l> . .. i * ^ . . / - ■ i ••-■>,V»' "IP. "*' :f^^ %-'^w^y ^^' ^/•Tf.^T- .^^' %''?^y.^^ ^/•Tf.r'>" \'^^y,^ i'""- .^" '>^'/% .^°^•^i'''°- /'>^'.\ -^°^•^i'''- .^^ -■ •'\o' v''.^'y "o^*-^-'\o^ v''!^'-y "c> *^-'\o' V' 4 o '^^'■^c -'"'"'> ■■■■■% • / % ■■ .V.'- ^,*' ?^'', \,^' ;:^^K'. "^^ •'>^?^^ Su-o^' o;-^^'- "-x,^ v>^^ < o ■ • ,0 V ^'^'^ % .^~ yy-^ri' .0 -/■ v^ 4 O C> -' .. <^ A '^^ -" . . • ,0 4 . ^li^'^UE^ • Si -r • i K^ **■ y^^y^^ ^ rid. "-^ o . . • ,0 O ' . . s * .'\ '> .s^"-. o > so - b: 0^ °'^... - o - ' ^* O ' , , , "•^^o^ 1^^ ^^A^^r^ (U^o^i^^aXTc^ ^»UCU Cow/WMjttZu ^ HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION A.E.F. DURING THE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919 FORMATION AND TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1917—1918 THE PRE-COMBAT PERIOD IN FRANCE AT THE FRONT THE FOST-.\RMISTICE PERIOD IN FRANCE DEMOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1919 Compiled anii Edited dy lIisTORr Committee "Dtii Division Association J. Frank Barher, Chairman Published by Steinman & Stein.vian Lancaster, Pa. N \^7^Z ,^^ T -PJ^ ^^^ '^ Copyrighted BY 79th division association 315 Liberty Bldg., Philadelphia. IC1A69G007 JAN 12 '23 ♦A« I DEDICATION To the proud and loving memory of those men of the Seventy-ninth Division with whom we marched and fought over gassed and shell-swept roads and fields, through days and nights of rain and cold and mud, who gave their lives for the cause of right, to the everlasting glory of them- selves, their Division and their country. SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISIONAL INSIGNIA The shoulder sleeve insignia of the 79th Division was approved by telegram November 16, 1918, from the Adjutant General, A.E.F., to the Commanding General, 79th Division. It is described as follows: A blue triangular shield 2}^" in height by 2}^" in width, a Lorraine Cross within an orle. Cross and orle silver gray and the elements of each ys" in width. TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I Foreword by General Kuhx 1 CoMPOsiTiox OF Seventy-ninth Division 12 Introduction 13 Chapter T — Camp Meade Days 17 Chapter II — The Di\ision Goes to France 38 Chapter III — The Avocourt-Malancourt Sector 51 Chapter IV — The Meuse-Argonne, First Phase 75 Malancourt and Montfaucon Chapter V — The Meuse-Argonne, First Phase 129 iSantillois and tlie Bois de Beiige Chapter VI — The Thoyon Sector 179 Chapter VII — The Meuse-Argonne, Third Phase 203 La Borne de Cornouiller Chapter VIII — The Meuse-Argonne, Third Phase 260 " Tlirough the Hills of the Meuse Eastward" Chapter IX — After the Armistice Slg Chapter X — The Artillery Brigade 340 Chapter XI — The Souilly' and Rimaucourt Areas 318 Chatper XII — Nantes, St. Xazaire and Home 364 Part II Appendix I — The Roll of Honor — the Division's Dead 379 Appendix II — Statistics 424 Total of casualties — Kilometers gained — Prisoners taken — Material cap- tured — Units of German Army which opposed the Division — Totals of Deco- rations and Citations — Combat Service of Division, etc. Appendix III — Chronology 429 The successive stages of the Division in Fiance as gained from table showing all locations of Division Headquarters. Appentjix IV — D ecorations akd Citations 432 Awards of the Distinguished Service Cross — Distinguished Service Medal — Croix de Guerre — General Headquarters Citations — Division Citations — Unit Citations. Appendix V — Field Orders 477 Principal Orders of Corps and Division Relating to Operations. Appendix VI — Translation of Captured German Field Order 486 Appendix VII — Source or Reference Notes 491 Appendix VIII — " The Lorraine Cross" 503 The Division Newspaper Appendix IX — The Seventy-ninth Division Association 510 AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF /£z Oiu^^^^-^ /2^/*^- /^*<^ /^^w^ (- y^^'^^^ /X/^^^-*'*****<^ American Expeditionary Forces, Office of the Comnander-in-Chief , France, April 13, 1919. Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, Commanding 79th Division, American E. F. My dear General Kuhn: It afforded me great satisfaction to inspect the 79th Division on April 12, and on that occasion to decorate the standards of yotlr regiments and, for gallantry in action, to confer medals upon certain officers and men. Your transportation and artillery were in splendid shape, and the general appearance of the division was well up to the standard of the American Expeditionary Forces. Throughout the in- spection and review the excellent morale of the men and their pride in the record of their organiza,tion was evident. In the Meuse-Argonne Offensive the division had its full share of hard fighting. Entering the line for the first time on September 26 as the right of the center corps, it took part in the beginning of the great Meuse-Argonne Offensive. By September 27 it had captured the strong position of Montfaucon, and in Spite of heavy artillery reaction, the Bois de Beuge and Nantillois were occupied. On September 30 it was relieved, having advanced ten kilometers. It again entered the battle on October 29, relieving, as part of the 17th French Corps, the 29th Division in the Grande Montagne Sector to the east of the Meuse River. From that time until the armistice went into effect, it was almost constantly in action. On November 9 Crepion, Wavrille and Gibercy were taken, and in conjunction with elements on the right and left, Etraye and Moirey were invested. On November 10, Chaximont-devant-Damvilliers was occupied, and on November 11 Ville-devant-Chaumont was taken — a total of 9 kilometers. This is a fine record for any division and I want the officers and men to know this and to realize how much they have contributed to the success of our arms. They may return home justly proud of themselves and of the part they have played in the American Expedi- tionary Forces. Sincerely yours. (-""jdUc^ Nlen^^ ^ rt/fu^ /y v e/T^=i^fi^ k/ Major General Joseph E. Kunx TO MY COMRADES OF THE 79th DIVISION This history has been prepared primarily for you in order to preserve the ties of comradeship formed during strenuous days of training at home and stirring incidents of campaign abroad, and to make it possible, by word and picture, to convey to friends and relatives the trials and achievements of one of America 's combat divisions, hastily called into being to meet a nation- al emergency. A scant four months between the peaceful pursuits of farm, factory and counting house to "over the top" in a foreign land against a veteran foe, practiced in more than four years desperate fighting, sounds incredible and yet this was the experience of more than half of the 79th Division when it underwent its first baptism of fire on tlie morning of September 26, 1918. The capture of the dominating and strongly fortified Montfaucon and the penetration of the enemy's line to a depth of nine kilometers constitute a worthy achievement for a green division. In the subsequent desperate fighting at the salient on the scarred and rugged heights north of Verdun, the Division again demonstrated a courage and tenacity of whic-h it is justly proud. Not only on the field of battle but on the march, in camp, billets and bivouac you have uniformly proved yourself loyal, patriotic and unselfish soldiers and citizens. It is with a deep and abiding sense of gratitude for your faithful services that your former commander looks back upon those eventful 22 months which covered the life of the Division. Jufi-'Z^:-^ ^^^WC^ JOSEPH E. KUHN, Major General. U. S. A. General Kuhn was born June 14, 1864, in Leavenworth, Kansas. He was appointed Cadet, United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y., July 1, 1881, and graduated at the head of his class, June 14, 1885. He was appointed 2nd Lieutenant Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. and served with Co. "C," Engineer Battalion at Willets Point, N. Y., and with the Engineer School, until 1888. During 1888 and 1889 he was Assistant to the District Engineer at Detroit, Michigan, in charge of River and Harbor Works on the East Shore of Lake Michigan. In 1889 he was promoted to 1st Lieutenant of Engineers, and served from then until August of 1894 as Instructor of Civil and MiHtary Engineering at the U. S. Military Academy. From August 1894 to 1896, he was Assistant to the District Engineer at San Francisco, California, in charge of the Works of Fortification of that harbor. In 1896 he received his Captaincy, and from then until 1900 he was Assistant to the Chief of Engineers, and in charge of the Sea Coast Defenses of the United States, and Military Personnel of the Engineer Corps. During the Spanish-American War General Kuhn held the rank of Major, from May 1898 to September 1899. From August 1900 to August 1903, he commanded the Engineer Company at West Point, and was Head of the Department of Practical Military Engineer- ing. He was also a member of the Academic Board of the Academy during this time. From 1903 to 1904 he commanded, in the Philippine Islands, the 3rd Bat- talion of Engineers, and in April, 1904, he was promoted to Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. The period from March 1904 to November 1905, General Kuhn spent as Military Observer with the Japanese Armies in the Field during the Russo- Japanese War, and from December, 1905, to June, 1906, he was occupied in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C, writing the report of his ob- servations. This work is published in War Department Document, ''Report of Military Observers attached to The Armies in Manchuria during the Russo- Japanese War'' — Part III., — and is used extensively as a text book and reference by the War College. From June to September of 1906, General Kuhn attended the famous German Army Maneuvers and there had personal contact, and some very interesting conversations, with the Kaiser, on the subjects of Military Strategy and Tactics. (8) From September 1906 to August 1909, General Kuhn was District Engineer in charge of the Norfolk River and Harbor District, and Works of Fortification, at Norfolk, Va. In September 1909 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of En- gineers, and from August 1909 to August 1912 was Senior Instructor in Military Engineering at the Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. August 1912 to August 1913 was spent as District Engineer in charge of the River and Harbor District and the Fortification Work at Philadelphia, Pa. From September 1913 to December 1914, he was Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion of Engineers, the Engineer Depot and the Engineer School at Washington Barracks, Washington, D. C. From December 1914 to March 1915, General Kuhn was a member of the Military Mission to Germany. In March 1915 he was promoted to the grade of Colonel, Corps of Engineers, and from March 1915 to December 1916, was Military Attache at the American Embassy in Berlin. During this period he was attached to the German General Headquarters, and visited frequently the German Lines on both the West and East Fronts. In January 1917, General Kuhn was promoted to the grade of Brigadier General, and appointed President of the Army War College, and a member of the General Staff. He continued on these duties until August of the same year, during which time he was in charge of the initial steps for war preparations and war training. In August 1917, he was promoted to the grade of Major General, and placed in command (at its inception) of the Seventy-Ninth Division. He commanded the Division during its organization and training at Camp Meade, Md., from August 1917 to July 1918, and from July 1918, he commanded the Division in France, including its entire combat service and until its return to the United States and its demobilization at Camp Dix in Jime 1919. From July 1919 to September 1920, General Kuhn commanded Camp Kearney, California, and from September 1920 to January 1922, commanded Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, and organized the Hawaiian Division. General Kuhn received the Croix de Guerre, with palm, and was invested with the rank of Commander of the Legion of Honor by the French Government in recognition of his services in the World War. During the days of the Division at Camp Meade and its period of operations in the A. E. F., more than ninety thousand men served under and passed through General Kuhn's command. He earned and holds the respect, confidence and admiration of every man of the Seventy-Ninth Division, every one of whom sincerely appreciates his splendid services to the Division, to the individual, and to the Country. Every member of the Division will, throughout his life, hold General Kuhn in the highest honor and esteem. (9) SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION STAFF Lt. Col. George A. Wildrick, G-3 Lt. Col. James H. Steinman, Adjutant 12 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION UNITS COMPRISING THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION, U. S. A. Division Headquarters Headquarters Troop 310th Machine Gun Battalion 157th Infantry Brigade 313th Infantry 314th Infantry 311th Machine Gun Battalion 158th Infantry Brigade 315th Infantry 316th Infantry 31'2th Machine Gun Battalion 154th Field Artillery Brigade 310th Field Artillery 311th Field Artillery 312th Field Artillery 304th Trench Mortar Battery 304th Engineers 304th Engineer Train 304th Field Signal Battalion 304th Division Trains and Military Police 304th Ammunition Train 304th Supply Train 304th Sanitary Train 304th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop INTRODUCTION Whenever a great nation declares war, it follows as a natural consequence that history will be made. If that war is punitive in character, the masses of the people in a great nation pay little attention and are not greatly disturbed, nor are they distracted from their daily routine. But when that war is by far the greatest undertaking ever engaged in, the whole nation is awakened to its immensity and supports the concerted movement to the limit, throwing its full force — its every resource — into the fray. Our country's part in the World War was by far the greatest project, com- mercial or military, ever entered into by these United States. All the nation's resources were turned from jieaceful and commercial pursuits and thrown into a supreme military effort. The Anny, the military force, was increased within eighteen months from a body of less than one hundred thousand to more than five million men, and within fifteen months from the date this country declared war, we had placed a substantial fighting force in a field over thirty-five hundred miles from its base. This was augmented at the rate of several hundred thousand a month until more than two million men were in the American Expeditionary Forces in France. It was of this great army, the American Ex]ieditionary Forces, that the Seventy-ninth Division became a part, and it is the purpose of this book to record in an accurate, unbiased, complete and authenticated manner the history of the Seventy-ninth Division, both at home and overseas. Standing forth in the splendid record of the Division are three achievements, three grim epics of modern warfare. To the Seventy-ninth Division fell the signal honor of conquering the two highest points on the Meuse-Argonne battlefield and thrusting into the German line on Armistice Day the deepest salient on the whole American front. Montfaucon, impregnable for four years, famed as an observatory from which the enemy commanded the entire American line, fell before the assaults of the Division. It was taken on September 27, the second day of the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, and, once it had been wrested free, the eye of the German Army was gone. Of this front on which the Division was thus engaged General Pershing said ■} "The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in September, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German attacks on Verdun in 1916 and the French counter offensive in August, 1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. The net result of the four years struggle on this ground was a German defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter devastation, itself a serious obstacle to offensive operations. The strategical importance of this portion of the line was second to none on the western front." ' Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, p. 43. (13) 14 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Rreferring to a conference held at Marshall Foch's headquarters on Sep- tember 2, 1918, at which General Petain was present, General Pershing said: * "It should be recorded that although the general offensive was fully outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force a cessation of operations." The 79tli Division captured Montfaucon within thirty hours after its jump off on September 26th, and in the succeeding days pushed its lines far beyond into enemy territory before, its strength spent and its ranks fearfully depleted, it was relieved from the offensive, September 30, 1918. La Borne de Cornouiller, east of the Meuse, a height from which enemy observers had directed terrible enfilading fire on the American forces through two phases of the same offensive, was stormed early in November and fell before the onslaught of the Division. A menace to communications, it had played an im- portant part in holding up the American advance. Once it was captured, the lines east of the Meuse moved on with no molestation from the flank. The attack was to be launched against the last line of German trenches of the Kriemhilde Stellung, the attempted assault against which, in the middle of October, had failed. To the 79th Division was assigned the desperate task of breaking the enemy line at its pivotal and key position on La Borne de Cornouiller, known to the French as La Grande Montague and to the Americans as Hill 378, a great bare crest rising sheer from the Meuse Valley, and commanding practically the entire Meuse-Argonne front. The full strength of the Division was thrown into the attack on November 3rd, and after four days of terrific fighting La Borne de Cornouiller was captured, and held. Of the troops who made the assault General Kuhn at that time said: "They have done the impossible." The Division pressed on to the north, four kilometers beyond its first objective. On November 8th the Division changed its direction of attack to due east, and assaulted and carried the last of the spurs and ridges of the long line of hills that separate the Meuse from the flat plains of the Woevre, and on the 9th and 10th went down into the valley of the Thinte, sweeping the enemy before it. Then, during the closing days of the War, its face turned directly toward Germany after making a most difficult flank movement, the Division crowned its record with a memorable advance, culminating in a salient pushing straight toward the heart of the enemy. Beyond the crest of Hills 319 and 328 it extended, a threatening menace to the enemy flung far ahead of any other American position. The attack was resumed on November 11th; under cover of a dense fog, and good progress was being made up the western slopes of the Cote de Morimont and the Cote de Romagne, the last strongholds of the Germans, when the order came to cease fire. This, as the records show, was by far the deepest penetration of the enemy lines by American troops at the time of the Armistice.'' ' Final Report, Gen. John J. Pershing, p. 40. ^ See map of Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing. Also Situation Map of G-2, G.H.Q. of Nov. 11, 1918, accompanying this History. INTRODUCTION 15 The Division was composed normally of some twenty-seven thousand men, yet through the period of its life — August 1917 to May 1919 — more than ninety- five thousand men were received and equipped by it, and trained and served in it. The Division was in existence about twenty-three months and in service in France from July 1918 until May 1919. It had left the States M-ith approximately sixty-five per cent of its men in the ser^■ice only six weeks, so, including the time spent on the transports and in the training area in France, this portion of our na- tion's fighting force had had but sixteen to eighteen weeks of military training. As a further example of the nation's condition of gross unpreparedness, the men received by the Division as replacements, during October 1918, were from the July draft and, consequently, entered the lines without any knowledge or experience with the rifle and very short military training. Naturally, this practice of rushing green material into combat was costly in man power and an extravagance for which the people in general are alone to blame. It is interesting to note that, of the nine shock Divisions wliich were in line at the beginning of America's greatest battle, the Meuse-Argonne, three divisions, the Twenty-eighth, Seventy-ninth and Eightieth, were composed principally of men from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Thus, Pennsylvania is accredited with thirty-three per cent of the shock troops which opened the American Offensive. History is the prose narrative of past events, as true as the fallibility of human testimony will allow, and it has been attempted in this volume to cover the life and achievements of the Seventy-ninth Division on this plan. War and battle conditions are so severe, so many different incidents occur at one and the same instant, and there are so many different angles from which the same incident can be seen, surveyed and estimated, that it is humanly impossible to picture, by words, any event in a manner that would correspond to the version of all eye witnesses and those concerned in the actual occurrences. A most careful and exhaustive search and re-search have been made of all records pertaining to the Division, and months have been spent in analyzing, assembling and collating this data, and in arranging it in the text and tables. In reading the tables of casualties, the killed and wounded, and in reading of the individual acts cited from time to time, it should be remembered that there were many more hardships and sacrifices, acts of bravery and devotion to duty, than it would ever be possible to relate. Those given are only examples, and the operations of the Division were filled — were rife — with acts and deeds that are the true test of the real, staunch, red-blooded manhood of our country. Many heroic acts were recorded, and many brave men were rewarded; but far more numerous were the heroic acts that went unobserved and unacknowledged, and will forever go unrecorded. This History first had its inception whUe the Seventy-ninth Division was in the Souilly Area in France in the winter of 1918-19. It was then placed in the hands of Lieutenants Albert S. Crandon and AVarren M. Wells, who prepared a text of approximately thirty thousand words. Subsequently it was placed in the hands of Mr. James B. Wharton, who assembled more data and re-wrote the text. This version was of greater length than the first but, after careful reviewing by representatives of the different units of the Division, it was decided that the text was not yet in the form desired, and so a third and last effort was decided upon. 16 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION It was at this stage that the services of Mr. William Bell Clark were enlisted, and after months more of earnest work, collecting more data, making every effort at further research, Mr. Clark produced the text as it now stands and as it was finally accepted. The earnest way in which he undertook the task, sparing no pains to get the true understanding of his subject, the spirit of the elements he was to depict, the mass of detail — all necessary for the success of such a work — is evidence of Mr. Clark's ability and sincerity, and it is to him the Division owes a great debt for a history text, complete, authentic and yet full of human interest. We owe also acknowledgements to Captain Joseph M. DuBarry, Captain Carl E. Glock, and Captain George L. Wright for their assistance and general contributions and help, and to Major Edward W. Madeira for his assistance in reviewing and criticising the text. Also to Lieutenant Colonel H. Harrison Smith for his contributions of many original and valuable views, taken mainly of the Grande Montague Sector, as well as for his help in preparing the history and appendix. Mr. Virgil Kauffman and Mr. Morris C. Sparks also have been very generous to us, allowing the use of several of their best photographs. Many of the illustrations were procured from the collection of the 304th Engineers, as that was the largest and most complete set of views of our particular areas available. Also the several maps used are reproductions for which the 304th Engineers are responsible. To Sergeant Thomas M. Rivel, of Division Headquarters, we are indebted for the cover design. Sergeant Rivel has used for his subject the Montfaucon Chateau, a scene familiar to every member of the Seventy-Ninth Division as well as to thousands of others who occupied this sector subsequently or who were engaged in the neighboring sectors. His wonderful presentation of the typical column of troops going forward on relief, is so vivid and realistic, so lifelike, that it im- mediately takes the soldier back to the gloomy, misty, rainy days, — days full of action every hour of the twenty-four, days full of ghastly noise, tumult, and in- tensive motion, days of hunger, fatigue and carnage, days of battle — the days of September, October and November, 1918. The subject could not be more appro- priate or the design better executed. I am greatly indebted, personally, and the Division is indebted generally, to Sergeant John V. Dignan, of Division Headquarters, for the use of his very complete albums of Division orders and data, for his untiring work, his liberal assistance and his loyal co-operation in assembling of pages, the arrangement of illustrations, and his ingenuity, so liberally and generously given during the days of publication. There were many others interested and helpful in varying degrees to whom, also, our appreciation is due. It was through the co-operation of these men and by untiring effort, undaunted by many, many obstacles, that this history was made possible and, after a period of ceaseless effort extending over four years, that it is finally accomplished. There were many difficulties and periods of trying times, when it seemed that progress was impossible; but that is ended, and now it remains for the reader to render his verdict on the result of the efforts expended. J. Frank Barber, Chairman, 79th Division History Comm. Note: Should the reader find errors or discrepancies, the editors will welcome constructive criticism, substantiated by proper evidence. The reader will find numerous small figure references throughout the text. By referring to pages i91 to 503 in the appendix the source of the information can be determined. CHAPTER I CAMP MEADE DAYS THE Seventy-ninth Division was one of sixteen created in the spring of 1917 to meet, by universal conscription, the emergency expansion of the United States Army during the World War. It was authorized by the Army Act of May 18, 1917, which prov-ided in part that the President "might raise by selective draft an additional force of 500,000 men and at a later time another force of 500,000."' Presaging the drastic legislation called forth through the declaration of a state of war against Germany, the War Department previously had prepared a paper organization for each of the proposed divisions. Conse- quently, the birth of the Seventy-ninth Division may be considered as coincident with the signing of the Army Act. From a typewritten table of division units as they were to be, to their actual existence upon the field, however, proved a long step. This process of incubation in the case of the Seventy-ninth Division was protracted over a period of four months. Measured in terms of days it seemed unusually long; in terms of accomplishment it proved remarkably brief. The numerical designation of the Division was fixed by the War Department under an original plan dividing the fighting forces of the country into three groups — Regular Army, National Guard and National Army. The Seventy-ninth Division was placed in the latter category. The National Army divisions were numbered from seventy-six upward and the order followed was along geographical lines, beginning in the New England States. Tracing this plan, the result was: Seventy-sixth Division, New England; Seventy-seventh Division, Greater New York City; Seventy-eighth Division, New York State, New Jersey and Delaware; and Seventy-ninth Division, Eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia. Subsequently the distinctions between the various divisions of the army were eliminated by the War Department. Regular Army, National Guard and National Army gave way to the United States Army.- The numerical desig- nation of the divisions, however, remained unchanged. To facilitate the mobilization of the selected men, the War Department de- cided to establish the training centres, or cantonments, within each geographical division and, in the case of the Seventy-ninth Division, the site chosen was near Annapolis Junction, Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The Government com- mandeered 4,000 acres which hitherto had been used exclusively for truck raising and fruit growing, prepared plans for a permanent encampment capable of housing 40,000 men, and named it Camp Meade in honor of Major General George Gordon Meade, the Pennsylvania commander of the Army of the Potomac who turned Lee back at Gettysburg in '63. The construction of what became eventually a modern city, located nearly midway between Baltimore and Washington and with Philadelphia 110 miles away, began on July 2, 1917.' (17) 18 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION In the meanwhile the machinery was evolved whereby conscription was to be enforced. The iVrmy Act of May 18, 1917, gave the President the power to enroll all men in the United States between the ages of 21 and 31, and, by procla- mation, June 5, 1917, was assigned as national registration day.^ Prior to this a provost marshal general had been appointed to administer the draft, and calcula- tions of the number of men available had been worked out on the basis of the cen- sus of 1910. These calculations were used in preliminary surveys whereby the various apportionments had been estimated in a rough manner, but with sufficient accuracy to enable the authorities to group the prospective draftees within the contemplated geographical boundaries. Actual figures were available for the necessary computations when 9,586,508 men of military age enrolled on national registration day.^ The next step, to establish the order of call to the colors for each individual, came on July 20, 1917. The country had been divided into draft districts, each district containing approximately 2,100 men. In each district the men were given serial numbers from one upward. At Washington, on July 20, a series of these numbers was placed in a bowl and the order of their being drawn forth established the order of the individual call.'' While the draft preliminaries were under way, the War Department was also taking up the question of officers to command and train the units of the new divisions. Recognizing that the commissioned personnel of the Regular Army was totally inadequate in number, the Officers' Reserve Corps was enlarged and numerous camps, for a three months' intensive training course, provided. One of these, established at Fort Niagara, New York, produced the majority of the men who were assigned ultimately to the Seventy-ninth Division. The Fort Niagara Training Camp opened on May 8, 1917, the officer candidates arriving during three successive mornings on trains known as the "Red, White and Blue Specials."' The candidates were drawn chiefly from Pennsylvania and Maryland and were formed into nine companies of infantry, three batteries of artillery, two troops of cavalry and one company of engineers. Barring those training in the company of engineers, they remained at Fort Niagara until August 15, 1917, when the successful men received their commissions and assignments. In the case of the engineers, the company was transferred on June 15, 1917, to the En- gineer Training Camp, American University, Washington, D. C, and Belvoir, Va.« The number of men to be called in the first draft had been placed at 687,000, the excess over 500,000 being required to fill up the National Guard to war strength.' This 687,000, however, was known as the gross quota, and the draft officials an- nounced that credits would be given in all districts for volunteer enlistments. The working out of the net quota was not completed until well into August, 1917. The final figures of the first draft for the Seventy-ninth Division showed the net ciuota to be 39,951, divided as follows:'" District of Columbia (11 draft boards) 929 Baltimore (21' draft boards) 2,866 Maryland (21 counties; 29 draft boards) 4,230 Philadelphia (51 draft boards) 14,665 Pennsylvania (36 counties; 108 draft boards) 17,261 CAMP MEADE DAYS 19 Under the credit system for volunteer enlistments two cities ■within the Seventy- ninth Division area were exempt from the first draft. They were Harrisburg and Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the former with a gross quota of 811 and enlistments of 887 and the latter with a gross quota of 476 and 531 enlistments." Directions were issued by the Adjutant General of the Army on August 8, 1917, calling the National Army to the colors as follows:'^ 30 per cent to be delivered commencing September 1. 30 per cent to be delivered commencing September 15. 30 per cent to be delivered commencing September 30. The remainder as soon thereafter as practicable. Five days later, however, the Secretary of War changed the dates because ■'Saturday, Sunday and Labor Day are three of the first five days in September."'* The rearrangement set the first call for September 5, instead of September 1 ; the second call for September 19, and the third call for October 3. Another modifica- tion was found necessary because of the extensive use of the railroads in trans- porting the National Guard southward during the early part of September. On August 25, therefore, it was announced that only five per cent would be called beginning September 5, to be moved at the rate of one per cent a day, and that forty per cent would be called upon each of the other days, September 19 and October 3.>2 But Camp Meade, despite its rapid growth, was not ready for the drafted men from Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia on Sei)tember 5. According to the Provost Marshal General, "the water supply system would not be completed."'* From the report of Lieutenant Colonel P. E. Pierce, of the General Staff, and a member of the War Industries Board, it was apparent that more than the water supply was at fault. Lieutenant Colonel Pierce's report, dated September 1, 1917, gave the status of completion as follows:" Annapolis Junction, Md. (Camp Meade) Buildings: Company barracks, 44 per cent; company lava- tories, 44 per cent; officers' quarters, 44 per cent; officers' lava- tories, 44 per cent; storehouses, 56 per cent. Materials: Frame lumber, 72 per cent; boards, 68 per cent; flooring, 68 per cent; hardware, 68 per cent; finish lumber, 72 per cent; sash and doors, 68 per cent. Water Supply: Source of supply, 80 per cent; pumping sta- tions, 28 per cent; supply main, 60 per cent; storage, 28 per cent; purification works, 28 per cent; distribution system, 64 per cent. Materials: Piping (cast iron or wood over 6 inches), 64 per cent; piping (cast iron or wood 6 inches or under), 64 per cent; piping (galvanized iron), 100 per cent; machinery, 84 per cent. Sewerage: Collecting system, 60 per cent; disposal, 40 per cent. Material: Piping, 80 per cent. Plumbing: Conapany lavatories, 44 per cent; officers' lava- tories, 44 per cent; kitchens, 44 per cent; hospitals, 16 per cent. Materials: Heaters and boilers, 24 per cent; lavatory outfits, 72 per cent; shower outfits, 100 per cent. Piping : Valves and fittings, 72 per cent; sinks and grease traps, 36 per cent. Roads: 32 per cent bridges and culverts, 32 per cent. Mater ials: Broken stone and gravel, 96 per cent. 20 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Electrical work: Transmission line, 44 per cent; cantonment distribution, 44 per cent; interior wiring, 44 per cent. Materials: Lamps, 44 per cent; wiring, 44 per cent. Number of men employed, September 1, 1917, 9,140. As a result of this report, the War Department, under date of September 1, 1917, made an announcement that "draft of the first increment of the National Army has been postponed to September 19. This includes only the first five per cent and only men who are to report to Camp Meade, Admiral, Md."" Preparations for the reception of the first of the selected men had been going on apace in the partly completed camp. On August 3, 1917, the War Depart- ment, in General Order No. 101, specified the various units to be incorporated in the Seventy-ninth Division and, on August 11, in Special Order No. 186, desig- nated the ofiicers of the Regular Army and of the Officers' Reserve Corps to be assigned to the Division. In the meanwhile, on August 5, 1917, Joseph E. Kuhn, a brigadier of the Regular Army, had been promoted to the rank of major gen- eral in the National Army and assigned to Camp Meade to organize and com- mand the new Division. He arrived at the cantonment with his staff on August 25, while still a brigadier, not accepting his new commission until four days later. On the day of his arrival, however, he organized the Division officially with the issuance of General Order No. 1, Seventy-ninth Division, the first of a long series to foUow. The graduates of the First OflScers' Training Camp at Fort Niagara, 1100 in number, having enjoyed a two weeks' leave of absence after their strenuous three months of training, reported for duty on August 29. Simultaneously there arrived the Regular Army officers selected to command brigades and regiments, and about 600 enlisted men from the Regular Army to form the non-commissioned cadre, or framework of companies, battalions and regiments. General Order No. 2, issued on August 26, 1917, was awaiting the newcomers. It assigned the of- ficers to their respective units and, by September 1, the skeletonized Division was formed according to the War Department Tables of Organization. The com- manding officers assigned to the various units as of August 26, 1917, some of whom served with the Division throughout the entire war, were as follows: Commanding General *Major General Joseph E. Kuhn Chief of Staff *Lieutenant Colonel Tenney Ross Adjutant Major Charles B. Moore Division Engineer Colonel James P. Jervey Quartermaster Major Robert F. Tate Inspector Major Samuel G. Talbott Ordnance Officer Major Townsend Whelan Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel James J. Mayes Signal Officer *Major George S. Gillis Surgeon *Lieutenant Cloonel Philip W. Huntington Headquarters Troop *Captain Eugene S. Pleasonton 310th Machine Gun Battalion *Major Andrew W. Smith 157th Infantry Brigade *Brigadier General William J. Nicholson 313th Infantry Regiment *Colonel Claude B. Sweezey CAMP MEADE DAYS 21 314th Infantry Regiment 311th Machine Gun Battalion 158th Infantry Brigade 315th Infantry Regiment 316th Infantry Regiment 312th Machine Gun BattaHon 154th Artillery Brigade 310th Field Artillery Regiment 311th Field Artillery Regiment 312th Field Artillery Regiment 304th Trench Mortar Battery 304th Engineer Regiment 304th Division Trains and Military Police 304th Ammunition Train 304th Field Signal Battalion 304th Supply Train 304th Sanitary Train * Indicates those tvho served K. I. A. Killed in action. Colonel Thomas W. Darrah Brigadier General Everard E. Hatch Colonel Otho B. Rosenbaum Colonel Oscar J. Charles Major Edmond L. Zane * Brigadier General Andrew Hero, Jr. Colonel Dan T. Moore *Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Mortimer Colonel James F. Brady Captain William G. Huckel Colonel James P. Jervey *Colonel William C. Rogers Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Prosser Major Sidney T. Moore K. I. A. Major Israel Putnam, *Lieutenant Colonel James F. Trout. with the Division throughout the war. At the time the various unit commanders, officers and non-commissioned officers arrived. Camp Meade was just beginning to take form. Its appearance is thus described by the historian of Company "I", 315th Infantry: In the few weeks preceding the permanent organization of the Division, Camp Meade presented the disheveled appearance of a lumber camp or of a railroad pioneer camp in the first stages of constructive work. The ground chosen for the cantonment lay in ridges and vales, running northwest and southeast, heavily wooded with scrub pine and scattering trees of the deciduous varieties. Dotting the open land, like toy ornaments, sat the little old cottages built of silvered, weather-beaten clapboards; souvenirs of many win- ters, and of a construction, hand-hewn and massive, to secure man from the raging elements. Such of these dilapidated little houses as the Government allowed to remain standing were often, in later months, seized upon eagerly in maneuvers as ideal nests for machine guns, and as such came to fill the eye of the dough-boy with suspicion and distrust. Clustered around these rustic cot- tages, and marking spots where others of equal magnificence had stood, rose many delicately formed small cedars, whose dusky richness formed landmarks which guided many a warrior, pleasure bent, to satiate his craving for pears, apples and cherries in the abandoned orchards that adjoined them. 2£ HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION At this time, great gangs of darkies were clearing sites and blasting stumps, hiding under any small brush nearby until after the explosion, frightened ashen-grey one moment and singing heart-high the next. Trucks from Truck Company S^S, which had only recently arrived from Texas, roared up and down the sandy roads, carrying piles of lumber and pipes, as well as cots and blankets for the first few barracks that were up. On many oc- casions, these trucks sank hubdeep in the soft Maryland sand, and it was no uncommon sight to see a mixed crowd of soldiers and laborers digging one of the mired trucks out of its over-soft resting place. Day and night the pile-drivers were at work and were followed in turn by gangs of carpfenters, erecting the frame- work of barracks, laying floors and putting on roofs, so that the Camp seemed to spring up from a waste almost by magic. Through the balance of the day the selected men came pouring into the camp. All in civilian attire, their habiliments were as varied as their types. Some wore brown suits and some checked suits, some showed the latest cuts of a custom tailor's art and some were attired in the baggiest of trousers, coatless and with shirt sleeves rolled up. Their headgear was as variegated — straw hats, felt hats, derby hats, caps, and no hats. They carried suitcases, bags and bundles, these civilians — business men, school teachers, clerks, farmers, barkeepers, peddlers, laborers, Americans, Hebrews, Irish, Slavs — of all occupations and of many of the nationalities of the earth. Some were a little frightened, some dumb-struck by the sudden change in the more or less even tenor of their lives, others con- temptuous, the majority eager, but all, consciously or unconsciously, stirred deep down in their souls by what they were doing. They were proud to be playing their part in the world's most stupendous undertaking and, as a whole, they were pretty sure of themselves. Daily, for the ensuing week, scenes similar to the foregoing were witnessed as contingent after contingent came swinging in, first from Pennsylvania and then from Maryland and the District of Columbia. September 20 saw 2,304 men delivered at the camp — all Pennsylvanians. Adams County sent 120 of these; Bucks County, 80; Chester County, 142; Cumber- land County, 86; Dauphin County, 225; Delaware County, 277; Chester City, 179; Franklin County, 140; Juniata County, 45; Lancaster County, 208; Lebanon County, 138; Monroe County, 52; Northampton County, 75; Perry County, 59; Philadelphia, 113; Pike County, 29; York County, 317; and York City, 19. Pennsylvania's eastern counties, still contributing, on September 21, added 2,615 to the growing total. They came as follows: Berks County, 315; Reading, 269; Carbon County, 127; Columbia County, 133; Scranton, 208; Luzerne County, 500; Wilkesbarre, 43; Montgomery County, 415; Norristown, 46; Montour County, 34; Schuylkill County, 363; Sullivan County, 37; Susquehanna County, 77 and Wyoming County, 38. September 22 and 23 were Philadelphia days. Three Philadelphia boards had sent contingents on September 19 and one on September 20. Twenty boards entrained 2,490 men on September 22 and twenty-four boards sent 2,582 men the following day. In the five days Pennsylvania had sent 12,768 men to camp." CAMP :\IEADE DAYS 23 Camp Meade- jHEtT no 5. Map of Camp Meade, Md., Made by the Topoghaphic Section, 30-Ith Engineers, Fall, 1917 This area was occupied by the 79th Division during its mobilization and training before going over- seas — August, 1917-June, 1918 24 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION The District of Columbia sent its first forty-five per cent on September 26,'' 420 of its net cjuota of 929 men arriving at a})Out the same time that the first Balti- more contingent heralded the beginning of the Maryland influx. The Maryland movement continued from September 26 to September 30. The first day 700 men arrived from Baltimore and surrounding counties." By September 30, the forty-five per cent cjuota, 3,000 men, were in camp and a total of 16,000 raw re- cruits, from two states and the National Capital, awaited welding into soldiers. Camp Meade, by October 1, 1917, was well on its way to becoming the second largest city in Maryland, a rank which it later attained. It was an unfinished city, however, and remained so until about November 30 of the same year. Not until that later date was it of sufficient size to house the entire division and the depot brigade, 40,000 men in all. Like all other cantonments and large war in- dustries, it sprang up like a mushroom. Its construction required 450,000,000 feet of lumber, used in the erection of 1200 wooden barracks, stables and other buildings. Most of the barracks were of two stories and housed between 200 and 250 men. Fifty-two miles of sewer pipe and fifty miles of water pipe were laid, the latter distributing 3,000,000 gallons of water daily.' The cantonment was laid out along highly scientific lines with the parade grounds running through the centre, and the various brigade and Division units located to the east and west on either side. Barring the remount station, all the Division buildings lay to the north of the Washington, Baltimore and Annapolis Railroad, which passed through the cantonment grounds from east to west, with the Admiral and Disney sidings located on either side of the inverted "U", or southern mouth, of the parade grounds. Along these sidings for a distance of more than a mile stretched the Division warehouses. Turning northward through the centre of the parade grounds, on the right hand side were barracks of the following units in order: 304th Ammunition Train, 304th Supply Train, 304th Engineers, 316th Infantry, 315th Infantry, 312th Field Artillery, 23rd Engineers (not a Division unit), 311th Field Artillery, 310th Field Artillery and 304th Trench Mortar Battery. On the left side of the parade grounds, beginning at the south, were the bar- racks of the 351st Field Artillery (colored) and 368th Infantry (colored) (neither a Division unit), 310th, 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions, 314th Infantry, 313th Infantry, Headquarters Troop, 304th Field Signal Battalion, 304th Sani- tary Train, 304th Division Trains and Military Police, 27th and 28th Engineers (not division units) , 324th Field Signal Battalion (not a Division unit) , and 154th Depot Brigade with its training battalions. Division headquarters was almost in the centre of the encampment in front of the 313th Infantry barracks and facing the artillery brigade, while the three brigade headquarters were located in barracks housing particular brigade units. Beyond the parade ground, nearly a mile to the north, lay the permanent base hospital. A task of tremendous magnitude confronted the officers and non-commis- sioned officers assembled in this large cantonment. They had been brought together suddenly to constitute the framework of a combat division and to direct its training — the training of thousands of men who had never before marched in CAMP MEADE DAYS 25 formation, shouldered a rifle, obeyed orders, or had the slightest knowledge of military life and discipline. Only a handful of the Regular Army officers assigned possessed the experience necessary for the organizing and training of this mass of raw material. The large body of young oflScers from the Officers' Training Camp was somewhat divided as to pre\'ious military experience. A great many had been members of the National Guard and could draw upon the training secured in the enlisted or commissioned ranks there, but the majority confessed to no more military knowledge than that gained in three months at Fort Niagara. Most of the soldiers from the Regular Army, slated for non-commissioned posts, had seen but short service, owing to the absorption of the older and more valuable enlisted men in the expansion of the Regular Army. In fact, in many instances, the train- ing cadres sent to the National Army camps were used as means to clear Regular Army outfits of undesirable soldiers and, hence, proved of little assistance. But, if there was a dearth of experience, there was no lack of zeal, willingness and abil- ity, which, as later events showed, met and successfully overcame all obstacles. New Material Going to be Outfitted The handling of so large a body of untrained men as was shunted into Camp Meade during the last eleven days of September, 1917, was a serious problem alone. Outside of the framework of company and non-commissioned ofiicers, there was no organization to enable each unit to commence immediately its daily routine. These new arrivals were not yet soldiers, classified according to the tasks for which each one was fitted, but thousands of civilians taken from every walk of life and suddenly plunged into a new and strange environment. It was necessary to determine the qualifications of all of these men — -who could cook, who were mechanics, who had handled horses, who were chauffeurs, and most important, which ones possessed the quality of leadership to hold non-commis- sioned rank. It was this which gave the officers many trying days and much serious thought before every unit was functioning smoothly. The personnel of the regiments was vastly different. Those which were made up of men drawn from Philadelphia or Baltimore contained far different types from those composed of men from the farm regions of the two states, and the 26 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION farmers, in turn, differed largely from miners from the Eastern Pennsylvania coal regions. An excellent indication of the various kinds and classes represented in the Division was secured in a statistical census taken by the 310th Field Ar- tillery. In this one regiment there were fifteen nationalities, American, Russian, Italian, Polish, Austrian, Jewish, Swiss, English, Lithuanian, Greek, Bohemian, French, Irish, Roumanian, and even German. There were four different religious beliefs, Protestant, Catholic, Hebrew and Greek Catholic, while twenty-five men of the regiment asserted they had no religious adherence. As to educational at- tainments, but fifty men in the regiment had ever attended college, while 114 had no education of any sort. Others had been to elementary, gramnaar and high schools. These statistics are typical of other units in the Division. They indicate the heterogeneity of the regiments and the mammoth task it was to weld these thousands into a fighting unit. Under the original plan, to place only selected men from Eastern Pennsyl- vania, Maryland and the District of Columbia in the Seventy-ninth Division, the geographical allocation was carried into the personnel of the various units as well. The best illustration of this method is given in the original distribution of the men from the fifty-one Philadelphia draft districts, which was as follows : 315th Infantry: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 1, 9, li, 13, 17, 19, '21, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 44, 47 and 51. 