PES FROM LECTURES 
 
 Theistic Conception of the Universe 
 
 Copyright /88j, by Francis L. Patton. 
 
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6^ 
 
 THE THEISTIC CONCEPTION OF 
 THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 NOTES FROM LECTURE I. 
 
 Metaphysical principles already known to you. This 
 course of lectures aims to show their relation to a true theory 
 of the universe. Subject before us is Theism ; theism, philo- 
 sophically speaking is simply one of several possible theories 
 of the world. 
 
 Theism ? What, in common between Poly-, Pan- and 
 Mono-theist ? Application of common name variously modi- 
 fied, shows something in common. How do the three stand 
 opposed to the Atheist ? In all theisms common factor is 
 mind. They all teach that mind is the prius all existence. A 
 pantheist is no more of an atheist than a polytheist is ; and 
 the use of the term materialistic pantheism may be questioned. 
 If a man believe the universe an aggregate of atoms what 
 need has he for the word " God." 
 
 It is objected that, as popularly held, theism is anthropo- 
 morphic and there is a certain anthropomorphism which we 
 should reject ; but there is a sense in which theism and pan- 
 theism as well as monotheism are and must be anthropomor- 
 phic. This only means that knowledge begins with ourselves ; 
 that, in trying to make a theory of the universe we are apt to think 
 according to analogies of our experience and explain change 
 and apparent adjustment and adaptation by the hypothesis of 
 other selfs similar to ourselves. 
 
 Fundamental fact of all theisms is an inference from our 
 human self to other selfs or an Infinite self. We distinguish 
 
 
.eneric from specific use of word "theism." Atheism not 
 fhe anUthesis of theism in the specific but in genenc sense of 
 
 1116 Z'heism we commonly mean monotheism. Atheist, 
 
 Y« it c.» 'I be topen.etl with. Must have » tneamog to **- 
 2 IS ot ti. ^ ™- •» - ' SS 
 
 ui! J^ns « God " When uniformity of nature is an- 
 2SS? o? God vou may call the system atheism by 
 ^msTverit is advocated. Again when the two e« i tie 
 
 IS If FoTce " not an entity then by hypothesis there 
 
 f b tone entity and the system is atheistic. If .t is an entity 
 
 -tZ matfer or mind or neither. If It is -atter again ,t 
 
 ic atheistic If it is neither matter nor mind it is an entity 
 
 lypoSzed by men whose great objection to theisU is to 
 
 they do not stick to what they see. It is a metempir.cal pos 
 
 ulate begged to support an empirical philosophy. If it be 
 
 he maniS ation of mind, or if both matter and force depend 
 
 £ ^underlying omnipotent Power which is mind then the 
 
 ^AToTamVof Sings mechanically articulated that is 
 atheism A system of things manifesting mind and ruled by 
 t to is theL. Poly-, Pan- and Mono-theism are here 
 agreed in opposition to atheism, i. e., to materialism. 
 "Scientific progress has made polytheism impossible. 
 Therefo e we are practically confined to a choice between three 
 tories of the universe. Shall we hold an atheistic theory ? 
 or a pan-fistic which carries the immanence of the D»*J 
 ^ind o a point when it makes it equivalent to the totality of 
 
 I 
 
things and blots out all finite and separate personality ; or a 
 monotheistic theory which affirms the immanence of God 
 without denying that he is separate and distinct from the world 
 of dependent existences and without compromising our own 
 finite personality. To the last named conception of God the 
 general name is now theism. It is theism par excellence in 
 the specific as distinguished from the generic sense. Belief in a 
 living God, infinite and personal, is the restricted mean- 
 ing hereafter to be attached to the word theism. Dis- 
 cussion under two leading divisions. 1st Historical 
 2d Constructive. Under 1st division three subjects consid- 
 ered, (a.) Principal forms of existing theism shown. (b.) 
 Inquiry into origin of theistic belief, (c.) A sketch of the 
 history of theistic proofs. 
 
 A. The Phenomenology of Theism. 
 
 I. Chief phases of theistic belief are the theisms of the 
 three historic religions — Judaism, Mohammedanism and 
 Christianity. All three had the same God. Hence all alike 
 interested in inquiry regarding the God of Mosaism. We are 
 not concerned with how the Old Test, came to be a body of 
 monotheistic literature. The facts of scripture regarding O. 
 T. theisms are (a) a people surrounded by polytheism made 
 pupils of God in a monotheistic belief; (b) a perpetual 
 tendency in the history of Israel to relapse into poly- 
 theism ; (c) The emphasis of monotheistic belief the 
 decalogue and all the Mosaic cultus. 
 
 Primitive monotheism of Israel derived by Kuenen on 
 ground of several assumptions ; that the Jews reached mono- 
 theism by passing thro' intermediate steps of fetichism and 
 polytheism ; that different names for God were names of dif- 
 ferent divinities ; that reference to new moons, to God's ap- 
 pearing in fire — to worship in high places are so many intima- 
 tions of a Jewish mythology ; finally that the Law with its 
 strong monotheism was of post-Mosaic authorship. 
 
"4 
 
 a. Theism of comparative Theology. Pure theism, some 
 think, is to be the ereed of the future. Theism stripped of miracle, 
 prophecy and revelation is commonly held to be the dogmatic 
 residuum of investigations in Comparative Theology. 
 
 3. Theism of speculative philosophy. Here God is re- 
 garded simply as a hypothesis for giving rational explanation 
 of the universe. 
 
 4. Theism of Speculative Theology. Men of this class 
 differed from last-mentioned because they insist upon their Chris- 
 tian name. They eliminate all that is supernatural; identify 
 God with an impersonal intelligence ; but still claim to be 
 Christian theologians. 
 
 B. Genesis of Theism. 
 
 Four theories advanced to explain Genesis of our idea of 
 God: 1. Development; 2. Revelation; 3. Inference; 4. In- 
 tuition. These are not, however, mutually exclusive; for 
 same belief either an inference when considered as related to 
 believer, or a development as related to an antecedent belief. 
 Truth of theism not affected by question concerning its origin. 
 Suppose monotheism to have been preceded by polytheism 
 and fetichism, and that monotheism is an evolved belief. Evo- 
 lutionist cannot urge this against truth of monotheism ; for if 
 the evolution of a belief is an argument against its truth, it. is 
 an argument against the belief in evolution. 
 
 I. Development. Genetic relationship, supposed to sub- 
 sist between monotheism and antecedent impure forms of re- 
 ligious belief expressed in several forms. 
 
 1. Theory of. Hume. Polytheism, according to Hume, 
 is prior to monotheism. The advance from the one to the 
 other, not due to philosophic reflection and a growing appre- 
 ciation of the unity of nature, but is explained by tendency to 
 flatter a local deity, to impute greatness, and so, by degrees, 
 to invest him with the attribute of infinity. A view lacking 
 every element of plausibility, and speculatively worthless. 
 
5 
 
 2. Theory of Comte. Primitive man regarded world as 
 a living thing. By an instinctive anthropomorphism, prim- 
 itive man imputes life to all objects, and primitive religion is 
 fetichism. But fetichism cannot be earliest form of religion 
 however it may be defined. If fetich is worshipped be- 
 cause supposed to be alive, and is supposed to be alive, 
 because the world .is supposed to be so, then the general- 
 ization, akin to the anima mundi of the Stoics ante- 
 dates fetichism. If fetich is worshipped as the abode of 
 an indwelling ghost, as Lippert thinks, then whence the belief 
 in ghosts ? If the fetich is treated as a sort of sacramental 
 means of establishing relations with a divine being, as Hap- 
 pel supposes, then belief in God is pre-supposed in fetich 
 worship. However explained, a general conception conditions 
 this concrete fact, and whether this conception be called the 
 religious consciousness or animism, or belief in God or 
 belief in ghosts, it must be explained upon naturalistic prin- 
 ciples before there can be a naturalistic philosophy of religion. 
 
 3. Theory of Herbert Spencer, Primitive religion, ac- 
 cording to this writer, was ancestor-worship. He tries to 
 show how reverence paid to a deceased ancestor took on, 
 after a while, the form of tree-, plant-, animal-, hero-worship, 
 the worship of heavenly bodies, and finally of one living and 
 true God. Spencer's attempt at a naturalistic explanation of 
 religion has serious defects, e. g. : (1) To prove his theory he 
 should have shown that when homage was paid to ancestors, 
 no homage was paid to the gods. 
 
 (2) He should have shown that filial piety is worship, 
 or such worship as is paid to the gods. 
 
 (3.) Because the savage regards God as his father he is 
 not therefore worshipping his ancestors. To make much of the 
 case of Unkulunkuln in this direction, would require him to 
 draw a similar inference from our use of the Lord's Prayer. 
 
 (4) Incumbent on Mr. Spencer to show how all forms of 
 religion have grown out of an original ancestor worship. 
 
His attempt to do this resulted as follows : Fetich worship 
 •from identification of deceased, with portions of his clothing; 
 idol worship from the habit of making images of the deceased ;■ 
 animal worship from the frequenting of the home of the de- 
 ceased by certain animals, or from the fact that the deceased 
 had an animal name; plant worship from the intoxicating 
 liquors produced from some plants supposed, by this way, to 
 be possessed by supernatural beings ; mountain worship and 
 worship of the sea from the fact that their ancestors came 
 from the mountain or over the sea, — origin in this sense was 
 mistaken for parentage. Easiest part of his undertaking to 
 explain mythology by ancestor worship. He is committed 
 to the Euhemeristic doctrine on this subject ; which is, that 
 " the divine man as conceived had everywhere for antecedent 
 a powerful man as perceived." 
 
 4. Theory of Hegel. Calls for no notice here beyond 
 the remark that since philosophy of Hegel was one of evolu- 
 tion from the ideal side, quite as much as that of Spencer is a 
 philosophy of evolution from natural side, religion was neces- 
 sarily held by him to have had an upward history ; the the- 
 istic belief reaching the monotheistic stage only after passing 
 through the intervening forms of fetichism and polytheism. 
 
 5. Theory of Max Miiller. It is not very easy to de- 
 termine the position of this author in religious thought. His 
 didactic position does not quite accord with that which his 
 polemic would suggest. . 
 
 1. In his attack on the Comtean theory of religion, he 
 has conclusively shown that fetichism is not the primitive re- 
 ligion. 
 
 2. In his Hibbert Lectures he avows, less heartily than 
 in an earlier work, his belief in a religious instinct ; indeed, 
 he practically discards the idea. 
 
 .(3). The Max Miiller of to-day is not the Max Miiller of 
 Chips from a German Workshop, and cannot be quoted as the 
 advocate of primitive monotheism or heaothWsm. For, 
 
when a student of literature, he tells us that Vedic writings 
 show that a belief in one God (henotheism) antedated polythe- 
 ism : as a psychologist asking what religion a man can learn 
 through his five senses, he tells us that whether monotheism 
 be or be not the primitive religion is of no consequence since 
 before man had reached any belief in God he " had already 
 accomplished half his joifrney." The primitive monotheism 
 pointed to in the Vedas is thus made of no avail by the sug- 
 gestion that the journey of progress was half done before men 
 came to the idea of God. Max Mliller must be classed among 
 the evolutionists ; but it must be noted that his recent con- 
 clusions regarding primitive religions are in conflict with the 
 testimony of the ancient literature of India which he has 
 brought to the attention of English readers. 
 
 (2). Theory of Schelling. He held that primitive man 
 had an intuitive or instinctive knowledge of God ; but that 
 his theism was relative, not absolute. From this original rel- 
 ative monotheism have come two streams of tendency, one 
 issuing in the polytheism of the Indo-European world, the 
 other in the absolute monotheism of the Semitic races. His 
 reasons for this view are (1.) It furnishes a natural answer to 
 the question how men became polytheists. Belief in one 
 God did not exclude belief in a plurality of Gods. (2.) Mono- 
 theism absolute or belief in only one God is said to be a gen- 
 eralization derived from contact with a previously ex- 
 isting monotheism and through protesting against it. 
 
 II. Idea of God due to revelation. Not only Watson the 
 theologian, but Gladstone the statesman supports this. The 
 latter traces analogies between Greek mythology and Christi- 
 anity to the existence of an objective revelation antedating 
 the dispersion of the nations and comprehending even the dis- 
 tinctive doctrines of Christianity. Sometimes incorrectly said 
 that idea of God is due to tradition; tradition originates noth- 
 ing : tho' the traditional theory as to the diffusion of religious 
 belief is very closely related to theory which makes origin #f 
 
8 
 
 religious belief a matter of objective revelation. Strongest 
 objection to this is that of Schelling — that to suppose that 
 man owes his first knowledge of God to an objective revelation 
 would imply a "previous atheism of consciousness." But 
 whatever doubt there may be as to how Adam derived his 
 monotheism, there can be no doubt that the Bible is the main 
 source of ours. 
 
 III. Inference — acknowledging indebtedness to tradition 
 and Scripture for our definite conceptions regarding God there 
 is still room to inquire whether there is not an inferential ele- 
 ment in our theistic belief. There is a natural theism — a the- 
 ism of Reason as well as revealed theism of Scripture. Is this 
 natural theism an inferenc or an intuition ? . In answering this 
 the following propositions are submitted : 
 
 1. It is admitted that theistic belief is not a simple, irreduc- 
 ible, necessary and universal conviction, but " it (Dr. McCosh) 
 is the proper issue of a number of simple principles all tend- 
 ing to one point." 
 
 2. Belief in God can be vindicated — reasons given for it. 
 Hence, so far as our theism is a reasoned theism there is an 
 inferential element in it. 
 
 (3). Since a belief in God can be vindicated by means of 
 the causal judgment there is no reason why the causal judg- 
 ment might not lead to a belief in God though a man had it 
 not before. 
 
 4. Admitting that inference has filled an important 
 place in the history of theism, yet it is true that belief in God 
 however corroborated by reasoning existed long before men 
 made use of the argument from final causes. Prof. Flint ad- 
 mits this but holds that the theistic belief is reached by a 
 process of unconscious inference. 
 
