, which seems to me would be most useful. This I consider a very good, perhaps the only chance, to maintain the peace of Europe. I may add that now more than ever Germany and Eng- land should lend each other mutual help to prevent a ter- rible catastrophe, which otherwise seems unavoidable. Beheve me that WilUam is most sincere in his endeavors to maintain peace, but that the military preparations of his two neighbors may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own coimtry, which otherwise would remain defenseless. I have informed WilUam of my telegram to you, and hope you will receive my informations in the same spirit of friendship which suggested them. [Signed] Heney. Telegram of H. M. the King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia of July 30th, 1914. Thanks for your telegram. So pleased to hear of Wil- liam's efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further miUtary preparations if Aus- tria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring SerWan territory as a hostage for satis- factory settlement of her demands, other countries mean- while suspending their war preparations. Trust WilUam will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an inter- national catastrophe. Pray assure WilUam I am doing and shaU continue to do aU that Ues in my power to preserve peace of Europe. [Signed] George. Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England of July iisl, 1914. Many thanks for your kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancellor that oflicial notifica- tion has just reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left Me without any news. I am off for BerUn to take measures for insuring safety of My eastern frontier, where strong Russian troops are akeady posted. [Signed] Willy. Telegram of the King, of England to His Majesty the Em- peror of August 1st, 1914. Many thanks for Your telegram last night. I sent an urgent telegram to Nicky expressing My readiness to do everything in My power to assist in reopening conversations between powers concerned. [Signed] Geoegie. Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Chan- cellor of August 1st, 1914. Sir E. Grey just asked me by telephone whether I be- lieved to be in a position to declare that we would not at- tack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral. I declared I beUeved to be able to give such an undertaking. [Signed] Lichnowsky. Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of Englaftd of August ist, 1914. I just received the communication from Your Govern- ment offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether 276 EUROPE AT WAR under these conditions Germany would refrain from at- tacking France. On technical grounds My mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so late. But if France offers Me neutraUty which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ My troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France. Telegram of llic Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London of August ist, igi4. Germany is ready to accept British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in Russo-Gerraan conflict. German mobiliza- tion has been ordered to-day on account of Russian chal- lenge before English proposal was known here. It is therefore now impossible to make any change in strategical distribution of troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 p. M. on Monday the 3rd inst, in case England will pledge herself meanwhile. [Signed] Bethmann-Hollweg. Telegram of H. M. the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor of August 1st, 1914. In answer to your telegram just received, I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were dis- cussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early to-mor- row morning to ascertain whether there is a misunder- standing on his part. [Signed] Geoege. Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Chan- cellor of August 2nd, 1914. Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous understanding with France and made without knowledge of our mobiliza- tion, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless. [Signed] Lichnowsky. Note Following the Correspondence. "The essence of Germany's declarations is contained in Emperor William's telegram to the King of England of August ist, 1914. Even if there existed a misunderstanding as to an English proposal, the Kaiser's offer furnished England the opportunity to prove her paciiic disposition and to prevent the Franco-German war." MISCELLANEOUS VIEWS TROBABLE CAUSES OF THE WAR BY DR. CHARLES W. ELIOT President Emeritus of Harvard University THE American people without distinction of party are highly content with the action of their National Administration on all the grave problems presented to the Government by the sudden outbreak of long-prepared war in Europe — a war which already involves five great States and two small ones. They heartily approve of the action of the Administration on mediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, dis- couragement of speculation in foods, and, with the exception of extreme protectionists, admission to American registry of foreign-built ships; although the legislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is manifestly inadequate. Our people cannot see that the war will neces- sarily be short, and they cannot imagine how it can last long. They realize that history gives no example of such a general interruption of trade and all other international intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a stoppage of the production and distribution of the necessaries of life as this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are about to over- whelm Europe. Hence, thinking Americans cannot help re- flecting on the causes of this monstrous outbreak of primitive savagery — part of them come down from the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries and part developed in the Nineteenth — and won- dering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly come out of the present cataclysm. The whole people of the United States, with- out regard to racial origin, are of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this pro- digious physical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all the new forces of Nineteenth-Century applied science, some new liberties, and new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they can cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The mili- tary force which Austria-Hungary and Germany *Reprinted, by permission, from Tiie New York Times of September 6tli. 277 are now using on a prodigious scale, and with long- studied sldll, can only be met by similar mihtary force, and this resisting force is summoned more slowly than that of Austria-Hungary and Ger- many; although the ultimate battalions will be heavier. In this portentous physical contest the American people have no part; their geographical position, their historical development, and their political ideals combine to make them for the present mere spectators; although their interests — commercial, industrial, and poHtical — are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our Government can do is to utilize all existing neu- trality rights, and, if possible, to strengthen or develop those rights, for out of this war ought to come more neutral States in Europe, and greater security for neutralized territory. The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic struggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all other neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear understanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the war, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more thoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of public sentiment outside of the contending nations, and the con- clusions which the peace negotiations will ulti- mately reach. When one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and wide- spread evils in Europe from which America has been exempt for at least 150 years. The first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine events, and the second is autocratic national executives who can swing the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without consulting the people or their represent- atives. 