304th Engineers: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16 and 23. 312th Field Artillery: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 8, 10, 18, 20, 22, 25, 30, 39, 41, 48 and 49. 316th Infantry: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 32 and 43. 304th Field Signal Battalion: Contingent from Local Board No. 11. 314th Infantry: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 3, 33, 37, 38, 42 and 46. 304th Ammunition Train: Contingent from Local Board No. 45. 310th Field Artillery: Contingents from Local Boards Nos. 7 and 40.-'' During the calling of the first 100 per cent every effort was made to assign tne men to the same regiment to which their predecessors from the local boards had gone, the idea being to make as distinct geographical units as possible. In carrying this out, the men from the District of Columbia were placed in the 312th Machine Gun Battalion; from Baltimore and Western Maryland in the 313th Infantry, and from Southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore in the 310th Field Artillery. Of the Pennsylvanians from the thirty-six counties, exclusive of Phila- delphia, those from the mining regions were sent to the 311th Field Artillery and the 314th Infantry, and from the central and southern counties of the state to the 316th Infantry, 304th Engineers, 310th and 311th Machine Gun Battalions and Division auxiliary troops. In the early months of the camp, before drafts from other sections of the United States had, in a measure, destroyed the geographical distinctions, two of the infantry regiments, the 313th and 315th, had been named "Baltimore's Own," and "Philadelphia's Own," respectively, because of their personnel. CAMP MEADE DAYS 27 Before the rudiments of military training could be taught to the first con- tingent of 16,000 men, the War Department ordered another five per cent to the colors and, on October 5 and 6, a two day movement brought 1,739 men from Pennsylvania, 350 from Maryland and 50 from the District of Columbia. In addition, from Pennsylvania, between October 1 and 14, came numerous delayed contingents which should have reported in September, totaling 1,126 men." The five percent and the delinquents, added to the 16,000 of the first contingent, brought the total of selected men at Camp Meade as of October 11, 1917, to 20,- 300.=^ The War Department kept pace with the draft movement in supplying clothing for the new soldiers, and, on the same day that the total of 20,300 men was given for the cantonment, it was announced that the equipment which had gone to the camp consisted of 30,000 bedsacks, 80,532 blankets, 16,096 cotton breeches, 21,295 woolen breeches, 16,691 cotton coats, 24,188 woolen coats, 50,815 Recruits Lined Up for Their First Instbuction summer drawers, 116,911 winter drawers, 42,062 hats, 24,111 leggings, 22,034 overcoats, 53,996 flannel shirts, 66,878 cotton stockings, 41,453 light woolen stockings, 48,615 cotton undershirts, 77,595 woolen undershirts and 36,642 pairs of shoes. -^ Receiving the clothing and assigning it to the men were different matters, particularly in the case of shirts, breeches, shoes and socks where the question of size intruded. Company and regimental supply officers realized the herculean task soon enough, but the sympathy was never extended to them but went to the "rookies" who couldn't be fitted. For several weeks after the first draft con- tingents arrived, companies could be seen daily at drill garbed in a weird mixture of civilian and military attire. The parade of the non-descripts was a feature of almost every organization of the Division until well into October. Even after O. D.'s (olive drab) were supposed to be plentiful, civilian articles of apparel clung tenaciously to each company. The problem was solved only when the supply officer succeeded in begging, swapping or stealing certain needed sizes of blouses, breeches, leggings, shoes, etc. 28 HISTORY OF THE SEVEXTY-NIXTH DIVI>IOX Throughout the first week in October work went on in earnest, and all cleared spaces in and about the camp were filled from early morning until night with squads of men jierforming setting-up exercises and receiving instructions in the fundamentals of military training. The general lack of knowletlge was more than offset by the enthusiasm with which the men sought to learn. This spirit brought rt^-sults and within a few weeks markeii progress had been made. Squads, platoons, companies, regiments, in fact, had a military appearance when as- sembled and the men had a soldierly bearing when alone. As an illustration of the enthusiasm with which the transformation from civilian to soldier was carried on. four days after the first men had reached Camp Meade a uniformed band had been organized in the Sloth Infantr>- and on September '25 it played the National Anthem at retreat.- And all the while, as the drilling was carried on. the changes throughout the camp liecame marked. The old sweet potato and stjawl>erry patches around the barracks rapidly became tramped bare by the passage of countless feet, while the erection of the barracks went on apace. Where once had l>een a paying truck farm was now a drill field or an athletic ground. As the camp neared completion the contractors' army of laborers and artisans gradu- ally diminisheil. Fewer lurching lumber wagons, drawn by teams of Maryland mules, jolteii along the uneven ro;ids with their darkey drivers dozing on the seats. The roads, in turn, tlirough the tireless efforts of grading gangs, became more and more what roads should be, while rapid progress was made on the main liighway. a concrete U-shaped n^ad skirting the building line of the canton- ment. The entire Division, as it was then constituted, was assembled upon the piirade grounds for the first time on OctoWr 11. 1917. the occasion being the for- mal opening of the Second Liberty Loan Drive. Genend Kuhn. from a stand erecteii on a knoll, delivered a brief address and the massed bands of the Divi- sion rendered a cretiitable performance.^ In addition to the rivalrj- between the thirty or more training camps and cantonments throughout the countrj- during the Second Loan, there was keen competition l^etween the various luiits of the Division to see wliich would subscribe the largest quota. In the end, ^l.TOO.OOO was subscril>ed by men of the Di\-ision. which took first place among National Army cantonments and second place among all the camps of the countrj". AMiile the Liberty Loan camp;iign was under way. the War Department made the first of a long series of drafts upon Camp Meade, robbing the Di\ision of many of its trained men at a time when they were most needed to train pending incoming drafts. Between Octolier 16 and -20 the four infantrj" regiments were stripjieii of l.CXXt men each and two of the artillerj- regiments of 500 men apiece, making a total of 5,000 transferred to the Eighty-second Division at Camp Gor- don. Atlanta. Ga.-* To offset this another draft movement, calling for thirty percent more of the first quota, was ordered by the War Department. Notifica- tion of the pendiiig movement was given October ^7 to the State Draft authori- ties^ the instructions calling for the men to be sent to camp l>etween November ^ and 6.-* Pennsylvania responded with 7.S06 men in the period; Maryland with •2,000 and the District of Columbia with •250. The result brought the Di\-ision strength up to alx>ut -23.000. CAMP MEADE DAYS 29 In the early days of the cantonment, the anxiety and concern of rehitivcs and friends of the men, wiio were solicitous for their material and moral welfare, caused a mixture of pity and amusement. The belief seemed to have prevailed that the moment a citizen put on a suit of khaki he became at once a starving hero, subjected to all manner of cruel and ruthless treatment from a relentless army discipline. Much that was both pathetic and ludicrous might be written upon this subject, but the main point is that the public had to be more or less educated to accept new and unusual situations at the same time that the citizen soldiers were being trained. The men themselves fell with avidity into army life. Can- teens appeared to take the place of the corner drug store and cigar stand; company messes were made more homelike by purchase of edible luxuries to garnish the army rations; some organizations bought cutlery and table wear and relegated the less inviting mess gear for use at Saturday inspections only; while sleeping in underwear and discarding a necktie slipped in like second nature. Man's adapta- bility to circumstances was evidenced on all sides. Bihd's-eye View of the Cantonment from Division Headqbaktebs At the same time the various welfare organizations stepped forward with much to offer in the way of recreation, amusement and education, moral and mental. The illiterates of the Division found, in the classes formed by the Young Men's Christian Association the opportunity to learn; the foreign-born, profiting likewise, took pride in the mastery of the English language, while the men with an eye to the future, who wished to speak French, found teachers only too ready to aid them. These various agencies, in addition to the Young Men's Christian Association, included the Knights of Columbus, the Jewish Welfare Board, the American Red Cross, the Young Women's Christian Association, the American Library Association, the Episcopal War Commissions of Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, and the Fosdick Commission on Training Camp Activities. Of all of them, probably the Y. M. C. A., with its central auditorium and eight huts conveniently located throughout the camp, was the most appreciated. Nightly entertainments, varying from song services to boxing matches, were held in each 30 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION of the "Y" buildings, while on Sunday religious services were conducted there by army chaplains or by denominational clergymen from outside the camp. Several months after the camp opened, the Young Women's Christian As- sociation provided an artistic, well-built Hostess House which radiated cheer and hospitality to the members of the Division and the numerous visitors who flocked into the cantonment each week-end. The Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, the Library Association and the Episcopal War Commissions also erected buildings for carrying on their several activities and contributed materially to the mantenance of contentment and morale. The Fosdick Commission provided an able and popular song leader in Kenneth Clark, who remained with the Division continuously and whose rallying cry, "Alre-a-d-y let's go-o-o-oh" became famous. He was a tower of strength upon many occasions. Colonel Tenney Ross, the Division Chief of Staff, credits Mr. Clark with doing "more than any other one man of or with the Division" in keeping the morale at a high standard and making the men satisfied with conditions. Later in the life of the camp, the Fosdick Commission also provided a large Liberty Theatre with a capacity of .3,000, where plays were provided nightly at a nominal fee. Recreation and amusement, however, did not interfere with the grim business of preparing for modern warfare By the begnning of November the canton- ment was ready for something more than rudimentary training. On November 3, two distinguished foreigners, General McLauchlin, of the British, and General Vignal of the French War Missions to the United States, visited the camp to make arrangements for the attachment of British and French officers to the Divi- sion for training purposes. With them came Lieutenant Paul Rochat, a French expert on automatic rifles. The 158th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Gen- eral Hatch, and with Colonels Rosenbaum and Charles at the head of the 315th and 316th Infantry, respectively, paraded 4,000 strong before the visitors.='= The result of the inspection was apparent when, during the next week, there arrived a little group of ten British and French specialists in modern warfare, together ' with a number of non-commissioned officers from the two Missions. Included in the officers were Major Duncan Campbell and Major Liebenrood, from the Brit- ish Mission, and Captain Marie Adolphe de Casteja and Lieutenant Rochat, who had accompanied General Vignal on the visit of November 3, from the French Mission.-' On Monday, November l^, the foreign officers began their courses in special instruction.-' Rifle ranges, bayonet courses and various types of trenches were constructed and the troops entered upon a period of advanced training. Every- thing became specialized. Bombing schools were organized, bayonet schools, schools of automatic arnas, intelligence schools, machine gun schools, small arms schools, schools of engineering, classes in gas defense, in signalling, in artillery fire, in first aid, in fact, schools and classes covering all of the major and many of the minor requirements for each of the units. Thanksgiving Day came and brought leaves of absence for many of the men, and for those left in camp menus of turkey and cranberries, celrey, ice cream and pie, cake and candy — a true Thanksgiving dinner. From this time on, every week-end long trainloads of khaki-clad, healthy and well-disciplined soldiers left CAMP MEADE DAYS 31 Camp Meade for Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington and the hundreds of little towns of Pennsylvania and Maryland which had sent their sons to form the Sev. enty-ninth Division. One of the largest leave of absence crowds journeyed to Philadelphia on December 1, to watch their Division football team play Camp Dix. The result was a set-back for the Seventy-ninth's championship aspirations as Camp Dix won, 13 to 6.-' In mid-December the War Department renewed its drains upon the Divi- sion personnel. On December 12 a large draft of men was taken from the infantry brigades and transferred to the Fourth Division, at Camp Greene, N. C, and on December 13, sixty-nine second lieutenants of the Quartermasters' Corps, who had been temporarily assigned to the Division, were transferred, forty-nine to Camp Joseph E. Johnston and the remainder to Camp Greene.^' An event of interest preceded the Christmas holidays when, on Saturday. December ^'J, Sec- retary of War Newton D. Baker reviewed the Division and was quite compli- mentary upon its appearance.^' As Christmas approached preparations were made for the celebration of the day. Greens were picked and taken into all the mess halls, the curriculum was suspended for four days, and company funds were spent lavishly. Reports of Uncle Sam's gift of turkey for the big dinner filtered through the camp in advance. The day passed with many of the men on leave, while those who were obliged to remain in camp feasted bountifully and enjoyed themselves as much as it was humanly possible to do upon such an occasion away from home and in an army post. With the beginning of the New Year, the War Department ordered all local boards to forward to Camp Meade sufficient men to fill up deficiencies in per- centage due to physical rejections at camp. At that time Camp jNIeade was sup- posed to have received eighty-six per cent of the first quota from all sources, but figures showed that approximately 3,000 more men were needed to make the eighty-six per cent accurate. ^^ The instructions were that the deficiencies were to be made up prior to February 15. As a result, on January 3, 1918, Philadelphia moved 881 men to camp. Pennsylvania's total between January 1 and February 1-t was 1,891,'" and Maryland's and the District of Columbia's about 1,100. These men, unlike those who had gone before, were not assigned immediately to units of the Division. Instead, they were placed in the 15-lth Depot Brigade, from where, after partial training, they were transferred to the special and technical services and to other divisions. Few of them found their way into the Seventy- ninth Division units. They went to aviation, engineering, ordnance, quarter- master and other special branches of the service. Between February 2 and 5 large drafts were sent from both the 15-lth Depot Brigade and also the long-suffer- ing infantry and artillery brigades to the Eighty-second Division, while another lot went to the Eightieth Division at Camp Lee, some to the Fifth Division and still others, in small dribbles, to other training camps. By the end of March, 1918, the depot brigade was almost depleted and the Division itself numbered scarcely more than 15,000 men. Meanwhile there had been some few changes in the officer personnel. In January, 1918, the Third Officers' Training Camp was organized in the Division and, for those chosen to attend, three long months of intensive drilling, tiresome 32 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION hours of study and nerve-racking examinations followed. On May 17, 1918, the camp ended with 103 soldiers receiving certificates of eligibility for commissions.^^ Prior to this, on December 15, 1917, a small number of commissioned men, gradu- ates of the Second Officers' Training Camp at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., were assigned to the Division.^* In December, 1917, and January, 1918, had come cold weather and much snow. The winter of 1917-1918, in fact, was one of the bitterest in years. Its frigidity forced a partial abandonment of outdoor work; lectures in barracks took the place of training on the snow-covered drill fields. Even though barrack-room stoves were kept red hot, it was hard to keep warm. Outside, the thermometer flirted always with zero. Sentries could testify to that as they felt the cold gripping at their finger tips and nipping their ears. So could the hapless companies hauled out on the ice-coated fields to stagger through the intricacies of a bayonet drill, each man expecting to see his opponent skid and receive the point of the weapon somewhere in his frozen anatomy. But ik-'.-Ctf 304 ENGINEERS Company Drill Atter Weeks of Training miracles still happen, or at least they did that winter, for never a casualty was reported from these hazardous instructions. Right in the heart of the cold weather, on January 29th, the Second Battalion of the 304th Engineers was ordered off to Accotink, Virginia, to begin construction on one end of a spur railroad line run- ning from Accotink Station to Camp Humphreys. The work consisted of clear- ing timber, grading, making cuts and fills and building four trestles. Not until April was it finished and the battalion ordered back to Camp Meade. The winter training was dreary, at times discouraging and always amid discomforts, but the men persevered with unflagging zeal and, as April approach ^d, those who had been unmolested by the War Department drafts found themselves fast rounding into something considerably better than recruits. During February, 1918, the final contingents of the first quota had been called out, the men arriving at camp between February 18 and 28, with some de- layed shipments in the first two weeks in March. Pennsylvania contributed 2,945 men to complete its quota;" Maryland, 1,000, and the District of Columbia CAMP ]\IEADE DAYS Emergency Road Construction by the 304th Engineers at Camp Meade 1. Placing stringers for the foundation 2. View of excavation and foundation 3. Placing corduroy for the sm-face 34 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION about 100. These proved a mere drop in the bucket to the insatiable demand for men from other camps and finally, in late March, a second quota was demanded from the divisional territory. The War Department went further afield, however, and dropped the old boundary lines, ordering men to Camp INIeade not only from Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia, but from West Virginia and Ohio. The movement began on April 1 and continued, with slight interrup- tions, for a whole month. The final shipment, on May 1, consisted of 465 men from Ohio.^° The total movement was 8,316, of which '-2,700 were from Pennsyl- vania, 1,000 from Maryland, a few from the District of Columbia, and the bal- ance from West Virginia and Ohio. AVhile this converging movement was on foot, the various units of the Divi- sion acquired their first taste of army life under real field service conditions. Late Sunset View of Pup Tent Camp in March, each organization was required to hike out to the fringe of the reserva- tion and pitch a shelter tent camp for at least one night. The chill of wnter was still in the air and the ground had not yet dried out from its winter deluge of snow and rain. The troops, however, regarded their one night stand as a wel- come relief from the monotony of work in the regimental areas, and carried through their maneuver in a manner that drew commendation from the Division Staff. Shortly after this the Division was given an opportunity to show the results of its long months of hard work by a review in Baltimore on April 6 before the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, President Wilson, in commemoration of the first anniversary of America's entry into the World War. The Di\-ision marched from Camp INIeade to Baltimore and back, '2^1 miles each way, and in this, the first real test of endurance, the men acquitted themselves well. It was a great day for the Division as rank after rank of those, who a few months before had been untrained civilians, passed through the streets, erect in carriage, keen eyed and CAMP MEADE DAYS 35 bronzed by the outdoor training. With "eyes right," platoon after platoon passed the official reviewing stand whereon the President and his party showed their appreciation of the moulding of a greater American Army as typified by the Seventy-ninth Division. The occasion was an especially eventful one for the 313th Infantry, which marched on home soil for the first time since created at Camp Meade. Shortly after the review at Baltimore, the 31'-2th Field Artillery was given an opportunity to shake the dust of Camp Meade for a two-days hike. On April 25 the entire regiment, in llea^•y marching order, went out the Baltimore pike and wound through the picturesciue hilly country to a camp site on a bluff over- looking the Severn River. It was a twenty-one mile hike and wound up with every artilleryman in the outfit swimming in the Severn. The regiment broke camp the following day and returned by the shortest route to the cantonment. The hike was repeated on May 3 and 4, being made particularly interesting on the second occasion by a sham battle the first day and a rain storm during the night which blew down ninety per cent of the pup tents. The camp on the Sev- ern was made possible through the friendship between the owner of the land and Major James Patterson, commanding the second battalion. Excluding the re- view at Baltimore, the 31'-2th Artillery and the 304th Engineers were the only outfits to get away from Camp ]Meade for over night stretches during the period of the divisional training there. The result of the intensive and specialized training became apparent as spring crept on. Upon one occasion the machine gun units of the Division gave a demon- stration of indirect firing and barrage work before a group of officials from the War Department and high-ranking officers of the Army. This demonstration, directed by Major Liebenrood, of the Briti.sh Machine Gun Corps, was fired with the new Browning guns. It was a distinct success and was instrumental in es- tablishing confidence in the new Browning, which later resulted in its adoption as standard equipment. During the week after the return from the Division review in Baltimore, the S16th Infantry regiment repaired to the target range, on the southern end of the cantonment. ^^ For six days the men sought to make marksmen of themselves. During this time they slept in shelter tents, securing just a glimpse of some of the experiences in store for them. The 316th was followed to the range by the 315th. which was succeeded in turn by the two regiments of the 157th Infantry Brigade. On May 3, the 314th Infantry was awarded the highest honors for rapid fire work at the 100, SOO and 300 yard rifle range. The regiment made the best showing of any unit in the National Army, thirty-one of the men cjualifying for the mid- ranges. '' With the rifle practice completed, the attention of the entire Division was turned to the "open war game." Hitherto the trend of training had been toward trench warfare, but a new era of fighting seemed to be developing on the Western Front and its effect was apparent in the changed curriculum at Camp Meade. A bayonet assault course was constructed by one of the regiments as part of the larger scheme of offensive M'ork, and, by mid-May, the Division as a whole was solving real problems; "capturing" strategic points, "outmaneuvering" strong 36 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION columns, "routing" heavy attacks, and "surprising" unsuspecting encampments. The new training had a novelty to it which the tedious instruction through the winter had lacked. The men took part with avidity in the new "game," and Division "oflfensives" were remarkably battle-like save for the absence of gun- powder. During the spring months a great deal of stress was laid upon the subject of gas training and gas discipline. Certain officers and non-commissioned officers were selected from each regiment to take a special course of training at the Divi- sion Gas School, in order that they might serve as instructors in their respective units. Returning from the Division course of training, they lost no time in ex- plaining the dread effects of German gas, to which explanations their comrades listened with broad, sickly grins, and learned to don the gas mask in less than five Rifle Practice on the Range at Camp Meade, Md., Spring, 1918 seconds. As a grand finale to the general course of gas instruction, each com- pany was required to visit the gas chamber, located in a ravine near the south- western edge of the reservation, and there spend a certain amount of time in a room filled with lachrymatory gas. But still the Division was being robbed of its men by the War Department. On April 24 a total of 1900 were sent to the Twenty-eighth Division at Camp Han- cock, and the drain continued until June, when the Division had been reduced in strength to 12,000 men. This was despite the fact that in May alone 11,065 men were added in a third call upon the two original states. The third quota began to arrive on May 25, when 2,038 men were despatched from thirty-six Pennsyl- vania counties. The subsequent arrivals were, May 26, 1,244 from Philadelphia, May 27, 1,500 from Philadelphia and 1,085 from Eastern Pennsylvania and 500 from six Maryland counties; May 28, 500 from Baltimore, 220 from Maryland, CAMP MEADE DAYS 37 446 from Philadelphia and 1,180 from Pennsylvania, and jNIay 29, 675 from Balti- more and 618 from Pennsylvania.'* The majority of these men got no further into Camp Meade than the Depot Brigade, taking the place of 2,126 men for- warded elsewhere on May 30 and 31, of which 1502 went to Camp Lee and 574 to Fort Niagara. These 2,126 comprised many of the men who had arrived at the camp in the late April draft.'' The reasons lying behind the wholesale raids upon Camp Meade for men are much in dispute. Whether it was failure of the volunteer system, failure of the cantonment builders to meet contract time, failure of the War Department to call sufficient men to the colors in the beginning, or lack of vision of the political leaders of the period are mooted questions. Whatever the causes were, the re- sidt was disheartening and discouragmg to the Seventy-nmth Division, as it was also called upon to furnish details of officers who were sent to the various towns / in eastern Pennsylvania to stmiulate recruiting for the Twenty-eighth Division, i'"*"^ Approximately 95,000 men were called to Camp Meade to be trained and of these only 27,000 were retained by the Division.^" In addition to that, of the 27,000, about 15,000 were men selected for military training in June of 1918 and conse- quently went overseas with the Division as green troops. Maryland and the Dis- trict of Columbia alone of the original Camp Meade area contributed quotas to the final draft. No more men went from Pennsylvania after the month of May. Maryland sent 2,150 men beginning June 22; the District of Columbia sent 300 and the balance were received from New York City, Brooklyn, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio and West Virginia.*' In the time allotted before sailing, it was impossible to give these men, representing fifty-eight per cent of the Division, more than the mere rudiments of a military educaton. They secured overseas clothing, accoutrements and rifles along with the rest of the Division, learned the elements of movements by columns, had a brief lesson or two in the use of the gas mask and that was all. By June the War Department was beginning to establish records in the way it was shipping men to the American Expeditionary Forces. Rumors of sailing orders, which had been prevalent around the cantonment for several months, grew more believable. Issuance of the overseas equipment was evidence that a movement was anticipated soon. The departure between June 26 and 29 of ad- vance detachments from the various units was significant enough.*- The per- sonnel of the Division, even to the newest recruits, was more than satisfied to get away soon. To a man, the Division was eager to go. CHAPTER II OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA TN THE first six months of 1918, while the Seventy-ninth Division at Camp -'■ Meade was being plucked of its men more rapidly than the local boards could supply them, the war had brought grave conditions to the Western Front. The old stalemate of trench warfare was at an end. Ludendorff, that German Quartermaster General who specialized in shock formations, was hammer- ing at the Allied hue. Amiens in March ! Flanders in April! To the Marne in May! Montdidier in June! Four offensives in four months and the last twoof them toward Paris!' The Germans had battered their way to within seventy kilometers of the French Capital and the struggle "had cut wide swaths in the British and French ranks."^ Elements of three American divisions had been thrown into the fighting — the First at Cantigny, the Third at Chateau Thierry, and the Second at Belleau Woods and Vaux. More American divisions were training behind the battlefront and still more were on the way overseas. France, England and America had pooled their maritime interests in the hour of dire ne- cessity. The joint tonnage had transported 2-25,000 men across the Atlantic in May and 230,000 in June.^ July's record was to eclipse that, and, to the Seventy- ninth Division fell the honor of being in the forefront of the July movement. On June 30, 1918, General Kuhn and his staff and the Advance School De- tachment of the Divison, composed of various regimental officers and enlisted men who had left Camp Meade between June 25 and 28, sailed from New York for France. Their departure marked the first move of the Division toward the battlegrounds of Europe. The Division Commander and his staff sailed on the Calamares; the regimental infantry officers and all the enlisted men on the Duca Degli d'Abruzzi, and the regimental artillery officers on the Mongolia. These ships were in a convoy of ten others and arrived in Brest on July 13. The departure of General Kuhn left the command of the Division at Camp Meade to Brigadier General Nicholson, of the 157th Infantry Brigade. It was the second time in the history of the cantonment that he had been at the helm, there having been a period of about nine weeks in the winter of 1917-18 when the Com- manding General and his Chief of Staff made a tour of inspection on the Western Front. Upon General Nicholson devolved the task of entraining the Division for the port of embarkation. His success was noted after the war when, in an address before the General Staff College at Washington, the Chief of the Trans- portation Service, Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines U. S. A., stated that "the Seventy- ninth made the quickest entrainment of any division in the United States."^ (38) OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 39 Changes in commanding officers in a number of the units also had taken place, some permanent and others merely temporary. Colonel Darrah, of the 314th Infantry, and Colonel Rosenbaum, of the 315th Infantry, had been promoted to brigadier generals and transferred to other divisions, the latter being detached upon the eve of departure from Camp Meade. ^ Lieutenant Colonel ^Yilliam H. Oury succeeded to the command of the 314th, and was promoted to his full Colonelcy on May 12th, 1918, and assigned to command the 314th Infantry; but in the 315th where the lieutenant-colonelcy was vacant and the two senior majors were in the Advance School Detachment, the command devoh'ed ujjon INIajor Francis V. Lloyd, of the third battalion.^ In the Artillery Brigade, Colonel Howard L. Landers had, some time before, succeeded Colonel Dan T. [Nloore in command of the 310tli Artillery,'' while other new leaders were Captain Edward \V. Madeira, Headcfuarters Troop, vice Captain Pleasonton, promoted to Major and assigned as Adjutant of the 157th Infantry Brigade," and ^Major Stuart S. Janney, Sl'ith Machine Gun Battalion, vice Major Zane, transferred. As Bri- gadier General Hatch also had been detached from the Division, the 158th Infantry Brigade command fell to Colonel Charles, of the 316tli Infantry, as the senior ranking officer. Also, a new unit had been organized in May, the 304th Engineer Train, commanded first by Lieutenant Clinton W. Morgan and later by Lieutenant Edward A. Hill. With all of these changes, some of several months previous and others of a more recent date, the manner in which General Nicholson and his various unit commanders won the praise of the Chief of the Transportation Service is a tribute to their individual ability. The units of the Division began to entrain at Disney Station on July 6. Ef- forts had been made toward the utmost secrecy in carrying out the troop move- ment; but for a week or more the atmosphere of the cantonment had been electric with rumors of the Division's departure, and on Saturday, July 6, and Sunday, July 7, there were quite a number of mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers and sweethearts on hand to bid the men a heart-aching farewell as companies, bat- talions and regiments marched across the parade ground for the last time and halted along the tracks, awaiting their turn to board the long trains of day coaches. By nightfall of July 7 all had gone except the Artillery Brigade and Ammunition Train. The troop trains ran north, each containing a noisy and excited crowd. There could be no concerted effort to give a rousing send-off to the men of the Division. Theoretically, no one in civilian life was to know they were going. Yet, somehow, at the little towns, the station platforms were fairly ■well crowded with cheering people, and at North Philadelphia, where all the trains made a brief stop, the word had spread that the Division was bound overseas, and the relatives and friends of Philadelphia men were on hand by the hundreds.** Beyond Phila- delphia lay a quick run across New Jersey, and then ferries from the Jersey City railroad yards took the men to the great embarkation piers at Hoboken. The U. S. S. Leviathan, once the famous Hamburg-American liner Vater- land, was waiting at Hoboken for part of the Seventy-ninth Division. On July 7 and 8 the embarkation was carried out until slightly more than 10,000 troops were on board. These, with the crew, made more than 13,000. The Division units on board were Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, 310th Machine 40 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Gun Battalion, 304th Field Signal Battalion, and the 157th Infantry Brigade complete (313th and 314th Infantry and 311th Machine Gun Battalion). It is interesting to note that the two machine gun battalions were the first to sail over- seas equipped with the new Browning guns. The sailing of the great liner is best described in the words of one of the of- ficers of the Division who was a passenger: I have a distinct recollection of the evening of July 8, 1918, when, with a screech of her siren, the Leviathan left her pier at Hoboken. We had just completed our first Abandon Ship drill, and the troops were all on deck as the engines of the ship moved her away from the pier. As she swung down stream, gaining speed at every moment, the troops all cheered and the bands played. On the buildings of New York were great crowds of m-:. U. S. S. Leviath.^n people likewise cheering, and every whistle, both in the city and on the ships in the river saluted the ship. Above all, on each flagstaff were the Stars and Stripes, flying at half-mast in honor of Mayor Mitchell, who had just been killed in an airplane acci- dent, but flying, nevertheless, triumphant. We stayed on deck as the ship moved down stream in the afternoon sunlight and passed the Statue of Liberty, which we were not to see again for many long months. Finally, as twilight came and the land gradu- ally disappeared in the west, the word was passed to clear the decks and we went below. German submarines had appeared off the American coast in June, so war- ships of Squadron No. 1, Cruiser Force, U. S. N., were escorting all troopships to OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 41 a rendezvous twelve hours out of New York, where the overseas convoy usually was formed.' The Leviathan, because of her superior speed, left the cruisers at the end of the twelve hour period and steamed onward alone, disdaining protection in the twenty-two knot speed of her engines. Life on board was not monoton- ous. It could not be with 13,000 human beings packed on the great ship. The feeding of some 10,000 troops on board was a stupendous task in itself, but was accomplished successfully twice a day. The meals were served in the main salon of the big ex-German liner and were excellent, which is more than can be said regarding some of the other transports. Constant practise in the "Abandon Ship" drill was the chief evidence of danger from enemy U-boats. The men became so expert that, before many days out, they could clear their compart- ments and get to their lifeboat stations in slightly more than seven minutes after "Abandon Ship" was sounded on the bugle. Incidents typical of the voyage are found in a memorandum of July 13, 1918, for "Officers' Call." It is an almost forgotten bit of war-time literature, but quotations from it are interesting. For illustration, the following:'" Services will be held for the 313th Infantry on B deck aft Starboard at 10.30 A. M. tomorrow. Services will be held on B deck aft Port at the same time for the 314th Infantry. Or this: It is reported that Head(|uarters Company, Supply Conipany and part of Company G, 314th Infantry quartered in E. R. S. 1, moved out to dinner ahead of their time. Apparently no officers were present with these men. Or even this: It is reported that at the "Abandon Ship" drill 11:00 A. M., July 13, Company L, 313th Infantry, came from the upper decks with no officer leading. This Company was halted with its head at No. 4 Stairway, thereby causing more congestion. Anyone desiring reading matter on the voyage found it in the twenty-seven or more pages of memorandum on "Provisional Instructions on Embarkation, Entraining and Detraining of Troops in France and England; also General In- structions for Debarkation on Base Sections."^' The memorandum, as formidable as its title implies, consisted of an original on July 3 and extensive supplements on July 10 and 11. It contained information of all variety, ranging from orders to erase distinguishing marks from base drums to form sheets for lighter services, with advice on spies, French money, rest camp rations and many other matter, thrown in. Four destroyers picked up the Leviathan, when twenty-four hours out of Brest, on July 14. Everyone had been feeling a little uneasy, knowing they were in the danger zone, and it was with the greatest sense of relief and security that the men viewed the greyhounds which were to escort them to port. The big troop- ship arrived at Brest on the morning of July 15, six and one-half days after leaving New York'^ and but two days after the arrival of General Kuhn and the Advance 42 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION School Detachment, who had sailed on June 30. On July 16 the debarkation was completed, the troops moving to Pontanezen Barracks and vicinity for a rest of three days.'^ On July 9, the day after the Leviathan sailed from Hoboken, a second convoy put out from New York Harbor with the 158th Infantry Brigade complete (315th and 316th Infantry and 312th Machine Gun Battalion), 304th Engineers, 30-ltli Engineer Train, 304th Division Trains and Military Police, 304th Supply Train and 304th Sanitary Train. These units of the Division were di\ided among five transports, the Agamemnon, America, La France, Mount Vernon and Ori- zaba. The Agamemnon carried all of the 316th Infantry except Co. ^I and the Supply Company;" the America bore the 315th Infantry;" La France had on board the 312th Machine gun Battalion, 304th Engineers and Engineer Train, and the balance of the 316th Infantry/^ and the other Trains were on the Mount Vernon and Orizaba. Poignant recollections of this sailing from home are brought back in this description, written by the historian of the 316th Infantry, who was aboard one of the troopships of this convoj':'' "The subway was filled with its evening rush crowd; the commuters were jamming the ferries to Jersey; the lights of Man- hattan were barely awakening into radiance; the thoughts df some millions of busy humans were turning once more to home in tene- ment or flat or mansion, as the Agamemnon, with a hoarse blast of its siren, left its dock and floated down the river, past the crowded ferries, past the figure of Liberty and out into the broad Atlantic. Behind lay the imposing sky-line of New York, a mass of majestic ghosts in the twilight — ahead, lay France, and thte Western Battlefront." Unlike the voyage of the Leviathan, the trip of the second convoy proved eventful. At 11.50 o'clock on the night of July 14, the America rammed the British freight steamer Indesiructo. The America, at that time the third largest transport carrying the American flag, was running without lights at a speed of about fifteen knots. The big ship's bow plunged into the freighter amidships, plowing through it like a knife and practically cutting it in two. The Indestructo was hurled to starboard where it sank in seven minutes. ^^ The America, veering off and coming to a stop, well nigh collided with the La France.^' Lifeboats from the America rescued eleven of the forty-two members of the crew of the freighter. The rest were lost.'^ Two days later, on the morning of July 16, eight sub-chasers arrived to escort the five transports into Brest. Their presence proved fortunate when, on the following morning, an enemy submarine was sighted. It dove as the sub-chasers started toward it, and then emerged a little astern of the convoy. The after port gun of La France was fired and the U-boat submerged. The sub-chasers bombed the spot for an hour, but nothing happened.'* The transports reached Brest, without further incident, on the afternoon of July 18, and debarkation began at once. The men were marched to open fields adjoining Pontanezen Barracks and pitched shelter tents, resting for three days OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 43 where "the face of the land m'HS pleasant enough but the face of the sky was marred with continual weeping."'