 5. Still we are not sure that the theory of unconscious 
 inference exhausts the problem. Does not follow because 
 reasons can be given for a belief that the belief is due to those 
 reasons. In accounting for the genesis of a belief we may 
 
 1 
 
have to consider the cause behind as well as the reasons 
 before. 
 
 IV. Word Intuition as used in this connection will em- 
 brace a variety of opinions. It is employed to denote all 
 forms of opinions which give an a priori, or at all events an 
 uninferential account of the theistic concept. 
 
 1. The doctrine of Schelling and Cousin, refuted by Sir 
 Wm. Hamilton — that the infinite or absolute is revealed to us 
 immediately by consciousness. 
 
 2. Theory of Jacobi and Schleiermacher which builds 
 upon the religious feeling or consciousness of dependence. 
 Yet the consciousness of dependence is not the same thing as 
 consciousness of God. The instinct that prompts us. to pray 
 is not the same thing as an intuition of God. 
 
 3. Prof. Calderwood says that " belief in the existence of 
 the one infinite God is a necessary belief, that is a belief es- 
 sential to our nature so that the opposite cannot be believed 
 when the real problem is presented to the mind." 
 
 This is too radical a position in the presence of the 
 abounding atheism of our time. 
 
 4. Principal Caird disavows intuitionalism yet declares 
 that " in all religious experience there are involved feelings 
 and acts which are possible only to spiritual and intelligent 
 beings, which are grounded in certain necessary relations of 
 the human spirit to the Divine and which therefore do not rise 
 accidentally but in conscious obedience to the hidden logic of 
 a spiritual process. It is necessary that mind as mind should 
 relate itself to God." This view does not make belief in God an 
 inference taken up into the soul through force of reasons. 
 Rather it is a belief that flows by influence of a divine impulse 
 into the channel of the soul's activities and is ever pushing 
 itself into fuller, freer and most manifest expressions. For this 
 reason, using the word in a very wide sense, Dr. Gaird may 
 be said to be an intuitionalist. 
 
10 
 
 In what sense then can our knowledge of God be said 
 to be due to the intuition ? (a) By intuition we may mean 
 an immediate presentative knowledge of God. Some may 
 profess to enjoy this, but they can not make it intelligible to 
 most people what they mean by this knowledge, (b) Intuition 
 may mean an ultimate a priori belief. This the accepted sense. 
 If belief in God be an intuition in this sense all men ought to 
 have it ; the opposite ought to be unthinkable ; the proof of it 
 would be impossible. Idea of God can't stand these tests and 
 cannot be called an intuition in the strict sense of the term 
 (c) But ordinarily nothing more is meant by saying belief in 
 God is an intuition than that we have a constitutional impulse 
 Godward : or that there is a universal tendency to belief in God 
 as shown by the almost universal existence of that belief. 
 Undoubtedly this is true and in this sense there is an intuitional 
 as well as an inferential element in theism. Yet how happens 
 it that we have this tendency to theism ? It may be (a) that 
 this tendency is a synthesis of inferences unconsciously per- 
 formed and to which all the elements in our nature have con- 
 tributed; or (b) that the idea of God is the spontaneous sug- 
 gestion of correlative truth, the finite implying the Infinite, 
 the relative, the absolute; or (c) that belief in God is a great 
 process of development. These explanations have all been 
 given of the Godward tendency of man. But do they exhaust 
 the possibilities of thought ? We are told that in 
 Him we live and move and have our being. May 
 it not be that while we confirm our faith by means 
 of reasons that faith is itself the fruit of a divine contact 
 with the soul? May not God himself be the cause of the con- 
 cept of God ? DesCartes thought so. If this view is correct, 
 then, without holding that belief in God is an a priori cogni- 
 tive judgment, like that of time and space, or cause and sub- 
 stance, it can still be said that belief in God is intuitional, or 
 rather inspirational. Certain obvious advantages recommend 
 
II 
 
 this view. The constitutional impulse so explained would 
 not render unneccessary tfre proofs for the divine existence, 
 and so we should not be required to give up the proofs or the 
 intuition. The argumentative status of theism on the one 
 hand would not be destroyed through lack of demonstrative 
 certainty, nor on the other hand would believing in God rest 
 altogether on the basis of inductive probability. 
 
 In this way we could set a proper value upon all forms 
 of intuitional theisms, and see a soul of truth in each. It makes 
 it unnecessary to establish a schism between Adam and his 
 posterity as to the mode of knowing God. It agrees with 
 the analogies of subsequent revelations. Finally it is conson- 
 ant with the idea of God's ever present operation to believe 
 that his thought is so far confluent with our thought that we 
 know him through his own presence in the soul. We find, 
 therefore, when we analyze our belief in one living and per- 
 sonal God, that we cannot put an explanation of it under any 
 one of the categories that have been named. It is composed 
 of different elements. Among them will be found the indwel- 
 ling presence of God himself; the unconscious inference 
 whereby we grasp the idea of dependence, and of the Being 
 upon whom we are dependent in one indivisible synthesis ; 
 the historic proofs and elaborate defences of a reasoned the- 
 ism, and the clear growing and progressive revelation which 
 reaches its climax in the incarnate Logos. 
 
13 
 
 NOTES FROM LECTURE II. 
 
 C. THE HISTORY OF THEISTIC DISCUSSION. 
 
 The theistic problem is as old as philosophy itself. The 
 arguments for theism and the theories opposed to theism 
 are all old. Convenient to consider theistic history under 
 three periods : 
 
 ist. Ancient period extending to 8th century, A. D. 
 
 2nd. Mediaeval, extending to 15th century. 3rd. Modern. 
 
 I. Ancient Period. 
 
 To know history of Theism in Greek philosophy we must 
 know something about the course of thought in the Pre- 
 Socratic, Socratic-Aristotelian and Post-Aristotelian periods 
 of that philosophy. These are to be considered only as they 
 bear upon the theistic problem. Judged by a very exacting 
 standard of theism, ancient philosophy must be pronounced 
 very defective ; for although the principles which must always 
 underlie, and which, carried to their logical results, necessitate 
 theistic belief, are asserted and defended, we are not always 
 sure that the writers to whom we owe these theistic defences 
 were very pronounced theists themselves. Of Xenophanes, 
 for example, who protests vigorously against anthropomorphic 
 polytheism, and says that oxen and horses, if they could 
 paint, would make their gods like oxen and horses ; and who 
 affirms his belief in one God among the Gods, like to mortals 
 neither in body or mind — we can not tell whether he was a 
 theist or a pantheist. Parmenides was a pantheist or more 
 probably an atheist. Yet these two Eleatics, the one being 
 the theologian, the other the metaphysician of the school, 
 were doing an important work for philosophy. They were 
 learning, as their predecessors of the Ionic school had begun 
 
14 
 to learn, the lessons of generalization. The Ionic school 
 were pure physiologists, as Erdmann says. Besides being cos- 
 mological in their modes of thought, they were in a sense, 
 materialistic. They saw the world of sense and experience 
 made up of different materials. In was a great step in phil- 
 osophy for them whem they could say : There is an dp%q — 
 there is one principle to which all the forms of matter are 
 ultimately reducible. Anaximander took another step in 
 metaphysical thinking when he said that this one substance 
 was unconditioned. Not quite clear what Anaximander's 
 to dnetpov was. Some say the old Ionic philosophers fell into 
 two classes, one representing the mechanical, the other the 
 dynamical theory of the universe ; that Anaximander was of 
 the latter class and that his to anecpov is the Infinite in the 
 sense of an Infinite mind ; in short, that the unconditioned 
 was God in a pantheistic or, as Fortlage puts it, a cosmothe- 
 istic sense. He was, however, clearly grappling with the 
 really great problem of the Eleatic philosophy — the relation 
 of the One to the Many. , Not necessary to know science or 
 have a mechanical theory of universe that we may be able to 
 draw a line around the totality of things and conceive of this 
 Totality as One. Anaximander in reality did this. So did 
 the Eleatics though the process of thought was more meta- 
 physical ; as to aizupov had been the watchword of the Ionics 
 so tosv became that of the Eleatics. Whether they reached 
 theistic conclusions or not they were dealing with a very 
 important part of theistic discussion. To reach the One out| 
 of the Many, to grasp unity — is the effort of all philosophy. 
 Yet there are different ways of doing this. One method, that 
 of Anaximander, is to conceive of the multiplicity of the out- 
 ward world simply as modes of matter. Or can we read 
 unity by stripping objects of their predicates till we reach sub-j 
 stance or rather simple Being. This is a logical unity : th< 
 one of the summum genus. This we understand to be th( 
 system of Parmenides. And, if a world of thought were 
 
 I 
 
15 
 
 world of things, if a logical universe were a real universe then 
 we might say according to Parmenides, Being--All=:God. 
 The One of Anaximander : the Many:: Substance: Mode 
 The One of Parmenides : the Many : : genus : species. The 
 One and the Many may also be related as Cause and Effect. 
 With the pantheist we must hold to an eternal something. The 
 relation of this something to the phenomenal world is what 
 determines the problem in question. While we are not sure 
 that Xenophanes was a theist, yet we have no right to say 
 that he was a pantheist. The Eleatics did not reach theism 
 distinctly because they did not affirm Intelligence distinctly, 
 but they laid the foundation of all subsequent ontological 
 proof. The existence of one infinite, eternal, necessary Be- 
 ing ; — this is the Eleatic contribution to theistic discussion. 
 
 Anaxagoras marks an era in theistic discussion. He is the 
 Father of the doctrine of Final Causes. He wrote the first 
 chapter in Natural Theology. His God was an Intelligence, 
 or Nous working toward an end. He made a great advance 
 upon the Eleatics who preceded him when he affirmed the 
 existence of a world- ordering vouz. To compare the Eleatic 
 and the Anaxagorean philosophies ; the one saw the world 
 of multitude and sought a unifying principle ; the other 
 the world of adaptation and sought the organizing 
 principle. To the one the great fact presented was : 
 The world exists. To the other it was : The world exists for 
 something. When we come to Anaxagoras we are in the 
 Socratic- Aristotelian period, the former being the Pre-Socratic, 
 the following the Post- Aristotelian. Whatever our view re- 
 specting his daemon we can not doubt that Socrates was a 
 theist. He was the first, says Oesterley, to address himself 
 to the task of stemming the tide of popular atheism. This he 
 did in plain language and in the presentation of the teleo- 
 logical argument. 
 
 It has been said, but upon insufficient grounds, that 
 Plato was a pantheist. This is not a fair inference from the 
 
Timaeus, his most distinctively theological work. The doctrine 
 of causation, the difficulty of believing in an endless regress of 
 finite causes, the necessity of Intelligence to account for the 
 world's order — these ideas all have place in this treatise. His 
 theism embraced probably the following points: (i) It would 
 not be necessary to prove existence of God but for Atheism. 
 (2) The Soul has a natural tendency toward God. (3) The 
 orderly movements of the heavenly bodies justify belief in a 
 divine author of Heaven and Earth. (4) There must be an 
 ultimate, unconditioned Final Cause. (5 ) The teleological 
 proof set forth in the Timaeus. (6) There is a soul of the 
 world. Man's soul exists before his body. It is the organ- 
 izing principle under whose direction the body has been built 
 up. The world is an animal, invested like ourselves with a 
 soul by which, as an architect, the world has been built. 
 Plato's analogy would not give us a theism satisfactory to very 
 exacting critics. To some the doctrine of the anima mundi is 
 Pantheism. But it is not so necessarily. No man can 
 be a pantheist who believes in the Personality and conscious 
 Intelligence of God and the separate and perdurable personal- 
 ity of man. Plato went beyond the doctrine of anima mundi. 
 The world was an animal, round, immense, possessed of body 
 and soul ; but the world's soul was itself a creation — the first 
 creation of the Infinite God. 
 
 Plato was not a pantheist, and it is hard to believe that 
 Aristotle was. Indeed it is difficult to see how he could use 
 the theistic arguments imputed to him, and fall short of 
 theistic belief. Aristotle enunciated the argument for the 
 divine existence based upon the causal judgment pure and 
 simple Yet when he affirms the finality of the world there 
 is still doubt whether we are to impute to him a theism im 
 plying a belief in one Personal God. When belief in order, 
 in purpose and in the adaption of means to end is affirmed 
 belief in a Personal God is a matter of such immediate an 
 natural inference that there is the strongest presumption, t 
 
17 
 
 be set aside only by positive proof, in favor of the theistic 
 position. 
 
 No name calling for more than passing notice, between Aris- 
 totle and Boethius. Philosophy in the Post- Aristotelian period 
 is represented by the Epicureans and the Stoics by Pyrrho 
 and the New Academy. It passed through the stages of 
 dogmatism, skepticism and eclecticism. A period of large 
 intellectual activity but limited intellectual strength. Its re- 
 lations to Theism well given in Cicero's de naturd deorum. 
 
 Boethius occupies a place in the history of opinion 
 which makes it impossible to pass him by. He argued from 
 the basis of the idea of the Perfect to the necessary existence 
 of a Perfect Being ; following in this respect, Augustine, who 
 also had made a theistic argument on the idea of the highest 
 good and becoming in this way himself the predecessor of 
 Anselm. Kostlin esteems him the real founder of the onto- 
 logical argument. No reason to doubt his conversion to 
 Christianity, but he was a philosopher rather than theologian, 
 He may be regarded as the bridge between the two forms of 
 ecclesiastical life, — patristic and scholastic. 
 
