Class _^4LO. 
 Book 1 
 
 ''-^ ■g'-/ »!>' 
 
 Copyright N?_ 
 
 J vJ. 
 
 COPYRISHT DEPOSIT. 
 
MOTORING THROUGH 
 NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 NAPOLEON'S FIRST CAMPAIGN 
 
MOTORING THROUGH 
 NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 NAPOLEON'S FIRST 
 CAMPAIGN 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES PORTER KIMBALL 
 
 CHICAGO 
 
 PRIVATELY PRINTED 
 
 1911 
 
^ ^ iA v^ 
 
 Copyright, 1911, by 
 Charles Porter Kimball 
 
 CCi.A2920G4 
 
MOTORING THROUGH 
 NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 |T was with the intention of visiting the 
 battlefields of Napoleon Bonaparte's first 
 campaign that we decided to take a motor 
 trip through northern Italy. There it was 
 that the great Corsican laid the foundation 
 of his glory. It was through Italy that he 
 subjugated France. So, early one bright July morning in 
 1910, with a typically hot Italian sun and the concierge of 
 the Eden Palace Hotel, the only ones up early enough 
 to see us off, we left Genoa in an Itala machine, with Ales- 
 sandria our destination for the first day's run. For some 
 distance the road follows the Mediterranean, turning innumer- 
 able sharp angles, thereby endangering many a collision with 
 peasants in market wagons — on whom the chauffeur vented 
 his anger in true Italian style. Not only were we obliged 
 to stop in order that we might argue the better as to which 
 had the right of way, but at most railroad crossings the gates 
 would be lowered a good ten minutes before the train so 
 much as put in an appearance, and only by the inducement 
 of a few coppers would the woman with the red flag consent 
 to let us pass. We turned inland at Savona, ascending the 
 slopes of the Apennines, and stopped at the crossroads of 
 Carcare. This is the fork which Napoleon had seized after 
 the battle of Montennotte, as it was of great strategic value 
 
 7 
 
MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 Castle of Cosseria 
 
 — the road to the left leading to Turin and that to the right 
 to Milan. We left the main road in order to get some 
 pictures of the castle of Cosseria, after which we went on 
 to Millessimo. After returning to Carcare we soon reached 
 Cairo where we had an uneatable lunch at a queer old 
 tavern. In some miraculous way the daughter of the house 
 managed to relieve the pockets of my duster of all that 
 they contained while we, blissfully ignorant of the fact, 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 9 
 
 were in the meantime paying for the meal, the greater part 
 of which we fed to the dog. In three hours more we 
 were in our little hotel at Alessandria where we had planned 
 to spend the night — never supposing that the distance was 
 so short. 
 
 When Napoleon Bonaparte, appointed Commander-in- 
 Chief of the Army of Italy in March, 1796, arrived in Nice, 
 he found the army in a pitiable state. It had been utterly 
 neglected during the winter by the Directory — it had very 
 little money, its generals were demoralized, there was cor- 
 ruption connected with the administration, and the soldiers 
 were half starved and half clothed. It appeared anything but 
 a bright prospect to Napoleon. At first the older generals 
 looked askance at the young Corsican and grumbled at being 
 superseded by a young man of twenty-six who had little 
 experience in war. But Bonaparte soon showed his char- 
 acter, by his punishment of the government officials who 
 were robbing the army, his personal zeal, and the pains he 
 exerted to have his men well fed and clothed. He issued 
 a very stirring proclamation, foretelling his victories and the 
 triumphant march through Italy, thereby raising the spirits 
 of the army. To better illustrate his strategy, it might be 
 advisable to describe the position of the opposing armies. 
 The divisions of Serurier and Augereau, about 15,000 strong, 
 were spread out along the upper Tanaro valley down to the 
 sea, from which point to beyond Savona were 17,000 men 
 under Massena and La Harpe. The troops of the Allies 
 were poorly distributed, as they were stretched out for more 
 than sixty miles and inter-communication between the various 
 parts was almost impossible owing to the mountain ranges 
 separating them. Colli, commanding the Piedmontese, stood 
 along the roads from Coni to Millessimo, with about 25,000 
 men; and the Austrians, 35,000 strong under Beaulieu, a 
 