^ To return to the Artillery Brigade at Camp Meade. The three regiments, the Trench Mortar Battery and the Ammunition Train had watched the infantry, machine gunners and other units depart on July 6 and 7, knowing their own turn would come soon. The order arrived in time to send them forth on July 13. The trains took them not to Jersey City, but to the Port Richmond piers at Phila- delphia where, awaiting them, was the most nondescript collection of troop ships the men could imagine. It consisted of the Haverford and Northland, former liners which had been converted into au.xiliary cruisers, transports, supply ships or anything else the British Navy had required of them in four years of war, and the Saxonia, Mesaha, Nevasa and Morvada, all of which had been horse or cattle ships for several years. A great crowd, which grew as the word spread that the artillery of the Seventy-ninth Division was embarking, congregated on the water- front to say good-bye. During the morning of July 14, Bastille Day, the vessels were freighted with their human cargo. The departure is described by the his- torian of the 310th Field Artillery, who was on board the Northland:-'' In broad daylight the ship pulled out and passed down the river, cheered by the crowds on ferry boats and pier heads. Next morning the hotels of Cape May loomed out of the mist off the port beam; by dark we passed Fire Island Light. Wednesday night, the 17th, we lay off Halifax and nosed into the harbor next morning. The larger part of the fleet already lay at anchor but we lay over two days while the stragglers came in. Saturday, July ^20, at 8 A. M., the convoy filed out, twenty-two transi)orts and freighters, one light cruiser, H. M. S. Berwick, another of the "leaf" type, and two sub-chasers. From ships, shore and docks, bands played and crowds cheered. At sundown the chasers turned back; with the danger zone extending to our own coast, the great fleet seemed curiously naked and exposed." On July 30, the artillery transports arrived off the coast of England and paused to await the escort of destroyers due to guide them through the danger zone. This picturesciue and thrilling incident in the passage to France is well described by an officer of the 311th Artillery on board the Saxonia-}^ At last they topped the crest and tore over the horizon — two, four, sbc, eight destroyers — and bore down uj)on us, their funnels pouring out great clouds of dense black smoke, the spray dashing wildly from their bows, careening over to port, then to starboard, in seeming imminent peril of vanishing for good and all beneath the surface but suddenly bobbing up again and crash- ing through the waves. Then they were upon us. As we approached land, though not yet in sight, our own look- outs gave the dreaded warning, "Submarine in sight^" Like a flash the destroyers wheeled and struck across our bows to the starboard side. The transport came out of its lethargic mood and, like an ancient gray-hided monster, suddenly lurched for- ward with a crash and roar and dropped a shell two hundred feet in front of our bows, but, if the truth must be told, the gallant old hulk had fired at a fish which had lucklessly leapt out of its ele- 44 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION ment, tossing up white foam in its path. Meanwhile the destroy- ers were combing the sea, blasting the depths for miles around with their powerful and deadly bombs. For some time the heavy detonations continued and then, slowly, steadily, a film of oil rose and spread, carrying the tale of success to our arms. Out it stretched in a great wide pool, sinister, merciless, betraying the death of the skulking Boche. Back swept the destroyers, and falling into line, the convoy pushed on, and then, in sight of land, our party split, each boat destined for a different port. The transports docked at Liverpool and Birkenhead, England, and Avon- Ttpical French Locomotive mouth, Wales, on July 31, the men being sent to the rest camp at Knotty Ash and subsequently to the American camp at Romsey. On the night of August 3 and 4, the 311th Field Artillery crossed the channel from Southampton to Cher- bourg, France; the 312th crossed and debarked at Le Havre on August 5, and the 310th at Cherbourg on August 8. While the completion of this final step, the entire Division was at last in France. However, it was not assembled there, nor was it to be until after the Armistice. Henceforth, save where otherwise indicated, the term, "Division," will exclude the Artillery Brigade. Some time before the i\.rtillery Brigade reached France, the balance of the Division had departed from Brest for a training area. To the men, the three days in the rest camp had been a nightmare. But few had been billeted in the Pon- tanezen Barracks, the majority sleeping in shelter tents in the mud. Commenting upon the conditions, the historian of the 304th Sanitary Train states that "at first men became righteously indignant over conditions but later came to regard the 'rest camp' idea as an atrocious form of Yank humor, and so just grinned and OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 45 stood up under the strain.--" On July 19, Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, SlOtli Machine Gun BattaHon and the 157th Infantry Brigade were marched back to Brest and informed that they were headed for the Twelfth Training Area- to which had been ordered all of the Division except the Artillery Brigade and the Artillery Section of the Ammunition Train. The men embarked in some- thing new — French box cars, now forever famed in American Expeditionary Force annals as "Hommes 40, Chevaux 8," a title drawn from the legend painted upon each car. These queer vehicles called to mind a paragraph in the debarkation memorandum which had read:" An "8-40" French Box-car — the Soldier's Traveling Pal.\ce Box cars are usually provided for the accommodation of the troops. They hold from 3'-2 to 40 men. Sometinies seats are provided. Straw will be pro^■ided whenever practicable to make the men as comfortable as possible when traveling in cold weather. Space at each end of the car should be left clear for rifles, rations and accoutrements; the rifles being secured by an improvised rack made with screw rings and a strap or sling. The paragraph had not exaggerated. If anything, it had painted a prettier picture than the real articles turned out to be. For three days these box cars were the habitation of the "Hommes 40"; fortunately there was no attempt to crowd in the "Chevaux 8." The way led through the very heart of France, dis- closing scenes of rural beauty which thrilled and yet saddened the men. The absence of young men in the towns and villages and the use of women to take their places in fields provided a deep reminder of what war meant. Men unaccustomed to a dearth of youth for farm work, found it strange indeed to see women spading or plowing in the fields. German prisoners also were seen work- 46 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION ing along the railroads. And the men of the Division from the farming com- munities eyed with astonishment the land cultivated and divided into neat little strips of different kinds of crops. Always the French people were cheerful, inter- ested in the Americans, and gave them gay receptions. The route led by way of Laval-Rennes and Le Mans. At the latter place while one of the troop trains stopped in the train shed, a number of Turkos were brought in wounded, all cov- ered with mud and badly cut up. In a large baggage hall many stretchers were lined up, each containing a very badly wounded man. The men standing about were astonished to think that a battle was on so near; that is, near enough to al- low men so badly wounded to be transported from it and still live. The wonders and discomforts of the ride were brought to a close only with the arrival, on July 22, in the Twelfth Training Area around Chatillon-sur-Seine. Before the balance of the Division put in an appearance at Chatillon-sur- Seine, General Headquarters decided suddenly that the Seventy-ninth Division should go to the Tenth Training Area, around Champlitte and Prauthoy, in the Department of Haute-Marne and midway between Dijon and Langres. The decision was reached in time to divert tlie 158th Infantry Brigade, which had entrained at Brest on July 21 and 22, but the 157th Infantry Brigade and Division units were getting comfortably ensconced in the Twelfth Training Area and had to be rooted out of their billets around July 25 and consigned to truck trains for another ride. Fortunately, the distance was short. By July 29, the final units had reached the area designated. Division Headquarters were established at Prauthoy; 157th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Champlitte and 158th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Vaux-sous-Aubigny near Esnomes. The various out- fits were scattered among some thirty-eight towns, a few being Boussenois, Choil- ley, Chassigny, Percy-le-Grand, Maatz, Dommarien, Courcelles, Chalancey, and Leuchey, which made up the area. The soldiers were billeted in stables, barns and anything else with a roof on it. In many instances "the billets of the men were identical with the billets of horses, cows and chickens; foul, dark, damp places, reeking with a million unsavory odors."" The 304th Sanitary Train had its work cut out during that occupation of the training area and spent many weeks making that particular spot in France measure up to American Sanitary stand- ards. By the first of August the intensive training schedule was laid out and the men realized suddenly that the lessons of Camp Meade days had been little more than the primer of warfare. Several of the French officers, assigned to the Div- ision in America, had accompanied it overseas and they were augmented by many more, all specialists in their several lines — Captains Antoine Prevost Du Comte, Antone Raoul Erondelle and Robert Feuardent, First Lieutenants Paul Medinger, Louis Olivier, Emile Comoy, Stephan Knocker, and Second Lieutenants Edouard Cauchois, Henri Castel, Raymond Bezancon, Andre Garelle and Jean Bezos.^ Eight hours a day were devoted to training, and made a varied and crowded cur- riculum. The war was not waiting for anyone in those days of August, 1918. The German had shot his bolt at Rheims and Chateau Thierry on July 15 and was being hurled back by American and French troops across the Marne and the OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 47 Ourcq to the Vesle, while, further north, the British had opened up the magnifi- cent August offensive in which two more American divisions were about to par- ticipate. It was the task of the Seventy-ninth Division to learn much and learn quickly, for it was needed at the front. Rifle ranges were constructed and the men who had joined in the June draft had their first opportunity to receive instruction in musketry, to fire at various ranges and to become generally acquainted Mitli their rifles. Specialists were selected and received individual instruction as automatic riflemen, carriers, rifle grenadiers, runners, bombers and so forth. A Division Intelligence School, established at St. Broingt-Le-Bois, had a large attendance and trained the men who subsequently functioned in the intelligence detachments with division, brigade and regimental headquarters. The machine gun battalions sent experts to the machine gun companies of the infantry to train them in handling the light Brownings, first of their kind to be used abroad.'-* Maneuvers formed a large part of the instructions. Division terrain exercises were held weekly in the ^-icinity of Freftes near Champlitte, to train the elements of the Division in the important work of liaison and combat. In the middle of August, the officers and men who had formed the Advance School Detachment rejoined the Division, and others were sent to the Second Corps School at Chatillon." Some changes had also been made in the unit com- manders. On July 27, Lieutenant Colonel Alden C. Knowles, of the 316th In- fantry, had been transferred to the 315th Infantry and was later commissioned a colonel and assigned permanently to the regiment.-* In the SlOth Machine Gun Battalion, INIajor A. W. Smith was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and became Divisional ^Machine Gun Officer, being succeeded by Captain J. L. Evans, pro- moted to major." On August 14, Brigadier General Robert H. Noble arrived and was assigned to the command of the 158th Infantry Brigade.-- As the period of training approached an end, surplus clothing and equipment were salvaged. Steel helmets and gas masks were issued. The gas officers and non-commissioned officers, recently returned from a short term at gas school, told gruesome stories of the German use of different kinds of deadly vapors. Influenza first made its presence felt in the Division in the latter part of August. In one organization, the 304th Engineers, the epidemic became so severe that it was quarantined. In the late August period, the Division had a total of about 600 cases with four per cent mortality.-^ The country about Champlitte and Prauthoy had never been scorched by the fires of the World War. It was picturesque from one end of the training area to the other, with the peasants always ready to extend a hearty greeting. ]Men of the Ammunition Train tell of a large sign displayed on the town hall, or hotel de ville. of one of the places they entered, bearing the inscription, "Welcome to our American Friends," and of the formal address of welcome delivered by the town's patriarch, while the children and girls threw flowers to the men standing in the ranks. There was, however, little to do in the area by way of recreation. At the end of a hard day's work the sole amusements would be a stroll through quaint village streets, a halting conversation with a native, or a glass of light wine sipped in a sidewalk cafe. Regulations forbidding the sale of strong liquors 48 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION were enforced by the military authorities, and were well observed on the part of the French population. The conduct of the American soldiers, General Kuhn is quoted as saying, was in every respect all that could be desired. News of what was going on at the front was received by the various units daily. On August 18, the office of G-2, Seventy-ninth Division, began the issu- ance of Summaries of Intelligence, which embraced the activities of the Allies and the enemy, and the mimeographed copies were posted on each company bul- letin board for one day and then destroyed.^' Copies of the London Daily Mail, the Continental edition of the New York Herald, the Stars and Stripes, and news- papers and magazines from home, were read with eagerness. In late August three officers of the Division participated in a successful de- ception of the enemy as to the actual point where the initial attack of the First American Army was to be launched. The trio, none of whom dreamed they were merely acting as decoys were. Major George A. Wildrick, G-3 of the Division staff; Major Alfred R. Allen, of the 314th Infantry, later killed in action and Major Norman E. Borden, of the 315th Infantry. They were sent under secret orders to Belfort, in the Sixth (American) Corps front line sector, near the Swiss border. At Belfort they were instructed to make a reconnaissance of the sector opposite Altkirch, which, they were told, would be the area selected for the Seventy-ninth Division to attack in a pending offensive, vast preparations for which were al- ready underway. As the officers learned long afterwards, the entire affair was a "demonstration" which misled the Boche and resulted in some German divisions being sent to that part of the front, with the consequent weakening of other sec- tors. This will explain many a rumor which circulated in the Division Training Area at the time. The ruse was so well kept a secret that it deceived everyone except those few who knew its purpose. September came and the first day of the month found several of the units that were billeted on the outer edge of the area, headed toward Champlitte, with full field equipment, on a march of concentration which was scheduled to con- clude with a divisional maneuver by the entire Division on September 3d. How- ever, before the end of the first day's hike, news had apparently reached Division Headquarters that changed the whole complexion of affairs, for the units which were already on the road received orders to return to their billets the following day. To the rank and file of the Division this news indicated strongly that some- thing important was in the wind, and that idea was strengthened materially by a secret order with a long supplement which were issued by Division Headquarters on September 1 and 4, respectively, and which was found to contain important general instructions regarding movements in front line positions, concealments, reconnaissances, combat employment, infantry deployment, artillery barrages, cleaning-up operations, organization of conquered ground, liaison, etc.'^ Divi- sion Headquarters had nothing to say specifically, but rumor said much. The men listened to rumor and waited, but not for long. OVERSEAS AND THE TRAINING AREA 49 SS M O 2 Jo ;K < O B Ph .,- e^ ?« 0& s< £i f- M a O OS^ - - W 5 J O z 5 <; o o ^ o S 5 ? - oS" to B OH . a D p a to S • f W <; w S ^ S " f" s 2 " (u o J J -H -, SB3 i^O a a K 2 IKPM ! a a ' .JO' B O a £ » ■ «0 B a « " ■" fe:6. § H S s 5 g .1 ^ ^ P3 ^ b o d s o a o O ^B I ^' ^ a m o H O aiALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 91 combat groups, died under the hurricane of fire but exhibited such courage that his men pressed forward and avenged him upon the machine gunners in their path.^- Private 1st cl Garosi Guido, of Ventura's combat group, though wounded in the shoulder, emulated his dead leader by his "bravery and self-sacrifice to duty."^^ Another instance of unusual bravery was the conduct of Private Ralph Pilla, Company "I". He, instructed to take prisoners to the rear, disdained the machine gun fire as he herded them before him. They passed a wounded soldier. Pilla stopped and made an improvised stretcher from the soldier's coat and sev- eral pieces of wood. Then he compelled the prisoners to carry the wounded man, first to a dressing station and afterwards to an ambulance a mile further along. The First Group of Prisoners Captdred by Seventy-Ninth Division, Carrying Wounded Men Back. Finally, having delivered his prisoners, he retraced his steps and rejoined his company after dark.'^ The fight through the ruins of Malancourt was a series of bitter combats with nest after nest of machine gunners, located so that the field of fire of those to the rear protected the more exposed positions. Colonel Oury, of the 314th, endeavored throughout to make use of his own machine guns.'" The Machine Gun Company of the regiment, armed with heavy Brownings, managed to keep well up in the support line, but the company from the 311th Machine Gun Bat- talion (Company "C") had encountered rough going from the very jump off. Within an hour after it had left the German first line trenches behind it, the men, despairing of making fast enough time, discarded their carts and man-handled 92 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION their heavy Brownings.'" Sergeant John E. Spasio, of this company, pushing forward with a squad, captured a German non-commissioned officer and, at the point of a pistol, forced him to disclose the position of a number of trench mor- tars. Through this stroke the mortars were later captured, but Spasio, a little later, enlarged his achievement by capturing ten more prisoners.'' Private Sher- idan C. Broadwater, of the company, was killed by a machine gun bullet during the advance. The heavy Brownings finally reached a forward position at lOh 30, arriving at a time when Major Gwynn, of the Third Battalion, 314th Infantry, was seeking some way of silencing three persistent nests on his flank. "C" Com- pany mounted its guns and set to work. It silenced the enemy guns in almost less time that it takes to tell about it. At that time Major Gwynn, seeing the terrain in front of them and realizing that the men could not stagger forward any farther with the heavy weapons, reluctantly ordered them to return to the jump- ing off place and await further orders. '"' All through the advance on the left of the regimental sector, the Third Bat- talion was having its troubles. Company "K," in particular was, "up to its neck" in combat with machine guns. Corporal James A. Larson and Private Nolan L. Jordan, of this company, "outflanked a machine gun in advance of the line, killed three of the crew and captured two others together with the gun."'* Serg- eant Charles J. Dewees, Jr., "led in the capture of two machine guns, killing the entire crew of both guns."'- Corporal Earl B. Mohn, although seriously wounded, led his squad to the capture of yet another weapon.'- The enemy shelling during this period was not particularly severe, nevertheless, it had inflicted a number of casualties in this same Third Battalion. '^ First Lieutenant Kenneth H. Mor- ton, Company "K," was knocked unconscious by a high explosive. Upon re- covering consciousness he refused to go to the rear, continuing to lead his pla- toon until wounded by a piece of shrapnel. '^ Sergeant Mart J. Cawley, Sergeant Samuel W. Shearer and Private Samuel Santucci, all of "K" Company also, although knocked over by a bursting shell, got doggedly to their feet and re- mained on duty.'- Sergeant Harry E. Mitchell, of the same company, when wounded, disdained even first-aid in his determination to keep up with his men.'^ In Company "L", Corporal John Bassusky, with a shrapnel wound in the hand, went to a dressing station, but, refusing to be evacuated, returned to his platoon,'^ while Sergeant Peter C. Strucel, "walking up and down the line cheering and en- couraging his men," was killed instantly.'* On the right, where the Second Battalion was echeloned in depth, two non- coms of the leading company — "E" — conducted themselves heroically. They were Sergeant Carl P. Frank, who, with two other men, captured a machine gun nest and seventeen prisoners, and Corporal Eric Rosenfield, who led his squad in cleaning up three nests and taking twenty-two prisoners.'- Nor were the other companies of the Second Battalion without their deeds of gallantry. In the fore- front of those recorded stands the achievement of an automatic rifle patrol of "F" Company, headed by Sergeant John A. McCawley. It had been sent out to flank several machine gun nests. McCawley got within fifty yards of one of the nests and opened fire, directing his men to fire on two others. The patrol wiped out entirely the three enemy groups. Other enemy machine gunners spotted IVL\LANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 9S the determined band and decimated it. Sergeant McCawley being instantly killed. Almost all of the men in the patrol were killed or wounded "but the sacrifice saved many, for it enabled the company to advance, while the patrol attracted the enemy fire."^^ Captain Henry M. Smith, Company "G," won the Distinguished Service Cross in the advance through Malancourt, when "although painfully wounded leading a platoon of his company against strong machine-gun nests, he continued the advance until all the machine guns in his immediate front were silenced and the crews killed or taken prisoners. He continued on duty until ordered to the rear by his regimental commander."^^ Even more thrilling was the exjierience of Second Lieutenant (then Sergeant) Joseph Cabla, of Company "F", of whom a Division Citation states:'^ Sergeant Cabla successfully maneuvered his patrol so he could flank the enemy machine gun nests. He advanced within five feet of one gunner and opened fire. At this point he directed his fire than six other machine gunners directed their fire upon it. Sergeant Cabla then ordereil his men to fall back and in doing so received a bullet in his breast stopped only by the whistle which he carried. He successfully withdrew his platoon to a better position and jiroceeded to use rifle grenades to great advantage. While discharging a grenade a sniper bullet hit him in the foot. Although the wounds gave him much pain, he refused to leave until the machine gun nests were wiped out. Then there was Private 1st cl Clifford M. Seiders, of the Machine Gun Com- pany, who "advanced ahead of his platoon in the face of heavy machine gun fire, entered alone a ruined building and discovered thirteen of the enemy. He shot one who resisted capture and made prisoners of the remainder, bringing in with him three light machine guns. Later in the same day he captured ten of the enemy and five machine guns.'^ Thus the 314th fought a bitter struggle, forcmg its way northward foot by foot, and in the early hours of the afternoon cooperating with the 313th Infantry's final and successful attack upon the Golfe de Malancourt. On hand to cooperate also in this attack was Company "B", 311th Machine Gun Battalion, which, from 7h, when it, like "C" Company, abandoned its carts, had been struggling along, eager to plant its tripods and concentrate its fire on the enemy.'* Private John M. Clark, of this unit, was killed in the attack. The other two companies of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion, being in Brigade Reserve, had no chance to fire,'" but a platoon of "D" Company, supporting a combat liaison group of in- fantrymen on the left of the Division sector, indulged in some hand to hand en- counters, one of the most notable of which was that of Private 1st cl Claude O. Twigg, who, although wounded, cornered twenty-three Boche in a dugout where they had sought concealment. Private Twigg had two hand grenades with him and there were no comrades near. Nothing daunted, he threatened with the grenades and succeeded in marching his twenty-three prisoners to the rear.'' In a somewhat similar encounter, Corporal Fred C. Durbin, of the same platoon, was killed. To return to the 313th Infantry which, since 9h, had been hung up in the northern edge of the Bois de Malancourt by the German resistance in the open 94 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION beyond. No matter how ■well worked out beforehand the plan of attack of an operation the size of the Meuse-Argonne battle — 12 miles of front and 600,000 men — may be, it is absolutely certain that there will arise, during the course of the operation, special situations of varying degrees of seriousness that could not have been foreseen and are not provided for in the plan of attack. Of such a nature was the hea\'y resistance in the Golfe de Malancourt. But it is also true that, where the general plan of attack is essentially sound and is carried out in the main successfully, these special situations are eventually overwhelmed in the general success. So it was in this case. Early in the afternoon the Thirty-seventh Division, on the left of the 313th Infantry, by normally pushing the attack toward its frontal objective, had passed well beyond the German second position before which was the 313th. The 314th Infantry, on the right, had also passed the German second position although in its case, too, its attention was largely centred upon the resistance in its front. The enemy's realization of the menace to his position in this situation, unplanned CiERGKS — Ruined Towx ix the Sector of the Division on our Left Fu-iXK and uncoordinated as it was, combined with his belief, no doubt, of the greater advantage in concentrating his defenses at jNIontfaucon, weakened his resistance. Probably, too, his knowledge of the rapidity of the American advance all along the line elsewhere, particularly that of the Fourth Division on the Seventy-ninth's right, then very nearly on the line of Montfaucon, convinced him that if his posi- tion in front of the Bois de Cuisy was not then untenable, it would shortly be so. In any case, another frontal attack by the 313th Infantry, assisted by support- ing units of the 314th Infantry from the right as well as by a fleet of French "whip- pet tanks," which had just come up over the road built by "D" Company, 304th Engineers, and the fire of the hea\'y Brownings from the 311th Machine Gun Battahon, succeeded in forcing the Germans at last to evacuate the position they had held for nearly five hours with conspicuous success. For a while the fighting was bitter. Captain Harry Ingersoll and Second Lieutenant William E. Fraley, both of "H" Company, were mortally wounded at the barbed wire entanglements in the centre of the clearing. The former's "absolute disregard for personal MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 95 danger" inspired his men to continue after he fell until they swarmed over the German position and into the southern edge of the Bois de Cuisy.^^ Sergeant Harry E. Forrest, Company "I", also was shot to death by machine guns as he led his platoon in a desperate attack. As in the case of Captain Ingersoll's men. Sergeant Forrest's followers emulated his splendid courage and stormed the nest before them, taking twelve prisoners.'^ Intrepid also was the courage of Chap- lain John Carroll Moore, who, although wounded, remained with the attacking line, administering to the dying and aiding the wounded. Entering one of the enemy trenches with a group of men, Chaplain Moore spied a hand grenade being hurled into their midst, and "in utter disregard of personal safety he grabbed the grenade to throw it from the trench. It exploded just after leaving his hand, seriously wounding him in several places."'^ Once the southern edge of the Bois de Cuisy had been won, the Germans began to withdraw, but resisted stubbornly in rear-guard actions with the result that there was much hand to hand fighting. At the northern edge of the Bois de Cuisy, immediately opposite the heights of Montfaucon, the 313th was again checked by machine gun fire. Under its cover, the retreat of the enemy infantry was rapid to the comparative safety of Mont- faucon. By now it was IGh^' and Colonel Sweezey paused to reorganize. Units had been broken up into little groups, widely scattered by the pursuit of the enemy through the Bois de Cuisy and the nature of the fighting that accompanied it. Montfaucon was too strong a position to move against without the attack being thoroughly organized and carried out with the greatest precision. The loss of oflScers in the attacks on the German second line had been severe, and the casual- ties among the enlisted men had been in proportion. The command of the Second Battalion had passed to Captain George C. Burgwin, Jr., of "E" Company, and of the Third Battalion to Captain James P. Lloyd, of "L" Company. '' All during the hours of the advance of the 157th Brigade, the 158th Brigade had been following 1,000 meters in the rear, suffering somewhat from artillery fire but having its worst experiences with the machine gunners left behind, unde- tected by the assault brigade. Behind the 314th, on the right, the 315th Infantry ran into sniper fire almost as soon as it crossed the German first line, and the first battle casualty of the regiment was First Lieutenant Raymond T. Turn, of "I" Company, who, it is believed, was killed when a sniper bullet exploded a hand grenade in his pocket.'^ Pressing forward, the leading battalions had, by early afternoon, mopped up what the 314th had overlooked in tlie way of Boche machine gun nests in Malancourt. In fact, the zeal of several elements of the 315th In- fantry had carried their attack forward so strongly that they found themselves fighting side by side with the front line units of the 314th Infantry. The Third Battalion, 315th Infantry, to the northwest of that town, ran into serious resist- ance in the underbrush. Second Lieutenant Floyd S. Strosnider, of "L" Com- pany, was killed by a machine gun bullet,'' but was avenged by his men, of whom Private Giacomo Masciarelli alone charged a machine gun nest, "killed one mem- ber of the crew and caused the rest to surrender. "^^ Two more nests were cap- tured by Corporal Mataus Unchis and two men, the corporal being wounded in the accomplishment.^" The tactical disposition of the leading platoon of "K" Company was made by First Lieutenant Ernest B. Becker, whose "fearless leader- 35 96 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION ship" was responsible in a large measure for the capture by his platoon of two machine guns and fourteen prisoners.'"' Corporal Harry L. Greenwood of "K" Company "personally led a patrol of four men against a machine gun and cap- tured the gun and nine prisoners." He was killed while reorganizing his platoon Company "A", of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion, supporting the Third Bat- talion of the 315th, afforded both overhead and flanking fire against the positions above Malancourt. One section and one-half of the company became separated from the rest and assisted the organization of the left subsector, south of Mont- faucon." The third officer of the 315th to be killed in action that day was First Lieutenant William F. Craig, of the Medical Corps, who was assigned to the Sec- ond Battalion. He met instant death tlirough the explosion of a German shell at the cross-roads in Malancourt.'" The enlisted personnel of the 315th killed on September 26 was as follows: (See Note) Company "A" Privates Henry Faller Private Patrick J. Egan William Monter Charles Staehle Company "C" Clifford Pickering Private Frakle Kozman John A. Ulrich Company "K" Company "D" Sergeant Harry L. Greenwood Private George R. Hill Private 1st cl Bernard J. Casey Private George Gonaff Company "F" Corporal Pius J. Nau Company "L" Privates Thomas T. Bray Privates Anthony M. Forsthoft'er Charles O. Dozois "William A. Nash Joseph Fox Ernest J. Harrison Company "M" Pvts. 1st cl Michael J. Joyce Company "G" Adolph Kurmin Private Guiseppe De Cellis George F. Reedy Private Otto E. Grigull Company "H" Corporal James L. Gallagher Sanitary Detachment Private 1st cl William Lentine Private Richard C. Owen NOTE: — It is obviously impossible to record the names of the wounded, but it must be borne in mind that every list of dead connotes a much longer list of wounded. On the left of the 158th Infantry Brigade sector, the 316th Infantry also ran into machine gun nests, but did not meet the resistance opposed to the ad- vance of the 315th. Maintaining its distance of 1,000 meters behind the 313th, it had, by noon, reached and passed the Avocourt-Malancourt road and, after the 313th ahead had subdued the Germans in the Golfe de Malancourt, it in turn crossed the open space into the Bois de Cuisy. Sergeant Charles H. Slair, "L" Company, won commendation by the way he reconnoitered the Bois de Cuisy ahead of the regimental advance,^ and Private Harold P. Rumberger, Company "B," was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for the way in which he re- duced a machine gun nest with an automatic rifle.'^ Captain Frederick A. Van MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 97 Dyke was wounded in the advance on the afternoon of the 26th. The bullet pierced his identification tag and forced it under his collar bone, where it was not found until a second operation. The experience of Captain Robert Feuardent, the French officer attached to the 316th, was typical. He entered a dugout on the German first line and came upon three Boche who had escaped the bom- RuiNED Church in Cierges. bardment and the assault battalions, and who surrendered on sight of his pistol.'' The 316th Infantry fatalities on the first day were heavy. The following men were killed: Company "A" Privates Joseph F. Parell William Wilcox Company "C" Sergeant Arthur J. McKinney Company "D" Corporals Frank L. Mead Ralph W. Remick James Yost Private 1st cl Frederick Putz Privates Richard A. Powell Thomas F. Purcell William A. Traver Company "H" Sergeant Peter S. Pero Private 1st cl John Eschbach Privates James O'Neill William C. Schhnder Privates Harry Semel Gordon B. West Company "I" Corporal Robert H. Hoke Private 1st cl Fred O. Mork Privates Peter Demko Leslie A. Devlin Glenn A. Lloyd Victor Piccirilh Jacob Veton Private Edward J. Knaff Company "K" Privates Francis M. McCaughan George M. Markley Arthur B. Rooney Emil J. Schwab Company "L" Supply Sergeant John C. Rieker Sergeant James E. McKown Corporals Samuel R. Foltz Fred J. Tolan Privates 1st cl Harvey J. Delong Louis B. Hay den Joseph A. Sjovall Oscar W. Swanson Privates Edward M. Campbell Andrew H. Cookman Edward E. Jamerison 98 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Leo J. L'Homme "William J. Miller Company "M" Edwin H. Miskell Privates Charles P. Cartin Charles S. Roberts Michael F. Duffy Headquarters Company WiUiam H. Golden Privates George H. Boyer Machine Gun Company Carl H. Carmichael Private John R. Duly Ralph C. Maurer In the final assault into the Bois de Cuisy by the 316th Infantry, Company "C", of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion, offered a valuable barrage against machine gun nests and snipers,^' and lost one man killed in action, Private Wil- liam Oster. Companies "B" and "D", of the same battalion, both in Brigade Reserve, secured no targets that day for their weapons. ^"^ Nor was the 310th Machine Gun Battalion, in Division Reserve, enabled to get into the action, it being halted by military police of the Fourth Division on the cross-roads west of Esnes, one kilometer south of Haucourt, because the road was not available for Seventy-ninth Division traffic. Its motor equipment was parked on the road- side and the troops bivouaced for the night at that point. ^^ Behind the advance of the infantry, the other Division units were finding the road conditions extremely diSicult. The road allotted to the Division, due to its having been torn up in many places by shell fire, was entirely inadequate to handle the transportation. In addition, a part of it, through Avocourt, was shared with the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first Division, who were attacking further to the west. A very bad traffic jam ensued as a result and the road was continually blocked at some point or other throughout the whole period of the operations. Fearing this condition, a request had been made upon Corps, two days before the attack, for authorization to the Seventy-ninth Division to use the Esnes-Malancourt road, but this was refused and the Division started the advance with its only outlet to the front, the Avocourt-Malancourt connection with the Malancourt-Montfaucon road.** What this meant is described in the laconic field message penned at llh 15 by Lieutenant Colonel Barber, of the 304th En- gineers, who had returned from a forward reconnaissance to determine the con- ditions. The message read:'^ Axial road into Avocourt will be OK within one hour. From there N. 3-4 K. M. can be repaired in a few hours. From that point on all roads seem to be lost. All forward area a mass of craters. Must have unlimited help to construct both roads. Advise what I can expect. Company "F," 304th Engineers had been detailed on the night of September 25-26 to work on the cut-off which connected the road leading to Esnes, from the middle of the sector, with the Esnes-Avocourt road. Company "D", at work on a path for the tanks, had an infantry company from the Division Reserve to as- sist it.^° Company "A" had a platoon detached for forward reconnaissance and liaison with the infantry. The balance of "A" company and the remaining com- panies were at work on various sections of the Avocourt-Malancourt road. By early afternoon the road had been rebuilt as far as the southern edge of the Bois de Malancourt and reinforcement then received, two companies from the 52nd MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 99 100 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Pioneer Infantry and one company from the 310th Engineers, enabled better progress to be made from then on/* Colonel Jervey, the Division Engineer; Lieutenant Colonel Barber; in field command of the regiment, and Captains Clin- ton W. Morgan, of "A" Company, and Gordon H. Fernald, of "D" Company, all received Division Citations for their work in directing the road building at this point. ^' In the case of Company "A," being the most advanced, it was constantly under sniper and machine gun fire. One platoon, which had followed the infantry, ran into a machine gun nest in the Bois de Malancourt and silenced it, capturing the gun and eight prisoners." Lieutenant Arthur C. Rubel, commanding another platoon, was held up by a machine gun while reconnoitering. Lieutenant Rubel "proceeded ahead of two men of his platoon and personally disposed of two Ger- man gunners."'^ For this act Lieut. Rubel was later awarded the D. S. C. hJM^*\ Axial Ro,\d, Avocourt — Malancourt, Showing Fill at Point where German Trench Crossed Road. He and his platoon then returned with the machine gun and nine prisoners.** One man of Company "A," Private Charles S. Simpson, while working in the advanced road detail, was killed by a machine gun. In the meanwhile, at 15h Major General Kuhn had moved from the Division P. C. at Hill 309 to the advance information centre, three kilometers to the north- east at P. C. Zouave, located on the ridge of Hill 304, where the Esnes-Malancourt road crossed it. The Division P. C, however, could not be moved forward at the same hour because of the poor telephonic communication, and it was neces- sary for Colonel Ross, Chief of Staff, to remain at the old post until 19h. At 14h 50 a message from the "V" Corps was received stating that General Cameron, the Corps' Commander, "desires attack pushed."*^ At that time the "V" Corps was entirely out of touch with the Seventy-ninth Division and ignorant of its advance or of the resistance it was encountering. Likewise, the Corps had received er- MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 101 roneous reports of its progress from neighboring troops and was under the impres- sion that the advance was not being pressed with sufficient rapidity. The reason contact had been lost between the Corps and the Seventy-ninth Division was because the wire furnished the latter by Corps was so poorly insulated that it went out as soon as it became wet. Both Colonel Ross, at the Division P. C, and General Kuhn, at P. C. Zouave, endeavored to forward this message from the Corps to the commanding general of the 157th Infantry Brigade. Unfortunately, General Nicholson had moved his P. C. without making necessary provisions for liaison, and it was not until 17h 35 that the message from the Chief of Staff reached him.""" This message eventually was forwarded to Colonel Sweezey, of the 313th, just when that regiment was reforming on the northern e dge of the Bois deCuisy, after having been driven back by machine gun fire from Montfaucon. Darkness Slope Tow.^kd Montfaucon, up which the 313th Inf.\ntry, 79th Divisiun, Kuught AGAINST Desperate Machine Gun Resi8ta.vce. was coming on, and, "although the Regimental Commander did not wish to at tack this strong position without his troops being able to see the machine gun- opposed to them, in view of the orders received, the attack was ordered."-' Whether or not Montfaucon could have been taken late on the afternoon of September 26 by a coordinated attack, involving units on the right and left of the 313th, is a matter of difference of opinion among the officers on the ground at the time. In any case, the means of arranging such an attack did not exist in the short time at hand. However, with a single regiment, well shot up, as the only offensive weapon, it seemed like a hopeless task then. The backbone of the attack as planned was some seven or eight French "whippet tanks", gathered together after the attack on the German second position, in which a number of them had assisted, and reported to Colonel Sweezey by their French commander. Likewise there was the first battalion of the 313th, almost fresh, to swing from support to assault. 102 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Between the Bois de Cuisy and IVIontfaucon lay a valley, the slope to the bottom of which was gradual from the Bois and very much steeper from INIont- faucon on account of its much greater height. Down this slope at 18h rolled the tanks in the face of terrific machine gun fire, and behind them the 313th Infantry. Progress was necessarily slow. Only by short rushes was any advance possible. It took three-quarters of an hour to reach the bottom of the valley and just about that time the gradually deepening dusk gave way entirely to the pitch darkness of night. On account of the darkness the French commander refused to continue with his tanks and withdrew. Colonel Sweezey, in the face of an utterly hopeless situation, ordered the regiment back to the only available defensive position in the Bois de Cuisy, where the night was spent in preparation for an attack on the morrow. One company, however, "K", had gained the outskirts of Montfaucon when the order came to withdraw. Only with great difficulty was the company relieved from its dangerous position. Again the 313th had suffered hea\y casual- ties. Scattered over the slope into the valley lay the toll of a daring attempt to accomplish the impossible. Half way down lay one dead officer. Second Lieu- tenant Thomas Vandiver, of "B" Company. At the furthest point down lay the body of the last of the three battalion commanders, Major Israel Putnam, killed instantly by a bullet through his head." The heaA'y fatalities of the regi- ment in that single day speak for themselves. The killed among the enlisted per- sonnel were as follows: Company "A" Private Andrew J. McVeigh Company "B" Corporal William W. Murphy Mechanic Martin j\I. Roberts Privates Biaggio Grillo David E. Long Levi T. Naylor Frederick W. Prettyman Christoforo Quinto Walter A. Shaw Company "C" Corporal Jolm B. O'Melia Private 1st cl John H. McCoy Private Harry A. Sunderland Company "D" Corporals Boyed Crandall Harry B. Morgan Privates Herbert A. Ingram Samuel Schless Company "E" Privates Samuel B. Cohee James F. Carey Domenico Creno Charles F. Scott Company "F" Sergeant Walter G. Bode Bugler John E. Fuchs Private 1st cl Alvin G. White Privates George E. Airey Raymond A. Brandau Thomas Cooper John C. Hauck Willis Jackson Francis X. Koerner John H. Lambert James C. Mulcrone Emmett L. Roberts Company "G" Private Felix Morris Company "H" Corporals Thomas A. Ricker Harry D. Wantland Mechanic Julius F. Richter Headquarters Company Private 1st cl William J. Biscoe Privates Maynard W. Stevens Agostino Strazza Private 1st cl Michael F. CuUen Privates Charles R. Burkholder Clarence E. Eccleston Henry Heller MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 103 Martin P. Kavanaugh Russell R. Messick ' George E. Neher Salvatore Stagno Leroy F. Thompson Maurice G. Walsh Company "I" Sergeant Harry E. Forrest Company "K" Corporals George E. Grill Bernard J. Mclntyre Privates Charles J. Doerfler John A. Merryman Henry E. Tirschman Company "L" Prvate 1st cl David Miller Privates Joseph Budd Joseph E. Cummings Fred A. Einschutz John H. Lang Company "M" Sergeants John E. Martin Fred H. Rumenap Corporals Howard E. Crispens August T. Schultz William J. Slicher Privates Charles H. Andrews John Carney Isador Goldberg WiUiam A. Graham Rocco Mariani Ernest Martin Isadore Nagdyman Isidor Rudoy Thomas Russell Joseph StGermain Stamatios Sakellarides Amos R. Taylor Daniel L. VanlNIater Machine Gun Company Private Antone Eberlein On the right of the advance zone, just as the 313th Infantry was launching its final and futile assault of the day at 18h, the 31-ltli Infantry liud managed to advance one kilometer north of Malancourt, and had silenced all machine guns save those on the strongpoint a kilometer and one-half northwest of the town.'' The regiment was badly in need of reorganization and was in no shape to attempt a further advance until such a reorganization had been effected. The battalions were again arranged in depth, but it was a tedious job and before it was com- pleted, the 313th, on the left, had retired to bivouac for the night in the Bois de Cuisy. Thereupon, at 20h 30, Colonel Oury ordered his regiment to dig in, the front line being in liaison with the front of the companion regiment.^' The deaths among the men of the 314th Infantry were as follows: Company "C" Privates William C. Foreaker Samuel Sandler Company "D" Sergeant Michael C. Ventura Private William H. Cutting Company "E" Sergeant Samuel C. Hulings Corporals David T Smith Joseph E Stanton Privates Harley P. Chase Irvin Ebling Daniel J. Falvey Ermen E. Lepley Wladislaw Szadziewicz Company "F" Sergeant John A. McCawley Private Charles O. Yoder Company "G" Sergeant Lee A. Brooks Corporals Charles L. Guthrie Harold R. Peters John Shimko Privates Joseph E. Castro Jefferis Higgins Harry D. Miller Anthony J. Mitsko Chester C. Riley Gurney F. Weist Donato Zerillo 104 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Privates Henry J. Cronan Herbert Tweedale Company "M" Supply Sergeant James P. O'Connor Privates Lewis E. Babcock Harry F. Barrett Walter C. Good Charles A. Henry Dearborn J. McAleer Edward M. McAvoy Roy A. Thomas John F. Walter Headquarters Company Privates James C. Mitchell Martin N. Shank Company "H" Private 1st cl Horard E. Laughlin Company "I" Privates James Dillon William A Ernst Anthony J. Leva John Martinkus Morris Slup Company "K" Corporal William R. Hartman Privates Peter Ducharme Frederick Hull James F. Mulholland \\'illiam Pierce, Jr. William L. Reardon Max Silver Company "L" Sergeant Peter Strucel During the entire first day of the fight, the 304th Sanitary Train had been functioning admirably, but was being terribly delayed in the evacuation of the wounded by the congested condition of the Avocourt-INIalancourt road. The train had detailed an ofiicer, four non-coms and forty men from the four ambulance companies to each of the four infantry regiments.