278 EUROPE AT WAR The actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations, like those habitually conducted on behalf of the "concert of Europe," and alliances between selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or at any rate not publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but can only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free institutions, like those of the United States, take the public into confidence, because all important movements of the Government must rest on popular desires, needs, and voHtions. Autocratic institutions have no such necessity for publicity. This Government secrecy as to motives, plans, and purposes must often be main- tained by disregarding truth, fair dealing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to force comes, one Government may secure the advantage of taking the other by sur- prise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of treaties during war come to be regarded as obvious military necessities. The second great evil, under which certain large nations of Europe — notably Russia, Ger- many, and Austria-Hungary — have long suffered and still suffer, is the permanent national exec- utive, independent of popular control through representative bodies, holding strong views about rights of birth and religious sanctions of its au- thority, and really controlling the national forces through some small council and a strong bureau- cracy. So long as executives of this sort endure, so long will civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this August, though not always on so vast a scale. Americans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of liberty, because Ameri- cans are detached from the actual conflicts by the Atlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal or the imperial system for nearly 300 years. Pilgrim and Puritan, Covenanter and Quaker, Lutheran, and CathoUc aUke left the feudal system and autocratic govern- ment behind them when they crossed the Atlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of the present war will be: (i) The aboli- tion of secret diplomacy and secret understand- ings, and the substitution therefor of treaties publicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) The creation of national executives — Emperors, Sul- tans, Kings, or Presidents — which cannot use the national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed national assembly, acting with dehberation, has agreed to that use. The American student of history since the middle of the Seventeenth Century sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in Europe: First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small States such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and for two centuries secured in a fairly independ- ent existence, and, secondly, a tendency from the middle of the Nineteenth Century toward larger national units, created by combining several kindred States vmder one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in the case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in Germany has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the Nineteenth Century the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of small States was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The larger national units had a more or less federative quality, the com- ponents yielding some of their functions to a cen- tral power, but retaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited unification is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We believe in the federative prin- ciple, and must therefore hope that out of the present European horror will come a new develop- ment of that principle, and new security for small States which are capable of guaranteeing to their citizens "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- ness" — a security which no citizen of any Euro- pean country seems to-day to possess. Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American people are now watch- ing from afar are commercial and economic. Im- perial Germany's desire for colonies in other continents— such as Great Britain and France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions — is intense. Prussia's seizure of Schles- wig in 1864-5 had the commercial motive; and it is with visions of ports on the North Sea that Germany justifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for generations desired to extend their national territory south- ward to the j^gean and the Bosphorus, and east- ward to good harbors on the Pacific. Later they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted successfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on the Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and PROBABLE CAUSES OF THE WAR 279 Bosnia to promote her approach toward the i^^^gean, and is now trying to seize Servia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately descended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this intense desire for colonies — profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the Amer- ican people, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to acquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the Twentieth Century opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice — first in Cuba, and then in Mexico — this democratic objection. They believe that extensions of national territory should be brought about only with the indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly concerned. They believe also that commerce should always be a means of promoting good-will, and not ill- wUl, among men, and that all legitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and commercial nation may be procured through the policy of the "open door" — which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed to compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether backward or advanced in civilization. No American Ad- ministration has accepted a "concession" of land in China. They also believe that peaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford ade- quate relief from the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory it occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory to secure relief. It is inevitable, there- fore, that the American people should hope that one outcome of the present war should be — no enlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent of the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable commercial and industrial methods. One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the minds of thinking people that the whole process of com- petitive armaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national armies, and the inces- sant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is not a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted in the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate outbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of civilization this is a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern civilization is to be preserved, national executives — whether imperial or republican — must not have at their disposal immense armaments and drilled armies held ready in the leash; that arma- ments must be limited, an international Supreme Court established, national armies changed to the Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any nation that may suddenly be- come lawless agreed upon by treaty and held always in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be necessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an aggressive, but a protective, force and used as such — just as protective force has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and commonwealths. At present, Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the brute force which Ger- many and Austria-Hungary are now using, can only be overcome by brute force of the same sort in larger measures. It is only when negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility of huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect. Is it too much to ex- pect that the whole civilized world will take to heart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe and cooperate to prevent the recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and Austria-Hun- gary succeed in their present undertakings, the whole civilized world would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an