lo MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 veteran of the Seven Years' War, lay spread out from the 
 Bochetta Pass, north of Genoa, to Dego. Napoleon saw 
 the false position in which the enemy had placed itself, with 
 its strength at both ends of a long line, and a weak center. 
 To weaken their center still further, he bluffed Beaulieu into 
 supposing that Genoa was the point of the French attack. 
 Napoleon had previously warned that city that on account 
 of their violation of neutrality he was going to punish them 
 and this news was immediately transmitted to Beaulieu who 
 had orders from Vienna to protect Genoa at any cost. 
 Curiously enough nine years later the Republic of Genoa 
 voluntarily gave up its independence and contented itself 
 with becoming the principal town in the 27th military divi- 
 sion of the Empire. Consequently, Cervoni's march on Voltri 
 alarmed Beaulieu who reinforced Sebottendorf and ordered the 
 latter to arrest the French advance. Another Austrian force of 
 10,000 troops under Argenteau was ordered to debouch from 
 Sassello to Savona. Beaulieu supposed that between these two 
 columns the advance guard of the French would be cut off 
 and destroyed. The Austrian general could not have played 
 better into Napoleon's hands. On April loth, while Cervoni 
 held Sebottendorf's superior numbers in check, Bonaparte 
 quickly brought up Augereau, Massena and La Harpe to 
 attack Argenteau 's column which had been arrested by 
 Rampon, with 1,200 men, in the redoubt at Montennotte. 
 The Austrians were not prepared for an attack in such 
 force and had to beat a disastrous retreat to Dego with a 
 loss of 2,500 men. On this day Napoleon wrote to Massena: 
 "Everything assures us that the work of to-day and that of 
 to-morrow will tell in history." Some years later when the 
 Emperor of Austria asked Napoleon whence he dated his 
 nobility, he replied calmly: ** Sire, from the day of the battle 
 of Montennotte." Beaulieu, who accompanied Sebottendorf's 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 1 1 
 
 column, learning of the combat at Montennotte, saw the 
 uselessness of a further advance towards Savona and ordered 
 his troops to reach Dego by such mountain roads as were 
 available. Napoleon now turned his attention to Colli and 
 sent 10,000 men against him via Millessimo and ordered 
 Serurier to advance down to Tanaro. On the 13th Augereau 
 struck a force under Provera, in the castle of Cosseria. 
 
 Adda — Lodi 
 
 From want of water and ammunition, the Sardinian general 
 was obliged to surrender next day with 1,500 men. On the 
 14th Napoleon turned his attention to the Austrians again 
 and attacked Dego, which fell by evening. It was here that 
 Bonaparte for the first time noticed Lannes in action, as he 
 led a brisk bayonet charge which drove the Austrians out 
 of the town. In these three or four days, Napoleon had 
 worked so rapidly and successfully that he had pierced the 
 center of the Allies, causing them a loss of about 9,000 
 
12 MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 troops, and set Beaulieu to collecting his scattered soldiers 
 for the bare protection of Lombardy. The Austrians were 
 now fully cut off from Colli, and Napoleon determined to 
 crush the latter before Beaulieu could gather enough men 
 to come to his assistance. On the 28th a truce was signed 
 between France and Piedmont at Cherasco, whereby Napoleon 
 got possession of the three fortresses of Coni, Alessandria and 
 Tortona. As Bonaparte said in his proclamation of April 
 26th, the French army had won six victories, taken twenty- 
 one flags, fifty-five guns and fifteen thousand prisoners and 
 killed or wounded more than ten thousand men in a fortnight. 
 He ended with the fulfilled prediction, "And if, victors of 
 Toulon, you foretold the immortal campaign of 1796, your 
 present victories foretell a yet finer one." 
 