-" These medical details fol- lowed close upon the heels of the advance, establishing first aid and dressing sta- tions in dugouts or wherever cover was available. They were often under ma- chine gun and sniper fire and frequently advanced so rapidly that they found themselves practically in the first wave of an assault. ^^ Only one man in the Sanitary Train lost his life that day. He was Private Joseph W. Daily, of the 313th Ambulance Company, who "repeatedly exposed himself to heavy fire evacuating the wounded until fatally wounded by shell fire.""" During the day, the advance dressing stations of Ambulance Companies 313 and 315 were moved forward, the former to a point south of the Esnes-Avocourt road and the latter to the Division P. C. at Zouave. ^^ As night fell on September 26, the Division Commander was only with dif- ficulty learning the position of his advance units. The telephonic communica- tions were "out" most of the time, owing to the wires grounding in bad weather and being severed by tanks, trucks and artillery passing over them. In addition, the 214th French Aero Squadron failed to deliver a single report as to the loca- tion of the American front lines, or the enemy positions. ''•' The Sixth U. S. Bal- loon Company, its direct wires gone, about llh 30, endeavored to maintain liaison through its officers reporting in person, but the system was too slow because of the distance to be traveled.** The chief method for accurate information, conse- quently, was by runner or by staff officers and naturally this system could not help but be slow also. A field message despatched by Colonel Oury of the 314th at 23h 35, and delivered by runner a long time afterwards, informed the Division Commander that his advance line was occupying a former German trench on the coordinates 12.8-76.0 to 13.1-76.3.^' All efforts to get into communication with MALANCOURT AND .AIONTFAUCON 105 a ■< o « CO H Z 00 106 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION General Nicholson, however, were proving futile. Just before midnight, when the Division Staff was trying to puzzle out the whereabouts of the 313th Infantry, an imperative order came from the Chief of Staff, "V" Corps, stating:*' Commander in Chief expects 79th Division to advance tonight to position abreast of 4th Div. in the vicinity of Nantillois. This was amplified by a message from the Corps, received at Oh 30 on the morning of September 27, and which read:''^ The Army Commander has issued the following instructions: "Division and Brigade commanders will place themselves as far up toward the front of the advance of their respective units as may be Wounded Men Watching Prisoners File Balk thru Malancouht. necessary to direct their movements with energy and rapidity in any attack. The enemy is in retreat or holding lightly in places, and advance elements of several divis.ions are already on First Army objectives and there should be no delay or hesitation in going forward. Detachments of sufficient size will be left behind to engage isolated strong points which will be turned and not be permitted to hold up or delay the ad- vance of the entire brigade or division. All officers will push their units forward with all possible energy. Corps and Division Commanders will not hesitate to relieve on the spot any officer of whatever rank, who fails to show in this emergency those qualities of leadership required to accompolish the task which confronts us. This order will be published to all concerned by the quickest means possible. Pershing." A further delay in getting in liaison with General Nicholson could not be MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 107 thought of. General Kuhn, however, had sufficient communication with the commander of the 158th Infantry Brigade to work out a new plan for the advance which would at least guarantee an assault by the 314th Infantry on the right front. He, therefore, at Ih 15 despatched the foDowing message to General Noble, which was received by the latter at 2h 22:°' Pursuant to instructions from the Commander in Chief, the Division Commander directs that you advance at once with the 315th Infantry in the Divisional sector. The 4th Division will be on your right. The 314th Infantry is reported across the Malancourt-Montfaucon road about 1 km. N. W. of Malancourt. The C. O. 314th Inf. has been sent instructions to move forward at once, and if possible to transmit similar View Looking i\ CUISY. orders to the C. O. 313th Inf. If, on arriving at present location of the 314th Inf., you find that these instructions to its commanding oflicer have not been received or obeyed, you will take command of the 314th Infantry and will advance as rapidly as possible without regard to the pro- gress made by the Division on your right and left. Should you find that the 314th Infantry has moved forward, you will move forward in support of that regiment. You will take every possible measure to press the advance with the utmost vigor and will report the location of your P. C. and that of your regiments at these headquarters by runner, if telephone is not available. The forward information center of the Division will be located at Malancourt, to which point Division P. C. will move at the earliest practicable moment. Communication with General Nicholson was not established until several hours later, the following message being sent at 4h 53:''^ 108 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Imperative orders from Commander in Chief require that the 79th Division advance at once to come in line with neighboring divisions. Owing to your having broken haison it was necessary to place Gen. Noble in charge of the 315th and 314th Regiments to make an immediate advance. You are directed to take command of the 313th and 316th Regiments and to push on with all possible speed the to First Army first phase objective. Location of these regiments not definitely known. This message was received by General Nicholson at 5h 15*^ and more than an hour before then, the 314th Infantry was off for the opening assault of Sep- tember 27. By this time also, the Intelligence Section of the Seventy-ninth had established the fact that the Germans opposing the advance on their front con- sisted of the 117th Division, comprising one infantry brigade, the 233rd, of three infantry regiments — the 11th Grenadiers and 157th Infantry on the front line from east to west, and the 450th Regiment in support. '^^ What was not known at that time, however, was, that during the night of September 26-27, the 37th German Division had appeared upon the scene with another infantry brigade, the 73rd, comprising the 147th, 150th and 151st Regiments, one of whom, the 151st, had already relieved the badly shattered 450th Regiment of the 117th Division.^' At 4h September 27, in response to a verbal order from Colonel Oury, the 314th Infantry started forward in the darkness. From the moment that "I" Company, leading the Third Battalion on the left, and "E" Company, leading the Second Battalion on the right, emerged in the darkness from the old German trenches where they had secured only a few hours of rest, the resistance began, stiffening as the men pressed forward. It was machine gun opposition from the start, with severe enfilading fire sweeping in from both flanks, the left being scourged by the nests in the strong point now but a half kilometer to the northwest and the right by a similar position in the vicinity of Cuisy, about a kilometer to the north- east. Along the axial road — the Malancourt-Montfaucon highway — which the regiment was practically astride, the enemy had placed numerous rapid-fire weapons.'' Fortunately, the very blackness of the night prevented any accuracy in the enemy fire, but it also had the effect of concealing the strong points from the Americans. As a result, a number of nests were passed unsuspectingly and had to be mopped up by the support companies. In the right battalion, for ex- ample. Corporal William J. Walsh, of "H" Company, leading a scouting patrol about 300 meters in advance of his company, was fired upon by machine guns and several members of the patrol were wounded. Corporal Walsh carried one man to shelter and aided several others also to concealment. Then he returned to the remnant of the patrol and they began to flank the enemy. In the end, the Corporal and his men had located six machine gun nests and had shot the entire crew of one of them.'^ The Third Battalion, on the left, had even harder going, particularly "I" Company in the lead. Its immediate objective was the strong point a half-kilometer in front, and the German defenses were a series of emplace- ments each protected by radiating fire from guns further to the rear. Frequently a whole platoon would be held up by the fire which there was no possible means to flank. First Sergeant Mike A. Hartman, of this company, at one point ad- MALANCOIRT AND MONTFAUCON 109 vaiiced alone and silenced a nest which was holding up the line." Similar was the deed of Sergeant Louis S. Smith in another platoon. ^^ Private Raymond H. Koch, while his platoon was being held at bay, worked his way up a flank and drew the enemy fire. He kejit the attention of the machine gunners upon him long enough for the balance of the platoon to rush and take the weapons.'- One of the machine guns, passed in the darkness by "I" Company, was taken by "K" Company, the operation costing the life of Corporal James J. Mullen, who was mortally wounded leading his squad to the assault.'^ Corporal Edward C. Punch was also wounded, but refused first aid and continued to lead his squad.'- Just as daylight — a rainy, foggy, miserable morning — put in its appearance, the last rush of the Third Battalion carried the organized strong point on its front, and, at the same time, the Second Battalion completed the subjugation of two machine gun nests in a small woods along the western edge of the Malancourt- Montfaucon road.'' At 6h, with the regiment reorganizing for another push forward toward the higher land ahead. Colonel Oury moved his P. C. forward to a point in the centre of what had been the front line at 4h.'' What was the situation at this time on the left of the Division sector, where General Nicholson had, at 5h 15, received the order to take command of the 313tli and 316tli Infantry and pu.sh forward? Before taking u]) the progress there, it is necessary to revert for a moment to the situation in the rear. The "V" Corps had notified the Seventy-ninth Division the preceding afternoon that a section of the Malancourt-Montfaucon road from Malancourt to the Cuisy cut-off, which was a few meters ahead of the 314th's jjosition on the night of September 'iQ-'il, would have to be used jointly by the Fourth and Seventy-ninth Divisions. ^^ The situation which was going to arise from this order became a serious one. The Fourth Division had the road from Esnes to Malancourt and the Malancourt Montfaucon road was practically a northern continuation of this highway. The Seventy-ninth Division, however, had the Avocourt-Malancourt road, which crossed the former "No Man's Land" diagonally and for a distance of nearly three kilometers had been totally oliliterated by four years of constant shell fire. The result was that the traffic of both divisions met in Malancourt and proceeded jointly along the Malancourt-Montfaucon road for ^H kilometers, before the Fourth Division traffic could be diverted to the right. All the roads in this for- ward area were extremely narrow and designed for light one-way traffic only. Laboring through the night on the Avocourt-Malancourt road, and with a bare hour or two of rest,''* the 304th Engineers were gradually, toward dawn, making it passable. Lieutenant Colonel Barber notified the Division Engineer at 2h 45, September 27: Avocourt-Malancourt road now open for horse drawn vehicles. Ex- pect to be able to let trucks through at 8h. At 6h the Division trains entered Malancourt, but were held up pending the further advance of the infantry, and "the roads were crowded for miles with conveyances of all descriptions — ammunition trains, rolling kitchens, field trains, motorcycles, and an increasing number of ambulances with the wounded.^' With this congestion on the only Division road, and the road itself passable only with 110 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION "the precaution of careful and skillful driving, "^^ the Division Commander had despaired of getting any light artillery to the support of the advancing infantry without permission to use the axial roads of one or other of the flanking divisions. Fortunately this had been secured in the early hours of the morning, and a bat- talion of 75's from the 147th Field Artillery of General Irwin's 57th Artillery Bri- gade, had been despatched forward through Esnes to Malancourt over the Fourth Division road. It arrived behind the 313th Infantry in time to open effective fire on the southern slope of Montfaucon at 6h. Colonel Sweezey had been noti- fied of its coming, and understood that at 7h it would begin a rolling barrage to protect the advance of the infantry. At 7h, therefore, as arranged, the 313th left the Bois de Cuisy and started r^:f m ... ■'^^:^ - ■■'■ Dump on Road Leading fhom Avocourt-Malancouht Road. ,":Si«r'^» down the gentle slope toward the bottom of the valley and then up the steeper slope opposite toward the ruins on the hilltop." At practically the same time the 314tli Infantry, on the right, fully reorganized, sprang forward again along the Malancourt-Montfaucon road. "Against the sky-line looking up toward Mont- faucon" the advance of the infantry could be seen even from as far south as Mal- ancourt.^^ From this point on, the Seventy-ninth Division received continual harassing fire from the enemy hea\'y artillery The whole approach to Montfaucon and the Bois de la Tuilerie, which lay immediately east of the town, was an open plain, inclining upward. It offered no places of concealment, save an occasional bush here and there on the slope, and it was plotted for enfilading fire from the MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 111 northern edge of the Bois de Cuisy clear to the outskirts of the defenses on the hilltop. Because of its elevation it stood out, clearly discernible for miles around, and the enemy artillery from two points could sweep it by direct fire, observing the effect of every shell. These points were in the Argonne hills, some ten kilo- meters due west, and the summit of Hill 378, on the far side of the Meuse River about the same distance to the east By indirect fire, the Boche artillery to the north, in the protection of woodland around Cierges and Romagne, also com- manded the approach. From these three locations, then, as the two infantry regiments of the 157th Brigade came into the open, there poured an incessant and terrific fire of high explosives and shrapnel. There was no heavy artillery to reply to this enemy fire. The 157th Brigade had for support only the battalion Aeroplane View of Montfaucon Looking toward Septsarges. of 75's, which could cover the immediate defenses of Montfaucon and the Bois de la Tuileries, and Company "D," of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion, which was in support of the 313th Infantry, and which gave direct overhead fire as the latter advanced. The 313th attacked with the Second Battalion on the left and the First Bat- talion on the right, the Third Battalion being in support." A half-dozen French "whippet tanks" rolled forward ahead of the men. For the first 300 meters no machine gun resistance of any account was met, but from that point, which was at the beginning of the upward slope, the machine gun fire was withering in its intensity, yet not so bad as that which had been encountered the previous night. One captured machine gunner here informed Colonel Sweezey that he was one im HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION operator of three machine guns on the flat in front of the town, and that there were thirty-two more guns on the slopes leading up to it.^^ The attack was gal- lantly pushed, despite all opposition, and even hand grenades were being hurled among the men as they swarmed up the hillside.^' First Lieutenant Joseph H. Cochran, of Company G, in the leading echelon of the Second Battalion, "showed remarkable courage and absolute disregard of his personal safety in leading his platoon against machine gun positions and against a position of the enemy from which hand grenades were thrown at his platoon."-* Similar commendation was given Sergeant August A. Schwenke, of Company "B", leading a detachment of his platoon in the forefront of the first battalion advance.^* In the face of this resistance, but with remarkably low casualties, the 313th forced its way to the edge of Montfaucon by llh, the Second Battalion entering the outskirts of the town to the left, or western side, and the First and Third Battalions through the streets and eastern edge." For the next forty-five minutes the men were en- gaged in mopping up the snipers lingering in the ruins, and this was done under constant shellfire which the enemy rained on the summit when once their major forces had retreated. The conquest of the town was completed at llh 45 and five minutes later Colonel Sweezey's P. C. was established on the eastern slope of the hill near the cemetery." At I'Sh 15 Colonel Sweezey had written the following historical message: U. S. ARMY FIELD MESSAGE TIHC FILED HO. SENTBY^ TIME RECEIVED BY TIME HESE SPACES FOR SICNAl- OPCtVATORS ONLY. CHECK From At *N I Jil^^^ SPACES FOR SICNALOPCnATORS ONLY I " ;yc Qt.di — -^ — -7 T, >%M^C(^ i , 'i^ ^36^ /A * ^ M ^Jt ^ i ^ — I'^Cirvt^t^l jkc/M ^ ^2 t^ Original Message sent by Col. Swee.vet to General Kuhn This message, turned over to the detail from Company C, 30-lth Field Signal Battalion, having in charge the pigeons with the advance forces, was fastened in MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 113 the metal capsule on the leg of Pigeon 47. The bird arrived at the pigeon loft, just outside of Jouy-en-Argonne, "with its left wing torn and bleeding, evidently caused by shrapnel, after having struggled through a heavy artillery fire, cover- ing the distance of about fourteen miles in one hour and forty-three minutes. "'' The pigeon loft did not telephone the contents of the message to Division P. C, or, if they did, it was never received,^* and consequently the first news received by General Kuhn of the capture of the stronghold came in the shape of another field message, written by Colonel Sweezey at 13h 5 and conveyed by courier. This read as follows :^^ Took town of Montfaucon llh 55, after considerable fighting in town. Many snipers left behind. Town shelled to slight extent after our occupation. Am moving on to corps objective and hope to reach it by 16 H. Sweezey Request artillery fire on Bois de Beuge beginning 2:30 P. M. and lifted at 4:00 P. M. The message was received at the Division P. C. at 13h 30 or one hour and forty minutes after the actual capture. General Kuhn, with an aide and an or- derly immediately rode up to Montfaucon under heavy shell fire, and made an examination of the front lines in order to make a definite report to Corps that this stronghold was now held by the Seventy-ninth Division. The immediate organization of the captured stronghold was begun. Two Germans were found operating a buzzerphone, and apparently directing the enemy fire/' as, when they were corralled, the artillery firing began to lose some of its efifectiveness. Companies "A," "B" and "D", of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion entered Montfaucon immediately behind the infantry and took up a position on the slope to the north, where, at 12h, Company B opened a successful fire on a group of German infantry retreating in column.^' Peculiarly enough, this fire was directed by means of captured German artillery glasses.^' At 13h 30 it was reported that a German counter-attack was pending from the vicinity of Cierges. The machine guns were already in position to oppose it, and Colonel Sweezey notified General Nicholson at 14h 25 by runner that "counter attack being launched by Germans. Tanks, gas and shrapnel is only information we have."''' The attack, however, did not develop. ^^ The advance of the 314th Infantry, on the right of the Division sector, dur- ing the advance abreast of the 313th had been, if anything, more desperately opposed. From 7h, when the leading battalions passed through the small woods on the Malancourt-Montfaucon highway and advanced into the open, the artillery fire had been exceedingly destructive. Colonel Oury was at all times in complete liaison with his three battalions and received frequent information as to good artillery targets. The supporting 75's for his regiment, however, could not get through the traffic jam, and the messages were relayed back to the Division P. C. and from there forwarded to the artillery brigade. Whenever possible, without endangering the front lines, the artillery heavies sought out the targets, but the relief afforded could be but slight because of constant advance and frequent changes in the front line of the infantry.*' The regiment, fortunately, had a par- tial salvation at hand in the shape of the one pounder platoon of the Headquarters 114 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Company, which had fallen behind during the first day's attack. The one pound- ers came up during the night and were assigned by sections to the three battalions before dawn.^* When Company "I" was hung up a little later by machine gun fire in front, Private George G. Neidig was despatched with a message to the battalion commander requesting the support of the Third Battalion's section of the small guns. He passed through a field of intensive machine gun fire to de- liver his message.^^ Immediately the section moved forward, where, shortly afterwards, Sergeant Clarence A. Owens, also of "I" Company, daring machine gun and artillery fire, reached it and gave it the locations of the enemy strong- points.^^ The liaison between "I" Company and the one pounders was splendidly maintained throughout by Sergeant Owens and Private William Seaman, the German Pill Box on Slope of Montfaucon. latter suffering from severe mustard gas burns.^^ Machine gun and artillery fire scattered most of the crew of one of the 37mm guns shortly after it went into ac- tion. Sergeant Ray J. Howells, the chief of piece, and Private William B. Cram- mer, the loader, both of the Headquarters Company, remained undaunted, serv- ing the weapon. Within a few minutes Sergeant Howells was seriously wounded by a machine gun bullet. Private Crammer thereupon "went alone out into the open where his gun was in battery, and, although in direct observation of the enemy machine gun positions, unassisted pulled the gun back under cover.' '^^ The fire of the one pounders soon proved effective, the nests being reduced and the company again being able to advance. Shell fire from that point onward was more deadly than machine gun bullets. Sergeant John C. Strider, of "I" Com- MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 115 pany was instantly killed by a high explosive, while encouraging his men to the attack.^- Private 1st cl Speros Pappadopoul, of the same company, was seriously wounded in a heavy artillery barrage just after he had used his autoniittic rifle successfully against several machine gun nests. '^ The other companies of the Third Battalion were suffering almost as severely. In the open ground leading upward to the Bois de la Tuilerie, Captain Clarence Patton Freeman, of Company "M", was mortally wounded by snipers, and Second Lieutenant Clifl'ord McK. Alexander, of Company "L", instantly killed by shell fire. In the latter company, Corporal Riva Persing was badly wounded in the leg by shrapnel. He was sent back to a dressing station and ordered evacuated. He rebelled and returned to his company, carrying on during the balance of the engagement. ^^ Likewise, in "K" Company, Private 1st cl David Loiselle had his wrist broken by a fragment of high explosive, while delivering a message to his platoon commander. He refused first aid until after he had delivered the mes- sage and was then ordered to the rear by the platoon commander.''^ By noon the leading elements of the regiment had left the ]\Ialancourt-Mont- faucon road, where it converged with the road from Cuisy, and had struck across the Fayel Farm and into the Bois de la Tuilerie, due east of Montfaucon.^' Within these woods, where the resistance was great, the 314th captured four 77mm guns.'' Just at this time. Colonel Knowles, of the 315th Infantry, reported to Colonel Oury that he, the latter, was now in command of a Provisional Brigade consisting of the 314th and 315th Infantry. Colonel Oury at that hour had established his P. C. at Chapelle des Malades, and immediately took steps to reorganize the brigade for a further advance. '' The conditions which had brought about this change, dated back a number of hours. At 5h, September 27, General Kuhn, with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Ross, and an aide, had set out on horseback along the Esnes-Malancourt road to make a personal examination of the situation. On reaching Haucourt he dis- covered that there had been a failure to put into execution certain orders relating to the 158th Infantry Brigade which led to the immediate relief of the responsible officer and a reforming of the infantry brigades. The 313th and 316th Infantry composed the 157th Provisional Brigade, under General Nicholson, just as previ- ously arranged in the message to the latter at 4h 53, while the 314th and 315th Infantry formed the 158th Provisional Brigade, under command of Colonel Knowles, until word could be sent to Colonel Oury placing him in command as the senior officer.^" The Division Commander then moved on to Haucourt at 7h and established a new P. C. there, receiving the news of the fall of Montfaucon at that point some hours later, while the Chief of Staff returned to P. C. Zouave to retain contact with Corps through relay telephone until a connection could be laid between the Corps and the new P. C.^" Both the 315th and 316th Infantry regiments advanced during the morning of September 27 without encountering any resistance worth mentioning. On the right, the 315th, with the First and Third Battalions leading, had by noon reached a point a half kilometer south of the Fayal Farm, astride of the Malan- court-Montfaucon road, where it awaited further orders while Colonel Knowles reported the brigade to Colonel Oury. "L" Company alone indulged in skir- 116 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION mishing. A platoon headed by Lieutenant John T. Ford had been held up temporarily in a trench by the fire of snipers from the small woods along the high way. The snipers had evidently lain concealed while the 314th passed. Lieu- tenant Ford took a rifle from one of the men, worked his way out of the trench, and mortally wounded one of the snipers.^" The 316th Infantry, on the left, had gotten away on September 27 at 6h 45 and three hours later was in the northern edge of the Bois de Cuisy. The First and Third Battalions, leading, maintained the proper distance behind the 313th. At 12h 50 a message from Colonel Sweezey requested a battalion of the 316th to support his regiment in case the expected enemy counter-attack developed, and the First Battalion of the 316th was then moved close up to Montfaucon and two compan'es sent from the brigade reserve to reinforce it. At 13h both leading •••-^->r Shell bursting in midst of Truck Train, Near Cuisy. battalions of the 316th were in Montfaucon, the 313th having passed to the pla- teau beyond.*^ In the meanwhile, at llh 30, the traffic which had been tied up in Malancourt was released northward over the Malancourt-Montfaucon road.^^ In short order the jam was terrific. Brigadier General William Mitchell, Commander of the Air Service of the First Army, subsequently stated that "although there was some congestion in other places, it was worse in this area than I had ever seen on a battle- field."*^ After a few hours of the jam, it was decided to make the Avocourt- Malancourt section a one-way road, southbound, all traffic for both the Seventy- ninth and Fourth Divisions to use the Esnes-Malancourt road northbound. One of the results of this was to necessitate the turning back of all Seventy-ninth Division trains at Avocourt clear around to Esnes before they could proceed to- ward the front." The Division P. C. at Haucourt, after the receipt of the mes- MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 117 sages regarding a tlireatened counter-attack upon Montfaucon, decided to rein- force the 314th Infantry with the 310th Machine Gun BattaHon. Early in the afternoon Company "B", of that outfit, with nine squads of Company "A" at- tached, "moved forward along the crowded road through Malancourt, passing by artillery, tanks and overflowing field hospitals and first-aid stations, and took position immediately in rear of the 314th Infantry."** Just prior to that, about 12h, two more battalions of the 147th Field Artillery also passed through the traffic jam and took up advanced positions in support.*" Forward on the front line, where Colonel Knowles reported the 158th Pro- visional Brigade to Colonel Oury, the latter found that little use could be made of brigade facilities because of lack of organization.^' According to the com- mander of the 315th, his regiment was advancing in the brigade sector, with six companies on the right and six on the left, each wing organized in depth.'' Colonel Oury instructed Co'onel Knowles verbally to keep within supporting distance but not to push the regiment close until needed. '' At about the same time, the original brigade reserve, consisting of the First Battalion of the 314th Infantry, less one company, also came up to the P. C. at Chapelle des Malades. It, too, was organized in depth and held in the centre of the sector, with the view of sup- porting either flank as occasion required. '' It was apparent that strong resistance was developing north of the Bois de la Tuilerie, in the direction of Nantillois, so a reorganization was effected in the woods, and the 314th placed under command of Lieutenant Colonel McKenny with orders to attack Nantillois from the right flank and come in by the north of the town.*' For this purpose, one battal'on of the 314th Infantry was placed in the van, with the remaining battalions echeloned in depth in support. To fill the gap in the line, by the withdrawal of a battalion, the First Battalion of the 315th Infantry was called from reserve, taking over the left regimental sub-sector.*' The moment the advance began it was apparent that it was to meet terrific resistance, particularly from the Boche heavy artillery which swept the entire area with a decimating fire.*' Added to this, the men of the 314th and 315th Infantry were in a state bordering on exhaustion. They had received no supplies of any sort since the advance was begun on the morning of September 26 and had secured only a few hour's rest since the memorable "H" hour.*' They strove frequently to press forward for the objective, but high explosives, shrapnel and machine gun bullets were too much for them, unsupported as they were. When evening came the advance had been so slight that there was no prospect of any further attack by the Brigade being successful until the men could secure rest and rations. Therefore Colonel Oury called a halt to the offensive and ordered the men to dig in. The bivouac was about one-half kilometer north of the line of Montfaucon-Bois de la Tuilerie.*' Darkness also found the motorized 310th Machine Gun Battalion (less part of "A" Company) at its destination just across the Montfaucon-Septsarges road to the right of the Bois de la Tuilerie, where it occupied several former German trenches.** That night the 310th Machine Gun Battalion lost its first and only officer killed in action, First Lieutenant A. Brookes Lister, of Company "B", who was mortally wounded while reconnoitering. Sergeant Harold B. Searles, of 118 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION the Sanitary Detachment of the BattaHon, won a Division commendation for his bravery in rescuing, at the risk of his hfe. Lieutenant Lister under hea\'y enemy fire and transporting him back through forests infested with snipers to a first aid station.*^ The afternoon attack on the left of the Seventy-ninth's Hne did not begin until 15h 30, being preceded, as requested, by an artillery barrage from 14h 30 to 15h on the Bois de Beuge,^^ a woodland stronghold about one kilometer square, lying in the direct path of the 313th Infantry, its southern edge two kilometers north of Montfaucon and west by south of Nantillois. During the preparations the 313th had been reorganized for the advance and the First Battalion of the 316th prepared a defensive position in shell holes along the base of the northern slope of the town, with the 313th in the open ground in front of it.*^ When the 313th got underway, the remaining two battalions of the 316th also moved up until both were on the northern side of Montfaucon.*- Two platoons from "C" and "F" Companies, of the 316th, went forward to the assault with the 313th. First Lieutenant Hank Welling, of "F" Company, was severely wounded in the side during the first rush. Seeing him drop. Corporal Paul S. Runkle "immediately took command of the platoon and led and held it together in several rushes until relieved."*- He was relieved by no one else than the wounded lieutenant himself, who refused to be evacuated, but remained with his men "inspiring them by his courage and fortitude in spite of intense pain, it being necessary to carry him when a temporary withdrawal of the line was made."^^ The advance of the 313th was halted in the open fields north of Montfaucon, the Germans pouring in withering fire from machine guns and mortars ensconced in the Bois de Beuge, and the usual enfilading fire from the east. The light French tanks, several of which were the victims of direct hits, failed to continue with the assaulting columns. In the Third Battalion, Captain Lloyd, who had assumed command on the preceding day, was wounded and the battalion command de- volved upon Captain Effingham B. Morris, Jr., of "K" Company. Captain Morris was painfully wounded in the leg, but "persisted in remaining despite his severe wound," and retained command of the battalion during the balance of the operations.'^ Corporal George L. Brown, of "K" Company, distinguished him- self by crawling ahead of his platoon and locating a sniper who had wounded him and several others. Corporal Brown killed the sniper and remained in command of the platoon until ordered to the rear. Even then he insisted upon going back without assistance, although so weak he could hardly walk.'^ In Company "I", Sergeant William P. Reilly, commanding a platoon, was mortally wounded by high explosives, the company losing two other sergeants, two corporals and five privates wounded at about the same time from the same cause. Sergeant Theo- dore C. Krause and Corporal Charles W. Benson took command of Sergeant Reilly's platoon, assembling it and leading it forward through heavy fire.^' In the First Battalion, two men. Sergeant Howard Brown and Corporal Walter Ostrowski, both of "B" Company, volunteered to carry a message to battalion headquarters. Sergeant Brown made the trip in safety despite the heavy artillery fire, but Corporal Ostrowski received a wound which resulted in his death. ^' Another act of bravery was that of First Lieutenant Royal C. Johnson, of "D" IVIALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 119 Company, who, when severely wounded by shell fire, "assisted two men of his company to the rear and refused to occupy space in the ambulance until these men had been provided for."^^ Equally gallant was the conduct of all of the medical officers attached to the 313th, one in particular, Captain Frank B. Wheel- ock, working even as a stretcher bearer "carrying patients to places of safety after giving them medical attention. "^^ During the progress of the attack Captain Frederick R. Drayton. Personnel Officer of the regiment, acting as an aide to the commanding officer, maintained "communication with the advanced lines and with the brigade and continually exposed himself to fire until serious y wounded."-" The enemy fire grew so se- vere that Colonel Sweezey, the supporting tanks gone and the men exhausted. "P. C." OF THE 313th Infantry at Montf.wcon on Sept. 27, 1918. ordered a halt in position for the night. ^' Shortly after that the "front line of the regiment came under artillery fire from the artillery of other divisions."-' A call was made for a volunteer to carry back a message recjuesting that the fire be stopped before damage was done. First Lieutenant Thomas G. Bradlee, of Head- quarters Company, responded and "returned through the artillery fire" with the necessary orders.^' During the attack Colonel Sweezey had moved his regi- mental P. C. forward to a shell hole on the top of the hill overlooking the entire country to the north. Wlien the German artillery proceeded to rain high ex- plosives all around it, however, it was considered prudent to withdraw from such an exposed position to the former P. C. near the cemetery.** The final position of the regiment on the night of September 27-28 was about a kilometer north of 120 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Montfaucon although some elements were even further advanced to the edge of the Bois de Beuge.*' The 316th Infantry remained in the immediate rear of the 313th along the roads to Cierges and Nantallois, which diverged at the northern approach to the town.*^ The condition of the infantry and machine gun battalions through want of proper rations and water, as darkness fell on September 27, was truly deplorable. The units of the 304th Supply and Ammunition Trains had been unable to get up any supplies owing to the road congestion.*' Company "G", of the Ammunition Train, with its 100 small burros, alone succeeded in getting through with food.^' The burro train, under Lieut. Col. Thomas W. Miller, Divison Ordnance r ■ ■ 1 ^,^M2'H''i'^ ^i'^^-'rl ^-^<.::.:^ The M.^in Road thru Montfaucon Officer and Captain Parker R. Skinner, arrived at Malancourt via Esnes during the height of the shelling, but the animals were absolutely undisturbed by the hostile fire, carrying out their natural inclination regardless of the shells bursting around them. The food supply so carried, however was limited and not enough for general distribution. It was forwarded to the regimental supply companies, but they, in turn, had difficulty in getting it to the men. For example, Captain John A. Hughes, Regimental Supply Officer of the 313th, came up with the trains on the evening of September 27, and was immediately shelled out of the orchard near Montfaucon.'* The men in the advance lines were still without water and had, in almost all instances, exhausted the rations they had carried in their packs at the opening of the drive. Fortunately for those in Mont- faucon, especially the wounded, a pure well was found.** MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 121 122 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION The organization of the town by the captors had developed some interesting disclosures. The ruined houses in the town proper had been provided with arched, stone wine cellars from ten to twenty feet wide, fifteen to forty feet long, with five to sixteen feet of cover. In many instances these had been used as shelters by the Germans, especially as observation posts, reinforced machine gun nests and signal stations. In some cases the cellars had been connected by galleries to form continuous shelters. Deep dugouts were to be found everywhere, at least 100 of them in the immediate vicinity of the town, especially on the slope to the north and east and in the Bois de la Tuilerie. Along the bottom of the ratiher steep scarp to the north, the Germans had constructed two groups of about thrty build- ings, consisting of barracks, offices, officers' quarters and storerooms. Seventeen 'Ml*. The Ruined Chhhch at Montfaucon. heavily reinforced observation posts' groups were distributed at various points in the town. Usually they were built up in the form of a concrete shaft inside of a ruined house, and had an eight inch slit at the top for observation. The shafts were usually from five to seven feet square. The biggest find, however, was "a heavily reinforced concrete observation tower and shelter built up on the inside of a large chateau on the extreme western slope of the hill, and commanding from its top the terrain from the heights of Verdun to Clermont at the edge of the Foret d'Argonne. A more favorable topographic situation could hardly be imagined, but realizing the fact that such a point would receive considerable attention from enemy artillery, the Germans built, with characteristic thoroughness, an observa- tion post and system of shelters which could defy any ordinary bombardment."^* MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 123 A complete description of this post that the Crown Prince was reputed to have used during the attacks on Verdun in 1916, and which was used so effectively by the Americans subsequently against the very enemy which had built it, is as fol- lows :«' The chateau is a three-story barn-shaped building, constructed with the massive outside and inside masonry walls common to the older French architecture. The Germans have first laid a heavy course of reinforcing over the first floor, making the arched cellars excellent shelters with from 6 to 10 feet of masonry and a 30 inch stone as cover. In addition, a dugout was built under the road providing an additional 18 feet of cover. From the basement a tower is built, reaching to a total Another View of the Chateau at Montfaucox. height of 35 feet. This tower is well protected, having for the most of its height three feet of concrete and two masonry walls on the side toward the enemy line. Where the protection of the outer wall ceased an additional concrete slab protected the upper I'-J feet of the tower. A four foot slab covered the top. A small chart room at the highest point by the opening she'tered the observer and his instruments. The si^ecial feature of the place, however, was a powerful reflecting telescopic periscope mounted on a gun carriage and put in place on the first floor with the tube running through the tower and out the roof. This instrument was so constructed that observation could be carried on either through selective eye pieces at the base of the tube on the first floor or by means of reflectors and prisms from the second or third floors. A large and very elaborate observation map was found mounted in the room scaled in nails and oriented with respect to the instrument so that to lay on any point on the map it was only necessary to get its milsdeflec- 1:24 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION tion from the map, turn it off on the traversing scale of the tele- scope and bring it into focus from the eye piece. The instrument, when captured, was in serviceable condition, but before it could be reversed to bear on the enemy lines, some thoughtless souvenir hunter stole the eye pieces, rendering it useless. Word of the finding of the periscopic telescope was sent back to Division P. C, reaching the ear of General Kuhn shortly after 18h, at which time he had moved his P. C. from Haucourt to Ouvrage du Demon, 2,600 meters southeast of Mont- faucon, near the fork of the Malancourt-Montfaucon and Malancourt-Cuisy roads.''' The Division Commander had been having difficulties all day in secur- ing proper information regarding the front. The brigades and regiments had been in constant touch by telephone, but the aeroplane, the supposed "eye of the army," had been sadly missed. The French air squadron had been of no use whatever.*' The news that there was a good observation post on the very summit Crown Prince's Periscope — Montfaucon. A Concrete Tower erected within Walls of Chateau housed the periscope. This view was taken from within the Tower, looking out thru the port toward Sector 304. of Montfaucon was sent back by the Division Observers. The Observers con- sisted of ten men under Sgt. Thomas M. Rivel and included Privates 1st CI. Arthur S. Roberts and Arthur J. McCain. At 18h, also, the Division Commander ordered the 304th Sanitary Train, less the units already at the front and Field Hospitals 314 and 315 at Clair Chene, to proceed to Malancourt. The movement started, but had to be postponed because of the darkness and road conditions which made travel impossible.*' Company "A", of the 304th Engineers, had been busy from noon on, repairing the Malancourt-Montfaucon road as it moved northward to- ward the latter place, and a large portion of the rest of the regiment was also seek- ing to put the road in better condition, three platoons of "C" Company con- structing a short cut for light traffic around the crossroads at Malancourt, and Companies "E" and "F" doing nothing but road repair work until midnight. MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON US- With "B" Company building a water station and "D" Company striving to make the tank road adequate for heavy tanks, the entire regiment was well occupied.^* Despite the severity of the fighting, the fatalities among the enlisted per- sonnel on the second day were unusually light, as the following tables show: 313th Infantry Company "A" Private Harry E. Barnhart Company "B" Corporal Henry J. C. Rechner Privates John B. Bean Frank Rivenburgh Joseph A. Roche David Rudolph Company "D" Private Victor S. Carlson Company "E" Mechanic Guy O. Brown Privates 1st cl Robert K. McKenzie Otto C. Phillips Privates Jacob Gersuk Jerry G. Picha Walter Wells Company "H" Private Emilio Mattia Company "I" Private 1st cl Zadoc M. Katz Company "L" Corporal John L. Hoffman Headquarters Company Private 1st cl Roland E. Todd Machine Gun Company Private Herbert A. Zittinger The Sighting Device and OrEUATiNG Mechan- ism OF Periscope resting on Sin. gun carriage IN hallway of first Floor. Sanitary Detachment Private William J. Deans 314th Infantry Company "A" Sergeant George W. Hougham Private Clarence P. Ferguson Company "F" Sergeant Reginald E. Vought Privates Noble H. Gilbert Stanley L. Jones August C. Shuler Charles E. Shade Charles F. Weber Company "G" Corporal William W. Sipler Private Paul Zinder Company "H" Privates Paul Goman Joseph E. Haines 126 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Company "I" Private Wayne R. Horton Company "K" Sergeant Thomas J. Fearn Corporal Phillip S. Sharp Company "L" Private Alexander Lmanian Company "M" Private 1st cl Louis Sofianos Privates Everett Hogoboom Joseph J. Miscannon The Engineers' Handywork on the Road to Montfaucon. 311th Machine Gun Battalion Company "B" Sergeant Thomas J. Kennedy Private 1st cl John E. Davies Company "B" Corporal Henry E. P. Pritchard Private 1st cl Albert F. Pillieger Private Louis Lohmuller Company "D" Private 1st cl Charles R. Diehl Company "G" Private John Greenwood Company "K" Privates Giovanni Angelillo Bernard Aspell 315th Infantry Private 1st cl Russell T. Delker Private Albert Commaker Company "M" Private Harry Hirsch Machine Gun Company Segeants Robert P. Black Howard Hoesle James W. McCartner Sanitary Detachment Private Anthony Saccomanno MALANCOURT AND MONTFAUCON 127 816th Infantry Company "H" Headquarters Company Private William H. Haag Private John R. Rickenbach 312th Machine Gun Battalion Company "A" Private Henry E. Michaelis Company "B" Privates Claude J. Brittingham Thomas H. Davies 128 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION CHAPTER V THE MEUSE-ARGONNE— FIRST PHASE Nantillois and the Bois De Beuge THE Seventy-ninth Division had been given the deepest first day objective on the entire Meuse-Argonne front.' In fact, the ambitious program mapped out for this Division and the other two of the "V" Corps "required an abounding faith in their manhood, initiative and training upon the part of an audacious command."^ The Corps' objective, on the front of the Seventy-ninth Division, was a hne drawn from the coordinates 08. 2-80. "2 to 11.5-81.0, and which passed through the northern end of the Bois de Beuge on the west and the town of Nantillois on the east.' That the Seventy-ninth, on the night of September 27, was still two kilometers south of this objective was no reflection upon the Divi- sion. The high command had failed to take into consideration the strength of the German defenses. Up the Malancourt valley, with the flanking divisions clearing the woods on either side, "was supposed to be marching over a boule- vard."'' The terrific fighting of the first two days demonstrated clearly enough to G. H. Q. that there had been an error made somewhere in determining the enemy resisting power. That error seems to have been committed elsewhere on the extended battle front as well. Only on the extreme right had it been possible, in the first two days of the drive, to reach the given objectives.