ever-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live in constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there — a terrible fear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable intentions would offer the least security. It must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization, which has long been com- pulsory on the nations of continental Europe, is inconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of individual liberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and sometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common sentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern army like that of Ger- many, Austria-Hungary, or Russia has a despotic or autocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of democratic society. To make war in countries like France, Great Britain, and the United States requires the wide- spread, simultaneous stirring of the passions of 28o EUROPE AT WAR the people on behalf of their own ideals. This stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war and public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are securities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on militarism — a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of settling international disputes. It must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people to sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which, in summoning the people to war, use such phrases as "My monarchy," "My loyal people," or "My loyal subjects ;' for there is implied in such phrases a dynastic or personal ownership of peoples which shocks the average American. Americans in- evitably think that the right way for a ruler to begin an exhortation to the people he rules is Pres- ident Wilson's way — "My fellow countrymen." It follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes that, although the people of the United States mean to maintain faithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and can not be, neutral or indifferent as to the ulti- mate outcome of this titanic struggle. It already seems to them that England, France, and Russia are fighting for freedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the immense services which Germany has ren- dered to civilization during the last himdred years, or desire that her power to serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least abridged in the outcome of this war upon which she has entered so rashly and selfishly, and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness the Allies will only promote the noble German civilization. The presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and Austria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal pheno- menon; because Russia is itself a military mon- archy with marked territorial ambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that of France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score by recalling that Russia submitted to the " Concert of Europe" when her victorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that she emancipated her serfs, proposed The Hague Conferences, initiated the "Duma," and has lately offered — perhaps as war measures only — autonomy to her Poles and equal rights of citizenship to her Jews. He also cannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature as Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its multi- tudinous population a large minority which is seething with high aspirations and a fine idealism. For the clarification of the public mind on the issues involved, it is important that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and understood. The action of the Government must be neutral in the best sense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral, for the whole history and present state of Ameri- can liberty forbids. For the present, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and real issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize every opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human free- dom, and of peace at last. Asticou, Me., Sept. i, 1914. THE EUROPEAN DEBACLE BY HERMAN RIDDER of the New Yorker Staals-Zeitung. THE present European debacle is but another exemplification of the great principle which has underlaid all of the major conflicts of history — the inexorable neces- sity for a people to expand, or to decay. In this sense, the peaceful expansion of the various coun- tries of Europe during the last half century paved the way, smooth and direct, for the cosmic tragedy which we are now witnessing across the oceans. With the expansive forces of economic need and race-sense constantly working within the fixed limit of a certain geographical territory, conflicts of interests and eventually the conflict of nations was inevitable. The rise of Germany subsequent to the con- summation of the Empire has been remarkable. Her commercial expansion has been not simply irresistibly steady; it has been prophetically rapid. THE EUROPEAN DEBACLE 281 It was not to be expected that France and, more especially, Great Britain could regard the un- remitting inroads thus made into fields which up to this time they had regarded as their own, with equanimity. The story of British diplomacy during the last years coincident with Germany's tremendous cutting down of Great Britain's commercial supremacy is punctuated with every conceivable form of possible interference with her rival's legitimate lines of trade extension. It was all done under the cover of that shibboleth "the status quo," but, like other fabrics stretched to cover too much, the "status quo" became at last transparent. When that point was reached, war was already in sight. There was not one field beyond her own borders in which Germany was unopposed not simply by the commercial competition of her powerful rival but by all the diplomatic forces that could be brought to bear against her. Germany knew this, and Great Britain knew thaft she knew it and that the hour of reckoning could not be long postponed. When her chain of allies had been completed, Great Britain sought only for the conventional pretext. The ends of the earth, it would seem, had been searched by British diplomacy for its purposes. When the Russian advance toward India had been for the time being stayed on the fields of Manchuria, Russia, washed clean of a century of suspicion, was hailed in an hour the ally of England. The cry "Pan-Germanism" was all that she required to bring her forward against Germany, as the standard-bearers of "Pan- Slavism." The memory of " perfidious Albion " was wiped out by Edward VII, when he offered France the assistance of British arms in the move- ment toward the "revanche." Japan, whose friendship had been sought in the first instance against Russia, was stOl an ally. It would seem as if Great Britain might have rested content with these achievements, but apparently not one stone was to be left unturned to make the isola- tion of Germany and Austria complete. By raising the hopes of the Irredentists of Italy, the bonds of the Triple Alliance were loosened and their one ally withdrawn from them. By a viola- tion of the spirit of Belgian neutrality the French advance to Berlin was to be smoothed. While all this was going on Germany was silent but not asleep. She was not blind to the activ- ities of her enemies, but she was impotent to forestall them. It was not a difficult feat to provoke the war, once the Allies were prepared for it. Out of the Balkan War had come conditions which Russia interpreted as propitious to the fulfillment of her long retarded ambitions for a port on the south and the erection of an all-embracing Slavic Em- pire. Working through the Pan-Slavic move- ment in Servia she created in that country a state of afifairs which no self-respecting nation could tolerate on its borders. When Austria protested to Servia, Russia began the mobilization against her of the vast army which had been whipped into shape for just this contmgency. As Austria's ally, Germany was compelled to go to her assis- tance in a struggle in which the meaning of the eventual success of Russia was evident to every German mind. Germany did not want the war. During a quarter of a century her industries and commerce have developed under an emperor who had shown himself a sincere and forceful advocate of peace. It is the limit of the illogical to assert that