 II. Mediaeval Period. 
 
 The Scholastic philosophy falls into two periods. John Sco- 
 tus Erigena, Roscellin, Anselm and Abelard mark the first 
 era ; Thomas Aquinas, Occam and Duns Scotus the second. 
 Platonic philosophy and particularly Neo-Platonism was prom- 
 inent in the ist period; Aristotelian philosophy in the 2nd. 
 Anselm and Aquinas respectively in the two periods represent- 
 ed theistic discussion. Anselm was a Platonist ; Aquinas an 
 Aristotelian. The one argued from the general to the partic- 
 ular ; the other vice versa. The one argued a priori ; the 
 other a posteriori. We may criticise the logical validity of the 
 a priori proofs of the divine existence ; yet we can see how 
 Anselm and Des Cartes were led by the concept of the Infin- 
 ite to affirm the existence of God. From the simple propo- 
 
i8 
 
 sition ex nilnlo nihil fit the passage is easy to the statement 
 that something exists per se. And what exists per se must 
 contain in it potentially all dependent existence. Admitting 
 that there is some basal being that is Infinite and Self-existent ; 
 then we must either abstract all attributes from it, or unite all 
 in it, or affirm some and deny some ; or else affirm entire ig- 
 norance of any of its attributes, i. e., that necessary Being 
 exists but that it is unknowable. Erigena, Spinoza, Anselm 
 and Herbert Spencer represent these different modes of con- 
 struing necessary being. 
 
 Dr. Patton agrees with Anselm, though the attempt to de- 
 fend the position syllogistically may be unsuccessful. 
 He prefers to say that the finite implies the infinite ; 
 and that our ideas of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are 
 broken lights. To be sure this proves nothing ; it is 
 possible to construe the world from a different stand- 
 point. Construed from the standpoint of empiricism all 
 ontological argument may seem chimerical. But why should 
 empiricism be the only road to knowledge ? Anselm in his 
 monologium developed his 1st argument for God's existence 
 from the idea of the highest good ; following Augustine who 
 had argued on the basis of the highest Truth. He mixed up 
 the causal idea with the realistic conception and so Hasse very 
 properly describes the monologium as a cosmological discus- 
 sion ; for while the argument is conducted under the terms of 
 the highest good it is really an argument proceeding upon 
 basis of the formula ex nihilo nihil fit and is intended to show 
 that there is a self-existing being including in himself the 
 potentialities of all being and therefore the being to whom all 
 actual and phenomenal existence is to be referred. In the Pros- 
 logium he aims to make an argument carrying demonstration 
 in its face. Let us first state Anselm's argument including 
 Gaunilo's reply ; secondly, the objections urged against the 
 Anselmian proof; thirdly, offer some criticisms respecting it. 
 
19 
 
 1. Anselm's argument. We believe, says he, that God is 
 that than which a greater cannot be conceived. But what ex- 
 ists in re is greater than that which exists in intcllectu. There- 
 fore when we say that we believe in a being than which a 
 greater cannot be conceived we must think of a being in re. 
 For if it did not exist in re we could think of it existing in re 
 and this would be greater than the one of which we are now 
 thinking. Again God cannot be thought not to be, i. e. y His 
 existence is a necessity of thought. For if the Being of whom 
 we are thinking can be thought not to be, we can think of a 
 Being, who can not be thought not to be, and this would be 
 greater than the Being of whom we are thinking. Gaunilo's 
 objection is, that it does not follow because I think of a being 
 than whom a greater cannot be conceived that such a Being 
 actually exists and even though the thought of a Perfect 
 Being does imply His existence ; the argument would only 
 prove not that the Being exists in re but that it must bethought 
 to exist in re. But between the greatest being thought as ex- 
 isting and greatest Being existing there is a wide difference. 
 
 2. Objections to Anselm's argument. Among these we 
 have (i.) Assumptions. Realism is said to be the underlying 
 assumption of the argument. He assumes that the relatively 
 and partially good of experience partakes of the absolutely 
 and completely good of Idea. It is said moreover that An- 
 selm assumed his conception of God derived from Revelation 
 and then tried to prove it by reasoning : whereas pure onto- 
 logical deduction however valid could never give us more than 
 the metaphysical unity of the universe. In short Anselm's 
 argument supposing it to be valid would never yield more 
 than the existence of a self-existent, eternal and infinite some- 
 thing or universum. There is great force in this. (2.) The 
 aim of the Anselmian argument has been criticised. Schelling 
 objected that Anselm was trying to prove that God existed as 
 an individual co-ordinate with other individuals instead of re- 
 gardin; him as the ground and support of all dependent ex- 
 
20 
 
 istence. Little force in the objection of Jacobi and Spencer that 
 we can not deduce God by an a priori process of reasoning be- 
 cause deductive proof proceeds from the general to the less 
 general ; and God being the highest being cannot be put into 
 a higher category. Nothing in Spencer's objection that we 
 can not know God because we can not include him in a higher 
 category. Why should knowledge be defined in this 
 way ? Why should it be knowledge to say that C and B are 
 contained in A and not knowledge to say that A contains B 
 and C. 
 
 (3.) Objections based on his method. A mistake, others 
 say, for him to have put his proof in syllogistic form ? God 
 is metalogical. This objection not valid. God is metalogical 
 in the same sense that the north-west passage is metalogical. 
 His existence can be arrived at argumentatively only by an 
 application of the laws of thought to the facts of experience. 
 All shades of thinkers including Kant and Schleiermacher, Dr. 
 Hodge and Prof. Bowen agree that we can not proceed from 
 idea of God to His objective existence. All see a fallacy in 
 Anselm's method but differ as to its nature. 
 
 (4.) Some think the attempt ofAnselm to prove existence 
 of God was incompatible with revelation. This objection 
 might be regarded as a protest against Natural Theology in 
 all its forms. 
 
 3. Examination of Anselm's argument. We have, he 
 says, in intellectu a Being than whom a greater can not be 
 conceived. Anselm does not say we have idea of a Perfect 
 Being nor that we can form a mental image of the Infinite. 
 He doesn't' inquire how this idea is derived, nor say that we 
 have the belief that the Infinite exists. But he says : ' We 
 have this idea— of a Being, etc' We can't help admitting this. 
 But has every fancy an object corresponding to it ? Do sub- 
 jective conceptions insure objective realities ? Anselm un- 
 doubtedly meant that the conception was not only a thought 
 but a necessity of thought. And he was striving to find a 
 
21 
 
 bridge whereby to pass to the statement that this necessity of 
 thought was a necessity of thought as to an objective fact. 
 But in order that the argument should proceed to actual 
 existence this necessity of thought must be a necessity of 
 thought as to an object in re and not to an object in intellectu 
 merely. But how will Anselm show that this necessity of 
 thought is a necessity as to objective fact ? The nerve of the 
 argument is found in the 2nd sentence. ' But that which exists 
 in re is greater than that which exists in intellectu! And there- 
 fore when I say that I think of a Being than whom a greater 
 can not be conceived I must mean a Being existing in re ; I 
 otherwise I would think of a Being in re and this would be 
 greater than the Being of whom I was thinking before. But 
 by hypothesis I was thinking of a Being than whom a greater 
 can not be conceived. Clearly the value of the Anselmian proof 
 depends upon whether existence is a predicate. Has Anselm 
 added anything to the conception of the Being than which 
 a greater can not be conceived by adding existence to it ? 
 Anselm's proof differs from all other forms of ontological 
 argument in that it makes the necessity of thinking about the 
 Infinite cover the necessity of thinking that the Infinite has 
 objective existence. Undoubtedly we can not put out of our 
 minds the idea for which the word Infinite is the equivalent. 
 But the necessity of the idea and the idea of the necessity are 
 two very different things. Having the idea of the Infinite we . 
 may reasonably say that the Infinite God is the cause of the 
 idea. God as a metaphysical objectivity was in his view the 
 cause of the idea of God which he had. Anselm desires 
 to make this metaphysical objectivity a dialectical objectivity. 
 He may be considered as reasoning from any of these prem- 
 isses ; — (a.) What exists in intellectu exists in re : A Being than 
 which a greater can not be conceived exists in intellectu . ' . 
 Such a Being exists in re. This would justify Gaunilo's ob- 
 jection. But this is not Anselm. 
 
22 
 
 (b.) What is necessarily in intellectn exists in re, A Being 
 than which, &c, exists in intellectu . ' . Such a Being exists 
 in re. But this would make superfluous the statement that to 
 exist in re is greater than to exist in intellectu. Again this is 
 not Anselm. 
 
 (c) What is necessarily thought to exist in re does exist 
 in re. A Being than whom a greater can not be conceived is 
 necessarily thought to exist in re. :. Such a Being exists. 
 This is the Anselmian position ; and the minor premiss clear- 
 ly needs proof. Could it be proved his argument would be im- 
 pregnable. The nerve of the argument is in the statement that 
 what exists in re is greater than what exists in intellectu; and 
 since we are necessarily led to think of a Being than which a 
 greater can not be conceived, we are supposed to be necessa- 
 rily led to think of such a Being as existing in re. It which 
 it may be replied (i) That the predicate existence adds noth- 
 ing to the concept and so it may be denied that a Being in re 
 is greater than a Being in intellectu. (2) That if a Being in re 
 were greater then the conclusion would be either that the 
 Being in re existed in intellectu, which is absurd, or that the 
 Being in intellectu was not the Being than which a greater can 
 not be conceived since it was not as great as the Being in re. 
 
 Aristotle was the sovereign philosopher throughout the 
 2d period of scholasticism and his influence was exerted 
 mainly through Arabian philosophers like Avicenna, who 
 brought his philosophy through Latin translation to the notice 
 of the Western mind. Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, 
 Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Occam were the most 
 prominent names, but Aquinas towered above them all. 
 Thomas Aquinas was the most broad-minded of the school- 
 men. The proofs which commend themselves to him are 
 given in this second question of the Summa. I. From motion. 
 What moves must move of itself or from another ; that other 
 must move of itself or by another. This can not go on in 
 infinitum. There must be a first mover. 
 
23 
 
 2. The argument based upon the idea of an efficient 
 cause. A direct as the other was an indirect statement of the 
 etiological argument. 
 
 3. The third argument is simply the statement that there 
 must be a necessary Being having the cause of its existence 
 in itself. 
 
 4. This argument is based on the use of superlatives and 
 is akin to those already noticed as advanced by Boethius and 
 Augustine respecting the highest truth and highest good. 
 
 5. The fifth is a short and compact statement of the tele- 
 ological argument. Some things, he says, though destitute of 
 intelligence operate more or less with reference to an end 
 propter finem. Moreover they act generally in the same way, 
 so that they follow what is best. Hence it is evident that they 
 attain their end not by accident but by intention. What is 
 destitute of intelligence does not, however, tend to an end un- 
 less directed by an intelligent agent, as an arrow by an archer. 
 
 During the decline of scholasticism there were few names 
 worthy of mention in the history of Theism. Oue writer — 
 Raymond de Sebonde, a Spanish physician born 1334 A. D. } 
 deserves more than bare mention. Raymond's " Natural 
 Theology" is epoch-making is this respect that it is the first 
 attempt to write a systematic treatise upon this subject. His 
 method it is true is that of the philosopher but his creed is 
 the creed of the church. He teaches very erroneously that 
 all that is necessary to faith can be learned from nature ; but 
 that this implies no skepticism on Raymond's part may be 
 gathered from his preface which begins with a salutation to 
 the most blessed Trinity, the Virgin Mary et totiits curiae 
 coelestis. And that his appeal to nature had no agnostic im- 
 plications may be inferred from the statement that the Sci- 
 ence to which his book is a contribution — the science of the 
 book of the creatures teaches every man to know really and 
 without difficulty everything necessary to man alike concerning 
 man and concerning God. And whatever in Holy Scriptures 
 
24 
 
 is said or taught is through this science infallibly known so 
 that the human intellect with all certainty and security, any 
 doubt being removed, assents to the whole of Holy Scrip- 
 ture. Raymond's book was but little known until attention 
 was turned to it by the Essays of Montaigne. In the 18th 
 century it was generally lost light of, but in the opening 
 pages of Grotius' great work, De veritate Christianse religionis, 
 Raymond is quoted with great respect and referred to as one 
 of his own predecessors in the field of apologetics and as 
 one too who had handled his subject cum magna subtiltate. 
 Attention is now being turned to him again and his book 
 would form a most admirable text on which to found an es- 
 say on the proper relations of Natural and Revealed Religion. 
 
NOTES FROM LECTURE III. 
 
 This lecture finishes history of theistic discussion. 
 