 Our second day's run was from Alessandria to Milan, by 
 way of Placentia. We left early in the morning, and after 
 paying the large sum of one franc for our garage bill, struck 
 the broad highway which leads to Tortona. A few miles 
 out of Alessandria we came upon the famous battlefield of 
 Marengo, where four years later Napoleon won a memorable 
 victory over the Austrians which brought peace to the Conti- 
 nent for several years. From Tortona we followed the same 
 road over which the special column under Gen. Dallemagne 
 made its famous march to Placentia. Here we stopped for 
 lunch. After partaking of a meal, consisting principally 
 of soup and fruit, as the rest of the menu was too strongly 
 Italian for us, we again set out, and within an hour or so 
 reached Lodi. We crossed the long bridge and thought of 
 the courage it must have required to rush over in the face 
 of cannon. We were so glad at about four o'clock to perceive 
 in the distance the familiar spires and lace-work of the Milan 
 Cathedral looming up ahead of us, as we wanted to see as 
 much of that famous city as we could before darkness set in. 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 13 
 
 To return to the Austrians, BeauHeu had decided that 
 it would be impossible to remain on the right bank of 
 the Po and had consequently crossed the Valentia on May 
 1st. He took up his position at Valeggio, and along the 
 north bank of the Po as far as the Ticino. Napoleon, in 
 his negotiations with the Piedmontese, stipulated that he 
 was to have permission to cross the Po near Valentia, 
 
 Bridge over Adda at Lodi 
 
 without having the slightest intention of so doing, however. 
 Beaulieu did not suspect the bluff and prepared to meet 
 their supposed crossing. Bonaparte saw that by holding 
 the Austrians opposite Valencia, he might cross the Po 
 further down with little resistance and thereby turn their 
 position. Consequently, on May 6th a special corps, under 
 Gen. Dallemagne, started its march for Placentia, while 
 Serurier at Valencia and Massena at Salo, kept the Aus- 
 trians from suspecting this turning manoeuvre. On the 
 
14 MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 7th the head of Dallemagne's column reached Placentia, 
 after marching from Tortona, 45 miles, in thirty-six hours. 
 The lack of a pontoon bridge prevented Napoleon from 
 dealing the Austrians a fatal blow, for the crossing, by means 
 boats, was necessarily slow. By the 8th Liptay, with 5,000 
 men, had come up and struck the French column at 
 Fombio where, during the night, La Harpe was killed by 
 the fire of some of his own men. Liptay was forced back 
 on Pizzighetone with considerable loss, and Beaulieu, by 
 this time realizing the full meaning of the French crossing 
 at Placentia and the danger of his being cut in two, gave 
 immediate orders for a complete withdrawal behind the Adda 
 and concentration at Cremona. He left Sebottendorf with 
 12,000 troops at Lodi to act as rear guard. During the 
 8th and 9th Massena's and Augereau's divisions crossed 
 at Placentia and pushed forward to Borghetto where, at 
 3 A. M. on the tenth, Napoleon joined the former's division. 
 On Dallemagne's reporting that Lodi was held in force, orders 
 were at once issued for the various divisions to march thither. 
 Before noon the French van reached Lodi, which was soon 
 taken by Dallemagne's grenadiers. The Austrians, in their 
 retreat, were followed so closely by the French troops that 
 they could not destroy the bridge, and Napoleon, seeing this, 
 ordered batteries to open fire on those across the river and 
 give time for Augereau's and Massena's troops, 12,000 in 
 all, to come up. At 7 P. M. the grenadiers, formed in a 
 deep column, dashed upon the long bridge shouting "Vive 
 La Republic." They were brought to a standstill by the 
 enemy's fire and only rallied by the exertions of their chiefs — 
 Dallemagne, Massena, Berthier, Lannes and Napoleon — who, 
 without a moment's hesitation led them forward again. The 
 first Austrian line and all the guns were captured and soon 
 Sebottendorf, seeing the impossibility of keeping his men in 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 15 
 