a sovereign who had worked so consistently for the economic uplift of his people should from motives of personal ambition impose upon that same people all the burdens and horrors incident to modern warfare on a large scale. That all the achievements of the last twenty-five years must be lost in a few days tells its own story. Successful in the end or not Germany must make terrible sacrifices and stand tremendous losses. To picture the Emperor of Germany as a blood- thirsty war-lord is the most arrant nonsense. The telegrams that were exchanged between the Em- peror and the Czar show only too clearly the ex- tent to which the former was willing to go to pre- serve the peace of Europe. The limits of Ger- many's honor and national integrity alone re- strained him. To assume that the Emperor declared war in the present instance against the will of the German people is equally absurd. The Germans are a military nation. Their position in relation to the other nations of Europe has made them such. They are soldiers to a man and the problems of Germany are known to every German subject. When Russia began to mobilize, it meant war and every German knew and expected war. Had Germany been under a republican form of govern- 282 EUROPE AT WAR ment hostilities would have been declared just the same. This is not, on the part of Germany a war of conquest. It is not a Napoleonic war to satisfy the personal ambitions of an emperor. It is a defensive war, with Germany's national life at stake. It is difficult to forecast the outcome of what is already proving to be the greatest conflict in the history of civilized nations. There is no more reason to assume as yet that Germany will emerge from it completely triumphant than there is to assert as a foregone conclusion that the allied armies will destroy the German and Aus- trian combinations. The great machine which in turn crushed Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870 is again under way, and it only remains to be seen whether the modern engines of destruction can stop the massed attack of the most wonderful infantry that has ever marched on a field of battle. Out of it all will come — what? In the event of a German triumph, we may look confidently fonvard to the steady advancement and increase of those arts and sciences which have given German civilization a foremost place in Europe and have done so much for the other peoples of the earth. In the event of a German defeat, I can see only disaster. The temporary supremacy of Great Britain upon the seas and in commerce, will pass with the fruition of the seeds which she herself has sown. The Asiatic has been aroused, and the coming struggle between the East and the West has been hastened by unnumbered years. The Slavic advance against Germany will be accomplished, but in so far as it spells only Russia, it will also be temporary. When the hordes of China and Japan directed from Tokyo, and the uncounted millions of India, are turned against Europe and our own beloved land, the real meaning of the forces now at work for the destruction of Ger- many will be felt. Swallowed up in the general movement of Asia westward, Russia will be but a tool in the hands of her still more eastern con- querors. When that day comes, we shall turn back to the Month of August, in the Year of Our Lord and Saviour Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen, and read the first chapter of the cataclysm. *A VISION OF ARMAGEDDON BY H. G. WELLS AT LAST the intolerable tension is over. Europe is at war. The monstrous vanity that was begotten by the easy victories of 1870-71 has challenged the world. Germany prepares to reap the harvest that Bismarck sowed. That trampling, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe that has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years — German imperialism and German mil- itarism — has struck its inevitable blow. The victory of Germany will mean the perma- nent enthronement of the war god over all human affairs. The defeat of Germany may open the way to disarmament and peace throughout the earth. To those who love peace there can be no other hope in the present conflict than her defeat, the utter discrediting of the German legend — ending it for good and all — of blood and iron, the superstition of Krupp, flag-wagging, Teutonic Kiplingism, and all that criminal sham efficiency that centres in Berlin. ♦Reprinted by permission from the New York Times. Never was a war so righteous as is the war against Germany now; never any State in the world so clamored for punishment; but be it remembered that Europe's quarrel is with Ger- many as a State, not with the German people, with the system, not with the race. The older tradition of Germany is a pacific, civilizing tradition. The temperament of the mass of the German people is kindly, sane, ami- able. Disaster to the German army, if it is unaccompanied by such a memorable wrong as dismemberment or intolerable indignity, wiU mean the restoration of the greatest people of Europe to the fellowship of the western nations. The role of England in the huge struggle is as plain as daylight. We have to fight if only on accoimt of the Luxemburg outrage. We have to fight. If we do not fight England will cease to be a country to be proud of and we shall have a dirt bath to escape from. But it is inconceivable that we should not fight, and, having fought, then in the hour of victory A VISION OF ARMAGEDDON 283 it will be for us to save4;he liberated Germans from vindictive treatment, to secure for this great people their right to a place in the sun as one united German-speaking State. First, we have to save ourselves and Europe, and then we have to stand between the Germans on the one hand, and Cossack revenge on the other. For my part, I do not doubt that Germany and Austria are doomed to defeat in this war. It may not be a catastrophic defeat, though even that is possible, but it will be a defeat. There is no destiny in the stars and every sign is false if this is not so. They have provoked an overwhelming com- bination of enemies. They have underrated France. They are hampered by bad social and military traditions. The German is not naturally a good soldier. He is orderly and obedient, but not nimble or quickwitted. Hence his sole con- siderable military achievement is his not very lengthy march to Paris in 1871. The conditions of modern warfare have been almost completely revolutionized and in a di- rection that subordinates massed fighting and unintelligent men to the rapid initiative of in- dividuaUzed soldiers. On the other hand, since those years of dis- aster, the Frenchman has learned the lesson of humility. He is prepared now sombrely for a similar struggle. His is the gravity that precedes astonishing victories. In the air, in the open field, with guns and machines, it is doubtful if any one fully realizes the superiority of his quaUty to the German. This sudden attack may take him aback for a week or so, though I doubt even that; but in the end, I think, he will hold his own even with- out us, and with us I venture to prophesy within three months from now his tri-color will be over the Rhine, and, even suppose his line gets broken by the first rush, even then I do not see how the Germans are to get to Paris or anywhere near Paris. I do not see how, against the strength of mod- ern offensive and the stinging power of an intel- ligent enemy in retreat, of which we had a little foretaste in South Africa, the e.xploit of Sedan can be repeated. A retiring German army, on the other hand, wiU be far less formidable than a retiring French army, because there is less devil in it, because it is made up of men taught to obey in masses, be- cause its intelligence is concentrated in old, autocratic officers; because it is dismayed when it breaks ranks. The German Army is everything the conscrip- tionists dreamt of making our people. It is, in fact, an army about twenty years behind the requirements of contemporary conditions. ISSUE WITH RUSSIA MORE DOUBTFUL On the eastern frontier the issue is more doubt- ful because of the uncertainty of Russian things. The peculiar military strength of Russia, the strength she was never able to display in Man- churia, Ues in her vast resources of mounted men. A set invasion of Prussia may be a matter of many weeks, but the raiding possibUities in Eastern Germany are enormous. It is difficult to guess how far a Russian attack