 Ill Modern Period 
 
 To student of philosophy leading event in modern civil- 
 ization is the publication of the Discourse on Method in 1637. 
 DesCartes an intellectual King. Born in 1596; Educated 
 at Jesuit school of LeFleche ; in Paris, in the army ; study- 
 ing philosophy ; orthodox in theology but a systematic skep- 
 tic in philosophy ; planning method of doubt and at same 
 time going on a pilgrimage to our Lady of Loretto ; absorbed 
 in meditation and on this account leaving Paris that he loved 
 for the unlovely city, Amsterdam; dividing his time between 
 controversy with Calvinists of Utrecht and correspondence with 
 Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia — these facts are the story of 
 his life up to the time when the commands of Queen Chris- 
 tiana of Sweden were laid upon him and he was told that she 
 wished to hear his philosophy from his own lips. Died of 
 inflammation of lungs Feb I, 1650. Prof. Huxley commends 
 two features of his philosophy : his method of doubt and his 
 belief in the automatism of brutes. Passage from automatism 
 of brutes to that of man not difficult. DesCartes was a Dualist ; 
 believed in mind and matter ; was also a Theibt. "By the 
 name of God I mean" he says, " an infinite, eternal, immuta- 
 ble, independent, omniscient, omnipotent substance by which 
 I, and all things which are if it be true that there are things 
 which exist, have been created." This definition ought to 
 satisfy the most exacting theism and should have protected 
 him against the charge of Pantheism. Yet Saisset in his 
 "modern Pantheism " begins with DesCartes and his criticisms 
 are acute and worthy of attention. DesCartes no more of a 
 Pantheist than Jonathan Edwards. He was a determinist ; 
 
26 
 
 he held to immanent theism ; he made Providence equivalent 
 to continued creation but he made a sharp distinction^ be- 
 tween finite and infinite. Nor was he a materialist. Mahaffy 
 intimates that DesCartes identified God with the order of the 
 world. Two conflicting opinions here, the one representing 
 Him as believing that Providence is continued creation and 
 the other as advocating a system that needs no creator at all. 
 Before referring to the specific forms of the Cartesian proofs of 
 Divine existence we notice DesCartes' position respecting the 
 relation of Theism to knowledge. He had argued that the 
 idea of God was as certain to him as the propositions of 
 geometry. But he might doubt the results of Geometry. 
 His senses might deceive him. His only guarantee that he 
 was not imposed upon in the constitution of his being was 
 his confidence in God. So he concluded that his knowledge 
 of God conditioned the possibility of all knowledge. Des- 
 Cartes rightly charged with reasoning in a circle. For if I 
 can not know anything till I know God how can I know God ? 
 Confidence in the knowing power of the mind must condition 
 any discovery of God as an object of knowledge. I must 
 know in order to know God. Yet DesCartes' position, in- 
 volves a great truth. Suppose he had succeeded in putting 
 the argument for Divine Existence on the same basis as the 
 truths of Geometry : these truths could be doubted if he 
 believed that his nature was mendacious ; which means simply 
 that the truths of Geometry are true provided something else 
 is true ; that they depend upon an underlying postulate or 
 supposition, namely, that there is such a thing as Truth. 
 Therefore when Des Cartes said belief in God was as 
 true as the truths of Geometry, he really said that in regard 
 to the latter as well as the former, there was a possibility of 
 doubt. For the truth of both stood in the possibility of truth. 
 While logically we may say he was reasoning in a circle, yet 
 deeper reflection will show that a great truth was wrapped up 
 in the statement that God is the pre-supposition and postulate 
 
 
27 
 
 of all knowledge. Let us grant the thinkableness of a uni- 
 verse proceeding under naturalistic conceptions. Grant the 
 possibility of the enthronement beyond successful challenge 
 of an empirical philosophy — one that can never say ' 4 I 
 know ", but can only say " perhaps." Then this would 
 seem to be true. The Intuitional philosophy can only be 
 shaken by establishing the philosophy of naturalistic evolu- 
 tion, which in the very act of being established proves the 
 uncertitude of all so-called truth. How then will Evolution- 
 ists get out of their dilemma? If Evolution be true it de- 
 stroys the certitude of knowledge and then how can they 
 know it to be true ? And if they do not know it to be true 
 how can they assail the a priori elements of knowledge ? We 
 must know in order to know that we do not know ; we must 
 know in order to know that intuitionalism is in error. Grant- 
 ing, however, that empiricism leaves us without any criterion 
 of truth ; that under a process of naturalistic evolution both 
 consciousness and belief and so belief in God are naturalistic 
 developments and that these beliefs are no guarantee for the 
 existence of the objects to which they refer, for this is what 
 the most pronounced empiricists would say, what under these 
 circumstances shall we do ? Do just what Des Cartes did, i.e., 
 posit God not indeed as given in consciousness but as a work- 
 ing hypothesis. Take the facts and say, here are two theories 
 of the universe. One proposes to build the physical world, 
 conscious iife and praying man out of material atoms. If it 
 be true it leaves me without any certainty, any explanation of 
 history, any interpretation of conduct, any ground for belief 
 in God, any exceptional respect for Christianity. Then there 
 is the theory of the universe which supposes that the ground 
 of all being and the explanation of all phenomena is a Personal 
 God. If it be true, we may find his method in the world is one 
 of progress. Intelligence rising on the ladder of life and culmi- 
 nating in man. If this is a true account it is only what we might 
 expect if there be a God. The hypothesis of God gives unity 
 
28 
 
 to thought. Such congruity between this belief and other 
 correlated facts that our confidence in this strengthens our be- 
 lief in other truths. If, having to choose between the mater- 
 ialistic hypothesis with its conclusions and the theistic with 
 its conclusions, we take the latter and say — We believe that 
 our nature bears testimony to God and that God is the guar- 
 antee of our intellectual integrity. We go out from ourselves 
 to Him. We come back from Him to ourselves — if we do 
 this we are doing what Des Cartes did. We are saying : our 
 belief in God is the presupposition and postulate of all knowl- 
 edge. We take a theistic view of the world and that view 
 prevents us from casting discredit upon the fundamental pro- 
 cesses of thinking. Turning to the specific forms of Cartesian 
 proofs we have (i) The argument based upon the idea of a 
 Perfect Being. Under this conception he sought to demonstrate 
 the Divine existence by showing that existence was implied in 
 the idea of a Perfect Being. This argument not as acute, how- 
 ever, as Anselm's and it is equally open to criticism. (2) In 
 the second proof Des Cartes uses the causal judgment in ac- 
 counting for his own existence. Argument exhibited under 
 several forms. Thus, (a) My continued existence requires a 
 cause as much as my beginning to exist ; (b) The cause of 
 my beginning is either self-existent or it is a caused existence 
 and so back in the regress of causes till we come to a first 
 cause ; (c) But really my parents are not the cause of my ex- 
 istence, i. e. t of my mind. In short creationism according to 
 Des Cartes is the only rational explanation of the origin of 
 the soul — and this implies that since finite mind exists now 
 there has been an infinite mind in existence from all eternity. 
 3. Application of the causal judgment to the idea of God ex- 
 isting in the mind of man. Impossible that idea of Perfect 
 Being should originate with an imperfect being. Excepting 
 the first which is the Anselmian, the Cartesian proofs are a 
 posteriori, the second being the application of the causal judg- 
 ment to the author's own contingent existence ; and the third 
 
2 9 
 
 which contains the distinctive feature of Cartesian theism 
 affirms that the existence of God will alone explain belief in 
 God. 
 
 The method of Des Cartes published in 1612 : the critique 
 of Kant in 1781. Between these dates some names merit more 
 than passing notice. Leibnitz, though Schwegler treats his 
 theism with contempt, was essentially a religious philosopher. 
 Spinoza might be compared to the Eleatics, Leibnitz reminds 
 one ot Democritus. He was an atomist and emphasized the 
 many. Not a materialist though and his atom not a material 
 atom. His monad the unit of the universe. The monads 
 of different orders existing in a rising scale from lowest or- 
 ganism to highest archangel. Nothing per saltum is a princi- 
 ple with Leibnitz. He was the father of modern doctrine of 
 evolution. Such is the pre-established harmony between 
 these independent monads that though each acts independently 
 they all act so as to bring about the existing cosmos. Final- 
 ity, the adaptation of means to ends, the harmony resulting 
 from the interaction of monads in this vast plane of being is 
 naturally^ a prominent idea in Leibnitz' system. But two 
 views are possible on the subject. He might allow his mind 
 to terminate in the finality of universe and call this God — as 
 Matt. Arnold defines God to be a stream of tendency. Or he 
 may ask ; what is the cause of this finality ? Not possible to 
 admit finality and stop short of intentionality if one is logical 
 and consistent. No reason to believe that Leibnitz denied 
 intentionality in a world which impressed him so fully with 
 its finality. 
 
 Leibnitz and Locke corresponded on the subject of innate 
 ideas. Yet Locke was no materialist, because he denied 
 innate ideas. He believed in mind as distinct from matter 
 and the incommensurable character of the two is the basis 
 of his argument for the divine existence. "There was a time," 
 says he, " when there was no knowing being and when know- 
 ledge began to be or else there has also been a knowing 
 
30 
 
 being from all eternity. If it be said that there was a time 
 when no being had any knowledge when that eternal being 
 was void of understanding, I reply that then it was impossi- 
 ble that there should ever have been any knowledge ; it being 
 as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge and 
 operating blindly and without any principle should produce 
 a knowing being as it is impossible that a triangle should 
 make itself three angles bigger than two right angles." We 
 have to choose between alternatives. Either all that is, is 
 due to a self-existing, omniscient Being, the source of all ex- 
 istence or else there was a time when there was no knowledge 
 and no knower and man is the measure of the intelligence 
 of the universe. 
 
 Dr. Samuel Clarke, was a Cartesian rather than one of 
 the school of Locke. He was a man of diverse talent. Was 
 an epicure and loved his joke. Born 1675, died 1724. He 
 argues: Something exists ; something must have existed from 
 eternity. That something is independent. It must therefore 
 be self- existent. We know its attributes but not its substance. 
 It must be infinite, eternal and must be one. To all this 
 Spinoza would have made no objections. Difficulty begins 
 when he attempts to invest this infinite being with the attri- 
 butes of intelligence and free will. Here Clarke admits the a 
 priori argument will not suffice. Makes use here of three 
 familiar modes of reasoning regarding divine existence. Re- 
 peats Aristotle's argument from motion. Denies possibility of 
 an infinite regress of finite causes. Scouts the idea of think- 
 ing mind springing out of unthinking matter. His argu- 
 ments partly ontological and partly teleological. Spinoza and 
 Clarke, to a certain extent, follow the same reasoning. Spi- 
 noza emphasized substance ; Clarke, attribute. Spinoza felt 
 necessity of believing in necessary one as contrasted with the 
 Infinite many : so did Clarke. But Spinozas' one was totality; 
 Clarke's one was cause. Spinoza's one included, Clarke's ex- 
 cluded the many. Clarke's was a good argument but not a 
 
3i 
 demonstration. It was a new synthesis of old arguments and 
 so takes classical rank in history of theism. 
 
 Student of philosophy supposed to know relation of 
 Locke to Berkeley and of Berkeley to Hume and of Hume 
 to Kant. Hume awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumbers. 
 Without inconsistency Kant may be quoted as an intuitional- 
 ist and an agnostic. He is the forerunner of both Hamilton 
 and Spencer ; the defender of a priori truth and the master- 
 metaphysician of the skeptics. He was poor and deserves 
 our highest admiration for preserving his intellectual indepen- 
 dence at the expense of bodily comfort. In this respect was 
 like Spinoza who ground lenses for a living that he might be 
 ; free to think. Kant's Criticism in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
 ! of the arguments for existence of God mark an era in historic 
 1 discussion. Since the publication of the Critique the tendency 
 with those whose faith was strong enough to save them from 
 i atheism, has been to fall back upon feeling and intuition or 
 j else to relapse into the bosom of authority. Kant's criticism 
 embraces three points, (i) That there can be put three argu- 
 1 ments open to the speculative reason in proof of God's exis- 
 tence ; the ontological, the cosmological and the physico- 
 I theological. (2) That each argument in turn is open to criti- 
 I cisms that are fatal to its claim to be a proof of God's 
 j existence. (3) That the cosmological and teleological are 
 ' ultimately resolvable into the ontological so that strictly all 
 speculative proof is the proof known as the Anselmian or 
 Cartesian. 
 
 To the ontological argument Kant objects as follows : 
 (a) The illustrations of correspondence between subjective and 
 objective have been drawn from judgments and not from 
 Things. Thus in that of the triangle the proposition is not 
 that the triangle exists but that if it exists, its three angles, &c # 
 So of the Perfect Being, (b) Absurd to introduce into con- 
 ception of a thing cogitated solely with reference to its possi- 
 bility the conception of its existence. Shows this by asking 
 
 j 
 
32 
 whether the proposition "This thing exists " is analytical or 
 synthetical. If it is analytical we must either identify our 
 thought and the thing or else we must assume that the thing 
 exists, so making it a predicate which is repeated in the prop- 
 osition. If, however, it be synthetic, there is nO contradiction 
 in removing the predicate. But the ontological argument 
 proceeds on the assumption that the proposition is analytic- 
 (c) Existence is not a real predicate as distinguished from a 
 logical predicate. A real predicate adds something to the 
 concept. Existence never does. If existence were a real 
 predicate there never could be a correspondence between the 
 concept and its object since the object would always be greater 
 than the concept. Cosmological argument characterized by 
 Kant as maintaining " a nest of diabolical assumptions." 
 Among them are the following : (i) That the doctrine of cause 
 and effect transcends experience. (2) That an infinite regress 
 of finite causes is impossible. Reserving the right to criticise 
 the teleological argument on the ground that it proceeds 
 analogically, Kant calls attention to following points. I. 
 The order and harmony of the world prove the contingency of 
 its form not of its matter. Impossible to deduce a creator of 
 matter ; can only get an arranger of matter — an architect. 2. 
 From order and harmony of world we may infer the existence 
 of a cause proportionate thereto, i. e., we can not infer from 
 the order of the universe that the cause of that order is infi- 
 nite. 
 
 Kant's most subtle criticism and that in which he is least 
 successful is where he attempts to show that the cosmologi- 
 cal and teleological proofs resolve themselves into the 
 ontological. Legitimacy of criticism on ontological 
 argument, unhesitatingly conceded. But this thought 
 of God, this great conception of the infinite is common prop- 
 erty of the race. And what in common minds takes the 
 form of religious feeling or a vague sense of dependence, in 
 clearer minds takes on the form of epoch-making arguments 
 
33 
 for existence of God. Kant's criticism of the ontological ar- 
 guments leaves untouched the great fact that the thought of 
 God is a constitutional tendency. Kant admits this tendency. "It 
 is very remarkable," he says, " that in proportion that some- 
 thing exists, I cannot avoid the inference that something 
 necessarily exists." Why do we have the necessity of thought ? 
 Did men rise to this high concept under hallucination and in 
 error or is the subjective the witness within of the great " I 
 am " without ? Of course if knowledge is defined as coming 
 only from experience, we do not know God. God is a met- 
 empirical, which means we can not see Him. Dr. Sterling 
 says : " Strange as it may appear, this is Kant's sole reason 
 why we do not know God, why we do not know the soul. 
 We can not see God or hear Him ; we cannot smell the soul 
 or taste it." 
 