 good order, retreated toward Cremona. Some military critics 
 have blamed Napoleon for his attack on the bridge at Lodi, 
 claiming that it would have been wiser and safer to have 
 turned the Austrian position by crossing further up the river 
 just as Beaumont's cavalry division actually did. The fact 
 of the matter is that Napoleon wished to give an example of 
 his courage and Lodi was the first chance he had of doing 
 this, for, though it was not a great strategic feat, it was 
 extremely bold. Others claim that after he had accomplished 
 his purpose, he should have followed Sebottendorf's division 
 more closely than he did and Beaulieu himself admitted that 
 Napoleon could have gained the city of Mantua, as it was 
 totally unprepared for a siege. The French troops, however, 
 had had no rest for nearly a month and Napoleon realized 
 that Beaulieu had the start and it would be extremely hard 
 to catch him before he reached Mantua. Futhermore he 
 thought it better to establish French rule over what had 
 already been gained rather than advance prematurely. The 
 battle of Lodi and the capture of Pizzighetone, two days 
 later, gave the French the whole course of the Adda and 
 opened the gates of Milan to Napoleon. 
 
 On our third day's tour we set out bright and early, 
 bound for Mantua. We had lunch at Brescia and had 
 the pleasure of being served by a waiter who spoke fairly 
 good English. It seemed so strange that a man who had 
 been energetic enough to go all the way to London in order 
 to speak her language should bury himself in such a small 
 town, especially one unfrequented by tourists. The scenery 
 that afternoon was the most beautiful so far, as the greater 
 part of the road ran along the Lake of Garda. Our first view 
 of the lake was from the heights above Salo — a never-to-be- 
 forgotten sight — with the color of the water the most intense 
 dark blue, within which the sky was reflected and as a back- 
 
i6 MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 ground the high dark mountains making a perfect frame for 
 this marvelous painting of Nature. We left the lake at 
 Desenzano and passed through Lonato and Castiglione. 
 Crossing the Mincio at Goito we followed the road along the 
 left bank and shortly reached the broad expanse of water that 
 surrounds Mantua. The city itself, on account of the narrow 
 streets and enclosing walls, was extremely hot and stifling. 
 The only hotel that the place can boast of was charming — 
 the restaurant being out of doors in a courtyard. Mantua 
 having a large garrison, we saw more soldiers there than in 
 any other city where we had stopped. 
 
 The defeat at Lodi determined Beaulieu to seek safety 
 behind the Mincio, towards which river the French advanced 
 from the Adda the last week in May. Again the Austrian 
 commander was duped as to the real point of crossing, and 
 on the 30th, Kilmaine, with the van, forced a passage at Val- 
 eggio, the other divisions following. The Austrians were so 
 demoralized that they retired behind the Adige and assembled 
 at Dolce. Napoleon had to take Mantua before advancing 
 any further, and it was that siege and the various attempts to 
 relieve it that occupied the attention of both leaders. Bona- 
 parte established his headquarters at Roverbella, whence he 
 could watch the siege of Mantua, and take care of any Aus- 
 trian advance down the Adige valley. Of the 42,000 French 
 troops, Massena's corps was stationed about Verona, those of 
 Serurier and Augereau were besieging Mantua, and Dalle- 
 mange's grenadiers, with the division of Vaubois from the 
 Army of the Alps, were at Roverbella. During June and 
 July Napoleon wrote repeatedly for reinforcements, as reports 
 had come in that Beaulieu's successor, Wurmser, with 25,000 
 veterans from the Rhine, was ordered to relieve Mantua. 
 The siege of that city had been carried on actively in spite of 
 the fact that French were far from being well equipped for it, 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 17 
 
 having only 140 heavy guns against 3 16. Two attempts were 
 made in July to take the place by assault, but they failed, 
 and a siege bombardment was resorted to. Towards the end 
 of July Wurmser began his advance for the relief of Mantua. 
 Dividing his army into two columns, he sent Quosdonavich, 
 with 18,000 troops around Lake Garda, and with the main 
 body of about 30,000 troops, prepared descend the Adige from 
 