will be directed by intelligence, how far Russia mil have to blunder very disastrously, indeed, before she can be put upon the defensive. A Russian raid is far more hkely to threaten Berhn than a German to reach Paris. Meanwhile there is a struggle on sea. In that I am prepared for some rude shocks. The Ger- mans have devoted an amount of energy to the creation of an aggressive na\y that would have been spent more wisely in consolidating their European position. It is probably a thoroughly good navy, and, ship for ship, the equal of our own, but the same lack of invention, the same relative uncreativeness that kept the German behind the Frenchman in things aerial made him follow our lead in naval matters, and if we erred, and I believe we have erred, in overrating the importance of big battleships the German has at least very obligingly fallen in with our error. The safest and most effective place for the German fleet at the present time is the Baltic Canal. Unless I underrate the powers of the waterplane there is no safe harbor for it. If it goes into port anywhere that port can be mined and bottled up. Ships can be destroyed at leisure by aerial bombs, so that if they are on this side of the Kiel Canal they must keep at sea and fight, if we let them, before their coal runs short, a battle in the open sea. NAVAL TIGHT AGAINST ODDS In that case their only chance will be to fight against odds, with every prospect of a smashing, 284 EUROPE AT WAR albeit we shall certainly have to pay for victory in ships and men. In the Baltic we shall, notably get at them without the participation of Denmark, and their ships may have considerable use against Russia, but in the end even there the mine, aero- plane, and destroyer should do this work. So I reckon that Germany will be held in the east and that the west wUl get her fleet practically destroyed. We ought also to be able to sweep her shipping off the seas and lower her flag forever in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. All the probabilities seem to me to point to that. There is no reason why Italy should not stick to her present neutrality. There is considerable inducement at hand for both Denmark and Japan to join in directly they are convinced of the failure of the first big rush on the part of Germany. All those issues will be more or less definitely decided within the next two or three months. By that time, I believe, German imperialism will be shattered, and it may be possible to anticipate the end of the armaments phase of European history. France, Italy, England, and all the smaller Powers of Europe are now pacific countries. Russia, after a huge war, will be too exhausted for further adventure. Shattered Germany will be revolutionary. Germany will be as sick of the imiforms and imperialism idea as France was in 1871, as disillusioned about predominance as Bulgaria is to-day. The way will be open at last for all these West- ern Powers to organize a peace. That is why I, with my declared horror of war, did not sign any of these "stop the war" appeals. Declaractions that have appeared in the last few days are that every sword is drawn against Germany. Now is the sword drawn for peace. London, Aug. 4. *GIVE GERMANY FAIR PLAY BY HUGO MUNSTERBERG THE European war broke into the calm of our summer quick and unexpected, but still quicker and still more unexpected by any lover of fair play was the vehement turn of the American press for the Slavs and against the Germans. Whatever Germany or Austria did was seen through the spectacles of the enemy. Their motives appeared tainted, their actions against the rules of the game; they had no just cause and no morals, they were not worthy of American sympathy. Of course, some pretext can be found for every partiality, and it is not difficult to fore- see how this game can be played on. If Germany's enemies are defeated the American nation must be with them because it is always with the weak- est, always with the under dog; but if they are victorious the American nation will be with them, too, because it loves a spirited fighter, and a triumphant power. Yet it is just Germany which dares a spirited fight and which is the weaker, forced to fight against heavy odds. HOW THE NEWS HELPS The naked news which the cable brings helps on this cruel game. The average American reader *Reprinted by permission from the Boston Herald. has no idea how much anti-German feeling is in- fused into the so-called facts which are sent over the ocean. He sees that the news is dated from Vienna or Berhn and he does not know that most of the American correspondents on the continent for many years have been enthusiastic English- men, who serve first of all their home papers. And even the few American journalists on the spot devote most of their energies to London papers and receive from there the daily advice and the daDy prejudice of English rivalry. But does the news at least find fair play when it arrives? What the French or the English government proclaims stands gloriously on the first page; what the German government replies is hidden somewhere in a corner of the fifth. When England interprets German action in Luxemburg as the violation of agreements it is told in inch-large letters; when Germany proves that it had the right it comes out in the smallest print. When Germany goes through Belgium, America shares the indignation of England, to which it serves as a welcome pretext. But that France went through Belgium and Holland first is kept secret in most American papers. This means playing the reporter's game with loaded dice. GIVE GERMANY FAIR PLAY 28s THE POWERS OF KINGS Yet, even the kind of news which is dumped on us does not justify the editorial temper with which especially the New York papers appeal to our sense of superiority over medieval Germany. Typical is the way in which the decisions and deeds of emperors are always treated as if they were purely personal autocratic caprices without inner contact with the national life. This better than anything whips up the democratic spirit of the new world. Who stops to consider that in the hour of war, and even of danger before the war, the American President has more personal power than any emperor except the Czar, and even he would be swept away if he obstructed the will of the people? Children like to fancy that kings run about with golden crowns on their heads and with purple cloaks. It is hardly less childlike to imagine that a pro- clamation like that of the Emperor Franz Josef was written by him personally, and to construe it as if he made war on Servia because he wanted to take personal vengeance for the murder of his heir. Even the distant spectator ought to have seen that the whole tremendous pressure of the Austrian nation was necessary to force the old emperor into a war which he resisted with all the instincts of a man who has suffered much and who wants at last his peace and rest. Is it really possible to doubt that Emperor William desired nothing but honorable peace with all the world? For twenty-five years he has been the most eificient power for European peace. He has done more for it than all the European peace societies together, and, however often the world seemed at the verge of war, his versatile mind averted the danger. He knew too well, and the whole German people knew too well, that the incomparable cultural and industrial growth of the nation since the foundation of the young em- pire would be horribly threatened by the risks of war. Can any sane man really believe the slander that all was a long-prepared game which Austria was to start, and in which Germany would wUf uUy force the furies of war into the Russian realm? EVERY EFFORT IN VAIN No, this time every effort was in vain, and all good will for peace was doomed because the issue between the onrushing Slavic world and the German world had grown to an overpowering force. The struggle between the two civilizations was imminent, and where such a historic world conflict arises the will of individuals is crushed until they serve the will of the nations. The Slavs of the southeast, the Servians, had defeated their oppressors, the Turks. It was inevitable that their new strength should push them to am- bitious plans. It was necessary that they should aim toward a new great Slavic empire which would border the sea and embrace Austria's Slavic pos- sessions. That had to mean the end of Austria, the crumbling of its