 Kant says the argument based on design is very old, 
 
 ! very respectable and not very satisfactory ; but it turns out to 
 
 I be unsatisfactory only by first assuming that it undertakes to 
 
 do what does not belong to it to do. It does not prove the 
 
 contingency of matter. Does not shut us up to the creation 
 
 | of matter. Only gives us at best an intelligence capable of 
 
 I using existing materials so as to produce the existing world 
 
 ! of order and adaptation and we do not know whether it would 
 
 i require infinite power to do this. Suppose this to be all we 
 
 I ask the teleological argument to do for us, what then 
 
 1 becomes of the objection to it ? Instead of any damage 
 
 I having been done we are disposed to take the concessions 
 
 J which the thinkers make to the theistic position to the effect 
 
 that the order and harmony of the universe give ground for 
 
 the belief that there is a Being who is equal to the task of 
 
 making the world. Whether he made it out of pre-existing 
 
 materials or whether he be infinite are questions not involved 
 
 in the argument of design. If we have been using the 
 
 word demonstration too freely, it is as well to be told it is too 
 
 strong a term. An error, though, to suppose Kant's criticism 
 
34 
 
 has destroyed the possibility of Natural Theology. Some 
 undoubtedly will take his arguments as the best support for 
 their own position. Roman Catholics will say : Can not 
 have religion without authority. Leave the church and you 
 must go to atheism. Kant has shown the incompetency of 
 Natural Theology. Extreme Protestants will say : We have 
 no knowledge ot God outside of Bible. Church can not give 
 certitude. Kant has shown that Reason can not. It is the 
 Bible or Atheism. Skeptics will say ; Protestantism re- 
 volted from the Church and took its stand on an infallible 
 Bible and now it turns out that the Bible is no more infallible 
 than the Church. The Protestantism of Protestant religion 
 falls back upon Deism, upon natural religion. But, Kant has 
 destroyed the foundation of natural religion by showing the 
 weakness of the theistic proof. 
 
 An unworthy proceeding to make an in terrorem argument 
 for Holy Church or Holy Scriptures by accepting for a mo- 
 ment the suggestion that our moral constitution and the facts 
 of nature are not able to lead us to a belief in a Personal God. 
 
 
 
35 
 
 NOTES FROM LECTURE IV. 
 
 Remaining lectures deal with constructive side of theistic 
 discussion. Notice briefly our argumentative attitude so far 
 as theistic theory of universe is concerned, (i). In giving a 
 reasoned account of theism we do not prejudge the question 
 as to its genesis. To say that certain arguments support 
 theistic view of the world does not mean that those arguments 
 have originated this view of the world. Question is whether, 
 given an antecedent belief in God, due to whatever cause, that 
 belief can be corroborated by arguments. (2). Do not set out 
 to demonstrate existence of God. Demonstrative process be- 
 gins and ends in thoughts. Can reach deductive certainty 
 from syllogisms in every mood and figure, but it is the cer- 
 tainty of form not of matter. Logical process as thorough 
 with the letters a b c as with the logical entities " Socrates " 
 and " Balbus." Of course you can apply mathematical reason- 
 ing to material phenomena and on the hypothesis of uniform- 
 ity of nature predict an eclipse of sun or moon during the 
 year. But sun may be darkened or moon turned into blood 
 before that time comes. We don't know. We see what is. 
 We predict with greater or less probability what will be. But 
 when we are reasoning about God we are going outside our 
 I thoughts : beyond the experience of our senses. Are affirm- 
 jing existence of a Being whom we do not see on the strength 
 of phenomena that we do see. Dismissing idea of demonstra- 
 tion and using word proof to mean that which justifies belief 
 jwe start out to prove existence of God : that is to show that 
 atheism is unreasonable. Question is, as Physicus well says, 
 whether theism be rationally probable. Must bear in mind 
 that the theistic argument is both complex and cumulative. 
 jStrength of all the arguments not to be judged by strength of 
 leach taken separately. In the theistic proof each argument 
 gives adequate reason to rest in the theistic conclusion ; but 
 jtheistic conclusion is strengthened by congruity and concur- 
 rence of all the arguments. 
 
36 
 
 These arguments may be grouped under three principal 
 divisions : First : Argument based on idea of cause ; Sec- 
 ondly: Argument founded in our moral nature; Thirdly: 
 Argument based on idea of the Infinite. We consider 
 these in order named : 
 
 Theistic proofs : Division I. Arguments based on cause. 
 Regarding the world under concept of causation we may dis- 
 tinguish between three ideas presented to our notice. May 
 consider world 1st as contingent ; 2nd as a cosmos; 3rd as 
 exhibiting finality. General arguments based on the causal 
 judgment will therefore take 3 forms, the aetiological, the cos- 
 mological, and the teleological. 
 
 A. The aetiological argument. 
 
 This considers phenomena simply as contingent. Does 
 not regard them as existing in certain collocations or as serving 
 a purpose. Are simply phenomena that have begun to be 
 and therefore that demand a caus@. Two ways in which this 
 aetiological argument may be considered. It may be applied 
 to the universe considered as a totality of phenomena; or to 
 specific types of phenomena in the universe. We shall do 
 both. First consider the Basis of Theistic inference in the 
 totality of phenomena. Syllogistically expressed the argu- 
 ment is: Every effect has a cause: The world is an 
 effect . * . The world had a cause. But is the world an 
 effect ? Difficult to prove this if by world we mean substance 
 of which world is made. Hence some say aetiological argu. 
 ment is valueless because it assumes non-eternity of atoms 
 which we know nothing about. But we are not required to 
 raise this question. The world of our experience is one of 
 phenomenal successions in time and a co-existences in space. 
 Do these demand a First Cause and if so what cause ? An- 
 swer to this question depends somewhat on meaning of causa- 
 tion. We notice, therefore, leading theories of causation. 
 
37 
 
 I. John Stuart Mill's Theory — He has distinctly said 
 (three Essays on Religion) " that the very essence of caus- 
 ation as it exists within the limits of our knowledge is incom- 
 patible with a First Cause." This grows naturally out of his 
 idea of a cause : " The cause," says he, " of every change is 
 a prior change." His doctrine of plurality of cause and effect 
 contributed to proper understanding of cause and effect. But 
 Mill's doctrine of causation has an element open to adverse 
 criticism. By causation he means only the relationship of 
 phenomena in time-succession. " It is a universal truth that 
 
 every fact which has a beginning has a cause 
 
 " When I speak of the cause of a phenomenon I do not mean 
 a cause which is not itself a phenomenon." " The law of the 
 universality of causation consists in this that every consequent 
 is connected in this way with same particular antecedent or 
 set of antecedents. Let this fact be what it may, if it has be- 
 gun to exist it was preceded by some fact or facts with which 
 it is invariably connected." We criticise not the conclusions 
 from his doctrine of causation but his doctrine itself, (a) 
 Cause and effect express relations between phenomena. As 
 God is not likely to appear as a phenomenon he is ruled 
 out by Mill's definition, (b) Cause and effect refer to the 
 time-relations of phenomena. It is the fact that A is the in- 
 variable predecessor under certain circumstances of B that 
 makes it possible to call A the cause of B. But suppose 
 same time-succession between phenomena were preserved 
 while each phenomena (the series being represented symboli- 
 cally by a row of billiard balls) was produced by a separate 
 cause or all by same cause. How would Mill's theory work ? 
 (c). He is confined to an infinite regress of finite causes. For 
 he says a cause is only that which is a phenomenon and every 
 phenomenon that begins has a cause, (d). It follows that 
 there can be no law of cause and effect under conditions 
 where the law of uniformity of nature is not in force. Thus 
 he supposes that in some parts of the universe events may 
 
38 
 
 happen without regularity, and regards this as equivalent to 
 suspension of law of cause and effect. But this shows abso- 
 lute disregard of psychological facts. Suppose such a reign 
 of chaos were to occur; should we not feel bound to ask of 
 each event what was its cause ? (f). Mr. Mill violates prin- 
 ciples of his own empirical philosophy and at same time con- 
 tradicts his doctrine of causation by appealing to what he calls 
 a permanent element in nature. '• There is," he says, " in 
 nature a permanent element and also a changeable; the 
 changes are always the effects of previous changes. The per- 
 manent existence, so far as we know, are not effects at all," 
 though, as he afterwards adds, " they are causes or concauses 
 of every thing that takes place." Contrary to his previous 
 statement in his logic that a cause is also an effect he says 
 here that this permanent element which is not an effect is the 
 cause or concause of everything that takes place, (g). Fur- 
 thermore, as Mr. Shute has shown, it would be impossible ac- 
 cording to Mr. Mill's definition of a cause ever to discover a 
 cause. For suppose that series of phenomena be A A 2 A 3 A 4 . 
 The cause of A 4 is not simply A 3 , but A 3 as modified by 
 peculiar circumstances and collocations, and so in reference 
 to A 2 , &c. ; so that in seeking for the cause of A 4 we have to 
 consider not only A, A 2 , A 3 , but all the circumstances that 
 condition their separate phenomena. We admit, therefore, 
 that upon Mr. Mill's definition of a cause we can make noth- 
 ing out of argument a contingent^ mundi, but we do not 
 accept Mr. Mill's idea of cause. Assuming phenomena are so 
 related as to be capable of mathematical expression, if we 
 know the entire past we might know the remote future. 
 Physical causation in exact sense of word would, it is true, be 
 plural and more too. For, any given physical phenomenon 
 would be conditioned by the entire series of phenomena for 
 all time past. Physical universe at any one moment is mathe- 
 matical expression of all physical antecedents of all time. 
 Mill's docrine of causation does not satisfy demands of causal 
 
39 
 i 
 
 judgment. It is a postulate not as to the necessity of a cause 
 but as to the certainty of events. We say if any event occur 
 it must have a cause. He says if any event occur it must 
 have occurred in a certain ascertainable relation to other 
 events and in accordance to the law of uniformity. If the 
 only causes of phenomena are themselves phenomena de- 
 manding causes in explanation of them then an uncaused 
 cause is absurd. But there is no reason why a cause must be 
 a phenomenon, except the inadequate one of Mr. Mill. Mar- 
 tineau puts it well : "Phenomena demands causes; entities 
 do not." Entities as such do not — otherwise cause of God 
 would be asked for. But new entities, contingent entities, do. 
 
 2. Theory of pure physical causation. Reduced to its 
 lowest terms, the world that is open to inspection of physic- 
 ists is (i) matter (2) motion. Matter, whatever be the the true 
 theory, will remain the same phenomenal manifestation of at- 
 tributes in certain collocations. Now matter moves and 
 motions of matter molar and molecular are what mathemati- 
 cal physicists take cognizance of. Matter is and matter is 
 discrete — not continuous. If factors of the universe be matter 
 and motion : then cause can only mean the phenomenal ante- 
 cedents necessary to certain consequents. We conclude (1) 
 every physical phenomenon is necessarily determined by 
 physical antecedents ; (2) has been an infinite regress of phys- 
 ical antecedents ; (3) all so called free actions are physically 
 determined. A first cause in sense demanded by Theism is 
 impossible under this view of causation. Moreover the free 
 action of our own wills is obliterated and volitions take their 
 place in a row of physical phenomena. To this theory of 
 causation strongest protest offered by our own consciousness 
 of being free agents. Insufficiency of this theory is shown by 
 the disposition to hypostatize force and treat it as an entity 
 distinct from matter or the motions of matter. 
 
 3. Theory of persistence of force. — Sir Wm. Hamilton 
 says : " When an object is presented phenomenally as com- 
 
40 
 
 mencing we cannot but suppose that the complement of ex. 
 istence which it now contains has previously been, in other 
 words that all that we at present come to know as an effect 
 must previously have existed in its causes, though what these 
 causes are we may perhaps be altogether unable to surmise." 
 Prof. Bain regards this statement as a remarkable anticipation 
 of law of persistence of force given by Herbert Spencer as fol- 
 lows : " The quantity of matter in the universe can not really 
 be conceived as diminished any more than it can be conceived 
 as increased the annihilation of matter is un- 
 thinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is 
 unthinkable and its indestructibility thus becomes an a priori 
 cognition of the highest order." This a more natural view 
 than that of Mill. Does not identify cause and mere uniform- 
 ity of sequences or make the essence of causation consist in 
 invariability of time-succession. Does not condition pre- 
 dicates cause and effect on an observed uniformity. The doc- 
 trine is burdened with difficulties, but, at least, teaches that 
 all forms of existence are manifestations of a power at once 
 omnipotent and incomprehensible. " In this consciousness," 
 says Spencer, "of an omnipotent power, we have that con- 
 sciousness in which Religion dwells, and so we arrive at that 
 point where Religion and Science coalesce." We agree with 
 Prof. Diman that doctrine of a first cause has not been wiped 
 out by doctrine of force. Suppose the idea of causation pure 
 and simple yielded this and nothing more, that there is an in- 
 comprehensible but omnipotent power that is the ultimate 
 cause of all phenomena (this is Spencer's position) we should 
 use this as laying a foundation upon which a theistic structure 
 would be built. So far forth this conclusion would be in 
 the direction of a theistic view of the world. But there are 
 objections to this view of causation. It lies halfway between 
 theism and materialism and consistency requires it to go on 
 to the one or back to the other. If Force is an entity distinct 
 from matter and all phenomena manifestations of it : there is 
 
4i 
 
 no difference between this view and theism save that it does 
 not invest force with the attributes of Intelligence. If, how- 
 ever, Force be not an entity but a term expressing rate or ratio 
 of motion, work done, &c, then the theory resolves itself into 
 that of pure physical causation. The universe at any moment 
 has been physically conditioned and determined by the past. 
 This is physical determinism which to be complete must in- 
 clude mind and will. We come now to automatism. Prac- 
 tically the outcome of doctrine of persistence of force when 
 it is taken as the explanation of all physical phenomena. It 
 is certain that some physical phenomena are the direct result 
 of physical antecedents unless volition be capable of physical 
 explanation. If volition be not capable of physical explana- 
 tion we then have a large area of effects not explained by 
 doctrine of persistence of force. Hence we must hold that 
 physical causation is not the only causation. 
 