 Bridge leading to Mantua 
 
 Trent. The Austrian commander thought the French would 
 be forced to fall back immediately to the right bank of the 
 Po, and consequently ordered Quosdonavich, after taking 
 Brescia, to seize Placentia and cut off Napoleon's retreat. 
 Had he been dealing with any other general than Bonaparte 
 no doubt he would have reasoned correctly, for the French 
 were in a ticklish position. The enemy by the 29th had 
 broken through the French lines at Rivoli, Salo and Brescia. 
 Although Napoleon feared he would have to give up the line 
 
i8 MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 of the Mincio, he was determined not to retreat without a 
 struggle. After fully collecting himself, he saw the mistake 
 Wurmser had made in separating his superior army into so 
 many columns that if attacked separately, would prove too 
 weak for the combined French army. Montennotte had 
 taught the Austrians nothing, for they still clung to the idea 
 of an advance in many columns. Napoleon decided to fall 
 on the division of Quosdonavich and ordered Sauret to retake 
 Salo and Massena to give up Verona and take post at Lonato. 
 As every man was needed to meet the Austrian advance, the 
 siege of Mantua was raised, and Serurier and Augereau given 
 orders to assemble at Valeggio, whence they were hurried to 
 Montechiaro. The French were now entirely massed on the 
 west side of the Mincio prepared to bring superior numbers 
 against the column of Quosdonavich. Wurmser, in the 
 meantime, reaching Valleggio July 31st, determined to cross 
 the Mincio and fall on the rear of the French, and had he 
 done so promptly, might have seriously inconvenienced Napo- 
 leon's plans, but fortunately for the latter, he visited Mantua 
 first, leaving Bayalich at Peschiera and Liptay at Goito. 
 The former, crossing the Mincio, marched on Lonato, from 
 whence Massena was obliged to retire to Porte San Marco. 
 Liptay, crossing at Goito and pushing on to Montechiaro, 
 was met by Augereau 's troops returning from that place and 
 driven back beyond CastigHone. On the 4th of August 
 Wurmser detached two columns on useless errands, whereas 
 Napoleon used every available man for the coming battle. 
 "When you want to deliver battle, assemble all your forces; 
 neglect none of them; a battalion sometimes decides a day," 
 was one of the foremost rules of Napoleon's strategy. When 
 the battle began Wurmser made the mistake of stretching out 
 his right towards Lonato, hoping to effect a union with 
 Quosdonavich, whose retreat around Lake Gorda he did not 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 19 
 
 know of. Massena held the Austrian right, while Serurier 
 and Kilmaine pressed in the enemy's left, and at the critical 
 moment, Augereau assaulted their center, which had been 
 weakened too much by Wurmser's effort to stretch out his 
 right too far and to reinforce his left against the cavalry 
 attacks of Kilmaine. Wurmser saw his mistake too late and 
 realized that he must retreat at once to save his army, and this 
 
 Adige Valley 
 
 he did, though with considerable loss. On the 6th Massena 
 advanced against Peschiera and Augereau against Valeggio. 
 But there was little fighting as Wurmser retired to Trent. 
 The French troops took the same position they had occupied 
 in July and the siege of Mantua — which Wurmser had rein- 
 forced by seven battalions — was resumed. 
 
 To return to our trip, it was well that we left Mantua 
 early in the morning, as we were obliged to leave the main 
 road in order to go to Areola, and this took us longer than 
 