^ The fact that in two days the greater part of the line had not reached the objectives the Army command had originally set for the first day, did not mean that the offensive was failing. What it did mean was, that it would take longer to break through to the Carignan-Mezieres railroad than the optimistic time schedule prepared in advance of the drive. That the Meuse-Argonne was a gigantic success was made possible only through the determination of the Seventy-ninth and other American divi- sions which kept hammering away, absolutely undeterred by the delays in the original program. On the night of September 27-28, with the front line of the Seventy-ninth Division just north of Montfaucon, Major General Kuhn decided it was time to relieve the 313th and 314th Infantry and place the subsequent assaults in the hands of the two regiments following in reserve. The 313th and 314th had ac- complished a herculean task and it had become necessary "to afford these regi- ments a chance to obtain food and water, which they had not received since Sep- tember 26th, and to obtain some slight rest after their exertions."* When the troops dug in after dark on September 27, the Division P. C. was in better liaison with all elements than it had been during any of the previous hours of the first (129) 130 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION two days. Consequently, it was possible to give more than verbal orders in ar- ranging the plan of attack for September 28. Just before midnight, therefore. Field Order No. 8, 79th Division, was completed and copies were despatched at 23h 30 to the Corps, the Fourth Di\'ision, the two provisional infantry brigades, the 57th Artillery Brigade, the commander of the French tank battalions, the Chief of Staff, and the three "G's." There were only fourteen copies printed and, after General Kuhn retained his, there remained one for the Division War Diary and two for the file.'' The Field Order, after pointing out that the enemy held the line Bois de Beuge-Nantillois and that the Fourth Division and Thirty-seventh Division, on the flanks, were both somewhat north of the Seventy-ninth, provided: Oblique Areoplane View of Nantillois — Captured by the 79th Division, Sept. 28, 1918. "Maintaining the strictest and closest of combat liaison, the 79th Division advances to the attack from its present position at H hour tomorrow morning, which will be 7 H, 28th September, 1918. Dur- ing the night 27-28 September, 1918, the front line units of the 313th and 314th Inf. Regiments will be relieved by the units of the 316th and 315th Inf. Regiments respectively, arrangements of the relief being made under direction of brigade commanders after conference between regimental commanders concerned. "The troops will form up for the attack in such manner and at such time in order to launch same with the greatest vigor and with the least lapse of time upon the cessation of the artillery preparation. "The greatest echelonment in depth, consistent with a pushing, driving attack will be made." Then followed further details arranging for liaison combat groups, an ar- tillery preparation fire of "not less than one hour's duration"' to lift at H hour, NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 131 132 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION necessary fire during the advance by accompanying batteries, and the formation of the units withdrawn from the line into a Division Reserve to follow the advance at 1,000 meters.' General Nicholson, of the 157th Provisional Brigade, issued the order for the relief of the SlSth Infantry by the 316th immediately after the receipt of Field Order No. 8, the 313th being notified at 2h, September 28,^ and the 316th at 2h 30.' Colonel Oury, commanding the 158th Provisional Brigade, however, had not received any instructions at 2h and despatched a brigade adjutant to Division Headquarters, who returned shortly afterwards with the Field Order.'" In both brigades the relief was carried out successfully during the murky hours preceding German Dugouts at Cuisy Cutoff (Ouvbage Demon) — 600 Meters south of Moxtfaucon Occupied as P. C. 79th Division Sept. 28-30, 1918. a misty dawn, the final movements being rendered exceedingly dangerous by heavy hostile artillery fire which opened on the lines at 5h" to continue without respite for the entire day. The 315th Infantry was in formation with the Third Battahon on the east and the First Battalion on the west, the Second Battalion, in support, following in the centre.'- In the brigade sector on the left, the 316th Infantry had the Third Battalion on the right and the First Battalion on the left with the Second Battalion in support.' The fury of the German artillery fire found no proportionate answer from the American guns. The hour of preparation fire was exceedingly weak, coming as it did from only four batteries of 75's, the only units of the 57th Artillery Brigade which had so far been able to get to the front through the traffic jam. While the 315th, on the east, waited for the American barrage, not recognizing it in the NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 133 feeble fire then in progress,^^ First Lieutenant Seth C. Hetherington, of "D" Com- pany, was killed by an enemy shell." At 7h, as an indication of how the 315th looked for more artillery support than was then being given it, Colonel Knowles sent the following message to the Advance Division P. C, 600 meters south of Montf aucon :" "Have Art. pound 10.2-80.2, 13.1-80.5, 12.6-81.5 and line 10.0-82.3 to 11.0-82.6. These hostile positions form a cup into which we cannot advance without serious losses. Some guns to be directed on Nantillois. Art. must get busy fast if they are to assist Inf. Tanks circled right of Nantillois last night going 500 meters north that town. No tanks now as- sisting on our front. We are in touch with 4th Div. on right. Our disposition 10.6-78.6 to 12.3-79.2 Please rush artillery fire." Finally, at 7h 30, when the American artillery fire grew fainter, it was realized that there was to be no more support from that quarter, and the attack began. '^ Despite no covering barrage, the 315th made good progress over an area which was swept by enfilading artillery fire and by German aviators who flew low and poured machine gun volleys upon the assault squads.* The leading companies reached the crest of a ridge south of Nantillois and al)out 200 meters ahead of the jump off line, and from that point on experienced terrible raking fire from snipers and machine gunners in the Bois de Beuge and Bois de Septsarges. Coupled with that, the German heavies laid down a terrific barrage over the entire slope leading into Nantillois.'^ The men kept on in short rushes. Lieutenant John T. Ford, leading the advance platoon of "L" Company, was wounded in the leg by a frag- naent of high explosive but, before retiring, managed to gather a number of the leSs seriously wounded of his men around him and guide them to a first-aid station.'* Corporal Louis A. Berkowitz, of the same company, advanced recklessly across the open ground to give first aid to a wounded comrade and coolly applied the dressing, only to be killed by shell fire as he rejoined his squad." Sergeant Patrick Dolan, also of "L" Company, who had gone sleepless for twenty-four hours while his squad held a perilous outpost position on the night of September 27-28, was severely wounded as the Third Battalion came down from the crest toward Nan- tillois.'^ In the First Battalion, First Lieutenant Alfred L. Quintard, of "A" Company, was mortally wounded, and in "B" Company Captain John V. Bo.st- wick and First Lieutenant Benjamin H. Pollock were seriously wounded. Despite all opposition, the advance moved on until, at lOh 50, the leading battalions swarmed into the ruins of Nantillois.' "L" Company, on the extreme right, capturing a Gennan battery of six 77mni guns on the outskirts of the village where the roads forked.'^ "B" Company entered through the centre and "D" Com- pany on the left. The shock companies "had each lost a third of their men killed or wounded and the other companies of the advance battalions had sustained losses almost as heavy. "'^ Wliile the support companies "mopped up" the town, and there were many German snipers and machine guns concealed therein, the advance was pushed on through to Hill 274, which lay just a kilometer further north, and here, about 13h, a halt was called and the battalions reorganized." It was here, during these trying days of severe fighting, that Major Stuart S. Janney, later Lieut. Colonel, was commended for his conspicuous gallantry by the Brigade Commander, Colonel Oury, and subsequently cited by General Kuhn 134 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION It was through Major Janney's efforts and assistance that Colonel Oury was enabled to maintain his lines and his communications under terrific artillery and machine gun fire. The news of the capture of the town had been relayed by runner to Colonel Oury, who, at nil 25, sent the following message to General Kuhn:" "Nantillois reported taken. 316th Inf. has entered and is working through Bois de Beuge. Col. Knowles requests ambulances, stretchers and doctors." The above message makes mention of the progress of the 316th Infantry. That regiment had gotten away to the attack promptly at 7h, maintaining liaison with the 315th on the east as it moved forward over ground similar in contour. It had no artillery support. Colonel Charles, seeking to secure a barrage from the 75's, took the matter up with the artillery liaison officer with the 157th Bri- gade. The latter, at 8h 18, notified G-2 that "Colonel is complaining that he has no liaison with light artillery and asks me to state this to brigade."" The 316th's commander, in his first message to the Division P. C, again requested artillery support as follows:" "Relief of Incite effected and attack launched at 7 hour. Heavy ar. resistance encountered from Bois de Beuge and Wood 268. Have asked for shelling of Wood 268, Bois de Beuge. Request wire connection with Brig. (Italy). Place from which message was sent 11.5-78.2, foothill east of Montfaucon." In front of the 316th lay the same open valley, the Bois de Beuge ahead being a hill crowned with woods and organized with a defense of machine guns, minnen- werfers and Austrian 88's. The advancing lines ran into this hail of fire and seemed to melt away. A vivid portrayal of what happened came from a par- ticipant :^' "The lines dropped; automatics opened a spluttering reply; here and there a group rushed, dropped and crawled cautiously; the lines crept on — forward; delayed, harassed, terribly punished — but on their dead behind them, their tortured wounded moaning to the winds that most heart-breaking cry of the battle-field: "First aid, this w\ay; first aid, this way." German artillery, some of it from beyond the distant Meuse, dropped a hail of shrapnel and high explosives; machine guns spewed the ground with a deadly shower — the Regiment crawled on." It was heart-rending; it was magnificent. The whole horror of it was borne to those at regimental headquarters who received at 8h 30 this message from Major J. Baird Atwood, commanding the Third Battalion: "Being fired at point blank by field pieces. For God's sake get artillery or we'll be annihilated." All efforts to secure the necessary barrage were unavailing. Liaison had been lost with the artillery — the telephone lines had "gone out." Not for two mortal hours after receipt of that first message from the battalion commander was contact reestablished. In the meanwhile, on went the 316th, its casualties mounting by great leaps and bounds. About 500 meters north of Montfaucon, Corporal George D. Livelsberger, of "C" Company, took command of a platoon which had suffered severe losses, led it around to the left flank of an enemy spur trench and charged the machine gunners nested there. These particular guns had been holding up NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 135 the entire battalion advance. The corporal and his men took them in a brief, fierce struggle and cleared the path for the continuance of the attack. '^ Major Atwood, at 8h 51, messaged back, "Our troops now entering southern edge of Bois de Beuge," and at 9h he was killed. With his death the command devolved upon Captain John McI. Somers, of "j\I" Company. '^ His orders were to keep on. The 316th was badly disorganized, but it was still advancing. That it main- tained its advance was remarkable. It was an untried regiment, and it had gone for two days with scarcely any food or water. In addition to that it saw officers and men being shot down on all sides, had lost contact even between platoons, and yet pressed forward. One company lost all its oflScers; another lost all but one. Company "L", of the Third Battalion, virtually alone, passed through the Bois de Beuge ahead of the general line and withered under a flanking fire, Captain Charles E. Loane, Jr., and Lieutenant Clarence W. Renshawe being wounded and Lieutenant Albert C. Wunderlich instantly killed. In the fighting leading up to the conquest of this woodland stronghold, Company "K" lost two officers wounded, First Lieutenants Charles M. Sincell and Robert P. Stout, and Company "I" lost one. First Lieutenant Charles E. McKillips. Nor had the First Battalion escaped with less suffering. Fst. Lt. John H. Fox, of Co. "D", had been killed by machine gunners when he was reconnoitering in front of his Company in an exposed posi- tion. Captain Percy F. Burrage, of "D" Company, was killed and First Lieu- tenant Earle P. Burdick wounded. Captain Robert L. Fatzinger and Lieuten- ants John Sheridan and Daniel J. Dougherty, of " C " Company, were both wounded, as were Lieutenants Burrlie M. Odom, Arlington B. Evans and Phillipus Miller, of "A" Company, and Lieutenants Norman L. Botsford and Charles J. Hurley, Jr., of "B" Company. In "G" Company, still assigned to the First Battalion, First Lieutenant James M. Hamilton was wounded." Still they advanced! A flash of what was happening on that front came back by runner to the Division P. C. in a message sent at lOh 15 by Colonel Char- les:" "Estimated casualties so far: Officers 17 — men 250." "At nil 05, General Kuhn sent an encouraging answer:"" "Am arranging to send forward company of big tanks to assist you in capture of Bois de Beuge. Suggest they be employed on your right flank. Imperative that infantry closely follow the tanks otherwise no results will follow. Organize the assault and give necessary instructions to insure co-operation between infantry and tanks. Maintain liaison with Colonel Oury's P. C. by frequent courier service if not possible by wire." When the message reached the 316th, the Bois de Beuge was already cap- tured and the advancing companies were out in the open sweeping across another machine-gun swept plateau toward the Bois 268, a kilometer ahead. Far to the north-east, over Cote Lemont, a captive German balloon had risen, floating si- lently in the air as its observers directed the artiUery fire upon the country through which the 316tli was advancing. ° The advance slowed up, but did not stop. Colonel Oury sent First Lieutenant Clifton Lisle forward to find Colonel Charles and report the exact progress. At 12h 15, Lieutenant Lisle made his first report directly to General Kuhn by telephone." 136 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION iSOMLi^ Ww^m'm ^iOSiL.v NANTILLIOS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 137 "Verbal orders came through this morning for me to find Col. Charles and go forward. Found Col. Charles at llh 15. He was then moving for- ward. He was at point 11.4-78.8. At that time they were under heavy shrapnel fire. He was going forward." After that came nothing from Lieutenant Lisle until loh 35, when he sent the following message to General Nicholson:" "Invent 's P. C. is now at 69.5-79.8. The tanks are with us. At loh 15 three large tanks were ordered to woods at 09.5-81 .4. Artillery support throughout the day entirely inadequate. Lack of telephone wire has re- duced communication to runners. Troops now without food or water. Front line now approximately in woods at 09.5-81.4." At 16h 35, he again communicated as follows:'* "Our barrage is falling too short. Wien last reported it was falling on 10.2-81.7. in Bn., Com. "K" and one half Co. "I", at 10.2-81.0. The I Bn is on a line with the III Bn. The II Bn is not yet sure." The 316th was even further advanced than Lieutenant Lisle thought. Com- pany "D" of the First Battalion, now under Second Lieutenant Howard A. W. Kates, was so much ahead of the troops on the right and left that the infilading fire was sweeping his ranks viciously. He halted and protected his flanks until the other companies came up and,"* at 13h, the First Battalion was in Bois 268." Similarly, at 13h 42, Captain Somers, of the Third Battalion, reported his line at 10.2-81.8 "with right on the Nantillois-Cunel road."" A platoon of "G" Com- pany, the most advanced of all, had crossed the open land north of Bois 268 and was entrenched in Bois 250, two kilometers northwest of Nantillois.'^ Colonel Charles established his P. C. on the southern edge of Bois 268, where it was main- tained until the regiment was withdrawn. At 13h 30, the heavy Brownings, of Company "C", 312th Machine Gun Battalion, which had been following in support, were advanced sufficiently to open fire,-" the first and third platoons covering the Third Battalion, 316th, and the second platoon advancing to the northern slope of a hill a kilometer behind the same Battalion. Here it engaged in direct machine gun fire; a German nest along the railroad to the north was the objective.-' The retaliatory fire of the enemy inflicted severe casualties. Battalion Sergeant Major Earl B. Lyles was instantly killed. Privates 1st cl William J. Compher and William A. Eopolucci mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Wright Duryea seriously wounded. Private 1st cl Hugh O. Williams dressed the wounds of Lieutenant Duryea, while under direct machine gun and shell fire, and assisted the injured officer to the rear.-- Private 1st cl William N. Brazel, under the same fire, deliberately disassembled a Brown- ing gun which had been jammed by a flying piece of shrapnel, extracted the shrap- nel, reassembled the gun, and added it to the weapons then firing a barrage on an enemy strongpoint.-- After the hostile machine gunners had fled Private Brazel assisted in carrying Privates Compher and Eopolucci to the first aid station where they died shortly afterwards.-^ A reconnoitering party from Company "C" found that the enemy had abandoned one heavy and three light machine guns and seven rifles in their flight.-' Shortly afterwards, the heavy Brownings located 138 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION a retreating body of German troops about 1200 meters to the north, causing them to scatter and preventing them from manning a piece of artillery. Later, the Ger- mans removed the field piece, but that night the bodies of four Germans, two dead horses and an abandoned limber were found on the spot.^"^ At this time a section of Machine Guns, commanded by Sergeant William A. Rodruan of the Machine Gun Company of the 316th Infantry, firing from the northern edge of Bois 268, scattered a company of German infantry marching in column of squads at 1000 meters, inflicting hea^^ casualties. This entire Machine Gun company occupied the northern edge of Bois 268, harrassing the opposite enemy lines, preventing the placing of machine guns and minnenwerfers. However, on account of low ammimition supply the fire had to be slackened. This Company placed its guns protecting the front line after nightfall. The one pounder platoon of Headquarters company secured good targets and fired with telling effect on the opposite lines. In the middle of the afternoon the 316th was reorganized in Bois 268,^' and there, at 17h, it was found by Captain Harry A. Rapelye, of the Division Staff, who was sent forward to reconnoiter. At that hour he notified the Division P. C. :'* "Have located 313th, 314th and 316th together with part of tanks, with a company of 311th Machine Gun and 312th Machine Gun in ■woods W.of Nantillois. Theyare held up by our artillery patrols report. Request order. Best field of fire can be gotten from forward slope of Hill 268." With the enemy shelling continuing without abatement, the orders were finally given for the regiment to dig in for the night. A runner reached the pla- toon of "G" Company, in the next woods ahead, with instructions to fall back to the regimental line after darkness,^^ and the Brownings of Companies "B" and "C", 312th Machine Gun Battalion, were placed in position as cover in case of counter-attack.^^ A desperate effort to get food to the men resulted in Lieuten- ant Romaine Shephard, of the Regimental Supply Train, being mortally wounded. The killed that day among the enlisted men of the 316th were as foOows: Company "B" Sergeant Hans Hellman Bugler Raymond L. Beard Private 1st cl George W. Dunmire Privates Edgar H. Denson Joseph Ochuito Company "C" Private 1st cl William J. Swoboda Privates John Bayliff Thomas Dooney Vincent Martini Company "D" Private Irwin B. Gibble Company "G" Sergeant Harry C. Stover Corporals Clark R. McWilliams Fred S. Schantz Charles P. Scheifer Privates 1st cl Abe Bellmore William A. Potter Privates Horace Lyman Joseph P. McNulty Thomas W. Morrison Michael Petronchak George Phillips Petro Polito Allen Rosenberry Harry Zucker Company "H" Privates John Kilgus Leo E. Malett Michael Peifer NAMTILLVIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 139 140 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Company "I" Private Louis Gold Company "M" Private 1st cl Leonard J. Daily Company "K" Sergeant William T. Meiskey Headquarters Company Privates 1st cl Jonathan P. Clauser Sergeants Elmer T. Bomboy Elmer S. Showalter Harry T. Morrow Privates George E. Irvin Private 1st cl John Zinkand John J. Mahoney Privates Carrington E. Bailey William H. Jones Company " L " William A. O 'Neil Corporal Edwin D. Miller John E. Roberts Private John Riester, Jr. So much for the left of the front line on September 28. On the right, the 315th Infantry, being reorganized under the crest of Hill 274 for a further assault, notified the Division P. C. at 13h 45 that it wanted no artillery fire "this side of 83,"^^ 83 being the parallel running through the Bois des Ogons and a kilometer and one-half north of the reorganizing line. General Kuhn forwarded this in- formation to the "V" Corps at 14h 26, the message reading;" "Request no artillery fire be placed south of 83.0, and if fire has started below this line that it be stopped at once. Our troops approaching edge of Bois de Ogons." The 315th then launched forth in another assault, two large tanks and four small ones, all French manned, participating.* The objective was the Madeleine Farm in the heart of the Bois des Ogons. For a covering fire this attack had s lone battery of artillery and a direct overhead barrage by Company "A", 312th Machine Gun Battalion, in which a private, Hagop Mushekin, was killed by shell fire. The artillery fire and barrage had lasted from 16h to 16h 30, after which the infantry waves and the tanks went out into a raging inferno of machine gun and artillery fire." The same captive balloon over Cote Lemont was directing the Boche gunners in firing against the 315th. Heavies from east of the Meuse, lighter field pieces from the Madeleine Farm, and machine guns from the Bois des Ogons swept the area through which the advance was being made. The two heavy tanks were bowled out by direct hits." Three of the small tanks withdrew, their drivers wounded.* The regiment was being withered away even as the 316th had been in the Bois de Beuge. The advance companies reached the edge of the Bois des Ogons and the machine gun fire grew heavier. Sergeant Harry Polinsky, of "L" Company, cutting through a band of intensive machine gun fire, led his men forward in a heroic rush that won for him a citation in Division orders. Ser- geant George C. Bewley, leading a platoon of " K " Company, was severely wounded in another brave rush forward. ^° Lieutenant William D. Dodson, of "I" Company, was gassed, tagged for the rear and returned to his company. ^^ First Lieutenant Benjamin Bullock, Third Battalion Adjutant, "displayed great bravery and fear- lessness by assisting two wounded men to a place of safety while under heavy sniper and artillery fire."^^ Sergeant George N. Churchill, of the Medical De- tachment, "went from shell hole to shell hole and in the open, with shells bursting all around him, giving first aid to the wounded and carrying several wounded men NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 141 to shell holes. "^^ Despite the magnificent heroism on all sides, it was evident that it would be impossible to hold the Bois des Ogons in face of the murderous deluge of high explosives which poured forth from the German batteries, located in the woodlands to the north and on the heights east of the Meuse, until such time as it was possible to secure at least a small measure of support from the Divisional and Corps artillery. Under these circumstances, the leading battalions of the 315th Infantry were ordered to consolidate their lines, temporarily, on the reverse slope of Hill 274, which rose within a few hundred meters of the southern edge of the Bois des Ogons. \Miile the First and Third Battalions were reorganizing their shattered ranks, preparatory to another thrust into the Bois des Ogons, the Second Battalion, took up position immediately behind them, and the regimental P. C. was moved forward to the southern edge of Nantillois.^^ From here, at 16h 40, Colonel Knowles sent the following message.''' "Men of 315th Inf. must have food. Too weak for further advance without food." But there was no food to give them. The supply trains were still below Mont- faucon, and the men of the regiment, who had received neither rations nor water for three days, were destined to carry on for many more heart-breaking hours without being able to satisfy either hunger or thirst. Meanwhile, massed in the lee of Hill 274, under orders to await a covering artillery fire on the Bois des Ogons, the depleted battalions of the 315th grimly gathered themselves together, and filled in as best they could the yawning gaps and rents left in their lines by the first attack. Finally, as the afternoon wore on and it became evident that no further aid could be expected from the artillery, the regiment, at 18h, hurled itself for a second time against the Bois des Ogons, and the Madeleine Farm. The diary of a non-com in "B" Company gives a thrilling description of it:" "The Germans seemed to be preparing for a counter attack here. They were pouring a heavy machine gun and rifle fire on us. Major Patterson ordered our company to form in line of skirmishers and go over after them. We formed our line, first and second platoons in front and the fourth platoon in support. A shell landed just in front of where I was standing, killing Buckwald and wounding Lieutenant Conahan and another officer. I was thrown about ten feet but fortunatlely was not injured. Lieutenant Bagans jumped out in front of the company and led us on the run for the woods. How manj' of us got there is more than I can tell. Bullets pelted around us like hail. With "L" and "D" Companies we managed to get to the edge of the woods. We had to fight for every inch of ground. We saw some wooden shacks about 200 yards in the woods and these we bombed with grenades. We captured several machine gun nests and took eleven prisoners. We worked our way into the woods and finally captured the shacks. These turned out to be officers 'quarters and artillery chart rooms. We got some valuable maps and papers there. We discovered a large building about 100 yards further in the woods with a Red Cross flag flying over it. At first we thought it was a hospital, but we found out later that it was a regular fort. They had a machine gun in every window. Lieuten- ant Bagans had about decided to investigate it. We would all have been killed. The woods were full of machine guns and snipers and several of 142 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 143 our men got hit. We were making good progress when we were ordered out. Word had been received that the Germans were going to set the woods on fire, so we had to give it up. We got out just in time for the Germans started a terrific bombardment and almost leveled the woods. We got back to the hill under heavy shell fire and were ordered to dig in." This extract fairly well depicts the experience of all who reached the woods and emerged alive. The withdrawal to Hill 274 was the only thing that could be done, and upon the southern slope of what afterwards became known as "Sui- cide Hill" the men dug in for the night.'^ Major Fred W. McL. Patterson, of the First Battalion, had been seriously wounded, but had refused to relinquish command at so critical a period,^ and Captain Charles H. Tilghman, of Com- pany "C", had been wounded in the head by a piece of high explosive which had fractured his skull and rendered one eye useless, but also had refused to be evacu- ated during the night.^^ Lieutenant George N. Althouse, of Company "H," had been mortally wounded by machine gun bullets.^^ The following enlisted men had been killed during the day: Company "A" Privates Anthony Koinski Ernest Livingston Joseph Rice Company "B" Corporal Ronald N. McCaughey Private 1st cl Frederick Buchwald Privates Walter Durieu Samuel Doris Jacob Erlich Ceslaw Stepulkowsky Company "D" Mechanic Thomas Moore Privates 1st cl John J. Curran Michael Kenny Private Richard A. Sullivan Company "E" Private Richard J. Rorke Company "F" Sergeant Nelson M. Herron Privates Carl J. Albrecht David Schlossberg Company "H" Private 1st cl Edward C. Moran Private Walter Atwood The situation at the front, as darkness drew nigh, was described by Colonel Oury, of the 157th Brigade, in a message sent at 17h 20 to General Kuhn:" "Invade holds secoiid ridge north of Nantillois, 10.3-81.7, 10.8-81.9. Strong machine gun nests in woods in their front. These woods were Company "I" Sergeant Samuel J. Trotta Private 1st cl John A. Barron Company "K" Privates Thomas W. Astbury John G. Boss Company "L" Sergeant Harry Polinsky Corporal Louis R. Berkowitz Private 1st cl Walter R. Shoultz Privates Harry T. Boyle Joseph T. Girmscheid William F. Scheidemann William Schwind Company "M" Corporal John H. Castor Headquarters Company Private 1st cl John A. Eisele Machine Gun Company Private 1st cl John A. Millard Private John W. Trost [44 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION attacked with four companies and tanks, were entered, but attack was repulsed by machine gun fire. Invade now dug in for the night. Front line machine gun commander reports two hostile field pieces flanked by machine guns in Bois de Cunel along ridge. Instruct supports Invade holding first ridge north of Nantillois, 10.2-81.3-11.1-81.3. Request artillery along the following line: 10.3-8'2.7, 10.5-82.6, 11.0-82.6, front of Invade and counter-battery work in Bois de Cunel. Invent observed entering wood 268 and halted in line with our front line. Patrols of right supporting division observed on right flank abreast or a little in advance of our front line. Italy has been instructed to organize in depth and dig in." This was supplemented by a message at 18h 40 from Colonel Knowles, who stated :" Road just ovtside of Xantii.lchs — Ax Artillery Train caught here in a banage was ALMOST ENTIRELY ^IPED OUT. "I have suffered heavily from our own artillery firing short at 4-4.30 p. m. with 75 's. 4th Division has reached enemy 3rd position and are entrenching. My front line well over to the right out of my sector." As a matter of fact, the American artillery had not been firing short, but the German guns, east of the Meuse, with a direct range, had placed their shells with such precision as to give this impression. Many of the men of the 31oth, in con- sequence, believe to this day that they were shelled by their own guns. The two regiments in reserve, the 313th and 314th, had also suffered severely throughout the day from German shelling, and their advance had also been punc- tuated by encounters with machine gun nests passed in the first rush. One of these nests, which was found in the path of the 314th, was silenced by Sergeant NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 145 Frank A. Ross, of "I" Company .^^ Many acts of heroism occurred in the face of the artillery bombardment. Sergeant Sidney M. Painter, Company "K", 314th, having been mortally wounded, "beckoned for the second in command of the platoon, advising him of his condition, giving him all his orders and telling him to take charge of the platoon. "-° Corporal Earl A. Adams, of Company "L", although badly gassed, refused to be evacuated, tearing off his tag at the dressing station and returning to his company.^* Privates Thomas B. Simmons and John J. Quinn, of the Medical Detachment, both did meritorious work in treating the wounded under shell fire,^* as did Sergeant Harry E. Snook, of "F" Company, 313th, who discovered eight wounded men of his company and spent the night with them in the woods, relieving their misery by first-aid treatnient during the entire period of the enemy bombardment.-' Particularly heroic was tlie conduct of Captain Walter F. Bourcjue, a medical officer attached to the 311th Machine Gun Battalion, who "was placed in command of a first aid station only 100 meters in the rear of the most advanced line. The station was tactically untenable. BocHE Pill Box near Montfaucon Despite the extraordinary hazard of the position, Captain Bourqiie remained at his post with utmost courage and unconcern, devoting himself single-mindedly to the relief of the wounded."^* The 311th Machine Gun Battalion remained in support of the 313th Infantry on September 28, Company "A," however, being placed in reserve. None of the com- panies had an opportunity to fire, although several times their guns were placed in position to repulse expected counter-attacks which did not materialize. ^^ Neither had the 310th Machine Gun Battalion been called into action. The remaining sections of "A" Company arrived at the Fayel Farm early in the morning, being joined by the sections previously sent forward with "B" Company, and both units remained in their respective locations until evening, when they moved short distances toward the rear and bivouacked.'^" Practically all the casualties in the support regiments and machine gun battalions that day were caused by shell fire. Two oflBcers were killed in the 313th, 146 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION First Lieutenant Thomas Kriebel and Second Lieutenant George M. Baker, both of Company "L"; the following enlisted men were killed or died of wounds in the various units: Company "A" Privates Earl B. Howard William P. Johnson William Leddin Harry A. Schleuter Company "B" Private George S. Price Company "C" Corporal Raymond C. Noxter Private Howard H. Gilbert Company "E" . Privates Robert L. R. Cole Edward H. Couchman Howard M. Fisher Michael J. Moxwell 313th Infantry Company "G" Private Max E. Lehman Company "L" Sergeant Walter J. Rogers Corporals Henry Alt, Jr. Wilbur E. Graham Joseph L. Hibbitts Headquarters Company Privates Robert M. Armstrong Austin L. Grove Herman F. Handy Machine Gun Company Private Clinton A. Hose 314th Infantry Privates Stanley Gustave Daniel L. McManamon Emery J. Pelkey Company "L" Private William G. Ruth Company "M" Privates Gabriel L. Adams Anthony Vottero Headquarters Company Private Robert J. Muir Machine Gun Company Corporal Charles C. Cotner Private 1st cl Mac C. Merrifield Company "B" Private James E. Keegan Company "E" Private Sam Shachtmaister Company "G" Privates Demetrius Dionne Sampson D. Dodrill George J. Druding Company "I" Privates Theodore Brunett Lewis E. Shaffer Company "K" Sergeant Sidney M. Painter Corporals Earl B. Mohr James J. Mullen 311th Machine Gun Battalion Company "B" Sergeant Edwards Rinus Private 1st cl Eugene F. Riley Private Frank T. Kowalchek Efforts to get rations to the front lines had been carried on all during the day, but without much success. The 304th Supply Train managed for the first time to get a single truck convoy through with food, delivering it to the four infantry NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 147 regiments and the machine gun battalions, all of whose Supply Companies were parked along the Malancourt-Montfaucon road.'' The regimental supply trains sought to pass through or around Montfaucon, and did reach the northern side of the town despite the hea^'J' shelling. To reach the advance lines, however, even with carrying details, was almost an impossibility, and of the food and water meant for the assault battalions the men "got little or none of either."'' The 304th Ammunition Train, during September 28, had the same continual battle against traffic that the Supply Train had. At 14h Major Thomas W. Miller, the Division Ordnance Officer, then at the Ammunition Dump, notified General Kuhn that two convoys were somewhere on the way and that one of them was past Malancourt. The message read:" "There are 13 truck-loads of cal. 30 (432,000 rds) 37 mm. (2000) grenades OF OFL and pyrotechnics, I have had on road from Avocourt since Thursday afternoon. They are reported to be between Esnes and Malancourt this A. M. The horse section, 304 Amm. Tr. has 900,000 rounds cal. 30 on and has passed Malancourt. My dump here has 1,- 600.000 rounds Cal. 30 on hand which I am not shipping because of lack of trucks and state of roads. Will send fom-ard as soon as feasible. I am sending all rations duniped at this point forward to Malancourt and completed same at 15h." The horse section got through to south of Montfaucon on that day, being the first ammunition convoy to reach the infantry regiments since the beginning of the drive.'' It was intermittently shelled throughout and, in one case, a, driver was wounded. Corporal Eugene W. Ruch, Company Clerk of "E" Company, 314tli Infantry, took the wounded man's place and drove the team forward to its destination.^^ The congestion toward the rear during September 28 was found chiefly in the section of the Malancourt-Montfaucon road, used jointly by the Seventy-ninth and Fourth Divisions." Practically the entire day was spent by the 304th En- gineers in improving the road bed, five companies around Malancourt in the fore- noon and "Company "A" at Montfaucon, and all the companies, save two pla- toons from "D" Company, in the vicinity of Montfaucon in the afternoon.'^ The two platoons from "D" Company remained at Malancourt to maintain the road surface in the vicinity where the routes converged from Esnes and Avocourt.'^ The road conditions and lack of sufficient transportation made evacuation of sick and wounded very difficult. An effort to secure more ambulances, made by the Division Surgeon, Colonel Philip W. Huntington, brought no answer until after nightfall when, at 20h 43, a reply from the "V" Corps advised that "Colonel Huntington will have to use empty trucks returning from the front "'* This was already being done. Round trips for ambulances between Montfaucon and the hospital at Clair Chene were taking as long as forty-two hours, and the returning trucks of the two convoys of the Supply and Ammunition Trains were pressed into service and freighted with casualties tagged for evacuation." The animal drawn ambulances from the Triage at Clair Chene were used successfully many times to help out when the motor ambulances or trucks were held up by traffic jams. A message from the stalled machines would bring the animal drawn ambu- 148 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION lances to the scene, "and by driving out through mud, bushes and shell holes" the lighter vehicles were able to relieve to a great extent the holding of wounded along the way.'^ No other field hospitals, save the Triage at Clair Chene, had been set up during the day, although that part of the Sanitary Train stalled along the highway the preceding day had moved out at 5h and reached Malancourt at llh, only to be again held up.^^ Nearly 2,000 wounded, gassed and sick had been evacuated through the Division advance dressing stations by this time. During the three days of fighting, casualty clearing stations had been established at Caesar, Morigny, Geddeon, Zouave, on the Malancourt-Montfaucon road, on the Mont- faucon-Nantillois road, and several other places. On Roof of Cro^vn Prince's Observatokt, Montfaucon, used as an Observation Post BT Division Observers Sept. 27-30, 1918. The advance observation post, in the chateau at Montfaucon, manned by Sgt. Rivel and his squad, began to function during the morning of September 28. Despite the enemy shell fire — and the Germans, knowing the position of the old chateau and what it contained, sought hard to destroy it. Sergeant Rivel and his men clung tenaciously to their post, three of them subsequently being awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. ^' They had difficulty during the first part of Sep- tember 28 in erecting their instruments, but, at 17h 10, according to a message of that hour, had the "tripod working" and could "see much better."" It was fortunate that the Montfaucon post had been utilized, as the only other means of observation, the single captive balloon of the Sixth U. S. Balloon Company was. shot down by Boche aviators at 9h 45 that same morning.^^ Some twenty enemy NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 149 planes were over the Seventy-ninth Division sector at the time, some firing into the infantry to the north, some bombing the trains on the highways, and several con- centrating on the balloon.'^ The French aero squadron was not in evidence.'^ Division Headquarters, at 18h, had received a message from General Bul- lard, commanding the "III" Corps, on the right of the Seventy-ninth Division, to the effect that the Fourth Division, the most western of the IH Corps and in liaison with the Seventy-ninth, was then "on the hostile third position" and had been "so staked out by airplane at 4:20 P. M."" This line was apparently about a kilometer ahead of the front line of the Seventy-ninth, a fact corroborated by Colonel Knowles* message of 18h 40, previously alluded to. Information from the left also indicated that the Thirty-seventh Division was a trifle further ad- vanced. While the Division staff were completing plans for the continuance of the attack on the following morning. Field Order No. 46, "V" Corps, received at 23h, directed that the assault begin at 7h, September '29, and that "Divisions -will ad- vance independently of each other, pushing the attack with the utmost vigor and regardless of cost."" A half hour later, at 23h 30, Field Order No. 9, 79th Di\'i- sion, emanated from the Division P. C, -ndth specific instructions for an attack at 7h in both brigade sectors, the assaulting regiments to be the 315th Infantry on the right, and the 316th on the left, with the 314th and 313th in support in the respective sectors. A battalion from each of the support regiments was to be withheld with the 310th Machine Gun Battalion, as a Division Reserve which was to follow the front line troops at 1,000 meters. A preparation fire of "not less than one hour's duration," to lift at 7h, was demanded of the 57th Field Artillery Brigade, while a battalion of 75's was to be assigned to each of the attacking in- fantry regiments.^* The objective and the resistance to be expected were set forth as follows:'' "The enemy continued his retreat today in front of our First Army which drove back the hostile rear guard consisting mainly of machine gun nests. There are hostile machine gun nests in the Bois de Ogons and in the Bois de Cunel. There is a hostile entrenched position protected, partially by wire, north of the Bois de Cunel which extends across the sec- tor of the 79th Division. The 79th Division will attack at 7h, 29th September, 1918, and will advance rapidly in the sector previously assigned. Brigade, regimental and battalion commanders will use every means regardless of cost to pre- vent the advance from being delayed. The accompanying artillery will be called upon by the commanders of units to which attached, to fire upon machine gun nests or other resisting points which hold up or delay the advances. The commanders of all units will maintain the strictest liaison with adjoining units." The night of September 28-29, on the front lines, was one of horror. The rainfall had continued steadily, gradually turning the ground into mire, the shell holes into muddy lakes. Occasional sweeps of enemy machine gun fire added to the horror of the night. Officers and men, clinging to what shelter they could secure in the lee of "Suicide Hill" on the right, and in the fringes of Bois 268 on the left, were soaked to the skin. There could be no rest in this dismal, swamp- 150 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION like existence under ordinary conditions, and certainly none with the German artillery pounding and pounding upon the entire area. Shrapnel and high ex- plosives burst in front, in the rear, overhead and in their midst. The troops crouched in the shallow, water-filled shell-holes, hoping to escape a direct hit, listening to the wicked roar of the avalanche of shell, trying to stop their ears to the piteous moans of the wounded, many of whom had not been and could not be evacuated. A great gnawing hunger had seized upon the men and could not be appeased. Only a few carrying details passed through to the advance battalions with food, being the first rations received since the jump off. The rain of steel kept supply trains and rolling kitchens from venturing near. Over all was the impenetrable darkness of a stormy night, no man seeing more than a yard before his face, knowing only by the breathing that his comrades were near. Into this region of death and desolation shortly after midnight came the Field Order for the advance at 7h. It reached brigade headquarters, was f orM^arded to regimental headquarters, and then turned over to runners with instructions to get it to battalion headquarters. What this meant can best be understood from the experiences of Sergeant Morris G. Roseman and Corporal Albert E. Hutchin- son, both of Company "H", 315th Infantry, who were despatched at Oh 30 by Colonel Knowles to find the front line battalions and deliver a hastily written message, which read: "After an artillery preparation fire you will attack at 7h." The location of Major Francis V. Lloyd, commanding the Third Battalion, was uncertain, the path was under heavy shell fire, and the darkness was opaque. The two non-coms started. About 600 yards from the front they ran into the regimental machine gun company. An officer warned them not to advance fur- ther or they would find themselves within the German lines. They disregarded the warning and continued, fina'ly, after a long and dangerous search, finding Major Lloyd and delivering the message. ^^ All through the night the Division and Corps artillery strove to neutralize to some extent the German fire. The heavies fired into the Bois des Ogons and the Bois de Cunel, but labored always at a disadvantage for lack of knowledge as to enemy battery positions. As the hours moved along toward daylight, the German fire waxed more severe, an indication that the American effort had proven of a,bsolutely no value.^' In fact, from 5h on, the Boche shelled not only the front, but the back areas clear to Malancourt, and with special concentration on the ground lying north of Montfaucon where the support and reserve units waited. The first faint streaks of dawn disclosed the enemy observation balloon going up over the Cote Lemont, to remain up almost all day, being hauled down only on two occasions when Allied aviators were nearby. Its observation was practically continuous, and the Germans in the lazy floating bag were able to control the ar- tillery fire to a remarkable degree. The balloon was in operation by daylight and the effectiveness and severity of the hostile artillery at once became almost redoubled.^' The enemy batteries apparently were located in the Bois de Cunel, La Mamelle Trench, Cunel Village, Farm de la Madeleine, and Le Ville aux Bois Farm, high explosives, shrapnel and some phosgene and mustard gas being used.'^' Besides that, the flanking fire from Hill 378, far over on the right bank of the NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 151 Meuse, was even more destructive at times than the direct discharges from the weapons closer at hand.