 4. Accordingly we have common doctrine of dual caus- 
 ation, which recognizes the will as a cause — a first cause, and 
 physical phenomena as causes likewise — second cause. We 
 take our personal experience of power and causation and im- 
 pute an agency similar to our own to matter. This view of 
 causation is more suggestive of theistic inference than 
 any that have been considered. For clearly there is one 
 effect, viz.: a volition, which is not a physical phenomenon, 
 and there are some physical phenomena which are not due to 
 physical antecedents, and the only real cause actually known 
 is personal agency. We see phenomena invariably related : 
 we infer a causal connection. In the exercise of volition we 
 know ourselves as causes. Our own experience of agency as 
 to the exercise of will shows us, that however related to one 
 another physical phenomena may be, there must be behind 
 them all a will as the original cause of motion : as Aristotle 
 says, a first mover. Very natural, therefore, to hold that the 
 human will is the true type of causation. 
 
42 
 
 5. The Volitional Theory of Causation. — Whether an in- 
 finite regress of physical antecedents be thinkable or not it is 
 certain that the mind naturally seeks for a cause of real be- 
 ginning . Not satisfied with a cause which is also an effect. 
 Also certain that the only thing in our experience answering 
 to a first that is to say a real cause is our will. The passage 
 from our own will as the cause of motions we set up, to an in- 
 finite will the cause of all physical change, is natural if not 
 necessary. Grant that law of interchange of motion is as true 
 of our bodily organism as of other physical phenomena. But 
 it is a fact that by a fiat of one's will motion is inaugurated. 
 In the nisus of voluntary effort of which one is con- 
 scious there is absolute beginning of a set of motions setting 
 out therefrom. Go now into sphere of molar and molecular 
 physics. Motion : rates of motion : motion calculable in foot- 
 pounds : motions interchangeable. Explain all this by Force. 
 Still you have motion followed by motion, antecedent by 
 consequent, none the less so because calculable. But question 
 comes as to beginning of ail this? You can choose an in- 
 finite regress or find an originator in a will of which your own 
 will is the type. We take the latter view. Find in our own 
 agency the only case of a real beginning of which we have any 
 experience. 
 
 Argument a contitigentia mundi as dealt with now con- 
 cerns phenomena. It is really the old Aristotelian argument 
 for a first mover. Does not concern itself with substance nor 
 with question of the eternity of matter. Non-eternity of 
 atom may be argued on ground of the law of parsimony (that 
 is> theism being conceded, there is no need of believing in 
 eternity of matter), as following (though this is not conclusive) 
 from doctrine of dissipation of energy or on ground of a dyna- 
 mic theory of matter; but it is not necessary to prove the 
 atoms had a beginning in order to come to the theistic infer- 
 ence thro' doctrine of causation. 
 
43 
 
 Basis of tkeistic inference in specific phenomena. — Certain 
 phenomena, because they cannot be accounted for by antece- 
 dent physical phenomena suggest, if they do not require, 
 hypothesis of a Divine intelligence for their explanation. Ex- 
 istence of life and of human mind are examples of these. 
 Argument for Divine existence based upon existence of mind 
 has been presented in two forms by John Locke and Sir Wm. 
 Hamilton. Both forms criticised by unknown writer, Physicus. 
 Grant, says Mill, an unknown mind caused my mind. That 
 only puts the difficulty farther back. " The creating mind 
 stands in as much need of another mind as the cause of its 
 existence as the created mind." But, it is existence of a con- 
 ditioned, contingent, dependent mind that calls for an explan- 
 ation. Does not follow, though, that a mind that never be- 
 gan to be should need still another mind as its cause. Mill 
 repeating his old argument. We are minds. Only mind can 
 produce mind. This is the argument. But Physicus asks what 
 proof there is of this second statement. We say the contrary is 
 inconceivable. Conceivability may not be the best of truth but 
 inconceivability is a good reason for not believing an unsupport- 
 ed proposition. But, says Physicus, it is as inconceivable that 
 mind should be the cause of matter as that matter should be 
 the cause of mind. This is easily said but it is an appeal to 
 consciousness which every man must make for himself. 
 Locke gives reasons why matter is not the cause of mind. 
 " Whatever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it 
 and actually have at least all the perfections that can ever 
 after exist .... it necessarily follows, therefore, that 
 the first eternal being cannot be matter." Does not that seem 
 to be true ? Compare the two hypotheses and ask which 
 commands the assent of reason best. 
 
 From argument as presented by Locke, Physicus turns 
 to that presented by Sir Wm. Hamilton, whose argument was 
 this : I know that I am free : that whatever be the connection 
 
44 
 
 between mind and body I know that I am not determined in 
 my choice by my body. I am conscious of a free personality 
 that is taken out of the row of physical antecedents and con- 
 sequents. Mind in its action is toto ccelo different from mat- 
 ter. And in the microcosm of mind and body I have an argu- 
 ment for the supremacy of mind over matter in the macrocosm. 
 One way to destroy force of this argument, namely, by teach- 
 ing physical determinism. Physicus assumes that physical deter- 
 minism is established and with this established the fabric of 
 Hamilton's Theism disappears. But in spite of Physicus' 
 attempt to make use Hamilton's seeming vacillation between 
 freedom and necessity, the Hamiltonian argument is really a 
 good one. Give us the priority of mind and its independence 
 in the microcosm and we will believe in its priority and inde- 
 pendence in the macrocosm. This is Hamilton's argument. 
 Physicus does not touch it and it can not be touched till the 
 phenomena of mind have been explained in the terms of 
 matter. 
 
47 
 
 NOTES FROM LECTURE V. 
 
 From argument based upon contingency of the world we 
 pass to that based upon the order of the world. Mr. Hicks 
 in his "Criticism of the Design arguments " proposes to call 
 this the eutaxiological argument — not a bad designation. 
 Some inconvenience in calling this argument from order the 
 cosmological, because it has been so generally in literature of 
 Theism to designate the argument a contingentia mundi. 
 Nevertheless we shall use the old term rather than the new 
 one of Hicks. 
 
 B. The Cosmological Argument. 
 
 A distinction between argument based on order and that 
 based on final cause. All cases of finality are instances of 
 order ; but all instances of order are not adaptations of means 
 to ends. Neither the cosmological nor the teleological facts 
 in the world are affected by the question of a possible mechan- 
 ical explanation of them. Granting that the physical ante- 
 cedents of any organism are such that the organism down to 
 the minutest detail can be predicted or is necessitated : that 
 the past gives a mechanical explanation of the eye and the 
 hexagonal cell and of the correlation of form and function in 
 the animal world. Still the mind will feel itself irresistibly 
 impressed with two great classes of facts. It will see the cos- 
 mical facts of order, harmony and proportion: and the teleo- 
 logical facts of adaptation and adjustment. Observing hex- 
 agonal cell of the bee, its uniformity and regularity, it will 
 ask the question — How? And observing on the other hand, 
 its adaptation to a purpose, it will ask the question — Why ? 
 The theistic argument will say (i) That admitting the certain- 
 ty of result to be contained in chain of physical causation it 
 is nevertheless impossible to believe that these great cosmical 
 facts could have occurred without agency of an Intelligent 
 
4 8 
 
 mind whose thought they express. (2) Admitting all that is 
 claimed in behalf of certainty of physical causes we can not 
 avoid the conclusion that the adjustment of means to ends is 
 part of a great scheme of Providence. Arguments in both 
 cosmological and teleological forms are the same ; they pro- 
 ceed upon same principles ; are alike independent of question 
 of mechanical antecedency. In cosmological argument we 
 see order and infer a plan antecedently existing in an intelli- 
 gent mind. In teleological argument we see adaptation o 
 means to ends and we infer finality and hence also infer 
 mind as the cause of that Finality. Cosmological facts sug- 
 gest God as a great Lawgiver so that that the uniformities of 
 nature are manifestations of his uniform will. Teleological 
 facts suggest God as a great architect knowing the end from 
 the beginning and in all details of his structure adapting means 
 to ends. Consider now the facts which form basis of argu- 
 ments from order. Is very natural to conclude that what re- 
 quires thought to understand is itself the product of thought. 
 When the logician finds that nature has same systematic way 
 of exhibiting phenomena both in time and space that he has 
 of arranging of his own thoughts : that his impulse to grasp 
 phenomena in bundles and refer them to some principle of 
 uniformity has been anticipated and that there is the closest 
 correspondence between his mental life and these material co- 
 existences and successions it is very natural that he should 
 say that these two are the product of mind. Physical world 
 is full of testimony like this. Time, number, rate, ratio, vol- 
 ume are all matters of a most definite and precise nature and 
 physical world is an exhibition on the grandest scale of mathe- 
 matical relations. Not strange that this order should be held 
 as a proof of mind. Fact of order is undeniable. Some ex- 
 planation of the fact is demanded. What substitute is pro- 
 posed by those who deny the theistic explanation ? 
 
 1. The theory of Chance. Under this we deal not only 
 with what is popularly called chance but also with question 
 
49 
 as to the application of doctrine of probabilities to the theistic 
 argument. 
 
 (a) Suppose the word chance represented some sort of 
 metaphysical entity or agent, the antithesis of design ; and it 
 were asked whether world were made by chance or design. 
 And suppose we concede that by a purely fortuitous concourse 
 of atoms the cosmos might have resulted. What would the- 
 ism suffer by such a concession ? We should say that the 
 credulity of the atheist was simply amazing. Not likely that 
 many have this idea of chance and think that chance is an 
 agent. If there are such Mr. Venn has expressed their 
 view in the only form which will make it intelligible. " Imag- 
 ine some being, not a creator but a sort of demiergus who 
 has had a quantity of materials put into his hand and he as- 
 signs them their collocations and their lines of action blindly 
 and at haphazard ; what are the odds that such a world as we 
 actually experience should have been brought about in this 
 way ?" His answer is that " all the paper which the world has 
 hitherto produced would be used up before we got far on our 
 way in writing them down." 
 
 (b) No one takes this view of chance. There is no such 
 thing as chance. The falling of the leaf as much determined 
 by mechanical causes as the path of the planet. Nothing 
 really casual. Could we really see relations of antecedents 
 and consequents we should see that what seemed most casual 
 was antecedently determined. Chance is direction which we 
 can not see. Here then we come to doctrine of probabilities 
 in it application to natural theology. It must be understood 
 that the doctrine of probabilities has nothing to do with the 
 question how an event occurs. Strictly speaking it has to do 
 with a single question. It undertakes to tell us the exact 
 number of chances in favor of or against the occurrence of a 
 certain event, ,ali the probabilities in the case being known. 
 The calculation of the odds will therefore give us the exact 
 mathematical expression of the expectation we ought to enter- 
 
50 
 
 tain of a certain event happening. The difficulty in applying 
 the doctrine of probability to the case of the universe lies not 
 only in ourinability to count or calculate the permutations of all 
 the atoms of the universe: but in the fact that we can not get 
 back to the point where the cosmos is still future and where 
 chance is just about to empty her great dice-box. For there 
 is a great difference between the improbability before and im- 
 probability after the event has occurred. In another place in 
 his Logic of chance Mr. Venn says that " Probability has 
 nothing more to do with Natural Theology either for or 
 against it than the general principles of Logic or Induction 
 have." 
 
 (c) Makes a great difference in the application of the doc- 
 trine of probabilities whether you contemplate event before or 
 after its occurrence. Illustration; 150 seats in the room and 
 100 men in class. Chances very small that Mr. A. will occupy 
 a certain seakbut they are capable of mathematical expression. 
 Yet coming into the room after class were seated we would 
 not be surprised if a given seat were occupied nor if it were 
 empty. Now men say that when we consider the world we 
 are considering the event after it has happened but are trying 
 to apply a set of reasonings that would have force only if we 
 would get at some point of observation before the event hap- 
 pened — and that therefore an argument against fortuitous ori- 
 gin of the cosmos based on probabilities is absolutely worth- 
 less. To illustrate this objection. 
 
 Suppose we put 100 numbers into a hat, and taking them 
 out one by one blindfold the order should read 1, 49, 78, 3, 
 19, &c, &c. That would be no surprise. They must come 
 in some order. The possibilities are limited. This is one of 
 them. Nothing in it to suggest that the drawing is not for- 
 tuitous. But suppose before I begin to draw I ask: What is 
 the likelihood of my drawing these numbers in the; order named ? 
 The chances of my drawing that order would be immensely small. 
 Now, says the objector, you are trying to show the non-for- 
 
5* 
 tuitous character of the world by an appeal to probabilities; 
 but you are guilty of a fallacy; you are trying to applyto the 
 actual world rules that apply to a potential world. I grant, 
 he continues, that given the world's factors in atoms as about 
 to be shaken up and spilled out the probabilities are immensely 
 against their making this particular cosmos. But seeing that 
 these atoms must take some particular form, I see no reason 
 why they should not take this form. This is the objector's 
 case. It does not help the doctrine of a fortuitous origin of 
 things; but it serves to illustrate Mn V.'s position, that theistic 
 argument has nothing to do with the doctrine of probabilities. 
 If, however, objector's argument is good, so far as world is 
 concerned, it ought to be good in reference to smaller mat- 
 ters—the letters of the Iliad for example. And if we still 
 find that our unwillingness to entertain the idea of a fortuitous 
 origin holds its ground, it must be because of some reason 
 not found in calculus of probability. No reason for sur- 
 prise if the casual drawing of letters of alphabet from a hat 
 should give me a poem, or an essay, or a metaphysical treatise. 
 The surprise, we are told, is out of place. It is a transfer of 
 feelings to one set of conditions that are proper only under 
 another. If the argument is good as to world it is a fortiori 
 good as to Iliad. What is your answer to it? Our answer 
 is, that so far as probability is a calculable thing it has reference 
 to the constituent elements of the world, and of the Iliad, as so 
 many units capable of so many permutations. That the possible 
 permutations constitute basis of calculation as to an antecedent 
 probability of occurrence of a given sequence. But that it is 
 impossible after a sequence has occurred to make any rational 
 application of law of probability. The surprise we feel in the 
 imagined case of drawing letters of Iliad is not measured in 
 terms of calculus of probabilities, but is due to something 
 else. There is another element of which doctrine of proba- 
 bilities takes no account. The Iliad is expression of thought ; 
 it is the record of mind. Impossible for us to believe that 
 
52 
 
 mechanical forces working blindly should have so arranged 
 these letters as to have yielded these results. The calculus 
 of probabilities takes cognizance of numbers ; it can not meas- 
 ure mind. What is true of the Iliad is true of the world. 
 Doctrine of probabilities can not show, after the occurrence of 
 an event, how it occurred. In this argument we are not cal- 
 culating the chances of an event before it occurs ; we are 
 saying that, having occurred, it gives unmistakeable evidence 
 of having been produced by mind. 
 