historic power. Such an inner, passionate conflict, such an issue of exist- ence, must lead to explosions. SLAV AGMNST GERMAN Servians kill the archduke. That was Austria's opportunity for an effort to crush the power which aimed toward its downfall. But it was no less historically necessary that the largest Slavic nation, the Russians, should feel that Servia's cause was their own. Russia knew well that while it had recovered from the wounds of the Japanese war the Slavic strength was still unequal to that of the German nations, but it knew also that it could rely on France's latent longing to revenge itself for Alsace and on England's grumbl- ing jealousy of the great German rival in the world's markets. At last the chances seemed splendid to strike the long delayed blow of the Slavic world against the German. The Czar was unable to resist the gigantic pressure of the hour; his Government mobilized against both Austria and Germany. WHY BLAME THE KAISER? Is there really any sense in blaming the Ger- man emperor for actually declaring war, when the Russian hostile preparation was evident, before its slow mobilization was completed and before Germany by such loss of time had been brought to certain destruction? Four times he urged the Czar to abstain from the moving of the Russian troops to the frontier; most unwillingly he undertook to urge Austria to new negotiations. But the world contrast of the two civilizations was too deep; Russia could not forego its unique chances, and so it continued passionately its armaments, trusting that the French guns would start of themselves. The German emperor would have shamefully neglected his duties if he had quietly waited until 286 EUROPE AT WAR the Russian armies were brought together from the far East. He had to strike as soon as the war was certain. He therefore had to go through the formality of declaring war, but it was Russia which made the war, and it was part of Russia's war making that it forced Germany to declare the war first. America undertook without such a deep inner conflict a punitive expedition against Mexico, not unlike that of Austria against Servia. If at that time Japan had declared that it could not tolerate such hostility to Mexico and had sent all its warships toward California, would the President have genially waited until the Japanese cruisers entered the Golden Gate, instead of putting an ultimatum to the Mikado saying that unless the ships stopped it would mean war? NEITHER COULD HELP IT In this historic situation neither Russia nor Germany could really act otherwise. The great conflict of civilizations was necessarily stronger than the mere wishes of peaceful indi^dduals. But if it is such a gigantic confhct of Slavic and Germanic culture, the sympathies of the progres- sive American nation ought not to be so wilfully misled and ought not to be whipped into the camp of the Cossacks. Americans ought not to rejoice when the uncultured hordes of the East march over the frontier and aim toward the most eastern German city, toward Konigsberg, the town of Immanuel Kant. If this war means such an inevitable conflict of the Slavic and the Germanic world, at least it ought to be clear to every one who can think his- torically that it belongs to the type of war for which the world as yet knows no substitute, the one type of war which in spite of the terrible losses is ultimately moral. Surely no comment on this fight of the nations is more absurd than the fri- volous cry that this is an immoral war. Every war for commercial ends or for personal glory or for mere aggrandizement or for revenge, may be called immoral, and thus the feelings with which Frenchmen and Englishmen join the Slavic forces might justly be accused. But both Slavs and Germans stand here on moral ground, as both are willing to sacrifice labor and life for the con- servation of their national culture and very exist- ence. Since the days of Napoleon Germany has never gone into a war which was more justified by the conscience of history. THE FLIGHT OF ITALY To be sure, there is no lack of elements in this war which do hurt the moral feeling. In victory or defeat Germans will hardly forget the flight of Italy which, under the flimsiest subterfuges, has deserted its allies in the hour of need. And immoral above all is the eSort of the world to strangle the spirit of Germany by the mere num- ber of enemies. That truly is no fair, no moral fight, when Germany and Austria are not to stand against Russia and Servia alone, which together have a population equal to that of the two op- ponents, but are also attacked from behind by France and England, by Japan and perhaps Rou- mania and last, but not least, by the misled public opinion of America. And this answers at once the pointed question which many American papers have discussed since the war began, the question whether the whole system is not fundamentally wrong, whether the armaments which were planned to protect the countries and to keep the balance and harmony have not thrown them into a destructive war, and whether it would not have been better to rely on international arbitration throughout the world. The grouping of this war shows why Germany would have trampled on her own sacred rights if she had laid the armor away and had relied on the judgment of the other nations. Would she have had the slightest chance for a fair judgment if political jealousy, economic rivalry, the vanity of revenge, and the aversion of a lower culture had been combined against her in an unholy alliance? The jury would have been packed, prejudices would have swept the court room. No; unless the Cossacks with their pogroms were to crush the culture of Germany she had simply no resort left but to trust in her sword and in her prayer. ANNOTATED LIST OF HELPFUL BOOKS WAR MANUALS The World's Work War Manual of the Great Con- flict of 1914, with 100 illustrations, maps, and a complete reference index. Edited by Arthur W. Page. Doubleday, Page & Co. 25 cents (paper), 50 cents (cloth), $1.00 (leather). War Gazetteer, compiled by Charles McD. Puckette BIBLIOGRAPHY 287 and Carrington Weems. N. Y. Evening Post. 15 cents, paper. TRIPLE ALLIANCE The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi. Edited by Thom- as Palamenghi-Crispi. 3 vols. Doran. $10.50. The third volume, — particularly timely just now, — contains a history of the negotiations at the Congress of Berlin. The Borderland of Czar and Kaiser. By Poultney Bigelow. Harper. $2. A stimulating and entertaining account of travels in eastern Europe along the Austro-Russian and Russo- German frontiers. Poland of To-Day and Yesterday. By Nevin O. Winter. Boston: L. C. Page. 487 pp., ill. $3. A review of the history of the land and people, past and present, outlining the causes which resulted in the parti- tion, and a survey of social, poUlical, and economic condi- tions of to-day, with relation to the three partitioning powers, Germany, Russia, and Austria. TRIPLE ENTENTE Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876- 1906. By Sir Thomas Barclay. (Houghton, Mifflin. $3.50. A stimulating account of the Entente Cordiale from within, by one of those who contributed largely to establish the now famous rapprochement between England and France. England and the Orleans Monarchy. By Major John Hall. Dutton. $4. A piece of diplomatic history detailing the creation of Belgium as a neutral state by the Five Powers, and the estabUshment of the Entente Cordiale between France and England. Common Sense in Foreign Policy. By Sir Harry Johnston. Dutton. $1.25. An account of the problems faced in shaping Great Britain's policy toward France, Germany, Austria- Hungary, Russia, the East, and America. ENGLAND Impressions of British Life and Character. By Meherban Narayanrao Babasaheb. Macmillan. 240 pp., ill. $2.25. The Hindu chief gives a series of sketches and impressions from the standpoint of the traveler, of British Ufe and character compared with people and habits of India. England Invaded. By Edward Ford and Gordon Home. Macmillan. 371 pp., iU. $2. A serious and well-founded forecast of what would hap- pen in case a German army landed on the English coast. A History op England and Greater Britain. By Arthur Lyon Cross. Macmillan. 1,165 PP- $2.50. This excellent history of England from Roman days to the middle of the present year, and covering more than 1,100 pages, appears very opportunely at the present time. The Day of the Saxon. By General Homer Lea. Harper. 