^' Despite the conditions — companies down to two platoons, men weary and faint from loss of sleep and absence of food, cold and chilled from the continued rainfall, the ground a sticky morass, the air a living hell of shell fire — preparations were carried on for the attack to be delivered at the scheduled hour. On the right, the 315th Infantry had the Third Battalion (Major Francis V. Lloyd) to the east, and the Second Battalion (Major Norman Borden) to the west. The First Bat- talion (Captain Joseph D. Noonan, Company "A", vice Major Patterson, evacu- ated) was in support, but support that morning meant practically being on the line, so low in effectives was the regiment. Over to the left, the 316th had Captain Somers' Third Battalion and Major Parkin's First Battalion still in front, with the Second Battalion (Captain Lukens) in support. For machine gun support, the Machine Gun Company of the 315th Infantry was behind its Third Battalion, and the Machine Gun Company of the 316th Infantry behind its First Battalion. In between, the second platoon of Company "C", 312th Machine Gun Battalion, was to cover the advance of the Second Battalion, 315th, on the right, and the Third Battalion, 316th, on the left.-^ There were four French tanks remaining with the 315th Infantry.^" There were none with the 316th. The artillery preparation fire between 6h and 7h was a fiasco, the artillery supporting the 315th being "all but incapable of action."'' Nevertheless, at the given H hour the two regiments started forward, the 315th over the brow of "Suicide Hill," the 316tli down a gentle slope in front of Bois 268, and as each reached open country they were smitten by a scourging machine gun fire. Ma- chine guns all along the front in the Bois des Ogons and machine guns cross firing from every bush and even from the Madeleine Farm, which a reconnaissance had previously shown to be flying a red-cross flag, met the oncoming troops.^- At 7h 05, just as the machine gunners began their deadly work, Colonel Oury reported the situation by field message to General Kuhn:''' "Reconnaissance made at daylight by the scouts this morning indicate that the 315th Inf 316th Inf. in front line were in position prepared to advance. Their lines are thin, due to details for food made to the rear men getting lost and for various other causes. The 314th is in support with the 1st and 2nd Bns. The 3rd Bn has been designated as Division Reserve. All formed in depth according to orders. I am in liaison with the Division on our right. It is attacking abreast of us. Will be able to indicate where their line is shortly, as I have an officer on duty . . , Reports will be rendered as advance progresses." This message, by runner, was received at the Division P. C. at 8h 07, and a response was made to it by Colonel Ross:'^ "The Commanding General directs me to say that some army artil- lery has come up with sound-ranging devices for locating hostile guns. Consequently our counter-battery work should become more effective. We will do everything possible to push supplies forward as close up to you as possible. Your supply officers must get in touch with their organi- zations so that the troops will be supplied. The 316th Infantry is practi- cally on line with you according to last reports. Have heard nothing 15^2 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 153 from them since the hour of attack. Itasca appreciates the tone of your message and wishes you every success." In that hour, between the despatch of Colonel Oury's message and the answer from the Chief of Staff, there had developed the most desperate fighting of the entire operation. On the extreme right, the Third Battalion, 315th Infantry, led in person by Major Lloyd'^ and First Lieutenant Bullock, the Battalion Adjutant,^' "started with a yell that carried above the scream of Boche machine gun fire."^' The lead-off company ("I") crossed the open ground without a casualty and dashed into the underbrush on the edge of the Bois des Ogons.^^ The other com- panies following were not so fortunate. From the sector to the right, a terrible flanking fire opened up.*' The report that the Fourth Division was in advance of the Seventy-ninth was proven untrue in that very episode, as the flanking fire came from the Fourth Division sector in the Bois de BrieuUes.''" Captain Francis A. Awl, of Company "L," was wounded in the first few moments,*^ leaving a single officer. First Lieutenant George L. Wright,^ with the unit. Two sergeants, Carl A. Oesterle and Adolph J. Kunze, led platoons with extraordinary coolness and bravery.'* Company "K" ran straight into a strong machine gun nest in the woods and was held up. Captain William M. Carroll, Jr., the company com- mander, and Sergeant Arthur W. Olanson, outflanked the nest, shot a German non-com who tried to escape, and captured two prisoners.^ Sergeant Francis A. McCloskey, of the same company, was severely wounded while courageously leading a platoon.'* "I" Company, desperately striving to push ahead, was now being enfiladed from the flanks and decimated by a frontal fire. First Lieutenant William D. Dodson, suffering from gassing, and Second Lieutenant Ira N. Kellberg, severely wounded, remained with the company throughout as the only officers. The whole Third Battalion advance was completely hung up at 9h by the deluge of machine gun fire, through which there was no passing. Abreast of the Third Battalion, on the left, the Second Battalion was suffering as cruelly. First Lieutenant William A. Sheehan, of Company "F", had been killed instantly by machine gun bullets, and First Lieutenant Edgar J. Eyler, Second Battalion gas officer, mortally wounded. Captain Earl C. Offinger, of Company "G," was severely wounded in the arm and sent back to a dressing station, where he refused to be evacuated.^ But this left only one officer with the company, First Lieutenant J. Ferguson Mohr, who was leading it gallantly in successive efforts to penetrate to the Madeleine Farm.'* In addition, the single one-pounder of the Headquarters Company for which there was ammuni- tion used up the last of its supply in firing at a strong nest ahead and had to be withdrawn.^ Like the Third Battalion, the First Battalion faced an impene- trable wall of fire in the heart of the Bois des Ogons and could go no further. This was the situation at 9h when Colonel Knowles, from the regimental P. C. at 11.5- 81.0, at the northeast corner of Nantillois, had the following message telephoned to Division P. C.:'* "4th Division must go forward before I can. Hostile artillery in location 11.8-83.4 is enfilading my front line (Co-opdinates only approxi- mate). Do we hold Hill 273?" 154 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION At that point in the message the connection broke." Lieutenant INIeiley had just reached regimental headquarters with word from the First BattaUon. Colonel Knowles sent him on back to Division P. C. to report the situation as "II Bn and III Bn had gone into the Bois des Ogons but were unable to advance owing to machine gun fire. The men reported to be completely exhausted and regi- mental commander is of the opinion they have no more driving power. Casualties are severe."" Lieutenant Meiley did not reach the Division P. C. with this until 14h 30." General Kuhn, however, had made immediate use of that part of Colonel Knowles message received before the connection parted. At 9h 15 he notified the " Commanding General, 4th Division (Thru C. G. Left Brig., 4th Division, Sept- sarges)" as follows:" "My Division on approximate line 10.0-81.4 to 11.0-82.1 cannot advance because of enfilading artillery fire from the right. Cannot advance unless your left brigade also advances at the same time. Request present location of your frontline and your intentions." From 7h on, the 316th, on the left brigade sector, had encountered experiences similar to those of the 315th. The artillery fury was not quite so severe against it.^^ The Third BattaHon, in liaison with the Second Battalion, 315th, to the east of it, had been deluged with shell and machine gun bullets from the jump off. Lieutenant Joseph C. Fitzharris was instantly killed and Lieutenant Ivan L. Lautenbacher mortally wounded. Companies "I" and "L" were ed by ser- geants William M. Flanagan and Manly H. McWhirter, all oflScers having become casualties during the preceding day or within the first few minutes of the morn- ing's offensive.^* A little group of fifty determined men, headed by Captain Somers, the acting battalion commander, and Lieutenants George L. Bliss, Joseph Home, Arthur Sayre and J. Edgar Murdoch, fought their way across the open and into the lower edge of Bois 250. Struggling forward in the woodland, fre- quently in hand to hand encounters with machine gunners, they pushed at last to the northern edge of the woods and set up a defensive position." In this group. Private 1st cl James J. Bracken, Company "M", displayed conspicuous bravery by the manner ;n which he hunted the heavy underbrush for snipers." The First Battalion, on the extreme western side of the regimental sector, was unable to make corresponding progress. In the open country ahead of Bois 268, Lieutenant Daniel S. Keller, the First Battalion Adjutant, was instantly killed, and Lieutenant Richard Y. Naill, the Battalion Intelligence Officer was seriously wounded."^ Two companies of the Second Battalion ("E" and"F") followed directly behind. The Captain Benjamin H. Hewit, of "F" Company was wounded three times, the last time fatally.^' Others wounded were Lieutenants John J. Pickard, "E" Com- pany, and Charles M. Hoffman, "F" Company. Lieutenant William E. Dreher was the only officer left with "C" Company," and a sergeant, Joseph J. Davidson, led "D" Company." About 300 meters north of Bois 268, the advance of the First BattaHon was checked entirely by the frontal and enfilading machine gun fire.22 At about this hour. Lieutenant C. A. Webb, artillery liaison officer, having completed a trip along the entire front from the Fourth Division sector to the NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 155 lo6 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION 157th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, sent, by runner, a field message to the sup- porting 121st Field Artillery, which painted an accurate picture of the situation. The exact time of this message was 9h 20. It read:" "Went forward to note progress of advance. The Fourth Division on our right are well advanced into the Bois des Ogons having taken 30 prisoners and taken some barracks and dugouts there. On Hill 274 I found companies of the 314th Infantry held back by one machine gun lo- cated in the Bois des Ogons which had not been mopped up by the First, Second and Third Battalions of the 314th Infantry who are completely over Hill 274 and into the woods to a depth which I did not determine. The enemy was firing two star green rockets and various colored ones from the rear of this woods. Some of the artillery which is firing is at short range. Several 150 batteries are firing from a northwesterly direction. The enemy is covering the lines of advance by effective artillery fire. Nantillois is being shelled regularly a large calibre gun is now firing on that town. The wounded are not removed from the field. Found wounded men who had lain on the ground since 1 o'clock yesterday without attention. No stretchers or ambulances at hand. First aid stations are far in the rear. Some of our light artillefy has advanced as far as this P. C." At 9h 45,^Colonel Oury dictated a message upon the progress of his brigade, but it had to be despatched by runner and did not reach General Kuhn until llh 15. It stated:" U. S. ARMY FIELD MESSAGE No. BS6 Sent by Time Rec'd by Time Check Communicated by Ruanar. From Znetruoi 1 At . P. 0. 11.6 • 60.9 Date 89 Stpt. 18 9ii 45 .Hour No,. Ita«ca 1. AA°cr eei>*uli«U9a with C««.aBder of heaty tanks find that h« »lll he up by aft.r.»«o t. aiilit at. H« stat.s, ho.e»*r, that h« M.t bare •or. •fr««ti»a •oaatar-batt.ry work than ha« bean obtalm.d ihaa far. Ha haa aada a ptraanal ra«9nnalaaanaa a* the aitaauaa and kaawa what ha la talKlag abaut. Ha»e had raparti from 31 3th and lldth. «e ara in toatb with both Wvlaloao oa our rljht and left. to ara allfhtly In adraaco of thOB, prosroeoin* Tory olowly. Uaohlna gun and oohrapnal dolaylag uo. Tho oltuatlon relative to tho wouadod BO*do attention at onea, Muot haTa aare litters and ohould ha»o aabulanoot for ovaeuatioa, provi|lns it docs not inter- for* with brlncing up aaaunltloa. OURt Received 1 Xh X 5 NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 157 A message from General Nicholson, of the 157th Brigade, despatched at lOh 15, gave the following as the situation on his front:''' "Incite 1 reports at 8h 45 that attack is progressing slowly and that all lines are under heavy shell fire (H. E., shrapnel and gas — both mustjird and phosgene). Have sent for full particulars. This P. C, established at east edge of Bois de Beuge, is under heavy fire. We have liaison with our units. Will move forward when shelling is reduced and will advise you." Both brigade commanders finally secured definite information regarding their front lines around llh. General Nicholson sending a message to the Division P. C at lOh 53 and Colonel Oury at llh 15. General Nicholson's report was:'* "Invent 1 reports at lOh 10, III Bn lies north edge woods 09.7-82.7. I Bn is held up on line 300 meters ahead of N. W. edge 268. Troops being cut to pieces by artillery and machine gun fire. II Bn, 119th F. A. now here. 2 batteries preparing to open fire on Bois de Cunel and one battery on draw about 09.3-82.5. Field behind our P. C. now under con- stant shell fire. Invent P. C. at 10.0-81.5. Hostile artillery fire practic- ally unopposed by our artillery." Colonel Oury reported:'* "The front line is now as follows: 09.9-82.5, 10.0-83.2, 11.9-82.8, 11.3-83.0. This information was obtained from the tank commander of the small tanks who is now back and from the two leading Bns. of the 314th Inf. The advance has been stopped. It appears to be held up on right and left divisions who are still behind us. The enemy forti- fication at Madeleine Swamps consists of anti-tank guns, machine guns, renders imperative further artillery preparations before advance can be resumed. Bois de Cunel is also strongly held. Request that heavy artillery be again laid on Farm de la Madeleine and that the 37th Div. be requested to push up guns to prevent enfilading machine gun fire from nests in their fronts." Both of the above messages were sent back by runners and both arrived at the Division P. C. at 14h 32.'* Prior to that, at llh 15, Lieutenant Colonel Fish, artillery liaison officer with the 158th Infantry Brigade, had sent a message to General Irwin, commanding the 57th Artillery Brigade, requesting fire on the Madeleine Farm between llh 30 and 12h.'* General Irwin directed the 121st (American) and 330th (French) artillery to open up at llh 30 on the farm, as requested,'* and then notified General Kuhn at llh 34 that "the fire cannot start exactly at 11.30. It will stop exactly at 12.00. It will be heavy fire while fired. Tell Colonel to use his own batteries."'* The last sentence in the message related to the commanding officer of the supporting 120th Artillery with the 158th Infantry Brigade. General Kuhn, however, ordered the firing to continue after 12h, directing that "artillery will open at 13h on edge of Bois de Cunel and con- tinue firing until 14h."'* The fire on the Bois de Cunel was to be entirely from the 75's, the heavies being directed to concentrate upon "la MameUe trench, upon Cunel village and upon le Ville aux Bois farm until further orders."'* This order was the result of the information contained in the two field messages received at llh 15 at Division P. C, both of which had spoken of the need for artillery 158 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION support. Genera-1 Kuhn had also sent one of his aides, Captain Jay Cooke, 3id forward for more exact information. Captain Cooke met General Nicholson at llh 15 in Montfaucon, the latter being then on his way back to report in per- son. General Nicholson gave Captain Cooke the message he desired delivered, with which he arrived at Division P. C. at 12h 53, reporting that the 316th In- fantry was advancing very slowly under intense fire of high explosives and shrap- nel, and that the entire front was in open ground in plain view of the enemy artillery.'^ At 12h 45, therefore, General Kuhn directed messages to both for- ward regiments, the one to Colonel Knowles stating:''' "Reorganize your command. We are having strong artillery fire in Bois de Cunel. Hold at all costs your position well in front of Nantillois- Bois de Beuge line." Steeet in Montfaucon looking toward Fayel Fakm. The 316th Infantry was directed, by the Division Commander, to organize a holding line along the north edge of the Bois de Beuge with machine guns, and await orders. "Am arranging for protection artillery barrage in case of need," the message concluded. Before it was received, however, the situation on the front of the 157th Brigade had changed materially. The First Battalion, 316th Infantry, on the extreme western flank of the Division sector, was too depleted to maintain its position in the open. At about 12h it withdrew into the Bois 268, arriving just as General Nicholson "dashed forward on horseback through an area swept by intense artillery and machine gun fire in full view of the enemy to give orders for an attack on the Bois 250."^^ General Nicholson, seeing the terrible condition of the shattered remnant of the First Battalion, 316th, found Colonel Sweezey, of the 313th, and ordered him to advance with his regiment and attack.*^ The remnant of the 316th was reorgan- ized finally into a single battalion under Major Parkin, and directed to follow the NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 159 313th at 800 meters.^' No, not all of the 316th, for on the origmal right sector of that regiment. Captain Somers and his gallant men were still far ahead in the northern edge of Bois 250, clinging tenaciously and out of all touch with the bal- ance of the regiment.^' They had tried to communicate with the Brigade but ■wathout success. Privates William Lunn, Harry Cooper and Leonard J. Daily being mortally wounded, and William Gardner and John S. Costa seriously wounded, all members of "M" Company, and all shot down while acting as run- ners and seeking to communicate with the rear.'* This gallant band had not been unsupported, however. The second platoon of "C" Company, 312tli Machine Gun Battalion, after delivering the opening barrage at 7h, had followed in the trail of the Third Battalion, 316th, and at lOh had been actually in front of the bulk of the battalion in Bois 250, where it opened fire on a body of Germans advancing from the northwest, causing them to drop their machine guns and retire. An hour later, the same platoon engaged a battery of field pieces to the northwest of the woods, causing them to limber up and drive off.-' Private 1st cl William Jones displayed exceptional coolness and courage in repairing a broken gun while under continuous and deadly fire.^^ Private 1st cl. Harmon G. Young, of this platoon, was killed during the fighting. Meanwhile, General Nicholson had notified General Kiihn, the message being despatched about 12h 30 and received at 14h 15, that the 313th had passed through the 316th and was attacking with the 316th in support. The message continued:" "Troops receiving practically no artillery support. Airplanes are urgently requested to coordinate artillery activity with advance of infan- try. This is most important as other means of liaison cannot prevent our artillery firing into our troops under orders of commanders not acquainted with the progression as a whole." Consequently, when General Kuhn's order of 12h 45 to the 316th, to main- tain a holding line on the northern edge of the Bois de Beuge, was received, it arrived too late to stop the attack ordered by General Nicholson. The recipient of the message was Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Meador, Colonel Charles having been wounded shortly before by the bursting of a high explosive shell near regi- mental headquarters which killed Regimental Sergeant Major Harold H. Bair.*^ Lieutenant Colonel Meador's answer to General Kuhn's message stated:'* "Orders to reorganize Beuge received 15th 25, but 313th Infantry has relieved us for assault and is held with ruinous losses on northern edge of W^ood 268, falling in scattered groups. Am trying to communicate with Sweezey. Charles slightly wounded. This regiment is effective about 450, S13th also fast melting away." The attack of the 313th had indeed been fraught with serious casualties. Lieutenants David M. Rupp and William J. H. Walters, leading their platoons in "G" and "B" Companies, were killed in the assault, and Lieutenant William P. McGoohan, of "A" Company, mortally wounded. Lieutenant James W. Towsen was wounded eight times and finally evacuated.^' Nevertheless, the regiment kept on. Within an hour it had penetrated to the Farm de la Madeleine ^ 160 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION n 3 o W o B CO O la o cn o a O m o m HI H ;?; .a n NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 161 where "without more artillery the situation appeared hopeless, the casualties increasing all the time."^^ About 16h word was passed that a counter attack was expected and at the same time orders were received from the brigade to fall back and secure a holding position in the Bois de Beuge.'** The withdrawal was almost as serious as had been the attack, Captains David Rupp, 3rd, of "C" Company, and Charles G. Eiley, of "D" Company, being killed and Captain Joseph N. Du Barry, 3rd, Regimental Operations Officer, seriously wounded in the leg.''^ Ser- geant John W. Livegood and Corporal Albert W. Thrasher, both of Company "G", remained in their front line positions under heavy fire and helped out the wounded."" Major Horatio N. Jackson, of the Medical Corps, was severely wounded by high explosives, while "directing the administration of first aid and guiding the work of litter bearers."^ The single battalion which now constituted the 316th Infantry had started forward in support of the 313th but had pushed past it, due to the 313th attacking too much in a northeasterly direction/' Major Parkin, commanding this 316th unit, continued ahead through Bois 250 and came upon Captain Somers and the little band of the Third Battalion entrenched there. Still advancing. Captain Somers' force joining in. Major Parkin's men drove through to the northern end of the Bois des Ogons, where Captain Alan W. Lukens, Second Battalion commander, was killed. Major Parkin went forward into the open to recon- noiter. He saw a German hospital close at hand to the northeast, the town of Romagneon his left, and in the intervening sjiace several large groups of Germans.^' His command was in a splendid tactical position to outflank the German defenses of the Bois des Ogons, and he realized it. Lieutenant Mowry E. Goetz was sent back with this information and an urgent request for reinforcements so that an attack might be launched.^' Lieutenant Goetz could not locate General Nichol- son and no one else would take the responsibility of ordering men forward in the face of the command to hold a defensive position. The Division Commander, himself, knew nothing of Major Parkin's position and did not learn of it until mid-night. Finally, an oflicer was despatched from regimental headquarters of the 316th to stop an artillery barrage which was about to open on the woods ahead, and word was sent to Major Parkin to withdraw.** Lieutenant Goetz and Private Roy B. Andes, Intelligence Section, volunteered to return from the Bois de Beuge across the open space into Bois 250 mtli the withdrawal order, the lone and perilous mission being performed with exceptional gallantry. At 21h Major Parkin started back with 160 men.''* He had made the farthest advance of any element of the Division,'^ and, more than that, as the operation maps in the War Department at Washington show, the position of the battalion of the 316th Infantry on the afternoon of September 29 represents a salient deeper in the enemy line than any other position of the nine American divisions in the Meuse- Argonne offensive that day. Before Major Parkin and his men had reached the Bois de Beuge in their withdrawal, the defensive line had been established and strongly held despite the continuing shell fire from north, east and west. The message from General Kuhn to the 315th to take up a holding position in front of Nantillois was received none too soon. That regiment had expended itself. Mortal man could do no more in that wilderness of machine guns in the 162 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Bois de Ogons, which no artillery fire had been able to suppress, and which had for hours cut the 315th to pieces. Sullenly, therefore, under orders, the 315th with- drew from the fringe of the woods it had won at so terrible a cost, and, for the third time, fell back to the northern slope of Hill 274, where, at 14h 45, Colonel Knowles notified the Division Commander that his men had stopped and were reorganizing and that he had "two battalions in the line and other I am getting ready to put in rear."'^ But there was no staying at that point. The northern slope of Hill 274 was under direct artillery fire and it was swept by high explosives and shrapnel, which in a short while had piled up many more casualties. One shell alone killed Captain Joseph Gray Duncan, of the Machine Gun Company, and Lieutenant Benjamin Bullock, Third Battalion Adjutant, and mortally wounded Lieutenant James F. Delaney, of the Machine Gun Company.*' Two men of Company "I", Corporal Joseph A. Keenan and Private Frank M. Flegel, performed an act of great heroism, when their platoon was ordered to cover, by going to the aid of a wounded comrade who was lying 300 yards distant in the open, making the journey through heavy and continuous firing, and succeeded in their mission." Finally, when the northern slope was untenable, the regiment withdrew again, this time to the protection of the south slope, and dug in, Colonel Knowles notifying the Division Commander at 15h:'* "Regiment now being in position south of the 10.5-81.6 with the 2nd Bn and 1st Bn on road with head near 10.3-81.6 with orders to organize, collect stragglers (most of whom are after food and water) dig in or get shelter and await orders. M. C. Co. shortages in belts, ammunition low in 1st Bn particularly. 316, 314, 313 men mixed with us — trying to weed them out, and report their organizations. Effectives this regiment approximates 50 per cent in some companies, particularly in 1st Bn. Men are of good morale but badly exhausted, because of lack of food, water and sleep. Officers getting scarce. Med. officers left all in. Wounded with practically no help but 1st aid and many who could be saved are dying because of lack of attention and exposure. Supply train near my P. C. but unable to get further on account of shelling. Have one pounders and some ammunition for same." There was no respite anywhere along the front of the 158th Brigade from shell fire. The supporting 314th Infantry was being as badly hit as the 315th during the latter part of the afternoon. Major Alfred R. Allen, of the In- fantry 314th, was killed by shell fire late in the day, as were First Lieutenant Ballard C. Linch of the Medical Detachment and Second Lieutenant Edwin T. Van Dusen, of the Machine Gun Company. In fact, at 17h 32, Colonel Oury despatched a message by Lieutenant Lisle, which read:^* "Find that the casualties have been growing worse. Major Allen just killed by shell fire. We are lying in the open accomplishing nothing in our present position. Am getting men destroyed. Request that I be permitted to withdraw." Lieutenant Lisle reached General Kuhn at 18h 45 with this message and a reply was forwarded which read:" "You are again directed to establish a holding position in the vicinity of Nantillois, if possible in the north thereof, and organize same for NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 163 defense. You will provide a sufficient garrison for this line from the troops under your command and will place the rest within supporting distance in rear. During the night and while present heavy shelling is in progress it will be necessary to hold this line with sufficient personnel for observa- tion only. Corps has been informed of our situation and of the direction from whence the fire is coming and it is believed that some measure will be taken in the very near future by Corps or Army to afford relief. Rumors have been prevalent that the 79th Division is to be relieved. This rumor has no foundation in fact, and must be suppressed." Upon receipt of this, Colonel Oury relieved the 315th, the 314th taking over the front line and digging in on the line 10.2-81.2 to 11.2-82.2, the 315th being placed in the railroad cut south of Nantillois.** The effect of the unending, terrific shelling of the immediate front has been shown with the narration of what happened to the infantry. In a lesser degree, the enemy artillery wrought severe havoc in the back areas, particularly in the Machine gun nest on outskirts of Montfaucon. open ground between Montfaucon and Nantillois. Two companies of the 304th Engineers, "B" and "C", had gone forward at 5h on the morning of September 29, with their trains, expecting to follow the infantry in the attack. Instead they found it necessary to return south of NantiUois,'" where the "C" Company train came under terrific shell fire. Sergeant Thomas Flanagan, by skillful hand- ling, "succeeded in extricating the train with the loss of only two horses."^" Wag- oner Alvin May, after the train had been driven to safety, volunteered to return for a wagon which had been left behind and brought it up safely through the shelled area.^'' At 9h the two companies withdrew to south of Montfaucon, where they were joined by the balance of the regiment, and the remainder of the day was spent in fighting the mud and the traffic on the Avocourt-Malancourt-Montfaucon roads.'' How serious the traffic conditions had grown on this highway was evidenced at llh 10, when Colonel Jervey, Division Engineer, reported to the Division Com- mander, by field message following a reconnaissance, as follows:" 164 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 165 "Conditions on Avocourt-Malancourt road in southern part of Bois de Malancourt Corps area very serious. All movements between Avo- court and Malancourt blocked. If rain continues, a personal reconnais- sance satisfies me that conditions will grow rapidly worse. No stone available in vicinity and remaining timber unfit for corduroy purposes. With the present congestion on the road, it is impossible to haul in material which would have to be brought from Avocourt or Malan- court. The Corps seems to have sufficient labor on hand. I am maintain- ing roads from northeast edge of Bois de Malancourt forward." On the morning of September 29 also, the train of "A" Company, 311th Machine Gun Battalion, came under heavy shell fire. One man, Private John K. Moutafes, and six horses were killed and nine men were wounded within a few minutes. Lieutenant Benjamin Jones, commanding the train, "proceeded in full view of the enemy, under heavy artillery fire and -with utter disregard of his own safety, to transport the wounded beyond the shelled area, to disengage the undamaged machine gun carts and harness and to direct the same to cover."'^ At the same time Wagoner Clair M. McClure, "although wounded in three places, turned his team and took it to a place of safety and did not mention that he was wounded until the team was properly parked with the rest of the train. "*^ Ser- geant Major Francis W. Keifer, of the Headquarters Detachment, also remained with the train while it was being turned, not seeking shelter until the last cart was in safety. ^^ Mechanic Michael A. McHugh, who was wounded, refused to be evacuated, having his wound dressed and remaining with the company.*^ The 311th Machine Gun Battalion, in reserve throughout the attacks of the day, secured many opportunities to succor the wounded. Sergeant James R. Marshall,-' Sergeant Ralph A. Capen,-' Sergeant Michael F. Ginley,^^ Private Bentley Merton,^^ and Private Joshua T. Fenby^- all being cited for deeds of this sort. Three men in "C" Company were killed by shell fire. Corporal Edwin J. Kellogg, and Privates Marshall S. Baker and William J. Marsch, and three others. Corporal John J. Poillon and Privates Charles I. Thomas and Perry W. Wilt being cited for bravery under shell fire as runners.-^ Shell fire also killed three men of Company "C", 304th Field Signal Battal- ion, Private 1st cl Lawrence R. Campbell, and Privates George W. Kuhns and Newton E. Long, who were engaged in repairing telephone wires about two kilo- meters north of Montfaucon. Sergeant James P. Moroney, of Company "D", of the same battalion, had charge of a patrol of the only telephone line which was maintained during most of the day. On the afternoon of September 28, the Medical Detachment of the 315th Infantry had established a first aid station at the southern edge of Nantillois and at lOh, September 29, a low-flying German airplane dropped several signal flares over the station. Almost immediately "enemy shells began breaking within the area."'' The firing killed " the majority of the wounded who at that time occupied the aid station" and also two medical officers and several men who had been at- tached to the station and who attempted to remove the wounded men during the shelling. 5' Sergeant Harry W. Kendrick, of Ambulance Co. 316, was the last man to re-enter the station in search of wounded, and received several severe wounds, despite which he gave up his place in an ambulance to a more seriously 166 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION wounded comrade and walked to the evacuation hospital.^'' First Lieutenant Lee M. English, Dental Corps, attached to the 314th Infantry, assisted in caring for the wounded on the field until the aid station could be located further to the rear.^^ Lieutenant Samuel J. Marks, Medical Corps, 314th Infantry, although wounded, also remained at his post caring for the patients who had received fresh wounds.-' Private Guiseppe Spadafora, Headquarters Company, 315th Infantry, forced four German prisoners to assist him in evacuating the wounded.^' The 314th Ambulance Company, before dawii of September 29, had estab- lished an advance dressing station on the Montfaucon-Nantallois road in the open country a half kilometer south of the latter town. The severe shelling forced the evacuation of this station at 8h,** two members of the company. Corporal John Walsh and William Benson being fatally wounded in their heroic efforts as litter bearers to carry the patients to a place of safety. ^^ The utmost gallantry was displayed by First Lieutenant William D. McLelland, 314th Ambulance Co., in aiding in the speedy evacuation of the station. ^^ Sergeant Donald L. Wagner forced his way into the burning station and secured certain surgical instruments needed on the outside for an immediate operation upon a re-wounded man, and Corporal Joseph W. Klapetzky risked his life to save two wounded Germans from the station.^' The 314th Ambulance Company then transferred its activities to south of Montfaucon and a little later was attached to a new triage set up on the Fayel Farm, a few meters south of the Bois de la Tuilerie.^* This triage consisted of the 316th Field Hospital, which had been on truck along the road north of Malan- court up until that time, and Field Hospital 315 which was ordered up from its previous station at Clair Chene.^^ All of the ambulance companies of the Divi- sion were attached to it and it was opened at 14h.'^ At 15h, while the hospitals were filled with wounded and "in spite of the large red crosses on the top," heavy enemy shelling developed. ^^ It was thought this fire "was directed by an enemy plane which was overhead" during the bombardment.^^ According to eye-wit- nesses, the airplane was machine-gunned from a point not far distant, and it was known that two batteries of American light artillery were located to the north in the Bois de la Tuilerie. Under these conditions there may have been some ex- tenuating circumstances connected with the shelling, although the red crosses should certainly have been an incentive to a humane foe to be cautious in his fir- ing. Ten shells were dropped upon the hospitals and eight made direct hits.^^ Twenty-one men were killed, including a German captain and a German private, prisoners who were being treated for wounds. ^^ The action of Lieutenant Colonel William A. Harris, Director Field Hospitals, was an inspiration to his men. He "personally littered patients from the tents during the shell fire and made every effort to get the wounded evacuated immediately."*^ Captain Edgar P. Sand- rock, of Field Hospital No. 315, behaved as gallantly, dressing patients during the violent shelling, reassuring the wounded and assisting in their prompt evacuation.*'' Similarly, Captain Louis E. Emanuel, of the Medical Corps, 314th Infantry, remained to the end to assist in the evacuation.^* Sergeant Robert L. Penny- packer, of Field Hospital 315, "unassisted got a stranded motor truck out of a ditch and transported a number of wounded soldiers on litters out of range of the NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 167 shells. '"=* Private William G. Toone, of Ambulance Co. 316, "transferred a patient, whom he was carrying on his back, to another comrade, and returned through the^ shell fire to the hospitals, with the hope of evacuating others, but sacrificed his life in the attempt. "='' Private William L. Heard, of the same am- bulance company, was working in one of the tents and helped to carry the pa- tients to safety.^* With such heroism on all sides, the more serious cases were carried on litters and the walking cases limped along, holding to overburdened orderlies, until the area was cleared, leaving three badly rent tents behind. The patients were first held at the former advance dressing station on the INIalancourt- Montfaucon road, but, as the shelling continued, they were finally evacuated to Clair Chene, where P^ield Hospitals 315 and 316 were set up.^^ At 17h Field Hos- pital 313 was opened on the Avocourt-ISIalancourt road, south of the latter town, and a dressing station for slightly wounded opened by Ambulance Company 316 at the crossroads nearby.** The 304th Sanitary Train lost nine men killed in action that day, those in addition to the ones previously mentioned being Ser- Demolisued German Trench, in the Bois de MoNTFAncoN. geant Bertie W. David and Privates Harold C. Robinson, and Edward F. Wilson- of Ambulance Co. 314; Privates Albert Philippe and Oscar N. Rollins, of Ambulance, Co. 313, both of whom died while heroically going to wounded men in the open;^* and Private Oscar L. Cast, of Ambulance Co. 316. Every possible vehicle was used to evacuate the wounded, even the trucks of the 310th Machine Gun Battal- ion (except those carrying guns) being pressed into service as darkness came on.'* With liaison restored after dark, and having before him a complete descrip- tion of the terrible experiences of the day. General Kuhn, at 19h 30, despatched a message to General Cameron, commanding the "V" Corps, asking for more ef- fective counter-battery work and pointing out the exhaustion and depletion of his command. This message" is given on page 168. The losses in the three infantry regiments, which had been in the attacking line during the course of September 29, were exceedingly heavy, as all reports indicated, and even the 314th had suffered considerably from shell fire, although 168 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION not called on that day for offensive action. The enlisted men killed in action or dying of wounds during September 29 were as follows: Time Rec'd by U. S. ARMY FIELD MESSAGE No. I awB Sent by Time Check Ciommunicated by MESSG. Fr^m — eoisHwuid-ine-General;-,-7§ttr-lJlv-,- At -^iTiBiTjir- Trr^c; ' 0<* -S9-9ept ;- -ie-.— """^ - ±§- B-SSO-- No.. Tos Commanding General, Fifth Corps. I am informed that my telephone message to you regarding the situ- ation of the 79th Division which was relayed through two inter- mediate stations, reached your headquarters about 16R 30 today. I am not sure that you have in fact received this message. I there- fore deem it my duty to inform you by an orderly officer that the remaining troops of the 79th Division have "been ordered, to take up a holding position along the northern edge of the Eoia de Eeuge Sxid in front cf NANTILLOIS. Due to casualties and straggling, the effective force now available for holding this position is less than 50% of the original strength of the command. All of these troops are completely exhausted and incapable of effective action. They have been under a terrific slnell fire, mixed with gas, for more than 24 hours. They have twice attempted to advance and capture the BOIS de QUONS. Both times they vierc driven back by artillery fire from the froht and flanks, principally the right, and from combined machine gun fire. The tanks co-operated in the first attack towards the MADELIIIJE PABM, losing three. In yesterday's attack nine tanks were lost at the same point. The comnand has been on very short rations since the beginning of the advance and has suffered greatly from lack of v/ater, which it has been im- possible to supply during the last 36 hours because of the artillery fire before mentioned, I am informed that a somewhat similiar situation exists on my right and left. It is my opinion that no advance by infantry is possible until effective counter battery work has been instituted. It has been impossible for the divisional artillery to cope with the situation. I deem it my duty to bring these matters to your attention in order that proper action may be taken in the premices. Indentif ication of prisoners show that the Fifth Bavarian Reserve Division is nov/ on our right. Statement under "Future Instutions" in Operation Report, this date, signed by C--3, is in error. JoBeph E. Kuhn, Major General, USA Comdg. Fac-simile of Original Message Sent by Gen. Kuhn to Corps Commander that Resulted in Odr Relief. COMMANDING OFFICERS (157TH INFANTRY BRIDGADE) Colonel Claude B. Sweezey, 313th Inf. Regt. Colonel Wm. H. Ourt, 314th Inf. Regt. Major C. M. DuPut, 311th M. G. Bn. COMMANDING OFFICERS (158TH INFANTRY BRIDAGE) COLOKEL A. C. KnOWLES, 315th Inf. Regt. Colonel Geo. Williams 316th Inf. Regt. Lt. Col. Stu.^rt S. J.^nxey, 312th M.G.Bn. NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 169 313th Infantry Company "A" Mechanic John J. Strehlen Private 1st el James N. Granger Company "D" Privates Ivar M. Johnson Walter Smith Company "E" Corporal Joseph M. Wilkinson Private 1st cl James C. Ludwig Private Timothy R. Ryan Company "F" Privates Joseph F. Mathis August H. Rittmiller Abraham E. Shapiro Company "G" Private Oram R. Engle Headquarters Company Private Frank J. Kutcher Company "B" Corporal Frank C. Whitmore PrivateAbelo Fiores George Horst Company "H" Privates Harold R. Archer Joseph Wade Company "K" Privates John E. Nieter Harry H. Roehner Company "L" Corporal Alvey D. Keenam Private 1st cl Harry C. Burke Machine Gun Company Mess Sergeant John A. Ryan Mechanic James F. Harper Sanitary Detachment Private 1st cl Veri E. C. Snider Company "A" Private William McClain Company "C" Private Reider Thompson Company "E" Private Henry H. Sprenkle Company "G" Private Frank E. Pickering Company "A" Private 1st cl Reuben H. Duffel Company "B" Corporal Leroy B. Hinton Privates Lloyd C. Baughman Arthur M. Brion Grover C. Kook John A. Murray Company "C" Corporal George Danig Edward Fleisch Privates Fred J. Fudala Edward T. Kane Paul J. Smith Company "D" Privates 1st cl Lugi GagHardi John J. McNamara 314.th Infantry Company "I" Private William H. Sullivan Company "K" Private 1st cl Joseph G. Bauer Machine Gun Company Sergeant Charles Trapp Sanitary Detachment Private Esmond C. Tabor 315th Infantry Privates David Diamond James P. Kelly Frank Lewis John Mauro Joseph O. Yehle Company "E" Privates Frank Scheid Edward A. Smith Company "F" Privates Charles Coyle Robert King Irving S. RofEs Jesse E. Schaal Theodore G. SchoUer Company "G" Private Leo J. Hart 170 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Company "H" Privates Charles H. Bates Henry R. Klenck Frederick Lippert William O'Connell Robert Ritchie Company "K" Private Robert R. Morris Company "L" Corporal Hugh Moy Privates Thomas J. Cullen Jonathan E. Morgan William R. Scheulen Company "M" Privates Bernard McGarry Samuel K. Steever Headquarters Company Private Walter J. West Milton Stern Nichele Vetrona Supply Company Wagoners William P. Cotter Jesse W. Soby 316th Infantry Company "A" Corporals Thomas Murphy Clarence R. Scott Privates Charles H. Mansberger Abraham Mash Company "B" Sergeant Earl F. Leckrom Mechanic Homer R. Lanning Private 1st cl Joseph E. Motiska Privates Nunzio Bramanto Charles M. Hughes Vincenzo Screnci Joseph F. Swann Company "C" Privates Adolph Przestzelski Arnold Rabman Raymond T. Lynch Joseph A. Phillips Edward J. Rogan Company "H" Sergeant James A. Kelly Privates Livio Di salvo Nicholas A. Haidner Frederick Talbot Company "I" Sergeant Enos R. Lutman Privates Sam Susson Sam Urciuoli Company "K" Privates Joseph luliano John B. Smith Company "M" Corporal Daniel E. McComsey Private Herbert M. Hill Headquarters Company Regt. Sgt Maj. Harold H. Bair Private 1st cl John M. Wise Private Samuel M. Shelly Machine Gun Company Mechanic Eugene R. Kreider Privates Arthur H. Jones Frank S. Kennedy Company "E" ^ Sergeants John M. Kutchever David W. Mundis Corporals Martin M. Babb Alfred A. Heisey Mark C. M. Weierbach Privates 1st cl Michael Adzema Joseph T. Conner Benjamin Husik Rene E. Tissot Privates Frank Coleman Joseph Horenstein Stanley Kopetsky Company "F" Corporal Alvin T. Reymeyer Word that a much-hoped for and greatly-needed relief was on its way came to the Division about 4h 30 on the morning of September 30, when Field Order No. 47, "V" Corps, was received at the Seventy-ninth Division P. C. General NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 171 Kuhn at once despatched field messages to the two infantry brigade commanders, the one to Colonel Oury reading:'^ "Orders from Corps just received direct relief of 79th Division from the line. The 5th Brigade, 3rd Division, is now marching to your relief. Designate an officer of your brigade to be at the western exit of ]Montfau- con on the Montfaucon-Ivoiry road to meet a representative of the reliev- ing regiment." To General Nicholson the message read:** "The 5th Brigade, 3rd Division, is now marching to the relief of your brigade, pursuant to orders just received from 5tli Corps. You will send a suitable ofiicer familiar with the present disposition of first line troops to report at the exist of Montfaucon on the Montfaucon-Ivoiry road as a guide. This officer wiU be ordered at once in order that when the head of the relieving column arrives. Orders will issue later relative to the assembly of troops, their routes of march and supply." This was followed at 6h 30 by Field Order No. 10, 79th Division, which an- nounced that "upon relief the 157th and 158th Brigades and separate units of the 79th Division will be assembled under the direction of brigade and separate unit commanders in the vicinity of Malancourt and from which point they will be gradually transferred south of the Avocourt-Esnes road."^' The order also pro- vided that rolling kitchens and water carts containing water would accompany the troops, and that empty water carts, ration carts and horse drawn ammuni- tion vehicles should be immediately despatched to the refilling points via the Montfaucon-Avocourt-Recicourt road. ^' In view of the contemplated relief, it was decided to attempt no further at- tack during September 30, "the troops only holding the positions taken up the night before until the relief was effected."^* The mere holding of this line was a trying ordeal. The American artillery still seemed unable to neutralize the Ger- man fire, and the defensive line, shallow trenches and shell holes along the front of the Bois de Beuge and Nantillois, were shelled incessantly. The line was held with the heavy Brownings of the 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions and of two platoons of Company "B", 310th Machine Gun Battalion, in constant sup- port. The enemy made no attempt to attack, being content to harass the lines and the back areas as much as possible by shell fire. In the meanwhile, carrying details got food forward at last to the men in the holding companies, and the 315th and 316th in reserve had their first substantial meal in four days. At lOh 45, the first columns of the Third Division reached the southern edge of Montfaucon, and the relief was carried on as rapidly as possible.