 2. The second substitute for theistic inference respect- 
 ing order of the world is the doctrine of Law. This is pre- 
 sented as a satisfactory explanation of facts of the world ; 
 and some writers seem to think theistic belief is rendered un- 
 necessary by the generalization that everything is under law. 
 Do not try to make theistic argument out of juristic use of 
 word Law and say that every Law implies a Law-giver. We 
 use word Law in the scientific sense. How far does this 
 generalization offset theism ? Duke of Argyll is an earnest 
 theist but also an earnest believer in the reign of Law. 
 Nothing exempt from its rule ; " Not one of the countless 
 varieties of form which prevail in the clouds and which give 
 to the face of heaven such infinite expression. Not one of 
 these but is ruled by Law — woven or braided, or torn or 
 scattered, or gathered up again and folded — by Forces which 
 are free only within the bounds of Law." The Duke gives 
 four different uses of word Law in the Sphere of Science and 
 shews how in each case we advance from mere conception of 
 order to idea of force or power in explanation of the order. 
 Thus we are not satisfied with the fact that bodies move with 
 a certain regularity ; we seek an explanation of this regularity 
 — a formula which will embody it. And we not only seek 
 to embody the fact of motion, say in gravitation, in the ascer- 
 tained mathematical formula ; but we impute the fact 
 to a force which we call Law of gravitation. Now we 
 may say that Force is metaphysical and that we have no 
 
53 - 
 right to hypostatise entities to explain uniformity. If we do 
 that Law means simply uniformity of sequences. Then it 
 does not explain anything but only explains a part. We shall 
 say, however, that these manifestations due to some agency 
 and we shall give a more transcendental meaning to word 
 Law. Shall employ it to express not the order of the phe- 
 nomena but the explanation of that order. Going the full 
 length of inference we find that Theism is the only explan- 
 ation of that order. Must choose between an order that is 
 thus explained and one which is explained by reference to a 
 designing mind. The cosmological argument is thus admir- 
 ably expressed by Baden Powell in his " Order of Nature." " If 
 we read a book which requires much thought and exercise of 
 reason to understand but which we find discloses more and 
 more truth and reason as we proceed in its study and contains 
 clearly more than we can at present comprehend then unde- 
 niably we properly say that thought and reason exist in that 
 book irrespectively of our minds and equally so of any ques- 
 tion as to its author's origin. Such a book confessedly exists 
 and is even open to us in the natural world. Or to put it under 
 a slightly different form : — when the astronomer, the physic- 
 ist, the geologist or the materialist notes down a series of ob- - 
 served facts or measured data this is not the author express- 
 ing his own ideas, he is a mere amanuensis, taking down the 
 dictates of nature : his observation book is the record of the 
 thoughts of another mind; he has here set down literally what 
 he himself does not understand or only very imperfectly. 
 * * * * That which requires thought and reason to un- 
 derstand must be itself thought and reason. That which 
 mind alone can investigate or express must be itself mind." 
 
 3. The third objection to the theistic argument based on 
 the order of the world is the doctrine of the persistence of 
 Force. Physicus puts this forward as the strongest which 
 theism has to encounter. With the persistence of Force 
 an established fact, Powell's theistic position, Physicus 
 
54 
 thinks is without support Let us see what he means. 
 " What conclusions are we driven to accept ? Clearly- 
 looking to what has been said in the last two sections 
 that from the time when the process of evolution first 
 began, from the time before the condensation of the 
 nebula had shewed any sign of commencing — every subse- 
 quent change or event of evolution was necessarily bound to 
 ensue — else force and matter would not have been persistent." 
 Now what does this come to ? Simply this: that if we could 
 have been present when the process of evolution began and 
 could have been gifted with eyesight keen enough and 
 mathematical powers of sufficient scope we should have seen 
 that in the condition of things there and then the whole 
 future of things was provided for. Suppose that were true. 
 Would it destroy theism ? If we had been present and had 
 been constituted as we now are, should we not have looked 
 backwards as well as forward, and while we mathematically 
 predicted the future should we not have asked how this came 
 to be ? Should we not still have been necessitated to demand 
 some Power behind phenomena as the cause of these pheno- 
 mena. A mechanical conception of the universe is in the 
 highest degree theistic, provided that mechanical conception 
 does not include mind. The real objection which Physicus 
 makes is after all one which blots out mind or rather gives it 
 a mechanical genesis. For if you object that order im- 
 presses you as the work of mind, Physicus replies : " ac- 
 cording to the theory of evolution human intelligence like 
 everything else is evolved." And he continues : " Granting 
 that as a matter of fact an objective macrocosm exists, and if 
 we can prove or render probable that this objective 
 macrocosm is of itself sufficient to evolve a subjective micro- 
 cosm, I do not see any, the faintest reason for the latter to 
 conclude that a self-conscious intelligence is inherent 
 in the former merely because it is able to trace in 
 the macrocosm some of those orderly objective relations 
 
55 
 by which its own corresponding subjective relations were 
 originally produced." Physicus continues : " How - such 
 a thing as a conscious intelligence is possible is another 
 and wholly unanswerable question." Physicus then is a ma- 
 terialist. Matter is and matter moves, and the movements of 
 matter under the formula of evolution have given us the cos- 
 mos. Mind is the product of evolution. Here then we have 
 to distinguish. Does Physicus mean that there is an entity 
 mind as he believes that there is an entity matter and that 
 mind has been evolved from matter? If so then he agrees 
 with rest of world in affirming dualism of mind and matter 
 and it is only a question which is the ptius of the other. No 
 difficulty in choosing between these alternatives. Does he 
 believe that mind is a function of matter ; and that there is 
 no entity mind; but that in the thinking, reasoning being 
 called Physicus we have only so many atoms in relation to 
 one another? Then Physicus is a materialistic monist. If, 
 therefore, what he calls mind, meaning himself, be only matter, 
 it is not strange that he should not believe in the mind of 
 God. If he, the thinking being, is only a series of molecular 
 motions, then he the mind, does not exist. We can agree with 
 Physicus however, in saying that we can not hold on with con- 
 fidence to our belief in God's mind after belief in my own 
 mind is gone. If one is not justified in believing in his own 
 mind as the subject of his thoughts and the substratum of his 
 purpose, he may be excused, if he doubt a purposing, and in- 
 telligent, supreme and Infinite mind. You can not be a ma- 
 terialist and a theist at the same time. But if man the thinker 
 is evolved : if he is himself the physical side of matter, mat- 
 ter construed subjectively, then we should like to know what 
 knowledge is. If man is mattei— atoms ; if man, the 
 thinker, does not know himself; has been mistaken about 
 himself, is irredeemably led to believe in mind, and to see 
 mind in the objective world ; and if it turn out that he is 
 wrong about himself, his mind, his convictions regarding mind 
 
56 
 
 in nature, how does he know that he is right about matter ? about 
 the persistence of force ? The persistence of force, when car- 
 ried the length of materialistic monism, blots out the theistic 
 argument, as Physicus shews. It blots out belief by blotting 
 out the basis of belief. It is a very inconsistent sort of phi- 
 losophy that first repudiates metaphysics and affirms that we 
 know nothing but phenomena; which then construes the 
 world and writes history in terms of matter; which even 
 accounts for mind under the formula of materialistic evolution, 
 and yet at the last denies the charge of materialism, denies 
 the dualism of mind and matter, and affirms a monistic theory 
 of the universe in the terms of a hypostatised something that 
 is neither mind nor matter. If, then, materialism be absurd, 
 as most men concede ; if there be not two substances, but 
 one; then this one, which is the basis of the monistic 
 theory — is what? Why, if there must be a thinker 
 before a thought, a feeler before a felt, a knowen 
 before a known — there can be no way of con- 
 struing a monistic philosophy which is not suicide ex- 
 cept it be that which takes the feeler, the thinker, the knower 
 as the basis of monism. A theory of the universe that leads 
 every man to say all things are like me, is a theory which makes 
 mind the only existence. For mind is the name we give to 
 what in the case of each of us we call me. Wriggle as men 
 may mind is bound to be the prius of all existence. Let 
 mind be — let mind rule and we shall call that mind God. 
 
NOTES FROM LECTURE VI. 
 
 C. THE TELEOLOGIAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 Commonly known as argument from final cause or the design 
 argument. First understand what is meant by final cause. By 
 final cause is meant the end for which a thing or an event exists. 
 Thus distinguished from efficient cause which always means the 
 agency by which anything is brought about. If, in regard to an 
 event — say an eclipse — you ask the questton, Why? the answer 
 will give you the cause. If, in regard to an object like a locomo- 
 tive, you ask, What for? the answer will give you, not the agent 
 who made the engine, but the purpose for which it was made ; and 
 you will express this in other terms by saying that the final cause of 
 a locomotive is railway travel. The tiling is conditioned by the 
 purpose which it is meant to serve. And this purpose is thus meta- 
 phorically conceived of as a cause. Strictly speaking, a final cause 
 is not a cause at all ; it is not an agent. Absurd to put mechanical 
 causes and final causes into antithesis and to speak of God as a final 
 cause. A final cause never answers question, How or Why ; it 
 always answers question, for what? With this understanding of 
 meaning of final cause, we enter upon two-fold inquiry suggested 
 by Janet : 
 
 i. Is finality a law of nature? 
 
 2. What is the cause of this finality? 
 
 I. Is Finality a Law of Nature ? 
 
 Deal with this question by considering: First. The nature of 
 process by which we are led to believe that there are ends in nature. 
 Secondly. The specific proofs in support of faculty. Thirdly. The 
 objections to the doctrine of finality. 
 
 President Porter holds, in his Human Intellect, that final cause 
 is an intuition. He defends this by six reasons, which are not con- 
 clusive. We are not under any necessity to ask regarding an event 
 
what end it serves, as we are to ask what brought it about. On the 
 contrary, design argument is a case of analogical reasoning. As 
 Mill says, it is an inductive argument according to method of agree- 
 ment. We pass from our own experience analogically to the infer- 
 ence that the arrangements and collocations are the result of intention . 
 Argument has two stages. In the first place, we know from our own 
 experience that certain ideal future to be brought about stands related 
 to certain means necessary to the accomplishing of this result. A. and 
 B. are related to each other as means and ends. Passing from our 
 own consciousness to the cognition of facts outside of consciousness, 
 we see phenomena related to each other in a way that irresistibly 
 suggest the relation of means and ends, and we accordingly say that 
 B. was final cause of A. To be sure, we are not as certain of this 
 relationship in matters outside of consciousness as we are of matters 
 of consciousness. Finality, in short, seems stamped upon nature. 
 The next question is to account for this Finality. A. and B. look 
 as if they were means and end. Again we revert to our own ex- 
 perience, and since the only finality of which we have any immediate 
 knowledge is that of a purposing mind — in other words, since finality 
 implies intentionality in our conscious experience, the inference from 
 finality to intentionality is natural and almost necessary. Accord- 
 ingly, let us consider the specific proof of finality. When we ask 
 whether there is finality in nature, we mean to ask whether an ideal 
 future conditions physical phenomena. How can we tell ? We 
 can only interrogate physical phenomena by comparing them ; 
 by asking whether a given hypothesis will account for them, and 
 whether objections can be urged against the hypothesis. The proof 
 of finality consists in the cumulative force of a great multitude of 
 as ifs. Reasoning according to analogy, it looks as if the wide 
 domain of nature were a great system of ideals, as if striving 
 toward an end were the great characteristic of nature. We must 
 begin where Janet did, in shewing the proofs of finality, with the 
 purposive action of which we are all conscious. In our purposive 
 life we form ideals which condition and determine action. We see 
 action performed by our fellow-men that seem to be dictated by 
 purpose and directed to attain an end. We impute to them a 
 teleological meaning, and say that they are conditioned by an ideal 
 
future. We descend a step. Actions of the lower animals strike 
 us irresistibly as purposive. The dog certainly acts as if he had a 
 purpose, and those who say that incipient religion and morality 
 are to be found in the dog ocght not to object if we go the length 
 of imputing finality in some sense of conscious purpose to the dog's 
 action. We do not say that the dog, ant and bee have an ideal 
 consciously in view, and that they accordingly adopt means to ends. 
 We are conscious of intelligence and purpose in ourselves ; we 
 infer it with certainty in other men ; we infer it with strong proba- 
 bility of truth in some animals below man, and we come to a point 
 where the action as definitely suggests adaptation of means to ends, 
 though we see no reason to credit the animal with consciousness. 
 But is the finality less because it is not attended with a conscious- 
 ness of the end to be attained ? Analogy thus suggests that action 
 with reference to results, whether consciously or unconsciously, is 
 everywhere manifest throughout animal life. We turn then to rela- 
 tion of organ and function ; the relation of eye to vision ; of 
 stomach to digestion ; of the whole secreting system to the func- 
 tions of life. We are at once on the familiar ground of Natural 
 Theology. We consider also the relation of organ and organism, 
 and the suggestion of finality meets us there. We find that there 
 is a close and apparently premeditated relation between organ and 
 organism, and this is paralleled by the correspondence between 
 organism and environment. With the thinkers of all ages we 
 should say : These adaptations are not accidents — they are inten- 
 tional. They bespeak purpose and a presiding mind. In all these 
 instances of adaptation of organ to function, organ to organism, 
 organism to environment, the physical antecedents have been 
 shaped with reference to the ideal future. The same teleological 
 trend of things is manifest in the world. For study of the world 
 shows that things sustain relations of lower and higher. Scientists 
 see prophecies of the higher in the lower. An otimistic evolution- 
 ist, looking for a sociological millenium, would say that there is an 
 upward tendency ; that nature is moving toward a goal ; that she is 
 rising on stepping-stones of her dead self to higher things. Along- 
 this line of argument theologists conduct the proof that there is 
 finality in nature. That proof consists in shewing that there is the 
 
closest analogy between relation of part and part, part and whole ; 
 in the organic world that«there is between means and ends, in the 
 sphere of our own purposive action. Thirdly. Let us consider 
 objections to doctrine of final causes. These objections, not as 
 formidable as in their usually unclassified form they sometimes 
 appear to be, may be considered under three heads. Objections of 
 the first class are clear cases of ignoratio elenchi. They are irrele- 
 vant, because they do not bear on the particular point we are dis- 
 cussing. Thus : 
 
 (a.) May concede all Bacon has said without feeling that 
 design argument has been affected. No right to begin an inquiry, 
 whether there be soda in the sun by asking what good soda would 
 do there. The physicist wishes to discuss causes not final causes. 
 