249 pp. $1.80. This is a brilliant analysis of the part played by Saxon civiUzation in the world's history and a tribute to its great achievements. The History of English Patriotism. By Esme Wingfield-Stratford. Lane. 2 vols. 1,286 pp. $7.50. A review of the great fervid moments of British history from the defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Trafalgar. The Britannic Question. By Richard Jebb. Long- mans, Green. 262 pp. 35 cents. How to effect a closer and permanent union between the self-governing states of the British Empire is the text of Dr. Jebb's monograph. The Passing of Empire. By H. Fielding-Hall. Mac- millan. 307 pp. $2.50. This discussion of India and its relation to the British Empire is of particular significance now when sedition is rife in Hindustan, and the shadow of the Russian bear per- sists, despite the fact that Russia happens to be the ally of England in the present conflict. Social Forces in England and America. By H. G. Wells. Harpers. 415 pp. $2. According to Mr. Wells himself this gives "a fairly com- plete view of all my opinions." When William Came. By H. H. Munroe. Lane. 322 pp. _ $1.25. A vivid and appealing, although imaginative story of what would happen to England if the Germans conquered her and began to alter the processes of government to the HohenzoUern pattern. England and the English. By Price Collier. Scrib- ner. $1.50. Entertaining studies based on long acquaintanceship. Fair and appreciative. FRANCE How France is Governed. By Raymond Poincarfi McBride, Nast. 376 pp. $2.25. The President of the French Republic in this volume gives us discussions of elementary civics as applied to French political life, tracing the history of the administrative machinery of the French Government, national and local. France Under the Republic. By Jean Charlemagne Bracq. Scribner. 376 pp. $1.50. An attempt to gauge the great pohtical experiment of France during the last four decades, and to make an in- ventory of the constructive and reformatory work of the RepubUc. SoLTRCE Problems of the French Revolution. By Fred Morrow Fling and Helen Dresser Fling. Harpers. 338 pp. $1.10. A summary of documentary and other evidence. France from Behind the Veil. By Paul Vassili. Funk & Wagnalls. 396 pp., ill. $3.75. A chronicle of the social and pohtical hfe of France for half a century beginning with the reign of Napoleon III and closing with the Paris of " the day before yesterday." GERMANY German Sea-Power. By Archibald S. Kurd and Henry Castle. Scribner. $3.25. A book which may be said to ask the question "Will Anglo-Saxon or German civiUzation predominate in the world?" According to the authors, neither the United States nor Great Britain has thoroughly understood the causes for the present naval and economic growth of the German Empire, and in explanation they take the ground that Germany has a maritime history and possesses mari- time instincts of which her naval development is an out- come. History of the German Struggle for Liberty. By Poultney Bigelow. Harper. 4 vols. $10.50. An account of the heroic moral and spiritual, as well as physical warfare which the German people waged to ob- tain the degree of hberty that they now possess. Germany and the Germans from an American Point OF View. By Price CoUier. Scribner. 602 pp. $1.50. One of the best discussions of the German people and their character and problems which has appeared in recent years. An unusually intimate knowledge fitted Mr. Collier for the task. A significant sentence at the end of the chap- ter on Frederick to Bismarck is, "We shall have war when the German Kaiser touches a button and gives an order, and the German people will have no more to say in the matter than you and I." 288 EUROPE AT WAR Germany and the Next War. By F. Bernhardi. Longmans, Green. $3. This is a candid expression of the German purpose to predominate and created a great sensation in Germany when pubUshed, going through many editions in a short time. General Bernhardi does not merely produce a book in praise of war; he deUberately advocates not only pre- paration for war, but also war itself. He writes from the standpoint of one who thinks that aspirations for peace threaten to poison the soil upon which the German people live. Germany of To-Day. By Charles Tower. Holt. 256 pp. s° cents. A concise account written without any non-essentials. Germany and the German Emperor. By G. H. Fer- ris. Holt. 5 20 pp. $3. A useful summary of the characteristics and achievements of William of Germany. Men Around the Kaiser. By Frederick W. Wile. Lippincott. 279 pp., ill. Si. 75- A fascinating, illuminating picture of those earnest, effi- cient personalities in war, government, finance, industry, art, and diplomacy, who have made the German Empire what it is. Imperial Germany. By Prince Bemhard von Biilow. Dodd, Mead. 342 pp. $3. A story of the historical development of the German Empire, by the E.x-Chancellor, with a discussion of how the Germans built a great naval power, why they have expanded colonially, and what SociaUsm means to them. The German Emperor and the Peace of the World. By Alfred H. Fried. Doran. $2. A Nobel Prize essay of immediate timeliness. William of Germany. By Stanley Shaw. Macmillan. 395 pp. $2.50. A sketch, by an Englishman, and for English readers, of the German Emperor. The Kaiser — a manual of information. Doubleday, Page. 1914. $1.00. A Character Sketch of Germany. Compiled and edited by M. Blakemore Evans and Elisabeth Merhaut. Heath. 237 pp., iU. Si. A picture of modem imperial Germany by means of a series of readings in German by eminent German authors. Germany. By A. W. Holland. Macmillan. 312 pp., ill. $2. A new recounting of the story of Germany's nationhood, and how it came to be, from prehistoric times to the saber rattling of Zabern, written in clear, interesting style, is the volume "Germany," in The Making of the Nation series. This volume is by A. W. Holland, of 0.xford, author of "Germany to the Present Day." Germany and Its Evolution in Modern Times. By Henri Lichtenberger. Holt. 440 pp. $2.50. A book to be recommended unconditionally for its com- prehensiveness, insight, and impartiality. Monarchical Socialism in Germany. By Elmer Roberts. Scribners. 200 pp., ill. $1.25. A succinct, workmanlike book on the efficient organiza- tion of the empire. Pak-Germanism. By Roland G. Usher. Houghton, MifHin. $1.75. Professor Usher, beginning with the great international movement, Pan-Germanism, considers the grounds for the existing jealousies between England and Germany, the relation of Russia, France, and Austria to the affair, the effects of the Balkan War upon the balance of power, and discusses with brilliance the relation of the United States to these new conditions in European diplomacy. AUSTRIA Austria: Her People and Their Home Lands. By James Baker. Lane. 310 pp., ill. S6.50. An excellent informational description of the polyglot character of the Austrian Emnire. Hungary: Its History and Revolutions. Macmil- lan. $1. A serviceable history ,'with a memoir of Kossuth added. Austria of the Austrians and Hungary of the Hltngarians. By L. Kellner and others. Scribners. $1.50. Packed full of information well put. Hungary's Fight for National Existence. By Baron Ladislas Hengehniiller von Hengervar. Macmillan. 342 pp. $3-2S-, A very illuminating presentation. The Hapsburg Monarchy. By Henry Wickham Steed. Scribners. 304 pp. $2.50. An attempt to "dwell less upon the points of difference than upon the features and interests that are common to the peoples ruled by this famous house." ITALY Italy of the Italians. By H. Zimmem. Scribners. $1.50. A compact account of Italian characteristics and achieve- ments. CaVOUR ANT) THE MAKING OF MoDERN ITALY. By Pietro Orsi. Putnam. 385 pp., ill. $1.50. A sympathetic story of the career of the great Italian liberator and its significance. Italy's War for a Desert. By Francis McCullagh. Chicago: F. G. Browne & Company. 410 pp., ill. $2.75. Brilliant and comprehensive, but decidedly pro-Turkish. THE BALKANS The Servian People: Their Past Glory and Their Destiny. By Prince Lazarovich-Hrebelianobich. Scrib- ners. 2 vols. S5. A glowing statement of Servia's ambitions. Hellas and the Balkan Wars. By D. J. Cassavetti. Dodd, Mead. 368 pp., ill. $3. A study of Greek liistory during the past half century, particularly in its relation to the wars with Turkey and Bulgaria. Czar Ferdinand and His People. By John Mac- Donald. Stokes. S4. A careful, judicial study of the personality of the Czar of Bulgaria, with a brief history of the Bulgarian people, and much that is useful about the Bulgarian army. The Balkans. By William M. Sloan. Eaton & Mains. 