** At 13h the first units of the 315th Infantry were replaced by the newcomers,*^ and in rapid succession the columns of fresh troops stepped into the places made vacant by the other imits of the Division, until, by 18h, all had started back except "A" and "D" Companies of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion which remained until noon the next day, supporting the Third Division infantry.** The "thin columns of exhausted men"*^ stumbled back through Montfaucon, the heavy shelling still continuing and casualties occuring not infrequently. The haggard troops 172 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION were bivouaced during the night of September 30 — October 1 in the vicinity of Mal- ancourt.^* Exhausted, they slept that night for the first time since the opening of the drive with no fear of artillery, or machine gun, or gas. On the following morning they again took up the march, and all during October 1 and October 2 the shattered remnants of regiments and battalions went shambling over the rebuilt Malancourt-Avocourt road and the Esnes-Avocourt road and those other familiar spots on the line of their old Avocourt-Malancourt sector, to encamp at last in the same locations they had vacated on the momentous night of Septem- ber 25-26 — Camp Normandie, Bois de Lambechamp, Foret de Hesse, and Bois le Deffoy. All save the 304th Engineers.' "F" Company, of the Engineers, had been detailed to the gruesome task of burying the dead and was engaged thereon Avocourt-Malancourt Road Crossing Old Trench Line beginning September 30.^° The other five companies were swinging down the road toward Camp des Gendarmes when a radio message was handed Lieutenant Colonel Barber. It read:*" "September 30 — Engineer regiment with 79th Division is placed at the disposal of Commanding General, 3rd Division, and will not be re- lieved with the remainder of the 79th Div. Repeat to its C. O Cameron." The regiment was immediately ordered to retrace its steps, and subsequently served eight more days at the front as the combat regiment*" with the 3rd Divi- sion. Lieutenant Colonel Barber was in command. Colonel Jervey having been evacuated to a hospital. The five companies worked south of Montfaucon on the road for a day and then moved to the north of the town, repairing the high- NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 173 way to Nantillois. There they were joined by "F" Company. On October 4, when the Third Division made its first effort to continue the advance north of Nantillois, the 304th Engineers were in support, but what had proven too hard for the worn Seventy-ninth on September 29 proved too hard for the fresh Third on October 4.'' The SOith Engineers, so close to the infantry, received considerable shelling and great quantities of gas in the next few days, seventy men of the Second Battalion alone being gassed on October 4.^- During the subsequent three days, all the comi)anies were engaged in maintenance of roads north of Montfaucon, except one which was barricading Third Division Headquarters. On October 7 the regiment was relieved from further duty with the Third Divi- sion and at oh, October 8, marched away for a rest at last.*' The Seventy-ninth Division P. C, southeast of Montfaucon, had closed at 18h, September 30, when the relief was well nigh completed, and was established at 19h 30 at Jouy-en-Argonne.^'' At the same time Major William T. Price, commanding the 304th Supply Train, *^ and Major Rudolph Van Hoevenberg, commanding the 79th Military Police Company,*^ were doing splendid work in handling the terrible traffic congestion resulting from one division mov- ing in and another moving out of the area during the same period and over the same road. Major Price's "efficient organization of wrecking squads enabled him to bring all trucks for which he was responsible out of the Montfaucon area with- out losing a truck, although eighteen had been overturned along the way and dis- abled by shell fire and other causes."*^ By October 2 the entire Division, with the exception of the Engineers and Field Hospitals 314 and 315 at Clair Chene,*' had gone into camp in the vicinity of Jouy-en-Argonne and had passed from the control of the "V" Corps to that of the "in" Corps." While it rested, it took stock of what it had accomplished, and die record could not help but fill all connected with the Division with a just pride. During the period from September 26 to September 30 it had advanced ten kilometers, and had taken 905 German prisoners. There is no complete record of the precise material captured, owing to the Division being relieved before it was possible to take an inventory, and all property taken was left on the field. The 314th Infantry was the only regiment which was able to render a report, and in this is listed among its captured material, seventy-eight light machine guns, five heavy machine guns, 121 rifles, five 77 mm. cannon and four minnenwerfers.*^ The Division's record, in its first battle experience, is well reviewed by Major General Kuhn in the conclusions to the official Report of Operations of the Division in the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. He states:*' "The Seventy-ninth Division came under fire for the first time since its organization. More than half of its strength was made up of draftees of not more than four months 'service, and considerably less of actual train- ing, due to the time lost in transport from United States and in moving about while in France. So far as courage and self-sacrifice are concerned, the conduct of both officers and men was above all reproach, but, as is the case with all green troops, there was lacking the experience which comes only from actual contact with the enemy. In view of the difficulties of the terrain and the inexperiences of the troops, I am of the opinion that both officers and men fought well." 174 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION He commended the Division again on October 24, when, in General Order No- 16, 79th Division, he stated:'" "During the recent fighting in the Battle of Verdun, the 79th Division received its first baptism of fire in the Montfaucon sector. The Commanding General takes this means of expressing to his command his satisfaction and gratification for the courage, fortitude and tenacity displayed by all troops, especially the infantry, which although frequently subjected to heavy machine gun and artillery fire, not only held all ground conquered but gallantly strove to advance whenever called upon to do so. The Commanding General feels confident that the 79th Division will not fail to maintain its excellent records and that the experience gained in the recent fighting will be turned to profit when again confronting the enemv." Montfaucon ukder Snow December 1918. The casualties of the Division, as computed immediately after the relief on September 30, showed that twenty-two ofiicers and 278 men had been killed in action; eighty-six officers and 2,228 men wounded or gassed, and 749 men were missing in action.^* Of this latter classification many were found eventually to have been killed and some were wounded. Likewise, many of these listed as wounded immediately after the operations, subsequently died of their injuries. The killed in action during September 30 and October 1 and those who died of wounds after September 30 were as follows: 313th Infantry Company "A" Company "B" Private 1st cl Clyde F. Jones Corporals Walter H. Ostrowski AMlliam E. Sheridan NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 175 Privates Edgar L. Bandel Harry H. Kelley William Luneberg Edward A. Stocksdale, Jr. Company "C" Sergeants Frederick Bean William P. Shamleffer Corporals Walter E. Campbell Alexander H. McClintock Privates Walter G. Albert Frank Berger William T. Dorsey Ellis Eskowitz Nick Jannaxcone Adolph Plucinski Irving R. Stallings Charles Thompson Angelo Turchiano Earl H. Tyree George Weyuker Bronislaw Wolukanis Company "D" Corporal Seligman B. Austrian Privates William L. Crampton Adam Hartman, Jr. Felix S. Rab Henry V. Talbert Company "E" Sergeant Charles R. Clubb Corporal Jeremias J. Visser Privates George F. Coleman Joseph H. Weber Company "F" Corporal William H. England Privates Clarence H. Cole Arthur Madden Harry O 'Donnell Eli M. Shapiro Company "G" Corporals Thomas A. Carr Samuel A. Macatee Thomas C. Sard Privates Philip R. Berfeld William E. Hyland Charles C. Lerner Raymond E. Ross Company "H" Corporal Timothy A. O 'Leary Privates Arthur Cammarata Stephen T. Sullivan Andrew J. Wells Company "I" Privates William 0. Hill Pasquale Maruceio Company "K" Privates John Keenan Leo J. Lipschutz Leo I. Nuedling Company "L" Privates John J. Deller John T. McKee Witold M. Sokolowsky Alfred Vannata Company "M" Privates Wilbur F. Baldwin Antonio Regruto Headquarters Company Corporal James L. Carr Privates Harry Ruehl Machine Gun Company Privates Thomas G. Grail Oscar E. Rodman 314th Infantry Company "A" Privates Amos R. Nields Sterling W. Seitz Company "B" Private Domenico Tortora Company "C" Corporal Stanley Andresic Company "D" Private William Mattson Company "E" Private Andrea Frasca Company "F" Privates Charles W. Baer Harry F. Lackhove Looren Paroonagian 176 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Company "H" Private 1st cl Nicholas W. Heery Privates Howard M. Fye Harry B. Moore William F. Taylor Harry J. Williams Company "I" Sergeant John C. Strider Privates Samuel M. Cottrell Raymond H. Koch Company "K" Private Joseph Polowski Company "L" Private Francis L. McEU Company "M" Sergeant Raymond McCracken Privates Francis Hannify Gilbert C. Haupt John H. Miller William L. Nunan John E. Schleig Frank J. Turner Headquarters Company Privates Thomas Smith Fred Stone Allen H. Winter Sanitary Detachment Private Joseph L. Ginley 311th Machine Gun Battalion Company "D" Corporal James A. Darrah 315th Infantry Company "A" Private 1st cl Charles J. Dougherty Privates John Heineman Mieczj'stan Ruzycki Company "B" Private Thomas lannuzzi Company "C" Corporals David P. Anderson George Horn Privates Joseph H. Cherry Alexander Gilchrist Joseph Lewis James N. Mallus Leo J. Swartz Company "D" Private 1st cl Ornill S. Cummings Privates Antonio Del Sordo William V. GrifEn Martin J. Kelly Alexander McClean Morris Nachtigal Charles H. Schnell Frank M. Trebino Company "E" Privates Edward Huss Charles J. Kelly Company "F" Corporal Lewis Ryan Privates Jan Citko George A. Harrington Sotirios Verras Company "G" Privates 1st cl Peter J. Conway George M. Donahue William Hetherington Private Kenneth A. MacKenzie Company "I" Private Frank Kossakowski Company" L" Corporal Harry Hahn Privates 1st cl George L. Kelley Privates Reed Barnitz Walter J. Henderson Maury Lieberman William Reid William H. Stanley Company "M" Privates Alexander Friedel Donato Masciole Giacomo Moscariello Machine Gun Company Private Elton N. Reid NANTILLOIS AND THE BOIS DE BEUGE 177 316th Infantry Company "A" Bugler Elbert L. Davidson Private 1st cl Charles C. Bucher Privates William Demos Dimeteo Gregore Tootsie Miller James V. Pergola Michael Tomosley Company "B" Corporal George E. Green Mechanic Peter S. Lengel Private 1st cl Andrew M. Detrich Privates Raymond Brough Vincent King Rosario Patane Company "C" Privates 1st cl Frederick W. Pineman Privates Mike Holowopura Jacob A. Lohmiller Delbert M. Welliver Company "E" Sergeant Francis E. Ryan Privates James E. Dye William W. Fahey James S. Lockhart Erick W. Lund John Prihoda Carmine Provisiero Frank Willowitch Company "H" Privates William J. Hasson Eugene A. Kibbler Company "I" Privates Albert E. Forsyth Lester W. Pfeffer Company "L" First Sergt. Arthur E. Undercoffer Corporal Lloyd D. Tschopp Privates 1st cl Monroe C. Bill Thomas C. Snyder Company "M" Corporals Joseph Giangreco Ralph Heckle Robert L. Libhart Privates Harry E. Cooper Wilham Lunn Headquarters Company Batn. Sgt. Maj. Edwin C. Rebert Private 1st cl Clifford J. Gangewere Machine Gun Company Sergeant Albert E. Shoemaker Private 1st cl Conrad W. Ziegler Privates Thomas V. Flanigan William Smith Thomas Z. Wagner Company "G" Privates 1st cl Abrahm L. Turner Private John Welsh 312th Machine Gun Battahon Sanitary Detachment Private 1st cl Harry E. Fuerst Company "A" Bugler Norman D. Coates Company "C" Privates Glenn L. Doebler Ralph E. Windsor Company "B" Private John F. Walsh 310th Machine Gun Battalion Company "B" Private Samuel M. Clark Company "D" Corporal Joseph A. McGrath Company "E" Corporal James J. Taskey 304th Engineers Privates George H. Raiger Lyman G. Saunders Anthony J. Stoe Company "F" Privates Alvin A. Gochnauei Paul H. Utz 178 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION 304th Field Signal Battalion Company "B" Pri^'ate Raymond S. McGonigal Company "C" Corporal Edgar R. Krengel Privates Clarence Champ Frank C. Cole Arthur D. Simonson Ambulance Co. 313 Private Walter M. Briggs Ambulane Co. 314 Corporal John Walsh 304th Sanitary Train Ambulance Co. 315 Private Carl L. Firor CHAPTER VI THE TROYON SECTOR THE Seventy-ninth Division, in bivouac in the area around Jouy-en-Argonne, picked up its blanket rolls from regimental and battalion dumps, settled back in ■woodland security from occasional Boche aviators and prepared to rest. That was on October 1. Two days later its officers received the latest Division Field Order (No. 11) and discovered that it contained marching orders for that very night. ^ On the face of it, there was nothing suspicious in this. The Division felt that it had acquitted itself splendidly in its baptism of fire and that it now was bound for a rest area — that mythical spot for which the A. E. F. al- ways sought in vain. The terms "rest and replacements" were not mentioned in the new field order, but, logically, there could be no other interpretation. At least, such was the consensus of opinion after a careful perusal. The field order stated that the Division, less the 304th Engineers, was "relieved from duty in the HI Corps" and would "proceed by marching" on the night of October 3-4 "to the zone of the II Colonial Corps" (French).' Evidently that zone was not far distant if it was to be reached in a night. The second paragraph of the Field Order divided the Division into three columns; the first, under General Nicholson, consisting of the 157th Provisional Brigade with four horse-drawn ambulances and a platoon of military police; the second, under Colonel Oury, consisting of the 158th Pro\'isional Brigade, and the same number of ambulances and military police; and the third, under Colonel William C. Rogers, consisting of the 310th Machine Gun Battalion, 304th Field Signal Battalion, 304th Train Headquarters and Military Police, and 304th Sanitary Train. ' The 304th Am- munition and Supply Trains were directed to "remain in present location until further orders."' Field and combat trains were to accompany the columns, and rolling kitchens, water carts, rations, baggage and ammunition were to proceed in that order of priority should the animal supply be sufficient. One day's field rations were to be carried by each man and one additional day's rations on the field trains. The only thing lacking was the destination. Regarding that, the order stated that "march table will be furnished as soon as possible."' While the still wearied men proceeded to break camp, yet under the impres- sion that they were headed for some quiet spot out of the battle area, the promised march table put in an appearance. Suspicions were still lulled. The destinations of the columns were Ancemont, Senoncourt and les Monthairons,' all unfamiliar names and certainly not associated with any fighting so far as the Division could recall. The towns were somewhere to the south, as the table contained a para- graph to the effect that "heads of columns will not pass south of the line Ville sur Cousance-Rampont-Blercourt-Verdun prior to 22h, October 3, 1918."' To go southward meant to leave the Meuse-Argonne at their backs, and the men were not sorry to do this. (179) 180 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Beginning at 18h, October 3, the units started over various roads leading to the points where the columns were to concentrate. The units comprising Gen- eral Nicholson's command swung through Montezeville, Vigneville and Bethelain- ville to Sivry le Perche, the four horse-drawn ambulances and the platoon of mili- tary police reporting at the latter place at 20h.i With 500 meters between each battalion, the march was resumed due southward and so timed as to obey the instructions regarding the furthest point permissible at 22h. Colunm No. 2 gath- ered at Dombasle, via Montezeville and the Avocourt-Dombasle road, and then moved on, the head of the column reaching Rampont at 20li 20 and halting until 22h as instructed.^ The third colunm followed the second into Dombasle and then turned south toward Ville sur Cousance.' An addendum to Field Order No. 11, distributed to the columns on the way, provided that General Nicholson's command should camp during October 4 in the Bois de Nixeville, east of the "Sac- red Way on the road between Nixeville and Lempire," and the other two columns "in the Foret de Souilly, east of Senoncourt."^ The addendum was emphatic that "north bound traffic must not be interfered with by the movement," and instructed column commanders to detail officers at each point where the march crossed a north-bound route. In conclusion, it stated that the march to the bil- leting area would be completed by daylight and that colunm commanders should notify the 17th French Army Corps at Regret and the 2nd Colonial Corps at St. Mihiel as to the location of camping places enroute.' Wearied though they were, the men made good time on this night march» spurred, no doubt, by the anticipated rest ahead, and dawn of October 4 found all units safely ensconced in the shelter of the Bois de NLxeville and the Foret de Souilly, and well concealed from aeroplane observation.^ During the morning the columns rested and at ISli received G-1 Order No. 13, directing them as to the pursuance of their journey.' This order assigned the 157tli Provisional Brigade to "Area B," which lay on either side of the Meuse River, thirteen kilometers south of Verdun, and the 158th Provisional Brigade to "Area A," adjoining 'Area B" on the south. Column No. 3 was directed to be divided among towns in both areas, but was instructed not to march until Colunm No. 2 ahead of it "had cleared the cross roads east of Souilly."' Billeting officers were directed to proceed ahead of the units and make arrangements "with local French authori- ties. Zone Majors, Town Majors and Majors in charge of cantonments" for as- signment of outfits.' The journey was to be resumed, the order stated, at 14h, October 4. In the case of the 158th Provisional Brigade, the march was not re- sumed until 14h 45, as Colonel Oury granted the 315th Infantry time to complete "the serving of a hot meal."^ Ahead of the men lay a long hike. General Nicholson's brigade emerged from the Bois de NLxeville and took the main road leading through Lempire, Landrecourt and Dugny to the Meuse. It turned south along the west bank of that river as far as Ancemont, where it crossed and separated. The 316th In- fantry proceeded to Rupt en Woevre, seven kilometers east by south of Ancemont, arriving at midnight.^ The 313th Infantry turned south down the east bank of the Meuse, three kilometers, to Genicourt sur Meuse,' and the 311th Machine Gun THE TROYON SECTOR 181 Battalion found its billets in the Bois la Rappe, about midway between the in- fantry regiments' headquarters. Colonel Oury's command, starting from the Foret de Souilly forty-five minutes late, did not attempt to do the whole distance ahead of it in a day, but halted for the night in a shelter tent camp at Recourt.^ Because of the congestion on the road and the situation of the camp, a hot meal could not be served and the men were permitted to use their reserve rations.^ The march was resumed at 7h 15, October 5, and was pushed hard all day long, the route leading due south to "Area A," where headquarters of the 314th were established at Rupt-devant-St. Mihiel,* of the 315th Infantry at Lahaymeix,* and of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion at Courouvre,' all west of the Meuse. The third column, delayed until Column No. 2 had cleared the crossroads east of Souilly, spent a whole day in the Bois de Senoncourt and then proceeded to les Monthairons. Here the 310th Machine Gun Battalion, Supply Train and one-half of the Sanitary Train were quartered. The 304th Field Signal Battalion Village of Les Monthaibons occcpied by 310th Machine Gun Battalion, 79th Divi- sion, Oct. 5, 1918, en-route to Thoyon Sector. and the balance of the Sanitary Train continued southward to Camp Gibraltar, lying west of Thillonibois in "Area A."' Division Headquarters had been opened at Thillombois at 13h October 4.' At that time all three columns were still on the march, and, even while the ex- hausted men were plodding the muddy roads in the final stages of the tiring hike, a new field order was being drawn up at Thillombois which was to shatter the dreams of rest. It was Field Order No. 12, distributed on October 5, and it dis- closed to the Seventy-ninth Division that the supposed rest area was a front line sector about 13 kilometers north of St. Mihiel. The second paragraph of Field Order No. 12 told the story:' "Pursuant to Special Order No. 811, II Colonial Corps (French) dated 5th October, 1918, the 79th Di^^sion will relieve the 26th Division in the Troyon Sector during the night 7-8 October, 1918. The relief of the infantry and of the machine guns will be com- pleted by the morning of 8th October." 182 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION There was considerable more in that field order. Not only that, but con- siderable of what was in it was found subsequently to be in error with the result that between October 5 and 7, there were issued four memorandums and an ap- pendix before all matters were straightened out.^ As finally corrected, it described the new front as being divided into two brigade sectors — Massachusetts and Con- necticut — each of which was further divided into two regimental sectors — ^from right to left, Concord, Montpelier, Augusta and Providence.^ These good old New England names identified the 26th as the famous "Yankee" Division, which had won the ground in the St. Mihiel drive and had the right to christen the ter- rain as it would. There were two clauses in the order, however, for which the Seventy-ninth was thankful. The one pleased the 157th Provisional Brigade, Demolishing walls for road-building stone — St. Remy-Troton Sector. which was assigned to relieve the 26th, as it provided that two French battalions would occupy the zone of observation.^ The other pleased the 158th Provisional Brigade because it was directed to remain in its "present billets pending further instructions."^ In the 158th Brigade, the period from October 5 to October 10 was consumed in "policing of billets, re-equipping of the regiments, rendering of reports and a five hour training schedule," the latter including considerable close order drill, "deemed necessary on account of the long period which had elapsed without any disciplinary instructions."^ The 157th Brigade found slight time for any routine. The 316th was hurried out in the evening of October 6 and marched toward the front through Mouilly THE TROYON SECTOR 183 to the Grande Tranchee de Calonne, turned south on it two kilometers and then struck east for another kilometer into le Chanot Bois, arriving before dawn and going into bivouac.''' The 313th Infantry broke camp at 18h, October 6 and marched to Rupt-en-Woevre, taking over the ground vacated a few hours previ- ously by the 316th Infantry.^ The relief began, as prescrilied, on the night of October 7, the French battalions having effected the relief in the zone of observa- tion the previous night.^ The 316th Infantry took over the right hand sector — Massachusetts — the First Battalion on the left and the Second Battalion on the right, in the zone of resistance and the Third Battalion remaining in reserve in le Chanot Bois.'' The 313th Infantry, taking over the left hand sector — Con- Po.STE DE COMMAXDE, 157X11 I.VFAXritV BuiUAUE, XEAU MoUILLY, THE KUIXS OF WHICH C.4X BE SEEX IX FAR BACKGROUXD. necticut — ^placed the Third Battalion on the left and the Second Battalion on the right, ■with the First Battalion in the rear.^ The new front covered a distance of nearly nine kilometers and was of a pe- culiar nature. The main line of resistance ran from northwest to southeast along the summit of the Cotes de Meuse. The Cotes de Meuse were almost a continu- ous line of wooded cliffs, whose northeastern edges dropped precipitously to the plains of the Woevre. The line was wavy and irregular, following each projection thrust out into the plain by every cote (hill) which pushed boldly away from the main range. The observation from such an elevation was perfect. The Ger- mans, to overcome the disadvantages of being watched from the heights, had withdrawn their lines about six kilometers, and the outposts of the Yankee Divi- 184 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION sion had pushed after them, estabHshing their own outpost Hues some 3 kilometers beyond the hills. As a result, the zone of observation covered the entire flat from the hills to the outpost line. ^Vhile the 157th Brigade was going into the line of resistance, the 310th Ma- chine Gun Battalion was moving up to support the 316th Infantry,'^ and the 311th Machine Gun Battalion to support the 313th Infantry." The 157th Brigade Headquarters was established at Mouilly at 12h, October 7, while the Division Headquarters moved to Troyon sur Meuse, seven kilometers northeast of Thil- lombois at 8h, October 8.' Following this move the headquarters of the 315th Infantry were transferred from Lahaymeix to Thillombois. The Division rail- Hotel de ville, Troton-sub-meusb, 79th Division Headquarters Oct. 8-28, 1918. head was at Rattentout, with the advance dump at Mouilly, a 60 cm. railway connecting the two points.' When the St. Mihiel salient had been taken from the Germans on September 12 and 13, the Boche had been forced to abandon great quantities of ammunition, guns, machinery, clothing and equipment of various kinds, most of which was still lying about the sector when the Seventy-ninth Division moved in. During four years of uninterrupted occupancy, the enemy had made himself comfortable in the area to no slight degree, and such of his luxuries as had not been ruined by shell fire or drenched with gas during the recent operations were enjoyed to the utmost by the men. Elaborately furnished officers' clubrooms, billiard rooms, dance halls, recreation huts, baths and vegetable gardens had been left behind. THE TROYON SECTOR 185 all in somewhat battered condition, but nevertheless capable of being improved and enjoyed. This German lavishness existed, of course, only in that part of the sector held by the front line regiments. The enemy had not set foot west of the Meuse where our reserve regiments were encamped. However, real comfort was by no means lacking for the troops stationed in reserve in the small partly demolished villages on the west bank of the INIeuse. A brief description from the diary of Captain George L. Wright of the 315th BocHB Esprit de-Corps: "We Germans Fear Gott but nothing else in the World." Infantry, of this date, stationed in the village of Les Paroches about a mile and a half from St. Mihiel, gives an interesting light on existing conditions: "Evidence piles up on all sides as to the comforts which the French Troops were able to surround themselves with even on the edge of the front lines. Here, near St. Mihiel, where until a short month ago the front line remained almost immovable for a period of four years, the French dugouts and posts of command are marvels of comforts, considering conditions. Electric lights, shower baths, and com- 186 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION fortable beds are in evidence. From the lips of the old French non- com, who now acts as town-major and sole inhabitant of Les Paroches, we hear of white table cloths, silverware, wine and champagne that graced the tables of the French officers' mess in by-gone days. In fact, if we can believe our French comrade, visits to these parts by relatives and sweethearts were not at all uncom- mon in the days of stabilized warfare. Our visits to St. Mihiel seem to indicate that the Germans were wont to make themselves equally as comfortable. Here again many of the comforts of civilization were to be seen and many of the trenches occupied by the troops were constructed of solid con- crete." A tragic accident marked the first day of the 313th Infantry in its new sector. Two officers, Captain Timothy L. Barber, Medical Corps, and Captain Melvin M. Augenstein, Dental Corps, were reconnoitering some old German mine galleries neai' the Second Battalion P. C, in search of a location for a first-aid station. Captain Barber accidentally dropped a match which set fire to a large ciuantity of flares and other pyrotechnics left behind by the enemy, and both officers were so badly burned that they died a few days later." From the moment that the 157th Brigade took over the Une of resistance it was apparent that the Germans were not going to let the sector remain a cjuiet one. On the first night in the C6tes de Meuse, the lines were treated to a vigor- ous bombardment consisting of both shell fire and gas, the incident bringing forth the ability of First Sergeant John L. Brace, of Company "B", 311th Machine Gun Battalion,'^ which unit had placed six guns in outpost positions at Fresnes en Woevre.'- In the absence of the platoon commander. Sergeant Brace, "during exceedingly heavy shell fire of both explosives and gas, continually visited the guns, thereby stimulating the morale of the men and showing exceptional brav- gj.y "15 On the night of October 8-9, the 313th Infantry, under instructions con- tained in Field Order No. 14, 79th Division, ^^ relieved the French battalion in the zone of observation on its front, and the following night, pursuant to the same field order, the 316th effected a similar relief in the right sector.'" Beginning on the night of October 9-10 also, the 26th Division artillery was relie\'ed by the 55th Artillery Brigade, of the Thirtieth Division, which, as directed in Field Or- der No. 15, 79th Division, completed taking over the sector at 8h, October 12, and thereupon became attached to the Seventy-ninth Division.'' Also, on Oc- tober 10, all daylight traffic was prohibited in that part of the sector lying behind the line of Mouilly and Dompierre-aux-Bois save by single vehicle, and traffic behind that line was allowed to consist of not more than ten wagons in a single convoy. Beyond the line running from Mesnil to Thillot, which meant in ad- vance of the hills containing the line of resistance, no daylight traffic of any nature was ijerniitted.'* The 304th Engineers, relieved of duty with the Third Division in the Mont- faucon area, marched via Souhesme, Lenimes and Vadelaincourt to Ancemont on the Meuse, and thence southward to Tilly sur Meuse, arriving in the area on October 10." The three companies of the 304th Ammunition Train, then with the THE TROYON SECTOR 187 Division, and the balance of the 304th Sanitary Train moved in from Dombasle and Clair Chenes about the same time, so that the Division, as it had been consti- tuted in the Avocourt-Malancourt sector, Init with a different artillery brigade, was reassembled in the new sector l)j' October Vl. The original infantry brigades had been reconstituted under Field Order No. 17, 79th Division, of October 10, which provided that General Nicholson, of the 157th Brigade, should take over subsector Connecticut, with the 313th Infantry in the line and the 314th Infantry in reserve "for training," while the 158th Bri- gade should take over the ^lassachusetts subsector with the 31fith Infantry in "**«.&> ,'• iEjB. Barber Shop in the Troton Sector. the line and the 315th Infantry "in training."-" This order required only one regiment to change its position, the 314th, which, between Octol)er 11 and 13, moved from the vicinity of Rupt-devant-St. Mihiel to the vicinity of Ambly, with one battalion east of the Meuse in Ranzieres, and the other battalions west of the river at Tilly-sur-Meuse and Recourt. Here it resumed its training sched- ule.^"^ As Colonel Oury, commanding the 314th Infantry, was transferred with his regiment to the 157th Brigade, the command of the 158th Brigade devolved upon Colonel Knowles of the 315th Infantrj'. In the absence of Colonel Knowles, Major Francis V. Lloyd assumed cormnand and of the 315th Infantry. The Seventy-ninth Division passed officially to the newly constituted Second American Army, commanded by Major General Robert L. BuUard, on October 188 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION 12, this army taking over "that portion of our front extending from Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun. "^^ Fresnes-en- Woevre was in the northeast corner of the Seventy-ninth Division front, making the Division the northernmost in General BuUard's new organization. The enemy evidently feared a renewal of the attack along this front, and used every effort to keep the Seventy-ninth Division well back from his lines by continual artillery fire. The original field order, taking over the sector, had men- tioned that while the opposing line was held by a second or third rate German division which was uniformly unsuccessful in raiding, yet the German artillery was active, "especially on the towns in the Zone of Observation."^ This was soon found to be very true. Night after night the towns along the hills and in the plains — Fresnes-en-Woevre, Tresauvaux, Saulx-en-Woevre, Hannonville, Herbeu- ville, Combres, Wadonville-en-Woevre, and Mesnil-sous-les-Cotes — would be drenched with gas and raked with shrapnel and high explosive, which inflicted Church at Gercourt, Defended with Barbed Wire many casualties. Although the losses were light compared with the casualties of the battles before and after, still the "quiet sector," took its sizable toll. The roads near the front, particularly those leading down into the plain, were watched carefully by the enemy and no living thing could move upon them with- out drawing shell fire. The supply wagons and trucks, especially, experienced difficulty in going to and from the front. Although this transportation only moved singly and at night, the Boche seemed to have an uncanny knack of shelling the roads at the summit of the hills in the line of resistance at such hours with both high explosives and gas. Every night, carrying details met the supply trucks and "took great burdens of rations and supplies by hand from the top of the cliffs down the steep and winding paths to the plains below and then for a long perilous trip out over the plains, along the shelled roads and through the soft marshy lowlands" to the men in the outposts.^' Another extract from Captain Wright's diary gives us the following interest- ing description of life in the Troyon sector as viewed from the line of resistance: THE TROYON SECTOR 189 "Perched up here, above the village of St. Maurice, in a rustic German villa that formerly served as head-quarters for a Brigade Commander, we are occupying the most picturesque sector we have yet struck. Stretching away to the East lies the broad, flat plain of the Woevre. Six kilometers away rises a misty line of hills which mark the main German line of defense. Thirty kilometers east of these hills Metz with its immense fortifications. By day, the low-lying expanse of the Woevre lies in solemn stillness, no life or movement visible on its broad surface. At night, however, when Becker, Mitchell (the Y. M. C. A.) repre- sentative and I gather on the porch for observation and a discrete cigarette, there comes a miraculous change. Star-shells, red, green, yellow and white rise in rajiid succession and throw their weird 315th Ambulance Go's Dressing Station at Les Eparges. This section received a severe gassing Oct. 14, 1918. light over the plain below. Suddenly, far back of the Boche line, an orange flash stabs the darkness momentarily. Then comes an instant's silence, followed by a low whine which mounts into a cres- cento scream as an Austrian shell goes hurtling past our villa and bursts with a resounding crash at the cross-roads a half a mile or more behind us. Meanwhile the German planes drone ceaselessly overhead and we get faint echos of an occasional snuttering machine gun fire which we surmise represents some kind of linsion signal." The most serious incident of gas shelling during the entire period of the occu- pation took place on the night of October 14, when the dressing station and billets 190 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION established by Ambulance Company 315, 304th Sanitary Train, at Les Eparges, were subjected to a severe gas bombardment. There were not many wounded men in the station at the time, but the entire personnel of the Ambulance Com- pany was caught unawares and had a narrow escape. Captain Daniel B. Wil- liams, Medical Corps, commanding the company, although himself gassed, "re- mained at this post and evacuated to safety all the wounded," saving many lives "by his example and prompt action."-^ The same courageous conduct was dis- played by First Lieutenants Jesse C. Stilley and James L. Brennan, both of the Medical Corps, and on duty at the station, the latter being slightly gassed.^* Private 1st cl Carl C. Kidd, "after assisting in placing gas masks on the wounded men in the dressing station, exposed himself many times by going to the dugouts occupied by his comrades to make certain that they had been warned of the pres- ence of gas."^'* While moving into Hannonville, eighty-five men of the 316th Infantry, under Lieutenant Dwight C. Cook, were put out of action by enemy shells. Reconnaissance patrols provided the most thrilling activity for the 313tli and 316th Infantry. The Boche was suspected of digging tank traps, machine gun emplacements, trenches, and all other styles of defensive fortifications, and detailed information was desired. Every night picked men, from the two regi- ments in the line, crept out into the perilous darkness of "No Man's land" to gain information of the enemy's locations and plans of defense, and, perhaps, to bump into an invisible foe. Through the constant and daring work of the scouts, the enemy was kept constantly worried and harassed, and valuable information of his positions obtained. Combat patrols, which covered the entire front, in- flicted severe casualties upon the German outposts and patrols which they en- countered. Several commendations were issued by the Division to patrol leaders during this period. One went to Corporal Edward T. Leary, Company "K", 313th Infantry, in charge of a liaison patrol on the right flank of his company. On the night of October 13 it was reported that the Germans intended a raid. The liaison patrol went out and was caught in a violent barrage, notwithstanding which Corporal Leary "continued through and kept up communication with the units on his right. "^^ One of the patrols, under Lieutenant Mowry E. Goetz, Regimental Intelligence Officer of the 316th Infantry,-^ on the night of October 16 "worked its way to a point about 300 meters north of the St-Hilaire-Doncourt road and remained in observation for two hours. "-^ It heard what it believed to be a narrow gauge railroad in operation, as well as a heavy drop forge or me- chanical unloading device to the east.-^ On this same night the Germans made an attempt to penetrate the line of the 313th Infantry and gain some information regarding the newcomers in the sector. The enemy selected a point on the observation line held by a half -platoon of "K" Company under command of Sergeant Gideon J. Jessup, who maintained his position during a preceding barrage.^^ The Boche, creeping forward through the night, were discovered by Private 1st cl Frederick J. Mehle, a sentinel in the farthest outpost. Private Mehle permitted the patrol to file past him and then opened fire with his automatic rifle, killing the patrol leader. ^^ Sergeant Jessup and his men also directed their fire on the spot and the Germans retreated in con- THE TROYON SECTOR 191 fusion.^^ One prisoner was taken. He was discovered in front of the outpost by Corporal James A. Waldron, wlio leaped out and subdued him.-- The prisoner was sent back to Captain Spencer Roberts, Division G-2 and tliere exanained. He said he was from the 1st Company, 82nd Regiment, 13th Division of Land- wehr, and had been a member of a patrol of sixteen men, under an acting officer, sent out at 23h 30 to find out if Fresnes-en-Woevre was occupied. The prisoner declared that the acting officer had been killed and that he had become detached from the patrol before he could retreat with it.-^ The front line regiments, under instructions of Field Order No. 22, dated October 16, were holding the observation line very lightly.-^ But one company was used in each of the four sub-sectors, about one-half of the company furnish- ing the advanced post (petit postes) and the other half constituting the "Grand Guards," or line of resistance for the outpost.^' The entire Division front was extended, beginning the night of October 17 and concluding the morning of October 19, under directions contained in Field Order No. 23, 79th Division, issued October 17.^ The new sector taken over (Thillot) lay adjacent to the original sector on the right, and had been occupied by the 13tli French Cuirassiers a Pieds, of the Second French Cavalry Division.-^ Under the Field Order, the Third Battalion, 316th Infantry, passed from support in the old iMassachusetts sector to the zone of observation in the Thillot sector, holding liaison witli the Second Battalion, 316th Infantry, to the north, and with the 39th French Division on the south. The relief in the zone of observation was completed on the night October 17-18, and on the next night the Third Battalion, 315th Infantry, marched in from Boque- mont, to the line of resistance.-' At the same time, the 312th Machine Gun Battalion relieved the 310th Machine Gun Battalion, which had been supporting the 316th Infantry. Companies "A" and "D" of the relieving battalion took over defensive positions in the line of observation with their platoons at Wadon- ville-en-Woevre, Saulx-en-Woevre, Avillers and Thillot-sous-les-Cotes, and Com- panies "B" and "C" occu])ied the line of resistance.^ The front of the Thillot sector was of about two kilometers, naaking the total Division frontage after October 18 about eleven kilometers. A platoon of "D" Company, 312th Machine Gun Battalion, had been es- tablished near Saulx-en-Woevre only a day when the Germans, on October 18, sent over a patrol of one officer and eight men, which ran into the advance ob- servation post at 50.9-54.45 and was stopped.^' Corporal Henry E. Cruse, of the Machine Gun Battalion, advanced in front of the line, "armed with a pistol only," and captured one of the raiders.''- This captive turned out to be a private of the 12th Company, 3rd Battalion, 51st Regiment, 35th Austro-Hungarian Division. He gave some interesting particulars regarding the German outpost line in the vicinity of St. Hilaire, and also said that his division had suffered severe casualties during the American drive on St. Mihiel, his own battalion receiving replacements consisting mainly of Roumanians.'' Confirmation of this latter fact came before dawn when two Roumanians, who had deserted, were picked up by the outposts and taken to the Intelligence Section where they said several others of their countrymen were waiting for a chance to do the same.'' 192 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION October 19 was quiet, that is, quiet for the Troyon sector. There was fre- quent shelling and some gas, but no untoward excitement until the morning of October 20 when the outpost companies of the 313th Infantry, on the left flank of the front, noted considerable activity within the German lines. A report of this was made and was embodied in the Summary of Intelligence of that day:'* "Judging from the increased activity of the enemy opposite Fresnes, it is the opinion of the officers of our units holding that sector that there are new troops opposite them who are endeav- oring to draw our fire in order to locate our positions. Presumed BocHE Prisoner who Deserted to oub Lines. This prisoner stated that he had heard rumors that the American Army fed its prisoners well, and that several of his friends were going to desert that night because of bad conditions in their regiment. enemy battle order from the extreme left to the extreme right of our sector: Unknown Division, 13th Landwehr Division (Fourth class); 24th Landwehr (?) Division (Fourth Class) 35th Austro- Hungarian Division." On the night of the 20th of October a heavy barrage was placed on the 313th Infantry front, but nothing further developed. The following morning, at 7h 30, a deserter from the 82nd Regiment, of the 13th Landwehr Division, surrendered to a front line platoon and identified a new unit in the hostile line as the 23rd THE TROYON SECTOR 193 Regiment of the 3rd Bavarian Division, which had hitherto been in reserve.^^ Shortly after noon on October '21 two German observation balloons went up in the vicinity of Darmont and Ville sur Yron,'* and uncertainty as to German purposes led to the issuance of Field Order No. 24, 79th Division, which directed the strengthening of the front line.'^ It stated:'' "From movements in the vicinity of Etain and further large movements on our enemy front, it would appear that the enemy is strengthening his sector in front of us. This is further con- firmed by possible registration fire on the sector on our left and by the entrance of a new regiment and possibly a division to the left of the Troyon sector." The First Battalion and the Machine Gun Company, of the 314tli Infantry, were ordered to Mouilly to report to the 157th Brigade as brigade reserve, and the Second Battalion to report to the 158tli Brigade as brigade reserve. The Third Battalion were directed to the cover of woods two and one-half kilometers east of Troyon. The First Battalion and Machine Gun Company, of the 315th Infantry, was instructed to march to Troyon and there receive further orders, and the Second Battalion to move to Woimbey as Division Reserve. '^ At 17h 20, Colonel Ross, Chief of Staff, despatched a courier to the loStli Brigade with the following message:'* "I want you to send me a motorcyclist who knows the way to your new post. There has been a large movement of troops no- ticed in this direction. We are going to bring up the other troojjs as soon as we can. The General says that your front line must hold." Both the 314th and the two battalions of the 315th were under way shortly before dark. The 314th arrived at its various battalion destinations between midnight and 2h, October 22.^1 The Sloth's two battalions, having less of a march, arrived in position before midnight.''^ The whole Division was on the "alert" but nothing of consequence happened save an unusually heavy shelling, during which a total of 1467 shells fell in the area.'^ Of it the Summary of In- telligence of the day says:''' "The artillery activity of the enemy showed a sharp increase during the night heavy shelling with both gas and H. E. was laid in our forward area." Under cover of this fire, the Germans sent out a single patrol in each brigade sector. The one on the south was reported fired on outside the wire at 53.0-53.1," while the one to the north ran into a half platoon of Company "L", 313th Infan- try, under Sergeant Cameron R. Butt, and was repulsed with casualties.-' That same night Private John Thompson, of Company "M", 313th Infantry, disting- uished himself by carrying messages between his Company P. C. and the buzzer station at Fresnes-en-Woevre, despite the shell fire.^' Before daybreak, when it was pretty well established that if there was un- usual movement in the German line, it simply meant a division was being re- lieved, Field Order No. 26, 79th Division, was issued.'^ It directed that "the troops who moved pursuant to Field Order No. 24 will be marched back to their 194 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Major General Joseph E. Kuux. THE TROYON SECTOR 195 original positions of rest. These movements will commence as soon as possible. "'' In comformity therewith, the 314th Infantry started the return trip at 13h 10 and reached Tilly and vicinity at about 22h 30.^' The 315th Infantry was back in its billets by noon of October 23." The most determined effort at raiding of the entire period was made by the Germans facing the 316th Infantry before dawn on the morning of October 23. From information later obtained, it was apparently a joint effort aimed simul- taneously at two points — Wadonville-en-Woevre and Doncourt-aux-Templiers, both in the outpost line of the observation zone. At Doncourt, Company "I", 316th Infantry, suspected something would happen from the fact that the wire 'entanglements around the post had been cut the night before. Lieutenant George I>. Bliss, commanding the platoon, left an ambush patrol ahead of the town and withdrew the balance to a safe distance. As expected, the Germans came over, opening their attack with hand grenades upon an empty post. They were en- filaded by the ambush patrol and the automatic rifles of the Americans killed four and wounded others, driving the patrol back in confusion.'