 (£.) Same is true of Des Cartes' objection. He says we are 
 ignorant of ends. So we are. And if we were imputing a final 
 cause to ever event, the objection w r ould be valid. But we are not. 
 We say that organic nature has an appearance of finality. It looks 
 as if certain physical coincidences were conditioned by an ideal 
 future by an end. 
 
 (V.) Equally irrelevant is the objection that the doctrine of 
 final cause assumes, that man is the final cause of creation. Surely, 
 is not necessary to hold that every thing was made for man, 
 because it is held that the eye was made for seeing. 
 
 (d.) Nor because some have abused final causes by urging 
 a priori that certain hypotheses could not be true, because, if true, 
 they would serve no good purpose are we to get rid of the 
 argument from final cause. Nor because some have ridiculed tele- 
 ology by treating every possible use of an organ as an intended use, 
 does it follow that teleology deserves no consideration. 
 
 Second-class of objections come from the quarter of biology. 
 In opposition to the claims of teleology that organs are related to 
 functions as means to end, we are told that there are rudimentary 
 organs that are never developed, and that cannot be used without 
 inflicting injury on organism of which it is a part. We are asked 
 to make this fact harmonize with the general doctrine of teleology. 
 But these facts are not a serious objection. For does it follow that 
 other cases of design are to be discredited, because, in some facts 
 
we fail to see the signs of beneficient contuvance? Must we deny 
 finality where we do see it, because there are cases where we fail to 
 see it. 
 
 Many ways of replying to objections to this class; e. g.: 
 
 i. We do not affirm that every detail of organization is 
 designed to serve a useful purpose. 2. We do not know that an 
 organ has no uses because we do not see its uses. 3. Obvious 
 finality in a multitude of cases is not set aside by a case of appar- 
 ent want of finality. 4. These rudimentary and useless organs are 
 explainable without denying teleology. Suppose they are survivals 
 of a past condition of things ? The Evolutionist would say that : 
 This would be a good reason wfiy, though useless and rudimentary, 
 they should exist. Their presence would not affect teleology unless 
 evolution affects teleology. Suppose that, while each species is due 
 to the creation of God, there is a uniformity of type in the natural 
 world ? That would account for the organs, and be a good reason 
 why they should exist. But their presence would not destroy teleo- 
 logical significance of other facts. The point that concerns us is 
 not how these organs came into existence. The question is, 
 Whether, being here, they cancel teleological significance of all 
 other facts whose usefulness and adaptation are conceded ? We 
 believe they do not. 
 
 Thirdly. Objections to the design argument, of the third 
 class may be expressed by saying that the effect has been 
 taken for the cause. This is the way the Epicureans expressed it. 
 We say — this is an illustration of what they meant — that vision is 
 the cause (final) of the eye, when we know that the eye is the cause 
 (efficient) of vision. This was the objection urged by Maupertius. 
 Substantially that of the anti-teleological Evolutionists. The ques- 
 tion is not whether evolution be true. Answer to that may be left 
 where it belongs. Suppose it were true, is it contradictory to tele- 
 ology ? Can it dispense with teleology ? These are most important 
 questions that natural theology has to answer. 
 
 Scientifically speaking, evolution means simply a process. When 
 scientific man undertakes to explain the process he begins to deal 
 with metaphysics. Scientifically speaking, the question is, whether 
 species have originated separately and distinctly, or whether they 
 
6 
 
 sustain genetic relations to one another. This is a form of larger 
 question, whether all the forms of complex phenomenal existence 
 have followed simple forms of existence, along in a line of infi- 
 nitesimal changes. If it were true that God buiit the universe by 
 the process known as evolution, would it not still be a question how 
 God operated ? If evolution were the mode of His working, you 
 would see what you see now. You would see order. You would 
 see organ and function as if made for each other. You might say 
 that species developed, one out of another, by cnange of environ- 
 ment, &c. But here is a fact. There is order in the organic world. 
 There is a logic of classification. There is an upward tendency. 
 There is now, at all events, a purpose in man. You may say 
 that we and our fellow-men are not adapted to our environment 
 in order to live, but, that, happening to suit the soil, we do live, 
 the present order of things being nature's happy hit after millions of 
 experiments. If you do this you say again this is a chance world. 
 Or you may say this order, adaption and upward movement are 
 intended. If you take the latter view, effect of evolution upon 
 teleology is simply to put a great many physical antecedents 
 between the ideal and the attainment of the end. We see but one 
 objection to teleological idea in view of evolution. That is the 
 large amount of waste. Why do we have so many abortive 
 structures ? Why do so many races die in order to. get one to 
 live? Why did not God make organs perfect and species without 
 intervening links ? Theological question, Why he did not, may be 
 postponed till it is shown that he did not. But if he did not — if 
 in all life up to the life eternal, the law of selection holds good — 
 what is waste? By what right do we say that all the abortive 
 structures were in order to secure the good ones ? Not only does 
 teleology not suffer at the hands of evolution, but evolution cannot 
 dispense with teleology. Try and construe the organic world accord- 
 ing to doctrine of evolution without teleology. Then it follows that 
 the world of organic life, which has been a scene of war, pillage and 
 bloodshed, has become a world of order by the bare chance that right 
 conditions of organism and environment combine. Or do you help 
 matters if you say that these adaptations can be explained mechan- 
 ically. Do you destroy finality by a mechanical explanation ? 
 
And if you explain the relation of organs and organism mechan- 
 ically, so as to get rid of finality, may you not explain v mechan- 
 ically, the instinctive actions of lower animals — those % which 
 involve self-defense and protection of the young and foresight 
 of the future. Why stop there? If they are mechanical, are not 
 the dog's acts mechanical ? Could we not suppose that what seems 
 purposive is only mechanical ? Where is the line between mechan- 
 ical acts in the ant and intelligent acts in the dog ? And if 
 your analogy fail in the case of the dog, how do you know 
 it will not fail in regard to your fellow-man ? How do you 
 know that his so-called purposive act is not mechanical ? You 
 would say, doubtless, Because he can talk. But how do you know 
 that your own purposive actions are not mechanical ? Here is your 
 trouble : If you admit finality in your own action, where will you 
 stop? What right have you to stop in the downward aspect of 
 things? On the other hand, if you admit that what appears to be 
 finality in organisms is only mechanical, where does mechanism 
 stop in the upward aspect of things ? Evolution does not deliver us 
 from necessity of choosing between chance and purpose in explana- 
 tion of the world. But, possibly, those who admit finality will not 
 be ready to concede the theistic inference which accounts for that 
 finality. We come, therefore, to consider the second of the two 
 questions into which this discussion falls. 
 
 II. What is the Explanation of the finality in Nature ? 
 
 To this four answers have been given, which we well considered, 
 under following heads : 
 
 (i.) Subjective finality. (2.) Immanent finality. (3.) Un- 
 conscious finality. (4.) Intentional finality, 
 
 1. Subjective Finality. — This is Kant's doctrine, which Janet 
 sums up thus : "In a word finality is an hypothesis, and even a 
 necessary hypothesis, given the conformation of the human mind ; 
 but nothing warrants us to suppose that this hypothesis has an 
 objective foundation in reality, and that an understanding that 
 should penetrate to the very principle of nature, would still be 
 obliged to conform to it." This simply doctrine of relativity over 
 again. It is saying our knowledge is limited to our circumstances. 
 
As things go we are impressed with finality of nature, but if we 
 had a more minute acquaintance with nature we might have a 
 different opinion. Upon subjective finality we remark : 
 
 (a.) If we were under necessity of seeing finality in everything, 
 then subjective finality would be best guarantee of objective finality, 
 and discussions about its objective value would belong to same class 
 as objective validity of cause and effect. 
 
 (b.) But since there is no such necessity, we do not see finality 
 in everything. If, then, we see finality in some things and not in 
 others, there must be some objective ground for this distinction, 
 and finality cannot be altogether subjective. 
 
 (c. ) Finality is not the less finality because it is brought about 
 through mechanical causes. As true of beauty as of the eye. 
 
 (d.) Finality in nature being simply an hypothesis to explain a 
 fact, the question is, whether it is more reasonable to believe in it 
 or to reject it. Does not affect the question to distinguish, as Kant 
 does, between aesthetical and teleological finality. For the judgment 
 of finality is same in all cases. Invariably it takes form of adaptation 
 of means to ends. Whether an object exhibit finality may depend 
 on way we look at it, and finality may be subjective in that sense;, 
 but in no other. Thus, one may say that there is correspondence 
 between his judgment and certain forms, and that to the pleasure- 
 giving correspondence he gives the name of beauty. In this way 
 he makes the beauty subjective and eliminates the finality. ' Or, he 
 may say, "This is a beautiful world," and in this case he makes 
 beauty objective, and it becomes at once apparent that beauty is 
 one of the ends nature has had before her. If you give beauty an 
 objective place in the world, you will do with it as you do respect- 
 ing form and function ; you will reason analogically. You will say, 
 "This art of nature anticipates the art that copies nature." You 
 will go from the copies to the original. You will not impute the 
 copy to industry and effort, and the original to chance and the 
 fortuitous concourse of atoms. 
 
 2. Immanent Finality. — The Hegelian doctrine affirms finality, 
 but credits it to the activity of nature, and denies personal God. 
 Kant paved the way for it by noticing two important points of 
 distinction : First. That the works of art and those of nature 
 
differ in this respect, that in the former the agent stands outside of 
 his work ; while in nature it is different. Man makes the parts of a 
 watch, but they sustain no organic relation to each other. Nature, 
 however, has a formative, reparative and reproductive power which 
 distinguishes her works from those of human art: Secondly. Kant 
 made the distinction between extrinsic and intrsnsic ends. To say 
 that small fish were made to furnish food for the large ones is to give 
 the external end of the small fish. And the teleology that builds 
 mainly upon extrinsic ends is very apt to expose itself to merited 
 ridicule. But we are not obliged to emphasize extrinsic ends. 
 Suppose we emphasize the internal ends. Small fish is made to be 
 eaten perhaps. But it is made to live first ; to exhibit a certain 
 specific form of organic existence. An ideal has been realized in 
 that organism, whatever external end it may afterwards serve. This 
 means that the forms of nature in the organic and inorganic world 
 are the realization of an ideal. No need of supposing that an end 
 has some extrinsic reference in order to constitute an end. Hence, 
 the Hegelian doctrine of immanent finality upon which we remark. 
 
 (a.) That whatever view be taken as to the mode in which 
 finality expresses itself, the Hegelian doctrine affords an unequivo- 
 cal concession to doctrine of final causes. 
 
 (b.) Must distinguish between finality and the cause of finality. 
 Hegel agrees with the Theist in affirming the fact. He differs with 
 him in the explanation of it. Nothing in immanent finality to 
 interfere with legitimate teleology. Nature gives no evidence of a 
 worker from without. Theism not compromised by Immanence. 
 
 (c.) Though distinction between external and internal ends be 
 a valid one, it is, nevertheless, impossible, always, to separate one 
 from the other. Our bodily organization is a unity which consists 
 in the adaptation of part to part. The body is a system. The eye 
 is a system. The several parts of the body are systems. Each 
 system realizes its end in being such a system. But the whole body 
 realizes its end as a system only by the co-ordination and adapta- 
 tion of systems to each other. 
 
 (d.) When Hegel, affirming finality, affirms that if is a finality 
 which is not conscious and active, but only the activity of nature, 
 he is not arguing, but only affirming. 
 
3. Unconscious Finality. — This is the doctrine of Schopen- 
 hauer and Hartmann, and differs little from that of Hegel. It 
 admits the finality of nature, affirms intelligence as accounting for 
 this finality, but maintains that this is an unconscious intelligence. 
 Advocates of this view are zoomorphoic, and undertake to explain 
 nature by watching instincts of animals. Do not know what an 
 unconscious intelligence is that adapts means to ends and directs 
 the whole telelogical trend of nature without purpose and without 
 knowing what it does. Schopenhauer has given us the choice of 
 conceiving God as like men and explaining finality by purpose and 
 conscious intelligence, or making nature in the likeness of the brute 
 and explaining finality by instinct. By so much as the former is 
 more rational than the latter, by that much is Theism more worthy 
 of our consideration than the substitutes for it that have been under 
 consideration. And Theism is that theory of the universe that 
 explains the adaptation of means to ends in the universe by the 
 doctrine of 
 
 4 . Intentional Finality, 
 

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