20 MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 we had anticipated. It was well worth our trouble, however, 
 as we found there an interesting old monument commemorat- 
 ing Napoleon's famous victory. Passing through Caldiero, 
 we reached Verona about noon. From there up the Adige 
 valley there was quite a noticeable difference in the air as well 
 as the scenery. Our approaching the Alps was, of course, 
 what caused these changes, for Trent, where we intended to 
 stop for the night, is right in the midst of the Tyrolean moun- 
 tains. The most difficult part of the whole trip was, perhaps, 
 our wishing to see the battlefield of Rivoli. We were obliged, 
 after leaving the main highway and going to a certain point of 
 the river, to drive the car on to a ferry just large enough to 
 hold it, and then by means of a pulley and the assistance of 
 the current, we crossed slowly to the other bank. Our path 
 was now a narrow winding one, and as there were sentries all 
 along, and we were obliged to pass through the gates of the 
 fort, we naturally were unable to take away with us anything 
 more than a mental picture. We reached Trent late in the 
 afternoon and found an excellent hotel. It is quite modern 
 and the meals most enjoyable, especially when eaten out on 
 the huge veranda with the keen air as an appetizer. Al- 
 though we were obliged to go indoors at dinner on account of 
 the rain, we had little idea of the consequences a storm in the 
 mountains meant, but we soon learned by experience. 
 
 Towards the end of August Wurmser again made plans 
 for the relief of Mantua, which required a division of forces. 
 Davidovich, with 20,000 troops, was ordered to guard the 
 approach to Trent, as well as the upper Adige valley, while 
 Wurmser, with 25,000 men, descended the Brenta valley to 
 Bassano. The fact that he supposed the French would be 
 forced to fall back behind the Mincio, showed how little the 
 Austrian commander had learned from his previous campaign. 
 On September ist Napoleon ordered Massena and Augereau to 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 21 
 
 advance up the Adige, and Vaubois up the Chiese around the 
 Lake of Garda to Mori, where all three divisions were to 
 unite. Several fierce battles were fought at Roveredo and 
 Caliano, for, although the French had a superiority of 
 numbers, the Austrians had the advantage of good defensive 
 positions. The French fought brilliantly and after capturing 
 some three thousand prisoners at Caliano drove Davidovich 
 
 Monument at Areola 
 
 in disorder back to Trent. Wurmser should have recalled 
 those troops which were along the Brenta, to reinforce David- 
 ovich, but instead, he hastened to Bassano, with the object of 
 seizing the lower Adige and falling on the rear of the French. 
 On the morning of the 5th Massena entered Trent. David- 
 ovich should have retired through the Brenta valley and 
 rejoined his chief, but his orders from Vienna held him in the 
 Tyrol, to prevent Napoleon from advancing and joining 
 Moreau near Innsbruck. On the 8th Napoleon overtook 
 
22 MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 Wurmser at Bassano, where a battle was fought which resulted 
 in the utter rout of the Austrians. They lost nearly 5,000 
 prisoners, 35 guns, 200 ammunition wagons and five flags of 
 which two were taken by Lannes himself. Wurmser and the 
 treasury came within a minute or two of being captured. 
 Napoleon followed up this victory with his usual promptitude, 
 hoping to catch and cut off Wurmser before he reached 
 Mantua. One accident after another prevented him, how- 
 ever, and on the 12th Wurmser, at the head of only 12,000 
 troops, entered Mantua, to become one of the besieged 
 instead of a liberator. In less than two weeks the third 
 Austrian army had been defeated with a loss of more than 
 15,000 in killed, wounded or prisoners. But Napoleon's 
 position, in spite of his many victories, was serious, and he 
 wrote the Directory that unless they wished to lose what had 
 already been gained, they must send him more troops, as he 
 now had less than 30,000. The French reverses on the 
 Rhine had cut off hopes of reinforcements from that direction. 
 Austria would not listen to peace negotiations until she had 
 recovered Lombardy, and she intended to try again to raise 
 the siege of Mantua. Venice might declare war on France, 
 and she could put 20,000 troops into the field. The Pope 
 had broken the terms of his armistice, and by the death of 
 the king of Sardinia, the attitude of Piedmont again became 
 questionable. Meanwhile, by the end of October, Austria 
 once more prepared to relieve Mantua. Davidovich, with 
 20,000 troops, had orders to take Trent, while another army 
 of 30,000 under Alvinzi, was to recapture Bassano. These 
 two columns were to unite at Verona and Wurmser was 
 notified to get ready to make a sortie at the proper time. 
 The one thing in Napoleon's favor was that the Austrians 
 were again operating against him on divergent lines and he 
 hoped to be able to repeat his former movements against 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 23 
 