^ The attack on Wadonville, launched at 5h, was a complete surprise. It was preceded by a heavy barrage of fifteen minutes duration. The platoon of "G" Company, 316th Infantry, on duty there, withdrew to dugouts to avoid the shell fire. Above the shelling they heard a cry, "Everybody out — Germans in the village — everybody out." The dugout door was thrown open and immediately hand grenades were thrown into the room, woimding thirteen men.'' The un- wounded Americans rushed for the door. The first man out was Private 1st cl John T. Campbell. He was immediately seized by two of the enemy. In a des- perate struggle Campbell freed himself,^" and his companions, swarming forth after him, "scattered the raiders like a cyclone. "'' One of the enemy was killed and one taken prisoner. The prisoner said that an Austrian had done the shout- ing and that the raiders were from the 51st Regiment, 35th Austrian Division. He gave the following detailed statement of the events leading up to the attack :*' "At 3h his entire company of about 85 men left their reserve position about 3 km. in rear of their front lines and proceeded to their line of outposts. At a signal of three shots the company started over their line for Wadonville. Two platoons of 18 to 25 men each were sent ahead and the prisoner followed them as liai- son agent. The prisoner further states that during their advance se^'eral of their raiding party were killed by their own barrage." This was the last attempt at patroling or raiding detected by the Seventy- ninth Division while in the area. The shelling, however, continued without abatement during October 23. That night, in the northern sector, the German artillery located a section of Company "D", 311th Machine Gun Battalion, at Fresnes-en-Woevre, and for a time it looked as if it would wipe out guns and men. One shell struck a liea\'y Browning and turned it completely around, but the gunner. Private Joseph C. Shemela, stuck with his piece bravely.'^ Later that night, a Boche mail carrier, of the 365th Regiment Musketeers, lost his way and entered the 313th's line by mistake, being captured with glee by the infantrymen on outpost.^- Other prisoners that day included four deserters from the 439th Regiment, 94th Division.^^ 196 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION In the meanwhile, on the morning of October 23, Division Headquarters at Troyon-sur-Meuse had received by courier Field Order No. 816, of the II Colonial Corps, announcing that the Seventy-ninth Division was to be relieved in the Troyon sector by the Thirty-third American Division, the relief to commence that night, and that the Seventy-ninth Division was to be assembled in the zone Dieue to be placed, after October 26, at the disposal of the First American Army.^ In compliance with this order. Field Order No. 26, 79th Division, of 12h, October 23, repeated the information for the benefit of the units and prescribed the methods for the relief.^ Lt. Colonel John A. McKenna and Staff of 315th Field Hospital. During the occupation of the sector the troops behind the line and in the zones of observation and resistance had been threatened by influenza as well as artillery fire and gas, but the fight against the disease, which was then extracting a large toll in all the armies, could not be as spectacular as the battle with the Boche. A warning of the danger was issued in G-1 Order No. 25, of October 14, which stated;^* "Influenza at the present time is pandemic. This disease is causing a very high mortality rate among our own troops and those of our allies. It is of importance, not only on account of its immediate effects, but also for the reason that it predisposes THE TROYON SECTOR 197 to, and is frequently followed by bronchitis, pneumonia and other respiratory complications. These complications have a very high mortality rate." The order further directed the company commanders to inspect each man in their commands at least once a day, to see that the living quarters were policed and kept clean, to keep close watch on shelters, food and clothing, and to report the first sign of a cold to a medical officer.^* With these precautions, the Division went through the epidemic with comparatively little sickness, although "most of the evacuations were cases of influenza and bronchitis. "^^ The period, as a whole, from a sanitary standpoint, was spoken of as one "very beneficial to the division."'" While in the Troyon sector, the Division was also occupied in strengthening the defensive positions. Each night working parties Avere sent forward to string wire and construct strong points. A continuous apron of wire entanglements was ordered placed fifty meters in front of the most advanced line. In rear of this the construction of strong points, comijletely protected by wire, was begun. The defensive system required also the preparation of machine-gun emplacements and a more elaborate trench system. These fortifications were laid along the ridge of hills, running from the village of St. JVI&urice-sous-les-Cotes northward to the town of Mesnil-sous-les-Cotes. The work for the most part was done by infantry details imder charge of officers, non-commissioned officers, or men of the 304th Engineers.^' The work was both hazardous and nerve-racking, particularly in front of the outpost line, as any noise might draw enemy shell fire. The in- numerable star shells, which the enemy sent up over "No-Man's Land", made the details crouch Iom' and remain motionless until the glare left the sky. In one instance, the Germans located an infantry detail thus engaged and shelled it heavily, wounding a number of the men, including three of the engineer scjuad, one of whom. Sergeant Stephen J. Hanrahan, of Company "E", 304th Engineers, died subsequently from his injuries.'" Another of the tasks of the Engineers while in this sector was the inevitable repairing of roads. Besides mud-scraping, filling in of holes and construction of culverts, there was considerable cjuarrying to be done and some salvaging of engineer' equipment.^' Likewise, a sawmill was organized and operated at Rupt-en-Woevre, and some topographical work was accomplished in connection with the utilization of the 60 c-m railroad which had been tied up with the cap- tured German system after the St. Mihiel drive.^' The relief by the Thirty-third Division was carried on in conformity with a table accompanying Field Order No. 26. Units of the relieving division began to reach the lines on the night of October 23, and during two subsequent nights all of the Seventy-ninth Division infantry regiments and machine gun battalions passed back into the two areas they had occupied prior to taking over the sector. While in the areas behind Troyon the Division received its replacements. These replacements, 2200 in number, had been waiting for some time to join the various units but had been held in isolation because of an epidemic of influenza and spinal meningitis in their midst. They were assigned to the regiments and battalions in proportionate numbers, and practically brought all elements up to prescribed war strength. Most of the men came from the far western and southern parts of the 198 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION 5)cv !3o(icii, nn> ficft bic T^ciitfAcn 4 3al)rc lan(\ bcfiaiivtct Iwttcu, umrbc in 27 8tuii6en lUMi bcii '■Hmcrifaucrn ciiiiU'iiommeii. ••••••a Ij^cDtu aui IJ, Scplt'Jiibci frn|). 390 DiiafcrfftUioiuctcr tpurbcii crobcvt. I>it 3i>|)l bci -(ScfiiUQfiuu ijcUfitU 15 000. Allied Propaganda Dropped fhom oue Aeroplanes into German Lines. It states that while the German army spent four years defending the St. Mibiel Salient, it took the American army only 27 hours to cut it off. THE TROYON SECTOR 199 United States and had had no infantry training whatever. Great numbers of them had never fired an army rifle. During the occupation of the Troyon sector there had lieen a number of changes in command. In the 313th Infantry, Colonel Sweezey had been evacuated with a high fever, following the strain of the Montfaucon campaign, and was suc- ceeded by Lieutenant Colonel AValter A. De Laniater, transferred from the Twenty- seventh Division. On October 15, however. Lieutenant Colonel DeLamater was transferred to Division Headquarters as G-1, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Moore, former G-1, assigned as regimental commander.'^ Finally, on October 26, Lieutenant Colonel Moore was transferred to Headquarters, First Army, being succeeded by Colonel William C. Rogers, former commander of Division Trains. ^^ In the S14th Infantry, Colonel Oury had returned to the command of his regiment with the re-establishment of the original brigade formation. Colonel Knowles also returned to the 315th Infantry on October 26, relinquishing the command of the 158th Brigade to Colonel George Williams, of the 316th Infantry.'^ The latter had assumed command of the 316th on October 20, succeeding Lieu- tenant Colonel Meador, who had commanded it after the evacuation of Colonel Charles.^ Lieutenant Colonel Barber had been promoted to Colonel and Divi- sion Engineer on October 16, retaining field command of the 304th Engineers.'*' vice Colonel James P. Jervay who had been transferred to the Chief of Engineer's Staff. Major Staurt S. Janney, of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion, had been transferred on October 26 to the 313th Infantry, and on October 31st was pro- moted to lieutenant colonel of that regiment. Major Samuel J. Taylor succeeded to the command of the machine gunners. The battle fatalities of the period from October 8 to October 27, when the last of the troops vacated Troyon, were small and confined chiefly to the four infantry regiments. Likewise, they were almost in all instances from shell fire. The losses by regiments of men killed in action or died of wounds, and the dates of the fatalities, were as follows; 313th Infantry Company "B" Company "F" Bugler Edwin A. Shaw, Oct. 21 Private 1st cl Elmer E. McAuley Oct. 12 Private Henry Thompason, Oct. 20 Company "G" Company "C" Sergeant Robt. B. Atkinson, Oct. 28 Private Abner W. Itnyre, Oct. 13 Corporal Wm. C. Stanton, Oct. 12 Company "D" Company "L" Sergeant Leroy J. BruflF, Oct. 27 Sergeant Adolfo Salvadori, Oct. 13 Private Joseph L. Moore, Oct. 20 Supply Company Company "E" Wagoner William Kelly, Oct. 28 Private Raymond G. Lewin, Oct. 12 314.th Infantry Company "A" Company "D" Private Paul A. Jordan, Oct. 18 Private Mario Galli, Oct. 24 Company "B" Supply Company Private Emmett H. Rhodes, Oct. 10 Private Charles M. Brophy, Oct. 25 200 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION 315th Infantry Company "A" Company "D" Corporal Angelo E. Crudele, Oct. 27 Corporal Stormonth Polock, Oct. 17 Privates William I. Deardorff, Oct. 25 Frank C. Richter, Oct. 24 Company "M" Private William A. Frey, Oct. 14 Company "C" Privates Guiseppe DiBenedetto, Oct. 28 Michael D. Vicchia, Oct. 17 316th Infantry Company "A" Company "F" Privates Isadore Friedman, Oct. 21 Private Joe E. McLaughlin, Oct. 10 William Hopkins, Oct. 23 Company "G" Company "B" Corporal Harry L. Yingling, Oct. 17 Private Frank A. Grogan, Oct. 23 Privates Jack Sarcona, Oct. 23 Alfonso Tramontano, Oct. 24 Camp des Moxthairons. Company "C" Privates Joseph A. Milano, Oct. 20 Peter E. Mooney, Oct. 21 George J. Wintz, Oct. 25 Company "D" Private 1st cl Vincent Stellar, Oct. 16 Private Walter F. Lawson, Oct. 17 Company "E" Privates Charles C. Catron, Oct. 23 Warren Fatzinger (?) Evert M. Jenkins, Oct. 27 Company "H" Private Joseph Fineberg, Oct. 23 Company "I" Privates William J. Sauer, Oct. 8 Albert A. Turkan, Oct. 22 Company "K" Corporal Ira J. Lannen, Oct. 15 M. G. Co... Cook Elmer Brough The 314th Infantry, with battalions at Ranzieres, Tilly-sur-Meuse and Re- court, all in the reserve area, was the first to start for the zone Dieue. By 22h 30 on October 24, the entire regiment, after an eleven kilometer hike northward, had reached Sommedieue, three kilometers east of the Meuse, where it occupied billets that "were filthy."** In view of the fact that it was expecting to move on THE TROYON SECTOR 201 Tvithout much delay, "no orders were given to clean them."*' The 31oth Infantry, which had been assembled during October '-2(5 at Camp Monthairons," swung out on a long northward hike at 18h that day, swerving slightly to the westward of the ^Nleuse, and at dawn entered the woods around Fromereville, which lay five kilometers due west of ^'erdun.*" From Camp Monthairons the same evening of October 26, the 316th Infantry also started on a long march which brought it after midnight into the amazing pile of ruins which once was Verdun. The 316th, with mingled feelings of awe, passed through the streets of the town where France had bled in answer to Petain's immortal words, "They shall not pass." The historian of the 316th Infantry thus describes Verdun as it appeared to the men of his regiment on that memorable night :^" UivibiuN Headquarters Dieue-sur Meuse Oct. 26-29, 1918. "Hushed — save for the clattering of hobnails on ringing cob- bles, the boom of a vagrant cannon, the crash of an occasional shell, and the solemn striking of the hour in the battered cathedral, invisible in the dark. Slowly the column wound its way between gaping houses, and all the usual grimness of a ruined city, past the still upright Hotel de Ville, and on into the massive citadel, the sheltered galleries and sturdy walls of which gave an unac- customed sense of security to men inured to shell-holes and de- ceptive dugouts. Once within, Verdun was no longer a "Holy of Hohes," but a place in which to stretch out and sleep." The final infantry regiment, the 313th, left Genicourt and les Monthairons on the afternoon of October 27 and, before dawn of October 28, also found billets 202 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION within the citadel of the heroic city on the Meuse.*^ Likewise, the ShZih and 311th Machine Gun Battalions had been sent to Verdun, arriving on October 26 and 27, but the former pushed on, after only a night in the citadel, to the Bois de Forges, on the west bank of the Meuse opposite Consenvoye and went into bivouac there on the morning of October 28.'^^ That morning also two battalions of the 316th Infantry encamped in the Bois de Forges after a night's march, one battalion remaining for a day in Verdun. The 310th Machine Gun Battalion, which had been bivouacking for several days at Rattentout, in the area beliindTroyon, marched on October 27 and reached the Bois de Forges on the night of October 28. ^^ Of the other Division units, the 304th Engineers had proceeded to Haudainville and Belleray, in the zone Dieue, arriving October ilo;^' the 304th Supi^ly Train had established headquarters at Dugny, five kilometers south of Verdun, on October 25;^^ the three companies of the 304th Ammunition Train had gone to Bois Sec Main Street of Dugnt, our kail head during the Grande-Montagne Battle and Dugny on October 25;*^ the 304th Field Signal Battalion to Dugny," and the 304th Sanitary Train to Ancemont. Division Headquarters had left Troyon-sur-Meuse at 7h, October 26, and reached Dieue-sur-Meuse that same day at lOh, the Division P. C. being at once set up.^ Dieue-sur-Meuse was directly across the river from Ancemont. As a result of all these movements, the Division, during October 26-28, was more widely scattered than it had been at any prior time in its history, barring, of course, the trip overseas. It was not to be so for long, however, as, at 16h, October 27, Field Order No. 28 was issued from Dieue-sur-]\Ieuse, announcing that on the nights of October 28 and 29, the Seventy-ninth Division would relieve the Twenty- ninth American Division in the sector Grande ]\Iontagne, "which is to the east of the Meuse, and N. E. of Brabant-sur-Meuse," and that later a portion of the Twenty-sixth American Division sector would be taken over.^' This time the Seventy-ninth Division knew it was again headed for action. CHAPTER VII THE MEUSE-ARGONNE— THIRD PHASE La Borne de Cornouiller (Hill 378) BETWEEN the time the Seventy-ninth Division left the INIeuse-Argonne front on September 30 until it received word on October '27 to re-enter the vast offensive, a great change had been wrought in the extended battle- line from the North Sea to Verdun. Ludendorff, beaten on every front by Amer- icans, British, French and Belgians, was attempting to withdraw his armies from Northern France and Flanders and fall back as deliberately as possible to suc- cessive positions, hoping thus "to keep the Allied armies out of Germany at least until the spring."' His plan was a slow retirement to the Meuse River, along the line of which, from Verdun on northward, he hojjed to make "a prolonged stand. "^ This monster retreat had begun to the far northwest — from the Belgian coast and Flanders — in the first week of October,- and by the middle of the month the enemy was falling back rai)idly honi the British front to Rheims.^ But, coupled with this extensive withdrawal, it was imperative for its success that the First American Army should be frustrated in its dash to close the neck of tlie bottle before the northern territory could be evacuated.^ Hence, from the very beginning, there was no thought of retreat from the Kriemhilde-Stcllung line, and the First American Army was compelled "to fight hard for every yard of ground."' Despite the resistance, the Americans had been successful on the entire front from Verdun to the Argonne. The second phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, opening on October 4, had seen the Argonne cleared, the Kriemhilde-Stellung line broken in the centre by October 14,* and a total advance of twenty-one kilo- meters effected by October 27.* The objective was still the Carignan-Sedan- Mezieres Railroad to the north,' while the enemj', swinging back from the terri- tory he had occupied for four years, was carrying on a vast hinge-like movement which pivoted on the strong hill positions centering on la Borne de Cornouiller. three kilometers east of the Meuse and nineteen kilometers north of Verdun.* "East of the Meuse," says General Pershing in his final report, "the dominating heights not only protected his, the enemy's, left, but gave him positions from which powerful artillery could deliver an oljlique fire on the western bank."^ The ef- fectiveness of that fire, first demonstrated on the second day of the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne,'" had been practically continuous from then on, the First Army Divisions on the immediate western bank of the Meuse, particularly, hav- ing been subjected to it during every foot of their advance. As the offensive continued northward, there was immediate realization of "the murderous handi- (203) 204 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION cap of a force advancing on exposed slopes on one bank of a river, with its flank at right angles to the other bank held by the enemy far back of its reserves. "'' The result was the opening, on October 8, of a new operation having a dual pur- pose — to drive the enemy from the commanding heights and to "force him to use troops there and weaken his tenacious hold on the front west of the Meuse."* The operations were entrusted to a French Corps, with a French commander. Major General Claudel, but part of the First American Army, and with two American divisions, the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-third, participating in the initial stages.'^ The attack was launched "against the exact point upon which the German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from northern France."* From then on developed "a separate battle, so influential in the fortunes of the main battle, which has never received its share of credit."" The Germans held a system of hills extending from the line of the old forts of Verdun, east of Saniogn ■ eux, on the Meuse, clear north to la Borne de Cornouiller and beyond. It 304 ENGINEERS! The now familiar Type of Trench in the Region of Verdun. formed "the walls of a bowl, which the French Corps, the 'XVII', in a fan-shaped movement was to ascend."" On the morning of October 8, the Twenty-ninth Division leaped forward to the attack, as the westernmost of the XVII Corps, and with the Eighteenth French Division on its right and the Twenty-sixth French Division as the eastern flank. The Twenty-ninth Division struck due north, the Eighteenth French north by east, and the Twenty-sixth French east by north. At the same time, the Thirty-third American Division, on the west bank of the Meuse, crossed the stream at Forges, north of Samogneux, and joined up with the Twenty-ninth on the west.'^ With that movement, the Thirty-third Divi- sion passed to the French Corps." Both American divisions made an advance of three miles and then dug in to allow the divisions on the right to come up.^^ On October 10 the Corps made a desperate attempt to capture Sivry-sur-Meuse, five kilometers further up the stream, and storm la Borne de Cornouiller, and came within a mile of the objectives before being stopped." The cost of the attack had been terrific." From then on, the Thirty-third Division, which had been LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLER (HILL 378) 205 engaged in constant fighting since September 26, made no more efforts to advance, holding its positions until relieved on October 21 by the Fifteenth French Divi- sion.'' Thence it passed back to the zone Dieue, eventually to relieve the Seventy- ninth Division in the Troyon sector. Local operations by the Twenty-ninth Division, from October 10 to 12, enlarged its holdings somewhat to the north-east, and on October 15 and 16 progress was made across MoUeville Farm and into the lower part of the Bois de la Grande Montague.'^ The Twenty-sixth American Division entered the line on the right of the Twenty-ninth on October 23, reliev- ing the Eighteenth French Division, and an attack on October 24 brought the Twenty-ninth to the Etraye ridge, on the eastern side of its sector, and took the The CoNSENvoYK-EiKAi t. ui/.u) aiju;\u uurii Liih VLiiii Division relieved the fkdnt unit;* OF THE 29th Division— Oct. 28-29, 1918. Twenty-sixth into Belleu Bois.^'' This woodland stronghold was twice taken and then evacuated because of the terrible shell fire, and, on October 26, after two days of sanguine fighting, the Yankee Division was not yet in full possession of it.^' Since October 8, the XVII French Corps had broken through the Brabant- Stellung, Hagen-Stellung and Volker-Stellung lines for a distance of eight kilo- meters east of the Meuse, and was now facing the strongest defenses of all — the Etzel-Stellung and Kriemhilde-Stellung lines, consisting of a continuous band of resistance five kilometers in depth. -^ Such was the situation east of the Meuse on October 27, when Field Order No. 28, 79th Division, announced that the Seventy-ninth was to relieve the Twenty-ninth Division with the 158th Infantry Brigade on the night of October 206 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION 28-29.-' The XVII French Corps had calcidated the rehef with care, the move- ments prehminary thereto liaving lieen worked out with the order of October 22, which had ordered the Division from Troyon to be "within the 26th October 12h, at the disposition of the First Army, IT. S."" Under the Corps' plan, an indication of which was given in a confident'al memorandum to Seventy-ninth Division Headciuarters on October 24,^^ the 157tli Infantry Brigade was to reheve the left brigade of the Twenty-sixth American Division, enabling this latter bri- gade, in turn, to relieve the Twenty-sixth French Division by extending its front further to the south. ^^ The operations then under way by the Yankee Division in Belleu Bois prevented the entire relief from being carried on at one time. Con- Ox THE WAY UP TO OUR NEW POSITIONS Wl. I A-,-1,1-' lilt ijLb THE\. H SYSTEMS OF THE VeRDUN SaLIENT. sequently. General Order No. 842, "XVII" Corps, the document upon which Field Order No. 28, 79th Division, was based, said:^^ "One Brigade of the 79th Division (158th Brigade) will re- lieve, during the nights from the 28th to the 29th and from the 29th to the 30th, the six battalions of the 29th Division in first line and in support in the present Divisional Sector. The other Brigade, 157th, will be pushed as Division Reserve in the region Brabant (where the P. C. of Brigade, of one regiment and of the Army Corps will be located). Bois de Forges wood (head- ciuarters of one regiment and three battalions.) The going in line of a part of the elements of that Brigade in the northern por- tion of the present sector of the 26th Division, A. E. F., will be settled in a later order." LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLER (HILL 378) 207 Aeroplane oblique view of Consenvote taken Sept. 17. 1918, while the Boche were still in the ^^ll.4ge. 208 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION On October 27, after a bitter struggle, the Yankee Division completed the conquest of most of Belleu Bois, an achievement announced by a secret memoran- dum. No. 738 s-3, "XVII" Corps, which pointed out that "to avoid a relief in the midst of the reaction occasioned by the attack, it seems prudent to postpone the attack on Ormont woods by some days" and the attack "will be made by the 79th Division infantry."^' The same day. Secret Order No. 740 s-3 was sent by Corps to the Seventy-ninth Division, ordering the 157th Brigade to take over the sector "in the region Bois Belleu-Bois d'Ormont," on the night of October 31- November 1.°' Field Order No. 30, 79th Division, developed from the Corps order just mentioned, was issued October 30,^^ at a time when the first stage of the relief by the 158th Brigade had been completed. Street in 15kabant-Sur-Meuse wheke Our Axial Road lekt the Meuse and led us up OVER THE Hill into the Open and into Direct Sight of the Enemy. OflBcers of the 316th Infantry had gone forth from the Bois de Forges on the afternoon of October 28 to reconnoiter the sector to be taken over,^" and that evening the regiment filed out, heading northwest to Gercourt and then swerving due east to the Meuse, opposite Consenvoye. From the highlands to the north- east the German heavies were dropping shells dangerously near a long wooden bridge that led over the stream. The 316th crossed, met guides in the ruins of Consenvoye, went stumbling up a dark road between firing batteries, felt the earth shuddering to the enemy high explosives, groped its way off the road and into a woods and found its positions, taking over a sector 1,800 meters in length^' (sub-sector Blue).^' That same night Companies "C" and "D", 312th Machine Gun Battalion, moved out from the Bois de Forges and followed the 316th, re- lieving Twenty-ninth Division machine gun units in sub-sector Blue, gun for gun.'* LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLER (HILL 378) '209 The Brabant-Etraye Road — The south edge of Consewoye Woods still under intense shell fire. Box Barrage, evening of Oct. 30, 1918, on the edge of Bois de Consenvoye. Note del.\yed TRAFFIC AND OUR GUNS UNDER CAMOUPIAGE ON THE RIDGE 210 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION On the next morning, October 29, oflBcers of the 315th Infantry reconnoitered the new sector, the regiment having marched from Fromereville to the Bois de Forges on the night of October 28-29.'^ That night the balance of the rehef was carried out. The 315th marched into position by a different route, crossing the Meuse on a narrow footbridge to Brabant, and thence northeastward over a wind- ing road to the Bois de Consenvoye. It was after midnight before it had com- pleted the taking over of sub-sector Gray, lying to the right of that of the 316th. '^ The same night the remaining two companies of the 312th Machine Gun Battal- ion ("A" and "B") also left the Bois de Forges, "A" Company going into a re- serve position 500 meters south of Brabant, on the Brabant-Samogneux road, and "B" Company, leaving six guns in reserve at Brabant, following the 315th up through the Bois de Consenvoye to take over a position in the Bois d'Etraye.'^ The 158th Brigade Headquarters were established at 24.6-79.3, about three kilo- meters due south of the centre of the front line of the brigade sector,'^ and there, on the morning of October 30, reported to the new brigade commander. Brigadier General Evan M. Johnson,^^ upon whose arrival Colonel George Williams returned to the 316th Infantry. The relief had been completed in scheduled time. Meanwhile, in conformity to the tables of movem.ents for the 157th Brigade, as contained in Field Order No. 28, the 314th Infantry had started north from the region of Sommedieue on the evening of October 28, continuing by long stages ' until, between 23h, October 29, and Ih, October 30, the three battalions had reached the Bois de Forges.^' The 313th Infantry, on October 29, moved out from Verdun and occupied French camps in three woods a short distance north of the city, remaining there until the night of October 30.^ The advance echelon of Division Headquarters, moving forward from Dieue- sur-Meuse, was established at Vacherauville, seven kilometers north of Verdun and on the east bank of the Meuse, at 8h, October 29, while the rear echelon moved north from Dieue-sur-Meuse to Dugny.^' Twenty-four horn's later, at 8h, October 30, General Kuhn ofBcially took over the command of the fornier Twenty-ninth Division sector,^^ issuing Field Order No. 30, and the next night the 157th Bri- gade proceeded to the relief of the northern sector of the Twenty-sixth Division, as prescribed, the Brigade P. C. being established at 26.0-76.7, a half kilometer northeast of Samogneux.^^ The 314th Infantry, marching from the Bois de Forges, crossed the Meuse and continued on a five hour hike, finally taking over the north- ern part of the assigned sector from Belleu Bois to Bois des Chenes,^" while the 313th proceeded north along the Meuse from the vicinity of Verdun to the Cote de Roches, north of Samogneux, where one battalion went into the line in the Bois d'Ormont.^' The 311th Machine Gun Battalion had left Bois Bourrus on the night of October 30 and had crossed the Meuse into the Cote de Roches where, the next night, Company "C" took over a front line position in the Bois des Chenes, the remaining companies staying for the time being on the Cote de Roches.*^ The relief by the 157th Brigade also had been completed "per schedule." The Corps Order of October 26 had provided that "all the miscellaneous elements of the 79th Division; such as Sanitary Train, Field Signal Battalion, Supply Train, etc., will couple themselves fiirst with the similar elements of the 29th Di^asion."''^ The whole movement was carried out in a systematic and LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLER (HILL 378) 211 VaIIIERAVVILLE, a miNEU \ ILLACE THAT HAD HEEV IN' \o-Man's LaN'D, USED AS DIVISION' P.C. ()c TciHEI! ;il TO De( EMBER '2fi. 1H18. French pontoon bridge across the Meuse connecting Regnenille and Samogneux. 212 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Charnt, a buined town, 7 Kilometers north of Verdun', used as a Regulating Station. satisfactory manner. The 304th Supply Train estabHshed an advance Regulating Station at Charny, a little over a kilometer south of Division P. C, but on the opposite shore of the Meuse, on October 28, the purpose being to fill the gap in liaison between the distributing points along the axial road from Samogneux to Brabant and the railhead at Dugny; to furnish hot food to all passing the point; to furnish emergency spare parts for vehicles; and to furnish medical first aid in case of necessity. ^^ The results "attained in traffic control through the medium of the Regulating Station were very gratifying. "^^ The 304th Engineers, leaving Haudainville and Belleray on the evening of October 28, reached Thierville, west of the Meuse and north of Verdun, before dawn of October 29. That evening the Second Battalion continued north, taking up position on the west shore of the river between Cumieres and Regneville, while the First Battalion, after spending twenty-four more hours in Thierville, finally ENGINEERS The Meuse Valley in Winter, near Regnevtlle. LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLER (HILL 378) 213 The Mecse River road just soi'th ■< a it a 00 a: «> o o o fe 1 K a (- ■H g3 OT g;S > g § o o a n 1 a Be« « g o S : Ch 1 n a o ■< Q O ^ o 5 M ^ S U B IB O o b "1 a < a § Z «! ce (0 o pa 218 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION and to the American soldier as "Corn Willie Hill," guarded the valley roads lead- ing eastward to the plains of the Woevre and the German camps at Etraye, Re- ville and Ecurey, where the enemy had great numbers of troops, besides their railheads for supplies containing vast stores of material. It was a ridge or hog back, high and with a commanding elevation. Directly in front, the Meuse River made one of its characteristic bends and the ridge was so located that it gave a commanding sweep of the Meuse Valley, both up and down stream, for many kilometers. On account of these natural characteristics or advantages, the Ger- mans had thoroughly organized the hill and placed behind it their major heavy artillery. It was unquestionably the most important position and the center of the enemy artillery resistance east of the Meuse. From this commanding artil- lery position came most of the devastating flanking long range fire which was proving, and had from the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne proven, so disastrous to the advancing Divisions on the west. To the 158th Brigade fell the task of reducing la Borne de Cornouiller, while the 157th Brigade waited to participate in the drive for the Woevre plains when the hill was gained. The result was two distinct phases of the operation in la Grande Montague, as the region was known, and these operations must be treated separately. Leaving the 157th Brigade, then, with its lines established from north- west to southeast between Belleu Bois and the Bois d'Ormont, the description from now to the end of the chapter concerns entirely the northern thrust of Briga- dier General Johnson's command. The 158th Infantry Brigade, on the nights October 28-29 and 29-30, had taken over the most difficult front line ever assigned to it. The 316th Infantry, occupying the left sub-sector, held its frontal position on the northern outskirts of the Bois Plat Chene to the west and the southern outskirts of the Bois de la Grande Montague to the east. In front of it, on the extreme west was the upper end of a ravine, Vaux de Mille Mais, a branch of which, the Ravine de Moyement, jutted down into the regimental line. From the ravine the ground rose rapidly along the front, eastward, in a series of ridges until it culminated in Hill 370 on the regiment's right front. Further ahead was visible the bald, rounded top of la Borne de Cornouiller, bare of trees or underbrush, and beyond it the dominating Haramount ridge, a full three kilometers away. The lines of the 316th were "merely small holes scooped in the ground, sheltered from observation by brush and leaves."^' Former German dugouts, with their fronts facing the enemy line, formed the shelter for those in support." A road, which cut down through the sub-sector near the center, intersected the Consenvoye-Etraye road several hun- dred yards behind the front, and near the cross-roads the regimental P. C. was established." On the right of the 316th, the 315th Infantry took over a sub- sector, which was in the shape of an inverted "V." Its western flank held liaison with the 316th in the lower edges of the Bois de la Grande Montague. From that point it ran gradually northeast into the Bois d'Etraye and then turned sharply south by east across an open space facing the Bois de Wavrille and culminated at the edge of Belleu Bois. Behind its western flank lay another clearing, Molle- ville Farm, the old farmhouse in the depth of a ravine being a mass of ruins. The regimental P. C. was established on the Brabant-Etraye road, west of the farm.^^ LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLER (HILL 378) 219 BocHE Concrete Shelter along road through Bois db Consenvote, near upper end of De.\th Valley and MoLLE\^LLE Fme. BoCHE NARROW GAUGE RAILROAD AT MoLLEVILLE FaRM BLOWN INTO ARCH BY FORCE OF SHELL EXPLOSION. 220 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION On taking over its sector each infantry regiment placed two battalions in the front line and one battalion in support. The first two days were used almost ex- clusively in strengthening the positions by establishing strongpoints surrounded by barbed wire entanglements and linking up all positions by a comprehensive system of telephone wires connecting battalions with regiments and reginents in turn with the Brigade P. C, this work being directed by First Lieutenant H. W. Webbe, of the 304th Field Signal Battalion, attached as signal officer to the 158tb Infantry Brigade. Throughout, both regiments suffered heavily from shell fire. The Germans had every point on the front registered and could find them day or night, the result being that the high explosives and shrapnel wrought havoc with ration BocHB Machi:«; Gnx Nest axd Observation* i.v Bois de Consen'\'ote near .\dvaxce P. C. OF the 158th I.mfantky Brigade. details, working parties and liaison groups, while the constant use of gas shells made it necessary for the men to be masked most of the time. The greatest courage was evidenced by the men of both regiments and of the signal battalion groups detailed with them in maintaining the telephone wires. The heavy shelling was constantly knocking out connections, and the vital need of repairing them at once necessitated going out into the heart of a hostile barrage and working with shells bursting on all sides. The runners who traversed the shrapnel torn woods between the outposts and the company P. C.'s and battalion headquarters, dared death constantly to deliver messages, while heroic ration groups mounted the roads and penetrated to the frontal positions with food and water, performing with unequalled bravery in the face of terrible hazards. The LA BORNE DE COENOUILLER (HILL 378) 221 Distinguished Ser\'ice Cross was awarded to a few of these men and many were cited in Division orders. Instances of what they did are the best illustrations of the daily and nightly horror of shell fire through the sector. Sergeant Bernard F. Sweeney, Jr., Headquarters Company, 315th Infantry, on the night of Oc- tober 31 made a dozen trips to repair telephone wire broken by the shelling, and was wounded the following morning while performing the same work.^'' On No- vember 1, Private Eugene G. Watkins, Company "K", 315th Infantry, was mor- tally wounded »vhile acting as a runner between battalion and regimental head- quarters, but continued and "covered a distance of approximately 300 meters to deliver his message." He died a few minutes after reaching his destination." Supply Sergeant William K. Dieste, Company "B", 312th Machine Gun Battal- ion, on the night of October 30, led a ration detail through extremely heavy fire, showing "the greatest personal courage and coolness," and on the return trip, after all of his detail had passed the exposed Molleville Farm ravine in safety, he, the last man, was struck and instantly killed by a fragment of high explosive.** Finally, on November 2, "owing to the intense shell fire to which the front line troops were continually subjected," each regiment withdrew a battalion from the line and the remaining battalion extended its front to include the entire regi- mental sector.'^ The First Battalion, 316th Infantry, under Major Harry D. Parkin,*' and the First Battalion, 315th Infantry, under Major Ward W. Pierson, recently promoted from Captain,*^ were the front line units. The "killed inaction" and "died of wounds" in the 158th Brigade during the period from October 29 to November 2 — the pre-oflensive period — were as follows : 315th Infantry Company "A" Company "I" Corporal Vincent Byrne Privates Raymond Bolte Stephen Michalski Company "B" Private David Gollmer Company "K" Private Eugene A. Watkins Company "D" Private Stephen Esterly Company "L" Corporal William B. Hughes Company "E" Privates Charles P. Reichert Privates Harry F. Diamond Jesse Wooten Pietro Merola Headquarters Company Company "F" Private 1st cl Charles A. Keating Corporal Mitchell Sargen Private Joseph Haines Private John W. Manning Machine Gun Company Company "G" Private Gioacchino Spagnuolo Corporal William M. Smith Private Richard B. Ward Supply Company Wagoner Theodore Carro 222 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION 316th Infantry Company "B" Private Michelangelo Apolito Company "C" Corporal Arthur J. Murphy Pvt. 1st cl Lawrence W. Seiberlich Privates Emil C. Bendixen William Goldman Albert D. Lowrv Harry E. R. Otto Company "D" Privates Meyer Hodes Jay M. Jackson Jacob M. Lizeski Company "E" Private Samuel Rosenthal Company "F" Private Abraham Silver Company "G" Pvt. 1st cl Frank E. Painter Private Ciro Puorto Company "I" Pvt. 1st cl Charles R. Kohler Privates James M. McLevy John R. Scheppman Company "K" Privates Francis A. Carlson Venerando Ragaglia Company "L" Private Frederick W. Sonksen Company "M" Private C. 01 sen Headquarters Companj' Private Ernest C. Neuratli 312th Machine Gun Battalion Company "D" Corporal Russell S. Tomlinson Private Andrew A. Ziegler Company "B" Supply Sgt. William K. Dieste Private Martin J. Marvel Company "C" Private Blaine B. Boggs On October 31, the "XVII" Corps had issued a warning order, purposing to put the Corps in a situation to pursue the enemy, thus:^' "At present, as the result of the actions carried on since the 8th of October, the Army Corps found itself encompassed in the difficult region of the heights of the Meuse. It is necessary to prepare our disposition so that when the order is given the ad- vance can be instantly undertaken in the region situated between the line Loison-Orne and the foot of the heights." This order apparently was based upon the assumption that la Borne de Cornouiller and the other strongholds would be taken without much delay, as otherwise a pursuit, as contemplated, could not be attempted. Se\'eral patrols from the 158th Infantry Brigade, between October 30 and November 2, however, gave no indication that the enemy was in retirement from the ]VIeuse hills, although bringing back valuable information regarding hostile positions. The patrols were successful in their missions, — one, on the night of October 30, led by Lieutenant Harry S. Gabriel, of the 316th Infantry, reporting enemy wiring in tlie ravine leading to hill 378.^'* That same night Second Lieutenant Elton B. McCowan, of the 315th Infantry, made a solitary reconnaissance in order to find distinguish- ing marks and papers on a German who had been killed between the lines during the day, and returned with some valuable documents.^" German patrols had LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLES (HILL 378) 293 been uniformly unsuccessful during the period, elements of the 316th repulsing two and capturing two prisoners who were found to be members of the 48th Regi- ment, 228th Division. 58 Upon the belief that the enemy should be withdrawing from the Meuse line south of Dun-sur-Meuse, the Corps, on November 2, issued Special Order No. 19, directing that strong reconnaissance patrols be sent out by the 15th French Division and the 158th Brigade.^' In pursuance of the order, G-3 Order No. 7, 79th Division, was drawn up the same day and provided that the 158th Brigade should test the strength of the enemy on la Borne de Cornouiller and at two points on the ridge to the east.^^ The reconnaissance was given over to the 316th Infan- try. On the night of November 2-3 these three patrols, consisting of two platoons each, drawn from the companies of the Second Battalion with a section of heavy 1st Aid Station. 316th Inpaxtry — formerly Boche Dugout — Bois de Consenvoye Nov. 3rd to 6th, 1918. Over 600 wounded men passed through this station in 24 hours Nov. 4th and 5th, 1918. (note direct hit by Boche H. E. made while the shelter was filled with American wounded.) Brownings from Company "C", 312th Machine Gun Battalion attached, were formed up in the reserve line, while three other platoons, each having a 37mm gun, were assigned to act as a support and follow at 200 meters. The whole was directed by Captain Paul D. Strong, acting Second Battalion Commander, from a tiny shelter, well to the front. Artillery preparation was arranged for by a con- centration of 155's at sensitive points, as well as a standing and protecting bar- rage by the regiment of 75 's attached to the 158th Brigade, and a rolling barrage to precede the advance of the platoon on the left, moving at the rate of 100 meters in six minutes.*^ In moving into the line for the jump off, the platoons were subjected to in- tense shell fire and gas, and one of them was caught in a box barrage near the 224 HISTORY OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH DIVISION Second Battalion P. C. and sustained many casualties, thirty men alone being^ gassed.*' Two men, Mechanic Moses S. Yerger, Company "G", and Private 1st cl Nicholas C. Rosa, Company "F", rushed fearlessly to the spot and as- sisted in their prompt evacuation. Mechanic Yerger being killed.'^ When the combat patrols were finally in position, the preliminary artillery fire began at 5h 30 on the morning of November 3, and at 6h the three columns started for their given destinations. The right group, under Lieutenant Frank A. Ste- vens, took a northeasterly course through a dense woods to a point north of the line held by the 315th Infantry, and was there held up by an impenetrable tangle of underbrush, where, after suffering heavy casualties, it was forced to withdraw to the shoulder of Hill 370. The central group, under Lieutenant Harry S. Gab- riel, moved into the thick woods to the east of la Borne de Cornouiller, heading for Cote 320 and the ultimate objective. Hill 370, beyond. It encountered stern resistance from German machine guns before it had gone 100 yards. Corporal Israel Greenberg, with three volunteers, advanced ahead of the platoon and cap- tured one nest, putting twelve Germans to flight.** A little later a squad headed by Corporal Thomas Deysher confronted another nest and found themselves with a ravine saturated with chlorine gas between them and the enemy. Of his achieve- ment, a Division citation states:*^ "Either he must give up the patrol and not advance because to advance was impossible with gas masks; or he must take the masks off. Corporal Deysher chose the latter alternative and advanced with his squad, captured the machine gun nest and voluntarily paid the penalty with all his squad by being severely gassed." By lOh the middle platoon had reached its second objective, having advanced 1200 meters and captured six machine gun nests. Its casualties, however, had been heavy, the second in command. Lieutenant Rudolph E. Peterson, having been killed while on the left flank. Lieutenant Gabriel then drew back to re- organize and, after two more attacks, in each of which prisoners were taken and machine guns subdued, it became apparent that the enemy was closing in through the underbrush. Finally, in the middle of the afternoon. Lieutenant Gabriel took what was left of his column toward the left and reinforced the platoon ou that side. The platoon on the left, under Captain Francis D. Johnson and Lieutenant. Ira D. Lady, had jumped off at 6h, headed straight for la Borne de Cornouiller. Within a short time Captain Johnson was killed while heroically leading his men,, and a little later Lieutenant Lady was mortally wounded.*' Sergeant Evin C. Miller was killed while gallantly rallying the platoon,** and Sergeants Adam. Matlawski and, Oscar O. Grip,** the remaining non-coms, rallied the men and held them in line until Lieutenant Harold B. Alston, of the 312th Machine Gua Battalion, who commanded the three sections of "C" Company, that battalion, could assume command.*^ The description of what then ensued can be gained from Lieutenant Alston's own story, which is as follows: "Nothing better indicates the strength of the enemy defenses in this sector than the fact that during the first four or five hours LA BORNE DE CORNOUILLER (HILL 378) i-25 Our wounded being evacuated from the First Aid Station on their first lap of the long, LONG JOURNEY TO THE RE.\H. ThEY ARE MEN OF THE 316tH InFANTRY WOUNDED IN THE FIRST ATTA