322 pp. $1.50. An exhaustive treatment of the causes, progress and re- sults of the late wars in the Balkans. Teie Balkan Peninsula. By Lionel M. Lyde. Mac- millan. Si. 40. A useful compendium of maps. RUSSIA Behind the Veil at the Russian Court. By Count Paul VassiH. Lane. 408 pp., ill. $4. 50. Intimate revelations of the social, political, and family life of the Russian royal family and their retinue. Russia and the Russians. By H. W. Williams. Scrib- ner. $1.50. An account of the political ascendancy and situation, and of the leading figures in Russian politics, as well as of the country's social and economic relations. History of Russia. By Vasilii Osipovich Kluchevsky. Dutton. 3 vols. $2. 50. Not a simple narrative of political or international hap- penings, but a remarkable'study of Russian social, economic, and international history based upon years of personal re- search in the available historical sources of the subject. Changing Russia. By Stephen Graham. Lane. 309 pp., ill. $2.50. By a widely known traveler and scientific observer well acquainted with Russia. BIBLIOGRAPHY 289 Economic History of Russia. By James Mavor. Dutton. 2 vols. $10. Russian history has been thoroughly rewritten within twenty years. It is a survey the importance of which can scarcely be overestimated. WAR War. By W. Douglas Newton. Dodd, Mead. 236 pp. $1.20. "Sensational and disgusting, because it is an account of the sensational and disgusting thing called war." There is an introduction by Rudyard Kipling. The Passing of War. By William Leighton Grane. Macmillan. 302 pp. $1. In this volume, which Mr. Grane calls "a study in things which make for peace," the text is given in a sentence of the late King Edward VII. of Great Britain: "I am con- vinced that as civilization advances, the influence of Chris- tian teaching will tend increasingly to inculcate the love of peace." War and Waste. By David Starr Jordan. Double- day, Page. 296 pp. $1.25. Dr. Jordan is one of the best known and most courageous advocates of disarmament and general peace. He has for years been devoting his energies and time to convincing the world that war does not pay. This is a graphic and keen presentation of the economic loss occasioned by war. The Human Slaughter House. By Wilhelm Lams- zus. Stokes. IIS PP- 5° cents. An extraordinarily keen analysis of the atrocities of war. All the deceptive glamor is stripped from battle and its horrors laid bare with shuddering, yet fascinating, strokes. The Balkan Wars 1912-19x3. By Jacob Gould Schur- man. Princeton University Press. 140 pp. $1. A compact history, illuminatingly written, of the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13, has been given by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University. This little volume is one of "The Stafford Little Lectures." Our Navy. By Archibald Hurd. Warne. 270 pp. 50 cents. An up-to-date, comprehensive history of the British navy, with figures and statistics particularly with regard to its development during the past twenty years. The Crimson Fist. By O. H. Neland. Boston: Bad- ger; 208 pp. $1.25. A brilliant indictment of war. The author "convicts" the home, the school, the church, the press, and govern- ment of molding the character of the individual " to a spirit of aggressive patriotism, and thus to love for war." Arms and Industry. By Norman Angell. Putnam. 248 pp. $1.25. This companion volume to Mr. Angell's now famous book "The Great Illusion," concerns itself chiefly with the rela- tions and interrelations between modern states. While it treats chiefly of the moral and material factors of inter- national politics, it also discusses credit, miUtary force, and diplomacy. The World Set Free. By H. G. WeUs. Dutton. 229 pp. $1.35- An elaboration of Mr. Wells's creed which has for its goal the end of war and the realization of a real parliament of the world. It crackles with Mr. Wells's best style. The Wine Press. By Alfred Noyes. Stokes. 49 pp. 60 cents. A powerful argument in verse against war, with an epilogue that loftily visions the dawn of peace. THE TRADE OF THE WORLD The Trade of the World. By James Davenport Whelpley. Century. 436 pp., ill. $2. A comprehensive and stimulating account of the forces and facts that make up the activities of the great trading nations. INTERNATIONAL LAW A History of Diplomacy in the International De- velopment OF Europe. By David Jayne Hill. Long- mans, Green. Vol. III. 706 pp. $6. While not treating directly of the present conflict, or the causes that led up to it, Dr. Hill analyzes the forces that have guided the destinies of Europe for nearly two centuries. The Essentials of International Public Law. By Amos S. Hershey. Macmillan. $3. In the preface Dr. Hershey states that "the work aims to furnish the teacher and student with an up-to-date text adapted to the needs of the classroom, and also to present the speciaUst as well as the general public with a scientific treatment of the subject." THE AIR AS A BATTLEFIELD Airships in Peace and War. By R. P. Hearne. Lane. $3.50. The new edition of this standard work on the theoretical influence of aeronautics on war. The Airman. By C. Mellor. Lane. 123 pp., ill. $1. The Law of the Air. By Harold D. Hazeltine. Doran. POLITICS AND HISTORY Socialism and Democracy in Europe. By Samuel P. Orth. Holt. 350 pp. $1.35. A very brilliant and stimulating account of the progress of Socialism and social democracy throughout the continent. Social Progress in Contemporary Europe. By Frederic Austin Ogg. Macmillan. 384 pp. $1.50. An exhaustive and well-balanced account of the social advance of European peoples for a century. The Problem of Empire Government. By C. E. T. Stuart-Linton. Longmans, Green. $1.25. This contains several chapters on imperial defence, writ- ten nearly two years ago, prophesvnng the turbulent status of European governments now observed. The Influence of Monarchs. By Frederick A. M^oods. Macmillan. 422 pp. $2. "Only very rarely has a nation progressed in its political and economic aspects save under leadership of a strong sovereign." This is the text of the author. Le Probleme Mondial. By Albert Torres. Rio de Janeiro: National Library. 212 pp. A study of the motives that guide nations in their rela- tions one with the other, an especially interesting chapter being that on the Monroe Doctrine, by this Brazilian writer. Travel and Politics in Armenia. By Noel Buxton and the Rev. Harold Buxton. Macmillan. 274 pp., ill. $1.50. An account of the extensive experiences of a traveler among that strange people, the Armenians, who, because of mutual jealousies of the Great Powers, may be one of the focuses of the later portion of the present European war. Problems of Power. By William Morton Fullerton. Scribners. 323 pp. $2.25. A survey of the relations of the Great Powers of the world and an analysis of the national situation during the past quarter of a century, from the standpoint of conscious national aims and political cross currents. History of Our Times. By G. P. Gooch. Holt. 256 pp. 50 cents. An excellent summary of the history of Europe for the past quarter of a century. FICTION. The Iron Year. By Walter Bloem. Lane. $1.23. A novel which recently created a great sensation in Ger- many, where it was read aloud by the Kaiser to the mem- bers of the royal family. Red Wrath. By John Oxenham. Lane. 416 pp. $1.25. 290 EUROPE AT WAR A story of the Franco-Prussian War dealing with many places now again the scene of war. Children of Alsace. By R^ne Bazin. Lane. 262 pp. $1.30. This book shows the deep feeling of loyalty to France opposed to German rule in the conquered district. Frontiers of the Heart. By Victor Margueritte. Stokes. 345 pp. $1.25. _ A graphic story of Alsace, of a French woman who marned a German. The Last Shot. 517 pp. $1.35- By Frederick Palmer. Scribner. A work of fiction written by an eye-witness of all the important battles of the last twenty years, in a number of which Mr. Palmer took part. A drama rather than a novel. Englishman's Home. By G. L. B. DuMaurier. Harper. $1.23. This play, describing the invasion of England, produced a great sensation on its first appearance in 1909. /