 Wurmser — this time, however, to beat Alvinzi and hurry up 
 the Brenta valley and attack Davidovich in his rear. But 
 this was not to be, for not only did the latter push Vaubois 
 before him, but Napoleon failed to inflict a decisive blow on 
 Alvinzi. On November 8th the latter had got as far as 
 Vicenza, with 27,000 troops, and Davidovich with 16,000 as 
 far as Roverdero. Napoleon at this time was at Verona with 
 
 Brenta Valley 
 
 21,000 and Vaubois at La Corona with 8,000. By the nth, 
 Alvinzi had moved to Villanova. Napoleon sent Massena 
 up the Adige valley to gauge the situation, for if Davidovich 
 advanced he determined to fall on him first and crush him, 
 so as to keep his line of communications through Peschiera. 
 Massena, however, reported that Davidovich was inactive, as 
 the latter had heard that Vaubois had received reinforcements. 
 Had Alvinzi pushed rapidly on to Verona, Davidovich forced 
 Vaubois back, and Wurmser made a sortie, it would have 
 
24 MOTORING THROUGH 
 
 seemed as if the total Austrian force of 65,000 would have 
 been able to overwhelm the French army of 45,000. But 
 time and speed did not enter into the calculations of the 
 Austrian commanders. On the afternoon of the nth, Napo- 
 leon took the offensive and drove the advance Austrian van 
 back on Caldiero, where during the night they entrenched 
 themselves. On the 12th Napoleon attacked, but a driving 
 rainstorm blew in the faces of the French troops, and by the 
 time Massena came up, Alvinzi's main body arrived and 
 Bonaparte was forced to retreat to Verona. The worst part 
 of this defeat was that all the best generals were wounded — 
 Joubert, Lannes, Victor, Murat and Rampon. Napoleon's 
 situation was most perilous and any other general would 
 immediately have ordered a retreat behind the Mincio. 
 There was one chance left and Napoleon determined to 
 try that rather than retreat. A force of three thousand 
 men was left in Verona with orders to hold it at any cost, 
 and on the evening of the 14th Napoleon marched his men 
 out of the Milan gate and headed towards the west. No 
 doubt the soldiers expected it was a retreat behind the 
 Mincio. But soon the army turned south and headed 
 rapidly down the Adige towards Ronco, where Napoleon 
 had ordered a bridge to be built, and on the morning of 
 the 15th the French army crossed. Had it not been for 
 a few Hungarian regiments in Areola, the surprise would 
 have been complete and Alvinzi taken in flank and rear, 
 but the marshes between Ronco and Areola, having only 
 one causeway, rendered a quick advance impossible. For 
 three days the battle raged and not until the i8th did 
 Alvinzi, reduced to 15,000 troops, retire to the Brenta. 
 The French had been lucky in the fact that Davidovich 
 had not moved until the 17th, on which day he pushed 
 Vaubois back to Paschiera. Napoleon now turned his 
 
NORTHERN ITALY 
 
 25 
 
 attention to Davidovich who, hearing of Alvinzi's retreat, 
 retired up the Adige valley. During this short campaign 
 the Austrians had lost over 20,000 troops, but by January, 
 1797, Alvinzi, with 45,000 soldiers, was preparing the fourth 
 attempt to relieve Mantua. Again the Austrian plan was 
 faulty, as it provided for an advance in three columns. 
 On the 7th of January, Provera with 9,000 troops, left 
 
 Road through the valley — Brenta 
 
 Padua, and Bayalich, with 6,000, left Bassano. Napoleon 
 did not know for some time from which quarter the main 
 Austrian body would advance, and until he was certain, he 
 made no move. Joubert's report of the Austrian advance 
 on La Corona cleared up the situation and Napoleon judged, 
 rightly, that the chief column was that advancing down the 
 Adige. Joubert with his small division had abandoned La 
 Corona on the I2th and retired to Rivoli, where, on the 
 13th, he was attacked by the Austrian van. His dispatches 
 
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